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R. SUNDARA RAJAN

THE NATURAL AND THE POLITICAL: THE GREEK AMBIVALENCE

The distinction between the natural (*physis*) and the man made (*nomos*) was an ambivalent one in Greek thought almost from the time at which the distinction itself was made.[1] The sophists used this distinction for the purpose of dramatising the relativity of morals and customs and also, some of them, to underscore the artificiality and non-substantiality of virtues and vices.[2] Unlike the needs and passions which are, it was told, 'natural' to man, these customary notions of good and bad, the honourable and the base are constructions of men and change with the changing frontiers of cities and nations.[3] But there was also, particularly among the poets and tragedians, quite the opposite feeling about this distinction; here, the unity of the human and the natural, the orderliness of the anthropological and cosmological realms, as it were, was emphasized. It is this homology between *nomos* and *physis* that makes Heraclitus, for instance, talk of the transgressions of the sun and other natural bodies and of the punishment of such violations; also Kelsen has shown in very great detail that the very notion of causality arose in a context of transgressions and punishments. On a more reflexive level, these attributes which distinguish the human from the natural were regarded as part of nature, and even the social dispositions and political impulses were regarded as 'second nature'.

Hence there was both a naturalization of the human and a humanization of nature. Under this cross play of ideas, on the one hand, there was a tendency to look upon the State and other political associations as part of nature and the transformations of the

State as the lifecycle of cities. On the other hand, there was also the tendency to think of the natural order as an order of will and impulse. Perhaps this crossing of distinction between the natural and the human came 'naturally' as it were, to the Greeks, for as Collingwood[4] has shown, the Greek conception of nature itself was in terms of life rather than mechanism. But Greek social and political theory was riven by another conflict over language. It was a Greek commonplace, as it were, to say that a *polis* is the creation of speech. It is the bonds of discourse that holds the city together; it is in the speech of men that the good and the bad, the noble and the base, are defined and it is also through language that commands and obligations are born and recognised. Hence the civic order is a discursive order; therefore, the nature of this order, its significance and value as well as the nature of its power, depends on how language itself is seen.

And on this issue of the nature of *logos*, there were at least four major philosophical positions to take into account—the Heraclitean, the Parmenidean, the Sophist and the Platonic. For the Heracliteans, of whom we may take Cratylus[5] as a representative, the ever changing flux of phenomena, the constant becoming of inner and outer nature renders language and communication futile. And the generality of all words renders them incapable of comprehending the concrete and the singular. And so it was reported that Cratylus declined all speech and would only move a finger in assent or dissent.[6] It must be obvious that this extreme self-negating scepticism about language renders all social life and political order impossible.[7]

The Heraclitean world of radical flux is pre-political, since it does not even seem to find a place for life as a stable and abiding form of relationships and functions.[8] Although, in ontology, the Parmenidian position of the unchanging one was the polar opposite of the flux of the Heracliteans, it also converges with the Heraclitean position in making impossible any political order.[9] And indeed this convergence of the classic ontological opposites of Being and Becoming is instructive, for it suggests that the political life demands both stability and change. Neither an unalterable constancy nor identity destroying change are hospitable to the demands of political life which is order in change, constancy in motion.[10] Also the discourse of the political should name both the universal and the particular for the rule of the law is precisely the formula for the invariable and the

constant and it is in terms of the universal that we have to think of the just and the right.[11] But these universal principles have to be applied to the here and now and it is in this context of the concrete singular that we have to decide and act and the application of the universal essence to the variable circumstances, is the political judgement *par excellence* as Aristotle saw it.[12]

The discursive agencies of the political, therefore, must be both; and, it is thus conservative, seeks to keep both as against the doctrinaire radicalism of philosophy. At bottom, this was the meaning of the contestation of Plato and Isocrates. From the point of view of the radicalism of the philosopher, the compromises and adjustments of the practical politician seem like hunting with the hound and running with the hare, whereas to the statesman who is always in the midst of the many, the passion of the philosopher for uniqueness appears a concealed coercion. It is this basic cleavage that rends the discourses of politics into two antithetical camps—that of the philosopher and that of the Sophist. The philosopher, of whom Plato may be taken to be the paradigm, comes to politics with at once a fascination and a distaste, at once to be involved in the world for the sake of transforming it and a weariness with it and a longing to withdraw from it. Therefore, there are constant swings of the pendulum, a constant movement of involvement and return, a fascination and a disgust. The disgust is provoked not merely by the insincerity and hypocrisy of the practical world and its uses, not only by the crassness of its motivations and the sordidness of its desires, but also by the multiplicity and heterogeneity of its values.

The politician is an unredeemed polytheist to whom the passion for the absolute of the philosopher appears inhuman. And also, the constant moralizing and censure of appearances in the name of a reality known only to himself, the impatience with people as they are and a general distaste for actual politics, governance in the name of a city laid up in heavens and a kind of politics which is more speech than action—to the statesman of living cities, these appear to be games children play in the name of politics. But the philosopher has seen another reality—the Idea of the city. The vision transports him and imagining himself to be the spokesman of the idea of the Good, he needs must overflow and pour out his wisdom on an unheeding world; the philosopher sets out for Sicily; there are two stories to be told about the philosopher in Sicily; in one, it is essentially the fallenness of actual politics and the martyr-

dom of philosophy. The world is not ready as yet, in its grossness and cupidity, for the vision of the philosopher and hence the philosopher needs must be banished and suffer exile and humiliation, for he has been a stranger and an alien even when he mingled with the crowds in the market place.

The philosopher retires with a group of friends, each committed to the idea and through that to each other and forms a community which is not just one among the many, but the true Society and the true State. The philosopher now knows that the idea is too powerful, not with the power of force and fraud, but with the power of purity and truth, to be embodied directly, as it were; there is a certain transcendent inviolability about the idea which forbids a worldly involvement, but the world is poorer without it; while perhaps philosophy does not need politics, politics needs philosophy; it needs it as its conscience and as its innermost dream. It also needs it as a standard of comparison, as a measure of health. Therefore, the pure theory of the philosopher, remote from the bustle of the market place, is yet the most practical thing in the world, for it is the idea that explains the being as well as becoming of everything. Thus, for the Platonic sensibility, the discourse of the political is, as it were, bilingual—it has both the language of appearance and the language of reality.

The language of appearance is the language of semblance, of the arts and crafts of unlawful persuasion, of violence, deceit and flattery. It is on this ground that Sophistry and Rhetorics join together and confront philosophy. The philosopher must cleave to the great divide—the politics of semblance, of the seeming good and the politics of the unseen good; he must learn to live, as it were, in a topsy-turvey world and insist that it is better to suffer violence than to commit it, better to be punished than to do wrong and get away with it.

And he must have the courage to proclaim to the world that it does not know the meaning of power and pleasure, of health and sickness, that it mistakes the art of cooking for the healing art, beautifying the body with preserving it in health and flattery for right rule. In the world, therefore, the language of true politics is the language of criticism and censure; but platonic criticism, is a *sui generis* mode of criticism; it is a criticism, not in terms of lack of efficiency or operation but a criticism of things for what they are, of appearances for being only that—appearances. In this mode of criti-

cism, therefore, all worldly distinctions between good man and bad, of good State and evil, as the world sees them, make no sense; the best and the worst according to the world's lights are equally phenomenal.

The language of truth, of being rather than becoming, is a discourse about things which do not appear, but nevertheless are. The philosopher does not merely claim that he has seen some aspect of justice, some feature of it but, instead, claims that he alone has seen it whole and seen it for what it is and therefore loves it for its own sake. The discourse now is therefore erotic, charged with a passion for an unworldly truth and beauty. It is the language of a visionary, of the dreamer, the poet, but yet claiming not merely truth but inescapable necessity for itself.

This strange combination of a transporting vision and a relentless argument is the very stuff of platonic dialectics. Dialects does not merely dream but claims that its dreams are the most real of all realities and in this claim, it stands the world upside down; no wonder, to the man of the world, the philosopher seems to be walking on his head.

The Sophist, on the other hand, prides himself on seeing things as they are, without illusion and projection. Indeed, it is in the name of truth and another mode of learning that Sophistry contends with philosophy; too often Sophistry has been seen through the eyes of philosophy, from which perspective, it appears alternatively incoherent and evil, absurd and dangerous. The philosopher only finds it too easy to reduce it to absurdity; if all truths are only relative to time, place and personality, then so is the truth of Sophistry itself; if nothing can be known or communicated then neither can Sophism be known and there can be no sophists to teach it, for it cannot be spoken about.[13] But one wonders why the passion and the sense of severe crisis, if sophistry is logically such a weak and self-refuting thing. But the Sophists at least the more enlightened ones like Protagoras, were the first humanists, they based their vision of political life on two things—the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the conception of the human good and the power and indispensability of speech for the political order.[14]

With regard to the first, the sophists were perhaps the first among thinkers to not only recognise the facts of diversity but to welcome plurality as a value and as the very medium of social life.[15] But they also realised that the acceptance of plurality demands certain types

of culture, for there are deep and strong forces arraigned against it; on the one hand, there is the traditionalist who cannot look beyond his society and its ways of thought, and to whom the one right way of thinking, feeling and doing has been handed down to him as the tradition of his own people.

On the other, opposed to the traditionalist who scorns reason and argument is the philosopher who lives by it; but in spite of this contrast, they agree on one thing—a certain inflexibility of conviction and impatience with the may be and may not be of chance and circumstance. For the traditionalist, history teaches necessity, for the philosopher, it is reason, but both of them think that truth can only be singular and the good univocal. But there is a third kind of dogmatism also, the dogmatism of the inertia and lack of imagination of the common man. For him also, the distance, the gap between the is and ought, between what he does and what anyone should do, vanishes.

Therefore, when the sophists offered to teach their pupils differences, they were not confusing their young pupils with logical conundrums and paradoxes; rather the point of the paradox was to shake them into a serious concern with un-examined presuppositions and to alert them to a sense of alternative possibilities. In their own way, at least in the case of the masters, sophistry also had a discipline as well as a vision. The discipline is the art of questioning, of self-examination. It is this which brings them near to Socrates, or rather brings him near to them. For both, an unexamined life was not worth living, although they had very different ideas and models of examination. Also, like Socrates, the sophistic discipline too, to a very large extent, was conceptual, alerting us to the meanings and implications of what we say.

It is when the connection between the discipline and the vision is obscured or repressed that sophistry appears as mere play of words and verbal duels. Plato deliberately suppresses this connection and with unparalleled skill magnifies the verbosity of the discipline thus making the sophists appear as, at once unscrupulous, trivial and lacking in good sense. But they did have a vision which, however in certain respects, was very closely tied up with their method or rather with the linguistic context and background of their methods. The sophists had a new sensitivity for language; in fact, language was the medium of the art and craft of the sophists; perhaps, this association with the sophists and rhetors was one of the factors which fed

into the Platonic distrust of language. Be that as it may, the Sophists, on their part, were great students of language who pioneered many disciplines of linguistic science.

But language was not only the object of their study; it was also the principle or resource of the particular form of their thinking.[16] We may indeed describe the sophists' concern with language in the form of three inversions of the ordinary attitude and feeling for language.[17] If, for the ordinary person, language is one of the things in the world and as such a fact among other facts, for the Sophists, the world is in language. The world as significant, as something that matters to us in terms of our likes and dislikes, hopes and fears, in fact the significant environment, is the achievement of language. But this speech which builds up the world is polyvalent; many voices have gone into its making so that what it means from the smallest object to the world as a whole, is not any one thing but an awesome range of meanings. The nature of the gods, the condition of happiness, the meanings of good and bad, holy and accursed—all these are irremediably plural and hence to know the world is to be aware of this proliferation and to thrive and be successful in it is to know how to cope with it.

But it was not of only success that they were always thinking; they were also keenly sensitive to human flourishing and in this respect they also regarded the diversity of meanings as the mark of the richness of an individual; it is richness that was the aerate of the Sophists and when Protagoras told the young men who sought him out that he could make them better day by day it was this kind of growth that he perhaps bore in mind.

The second aspect of difference is even more momentous in its consequences. For the ordinary person, speech or communication is one among other social relations and hence having no special privilege or particular significance. In fact, there are relations which are more powerful or of greater intrinsic value or more inherently satisfying, whereas speech is parasitical upon these. For the Sophists, however, every social relation is a form of communication and hence a language. To say that every form of relation is a form of communication is to say that it is expressive of the way one sees oneself and the others in the act; it is to disclose a certain implicit understanding of the self and the other. And these understandings are liable to be interpreted in different ways. These differences pertain not only to the sense of the action, but to the very identity

of the act itself. What he did is itself constituted in the way the action is interpreted. Secondly, every relation has an element or aspect of display. In acting in a certain way, I show myself in a certain light, suggesting and inviting a certain interpretation, a placement of myself; this is not so much a confessional disclosure as a theatrical display. The sophists were concerned precisely with what today, after Goffmann, we call 'presentations of the self'.[18]

This is the art that they were claiming to teach—the art of display of what one is in words of glory and power. The Sophists were the first and the last rhetoricians, but for them rhetorics was not merely a verbal technique of beautiful words, but was the art of constructing oneself in public, in the building up of a self through words and speech. And that brings us to the third aspect of difference between the ordinary and the Sophists' feeling for language. For the ordinary view, the self or character pre-exists language or speech, which therefore has to conform to the order of the real. But for the Sophists, it is through language that the self is born and continues to exist. From this point of view, rather than saying that language expresses the self, it is truer to say that it constitutes it. And because it is through language that the effect is achieved, to a certain extent, this is in our power; the sophists, of course, did not bother to pause and untangle the paradoxes of a self building itself.

One could imagine how Socrates would have rendered the whole thesis aporetic; for does it not seem obvious that the self is already there, antecedent to the process; if so, what exactly is it that is being built? Another self and if another self, which is really my self—the original self or the new one which comes into being through language? And indeed there are deep problems in this process of what Husserl would call auto constitution, as Husserl in fact, made us all aware.[19] But for the Sophists, only the obvious truth about it, namely the intimate bond between self and language mattered. Since this process of building up the self takes place in public, in the assembly, the courts, the political meetings, on memorial occasions; in the light of day, before one's own fellowmen, it is a grave matter of how this is done and what sort of self is achieved.[20]

Therefore, everyone has a vital concern about it and hence one can imagine the great attraction the Sophists had for all, for they claimed that they could teach the process.[21] And of course, there are only too obvious possibilities of dishonest practices lying just beneath the surface of such a claim. But if one looks beyond ques-

tions of professional ethics[22] in the ancient world and considers the matter more reflectively and in the context of a philosophy of political psychology, it appears that the Sophists were struck by what today we call the performativity, such as promising, greeting etc.

We must consider such situations as that of Luther at Worms taking a stand by declaring 'Here I stand; I can do no other'; or, Socrates saying 'yes' to the man who brings the hemlock or such other occasions when with a word, we sum up the whole of our lives and take a stand. Or in another context, we may consider how the poem or the play reconstitutes the author; the very fact of having brought such shining words into existence seems to lift up and ennoble the author such that he verily does add a cubit to his stature by his words. It is such phenomena of language articulating the self and giving it a form and clarity it did not have before, that seems to have attracted their attention. Now, it may be that such performativity has many modes and that different discourses may achieve different results. Perhaps it is also the case that the self that is born in these discourses are again different; perhaps we may even distinguish such genres of self constitution as discourses of Science, of Religion and of Politics. But being intensely 'political' people, with a high degree of civic sensibility, the Sophists saw the emergence of the self in speech as primarily a 'political' phenomenon.

And perhaps this indeed is their most significant contribution the performativity of the political. But precisely because the idea is so important, it is all the more necessary to give it an adequate formulation and preserve it against the two temptations to which it is liable. The first may be called the temptation of technique and it consists in thinking of the performativity of the political as something produced by us by skill and expertise. The sophists gave room to these by their talk of special talent and expertise and their rhetoric of stunning performance; as we shall see, the analogy of politics with the performing arts must be handled with care. The second temptation is amoralism, the view that since the political is its own end, it cannot be subjected to moral judgement. Hence even if we take them most generously and recognise the vital contributions they have made to a viable theory of the political, yet, such a theory must go far beyond the level of refinement and discrimination that it has received from the Sophists. The next level of clarification we have in the political theory of Aristotle.

THE NATURAL AND THE POLITICAL: SOME ASPECTS OF ARISTOTLE'S POLITICAL THEORY

The two themes—the distinction between the natural and the political, and the language-mediated nature of the political—receive profound consideration in Aristotle's theory.[23] But because the theory of the political is framed by a biological orientation on the one hand and a theological ultimate context on the other, the notion of the political gets problematized. Although the distinction between the natural and the political is introduced with a degree of sharpness it has not received earlier,[24] although the political is firmly related to the discourse within the *polis*[25] and thus the performativity of the political is clearly seen,[26] yet, the larger pre-occupation, at once biological and theological, which frames the understanding or the political destabilizes the notion leading to its internal subversion.[27]

Aristotle's discrimination of the political from 'the natural' is 'perhaps clearest in his distinction between doing and making, *praxis* and *poeisis*.'[28] Productive activity which is essentially teleologically ordered in terms of means and ends is a hierarchy of domination and subordination. From this complex of productive activities, *praxis* as self-formation in the *polis* is designated as its own end; the value of this does not lie in the achievement of anything external to it, but in itself, in its ongoing rhythm. It is for its own sake and not for another; in our sense, this is Aristotle's way of recognising what we have called the performativity of the political. The discrimination of the political from the contexts of natural life is further determined by his placement of the *polis* in relation to the family.

Although Aristotle had a profound understanding of the processes of genesis and development of life forms, yet in his social or political and moral theory, he avoids the temptations of a genetic reduction; the state is 'natural' in one sense as deriving from the distinctive nature of humans but it is not 'natural' in the sense in which the family is natural.[29] Aristotle himself makes this point by saying that while the family exists for life, the *polis* exists for the good life.[30] However, this formulation may mislead in so far as it may suggest that the political is functional for the perfection of certain activities; the picture that we may get is that while the family is oriented to survival, the *polis* serves ends beyond those of survival;[31] it is an embellishment or refinement but yet for all that, a natural function whose goal is set by the exigencies of the natural

order of human life. In order to avoid such a naturalistic reading of the political, it is necessary to keep two things in mind. While the ends of the family are procured by productive activities of various sorts, referred to by Aristotle, as the arts of household management[32] (the sphere of the economic) the ends of the political is pursued in speech and deliberation;[33] there is of course speech in the family also but that is the discourse of instrumentality, a deliberation that, given certain ends, seeks out the best means for achieving those ends.

In modern terminology, the discourse of natural formations is a technical discourse, concerned with adaptation and functionality. But the political, we are told, is a deliberation about the ends themselves and as such, the discourse of the *polis* is radically different. Precisely at this point arises the chief problem of a discursive conception of the political—to clarify the precise form and presupposition of the ends—thinking in the domain of the political. Aristotle does take the first and all important crucial step here, namely that political discourse is a discourse of equals whereas within the order of the family, authority and subordination is the norm. But while this is indeed a decisive turning point in the discussion of the political, yet when one turns to the conditions under which equality is recognized in Aristotle's theory, one finds that the natural, as it were, stages a come-back, because the criteria of equality specify the free male property owners as alone citizens.

At this point, the forces of the *communitas* makes a strong counter assertion and a moment of universality is missed. Within the framework of our earlier discussion, the equality could have been grounded in the recognition of the person; this would have led the political out of the limits and the boundaries of the ethnic communities and opened it to wider horizons, as it did for the Stoics. But instead, the attractions of the local context, of the particularism of the ethnic communities proved too much and the theory, in fact, becomes an impressive version of contextualism. It is as such that the Aristotelian theory has been involved in the recent debates over communitarian and universalist orientations in political and moral theory.

The price of falling back into a communitarianism is that it now becomes almost impossible to develop a theory of inter-communal relations. If fellowship is seen in terms of a common tradition, then it is obvious that between communities, there can be no fellowship

and since friendship is seen as the very basis of the political order, it would appear that inter-communal relations fall back into the order of nature. And the natural order is an order of inequality, of natural superiors and natural slaves. Therefore, it would appear that between the States also the relation would be one of inequality. But what is more disturbing is the idea that some states are, as it were, by nature masters and others, natural slaves. And there is also another kind of slavery—the subordination of women. The point is not merely that women and slaves are excluded from the discourses of the *polis* but the suspicion that an equality that can maintain itself only on the basis of these exclusions, both internal and external, itself is deeply flawed.

The bad faith of the Greeks was that the freedom and equality among citizens is not corrupted by the massive inequalities and deformations in the private order; the idea that the political could, as it were, be sealed off from the social was one of the most unfortunate temptations of the discrimination of the political from the natural. More than anything, it is the perception of the empty abstraction of the political thus conceived that leads to the resurrection of the primacy of the social and the naturalization of the political in modern times.

If the strong pull of the *communitas* is one of the destabilizing factors of Aristotelian theory, the other is the equally strong pull of transcendence in the form of the attractions of the contemplative life. In the contestation over the best form of life, it is finally the contemplative life, *vita contemplativa* or the *bios theoretikos* that is preferred. As Arendt observes, this privilege given to contemplation has the effect of reducing the importance of the distinction between making and doing, thus leading once again to the naturalization of the political. Since the highest good is the divine life, that which is best for men is a condition as near the divine as possible and that is the condition of the contemplative life.

From this point of view, not only is the political life of lesser value, but it exists for the sake of making possible the contemplative life for those who are qualified for it. Just as the *polis* subordinates women and slaves, now the political order itself is subordinated to the theological. The theological does not elevate the political but brings about an indirect naturalization of it.

In our earlier discussion concerning the language of the political, we saw that we have to recognise two modes of the functioning

of language—a context-bound signification and a context-transcending faculty which we called symbolization. The functioning of language requires both, such that in every case of meaning, there is both a signifying and a symbolizing moment. Particularly, in the case of experiences of persons, the dialectic of signification and symbolization is crucial for preserving both intimacy and respect. Signification is context bound but within its delimited domain of operation, it evokes the fullness and rich texture of a concrete experience. Signification assures the bonds of affinity and fellowship and hence is capable of evoking images and feelings of a shared life. Signification is solidarity building and it is the mode in which the *communitas* is accessible to us. On the other hand, symbolization is the indirect access we have to the aspect of transcendence.

As we saw, even in the case of those with whom we have a sense of kinship or fellow feeling even in the case of the near and the dear, there is an element of otherness, a dimension of transcendence—it is this two-fold mode of our intersubjective and interpersonal relations that is expressed by the two poles of the 'thou' and the other. The thou is the pole of immediacy, of closeness and contact, whereas the other is the aspect of distance, of inviolability of another self or subject. We recall these features here at this point, for at the level of theory of reason or intelligence, some of the statements of Aristotle modes of signification and symbolization.

In the *De Anima* Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of intellect—the passive and the active intellects.[34] The passive intellect is the faculty of sense-perception understanding, memory, and other powers and operations of an embodied being;[35] it is conditioned by the senses and it is of this intelligence that it could be said that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses. It is an activity which is therefore contextualized by our position in the world and it is also a form of thinking which has its source in the particular and the individual. It is precisely here that the most important problem of Aristotelian epistemology and theory of science are located. Knowledge, by its very nature, is of the general and the Form, but experience is always of the singular and what exists also is the concrete individual.

Because of this disparity between the order of knowing and the order of existence, two questions arise: the question of access to the concept and the form; by what movement of the soul do we acquire

the supreme principles and the fundamental categories in terms of which we are able to conceptualize experience? There also arises the question of the application, of the return from the conceptual to the perceptual; how do we fit the general concept and the abstract rule to the here and now; how do we conceptualize experience? If *De Anima* provides a perspective on the first question, *Nicomachion Ethics* suggests an answer to the second.

In *De Anima*, after the explanation of the passive intellect its nature and functions, Aristotle, with a startling suddenness, introduces another form of understanding which he calls the *Active Intellect* or the *Agent Intellect*; of this he says that it is *one* and *unmixed. Comes from without* and *is alone immortal*;[36] he also says that while this is necessary for all thinking, yet we are not aware of it. The *Active Intellect* is free of all context dependency and it is due to this that we have access to the basic categorical principles and truths.

Hence it can be said that it is due to the presence of the active Intellect in us that we have such knowledge as we do: Recognition, Memory and Thought—in fact all the operations of the mind are energized by the active intellect and it is also this which provides a perspective of unity and fellowship of the mind (it is in this way perhaps that one should take the claim that it is one and immortal) Although it is that which gives an epistemic status to the mind, enabling it to be an organ of knowledge, yet it is not conditioned by the body and the senses ('it is unmixed and comes from without').

There are two things which strike a resonant chord in us, about Aristotle's discussion of the Active and the Passive Intellects in us. Although the two kinds of intelligences are radically different, yet both are required for knowledge and experience; the point is not merely that we have two kinds of knowledge—knowledge of the particular and knowledge of the general, but even the awareness of the individual as individual requires conceptualization and categorization; as Hegel would say, even perception involves and depends upon the universal. In this way, we could say that experience at all levels, from the meanest awareness of an object to the most severe abstractions of science, is distinguished from all other orders of sentience in so far as thought enters into perception itself; our relationship to the world itself is significantly different, for we see the world differently in terms of the categories. The operation of the Active and the Passive Intellects as well as the illumination of the latter by the former recalls the claim that symbolization and

signification, the contextual and the context-free modes of meaning are both necessary, and that symbolization does not transcend or eliminate signification, but, on the contrary, it serves to give it a certain orientation.

The second feature of application, of the judgement of the singular and the here and now is equally fundamental for a full comprehension of the life of the mind.

The relevance of these two modes of thinking—the faculty of the general and that of the particular—for the discourse of politics may be seen in two important forms—deliberation and debate. It is obvious that Aristotle's theory of the political also thematizes these two functions, for Aristotle characterizes the political in terms of three essential determinators:

(1) The medium of the political is language; it is in discourse that the typical functions of a political mode of being are constituted.
(2) The political is concerned with the ultimate ends, the ends which predelienate 'the good life'.
(3) Politics is not theories but praxis, or action. It is concerned with the deliberation about what is to be done. Action is always situated in a particular context and is about what may or may not be, depending upon our choice and decision.

Summarizing the above three points, we can say that the discourse of the political is constituted by deliberation and debate; we are using these with a certain accent and slant, which may not be Aristotle's own: in this formulation, while debate is speech about the ends themselves, deliberation is the determination of the when, what and how of action; as he himself would say, we deliberate about what is in our power and what we should do and for the sake of which ends. In Aristotle's discussion, the accent falls upon deliberation for it is here one can see in a particularly clear manner the linkages between rationality, freedom and action, but in a sense this introduces an element of distraction for, as Arendt observes,[37] the accentuation of deliberation serves to reintroduce the teleological schema into the characterization of the political, which, for her, is *auto telic*.[38] We might put the same point somewhat differently; we may say that the teleological schema creates a problem for a proper understanding of the perfomativity of the political; also the aspect of deliberation marginalizes debate. The consequences of this are

significant; for one thing as Arendt herself notes, this tends to blur the contrast between making and doing, between productive and 'Political' activity, as a result of which the term 'practical' takes shape in the modern sense as an efficiency-sensitive mode of thinking; for another, it also tends to bring the political order under the rule of the social in spite of the declared superiority or primacy of the political over the social. And because the social order is one of natural superiors and inferiors, the 'socialization' of the political immediately raises the problem of freedom and authority.

Notes and References

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Shadows: The Ontology of Contoured Darkness

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'yā devī sarvabhūteṣu chāyārūpeṇa saṁsthitā/
namastasyai' *Durgasaptasati*, V.17.
(I supplicate to that Goddess who resides in every being in the form of a shadow)

1. THE PUZZLE OF SHADOWS

Dark, odd-shaped, swaying shadows not only scare children at night, they also threaten philosophers' smugly-drawn distinctions between substance and quality, presence and absence, the real and the illusory, what is objectively there and what is merely subjective.

I shall propose some alternative positions regarding the ontological status of shadows and highlight the appeal as well as the pitfalls of these positions. For those of my readers who cannot wait to ask: 'why bother about shadows after all?', I have points on the *importance* of shadows in Plato as well as in Advaita Vedānta to which I shall briefly turn at the end of the paper. Until then—one will just have to bear with my exercise in purposeless precision as if 'importance is not important, only truth is'.[1]

Our intuitive assumptions about shadows lead us into some paradoxes which are not easy to resolve. It is this puzzling indeterminable nature (*anirvacanīyatā*) which makes a shadow such an excellent analogue of *Avidyā*—that primordial gloom of Ignorance from which, *a la* the Ṛgvedic hymn starting, 'Neither unreal nor real was there in the beginning', the universe emerged by way of uncovering and which allegedly has the power to project this plural world on the screen of non-dual pure consciousness.[2] Let us call one such paradox 'The Paradox of Cast Shadows':[3]

Initially Plausible Assumptions:

1. An ownerless shadow cannot exist, i.e. A shadow must be cast by something.
2. An object upon which no light falls cannot cast a shadow.
3. A shadow cannot pass through an opaque object and be cast on a surface behind it.
4. If a shadow is cast by two things A and B, e.g. when my fingers plus the pencil I am holding cast a continuous shadow, it follows that A casts part of it and B casts another part.



Given these uncontroversial-looking assumptions, we seem to be trapped into the following paradox:

(*a*) Shadow S is not owned by B because no light falls on B.
(*b*) Shadow S is not owned by A because through the opaque surface B, A cannot cast its shadow.
(*c*) Since neither A nor B casts any part of S, S cannot be cast jointly by them.
(*d*) S is not cast by anything, hence it is ownerless.
(*e*) But being an ownerless shadow, according to assumption 1, S cannot exist but it is seen. Seeing something nonexistent should count as hallucination but as a normal seeing of a shadow it is most definitely not a case of hallucination.

Several 'obvious' solutions suggest themselves. We may be tempted to drop assumption 3 because it is based upon the confused notion of the casting of a shadow 'through' another opaque object. But there are independent reasons for not letting A pass as *the* owner of S, since S *would have been there* even if A were not present, as long as B were there. Unfortunately, the same sort of consideration disqualifies B as well. Perhaps the very idea of 'the owner of a shadow'

has to be given up. But I do not intend to solve this puzzle now. I shall get back to it at the end of my ontological excursion.

2. SOME DISTINCTIONS

First, some clarifications and distinctions. The word 'shadow' has two easily distinguishable uses, to mean *reflections* and to mean what I call *contoured relative darkness*. When Wordsworth says: 'The swan in St. Mary's lake floats double swan and shadow'—he is talking about a well-lit, richly detailed mirror image of the swan on the clear placid water of Yarrow's lake. This is not the sense I am concerned with in this paper. I shall investigate the exact category into which we can fit dark silhouetted murky images cast by opaque objects on unmirrorlike surfaces due to obstruction of light. This is the sense in which, to use the language of juvenile literature, 'The Zebra's shadow has no stripes'.

There are two other words which are closely akin to 'shadow' in this sense: 'Darkness' and 'Shade'. I don't usually call the interesting shadow cast by my moving fingers on the wall 'a shade', although the shadow cast on the ground by a big tree or an umbrella or some such large umbrageous sun-shed *is* called 'shade'. But actually, shades are typically borderless—notice the metaphorical idiom 'shades off'—whereas shadows have more or less well-defined boundaries. When painters talk about light and shade as visual cues for convexities and concavities of surfaces, they do not mean by 'shade' what we call a cast shadow. I shall also leave aside the further ambiguity of the word 'shade' due to its use signifying distinguishable hues of the same colour, as in 'this shade of green'. There are two straightforward ways of establishing the distinction between the two darkness-related notions, viz. *shade* and *shadow*.

If I bring my palm in front of a source of light, one of its surfaces will be in light and the other in shade. The darker side is shaded or in shade, but it cannot be said to have a shadow on it. Whose shadow would it be anyway? A surface cannot cast its own shadow onto itself, because the shadow-casting surface has to be lit by that very light the lack of which is suffered by the shadow-hosting surface, and no surface can have and not have the same light shining on itself at the same time. Its shadow is cast on the wall or ground which is partly illuminated by the same source of light. Michael Baxandall, in his trail-blazing study[4] calls shades 'self-shadows', ap-

parently defying my rule above that nothing can cast its shadow onto itself and blurring the distinction I am so eager to draw. But actually, there is only a terminological difference between his usage and mine, in so far as he too attaches importance to the separation between self-shadow (= shade) and projected shadow (shadow).

Secondly, as any realistic painting or photograph of a well-lit spherical or smoothly curved surface should bring out, the distinction between light and shade is without a cut-off point and relative. It is difficult to count shades, whereas one is generally able to enumerate shadows. Shade is standardly a visual cue for depth and dent, but shadows, by themselves, are usually not so. Shades used in the depiction of undulations on drapery or a human body could be so sharply set off against highlights as to be strictly *visually* indistinguishable in colour from cast shadows; yet *conceptually* shadows are purely visual objects caused by or causing no tangible difference in the texture or shape of the surface where they fall.

Is 'shade' then just another name of darkness? Of course—the word 'darkness' itself has a subtle ambiguity. 'Dark' is used most often as an adjective of a *place* or area with respect to its condition of illumination. Sometimes it is also used as a qualifier of a colour, as in 'dark red', dark blue' or 'dark green', when it seems almost interchangeable with 'deep' (except perhaps that the substitution of 'deep yellow' with 'dark yellow' is not all that happy!). Now *this* latter sense of darkness has little to do with lack of illumination. A light blue when seen in gloom does not *look* deep blue, and surely a rich dark green is hardly the same as a pale green, less well-lit.

Wittgenstein, I suspect, gets himself trapped in this ambiguity when, after treating *darkness* in the second colour-qualifying sense and noting that a ruby could keep getting darker red without ever becoming blackish or cloudy—he remarks 'In paintings darkness *can* also be depicted as black'.[5] Taken by itself the remark is banal and true. But taken as a remark about saturation of a hue it goes flatly against the point Wittgenstein was noting in the very same passage.

If we confine ourselves to the notion of darkness which has to do with lack of light rather than with saturation of a hue, we might be tempted to identify it with shade. But even here Turner draws a useful distinction. 'Light', he writes, 'is a body in painting of the first magnitude and reflection—the half light; while shade is the deprivation of light only, in the deprivation of reflection likewise it

becomes darkness'.[6] Turner illustrates this point with Titian's bunch of grapes, where except for the central focus of a highlight every other part of each grape is depicted as in shade—in relative deprivation of reflection—yet each whole grape (or its visible front) is in full light. There is no *darkness* on it. Perhaps Turner's distinction is drawn slightly more rigidly than common users of English would draw it. But the concept of sheer darkness, carefully considered, I think, turns out to be distinct from both that of shadow and shade. Leonardo da Vinci makes this most succinct by two successive definitions: 'Darkness is the absence of light. Shadow is the diminution of light'.[7] What descends on a natural forest after sundown, or in a city in case of a power-failure at night—especially if the night is practically moonless—can be safely called darkness. If it is really complete absence of light then it makes us feel as we might imagine a blind person always feels—forgetting for the moment the phenomenon known as dark-adaptation. Hence the Sanskrit word '*andhakāra*', literally meaning *blind-maker.*

However, like complete vacuums, complete darkness must be hard to achieve. But if it is achieved, it would not be discernible as shade or shadow, for both of those sorts of things need some visible light to be around within the visual field where they are identified. No shadows can exist under the condition of zero-illumination. To see the difference between shade and darkness, imagine carrying an umbrella on a cloudy moonless night or inside a pitch-dark tunnel. Far from being identical with it, darkness seems to make shade impossible. Switch off the light and all the shadows in a room (in the evening) are gone. The property of being visible without the aid of light which figures crucially in (classical Indian) metaphysical argumentation about darkness—surely does *not* belong to shadows, which need the help of light in order to exist and be perceived.

3. SEEING DARKNESS OR NOT SEEING LIGHT?

Of course, these are just *prima facie* distinctions. No one can deny that all three of these notions, namely of darkness, shade and shadow, are closely interlinked. Having made these distinctions, I shall often in what follows speak interchangeably of shadows or darkness or shade; all of which can be perceived as 'out there' and need to be cleverly represented in any realistic portrait, still-life or landscape to create the intended impression of depth, distance, and direction.

I just now said that darkness can be perceived. Some philosophers would stop me right there. If darkness is just lack of light and a lack is a negative thing—a gap in reality rather than a bit of reality—how could it have the causal power or the appropriate effective relationship with a sense-organ, to generate genuine perceptual experience? The absence, for instance, of a beloved person can figuratively weigh someone down, but literally absences cannot act on you or, for that matter, on your retina. When we seem to be perceiving darkness, these reductionist enemies of absence would insist, we are just *not* perceiving light. It is not that we see lack of light but that we fail to see light. However plausible this may sound, the suggestion has the following awkward consequences: First, when we close our eyes or sleep without a dream we are not seeing anything, hence we are not seeing any light either. When with our eyes wide open we are seeing darkness, even then, according to these philosophers we are merely not seeing light. The experiential content of these two states ought to have been identical. But they are in fact very different, if, that is, the not-seeing counts as having any experiential content at all.

Second, there is a rule of thumb that if a certain object is perceived by a certain sensory faculty then its absence should also be recognized by the same sense. When a singer misses a note we have to *hear* the omission; when a soup lacks a flavour or taste we cannot *visually* experience such a lack. Now perceptions themselves are mental or inner states, unlike colours or sounds. Perceptions are perceived by the inner sense. If we have to register lack of a perception we have to do that as well by introspection through the inner-sense—or Locke's *Reflection*—the same faculty that would have noticed a perception had it been there. But we cannot sincerely confess to noticing shadows or darkness through introspection. Hence seeing shadows cannot be identified with not seeing light. Shadows must be visible things and not mere lacks of vision.

Third, when from inside a very dark room I look outside and *simultaneously* notice the gloom in the room and the sunny outdoors—I would have to be described as not seeing and seeing at the same time. A much more *coherent* description of my experience would be seeing light in one place and privation of light in another.

However, to echo Russell,[8] there lurks in the deepest core of our robust sense of reality a tendency to resist the admission of such negative things as lacks, absences, cessations etc. Russell had to struggle

against it when in his lectures on logical atomism he took a strong stand in favour of the objectivity of negative facts. But even Russell, I'm sure, would have felt squeamish about the claim that we are as directly and perceptually acquainted with the absence of an egg in the fridge as we would have been with it if the egg were present. Yet our acquaintance with shadows or darkness seems to be *visual* and *direct*. If darkness and shadows are mere lacks of light then must we not admit the actuality of sensory acquaintance with absences?

Perception of an absence has got to be distinguished from a mere non-perception of the absentee (I shall not here deal with the other reductionist tack, namely that of Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas, that perception of absence is reducible to perception of the bare locus). Whenever I do not see an elephant (like now) I am not seeing the absence of an elephant either. In order to see the absence I have to somehow think of and miss the absentee, *qua* an elephant. That is why a born-blind man does not see darkness, because he does not have any idea of what it is a lack of, and also because he simply does not see. Seeing a hole in the wall is not to be equated with not seeing the wall at a certain point. It is more than that. It is a distinct positive act of perceiving the fact that a bit of the wall-substance which should or could be there is missing. An eighteenth-century scientist called shadows 'holes in the light'.[9] If holes are seen shadows are seen too.

Before I return to darkness and shadows, let me add two important cautionary remarks about absences in general. First, the silliest but also the most common mistake is to conflate the absence (*abhāva*) with the absentee (*pratiyogin*), the negative fact with a nonexistent state of affairs, the not being there of a thing with the thing which is not there. Absences are not Meinongian nonexistent objects. That the Eiffel Tower is not in Seattle is a *fact*. It is not a piece of fiction like *The Eiffel-Tower-of-Seattle*. The absence of light which we wish to call darkness is never to be confused with the missing light. One may have independent reasons to balk at the absence theory of darkness, but fearing that thereby we shall flout the Parmenidean warning against getting involved with nonbeings would be foolish.

Second, from the fact that we do not *perceive* absences unless we somehow remember or think of the absentee, we are tempted to conclude that absences are subjective, cooked-up by our expectations. But we must resist that temptation. Thought of the absentee

is a prior condition for someone's *recognition* of an absence, but it is not a condition for the existence of the absence. The negative fact is discovered by thwarted expectation or denial of an entertained false proposition and so on, but it is not invented by those cognitive acts. The absence-theorist of darkness, therefore, is *not* committing shadows to the subjective realm.

4. THE ABSENCE-THEORY OF DARKNESS AND ITS DIFFICULTIES

Like holes, then, are shadows distinctly perceived absences? Are they simply lacks of light? That, at any rate, is the most appealing and usual view among philosophers about both contoured and uncontoured darkness. Witness the peripatetic work *De Coloribus*, controversially attributed to Aristotle:

> There are many arguments to prove that darkness is not a colour but merely privation of light, the best being that darkness, unlike all other objects of vision, is never perceived as having any definite magnitude or any definite shape.[10]

Of course, the argument fails completely in case of shadows with well-defined shapes and comparable measurable magnitudes. If shadows did not have definite location, shape and size, sundials would be quite useless. But then how can absences have sizes and shapes? Apart from general ontological worries about the identity criteria of absences, there are serious hurdles to the view that shadows are mere absences of light.

Many shadows can overlap or occupy partially or wholly the same area of space, but still can be easily enumerated, according to the number of obstructing bodies and/or the number of sources of discriminable illumination, whereas absences are much harder to count. A vacant chair seems to house countless absences corresponding to all the likely and unlikely persons, animals and objects which might have occupied it. Usually absences are individuated in terms of distinct absentees or counter-positives and not in terms of their locus, so that one single absence, for instance, the absence of the Eiffel Tower, can at the same time be located in Seattle, London, New York, and Calcutta. But there are cases where this principle of identity of absence on the basis of identity of absentees becomes less obvious and we have to count absences on the basis of the number of locations. Thus the identity criteria of absences seem to be much foggier than those of shadows.

Secondly, absences, such as the absence of colour in air, are incompatible with their own absentees. David Keyt and David Keyt's absence cannot coexist on a chair. But shadows can coexist very peacefully with *some* light. Even deep darkness of the night can easily tolerate the flickering feeble light of fireflies. Strictly speaking, therefore, a shadow or darkness cannot be the total absence of light.

Thirdly, absences do not bear properties like colour, shape, and movement. Shadows, on the other hand, have all kinds of properties. On white surfaces, shadows of things against the sun usually look blackish or bluish grey in colour. But actually the colour of shadows varies enormously from surface to surface, depending upon the colour of the light and condition of the weather and atmosphere. Leonardo's notebooks abound with instructions to the painter as to how best to depict coloured shadows. Among the French impressionists, Seurat made the most strenuous effort to articulate the colourfulness of shadows even on a sunny afternoon. Like any other coloured surface, a shadow would be depicted by Seurat as a collection of minute multicoloured dots which taken together *look* as though they are or a certain uniform colour. Most probably, therefore, as a pointillist, Seurat would draw a distinction between the apparent colour and the real colour of the (parts of the) shadow. But it would still be odd to think of an absence of light as having a real colour!

About creating coloured shadows with artificial illumination, Goethe in his *Theory of Colours* suggests the following:

> Two conditions are necessary for the existence of coloured shadows: first that the principal light tinge the white surface with some hue; secondly, that a contrary light illumine to a certain extent the cast shadow.
>
> Let a short lighted candle be placed at twilight on a sheet of white paper. Between it and the declining daylight let a pencil be placed upright so that its shadow thrown by the candle may be lighted, but not overcome, by the weak daylight: the shadow will *appear* of the most beautiful blue.
>
> That this shadow *is blue* is immediately evident; but we can only persuade ourselves by some attentions that the white paper acts as a reddish yellow, by means of which the complemental blue is excited in the eye.[11] (emphases mine)

Notice that Goethe does not commit himself to the view that under those conditions the shadow really *'is blue'*, although he literally uses those words once. He says how it can be made to *appear* blue because the surrounding white paper appears reddish yellow and a complementary blue is *suggested* to the eye. One could definitely argue that the blueness of the shadow is doubly illusory. First, the real colour of the surface which is covered by the shadow is white. Just as the yellowness is superimposed on the rest of the white paper by the candlelight, its whiteness is concealed by the shadow cast by the pencil. Upon this already falsified colour of the paper is superimposed an apparent blueness because of the contrast-effect upon the cones in the retina. So the shadow is not *really* coloured. But is anything really coloured?

Of course, to believe in a Lockean analysis of them, all colours are, strictly speaking, subjective. Colin McGinn, in his book *The Subjective View*, ascribes even to current common sense the view that colour-predicates are dispositionally understood in terms of our reactions as against shape-predicates which common sense takes to have direct objective content. I cannot agree with that. I think, in spite of the normal dose of physics and physiology, all of us take 'red' to be more like 'square' than like 'scary'. So when I ask 'Do shadows have colours?', I don't want to get entangled with the larger issue of objectivity of colours. A second kind of temptation to paraphrase has to be resisted as well. When a shadow looks bluish, we should not report that the part of the surface on which the shadow is cast looks bluish. Even the most unreflective viewer does not think that the lawn looks partly green and partly bluish grey when it is sun-dappled. It is the shadow which looks bluish grey, as the lawn looks green. But the absence-theorist cannot even concede that shadows have secondary qualities because absences cannot have insensible parts by the bulk, figure, texture and motion of which it can have the power to produce in us visual sensations as of colours. Only substances can have primary or secondary qualities. But we cannot *presume* that darkness is a new sort of substance in order to defend that it has or appears to have colour especially because, as we shall see later, possession of colour itself has been used as the main premise for the conclusion that darkness is a substance.

Finally, the absence-theorist of shadows faces fresh troubles from the phenomenologically undeniable evidence that shadows *move* in the most interesting and fascinating fashion, get bigger and smaller,

which makes the ancient Chinese and Indonesian shadow-plays possible. Can absences move? If motion is defined as successive production and perishing of *contact* with different regions of space, absences—which are never in the relation of contact with anything even according to those metaphysicians who take absences with utmost seriousness—should be logically incapable of motion.

Once again, this ploy for treating shadows as positive entities may turn out to be rather weak. Imagine a human formation made by an army of well-trained people in a parade. They might march on in a fashion on a ground such that right in the middle of the block of people they show an x-shaped hole or recess which preserves its shape and size as the army moves. From an aerial viewpoint not only will the definitely shaped recess move along with the marching forward of the army, the paraders can keep changing their positions in such a synchronized fashion that the hole itself appears to move from one part of the entire block of humans to another while the block remains apparently stationary in one place, or the gap may change shape or become smaller or bigger. Similarly, one could argue, it is the contour of the patch of light which changes and it is the motion of the light which is falsely superimposed upon the area where there is relative absence of light. The shadow, in reality, is as incapable of movement as the hole amidst the marchers was. Of course, the motion of the light is not the only cause of the illusory motion of the shadow. Leonardo in his notebooks observes *five* kinds of motions of shadows.

> . . . the first of them is that in which the derivative shadow moves together with its opaque body and the light causing this shadow remains immobile; . . . the second is that in which the shadow and the light are moved, but the opaque body is immobile; the third is that in which the opaque body and the luminous source are moved but the luminous source with greater slowness than the opaque body; in the fourth the opaque body is moved less swiftly than the luminous source; and in the fifth, the motion of the opaque body and the luminous source are equal to each other.[12]

It remains a deeper philosophical question as to how to take these causal explanations of the movement of shadows: Do they explain away the apparent motion of shadows as visual illusions like the motion of trees or the river-bank seen from a speeding boat? Or do they give the causes of what we really and veridically see as out there?

One could appeal to the shaky generalisation that whatever can be the substratum of an erroneous superimposition must be positive in nature like the tree or the river-bank upon which motion is superimposed. However, the mainstream philosophical attitude is to take linguistic usages such as 'shadow grows longer' and 'shadow moves' as unnoticeably metaphorical like the statement: 'This lecture-room is sleepy' or the phrase 'the sharp rise in death-rates'.[13]

If we do not take seriously the colour and motion arguments against the negative nature of darkness, the absence-theorist has a tough time articulating what sort of *not-being of light* darkness is. Not-beings are divided into two major kinds: not-being-the same-as (or *otherness*), and not-being-there (or *lack*). There is no question of identifying darkness with *otherness* from light. We perceive all sorts of bright objects like tigers and teapots as distinct from light. We do not thereby see them as having darkness or shadow. Lacks, on the other hand, are either atemporal or temporal. Atemporal lacks are usually absolute—like the lack of colour in air or the lack of fire in ice, which is *complete*. Shadows are never such absences of light. Even what is known as a pitch-dark night generally has some light particles or waves which start affecting the retina once the latter gets used to the darkness. Temporal absence is either prior or posterior. It seems arbitrary to decide to label the darkness at nightfall as the prior absence of the future morning light, rather than as the posterior absence of the past daylight, or the converse. Prior absences are beginningless and posterior absences are endless. Since a shadow or a patch of darkness has both a beginning and a terminal point of existence it could be neither of those absences.

If we define shadow or darkness as relative deprivation of strong perceptible light, rather than as absolute or temporal lack of any light whatsoever, then we can even explain the following observation made by Goethe in describing some landscapes of the Venetian School:

> The sunlight brought out the local colours dazzlingly, and the shadows were themselves so light that they could have served as lights in another context.[14]

The part of a body which is in shade or darkness can easily be at the same time illuminated by the most clearly visible light—without the shade ceasing to be seen as shade. Leonardo not only notes this theoretically, but demonstrates this phenomenon with superb mas-

tery in his *Cecelia Galleriani* (Lady with the Ermine). In this painting, the bottom of a chin, which is in darkness compared to the highlighted cheek, most naturally accommodates a strong reflected light, proving the crude form of the lack-of-light theory of shade to be quite mistaken.

Even when we adopt a sophisticated version of it, the absence-theory of darkness faces grave epistemological objections. Perceptions of an absence, we have already noted, necessarily presupposes awareness of the absentee. It also presupposes awareness of the locus. The fully fledged form of the alleged absence-perception would be:

'The *a* which is *f* is not there in *l*'—where *a* is the absentee, *f* can be technically called the property limiting the absenteehood and *l* the locus. Now, sometimes we do perceive darkness in this way. When lights go off suddenly at night we perceive the posterior absence of those very lights in the room. But one can imagine a person who has always lived in a dark chamber—maybe a born Benedictine monk—who nevertheless has full eyesight. He would see darkness without having the vaguest idea of the lack of what sort of light it is that he is witnessing. Often darkness is seen without any identification of the place where it is seen, precisely because the place is enveloped in gloom. Thus even the requirement that the locus of absence be identified is not satisfied by the perception of darkness.

Finally, there are philosophers who stubbornly question the division of entities into presences and absences. If light and darkness are opposites why not think of light as absence of darkness, rather than the other way around? Leonardo observes,

> Shadow is of greater power than light, because it banishes and completely deprives bodies of light and light can never wholly chase away the shadows of bodies that is to say of dense bodies.[15]

If Leonardo is literally correct—I suspect he is not—then it would be implausible to decide that darkness is the privative entity on the ground that light is stronger and more ineliminable from the manifest image of the visually available world than shade.

We have discussed the absence-theory and objections to it at some length. Before I end I want to flesh out a little some of the alternative *positive* account of darkness as an entity.

5. POSITIVE THEORIES

The English word 'darkness' with its ness-y ending suggests that it is a positive *quality*. Avoiding the confusion already noted at the outset, one account which can be suggested is that like redness and blueness darkness itself is a colour.

Shadows are just patches of such a colour which can appear to be a different colour because of the colour of the surface and light condition of the surroundings etc. Now, all of us who have struggled with sense-data theories of various kinds know that the word 'patch' in 'a patch of colour' hides quite a lot of confusions.

In a typically tantalizing entry in his *Commonplace Book*, called 'Shadows, Patches of Light, etc.', G.E. Moore wonders why you can have blue and yellow patches of light but not a black patch of light. Yet black surely can be the colour of something that appears on the movie-screen. Moore asks: 'What name is there for the ? thrown on the screen in a cinema?' At the end of the entry he decides to call the ? 'images'. But, I think, 'images' is no clearer than 'patches'. Moore rules out the possibility that what we see on the movie-screen when a colour film is being shown are *shadows* of translucent surfaces. But one can try proving that shadows are colours from the other side of the equation. Goethe quotes one seventeenth-century Jesuit author called Athanasius Kircher, who held the view that 'Colour itself is a degree of darkness'. We can understand the appeal of this view in the following manner: In order to create darkness or cast a shadow we usually need to obstruct the light with an opaque body. But if we start making the obstruction less and less opaque it would still prevent some light. The shadow of a panel of stained glass will be a collage of patches of colour. Thus, if we look at a projected colour slide on the screen as shadows left behind by partially opaque surfaces, then we shall see the point of calling colour itself a degree of darkness. The baby physics behind the theory could be this: colours after all are results of the selective absorption of parts of the spectrum by different surfaces. Any colour other than white must be therefore a result of some sort of obstruction eating up parts of the light falling on the surface. Thus our experience in watching a colour film can be just an enriched version of the experience of a shadow-play. If colours are bits of darkness then it may *seem* easier to agree with the view that darkness is colour, although I suspect that such ontological identities are not exactly symmetric.

But this view is not at all popular among phenomenologists of shadow. First, there is an unclarity in the very notion of colours. Are they universals or particulars? Modern Western philosophy—barring exceptions like G.F. Stout—has a tendency to treat colours along with all qualities as universals. I myself prefer the view that colours are objective particular qualities or tropes specific to the surface where they belong.

Now, if colours were universals then shadows cannot be colours because the visual perception of shadows clearly points to particular two-dimensional unrepeatable entities. I am not assuming that universals are imperceptible, and perhaps all shadows share the universal: *shadowiness*. But I find it unintuitive to think of shadows themselves as abstract entities.

What if colours are particular qualities? Even then, there would be *two* strong arguments against treating shadows as colours. First, the same single shadow can consist of different discriminable patches of colour, when it spans across different surfaces. Take the shadow of the lance on the admiral's dress in Rembrandt's *Nightwatch*. We see different colours within the same continuous shadow, and the particular colours are individuated according to the number of distinct dress-materials in which they inhere. But the shadow is individuated by the light source and the shadow-casting object. We see one shadow, but many colours.

Secondly, take this neat and naive little argument: Colours do not have colours, shadows have colours, hence shadows are not colours.

That shadows *have* colours—however questionable it may be—has been also used as a perceptually well-grounded premise for the somewhat strange view that shadows are *substances* rather than qualities.

Entire schools of philosophy—Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā, and Jaina—in ancient and medieval India had upheld the view that darkness is an independent substance on the basis of arguments such as the following: Whatever has the capacity to cover another substance is itself a substance, e.g. a curtain, a lid. Darkness can cover any substance on which it is cast. Hence it is itself a substance. Only substances can have qualities like colour and shape. Darkness has colour and shape. Hence darkness is a substance.

That it does not physically clash with other substances, or that it cannot be *really* coloured or contoured because all really coloured or contoured objects are touchable—have not dissuaded these substance-theorists. A beam of light or a flame of fire can also be

passed through without any clash, and a shadow, after all, does get distorted if a hand or stick goes through it. In scorching summer days darkness or shadows feel cool to the *touch*—so it is not obvious that they are only accessible to *one* sensory faculty. And in any case, the converse generalisation that whatever has touch has colour fails in the case of air. The rule that all coloured substances are tangible may also admit an exception, viz. darkness.

The strongest argument against shadows being coloured substances has been the following:

A. All substances which are genuinely coloured need the help of light to be seen, e.g. a cherry.
B. Darkness can be seen without the help of light. Hence darkness is not a genuinely coloured substance.

We find premise A clearly formulated in early and late Vaiśeṣika texts on metaphysics and also in Aristotle's *De Anime 419*[a]. Starting somewhat polemically Aristotle observes:

> Not everything that is visible depends upon light for its visibility. This is only true of the 'proper' colour of things. . . . That is why without the help of light colour remains invisible.

In the Indian context, *A* has been challenged by the counter-example of light itself, or the sun or the moon, which do not need the help of light to be visible. Also premise *B* does not hold true at all about coloured shadows.

Both Leonardo and Goethe who talk about coloured shadows make the presence of light of a specific kind a necessary condition for the visual perception of coloured shadows.

The robust point behind this standard argument, however, remains true. A coloured substance, even a black surface, can be better observed in brighter light, although perhaps one can never see its *real* colour under any condition of illumination—maybe it has none (remember Russell's famous remark: 'To avoid favouritism we are compelled to deny that, in itself, the table has any one particular colour'). But it is foolish to try to observe the real colour of a shadow by illuminating it with a beam of light which destroys the shadow. Of course we can illuminate the *painting* of a shadowy twilight scene or even a predominantly dark Rembrandt with bright light, but that does not entail that darkness itself can be seen better with the aid of light.

Finally, material substances which are accessible to external perception are necessarily supposed to be divisible into particles. But talk about particles of shadow seems out of place outside of a Seurat canvas. Yet Jaina ontologists talk fearlessly about darkness atoms clustering together to form visible darkness.

Astrophysicists of today are talking very seriously about dark matter. The most famous physicist of our times, Stephen Hawking wrote in 1990:

> According to our understanding of the early universe, objects should be moving apart at a rate which is just fast enough that gravity will never quite make them stop and start falling together again. . . . We can measure the rate at which objects are moving apart, but the amount of matter we can see in the universe is not enough to slow down this rate of expansion significantly. So there are two possibilities; either our understanding of the very early universe is completely wrong, or there is some other form of matter in the universe that we have failed to detect. The second possibility seems more likely, but the required amount of missing 'dark' matter is enormous; it is about a hundred times the matter we can directly observe.

The astrophysics book of which he was writing the foreward where the above passage occurs not only speaks of the well-known black holes and dark baryonic matter, but also states unambiguously: 'We can imagine that the particles of shadow-matter might form shadow atoms and molecules.'[16]

I have always been suspicious of current scientific parallels of some ancient metaphysical speculations. The dark matter of current physics may have nothing to do with ordinarily perceived shadows—which most probably are a form of absence of light.

6. ARE SHADOWS ILLUSIONS?

All these phony quarrels about the ontological status of shadow might finally lead us to believe that shadows, after all, are public optical illusions like the 'rising' sun, or the 'broken' stick immersed in water. Against the view that shadows themselves are illusory appearances, one could argue that sometimes we hallucinate shadows rather than really see them. There are regular optical illusions, where, for instance in the white gaps between a series of separated blocks of black squares we regularly hallucinate patches of darkness. The converse

illusion can also happen. A very clear shadow-dot on a white shirt could be mistaken for a hole or piece of dirt. We might try touching it or knocking it away, only to realize that it really was a shadow. Could shadows be mistaken for something else, and falsely perceived to be there unless they were sometimes veridically perceived? When there were no humans or even any animal with visual sense organs around on this planet, wouldn't an erect stone cast its shadow on the ground on a clear sunny afternoon?[17]

So shadows cannot be so easily wished away as illusory or any more observer-dependent than other visible objects. If we regard them as objective perceptible absences of light, then we must provide an account of perception of absences as separate countable entities, because we have seen that seeing of a shadow cannot be reduced to just failing to see light. A correct definition of 'seeing' is immensely difficult to come up with (as David Lewis' paper *Veridical Hallucinations* brings out). But if shadows are lacks of light, and they are *seen* and seeing essentially involves a causal relation between the object and the sense-organ then we have to start thinking about the causal efficacy of lacks. Negative things like lacks or absences, by and large, have not been favoured by ontologists in the recent Western mainstream. Given that not only Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysicians but even contemporary thinkers conclude that a shadow is a 'local relative deficiency in the quantity of light meeting a surface, and is objective',[18] seems to demand a reconsideration of this bias in favour of the positive—a 'positivism', as it were, on a par with sexism and racism. Negative things like shadows, shades and darknesses most definitely exist mind-independently and can cause us to see them directly. Indeed, without seeing *them*, we would not see bulges and depressions, undulations and grainy textures, cracks and holes, spheres and edges, dawns and dusks.

In an earlier section, I had promised to say something about the importance of shadows and darkness in the history of philosophy. Let me mention just two glaring examples: shadows in Plato's cave and darkness as Śaṅkara's analogue for Ignorance—a positive *presented falsehood.*

7. IN PLATO'S CAVE

In Plato's *Republic*[19] shadows seen by the prisoners in the cave serve as analogues for illusory objects or mere appearances. When the liberated lucky ones are outside the cave recovering from the initial

dazzlement by the well-lit originals, they realize, and I quote Plato, 'that what they had formerly seen was meaningless foolery'. The Greek originals here uses the word '*phluarios*' which has been translated by Julia Annas as 'illusion' and even Shorey and Jowett have over-translated it giving the impression that Plato considered seeing of shadows to be a case of our senses cheating us into believing what was not there to be there.

Now, it is one thing to call shadows insubstantial but quite another thing to call them illusory. The popular Greek idiom: 'fighting over the ass' shadow' which is alluded to in Plato's *Phaedrus* (260c) as well as in Aristophanes' comedy *The Wasps* understandably takes shadows as less *important* than their originals but not as less real. Even Plato calls them 'silly trifles' in the context of the cave, but perhaps for Plato to be real is to be valuable and hence unimportance is not that far from unreality! But let us see how appropriate it would be to call what the prisoners saw as mere appearance or silly trifles. Of course, if a prisoner saw a silhouette of a man blowing a bugle and judged 'That is a man blowing a bugle on that wall', that *would* be a pretty silly error. But for that error to be possible, doesn't he need to have seen correctly, sometimes before, a man and a bugle? The elements of the content of a misperception have to be severally available to him through some veridical experiences of the past. Given that, unlike a mirror-reflection, a shadow did not look like the prisoners themselves (supposing that the prisoners could barely see themselves) it is hard to imagine how such an error could actually be made. It is understandable, however, that since the light source or the effigies in wood or stone were not seen or even suspected by them, they could not see the shadows *as shadows*. So they could be making some misjudgement. But what they saw on the surface of the wall they were facing were objective entities, even if they were a bunch of absences or superficialities like holes and cracks. In so far as a sun-dazzled landscape is also sun-dappled—to carry on the analogy—even in the sunny world outside the freed people should meet with real shadows cast by real people and real trees!! What then could be the rationale for using shadows as illustrations of mere appearances (even if he does not call them illusory)? One answer could be found in Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's discussion on the different meanings of 'falsity'. Shadows are called 'false' in so far as they are 'fitted by nature to appear to be other than (what)

they are'.[20] Here also, Aristotle's example of a 'shadowgraph' reminds us of Plato's parable. The very next example is of dreams but the explanation of *their* falsity is different. Dreams are false because they 'appear as things which do not exist'. It stands to reason therefore that those 'other things' (that shadows might mislead us into thinking that we see when we see their shadows) *do exist.* Real shadows can only be cast by real owners of shadows.

Let me at this point return to the initial puzzle of cast shadows, set up in the first section. A shadow is a relative privation of light. Now, a certain located absence of light (the end-shadow) due to an intervening opaque object is such that within the conical range marked by the apex which is the source of light and the base which is the surface hosting the end-shadow, any arbitrarily placed obstruction of the appropriate size would have caused the *same* end-shadow on the same surface. Thus, a single shadow could 'belong to' a number of distinct obstructing objects; if more than one of them are actually present within the shaded volume of space then no one of them has any special claim on it. Yet a shadow always raises the question 'whose shadow?' because *it is a parasitic entity.* It needs an owner but cannot legitimately be assigned one. As an ontological orphan, therefore, in spite of its objectivity as a visible absence, it gravitates towards a misleading appearance. One of our assumptions creating the puzzle was that an ownerless shadow cannot exist. The solution of the puzzle lies in simply giving up this assumption. As mere absences which require an absentee (the light from the source) and a locus (the host surface) but no determinate blocking entity (*vāraka dravya*), shadows with no (specifiable) owners do exist.

8. THE ANALOGUE OF POSITIVE IGNORANCE

A famous passage of the post-Śaṅkara Advaita work *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha* tries to establish the 'existence' of a positive veil of ignorance on the basis of the following inference: 'This freshly obtained veridical awareness must have been preceded by an ignorance, just like the illumination of a first-lit lamp in darkness which is preceded by a positive darkness substance distinct from mere prior absence of the light, concealing the object which is now illuminated by the light, and removable by the same light, because both of them (the light and the knowledge) have the feature of

manifesting that which was hitherto unmanifested.' Although this inference heavily depends upon the positive substance theory of darkness which Advaita Vedānta borrows from Mīmāṁsā (after all Vedānta is Mīmāṁsā too!!) and to that extent, it lacks strength in so far as that theory of darkness fails to hold water, we can appreciate the analogy between darkness and ignorance (shadow and doubt) that underlies this inference. The phenomenological significance of the introspective state expressed as: 'I do not know (I do not see, understand, remember or feel) anything' that we seem to suffer (or even enjoy!) sometimes is as immense as the value of darkness in a Rembrandt painting. Without this surrounding 'field' of nescience the revealing 'focus' of knowledge would not have been discernible. The just-woken person's retrospective report seems to point towards the existence of such a felt darkness during deep sleep. Advaita metaphysics does not only compare darkness and ignorance, it also confesses that the exact nature of this ignorance, which, like the play of shadows in a three dimensional field of vision, gives delineation and body to the empirically known objects, whereby every object known, as it were, is fished out of an ocean of beginningless unknowing. The exact nature of this concealing ignorance, however, is indeterminable. It is neither ultimately real nor totally unreal. The contradictory pulls of intuition that we feel about the cast shadows inside Plato's Cave when explored equally well lead us to this ontological twilight of indeterminacy which Advaita captures through the concept of *māyā*.

Notes

1. Austin, 1961, p. 219.
2. *Nāsadīya Sūkta* ṚgVeda X. 129 has the phrase '*tama asid*' (there was darkness) in its 3rd verse. Sāyaṇa packs in the entire Advaita Vedānta metaphysics of positive ignorance here while commenting upon this occurrence of the word 'darkness'. Let me translate extracts from his gloss here: 'Before creation, at the state of dissolution, matter and the entire material world were concealed in darkness. Just as nocturnal darkness covers all things, so were things. Here, that positive ignorance of which another name is "*māyā*", because it obstructs the true nature of the self, is called "darkness" . . . When it (the world) comes to light through name and form out of that engulfing darkness then that is said to be its "birth". By this, the view—that the effect which is nonexistent in the causal state comes into being—this kind of nonexistent-ism or non-pre-existence (*asatkāryavāda*) of the effect is rejected . . . thus "*tamas*" means the positive unknowing which is the root cause. But how can darkness which is the covering agent and the world which is the covered

object, the nominative and the accusative of the act of covering, be essentially of the same nature? This query is answered by the expression "*aprajketam*" meaning that which is not clearly knowable. This darkness is inscrutable and the world inside it at that primordial state is not distinguishable by name and form . . . It is this indistinguishablility which is further emphasised by the analogy of water, because "*salilam*" here means "like water". Just as milk mixed with water is impossible to tell apart similarly the world assumes indiscriminablity through darkness.'

Apart from distinction-effacing '*tamas*', this verse mentions another crucial word '*tapas*' which means 'austere exertion'. How did the One Spirit when immersed in such borderless 'gloom of unknowing' manage to exert Itself to uncover the universe? Sāyaṇa's answer is: 'Through brooding thought about what is to be manifested' (*śraṣṭavya-paryālocanena*) because the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* says about the Ātman-Brahman: 'His *tapas* is of the nature of cognition'.

The total picture of creation is thus very similar to the phenomenology of the birth of a poem or painting which emerges out of painful creative fervour in the midst of an undifferentiated darkness of pregnant confusion. Does the artist know what is about to be uncovered? The answer has to be 'Neither Yes nor No'. Creation is thus always a process of manifestation of the unmanifest, murky unknowability being the root of it all.

3. Todes and Daniels, 1975, p. 87.
4. M. Baxandall, *Shadows and Enlightenment*, 1995, pp. 2-15.
5. L. Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Colour*, p. 37e.
6. Gage, p. 198.
7. Leonardo da Vinci, *Notebooks*, p. 337.
8. Russell, 1956, p. 211.
9. M. Baxandall, *Shadows and Enlightenment*, 1995, p. 2.
10. Translated by Loveday and Forster, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1913, p. 79 1b.
11. Matthaei, 1971, p. 87.
12. Kemp, p. 114.
13. Vyomavati, Chowkhamba edition by Gopinath Kaviraj and Dhundhiraja Shastri, along with *Śākti* and *Setu* glosses by Jagadīśa and Padmanābha, explains away motion of shadows as follows: 'In each successive place where the projection of light is obstructed by a screening substance (like an umbrella) we apply the word 'shadow'. The movement in the screening substance is then falsely superimposed upon the visible absence of sun-light, and we get the usage 'shadow moves'. What is interesting is that a later Jaina text called *Nyāyakumudacandra* quotes this passage and refutes the erroneous superimposition account proposed by Vyomaśiva by arguing: 'motion of one thing can only be superimposed on another existent thing. If shadows do not exist as positive entities how can they be the locus of superimposition of the screen's motion?' The language of the reply, however, suggests that the Jaina author is making the common mistake of conflating Vaiśeṣika absences with nonexistent entities. The final argument:

> Shadows must be ultimately real, because they are things which have superimposed motion; whatever has superimposed motion, like the trees on the bank, is ultimately real

does not actually refute the absence-theory of shadows of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika because absences are ultimately real in that scheme of things.

14. Gage, p. 176.
15. Kemp, p. 90.
16. Riordan, p. 200.
17. We find at least five well-defended positions in Classical Indian Philosophy about the ontological status of shadows:

    A. They are general absences of strong light (*prauḍhaprakāśakatejahsāmānyā-bhāvaḥ*) —Nyāya Vaiśeṣika
    B. They are misperceived dark-blue colour superimposed from the eyes onto a surface relatively deprived of light.—Śrīdhara in *Nyāyakandalī*.
    C. Darkness is a substance—dense, thin, and intangible, blackish-blue in colour and visible without the help of light. It is an evolute of earth or *ākāśa*.—Rāmānuja and Vedāntadeśika.
    D. Darkness and shadows form a positive, mobile, independent and tenth category of substances by destroying which light has to manifest itself and other things hidden by gloom.—Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta.
    E. Darkness is a substance with colour, touch and healing properties—Jaina. The best account of all these views and their polemics is to be found in Vadidevāsuri's *Pramāṇānayatattvalokālaṁkāra*, chapter 5, pp. 849-58.

18. M. Baxandall, op. cit., p. 2.
19. Plato, *Republic*, Bk VII, ch xxv, 514A-521B.
20. Bk. V Lesson 22. commentary 1129.

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Semantic Holism *versus* Intentional Realism: An Informational Semanticist's Approach

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Semantic holism is a doctrine about the meaning or content of representations—linguistic or mental. So it is a doctrine lying in the theory of meaning, if we are ready to accept the Dummettian distinction between a semantic theory and a theory of meaning. Intentional realism is a doctrine about intentional states. It is a metaphysical doctrine. Fodor has pointed out a conflict between these two doctrines and he sides with intentional realism. He proposes an alternative semantics (anti-holistic) for the intentional states (mental representations) which is within the tradition of informational approaches to content. Fodor has also made an attempt to undermine semantic holism in the sense that the arguments on the basis of which semantic holism has actually been proposed cannot establish it. In this paper I have elaborated Fodor's position in the holism-realism issue and made an attempt to show that the whole project of Fodor is ill-founded.

Let us start with the way in which Fodor shows the conflict between semantic holism and intentional realism. He first formulates holism in *Holism: A Shopper's Guide* with respect to a property and then specifies semantic holism by applying this formulation of his to a semantic property. He holds that a property may be anatomic or punctate (atomistic). A property is anatomic in the case when anything has it then at least one other thing does, e.g. the property of being a sibling. If x is a sibling then there is at least one other person y who is a sibling. A punctate property is one which might, in principle, be instantiated, by only one thing, e.g. the property of being a rock. An anatomic property is holistic in the sense that if anything of a kind has it then all things of the kind do. The property of being a number is, unlike the property of being a sibling, not only an anatomic property but also a holistic property. If 1 is a number then so is 2 and all other elements of the series.

If this notion of holism is applied to the property of having a content then we get semantic holism. The property of having a content is a semantic property. So the doctrine that the property of having a content is holistic, is to say that if anything of a kind has a content then everything of that kind has a content. It is representations which can have content. Representations are of two kinds—linguistic and mental. So there can be two versions of semantic holism. One version is: if any linguistic representation (i.e. any expression of a language) has content then every linguistic representation (every expression of that language) has a content. The other version is: if any mental representation (every intentional state of the mind) has a content then every mental representation does. Thus, Fodor points out, the issue of semantic holism has given rise to two traditions of thinkers. One tradition stems from the likes of the British empiricists, via such of the pragmatists as Peirce and James, members of the Vienna Circle through the contemporary representatives, such as model theorists, behaviourists and informational semanticists. The second tradition begins from the structuralists in linguistics and possibly the Fregeans in philosophy. Its contemporary representatives include Quine, Davidson, Lewis, Dennett, Block, Putnam, Rorty among philosophers, almost everybody in AI and Cognitive Psychology. Fodor draws our attention, first in *Psychosemantics* and then in *A Theory of Content: And Other Essays* and his other writings, to the fact that semantic holism brings forth a major threat to intentional realism.

Intentional realism is a metaphysical doctrine about intentional states. Intentional science rests on the realistic understanding of intentional states. In intentional science it is taken for granted that two organisms can be in the same intentional state, i.e. they can have thought tokens which are of the same type. It is assumed here that two persons can have the same belief or desire (which are examples of intentional states). The sharability of the intentional states, which is assumed in intentional sciences, constitute the objective, realistic character of the intentional states. The laws laid down in intentional science achieve generality by quantifying over all the organisms which are in a specified intentional state. These laws take a form such as: 'If any organism believes that p and desires q then it behaves in such a manner'.

Fodor shows that if semantic holism is true, then the likelihood that intentional science might eventually produce theories whose objectivity and reliability parallel those of the physical and the biological

sciences is jeopardised. Thus semantic holism comes in conflict with intentional realism. The conflict between semantic holism and intentional realism is explained by Fodor in the following way. Let us suppose that *T* is a property which a thought or mental representation has if it expresses a proposition that is the content of some intentional state (say a belief) of mine. Now if *T* is holistic then it might turn out that nobody has a thought that is a token of the same type of which my thought about something is a token unless he also has thoughts which are tokens of the same types of which all my other thoughts are. Because if anybody is to share a thought of mine which has a content (where having a content is supposed to be a holistic property) then he must also be in possession of thoughts having the contents which my other thoughts have. But no two minds ever do share all of their thoughts (intentional states). Hence, if holism is true, no two organisms can be in the same intentional state, i.e. nobody can share any of the thoughts of any other person. Hence we have to admit, if holism is true, that the intentional science cannot legitimately make generalisations quantifying over the organisms which are in the same intentional states. No two organisms will ever get subsumed under the same intentional generalisation. So, there is no hope for the intentional science which assumes intentional realism. Hence intentional realism is at stake.

At this juncture, Fodor holds that we have to choose between semantic holism and intentional realism. One option is to live with semantic holism and look for ways to mitigate the consequences for the intentional science; another is to stick to intentional realism and do without semantic holism. Quine, Davidson, Stich, Dennett, Churchland and others opt for the former, whereas Fodor and other informational semanticists opt for the latter.

Fodor proposes an alternative theory of content. He receives the moral from the above conflict between semantic holism and intentional realism that a satisfactory theory of content must be atomistic. His theory of content is within the tradition of informational semantics. In order to retain intentional science, which assumes intentional realism, Fodor specifically gives an informational semantic account of intentional states (mental representations).

Let us recapitulate what has been said so far. I have explained the way in which Fodor first formulates semantic holism and intentional realism, and then shows the conflict between the two. After showing this conflict, he holds that we have two options: either to opt for se-

mantic holism or for intentional realism, we cannot admit both. Fodor opts for the latter and consequently he proposes a theory of content which is not holistic, but is rather atomistic.

The theory of content which Fodor proposes falls within the tradition of informational semantics. He has given a detailed exposition of informational semantics in *A Theory of Content: And Other Essays* showing how it originates from the Skinnerian semantics discussed in *Verbal Behaviour*, and develops through Dretske's theory in *Knowledge and the Flow of Information*. Finally, he gives his own version of informational semantics. The basic idea of this kind of semantics is that for a representation to have content is to carry information, and the information which constitutes the content is determined solely by the nomic relations between the representation and the extrarepresentational entity.

One may pose a methodological query in connection with Fodor's critique of semantic holism. One may call in question the way in which Fodor proposes intentional realism through the rejection of semantic holism. The problem emerges from the second step in Fodor's project, where Fodor holds that there are two options to resolve the conflict. One is to live with semantic holism and the other is to stick to intentional realism. We have seen that Fodor opts for the metaphysical doctrine and he constructs his own theory of content (meaning) which fits his metaphysical doctrine. The reason which he provides for the option he takes is: 'Anti-individualism one may have learned at Mother's knee, but you have to go to Harvard to learn to be a Meaning Holist' (*Psychosemantics*, p. 60). Although it sounds too emotionally loaded, it does have a solid ground. The ground is that we have a very strong intuition that one organism can share another's intentional states.

Now the methodological question can be expressed in this way. In any field, whether it is the field of intentional states or the field of mathematics or any other, we can think of different aspects, e.g., representational, metaphysical, logical, epistemic, etc. In each aspect of every field we have certain intuitions which are supposed to be accommodated in the theory we construct concerning that aspect. The question is: With intuitions of which aspect are we to start our philosophical enquiry? Suppose we are concerned with mathematics. Should we start with building our ontological theory accommodating our intuitions concerning mathematical reality and then construct the other theories concerning the other aspects accordingly? Or

should we start with building our theory of meaning accommodating our intuitions concerning the use of mathematical statements and then construct the other theories concerning the other aspects accordingly? We find in our discussion of Fodor's project that Fodor starts with our intuition concerning the metaphysical aspects of intentional states. It is on the basis of these intuitions that Fodor opts for intentional realism and constructs his theory of content of the language of thought. So Fodor seems to suggest that we should settle our metaphysical issues first of all and then proceed for settling meaning theoretic issues.

Michael Dummett, on the other hand, gives a diametrically opposite suggestion. In *The Logical Basis of Metaphysics,* Dummett explicitly observes that meaning-theoretic problems should be settled first, and then we can proceed to settle the metaphysical issues via the solutions of the semantic or truth-theoretic issues. He holds that if we are to climb on the metaphysical peaks then we have to start from our base camp of meaning theory. So if Fodor's approach to settle philosophical issues is called the top-down approach Dummett's approach is to be called the bottom-up approach. Davidson's approach comes very close to that of Dummett. Quine seems to say that the base camp is constituted by naturalised epistemology. Thus we, are really baffled. Which path should we take? One may hold that we should not give primacy to any of the different kinds of intuitions mentioned above. In our philosophical enquiry, we must go on philosophizing across the board. But this will make philosophical enquiry much more unsystematic than it actually is.

At this point, I am sympathetic to Dummett's approach, because the argument given by him in favour of his approach is not very weak. Dummett holds, to repeat, that we should start with building our philosophy of language. The advantage of philosophy of language is that here we do have a definite means of justifying our theory of meaning. Because a satisfactory theory of meaning has to satisfy certain unanimous constraints with the help of which we can check whether or not our theory of meaning is a correct theory. But in the case of metaphysical issues, there is no such means. So our metaphysical theories are to be judged in the light of our theory of meaning. Now if this is granted, then Fodor's whole project appears to be misdirected.

The point which I would like to highlight is that Fodor's project is ill-founded. The whole project depends on the conflict he has attempted to show between semantic holism and intentional realism.

But it can be pointed out that the argument on the basis of which he tries to highlight the conflict is not convincing enough. Fodor's argument for this conflict can be schematically stated in the following way:

Premiss 1: Semantic holism is the doctrine that the property of having a content is such that if anything of a kind has it then everything of the kind has it.

Premiss 2: If any intentional state of a mind has a content then every intentional state of the mind has a content [This is a special case of permiss 1].

Premise 3: Nobody can have all the intentional states of any other person.

From Premisses 1 and 2 we get:

If *A* is to have an intentional state of *B* then *A* must have all other intentional states of *B* having the content they have.

From this and permiss 3 we get: Nobody can share any thought of any other person.

This conclusion evidently conflicts with intentional realism which is the doctrine that intentional states are sharable.

Here it may be argued that Premiss 1 presents a very unusual characterisation of semantic holism. The question is not really whether anything's having a content depends upon all other things' having a content or not. The real question is whether the content of anything of a kind is determined by the content of all other things of the kind. It is conceivable that all things of a kind have content, one thing's having a content depends upon other things' having content, although it is not the case that the content of anything of the kind is determined by the content of all things of the kind. It is this sense in which philosophers usually use the expression 'semantic holism'. Semantic holism, with respect to a language, is understood to be a doctrine that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of all the sentences of the concerned language. But this property of being determined by the contents of other things of the kind is neither explicitly maintained nor is it implied in Fodor's characterisation of semantic holism.

It can further be said that if the dependence of the very being of the content of a representation on the content of other representations is not mentioned in the characterisation of semantic holism then it does not necessarily follow from Premisses 1 and 2 that if *A* is

to have an intentional state of *B* then *A* must have all other intentional states of *B*.

We have seen that Fodor's project of establishing intentional realism through the rejection of semantic holism is based on the supposed conflict between semantic holism and intentional realism. So the success of Fodor's project depends upon the success of showing that the conflict really exists. But I have argued that Fodor fails to show that this conflict really exists. Therefore, Fodor's whole project seems to be ill-founded.

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The Notion of 'Intentional Content': Mohanty and Searle

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This paper is an attempt to understand the concept of *intentional content* within the framework of semantics of phenomenology, especially the theory of 'transcendental constitutive intentionality' advocated by J.N. Mohanty. This theory mainly advocates a non-naturalistic version of the theory of intentionality. Moreover, for Husserl, as for his successors who advocate the theory of intentionality, 'transcendental theory of intentionality cannot appeal in whole or part, to causal relation between acts (or contents or egos) and objects in the external environment'.[1] And, Mohanty is not an exception to this view. So far as the ontology of 'content' is concerned, it has been treated as autonomous in the sense that it can neither be propositionalized nor can one propositionally be aware of it. Rather, the very idea of propositionalization and thereby identifying the content with linguistic meaning goes against the whole contention of phenomenology, according to Mohanty.

For Mohanty, the study of the generative structure of intentional content presents a descriptive picture of the intentional content by focusing on various functional aspects, such as, physical and social.[2] Although he feels that this version of content provides a 'satisfactory' account, he characterizes it as 'empirical' as well as 'contingent'. It displays the relationship of intentional content with the *subject*. As a result of which it individualizes the content. Thus, ontologically speaking, for Mohanty, intentional content, being the source of our various intentional experiences, presupposes a phenomenological or transcendental ground. However, this raises two important points: (1) whether we can advocate the theory of meaning with reference to 'transcendental constitutive intentionality' and (2) whether we can justify the theory of 'pure transcendentalism' of

the Husserlian variety. If we cannot, then the content theory of intentionality is not at all transcendental. That is, meaning can be thoroughly explained without appealing to phenomenological transcendentalism. John Searle who advocates such a theory of meaning is opposed by Mohanty, who characterizes Searle's theory as 'existential intentionality'.[3] However, for Searle, the objectivity of intentional content is not located in an independent third world unlike Fregean 'sense' and Mohanty's 'content'. Rather, intentional content functions within our language-use. Hence, it is difficult to interpret Searle's theory of intentionality of meaning as having closer affinity with Husserl's theory of intentionality.[4]

Husserl's 'pure transcendentalism' in its approach is *essentialistic.* Although Husserl talks about 'meaning', primacy is given to the 'essence'. Both essence and meaning are intertwined, and the description of meaning is always 'overshadowed' by the description of essence. This essentialism of Husserl can be called a *strong* version of transcendental phenomenology.[5] On the other hand, Mohanty's interpretation of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology gives a different dimension to it. So far as 'constitution of meaning' is concerned, his effort is to set free phenomenology from the Husserlian strong essentialism. According to him, meaning is rooted in the unalterable facticity of worldly experiences. This phenomenological world-view of Mohanty does not disown transcendentalism altogether, but brings about a harmony between empiricism and transcendentalism. They are not two different domains—rather they belong to one.[6] To quote Mohanty: '. . . transcendental consciousness and empirical consciousness are distinct and different; the later one is individualized, the former is a pure eidos with no individuating traits within itself. However, such a conception does not accord with the empiricist *motif* of Husserlian thought, with its thesis of "wonderful parallelism" between the empirical and transcendental, and the claim that with *epoche* nothing is lost but everything reappears with "a change of signature".'[7] This parallelistic conception of Mohanty lays stress on the fact that the clarification of the constitution of meaning can be given with reference to 'originary of experiences.' As he points out, the exercise of 'meaning' needs transformation within the domain. This is not the pure transcendentalism of Husserl, but a *transmution* within the same domain.

The first section of this paper focuses on the structure of inten-

tional content with reference to mental representations. It mainly stresses on the point how intentional content is related to mental representations and mental phenomena. The second section points out the functional relationship of intentional content within language use in general and forms of life in particular. Moreover, it highlights the objectivity of meaning and truth in connection with the function of intentional content. The concluding section discusses the nature of the Searlean subject and its role in the world. It mainly tries to answer the questions as to whether, it is not the case that intentional content is presupposed in experience. The notion of contenthood and its intrinsic relationship with objecthood is explicated in the case of the subject's participation with the world, and with regard to the experience of the 'experiencing subject'[8] and it explains 'why this subject has its experience?'[9] This further leads to the possibility of 'linguistic categories'[10] as the subject itself is a linguistic being. Moreover, this shows that the propositionalization is inevitable in order to give a systematic account of the logical structure of intentional content.

I. INTENTIONAL CONTENT, REPRESENTATION AND LANGUAGE

'Intentional content' plays a central role in semantics. Its nature is such that it explicates the structure of 'intentionality' as well as that of 'representation'. By representation we mean the representation of a piece of knowledge in the sense that all knowledge is propositional and can be expressed in language. Hence, it is through *representation* that the contents and their directedness are revealed. Moreover, there are two facets of representation. They are, the representation of visual experiences, and the representation of intentional states. In the case of representation of visual experiences, when a person is 'seeing' an object given within his/her visual field, the person is not simply 'seeing' the object, s/he is 'experiencing' the object.[11] And later on, if the person is asked to report about the perceptual object, then the person's report will be certainly like, 'I saw the object as that . .'. and that'. That is to say, whenever we see something we usually *see* the thing *as* something. As a result what is being experienced is not the object, rather the way the object looks like and is presented, .i.e. the content. Thus, we have already propositionalized the content. Thus there is a sort of *transformation*[12] from our visual experience to verbal expression. Searle says,

'. . . the verb "see" takes spatial modifiers that under the natural interpretation require us to postulate an entire proposition as content of visual experience.'[13] So far as the representation of mental or intentional states is concerned, Searle says, '. . . verbs of "desire" take temporal modifiers that require us to postulate entire propositions as contents of desire.'[14] In both the cases of *representations* we can say that it is only through language that representation takes place. Thus, precisely 'speech-acts' are the paradigmatic cases of representation. To perform a speech-act is to describe the *world* directly or indirectly. The description does not simply mean the description of a state of affair. Rather, the *description* also can be interpreted from a wider perspective which reveals the 'intention' of the speaker as well as shows its reference to the *world*. Wittgenstein rightly says, '. . . we know what is a compete and what is an incomplete description . . . . Giving a complete (incomplete) report of a speech. Is it part of this report the tone of voice, the play of expression, the genuineness and falsity of the facts of feeling, the intention of the speaker, the strain of speaking? Whether this or that belongs to complete description will depend on the purpose of the description on what the recipient does with the description.'[15]

Representation is basically subjective in its nature. It is subjective in the sense that it depends upon the person's experience with the world. That is, everybody has a peculiar way of perceiving or experiencing the world. As Searle says, 'The world itself has no point of view, but my access to the world through my conscious states is always perspectival, always from my point of view.'[16] Thus, Searle's concept of representation does not accommodate a physicalistic version of representation as Mohanty[17] seems to believe. Searle never denies the reality of the 'self' or 'I'. For him, the self or the subject is autonomous and cannot be reduced to a physical body.

Both Husserl and Searle have emphasized the *internality* of representation. The notion of internality here means that the representation can be traced to the mental states of the representing subject. The mental states are expressed in language such that the linguistic representations are derived from mental representations.[18] Therefore, meaning of the mental representations is expressed through the *noematic sinn* of the linguistic representations. This conception of internality of mental representation for the expression of *noematic sinn* results in a serious debate in semantics. To say that mental states are represented in language and are simultaneously expressed

in the *noematic sinn* indirectly implies the location of content in the mind. Though Searle advocates that meaning exists in the mind still he gives importance to the notion of objectivity of meaning and truth. And, in so far as the structural formalization of mental states is concerned, Searle is against the idea of syntactical characterization of content. 'The syntactical content is not sufficient for semantics'.[19] The whole network of intentional states is both syntactically and semantically structure. However, it is through the *semantic content* that, '. . . thoughts, and beliefs, and desires are about something, or they refer to something, or they concern states of affair in the world; and they do that because their content directs them at these states of affairs in the world.'[20] Thus, mental or intentional states are well contained within the linguistic structure. The representation of intentional states takes place essentially in language and so the expression of the content is just a formal entity in language. Furthermore, Searle supports the view of 'generative semantics', and says that, '. . . the generative components of linguistic theory is not syntax . . . but semantics . . . that the grammar starts with the description of meaning of a sentence and then generates the syntactical structures through the introduction of syntactical rules and indexical rules.'[21] The whole domain of language can be realized with reference to its 'structure' and 'function'. However, communication also follows representation as it involves thinking and talking. According to Searle, communication is as much intentional as representation and so the content is common to both communication and representation.[22]

Searle's conception of 'language' as a derived phenomena from mental states should be positively interpreted. That is, it is the language use which is secondary in comparison with the structure of mental states. As we have seen earlier, language or the linguistic components (syntax and semantics) are interwoven with the mental states. Thus, it, in no way, makes language less important. So far as the debate over the primacy of language is concerned, it can be resolved, if we look at the nature of human being as a whole and his involvement in language-use. Pradhan aptly remarks, 'Language is part of the world processes in space and time and this fact is manifested in language having its own history. What is remarkable here is not history of language, but that language belongs to the natural history of man. Language embodies the process of concept-formation and language-use. It builds up the conceptual connections in

the context of the human situation in the world. Thus, there is a necessary connection between what the human beings naturally do and the language-use or the game they play.'[23]

II. LINGUISTIC SPACE AND FORMS OF LIFE

In the previous section we have already discussed the internality of intentional content, that is, the way mental states are linguistically structured. In this section, let us focus on the *functional* aspects of language, and show how language and the world stand together. The function of language is generally understood through the variety in language use. It refers to the multiple and innumerable varieties of linguistic activity performed by the user,[24] and, thereby includes the totality of language-games. The totality of *language-use,* or functions, exists parallel to the spatial world. The conception of language-use has no separate ontology. Rather, one can say that the two are embedded in each other. If at all one tries to divide ontology into two distinct domains, i.e. the domain of language and the domain of reality, then one is sure to be dividing reality into two. Precisely for the reason, the whole domain can be characterized as the *linguistic space.*[25] In so far as semantics is concerned, it can well be placed within the framework of 'linguistic space'. Hence, there is nothing beyond the linguistic space.

Now, it is important to note the interrelationship between Searle's 'subjective intentional representation' of content with the language-use in general and objectivity of meaning and truth in particular. By saying that mental representation expresses the *subjective* intentional content, Searle's theory does not commit itself to a solipsistic world view. Rather, for Searle, subjectivity is an essential feature of consciousness. And, consciousness itself emerges out of the brain process. As he remarks, 'By consciousness I do not mean the passive subjectivity of Cartesian tradition but all the forms of life—from the forms "four's". . .'[26] Thus, the threat of solipsism is mitigated. Searle relates the intentional states to language-use which is a frolic activity. Besides, the mental processes as well as language-use, are biological in character. To state that language use is a biological process creates the impression that the whole process of mental activities is mechanical and so seems to deny the rationality and creativity of language-use. Pradhan critically remarks, 'To liken language-use to a mechanical process and the activity of rule-following to a bio-

logical process alone, is thus to disregard the fact of normative and rational behaviour on the part of human beings.'[27] However, Searle is not a naturalist who denies the rational aspect of a human being. Rather, for him, *rules* in principle are essentially related to consciousness and language-use.

Now the question arises, what is the language-use we are talking about? The totality of language-games never means the whole range of representations at a particular time by each and every language user. That will make the language-games too narrow and context bound. They will lose their universal significance. As Wittgenstein rightly puts it, 'Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into the prominence of the fact that speaking of language is a part of an activity or "forms-of-life".'[28] The forms of life are emphasized in order to make language-games meaningful in a universal sense. And forms of life are both the source and limit of meaning, because there is nothing beyond the forms of life.[29] Thus each language game has certain rules which limit the boundary for the user to perform the linguistic activities. The rules are not something imposed on the user. Rather, they are followed internally. To say that rule-following is internal is to mention the fact that there is nothing empirical about it. Moreover, it is a presupposition of language use. In other words, any systematic analysis of the structure of the forms of life will definitely presuppose the systematic activity undertaken by the investigators themselves, in order to make the enquiry intelligible.[30]

So far as rule-following is concerned, Searle refers it to the intentional realm of mind. The function of the intentional realm contains both rule-following as well as the subjective mental representation, such as, desires, beliefs and their relationship with normative phenomena as truth and falsity and success and failure, etc.[31] The function of intentional content also produces causal behaviour. In case of the intentional content of rule-following, it entails two things, viz., (*i*) it does not produce causal behaviour directly and (*ii*) in principle, rules are available or accessible to consciousness.[32] Take Searle's famous example of driving. Every morning he drives to his Department and while driving he thinks seriously about the philosophical problems and the lesson he is supposed to teach in the class, etc. He does not think about the rules of driving. But he does not disobey the rules of traffic for that matter. Everything goes perfectly. The contents of rules are in no way directly causing his

physical behaviour. Rather he is unconsciously following the rules. However, it denies the privacy of rule-following and emphasizes the *norms* saying that 'only norms are in us and exist only from *our point of view*'.[33] Thus it rules out the idea of solipsism.

III. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD.

The phenomenologist's conception of subject or being is always a 'transcendental being'. Furthermore, as we have discussed earlier, meaning has to be understood from both empirical and transcendental standpoints. Similarly, Mohanty's 'transcendental being' has an existential import so far as its meaning is concerned. Mohanty reformulates Husserlian transcendental subjectivity as well as the notion of meaning by reflecting on Husserl's notion *of act of intending* and *object being intended*. The *act* mainly belongs to the nature of transcendental being. Its importance lies in not only 'explaining' its existential or empirical facticity, but also making its essence intelligible. This is precisely why Mohanty advocates that the formulation of 'essence of meaning' must be placed in the 'life-world', and, the *essence* has to be looked at from the standpoint of universality of *intentional-speech-acts*. Thus, Mohanty brings about language and being together. To say that being is transcendental is also to assert that 'speech act transcends itself'.[34] However, the problem before us is whether 'the Searlean subject' is a mere existential (concrete or mundane) entity[35] as Mohanty interprets it to be, or whether there can be any possibility of interpreting the Searlean subject as a transcendental subject.

Now, let me first focus on the nature of the Heideggerian 'Being' and see how it is related to the Searlean subject. Does the Heideggerian subject or Being have any role beyond linguistic space, i.e. does the Being really transcends the world of experience? Here I would like to emphasize Stephen Mulhall's interpretation of Heidegger. The *Being* is found always within the realm of world. That is, the world is presented to the Being as its field of action. And the world is not just given or the Being is not merely a static dweller in the world. Rather, the whole contention of Heidegger's construal of the characterization of *Being* is to disclose the potency of Being by showing how it participates or 'encounters' the world. However, Heidegger tries to see how the 'person-world' interrelationship[36] is captured *through language*. It is precisely because the

notion of 'encountering' of being with the world refers to *understanding* the various modes of existence. The modes are being-in-the-world and being-with-others. Moreover, they are not entirely two different modes of existence. As a result, the nature of understanding is confined to the world. Mulhall rightly says, 'Once again the relationship of mutual implication between human beings and the world is emphasized: to say that Dasein exists in the world is to say that the act of understanding through which Dasein grasps its own being and potentiality for Being must always encompass the world in which it is, i.e. must always relate to the environment which the referential totality constitutes and which alone furnishes equipmental domain within which human purpose can be achieved.'[37] The analysis of the concept of 'understanding' brings out how language is essentially interrelated in the *Being*. Moreover, to say that the being realized its location in the world and participation with others would be intelligible when the being can 'interpret' the encountered world. Therefore, in the Heideggerian scheme the development of understanding and interpretation go together. In other words, they are not indifferent to each other. Thus, for Hiedegger, the structure of Being can be seen within language.[38]

So far as the Heideggerian notion of Being and the Searlean experiencing subject are concerned, it is difficult to characterize them as purely transcendental Beings in the phenomenologist sense of the term. So far as their relationship with language is concerned, the subject can be defined as a Linguistic being. In other words, the *being* can be defined as a 'Language-centric-conscious-being'.[39] The intrinsicness of language to the human being or human life reveals the autonomy of human existence with relation to the world. The linguistic being has two important dimensions. As Pradhan points out, 'Life, seen in the empirical way, is a positioned state of human existence; it is conditioned, limited and finite. It has verbal dimension and it is thoroughly structured with rules of the symbolic organization. Yet, it has a dimension of giveness which is not dictated by an *a priori* logical machinery.'[40]

We have already seen the significance of the *verbal dimension* of the human life. However, within the *functional* domain of language the being is representing its views and thereby participating in *forms of life* from a first-person point of view. For Searle, the first person subjective experiences are the unique way of experiencing or knowing the world. However, he says that the 'experiences' can be repre-

sented. And, as Kent Blender remarks, 'my' awareness of my representation as fully 'conscious activity' necessarily belongs to me as a particular unitary subject.[41] It is not the case that s/he is always a first-person unitary subject, rather the *subject* also acts as the third-person. And the meaning confirmed, as Searle says, 'from a third-person point of view.'[42] It does not deny the first-person experience of intentional content. Rather, there is compatibility of 'my' point of view with 'our' points of view. And there is no reduction possible, because *subjectivity*, for Searle, is an ontological category not an epistemic mode.[43] Thus each *human being* is an autonomous being and simultaneously all the human beings act within *a form of life*. Thus everyone is *aware of* 'oneself' and thereby there is at all no question of opacity (*TP*, p.104) among the human subjects. In order *to know the subject* or Being we have to know the various modes of *existence*, i.e. the way s/he participates in the world. Furthermore, to quote Blender, 'I am aware of myself, just as I am aware of everything else, only as I appear to myself, and so my knowledge that this representation is mine cannot consist in any knowledge that it "belongs" to some unitary enduring self-in-itself. The unity or identity of self necessary for the possibility of experience is not to be found in some "noumenal self" that *transcends* experience, but in what is immanent *within* experiences: it is none other than identity of the rule or function by which we recognize representations into experiences of objects.'[44]

Thus, the nature of 'Searlean subject' and the 'intentional content' of meaning have to be understood within the framework of *forms-of-life* in particular and linguistic space in general. The Searlean subject is not a mere experiencing Being but is also one participating in the normatively structured forms of life. Thus experiencing subject has a transcendental status in both Mohanty and Searle.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Smith and R. MacIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality*, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1984, p. 105.
2. Cf. J.N. Mohanty, *Transcendental Phenomenology*, (henceforth *TP*), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, p. 84.

3. Ibid., p.105.
4. Ronald MacIntyre points out that Searle's theory of Intentionality has closer affinity with Husserl's. So far as the 'Intentional Content' is concerned, according to him, Searle's theory is an extended version of Frege's and Husserl's notion of noematic *Sinn*. See, R. MacIntyre, 'Searle on Intentionality' *Inquiry*, Vol. 27, 1984.
5. The *essentialism* that Husserl's philosophy represents has two facets. Particularly, this sort of essentialism, according to Mohanty, is known as 'early essentialism'. J.N. Mohanty, 'Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology and Essentialism' in *The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy*, (henceforth, *PTP*), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1985, p. 192.
6. Cf. Ibid., pp. 209-11.
7. Ibid., p. 208.
8. For Mohanty, phenomenology brings out the nature of 'experiencing', See his *Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 92.
9. Mohanty in his *Transcendental Phenomenology* says: 'It is not as though an experience is first there, contentless and objectless, and the *receives* their imprint from outside. That is a misleading picture. What then needs to be taken account of is why this subject has the experience *not* why this experience has the content it has.' p. 92.
10. See, Searle's answer to Bryan Magee in an interview that is published in *Man of Ideas*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978, p. 156. Searle clarifies it again in *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1992, p. 136.
11. See, Smith and MacIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality*, pp. 91-93. Whereas for Searle, the 'experience' succeeds our perception or 'seeing'. See, John Searle's *Intentionality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 38.
12. See, L. Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, Sects. 433-34.
13. Searle says that 'it does not imply that visual experience itself is verbal'. See, Searle's *Intentionality*, p. 41.
14. Ibid.
15. L. Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, sect: 311.
16. See, Searle's *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, p. 95.
17. Mohanty characterizes Searle's notion of representation as physical. See, *Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 106. This fairly implies the reducibility thesis, i.e. that the mental can be reduced to the physical. Whereas Searle never approves of the very idea of reduction as applicable to *subjectivity*. Of course, it is true that Searle's theory talks about 'naturalism' and naturalism includes both *Physicalism* and *Biological Naturalism*. Hence it is important to understand the essence of what biological naturalism means.
18. See, R. MacIntyre, 'Searle on Intentionality', p. 473.
19. Searle argues strongly against the very idea of computation saying that the notion of 'understanding' depends on semantical content. See, his 'Can Computers Think?' in *Minds, Brains and Science*, Harvard University Press, Mass., 1984, p. 39.
20. Ibid.
21. See, Searle's remark on Chomsky's theory of *generative syntax* in J. Searle,

'Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics', *The New York Review of Books*, 1972. This paper is later published in *Noam Chomsky: Critical Assessment*, Vol. II, de. C. P. Otero (ed.), Routledge, London, 1994, p. 19.

22. Ibid., However, Searle in his later work, *Intentionality*, emphasizes the concept of *representation* and brings forth *communication* as subsidiary to representation. And thus representation becomes primary.
23. R.C. Pradhan, 'Life, Will and the World: Some Reflections on *Notebooks 1914-1916*', *JICPR*, Vol. X, No. 3, May-Aug. 1993, pp. 42-43.
24. See, Wittgenstein's Notion of Language-games in *Philosophical Investigations*, G.E.M. Anscombe, and R. Rhees (ed.), G.E.M. Anscombe (tr.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953, Sect. 23.
25. See, R.C. Pradhan, 'Wittgenstein on Forms of Life: Towards a Transcendental Perspective', *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 3, 1994, p.64.
26. By four 'forms' Searle means the various activities like, 'fighting, feeling, feeding, and fornicating to driving cars, writing books and scratching our itches.' See, Searle's *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, p. 227.
27. R.C. Pradhan's 'Wittgenstein on Forms of Life', op. cit., p. 67.
28. Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*, sect. op. cit., 23.
29. Cf. L.R. Backer cites the transcendental argument of Wittgenstein's forms of life, in L.R. Backer's, 'The Very Idea of Forms of Life', *Inquiry*, Vol. 3, 1984, p. 281.
30. Ibid., p.278.
31. Cf. J. Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind* , p. 238.
32. Ibid., p. 241.
33. Ibid., p. 239.
34. *PTP*, p. 204.
35. Mohanty characterizes Searle's theory of intentionality as 'a non-representational but intentional-cum-causal-being-in-the-world.' And thus it can be called 'existential-intentionality'. See, *Transcendental Phenomenology*, p.105.
36. See, S. Mulhall, *On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects*, Routledge, London, 1990, p. 109.
37. Ibid., p.116.
38. See, K. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, sect. 34, p. 204. Cf. S. Mulhall's *On Being in the World*, p. 119.
39. Cf. R.C. Pradhan, 'Wittgenstein's Forms of Life', op. cit., p. 69-75.
40. See, R.C. Pradhan, 'Life, Will and the World', op. cit., p. 44.
41. Kent Blender, 'Subjectivity and the Unity of the World', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 46, No. 184, July 1996, p. 336.
42. J. Searle, *Intentionality*, op. cit., p. 63.
43. J. Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, op. cit., p. 94.
44. See, K. Blender, op. cit., pp. 336-7.

Cultural Wars in Nietzsche's *Human, All-Too-Human*

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ABSTRACT

This paper offers a critical analysis of Nietzsche's conception of philosophy and culture as presented in *Human, All-Too-Human* (*HATH*), a text to which commentators have devoted scant attention as they focus on Nietzsche's later and so-called more mature works. As this paper demonstrates, however, *HATH* marks an important turning point in Nietzsche's philosophical development as he introduces, for the first time, his characteristic genealogical method of criticism. The paper further dispels the typically simplistic interpretation of *HATH* which reads Nietzsche's culture of philosophy and philosophy of culture as little more than flag-bearers for exclusively cognitivist values—i.e. truth, knowledge, and science. A deeper analysis of *HATH* reveals a complex tension within Nietzsche's conception of philosophy and culture between the demand for truth and the need for error, illusion, and falsehood. The paper is divided into four parts. The *first section* lays out Nietzsche's newly developed genealogical method for undermining traditional moral, religious, and metaphysical values—a method which, it is contended, may function as a legitimate philosophical tool for critiquing traditional values. The *second part* of the paper places Nietzsche's genealogical method within the context of his philosophy of culture. Nietzsche's distinction between higher and lower culture is spelled out, and his notion of cultural development is explicated. As the culmination of a long and uncertain process of cultural/historical development, higher culture is regarded by Nietzsche as the triumph of science, scientific knowledge, and scientific method over the errors of lower culture, i.e. over the falsehoods and illusions of religion, art, morality, and metaphysics. Nietzsche regards his own genealogical method—his historical philosophy—as part and parcel of higher culture and its scientific outlook. (This is where commentators typically cut short their analysis of *HATH*.) *Part three* presents the difficulties Nietzsche sees in making the perilous transition from lower to higher culture. The errors and illusions of lower culture endowed our lives with value and significance, and higher culture threatens to plunge us into nihilistic despair as it exposes the tainted treasures of our cultural past. Although Nietzsche envisions higher culture as inhabited by free spirits who have liberated themselves from past errors, he remains skeptical that humankind as a whole can make the difficult and dangerous transition to higher culture. Finally, *part four* makes it evident that Nietzsche does *not* think that cultural liberation is a simple matter of making a clean break from the past errors of

lower culture. In several passages throughout *HATH* Nietzsche concedes that higher and lower culture must somehow coexist, and that science and higher culture will overheat and self-destruct without the cooling balm of lower culture. Part four analyzes and severely criticizes several metaphors Nietzsche employs in his desperate attempt to negotiate between the conflicting demands of higher and lower culture. Nietzsche ultimately fails to clarify how our competing and equally powerful drives for truth and error can be reconciled, but *HATH* is instructive in illustrating how he wrestled with a problem that continued to plague him in his later works.

Human, All-Too-Human (*HATH*) appeared in the spring of 1878, one year before Nietzsche was to resign from his university position at Basel.[1] He was already wretchedly ill, and it was during one of his brief convalescent leaves from teaching that he wrote the bulk of *HATH* in Sorrento during the winter and spring of 1876-77. Nietzsche later referred to the book as 'the monument of a crisis', and although we are all too familiar with his hyperbole, the characterization is fitting.[2] *HATH* marks an important turning point both in Nietzsche's personal and scholarly life. By 1878 he undoubtedly knew his deteriorating health would not allow him to continue teaching much longer. His sickness, he later wrote, forced him to return to himself and to think his own thoughts (*EH:* '*HATH*', 4), and the result was a radical liberation from everything that was foreign to his nature (*EH:* '*HATH*', 1).[3] Subtitled 'A Book for Free Spirits', *HATH* was written by 'a spirit that has *become free*, that has again taken possession of itself' (*EH:* '*HATH*' 1). The transformation is striking. *HATH* put an end to Nietzsche's intellectual and personal relationship with Wagner. Gone is the 'artists' metaphysics' of *The Birth of Tragedy*, along with the quest to justify existence aesthetically and the desire, proclaimed in section 2 of 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism', *'to look at science in the perspective of the artist, but at art in that of life'*.[4] Art is downgraded in *HATH* to a lower cultural form mired in error, illusion, and falsehood. Further, in *HATH* Schopenhauer comes under heavy criticism,[5] and the powerful metaphysical assumptions at work in the *Untimely Meditations* are absent.[6] Looking back on *HATH*, Nietzsche states, 'I put a sudden end to all my infections with "higher swindle", "idealism", "beautiful feelings", and other effeminacies' (*EH:* '*HATH*' 5). This antimetaphysical turn calls for a new analytic approach to rework the traditional philosophical landscape, and thus Nietzsche implements his genealogical method which overturns, unmasks, and exposes the origin of

our lofty ideals and values not in 'the starry heavens above' but in this world below. This new methodology is already indicated in the title of his work: '"where *you* see ideal things *I* see what is—human, alas, all-too-human!" I know man better' (*EH*: '*HATH*' 1). As if to highlight his new methodology, Nietzsche uses *HATH* to showcase, for the first time, his characteristic aphoristic style.

In content, method, and style, *HATH* is a watershed in Nietzsche's career, and yet it remains largely ignored in the literature. Nehamas[7] and Schacht[8] have nothing to say about the work as a whole, and *HATH* was omitted from *Reading Nietzsche*, a collection of essays devoted to a discussion of individual works from Nietzsche's corpus.[9] Kaufmann discusses *HATH* in the context of Nietzsche's later theory of the will to power, focusing exclusively on passages which analyze various phenomena—rights, justice, religious asceticism—in terms of power relations.[10] The underlying assumption seems to be that there is not much of philosophic importance in *HATH* aside from that which prefigures Nietzsche's later thought. Where *HATH* is granted more than cursory attention, it is generally taken to represent the high point of Nietzsche's cognitivist or positivist period. Both Wilcox[11] and Danto[12] are typical in this respect, as their discussion of *HATH* turns on Nietzsche's strong claims about the possibility of knowledge and his seemingly boundless praise of science, scientific method, and scientific spirit.

Nietzsche's new-found enthusiasm for science in *HATH is* striking, and there is little in his previous writings which prepares us for this development. But *HATH* is much more than an ode to science, and this paper will correct the overly simplistic reading which fails to see it as anything more than that. Although a powerful cognitivist strand runs throughout *HATH,* commentators have overlooked the equally important anticognitivist themes which pervade the work. Both Nietzsche's endorsement of science and his recognition of the necessity of error and illusion must be understood within the context of his theory of culture and cultural change. History, in his view, represents a slow advance through the stages of 'lower culture'—i.e. the errors of religion, metaphysics (including morality), and art—culminating in the birth of 'higher culture', the embodiment of scientific knowledge, careful reasoning, and critical inquiry. Nietzsche contends that we are presently caught in a perilous transitional phase where higher culture is struggling to break free from past errors and interpretations. This tension between higher and

lower culture represents the first front of *HATH's* cultural wars. But what gives *HATH* its philosophical depth and subtlety is the fact that this conflict between truth and error, between knowledge and illusion, is projected within the internal workings of higher culture itself—the second front of *HATH's* cultural wars. Higher culture for Nietzsche can only sustain itself by making room for the errors and illusions of our cultural past. The fundamental challenge of *HATH* is to balance the competing demands of truth and error within the confines of higher culture. This paper will examine the problems, questions, and difficulties that surround Nietzsche's attempt to negotiate the cultural wars of *HATH*: that is, his attempt to reconcile the conflicting requirements of truth and error, first, as we move from lower to higher culture and, second, as we struggle to accommodate these antagonistic elements within higher culture itself. Nietzsche's efforts in *HATH* to resolve the tension between truth and error are less than successful, but it is instructive to see how he grapples with a problem that will continue to preoccupy him in his later philosophy.

HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY

Nietzsche begins *HATH* by announcing a new kind of philosophic method which he contrasts with traditional metaphysics by subsuming it under the natural sciences. This 'youngest of all philosophical methods', which he refers to as 'historical philosophy', is none other than his genealogical method that he continues to practice and refine in his later work (*HATH* 1).[13] While Hollingdale states that the central aim of *HATH* is 'to explain reality without reliance upon metaphysical ideas',[14] Nietzsche's point is not simply to offer an alternative to traditional metaphysical explanations but to subvert them by intellectually cooling our metaphysical aspirations. The assumption behind traditional metaphysical thought has been that the higher values of art, religion, morality, and metaphysics have a 'miraculous origin' (Wunder-Ursprung) in the thing in itself. Conversely, the reputed opposites of these higher values are assumed to have their origin in the empirical world.[15] Nietzsche flatly denies the existence of opposites. The belief in opposites, he charges, resulted from a 'mistake in reasoning' and was perpetuated by the exaggerated views of metaphysics and popular thought (*HATH* 1). Historical philosophy corrects this mistake by proposing that the values traditionally grounded in the transcendent world can be ex-

plained by reference to the world of experience. Both positive and negative values originate in the phenomenal world for Nietzsche. He adds a special twist, however, by suggesting that 'the most glorious colours are derived from based, indeed from despised materials' (*HATH* 1). He takes malicious delight throughout *HATH* in demonstrating how our higher values are nothing more than refined developments of their so-called lowly opposites.[16] He wants his genealogical explanations to sting, ultimately in order to force us to reconsider what we value and how our values are to be grounded.

By referring to his new method as historical philosophy, Nietzsche underscores two points. Traditional metaphysics assumes that higher values do not develop or change: they spring ready made from the thing-in-itself which lies outside of space and time, immune to change. The first point historical philosophy drives home is that 'everything has become' (*HATH* 2), thereby returning these values to the phenomenal world of change. Secondly, since Nietzsche contends that traditional values actually developed out of their 'opposites', historical philosophy must explain and trace these genealogical connections. His analysis of the saint provides a good case study. The saint was thought to represent 'something that exceeded the ordinary human portion of goodness and wisdom'; but Nietzsche contends the saint 'was not an especially good man, even less an especially wise one' (*HATH* 143). The saint's tremendous self-denial and apparent renunciation of earthly striving, once believed to indicate the presence of the divine and miraculous, can be explained in terms of the 'lust for power' or any other less-than-flattering physiological or psychological need (*HATH* 139-42). Nietzsche's analysis of moral phenomena follows a similar pattern: 'between good and evil actions there is no difference in kind, but at the most one of degree. Good actions are sublimated evil ones; evil actions are coarsened, brutalized good ones' (*HATH* 107). Although Kant and Schopenhauer disagree about which motive confers moral worth upon an action (duty or compassion), they both agree that this motive does not belong to phenomenal world; for Nietzsche, however, *all* motives are located in this world. Power, fear, pleasure and displeasure, and vanity are the predominate springs of human action in *HATH*.[17] Dramatically reversing his position in *BT*, he dismisses the idea that art offers us any kind of experience or knowledge of the underlying nature of reality (*HATH* 222). Thus, Nietzsche

now contends that the accomplishments of the creative genius do not indicate a 'super-human origin' or 'miraculous abilities' but the fortuitous gathering of natural qualities and circumstances (*HATH* 164).

Nietzsche contends that his naturalistic explanations of traditional values demonstrate that 'it is probable that the objects of religious, moral and aesthetic sensations belong only to the surface of things, while man likes to believe that here at least he is in touch with the world's heart' (*HATH* 4). We have allowed hubris to delude us into thinking that what is so important to us—our happiness and well-being—must hook up with the fundamental nature of reality, just as those who believe in astrology assume that the heavens revolve around human destiny (*HATH* 4). But historical philosophy reveals that the actions, motives, mental states, experiences, and character types so highly prized by art, religion, and morality do not transport us to some transcendent, metaphysical realm. Once we realize that the origin of these values can be explained without appeal to the thing-in-itself, Nietzsche predicts that metaphysics will be rendered innocuous as 'the greater part of our interest in the purely theoretical problem of the "thing-in-itself" and "appearance" ceases to exist' (*HATH* 10). Rather than directly attacking metaphysical assumptions by marshalling a battery of philosophical arguments and objections, Nietzsche seeks to break their hold on us by showing that they have absolutely nothing to do with our lives. The practical upshot of his method is that our metaphysical interests are cooled to the point of icy indifference: 'One error after another is coolly placed on ice; the ideal is not refuted—it freezes to death' (*EH*: '*HATH*' 1).

Danto is content to regard Nietzsche's strategy as nothing more than a 'therapeutic' psychological device to rid us of our metaphysical beliefs.[18] Nietzsche *is* interested in helping us overcome these beliefs, but his method packs a philosophical punch which Danto fails to see. Instead of simply working to cool our psychological interest in metaphysics, Nietzsche's method may provide us with good justificatory reasons for turning a cold shoulder to metaphysics. To begin, the principle of parsimony gives us reason to prefer Nietzsche's hypotheses over traditional metaphysical accounts, provided he is able to offer plausible *naturalistic* explanations of moral, aesthetic, metaphysical, and religious phenomena, i.e. explanations which do not require postulating the thing-in-itself. Next, Nietzsche

realizes that if the notion of the thing-in-itself is explanatorily superfluous, something must be said about how we acquired such a concept in the first place, and he provides the following quasi-anthropological, psychological account:

> The man of the ages of barbarous primordial culture believed that in the dream he was getting to know a *second real world*: here is the origin of all metaphysics. Without the dream one would have had no occasion to divide the world into two. (*HATH* 5)

Although this explanation is highly speculative, we might agree with the general thrust of Nietzsche's thinking that a plausible naturalistic account can be given of how we came into possession of our strange pantheon of philosophical ideas. But whatever this explanation might be, Nietzsche's point is that our metaphysical beliefs are not philosophically justified:

> all that has begotten these [metaphysical] assumptions, is passion, error, and self-deception; the worst of all methods of acquiring knowledge, not the best of all, have taught belief in them. When one has disclosed these methods as the foundation of all extant religions and metaphysical systems, one has refuted them! Then that possibility [of a metaphysical world] still remains over; but one can do absolutely nothing with it, not to speak of letting happiness, salvation and life depend on the gossamer of such a possibility. For one could assert nothing at all of the metaphysical world except that it was a being-other, an inaccessible, incomprehensible being-other; it would be a thing with negative qualities. Even if the existence of such a world were never so well demonstrated, it is certain that knowledge of it would be the most useless of all knowledges: more useless even than knowledge of the chemical composition of water must be to the sailor in danger of shipwreck. (*HATH* 9)

Of course, asserting that our metaphysical beliefs are improperly grounded and demonstrating this are two different matters, but Nietzsche is confident that a 'history of the genesis of thought' will confirm his critical appraisal (*HATH* 18).

Let us suppose that Nietzsche is correct about the questionable nature of our metaphysical assumptions. Such a disclosure hardly constitutes a refutation of metaphysical beliefs. It doesn't follow that a belief is false or cannot in principle be rationally justified

simply because it was acquired by cognitively illicit means. To reject the belief in the thing-in-itself because of its origin in primordial culture and the misinterpretation of dreams is to commit the genetic fallacy. While Nietzsche may have exposed the shaky underpinnings of our metaphysical beliefs, it is conceivable that other, more philosophically respectable arguments await to be discovered which would rationally justify our metaphysical outlook. Perhaps, but at this point Nietzsche considers further pursuit of the question an idle intellectual exercise, and he thinks he has good reasons for so regarding it. Consider the following claims he wants to make: (1) An examination of the assumptions underlying our metaphysical beliefs reveals that they are badly grounded, and to date there are no extant arguments sufficient to rationally justify these beliefs. (2) Moral, religious, aesthetic, and metaphysical phenomena, traditionally explained by reference to the thing-in-itself can now be accounted for naturalistically without postulating the existence of a transcendent, metaphysical world. (3) We can explain how the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms originated and took root in the human psyche, again without appeal to anything beyond the natural, empirical world. While Descartes argued that we can only account for our idea of God by supposing that there is such a being, Nietzsche contends that we can explain how we acquired our notion of the noumenal realm without actually postulating the existence of such a world. It is in light of these considerations that Nietzsche thinks the notion of the thing-in-itself is rendered philosophically superfluous. The concept of the thing-in-itself is thus stripped of any explanatory role or significance: it should be regarded as a relic of the past which no longer merits serious philosophical consideration. Nietzsche admits that the existence of the thing-in-itself is (logically?) possible—even if we have no reason to believe that it does exist—but he contends that its existence would render it no less vacuous and insignificant. Whether it exists or not, the thing-in-itself has no place in our conceptual, explanatory schemes and thus deserves to be relegated to the intellectual scrapheap of ideas. Nietzsche finds it laughable that the concept of the thing in itself which 'appeared to be so much, indeed everything, is actually empty, that is to say empty of significance' (*HATH* 16).[19]

HIGHER AND LOWER CULTURE

Nietzsche's use of the genealogical method in *HATH* can only be understood against the backdrop of the general theory of culture developed in the book. This interest in culture is not new but evolves out of his earlier work. Beginning with *BT*, and continuing through *UT*, Nietzsche was passionately concerned with defining culture; articulating its purpose; determining how it arises, develops, and changes; and investigating what sustains and threatens it. His unpublished notebooks from the period are filled with such questions and concerns.[20] With *HATH*, Nietzsche becomes the advocate and practitioner of the higher culture of science. He considers his own methodology—historical philosophy—to be a part of science and an instrument of higher culture. He regards it as 'the mark of a higher culture to value the little unpretentious truths which have been discovered by means of rigorous methods more highly than the errors handed down by metaphysical and artistic ages and men, which blind us and make us happy' (*HATH* 3). The truths provided by higher culture are the product of scientific method; religion, morality, metaphysics, and art embody the errors of lower culture. The former 'stand there so modest, simple, sober, so apparently discouraging, while the latter are so fair, splendid, intoxicating . . . enrapturing' (*HATH* 3; see also, *HATH* 264).

Danto and Wilcox refer to *HATH* as Nietzsche's 'second' or 'middle' period, presumably because they believe that its strong positivist themes dramatically set it off from what came before and after.[21] While Nietzsche no longer holds, as he did in *BT*, that art gives us an insight into the ultimate nature of reality, and while he tones down his enthusiastic endorsement of science in his later work, there are important ways in which his interest in science in *HATH* does not represent a serious break from his earlier and later work. Wilcox mistakenly reports that Nietzsche's praise of Socrates, science, logic, and reason in *HATH* is a reversal of his earlier position in *BT*.[22] But the notion of science he attacks in his first work is not the same as the one he embraces in *HATH*. In *BT*, section 15, Nietzsche rejects as illusory the science of Socrates which expresses itself in 'the unshakable faith that thought, using the thread of logic, can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of *correcting* it.' He praises Kant and Schopenhauer in their victory over this kind of 'optimism' since they both recognized the inability of reason to give

us knowledge of anything beyond the world of experience (*BT* 18). The kind of science and knowledge Nietzsche affirms in *HATH* remains within the bounds set by Schopenhauer and Kant: its object is the empirical world and not the thing-in-itself. Furthermore, in *HATH* Nietzsche remains adamant in insisting that science should not succumb to the Socratic idea that knowledge can make us happy and improve our lives (*HATH* 6-7).

The word 'Wissenschaft' can refer to either the natural sciences or any rigorous, scholarly discipline, and Nietzsche uses it in both senses throughout *HATH*. When he proclaims that science—as opposed to metaphysics, art, and morality—'seeks knowledge and nothing further—and does in fact acquire it' (*HATH* 6), he is talking about knowledge of the natural world and the kind of causal explanations of empirical phenomena science is able to offer. This affirmation of science extends far beyond his 'middle' period. It is because he continued to believe in the possibility of such knowledge that he could, in *The Antichrist*, accuse Christianity of believing in nothing but imaginary causes, effects, and entities which form an imaginary psychology and science that have 'no trace of any concept of natural causes' (*HATH* 15).[23] But more important in *HATH* than the truths yielded by science is the fact that science has given us 'the most rigorous methods of acquiring knowledge' (*HATH* 272). 'Scientific spirit' also extends to the practice of good reasoning and thinking (*HATH* 144, 256); it is reflected in the strict methods of investigation and the careful, critical formation of belief (*HATH* 635). Science forms its closest allies with doubt and distrust (*HATH* 24), and thus it is skeptical of those who dogmatically insist that they possess the truth (*HATH* 633). Nietzsche also links the practice of good philology with the emergence of science (*HATH* 270); instead of reading imaginary causes into the text of nature, science understands the world in terms of natural causes (*HATH* 8, 135). The endorsement of 'Wissenschaft' construed in this broad sense is not peculiar to *HATH*. For example, in *The Gay Science*, section 2, Nietzsche praises 'intellectual conscience' and attacks those who are too lazy to examine critically their reasons for belief.[24] And in *Twilight of the Idols* ('What Germans Lack' 6), he identifies 'learning to think' as one of the goals of noble culture, as he does in *HATH*.[25]

Higher culture is therefore defined in terms of science, scientific method, and scientific knowledge within *HATH*. Reminiscent of

Comte,[26] Nietzsche identifies a cultural-historical development beginning with a religious world view and moving on to a metaphysical, an aesthetic, and, finally, a scientific conception of the world. Anything short of science represents lower culture since each previous stage has, in its own way, systematically misinterpreted and misunderstood the natural world. There is no Hegelian necessity in the movement from lower to higher culture; cultural regression is always possible (*HATH* 272). Moreover, higher culture does not incorporate what was 'best' in lower culture (*HATH* 24, 239). Interestingly enough, however, like Hegel, Nietzsche holds that the individual's intellectual development recapitulates the same cultural process seen within history (*HATH* 272). The transition from religion to science is too abrupt and is eased by moving through a metaphysical and aesthetic phase where we are slowly weaned from the effects of religion. But the final liberating move to science can only be achieved when we realize that the needs satisfied by lower culture are not immutable but 'can be *weakened* and *exterminated*' (*HATH* 27). This cultural transformation requires nothing less than a change in human nature—a remaking of our psychic needs and desires.[27] The free spirits are those who have undergone this process and inhabit the higher culture of science. The bound spirits remain shackled to past forms of lower culture they still need to see the world through the gilded lens of religion, art, and metaphysics.[28]

THE PROBLEM OF CULTURE

Although Nietzsche holds out for the possibility of cultural progress, he also expresses extreme uncertainty about our ability to break from past errors. The transition to a new culture was once unconscious and accidental. But Nietzsche thinks that the time has come to make a conscious effort to destroy the past culture and create a new culture (*HATH* 24). We are, however, caught in a precarious transitional phase between higher and lower culture:

> Our age gives the impression of being an interim state; the old ways of thinking, the old cultures are still partly with us, the new not yet secure and habitual and lacking in decisiveness and consistency . . . everything is becoming chaotic, the old becoming lost to us, the new proving useless and growing feebler . . . . We are faltering, but we must not let it make us afraid and perhaps

> surrender the new things we have gained. Moreover, we *cannot* return to the old, we *have* burned our boats; all that remains is for us to be brave, let happen what may. Let us only *go forward*, let us only make a move! (*HATH* 248)

The problem is that the past cultural forms of religion, metaphysics and art infused value and significance into our lives: they beautified the world and made life interesting. The errors and fantasies of lower culture which coloured our perception of the world and human nature have become such a part of us that they 'are now inherited by us as the accumulated treasure of the entire past . . . the value of our humanity depends upon them' (*HATH* 16). From the perspective of higher culture, however, our inheritance is tainted, for we now know that it was acquired by means of a false conception of reality; we are ashamed of our origins and of who we are (*HATH* 29). Nietzsche recognizes the terrible sense of disillusionment which follows once historical philosophy exposes these falsehoods:

> But will our philosophy not thus become a tragedy? Will truth not become inimical to life, to the better man? . . . The whole of human life is sunk deeply in untruth; the individual cannot draw it up out of this well without thereby growing profoundly disillusioned about his own past . . . . Is all that remains a mode of thought whose outcome on a personal level is despair and on a theoretical level a philosophy of destruction? (*HATH* 34)

The advent of higher culture threatens to destroy our sense of humanity, and Nietzsche now worries that if 'error has transformed animals into men; is truth perhaps capable of changing man back into an animal?' (*HATH* 519). He takes this possibility seriously for he says that 'we belong to an age whose culture is in danger of perishing through the means to culture' (*HATH* 520).

Nihilism looms for those who continue to hold on to past modes of valuing and interpreting. Religion, metaphysics, and art were valued because they were believed to point to a world beyond this one, but in the wake of Nietzsche's historical philosophy this pretense has been dashed. To escape nihilism we must learn to live in this world and stop demanding that the things of higher value trace their origin to some transcendent metaphysical realm. Nietzsche imagines that for someone of the right temperament, the shock waves of knowledge might actually be liberating. For such a person,

> a life could arise much simpler and emotionally cleaner than our present life is: so that, though the old motives of violent desire produced by inherited habit would still possess their strength, they would gradually grow weaker under the influence of purifying knowledge. In the end one would live among men and with, oneself in *nature*, without praising, blaming. (*HATH* 34)[29]

This is not a Rousseauean return to nature, but a way of living in the world taught by higher culture where one assumes an attitude toward life and experience characteristic of the natural scientist—inquisitive, observing, more eager to understand than to judge (*HATH* 106-7). This is Nietzsche's vision of the free spirits, the inhabitants of higher culture. For those who occupy this higher terrain, everything is returned to the realm of natural necessity, and for the free spirit this is a return to innocence, Kant notwithstanding (*HATH* 107). The free spirits are fundamentally cheerful, and there is real joy to be experienced in the life of knowledge, a life that requires a courageous 'hovering over'[30] traditional judgments and values (*HATH* 34). And yet Nietzsche is cautious, if not pessimistic, about the prospects of attaining such a life. The agitation generated by the current cultural upheaval is so great that 'higher culture can no longer allow its fruits to mature', and the fear is that we will turn civilization into a modern form of barbarism (*HATH* 285).

There is an additional wrinkle in Nietzsche's positivism of higher culture. Even if we avoid the chaos of the present by installing a culture of science, it is impossible to completely escape error and illusion. The illogical 'is implanted so firmly in the passions, in language, in art, in religion, and in general in everything that lends value to life, that one cannot pull it out of these fair things without mortally injuring them': it is absurd to suppose that we could ever transform ourselves into purely rational creatures (*HATH* 31).[31] Nietzsche therefore worries about a self-destructive dynamic internal to higher culture itself. The very progress of science throws 'suspicion on the consolations of metaphysics, religion and art' with the result that the 'mightiest source of joy to which mankind owes almost all its humanity will become impoverished' (*HATH* 251). Nietzsche goes on to say in the same passage that if science is unable to sustain interest in itself, the past errors, illusions, and fantasies which granted us so much pleasure will regain their former standing, and we will lapse back into cultural barbarism.

MIXED METAPHORS

Cultural progress is possible, Nietzsche wants to say. We can recognize the errors and illusions of lower culture for what they are and consciously decide to move beyond them toward the truthfulness and honesty of higher culture. At times, Nietzsche writes as if we must make a clean break from the falsehood of the past and learn to conceptualize and value reality differently, more 'scientifically'. To be sure, we are caught in a difficult transitional stage between higher and lower culture, but having burned our boats behind us, we can only move ahead, he tells us (*HATH* 248). Consistent with this picture of cultural change is his discussion of 'the zones of culture' (*HATH* 236), where he states that cultural ages are like climatic belts, laid out not as geographic regions, side by side, but as time zones, one after another. The task before us is to pass over into the cooler, brighter 'temperate zone of culture' (science being associated with coldness and iciness), leaving behind our cultural past which resembles a '*tropical* climate', marked by violent oppositions, heat, colour, and 'reverence for everything sudden, mysterious, terrible'—that is, lower culture (*HATH* 236). As we leave our past behind us, Nietzsche cautions us not to suppose that, like Hegel, we can somehow preserve and incorporate the best of the past in our new cultural setting:

> it is folly to believe that a new higher stage of mankind will unite in itself all the excellences of earlier stages and be obliged, for example, to include the highest phase of art. What is the case, rather, is that every season has its own particular charm and excellences and excludes those of the other seasons. That which grew up out of religion and in proximity to it cannot grow again if this is destroyed . . . . (*HATH* 239)

At the end of the chapter 'Tokens of Higher and Lower Culture' (*HATH* 292, 'Forward'), Nietzsche encourages his free spirits to acknowledge the value of the past but then urges them to move ahead, to go beyond the errors of our cultural past:

> forward on the path of wisdom, with a bold step and full of confidence! However you may be, serve yourself as your own source of experience! Throw off discontent with your nature, forgive yourself your own ego, for in any event you possess in yourself a ladder with a hundred rungs upon which you can climb to knowledge . . . . Do not underestimate the value of

> having been religious; discover all the reasons by virtue of which you have still had a genuine access to art. Can you not, precisely with aid of these experiences, follow with greater understanding tremendous stretches of the paths taken by earlier mankind? Is it not on precisely *this* soil, which you sometimes find so displeasing, the soil of unclear thinking, that many of the most splendid fruits of more ancient cultures grew up? One must have loved religion and art like mother and nurse—otherwise one cannot grow wise. But one must be able to see beyond them, outgrow them; if one remains under their spell, one does not understand them.

As much as the above passages seem to suggest that cultural stages can be nicely delineated and temporally laid out end to end without overlap, Nietzsche does *not* think that cultural liberation is a simple matter of making a clean break from the past. In *HATH* 20, for example, our relationship to the past is cast in much more ambiguous terms, and it is less evident that the past is something we can or even should leave behind us:

> One, certainly very high level of culture has been attained when a man emerges from superstition and religious concepts and fears and no longer believes in angels, for example, or in original sin, and has ceased to speak of the salvation of souls: if he is at this level of liberation he now has, with the greatest exertion of mind, to overcome metaphysics. *Then*, however he needs to take a *retrograde step*: he has to grasp the historical justification that resides in such ideas, likewise the psychological; he has to recognize that they have been most responsible for the advancement of mankind and that without such a retrograde step he will deprive himself of the best that mankind has hitherto produced. In regard to philosophical metaphysics, I see more and more who are making for the negative goal (that all positive metaphysics is an error), but still few who are taking a few steps back; for one may well want to look out over the topmost rung of the ladder, but one ought not to want to stand on it. The most enlightened get only as far as liberating themselves from metaphysics and look back on it from above: whereas here too, as in the hippodrome, at the end of the track it is necessary to turn the corner.

Lower culture is not a Wittgensteinian ladder which should be kicked over once we have scaled the top. Unlike *HATH* 292, which em-

ploys the ladder motif in the context of cultural liberation and ascent, Nietzsche now redirects the free spirits, recommending that they step down the ladder a few rungs. Perhaps, as in *HATH* 292, he is simply calling upon us to acknowledge the role played by lower culture in the advancement of humankind. His 'retrograde step' may therefore serve as a gesture of gratitude or goodwill to what we must now leave behind. But another reading is suggested. For Nietzsche to urge that we should not remain standing on the highest rung might mean that we must recognize our continued need for lower culture. Perhaps we are not completely 'above' the errors of the past. The metaphor of the hippodrome in *HATH* 20 supports this view: even though we initially race away from metaphysics and religion, we must eventually round the corner and return to lower culture.

Nietzsche, in fact, holds that it would be fatal for higher culture to purge itself of falsehood and illusion. If it is not to self-destruct, higher culture must accommodate both the demands of truth and illusion and thus

> give to man a double-brain, as it were two brain-ventricles, one for the perceptions of science, the other for those of non-science: lying beside one another, not confused together, separable, capable of being shut off; this is the demand of health. In one domain lies the power-source, in the other the regulator: it must be heated with illusions, onesidednesses, passions, the evil and perilous consequences of overheating must be obviated with the aid of knowledge furnished by science. If this demand of higher culture is not met, then the future course of human evolution can be foretold almost with certainty: interest in truth will cease the less pleasure it gives: because they are associated with pleasure, illusion, error and fantasy will regain step by step the ground they formerly held: the ruination of science, a sinking back into barbarism, will be the immediate consequence; mankind will have to begin again at the weaving of its tapestry, after having, like Penelope, unwoven it at night. But who can guarantee to us that it will always find the strength for it? (*HATH* 251)

This bifurcated model of higher culture leaves too many questions unanswered and is ultimately inadequate. How are the antagonistic elements of higher culture to be delineated, and what determines their spheres of influence? Each side can be 'shut off,' but unless

there is something which exercises independent control over both, there is nothing to prevent usurpation and domination. The epistemic problems are especially troublesome. Are we literally to be of 'two minds' on issues that both science and religion address? Compartmentalization of belief is possible, but only at the expense of self-deception, and that is what seems to be required if the illusions of lower culture are to do their work within the confines of higher culture.

Nietzsche appears to recognize the problems with this model and experiments with a number of other metaphors. He suggests, for example, that the positioning of truth and illusion within higher culture can be orchestrated as a dance where, instead of hopping back and forth from one foot to the other, the dancer is strong and supple enough to bring off an integrated and harmonious performance:

> Nowadays it is to be regarded as the decisive sign of great culture when anyone possesses sufficient strength and flexibility to be as clear and rigorous in the domain of knowledge as at other times he is capable of as it were giving poetry, religion and metaphysics a hundred paces advantage and entering into their power and beauty. Such a situation between so different demands is very hard to maintain, for science presses for the absolute dominance of its methods, and if this pressure is not relaxed there arises the other danger of a feeble vacillation back and forth between different drives. To indicate the way towards a resolution of this difficulty, however, if only by means of a parable, one might recall that the *dance* is not the same thing as a languid reeling back and forth between different drives. High culture will resemble an audacious dance: which is aforesaid, why one needs a great deal of strength and suppleness. (*HATH* 278)[32]

Higher culture is not a simple homogeneous entity: it contains antagonistic elements which must be harmonized and coordinated. Truth and illusion must learn to dance within higher culture. But as suggestive as this metaphor might be, it fails to answer difficult questions. How do we learn to master this demanding artistic form of higher culture? Who or what within higher culture is supposed to choreograph this movement between truth and illusion? The problem of compartmentalization continues to lurk in the background, as much as Nietzsche would like to side-step it. Are we

supposed to set aside or somehow forget about the rigorous demands of science when we indulge ourselves in the power and beauty of poetry, religion, and metaphysics? Can the artifacts of lower culture continue to work their 'magic' on us if science has already exposed the error of their ways? In Nietzsche's double brain model, science is supposed to function as the 'regulator' of culture which prevents the 'power-source' of lower culture from overheating the system. But in his dance metaphor, he admits that 'science presses for the absolute dominance of its methods' (*HATH* 278), so now we must wonder what is supposed to regulate the 'regulator' of higher culture. What is to prevent the scientific component of higher culture from running full throttle and eventually dominating the entire mechanism?

In section 276 of *HATH*, entitled 'Microcosm and Macrocosm of Culture,' Nietzsche presents yet another metaphor in which he attempts to strike a balance between higher and lower culture:

> The finest discoveries concerning culture are made by the individual man within himself when he finds two heterogeneous powers ruling there. Supposing someone is as much in love with the plastic arts or music as he is enraptured by the spirit of science and he regards it as impossible to resolve the contradiction by annihilating the one and giving the other free rein, the only thing for him to do is to turn himself into so large a hall of culture that both powers can be accommodated within it, even if at opposite ends, while between them there resides *mediating powers with the strength and authority to settle any contention that might break out.* Such a hall of culture within a single individual would, however, bear the strongest resemblance to the cultural structure of entire epochs and provide continual instruction regarding them by means of analogy. For whatever grand cultural architecture has developed, its purpose has been to effect a harmony and concord between contending powers through the agency of an overwhelming assemblage of other powers, but without the need to suppress them or clap them in irons.

As with his other metaphors, Nietzsche realizes that the problem of higher culture is to accommodate within itself conflicting drives or powers. Some kind of harmony must be struck where both the demand for truth and the need for error and illusion are gratified, without allowing one to dominate the other. Unlike the dance meta-

phor, however, Nietzsche's 'hall of culture' returns to the rigidity of the double brain image but now without the close proximity of the antagonistic forces. Truth and error are brought under the same roof of higher culture, but, like feuding house guests, they are assigned to separate ends of the 'hall of culture' where they can hardly be said to interact at all. They reside within the same structure but remain isolated and compartmentalized. The diverse elements within higher culture are not integrated or coordinated as they were in the dance metaphor. To mix Nietzschean metaphors, it now seems that instead of dancing, one must race back and forth between opposite ends of one's psyche if some kind of inner unity or cohesion is to be maintained. Nietzsche does acknowledge something in the 'hall of culture' metaphor which he previously ignored—namely, the intervening powers which will arbitrate and reconcile the conflicting demands of truth and error. But he doesn't explain what these powers are or where they draw their strength to interpose themselves as independent negotiators between hostile forces.

The great irony of Nietzsche's repeated use of metaphor to explain the workings of higher culture is his insistence throughout *HATH* that poetry, art, and metaphor are forms of lower culture which only distort our vision of reality and are incapable of communicating knowledge or truth. This reliance upon metaphor to illuminate the truths of higher culture indicates that the positivism of *HATH* is anything but simplistic. It is this uneasy tension between truth and illusion, between higher and lower culture, which makes *HATH* so philosophically interesting and problematic. Nietzsche's attempt in this work to strike a balance between truth and error is less than satisfactory, but it is a problem to which he returns time and again in his later work. *HATH* deserves to be read as an important contribution to this ongoing intellectual struggle.

Notes and References

1. F. Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits*, trans. J.R. Hollingdale, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986. Henceforth, *HATH*.
2. F. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. and ed. W. Kaufmann, Vintage, New York, 1989. 'Human, All-Too-Human,' sec. 1. Henceforth *EH*.
3. This liberation theme is repeated in *HATH*, Pref. 5: the free spirit represents the liberation from past duties and values.
4. F. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. W. Kaufmann, Vintage, New York, 1967. Henceforth, *BT*.

5. See F. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. and ed. W. Kaufmann, Vintage, New York, 1989, Pref., 5 in which Nietzsche states he came to terms in *HATH* with his teacher, Schopenhauer. Henceforth *GM*. See also *HATH*, Pref., sec. 1 regarding Nietzsche's break with Schopenhauer and Wagner; Schopenhauer's notion of character and intelligible freedom is attacked in *HATH* sec. 39.
6. For example, see 'Schopenhauer as Educator', *Untimely Meditations*, henceforth *UT*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1983, p. 160 in which Nietzsche posits self-enlightenment in the figure of the saint, the artist, and the philosopher as the 'metaphysical goal' of nature.
7. A. Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1983.
8. R. Schacht, *Nietzsche*, The Arguments of the Philosophers Series, ed. Ted Honderich, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1983.
9. R. Solomon and K. Higgins, (eds.), *Reading Nietzsche*, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1988.
10. W. Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1974, pp. 181-6.
11. J.T. Wilcox, *Truth and Value in Nietzsche*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1974.
12. A.C. Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, Macmillan, New York, 1965.
13. In *GM* Pref., 4 Nietzsche remarks that the genealogical hypotheses advanced in the work were first formulated in *HATH*.
14. R.J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and his Philosophy*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1965, p. 150.
15. See F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. W. Kaufmann, Vintage, New York, 1989, sec. 2 which offers a similar analysis of the belief in opposites: 'The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is *the faith in opposite values*.' Henceforth *BGE*. *HATH* and *BGE* also share a similar organization of topics; also, both grant special importance to the 'free spirits.'
16. He states in *HATH* 1 that for historical philosophy 'there exists, strictly speaking, neither an unegoistic nor completely disinterested contemplation; both are only sublimations, in which the basic element seems almost to have dispersed and reveals itself only under the most painstaking observation.' His genealogical explanations disclose the hidden relationship and family resemblance between the 'opposites' of metaphysics.
17. For references to power, see *HATH*, 44, 50, 142; to fear, *HATH*, 74, 110; to pleasure and displeasure, *HATH*, 99, 102-103; and to vanity, *HATH*, 74, 89, 313, 346, 371.
18. Danto, op. cit., p. 70.
19. Danto argues that Nietzsche uses the same criterion of meaning as modern logical positivists and therefore rejects metaphysics as literally meaningless (p. 83). But there is absolutely no evidence of such a criterion in *HATH*: the notion of significance Nietzsche refers to at *HATH*, 16 is clearly existential and not semantic.
20. For a brief but excellent discussion of the importance of culture in Nietzsche's early writings see D. Breazeale's *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks from the Early 1870's*, Humanities, New Jersey, 1979, pp. xxiii-xxvii.
21. Danto, op. cit., p. 69; Wilcox, op. cit., p. 111.

22. Wilcox, op. cit., p. 111.
23. F. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, trans. and ed. W. Kaufmann, in *The Viking Portable Nietzsche*, Vintage, New York, 1954.
24. F. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. W. Kaufmann, Vintage, New York, 1974.
25. F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. and ed. W. Kaufmann, in *The Viking Portable Nietzsche*, Viking, New York, 1954.
26. Comte's major work was the six-volume *Cours de Philosophie Positive* (1330-1842); he isolates three stages in history: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive or scientific. Wilcox is the only commentator in the English literature to have noted this similarity (p. 46).
27. Compare 'Schopenhauer as Educator,' *UT*, pp. 142-6: the goal of culture *is* 'transfigured physis'.
28. For more on the free and bound spirits see *HATH*, pp. 229, 235, 283-4, 288, 291; in 'Schopenhauer as Educator,' *UT* culture is embodied by the saint and the genius (p. 142); but with his turn against Schopenhauer in *HATH*, the saint and the genius are replaced by the modest free spirits of science.
29. Compare *HATH*, p. 107 where Nietzsche discusses how habits of thought, feeling, and valuing can be weakened and eventually broken as we develop a new, second nature; the language is strikingly similar to his discussion of critical history in 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,' *UT*, pp. 76-7. The problem is the same in both texts: how do we free ourselves from past errors which have become a part of us?
30. This image is repeated in *HATH*, p. 287.
31. For additional passages on the inevitability of error see *HATH*, pp. 32-3; and *HATH*, Pref., 1: '[life] *wants* deception, it *lives* on deception'.
32. This metaphor calls to mind his definition of culture as 'unity of artistic style' in 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life', *UT*, p. 79. Nietzsche is concerned in this essay with the inability of German culture to achieve this unity.

The Myth of the *Prasthāna Trayī*

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The view that the roots of the Indian philosophical tradition lie in the *Upaniṣads*, the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Gītā* is so widely accepted that it is taken to be almost axiomatically true by scholars and laymen alike. These are the primal sources from which the stream of Indian philosophy is supposed to have flown for millennia, and if we want to know the essence, we should seek their original texts and decipher the truth contained in them in order to understand the spirit of Indian philosophy. A recent book, for example, Somraj Gupta's *The Word Speaks to the Faustian Man* (1991), mentions these as *'prasthānatrayī'* on the very title page. Yet, he does not ask himself even the simple question as to what that philosophical stream is for which these three texts provide the starting point or the *prasthāna* as they call it in the tradition.

Even the blindest student of the subject knows that neither Buddhism nor Jainism ever accepted the authoritative nature of any of the texts of the Vedic tradition. Do the protagonists who regard the *prasthāna trayī* as being the foundational source of the stream of philosophizing in India wish to deny the 'Indian' character of the two philosophical traditions? In case they do, let them say so openly and not hide behind the facade of a falsity that masquerades as axiomatic truth. And even if we accept the preposterous claim that the Buddhist and Jaina traditions of philosophizing do not form an integral part of the philosophical traditions of India, would the other schools conform to the definition which has been set up by some to determine what constitutes a genuine Indian philosophical tradition?

The moment we ask this question, we are faced with the incredible fact that except for Vedānta, none of the other schools of Indian philosophy measure up to this criterion even in a *prima facie*

manner. Who would say that Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika or Sāṁkhya or Mīmāṁsā derive from these three texts in any meaningful manner? Mīmāṁsā, as everyone knows, does not accept the *Upaniṣads* and has never been concerned with them in its long history of over two millennia from the time its foundational *sūtra* text was written. As for the *Gītā*, no one in his wildest imagination would even dream of thinking that Mīmāṁsā has ever had anything to do with it.

Nyāya, which even at the *sūtra* stage tried to uphold the authority of the Vedas, explicitly rejects the notion that all reality is one, a view which one may plausibly ascribe to the *Upaniṣads*. In fact, even the defence of the Vedas by Gautama in the *Nyāya Sūtras* is extremely ambiguous as he equates it with the authority that one accords to the *Āyurveda*. As for the criticism of the Upaniṣadic view, it is explicit in the *Sūtras*.

It is true that Udayana in his *Ātmatattva Viveka*, specially in its concluding portion, shows a strong inclination towards the extreme Advaitic interpretation of the Upaniṣadic position as developed in the *Brahma Sūtras*, the *Gauḍapāda Kārikā*, and Śaṁkara's commentaries on the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahma Sūtras*. But the honeymoon, if it ever happened there, was short-lived, as the long debate on Śaṁkara Miśra's *Bhedaratnama* showed. The reality of difference became the central bone of contention between the Advaitins and the non-Advaitins even though it is not clear how the Naiyāyika will accommodate this reality in his conception of *mokṣa*, or the state of liberation.

As for the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Gītā*, no Naiyāyika seems to have paid much attention to them, except the great Vācaspati Miśra I, whose case is unique as he not only wrote authoritatively on Nyāya, but also on Vedānta and Sāṁkhya giving us new directions for their interpretation. He is perhaps the first person to exemplify the trend in the Indian philosophical tradition of thinkers who write on a number of different philosophical schools and contribute to their development. Yet, though this has been the case with many a thinker, no one has cared to see the inter-relationship between their different works or evaluate the arguments that they have given in support of each of them. Many of these arguments must have been opposed to one another as they were in support of radically different positions. In any case, no Naiyāyika, except Vācaspati Miśra I, has ever written, even individually, on the *Brahma Sūtra*, or the *Gītā* or the *Upaniṣads* or accepted their authority in any sense of the term.

As for Vaiśeṣika, it is well known that it does not accept the authority of *śabda prāmāṇya* and hence cannot be suspected of recognizing any of the texts in the Vedic or non-Vedic tradition as authoritative. The *prasthāna trayī*, therefore, is totally irrelevant to it, as it has been for Sāṁkhya which is supposed to have an independent origin and has continued to lead an autonomous life of its own. The philosophical system known as Yoga in the Indian tradition has generally been regarded as allied to Sāṁkhya as far as the epistemological and metaphysical aspects were concerned, and while its methodology of spiritual praxis may have something to do with the various *upāsanās* mentioned in the *Upaniṣads*, it is basically independent and pursues a line of *sādhanā* which is different from the one prescribed either in the *Upaniṣads* or the *Gītā*. It should be remembered in this connection that the *upāsanās* prescribed in the former are rejected by Śaṁkara in the sense that, according to him, they do not lead to *mokṣa*, and that the paths prescribed in the *Gītā* are very different from those that are prescribed in the *Upaniṣads*. Thus none of the five major non-śramaṇic traditions in Indian philosophy have anything to do with the so-called *'prasthāna trayī'* texts which have been loudly proclaimed to be the source of all philosophies in India.

The same is true of all the *āgamic* traditions of India. We have already mentioned Buddhism and Jainism. The non-śramaṇic *āgamic* traditions such as the Pāśupata, the Pāñcarātra, the Śaiva Siddhānta, the Vīra Śaiva and the Kāśmīra Śaivism or the Pratyabhijña have the same attitude with respect to the *prasthāna trayī* texts *as* do the non-Vedāntic traditions which, at least nominally, began to accept the authority of the Vedas at some period in their long history. Some of the āgamic schools, such as Vīra Śaivism, are openly hostile and reject the Vedic tradition of which the *prasthāna trayī* texts are supposed to be an integral part. Others have independent texts of their own which they regard as authoritative.

It is true that sometimes some important person in these traditions has written on one of the *prasthāna trayī* texts. The most well-known example is that of Abhinava Gupta who wrote on the *Gītā*. But, as is obvious in his case, they do not regard the text they write upon as authoritative in the same sense as those which belong to their own tradition.

In fact, the question of the independent authority of non-śramaṇic *āgamic* texts was raised by Yāmunācārya, the first non-Advaitic

Vedāntic ācārya in his *Āgama Prāmāṇya* in the eleventh century, a clear indication that even those who wanted to ally themselves with the Vedic tradition were not satisfied with its claim to being the *sole* authority on the tradition, *excluding* all other sources which were highly regarded in the tradition. Śaṁkara's inclusion of the *Gītā* amongst the basic texts was already an evidence of this, though it has never been seen as such. In fact, the attempt by some well-meaning persons to include it amongst the *Upaniṣads* had been rejected by the tradition and it enjoyed only the stature of a *smṛti* and never a *śruti* in the Indian tradition. Thus, even though it was regarded as the word of God by many people, it was never given the status accorded to those texts which were regarded as 'Vedic' in the tradition.

Yāmunācārya, it seems, wanted to widen this notion of the basic authoritative texts of the tradition even though, for some strange reason, the *Gītā* has never, as far as I know, been recognized as an *āgama* in the Indian tradition. The other great non-Advaitic ācāryas continued what Yāmuna had begun, but adopted a strategy which was different. On the one hand, they accepted the authority of all or at least some of the texts included in the *prasthāna trayī* but interpreted them in a way that was radically different from the one given by Śaṁkara. On the other hand, they included texts other than the ones regarded as belonging to the *prasthāna trayī* group and treated them as *equally* authoritative. This was specially the case with the *Śrīmadbhāgavad* which, in fact, became the main text for them and the interpretations of both the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahma Sūtras* had to accord with it.

Yāmunācārya had commented on the *Gītā*, but had left the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Upaniṣads* aside. Rāmānuja, on the other hand, faced the challenge directly and wrote the famous commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras* treating Śaṁkara's interpretation as a *pūrvapakṣa*. Thus began the long debate between the Advaitins and the non-Advaitins regarding the interpretation of the *prasthāna trayī* texts; but none of the non-Advaitic ācāryas confined themselves to these texts alone, or commented on all of them, all the time.

Rāmānuja did not write any independent commentary on the *Upaniṣads* as Śaṁkara had done, even though, like him, he wrote on the *Gītā*. In fact, except for Madhva, none of the non-Advaitic ācāryas wrote separately on the *Upaniṣads* as perhaps they thought that a successful non-Advaitic interpretation of the *Brahma Sūtras*

was sufficient, as the latter was supposed to contain the essence of the former.

All of them, of course, wrote on the *Brahma Sūtras* and some of them also on the *Gītā*. But there were ācāryas like Nimbārka who wrote only on the *Brahma Sūtras* and left the *Gītā* and the *Upaniṣads* alone. But what is even more interesting is the inclusion of the *Śrīmadbhāgavad* as an independent text, first by Madhva and then by Vallabha and still later, by the followers of Caitanya who gave up the whole *prasthāna trayī* tradition altogether. Madhva according to B.N.K. Sharma, the well-known authority on Dvaita Vedānta, had written a work entitled the *Bhāgavattātparya Nirṇaya* on which two *vyākhyās* were written by Yadupati (AD 1630) and Śrīnivāsa Tīrtha (AD 1640), respectively, the manuscripts of which are available at Udipi and Mysore.

Vallabha, of course, wrote both on the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Gītā*, but he laid an even greater emphasis on the *Śrīmadbhāgavad*. Caitanya did not write anything, but his disciples, Rūpa Goswāmi and Jīva Goswāmi, gave up even the practice of writing on the *Brahma Sūtras* and concentrated only on the *Śrīmadbhāgavad*.

Thus the only text which may possibly claim to be a *'prasthāna'* text for the pre-Caitanya Vedāntic tradition of philosophy in India is the *Brahma Sūtras* and not the *Upaniṣad* and the *Gītā* along with it, as is generally claimed. But this will be *true* only of the pre-Caitanya Vedāntic tradition and not for any of the other schools of Indian philosophy, whether Vedic or non-Vedic. The *āgamic* traditions of India have never accepted them, nor have those non-Vedāntic schools which have, mistakenly, been ascribed to the Vedic tradition. There has been nothing like *one 'prasthāna'* in the Indian tradition, as has been evident time and again in its long history. Even such a late thinker as Swāmi Nārāyaṇa, the founder of the sect by that name sometime in the late-eighteenth or early-nineteenth century in Gujarat, for example, accepted the Vedas and the *Brahma Sūtras* as authoritative texts but also added to them, texts such as the *Viṣṇusahasranāmā* which no one had even thought of as an authoritative basic text before. In fact, his list is quite perplexing as it includes, besides *Viduranīti*, *Vāsudeva Māhātmya* and the *Yājñavalkya Smṛti*.

The inclusion of *Vāsudeva Māhātmya* is strange, but stranger still is the inclusion of *Yājñavalkya Smṛti* and *Vidura Nīti* by him. Does it indicate that spiritual leaders at this time were becoming aware of

the importance of legal and political-cum-social texts for guidance in the changing situation that was developing all around? Further, there is the added question as to why Swāmi Nārāyaṇa chose the *Yājñavalkya Smṛti* instead of the *Manusmṛti* which one would expect he would do. Perhaps the former served his purpose better. In that case, the differences between these two basic texts of the Dharma Śāstra tradition in India will have to be explored in this light.

A more radical departure seems to have occurred in the writings and practice of Nārāyaṇa Guru who came from Kerala and lived during the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century. Not only did he not write on the *Brahma Sūtras* or the *Gītā* but he built temples without any idol in them. This was in that true Advaitic tradition which ultimately believes only in the formless and the nameless one. It is also reminiscent of Dayānanda Sarasvatī who also completely gave up the worship of images, as a result of his return to the origins and acceptance of the Vedas as the only authoritative source for the tradition.

The idea that there was some sort of '*prasthāna*' for all of the diverse philosophical traditions of India is not found in the ancient texts. Perhaps, the idea arose sometime in the seventeenth century when Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the well-known Advaita thinker, wrote his *Prasthāna Bheda.* But those who have derived inspiration from the title have not carefully read the contents of this work as its main contention is that the differences in the various philosophical traditions of India derived from the differences in their *prasthāna bheda,* which is their starting point. This would imply that the uniqueness of Vedānta lies in its starting point, or in the basic texts which it treats as authoritative, and not in the compelling nature of the arguments which are given in support of its position. This, to a certain extent, parallels the Jain position that it is the *dṛṣṭi bheda* which accounts for the differences between the different traditions of philosophy in the country. But how far such a contention accords with Madhusūdana's position in *Advaita Siddhī,* is difficult to say. *Prima facie,* there seems to be an apparent contradiction, as the latter work is justly famous for its arguments against Vyāsatīrtha II given in his *Nyāyāmṛta.*

Whatever is the origin of the idea that the *prasthāna trayī* texts have been the source of all philosophical traditions in India, is a myth and should be recognized as such. It is sustained neither by evidence nor argument. It is *not* true even of those schools which

are generally considered as 'Vedāntic' in the tradition. Only the *Brahma Sūtras* may be said to provide the basis for this claim to a great extent, but neither Yāmuna nor the post-Vallabha masters wrote on it. And, many of them *openly* advocated the authority of other texts not included in the *prasthāna trayī* texts. It is time that the myth be buried and forgotten by all those who are more in favour of intellectual honesty than of their own private prejudices and predilections, or the particular school of philosophy they may happen to love or espouse in the Indian tradition.

Does Dharmakīrti Embrace A Pragmatic Theory of Truth In His Theory of Knowledge?

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When we try to present Dharmakīrti's epistemological position in a clear perspective, we find ourselves beset with a problem. There seem to be conflicts between several remarks, made by Dharmakīrti, in several of his works like *Nyāyabindu, Pramāṇavārttika* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya,* about the nature of *pramāṇa* or valid cognition. Classical commentators, as well as recent interpreters of his works, are at pains to provide a systematic exposition that can set at rest the tensions, and come up with a coherent account of his epistemic standpoint. I shall, in this paper, make an attempt to present, to the best of my ability, a coherent account of Dharmakīrti's epistemic position which resolves the apparent conflicts in his work.

The apparent conflicts, it must be noted, arise from certain misunderstandings of Dharmakīrti's position. We can mention here just two of them. The first misconception is: (*i*) Dharmakīrti considered perception to be valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) from the transcendental standpoint, and he considered inference to be so from the empirical or pragmatic point of view. The second misconception is: (*ii*) Dharmakīrti embraced a radical form of pragmatic theory of truth in his epistemology.

I shall tackle the misconceptions in sequence, and expose their inadequacies in the course of what would be the *proper* exposition of Dharmakīrti's position.

A. DHARMAKĪRTI ESPOUSED A TRANSCENDENTAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL STANDPOINT

In the introductory verse of his *Nyāyabindu,* Dharmakīrti spells out the importance of a study of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). He says that

because the success of an action, undertaken for the fulfilment of any human purpose, depends on the action's being preceded (caused) by valid cognition, therefore valid cognition must be understood properly.

'*Samyagjñānapūrvikā sarva-puruṣārthasiddhiriti tad vyutpadyate.*'[1]

The above introductory *sūtra* of *Nyāyabindu* makes it clear that the arena of action, undertaken for the attainment of desired objects (and the avoidance of unwelcome ones), is Dharmakīrti's context for the discussion of valid cognition. Thus, the background of Dharmakīrti's epistemology is an anthropology of active beings striving for the attainment of objects desired and for the avoidance of objects undesired. It is evident that Dharmakīrti is concerned, in his *Nyāyabindu,* with valid cognition within the sphere of desire; he is not concerned with the transcendent perspective of one who has realized *Nirvāṇa.*[2]

The misconception that Dharmakīrti considered perception and inference to be valid, respectively from the transcendental and the pragmatic points of view, stems from Dharmakīrti's designation of perception as '*abhrānta*'[3] and inference as '*bhrānta*'.[4]

This designation has given rise to the idea that perception alone is the true source of the knowledge of ultimate reality. It is thought to be a source of knowledge from the 'transcendental standpoint'. Even writings of contemporary Buddhist scholars like Stcherbatsky seem to have contributed to the misconception. For example, Stcherbatsky wrote: 'sense perception has been defined above as the sensational core of perception, that part of it which remains when every bit of thought-construction and imagination has been eliminated. But this is only a transcendental source of knowledge'.[5] Stcherbatsky also commented: 'Thus is it that inference (or judgment) is right knowledge empirically, but at the same time it is an illusion transcendentally'.[6] Dharmakīrti's designation, along with such comments as stated above, have driven people to conclude: since inference, which is erroneous from the transcendental viewpoint, is still considered to be valid cognition by Dharmakīrti, it must be valid from the empirical or pragmatic considerations. Inasmuch as inference helps a man to successfully attain the desired object, it is valid, because it has pragmatic utility. Perception, on the other hand, has been defined by Dharmakīrti to be free from

thought-construction and non-erroneous (*kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntam*).[7] The objects of perception are unique, momentary particulars known as *svalakṣaṇas*, and the latter are referred to as *paramārthasat* by Dharmakīrti.[8] Since perception cognises the *paramārthasat* without any superimposition of thought-construction perception is therefore taken as a source of knowledge from the transcendental standpoint.

However, Dharmakīrti never intended to consider any cognition as valid from the transcendental point of view. He treats both perception and inference as valid empirical cognitions. It is neither true that only perception is the source of knowledge of ultimate reality. In his opinion, both perception and inference acquaint us with the real *svalakṣaṇa*. Perception does it directly; inference does it indirectly, through conceptual constructs (*vikalpa*). This will become evident in later sections in which we establish that what makes perception and inference valid cognitions is coordination of cognition with the object.[9]

In Dharmakīrti's opinion, cognition can be (*i*) of the real, such as real fire, water etc. or (*ii*) of the unreal, such as the imaginary horn of the hare, the double moon, the constructed identity of changing particulars, the conceptually constructed universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇas*). The former cognition alone counts as valid cognition. However, the real that is talked about is not Ultimate Reality or *Nirvāṇa*. The reality with which Dharmakīrti is concerned here is reality bound up with an anthropology whereby human beings are seen to undertake actions to satisfy their desires.

Had this reality been identified with *Nirvāṇa*, it would not be swayed by temporal considerations. The real Dharmakīrti is talking about, in the context of epistemology, is the momentary *svalakṣaṇa*. *Nirvāṇa*, it is to be remembered, is neither temporal nor particular. Thus the sphere in which Dharmakīrti's epistemology is concentrated is the sphere of the phenomenal. Dharmakīrti points out that even in the sphere of the empirical, men are deluded by ignorance. Ignorance is of two kinds: (*i*) ordinary ignorance which is the cause of our day-to-day mistakes, and (*ii*) primeval ignorance which causes us to wrongly apprehend the momentary and particular as enduring and general. The second ignorance is the cause of selfish actions in a man and results in bondage and suffering. The knowledge, that things are in reality changing and momentary, acts

as a stepping stone to attain *Nirvāṇa*. However, the changing *svalakṣaṇas* are not *Nirvāṇa*, the Ultimate.

Let us now discuss the reason why Dharmakīrti is considered to be a pragmatist. It seems that he is thought to be a pragmatist primarily because he regards valid cognition (*samyagjñāna* = *pramāṇa*) as *avisaṁvādakaṁ jñānam*.

B. PRAMĀṆA AND AVISAṀVĀDAKAṀ JÑĀNAM

Perception is not tied up, at the level of its *prima facie* object (*grāhya* = *pratibhāsa-viṣaya*), with any utilitarian considerations. Yet, it is subsequently expressed in judgmental awareness, consisting of concepts.[10] This judgmental awareness prompts a man to action which enables him to successfully get the object of desire (which is a *svalakṣaṇa* interpreted in terms of concepts and conceived as enduring). Suppose a man, seeing something, judges the presence of water in the vicinity. He strives to get the water (which is a *svalakṣaṇa* interpreted by concepts), and finally attains it. The sequence from perception to the final attainment of the desired object is represented as follows.

First, perception presents an object to the perceiver as an object of volition (*pravṛttiviṣayapradarśakatvam*). Thereafter, there arises a volition (*pravṛtti*) for attaining the object. Finally, this volition leads to the attainment of the object (*prāpakatvam*). In accordance with the analysis, valid cognition (both perception and inference) is characterised as *avisaṁvādakaṁ jñānam* or uncontradicted knowledge.[11] Dharmakīrti emphasizes the fact that valid cognition must have as its object something not known before.[12] The idea is probably derived from the belief that knowledge is meaningless unless it adds something to the existing stock of knowledge.

It may seem, then, that Dharmakīrti considers a valid cognition primarily in practical terms. A cognition is valid, he seems to maintain, because it has the ability to bring about the appropriate practical results.

The question that inevitably arises in our mind is, is Dharmakīrti a pragmatist? Let us now try to find answers to this question.

C. DOES DHARMAKĪRTI EMBRACE A PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH?

The tendency to describe the Buddhist views of truth as a form of pragmatism has a long tradition. Even in recent years, D.J.

Kalupahana has emphasized the pragmatic aspect of Buddhism and undervalued the importance of tradition as a source of truth.[13] Prof. Karl Potter is ready to apply this pragmatic label to majority of Indian Schools of Philosophy, including Buddhism, and asserts that they consider validity (*prāmāṇya*) in terms of workability.[14] Prof. J.N. Mohanty, however, contends that it is only true of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and their followers that they equate validity with practical workability.[15] In our opinion, however, proper care should be taken in the use of the term 'pragmatism' as a blanket designation of the Buddhist theory of truth.

A proper scrutiny will, however, reveal that Dharmakīrti, as far as his most mature accounts of valid cognition are concerned, is *not* a pragmatist. Knowledge, according to Dharmakīrti, functions in relation to practical concerns, but it cannot be defined exclusively in terms of practical workability. *Avisaṁvādakatva* (uncontradictedness of knowledge) cannot, by itself, constitute validity.

Buddhism insists on the practical consequences of knowledge, but a similar insistence is found in Nyāya. Strictly speaking, Nyāya maintains that *saṁvādakatva* of the *pravṛtti* (volition) which follows from valid cognition, is the *criterion* of valid cognition; but it does not hold that this *saṁvādakatva* constitutes the defining property of valid cognition. Moreover, this practical emphasis is very different from adopting a pragmatic theory of truth. According to the pragmatic theory of truth, 'this is true' is interpreted as meaning, 'this leads to appropriate results'. As far as this theory is concerned, the obtaining of appropriate results is not only a necessary but a sufficient condition of truth. William James asserts that 'the true is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as right is only the convenient in our way of behaving.'[16]

Those who want to interpret Dharmakīrti's notion of validity (*prāmāṇya*) in purely pragmatic terms would encounter the difficulty of coming across cases where the pragmatic criterion is satisfied but which do not obviously count as cases of valid cognition.

D. THE DIFFICULTY INVOLVED IN THE PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION

To illustrate our point that practical considerations are not sufficient to determine knowledge, as far as Dharmakīrti is concerned, let us, in accordance with him, and his commentator, Dharmottara, quote the following examples of apparent cases of valid cognition:

(*i*) A person is seeking water on a hot day. He/she suddenly seems to see water lying ahead. In fact, what is visible is just a mirage. But as he/she reaches the spot, he/she is lucky and finds water right there under a rock. Can we say that the person concerned had genuine knowledge of water? The answer seems to be negative. The water just happened to be nearby, yet he/she had no knowledge of it being there. Thus practical success is clearly not enough to determine the validity of cognition.[17]

(*ii*) On seeing merely the radiance of a lamp coming through a crevice, and mistaking it to be the lustre of a jewel, a person rushes to the spot to get the jewel. But as he/she reaches the spot, he/she finds a jewel lying inside the cave, and thus the person is successful in getting the jewel desired. Can we say that the person had genuine knowledge of the jewel? If practical concerns were enough for validity, this case would have to count as one of genuine knowledge.

The examples cited above are interesting in more than one respect. They are quite similar to the cases cited by Edmond Gettier in his attacks against the classical western definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In his essay, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge'?,[18] he concocts examples of situations in which the criterion needed to be satisfied by the definition of knowledge is satisfied, but our intuitions tell us that there is no knowledge. Dharmakīrti's and Dharmottara's examples are quite similar to those cited by Gettier. Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara offer a putative definition of knowledge as *avisaṁvādakaṁ jñānam* = uncontradicted cognition, and bring counter-examples in which the criterion implied by the definition is met, but our intuition tells us that there is no knowledge.

Let us cite one of Gettier's examples: Smith has adequate evidence for the following conjoined fact:

(*i*) Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith is justified in believing (*i*), since the President of the company, a thoroughly reliable person, has told him that Jones will get the job, and Smith has just counted the number of coins in Jones' pocket.

Moreover, Smith sees that (*i*) entails (*ii*) the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Thus, Gettier claims, Smith is

justified in believing (*ii*) the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

It happens, however, that Smith himself gets the job and, *coincidentally*, but unknown to Smith, he has ten coins in his pocket. Thus (*ii*) is true and Smith justifiably believes (*ii*). However, Smith does not know (*ii*). Accordingly, Gettier argues, it is a matter of *coincidence* that Smith has a justified true belief which turns out to be true. Hence, the justified-true-belief analysis is inadequate.

Let us now consider the way to overcome the difficulty involved in the pragmatic interpretation of Dharmakīrti's theory of validity.

E. TOWARDS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM INVOLVED IN THE PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION

Dharmakīrti never considers practical utility to be the sufficient condition for a cognition's validity. In his opinion, the correspondence or *sārūpya* between a *svalakṣaṇa* and its image (*pratibhāsa*) constitutes the validity of perception. And the correspondence between a concept which is inferred (the immediate object = *grāhya-viṣaya* of inference) and the *svalakṣaṇa* (the ultimate object or *adhyavasāya* = *pravṛtti-viṣaya* of inference) to which it applies, constitutes the validity of inference.[19] It is because of this correspondence or *sārūpya* that the man who perceives or infers succeeds in attaining the object known.[20] Let us now attempt a detailed analysis of *arthasārūpya* as the necessary and sufficient condition of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), as far as Dharmakīrti's epistemological standpoint is concerned.

We will start with the concept of perception. Let us first see how *arthasārūpya* is *pramāṇa* as far as perception is concerned.

F. PERCEPTION AND ARTHASĀRŪPYA

The concept of correspondence or *arthasārūpya* is explained in detail by Dharmakīrti in his discussion of the identity of *pramāṇa* and its *phala*, in both *Nyāyabindu* and *Pramāṇavārttika*.

Buddhist philosophers held that *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala* or *pramā* are, in reality, non-distinct. This theory of the identity of *pramāṇa* and its *phala* is primarily a consequence of the Buddhist rejection of the validity of the concept of production. Since all *svalakṣaṇas* or ultimate existents are, in their opinion, momentary,

the relation of the producer and the product cannot hold between any two of them. A *svalakṣaṇa* cannot come into existence at one moment and exercise its causal efficacy in the next. *Pramā*, therefore, is not really a result produced by a separate producer known as *pramāṇa*. Moreover, *pramā* as a conscious cognition can never be produced by the instrumentality of a non-conscious sense-organ (or its contact with the object).

Dharmakīrti in *Pramāṇavārttika* points out that the instrument (*karaṇa*) of a result is the causal factor that is immediately (*avyavahitena*) followed by the result. And it is also the most predominant factor (*sādhakatamaṁ kāraṇam*) determining the nature of the result.

Pramāṇa as conceived by the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṁsaka, is an instrument (*karaṇa*) for producing *pramā*. However Dharmakīrti points out, the so-called instrument (*karaṇa*) of perception, the sense-organs, do not share any of the characteristics of a *pramāṇa*. The presence of the sense-organ is not immediately followed by perception.[21] Nor is the sense-organ the most predominant factor. It is not the eye which makes a particular cognition (*viṣayādhigati*) the cognition of blue and not that of yellow.[22]

However, inasmuch as *pramā* is a specific or definite (*niścita = niyata = vyavasthāpita*) awareness, we normally tend to believe that something else is responsible for its specific or definite nature. Accordingly. we artificially tend to consider it as a result (*phala*) of a specifier which acts as a *pramāṇa*. Yet, if a specific awareness depends on any specifier at all, it must itself be a cognition.

Dharmakīrti holds that cognition bears upon itself the *ākāra* (form) of the object impressed on it as an image. Owing to this it turns out to be a specific cognition. This bearing of the form of the object is known as *meya-rūpatā* or *arthasārūpya*. This *meyarūpatā* (*arthasārūpya*) is also that which is immediately followed by the specific cognition of the object.[23] Hence the cognition's possessing the form of the object (*viṣayākāratā = arthasārūpya*) is, in Dharmakīrti's opinion, the *pramāṇa* of the resulting cognition of the object.

In *Nyāyabindu* Dharmakīrti maintains that what is capable of specifying a particular perception is the similarity (*sārūpya = sādṛśya*) of the form of cognition (*nirbhāsa*) to the form of the corresponding object. What makes a particular cognition a specific perception of blue is the fact that the cognition possesses the form of the object

(*meyarūpatā* = *arthasārūpya*) blue.[24] Thus the relation between an 'instrument' and its result is to be understood as that between a specifier (*vyavasthāpaka*) and the specified (*vyavasthāpya*). However, it must be remembered that it is the same cognition that appears as the specifier from one point of view and the specified from the other. The specifier is the *pramāṇa* and the specific cognition is viewed as *pramā*.[25]

G. PRAMĀṆA AND JUDGMENTAL AWARENESS

In *Nyāyabindu* Dharmakīrti deals at length with the problem as to whether *pramāṇa* is really a judgmental awareness. Indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) is incapable of making itself specific. What makes it a specific cognition (*vyavasthāpayati*) is really a judgment which arises immediately after the indeterminate perception. One may, in that case, be inclined to believe that it is the determinate judgment (*vikalpa-adhyavasāya*) that is really the *pramāṇa*. Dharmakīrti maintains that this is a misconception. The power of making a cognition specific does not reside in a judgment. The real source of this power is the original pure sensation—the power of specifying that the following judgment appears to possess is really parasitic.

Take, for example, specific cognitions like 'this is blue', 'this is yellow' etc. What makes a particular cognition a valid and distinct cognition of blue (and not of any other colour) is really the correspondence of the form of cognition with that of the blue *svalakṣaṇa*. Had the original perception been lacking in this correspondence, the following determinate judgment (which only makes the *original perception clearer and more distinct*), could, by no means, make itself a valid cognition.[26] Thus the original sensations differ among themselves as valid cognitions due to their correspondence with the forms of *svalakṣaṇas* of blue, yellow etc. As a result of this correspondence they are specified, later on, by determinate judgments. Thus the determining power of these judgments is really a derivative power. The real source of this power lies in the correspondence of the original sensations with the forms of objects. It is these initial sensations that play the role of specifier, and, consequently, that of the *pramāṇa*.[27]

Thus, as far as perception is concerned, its validity is constituted by its *arthasārūpya*. It is really because of this *arthasārūpya* that the

knower eventually succeeds in attaining the object perceived. An unambiguous statement of this position can be found in the remarks of Kamalaśīla in the *Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā*, regarding what counts as *pramāṇa*.

Kamalaśīla attracts the reader's attention to the important fact, that, according to Nyāyavādi Bauddhas, *pramāṇa* is a cognition which is *avisaṁvādaka* in the sense that it leads a man to successful action (*saphalapravṛttipravartaka*). Valid cognition prompts a man to act in such a way that he succeeds in attaining the object cognised. Now what prompts a man to act successfully is really the *sārūpya* between the form of cognition and that of the object. For example, it is really the *sārūpya* of the form of perception of water with real water that prompts a man to successfully get the water presented in his perception. If the said *sārūpya* is lacking, as in the case of the illusion of water in a mirage, the man will fail to attain the object presented in his perception. What makes a particular cognition *pramāṇa* is thus the fact that it leads a man to launch a fruitful activity. Since it is only *sārūpya* of a cognition that causes a man to act successfully, it is *sārūpya* that really counts as *pramāṇa*. The distinction between *pramāṇa* and its *phala* must, as far as valid cognition is concerned, be made on the basis of *sārūpya*.[28]

Let us now consider how *arthasārūpya* is *pramāṇa* as far as inference is concerned.

H. INFERENCE AND ARTHASĀRŪPYA

As remarked in sections E, it is the *sārūpya* of a concept with the *svalakṣaṇa*, that in Dharmakīrti's opinion, constitutes the validity of inference. And it is because of this *arthasārūpya* that the inferer's effort to attain the object is crowned with success. In *Nyāyabindu* Dharmakīrti emphatically says that in the case of inference of a blue object, *sārūpya* of the blue *svalakṣaṇa* with its conception constitutes the *pramāṇa* of inference. And the resulting definite knowledge is its *phala*.[29]

Now all this needs some explanation. Scholars usually tend to explain away the contradiction of saying that inference is *pramāṇa* in spite of being erroneous,[30] by saying that, inference is *pramāṇa*, only because it is the cause of the attainment of the desired object. But this explanation is not entirely correct. The *prāpakatva* of inference is dependent upon its *arthasārūpya*. That *arthasārūpya* is a more

basic criterion compared to that of *prāpakatva* is evident from the following considerations:

> A cognition can be *prāpaka* only if it is a specific or definite cognition connected necessarily with a real *svalakṣaṇa*. This is stated categorically in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā: pratyakṣam pratibhāsamānaṁ niyatāmarthaṁ darśayati, anumānaṁ ca liṅgasambaddhaṁ niyatāmarthaṁ darśayati, ata ete niyatasyārthasya pradarśake, tena te pramāṇe.*[31] Perception and inference are thus *pramāṇas* because they present real objects (connected with cognition) in a specific way. In the case of doubt, since the presentation of the object is non-specific or indefinite, it is not capable of being attained.[32]

Thus, a cognition is *avisaṁvādaka* (meaning, thereby, *prāpaka*) only if it is a definite and specific cognition. Dharmottara points out that all non-inferential conceptual constructions, which operate freely without taking notice of any determining or regulating factor (unlike inferential knowledge which is determined or regulated by *hetu*), can only refer to objects which are not determined as existing. Hence, such objects can never be attained.[33]

Now the question is, what makes a particular cognition definite or specific? As remarked earlier, it is *arthasārūpya*. Now, in the case of perception, *arthasārūpya* means direct correspondence between a *svalakṣaṇa* and its image. Such a direct correspondence is not possible in the case of inference as the object is not directly present in the ken of the observer, and, so, it cannot directly imprint its image in the cognition. *Anumāna* presents its object, viz. *sādhya*, indirectly.

The knowledge of the inferred object (viz. fire in the hill), however, must be a definite cognition. What then is responsible for its definite character?

In the first place, it is definite because the perception of the *hetu*, viz. smoke, in the *pakṣa*, viz. the hill, is the result of *sārūpya* between a *svalakṣaṇa* and its image. Secondly, the knowledge of the necessary connection between the *hetu*, viz. smokeness and the *sādhya*, viz. fireness also contributes to the definiteness of the cognition. But, then, this is not enough. For the object of inference is not merely fireness, but the presence of 'fire in the hill', Now, what makes this knowledge definite is that there is an *indirect correspondence* or similarity between conceptual cognition and its object here. The object, fire (in the hill) is an individual presented to the knower

by subsuming a particular *svalakṣaṇa* (*vahni-svalakṣaṇa*) under the concept of fireness (*vahnitva*). The concept that is applicable to the *vahni-svalakṣaṇa* here must be one that is applicable to objects having similar (causal) properties, and not to objects having different (causal) properties (for example, *jala-svalakṣaṇa*). As a distinct and determinate concept, the concept of fireness is different from other concepts (e.g. that of waterness) which are applicable to individuals (e.g. water) having different (causal) properties than that of fire.

The concept of fireness is thus applicable to the *vahni-svalakṣaṇa* because of the indirect *arthasārūpya*[34] or correspondence between the concept and the subject inferred. The causal efficacy (like producing smoke) that has been observed in other similar cases of individual fires is also present in the fire inferred. This is the reason why the concept of fireness is applicable to and corresponds to the fire-individual inferred.

All this will be clearer if we direct our attention to Dharmakīrti's analysis of the way concepts and judgments are formed in the case of *valid cognitions.*

In *Pramāṇavārttika* Dharmakīrti analyses how the general concept and the general word 'cow' are applied to individual cows because of our perception of some similarity among them. We see all the different individual cows performing similar functions[35] like yielding milk, carrying load, and so forth.[36] As a result of perceiving a similarity, we form a judgment of identity[37] like, 'all these are the same, i.e. cows'.

Given a general term such as 'cow' we can form an excluded (*vyāvṛtta*) class, members of which defy the description 'cow'. This is the supposed class of 'non-cows'. A particular object comes to be recognised as a cow when it is excluded (*apohyate*) from the class of non-cows. The basis of this exclusion (*apoha*), is the observation of performing similar or dissimilar functions. The application of the concept of cowness to individuals performing similar functions excludes (*viśleṣate*) these individual items from the class of non-cows[38] which do not perform the same function. In this way, we judge 'this is the same cow' in cases of valid cognition.[39]

It seems evident that in the case of valid conceptual knowledge (viz. inferential knowledge) *sārūpya* acts as a *pramāṇa.* And the existence of this *sārūpya* is the reason why the knower is successful in obtaining the object known. In case of a wrong inference the *sārūpya*

is absent, and, consequently, the knower will be unable to attain the object inferred. This is illustrated by Dharmakīrti in the following way:

> Two people see some radiance in two different circumstances. In one case the radiance is seen in a place where some jewel is lying. In another case the radiance comes out of an opening in a cave where a lamp is burning. In both cases the people rush to the spot inferring the presence of a jewel there. But only one of them (who correctly inferred the presence of the jewel from its radiance) is rewarded with the jewel. Dharmakīrti explains that person's success by saying that his/her conceptualised cognition of the jewel, although erroneous, is indirectly linked with the object (*vastu* = *artha*), viz. jewel.[40] No such link exists in the case of the inference of the 'jewel' on seeing the radiance of the lamp.[41] Thus, although both the inferences wrongly apprehend the primary appearance (*grāhya* = *pratibhāsa-viṣaya*) as a real object, only those which correspond with the real object (*svalakṣaṇa*) can lead to the attainment of the real.[42]

We may conclude by remarking that, according to Dharmakīrti, *pramāṇa* should be *defined* as *arthasarūpaṁ jñānam*, both as far as perception and inference are concerned. *Avisaṁvādakatva* and *prāpakatva* are to be considered as the criteria of *pramāṇa* both in the case of perceptual and inferential knowledge.

Notes

1. *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, Ch. I, v. I.
2. It is to be remembered that soteriology is at the background of his epistemology. In *Pramāṇavārttika* Dharmakīrti does talk of transforming desire back into the pure state of compassion as part of his defence of the Buddhist way. *Pramāṇavārttika*, Ch. I, vv, pp. 126-8.
3. tatra kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntaṁ pratyakṣaṁ, *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, pp. 8-9.
4. bhrāntaṁ hyanumānam. svapratibhāse'nārthe'dhyavasāyena pravṛttatvāt, *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, p. 9. The immediate object of inference is a concept. Concepts correspond to universal characteristics. Being conceptual in nature, inference does not grasp a real *svalakṣaṇa* as it is. It merely understands the real object through superimposing a universal characteristic upon it. Inference is, thus, erroneous because it superimposes an unreal universal on the object inferred (samāropyamānaṁ hi rūpaṁ sakalavahnisādhāraṇam). *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, p. 18.
5. *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 211.
6. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 18.

7. *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, p. 8.
8. Ibid., p.17.
9. See section F and section G.
10. pratyakṣabalotpanna-adhyavasāya, *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, pp. 19-20.
11. avisaṁvādakaṁ jñānaṁ samyagjñānaṁ—jñānamapi svayaṁ pradarśitamartha prāpayat saṁvādakamucyate—pravartakatvameva prāpakatvam—pravartakatvamapi pravṛttiviṣayapradarśakatvameva, *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, p. 4.

    It is implied in the remark, here, that Dharmakīrti wants to qualify the statement, that, 'valid cognition always leads to the attainment of the object cognised'. It is possible that the person cognising an object has no need for the object, and consequently, there is no volition produced in him to obtain it. Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti maintains, a valid cognition must be an awareness, which presents an object in such a way, that if the cogniser intends to attain it, then his voluntary act must lead to his attainment of the object. All this is suggested in the remark, 'pravartakatvameva prāpakatvam—pravartakatvamapi pravṛttiviṣayapradarśakatvameva'.
12. ajñātārthaprakaśakaṁ jñānaṁ pramāṇam, *Pramāṇavārttika*, p. 8.
13. D.J. Kalupahana, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way*. See especially, pp. 16, 19, 159, 219, 224, 229, 272, 232.
14. K.H. Potter, 'Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief?', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 12, 1982.
15. J.N. Mohanty, *Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth*, p. 230.
16. W. James, *The Meaning of Truth*, p. vii.
17. See Dharmottara's *Ṭīkā* on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, D: Dza 9, 1, 2-3.
18. Published in *Knowledge and Belief*, ed. A.P. Griffiths, pp. 144-46.
19. The immediate object of inference, referred to as 'grāhya/pratibhāsa-viṣaya' is invariably linked with, and thus corresponds to, its ultimate object referred to as 'adhyavasāya/pravṛtti-viṣaya'. See *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, p. 16.
20. See section G, passim, below.
21. (*i*) indriyādeḥ pramitiṁ pratyavyavahitasādhakatvabhāvānna pramāṇam, *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*, p. 190. (*ii*) na hyanah kaścidindriyādih svabhedāt kathañcana kenāpi prakāreṇa jñānasya bhedako'pyarthena jñeyena ghaṭayati yojayati . ... . nīlasyevamadhigatih, pītasya ceyamityādi. See Manoratha Nandin's Ṭīkā on *Pramāṇavārttika*, Ch. II, v. 305, p.191.
22. It is in the same spirit that Dharmottara remarks: yebhyo hi cakṣurādibhyo vijñānamutpadyate na tadvaśāt—nīlasadṛśaṁ tvanubhūyamānaṁ nīlasya saṁvedanavyavasthāpyate. *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, p. 19.
23. sārūpye ca svīkartavye tadevāvyavahitatvāt sādhanamastu. *Pramāṇavārttika Ṭīkā* on Ch. II, v. 313, p. 193.
24. tasmāt prameyādhigateh—sādhanaṁ pramāṇaṁ meyarūpatā, *Pramāṇavārttika Ṭīkā* on Ch. II, v. 306, p. 191.
25. arthena saha yatsārūpyaṁ . . . sādṛśyamākāra ityābhāsa ityāpi vyapadiśyate . . . na cātra janya-janakabhāvanibandhanaṁ sādhyasādhanabhāvah—api tu vyavasthāpyavyavsthāpakabhāvena, *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, pp. 18-19.
26. It is also to be noted in this connection that Dharmakīrti never considers determinate (conceptual) perception as pramāṇa, inasmuch as it fails to fulfil one of the conditions of pramāṇa—viz. that of revealing an object not known before—ajñātārtha prakāśakatva. Its object is already known in indeterminate perception. It only makes that knowledge clearer.

27. janitena tvadhyavasāyena sārūpyavaśānnīlabodha-rūpe jñāne vyvasthāpyamāne sārūpyaṁ vyavasthāpanahetutvāt pramāṇaṁ siddhaṁ bhavati. *Nyāyabinduṭikā*, p. 20.
28. yato yenaivāṁśena pravartakatvaṁ jñānasya bhavati sa eva darśanīyah, na cotpādyotpādakabhāvena pramāṇa-phala-vyavasthāyāṁ pravartakāṁśah sārūpyaṁ gamyate, *Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā*, Vol. I, p. 489.
29. tadvadanumānaṁ nīlākāramutpadyamānaṁ nīlabodharūpamavasthāpyate, tena nīlasārūpyam pramāṇam, *Nyāyabinduṭikā*, p. 22.
30. anumānasya bhrānterapi pramāṇatā, *Pramāṇavārttikaṭikā*, Ch. II, commentary on, v. 56, p. 118.
31. *Nyāyabinduṭikā*, p. 4.
32. kaścidaniyto bhāvābhāvayoḥ. yathā saṁśayārthaḥ. na ca bhāvābhāvābhyāṁ yukto'rtho jagatyasti. tataḥ prāptumaśakyaḥ. Ibid., p. 5.
33. sarvena cāliṅgajena vikalpena niyāmakamadṛṣṭvā pravṛttena bhāvābhāvayoraniyata evārtho darśayitabhyaḥ prāptumaśakyaḥ. *Nyāyabinduṭikā*, p. 5.
34. The concept of indirectness of correspondence is indicated by the expression, 'paramparayā vastupratibandha' of inferential cognitions.
35. ekārthakriyākāritvaṁ sādṛśyaṁ. *Pramāṇavārttika*, p. 292.
36. *Pramāṇavārttika*, pp. 284-5, 290.
37. ekākāra-parāmarśa.
38. This is another reason why it is remarked that there is an *indirect* correspondence between the concept and the object inferred.
39. jñānamādiryasyā bāhādyarthakriyāyāstāmekākāra—parāmarśaviṣayaṁ bhede'pi nānātve'pi kurvato'rthān dṛṣṭvā tadanyasmād yo viśleṣah sa viṣayo yeṣāṁ tairdhvanibhih saha saṁyojya sa evāyaṁ gauh', *Pramāṇavārttika*, p. 290.
40. *Pramāṇavārttika*, p. 285.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid, p. 285, evaṁ yadyapi sarvasya vikalpasya svapratibhāsenārthe'rthādhyavasāyena vṛtterbhrāntavaṁ tathāpi yo vastusambandhavān sa tat prāpakah.

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T.V. Kapālī Śāstrī's Contribution to Vedic Studies

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T.V. Kapālī Śāstrī was a many-faceted scholar. He wrote extensively on the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the Tantras and Indian philosophy. However, he was not a mere academic student of philosophy, a scholar whose adventures in the world of letters was but book-deep. He was a *sādhaka*, a Śrī Vidyā *upāsaka*, an aspirant *yogin* and poet who had sought to achieve the life divine, the *divya jīvana* on the earth.

Kapālī Śāstrī was born on September 3, 1886 in a family of Sanskrit scholars. His father initiated him into Śrī Vidyā *upāsanā* and *Sāma Veda* recitation quite early in his life. By the time he was twelve, he had read the *Rāmāyaṇa* several times even as he made progress in English studies. The Vedas attracted him in particular; and he felt that there was more to be had from Vedic studies than directions for conducting rituals.

As Śāstrī grew older, he made it a point to go daily to the temple in Tiruvotriyur to worship Lalitā Tripurāsundarī. Here he met the renowned Vedic-Tāntric scholar, Kāvya Kaṇṭha Gaṇapati Muni who was delighted by the glowing zeal of Śāstrī and took him under his wings. Kapālī Śāstrī (who later on wrote Gaṇapati Muni's biography in Sanskrit) says:

> When I turned to the pages of *Sāyaṇa Bhāṣya*, I did not find any difficulty in understanding the word-for-word meaning given therein, but in some places I vaguely thought there was something more than what was written there, but I was not able to go further, what little I could sense was that it was dark to me and the darkness was visible; in effect my eyes could not see.
>
> A few years, afterwards, it was the late Vaśiṣṭa Gaṇapati Muni—Kāvyakaṇṭha Gaṇapati Śāstrī whom we adored and addressed as *Nayana*, beloved father—who, in a way first opened my eyes. It

was he who since 1907-1908 took me as his own and guided me in many branches of Sanskrit study and laid in me the foundations for spiritual life which in later years grew to claim me in its entirety. It was in 1910 that he favoured me with instructions regarding the deities of the *Ṛg Veda* and the depth of thought in the Vedic hymns.[1]

Śāstrī became a Sanskrit teacher at Muthialpet High School, Madras. When he came upon the first issue of *Ārya* (August 15, 1914) edited by Śrī Aurobindo, Śāstrī was overwhelmed by the first instalment of the series, *The Secret of the Veda*. M.P. Pandit, Śāstrī's disciple, writes of those far-off days:

> Śāstrīar was amazed. For the line of thought that Śrī Aurobindo was propounding was precisely the same that he himself had chalked out and pursued during the preceding years. The solution to the problem of life given in the *Ārya* was also identical with his own. He read the entire issue of closely printed 64 pages that very night. And what is more, he read the whole issue every night thereafter till the next one arrived.[2]

In 1917, Śāstrī met Śrī Aurobindo who assured him that India would gain freedom at an early date. Presently, Śāstrī was accepted by Śrī Aurobindo as a disciple and he joined Śrī Aurobindo Āśram in 1929. His life was a total dedication to the Mother and the Master in the Āśram. While he taught Sanskrit or performed the duties assigned to him, he steadily wrote commentaries, poetry, reflections and also translated from one language to another since he could handle, with equal felicity, English, Sanskrit, Telugu and Tamil. Śrī Aurobindo would occasionally refer to him a grammatical or astrological problem for clarification. Śāstrī was also accepted by Ramaṇa Maharṣi as a dear child. In course of time Śāstrī became a fine expounder of the vision of Ramaṇa Maharṣi and Śrī Aurobindo. He passed away on August 15, 1953.

The most striking fact about Kapālī Śāstrī is that he was the disciple of three great spiritual luminaries of his time. Gaṇapati Muni was a traditional scholar and ritualist who engaged himself in *tapasyā* under arduous conditions. But he was no obscurantist and was always ready to strike out on new pathways of the spirit. In fact, he even dared orthodoxy by speaking in favour of emancipating the *harijans*. As a Vedic scholar, Gaṇapati Muni saw behind the dictionary meaning and Sāyaṇa's commentary. Śāstrīar who thirsted to

know about the inner significances of the Vedic hymns was amply rewarded by Gaṇapati Muni's new way of thinking. Unfortunately, as Śāstrī says with a touch of regret, Gaṇapati Muni did not commit to writing a systematic study of the Vedas with reference to his own illuminations.

Gaṇapati Muni took Śāstrī to Ramaṇa Maharṣi. Śāstrī became an ardent disciple and a commentator and translator of some seminal works of Śrī Ramaṇa. Though he found his spiritual haven at the feet of Śrī Aurobindo and the Mother, he experienced no difficulty in continuing to be Śrī Ramaṇa's beloved '*Cinna Nayana*'.

However, it was the Aurobindonian approach to the Vedas that drew Śāstrī very deep into Vedic studies and inspired him to write extensively on the Vedas, the Upaniṣads and the Tantras.

Śāstrī's writing on the Vedas include his essays in English, a Tamil translation of the *Agni Sūktas* and the Sanskrit commentary on the first *aṣṭaka* of the *Ṛgveda* titled *Siddhajñāna*. Throughout he follows Śrī Aurobindo's interpretative vision recorded in *The Secret of the Veda, Hymns to the Mystic Fire* and other essays on the subject. He was not happy with European scholars and their Indian counterparts who too sported a rigidly rationalistic outlook. According to him, the Vedic *Ṛṣis* were advance guards of man's spiritual development as he ascends the evolutionary ladder towards future perfections.

As for Sāyaṇa, has not the time come to take a new look at him? After all, he himself came one thousand years after the Vedic Age and the original mystic vision had been crusted over by ritualism. In any case, one must give some thought to Yāska's statement on alternate interpretations of the Veda from the angle of spiritual experience.

Naturally, such a view calls for a 'double-meaning' in the Vedic hymns. Śāstrī says this language came naturally for the mystic consciousness of the *Ṛṣis*:

> . . . it was a natural expression of the human organism in terms of vocal sound, reproducing and acting to the stimuli from the environment, the objective universe or as in the case of the *Ṛṣi* from the Universe within of the higher Powers, of the Spirit, of God. Language was a living growth, a live force. Besides, words of the Vedic age retain their derivative significance, so that when a word is uttered, it not only denotes the object intended, but signifies its characteristic aspect.[3]

Here it is always the inner significance which is true; the outer is merely a symbol. However, this would not mean that each and every

Ṛk can be put through a Procrustean Bed of inner significances. Sometimes words like '*dhi*', '*ketu*' and '*ṛtam*' would not require any special explanation as the words themselves effortlessly convey the exterior image as well as the interior significance.

We cannot, of course, assign to the Vedas a rigid programme of ritualism for ever as is done by the Mīmāṁsakas. Śāstrī has great respect for their capabilities in explaining the ancient texts, but if we follow them blindly, the inner significances will be lost for mankind. One must try to achieve the kind of *tapasyā*—concentration to get at the significances of the *mantras* which had originally evoked them from the Unknowable. According to Śāstrī, the Vedic Age of spiritual illumination was followed by centuries of intellectual argumentation which led to 'a certain plunge towards darkness, a decadence or a descent into something short of death.'

Fortunately, seven centuries ago, Ānanda Tīrtha (Madhvācārya) and his follower Rāghavendra Swāmī posited a spiritual interpretation which saw the various deities as instruments of Viṣṇu. In our own century Dayānanda Sarasvatī, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Paramaśiva Iyer have indicated new approaches to the Vedas. Śāstrī feels that Sāyaṇa's commentary read along with Śrī Aurobindo's *Secret of the Veda* and *Hymns to the Mystic Fire* can definitely lead us to a correct understanding of the Vedic mass.

Though it was Gaṇapati Muni who had set Śāstrī on the Vedic trail with his ability to relive the Vedic experience through askesis, the former did not make any systematic study of the subject. When Śrī Aurobindo's writings on the Veda began to appear in the monthly *Ārya* from August 1914 onwards, Śāstrī was astonished. He writes:

> One remarkable fact is this: both Śrī Aurobindo and Śrī Vaśiṣṭa Muni came to extraordinary conclusions about the Vedic gods and Vedic secret independently without the one knowing the other. Their methods are not identical, their views are not the same, though both regard the Veda in supreme esteem as a scripture of secret wisdom.[4]

Śāstrī thus began reading the Vedas in the light of Śrī Aurobindo's interpretation, and chose the *Ṛgveda*. Why the *Ṛgveda*? Śāstrī answers:

> Sāyaṇa in his introduction to the *Ṛgbhāṣya* says that if one studies the first Adhyāya of *Ṛk Saṁhitā* with his *Bhāṣya* in accordance with the traditional instruction, the rest of the work the student can

> read for himself without further help. We may apply the same method to the study of the *Ṛgveda* in its esoteric sense; for if one grasps and ponders over substance of the introduction to the *Hymns to the Mystic Fire,* he will find no difficulty in understanding the hymns, translated in the inner sense.[5]

Śāstrī's commentary on the first *aṣṭaka* of the *Ṛgveda, Siddhajñāna,* opens with a brilliant *bhūmikā* which was also translated by him into English. After summarising the conclusions of European scholars who generally regarded the Vedic Age as one of primitive culture and ritualistic nature worship, Śāstrī deals with Indian scholars who follow European pathways. He refers to S. Radhakrishnan's criticism (without naming him) of Śrī Aurobindo. According to Professor Radhakrishnan, the Aurobindonian interpretation goes against the conclusions of European scholars, is contrary to Sāyaṇa's interpretation and is diametrically opposed to that of the Mīmāṁsakas.

Śāstrī answers that not all people of the earlier times are termed *Ṛṣis.* The Vedic *Ṛṣis* were the advanced few whose intuitive perceptions were recorded in the hymns:

> Spiritual experience does not proceed from Reason based on metaphysical thought; nor does it depend upon material prosperity and opulence of riches needed for bodily life. Neither does proficiency in occult knowledge depend on high development of the outward intellect. We see that in the very stage which we call primitive, following the conclusions of the historians, many ancients had known profound truths of Nature which strike the moderns with wonder. Insight does not depend upon modernity.[6]

These mystic experiences gave rise to later developments (Upaniṣadic, Tāntric) and attempts were made to relive these experiences through disciplines like *yoga* and *tantra.* The Indian thinker and seeker never lost the spiritual aim adumbrated by the Vedic *Ṛṣis.* As for Sāyaṇa, his exoteric interpretation is not going to be set aside by Śrī Aurobindo's esoteric view as the Vedic *Ṛṣis* did not set aside either of the possibilities. Again, if the Mīmāṁsakas have not tried the intuitive approach, it does not mean the doors are closed for ever on the Vedic hymns. Besides, Śrī Aurobindo presents a cogent argument and his explanations are not shots in the dark.

Śāstrī takes up the example of *Agni* in the *bhūmikā* of the *Siddhajñāna* 'because he is nearer to us than others, is easily acces-

sible and awakened in us and his immediate importance entitles him to first place in our adoration.' Taking his cue from Śrī Aurobindo, he deals with the many epithets applied to *Agni* and relates to Skanda Kumāra and seeks to prove that the Vedic godheads reappear in the Purāṇas, Tantras and the Itihāsas. After all, if the Vedic gods did not have significances coiled within, the Upaniṣadic seers, the epic poets and the eminent codifiers of the Purāṇas would not have drawn so close to them, and sought further illuminations:

> The language of the Veda itself is *śruti,* a rhythm not composed by the intellect but heard, a divine Word that came vibrating out of the Infinite to the inner audience of the man who has previously made himself fit for the impersonal knowledge. The words themselves, *dṛṣṭi,* and *śruti*—sight and hearing—are Vedic expressions; these and cognate words signify in the esoteric terminology of the hymns, revelatory knowledge and the contents of inspiration.[7]

In a remarkable essay, 'Sphoṭa and the Spoken Word', Śāstrī proves how even a grammatical concept provokes us to think on the psychological and spiritual aspects of the word sound. For Sanskrit grammarians, word is power:

> The essential factor in speech is the real *śabda,* called *sphoṭa* by the grammarians, and the outwardly audible sound is *dhvani*—a quality of the former, *sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇaḥ.* Dhvani is what manifests the *śabda* which is *sphoṭa*—the former is *vyañjaka* and the latter, *vyaṅgya.*[8]

The permanent, 'vibrant voice within' in the *śabda* is *sphoṭa*:

> Every time a word is pronounced to convey a meaning, the intelligent principle within (which is vibrant and expressive) takes the form of that meaning. The *dhvani* of the word is the instrument used to manifest the sensible word, *arthavacchabda,* the *Sphoṭa.* In itself, it is permanent and luminous, and when a *dhvani* stimulates it, it responds and illuminates.[9]

The Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṁsakas do not look favourably upon the theory of the *sphoṭa* as it posits something that is not seen and sets aside what is actually visible. Śāstrī brings in evidence from Patañjali (*Mahābhāṣya*) and Bhartṛhari (*Vākyapadīya*). The latter says that the sound is the manifestation of Brahman and the world of

objects is born of *chandas*. This is how the *Ṛgveda* lays great importance on the power of sound (word). The uttered word is sacred, it is the magnet for man's ascent to the immortal regions, it has inexhaustible power to bring down the powers of the supramental planes of consciousness. Thus, the seer Virūpa is quoted by Śāstrī:

> Towards him (*Agni*), just now luminous in front, *vṛṣan*, the showerer (of benefits), O *virūpa*, urge the auspicious praise with the Word Eternal.[10]

Though in later days speech became the handmaiden of the mind, 'a conventional sign, vocal symbol of an idea', the grammarians never thought so. They held that speech 'expounded the *śakti*, the innate power of the word, and laid stress on the psychological and spiritual factors in all speech.'

This total faith of Śāstrī in the inner planes of power in the Vedic word led some of his friends to request him to give a word-for-word meaning of the hymns in simple Sanskrit so that the same could be translated into Hindi. Śāstrī asked Śrī Aurobindo for his opinion. Śrī Aurobindo welcomed the proposal and also permitted him to make use of the clues provided by him in interpreting the hymns. Śāstrī's in-depth scholarship and range helped him in writing a detailed exposition of 121 hymns in three years. He stopped at that. His disciple, M.P. Pandit says:

> He had hardly any reference books at hand. He worked single-handed, often waiting for hours before putting his pen to the paper so as to get the right clue. He did not proceed further. When I asked him about it, he replied that the main work had been done and one could study the rest of the Saṁhitā with ease using the clues that had been provided in this commentary. This work, *Siddhajñāna*, (Mystic Collyrium) has been acclaimed as an work of authentic standard on the subject, in all quarters.[11]

Though Śāstrī follows Śrī Aurobindo's intuitive approach, the commentary itself is cast in the traditional pattern. The '*Ṛg Bhāṣya Bhūmikā*' opens with a prayer to the Supreme who has the Sound-form as the body:

> Victory to the Person who is denoted by the word *supreme*, who wears the Sound-form for body and creates the universe by exhalation and who lives with *tapas* for his life breath.

> Victory to the unmoving Ether Supernal, the abode of *Ṛks*, whence the creation is released with purpose by the Creator.[12]

Immediately Śāstrī makes it clear that his commentary is completely inspired by Śrī Aurobindo:

> Fixing the thought again and again on that splendour of great parts that is stationed in Śrī Aurobindo, the most excellent among the eligibles who are the knowers of the secret sense of the Vedas, we explore the intricacies of the Veda for the understanding of the esoteric sense, in accordance with their Light (of Wisdom that is Śrī Aurobindo) unaffected by the bonds of ritual without understanding.[13]

Then follows a reference to other classical commentators and a summary of the conclusions reached by Western scholars who felt that the Vedic *mantras* did not convey knowledge, and one had to go to the *Āraṇyakas* for the same. At a time when even some Indian scholars agreed with the view, Śrī Aurobindo through his *yoga-niṣṭhā* suddenly came upon the secret of the Veda, and the significances of the hymns stood revealed to him![14]

Śāstrī then indicates how the concepts of One Supreme and several gods, were perfectly compatible: 'Like many limbs of one who is bodied, the Gods are different functionings of the Supreme Light.' The exterior and interior worlds of man contained innumerable planes of consciousness presided over by countless divine guardians. The *ṛṣis* who had mastered *yoga* knew this secret but the mass of mankind was not able to grasp the Inner Sacrifice of the mystics. Hence Vedic studies in India floundered in ritualism through the centuries.

After referring to Prof. Radhakrishnan's criticism of Śrī Aurobindo's intuitive method, Śāstrī gives a brief Aurobindonian interpretation of the *yajña* and how the true significance of the elaborate *yajña* ritual is man's seeking after truth, Immortality and Light. Whichever of the gods was invoked, the aim of the Inner Sacrifice was to attain 'That One', the Brahman, which is the sole Reality. The Upaniṣadic seers would take it up later.

The make-up of the Vedas is explained with crystalline clarity before Śāstrī proceeds to deal with the concept of *dharma* in Veda according to the Mīmāṁsakas and the supremacy of the *mantra* and how Śrī Aurobindo establishes the presence of a secret significance through the phrase *ninyā vācāṁsi* used by Ṛṣi Vāmadeva. At the

same time, Śāstrī assures the readers that the study of the Vedas based on the outer meaning of the hymns is not rendered infructuous by the presence of an intuitive interpretation. These studies would help reconstruct the history of the Vedic Age as indeed Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Paramaśiva Iyer had attempted in their researches. A helpful note on the placing of the Vedic deities as Powers concludes the *bhūmikā*.

The hymns to *Agni* open *Siddhajñāna*. The very first Ṛk draws help from Rāghavendra Swāmī's *Mantrārtha Mañjarī* to explain the term *ratnadātamam*. '*Ratna*' denotes happiness; words like '*rayim*' and '*bhadra*' in the other *Agni Sūktas* actually mean spiritual wealth.

The second sub-hymn of the first *maṇḍala* is addressed to *Vāyu*. Kapālī Śāstrī's training in Tantra is seen in the explanation to the first *Ṛk*:

> The sacrificer hymns to *Vāyu*, after lauding *Agni*, to drink the *Soma*. And Vāyu is the life of the world; hence even as embodied *prāṇa*, he supports the organisation of the nerve-channels and the Cakras. Hence he is the supporter of the activity of the mind in man. If so, who then is Soma for the drink of whose pressings Vāyu is invited? We reply: that sap of Delight of Existence, divine, which flows into the plane of the Mind from the plane of Truth-Knowledge signified by the terms *ṛta-cit*, Truth-Consciousness, is termed as Soma in the Veda.[15]

The aspirant (*yajamāna*) on the earth needs to purify his nervous system and infuse it with strength before attaining the capacity to receive and retain the Delight of Existence which is a Divine (supramental) consciousness. Hence, the aspirant prays to Vāyu (God of Life) first; then to Vāyu and Indra (God of Mind) together, for 'it is a matter of common experience the life-activity bereft of the power of the mind is not wholesome'. Presently, the hymnologist turns to Mitra and Varuṇa who are 'increasers of truth'. Their action in purifying the aspirant is described by Śāstrī:

> Existent in man as the Power of *ṛta-cit*, he ends all the wicked opponents who strike at our progress. That is why Varuṇa is said to be *riśādasa*. Like Varuṇa, Mitra in the form of the Power of Truth-Light, establishes the *ānanda* of *ṛta* in man by bringing about the state of harmony, happiness, benevolence and equality of *dhī* consequent to the establishment of the wealth of purity by Varuṇa.[16]

According to Śāstrī, this is the broad pattern throughout the Veda. There is a two-fold movement in the sacrifice: 'one is the maturing in body and mind of man by means of which they get equipped for the object to be attained. The other is the attainment of Truth and its Delight which is indicated by the term *Soma*, by which the work of the Supreme Godhead in the form of Immortality in man is fulfilled.'[17]

Śāstrī's commentary rolls on majestically with a precise attention to detail. No word in the chosen *ṛks* is ignored and Śāstrī never loses sight of his intuitive interpretation. The principle conveyed by the names of gods is stated in no uncertain terms. The Aśvins 'are doers of action in superb thought' and the horse they ride symbolises the nerve-force, the quickness of thought-movement. Śāstrī gives a number of other references to the Aśvins in the rest of the Vedas to prove the aptness of the symbolism.

Next come the hymns to the *Viśvedevas*. Who are these All-Gods? Śāstrī notes the explanations given by classical commentators like Sāyaṇa, Yāska and Śākapūni but then sets his own course on the Aurobindonian track. The sole aim of the Inner Sacrifice (yogic discipline) is the wealth of Truth-Consciousness; the collectivity of all the Gods bring this about by their blessings:

> The purport is that when the human sacrificer sets on his inner sacrifice, the life-substance is prepared by the activity of the Aśvins, the mental substance is processed by the action of Indra, the flow of delight indicated by the extraction of *Soma* is set going on in the mind, life and body, the All-Gods who are invited, enter the libation, upbear it and become capable of bringing about the fulfilment of the Sacrifice.[18]

Three verses on Sarasvatī conclude the group. Externally speaking, the hymns appear to pay homage to the river Sarasvatī. But Śāstrī takes up key words like '*pāvaka*' and '*ketuna*' to show that the hymn indicates the inner development of the human aspirant for divine consciousness. The uttered word carries power in the Vedas, hence the image of Sarasvatī carries a special significance. The inspired word destroys Falsehood and Sin ('*pāvaka*') and acts as a revelatory perception ('*ketu*')

> It is an ancient doctrine that falsehood takes the form of all-sided sin, that there is no sin apart from falsehood. It is by the impulsion of falsehood alone that evil and wicked enjoyments, evil will,

> evil action enter into human life and subdue it. That is how falsehood afflicts us, our entire life from the very birth and all our action—bodily or mental—are made over to falsehood and blinded. There is no antidote to it except the Truth. And this Truth—says the Perception of the ancient *Ṛṣis*—descends, enters, and manifests in the form of light or of speech or both. By that is effected the transformation of our intelligence and there is a fresh discrimination in our relations with the world.[19]

Throughout the massive exercise in exegesis of Ṛg Vedic hymns in *Siddhajñāna*, Śāstrī's approach never flags from such detailed explanations which are, nevertheless, backed by a logical argument. For the student of Śrī Aurobindo's English writings on the Veda, Śāstrī's Sanskrit *Siddhajñāna* is a very important help, as the perceptions attained by yoga are here substantiated thoroughly by going back to the original hymns word by word.

The Tantra background helps Śāstrī's critical vision while discussing the deities. The hymns to Varuṇa by Ajigartha's son, Sunahcepa can be cited as an example. He finds the very names of the *Ṛṣis* like Kaṇva, Kakṣivan and Gotama to be significant. While the name Sunahcepa signifies 'a ray of Delight', the legend of Sunahcepa being tied to the sacrificial altar for the *Puruṣamedha* sacrifice comes in handy to demolish the theory of human sacrifice in Vedic times by taking up the commentaries of Mahīdhara and Uvvata:

> It is a vulgar version that human sacrifice for Gods is enjoined in the Vedas. The ancient *Ṛṣis* have the divine eye, are endowed with spirituality; let it not be falsely propagated that these our Aryans of old were gross-sighted, devoted to external sacrifice and addicted to human sacrifice for Gods.[20]

Was it then but childish imagination that tied Sunahcepa to the sacrificial pole and had him released by Viśvāmitra's askesis? The Tantra methodology gives Śāstrī a hand. The hymn to Varuṇa beginning with '*Uduttamam varuṇa pasam*' is a prayer to the god to unloosen the bond above, the bond in the middle and the bond below. Śāstrī comments that this is regarding the secret of '*sarvagranthi vipramokṣaṇa*' and the three knots refer to the '*Tāntrika yoga prasiddha Brahmā Viṣṇu Rūdra nāmāṅkita granthi baddha traya*':

> This release from the hold of bondages may be the mystery unveiled in the untying of all the knots spoken of in the Upaniṣads.

> It is the considered conclusion of the practising Vedāntins that the knots are knots of ignorance, bonds of the three-fold body, like the gross, etc. There is no doubt, whatsoever, that the triple bondage corresponds to the three knots famous in Tantra Yoga under the names of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rūdra. Here in fact—it must be noted—the triple bondage obstructs the entry and spread of the Truth-Light in the threefold being of mind, life and body. Release from it is possible by the grace of God Varuṇa.[21]

The presence of the terms Āditya (son of Aditi) and 'Āditaye' is a clear indication of the trend of the *ṛṣi's* recordation about the Supreme Mother (*Akhaṇḍa satvamayī citi*):

> Aditi is the Consciousness full of Infinite Existence. All the universe is born from her, so also are born the God's overlords of the worlds. Her ray of delight, verily, is the soul though human. It has entered the microcosm made of the five elements and is held and bound there in three main places based upon matter, life and mind. He lives there and obtains release from the bondage by the grace of Varuṇa preceded by the favours of many Gods.[22]

Siddhajñāna indicates the Aurobindonian inspiration everywhere. Thus when the name 'Gotamabhih' is used (*Ṛgveda*, I, 77) Śāstrī harks back to Śrī Aurobindo's translation, 'masters of light',.and his explanation:

> The *Ṛṣi* uses his name and that of his house as a symbol-word; we have in it the Vedic *go* in the sense 'luminous', and Gotama means 'entirely possessed of light'. For it is only those that have the plenitude of the luminous intelligence by whom the master of divine Truth can be wholly received and affirmed in this world of an inferior Ray,—*gotamebhir ṛtva.* And it is upon those whose minds are pure, clear and open, *vipra,* that there can dawn the right knowledge of the great Births which are behind the physical world and from which it derives and supports its energies,—*viprebhir jātavedaḥ.*[23]

Śāstrī follows this trend of thought in his Sanskrit commentary by explaining the term 'Gotamaibhih' as '*etannamaikairṣibhiḥ citprakāśa sampannairiti dhvanim goḥ kiraṇa vācitvāt jñāna prakāśasanketakatvaca*'.

While all the gods individually as well as the collectivity of gods known as *Viśvedevas* are revealed as ever so many powers of the

Supreme who can bring down the Truth Consciousness into man's Mind and lift him up to a life of higher consciousness. Dawn has a special place in Śrī Aurobindo's writings on the Veda as well as his poetry. *Uṣā* has a prime place in the hierarchy of transformation, for she is 'the medium of the awakening, the activity and the growth of the other Gods; she is the first condition of the Vedic realisation.' (Śrī Aurobindo)

There are several hymns to *Uṣā* in the *Ṛgveda* and she also appears in hymns addressed to other deities like Indra and Agni. Kapālī Śāstrī has taken three hymns for exegesis. The verse beginning '*Ā ga yośeva*' (I, 48, v) paints a familiar enough picture. Dawn appears daily to guard everyone, verily a housewife. Appearing like one engaged in household tasks, she sends living beings whose time is done, to destruction. When she comes, each living being wakes up. She wakes up the birds. Having given this surface meaning, Śāstrī says that for the rise of Truth Consciousness in the person engaged in Inner Sacrifice, Dawn comes to act as the impelling force, and he rises upward into the divine dawn.

In the verse beginning '*Viśvāni devī*' (I, 92, ix) which describes *Uṣā* as spreading illumination everywhere, words (stone, platters, mortar) are used in such a way as if to insinuate baser pleasures. This is a prayer to Indra to partake of the *Soma* drink. Śāstrī engages upon a painstaking and detailed explanation, posting the words appropriately to get at the intended mystic movement:

> Just as in the outer sacrifice, they fasten the churning rod in the infusion for the firmness of the vessel, similarly in the inner sacrifice, the spinal chord is made like the Mandāra hill in the churning of the nectar, by special divine Power, the causes leading to the pressings of *Soma*, in order to establish an almost stunning stillness in the body for holding the sap of the *Soma* of delight that is being pressed out by the special play of the power of knowledge and action arising from the association of mind and life.[24]

Śāstrī possessed monumental scholarship in the fields of Sanskrit grammar; his study of the traditional commentaries was admirable; and he was also a *tapasvin*. He assures us that he had studied other hymns of this kind as also references to the pressing of *Soma* in other Śāstraic texts and the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. He feels that the

Vedic Ṛṣis had naught to do with crudities in the same way that they had no use for human sacrifice. But why use words in this manner:

> It has to be said that the words are thus kept so as to provide room for interpretation in the external sense. This hymn will clarify that the hidden sense alone is important in the opinion of the seers. That is why covert words like stone, extraction platters are used, which are famous in *Śrauta* rites and the hidden meanings of which are demonstrated in the *Mantra Brāhmaṇas*. Also usage suggesting even an obscene meaning occurs here, viz., 'the woman practices ingress and egress'. Though just as Yāska had said in explaining the sense of the name *śipivista* we would be able to take the praiseworthy sense leaving the despicable meaning, what doubt is there that this kind of usage itself like a conundrum would suggest a different hidden meaning?[25]

Śrī Kapālī Śāstrī's enviable command over Sanskrit and English has built a golden bridge for us to approach the Vedic foundations of Indian culture. The Age of the Vedas belongs to antiquity. We are already peering towards the twenty-first century. Scores of traditional commentators overwhelm us by their presence. The growth of science and technology has been holding an axe at our inborn faith in a personal self-transcendence. But with Śāstrī's *Siddhajñāna* in hand, the doubts and difficulties vanish. Besides, such an intuitive approach does not close the doors upon our own thought processes. Indeed, Śāstrī's commentary helps us strike out on our own adventures in understanding the hymns of the Veda.

One of the important results of Śāstrī's immersion in the Vedas is his Sanskrit lyricism. The '*Sūktastava*' takes up Ṛṣi Parāśara's nine *Sūktas* (*Ṛgveda*, I, 12) on Agni and transcreates them into Sanskrit verses in different meters demonstrating the validity of Vedic thought-processes for a contemporary poet. '*Kumārastava*' reiterates his view that the Agni of the Vedas is the god Skanda Kumāra who is present in the cave of the human heart and helps the human being transcend the present state and reach out the Truth Consciousness:

ऋग्यजुर्निगदतामशरीरं पूर्वसूरिभिरूपार्जितमर्थम्।
त्वां परं निहितमत्र गुहायामाह्वायामि भगवन् बहिरेहि॥
एव वेषविरहं विनतस्त्वां नाथ नम्रशिरसामधिदैवम्।
काङ्क्षति व्रज सनातनसख्यं स्वीकुरुष्व जनमेनमनंशम्॥

Kapālī Śāstrī's life was one long *yoga sādhanā*, an Inner Sacrifice. While his writings are a challenge and a delight to scholars, even the common reader enters with enthusiasm the world of Vedic studies unveiled by Śāstrī and begins to enjoy this *Soma* of *Siddhajñāna* pressed by a '*sarvadā tapomaya jīvita*' (in the words of M.P. Pandit) and gains the Delight of Existence for all time.

Notes and References

1. *Collected Works of T.V. Kapālī Śāstrī*, Dipti Publications, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1977-92, vol. II, 1979, p. 238. This collection is in eleven volumes; twelfth volume is indices.
2. M.P. Pandit (ed.), *Versatile Genius*, Dipti Publications, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1986, p. 290.
3. *Collected Works of T.V. Kapālī Śāstrī*, Dipti Publications, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, vol. I, 1977, p. 14.
4. Ibid., 1991, p. viii.
5. Ibid., vol. I, 1977, p. 52.
6. Ibid., vol. IV, 1983, pp. 92-93.
7. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 128-29.
8. Ibid., p. 139.
9. Ibid., p. 140.
10. Ibid., p. 145.
11. *Versatile Genius*, pp. 298-99.
12. *Collected Works of T.V. Kapālī Śāstrī*, vol. IV, p. 83.

    जयत्युत्तमशब्दार्थः शब्दमूर्तिधरः पुमान्।
    निःश्वासेन सृजन्विश्वं प्राणवान् तपसा प्रभुः।
    तदृचां जयति व्योम स्थानं परममक्षरम्।
    यतो विसृष्टं भुवनं सार्थकं परमेष्ठिना॥

13. Ibid., p. 83.

    वरेण्यं वरणीयानां वेदगुप्तार्थवेदिनाम्।
    भावं भावं महाभागमरविन्दपदं महः॥
    तत्सम्मतमसम्बाधमबोधैः कर्मबन्धनैः।
    कुर्मो गूढार्थबोधाय वेदमर्मविभेदनम्॥

14. It may be pertinent here to refer to what the eminent Tamil poet and contemporary of Śrī Aurobindo, Subramania Bharati wrote in an article 'The Dawn' (*circa* 1916):

    > 'It is a common experience with poets that they receive their best songs from Above. A few days ago, I asked Śrī Aurobindo Ghose how he got his new and marvellous theory of Vedic interpretation. "It was shown to me", he said, and I knew he meant it in a very literal sense. All truth is inspired..*Agni and Other Poems and Translations and Essays and Other Prose Fragments*, 1980, p. 67.

15. *Collected Works of T.V. Kapāli Śāstrī*, vol. IV, p. 20. We are indebted to M.P. Pandit for the English Translation of the commentary (sometime in full, sometime compressed) under Śāstrī's personal direction.
16. Ibid., p. 37.
17. Ibid., p. 39.
18. Ibid., p. 59
19. Ibid., p. 63.
20. Ibid., vol. VI, 1987, p. 67.
21. Ibid., p. 64.
22. Ibid., p. 65.
23. Sri Aurobindo, *On the Veda*, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1956, p. 322.
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25. Ibid., p. 112.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

The Calling of an Ethics of Servanthood

> In its master-slave struggle to death, the ego desires to make the other into a thing; and arrogates to itself the right to form or shape it, to objectify it, to make it passive. . .xxx It is interested in difference in so far as everything different from it provides it with a mirror for itself.
>
> —Teresa Brennan, *History After Lacan*, pp. 55, 37.

> The approach to the face is the most basic mode of responsibility. As such, the fact of the other is verticality and uprightness; it spells a relation of rectitude. *The face is not in front of me but above me . . . the face is the other who asks me not to let him die alone, as if to do so were to become an accomplice in his death* . . . . Accordingly, my duty to respond to the other suspends my natural right to self-survival. My ethical relation of love for the other stems from the fact that the self cannot survive by itself alone, cannot find meaning within its own being-in-the world, within the ontology of sameness . . . . In ethics the other's right to exist has primacy over my own.
>
> —Emmanuel Levinas, *Ethics of the Infinite*, p. 189.

> Above all, the ethics or aesthetics of self-development would seem to be tailor-made for the specific dilemma of the executive in modern organization. By himself he is nobody and is indeed anonymous. . . Yet collectively these anonymous executives are the leaders in a modern society. *Their function demands the self-discipline and the self-respect of the superior man.*
>
> —Peter F. Drucker, *The Ecological Vision*, p. 206.

At the turn of the millennium, we are confronted with unprecedented problems and paradoxes. Probably, at no point in human history we had so much knowledge and power to deal with the basic incapacities and slurs of life such as poverty, ignorance and disease. Yet the contemporary moment presents us a brutal and life-threatening picture of juxtaposition of penury and plenty, power and helplessness, knowledge and ignorance. Those who have knowledge and power forget the face of the other, the silent majority, who constitute the wretched of the earth. They only look at themselves through their mirrors and are trapped in a 'demeaning narcissism' (Chakraborty, 1995). While they are the managers of many systems which govern and dictate our lives, systems which threaten to incorporate the whole world into its systemic logic of money and power, for the vast majority who are outside such systems and their subjects and victims, the epochal prom-

ise of democracy has not made any difference to their lives. Their life is governed by systems, structures and managers who do not embody the spirit of democracy and wish to share their knowledge and power. The managers of systems in many domains of our lives today are reluctant to realize that they are our friends and their primary task is to hold our hands and take us ahead and uplift our lives as fellow travellers. Instead, they think of themselves as our new masters. In this context, how do we come to terms with the ethical challenges that confront us as we enter inside a new century and a new millennium? The response lies in masters of systems thinking of themselves and relating to others as servants. So far masters have utilized their knowledge and power to enslave others for their ego-aggrandizement and for the preservation of an unjust and inhuman social system. But the ethical challenge that confronts all of us now—both masters as well as those who are not so at present—to be servants. Human history has been a history of struggle, quest and *tapasyā* for a dignified life and dignified relationship and the call of both history and future for all of us at this juncture is to participate in this ongoing quest, indeed to participate as servants.

In, order to come to terms with the calling of servanthood at this juncture, let us begin this conversation with Professor S.K. Chakraborty, a soul-searching management educator of our times. Chakraborty writes in a recent work of him: 'People who begin their careers in the mid-twenties at a monthly remuneration of around Rs. 8000/- or more, and those above them, in a country where fifty per cent of people are still below poverty line, owe a much more humble and sane orientation to work and society' (Chakraborty, 1995, pp. 117-18). This urges us to realize that a minority of us have more wealth, knowledge, power and privilege but we forget that 'We are here because of other people.'[1] An ethics of servanthood, first of all, calls those who have more and know more to realize that their power, knowledge and privilege are not solely of their own making, their own achievement. They owe this to many others. They also have a basic responsibility to those who do not have more and know less and are victims of the annihilating incapacities of life. An ethics of servanthood reiterates the fundamental ethical obligation that all of us have to each other. It begins with those who have more but this call touches all. All of us—rich or poor, knowledgeable or ignorant—have fundamental mutual obligation to each other. At the same time, an ethics of

servanthood reiterates what has been emphasized in many philosophical and spiritual traditions of the world that those who have more knowledge, power and understanding are expected to be examples of unconditional ethical obligation to their less fortunate brothers and sisters. They are called upon by God, society and the conscience of their own hearts to be beacons of life and light for the poor and the disadvantaged of the world. So, while responding to the calling of an ethics of servanthood, we would have to realize its simultaneous double location: it is a call for the masters and managers to be servants of man, society and humanity; at the same time, it is also a call for all of us—privileged or not-privileged—to cultivate an unconditional obligation to each other.

Indeed, an ethics of servanthood calls us to realize that our primary identity is that of a servant. There is a distinction between servanthood and slavery and an ethics of servanthood is uncompromising in its condemnation of and fight against slavery of any sort, physical, social, moral and spiritual. To be a servant does not mean to be a slave but to be a humble, voluntary and non-compromising maker of one's destiny and the shaper of the evolutionary course of culture, society and history. We are, first of all, servants of God, nature, society, history, heritage and the universal creative force which has created and nurtured us. Then we are servants of each other—many webs of relationships—of which we are parts. Without multifarious webs of relationships with others, the self cannot survive and grow. An ethics of servanthood bases upon this primary insight of human becoming to which, in recent times, thinkers such as George Herbert Mead, Jacques Lacan and Emmanuel Levinas have drawn our attention. For Mead, the many symbolic interactions which facilitate human becoming require a continued dialogue between the self and the other. Mead tells us: 'What is essential to communication is that the symbol should arouse in oneself what it arouses in the other individual' (quoted in Giri, 1998, p. 308). Taking inspiration from Mead, Jurgen Habermas makes the accompanying bold statement about our identities as human persons: '. . . all of us feel that one must be ready to recognize the interests of others even when they run counter to our own, but the person who does that does not really sacrifice himself, but becomes a larger self' (Habermas, 1987, p. 94).

But this basic truth about ourselves as human persons seems to have been forgotten in the era of modern individualism, the era of

ego, as psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan calls it. In ego's era, the self thinks that it is the master of all. However it is a psychosis which requires an ethics of servanthood for recovery and reconstruction. For Lacan, 'Psychosis means that the subject has been unable to assume the position of 'I'. Assuming this position means (among other things) that the subject seeks to know itself through the other, rather than to reduce the other to itself . . .' (Brennan, 1995, p. 34).

We owe it to the bold imagination of philosopher Emmanuel Levinas that even in ethical discourse and practice, we have been engaged in this psychotic reduction of the other to the self. In ethical discourses which privilege self, Levinas urges us to realise that, it is the self which gets the priority, and the face of the other is not recognized and lit up for its own sake. But Levinas gives fundamental priority to the other: We have a fundamental responsibility to the other, rather than to ourselves. This responsibility is unconditional irrespective of whether the other reciprocates us or not. For Levinas, even the responsibility of the other to self is predicated upon the responsibility of the self to the other. Therefore unlike the symmetrical relationship of I-Thou of Martin Buber, self-other relationship in Levinas is characterized by a fundamental asymmetry: 'In the radical asymmetry of the ethical . . . I am responsible even for the responsibility of the other' (Ciaramelli, 1991, p. 92). An ethics of servanthood can be enriched a lot by a dialogue with Levinas. Servanthood requires going beyond the bindings of ontology. In Levinas' path, it calls us to go beyond our 'I' and discover our 'me', a 'me' which is in a state of permanent 'wakefulness' [2] in us and which listens to the call of the other and responds. It means the 'acceptance of a vocation to which I alone can respond' (Ciaramelli, 1991, p. 88). In this particularity of my responsibility lies the universality of ethics. Ethics cannot sustain itself through law and reason except through the vocation of personal responsibility.

For Levinas, however, this vocation of personal responsibility has a transcendental grounding and a spiritual destiny. Levinas does not confine ethics to either religious belief or spiritual realization, but at the same time urges us to discover their spiritual roots and horizons. For Levinas, the vocation of ethics is a vocation of prophetic witness where prophet is not a superman but a dimension of reality and possibility in each of us. For Levinas, 'All people are the Messiah to the extent that they become a *me*, responsible for others' (ibid., p. 99).[3]

In his ethical discourse Levinas says that he is interested in a 'description of subjectivity before its ontological constitution' (Ciaramelli, 1991, p. 86). But it seems in his involvement with the other, he takes the self for granted. The self has to be responsible to the other. But how to cultivate this responsibility? Does it require any preparation on the part of the self? Invitation to the other to the 'hard-core of the moral self' (cf. Bauman, 1993) which postmodern ethics takes as its aim requires opening in the doors of self as well (Giri, 1996a). Moreover, self is not an undifferentiated whole. Aspects of Indian thought such as Vedānta believes that each of us have a lower self and a higher self. While the lower self is the bearer of our urge for ego aggrandizement, the higher self is the bearer of our seeking of intimacy and aspiration for *Ekātmanabhūti*. An ethics of servanthood needs to move beyond what Chakraborty (1995, p. 16) calls the 'ontological bind of an incomplete theory of self' and realize that in our self itself there is a universal ground where the self and the other hold each other's hands as friends and, in fact, cannot live without one another. The calling of ethics then requires us to discover, realize, and cultivate this higher self within us and be free from the bondage to the lower self. However, the lower self is not to be despised but to be made a servant of the higher self.[4] This is a process of *sādhanā*.

Ethical discourses such as those of Levinas and other contemporary thinkers who challenge us to recognize the face of the other can be enriched by a dialogue with Vedānta. It would help us not only to have a differentiated understanding of self and the need for *sādhanā* in the engagement with the other, it would also help us to have a differentiated view of the other. Ethical vocation requires us to be the servant of the other. But does it mean to be the servant of the ego of the other or his real self? The other may have some whims, the other may be bound to many chains of illusion. Ethics of servanthood does not mean that the self engaged with the other would also be servants to these whims, passions and illusions. It rather means that the ethical interlocutor has to be a critic of the self-destructive urge and behaviour within the other and help her become a lover of life and light rather than a condemned worshipper of death and darkness.

But Vedānta also can enrich itself by a dialogue with thinkers such as Derrida and Levinas. Vedānta conceptualizes the relationship between the self and the other in terms of a unity but this can have implication of

totalitarian assimilation and absorption. True, there is a mutual penetration between the self and the other but they do not totally lose each other's identity even at moments of 'unitive Self-consciousness' (cf. Chakraborty, 1995, p. 119). Dialogue with deconstruction can help us have a picture of differential integration in thinking about the relationship between the self and the other. Secondly, the Vedāntic privileging of the self needs to pay more attention to the needs of the other. It is part of our history that Vedāntic notion of essential divinity of self has not made much difference to the brutality of a system such as caste system in Indian society and tradition. As William Halbfass (1995, p. 216) tells us: '. . . it is undeniable that traditional, "orthodox" Advaita Vedānta, as represented by the school of Śaṅkara, did not try to "apply" the metaphysics of non-dualism in an ethical or social sense. Śaṅkara's position was conservative. Śaṅkara did not certainly invoke *tat tvam asi* to question existing social divisions, or to promote social programmes or neighbourly love.' In this context, an ethics of servanthood points to the Vedāntic ethicists that the unity of self and other is an object of striving, *sādhanā* and socio-political revolution rather than a matter of given and natural reality. Philosopher Daya Krishna's (1996, p. 58) challenge to the Indian preoccupation with self deserves our careful attention here: '[Once we begin to] see the "other" as a subject in his or her own right and capable of being affected by one's actions one will begin to see the self as "responsible" to the "other" and not just be concerned with the state of one's own being. Yājñavalkya's *ātman*-centric analysis of the human situation and his contention that everything is dear for the sake of the self would, then, seem to result from a one-sided analysis.'

Thus, an ethics of servanthood can neither privilege the other nor the self but has to be continuously attentive to the dialectic of the self and the other where dialectic is characterized by reflection and dialogue. But the dialogue in this engagement is not confined only to the relationship between the self and the other, in other words, only to the inter-subjective domain. It also touches society, the community of human beings. In both the self-oriented Vedāntic ethics as well as the other-oriented postmodern ethics (cf. Bauman, 1993; Giri, 1996a), the engagement with society as a fact in itself is sometimes not deep enough despite invocations of concepts such as '*lokasaṅgraha*' (cf. Chakraborty, 1995) in Vedāntic ethics. But ethics of servanthood has to make up for this neglect and has to be engaged with society in a spirit of understanding, dialogue and transformation. In recent times, the project of 'discourse ethics' of

Habermas shares such an ideal and urges us to look at our ethico-moral engagement as a 'co-operative search for truth' (Habermas, 1993, p. 157) in the field of culture, society and the public sphere. In discourse ethics, participants of a society are engaged in a rational deliberation on the foundation of their society from the point of view of justice. In this engagement they explore whether the formal ethics of a society and its institutional order is just or unjust from the point of view of human flourishing and upholding of human dignity. For instance, while much is claimed for Indian tradition for its emphasis on self-realization, a discourse-ethical engagement goes beyond the surface of these claims and deliberates on the destruction of self and soul that takes place in case of seekers such as Ekalavya. Ekalavya was a tribal boy. He wanted to be a great archer. This was not motivated by any desire on his part to conquer kingdoms for himself. But the 'great guru' Droṇācārya could not fulfil his ethico-moral responsibility of being an instrument in the realization of this aspiration of Ekalavya. Ekalavya learnt the art on his own and one day Droṇācārya comes and takes away his finger in the name of *gurudakṣiṇā*. The story of Ekalavya which is not merely a story but a continued reality in Indian society points to the problematic justice that is integral to Indian traditions which have spoken so eloquently and elegantly about the essential divinity of the human person. Discourse ethics brings us face to face with these problematic zones of our life. As Habermas tells us: '. . . under the unrelenting moralizing gaze of participants in discourse . . . familiar institutions can be transformed into so many instances of problematic justice' (Habermas, 1990, p. 108).

Indeed when the institutional system of a society is based on unethical and immoral foundation then the task for ethical engagement is to change this and to create transformed institutions which embody a higher and evolved ethical sensitivity, a sensitivity which is not bound by the conventions of a society but beyond these (see, Giri, 1996b). This 'post-conventional' (cf. Habermas, 1990) moral consciousness is an attribute of self as well as the institution of society. It is possible for a society to create institutions which embody a 'post-conventional' ethico-moral sensitivity where a majority of its members are still at a conventional stage in their ethico-moral development. In fact, creation and existence of such institutions catalyze the moral development of individuals for whom such institutions become sources of inspiration.[5]

Ethics of servanthood then does not worship society as God as it exists but continuously strives to transform it. It is engaged in social criticism and cultural transformation where the ethical interlocutor is also a model of self-transformation for others in society. It criticizes the unjust rules, conventions and mores of a society while at the same time respecting the authentic aspects of local cultures and traditions. Its act of criticism is one of connected criticism and the virtues it seeks to adore and establish are not only relative but also non-relative. And one important criterion of non-relativity or universality of the virtues that an ethical interlocutor seeks to explore and establish is the extent to which they contribute to 'human flourishing' or annihilate it (cf. Nussbaum, 1995).

But to create a society which facilitates 'human flourishing' is a matter of not just pious hope but of struggle and striving, *tapasyā* and *sādhanā*. Ethics of servanthood then becomes a participant in the struggle for the creation of a dignified society which gives fundamental priority to human flourishing. It participates in both socio-political revolutions and spiritual transformation of consciousness. An ethics of servanthood realizes that while earlier revolutionary agenda did not include the moral and spiritual dimension of transformation, the present talk of spirituality in this 'post-revolutionary' phase of human history is blind to poverty, exploitation and inequality of contemporary capitalism. Ethics of servanthood realizes that there is now an epochal need to integrate socio-political revolution with spiritual and moral revolution. It is also inspired by an aspiration of integration between the rational and the supra-rational in its quest and departs both from Vedāntin ethicists such as Chakraborty (cf. 1995) who make an unbridgeable dichotomy between the sacred and the secular and the discourse ethicists such as Habermas who cannot see beyond rationality even when the logic of their inquiry forces them to go beyond the limits of reason (Giri, 1996b).[6]

But while making this integration, an ethics of servanthood pleads that power or politics cannot be the base of this integration. It has to be spirituality; it is because while socio-political revolutions have so far focused only on the capture of power which has meant nothing but domination, spiritual revolutions seek to create inner transformations as well as qualitatively higher and deeper relationships in society—relationships which are the ultimate bedrock of transformed institutions. An ethics of servanthood submits that knowledge is not for power but for the practice of *Bhakti*, for the practice

of love and unconditional devotion to the other, world and the self. It derives inspiration from the Bhakti movements of India and the world where saints and prophets strove for both self-realization and world-realization and were spirits rebellious for the cause of a new relationship and new arrangement in society (cf. Das, 1982). While the potential for world-transformation of the saints of the *Bhakti* movements was compromised and constrained by the limits of the structures of feudalism, an ethics of serventhood pursuing its struggle and aspiration at the contemporary juncture has the benefits of both modern and postmodern developments—deconstruction and reconstructions—alongside it and can contribute to the realization of radical democracy (where democracy touches both food and freedom) in both the public spheres of society and the inner lives of individuals.

Notes

1. This is what Albert Einstein had stated long ago.
2. For Levinas (1995, p. 195), ethical responsibility is a constant 'wakefulness': 'Ontology as a state of affairs can afford sleep. But love cannot sleep, can never be peaceful or permanent. Love is the incessant watching over of the other; it can never be satisfied or contented with the bourgeoisie ideal of love as domestic comfort.'
3. This approach to the superman is also taken by Sri Aurobindo and recently by political theorist William Connolly (1991).
4. Chakraborty (1995, p. 257) describes this movingly: '. . . if you are seized by lust, then make God the object of your lust . . . Thus, the process involves consciously directing any dominant *avaguṇa* towards a transcendent, transmundane, spiritual focus'.
5. Habermas (1993, p. 171) writes: '. . . what seems to me to be essential to the degree of liberality of a society is the extent to which its patterns of socialization and its institutions, its political culture, and in general its identity-guaranteeing traditions and everyday practices, express a *non-coercive, non-authoritarian* form of ethical life in which an autonomous morality can be embodied and take on concrete shape' (emphasis added).
6. Jurgen Habermas himself writes: '. . . I do not believe that we as Europeans can seriously understand concepts like morality and ethics, person and individuality, freedom and emancipation . . . without appropriating for ourselves the substance of a salvation-historical thought which originates in Judaism and Christianity' (quoted in Kung, 1993, p. 47). But according to Hans Kung, 'the question which Habarmas does not answer is why I should now appropriate the "substance" of the Jewish Christian tradition in a "post-metaphysical" context, a context of rational unbelief . . . why should I not also give philosophical expression to the "longing for the Wholly Other"' (ibid.).

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The Parliament of Philosophies—Majority View Condemned

A Critique of Daya Krishna's views on Vedānta in the First Millennium AD*

Professor R. Balasubramanian's twenty page rejoinder to Professor Daya Krishna's eight page article on Vedānta in the First Millennium AD shows how academically, the former has come down upon the latter in defending the presence of Vedānta in the First Millennium AD and in showing the appropriate place of illusion in doing philosophy of Advaita. Two points are worth mentioning here. (1) Daya Krishna's assimilation of Indian thought and his capability to trace a missing thread and appropriate it to provoke some thinking and criticism so that the otherwise low-lying Indian philosophy gains some life and spirit and generates some spicy discussion among scholars, (2) Balasubramanian's rising up to the occasion and offering stronger arguments to refute the ill-conceived views. I, as a student of Indian philosophy, would like to offer my views on this, taking caution not to repeat any of the criticisms already offered by Professor Balasubramanian.

In this interesting and provocative article Daya Krishna tries to show the unpopularity of Vedānta in the first millennium AD which are based on the following arguments:

1. There is negligible presence of Vedānta in the first millennium AD. Even the *magnum opus* of Bādarāyaṇa, i.e. *Brahmasūtras* were not well known till Śaṅkara wrote a commentary on it. Vedānta, as the end of the Vedas, as it literally means, is a myth and hence there is no need to stretch Vedānta from the Upaniṣads. (*JICPR*, June 1996, pp. 201 and 202)
2. Nakamura and Potter record that there were a few Advaitins in between Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara, and they have marginal or even no importance at all.
3. Even in the post-Śaṅkara period, the scenario did not change. The *Śaṅkara-digvijayas* testify to this fact. There were in total

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eight Vedāntins in the post-Śaṅkara era excluding his disciples and Maṇḍana Miśra (including them it would be 13), whereas we have 117 Buddhist thinkers and 27 Jaina thinkers (pp. 203 and 204).

4. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (AD 900) has not mentioned the name of Śaṅkara even though he has refuted the Advaita view. Udayana in his *Ātmatattvaviveka* has enumerated six stages of self-realisation in an ascending order, and Advaitin's view has been overtaken by some other view.
5. The *Brahmasūtras* had little impact on the philosophical scene in India after their composition and, in fact, were practically absent when compared with Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika Sūtras.
6. Even the Buddhist literature of that period did not make much reference to *Brahmasūtras,* and hence the latter did never have any impact on the Philosophical scene in India.

Hence he comes to the conclusion that the Advaitin not only imposes illusion on the empirical world, but the theory of illusion or *adhyāsa* has also been imposed on the History of Philosophy in India.

I would like to take up the above points in sequence to examine their authenticity.

One. Daya Krishna gives a profuse encomium to Vedānta when he says in the beginning:

> Vedānta is supposed to be the most dominant and distinctive philosophy of India, accepted and propagated as such by innumerable writers on Indian Philosophy.

But this supposition is not favoured in the second statement when he looks for its presence in the first millennium AD as he does not find much evidence of its presence in the pre- and post-Śaṅkara period. Here I would like to differ from the learned author as the arguments given by him are neither sufficient nor convincing.

Daya Krishna wants to suggest that the first millennium closes with the signal of the impending dominance of Vedānta in the forthcoming millennium where it establishes its supremacy. First of all, taking this point for granted for the sake of discussion, I fail to understand why the most distinctive philosophy needs necessarily to be the oldest philosophy making its appearance in the remotest past. The strength, value and utility of a philosophical school lies

not in its ancestry or antiquity but in its adaptability to the needs of life, nay in its eternal character and eternality or otherwise of the truth it elucidates. For example, Buddhism sought to gain importance at the time of the Buddha and a few centuries afterwards. I don't think it is necessary to engage ourselves in a dialogue as to how Buddhism became so famous even though there was no trace of it before Buddha. It may not be the case with Vedānta, as there are claims that it is Upaniṣadic and hence has its roots in the hoary past. Daya Krishna confronts this view saying that Vedānta as the end portion of the Vedas is a myth as the Upaniṣads don't necessarily form the end portion as in the case of *Aitareya Upaniṣad*. Subscribing to the view that they form the final portion of the Vedas, charges are levelled to divorce the Upaniṣads from Vedānta. Daya Krishna's impending fear is that if Vedānta and Upaniṣads are taken together and *Brahmasūtras* and *Gītā* are brought in to the fold, he would not be able to prove his hypothesis that Vedānta was not there in the First Millennium AD. So there is a necessity as far as he is concerned, to give a segmental treatment to all these texts.

Subscribing to the view that the Vedānta forms the final portion of the Vedas charges are levelled, pointing out exceptions. Actually, the instances pointed out are only exceptions. Even granting that the charges are valid, Vedānta is understood more significantly as the purport (*nirṇaya*) of the Vedas. So it may not necessarily be of much consequence whether those great revelations occur in the middle of the book, or at the end of the book or anywhere else. What is more important is: what is that they seek to convey. Sadānanda defines Vedānta: *vedānto nāma upaniṣat pramāṇam tadupakāriṇī śārīrakaśāstrādīni ca,*[1] Vedānta is the evidence furnished by the Upaniṣads. The *Brahmasūtras* are the texts correlating the views of the Vedānta. While commenting on the word '*ca*' in the above text, Nṛsiṁhasarasvatī says that Texts like the *Bhagavadgītā* may be understood by the word *'ca'*. I would also like to make a mention of the *Vidvanmanorañjanīṭīkā* of Rāmatīrtha on the same text, which says that in the word *Upaniṣad,* the word *"upa"* means proximity, *ni* means certitude (*niścaya*) and *sad* is understood in several senses like "to take away" or "affirm."[2] Hence the word *Upaniṣad* means the text which definitely affirms the knowledge of the self because the self is the most proximate thing to a person or because of one's acquiring it out of his nearness to his teacher or the preceptor. My attempt here is to show how Vedānta is used in

the sense of Upaniṣads and also as a thinking based on the Upaniṣads throughout the tradition. Let's now go to the term Vedānta which comprises of two words viz., *Veda* and *anta*. The word *anta* has been understood as the final portion and hence creates a confusion in Daya Krishna as there are Upaniṣads, such as *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, which do not occur at the terminating sections of the Vedas. The word is representatively used as most of the Upaniṣads occur at the final portion of the respective Vedas. Secondly, the word *anta* has been interpreted in different ways in the different texts. In the *Medinikośa*, the word *anta* stands for "form" or "nature" (*svarūpa, svabhāva*).[3] What is meant is that the Vedānta is not something outside the purview of the Vedas, but is in the form of the Vedas, or of the nature of the Vedas. According to Hemacandra, the word *anta* means definite, limit, boundary.[4] In the *Bhagavadgītā*, the word *anta* is used in the sense of certitude (*niścaya*):

> *nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ*
> *ubhayorapi dṛṣṭo'ntastvanayostattvadarśibhiḥ* [II. 16]
> (The unreal never comes into being, the real never lapses into non-being. The determinative meaning (*anta*), i.e. the truth about both these has been perceived by the seers of reality.)

Here, the word *anta* is taken in the sense of truth, purport, by all the commentators. Śaṅkara explains *antaḥ* as *nirṇayaḥ*;[5] Rāmānuja restates the same meaning in his commentary on this verse—*nirṇayāntatvāt nirūpaṇasya nirṇaya iha antaśabdenocyate.*[6] Uttamūr Vīrarāghavācārya defines *anta* in the term Vedānta as the concluding view without any doubt. "*tathā vedārthanirṇayopayogītvādapi; antaḥ avasānaṁ saṁśayāpagamo nirṇayaḥ iti.*"[7] Hence there is nothing wrong to view Vedānta as the truth or the purport of the Vedas. Secondly, we cannot also say that Vedānta has nothing to do with Upaniṣads and that *Brahmasūtras* are not related to this. In the *Vedāntasāra* it is clearly mentioned that the texts supplementing *Vedānta* are *Brahmasūtras* and the like.[8] After all, what are the aphorisms for? Those are not independent or solitary texts; they stand for or represent some other existent text in an aphoristic manner.[9] Śaṅkara in the commentary on the second *sūtra* states that the *sūtras* are meant for stringing together the flowers of the sentences of the Upaniṣads for it is precisely the sentences of the Upaniṣads that are referred to and discussed in the Upaniṣads. (*vedāntavākyakusumagrathanārthatvāt sūtrāṇām, Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, I.i.2).[10] Even in the *Bhagavadgītā* we find

the mention of the term *Brahmasūtra* in the verse:

ṛṣibhirbahudhā gītaṁ chandobhir vividhaiḥ pṛthak
brahmasūtrapadaiścaiva hetumadbhirviniścitaiḥ (13.4)
(It has been sung variously by seers in varied hymns; as also stated in the reasoned and definitive words of the *Brahmasūtras.*)

Śaṅkara explains the word *Brahmasūtra* as the statements referring to Brahman which also refers to the Upaniṣadic statements. The word *hetumad*—"logical" in the text refers to the *Tarkaprasthāna* which is designed in a logical manner to expound the statements of the Upaniṣads.[11] This verse also can be understood in the sense of availability of some other *Brahmasūtras* which were known to the author of the *Bhagavadgītā.* Rāmānuja gives the meaning of the term *Brahmasūtra* as *Śārīrakasūtras,*[12] which makes it clearer that even the author of the *Bhagavadgītā* was aware of *Brahmasūtras* as expounding the meaning of the Upaniṣads. Thus, Daya Krishna's attempt to treat them separately does not have either the sanction of the tradition or logical tenability.

Two: Coming to the views of Potter and Nakamura, Daya Krishna has given the list of few Vedāntins who are well-known in the pre- and post-Śaṅkara period. According to Daya Krishna, "Before Śaṅkara, the only thinkers who are mentioned in connection with the *Brahmasūtra* in Potter's New Bibliography are Bodhāyana (AD 350), Dramiḍācārya (AD 525), Bhartṛprapañca (AD 550), Viśvarūpadeva (AD 600), and Brahmadatta (AD 660)." Just because Nakamura and Potter did not mention or even if we don't find, we cannot conclude that there were a few Vedāntins in that age. Vidyāraṇya (AD 1100) a Śākta author, in his work called *Śrīvidyārṇava* says that there were five famous Ācāryas between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara (*gauḍādiśāṅkarāntāśca sapta saṁkhyā prakīrtitāḥ*).[13] Potter says that there were five thinkers in between Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara but the evidence cited in *Śrīvidyārṇava* shows there were five important thinkers between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. And it must be borne in mind that the orthodox Advaita tradition does not make any mention of the above five thinkers, listed by Potter and quoted by Daya Krishna as the true representatives, or the preceptors, of the school. The same text also mentions, that Śaṅkara had fourteen direct disciples who were famous ones. (*śaṅkarācāryaśiṣyāśca caturdaśa dṛḍhavratāḥ, divyātmāno dṛḍhātmāno nigrahānugrahakṣamāḥ*).[14] But traditionally, and as per the accounts given by the *Śaṅkaradigvijayas*

only four disciples were famous as the pontiffs of the four Maṭhas. Hence a more rational way to explain the position of a few available Vedāntins would be to believe that only the prominent names have been preserved by the tradition. The *Śrībhāṣyaprakāśikā of Śrīnivāsācārya*, mentions that there existed Ninety-six *bhāṣyas* on the *Brahmasūtras* before Rāmānuja who refuted all those views in composing his *Śrībhāṣya*.[15]

bhagavatā bhāṣyakṛtā sūtrākṣarānanuguṇānyapanyāyamūlakāni ṣaṇṇavatibhāṣyāni nirākṛtyedam bhāṣyam praṇītamiti hi sampradāyaḥ

(page 5)

Those commentaries might have been lost due to the ravages of time and numerous other factors such as constant quarrels among the scholars nourished by their patrons, kings, which went to the extent of destroying the existing literature of opposing schools. In this regard, we can take the case of *Mahābhāṣya*. The *Mahābhāṣya* speaks of *Dhātupārāyaṇa* and *Nāmapārāyaṇa* and a host of other texts which were once popular. Today, these texts are not known through any other source. Now, are we to suppose that there never existed any such texts, just because some of the manuscript collectors did not come across them and consequently didn't record them in their bibliographies? Similarly, the *Bhāṣyas* prior to Śaṅkara also might have been lost for which we cannot say that there were no *bhāṣyas* at all. There is one more point that has missed the notice of Daya Krishna. In his "History of Early Vedānta Philosophy" Nakamura's main focus is Advaita Vedānta and hence there is a casual mention of Bodhāyana and no mention of Dramiḍācārya. These two are the standing edifices in Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta school and have been venerated by all the writers of that school starting from Yāmuna and Rāmānuja. In the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition, the *Bodhāyanavṛtti* is not available excepting its summary given by Ṭanka. Rāmānuja at the beginning of his *Śrībhāṣya* observes that the *vṛtti* of Bodhāyana on the *Brahmasūtras* was very lengthy, which was condensed by many other earlier preceptors (*Pūrvācāryas*).[16]

bhagavadbodhāyanakṛtām vistīrṇām brahmasūtravṛttim
pūrvācāryāḥ saṁcikṣipuḥ, tanmatānusāreṇa sūtrākṣarāṇi vyākhyāsyante

Hence, the arguments put forth by Daya Krishna are based on a hurried generalisation and thus cannot be accepted.

Thus, I would like to point out that there are sources other than Nakamura and Potter to determine the works of Indian Philosophy.

Daya Krishna implies that unpublished or inaccessible works are of little importance (p. 202) and appears on these flimsy grounds to dismiss Dramiḍācārya as insignificant. It is not so. Bādarāyaṇa and following him Śaṅkara mentioned a number of thinkers whose literature is not available to us. In fact, it is inherently plausible that the enormous success of Śāṅkara Vedānta was the cause of the obliteration of many of the Vedāntic currents of thought from which it emerged. This is one of the reasons why the numerical breakdown of first millennium thinkers belonging to different Vedāntic schools seems pointless.

Three: The evidences cited in the *Śaṅkaradigvijayas* are of less historical importance. These were written hundreds of years after Śaṅkara and are in the form of eulogies to the great master. That does not mean that these contain no truth at all. I have already shown how the important disciples of Śaṅkara, who were the pontiffs of the Maṭhas were taken up in these texts and not all others. But, I have difficulty in accepting Daya Krishna's statement that "even Buddhists are ahead of the Vedāntins, both in quantity and quality, thus nullifying the myth that they were defeated by Śaṅkara." As per the numerical evidence, he gives, the Buddhists outnumbered the Vedāntins and hence qualitatively they were of large numbers. What does he mean by "quantitatively?" Śaṅkara's confrontation with Buddhists was in the form of śāstraic dialogue and not physical fight where number of persons taking the side of each fighter would matter, or a political assembly where head counting, or hand raising is taken as the criteria to win. In his writings and in the writings of Sureśvara, we find the strong logic, that is employed to refute Buddhism and I am yet to come across any literature where Buddhists have offered any rejoinder to Advaitin's claims. Hence in all probability, Śaṅkara might have defeated the Buddhists in scholarly debates and what impact he made cannot be simply made by the head count of scholars.

Four: Daya Krishna refers to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka* to prove that the former does not make a mention of Śaṅkara and that the latter does not accept Advaitic liberation as the ultimate in his scheme of liberation. This point has been discussed by Balasubramanian in detail and I only would like to add one point which I feel pertinent to this. In Kashmirian writings, up to the period of Abhinavagupta (AD 1200), we don't find any refer-

ence to Śaṅkarācārya. But there are a number of references to Vedāntic systems and Maṇḍana's writings are quoted at times. Sadyojyoti (AD 700) in his *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* refers to Vedānta which is not of an Advaita type in the strict sense of the term. The commentator of this text, Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha points out that "this tenet is similar for the knowers of Vedānta and Pāñcarātras. They also view that the merger of the Jīvātmā in Brahman, that is Nārāyaṇa or the transcendental being is liberation."[17]

> *eṣa ca prasaṅgaḥ vedāntavidām pāñcarātrāṇām ca samānaḥ, tairapi brahmaṇi nārāyaṇākhyāyām ca parasyām prakṛtau jīvātmanām layaḥ muktiḥ abhyupagatā.* (Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary on *Nareśvaraparīkṣā,* verse 1.67)

In the Kashmirian writings, we find mention of a *Pariṇāmavedānta*, a type of Vedānta which is similar to Bhartṛhari's position. In my view, they had a type of Vedānta which was the earlier form of Advaita, rigorously formulated by Śaṅkara. Hence, there is nothing wrong if Jayanta or Udayana did not mention Śaṅkara by name. The problem comes when we try to equate Vedānta with Śaṅkara which is why Daya Krishna fails to identify Vedānta in the *Ātmatattvaviveka.*

Five. Daya Krishna points out that *Brahmasūtras* had little impact on the philosophical scene in India after their composition and, in fact, were practically absent when compared with the Sūtras of Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. My submission here is that even in the Vedic period there were thinkers who tried to understand reality on the basis of logic and reason without involving the Vedic doctrines. The Sāṅkhyas were one such group who showed the path and there soon appeared a number of thinkers who discovered independently new ways of emancipation quite independently of the Vedic tradition. As they discarded Vedic authority, they had absolute liberty of their conscience and soon there emerged too many different views followed by a large number of followers. It was a period of Indian dialecticians after the period of the epics and because of their (non-Vedic) logical stand, the *sūtra* literature evolved and became famous instantaneously and worked out thoroughly and elaborately in the following centuries. The result is that since there is no end to logical reasoning, there are bound to be further and further refinements. This perhaps justifies the greater number of thinkers, which actually is no glory to these philoso-

phies. Nor is it a defect for other philosophies to have lesser number of thinkers. Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Tarkapāda* shows how these schools are riddled with internal inconsistencies and those positions have been defended by refining and modifying the original positions in the wake of attacks from other schools. That is the reason, I feel, why the Sūtra literature becomes so prominent in Mimāṁsā, Nyāya and other schools as they become the most important source of information overtaking the earlier existent texts. This is not the case with Vedānta. In Vedānta, Sūtras were based on the Upaniṣads, which are taken as the primary source giving a place of second fiddle to Sūtras which show their referents to the Upaniṣadic passages. Moreover, the oral tradition of transmission of the knowledge did not leave behind much of writing material for the modern scholars to refer to. For example, there are no writings available of Govinda Bhagavatpāda, the illustrious teacher of Śaṅkara, who must have taught *Brahmasūtras* to the latter. Hence not finding enough references cannot be a deciding factor to prove Daya Krishna's point.

Six: Coming to Buddhism, Daya Krishna points out that there were not many references made to the *Brahmasūtras* in Buddhist literature. I would like to submit that a sincere and reconciliatory interaction between Vedānta and Buddhism was attempted by Gauḍapāda who tried to link the two schools. Bhāvaviveka (AD 500) in his commentary *Tarkojvalā* on the *Mādhyamakahṛdayakārikā* quotes four passages which closely resemble *Gauḍapādakārikās*. Śāntarakṣita (AD 700) in his *Mādhyamikālaṁkārakārikā* quotes ten *kārikās* to show the Upaniṣadic views and Kamalaśīla (AD 750) a disciple of Śāntarakṣita refers to those as *Upaniṣat-śāstra*.[18] In all these cases, since the purpose is to refer to Upaniṣads and their tenets, there is no need to refer to sūtras which need elaborate explanations to understand what they stand for. The Indian dialecticians are usually of the habit of not mentioning their opponents by name, they only refer to their views and refute them to avoid direct confrontation. That also may be one of the reasons why we don't have reference to Bādarāyaṇa in the literature of other schools.

CONCLUSION

In fine, it may be stated that, due to some reason or the other, the *Brahmasūtras*, as Daya Krishna points out from the available sources,

have not made their presence felt in the first millennium AD. Sometimes, some of the profound ideas propounded by some great thinkers, remain dormant for decades, nay centuries, and are actively embraced when the general intellectual climate acquires the appropriate sensitivity and capability to understand those truths. If others are not aware of *Brahmasūtras,* that is not the problem of Bādarāyaṇa or Śaṅkara. Any great philosopher is interested, not in publishing his philosophy, but in symbolising the truths he experienced. He documents them in order to share his experience with posterity. The immediate posterity at times may not understand and utilize that knowledge. That is not the problem or shortcoming or even a deficiency of the thinker. He could well be far ahead of his times. The posterity may be in a position to appropriate the work much better and benefit from it. Regarding this, it may be pointed out that it is no great merit in having a plethora of thinkers and writers on a given philosophy, and to have a lesser number of thinkers in another school is not a matter of disgrace or unpopularity.

Notes and References

1. *Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda, edited with commentaries by Colonel G.A. Jacob, Chaukhamba Amarabharati Prakasana, Varanasi, 1975, pp. 2 and 66.
2. Ibid., p. 65.
3. *antam svarūpam svabhāvaḥ; Medini* quoted in the *Vācaspatyam* (1962 edn.) Vol. 1, p. 195.
4. *antaḥ niścayasīmāprāntaḥ*— Hemacandra, quoted in the *Vācaspatyam,* Ibid.
5. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on the *Gītā,* verse 2.16.
6. Rāmānuja's *Gītābhāṣya,* on the verse 2.16.
7. *Śrībhāṣya* with *Śrutaprakāśikā,* edited by U. Vīrarāghavācārya, Śrīviśiṣṭādvaita-pracāriṇī sabhā, p. 1.
8. The line goes thus: *vedānto nāma upaniṣatpramāṇam tadupakāriṇi śārīraka-sūtrādini ca. Vedāntasāra,* p . 2.
9. A sūtra is defined as *alpākṣaram asandigdham sāravadviśvatomukham*
   astōbhamanavadyam ca sūtram sūtravido viduḥ
   (oft-quoted verse).
10. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, translated by Gambhirananda, Advaita Ashram, 1993, p. 15.
11. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on *Bhagavadgitā* 13.4.
12. *Rāmānujabhāṣya* on the *Bhagavadgītā,* 13.4.
13. From the *Digvijayas* we find the mention of Govindabhagavatpāda and none else. For details refer *Gauḍapādakārikā* edited by R.D. Karmarkar, BORI, Poona, 1973, p. ii.
14. Ibid., p. ii.

15. भगवता भाष्यकृता सूत्राक्षराननुगुणान्यपन्यायमूलकानि षण्णवतिभाष्यानि निराकृत्येदं भाष्यं प्रणितमिति हि सम्प्रदायः।*Śrībhāṣyaprakāśikā* of Śrīnivāsācārya, edited by T. Chandrasekharan, GOML No. 38, p. 5.
16. भगवद्बोधायनकृतां विस्तीर्णां ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्तिं पूर्वाचार्याः सञ्चिक्षिपुः। तन्मतानुसारेण सूत्राक्षराणि व्याख्यास्यन्ते॥ Ibid., p. 5.
17. For details refer Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Commentary on *Kiraṇāgama*, edited by Dominic Goodall, French Institute of Indology, Pondicherry, 1997, pp. 190- 91
18. *Gauḍapādakārikā*, edited by R.D. Karmarkar, BORI, Poona, 1973, p. iv.

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A Difference of Battle Cry: A Comment on the Article Entitled 'Sentence, Meaning, Intentionalism and the Literary Text: An Interface' by Ranjan K. Ghosh Published in *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 2

This is a response to the paper 'Sentence Meaning, Intentionalism, and the Literary Text: An Interface', by Dr. Ranjan Ghosh, published previously in *JICPR*.[1] Dr. Ghosh's paper is itself a response to previous writings by John R. Searle and S. Knapp and W. Michaels. A limitation in my paper is that I have not read what Searle and Knapp and Michaels have written. Moreover, this response is limited to only one of the issues in the controversy which, however, has far-reaching implications for philosophy—the use of the concepts of 'meaningful' and 'meaningless'. Knapp and Michaels think that accidentally produced but structurally correct language—say, some lines of Wordsworthian poetry produced by the action of the sea on a beach, or an English sentence typed out by a cat walking over a computer keyboard—is meaningless, while Searle and Ghosh think it is meaningful. For Knapp and Michaels, the outcome is only marks while for Searle and Ghosh it is sentences, although Ghosh is not prepared to go so far as to consider the Wordsworthian sentences to be poetry.

To get a bearing on this controversy, it is helpful to look at the everyday use of these words—and if someone asks why we should do this, we could answer by asking him where he got the words

from. In everyday usage, we talk both of the 'meaning' of something and of something being 'meaningful' or 'meaningless', the former more often than the latter. To take the case of 'meaning' first: the word crops up in diverse contexts. A Japanese may not understand the English word 'adversity' and we may explain the 'meaning' to him, perhaps through the Japanese equivalent. A baby may smile for the first time when it hears the word 'milk' and we may say that it understands the 'meaning' of the word. Again, a passage in literature may have a deeper 'meaning' which does not disclose itself to the layman, and an expert may have to explain the meaning to him. In these contexts, the concepts of 'understanding' and 'meaning' are in the closest connection. In fact, the word 'meaning' can be pruned out of everyday usage; we can make do with 'understanding' and 'explaining' alone. We can talk of the Japanese not understanding and then understanding the word because of the explanation, of the baby understanding the word for the first time, of the layman understanding the passage owing to the expert's explanation. Perhaps there are primitive languages which have an equivalent for 'understanding' but none for 'meaning'.

Apart from this question of what something means, the more fundamental question of whether it is meaningful at all, whether it has a meaning in the first place, can arise. This happens rather more infrequently and this is only to be expected, because it reflects upon the mental capacity of the utterer or the hearer of the language. For example, a child may babble, in an unintelligible way, words he hears adults use, and we would say the result was 'meaningless'. In intellectual discourse—literary criticism, philosophy etc.—we often find passages which are unintelligible to us, and we could say they were 'meaningless', that they were not properly thought through. It may turn out that we are wrong, that we could learn to understand them, or be made to understand them by an expert, and we would then say they were 'meaningful'. Although we understand nearly all the language we encounter, we only talk of language being 'meaningful' in contexts where it would make sense to say that it is not 'meaningful'. In ordinary contexts, we would not be giving information at all if we talked of language being meaningful. Once again, there is a close connection between 'understanding' and 'not understanding' on the one hand, and 'meaningful' and 'meaningless' on the other. To say that something is 'meaningless' is to say that there is nothing to understand in it and to say it is

'meaningful' is to say that there is something to understand and the words 'meaningful' and 'meaningless' can also be pruned out of everyday usage.

When we look at the imaginary cases of the Wordsworthian poetry formed on the beach by the action of the waves of the sea, and the sentence 'The chair is made of wood' accidentally typed out by the cat walking over the computer keyboard, we see at once that the concepts of 'meaningful' and 'meaningless' are being taken into new surroundings. These are not cases of language being unintelligible owing to the incompetence of the utterer or to his incoherence or to our failing to understand something understandable but abstruse. Nobody is failing to communicate or failing to understand. In these surroundings, 'meaningless' and 'meaningful' in their customary sense cannot get a foothold. To use an expression of Wittgenstein's; the disputants are playing a new language game with these concepts, a game for which there are no rules.

Why do they want to do this? Why not just leave these concepts of 'meaningful' and 'meaningless' alone? What information are they giving when they apply these labels of their preference? The facts, or imaginary facts, are not in dispute. A cat walking over a computer keyboard accidentally types out the English sentence 'The chair is made of wood'. This is a correctly formed sentence as regards grammar and syntax. One should add that it is also consistent with logic, unlike, for example, 'The chair is made of nothing', and empirical possibility, unlike, for example, 'The chair is made of wind'. But it is accidentally formed; the cat did not intend to type out an English sentence, and the sentence does not refer to any particular chair. The sentence has no application. If it appeared in an English textbook to illustrate a grammatical point, it would still not refer to any particular chair, but it would have an application. But neither is the cat's sentence incoherent; someone who saw it could paint an appropriate illustration of the sentence if he was asked to.

Why at all then play a new language game with 'meaningful' and 'meaningless' in these new surroundings? What factual error is made, when either of these labels is applied? One side is struck by the structural correctness of the accidentally formed sentence and wants to apply the label 'meaningful' to it, and the other is struck by the purely accidental formation of this structurally correct sentence and wants to apply the label 'meaningless', both playing a new language

game with the words, applying a new criterion, in the process. Each side behaves as if the application of their label amounted to giving information about the sentence, to identifying an objectively existing fact about it, but this is not the case; no epistemological ground is gained when either of these labels is applied, and the difference between the disputants is only one of battlecry. The dispute is not one of fact—there is agreement about the facts—but one of terminological preference.

Let us look more closely at this notion of meaningfulness as an objectively existing fact about which it cannot be right to have different opinions. 'Objectively existing' can mean two different things. It can mean, firstly, that it is an ontologically real property of the sentence, like its shape or sound. This is clearly not the case. 'Meaningfulness' is something notional, an evaluation we make. It is true that evaluation can be uncontroversial, leaving no scope for controversy, for example, that 'The chair is made of wood' is 'grammatically correct' and this could be termed an objectively existing fact about the sentence but this is a case where the rules for applying the label 'grammatically correct' are clear and unambiguous. In the case of an accidentally created sentence, there are no rules for applying the labels 'meaningful' and 'meaningless' (what is the need for them, when there are no such sentences?) and the disputants make up their own.

Dr. Ranjan Ghosh's interventions in the debate appear to be misconceived. He attempts to shore up Searle's position by demonstrating through examples that sentence meaning can exist independently of speaker meaning. A student in a foreign language class utters the equivalent in that language of the English 'This building is on fire' and a native speaker who steps into the room panics when he hears the sentence. Again, someone who does not know English and wants to order food in a restaurant says by mistake in English 'Come and fight me' and is attacked by a waiter in consequence. However, the other side need not concede the point; they could say that the sentences were meaningless, but had an effect because they were wrongly thought to be meaningful. Surely, they are not committed to the view that the wave-poem cannot move someone who read it, or that the cat's 'The chair is made of wood' cannot be wrongly taken for a report by someone. Ghosh also mentions the case of a man who says damaging things about himself when talking in his sleep. This is not a case of language

having a meaning not intended by the speaker. Rather, it is akin to a case where a man loses his self-control in public and says damaging things about himself. Sentence meaning and speaker meaning are one and the same, even if the revelation was not pre-planned. An intention is not a conscious mental act which is subsequently manifested in behaviour; rather, 'intention' is a concept which we use to evaluate behaviour.

However, Dr. Ghosh also says that the wave-created lines, although they are sentences, cannot be regarded as a poem:

> For something to be *regarded* as a poem the human intention must have gone into making it so. In the beach-marks example, the marks that appear after the receding waves may *look like* a poem though it cannot be regarded so if we are not sure that it was so *intended* by someone.[2]

This is a case of legislating, just as one would be legislating if one said that a group of words cannot be regarded as a sentence unless someone intended it to be one, although it may look like one. Elsewhere, Ghosh says that 'only an intentionalist thesis can come to grips with metaphorical meanings, departures from conventional usages, etc.[3] One might as well say that only an intentionalist thesis can come to grips with correct grammar and syntax but this is something that Ghosh will not allow. If the impossible happened and the wave-poem was created, we would have to account for 'metaphorical meanings, departures from conventional usages, etc,' by the action of the waves; an intentionalist thesis would be excluded. Of course, a replay of the present controversy would be possible; we could deny that there were metaphorical meanings, departures from conventional usages etc. and maintain that what we saw was just marks. Whether we talk of marks or of poetry, we would be making up our own rules.

Contrary to what Searle and Ghosh appear to think, correct grammar and syntax are not unchallengeable criteria for the meaningfulness of sentences. A visitor to Kerala may ask the writer in Malayalam which is incorrect in grammar and syntax the way to the railway station and the writer may understand him. Is what the visitor says meaningful or meaningless? The speech of illiterates is often incorrect as regards grammar and syntax but we understand them. Is what they say meaningful or meaningless? What however is the point of asking or answering these questions? Is it not significant that we do not ask them in everyday life?

If the laws of probability were different and grammatically correct sentences and beautiful lines of poetry superior to anything human beings have written were always being created accidentally, there would be a need in this context for the labels 'meaningful' and 'meaningless'. Since it would be inconvenient to keep encountering sentences which appear to be reports but are not, we would label them as 'meaningless'. And since we would want to preserve beautiful poetry even if it is artificially created, we would label it as 'meaningful'. This would be a new language-game with convenience and beauty as the criteria.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. R.K. Ghosh, 'Sentence Meaning, Intentionalism, and the Literary Text: An Interface', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, vol. XIV, No. 2, January-April, 1997, pp. 57-70.
2. Ibid., p. 67.
3. Ibid., p. 69.

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Development of a Symbolic Logic Courseware for Teaching Philosophy

Among philosophy courses, a course in symbolic logic particularly involves extensive handling of problem sets for both teachers as well as students. It is time to realize that specifically in this respect the computer can be an invaluable aide for logic teaching and learning. Internationally, some logic coursewares already exist; as for instance, *Logicworks* (version 7.0) which is developed by Rob Brady and is commercially available through Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, U.S.A, Logic courseware developed and used regularly by Prof. Clifton McIntosh, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Utah, U.S.A.,[1] etc. However, as far as we know, in India no such courseware has been developed, although symbolic logic is part of the Philosophy curriculum in almost all the major Indian

[1]Personal Communication.

Universities. It may be mentioned that even the afore-mentioned international coursewares are dated, in the sense that they were developed a few years back. Since then, the abilities of computers have advanced in giant strides. For instance, currently multimedia computers are available which allow us to integrate all the media elements, e.g. sound, video, graphics, animation, etc.

At Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani, we are developing a multimedia symbolic logic courseware. Its main objectives are: (*a*) to share the task of teaching by repeating some of the lessons taught in classroom and by monitoring the students' competence at problem-solving, and (*b*) to provide the beginning student of logic the much-needed opportunity to develop the desired level of competence at his or her own pace. Thus, it strives to supplement classroom teaching and learning while keeping the student's level of interest high through interactive participation. The use of this package does not require prior knowledge of any programming language or word-processing. It guides the user by icons and clear instructions that indicate what needs to be done for a desired activity. It also does not require any prior knowledge of symbolic logic as it is supposed to assist a beginning student of logic. To run the package, a multimedia PC will be most desirable. However, it can also run effectively on a 486 PC or a Pentium machine with colour monitor; only in that case the sound will not be available. The rest of the functions will be unaffected.

The module which teaches and tests the techniques of translating from English to symbolic notations is already completed and is ready for demonstration. A brief description of the module and its various functions is given below.

THE TRANSLATION MODULE

The opening screen offers the user four options: (1) to go to the Lessons, (2) to go to the Tests, (3) to the Help screen, or (4) to Quit. Against a colourful background, the options are displayed in large letters. The user chooses by simply clicking the mouse on the keyword of his choice. From hereon, this screen will be referred to as the Main screen.

(1) The Lessons

This option introduces the learner to the techniques of 'translation' through an overview of the five basic connectives, 'and', 'or',

'if-then', etc. This is accomplished through a combination of animations, textual instructions, sound effects and voiced instructions. The sound can be activated by clicking the mouse on a designated area of the screen marked as 'sound'. In this article, from now on, designated areas on the screen will be referred to as 'buttons' which can be 'pressed' by a click of the mouse. The learner moves to the next page only when he wants to by 'pressing' the button marked '>>'. Similarly, one may go back to any of the previous pages by pressing the '<<' button. Also, one may move back to the Main screen from *any* screen of the Lessons by pressing the 'Main' button.

(2) The Tests

This is a totally interactive segment in which the assignments have been kept at three levels of increasing difficulty: Basics, Advanced Beginners, and Multiple Mix. The user may choose the level he wants to be tested on. Problems are asked by the computer, and the student is supposed to either key in the answer or click the right choice depending upon the level of the test. Since the Basics, as its name suggests, asks elementary questions, it is not a timed test and the feedback is instant. The answer is immediately confirmed, if correct, and shown immediately on the screen, if incorrect. However, for the other two levels, the tests are timed and a set of ten questions must be answered within a fixed period of time. At the end of each test set of ten questions, a grade sheet appears which displays:

- number of right and wrong answers
- total marks on a scale of 100 obtained by the learner on the present test
- the corresponding letter grade, e.g. 'A', 'B', etc. indicating the student's level of performance.

The learner also has a choice to see the right answers to the questions which were answered incorrectly. Each level has a problem bank of about hundred questions currently. It is always possible to add more questions to the bank or to edit the existing questions. The computer chooses the questions *randomly* from the problem bank.

(3) The Help

This screen is there mainly to assist the user while he navigates through the courseware. It also instructs the user as to which symbols are acceptable to the computer. It can be accessed from various screens by pressing the 'help' button.

(4) Quit

This option allows the user to exit the package when he wants to. As in the case with the 'Main' or 'Help' button, it too can be accessed from various screens.

Our plan is to further develop similar modules on 'Formal Proofs of Validity and Invalidity', 'The Quantification Theory', etc. The entire courseware may be used in near future to supplement the classroom teaching of the existing symbolic logic course at BITS, Pilani. Ultimately, however, we would like to put it on the World Wide Web (www) so that it can be accessed by any networked computer worldwide. Any question, comment, or suggestion regarding this should be addressed to:

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Focus

Attention is drawn to the book *Humanity and Divinity: An Essay in Comparative Metaphysics* written by Eliot Deutsch, which is perhaps the most original reconstruction of the Advaitic position done by a thinker. Never before has a Western thinker so internalised a non-Western mode of thought and developed it creatively as Eliot has done the Advaitic insights in this book. Besides many other innovations, the crucial concept of 'sublation' gets a reformulation as 'subration' in this work which is described as the 'process whereby we disvalue a previously valued content of consciousness because it is contradicted by a new experience.' (p.10)

It is further explained that 'subration' is a special mental process which involves a revision of judgment. The judging process is not a simple axiological one of the sort 'I thought X was good (valuable, important) but then felt that it wasn't'; it is rather an axio-noetic one of the sort, X, because of *a, b, c,* is to be rejected and is to be replaced by Y, where X and Y may be any content of consciousness—a concept, an existential relation, a physical object, and so forth'. (p. 11)

The book deserves a serious consideration by all those interested in Indian thought in general, and Advaitic thought in particular.

Humanity and Divinity: An Essay in Comparative Metaphysics, by Eliot Deutsch, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1970.

* * *

Most Indians generally tend to assume that an integral view of things is a special peculiarity of their own tradition. But it was a general feature of all ancient civilizations and not a special feature of any one of them. W reproduce below a passage from a recently published book entitled *Medieval Thought* which brings together, in a highly readable and informative manner, the recent investigations in this field:

'Divine reason has implanted an order which can be discovered by the use of the disciplines of human language and of mathemat-

ics, by the use of poetry and music, geometry and astronomy. The ancient study of these liberal arts was thus given an ethical and religious value as part of the search in which philosophy consists. For example, the study of grammar constitutes the first stage in the passage from material things to immaterial things, as the intrinsic rationality of words is grasped and as speech is built up following the laying-down of rules. Dialectic is recommended to those who would study Scripture. The arts therefore are routes to truth." (p. 12)

Medieval Thought, by David Luscombe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.

* * *

An interesting view about arts is presented by John the Scot, a medieval thinker. According to him, the arts are fully a part of man's innate cognitive and communicative powers, not merely artificial techniques useful to understanding the Scriptures. With the arts man may uncover his origins by coming to an understanding of his resemblance to his creator, a resemblance that comprises the freedom, dignity, and rationality that man had enjoyed fully before the fall. (pp. 37-38)

Medieval Thought, by David Luscombe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.

Agenda for Research

Udayana's attempt to develop criteria for distinguishing between universals and pseudo–universals is well known. However, there has been little attempt to trace the history of this distinction in later times and see as to how it was modified by later Naiyāyikas. As late as the eighteenth century, we find works devoted specifically to this subject. The subject needs intensive investigation as it is of relevance to western thought also where there is a mention of this problem in Plato's *Dialogues* themselves. It may also be desirable to investigate whether other schools besides Nyāya have tried to tackle this problem.

* * *

The definition of *pratyakṣa* seems to have changed at the hands of successive thinkers in the Nyāya tradition after it was first formulated by Gotama in his *Nyāya Sūtras*. However, little is known about the details of these changes and the reasons given for them. The subject needs investigation as it would throw light on the discussion about the adequacy of the definition given in the foundational text of the Nyāya system whose authority is supposed to be accepted by all the Naiyāyikas.

* * *

The relevance of the distinctive position of Kumārila and Prābhākara for the performance of Vedic *yajña* needs investigation. This is important particularly if it is accepted that the main function of Mīmāṁsā is to formulate the correct *vidhi* for the performance of a Vedic *yajña* and if both Kumārila and Prābhākara are regarded as Mīmāṁsakas in this sense of the term.

Notes and Queries

Is it true that according to Nyāya, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion are *not* states of consciousness? J.N. Mohanty has contended, in his *Introduction to Gaṅgeśa's 'Theory of Truth'* (Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, 1966) that it is so. He writes 'Pleasure and pain, desire and aversion then are not as such states of consciousness, though we are—or, more accurately, become—conscious of them (p. 27).

But then, what shall be a state of consciousness according to Nyāya for, if according to Mohanty '"consciousness" and "*jñāna*" are, for the Nyāya synonymous expressions', (p. 27) as *jñāna* cannot be a state of consciousness since it will be meaningless to say that consciousness is a state of consciousness?

* * *

What is the distinction between *sāmānya, sādṛśya* and *jāti*? Does every *sādṛśya* give rise to a *jāti* as in the example of a *gavaya* in the case of *upamanā* in Nyāya?

Some queries regarding the texts known as the Vedas in the tradition:

(*a*) What is a Vedic *mantra*? According to Sāyaṇa, no *lakṣaṇa* of a *mantra* can be given as it will suffer from an *ativyāpti* or *avyāpti doṣa*. Thus according to him, what a *yājñika* calls a *mantra*, is a *mantra*. Are then, all the *mantras* used in some Vedic ritual or other? For, in case some of the *mantras* are never used in any ritual, how would the *yājñika* come into the picture? And, if he does not, then how would we ever decide whether it is a *mantra* or not?

(*b*) Do the *mantras* contain the detailed specification of the ritual for the performance of the various *yajñas*?

(*c*) Do the Vedic *mantras* contain *vidhi vākyas* among them? If not, how can they have any authority for the Mīmāṁsaka? In case only some of them contain the *vidhi vākyas*, what happens to the authority of those which do not contain them?

(*d*) Are the *vidhi vākyas* divided into those which enjoin the performance of a *yajña* and those which do not? If so, what is the authority of those *vidhi vākyas* in the *mantras* that do not enjoin the performance of a *yajña* for the Mīmāṁsaka? On the other hand, if no *mantra* has the form of a *vidhi vākya*, what is its authority for the Mīmāṁsaka?

(*e*) Where in the Vedic texts are the various *yajñas* enjoined to be performed? In case the details of the performance of the Vedic *yajñas* are not given in the *mantras*, where are they given and wherein lies the authority for their performance?

Book Reviews

T.R. ANANTHARAMAN, *Ancient Yoga and Modern Science,* PHISPC Monograph Series, New Delhi,

Prof. Anantharaman, the author of this monograph, is a working scientist by profession, and the growing interest of Indian scientists in Yoga, as instantiated by Anantharaman's work, is a very happy sign. One would, however, expect that a scientist would investigate and familiarize himself with the *modern* scientific interest in the Yogic phenomenon. The author, unfortunately, does not display any such familiarity or, even, interest. The earliest known neuro-physiological study on Yoga-phenomenon was published in 1955 by N.N. Das and H. Gastaut in the *Journal of Electroencephalographical and Clinical Neurophysiology* (Suppl. 6) as a research paper entitled 'Variations of Electric Activity of the Brain, Heart and Skeletal Muscles During the Course of Meditation and Yogic Trance' (original: French). Since, then, an explosion in modern scientific research in the yoga phenomenon can be noticed all over the world. The research article in this chain of researches which created some ripples the world over was by R.K. Wallace, H. Benson and F. Wilson, entitled 'A Wakeful Hypometabolic State', published in *American Journal of Physiology* in 1971 (Vol. 221), which claimed to establish experimentally the state of *samādhi* as distinct from the states of wakefulness, dreams and deep-sleep. These researches in yogic phenomena by modern physiologists and psychologists show more clearly and illuminatingly how 'science' and 'spirituality' complement each other, a view the author of the work is very anxious to defend and promote. In fact, what the *Yoga Sūtra* systemization is at pains to show is that not only are the two complementary, but further, 'spirituality' is only one amongst the many *sciences.* The concept of science that these ancient seer-scientists tried to work out and implement had its own limitations of time, for neither the sophisticated instruments of observation nor the sophisticated logical/mathematical techniques had developed in their age. Yet, the notions of *rationality* and *objectivity* that they worked out were remarkably accurate, and powerful in illuminating the truth. The fact that they conceived of science as that exploration which gave highest priority to the

discovery of the ultimate source or foundation of the cosmos, therefore, of man and his inner and outer life, and of all life in general, is itself an evidence of how comprehensive and deep-rooted the conception must have been. Further, not that only some world-negating, 'spiritually inclined', 'religious minded' persons sought this science of yoga, but, the science seems to have been a foundational and 'compulsory subject' for all including say the therapists (those who specialized in *Ārogya Śāstra*) or the architects (those who specialized in *Vāstu Śāstra*) or the rulers and ministers (those who specialized in *Artha Śāstra*). Thus, one may even claim this science to have been the main source of strength and vitality of Indian cognitive achievements and civilizational continuity.

One may object that this conception of science essentially works on the methodology of *inner* exploration whereas the methodology of modern science is that of *outer* exploration. Thus, even in psycho-physiological investigations where inner states are presumably explored, the scientist is essentially focusing on an outer something. This, however, may be said to be only a shortcoming of modern scientific methods from which ancient sciences did not suffer as they sought both inner as well as outer explorations (such as in *Ārogya Śāstra* or in *Kalā Śāstra*, that is mathematical cosmology).

Anantharaman suggests the phase transformation in alloys as an analogy, or model, for understanding the transformations of human consciousness/psycho-physiological system. While it is natural for a metallurgist to grasp the situation of yogic transformation in terms of his own, well practiced conceptual apparatus, the model is less likely to be fruitful for various reasons. For one thing, the transformations due to yogic practice are indubitably micro-neuro-physiological, as even the Haṭhayoga texts seem to suggest in their idea of *nāḍī śuddhi* and *cakra bhedan*. If the transformations are thus occurring at the neurone-cellular level, then their proper study would require bio-chemical analysis of the cellular structure. Here the analogy with the effects of nuclear medicines at cellular level is more illuminating. Moreover, the transformations also have *psychological equivalents* or parallel change of feeling for which the phase transformation model could hardly be considered adequate. In fact, Indian seers such as Patañjali adopted this psychological mode of description while analyzing the transformations due to yogic methodology. Modern psychologists call this approach 'phenomenological psychology'. Thus, for example, Patañjali names the situation of

transformations just setting in as *saṁprajñāt* which is, again, analyzed in terms of *vitarka, vicāra, ānanda* and *asmitā*. Thus, when the transformation starts, the activity of *vitarka* comes to rest in the beginning, then, upon subsequent practice, the activity of *vicāra* also comes to rest during the time of sitting/meditation. As further progress is made, the activities of *vitarka* as well as of *vicāra* as well as of *ānanda* come to rest and what remains is only self-awareness or inner 'ego-sense', with no body-awareness. Finally, the transformation is marked by the coming to rest of *asmitā* also upon which one enters a state which is un-nameable and has been called by Patañjali as *anya,* that is the one different from *saṁprajñāta* but neither analyzable nor definable nor nameable. In fact, the neuro-physiological description of the highest state of transformation is also beset with the same difficulty: no instrument of observation is sensitive enough to record the 'gradations' of this ultimate state of transformation.

It may be noted that Patañjali as well as later Haṭhayoga inquirers were very clear about the distinction between *natural* state and the *free/transformed* state of the human psycho-physiological system, and the process of transformation of the natural state into the free state. What seemed to be most puzzling to these seers was that the natural state gradually transforms, upon practice of yoga methods, into a *stable* free state in which the whole perspective of man undergoes revolutionary transformation. The transformation was thus said to be essentially cognitive though marked changes in the body-sense-apparatus (*bhūtendriya*) also occur. Thus, while the natural state was characterized as one of *bandha* or *pāratantrya* or constrainment in which the system is governed by the cause-effect relation of *karma-phala* and *karma-doṣa,* the free stable state was characterized as one of *mukti* or escape or transcendence from the cause-effect orbit—a radically different situation.

Patañjali's contribution consists essentially in the presentation of the *kleśa-vṛtti-karmāśaya* theory as descriptive of the natural state and working out further, on its basis, of a systematic methodology for the transformation of this state. It is notable that such transformation can occur in humans only, and not in animals or birds—as are the objects of study of modern psycho-physiologists—because they are not competent to execute the methodology on themselves. In fact, modern psycho-physiology, at least in its initial phase of growth, concentrated largely on the study of the natural state of humans

whether in cognition or memory or creativity or abnormality. Only recently, it has started the investigation of *altered* states of consciousness caused either by administration of drugs or religious experience or yoga practice. Anantharaman's monograph would certainly have been more rewarding had he presented detailed analysis of recent researches and their implications for yogic transformation. Nevertheless, the interest of a metallurgist in this important area of science is required to be appreciated.

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DANIEL ANDLER, Parthasarathi Banerjee, Mahasweta Chaudhury, Olivier Guillaume: *Facets of Rationality,* Sage Publications, New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London, 1995, pp. 379, Rs. 395 (cloth).

Rationalism, its very foundation, is in question. Attacks from several sources—scientific relativism, pluralism, sociologism, anarchism—making traditional scientific rationalism their target; cultural and moral relativism, historicism and hermeneuticism, post-modernism attempting to uproot rationalism altogether—have brought some rationalists closer to each other. The consequence was an international workshop on 'Rationality in Cognitive and Social Science' in Delhi in December 1993, an Indo-French collaboration. This workshop was preceded by a seminar on 'Science, Rationality and Cognition' held at the 78th Indian Science Congress in Indore in January, 1991. It was in this seminar that an informal group with common concerns was formed and a joint research programme was visualized under the umbrella of the Indo-Exchange programme. This, of course, did not mean that scholars from other countries would not participate.

Though the common agenda has been a defence of rationalism yet within that general aim the workshop was not confined to some one particular concern. As the editors remark, 'it would have been downright irrational to proceed in any spirit other than openness' (p. 9). At least openness is one requisite of rationality.

Facets of Rationality has appeared as a collection of the contributions of the various participants to the above workshop. In all, there are twenty papers included in this work, and they are classified

under four sections—Rationality, Social Choice and Moral Theory; Rationality and Social Sciences; Rationality Theory Construction and Science; and Rationality, Language and Logic. Each of these sections has been introduced by one of the editors. Parthasarathi Banerjee, Olivier Guillaume, Mahasweta Chaudhury and Daniel Andler respectively write the introductory prefaces to each of these sections. A reviewer could have easily saved the labour of going through the entire text and simply browsed through the introduction and the prefaces. However, it is difficult to leave an interesting and inviting book just at that.

The first section, entitled Rationality, Social Choice and Moral Theory, comprises five papers. The first two papers are mainly concerned with the issues relating to belief, desire, intention, belief-ascription, cognition and action, and deal especially with the nature of causal relation between belief and action. Pierre Jacob discusses mainly Fodor's theory of belief ascription, and conceives rationality in terms of consistency in a belief-system within which the content of belief derives its specificity. Jacob comments that functional role of belief requires Fodor that he gives up 'a purely denotational (atomic) theory of content and revises his rejection of Content Holism' (p. 33). Parthasarathi Banerjee in his paper 'Action Sentence and Action for Welfare', discusses Indian theory of action in terms of the notions of complete sentence (basically injunctional), complete cognition and complete action (pp. 41, 49). Perhaps the term 'complete' indicates 'individuated', rather than some kind of perfection. The injunction derives from a cognition (or belief) generating a desire, eventually causing an action to take place in the attainment of the desired objective. The injunctional understanding of a sentence is acquired by observation and participation in the discourse. The discussion in these two papers remains mainly confined to the causal/explanatory aspect of rationality while the next piece 'What Rational could Mean in the Human Sciences' by Allan Gibbard emphasizes the normative aspect of rationality in contrast to the descriptive aspect. While the term rational, can be given both non-factual, normative senses and factual, causal/explanatory senses, and the two senses would remain distinct, yet for many purposes one can 'conflate them harmlessly' (p. 75). Gibbard relies on the notion of a primitive ought, *a la* Ewing, which underlies the various other usages including moral and causal ones (especially in the context of sciences). 'To explain what the term "ratio-

nal" means is to explain the kind of state of mind the term serves to express"(p. 64). Gibbard also sketches a theory of meaning both in normative and descriptive senses (pp. 74-5). The fourth paper by Serge-Christopher Kolm confines rationality to the notion of choice, though he accepts that causal scientific laws provide reasons to believe how things take certain shape or direction. He points out that 'rationality requires that one considers *at least one counterfactual specific and one counterfactual choice*'(p. 95). Satish K. Jain attempts a formalisation of the notion of coherence and the idea of being liberal (liberal is one who respects the rights of others) in the last of this section 'The Coherence of Rights'. He shows that divergence between individual rationality and social rationality, generates paradoxes. 'Consequently, for the resolution of these paradoxes either one will have to accept a weaker notion of individual rationality which is more in tune with social reality, or one will have to weaken the constraints on social reality' (p. 122).

The second section begins with a paper by A. Raghuramaraju who presents an analysis of rationality in a historical perspective with a view to show its relationship to social sciences on the one hand and placing this relationship in the philosophy of social sciences on the other. He describes how the project of rationality has evolved through the ideas relating to the concept of man in nature or pre-societal man and the thematic of general will. Obviously this requires him to discuss the social contract theory. Strangely enough, while he emphasizes the historical perspective he also remarks that the notion of pre-societal man, as presented differently by different thinkers in the social contract theory is hypothetical which, of course, is the standard position. The creation of general will and decentering of self form the thematic of modern thought (p. 135). In spite of this, it distances itself from reality and remains anthropocentric. The resulting emptiness can be avoided only by a collaboration of rationalism and empiricism (p. 137).

The next two pieces are concerned with computability in human sciences and legal reasoning. Jean-Claude Gardin points out in his essay on 'Cognitive Effects of the Computational Paradigm in the Human Science' that the scholarly presentations consist of a database and a set of re-write formulae generalising and validating hypotheses. Construed in this way, schematisation is evident which is amenable to computability. The possibility of arguments in natural language being handled by computations distinguishes experts like

Gardin from lay men and the commonsense point of view, though Gardin admits a difference between the experts working with nature and those working with men. Gardin further considers the alternative rational approaches to humanities in terms of the in-between realm and the narrative mode and thinks that with stronger requirements met, it is possible to extend computation further (pp. 156-57).

The paper is followed by a postscript reporting questions put to Gardin and his responses to them. This paper is an exciting and provoking piece and a challenge to anti-positivists. The next paper 'Emergent Rationality through Jurisprudence' presented by three authors—Haurent Bogereau, Daniele Bourcier, Paul Bourgine, describes 'how legal rules can be extracted from, a connexionist model constructed on a learning base of case law'(p. 165). For the authors, reasoning processes being amenable to Artificial Intelligence, rationalism in law or formalisation in legal reasoning can be computerized. In fact such a project has now been realized and implemented, designed to help French mayors discharge their duties in the field of municipal jurisprudence. The experiment proves that feeding the computer in an appropriate way with the text of the law and with legal case studies, it enables not only to return verdicts but, more interestingly, to create new rules, as Olivier Guillaume points out in his preface to this section. Wagish Shukla in his 'The Remainder World' points out to an enigmatic feature of rationality. In his words 'Rational talk is repressive discipline. But the decentring of rationality means that there is no communication, no questions to be asked, no answers to be given. A catechism-free world is immobile. But with all the catechism-directed mobility we seem to be no further than building pyramids or mummies which may well start talking if the algorithm for articulation is found and activated through the relentless pursuance of rationality. The teleology of rationality is post-rationality' (p. 19). As Guillaume has pointed out in his preface, all these authors are working with the idea that rationalist is basically a western notion and he rightly suggests the limitation of such a view for if that were true, the phenomenon of Indian Nobel laureate would be a puzzle. Though science in its modern form had its origin in the West, it has a universal language in which both scientists from the West and those from the East express themselves and understand each other. Moreover it seems sad that man is abandoning his prerogative to machine.

There is, however, a deeper issue which has escaped the notice of both authors as well as that of Guillaume. Complete mechanization is dehumanization. There is something basically wrong about the notion of a rationality which is thoroughly artificial or mechanized.

While the first and second sections of the book seem to bring out a notion of rationality which more or less appears to be in tune with its usual understanding, i.e. as either having to do with choice and action or with strict reasoning, and presumably being a source for definite and reliable knowledge, the next two sections reveal an aspect of rationality which renders it loose and imprecise. The third section dealing with Rationality, Theory Construction and Science, begins with Mahasweta Chaudhury's paper which offers a conciliation between objectivism and relativism. She shows that the confusion between what is asserted and the speech act is responsible for the opposition between objectivism and relativism. 'The sociologists of knowledge are *right* about a speech acts being dependent on social conditions but *wrong* about sweeping the content of a proposition under these determinants. The notion of fact is not reducible to any social factor'(p. 204). As against this contention, one is reminded of the Whorfian view of language. Language which is a social phenomenon and which, according to Whorf, determines both our thoughts and perception, would not permit a fact to be completely free from social construction. Further, granting some validity to the relativistic position Mahasweta has pierced a hole in the notion of rationality, however small it may be. In the next paper by T.K. Sarkar, the hole widens in much greater proportion. For Sarkar presents a notion of rationality which is not merely contextual but also permits a fuzzy version of default logic, interpretative component, and paraconsistency to be included in it. Thus, it is further distant from the *aprioristic* and positivistic notion of rationality (p. 221). M.K. Chakraborty and Mohua Banerjee take away even precision from the notion of rationality by accommodating vagueness which they attempt to formalize in their paper 'Identity and Property in Vagueness'. S.M. Bhave, in his paper 'Rationality of Mathematical Constructions', presents a view of rationality which is embedded in tradition. As he remarks 'rationality is after all a function of tradition'(p. 247). Whether a new concept is introduced or an old concept is given an extended usage, the tradition delineates the process within which the newness or innovation is absorbed and assimilated after a lapse of time. The tradition which defines mathematics is the one which begins with Plato and Pythagoras

and is conserved by Russell (pp. 247-8). That is why Bhave believes that 'Wittgenstein's understanding of mathematics, its history and its place in human culture is in sharp conflict with the understanding of mathematics cherished by this dominant tradition . . .' (pp. 247-8).

The fourth and final section, entitled 'Rationality, Language and Logic' brings out the divergence in the traditional and critical understanding of Rationality in sharper relief. In the words of Daniel Andler who writes the preface to this section, 'there to be rationality, there must be, in some way or other, language and logic.' But at the same time the properties, varieties and degrees of rationality lead to an inclusion of some third term 'science, morality, action', etc. (p. 253). V.N. Jha writing about language and cognition in an ancient Indian perspective, points out that *saphala pravṛtti* or consistent behaviour depends on the consonance of true cognition and an effort determined by it. True cognition involves the notion of reality. In this connection, Jha discusses two diametrically opposed views regarding reality in the Indian thinking: Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā on the one hand and Advaita and Buddhism on the other. After Bhartṛhari he suggests that *Śabda* or language is one source of true cognition (p. 261). In the next paper John Vattanky describes the role of grammar, according to the Nyāya Philosophy of language, in the identification of denotation. Grammarians accept the denotative function of both roots as well as compounds (p. 268). Vattanky continues his discussion concentrating on the controversies over denotative function, between Naiyāyikas and Vaiyākaraṇas. The paper is rich in the related details and would interest scholars interested in the intricacies of grammar and denotative function in the context of Naiyāyikas, Vaiyākaraṇas and Mīmāṁsakas. In 'Reference and Interpretation' Kalyan Sankar Basu Discusses Donald Davidson's views regarding meaning and truth. He thinks that there is a tension between the concepts of truth and interpretation—'the concept of truth must, in order to conserve our intuition of its material adequacy, admit to a transparency across contexts of reference, relative to its domain, which is sentences; yet, the concept of interpretation admits,—which is the very reason for its universality as a fact of language usage, as opposed to an unmediated access to the world and the intentions of the other a certain inscrutability at the roots of our language' (p. 290). Against Davidson, Basu points out that the 'interpretation-as-social practice' perspective underemphasizes the fact that interpretation is also an individual and

intentional act; the intention to interpret and the intention to make meaningful, both pre-form the practice and make it inscrutable at its roots' (p. 298). Once again the source of rationality turns out to be lost in some dark tunnel. Distinguishing between the linguistic mode of presentation and the psychological mode of presentation, Francois Recanati points in his paper that, while the psychological mode satisfies Frege's Constraint, which Recanati renames as a Rational Constraint, the linguistic mode does not. If a person does not notice that certain modes which he takes to be distinct present one and the same object, then for him they are distinct. This rational constraint is not satisfied by the linguistic mode which gives us a rule which in a given context helps us to determine the reference of a term. Thus the character of 'I' refers to the speaker, i.e. to the person who utters this token of 'I'. First person thoughts being private are incommunicable yet they are communicated in terms of first person sentences. Recanati calls it 'the paradox of first person'. He thinks that it can be resolved by distinguishing between a primitive mode of presentation involving I or Self as standing for the name of the thinking person, and the 'I' in communication that is the one speaking at a given moment. The first is incommunicable while the later is grasped by the listener (p. 303). One might ask how do we at all understand the distinction that Recanati is trying to make? Doesn't that throw some light on the paradox? In the next paper 'Executable Justificational Rationality as Naturalised Epistemology', Amitabh Gupta and Nilesh Sutaria take up the problem of assimilation of rationality within the framework of naturalised epistemology. The paper discusses Pollock's Defeasible reasoning, Garfield's claim that relevant logic captures the pre-analytic intuition about inferences in the epistemic context, and Cherniak's notions of Minimal rationality and Feasible inference, and finally outlines a logic which the authors call Defeasible Relevant Minimal Logic, and present a unified theory of justification of belief in the epistemic context. The entire analysis is based on the sensible distinction between the ideal requirement of epistemic rationality as involving the notion of a perfect rational being and the fact of finitude of human existence and consequently the limited cognitive resources. The argument clearly is moving in the direction of a more humanistic and realistic concept of rationality. Next Daniel Kayser opens his paper by remarking that in ordinary speech rational and logical behave more or less in the same way, but shows the

inadequacy of such a usage by considering the perspective of Artificial Intelligence. He points out that the intuition which had been the source of the closeness between the logical and the rational is no more manifest in what is supposed to be logical. Contextuality and intensive use of inductive and abductive inferences indicate deviation from the strictly logical and deductive. Moreover we, now, no more speak of some *one* logic. In respect of revision of a theory, Kayser draws attention to an important aspect of the dynamic character defining the relation between cognition and the world. The evolution of the world dictates updating the belief state of the rational agent while the evolution of agent himself requires an updating in his beliefs. Though Artificial Intelligence (AI) has an advantage over logic as a model of rationality (p. 352) the problem relating to the 'meta-level' decision still awaits resolution. Kayser finally concludes his essay on a problematic note. Though interesting answers to problems relating to rationality are provided by computer sciences as well as AI works, yet it is 'still not clear on which principles of rationality they are grounded: is there an underlying logic lurking behind these techniques, or is it a necessity that any model of rationality contains an intrinsically alogical part?' (p. 357). The last paper in the book in the last section offers a characterization of coherence both in relation to a text as well as to a multimodal discourse. The author, S. Bandhopadhyay suggests that self consistency is the minimum requirement of coherence. It is connectedness or togetherness which reflects the rationality of an agent who tends to maintain coherence to fulfil his rational purpose. This connectedness may be more or less and often implies intention and purposive life. It is also context-sensitive (pp. 361-62). Besides, Bandhopadhyay also gives a three-level description of coherence in discourse—syntactic, semantic and pragmatic. Syntactic coherence has to do with mechanism which links the various segments of a discourse, semantic coherence points to ties which generate thematic organisation of the entire presentation and pragmatic coherence renders the presentation effective.

The above brief account is intended to introduce the variety of concerns of the authors which receive their thematic organisation from the problematic of rationality. As pointed out by Daniel Andler 'all the contributions reviewed here fit squarely in a rationalistic tradition' (p. 256). In fact, the comment can be extended to all the contributions to the book. As Andler adds to his comment, these

contributions do not just accept the rationalistic tradition but show in what way the tradition need to be repaired and strengthened. He thinks that the 'conception of rationality which will eventually emerge from the present efforts may well turn out to incorporate, to 'co-opt', many of the insights of the romantics, just as tomorrow's logics will manifestly include dimensions ruled by the founding fathers out of the province of logic' (p. 256). Andler, however, does not see that such a concept of rationality would no more remain in the strictly rationalistic or logical tradition. Not only that, like logics some sort of plurality would continue to infect the action of rationality.

While it is interesting to find some Indian input in the book, yet the papers present a very limited perspective and are confined to language and grammar. The problems relating to moral decisions, and social relations and institutions, in short, relating to forms of life remain untouched. Anyone having interest in Indian epics as well as the varied strands in Indian thinking cannot remain unstruck by the multiple approaches to forms of life which characterise Indian culture. In some way, the lack of an adequate representation of it also reflects a limitation of the whole project. Being strictly in the rationalistic tradition, and brushing aside what Andler calls romanticism, constructivism or hermeneuticism, have prevented the authors from attending to the deeper and more humanistic concerns which lead to a problematic ambivalence towards rationality. After carefully going through the various papers in this collection, one is still not in a position to distinguish between the rationality of a fascist, a dictator, a destructive genius and the rationality of a saint, a constructive genius, a good human being. While the contributors seem to be aware of the counter-functional influence of academic institutionalism and professionalism, they have not been able to emancipate themselves from it. This does not imply that the problems handed over to us as academic heritage have to be neglected. From that limited point of view *Facets of Rationality* would prove both provoking and exciting to its readers.

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Obituary

Syed Vahiduddin
(1909 – 1998)

Prof. Syed Vahiduddin, who passed away recently, was a man of some uncommon qualities. Friendly with everyone who happened to meet him, he had also the rare gift of relieving a serious discussion with welcome touches of lightheartedness. I distinctly remember that his very first address to us as our newly appointed Head of the department evoked peals of laughter. On the other hand, he was deeply interested not only in the philosophical problems of religion, but in the esoteric details of religious experience and disciplines. Fashioning new prayers was as much his favourite pastime as mulling over the profounder couplets of Urdu and Persian poets. I feel impelled here to cite the following from one of his original prayers which I received from him as acknowledgement of a birthday greetings card from me, not long before his life came to an end:

> "Why should I grieve and fear when Thou art nigh, and why should I complain against Thy decrees when I know not ... the joy that may lie hidden in sorrows, and the sorrows that may lurk in joy?...Blessed is he who has won his peace in Thy pleasure. Bless me with the fullness of life on earth, and when the time comes, make me return unto Thee in the fellowship of Thy loving ones."

A full life was indeed granted to Syed Vahiduddin, full not only in respect of number of years, but in that of academic activity and attainments, and also an abounding in the warmth of genial personal relations. He was about ninety years of age when he breathed his last; and, in addition to the privilege of lecturing and studying in Europe and America, he had the distinction of being nominated as the President of the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1988.

Graduating from Osmania University in 1932, Professor Vahiduddin took the Ph.D. degree from the University of Hamburg, Germany. Later, for a number of years, he served the Osmania University as a Professor of Philosophy and as Head of the department, retiring in

1965. Thereafter he was invited to join the University of Delhi as the Head of its Philosophy department. As a member of this department, which he left in 1971, I still remember his informal ways of working. He would often quietly ignore the set procedures for the sake of speedier justice, and on one occasion during the very conduct of a selection committee meeting, he sent a messenger to the residence of a forgetful, but deserving candidate, inviting her to take the interview.

Professor Vahiduddin's published work includes two books in English – namely, *Religion at the Crossroads*, and *The Islamic Experience in Contemporary Thought* and the following two in Urdu: *Philosophy of Iqbal* and *Tafakkur-e-Iqbal*. He is also the author of about two dozen essays published in Journals of national and international repute, such as *The Personalist*, (USA), *Diogenes* (France), *The Philosophical Quarterly* (Amalner), *The Aryan Path* and *The Prabuddh Bharat*. One of his articles "Man and God: An Essay in Transcendental Personalism" appeared in the book *Current Trends in Indian Philosophy*, edited by Prof. K.S. Murty and another "Aesthetic Experience and Beyond" in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* (Series II, George Allen and Unwin), 1974 edited by Prof. Margaret Chatterjee. But though he had published on such diverse subject as "Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet (*The Aryan Path*) October, 1971, "Schiller's Philosophy of Education and Culture" (ibid., August, 1953) and "Philosophy and Historical Phenomenon" (*The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXXII, 1959). Prof. Vahiduddin's dominant interest was religion. He presented a paper "The Apprehension of God – An Inapprehensible Mystery", organized by the Unification Church at Landerdale, USA. (Dec. 31, 1982) and also delivered lectures on religion at the Chinese Institute of the Study of Religion.

But if he is still remembered with love and regard, as he surely is by his colleagues and numerous pupils, it is essentially because of his friendliness and sense of humour.

A gentleman indeed.

Former Professor of Philosophy
University of Delhi

S.K. Saxena