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Subjective, Not Objective, Truths

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> 'Truth can never be told so as to be understood, and not be believed.'
>
> WILLIAM BLAKE

SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE TRUTHS

The first move, the starting point of Kierkegaard's religious epistemology, is that truth is a function of subjectivity meaning thereby that the crucial concern of the knower about the truth is the knower's relationship to truth. Kierkegaard was not concerned with the theory of knowledge as such, but his basic inquiry was: What is the good of purely objective truth if it is not appropriated into the life of the knower?
He writes in his *Journals*:

> What I really lack is to be clear in my mind *what I am to do,* not *what I am to know,* except in so far as a certain understanding must precede every action . . . the thing is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the *idea for which I can live and die.*[1]

The questions to be considered in the light of subjective *vis-à-vis* objective truth are:

> What can so-called objective truth provide? What would be the use of discovering the so-called objective truth, of working through all the systems of philosophy . . . to construct a *world in which I do not live,* but only hold up for the view of others.. . . I am left standing like a man who has rented a house and gathered all the furniture and household things together, but has not yet found the beloved with whom to share the joys and sorrows of his life.[2]

Ordinarily, the term 'subject' in philosophy means the *knower,* and 'subjectivity' would, thus, mean the nature or the state of the *knower.* But in Kierkegaard's view, subjectivity does not mean this abstract nature or the state of the knower; rather it means the *self-consciously existing concrete subject, the individual.* Again, subjectivity for Kierkegaard is not

ntrospection of inner mental states like memory, imagination, etc. for, such an introspection is also a kind of objective attitude with the difference that the objects perceived in these cases are internal. Subjectivity consists in concentrating and intensifying one's life's ideals. Kierkegaard's subject is not a cognitive entity, but an ethico-religious category.

The heart of Kierkegaard's philosophical work rests in his *Philosophical Fragments* and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, which are connected with the common pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, who would henceforth be referred to as Climacus. Both these books are polemically directed against speculative philosophy of Hegel, the dominant philosophy of his day. Climacus' revolt was against Hegel's basic tenets:

(1) Truth is a comprehensive whole, meaning that no truth is obtainable apart from a completely coherent system, which in turn means that no individual could attain the truth.
(2) Truth as objective, meaning that truth by definition is independent of the individual's relationship to it. Hegel termed it the scientific study of the reality.

Climacus demonstrates that, in both the above positions held by Hegel, the individual is eliminated from the knowing process by doing away with the need for commitment on the knower's part. Hegel is said to have raised philosophy to the level of 'science' by making it systematic. Hence, in the universe of the Hegelian discourse 'philosophy,' 'system,' and 'science' are considered synonyms.

Kierkegaard's position is exactly the reverse of that of Hegel's. Hence Climacus expresses his opinion clearly by designating one of his books as 'fragments' and the other as 'unscientific,' meaning that truth is always fragmentary (philosophical bits) as opposed to systematic and, hence, unscientific. The term 'unscientific' here should not be understood in the context of science; it merely indicates that the contents are unsystematic.

Further, Hegel's treatment of religion in general and of Christianity in particular, which he calls the 'Absolute' or 'God' or 'Truth,' aroused Climacus to revolt. For Hegel, truth cannot be expressed in propositions which must be either true or false. It cannot be grasped by simply affirming or negating such propositions, but through a process, which is generally termed Hegel's dialectical method, that is, truth in a sense both 'annuls' and 'preserves' the opposing statements (equivalent German verb *aufhaben*); and this process is called mediation by Climacus. Therefore, totally adequate truth, according to Hegel, emerges through the dialectical process as a whole in the sense that truth lies in the whole and requires systematic thinking. Climacus understands this as implying that through simple faith an ordinary believer cannot attain the religious truth, but through the process of speculation a philosopher seeks a

more adequate expression of the truth. Hence, he feels that in Hegel's system faith is treated as a 'superseded movement.' It is this which makes him revolt against speculation in religious truth. Moreover, Hegel argues that art, religion, and philosophy together formed the philosophy of the Absolute Spirit, *Geist*, wherein only philosophy occupied the highest stage or rather expressed the Absolute more accurately through reason and reflection.

The essential object of art, religion, and philosophy, according to Hegel, is the same, namely, God; but their modes of expression are different. In art the awareness of the Absolute is in the sensuous mode; in religion the Absolute is grasped through legends and stories; and in philosophy the Absolute is reflected upon, a purely conceptual attitude. Climacus combats this view of Hegel's vehemently, because he holds that Hegel places reason and intellectual analysis on a higher plane than simple faith, meaning that faith is child-like, an unreflected attitude, which can be superseded by reflection and intellectualization. According to Hegel, philosophy is superior to the other two, namely, art and religion, because it can go beyond blind faith and raise the Absolute to reason and scientific analysis. Faith is alright for ordinary people, but the educated can go further and reason it out. Considering these views of Hegel's, Climacus projects himself as a critic of reason, not attempting to destroy reason, but to subjugate reason to faith in the realm of essential truth.

CLASSICAL THEORIES OF TRUTH AND THEIR LIMITATIONS

Climacus begins the chapter on 'subjective truth' in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* by bringing in different classical approaches to truth.

> Whether truth is defined more empirically as the agreement of thinking with being or more idealistically as the agreement of being with thinking, the point in each case is to pay scrupulous attention to what is understood by being. . . .[3]

Climacus discusses the two classical philosophical analyses of the concept of truth, which are similar to the classical correspondence and coherence theories of truth. These two theories are called, by Climacus, the empirical theory, which defines truth empirically as the agreement of thought with being, that is, truth as 'the conformity of thought with beings,' and the idealistic theory, which defines truth as the agreement of being with thought, that is, truth as 'the conformity of being with thought.'

The correspondence theory of truth, which is generally associated with realism, considers the reality or existing situation as given and that truth as the ideas or thought which corresponds to the given reality.

The realists think of truth as having a logical relationship between the propositions or statements uttered about reality and reality. Thus, truth here means an idea that expresses a one-to-one correspondence between a proposition and a fact.

The idealistic theory, which is none other than the classical coherence theory, holds that the ultimate essence of reality or being is thought, and that reality or being, thus, conforms to thought itself. Hence, the test of truth is the test of reason, meaning thereby that rational coherence is the essence of truth.

Considering the above two theories of truth, Climacus is of the opinion that in both the cases there is an involvement of 'doubling' or 'reduplication.' In both the definitions there is an agreement between being and thought with the difference in direction, that is, either being corresponds to thought or thought corresponds to being. It will be helpful to follow the elucidation of the concept of 'reduplication' as given by Gregor Malantschuk. Reduplication, according to Kierkegaard, means a fusion of two different qualities or categories into a synthesis, meaning the doubleness of a relationship, that is, two different qualities are linked to each other. For instance, a teacher proposes a doctrine while at the same time reduplicates this doctrine in his or her life. This reduplication constitutes a doubling, for it embodies two different elements that now merge to form a synthesis—the teacher's original attitude and the requirement exacted of his/her by the doctrine.[4]

Regardless of which definition of truth one prefers, realistic or idealistic, Climacus holds that one must first ascertain what one means by being, for in either case the crucial concern is about being. He makes a distinction between being in the ideal sense and being as concrete, empirical actuality. The empirical being is in a process, a constant becoming and, hence, the truth about such an empirical being is also subject to change. If we are speaking of empirical being, the truth about such an empirical being will remain an approximation, because empirical being is constantly undergoing change.

> If, in the two definitions given, being is understood as empirical being, then truth itself is transformed into a desideratum (something wanted) and everything is placed in the process of becoming (vorden), because the empirical object is not finished, and the existing knowing spirit is itself in the process of becoming. Thus truth is an approximation whose beginning cannot be established absolutely, because there is no conclusion that has retroactive power.[5]

Climacus gives two reasons for his claims. First of all, the object of our knowledge is constantly undergoing change. Secondly, the knower himself is in the process of becoming. Since both are unfinished, no human idea can claim to have final truth about it. All human cognition

in the empirical realm is subject to correction and improvement. Hence, a truth which is subject to such a correction and improvement cannot be the final truth, but only an approximation to it. However, Climacus makes an exception to this with regard to God. Since God is eternal and sees from an eternal viewpoint, truth about the empirical reality would be perfect for him. Therefore, it is only for God that the existential reality forms a system.

> As soon as the being of truth becomes empirically concrete, truth itself is in the process of becoming and is indeed in turn, by intimation, the agreement between thinking and being, and is indeed actually that way for God, but it is not that way for any existing spirit, because this spirit, itself existing, is in the process of becoming.[6]

Hence, Climacus argues that for an individual it is possible to construct a formal or logical system of truth, but not an existential truth. However, Climacus' aim here is not to belittle, but to show us the nature of, empirical knowledge.

What about truth in the ideal sense? Climacus says that, if we take the idealistic approach to truth, we end up with a tautology.

> Truth is the first, but truth's other, that it is, is the same as the first; this, its being, is the abstract form of truth. . . .[7]

But if being is understood in this way, the formula is a tautology; that is, thinking and being signify one and the same, and the agreement spoken of is only an abstract identity with itself. When one speaks of truth in the idealistic sense, one is not talking about actual, concrete, empirical truth, but about the ideal which that truth attempts to approximate. By truth here we mean conceptual truth or the analytical/*a priori* truth, which merely depends on relations between concepts. In this case the conformity of thought with being simply means the ideal relationship between reason and ideal being, which is the object of thought and which emerges when thought abstracts being from the concrete, empirical world. For instance, a mathematician does not consider three pears and three apples while calculating, but merely the abstract number 'three.' The mathematician's aim is a conceptual ideal; and such a conceptual ideal, therefore, is always finished and complete in a way no empirical object is. Hence, Climacus holds that, when we are dealing with a purely conceptual being, the terms 'thought' and 'being' mean the same and that we get nowhere at all, ending up with a tautology.

Climacus does not deny the value of such abstract truths. However, he claims that they cannot grasp the existential situation, for abstact truths are complete in themselves, while empirical truths are constantly changing. He says that such abstract truth does fit into the classical

definition of truth, particularly the coherence theory of truth—abstract thought corresponding with abstract being. In any case, in such claims there is no genuine 'doubling' or 'reduplication' because thought and being refer to the same thing. It does not touch the question of truth about actual entities.

Having found the limitations of the above two theories of truth, Climacus suggests a third possibility. In the event of a truth that is essential for an existing spirit, the truth should be defined not as something objective, to the exister, but as a process of assimilation, inwardness or subjectivity. Here, the task of the individual consists in appropriating truth. Climacus is of the view that this is the perspective to which the speculative philosophers have not paid much attention.

> To objective reflection, truth becomes something objective, an object, and the point is to disregard the subject. To subjective reflection, truth becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the point is to immerse oneself, existing, in subjectivity.[8]

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUTH AND THE EXISTER

The question Climacus is really concerned with here is: What is the relationship between truth and the individual who pursues it? Climacus writes:

> Consequently, it is an existing spirit who asks about truth, presumably because he wants to exist in it, but in any case the questioner is conscious of being an existing individual human being.[9]

Climacus does not deny the fact that human beings possess abstract ideas. Human existence does contain such ideas essentially. However, this is only one aspect of existence, or rather it is only the half truth. The full truth lies in reduplication of such eternal ideas in life, in actuality. Thought, in this sense, is only one aspect of existence. Hence, in no way does it mean that existence should be reduced to thought. Climacus strongly insists on this point on the ground that human existence has a tendency to forget the fact that the thinker is first and foremost an exister, and hence fails to build correct relationship between abstract thought and real existence. Human being's relation to abstract thought possesses significant existential as well as religious truth. He quotes a few classical thinkers in *Postscript* to elucidate this point. Socrates was one of the rare classical philosophers who sought conceptual understanding with religious significance. On the contrary, Plato, his pupil, considers the ultimate or essential truth as 'forms' and that the eternal can be reached in thought. Similarly, Hegel claimed that reason is the most adequate means to grasp the reality or Absolute—'the real is

rational and the rational is real.' Climacus feels that, for these thinkers, it is the abstract thought which paves the way for salvation. He observes that these thinkers, however, did have religious concern in their epistemological or metaphysical approach to truth, unlike the contemporary logical theorists and epistemologists. Hence, when their concern is about the religious truth, Climacus suggests that they must pursue the right kind of truth. Without questioning the value of truth and the duty towards that truth, one cannot seek a saving truth. Stephen Evans rightly puts it thus:

> Is man's *telos* qua man the acquisitions of intellectual understanding? Does that mean a person who fails to know something she could know is less human than she could be? This seems implausible.[10]

Climacus wonders at man's ability to think abstractly such that universal concepts and propositions become a part of an individual's temporal existence. Hence, he says that human existence is a paradox, a synthesis of the eternal and the temporal. Existence is a double movement wherein an individual conceives of ideas and reduplicates it in one's existence. Once she ignores to reduplicate it, she only remains in abstract thought and then she loses herself in the ideas, bracketing her existence.

Climacus brings in a humourous analogy of madness to elucidate subjective and objective approaches to truth. In a purely subjective definition of truth one cannot distinguish between truth and error, for subjectivity rests on passion. Hence, an insane person is said to lack objective reflection and dwell in a madness which is linked with the passion of inwardness.

> In a solely subjective definition of truth, lunacy and truth are ultimately indistinguishable, because they may both have inwardness.[11]

Climacus argues that subjectivity is one form of madness, which the objective thinking avoids and is out of such a danger. He points out that there is another form of madness which arises due to the lack of inwardness or passion, and it is called 'parroting lunacy.'

> But when inwardness is absent 'parroting lunacy' sets in, which is just as comic . . . when the insanity is a delirium of inwardness, the tragic and the comic are that . . . pertains to the unfortunate person . . . that pertains to no one else. But when the insanity is the absence of inwardness . . . truth that pertains to the whole human race but does not in the least pertain to the highly honoured parroter.[12]

Hence, for Climacus, objectivity is no guarantee of sanity, for here one

goes around repeating the truth without finding a meaningful relation to it and with lack of passion and interest.

It is now obvious why Climacus is concerned about the basic question: What kind of truth should one seek? By way of answering this question he distinguishes nonessential/accidental truth from the essential one.

TRUTH: ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL

What kind of truth is the saving truth? How can a truth itself be realized in existence? By way of answering these questions, Climacus makes a clear-cut distinction between essential and accidental truth.

> All essential knowing pertains to existence or only the knowing whose relation to existence is essential is essential knowing. Essentially viewed the knowing that does not inwardly in the reflection of inwardness pertains to existence is accidental knowing, and its degree and scope, essentially viewed, are a matter of indifference.[13]

Truth here simply means the truth with which an exister can lead a meaningful life; and Climacus identifies it with the quest for ethico-religious knowledge. Hence, he says:

> Therefore, only ethical and ethico-religious knowing is essential knowing. But all ethical and ethico-religious knowing is essentially a relating to the existing of the knower.[14]

It is important to note here that Climacus' definition of truth as subjectivity is intended to apply to this essential truth. He clarifies this point in a footnote thus:

> The reader will note that what is being discussed here is essential truth, or the truth that is related essentially to existence, and that it is specifically in order to clarify it as inwardness or as subjectivity that the contrast is pointed out.[15]

Thus, Climacus makes it clear that by such a definition of truth he does not intend to apply it to science, logic, mathematics, history and other areas where the truth concerned does not directly bear on the individual's existence. And, it is because of the fact that one can lack such knowledge and yet lead a meaningful and valuable life. Hence, Climacus characterizes such knowledge as accidental knowledge.

Having made clear the point that essential truth is that which relates truth to existence, Climacus makes an examination of the nature of existence. He says that an individual is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. In *The Sickness unto Death*, the pseudonymous author, Anti-Climacus, describes the self as a composition of the infinite and the finite, which is viewed as bipolar tension rather than two different

elements in the self. It is characterized as bipolar tension because the infinite aspect of the self, that is, the possibilities which are the different ways of looking at the expansive and future-oriented goal, forms the ideal pole in the self. The finitude, necessity, and temporality form the limited and contingent aspects in the self. Therefore, human existence contains a double movement. The first movement is from the actuality to the possibility, that is, the possibilities contained by the actual self, and the second movement from possibility to actuality, that is, these possibilities to be actualized by passionately identifying oneself with the possibilities. This involves two phenomena, action and reflection—reflection being the first move (conceptual ideals), and action being the second move (ideals actualized).

As against the contemporary philosophers who claim that only a proposition can be true or false on the ground that they agree with, or correspond to, the reality, Climacus posits such a correspondence in human existence. Human existence is capable of modelling reality. The ideal truth gets actualized by living. When the truth is existentially realized this way, the exister is in truth, and her existence can be described as true existence.

Climacus, here, brings in two possibilities of an individual living in truth. One is that the individual is in truth if she knows objectively the ethico-religious ideals. The other is that the individual is said to be in truth if she relates herself to what she considers to be the truth and thus actualizes the truth in life.

> When the question about truth is asked objectively, truth is reflected upon objectively as an object to which the knower relates himself. What is reflected upon is not the relation but that *what* he relates himself to is the truth, the true. If only that to which he relates himself is the truth, the true, then the subject is in the truth. When the question about truth is asked subjectively, the individual's relation is reflected upon subjectively. If only the *how* of this relation is in truth, the individual is in truth, even if he is in this way were to relate himself to untruth.[16]

The point Climacus holds here is that, when an individual makes an objective inquiry, one attaches importance to *what* one says, whereas, if one inquires subjectively, one places emphasis on *how* one says what one says. He elucidates this point by means of the example of the knowledge of God.

> Objectively, what is reflected upon is that this is the true God. Subjectively that the individual relates himself to a something in such a way that his relation is in truth a God-relation.[17]

Therefore, when the question of truth is raised objectively, 'what' here refers to the question whether there is any such eternal truth, God as

faith affirms. To this question, Climacus feels that there can be no answer at all; rather such a question should never be asked. When this question of truth is raised subjectively, then it will be, 'Is what my faith affirms true?' Here, one affirms one's faith and hence one is in truth. Hence he is of the view that an individual is truly existing in believing it to be so even if it is not. The point of the whole discussion of truth as subjectivity is to recommend this change of reference. Therefore, objectively the interest is focused on the thought content, but subjectively, on appropriation.

Climacus asks the question: 'Now, on which side is the truth?'[18] He, however, suggests an alternative to drive home his point.

> Alas, must we not at this point resort to mediation and say: It is on either side; it is in the mediation?[19]

He affirms that there is no such mediation between objectivity and subjectivity of truth because truth lies in the inwardness. The existing person who chooses the objective way alone approximates the knowledge of God. A person who chooses the subjective way does not want to waste time in finding God objectively, but by virtue of infinite passion of inwardness tries to strengthen his God-relationship. Here, for the subjective thinker, God, indeed, becomes a postulate (an assumption that is considered to be true), for this is the only way through which a person can enter into a relationship with God.

> If one, who lives in the midst of Christianity, goes into God's house... with the true concept of God in his knowledge, and now prays, but prays in untruth; and when another lives in an heathen land but prays with the whole passion of infinity, though his eyes rest on the image of an idol: where is there then the most truth? The one prays in truth to God, though he worships an idol; the other prays in untruth to the true God and therefore truly worships an idol.[20]

It is important to note here that Climacus by no means is asserting any absurd thesis that a false proposition such as 3+3 = 5 can be made true if an individual believes that way. In such cases the belief remains false, no matter however passionately one believes it. This is because such claims have only objective validity. Here, what is spoken about is a certain objective fact, while Climacus' concern is about existential truth, a knowledge through which an individual makes life meaningful.

An important question which Climacus raises here is: does subjective truth exclude objective truth? Climacus does not say that objective truth is unimportant, or that the individual should not care whether there really is a God as well as such a thing as immortality. He rather argues that truth about such question is gained not through detached theoretical inquiry, but through the process of existing itself. Hence, proper

objective belief without subjectivity is worthless, though subjectivity without objective beliefs is possible.

> The existing person who chooses the objective way enters now into the whole approximating reflection process, which wishes to bring God to light objectively, which cannot be achieved in all eternity, because God is a subject, and therefore is only for subjectivity in inwardness.[21]

In this connection, Climacus discusses the Socratic position, distinguishing Socrates from Plato, and characterizing the former as a philosopher who wanted to exist while the latter as one who was interested in speculation. He writes:

> The Socratic ignorance was thus the expression, firmly maintained with all the passion of inwardness, of the relation of the eternal truth to an existing person. . . .[22]

Climacus compares Socrates to a girl who possesses the sweetness of being in love although with a weak hope of being loved by the beloved, because she staked her love on the weak hope. Hence, he claims:

> Objectively the emphasis is on *what* is said; subjectively the emphasis is on *how it* is said.[23]

PASSION AS THE FOUNDATION OF SUBJECTIVITY

Climacus defines subjective truth thus:

> An objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth there is for an existing person.[24]

The definition of truth stated above is a paraphrasing of faith, for there is no faith without risk. Faith is the contradiction between passion of inwardness and objective certainty. Hence, Climacus observes:

> At the point where the road swings off, objective knowledge is suspended. Objectively he then has only uncertainty, but this is precisely what intensifies the infinite passion of inwardness, and truth is precisely the daring venture of choosing the objective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite.[25]

Climacus further elucidates this point by bringing in the apprehension of God. If one were to apprehend God through reflection, one does not have faith; and because it is not possible, one must have faith. Moreover, if one wants to be in faith, then one must hold on to objective uncertainty. He says: '. . . in the objective uncertainty I am 'out on 70,000 fathoms of water' and still have faith.'[26]

Passion is the content of inwardness for it is passion which provides

the impetus to the exister's life. It is the passion which leads a person from reflection to action. If the process of reduplication is true, then it follows that truth will be a function of passion, as passion is the source of all actions.

In 'The Interlude' of the *Fragments*, Climacus makes it clear that even the approximative truth (empirical or probable truth) is grounded in subjectivity to a certain extent. He holds that all existing events are contingent and that our cognition, therefore, involves uncertainty. For example, historical knowledge or knowledge of matters of fact cannot be grounded purely on objective data, as it includes an element of uncertainty which is negated by the historian or the empiricist by clinging to a certain amount of belief. This kind of faith, declares Climacus, is faith in a 'direct, ordinary' sense as against faith in the 'eminent' sense, which is distinctly religious. The significance of personal passion in objective reflection is to emphasize the point that one should not take refuge in objective reflection neglecting subjectivity.

But, why is faith, or being subjectively in the truth, the highest truth for the existing individual? Climacus gives two reasons by way of answer to this question. First of all, the 'leap of faith' intensifies passion. The objective uncertainty thrusts upon the individual the responsibility to decide for or against the eternal truth. This becomes the supreme expression of the individual's choice; and an individual who exists in such a state is actually existing. Secondly, this brings the individual into right relationship with truth.

CAN SUBJECTIVE TRUTH BE LEARNT?

In chapter one of the *Philosophical Fragments*, Climacus begins his project by inquiring into the method of acquiring the knowledge of essential (that is, eternal or saving) truth. The project is to see whether there is any alternative to what he calls the Socratic view of truth and how the truth is learnt. He calls the Socratic view as 'A' hypothesis, and the hypothesis which he formulates as 'B' hypothesis.

According to the Socratic view, that is, 'A' hypothesis, truth is already present within each person so that it only needs to be recollected. Socrates in the *Meno* calls attention to the 'pugnacious proposition' (tricky argument):

> . . . a person cannot possibly seek what he knows, and just as impossibly, he cannot seek what he does not know, for what he knows he cannot seek, since he knows it, and what he does not know he cannot seek, because, after all, he does not even know what he is supposed to seek.[27]

Therefore, according to Socrates, every individual is the midpoint; and the whole world focuses on him because his self-knowledge is God-knowledge. Here, truth is not introduced from outside, but it is

immanent in him. Truth is the eternal possession of the soul. It is with this idea that Socrates established the immortality of the soul or the pre-existence of the soul. Thus, it follows that the teacher has no significant role, for the teacher will only be an occasion, a midwife, who helps the learner discover her truth. Also, the moment of realizing this truth has vanishing significance for the reason that the moment one acquires this truth, one is also aware of the fact that one has not in fact acquired it, but has always possessed it.

With these baselines, Climacus formulates an alternative view, 'B' hypothesis, according to which the learner lacks the truth; it is brought to him/her by a teacher no less than God, who brings the truth as well as provides the learner with the condition necessary to perceive the truth; and that such a moment is all important as it forms the turning point in the learner's life.

The justification given by Climacus for the above points is worth considering. The learner not merely lacks the essential truth as something which she may acquire at a later stage, but her nature is such that it is impossible for her to acquire this truth by her own efforts, because basically she is in error. How is it that the learner is in such a state? Climacus attributes the learner's condition of error to the learner himself for at one point the learner must have had the capacity to understand the truth. Otherwise, he would have been merely an animal. The teacher gives him the truth along with the ability to understand it and makes him human for the first time. Moreover, Climacus posits three possible reasons for the learner to lack the potentiality to learn and thus be in error. Either God himself took away such a capacity; or, it was lost through accidental circumstances; or, it was lost through the misuse of freedom by the learner.

The first possibility is rejected on the ground that God, being the incarnate of goodness, can never do such a damage to the human by destroying the humanness. The second possibility is rejected on the ground that the condition being integrally linked with any human being cannot be lost through mere accident. Therefore, by the process of elimination, only the third possibility, namely, that the problem is due to individual's misuse of his own freedom, holds good.

> . . . he [individual] himself has forfeited and is forfeiting the condition. The teacher, then, is the God himself, who acting as the occasion, prompts the learner to be reminded that he is untruth and is that through his own fault. But this state—to be untruth and to be that through one's own fault—what can we call it? Let us call it sin.[28]

One can have a serious doubt here. If my loss of condition is due to my own fault, then I must be able to remedy the damage too. Climacus defends his position by explicating the characteristics of human freedom.

Human beings do have freedom, but they do not have freedom to undo the freedom which they have misused. He illustrates this by means of an example. If a child who has received the gift of a little money enough to be able to buy either a good book or a toy, for both cost the same—and buys the toy, can he use the same money to buy the book? By no means, for now the money has already been spent. But he may go to the book-seller and ask him if he would exchange the book for the toy. Suppose the book-seller answers: 'My dear child, your toy is worthless; it is certainly true that when you still had the money you could have bought the book just as well as toy, but the awkward thing about a toy is that once it is purchased, it has lost all its value. This is very strange, indeed. In the same way, a human being could either buy freedom or unfreedom for the same price, the price being the free choice of the soul and the surrender of the choice.

Climacus justifies his second position that the teacher is no less than a God thus: if the teacher must bring to the individual the truth, as well as the condition for acquiring this truth, which amounts to a radical transformation of the individual, then it is impossible for any human to do this. It must be done by God himself.

> But the one who not only gives the learner the truth but provides the condition is not a teacher . . . [he] transforms but not reforms the learner . . . no human being is capable of this; if it is to take place, it must be done by the God himself.[29]

Primarily, a teacher serves as 'an occasion' for the learner to know that he is in untruth. This is similar to the Socratic view which says that a teacher is merely an occasion for a learner to recollect the truth. Climacus finds the Socratic principle necessary here, because the individual is unaware of his natural state, that is, untruth; though he is reminded, yet he has to discover it by himself. In the words of Climacus:

> I can discover me only by myself, because only when I discover it, is it discovered, not before, even though the whole world knew it.[30]

Since a teacher also provides him with the condition for understanding this truth, Climacus calls such a teacher, who gives the condition and the truth, *a saviour*, for he does, indeed, save the learner from untruth and lead him from unfreedom to freedom. He is also called the deliverer, for he delivers the person, who had imprisoned himself, from untruth to truth. A transition takes place in the learner. This transition Climacus calls 'rebirth,' which is different from baptism, for individuals can be baptized *en masse*, but not reborn *en masse*. Such a being who is reborn owes nothing to human, but everything to God.

Coming to the third position, Climacus says that the Socratic teacher has only a vanishing significance because he serves only as a midwife who helps the learner to discover the truth which is immanent in

himself. But with regard to 'B' hypothesis, the situation is different since the learner will never be able to forget such a teacher who transforms the learner. Climacus gives an important reason for such a relationship with the teacher. He thinks that the learner does not acquire the condition to understand the truth once and for all, but acquires it by continuous relationship with God. Now, this event in time has a decisive significance, for at no moment the learner will forget this fact. Thus, the moment of revelation of truth acquires significance. Though the learner is in truth, nevertheless he is human; and after he receives the condition as well as the truth, he becomes a new person. But after becoming a new person, he just does not forget his earlier state. However, the individual takes leave of his earlier state, that is, untruth, by being sorrowful of his existence, which Climacus calls *repentance.*

> . . . for what else is repentance, which does indeed look back, but nevertheless in such a way that precisely thereby it quickens its pace towards what lies ahead.[31]

For Climacus, existential truth lies in the individual's right relationship to the truth rather than the individual's mere acquisition of right truth. But, one may ask: is an individual capable of being in such a truth through his own effort? It is here the Christian perspective differs from others which claim that truth is immanent in the person.

> Therefore subjectivity, inwardness, is the truth; can there now be given a more inward expression for this? Yes, if the statement 'Subjectivity, inwardness is the truth' begins like this: 'Subjectivity is untruth.'[32]

However, the Christian view requires both the statements. Climacus says that the higher expression of subjectivity is that truth begins by considering subjectivity as untruth. This is because Christianity always demands transcendence from human self-sufficiency. It is this which secures Christianity from any kind of category reduction.

Climacus' discussion of subjectivity as truth rests on the commentary on *John* 14.6: 'I am the way, the truth, and the life . . .' Jesus not merely claims to bring the truth to men, but also to be the truth. In the words of Stephen Evans:

> If we may, for a moment, go behind the pseudonym, it is at least very probable that Kierkegaard's own reason for having Climacus discuss this issue bears on Christ's statement in John.[33]

It is this idea in Christianity which is different from what other religions hold and which attracted Kierkegaard the most.

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Monad as a Triadic Structure—Leibniz' Contribution to Post-nihilistic Search for Identity

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In this paper shall be given a more detailed explication of some topics dealt with in my Hannover lecture.[1] As it seems, it is extremely relevant for an assessment of the common universal actuality of Leibnizian philosophy to demonstrate that Leibniz' notion of the monad implies a certain triadic structure significant for the constitution of all being *as* being.

In various passages of his writings—especially in the triad of '*power*', '*wisdom*' and '*goodness*' (and modifications of it)[2]—Leibniz himself has pointed to the triadic dimension of his monadic conception of reality. Modern Leibniz-scholarship, however, has scarcely[3] or, for the most part, not considered this conceptual proposition at all. In its work it proceeds within an 'eclipse of the Trinity' (the origin of which will be explained later on) and therefore it is not able to unfold adequately the inner richness intended and discovered by Leibniz in his monadology.

Jürgen Mittelstraß, for example, would have us believe that Leibniz, in searching for an alternative to physical atomism, discovers a *logical atomism*[4] that is characterized by 'undecomposable unites.'[5] Because of his criticistic reservation regarding metaphysics, Mittelstraß cannot see any internal and original activity in these units. For that reason, however, it is not possible for him to find any approach to the central intention of Leibnizian philosophy. In contrast to Leibniz, who stresses that the elementary units, that is, the monadic substances, consist *in* and *through* activity,[6] Mittelstraß interprets the units in an aggregative manner merely as 'building-blocks'.[7] He lacks the insight into the process that constitutes things in themselves. And he brings precisely this—his own!—deficiency in ontological reflection into the philosophy of Leibniz, when he thinks that he has to characterize it as an 'artificial and fruitless project'.[8]

In turning away from such a pre-ontological and undynamical understanding of Leibnizian thought, the following explications intend to show that monadology is a theory of creativity *per se*, that is, a theory of the abundant fullness and fertility of the ultimately trinitarian ground of being itself.

To keep things short, three steps shall be taken: in the *first* one I shall

outline the antitrinitarian 'passion' of the subjectocentric western rationality, which Leibniz has vehemently opposed. The *second* step will introduce the reader into the method, the breadth and integrative structure of Leibniz' ontology. Attention will also be given here to the motivating influences that came from ancient and medieval philosophy to Leibniz. Finally, in a *third* step, I want to consider and deliberate what might be the positive and innovative contribution of ontotriadic monadology with regard to the present-day identity crisis and to an ontically consistent forming of the future.

I

By writing a 'Defensio Trinitatis' the young Leibniz takes up a central and motivating thought that is to be considered as the shaping principle of his philosophizing; this remains an active element up to his last works (especially the 'Monadology' and the 'Theodicy'). As it seems, Leibniz still had enough intellectual sensibility for the ontological implications contained in the traditional trinitarian theorem.[9] Thanks to this theorem he is, indeed, able to interpret reality in a differentiated and simultaneously holistic way. This means, however, that exactly because of its triado-trinitarian basic conception Leibnizian philosophy is relatively isolated in the midst of the seventeenth century discussion, in which a subjectocentric, rationalistic and *anti-trinitarian* 'standpoint' was maintained.

The connection between rationalism and anti-trinitarianism is unusual and risky. But after a deeper historical analysis of the development of modern subjectivity it becomes clear, without any doubt, that the connection mentioned is entirely correct. That means, however: it is rather short-sighted when some scholars think that modern philosophy begins with the Enlightenment, and view Leibniz as a forerunner of it. In lieu of that opinion it is necessary to *enlighten* the *Enlightenment* within a wider perspective of intellectual history.

Above all, we have here to take into consideration the *nominalism* of the late Middle Ages. In this period logic had gained a primacy over ontology. Because of the logic 'abstractness' involved in that the profound contour of trinitarian thought gradually disappeared. Its special terms, for instance 'nature' or 'person', became meaningless, because they could no longer be understood within the whole of the inner-shaped process of absolute being. Desperate attempts on the part of some theologians to 'save' the mystery of the Trinity against the logicians by refined *logical* distinctions ultimately failed. The Trinity was then declared (as for example by Occam) to be a 'solâ fide tenendum.'[10] Thus the separation of theology and philosophy, typical of modern self-consciousness, was introduced; and theologians as well as philosophers lost the genuine interest in the problem of the Trinity.

The nominalistic elements were still influential during the Reformation. The doctrine of the Trinity then had the reputation of being over-subtle and of being a dispute 'alienated from life.' The moderate reformatory groups considered it a 'worthless heirloom;' and they tried to overlook it silently. The other more radical groups, the so-called *Socinians*, rejected it explicitly and energetically.[11] And after Michael Servet, famous for his work 'De trinitatis erroribus libri septem', was executed in 1553 due to the agitation by the religious fanatic Calvin,[12] the anti-trinitarian way of thinking spread like wild fire throughout Europe and exercised its greatest influence on the intellectual life of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Socinianism is, so to speak, a pivotal point, at which nominalistic aversion against the Trinity was brought into Enlightenment philosophy.[13]

Although antitrinitarianism is extremely revealing with regard to the constitution of modern self-consciousness, it is surprisingly little-known. Its analysis was 'repressed' by modern scholars along with the 'repression' of the Trinity in the modern time. Nevertheless 'traces' of this are recognizable in the progress of the modern autonomy experiment, that—from its beginning up to its culmination in nihilism—proceeds—even though unavowedly—conditioned by Trinity criticism. According to this, the negative triad of relativistic *dialectics*, dualistic *positivism* and desperate *existentialism* must be explained as a successive decomposition of original ontic integrity which, in the Augustinian sense, can be interpreted by the ternary '*being*', '*cognition*' and '*love*'.

Descartes' reaction to this is very typical of modern rationalism: after he had become aware that an 'image de la Trinité' is discovered by this ternary in the inwardness of man, he did not, in any way, go more deeply into this suggestion. Without comment, he set his '*moy*, qui pense' beside it.[14] Through this—far less through argument than through contrapositive rejection—modern subjectocentric philosophy and its 'constitutional' self-contradiction are 'pre-programmed'.

II

Nowadays, within the chaos of 'universal' meaninglessness brought on by the 'self-explication' of subjectocentrism, we have reached an 'era of fundamental change', we have arrived at the 'turning-point'. In view of the logic of decline involved in the abovementioned eclipse of the Trinity, we can now imagine that the Leibnizian project of a 'defence of the Socinian missiles'[15] is, by no means, a quixotic act; it is rather to be considered as a philosophical and intellectual deed of great relevance for the present day.

Leibniz is not satisfied with the notion of 'substance' presented by contemporary philosophers. Against the Cartesian de Volder he emphasizes that 'extensio' or 'materia' cannot be identified with

'substantia' because they are merely 'attributa',[16] that is, secondary stages within the evolution of primary substantial energy.

We can see here that Leibniz' attempt to define what 'substance' is as comprehensively as possible, is guided by the Aristotelian question of the 'principle of movement' (ἀρχὴ κινήσεως). Therefore, however, Leibnizian thought cannot acquiesce in any form of materialistic atomism or in mechanistic description of spatial or temporal 'phenomena'. Because in this dimension the mere juxtaposition of a plurality of parts is still immersed in ambiguity, the quest for the 'true' substance cannot stop here. It has to 'transcend' every particularity. That means: the real unit of being, the 'substantial atom', can be found neither in composed things nor in moved movement. It is rather the movement in itself; it is the common 'source' of all particular movements or—as we have suggested above—the elementary inner-shaped process by virtue of which composed beings are intimately constituted.[17]

After these explications we can be sure that the Leibnizian programme of the 'rehabilitation of the substantial forms'[18] intends to criticize the dualistic (or pluralistic) concept of subjectocentric rationality. At the same time, however, it is also directed against the monistic comprehension of 'substance' presented, for example, by Spinoza. Thus Leibniz blames Spinoza's definition '*Substantia prior est naturâ suish affectibus*', because it fails to explain '*quid sit esse "naturâ prius"*'.[19] In a similar manner he critically observes that Spinoza's first axiom 'Omnia quae sunt, vel in se, vel in alio sunt' remains unintelligible as long as '*quid sit esse in se*'[20] is not clear. That, however, means: by dint of his search for substantial forms Leibniz—contrary to the trend of the philosophy of his time—has regained the methodical dimension of 'metaphysica generalis', which according to Aristotle is the 'First Philosophy'[21]—the 'science which theorizes being as being.'[22]

On the strength of this genuinely ontological conception Leibniz is able to point out the 'weak spot' of Spinozism, and, of course, of all other idealistic systems also that. For in these systems it is pre-supposed that—at the 'beginning' of the process of self-cognition—'nothing' shall be pre-supposed. That means, in the words of Hegel: 'The pure being and the pure nothing is the same.'[23] The result of this conception however—that is, of the assumption that the 'ground' of all beings is indeterminately determined—is that the 'Leibnizian' question: 'why does something exist rather than nothing?'[24] can no longer find any sufficient answer. The ontological argumentation is replaced by phenomenological descriptions. The common insight into the internal structure of substance is 'methodically' blocked. All beings are now conceived in an insolubly relativistic manner. Therefore being seems to be as indifferent as non-being, knowledge as illusory as delusion, feeling of happiness as insignificant as despair.

Because of the lack of an ontically positive criterion the way of thinking thus characterized (we can call it 'dialecticism') 'stylizes' the negative phenomena as productiveness and creativity. (Hegel, for instance, speaks of 'the vast power of negativity'[25]). In defence of such a fundamental confusion within the concept of reality, Leibniz sets forth the thesis that negation cannot be an ontically primary moment because it always and necessarily presupposes some positive content.[26] (Otherwise negation would be a negation of nothing, a non-negation; it would not exist at all.)

Thus we can see that Leibniz' investigation of the meaning of 'esse "naturâ prius"' and 'esse in se' implies a criticism both of dialectics (and the absurdities involved in it) and of modern anti-trinitarianism as the pre-condition for it. When, namely, Servet asserts that Augustine's efforts to discover trinitarian analogies in the human mind are nothing but 'dreamings',[27] then the systematic objective of this polemical rejection of the method of 'analogia entis' is to show that there is no 'esse "naturâ prius"', because 'esse in se' *is* nothing! (Thus it becomes evident that, as a consequence of an exaggerated 'theologia negativa',[28] Böhme's 'Ungrund' as well as Schelling's 'absolute indifference' can be traced back to an anti-trinitarian attitude.)

We can now recognize that the Leibnizian problem of 'monad' or 'substance' is internally connected with the question: what is 'esse "naturâ prius"', what is 'esse in se'?. Viewed in this way, Leibniz, for ontological reasons, rejects the two extreme positions: the first of which means mere plurality and hypostasised differences, the second mere unity and hypostasised levelling of all differences. That is: the 'truth' of 'monad' and 'substance' can only be discovered 'in the middle'. It criticizes the one-sidedness of the extremes mentioned, and it simultaneously preserves the positive content to be found both in plurality and in unity.

For that reason, however, the substantial monad of 'esse in se' and 'esse "naturâ prius"' is to be conceived neither as permanent decomposition and transitoriness nor as lifeless rigidity. It means rather an all-encompassing horizon within which the dialectical shift from one extreme to the other is critically reintegrated into the originative actuality of 'esse in se'. In the sense of a *distinct-compositive motion* the 'difference' (or better: 'differentiation') appears in this as an inner emergence of being (*not* from out of 'nothing', as idealism thinks, but from being). This emergence however—the opening phase within being—represents the ontic pre-condition for a second and closing internal movement: for the unity as completion of being within itself. In such a way it becomes evident that the monadic 'esse in se' necessarily has to be explained as a triadically structured circulation. (We understand now why Leibniz so vehemently refused the anti-trinitarian Socinianism of

his time: Leibniz—as well as the Czech philosopher Johann Amos Comenius[29]—feared that by this way of thinking the holistic cognition or reality would be destroyed).

Conceiving the monadic substance as 'per se completum seu se ipsum complens', Leibnizian thought was without a doubt strongly influenced by the Aristotelian concept of ἐντελέχεια.[30] And with regard to the explications made above it is not surprising that Josef Stallmach illuminates the evolutionary stages of ἐντελέχεια as a threefold complexity: as '*origin*' (arché), '*species*' (morphé) and '*final objective*' (télos).[31]

This concept clearly has some similarity with the Pythagorean theorem according to which all entities are determined triadically: by an evoking '*beginning*', a forming '*middle*' and a fulfilling '*end*'.[32]

These triads (or analogously shaped other ones) can be transferred to every entity in so far as it is an entity. Therefore the 'esse "naturâ prius"' searched for is analysed—indeed, we have to say: *must* be analysed—as a triadic process that is identical with the order of the 'actus essendi' itself.[33] This process—the monadic substantiality of being itself means there is no doubt—the 'entelechial' potenty, *out* of which, *through* which and *back* to which all movements in the world are foreordained or, to use the Leibnizian term, 'pre-established'.

Beyond space and time that 'entelechial' triadic process causes spatial and temporal changes; it remains, however, structurally unchangeable within itself:[34] *Tripliciter in se ipso manens innovat omnia.*

In case these considerations seem to be a little 'abstract', we have—as Leibniz within his anti-Socinian argumentation—the possibility of finding a 'real' experimental basis for the onto-triadic analysis of monadic substantiality in the inwardness of our mind. Here we encounter astonishing connections, especially this one: that from an ontological perspective there is no relevant difference between Aristotle's concept of ἐντελέχεια and the introspection into the working of man's mind presented by the 'church father' St. Augustine and by Thomas Aquinas for demonstrating the human mind as an instance of 'image Trinitatis'.

In a manner similar to Aristotle's comprehending the 'soul' (esp. in 'De anima') as an 'entelechial' unit, Leibniz calls the human mind 'aliquid vivum et actuosum,'[35] and he tries to inquire into the common moving-structure 'within our *mind*, in so far as it *knows* and *loves* itself.'[36]

With regard to the aforesaid three ontically different stages can be described: (1) the *insistent* mind as the real 'memory' of all things which are thinkable at all (originative 'power'), (2) the *ec-sistent* knowledge within which the memory-things are expressed into ideal distance and thus illuminated (differentiating 'wisdom'), and (3) the *con-sistent* love, the attractivity of which comes about by means of powerful reality *and* illuminative ideality flowing together and melting into one another (uniting 'goodness' as final condition for creativity 'ad extra').

III

With the short formula '*in-ec-con*-sistence' I try to characterize the fundamental rhythm within which, what Leibniz called 'internal action',[37] is actualized. At this point I cannot sufficiently explain how pregnant this formula is. I shall make only ten preliminary remarks for the further interpretation of Leibnizian monadology:

(1) The monadic 'in-ec-consistence' implies an *ontical* dimension ('actuality'/'power'), a (gnoseo-) *logical* one ('knowledge'/'wisdom') and an *ethical* one ('love'/'goodness'). Therefore—with respect to *onto-logo-ethical* wholeness—it seems to be necessary to make a critique of the 'methodically' isolating tendencies, as seen in the theories of sciences as well as of human behaviour.

(2) 'In-ec-consistence' signifies the constitutional structure of being only in a general manner,[38] that is, in the sense of the above-mentioned 'metaphysica generalis.' But within this structure all 'entia quatenus entia' are, so to speak, 'rooted', and because of this their radical triadicity, all beings as beings can unfold a meaningful and harmonious community.[39]

(3) The in-ec-consistential actuality of monadic substance is first traced out within the immediate presence of the 'working' inwardness of human mind.[40] But it would be a great misconception to think that the ternary process, detected in the self-movement of human consciousness, is exclusively valid for that consciousness. The ontological analysis starts, it is true, with the observation of the really given mental process, but it cannot be stopped there. (Without a doubt, that would be a 'short-circuit'). That analysis can only be considered to be successful, when the temporal conditions characteristic for human mind—the 'nothingness' of indifference and ambiguity—are conceptionally divested. Then, however, the structural insight thus gained is transferable to various dimensions of being:[41] to natural and worldly ones as well as to the divine.

(4) Because the human mind is essentially afflicted by the temporal potentiality, we cannot say that it is a 'causa sui'. Human mind subsists and works *in* itself, but it is not totally *out* of itself. In order to find its true 'self', it has—within itself—to transcend itself. By this act of progressive introscendence human being becomes aware both of its structural connectedness with the divine ground and of its abyssmal difference to it. Leibniz illustrates this internal experience by saying: 'The perfections of God are the same as those in our souls. He, however, possesses them without any limits. He is an ocean out of which we've got a few drops. There is in us a bit of *power*, a bit of *knowledge*, a bit of *goodness*, whereas all of this is in God without any restriction'.[42]

(5) Whereas the monad of human mind is still obscured by temporality, the divine monad has the greatest depth-contour and the

strongest radiating energy. In-ec-consistentially inner-shaped by 'power', 'knowledge', and 'goodness', it flows in the 'perichoretic'[43] abundance. Just as a human thought is not diminished when uttered and communicated, the divine monad's abundance is not diminished or altered, when it creates spiritual and material beings. Free of envy it can let them be.

Thus however—beyond space and time—it is able to 'guarantee' the gradually '*growing*' perfection of spatial and temporal processes, which participate in the triadic actuality of its '*perfect*' perfection. (From this point of view, I think, Leibniz' 'Theodicy' can be understood.)

(6) The timeless divine substance is simpler than the substance of human soul which—because it is spaceless—is itself, in turn, simpler than worldly space. Thus we have here a gradation of simplicity, at which the rule is recognizable: the simpler a substance, the clearer its acting in itself and the more far-reaching its influence upon other beings.

In this context the divine monad is comparable with the white light 'before' the prism: in 'dense' simplicity it contains, in a 'supra-coloured' manner, all luminous colours 'after' the prism.[44] Thus we can say: the simplicity of divine monad does not at all exclude (as some Neoplatonists think[45]) all differences and relations; it rather represents the highest form of differentiatedness and relationship.

As 'Unum Dominans' and 'extramundanum' (as Leibniz puts it)[46] divine substance is simpler than the simple monad of human soul. It can therefore be called the 'soul of human soul'.[47] Like the 'light' in contradistinction to the 'colours', it eminently contains the in-ec-consistential structure traced out in human soul, which itself originates from divine monad. Therefore, it is not amazing that Thomas Aquinas in his 'quaestio de divinae essentiae simplicitate' [!] distinguishes—within divine actuality—the '*agens*', the '*exemplar*' and the '*finis*'.[48] Leibniz demonstrates exactly the same conception, when he stresses, against Cartesian rationality, that God is the '*efficiens*', the '*forma*' and the '*finis*' of all things.[49]

But what about soul? Like a colour in the white light, it participates in the triadic actuality of God. With respect to the body it is a 'dominant entelechy';[50] and according to Thomas we can say: 'Anima est forma et actus corporis.'[51] (Therefore however—from the perspective of 'entelechial' self-organization—the troublesome problem of the relation between soul and body—it appears sometimes in Leibnizian philosophy, so to speak, as a holdover from Cartesian dualism—seems like to be soluble.)

(7) Methodically considered, the concept of triadic substantiality allows the transition from one ontic dimension to the other. That means: according to the theorem '*Idem potest esse principium plurium diversis modis*'[52] (or in the sense of the 'tema con variazioni') within the diversity

and plurality can be seen an originating unity. And the unity itself, in turn, is to be considered as the 'rootstock' of every form of plurality. The dialectical method of 'construction' and 'deduction' of reality thus becomes superfluous.[53]

The method of triadic substantiality is instead an un-locking and reflecting one. It respects given realities and investigates the way from the προτερον προς ημας to the προτερον τη φυσει.[54] In this 'physical' firstness it detects the conventional basis of differently appearing, nay even essentially differentiated things. Thus, for example, although the sphere and the circle are dimensionally different things, nevertheless they have the same triadical constitution.

(8) From the onto-triadic perspective it is not possible to end the analysis of reality with the mere description of an 'aggregatum', which Leibniz characterizes as an 'unum per accidens'.[55] Thus the conceptional arbitrariness would remain uncriticized.

As seen above, the analogical method sought after accepts neither the indeterminate nothingness as the pre-condition of monistic thinking nor the mere pluralism, that has recently, in so so-called 'post-modern' discussions, been revived. The positive meaning of that 'postmodern' pluralism undoubtedly consists in exploding the various phenomena of societal and ideological 'uniformism'.[56] The 'postmodern' 'ability to produce the dissension'[57] may stimulate and purify man's reasoning and therefore pave the way for his free acting.[58]

But all these advantages cannot be recognized as such, as long as their ontological foundation is 'faded out' by maintaining an 'aggregative' 'polysemy' of being, allegedly to be found in Aristotle.[59] With regard to the Leibnizian substance theory, however, a thinking which hypostasises 'plurality' by saying that it is the 'focus of all postmodern theses',[60] is only busy with and interested in secondary (and tertiary) expressions of substantial energy, the constitution of those 'expressions' being totally unknown.[61]

For the better and more radical understanding of 'plurality' itself and (as Leibniz says) 'ob . . . omnium connexionem inter se'[62] it therefore seems necessary, for the present, to pay attention to the Plotinian argument that 'plurality is posterior to the One'.[63] For all 'coherent entities'—for example, a house, a ship, an army, a round dance—'could not exist at all, unless the One were present with them'.[64] Thus can be said: 'All beings are beings only by means of the One'.[65]

After we have happily avoided, in this way, the Scylla of pluralism, we have yet to escape the Charybdis of Monism. That means: in order to conceive the oneness as originative actuality, plurality can no longer be considered to be 'behind' the oneness, but rather 'within' it. Thus, however, as Thomas Aquinas has indicated, the plurality becomes, more clearly determined, a trinity.[66]

A splendid illustration for the connections discussed here we can

find in the circle-symbol:[67] It represents a monadic actuality, differentiated in an *in-sistent* 'centre-point', an *ec-sistent* 'radius' and a *con-sistent* 'circumference'. It is completely defined by these three elements. More elements are not necessary; they would bring on an *over-determination*. Less (than three) elements would imply an *under-determination*.

The same structure is observable in language as well as in music: The ultimate unit of language is the sentence. Therefore it does not 'make' any sense to enumerate single words (for example, 'wives', 'intelligent', 'are', etc.). Meaning is not perceptible, until triadic actuality has been mentally executed (for example, 'Wives are intelligent'). Then, however, *three* constitutive moments—not more and not less—are discernible within the wholeness of the sentence: the *insistent* 'subject', the *ec-sistent* 'predicate' and the *con-sistent* 'copula'.[68]

The baroque theorists of music conceived the '*trias harmonica radicalis*' (that is, the tonality-forming major-triad) as a symbol of the all-creating Trinity. This suggestion displays onto-triadic plausibility: As the nuclear element of tonal music—of music at all!—we have to distinguish an *in-sistent* 'octave' (1:2), an *ec-sistent* 'fifth' (2:3) and a *con-sistent* double-'third' (4:5, 5:6).[69]

9. In the context of the aforesaid we now can devote ourselves to the '*quaestio vexata*' of the Leibnizian philosophy, to the problem of the 'windowlessness' of the monads.[70] By this is meant, 'that no material or mechanistic cause can work upon the interior of the monad as a simple substance'.[71] That's clear, because monadic substance, as conceived by Leibniz, signifies per se a partless actuality, which, expressing itself (for example, into material phenomena), continuously remains *within* itself. When, for instance, I try to express an idea by means of 'material' acoustical sounds, the act of thinking that idea does not leave its inwardness and nevertheless—simultaneously!—produces and forms the acoustical sounds.

Thus we can say: the 'windowlessness' of the monad is a (perhaps unhappy) metaphorical formulation, by which Leibniz tries to characterise the irreplaceable and ineluctible integrity of the triadic 'acting-centre'. Through this 'acting-centre' every entity is totally constituted. Therefore the respective entity would no longer exist at all when its triadic 'acting-centre' is disturbed or broken.

We observe this by means of the examples used above: a sentence still remains understandable when secondary grammatical forms are falsely fashioned (for example, by a foreign speaker). But a sentence is no longer a sentence, when the central triadicity of 'subject', 'predicate' and 'copula' is dissolved. (Therefore 'dadaism' or 'expressionistic' poetry, by which that sentence-centre is intentionally destroyed, cannot—as hoped—give a 'new' meaningful freedom. They are rather the 'adequate' self-expression of nihilistic senselessness.)

That modern nihilism, a disintegration product brought about by a way of thinking conditioned by anti-trinitarianism, can also be considered in the field of 'avantgardistic' music. Here, in so-called 'atonality' the 'emancipation of musical triads'[72] was proclaimed and also actualized. Thus, however, the fertile kernel of musical 'self-organization' was trodden down. The consequence is, as Adorno says, the 'arbitrariness of a radicalism, which has become worthless'.[73] As is known, atonal music cannot grant any positive sense of feeling; it exhausts itself in mere 'anti-actions'.

The real significance of the Leibnizian theory of the 'windowless' monads can especially be appreciated with regard to the human monad, which consists—as mentioned above—in 'memory', 'cognition' and 'love'. In this triad the dignity of every human person is *ontically* founded. No single moment of this triad can be destroyed without simultaneously destroying the others. Therefore we have to say that the human person in its totality is in three ways endangered: (1) by 'brain-washing', the aim of which is to extinguish human memory in order to manipulate man as an interchangeable element of the totalitarian 'system', (2) by sciences based on mere axioms, in which human thinking is ontically 'uprooted' because, for the sake of subjectocentric rationality, the connection between nature and mind is dissolved, (3) by anonymous 'conventions', by means of which man is prevented from loving what the 'inner' light presents to him as reasonable. (We can see here, what the contribution of Leibnizian monadology to the present discussion of 'human rights' consists in.)

When it became fashionable to think that Leibniz's 'windowless' monad implies a self-enclosed, nay even selfish world,[74] this may, among other things, stem from the fact that Leibniz did not explain, in full 'plasticity', the ontological implications of the traditional trinitarian metaphysics. According to this metaphysics the 'filial' λογος receives its ontical content totally from the 'paternal' αρχη. Whereas the trinitarian λογος reflects the producing αρχη, the 'spiritual' πνευμα is, in the literal sense, the 'result' of both these movements,—the fulfilling subsistent communication *within* the divine process.[75]

That means, however: with respect to an onto-triadicly unshortened conception of the monadic substance it is necessary to stress that 'receptivity' as well as 'communication' are essentially immanent operations within the actuality as such.[76]

10. Because of its notion of internal productivity Leibniz' monadology demonstrates some resemblance to the Stoic theorem of the λογοι σπερματικοι. This does not, however, imply any form of pantheism.[77] For, as we have seen above in the sphere-circle-comparison, structural identity is thoroughly possible amongst dimensionally different beings. Thus, one must by no means rule out a structural identity between essentially different monads, especially that between the 'created' temporal monads

and the 'creating' monad, which per se is beyond all temporal (and spatial) conditions.

Since that divine monad *is* actuality in the purest form, it can let other monads be 'beside' itself. That, however, means: The motive for creating is not, as idealism suggests, the all-devouring indigence of hypostasised 'nothing'; it is rather the abundance of the absolute being in itself. In the inviting breadth of this horizon God does not appear (as Sartre suspects) as the 'oppressor' of human freedom, but rather as the continuous 'stimulator' of balanced self-realization of the human being.[78]

According to the aforesaid both the 'individuation' and the 'socialization', the 'differentiation' and the 'communication' are—in the sense of an 'approximation through distance'[79]—included within the act of this self-realization.[80] From this perspective, however, it becomes evident, that the onto-triadic conception of monadic substantiality (the investigation of which has remarkably increased during the last decade[81]) implies a most important forming-potency with regard to a creatively peaceful world community: for the 'pluralistic' West it points towards the all-encompassing horizon of meaning and being that was believed to be lost.[82] For the 'monistic' East, it serves as a reminder that inner differentiation is required for the development of 'progressive' forces.

Notes and References

1. Cf. E. Schadel, 'Zu Leibniz' "Defensio Trinitatis". Historische und systematische Perspektiven, insbesondere zur Theodizee-Problematik', *Leibniz. Tradition und Aktualität*, I. Marchlewitz (ed.), V. Internat, Leibniz-Kongreß, Hannover, 1988, pp. 856–65; a substantially expanded version under the same title in *Actualitas omnium actuum. Festschrift für Heinrich Beck zum 60*, E. Schadel (ed.), Geb., Frankfurt am Main-Berne-New York-Paris, 1989, pp. 235–305.
2. Cf. e.g. G.W. Leibniz, *Monadology* § 55, further ibid., § 9 and 48; *Theodicy* I, § 7; II, § 116 and 150 (here the explicit reference to Thomas Campanella). For the great tradition in which Leibniz participates here by drawing attention to triads, see E. Schadel (ed.) *Bibliotheca Trinitariorum*, Vol. II, München-New York-London-Paris 1988, esp. pp. 180–93.
3. Cf. for instance, the faint-hearted and vague allusion to a trinitarian conception of the monad in: J.C. Horn, *Monade und Begriff*, Wien 1965, pp. 27–34.
4. Cf. J. Mittelstraß, 'Monade und Begriff', *Studia leibnitiana* 2 (1970) 171–200, p. 198: 'Leibniz sucht nach einer Alternative zum physikalischen Atomismus; das Ergebnis ist der *logische Atomismus*"' [emph. J.M.].
5. Cf. ibid., p. 199.
6. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Theodicy* III, § 393: 'Ce qui n'agit point, ne merite point le nom substance' [(Philos. Schrr.) ed. (C.J.) Gerh(ardt) VI, 350]; Brief an B. de Volder [ed. Gerh. II, 256]: 'Monades per se activas agnosco'.
7. Cf. J. Mittestraß, op. cit., p. 199.
8. Cf. ibid., p. 200: 'Das Ergebnis' [sc. der Leibnizschen 'Ersetzung' des physikalischen Atomismus durch einen logischen] 'ist . . . ein spekulatives Gebilde: der künstlerisch-vergebliche Entwurf einer Welt der Philosophen' [?!].
9. A careful study of this theorem from the perspective of the dogmatic evolution

of the first four centuries has been presented by Th. F. Torrance, *The trinitarian faith*, Edinburgh 1988.

10. Cf. Guilelmus de Ockham, *Opera theologica*, Vol. 3, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1977, p. 275.
11. Cf. E. Schadel, 'Das Trinitätsproblem in reformatorischen und sozinianischen Umfeld, *Freib. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 34, 1987, pp. 399–413.
12. Cf. the detailed explanation in: Fr. Sánchez-Blanco, *Michael Servets Kritik der Trinitätslehre, Philosophische Implikationen und historische Auswirkungen*, Frankfurt./M.-Bern-Las Vegas 1977.
13. Cf. G. Mühlpfordt, Arianische Exulanten als Vorboten der Aufklärung. Zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Frührationalismus ponischer and deutscher Arianer vom 16. bis ins 18. Jahrhundert, J. Irmscher (ed.), *Renaissance und Humanismus in Mittel- und Osteuropa*, Vol. II, Berlin 1962, pp. 220–46; E. Schadel, Antitrinitarischer Sozinianismus als Motiv der Aufklärungsphilosophie. In: Klaus Schaller (ed.), *Zwanzig Jahre Comeniusforschungsstelle in Bochum*, St. Augustin 1990, S. 260–287; also S. Wollgast. *Philosophie in Deutschland zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung, 1550–1650*, Berlin 1988, esp. pp. 346–422.
14. Cf. R. Descartes, *Œuvres*, Vol. III: Correspondence, Paris 1956, p. 247.
15. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, 'Depulsio Telorum Socinianorum', *Demonstrationum catholicarum conspectus* III, c. 7, [Sämtl. Schrr. u. Briefe. 6. Reihe, 1. Bd., Berlin 1970, p. 495].
16. Cf. idem, Briefwechsel mit B. de Volder [ed. Gerh. II. 183]: 'Extensio attributum est: extensum seu materia non substantia est, sed substantiae'; ibid. [ed. Gerh. II, 268]: 'Unitates . . . substantiales non sunt partes, sed fundamenta phaenomenorum'; idem, Briefwechsel mit B. des Bosses [ed. Gerh. II, 518]: 'Quod vulgo substantias dicunt, revera non sunt nisi substantiata'.
17. Cf. for more of this the 'dense' argumentation in: idem, Systeme nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances [ed. Gerh. IV, 482]: '*Les Atomes de matiere* sont contraires à la raison: outre qu'ils sont encor composés de parties, puisque l'attachement invincible d'une partie à l'autre (quand on le pourroit concevoir ou supposer avec raison) ne detruiroit point leur diversité. Il n'y a que les Atomes de substance, c'est à dire, les unités reelles et absolument destituées de parties, qui soyent les sources des actions, et les premiers principes absolus de la composition des choses, et comme les derniers elemens de l'analyse des chose substantielles. On les pourroit appeller *points metaphysique*' [emph. G.W.L.].
18. Cf. ibid [ed. Gerh. IV, 478f.]: '. . . Il fallut donc rappeller et comme rehabilitér les *formes substantielles*, si décriées aujoud'huy' [emph. G.W.L.].
19. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Briefwechsel mit Spinoza* [ed. Gerh. I, 140]: [Spinoza] "non explicuit, quid sit esse 'natura prius'".
20. Ibid.: [Primum axioma] "obscurum est, quam diu non constet quid sit esse in se".
21. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* XI, 4 [1061 b. 19]: πρωτη φιοσοφια.
22. Cf. ibid. IV, 1 [1003 a. 21]: επιστημη ... η θεωρει το ον η ον.
23. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft dr Logik I, Frankf./M. 1983, p. 83: 'Das reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist . . . dasselbe'.
24. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Principes de la nature et de la grace* § 7 [ed. H. Herring, Hamburg 1969, 12]: 'La première question qu'on a droit de faire, sera, *pourquoi il y a plus tôt quelque chose que rien*'.
25. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Frankf./M. 1974, p. 36: '. . . die ungeheure Macht des Negativen'.
26. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui* § 12 [ed. Gerh. IV, 21]: 'Omnis negatio est alicujus positivi, alioqui erit solum verbotenus negatio'.
27. Cf. M. Servet, *Christianismi restitutio*, 1553, reprint Frankf./M. 1966, p. 32:

'Augustinus . . . internas . . . de trinitate nobis esse mentis illusiones somniat'. A hasty critique is inserted into that sentence; in a less complicated form it would read: 'Augustinus internas de trinitate nobis esse mentis [processiones] sominiat [quas ego, M.S.] illusiones [esse puto]'.

28. Cf. ibid., p. 110: 'Per solam abnegationem Deum posse diffiniri' [emph. E.S.].
29. Cf. the introduction in: J.A. Comenius, *Antisozinianische Schriften*, edited by E. Schadel, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 1983, p. 7^{+}–72^{+}.
30. Cf. the maginal note in: G.W. Leibniz, *Briefwechsel mit B. de Volder* [ed. Gerh. II, 224]: 'Substantia est ατομον αυτοπληρουν, Atomon per se completum seu se ipsum complens. Unde sequitur esse Atomon vitale seu Atomum habens εντχελεχειαν. Atomon idem est quod vere unum'.
31. Cf. J. Stallmach, *Dynamis und Energeia*, Meisenheim 1959, pp. 180–183.
32. Cf. Aristotle, *De coelo* I, 1 [268 a. 10–13].
33. Further detailed explications of this in: H. Beck, *Der Akt-Charakter des Seins, Eine spekulative Weiterführung der Seinslehre Thomas von Aquins aus einer Anregung durch das dialektische Prinzip Hegels*, München, 1965; a Spanish version of this book under the title: El ser como acto, Pamplona 1968.
34. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Briefwechsel mit B. des Bosses* [ed. Gerh. II, 306]: 'Materia instar fluminis mutatur, manente Entelecheia'.
35. Cf. idem, *Briefwechsel mit B. de Volder* [ed. Gerh. II, 184]; ibid., human soul is called 'fons idearum', for this see Aristotle *De Anima* III, 4 [429 a. 27 f.]. See also G.W. Leibniz, *Gegen Descartes* [ed. Gerh. IV, 393]: 'Vim activam sive εντελεχειαν agnosco, ut ita recte mihi Aristoteles naturam definisse videatur principium motus et quietis'.
36. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Theologisches System* [ed. by C. Haas, Tübingen 1860, repr. Hildesheim 1966, p. 19]: '[Trinitatis] simulacrum aliquod in mente nostra seipsam cogitante atque amante intelligimus'; in addition; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I, qu. 43, a. 3: 'Cognoscendo et amando creatura rationalis sua operatione attingit ad Deum'; St. Augustine, De Trinit. IX, 5, 8: 'Cum se novit mens et amat se, manet trinitas 'mens', 'amor', 'notitia', et nulla commixtione confunditur'.
37. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Principes de la nature et de la grace* § 3 [ed. H. Herring, Hamburg 1969, p. 4]: 'Chaque Monade est un Miroir vivant ou doué d'action interne'.
38. 'In-ec-con-sistence' is therefore comparable to the Augustinian formulation: 'Omne quod est, aliud est *quo constat*, aliud *quo discernitur*, aliud *quo congruit*' (De div. quaest, 83, qu. 18).
39. Cf. For the notion of 'harmony', connected intimately with the concept of triadic monadology, cf. Y. Belaval, L'idée d'harmonie chez Leibniz. In: *Studium generale* 19, 1966, 558–567; M. Mugnai, 'Der Begriff der Harmonie als metaphysische Grundlage der Logik und Kombinatorik bei J.H. Bisterfeld und Leibniz.', *Studia leibnitiana* 5 (1973) 43–73; W. Schneiders, Harmonia universalis. Ibid., 16, 1984, 27–44; furthermore B. Meyer, *APMONIA*, Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes von Homer bis Aristoteles, Zürich 1932.
40. Cf. the annotations of footnote 36, furthermore G.W. Leibniz, *Discours de métaphysique* § 27 [ed. H. Herring, Hamburg, 1985, p. 68]: [Les notions] 'que j'ay de moy et de mes pensées et par consequent de l'estre, de la substance, de l'action, de l'identité, . . . viennent d'une experience interne'; Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. c. gent.* IV, c. 11: [Quid sit 'naturalis' processio Verbi divini] 'ex his quae in intellectu nostro accidunt, perspici potest'. In a similar manner A. Schopenhauer's thinking proceeds from the insight, 'daß die letzten und wichtigsten Aufschlüsse über das Wesen der Dinge aus dem Selbstbewußtsein geschöpft werden können', *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* II, edited by W. von Löhneysen, Darmstadt 1980, p. 231. Schopenhauer confounds, however, die 'condition' of human thinking with the 'origin' of it, when he reduces mental

movements, the intellect and the will, to the 'Indifferenzpunkt' of the ego (see ibid., p. 261). An opposing position is argued by Thomas Aquinas; he says: 'Anima . . . perfecte Trinitatem imitatur, secundum quod meminit actu, intelligit actu, et vult actu' (De veritate, qu. 10, a. 3).

41. Thus Leibniz, for instance, presents his conception of monadic substance in a more generalizable form, when he substitutes 'knowledge' and 'love' (the two special movements within the monad of human mind) with 'perceptio' and 'appetitus'. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Briefwechsel mit B. de Volder* [ed. Gerh. II, 270]: 'Rem accurate considerando dicendum est nihil in rebus esse nisi substantias simplices et in his perceptionem et appetitum'; see also Aristotle, *De anima* III, 10 [433 a. 9]: δυο ταυτα κινουνια, η ορεξις η νους ; ibid. 9 [432 b. 5–6].
42. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Theod.*, pref. [ed. Gerh. VI, 27]. For the method, applied here, see Thomas Aquinas, Sum c. gent. I. c. 98: 'Omne . . . quod est per participationem, reducitur ad id quod est per seipsum'; furthermore idem, De potentia qu. 7, a. 1: 'Deus a beatis mente attingitur totus, non tamen totaliter'.
43. Leibniz knows this pregnant trinitarian term περιχωρησις, cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Briefwechsel mit P. Bayle* [ed. Gerh. III, 34]; furthermore M. Mugnai [footnote 39], pp. 50–58; P. Stemmer, 'Perichorese. Zur Geschichte eines Begriffs', *Archiv für Begriffsgesch*, 27, 1983, pp. 9–55; Santiago del Cura Elena, Art. 'perikhóresis', *Diccionario teológico. El Dios cristiano*, edited by Xabier Pkaza/Nereo Silanes, Salamanca, 1992, pp. 1086–94.
44. For this example see H. Beck, *Natürliche Theologie, Grundriß philosophischer Gotteserkenntnis*, München-Salzburg ²1988, pp. 179–81; furthermore H. André, *Licht und Sein. Betrachtungen über den ontologischen Offenbarungssinn des Lichtes und den Schöpfungsinn der Evolution*, Regensburg 1963.
45. For example see W. Beierwaltes, *Das Denken des Einen*, Frankf./M., 1985, p. 12: 'Das Eine Selbst (Hen) . . . ist intensivste Einheit, weil in sich differenzlos und daher ohne innere Relationalität, die durch in sich selbständige Pole bestünde'.
46. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *De rerum originatione radicali* [ed. Gerh. VII, 302].
47. Cf. Augustinus, *Sermo* 65, 5: 'Vita corporis anima est, vita animae Deus est. Sicut adest vita corpori, id est anima, ne moriatur corpus, sic debet adesse vita animae, hoc est Deus, ne moriatur anima'.
48. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia*, qu. 7, a. 1: 'Deus . . . per hoc quod est actus primus, est *agens* et est *exemplar* omnium formarum et est bonitas pura et per consequens omnium *finis*' [emph. E.S.]. It sounds like an 'allusion' to Leibnizian philosophy, when he even says: 'Deus est *causa sufficiens* productionis creaturarum', *Sum. c. gent*, II, c. 32).
49. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum* [ed. Gerh. IV, 392]: 'Idem . . . DEUS et *forma* eminens et efficiens primum, et finis est sive ultima ratio rerum' [emph. E.S.]; in addition: Bonaventura, Breviloquium, Pars II, c. 1 [Opera V, Quaracchi 1891, 219]: "Creatura est effectus Trinitatis creantis sub triplice genere causalitatis: *efficientis*, a quo est in creatura 'unitas', 'modus' et 'mensura'; *exemplaris*, a quo est in creatura 'veritas' 'species' et 'numerus'; *finalis*, a quo est in creatura 'bonitas', 'ordo' et 'pondus'".
50. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Monadology* § 70.
51. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. c. gent*, II, c. 57.
52. Cf. idem, Comment. in I sent. Dist. X. qu. 1. a. 5 [ed. P. Mandonnet, I, Paris 1929, p. 270].
53. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Frankf./M. 1975, p. 445: 'Die immanente Entwicklung einer Wissenschaft [ist] die *Ableitung ihres Inhaltes* aus dem einfachen Begriffe' [emph. Hegel].
54. Cf. Aristotle, *Analyt. post.* I, 2 [71 b. 34].
55. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Briefwechsel mit B. des Bosses* [ed. Gerh. II, 520]: 'Aggregatum vero non constituit nisi unum per accidens'.

56. Cf. W. Welsch, 'Vielheit ohne Einheit?' *Philosoph. Jahrb*, 94 (1987) 111–141, esp. p. 117.
57. Cf. J.F. Lyotard, 'Grundlagenkrise', *Neue Hefte für Philosophie* 26, 1986, pp. 1–33, esp. p. 9.
58. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum*, [ed. Gerh. IV 362 f.]: 'Quanto . . . purior ratio est. . ., eo liberior actio est'.
59. Cf. W. Welsch, 'Postmoderne und Postmetaphysik', *Philosoph. Jahrb*, 92, 1985, pp. 116–22, esp. 122.—Indeed, Aristotle says: Τὸ δε ον λεγεται μεν πολλαχως [*Metaph.* IV, 2; 1003 a. 33], but he immediately adds: αλλα προς εν και μιαν τινα φυσιν. For the problem of plurality and unity in the horizon of trinitarian metaphysics, see A. Wucherer Huldenfeld, 'Trinitätshäresien und die ihnen zugrunde liegenden Auffassungen von Einheit und Vielheit', *Wissenschaft und Weltbild* 15 (1962) 352–361.
60. Cf. H.M. Baumgartner's report on a paper given by W. Welsch in: *Jahres- und Tagungsbericht der Görres-Gesellschaft*, 1988, Köln 1988, pp. 98–100, esp. p. 99: '. . . schließlich ist Pluralität—im entscheidenden, durch Heterogenität und Inkommensurabilität bestimmten Sinn—der Fokus aller postmodernen Thesen'.
61. Leibniz says: 'Nihil . . . reale esse potest in natura quam substantiae simplices, et ex iis resultantia aggregata' [*Briefwechsel mit B. de Volder*, ed. Gerh. II, 282]. Thus the ontological task of reducing the phenomenal 'aggregata' to the substantial units, out of which they have come, is recognizable. This task requires analytical efforts. For: 'Latent primitivae notiones in derivatis, sed aegre distinguuntur' [ibid.; ed. Gerh. II, 227].
62. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, *De rerum originatione radicali* [ed. Gerh. VII, 305].
63. Cf. Plotinus, En. III, 8, 9.3: πληθος ενος υστερον; see also G.W. Leibniz, *Briefwechsel mit B. de Volder* [ed. Gerh. II, 267]: 'Ubi nulla vera unitas, ibi nulla vera multitudo'; a similar conception can be found in: idem, Systeme nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances [ed. Gerh. IV, 478]: 'La multitude ne pouvant avoir sa realité que des unités veritables' [emph. G.W.L.].
64. Cf. Plotinus, En. VI, 9, 1.9f.: τα τοινυν συνεχη μεγεθη, ει μη το εν αυτοις παρειη, ουκ αν ειη.
65. Cf. idem, En. VI, 9, 1.2: Παντα τα οντα τω ενι εστιν ὀντα.
66. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. theol. I, qu. 31, a.1: "Hoc idem, quod 'pluralitas' indeterminate, significat hoc nomen 'trinitas' determinate".
67. Cf. Nicholas de Cusa, De doct. ign. I, 21, 64.
68. Cf. S. Bulgakow, 'Der Satz als dreieiniges Ganzes', *Sprachphilosophisches Lesebuch*, edited by H. Junker, Heidelberg 1948, pp. 290–93; V. Warnach, 'Satz und Sein', *Studium generale* 4, 1951, pp. 161–65; R. Panikkar, 'The threefold intrasubjectivity', *Archivio di filosofia* 54 (1984) 593–607.
69. Cf. R. Dammann, *Der Musikbegriff im deutschen Barock*, Köln 1967 (esp. chapter 1 and 5); E. Schadel, *Trias Harmonica Radicalis. Tonale Musik als Integrationssymbol*, Sein—Erkennen—Handeln. *Interkulturelle, ontologische und ethische Perspektiven. Festschrift für H. Beck zum 65.*, edited by E. Schadel/U. Voigt , Geb., Frankf./M. Berlin-Bern-New York-Paris-Wien 1994, pp. 337–61; more detailed explications in: idem, 'Musik als Trinitätssymbol. Einführung in die harmonikale Metaphysik', ibid. 1995; see also: idem, *Neuzeitliche europäische Rationalität und ihr Ausdruck in der Zwölftontechnik., Entwicklung zur Menschlichkeit durch Begegnung westlicher und östlicher Kultur*, edited by H. Beck/I. Quiles, Akten des IV, Interkontinentalen Kolloquiums zur philosophischen Insistenzanthropologie, 1–6 September 1986 an der Univ. Bamberg, Frankf./M.-Bern-New York-Paris 1988, pp. 221–40.
70. As asserted e.g. in *Monadology* § 7.

71. Cf. P. Koslowski, 'Maximierung von Existenz', *Studia leibnitiana* , 19, 1987, pp. 54–67, esp. p. 62 (footnote 14).
72. Cf. Th. W. Adorno, *Dissonanzen*, Göttingen, 1982, p. 147.
73. Cf. ibid., p. 141: 'In der Nivellierung und Neutralisierung des Materials wird das Altern der Neuen Musik greifbar, die Unverbindlichkeit eines Radikalismus, der nichts mehr kostet'.
74. Cf. W. Lütterfels, 'Die monadische Struktur der Kommunikation—eine Ursache des Verstehenskonfliktes?', *Leibniz, Tradition und Aktualität*, V. Internat. Leibniz-Kongreß, Hannover, 14–19 November 1988, Hannover, 1988, pp. 477–84.
75. Cf. E. Schadel, 'Das Trinitätskonzept des Origenes', *Origeniana quarta. Die Referate des 4, Internat, Origineskongresses*, edited by L. Lies, (Innsbruck, 2–6. September 1985), Innsbruck-Wien 1987, pp. 203–14.
76. Some thought-provoking propositions for this conception can be gained in Bracken's explanations which are influenced by Whiteheadian process philosophy; cf. esp. J.A. Bracken, *The triune symbol. Person, Process and Community*, Lanham-London 1985; see also H. Beck, *Natürliche Theologie*, München-Salzburg ²1988, esp. p. 199–205.
77. As e.g. supposed in: D.M. Datta, 'The windowless monads'; *Monist* 46, 1936, pp. 13–26, esp. pp. 23.
78. Therefore Leibniz says: 'Quanto magis non tantum *potentiam* et *sapientiam*, sed et *bonitatem* Supremae Mentis exerceri intelligimus, eo magis incalescimus amore Dei, et ad imitationem quandam divinae bonitatis iustitiaeque inflammamur' [*Causa Dei* § 144: ed. Gerh. VI, 460; emph. E.S.]. Further explications of this with special attention to an encounter between theology and philosophy, in: idem, *Discours de métaphysique* § 33. See also E. Schadel, 'Anthropologischer Zugang zum Glauben. Implikationen der Beck'schen Religionsphilosophie als konstruktive Kritik neuzeitlichen Wissenschafts-verständnisses in trinitäts-metaphysischer Perspektive', *Freiburger Zeitschr. für Philos. und Theol.* 36 (1989) 129–158.
79. Cf. H. André, *Annährung durch Abstand. Der Begegnungsweg der Schöpfung*, Salzburg 1957.
80. Cf. A. Deeken, 'Man as an image of the Trinity: Toward a trinitarian ethic', *Catholic World* , 214, Oct. 1971, pp. 9–13, esp. p. 13: 'The unique feature of trinitarian ethic lies in this that it opens the way to achieving two seemingly opposite goals. It brings about a maximum unity within the human community and at the same time it develops most fully the individuality of the person'.
81. Cf. The epilogue 'Das trinitarische Problem und die Philosophie', *Bibliotheca Trinitatiorum*, Vol. II, edited by E.Schadel, München-New York-Bern-Frankf./ M.-Paris 1988, pp. 576–94; a revised version of this article as 'Renaissance des Trinitarischen?', *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 33, 1990, pp. 278–300.
82. Cf. A. Deeken, 'A trinitarian spirituality for today', *Homiletic and pastoral review*, Nov. 1971, pp. 23–32, 53–55; esp. 32: 'A Trinity-oriented spirituality can be an important way to overcome the failure of contemporary individualism and to build the new communities that will be needed if our Western civilization is to survive the present crisis'; see also C.S. Mackenzie, *The Trinity and Culture*, New York-Bern-Frankf./M.-Paris 1987, esp. p. VIII: 'In our day, a powerful, new vision of the triune God is needed'.

Buddhist Conception of Reality

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The purpose of this article is to present, in a succinct way, the principal elements of the Buddhist conception of reality, not at its beginning, as it appears only in the earliest texts, nor in the course of its historical evolution, showing its different stages, but in the form this conception assumed when it had been fixed once for all several centuries after the *Parinirvāṇa* of Buddha.

Infinitude of Saṃsāra

Beginninglessness (*anāditva*) is one of the most important principles in Indian philosophy, Hindu as well as Buddhist. It asserts the lack of beginning for a series of entities, processes, phenomena, etc.[1] This conception of Indian philosophy contrasts in a very remarkable way with the more generalized conception in western philosophy, always anxious to find for everything a First Cause, a First Motor, a First Principle, that marks a beginning, beyond which it is impossible to go further.

The word *saṃsāra*, which originally means the series of reincarnations, designates also in a broader sense the empirical reality in which human destiny fulfils itself and which is opposed to the Absolute: *saṃsāra/Brahman, saṃsāra/nirvāṇa.*

Buddhism (as well as Hinduism) maintains that the empirical reality, with its worlds, universes, men, gods, etc., the processes that take place in it and the laws that govern it, has had no temporal beginning, is eternal *a parte ante.* The beginninglessness of *saṃsāra* is affirmed in many texts:

Saṃyutta Nikāya II (*Tiṇakaṭṭhasutta, Paṭhavīsutta, Assusutta, Khīrasutta*), pp. 178–81, where in the beginning of the first four *suttas* Buddha declares: *anamataggoyaṃ bhikkhave saṃsāro/pubbā koṭi na paññāyati avijjānīvaraṇānaṃ sattānaṃ taṇhāsaṃyojanānaṃ sandhāvataṃ saṃsarataṃ.* (The *saṃsāra*, O Bhikkhus, is without limit. A first extreme [of the series] of the beings cloaked in ignorance, tied to craving, that are running on (in the *saṃsāra*), that are transmigrating is not known.) Cf. III, pp. 149 and 151, V, pp. 226 and 441; *Kathāvatthu*, p. 29; *Divyāvadana* p. 122, lines 18–20. *Anamataggo* is commented by Buddhaghosa in the

following way: *Sāratthappakāsinī*, Vol. II, p. 156: *anamataggo ti, anu amataggo, vassa-sataṃ vassa-sahassaṃ ñāṇena anugantvā pi amataggo aviditaggo, nāssa sakkā ito vā etto vā aggaṃ jānituṃ: aparicchinna-pubbāpara-koṭiko ti attho.*

Laṅkāvatārasūtra II, verse 151: *anādigatisaṃsāre* (in the *saṃsāra* whose course exists from eternity).

Mahāvastu II, p. 288, verse 45: *anavarāgrasmiṃ saṃsāre* (in the *saṃsāra* without beginning and end). Cf. III, p. 26, verse 4, p. 300, verse 2, p. 375, verse 3.

Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* II, verse 28: *anādimāti saṃsāre* (in the beginningless *saṃsāra*).

Śāntideva, *Śikṣā-samuccaya*, p. 94, line 30: *anavarāgre jātisaṃsāre* (in the course of rebirths that has no beginning and end).

Prajñākaramati ad *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX, verses 12 and 32: *anādisaṃsāra*° 33 and 84 *anavarāgrasaṃsāra*°; 118: *anavarāgrasya saṃsārasya pūrvakoṭir na prajñāyate* (A first limit of the beginningless and endless *saṃsāra* is not known); 124: *anavarāgro hi jātisaṃsāraḥ.*

Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa* III, verse 19, p. 434: *ity anādibhavacakrakam* (Thus the wheel of existences has no beginning). Cf. *Āryamañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, p. 434, line 21: *sarvasattvā tridhā ye ca anādibhavacakrake* (And all the beings that in three ways are in the wheel of existences which has no beginning ...).

Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamakaśāstra* XI, verse 1: *pūrva prajñāyate koṭir nety uvāca mahāmuniḥ/ saṃsāro navarāgro hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimam* (The great Muni has said that a first extreme is not known, for *saṃsāra* is without beginning and end—it has neither beginning nor end). Cf. Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā* ad locum. Let us remark that the doubtful word *anavarāgra* is understood by Nāgārjuna as 'having neither beginning nor end'.

Buddhaghoṣa, *Aṭṭhasālinī*, p. 10, paragraph 25: *ayaṃ saṃsārasāgaro nāma anamataggo* (The ocean of *saṃsāra* is indeed without limit); p. 177, paragraph 471, p. 191, paragraph 515, p. 192, paragraph 519, and p. 285, paragraph 34: *anamatagge saṃsāravaṭṭe* (In the round of the *saṃsāra* without limit).

Infinitude of the space

To the eternity that Buddhism attributes to the empirical reality corresponds the infinity of space (*ākāsānañca*). The empirical reality extends in an unlimited way in the ten directions of the space.

The stanza I, 64 of *Buddhavaṃsa* affirms that four things are beyond any measure: the number of beings, the space (*ākāsa*), the number of universes or world systems and the knowledge of a Buddha: *cattāro te asaṅkheyyā, koṭi yesāṃ na nāyati* (var. *ñāyati*) / *sattakāyo ca ākāso, cakkāvāḷā canantakā / buddhañāṇaṃ appameyyaṃ, na sakkā ete vijānituṃ.*

Aṭṭhasālinī, p. 131, paragraph 321, affirms in a similar way: ... *cattāri hi anantāni—ākāso ananto, cakkavāḷāni anantāni, sattanikāyo* (var. *sattakāyo*),

buddhañāṇaṃ anantaṃ (Four things are infinite: space is infinite, worlds are infinite, beings are infinite, the knowledge of a Buddha is infinite).

Milindapañho, p. 388, lines 3–4 (PTS ed.), expresses: *puna ca paraṃ mahārāja ākāso ananto appamāṇo aparimeyyo* (And again, O great king, space is infinite, endless, immeasurable).

The affirmation of the infinitude of space is frequently found in the Pāli texts in relation to the stages of meditation (*jhāna*) and the levels of liberation (*vimokha*) reached through it, as for instance *Dīgha Nikāya* I (*Poṭṭhapādasutta*), p. 183: *Puna ca paraṃ ... bhikkhu sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamā paṭighasaññānaṃ atthagamā nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikārā 'ananto ākāso ti' ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharati* (And again ... the Bhikkhu, by passing completely beyond the consciousnesses of form, by the disappearance of consciousnesses of resistance, by paying no attention to the consciousnesses of diversity, lives having attained the domain of the infinity of space with his mind centred in the idea: 'The space is infinite').

Dīgha Nikāya II (*Mahāparinibbānasuttanta*), p. 112, after giving the text just quoted, adds: *ayaṃ catuttho vimokho* (this is the fourth liberation).

The expression '*ananto ākāso*' is commented by *Vibhaṅga*, p. 262, and Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga*, p. 275, paragraph 23.

Vibhaṅga: ananto ākāso ti—tattha katamo ākāso? yo ākāso ākāsagataṃ[2] *aghaṃ aghagataṃ vivaro vivaragataṃ asamphuṭṭhaṃ* (var. *asamputaṃ*) *catūhi mahābhūtehi—ayaṃ vuccati 'ākāso' / tasmiṃ ākāse cittaṃ ṭhapeti saṇṭhapeti anantaṃ pharati / tena vuccati 'ananto ākāso' ti* (That which is space and realm of space, sky and realm of sky, vacuity and realm of vacuity, untouched by (var. not filled with) the Four Great Elements—that is called 'space'. In that space he (= the Bhikkhu) fixes, establishes his mind, pervades the infinite. Hence it is said: 'Infinite space').

Visuddhimagga: ananto ākāso ti ettha, nāssa uppādanto vā vayanto vā paññāyatī ti ananto; ākāso ti kasiṇugghāṭimākāso vuccati. manasikāravasenāpi c'ettha anantatā veditabbā. ten'eva Vibhaṅge vuttaṃ: 'tasmin etc.'. [*Vibhaṅga's* text quoted above] (Here in 'Infinite [lit. extreme-less, border-less, limit-less] space'—'infinite' means: because for it neither an arising-extreme nor a final-ceasing-extreme is known. 'Space' is called a space where a meditation-device can [or: is to] be removed. And here infinitude is also to be known by means of attention. For this reason in the Vibhaṅga is said: 'In that space etc.').

A passage of the *Lotus Sūtra*, Chapter XI, p. 240, lines 12–13, describes in an impressive way the profoundness of the universe: *asti ... adhastāyāṃ diśy asaṃkhyeyāni lokadhātukoṭīnayutaśatasahasrāṇy atikramya ratnaviśuddhā nāma lokadhātuḥ* (There is, in the nadir, beyond incalculable hundreds of thousands of ten millions of hundred thousands millions of universes, a universe called Ratnaviśuddha).

And the great/infinite number of worlds that inhabito the space, to

which we shall refer afterwards, requires an unlimited space, in which these worlds can be located.

Infinite number of worlds

This unlimited space, as it is already seen through the preceding quotations, is occupied by millions of millions of worlds, disseminated in all the regions. Many texts refer to the infinite number of worlds that fill the space:

(The smaller) *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, p. 93, lines 1–2: *asti śāriputra paścime digbhāga ito buddhakṣetraṃ koṭiśatasahasraṃ buddhakṣetrāṇām atikramya sukhāvatī nāma lokadhātuḥ* (O Śāriputra, there is in the western region of space, from hence beyond one thousand of ten thousands of Buddha-Worlds, a Buddha-World, Sukhāvatī by name).

Mahāvastu I, p. 124, verses 13 ff.: *buddhakṣetrasahasrāṇi anekāni atahparaṃ buddhakṣetrasahasrāṇāṃ koṭī na prajñāyate 'parā* (13) / *buddhakṣetrāṇām śūnyānāṃ koṭī na prajñāyate 'ntarā / lokadhātusahasrāṇāṃ koṭī na prajñāyate 'ntarā* (14) (There are from hence numerous thousands of Buddha-Worlds; the other end of the thousands of Buddha-Worlds is not known [13]. Another end of the empty Buddha-Worlds is not known; another end of the thousands of universes is not known [14]).

Ta chih tu lun (*Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*), p. 133 b, lines 3–13 (=Lamotte's translation, Vol. I, pp. 594–595: *Sūtra*: Dans la région du Sud (*dakṣiṇasyāṃ diśi*), par delà des univers aussi nombreux que les sables du Gange (*gaṅgānadīvālukopamān lokadhātūn atikramya*) et à la limite extrême de ces univers (*tebhyo yaḥ sarvāvasānikaḥ*), est situé l'univers nommé Li yi ts'ie yeou (Sarvaśokāpagata); son buddha s'appelle Wou yeou tŏ (Aśokaśrī) et son bodhisattva Li yeou (Vigataśoka).—Dans la région de l'Ouest (*paścimāyāṃ diśi*), par delà des univers aussi nombreux que les sables du Gange et à la limite extrême de ces univers, est situé l'univers nommé Mie ngo (Upaśāntā); son buddhas'appelle Pao chan (Ratnārcis) et son bodhisattva Yi yi (Cāritramati).—Dans la région du Nord (*uttarasyāṃ diśi*), par delà des universe aussi nombreux que les sables du Gange et à la limite extrême de ces univers, est situé l'univers nommé Cheng (Jayā); son buddha s'appelle Cheng wang (Jayendra) et son boddhisattva Tŏ cheng (Jayadatta). —Dans la région du nadir (*adhastād diśi*), par delà des univers aussi nombreux que les sables du Gange et à la limite extrême de ces univers, est situé l'univers nommé Houa (Padmā); son buddha s'appelle Houa tŏ (Padmaśrī) et son bodhisattva Houa chang (Padmottara). —Dans la région du zénith (*upariṣṭād diśi*), par delà des univers aussi nombreux que les sables du Gange et à la limite extrême de ces univers, se trouve l'univers nommé Hi (Nandā); son buddha s'appelle Hi tŏ (Nandaśrī) et son bodhisattva Tŏ hi (Nandadatta).).

Ibidem, p. 113 c, lines 15–16 (=Lamotte's translation, Vol. I, p. 447: *Sūtra*: Les rayons s'élancèrent à travers la région de l'est et ses univers

aussi nombreux que les sables du Gange, et il en fut ainsi pour les dix régions.).

Ibidem, p. 125 c, lines 24–27 (= Lamotte's translation, Vol. I, p. 542: Il est dit dans le Tsa a han king (*Saṃyuktā-gamasūtra*): 'Quand il pleut à verse, les gouttes de pluie (*bindu*) sont si serrées qu'on ne peut pas les compter. Il en est de même pour les univers (*Lokadhātu*). Je vois dans la région de l'Est (*pūrvasyāṃ diśi*) d'innombrables univers naissant, subsistant ou périssant. Leur nombre est très grand et défie le calcul. Il en est de même dans les dix régions.).

Ti tsang pu sa pên yüan ching (*Kṣitigarbha-praṇidhāna-sūtra*?), p. 777 c, line 9 (... from countless universes in the ten directions of space).

In Chapter VII of the *Lotus Sūtra* several references to the infinite number of worlds are found. So in p. 163, lines 6–7, the number of universes in each region of the space is mentioned in a general way: *daśasu dikṣv ekaikasyāṃ diśi pañcāśallokadhātukoṭīnayutaśatasahasrāṇi ṣaḍvikāraṃ prakampitāny abhūvan* (In the ten regions of the space, in each one of them, the fifty hundreds of thousands of ten millions of hundred thousand millions of worlds trembled). And in the following pages (p. 167, lines 10–11; p. 171, lines 4–5; p. 174, lines 6–7 and 8) the same expression is used in order to indicate in an individual form the infinite number of universes in each region of the space. In page 157, lines 1–2, the infinite number of the worlds is also pointed out: *tad kiṃ manyadhve bhikṣavaḥ śakyaṃ teṣāṃ lokadhātūnām anto vā paryanto vā gaṇanayādhigantum / ta āhuḥ / no hīdaṃ bhagavan no hīdaṃ sugata* (What do you think, O Bhikṣus, is it possible to arrive through calculation to the end, to the limit of world systems? They said: 'No, Lord; no, Sugata'). Cf. p. 6, line 7; p. 8, line 6; p. 9, stanza 4; p. 14, stanza 44; p. 15, stanza 49; p. 16, stanzas 53–55, etc., where references to the infinite number of worlds and/or universes or world systems are found.

In these characteristics of the empirical reality, proper of Buddhism, is revealed an eagerness for infinitude, a will of not remaining confined to narrow spatio-temporal limits—eagerness and will that are certainly proper of the Indian culture in which Buddhism sinks its roots.

Infinite number of beings

The countless universes in the unlimited space are peopled by an infinite number of beings (*sattakāyo ananto*). This is an ancient doctrine that is referred to in *Buddhavaṃsa* I, 64, and *Aṭṭhasālinī*, p. 131, already quoted.

We can add the following texts in which this doctrine also appears:

Ta chih tu lun (*Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*), p. 94 b, lines 4–11 (= Lamotte's translation, Vol. I, p. 310: 'Enfin, les êtres (*sattva*), telle la grande mer (*mahāsamudra*) sont sans commencement, sans milieu et sans fin (*apūrvamadhyacarama*). Un intelligent maître en calcul (*gaṇanācārya*) qui en ferait le compte durant d'innombrables années,

n'arriverait pas au bout. C'est ainsi que le Buddha a dit au Bodhisattva Wou tsin yi (Akṣayamati): 'Si tous les univers (*lokadhātu*) des dix régions jusqu'aux confins de l'espace (*ākāśa*) formaient une seule masse d'eau, et que des êtres innombrables et incalculables vinssent, chacun avec un cheveu, en enlever une gouttelette, il resterait encore un nombre incalculable d'êtres. Si en enlevant ainsi une gouttelette avec un cheveu, ils parvenaient à épuiser complètement cette grande masse d'eau, le nombre des êtres n'en serait pas pour autant épuisé'. C'est pourquoi le nombre des êtres est illimité (*ananta*), immense (*apramāṇa*), incalculable (*asaṃkhyeya*) et inconceivable (*acintya*)'.).

Ibidem, p. 93 b, line 29—c, line 1 (= Lamotte's translation, Vol. I, p. 304:'Enfin les êtres (*sattva*) sont innombrables'.).

Ibidem, p. 125 c, lines 27–28 (= Lamotte's translation, Vol. I, pp. 542–543: 'Dans ces univers des dix régions, d'innombrables êtres (*sattva*) subistent la triple douleur physique (*kāyaduḥkha*) ...'.).

The doctrine of the limitlessness of the number of beings is mentioned in relation to the infinite number of beings that are brought to *nirvāṇa* by each of the Buddhas that appear in the worlds:

Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa* ad III, 3 c—d, p. 388: *Traidhātukānām anto nāsti / yāvad ākāśaṃ tāvanto dhātavaḥ / ata eva ca nāsty apūrva-sattvaprādurbhāvaḥ / pratibuddhotpādaṃ cāsaṃkhyeya-sattvaparinirvāṇe pi nāsti sattvānāṃ parikṣayaḥ, ākāśavat* (There is not a limit for the three worlds [*kāmadhātu, rūpadhātu, arūpyadhātu*]. As is the space so many are the worlds. And therefore, there is not coming into existence for beings that have not existed before and, although the *parinirvāṇa* of innumerable beings is produced on the occasion of the appearance of each Buddha, there is not coming to an end for beings, as [there is not for] space).

Shou chang lun (*Hasta-daṇḍa-śāstra*), attributed to Śākyakīrti (?) and translated by I-Tsing, a treatise that refutes the heretical belief in the existence of an *apūrvasattva*, quotes in its beginning (p. 505 b, lines 10–12) the mentioned passage of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*.

Ti tsang pu sa pên yüan ching (*Kṣitigarbha-praṇidhāna-sūtra*?), p. 778 a, lines 13–19, refers to the infinite number of beings that attend the Great Assembly, where Śākyamuni is going to preach. (At that time Śākyamuni Buddha told the Bodhisattva Mahāsattva Mañjuśrī, son of the Dharma king: 'As you look at all these Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and gods, nāgas, pretas, spirits from this world and from the other worlds, from this region and from the other regions, who have come and are now assembled in the *Trayastriṃśā* heaven, do you know their number or not?' Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha: 'O Bhagavant, even if with my extraordinary power, for a thousand *kalpas*, I were to calculate (their number), I would be unable to know it.' The Buddha told Mañjuśrī: 'As I look at them with my Buddha eye, yet their number cannot be exhausted').

The *Lotus Sūtra* has several references to the infinite number of beings:

p. 15, verse 48, in relation to the number of beings that attended the Assembly of the Buddha in Rājagṛha: *ahaṃ vimāś ca bahuprāṇakotya iha sthitāḥ* (I and these numerous ten millions of beings standing here);

p. 24, verse 68: *tahi śrāvakāṇāṃ gaṇanā na vidyate te cāpramāṇāḥ sugatasya śrāvakāḥ* (There is no calculation for the disciples assembled there; the Sugata's disciples are numberless);

p. 26, verse 85: *bhikṣū bahū tatha pi ca bhikṣuṇīyo ... analpakās te yatha gaṅgavālikā* (Many monks and also nuns, numerous as the sand of the Ganges);

p. 10, verse 13: *bodhisattvā yatha gaṅgavālikā* (Bodhisattvas [numerous] as the sand of the Ganges);

p. 20, line 12: *viṃśatibodhisattvakotyaḥ* (Twenty times ten millions of Bodhisattvas);

p. 24, verse 70: *bahubodhisattvā yatha gaṅgavālikāḥ* (Many Bodhisattvas [numerous] as the sand of the Ganges);

p. 2, line 10—p3, lines 2–3: *aśītyā ca bodhisattvasahasraiḥ . . . bahuprāṇikoṭīnayutaśatasahasrasaṃtārakaiḥ* (With eighty thousand of Bodhisattvas saviours of many hundred thousand of ten millions of hundred thousand millions of beings);

p. 49, verse 73: *ekasmi yāne paripācayanti acintiyā prāṇisahasrakotyaḥ* (In One Vehicle they lead to full ripeness inconceivable thousands of ten millions of beings);

p. 26, verse 82: *āśvāsayitvā ... prāṇakoṭyo bahavo acintiyāmaḥ ... bhāviṣyatha buddha mamāntareṇa* (Conforting many inconceivable ten millions of beings: ... you will be Buddhas after me).

Infinite number of the Buddhas

As beings, the Buddhas are also numberless. Their function is to save beings and to lead them to Enlightenment. The idea of the infinite number of the Buddhas had a modest origin. From the very beginning of Buddhism, the texts mention the existence of several Buddhas of the past. Their number is at first a small one, but it gradually increases and reaches very big proportions: 6 (*Vinaya* III, *Suttavibhaṅga*, Part I, p. 7; *Dīgha Nikāya* II, *Mahāpadānasutta*, III, *Āṭānāṭiyasuttanta*, pp. 195–196; 27 (*Buddhavaṃsa*); 55 (*Lalitavistara*, Chapter I, p. 5); 75000, 76000 and 77000 (A p'i ta mo ta p'i p'o cha lun = [*Abhidharma*] *Mahāvibhāṣā* [*śāstra*]?, p. 892 c, lines 4–15). Cf. *Hōbōgirin* III, sub '*Butsu*', pp. 194–197.

In several Mahāyāna texts the number of the Buddhas becomes almost infinite and they are located in the past, the present and the future and in all the extension of space:

Karuṇāpuṇḍarīkasūtra II, p. 41: *atha te bodhisattvā evam āhuḥ / 'asmābhir badhanta bhagavan gaṅgānadīvālikāsameṣu atīteṣu buddheṣu bhagavatsu triṣṭhatsu dhriyatsu yāpayatsu iyaṃ dhāraṇī śrutā ca pratilabdhā ca', / apara*

:vam āhuḥ, 'asmābhir dvigaṅgānadīvālikāsamānāṃ', apare 'tribhiḥ', apare caturbhiḥ', apare 'pañcabhiḥ' apare 'ṣaḍbhiḥ', apare 'saptabhiḥ', apare 'aṣṭabhiḥ' /apare evam āhuḥ, ... navasu ... (Then those Bodhisattvas said :hus: 'O Lord Bhagavant, this *dhāraṇī* has been heard and grasped by us when Buddhas Bhagavants of the past, so numerous as the sands of a river Ganges, stayed, lived, existed'. Others said thus: '... so numerous as the sands of two rivers Ganges'. Others: '... of three...'. Others: '... of four ...'. Others: '... of five ...'. Others: '... of six ...'. Others: '... of seven ...'. Others: '... of eight ...'. Others said thus: '... of nine ...').

Daśabhūmikasūtra, p. 4, lines 6–7: *...daśabuddhakṣetra-koṭīparamāṇurajaḥsamās tathāgatā mukhāny upadarśāyāṃ āsuḥ* (Tathāgatas so numerous as the powder of the atoms of ten times ten millions of Buddha-Worlds showed their faces).

Mahāvastu I, pp. 124–126: *atikrāntānāṃ buddhānāṃ pūrvā koṭī na prajñāyate / praṇidhentāna bodhāya ... /16/ avaivartikadharmāṇāṃ ... / abhiṣekabhūmiprāptānāṃ ... /17/ tuṣiteṣu vasantānāṃ ... / tuṣitebhyaś cyavantānāṃ ... /18/ mātu kukṣau śayantānāṃ ... / sthitānāṃ matuḥ kukṣau ... /19/ jāyamānānāṃ vīrāṇāṃ ... / jātānāṃ lokanāthānāṃ ... /20/ aṅkeṣu gṛhyamāṇānāṃ ... / pādāni vikramantānāṃ ... /21/ mahāhāsaṃ hasantānāṃ ... / diśaṃ vilokayantānāṃ ... /22/ aṅkena dhāriyantānāṃ ... / upanīyamānānāṃ gandharvaiḥ ... /23/ purebhyo niṣkramantānāṃ ... / bodhimūlam upentānāṃ ... /24/ prāpnuvantānāṃ tathāgatajñānāṃ ... / dharmacakrapravartantānāṃ ... /25/ satvakoṭī vinentānāṃ ... / siṃhanādaṃ nadantānāṃ ... /26/ āyuḥsaṃskāraṃ utsṛjantānāṃ ... / nirvāyantānāṃ vīrāṇāṃ ... /27/ nirvṛtānāṃ śayantānāṃ ... / dhyāpiyantānāṃ vīrāṇāṃ pūrvā koṭī na prajñāyate /28/* (The first extreme of past Buddhas is not known ... neither of those who assume the vow to win Enlightenment ... (16) ... neither of those who are not liable to turning back ... neither of those who attained the consecration stage ... (17) ... neither of those who live among the Tuṣita Gods ... neither of those who fall from the Tuṣita Gods ... (18) ... neither of those who lie in their mother's womb ... neither of those who stand in their mother's womb ... (19) ... neither of the Heroes who are being born ... neither of those Saviours of the world who have been born ... (20) ... neither of those who are taken on their mother's hip ... neither of those who take the (seven) steps ... (21) ... neither of those who laugh a loud laugh ... neither of those who contemplate the regions of the space ... (22) ... neither of those who are carried on the hip (of their mothers) ... neither of those who are attended by the Gandharvas ... (23) ... neither of those who depart from their homes ... neither of those who approach the Bodhi-tree ... (24) ... neither of those who attain the knowledge of a Tathāgata ... neither of those who set rolling the Wheel of Dharma ... (25) ... neither of those who convert ten millions of beings ... neither of those who roar the Lion's Roar ... (26) ... neither of those who abandon the conditionings of life ... neither of those Heroes who are extinguished ... (27) ...

neither of those who lie extinguished ... neither is known the first extreme of those Heroes who are cremated (28)).

Ibidem I, p. 46: *aprameyās tathāgatā arhantaḥ samyaksaṃbuddhāḥ pūjitā...* (Countless Tathāgatas arhants, perfectly enlightened have been honoured [by me = Śākyamuni]).

In *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* are found numerous references to the countless Buddhas of the past, the present and the future. We mention some of them:

p. 52, verse 98: *anāgatā pi bahubuddhakoṭyo acintiyā yeṣu pramāṇu nāsti* (The inconceivable many ten millions of future Buddhas who have no measure);

p. 49, verse 71: *ye cāpy abhūvan purimās tathāgatāḥ parinirvṛtā buddhasahasraneke / atītam adhvānam asaṃkhyakalpe teṣāṃ pramāṇaṃ na kadāci vidyate* (There is not in any way a measure for those who in the past in countless kalpas have been the many thousands of Buddhas, the former Tathāgatas completely extinguished);

p. 22, lines 1–2: *paścād bahūni buddhakoṭīnayutaśatasahasrāṇi dṛṣṭāni satkṛtāni ca* (Afterwards many hundred thousand of ten millions of hundred thousand millions of Buddhas were seen and worshipped [by them: the eight sons of *Candrasūryapradīpa*]);

p. 29, lines 3–5: *bahubuddhakoṭīnayutaśatasahasraparyupāsitāvino ... tathāgatā ... bahubuddhakoṭīnayutaśatasahasracīrṇacaritāvino* (Tathāgatas who have worshipped many hundred thousand millions of Buddhas, who have fulfilled their Career under many hundred thousand of ten millions of hundred thousand millions of Buddhas).

For other cases of references to infinite number of Buddhas in the *Lotus Sūtra* see Index to the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* sub '*bahu-buddha*' etc., pp. 712–714.

Dynamic conception

We can say that Buddhism has a dynamic conception of reality. This manifests itself in the peculiar doctrine of the *dharmas*.[3]

The *dharmas* are the elements, the constituent factors of all that exists. All that is 'material', as human body, is constituted by material *dharmas*. The mental phenomena as perceptions, sensations, volitions, acts of conciousness are nothing but *dharmas*. And man is only a psycho-physical aggregate of material *dharmas* and of mental *dharmas*. Reality, in its integrity, is likewise nothing else than *dharmas*—isolated or accumulated.

Dharmas are unsubstantial (*anātman*), because (using the western terminology) they do not exist in *se et per se*, or (using the Buddhist terminology) they do not exist *svabhāvena*, i.e. they do not possess an own being; they are dependent, produced by causes and conditions. And, besides that, since the first period of Buddhist thought, *dharmas* were conceived as impermanent (*anitya*). But in the Hīnayāna several

sects added to the *dharmas* the attribute of instantaneity. Among these sects are the Sarvāstivādins, the Vātsīputrīyas, the Mahīśāsakas and the Kāśyapīyas and the sects derived from these, according to Vasumitra (*Ipu tsung lun lun*, pp. 16 c, line 2; 16 c, lines 15–16; 17 a, lines 13–14, and 17 b, line 1 = Bareau [1954], pp. 255, 257; 262 and 265, and Masuda [1925], pp. 50, 54, 62 and 65). Buddhaghosa in his commentary (pp. 195–196) to *Kathāvatthu* (XXII, p. 620), informs that the Pubbaseliya and the Aparaseliya sects, both derived from the Mahāsaṅghikas, affirmed the instantaneity of *dharmas*. Vasubandhu, who exposes the Abhidharmic point of view of the Sarvāstivādins-Vaibhāṣikas, emphatically says (*Abhidharmakośa* IV, 2 d, pp. 568–569) that 'what is conditioned is momentary' (*saṃskṛtaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ*, and *bhāṣya* ad locum: *ko 'yaṃ kṣaṇo nāma? ātmalābho 'nantaravināśī*, so *'syāstīti kṣaṇikaḥ*). Yaśomitra ad *Abhidharmakośa* II, 46 b, p. 262, line 26, refers to the Vaibhāṣikas with the term *kṣaṇikavādin*. On the contrary the Theravādins, according to the quoted text of the *Kathāvatthu*, did not accept the momentariness of the *dharmas*, and this explains why they remained attached to the realistic conception of the world.

This thesis of the momentariness of the *dharmas* will prevail in the Mahāyāna and it will give rise to its idealistic conception of reality, as we shall see. On the momentariness of the *dharmas* in Mahāyāna see for instance the following texts where the concept of momentariness is fully developed, and arguments for its demonstration are given: Asaṅga, *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra* XVIII, 82–91; Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṅgraha* (*Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā*) 350–475, and Kamalaśīla ad locum; Dharmakīrti, *Hetubindu*, pp. 42–67, and the *ṭīkās* of Vinītadeva and Arcaṭa; Dharmottara, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*; Jñānaśrīmitra, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya*; Ratnakīrti, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ-anvayātmikā*, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ-vyatirekātmikā* and *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*; Ratnākaraśānti, *Antarvyāptisamarthana*. Jitāri wrote a treatise whose title is *Kṣaṇajabhaṅga*, see G. Bühnemann [1985], p. 11.

The *dharmas*, as soon as they appear, disappear, and are replaced by other *dharmas* of the same species as long as the causes that provoked the appearance of the replaced *dharma* continue to exist. Thus reality is an accumulation of series of *dharmas*, in a process of vertiginous constant replacement.[4] The result is that, as D.N. Shastri [1976] says, p. 189, 'the reality, according to the Buddhist, is not static; it is dynamic. It is not being; it is becoming'.

The dynamic nature manifest itself not only in the elements, the *dharmas*, that constitute the foundations of reality, but also in reality itself, taken as a whole, since it is in a beginningless process of cyclic alternance of creations and destructions. This conception[5] is formulated in *Aṅguttara Nikāya* II (*Kappasutta*), p. 142, where it is said that in each cosmic period (*kappa* = *kalpa*) there are four incalculable periods (*asaṅkheyyāni*); 1. the period of *saṃvaṭṭa*, complete destruction, dissolution ('in-volving' cycle); 2. the period during which the state

reached by the complete destruction remains (*saṃvaṭṭaṭṭhāyin*); 3. the period of *vivaṭṭa* (creation, 'de-volving' cycle), and 4. the period during which the state reached by the creation remains (*vivaṭṭaṭṭhāyin*). Each of these periods lasts an incalculable number of years.

This cosmological theory is referred to in numerous texts as for instance:

Dīgha Nikāya III (*Aggañña suttanta*), p. 84: *hoti kho so Vāseṭṭha samayo yaṃ kadāci karahaci dīghassa addhuno accayena ayaṃ loko saṃvaṭṭati ... hoti kho so Vāseṭṭha samayo yaṃ kadāci karahaci dīghassa addhuno accayena ayaṃ loko vivaṭṭati* (There is a time, O Vāseṭṭha, when at some moment or other, at the end of a long period, this universe is destroyed ... There is a time, O Vāseṭṭha, when at some moment or other, at the end of a long period, this universe is created. Cf. ibidem (*Brahmajālasutta*) I, p. 17; *Vinaya* III, p. 4; *Itivuttaka*, p. 99.

Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga*, p. 356, paragraph 66: *Pubbenivāsaṃ anussaranto pi ca kappānussarako bhikkhu etesu kappesu aneke pi saṃvaṭṭakappe aneke pi vivaṭṭakappe aneke pi saṃvaṭṭavivaṭṭakappe anussarati* (Remembering his former state of existence, the monk, who remembers the cosmic cycles, remembers in those cosmic cycles numerous cycles of destruction, numerous cycles of creation, numerous cycles of destruction and creation).

Ta chih tu lun (*Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*), p. 125 c, lines 25–27 (= Lamotte's translation, Vol. I, p. 542: Je vois dans la région de l'Est (*pūrvasyāṃ diśi*) d'innombrables univers naissant, subsistant ou périssant. Leur nombre est très grand et défie le calcul. Il en est de même dans les dix régions).

The laws that regulate our world

The empirical reality as conceived by Buddhism, unlimited in space, without beginning in time, with its immense number of worlds, peopled by numberless beings, in which countless Buddhas preach the salvific Dharma, in a constant process of change, is not a chaotic universe. The empirical reality is submitted to laws, principles, norms, which regulate its existence and behaviour, which determine what necessarily must happen and vice versa what necessarily cannot happen in given circumstances, that is to say, when determined causes and conditions occur or do not occur. Thanks to these laws the universe appears as an organized system, as a cosmos.

We may consider that this Buddhist conception of a regulated universe is rooted in the ancient Vedic conception of a Cosmic Order (*ṛta*) that is either a product of the norms imposed by the Gods or an autonomous self-imposed principle.

The causal law and its universality

All that exists is for Buddhism under the sway of the law of causality (*paṭiccasamuppāda / pratītyasamutpāda*), condensed in the well-known

formula, *asmin sati, idaṃ bhavati*: 'given this, occurs that'.[6] Nothing occurs in the domain of existence owing to hazard, casually. Everything is the product of the conjunction of a multiplicity of causes. Nothing comes into existence, remains in it or goes out from it without the intervention of one or several causes. All is dependent, *pratītyasamutpanna*. This conception had a remarkable development in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* and it reaches its extreme expression in the Mādhyamika theory of Voidness (*śūnyatā*), absence of an own being (*svabhāvaśūnyatā*).[7] This law of causality is the great law of the universe.

The universality of the causality law is revealed by the fact that it is the foundation of one of the *tilakkhaṇa / trilakṣaṇa*, the three universal characteristics of reality: all is *anattan / anātman*, that is unsubstantial, lacking an own being, lacking an existence in *se et per se*. The principle *sabbe dhammā anattā* or *sabbaṃ anattā* is found in many Pāli texts as for instance: *Dhammapada*, verse 279; *Saṃyutta Nikāya* III (*Channasutta*), p. 133, IV (*Aniccādisuttanavaka*), p. 28 (*sabbaṃ anattā*), p. 401; *Majjhima Nikāya* I (*Cūḷasaccakasutta*), p. 228; *Aṅguttara Nikāya* I (*Uppādāsutta*), p. 286; *Theragāthā*, verse 678; *Paṭisambhidāmagga* I, p. 37, p. 53; *Mahā-Niddesa*, p. 94, p. 271; *Kathāvatthu*, p. 65, p. 531; *Vibhaṅga*, p. 70 (without *sabbe*).

And all is unsubstancisal because of being dependent, *pratītyasamutpanna*, as expressed in the following texts:

Nāgārjuna, *Acintyastava* 3: *pratyayebhyaḥ samutpannam anutpannaṃ tvayoditam / svabhāvena na taj jātam iti śūnyaṃ prakāśitam* (What has arisen from conditions has been said by you to be un-arisen; that is not born with an own being, therefore it has been proclaimed to be void).

Ibidem 40 a-b: *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatā saiva te matā* (What is Origination in Dependence, that indeed has been considered by you to be Voidness, i.e. dependence = unsubstantiality).

Nāgārjuna, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikākārikā* 19 a-b (Tibetan translation): *de daṅ de brten gaṅ ḥbyuṅ de / raṅ gi dṅos por skyes ma yin* (What arises depending on this or that [cause]-that is not produced as a thing with an own being). Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā* ad I, 1, p. 9, line 5, and *Subhāṣita-saṃgraha* [28], p. 395, line 19, quote the (Sanskrit) text of kārikā 19 of the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā: tat tat prāpya yad utpannaṃ notpannaṃ tat svabhāvataḥ*.

Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā* quotes four times ad XIII, 2, p. 239, indicating the source (see below), ad XXIV, 7, p. 491, ad 14, p. 500, and ad 18, p. 504, the following stanza: *yaḥ pratyayair jāyati sa hyajāto no tasya utpādu sabhāvato 'sti / yaḥ pratyayādhīnu sa śūnya ukto yaḥ śūnyatāṃ jānati so' pramattaḥ* (ad XIII, 2. The other quotations have *svabhāvato* instead of *sabhāvato*). (What is born out of conditions, that is not born indeed, it has not an arising with being [variant: with own being]; what is dependent on conditions, that is called 'void'. Who knows Voidness, he is not negligent). Prajñākaramati, *Pañjikā* ad IX, 2, p. 172 (with *sabhāvato* in *pāda* b) and *Subhāṣita-saṃgraha* [28] pp. 395–396 (with *utpāda evāsya bhavet svabhāvāt in pāda* b) quote this stanza (with the indicated variants and without mentioning the source). Candrakīrti points out that this

stanza comes from the *Anavataptahradāpasaṃkramaṇasūtra.* The stanza is found in the Chinese translation of this *sūtra* included in *Taishō*, Vol. XV, No. 635, p. 497 b, 3–4 and in the Tibetan translation included for instance in Sde-dge edition, *Tōhoku* No 156 and Peking edition, Catalogue No 823. In both translations the *sūtra* bears different names.

Several Mahāyāna text explicitly assert that everything is dependent on causes, i.e. is *pratītyasamupanna*, as for instance:

Lalitavistara, p. 117, line 1: *hetu pratītya bhava śūnya ... dharmā* (The dharmas being dependent on a cause, are void of [real] existence).

p. 340, lines 3–4: *pratītya jātā dharmā ime* (These dharmas are born in dependence).

p. 375, line 11: *pratītyasamudāgataṃ jagac chūnyam* (The world arisen in dependence is void).

p. 419, line 9: *hetuṃ pratītya imi saṃbhuta sarvadharmā* (All these dharmas are born depending on a cause).

Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 191, line 12: *pratītya sarve imi bhāva utthitāḥ* (All these beings have arisen in dependence).

Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamakaśāstra* XXIV, 19 a-b: *apratītyasamutpanno dharmaḥ kaścin na vidyate* (There is not a dharma arisen not in dependence).

Aryadeva, *Catuḥśataka* IX, 2: *apratītyāstitā nāsti kadā cit kasya cit kva cit* (An existence not in dependence does not exist at any time for anything at any place). This verse is quoted by Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā* ad XX, 9 and XXIV, 19).

The same Candrakīrti quotes, ibidem, a saying of the Bhagavant: *sahetu sapratyaya dharma jānati / ahetu apratyaya nāsti dharmatā* (The [wise] knows that dharmas are with causes, with conditions; the nature of the dharmas is not without causes, without conditions).

The expression of the same idea is found in Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* VI, 25 c-d: *sarvaṃ tatpratyayabalāt svatantraṃ tu na vidyate* (Because of causality nothing is self-dependent), which is commented by Prajñākaramati ad locum: *idampratyayatāmātrasamupasthitasvabhāvaṃ sarvam idam / na tu svātantryapravṛttaṃ kiṃcid api vidyate* (All this has a nature which has been produced only by causality. Nothing exists self-dependently arisen), and VI, 31 a-b: *evaṃ paravaśaṃ sarvaṃ* (Thus all is dependent on another).

Importance of the causal law

The *paṭiccasamuppāda / pratītyasamutpāda* has ever been a fundamental theory of Buddhism, since its origin, along all its history, either when it designated the chain of twelve *dharmas* that produce suffering or when it came to designate universal contingency as the supreme law of reality. The importance possessed by the causal law is indicative of its universality. This importance manifests itself in many facts.

The *paṭiccasamuppāda / pratītyasamutpāda*, as the chain of twelve

members, constitutes a development of the Second and Third Noble Truths, which explains how suffering arises and how it is suppressed. And, as the universal contingency, it is the basis of the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra philosophies.

The *paṭiccasamuppāda / pratītyasamutpāda* is considered by Buddha to be his *dhamma: Vuttaṃ kho pan 'etaṃ Bhagavatā: Yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati, yo dhammaṃ passati so paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passatīti* (That has been said by the Bhagavant: Whoever sees Dependent Origination sees the Doctrine, whoever sees the Doctrine sees the Dependent Origination) (*Majjhima Nikāya* I, *Mahāhatthipadopamasutta*, pp. 190–191). The *Śālistamba Sūtra* in its beginning affirms in a similar way: *yo bhikṣavaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyati / sa dharmaṃ paśyati / yo dharmaṃ paśyati sa buddhaṃ paśyati / ity uktvā Bhagavān tūṣṇīṃ babhūva.* According to the *Āryapratītyasamutpādanāmamahāyānasūtra*, p. 71 infra: *rten ciṅ ḥbrel bar ḥbyuṅ ba ḥdi ni de bin gsegs pa rnams kyi chos kyi sku yin te / sus rten ciṅ ḥbrel bar ḥbyuṅ ba mthoṅ ba des de bzin gsegs pa mthoṅ ṅo* (This Dependent Origination is the dharmakāya of the Tathāgatas, whoever sees the Dependent Origination sees the Tathāgata).

The *paṭiccasamuppāda / pratītyasamutpāda* is also considered by Buddha to be the *ariyo ñāyo*, the Noble (Buddhist) method: *katamo cassa ariyo ñāyo paññāya suditṭho hoti suppaṭividdho? idha, gahapati, ariyasāvako paṭiccasamuppādaññeva sādhukaṃ yoniso manasi karoti—iti imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imassuppāda idaṃ uppajjati; iti imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati; yadidaṃ avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā ... ayam assa ariyo ñāyo paññāya suditṭho suppaṭividdho* (And what is the Noble [Buddhist] method which he [Buddha's disciple] has well seen and well penetrated by insight? In this world, O householder, the Noble [Buddha's] disciple well and thoroughly reflects on the Dependent Origination: this being, that is; by the arising of this, that arises; this not being, that is not, by the cessation of this, that ceases; thus, conditioned by ignorance, the *saṅkhāras* [arise] ... this is the Noble [Buddhist] method which he has well seen and well penetrated by insight) (*Saṃyutta Nikāya* V, *Paṭhamabhayaverūpasantasutta*, pp. 388–389). Cf. ibidem II (*Pañcaverabhayasutta*), p. 70.

Many texts express that the discovery by Buddha of the *paṭiccasamuppāda / pratītyasamutpāda* took place during the middle watch or the last watch of the night in which he attained the *bodhi* (Enlightenment). That indicates the importance this doctrine possesses as being discovered in the most significant moment of Buddha's life. See the texts quoted by Lamotte [1977], pp. 282–283: *Taishō* 187, pp. 595 b 6–595 c 24; *Mahāvastu* II, p. 285, lines 7–18; *Lalitavistara*, pp. 346, lines 1–348, line 15; *Taishō* 189, pp. 642 a 20–642 b 10; *Taishō* 190, pp. 794 c 12–795 b 19; *Buddhacarita* of Aśvaghoṣa XIV, verses 49–86; *Nidānakathā*, p. 75, lines 25–26.

Buddha himself praises the *paṭiccasamuppāda / pratītyasamutpāda* as

being profound (*gambhīra*) and as looking profound and remarks that, through not understanding this doctrine, through not penetrating it, people are in a confused state of mind: *Gambhīro cāyaṃ Ānanda paṭiccasamuppādo gambhīrāvabhāso ca. Etassa Ānanda dhammassa ananubodhā appaṭivedhā evam ayaṃ pajā tantākulakajātā gulāguṇṭhikajātā muñjababbajabhūtā apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ saṃsāraṃ nātivattati* (*Dīgha Nikāya* II, *Mahānidānasuttanta*, p. 55). Cf. *Saṃyutta Nikāya* II, (*Nidānasutta*), p. 92. Buddhaghosa in his commentaries of both passages (*Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī* II, pp. 485–486, and *Sārattha-pakāsinī* II, p. 87) explains that the profoundness of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* is like the ocean at the foot of Mount Sineru: *Ekaṃ gambhīraṃ gambhīr 'āvabhāsaṃ hoti, Sinerupādakamahāsamudde udakaṃ viya.*

And it is a very well-known fact that the *paṭiccasamuppāda / pratītyasamutpāda* theory is mentioned, developed, explained, commented in a brief or large form in numerous Buddhist texts. Even there are *suttas, sūtras, śāstras* dedicated to that theory. And many times Buddha is extolled as the discoverer of this theory. Ancient Brahmin authors have referred to this Buddhist theory in order to discuss and criticize it, and many modern scholars have dealt with it pointing out its paramount importance in Buddhist philosophy.

Universal interdependence

The strictest causality which governs empirical reality in its entirety implies, as a corollary, the interdependence of all that exists, since every thing is produced as an effect by the conjuction of a multiplicity of things that act as causes; and consequently each of these things that act as causes is on its own turn produced as an effect by the conjunction of a multiplicity of other things that also act as causes, and so on in a beginningless backward process. The necessity of a plurality of causes and/or conditions for the forthcoming of anything is stated in many texts as for instance:

Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa* I, 7, pp. 25–26: *rūpaskandhaḥ vedanāskandhaḥ, saṃjñāskandhaḥ saṃskāraskandhaḥ, vijñānaskandhaś ceti, ete saṃskṛtā dharmāḥ / sametya = sambhūya pratyayaiḥ kṛtā iti saṃskṛtāḥ/ na hyekapratyayajanitaṃ kiñcid astīti* (The form-aggregate, the sensation-aggregate, the perception-aggregate, the *saṃskāra*-aggregate and the consciousness-aggregate, are the *saṃskṛta* [conditioned] *dharmas*. They are conditioned because they are produced by conditions coming together (*sametya*) i.e. being joined (*sambhūya*), because there is nothing produced by [only] one condition).

Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga*, p. 461, paragraphs 105–106: *Etth 'āha: Kiṃ panāyam ekā va avijjā saṅkhārānaṃ paccayo, udāhu aññe pi paccayā santī ti? Kiṃ pan 'ettha? Yadi tāva ekā va, ekakāraṇavādo āpajjati; atha aññe pi santi, avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā ti ekakāraṇaniddeso n'upapajjatī ti. Na n'upapajjati. Kasmā? Yasmā*

Ekaṃ na ekato idha nānekaṃ anekato pi no ekaṃ
phalam atthi...

Ekato hi kāraṇato na idha kiñci ekaṃ phalam atthi, na anekaṃ, nāpi anekehi kāraṇehi ekaṃ, anekehi pana kāraṇehi anekam eva hoti. Tathā hi anekehi utu-pathavī-bīja-salilasaṅkhātehi kāraṇehi anekam eva rūpagandharasādikaṃ aṅkurasaṅkhātaṃ phalaṃ uppajjamānaṃ dissati (Here [some one] says: Is ignorance alone the condition of the *saṅkhāras*, or are there other conditions? What does this mean? If [ignorance] alone, then the theory of a single cause occurs, if there are other causes, then the teaching of one single cause as expressed in 'the *saṅkhāra* are conditioned by ignorance' has no place. No, it has no place [really]. Why? Because:

> In the world from one neither one nor many, and only one effect is not [produced] from many...

For in the world from a single cause no single effect whatsoever is [produced] nor many; through many causes a single [effect] is not [produced] either; through many causes many [effects] are indeed [produced]. Thus through many causes named 'climate, earth, seed, water' etc., many effects as form, smell, taste and so on named 'shoot' are seen to arise).

A similar process takes place in regard to the effects. Each of the things that are produced as an effect, acting as a cause, in conjunction with a multiplicity of other things, that also act as causes, produces other things as effects, and so on in an endless forward process.

We may consider that this idea is on the basis of the explanation given in *Milindapañho, Lakkhaṇapañho* II, pp. 52–54 (Vadekar ed.). Nāgasena expresses that *avijjā*, ignorance, is the root of the three times, that from it come forth the other members of *paṭiccasamuppāda* and that for the whole of time a 'first end', that is, a beginning is not known. At the request of the king, Nāgasena gives three illustrations that imply that *paṭiccasamuppāda* incessantly revolves, as a wheel, that this movement has neither beginning nor end, and that in this dynamic process effects behave as causes of other effects. The first illustration concerns the *bīja-aṅkura-phala* mechanism: from the seed, the shoot, from the shoot, the fruit, from the fruit again the *bīja*, and so on. The second illustration is that of the hen and the egg which give rise to one another. The third illustration makes manifest the circular conception of *paṭiccasamuppāda* (p. 53, lines 15–17): *Thero paṭhaviyā cakkaṃ likhitvā Milindaṃ rājānaṃ etad 'voca—Atthi mahārāja imassa cakkassa anto 'ti. Natthi bhante 'ti* (The Thera drew a circle on the ground and said to King Milinda: Is there any end to this circle? No, Sir, there is not). In reference to this last illustration Nāgasena introduces another 'circles' mentioned by Buddha (p. 53, lines 17–21): *Evam eva kho mahārāja imāni cakkāni vuttāni bhagavatā—cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpaṃ ca paṭicca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ,*

tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṃ, upādānapaccayā kammaṃ. Kammato puna cakkhuṃ jāyatī 'ti. Evam etissā ṣantatiyā atthi anto 'ti. Natthi bhante 'ti (Such are, O Great King, these circles spoken of by the Bhagavant: depending on the eye and depending on the form arises the consciousness-of-the-eye [= sight], the union of the three is contact, depending on contact arises sensation, depending on sensation arises thirst [= desire], depending on thirst arises attachment, depending on attachment arises *kamma* [= *karmam*], and from *kamma* eye again arises. Is there any end to this series? No, Sir, there is not). The same reasoning is applied to the other organs of sense, including mind (*manas*).

The *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā*, wrongly attributed to Nāgārjuna,[8] states the circular nature of the causal law, its eternal revolving movement (expressed by the metaphor of the never-stopping wheel) and the effects becoming causes: *tṛbhyo bhavati dvandvaṃ dvandvāt prabhavanti sapta saptabhyaḥ / traya udbhavanti bhūyas tad eva* [*tu*] *bhramati bhavacakram* (From the three [*avidyā, tṛṣṇa* and *upādāna* = *kleśa*] arise the two [*saṃskāras* and *bhava* = *karma*], from the two come forth the seven [*vijñāna, nāmarūpa, ṣaḍāyatana, sparśa, vedanā, jāti, jarāmaraṇa* = *duḥkha*] and from the seven again arise the three: this wheel of existence revolves).

The *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu ad III, 19, p. 435, has: *etena prakāreṇa kleśakarmahetukaṃ janma taddhetukāni punaḥ kleśakarmāṇi tebhyaḥ punar janmety anādibhavacakrakaṃ veditavyam* (In this way birth is caused by impurity and action; impurity and action are caused at their turn by that [birth]; and again birth is [produced] from them [= impurity and action]—thus the beginningless wheel of existence is to be known).

And finally, we find in Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* XVII, p. 498, paragraph 298: *Tivaṭṭam anavaṭṭhitaṃ bhamatī ti* [cf. p. 496, paragraph 288] *ettha pana, saṅkhāra-bhavā kammavaṭṭaṃ, avijjā-taṇhupādānāni kilesavaṭṭaṃ, viññāṇa-nāmarūpa-saḷāyatanā-phassā-vedanā vipākavaṭṭan ti imehi tīhi vaṭṭehi tivaṭṭam idaṃ bhavacakkaṃ, yāva kilesavaṭṭaṃ na upacchijjati, tāva anupacchinnapaccayattā anavaṭṭhitaṃ, punappunaṃ parivattanato bhamati yevā ti veditabbaṃ* (The round of three revolves without stopping—here the *saṅkhāras* and *bhava* are the round of *kamma; avijjā, taṇhā* and *upādāna* are the round of *kilesa; viññāṇa, nāmarūpa, saḷāyatana, phassa, vedanā* are the round of result, *vipāka*—this wheel of existence, consisting of three rounds, because of having these three [mentioned] rounds, not stopping due to a causality which is not cut off, revolves with an incessantly turning, so long as the round of *kilesa* is not cut off—so it must be known).

The result of this interdependence of causes and effects that pervades the whole reality is a 'net' that relates among themselves all the existing things—momentary, evanescent, interconnected by causal relations, acting all of them at the same time as effect and cause. The universal

interdependence is another great law of existence. And it is based on it that Buddhism constructs an ethics of solidarity among all beings, humans, animals, plants, the non-conscious nature and things.

Other laws

The law of causality manifests itself in other laws that regulate the physical order, the moral order, and the course of the salvific action.

As an example of law referent to the physcial order, the Buddhist texts mention the inevitable destruction of all that arises, which affects the human body and every kind of life in nature, being time the factor that allows the functioning of this law.

This law is expressed in the well known formula: *yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ, sabban taṃ nirodhadhamman ti* (Whatsoever arises is subject to destruction). Cf. *Udāna* V, 3, p. 49, lines 15–16; *Mahāvagga* p. 11 in fine; *Dīgha Nikāya* I (*Ambaṭṭhasutta*) p. 110, lines 12–13; *Saṃyutta Nikāya* IV (*Paṭhamagilānasutta*), pp. 47, 107; *Majjhima Nikāya* III (*Cūḷarāhulovādasutta*), p. 280, lines 10–11.

An example of law referent to the moral order is the law of *karman / kamma* or moral retribution of actions. Every action, good or bad, gives rise to merits or demerits and demands necessarily reward or punishment in this life or in other future existences. The whole destiny of beings depend on their *karman*, that is, on the moral quality of the actions that they have accomplished in their previous existences.

Majjhima Nikāya III (*Cūḷakammavibhaṅgasutta*), pp. 202–203, clearly expresses this doctrine: *Ko nu kho, bho Gotama, hetu ko paccayo yena manussānaṃ yeva sataṃ manussabhūtānaṃ dissati hīnappaṇītatā? Dissanti hi, bho Gotama, manussā appāyukā, dissanti dīghāyukā; dissanti bavhābādhā, dissanti appābādhā; dissanti dubbaṇṇā, dissanti vaṇṇavanto; dissanti appesakkhā, dissanti mahesakkhā; dissanti appabhogā, dissanti mahābhogā; dissanti nīcākulīnā, dissanti uccākulīnā; dissanti duppaññā, dissanti paññavanto. Ko nu kho, bho Gotama, hetu ko paccayo yena manussānaṃ yeva sataṃ manussabhūtānaṃ dissati hīnappaṇītatā ti? Kammassakā, māṇava, sattā kammadāyādā kammayonī kammabandhū kammapaṭisaraṇā. Kammaṃ satte vibhajati yadidaṃ hīnappaṇītatāyāti.* (Now, dear Gotama, what is the cause, what is the reason, that lowness and excellence are seen among human beings, while they are born as humans? For, dear Gotama, human beings of short life-span are seen, of long life-span are seen of many illnesses are seen, of few illnesses are seen, of ugly complexion are seen, of beautiful complexion are seen, of little power are seen, of great power are seen, of little wealth are seen, of great wealth are seen, of low-class family are seen, of high-class family are seen, of weak intelligence are seen, intelligent (ones) are seen ... O young man, beings are owners of their *karman*, are heirs of their *karman*; they have as matrix their *karman*, they have as kinsman their *karman*, they have as protector their *karman*. Karman divides beings—by lowness and excellence). Cf.

Milindapañho, p. 65 (PTS ed.). Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya* II (*Mallikādevīsutta*), pp. 202–205: the *karman* explains why some women are beautiful, rich etc. and others are not; *Ta chi tu lun* (*Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*), p. 119 b, line 11-c, line 4: the *karman* is the cause whereby some persons do not see a Buddha but get to eat and to drink, while others see a Buddha but do not obtain food and drink.

In the *Majjhima Nikāya* I (*Kukkuravatikasutta*), pp. 387–392, the Buddha describes the four kinds of actions that can be accomplished by men indicating the consequences of each of these kinds of actions. He concludes each one of his four expositions with the following words, which concentrate the essential import of the doctrine of *karman: bhūtā bhūtassa upapatti hoti, yaṃ karoti tena upapajjati ... Evaṃ p'ahaṃ ... kammadāyādā sattā ti vadāmi* (Rebirth of a being is from what has come to be; according to what he does, so is he reborn ... So I say: beings are heirs of their karman).

The greatest example of the application of the law of *karman* is given by Śākyamuni himself who, after an infinite number of rebirths in which He accumulated limitless merits, attained the condition of Buddha.

The destiny of beings, in all its aspects, as is seen by the quoted text of *Majjhima Nikāya* III, depends on their deeds, on their *karman*. But the incidence of the *karman* of any individual is not limited to him; together with the *karman* of other individuals it possesses a collective force that determines the destiny of the universe: its destruction, its new creation, the special features it is to possess in its new stage of existence, the events which will occur in it, etc.

This doctrine is several times referred to in Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa*, Book III, while describing the *bhājanaloka*, the world where beings are to exist:

ad III, 45 c - d, p. 506: *trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātor evaṃ sanniveśam icchanti, yad utākāśapratiṣṭham adhastād vāyumaṇḍalām abhinirvṛttaṃ sarvasattvānāṃ karmādhipatyena* (They maintain that the disposition of the universe consisting of three thousand great thousand world-systems is thus: below is the circle of wind placed on the space, come into being by the sovereign power of the karman of all beings);

ad III, 46 a - b, p. 506: *tasmin vāyumaṇḍale sattvānāṃ karmabhir meghāḥ saṃbhūyākṣamātrābhir dhārābhir abhivarṣanti* (By the [power of the] karmans of beings clouds, coming together, pour their rain by means of drops of the measure of an akṣa[9]);

ibidem: *kathaṃ tā āpo na tiryag visravanti? sattvānāṃ karmādhipatyena* (Why these waters [those that form the circle of waters] do not flow away sideways? [They do not] owing to the power of the karman of beings);

ibidem, p. 507: *tāś ca punar āpaḥ sattvānāṃ karmaprabhāvasaṃbhūtair vāyubhir āvarttyamānā upariṣṭāt kāñcanībhavanti* (And then these waters

agitated by winds produced by the force of the *karman* of beings become gold in the upper part);

ad III, 50 a, p. 509: *evaṃ ca punaḥ sambhūtāḥ suvarṇādayaḥ karmaprabhāvāt preritair vāyubhiḥ samāhṛtya rāśīkriyante. ta ete parvatāś ca bhavanti, dvīpāś ca* (And then the gold etc., produced in this way are gathered and heaped by the winds, put in motion by the force of *karman*, and they become the mountains and the continents.);

ad III, 59 a - b, p. 516: *katham idānīṃ ceṣṭante? sattvānāṃ karmabhir vivarttanīvāyuvat* (How then they [the *narakapālas*] move? [They move] by the *karmans* of beings, like the winds of creation);

ad III, 60 ante a, p. 518: *athemau candrārkau kasmin pratiṣṭhitau? vāyau. vāyavo 'ntarikṣe sarvasattvasādhāraṇakarmādhipatyanirvṛttā āvartavat sumeruṃ parivartante* (On what the moon and the sun are established? On the wind. The winds produced by the sovereign power of the collective *karman* turn round the Sumeru like a whirlpool);

ad III, 60 b, p. 518: *sūryavimānasyādhastād bahiḥ sphaṭikamaṇḍalaṃ taijasam abhinirvṛttaṃ tāpanaṃ prakāśanaṃ ca. candravimānasyādhastād āpyaṃ śītalaṃ bhāsvaraṃ ca. prāṇināṃ karmabhir dṛṣṭiśarīraphalapuṣpaśasyauṣadhīnām anugrahārtham, upaghātakārtham ca yathāsambhavaṃ* (Under and outside the mansion of the sun a crystal circle of fire is produced, burning and illuminating, under the mansion of the moon one of water, cold and brilliant. By [the force of] the *karmans* of beings they [: both circles] are, according to circumstances, for conferring benefits to the eye, the body, fruits, flowers, grains, herbs and for damaging [them]);

ad IV, 85 a-b, p. 711: *prāṇātipātenātyāsevitena bāhyā bhāvā alpaujaso bhavantīti. adattādānenāśanirajobahulāḥ, kāmamithyācāreṇa rajo 'vakīrṇāḥ, mṛṣāvādena durgandhāḥ, paiśunyenotkūlanikūlāḥ, pāruṣyeṇosarajāṅgalā pratikruṣṭāḥ pāpabhūmayaḥ, sambhinnapralāpe viṣamartupariṇāmāḥ, abhidhyayā śuṣkaphalāḥ, vyāpādena kaṭukaphalāḥ, mithyādṛṣṭyā alpaphalā aphalā vā. idam eṣāṃ adhipatiphalam* (Owing to murder intensely carried on [by men] the external things [according to commentary: plants and earth, etc.] become of little vitality. Owing to theft, they are attended with [rains of] stones and dust; owing to sexual misconduct they are covered with dust; owing to lying they have bad smell; owing to calumny they are going up and down; owing to hard words, they are impregnated with salt and arid, they are poor, bad soils; when there is idle talk, change of seasons is irregular; owing to covetousness [soils] produce dry fruits; owing to malice they produce pungent fruits; owing to wrong views they produce few fruits or no fruit at all. This is the effect of the sovereign power of these bad deeds (*karman*));

ad III, 90 a-b, p. 540: *tataḥ śūnye bhājane ita eva sāmantakāt sattvānāṃ tadākṣepake karmaṇi parikṣīṇe sapta sūryāḥ prādurbhūya krameṇa yāvat pṛthivīṃ sumeruṃ ca nihśeṣaṃ dahanti* (Then, once the *bhājanaloka* is void owing to the extinction of the *karman* of the beings who dwell in it, [that

is, the *karman*] that [previously had] produced that [*bhājanaloka*], seven suns, gradually appearing, burn all up to the earth and the Sumeru);

ad III, 90 c-d, p. 541: *tathā hi saṃvṛtto loka ākāśamātrāvaśeṣaś ciraṃ kalaṃ tiṣṭhati yāvat punar api sattvānāṃ karmādhipatyena bhājanānāṃ pūrvanimittābhūtā ākāśe mandamandā vāyavaḥ syandante* (Thus the world, which has disappeared in this way, during a long time remains being only space until again, through the sovereign power of the *karman* of beings, soft winds spread in the space, as previous signs of *bhājanalokas* [that will appear in the future].

Likewise the *Li shih a p'i t'an lun* (*Lokaprajñāptyabhi-dharmaśāstra*), p. 223 c, lines 1–9, a text belonging to the Sarvāstivāda literature[10] states that, when the universe is again created, it is by the force of the accumulated *karman* of all beings that God Brahmā and his *vimāna* appear as the maturation (*vipāka*) of the fruit (*phala*) of the *karman*. It also asserts that the *karman* produced in previous births is the only sovereign cause (*adhipati*) in the creation of a new world.

The quoted texts of the *Abhidharmakośa* refer to the real creation, existence and destruction of the universe by the force of *karman*, and the text of the Chinese *Lokaprajñaptyabhidharmaśāstra* adopts a similar position in relation to the creation of Brahmā and his *vimāna*, owing to the realist philosophical position of the Hīnayāna to which they belong.

The texts that follow belong to a very different context: Mahāyāna Buddhism, and specially the Yogācāra system of philosophy. Although they consider that the world is only a mental creation, nevertheless they still affirm that the creation, existence and destruction of that mental creation is due to *karman*. Furthermore, the idea that *karman* is the cause of universe gives them the possibility to explain why all beings create in their minds, all of them, the idea, the representation, the mental creation of one and the same universe, avoiding in this way the extreme position of solipsism. All beings mentally create one and the same universe, because their *karman* have had the same 'maturation' (*tulyakarmavipāka*) or because there are 'common' seeds that produce the same 'fruit'.

Hiuan-Tsang, *Ch'eng wei shih lun* (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra), p. 10 c, lines 13–18: The *vipākavijñāna* ('maturation' consciousness), because of the 'maturation' of common *bījas* ('seeds'), is transformed adopting the appearance of the *bhājanaloka* constituted by matter, etc., i.e. the exterior great elements (*mahābhūta*) and the matter formed by them (*bhautika*); [and,] although it in all sentient beings, once transformed, is [in each one of them] apart, different, nevertheless the external aspect is identical [for all beings]: the *bhājanaloka* is not different [for each one of them], as the light of the lamps is [each one] apart, [but] that of all seems to be one. Which *vipākavijñāna* is transformed as that external aspect [of a *bhājanaloka*]? The answer is: all the *vipākavijñānas*. Why? The *sūtra* says: 'because it has arisen by the sovereign force of the

karman of all sentient beings as common [for all].

Vasubandhu, *Viṃśatikā* ad III c-d, explains the fact that all the infernal beings see the same infernal world because they are *tulyakarmavipākāvasthāḥ*, that is, 'because the condition of the maturation of their *karman* is identical', and ad IV c-d: *samānasvakarmavipākādhipatyāt* ('owing to the identical maturation of their *karman*').

Many laws regulate the course of the salvific action. Let us mention among them the law constituted by the Four Noble Truths, according to which human condition is necessarily submitted to suffering, suffering has as its cause attachment, and suffering can be suppressed destroying its cause through a special method: the Eightfold Noble Path, which Buddhism offers. If one follows the Noble Path, one attains Liberation from suffering, Nirvāṇa. From the numerous texts that refer to the Noble Truths and the Noble Path we mention only *Mahāvagga*, (*Dhammacakkappavattana*), p. 10; *Saṃyutta Nikāya* V (*Dhammacakkappavattanasutta*), pp. 420–424; *Dīgha Nikāya* II (*Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasuttanta*), pp. 304–315.

Characteristics of these laws

These laws have not been imposed by a Creator since Buddhism does not accept the existence of a God, Creator and Governor of the Universe.[11] It is the Buddhist atheism which is inserted in the atheistic tradition in India. This tradition is very strong and is shared by a series of non-Buddhist philosophical and religious systems, fully accepted by Hindu orthodoxy, as the Mīmāṃsā, the Sāṃkhya and the most ancient form of the Yoga.

These laws have not been created by Buddha either. They have not been revealed to Him by any superior power or even by any human teacher. They are not a construction of His mind, He has not invented them.

These laws, as the empirical reality that they regulate, exist from a beginningless eternity valid by themselves, always the same, inalterable, neccesary, acting with an ineludible force, not being possible for anything to escape the rigour of their dominion.

These ideas are expressed in the following texts:

Saṃyuktāgama (Nidānasaṃyukta, Bhikṣusūtra), pp. 164–165: *kin nu bhagavatā pratītyasamutpādaḥ kṛta aho svid anyaiḥ. na bhikṣo mayā pratītyasamutpādaḥ kṛto nāpi anyaiḥ. api tūtpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā sthitā eveyaṃ dharmatā dharmasthitaye dhātuḥ. taṃ tathāgataḥ svayaṃ abhijñāyābhi-saṃbuddhyākhyāti prajñāpayati prasthāpayati vibhajati vivaraty uttānīkaroti deśayati saṃprakāśayati. yadutāsmin satīdaṃ bhavaty asyotpādād idam utpadyate. yadutāvidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā yāvat samudayo nirodhaś ca bhavati* (The Dependent Origination has been made by the Bhagavant or by others? O *bhikshu*, the Dependent Origination has not been made

by me [the Buddha] nor by others. Whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, stable is that essence of the dharmas [= *pratītyasamutpāda*], the foundation for the stability of the dharmas. The Tathāgata having known and comprehended it [= *pratītyasamutpāda*] perfectly by Himself, declares, makes known, establishes, analyses, reveals, proclaims, teaches, manifests it: given this, occurs that; from the arising of this, that arises, namely the *saṃskāras* exist having as condition ignorance up to [such] is the origin and destruction [of suffering]. The Chinese translation of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* (*Ta chih tu lun*), p. 298 a, lines 19–20, after quoting the *Bhikṣusūtra*, remarks that the 'law of the arising and destruction, whether the Buddhas exist or not, is eternal'.

The *Śālistambasūtra*, p. 72 (de la Vallée Poussin ed.), enumerates the characteristics of these laws in relation to *pratītyasamutpāda* or Dependent Origination: *ya imaṃ pratītyasamutpādaṃ satatasamitam [ajīvaṃ] nirjīvaṃ yathāvad aviparītam ajātam abhūtam akṛtam asaṃskṛtam apratigham anālambanaṃ śivam abhayam anāhāryam avyayam avyupaśamasvabhāvaṃ paśyati, sa dharmaṃ paśyati; yas tv evaṃ [dharmaṃ] satatasamitaṃ [ajīvaṃ] nirjīvaṃ ity ādi pūrvavat, yāvad avyupaśamasvabhāvaṃ dharmaṃ paśyati so 'nuttaradharmaśarīraṃ buddhaṃ paśyati* (He who sees this Dependent Origination as eternal, [without life], lacking life, truly without alternation, not born, non become, not made, not compounded, unobstructed, baseless, calm, fearless, ineliminable, imperishable, whose nature is non-cessation, he sees the Dharma; and he who sees the Dharma in the same way, as eternal, [without life,] lacking life, and so on as before up to: whose nature is non-cessation, he sees the Buddha whose body is constituted by unsurpassable *dharmas*).

Saṃyutta Nikāya II (*Paccayasutta*), p. 25, after exposing the *paṭiccasmuppāda* theory, Buddha declares: *uppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ, ṭhitā va sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā. taṃ tathāgato abhisambujjhati abhisameti. abhisambujjhitvā abhisametvā ācikkhati deseti paññāpeti paṭṭhapeti vivarati vibhajati uttānīkaroti* (Whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, stable is this principle [= *paṭiccasamuppāda*], the stability of the law, the necessity of the law, the causality. The Tathāgata perfectly comprehends and understands it [the Dependent Origination]; having perfectly understood and known it, He declares, teaches, makes known, establishes, reveals, analyzes, proclaims it).[12]

The texts already quoted refer to the *pratītyasamutpāda* whose characteristics they describe. But it can be thought that these characteristics are also to be attributed to other laws. There is not a reason why not, and besides that there is a text in *Aṅguttara Nikāya* I (*Yodhājīvavagga, Uppādāsutta*), p. 286, which applies the formula found in *Saṃyutta Nikāya* II (*Paccayasutta*), p. 25, just quoted, to other laws of reality—those of the impermanence (*anicca*) and the painful nature (*dukkha*) of all compounded things and that of the lack of an own being

of all *dharmas: uppādā vā, bhikkhave, tathāgatānaṃ anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ ṭhitā va sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā. sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā. taṃ tathāgato abhisambujjhati abhisameti. abhisambujjhitvā abhisametvā ācikkhati deseti paññāpeti paṭṭhapeti vivarati vibhajati uttānīkaroti—sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā ti.* (Whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, stable is this principle [= *sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā*], the stability of the law, the necessity of the law; all aggregates are impermanent, that is, as in *Saṃyutta Nikāya* II, p. 25). The same is said in regard to *sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā* and *sabbe dhammā anattā.*

Buddha as a discoverer and expositor of these laws

From the texts just quoted it is evident that Buddha has not created these laws, has not invented them, they are not a construction of His mind. Moreover they have not been revealed to Him by another being. In severeal texts He proudly affirms that He has had no master: *na me ācariyo atthi.* Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya* I (*Ariyapariyesanasutta*), p. 171, *Kathāvatthu,* p. 289; *Mahāvagga,* p. 8; *Milindapañha,* p. 235 (PTS ed.); *Saṅghabhedavastu,* Part I, p. 132.

These laws are there, they have been always there, and Buddha, after an intense and painful intellectual effort, in the memorable moment of his Enlightenment, discovers the existence of these laws, their nature and their functioning. And He has full consciousness of his character of mere discoverer of a reality that trascends him and to which He has opened his mind and his receptivity in order to allow it to penetrate into him. And it will be the exposition of these laws what constitutes his teaching, His Dharma. His Teaching, His Dharma is thus only the exposition, manifestation, explanation, elucidation, revelation and transmission by him of these laws.

We can say that in the beginning of Buddhist doctrine there was an intellectual act of knowledge, painfully conquered. From the first moment the importance of knowledge and of human effort have constituted essential characteristics of Buddhism.

Realistic conception of Buddhism in its first stages

In its first periods, from the VIth century BC up to the beginning of Christian Era, Buddhism maintains an open realistic position. The world is real, it exists independently of man, who grasps it with his sense-organs and who thinks it with his mind. But in the world in its totality, submitted to the causal law, in which every thing is an effect, product of the conjuction of a multiplicity of causes and determinating conditions, there is nothing substantial, nothing which exists in *se et per se* or nothing that exists *svabhāvena,* that is, that has an own being that belongs to itself and that depends on itself. Corollaries of the fundamental non-substatialist conception of Buddhism are, on one

side, the non-existence of God—already mentioned—and the non-existence of the soul in man.

Transformation of the early Buddhist conception of reality

But, in the beginning of the Christian Era, and because of the evolution of the ancient conceptions, the existence of the external world and likewise the capacity of our sense-organs and of our reason to grasp its nature begin to be doubted. Two great philosophical schools are then constituted: the Mādhyamika School and the Yogācāra School,which will mark new trends to the principal manifestations of Buddhist philosophy.

The Mādhyamika School[13]

The Mādhyamika School, founded by the great Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna, brings to its utmost development the conception of causality and the conception of unsubstantiality grounded in it, both inherited from the past, and ellaborates its central theory of Voidness. The every-day experience reveals to us a reality constituted by beings and things which present themselves before us as existent in *se et per se*, as compact, continuous and unitarian.

The Mādhyamika School studies the reality we perceive and reaches, a conclusion, regarding that reality, completely different from that of our ordinary experience. The empirical reality is constituted only by beings and things absolutely contingent. In it everything is conditioned, relative, dependent. Furthermore everything is constituted by parts. No totalitary entity exists; there are only conglomerates of parts, of elements, of constituent factors. The rope we perceive does not exist in *se et per se* as a rope, it is only an aggregate of threads, and these at their turn do not exist in *se et per se*, they are only an aggregate of filaments, and so on; and this analytic-abolitive process does not stop in something substantial, provided with a being, with an existence which is proper to it.

Conditionality, relativity, dependence, the fact of being composed, contingency, the absence of an own being or Voidness (the proper term used by the School) constitutes the true nature, the true way of being of the empirical reality, and the form under which it appears before us is only an unreality, an illusion.

The Yogācāra School[14]

If the Mādhyamika School of the great Nāgārjuna puts special emphasis in Voidness, the universal contingency, the absolute relativity of everything, the Yogācāra School affirms with the same force the sole existence of mind, of consciousness; for this school the only thing that exists is ideas, representations, mental creations, to which nothing real corresponds. Let us remember that for Buddhism, from the very

beginning, mind or consciousness is only a series of states of consciousnesses, of acts of knowledge. These cognitive acts constitute the mind; there is not an entity outside and different from them, permanent and autonomous which 'has' these acts of consciousness, which is what 'experiments' them as their inalterable witness or seer. The idealistic school maintains that thesis, but adds (contrarily to what Buddhism thought in its beginning) that to the succession of representation, which constitutes mind, does not correspond any real correlate.

The empirical reality in which we exist has in this way the same ontological status as dreams or illusions created by magic. Nothing distinguishes the vision of the reality in which we move from oniric visions or from the fantasmagory created by the magician or from the hallucinations to which suggestion gives rise. The naïve realism embraced by Buddhism in its first stages or in the Hīnayāna period, has left the place to an extreme idealistic view, where beings and objects disappear as real entities and where only entities of mental nature remain.

If for the School of Nāgārjuna the empirical reality becomes the Great Void, for the Yogācāra School reality is only a Great Illusion, created by the mind submerged in error.

CONCLUSION

The prodigious Universe imagined by the ancient Buddhist thinkers, infinite in time, unlimited in space, peopled by an inconceivable number of world systems, with their incalculable millions of millions of beings, and with their incalculable millions of millions of Buddhas guiding the infinite beings to their Liberation, in a permanent transformation, regulated by laws of universal validity, has become a product of human mind, a dream of that shadow that is man, who depending only on his own effort and counting only with the help of the Teaching of the Master, looks for the path that leads to Enlightenment—the foremost degree of intelligence, knowledge and consciousness—and will allow him to reach that realm of peace and silence, the beatitude of extinction, the supreme Nirvāṇa.

NOTES

1. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti (1980), pp. 1–20.
2. On °*gata* as 'realm', cf. *Pāli Tipiṭakaṃ Concordance* and *Critical Pāli Dictionary* sub '*aghagata*', and *Aṭṭhasālinī*, p. 326, line 1.
3. On the Buddhist theory of *dharmas* see M. and W. Geiger (1920); Th. Stcherbatsky (1923); H. von Glasenapp (1938); F. Tola and C. Dragonetti (1977), with bibliography.
4. Cf. D.J. Kalupahana (1975); S. Mookerjee (1935); N.J. Shah (1967).
5. Cf. González Reimann, L. (1988), Chapter 8.

6. Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa* III, stanza 18 a, p. 432.
7. Cf. C. Dragonetti (1987).
8. Cf. C. Dragonetti (1978) and (1986).
9. *Akṣamātra* in the original: 'of the measure of one *karṣa*, 16 *māṣas*, one *tolā*'; 'of the size of the axle'; 'of the size of the *akṣa* fruit'; of the measure of *akṣa* (104 *aṅgulas* in length)', according to *An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit.*
10. Cf. J. Takakusu (1905), pp. 142–143; and L. de la Vallée Poussin (1971), I, pp. XXXVII–XLI. This text is quoted in the text of Hiuan-tsang that follows.
11. Cf. H. Von Glasenapp (1954).
12. This formula has been reproduced by numerous texts as Yaśomitra's commentary to *Abhidharmakośa* ad III, stanza 28 a-b, p. 452; Aṅguttara Nikāya I (*Uppādāsutta*), p. 286; *Kathāvatthu* VI, 2, p. 321, and commentary ad locum, pp. 89–90; *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, pp. 143–144 and 218 (Nanjio ed.): Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā* ad I, stanza 1, p. 40; Prajñākaramati, *Pañjikā* ad IX, stanza 150. Cf. *Lotus Sūtra* II, stanza 103. It was even quoted by Brahmanic authors as Kumārila, *Tantravārtika*, ad I, 3, 11, and Vācaspati Miśra, *Bhāmatī*, ad II, 2, 19, p. 526.
13. Cf. C. Dragonetti (1987) and F. Tola and C. Dragonetti (1994).
14. Cf. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti (1983), (1989) and (1990).

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Cognition, Being, and the Possibility of Expressions: A Bhartṛharian Approach

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I

Since philosophy for disinterested knowledge is concentrating on phenomenalism of cognition, the Indian approach to cognition and being as accomplished in communication seems relevant to philosophical reflections today. Unlike the metaphysical, epistemological and psychological approaches on 'being and cognition by expression', we have adopted a purely philosophical outlook for the present discussion on the problem. By the term 'purely philosophical outlook' we mean the reflection on the problem from the point of view of the cognition as figured in the mind by language in usual communications which, we think, is perhaps a disinterested approach on cognition, and, is philosophically highly interesting.

Here, in this paper, we propose to discuss the issue 'Cognition, being and the possibility of expressions' in the light of Bhartṛhari's (henceforth referred to as B) magnum opus *Vākyapadīyam* (henceforth *VP*) and the commentaries on it. The language infuses[1] 'Cognition' is the principle which forms the basis of sentence-holism of Bhartṛhari, a fifth century philosopher.[2]

A summary of the issues planned to be discussed in this paper may be given as follows:

(1) Cognition is concerned with and is confined to objects figured by language in the mind.
(2) Language (*śabda*) reveals[3] itself (*svarupa-śabda*) before it reveals meaning (*vācya*),
(3) All cognition is cognition shot through-and-through by language,
(4) Meaning is what figures non-differently by language in the mind.
(5) Expressions regarding being, non-being will not be possible if meaning is taken as external-being,
(6) The possibility of beginninglessness of relation between language and meaning will not be explained if meaning as

being figured in the mind by language is not taken into account,

(7) All cognition revealed by language in the mind is veridical cognition.

Conclusively, we have shown that the possibility of expressions and cognition by them cannot be explained adequately if cognition is not taken as infused with language, and that the possibility of veridical cognition may be found neither in referents nor in empirical-justifications but in the accomplishment of communications itself. Communication for a Bhartṛharian is not only an act of uttering and hearing but the accomplishment of cognition by language which causes incentives to do or not to do something.

According to B's philosophy, language itself and the meaning revealed non-differently by it are the objects of cognition. The objects of cognition are beings revealed by language in the mind and our reflections are confined to them only. Kant said we know only phenomena, that is, how the things appear to the mind. In other words, sense qualities which are constituents of perceptual things are the objects of our cognition. B, contrary to Kant, elucidates that perceptual things or their constituents can reveal neither as being nor as non-being. Being and non-being are known as they are revealed in the mind by language.[4] His philosophy is quite different from those interpreting the physical world of entities through the linguistic units. He conceives physical entities as beyond the grasp of language and of mind.[5] For him, the aim of philosophy, is to interpret the cognition as revealed by *śabda* (language) in usual communication. Physical entities, whether eternal or transient, existent or non-existent are of no use as far as the cognition or the accomplishment of communication is concerned. The sense-data acquired through senses serves only as instrumental in the manifestation of *śabda* and the meaning is revealed non-differently by language itself.

Our cognition, philosophical reflection and investigation are not only based on but are confined to the objects figured in the mind by language. By 'objects' we mean the ideas or the beings revealed non-differently by language in the mind and, as such, they are communicable and are cognitive units by nature and that is why they are called, by grammarians in general, *vācya* (expressed). Language (*vācaka*), in the philosophy of B, is not confined to the language as we speak, read or write it, but is inner, indivisible, given and meaning-revealing-unit (*sphoṭa*).[6] Verbal-utterances, perceptual sense-data, gestures and other tokens are only instrumental in the manifestation of inner-*śabda* which when manifested by them reveals itself (its own real nature) and the meaning is revealed in the mind non-differently by it, and, hence, as expressor (*vācaka*) the inner language (*sphoṭa*), in his philosophy, is also accepted as an object of cognition in a cognition by language.

Being and non-being, either of accomplished or of non-accomplished character, are cognized as revealed by language in the mind. The language revealed in the mind for B is a being, that is, a mental being, that is, idea (*vācya*), the meaning revealed non-differently by it in the mind is also a being, that is, thought-object (*vācya*) and the cognition of meaning as thought-object is also a being. They are self-restrained beings; they are not abstractions from external-things but are revealed by language as such. They, unlike the Wittgensteinian facts, are not independent, discrete-beings but are those non-differently revealed by language. The language reveals itself and is eternally fit to reveal the meaning non-differently, hence, the identical or unitary and indivisible cognition is accomplished by language. Meaning without language is not possible and cognition isolated and independently of language ceases to be a cognition, because all cognition as B propounds it is cognition shot through-and-through by language (*śabdānuviddha*).[7] If 'cognition as shot through-and-through by language' is not accepted, the philosophy which takes analysis of language for clarity of thoughts as its basic function will face the pains of contradiction. Analysis of language *vis-à-vis* analysis of thought is possible only if cognition is taken as shot through-and-through by language; and only in this way philosophy may be taken to perform its function for the clarification of thought by the analysis of language and for the analysis of language by the clarification of thought as well. Philosophers since long have often doubted the objectivity of the study of language by language itself. They opined that it is due to human limitations that he has only language to study even the language itself. H.G. Coward remarks 'all thinking about language must by virtue of human limitation be done in language itself. One cannot get outside of language so as to objectively examine it'.[8] It is rather misleading and non-philosophical to study a set of language tokens by another set of them or to present them in a set of logical symbols and then to study them. A philosophical study of language takes it as concept which figures in the mind in usual communication. Language reveals itself as the object of cognition in a cognition by language. Thanks to B who emphasized for the first time in the history of philosophy that language in every cognition inevitably reveals itself first as *vācaka* (expressor) and, then meaning is revealed by it non-differently. If it will not reveal itself first, meaning cannot be revealed, and, as meaning is the being revealed by language, no meaning is acceptable to him independently of language. The question as such may significantly be asked: how can the *vācaka* be the *vācya* of its own? As an expressor cannot be the expressed at the same time, language may not be studied objectively by language itself. But if we take another point made by B according to which 'language also figures as an object of cognition through language', into consideration, we will be in a better position to estimate that language is naturally fit to be studied by

language itself. Not only that but B has analysed the functional *śabda (upādānaśabda)* as a unity of two-one which serves as the cause of the cognition of *śabda* as *śabda* (that is, *svarupa śabda*) and another which serves as the cause of the cognition of the meaning. In other words, he analyses language as *grāhya* (illumined) and *grāhaka* (illuminative) and elucidates *vācakavācya* relation between the two also. As the *svarupa śabda* is also expressed by *śabda*, it like other *vācyas* (expresseds), is studied as an object by the language itself. *Vyādi*, as Vṛṣabha quotes, is of the opinion that inner, sequenceless, indivisible form of language is *vācya* itself while the expressor *śabda* is revealed as *vācaka* when uttered and heard by the audience (*padhāti*, on *VP* 1/58). It implies that as language reveals itself as the object of cognition by language, it can be studied or be reflected as it figures in the mind. As this reflecting on the language as *vācya* for clarity and conception, is based on cognition and as cognition revealed by language is always a veridical cognition on the basis of which communications are accomplished, the verity and objectivity of the cognition of language by language cannot be doubted.

II

Śabda reveals itself before it reveals meaning.[9] The very distinctive feature of cognition by *śabda* according to B is that, in a verbal cognition, *śabda* reveals itself first and, then, its meaning is revealed non-differently. The cognition is not only an act of hearing and uttering of verbal noises/utterances but the accomplishment of cognition. Phonemes, that is, verbal noises/utterances are only instrumental in the manifestation of indivisible, real *śabda* given in the mind. The *śabda* manifested gradually in the sequence of verbal noises, reveals its own nature (*sphoṭa*). To reveal itself in a cognition is the characteristic of *śabda* on the basis of which the function of language is distinguished from that of the senses. Showing their differences B writes 'the senses need not be cognized themselves before they know the objects. They do so by their mere existence when they come into their contact. But this is not the case with *Śabda*; it reveals itself before it reveals meaning',[10] and, that is the reason, B defines *śabda* as *grāhakagrāhya* or *prakāśaka-prakāśa* (illumined and illuminative).[11] If language like senses is taken only as instrumental in the accomplishment of cognition, there would be no need for knowing the language itself before knowing the meaning but this is not the case with the cognition by it. The real unit of language given in the mind when manifested by utterances is known first and, then, the meaning is known non-differently by the real language.[12] If the language which is *vācaka* is not revealed, no cognition will be possible because all cognition is cognition through language. Objecting to this position of B's philosophy, *Mīmāmsakas* and *Naiyāyikas*[13] may say that we perceive a thing by senses without perceiving or knowing the nature of the senses

themselves before hand, similarly, language is a means of cognition, and, therefore, there is no need for accepting the cognition of *śabda* itself before knowing its meaning. According to B, it is the nature of language that in a cognition it reveals itself as *vācaka* before it reveals meaning (*vācya*). As meaning is what is non-differently revealed by the language, it cannot be revealed if the language (*vācaka*) itself is not revealed in the mind first.[14]

The language (*vācaka*) like sense-data in perception or verbal-noises cannot be taken only as a means of cognition. Language is the light or consciousness (awareness); it reveals itself and the meaning is revealed non-differently by it. There is a fundamental difference between the processes involved in the perception and the cognition by language. In perceptual cognition and inference as well, the senses like eyes, etc., and indications (*linga*) like smoke, etc., stand respectively at a distance. They are separated from the object (external) to be known, while in a verbal cognition the language is not separated from the cognition. It reveals itself and the meaning is revealed by it, and, therefore, meaning for a Bhartṛharian is not a picture either of *śabda* or of external-things, and, again the two are not mutually independent facts as a Wittgensteinian would say. *Śabda*, for B as mentioned earlier, is a being (inner and given being) which is manifested by verbal-noises and, when manifested, it reveals its own nature, that is, *sphoṭa*. The meaning is also an inner-being but is not an independent being. It is a being revealed non-differently in the mind by the inner *Śabda*. Thus, the two beings, as revealer and revealed or as expressor and expressed, are naturally related by the fitness of language itself. An expressor for a Bhartṛharian is not an expressor if it does not express the meaning, and, as the meaning is what is revealed non-differently by language (*śabda*), (it cannot be revealed without the *śabda* which is naturally fit for expressing the meaning), the relation between them is natural-fitness of the *śabda*—its natural-fitness in expressing its meaning non-differently.[15]

III

B elucidates cognition as shot through-and-through by language (*śabdānuviddha*).[16] Language infuses not only verbal but all sorts of cognition, i.e. perceptual, inferential, etc.[17] The difference between the cognition by language and that by perception, etc. is rooted respectively on the very process of cognition. Senses and indications (*linga*) are separated after causing perception and inference respectively but cognition is always shot through-and-through by language. If otherwise, in the absence of proper revelation of language first, no knowledge can be accomplished either in isolation of it or only by hearing of verbal-noises which are destroyed after the next moment.

This issue will be discussed in some detail later. Presently, we want to

discuss Mīmāmsakas' and Naiyāyikas' objections against B's theory of language infusing cognition. Denying the basic position of Vaiyākaraṇas, they say, 'cognition as shot through-and-through by language' cannot be proved. In their opinion, the language is instrumental in the indication of the meaning and the cognition of the meaning as well. As an indicator stands always at a distance from what it indicates and is separated after performing the act of indicating, the indicator (*siddha*) and the indicated (*sādhya*) cannot be taken as intertwined. Is it proper to say that the senses (eyes, etc.) which are means for accomplishment of the cognition of the object and the object (pot, etc.) cognized through them are infused together? It can also be added, from the side of those who take language only as means of cognition that the language for example, the word 'pot', the meaning 'pot' and the cognition 'pot' are indicated by the speaker by the same word 'pot' because there is no other instrument or means except language for indication of them. Nonetheless it (as they say) is only by the limitation of the speaker that he uses the same word 'pot' as an indication of all of them and this limitation of the speaker cannot be taken as a ground for accepting cognition as shot through-and-through by language. They say *Vaiyākaraṇas* theory of 'language infuses cognition' (that is, the infusion of means and ends) is inconsistent because it is not as such to be proved by any means. There is no infusion of senses (means of perception) and the object perceived by them. On the basis of this reasoning they show that *Vaiyākaraṇas* theory of sentence-holism based on the infusion of cognition and language is ignorance.[18]

It can, from the side of B, be said that the above objections raised by Mīmāmsakas and Naiyāyikas are based on their overlooking the difference between perception and cognition. It is, as we have seen in the earlier pages, distinctive feature of cognition by languages that it, unlike the senses, plays a different role. It reveals itself first and then meaning is revealed non-differently by it. It is the very nature of language that it reveals itself before it reveals meaning.[19] As nature cannot be changed and as it is based on cognition or comprehension, one is bound to accept that which is cognized directly; if, otherwise, there would be a case of violation of the cognition and communication.[20]

Cognition as such is discriminative by its nature and discrimination is not possible without language. How can the sense datum of 'pot' be distinguished from that of the 'cot' if cognition of them is not taken as shot through-and-through by language? Even 'the sense datum' of 'pot' if separated from the language cannot be known as the object of cognition. Whether the cognition 'the pot is there' is acquired by perception or by inference cannot distinctly be understood if taken as abstracted from language.

Objecting to the above position of B's philosophy Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamanjarī*[21] has argued that in between the two types of perceptual

cognition, that is, (1) *Savikalpaka* (determinate) and (2) *Nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate), the former would not and the latter could not be taken as intertwined with language. The indeterminate perception as they say, is a cognition void of the association of language (*Śabdasansarga Śunya*) and that there is only association (and not infusion) of language in a determinate perception. Naiyāyikas, in general, take it contradictory to accept cognition as infused with language on one hand and to assume the existence of indeterminate cognition on the other hand. If the two (determinate and indeterminate cognition) are taken as infused with language how will the two be differentiated? According to grammarians, the objections raised above are based on a wrong idea that language is confined to verbal utterances/noises only. In reply to the objections raised above, it can be said from the side of Vaiyākaraṇas that all objects of cognition are cognized as objects revealed by language (*sphoṭa*). B's theory of *sphoṭa* views cognition as essentially (*tattvataḥ*) and cognitively (*jñānataḥ*) shot through-and-through by language. The *śabda* is the only expressor. It expresses itself and the meaning. Can these objects be known separately from the language? No, they all are revealed by language. Cognition ceases to be cognition if separated from language.

Incentives to do or not to do something are not possible without cognition and no cognition is possible if isolated from language.[22] The cognition if taken for a moment as isolated from language will be unknown and unfounded. Even the indeterminate cognition in a newborn baby is also intertwined with language. The activities like crying, tittering, suckling, vibrating of the vocal organs, etc. of a newborn baby cannot be accomplished if there is no incentive, and, as the incentive to act or not to act or something other to act cannot be denied, cognition as the cause of them (incentives) must be accepted. As all cognition is cognition shot through-and-through by language, the cognition in a newborn baby is also accepted as intertwined with language. As there is no possibility of being a newly born baby taught the language we speak, read or write, those who take language as confined to these tokens learnt gradually after birth fail to understand the nature of cognition and deny even the fact of cognition in the newly-born baby also. B is quite clear on the issue of cognition as intertwined with language. If the inner-language as *bhāvanā* (potency) is not accepted as given in the mind of the newborn baby, no activity of crying, tittering, etc. should be possible but this is not the case with it. Thanks to modern psychologists and scientists who have also proved the presence of cognition as the cause of the incentive to the crying, tittering, smiling, etc. of the baby.

Nothing but given *śabda-bhāvanā* (impression or the speech-dispositionality of its consciousness) can only be accepted as the revealer of the cognition. There is no other means by which it can acquire knowledge. Its audio-video organs are not mature enough to be taught

or even to grasp from outside.[23] The *śabda-bhāvanā* is given since its birth and that is the reason it tries naturally to communicate its feeling by crying, etc., and gradually learns to communicate with little effort; if, otherwise, it would not be possible for it to learn communicating. Thus, the cognition of the baby who is completely unaware of language-meaning-relation is elucidated by B as a cognition shot through-and-through by language. Similar is the case with the cognition in the dumb and deaf who cannot speak or hear the verbal utterances/noises. In their case, when they intend to communicate, the inner *sphoṭa* is manifested through their bodily gestures and the gestures by the audience manifest the inner *sphoṭa* through which meaning is revealed in their mind.

Showing the ground for differentiating the determinate from indeterminate cognition, B says that infusion of language or otherwise is not the ground for difference of them because all cognition is shot through-and-through by language. In the case of determinate-cognition, *sphoṭa* (*vācaka*) is fully revealed and its meaning (*vācya*) is distinctly cognized, contrary to it, in cases of indeterminate cognition, the language (*vācaka*) is not fully revealed in the mind, and, in the state of non-apprehension of language in its completeness and clarity, its meaning with all its distinctive characteristics is not revealed.[24]

No cognition can distinctively be known as cognition if not infused with language.[25] It is the language on account of which the inferential cognition is distinctively known so. Dream-objects (*svapna*) and that of deep-sleep (*suṣupti*) are also distinctly known as they are also intertwined with language.

Knowledge is not the knowledge in isolation, and, hence, not without illumination. This illuminating nature of cognition is not possible if taken as separate from language. Nothing remains to be expressed as cognition if isolated from language.

Unlike B some propositionalists accept propositions as abstracted fact—abstracted from several instances and occurrences of sentences (sentence-token) signifying the same proposition. Opposite to them, a sentence (indivisible, inner, meaning-revealing unit), for B, is not an abstraction from occurrences and instances perceived but is foundationally given as awareness itself. Verbal utterances, tokens, etc. are only instrumental in manifesting the given inner-meaning-revealing unit, that is, sentence. It is neither an abstraction from outside entities nor mental construction in its popular use of the term but is awareness which reveals both itself and the meaning. *Sphoṭa* ceases to be *sphoṭa* if taken as abstracted, it will loose its *vācakatva* (expressive character). Even thought as an abstracted unit (if accepted for a moment) also implies *sphoṭa* in order to be revealed, otherwise, how could it be known so; if thought itself is abstracted from language, it cannot reveal itself and the meaning also, and, then, no knowledge will be accomplished by

abstraction. The idea of abstraction may lead to undesirable metaphysical presumption of the things from which it is abstracted, the mind which abstracts and the relation of them also. An abstracted proposition may be taken as that signified by sentences but how can it signify meaning if it does not signify itself first as signifier and, hence, the idea of proposition as abstraction is cognitively and logically inconsistent. Contrary to it, *sphoṭa* (language) for B is not a unit abstracted from language-tokens but a self-restrained inner-being. The idea of language as self-restrained being which is *grāhya* and *grāhaka* by nature inevitably implies the non-difference of language and thought.

The non-difference of language and thought may not be acceptable to those who take it that the law of language and that of thought are different. If language and thought are taken as different, then, it will be contradictory to accept philosophy as a system of analysis of language for clarification of thought. The analysis of language (separate from thought) will not, then, be the analysis of thought, and, hence, it will be an aimless intellectual game. If language and thought are taken as different how can the clarification of the latter by the analysis of the former be achieved? Not only philosophy but analysis will also be a useless task if language and thought are taken as separate. It is rather, contradictory to assume language and thought as the different on one hand and to accept analysis of language as a basis of the clarification of thought on the other hand. This difficulty is equally applicable to all those philosophies which take language as confined to language-token, that is, verbal utterances/noises, gestures, etc., (which for us are only instrumental in the manifestation of inner, self-restrained, meaning-revealing language) and, also to those who take language as abstracted from verbal-utterances. For a Bhartṛharian, the same idea from the point of view of expressibility is language and from the point of view of cognition is the meaning (thought-object) and, hence non-different. Both of them are restrained by the same law—law of cognition, that is, cognition as revealed and shot through-and-through by language. The idea of infusion of language and thought serves as the basic ground of B's philosophy of sentence-holism.

If it is taken that the proposition reveals itself and the meaning is revealed by it non-differently, it, as such, cannot be taken as abstracted fact but foundational being (illumined-illuminating principle). There is no philosophical and logical need of accepting proposition as abstracted. The idea of proposition as abstracted fact underestimates the revealing power of language on one hand and such abstractions amount to unnecessary metaphysical assumptions on the other hand. Language for B is a self-restrained being. It reveals itself and the meaning and, hence, the foundational being of the world of cognition and communication. The luminous and illuminative character of cognition according to B is a sufficient cognitive-ground for accepting

the cognition as intertwined with language. Conclusively, we can say that philosophy for B does not have room for copy theory of cognition as he conceives language not merely as a designation, but as expression. Language infuses thought and for that reason it is foundational (that is, it reveals itself and the meaning is revealed non-differently by it). The token-gestures, etc., and the sense-data acquired by senses like eyes, ears etc. are all instrumental in the manifestation of inner-meaning-revealing language (*sphoṭa*) and, hence, the representative theory of cognition is inconsistent with the nature of cognition itself.

IV

We, in the previous pages have presented a critique of language as the object of cognition by language and have argued in favour of language infusing cognition. Presently, we propose to discuss the objects of cognition as meaning which figure in the mind by language. We, in this regard, think it necessary to mention, for avoiding unnecessary confusions regarding the nature of what figures in the mind by language, that language itself and the meaning are revealed in the mind by language and, hence, they are objects of cognition. What figures in the mind by language independently of external being (*vāhyasattā*) is inner-being, that is, *upacārasattā*.[26] As *upacārasattā* is not abstracted but is a being revealed by language itself independently of external existents, it is self-restrained. This self-restrained being from the point of view of communicability is language (*sphoṭa*), that is, inner meaning-revealing-unit or concept and from the point of view of accomplishment of cognition is *pratibhā* (unit of flash or understanding) revealed by language, that is, thought-object which from the ontological point of view is secondary being (*upacārasattā*)[27] as taken in contrast with the external-being (*mukhyasattā*). As external-being is popularly known by the word '*sattā*' it is called *mukhyasattā* (primary-being). In contrast with *mukhyasattā*, the being revealed in the mind by language is taken as *upacārasattā* (secondary-being). The inner-being for B, is of a universal character and as he accepts 'universal in the universal' there is no logical difficulty in accepting the universal inhering in the universals of objects (the idea of language and that of the meaning revealed by it as well). Even the cognition of an object like 'pot', etc., is also taken by B as universal but he does not accept cognition itself as universal. If it is universal it will be an object of cognition but cognition, according to B as we have indicated earlier, is not as object or another in a cognition. Though cognition of the objects like language and meaning is also taken as an object of philosophical reflection, it is not itself an object in that cognition.[28] There is a difference between the idea of cognition and the cognition itself. The idea of cognition is the object of cognition and of philosophical reflections but cognition does not figure or is not

cognized as an object or another in a cognition. It is itself awareness and, hence, foundational. It is contradictory to accept the cognition simultaneously as the object of its own.

Coming to an analytical exposition and examination of B's view on the nature and philosophical significance of *upacārasattā* (being figured in the mind in communication as accomplished by language), it seems necessary to begin with Mahābhāṣyakāra Patanjalī's view on *sattā* (being).

Mahābhāṣyakāra has classified all the beings into two categories[29]:-

(1) *Vāhyasattā* (external-being) and (2) *Buddhisthasattā* (inner or mental-being). Philosophically, *upacārasattā* or *buddhisthasattā* is the being which according to Vaiyākaraṇas figures in the mind non-differently by language and, hence, eternally related with the language. Defining *upacārasattā,* Mahābhāsyakāra writes '*na padārtho sattām Vyabhicarati*' (the meaning is never deprived of its inner-being). All external 'pots' may be destroyed, even then, the meaning of the word 'pot' is non-differently revealed in the mind by the word (that is, the inner-being of 'pot' is not dependent on the external pot). Now, if meaning is never deprived of its inner-being, the opponents may ask as to what is the need of qualifying an eternally existent or being by the use of the word '*asti*' (exists)? The uses like '*sattām asti*' (it exists) will be contradictory if being is taken as externally existent. Actually, such problems arise out of opponent's objections regarding the *Pāṇini Sūtra 'Ta dasyastyasminniti matup'*.[31] If the *padārtha* is never deprived of its being there is no need of using the word '*asti'* in the *sūtra* for qualifying the being as existent. An adjective (*viśeṣaṇa*) is significantly used with a being only if it sometime is associated and at other times is dissociated with the being to be qualified (*sambhava vyabhicārābhyām viśeṣaṇamarthavat*).[32] As an inner-being (that is, meaning) is never deprived of its existence, it is useless to apply the qualifier '*asti*' specifically for expressing its existence. Mahābhāṣyakāra does not feel any need for the use of '*asti*' for qualifying the eternally given inner-being and elucidates that the use of '*asti*' in the *sūtra* under consideration does not stand for inner but for external-being which is existent neither in the past, not in the future, but in the present only. For example, the word '*gomān*' derived by the use of suffix '*matup*' expresses 'the person possessing cow at present'. The person possessed cow (in past) or will possess it (in future), will not be called by the term '*gomān*'. Clarifying the issue Mahābhāṣyapradīpakāra Kaiyaṭa says that the use of the word '*asti*' as qualifier in the *sūtra* under consideration stands for external-being (*sampratisattā*) having existence only in present (*sampratisattāyāmuti vartamāna sattāyām vāhyamsattāyāmityarthaḥ*).[33] As the inner-beings pertaining to the past and future also figure by language, the use of the qualifier '*asti*' is not intended for them, and, hence, its use stands for external-being (*sampratisattā*), which exists only in present.

Taking *buddhisthasattā* as different from *vāhyasattā,* B has conceived

the former as the only being revealed by language, and the latter as *mukhyasattā* (Primary-being).[34] The former, in contrast with the latter, is *upacārasattā* (being figured in the mind by language).[35] Though the former from the point of view of cognition and accomplishment of communication is primary yet as the word '*sattā*' is popularly used for the latter, its use for the former is taken as secondary. In other words, the word '*upacārasattā*' from the point of view of primary-being as *vāhyasattā* is taken for secondary-being. Clarifying the reason for the use of secondary-being for *upacārasattā* and primary-being for *Vāhyasattā*, Kaiyaṭa[36] has remarked that the use of the suffix (*sat* + *tā* in the place of *laṭ* (present tense) in the derivation *sat* + *tā* = *sattā* suggests the existence in present time, and, as external being is existent only in present, the use of the word '*sattā*' is primarily taken for *vāhysattā*. The mention of existence of *buddhisthasattā* in present time is not significant because it is always existent. Past and future beings are existent only in the mind and are revealed by language in communication. Thus, it is relative to the popular use of the word '*sattā*' for external-being that the *buddhisthasattā* is called secondary-being (*upacārasattā*) and, hence the use of the word *upacārasattā* for inner-being cannot be taken as of a being deprived of its existence in present. It is from this point of view that Mahābhāṣyakāra has defined *upacārasattā* as '*bhūtabhaviṣyat sattā*' (being existent in past and in future as well). It does not mean that upacārasattā is not existent in present. It is not justified to say that both (the *vāhyasattā* and the *upacārasattā*) cannot exist simultaneously, that is, in present. For B, both kinds of beings from the point of view of cognition are not mutually separate (*anyonyavyāvṛta*) because the external-being in order to be known also requires to be revealed as inner-being which is the only object of cognition. It will be contradictory to accept that inner-being is never deprived of its existence on one hand and to deny its existence in present on the other hand. The inner-being is existent in all the division of time (*abhinnakālāh*), that is, it figures positively by the words as of past, present and future (*etām sattām padāratho hi na kaścidativartate*).[37]

Being of a fixed character, the external-being cannot move into the different changing or opposite characters of being and non-being, existence and non-existence, and it is only *upacārasattā* which figures in the mind by language as being and non-being. As *upacārasattā* is the being revealed in the mind by language, it is equally revealed as being, non-being, existent, non-existent, etc., as presented by language. If meaning is taken as externally existent, it cannot be non-existent and viceversa at the same time. If 'pot' is taken as an externally existent it cannot be non-existent and, thus, the expressions like '*ghatonāsti*' (pot is non-existent) will not be possible. The external existents can be revealed neither as existent or as non-existent nor as existent and non-existent both at a time.

As *upacārasattā* figures equally as being and non-being by respective words, B calls it as '*Bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*'. It is also not true to say that the idea of being figures positively and idea of non-being figures negatively by the respective words. All ideas figure positively as ideas in the mind and so is the case with the idea of non-being. B has clarified the figuring of idea commonly as being and non-being by the example of crystal, mirror and jewel.[38] Being transparent, they configure as the form and colour of the things kept near them, similarly, the idea or inner-being is revealed as both the being and the non-being by their respective expressors (*vācakas*). As the meaning for B is that which figures by language (*śabdāta iti śabdārthaḥ śabdaḥ*),[39] the idea 'it is pot' and the idea 'it is not pot' both are known as they positively figure in the mind by respective sentences. The law of contradiction is not applicable to the inner-being (*upacārasattā*). Even the idea by the word 'contradiction' also figures positively as idea of it on account of which it is cognized so.

Discussing the purpose of accepting *upacārasattā* as that which figures equally as being and non-being, Hēlārāja (HR) says[40] as the crystal, mirror, etc., do not undergo any change with the association of different things of different colours though they configure the things kept near them, *upacārasattā*, without a change in its nature, figures always positively as being or as non-being by the respective expressions and that is why they are known so.

V

Upacārasattā figures positively even by negative sentences. If otherwise, no knowledge by negative language, and, hence, by the word 'non-existence' will be accomplished and, then, there will be a case of denial of negative sentences.

According to HR, the inner-being by the sentence 'it is pot' is not transferred as existent (*asti*) on one hand and is not deformed as 'non-existent' by the expression 'it is not pot' (*ghatonāsti*) on the other hand. Being of an awareness in character, it is equally revealed by language as being and non-being. Is it true to say that it is a meaning if revealed by the word 'being' and otherwise or non-meaning if revealed by the word 'non-being'? Meaning according to B is universal—it is the meaning of being and of non-being, meaning of meaning and of the non-meaning as well. Objecting to B's theory of meaning as inner-being, it can be said from the side of Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas for whom language is the expression for external-existents or non-existents (that is, 'there is pot' and 'the pot is not there' are expressions for externally existent and non-existent respectively) that inner-being or non-being of 'pot' is not expected by the expression. It is not capable of even doing so. If it is taken as inner, then, negation of it will not be expected and, hence,

negative expressions will not be possible because of its ever-presence (*sarvakālika*). If the negation of it (*buddhisattā*) is accepted, it will, then, be a counterpart (*pratiyogī*) of negation. As a *pratiyogī* (counterpart) and negation (*abhāva*) are opposite to each other, both of the two cannot co-exist simultaneously. They say as *upacārasattā* according to Vaiyākaraṇas figures as both being and non-being, the negation (*nāsti*) cannot be taken as the negator of the mental being 'pot', etc. and, similarly '*asti*' cannot be taken as the expressor of its existence. On the basis of the arguments mentioned above they accept the terms '*asti*' (exists) and '*nāsti*' (non-exists) as the expressions of being and non-being of external-existents.

Replying to the objections raised above, B and his commentator HR illustrate Upacārasattā by the analogy of Vaiśeṣika's notion of sattā. As sattā for Vaiśeṣikas is the unity of substance (*dravya*), quality and action (*karma*), upacārasattā is the unity that figures equally as being and non-being. Different to *Vaiśeṣikas*, B accepts *upacārasattā* as universal which inheres in both the expressor and the expressed, being and non-being, opposite and non-opposite, positive and negative-beings.[41] *Upacārasattā* according to *Vaiyākaraṇas* is like a crystal which configures as the things kept near it.

As *upacārasattā* is the being revealed by the language in the mind, it according to Vaiyākaraṇas figures equally as the idea of negation, affirmation, emptyness, non-existent, etc., by the respective expressions. That which is common to both in figuring as being and non-being (*Bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*) by language can be opposite neither to a being nor to a non-being. External-existents can be perceived only as existents but not as non-existents. It is only *upacārasattā* which figures in the mind equally as being, non-being, positive or negative as presented or revealed by language in the mind.

Expressions not only by negative suffix *nañ(a)* but, as *Vaiyākaraṇas* say, by birth, existence, change, increase, decrease and destruction also are possible only on the basis of *upacārasattā* as the meaning figured in the mind by words. Keeping different kinds of beings chiefly into three categories (that is, birth, existence and negation) B has tried to show that the possibility of expressions and accomplishment of cognition by language cannot be explained if *upacārasattā* is not taken as the meaning of the language. In the following paragraphs we, in brief, will discuss how B and his commentators have explained the possibility of expressions regarding negation, birth, existence, etc., on the basis of meanings as figured in the mind by language. It is also noteworthy to mention here, that if *upacārasattā* is denied and if external-being is taken as the meaning, the expressions regarding negation, birth, existence, etc., will not be possible in the absence of the cause of expectancy for those expressions.[42] For example, the accomplishment of negation by the expression 'abrāhmaṇa (*a* prefix) + Brāhmaṇa (nominal-word) is possible only if

the *upacārasattā* of Brāhmaṇa of the negative expression 'abrāhmaṇa' is taken into consideration. If the external-being of Brāhmaṇa is taken into account, it will be contradictory to negate the external-existence of Brāhmaṇa by the expression 'abrāhmaṇa'. The external-existents are not perceived as non-existent and simultaneous expression of the existence and non-existence of an external thing is not possible. Thus, if the word 'brāhmaṇa' is taken as expressive of external-being of Brāhmaṇa, the negative expression like 'abrāhmaṇa' will not be possible. Not only that but in the absence of expectancy for the negation of what is already existent, the use of negative prefix will also not be possible. If for a moment the non-existence of external-*Brāhmaṇa* is accepted and, then, we use the negative prefix (*a*) with the word Brāhmaṇa, to whom, the negative prefix '*a*' (*nañ*), will negate? The negation of that which is already a non-existent is contradiction in term. Tout au contraire, if the meaning as inner-being is taken into consideration only then it is accomplished as the being, the external-being of which in Kṣatriya, etc. is negated by the negative prefix '*a*'. Thus the word 'Brāhmaṇa', according to B, reveals the inner-being of 'Brāhmaṇa' which is attributed to Kṣatriya, etc., and this attribution of Brāhmana-hood in external kṣatriya, etc. serves as the object of negation by the negative prefix (*nañ*). The word 'Brāhmaṇa' expresses inner-being and it is this inner-being which by similarity is imposed on Kṣatriya, etc. The negative prefix (*a*) conveys the natural absence of Brāhmaṇa in external Kṣatriya, etc. through which we know that Brāhmaṇa-hood is not natural (in anybody, namely, Kṣatriya etc., who is not a brāhmin') but is imposed on them by resemblance. In other words it is inner-being. The use of the expression 'abrāhmaṇa' clarifies that the inner-being of Brāhmin in external Kṣatriya, etc., has been negated by the word. If the word 'abrāhmaṇa' is taken as a compound denoting integration of meaning (*vṛtti*) it like the word 'Brāhmaṇa' serves as independent expressor and, then, it also seems right to say that as the word 'Brāhmaṇa' expresses a brāhmin, the word 'abrāhmaṇa' expresses independently a non-Brāhmaṇa (anybody who is not a brāhmin). But in all the two explanations, the expression of the meaning 'Brāhmaṇa' and 'abrāhmaṇa' is possible only if the inner-being is taken into account.

The opponents may say that as the inner-being is accepted by Vaiyākaraṇas as ever existent it cannot be a counterpart (*pratiyogī*) of negation. In other words, being eternally existent, it can never be non-existent. Contrary to it, external being, for them, is non-existent in past and in future. Thus, that of which non-existence is possible can only be negated by the negative prefix = *nañ* (*a*). As non-existence of only external being is possible, it is itself the being negated by the negative prefix.[13]

In reply to the above objection made by opponents of the inner-being as the meaning of language, Vaiyākaraṇas say that negative prefix

is naturally expressive of negation. Negative prefix does not negate the external-existence but it expresses the idea of the negation of external existence. Refuting those who take negative prefix as the negator of external-being, Mahābhāṣyakāra satirically comments: 'if the word "negation" were as miraculous as to negate the external-existents, the kings need not have to be equipped with the board of horses, elephants, army, etc., for defeating enemies. Their opponents were all removed only by uttering the word "negation" (*nañ*) at the front of them.'[44] It is clear from these lines that 'negation' does not negate the existence of externals but reveals the idea of the negation of external-existence, similarly, the negative prefix with the word 'Brāhmaṇa' reveals the idea of negation of Brāhmaṇa and the meaning 'Kṣatriya', etc., by the word 'abrāhmaṇa' is known by the intention involved in the use of the word.[45] In other words, the idea of the non-existence of some external-existence is revealed by the negative prefix (*nañ*). The negation of the 'Brāhmaṇa' by the negative prefix (*nañ*)—in the expression 'abrāhmaṇa' will not be possible if external-being is taken as the meaning of the words. The word 'Brāhmaṇa' is expressive of inner-being and by the use of negative prefix the idea of the inner-being of the 'Brāhmaṇa' which is the object of negation, is negated in external-being of Kṣatriya, etc.[46]

VI

In the previous pages, we have discussed how both—positive and negative—beings are cognized as beings revealed by language in the mind. We have also discussed how the negative expression cannot be possible if external-being as meaning is taken into account. B has very clearly discussed how the possibility of expressions regarding '*jāyate*' (birth), '*asti*' (exist) and others is explained on the basis of meaning as inner-being (*upacārasattā*). In brief, B is of the view that all the kinds of beings including birth, existence, etc., are known as they are revealed in the mind by language. Now, we proceed to examine the possibility of the expressions regarding 'birth' by taking, the example of the expression '*ankurojāyate*' (the sprout comes out).

By the 'birth' of something, we mean acquisition of one's own form—a permitted form of what is prevented previously or the form prior to its existence and later to its unmanifested form (prevented) which is next in sequence and is still prevented. Accordingly, the expression 'the sprout comes out' means the acquisition or permission of the prevented form of sprout—a form prior to its existence which is second and is still prevented form in the sequence. 'Birth' of something is conceived as a manifested form of one previously unmanifested and prior to the next form (existence). Permission of a previously prevented casual form but before its existence (*asti*) is conceived as birth (*jāyate*).[47] The agent (acquisitor), the object (acquisable) and the action (acquisition) as congealed together are expected by the expressions

like the 'sprout comes out'. The agent (sprout) of the action (coming out), *karma* (the form to be achieved, that is, birth) and the action of coming out (of the sprout) must be involved there in the accomplishment of action (*kriyā*). The substratum of an action may either be an agent or an object. In the absence of agent or object, accomplishment of an action is not possible. The expectancy for expressing externals (agent or object of birth=action) is not possible as they cannot exist before their birth. External objects can be the agent or the object of an action only if they are born first but prior to their birth how can they serve as the object of or as the agent of their own birth?

Showing the contradiction in the use of 'birth' of an external-existent, B puts the dialectic, a brief account of which is given as follows:

If the sprout is already existent (real) there will be no expectancy for the expression of its birth (*janma*) and if it is non-existent (unreal), the expression regarding the birth of a non-existent is self-contradictory.[48] Unlike the action of going (*gaman*), in which the external mover (*gantā*) and place to be reached by going (*gantavya*) are different, B seeks no room for difference of 'the agent of birth' and the form to be achieved by the action 'birth' (*jāyate*) of an external-thing, and, hence, the expression 'sprout comes out' is not possible if being as external-existent is taken as the meaning of the language.[49]

Opposite to B's position Sānkhya system of Indian philosophy accepts externally existents as the meaning of the word. External 'sprout', for them, is existent even in the time of its taking birth and serves as the agent of the action (of its taking birth). The 'birth' in their theory of *Satkārya* (the theory that assumes the unmanifested existence of effect in its cause prior to its birth) is the manifested form of an unmanifested. Objecting to the Sānkhya theory, HR says that the explanation of 'birth' even according to *Satkāryavādins* is not possible if meaning is taken as external being. Sānkhya also accepts 'birth' though, interprets it as the manifested form of an unmanifested. HR observes that as *Satkāryavādins* accept birth, they have also to accept that which is to be achieved by birth, that is, the result (*phala*) of the action, if otherwise, the uselessness of action has to be accepted. As the sprout, in their theory, as HR observes, is existent (in an unmanifested form), there will be no expectancy for the expression for its birth (to be manifested as yet?). In brief, B and HR want to show that the expression like 'sprout comes out' cannot be possible if external-existents are taken as the cause of the expectancy for the expression. In other words, the expression of the birth of externals (already existent) cannot be expected as the object of expression 'sprout comes out' and, hence impossibility of the expressions as concerned with 'birth'.

B explains the expression 'the sprout comes out' by taking *upacārasattā* of sprout and of the act of its birth as well. HR says[50] as the sprout has not completely come out, the expression '*ankurojāyate*' is used for

communicating its latter form in which it comes out fully. Had it fully come out, it would not be expected as an object of '*jāyate*' (birth) but of '*asti*' (existence). We, on B's explanation of the word '*asti*' (exists), will discuss after few steps. Here, we want to show that as the sprout has not fully come out, it can be taken as that which has not accomplished its own form, that is, non-existent (*asattā*). An action by a complete void or by unreal cannot be expected while the 'sprout' in the expression 'sprout comes out' is expressed as such that gets birth (*jāyamāṇa*). Thus, the sprout can be taken as both existent and non-existent. In other words, it is *asattā* (non-existence) in the sense that it has not fully come out and, is '*sattā*' (existent) as it is there in an incomplete form and comes out fully later on. In other words, sprout as the cause is taken as non-existence (*asattā*) and as the effect is existent (*sattā*). The preceding and following states of the sprout (*ankura*) figured in the mind are expected by the expression 'sprout comes out' as the agent and the object of the expression respectively. It, at the time of its 'coming out', is not externally existent. As the sprout is not externally existent, no expectancy for the expression 'sprout comes out' is possible. According to HR, the precedent and subsequent states of the sprout figure in the mind and these inner-beings (figured in the mind) are taken into account for the expression of the sentence 'sprout comes out'. If the inner-beings of permitted and prevented sprout are accepted, only then the significance of the use of instrumental case (*kartṛkāraka*) with the verb '*jāyate*' may be expected on one hand and the meaning of 'birth' (act of coming out of the sprout) may be expressed by the word '*jāyate*' (exists) on the other hand. If the following state of the effect 'coming out of the sprout' (*jāyate*) is already existent, it can be asked as to what is the need of saying its 'coming out' (*jāyate*)? According to B, the objection mentioned above does not arise if existence or 'being of sprout' is taken as inner-being. Conclusively, it can be said from the side of B that the expression like 'sprout is coming out' is expected on the basis of the inner-beings of the following state without negating its preceding state.[51] In the expression 'sprout comes out' the inner-beings of the preceding and following states are congealed together and the congealed state is expected by the expression 'sprout comes out'.

The difficulty in explaining the expressions like '*ankurojāyate*', arising out of taking external-existents as the meaning of words, does not arise if inner-being is taken into consideration. The inner-being (*ankura* not fully manifested) figures first which serves as the agent (*kartā*) of the mental being of the action '*jayate*' (comes out) on account of which the agent (the idea of '*ankura*' figured first in the mind) and the object (achievement of its next form, that is, 'coming out' which figures in the mind) of the verb '*jāyate*' by the expression '*ankurojāyate*' are cognized. The agent (*ankura* before its coming out), the object (the form of *ankura* to be achieved) and the action '*jāyate*' (coming out) are inner-

beings. The substratum of an action may either be an agent or an object and if both of them are mental, the action is also mental. Being mental, the prior and latter forms of sprout are taken into consideration as the agent and object of the action '*jāyate*' respectively for the expression of '*ankurojāyate*'. Grammatically, the use of *lakāra* (verbal tense) with '*jāyate*' is possible only if the agent and object of the action '*jāyate*' are taken as inner-beings, otherwise, the use of *lakāra* with the verb, as we have mentioned in earlier pages, is not possible.

VII

The expectancy for the expression, of 'existence' (*asti*) the second mode of being, can also not be possible if external being is taken into consideration for the use of the language. The word 'exists' (*asti*) is a verb denoting action of possessing or holding one's own being. Being departed from the 'birth' but has not reached as yet the third stage of it, that is, 'change' (*viparinamate*), is called 'to hold itself' which is expected by the word '*asti*' (exists). As agent (*kartā*) in *Vyākaraṇa* is taken as independent (*svatantro-kartā*) and the object (*karma*) is taken as dependent (*paratantra*) and as they are mutually contradictory in nature, an external-being cannot be taken as both—an agent and an object simultaneously, and, therefore, there will be no ground for the expression '*ankuro asti*' (The sprout exists), if external-being is taken as the cause of the expectancy for the use of word. It is only *upacārasattā* (inner-being) which even as a single one is expected or imagined by mind differently as both—the agent and the object on the basis of which the expression '*ankuro'sti*' is expressed (*Ātmānamātmanā vibhṛdastiti vyapadiṣyate*).[52]

Asti (exists) is a verb (*Ākhyātapada*) expressive of a being of a non-accomplished character (*sādhya*). It, like the verb '*pacati*' (cooking), expresses a collection of many actions involved in a sequence. As there is no external agent who can accomplish the external action of existing (*asti*)? The expression '*ankuro'sti*' cannot be possible if external being is taken as the meaning of words. In the act of 'existing of the sprout' there is no external agent (finished-character) and, then, what will serve as the substratum of the action? In the act of 'existing' the being of existing is conceived but the same being cannot simultaneously be of a finished and of a non-finished character. An agent and object are the beings of an accomplished character and the being revealed by the verb '*asti*' is of a non-finished character. How can that which is just going to achieve its 'existence' be taken as of a finished-character? If, for a moment, it is accepted as of a finished character, it cannot, then, be expected as of a non-finished character (that which has to be finished). The external being cannot at the same time be both of the opposite characters of finished and non-finished.

An external being is always a *siddha* (accomplished-character), and, hence, it cannot be a *sādhya* (non-finished character). B and HR elucidate that the verb '*asti*' denoting non-accomplished-being cannot be the expression of external existence which is of a finished character.[53]

From the discussion made in the previous pages, it is clear that all meaning—positive, negative, birth, existence, change, increase, decrease, destruction, etc.—are inner-beings revealed by language in the mind. The inner-being (*upacārasattā*) of a finished and of a non-finished character figures in the mind non-differently by language independently of external-beings. It is *upacārasattā* which causes incentive in a speaker for communicating through verbal utterances and which, in a hearer, is cognized as figured in the mind through verbal-noises. External-beings which are generally taken as the object of perception, inference, etc. are in themselves beyond the grasp of language and the sense-data acquired by perception by senses, eyes, ears, etc. are only instrumental in manifesting the inner-language. Manifested by them, the inner-language is revealed as *vācaka* which non-differently reveals the meaning (*vācya*) and, thus, both—the *vācaka* and *vācya*—are inner-being (*upacārasattā*).

For B, the being as qualifier-qualified[54] is also cognized as is figured by language in the mind. For example, the expression '*nīlotpalam*' expresses the 'lotus' qualified by the colour 'blue'. It cannot be expected so if external-being is taken as the meaning of the expression '*nīlotpalam*'. From the point of view of external-being the same *utpal* (blue-lotus) is *nīla* (blue) also. The *nīla* quality is not seen separate from the external *utpal* (blue-lotus) and, thus, the qualifier-qualified being by the expression '*nīlotpal*' will not be expected if external-being is taken as meaning. This is not the case with inner-being. The same meaning (being) is divided in the mind as qualifier (*nīla*) and that which is to be qualified by *nīla*, that is, *utpalam*. The inner meaning-qualifier (*nīla*) and the qualified (*utpala*) congealed together are taken into account for the expression '*nīlotpalam*'—the being having a qualifier-qualified character.

The inner-being revealed in the mind by language is universal—universal in the sense that identical cognition by language in all occurrences and instances is accomplished. If it is said that *abhāva* (negation) and other empty-concepts like hare's horn, barren's son, etc. (as there are no individual existents for the inherence of universal) cannot be admitted as universal and, hence, the denial of them as universal is the denial of their inner-being. Solving the problem, HR elucidates '*abhāvasya 'pi buddhyākāriṇa nirupaṇāt*'.[55] According to this statement of HR, '*abhāva*' in all its occurrences figures in the mind and that is why identical cognition by the word '*abhāva*' in its several occurrences and instances figures. Not only that but on the basis of how '*abhāva*' is presented by words in the mind it is classified into different

kinds, that is, *prāgbhāva, pradhvanśābhāva, anyonyabhāva, atyantābhāva* and, hence, *abhāva,* inhering in all its kinds is taken as universal.[56] *Abhāva* (non-being) in the system of *vyākaraṇa* is accepted as an idea of negation (non-existent).

As being so also non-being also figures in the mind by the words and that is why cognition by the word '*abhāva*' is accomplished. For example, the dative case is taught with verb '*dadāti*' as in the expression '*viprāya gām dadāti*' (He gives a cow to a Brāhmin). The same case is taught with its negation also as in the expression '*Viprāya gām na dadāti*' (He does not give a cow to a Brāhmin). The same rule is taught for both of the being and of the non-being and the cognition by both—the being and non-being—figures positively and, hence, to accept the inner-being of *abhāva* (non-being) like *bhāva* (being) seems justified from the point of view of accomplishment of cognition in communication.

VIII

The possibility of the eternity of relation between the language and meaning on which *Vaiyākaraṇas* theory of holism is based can also not be explained if external-being is taken as the meaning of language.[57]

A *śabda* is eternally related with meaning because meaning for *Vaiyākaraṇas* is that which is revealed in the mind non-differently by it. If meaning as external-being is taken, the relation between a linguistic unit (language) and the external-being (that is, physical unit which is beyond the grasp of language) will be difficult to explain. Moreover, physical things which are existent only in the present cannot be taken as eternally related with the language. As the meaning according to *Vaiyākaraṇas* is non-different from the eternally given *śabda* and the *śabda* reveals itself and the meaning, the question regarding the relation between the two (that is, the *śabda* and meaning) arises significantly as *Vācyavācaka.* The meaning, as it is what is figured non-differently in the mind by *śabda,* is eternally related with the *śabda.* This eternal relation according to *Vaiyākaraṇas* is the eternal-fitness (*yogyatā*) of the *śabda;* it is the *yogyatā* of the *śabda* by which it is eternally related with meaning. The *yogyatā* (*sambandha*) of a *śabda,* is eternally there with all of its meaning because *śabda,* in the system of *Vyākaraṇa* is taken as the expressor (*vācaka*) of all meaning (*Sarvesarvārtha Vācakāḥ*) and it is convention (known to us through the observation of the use of the *śabda* by elders) by which the *yogyatā-sambandha* of a word is restrained on account of which a fixed meaning (*artha*) is known by a fixed *śabda.*

The picture-theory of Wittgenstein, according to which the proposition is a fact and the meaning supposed to be pictured by proposition, that is, 'fact pictured' is also a fact and the two are mutually independent, distinct, discrete facts, has no sound logical or epistemological ground for explaining the relation between the

propositional fact and the fact pictured. His theory of structural-commonness between propositional fact and the fact pictured is not a solution to the problem of the relation. According to his own theory, the commonness may also be a fact to be expressed by a further proposition since it is also an experience. Thus, the fact of commonness will be just an addition to the number of facts but will be of no help in solving the problem of relation between the discrete facts—except amounting to infinite regress.

As his picture-theory rejects causal relation as a mark of superstition, the relation between the two facts (by accepting that the preceding fact causes the following fact) cannot be taken into account. The problem of relation between language and meaning is solved by B by taking it as the natural fitness of language to reveal meaning non-differently in the mind. Meaning is not a discrete fact but is a being non-differently revealed by language and, hence, the two are eternally related.

IX

What is revealed in the mind by *śabda* is *pratibhā*, a clear, distinct and complete indivisible unit, a flash of understanding. The cognition or flash revealed in the mind by inner-*śabda* (*sphoṭa*) is always a veridical cognition because communication is accomplished by it. According to B's trend of philosophy, the cognitions revealed even by the terms non-veridical, indistinct, etc., are also veridical, if otherwise, the communication cannot be accomplished. By the term 'veridical cognition' B means the cognition revealed or figured in the mind by *śabda* and that which by itself functions as an incentive to an action. The clear and distinct cognition revealed by *śabda* in the mind is always a veridical cognition and that is why B calls it by the term '*pratibhā*'. He accepts the cognition (both sentential and word-meaning) as veridical and does not reject the possibility of their further examination through reasoning and experience for men who seek verification or confirmation for believing in the veridical cognition revealed by '*śabda*' in the mind.

Verification and confirmation of a veridical cognition revealed by *śabda* in the mind are as the most central epistemological problem of philosophy for those who take *śabda* as that which stands by proxy for the things of the empirical world. They decide and accept the truth of cognition revealed by a statement on the basis of the state of affairs, that is, . . . A statement is true if it has a referent in the empirical world, otherwise, false. Contrary to them, B sees no need for external objects for explaining the expressions and the world of communication, that is, the world of expressions and the meanings. The verifying experience as a complete independent unit of experiential event, as a Bhartṛharian would say, has no connection whatsoever with the earlier experiences which are supposed to verify and, thus, the testability theory of meaning

based on the comparison of it with referable entities is of no use and of no significance as far as the accomplishment of communication or cognition by *śabda* is concerned.

Cognitively, verity is the very character of the cognition accomplished in communication. No communication is possible if the cognition revealed by *śabda* in the mind is not veridical. Veridical-cognition revealed in the mind is prior to, and functions as, a base of verification, falsification, confirmation, etc. involved in the explanation of it. These are means required for convincing the persons governed by stereotyped perception and practice. Persons having stereotyped attitude regarding cognition consider language as a name of things or of action, etc. The explanation of the veridical cognition revealed by *śabda* is useful for facilitating a discursive understanding of a man who takes *śabda* as that which stands by proxy for the things meant. Such an understanding inevitably demands verification of a statement on the basis of reason and experience for believing.

Verification is a logical criterion applied for the examination of a statement on the basis of referent as meaningful or meaningless or even as true or otherwise. It has a referential value and is based on the theory of language as representative for which a sentence is meaningful if it has a referent to be experienced in the empirical world or if it can be described in terms of experience. But how can verification or the referential truth of the statement 'the sentence is true if it expresses the true state of affairs or thing in the empirical world' be possible? For the lack of verification, the statement under example will be accepted either as presumptuous or as meaningless. Meaninglessness itself is known as is revealed by the language, but it will be embarrassing for positivists to accept their fundamental theory as inconsistent or as presumptuous. Empiricists in general and logical positivists in particular stand self-contradicted if they submit themselves to verification as the cause of the verity of cognition which for B is revealed by *śabda* itself.

Verity of cognition revealed by *śabda* in communication cannot be denied without a veridical cognition revealed by the word 'denial', and empiricists and positivists cannot deny the verity of cognition revealed by their basic proposition 'the meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification'. Taking the verity of cognition revealed by the statement for granted, further explanation of it through the instances of statements and subsequent examination of them in terms of meaningfulness or meaninglessness and truth or falsity is made on the basis of referents to be found in the empirical world. The verity of cognition and the examination of its truth on the basis of verification are different from each other. In the case of the former, the *śabda* occupies a foundational status (it reveals itself and the meaning also) while in the case of the latter, the *śabda* is taken as representative. The *śabda*, in the case of the former, is fundamental while in that of the latter is instrumental. B's

approach seems justified from the point of view of both accomplishment of communication and its explanation in terms of validity as well. It considers the cognition revealed by *śabda* in communication as veridical and estimates verification, confirmation, etc. as instruments involved in the further explanation/examination of the verity useful for convincing and believing those who seek referential evidence for the certainty of the cognition by language.

Those who take perception and other allied sources as the illuminator of cognition and consider *śabda* as representative of the cognition by perception, take *śabda* as a tool through which the cognition by perception is expressed to the audience. Contrary to their view, B considers *śabda* as *grāhaka-grāhya. Śabda* is the only illuminator of cognition. It illuminates itself and the meaning as well.

Perceived sense-data is instrumental in cognition or knowledge which is shot through-and-through by language. If otherwise, it will be just incommunicable private feeling with the things on the basis of which communication cannot be accomplished. According to B's system of thought, the perception by different senses and the senses themselves are distinguished by '*śabda*' which is the illuminating principle of them also. There is no knowledge which is not intertwined with *śabda*, all knowledge is knowledge shot through-and-through by *śabda* and what is revealed by *śabda* in the mind is always a veridical knowledge which, irrespective of verification, confirmation, etc. accomplishes communication. The examination of the cognition revealed by *śabda* in the mind through experience and reasoning forms a subject matter of a distinct logic for which the veridical cognition revealed by *śabda* (sentence or word) is valid if there is a possibility of a corresponding referent in the empirical world.[58] What counts in communication is not the validity based on empirical evidences and epistemic justifications but the verity and this verity is the nature of cognition as it is directly revealed by the language. All cognition is revealed (by language) and is veridical. It is indivisible flash and not predication.

As far as the differences of the cognitions by fantasy, allegories, myths, factual, non-factual and other expressions are concerned, they, for B, are relative to communication. It is the communication on the basis of which their differences are known by the expressions themselves. Those who are not well versed in communication, as in the cases of children, may take fantasy, myths, etc. to be expressions of real-life situations but when they grow up they see the differences of the cognition through communication. The cognition by the expression 'A is a myth' is a veridical cognition and that is why it is known thus. Verity of cognition is based neither on referents nor on empirical evidences and epistemological justification but on the accomplishment of communication itself.[59]

X

Conclusively, it can be said that what figures in the mind by language is a kind of being, that is, *upacārasattā*. Mental ideas revealed by language in the mind are taken by B as self-restrained being. The language itself and the meaning revealed non-differently by it are only cognized as such but as all knowledge is knowledge shot through-and-through by language, the identical cognition of the beings revealed in the mind is accomplished in communication. *Upacārasattā* is a self-restrained being[60] as it is not something abstracted from external things. By self-restrained being we mean to say that the objects of cognition are not abstracted from external things. They are not constructions of minds but are beings revealed non-differently by language itself. There is a difference between the cognition and the cognition of the object. Cognition is not an object or another in a cognition. As a light does not need another light in order to be illuminated, cognition, as such, is self-luminous and, hence, foundational while the cognition of the objects (being—the object of cognition, that is, idea) is relational to cognition. As communication is the accomplishment of cognition by language, the objects of cognition are also the objects of communication and, hence, of philosophical reflection and investigation as well.

So far as things-in-themselves are concerned, B does not deny their existence, in fact, he accepts them. For him, they are not revealed by language, rather, they are beyond the grasp of language but are known by implication as ontological apposition (*Samānādhikaraṇa*) of the cognition and of the objects of cognition as are revealed by language in the mind. External existences are taken by habit, practice and perception as the object of cognition but even in the case of representative theory of perception, bare sense-data (and not the things-in-themselves) is grasped. The sense-data like verbal-noises, as a Bhartṛharian would say, is only instrumental in manifesting the inner-language which when manifested reveals itself first as *vācaka* and the meaning (*vācya*) is revealed by it non-differently. We are so accustomed in the manner of perception by eyes that we do not usually mind their actual role of only instrumentality in the manifestation of real language. We do not mind the foundational character of cognition as shot through-and-through by language.

The things-in-themselves are not beings revealed by language. There is no room for the admission of them in B's holism of language. Even the sense-data in order to be differentiated and distinguished as sense-data requires language. It cannot be known even as sense-data, if isolated from language. Things-in-themselves whether eternal or transient are of no philosophical significance because philosophical reflections are concerned with and are confined to the objects figured in the mind by language. The theory of objects of cognition as *upacārasattā* (being figured in the mind as presented by language)

seems justified on the plane of cognition as it does not take the objects of cognition as abstracted from or as imagined by or as constructed by mind. It does not take them as ideas hypostatized as external-things. Nonetheless, the basic premises of the sentence-holism hold the objects of cognition neither as ontological nor as psychological entities but as cognoscible and communicable beings figured non-differently by language in the mind.

To sum up, we can say that language for B's philosophy is expressive by nature. It is on the basis of expressive nature of language that he interprets the most controversial problem of relation between language and meaning, language and being or between being and being in a very natural way. He, by taking cognition as intertwined with language, resolves the problem of relation between language and cognition. What figures by language in the mind for B is the object, that is, thought object, which is identified by him as meaning or inner-being. His concept of meaning as inner-being revealed non-differently in the mind by language and its implications drawn by him may be taken as his real contribution to the history of philosophy. It is on the basis of inner-being only that the expressions regarding birth, existence, change, negation, etc. are made possible. Empty concepts like hare's horn, barren's son (having no external being), future (the being yet to be born) and past-being (externally non-existents) cannot be explained if inner-being as revealed by the expressions is not taken into account. Not only that but words generally taken as of having only syntactical significance and many others can also not be taken as expressors and hence cease to be words if what figures by these words is not taken as their meaning. Over and above all, no expression even the expression regarding external things (existing only in present), can also not be possible if inner-being as the meaning is denied. Expression implies a prior expectancy and expectancy prior to the expression is not possible if inner-being as its cause is not accepted. This theory of sentence-holism, in very brief, is a philosophical theory of primacy of language intertwined with cognition. It is ubiquitously and foundationally given as illumined-illuminating-being of the world of communication to which our cognition and reflections are confined. Cognitively, *upacārasattā* only figures in the mind by it and that is reason he insists on reflecting even on metaphysical objects also as they figure in the mind by language or as are presented by language. External-being as a Bhartṛharian would say is known by implication or by inference as ontological substratum (external basis) of the inner-being revealed in the mind by language.

As cognition by language is accepted by B as a revealed truth, it is always a veridical cognition (*prakāśita*). Communication cannot be accomplished if cognition by language is not taken as veridical and cognition cannot be taken as veridical if it is not accepted as revealed.

As language is luminous and the illuminating principle of cognition and as cognition is revealed and is shot through-and-through by language, the cognition revealed by it is taken as self-restrained on one hand and as veridical on the other hand.

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Notes and References

1. A. Aklujkar defines '*Śabdānuviddhatā*' as infusion of language and cognition. I would like to acknowledge him for the word. *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophy*, Edited by H.G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja, Vol. 5: *Philosophy of Grammarians*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1990.
2. As decided by K.A. Subramahia Iyer, Bhartṛhari cannot be placed later than the fifth century AD. See, Bhartṛhari, p. 14, Deccan College, Poona, 1969. This date is also supported by H.G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja. *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 5, p. 18.
3. The word 'revealed' cannot be misunderstood for intuition as super-rational mystical cognition by divine agency or inspiration. It is used here for signifying the illumination or the figuring of the objects of cognition given in the mind. B's philosophy takes cognition as directly revealed by inner-language (*Śakṣāt śabden janitā*).
4. *Tadeva asti nāsti jāyate iti prayogamupacārasattāsamasryṇena samarthitaḥ.* Helārāja's commentary on *VP*, 3/3/48.
5. See, Saroja Bhate, 'Bhartṛhari on Language and Reality', pp. 67–74, Edited in the book *Bhartṛhari: Philosopher and Grammarian*, edited by Saroja Bhate and Johannes Bronkhorst, M.L. B.D., Delhi.
6. *Sphoṭa*, in the system of *Vyākaraṇa* has been considered chiefly from two points of view. The first is a metaphysical understanding of it while the second is a cognitive understanding of it. *Sphoṭa*, from the former point of view, is the conscious principle, all-pervading and uncaused cause of all that is created and cognized. The *sphoṭa* as ontological being is beyond the grasp of the language. From the latter point of view *sphoṭa* is real, indivisible, complete-meaning-revealing and inner-language which is ubiquitously given as illumined-illuminative being. It is the being which reveals itself and the meaning is revealed non-differently by it. From this point of view, *sphoṭa* manifested by utterances/noises, reveals itself first and then, it reveals meaning non-differently in the mind. The *sphoṭa* as ontological being is inferred or implicated as substratum (*samānādhikaraṇa*) of the cognition revealed by it in the mind. Perhaps, this is the chief difference between the *sphoṭa* as ontological being and as cognitive being. However, the *sphoṭa* as envisaged by the latter point of view is taken into account for the discussion in the paper.
7. *Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte, Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate, VP*, 1/123.
8. *Sphoṭa Theory of Language*, p. 1.
9. *Yathā Prayoktuḥ prāgbuddhiḥ śabdeṣveva pravartate, Vyavasāyo grahitṛṇāmevamteṣveva jāyate*, Ibid., 1/53.
10. VP, 1/56–57.
11. Ibid., 1/55.

12. *Vṛtti* on 1/62.
13. *Na hyupāyadabhinnatvam tadupeyasyayujyate, Vupasya nahyabhinnatvam dīpādvā cakṣuṣ'opi vā, Nyāya Manjarī*, Vol. II, p. 100, and *Ślokavārtika, Pratyakṣasūtra* 182.
14. *Viṣayatvamanāpannaiḥ śabdairnārthaḥ prakāśyate. Na sattayaiva te'rthanāmagṛhītāḥ prakāśakāḥ. VP*, 1/56.
15. For a detailed and clear account of relation between a *Śabda* and *Artha* my Article on 'Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Relation between Word and Meaning', published in *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 2, 1994, edited by Daya Krishna, pp. 43–54, may be consulted. See also *VP, Sambandha—Samuddesaḥ.*
16. *VP*, 1/123 and also *Mahābhāṣya* on 1/1/67.
17. Helārāja (HR) on *VP*, 3/3/2.
18. *Nyāya Manjarī*, Vol. II, p. 100.
19. *VP*, 1/57.
20. Mahābhāṣya on '*Hayavarat*' *Sūtra* of Pāṇini.
21. *Nyāya Manjarī*, Vol. II, p. 355.
22. *VP*, 1/121.
23. *Vṛṣabha* on *VP*, 1/121.
24. *Vṛṣabha* on *VP*, 1/123.
25. *VP*, 1/123.
26. Western propositionalists like G.E. Moore, B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein, etc. also accept that all knowledge, even knowledge by sense-perception, is nothing but cognition of a proposition. See *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Edward Paul, 5–6, p. 496.
27. Following B.K. Matilal, *Perception*, 1986, p. 396, many scholars of *vākyapadīyam* have taken *upacārasattā* as metaphorical-existence in the sense of abstraction, but in our opinion it is misleading and may cause confusion in understanding B's philosophy of language in general and his concept of sentence-holism in particular. B has used the term '*upacārasattā*' for inner or mental-being figured in the mind by language. It comprises the being of language and of meaning which are only objects of our cognition. Cognition, communication and, hence, our philosophical reflections are confined to the *Upacārasattā* which is cognized as revealed by language and is not inferred or implicated existence like metaphorical existence.
28. We agree with Ashok Aklujkar in taking the '*upacārasattā*' as 'secondary existence' in contrast with primary existence. This is exactly what Mahābhāṣyakāra and Bhartṛhari want to say by the term '*upacārasattā*'. *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 5, edited by H.G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja, 1990. Also see—*Mahābhāṣya* 5/2/94 and *VP*, 3/3/39–50.
29. See *VP*, 3/1/98–104.
30. Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini, 5/2/94.
31. Pāṇini, 5/2/95.
32. Mahābhāṣya on 5/2/94.
33. Pradīp on Pāṇini, 5/2/94.
34. *VP*, 3/3/46–48.
35. Ibid., 3/3/39.
36. Mahābhāṣya Pradīp on Pāṇini, 3/2/94.
37. *VP*, 3/3/51.
38. Ibid., 3/3/40–41.
39. HR on *VP*, 3/3/40–41.
40. Ibid., 3/3/40–41.
41. Ibid., 3/3/40–41.
42. *VP*, 3/3/42.
43. HR on *VP*, 3/3/42.
44. Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini, 3/2/6.

45. HR on *VP*, 3/3/42.
46. Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini, 3/2/6.
47. HR on *VP*, 2/2/118 & 3/3/40–41.
48. *VP*, 3/3/43.
49. Ibid., 3/3/44.
50. HR on *VP*, 3/3/43.
51. *VP*, 3/3/45–46.
52. *VP*, 3/3/47.
53. *VP*, 3/3/48 and HR Commentary on it.
54. *VP*, 3/3/39 and HR Commentary on it.
55. *VP*, 3/1/34.
56. HR on *VP*, 1/2/46.
57. See 'Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Relation between Word and Meaning' by D.N. Tiwari, *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 4, edited by Daya Krishna, pp. 43–54.
58. Ignorants and Children's Arguments Based on Referential Criteria, see *VP*, 2/287–296.
59. B is not interested in analysing veridical cognition revealed by language in communication in terms of validity or justifiability and hence he has not cared specially for providing empirical evidences and epistemic-justification used for analysing the cognition in terms of objectivity. He aims at interpreting communications as are accomplished by language. He, like a hermeneutist, tries to clarify the concepts as are used in usual communications by the method of interpreting different views on them given by different thinkers popular at his time. The accomplishment of communication is the basic criterion of cognition. Cognition by language or the accomplishment of communication is itself evidential for its verity. The cognition even derived by reasoning and argumentation which prove or disprove it as valid or invalid may be accounted for the limit of the subjectivity or the objectivity of a cognition or as distinguisher of verified cognition and other's imagination, etc., but so far its communicative value is concerned, it is not worth accepting if it goes against communication.
60. By the term self-restrained being we mean the self-determined flash of understanding, that is, *Pratibhā*, revealed non-differently by language in the mind.

Basanta Kumar Mallik and the Negative

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Mallik had a lifelong preoccupation with the Negative. He pondered for a long time over its many forms, for example:

(a) Negation in the forms of contradiction and contrariety;
(b) Opposition in the form of warfare, personal and racial conflicts; violent and non-violent demonstrations, the restriction of order and disorder;
(c) Values associated with opposition: good/evil, truth/illusion, honesty/dishonesty, conventional/unconventional, real/unreal.

All these forms were bound up with the ideas of relationship and change. The relationships varied from the inequality of contradiction to the strict equality and frustration of contrariety. Negation is often associated with ending, yet the Negative is not necessarily regarded as ultimate, rather as a stepping-stone to another state. Furthermore, the Negative is usually referred to in terms of the Positive. Even such Sanskrit words as *arogya*—health, or *ahimsa*—non-violence, denote absence of or freedom from the negative, which suggests that the Negative is not quite essential in an ontological sense, though it is not impossible. 'The Negative somehow appeared to be non-existence; yet nobody ever thought it impossible.'[1] Strangely enough, a parallel statement is made about the ideal Positive, the Absolute or the Perfect. It is not actual at present, but it is not impossible. These experiences support the belief that 'The Negative is just as distinct a type of human experience as the Positive and both are equally elementary and ultimate. We do not derive either of them from the other.'[2] When Mallik turned to methods used to deal with the Negative he found a wide variety. For example:

Parmenides denied its existence;
The tyrant crushed it underfoot by brute force;
The Saint or Holy Man smothered it with love and patience;
The Jurist contained it, kept it within bounds by the power of law or public opinion;
The loser yielded to greater force by submission, conversion or martyrdom.

There were those who endured oppression for a time in the hope of achieving freedom through self-discipline. Others sought protection from a Higher Power through prayer, repentance and forgiveness. Some others accepted suffering as inevitable for the time being, but pinned their hopes on a higher state of existence where it would no longer be found. There were many different approaches to this state of Heaven, Paradise, Nirvana or Brahman. Mallik believed all these approaches to the problem contained a valuable grain of truth or realism. But because each addressed only one aspect of the problem they did not manage between them to solve the conflict or the enigma. An account was needed which would give all these observations a place in which they could support one another. Efforts to deal with the Negative had produced qualities held in high esteem in all cultures: courage, honesty, purity, steadfastness, foresight, tolerance, responsibility and spirituality, to name but a few. But, as Mallik so often said, when he heard one of these virtues being acclaimed, 'That alone is not enough.' They may have helped man to survive, but by themselves they have not solved the problem of the Negative.

After years spent studying these aspects of the Negative and the methods devised to deal with it in different contexts, Mallik came to the conclusion that such a universal problem had to be tackled at a very basic level indeed. It could not be dealt with until it was understood. He considered the question 'What is the essence of the Negative?', and then going still deeper, 'Does the Negative actually exist?'. He had already established to his satisfaction the certain existence of Reality, quoting the classical reply to the sceptic driven by doubt who suggested that there was Nothing when reality appeared to have lost its significance. The sceptic was told that his doubt, which he could not deny, in itself constituted evidence of some reality. 'Under the Laws of Thought nothing cannot be there if even the minimum form of Reality or Being or Existence is there'.[3] This gave assurance and appeared to leave the field free for the existence of Being. Parmenidean position took this to the extreme: 'Being is absolute and total; there is no Negative.' But to accept such a position would be to close our eyes to the fact that day in day out we are actually dealing with the Negative in one form or another. It is impossible to deny our experience of it. While the fact of doubt provided logical evidence which ruled out the Absolute Negative, our lives provided historical evidence for the continued experience of forms of the negative which opposed our positive experiences or achievements. From this fact, Mallik drew the conclusion that the existence of the negative relative to the positive must be recognized. It followed that the positive must be in some sense relative to the negative.

The bare assurance about Reality is not a sufficient answer to the sceptic. This has to be supported by a far-reaching philosophic enquiry

to provide an account of the nature of Reality and the part played in it by the negative.

Mallik could not follow the traditional methods used by mystics, dogmatists or scientists because, as he put it 'he did not happen to have any spiritual, rationalistic or scientific intuitions from which to start. As a philosopher he must depend on the laws of thought.'[4] He takes the first law: A is A, as establishing the identity of A, and by implication recognizing the conceivability of Not-A. The second law: A cannot be A and Not-A, needs, he suggests, another clause to complete it: A and Not-A are opposites, and must co-exist in order to oppose one another. The third law of Excluded Middle: There must be either A or Not-A, refers to a non-related state of existence and leaves open its positive or negative character.

He turned to the laws of thought, 'not as subsisting beings to whom we could appeal for help as devotees appeal to Gods for help. They should be taken rather as records of human experience. . . in which Positive and Negative as categories appear in definite relationships.'[5]

He takes care to distinguish these categorical experiences from images or percepts. They dispel doubt and provide evidence about the structure of reality. There is no question of action or reaction, or memories or foresight in a categorical experience. They are, nevertheless individual experiences, unique and yet related like any other moment in the individual's career.

Accounts of all types of experience if they are to be accepted as true or valid must support one another. Mallik follows scrupulously the plan he laid down for enquiry—the combination of metaphysical conclusions and records of day-to-day events. Experiences and records of conflict are as essential as their metaphysical interpretation to any account of reality, if it is to be a complete one.

Among reviews of the Real and the Negative one suggested that Mallik's effort to clear up the false antithesis between the Real and the Negative had led him into such 'nebulosities' as the suggestion that 'Clear distinction between the Negative and the possibility of the negative might hold the solution to the problem of life and thought.' He had laboured long, the reviewer suggested, but must work harder to clarify his position. Mallik conceded that the argument was a difficult one to follow, and included a long and closely reasoned review of the negative as an appendix to Related Multiplicity.[6]

The most acute experience of the Negative arises as a possibility following doubt. It occurred to Mallik that such an argument must also affect the dogmatist's claim for the Positive. The absolute sceptic's case had been destroyed by the evidence of his own doubt, for which there was no place in the Absolute Negative. The same argument would affect the dogmatists' claim for the Absolute Positive, which was also described as all-inclusive. This would leave no room for any claim or faith either.

Evidence that the doubt of Non-Being and the faith in being reduced the claims for the Negative and the Positive to possibilities, denying the absolute character of both. As far as he knew, this point had not been raised in tradition. He called this discovery the primal form of categorical experience, the possibilities or non-absolute forms of the negative and the positive, or of non-being and being. The so-called categorical conceptions prior to this experience were revealed as value judgements, implying judgements of inequality which have had a profound effect on man's attitude to the negative. The possibilities of being and non-being stand as true and equal categories, pure unbiased evidence of Reality.

A category is not an experience of something material or historical. It is an idea, a recognition of a possible state of existence. The philosopher, elated perhaps by having dismissed the threat of the Absolute Negative or Nothingness, hurried to replace it by the prospect of the Absolute Positive. But when he introduced the concept of the Absolute, he also admitted the notion of value, as better or worse, leading inevitably to right and wrong, good and evil. The dual notion of Reality was forgotten, and replaced by a system of values, or inequalities.

Reality, being total and all-inclusive must make provision for every conceivable state of existence. But certain states, for example the Related and Unrelated, or the Monistic and the Pluralistic are incompatible and cannot co-exist. This led Mallik to restate in Related Multiplicity[7] his account of the Cosmic pattern of existence, which he calls the Triadic Universe. This consists of the first Continuous Universe of Non-Being, unrelated and monistic, without a beginning but ending. This is followed by the Discontinuous Universe of Being and Non-Being co-existing in relationship, which begins and ends. The Discontinuous is in turn succeeded by the second Continuous Universe of Being, monistic and unrelated, which will begin, but will not end.

This triadic pattern provided for both beginning and no beginning; for ending and no ending; the monistic and the pluralistic, and for the unrelated and the related. There is only Reality, constituted by Being and Non-Being. The unreal cannot exist, nor can the self-contradictory. 'The Real was never in the predicament in which it was called upon to embody no beginning and no end at the same time. It was open to Reality only to exist as continuous or discontinuous. It could never be both simultaneously.'[8]

Everyone is aware of situations in which two individuals' recollections of events are recorded or interpreted in two different, even incompatible accounts, though both individuals had actually participated in or witnessed the incidents they are describing. Two contradictory statements cannot both be accepted as 'true statements', and yet both may be given in good faith and with conviction of their accuracy. These discrepancies range from the description of an incident in the street to profound philosophical interpretations. To judge or evaluate these conflicting

statements remains a perennial problem. One version may be accepted as more in tune with the listener's own point of view. To justify this choice, recourse is sometimes made to a mysterious unexplained factor—prejudice, illusion, incompleteness, or even evil, which taints the opposite version. It may be conceded that we have not yet attained understanding of the whole truth. It is something to be sought but remains still beyond our reach.

It is one thing to accept a metaphysical statement about the nature of Reality—that it is non-absolute—quite another to apply that understanding to one's actual life, one's actions and reactions. The world we know is the Discontinuous Universe, the world of related multiplicity. It is composed of multiple individuals, instances of the two basic forms of concrete existence—being and non-being. These instances Mallik identifies as individuals or entities, unique chains of experiences, with each link in the chain related to links in other chains as identical, or distinct, as opposite or complementary. For example, a man thinks, feels or acts as a member of a family, professional group, a group of friends, a nation, etc. These individuals, instances of being and non-being, are the only concrete entities in existence. Not all substantives are substantial. To give a simple example, it makes sense to say that a baby is 'the picture of health'; but the statement: 'health is the picture of a baby' has little if any significance. Words like 'health' or 'non-violence' are catalogue words, referring to a type of experience an individual may have from time to time. They are not objects permanently existing or stored; they are not percept or image experience.

Where, then does the individual stand in this world of related multiplicity? In common with all other entities he must be an instance of the positive or the negative, existing and functioning in relationship. The negative has been regarded as something with which one has to deal, either by managing it or bearing it. At the same time, all individuals have viewed the negative as something they would be glad to do without. Most of us hoped that we should eventually reach that happy state.

The question may be asked what does it feel like to be an instance of non-being? This is difficult to answer, because we live in an age of belief in the Absolute, and therefore inequality where the positive is considered superior to the negative. No one wishes to identify with the negative. But it will be generally agreed that the negative appears to indicate at least inferiority, and at the extreme some threat of destruction. It may be suggested that feeling of humiliation, shame or guilt indicate a negative state, or that indignation or anger, some sense of injustice which leads to a fight against all odds, or a ruthless attempt at extermination represent negative responses to a situation in which an individual is caught up.

Mallik suggests that in classical western philosophy the negative is recognized as an entity which has eternally existed with the positive, but

in the final phase of reality non-being is to be excluded. Relationship is shed, and Being, either as unrelated self-contained units, or as an idea or essence of unity continues alone. The Indian account, starting with mystical unity, envisaged the world of related multiplicity as an emanation from Being, and envisaged the historical world as a temporary phenomenon.

These accounts presuppose inequality between being and non-being. Non-being is regarded as the temporary unreal or illusory element, whereas being has the capacity not only to co-exist with non-being, but also to become actual or absolute, and continue unrelated.

To Mallik this position appeared as untenable for two reasons. Being and non-being, as opposites must be equal. They could not therefore be real and unreal. Being has no greater right to be equated with Reality than Non-Being. They are both essential constituents of Reality, existing alternatively in monistic and related forms. Non-being is not to be confused with 'absence of being.' It is equally real, and might be described as 'other than being.' It is one of the two ultimate constituents of Reality.

Inequality which may characterize experiences in the context of action or performance, cannot apply to existence as such. There can be no degrees of existence. Mallik's possible existent is not to be confused with Aristotle's nondescript potential, which cannot claim to be there or not there. If the positive and negative co-exist, or exist alternately, they must have equal claim to existence. In conflicts, first one side and then the other prevails, but one never eliminates the other, or even establishes permanent dominance.

Great victories have been hailed as the result of brilliant strategy or outstanding courage. Men celebrate also the resilience of those who slowly overcome oppression and return to power. Groups are formed, flourish for a time and then fade away. Even nations and races having established themselves over a long period are eventually overthrown or virtually extinguished. They had their moments of victory and defeat and came to an end. They had their place in history, but not the last word. The struggle goes on between the authoritarians and the equalizers, the upholders of spiritual and material values in other times and places, between members of other groups. The continuing feature of conflict is the equal ability of both sides to survive.

In considering the role played by the negative in the Discontinuous Universe, Mallik begins from the same position as he adopted in considering it in Reality as a whole. If something exists it must exist in every conceivable state. Provision is made in the related universe for every possible type of relationship between the positive and negative.

Provision for every conceivable kind of related existence or in individual terms every imaginable experience, implies stages or sequences in time or space—some co-existing, others alternating. Mallik

envisaged five such stages in the Discontinuous Universe, under two main types: The Primal or Beginning, and the Creative or ending, linked with the conception and realization of the Common Purpose.

In the Primal stage there are two basic states of related existence: identicalness and distinctness. Individuals as instances of being and non-being are found in both states. In other words, individuals exist as identical with one another and as distinct, although never merged into unity or completely detached as absolute differents. In the creative stages, where the end or purpose of the discontinuous universe is conceived and realized, these functions of conception and realization are undertaken by individuals in a state of identicalness and distinguishability respectively.

The primary stage of pure existence logically precedes the creative stages. Something must be recognized as existing before any enquiry can be made as to how it functions. But as a matter of historical fact, these two stages are features which characterize the discontinuous universe throughout its course. Being and Non-being cannot create without existing; nor can they exist without a purpose.

The instances of Being or Non-Being, the individuals, are the only concrete constituents of this universe. They begin and end with it. Each individual consists of a unique series of experiences. At the same time, each individual experience is related to the experiences of other individuals, forming groups of different kinds.

The equality of these individuals is perhaps the most difficult concept of all to accept. Mallik himself had a lingering tendency to regard the negative as the instigator of problems and suffering. For example, he refers to the period of conflict and illusion, which he calls the third stage, as 'the period of the negative'. One might almost be tempted to think of the negative as the villain of the piece. But if challenged on this point he would certainly have agreed that being and non-being are equally involved in conflict and illusion, and that in due course they will contribute equally in the fourth and fifth stages to harmony and realization of the Common Purpose.

The distinction between existence and non-existence which has been universally held, Mallik believed, arose possibly from a confusion between Being and Existence. He reserves the terms Being and Non-being for the two constituents of reality, which are non-absolute, equal and actual. Concrete existence he defines as a state in which being and non-being are to be found existing in relationship as a matter of historical fact. In the primary stage the relationship between individuals in a state of identicalness and a state of distinctness hardly extends beyond implication.

Every instance of reality has its own unique identity, and all individual experiences must be positive. As reality is dual it is possible for two instances to oppose one another. Non-existence would imply no claim

to reality, the absolute negative, without identity. The personification of the negative in mythology as the Demon or Devil is regarded as positively existent and identifiable. Such accounts are believed by many, who have found evidence for them in their own experience, though they may be unable to supply a logical basis for their belief. In other words, what is conceivable must be granted a claim to reality.

To take an everyday example, water may be felt as hot or cold. When it is hot we say that it is not cold, but as long as water is there it is connected with some positive temperature. It is never simply 'not something'. Non-existence in the sense of 'no temperature' is impossible, inconceivable and simply not there. The situation is summed up in the child's nonsense rhyme:

> As I was going up the stair
> I met the man who wasn't there.
> He wasn't there again to-day,
> Oh! how I wish he'd go away.

Does this not provide the clue? The contradiction lies in the child's illusory experience. The man cannot be defined as simply 'not being somewhere'. He must be somewhere else.

It has already been mentioned that relationships develop in different ways during the course of the Discontinuous Universe. Different functions give scope for different situations. Instances of being and non-being conceiving or formulating the Common Purpose are necessarily in accord, just as they are in a state of identicalness. But, as everyone knows from experience, different attempts at realizing an objective, or bringing a plan to fruition can produce degrees of difficulties, ranging from a simple misunderstanding to prolonged and bloody warfare.

Not only are being and non-being equal constituents of reality which must be recognized as equally active. The activity involved in beginning the Universe is quite different from that which brings it to an end. It is one thing to establish an actual presence, quite another to formulate the purpose or objective of one's existence and to take steps to bring that idea of the future into actual concrete action. Activity takes different forms. These forms of activity imply one another, as do states of existence and the stages of beginning and ending. In Mallik's dual world all parts are equally essential to the whole. There is no need or place for any external agent or cause.

As Mallik's account comes to include historical features as well as metaphysical statements it is necessary to give some clearer definitions of the terms he uses. In the Real and the Negative he uses the term 'Being' as a synonym for the positive, existence and reality. But in Related Multiplicity he makes a clear distinction between these terms. Reality he uses as the overall word for everything which is, existence is a

state of Reality, being and non-being are the ultimate constituents of reality. Like Humpty Dumpty is Alice through the Looking-Glass when Mallik used a word, 'It meant what he chose it to mean—neither more nor less, but when he made a word do a lot of work he paid it overtime.' As time went on, the words overworked by Mallik underwent subtle changes. He uses the word 'stage' in two different contexts. The first is the distinction between the first and final stages of the discontinuous universe. But he also uses the word 'stage' for the subsequent developments in the creative stages—the second, third, fourth and fifth stages all being parts of the creative process.[9]

One may make a distinction between a categorical notion or experience and an image or perceptual experience. We have categorical experiences of the primary and following stages. They are part of the metaphysical account of the discontinuous universe. They are concepts which are possible, but are not supported by historical or concrete evidence. The accounts of the third and fourth stages rest not only on categorical evidence, but refer to historical records and personal experiences. Any knowledge of the fifth stage must be purely categorical. It may be helpful to refer to the third stage as the stage of conflict, and the fourth stage as that of certainty or necessity and of abstention.

Mallik's second stage of tension initiated the creative phase of the discontinuous universe. Being and Non-being were still actual, non-absolute and equal, and in the state of distinctness were ready to fulfil their function of realizing the Common Purpose of the discontinuous universe. But before this could proceed, Mallik suggests, 'There was bound to be a sudden catastrophic interval, which he describes as tension.'[10] Because being and non-being were equal and opposite they could not produce any positive result. They were capable only of mutual neutralization, a passive interlude, which if not halted could have led to the disappearance of both. There is no historical record of this event, but we know that the universe has not disappeared, and therefore in some way provision was made for the two absolute values of unity and individuality with which we are familiar. It would be senseless to suggest that the non-absolute could become the actual absolute, which is incapable of existence; but the position becomes clearer if we think of the change in terms of the individuals having an illusory experience of the possibility of an absolute state, an ideal which it was believed might be attained, but which in reality proved unattainable.

As there are two groups, possibilities of the Absolute, there will be two opposing attempts to reach that ideal. But these two notions cannot be held as equal or actual, for that would reproduce the situation of tension and inactivity experienced in the second stage. There is action, the two sides rising and falling alternately, never reaching complete success or total extinction. In fact, the most that one group can achieve is the bringing of his opponent's ideal into total disrepute. All series of

action in the discontinuous universe begin and end. Therefore success and failure, or the Real and Unreal are bound to be reversed periodically. The mainspring of action is not creation or realization, but value. This obtains in all forms of existence, inorganic, organic, cultural and spiritual. Three possible objectives were imagined and the way towards them was mapped out: identicalness, reassessed as unity, distinctness, reassessed as self-sufficiency, and relationship envisaged as community. These reflected in a distorted way three features of the primal stage of existence.

Three different social organizations developed, based in human terms on mystical unity, individuality and the subordination of unity and individuality to the needs of the community. They provided incentives for action, but laboured under two serious disadvantages. First, they looked back to what had already been experienced and took a part of it as an ideal to be attained, instead of looking forward to a common objective, completely new and original, to be realized. They hoped for the establishment of better existence, but put all their efforts into bringing about Heaven, Paradise, Atman or the Kingdom of the Gods, and so retrieve the Golden Age. These perfect states were conceived of as already existing somewhere, waiting to be reached.

For thousands of years these ideal states have been described and interpreted in every imaginable way, and the attempts to make them historical realities were inevitably unsuccessful. As absolute conceptions, unity, individuality and relationship are incompatible, and cannot co-exist. If one of them were to become a historical fact, the others must disappear. These enormous efforts could therefore result in nothing more than the frustration of one's opponent's efforts.

Mallik refers to this as the stage of the negative, conflict or illusion. It is negative in the sense that it brings about no positive or actual result. In terms of human beliefs and actions, being and non-being are equally involved, equally convinced that their endeavours for their chosen plans hold the best chance of success. In this scenario opportunities occur for all kinds of efforts, coalitions and compromises. Though people speak of fighting to the death, this never happens to the individual. What does take place sooner or later is the ending of a particular coalition or group. Empires and nations cease to exist but old conflicts surface in new forms between the surviving individuals.

There comes a time when the results of so many unsuccessful efforts lead individuals to doubt not only the methods employed, but the faith underlying those methods. For a time such doubts may not be openly expressed, because unless one has an alternative faith to offer, it appears irresponsible to destroy people's basic 'anchor'. But these doubts leave their mark. There is a rise of cynicism, a growing awareness that while people are continuing to exist and function, they are not achieving. Mallik describes this development as a period of 'mythology', and he believes that it marks the beginning of the end of the third stage of

conflict. It is easy to say that there is something badly wrong with a world where there is so much unhappiness. But it is more difficult to suggest a new basis on which a new start may be made.

This is a skeletal account of the world Mallik saw around him as his metaphysical outline of the discontinuous universe developed. For him, Reality was established beyond doubt on the basis of logical evidence. But the nature of that reality appeared in a new light. It was not absolute but dual, and consisted of the two types of entities, being and non-being, or the equal positive and negative. They existed in relationship, working together to realize the Common Purpose, or the end of the discontinuous universe. This situation raised new issues. For instance, the individual must accept the continuing presence of his opponent. How could one contemplate existing beside and actually working with those who had always been thought of as wrong, in varying degrees from the terrifying to the contemptible?

Mallik could answer this only by referring to his own experience. Starting from the moment of the sceptic's moment of universal doubt, he had established the certainty of reality and outlined its structure in categorical terms. He had then seen the implications of this account for 'proximate reality' and the prospect of the fourth stage which would replace this long drawnout phase of conflict which we have endured. 'To talk about a new stage in the universe, whose main objective is to replace the history in which we were born and grew up, may easily sound stupid, if not conceited lunacy.'[12] He defends himself against any charge of conceit by saying that it was something which might have stood to the credit of any man. It was not due to any special preparation on his part. It had to be recognized however that his experience had resulted in changing him from an individual possibility in the stage of conflict to a new kind of individual with a new conception of his objective, or indeed the common purpose of the universe. Instead of being an effort to establish the Absolute, he had become a necessity to negate the illusion of the Absolute and inequality. This gave him a completely different view not only of metaphysical truth, but of his day-to-day experience of people and events. The individual never stands alone, he is always part of an historical process. It seemed to Mallik that his work appeared when it did because the universe had reached a point where frustration of the Common Purpose envisaged as the Absolute had taken place, and this gave an opportunity to end that phase by the negation of the illusion underlying it. Inevitably the third and fourth stages co-exist for a time. They are both dealing with the issue of illusion, one in the dying attempt to establish the Absolute, and the other wholly occupied in removing illusion and replacing it by 'necessity'—the discovery of a new conception of reality to which there appears to be no alternative. Only when this process of disposing of illusions has been completed can we move on to the image and

realization of the common purpose, or the end and objective of the discontinuous universe.

Mallik was well aware that the implications of his position were so far-reaching that they involved a re-examination of all the beliefs and conventions which men had built up over the centuries. Could we discard this powerful, even sacred framework and begin again as if the past could be dismissed out of hand? In practical terms how did he suggest that conflict could be brought to an end, how could the opponent be made to see the need for such a change? He knew that these questions raised many different issues and required long analysis before a complete answer could be found. But he laid down certain guidelines which would help those who felt a need to embark on this new way of life.

In the first place, the negative, the opposite or the enemy however one regarded him, was an equal, as essential to the world as oneself. Therefore, he must be recognized and respected as one would respect oneself.

Secondly, there could be no question of converting or changing by any method the beliefs of an opponent. Changes must occur in each individual in his own time and by his own effort. No one could undertake such a task for another; and everyone needs all his strength and energy to change himself.

Thirdly, in attempting abstention one would never be alone. Those who try to adopt this new way of life will form a group of like-minded people whose relationship will be based on a need to discover and realize a common purpose which must include the whole of reality. Such a group is in no danger of disintegration because it will not oppose or exclude others. It co-exists with other groups in conflict; but it does not threaten them.

In the period of conflict individuals with similar aims or inclinations form alliances to challenge and if possible demolish an opposing position. Mallik calls these combinations 'similars'. Their agreements do not outlive the moment of victory or defeat. Soldiers do not go so far as to plan for a whole new life with their comrades-in-arms. In fact once the particular threat is removed, new factions develop related to other objectives which may have lain dormant, but which are equally exclusive in their aims.

The relationship of abstention does not cover anything so ambitious as planning a whole new life with one's opponent. The immediate concern is simply to block or discontinue the conflict. It may be described as a state of negative harmony.

It would be understandable if at this point the questioner breaks in to say: 'It is all very well. We have a description of the individual's state of mind, and even the situation in which he finds himself. But what is he expected to *do* in a situation of conflict?'

Mallik would agree that was a fair question. He would suggest that the unmistakable symptom of conflict was pain or irritation of some kind. This might range from annoyance at a man's protest that he was not going to be made to do or not do something against his will, to deep fear or anger at the power of the other man to prevent ones action. In other words, conflict begins in the mind. The first effort must also happen in the mind. One must make every effort to refrain from doing or trying to do what is causing offence.

Then one should examine the immediate objective one is trying to achieve, and endeavour to find the point of opposition or clash, and the exclusive element in the position one is supporting. This is often clear enough to a detached observer, but hard for either of the combatants to recognize.

In other words what one is trying to remove is an illusion, and the first step must be to restrain oneself from pursuing it, in other words to abstain from it, while seeking to recognize that such an objective cannot actually be attained. This makes the two notions of restraint and equality with one's opposite more acceptable. The immediate reaction to this suggestion may be: 'But will this not leave the way clear to the opponent to achieve his wicked will?' The answer must be 'No', because his endeavour to achieve the absolute is as certain to reach a point of frustration as is one's own.

In the practical situation the first step towards abstention is followed by an immediate relaxation of tension in the relationship. A. is no longer putting his whole heart into reaching what he realizes is ultimately unobtainable, and B. whether he understands it or not will feel the threat to his intention is lessened or even removed. This will not solve the problem immediately, but it does deflect the attention of both parties, and can have unexpected results. It is not easy to provide evidence in the form of records to support this claim, because the changes which take place occur in the individual's experience, and he may not speak or discuss it. There is plenty of evidence in today's world of a widespread longing for an alternative to the continuing aggression and ruthless disregard for others which follow the familiar methods of 'dealing with the situation.' Two illustrations on two very different scales illustrate this disquiet in the common man. The first is the call to keep the memory of the Holocaust alive, in the hope that such memories will prevent any repetition of such an horrific event. This is a natural and understandable reaction. But memory, however intensely it may be cultivated, will not suffice to prevent a repetition of the same or similar tactics. News items over the last half century bear witness to this. Certainly such events cannot be written off or brushed aside. But we shall never prevent their recurrence until we understand why and how they happen and our own involvement in them. We must hope that a certain distance in time will enable us to develop a clearer perspective.

The second example is a plea made by an young Irish poet, Damien Gorman, whose entire life has been spent in an atmosphere of mistrust and terrorism in Northern Ireland. He speaks in his poem 'Devices of Detachment'[13] of the dangers of developing a protective insensitivity as a form of self-defence. We have all experienced such feelings in hearing of some tragic event far away in time or space. It may shock and distress, but this first reaction fades and we continue our lives without too much difficulty, having perhaps sent some donation, or even offered a temporary service to bandage not only the victims' wounds, but also our own. Gorman describes how such detachment can come to enfold people directly involved in a conflict, and recognizes that it does nothing to solve the problem. We are no longer greatly shocked by murder, even if it happens next door, in our own neighbourhood. Can we doubt that there is a widespread need to find new methods of dealing with the negative? It is time to stop celebrating victories and organizing excursions to scenes of carnage, and at the other extreme attempting to deny disasters, or to detach oneself from them.

Perhaps it is worth repeating that the vital first step is to respect one's opponent. If this respect is genuine—and it is is clearly useless to put on a show or abstention—it must replace faith in the Absolute by a concept of reality, based on related multiplicity, in which the constituents are equal. A man does not set out to destroy his equal. Aggression or defence by any means must come from a belief that the opponent is of less value or greater power, and that he needs to be subdued or attacked, or if possible eliminated to establish oneself. In other words, one has been judging the negative in relation to oneself. But once we recognize the equal status of the opposite we must admit his claim to a point of view insofar as we make such a claim for ourselves. He is not just 'not-me', but 'other-than-me', real and positive.

This state of mind will not be reached suddenly or without a good deal of practice and self-discipline. It entails what Mallik describes as 'clearing the corpses from the battlefield',[14] that is recognizing mistakes and illusions and breaking away from established habits and convictions.

His next guideline is to recognize the common agreement which underlies all conflict. While one is engaged in the fight this background is not always apparent. Sometimes the differences are perceived against a backcloth of the Eternal Absolute, or some legendary Golden Age which is believed to have existed in the past. But the end or purpose of the Discontinuous Universe cannot be found in the past. It must be discovered and realized in the future. Mallik believed that the time had come when we might expect to have communication with the Society of Beings in a state of identicalness, whose function is to conceive the common purpose. When that happens it will be apparent that relationship implies not only agreement but a common goal.

If at this point the reader says: 'This is altogether too far-fetched and

removed from the practical world', I would reply: 'Just try it in a concrete situation, and see whether it works at all.' If I cannot make any impression on the event, or on my attitude towards it, I know that my convictions are still too firmly held for me to question them effectively. They still retain an importance which I cannot give up, and the drama will have to be played out to its end. On the other hand, the process has been known to give results even when the participants were perhaps not fully aware of what was happening. Take for example, a man's account of his experience in a Japanese prisoner-of-war camp. He was a man who tried to get some benefit from any situation in which he found himself, and he had learnt a smattering of Japanese from the guards. During an inspection of the camp by a high-ranking Japanese officer he spoke to him about the dirty condition of some area of the camp. To his astonishment, the officer flew into a rage, ordered that all the prisoners be assembled in the exercise yard with this man and his Commanding Officer kneeling in front of them to wait immediate execution. Drawing his sword, the officer stepped up to the young man, and asked if he had any last thing he wished to say, probably expecting either a plea for mercy (which would confirm the prisoner's inferiority) or some defiant phrase, (which justify disposing of him). To his surprise he found neither. The man said: 'I don't understand why this is happening.' The officer put up his sword, ordered the guards to release the two men and dismissed the camp. The prisoner discovered later that he had unwittingly used a strong Japanese term, which addressed to a superior would constitute an insult. The officer recognized that in fact there had been no intention of insulting or threatening him. He recognized that a man in imminent danger of losing his life who could speak to him as an equal, assuming that they both looked for reason and sanity in the nature of things, was worthy of respect.

This incident might be described as being on the verge of abstention. It was not deliberately thought out, a conscious effort to draw back, but the recognition of equality with its implication of a common background, which immediately changed the situation.

The further stages of the discontinuous universe in which being and non-being will complement each other and co-operate to attain their common objective is something to which we may look forward. We cannot hope to embark on this before we have succeeded in removing illusions of absolute values and inequality in which we are all still steeped.

Notes and References

1. B.K. Mallik, *Related Multiplicity*, Hall, Oxford, 1952, p. 243.
2. Ibid., p. 243.
3. B.K. Mallik, *The Real and the Negative*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1940, p. 79.

4. Ibid., pp. 81/2.
5. *Related Multiplicity*, pp. 239/258.
6. Ibid., p. 240.
7. Ibid., p. 243.
8. Ibid., pp. 206/7.
9. The use of the word 'stage' was discussed when Non-Absolutes was being prepared for publication. Mallik admitted there was some overlap, and even suggested that a distinction might be drawn by using different words for the different states and stages. He was not prepared to revise the whole text himself, but would have accepted a revision if someone would substitute appropriate alternatives. The offer, unfortunately, was not taken up.
10. B.K. Mallik, *Non-Absolutes*, Vincent Stuart for the B.K. Mallik Trust, London, 1956, pp. 128 ff.
11. *Related Multiplicity*, pp. 171/209. Mallik gives a detailed analysis of terms and relations as envisaged in different schools of thought, and his suggested solution of this longstanding paradox.
12. *Non-Absolutes*, pp. 162/176.
13. Damien Gorman, *Devices of Detachment.*
14. B.K. Mallik, *Mythology and Possibility*, Vincent Stuart for the B.K. Mallik Trust, London, 1960, p. 210.

Epistemology of Sri Aurobindo

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THE BASIC PRESUPPOSITIONS

The whole epistemology of Sri Aurobindo is based upon three basic presuppositions. They are: (i) All experiences are real and worthy of philosophical interpretation; (ii) all possible knowledge is knowledge within the power of humanity; and (iii) knowledge must be integral. Let me analyse these basic presuppositions.

According to Sri Aurobindo, in our search for knowledge, our experience must be extended to all the realms of experience. Unlike empiricists and positivists, our experience, he holds, should not be limited only to objective experience. Empiricists and positivists are dogmatic and skeptical regarding subjective realm of experience since it is unverified and hence, there may be possibilities for errors to occur. Sri Aurobindo vehemently opposes this view. He says[1]:

> It is reasoned that to depart from the physical standard and the principle of personal or universal verification will lead to gross delusions and the admission of unverified truth and subjective phantasy into the realm of knowledge. . . . The probability of error is no reason for refusing to attempt discovery and subjective discovery must be pursued by a subjective method of enquiry. . . . To refuse to enquire upon any general ground preconceived and *a priori* is an obscurantism . . . (and) prejudicial to the extension of knowledge.

For Sri Aurobindo, the subjective realm of experience is as important as objective realm of experience and, in fact, it is more important. In emphasizing the subjective realm of experience Sri Aurobindo thus asserts[2]:

> An inner range of spiritual experience is one very great domain of human consciousness, it has to be entered into up to its depths and its vastest riches. The supraphysical is as real as the physical; to know it is part of a complete knowledge.

Sri Aurobindo holds the view that all ranges of experiences, namely, the

physical, the mental, and the supramental, are real. But it does not mean that Sri Aurobindo wants us to accept any and every experience blindly. He aptly says[3]:

> Firmness without dogmatism in our system, toleration without weakness of all other systems should be our intellectual outlook.

According to Sri Aurobindo, there cannot be any knowledge which is beyond human reach. 'All knowledge is knowledge within the power of humanity.' This view of Sri Aurobindo makes it clear that there is no reason for either skepticism or agnosticism in his thought. Sri Aurobindo comments[4]:

> The unknown is not unknowable, it need not remain the unknown for us, unless we choose ignorance or persist in our first limitations. For to all things that are not unknowable, all things in the universe, there corresponds in that universe faculties which can take cognizance of them, and in man, the microcosm, these faculties are always existent and at a certain stage capable of development. We may choose not to develop them, where they are partially developed, we may discourage and impose on them a kind of atrophy. But fundamentally, all possible knowledge is knowledge within the power of humanity.

In accordance with his conception of reality which is multidimensional in nature, Sri Aurobindo speaks of experience which is multidimensional in nature. He says that our knowledge which consists of experiences must be integral taking into account all the terms of Being. He is of the view that it is only when we have seen both ourself and our nature as a whole, in depth as well as in surface, that we acquire a true basis of knowledge. Sri Aurobindo points out that 'an integral knowledge demands an exploration and unveiling of all possible domains of consciousness and experience.'[5]

THE OBJECT AND STATUS OF KNOWLEDGE

In accordance with the Upaniṣadic thought, Sri Aurobindo speaks of two kinds of knowledge, lower and higher. The lower knowledge tries to understand the apparent phenomenon of existence externally by making use of the sense and the intellect. The higher knowledge aims at the knowledge of the truths of the existence in its source and reality. Hence the approach is from within unlike the former. Though such a sharp distinction is made between these two forms of knowledge, they are, says Sri Aurobindo, two sides of one seeking. He further says that it is wrong to think that, when we attain the knowledge of God, then the knowledge of the world is of no concern to us. Mankind first has to obtain the lower knowledge because, until our knowledge of the world

is sufficiently developed, spiritual knowledge is not really possible. Our spiritual knowledge becomes richer and fuller depending upon the development of our knowledge of the world. Science, art, philosophy, ethics, psychology, and knowledge of man, act as means by which we arrive at the knowledge of the working of God through nature. Sri Aurobindo says[6]:

> The lower knowledge has been the step from which he has risen to the higher; the higher illumines for him the lower and makes it part of itself, even if only its lower fringe and most external radiation.

The *Īśa Upaniṣad* says[7]:

> Those who worship *avidyā* enter into blinding darkness; but into greater darkness than that enter they who are engaged to *vidyā*.

Further, it says that both *vidyā* and *avidyā* are essential for attaining life's goal. In the words of the *Upaniṣad*[8]:

> He who knows these two, *vidyā* and *avidyā* together, attains immortality through *vidyā*, by crossing over death through *avidyā*.

Similarly, says Sri Aurobindo, both lower knowledge and higher knowledge are essential to have a total knowledge.

But at the same time Sri Aurobindo is not unaware of the Upaniṣadic statement, 'What is that by knowing which everything else is known?'[9] Ultimately, the highest object of knowledge, for Sri Aurobindo, is that which is eternal, infinite and absolute. For Sri Aurobindo, reality is integral in nature of which the one and the many, the finite and the infinite, the silence and the dynamism, and the being and the becoming are different poises. To know integral reality, we require integral knowledge. But what does Sri Aurobindo mean by integral knowledge? By integral knowledge he means[10]:

> An integral knowledge then must be a knowledge of the truth of all sides of existence both separately and in relation each to all to the truth of the spirit.

It also demands 'an exploration and unveiling of all possible domains of consciousness and experience'. He also says that the fundamental real must include all truths of existence, namely, the truth of the individual, the truth of the universe, and the truth of all that is beyond the universe. It connects the highest to the lowest through all the mediating terms and achieves the indivisible whole. At the highest summit of things it opens to the reality and realizes the absolute by self-awareness. It recognizes both superconscient and inconscient by perceiving self-involvement of the absolute. This is the higher knowledge.

In criticizing the absolutistic view of reality, Sri Aurobindo says that

this view of reality, consciousness, and knowledge is based upon understanding only one side of the earliest Vedāntic thought. It has not taken the whole view of the earliest Vedāntic thought. In the Upaniṣads we do find the affirmation of the absolute, the experience of the utter and ineffable transcendence. Again, not in contradiction but as its corollary, we do come across the affirmation of the cosmic Divinity, an experience-concept of the cosmic self and becoming of Brahman in the universe. At the same time, we too find affirmation of the divine reality in the individual which is again an experience-concept. He further says that ignorance too is a half-veiled form of knowledge and world-knowledge, a part of self-knowledge. He substantiates his standpoint by referring to the *Īśa Upaniṣad* which does not confine truth to any one aspect. Sri Aurobindo observes[11]:

> To live in a cosmic Ignorance is a blindness, but to confine oneself in an exclusive absolutism of Knowledge is also a blindness: to know Brahman as at once and together the Knowledge and Ignorance, to attain to the supreme status at once by the Becoming and Non-Becoming, to relate together realization of the transcendent and the cosmic self, to achieve foundation in the supramundane and self-aware manifestation in the mundane, is the integral knowledge.

But can we acquire integral knowledge? For Sri Aurobindo, integral knowledge cannot be acquired or invented, but it has to be discovered or uncovered since it is in a concealed form in our deeper self. It has to be realized. It can be revealed to a spiritual aspirant. To quote Sri Aurobindo[12]:

> The integral Knowledge is something that is already there in the integral Reality: it is not a new or still non-existent thing that has to be created, acquired, learned, invented or built-up by the mind; it must rather be discovered or uncovered, it is a Truth that is self-revealed to a spiritual endeavour: for it is there veiled in our deeper and greater self; it is the very stuff of our own spiritual consciousness. . . . There is an integral self-knowledge that we have to recover and, because the world-self also is our self, an integral world knowledge.

For Sri Aurobindo, knowledge does not mean a kind of sense experience or an intellectual conception. Knowledge gained through the above sources is knowledge only by courtesy, but not knowledge in its essential nature, though they form only a part of our integral knowledge. Sri Aurobindo holds that an information attains the status of knowledge only when it is realized. Knowledge is essentially and truly a kind of realization. It can be said that the knowledge of the supreme reality,

which is the object of higher knowledge, is truly justified only when it is realized. It is only the yogic knowledge that is justified to have the status of knowledge. Ordinarily, what we mean by knowledge is only an intellectual appreciation of the facts of life, mind and matter and the laws that govern them. It is only founded upon our sense-perception and upon our reasoning. Yogic knowledge has its source in a greater consciousness which is different from mental consciousness in kind and in essence. It is this higher consciousness alone which knows truly all the metaphysical truths and also the world in its real nature. Knowledge through senses and reasoning is only the knowledge of the appearance. When the knowledge of the self is seized, then all other things can be known in their true nature. The intellect cannot be the source of the knowledge of the supersensuous truths. The intellect, by following certain rigorous analysis, can arrive only at the intellectual conception and conviction of the self, but still it is not knowledge. At the most, this intellectual analysis helps in arriving at clear conceptions. It is not itself an 'effective knowledge'. Intellectual information is only an understanding, which attains the status of knowledge when it is followed by realization. According to Sri Aurobindo, this realization consists of three successive movements, namely, (a) internal vision, (b) complete internal experience, and (c) identity.

Internal vision

It is the internal vision which makes a man a *ṛṣi* or *kavi* and not thinker. The ancient sages named this internal vision as *dṛṣṭi*. This is a form of light in the soul by which supersensuous things which remain unseen become evident and real to the soul. To make it more clear, Sri Aurobindo draws an analogy. He says that in the physical world we have two forms of knowledge, the direct (*pratyakṣa*) which is present to the eyes and the indirect (*parokṣa*) which is remote and beyond our vision. The idea of the indirect is arrived at by inference, imagination, analogy or some verbal testimony. Knowledge gained through all these processes more or less gives only an adequate idea of the thing, but we do not realize it. It is only a conceptual representation of the reality. But once we have seen it with the eyes, we realize it or possess it. It is the same with the psychical things and the self. We have information about these things through inference, analogy or testimony, but still it does not form knowledge in its essential nature as we have not seen it and hence, not realized it. It is only by inward vision (*dṛṣṭi*) that we realize the self.

Complete internal experience

The inner vision is only an opening to the self which gives forth to one form of psychological experience, but does not give us complete internal experience. Our internal vision of the self must lead us to have complete

internal experience of it; and this is possible only when we have all-embracing knowledge pervading the whole being of ours, that is, the mind, the heart, and the body.

Identity

Our vision and experience remain incomplete unless they culminate in identity. Sri Aurobindo says: 'We must not only see God and embrace Him, but become that Reality.'[13] We must live in all our being the supreme Vedāntic knowledge: 'He am I.' Sri Aurobindo further says that it may appear to the modern mind that it is impossible to have more than intellectual conception of the self or God but a shadow of realization of the self is suggested by Wordsworth's poetic expression 'A slumber did my spirit seal' regarding realization of Nature.

FOURFOLD COGNITIVE METHODS

According to Sri Aurobindo, man becomes aware of himself and also of subjective and objective orders of existence because of mind's fourfold cognition. They are: (i) knowledge by identity, (ii) knowledge by intimate direct contact, (iii) knowledge by separative direct contact, and (iv) wholly separative knowledge by indirect contact.

Knowledge by identity

A human being is able to be aware of himself by knowledge by identity. He has an indubitable knowledge of his existence. This form of knowledge is the purest form of knowledge by identity. While our knowledge of the world is subject to doubt, our knowledge regarding our existence enjoys the status of apodictic certainty. Sometimes some element of knowledge by identity is given to us in our mental states. For example, when we are in deep love, our whole being is permeated by love; and it seems to us that for a moment we have become one with that mental state. Similar is the case with other emotional states like anger, grief, joy, where total consciousness of ours is occupied by these passions. In the case of thought also, sometimes the thinker becomes one with the thought; and the thinker-thought dualism disappears. So, many a time the subject loses control over his emotions and passions.

Sri Aurobindo's cognitive method can be made clear by analysing the process of our mental experience. There are, according to Sri Aurobindo, four elements in all our mental functionings. They are: (i) the object of mental consciousness, (ii) the act of mental consciousness, (iii) the occasion, and (iv) the subject. In the case of subjective experience, the object may be of any cognitive, affective or conative state of our psycho-physical organism. The act is, according to Sri Aurobindo, where the subject may either simply become a movement, not at all standing back from that activity, not reflecting or observing

himself, not controlling the feeling or accompanying action or he may observe what he becomes and reflect on it. In the former case we have the illustration of knowledge by identity in which the subject or mental person, the act of conscious self-experience, and the object of mental state are identified into one wave of conscious force in movement.

According to Sri Aurobindo, the total subjective existence is not exhausted in the ever-changing mental stages. There is something called the pure self or the pure subject which is over and above the changing conscious experience. But we remain unaware of our self or pure subject as long as we identify ourselves with these mental stages. Knowledge by identity in its purest form is experienced only when one identifies oneself with the self which is the pure subject, a witness to all our mental states. But this total identification with the self is possible only when one goes beyond the ordinary regions of consciousness, namely, the subconscient, the submental, the subliminal, and reaches the superconscient, the highest region of consciousness. The superconscient regions are based upon the spiritual consciousness which is free and luminous. Here we can trace the original power of knowledge. In the supreme timeless existence, existence and consciousness are one. It is simply and purely the self-awareness which is inherent in existence. Here there is no need of knowledge nor any operation of knowledge. Being is self-evident to itself. It does not need to look at itself in order to know itself. It is also intrinsically all-conscious since all is itself. This is the essential awareness by identity.[14] Even the three great declarations of the Upaniṣads, 'I am He', 'Thou art That, O Śvetaketu', and 'All this is Brahman', are illustrations of knowledge by identity in its purest form.

Knowledge by intimate direct contact

While, in the case of knowledge by identity, the subject or the mental person, the act of conscious self-experience and the objective mental state are identified into one wave of conscious-force in movement, in the case of knowledge by intimate direct contact, the act or the process of self-experience partly detaches itself from the object.[15]

Very often, says Sri Aurobindo, the whole of our personality does not get involved in our passing mental states. Many a time there is a double movement where a portion of ourselves becomes the thought or the passion, and another part of us remains as an observer of our passions or thoughts. Here there is no entire self-oblivion in the movement. This kind of cognition is termed by Sri Aurobindo as knowledge by intimate direct contact. In the former case, that is, in the case of knowledge by identity, the total personality of the individual is eclipsed for the moment by a state of passion or emotion, but in the latter case (knowledge by intimate direct contact) the individual has the capacity to control his passions or emotions or to some extent his becoming.

There is a kind of partial detachment of the act from the object found in the act of self-observation. But of course, says Sri Aurobindo, the mental person or the subject is not separated or partially detached from the mental act or the process. The mental person or the subject and the mental act or the process are rolled up in each other. In a similar way, the mental person is not sufficiently detached or separated from the emotional becoming. So, in the case of the knowledge by intimate direct contact, there is neither the total detachment of the subject from the object, nor of the subject from the mental act.[16]

We are able to have this kind of identification and also simultaneous separation and partial identification, according to Sri Aurobindo, because these things are becomings of our being, determinations of our mind stuff and mind energy, of our life stuff and life energy. But because these becomings are only a small part of us, we are not bound to remain identified and occupied. We can detach ourselves and separate the being from its temporary becomings. If we want, we can observe it, control it, sanction or prevent its manifestation.

Knowledge by separative direct contact

Here, the mental person detaches himself completely from the mental states. He remains as a mere spectator or witness to inner states. According to Sri Aurobindo, when we detach our mental person from the act of self-experience, we are fully aware at the first instance of the sheer ego and at the end, the witness self, which remains as a constant factor, aware of an unlimited succession of conscious movements. The knowledge of our inner movements, says Sri Aurobindo, is of a double nature, separation and direct contact because, even when we detach ourselves, the contact is maintained where there is a kind of intimacy, immediacy and directness. The more separative the attitude seen in our method of reasoning, in observing and knowing the inner movements, the more intimate is the method of the dynamic part of mind associating itself with our sensations, feelings, and desires. But in this association also, the thinking mind can intervene and exercise a separative, disassociated observation and control over both the dynamic self-associating part of mind and the vital or physical movements.

Wholly separative knowledge by indirect contact

With regard to our knowledge of the external world, we do not identify ourselves with the objects. The subject and object remain apart. Here our knowledge has an entirely separative basis; its whole machinery and process are of the nature of an indirect perception. One cannot know the external objects and also their movements with directness, immediateness, and intimacy since we cannot enter into their existence as we can enter with regard to our subjective states in the case of knowledge by identity. Our knowledge of the external objects not only

lacks identification, but also lacks direct contact; hence, this knowledge is aptly termed wholly separative knowledge by indirect contact by Sri Aurobindo. The only apparent direct contact with the objects, or direct evidence which we have of them, is through the senses which give us some kind of direct intimacy with the objects of knowledge. But this is not a real directness or real intimacy in the strict sense of the term, but direct knowledge by courtesy; for, what we get by our senses is not the inner or intimate touch of the thing itself, but an image of it, or a vibration or nerve message in ourselves, through which we learn to know it. Our knowledge could have been so little and even nothing if our sense-object contact is the whole machinery in our knowledge enterprise. Our knowledge remains meaningful because[17]:

> There intervenes a sense-mind intuition which seizes the suggestions of the image or vibration and it equates with the object, a vital intuition which seizes the energy or figure of power of the object through another kind of vibration created by the sense contact, and an intuition of the perceptive mind which at once forms a right idea of the object from all this evidence whatever is deficient in the interpretation of the image thus constructed is filled up by the intervention of the reason or the total understanding intelligence.

But, says Sri Aurobindo, if the first composite intuition were the outcome of a direct contact, then there would be no need for the intervention of the reason except as a discoverer or organiser of knowledge not conveyed by the senses and its suggestion. On the other hand, intuition is working upon an indirect evidence; and hence, our intuitional interpretative construction of the object is open to question or at least likely to be incomplete.

SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

It has been pointed out earlier that Sri Aurobindo aims at integral knowledge which demands an exploration and unveiling of all the possible domains of consciousness and experience. Sri Aurobindo 'tries to explore and interpret and integrate all such data'. He takes experience in the widest possible sense and hence takes into account all the levels of experience, which help in obtaining knowledge. Each level of experience reveals the knowledge of one specific aspect of the reality which is multidimensional and integral in nature.

According to Sri Aurobindo, most empiricists limit their philosophical investigations to ordinary waking experience and hold that all knowledge can be traced back to sense-object contact. For him, this normal waking experience is really the middle part of our existence which has a 'subconscient' sphere below and 'superconscient' one above.

Along the lines of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Bhagavad-gītā*, Sri Aurobindo accepts five external senses (*indriyas*), lower mind (*manas*), and intellect (*buddhi*) as preliminary organs of human knowledge in a rising scale. He also discovers 'supermind' as the highest organ of knowledge which is beyond the ordinary instruments of knowledge. Also, between the mind and supermind, he discovers intermediary instruments of knowledge like the higher mind, the illumined mind, the intuitive mind and the overmind, which are in an ascending hierarchy. Corresponding to these different instruments of knowledge, Sri Aurobindo recognizes different means of knowledge depending upon the object of knowledge which it aims at. No means of knowledge is devalued in comprehending the nature of the integral reality. The various means of knowledge, according to Sri Aurobindo, are: (a) sense experience, (b) reason, (c) intuition, and (d) gnostic or supramental consciousness.

Sense experience

Sri Aurobindo recognizes sense experience as a valid source of knowledge in acquiring knowledge of the world and its phenomena. Like Kant, Sri Aurobindo believes that our sense-organs furnish us only with raw materials of knowledge. He says that the sense experience has no meaning unless 'it is translated into terms of the sense-mind'. That is why '*manas*', says Sri Aurobindo, has been regarded by Indian philosophers as the sixth sense. It can even be said that it is the only sense and that other sense-organs of vision, hearing, touch, smell, and taste are merely specialization of the sense-mind. Although the sense-mind normally uses the sense-organs for the basis of its experience, yet it goes beyond them and is capable of a direct experience 'proper to its own inherent action'. In a sense, all our experiences are psychological in nature. Thus, it is evident that the sense experience in itself is inadequate to give us knowledge unless reason corrects and modifies our perceptions. Sri Aurobindo greatly appreciates this function of reason and says that the power of correcting the errors of the sense-mind by the use of reason is uniquely possessed by man alone, and thus marks his superiority over the terrestrial beings. If human knowledge were to depend on sense experience alone, then it could know little or nothing about the object. The senses alone do not give any definite idea of the object of experience.[18] Thus, the raw materials which are provided by the senses are arranged and synthesized by the sense-mind, the vital-mind, perceptive-mind, and reason in order to have a definite and vivid knowledge of the object. As Sri Aurobindo puts it[19]:

> Our world-knowledge is therefore a difficult structure made up of the imperfect documentation of the sense-image, an intuitional interpretation of it by the perceptive-mind, life-mind, sense-mind,

and a supplementary filling up, correction, addition of supplementary knowledge, co-ordination by the reason.

According to Sri Aurobindo, the sense-mind possesses double action: (i) mixed or dependent and (ii) pure or sovereign.

Mixed or dependent action

To depend on the sense-organs for becoming aware of the external object is the mixed action of the mind. But in reality, all our experiences in their secret nature are knowledge by identity. Our true character is hidden because we have separated ourselves from the rest of the world by means of a dichotomy between ourselves and the rest of the world, by regarding ourselves as the subject and the rest of the world as object. And this kind of distinction compels us to develop processes and organs by which we may again enter into communion with all that we have excluded. We have to replace direct knowledge through conscious identity by an indirect knowledge which seems to be caused by physical contact and mental sympathy. The limitation which is brought forth by the subject-object distinction is basically a creation of the ego which, in turn, covers the true truth of things.

But these existing limitations are not necessarily inevitable. They are the result of an evolution in which mind has accustomed itself to depend upon certain psychological functionings and their reactions as its normal means of entering into relation with the material universe. Hence, although it is a rule that, in order to have the knowledge of the world and men, we have to approach indirectly, that is, through the senses and the mind, yet we can have direct cognition of the world without the aid of the senses since this rule is merely the regularity of dominant habit.[20]

Sovereign or independent action

Sense-mind in its pure action becomes aware of itself, the subject. Here, the sense-mind acts in itself and is aware of things directly by a sort of identity with them. Sometimes our experiences of deep love, anger, etc. are the result of knowledge by identity where we become one with our subjective states. Truly speaking, all our knowledge is fundamentally knowledge by identity, but its true character is hidden. While in sovereign action of the sense-mind, the knowledge by identity is apparent, in its mixed action knowledge by identity is hidden. In the experiments of hypnosis and cognate psychological phenomena, direct cognition of the object is given without the mediation of the sense-organs. Since our waking consciousness is determined and limited by the balance between mind and matter, worked out by life in its evolution, the direct cognisance between the subject and object is impossible. But in the case of hypnosis, direct cognisance is brought about by throwing the waking mind into a

state of sleep which liberates the true or subliminal mind. Here, the mind becomes single and all-sufficient sense and gets to know the object directly. But this kind of extension of faculty is not really impossible.

Sri Aurobindo is of the view that the sovereign action of the sense-mind can be used to develop other senses besides the five which we already have. With the developed senses one can accurately weigh an object which we hold in our hands without any physical means. Here the sense-object contact is used only as a starting point just as the data of sense experience are used by the reason as the raw materials. The mind has its independent perception of the object. Even the direct knowledge of the subjective states of other human beings may be possible without taking the help from the utterances, gestures, action or facial expressions, which many a time mislead us.

But, says Sri Aurobindo, how much we may perfect our senses and sense-mind, they fail when we begin to tread the regions of knowledge which can be studied only by the help of reason. The *Bhagavad-gītā* also talks of such subject matter of knowledge. It states that there are some truths which are 'beyond the perception of the senses but seizable by the perception of reason', (*buddhi-grāhyam atīndriyam*). This brings us to the discussion of the second way of acquiring knowledge, namely, reason or *buddhi*.

Knowledge through reason

Sri Aurobindo has analysed the function of reason into two parts: (i) mixed or dependent and (ii) pure or sovereign.

Mixed or dependent action

Reason can be said to be in its mixed action when it confines itself to the sense experiences by admitting its law as the final truth. Hence, it deals with only the phenomenal world or appearances of things. The mixed action of reason is incapable of knowing the essential nature of things or thing-in-itself. On the other hand, it can survey only the field of becoming, but not the depth of being. Scientific laws are derived by mixed reason.

Pure or sovereign action

Reason in its mixed or dependent action cannot know the reality behind the appearances of becoming. The reality behind the appearances can be known conceptually when reason is in its pure or sovereign action. Here the reason makes use of sense experience only as a starting point. The complete use of pure reason takes us finally from the physical to the metaphysical level. Sri Aurobindo feels that this kind of movement is legitimate and indispensable because:[21]

> Our normal experience not only covers only a small part of universal fact, but even in the limits of its own field uses instruments that are defective and gives us false weights and measures. It must be exceeded, put away to a distance and its insistence often denied if we are to arrive at a more adequate conception of the truth of things. To correct the errors of the sense-mind by the use of reason is one of the most valuable powers developed by man and the chief cause of his superiority among terrestrial beings.

Sri Aurobindo holds that the concepts of metaphysical knowledge do not in themselves satisfy the demand of our integral being, though they are entirely satisfactory to the pure reason itself, since they are the stuff of its own existence. Sri Aurobindo holds the view that ideas are mere promises if they are not fulfilled or experienced.[22] Ideas about sensuous objects formed by reason through inference are not fully accepted until they are verified by perception. Similarly, the non-sensuous ideas about the ultimate reality formed by pure reason are not fully accepted without some non-sensuous experience. But is such experience possible? Sri Aurobindo maintains that direct and non-sensuous ideas about the ultimate reality formed by pure reason are not fully accepted without some non-sensuous experience about reality which is not only possible, but is actually present in us in an obscure way. It can be developed by yogic culture.

A CRITIQUE OF SENSE EXPERIENCE AND REASON

According to Sri Aurobindo, materialists affirm the existence of the world of matter on the ground that it is given to the experience of physical senses, but they deny the supersensible as they are not given to our sense experience. But, says Sri Aurobindo, the physical senses are incapable of judging validly in the realm of philosophical reasoning.[23] Even in the world of matter, there are certain things which go beyond the capacity of the physical senses and yet some deny the supersensible as illusion, which is really ridiculous. Sri Aurobindo further remarks[24]:

> The denial of the supersensible as necessarily an illusion or a hallucination depends on this constant sensuous association of the real with the materially perceptible which is itself a hallucination. Assuming throughout what it seeks to establish, it has a vice of argument in a circle and can have no validity for an impartial reasoning.

Sri Aurobindo also holds that there are not only suprasensible entities, but also senses which are supraphysical (*sūkṣma indrīya*), existing in the subtle body (*sūkṣma deha*), which are means for subtle vision and experience (*sūkṣma dṛṣṭi*), which can bring us into contact with supraphysical realities. At the emergence of new scientific progress, the

truths relating to supraphysical realities and also subtle instruments do not remain in the level of belief any more. For example, the telepathic knowledge which is discovered is able to give us a glimpse with reference to the existence of suprasensible realities and suprasensible organs of knowledge. But, of course, says Sri Aurobindo, the glimpse of supraphysical realities acquired by methodical research has been, to some extent, imperfect and is ill-affirmed; for, the methods used are still crude and defective. But these rediscovered subtle senses have at least been found to be true witness to physical facts beyond the range of the corporeal organs. Hence, there cannot be any justification for scouting them as false witness when they testify to supraphysical facts beyond the domain of the material organization of consciousness.

Sri Aurobindo further remarks that, though the materialists' denial seems to be more successful and more facile in its appeal to the generality of the mankind, it is ultimately less enduring than the refusal of the ascetic for it carries within itself its own cure. Its most powerful element is agnosticism. It admits the unknowable behind all manifestation and then extends the limits of the unknowable until it comprehends all that is merely unknown. Its basic premise is that our physical senses are the sole means of knowledge; and it also holds that reason must confine itself within the boundaries of the sense experience. This premise, holds Sri Aurobindo, is an arbitrary pronouncement. The materialistic view can be held only at the expense of ignoring all the vast field of evidence and experience, which contradicts it and denying noble useful faculties which are latent in all human beings. When we begin to investigate the operations of the supermind, we realize that we have the capacity to come into contact with a mass of phenomena, which remains unapproachable by the limited faculties recognized by the materialists. And the moment we realize this, we conclude that there are in the universe knowable realities which are beyond our sense experience; and here the premise of the materialistic agnosticism disappears. Though Sri Aurobindo is well aware of the limitations of materialism, he does recognize the important role played by it when men with unchastened minds and unpurified sensibilities attempt to rise into the higher domains of spiritual experience, but still he recognizes the reason to be rash and premature. It is, therefore, necessary that advancing knowledge should base itself on a clear, pure and disciplined intellect. It is also necessary that it should correct its errors sometimes by a return to the restraint of sensible fact, the concrete realities of the physical world. The supraphysical can really be maintained and mastered in its fullness when we keep our feet firmly on the physical. To support his view Sri Aurobindo refers to the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* which states that 'earth is his footing'. It is certainly the fact that the wider and surer becomes our knowledge of the world, the wider and surer becomes our foundation for the higher knowledge and

even for the highest, that is, the *Brahma-vidyā*. He acknowledges the great service rendered by agnosticism in preparing the illimitable increase of knowledge. Our error acts as a hand-maid and path-finder of truth since error is really half-truth that stumbles because of its limitations. Often it is truth that wears a disguise.

Sri Aurobindo further says that in order to arrive at valid knowledge of supraphysical realities, the evidence of the testimony of the subtle organs has to be controlled, scrutinised, and arranged by the reason. At the same time he emphatically affirms the validity of the supraphysical and supramental experiences. Sri Aurobindo says that the truth of great ranges of experience whose objects exist in a more subtle substance are perceived by more subtle instruments than those of gross physical matter. The knowledge claims of the supraphysical in the end achieves the same validity as the truth of the material universe.[25]

Though Sri Aurobindo recognizes the important role played by reason, he has not failed to understand the limitations of reason in obtaining complete knowledge of the world, ourself and also of the reality which is both immanent and transcendent in its nature. The human mind makes use of various intellectual faculties like imagination, speculation, reflection, impartial weighing, and inference in order to obtain more complete and satisfactory knowledge of the world, but even then it fails in its endeavour. Sri Aurobindo says that even after so much efforts, our knowledge still remains 'half certain', 'half dubious', indirect, 'a mass of significant images', ideative representations. Our knowledge still remains as hypotheses, theories and generalizations. Not only our knowledge of the external world acquired by reason remains imperfect but also about the self and our subjective existence. We are not aware of our true self and true meaning of our existence, but only aware of our surface existence. Here again our knowledge is meagre and pitiful.[26] But why is it that mind is not able to have complete knowledge either of the individual, or of the world, or of the reality? First and foremost, basically and essentially, mind is neither a faculty of knowledge nor an instrument of omniscience. It is an instrument for the seeking of knowledge, for expressing as much as it can gain of it in certain forms of a relative thought and towards certain capacities of action. Even when it finds, it does not possess; it only keeps certain fund of current coin of truth and not the truth itself. Sri Aurobindo holds the view that mind basically is that which does not know; though it tries to know, it never knows 'except as in a glass darkly'. He further observes that mind is only a reflective mirror which receives presentation or images of a pre-existent truth or fact which is external to it or vaster than itself. It also possesses the faculty of constructing in itself possible images rather than those of the actual facts presented to it.

Hence, so long we work only through the mind, which is governed by the appearances, it can never know directly the reality which is behind

the appearances and which is again both immanent and transcendent, but we can only infer it. Reason is only a messenger, a representative or a shadow of a greater consciousness.

In reality, thought is only a pioneer; it can guide, but it cannot command or effectuate. Since thought is not the highest and strongest part of nature and not even the sole or deepest index to truth, the conclusive satisfaction of thought cannot be considered as the criterion for attainment of the supreme knowledge. It can only act as a guide up to a certain point.[27] An abstract logic of the narrow and incompetent human mind is not likely to be the key to divine super-human knowledge. Sri Aurobindo beautifully puts it in his *Savitri*[28]:

> . . . not by Reason was creation made and not by Reason can truth be seen.

Reason cannot comprehend the Truth because[29]:

> In her high works of pure intelligence,
> In her withdrawal from the senses' trap,
> There comes not breaking of the walls of the mind,
> There leaps no rending flash of absolute power,
> There dawns no light of heavenly certitude.

Sri Aurobindo also feels that reason can never arrive at any certain truth because[30]:

> It reasons from the half-known to the unknown,
> Ever constructing its frail house of thought,
> Ever undoing the web that it has spun.

Sri Aurobindo is emphatic about the incapability of the mind to comprehend the higher truths. He aptly says[31]:

> If Mind is all, renounce the hope of Truth.
> For Mind can never touch the body of Truth
> And Mind can never see the soul of God.

In expressing incapability of the mind in grasping the higher truths Sri Aurobindo writes[32]:

> On the ocean surface of vast consciousness
> Small thoughts in shoals are fished up into net
> But the great truths escape her narrow cast.

Sri Aurobindo further says that mind by its very nature is a dividing principle; it cuts whole into parts and recognizes these parts as independent. Again, even when it knows that they are not things in themselves, it sees them as if they were things-in-themselves.[33] So, it is clear that our so-called mental knowledge, although considered to be knowledge by courtesy, is a kind of ignorance since it is limited, imperfect, and inadequate.

But, why is it that our mental knowledge with regard to ourselves, the world and the reality is so narrow? It is because ordinarily our mental consciousness remains on the surface level. This kind of self-concentration of divine consciousness force, on the surface level, makes the individual enjoy its ego-centric individuality which in turn enables the individual to have subject-object differentiation, and myself-otherself dualism. But the unique property of self-consciousness is possessed by man alone. It is the ego which is the underlying principle at the root of all human experience. It synthesises all human experiences into a coherent whole. To put it in his own words[34]:

> Mind-sense is the basis, memory the thread on which experiences are strung by the self-experiencing mind; but it is the coordinating faculty of mind which, relating together all the material that memory provides and all its linkings of past, present, and future, relates them also to an 'I' who is the same in all the moments of Time and in spite of all the changes of experience and personality.

The ego-sense which enables the man to have self-consciousness makes him proceed towards the realization of his real self and existence.

But in mental level because of sevenfold ignorance, man suffers from ego-sense and which, in turn, makes man suffer from the limitation of knowledge. Man, in order to get rid of his separative ego-sense which is a stumbling block in his way to complete knowledge, must get rid of these sevenfold ignorance and must in turn lead to sevenfold knowledge.

According to Sri Aurobindo, man is not bound to be within the iron chain of ignorance for ever. Our true individuality is not represented by the ego. Deep within ourselves lies the true individual, the psychic entity. Man can realize his true and essential being which is within himself by transcending the limitations of his ego. Hence, our ego is not something inescapable. It is apt to quote Radhakrishnan[35]:

> *Avidyā* is not inevitable though quite natural. If it were inevitable, there is no point in asking us to get rid of it. We cannot strive against the inevitable. We cannot know what cannot be known. It is possible for us to check the course of *avidyā*, and it shows that we are really greater than our habits.

Sri Aurobindo's approach with regard to *avidyā* is quite novel. According to him, *avidyā* is not an essential and integral part of human consciousness. It is merely a passing phase of human life. For him, *avidyā* is not non-knowledge, but only partial knowledge.

As long as man remains in the level of ignorance, mind has to rely on various mental and intellectual faculties and specially on memory for gaining knowledge of the individual and the external world. It is because of memory that mind is able to be aware of the past and link with the present in this life. But, says Sri Aurobindo[36]:

> Memory is a poverty stricken substitute for an integral direct abiding consciousness of self and directly integral or global perception of things.

But the human being requires memory in order to obtain a coherent knowledge as long as he confines himself within the limits of ego-sense. When he goes beyond the boundaries of mental and ego-sense, the limitations of ego-sense, its various mental faculties are shaken off and it is replaced by supramental consciousness which, in turn, enables him to have the knowledge by identity of his own essential existence, and realize his identity with the whole of the cosmos. This supramental consciousness which gives rise to integral knowledge is possessed only by the supermind which is the highest faculty of knowledge according to Sri Aurobindo. Mind has the innate capacity to raise itself to the level of supermind which, according to Sri Aurobindo, is nothing but the self-concentration and self-manifestation of the supermind. It can become one with it by the process of self-expansion during the course of evolution. Between the mind and supermind Sri Aurobindo recognizes different grades of mind representing different levels of consciousness in a hierarchy. In fact, they function as different instruments of knowledge leading to integral knowledge. They are: (i) the higher mind, (ii) the illumined mind, (iii) the intuitive mind, and (iv) the overmind.

The higher mind

The first ascent of our ordinary mentality takes us into the higher mind which is the first plane of spiritual mind-consciousness. For the first time automatic and spontaneous knowledge takes place in the higher mind. According to Sri Aurobindo, the higher mind is 'a luminous thought-mind, a mind of spirit-born conceptual knowledge'. Here the activities of consciousness are dominated by thought. But the thought process of the higher mind is qualitatively different from the ordinary mind.

Ordinarily, our normal mind depends on sense experience, inference and other sources of knowledge for acquiring knowledge, but the higher mind does not rely on such sources for acquiring knowledge. In the higher mind there is no 'self-critical ratiocination', no logical motion in order to derive a conclusion. There is no deductive procedure, implicit or explicit. On the other hand, it can express itself in a single idea. It sees the totality of truth at a single view. The relations of idea with idea, and truth with truth, are not established by logic, 'but pre-exist and emerge already self-seen in the integral whole'.[37] The higher mind does not give us knowledge which is a system of conclusion from premises. Here, thought is a self-revelation of eternal wisdom. It is not an acquired knowledge, but knowledge which is inherent.[38] But the

higher mind cannot give knowledge which is totally free from ignorance. Its knowledge is distorted and diminished by the mind. But it has all the potentiality to raise itself to higher states of knowledge.[39]

The illumined mind

In the level of illumined mind there is a possibility of greater knowledge since here mind ascends to a higher level of consciousness. It is a mind 'truth-sight'. It basically works by spiritual vision and not by thought. Here, thought plays a secondary role in the spiritual order; thought is not an indispensable proceess. Thought in itself in its origin on a higher level of consciousness is a form of perception and a cognitive seizing of the object or some truth of things, but it is a secondary result of spiritual vision. It creates a representative image of truth, but the true truth of things exactly caught and held in the 'sunlight of a deeper spiritual light'. Sri Aurobindo further says that though thought is powerful for communication of knowledge, it is not indispensable for reception of possession of knowledge. In illumined mind we find the consciousness of the seer. The consciousness that proceeds by sight is a greater power for knowledge than the consciousness of the thinker. The perceptual power of the inner sight is greater and more direct than the perceptual power of thought.[40] Sri Aurobindo brings out the nature of illumined mind, beautifully in his *Savitri*.[41]

The intuitive mind

According to Sri Aurobindo, intuition is a power of consciousness which is nearer and more intimate to the original knowledge by identity since it is a direct outcome of a concealed identity. Intuition takes place when the consciousness of the subject meets with the consciousness of the objects by penetrating, seeing and feeling the truth of what it contacts.[42]

Sri Aurobindo speaks of two other ways by which intuition has its origin. When the consciousness, even without having any meeting between the subject and object, looks into itself, it can feel directly and intimately the truth that is hidden behind the appearances. Very often, observes Sri Aurobindo, the human mind fails to experience intuition in their pure and unadulterated state. For him, 'a pure intuition is a rare occurrence in our mental activity'. Very often, our intuitive knowledge gets modified by our mental categories and hence loses its purity. Sri Aurobindo holds the view that, in our mental level, reason must make a thorough scrutiny of intuitions since intuition may come from both higher and lower levels of consciousness. But when the mind passes through both higher and illumined mind, it becomes fit enough to receive directly the pure spiritual truths descending from spiritual plane.

Sri Aurobindo speaks of fourfold power of intuition, namely, a power of revelatory of truth-seeing, a power of inspiration or truth-hearing, a power of truth-touch or immediate seizing of significance, and a power of true and automatic discrimination of the orderly and exact relation of truth of truth.

Sri Aurobindo sees intuition as a communication to the mind from above. According to him, 'Intuition brings to man those brilliant messages from the unknown which are the beginning of his higher knowledge'. He further calls it 'a projection of the characteristic action of these higher grades into the mind of ignorance'. In Sri Aurobindo's thought, intuition, as it is ordinarily understood, cannot be the highest form of consciousness since, in human mind, its action is largely hidden by the intervention of our normal intelligence; a pure intuition is a rare occurrence in our mental activity. According to Sri Aurobindo[43]:

> Very often the flash of intuition is quickly replaced or intercepted, before it has a chance of manifesting itself by an imitative mental movement, insight or quick perception or some swift-leaping process of thought.

Intuition, thus, being overlaid with mental stuff and its flow being frequently disturbed by imitative mental movement, is not in a position to give us that integral experience which alone reveals the ultimate truth. Sri Aurobindo makes a difference between gnosis and intuitive mentality. For him, intuitive mentality is still mind and not gnosis. It is indeed a light from the supermind, but modified and diminished by the stuff of mind in which it works. Sri Aurobindo, therefore, makes a distinction between intuitive reason and pure intuition and this pure intuition is technically termed by Sri Aurobindo as gnosis or *vijñāna.*

The overmind

According to Sri Aurobindo, overmind in its nature and law is a delegate of the supermind to the ignorance. It is the first parent of ignorance. Overmind does not possess the integral unity of the supermind, but it is the opening into the cosmic consciousness by having direct contact with the supramental truth consciousness. Intuition draws its light from this overmind. But at the same time it has the tendency towards separation and this enables the one to express itself as many maintaining the fundamental principle of unity in the background. The inherent defect of the overmind is that it cannot serve the essential condition of the supreme truth consciousness, namely, the full integrality. In describing the nature of the overmind, Sri Aurobindo writes[44]:

> It covers as with the wide wings of some creative over-soul this whole lower hemisphere of knowledge—ignorance, links it with that greater Truth-consciousness, while yet at the same time with its brilliant golden lid it veils the face of the greater Truth from

> our sight, intervening with its flood of infinite possibilities at once an obstacle and passage in our seeking of the spiritual law of our existence, its highest aim, its secret Reality.

The supermind (Gnostic consciousness as a source of knowledge)

It is aptly pointed out by S.K. Maitra that the conception of the supermind is the pivot round which the whole philosophy of Sri Aurobindo moves. One cannot really discuss either the metaphysics or the epistemology of Sri Aurobindo without discussing in detail his concept of supermind. The absolute, according to Sri Aurobindo, manifests the world through the supermind. We have discussed earlier that the absolute manifests the world through its conscious force. The supermind is nothing else but the conscious force working according to some fixed truth, some definite principle or law. In this context, it is apt to quote Sri Aurobindo[45]:

> Infinite consciousness in its infinite action can produce only infinite results; to settle upon a fixed Truth or order of truths and build a world in conformity with that which is fixed, demands a selective faculty of knowledge commissioned to shape finite appearance out of the infinite Reality.

This selective faculty of knowledge is called, by Sri Aurobindo, supermind. The supermind, for Sri Aurobindo, is the link between the absolute and the finite world. Unlike mind, it is fully aware of the indivisible, unitary and self-concentrated consciousness of *sat-cit-ānanda* in which there is no separate distinction. It also contains the essential truth of the world and creates the world of multiplicity out of the indivisible unitary and self-concentrated being of *sat-cit-ānanda*. So, above the supermind we have the pure being of *sat-cit-ānanda* and below it, the analytic consciousness of mind which knows only by division and separation and has only an indirect and secondary apprehension of unity and infinity. The supermind succeeds where mind fails.

Supermind is neither the mind raised to the highest degree of consciousness nor does it include the absolute in itself. It is radically different from mind. Though it manifests mind, yet it is quite different from it in nature. The supermind belongs to the higher hemisphere and shines in perfect knowledge and supreme light. In order to give a precise meaning to the term 'supermind', Sri Aurobindo calls it the 'Truth-consciousness'. Sri Aurobindo has borrowed this significant term from the *Rg-veda*. The Truth-consciousness is present everywhere in the universe as an ordering self-knowledge and manifests the cosmos in the light of its own law. It has the full awareness of each thing in its potentiality and actuality. It has full perfect knowledge of the 'what' and 'how' of things.

The principle of supermind is not completely foreign to the human mind though it is far above the plane of human consciousness and is

radically different from it. The supramental consciousness is accessible to the human consciousness provided it has broken through all the barriers of ignorance, limitation, and division. This conception of supermind is not totally a novel contribution of Sri Aurobindo. He himself says that the gospel of the divine and immortal supermind is contained in the cryptic verses of the *Veda*.[46]

THE TRIPLE STATUS OF SUPERMIND

Sri Aurobindo speaks of three poises of supermind, namely, (i) comprehending consciousness, (ii) apprehending consciousness, and (iii) projecting consciousness.

Comprehending consciousness

In this primary and fundamental status of the supermind, there is no individualisation. In this poise there is an equal self-extension of consciousness. The multiplicity is there, but all the multiple forms are the forms of the divine Being and are not in any degree separate existence. The supermind in this status will know the whole world of multiplicity as itself since the one has become all without losing its oneness. When the reflection of this supreme status of all comprehensive and self-extended unity falls on our stilled and purified self, we lose all sense of individuality. The consciousness of individuality and separate existence is merged altogether in an all-embracing and all-unifying vision of unity. There is no difference between subject and object. The divine soul will have no sense of otherness. The consciousness in this poise is called, by Sri Aurobindo, the comprehending consciousness.

The supermind, in this poise, is not distributed or divided. It is everywhere the single and equal Brahman, '*Samam brahman*'. There is an equal concentration of this consciousness in the smallest things as well as greatest things. This all-comprehensive poise of the supermind is best expressed by the characteristic formula, 'All this, indeed, is Brahman.'

Apprehending consciousness

The second poise of the supermind is called the apprehending consciousness or *prajñā*. Here, for the first time, a division between the divine consciousness and its force or between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* appears. Though indivisible, it seems to distribute itself in the forms of nature. And, hence, we for the first time come across the fundamental distinction between subject and object, but they do not appear as contradictory entities. The subject and object are fundamentally one as we find in the first status. The difference is only practical difference, but no essential difference. The object is nothing but a manifestation of the subject.[47]

In this poise of supermind, the divine consciousness would view all

the objects as essentially the forms of itself. In this poise the concentration of the divine consciousness is within the framework of space and time. Here, a distinction between the individual divine or *jīvātman* and the universal divine appears. While, by the comprehending consciousness, the individual divine would be able to realize its unity with the one and with all the other soul forms, by the apprehending consciousness it would realise itself different from the one and from the other soul forms. Thus, it is capable of enjoying its individual movement as well as its oneness with the One and with all other soul-form. In this poise, we find the relation of identity-in-difference between the one and the many. The same 'One' manifests as the many and the many are essentially conscious of their fundamental oneness. Here, the difference is only practical, but not essential: the relationship is that of unity in multiplicity. A practical difference among the known, knower and knowledge is created.

Projecting consciousness

Here, the consciousness soul projects itself into the movements and identifies itself with each form of itself. The *puruṣa* identifies himself with each soul-form and views other soul-forms as different from itself. Though it is true that there is no essential difference, yet there is still the consciousness of the duality predominant in this status. But here also the individual divine soul does not lapse into ignorance. It only affirms the truth of the differentiating movement along with the truth of the stable unity regarding them as the upper and lower poles of the same truth.

In supramental plane, the soul is aware of the unity maintaining the diversity and constituting essence. But in the empirical world the soul is unaware of the unity. In supramental level it is the gnosis or *vijñāna* which acts as a source of knowledge.

Vijñāna or gnosis for Sri Aurobindo is not only truth, but truth power. It is the divine knowledge which man possesses in supramental level. In order to describe it more accurately Sri Aurobindo distinguishes *vijñāna* from two kinds of *buddhi*, namely, lower *buddhi* (intellectual knowledge) and higher *buddhi* (intuitive reason). He further distinguishes it from *caitanyaghana* (consciousness of the infinite which is free from all ideations).

The nature of the gnosis can be explained to the intellectualists to some extent by contrasting it with the nature of the intellect. However, one can grasp the total meaning of gnosis or *vijñāna* only by experience since it is always the knowledge of the suprarational. The fundamental difference between these two is that, while the mental reason proceeds with labour from ignorance to truth, the gnosis has in itself the direct contact, the immediate vision of the truth, and in fact has the constant possession of the truth; hence, it need not have to go from ignorance to

truth. Reason starts with appearances in order to arrive at the truth behind them. It shows the truth in the light of the appearances. In contrast to reason, the gnosis starts from the truth and shows the appearances in the light of the truth. Reason proceeds by inference, while gnosis proceeds by identity or vision. 'It is, sees and knows.' It sees and grasps truth of the objects as directly or even more than the physical vision. Reason considers sense-experience alone as direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and the rest is taken as indirect; but to *vijñāna*, all its truth is only direct knowledge. While knowledge acquired by the intellect has a shadow of doubt, it is incomplete half-knowledge and hence, subject to alteration; but the knowledge of the gnosis is free from doubt, self-evident, self-existent, irrefragable, and absolute.

Reasoning proceeds from experience to indirect knowledge by the logical process of deduction, induction, analysis, synthesis, comparison and analogy by resting itself upon memory. But gnosis does not use any other method. It does not seek knowledge, but possesses knowledge. It reveals and it illumines. When our consciousness is transmitted from intelligence to gnosis, there will be a radical change in our knowledge process.[48] Again, while reasoning under the domination of time, gains and loses knowledge repeatedly, gnosis, on the other hand dominates time in one view and it also links the past, present, and future. The gnosis starts from the totality of which it has immediate possession. It sees parts only in relation to the totality while reason is incapable of seeing things in totality. The reason cannot see things in itself, but gnosis sees things in itself. It starts from unity and sees diversity through unity. While reason treats each as a separate existence, gnosis does not treat things separately. It does not recognize any real division; while reason deals only with the finite and is incapable of penetrating into the infinite; gnosis is the infinite, sees the infinite and lives in the infinite. It knows finite things only in relation to the infinite.

So, even the purest reason, the rational intellectuality which is luminous, is not the gnosis. It is clear that gnosis cannot be compared to lower *buddhi* (lower reason). It is an error to do that. It is dependent for its action on the precepts of the sense mind and on the concepts of the mental intelligence. It is not like the gnosis, self-luminous, authentic, making the subject one with the object.

Gnosis is distinguished from higher *buddhi* (intuitive reason) also. Sri Aurobindo does say that, as long as it is a pure intuition and not subject to any mixture of sense-error or intellectual ideation, it is never contradicted by experience. Of course, the intuition may be verified by the reason or sense-perception afterwards, but at the same time its truth does not depend on that verification. It is guaranteed by automatic self-evidence. Even then, intuitive reason is not the gnosis since it is only an edge of the light of the supermind. Sri Aurobindo says[49]:

> At the best . . . the intuition gives us only a limited, though an intensive light; at the worst, through our misuse of it or false limitation of it, it may lead us into perplexities and confusions which the less ambitious intellectual reason avoids by remaining satisfied with its own safe and plodding method,—safe for the inferior purposes of the reason, though never a satisfying guide to the inner truth of things.

Sometimes the mystic identifies gnosis with the consciousness of the infinite free from all ideations. This is the *caitanyaghana* of the *Upaniṣads*. But, says Sri Aurobindo, it is only one thread of the many-aspected movement of the gnosis. *Vijñāna* is not only concentrated consciousness of the infinite essence; it is an infinite knowledge of the myriad play of the infinite as well. It contains all ideations (supramental). It exceeds all ideative movements.

The Vedic seers always sought this faculty of constant awakening and growing perceptive vision, which they termed *ketu*. The true knowledge or essential knowledge is not merely intellectual conception of the truth, but also is a realization. In the complete sense of the term, it is knowledge by absolute identity, *tādātmyajñāna*. It is knowledge of the self, by the self and in the self, *ātmani ātmānam ātmanā*. The highest state of cognition is attained only in the level of supramental consciousness. This alone gives us integral knowledge which, in turn, reveals to us this integral reality. Truly speaking, supramental consciousness, integral reality and integral knowledge are not three different things in Sri Aurobindo's philosophy. In supramental level there is no distinction among *jñānam* (knowledge), *jñeya* (object of knowledge), and *jñātā* (knower). In accordance with the Vedāntic thought, Sri Aurobindo holds that it is the self alone which reveals true truth of the things being the source of highest cognition. This view of Sri Aurobindo is beautifully expressed in his epic work, *Savitri*[50]:

> All this she saw and inly felt and knew
> Not by some thought of mind but by the self.
> A light not born of sun or moon nor fire.
> A light that dwelt within and saw within
> Shedding an intimate visibility,
> Made secrecy more revealing than the word:
> Our sight and senses are a falliable gaze and touch
> And only the spirit's vision is wholly true.

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DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Daya Krishna's Retrospective Delusion

I

Once again Daya Krishna has succeeded in producing a provocative paper which is unfortunately a blend of the true and the false.[1] The title of the paper is intriguing; and he provides the justification for the title in the concluding part of the paper. I will, therefore, begin my comments on this paper with his conclusion. Daya Krishna observes:

> There is thus practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD and the idea of its dominant presence there is a super-imposition by the historiography of Indian philosophy due to its being dazzled by the picture in the second millennium AD. The propounders of the theory of *adhyāsa* have perhaps imposed one on the history of philosophy in India.[2]

It is not correct to say that there was practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD or that 'there is very little evidence of its presence before Śaṅkara and even for quite some time after him'. No Advaitin believes it for the evidence is to the contrary. I will revert to this point a little later. Let us, for the sake of argument, concede Daya Krishna's claim that there was practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD. If the Advaitin who writes the history of Advaita knows the truth as averred by Daya Krishna, but still maintains that Advaita was not only dominant, but also triumphant in the first millennium AD, he does not suffer from any delusion. In such a situation others like Daya Krishna who have been successful in uncovering the past may present the real state of affairs of Advaita in the first millennium AD and say that the Advaitin has deliberately distorted the truth. If, on the contrary, he does not know the truth of the absence of Advaita in that period, we can only say that, being ignorant of that fact, he deluded himself into thinking that Advaita was dominant at that time. So a critic like Daya Krishna can accuse the Advaitin of either distortion or delusion in respect of what he claims. While distortion is mispresentation of facts, delusion is false or mistaken belief. My mispresentation of facts that prevailed in the first millennium AD or my mistaken belief about it cannot be considered to be a case of *adhyāsa* as understood in Advaita. The theory of *adhyāsa* (superimposition) as formulated in Advaita is well known. *Adhyāsa* is perceptual error, which is different from errors in reasoning as well as

errors in interpretation. In the Advaita tradition *adhyāsa* is spoken of in several ways as *jñānādhyāsa* and *arthādhyāsa*, as *svarūpādhyāsa* and *saṁsargādhyāsa*, as *sopādhikādhyāsa* and *nirupādhikādhyāsa*; and all these are cases of perceptual error known as *bhrama*. Since there is no scope for *adhyāsa* in the context of historiography of Indian philosophy, it is wrong to say that the Advaitin has imposed his theory of *adhyāsa* on the history of philosophy. The expression 'retrospective illusion' makes no sense because illusion in the sense of *bhrama* is neither of the past nor of the future, but of the present. It seems to me that Daya Krishna wants to beat the Advaitin with his own stick, but he does not succeed since he has chosen an instrument which has no use in the present case.

Of the various idols which Daya Krishna seems to worship, that of the number is very conspicuous. We know that in politics the strength of a view is dependent on the number of persons who support it. A particular view becomes dominant and prevails over others if its supporters are numerically in a majority. However, the politics of number has no place in philosophy. It will be of interest to listen to Śaṅkara who has something to say about the fallacy of number, of numerical strength, in philosophy. In the course of the discussion of a particular view which Śaṅkara defends, the opponent maintains that Śaṅkara cannot establish his point of view on the ground that those who hold the opposite view are numerically more. The dialogue proceeds as follows:[3]

> *Śaṅkara*: What! Is there a Vedic commandment that the point shall not be established?
>
> *Opponent*: No.
>
> *Śaṅkara*: Why then (do you say that I cannot establish the point)?
>
> *Opponent*: Because there are many opponents. You are a monist, because you follow the Vedic teaching. But many, indeed, are the pluralists who are outside the Vedic pale and who are opposed to you. So I doubt that you can establish your point.
>
> *Śaṅkara*: You brand me a monist surrounded by many who are pluralists—this itself is a benediction to me. Therefore I shall conquer all; and I shall now commence the discussion.

An important point which Śaṅkara wants to drive home here is that a philosophical position cannot be considered to be sound just because the number of its votaries is legion. A philosophical view is strong only if it is sound or tenable; and the soundness of a view is not decided by the number of its votaries. In the same way the strength or dominance of a philosophical system is not decided by the number of philosophers and their writings at a particular time.

It appears that Daya Krishna relies on number and seems to think

that we can decide whether a philosophical system is dominant or not by the number of its champions: the more the champions for a system, the more dominant it is; the less the champions, the less dominant it is—this seems to be his line of reasoning. Let us consider his argument based on number. For the purpose of assessing the importance and influence of Advaita both in the pre-Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara period, he starts with Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma-sūtras*, which is undoubtedly a landmark in the history of Advaita. He says that between Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara there were only five Vedāntins according to Potter's *Bibliography*. He does not take into consideration Gauḍapāda on the ground that the latter's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, which is an independent work, has nothing to do with the *Brahma-sūtras*. So we do not have more than five Vedāntins connected with the *Brahma-sūtras* in the pre-Śaṅkara period. Apart from Śaṅkara's four direct disciples and Maṇḍana, the author of the *Brahma-siddhi*, there were, says Daya Krishna, only eight Advaitins in the post-Śaṅkara period in the first millennium AD. Then, how about the non-Advaitins during this period? Daya Krishna is ready with the number. 'Within almost the same period', says Daya, 'we have 117 Buddhist thinkers and 27 Jain thinkers. As for the so-called orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika number about 13 (9+4).'[4] As for Sāṅkhya, there were about ten thinkers during this period.[5] Since we find a large number of non-Vedāntic thinkers during this period, Daya draws the conclusion that the *Brahma-sūtras* had little impact on the philosophical scene in India after its composition and that the Vedānta was not the dominant system in the first millennium AD. Though his argument based on number seems to be impressive, it has to be rejected as the dominance or otherwise of a philosophical system cannot be decided by the number of its champions. The prejudice for number is deep-rooted in human nature, and Daya Krishna's argument in this case shows how he is a victim of the *Idola tribus*.

II

Daya Krishna is fond of projecting his own myths in Indian philosophy. There is, according to him, a myth about the Upaniṣads being the end portion of the Vedas. There is, again, he says, the myth of the *prasthāna-traya*. I will confine myself to a certain issue that he raises in respect of the latter. He maintains that Śaṅkara's commentary on the Upaniṣads, the *Brahma-sūtras*, and the *Bhagavad-gītā*:

> resulted in the famous myth of the *Prasthāna-trayī*, that is, the view that the source of Indian philosophy lies in these three texts when

> even the so-called different schools of Vedānta do not treat them in this way as, except for Śaṅkara and Madhva, no one else has commented on all the three so as to establish his position as to what Vedānta really means.[6]

First of all, it is not correct to say that these three texts are the source of Indian philosophy. We know that Indian philosophy includes not only systems of Vedānta, but also other systems such as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and so on, which are characterized as Vedic systems, and also non-Vedic systems such as Buddhism. Only the systems of Vedānta are grounded in the *prasthāna-traya*, but not the non-Vedāntic systems.

Secondly, it is not required of the Vedāntins that they have to write separate commentaries on the *prasthāna-traya* which they accept as their sourcebooks. Let us confine ourselves to the three model or typal systems of Vedānta, namely, Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, and Dvaita. It is true, as Daya Krishna says, that Śaṅkara and Madhva wrote separate commentaries on the *prasthāna-traya*. Though Rāmānuja wrote *bhāṣyas* on the *Brahma-sūtras* and the *Bhagavad-gītā*, he did not write one on the Upaniṣads. What does it matter if he has not written a separate commentary on the Upaniṣads? Does it in any way damage the collective authority of the *prasthāna-traya*? Does it in any way affect the status and authority of Rāmānuja? The followers of Rāmānuja do not think that the great *bhāṣya-kāra* has either slighted or side-tracked the Upaniṣads. If it is admitted that the *Brahma-sūtras* strings together in a coherent and condensed manner the scattered teachings of the Upaniṣads and that it is, therefore, integrally connected with them, then to write a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras* amounts to writing a commentary on the Upaniṣads. In his *Śrībhāṣya*, the celebrated commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, and *Vedārtha-saṁgraha*, an authoritative exposition of the basic doctrines of Viśiṣṭādvaita *vis-à-vis* other systems, Rāmānuja interprets the important Upaniṣadic texts, reconciles the apparently conflicting passages through *ghaṭaka-śrutis*, emphasizes the need for, and the importance of, *pramāṇa-samuccaya* reconciling *śruti* and other *pramāṇas*, and shows that the Upaniṣads purport to teach that the supreme Brahman which is one is *viśiṣṭa* inasmuch as it is qualified by *cit* on the one hand and *acit* on the other. There is nothing wanting in his position even though he has not written a separate *bhāṣya* on the Upaniṣads.

Thirdly, Daya Krishna is of the view that one has to comment on all the three texts in order to establish one's position as to what Vedānta really means. This view too is untenable. One may comment on all the three texts or on any one of them and establish Vedānta, though it is not necessary to write a commentary on one, or more than one, or all of

these texts for the purpose of bringing out the meaning of Vedānta and vindicating it. Let me cite a few well-known texts of Advaita. Neither Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi* nor Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* is a commentary on the *prasthāna-traya.* But still they bring out the purport of Advaita, controvert the views of others, and establish the final position of Advaita. What Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva did need not be a model for others in every respect. Nor has any of them given an injunction that no one should write on Advaita without writing a commentary on the *prasthāna-traya.*

III

Daya Krishna has a hypothesis which he wants to establish at any cost. He has his own cave from which he operates and looks at the Vedāntic scenario in the first millennium AD. His hypothesis is that the *Brahma-sūtras* had little impact on the philosophical scene in India after its composition; and he resorts to the ingenious strategy of bifurcating the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtras* for establishing his hypothesis. The separation of the *Brahma-sūtras* from the Upaniṣads is the thin end of the wedge. This is what he decrees:

> . . . in any discussion of Vedānta in the first millennium AD the status of the Upaniṣads and of the thought propounded by them in the philosophical scene of those times is a secondary matter as what is of relevance in the assessment of the position of Vedānta in the first millennium AD is the attempt at a coherent, unified presentation of their thought by Bādarāyaṇa in his *Brahma-sūtras* (AD 50).[7]

Daya Krishna fails to achieve his objective by adopting a strategy which is defective. The relation between the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtras* is such that it is neither possible nor desirable to separate them. The story goes that a young girl who was fond of glittering golden bangles wanted to have only bangles without the gold and in a complaining mood told her mother to take away the gold from the bangles. Daya Krishna's problem is in no way different from that of the young girl in the story for both of them would like to separate the inseparables. Let me now explain the two reasons I have mentioned for their inseparability. First, the illustration. The bangle is related to the gold in two ways. It is, first of all, the modification or manifestation of the gold which is its cause or source. Secondly, it is a meaning or an explanation of the gold; it speaks for, provides us an insight into, and declares its dependence on, the gold. What is true of the illustration is

equally true of the illustrated. The Upaniṣads serve as the source of the *Brahma-sūtras*. The latter would not have come into existence in the absence of the former. The name and the form which it has are provided by the Upaniṣads. It is called '*Vedānta-sūtras*' in order to emphasize its intimate relation with the 'Vedāntas', by which the Upaniṣads are also known. Just as the expression '*mṛd-ghaṭaḥ*' (clay-pot) conveys the intimate relation between clay and pot, even so the term '*Vedānta-sūtras*' brings out the close relation between the Vedāntas and their sūtras. More important than the name is its form. The shape it has is determined by the material drawn from its source. To say that it has four chapters, each of which is divided into four parts, is to take a superficial, outward view of its structure or form. One must pay attention to its content (*viṣaya*) in order to appreciate its structure. Bādarāyaṇa who composed the sūtras and planned the form or structure of the work must have done so on the basis of the content of the work. Where did he get the content from? From the Upaniṣads. This will be obvious if we pay attention to *viṣaya-vākyas*. When we explain the structure of the *Brahma-sūtras*, we cannot just stop with *adhyāyas* (chapters) and *pādas* (parts); we must also go further down to the level of *adhikaraṇas* (topics). An *adhikaraṇa* may consist of one sūtra or more than one sūtra as the case may be. Every *adhikaraṇa* takes up a certain Upaniṣadic text and discusses its purport and purpose; and the text taken up for discussion in a topic is called *viṣaya-vākya*. If it is admitted that there is a scheme in the structure of the *Brahma-sūtras* and if it is further admitted that the content determines the scheme, then the relation between the source, namely, the Upaniṣads, and the manifested structure, namely, the *Brahma-sūtras*, that is to say between matter and form, is such that the two cannot be separated. Daya Krishna himself admits that the *Brahma-sūtras* presents the thought of the Upaniṣads in a coherent, unified way; but at the same time he says that the thought of the Upaniṣads is a 'secondary matter'. If the thought propounded by the Upaniṣads is not primary and can, therefore, be ignored when assessing the position of Vedānta in the first millennium AD, then the *Brahma-sūtras* will be contentless. If so, it makes no sense to say that Bādarāyaṇa systematizes the thought of the Upaniṣads. Consequently he will not have any work to do as he has no material. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the attempt to separate the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtras*. It is, therefore, not desirable to separate them. Daya Krishna's argument is vitiated by the fallacy of separating the inseparables.

IV

Following Daya Krishna, let us focus our attention on the period between Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara with the view to find out the status of Vedānta at that time. Daya Krishna makes two observations in this connection. He says: 'Surprisingly, the *Brahma-sūtras* remained entirely unnoticed until the appearance of Śaṅkara who wrote his commentary on it . . .'[8] After listing five Vedāntins of this period, who were 'supposed' to have written commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtras*, he goes on to say:

> Thus in the pre-Śaṅkara period the total presence of thinkers who could even be remotely designated as Vedāntins is not only negligible, but many of them have to be included just because they have been mentioned by someone else or because their work has a marginal reference in the tradition.[9]

While the first statement is not true according to his own account, the second one defaces the image of Vedānta. He mentions five Vedāntins—Bodhāyana, Dramidācārya, Bhartṛprapañca, Viśvarūpadeva, and Brahmadatta—who wrote commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtras*. If so, he contradicts himself when he says that 'the *Brahma-sūtras* remained entirely unnoticed until the appearance of Śaṅkara'. In justification of his statement he may say that he doubts that all these five Vedāntins, or some of them, wrote commentaries on it. In other words, he doubts the tradition. For example, he doubts that Bodhāyana wrote anything on the *Brahma-sūtras*. However, we get a different picture of Bodhāyana in the writings of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Though Śaṅkara does not refer to Bodhāyana, he refers to a *vṛtti* by Upavarṣa. In the '*Ānandamayādhikaraṇa*' (1.1.12–19) he refers to the view of the Vṛttikāra, from which he differs in his explanation of *ānandamaya*. The *vṛtti-kāra* is identified as Upavarṣa. Bodhāyaṇa and Upavarṣa are identical. In the beginning of his *Śrībhāṣya*, Rāmānuja says that he follows Bodhāyana's *vṛtti* in his explanation of the *Brahma-sūtras*. To quote Rāmānuja:

> The lengthy explanation (*vṛtti*) of the *Brahma-sūtras* which was composed by the reverend Bodhāyana has been abridged by former teachers; according to their views the words of the sūtras will be explained in this work.[10]

In his *Vedārtha-saṁgraha* he mentions Bodhāyana, Ṭaṅka, Dramida, and others as the authorities who followed the ancient commentaries on the Veda and Vedānta.[11] The non-availability to us of Bodhāyana's *vṛtti* on the *Brahma-sūtras* is no reason to say that he did not write it.

Again, he makes a cursory remark that 'Dramiḍācārya has not been

referred to by subsequent thinkers in the tradition',[12] totally ignoring the evidence available in the tradition. Surprisingly, both Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita traditions claim that Dramiḍācārya was one of their teachers. Ānandagiri in his gloss on Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* identifies a passage quoted by Śaṅkara as that of Dramiḍācārya.[13] Sarvajñātman in his *Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka* refers to the views of the Vākya-kāra and the Bhāṣya-kāra.[14] Commentators on this work identify the former as Ṭaṅka and the latter as Dramiḍācārya. Mahadevan's observation is worth quoting here: 'If Ānandagiri and the commentators on the *Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka* are right in what they say, Dramiḍācārya must have been a leading Advaitin of the pre-Śaṅkara era, upholding the *niṣprapañca or nirguṇavastu-vāda.*'[15] References are to be found to Dramiḍācārya in the writings of Yāmuna, Rāmānuja, and Vedāntadeśika. For example, Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya*, 2.2.3, quotes the authority of Dramiḍācārya (mentioning the name) in support of his position. Suffice it to say that Dramiḍācārya was a greatly respected Vedāntin who flourished in the period we are considering.

Daya Krishna's comment on Bhartṛprapañca is baffling. He seems to doubt that Bhartṛprapañca is a Vedāntin though he does not openly say so. Look at his carefully worded comment:

> As for Bhartṛprapañca, he is supposed to be an exception to the general position held by *most* (emphasis mine) Vedāntins that Brahman cannot be known by reasoning, and that it can only be known through the *śruti* or perhaps even through intuition.[16]

Every Vedāntin holds the view that Brahman can be known only through *śruti* and not through reasoning. If Brahman can be known through reasoning, then there is no need for *śruti*. The work of *śruti* cannot be performed by any other *pramāṇa*; and so all Vedāntins without any exception hold the view that *śruti* alone is the *pramāṇa* for knowing Brahman, as conveyed by the *sūtra*, 1.1.3, '*śāstra yonitvāt.*' Daya Krishna is, therefore, wrong when he says that 'most' Vedāntins hold this view. Daya Krishna's aim is to separate Bhartṛprapañca from the school of Vedānta on the ground that he holds a view different from that held by the Vedāntins. So the question to be considered is whether Bhartṛprapañca is an exception to the Vedāntic view that Brahman can be known only through *śruti*. The answer is no. There are evidences to show that Bhartṛprapañca wrote an extensive commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Also, he wrote commentaries on two other Upaniṣads, *Īśā* and *Chāndogya*. In addition to these, he wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*. Unfortunately, none of these works are available to us. Hiriyanna has reconstructed his philosophy on the

basis of the discussion of his views in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and Sureśvara's *Vārtika* thereon; and his reconstruction is both delightfully insightful and fairly informative.[17] What is relevant for the present discussion is Bhartṛprapañca's theory of *pramāṇa-samuccaya* according to which perception is as valid as *śruti*. While perception reveals diversity and also validates it, *śruti* gives us knowledge of unity as well as diversity. The difference between Bhartṛprapañca and Śaṅkara comes to this:

> Śaṅkara explains the reference to variety in the Upaniṣads as a mere *anuvāda* of what is empirically known and so, as carrying no new authority with it. Thus he restricts the scope of the scripture, as an independent and primary *pramāṇa*, to the teaching of unity alone.[18]

Bhartṛprapañca does not differ from Śaṅkara and others in upholding the view that Brahman which is one and which is the sole cause of the entire manifested universe can be known only though *śruti*. In addition to *pramāṇa-samuccaya*, he also advocates *jñāna-karma-samuccaya* which is an entirely different matter. There is no need to discuss about 'intuition' mentioned by Daya in this context as it does not find a place in the *pramāṇa-vicāra* of the Vedāntin. For knowing anything through *śruti* or through any other *pramāṇa* what is required is the *vṛtti* of the mind, and nothing more.

It appears that Brahmadatta wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*.[19] Yāmuna in his *siddhi-traya* refers to him as one of the commentators on the *Brahma-sūtras*.[20] But Brahmadatta's work is not available to us. It is difficult to say whether Brahmadatta was a Bhedābheda-vādin like Bhartṛprapañca. Probably he was. It is equally difficult to say whether he was an Advaitin or not. In so far as he identifies the *jīva* and Brahman, we can say that he is an Advaitin. However, he holds the view that the *jīva* is non-eternal (*anitya*) because it originates from Brahman and merges into it at the time of liberation. No Vedāntin of any school would accept this view of Brahmadatta. Like Bhartṛprapañca, he too stresses the importance of meditation, variously called *upāsanā, bhāvanā, prasaṅkhyāna*, for attaining immediate knowledge of Brahman from the Upaniṣadic texts. Sureśvara in his *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* refutes Brahmadatta's view regarding *bhāvanā*.[21] The theory of *jñāna-karma-samuccaya* advocated by Bhartṛprapañca and Brahmadatta is rejected by Śaṅkara and other Advaitins. The point to be noted here is that Brahmadatta was a Vedāntin like Bhartṛprapañca, but not an Advaitin. Dvaitins and Advaitins, Bhedābheda-vādins and Viśiṣṭādvaitins—all of them hold that their position is supported by the

Upaniṣads and also by the *Brahma-sūtras*. If Brahmadatta is an advocate of *bhedābheda*, as mentioned by Daya Krishna, his standpoint, too, one may argue, is supported by the *Brahma-sūtras*.

Daya Krishna excludes Gauḍapāda from his purview as the latter did not write a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, aknowledging at the same time Gauḍapāda's contribution to Advaita. But he makes a damaging statement about the five Vedāntins listed by him. I have two comments here. First, the thinkers listed by him must have been foremost Vedāntins in the period between Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara. Otherwise Śaṅkara, Yāmuna, Rāmānuja, and others would not have discussed their views and acknowledged their indebtedness to them. That we do not have access to their writings is, indeed, a severe handicap to us, and so we have to rely upon these authorities to whom their writings were available and who were highly competent to evaluate their contribution. This should not be dismissed as a case of *argumentum ad verecundiam* as Daya seems to do when he says that 'they have been included just because they have been mentioned by someone else'. Second, it is wrong to say that their standing in the tradition is marginal. With some imagination and open-mindedness it will not be difficult for us to visualize the kind of personalities that Bodhāyana and Bhartṛprapañca (to consider only two of the five Vedāntins mentioned earlier) must have been to have caught the attention of Rāmānuja, Śaṅkara, and others. As stated earlier, Rāmānuja says that he follows, like others before him, the explanation of the *Brahma-sūtras* given by Bodhāyana. Śaṅkara will not pick up Bhartṛprapañca's point of view as his *pūrva-pakṣa* quite often if it is poor, unsubstantial, and inconsequential. It may be mentioned here that we have inherited four models for explaining the relation among Brahman, *jīva*, and the world. They are: the *bheda* model, the *abheda* model, the *bhedābheda* model, and the *viśiṣṭādvaita* model. We owe the *bhedābheda* model to Bhartṛprapañca. Bhāskara modified and developed it in his own way later on. This model has influenced philosophical thinking throughout the ages down to the present day. In the words of Hiriyanna:

> It is strange that the name of this old Vedāntin should now be all but forgotten, though references to him are fairly plentiful in Indian philosophical literature; and the strangeness of it will appear all the greater when we remember that Brahman or the Absolute, as conceived by him is of a type that has commended itself to some of the most profound philosophers. Like so many other old thinkers, Bhartṛprapañca appears not as the author of an independent system, but as an interpreter of the Upaniṣads.[22]

It must be emphasized here that the influence of these traditional Vedāntins is not marginal, but central.

V

Daya Krishna argues that the Vedāntic thought as embodied in the *Brahma-sūtras* was not seriously taken by other systems. He mentions in this connection the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* and the *Nyāya-sūtras*. Depending on Nakamura, he says that, while the former refutes the Vedāntic position in a couple of places, the latter does not. According to Radhakrishnan, the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* is probably 'contemporaneous' with the *Brahma-sūtras*. There are reasons to think that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* must be earlier than the *Brahma-sūtras* because the latter, after answering the Vaiśeṣika objection that Brahman cannot be the first cause in 2.2.11, criticizes the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣika in 2.2.12–16. Dasgupta is of the view that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* is probably pre-Buddhistic.[23] In any case the fact remains that, even though Kaṇāda was familiar with the Vedānta concepts such as *avidyā* and *pratyagātman* and also with the Vedānta standpoint generally, he did not criticize Vedānta in his *sūtras*. If the *Nyāya-sūtras* does not refer to the *Brahma-sūtras*, the reason must be, as many scholars have suggested, that it was also earlier than the *Brahma-sūtras*. If both Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Udayana, who refute Advaita, do not mention the name of Śaṅkara, it does not follow that Śaṅkara's pre-eminence was not established by that time. When the views of others are refuted, sometimes the names of those who hold them are mentioned, and very often they are not mentioned. Since both the conventions have been followed in the tradition, the absence of specific reference to Śaṅkara in the writings of Jayanta and Udayana does not prove Daya's hypothesis.

VI

Daya Krishna tries to support his thesis by citing a passage which forms the conclusion of Udayana's *Ātmatattva-viveka*.[24] A few observations will be helpful before we consider his comment on this passage. The context is about the attainment of release and the means thereto; and Udayana sets forth some preliminaries in this connection. He says that first of all one should know the nature of the Self from scripture. Following this one should know that the Self is different from the objects to be discarded such as the mind, the senses, and the body through the help of reasoning. Thirdly, one should practise moral and spiritual discipline for the purpose of controlling the mind and reflect on the Self. It looks as though Udayana describes the preliminary discipline as an Advaitin

would do. The process of reflection may be such that the practitioner may think of the external world alone oblivious of the Self, or of the Self manifesting itself as the external world, or of the absence of the external world, or of the Self as different from the manifested world along with its cause, or of the Self as the sole reality, or of the Self as the indeterminate reality devoid of all distinctions. Thus, there are six stages of reflection of which the succeeding one is intended to replace the preceding one. Each stage is supposed to be a means, a gateway (*dvāra*) to release. According to Udayana, the last one alone, which represents the standpoint of Nyāya, is the right means to the goal whereas the remaining ones are the wrong ones (*apadvāra*) to be discarded, even though one can find a *śruti* text in support of each standpoint. Interestingly, each stage of reflection is presented against a metaphysical standpoint. The Mīmāṁsaka who is brought in first of all believes in the reality of the things of the external world. Bhāskara, the *tridaṇḍin*, who is presented next, holds the view that the external world is the manifestation of the supreme Self. Then comes the view which denies the reality of the external world (*arthākāra-śūnyam paramārthataḥ*). Udayana characterizes this view as the gateway to *Vedānta-śāstra*. The point that is sought to be conveyed here is that the spiritual aspirant should meditate on the Self which is devoid of the world (*niṣprapañca ātmā dhyeyaḥ mumukṣubhiḥ*). After this is the turn of the Sāṁkhya who holds that the Self or *puruṣa* is different from *prakṛti*. Thereafter the view of the Advaitin, according to whom the Self alone (*kevala ātmā*) is real and nothing else, is presented. And lastly there is the Nyāya view which holds that the Self free from all distinctions is not apprehended in a determinate way. On the contrary, it shines or shows itself in its indeterminate form (*nirvikalpakenaiva pratibhāsate*). Since the Nyāya standpoint is the final one (*caramāvasthā*), Udayana speaks of it as the *carama-vedānta-upasaṁhāra*. Since the Self is indeterminate, the Upaniṣad says that it is beyond the grasp of both the mind and speech. This indeterminate cognition of the Self will cease of its own accord in course of time; and Udayana elucidates this Nyāya position by citing the Upaniṣadic text which says: 'Of him who is without desires, who is free from desires, the objects of whose desires have been attained and to whom all objects of desire are but the Self—the organs do not depart. Being but Brahman, he is merged in Brahman.'[25]

It may be noted that Mīmāṁsā, Bhāskara-mata, etc. are not the only systems mentioned by Udayana in the meditative scheme. In addition to them, he also mentions Cārvāka, Yogācāra, Śūnya-vāda, and Śākta-mata in the scheme associating them with the first, second, third, and fourth stages respectively. Though Udayana is clear in presenting the scheme

as well as in his understanding of the systems, the addition of four more systems has created some problems to the readers. To think that Udayana has placed Mīmāṁsā and Cārvāka, or the Bhāskara-mata and Yogācāra, or the gateway position of Vedānta and Śūnya-vāda, or Sāṁkhya and Śāktism on a footing of equality is wrong. Udayana carefully distinguishes the systems mentioned first from those mentioned thereafter in each pair by using two different words when he introduces them in the scheme. He uses '*upasaṁhāra*' when he speaks of Mīmāṁsā, Bhāskara-mata, and so on, which are the systems first in each pair, and '*utthāna*' in respect of Cārvāka, etc. which are second in each pair. While the former conveys the sense of validity (*prāmāṇya*) for the system based as it is on a scriptural text, the latter suggests the pseudo-validity (*prāmāṇyābhāsa*) of the system which has arisen.[26] The mentioning of two systems at a particular meditative stage does not mean or imply that the two systems are equated by Udayana. It must be borne in mind that the two systems mentioned at each stage are not at all allied systems (*samāna-tantras*): they are neither metaphysical cousins nor spiritual partners. It requires extraordinary courage even to imagine the possibility of an alliance, as in the case of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, or Sāṁkhya and Yoga, between two systems mentioned in each pair. Nor is it possible to equate one system with another listed in the pair. It is, therefore, surprising when Daya Krishna says that 'the Mīmāṁsā position is equated almost with that of the Cārvāka' in the scheme.[27] The idea of equation or near equation between Mīmāṁsā and Cārvāka is untenable since they have different metaphysical bases, different epistemological theories, and different soteriological perspectives. One has to extend this line of reasoning with suitable modifications with regard to the remaining systems which are paired. Udayana has not committed this egregious blunder of equating the Mīmāṁsā position with that of the Cārvāka, or of the Bhāskara philosophy with that of the Yogācāra, and so on in the scheme.

Udayana has listed a total of ten philosophical perspectives. One will get into trouble if one enumerates these perspectives one after another in a series. Consider the following passage which gives a summary statement of the text we are discussing:

> While meditating upon the Self there are stages of realization through which one has to pass. Karma Mīmāṁsā, materialism, the Vedānta of Bhāskara, idealistic Buddhism, the Vedānta system in general, nihilistic Buddhism, Sāṁkhya, the Śākta cult, the Advaita system, and the final stage, which Udayana calls 'final Vedānta', equating it with the Nyāya school, are shown to be the stages, each succeeding stage being superior to the previous one. . . .[28]

To take only the first two systems, would it be right to say that the materialism of Cārvāka is superior to *Karma Mīmāṁsā* as stated above? Does Udayana say that? Anyone with a little acquaintance with Indian philosophy will shudder to think that Udayanācārya, a great lumminary capable of shedding light on abstruse metaphysical issues and subtle logical problems, will provide us with a hierarchy of disciplinary scheme which will show the Cārvāka position to be superior to that of Mīmāṁsā.

The standpoint of Advaita is mentioned only once in the fifth stage and not in the third and the fifth, as stated by Daya Krishna. Since Udayana uses the expression '*Vedānta-dvāra*' and not just 'Vedānta', there is the need for extra care in explaining the third stage. Also, one should take into consideration the fact that Advaita is specifically mentioned in the fifth stage and that there is no reason why a system should be accorded a special status by listing it in two places in the scheme. Nārāyaṇācārya Ātreya in his commentary on the text explains the expression as follows: '*dvāraśabdena nānārthābhāve tātparyam, śāstrasya dvāramātraṁ tat.*'[29] An important attitude of the mind, a certain conviction arising from *nityānitya-vastu-viveka*, which is an indispensable preliminary to Advaita, is mentioned in the third stage. The description of the stages as well as the identification of each one with a certain system is clear. This does not mean that this is the only way in which the stages of meditative discipline can be presented. One can present a different scheme. However, our aim here is to understand Udayana who undoubtedly has a plan underlying the sequential arrangement of the stages of meditative discipline.

I shall close my review of Udayana's meditative stages with two comments from the standpoint of Advaita. First of all, the distinction that Udayana seeks to make between Advaita and '*carama-vedānta*' can be questioned. According to Advaita, the fifth stage itself where the Self is left alone transcending the distinction between the seer and the seen, the witness and the witnessed, and so on, is the final one. There are many Upaniṣadic texts which, making a distinction between the stage of *avidyā* and that of *vidyā*, point out that all kinds of distinctions which are made in the former are absent in the latter. Consider, for example, the following text from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*:

> When there is duality, as it were, then one smells something, one sees something, . . . one knows something. But when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one smell, and through what, . . . what should one think and through what?[30]

Śaṅkara argues that an entity which is *saguṇa* can be known through the mind and also can be described through words, but not an entity which is *nirguṇa*. Since the Self which is one and non-dual is *nirguṇa*, it falls outside the scope of both the mind and speech; it is, that is to say, both trans-conceptual and trans-linguistic. That is why the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* describes the Self as that 'from which words, along with the mind, turn back as they fail to reach it'.[31] What Udayana characterizes as '*carama-vedānta*', in support of which he cites the *Taittirīya* text mentioned above, is no other than Advaita. A person who has realized the distinctionless Self which is trans-conceptual and trans-linguistic, remains as the Self, free from all desires (*niṣkāmaḥ*), having attained the Self (*āptakāmaḥ*) which is everything, and so on as described by the Upaniṣad which Udayana finally quotes.[32] So, the *carama-vedānta* about which Udayana is legitimately eloquent is not different from Advaita. The fifth is not the penultimate, but the final. By appropriating the Advaita position and making it his own, Udayana has paid the highest tribute to Advaita; for, to borrow the felicitous expression used by Suryanarayana Sastri in some other context, what is good enough to be appreciated is good enough to be appropriated.

Secondly, the reason given for discarding the Advaita standpoint is not satisfactory. The Advaitin, Udayana seems to argue, speaks of the Self as real, knowledge, and bliss, as one and non-dual, and so on; and the spiritual aspirant attains the 'determinate knowledge' of the Self. But the Self *per se*, maintains Udayana, is indeterminate because it is devoid of all distinctions and determinations: the Self, that is to say, is *nirvikalpa*; and so what is required is the indeterminate cognition of the Self (*ātmaviṣaya-nirvikalpa-jñāna*). For attaining this cognition one has to move, according to him, beyond the stage of Advaita. There is no substance in this argument. Just as the Naiyāyika speaks of *nirvikalpaka-jñāna*, the Advaitin speaks of *akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti-jñāna* which is final. The Self or Brahman is *akhaṇḍa*, that is, a homogeneous whole; and the final cognition which arises through the unfragmented, impartite *vṛtti* is *akhaṇḍa*. Cognition reflects the nature of the object: that is to say, as the object, so the cognition. That is why Śaṅkara says that knowledge is *vastu-tantra* with a view to showing how knowledge is totally different from *upāsanā*, which is *puruṣa-tantra*.[33] So, the *akhaṇḍa-jñāna* of the Advaitin is the same as the *nirvikalpa-jñāna* of the Naiyāyika; and the explanation of the cessation of *akhaṇḍa-jñāna/nirvikalpa-jñāna* given by the Advaitin/Naiyāyika is surprisingly the same. The transition from the fifth to the sixth stage which Udayana suggests is uncalled for.

VII

Daya Krishna tries to get support for his thesis from Haribhadrasūri (AD 750), the Jaina thinker who wrote the famous *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* which gives an account of six philosophical systems.[34] Scholars are of the view that Haribhadra's work is a valuable one. In the beginning he states that Buddhism, Nyāya, Sāṁkhya, Jainism, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṁsā are the six systems which he proposes to expound in his work.[35] He explains the systems in the same order in which he mentions them. Concluding the exposition of Mīmāṁsā, he observes that he has given a brief account of *āstika-darśanas*.[36] His connotation of *āstika-darśana* is different from the one that is usually given in the classification of systems into *āstika* and *nāstika*. A system which accepts the authority of the Veda is said to be *āstika*, and that which does not accept the authority of the Veda is *nāstika*. Following this principle, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Pūrva-mīmāṁsā, and Uttara-mīmāṁsā are called *āstika-darśanas*, while jainism, Buddhism, and Cārvāka are labelled *nāstika-darśanas*. It may be noted that the term '*āstika*' is also explained without reference to the Veda. According to this explanation, a person who believes in the other world which is attained in accordance with one's stock of *adṛṣṭa*, etc. for which Īśvara is the *sākṣin* is an *āstika*. One can even drop reference to Īśvara and explain the term with the remaining ideas, as done by Maṇibhadra in his commentary called *Laghuvṛtti*.[37] The six systems mentioned by Haribhadra in the beginning of his work are undoubtedly *āstika* because they believe in *paraloka* to which merit and demerit are the means. Haribhadra further says that we will have only five *āstika* systems if we accept the view of those who hold that Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika which are allied systems may be treated as one. However, since there is the general view that there are six *darśanas* and not five, we may, Haribhadra suggests, make up the number by adding Lokāyata to the list.[38] In that case we will have six *darśanas*, but not six *āstika-darśanas* since Lokāyata is not an *āstika* system. In whatever way we identify the systems, either as *āstika-darśanas* or as just *darśanas*, there is no place for Advaita in the list. This proves, according to Daya, the non-existence of Vedānta as a significant philosophical force in the first millennium AD: otherwise, how should one account for the omission of Vedānta in the list given by Haribhadra?

The problem here is not about the connotation of the term '*āstika*', but about the non-inclusion of Advaita as a system in the survey. It is surprising that the Yoga system also does not find a place in Haribhadra's survey. Even if one accepts AD 300 and not the second century BC as the date of the compilation of the *Yoga-sūtras* by Patañjali, there was a gap of

more than three hundred years for anyone to take notice of it. It must be borne in mind that the yoga practices were well known even before Patañjali compiled them in the form of sūtras. The Upaniṣads, the *Mahābhārata* including the *Bhagavad-gītā*, Jainism, and Buddhism accepted yogic practices. Therefore, the Yoga system should not have been unknown to Haribhadra. In fact, because of its antiquity on the one hand and its influence on both Jainism and Buddhism on the other, Yoga should have been dominant during the period before Haribhadra. But still he does not discuss it in his work. The non-inclusion of the Yoga system does not mean its non-existence in the first millennium AD. Keeping the Upaniṣads in the background, the *Brahma-sūtras*, which gave an impressive shape and structure to the Vedāntic thought, received the attention of Bodhāyana, Bhartṛprapañca, and others. It must have been a formidable force to be reckoned with not only because of its coherent and comprehensive exposition of Vedānta, but also because of its critique of other systems—Sāṁkhya and Mīmāṁsā, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, Jainism, and so on. If so, what could be the reason for the non-inclusion of Advaita and Yoga by Haribhadra in his survey? Though Sāṁkhya and Mīmāṁsā are *āstika-darśanas*, they have not provided a place for the Creator-God in their systems: both of them are anti-theistic. The historical development of the Vaiśeṣika shows that it was anti-Vedic in its pre-Buddhistic stage. Though the pre-Buddhistic Nyāya was in close association with Vedic exegesis, it gradually developed a secularized logic and slowly freed itself from its Vedic association. Thus, Nyāya was moving away from its Vedic moorings. Kuppuswami Sastri gives an account of the background of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Sāṁkhya, which is worth quoting *in extenso*:

> Before the end of the Upaniṣadic period and prior to the advent of the Buddha, the Vedic scriptures embodying the results of the intuitive insight of the Vedic and the Upaniṣadic seers had asserted their authority so far as to persuade a large section of rationalistic thinkers to agree to play second fiddle to scriptural authorities. This should have resulted in the development of the pre-Buddhistic *nyāya* method in close association with Vedic exegesis and accounts for the earlier use of the term '*nyāya*' in the sense of 'the principles and the logical method of Mīmāṁsā exegetics'. This also accounts for the fact that, even after the disentanglement of the Nyāya logic from Vedic exegetics, the legislators of ancient India like Manu and Yājñavalkya emphatically recognized the importance and value of logical reasoning (*tarka*) in a correct comprehension of *dharma* as taught by the Vedas (*Manu*, XII. 105 and 106; *Yājñavalkya*, I. 3).

> Another section of rationalistic thinkers who did not agree to play second fiddle to scriptural authorities, perhaps developed and expounded rationalistic doctrines on independent lines, without subjecting themselves to the thraldom of Vedic religion and philosophy. Some of these doctrines perhaps shaped themselves into the Sāṁkhya thought of the pre-Buddhistic stage, with a marked degree of hostility to Vedic ritualism. Some other doctrines of this kind gave rise to the pre-Buddhistic logic and metaphysics of the Vaiśeṣika, with a special leaning in favour of the inductive method of reasoning based on observation and analysis and with a simple rationalistic scheme of two sources of valid knowledge—perception and inference (*pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*). It is very likely that the anti-Vedic speculations of the pre-Buddhistic Vaiśeṣika paved the way for the development and systematization of Buddhism. . . . Thus, the *nyāya* of the Vedic exegesis and logic and metaphysics of the early *anti-Vedic Vaiśeṣika* came to fraternize with each other and gave rise to two sister-schools of philosophical reasoning—the Vaiśeṣika school mainly concerned with inductive observation and analysis, and the Nyāya school chiefly concerned with the formulation and elucidation of the principles of ratiocination on the basis of inductive reasoning.[39]

Buddhism was openly anti-Vedic. Haribhadra was willing to admit Lokāyata, which is anti-Vedic, as one of the six *darśanas*. It follows that the six systems which receive Haribhadra's attention in his work are non-Vedic, overtly or covertly as the case may be; and so he elucidates them in his work. Yoga and Advaita stand apart from these systems. Though Yoga has borrowed its metaphysics from Sāṁkhya, it is not atheistic as it has provided a place for God as an object of meditation in its scheme of spiritual discipline. That is why it is characterized as '*seśvara-sāṁkhya*'. So far as Vedānta is concerned, it holds that Brahman is both the material and efficient cause (*abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world. According to the Upaniṣads, Brahman is not only cosmic (*saprapañca*), but also as acosmic (*niṣprapañca*). Advaita which has developed both these aspects of the Upaniṣadic teaching is, therefore, unique. It means that both Yoga and Advaita, each of which has a speciality of its own, cannot be grouped with the other systems which are non-Vedic; and so Haribhadra could have omitted them in his survey. From this one should not draw the conclusion that both Yoga and Vedānta did not count very much in the first millennium AD. Buddhism has borrowed a great deal from the Upaniṣads. Just as it has influenced Advaitins such as Gauḍapāda, even so it has been influenced

by the Upaniṣadic ideas.. One can trace the idealistic thinking of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the Upaniṣads. So, if Nāgārjuna, Maitreyanātha, and others 'do not show any awareness of the *Brahma-sūtras*',[40] it does not mean that Vedānta was not dominant during that period. Buddhism did not come into existence in a vacuum. It came in the wake of the Upaniṣads. If so, why should it not be said that Nāgārjuna and others who were aware of the idealistic trend in the Upaniṣads and who were benefited by it did not feel the necessity to discuss it in their writings?

VIII

The Vedāntic thought of the Upaniṣads constitutes the *philosophia perennis* which has endured through the ages. Bādarāyaṇa's attempt to shape and synthesize the Upaniṣadic ideas in his *Brahma-sūtras*, perhaps the last, is easily the best that is available to us. He has provided a strong philosophical base for theism and absolutism, which have influenced the development of Indian philosophy in general and the systems of Vedānta in particular. To deny the influence of the *Brahma-sūtras* at any period of time is to deny the influence of the Upaniṣads on the divergent schools of thought. The Vedānta philosophy of the Upaniṣads is, indeed, the Rock of Ages, which one has to encounter and reckon with in doing philosophy.

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4. *JICPR* (Special Issue), p. 204.
5. Ibid., p. 205.
6. Ibid., p. 206.
7. Ibid., pp. 200–1.
8. Ibid., p. 202.
9. Ibid., p. 203.
10. *Śrībhāṣya*, 1.1.1. See also S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarsidass, reprint, 1992, Delhi, Vol. 1, p. 433.
11. See S.S. Raghavachar (ed. and tr.), *Vedārtha-saṁgraha*, Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1978, Mysore, sec. 130, p. 102.
12. *JICPR* (Special Issue), June 1996, p. 202.
13. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 2.32 with Śaṅkara's commentary and Ānandagiri's gloss thereon.
14. Sarvajñātman's *Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka*, 3. 220–21: 'The Vākyakāra first explains the theory of transformation, and then gradually giving it up holds the view (of transfiguration which is) nearer (to the Advaitic doctrine than the previous one), and then says that all the modifications are only empirically real. Thus he maintains the Advaita standpoint.' (220) 'The venerable Bhāṣyakāra also states

that the adorable supreme Self is of the nature of the inward Self. And this holds good in the view of Advaita and not when the theory of transformation is maintained.' (221)

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22. M. Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 79.
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33. See his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, 1.1..4.
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Euthanasia

INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM OF EUTHANASIA

There are some actions which bring death. Some such action-expressing terms are 'killing', 'murder', 'suicide', 'euthanasia' and 'abortion'. In this article we shall be concerned with 'euthanasia' in particular.

In case of killing, the killer is the agent, and the act is done on someone other than the agent. Killing is an act which is normally repulsive to human beings. Still, we are bound to kill many lives daily for self-preservation. It is this utility-oriented compulsion that suggests why 'killing' is not an entirely—negatively—coloured term.

Killing and murder have two things in common:

(1) The killer and the murderer are the agents of the acts and (2) The act is done on someone other than the agent. But 'murder' means killing which is wrongful, because usually there is no drive of self-preservation behind it. However, in both the cases agent A (be he the killer or the murderer) does something to B (the killed or the murdered one).

But 'suicide', as the very name suggests, denotes a self-reflexive action. In committing suicide, A does something to A himself, or, in other words, A kills A. Here, as in killing or in murder, agency belongs to the person who commits the act, but the difference between suicide and killing/murder lies in the fact that the former act is done to the agent himself.

In case of euthanasia, some curious questions are raised, the foremost of which being the question of agency: Who is the agent here? Can euthanasia be categorised as a killing, or as murder? Let us try to pursue these questions in a systematic manner.

EUTHANASIA AND THE MODERN DEFINITION OF DEATH

'Thanatos', a Greek word, means 'death'. 'Euthanasia', another Greek word, etymologically means 'good or easy death'. Now, when should we pronounce a man dead? Previously, according to doctors, death meant cessation of vital functions. But for several reasons, this meaning seemed to be inadequate. In the 1960s The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death was constructed. This committee comprised of physicians, lawyers and theologians. A new definition of death, namely, 'irreversible coma', came in vogue in 1968.[1] The aforesaid committee suggested that irreversible coma should have four characterizing marks, namely, (1) unreceptivity and unresponsivity, (2) no movements or breathing, (3) no reflexes and (4) flat electro-encephalogram.

Let us agree to the proposal that 'irreversible coma' and 'death' are

synonymous. Now, what is 'good death'? It is to be observed that if one is lying in a coma, with no chance of gaining consciousness, and, as per the older definition of death, is not dead, we may say that this sort of waiting for death is not good. But this situation is out of consideration now for, as per the definition of 1968, the patient in irreversible coma may be declared dead. Armed with this recent definition of death, if we now turn off the switch of a respirator in case of a person lying in irretrievable coma, we are not killing him, because he is already 'dead', and we are not applying euthanasia either.

Now, if one is groaning in severe pain and if doctors surmise that he has to suffer such pain till death, we may say that the death which he is going to face is not a good one, because it is not tranquil. But if that be the case, are we justified in pushing a mortal dose of poison to such a terminally-ill patient? Or let us imagine a different situation. If an aged person is afflicted by various diseases, and wants to die and refuses to take pills and potions, should we allow him to do so? Is letting someone die something equivalent to killing?

WHY EUTHANASIA?

It has often been stated that we can avoid the ugliness of the death of an incurable patient jumping over the rails of a verandah or hanging from the ceiling with a distorted face, if only euthanasia is legalized. And Holland is the pioneer in doing that.

Talk about euthanasia comes when (1) a patient has inexorable, unbearable pain, (2) medical science declares that he has no chance of recovery and (3) the patient gives consent to kill himself.

LACUNAE IN THE CONDITIONS

There are some lacunae in these conditions. First of all, while speaking of applying euthanasia to a patient, when we speak of this pain, we assume that he is in physical pain. But, what if a patient begs for death, being in inexorable mental pain and also not knowing how to court an easy death? It is often said that Time is the best healer of wounds. But we do not allow the responsibility of cure to Time in case of physical wounds. So it appears that we are less attentive to mental pain. To a person suffering acute mental pain, we seem to say: 'Suffer your pain all by yourself, please, and do not disturb us. If you fail to bear the pain, do what you like. If you want to die, be thou the agent'. Perhaps the idea behind this sort of discriminating attitude towards patients suffering physically and persons suffering mentally is that for the former group someone, be he a relative or the taxpayer in general, has to bear a pecuniary loss.

What I suggest is that if euthanasia is taken to be permissible in the case of physical pain, then it must be extended to cases of mental pain

as well. But as for the present situation, euthanasia is permissible only in the case of persons having severe physical pain.

Another point to note is that in applying euthanasia, we have to get the patient's consent. Then, in one sense, euthanasia may be equated with suicide, because it is the person in question who decides to die. Though he does not carry out his death, still the decision is his own. And from that standpoint, the agency of the act belong to him.

Pushpa Misra in her paper 'A Case for Euthanasia'[2] has referred to James Rachels' paper 'Active and Passive Euthanasia' (where Rachels distinguished between active and passive euthanasia and suggested that both are equally permissible) and has argued that active euthanasia is not permissible and passive euthanasia is morally permissible only under certain conditions, one of which being the consent of the person concerned.

But it may be stated that his consent to kill himself is forced by pain. When we seek consent from a person, it is assumed that the person is in a stable mental condition; or, in other words, he is mentally alert. But the assumption may not be tenable in the case of euthanasia. It is quite conceivable that insufferable pain is a stimulus, and the patient's begging for death or giving consent to kill himself is just a response to that stimulus. If his pain has periodicity, it is highly probable that in the calm moments the patient will call his consent back. All these suggest that the agency of the patient asking for euthanasia is agency in the false sense. And to tally with a decision or consent which is forced on the agent cannot be moral.

What is more, if someone is highly productive in normal moments, his utility-value, in the good sense of the term, may prohibit us from accepting his consent to die, the consent that has been given in his stormy moments of pain. Again, even if his pain is unbearable, while his disease is curable after a long process of treatment, it is obvious that we would reject his prayer for euthanasia.

From the discussion stated above, it is becoming evident that the consent of a patient is nothing but a formal rubber-stamp to clear the conscience of the persons who will carry out euthanasia on the patient. It is we, the non-suffering persons around the suffering patient, who will effectively decide whether euthanasia is to be applied. The situation is obviously queer and repulsive, for the decision to kill someone of the same species cannot be taken by others.

Even if the request of the patient concerned is in earnest, we cannot accept the general statement that we should try to fulfil all earnest requests. If A's daughter has been raped by a ruffian B, if A is powerless against B and if A requests C to kill B, it is quite probable that C will turn the request down. The recurring problem of euthanasia is that it cannot be derived from a generalized maxim.

CONSIDERING ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF EUTHANASIA

The strongest argument in support of euthanasia is the argument from mercy. Euthanasia, by definition, is the act or practice of killing individuals (as persons or domestic animals) that are helplessly sick or injured for reasons of mercy.[3] The argument from mercy is in tune with utilitarian standard of morality. According to this standard, an action is morally justified if it helps either in increasing the amount of happiness or in decreasing the amount of misery in the world. In pushing a mortal dose of poison to a patient suffering from incurable pain, we decrease the amount of misery in the world. Hence, euthanasia is justified.

A general criticism against such a standard is that increasing happiness or decreasing misery may not be the only important thing in considering the moral value of an action. In the course of decreasing the amount of global misery, we cannot be justified in forcibly killing a patient who is suffering from an incurable disease but is unwilling to die.

Secondly, a moral judgement that is passed after considering the consequences of actions alone is inadequate. Thirdly, the happiness of each individual may not be equally important.

In reply, it may be said that even if increasing/decreasing happiness/misery may not be the only criterion for the moral evaluation of actions, it is nonetheless an important thing. James Rachels, in his book *The End of Life*[4] gives a better defence. He replaces the phrase 'maximizing happiness' by 'maximizing interests' and writes:

> . . . if it is in a person's best interests to have freedom of choice in religion, or in choosing to remain alive, then the principle will not countenance taking away that freedom or that life. Armed with this better version of the principle of utility, we may then offer this improved argument concerning euthanasia.

(1) If an action promotes the best interests of everyone concerned, then that action is morally acceptable.
(2) In at least some cases, euthanasia promotes the best interests of everyone concerned.
(3) Therefore, in at least some cases euthanasia is morally acceptable.[5]

Argument from the intended promotion of the best interests of everyone concerned is one variant of the argument from mercy and all possible formulations of the argument from mercy adduced in support of euthanasia seem to be jerry-built. Mercy is an honoured human sentiment, but it should not overstep its limits. In the name of mercy, we cannot kill.

If we are not ready to share the view of the utilitarians that consequential situations alone are important in estimating the moral value of an action, and if we think that morally acceptable deeds must be derived from a broadly generalized maxim, we may look at the

Kantian standard. Life should be retained for life itself. Hence, euthanasia cannot be generalized.

But, if that be the case, we may say that we should respond to the call of 'life for life's sake'. If a person, who is incurably ill and is also suffering immense pain, begs for death, should we not be eager to grant his prayer? Should we not be willing for everyone to follow that rule in similar situations? Should we not claim euthanasia to be justified if our positions were unfortunately reversed with the ill-fated patient? Can it not then be said that even if Kant is opposed to euthanasia, his Categorical Imperative justifies it?

CONSIDERING ARGUMENTS AGAINST EUTHANASIA

Euthanasia is usually rejected from two religious standpoints: (1) from the standpoint of absolute determinism and (2) from the standpoint of cosmic pattern. If we think that everything is determined or settled by some determinant, then we should not try to 'unsettle the settled fact', the 'settled fact' being the suffering of the patient and attempt to 'unsettle' that being the introduction of euthanasia.

But the assumed determiner or the cosmic determinism is an axiomatic assumption which does not add anything to the worth of an argument employed either for or against euthanasia. What is more, persons with strong religious belief have come forward to support it. The Euthanasia Society of America is headed by Joseph Fletcher who is a religious leader. In his book *Morals and Medicine*, euthanasia has been strongly defended. Another renowned Catholic academician, Daniel Maguire, has written a book entitled *Death by Choice*, where euthanasia has been claimed to be perfectly moral.

The second standpoint stated above deserves more careful attention. It is said that a person, together with all his sorrows and sufferings, has a particular place and function in a pattern. Not knowing the exact significance of his position in the cosmos, we should not disturb the pattern by releasing him from that pattern.

Taken literally, this argument, being based on our ignorance about the cosmic plan, will entail complete inaction. We should neither allow enthanasia nor even try to cure a patient, else we disturb the cosmic architecture. But this argument may be stated in more agreeable terms if we replace 'cosmic plan' by 'social relationship'. If we view the patient just as an isolated individual, we may accept euthanasia. If we place him in the web of his social relationships, euthanasia loses its rational justification, for some of his kins may consider his existence valuable. 'A man is not an island', and if he is somehow intertwined in a social pattern, his opinion about his own destruction may not be considered as final.

From the standpoint of the patient, his existence may be useless. From the standpoint of his family, too, the existence of the patient may

be useless, but may not be without value. From a very individualistic standpoint, we may say that as the emotional bond is one-sided, we need not bother about it. But this stand may not be accepted by those who view a person as a social being.

It may be said that we would do wrong to the patient in giving value to the said emotional attachment. For the sake of a visitor's emotion (who is allowed to visit the patient for an hour) we are allowing the patient to suffer pain (for the remaining twenty-three hours). Quantity of life enjoyed is at a minimum here. But in reply it may be said that the quality of an hour may be more important than the quantity of twenty-three hours.

In rejecting euthanasia from a non-religious standpoint, Kant has often been referred to. It has been pointed out that in applying euthanasia, the operator or the executor is taken as an object, as means to the patient's end. From a Kantian standpoint, to use a person as a means is immoral. Hence, euthanasia cannot be justified.

But the argument is a bit carelessly formulated. In the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative in *Groundwork*, Kant holds the view that an agent should not be used 'only' as a means. And in the argument concerned it has not been demonstrated that the operator or the executor is taken 'only' as a means.

In rejecting euthanasia from another non-religious standpoint, it has been stated that doctors may be mistaken in declaring the disease of a patient as incurable. A judgement about the incurability of a disease is never final, it can at best be perilously probable. But though it is true that doctors sometimes make mistakes, it does not follow therefrom that they are never correct in their diagnosis. Of course, before administering euthanasia, special care is essential to eliminate or reduce human fallibility. Persons entrusted to consider whether euthanasia is to be allowed to a particular patient must be quite conversant with the researches in progress to ensure that a cure for a particular disease is not in the offing. When a patient is suffering unbearable pain and when his cure is not visible in the near future, it may be said that medical ethics demands euthanasia. When the very existence is useless to the patient, we should bring him death, call it killing or mercy-killing. If it is cruel, it would be more cruel for the patient if we do not help him to die.

The argument is quite forceful. But the question is: Will anyone think of being engaged in a long-drawn painstaking investigation in search of a cure for a dreadful disease, if euthanasia is legalized? What is more, when it is seen everyday that people kill, become exuberant at the aggressive role of their country, participate en masse in riots and genocides, how can it be believed that some representatives of this murderous species will be very considerate in deciding when euthanasia is to be administered? The suspicion becomes stronger when we find that even in such a debated field, money-making is on its way. One

person has already accumulated a lot of wealth by selling methods of easy death. On the other hand, along with the new definition of death, the prospect of stockpiling 'dead' bodies with live organs ready for an organ-market invariably accompanies the prospect of euthanasia. These apprehensions fit into a package-term, namely, slippery-slope-argument, which indicates that if we declare euthanasia as morally and/or legally justified, it is highly probable that our moral standards will fall with spectacular rapidity.

CONCLUSION

Not to speak of wrongful killing, in every case where necessity compels us to take life, we feel a prick of conscience. That we feel the prick is evident from our eagerness to invent arguments in favour of it, and no killing can be given a generalized rational justification. We cannot give life, hence we are not entitled to take one—that may be taken as a general rule. Euthanasia should be treated as an exception which proves the aforesaid general rule. Some very special situational context demands euthanasia. But ethics has a much broader dimension. Practical ethics is no ethics if it is confined to highly specific situational moments. Consequently, we should give up the hope of showing euthanasia to be ethical.

With industrialization, our perspectives have changed and are changing. Society is no longer given the first priority; priority is now given to the individual. It is quite conceivable that the present perspective may again change. If the perspective changes with renewed importance on society, with more medical advancements in hand, the demand for euthanasia may disappear.

[I hereby wish to convey my thanks to Dr Tirthanath Bandyopadhyay of the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Calcutta, for his comments which have vastly improved the content of this paper.]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Cf. *Journal of American Medical Association*, Vol. 205, No. 6, August 6, 1968.
2. Pushpa Misra, 'A Case for Euthanasia', *The Journal of the Indian Academy of Philosophy*, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, 1990, pp. 21–37.
3. Cf. *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, Indian ed., 1985.
4. Cf. James Rachels, *The End of Life*, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 151–67.
5. Quoted in *Twenty Questions: An Introduction to Philosophy*, edited by G.L. Bowie, M.W. Michaels and R.C. Solomon, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1988, p. 460.

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Nyāya: Realist or Idealist?

I have read your query entitled 'Nyāya: Realist or Idealist' with profit. Here are my comments.

(1) Nyāya, specially Navya-Nyāya, admits many eternal, uncreated objects of different categories.

(a) Substances such as *ākāśa*, space, time, *manas*, *ātmā*, atoms of earth, water, air, fire.
(b) *Jātis* are all eternal.
(c) *Samavāya* is eternal.
(d) *Viśeṣa*s are all eternal.
(e) *Atyantābhāva* is eternal.

As they are all eternal, uncreated, they are not dependent on anything, least of all on their knowledge.

(2) Knowability, nameability, existence are common properties of all reals—*sādharṇa dharmas Bhāṣāparichedaḥ*. (verse 13)

As *dharma* they are dependent upon the reals, not the other way round.

As no human being is omniscient; all reals are *objects* of God's knowledge.

The point that Nyāya is making is that all reals are *objects* of knowledge, and have names.

This theory is in opposition to Śaṁkara's advaitas according to which the real, Brahman, is never an object of knowledge, and can have no name.

(3) In liberation, according to Nyāya, there is no consciousness in the liberated self. This self is, even now, an object of inferential knowledge. For, at the stage of liberation, a self being devoid of consciousness does not know itself. In any case no knowledge can know itself according to Nyāya. It can only be an object, if one so desires, of another knowledge. In the case of one's own self, it is *anuvyavasaya*. In the case of perception, according to Nyāya, the object is a *cause of perceptual knowledge*, and hence must exist prior to the production of the knowledge.

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Nyāya is Realist par Excellence
(A supplementary note)

On reading the short note under the above caption written by me, in reply to a query of Prof. Daya Krishna, an inquisitive reader asked me a

pertinent question which seemed to be one whose proper answer would throw a great deal of light on the realistic character of Nyāya. Hence this attempt to write this supplement to the earlier note. The question asked is posed thus: As per my elucidation of the nature of knownness of everything, some or other cognition—of any kind—of each and everything is possible. This description covers even those things which remain totally unknown to any human being all through their existence. Such things remain unknown in their individual capacity but by a general cognition, like say of the form. Each and every object in the world is either non-eternal or eternal; even the totally unknown (individually) thing will be included as one of its objects. This being the case there is not and cannot be anything that is not known by some cognition (in some capacity or other). However, Nyāya would not go as far as the Advaitin does when he says that even an unknown thing is known as 'unknown'. This 'knownness' as unknown is obviously a peculiar kind of knownness—a kind of direct revelation—unmediated by any *vṛtti* to the *Sākṣin* or the witness-self. Nyāya does not admit the reality of the so-called witness-self or a property like 'unknownness' characterizing anything. The latter is just the hypostatization of sheer absence of a positive property. Now the question posed is that if everything is always known by some cognition or other (and under some aspect or other) according to Nyāya can't this school be dubbed as idealistic although this may appear to be a diluted and slightly peculiar version of idealistic? The answer to this question calls for some classification of the distinction between different kinds of properties of things that Nyāya admits. Broadly speaking, there are five kinds of properties excluding qualities which are not usually treated as properties. The five kinds may be known as generic properties, specific properties, unique (specific) properties, accidental or ad hoc properties, and relational properties. To illustrate: substanceness is the generic property called *jāti* in Sanskrit—of all substances like earth, water, light, etc. Earthness, waterness, etc. are the specific (and also generic) properties of earth, water, etc. respectively. Likewise, potness, clothness, treeness, etc. are the respective specific properties of pot, cloth, tree, etc. More specific and individuating properties which differentiate a particular thing, say a certain specimen of pot from another such specimen are given the names 'This potness' (in Sanskrit *etadghatatva*) and 'That potness' (in Sanskrit *tadghatatva*) respectively. Spaceness, timeness, etc. are instances of unique properties because they characterize singular entities like space, time, etc. Generic and specific properties characterize more than one entity. Accidental or ad hoc properties accrue to things when they enter into some temporary or non-essential relation with each other. For example, a book placed on a table acquires the conjunctive property of 'being located on the table' because of its conjunctive relation with the table. No sooner the book is displaced its

conjunction with the table and the ad hoc property it has given rise to vanish. Such properties may be described even as relational. But the more interesting and important relational properties are the properties of knownness, or knowability, spatiality, temporality, etc. The relations which are at the basis of these properties exist and do not cease to exist so long as both their relatia exist. Only if one of the relatia goes out of existence, the relations disappear. All the things which are spatial and temporal are related by special relations (called '*Densaka*' and '*Kalika*' respectively in Sanskrit to space and time. If the spatio-temporally located things cease to exist, space and time would not cease to exist but the relation between the things and space and time would disappear. The relation of cognition to things is not ad hoc and it is bilateral unlike the spatio-temporal relation which, as described, is unilateral. There is no cognition without an object and no object without there being some or other cognition of it. Cognizedness or knownness is the property that accrues to an object because of its cognitive relation to a cognition. But despite the bilateralness and permanence of the cognitive relation the relational property of cognizedness cannot constitute the nature or being of any object. A pot, for example, is identified as a pot not because it is the object of this or that cognition but because it has a certain structure, certain qualities and serves certain purposes. The cognitive relation is irrelevant to what a thing is in itself. The being of the pot is constituted only by potness which therefore is regarded as the determinant of the structure, causality, etc. pertaining to the pot. It needs to be particularly noted in this connection that Nyāya has given a wide berth to what is called in western philosophy 'the internal relatia'. No relation, even including inherence, is an internal relation for Nyāya. Such a relation swallows up the appropriate identity of at least one of its relations. To some inherence called *Samavāya* in Sanskrit may appear to be the prototype of the internal relation. But this is not true. Inherence—to use the words of Bradley in this context—joins the inherents by keeping them apart.

If the cognitive object were treated as the internal content of its cognition by Nyāya then it could not avoid the idealistic challenge. But Nyāya does not hold such a view of the cognitive object which according to it is neither the content nor the form of its cognition but is an entity wholly external and yet related cognition by a relation which even outlasts it, for, an object is cognizable both when it exists and also when it has ceased to exist. The idealist Buddhists (namely, the Yogācāras) however attach great importance to this (invariable) togetherness of cognition and its objects. As Dharmakīrti says:

> the blue (an object) and its cognition are known to go always together and so they are non-different. It is only due to illusory cognition that they are viewed as different from each other as one

moon is seen as two by pressing the eyeball. It is almost a tautology that no object is cognized apart from its cognition (where 'capart' means 'unassociated'). But mere invariable association cannot be regarded as the sign of identity. Moreover, it is not the case that an object is associated with the same cognition at all times. Cognitions may come and go but the object remains the same. So, much more intimacy than this is the cognitive relation that is needed to make the object internal to cognition.

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Kant's Doctrine of Categories: An Attempt at Some Clarification

In this note, I wish to respond to Daya Krishna's note, 'Kant's Doctrine of the Categories: Some Problems' (*JICPR*, Volume XI, Number 3, May–August 1994, pp. 143–44), in which he raises some questions concerning Kant's doctrine of categories as found in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. In doing this, I will not deal with these questions directly, one by one. What I will do is to say a few things, according to my understanding of things, strictly keeping in view these questions. I hope that what I am going to say will help in answering these questions.

(1) Kant mentions twelve categories, which he classifies under four different heads, three under each head: unity, plurality and totality under quantity; reality, negation and limitation under quality; inherence and subsistence (*substantia et accidens*), causality and dependence (*cause and effect*) and community (reciprocity between agent and patient) under relation; and possibility–impossibility, existence–non-existence and necessity–contingency under modality. Now, I find that all these categories are exactly on a par with one another, in the sense that each one of them is one and not more than one, including those under relation and modality. But they are not on a par with one another, in the sense that they are different from one another under the same head or under different heads. They are different from one another under the same head, as, for example, there are the different categories of unity, plurality and totality under quantity. They are different from one another under different heads, as, for example, the categories under relation, as far as I can see, are relational categories, whereas those under any of the other three heads are not relational categories. Like a relational term in logic, as the terms husband and wife, a relational category may be defined as one which is composed of two terms which

are correlative to one another, and that means to say, which are definable only in terms of one another.

I have said above that even the categories under relation are, in each case, one and not more than one. This is now easily seen. I have said above that the categories under relation are relational categories, and I have also defined a relational category. Now, if the categories under relation are relational categories, and a relational category is as I have defined it to be, then it follows that the categories under relation, like relational terms, are, in each case, one and not more than one. These categories may be composed of two terms, as indeed they are, but since these two terms are correlative to, or definable only in terms of, one another, these categories, like relational terms, are, in each case, one and not more than one. Now, it only remains for me to show that the categories under relation, as far as I can see, are relational categories. And again, this is easily done as follows: (1) to say that something is a substance (in one sense) is the same thing as to say that it is the support of accidents; and to say that something is an accident is the same thing as to say that it is supported by a substance. (2) To say that something is a cause is the same thing as to say that it is the cause of an effect; and to say that something is an effect is the same thing as to say that it is the effect of a cause. (3) To say that something, say A, is an agent in reciprocity is the same thing as to say that something else, say B, is an agent in reciprocity with A; and to say that B is an agent in reciprocity is the same thing as to say that A is an agent in reciprocity with B. Here following Kant, we can also say that if A and B are agents in reciprocity with one another, then B is a patient in relation to, or is determined by, A, and A is a patient in relation to, or is determined by, B.

I have also said above that the categories under modality are just as well, in each case, one and not more than one. The first category is either the category of possibility or the category of impossibility; and not both. The second category is either the category of existence or the category of non-existence; and not both. The third category is either the category of necessity or the category of non-necessity/contingency; and not both. And all the three categories are either the categories of possibility, existence and necessity, or the categories of impossibility, non-existence and non-necessity/contingency. It is unthinkable that Kant would have put under one and the same category both possibility and impossibility; under one and the same category both existence and non-existence; and under one and the same category both necessity and non-necessity/contingency.

(2) Kant mentions twelve categories, which he classifies under four different heads. But, as far as I can see, he does not mention whether all the twelve of them, or some number less than that, have to be present in each and every synthesis of the manifold of pure intuitions. The question has been asked whether, according to Kant, all the twelve

categories have to be present in each and every synthesis of the manifold of pure intuitions, or only four of them, one category from each head. Now, as Kant himself does not seem to mention anything about it, we have to make up our own mind in this connection. Now, as regards the first alternative in the question asked: if it is the case, as it may be said to be, that all the three categories under any of the four heads (say, the categories of unity, plurality and totality under the head of quantity) are distinct from one another in such a way that all of them, or even two of them, cannot be present at the same time in the synthesis mentioned; that is to say, not more than one of them can be present at the same time in the synthesis mentioned; then, it follows that all the twelve categories cannot be present in each and every case of the synthesis mentioned, that not more than four of them can be present in each and every case of the synthesis mentioned, one category from each head.

Further, as regards the second alternative in the question asked above: if, as it appears, according to Kant, every synthesis of the manifold of pure intuitions would be subject to all the four heads of categories (thus, to take a concrete instance, the synthesis of all earthly things as being perishable is subject to the category of unity under the head of quantity, to the category of reality under the head of quality, to the category of substance and accident under the head of relation, and to the category of existence under the category of modality); and if, as we have already seen in the preceding paragraph, not more than four categories can be present in each and every case of the synthesis mentioned, one category from each head; then, it follows that exactly four categories, neither more nor less, would have to be present in each and every case of the synthesis mentioned, one category from each head.

(3) The question has been asked: what is the difference between the categories of reality and negation, which fall under the head of quality, and the categories of existence and non-existence, which fall under the head of modality? I think that the clue to answering this question could be looked for in Kant's table of judgments, upon which his table of categories is claimed to be based. On that basis, we could say the following: the categories of reality and negation, as falling under the head of quality, would in some way relate to the affirmation or denial of something of something, respectively. And the category of existence *or* the category of non-existence, as falling under the head of modality, would in some way relate to the relation of actuality (as distinguished from that of possibility or that of necessity) *or* non-actuality (as distinguished from that of impossibility or that of non-necessity/contingency) of something with another, respectively.

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'*ṛṇaṃ kṛtvā ghṛtaṃ pibet*'—Who Said This?

At the end of the first chapter of *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, Sāyaṇa-mādhava (fourteenth century) quotes a number of verses and ascribes them to Bṛhaspati. One of them runs as follows:

yāvaj jīvet sukhaṃ jīved ṛṇaṃ kṛtvā ghṛtam pibet/
bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ//[1]

'While life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee
even though he runs in debt;
When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?'
(E.B. Cowell's translation)

To many this has become the epitome of the Cārvāka philosophy which is thus reduced to hedonism par excellence—a doctrine that urges man to seek happiness at any cost and, at the same time, makes happiness a matter of sensuous gratification alone.

Where did Sāyaṇa-mādhava (abbreviated hereafter as SM) get this verse? No authority is cited in his work though some other verses or parts thereof can be traced back to earlier Purāṇas, plays and poems.[2] The authenticity of such passages is therefore doubtful. It is also probable that SM as well as his predecessors borrowed them from a common source—perhaps purely oral. That is why T.W. Rhys Davids suggested that SM's description of the Lokāyata 'is chiefly based on certain infidel doggerel verses which cannot possibly have formed a part of the Lokāyata studied by the Brahmins of old.'[3]

There are, however, reasons to believe that at least in case of the verse cited above, SM reproduced a distorted version of the original. Let us follow the successive alterations of this verse.

In the earlier part of the same chapter SM himself quotes what he calls a *loka-gāthā*:

yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīven nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ/
bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ //[4]

'While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it ever again return?'
(E.B. Cowell's translation)

The main difference between the two verses lies in the second hemistich (no reference is made to Bṛhaspati as author either). Now, this verse occurs first in the *Viṣṇudharmottara-mahāpurāṇa* (*VDMP*) almost

exactly in the same form as the last and first lines of two consecutive—verses with one variant–*śāntasya* in place of *dehasya*:

> *mugdhā evaṃ pratāryante dhūrtair dhana-jihīrṣayā /*
> *yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīven nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ //*
> *bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya punarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ /*
> *nāsti dattaṃ hutaṃ ceṣṭaṃ na deva ṛṣayo na ca //*[5]
>
> 'The cunning ones thus cheat the deluded men, prompted by the desire to take away (their) riches. As long as life remains, live happily; nothing is beyond death. From where can be any return for that which has been reduced to ashes and ceased to exist? There are no such things as given (in sacrifices), oblations, rites, nor gods nor sages.'

This (Upa-) Purāṇa, composed some time between AD 400 and AD 500,[6] seems to be the primary source from which all later authors have quoted or adapted the verse under discussion.

Kamalaśīla (eighth century) quoted one line—*bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya* etc.—in his *Pañjikā*[7] but it was Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (ninth century) who first quoted the two consecutive lines from VDMP as a verse-unit[8] and thus, we presume, became the immediate source of all subsequent authors. Abhayadeva Sūri (eleventh century) most probably refers to this very reading of the verse.[9] (We say 'most probably' because he quotes the first hemistich only. The editor of his work, we think rightly, refers to *Nyāya-mañjarī*).

Only in the twelfth century we find the first line rewritten by another Jaina scholar, Hemacandra, as:

> *yāvaj jīvet sukhaṃ jīvet tāvad vaiṣayikaiḥ sukhaiḥ*

and the second line altogether altered:

> *na tāmyed dharma-kāryāya dharmādharma-phalaṃ kva tat.*[10]
>
> 'So long as one lives, let him live happily with the pleasures of the senses. He should not trouble himself by religious actions. Where is the fruit of dharma and non-dharma?'
>
> (Helen M. Johnson's translation)

This is the first alteration made in the first line of the original verse.

In the fifteenth century, Guṇaratna, a co-religionist of Hemacandra cites the first line with a minor variation:

> *yāvaj jīvet sukhaṃ jīvet tāvad vaiṣayikaṃ sukham*
>
> 'As long as a man lives, let him live happily; so long are the pleasures of the senses.'

but in the second line he reverts to the original reading with one variation: *dehasya* for *śāntasya*.[11]

Śrīharṣa (twelfth century), on the other hand, preferred to rewrite the verse in the following way:

> *kaḥ śamaḥ kriyatāṃ prājñāḥ priyāprītau pariśramaḥ /*
> *bhasmībhūtasya bhūtasya punarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ //*[12]

> 'Ye arrant fools, of what use is quietude? Try to gratify your mistresses. Will a creature, once he is reduced to ashes, ever return?'
>
> (K.K. Handiqui's translation)

It is interesting to note that Mādhava-Sarasvatī (sixteenth century), in spite of SM and Guṇaratna and Śrīharṣa, goes back to the Purāṇic reading as quoted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa but replaces *śāntasya* with *dehasya*.[13]

On the basis of available evidence we may safely conclude that the verse in question was first distorted by the Jainas (who were very much anti-Lokāyata) and then by the Brāhmiṇical opponents of the Cārvāka. What was meant to be a simple denial of the concept of after-life was transformed into a preaching of heedless hedonism as well. SM got this verse from some unknown source or rewrote the second hemistich himself, apparently forgetting that he had quoted another version of the same only a few pages earlier.

Second, if *VDMP* is the source of this verse, it is also to be noted that this is *not* an authentic version coming from the Bārhaspatyas themselves. The story of Vena in *VDMP* is hostile to materialism and, even in its original form, the verse is imputed to the irreligious king by the author/s of the Purāṇa.

ABBREVIATIONS

NC *Naiṣadhīyacaritam*	*SMS* *Sarva-mata-saṃgraha*
PC *Prabodhacandrodaya*	*SSS* *Sarva-siddhānta-saṃgraha*
PP *Padmapurāṇa*	*VDMP* *Viṣṇudharmottara-mahāpurāṇa*
SDS *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*	*VP* *Viṣṇupurāṇa*
SM Sāyaṇa-mādhava	

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *SDS*, ch. I, p. 14, v. 7, ll. 125–26.
2. A few are cited below:
   (a) *tyajyaṃ sukhaṃ*, etc.—*SDS*, p. 4 ll. 39–42, *PC* 2.23, p. 42.
   (b) *agnihotram* etc.—*SDS*, p. 13, ll. 112–13, *PC* 2.26, p. 44. Also found with variant in *SMS*, p. 15 and *SSS*, II. 14cd–15ab, p. 6; *NC*, 17.39; Nīlakaṇṭha on *Mbh.* 218.2 (Vulgate text); *Granthibhaṅga*, I, p. 228; Sadānanda, *Advaita-brahma-siddhi* p. 100.

(c) *paśuścen nihata*, etc.—*SDS*, p.13, 11. 114–15, *VP*, 3.18.26; *PP*, Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa, 13.367.
(d) *mṛtānām api*, etc.—*SDS*, p. 13, 11. 116–17, *PC* 2.21, p. 40 (cf. *NC* 17.53).
(e) *gacchatam iha* etc.—*SDS* p. 13 11. 118–19, *VP*, 3.18.27; *PP*, Sṛṣṭi, 13.368.
(f) *trayo vedasya* etc.—*SDS*, p. 14, 11. 128–29; also quoted in *SMS*, p. 15; Śrīdhara and Viśvanātha ad *Gītā*, 16.8 (first line only, with variants).

3. *Dialogues*, p. 172. By 'doggerel verses' Rhys Davids apparently refers to the *ābhāṇakas* and *lokagāthā-s* quoted Profusely by SM. The first word has been taken to mean 'a saying, proverb' (Monier-Williams, p. 145, col. 2) and the second 'a verse or song (handed down orally) among men' (ibid., p. 906, col. 2) which is how Böhtlingk-Roth rendered it'. ('*Ein im munds des volkes lebender Vers*', vol. 6, p. 582). Interestingly enough, none of these words seems to have been found elsewhere other than in *SDS*. There is no entry of *ābhāṇaka* in Böhtlingk-Roth, nor in Schmidt. None of these two words is recorded in *Śabdakalpadruma* either.
4. *SDS*, p. 2, 11. 17–18.
5. *VDMP*, I.108. 18–19, p. 70a (Translation mine).
6. *Studies*, Vol. I, p. 143.
7. Baroda ed., p. 14; Varanasi ed., p. 17. Trans., p. 21. Neither of the editors could locate this quotation.
8. *Āhnika* 7. ed. G. Sastri, part 2, p. 257; the Mysore edition has *dehasya* for *śāntasya* (which along with *jīvet* for *jīvam* is noted as a variant reading in the footnote. See Part 2, p. 348). Jayanta did not refer to any source. He simply stated, 'As they say' / 'As the saying goes' (*yathāha*). The learned editors of this work have not been able to trace this quotation.
9. *Tattva-vodha-vidhāyinī*, p. 505 n6. Jayanta too, in his work, once refers to the verse by quoting the first hemistich only (*Āhnika* 4. edited by G. Sastri, Part 1, p. 388: *nanu ca yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīved iti tatropadiśyate* ...)
10. *Triṣaṣṭi-śalākā-puruṣa-carita*, I, 345, p. 12.
11. *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā*, p. 202.
12. *Naiṣadhīya-caritam*, 17.69, p. 646.
13. *Sarva-darśana-kaumudī*, p. 108.

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Postscript

Somadeva Sūri (tenth century) in his *Yaśastilaka Campū* quoted this verse as it occurs in *VDMP* with a variant only in the first hemistich:

> *yāvaj jīvet sukhaṃ jīven nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ /bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya punarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ* (edited by M.M. Pandit Sivadatta and K.P. Parab, Nirnaysagar Press, Bombay, Part II, 1903, p. 253).

RAMKRISHNA BHATTACHARYA

Historiography of Civilizations: A Review

The June 1996 issue of *JICPR* was devoted to the Historiography of Civilizations. Of the 11 articles published five can be classified as contributions to various aspects of historiography from the purely philosophical point of view, the other six are contributions to a debate which has been going on for more than a century, namely, the absence of any Indian records as source material for the writing of ancient

Indian history. To the first category belong V. Shekhawat, Michael Krauz, G.P. Ramachandra, R. Sundara Rajan and Daya Krishna. The rest are related to polemical questions. These latter affect the overall character of the volume for which it will probably be remembered.

The Indian intellectual unfortunately has not been able to forgive the West for inventing everything from paper and printing (perhaps one should not forget the reading glasses either) to aeroplanes and computers. It is no comfort to be reminded that the Chinese invented gun-powder, paper and printing centuries before Europe.

The argument about historiography is a part of this wider debate. Admittedly the art of history writing was not confined to the ancient Greeks and Romans. The Hebrews, the Chinese and in the later period the Arabs also practised it. The European claim to uniqueness is thereby refuted. But how does that help to restore the hurt ego of our patriotic scholars?

The redoubtable D.P. Chattopadhyaya opens his defence by rejecting the definition of history as 'the reconstruction of human ideas and activities based on reliable records' (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*). Instead he makes out a case for including *Itihās* (legends of gods), and *Purāṇas* (legends of origins) in history.

G.C. Pande exposes the ethno-centrism of numerous western historians in an impassioned manner and then launches into an anti-rationalist, anti-scientific attack on the West. Quibbling about 'science' and 'progress' is a theme familiar to readers of the apologists of religion and Indian culture.

Michael Krauz rejects singularism or 'a single right interpretation of history'. Instead he favours multiplism. This argument is part of a wider question of the relativism of culture. Among the views of history that he rejects is that of the English philosopher R.G. Collingwood.

While Krauz addresses himself to deeper metaphysical issues related to culture, G.P. Ramachandra focuses on Collingwood's *Idea of History* (1945). He questions the definition of history as a re-enactment of the past in the historian's own mind. All history, according to Collingwood, is the history of thought. It is the thought of his forebears that the historian has to reconstruct. Ramachandra's scholastic (or shall we say pedantic?) doubts about whether 'realizations, imagined words and pictures' are 'thoughts' would please the professional philosophers. Sophistry after all is not a new weakness in logicians. He invokes the authority of Wittgenstein and others to make his point. For a reader interested in history it is relevant to remember that Collingwood was one of the rare philosophers who succeeded in writing two authoritative works of history on Roman Britain (David Hume in the eighteenth century was a worthy predecessor). Philosophers of the school of Wittgenstein school have yet to demonstrate their ability to practise history writing.

Suresh Chandra's article opens with the assertion that 'the data for reconstructing our past (has been) plundered by the West'. He then claims to have recovered the plunder. After such an unpromising start the author proceeds to make a number of unwarranted assertions. When he does not denounce he offers conjectures like the one that the Harappans travelled to Sumer, were pushed westwards by the Dravidians and finally established the kingdom of Elam. The only evidence for the penetration of ancient Indians into the Middle East is that the names of a few Zoroastrian deities are cognate with the names of some Hindu deities. The standard explanation of the common origin of Indo-Germanic languages is apparently not good enough for him. The rest of his assertions, like the horse being a native of India, are equally unverifiable. We may excuse his lapses of syntax but not his unscholarly temper.

Nisha Rathore seeks to refute Ranajit Guha (and like-minded historians such as Sumit Sarkar and Gyan Pande), both on the theoretical plane and the evidential. Guha's thesis is that the subalterns and the elites moved in two parallel lines without ever converging. Rathore's theoretical objection is that Guha's approach to historiography is axiomatic, not empirical. The evidential refutation lies in uprisings like the one at Champaran when the peasants and the elites united to remove the European planters. Thus the subaltern struggle against the landlords and the elite struggle against foreign domination converged. In fact, however, there are only a handful of such examples. In theory it is true the Congress party was pledged to abolish *zamindari*. To that extent there was no incompatibility between the two struggles. Historically also the princes and landlords supported the British against the nationalist movement.

The most challenging article is this volume is by Vinay Lal. He raises most of the questions raised by the apologists (more appropriately the inventors) of Indian historiography. To the present reviewer it was a disappointment that many famous names from R.C. Majumdar to Romila Thapar are among them. Lal refuses to accept the view that all ancient records except the *Rājātarangini* have perished, or that the *Purāṇas* and the genealogies of gods and kings should be counted as history. He is the only contributor who has the courage to state that the past of India cannot be read from historical records.

When it comes to defining history his position is not unassailable. He holds that history consists in the understanding of causation or the causal explanation of human behaviour as opposed to moral or supernatural explanation. While many reputable historians assume the causal or deterministic view of history (reinforced by the Marxists), this faith is by no means universal. Many historians seem to hold the view that H.A.L. Fisher stated in the Preface to his *History of Europe* (1936):

> There can be no generalizations, only one safe rule for the historian:

> that he should recognize in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen.[1]

Incidentally Tolstoy, not a historian by profession, expounded his philosophy of history in the Epilogue to *War and Peace*, which is relevant to this argument. He was convinced among other things of 'the complete unattainability of causes.'

V. Shekhawat is far more eloquent on the topic of causation. 'General history ought to explain why, when and how social consciousness of men emerged'. This is too extravagant a demand to require any serious consideration. Even a team of experts drawn from a variety of disciplines would not be able answer to these questions.[2]

But to return to Lal's article. After a foray into the dubious quest of causality, Lal asks a more fundamental question: why should the absence of historical works have struck James Mill and other Englishmen as a singularly important fact? The Indian explanation of this mission was varied. The most valuable part of Lal's article (which accounts for the title 'History and the Possibilities of Emancipation') is an examination of Bankim Chandra's works. The argument is too complicated to reproduce in detail.

Lal's own response is summed up in a paradox; 'the non-writing of history (is) a way of writing history'. This is followed by a number of statements which lean on post-modernism. For example he asserts that history is another mythography. This is close to R. Sundara Rajan's observation in another article that there is a kind of fictive quality in historical experience.[3] Another quotable paradox is: 'History itself had to be unlearned'. This is Lal's version of Gandhi's wisdom. He also ascribes to Gandhi the view that history is no guide to action in the present. It is doubtful if Gandhi ever made such statements. After all he was not competing with Shaw or Chesterton in spinning out quotable epigrams. What is objectionable in Lal and other post-modernists in India (the best known is Ashis Nandy) is that for want of a native authority whom they can invoke they have invented the dogma of Gandhi's infallibility.

Dryden, the English poet and critic of the seventeenth century observed: 'It is not enough that Aristotle has said so'. We are in danger of jumping from the dogmatism of Manu to that of Gandhi. Another contributor to this volume Nisha Rathore seems to assume that having invoked the authority of Gandhi, she has settled the argument. An even greater danger is that opinions alien to Gandhi are foisted on him by writers who wish to silence all objections to their views. For example, Lal asserts that Gandhi 'set up the untouchable and lower castes *against* [sic] the higher'. In other words, he was possessed by the same spirit as Ambedkar.[4]

Daya Krishna's article, unlike most other articles, does not seek to refute any recent publication. Nor does it refer to any contemporary

issue. He seeks to establish that there is no evidence of a widespread influence of Vedanta in the first millennium AD. Badarayana in his *Brahmasūtras* (AD 50) composed a coherent, unified exposition of Vedānta. This great work remained unnoticed until the appearance of Saṁkara [sic], that is in the eighth century AD. Even after Saṁkara the quantity and quality of Buddhist and Jain thinkers far exceeded that of the Vedāntins. Only after the disappearance of Buddhism in east India with the destruction of Nālānda did Vedānta revive. Daya Krishna's original findings are based on Potter's new bibliography. His findings cannot be ascribed to any preconception or bias.

Sri Krishna, like many of the contributors discussed above attacks the Enlightenment philosophy of the eighteenth century and the nineteenth century idea of progress. These are the favourite targets of post-modernism. The author rejects the version of history as unilinear progress. Typically, progress is conceived as technocratic in its character and presumed to go hand in hand with the hegemony of European culture and civilization. The reviewer may be permitted to ask such baiters of the West if technocratic progress is possible without a theoretical breakthrough which alters fundamental assumptions about nature and life:

> When Galileo invented the notion of temperature and designed the first thermometer, he knew very well what he was doing. He saw that to produce a thermometer would not just be to find a way of measuring something which we had been able to estimate only roughly: rather, it would be to alter the whole status of our thermal notions.[5]

Sri Krishna holds that the unilinear concept of progress is shared by influential thinkers from Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) to W.G. Hardy, a contemporary classical scholar. In his sweep the author includes such diverse writers as M.I. Finlay, another scholar of Greek, Gordon Childe the archaeologist, and H.G. Wells, the popular historian. The irony of such arguments is that Sri Krishna, like Edward Said and other detractors of the West, uses the authority of western thinkers to challenge the superiority of the western achievements in science and technology. In this case the authorities quoted are Levi-Strauss and Foucault.

Sri Krishna's conclusion is somewhat tame. He presents the cyclic view of time as an alternative to the unilinear. For this he seeks the support of Toynbee and A.L. Kroeber. Such a conclusion will disappoint a reader looking for a boost to the pride of an Asian, an African or even a Latin American.

I have concluded with this article because it is characteristic of the volume whose overall tenor is reactionary in the non-pejorative sense, that is, one that attempts to revert to the past.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. According to Bertand Russell even in science the traditional notion of cause is inadequate. 'At an early stage of a science this point of view is useful. . . But it has no philosophical validity. . .' See *An Outline of Philosophy*, London, 1941, p. 150.
2. Unfortunately Mr Shekhawat's Sanskrit terminology makes the main argument incomprehensible to the present reviewer.
3. In fairness to Sundara Rajan I have refrained from examining her thesis owing to my lack of familiarity with phenomenology and hermeneutics.
4. According to Aijaz Ahmad, Gandhi 'fumed against the railways as carriers of communicable diseases and for violating caste purities' in *Hindswaraj* (1909). See *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures?* Oxford, Bombay, 1992, p. 268.
5. Stephen Toulmin, *The Philosophy of Science*, Arrow Books, London, p. 130.

Jaipur R.K. KAUL

Notes and Queries

[The query was published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XII, No. 3, on p. 153, under the title 'What Exactly is Meant When We Talk of Different Types of Philosophical Texts in the Indian Tradition?'. It appears to have been discussed in Benaras and Dr Ambika Datta Sharma has sent the following as it might help in throwing some light on the differences that we had asked for.—Editor]

In the first 22 slokas of *Parāśarōpapurāṇaṃ*, chap. 18, Sri Parāśara said:

Now I will state in brief the essence of a *Śāstra* which is worthy of being known specially by those highly intelligent people who desire *mōkṣa*. 1

अथ शास्त्रार्थसंक्षेपं प्रवक्ष्यामि समासतः ।
मुमुक्षुभिर्महाप्राज्ञैर्वेदितव्यो विशेषतः ।। १ ।।

Learned ones have given the meaning of the word *śāstra* in two ways: (i) regulative, as being a source of regulation; (ii) *śaṁsanam*, as providing description. 2

शासनाच्छंसनाच्चैव शास्त्रमित्युच्यते बुधैः ।
शासनं द्विविधं प्रोक्तं शास्त्रलक्षणवेदिभिः ।। २ ।।

Regulation is of two kinds: (i) prescriptive, and (ii) prohibitive. Similarly *śaṁsanam*, has some positive thing for an object and is not concerned with action or activity. 3

तत्रैकं विधिरूपेण तदन्यत् प्रतिषेधतः ।
शंसनं भूतवस्त्वेकविषयं न क्रियापरम् ।। ३ ।।

It is the one who does not know, rather than the one who knows or the *ātma* or body, who is eligible to know the prescriptive *śāstra*, prohibitive *śāstra* and the *śāstra* which has for its object some positive thing. Being backed by or based in *cāturvarṇya*, being in an *āśrama*-state, having attained a certain age and similarly qualified by other conditions one has a *śāstra* which is specific to some specific need. However, a noble person or a good person is motivated into a *śāstra* by virtue of one's nature. Such a one cannot be prevented from following an enquiry. He is free from impositions such as *varṇa*, *āśrama*, age, state, etc. 4–7.

विधिरूपस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रतिषेधात्मकस्य च ।
केवलं भूतवस्त्वेकविषयस्य तथैव च ।। ४ ।।
अज्ञोऽधिकारी न प्राज्ञो नैवात्मा नैव विग्रहः ।
चातुर्वर्ण्यं समालंब्य कञ्चिदाश्रममास्तिक ।। ५ ।।
वयोविशेषमालंब्य तथावस्थान्तरं परम् ।
विशेषालम्बनं शास्त्रं विशेषे सति सत्तम ।। ६ ।।

प्रवर्तते स्वभावेन तस्यास्ति न निवर्तकम् ।
वर्णाश्रमवयोऽवस्थाविशेषाध्यासवर्जितः ।। ७ ।।

One who knows Brahma would not cast even a side-glance over a *śāstra.* Such a one is not motivated by virtue of having a body alone. 8

ब्रह्मवित् सकलं शास्त्रं कटाक्षेणापि नेक्षते ।
देहावलम्बनेनैव केवलं न प्रवर्तते ।। ८ ।।

Śāstra is destroyed (may cease to exist), body remains in this world, but the fruit lies elsewhere. O! Muni! there can be no *śāstra* having for its subject only *ātma.* 9

शास्त्रं नश्यति देहोऽत्र फलमन्यत्र हीरितम् ।
केवलात्मानमालंव्य सुने शास्त्रं न किञ्चिन ।। ९ ।।

The ignorant one (*ātma*) as other than the body, is motivated because of illusion—illusion generated by *saṁsāra,* and is eligible to know *śāstra.* Because of attachment, bondage and freedom are thought to lie in *ātma.* Initially, O! Muni! *śāstra* appears to have many dimensions and multifacets, but it turns out to be one-dimensional when rationally determined. On the command of *Śiva* alone (we) construct the logical rules determining *śāstra.* 10–11

प्रवर्तते ततो देहादन्योऽज्ञो भ्रान्तिमाश्रितः ।
आत्मा शास्त्राधिकारी स्यात् स हि संसारविभ्रमात् ।। १० ।।
तस्मिन्नात्मनि मोहेन बन्धमोक्षौ प्रकल्पितौ ।
शास्त्रमापाततो भाति मुने बहुमुखं नृणाम ।। ११ ।।

Having fewer letters, being beyond doubt, pregnant with meaning, expressing everything, free from *stōbha* and free from defect, those adept in *sūtras,* call (such an expression) *sūtra.* Where the meaning of a *sūtra* is described by the sentences and the related terms which are in consonance with the *sūtra,* we have *bhāsya.* 12–15

निरूपिते तु न्यायेन विभात्येकमुखं पुनः ।
शास्त्रनिर्णायकं न्यायकलापं मुनिसत्तम ।। १२ ।।
सूत्ररूपेण कुर्वन्ति शिवस्यैवाज्ञयैव तु।
अल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवद् विश्वतो मुखम् ।। १३ ।।
अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ।
मुनयश्च मनुष्याश्च प्रसादादेव शूलिनः ।। १४ ।।
सूत्रार्थं भाष्यरूपेण यथावद् दर्शयन्ति च ।
सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते यत्र वाक्यैः सूत्रानुकारिभिः ।। १५ ।।

Muni and men with the blessings of *Śiva* explain properly the meaning

of *sūtras* in terms of a *bhāṣya*. With the blessings of Rudra-Pārvatī and with the strength of their *tapa*, some people elucidate *bhāṣya*. Separating the words, stating the meanings of terms, breaking *samāsas*, etc., ordering sentences and resolving the objections—these are five characteristics of elucidation. 16–17

स्वपदानि च वर्ण्यन्ते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ।
प्रसादादेव रुद्रस्य भवानीसहितस्य तु ।। १६ ।।
कुर्वन्ति केचिद् व्याख्यानं भाष्यस्यैव तपोबलात् ।
पदच्छेदः पदार्थोक्तिर्विग्रहो वाक्ययोजना ।। १७ ।।

Some ancestors, with the blessings of Rūdra, with already attained strength of their *tapa* describe the meaning of *bhāṣya* in the form of a *vārtika*. *Vārtika* is that in which are considered what is stated, unstated and wrongly stated. Some people expound the meaning of a *bhāṣya* in brief or in an elaborate way in a *prakaraṇa* according to their own intelligence. Those who are conversant with the divisions of *śāstra*, call *prakaraṇa* that which deals with some part of a *śāstra*. 18–21

आक्षेपस्य समाधानं व्याख्यानं पञ्चलक्षणम् ।
केचिद् वार्तिकरूपेण भाष्यार्थं कथयन्ति च ।। १८ ।।
उक्तानुक्तदुरुक्तानां चिन्ता यत्र प्रवर्तते ।। १९ ।।
तं ग्रन्थं वार्तिकं प्राहुः वार्तिकज्ञा मनीषिणः ।
स्वबुद्ध्यधीनं भाष्यार्थं सङ्ग्रहेणैव चाथवा ।। २० ।।
विस्तरेण प्रकुर्वन्ति केचित् प्रकरणात्मना ।
शास्त्रैकदेशसम्बद्धं शास्त्रकार्यान्तरे स्थितम् ।। २१ ।।

With additions like *sūtra*, *bhāṣya*, etc., a *śāstra* provides direct access to knowledge. 22

आहुः प्रकरणं नाम शास्त्रभेदविचक्षणाः ।
सूत्रभाष्यादिभिः शास्त्र साक्षाद् वेदनसाधनम् ।। २२ ।।

Benaras AMBIKA DATTA SHARMA

Review Article

Research Monographs on the History of Science*

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The four research monographs on history of sciences in India are the result of about three years' effort by a group of thinkers in India who have been feeling the urgent need of presenting detailed historical study of Indian cognitive enterprise in particular and of culture in general. The monographs are presumably preliminary explorations in the area which will be followed by about a dozen volumes on the subject. Indeed the absence of any detailed historical study of Indian cognitive enterprise and culture has been long felt by scholars all over the world and the attempts made by the editors of the volumes is beyond doubt commendable, particularly if one remembers that it requires not only the assimilation of archaeological data available so far but also knowledge of *Samskrita, Māgadhi, Pāli* and several regional languages including Arabic and Persian. The alternative use of concepts such as 'historical perspective', 'heritage' and 'tradition' with equal facility in the titles of monographs suggests that the editors have no specific commitment to any definitive cultural perspective but are rather anxious to achieve largest consensus on executing the project.

Now, these monographs are not authored by single individuals but contain collections of articles by authors from diverse disciplines, —history, philosophy, natural sciences, mathematics, etc. which thus makes the collection somewhat amorphous so that each article has to be read as an autonomous contribution and the connections and links with the articles in the volume have to be traced by the readers themselves. The task becomes somewhat difficult since the editors have not presented any introductory remarks in the beginning indicating possible linkages. Yet, since the monographs are merely exploratory exercises in the possibility of construction of a systematic and coherent history of 'Indian Philosophy, Science and Culture', this lacuna may for the moment be overlooked as also the articles cover a timespan of over five millennia.

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*D.P. Chattopadhyaya and Ravinder Kumar (eds.), PHISPC Monograph Series on History of Philosophy, Science and Culture in India, New Delhi, 1995: *Science, Philosophy and Culture in Historical Perspective*, pp. 185; *Some Aspects of India's Philosophical and Scientific Heritage*, pp. 117; *Mathematics, Astronomy and Biology in Indian Tradition*, pp. 127; *Language, Logic and Science in India*, Rs. 90.

Many articles in these volumes are, I think, quite impressive such as those by S.R. Rao, C.K. Raju, S.N. Sen and B.M. Udgaonkar but the articles by the editors themselves are of particular significance since these present definite historiographical perspective and indicate about the things to come in future volumes. History is generally considered a reconstruction of the past as well as prediction of the future and since the present enterprise has to deal with a phenomenon of exceptionally long life span, there is every danger of mixing up the past and distorting the temporal order of unfolding of events if ever we disregard the chronological details to some degree. We can avoid this problem of mixing up the past if and only if we strictly adhere to a mature *causalist* conception of reconstruction rather than lapsing into the primitive *narrativist* conception, for history as science has already come out of its infantile descriptivist mode into the well grown-up explanatory mode like it happens in every *science*. Therefore, unless the historical *reconstruction* is such that the later events are shown to naturally unfold from the preceding ones displaying a causal link, it may prove to be rather imaginative and dubious than close to actual. We should keep in mind that historical causation is in many respects different from causation in natural sciences where also a distinction is often made between causation in the science of life and that of lifeless.

The editors are quite aware of different historiographical perspectives that have emerged in the West in the last few decades. Thus, D.P. Chattopadhyaya (DPC) in his 'On the Nature of Interconnection between Science, Technology, Philosophy and Culture' dwells in detail on the two possible conceptions of directionality of historical movement allowing the possibility of superposition of the two in historical construction so as to make it more comprehensive. 'If the underlying idea of Diagram III (p. 22) strongly commends itself to us, it is mainly because of its organic or coherent nature imparting clarity to the understanding of interrelationship between different branches of knowledge and skill (p. 22, Vol. I)'. Further, according to DPC, the spiritual and material pursuits, the cognitive and the affective or the theoretical and practical endeavours of man are an 'interwoven fabric' and that 'their specialization, differentiation or compartmentalization is mainly due to theoretical needs for specialization (p. 1, Vol. I)'. Regarding the historical enterprise, DPC holds that 'Both levelwise and scope-wise history may be of different types' and that 'The text of history is not like a thing-in-itself. It always bears the imprints of human interpretation and its cultural context (p. 3, Vol. I)'. Ravinder Kumar (RK) in his 'Reflections on the Proposal: A History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization' has attempted to underline the urgent need of undertaking such project in our 'quest for modernity' so as to 'reach out to a novel discourse which deepens our comprehension of our historical heritage, at the same time as it provides

those means for social reconstruction and cultural transformation which we have been seeking in our recent history (p. 150, Vol. I)'. Recapitulating other similar attempts made in the past pertaining to other cultures, he considers the present task as an 'attempt to delineate the trajectory of scientific and humanist culture in our own civilization at the same time as we seek to highlight its conceptual autonomy from *and* relative interaction with western paradigms in the twentieth century (1957, Vol. I)'. The *historical* mode of philosophical discourse which will presumably be undertaken in the project can be carefully *chosen* 'for it is theoretically possible to construct an infinite number of pasts of a society, the particular past which is invoked and successfully claims the attention of the community to which it is related, reflected, reflects a choice in praxis and influences the future of a society. Paradoxically, therefore, a discipline like history, which ostensibly deals with the past, is in reality the most 'futuristic of all the human sciences (p. 161, Vol. I)'. Further, 'the two notions of linear and scaled temporality on the one hand, and the causal mechanisms which underpin the social process on the other, constitute the basic pillars of historical thought as one of the seminal constituents of modernity. These two notions are conspicuous by their absence within the Indian tradition (p. 160, Vol. I)'. Thus 'Beyond highlighting the need to transcend *all* existing notions of temporality and the fragmentation of knowledge we need to devise a strategy of locating and of organizing knowledge which will facilitate such transcendence. It is possible to break up the diverse themes with which we are concerned into well defined temporal phases . . . (so as to) facilitate that integrality of the knowledge—scientific and humanistic —which we propose to locate in our discourse. It may also help us conceptualize ambiguous temporality as the most desirable notion of time (pp. 165–66, Vol. I)'.

This would make it clear that there is close similarity of perspectives of both DPC and RK. Thus, whether 'cultural context' is stressed or it is 'conceptual autonomy', or, whether 'interwoven fabric' is stressed or it is 'integrality of knowledge', both seem to conceptualize the present exercise as a search for historical identity of a culture/civilization whose lifespan is over five millennia of time. Yet it seems, at least to me, that the conceptions of 'science' and 'philosophy' of both the authors are themselves heavily clouded by Greco-European ethos which thus distorts the vision of historical reality which they are seeking to probe microscopically. It is for this reason that they are trying to locate, specifically DPC, 'disciplines' or 'specializations' which have never been there, at least before the beginning of nineteenth century, or, fail to locate that which has been there at least from 600 bCE or so onwards. Before I attempt to analyze the reasons for why this is happening, it would be prudent to indicate that there has been a science of philosophy (*darśana śāstra*) and a *science* of fine arts (*nāṭya śāstra*) which it would be

difficult to comprehend in Greco-European phraseology and that there has been a *science* of *samādhi* (*samādhi śāstra*) and a science of time (*kāla śāstra*) which are entirely missing in the entire history of human culture save China. On the other hand, it is impossible to find at least any well-defined science of mechanics or of formal logic, which are novel creations of Greco-European culture/civilization alone, in the entire human history, and which, along with the characteristic technology flowing from these, thus characterize it in a sense. If we thus try to search for these sciences in the historical reality under consideration, we are bound to be disappointed and yet, in spite of overwhelming successes of these two sciences contemporaneously, we need not lament at their absence, or, for that matter, rate the historical reality at a lower scale of creativity. Ancient Indians, including Baudhas and Jainas, conceived of *science* as discovery and rational systematization of *underlying* order or regularity of the world-experienced-as-such,—whether it allows us any control over it or not, and such discovery and systematization was sought for attuning humans to cosmic harmony or regularity (*dharma*)* which was thought to be the only *proper way* of living or *bhoga*. It is again noticeable that Indian thinkers were intensely preoccupied, during the great Period of Debates beginning around 1000 bCE, with three distinct issues *simultaneously*, namely the nature of *vāk* or *śabda*, causes and purposes of the cosmos, and foundations of moral-legal conduct of man. Such intense preoccupation with the foundations and nature of language in particular for several centuries is, again, characteristic of Indian culture alone which it is hard to find in other cultures that have arisen and disappeared or continue in human history. It will not be out of context to remark here that time is conceived by Indian seer-thinkers as conscious source (*kālātmā*) only a small part of which manifests as cosmos *gradually* eroding *(kalana)* itself only to return to itself and manifest again. Repetitiveness or 'periodicity' is inevitable in such conceptions but since the dimensions are of cosmic magnitude (one period equals 2000 *mahāyugas*, mahāyuga = 43,20,000 solar years), these are not incompatible with linear conceptions over smaller magnitudes since a small segment of a very large circle is more or less a straight line. Also, the temporal scale is provided in terms of erosion of manifest *dharma*** which, again is quite alien to contemporary notions of material or intellectual progress/regress. (Reference: *Surya Siddhanta*) Moreover, the social process has been conceived as aggregation of individual causal mechanisms each unfolding his own particular causal trajectory of *karmaphala* as actor and pursuer of diverse goals. (Reference: *Manu Smṛti*).

A very important feature of the historical reality under consideration

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*Cosmic harmony is conceived to be largely stable (*vyavasthā*) except during surging-forth and merging-back (*uday/pralay*).

** The term here means the *extent* of human attunement with cosmic harmony.

seems to have been missed by both DPC and RK: when cultures/civilizations start declining after a high rise of creativity and flourishing, they generally disappear gradually but this seems not to have happened with Indian culture, which *prima facie* seems to have started registering a decline around 700–800 aCE but overcame 'death' in the creative engagements of *tantra* which, though rejected systematization and ratiocination, made impressive inquiries and analyses in a novel way not made earlier within the cultural fold.

Now, turning to the Greco-European conceptual ethos heavily colouring the vision of the editors and thus distorting *their* conceptions of conceptual autonomy or cultural context, or, 'modernity' for that matter, we may first notice that the example taken by RK of Joseph Needham studying Chinese culture is misleading in a fundamental sense. Joseph Needham, being brought up and cultivated in a culture/civilization foreign to Chinese was not studying Chinese culture/civilization from *within* as a 'native'. Rather, he *translated* the native conceptions and formulations in a foreign framework and thus it is difficult to say to what degree he succeeded in projecting the conceptual autonomy of the native framework. (Only a 'native' historian of Chinese culture/civilization can be competent to judge this,—particularly, Needham's claim that Chinese culture maintained its autonomy in spite of deep interaction with the Baudha trend of Indian culture). Neither had Needham's culture/civilization *interacted* in any appreciable way with that of Chinese so that he was wholly an outsider to the native framework. Such is, however, not the situation with us. Indian culture/civilization has appreciably interacted with Greco-European culture/civilization during the last three centuries and our formulations tend not to be *wholly* native. Yet, we are studying *our** culture/civilization from *within* and in which we have been brought up and cultivated and this makes the situation radically different from that of Needham. Thus, the fundamental question is: Ought we to translate native conceptions and formulations into quasi-native conceptions and formulations or ought we to save the former as far as possible? It seems to me that honest projection of native conceptual autonomy will fail if we do not stick to the latter strategy resulting only in a caricature of historical construction and thus enmeshing ourselves in pervert comprehension of our historical heritage staking social reconstructions and cultural transformations themselves in the future. In this regard, our fundamental limitation is that we cannot affect the discourse itself in any native language for various reasons. This limitation can be somewhat overcome by preserving most significant native terms in brackets so that if retranslation is sought to be affected in future in any native language, it is easily

*Any aspiration of transcending *specific* cultural context can be fulfilled only by construction of *general* history of diverse cultures of the world as presented by the native histories of these cultures.

facilitated. A more serious limitation, however, is that whereas we have had a rather heavy doze of Greco-European conceptions and formulations in our education and intellectual training so that our thought processes themselves are heavily constrained by these, there has been a proportionate lack of familiarity with and study of native conceptions and formulations partly due to lack of their accessibility and due partly to educational policy itself. Those few of us who have tried to surmount this limitation understand how intense the personal effort is required for it in respect of familiarity of language, conceptualizations, visions and research programmes, undertaken in the remote and not so remote past!

Add to these a more fundamental limitation which we have *inherited* by force of time itself, namely the oversimplified (mis)interpretations of most of the original *sūtras* of texts by *āchāryas* and *śāstrīs*, the original *bhāṣyas* being lost. Most of us are by now familiar with the great work of Brahmadatta Jijnasu on Panini Vyakarana who held that the present method of teaching/studying Panini's *sūtras* was utterly defective and discovered, over several years of effort under serious handicaps, meanings and implications (*vyākhyā*) of the *sūtras* discovering thereby the original method (*ārṣa vidhi*) of studying/teaching Panini Vyakarana. By this method he claimed to develop the competence of reading and speaking *sanskrita* language within forty days without blind memorizing and organized regular camps in Banaras which are now held by his students there. The sort of achievement that Jijnasu made is not easy to make unless a wide familiarity with diverse works is attained and unless one attempts to enter the deeper ethos of the thoughts and issues and projects of ancient times.

Presuming that the editors have a thorough appreciation of most of our limitations, it is expected that some attempts will be made by them and encouragement given to others to overcome these as far as is possible, thus achieving conceptual autonomy or highlighting cultural context in a more thorough sense of the terms. The two of them represent a happy blend of philosophical insight and historical traversal-in-time and, I suggest, to make the most out of this blend, can work out a strategy for training the participants of the project such that the limitations may be negotiated somewhat,—to whatever degree possible. The concern for conceptual autonomy or cultural specificity is, I think, of fundamental significance in the present age where, not cultural coexistence, but cultural dominance seems to be the prevalent trend, or, at least, is likely to be so in the future.

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Several other articles in the volumes deserve detailed appraisal but the constraints of space and time do not permit it. Articles by S.R. Rao:

'Scientific Tradition in India 3400–1500 BC'; S.N. Sen: 'History of Science in Relation to Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization'; B.M. Udgaonkar: 'Scientific Culture and Ideological Influences on History of Science in India'; Kireet Joshi: 'Significance of Veda in the Context of Indian Religion and Spirituality'; C.K. Raju: 'Time in Indian and Western Traditions and Time in Physics'; and P.K. Mukhopadhyay: 'History of Science and Two Metamorphoses of Mind', touch upon various issues and themes crucial to the project. Thus, S.R. Rao (Vol. I) has accumulated impressive data to establish, more or less conclusively, a fairly high level of achievements in science of 'chemistry', 'metallurgy', 'architecture', etc., in Indus, Harappan and Lothal civilizations. He has also presented the evolution in deciphering of the Indus script and holds that the proto-language is close to that of Rka Vedasamhita and Zend. Further, he adduces evidences in favour of prevalence of yoga so that these civilizations were essentially 'Aryan' from which evolved the subsequent culture/civilization on Indian land mass as known today. This theory seems to be the only sensible one in spite of the fact that any horse-image generally associated with 'Aryans' or human-image bearing 'Aryan' features have not been found in archaeological excavations. The *absence* of evidence may sometimes falsify a theory but *positive* facts ought generally be preferred to absences. There is also a general problem, with construction of pre-history and proto-history, of the extent of speculative hypotheses these permit. S.N. Sen allows a distinction between Indus civilization and Vedic civilization drawing heavily from Greco-European studies/investigations of these civilizations and also the conceptions and formulations as was fashionable in his times. Being one of the foremost scholars of history of Indian sciences, he has by and large taken for granted the 'received' conception of science and has sought to establish that this can be found in both the civilizations including Baudha and Jaina trends of the latter one. Though not in the present article, he tried to elaborate in his famous book that 'Physics' in general and 'Mechanics' in particular did develop to a certain extent within general cosmologies (*Sāṁkhya Siddhānta* and *Vaiśeśika Siddhānta*) and mathematical cosmology (*Surya Siddhānta* etc.) but did not develop as autonomous *angavidyās* perhaps due to cultural preferences. B.M. Udgaonkar has attempted to document how 'scientific culture', which flourished in India since ancient times, gradually disappeared beginning with emphasis of world rejection attitudes and values to systematic attempts at destroying it by invaders and market-seekers for nearly six centuries. The British in particular developed their own basic techniques on the basis of age-old Indian techniques and then systematically destroyed the latter in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries so as to eliminate a powerful competitor. One may, however, ask what were the reasons of failure of Indian society in resisting external aggressions after, say, about 1100 AD, whereas all

earlier aggressions were successfully repulsed from time to time,—of Darius, of Alexander, of the Huns, the Sakas, etc. It seems, at least to me, that time itself had snatched away from us that spiritual energy and vital force which spurs societies on to higher achievements.

The essay by Kireet Joshi delineates the history of spirituo-mystico-religious pursuit in India and envisions Vedasaṁhitās and Upaniṣadas themselves as repositories of the deepest and the most secret perspective of human and cosmic spirit/psyche. His attempt seems to be to delineate and describe in enchanting style a view according to which, in its highest and deepest of inner psychic experience the human spirit strives to accommodate itself and respond to the demands of the outer world of sensibility so that its various faculties of reasoning, aesthetics, ethics, etc. develop. There can be mishaps and failures in this long march of accommodation and response and yet Indian mind has to continue to elaborate and proliferate this perspective so that the inner psychic experience of entire humanity may be deepened. Indeed this in itself is a vast project requiring certain competence of Indian culture/civilization as a whole and, I think, cannot be actualized in foreseeable future.

The articles by C.K. Raju and P.K. Mukhopadhyay bring in reference to 'western culture' in their own way, the former by way of comparison of conceptions of time and the latter regarding the negative influences of it on our own perspective, education and civilization. C.K. Raju attempts at an exhaustive and thorough analysis of the concept. Comparative study of conceptions and formulations of *different* cultures/civilizations is considered impossible by some (Spengler) and beneficial by others. These, by and large, seem to promote muddled thinking in addition to the fact that these are out of tune with the project under consideration. P.K. Mukhopadhyay studies 'western culture' with the aim of benefiting from the sort of metamorphoses of mind it generated,—first in itself and later in India—giving rise to 'two cultures' in the latter which seem incommensurate with each other. The phenomenon of 'two cultures' may, however, be investigated within the ambit of the project first during the interaction of Arabic–Persian–Turkish culture/civilization and then during the interaction of Greco-European culture/civilization. It is well known that the former affected only marginally the deeper form of native culture but has become *structurally* a component of the body of Indian society. The latter has left it structurally unaffected by and large but has deeply influenced the form as implanted conceptions and formulations the assimilation of which has yet to take place. To what extent the present project helps in facilitating this assimilation remains to be seen.

Bhuvan Chandel and her associates deserve to be thanked for the almost flawless printing and binding of the monographs.

Book Reviews

G.W.F. HEGEL, *On the Episode of the Mahābhārata known by the name Bhagavad-gītā, by Wilhelm von Humboldt*; Berlin, 1826, edited and translated into English by Herbert Herring, ICPR, New Delhi, 1995, xxix + 160, Rs. 185.

Hegel's two articles constituting a critical review of Wilhelm von Humboldt's essays on the *Bhagavad-gītā*, published in the *Yearbooks for Scientific Critique*, No. 7/8, Berlin, January 1827, pp. 51–63, have been characterized by Halbfass as a 'testament' in respect of Hegel's understanding of Indian thought, as quoted by Herring (xxix). Hegel had included his reflections on oriental thought not only in his *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, whose completely revised editions (1827, 1830) were published in his lifetime, but also in his lectures on history of philosophy, philosophy of history and philosophy of religion. These lectures were published posthumously 'based on unedited manuscripts of Hegel, lectures, protocols, and notes of his disciples (xxviii)'. He had lectured nine times on the history of philosophy between 1805 and 1830. As Hegel himself remarked, it was only 'recently' (after 1824) that Colebrooke's comprehensive work on Indian thought had become available. Earlier one had to confine oneself to the work of Fredrick von Schlegel which was concerned more with the religious ideas.[1]

Herring rightly points out that one cannot take it for granted that Hegel may have allowed his lectures to be printed without any further editing or alteration were they printed while he lived. Thus the writings which were published in his lifetime and which he had occasion to revise would obviously be considered more authentic. In this light the present text has been called a 'testament' of his understanding of Indian thought. However, this text was not available to readers in English and Herbert Herring, who is well known for his writings on Kant and Vedānta, and who has chosen Madras as his home, took it upon himself to fulfil this need. He discussed the project with Professor Daya Krishna and on his advice prepared a bilingual edition and with assistance from the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, the text was published in 1995.

Translation, as everybody knows, is a difficult exercise. It is much more so if a text belonging to early nineteenth century German is involved and then, that too of a thinker like Hegel who, as Herring tells us, made no concessions to elegance of verbal expression; the text of *Phenomenology of Spirit* being an exception. As the reader moves through the present translation, the feeling of unease or abstrusiveness is hardly ever encountered. Whether the original is as elegant or not, the translation is surely elegant. In fact, one does not feel that one is reading a translated version.

However, Hegel's term *Geist* invites a comment particularly in the light of a remark by Herring,' . . . Hegelian use of *Geist* refers Indians to their classical concept Ātman and its meaning . . . as essentially identical with Brahman.' (xxvi) First, the use of the term Ātman in general is not univocal. However, if we confine ourselves to its use in the context of *Advaita Vedānta*, then the term refers to a pure being—a unity which transcends all differences. Now, Hegel's notion of *Geist* is that of a unity which assimilates differences into it. That is why Hegel called his absolute as a concrete universal. In the two articles also, Hegel has two different terms for Ātman—*Seele* and *Geist*, rendered by Herring as soul and spirit respectively. In the first article Hegel uses *Seele*, while in the next he has used mostly the word *Geist* but at times *Seele* also. On page 39, there is an obvious slip—instead of 'Schlegel', it should have been 'Humboldt' as in the original on page 38. The beginning of the last sentence on page 125 also requires a change. Instead of 'This absolute separateness. . .' for '*Von solcher absoluten Selbständigkeit*. . .', we should have 'By such an absolute independence . . . .'

The twenty-pages' introduction by Herring is a piece of erudition and acquaints the reader with the perspective within which Hegel's articles came to be written. It also enables the reader to know about the beginnings of interest of German thinkers and poets in the Orient in general and Indian thought and culture in particular. One also learns about the sources that were available to Hegel in respect of Indian thought. It is interesting to note that the various histories of thought or philosophy that Hegel had consulted, included some space on Indian thought or culture. The significance of this fact comes into relief when we think of the histories of philosophy produced in the western hemisphere as generally confined to that area alone creating an impression that nothing philosophically relevant is to be found anywhere else. Hegel himself had followed the tradition set by his predecessors and included comprehensive sections on Asian philosophy. We should, however, keep in mind Hegel's peculiar view about philosophy as a form of knowledge coming to its own only in his own times. Herring's introduction also throws light on the relation between von Humboldt and Hegel as well as on von Humboldt's interest and studies in the Indian thought in an Indological context.

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There are two aspects from which Hegel's review of von Humboldt's essays can be approached. We may look at it as an exercise in an inter-cultural dialogue or comparative philosophy. Secondly, but not unconnected with the first, we may view it from the point of view of the problems which Hegel had raised about Indian thought in general and about the *Bhagavad-gītā* in particular.

From the inter-cultural point of view, Hegel's articles illumine the difficulties involved in such a study and also, in an implicit way, allow us

to see as to what could have been the major source of these difficulties especially in Hegel's case. Hegel himself refers to the problems involved in translating a text belonging to object-culture in the language of host-culture. Discussing the issue in connection with the concept of Yōga which is variously rendered by von Humboldt as 'meditation, taking contemplative introversion as the most obvious characteristic of a man practising *Yōga*. . . von Schlegel who translates *Yōga* usually with *devotio*, and the same do Langlois and Wilkins: 'devotion . . . where the meaning does not seem to be specific, Herr von Schlegel uses *applicatio, destinatio, exercitatio*'(39), he points out that it 'is contrary to the nature of the matter to demand that a term of the language of a particular people, which has a temperament and culture contrary to ours, if such a term does not directly refer to sensuous objects such as ocean, tree, rose, etc., but to something in its spiritual meaning, be rendered with a term of our language which is perfectly adequate to that term.'(41).

Besides the problem of rendering a word carrying connotations strange to the host-culture, the strangeness of connotations relating to the ways and habits of thinking concerning the object-culture makes it difficult to understand properly the thoughts and arguments as presented by someone belonging to that culture. Delineating the situation which defines the scenario of *Bhagavad-gītā*, Hegel describes how Arjuna is overcome by several scruples and puts down his bow and arrow. At a moment when the war between Kauravas and Pāndavas is about to begin, Arjuna asks for Kṛṣṇa's advice. Having described this situation, Hegel comments that not only that such a situation and the dialogue ensuing out of it were contrary to all conceptions Europeans had of war, but it was also 'contrary to all our demands of a poetic composition and to our habits to locate the meditation and presentation of an entire philosophical system in our study. . .'(13). Dealing with Arjuna's argument, he doubts if Arjuna's doubt was 'due to the peculiar fact that it is his and his army's kinsmen he is expected to fight. . . . Whether this doubt involves a moral quality, as it seems to do at first, must be dependent on the nature of that value which in the Indian Arjuna's mentality is attached to family ties.' (15–17). While Hegel accepts that the family tie itself is moral, he thinks that Arjuna was not disturbed by this moral sentiment, but he was worried on account of some other considerations which indicate religio-cultural constraints related to the consequences of the killings in the battle. While this is true that Arjuna did mention several other considerations including the ones Hegel is pointing out for thinking that he should not assume his bow and arrow, he *had* the moral embarrassment arising out of his killings—killing his own elders who had given him wisdom, love and concern. The question arises, why Hegel does not want to see that the moral embarrassment in a situation of this kind could have been the same for a European as for an Indian. It seems that Hegel had a prior and patent belief that if the

matter had to do with a culture other than that of Europe, it cannot point to the same sort of attitudes or thoughts. It is this prior assumption which directs one's attention to matters which reveal differences rather than to ones which point to convergence.

Apart from the differences between two cultures which may actually be there, the leanings and orientation to one's own attitude and thought also determine how a different thought system, not merely belonging to another culture, but also to one's own culture, could be received and evaluated. The well-known claims which Hegel made for his own philosophical system and the kind of confidence that he had attained in respect of its maturity and perfection led him to believe that his predecessors, even his contemporaries, were lisping Hegelians just as Aristotle had regarded his predecessors. Hegel did accept, partly, the enthusiastic, almost euphoric, assessment of the Romanticists of recently introduced Indian works as pointing to the origin of philosophy. As Halbfass remarks, for Germans India was neither alien nor extraneous, but a 'symbol of their own spiritual origin and homeland, their own forgotten depth'. It was the 'cradle of mankind'.[2] For this very reason, Hegel considered it to be immature and in need of transformation and transcendence. Obviously his own system alone was equipped with a method that could attain the possible results.

The tendency to disregard the possible similarity unconsciously motivated by the idea of determined immaturity of the thought of his predecessors, much more so in the case of cultures other than European, prevents Hegel from affirming the significance of a principle and leads him to present it in such a way that it is either rendered inconsistent or inferior. Helmuth von Glasenapp thought that Hegel lived in a world of abstractions, a world defined by his own conceptual schemes and he had no 'sympathetic understanding of other ways of thinking.'[3] The inadequate rendering of a Sanskrit expression in Latin or English sometimes helps this process. An interesting example in case comes to us in the form of Hegel's discussion of *Gītā's ślōka* xviii–47. He reads it as 'to fulfil one's caste duty (*dharma*) with *inadequate energy*; even if it is (here it is called an *attempted work*) connected with guilt, nobody should refrain from it. What else is there, that the one who is satisfied with his performance will reach perfection when performing without ambition and desire, comprises that —as we could say—not the *outward* deeds as such (the *opus operatum*) help to attain salvation.' (51, 53). On this, he comments that these statements, being taken as expressed in xviii–47, 'do not have the Christian meaning that in every class the pious and right-doer pleases God, for there is no affirmative link between a spiritual God and duties and thus no inner right and conscience, since the *content of duties* is not determined in a spiritual but in a natural way.' (53).

Let us re-state the *śloka* xviii–47: Although what is duty for the other is

well performed, it is better to perform one's own duty (*swadharma*) even if it is not so well performed. For by doing the action which is in accordance with one's nature (*swabhāva*), there accrues no sin.'[4] According to one dominant interpretation, and this is the interpretation which Hegel had also accepted, 'one's own duty' meant 'duty as following from one's *varṇa*'. In the present context, Arjuna's duty was to fight for what a *kṣhatriya* was supposed to do when the occasion demanded. The later part of the *ślōka* contains the word '*swabhāva*'—one's nature. The extended expression—'*swabhāvaniyatam karma*' which is used for the earlier expression '*swadharma*', is extremely misleading if it is understood in a sense other than that of a substitute. Hegel is working with the notion that duty is normally disparate from the natural inclination—a Kantian position. Doing what one's nature requires cannot be a moral duty. If 'acting according to one's nature' is emphasized, then Hegel is right in thinking that the *ślōka* does not give us a moral commandment and, obviously, in that case no 'inner right or conscience' would be involved.

However, if we take the later expression as a substitute for the former one, then what is being said in the *ślōka* is not that one should act according to one's nature. But this would not help us much. Hegel still has a point. Doing one's duty as determined by one's *varṇa* again is not a moral motive for it misses the peculiar subjective or inner freedom to do the right. The command 'get up and fight' follows from the fact that Arjuna is a *kṣatriya*. In that way, it is already determined and hence, there is no scope for a decision of conscience. Yet Hegel's objection remains weak. He would have been on very firm ground, while raising such an objection, had he himself not shifted from a stand of *moralität* to *sittlichkeit*. Criticizing Kant, Hegel had suggested that mere goodwill would remain one-sided abstraction unless it concretizes itself in the network of a social morality which gets its substance from the various institutions in society. In fact, it is this insight that led Bradley to formulate his moral thought in terms of 'my station and its duties'.

Further, had Hegel noticed Manu's indication of fourfold source of moral and general guidance for behaviour, he would have seen that for Indian thinkers a more comprehensive framework for action was already available—*dharmaśāstries* and *smṛtikāras* both have recognized subjective freedom (*ātmatuṣti*) as well as tradition and social morality (*śruti, smṛti* and *sadācāra)*. How best they could combine them in a coherent system, is, of course, a different issue and may provoke polemic. In Hegelian thought itself, it is not quite clear, how he would decide to act in a situation in which *sittlichkeit* clearly comes to be ossified in a given or positive moral tradition and leaves little room for the individual—for his subjective freedom or conscience.

Hegel's major objection against Indian thought is almost the same as he has advanced against his own predecessors or contemporaries.

Describing the state of highest perfection as given in the *Gītā*, Hegel remarks that it is negative and empty. Referring to the related *ślōkas* from *Gītā* in respect of the practice of self-discipline, self-control and self-purification, in order that one is able to attain the highest state he discusses the view as presented by Pātanjali. He also narrates the story relating to Viswamitra's struggle and penance for attaining *brahmarṣi* state. Hegel thinks that the process involved in *yōga* leads to 'purely negative attitude of spirituality.' He comments that the 'contradiction between the instruction to act and the instruction to refrain from action' remains unresolved, for the 'most sublime in Indian mentality, the absolute Being, *Brahman*, is as such without qualities and apart from Oneness, these qualities can only be external, natural ones. In this separation of the universal and the concrete both are spiritless,—that as empty Oneness, this as unfree manifold; man as bound to this is only subject to life's law of nature; elevating himself to that extreme, he is on the escape and is state of negating all concrete, spiritual activity. The unification of these extremes, as it appears in the preceding grade of Indian perfection, can thus only be indifference within the laws of nature towards these works themselves, not a fulfilled, appeasing spiritual centre' (57, 59). Later, talking about the 'destination of spirit' he reflects that it is 'abstraction from all external and internal determinateness, all contents of sensation' and 'is objectless thinking' (107, 109). Hegel is impressed by the nobility of Indian separation of the spiritual from the sensuous, the empirical from the universal and desiring—imagining—willing—perceiving from thinking, yet he thought that Indians did not 'proceed from the enormous abstraction of this extreme to the reconciliation with the particular, to the concrete', the whole process thus leads to the 'annihilation of the individual' (109).

Anyone who has tried to delve deep in *Gītā* in order to find its positive message, can realize how difficult and puzzling it is to view complete renunciation of *saṃkalpas* in an attempt to attain a state of objectless consciousness and to perform one's duty, in a unified, coherent frame. To that extent Hegel's criticism seems to arise from a genuine difficulty. Further, one also suspects that Hegel is viewing the entire poem from the point of view of his own system. That is why the idea of reconciliation between the universal and the concrete propels his arguments all the time. As he remarks a few paragraphs later, 'when using the terms subjective and objective and even more recent times should not be ascribed to the Indians' (111). 'Indeed as abstract unity without any determinateness it is extremely deficient and fictitious; it is precisely this deficiency which constituted the nature of the Indian *Brahman*; he is unity as abstract universality only, as indeterminate substance' (113).

One is tempted to respond to Hegel's observations by pointing out first that *Gīta* does not give us a purely negative, empty and abstract ideal, but a positive form of attitude and awareness which is an essential

condition for performing one's duty; and secondly, by picking holes in Hegel's own system of thought and procedure, remarking that the reconciliation that Hegel thought he had succeeded in bringing about in the universal and the concrete was merely a sham reconciliation. The reconciliation remained within the realm of thought itself.[5] It is still a problem as to how to make sense of Hegel's expression that idea externalizes itself in nature and then later comes back to itself in spirit.

Though Hegel wrote his articles on von Humboldt's essays, his discussion in the text seems mainly confined to the principles of Indian thought on spirit. As we learn from the text he used for Indian philosophy, other available material also, for example, *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society* for Colebrooke's essays on Indian philosophy; W. Jones' translation of *Manusmṛti: Indian Library* II, No. 2, in which von Humboldt joined von Schlegel in giving a rejoinder on Langlois's reviews of Schlegel's translation of the *Gītā* and relied on the writings of Franz Bopp for *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* translations. But Hegel speaks of von Humboldt with great regard as 'highly esteemed author' and refers to his work as 'extremely valuable presentation'. It is not possible to guess from Hegel's text if he differed in his assessment from von Humboldt or was critical of him, for the simple reason that we do not have the text of von Humboldt's essays available to us in English. This suggests that Dr. Herbert Herring must give us one more translation—that of von Humboldt's essays.

The translated text is followed by notes and references which are both informative and explanatory. One misses an index in the end. The book is a must for those interested in philosophy, in general, and Hegel and Indian philosophy, in particular.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, G.W.F. Hegel, Vol. I, 1892, p. 127.
2. Wilhelm Halbfass, 'Hegel on the Philosophy of the Hindus', *German Scholars on India*, Vol. I, Varanasi, 1973, p. 109.
3. Ibid.
4. Translation mine.
5. The position that the reviewer held in his thesis, 'Hegel in the Light of Existentialism', accepted for D.Phil., by Allahabad University in 1959 (unpublished).

Jaipur R.S. BHATNAGAR

VĀCASPATI MIŚRA: *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* edited by Anantalal Thakur, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, pp. xii + 710, Rs 800.

It is perhaps for the first time that scholars keenly interested in the study of Indian philosophy direct from its Sanskrit sources will have the immense satisfaction of handling an excellently produced volume of perennial value in Indian logic. The volume forms part of a corpus consisting of the Nyāya aphorisms of the sage Gotama and the commentary, sub-commentary and sub-sub-commentary of the aphorisms authored by great intellectual stalwarts in the field of the logic of ancient India. Vācaspati Miśra traditionally known as 'the great commentator' has composed the treatise under review to comment upon the *Bhāṣya* commentary of Vātsyāyana written upon the aphorisms. In what great esteem Vācaspati was held by the great logicians of ancient and medieval India is evident from the fact that the great Gaṅgeśa, the founder of the neological school, quotes profusely from the works of Vācaspati and Udayana, the first systematizer of the syncretic school of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, speaks with profound reverence of Vācaspati's works. In the supplicatory verse of his commentary Udayana prays to Sarasvatī, the Goddess of Muse, thus:

> O my mother, Goddess Sarasvatī, saluting you again and again I beseech you to make my mind and speech so alert that they do not falter and betray me while expounding the writings of Vācaspati.

Although this project, to bring out the whole corpus of the aphorisms and the commentarial literature connected with them in a set of five volumes, is most commendable, it would have been far more helpful to scholars if the corpus were divided vertically, so to say, in the five volumes. That is to say, if each volume consisted of one *adhyāya* and comprised the text as well as all its commentaries and sub-commentaries. This would have enabled the interested reader ascertain at a glance the complete meaning or explanation of a textual portion in the same volume. Professor Thakur, the editor, had himself arranged the corpus (just a part of it) in this manner in an earlier edition of a part of it.

As to the treatise, hardly anything need be said about its extraordinary importance for the study of Nyāya. The treatise has stood the test of alien challenges for more than a thousand years. Like all great commentaries in Indian philosophical literature *Tātparyaṭīka* is also an original work *par excellence*. The commentary serves mainly like a peg to hang the original work on. The same is the case with Udayana's sub-commentary on this commentary and the sub-sub-commentaries of Vardhamāna and others on the latter. It is an unusual phenomenon in the intellectual sphere of ancient and medieval India that thinkers of extraordinary originality should seek to express their well-reasoned

views through the medium of commentaries. Even the great founders of independent schools of thought like Śaṅkara, Rāmanuja, etc., pose as commentators.

A very interesting and touching anecdote about Vācaspati has come down to us from antiquity. It is said that right from his student days to his old age Vācaspati remained so thoroughly engrossed in his academic work that everything non-academic that took place in his life remained almost on the fringe of his attention. He was duly married and his wife looked after all his needs but he was not fully conscious of any of the goings-on around him. One evening while he was absorbed in writing his commentary on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* in the dim light of a burning wick, a sudden gust of wind blew out the light. His wife noticed the shocked expression on her husband's face caused by this unexpected interruption and so she immediately kindled the light. It was then that Vācaspati, for the first time, observed the shrunken face of his wife caused by his utter neglect even of her presence in the house. He was overwhelmed with a profound remorse and to compensate, at least partly, for this neglect of his wife he decided to immortalise her name 'Bhāmatī' by christening his best commentarial work relating to Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* as *Bhāmatī*.

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Nilima Chakravarty, *Indian Philosophy: The Pathfinders and the System Builders*, New Delhi, Allied Publishers Limited, pp. xxxv+358, Rs. 325.

The book under review approaches the history of Indian philosophy from the standpoint of pathfinders and system builders from the period 700 BC to AD 100. Scholars who write on this subject usually follow two distinct methods which are well-known: (i) system-based approach and (ii) concept-based approach. But here is a book which deals with the history of Indian philosophy on the thinker-based approach where different thinkers and their contributions have been taken into consideration, in a clear and systematic manner. Thus the author, Nilima Chakravarty deserves our compliments. Here, we find two groups of thinkers as: (i) *pathfinders* (Uddālaka, Yājñavalkya, Pārśva, Mahāvīra, Buddha, Ājīvikas, Lokāyatas, Kauṭilya and Caraka) who have shaped the speculative thinking of Indian tradition and, (ii) *system builders* (Kaṇāda, Kapila, Gotama, Jaimini, Bādarāyaṇa and Patañjali) who have made significant contributions by building different systems of philosophy as the *sūtra-kāras*. No doubt, this book is a new approach to the history of Indian philosophy. The book is a very detailed one and is divided into two parts. I shall summarise specific points to provide an idea of the manner in which it proceeds.

In part one of the book, Nilima begins her discussion by giving a detailed analysis of the philosophy of Uddālaka in chapter one. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* deals with the dialogue between Uddālaka and Śvetaketu. The author contends that one of the Uddālaka's teachings is about the original matter of the universe. The process of triplication (*trivṛtkaraṇa*), that is, the mixing of the three elements, fire, water and earth in different proportions and how all things and beings are composed of these three elements are well explained by the author. But the author's remark, namely, that Uddālaka's concept of *sat* is a highly controversial one (p. 12) is not acceptable. Her view that Uddālaka is a materialist trendsetter and gives greater weight to the view that he is a materialist or a hylozoist (p. 15) is also equally not acceptable. The dialogue of Uddālaka and Śvetaketu only point to the monistic basis and shows that Brahman alone is real and the pluralistic universe which we experience is non-different from its cause and exists only in name and form. Writing on this, Balasubramanian says:

> The text means that this (*idaṁ*) manifested universe of manifold things characterized by name, form, and change was, in the beginning (*agre*)—that is, before creation—Being (*sat*) alone, one only, without a second (*ekam eva advitīyam*). It means that Being or *sat* is the sole cause of the universe. . . Since the *Upaniṣad* says that, before creation there was Being alone without a second, Being must be both the material and the efficient cause rolled into one (*abinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa*).[1]

Nilima's contention that Uddālaka is a materialist is thus untenable. In chapter two, the three metaphysical categories, namely, Brahman, soul and world are discussed from the standpoint of Yajñavalkya, taking support from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. A thorough study of the nature of Brahman, Ātman and the identity of the two, etc., clearly prove that the author has done full justice to the topic by tracing the philosophical development during the Upaniṣadic period.

The pluralistic realism of Mahāvīra has been brought out in detail in chapter three. All the major philosophical concepts of this school are presented faithfully by the author. But one fails to understand the author when she makes a criticism that an exaggerated emphasis on ahiṁsā has led to certain absurdities in the behaviour of many Jains (p. 76). It appears as though she has not considered the implications of the concept of ahiṁsā when she makes such criticism. Again, it would have been better had she attempted on the philosophical distinction between the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara sect. The difference between these sects lies not only with regard to the clothes but also with other aspects like the number of source-books, sub-divisions, attitude towards women,

ascetics, etc. In chapter four, with regard to Buddhism, the author says: 'One cannot find a systematic body of a philosophical doctrine from the teachings of the Buddha... The interconnection or priority sequence between the various links of Pratītya Samutpāda remain vague or involve inconsistency or contradiction' (p. 126). I really do not know what the author means by this criticism. This passage needs further elaboration.

Ājīvikas and Lokāyatas are discussed in chapter five. Mention has been made about the six heretics, namely, Makkali Gosāla, Pūraṇa Kassapa, Ajita Keśakambali, Pākuḍha Kāccāyana, Sañjaya Belatthaputta, and Niggantha Nātaputta as Ājīvikas. The Ājīvikas did not propagate any system of philosophy but offered their views on different problems like the composition of the world, rejection of the otherworld, karma, soul, etc. It is interesting to note that the author, Nilima points out how both the Ājīvikas and the Cārvākas have rejected the doctrine of karma, the former challenging it with the doctrine of determinism and the latter with that of accidentalism (*yadṛcchāvāda*). 'It is just a matter of chance that thorns have sharpness, sugarcane is sweet or the *neem* tree is bitter' (p. 157) and naturalism (*svabhāvavāda*) 'The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn; by whom came this variety? From their own nature was it born.' (p. 158). Chapter six of the book deals with the political philosophy of Kauṭilya which discusses the various concepts like *artha*, administration of justice, duties and rights of the king and the subjects, the origin of the State and so on. It is true that the author has taken much pain to give a detailed analysis of the *Arthaśāstra*; but the question which comes to mind here, is whether one would be interested to read all these under the history of Indian philosophy. In other words, this chapter slightly deviates the mind of the reader and takes him or her away from the traditional Indian philosophy to political philosophy, thus obstructing the smooth continuity which the author has been maintaining from the beginning of the book. The first part of the book ends with chapter seven, wherein an attempt has been made to study Caraka. Though this chapter is well written with necessary support from other works on Caraka, the author, I feel, could have explained in detail, how in the philosophy of the Sāṁkhyas, Caraka and Pañcaśikha are very important. Das Gupta's remarks on this, are very apt. 'From the point of view of history of philosophy the Sāṃkhya of Caraka and Pañcaśikha is very important; for it shows a transitional stage of thought between the Upaniṣad ideas and the orthodox Sāṃkhya doctrine as represented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa'.[2] Das Gupta in another context remarks:

> It is important for the history of Sāṃkhya philosophy that Caraka's treatment of it, so far as I know has never been dealt with in any of the modern studies of Sāṃkhya, should be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy.[3]

I think that the author Nilima has kept the above point in her mind and nicely explained the philosophical ideas of Caraka which has been neglected by many scholars writing on Indian philosophy.

II

Part two of the book deals with the six system-builders of the orthodox fold who have developed their systems, based on the *sūtras* or aphorisms. The *sūtra-kāras*, Kaṇāda and Kapila receive a fair treatment in chapters nine and ten. The six categories of reality, the theory of atoms, *adṛṣṭa* or unperceived causal law are some of the important topics in the chapter on Kaṇāda. Writing on Kapila, Nilima argues that it would be appropriate to set forth Īśvarakṛṣṇa's ideas as pronounced in his *Kārikā*, as the (best) or true representative of Kapila's Sāṁkhya philosophy (p. 251). A significant point with regard to this has been raised by Daya Krishna in his paper, 'Is Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṁkhya-Kārikā* really Sāṁkhyan?' Daya Krishna explains that all that Īśvarakṛṣṇa wrote may not be Sāṁkhya.[4] He further says:

> . . . They may ask, 'How can we know what Sāṁkhya is except by looking into the *Sāṁkhya-Kārikā*?' The obvious answer is to ask the counter-question, 'Does *Sāṁkhya-Kārikā* exhaust all that is or has been considered Sāṁkhya?'[5]

Thus it is evident that there are certain problems in identifying Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Sāṁkhya. Gotama's view on logic, epistemology, ontology and ethics are discussed in chapter eleven. The philosophical views of Jaimini, which are traced in chapter twelve, throws light on the injunctive sentences (*vidhi-vākyas*), the unseen potency (*apūrva*), words and their meanings, etc. The theory of language developed by Jaimini has been brought out effectively by the author. The words as eternal and the relation between words and their meaning are explained. When the real meaning of the word is hidden, the author quoting Jaimini says, 'we have to follow *krama* method, that is, the words should be divided into their component syllables and letters and suitable meanings should be assigned to these, and then grasp the real meaning.' (p. 287) The author of the *Brahma-sūtra*, Bādarāyaṇa, is the central theme in chapter thirteen. Bādarāyaṇa compiled together the major concepts of Vedānta in an ordered manner. It is an exquisite garland made out of Upaniṣad-blossoms. The total number of aphorisms is 555 and the work is divided into four chapters, namely, *samanvaya, avirodha, sādhana* and *phala*. All these were very well recorded by the author, Nilima, thus making the subject matter very clear to the reader. But there are places where one is not quite at home when she makes some passing comments like:'From all account it appears, that Bādarāyaṇa upholds the doctrine of actual transformation (*pariṇāma*) and so Brahman is the creator of the world (which is a creation of Brahman) is real'. (p. 298)

Different views on the identity of the *sūtra-kāra*, Patañjali, is traced by the author, Nilima in chapter fourteen. Patañjali's analysis of the world into two categories—spirit (*puruṣa*) and matter (*dṛṣya*), the distinction between the ordinary forms of knowledge and the extraordinary knowledge, the eight stages of mind-control, etc., are well argued by Nilima. Special mention must be made to her study on Patañjali's realism. Quoting *Yoga-sūtras* she says; 'The past and future exist in reality. The past is the appearance which has been experienced, the future the manifestation which is to be, and the present that which is in active operation. If these did not exist, there could be no knowledge of them' (p. 321). In chapter fifteen, Nilima offers her concluding remarks which are noteworthy. For example she says: 'Some of the concepts—of great importance to Indian philosophers, need rethinking, since there have been distortions and deviations from the original meanings. What is more strange and distressing is that, sometimes these have been used by the privileged class to exploit the weaker section of the society. *Karma* and liberation are such concepts' (p. 343). She further says: 'It is necessary to scan the thought-systems of these philosophers to discern what are still living issues. It is on these lines, that fresh thinking can be planned and further development be undertaken' (p. 344). It is true that scholars writing on the history of Indian philosophy should keep this point in mind and discard the clichés that become stale and strive after hitherto unexplored possibilities. Modern scholars on Indian philosophy have already shown direction on this line.

III

The author, Nilima, has not considered the philosophical tendencies of the Vedic period. Though one can understand the limitations of the author as she approaches the history of Indian philosophy from the standpoint of the thinkers, any work on the history of Indian philosophy is only incomplete, if it neglects the *development of the philosophical development* during the Vedic period. It is also important that the author should have explained the clear-cut demarcation between the pathfinders and system builders. Mahāvīra and Buddha are discussed under the heading 'pathfinders' whereas Kaṇāda, Gotama and Kapila under 'system builders'. Are Mahāvīra and Buddha not system builders? The author should have discussed the basis for the above classification. Also, one should take into account the various factors which influence the development of a system. Each system has grown in relation to and in opposition to the growth of other systems of thought. Hence, any thinker-based approach must have relation with other thinkers. In other words, any attempt to study the history of Indian philosophy on the exclusive study of one thinker or another is only incomplete.

To conclude, the book written by Nilima Chakravarty is well researched

and shows that the author is evidently bright and widely read. The book's intended readership is clear. The bibliography is well prepared and the notes and references are neatly documented. The book is free from printing errors except in some pages like: In p. 227, Das Gupta's reference page No. is 214 and not 24; in p. 345, the title of the book is *Invitation to Indian Philosophy*: in p. 351, the author is S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri and not S. Suryanarayan Sastri.

It is beyond doubt that this book could be used as a resource text book for students of Indian philosophy.

Notes and References

1. R. Balasubramanian, *Primal Spirituality of the Vedas: Its Relevance and Renaissance*, Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture, New Delhi, 1996, p. 27.
2. S.N. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 1975, p. 219.
3. Ibid., p. 213.
4. Daya Krishna, *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 154.
5. Ibid.

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