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From the Editor's Desk

A PLEA FOR A NEW HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN INDIA

Few will dispute the fact that most of the existing books on Indian philosophy are outmoded. Yet, these are the books that have always been used all the world over to teach what Indian philosophy is, and have been so used through the ages. A lot of important information and new material has accumulated which needs to be assimilated and organized afresh in an interrelated manner around philosophical issues dealt with by a succession of thinkers over at least three millennia of recorded history. Each of these thinkers has an originality of his own and makes some new contribution, even though he may have written only a *bhāṣya*, a *vārtika*, a *vṛtti*, a *tika* or a *pariśuddhi* on an earlier work. There have also been new departures and radical breaks, many a time self-consciously, as when Udayana calls himself an *ādhunika* or a school calls itself *navyanyāya*.

The philosophical insight which is found in such abundance in the earliest texts needs not only to be highlighted but also linked with the later developments which assume a more differentiated and systematized 'form' from the *Sūtra* period onwards. The differentiation, however, is not a loss of active interrelationship, though it is usually presented as such. Even the earliest texts, such as those of Yāska, present views ascribed to previous thinkers and the *Nyaya-Sūtras* explicitly refute the mimāṁsā views of the *nityatva* and *apauruṣeyatva* of *śabda*, the *aikatva vāda* of the Upanisads and the *sarva pramana khandana* of the Madhyamic Buddhists, besides many others.

It is not only the interactional dialectic that is missing from the usual presentations, but also its historical development over a period of time. D.N. Shashtri's pioneering work in this regard in his *Critique of Indian Realism* has found hardly any followers, or been pursued further.

The shifting focus and emphasis in the discussion of issues has hardly been noticed, nor the reasons for them explored. The long absence of certain schools of thought from the centre of philosophical debate and their sudden reappearance into prominence has totally escaped the attention of historians, as has been the background of socio-political events surrounding philosophical activity in the country. The sudden disappearance of Buddhism on the philosophical scene from AD 1200 onwards has hardly been noticed; nor has the dramatic rise in the number of Jain

thinkers from, say, AD 1000 onwards. The rise and fall in the fortunes of schools seems to have totally escaped the attention of scholars, as have the radical shifts and developments within the schools themselves. Never has history been so absent from the writing of the history of any subject as has been the case of the philosophy of India. How unbelievable it seems that hardly any attempt has been made to discern its inner connections with developments in thought in other civilizations, or even with those that occurred within its own civilizational space in the field of art, or the sciences, or the theoretic reflection that occurred on them. The realm of social, political and legal thought seems to have been segregated, as if it had no relation to philosophical thought in the country. The same has been the case with thought about the arts; even though poetics is known to have had a long history of distinguished thinkers in the tradition; and the actual achievement in the field of sculpture and architecture is of such an outstanding quality as to arouse the wonder of the world. Theoretical reflection astronomy, mathematics and medicine has met the same fate, implying that knowledge enterprises in these domains had no relevance to philosophical thought in this country.

Both the timeless and insulated perspective in which Indian philosophy is seen has been aggravated by the almost total absence of any awareness of the way it has been influenced by thought currents in sister civilizations, or the way it might have influenced them. The Persian, the Greek, the Central Asian and the Chinese civilizations were in active interaction for long periods of time with the Indian civilization and it is extremely unlikely that they were not influenced by one another. In fact, it might be intellectually more rewarding to see this as one whole civilizational area with diverse, relatively autonomous centres in it. The parochial egocentricism of the currently 'national' and 'civilizational' identification is reflected in the way one looks at the past, and forgets that at that time no such identifications existed and that people did not need passports and visas to cross boundaries.

The manner in which history has been 'created' during the past few centuries itself is, however, the root cause of such a distorted way of looking at the past. History writing has been a child of the exploitation and domination of the world by a few West European powers during the last four centuries who have systematically produced a history in their own way, to suit their own interests. This is *not* history as 'others' see it and, even at its best, it can be regarded *only* as history from the viewpoint

of modern West European man who did not exist at the time when ancient Greece and Rome flourished.

The total appropriation of the Greek heritage by the West would have remained a strange curiosity in the intellectual history of mankind were it not for the fact that it has not only been accepted by most scholars the world over but also given rise to a persistent denial of any influence on Greek thought and culture by the other civilizations which flourished in those times. The close similarity of Greek thought, particularly in Plato and Parmenides, to certain schools of Indian philosophy has always been a 'problem' to Western scholars, as if the admission of any influence would contaminate the purity which they had achieved, solely on their own. The thought from Plato to Plotinus has such an Indian echo that only a 'purist' about civilizations would ever feel like decrying it.

If the western historian of thought is allergic to admitting even the possibility of any influence on Greek thought from any 'outside' source, his Indian counterpart is not even aware of the problem and takes it almost as axiomatically true that the Indian civilization has grown in complete isolation from the Vedic or the Harappan times onward. The 'monadic self-sufficiency' of Indian thought and culture is taken for granted in spite of the fact that in the field of mathematics, explicit mention of borrowing from the Greeks has been made in the Indian tradition and the development of what is known as 'Gandhara Art' unambiguously confirms this. It is extremely unlikely that the Greek influences were confined *only* to these two fields. The Indo-Greek kingdoms in north-west India in the post-Alexander period must have fostered interaction in all fields. Later, during the Śaka and Kuṣāṇa periods [1st–3rd century AD), large parts of North India were integrated intimately with Central and West Asia and it is highly improbable that only administrative and commercial interaction occurred between the different units of the region. We have also evidence of active trade links with the Roman Empire on the south-western coast of the Indian peninsula and, better still, of a long intellectual interchange with China, revolving around the Buddhist university at Nalanda. The latter seems to have been connected both by land and sea routes to China and there is evidence that a strong intermediary intellectual centre emerged at Palembang in what is now known as Indonesia.

The Buddhist connection with Sri Lanka and Tibet is well known, but little is known of the counter-influence from these countries except in the field of Tantra from the latter. The story of non-Buddhist, primarily Hindu, influences in South and South-east Asia is usually vaguely known, but the

awareness of its intellectual side seems totally absent. Similar is the case with the changes and modifications that they underwent there. Hardly anyone knows, for example, that a work from Thailand entitled *The Three Worlds of King Ruan* (Ed. B.L. Smith, Pennsylvania: Anima Books, 1978, pp. 194–203) shows a distinct influence of Indian thinking in the intellectual domain but presents noticeable differences with it as well.

The pre-Islamic encounters and interactions are however, at least dimly present on the margins of the intellectual consciousness about the past of this country. But even this is absent in respect to the intellectual interaction with the world of Arabic learning, its science and philosophy. From at least AD 1200 onwards, Islam may be said to have a definitive presence in North India. Yet, the histories of thought in the second millennium AD in this country show hardly any awareness of its presence, or of the possible influence that it might have had on the varied fields of intellectual life in this country. Usually, it is taken for granted that, except for the arts and religion, there was nothing substantive in this regard. Yet, Professor A. Rehman's pioneering work on this subject has shown that from the 8th century AD there is evidence of active interchange between Arabian, Persian and Sanskrit learning in the different fields of specific knowledge, particularly medicine, mathematics and astronomy. More than seven thousand works are listed in his *Bibliography* and they include translations of texts from the two different traditions in their respective languages.

These figures need an upward revision in the light of recent work, but this does not make any difference in respect to the problem that we are trying to point out in connection with the writing of the history of philosophy in India. There is, as far as we know, no mention of any interaction or influence between the Arabic and Indian philosophical traditions, even though there was an ample opportunity for such interaction to occur in this country. How could the rich traditions of Arabic philosophy remain unknown in India in spite of this long presence of West Asian learning? It is extremely unlikely that this was the case, particularly when there is substantive evidence of an opposite situation in so many other fields of knowledge. And, in case it was really so, it requires exploration and explanation.

The absence of any discussion regarding this issue in the histories of Indian philosophy is an anomaly that can hardly be understood in any way. So also, perhaps, is the total neglect of the presence of Christian theological thought in this country, or its influence on Indian philosophy.

Christianity is supposed to have come very early in India, and yet, as far as I know, its influence has hardly been a subject of any investigation.

The need for a new history of philosophy in India, thus, can hardly be denied. But even if the plea is accepted, how shall one go about implementing it? The usual method is for some institution to approach an outstanding scholar to undertake the work who, in turn, would ask other scholars to write for the volume. But as they are generally well-known specialists in the field, when they are invited to write on the subject, they only summarize, repeating what they have already said on the subject. Few scholars are prepared to do any new research to write for a volume edited by someone else and hardly anyone can adopt the viewpoint or perspective of someone else to do the task he/she is asked to do. Thus, at the end, what one usually gets is a volume of uneven quality, repeating the old things with the addition of some new information which has appeared since the earlier volumes on the subject were published.

What, then, is to be done to avoid such a situation? Perhaps, only a long-term plan consisting of diverse strategies at various levels would yield the desired result. One could start with a stocktaking of what has been done, spell out what needs to be done and then locate persons at various levels who could be involved in the thinking and execution of the project. A detailed spelling-out of interrelated research could be given to see that research work is done in those domains. Similarly, successive seminars could be planned in such a way as to explore questions that need an answer or problems that need to be resolved.

The ideal of a long-term collaborative, cumulative research has not happened in the Humanities though it is now commonplace in the natural sciences and even though it is true that disciplines in the Humanities need this, particularly in the context of projects such as this. What one needs is imagination, will and commitment to undertake these enterprises. Potter's *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies*, Thangaswami Sharma's *Darsanamanjari* and some of the forthcoming volumes in the 'Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture' have already done some fieldwork in this connection. The challenge is to carry the work further, and let us hope the challenge will be met. But, first, there has to be an awareness of the need for such a work. The rest will follow, at least, let us hope so.

Jaipur DAYA KRISHNA

Re-visioning Epistemology

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That there is something seriously wrong with epistemology—or, rather, wrong with the manner in which practitioners of this discipline have gone about doing their job—has been obvious for quite some time.[1] Analysis of its ailments vary; so do the remedies. The remedies range from a quiet burial of epistemology to a remodelling of it. Given the human urge to know—the propensity to critique received opinions so as to arrive the truth—I do not think the burial of epistemology is either a viable or desirable alternative. This does not mean that we can continue to cling on to the ideal of traditional epistemology. The urgent need, then, is to re-vision the epistemological enterprise. This is what I propose to do in this paper.

The paper is divided into four parts. In the first part I discuss some features of traditional epistemology, which I call the monological model. The second part presents an alternative, dialogical, model. The third part, after a brief discussion of the different levels at which dialogical epistemology could be done, goes on to spell out the assumptions underlying the new epistemology. This leads to a discussion of epistemological method which is taken up in the fourth part. Blending Karl Popper's epistemology with certain phenomenological insights, I propose naturalized phenomenology as the method proper to epistemology.

1. TRADITIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY

In critiquing the tradition, let me begin with Robert J. Fogelin's analysis of the problem since I think he has succeeded in hitting the bull's-eye.[2] According to him the problem is that the epistemologist sets his standards so very high that he is not able to meet them. Foglin's solution is

* I am grateful to the anonymous referee of *JICPR* and my senior colleagues Professors Subhash Anand and Job Kozhamthadam, SJ, for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Wittgensteinian, both in approach and in his finding. His approach is to look and see how we actually carry out epistemic justification and his finding is that a given context plays an important role in it. Looking at our actual practice Fogelin correctly observes that we normally allow a range of checkable, but unchecked defeators for any knowledge-claim. It is only under certain circumstances that we demand higher levels of scrutiny.[3] This may seem irresponsible to the Cliffordians (Fogelin's term) but this practice is 'essential for knowledge claims to serve their very useful purpose in the business of daily life'.[4]

Recognizing that knowledge is at the service of life is a very valuable insight. It enables us to keep our feet firmly on the ground and retrace some of the past misdirections and move forward in the right direction. Let me point out some specific areas where such retracing is required.

1.1 Absolute Foundations and the Fallacy of Abstraction

That skepticism regarding knowledge is the driving force of epistemology needs no elaboration.[5] The skeptical challenge spurs us on to give a justification of what we claim to know. But traditionally, at least since the time of Descartes, global skepticism is what the philosophers saw as the adversary. Descartes' solution was to look for absolutely certain, indubitable foundations upon which we can build up all our knowledge.[6] The empiricists overturned the foundations from mind to experience, but continued to maintain the same structure of justification.[7] Since nothing can be taken for granted under such circumstances, epistemology becomes a sort of first science, burdened with the task of establishing every type of knowledge, including the existence of the external world and other minds. It is natural that when epistemologists get bogged down in such questions the epistemic standards are raised so very high as to make epistemology itself a self-defeating enterprise.

It is obvious that such an approach is far removed from life. Hilary Putnam observes that even the most skeptical of philosophers leave their skepticism behind the moment they engage in serious discussion on almost any subject other than philosophy.[7] Even Hume confessed to leaving his skepticism about the material world behind the moment he left his study. It seems to me that this predilection of philosophy arises from what may be called the fallacy of abstraction, that typical tendency peculiar to philosophers to squeeze the flesh and blood out of a problem by removing it from the concrete context that gave rise to the problem in the first place. One wonders if this tendency is not primarily responsible for the present

state of philosophy where it has come to be ignored as irrelevant to human life. (What a fate for the 'mother of sciences'!)

By now it has become abundantly clear that no such foundations are available on which we can base all our knowledge about the world. Take empirical foundation—experience—for example. Traditionally it is held that a person is justified in holding a perceptual belief on the basis of his perceptual experience. While this may well be the case, it cannot function as foundation since such justification itself is based on an antecedent belief in the reliability of perception.[8] I shall return later to the matter of justification of perceptual beliefs. The point here is merely that the sort of foundational justification traditionally sought for perceptual beliefs do not seem tenable. As Wittgenstein observes: 'If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.'[9] Of course, the certainty presupposed is not of the doubted belief but of some other beliefs. Even the most presuppositionless philosophies take off from unrecognized presuppositions. To make matters worse, not only justification of perceptual beliefs, but the very perceptual experience itself does not seem to be independent of other beliefs. Wittgenstein, hermeneutic philosophers, and post-empiricist philosophers of science tend to be unanimous in denying that there are any theory-neutral experiences. These can be said to mark the demise of the traditional form of foundationalism.

Rooting epistemology in the concrete context of human life would lead to a drastic pruning of the problems dealt with in epistemology. Many traditional problems like the existence of the external world, other minds and so on come to be exposed as nothing more than mere intellectual gymnastics. Such issues, then, drop out of consideration as irrelevant in the new epistemology. It takes the epistemologist to be a being-in-the-world: a being related to other persons and the world in general.[10]

1.2 Certainty and Epistemic Responsibility

Along with this sort of foundationalism there are two further, related, misdirections that must be retraced before I can give a positive account of an alternative vision of epistemology. One concerns the manner of justification and the other the object of justification. Since I have dealt with these in detail elsewhere, I shall present them here only in brief.[11]

The manner of justification in traditional epistemology takes on a meditative or monological character. Since this type of foundationalism cannot take anything for granted, it must begin by doubting everything—includ-

ing even the existence on other persons—until shown otherwise. The epistemologist is then seen in the role of an Atlas who has single-handedly to support the world of knowledge on his own shoulders. This may seem absurd when we consider that, in the first place, epistemology arises in the skeptical context which is inherently inter-subjective.[12] But this is how Descartes set about doing his job, and his followers have remained faithful to him to the present.

One mistake leads to another. When the stakes are raised so high, epistemology becomes a dramatic spectacle where the epistemologist is engaged in a lonely battle of cosmic proportions. In such a scenario it is natural that the focus shifts from knowledge to the knower, from belief to the believer. The object of justification is no longer the concerned belief but the believer. It is he who is either justified or not justified in holding beliefs. Epistemic justification, then, amounts to a moral judgement on the performance of the believer. Is it any wonder then that works in epistemology begin by formulating the issue as whether 'S' is justified in believing P . . . .' Thus, the concept of epistemic responsibility comes to occupy a central place in theories of epistemic justification. Accordingly it is said that 'one is justified in believing that *p iff* one is not subject to reproach in doing so, one has not violated any intellectual obligations in doing so'.[13] What is forgotten is that a person may be responsible and not culpable (thus, fully justified) in holding certain beliefs while the beliefs themselves may not have the required supporting evidence and are hence not justified.[14] Approached from the perspective of epistemic responsibility, epistemology becomes dissolved, so to say, into ethics.[15]

2. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL

These considerations, however, should not lead us to conclude that epistemology itself is impossible, as some have done. But these considerations do rule out the possibility of a certain type of epistemology, the type that takes global skepticism as its context and hence cannot take anything for granted. But we have an alternative: take local skepticism as the context proper to epistemic justification. This would undermine the need for beginning epistemology on a blank slate and Popper's observations about science become applicable to epistemology in general:

> Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not

> down to any natural or 'given' base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.[16]

Seen thus, it is particular claims to knowledge that are doubted in epistemology—and that too doubted for such and such reasons—and not knowledge in general. Epistemology now begins with the acknowledgement that there are some things that we know (however provisionally), some other things we do not know, and some, of which we are not sure if we know. Epistemology, then, takes on the form that is made popular by Neurath's boat metaphor: standing on the planks of relatively unproblematic knowledge we try to examine and repair the parts that are in question.

Although the metaphor is an apt one it is not sufficient. We need a more detailed account of what is involved in accepting such a metaphor. Accepting it involves not only a change in the starting point of our epistemology, but a whole new way of looking at the epistemic task. Assuming that we do have knowledge that is relatively certain we reflectively examine it with a view to discovering the canons and the principles involved therein. This is done with the hope that once such principles are extracted from what we do know, those principles would enable us to decide on the doubtful or disputed cases of knowledge and thus enable us to know more and more. This conception of epistemology has a distinctively Popperian flavour, since it sees the *growth of knowledge to be the central problem of epistemology*.[17] This account of epistemology presupposes, of course, a general methodological principle to the effect that what is already known, and known to be known, provides the clue to the unknown, and hence, to the growth of knowledge.

When epistemology is seen in this manner it has certain consequences. First of all, the focus of justification would shift back from the person who believes to the proposition believed, where it properly belongs. Thus in the place of asking whether S is justified in believing P we would have to ask whether *P is justifiably true*. The point here is a negative one, that concepts like certainty and epistemic responsibility drop out of consideration as irrelevant to epistemic justification. For example, traditional epistemology would say that when I see a tree in front of me I am justified in believing that it is a tree on the basis of my experience. In the new epistemology it is not I who am the object of justification but my belief; and what justifies my belief is not the experience that a tree-like thing

appears to my consciousness but the fact that anyone (with normal perceptual faculties) looking at it can see that there is a tree in front of me. Epistemic justification, in other words, is an inter-subjective affair and not a matter of subjective certainty.

2.1 Dialogical Model

Positively, epistemic justification becomes a dialogical enterprise of the epistemic community, a community made up of anyone who has data relevant to the truth of *P*. Although I have talked earlier only about foundational epistemology being monological, the coherentist approach is no different in this matter. The difference between foundationalism and coherentism is a difference within the monological model. One is outward looking and the other is inward looking. Looking outward, foundationalism hopes to excavate and bring to light the ground of all knowledge. Coherentism contends that one cannot get out to facts; to think that one get to the facts is to succumb to a naive view of the human situation. Our facts are themselves theory-laden, constituted by the ego.

The rivals latch on to different metaphors. The internalist to the raft and the externalist to the pyramid. Both metaphors are inadequate and misleading because both conceive epistemology as an individual's concern. If a metaphor is to be given to the dialogical model, it would be that of a group of people making a common voyage in separate boats, calling out to each other to alert them on the state of each others' boats. It would seem to be much easier to spot the problems of a structure if one stands outside the structure itself. This is the strength of the foundationalist and this is incorporated in the dialogue model. The coherentist's insight is that the epistemologist never begins with a blank slate but comes with a host of beliefs that are taken for granted as a matter of fact and it is only within the web of those beliefs that the epistemological inquiries can be undertaken. The inability to get off the raft is also incorporated in the dialogue model, since it allows the skeptical challenger to stand on his own boat; he is within a raft but not necessarily on the same one as the rival.

The fundamental difference of the dialogue model from the monological is that the former takes understanding as its starting point; the latter takes observation as its starting point. The dialogue model grants the importance of both sorts of looking (within, for coherence, and without, for facts) but it contends that either manner of observation without being able to talk to each other of what we see is absolutely useless; that unless we can communicate with each other we would each go our own ways

with no assistance to each other until unsuspected strong currents capsize the boats individually. Hence he wants to get to the basics first: how to communicate and understand each other. This communication, however, is not a conversation for its own sake. Its purpose is to assist each other against the dangers on the voyage. There are two different tasks here: one, that of communicating to each other what one sees as leaks in the other's boat and prompting the voyager of that boat to see for himself or herself if there is a leak; two, that of examining and identifying the leak and trying to plug it to the mutual benefit of both.

The dialogical model, of course, assumes that there are other persons who exist beside me who are endowed with senses and reason like me. This is part of the assumptions that the new epistemology takes for granted. This is a consequence of taking being-in-the-world with local skepticism as the starting point of epistemology in contrast to a worldless subject with his global skepticism. A solipsist can't engage in this type of epistemology. But then, such a person is not likely to be faced with skepticism either.[18] Approached in this manner epistemology cannot be dissolved into morality. The relationship between the two is itself a matter to be investigated in epistemology.

Parenthetically it may be remarked that although I have said that inter-subjectivity is essential to epistemology considered as a response to skepticism, in practice, often, we may not be engaged in epistemology of this type; we may just be wanting to make sure for ourselves about the truth of something. In that case the monological model is sufficient and certainty plays a role in it. It depends on clarifying what it is that we want of epistemology. What is involved here is something like the distinction made in Indian philosophy between two types of inference: *svārtha* (for oneself) and *parārtha* (for others). This is a distinction that has received least attention in western philosophy. The result is that they define epistemology in one way and then do it in another way. They define it in terms of skepticism (showing that the skeptic is wrong, which is basically a *parārtha* perspective) but go about justification in terms of subjective concepts like certainty, which is appropriate only for *svārtha* purposes. What is involved in the monological model is, in fact, a real incongruity between what epistemology seeks to do and its manner of doing it. It seeks to resolve cognitive disputes. A dispute, by definition, would seem to be inter-subjective, and this is why the monological model cannot provide what epistemology seeks. In short, if epistemology takes skepticism seriously and is concerned with truth, then we should give up the monological model of epistemology and adopt a dialogical model.

2.2 Is Epistemology Possible?

Is an epistemology as envisioned here possible? What are the conditions that make it possible? Since I have taken the growth of knowledge through resolution of cognitive disputes to be the purpose of the new epistemology, we can also say that, to the extent this is an achievable goal, epistemology is possible. A cognitive dispute could be resolved either by showing that the two apparently conflicting descriptions are not really conflicting, or if and when there is a real conflict, by showing that one of them is not true. The process of showing it is justification, where evidence plays the crucial role. By reflecting upon this process we can say that epistemology is possible under the following conditions:

1. *Availability of meaning or understanding*: In order to be able to say whether a knowledge-claim is true or false, we should, first of all, understand what is claimed.
2. *Specifying the cognitive difference*: Having understood the conflicting claims, the difference between the rival claims must be specified. If the two are merely two different ways of saying the same thing, there is no question of a conflict between them.
3. *Specifying the possible evidential difference*: We may understand the difference between two descriptions, and yet not be able to say which is true and which is false unless we also know what possible evidential difference exists between the two.
4. *The availability of evidence*: The evidence specified in the previous requirement must be actually available, and not merely possible.[19]

3. THE NEW EPISTEMOLOGY

3.1 Different Levels of Doing Epistemology

When local skepticism is taken as the proper context of epistemology, justification could be done at various levels, depending on the context. There are at least three different levels that could be pointed out. At the first level there is the justification of particular knowledge claims about the world. These claims could be based on any of our sources of knowledge like perception, inference, testimony and so on. To quote a perceptual example from Fogelin,

> seeing a mule-sized animal with stripes is usually taken as sufficient grounds for thinking that we are looking at a zebra, but if we notice that the animal in a nearby cage is a lion shaved and painted up to look like

> a tiger, we would do well to inspect the animal we thought was a zebra more closely.[20]

There are various things to be noted here. First, this stands in sharp contrast to the traditional approach that seeks to justify knowledge in general. Second, it is the particular context of a painted animal in the nearby cage (not any general skepticism of the senses) that raises the level of scrutiny. Third, there is an inter-subjective dimension, though it is not obvious in Fogelin's example. The implication is that although I may not have noticed that the animal in the nearby cage is a painted one, it may be brought to my notice by someone else, and thus raise the level of scrutiny. We have already dealt with these features. It is a fourth feature that I want to focus on here. Note that even when the level of scrutiny is raised, there is no general skepticism of the senses. Perception is still held to be a reliable mode of cognition and it is on this basis that a closer examination (and subsequent justification) is made. This is important because such justification does not require a zero point, so to say, to stand on. It stands, among others, on the ordinary belief in the reliability of perception. Therefore, justification of particular perceptual judgements, when explicated, would take the following logical form:

(a) Perceptual beliefs are ordinarily reliable vehicles of truth and their truth is inter-subjectively checkable.
(b) *P* is a perceptual judgment and inter-subjectively available.
(c) Therefore, *P* is justifiably true.

In the justification of particular perceptual beliefs although we assume that perception is a reliable mode of cognition, someone could doubt even this taken for granted belief in the reliability of perception. And here we move on to a second level of epistemic reflection: justifying our belief in the reliability of perception. Since reliability of perception is part of a theory of perception, asking for its justification amounts to asking for the justification of a theory of perception. Since there are different theories of perception in philosophy this would require us to opt for one of them or to come up with another justifiable theory. (Besides a theory of perception there are other items that fall into the second level of epistemic activity. Theories of meaning, truth, religion, are examples. Moreover, since dialogue and communication are intrinsic to the new model, among other theories, a theory of meaning and understanding will have a central role in it.)

Since I have mentioned earlier that a knowledge claim is normally doubted for definite reasons, I should also point out at least one of the reasons that would lead to a demand for justifying the belief in the reliability of perception. An issue that could bring about this demand is the attempt of some philosophers of religion (e.g., Swinburne, Plantinga, Alston) to apply the same manner of justification to experiential beliefs of the religious kind.[21] This, in turn, calls for a justification of our belief in the reliability of perception.

At this stage the question that naturally comes to mind is how this can be done: How do we go about justifying so fundamental a belief as the reliability of perception? And when there are different theories of perception, how do we go about choosing one? Are there any criteria that are themselves not arbitrary? This leads to a third level of epistemological enquiry which is, properly speaking, a meta-level enquiry. Unlike the other two levels which deal with specific areas of knowledge, the third deals with the most general questions, such as the epistemic task, the conditions that make epistemology possible, the method proper to epistemology and so on. Since we have ruled out the Cartesian type of presuppositionless enquiry, this would also mean spelling out the assumptions and requirements that make epistemology possible. Existence of the external world and other persons are among the assumptions we have already discussed. There are also others. Some of the important ones are discussed below.

3.2 The Assumptions

I shall begin by pointing out that there could be some assumptions in epistemology which are optional. One could, for example, make an empiricist assumption to the effect that, of all available evidence, the experiential ones carry most weight. This would even seem to be in keeping with our ordinary practice. But my concern here is not with such optional assumptions but with the ones that are essential for any dialogical epistemology.

Perhaps the most fundamental of such assumptions which underlie the epistemological enterprise is the *universality of truth*. The inevitability of this assumption becomes clear when we reflect on the very *rationale* of epistemology. To see this, we need only to ask when we are confronted with conflicting truth claims: Yes, there are divergent claims to truth, but why bother? Why not remain content with such divergent truth-claims even if they are contradictory? If we adopt such an attitude, obviously

there is no need for resolving cognitive disputes, or for justifying knowledge claims. Then it is hard to see any need for epistemology itself. If we do not take such an approach and engage in epistemology, it is precisely because we assume truth and knowledge to be universal. They are assumed to be universal in the sense that anyone can come to know it with sufficient effort. In other words, truth is not relative to any person or place though the knowledge of truth may be so relative. My ignorance of the relativity theory, for example, does not make it less true or lead me to conclude that it is true only for the physicists and not for the others. Similarly, truth is not relative to place or time either. Though this statement needs further qualification for statements about historically dated information, as a general principle this remains valid.[22] It is this universality assumption that demands epistemology. If we give up this assumption it will be tantamount to abandoning epistemology itself. Hence, unlike the assumption regarding absolute foundations, the fundamental assumption regarding universality of truth cannot be abandoned.

If we reflect on this assumption regarding the 'why' of epistemology we will find that there are some further, related assumptions that are equally important. One of them is *neutrality of epistemic procedure*. Neutrality is the methodological counterpart (the 'how') of the motive (the 'why') that gives rise to epistemology. The 'why' question was answered in terms of universality of truth. Now, granted that truth is universal and there is a need to overcome epistemic disputes, how is it to be attained? The answer lies in the neutrality of procedure which is a methodological imperative of the universality assumption. It is because of this assumption that Kant freely uses the juridical metaphor to indicate the epistemic task itself.

In a juridical context neutrality is a quality which enables a judge to play a non-partisan role between the contending parties, which alone would qualify him to perform his juridical role. Neutrality as an epistemological assumption is similar. It may be described as that feature of the justificatory process which enables the contending parties to participate in the process. It means that, before epistemology pronounces the final judgement on the truth of any particular claim, it is capable of leading the competing parties through a process that is shared or common and hence acceptable to both. It is only through such shared process that they can come to an agreement on the disputed question.[23] If this assumption is questioned, the epistemic task is best abandoned as impossible. Epistemic neutrality is assumed also in traditional epistemology. The difference is

that there it is conceived as an absolute lack of the presuppositions characteristic of our starting point. In dialogical epistemology, neutrality is not a matter of having no presuppositions at all, but that characteristic of the justificatory procedure which enables the recognition of truth.

Another way of explicating epistemic neutrality is in terms of the *methodological continuity between different areas of knowledge* or between different sciences. However, given the history of the thesis about unity of sciences, especially as it was espoused by the logical positivists, affirming such methodological continuity might cause justifiable anxiety and vehement protest. While not falling prey to the scientism of the positivists, it is important to see that it is a legitimate insight that follows from the principle of neutrality. We reach this conclusion when we begin to reflect more concretely on what epistemic neutrality means. Methodological continuity, in fact, is just another way of spelling out neutrality in relation to different areas of knowledge. The juridical role given to epistemology requires that the supreme court has its own rules and regulations, and is not arbitrary in its dealings with different areas of knowledge. If truth is universal in the sense in which I have specified, and the task of epistemology is indeed to resolve cognitive disputes, how could that be achieved at all if the adjudicating authority is arbitrary in its procedure? The basic demand of methodological unity, then, is that epistemology should not be seen to be going about its task arbitrarily. Thus, for example, if coherence of use (or verificationism) is considered as an adequate criterion of meaning, it must be so in all cases of meaning, irrespective of the type of knowledge involved. Or, to take another example, if phenomenal experiences are brought in to justify perceptual beliefs, it would be unfair to deny the same privilege to experiential beliefs of other kinds (e.g. religious ones). This willingness to apply the same rule of procedure to all types of cognitive disputes is precisely what is meant by the methodological continuity between sciences. Taken thus, continuity is embedded in the neutrality requirement and, therefore, an *a priori* requirement for doing epistemology.

Methodological continuity can also be seen to follow from what was said earlier, namely, that the central problem of the new epistemology is to facilitate the growth of knowledge. There I mentioned that in order to extend the domain of knowledge we must take what is already known, and known to be known, as giving a clue to the unknown. This would be possible only if there is a certain *uniform dynamics* involved in our cognitive interaction with the environment and we can come to know this

dynamics by a close scrutiny of what is already known and is non-controversially taken as such. Only then can we use it for settling what is controversially known and thus extend the domain of our knowledge. Methodological continuity is merely another name for this dynamics spelt out in terms of different areas of knowledge. However, I must forewarn the reader that uniformity of dynamics and methodological continuity is not the same unity of method. This will become clear eventually.

Such *a priori* arguments for the methodological unity of sciences, however, does not give us a method. In other words, while such continuity is to be maintained, no definite method follows from these considerations. Nor have I suggested any definite method so far. On the other hand, recognizing the methodological continuity between different areas of knowledge already opens up the broad contours of a method. In order to show this I must bring in two further implications of recognizing methodological continuity.

The first is the *applicability of the epistemological method to epistemology* itself. Here again, I am not proposing any definite method, but merely saying that whatever method epistemology uses in resolving cognitive disputes external to it must be applicable also to itself. To see this we must focus on the problem of internal conflicts in epistemology. One has only to glance at the history of epistemology and see that philosophers often come up with conflicting accounts of truth, meaning, justification and so on. And these are definitely claims to knowledge, though of a different order than the first order claims about the world. Is it not really strange that there should be such internal conflicts when we consider that epistemology was meant to resolve disputes regarding truth and knowledge? Looked at against that background, instead of being able to resolve cognitive disputes rationally, epistemology just seems to end up engendering further disputes within. The result of such disputes is that, in spite of its professed goals, the fate of traditional epistemology becomes like that of a village panchayat (originally set up to resolve the conflicts of others in the village) where the judges, instead of resolving the conflict, themselves come to blows. Therefore, if epistemology is to perform its assigned task, it must first of all put its own house in order. It is in trying to put its own house in order that epistemology discovers the role of the neutrality assumption and the methodological continuity of different sciences. Since it aims at settling cognitive disputes, and to the extent that epistemology itself makes controversial knowledge-claims, the method it applies to others (whatever that be) is applicable also to itself. Since we know that

there are internal conflicts within epistemology, it is only fair that such a demand be made. This follows also from our assumption that there is a uniform dynamics involved in the process of knowing. A method that is appropriate to the revised model of epistemology, in other words, is an explication of this dynamics.

A further implication of recognizing methodological continuity is that there is already a certain *naturalizing of epistemology* involved in it. James Maffie has identified the distinguishing feature of naturalized epistemology to be the affirmation of the continuity between epistemology and science.[24] This continuity could be affirmed at various levels. What is affirmed here is at the methodological one. Besides methodological continuity there is also a contextual continuity between the two. Like science, the new epistemology does not start with rock-bottom foundations that presuppose nothing; both are embedded in specific contexts and hence have their presuppositions.

The important gain of recognizing the methodological unity of the different areas of knowledge, including epistemology, then is that insights from the method of sciences, a well-established and recognized area of knowledge, can be put to good use by epistemology in its task of resolving disputed questions. It is by looking at the practice of the well-established areas of knowledge that we can glean the broad contours of a method. Epistemology now becomes 'science self-applied',[25] as Quine would say. Once we recognize this methodological continuity we will also notice that it was not accidental that we applied to epistemology Popper's observation regarding science not requiring absolute foundations. We were merely applying this principle.[26]

Having recognized the continuity between science and epistemology we can further say that it is the reflective nature of epistemology that gives it an aura of a first philosophy or a meta-science, and not because it has some cosmic Archimedean point as absolute foundation. Naturalizing epistemology does not mean that epistemology as a meta-science can be reduced to any one science, much less to a chapter in psychology, as Quine seems to suggest. Its task remains that of a meta-science because it attempts to uncover the dynamics involved in the growth of knowledge in general. To naturalize epistemology in this sense is only to affirm the unity of human reason. Epistemology differs from particular sciences because it deals with knowledge in general and not with particular areas of knowledge as in other sciences. In other words, continuity is not a unity or oneness. This will become more clear in the next part.

4. EPISTEMOLOGICAL METHOD

Having recognized the continuity as well as the difference between epistemology and sciences, we are now in a position to say something concretely about a method that maintains both these aspects. As far as the general dynamics of knowing is concerned, the general outline of the scientific method given by Karl Popper in terms of conjectures and refutations seems to be accurate. It begins with a problem situation. A theory or theories are proposed to resolve the problem; this is the moment of conjectures. These are subjected to critical scrutiny; this is the moment of refutation. Critical scrutiny exposes the problems of the theory which, in turn, leads to a new theory or theories. However, to apply this schema to epistemology in general we will have to make appropriate modifications to it. I suggest that this can be done by introducing some phenomenological insights into the method on the one hand, and, in the process, naturalizing phenomenology on the other. Let us begin with the first step in the method.

4.1 Clarifying the Problem

The first step in the proposed method is the specification and clarification of the problem situation and the task to be done. Popper considered this step so important that he tied it up with the definition of rationality itself. He writes:

> Should anybody present us with the equations of classical mechanics without first explaining to us *what the problems are* which they are meant to solve, then we should not be able to discuss them rationally . . . in other words, any rational theory, no matter whether scientific or metaphysical, is rational only because it ties up with something else—because it is an attempt to solve certain problems: and it can be done only *in relation to the problem situation* with which it is tied up.[27]

One could argue that problem is prior to method, and not part of it. Such a quibble is not important as long as we recognize the importance of this step.[28] This is of special importance when dealing with problems of knowledge in general. Unlike particular sciences which have more or less clear-cut demarcated areas, philosophy has no one definite problem but very many different problems to deal with. In doing epistemology we have to deal with problems related to meaning and understanding, truth, evidence and justification and the role of experience in these matters. Moreover, within each of these there are different problems. In dealing with meaning for example, we need to distinguish between a theory of meaning and a

criterion of understanding, and both these form the problem of language acquisition. The complexity and the interconnections of different problems often lead to extreme confusions.[29] Hence clarification of the problem is extremely important if we are to avoid confusions. It so happens that, once the problem is clarified, some of the philosophical puzzles—though not all—tend to disappear.

When does a situation become a problem situation? It would seem that a problem situation is intimately linked to certain goals and tasks we seek to achieve. The roads of Delhi are often overcrowded, leading to frequent traffic jams. This is a situation, but not a problem situation as long as I stay in my room. But it becomes a *problem* the moment I wish to travel on the road and want to reach my destination fast. What is involved here is a judgement of the situation as *anomalous*. This could be better brought out by another example. There is poverty and starvation in the country; it would not be a problem (except to the starving ones, of course) if it were also not judged as an anomalous situation that needs to be overcome. The moment the situation is judged to be anomalous it becomes a problem.

Such would seem to be the case also in philosophy. Something becomes a problem only in the context of what is sought to be achieved and the accompanying judgement of the situation. Cognitive disputes would not be a problem if philosophers did not consider it an anomalous situation that is antithetical to the assumed universality of truth. It is in wanting to overcome this anomalous situation that cognitive disputes become a problem. Similarly, meaning becomes a problem when I want to understand or communicate and fail to do so. It becomes a problem in epistemology because in order to give evidence and justify a claim the statement must first be understood. If problems are related to goals in this manner then, in describing the problem it is important to be clear about the goal sought to be achieved in the first place. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what we did in ruling out global skepticism and monological epistemology. What was shown was that this manner of doing epistemology is at variance with the goal sought to be achieved. Specification of the problem situation is thus an exceedingly important step in the philosophical method.

4.2 Epoche and Phenomenological Description

Once we are confronted with a problem we must proceed to find a solution to it. But in doing so we must keep in mind the injunction of Wittgenstein to look and not just guess.[30] The immediate result of such

looking, however, is not a theory, but an awareness of the relevant phenomena. But there is a problem: Of the innumerable phenomena available to us at any given time, what are we to look at? This leads us on to another step, i.e., 'bracketing'. Once the problem is identified and made sufficiently specific, it enables us to bracket out the phenomena that are irrelevant to the problem at hand and focus on those that are relevant. Such bracketing, therefore, becomes a necessary step for any adequate description of the phenomena.

The term 'bracketing' is used here in a sense that is at once continuous and discontinuous with Husserl. Without entering into the controversies and technicalities surrounding this Husserlian notion, I shall briefly describe the sense in which it is advocated here.[31] Our previous example of the traffic jam is useful for the purpose. This situation becomes problematic in relation to my intention to travel and reach my destination fast. At other times, when I am in my room, say listening to music, the situation may still be there but is irrelevant to the activity I am engaged in. In listening to music I may have other problems (a power failure, for example), but traffic jam is not one of them. Traffic jam is still a problem for those on the road and the traffic police, but as far as my present concerns go it is as if that situation did not exist; it is bracketed out. Bracketing, therefore, is intrinsically linked to clarity regarding the problem.

Bracketing is, first of all, a bracketing out of considerations that are irrelevant to the logical level of discourse being considered. I have mentioned three levels of epistemic inquiry. At the first level there are particular judgements about the world. In the perceptual judgement about a tree, for example, it is important to ask whether what I see as a tree is indeed a tree. However, at the second level, while discussing a theory of perception, the object of my perception is irrelevant, since the theory applies not just to trees but to a host of other objects. If we are discussing the appropriateness of phenomenal experiences for justification of knowledge claims, it is irrelevant to consider if the tall green patch that I see before me is indeed a tree. The issue here is not whether a particular perceptual judgement is true; the issue is the perceptual process by which we come to make perceptual judgements in general and how they are justified. The objects of perception, in other words, must be bracketed out while discussing a theory of perception.

The role of bracketing becomes all the more clear if we contrast the third level with the first. What is involved at the third level is some sort of a transcendental turn: a shift from the primary task of settling cognitive

disputes to the task of examining the possibility of settling them. If epistemology was meant to be the supreme court in settling disputes regarding first-order knowledge, the problem now is that of determining the scope and limitations of the supreme court. This transcendental turn in epistemology brings along with it a bracketing of the first-order concerns of existence and non-existence which are the subject matter of a first-order inquiry. This bracketing of existence is also the main function of Husserlian reduction. Not to do such bracketing would lead to a confusion of different logical levels. As far as the bracketed portions are concerned, there is also a suspension of judgement concerning them.

This, however, is only one of any number of bracketings that could be done. Any number of such bracketings is made possible by tying up problems to certain purposes and goals. As the goals vary, the phenomena relevant to the investigation vary. The relevant ones are to be described and the irrelevant ones bracketed out. The great variations in the problems investigated and the phenomena relevant to them is a matter of great significance. It provides what Stephen Toulmin has called the 'intellectual ecology'[32] of reason and prevents the sort of positivist reductionism where methodological continuity becomes a unity of method and all knowledge is ultimately sought to be reduced to physics.

A second and easily recognizable sense of bracketing relates to a particular knowledge claim, of whichever order, that needs to be settled and concerns the truth status of that claim. To identify a given knowledge claim as problematic is to acknowledge that we cannot take its truth status for granted and this should be reflected in our description of the phenomena. For example, if we are dealing with the truth status of the statement, 'There is life on Mars', we begin by putting it into brackets. Having bracketed the disputed question we describe the non-controversial points relevant to it.

We have seen that bracketing is necessary to delimit the phenomena to be described. It is also important in another way: it enables us to be fairly unprejudiced in our descriptions. This also is in keeping with the Husserlian motives. Notice that what follows bracketing is not theory but description of the phenomena. As such, these descriptions should be non-controversial. If we are examining the possibility of epistemology, for instance, and start with the assumption that our knowledge must have some absolute foundations (whether rational or empirical), it would blind us to the need for coherence considerations. It is easy to be misled in this matter because of the historical prejudice that epistemology must have such foundations.

Bracketing is meant to block out such controversial assumptions entering in the guise of descriptions. It enjoins us to admit as genuine descriptions only what is non-controversially acceptable (hence inter-subjective) and what legitimately follows from those non-controversial premises. Thus epoche here performs a role similar to the one in Husserl.

But there is a problem that must now be confronted. Can we really have such unprejudiced descriptions? Aren't the phenomena themselves filtered through the framework of some prior theory independent of the current problem?[33] If so, will it not affect our method? It need not, in principle. Notice that I have emphasized only the inter-subjective and non-controversial nature of the phenomena, and not that they be neutral with regard to all prior theories. As long as those prior theories are common to the contending sides we will still be able to have the sort of descriptions we need. Take the case of ordinary perceptual judgements, for example. In spite of some extreme views regarding the theory-ladenness of observation there is a growing realization that we do live more or less in the same perceptual world, not because our percepts are not filtered through concepts, but because we humans live in the 'same conceptual world'.[34] The phenomenological concept of everyday life world,[35] the evolutionary concept of 'mesocosm',[36] the possibility of radical translation/interpretation in Quine and Davidson[37], all seem to point in the same direction: while there could be minor variations in our everyday perceptual judgements, they are not as relativistic as made out to be. Therefore, we can have the sort of descriptions we are after.

Our method differs from that of Husserl in some important respects. The crucial difference is that there is no suspending of other egos, and consequently the descriptions are themselves inter-subjective. Husserl starts out by bracketing not only the ontological status of disputed claims but all ontological commitments, including other egos. Having bracketed out everything other than the ego and its cogitations, it is left with only the contents of consciousness which are then described.[38] Having acknowledged inter-subjectivity from the very beginning, our descriptions are also different; they are not just contents of one's consciousness but inter-subjectively available phenomena. Similarly, having acknowledged the contextual continuity of epistemology and the sciences and given up the demand for absolute foundations there is no need to bracket out totally the ontological commitments either. What is required is the bracketing of the ontological status of particular controversial claims that are sought to be settled and the phenomena that are irrelevant to this particular task. It is

already seen how the first-order knowledge claims become irrelevant to the second-order inquiry.

Since naturalized phenomenology does not require absolute foundations, the apodeictic certainty of Husserlian description is replaced by non-controversial acceptability of the described phenomena, where the term 'phenomena' is used in a very extended sense to apply not only to the contents of consciousness as in Husserl, but also to certain types of empirical facts and will have even some normative dimensions. If we were dealing only with the first-order knowledge, we could simply say that the task at that stage is to describe facts which are sought to be explained. However, when the method is to be made applicable to epistemology itself it is difficult to find a term that can be used for these different considerations and hence the term 'phenomena' is used here, which seems broad enough to accommodate them. Like the ordinary term 'facts', the characteristic mark of the phenomena to be described is that they are inter-subjectively available and relatively non-controversial. A phenomenon in this sense is something that was 'always before our eyes'.[39]

Since such acceptance is taken as the criterion of the phenomena, there is no reason to exclude the normative aspect from the descriptions. As Habermas rightly observers, 'in everyday life we agree (or disagree) more frequently about the rightness of actions and norms, the appropriateness of evaluations and standards, and the authenticity or sincerity of self-presentations than about the truth of propositions.'[40] All such areas of agreement can be brought into the descriptions, provided they are relevant to the problem being dealt with. Irrespective of whether we are dealing with empirical 'facts' or contents of consciousness or normative requirements, it is important that these descriptions be non-controversial. This is so because, though the need for absolute beginnings is given up, the epistemic goal itself is maintained. Since the goal is to reach an agreement among the contending parties by leading them through a shared process, we cannot begin with claims that are mutually unacceptable. Besides the initial assumptions and clarity regarding the problem, it is these descriptions that form the neutral or shared ground upon which the disputing parties stand while adjudicating competing claims.

Another point of difference between Husserl's theory and naturalized phenomenology is that the bracketing done in the latter is only temporary; it is only a methodological device meant to enable an unprejudiced description of the phenomena. Though it accepts bracketing as a methodological device, its ultimate aim is to determine the ontological

status of disputed knowledge claims. Hence naturalized phenomenology does not remain content with descriptions; it proceeds to develop theories to explain the described phenomena. This is the next step.

4.3 Theorizing and Refuting

Once the descriptive task is completed, the next step is to propose a theory that would give a coherent account of these descriptions. The importance of these descriptions now comes to the fore: they provide us with parameters for judging the adequacy of a theory. A theory that can account for all the relevant phenomena would be considered adequate. Even if none of the available rival theories accounts for all the phenomena, we can still judge some theories to be more adequate than others: that which accounts for more phenomena would be more adequate than its rivals. The 'more' here may have to be taken not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. Ordinarily, introducing the qualitative dimension is very problematic in matters of judgement. However, there is no such problem here because the task has already been set and the importance of the phenomena is to be seen in relation to that task. In empirical epistemology, for example, the epistemic task gets precedence over the empirical principle because the latter is only a means to achieving the former. Accordingly, principles like those of neutrality and inter-subjectivity get precedence over empirical foundations.

Refuting a theory, first of all, is a matter of exposing its inadequacy by showing that it fails to explain certain phenomena relevant to the problem. Conversely, the success of a theory depends on its ability to give a coherent explanation of the described phenomena. Encountering anomalous phenomena prods us on to develop a better theory that would also explain the previously recalcitrant phenomena.

Secondly, a theory can be refuted by some new phenomena that may be subsequently brought to light as a result of criticism. Ordinarily, a scientific theory is tested not only on its ability to explain the known phenomena but also on its predictive power. Strictly speaking there is hardly any room for prediction in an epistemological theory. But there *is* something analogous to it: its ability to accommodate a 'new' phenomenon that was not taken into account while formulating the theory and brought to light as a result of subsequent criticism.[41] Accordingly, the anomalous phenomena that refute an epistemological theory need not be the already described ones alone (in which case the theory is already

inadequate), but also the ones that are subsequently brought to light. This makes epistemology a self-corrective enterprise.

I must make two caveats here. First, the critic has the responsibility to ensure that the new phenomena upon which he criticizes a theory are relevant to the problem at hand. In other words, effective criticism must be preceded by appropriate bracketing. Second, refutation of a theory must be clearly distinguished from its abandonment. The former is a matter of logic and reason; the latter is a matter of psychology and social acceptance. Finding recalcitrant phenomena shows up the inadequacy of theory. This may in turn lead to a weakening of its hold over us and to its subsequent abandonment. But refutation need not lead to its abandonment, as Thomas Kuhn has shown. Abandoning a theory depends not only on refutation but also on various other factors, such as how important the problem is for the community of investigators, the qualitative strength of the anomaly, the availability of a better theory, the psycho-social hold of the older theory over the community and so on.

The method proposed here differs from that of Popper in emphasizing clarity regarding the problem (which is an analytic task), and even more importantly, in its stress on bracketing and describing the relevant phenomena. Both these are steps that would ensure the autonomy of different sciences (often arising from a difference in the first step) while providing for methodological and contextual continuity. Moreover, this method can account for both change and continuity within a given science.[42] The proposed method, therefore, provides for change with continuity within a science and autonomy with continuity between sciences.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See, Susan Haack, 'Recent Obituaries of Epistemology' in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 27/3 (July 1990).
2. Robert J. Fogelin, *Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification* (New York: Oxford University Press), 1994. My reference to this work is based on its symposium in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (Vol. LVII/2, June 1997).
3. R.J. Fogelin, 'What does the Pyrrhonist Know?', in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, LVII/2, (June 1997), p.419.
4. Ibid., p.423.
5. For a more detailed account of the epistemic task and its relation to skepticism, see, George Karuvelil, 'Epistemic Justification and the Possibility of Empirical Evidence' in *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, XII/1 (1994), pp.29–48.

6. Traditional foundationalism can be defined as the view that all our beliefs or knowledge claims can be divided into two types—basic and non-basic; and that the justificatory relations between them is asymmetrical in the sense that it is always the basic beliefs that justify non-basic beliefs and never the other way. Basic beliefs or the foundations of knowledge are held to be self-justified, indubitable and so on. See, Timm Triplett, 'Recent Work on Foundationalism', in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 27/2 (April 1990), p.95.
7. Hilary Putnam, *Renewing Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992), p.135.
8. Empiricists have invariably held such a view. For details see, George Karuvelil, 'Some Problems in the Epistemology of Religion' in J. Kozhamthadam (ed.), *Interrelations and Interpretation* (New Delhi: Intercultural Publications, 1997), pp.109–40.
9. L. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, translated by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (New York/Evanston: J. & J. Harper Editions, 1969), p.115.
10. The Heideggerian concept of 'being-in-the-world' stands in opposition to a worldless subject (e.g., Descartes) who can find the world only at the end of, and as a result of, his philosophical investigations.
11. Karuvelil, 'Epistemic Justification . . .' (n.5 above).
12. Ibid., p.36.
13. William P. Alston, 'Epistemic Circularity', in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XLVII/I (Sept.1990), p.4.
14. Alvin Plantinga shows the incoherence of the traditional concept of justification formulated in terms of epistemic responsibility. See Alvin Plantinga, 'Justification in the 20th Century' in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. L Supplement (Fall 1990), pp 45–71.
15. See, Karuvelil, 'Epistemic Justification . . .', p.34.
16. Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London: Hutchinson, 1968), p. 111. First published, 1959.
17. Ibid., p.15.
18. Karuvelil, 'Epistemic Justification . . .', pp.36–7.
19. The third requirement is basically an insight of the logical positivists. But they go beyond it by conflating the evidential requirement with semantic requirement. It is easy to be led into such a contention regarding meaning because the first three conditions mentioned are all conceptual issues: the first two are semantic and the third follows from semantic difference specified in the second. However, what logically follows from the analysis of resolving cognitive disputes is only that if no possible evidence can be specified, the truth status of the cognitive difference (previous requirement), and hence, of the disputed claims, remains inconclusive. To say more about the positivist contention would lead me into discussing a substantial theory of meaning.
20. Fogelin, 'What does the Pyrrhonist Know?', p.419.

21. As against those who say that these attempts are misguided, I have tried to show otherwise. See, Karuvelil, 'Some Problems . . .'.
22. The statement, 'No one has set his foot on the moon', for example, was true before 1969, but no longer. But here the problem lies in the inaccurate formulation of the statement. 'No human has set his foot on the moon till today', uttered at time *t*, would be universally true when *t* is replaced by the appropriate variable.
23. This, of course, further, presupposes that beyond one's personal history, upbringing and ideological commitments etc., there is also a shared species history, and certain common human characteristics that enable all persons to stand at a certain distance from such personal factors by standing on this shared territory. Otherwise, epistemology would not be able to set up a justificatory process which is neutral between the contending parties. Granted such common human characteristics, we still require the neutrality of epistemic or justificatory procedure.
24. James Maffie, 'Recent Work on Naturalized Epistemology', in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 27/4 (Oct. 1990), p.281.
25. W.V. Quine, 'Reply to Smart', in Davidson and Hintikka (eds.), *Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975), p.203. The classical statement of this theme is Quine's article 'Epistemology Naturalized', reprinted in P.K. Moser and A. van der Nat, *Human Knowledge* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp.346–55.
26. The sort of continuity affirmed here between epistemology and science accords with the sort of continuity maintained by Habermas. See, J. Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, tr. by Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp.13–20. He, like Popper and Quine, does not see philosophy as resting on infallible foundations; their foundations are as shaky as those in science. In the place of a cut-and-dried division of labour between philosophy and science he sees the two as continuous, bringing about new research traditions, an idea that parallels what is described here as extending the domain of knowledge.
27. Karl Popper, *Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics* (London: Hutchinson, 1982), p.200; see also *Conjectures and Refutations* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp.198–9. First published 1963.
28. As Popper puts it, '. . . in order to apply this method we must already have *some aim*: we err if we stray from this aim . . . yet though in this way some aim must precede any particular instance of the trial and error method, this does not mean that our aims are not in their turn subject to this method. And our system of aims . . . *grow* in a way similar to the way in which our knowledge grows.' See, *Conjectures and Refutations*, Preface to second edition, p.ix.
29. It seems to me that many a theory of meaning prevalent today is infested with such confusions, although I cannot argue for it here.
30. 'One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to *look at* its use and learn from that'. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. by D.F. Pears

and B.F. McGuiness (London: Kegan Paul, 1961), sec. 340 (italics original). I am suggesting that this injunction which he gave in the context of a theory of meaning is applicable to philosophical problems in general.

31. R.C. Solomon, observes that bracketing is one of the most controversial issues in Husserl's philosophy. See, *From Hegel to Existentialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.171.
32. Stephen Toulmin, *Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp.316–18.
33. I am grateful to an anonymous referee of *JICPR* for drawing my attention to this dimension of the method.
34. Joseph Runzo, 'The Radical Conceptualization of Perceptual Experience', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 19/3 (July 1982), p.216. A similar observation from *Philosophy of Science* can be found in Donald Gillies where he says that the theories underlying statements like '*A* is now excited' are those of folk psychology. See, *Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century: Four Central Themes* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993).
35. E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp.382ff.
36. See, G. Vollmer, 'Mesocosm and Objective Knowledge', in Franz M. Wuketits (ed.), *Concepts and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology: Towards an Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984).
37. See Quine, *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1960), Chapter 2; Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp.125–39.
38. Although inter-subjectivity hardly plays any role in Husserl's early philosophy, it comes to occupy an increasingly important role later on.
39. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, sec. 129.
40. Habermas, p.27.
41. To see this analogy we must begin by examining the relationship between the predictive capacity of a theory to its superior status. Why does predictive capacity enhance a theory at all? The answer would seem to lie in the fact that it is a way of saying: 'Look, this theory can bring under its domain not only all the known phenomena, but even these earlier unknown ones.' In other words, predictive capacity enhances the status of a theory because it demonstrates its ability to go beyond the known and extend its domain even to the unknown and unaccounted phenomena. Thus, the predictive capacity of theories can be seen as a specific application of the generic capacity to account for new, hitherto unnoticed, phenomena. Seen in this perspective, we can say that the ability to account for a 'new' phenomenon is analogous to the predictive capacity of theories in science.
42. Toulmin's study of human understanding (see, note 32) gives an excellent account of such continuity.

Annexure

2. RESPONSE TO THE CRITICAL POINTS OF THE REFEREE

1. Relationship between morality and epistemology

First, let me make clear that my accusation against traditional epistemology is not that it fails to keep a fact–value dichotomy, but that justification, when conceived in terms of epistemic responsibility, does not address the real issue of whether the proposition concerned is justified. This is quite a different issue from whether the believer has been responsible in holding the belief s/he does. It is one thing to say that facts are theory-laden and that the process of epistemic justification may have an ethical dimension and quite another to say that the epistemic justification is the same as moral justification and thus reduces facts to values, epistemology to ethics.

Bringing in the concept of neutrality in epistemic justification does imply a sense of fairness or impartiality, which has ethical overtones, as the referee has rightly observed. But it does not reduce epistemology to ethics. The justification that I propose differs from the traditional concept in two respects: the object of justification remains the proposition (and not the act of believing) and the process is inter-subjective. These points have been discussed in detail, with examples, in the article mentioned in the relevant end note. Beyond what is said either there or in this paper, I do think that facts and values are inextricably interwoven, but not that facts can be reduced to ethics or vice versa. The two disciplines have irreducibly different foci. Hence there is no question of either a juridical or moral role being superior in the absolute sense. The issue, rather, is: What does one want to achieve from the inquiry—establish the moral culpability (or innocence) of the believer or find the truth of the proposition believed? I believe it is the latter.

The referee also asks: How monological is traditional epistemology if it has to fall back on moral judgement? I am not sure I understand the question correctly. It may mean: Since morality has an inter-subjective dimension, how can traditional epistemology be accused of being monological? If so, I would like to point out that I make two independent accusations. One about the process of justification (that it is monological); second about the object of justification (that it is the person's act of believing). It is the latter that reduces epistemology to ethics. (This again, is

a summary of the paper mentioned in the note.) Now, doesn't the fact that morality involves an inter-subjective dimension (assuming such to be the case) contradict the first accusation about the process? I think not. Morality is inter-subjective in the sense that its principles get their life from the social nature of man. But once the principles are there, it could be used without any help from the other subjects to determine if an action is moral. In this sense its process of application is monological. (I assume that morality is not the same as legality.) That brings me to the second point.

2. Will not the availability of a method make dialogue unnecessary?

Not necessarily. First, let me give an analogy: of a person wanting to go to a destination but is not sure of the way. He could go about it in two ways: either by studying a map or by asking other people on the way. The former makes dialogue unnecessary, but not the latter. Similarly, the mere fact of reliance on a method does not make dialogue unnecessary, especially when dialogue is built into the method, as in my proposal. Although I have taken the inspiration about methodological continuity from the logical positivists, the method I have proposed is very different from their scientistic approach. I have made it explicit that continuity is not uniformity (see the concluding paragraph of Section III of my paper—p.14). This discontinuity is made more explicit in the revised version above, by bringing in Toulmin's concept of 'intellectual ecology'.

The example of the traffic jam is taken out of context to accuse me of being a 'thoroughly monological epistemologist'. The point of the example is to analyse how a situation differs from a problem situation. After analysing the concept of 'problem', when I apply it to epistemology I use only epistemological examples. I also use the example of traffic jam to illustrate that the difficulty in deciding what is 'relevant' and 'irrelevant' disappears when there is clarity regarding the problem. This brings me to the third point.

3. Can we have theory-neutral phenomena?

In my proposal, what is relevant and what is not is filtered not so much through a theory but by the problem at hand. But the critic has rightly pointed out that there is a strong opinion that what is relevant can be filtered out only within the framework of a theory. I have taken note of this in the revised version and argued that it would not affect the proposed method.

William James's Radical Reconstruction of Experience and Its Significance

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William James (1842–1910), a graduate in medicine but later an instructor in physiology and psychology and professor of philosophy at Harvard is widely known as a pragmatist. He came to philosophy through psychology. In his philosophical enterprise he was tremendously influenced by the British empiricist philosophers. In this context, R.B. Perry, a biographer of James, writes: 'James did not, as is commonly said, begin with experimental psychology, but rather with British empiricism'.[1] He further points out that 'James' serious study of Berkeley and Hume began, like that of Locke, in 1875 and culminated in 1883–1884 in the course of English philosophy."[2]

While these quotations draw attention to the immense influence of British empiricism on James, it must be recalled that he did not confine himself within the realm of the empiricist's maxim that 'sense experience is the only source of knowledge'. In order to broaden the sphere of empiricism, he included thinking, feeling, willing etc. as the components of experience and to distance his theory from that of traditional empiricists he named it 'radical empiricism'. In this paper I shall endeavour to examine and expound the various aspects of William James's theory of radical empiricism and its impact on subsequent schools of thought.

William James, in his *Pragmatism*, maintains that pragmatism consists of 'first, a method; and second, a genetic theory of what is meant by truth'.[3] But a close look into James's philosophy reveals that he also advocates a theory of knowledge and a theory of reality. Bertrand Russell remarks that the core of pragmatism is its theory of truth and states that 'the cardinal point in pragmatist philosophy, namely its theory of truth, is so new and necessary to the rest of the philosophy ... that its inventors cannot be regarded as merely developing the thoughts of ... predecessors'.[4] Again in *History of Western Philosophy* he comments that pragmatism as it appears in James is primarily a new definition of truth.[5] Moreland Perkins,

in his article, 'Notes on the Pragmatic Theory of Truth', repudiates Russell's claim and opines that to consider 'the theory of truth' the central notion in James's philosophy is a mistake. 'It is rather his conception of knowledge which deserves that position'.[6] That apart, Nancy Frankenberry enunciates that 'pragmatism without radical empiricism is like a menu without food: appetizing but not digestible'.[7] These writers all agree that James's theory of radical empiricism is far more important than his theory of truth.

The problem of cognition is central in James's epistemology. In constructing his theory of cognition he seems to have faced the problem as to how to overcome the duality of consciousness and physical object, that is, how the knowing mind knows the object. Or, what is the process that goes on in the mind when we cognize outside objects? James, in his radical empiricism, develops the psychological doctrine of continuity into a metaphysical doctrine of continuity in consciousness, where he abandons both psychological and epistemological dualism, which assume duality between consciousness and physical object; thought and thing.

In fact, for a long time James was looking for a systematic philosophy devoid of duality. According to him, idealism, rationalism and associationism represent only one aspect of reality and so also with sensationalism and empiricism. For example, idealism accounts unity whereas associationism regards particularity, not vice versa. James opines that both the viewpoints are unsatisfactory because they represent only one aspect of reality. James on the basis of his psychological research seeks to reformulate the traditional epistemological problem in terms of radical empiricism, which, along with sensation and perception, includes feeling and emotion as components of knowledge. He differs with traditional empiricism on the ground that simple sensation can never be directly experienced; for instance, first we taste a lemon and only later analyse its various qualities, whereas for the associationists the taste of lemon is the result of separate experiences such as sweetness, wetness, coldness etc. James, thus, declares that associationists reduce knowledge to 'sheer contiguity of ideas which he considers inadequate to reveal the complexities of epistemology. He also points out that 'the relation of knowing is the most mysterious thing in the world'[8] and charges associationists with confusing the 'association of things and association of ideas'.[9] In *Psychology* James spells out:

> Association, so far as the word stands for an *effect, is between* THINGS THOUGHT OF —*it is* THINGS, *not ideas, which are associated in the mind.* We ought to talk of the association *of objects,* nor of the asso-

> ciation of ideas. And so far as association stands for *a cause*, it is between *processes in the brain*—it is these which, by being associated in certain ways, determine what successive objects shall be thought.[10]

In this passage James proclaims the inadequacy of associationism which fails to account for continuity of experiences. His aim is to formulate a philosophy which will adequately do so. According to him, the idealists/ rationalists uphold the transcendental principle while the associationists/ empiricists postulate the existence of an atomic, discrete world. Thus both the viewpoints are inadequate to unveil the radical nature of our experiences. James, in his essay, 'On Some Omission of Introspective Psychology' (*Mind*, January 1884) claims to overcome these twin inadequacies, that is the 'inadequacies of idealism and associationism', and expresses his concern for the 'feeling relation which he holds to be the major omission of introspective psychology'.[11] So his endeavour is to vindicate a 'relational continuity' in reality and holds that such 'relational continuity' is effectively experienced by us in the stream of consciousness. The nature and content of consciousness is the central problem in James's philosophy of radical empiricism.

James, in *The Principles of Psychology*, considers consciousness as an entity or something which is introspectable and asserts that consciousness exists because it is a '*fighter for ends* of which many, but for its presence, would not be ends at all.'[12] This imports that he conceives consciousness as an indivisible unity, a conscious stream. But in epistemology, James discards this notion of consciousness and states that 'it is very difficult, or even absolutely impossible, to know solely by intimate examination (introspection) whether certain phenomena are of a physical nature—occupying space etc.,—or whether they are of a purely psychical and inner nature.'[13]

James opines that mental states are conclusively known through introspection which never definitely shows that anything non-physical ever occurs, whatever our introspections disclose are connected with either bodily or psychological aspects that make us believe that only physiological occurrences such as heart beats or temperature changes are ever felt. Moreover, in his view, even thought is not consciousness, but something conscious because it is not introspectively different from physical entities. Hence, James claims that introspection cannot make a distinction between consciousness and a non-conscious object. This inability of consciousness gradually leads him to discard consciousness as an entity or something introspectable, and conceive it rather as a way in which experiences func-

tion in relation to one another. He asserts that there is a relational continuity in reality and adduces that such relational continuity is found only in our stream of consciousness. In 'The Stream of Thought' he makes his position more explicit by enunciating that 'if there be such things as feelings at all, *then so surely, as relations between objects exist in rerum natura, so surely, and more surely, do feelings exist to which these relations are known.*'[14] So introspection cannot make a sharp distinction between psychological and physiological objects. This prompts James to deny Cartesian dualism and substantiate radical empiricism.

James, in 'Does Consciousness Exist?' (1904) finally discards the existence of consciousness as an entity and declares: 'For twenty years past I have mistrusted consciousness as an entity; for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non-existence to my students ... . It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded.'[15] But by denying consciousness as an entity he does not intend to deny the thoughts and feelings of people. What he does deny is that 'the word [consciousness] stands for an entity.'[16] In his early writings, due to the immense influence of British empiricism, James stresses on percepts and characterize it as 'the only realities we ever directly know'.[17] But in the *Meaning of Truth* version of 'Function of Cognition' he changes his stance and does not treat percept as the only realm of reality and regards 'concepts as a coordinate realm'[18] as well. The inclusion of the latter as a coordinate realm in experience subverts dualism and modifies his earlier position and takes a wider view of experience where, along with sensation, he includes higher mental activities within the purview of experiences, that is to say, in the final phase, apart from perception and conception, James includes feeling, emotion, expectation, fear, doubt, religious feeling, and so on[19] as components of experience.

The latter understanding of experience leads him to give up belief in the duality between mind and body and gives a different framework for understanding the function of cognition in which he assumes 'consciousness', 'relation', 'pure experience' and considers them as the major planks of radical empiricism. He ferrets out: 'To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced.'[20]

In the preface to *The Meaning of Truth*, James enunciates the basic tenets of radical empiricism as follows:

(a) The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience.

(b) The statement of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more nor less so, than the things themselves.

(c) The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possess in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure.[21]

The above three tenets configure the framework of James's epistemology. Here it is important to note that there are distinctions between 'postulate', 'statement of fact' and 'generalized conclusion'. In his opinion the 'postulate' is a methodological parameter for settling metaphysical disputes. And the 'statement of fact' is the heart of the doctrine that the relation between things are conjunctive as well as disjunctive. By accepting disjunction and conjunction within the realm of experience, radical empiricism signals its departure from empiricism and atomism and advocates reality of relation. And the generalized conclusion leads radical empiricism to hold a metaphysical position, namely, that 'the parts of experience hold together next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience'. Therefore, the radicalization of experience implies 'a network of concatenatedly or related objects or things, selected out by human perceptual activity, consonant with the possibilities and limitations provided by nature, and historically structured by antecedent purposes and activities.'[22]

According to James, experience is 'double barrelled'[23] i.e., it can function in more than one context. In one context, experience is taken as a state of mind, and in another it is taken as a content. Thus the Jamesian form of experience, besides sensations and perceptions, also includes feelings and emotions as components of experience. This broadens the framework of experience which contains 'both the plurality of distinct items-disjunctions and the unity and continuity of item-conjunctions.'[24] That is to say, 'experience means experiencing of an experienced world.'[25] Here lies the significance of James's epistemology: first, it eliminates 'those problems associated with correspondence views in theory of knowledge',[26] and second, it augments 'the understanding of experience from a mere modality of cognition to an inclusion of experienced relations'.[27] In radical empiricism, James proposes two theories:

(a) Theory of 'pure experience'.

(b) Theory of experience containing a conjunctive relation.

Theory of Pure Experience: According to James, an experience is pure when it occurs innately, prior to being analysed. He interprets the cleavage between the mental and physical as something more ultimate or prime which he calls 'pure experience'. The universe of 'pure experience' does not consist of two kinds of stuff, mental and physical, rather it is an arrangement of one kind of stuff. He holds that there is 'no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made'.[28] He further states that 'there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed'.[29] This is what he designates as 'pure experience' and claims that this 'pure experience' is neither mental nor physical, but neutral, out of which the whole world is constituted. While explaining the nature of pure experience, James spells out:

> Although for fluency's sake I myself spoke early in this article [Does consciousness exist?] of a stuff of pure experience, I have now to say that there is no *general* stuff of which experience at large is made. There are as many stuffs as there are 'nature' in the things experienced. If you ask what any one bit of pure experience is made of, the answer is always the same: It is made of *that*, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, brawnness, heaviness or what not.[30]

James here acknowledges the nature of the ontological thesis that no adequate general description can be given of the supposed basic stuff, because it is understood only in terms of particulars and sensible not dispositioned in any general way. He illustrates: 'The instant field of the present at all times is what I call the "pure" experience. It is only virtually or potentially either object or subject as yet.'[31] He opines that 'pure experience' can either be understood as subject or as object and has no general nature of its own. In 'pure experience', what is subject in one context may be object in another context. He explains:

> As 'subjective' we say that the experience represents; as 'objective' it is represented. What represents and what is represented is here numerically the same; but we must remember that no dualism of being represented and representing resides in experience *per se* ... . Its subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely.[32]

So the 'pure experience' is neither mental nor material. It comes directly and has no duality in it such as thought and thing. In 'pure experience' 'knower and known, subject and object, like thought and thing, are merely experience taken in two different ways. They are in fact one and the same

thing, namely "pure experience"'.[33] This signifies that for James, 'one experience would be the knower, the other reality known'.[34] James, thus, claims to resolve the cleavage between subjective impressions and objectively existing things or 'between the state of apprehension and the thing apprehended'[35] and within the immediacy of experience there is no room for mind–body or subject–object distinction. The central thesis of James is: 'subjectivity and objectivity are affairs not of what an experience is aboriginally made of, but of its classification.'[36] For him experience is an indivisible fact and it is taken in a large world where phenomenal experiences and its connections are designated as either mental or physical content. This 'pure experience' is a way of formulising 'the nature of synthetic unity of consciousness.'[37] It is to be noted that James's doctrine of 'pure experience' does not deny the existence of mind and body, but what it denies is that the 'differences between them are ultimate and unanalysable.'[38] He reduces mind and body into 'pure experience' and is of the view that both are made of the same kind of stuff; that is, 'pure experience', which he claims as the primal stuff of the world, where subjective–objective and mental–physical dichotomies depend on the individual responses to them. In other words, in 'pure experience' the same piece of experience figures in one group as a thought and in another group as a thing. It is like a geometrical point which can lie at the junction of two intersecting lines. Hence, 'the same item of experience can be a member of two different groups of experiences, one of which constitutes a physical object and the other a mind.'[39] James, thus, by reducing the subjective–objective dichotomy into 'pure experience'; denies any qualitative distinction between the two realms of reality. Here, one may question: since experience is the experience of a particular individual, how can people who are circumscribed within the limits of their own experiences have the experience of a common object? In other words, how can two minds know one and the same thing, or how can the same 'pure experience' be both mental and physical, or how can many consciousnesses be at the same time in one consciousness? How can one and the same identical fact experience itself so diversely?

James endeavours to answer these questions with the help of 'pure experience'. He opines that since 'pure experience' is an indivisible fact, the object in the mind as well as in the world are but different names given to a single experience. For example, when we see a pen, the pen seen and the seeing of it, are but different names given respectively to an experience. The pen seen has its place in the history of the world, while seeing of it has a part in a mental biography.[40]

Thus it can plausibly be held that the real object pen, or the consciousness or percept of the pen, are the same bit of 'pure experience'. The differences between them are not the differences between two enduring things, rather they are differences between two successive contexts of original experience. In one context we call the using pen as objective, which has extension, and in the context of imagining the pen, it is the subjective or mental consciousness of pen. 'Pure experience', thus, designates pen either as a pen or as a percept of pen. The physical pen and mental pen differ not in the presence or absence of extension, but by relation. The distinction between subjective and objective phenomena, as we ordinarily make it, is due to the fact that they stand in different relationship to our experiences. But it can still be questioned as to how a single bit of 'pure experience' at certain point of time functions simultaneously as subjective and objective experiences; that is to say, how does the 'pure experience' of a pen work as a pen as well as the consciousness of a pen? In reply, it may be said that this is only a practical difficulty. If the theoretical construct of 'pure experience' can never be practised, then how can it be used to resolve the complexities of epistemological issues? Therefore, the psycho–physical distinction claimed by James is inadmissible.

The cardinal feature of James's 'pure experience' is that outer and inner are the terms used for two groups of experiences which we call mental and physical. Both of them are composed of 'pure experience' (the immediate flux of experience). Since 'pure experience' resolves the distinction between mental and physical phenomena and posits only one neutral primal stuff of the world, out of which everything is composed, it precludes any psycho–physical dichotomy. That is to say, in itself 'pure experience' is neutral. 'It is the immediate flux of life.'[41] Thus, in explaining epistemology, it seems that James comes to the ontology of neutral monism and considers it more basic than either the mental or the physical.

A close examination of the matter shows that James did not succeed in his endeavour to overcome psycho–physical dualism. It seems that in explicating 'pure experience' he adopts a double standard. While he designates 'pure experience' as the immediate flux of experience or the instant field of the present, he tends to describe it as feeling or sensation. He states: 'Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or sensation.'[42] Here it seems that James is inclined to explain 'pure experience' as mental, but while he upholds the view that 'there is only one primal stuff or material in the world; a stuff out of which everything is

composed', he seems to describe 'pure experience' as a stuff or material. Thus James's claim to have abolished dualism does not appear to be justified.

Having discussed and analysed James's theory of 'pure experience', the ultimate stuff out of which both mental and physical reality is constituted, let us now delve deep into his theory of conjunctive relation, the second basic component of radical empiricism.

Theory of Experience Containing Conjunctive Relation: In radical empiricism James ardently advocates the reality of relation, i.e., apprehended objects are related to one another, in what he calls a 'conjunctive relation'. While stressing the role of relation in radical empiricism James seems to depart from traditional empiricism and its atomistic view because of its strict heterogeneity between mental and physical phenomena. James believes in relational continuity. Since radical empiricism involves pluralism and belief in the reality of relation, he holds that it accommodates all aspects of human experiences. It is to be noted here that James, by accepting plurality and reality of relation in experience, 'both follows and departs from Hume'.[43] He appears to follow Hume when he holds that radical empiricism 'is essentially a mosaic philosophy, a philosophy of plural facts like that of Hume and his descendants',[44] but departs from the latter when he contends that the discrete impressions of Hume can only provide disjunction in experience not conjunction. James conceives experience as disjunctive and conjunctive. According to him, since traditional philosophers draw a distinction between mental and physical phenomena, they face problems in perception as to how the mind, which is so different from the physical world, can know physical objects. He believes that the traditional thesis of perception leaves an unbridged gap between our experiences and objects that they represent. He, thus, argues that the traditional philosophers are making knowledge incomprehensible:

> ... the whole philosophy of perception [James adduces] from Democritus's time downwards has been just one long wrangle over the paradox that what is evidently one reality should be in two places at once, both in outer space and in a person's mind. 'Representative' theories of perception avoid the logical paradox, but on the other hand they violate the reader's sense of life, which knows no intervening mental image but seems to see the room and the book immediately just as they physically exist.[45]

James bases his denial of atomism in *The Principles of Psychology*, when he opposes the empiricistic account of sensations and perceptions, on the ground that they are not as simple as the empiricists hold. He seems to maintain some distinction between sensations and perceptions and depicts the latter as more complex than the former. While repudiating the atomism of the British empiricists he stresses that our sensations over a period of time are never the same. In *Psychology* he writes: 'There is no proof that the same bodily sensation is ever got by us twice.'[46] The question is: Why do we identify one sensation with another? James is of the view that we identify sensation in terms of object and, consequently, the identity of the object guarantees a particular sensation. That is to say, we hear the same sound again and again on a piano and identify two sensations in terms of the same sound, but this does not mean that the two sensations are qualitatively the same because the conventional way of identifying sensation through the description of their object is not sufficient to establish the qualitative identity of sensation.

According to James, sensations for the empiricists, are simple and determinate, are not analyzable and must go beyond the particular sensations themselves. For Locke and Berkeley, the basic content of experience is ideas and for Russell and Wittgenstein it is an atom which is independent of other atoms. James rejects the atomistic universe which deals with a single unit of experience in isolation rather than the whole. He finds a relatedness between the things that make experiences a flux. And it is this continuity that relates our present sensations or thoughts to what had just preceded. Therefore, for him, experiences are not disjunctive but conjunctive.

In 'Function of Cognition' and 'Knowing Things Together', James expounds his doctrine of 'conjunctive relation' where he claims that self-transcendency and cognition can be experienced. In other words, everything in relation can also be experienced. He spells this out: 'Radical empiricism takes conjunctive relations at their face value, holding them to be as real as the terms united by them.'[47] Jamesian radical form of empiricism is different from that of Hume. The latter deals with the single unit of experience in isolation, that is, all that we experience is isolated facts, not their relationship. '... the mind can never perceive any real connection among distinct existences', he writes.[48] This implies that only distinctness of items are presented to us. James designates such a relation as a disjunctive relation which, in his view, cannot connote the vast range of human experiences that are inextricably related to one another. He endeavours to

overcome Hume's difficulty concerning the connection between diverse experiences to constitute an object by accepting conjunctive relations. And he conceives conjunctive relations as the basic content of experience, since reality is what is given in experience. Reality, for him, is the experience-continuum where there is no discontinuity of experiences. So radical empiricism is a thesis that contains conjunctive relations of various grades of intimacy and externality and not only terms disjoined and separated. Experience ... contains transitions and tendencies, it is not exhausted by atomic elements.'[49] It is, thus, evident that James's radical empiricism depends heavily on the reality of relations, i.e., it can concentrate on conjunctive relations because 'no item of experience is ever found absolutely distinct and separate, but always with various associates.'[50] These associates are:

> Propositions, copulas, and conjunctions, 'is', 'isn't, 'then', 'before', 'in', 'on', 'besides', 'between', 'next', 'like', 'unlike', 'as', 'but', flower out of the stream of pure experience, the stream of concretes or the sensational stream, as naturally as nouns and adjectives do, and they melt into it again as fluidly when we apply them to a new portion of the stream.[51]

These associates are the primordial elements of facts that make a bridge between disjunction and conjunction and make our experience a continuum. Radical empiricism, thus, advocates a relation of continuity. For example, when I hear two subsequent knocks at my door, I experience the second one as related to the first one, otherwise I would not have realized it as a second one. It is like a link in a chain which has direct attachment to what has immediately gone before and will immediately come afterwards. These earlier and later links are connected in a way that they enable us to recall our past.

In conjunctive relation, James explains, the memory and the self play a very significant role. In fact it is the memory and self that provide a stunning description of continuity, that is, the unity of consciousness; otherwise how would we connect the two stages of human life, as before and after sleep. It is memory and self that connect our past to the specious present which is the heart of continuity. Since empiricists deny continuity, they cannot substantiate the unity in the stream of consciousness.

James's radical empiricism is concerned with concrete experiences and claims to analyse the nature of reality. For him it is empiricism because, 'everything real must be experienciable somewhere, and every kind of

being experienced must somewhere be real'[52] and it is radical because 'the relations between things are held to be as real and as much a part of experience as are the things themselves'.[53] He further says, 'if empiricism is to be radical, it must, indeed admit the concrete data of experience in their completeness.'[54] He, thus, demonstrates that his form of experience is systematic and comprehensive and accommodates all aspects of human experiences. James intended to develop a systematic explanation of reality; since radical empiricism involves pluralism and belief in the reality of relation, he claimed for it the status of a world-view in which the world's essentials are found in a flux of perceived experience. That is to say, experience is understood within a wider world, which is synonymous with horizon.[55]

This explication of reality implies what James calls a holistic approach to reality. Isaac Nevo elucidates James's holism as 'the transition from the individual sensation to the organized system of sensation as the basic unity of objective experience.'[56] In other words, experiences are interconnected sensations that cannot be separated from one another. James's conception of holism seems to have deeply influenced W.V.O. Quine and Donald Davidson. It is to be noted that neither of them is a Jamesian. They are distinct in their own way, albeit in formulating their theory of meaning (they adopt holistic approach to meaning) they were enormously influenced by Jamesian holism. Like James, Quine explains holism as a transition from individual sentence to a branch of sentences organized in a system as the basic unit of empirical meaning. For Quine language is a cluster of sentences which denotes two levels of association. First, sentences are associated with other sentences; second, they are associated with external stimuli by the mechanism of conditioned response.[57] These two propositions constitute Quine's thesis that language is a network of sentences associated by the device of conditioned response, where an individual sentence cannot have meaning. He illustrates that 'the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science',[58] not the individual sentence. Quine's attempt is to build up the notion of meaning in successive stages, like a chain, which has no gap between the preceding and successive series. He regards meaning as an entity which is related to reality. For him 'truth hinges on reality'.[59] Thus true or false is 'applicable neither to sentences nor to language, but to the world',[60] which cannot be described through individual sentences but only through a network of interrelated sentences. This reasoning is known as Quine's holism, where the unit of meaning consists of a large system of sentences, and empirical data are

entertained in various ways. It seems that Quine's holism is similar to that of James. In explaining the Quinean notion of holism, Borrandori states: 'Holism is convergence of various hypotheses, theories, beliefs, truths; even when one focuses on any one of these, the others have to help.'[61]

Quine significantly influenced Davidson, to whom I now turn. For Davidson, isolated individual concepts are devoid of meaning, and truth and knowledge constitute meaning. He explicates meaning in terms of truth definition: meaning can be replaced by truth. In other words, Davidson's theory of meaning, his theory of language is a theory of truth. The problem of meaning, in his opinion, can be reduced either to truth or to the speaker's belief about the world.

However, Davidson is unlike Quine in many ways and does not treat meaning as an entity. For him the meaning of a sentence depends on its interconnection with other sentences and its reference to the state of the world. 'Truth of an utterance depends on just two things, what the words mean and how the world is arranged.'[62] Davidson's endeavour is to understand language, but understanding language is not merely playing with words and sentences. To understand a language, one needs to understand the interconnection between sentences and their references to the state of fact. This is known as Davidson's holistic approach to meaning which is more or less similar to the Jamesian notion of holism.[63]

James's attack on the atomistic view of traditional empiricists and his reduction of everything to 'pure experience' as well as his acceptance of conjunctive relations have already been elucidated earlier in this paper. James's emphasis on the continuity of experience and his rejection of atomism and dualism attracted a number of his contemporaries—John Dewey (1859–1952), E.G.A. Husserl (1859–1938), Whitehead (1861–1941) and others.

John Dewey in his philosophical formulation emphasizes the continuity of experience, which is Jamesian in its essence. Like James, he rejects the atomistic view of traditional empiricists and their cleavage between the knower and the known, the perceiving subject and the perceived object. In the traditional framework, knowing the object by the subject is something that goes on in the mind of the knower and is therefore subjective and private. Dewey is of the opinion that these sorts of perception create chaos. He questions how knowledge, which is subjective and private, becomes public and objective.

Dewey envisages this as a pseudo-problem because for him, we do not start either from knower or a knowing or known. He cogently argues that,

'knowing are always and everywhere inseparable from the *knowers*, the two are twin aspects of a common fact.'[64] He regards these two 'as forming together one event for inquiry—one transaction—since in any full observation, if one vanishes, the other vanishes also.'[65] Dewey, thus, is in agreement with James that there is no dichotomy between the knower and the known, the subject and the object.

James claims that there is an intimate connection among thought, action and purpose and that provides a new orientation for philosophy. Bertrand Russell in *The Analysis Mind* praises James's 'radical empiricism' and states, 'I believe this doctrine contains important new truth and what I shall have to say will be in considerable measure inspired by it.'[66] And he is in accord with James on the non-entity of consciousness, since he was seeking neutral monism to replace cartesian dualism. But he finds idealistic influence over 'pure experience'. Rorty envisages this sort of idealism 'as weaker version of idealism'.[67] Ayer also applauds James's radical empiricism and concedes it as the 'most original and fruitful contribution to philosophical theory'.[68] He argues that James's reduction of physical object to 'pure experience' bears phenomenological insight as well. The phenomenological orientation of James's thought becomes evident when Husserl reveals his indebtedness to James.

Both Husserl and James dealt with psychologism—the doctrine that depicts psychology as the foundation of philosophy and introspection as the primary method of philosophical inquiry. Husserl emphatically opposes psychologism and holds that phenomenology is a philosophical science, prior to and independent of psychology, and James radically confronts introspective psychologism. Husserl finds James an ardent ally in rejecting psychologism since he (James) introduced the experimental method in psychology and unshakingly condemned introspective analysis of subjective entities, and stressed that we do not experience psychological facts but objects as such. Husserl thanks James in the following words:

> It will be apparent from the present work that James's genius-like observations in the field of descriptive psychology of cognitive experiences are far from making psychologism inevitable. For the help and progress which I owe to this excellent investigator in the field of descriptive analysis have only aided my emancipation from psychologistic position.[69]

Husserl's homage to James becomes more evident when the former reveals to Dorion Cairns that he abandoned his project of writing psychol-

ogy '... feeling that James had said what he wanted to say'.[70] The cardinal aspect of Husserl's phenomenological method is its technique of bracketing the factual dimension of our experiences and is of focusing on the ideal aspect as the subject matter of philosophical inquiry, and for this methodological technique he uses the term *epoche*. The use of the term *epoche* is a radical effort to bracket the object of knowledge in order to concentrate on the subject. Therefore, after bracketing we are left with the stream of consciousness which is similar to James's immediate flux of experience, what he calls 'pure experience'. This imports that Husserl's phenomenological residue bears striking similarity to James's doctrine of 'pure experience'. It may, thus, be concluded that Husserl's method is parallel to James's: both of them embracing extreme subjectivism. Moreover, the former's theory of 'horizon' is similar to the later's doctrine of 'fringes'. These two theories mean the same thing, that is, the stream of our experiences is not discontinuous, but continuous.

That apart, James's radical breaking away from the traditional philosophies and his extreme inclination towards pluralism and subjectivism also gives an orientation, to some extent, to postmodernism. Postmodernism has been briefly defined as 'diverse, contradictory and evading closure'.[71] This echoes James's view that 'there is no conclusion. What has concluded, that we might conclude in regard to it?'[72] It seems that James did not seek to evade closure. He was optimistic in his endeavour and was of the view that through our conceptual apparatus we can 'revalue life' and 'drive it better to our ends'.[73] According to him, the world is imperfectly finished and imperfectly rational. It is pluralistic, growing and full of possibilities where things are partly joined and partly disjoined and is striving to achieve better ends.[74] In a similar strain, in *Some Problems of Philosophy*, he spells out:

> The world is full of partial purposes, of partial stories. That they all form chapters of one supreme purpose and inclusive story is the monistic conjecture. They *seem meanwhile* simply to run alongside of each other—either irrelevantly, or where they interfere, leading to mutual frustrations—so the appearance of things is invincibly pluralistic from this purposive point of view.[75]

Thus it appears that James's texts contain the spirit of postmodernism as well. The postmodern perspective is to reject the assumptions of traditional philosophies in favour of pluralism, fragmentation etc. The basic preoccupations of postmodernism are the basic presuppositions of mod-

ernism. This position is tantamount to James's, since he both 'follows and departs'[76] from the traditional philosophies. The charges that postmodernism levels against the traditional philosophies is that they should give up the concept of rationality, unity, totality etc. in knowledge, as postulated by modern theory, in favour of socially and linguistically decentrated and fragmented subjects.[77] Since James embraces pluralism and subjectivity in his philosophical enterprise, they find him an ardent ally. But James does have differences both with traditional philosophies as well as postmodernism with regard to his theory of conjunctive relation where he strenuously advocates the continuity of our experiences.

The above account plausibly reveals that at the centre of James's philosophy there lie subjectivity, pluralism, fragmentation etc. Likewise, the 'celebration of self and subjectivity',[78] pluralism and fragmentation are at the core of postmodernism.

It has already been explained that radical empiricism as James claims, resolves the problem of the epistemological chasm between the state of cognition and its object by introducing 'pure experience' and conceiving experience as a whole, i.e., by recognising that there is a relation between the different parts of our experiences, what he calls conjunctive relation. To quote James: 'A positively conjunctive experience involves neither chasm nor leap. Being the very original of what we mean by continuity, it makes a continuum whenever it appears.'[79] This implies that, to construct reality within the framework of James's radical empiricism both 'pure experience' and conjunctive relation are required. So James's world is a world where experiences and reality are identical and it is the subjective world view entirely depending upon the immediate human experience which is a gapless, seamless continuum and 'pure experience' is neither mind nor matter but a ground for both. It is composed of neutral primal stuff of the world, devoid of a subjective–objective dichotomy, i.e., in itself, 'pure experience' is neutral. Thus, in explicating epistemology, it seems that James comes to the ontology of neutral monism.

This leads Bertrand Russell to formulate his doctrine of neutral monism. Like James, Russell admits the non-entity of consciousness and expresses views in favour of rejecting the dichotomy of mind and matter. The doctrines of both James and Russell owe their root to Earnest Mach's theory of neutral monism which he developed in *The Analysis of Sensation*, based it on analysis of observation, that is, of what we observe in the world. The world as we perceive it is composed of various things, animate, inanimate etc. These things are relatively permanent constituents of

the world.[80] But a close look into the matter reveals that each of these objects is constantly changing, and yet is regarded as the same object. The same is also true in the case of 'I' or the ego. There are innumerable mental and physiological changes in me, but nevertheless enough durable features remain to identify the ego. The reason is that all features of an object do not change at the same time, some features remain unchanged. Therefore, the relative permanence of an object is due to the fact that objects are complexes of large numbers of features, properties and elements, some of which are continually changing while some of them remain unchanged, i.e., observation reveals that objects are complexes of elements which are their component parts. According to Mach, these elements of an object are unanalysable, hence simple or atomic. Mach, thus, arrives at the conception of elements as the constituents of objects. He designates these elements as sensations since we discover them through sense experience. He spells this out thus:

> A colour is a physical object so long as we consider its dependence upon its luminous source, upon other colours, upon heat, upon space and so forth. Regarding, however, its dependence upon the retina ... it becomes a psychological object, a sensation.[81]

A bare colour is neither physical nor psychical, but neutral. In his view, we form the ideas of external objects or our body or mind by combining our different sensations such as of colours, tones, pressures, pains, desires, hopes and so on. Mach rejects the view that the world is consisted of mysterious entities or substances which are acting upon one another and thus producing sensations and holds that the world is made up of sensations and these are the only neutral stuff of the world. Mind and matter, or body and soul are nothing but different names comprising of these elements. And these are the only stuff, the neutral stuff of the world. Mach, thus, through the analysis of matter arrives at the notion neutral monism.[82]

Bertrand Russell publicized this doctrine in *The Analysis of Mind*, and associated it with William James. He formulates the doctrine thus:

> The stuff of which the world of 'pure experience' is composed is, in my belief, neither mind nor matter, but something more primitive than either. Both mind and matter seem to be composite, and the stuff of which they are compounded lies in a sense between the two, and in a sense above them both like a common ancestor.[83]

It may be mentioned here that although Russell in *The Analysis of Mind* (1921) agrees with James and Mach by accepting neutral monism, initially he severely criticized the views of these thinkers. In *The Problems of Philosophy* he conceives three factors of sensation: mental act, content and object, but in *Our Knowledge of the External World* he reduced them into two: mental act and sense-data, and acknowledges their cleavage as fundamental, which cannot be explained through neutral monism. In a paper entitled, 'On the Nature of Acquaintance' (*Mind* 1914) he criticizes these thinkers for their abolition of dualism and holds that Jamesian exegeses of knowledge as experienced relation does present difficulties. It may be pointed out that at this stage, he regards that a single presentation is certainly knowledge, but disagrees that the difference between seeing the patch of red and the patch of red being there unseen, consists in the presence or absence of a relation between the patch of red and other objects of the same kind. He states: 'It seems possible to imagine a mind existing for only a fraction of a second, seeing the red, and ceasing to exist before having any other experience. But such a supposition ought, on James's theory, to be not merely improbable but meaningless.'[84] At this sage, Russell was a dualist and assumed mind as an entity which is there as the subject. Even in his lecture on 'logical atomisn' in (1918) he was not convinced of the rightness of neutral monism which is reflected in his words 'soon after I gave these lectures I became convinced that William James was right in denying the relational character of sensation.'[85] In 1919 Russell, in a paper entitled 'On Propositions: What They and How They Mean', affirmed for the first time his acceptance of neutral monism. His fuller exposition of this came out in 1921 in *The Analysis of Mind*. And in his subsequent works, *The Analysis of Matter* (1927) and *An Outline of Philosophy* (1927) he modified and completed the theory.[86]

Russell, in his neutral monism, endeavours to reconcile two different disciplines, namely, psychology and physics. He is of the view that modern psychologists, especially the behaviourists, have taken the materialistic view of psychology and overthrown the supposition of consciousness as an entity and opines that, like physiology, psychology is dependent on external observation. According to them, mental phenomena can be explained though the observed behaviour of the individual under various circumstances and they consider matter as more solid and indubitable than mind. That apart, the physicists, mainly Einstein and other relativists, repudiate the notion of matter as the quality of substance and enunciate the view that the 'world consists of events, from which matter is derived

as a logical construction'.[87] Russell, thus, endeavours to show that, due to the influence of behaviouristic psychology, mind has become less mental and similarly, owing to the influence of modern physics, matter has become less material. The materialistic tendency of psychology and non-materialistic tendency of physics lead Russell[88] to gradually discard the cleavage between mind and matter and encourages him to seek a way of bringing them together under a common head. He found that the view which harmonizes these tendencies is the theory of 'neutral monism' as suggested by Mach and James. Accepting their views, he declares that the duality of mind and matter is not metaphysically valid and the stuff of which the world is composed of is neither mind nor matter but something which is neutral between them.[89] Russell, thus, conceives that like matter, mind is also a separate construction constructed out of neutral particulars.

From the above account it is clear that before James, Mach had arrived at neutral monism which was fundamentally the same as James's theory. But Mach arrived at neutral monism through physics whereas, James reached it through psychology. This leads us to wonder whether James developed his neutral monism independently of Mach. Russell[90] and Morries Weitz[91] are of the views that since James does not refer to Mach in this regard he must have reached his theory of neutral monism on his own. But Passmore differs from them and suggests that James must have learnt from Mach.[92] In support of Passmore, R.B. Perry's view may be mentioned, which unveils James's regular correspondence with Mach and the former's careful reading of Mach's work.[93] Perry points out that even when James comes to know from Mach about the publication of *The Analysis of Sensation*, in a letter to Stumpuff he expressed his eagerness to read Mach's work, in the following words: 'I am thirsty to read it.'[94] In this background, it seems that James was familiar with Mach's thought and may have benefited from it.[95]

It seems that James's theory of 'pure experience' has played a vital role in constructing Russell's neutral monism. Nevertheless, a large number of commentators have raised questions regarding its acceptability. James's doctrine of radical empiricism did not receive as extensive critical reception as his pragmatism had received. This is partly because the essays included in *Radical Empiricism* were published in various journals and did not receive wide circulation. What is far more important is that, while his *Pragmatism* was impressionistic in style and hence stimulated the readers' controversy, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* was more mature in thought and therefore received critical reception within a smaller and

more informed circle. But this does not mean that it was unnoticed by commentators. A large number of commentators have published severe criticisms of the doctrine.

A.O. Lovejoy, in his book *Thirteen Pragmatists and Other Essays*, criticizes James's view of non-entity of consciousness. James, in his essay 'Does Consciousness Exist?', denies the duplicity and separability of experience into consciousness and content and upholds 'pure experience' as the ultimate stuff out of which everything is composed. But identification of consciousness and content does not seem to be tenable because experience means someone's experience and without being conscious, something cannot be an experience. So James's account appears to be ambiguous, as it asks how one can have a concrete bit of experience of an object or event without being conscious or aware of it.[96]

John E. Smith of Yale University launched two major criticisms against James. He agrees with James that radical empiricism is correct in its criticism of Humean empiricism, but he disagrees with its claim that all relations appeal to direct experience. For Smith the world is complex, its various components are interrelated and interdependent; our experiences cannot grasp all the complexities and relationships which constitute this complex reality. He states that 'the stream of experience does not contain all of the concepts and relations by which it is to be understood and interpreted.'[97] Moreover, without the appeal of the synthetic or constructive activity of the knower, we cannot derive all relations that are involved in the process of knowledge and experience from 'pure experience'.

Again, Smith argues that James fails to provide a systematic explanation of experience since the stream of experience is neither self-organizing nor self-interpreting. It is a non-relational whole. Smith, thus, concludes: 'A world of "pure experience" consistently adhered to as a philosophical doctrine would lead, if not to a world of pure nonsense, at least to one of unreason.'[98]

C.H. Seigfried, in his book *William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy* (1990), criticizes James's claim of resolving all traditional dichotomies, such as rationalism–empiricism, monism–pluralism, realism–idealism etc., and his reduction of everything into 'pure experience'. He also rejects James's claim of providing a system of completely unified knowledge of reality which is coherent and definite as against indefinite and incoherent knowledge of reality. He is of the view that it is not possible to develop a systematic explanation of reality from the ontologi-

cal standpoint of Jamesian texts because there is nothing outside experience that could grasp the reality as a total system. Seigfried points out:

> James's foray into a systematic presentation of philosophy was foredoomed to failure for reasons of which he did not seem to be explicitly aware ... His method of exaggerating the differences between rationalism and empiricism to create two ideal types linked the system so closely with dogmatic absolutism and gratuitous subjectivism and its opposite—fragmentary, piecemeal accretion with robust realism and experimental validation, that they stand or fall along with their satellite meanings. Thus, James could not imagine a systematic approach which was not thereby dogmatic and absolutistic.[99]

Seigfried further argues that pure experience is not pure as experience, and rightly so, because we cannot locate a 'pure experience' which is already a mental or physical experience. To substantiate the position, let us quote James: 'A pure sensation ... is an abstraction never realized in adult life.'[100] In a similar strain, in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* James emphasises '... its purity is only a relative term, meaning the prepositional amount of unverbalized sensation which it still embodies.'[101] So, the meaning of the term 'pure experience' is notoriously ambiguous; 'only newborn babies or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illness.'[102] etc. can be said to enjoy its purity. A state of 'pure experience' can be compared with a mystic experience. Thus, it can well be concluded that James's 'pure experience' can better be used by a mystic rather than to expound a systematic world-view.

Besides Seigfried, A.J. Ayer also criticizes James's theory of 'pure experience'. He describes it as neutral monism and comments that it leads to a contradiction.[103] According to James's neutral monism, the material and spiritual are two different aspects of one and the same experience. But the same neutral unit never becomes both permanent material object and a passing moment in an individual's stream of consciousness. James's 'pure experience' thus becomes a kind of mythical quest to discover the neutral constituents of both physical and mental reality.

James claims that his philosophy of 'pure experience' is reconcilable to commonsense. But it seems that the radical empiricist's metaphysics of 'pure experience' and commonsense cannot be reconciled, rather it confronts commonsense inasmuch as the core of commonsense is to distinguish between the subjective and the objective or between mental and physical phenomena which James claims to deny. Moreover, the theory of

'pure experience' breaks down because we cannot point to the bit of 'pure experience' that precedes the dichotomy between subjective and objective occurrences. Therefore, James's view of reality, as he expounds it in the theory of 'pure experience', cannot be used for explaining the world that we are experiencing.

After having discussed the different aspects of James's radical empiricism in general and 'pure experience' in particular, and the views of various commentators, a question that still haunts James's interpreters is: can Jamesian exegesis of experience be regarded as ushering in a new system of thought? The answer seems to be in the negative. Although James is distinctive in his own way, his doctrine of neutral monism seems to be rooted in Berkelian idealism.

For Berkeley the external world is nothing but the idea of mind, that is, what really exists is our mind and the natural world exists only in our sensations or idea. So phenomenal objects are nothing but mental states. Berkeley, thus, argues that what is given in experience is not material objects but its ideas. Similarly for James we cannot know the external world but only 'pure experience', i.e., in his view, reality is constructed out of 'pure experience', what he calls the immediate experience of the present or immediate flux of experience which is mental. This imports that the whole world is but ideas, which seems to be a Berkelian form of idealism. Thus, it is plausible to conclude that James, in the name of 'pure experience', advocates Berkelian idealism. In support of the stance, Lenin's view is worth quoting. Lenin in *Materialism and Emperio-Criticism* states that there is nothing new in James's theory but Berkelian subjectivism in a new dress.[104]

Despite these severe attacks by critics, in conclusion it can justifiably be said that James's philosophy is a broad platform to which a number of different trends of philosophical thinking can trace their roots. William James, with great skill and logical earnestness, attempted to develop a systematic explanation of reality. Since his form of empiricism involves both disjunction and conjunction, that is, pluralism and belief in reality of relation, it can be envisaged as a world-view. Therefore, Jamesian experience is systematic and comprehensive. It accommodates all aspects of human experiences. And here lies the significance of James's radical reconstruction of philosophy.

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Adorno's Critique of Kant and Hegel

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Kantianism and Hegelianism have made a great stir; not only in the field of philosophy but also in the fields of psychology, theology and socio-political philosophy. The Critical Theory of Postmodernity is a critique of enlightenment rationality. As a matter of fact, Kant is the philosopher of enlightenment rationality and Hegel continues on the same line of thinking. A critique of enlightenment rationality implies a critique of Kant and Hegel. Among the postmodernists who strongly criticize Kant and Hegel are the Frankfurt Schoolers like Max Horkheimer (1895–1973), Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) and Jürgen Habermas (L. 1929–), the French Structuralist-Poststructuralist Michel Foucault (1926–1984) and the deconstructionist Jacques Derrida (L. 1931–), Jean-François Lyotard, Richard Rorty and so on. These critics, each in his own way, have attempted to go ahead of Kant and Hegel, either by offering an emendation to Kantianism and Hegelianism or by making Kant and Hegel relevant in the changed intellectual climate in Europe and America. In this paper, I shall re-assess the basic charges levelled by the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, particularly by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer.

Before I come to re-assessing the charges levelled by Adorno and others, I would like to dwell on the question of what is the relation of postmodernity to modernity. No postmodernist will say that postmodernity is a denial of modernity. They say: 'it is a reconstruction', 'a reinterpretation', 'an attempt to give a new meaning to modernity', etc. This is what the spokesman of postmodernity, Jean-François Lyotard says, 'The whole idea of postmodernism is perhaps better rethought under the rubric of rewriting modernity'.[1] Postmodernity of the Critical Theory and the Post-Structuralist/deconstructionist retain many aspects of the Cartesian–Kantian–Hegelian modernity, yet they reject the norms of strict logic and rationality which characterize the latter. This relationship could further be analysed on the basis of the *Central* and the *Marginal* issues in modernity.

At the centre of modernity are such issues as human subjectivity (the *cogito*, the transcendental consciousness and the *Geist*), rationality, unity, science, morality, freedom and so on; whereas at the margins of modernity are such issues as madness, fantasy, demons, sexuality, pluralism, discontinuity, irrationality and fragmentation. Postmodernity underestimates the *Central* issues of modernity and overestimates the *Marginal* issues. In postmodernity, reality follows diverse models which are rich in conflicts, history is viewed in terms of ruptures and mutations, and there is a radical negation of totalitarian thinking. In marginalising, delimiting, disseminating and decentering the *Central* works of modernist inscriptions, the postmodernists, I feel, have expanded the horizons of modernity.

Modernity breaks with the endless reiteration of traditional (classical) themes, topics and myths; and postmodernity operates at the places of closure in modernity, at the margins of what proclaims itself to be new and a break with tradition. To be modern means to search for new self-conscious expressive forms. To be postmodern is to marginalize, delimit, disseminate and decentre the primary and often secondary works of modernist inscriptions. It implies that the line of demarcation between modernity and postmodernity remains a matter of uncertainty because postmodernity operates at the edge of modernity.

Postmodernity could be defined as an 'attitude' or a 'mood' or a 'Movement'. Modernity could be defined in an 'ism', i.e., 'a clear set of ideas' and a programme of action based on it. Postmodernity is not a systematic thing where you can develop concepts and relationships; precisely that is what the postmodernists are against. In modernity, everything is a system like 'foundationalism', 'essentialism', 'teleology', 'rationalism', 'freedom', 'logocentrism' and so on. Postmodernity attempts to transcend the contours of system-prone thinking. With these clarifications, I shall come to the Frankfurt School.

The Institute for Social Research, founded in Germany in 1923, is the home of the so-called Frankfurt School. Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas are, among others, prominent representatives. I'll begin with Adorno, and incorporate Horkheimer's contributions along with those of Adorno. Adorno officially became a member of the Institute in 1938 and, in 1941, during World War II, he, along with Horkheimer and Marcuse, moved to California (where Marcuse, of course, was to settle). It was not until 1953 that Adorno resettled in

Frankfurt. There he received a professorship and became the Director of the Institute.

The scope of Adorno's work is astonishing. His collected works (now being published in a standard edition in German) amount to 22 large volumes. They include writings within, and across the boundaries of philosophy, sociology, psychology, musicology and cultural criticism. The two volumes in the collected works which contain what its editors call Adorno's 'Sociological Writings', include theoretical writings on Weber, Durkheim, class and empirical methods. Adorno completed lengthy studies on Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and Kierkegaard.

Horkheimer and Adorno had been close friends since 1922 and they together wrote *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1972) which stands as a major critic of Enlightenment rationality as well as an analysis of the origin and nature of instrumental reason. The book was first published in Amsterdam in German in 1947. Marcuse also participated in the discussions on the book in New York and California, and he described it as one of 'the most authentic expressions of critical theory'. The thrust of the book is to show the failure of the Enlightenment to liberate man from his tutelages. Instead, it held, Enlightenment has degenerated into modern positivism, the culture industry, science and technology as ideology and domination, and the destruction of individual freedom in the administered society. Horkheimer and Adorno attempt to lay out, 'the discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism'.[2] They later described their work as an 'assessment of the transition to the world of the administered life', and believed the 'sinister trend was accelerating'.[3] Implicitly, Marxism too is part of the 'dialectic of Enlightenment' and serves as a new instrument of domination, rather than as a vehicle for emancipation. Horkheimer argued against the assumption that a proletarian revolution would lead to human emancipation. Taking as his point of departure the works of the young Marx and Hegel, Horkheimer's distinctive viewpoint is that a fundamental transformation of both theory and practice was required if modern civilization was ever to escape from its current alienative and exploitative form. Epistemologically, Horkheimer argued for the repudiation of all absolute doctrines, notions and categories. What was required was the establishment of 'an open-ended conception of reason, capable of informing human values and breaking the link between knowledge and human alienation'. However, I cannot go into all the details of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. In what follows, I shall discuss only those aspects where Adorno

seems quite preoccupied with Kant and Hegel. I shall first discuss Adorno's critique of Kantian and Hegelian epistemological quests. With this discussion, I shall proceed to the criticism of Enlightenment by Adorno and Horkheimer. Above everything else, Adorno, in particular, seeks to sustain and create capacities for new and genuine critical thinking. Although Adorno was steeped in the thought of Kant and Hegel, he attempted to break the grip of their closed systems. Adorno conceived of his writings as a series of analyses and interventions. Through the criticism of epistemological categories, Adorno hoped to preserve independent thinking and receptivity to the possibility of a critical effort of original reconstruction. His aim was to develop a non-dogmatic critical theory. In his epistemological writings, e.g. *Negative Dialectics* (1973), Adorno proposed the dissolution of any theoretical frameworks and conceptual distinctions, including Marxism, that threaten to become dogmas.

Both empiricism and positivism were rejected by Adorno. He questions the very foundation of a secure epistemic claim. 'Adorno raised the question about the basic law in all Epistemology, namely that no epistemology can itself be established by that Epistemology. Hegel had earlier raised that question apropos Kant's epistemology of categories. By what Category were these categories themselves established?'[4] Both Aristotle and Kant treated the categories as valid if they were correctly formed and if their use was in conformity with the ultimate laws of thought and the rules of syllogism—no matter what the content to which they were applied. Hegel repudiated the traditional separation of the categories from their content. Against Kant's attempt to formulate categories prior to any cognition, Hegel remarked, 'The investigation of the faculty of cognition is itself cognitive, and cannot arrive at its goal but rather is the goal itself, it can not come to itself because it is already there'.[5] Adorno also proceeds on the same line of argument but he goes ahead of Hegel. Whereas, for Hegel, it was basically the question of the formulation and the possibility of categories; for Adorno, it is the question of the existence of Kant's transcendental self and Hegel's *Geist*. By questioning the foundations of epistemological means, Adorno rejects 'Kant's transcendentalism and Hegel's concept of absolute spirit'.[6] Central to Kant's philosophical system are the transcendental consciousness and the transcendental deduction of categories. These are the two direct lines of developments in Hegel in terms of the *Geist* and dialectical logic respectively. I would like to briefly dwell on these issues in order to show their relevance to making a philosophical system.

Hegel begins by locating the centre-piece of Kant's epistemology in the 'transcendental unity of self consciousness'. This doctrine is required, he explains, as the non-perceptual source of universality and necessity in our experience. Kant, while agreeing with Hume that these features cannot be found in perception, refuses to go along the lines of the latter to draw a sceptical conclusion from this claim. He, therefore, demonstrates that transcendental consciousness consists of the forms of intuition (space and time) and the forms of understanding (the categories) which are not static forms but forms of operation that exist only in the act of apprehending and comprehending sensibility. The forms of intuition synthesize the manifold of sensibility into spatio-temporal order. By virtue of the categories, the results of the spatio-temporal order are brought to the universal and necessary relations of cause and effect, substance, quality, etc. And this entire complex is unified in the 'transcendental consciousness' which relates all experience to the 'thinking ego', thereby giving experience the continuity of being 'my' experience. The 'transcendental consciousness' is the matrix, the ultimate source through which the order and regularity in the field of appearance is given.

Hegel, in his assumption that the laws of nature spring from the laws of spirit or *geist*, applauds Kant's discovery of the 'transcendental consciousness' as the ultimate source of conceptual synthesis. But 'transcendental consciousness' is not available in and through sensibility. Consequently, the categories cannot be applied to it. Its transcendental subjectivity has no objective co-relate which could be logically claimed to be its 'expression' or 'reflection'. Hegel approves of Kant's criticism. But this is not, Hegel contends, because the categories overstep their legitimate limits, but because the soul is a living, active being, just as complex as it is self-identically simple. In fact, its simplicity is just as individual wholeness, but that is constituted solely by the cohesion and inseparability of its diverse traits, aspects and activities. Kant's objections, according to Hegel, are valid, but his reasons are the wrong ones.

Hegel takes over the notion from Kant that consciousness is necessarily bipolar, that it requires the distinction of subject and object. Hegel makes this principle his own and it is part of his general espousal of the view that '... rational awareness requires separation. Consciousness is only possible when the subject is set over against an object'.[7] Consciousness, says Hegel, constitutes the stage of *Geist* as 'reflection' or 'relationship', the stage of *Geist* as 'appearance'. These terms, which characterize the subject–object opposition of consciousness, are basic for Hegel's attempt to supplant Kant's doctrine of 'transcendental consciousness'.[8]

Adorno has an intense distrust of the doctrine of spirit and the categories of knowledge. In the course of an earlier comparative study of Kant and Hegel, I had written:

> Generally in the transcendental idealism of Kant as well as in Hegel's absolute idealism, there has always been an attempt to present an all-embracing concept with the help of which knowledge can be derived and freedom can be realized. To satisfy these requirements, Kant creates two spheres—a sphere of knowledge in which understanding with all its categories holds sway and a sphere of morality in which reason imposes maxims of categorical imperative. In both the spheres, Kant's basic thrust has been to present the world of knowledge and the world of morality in unified and orderly manner. Hegel too has the same preoccupation. But he tries to overcome the dualism between knowledge and morality created by Kant.[9]

Adorno has been extremely sceptical about such possibilities since his earliest works and, as his work has proceeded, this doubt has become something very strong. The tradition of German idealism with its doctrine of self as the locus of knowledge and morality is expansive with the pregnant sense of humanity within itself. Adorno is indignant at the very thought of humanity's invasion of self, and has no faith in human freedom and reason. Adorno suggested,

> ... we live in a world *completely* caught in a web spun by the bureaucracy, administration and technocracy. The individual is, in his view, a thing of the past: the age of concentrated capital, planning and mass culture has destroyed the possibility of personal freedom. The capacity of critical thinking is dead and gone. Society and consciousness are 'totally reified'; they appear to have the qualities of the natural—to possess the status of given and unchanging forms.[10]

It is in this context that Adorno could be identified like many others as a postmodernist. Pramod Talgeri further elaborates on this thus:

> There has been an increasing awareness of the inner contradiction within the concept of the modernity. The basic tenet of modernity to guarantee individual freedom and liberate the individual from the external authority was reversed in a paradoxical situation of liberating the individual on the basis of rationality on the one hand but at the same time subjugating the individual to the system compulsions which turn into the perversion of rationality. The postmodernist consciousness is in this

way a strong reaction to this systemic compulsion and tries to transcend the contours of a system-prone thinking.[11]

Adorno is extremely critical of modernist institutions and systemic thinking. 'The structure of many of his works *enacts* his concern with the development of repressive systems of thought and organization. Through "provocative formulation", ... Adorno hoped to undermine ideologies and to create conditions through which the social world could become visible anew,'[12] David Hold writes. In order to transcend 'all systems of thought that claim completeness', like those of Kant and Hegel, Adorno presents 'his themes in ways which demand from the reader not mere contemplation but a critical effort of original reconstruction. Through the criticism of ideologies, Adorno hope to preserve independent thinking and receptivity to the possibility of radical social change. His aim was to develop a non-dogmatic critical theory of society'.[13] To proceed on this line, he rejects all philosophical first principles, including Kant's transcendental deduction of categories and Hegelian philosophizing of them.

The method that Adorno adopts to outdo Kantianism and Hegelianism could be described as 'negative dialectics' or 'immanent criticism'. It is different from Hegel's dialectic of the *Geist* on the one hand and Marx's dialectics of Matter on the other. For both Hegel and Marx, the whole of reality is a single, unified and dialectically developing process where every part is in relation to the whole. Adorno vehemently opposes this view. For him, '... negative dialectics operates within the "force-field" between the claims that are made about reality and reality itself ... there is no theory which would hold good for every time and place and no eternally valid criterion on which is based a critique of society. Therefore, we can only measure and evaluate a given social phenomenon by investigating whether it falls short of its "ideal image" of itself.'[14] There is a difference between 'concept of an object' and its actual state of affairs. Adorno's negative dialectics is a critical assessment of this gap.

In *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno gives an elaborate description of several situations where analysis and criticism are inevitable and inseparable. For instance, a capitalist society claims to be a society with such features as equality before law, with a free and just process of economic exchange and so on. Yet, by virtue of its internal dynamics, it inevitably gives rise to structured inequality. By pointing to the discrepancy between what is claimed (in this case, a state of genuine equality and freedom) and what actually exists (structured inequality and alienation), a critical image is presented of what the object is and what it is not. Thus a critique is

required—a critical theory—to point to unfulfilled possibilities. Each situation requires its specific study, analysis and criticism. Hence, reality follows diverse models which are rich in conflicts.

Adorno argues that imposition of categories by Kant and Hegel are dogmatic and orthodox approaches to social reality. Negative dialectics or immanent criticism, '... identifies and assesses social phenomena through categories which are internal to the phenomena themselves, rather than imposed from the outside.'[15] This position, however, does not prevent Adorno from using concepts from a number of theoretical frameworks. 'But, of course, they must be employed within the context of immanent criticism—i.e. they must be used to critically expose the gaps between "ideal image" and "actual reality". Nor can they be employed without simultaneously being subjected to both rigorous philosophical analysis (of the ideas of society, of culture, of the individual for instance) and to strict empirical inquiry.'[16]

For Adorno, man and his place in the world is a product of the interpretation of concepts and this interpretation is never exhausted or completed, only certain representations of reality can provide an adequate approximation of concepts. Adorno is relentlessly critical of all belief systems that claim to have fully identified their objects. He employed language—'through the construction of constellations of concepts'—as a connotative of indicative device. His aim was to capture some aspects of reality.

In *Dialectics of the Enlightenment*, Adorno, along with Max Horkheimer, vehemently criticises the enlightenment rationality developed by Kant. In December 1793, in a brief but seminal work, *Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?*, Kant says:

> Enlightenment is the coming out of Man from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the unwillingness *[unvermogen]* to serve one's own understanding without direction from another. This immaturity is self-imposed, because Reason itself languishes, not in lack of understanding, but only of resolve and courage to serve oneself without direction from another. *Sapere aude!* Think boldly, take courage, your *own* Understanding to serve: This is therefore the motto of the Enlightenment.[17]

In other words, Enlightenment develops reason to the extent that it becomes autonomous and gets rid of restraints from tradition and authority. The way to Enlightenment, Kant emphasizes, is not to seek a mentor

or authority in Thinking, in Willing and in Feeling. Kant has placed freedom and maturity (*Muendigkeit*) at the centre of Enlightenment and contrasted it from tutelages. In an uncharacteristic manner Kant says, 'when the question is asked: do we live in an enlightened epoch (*Aufgeklaerten Zeitalter*) then the answer is: No, but rather in an epoch of Enlightenment (*Zeitalter der Aufklaerung*).'[18] This is possible only by regarding 'Reason' as the supreme faculty.

Kant first discusses 'Reason' in general: 'All our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, and ends with reason beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought.'[19] The distinction manifested in Kant's philosophy between 'reason', 'understanding' and 'sensibility' constitutes a landmark in the whole movement of German idealism along with the German Enlightenment. Let us elaborate on the nature and status of 'reason' within the general Kantian epistemological situation. As a matter of fact, Kant distinguishes 'reason' from 'understanding'. Reason is never in immediate relation to objects given in sensibility. It is understanding that holds sway in Kant's epistemology. Reason is concerned with understanding and its judgments. Understanding throughout the use of categories and principles unifies the manifold supplied by the sensibility. Reason seeks to unify the concepts and judgements of understanding. Whereas understanding is directly related to sensibility, reason relates itself to sensibility only indirectly, through understanding. As perceptions are unified by understanding with the categories, so understanding needs a higher unity—the unity of reason in order to form a connected system. This is supplied to it by the ideas of reason—freedom of will, immortality of soul and existence of God. These ideas have their use and value as guides to understanding. In Kant's terminology, the ideas of reason are 'regulative' rather than 'constitutive'. They do not constitute knowledge but merely regulate it.

Against Kant, both Adorno and Horkheimer say, 'From now on, matter would at best be mastered without any illusion of ruling or inherent powers (in it) of hidden qualities. For the Enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the rule of computation and utility is suspect.'[20] This is the first major criticism of European Enlightenment in this century. 'Enlightenment is totalitarian', declared both Adorno and Horkheimer, 'the implication was the Nazi totalitarianism was a product of Enlightenment Liberalism, whose central thrust is to establish human domination over everything, and to eliminate that which resists such domination.'[21] They have

also said, 'The fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant. The Enlightenment's attempt was to captivate Nature and to keep it in the strait jacket of abstract Reason, which it misinterpreted as Scientific Reason.'[22]

As stated earlier, Adorno recognizes the difficulty in establishing any system of knowledge on an indubitable basis of certainty. It was Kant who had declared that scientific knowledge was synthetic *a priori*. As synthetic, the subject is amplified in the predicate. And as *a priori*, the relationship between subject and predicate is universal and necessary. What we require in science is an ampliative element with the characteristics of universality and necessity. Kant went to the extent of saying that '... the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind originally set them there.'[23] The constitution of knowledge by means of categories is regarded by Kant as the activity of the human mind, because, '... it is, after all, we ourselves who are responsible for the formation of general concepts ... our ability to render the given intelligible to ourselves, and to describe it under the guidance of general words, is an expression of genuine intellectual activity.'[24] Without going into the details, I may just point out that Kant's position on scientific knowledge is very close to that of Newtonian physics which, in turn, has developed out of the Cartesian-Galilean mechanics. But we have gone ahead of Newtonian physics and as Mar Gregorios put it,

> Now we know that all proof is inductive, and therefore tentative, and can be questioned by subsequent experience. We know also that there is no such thing as a non-subjective objectivity, that all perception involves subjectivity, that the perceiver is always part of the reality perceived. No scientific theory is handed down by the objective reality: it is human subjectivity that formulates scientific hypotheses and then tests their validity by experimentation. Science is neither non-subjectively objective nor finally proven.[25]

Science as something existing and in a certain respect complete is the most objective thing known to man. But science in the making is as subjective as any other branch of human endeavour. So much so that the question, 'What is the purpose and meaning of science?', receives quite different answers at different times and from different sorts of people.

To bring this paper to a close, I can say that Adorno has an intense distrust in science and the Enlightenment rationality developed by Kant and further pursued by Hegel. Adorno's 'negative dialectics' or 'immanent criticism' or 'critical theory' is neither a pure 'scientific theory' nor pure 'philosophy'. Critical theory is located 'between philosophy and science'. This makes the critical theory negative dialectics, which sets out not only to describe but also to criticise vigorously the existing social norms without recourse to either the fundamental concepts of enlightenment rationality (i.e. reason, freedom, truth) or the value-free model of science.

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8. For details, please see, Raghwendra Pratap Singh, 'Consciousness: Kant–Hegel Divide on Knowledge', *The Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. xxvi, No. 2, February 1990, pp.63–72.
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Dialogical Not Exclusive

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Listen to my word, yet who want to know:
by my mouth will you learn the history of Mali.
By my mouth you will get to know
the story of ancestor of great Mali[1]
— Magu are du Kouyate
West African Poet

I

This paper examines the relationship between memory and history. Here the attention will be primarily on collective memory rather than personal memory.[2] Collective memory is general in nature and is both linked as well as different from personal memory. It recurs and sustains through myths, folklore and oral traditions of communities. Its study not only involves psychological analysis, but also sociological and historical investigations.[3] Alternative sources to understand the histories of a society like India would also be through collective memories of communities.

Here I am not concerned with 'History' but 'histories'. In my view, history does not mean history with a capital 'H' but with a small 'h'. 'History' with capital 'H' denotes a grand, unified and Meta History while societies generally contain multiple histories.

G.C. Pande and Ravinder Kumar are of the view that history writing in India, and in many other countries, is still influenced by the 19th century positivistic univocative tone and oppressiveness.[4] The historian thus depends on an objective analysis of records and documents bypassing memories. He is scared of memories because they need special efforts for interpretation, whereas it is easy to use classified facts through records and documents. In this 'heroic model', historical truth is the achievement of certain great academic historians, who, following the example of the natural sciences, have devised a set of rules and procedures that will ensure

objectivity and, thus, truth. By writing a unitary and essentially univocal account in the 'heroic mode', this model established reason and objectivity as the monopoly study of universal condition that suppressed the entire range of other cognitions—emotions, memory, feminine intuition, local lore and particularities characterizing them as biased.[5]

Like histories, collective memory is also not an innocent, univocative and unified domain. It is a contesting and fragmented whole. It is contesting because the way in which the past is recalled depends upon the power of the group that frames it.[6] The other factor is the memory (historical memory) is a constitutive element of the identity of the group.[7] The third factor is the element of remembrance in the collective memory which is not a mechanical act. It contains some interchange with creative imagination. So one finds many versions of one text during different time frames.[8] Memory is a social phenomenon and selectivity of memories lies in the remembrance process. This selectivity in the process of remembrance, oblivion and the multi-layered complex character of collective memory provides its form, which makes things difficult for the historian, habituated as he is to drawing conclusions from written texts.

II

Commemorative monuments, religious rituals, folklore, family lore are the vehicle of collective memory.[9] Through these vehicles, memories recur in the peoples' mind. Monuments are not mere stones in the landscape; they, as part of a nation's rites or the objects of a people's national pilgrimage, are invested with national soul and memory.[10] Memory built round a monument remains strong in community mind. Memorials also tend to concretize particular historical interpretations. In monuments, history and memory interact with each other. The interpretations of memory and history change gradually in the changing context of time, space and viewers. New generations visit memorials under new circumstances and invest them with new meanings.[11] However, with this changing nature, memory and history intermingle in the stone and architectural design of monuments. There is a constant structure of the past also to sustain in it, through a process of recurrence. Historians may interract with both these changing as well as continuing forms of history and memory lying in the monuments during the historical construction of past.[12]

Ritual is an integral part of religion as an ancient institution of this subcontinent. Collective memories of the communities recurs through ritual as a cycle of repetition. That is why to interact with collective memories

one should unravel the ritual structures and their practices which serve as primordial records of the history of human initiatives and values. People usually think, live and express themselves in the idiom of ritual. The other reading of ritual is that the politics of rebellion or tribal insurgencies are almost always expressed in sacred idioms as they are very effective in arousing mass support. In the Foucaultian or Boasian view, a history of rituals is a history of reproduction, contestation, transformation and deconstruction of authority.[13] In Gluckman's terms, while rituals obviously include a memory of protest against the established order they are also intended to preserve and strengthen the established order.[14] That is why ritual is historical practice as well as memory of historical practice which is a highly encoded resistance as well as appropriation to hegemonic order.

Myth is the memory of that which is meta-civilizational on account of its exclusive symbolic expressive articulation. Myth has been considered to be the pabulum of irrationalism but with the rise of anthropology myth has been perceived to be a functional category of comprehending structures, of primitive societies and an explanatory tool for understanding the problems of ethnicity, enculturation and acculturation. However, these trajectories of myth have been seriously challenged by such eminent scholars as Mercea Eliade, Ananda Coomarswamy, Zimmer and René Guenon, to whom every manifestation is a symbol of its eternity marching into the realm of time. Others belonging to this school are Jung, Cassirer and Kenneth Burke.[15] Myth is the abolition of time, of history and of duration. Positively, myth is also regeneration of time.[16] Every ritual takes time from the realm of chaos into cosmos and this cyclicity perpetually regenerates time. On the contrary, 'history' is bound within the framework of time and represents the chronology of events. Are the two then polar opposites? On the face of it, it would appear to be so but history, in order to immortalize itself, enters into myth and only when it has become a part of it, does it perpetuate itself or retain the potentiality to regenerate itself when objective time repeats cyclically. History can be a reservoir of wisdom through memory as conceived by Vico. Metaphors replicated through the myths are easily remembered by the primitive people because these metaphors were expressive and full of wonder of the world. According to Vico, the processes of obstruction that characterize modern thought are processes of forgetting. Vico could define history as memory because he assumed that primitive language, and the primitive imagination associated with it, are still dormant in us.[17]

Myths are not mere records which describe the nature of the relationship between elite and subaltern.[18] They also contain the history of the mentality and everyday activities of the common people but these cannot be unravelled easily, because they remain difficult to fathom and mysterious. Freud like Vico believed that ancient mythology could speak more directly than we are capable of speaking today about the origins of repression and the hidden desire for violence.[19] To decode these myths, to get in touch with collective memory, historians need to engage in sincere efforts to acquire a sensitivity to their deep significance.

The oral traditions, contain collective memories. The collective memories are continuously recollected by the communities themselves, through remembrance of oral traditions in their cultural life. Oral traditions are media of collective expression replete with traces of the experiences and activities of the people. Usually, in course of time, something new gets added to it and some other things get deleted from it. It inflows continually in the mental outlook of society and people and also in their everyday forms of behaviour. This is the standing base to which new changes are added by the people. Thus oral tradition possesses continuity and change as truth. The oral tradition in both its forms, unchangeable and changeable, records time and space in itself. In the Indian context oral traditions are mainly of two types:

1. Originally oral but later written down and given a fixed text like the Vedas, Buddhist and Jaina scriptures, epics like the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, the Puranas, the Tantra texts etc.
2. Continuously flowing in the oral cultures.

Collective memory links the missing poles of history. For the reconstruction of the history of African and of Amerindians tribal societies, or of north-east Indian societies or of many parts of interior rural India, the collective memory of these societies, which flows in the oral tradition, may play an important role. To know the history of mind, culture, consciousness and collective actions of these communities, there is no source other than oral traditions.

For societies like India and other Asiatic nations, history means not only differentiating the past from the present but also living with the past. This living with the past comprises living with memory in one or another form. In Indian society the masses live in their memories. They construct their present and future on the basis of these memories. Whichever caste heroes are eulogized in its folklore, a people positively relates itself to the

heroic deeds of these *nayakas*. In folk societies, the *sumiran* (remembrance of ideal) is sung at the beginning of every festival. The ritual of offering *pinda* to dead ancestors and related oral tradition (*mantras*) are nothing but means of reviving the ideal memories of generations.

The language of rural society is rich in metaphors and idioms which are nothing more than memories. They are memories in themselves and they also revive our social memories. Realizing the relationship between memory and oral tradition, the colonial power attempted to wipe out the oral tradition of Kenya. Ngugi Wa Thyongo pointed out that all this happened in a well planned way. In this way, much of our world of imagination was lost.[20]

III

Changes are always taking place in oral communities and the collective memory rarely remains static in our time.[21] But there are also some constant formulaic structures, e.g. special language, meters. Symbols repeat themselves. That is why these changes and continuity both provide interesting space for historical investigations.

In orality, through words, symbols, myths and folk songs, the collective memory recurs. In spoken form, a word is repeated and transformed each time.[22] But this transformation does not break the continuity of the internal effect of the words; most of the time, this effect increases. This increased internal effect of oral words evokes the collective memory of people. The process of memorialization in the oral cultures is different from that in a literate context. While in a literature context memorization means word for word duplication of a previous speech event; in an oral context memorization usually involves replication of tradition, not of specific words.[23]

In the view of Patrick H. Hutton, Vico sought to recover a wisdom forgotten by contemporary humankind. For Vico, however, this knowledge was embedded in the origins of civilization, not in the heavens. According to him, modern philosophers have misinterpreted ancient texts because they are unfamiliar with the oral culture that gave rise to them. The task of a historian of antiquity is not to construe the thoughts of antiquity in accordance with the rules of modern textualized knowledge but rather to grasp the preliterate poetic code that continued to shape human expression even as humanity first entered the literate stage of its development. Vico drew a line between oral culture and literate culture. He suggested that in the oral culture the modes of preservation of collective memory are different than in the written culture.[24] During their field

work in Yugoslavia, Milman Parry and Albert Lord also observed the same phenomenon. They discovered that oral culture has different methods to preserve memories than has written culture. Written culture usually freezes the living memory.[25] When memory which flows in the oral cultures comes to acquire a written form what is essentially dynamic becomes static in the process.

They also observed that the meaning of memory in oral culture gets transformed in the process of acquiring literacy. This dynamic and changing nature of memory in oral culture creates many problems for historians trained in a particular fashion. Such historians, habituated to reading fixed written texts become uncomfortable while dealing with memory inherent in oral cultures. However, collective memory bears the traces of continuity and change and opens up a new domain for study of various untouched questions which could lend richness to social history. Some historians in anthro-historical studies, while using folklore printed in journals and books as well interacting with orality in the literate world, claim they have access to collective memory. However, Ong (1978) has posed a question concerning this claim as follows:

> An oralty which functions in a 'literate context' as a 'secondary form' of orality in order to distinguish it from the primary orality of a culture yet 'Untouched' by 'writing' or 'Print'.[26]

IV

To Vico, to construe history is essentially an act of memory. Vico could define history as memory because he assumed the primitive language, and primitive imagination associated with it, are still dormant in us.[27]

But, as we know, collective memory is not an innocent and univocative domain. It is changing under many outside influences. Sometimes it is manipulated by the dominant power and culture. The selectivity of memory in the process of remembrance of the past also incorporates many complexities in it. That is why some postmodernist theoreticians propose critical inquiry into the structures of memory. Postmodernism, as an age of 'imagined communities' juxtaposes history against memory.[28] The theorem of the imagined community maintains that different communities are imagined on the basis of race, sex, sexual preferences etc. and ought to be identified through demonstrations and other means.

In fact, memory is different from imagination by virtue of the fact that the former involves beliefs whereas the latter does not.[29] The postmodern agenda of historical research defines that the task of the historian is no longer to recollect the past but to analyze the history of recollection. They are critical of the self commemorative character of French national history.[30] Michael Foucault, on whom postmodernist writings draw heavily, emphasized repeatedly the need to conceive social relations in a discontinuous form, without any general mechanism of connection determination. The grammar of discontinuity provides the space for Foucault to stand his critical position regarding relationship with memory and history. Foucault's critique of memory is his critique of our sense of continuity between past and present.[31]

However, all these suspicions concerning memory do not turn memory against history. In the exploration of the past, the perspectives of memory and history cross and intermingle. So the relationship of memory and history may be perceived as dialogical, not mutually exclusive and binary opposites.

Notes and References

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One of the inherent processes of memory is the phenomenon of remembrance.

3. See Maurice Halbwachs, on collective memory (edited) Lewis A. Coser (Chicago, 1932), pp.182–3.
4. G.C. Pande, *Bhartiya Samaj: Tatvik Evam Aitihasik Vivechan*, 1994, Delhi; and Ravinder Kumar, *Essays in the Social History of Modern India*, 1983, Delhi.
5. The term 'heroic model' is borrowed from Joycee, Apple, Lynnhunt and Margret Jacob's *Telling the Truth about History*. For further details see Bonnie G. Smith, 'Whose Truth, Whose History?' *Journal of History of Ideas*, 1955.
6. Maurice Halbwachs, *Les Cadras Sociaux de la Memoir*, New York, 1975. Exp. 83–145.
7. Ibid.
8. See Badri Narayan, 'Determining Relations, Memory, History and Politics', *Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. V, No.1, Summer 1998, IIAS, Shimla (pp.123–8).
   Nietzche while developing his concept of historical memory (Frederick Nietzche, 'Nach Gellasena Fragmentic 1872–74', *Werke* III, 4; Berlin, 1978) forsakes it for the creative activity of imagination but Jaffery Andrew Barash ('The Source of Memory', op.cit.) pointed out the interchangeable function of historical memory and artistic imagination.
9. Maurice Halbwachs, *Les Cadras Sociaux de la Memoir*, New York, op.cit.
10. See James E. Young, *Holocaust Memorials and Meaning: The Texture of Memory*, New Haven and London, 1993, Yale University Press, p.2.
11. See for differences and similarities between monuments and 'memorials', ibid., p.3.
12. Although some postmodernist historians suggest misuse of monument as memories in the historical constructions.
13. See Gyan Prakash and Douglas Hynes (edited), *Contesting Resistance and Everyday Social Relations in South Asia*, Delhi, 1991, OUP, p.8.
14. See Max Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict in Africa*, Oxford, 1965, Basil Blackwell.
15. A detailed discussion of the philosophy of these scholars is by S.P. Nagendra in *The Concept of Rituals in Modern Sociological Theory*, The Academic Publishers (year not mentioned).
16. Mercea Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return*, Penguin Books, USA, pp. 34–48. Also A.K. Saran in his recent book, *Traditional Thought: Towards an Axiomatic Approach*, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, Varanasi, 1996, p.65, wherein he states:

> Myth is the source, the origin,
> of human and cosmic history.
> It is neither rationalistic nor sublimating theroizing
> myth is archetypal,
> Essentially time.

17. See Patrick H. Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory*, Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1993, p.105.
18. Ranjit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*, Delhi, 1993, OUP, p.48.
19. See Patrick H. Hutton, *History As An Art of Memory*, op.cit., p.61.
20. Ngugi Wa Thyongo, *Bhasha, Sanskriti Aur Rashtriya Asmita*, Saransh, Delhi, 1994, p.58.
21. See Viv Edwards & Thomas J. Sinkewicz; *Oral Cultures: Past and Present*, op.cit., p.82.
22. Ibid., p.38.
23. Ibid.
24. See Patrick H. Hutton, 'The Role of Memory in the Historiography of the French Revolution' p.105; and Daniel Gordon, 'History As An Art of Memory (review article), *History and Theory*, Vol.34, No.4 (1995), p.347.
25. See Milman Parry, 'Coar Huso: 'A Study of South Slavic Song in the Making of Verse'. *The Collected Papers of Milman Parry*, edited by Adam Parry, Oxford, 1971.
26. See Albert B. Lord, *The Singer of Tales*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, pp.124–33.
27. See Daniel Gordon, 'History As An Art of Memory', op. cit., p. 347.
28. See Bendict Anderson, *On Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso.
29. Daniel Gordon, 'History as an Art of Memory', op. cit.; p. 347.
30. See Francois Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*. Trans. Elborg Forster, London, 1991.
31. See Patrick H. Hutton, *The Role of Memory in the Historiography of the French Revolution*, op. cit.; p. 105.

Imaging Time In Music: Langer's View and Hindustani Rhythm

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PART II

The first part of this essay (*JICPR*, XVI, No.3) ended with an attempt to define rhythm. Some explanatory remarks on this definition were also made. But, I now realize, they did not throw any light on an important question which has been debated by aestheticians in the West: (a) Is the time (or its semblance) that we find in rhythm similar to, or different from time as we experience it in daily life? Nor has my discussion so far addressed two distinct, yet allied problems relating to Langer's aesthetics of rhythm. (b) How does she avail of the concept of rhythm in defending her thesis that all art is a symbolic projection *of felt life*? And, finally: (c) how does the concept in question enable her to interlink the other important concepts that make up the fabric of her aesthetics of music, and of art in general, say, the concepts of forms of feeling, composition, and organic unity?

The second question may be taken up first, because of its greater relevance to an assessment of the crux of Langer's aesthetics. It calls for some critical attention to all the major arts. But to keep our discussion within manageable limits—and also because it is *literature* which is commonly regarded as essentially *related to life*, we may here focus on drama, ignoring non-dramatic poetry—again, for the sake of convenience.

A. Rhythm as Cadential

Now, turning to the two key concepts that figure in the second question—namely, *rhythm* and *life*—I find it necessary to give a clear, if brief, account of what Langer has to say about them. Rhythm, we have seen, can be cyclic—that is, a matter of mutual conditioning—or merely serial. A distinct form of the latter is, what Langer would like us to call, *cadential* rhythm. The word *cadence* admits of at least three clear meanings: the

beat or measure of something rhythmic; a *fall* in the pitch of the voice at the end of a sentence; and the *close* of a musical phrase or section. Langer seems to take the word, quite generally, in the sense of a fall or close. I say so in view of her following remark:

> Unlike the simple metabolic process [which may be said to be cyclic], the deathward advance of ... [our] individual lives has a series of stations that are *not repeated*; growth, maturity, decline. That is the tragic rhythm. Tragedy is a *cadential* form. Its crisis is always the turn toward *an absolute close*. This form reflects the basic structure of personal life.[1]

Now, a mere close as such cannot be said to be rhythmic. But where it comes as the end of a series of events or stages, each of which appears to prepare the way to the next one, it may well be said to culminate a cadential *rhythm*. What is necessarily present in every kind of rhythm is (a) change, process, flow and succession—besides, of course, (b) determination of that which follows by that which precedes. Strictly speaking, the 'stations' which Langer distinguishes in our individual lives are not fixed positions, but phases, that is, stages in growth or development. But, be that as it may, the two essentials we have distinguished hold of every instance of rhythmicity; where a process *is* rhythmic, 'the consummation of one phase is the preparation for another, which in its consummation prepares its successor...'[2]

Some attention may now be given to the other concept, *life*, as Langer understands it. Here, for the sake of clarity, our treatment may be divided under two distinct heads:

1. Life as featuring rhythms.
2. The pure sense of life.

1. The rhythms that distinguish life are organic, emotional, mental; the rhythm of attention is an interesting link between them; and, taken together, they compose the dynamic pattern of feeling,[3] or how it actually feels to be alive. As mutual conditioning, we have seen, rhythm 'is the law of *organic* function'.[4] On the outside, the daily life of an individual shows the rhythm of vigorous activity and consequent languor, followed (as naturally) by sleep which, in turn, generally prepares one for another day of vigorous activity. *Emotional* rhythms are provided, say, by the dualities of excitement and depression, joy and sorrow, elation and frustration which are all cases of mutual conditioning in the sense that the more we yield to any one of the pair, the more liable we become to experience the other.

if not quite readily. Attention connects them all in the sense that one is always more or less clearly aware of their character when they occur; but, we may note, attention is itself rhythmic in character in so far as every act of intense concentration of attention presses for, and is followed by a state of relaxtion which may or may not be incidental to the attainment of a desired end.

2. By 'the *pure* sense of life' Langer means sensation, awareness, and expectation. These may be called 'pure' because they belong 'to *all* higher creatures'. The *personal* sense of life—that is, the realization that one is a distinct self and is possessed of a life that has a 'beginning, efflorescence, and end'—'probably belongs only to human beings, and to them in varying measure'.[5] It is 'more elaborate and more integrated' than the pure sense of life. Yet both are alike 'fundamental forms of consciousness' that drama may be said to abstract from reality as its building material; and, speaking quite generally, they may be taken as one, to make 'the sense of life'. This (total) sense is infinitely complex and 'variable in its possible expressions'. But it is by no means the feeling of a chaotic series of indeterminate elements; for, as that which distinguishes the animate from the inanimate, life is teleological—a characteristic which manifests itself as 'self-restoration, functional tendency, purpose'. And, what is specially germane to our present purpose, all these manifestations involve rhythm as determination of what follows by that which comes earlier, often in the way of a need as itself pressing for a specific fulfilment. To illustrate,

> A tree ... that is bereft of the sunshine it needs by the encroachment of other trees, tends to grow tall and thin until it can spread its own branches in the light. A fish that has most of its tail bitten off partly overcomes the disturbance of its locomotion patterns by growing new tissue, replacing some of the tail, and partly adapts to its new condition by modifying the normal uses of its fins, swimming effectively without trying to correct the list of its whole body in the water, as it did at first.[6]

In a much more complex and integrated way, human beings too manage to survive by regulating their efforts and attitudes to changing circumstances. This is the rhythm of adaptation. The challenge of new situations elicits new responses, because of the pressure of the instinct of self-preservation.

B. Rhythm in Drama

Now that Langer's basic views on both rhythm and life have been brought out, in order to see how (according to her) rhythm serves as a link be-

tween art and life, we may first state, in brief, how exactly she traces the presence of rhythm in literary art, say, in drama.

An important, if general remark that she makes in this context is that

> A dramatic act is a commitment. It creates a situation in which the agent or agents must necessarily make a further move; that is, it motivates a subsequent act (or acts). The situation, which is the completion of a given act, is already the impetus to another—as, in running, the footfall that catches our weight at the end of one bound already sends us forward to land on the other foot.[7]

So, as determination of what is to come next by the present event, act or stage, rhythm may be said to be necessarily there in the art of drama. But some critical comments have to be made here. The word *act* in the extract cited is to be taken as something done or as a doing, *not* as a distinct main section of a play; for there are one-act plays too, and *such* a play cannot obviously be said to make for something to follow. But then, if *act* is to be taken as a *doing*, what shall we say of those *speeches*, as by the Fool in Shakespeare's tragedies, which only throw into bolder relief the gloom or ominousness of the situational context in the play, instead of directly suggesting any further move?

C. Rhythm as a 'Paving the Way To'

Langer could possibly rejoin by suggesting that the very deepening of the character of the situation makes the reader *expect* something catastrophic to happen; and that, therefore, the speeches in question could well be said to create a rhythm. I make this suggestion because of her following emphatic utterance:

> (a) Everything that prepares a future creates rhythm; (b) everything that begets or intensifies expectation, including the expectation of sheer continuity prepares the future; (c) and everything that fulfils the promised future, in ways foreseen or unforeseen, articulates the symbol of feeling.[8]

But one of the three points listed in the above extract, and distinguished by me as *a*, *b*, *c*, is clearly questionable; and another, not readily clear. (a) is clearly too sweeping. Where excessive bleeding on his surgeon's table is seen to lead a patient straight to his death, no one will profess to see any rhythm in the situation, in spite of the fact that the flow in question is very likely to cause alarm, and apprehensive expectation of what is *to*

come. So it is too much to say that *everything* that prepares a future creates rhythm. Further, the emphasis does not show any awareness of the truth that, speaking quite generally, rhythm involves *recurrence*. (b) may be allowed to pass; for to *expect* is necessarily to look forward to some future happening. But what does it mean to say (c) that *everything that fulfils the promised future ... articulates the symbol of feeling*? To answer this question we have, first, to remind ourselves that by 'feeling' Langer means 'whatever is felt'—maybe, the passage of 'lived time'; and, second, to consider the italicized words along with the following that she makes their immediate sequel:

> Whatever the special mood of the [musical] piece, or its emotional import, the vital rhythm of subjective time (the lived time that Bergson adjures us to find in pure experience) permeates the complex, multi-dimensional, musical symbol as its internal logic, which relates music intimately and self-evidently to life.[9]

Now, looking at all these cited words as one—they, in fact, occur in the same para—'the symbol of feeling' may be equated with 'the musical piece', also because *all art* (according to Langer) is a symbolic projection of the forms of feeling. 'The vital rhythm of *subjective* time', of which she speaks here, may be taken to mean the rhythm or complementariness of need, expectation or effort, and fulfilment or attainment. This is indeed what lived (or felt) time really is. Clock time is unchangingly periodic; the ticks occur at equal intervals. But lived time, or time as experienced in actual life, seems to move slowly or quickly according as one's life is soured with anguished waiting or enlivened with a series of happy events. As for the word 'articulates' (in 'articulates the symbol of feeling'), it may be taken to mean 'gives a clear appearance of elements that are distinct, though related in an orderly way'. Here I take my stand on Langer's explicit view that the *form* of music is *articulate* in so far as the elements which are here held as one retain a measure of self-existence in spite of the interlacement.[10]

The net meaning of the extracts we have picked for reflection could now be put thus. (a) Every individual phrase, accent or change of aesthetic pace (*laya*) which makes a distinct contribution to the emergence of the music's final form at once invests the piece with an *articulate* form. (b) Such a *form*, however, is no mere juxtaposition of parts, but an organic unity; and this is so because the whole is permeate with a rhythm in the sense that every part prepares the way, and makes us look forward to what

is to come next. Both these points, I may add, are clearly borne out by even a casual look at the practice of Hindustani rhythm. Generally speaking, every beat, as marking *and maintaining* the even flow of aesthetic pace, makes us look forward to the next one at an equal interval of time; the next one, as it comes expectedly, not only relieves the gentle tension of looking-forward-to, but paves the way to yet another beat; and, what is more, far from disrupting the unity of the *laya*-flow, the plurality of beats only lends a look of articulate form to the total playing which, in turn, makes them all appear as gentle accents, and not protuberant wedges in the *laya*-flow.

D. Rhythm and 'Life' in Drama

To turn again to literature, we may now briefly outline Langer's views on how it is rhythm which enables tragedy and comedy to project a semblance of life. As forms of drama, both of course show the rhythm that has already been referred to, namely, the rhythm of an act as creating a situation which presses for 'a further move'[11]; and so on, throughout the play. In life, on the other hand, if an individual's career be considered in relation to the totality of situations and happenings that fill it, two distinct kinds of rhythm may be distinguished: the rhythm of destiny and the rhythm of fortune. As rhythms, both signify a kind of dynamic relatedness; but whereas the rhythm of destiny or fate is the 'appearance that the future is already an entity, embryonic in (or determined by) the present',[12] 'the rhythm of fortune' is that of "vital continuity",[13] that is, the open and episodic rhythm of challenges or obstacles as making for appropriate, remedial action. Now, 'tragedy is the image of Fate, as comedy is of Fortune'.[14] Tragedy shows the largely inevitable rhythm of growth, efflorescence, and exhaustion. This is obviously quite similar to the rhythm of stages in real life; but comedy too may be said to project the motion and rhythm of daily living—the rhythm of confronting and dealing with situations as they arise, off and on. But in neither case does the dramatist merely copy life; he has to organize and articulate a symbol for the 'sense of life'.[15] This, however, calls for some explanation.

Take tragedy, to begin with. Whereas in actual life something *singular* and menacing must happen *a little* before we become apprehensive as to what is imminent—as when the doctor's definitive diagnosis that the only earning head of the family is suffering from cancer *at once* makes us think of the ruin that awaits them all—in a play we are quickly presented with 'the whole [*complex*] setup of human relationships and conflicting inter-

ests *long before* any abnormal event has occurred;' "but in such an integrated and suggestive manner that we *readily* perceive 'an ominous situation' and visualize that some far-reaching action must develop out of it. This creates the peculiar tension between the given present and its yet unrealized consequent, [or] form in suspense, [which is] the essential dramatic illusion .... [This *tension* is the *rhythm* of destiny. It does not imitate anything in life, but it surely resembles] 'an aspect of real experience ... [something] which distinguishes human life from animal existence; the sense of past and future as parts of one continuum, and therefore of life as a single reality'.[17]

E. Art and the Character of Life

This should not, however, make us believe that rhythm, as a dynamic relation, brings about a perceptible resemblance between life and drama *alone*. According to Langer, every work of art betrays this similitude. See, here, her following emphatic utterance:

> ... All art has the character of *life*, because every work must have *organic* character and it usually makes sense to speak of its *fundamental rhythm*.[18]

Now, partly because fundamental rhythm is here taken to be present not only in *life* but in art, and partly because Langer also introduces—elsewhere, but again in relation to art—the concept of *commanding form*, I think it necessary to make some explanatory remarks on the extract cited.

To begin with, 'life' is here to be taken *not* in the 'social' sense—that is, as 'what happens, (or) what the organism ... encounters and has to contend with' but as 'the characteristic functioning of organism' or as what is 'opposed to death'.[19] With this specific meaning in mind, we may say that all art is organic in character—or is similar to life—because, very much like life, no work can be regarded as a mere summation of elements of determinate individual values. Langer's following remark is here very pertinent:

> Who could say *how much* of a natural organism's life is in the lungs, how much in the legs, or how much more life would be added to us if we were given a lively tail to wave?[20]

The task here visualized is impossible; and, similarly, 'although it is possible to analyze what [or how the elements of a work of art] ... contribute to the ... [work], it is not possible to assign them any of its import apart from the whole'.[20a] What a line contributes to a painting, a look of

tension or of tranquillity, or of mere flow, can be determined only by noticing its position *in* the whole work; and, of course, the question, *how much* it contributes, would be quite out of order. 'The essence of all composition ... even purely percussive ... is the semblance of organic movement, [that is] the illusion of an indivisible whole.'[21] Now, this is surely true of composition in the region of Hindustani rhythm. Like any vital, organic process—such as digestion or circulation of blood—the run of a rhythmic pattern is inseparable from, and is determined by, many other factors or processes. Here, indeed, a pattern has to be so composed that (a) the *bols* it integrates may, in fact, be *playable* in the same order in which they have been put together; (b) that the whole pattern may bear a determinate and identifiable relation to the basic pace as set and marked by the *thekā*; (c) that the various segments of the pattern may appear to demand each other; and (d) finally, that the whole form may strike the knowledgeable listener as moving towards the focal beat as its destiny.

But though we may agree that, as a dynamic interplay of elements or processes, rhythm is to be found in works of art as well, before we finally accept the thesis that art projects the rhythms *of life*, we have to settle an important question of general significance. Can the analogues of a rhythm which has its locus in a particular region of reality or experience be effectively projected in a quite different setting? Here, following Langer, we may at once say *yes*; and with due reason. When, for instance, we speak of the rise and fall of a stately life, we create *in language* an analogue of the rhythm which we often come across in inorganic nature—say, in the run of an *undulating* billow; and which may also be said to resemble the rhythm of the gentle swell and easing off of the chest in breathing. But if a brief linkage of words, which are admittedly symbols, can create an analogue of the rhythm of life, why should the elaborate structure of an art symbol be denied the power to project analogues of the complex rhythms of life?[22] The artist achieves this by exercising a common capacity with which he is very well equipped. Langer calls this capacity 'logical intuition'. She explains that such intuition makes for the immediate recognition of relational factors in experience, namely, 'distinctness, similarity, congruence, and relevance'.[23] It is this capacity which enables the artist to seize the equivalence between forms of felt life and certain artistic structures.

But does an artist actually do this, or are we merely supposing that he does so? Now, so far as I know, and I speak in the light of my close personal relations with them, our *tablā* or *pakhāwaj* drummers would

simply feel bewildered if they are told that what they really do (when they play at their drums) is a studied projection of some forms of feeling. They would hasten to add, in one voice, that they only try to play the *thekā* and the various patterns according to established norms; and that their playing is determined not at all by the thought of expressing any feeling or its 'form', but by such basic requirements as are valued by all those who practice the art of rhythm, namely, the following: crystal-clear cutting of syllables that make the various patterns; due accentuation of some of the constituent *bols*; correct attainment of the *sama*, preferably in a well designed way; methodical sequencing of patterns as they make a whole recital; and, of course, the ability to keep the basic *laya* from wobbling.[24]

To conclude, a close look at the art of Hindustani rhythm does not bear out Langer's thesis in respect of art in general, or even her view of rhythm. But what she says about the nature of *time* in rhythm seems fair to me. I hope to make this clear in my discussion of the first question to which I now turn.

F. Is Time in Music Unique?

What does Langer mean by saying, and how does she argue for the view, that the semblance of time (or rhythm) that we find in music is *virtual*? Both parts of the question admit of a definite answer which I may put as follows, at places with some comments of my own—with an eye to greater clarity:

Ordinarily, we experience time as a sequence or passage of states or happenings. 'Is', 'has been' and 'yet to come'—such are the words that we commonly use in respect of the temporal aspect of our everyday experience. More or less similarly, what enables music to present an auditory apparition of time is the (apparent) movement that we see in it. 'Music flows; a melody moves; a succession of tones is heard as a progression'.[25] But this movement of music, we may note, is *virtual*. It is quite different from the *actual* vibrations that cause the sounds that we hear. The motions of strings are 'extremely small, rapid and repetitious'. They are as different from the movement of a simple melody towards its keynote (*vādi*)—or towards the focal beat of the cycle—as 'the spatial relations of pigments on a canvas' from 'the relations of sky and breakers in a seascape'. Surely,

> we do not hear vibratory motions in music, but large linear movements ... rhythms that are not at all like physical oscillations. We hear marching, flowing, or driving progressive motion. Yet in a musical progres-

> sion there is nothing that is displaced, that has gone from somewhere to somewhere else.[26]

Frets and keys which produce music are, of course, laid out in space; but *the music* which they produce cannot be said to occupy space. One cannot put any *thing* between two accents *of music*, as one can between any two points in actual space: and, in respect of vocal music, it would be clearly silly to say that the notes are spread out all over the vocal chords. Indeed, in a musical ascent or descent no actual thing is seen to traverse a moveless path. 'The listener [only] hears musical figures that move through a definite tonal range, from points of origin to points of relative rest.'[27] Musical movement may therefore be said to be illusory—in the sense of being different from movement of things in actual life, quite like 'volumes in pictorial space' which surely do not fill a room as chairs and tables do. Another very clear index of the difference between what we hear and follow in music and actual motion is provided by the fact that 'when a figure ascends to a resting tone' and we hear 'sustained rest'—that is, 'a changeless continuity in time'—'the *actual* motion of the air is faster on that resting tone than anywhere else in the passage'.[28]

Now, as an evocation of this virtual movement, the *time* that we see in music is also *virtual*—not only because of its patent otherness from clock-time, but because it is a *created* analogue of time as lived and felt. Here, two clear differences are to be borne in mind: first between clock-time and experienced time; second, between the latter (or lived time) and musical time—a difference which is (for Langer) at once partly a relation of similitude or semblance as well. Clock-time, that is, the time by which we regulate our daily work and appointments, is 'a simple one-dimensional trickle of successive moments'.[29] It regulates our lives, to be sure; but it has no content of its own, and is rigidly set in its abstract, unvarying course. Lived time is very different. To read in a watch the exact moment of one's arrival is surely not the same thing as the felt moment of relief on having made it at last, without delay, and after a long and arduous journey. Indeed, our direct experience of time has a felt quality, a

> sort of voluminousness and complexity and variability that make it utterly unlike metrical time. That is because ... [it is] the passage of vital functions—somatic, emotional, and mental tensions, which have a characteristic pattern.[30]

When we notice the changing positions of the hands of a clock we do not experience, but only infer the passage of time. And this passage (as

experienced), 'involves more properties than "length", or interval between selected moments'; it involves what may be called bulk or *volume*, a sense of being full on the inside.[31] The suggestion is warranted by such familiar turns of speech as 'a moment of destiny', 'a memorable occasion', or 'a hectic day at the office'. In such temporal experiences of daily life the 'volume' as felt is by no means simple, but is full of '*tensions*—physical, emotional, or intellectual',[32] tensions which may appear as impatience to do diverse jobs quickly; as subdued anxiety, may be, in respect of challenges that a new responsibility brings to light; or as the dawning of a pregnant insight which, so to say, insists on being worked out straight away.

This 'lived' time, however, differs not only from clock time, but from the time that we sense *in music*—or, as *I* would prefer to say, in the autonomous art of rhythm. Virtual time, or the time in which musical forms or rhythmic patterns move, is not a part of our everyday, actual time; *it rather tends to obliterate our sense of the latter*, at least for the duration of the music, provided the music is good. Again, what fills actual time is a shifting mass of everyday situations and activities. The content of musical time is, on the other hand, provided by orderly collocation of tones and rhythmic turns. Actual time is measured by clocks and watches; virtual time (in music), through *sensibilities*, *tensions*, *emotions*.[33] The former fact is common knowledge; but the latter too is pretty easy to illustrate with references to Hindustani music. For instance, if, in spite of its tunefulness, the singing of the *taar sā* does not satisfy him, a *rasika*—that is, a person of trained aesthetic *sensibility*—will tend to complain that the note has not been sung long enough—*without of course looking at his watch*. Again, in the case of *ālāpa* in *rāga puriyā*, the note *nishād* (in the middle register) is said to have been given its due occupancy in time *only after* it has created in our minds a *tense* expectancy for the requisite supplement of a touch of *rishabh* followed by *sā*, both in the *taar saptak*. Finally, a *sthāyī* deserves to be called *vilambit* (or adagio) only if it *feels* tranquil to *rasikas*.

There is at least one other way to distinguish actual time from virtual time. The latter, which is (according to Langer) the primary illusion of music, is entirely perceptible through hearing alone; we sense it *only* in the relations of tones to one another. The perception of actual time, on the other hand, depends on such motley objective factors as a clock, delay in the arrival of a friend, or a satisfying filling of the day with a quick succession of pleasing engagements. This is the point in Langer's following remark:

> Inward tensions and outward change, ... clocks, daylight and routines and weariness furnish various incoherent temporal data, which we coordinate for practical purposes by letting the clock predominate.[34]

Yet, though (as we have seen) she does not in any way identify the two, Langer openly speaks of our everyday experience of the passage of time as providing a model for the virtual time created in music. See, here, the following:

> The direct experience of passage, as it occurs in each individual life is, of course, something *actual ... yet it is the model for the virtual time created in music*. There we have its image, completely articulated and pure; every kind of tension *transformed* into musical tension, every qualitative content into musical quality, every extraneous factor replaced by musical elements.[35]

This is a significant utterance, and I think it necessary to make some explanatory comments on it, partly because it is likely to appear a little rhetorical to casual attention.

All that Langer here says by way of heightening the *difference* (too) between actual time and the virtual time of music admits of supportive illustration. Time in the art of rhythm—I prefer to speak of rhythm, I repeat, as an independent art, as against rhythm *in music*, because as a mere element of music, rhythm is not able to manifest its full aesthetic potential—is surely 'pure' and 'completely articulated'. It is pure in the sense that it is quite free from the admixture of everyday happenings which variegates our experience of time in real life; and it is fully articulated in the sense that not only the syllables which make the *patterns* of rhythm, but the beats and segments (*vibhāgs*) which the basic *thekā* comprises present the picture of a flow (*laya*) as *the underrunning unity of quite distinct accents*. The tensions which appear as configurations of rhythm are freely seen to assume the following diverse forms: a seemingly compulsive orientation of a patterned flow towards the *sama*; the aesthetic strain of having to hold on (inwardly) to the basic pace, even where the (overt) playing is made to stray for a while, purposely and as a mark of wilful abandon; and, where the drummer has to provide accurate 'accompaniment' to a *sitar* (or *sarod*) player, including moments of conscious endeavour to replicate the latter's patterns faithfully, again *sans* loosening his grip on the present pace of the matrix (or the *thekā*). All these 'tensions' in rhythm, I may add, have their rough parallels in daily life, say, in the form of unremitting endeavour towards a goal, intentional absten-

tion from indulgence in a friendly gathering of revellers, and meticulous description of the details of a complicated situation. Nor is it difficult to show how rhythm—or rhythm in music—transforms every qualitative content of everyday experience into rhythmic (musical) quality, or replaces every extraneous factor in day-to-day experience with a rhythmic (musical) element. We freely distinguish the course of daily living as leisurely or crowded with happenings; and the distinction can be just as easily made in the flowing form of music or of rhythm as patterned. And as aesthetic parallels of seeming 'irrelevances' in everyday experience—such as the *long* waiting for the outcome of an ongoing surgical operation—rhythm may project expansive, winsome patterns which are richly inlaid with syllables, and which wind their way majestically through three segments of equal extent, and finish at last immaculately at the *sama* which itself may be all along foreshadowed by the determinate relation which the patterns appear to bear, as they flow, to the underrunning basic pace. But all these parallels, it is obvious, do nothing to bedim the *difference* between 'virtual' time (or rhythm in music) and time as experienced in daily life. The sense that a busy day has passed very quickly calls for no special effort or training. On the other hand, the nimble *sama*-ward course of a pattern teeming with *bols* can be followed only by *rasikas* or persons of trained aesthetic sensibility.

The view that musical time (or rhythm) is *virtual* has, however, been questioned, as by Philip Alperson.[36] His is a reasoned protest, and so I think it necessary to consider if it could be fairly met by Langer. Alperson's formulation and criticism of her conception of musical time as 'virtual' may, in brief, be put as follows:

1. According to Langer, all music creates an order of virtual time, in which its sonorous forms move in relation to each other—always and only to each other, for nothing else exists there ... music makes time audible, and its form and continuity sensible.[37]
2. Musical or virtual time is quite different from *clock-time* in two clear ways. First, whereas clock-time is an 'abstraction' (of 'pure sequence') from 'direct experiences of time'—or a mere *concept*[38]—musical time is *perceptible*. Second, whereas clock-time is but a one-dimensional continuum—say, of 'before' and 'after'—musical time has more than one dimension; it has form and organization, volume and distinguishable parts.[39]
3. On the other hand, no such clear differences may be said to separate musical time from *actual* (or lived) *time*. The truth rather is

that, 'musical duration is an image of what might be called "lived" or "experienced" time—the passage of life that we feel as expectations become "now" and "now" turns into unalterable fact. Such passage is measurable only in terms of sensibilities, tensions and emotions.'[40]

4. But (Alperson protests), if this is so, if the resemblance between the model and its image is so complete, wherein lies the difference? Langer does not specify ... [any] difference ... [Could it not, then, be said that] the temporality of musical perception is simply another example of our direct, intuitive experience of all things temporal [?][41] ... As an occurrence, ... a piece of music is of a piece with all phenomena that occur in time: it has a determinate period of duration; an objective and irreversible time- order ... [;] it calls upon the same faculties we employ in all time perception ... [namely] attention, memory ... apperception ... [and] ... anticipation. [Indeed] ... the truth ... seems to be that the temporal dimension of musical experience is not [*sui generis* or] fundamentally different from that of any other sort of temporal experience.[42] [So] why say [at all] that music creates an order of virtual time?[43]

The crux of Alperson's *protest*, it is clear, occurs in 4. But, I believe, the critical points it makes can all be met by Langer, squarely. To begin with, it is incorrect to say that Langer does not specify the difference between 'lived time' (or the 'model') and its image, that is, musical time. In fact, were (1.) taken along with some (other) utterances of Langer, at least two differences between the two orders of time would seem to be suggested by her, pretty clearly. Here are some such utterances:

A. The direct experience of passage [or lived or actual time] ... is ... like all actuality ... *only in part* perceived, and its fragmentary data are supplemented by practical knowledge and ideas from other realms of thought altogether. *Yet* it is the model for the virtual time created in music. There we have its image, completely articulated and pure ... [only] the sonorous image of passage, abstracted from actuality to become free and plastic and *entirely* perceptible.[44]

B. Virtual time [which music creates] is entirely perceptible, through the agency of a single sense—hearing. There is no supplementing of one sort of experience by another ... Music spreads out time for our direct and complete apprehension by letting our hearing monopolize it—organize, fill and shape it, all alone.[45]

Now, a look at B. and 1. (in Alperson's formulation and criticism of Langer's view) makes it clear that, according to Langer, the virtual time which music creates is experienced *only through* the sense of hearing or by attending to sounding ('sonorous') forms alone. But this at once suggests, though it does not project, a difference between virtual time and lived time which *is* freely marked by a 'supplementing of one sort of experience by another'. To illustrate, my experience at the present moment is a 'heterogeneous'[46] mix of some thinking incidental to writing, visual perception of the words being written, hearing of the birds' chirping from outside the window, and some bodily sensations arising from being seated in a chair and from a shuffling of the forearm across the sheet of paper being used. One's experience of attending to music, on the other hand, comes essentially through listening to tones and passages as they appear to rest or move up and down the scale. It is true, of course, that musical listening is *not merely a matter of hearing;* and that, for example, the evenness of pace *between* two adjacent beats has to be kept and followed *in idea*. But unless the beats are *drummed*—or in some other way so marked as to be easily perceived—the requirement of keeping to the pace, and sensing that it is being properly done, cannot be met.

Here, however, I feel compelled to qualify what I have just said, from the viewpoint of our rhythm *as an independent art*. Of *our* rhythm it is indeed very true that whole collocations of syllables—even the most intricate and elaborate patterns—can be rehearsed merely in the mind. Such subdued recitation may well be said to involve some implicit speech, but there is no question of hearing here, because no sound is produced. But Langer and Alperson do not discuss rhythm as an independent art; and of rhythm or time as sensed *in music* it is certainly true that the sole agency of its experience is hearing which (I repeat) at once distinguishes it from lived time.

The second distinction that Langer draws between the two temporal orders is to be seen in *A*. I may put it as follows:

Whereas the direct experience of the lapse or passage of time—or of lived time—is only *partly* provided by perception, music presents the passage in question in an *entirely* perceptible form. Perception may here be taken to signify immediate experience; and the net meaning of the distinction suggested could be put quite simply. The passage of time is, of course, ceaseless; but because we generally remain occupied in life's diverse activities, it is only dimly or fitfully that we remain or become

conscious of its passage. Occasions that make it a distinct object of direct awareness, like a prolonged waiting for the delayed arrival of a friend, are infrequent; otherwise, in general, some practical knowledge—as of the fact that the milkman rings the door-bell at a particular hour—may make one aware, say, of how long one has been working at the study table. Similar awareness may also be provided by ideas from some altogether different 'realms of thought', as when a look at the many reports of his pathological tests makes a person aware of the *long* course of a disease he has been suffering from. On the other hand, when we listen to music, temporal features like the *meteoric* ascent of a *taan*, the *leisurely flow* of a *dagar* passage, or the sweet and reposeful *abidance* of voice at the upper tonic are all *directly* presented to us.

Nor is it proper to argue that the two temporal orders, rhythmic and everyday, cannot be regarded as *dis*similar because the *same* mental acts or attitudes are involved in the way we experience them. Would it make sense to deny the distinctness of sweet from salted food on the ground that they are both known by tasting? It is, I would say, not *how* we experience them, but *what* exactly we experience *in* them that makes the two orders of time quite unlike each other.

The point becomes very clear if we consider it in the context of rhythm as an independent art. A *tablā* or *pakhāwaj* maestro dwells in the unique world of rhythm—comprising beats, *bols*, and their variform collocations—with as perfect a sense of encompassment as a scientist in that of symbols and formulae. And 'happenings' in the drummer's world can be quite out of the ordinary. Where, for instance, in the ordinary world do we produce beauty, as our drummers occasionally do, by deviating designedly from a set course of flow, with meaningless letters (or *bols*) alone as the instruments of charm? Even generally, the time that *we* regulate and beautify cannot be the same as the one which is only *given to us* and is so often the locus of wayward and unforeseen events.

G. Rhythm and Some Other Concepts

Finally, by way of integrating some aspects of Langer's thought, we may discuss a broad question. How does the concept of rhythm provide a connecting-link between the concepts of, say, composition, organic unity, and 'forms of feeling' in Langer's aesthetics of music in particular and of art in general? Following the main tenor of her own thinking, I may answer the question thus:

For Langer, we have seen, the essence of rhythm lies in the preparing of a *new* event by the ending of a previous one.[47] But here the word *new*, as distinguished from the merely *next*, suggests that the continuity implicit in (her view of) rhythm is not the undifferentiated sameness of an unbroken line. *Exact* repetition is not the *essence* of rhythm, though a measure of such repetition may well be found in many cases of rhythm. (All this can be easily verified by considering the patterns of Hindustani rhythm). As Langer rightly points out, even in the case of bodily movements—say, like walking—a rhythmic look appears only when 'one can sense [in the movement contemplated, the different moments of] a beginning, intent, and consummation, and *see in the last stage of one gesture the condition and indeed the rise of another*'.[48] On the one hand, as the words in italics suggest, continuity that is implicit in *conducivness* of one detail to another *is* essential for the appearance of rhythm. Thus if, when he is requested to get into a car, an intoxicated person lifts his foot repeatedly, but fruitlessly—because in a direction which does not lead to the spot where the vehicle stands—his movements will only be said to be random and not rhythmic, even though they clearly involve some repetition. On the other hand, if (as in the game of cricket) a fielder keeps his eye on the ball aloft, traverses quite some distance, and makes a successful catch by adjusting his hands and stance suitably, the whole act may well be called rhythmic because, though it is not (immediately) repeated, it comprises 'a beginning, intent, and consummation' distinguishably. Now, such conduciveness of one detail to another distinct one (or rhythm) is also an essential feature of what Langer means by *composition*. True, she speaks of composition, first, as merely 'the total Gestalt', and 'the fundamental form of the piece'; but in so far as she hastens to add that it is precisely this form which, once it has dawned upon the artist's mind, presses for development, and *controls every detail* of art-making—be it a key or a mood in music, or a line or volume in painting[49]—the idea of interrelatedness of details is clearly brought in.

How rhythm is also related to the other concepts of organic form and expression (of forms of feeling) in Langer's aesthetics may be brought out as follows, largely by reflecting on what she says in *Feeling and Form*.[50]

The creation of virtual time, or of a semblance of time, is (we have seen) a necessary, though not the highest function of music. Now, the chief way in which we experience time in daily life is as passage. Therefore, movement is essential for music too. But even movement is here 'virtual', that is, a mere semblance: for, first, no actual path is here open

to view; and second, what may be said to move up and down in music is no given person or thing but only created *forms*. According to Langer, we may note, that which clearly distinguishes music from noise is no mere sensuous quality, but the play of forms. Noise is by no means intractably opposed to music. It may, in fact, furnish musical phenomena; 'hammers on anvils, rotary saws, dripping faucets are very apt to do so'.[51] But noise does not at all show what distinguishes music, that is, the seizure of a motif and its use 'either as a form to be developed, or as an element to be assimilated to a greater form'.[52]

How what we have just said is really true of Hindustani music can be easily brought out. A motif is a melody, subject or concept, or a design, shape, or form not merely as such, but *as repeated or worked upon*. A *rāga*, we may say, is a form; it may even be said to be a commanding form, for it determines all that happens in a recital of classical music. Music arises when either the concept of a melody—that is, the *rāga* chosen—is itself developed in terms of (audible) tones, as in the case of *ālāpa* that precedes the singing of a *dhruvapad*; or is used as the matrix or pervasive element of a *bandish* or composition. In either case, we may note, the *conduciveness* of one detail or phrase—that is, a *swara* or *swara-samooha*—to another is a clear feature of the music. In both cases the quality in question is sensed and determined by means of the foreknown and prefixed—and all along quietly remembered—form of the *rāga*. In the case of a *bandish*, however, the conduciveness we are talking of is also determined, in respect of its run, by the rhythm-cycle chosen; that is, *swaras* have to follow each other, if but generally, not only according to the melodic scheme (or *rāga*), but suchwise that the *sama* may be duly attained. All along, however, rhythm is clearly there, as a kind of paving-the-way-to the next detail.

It is indeed specially so in the case of a composition, say, a *sthāyi-antarā* twosome. The more visibly a composition appears rhythmic in the specific sense Langer gives to *rhythm*, the better it is said to be as a *bandish*, that is, a distinctive incarnation—and in this sense, a delimitation—of a particular *rāga* and *tāla*. Our words of acclaim here are: कैसी कसी हुई बन्दिश है। And the norm that we here go by, if not quite consciously, is not essentially different from what Langer appears to emphasize in the following:

> The essence of all composition ... even purely percussive, if you will—is the semblance of *organic* movement, the illusion of an indivisible whole.[53]

The word *organic* here means *indivisible*; and the point of (or warrant for) the utterance cited is that, just as we cannot determine exactly how much a particular organ contributes to the life of the whole body,[54] so it is impossible to determine the exact input of a particular *swara* or musical phrase to the overall look or charm of a *bandish*.

So, in respect of what she says about composition, we may concur with Langer unreservedly. But what are we to make of her following additional remarks?

> *Vital organization* is the frame of all feeling, because feeling exists only in living organisms .... The most characteristic principle of *vital activity* is rhythm .... All life is rhythmic .... The highest *organic response* ... [is] the emotional life of human beings. A succession of emotions that have no reference to each other do not constitute an 'emotional life' .... The rhythmic character of organism [that is, its indivisibility in the sense already explained] permeates music ... [so, is an exercise of its 'great office', this art is able] to organize our conception of feeling into more than an occasional awareness of emotional storm ... [or] to give us an insight into what may truly be called the 'life of feeling', or subjective unity of experience ... [55]

I may interpret these remarks as follows, with some such interpolations of my own as are likely to make Langer's meaning appear a little more plausible than it may otherwise seem to be.

The necessary setting or locus of feeling is a living organism. Only such an organism *feels*. But what makes and keeps it organized—and living—is rhythm, that is, the contribution or relatedness of one organic process (or activity) to another. This is quite manifest in the life of a human being which, however, requires (and provides) much more content to be organized than life at the level of lower animals. The life of a human being feels one and undivided in spite of its content of very diverse activities and responses to changing situations. Here, however, the *highest* organic response, we may say, is evidenced by emotional life, for an emotional response involves, first, a clear perception of the specific character of the object or situation faced; second, an impulse to combat or shrink from—or dwell with (or on) it lingeringly; thirdly, a fuller involvement of integrated—and so more or less predictable—inner and outer bodily changes; and, above all, a deeper and more abiding awareness that the experience is one's own than is involved, say, in an act of quiet deliberation. It is precisely through *this* felt appropriation of experience

by self that a man's joys and sorrows make his unique emotional life, and (what is more) may make him look upon the whole course of his life as studded with satisfying achievements or as a long, wan barenness of unrelieved failure. The art of music shows a similar organic rhythm. On the one hand, the various 'forms' of life as felt—namely, the rise and subsidence of emotion; pursuit and recoil, or endeavour, attainment and satiety; upgathering and division, as of thought or human relations; or wholeness of any kind as embracing and articulated by discreteness—which good music freely projects, are all quite embedded in its flowing *rāga*-form as this form unfolds itself in *ālāpa*. On the other hand, they all alike arise from the interplay of tones, phrases, and aesthetic pace. It is this dual integration that makes listening to a music recital (what Dewey would call) quite *an* experience. Above all, because of its generally articulate character, as also by virtue of its logic of creating and interlinking *forms* which draw and hold attention easily, music is able to project for discriminating following the 'forms' of lived experience, that is, their directly felt look, as distinguished from the diversity of *content* of actual experience which (in real life) takes attention away from the intimate *feel* of life. It is the forms in it which stamp music with the character of life as lived—though, of course, as a mere semblance, because things, persons, and actual situations are all missing here.

However, I find it difficult to accept all the points that the extract in question seeks to make. It declares that the 'great office' of art is to give us an insight into the 'life of feeling' or subjective *unity* of experience, and (/or) 'to *organize* our conception of feeling. Further, it regards 'the life of feeling' or man's 'emotional life' as an integration, and not as a mere succession of emotions. Now if, as is again suggested in the passage being discussed, to give an *insight* into the life of feeling is nothing less than 'to *organize* our conception of feeling', and if the life of feeling is already an inter-related complex of emotions, are we to believe that art enables us to *understand how exactly the various emotions are related to each other*? To answer *yes* to this question would, in my view, be untrue to the evidence of fact, unless the word *relation*, is taken to mean essentially the relation (?) of difference. Every exponent of Hindustani classical music knows that the emotive look of *rāga-adānā* is that of valour (*veer rasa*) and that of the *rāga jogiyā*, pathos (*karuna rasa*). But if he be asked as to *how* the two feelings, of valour and pathos, are related, he will only be able to say that they are quite unlike each other. Our classical dancers may be able to say a little more on the point; for the two shades of

shringār rasa (roughly, the emotion of love with a sexual base), *viyoga* and *samyoga shringār* (the pathos of separation, and the bliss of reunion *in love*) do have something visibly in common. But they (the dancers) too will be unable to *explain* how all the nine *rasas* (*navarasas*) interrelate, instead of merely following each other in the elaborate number known as *navarasa-mālikā*, though in actually dancing this number they may well be able to give us vivid glimpses of *each rasa in its individual character*.

Notes and References

1. S.K. Langer: *Feeling and Form* (Referred to from now on as *FF*), Routledge and Kegan Paul, 3rd impression, 1963, p.351. Italics added.
2. S.K. Langer: *Mind—An Essay on Human Feeling* (*MHF* from now on), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1967, Vol.I, p.204.
3. *FF*, p.241.
4. S.K. Langer: *Problems of Art* (Hereafter referred to as *PA*), Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957, p.52. Italics added.
5. *FF*, p.327.
6. Ibid., p.328.
7. Ibid., p.355.
8. Ibid., p.129.
9. Ibid.
10. See, here, the following:
    Music, like language, is an articulate form. Its parts not only fuse together to yield a greater entity, but in doing so they maintain some degree of separate existence, and the sensuous character of each element is affected by its function in the complex whole.
    [Ibid., p.31.]
11. Ibid., p.355.
12. Ibid., p.311.
13. Ibid., p 335.
14. Ibid., p.333.
15. Ibid., p.363.
16. Ibid., p.311; italics added.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p.214; italics added.
19. Ibid.
20. *PA*, p.135.

20a. Ibid.

21. *FF*, p.120.
22. Ibid., pp.128–29.
23. *PA*, p.166.

24. I may here cite the following from my write-up; 'Ustads pay brilliant homage to Dagars' on the 11th Dhrupad Samaroha (Kamani Auditorium, New Delhi, March 18–20, 1995, published in the *Asian Age* (New Delhi) of 24 March 1995:

    Most of those who provided 'accompaniment' (to the musicians) on the *pakhāwaj* ... impressed one and all, by virtue of their fluency, clarity and steadfastness of playing.

25. *PA*, p.36.
26. Ibid., p.37.
27. Ibid., p.38.
28. Ibid., p.39.
29. Ibid., p.37.
30. Ibid.
31. *FF*, p.112.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., p.109; italics added.
34. Ibid., pp.109–10.
35. Ibid, p.113; italics added.
36. In his essay,'Musical Time' and 'Music As An Art of Time', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Summer 1980, pp. 407–17.
37. Ibid., p.411.
38. Ibid., p.412.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p.412–13.
41. Ibid., p.413.
42. Ibid., p.412.
43. Ibid., p.413.
44. *FF*, p.113.
45. Ibid., pp.109–10.
46. Ibid., p.109.
47. Ibid., p.126; italics added.
48. Ibid., p.127.
49. Ibid., p.121.
50. Ibid., pp.125–7.
51. Ibid., p.126.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. *PA*, p.135.
55. *FF*, p.126; italics added.

Advaita—A Reconciliation and Reconstruction

An Analysis of Upaniṣadic and Buddhist Concepts of Advaita vis-à-vis Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara

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Advaita as a school of Vedānta is based on the testimony of the Upaniṣads and derives its support from the *abhedaśruti* passages emphasizing non-difference. In the wake of the stimulus of Buddhist thought, many schools which are independent of the testimony of the Vedas arose. Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkarācārya were sufficiently aware of the independent and the non-Vedic currents of thought prevalent in their times. This is evident from the fact that both of them have not only enumerated the schools they were acquinted with, but also refuted their views. The extant systematic literature in the pre-Śaṅkara period is the *Maṇḍūkyakārikā* of Gauḍapāda. The exact date, influence and background of Gauḍapāda are not known, but his name appears in the verse containing the list of Advaita preceptors which is chanted before any traditional discourse on Advaita. A study of his *Kārikās* shows that he had been influenced by the idealistic philosophy of the Buddhists. At a period when the influence of Buddhism was waning in India, Gauḍapāda noticed that the idealistic schools of Mādhyamika and Yogācāra enunciated a kind of non-scriptural non-dualism even though the real position was that they had borrowed their ideas from the scriptural non-dualism of the Upaniṣads. Hence, instead of resorting to *Śruti* as the only *pramāṇa*, a major part of his *Kārikās* was devoted to establishing non-dualistic reality by means of reason. In the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* of Gauḍapāda, we find that the term 'Advaita' is equated with transcendental reality, the fourth state (*turīya*) of one's own being. Therein, Gauḍapāda follows the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* and attempts to prove that the nature and content of non-dual reality ultimately gives us the idea that liberation lies in the recognition or realization of one's own self which is this non-dual reality. In the tenth verse of his *Kārikā*, Gauḍapāda states:

nivṛtteḥ sarvaduḥkhānāṁ īśānaḥ prabhur avyayaḥ
advaitaḥ sarvabhāvānāṁ devas turyo vibhuḥ smṛtaḥ

The inexhaustible non-dual one is the Controller, the Lord, who effects the eradication of all sorrows. The effulgent *Turīya* is held to be the all-pervasive source of all entities. Here, in the *Kārikā*, following the Upaniṣad, the word 'Advaita' is used towards the end of the descriptions of ātman and it precedes a series of positive and negative explanations. In the last mantra of this Upaniṣad, we find that the same idea is repeated with an emphasis on knowledge and the result, which one would obtain from that. Apart from his reverence for the Upaniṣads, Gauḍapāda shows profound reverence towards the Buddha in order to indicate his allegiance to Buddhism (*Māṇḍūkyakārikā* 4.1). In the penultimate verse of the fourth chapter of his *Kārikā*, Gauḍapāda says:

kramate na hi buddhasya jñānaṁ dharmeṣu tāyinaḥ
sarve dharmāstathā jñānaṁ naitad buddhena bhāṣitam.[1]

The knowledge of the Enlightened One, who is all-pervasive, does not extend to all objects; all the souls also, like knowledge, do not reach out to the objects. This view was not expressed by the Buddha.

Śaṅkara in his commentary thereon says: 'The nature of the supreme Reality is free from the distinctions of knowledge, the known and the knower, and is without a second.' '*naitad buddhena bhāṣitam*'—this fact was not expressed by the Buddha; though his negation of outer objects and his contention that everything is mere consciousness imply non-duality. Here Śaṅkara admits that there is clear proximity of Buddhist idealism to Gauḍapāda's non-dualism as there is evident commonality between the two schools, namely the negation of external objects and acceptance of everything as consciousness (*yadyapi bāhyārthanirākaraṇaṁ jñānamātrakalpanā cādvayavastusāmīpyaṁ uktam*). But this non-duality, the essence of ultimate reality, is to be known from the Upaniṣads only (*idaṁtu paramārthatattvaṁ advaitaṁ vedānteṣv eva vijñeyam*).[2] Now the problem before us is to reconcile what appears to be two positions propounded by Gauḍapāda as he tries to bring out the essence of Advaita through his understanding of Buddhism and of Śaṅkara's demonstration that Advaita follows from the *abheda-śruti* passages of the Upaniṣads. Furthermore, it is necessary to examine the *Kārikā* in so far as it seems to construct a synthesis, namely by presenting the concept of 'Advaita' or 'Advaya' as based, on one hand, on the philosophical tenets of the Mādhyamika school

and, on the other, also on the tenets of the Vijñānavāda school. This appears to be an attempt to reconcile these two idealistic schools of Buddhism with the main source of orthodox Indian philosophy, the Upaniṣads.

Later on, Śaṅkara rigorously established the concept of Advaita, but he did not follow the teachings of the Buddha. He, on the contrary, criticized and refuted the tenets of Buddhism.[3] A solid platform for Śaṅkara's Upaniṣadic non-dualism was already established by his great preceptor Gauḍapāda, whose idea was not to refute the Buddha but to establish the Upaniṣadic concept of non-dualism on a firm basis by utilizing the logical ideas of Buddhism. Even though his *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* is an explanation of the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, for Gauḍapāda, it is strong reasoning that is the principal support for his non-dualism, and for Śaṅkara it is scripture, which is his principal *pramāṇa*. Thus we can say that Gauḍapāda stands in the middle of the process of transition from a non-scriptural to a scriptural non-dualism which was the prototype source even for the Buddha. It is obvious from his presentation of ideas in the *Āgamaprakaraṇa* of the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* that he recognized the importance of the scriptures and advocated an Upaniṣadic system of non-duality over and above the Buddha's ideas without criticizing or in any way damaging the latter's views. In this paper, an attempt has been made to examine the concept of Advaita as approached by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara vis-à-vis the idealistic trends in Buddhism which have their genesis in the Upaniṣads.

ADVAITA IN THE UPANISADS

The source of philosophical speculation in Vedānta is the revelation as given in the Upanisads. As for Vedānta, these *apauruṣeya* (impersonal) texts serve as the means of knowledge and show the way for the realization of the ultimate. The difference among the Vedānta schools lies in the manner in which the world and souls can be said to be related to Brahman. Thus by the textual exegesis of the *Prasthānatraya,* the great preceptors like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva have propagated varieties of Vedāntic schools in Indian philosophy. Though this commentarial tradition still goes on, the original has survived all commentaries and preserves the capacity for new interpretations in the future. Coming to the term 'Advaita' as used in the Upaniṣads we find the *Sadvidyā-prakaraṇa* of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* providing the scriptural background and authority to the problem of one and the many. This Upaniṣad formulates the thesis that Reality is one without a second: '*ekam eva advitīyam*'.[4] This idea is corroborated by a passage of the *Aitareyopaniṣad*: '*ātmā vā idam eka evāgra*

āsīt' (the Ātman alone indeed was there in the beginning). In the *Chāndogya* too, we come across the text, '*tattvamasi*' (6.8.7), which equates the individual self to the supreme Self. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, we find the term 'Advaita' in the statement '*salila eko draṣṭādvaito bhavati*' (4.3.32) which means that, as the water is one, so is the knower of the Self. The explicit use of the term 'Advaita' is found in the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* where reality is equated with *Om* and this non-dual reality is spoken of as the inexplicable fourth state of one's own being—'*śāntaṁ śivaṁ advaitaṁ caturthaṁ manyante, sa ātmā, sa vijñeyaḥ*'.[5] In both these passages, the word 'Advaita' is used for the transcendental entity which is identical with the Self.[6] In Indian tradition, the term Advaita stands for the supreme state which can be an individual or the immanent and transcendent principle, either of them or none of them.[7]

ADVAITA OR ADVAYA IN BUDDHISM

In the *Amarakośa*, 1st century AD, we find the term '*Advayavādī*' used as a synonym for the Buddha.[8] The commentators of the *Amarakośa* state that the term '*Advaya*' refers to the principle of oneness, unity or non-duality, like the concept of *Śūnya* or *Vijñāna* of the Mādhyamika or of the Yogācāra (Vijñānavāda) schools respectively. Śaṅkara in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* avoids the criticisms of the Mādhyamika school, even though from the textual evidence it is clear that the tenets of the school were fairly well known to him.[9] Modern scholars like Paul Hacker and others feel that Śaṅkara was aware of the fact that the position held by the Mādhyamikas was close to his own view on *reality* and hence he refrained from engaging himself in an elaborate refutation of the Mādhyamika school as that might have undermined his own position of non-dualism. But Śaṅkara had to write his commentary within the framework of Bādarāyaṇa's aphorism dealing with the refutation of Mādhyamikas and there is no clue given in the *sarvathānupapatti-adhikaraṇa* excepting outright rejection of the Śūnyavāda. Moreover, since there is such bland refutation, it is not possible to know how Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara viewed the concept of Śūnya and what their understanding of this concept was.

There are many instances of non-Advaita thinkers trying to criticize Advaita on the ground that it is not different from the *Vijñāna* of the Vijñānavāda school of *Śūnya* of the Mādhyamika school.[10] The Buddha, in response to a particular need of his times, wanted to do away with scriptural testimony, which he must have known well, and tried to relate his vision to this oneness or non-duality (i.e. *Śūnya*), the understanding of

which can be an antidote to the sufferings of mankind. In Buddhavacana, the early canonical literature, we do not find much evidence of the presence of non-dualistic ideas being taught by the Buddha. Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga emphasised on certain teachings of the Buddha which gave an idealistic turn to Buddhism which resulted in the formation of the Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda schools. Nāgārjuna went to the extent of saying that the Buddha's teachings were absolutistic and what the Buddha meant by reality was only *Śūnya*, a concept which only the best of Buddhists could understand. Thus, even though the two schools, Mādhyamika and Advaita, appeared on the firmament of Indian philosophy and worked in different directions, much effort is not required to correlate them on the superstructure of philosophical edifices. This gives us an idea of how the two schools held their philosophical tenets side by side, one as an orthodox school accepting the scriptures and the other disowning them, and both promoting a trans-theistic philosophy of their own. In the principal Upaniṣads, the word *Advaita* is used in the sense of non-dualism; whereas in Buddhist literature the word *Advaya* is used in the sense of Advaita. This is also indicated by the usage of the term *Advayavādī* in the *Amarakośa*. This gives us an indication that even in the 1st century AD the Buddha seems to have been known by thinkers of other schools as one propounding non-dualism.[11] This has special reference to the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna who emphasized *śūnya* as the only principle. Buddha being a product of brahminical Indian tradition was definitely aware of Advaitic analyses of the Śruti passages and that must have been reflected in his discourses which shaped the Mādhyamika school later on. To quote T.R.V. Murti:

> A careful analysis would reveal that Hinduism (Brahminism) and Buddhism belong to the same genus; they differ in species. In a sense they are complementary to each other; one emphasises what the other lacks or slurs over. Without affinity they would have been completely sundered from each other, without difference they could not have vitalised and enriched each other. In view of the difference in their basic standpoints and the mode of their historical development, we should be alive to differences as much as we affirm their affinities.[12]

The Mādhyamika school which is centred on the idea of *Śūnya* will have difficulty in accepting the substratal Brahman of Advaita since *Śūnya* cannot become the substratum of anything whatsoever. The contention is that there is no need to accept some reality to be the substratum in the

absolute absence of the objects. This is the precise reason why *pratītyasamutpāda* and *asatkāraṇavāda* as the theory of causality and *asatkhyāti* as the theory of illusion have been accepted by Mādhyamikas. The main idea is that *Śūnya*, void or essencelessness, is not to be taken as the substratum of the world. This gives them enough scope to prove that since reality is divided into *saṁvṛtti* and *paramārtha, saṁvṛtti* is *asat* ultimately, and hence to search for a principle that would serve as the substratum does not make any sense at all. Śaṅkara, following Gauḍapāda, worked out a philosophy, to some extent similar to that of Nāgārjuna as far as absolute reality is concerned. But, for Śaṅkara, the understanding of the absolute requires the sublation of something like the appearances of the world etc. which have derived their existence from this absolute reality, i.e. Brahman.

GAUḌAPĀDA'S SCHEME OF ADVAITA—A RECONCILIATION

Much has been written on the concept of Advaita evolved by Gauḍapāda, the grand preceptor of Śaṅkara. V. Bhattacharya shows Buddhist tendencies in the *Kārikās*.[13] S.N. Dasgupta believes that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist who considered the teachings of the Upaniṣads as similar to those of the Buddha.[14] In the first *Prakaraṇa*, Gauḍapāda makes an empirical analysis to explain the fourth state of one's being which is non-dual Self. Here he says that the state of *turīya* (fourth) is the source of all objects and that the objects are like those of the dream state. When the individual sleeping under the spell of ignorance is awakened, one realises the birthless, sleepless and dreamless non-dual Self.[15] In another verse, he states that the world of appearance would have ceased if it had existed, but all this duality is mere illusion and hence in reality there is only the non-dual entity. Now the question may arise: If there is no duality at all what is the status of teaching which operates in the empirical world? In response to this Gauḍapāda says that it is only for the sake of instruction, and once the reality is known, there is no duality.[16] The idea is that a name is not the thing denoted and hence all the teachings, etc. are only factors indicating the reality. In the realm of understanding, this cessation of duality means that the world is understood as the mere appearance of the non-dual principle. In the second *Prakaraṇa*, Gauḍapāda says that world perception is because of the imagination of a perceiver self and along with it the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and the external world. It is just like the rope-snake where there is neither production nor destruction of anything. Gauḍapāda states:

na nirodho na cotpattiḥ na baddho na ca sādhakaḥ
na mumukṣur na vai muktiḥ ityeṣā paramārthatā.

There is no destruction, no origination, none is bound to this *saṁsāra*; there is neither an aspirant, nor salvation, neither one desirous of salvation, nor again one liberated, this is the highest truth.[17]

This can be compared to the invocatory verse of Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamikavṛtti*,

anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam
anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam.
yaḥ pratītyasamutpādam prapañcopaśamaṁ śivam
deśayāmāsa sambuddhaḥ taṁ vande vadatāṁ varam.

I offer my salutations to the best among the speakers who, having attained enlightenment, has taught relative origination, which is no cessation, no origination; no annihilation, non-abiding; and the non-difference, non-identity; and non-difference, non-appearance; and the non-difference, being the termination of linguistic description and the auspicious.

In the *Maṇḍūkyakārikā*, verse IV.1, we find the same idea and terminology being used by Gauḍapāda:

jñānenākāśakalpena dharmānyo gaganopamān
jñeyābhinnena sambuddhastaṁ vande dvipadāṁ varam

The term *Advaita* is used in another verse, II.36, where Gauḍapāda says that after gaining knowledge, one should fix one's memory on the non-dual entity. By attaining this non-dual state, one may move around like a dullwitted person (in whichever way one likes). The reference to the absence of the world in this non-dual entity is also given by him.

nirvikalpo hyayaṁ dṛṣṭo prapañcopaśamo 'dvayaḥ[18]

This shows that Gauḍapāda, unlike Nāgārjuna, believes in a principle which is the locus and is free from world perception. Gauḍapāda considers Advaita to be the absolute reality and that whatever is dual is the outcome of this non-dual. Hence there is no conflict with the dualists who believe the duality to be absolute and also empirical.

advaitaṁ paramārtho hi dvaitaṁ tadbheda ucyate
teṣāṁ ubhayathā dvaitaṁ tenāyaṁ na viruddhyate.

> Non-duality is the highest reality; duality is spoken of as its modification. For the dualists duality exists both ways. Hence there is no conflict with them.

In the Fourth Chapter, Gauḍapāda introduces *ajātivāda* which holds the key to the *Vivartavāda* of Śaṅkara. Gauḍapāda says:

prakṛteranyathābhāvo na kathañcit bhaviṣyati.[19]

Gauḍapāda feels that there is nothing wrong if the non-dual appears to be dual, like a single mind appearing as the cognizer and the object cognized in the dream state. Thus, in the empirical realm, it is the mind which owns the duality and, for controlling the mind, Gauḍapāda invokes the famous Buddhist concept of *Asparśayoga*. In his *Kārikā*, he first accepts Vijñānavāda and later on criticizes it. He says that external entities are not products of consciousness, nor is consciousness a product of external entities. Hence the cause–effect relationship cannot be established.[20] Gauḍapāda refers to *Śāśvatavāda* and *Ucchedavāda* when he says that everything appears to be born because of the empirical outlook. Therefore, there is nothing called eternal from the standpoint of the reality; everything is the birthless Self. Hence there is no such thing as annihilation. Gauḍapāda says:

samvṛtyā jāyate sarvaṁ śāśvataṁ tena nāsti vai
svabhāvena hyajaṁ sarvaṁ ucchedas tena nāsti vai.[21]

According to Gauḍapāda, the very concept of entity (*dharma*) is because of its birth or appearance. If *dharma* is not present, the concept of birthlessness is not required as it will have no applicability.[22] He also points out that this does not mean that there is no appearance, for in the state of *saṁvṛti*, one has to accept objects, cognition and cognizer, which has been taught by the Buddha himself.[23] In the penultimate verse, Gauḍapāda shows his reverence for the Buddha, saying that the all-pervasive knowledge of the Buddha has nothing to do with the objects of the empirical universe. Here Gauḍapāda says that the Buddha did not talk of entities getting related to knowledge, '*naitad buddhena bhāṣitam*'. The meaning is that though the Buddha denied *bāhyārthavāda*, he could not avoid causal relation while explaining *ajātivāda*. Bhattacharya explains this passage saying that, since transcendental truth cannot be attained by instruction, the Buddha preferred to maintain silence.[24] From the foregoing analysis of the text, it is clear that the first Advaita writer has been influenced to a substantial extent by the Mādhyamika tenets as found in

the works of Nāgārjuna and also by the Vijñānavāda doctrines, found in the *Laṅkāvatāra*. In professing non-dualism, he has assimilated all the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra teachings, believing that the truth taught by the Buddha is not far away from that of the Upaniṣads and that the two approaches are complementary. In the absence of any earlier reference to the Buddhist background of Gauḍapāda it is conceivable that he had acquaintance with a school of Buddhism that had assimilated the two idealist schools of Buddhism as referred to here. Be that as it may, he was the first to believe that the non-dualism, the *Advaya* of Buddhism, however indeterminable or indefinable, *Vijñāna* or *Śūnya*, is similar to the Upaniṣadic non-dual reality.

ŚAṄKARA'S CONCEPT OF ADVAITA—A RECONSTRUCTION

Śaṅkara, following Gauḍapāda, works out a similar non-dual philosophy as far as absolute reality is concerned. That understanding of this absolute requires the sublation of the world of appearance which has derived its existence from this absolute. Śaṅkara asserts that the visible world is nothing but the appearance of Brahman in a different context. As the rope-snake is just another appearance of rope so also is the world, an appearance of Brahman. Had there been no rope there would be no rope-snake. For Śaṅkara this reality is existence, consciousness and bliss which are shared in the things of the world and that is how the concept of non-dualism is brought about. Śaṅkara in all his writings equates the term 'Advaita' with Brahman, as the non-dual entity. The term 'non-dual' is very important because the visible duality has its place as quasi-real entities. The term 'Non-dualism' is preferred to the term 'Monism' because the absolute entity, Brahman, is intended to be understood as non-dual. Advaita gives emphasis to this term 'non' which implies a negation of all types of duality and difference like internal, between the members of the same species or between different species (*vijātīya-sajātīya-svagata-bheda-śūnyatvam*). A mere monism would not have the first two types of differences, whereas there would be no problem if the first type (*svagata-bheda*) is accepted. Advaita makes an outright rejection of all these differences. In Monism, substantial or attributive, there is an attempt to reduce all phenomena to a single principle as we find in Bradley, Spinoza and to some extent in Leibnitz, and traces of it can be seen in the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides. But for Advaita, in the very process of understanding, the world is real and even after the understanding, the so-called world continues to be without distorting the understanding, and that

is what is called *Jīvanmukti*. As Hiriyanna would put it, 'The freed man is in and out of *Saṁsāra* at the same time—empirically in it but transcendentally out of it.'[25] So the reality of the world is accepted while the understanding of it has undergone a change. This is how the relation between *Prārabdhakarma* and *Jīvanmukti* has been established in Advaita Vedānta. If liberation brings an end to the world of appearances, there is no question of *Jīvanmukti* as the body of the liberated man would fall off once he attains this realization. Sureśvara, a direct disciple of Śaṅkara, deals with this point in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* wherein he says that, since the person has become liberated in the psycho-physical frame, he continues to remain in that state until the fructified deeds are exhausted.[26] All this goes to show that in Śaṅkara's scheme of understanding, a place for *dvaita* is maintained but a '*dvaita*' in a different dimension, namely in the relative sphere. P. Hacker and T. Vetter suggest that, in the course of his development, Śaṅkara turned away from an early indebtedness to Buddhist ideas.[27] Vetter states that Śaṅkara's anti-Buddhist polemics in his *Brahmasūtra* commentary might be an attempt to dissociate himself from the position he had earlier maintained in his commentary of the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*. Hacker maintains that in his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, Śaṅkara turned against a Buddhist theory he had previously accepted, the theory of apparent disintegration of pure consciousness into subject and object.[28] But an observation of the *Kārikās* shows his suggestion that the great Buddhist truth of non-dual reality is what the *Upaniṣads* would have had in them as non-dual Brahman-Ātman, and the Buddha would have got this idea from the Upaniṣads themselves. The question relating to the theory of substratum, as pointed out earlier, is difficult to accept in an attempt to bring about a difference between Buddhism and Advaita. It is because even the Mādhyamikas would have *Śūnya* as the substratum which has not been pronounced directly by Nāgārjuna. The rigorous scriptural analysis which was taken up by Śaṅkara to establish Brahman-Ātman somehow gives the idea that his ideal of non-dual self is different from that of Nāgārjuna, for whom *Śūnya* is an essenceless reality. For Gauḍapāda the truth of the Upaniṣads is nearer to his understanding of the Buddha's non-dual reality and, therefore, he did not labour much to establish a substratal Brahman. In Śaṅkara's Upaniṣadic exegesis however, that concept of Reality is of great importance. While commenting on the *Chāndogya* text '*ekamevādvitīyam*' (6.2.1), Śaṅkara states '*nāsya dvitīyaṁ vastvantaraṁ vidyata iti advitīyam*'. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* again, Śaṅkara deals with the concept of immanence in a

detailed manner. 'By the realisation of the Self, my dear, through hearing, reflection and meditation, all this is known.' The term 'all this is known'[29] is of some interest to us in understanding the methodology Śaṅkara applies to establish Advaita. In his commentary he states: 'All this, that is other than the self, is known for there is nothing else but the Self.'[30] In order to distinguish *Advaitavāda* from *Advayavāda* of Buddhism, Śaṅkara emphasizes the *Śrutipramāṇa* and on that authority he branded Buddhists as unorthodox, stating that their literature should not be taken seriously by those who wish to attain liberation.[31]

In the post-Śaṅkara period, Śaṅkara's legacy of establishing Advaita was taken up rigourously and many writers took up this task from different angles. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his commentary on the *Daśaślokī* of Śaṅkara tries to define the term 'Advaita' by distinguishing it from the possible definitions of other schools. He says:

na vidyate dvaitaṁ dvidhābhāvo yatra tadadvaitam ityakṣarārthaḥ[32]

Advaita is that principle in which there is absence of duality. By using the word '*yatra*', Madhusūdana wants to give importance to the concept of substratum, i.e. Brahman which is not only transcendent but also immanent in all the beings. In the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, Śrīharṣa uses Mādhyamika dialectics to refute the standpoint of the other schools. However, he prefers scriptural exegesis to prove non-dualism. He says:

ekamevādvitīyamityuktyā yadevakāramādatte śrutiḥ tadātyantikamadvaitaṁ pratipādayitumiti.

His contention is that the usage of the term *eva* in the Upaniṣad is meant to establish absolute non-dualism.[33]

CONCLUSION

Śaṅkara and the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins have explained the concept of Advaita more on the authority of the Śruti with the aid of reason and experience. Śaṅkara's adherence to Śruti and his critique of other schools make him a radical Vedāntin who seems to be bent upon the establishment of an Advaita tradition on a scriptural base. He does not seem to be satisfied with the liberal approach taken by Gaudapāda. History in India has been such a neglected field that no conjecture can be made as far as the dates of ancient writers are concerned. It is all the more difficult when we take up the task of unearthing authentic history of the great authors of

Indian philosophical treatises. In Gauḍapāda, we find that reason and experience play a vital role in establishing the concept of non-dualism on the basis of something already established by the Buddha and the Upaniṣads which he reverentially acknowledges. This does not mean that he gives less importance to the Upaniṣads as he prefers to write the whole text of his *Kārikā* as an exposition of the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad.*[34] It is only where the necessity arises to criticize the views of opponents, have Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara based their arguments more on logic. But as an author of one of the earliest works to deal explicitly with scriptural non-dualism, Gauḍapāda launches his arguments through convincing logic to show that the tenets extended by the Buddhists can be traced to the scriptural non-dualism of the Upaniṣads and are the logical development of the scriptures which the Buddha did not take cognisance of. In Śaṅkara, on the other hand, we find a strong dose of *Śruti* along with reason, on the line of his grand preceptor Gauḍapāda, which has been employed to establish the philosophy of Advaita which stands the test of time.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Māṇḍūkyakārikā (MK)*, 4.9.
2. Śaṅkara's commentary on *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*, 4.9.
3. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra*, II.ii.32.
4. R. Balasubramanian, 'The one and the many', *The Tradition of Advaita, (Ed.)* 1994, p. 44.
5. *Māṇḍūkya-upaniṣad*, 7.
6. For Śaṅkara, the entity designated by the term Advaita is the non-dual, unqualified transcendental being which is the essence of individual soul. For Rāmānuja, it is qualified, though non-dual. For Madhva, it is independent, in contrast to the *jīvas* which are dependent entities.
7. In Advaita it is both; in Viśiṣṭādvaita, it is qualified and transcendent; in Dvaita it is transcendent; in Buddhism it is neither transcendent nor immanent.
8. *Advayavādī vināyakaḥ, Amarakośa*, Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1983, Vol. I, p. 12.
9. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra*, II. ii. 32. In his *bhāṣya* to the Sūtra, '*sarvathānupapattesca*', Śaṅkara says: *api ca bāhyārthavijñānaśūnyavādatrayamitaretaramupadiśatā sugatena spaṣṭīkṛtamātmano'sambaddhapralāpitvam, pradveṣo vā prajāsu, viruddhārthapratipatyā vimuhyeyuriṃā prajā iti, sarvathāpyanādaraṇīyoyaṁ sugatasamayaḥ śreyaskāmairityabhiprāyaḥ.* (Moreover, by advocating three mutually contradictory principles like Bāhyārthavāda, Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda, the Buddha has made some incoherent prattling, or his dislike for all beings, hoping that they would be thoroughly confused by his contradictory statements. The purpose of this

aphorism is that all those who seek liberation must totally disregard the philosophy of Buddha.)

10. Śaṅkara is referred to as a *Prachhannabauddha*, a pseudo-Buddhist, by his opponents. In the *Ātmasiddhi* of Yāmunācārya, it is said: *svayaṁprakāśasaṁvideva paramārthasatī saivātmā iti saugatāḥ-prakaṭāḥ pracchannāśca* (The self-illumined consciousness is the absolute reality and that is the Individual self. This is the view of the Buddhists, the marked ones like Vijñānavādins and the pseduo ones, the Advaitins.) Refer Siddhitraya (*Ātmasiddhi*) of Yāmuna, Ubhayavedānta Granthamālā, Madras, 1972, p. 25.
11. Amarasiṁha, the author of *Amarakośa* was a Buddhist writer.
12. *Studies in Indian Thought: Collected Papers of Professor T.R.V. Murti*, Ed. by H.G. Coward, 1983, pp. 198-99.
13. The *Āgamaśāstra* of Gauḍapāda, Ed. by V. Bhattacharya, 1943, p. cxxvii.
14. S.N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 423–9.
15. *anādimāyayā supto yadā jīvaḥ prabuddhyate*
    ajamanidramasvapnamadvaitaṁ buddhyate sadā. M.K. I.16.
16. *upadeśādayaṁ vādaḥ jñāte dvaitaṁ na vidyate. M.K.* I.18.
    Also refer to *yatra vedāḥ avedāḥ bhavanti* (Where Vedas, the epitome of knowledge become non-Vedas, i.e. do not carry any weightage), *Bṛhadāraṅyakopaniṣad*, 4.3.22.
17. *M.K.* 32.
18. Ibid., II.35.
19. Ibid., IV.7
20. *evaṁ na cittajāḥ dharmāś-cittaṁ vāpi na dharmajam*
    evaṁ hetuphalājātiṁ praviśanti manīṣiṇaḥ
    — *M.K.* IV.54.
21. Ibid., IV.57.
22. Ibid., IV.74.
23. *jñānaṁ jñeyaṁ ca vijñeyaṁ sadā buddhaiḥ prakīrtitam—M.K.* IV. 88.
24. R.D. Karmarkar (Ed. & Tr.), *Gauḍapādakārikā*, BORI, Poona, 1973, p. 146.
25. M. Hiriyanna, *Indian Conception of Values* (1975), p. 251.
26. R. Balasubramanian (Ed. & Tr.), *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* of Sureśvara, University of Madras, 1988, pp. 383 ff.
27. Wilhelm Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection*, 1991, p. 217.
28. Ibid., pp. 218 ff.
29. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 4.5.6.
30. Śaṅkara's commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 4.5.6.
31. Śaṅkara's commentary on *Brahmasūtra* II.ii.32.
    Also refer Note 9 of this article.
32. *Siddhāntabindu* of Madhusūdanasarasvatī. Commentary on *Daśaślokī*, verse 10.
33. *Siddhāntabindu* with the com. of Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, Kumbhakonam Edition, p. 209.
34. T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Vedānta*, University of Madras, 1960, p. 65.

Śaṅkara on 'Kena' Upaniṣad

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I

The Kena Upaniṣad is a small but very important text of the *Prasthānatraya*. Its importance can be gauged from the fact that it is the only Upaniṣad upon which Śaṅkara has written two commentaries, namely *Padabhāṣya* and *Vākya-bhāṣya*. The cryptic style of the Upaniṣads poses very abstruse problems and their subtle intricacies are difficult to be resolved without the help of Śaṅkara's commentary, for it not only explains the purport of the Upaniṣads but also puts forth certain genuine philosophical material for thought. It is with this view that some salient features of Śaṅkara's commentary on the Kena Upaniṣad are being discussed in the present paper.

Self-realization is the aim of the teaching of the Upaniṣads. In the Kena Upaniṣad, the goal of self-realization is approached from the standpoint of epistemology. The text under study is titled 'Kena' since it begins with the query: By whom or by what force are the activities of mind, life-force, speech and sense controlled? What is it within us that guides them to their objects? An answer is envisaged in the four sections of the Kena Upaniṣad; the first two dwell upon the unqualified *Brahman* while the last two propound the concept of qualified *Brahman*. This paper deals primarily with the first two sections.

II

Pursuit of knowledge has been the ardent longing and perennial goal of all human beings and the capacity to know has been their proud possession. Although their self-conscious faculty has also, at times, been voicing scepticism, yet it has always been a travesty of human fate that the more one seeks to know, the more knowledge eludes one's grasp. Of course nothing is more agonising than ignorance and nothing is more refreshing than knowledge, as one rejoices in knowledge and feels dejected in

ignorance. Knowledge is declared the means to emancipation.[1] But the process of knowing has always been beset with paradoxes in so far as we may claim to know and at the same time we may doubt and dispute the veracity of this claim. We tend to seek knowledge and yet at the same time we doubt the possibility of attaining it. On the one hand we claim objectivity for our knowledge, but on the other hand, we deny the very possibility of knowledge possessing this property on the ground that all human knowledge is subjective and liable to err.[2] In epistemological exercises, therefore, we tend to oscillate between truth-claim and error-exposure or even more fundamentally between knowledge and ignorance. The history of philosophical thought presents diverse responses to epistemological enterprises, ranging from dogmatic certainty to vehement agnosticism. In between there are also a wide variety of qualified positions, more so with regard to knowledge of the ultimate reality, i.e. *Brahman*.

In the background of this baffling epistemological situation, we find the Kena Upaniṣad a source of great solace and relief. It provides a very important critique of epistemology and gives a fine and sophisticated analysis of the knowledge situation which is subtle and sublime, valid and wonderful. Positing a trans-empirical ontos, it points out the inadequacy and futility of the epistemological approach. It emphasizes the failure of logical attempts to know the non-epistemic Reality known as *Brahman* which is unthinkable by the mind and unspeakable by speech.[3] It advocates a special sort of knowing, a knowing by being, an intuitive realization in which all epistemic process comes to a standstill and knowing becomes one with being. This realization may baffle an ordinary mind but make an enlightened mind revel in the glory of *Brahmajñāna*—which is illuminating and endearing and which culminates in Supreme Bliss and beatitude; it is therefore, rightly accepted as the highest goal of life according to the Upaniṣads or Vedānta.

It should be made clear here that Vedānta does not teach epistemic nihilism as it accepts the phenomenal validity of all empirical knowledge but asserts its limitations and ultimate sublatability. In the Nārada-Sanatkumāra parable in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, all empirical knowledge is conceded but assigned a limited role and the need to transcend it is emphasized.[4] Vedānta is, in fact, *Brahmavidyā*[5] and therefore advocates the necessity of *Brahmajñāna*. It is from this point of view that the Kena Upaniṣad is said to be the *Brāhmī* Upaniṣad[6] as it deals with knowledge of *Brahman*.

III

Here the question arises as to how can one know *Brahman*, which is neither the object, nor the subject of knowledge, but knowledge *per se*. In reply it may be said that, in the Vedāntic framework of advaitic hue, a dichotomous distinction is drawn between the empirical and the trans-empirical, the *vyāvahārika* and the *pāramārthika*. Accordingly, a parallel distinction between the *aparā vidyā* and *parā vidyā*[7] is also accepted though it is maintained that ultimately there is absorption of the former in the later. *Aparā vidyā* is related to the realm of subjectivity while *parā vidyā* is concerned with Pure Existence which is also Pure Knowledge and Infinitude.[8] Granting conditional and evanescent value to empirical knowledge (*aparā vidyā*), its vanity has been demonstrated. But so far as *parā vidyā* is concerned, it is *Brahmajñāna* itself which alone is regarded as 'Supreme Truth', untouched by all subjectivity, conditionality of doubt and denial. *Brahman* is the essence or Self of all things[9] and hence one who knows It, knows everything.[10] Nobody can doubt or deny the existence of one's own self and therefore the reality or truth of self-realization is well-established.[11] One may not know one's nature fully but no one can deny one's own existence, which is indisputable.

Kena Upaniṣad affirms the existence of this Supreme Consciousness, *Brahman*, as our real self and true existence; it states that the mind, life, sight, speech etc. are not able to comprehend the ultimate reality, *Brahman*, for they are only inferior modes and external instruments employed in the field of empirical knowledge. It reiterates that *Brahman* is the all-cognitive principle and asserts the following facts:

(a) It is beyond the reach of mind and the senses.[12]
(b) It does not itself require mind as an instrument to think.[13]
(c) It is rather that power by which mind is capable of thinking.[14]
(d) It is the very nature of *Brahman* that it is beyond description.[15]
(e) In fact, *Brahman* is our own self experienced by us in every cognition and at every moment. But again none can resort to his own self and neither can one evade one's own self. Hence it is said that *Brahman* is different from the known and above the unknown.[16]

Śaṅkara, while commenting on this part of the Kena Upaniṣad, says that whatever is known to someone, has to be the object of knowledge but *Brahman* cannot be the object of knowledge in any real sense of the term,[17] hence it is different from the known. Moreover, anything known in the empirical sense, has a name and a form (*nāma-rūpa*), since these

two remain in every transitory object or an effect. Brahman, a permanent entity, must be different from such an effect which has a beginning and an end.[18] Therefore, Brahman is different from the objects known empirically.

Now, it may ordinarily be said that if *Brahman* is different from the known, then it must be unknown. But it is not so; *Brahman* is not unknown but above the unknown: '*aviditādadhi*'. Śaṅkara clarifies that whatever is unknown, requires knowing while *Brahman* is not in need of knowledge; since it is Itself in the form of knowledge, hence it does not require another *Vijñana*. Just as a lamp does not require another light to illumine it, similarly *Brahman* does not stand in need of knowledge.[19] It is different from the phenomenal world which can be known through the sense organs, mind and intellect. In fact, it is the knower behind them and is therefore beyond the known and the unknown.

In other words, the 'known' is all that we grasp and possess by our present mental modes while the 'unknown' is that which is different from the known, but is not unknowable if we can extend our mental faculties or attain some other capabilities that we do not yet possess. That is what is meant by the word *adhi* i.e. above or as something other than.[20] But it has to be remembered that

> Brahman in itself is unknown and therefore beyond description, not because it is a void and capable of no description but because it is beyond all things that our knowledge can conceive and because the methods of ideation and expression proper to our mentality do not apply to it. It is the absolute of all things that we know and of each thing that we know and yet nothing nor any sum of things can exhaust or characterise its essential being. For its manner of being is other than that which we call existence; its unity resists all analysis, its multiple infinities exceed every synthesis.[21]

It is from this point of view that the Kena Upaniṣad uses several terms to convey the idea that the *Brahman* is unknown, i.e. not to be known ordinarily. On scrutinizing Śaṅkara's interpretations of these words we can point out the following:

(a) *na vidmo na vijānīmaḥ* (1.3)

Apparently these two statements seem repetitive but Śaṅkara has construed them in such a way that the first part of the statement characterizes the *Brahman* and the latter becomes an adverb of the verb *anuśiṣyāt*.[22]

(b) *anyadeva tad viditādatho aviditādadhi* (1.3)

Ordinary means of knowledge like perception and inference are not capable of grasping the ultimate reality, *Brahman*; it is only the scripture which is a source of knowledge in this respect. Accordingly, this phrase is cited here as an *āgama*, an instruction from the earlier tradition of preceptors.[23]

(c) *yanmanasā na manute, cakśuṣā na paśyati,*
śrotreṇa na śṛṇoti, prāṇena na prāṇiti

Śaṅkara, explaining these utterances, states that they reaffirm the basic Upaniṣadic contention, i.e. the Supreme Consciousness *Brahman* is not to be grasped through sense-organs like ordinary objects. On the contrary, It is the impeller of these senses; these can't work without Its power. Since the disciple had asked specifically about the impeller of these five organs, hence the preceptor is answering separately in five verses, although he had already answered his question generally (in verse 1.2).[24]

(d) *na svveda, na veda*

It is very difficult to say that one knows *Brahman* well, but at the same time one cannot maintain that one does not know It, for It is the very nature of one's being. One who has realized It, will not make such claims as, 'I know *Brahman* well', because such statements reflect the immaturity of one's knowledge.[25]

(e) *amatam*

One who is motivated by his quest for knowing *Brahman*, does not know It, but he, whose quest to know has already been satisfied, really knows It because he has realized his own self as *Brahman*.[26]

(f) *avijñātam*

Śaṅkara has clarified here, and quite logically too, that this second line may be taken as an argument in support of the first line. He explains the verse as follows: Since the realized ones are aware that the *Brahman* is one with the self and cannot be known as an object, hence It is unknown to them from this point of view. On the other hand, those who do not know Its real nature, think that they know It, but actually they do not know It.

It is intriguing to note here that on the one hand the Kena Upaniṣad propounds in so many terms that the Supreme Reality is unknown, but at

the same time states categorically and in five consecutive verses that '*tadeva Brahma tvaṁ viddhi* ', i.e. you should know that (consciousness or self) alone as *Brahman*:

The purpose of this repetition, according to Śaṅkara, is to underline the fact that the Supreme Consciousness or *Brahman* is no other than the self of a human being.[27] It is this identity of *Brahman* and *ātman* which is being emphasized here.[28] In fact, the ultimate reality, *Brahman*, is unoriginated and unrelated in its true nature, It exists on its own and is the ground of all objects which are originated and are relational. It is true that the ultimate reality is transcendental, it is not a phenomena with which we are familiar in our day-to-day experience, still we have to search for it and discover it in our own self, since it is not separate from our own being. In this way, this self-knowledge is unique, it is not merely knowledge of the self as an object or by the self (as a subject).

It is also to be clarified here that, on first reading, it seems as if there is a tautology in the five imperatives referred to above and the second part of the verses, namely: *nedaṁ yadidam upāsate*. But Śaṅkara has explained this repetition by stating that the first part of the imperatives is for enjoining a restrictive injunction (*niyama-vidhi*), while the second part is an exclusive injunction (*parisaṁkhyā*).[29] This is characteristic of the Upaniṣadic style according to which the ultimate reality, *Brahman*, is not to be described through positive diction. It is true that It can be known only through scripture but it may again be pointed out that even scripture cannot describe It clearly as such and such, it can reveal the nature of the real only negatively as *what it is not*.

IV

It is, therefore, not without reason that the seeker of *Brahmavidyā* puts forth various contrary viewpoints about his knowledge of *Brahman* which may apparently pose many serious epistemic paradoxes as follows:

(i) *Nāhaṁ manye suvedeti*, i.e. I don't think that I know It well.
(ii) *No na Vedeti*, i.e. Not that I do not know.
(iii) *Veda cha*, i.e. I know too.
(iv) *Yo nastad vèda tadveda*, i.e. Whosoever amongst us comprehends it, knows That.
(v) *No na vedeti veda cha*,[30] i.e. It is not known and the known as well.

In fact, it is a reaffirmation of what has already been said by the preceptor that *Brahman* is different from the known and above the unknown. It simply suggests that *Brahman* is not to be known like other empirical objects. It is different from all other knowables and hence '*durbodha*'. As regards knowledge of ordinary objects, such contradictory statements would definitely prove their dubitability but this language of confusing contradictions poses no paradoxes as far as it is employed to express and convey the self-awareness of Pure Consciousness. It is in such places that language breaks down in its attempts 'to express the Inexpressible'.[31]

Śaṅkara here clarifies by saying that the Upaniṣadic statement may apparently seem an epistemic paradox but on deeper analysis it resolves all the contradictions. Another commentator on the Kena Upaniṣad, Śaṅkarānanda, has highlighted the specific import of each of the terms in this verse[32] and said that *Brahman* is neither completely known nor entirely unknown like worldly objects.

V

Kena Upaniṣad makes another important distinction between knowledge and knowledge-claim. Knowledge is necessarily true and unfalsifiable but a knowledge-claim may be true or false. One may claim to know and yet may not actually know—this is stated in another verse in two pairs of apparent paradoxes which are resolved by Śaṅkara as follows:

1. (a) *Yasyāmataṁ mataṁ tasya,* i.e. He who properly knows It, thinks that he does not know. It means that one who does not know *Brahman* in a dualistic framework as a subject or as an object, does really know It.[33]
   (b) *Mataṁ yasya na veda saḥ*, i.e. He who does not know properly, thinks that he knows. Śaṅkara explains it by saying that one who claims to know Brahman, does not in fact know It, as this knowledge-claim is based on a distinction between known and the unknown.[34]
2. (a) *Avijñātaṁ vijānatām*, i.e. those who claim to know *Brahman* as determined by body, senses, mind etc., do not in fact know It. They do not even know that *Brahman* as an object is not known by senses, mind etc. but they think that they know It; their claim of knowing itself proves that they do not know It. According to Śaṅkarānanda, those who are conscious of *knowledge, knower and known*, do not in fact know *Brahman*, because It is devoid of any such differences.[35]

(b) *Vijñātaṁ avijānatām*, i.e. Those who know that *Brahman* cannot be known by senses, mind etc. correctly think that they do not know *Brahman*, since those who do not see any sort of difference, are really aware of It.[36]

Śaṅkara has tried to resolve the repetition and apparent contradiction here by logically explaining that *Brahman* is really undetermined by any attribute but when one talks of knowing It, It is bound to be determined with an attribute (like the object etc.), hence those who think or say that they know *Brahman*, do not really know It in its true nature. On the other hand, those who think that their knowledge of *Brahman* is not proper due to the existence of the determinant of being known, really know It. They at least have the minimum knowledge that *Brahman is different from the known and beyond the unknown.* It is knowledge *per se*, having no relation with the knower and the known. The *Śrutis* are unanimous in their declaration that *Infinite Bliss* can only be experienced by the one who has come to live in entire identification with the Brahman,[37] or the Self.

VI

Śaṅkara, in his commentary on Kena Upaniṣad further states that *Brahman* should not be understood as totally unknowable; if It were so accepted, then there would be no difference between ordinary mortals and the realized souls.[38] More-over, what has already been said above would prove self-contradictory. The Kena Upaniṣad, therefore provides the technique for realization of *Brahman* in one's own self. The real knowledge of *Brahman* is possible by realizing It as ever-present in every knowledge: '*Pratibodhaviditaṁ matam*'[39], is the key term of the Kena Upaniṣad from this point of view. It means that Brahman is always present as a witness (*sākśi*) in every knowledge,[40] to realize It in this form is the real knowledge which can dispel all ignorance and is the means to immortality. Śaṅkara explains this term in various ways in his commentaries but then accepts and advocates this very meaning by saying: '*atah pratyayapratyagātmatayā viditaṁ Brahma yadā tadā tat mataṁ tat samyagdarśanamityarthaḥ*'[41], i.e. *Brahman* can't be known, It can only be realized as the ever-present self in every knowledge. This is what is meant by the term *pratibodhaviditam*, also explained as *sarvabodhaboddhṛtvam* by Śaṅkara in his Padabhāṣya.

In other words, it also reaffirms that *Brahman* cannot be known in the ordinary way, It is to be realized as one's own self in the form of con-

sciousness ever-present in all cognitions. Just as the presence of fire is felt very much distinctly from the hot iron, similarly *Brahman* is to be experienced as *pratyagātmavijñānam* and not as *viṣayavijñānam*;[42] *viṣayavijñāna* is already negated in the case of *Brahman* (in verses 1.4 to 1.8).

The term knowledge is ordinarily understood in Advaitic tradition as *vrtti-jnana*, which is a blend of the *vrtti* (modification) of mind and the reflection of consciousness therein. This *vrtti-jnana* is empirical knowledge for which the functioning of mind and senses is absolutely necessary. But the mind as well as sense organs are capable of knowing any thing only when they are inspired by consciousness.[43] When the mind and senses are controlled through ethical and spiritual discipline, when the mind becomes a non-mind and there is complete absence of mental modifications, then the self, which is ever-present in the form of consciousness, remains in its natural state and the person who has come upto this stage of development, realizes the inward self and remains as the self. This is a case of knowing where to know the self is to be the self and this precisely is the meaning of *pratibodhaviditam* according to Śaṅkara.

VII

Two important conclusions follow from the foregoing analysis:

(i) *Brahman or Pratyagātma Brahma* is not unknowable or even unknown to the realized ones, but it is not known in the way ordinary objects are known at empirical level. It is in this sense that *Brahman* is other than the known and beyond the unknown. It is at one and the same time known to some and unknown to others. It is thus at once both known and the unknown and also not known and not unknown. Apparently, it may sound to be paradoxical but this is the ultimate truth as it is expounded in the Vedānta texts. In order to resolve this paradox, it has to be split up in four alternatives viz:

(a) It is known (as *pratibodhaviditam*). It is known in self-realization.
(b) It is not known (as an object). It is unknown through senses and mind.
(c) It is other than the known (objects known empirically). It is not known through *sajātāya* or *vijītīya bhedas*.
(d) It is other than the unknown (like *tuchha* or *alīka*).

There is no contradiction in any of these four alternatives as all are mutually exclusive. Contradiction will be there only when it is said that

'I know and yet I do not know'. Likewise, in fact 'other than known' is 'not unknown' and vice-versa as these are not mutually exclusive and exhaustive dichotomies.

(ii) The second conclusion is that one may know *Brahman* but may not do so fully well as *Brahmajñāna* is not like ordinary knowledge, where the knower and known are quite distinct.[44] *Brahman* is without any attribute and possesses no form, hence one who says that he knows *Brahman* well, knows It very little, since It requires meditation and contemplation. Therefore just after hearing from the preceptor one should not claim that 'I have known It well'; *śravaṇa* alone is not enough for It, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*[45] have also to be practised. This is what the Kena Upaniṣad reaffirms in the following words:

Yadi manyase suvedeti dabhramevāpi nūnam tvaṁ vettha Brahmaṇo rūpam.
Yadasya tvaṁ yadasya deveṣvatha nu mīmāṁsyameva te manye viditam.[46]

Śaṅkara, while explaining the above, has said that for a proper understanding of the Supreme Reality, three modes/steps of knowledge have to be exercised:

(a) *śravaṇa: evamāchāryoktaḥ*
(b) *manana: ekānta upaviṣṭaḥ samāhitaḥ san yathoktamāchāryeṇa āgamamarthato vichārya tarkataścha nirdhārya*
(c) *nididhyāsana: svānubhavaṁ kṛtva*[47]

It is only in this way that one can realize the true nature of *Brahman*, otherwise there is every possibility of error. That is why the *Śruti* cautions against any fake knowledge-claim and lays emphasis on *mimāṁsā*, an equivalent for philosophical enquiry.

VIII

The Kena Upaniṣad further declares that *Brahmajñāna* is to be realized in this very life itself. It is available in this birth provided the basic conditions of its availability are fulfilled. In fact this should be the *summum bonum* of life as Śaṅkara says in his commentary on the Brahmasūtras:

Brahmāvagatirhi puruṣārthaḥ.[48]

The Upaniṣad declares that if it is not accomplished in this life and on this earth, there is great perdition in the form of continued bondage and

suffering.[49] On the other hand, if it is accomplished here, one gains the power of pure knowledge and through that reaches immortality, the true nature of *Brahman*.[50]

In fact, this is the *phala-śruti* of the first two sections of the Kena Upaniṣad. Accordingly, he, who has realized this ever-presence of self or consciousness in every cognition, attains such strength or capability which is unattainable from any other source. It is such a strength which can overcome mortality, hence the statement; '*vidyayā vindate'mṛtam*'.

It may be contended that there is again a case of tautology in this verse, since all the three terms *pratibodha, ātmanā* and *vidyayā* have been interpreted by Śaṅkara as referring to the 'self', but this contention is baseless in the sense that all the Upaniṣadic statements dwell upon the inexplicable self in so many words which are incapable of expressing the same. Moreover, on closely examining Śaṅkara's interpretation of these terms, we find that *pratibodha* is used here in the sense of witness-self, *ātmanā* refers to the nature of self while *vidyayā* denotes the knowledge of the self which leads one to immortality.[51]

It is also worth mentioning here that Śaṅkara has explained this line of the Kena Upaniṣad differently in both of his commentaries, namely *padabhāṣya*[52] and *vākyabhāṣya*.[53] He has very well resolved the riddle of repetition himself. He also clarifies here the use of the verb *vindate*, i.e. knowledge of the self is not to be produced, it was already there in the form of self, it is to be attained and *vidyā* helps one to disclose it.

IX

The last two sections of the Kena Upaniṣad contain a story which is symbolic representation of the fact that none can attain this knowledge of *Brahman* without perseverance and the help of a preceptor. The Upaniṣad closes with the teaching that *Brahman* or Supreme Consciousness is the adorable *Yakṣam*[54] in all beings. It is the one to be worshipped as *Tadvanam*,[55] the self of all living beings. Self is always desired by everybody and so the *Brahman* is desired by all.[56]

Śaṅkara, while commenting on this portion of the Kena Upaniṣad elaborates and says that anybody who meditates upon *Brahman* endowed with this '*tadvanatva*', attains a stage where everybody loves him and adores him.[57]

X

To conclude, it may be said that the possibility of *Brahmajñāna* is not negated in the Kena Upaniṣad, but the emphasis is laid on the fact that the knowledge of *Brahman* is trans-empirical, whereas all knowledge-claim is empirical. It is therefore that those who claim to have known It, really do not know It, and those who know It, will not make any knowledge-claim. Moreover, *Brahmajñāna* is not possible by *śravaṇa* alone, it has to be pondered upon and practised as *pratibodhaviditam*; the attainment of *Brahman* is nothing but the realization of this ever-presence of It in every knowledge. It is through this technique that *Brahman* can be realized in this birth and on this earth itself. In fact, this is the culmination of Upaniṣadic teaching well expounded in Śaṅkara's commentary on the Kena Upaniṣad.

Notes and References

1. *Vidyayā amṛtam aśnute.* —Iśāvāsyopaniṣad, 11.
2. *Atra hi vipratipannāḥ sadasadvādinastārkikaḥ sarve.* —Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up. 2.1
3. Kena Up., 1.4–5.
4. Chhāndogya Up., 7.1.
5. Muṇdaka Up., 1.1.
6. Kena Up., 4.7.
7. *Dwe vidye veditavye ... parā chaivāpara cha.* —Muṇdaka Up., 1.1.4.
8. *Satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ Brahma.* —Taittirīya Up., Brahmānandavallī, 2.1.1.
9. *Sarvasya hi vedituh svātma Brahmeti sarvavedāntānāṁ suniśchito arthaḥ.* —Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up. 2.1.
10. Muṇdaka Up., 1.1.3.
11. Ya eva hi nirākartā tad eva tasya svarūpam. —Śaṅkarabhāṣya on Brahmasūtras, 2.3.7.
12. *Intriyamanobhyāṁ hi vastuno vijñānam. Tadagocharatvāt.* —Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up., 1.3.
13. *Yanamanasā na manute.* —Kena Up., 1.3.
14. *Dṛṣterdraṣta śruteḥ śrotā matermantā vijñātervijñātā.* —Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. 3.4.2.
15. *Yato vācho nivartante aprāpya manasā saha.* —Taittirīya Up. 2.4.1.
16. *Anyadeva tad viditādatho aviditādadhi.* —Kena Up. 1.3.
17. *Na hi veditā vediturveditum śakyaḥ.* —Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up., 2.1.
18. *Viditam nāma yad vidikriyāyatiśayenāptam vidikriyākarmabhūtam.* —Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up., 1.3.
19. *Astu tarhy aviditam. Na, vijñānāpeksatvād. Yad hi aviditam tad vijñānāpekśam ... Idam tu vijñānānapekśam. Kasmāt. Vijñānasvarūpatvāt.* —Ibid.

20. *Yaddhi yasmādadhi upari bhavati tat tasmādanyaditi prasiddham.* —Ibid.
21. Sri Aurobindo on Kena Up., Vol. 12, p. 180.
22. *Indriyamanobhyām hi vastuno vijñānam. Tadagocaratvāt na vidmaḥ tad Brahmedṛśamiti. Ato na vijānīmo yathā yena prakāreṇa etad Brahma anuśiṣyād updiśecchhiṣyāyetyabhiprāyaḥ.* —Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up. 1.3.
23. (i) *Satyamevam pratyakṣādibhih pramāṇairna paraḥ pratyāyayitum śakyaḥ, āgamena tu śakyata eva pratyāyayitumiti tadupadeśārthamāgamamāha.* —Ibid.
    (ii) *Anyadeva Tadviditādatho aviditādadhityāgamam.*
    —Śaṅkara, Vākyabhāṣya on Kena Up. 1.3.
24. *Iha ca tadeva pratipāditam praśnaprativacanoktyā 'śrotrasya śrotram' ityadyayā. 'Yadvācānabhyuditam' iti ca viśeṣatovadhāritam.*
    —Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up. 2.1.
25. *yavadaparinisthitam vijñānam tāvatsuveda susthu vedāham Brahmeti viparīto mama niścaya āsīt.* —Śaṅkara, Vākyabhāṣya on Kena Up. 2.2.
26. *Yasya vividisāprayuktapravṛttasya sādhakasyāmatamavijñātamaviditam Brahmetyātmatattvaniscayaphalāvasanabodhatayā vividiṣā nivṛttetyabhiprāyaḥ, tasya matam jñātam.* —Ibid.
27. (i) *Tadeva ātmasvarūpam Brahma niratiśayam bhūmākhyam bṛhattvād Brahmeti viddhi vijānīhi tvam.* —Śaṃkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up. 1.4.
    (ii) *Ātmānameva nirviśeṣam Brahma viddhītyeva Śabdārthaḥ.*
    —Śaṅkara, Vākyabhāṣya on Kena Up. 1.4.
28. *Tadevą Brahma tvam viddhītyaviṣayatvena Brahmaṇa ātmanyavasthāpanārtha āmnāyaḥ.* —Ibid.
29. *'Tadeva Brahma tvam viddhi' ityukte'pi nedam Brahmetyanātmano brahmatvam punarucyate niyamārthamanyabrahmabuddhiparisamkhyānārtham.*
    —Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up. 1.4.
30. Kena Up. 2.2.
31. Chinmayananda on Kena Up., 2.2.
32. *Na suvedetyanena Brahmaṇo durbodhyatvam, no na vedetyanenaśāstraikagamyatvam, vedetyanena saṃśayarāhityam, chakareṇa cha sākṣatkāramābhidadhau. Dvitīyardhasthasya 'no na vedeti veda cha' ityasya vyākhyāyāmāha-chakārena 'iti' śabdasya 'no' śabdasya cha anuvṛtyā 'na vedeti no, vedeti no' iti phalitārthaḥ.*
    —Śaṅkarananda, Kena Up. 2.2.
33. *Tena viditam Brahma yenāviṣayenātmatvena pratibuddhamityarthaḥ.*
    —Śaṅkara, Vākyabhasya on Kena Up. 2.3.
34. *'Matam viditam jñātam mayā Brahmeti yasya vijñānam sa mithyādarsī viparītavijñāna viditādanyatvād Brahma no na veda sa na vijānāti.* —Ibid.
35. (i) *Avijñātamaviditamātmatvenāviṣayatayā Brahma vijānatām yasmāt tasmāttadeva jñānam.* —Ibid.
    (ii) *Avijñātamanadhigatam vijānatām vividhajñātṛjñānajñeyādibuddhimatām deśakālavastuparichhedaśūnyarūpatvād Brahmaṇaḥ.*
    —Śaṅkarananda on Kena Up. 2.3.

36. *Yatteṣām vijñātam viditam vyaktameva buddhyādiviṣayam Brahma vijānatām viditāviditavyāvṛttamātmabhūtam nityavijñānasvarūpamātmasthamavikriyamamṛtamajaramabhayamananyatvādaviṣayamityevamavijānatām buddhyādiviṣayātmatayaivā nityam vijñatam Brahma.*
—Śaṅkara, Vākyabhāṣya on Kena Up. 2.3.
37. *Ānando Brahmeti vyajānāt ... sa ya evam veda pratitiṣṭhati.*—Taittirīya Up., 3.6.1.
38. *Yadi Brahmātyantamevavijñātam, laukikānām Brahmavidām chāviśeṣaḥ prāptaḥ.*
—Śaṅkara, Padabhāsya on Kena Up., 2.4.
39. Kena Up., 2.4.
40. *Yatsāksādaparoksād Brahma ya ātma sarvāntaraḥ.* —Bṛhadaraṇyaka Up., 3.4.1.
41. *Ataḥ pratyayapratyagātmatayā viditam Brahma yadā, tadā tat matam tat samyagdarśanamityarthaḥ.* —Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up., 2.4.
42. *Tasmātpratibodhāvabhasapratyagātmatayā yadviditam tad Brahma tadeva matam jñātam, tadeva sadmyagjñānavatpratyagātmavijñānam, na viṣayavijñānam.* —Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up., 2.4.
43. *Antaḥsthitena caitanyajyotiṣāvabhāsitasya manaso mananasāmarthyam.*
—Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up., 2.4.
44. *Anyo asau anyo ahamasmīti na sa veda.* —Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up., 1.4.10.
45. Ibid., 2.4.4.
46. Kena Up., 2.1.
47. Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up., 2.1.
48. Śaṅkarabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra, Introduction.
49. *Iha chedavedīdatha satyamasti na chediheāvedīnmahatī vinaṣṭiḥ.* —Kena Up., 2.5.
50. *Ātmanā vindate vīryam vidyayā vindate'mṛtam.* —Kena Up., 2.4.
51. *Vidyayā ātmaviṣayayā vindate'mṛtam.* —Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up., 2.4.
52. *Ātmavidyākṛtam tu vīryamātmanaiva vindate.* —Ibid.
53. *Yadi cātmanaivamṛtatvam vindate kim punarvidyayā kriyata ityucyate ... yata āha vīryam'vidyayā vindate'.* —Śaṅkara, Vākyabhāṣya on Kena Up., 2.4.
54. Ibid., 3.2.
55. Ibid., 4.6.
56. *Tasya vanam tadvanam tasya prāṇijātasya pratyagātmabhūtatvādvanam vananīyam sambhajanīyam.* —Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya on Kena Up. 4.6.
57. Cf. Chāndogya Up., 3.14.1.

Was Acarya Śaṁkara Responsible for the Disappearance of Buddhist Philosophy from India?

DAYA KRISHNA

The disappearance of Buddhism from India is one of those enigmas which defies explanation. For more than fifteen hundred years, it dominated the Indian scene and has left unbelievable marvels in the realm of sculpture, architecture and painting that it is difficult to understand how the faith that created this ceased to function as a living force in the very country where it originated. Sanchi, Karhaa, Ajanta are names to conjure with. And, there are many more located all over India testifying to its glorious presence everywhere in the country. Yet, it all disappeared as if it had never existed sometime around AD 1000.

All attempts at explanation flounder against the single fact that the other great śramaṇic religion still flourishes in India. There are not only various Jain communities in all parts of India, but some of them even proclaim their identities by calling themselves 'Jain'. And they *are* Jains, unlike the so-called neo-Buddhists who not only know nothing about the great traditions of Buddhism in this country but do not seek, or want to seek, any such thing as Nirvāṇa. They have no monks or monasteries or systems of meditation, nor do they have a monastic discipline as the outward manifestations of the inner seeking of the Great Buddha.

And it is not only the Jains who flourish and survive, but also the Zorastrians, the Syrian Christians, the Jews, the Armenians and many others. The synagogues of the Jews in Kerala are well known, but the Armenian Church in Calcutta, established long before the coming of the British, deserves equal attention.

The myth of Vedic Hinduism, 'swallowing up', all the other non-Hindu religious traditions in India, so persistently propagated by certain vested interests, is really a myth, unsubstantiated by any evidence whatsoever. There has, of course, been conflict and controversies, even violent ones, but never 'religious wars' in the form they have occurred in the West. Yet, it remains a fact that Buddhism did disappear from India, the land where

it originated and flourished for more than fifteen hundred years. But though the causes of the disappearance are little known, one has still some substantial knowledge of the reasons for the disappearance of Buddhist philosophy from the Indian scene where it had a visible dominating presence for so long. And, it is with this issue that we are concerned in the present paper.

Normally, the dramatic disappearance of Buddhist philosophy from the philosophical scene of India is ascribed to Śaṁkara who refuted the Buddhists in such a decisive way that they could not hold their own after being defeated by him. It is also alleged that as, through a subtle diplomacy, he had assimilated all the crucial elements of their distinctive thought in his own system which he ascribed to the Upanisads, the Brahma Sutras and the Gita, there was nothing here for the Buddhists to claim as distinctive in their own philosophy. Yet, however widespread the thesis, it does not even *prima facie* make any sense. Śaṁkara refuted not just the Buddhists but almost all the other schools of Indian philosophy as well. But in spite of his refutation, they continued to flourish in India. Why should there have been an exception in the case of Buddhism? Normally philosophical schools do not die of criticism. Rather, they get a new life and vigour as they try to meet the challenge, usually introducing interesting modifications in their positions or different arguments in support of the old one. The history of philosophical schools, in all traditions, is the history of argument and counter-argument and there is no reason to support the notion that Buddhism was an exception to this, especially when it was the main protagonist in the philosophical debates of the pre-Śaṁkara era of philosophy in India.

Even if we disregard these considerations, the history of Buddhist philosophy after Śaṁkara completely refutes the claim that it disappeared from the Indian philosophical scene because of his decisive demolition of their position by his arguments. In fact it did not disappear. Rather, it continued to flourish for almost five hundred years after Śaṁkara is supposed to have finally driven them away from the philosopical scene in the country. Not one, not two, but literally scores of Buddhist thinkers flourished during this period and if one compares them with those who followed in the steps of Śaṁkara's thought, one is amazed as to how such a contention could ever have been made by anyone.

Potter's *Bibliography of Indian Philosophy* (3rd ed.) lists at least forty-three (47?) important Buddhist thinkers from the 8th century to the first quarter of the 13th century, that is AD 1220. The list includes such well

known names as: Śanta Rakṣita, Kamalaśila, Dharmottara, Mallavādin, Jitendra Buddhi, Yaśomitra, Prajnākara Gupta, Pandita Aśoka, Jñānaśrī Mitra, Atīṣa, Ratnakīrti, Mokṣākaragupta and Aniruddha. If we break the list centurywise, we find that from 700 to 800 we have eight thinkers, from 800–900 seven thinkers, from 900–1000 five thinkers, from 1000–1100 thirteen thinkers and from 1100–1200 there are eleven thinkers.

It may be remembered in this connection that only one thinker is listed in the *Bibliography* after 1200, the date usually given for the destruction of Nalanda by Bakhtiyar Khilji in the standard books on Indian history. This would mean that from 1150–1250, the *Bibliography* lists six thinkers, most of whom have written on Aniruddha who is supposed to have flourished around 1120 and is said to have been a Sthaviravadin. In fact Aniruddha seems to have been a subject of intensive discussion among Buddhists, as even earlier the two thinkers who succeed him, Vimalbuddhi and Sumangala II, had written on him. This shows how alive the Buddhist philosophical tradition was even at this late period; what could be a surer sign of intellectual vitality than the sustained discussion of a thinker by his contemporaries and successors? In fact, the Buddhists seem to have had a lively tradition of discussion regarding the important thinkers who occurred both during the post-Śaṁkara period and the outstanding ones in the pre-Śaṁkara peṛiod such as Nāgārjuna, Asanga, Vasubandhu, Buddhaghoṣha, Dignāga, Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti.

It is obvious even from a cursory glance at this data that there can be no question of the disappearance of Buddhist philosophers and philosophy from India during the post-Śaṁkara period so that the question of ascribing to Śaṁkara the reason for their disappearance does not arise. A comparative study of the Advaitic thinkers influenced by Śaṁkara during this period may be helpful in understanding the relative position of these two important philosophical traditions.

A close look at the data about the advaitins given in Potter's *Bibliography* reveals, surprisingly, that if we exclude Śaṁkara and his immediate disciples, the total number of Advaitic thinkers hardly exceeds five during a period that covers roughly five centuries, that is, from 750–1250. The important Advaitic names during this period are those of Jnānaghana (AD 900), Vimuktātman (AD 950), Vācaspati Miṣra I (AD 960), Sarvajnātman (AD 1027) and Gangādhara (AD 1137). The situation does not change very much even if we include Maṇḍana Miṣra, the author of the *Brahmasiddhi* in this list, or Sureśvara, Padmapāda, Hastāmalaka and Troṭaka, Śaṁkara's immediate disciples. To have had not more than half a dozen thinkers

during a period of almost five hundred years does not speak very highly of Ācārya Śaṁkara's *Digvijaya*, so loudly proclaimed not only by his disciples, but others, in the Indian tradition.

There can thus be no ground for ascribing to Śaṁkara the responsibility for the disappearance of the Buddhists from the philosophical scene of India as is usually done by scholars and laymen alike. It is a myth like many other myths and should be recognized as such. The cause of its disappearance lay in the destruction of Nalanda, the internationally acclaimed intellectual centre of Buddhism in AD 1200, though even that leaves many questions unanswered such as why, unlike Jainism, it had only one centre in the whole country. But, whatever may be the answer to this question, there can be little doubt that Ācārya Śaṁkara had no hand in its disappearance from India.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

A Note on the Idea of Human Rights

In this brief note I would like to raise just one issue which seems to me to be among the basic issues connected with an adequate formulation of a human rights perspective. There are different possible starting points for this. I shall take the following: one claim which has been resolutely made on behalf of human rights is that such rights are unique and universal—unique and universal at least to the extent that the idea of a human being is unique and universal. The uniqueness and universality of the idea of a human being is part of the official ideology of modern liberalism. Perhaps the best way of showing this is to point out its easy derivation from modern epistemology. My knowledge of the world, according to this latter depends crucially on my capacity to take a totally disengaged view of it—disengaged, that is, from any particular circumstance in which I happen to be situated. The philosopher Nagel has very picturesquely characterized this as the 'view from nowhere'. What enables me to achieve this is my reason or rationality understood in the sense of my capacity to carry out procedures in my thought or mind which have strict pre-given criteria of correctness, clarity and distinctness. The modern idea of freedom is an adjunct of this concept of rationality. My freedom consists in my rational ordering of my desires so that they can be maximally satisfied. Human dignity consists in upholding this freedom. Every human being is potentially rational, and, therefore, the potential locus of freedom and dignity. Human rights are rights, which belong to human beings, *qua* human beings, as beings who can exercise freedom through reason. Such rights, therefore, are unique to human beings and apply universally to all human beings.

Suppose we accept: (1) the modern concept of knowledge; (2) the idea of freedom associated with it; and (3) the idea of human dignity as premised on this freedom. Then the argument for human rights can be constructed with a great degree of convincingness. But as the critique of modernity—in its different, and sometimes incompatible, forms (e.g. Gandhi and Foucault)—has shown all these are highly contentious issues. It is not necessary, however, to enter into the critique of modernity at all to appreciate the difficulty of articulating a detailed human rights perspec-

tive. Problems arise the moment we descend from the level of abstraction at which it is possible to construct a neat enough argument, to the level of particulars and specific forms of human life. Even to ask the question, 'Given that there are human rights in the sense we have just described, what *exactly* are these rights?' is to plunge into an arena of claims and counter-claims— an arena where our thinking and our practice or our being-in-the-world are so closely interwoven that disengaged reason can only be a helpless spectator, or at best a hollow dictator. This can be shown in detail, but I desist from doing so primarily because if I do not do it well enough, I shall be in danger of mistakenly suggesting that for me there is little use for the idea of human rights. Instead I shall merely state just the beginning of a possible argument for showing that the human rights discourse can become practically relevant for us—that is, can enter into the density of our everyday practical concerns only by shedding its pristine universality and uniqueness—at least to a large extent. The basic premise of this argument is that the notion of a human right is primarily a moral notion. I do not think there will be many quarrels about this. But once this is accepted, we shall have to ask questions such as: 'How does it enter into our idea of the good life?', 'What is its place in the hierarchy of goods that we envisage in a morally fulfilling life?'; 'How does it help in reaching clarity about morally perplexing situations?' It is my contention—a contention which is by no means uncontroversial—that the 'view from nowhere', 'universal'—and I shall add another adjective 'procedural'—rationality is not much help in dealing with questions of this kind. Their natural habitat is an arena of the engagement of human intelligence which has been pushed into obscurity, or at least into the background, by the stridency of the liberal-humanist-universalist ideology of modernity. This is the arena where what Aristotle called *phronesis*, or Gandhi, in our times, *satyagraha*, must be allowed unqualified precedence. One way of understanding the idea of *phronesis* is to think of it as implying that clarity about goodness or about the good life can be achieved only in and through one's active intelligent engagement in a moral practice. Any particular moral practice embodies ways of discriminating between the good and the bad, between the right pursuit and the wrong, between what will constitute true fulfilment and what will not. It is in the active contemplation and insightful use of these ways of discrimination that the moral practice itself acquires openness and possibility of change and transformation; this, in its turn, leads to ever finer articulation of the ways of discerning the good, in complex, frequently unpredictable human situations. The

good is not something, which is open to an uncluttered, disengaged, rational view. It opens itself to one never wholly, but in increasingly greater depth maybe, in one's thoughtful active engagement in more or less dense, more or less complex moral situations. In the Gandhian notion of *satyagraha* similarly knowledge and practice are inalienably interwoven. Knowledge and articulacy about *satya*, which, for Gandhi, is the same as the good, is to be achieved only through active and contemplative moral engagement in actual human situations. *Acara* and *vicara,* to use words I learned from the late Professor K.J. Shah, must always inform and enrich each other. *Satyagraha* is the only authentic method of engaging seriously in situations which hold out the possibility of making moral mistakes. While *satyagraha* is necessarily practical moral engagement, it also, in and through this engagement, leads to finer moral insights.

If it is agreed, therefore, that the idea of human rights is a moral idea, then the human rights discourse must be rescued from its abstract, disengaged universality and placed firmly in the context of localized moral discourses and the practices from which these discourses derive their sustenance.

Another, much more brutal, but perhaps for that very reason, more effective, way of putting the entire matter may be as follows: A serious and mature human rights advocate must already know—and act in ways which shows that he or she knows—what it is like to be, for instance, a good father or a good mother, a good friend, a good husband or a good wife, a good member of a community, a good citizen, and, if she is in academics, a good researcher. Otherwise, human-rights talk is likely to be not much more than hollow rhetoric and worse, talk inspired by ulterior motives.

If what I have said is right, then it has very important consequences. One of these is that human rights cannot be just a matter of following rules, of doing the 'right' thing. This is because morality or being moral is not just a matter of rights and duties, it involves active engagement in *phronesis* or *satyagraha*. Another, related, consequence is that the primary human rights discourse cannot be a discourse of legality or law. The law book is the quintessential book of rules. While rules may be useful, the reduction of human rights issues to issues of legality is likely to displace them from the centrality that they ought to have in our moral life. Yet another consequence is that solemn universal declarations of our commitment to human rights must be taken, to put it very mildly, with a pinch of salt. This is not, of course, an expression of cynicism, it is rather

a reminder that morality is a much more serious business than making declarations, in spite of the undoubted importance of declarations, particularly in public spheres.

There has been a growing demand for the inclusion of human rights as part of the regular curriculum of college and university education. I wish to end this note with a word about the implication of what I have said so far for the 'teaching' of human rights. Teaching of human rights must be as subtle as teaching of morality itself. A curriculum for such education in our formal educational institutions must begin with the enormous assumption that the proper place for such education is not perhaps the classroom itself, but practices where human beings enter into relationships which require the judicious exercise of virtues such as kindness, generosity, courage and even justice not in the legalistic sense but in the everyday sense in which it involves the adequate appreciation of the other's point of view. One great instrument of moral education is the stories we are told and listen to again and again with undiminished attention in our childhood. The political correctness of such stories may be questioned from time to time—but this is also an acknowledgement of their effectiveness. What we need perhaps are new stories about terrorism, fundamentalism, wars, about human diversity, about children and women—stories which are told with the powerful naturalness of the folk-story and heard with loving attention.

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A Note on Navya Nyāya View of Tautology

V.N. Jha's contention that Navya Nyāya has to admit tautologies as significant is inadmissible but not for the reason that 'any sentence to be meaningful must give some new knowledge' as stated in the introductory passage of 'Notes and Queries', *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 2. A significant sentence repeatedly uttered does not cease to be meaningful even if its several instances do not yield new knowledge. The correct reason for the denial of the meaningfulness of tautology in Navya Nyāya may be explained as under:

It is quite true, as Jha says, that because a pot is not locus of its difference it is pot itself. But this is only a matter of fact. What however

we are concerned with here is the problem of the significance of a (tautological) *statement.* Gadādhara, the great Navya Nyāya logician, raises and answers this very problem in his *Vyutpattivāda*, a treatise on Nyāya semantics. A part of the concerned passage is given below:

> अभेदान्वयबोधश्च विरूपोपस्तियोरेवेति वयुत्पत्तिः घटो घटः, दण्डवान् दण्डवान्, पाकं पचतीत्यादौ घटत्वदण्डवत्वपाकत्वाद्यवच्छिन्ने तत्रद्रपावच्छिनस्य तथाविधान्वयबोधानुदयात् अथ तत्प्रयोजकसमानविमकृिकत्वादेः सत्त्वात्कर्थं न तादृशान्वयबोधः? अत्राहुः। ... घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविशेष्यताकाभेदसंसर्गाधटत्वाद्यवाच्छिन्नप्रकारकशाब्दबोधस्य क्वचिदप्यनुदयः

The reason for denying the meaningfulness of tautology given here is that the verbal cognition of the denotends of two coordinate terms in a sentence arises only if the connotations of the terms are different from each other. This rule is in conformity with common usage. There is a logical basis also for the rule which may be explained thus: Navya Nyāya which admits many kinds of relations has divided them into two broad classes, viz. the class of location-determining (वृत्तिनियामक) and that of non-location-determining (वृच्चनियामक) relations. Conjunction, inherence, etc. are relations of the former kind as, things that are locus and locatee respectively are related by these relations. Identity and many logical relations are of the latter kind as the entities joined by these relations are not the locus and the locatees in respect of each other. Nothing can be supposed to be located in itself by the identity-relation although everything is self-identical. This is the reason why difference as a kind of negation is distinguished from occurrence-negation—called 'atyantābhāva' or 'samsargābhāvā' in the classification of negation in Indian logic. The counterpositive of the occurrence-negation excludes it from its locus while the counterpositive of difference excludes the difference from itself with which it is identical but not located in it by the identity relation.

Further there cannot arise a verbal or even a nonverbal cognition of a thing as both the epistemic qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) and the epistemic qualificand (*viśeṣya*) in the cognition. Unless the epistemic qualifier and the qualificand are different from each other the cognition cannot be determinate or predicative at all. It cannot be indeterminate either as it has a definite subject. It will have to be reckoned only as an instance of imperfect cognition. If however identity involved as relation in the cognition is turned into a property so that the cognition has the form, 'The pot is self-identical', then the cognition can well be determinate but then it will not remain tautological in the strict sense of the word.

It may be argued here that if we can say truly that 'a pot is not different from or the locus of the difference from itself', then we can say truly that 'a pot is a pot'. However the above mentioned distinction between difference and occurrence-negation and the consequent difference in the application of the principle of double negation to the two kinds of negation can very well meet the argument. The negation of the occurrence-negation of a thing is identical with the thing but the negation of the difference from a thing is supposed to be identical not with the thing but with the distinctive property of the thing. So the statement 'a pot is not different from itself' would not imply the statement 'a pot is a pot'. It would imply only the statement 'a pot is endowed with potness'. Tautologies are therefore as senseless and devoid of statementhood as the simple subject term 'a pot' or 'the pot' is.

Nagpur N.S. DRAVID

Comments on the Article 'Imaging Time in Music: Langer's View and Hindustani Rhythm' by S.K. Saxena, published in the *JICPR,* Vol. XVI, No. 3.

Here are some comments on the paper concerning music: 'Imaging Time in Music: Langer's View and Hindustani Rhythm'. I found the paper interesting. But making Langer a *purvapaksa* does not seem a happy idea. Langer does not belong to a sophisticated tradition of rhythm making where *ālāpa* is central to the process. Jazz in the west has something similar to Indian drumming, but jazz has no tradition of thinking or theorizing about *tāla*. Thinking and theorizing about rhythm in the west is associated with their 'classical' tradition, in which *tāla* is not allowed an independent status as it is in India, where a *tāla* may be elaborated on its own like a *raga*. Indeed, what really struck me as remarkable about the paper was the fact that the author sees *tāla* as parallel to the *raga*, an independent form built up through a similar process of *ālāpa*. This, I think, is obvious, yet it comes as a new insight when made so explicit, as the author of the paper does. I do not think that the *śāstra* actually speaks of this parallel (though now that the idea is before me, I must look more attentively). However, at least one branch of the tradition (in Maharashtra) does seem to have had the parallel in mind: I have seen old (perhaps 18th

century) paintings of *tālas* where *tālas* have been pictured as individuals like *rāgas* in *rāgamālā* paintings.

I do not remember what Langer says concerning *tāla*, or rather 'rhythm', a word, which carries a very different suggestion. *Tāla* in Indian music and musicology is allowed to stand on its own whereas rhythm in the west is the rhythm *of* something; in music it is the rhythm of *svara*. The paper you have sent me argues that *tāla* like *rāga* is an independent *ālāpa*-based non-representational art, meaning it is a complete art on its own and has no *anukaraṇa* of *loka*. (I am here using the concepts, *anukaraṇa* and *loka*, common in Indian thinking; the author himself does not.) Langer on the other hand believes that rhythm like every other art is *a symbolic projection of life as felt.* This is the phrase, which the paper quotes, taking it to mean or imply the idea of all art as 'representation' in some sense. To me this phrase itself does not quite suggest that. However, the author of the paper takes it in that sense, relying, one would think, on Langer's discourse as a whole. I do not remember Langer's views, and I had read her book only cursorily and quite long back: I do not know if she believes all art to be representational in the sense of being some kind of *anukaraṇa* of *loka*: The phrase, '*a symbolic projection of life as felt*', need not suggest that, since music can be significantly said to project felt life without an *anukaraṇa* of *loka*.

However, the point I really want to make is that to my mind in discussing *rāga* or *tāla*, a rich, and one might even say, 'proper', *pūrvapakṣa* for a theory of non-representational art is the *rasa* theory. Based on drama, the *rasa* theory is centrally representational. Yet right from its inception since the *Nāṭyaśātra*, it is aware of a strong tradition of non-representational art, self-consciously recognized as such. It has also quite consciously tried in its later ramifications (in the hands of thinkers such as Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta) to assimilate *rāga* music, which it grants to be non-representational, into *rasa* theory. It has done so I think without success. But it provides a rich background for discourse, either as *pūrvapakṣa* or as thought that could be carried forward in another direction as *siddhāntapakṣa*. Recently, as you have seen, Omkarnathji has attempted to do just this in his own way, I think with interesting insights. I had some years ago written a paper in Hindi concerning music and *rasa*, but I had argued that the concept of *rasa*, as it is understood by thinkers like Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, is not applicable in the context of *rāga* music because of obvious logical problems.

I make these remarks only to show India has a long awareness of the distinction between representational and non-representational arts, as well as a significant *parampara* of thinking about it. Any person theorizing about the Indian arts, be it *svara* or *tāla*, could, I think, meaningfully place himself in this tradition as a thinker, a *vādī*, whether for *khaṇḍana* or *maṇḍana*. This is not to deny the meaningfulness of *pūrvapakṣas* from other traditions, but in the case of *tāla*, thinking in the Indian conceptual context will I think prove richer and more stimulating. One may come to reject Indian thought on the subject, but this should be done critically; ignoring it is, I think, almost tantamount to a theoretical sin, more so for an Indian who is thinking about an Indian art, rooted not only as a *prayoga* but also as *śāstra* in the Indian tradition.

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'The Rationale of Reactive Attitudes': An Appraisal

Sauravpran Goswami in his article 'The Rationale of Reactive Attitudes' published in *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 3, has discussed the rationale of affective reactions made towards ethical actions. The central issue of his discussion is whether the reactions of resentment, approval, praise, blame, gratitude, etc. are justified or not. And he has discussed it in the context of what Rajendra Prasad and P.F. Strawson have to say in this regard. Prasad seems to regard such reactions as unjustified and uncalled-for, whereas Strawson thinks that they are quite in order. The former challenges the propriety of such reactions on the ground that they are not in consonance with determinism, and the latter approves them on the basis of their being the normal features of our natural participatory life. Goswami seems to support Strawson's view, not Prasad's.

A Concrete Example Involving Such Reactions

In order to discuss the relative merits and demerits of the two sides it is better if we take the help of a concrete example. There is a cake before me and I am feeling hungry. As soon as I try to eat the cake in order to satisfy my hunger a beggar looking more needy than me comes before me and asks for the cake. Now there are two alternatives before me: (1) to eat

the cake myself, and (2) to give it to the beggar so that he may satisfy his hunger. As a human being I have my instincts and desires and I do become inclined to act in accordance with them; but then I have also the capacity to subdue them if I so intend. Being mature I can very well judge in the present case as to whose need is greater. So in a split second I 'scan' the situation and decide to give the cake to the beggar, so that he can satisfy his hunger. A passer-by happening to watch our activities praises my generosity, and the beggar too expresses his sense of gratitude to me. This episode is perfectly realistic and there is nothing unusual about it.

The Thesis of Determinism

According to determinism every event of any kind must have an antecedent cause. It is not only a scientific demand, but also a logical necessity. To think otherwise is 'to be eternally condemned to be incurably irrational' according to Prasad (p. 28). He says, 'If I throw a doll from the fifth floor of a building, then by virtue of the law of gravity, it will of necessity touch the ground. Now the kind of determinism in question determines not only the doll's touching the ground, but also my engaging in the act of throwing it. Here I am left with no option than to throw the doll from the fifth floor of the building (pp. 30–1).

Reactive Feelings

In the cake–beggar example we found that the passer-by praised me and the beggar expressed his gratitude towards me. They did what they did because they held me responsible (of course, not in any reprehensible sense) for what I did under the exigency of the circumstances. While persons galore would regard both the passer-by's and the beggar's respective reactions of praise and gratitude quite in order and reasonable, Prasad would regard them as being not only uncalled-for, but also illogical. For, according to him, the thrower of the doll's being responsible for throwing the doll is logically ruled out (p. 31). This is so because the thrower of the ball does not exercise any freedom in throwing the ball, but is made to throw it by certain antecedent circumstances, both mental and physical.

A Possible Meaning of 'Freedom'

Had I in giving the cake to the beggar acted in perfect disregard of the obtaining situation and had my action been really a bolt from the blue, as it were, then and then alone perhaps my giving the cake to the beggar

would have been construed as a genuinely free action. But such a possibility is completely ruled out by both science and logic. Hence there cannot logically be any basis for such activities as praising, expressing gratitude, and giving vent to any other ethically charged reactive feelings. Prasad is vindicated after all. Agential freedom is a myth.

Another Possible Meaning of 'Freedom'

A person acts freely only when he acts in accordance with what he intends to act and not when he is compelled to act by external and/or internal causes. Now, is acting in accordance with one's own intention acting freely or under compulsion? An intention surely is what the intending person has decided to act in accordance with. So, an intentional action is a free action and reactive feelings to such actions are quite in order and justified. But Prasad may argue here also that even in an intentional action there is determining by intention and accordingly there is no freedom even in this action. But then this objection is like the one in which it may be objected that an agent who acts freely is determined by his own freedom, and so even he cannot act freely after all.

But I do not think that Prasad would deny the responsibility-bearing character of intentional actions. In arguing against Strawson did he not intend to 'correct' him, and in so doing did he not become responsible (not, of course, in any reprehensible sense) for it? Will he say to Strawson, 'Look, Strawson, why do you make me the target of your counterattack? I am merely uttering like a parrot whatever I utter in this seeming controversy between you and me'?'

Intentions

Well, it is a piece of common knowledge that intentions *are formed* by people. Ordinarily they do not involve any articulate conscious deliberation or consideration on 'merit'. But they surely imply that they have what may be called their 'rational scaffolding'. They cannot indeed be formed unless there are some kind of reasons behind them. And if the agent performs an action in accordance with his own intention which he has formed on rational consideration, either overt or covert, should he not be regarded as a free agent, and should he not also be praised if his action is moral, and blamed if immoral?

The Nature of Persons

It takes all sorts to make a world. If the world contains pebbles, plants and animals, it contains persons as well. Ontology need not be monistic after all. Persons are different from other kinds of existents in many respects, though also similar in many others. Persons are psycho-physical beings capable of ratiocinating over problems. When a person is faced with a situation demanding an action he is not required to issue a diktat to himself for doing any action whatsoever, but to take a decision or to make up his mind for doing what he considers to be appropriate for the situation. In so doing he is required to be logical, not mad.

In the cake–beggar situation my sacrificing the cake for the beggar was not a haphazard or mad action, but was based on the logical requirement of that situation. I might not have done what I did, but that is a different matter. That I might not have done what I did or I could have avoided what I did implies clearly that I was free in doing what I did, although if I would not have done what I did, I would have been still free, but would not have been moral. To have been guided by the idea of giving the cake to the beggar is surely being determined in a way, but this determining is not physicalistic, but ratiocinative. I ratiocinated with that idea in order to decide whether or not I should act in accordance with it. Prasad, who regards the concept of the human nature being infected with logical depravity so loathsome, will surely admit the existence of such ratiocinative capacity of human beings, and will also grant that intentions of persons can be formed on the basis of rational estimations. Human actions are *actions* and not mere movements and they cannot be satisfactorily analysed in terms of physicalistic determinism. No doubt, they too are determined, but their being determined is categorially different from the determination of movements. The former determining can pave the way for the determination of the will, but the latter one cannot. And the former is compatible with freedom, the latter is not. Perhaps Strawson is justified in saying, '... the "compatibilism" about freedom ... seems to me a legitimate fallback position for any one disinclined to accept the stronger view of the total irrelevance of the determinist thesis.' (p. 32.) Now, if intentional actions do have their characteristic freedom, should not they entail appropriate feeling-reactions towards them? Reactive attitudes which so profusely abound in our natural participatory life do have adequate rationale behind them. And the passer-by in praising me and the beggar in express-

ing his gratitude towards me had not behaved 'incurably illogically' after all.

N. MISHRA

A Rejoinder to Professor Srinivasa Rao[1]

At the outset, I thank Professor Srinivasa Rao for his comments on my article, 'A Critique on Brahman-realization'.

(1) Professor Srinivasa Rao (hereafter referred to as Rao) claims that I had not clarified the meanings of expressions such as 'personal experience' (p. 71),[2] 'practical realization' (p. 72), etc., anywhere in my article.

It is rather unfortunate that Rao has missed the main content of the section, 'The Epistemological Analytic' (pp. 73–4), wherein the 'personal experience of Brahman' is clearly explained. In the same place 'the experiential proof of Brahman' has been analysed and shown that 'practical realization of Brahman' as advocated by advaitins is impossible. Also Rao seems to have missed the brief account of revelation of Brahman explained in Note 20 (p. 81), where realization of *Nityajñāna* is analysed.

However, since a question is raised, let me throw some light on the meaning of the expression 'personal experience of Brahman'. According to the Advaita Vedānta, it can be explained in two ways: (i) First, 'personal experience' as means of knowledge of Brahman, and (ii) secondly, *Brahmānubhava* as such. (i) The first meaning has been adopted in the present context. Accordingly, an advaitin has no choice under epistemological analysis of Advaita Vedānta but to accept the *antaḥkaraṇa akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti* as the only means for the revelation of Brahman. Thus attainment of the *antaḥkaraṇa akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti jñāna*, according to Advaita Vedānta, is 'personal experience of Brahman'. Hence, the advaitins accept the *antaḥkaraṇa akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti* as a means of Brahman-realization. (ii) The second way refers to oneself being Brahman Itself. The *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* states in support of this view: '*Brahmaveda brahmaiva bhavati*'. (3.2.9) Thus, personal experience of Brahman is nothing but Brahman by one's own self.

This article directly aims at showing the impossibility of the first meaning, namely, the impossibility of revelation of Brahman in the *antaḥkaraṇa akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti* and thereby denies the second meaning.

Rao has raised several other points in his comments. Most of them are non-contextual and not substantive in content. For the benefit of general readers, however, let me explain in simple terms the following:

(2) Rao suggests that I should have been very clear about the meanings of the above expressions according to myself. It should be noted that the focus of the article is to understand the meanings of the said expressions according to traditional Advaita Vedānta and not in any other way. Let me reassure Rao on this issue.

(3) Rao feels that 'the notion of "hypothesis" itself is confusing and unclear,' in my paper. I can only say that he should be more attentive to the contents in the text as well as in the notes and references. He seems to admit that presenting the same statement, viz., 'This *Ātman* is Brahman' as both 'hypothesis' and 'premise' is the source of his confusion.

It is certainly possible in Advaita Vedānta to use the statement, 'This *Ātman* is Brahman', as hypothesis in one context and as a premise in another. 'This *Ātman* is Brahman' cannot be both simultaneously. I have taken the above statement as a hypothesis in the beginning and later as a premise in a different context. I did not use the same statement both as a hypothesis and as a premise in the same context. The statement, 'This *Ātman* is Brahman', is presented in the beginning as hyothesis along with the two other hypotheses, namely, Brahman and *Ātman*. It is reasonable to say that if Brahman (for example the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* statement: 'In the beginning there was Brahman alone, one only without a second') and *Ātman* are hypotheses then the statement of their identity namely, 'This *Ātman* is Brahman' is necessarily a hypothesis. Thus the statement 'This *Ātman* is Brahman' serves in the beginning as a hypothesis.

Similarly the statement 'This *Ātman* is Brahman' has been stated as one of the three premises based on which the above three hypotheses are explained. While the statement 'This *Ātman* is Brahman' is used along with two other premises, namely, 'There is Brahman from which everything comes forth', and 'There is *Ātman* by which everything is known', it only serves as premise in the given context.

As a matter of fact it is not very important in the given context of the article that whether a hypothesis is a premise or a premise is a hypothesis; what is important is whether or not statements related to Brahman can be

taken as hypotheses. It is shown in note no. 3 (p. 80) that Śaṅkara himself admits that the statements related to Brahman are presented as hypotheses. (For further reference of the same please see *Īśādidaśopaniṣadaḥ*, Vol. I, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi—Reprint 1992). '*Ekamevādvitīyam ityādiśrutibhyaḥ*', *āgamamātram tat*. (*Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad Gauḍapāda Kārikā Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, Introduction to Chapter II, p. 196). *Śivo advaita ātmeti pratijñāmātreṇa*. (Ibid., Introduction to Chapter III, p. 208). *Āgamataḥ pratijñātasya advaitasya*. (Ibid., Introduction to Chapter IV, p. 227). It is clearly established towards the end of the article that Advaita Vedānta begins with a hypothesis and ends with the same unconfirmed.

(4) Rao argues for the possibility of the 'personal experience' of Srī Rāmakrishna or Ramaṇa Maharshi by taking the literal meaning of the above expressions and misleads himself. He misses the point about how Advaita Vedānta is built by Śaṅkara. I would like to state that the advaitins do not rely on the experience of Brahman by Rāmakrishna or Ramaṇa Maharshi to establish the existence of Brahman; rather they depend on common human epistemological grounds. K.S. Murty is also of the opinion: 'Śaṅkara nowhere claims that his doctrine is the fruit of the experimental science of mysticism.' (K.S. Murty, *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta*, Delhi, Second Edition, 1974, p. 254).

It is clearly stated in the article that *advaitānubhava* is possible for those who fulfil the qualifications. This *advaitānubhava* is the *anubhavāvasāna*. The claim of the advaitins for the possibility of *Brahmajñāna* when mind gets cessated, as a matter of fact depends only on the *Upaniṣads*. My contention in this article is to deny one's claim that the *advaitānubhava* attained by one is *Brahmānubhava* or Brahman-realization.

(5) Rao also complains that I have used numerous assumptions in the article. One such assumption is: when *pramāṇagata sandeha, prameyagata sandeha* and *viparītabhāvana* concerning Brahman are completely removed there can still be *anubhavagata sandeha* concerning Brahman.

I take responsibility for introducing *anubhavagata sandeha*. There are two different things: (i) There is non-dual experience, and (ii) Attributing *Brahmatva* to the non-dual experience. The non-dual experience is an epistemological possibility and saying that it is Brahman-experience is a Vedic theoretical attribution. While attributing so there were lots of interpretations given by different *Vedāntāchāryas*. All the *āchāryas* differ in their Vedantic interpretation based on a theoretical doubt regarding their

ultimate experience. Consequently we have different schools of Vedānta, such as Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, etc. Thus I have stated in the article (p. 72) that the question 'Is Brahman-realization possible?' arises when one finds oneself in *anubhavagata sandehaḥ* regarding Brahman.

It is unfortunate that Rao has missed to notice the contents of the text and notes in many places in the article. For instance, if Rao had noticed the very first lines of p. 72 which declare that a 'logical method to establish Brahman–*Ātman* is not discussed in this paper', he could have avoided the total logical approach while giving his comments. They seem to suggest that his understanding of Advaita Vedānta does not conform to Śaṅkara's doctrine of Vedānta.

The remaining points which Rao has raised in his comments are non-contextual and not substantive in content.

NOTES

1. Rejoinder to Professor Srinivasa Rao's Comments on 'A Critique on Brahman-realization', *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, January–April 1997, pp. 71–82.
2. Page numbers in brackets refer to the article that appeared in *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, January–April 1997, pp. 71–82.

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A Rejoinder to Suresh Chandra and Ashok Vohra

My purpose in this note is to fill in the gaps which, in my opinion, exist in the discussion[1] between Suresh Chandra (henceforth SC) and Ashok Vohra (henceforth AV) so that the reader could get a clear picture of the latter's book, *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind* (henceforth *WPM*),[2] from a third person's perspective. I feel that Suresh Chandra in his comments on the book has gone, in some places, too far in his enthusiasm of criticism—which results in distorting the very purpose for which the book was written. At the same time, there are some points in SC's comment, which remain unanswered in AV's reply '*Why Flog a Dead Horse!*'. My purpose is to highlight the points missed by SC, and point out the issues, which have remained, unanswered in AV's reply. In the process I have

added my own comments on the book and advanced arguments to supplement SC's evaluation as well as at places shown how AV could have replied to the criticism raised by SC.

SC's first allegation on *WPM* is very carefully presented in the form of 'purist' and 'impurist' distinction (these are purely the critic's own terms). For SC 'a purist is one, who does not take the help of other philosophers' and 'an impurist is one who takes the help of other philosophers in order to explain Wittgenstein's views'. On the basis of this division and his 'personal' opinion that the 'purist does not have the danger of looking at Wittgenstein in the image of some other philosopher', he comes to the conclusion that since Vohra adopted the impurist way 'he takes for granted that their (Ryle, Strawson, Ayer and Shoemaker) views are well known to the people'. On the same line of criticism Suresh Chandra suggests that the book should have been named as 'Philosophy of Mind: Perspectives of Ryle, Strawson, Shoemaker and Wittgenstein'. He provides the reason for this conclusion in clearer terms in the next paragraph. 'By seeing the title of Vohra's book one would start expecting that the book would be crammed with references to Wittgenstein; it would be overflowing with Wittgensteinian landscapes. But Wittgensteinian landscapes are rare. Wittgenstein has been presented as an approver; now of Ryle's view, now of Strawson's view, now of Barnard Williams' view and so on. It seems as if Wittgenstein has no identity of his own; his identity is merged into the identity of so many British philosophers.'[3] AV in his reply justifies his looking at Wittgenstein through the glasses of Ryle because Wittgenstein is reported to have said that Ryle was one of the two of his contemporary philosophers who understood the import of his writings.

Though in his reply AV has given the reason for taking the help of Ryle for understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind, he has not explained the reason for using Strawson, Shoemaker and Ayer's works extensively. I venture below to give the reason on AV's behalf as far as the name of Strawson is concerned. Wittgenstein had almost given a similar account of the 'concept of Person' as Strawson did later on. 'Wittgenstein's dictum implies that a human being cannot be identified with a body, but has a body. Saying "Carter's body is in pain" instead of "Carter is in pain" would amount to a shift in grammar'. (*PI* 283; *BB* 73) This points in the direction of Strawson's claim that a human being or person is neither a Cartesian soul nor a body, nor a composite of the two, but a distinct type of thing to which both physical and mental predicates apply, and which can be said to have rather than be a body.'[4] Moreover, I feel that for this

one has to understand the 'general purpose' of the book. The purpose of the book was to show that 'there is no epistemological problem of mind whatever' and for this the method AV followed was that of '*Placing everything as it is undistorted before us*—to create complete clarity which leads to the complete disappearance of the philosophical problems.'[5] The purpose of AV's book as well as the methodology adopted by him is purely Wittgensteinian. Once this is understood, many points of criticism are demolished altogether. AV is right in his contention that SC could not understand the 'general purpose' of the book. In fact, the above-mentioned 'general purpose' is the central point towards which the entire platitude of the book revolves. In its revolution, planets like Ryle, Strawson, Shoemaker and Ayer come nearer to it and thus they need explanation. The revolution of the earth has to be explained in terms of the revolution of other planets. AV is right in his choice of the methodology to reach his goal. Relativity of thought shows that there is no dichotomy such as 'purist' and 'impurist'. There cannot exist such a cleavage. The claim to be 'purist' is imaginary. Wittgenstein was himself very much impressed by Kierkegaard, William James, and Weininger etc. Would SC call Wittgenstein an 'impurist' on that ground? Thus for a proper understanding of Wittgenstein one has to understand the background in which he made his aphorism. Since the purpose of AV's book is to place things 'as it is', he, instead of taking background, takes foreground into account.

Thus, for me, the 'purist' and the 'impurist' division is non-philosophical and needs further clarification. It shows one's sticking to absolutist's criteria. In order to understand me, e.g., one has to take into account the context in which I made such statements. Any judgement on my statements without taking my situation into account would be non-sensical and never true. Through cloning we can get another Suresh Chandra but that new Suresh Chandra, though he appears to be purely identical with the Suresh Chandra we have known yet in fact would not be so in his ideas, ideals and style for they are an output of the environment in which the two live. It would be harsh and to some extent irrelevant to evaluate one's ideas by another's completely alien ideas. Likewise, it is harsh on the part of SC to evaluate AV quite independently of the concerns and context of the latter, and in terms of the 'purist' category proposed by him.

There is no reply by AV to SC's allegation that 'It does not occur to Vohra that Ryle is playing one game and Strawson another. Ryle's objective is not to establish that the concept of a person is a logically primary concept. His objective is simply to drive the Cartesian ghost away from

the body.[6] As far as I am concerned SC is not only mistaken at this point, but suffers from inconsistency too. He is mistaken because it does occur to AV that Ryle and Strawson have different theories regarding the concept of person. This remark is sufficient to answer SC's allegation. I should not be compelled to give reasons to support my view because SC has not given any reason to support his contention that 'It does not occur to Vohra' etc. But I will not leave my comment without proper clothing. In fact AV's selection of Ryle and Strawson for explaining Wittgenstein, seems to be intentional. Its purpose is to describe Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind through different shades of ideas so that it could be understood properly. For example, a child asks his teacher to explain how to arrive at 144. The teacher explains this through various ways with the help of multiplication and addition etc. Now, can the teacher be criticized on the ground that it did not occur to him that multiplication and addition are playing different games so he should not have taught in ways which are quite different?

I do not understand what made SC to write, while disagreeing with AV's view that 'those who allocate the concept of "private" to the concept "language" have thus made a category mistake,' and that 'category mistake is a Ryle's jargon. Wittgenstein would certainly reject this jargon.'[7] SC is certainly not right on this point. *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*, while quoting BB47 and PG106, says that for Wittgenstein 'To say of a machine that it thinks is a category mistake.'[8] Equally troubling is AV's response. While reading it I was expecting that AV will definitely denounce the above underlined sentence of SC because this is an attack on the core of the book. Instead of disagreeing with SC, AV keeps on explaining what a category mistake is and how its Rylian conception is different from the Wittgensteinian conception of committing a logical howler through confusing primary and secondary senses of a word. In fact AV bows to SC's criticism. 'To confuse the primary sense of a term with its secondary sense may amount to committing a logical howler, a philosophical blunder, but it certainly is not what Ryle has called a category mistake.'[9] AV forgets that this concession to SC is a big blow to his own thesis, because if he is dealing with Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind then as he demarcates between Wittgenstein's 'logical howler' and Ryle's 'category mistake', in his reply to SC, why did he not use the term logical howler instead of category mistake? This is a complex issue, which AV has to clarify. I do not mean that the concept of 'category mistake' was given by Wittgenstein and not by Ryle. My point is that 'category mistake' is not a patent of

Ryle'. To say that the concept of category mistake is wholly and solely Rylian is to provide a patent to Ryle for the product which in fact in some form or other was existing earlier. It is like the current controversy of providing a patent to American companies for the extracts from the Indian neem tree and parboiling method of rice, which were prevalent, in some form or other, in India since time immemorial. SC and AV may provide a patent to Ryle for his product—'category mistake', but *A Wittgenstein Dictionary* is certainly not providing this. Thus, either SC and AV or the *Dictionary* can be right.

SC's criticism of AV's attack on sense data is misplaced. SC writes 'sense data philosophers may be wrong, but Vohra is certainly not right. For Vohra has assigned truth-value to a belief in terms of "normal perception" and "illusory perception" '.[10] Up to this point SC is right in representing AV's view. Hereafter, he beings his own constructions that the knowledge whether a particular perception is 'normal', according to AV, would amount to the knowledge of the particular belief being true and vice-versa. He concludes, 'So assigning truth-value to beliefs on the ground of "normal perception" and "illusory perception" would suffer from vicious circularity. Normalcy of a perception would depend on the truth of the belief connected with it, and the truth of the belief on its own part would depend on the normalcy of the perception connected with it."[11] SC forgets the context in which AV had made the reference to 'ordinary perception' and 'true belief'. In fact, at this stage AV is engaged in criticizing 'argument from illusion' for the existence of sense-data. Sense-data philosophers introduced this argument in order to prove that even in an illusion there is an object (sense-data) corresponding to the experience. Thus, these philosophers claim that the problem faced by non-sense-data philosophers is—what corresponds to illusory perception; since there is no physical object in illusion. For these sense-data philosophers sense-data is the object corresponding to veridical as well as illusory perceptions. One of the major assumptions of sense-data philosophers which AV objects to is as follows: 'There is no qualitative difference between what we are aware of in our normal sense experience and what we are aware when we experience an illusion.'[12] AV proceeds to deny the assumption of sense-data philosophers, namely that there is no distinction between the state when we have 'normal sense-experience' and the state 'when we experience an illusion'. The first point that he makes is that 'if there were no qualitative distinction between an illusion and a normal perception then every normal perception would be like an illusion.'[13] The second point of

AV is that 'the difference between ordinary perception and sensory illusion is that in the case of ordinary perception the beliefs are true, whereas in the case of sensory illusions the beliefs are false.'[14] SC catches up this second point and starts bouncing up his criticism at AV as described in the beginning of this paragraph. If one reflects upon all this, in the context of the book, he will easily come to know the superfluity in SC's criticism. Vohra has never said that 'ordinary perception' depends on 'true belief' and 'sensory illusion' on 'false belief'. What he meant is that they coincide. He writes that in the case of illusion 'we are simply under the false belief that "ordinary perception" is taking place.'[15] He further writes, 'All of us do recognise that in illusion our belief is false.'[16] The question, how does one 'recognize', would be a 'spurious question' for AV. For him, it would be like asking 'How does one count?' or 'How does one walk?' SC's question as to 'How do we know (or recognize) that a perception is normal?'[17] is still valid. This question dissolves when one reads the last line of this chapter which goes as follows: 'We shall say a person has paid heed if he can recognise things to which he paid heed at a subsequent time.'[18] These remarks of AV are perfectly in tune with Wittgenstein's standpoint that 'the project of tracing our belief to their origin in sense impression has no point with regard to the fixation of belief.'[19] Thus SC's objection to AV's attack on sense data amounts to his criticizing Wittgenstein. But SC, at this stage, does not even indicate that he has any reservation against Wittgenstein. What follows from all this is that either Wittgenstein is wrong or SC's criticism of AV is superfluous. Moreover SC, while alleging that AV commits 'vicious circularity' by making 'normal perception' and 'true belief' dependent on each other—says that the '"ordinary discourse" ... avoids vicious circularity in question.'[20] This critisim of SC indicates as if AV is writing about non-ordinary (extra-ordinary!) discourse of perception.

Chapter Two of the book, 'Privacy and Private Language', about which SC, after writing that 'here Vohra is best' and that 'he is a serious Wittgensteinian', continues with his blunt criticism, to which AV replies that here 'SC is worst confounded in his discussion.' This chapter represents Wittgenstein's arguments for the denial of the possibility of private language. The private language, i.e. the language which the speaker alone can understand, is an impossibility and the traditional philosophers' assumption that such language is possible, is based on their two mistakes: (i) mistakes about the nature of experience, and (ii) mistakes about the nature of language. A private linguist commits the first mistake when he

thinks that his sensations are (A) inalienable, and (B) incommunicable. He commits the second mistake when he assumes that 'sensation-specifying terms acquire meaning, that they can be taught, and used by private ostensive definition.'[21] For Wittgenstein, an individual experience is neither (A) nor (B) and that the meaning of a word is determined not by private ostensive definition but by its use, context and underlying 'form of life'.

AV in this chapter shows how Wittgenstein denies the concept of 'private language'. Since there is no possibility of 'private language' AV writes that to talk about a private language is to make a category mistake. This is the gist of the second chapter that is lucid, concise, tightly knit and a pleasure to read. However, the debate between SC and AV is not centred on the basic point of the above argument. The discussion about this chapter is centred on a superficial similie, namely, whether pain behaves like 'colours' or 'physical objects'. The book explains these points under the linguistic mistake of talking of sensations as inalienable. Again this inalienability mistake rests on two further mistakes—my pain is necessarily felt in my body and that only I am in possession of my pain. This second mistake, around which the discussion of SC and AV is centred, is committed because of the false identification of sensation with a physical body or a physical object. For AV '"my pain", "his pain", "your pain" look like expression of ownership, because of the surface similarity with "my coat", "his coat", "your coat".'[22] Further, 'In the case of sensations, the talk of correct identification of the possessor is senseless (nonsensical).'[23] And 'the case of pain is not like physical objects but is like colours. To assimilate pain to physical objects is to make a category mistake. It follows then that it is possible for two people to have the same pain as it is possible for two surfaces to have the same colour.'[24] SC's objection is that 'if it is impossible for a chair here to be numerically the same as a chair there, then it is also impossible for a colour here to be numerically the same as a colour there. Both of them, colour and chair stand and fall together.'[25] AV's reply to this is that SC confuses between 'identity' and 'individuation'. He says, 'In the case of chairs we normally say that the two chairs are similar to one another, or that they are replicas but in the case of colours and pains we say the two are same, or exactly identical.'[26]

This reply of AV as well as the objection of SC seem to me nothing but intellectual verbosity. AV's reply is the reply of an 'Indian Wittgensteinian' and not that of Ludwig Wittgenstein. AV's use of 'similar' for two chairs which resemble each other and 'identical' for colours

is his own distinction between identity and similarity. Wittgenstein does not make such distinction. Wittgenstein says 'Identity of object I express by identity of the sign and not by means of a sign of identity. Difference of the object by difference of the sign.'[27] SC is right in saying that for Wittgenstein 'no category mistake is committed by assimilating pains to colours and chairs'. But even if SC is right, does it affect the validity of AV's arguments for the impossibility of Private language? No, because SC has no objection against Wittgenstein's thesis that sensations are not inalienable.

SC has three reservations on Chapter Three titled, 'Self Knowledge and Personal Identity', of which two are related to Wittgenstein. These are as follows: (1) SC alleges that since Vohra treats 'formal features of our lives' as 'psychological features', and later on as 'essences of our life', for him bodily features 'are not formal features, they are contingently related to us'. From this SC concludes that 'so Vohra has quite intelligently introduced the Cartesian ghost into Wittgenstein's philosophy.'[28] (2) SC rejects AV's extension of (*PI* 38) where Wittgenstein upholds that 'I have learnt English' is the answer to the question 'How do I know that this colour is red?'. AV's extended use of the *PI* is that my knowing English is an evidence for my claim that 'This is a tree' and 'This is an ink-pot'. SC ridicules this extended reasoning of AV by saying that if AV is right then 'my knowing English' can be cited as a reason even in such cases as 'How do you know this is arsenic?' and 'How do you know that he is a murderer?' He is of the opinion that 'First person psychological statements do not have evidence, therefore, they cannot be knowledge-claim of any kind'. In support of his view SC has quoted Wittgenstein as '"I know that that's a tree". But if all the others contradicted me ... what *good* would it do to me to stick to my "I know".'[29]

Before I give my observation on the above, let us see AV's reply to these objections.

AV outrightly rejects SC's first allegation. 'I do not know how Suresh Chandra arrives at the conclusion: 'By formal features Vohra simply means "psychological features".' At no stage in the book either overtly or covertly have I said so.'[30] Further AV says 'I do not exclude bodily features from the formal features ... So, I cannot be said to have ignored the bodily features from being included in the formal features .... I have neither "introduced the Cartesian ghost into Wittgenstein's philosophy" ....'[31] Likewise, Vohra rejects SC's second objection: 'My reason for saying that my having learnt English is good enough to answer some questions like "How

do I know that this colour is red?" was that in such cases "we do not have to look for any other reason, nor is there one" .... So, there is no question of extending carelessly and irresponsibly the argument to each and every case."[32] .

It appears as if AV is inconsistent in his first reply as he does not take into account what he says on p. 80 where he asserts that 'psychological states' are 'formal features of our lives'. However, this inconsistency is only apparent and it is because AV does not clarify the distinction between 'psychological state' and 'psychological features' either in his response or in his book. Had he done so, there would not have been any confusion. This also indicates SC's confusion and vindicates Vohra's stand. SC's objection is based on the misunderstanding that 'psychological states' and 'psychological features' are one and the same thing. Once this distinction is properly understood, there is no need to say again that the book neglected bodily features.

SC's second objection as well as AV's reply to it, are partial truths and thus need corrections for proper understanding of *WPM*. SC is right in questioning AV's extended version of citing 'my knowing English' as the ground for an assertion. There cannot be an infinite extension of this reasoning otherwise the pedestal of any epistemological structure would collapse. There must be evidence and 'social acceptance' for any epistemological claim, as SC has rightly quoted Wittgenstein to point out. Further, the following quote from *On Certainty* also supports SC's standpoint: 'I may tell someone "this colour is called 'red' in English" (when for example I am teaching him English). In this case I should not say "I know this colour ..."—I would perhaps say that if I had just now learned it, or by contrast with another colour whose English name I am not acquainted with."[33] AV's attempt to do away with this criticism in his reply by saying that he restricted his 'my knowing English' reasoning to such cases where 'we do not look for any further reason' is insufficient. As Wittgenstein says, 'If someone believes something, we needn't always be able to answer the question 'why he believes it'; but if he knows something, then the question, "how does he know?" must be capable of being answered.'[34] 'And if one does answer this question, one must do so according to generally accepted axioms. This is how something of this sort may be known.'[35] Thus it appears that both SC and AV in their argumentation are confusing 'why' with 'how' of the above questions of Wittgenstein. Once this confusion is over there is no bone of contention between the two. However, though AV's defence is not flawless SC is also not quite right. For me SC

indiscriminately quoted Wittgenstein, without taking into account the context to support his own view. It is essential to be careful while quoting Wittgenstein. SC quotes Wittgenstein (*On Certainty*, 503) to show that the latter supports the 'social acceptance' as the basis of knowledge-claim. SC fails to recognize that here Wittgenstein intends to question the reliability of the first person psychological statements and does not absolutely endorse the 'social-acceptance' criterion. Wittgenstein can in no sense be said to be an absolutist. He always leaves room for contingencies. While thinking on these lines I came across Wittgenstein's view which is apparently contradictory to SC's quotation of 'social-acceptance' thesis. It is: 'Does human agreement *decide* what is red? Is it decided by appeal to the majority? Were we taught to determine colour in this way? For I describe the language game "Bring something red" to someone who can himself already play it. Others I might at most teach it (Relativity).'[36]

WPM neither accepts that the first person psychological statement can serve as basis for a knowledge claim nor denies that the 'social-acceptance' criterion plays an important role for any knowledge-claim. In fact this is what AV emphasises in the conclusion of the chapter on 'Knowledge of Other Minds' where he brings in the concept of 'form of life'. In his reply he quotes *On Certainty* 441. However, he did not mention in his reply that his extension of Wittgenstein's 'my knowing English' reasoning is not concerned with the knowledge-claim but with the process of knowing, i.e. 'why' of Wittgenstein quoted above. Once this gap existing between SC's criticism and AV's reply is understood, all the confusions regarding the *WPM* standpoint on first person psychological statement becomes clear.

WPM's last chapter deals with 'Knowledge of Other Persons' about which SC has made three comments and AV has replied only to the last one.

SC's first criticism is that AV equates soul to 'a subject of experience' which according to SC is a non-Wittgensteinian thesis. I appreciate SC for raising this sensitive issue of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Though *WPM* does not specifically mention whether soul = a subject of experience, if it had been intended, even cursorily to do so then certainly SC is right. AV's silence on this issue in his reply only endorses SC's allegation. The exact position can be known only if AV clarifies it. But, SC is certainly not right when he, after quoting PI, Part II, p. 128, on soul concludes that 'His (Wittgenstein's) problem is not the reduction of human beings to mere subjects of experiences, but making them free from this bondage.'[37]

Wittgenstein was not an angel or a preacher and never thought himself or human beings to be in bondage (at least not in the sense as 'bondage' and 'freedom' and other such religious concepts as interpreted in various religious traditions). He was religious in a quite different sense of the term.[38] Ray Monk in *Wittgenstein: Duty of Genius* quotes Wittgenstein as saying 'Suppose someone said: "What do you believe, Wittgenstein? Are you a sceptic? Do you know whether you will survive death?" I would really, this is a fact, say "I can't say. I don't know" because I haven't any clear idea what I'm saying when I'm saying "I don't cease to exist", etc.'[39] Thus if Wittgenstein did not believe soul to be a mere subject of experience he also did not believe in soul in the sense it is believed by SC and other religious thinkers. Wittgenstein was non-committal on the issues of God, soul, Last Judgement etc.[40] So much to counter SC's view that 'The attitude to which Wittgenstein refers is the attitude of a religious person.'[41]

Secondly, SC is in disagreement with Wittgenstein's attack on the argument from analogy for the existence of other minds and thereby rejects AV's quotation of PI 293, on the ground that 'those who have attacked the argument from analogy, have never succeeded in producing a better alternate argument.'[42]

SC is unaware of the fact that here he commits the fallacy of *argumentum ad ignorantiam*. Instead of giving reasons in support of the argument from analogy he accuses the critics of the argument on the ground that they are not in a better position than its supporters. Perhaps this is the reason why AV did not consider it worthwhile even to mention this criticism in his reply. Moreover SC's objection against *WPM's* view that 'by virtue of training we have received we know that the other walking and talking figures which have bodies similar to mine, have minds'; is uncalled for because the conclusion of the chapter reads, 'To say that we are taught this art of knowing other minds and their identity is misleading, though it may be said that we learn it.'

SC charges AV of inconsistency because first he upholds that (a) 'we know about ourselves and about our identity without any theories' and then goes on to support that (b) 'the theory of other minds involves bodily identity as the criteria of personal identity.'

AV replies by saying that 'Our criteria of personal identity has to have a proper mix up of behavioural component and memory component in it.'[43] *WPM* establishes that 'for the same reasons for which memory cannot be the criterion of personal identity in the first person statements, it can also not be the criterion of personal identity in the third person state-

ment.'[44] After establishing that the memory criterion cannot be the sole criterion of establishing personal identity it takes on the 'philosophers who think that bodily identity cannot be regarded as the criterion of personal identity at all' and concludes in the end of the chapter that 'From the above discussion, it follows that bodily identity can be regarded as a criterion of personal identity.'[45] It is this conclusion which motivates SC to write, 'Is there any doubt that Vohra has supported the theory of other minds that involves bodily identity as the criterion of personal identity?'[46] SC fails to anticipate that when AV objects to the attacks on the bodily criterion of personal identity it does not amount to his exclusive acceptance of bodily criteria and rejection of memory criteria. When I answer objections raised against *varna-vyavastha*, it does not mean that I endorse it *in toto*. I still can have reservations against the evil aspects of it. When my teacher scolds me for my mistakes it doesn't mean that he hates me. Rather it means that he loves me. In fact *WPM* deplores the then prevalent memory criteria and negates the objections against bodily criterion. This it does with the aim of establishing a combination of both as the criteria of personal identity. Though it does not establish this conclusion in clear terms, and perhaps this is the cause of SC's confusion, but AV through the introduction of 'form of life' as a tool for knowing other minds in the beginning of the last paragraph of p. 109, dispels all doubts regarding the criterion of personal identity. SC shouldn't have missed the point that 'form of life' includes both 'bodily' as well as 'memory' criteria.

This attempt of filling the gaps existing between SC's criticisms and AV's responses may at times, appear to be leaning either towards SC or AV. However, for ensuring the continuity of ideas expressed in *WPM* and growth of Wittgensteinian philosophy, it was necessary at some places to take sides. But at most of the places I tried to stand like a tennis net, doing nothing but establishing continuity between, and demarcating boundaries of the two well-known Indian players of Wittgensteinian philosophy. While highlighting the basic differences of approach between SC and AV at places, I have attempted a synthesis of their views on the important issues raised in *WPM* so that the discussion may be carried on.

Notes and References

1. *JICPR*, Vol. XV, January–April, 1998, pp. 141–63.
2. Ashok Vohra, *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind* (hereafter *WPM*), Croom Helm, London and Sydney, 1986.
3. Suresh Chandra, *JICPR*, Ibid., p. 142.

4. Hans Johann Glock, *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*, Blackwell, UK 1996, p. 157.
5. *WPM*, p. 3, *WPM's* introduction establishes its purpose in very clear terms.
6. SC, *JICPR*, p. 143.
7. SC, *JICPR,* p. 142.
8. *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*, op.cit., p. 157–8.
9. AV, *JICPR,* p. 142.
10. SC, *JICPR,* p. 145.
11. Ibid.
12. *WPM*, p. 23.
13. Ibid., p. 22.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 24.
17. SC, *JICPR*, p. 145.
18. *WPM*, p. 33.
19. Charles Landesman, *An Introduction to Epistemology*, Blackwell, UK, 1997, p. 192.
20. SC, *JICPR*, p. 145.
21. *WPM*, pp. 51–2.
22. Ibid., p. 47.
23. Ibid., p. 48.
24. *WPM*, p. 51.
25. SC, *JICPR*, p. 145.
26. AV, *JICPR,* p. 161.
27. Wittgenstein, *TLP*, 5.53.
28. SC, *JICPR*, p. 150.
29. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, p. 503.
30. AV, *JICPR,* p. 162.
31. Ibid.
32. *WPM*, p. 163.
33. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, p. 530.
34. Ibid., p. 550.
35. Ibid.
36. Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, pp. 431–2.
37. SC, *JICPR*, p. 151.
38. Cf. Georg Von Wright, quoted in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, Oxford University Press, London, pp. 19–20. For details see my paper, 'Wittgenstein Ka Dharmic Mat' in *Darshnic Traimasic*, January–December, 1996, pp. 93–8.
39. Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*, Vintage, London, 1991, p. 411.
40. Ibid.
41. SC, *JICPR*, p. 151.
42. Ibid., p. 152.
43. AV, *JICPR*, p. 162.

44. *WPM*, p. 107.
45. Ibid., p. 109.
46. SC, *JICPR*, p. 153.

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The Internality of Consciousness Experience[1]

Dr G.P. Ramachandra's remark that he 'could not understand much of' what I wrote in response to his note, 'Is There Such a Thing as Self-consciousness?',[2] carries a smack of arrogance. This arrogance undoubtedly arises from the fact that he has already surrendered to a style of thinking and a vocabulary which do not allow him to 'see' their delimitation in the face of our experience of 'inner freedom' (the 'existential freedom', if you like). Dr Ramachandra is so much captivated by his notion of 'function words' that he forgets to ask what the foundation or cause of the functions or behaviour expressions each one of us exhibits would be. He unfortunately believes that by replacing consciousness-language (words such as 'intending', 'desiring', 'boredom', 'feeling', 'disposition', 'knowing', 'wanting', 'deciding') by function-language (what he calls 'function words') he has been successful in dissolving the problem of the internality of 'mental events' (i.e., 'consciousness states', 'self-consciousness', '*my* act of experiencing', etc.). Would he ask himself why consciousness-language has survived and grown through the history of human culture and forms almost the bedrock of the verbalization of man in morals, poetry, religion and in the whole mass of literature, including scientific literature.

In order to draw Dr Ramachandra's attention to the sphere of his own self-consciousness while he must have been in the process of composing the thoughts in his paper, I had said:[2]

> He must have one day got the idea of writing this piece; as he was writing it, he was on and off journeying across his own 'inner space' to buttress his pre-set notion that there is no such thing as self-consciousness; he had to 'bracket' the ideas and views that he might have found to oppose or weaken his own pre-set notion; he operated on a canvas of meanings, expressions, effective and non-effective constructions; he

must have at every step of his thought and its verbal 'delivery' intended a certain effect on the readers and gauged it again and again; ...

To this Dr Ramachandra retorts:

> Dr Sinari should not be deceived by the linguistic nature of the exercise .... Writing a paper is not a matter of journeying across inner space, as Dr Sinari thinks.

And perhaps with an intent to be somewhat sensational, he adds:

> There is nothing inner about writing an essay, any more than there is anything inner about brushing one's teeth. A language is as much a social product as a toothbrush and toothpaste.

About one's changing the syntax and transposing words, symbols and sentences for bringing about the required effect, Dr Ramachandra repeats the mention of his teeth-brushing ritual thus:

> There is nothing inner about that process, any more than there is anything inner about the brushing of the teeth on the upper right side seeming unsatisfactory, so that one brushed it again.

I would want to assert that neither writing an essay nor brushing one's teeth can be without one's mental engagement, some sort of consciousness's directedness to different acts, the motivated thinking aimed at distinct anticipated results. The paraphernalia of brushing one's teeth, if dissected into minute individual activities (the picking up of the toothbrush, the spreading of a certain quantity of toothpaste on it, the moving of the brush over the teeth, etc.), surely hides an answer to the question 'Why should I brush my teeth?', just as writing a paper with all the skill that is seen to be essential for making its reading effective would conceal an answer to the question, 'Why do I or should I compose this paper?'. What coordinates the two distinct mental engagements (writing a paper and the brushing of the teeth) is the meaning or meanings the agent bestows on them. This meaning-bestowal is a mental event without which neither of the two performances could be understood. Although these performances appear to be overtly *of* consciousness and thus expressible in function-language, their full meaning is 'seen' by self-consciousness, i.e, within that sphere of consciousness where they are placed as 'willed' or 'designed' events.

I must point out, against Dr Ramachandra's complaint that I do not distinguish clearly between self-consciousness and inner events, that the

distinction between the two is actually totally blurred. When I say I am conscious of Dr Ramachandra's position in his paper, my 'being conscious' amounts to 'my being conscious of my being different from Dr Ramachandra' and at the same time 'my knowing what Dr Ramachandra maintains' and also 'my having a view not identical with his'. In the case of human beings, consciousness and self-consciousness coalesce in such a manner that in no situation would either of them stand as autonomous. It is this blending of the two that, as I have pointed out already, Merleau-Ponty covers by using the term 'intentional arc'.[3] There is no escape for Dr Ramachandra from the position that the experience of consciousness or of self-consciousness is an internal event for each one of us. For each one of us, to be in the world is to have an 'inside' (an 'inwardness' à la Kierkegaard), to have a noetic universe of one's own, to merge with and also to have a distancing from all that 'happens' to oneself. The domain of self-consciousness is strangely intertwined with 'I am I' (self-identity), with myself as world-conscious, time-conscious, lonesome in life and in death, as language- and meaning-conscious. Self-consciousness is a fluvial experience and function-language is too mechanical and too matter-of-fact a structure to grasp it.

Let me turn again to Dr Ramachandra's attempt to deride what I called *his* self-consciousness as he was writing 'Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness?'. I referred to the 'inner' process Dr Ramachandra must have experienced as the threshold of writing this essay. Dr Ramachandra says:

> The preconditions for writing are not prior inner events but a knowledge of the language and of the subject matter and both are social products.

To my insistent claim that Dr Ramachandra was being 'reflective' as he went on writing the essay and hence 'inward', he says:

> 'Reflecting' does not denote an inner event. We say someone is reflective when his language shows awareness of considerations which would escape the attention of the average man.

I wonder how Dr Ramachandra is so sure that there is no mental image in the mind of the writer of what he is going to write in the form of meanings, nuances, pre-perceptions, in the form of an impulse to express himself. These meanings, nuances and pre-perceptions are causative in relation to what the writer writes, and, for that matter, the underlying forms of that which would be amenable to function-language.

It would be interesting to see what perceptions Dr Ramachandra has about himself—about himself as a writer, a philosopher, a critic; about himself as one who has had a past 'lived' by him, a past which he recalls, constructs and reconstructs, and 'owns' as his own. *Where* and in what *state* are these perceptions? And what about one's freedom, almost absolute, as an imaginer, as a manipulator of language, and perhaps as desirous of bringing the moon down to earth? Do not these facets of one's being constitute one's subjectivity, as phenomenologists would call it, his/her inner experience? One's past as one's lived experience and one's remembrance of it, in the manner of what Marcel Proust narrates, are one's inner being and there is a certain sort of capturing of these by one which is private and self-uncovering. This capturing is of one's own internality, for which John Searle, for instance, has used the term 'understanding'. It happens to have a special place in the structure of the human mind, in the 'field' of human consciousness, and, whatever computational techniques might have achieved, or might achieve in future, is bound to remain always elusive.

It is because of the nature of our consciousness-experience, its internality we are capable of grasping that, as I said, the very inquiry into the existence or otherwise of self-consciousness would suggest that the experience of self-consciousness is self-evident to each one of us. Indeed, as philosophers, we would want to know what sort of stuff it is. There is no sense in one's saying that we would be able to circumvent it as if it were something we could distance ourselves from. To Dr Ramachandra's query, 'How could the inquiry get started if the experience of self-consciousness is self-evident?', I could ask, 'What is the inquiry about?' and 'What does one want to do with *that* into which one inquires?'

Dr Ramachandra seems to have no arguments to disprove several seemingly semi-psychological but at the same time philosophically very significant phenomena such as our everyday consciousness and conflicts 'felt' to be prevalent within it whenever we run into paradoxical situations; consciousness's 'wearing a veil' in what Sartre has called 'bad faith' (*mauvaise foi*) and Fingarette described as 'self-deception'; the 'divided self' which happens to be the reality of our inner being, for R.D. Laing; and psychoanalysts' clearly demonstrable fall-out of abreaction in the subject-under-analysis. Unless taken to the psychopathological extreme, these phenomena disclose themselves as the very 'soil' our individualities are made of. The same thing can be said about our experience of feelings. Dr Ramachandra's attempt to objectify feelings by preferring the struc-

ture, 'There are feelings here' to the structure, 'I feel' or 'I have feelings', would sound arbitrary once it is realized that feelings are to be 'owned', 'felt' or 'possessed' by some consciousness locus if they are to be meaningful occurrences. The feelings of insecurity, for instance, whatever its degree, is an inner-to-one's-consciousness event—it has to have a 'seat', it invades the whole of one's existence when it emerges. The sentence, 'There are feelings here', will inevitably raise the question, 'Where?', and the answer to the question would have to be in terms of some experiencer's consciousness-language.

Lastly, what may appear to be Dr Ramachandra's spontaneous burst. He writes:

> ... nothing happens *inside* a human being to which terms like 'conscious' and 'experience' can refer. In the first place, these are not referring words. Secondly, neural firings and such things may be going on but they themselves are not conscious and we are not conscious of them. It may become possible one day to observe one's own or someone else's neural firings through an instrument and we would then have an experience of them, just as we experience apples or bottles.

Critics of physicalism, robotics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) (Weizenbaum, Hubert Dreyfus and Roger Penrose, for instance)[4] know pretty well that neural firings in one's brain and one's 'being conscious' or 'experiencing' are not one and the same thing. The experience of pain or of perceiving a patch of green one has, although accompanied by very intricate neural firings in one's brain, can hardly be translatable into those neural firings. The two different languages which these phenomena have brought into being (one, the experience—or consciousness-language and the other, distinctly quantitative and physicalist function-language) have not been bridged by any human ingenuity so far. Indeed, as Dr Ramachandra says, the day might come when it might be possible to observe 'one's own or someone else's neural firings through an instrument' while oneself or someone else is in the process of 'being conscious' of pain or a patch of green. Yet it is not possible to conclude from this that one would be able to look upon one's own pain or one's own perception of a green patch (keep aside someone else's) as purely objective occurrences having no self-identity, no subjectivity, no possesser behind them. The function-language one would use to describe neural firings in the brain of someone who is in pain or perceives a green patch misses their 'inside' and this 'inside' is the *raison d'être* of what Dr Ramachandra calls 'designating words'.

The words 'consciousness', 'self-consciousness' and 'awareness', like the words 'intelligence', 'mind', 'self', 'the inner existence', 'subjectivity' are designating, and opposed to 'function words'. Leaving aside the question whether the meanings of these words could be so delienated as to make each of these have a unique referent (this is a problem which notably AI experts face when they embark upon simulating 'intelligence', 'mind' or 'awareness' in an electronic system), they are semantically intertwined with expressions like 'being alive', 'existing in the world', 'having an ego', etc., and designate a reality directly and immediately experienced by each one of us, a 'canvas' in and around which things happen, *that* stuff named 'I' or 'me' which none of us would want to lose (by extinction or death, for instance).

Notes and References

1. These are comments on Dr G.P. Ramachandra's response, entitled, 'Mistaking Function Words for Designating Words', to my comments on his note 'Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness?' (*JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 1).
2. Ramakant Sinari, 'Comments on G.P. Ramachandra's note, "Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness?"' (*JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 1, p. 130).
3. Ibid., pp. 130–2.
4. °See Joseph Weizenbaum: *Computer Power and Human Reason* (San Francisco, 1976); Hubert Dreyfus: *What Computers Can't Do* (New York, 1979); and Roger Penrose: *Shadows of the Mind* (Oxford, 1994).

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Why Conciousness is not a Fiction: A Response to G.P. Ramachandra

In response to my comments on his 'Is There Such a Thing as Self-consciousness?', Professor G.P. Ramachandra has reiterated his view that words like 'consciousness', 'self-consciousness', 'I', 'self', etc. are function words and do not designate anything real. He argues against the thesis that consciousness is independently real. His recent paper 'Mistaking Function Words for Designating Words' has sought to make it clear that consciousness is a fiction and that there is nothing ontologically real about it. In this

response I seek to clarify certain points which I had raised in my earlier response. I reiterate my point that consciousness is real and is not a matter of language alone.

CONSCIOUSNESS IS REAL, NOT A FICTION

Professor Ramachandra has characterized mental words as functional and not designating. The reason seems to be that there is nothing for them to designate: there is no ontological counterpart for them. He writes:

> ... I should say at the outset that I do not believe in consciousness, in consciousness of consciousness and in self-conciousness, that is, that these are things in their own right, made up of some psychic stuff. To do so would be to hypostatize words (p. 1).

He further adds:

> Seeing and consciousness and experiencing and perceiving are not mental entities or phenomena made up of some psychic stuff, or to put it in a different way, the words 'seeing' and 'consciousness' and 'experiencing' and 'perceiving' do not designate distinct mental entities or phenomena. These are function words, not designating words (p. 2).

The argument presented here runs on the assumption that it is a philosophical illusion to think of consciousness as something independently real and that the illusion is squarely based on the grammatical mistake of confusing function words with designating words. Since mental words have been mistaken as designating words, mental entities like consciousness have been hypostatized and entertained as ontologically real.

The argument has no doubt a point in that the words, so far as the ordinary grammar goes, do not have the same function: there are words which do not designate or name anything, e.g. 'I', 'self' and other mental words. Yet they have a function in language and perhaps an indispensable function. Their function is to signify mental phenomena. For example, the word 'consciousness' does not name an entity called consciousness, but it characterizes a certain phenomenon which consists in being aware of something, in perceiving something and so on. Professor Ramachandra is right in saying that consciousness includes seeing, knowing, believing, imagining, thinking, etc. But this is to admit that consciousness is something to be characterized as real, that is, there is something called consciousness.

Professor Ramachandra says that in being conscious of an apple, what really happens is that an apple is presented and made visible; there is nothing else that takes place such as an inner event in the theatre of the mind. Therefore, according to him, the apple is ontologically real, but not consciousness. There is nothing psychic about being conscious of an apple. But here one must take note of the fact that not only there is the apple but also there is something else and that is that we are conscious of the apple. The fact of being conscious of the apple is what is being characterized as real. Philosophers have recognized the fact that unless there is something called being conscious of the apple, there is no point in talking about the apple at all. The apple is presented to us, the cognizing subjects. So there is some act of cognizing, that is, there is some mental state of perceiving the apple. Thus the mental state of being conscious of the apple has to be admitted if a full understanding of the situation is to be possible. If being conscious of something is a matter of language alone, then why should we talk of conscious human beings at all or why should we have talk of conscious states at all? There should be no language of consciousness; there should be the language of apples only.

Professor Ramachandra insists that mental words are all hypostatized and therefore there is the mistake of entifying mental states. Perhaps he has no objection to having mental states but be cannot take them as entities of some queer sort. Supposing there are mental states, then there must be some way of expressing them. But that description of mental states need not be tied down to the language of designation. All linguistic description is not designation. There is a non-designative way of expressing the mental states. It is not the case that all mental words are mistaken as designative words, notwithstanding appearance to the contrary. Therefore from this we cannot infer that mental states are hypostatized entities and there is nothing to call consciousness at all.

Professor Ramachandra has a behaviourist strategy to deny that there are conscious states at all except the characteristic behaviour associated with the mental words. Mental words function rather well in standing for the behaviour. He says:

> These words do not denote psychic entities, things in their own right and no inner event need happen for the use of these concepts to be correct. They are function words and their function is to evaluate behaviour, to make sense of the interactions of human beings with the environment (p. 8).

That is to say, mental language is behaviour-descriptive rather than designative of any entity called mind. If the mind would have an ontological reality, it would have been something inner and private.

This argument is not as convincing as it might initially appear to be. Mental phenomena need not be inner events to be real. Besides, they need not be designated to be expressed in language. Their reality lies in their being experienced and made available in language. They are as much open to public inspection as the physical world. The fact that we are all conscious language-using beings suggests that our consciousness is not a matter of private experience and that we are not enclosed in the private circles of consciousness. Our shared language is a testimony to the fact that consciousness is public and sharable.

THE MENTAL IS SOMETHING RATHER THAN NOTHING

It is beyond doubt that there is something called the mental. Consciousness is the mental phenomenon par excellence. It is in this context that philosophers have claimed that consciousness is a fundamental fact of nature and that we cannot eliminate it at all.[1] The reason is that the effort to eliminate consciousness proves infructuous because of the fact that the very act of elimination presupposes consciousness. Consciousness is a built-in feature of man. Therefore it is futile to attempt to eliminate consciousness from the domains of reality.

It is also a philosophically acceptable thesis that the conscious mental life of man enjoys some sort of autonomy.[2] The argument behind this thesis is that no amount of explanation of conscious phenomena in terms of the material conditions can help. There is still a residue of consciousness that refuses to be derived from matter or any other functional system that is physical in structure. Consciousness is an irreducible phenomenon for that matter such that the more we explain it in terms of matter the more internal and non-material it appears. The properties of conscious states such as subjectivity, internality, immediacy and of being of the nature of qualia[3] make it clear that there is something peculiar about conscious states. Their peculiarity does not mean their being mysterious in nature. In fact, there is no mystery about everyday reports of our consciousness.

Professor Ramachandra's scepticism regarding consciousness follows from his refusal to see how our everyday reports of our mental life are made. They are no doubt made in a variety of ways; crying, laughing, enjoying, shouting, etc. are ways of expressing our mental life which do

not require language though most of our mental life finds expression only in a language. This suggests that there is nothing like designating consciousness and hypostatizing it as claimed by Professor Ramachandra: there is an open-ended way of expressing consciousness by human beings because of their linguistic skills. Human beings therefore remain characteristically conscious beings in spite of the fact that we hardly say that we are conscious. To affirm or deny that we are conscious is a meaningless exercise except when the situation warrants it, as for example, when the patient says to the doctor, 'I am conscious', after recovering from coma. But the fact that we do not say 'I am conscious' does not mean that we are not conscious at all or that consciousness is nothing real.

Same is the case with self-consciousness. There is no significant way of expressing self-consciousness except under unusual circumstances. But this does not mean that there is no mental phenomenon called self-consciousness or that it is a grammatical mistake to talk of higher order consciousness. Professor Ramachandra supposes that philosophers are prone to this mistake as they talk of higher order consciousness or meta-consciousness (p. 6). But the fact remains that being conscious about one's consciousness is a common mental phenomenon. It is not that self-consciousness is a philosopher's myth created for the purpose of puzzling the common man but that it is inevitable for envisaging a self-determining free agent who can claim responsibility for his or her action.

THE LOCUS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Consciousness is ascribed to a subject because it is only a subject or an agent who can claim to be conscious. Obviously we cannot ascribe it to a material body like a stone or even a dead body. It is because it is a necessary truth that consciousness is the property of an organism. Human beings are conscious beings, so are animals which are closer to human beings. Maybe the entire organic world is conscious. But consciousness of consciousness can be ascribed only to human beings. Thus higher order consciousness is a human feature and so is ascribable to human beings.

Now the question is: Is consciousness ascribable to the human body or the human self? The materialists invariably associate consciousness with the human body because they believe that there is nothing else that can bear the property of being conscious. But it is the dualists who ascribe it to the soul or the spiritual substance. Both commit the fallacy of ascribing consciousness to something that can never be the subject of consciousness. It is human beings who are conscious, not their bodies or souls.

Philosophers have, however, admitted that the self of man is the best subject of consciousness because the notion of a human being is still ambiguous. Human self is the subject of consciousness that can be identified neither with the body nor with the soul.

Professor Ramachandra rightly points out that it is a contradiction to ascribe consciousness to the human body and the human soul at the same time. He believes that I have committed a self-contradiction (see p. 24) in saying that the locus of consciousness is both the human body and the human soul. In fact I was only driving at the point that there are two ways of ascribing consciousness which exclude each other—the physicalist and the non-physicalist. I believe that both ways are faulty because it is the human subject or the self that is the locus of consciousness. 'I', 'you' and 'he' are the personal pronouns which are the indices of the human self.

I have also mentioned earlier that conscious phenomena are typical of human self because of the fact that human beings can claim self-consciousness and that they can determine their actions freely. This imposes on us the idea of a human self not because there is an entity as such called the self but because we understand human beings better by introducing the notion of self. The self is the most primitive notion which gives us the notion of the subject of consciousness.

SELF AS NON-ELUSIVE

Now the question is: Is the self a real entity or something elusive? It is neither. It is not an entity like the human body or the soul. It is not an entity of any sort. That is why 'I' cannot be treated as a proper name or a designative expression as Professor Ramachandra has rightly pointed out. The word 'self' has been systematically misleading[4] because it has been sometimes equated with a name. But this does not prove that self is a misnomer or an elusive entity. Definitely while using the expression 'I' we are not referring to an elusive self. I am not elusive to myself. If that were so, then the whole idea of myself would collapse. The self is the logical requirement of our language and experience because without that we cannot express whose experience an experience is.

Professor Ramachandra believes that our language could be pruned of the expressions such as 'I' and 'self' because what they do in language can be done by some other expressions. For example, instead of 'I think' we can say 'There is thought'. But actually the substitution does not help at all. The latter expression does not carry the meaning of the former. It is because we have not identified who the thinker is. Thinking is an activity

done by a human subject. So the human self has to be indexed by some suitable expression. Therefore a subjectless language cannot be adequate for expressing human experience.

The reality of the self cannot be based on any specious argument other than the obvious fact that our consciousness itself demands a locus, a self that is conscious. Of course one can say that instead of the concept self the concept of human being will do. But the latter concept is itself vague and ambiguous as it may mean the biological organism or the human body. Either way, there is no sharp sense associated with the concept of human being. The notion of self carries the sharp meaning of a subject of consciousness. Hence the indispensability of the concept of self. Neither the notion of mind nor the notion of body can be a substitute for the notion of self. Even the concept of human being does not suffice. If the self is elusive, so is a human being. Therefore reality can be claimed for self to the extent we need a subject of human consciousness.

THE 'HERETICAL' WITTGENSTEIN

In this context Wittgenstein's views on self and consciousness have become relevant not only because Professor Ramachandra seems to echo Wittgenstein's views on the matter but also because of the fact that Wittgenstein has something very important to say on the matter. Wittgenstein's views cannot be put into any standard straightjacket because he has remained more or less heretical on the issues we are dealing with. He can he called neither a behaviourist nor an eliminativist materialist nor a straightforward spiritualist in the philosophy of mind. In fact he claims only to do away with the confusions around the concept of mind and consciousness. He goes to the extent of claiming that he has no theory of mind and that all that he does is to clarify the concepts as they occur in language. According to him, philosophy puts the things as they are and does not put any theoretical gloss on them (Cf. *Philosophical Investigations,* sections 124 and 415).

Wittgenstein claimed in the *Tractatus* that the self is the limit of the world and our experience (5.632) and therefore it is transcendental rather than on a par with things in the world. This notion of self is definitely heretical because it is neither a denial of the self in the Humean sense nor is it an affirmation of it in the Cartesian sense. Nonetheless the self is real according the *Tractatus*. A similar approach I find in the remark 398 of the *Philosophical Investigations* which Professor Ramachandra has also noted with care. But he agrees with Sluga that in this passage Wittgenstein

denies the reality of self. Maybe Sluga is right. But there is still a nagging feeling about why Wittgenstein introduces the farmer along with the house and asks whose house is that. His answer is that the house belongs to the farmer though the latter cannot enter his house. Is there not a striking similarity between the Tractarian self which is the limit of the world and so cannot enter it and the farmer who has a house but cannot enter it? No doubt Wittgenstein is silent on what the nature of the self is and where it is located. But these questions might have looked meaningless for him once he admits that the self is the limit of the world.

Now the question is: Why should anyone deny the reality of the self unless one has a metaphysical axe to grind? The notion of self is as much common in human language as the notion of the world, experience, etc. To deny the self is to deny that anyone thinks, has experience, refers to himself and so on. One need not be a philosopher to assert that one thinks, has ideas, goes on a holiday, etc. Therefore only philosophers can quarrel over whether there is a self or not. If I am real, then so is my self. I and my self are one and the same.

As far as I understand, Wittgenstein does not intend to do away with the notion of self though he has reservations on how we must understand the notions of 'self' and 'I'. At least he does not mind being heretical in calling the self the limit of the world.

BACK TO THE PHENOMENA

I agree with Professor Ramachandra that 'today' has no form and therefore talking about the form of today has no meaning. But can we not talk of the form of life? Definitely objects and object-looking things have form. In that sense human beings have form of life and I do not find anything mystifying in the saying that consciousness is the form of life of man. All that it means is that human beings are conscious beings and that we cannot conceive of a human being who has no consciousness or cannot have it at any point of his or her life, temporary loss of consciousness notwithstanding. Thus there is reason to feel assured that consciousness is a necessary feature of being human. Of course we are talking here of human consciousness.

Consciousness and all its varied manifestations are so common and indispensable features of human life that we do not feel like asking what will happen if all human beings behave like automata. It is because we cannot conceive of life without consciousness. We do not know what it is to be without consciousness. Therefore I would like to conclude by

saying that consciousness is real as a mental phenomenon and that understanding consciousness remains incomplete if all its ramifications including self-consciousness are not taken into account.

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1. See John R. Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind* (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1994), Chapter 2.
2. Cf. Hilary Putnam, *Mind, Language and Reality* (The Cambridge Univesity Press, Cambridge, 1975), pp. 291–303.
3. See Owen Flanagan, *Consciousness Reconsidered* (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1992), Chapter 4.
4. See Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (Penguin Books, 1963; First Published by Hutchinson, 1949).

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'jīvikā dhātṛnirmitā' or 'jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ'?

At the end of the first chapter of *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (*SDS*), Sāyaṇamādhava (14th century) quotes a number of verses and ascribes them to Bṛhaspati. One of them runs as follows:

> *agnihotraṃ trayovedās tridaṇḍaṃ bhasmaguṇthanam/*
> *buddhipauruṣahīnānāṃ jīvikā dhātṛnirmitā//*[1]

J. Muir, the first English translator of this passage from *SDS*, renders it thus:

> The Agnihotra sacrifice, the three Vedas, the mendicant's triple staff, and the practice of smearing oneself with ashes, are only a means of livelihood ordained by the Creator for men who have neither understanding nor energy.[2]

The verse seems to strike an odd note. It is well known that Bṛhaspati, the eponymous founder of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata doctrine, denied the existence of God, after-life, etc. Why should he speak of the Creator, *dhātṛ*?

Cowell, however, felt that there was something wrong here. He, therefore, translated *dhātṛnirmitā* as 'made by Nature'.[3] In a note he added, 'I take Dhātṛi as God, or nature, speaking by common parlance. Dr. Hall

(Catalogue, p. 162) would seem to take Dhātṛi as the name of an author—'Dhātṛi may sometimes stand for Bṛhaspati'.[4]

There is no evidence elsewhere or in the lexicons that Bṛhaspati was also called Dhātṛi. In any case, even accepting that would be of no avail in the given context. How could Bṛhaspati or a mere author (as Hall would have it) make or ordain the livelihood of the ascetics?

The reading of the verse seems to be suspect.

Fortunately enough, Sāyaṇa-mādhava (SM) himself quotes another reading of the verse in the earlier part of the same chapter:

> *agnihotraṃ trayovedās tridaṇḍaṃ bhasmaguṇṭhanam/*
> *buddhipauruṣahīnānāṃ jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ//*[5]

The fourth hemistich here is quite different. Cowell translates the last line as: 'Bṛihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those who have no manliness nor sense.'

The difference lies only in the last hemistich, which, however, makes all the difference in meaning. Evidently the reading just quoted is more appropriate. Why then did SM alter it when he cited the verse for the second time? The question will lead us to the source of the verse itself.

As early as the 11th century, Kṛṣṇamiśra cited this verse in his allegorical play, *Prabodhacandrodaya* (2.26). The last hemistich has *jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ*.[6]

In the *Granthibhaṅga* commentary on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī*, Cakradhara (11th century) too quotes the same reading with one variation in the second hemistich—*bhasmamuṇḍanam* (ashes and shaving of the head) for *bhasmaguṇṭhanam*.[7]

Śrīharṣa (12th century), however, decided to rewrite the verse in his *Naiṣadhacaritam* (17.39) in the following way:

> *agnihotraṃ trayītantraṃ tridaṇḍaṃ bhasmapuṇḍrakam/*
> *prajñāpauruṣanihsvānāṃ jīvo jalpati jīvikā//*[8]

Bṛhaspati [=Jīva] says, 'Oblation in the fire, morning and evening, the system of rules built up by the three Vedas, the carrying of three sticks tied into one, and the bearing of browmarks of ashes are the means of livelihood of those who are devoid of wisdom and manhood.'

—K.K. Handiqui's translation

Nārāyaṇa, in his commentary on this, quotes the original verse as it occurs in *Prabodhacandrodaya* (*PC*) but retains *bhasmapuṇḍrakam* in the second hemistich.

Nīlakaṇṭha (17th century) goes back to the original version but writes *trayīdharmāḥ* (ordinance according to the three Vedas) in the first hemistich.[9]

Sadānanda Kāśmīraka, a contemporary of Nīlakaṇṭha, provides yet another reading:

> *agnihotraṃ pītañca tripuṇḍraṃ bhasmadhāraṇam/*
> *prajñāpauruṣahīnānāṃ jīvo jalpati jīvikām//*[10]
>
> The Agnihotra, wearing ochre robes, bearing of three browmarks of ashes are the means of livelihood of those who are destitute of wisdom and manhood, says Bṛhaspati.

The second line is taken almost *verbatim* from Śrīharṣa's version (only in the third hemistich it has *hīnānām* and in the fourth, *jīvikām*). The first line is largely rewritten.

Two philosophical digests of uncertain date, *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* and *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha*, quote the second line as it is found in *PC* without a single variant.[11]

Following the occurrence of the verse (ten times in nine sources) chronologically, can we come to any conclusion regarding its true reading? The variants in the first line are minor and of little consequence. The crux lies in the last hemistich: should it be *jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ* or *jīvikā dhātṛnirmitā*? The third alternative—*jīvo jalpati jīvikā(m)*—may be safely ignored. It was Śrīharṣa's fabrication and none but Sadānanda Kāśmīraka adopted it. All other readings have *jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ*. This seems to be the correct reading.

Why did SM substitute it by *jīvikā dhātṛnirmitā*? The reason is apparently as follows. While quoting the verse for the first time, SM himself calls it an *ābhāṇaka*, a popular saying.[12] Kṛṣṇamiśra might not have been the author of the verse. He too perhaps got it from a purely oral source. Most of those who have quoted this verse (including SM) retain the original reading of the last hemistich. When SM quotes the verse for the second time (along with ten others), he introduces them with the remark: 'And all this has been also said by Bṛhaspati.' The verse in question comes as the second one. So, instead of naming Bṛhaspati twice in so close a succession, SM omits his name and thereby alters the last hemistich. This

saves the metre but kills the sense. Dhātṛ is introduced for nothing in an uncompromisingly atheistic system of philosophy and unnecessarily creates some confusion.

It should be remembered that this is not the only instance of SM tampering the reading of what was known as Bārhaspatya sayings. He had done the same thing with another verse (*jāvaj jīvam*, etc.) by providing two readings: the first, original; the second, his own.[13]

So it may be concluded that the reading of the verse in question as found in *PC, Granthibhaṅga*, and in the earlier part of *SDS*, Chapter I is the original one, other readings are variations or distortions.

ABBREVIATIONS

JASB *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*
JICPR *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*
JRAS *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (of Great Britain and Ireland)*
Mbh *Mahābhārata*
NC *Naiṣadhīyacaritam*
PC *Prabodhacandrodaya*
SDS *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*
SM Sāyaṇa-mādhava
SMS *Sarvamatasaṃgraha*
SSS *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha*
ZDMG *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *SDS*, Chapter 1, p. 13, verse 2, lines 112–13.
2. 'Verses', etc., *JRAS*, 1861, p. 352. The anonymous German translation (*ZDMG*, Band 14, 1860) has '*von den Vätern angeordnet*' (ordained by the Father) for *dhātṛnirmitā* (p. 525).
3. *JASB*, 1862, p. 381. Cowell's translation also appeared in Appendix C to Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays* (second edition, edited by Cowell, 1873) and in *The Pundit* (1874) before the publication of Cowell-Gough (1882).
4. *JASB*, 1862, p. 381 n. The note was omitted in Cowell-Gough (1882). By 'Catalogue', Cowell refers to Hall (1859) who said, 'A complete list of the numerous authors and treatises cited or referred to in the *Sarva-darśana-sangraha* will, therefore, have value in affording a notion as to what philosophical and cognate works were held, five hundred years ago, to be authoritative, or, at least, representative' (pp. 161–62). He then cites the names of Bṛihaspati and Dhātṛi as authorities in relation to Chārvāka-darśana.
5. *SDS*, p. 5, lines 50–51.
6. *PC*, p. 44.

7. Cakradhara, Part 1, p. 228.
8. *NC*, p. 635.
9. Ad *Mbh*, Śāntiparvan, 218.25 (Vulgate Edition), 211.24 (Critical Edition).
10. Ch. 2 (*'dvītiya mudgaraprahāraḥ'*), p. 100. Translation mine.
11. *SSS*, p. 6; *SMS*, p. 15.
12. *SDS*, p. 5, line 49. A propos *ābhāṇaka*, I would like to modify what I said before (*JICPR*, XIV, 1, September–December 1996, p. 174 n3). Besides *SDS*, the word also occurs in the *Māṭharavṛtti*, *ad Sāṃkhyakārikā*, verse 1, p. 108 and, following Māṭhara, in Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvakaumudī*, ibid., p. 6.
13. For a detailed discussion of the variants of this verse, see *JICPR*, XIV, 1, pp. 170–74. Dakshinārañjan Shāstrī and Namai have included both *jāvaj jīvam*, etc. and *agnihotram*, etc. in their reconstruction of the lost *Bārhaspatyasūtra* as aphorism Nos. 40 and 45, and B7 and B3 respectively. Shāstrī adopted the second readings of *SDS* for both, whereas Namai prefers the first reading for B7 but the second reading for B3. Leaving aside, for the present, the question whether such popular sayings can be taken as authentic *sūtra*-s, we may note this much that the first readings in both cases would be more appropriate.

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Postscript

The verse (*agnihotram*, etc.) has also been quoted by Śālikanātha (9th century) in *Ṛjuvimalapañcikā* (*ad* Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī*), edited by S.K. Ramanatha Sastri, Madras, 1934, p. 285. He too writes *jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ*.

The *yāvaj jīvam* verse (see n. 13) is further quoted by Udayana (10th century) in *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-pariśuddhiḥ* (*ad Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.2), edited by Anantalal Thakur, Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996, p. 113 (first line only), in *Mugdhavodhini* (*Nitivākyamṛta-vyākhya*, Mumbai, n.d., p. 14, and in Abhayadeva's Sanskrit commentary on the *Dohākoṣa* by Sarahapāda, edited by Prabodhcandra Bagchi, Metropolitan Publishing House, Calcutta, 1938, p. 86. The second hemistich reads *nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ* (in the first two) and *tāvat mṛtyor agocaraḥ* in the third.

In the verse quoted from the *Viṣṇudharmottara Mahāpurāṇa* in *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, p. 171, read *agocaram* in line 4 (for *agocaraḥ*) and *devā* in line 6 (for *deva*).

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In Defence of the Metaphysical Absoluteness of Persons: A Response to Professor N. Mishra

Professor N. Mishra in his illuminating comments on my paper 'Persons as Minded Beings: Towards a Metaphysics of Persons', has sought to prove that my argument for the metaphysical absoluteness of persons is based on 'the paltry basis of a person's capacity to distance himself or herself not *in re* but *in intellectu*' (p. 2). Further, he contends that to argue on this basis that the person 'is eternal or metaphysically absolute is to say the least, a queer feat of logical ingenuity' (p. 2).

In this response I would like to argue that the notion of distancing oneself from one's body has deeper metaphysical meaning as it is not merely metaphorical that we can rise above our bodily self, but that we can in fact transcend our bodily existence in a higher-order consciousness. Thus the metaphysical understanding of a person does make room for a transcendental notion of person that does not limit itself to the bodily existence. This does not of course entail that the self has no connection with the body or that it is a bodiless phantom. Besides, my argument that persons are metaphysically absolute substances does not depend on the premise that persons can distance themselves from their bodies; rather the capacity to distance oneself from one's body itself presupposes that the person is metaphysically absolute. It is the metaphysically absolute persons who alone have the capacity to rise above their bodies. However, I agree with Professor Mishra that the capacity to transcend one's bodily consciousness is after all a matter of thought and not of reality, because we can never jump out of ourselves and exist outside our bodies.

HOW TO DISTANCE ONESELF FROM ONE'S BODY

The notion of distancing oneself from one's body is available not only in our common understanding of ourselves but also in our sharing a common metaphysics that does not identify the body with the self. It does not need to take us far in understanding what it is to distance oneself from one's body except to look at how we refer to a dead person and distinguish him or her from his or her body. Whereas we burn or bury the dead body, we revere the person who is no more. This is all to remind us of the fact that person and body are not the same and that the person lives longer than the body. In fact, this is commonplace, and Professor Mishra has no basic disagreement on this.

What Professor Mishra demands is the clarification of the concept of distancing itself if it has to carry any metaphysical implication. I must admit that I have invested the concept of distancing with metaphysical significance, and so it is not a matter of metaphorical talk at all that we have the concept of distancing. The concept of distancing has the following implications: first, by distancing oneself from one's body, one really makes a metaphysical distinction between himself or herself and the body she or he possesses, and secondly, one comes to realize that one can transcend one's bodily existence by attaining a higher-order consciousness. Thus the person or the self is self-consciously distanced from the body because of the higher-order awareness that the body is a limited reality and that the self transcends the body. The metaphysics of persons presupposed here does emphasize the fact that persons or selves are transcendent to the body and its material environment, that is, to the physical world, even though they are embodied in the world itself.

I am aware that the notion of the transcendent self has queer implications if the self is identified with a soul-substance in the Cartesian sense, because the Cartesian soul has to be a substance in the world, though different from the body. Therefore I have taken the concept of self in a non-material as well as in a non-spiritual sense. For me, the self is not an entity to be identified with either the soul or the body. The self is a unique substance in the sense that it continues to be one self-identical reality *in* the world and yet it is not *of* the world. The self is therefore transcendent in this limited sense.

Professor Mishra doubts if at all the concept of distancing can have any metaphysical implication in view of the fact that the concept can have at best a metaphorical use and, besides, can be taken as standing for a capacity, albeit a contingent capacity, of the person. He writes:

> Now, if the distancing of the self from the body is not literal but just metaphorical and if capacities do not have any ontological permanence, how can persons be regarded as having any metaphysical character on the ground of their having merely a capacity to distance? (p. 2).

The question raised here pertains, first of all, to as to whether the use of the world 'distancing' can be literal, and secondly, to the issue whether the contingent capacity of distancing can prove the metaphysical thesis that persons are absolutely real as distinguished from their bodies.

As to the problem whether the notion of distancing is only metaphorical or not, I would like to stress that we literally engage ourselves in the

act of distancing from our bodies from the very moment we are conscious of ourselves. To be self-conscious is to be conscious of the fact that we are not our bodies and that we are not the same as our physical appearances. The fact of the matter is that the 'I' we use in our discourse about ourselves does not stand for our bodies. It is not that the bodies do not belong to us, but that the bodies themselves do not speak, or that the bodies do not do the actions. It is *we* who do all these. This itself is the act of distancing from our bodies.

Besides, distancing is a kind of transcendence. We transcend our body-consciousness while engaging in the mental actions such as thinking, reading, writing and so on. We forget that we have bodies when we are in deep meditation. All these common activities remind us of the metaphysical fact that we are not our bodies. Apart from these activities, we have the higher-order reflective activities like having second-order desires which shows that we can, as reflective beings, transcend our first-order desires, emotions, etc., so that we can elevate ourselves from the level of ordinary consciousness. The level of ordinary consciousness is replete with conflicts arising out of the bodily desires and emotions. These have been considered lower in view of the fact that there is a higher level of consciousness which stands for our moral and spiritual life. This aspect of our consciousness is nothing mysterious because of the fact that we do have higher levels of consciousness at different stages of our life.

We are considered more mature and rational the more we transcend our ordinary and natural desires and emotions. That is, the more we control our natural first-order desires, the more civilized and cultured we become. Thus our moral and spiritual life depends heavily on how we transcend our bodily existence. The world of values, ideals and norms holds the promise of the higher life we are rationally inclined to have.

All this, however, does not prove that we have no bodies, or that we are not bound up with our bodies. Besides, as Professor Mishra has rightly pointed out, we do not and cannot live outside our bodies. It is therefore only in the intellect or in our consciousness that we can transcend our bodies. Transcendence is *in intellectu* because all our mental development towards the higher takes place in the realm of the mind. This itself proves that transcendence is not a bodily activity and that the body is least affected by our higher consciousness except for the fact that the body itself may reflect the mind, it being a fit medium of the latter's activity. I therefore agree with Professor Mishra that distancing from the body does

not mean leaving the body or living outside the body. My concept of a person does not demand the disembodied existence of the self.

THE SELF AS A PERMANENT ENTITY

Now as regards the question whether the concept of distancing can have metaphysical significance regarding the absolute and the indivisible self, I can very well argue that the very act of transcendence presupposes that there is a permanent, indivisible self that distances itself from the body. It is not that the act of distancing is the only ground on which the metaphysical absoluteness of a person depends; the act of distancing is an index of the fact that the self is permanent and indivisible. Had the self been an impermanent and momentary entity, it would not have had the capacity to transcend its body. An impermanent self would have no reason to go beyond its momentary existence.

The self reveals its transcendental nature in the assertion that it is not its body, and it thus proves that the self and the body are metaphysically distinct. The self is not in time and space like the body. Therefore it does not share the same spatio-temporal life of the body. The bodily existence may be there for a long period of time, but it itself does not prove anything about the existence of the self. The self is permanent in the sense that it cannot be temporary in the sense the body is. Its permanence is its non-temporariness. However, I admit that the person or self as an embodied being shares the temporality of the body in the sense that it is a continuant being in space and time.

That the person as a substance is in space and time has to be admitted because otherwise there is the fear of its being reduced to a bodiless spirit. The bodiless spirit is not the person as I have argued already: persons are the minded beings who are necessarily embodied. In that sense the best characterization of the person would lie in his or her being a minded being continuing to exist in time. Had the self been a bodiless ego, it would be difficult to prevent it from lapsing into an abstract metaphysical existence. That would prove counterintuitive because it would hardly explain the nature of the persons in the world.

I therefore argue that the unity and indivisibility of the self have to be metaphysically located in the permanent self. This self is not amenable to branching or splitting as has been imagined in the various thought-experiments. The idea of a Parfitian survivor barely resembling the original self cannot vouchsafe for the unity and the indivisibility of the self we are

arguing for. Hence the idea of the permanent self has added philosophical appeal.

THE METAPHYSICAL ABSOLUTENESS OF A PERSON

To think of a self that branches into multiple selves is not only metaphysically absurd but also factually incomprehensible. That is why the so-called thought-experiments regarding fission and fusion of the persons have no metaphysical appeal. It is therefore a metaphysical requirement that there be indivisible and absolute selves so far as our social and moral existence is concerned. The absoluteness of a person lies in his or her remaining the same substance across time, and this is represented by the fact that the person-substances are continuant beings.

Professor Mishra seems to regard this continuant and permanent being called the person an 'eternal substance' (p. 20), so he thinks it is utterly impossible to prove the absoluteness and eternity of the self from the capacity for transcendence. The capacity for transcendence and the fact of absoluteness are two entirely different things, though linked in the final analysis. However, I have not argued for an eternal substance called the person; all that I have argued for are the persons who are the indivisible person-substances who exist over a period of time. They are absolute substances no doubt, but are not eternal. They are not timeless entities existing in the cosmic sense. Persons are identifiably temporal beings endowed with the capacity to transcend their temporal selves in thought and consciousness. That is, though persons live in time, they are capable of realizing that they have a transcendental nature also.

The transcendental nature consists in raising one's consciousness to higher levels through a process of reflective thinking. This is called the higher-order thinking that brings in all the elements of the higher self in the sense that the latter belongs to the region of higher consciousness. It contains the consciousness of being more than the body, of having affinity with the universal and cosmic reality, of realizing the importance of being a human person in the cosmic order of beings, and so on and so forth. All these higher-order thoughts could not be possible if we were not endowed with the capacity to transcend our bodily existence in our thought and reflection.

That persons have a metaphysical nature of their own is beyond doubt for the reason that the very notion of a person is metaphysically grounded in the idea of an absolutely indissoluble self that knows no extinction as long as one is self-conscious of being a minded being. At the root of this

feeling of being absolute and indivisible lies the feeling that one is not a body and that one can rise in consciousness beyond the body. Both these feelings have origin in the idea of the self as a minded being. The idea of distancing oneself from the one's body is as much rooted in the idea of self as the idea that one's self is an absolute metaphysical reality.

To conclude: Professor Mishra has done well to remind me of the metaphysical difficulties in the idea of distancing oneself from one's body. I have, in this response, drawn his attention to the fact that the metaphysical notion of self does imply not only the metaphysical absoluteness of persons but also their will to transcend their bodily existence.

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Agenda for Research

I

The well-known works of British empiricists are all entitled in such a way as to restrict their analysis to what they called 'human knowledge'. Locke's famous work is entitled *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* while Berkeley calls his work *Principles of Human Knowledge.* As for Hume, the title of his two major works are *A Treatise on Human Nature* and *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.*

What exactly does the term 'human' mean in these expressions? Does it imply that there is such a thing as 'non-human' or 'trans-human' knowledge? In case knowledge is supposed to occur at animal level, then it shall have to be understood as 'sub-human' knowledge. And, if it may occur at the level of beings superior to human beings, if there are any, it will have to be regarded as 'super-human knowledge'.

Kant, as is well known, confined 'human' knowledge to that realm alone where the senses provided the 'material' and the intellect provided the category or the formal structure for the understandizing which shapes that material and gives it a form which makes it human. Was Kant then merely extricating what was involved in the term 'human' when used in the context of human knowledge? Did Kant then imply that the sensory knowledge possessed by animals was 'sub-human' or 'non-human' because it lacked structuralization in terms of the formal categories of understanding which human beings alone possess. But then what was that which unified the disparate multiple sensations at the animal level? In other words, what was the transcendental unity of apperception at the animal level and how were the transcendental forms of sensibility operating there?

Kant also accepted the *possibility* of pure 'intellectual intuition', but denied its actuality at the human level. Would trans-human knowledge then be the knowledge that did not require the sensory material which was necessary at both human and the animal level. But, if so, how would it be validated or its validity ascertained?

These are some of the issues which require detailed investigation and reflection. For if human knowledge is to be necessarily 'human' and it cannot be otherwise, then how can its structural limitation ever be avoided?

And, in case it is so, how can 'essentialism' deriving from this source be ever avoided?

DAYA KRISHNA

II

The relation between the Vaidalya Sūtra and the Nyāya Sūtra needs to be studied in detail, as the two works seem to be integrally related to each other in such a way that the one clearly attempts to refute the contentions of the other. It is not clearly established as to which is prior and, though the former is usually ascribed to Nāgārjuna, the ascription has recently been questioned by Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragoneti in their work entitled *Nāgārjuna's Refutation of Logic: Vaidalyaprakaraṇa.* Also, generally Nāgārjuna is ascribed to a date slightly later than that of the author the Nyāya Sūtra. But, chronology apart, it would be interesting to examine the arguments and the counter-arguments of both the works in detail as, while the one questions the very possibility of there being any *prāmaṇa-śāstra,* the other tries to establish, point-by-point, not only its possibility but shows how it can actually be established.

It would be interesting to find out whether the Mādhyamika denial of the possibility of knowledge emanates from its non-acceptance of the structural limits imposed on the exercise of human reason by the very character of its being 'human', and whether the author of the Nyāya Sūtra is arguing for the 'acceptance' of the human conditions for the search of the validity of knowledge within the conditions imposed by the term 'human situation' which no human being can possibly overcome.

DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

I

Dr Mukund Lath has drawn our attention to the following extract from the *Aitreya Brāhamaṇa* (original Sanskrit text and its English translation) which may prove of interest to our readers as it reflects ambivalence and the conflict involved in the 'ritual killing' of animals in the Vedic sacrifice. The long debate on the *himsā* involved in the Vedic sacrifice in the Indian tradition may be seen as having its roots in the *Brāhamana* text itself, particularly as it was in conflict with the Vedic injunction which unconditionally asked for its avoidance.

paśurvai nīyamānaḥ sa mṛtyuṁ prāpaśyat sa
devānnānvakāmayata aituṁ, taṁ devā abruvannehi
svargaṁ vai tvā lokaṁ gamiṣyāma iti, sa
tathetyabravīttasya vai me yuṣmākamekaḥ
purastādaitviti, tatheti tasyāgniḥ
purastādaitso'gnimanupracyavat iti ... anvenaṁ
mātā manyatāmanu pitā'nu bhrātā sagarbhyo'nu sakhā
sayūthya iti, janitraivenaṁ
tatsamanumatamālabhante iti.

(*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, 6th* khaṇḍa of the 6th adhyāya; pp. 163–4, part 1 of the Anandashram edition)

As it was being led, the (sacrifice) the animal saw death around it. He did not want to go to the gods. The gods asked him to come to them (saying), 'come we will lead you to heaven'. The animal agreed, saying, 'let one of you walk before me'. Agni walked before it and it followed Agni. ... Let its mother (allow the animal to go); let its father and its brother, born of the same mother (allow him), let its friend, who is from the same herd, (allow him). It is to be taken with the permission of those related to it by birth.

In another context, another passage from the same *Brāhmaṇa* makes a point, which is perhaps even more radical. *Yajña*, as is well known, was central to Vedic life, thought and culture. For the *Brāhmaṇa* texts, central to the *yajña* was the correct performance of ritual, a creed, which found its logical culmination in Mīmāṁsā. The presence of the right and knowl-

edgeable Brahman priests was essential for the correct performance of ritual in its specific details. Yet, here we have a passage from a well-known Brāhmaṇa text belonging to the Ṛgvedic priests, which disclaims the idea of the 'correctness' of ritual, denying also the necessity of a presiding Brahman priest. The interested reader is also invited to look up Sāyaṇa to see how a Mīmāṁsaka tried to get around the passage, which is unambiguous in its meaning:

saiṣā svargyāhutiryadagnyāhutiryadi ha vā
apyabrāhmaṇokto yadi duruktokto yajate'tha
haiṣāhutirgacchatyeva devānna pāpmanā saṁsṛjyate iti.

(*Aitareya Brahmaṇa*, Anandashram ed., 3, 5)

The offering of agni to agni is a heavenly offering (āhuti). Even though it be made without relying on the utterance of a brāhmaṇa (meaning, as Sāyaṇa says, both a Brahmaṇa priest and a Brāhmaṇa text), or be made with an utterance not rightly formed, yet it surely reaches out to the gods; it remains untouched by sin.

MUKUND LATH

II

The discussion on political liberalism by Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls published some time ago in the *Journal of Philosophy*, USA, Vol. XCII, 3, March, 1995, pp. 109–80 should be of interest to many of our readers.

The debate between these two well-known Western thinkers on the subject should provide an interesting take-off point for our own thinking on the subject in the country.

The exact title of the article by Jürgen Habermas is 'Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawl's Political Liberalism', pp. 109–31, followed by John Rawl's 'Reply to Habermas', pp. 132–80.

DAYA KRISHNA

* * *

Notes and Queries

ANSWERS TO D.K. MOHANTA'S QUERIES*

1. Pramā as Nyāya understands it is 'justified true belief' if the word 'justified' is used to mean 'that for which justification is available or can be provided if asked for'. In this sense every true belief is a 'justified true belief' and therefore the qualification 'justified' used in the phrase is redundant. If however the word is taken in the sense of 'that whose justification is known to the holder of the belief' then not every true belief may be said to be justified. Even if a true belief is held on wrong grounds it cannot be said to be justified in this sense of the word. But in both these senses the belief will not forfeit its intrinsic character of truth.

2. Pramā is certainly a piece of knowledge but it need not be 'justified' in the second possible sense of the word given above. As to 'nondubiety', it cannot be ensured for every true belief. In the Nyāya view nondubiety or veridicity of true beliefs needs to be inferentially established.

3. The word 'belief' is used both in the dispositional and the episodic sense in western epistemology. The technical Sanskrit equivalent of the word in the first sense is संस्कार and in the seond sense it is ज्ञान.

The Sanskrit translation of the sentence is as given below. For identifying the 'mukhya viśēsya' in the sentence the complexity of the sentence does not offer much difficulty. 'The beautiful princess' is the *mukhya viśeṣya* as the term having this meaning is in the nominative case and its meaning does not act as the qualifier of any other meaning in the sentence. The phrases 'bright red rose' and 'sweet subtle fragrance' appear to denote qualities of qualities but they need not be so taken as redness and fragrance are qualities no doubt but brightness and subtlety may be regarded as certain *upādhis* or analysable properties. Sweetness is nothing but the property of causing pleasure.

The words '*anuyogi*' and '*pratiyogi*' are rarely used in the analysis of sentences. They occur mainly in the analyses of cognition. In a cognition the epistemic qualificandum is the *anuyogi* while the epistemic qualifier is the *pratiyogi*. In the first four sentences given, obviously the first term

*JICPR, XV, 1, pp. 132–8.

is *pratiyogi* as it is in the locative case. In the remaining two there is no *pratiyogi* or *anuyogi*.

The Sanskrit rendering of the complex English sentence is:

इंद तदेव जपापुष्पं भास्वद्रक्तं, यस्य सूक्ष्म-मधुर-आमोदेन इपत् अभिभूता अत्र पूर्वं राजोद्याने प्रातः भ्रमणाय समागता सुन्दरी राजकुमारी यत् सा स्वसख्यः तत् पुष्पं अनुलक्ष्य भणति यत् अद्यं न कद्यपि तत् 'आमोदं विस्मरिष्यामि इति।

Nagpur N.S. DRAVID

NOTES AND QUERIES

1. What is the difference, if any, between the notion of *dhvani* and that of *vyanjanā*? In case there is none what is the novelty in Anandvardhan's doctrine of *dhvani?* In case there is any difference, what is it?

2. How can the Vedas and the Upaniṣads be both regarded as a part of the *Śruti,* when the latter relegates the former to the status of Vidyās that cannot lead to the realization of Mokṣa?

DAYA KRISHNA

Book Reviews

PATHIKONDA VISWAMBARA NATH: *Tat Tvam Asi: The Universal Message in the Bhagavadgitā*, Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Private Limited, Delhi, 1988, pp. xvii + 828.

The author of this book is a doctor practising General Medicine in the United Kingdom. He was born at Hospel, Bellary District, Karnataka State, India. He got his MBBS degree from Mysore University in 1964. He went to the United Kingdom in 1969 and is now settled as a General Medical Practitioner at Stanley County Durham. He developed his interest in the philosophy of the *Bhagavadgitā* on reading books on the subject by Swami Vidyaprakashanand and Swami Chinmayananda. He considers both these swamiji's as his spiritual gurus. It is interesting to note that the author of this book is not only a medical doctor by profession but also a great devotee of Lord Kṛṣṇa by temperament which the book clearly reflects.

The book under review is the author's important commentary on the *Bhagavadgitā*. It consists of two volumes. Volume I covers the first ten chapters, Volume II the last eight. In both the volumes the author has given a new line of interpretation of the *Bhagavadgitā*. His whole interpretation rests on the *Upaniṣadic* theme of *tat tvam asi*, the well-known statement from one of the oldest *Upaniṣads* which has been the subject of interminable controversy in the Indian philosophical tradition. Different Indian philosophical traditions have interpreted the statement differently. The author of this book also has his own intepretation. He has tried to interpret the *Upaniṣadic* statement of *tat tvam asi* exactly on the line of *advaita* philosophy. For him the entire philosophy of the *Bhagavadgitā* is nothing but a philosophy of *tat tvam asi*, 'Thou art That', which means, 'You are *Brahman*'. *Ātman* and *Brahman* are not two but one. The essence of the *Bhagavadgitā*, Dr Nath says, lies in the philosophy of universal oneness (*advaita*) and universal love (p. 812). Universal love consists in the upliftment and well-being of both the individual and society. According to him, anybody who wants to understand the essence of the *Bhagavadgitā* will have to have the qualities of self-control, devotion to the Lord, willingness to serve mankind and respect for the philosophy of Sri Kṛṣṇa (pp. 812–13). The author is of the view that the philosophy of the *Bhagavadgitā* provides a practical solution to all life's problems.

The author of the book divides the *Bhagavadgitā*'s entire philosophy of *tat tvam asi* into three units, each containing six chapters. The first unit deals with the theme of '*tvam*', the second with the theme of '*tat*', and the third with theme of '*asi*'. Some of the commentators give a different meaning to these three units. According to them, the first six chapters of the *Bhagavadgitā* deal with *karma-yoga*, the second six chapters with *bhakti-yoga* and the last six chapters with *jñāna-yoga*. But for Dr Nath all the units of the *Bhagavadgitā* deal with the philosophy of *tat tvam asi*.

The book under review is unique among books on the *Bhagavadgitā* in two important respects. Firstly, unlike other commentaries, it is written in a style that suits the new generation who need proper guidance in this materialistic world to meet the challenges of their lives. Although the book is written on the line of *advaita* philosophy, it goes beyond it. It incorporates certain ideas which the *advaita* philosophy does not propound. For example, the *advaita* philosophy does not say that a man can get liberation by following the path of *karma*. Instead of prescribing the path of *karma*, it rather condemns it. According to the *advaita* philosophy, liberation is possible only by knowledge and knowledge alone. *Karma* always leads to bondage, no matter which *karma* we perform. *Jñāna* and *karma* cannot go hand in hand. According to the author of the book, there is no incompatibility between *jñāna* and *karma*; both go hand in hand. The author subscribes to the view of the *Bhagavadgitā* and the *Bhagavadgitā*, according to him, clearly says that all the paths to *mokṣa* (i.e. the paths of *karma*, the path of *jñāna*, the path of *bhakti* and *dhyāna*) intermingle (pp. 27, 168). Anyone who follows the path of *karma-yoga* eventually becomes a *jñāni* and realizes the Self. A *jñāni* eventually is the one who is free from attachment, fear and hatred. A man of *bhakti* eventually sees God in all and becomes a *jñāni* and still leads the life of *karma-yoga*. But, unfortunately the four paths of *mokṣa*, the author of the work under review says, have brought about divisions in our religion. People praise the path which they like and ridicule the other paths which other people follow because of their ignorance. In his view, the *Bhagavadgitā* does not treat all the paths as distinct and separate. For it, all the paths intermingle with each other. Real *karma* gives one *jñāna* and real *jñāna* leads one to perform proper *karma*. The real *bhakta* performs all *karmas* and attains *jñāna*. By real *dhyāna* one attains *jñāna* and performs *karma*. Lord Kṛṣṇa gives an eighteen-chapters discourse and each chapter, he says, is *yoga*. If we properly follow the *Bhagavadgitā*'s philosophy of *yoga*, it uplifts us from the ocean of pain and sorrow of this world for all time to come.

However, in spite of all the merits of the work mentioned above, the author has failed to note that the *Upaniṣadic* statement of *tat tvam asi* does not assert any kind of relation of *yoga* (union) between *ātman* and *Brahman* as he says (p. 74). Because the relation of *yoga* is of such kind that it always admits the distinction between its terms of relation while the statement of *tat tvam asi* does not admit any kind of real distinction between the terms of '*tat*' and '*tvam*'. The terms '*tat*' and '*tvam*' occurring in it refer to one and the same reality. In other words, '*tat*' and '*tvam*' are only two different words. But what they mean and refer to is one and the same thing. We call it, from the subjective point of view, as *ātman* and, from the objective point of view, as *Brahman*. The distinction which lies between them consists only in our subjective experience and not in reality. Not only this, the author also has not maintained consistency in his analysis of *tat tvam asi*. Sometimes he says the relation of '*tat*' and '*tvam*' is a relation of *yoga* (p. xxviii), and sometimes he says the relation of '*tat*' and '*tvam*' is a relation of a part and the whole (pp. 44, 297, 771). And this creates confusion in the mind of the reader concerning whether the *Bhagavadgitā* incorporates both the *advaita* and *viśistādvaita* philosophies, which it does not.

The author makes a distinction between the doer and an agent and says that one should keep this distinction in one's mind while doing any *karma* (p. 75), but he does not spell out the grounds for making this distinction. If we go by the conceptual meaning of the words 'doer' and 'agent', we do not find any distinction between them. Because the doer is one who does a certain thing and doing is not possible without exerting power. If this be so, then the notion of doer cannot be said to be different from the notion of agent because the agent is one who acts and acting is not possible without doing and exerting power. Both the words carry the same meaning, which the author does not maintain in his interpretation of the *Bhagavadgitā*. The author is absolutely right when he says that the *Bhagavadgitā* does not abandon action. It only abandons attachment and desire for the fruit of action. But he does not specify clearly in his analysis that this statement holds good in the context of the *Bhagavadgitā* only in the respect of some specified types of action (i.e. selfish actions) and not in the respect of all types of action. If the latter were the case, the *Bhagavadgitā* would not have propounded the philosophy of *mokṣa* and *lokasaṃgraha* which it does (Chap. III; pp. 19, 20). The problem arises when we de-contextualise the *Bhagavadgitā*'s concept of *niṣkāma karma* and take it in the absolutistic sense of the term without taking into account the various types of action.

The entire discourse of the *Bhagavadgitā* is on *dharma* and *dharma* is generally understood in the sense of righteousness, duty or obligation in the context of *karma,* which the author says does not give the real meaning of the *Bhagavadgitā*'s concept of *dharma* (p. 145). According to him, *dharma* is the essential quality of an object without which it cannot exist. It is the 'law of the being'. Following this line of meaning of *dharma* he makes the distinction between *svadharma* and *paradharma* and says that our *svadharma* is the law of the self and is for self-realization and *paradharma* is the law of the objective world through ego or *jive* (pp. 146, 774). If we take the author's this interpretation of *dharma,* then no one can be *adharma* by definition because a man cannot act against his own essential nature without ceasing to exist. While according to the *Bhagavadgitā*, every man becomes *dharmic* and *adharmic* by his own *karma* and not by what he is in his essence. *Dharma* and *adharma* are value words. They do have meaningful use only in the context of action and not in the context of Self because Self is non-agent (p. 728). If Self is not an agent and *dharma* consists in doing of duty, then it cannot be of the quality of Self as the author says. *Dharma* and *adharma* are the qualities of a man which he acquires through his deeds. The distinction which is made between *svadharma* and *paradharma* in the *Bhagavadgitā* rests on the notion of class duty and the stage of life and not on the notions of Self and body. If the latter were the case, the *Bhagavadgitā* would not have classified human beings into the categories of *Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Sūdra* on the basis of their *karma*, which it does (Chapter IV, p. 13).

Furthermore, it is not correct to say, as Dr Nath does, that the purpose of the teaching of the *Bhagavadgitā* is to enable a person to attain union of the ego with the *ātman* (p. 42). The purpose of the *Bhagavadgitā* was to protect *dharma* for the welfare of humanity as whole, which Lord Kṛṣṇa did through Arjuna. All the metaphysical arguments given by Lord Kṛṣṇa were meant for the protection of *dharma* against *adharma* and not to enable any person to attain union of the ego with the *ātman* as the author says.

The author is not very careful in the using of certain philosophical words. Take, for example, the word '*jive*'. He uses this word in different senses. Sometimes he uses it in the sense of the union of body and soul (p. 511), sometimes in the sense of ego (p. 711), and sometimes in the sense of *ātmā* (p. 584). As a result, it creates confusion in the mind of the readers which the author could easily have avoided.

However, the book on the whole provides a good understanding of the philosophy of the *Bhagavadgitā*. The author's effort in this regard is laudable. His intention is very clear. He wants to convey the universal message of the *Bhagavadgitā* to the new generation for their well-being. He has succeeded in this. His commentary on the *Bhagavadgitā* deserves the attention even of those, like me, who do not fully agree with his interpretation.

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N.S. DRAVID (Tr. & Ed.): '*Nyayakusumanjali*' *of Udayanacarya*, Vol. I, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, pp. xiii + 500. Rs. 550.

Professor Dravid's translation of Udayana's *Nyayakusumanjali*, presented along with the original Sanskrit text and Dravid's explanations, is a most welcome addition to the growing corpus of Indian philosophical texts that are becoming available to scholars who think and write in English.

The work itself is a landmark text in Nyaya thought as it seeks to expound the school's position on a fair range of topics while taking on the arguments of the Buddhists, the Mimamsakas (Dravid prefers the term 'Mimamsists' which I resist), the schools of Samkhya, Carvaka, even the Vaisesikas. A notable absence in this list is the Vendanta of Samkara which only features in the discussion on causality. Thus these five bouquets are offered not without some polemical thorns.

Each offering deals with a major set of questions. The first deals with causality, chance and contingency, the second with the sources of cognitive validity. The third addresses the question of atheism and the issue of the authorlessness of the Veda (an important tenet of the Mimamsa school). There is a fascinating discussion on the status of *arthapatti* as independent *pramana*—again with reference to Mimamsa's strong contention in support of its independence. The fourth offering delves more deeply into the question of the validity of knowledge, specifically the question whether the cognition of an object results in a property of 'cognisedness'. The well known proofs of the existence of God make up the fifth and last kusumanjali.

The discussions are particularly valuable as they are based on the major extant arguments of not only the Nyaya school but those of other influential schools of thought as they had evolved over the centuries. Indeed reading texts such as Udayana's is a much more meaningful way of learn-

ing Indian philosophy than pouring over dreary textbooks which throw almost no light on the dynamics of the interaction between the different schools of thought. Here we have a ringside view of philosophy in the making. Also there is no reason why students of philosophy who are brought up on a diet of St Anselm and Thomas Aquinas should not be conversant with the theism of Udayana, especially his proofs of the existence of God. After all even the former are available only in translation to most students.

Which brings us to the subject of this translation. Although the language could have been more elegant, there is no doubt that Professor Dravid has taken great pains to make the original as intelligible and readable as possible. His is not a literal rendering. He inserts words, phrases and even sentences in parentheses to indicate his own supplements. There are however places where the translation does appear to run into the explanation as on p. 374 where Dravid observes that a set of terms used in the text, in fact have dual meanings. All this within the translation and without parentheses. At this point one must also draw attention to the fact that since there is a liberal use of parentheses in the translation, the printer's devil has at places played havoc with the text. We have for instance on pages 82, 84, 138, 249 and 263 some examples (noted by this reviewer) of parentheses opened but not closed. Also, and this may not be attributable to the printer, a portion of the original text appears to be missing on p. 298. The English translation goes well beyond what appears in Sanskrit.

Dravid has followed a commendable method of presenting the text. He has broken it up issue-wise so that an entire argument is treated as a unit (irrespective of its length) for purposes of translation and then explained. However an exception to this procedure occurs in the fifth section in which some proofs and their rebuttals are not broken up. The English translation of a portion of the text is followed by explanation (see pp. 374–5) which is then followed by a new section of translation. This also happens to be a very long section. For readers wishing to refer to the original text this arrangement is an awkward exception to a well-organized plan of presentation, possibly the result of an oversight.

A word of praise for the author's explanation must be recorded. Though we are told that in Volume II of this work, Professor Dravid presents 'an analytical critical survey of the contents of the whole work', even the explanations he offers here go a long way in providing background information, thus bringing controversies into focus. On occasion the translator

offers his own evaluation of the arguments in the text and explanation becomes critical annotation.

Translation of philosophical texts is never without pitfalls. It has been the subject of much philosophical debate. Serious questions arise—the literature now abounds in these discussions—when we search the lexicon for equivalents of Sanskrit terms from the terminology of western philosophy. On the whole the present text is not dogged by these fundamental issues (this at least is the impression the reviewer has after a first reading), unless one wishes to quibble at the rendering of नर-बीज़म् as 'human genes' and तर्क as 'contrafactual argument' which has other connotations in western philosophy of science. Dravid has, however, thoughtfully provided a Glossary of Sanskrit terms.

Finally a seemingly minor observation which reflects, in the reviewer's view, a major flaw in the Indian philosopher's approach to the tradition's texts. The blurb on the dust jacket describes Udayanacarya, as 'the great ancient Indian thinker'. The Preface, too, starts with the description of Udayanacarya as 'the great Nyaya philosophy of ancient India'. Now, Udayana lived and worked at the end of the first millennium AD. He belongs to the 10th–11th century which by no means can be viewed as belonging to the period of ancient history. The point here is not just one of inaccuracy. It is the sheer neglect of intellectual history, the history of ideas, by eminent scholars that is reflected in such descriptions. It robs the text of its role in the development of Nyaya thought in particular and Indian philosophy in general. This indeed was the occasion to append not just a biographical sketch of the text's author but to delineate his place in the genealogy and the archaeology of Nyaya thought (I hasten to add that I write in ignorance of the contents of Volume II). These remarks are premised on the belief that there is a great and urgent need for scholars of Indian thought to create and sustain an awareness of the developmental, dialectical and socio-historical processes that have shaped its progress. It is also time to cast off the assumption that all worthwhile Indian thinking must by definition be ancient!

MOHINI MULLICK

GEORGE CARDONA: *Pāṇini—His Work and Its Traditions*: (Volume One) 'Background and Introduction', Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged, 1997, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, pp. lxiv + 763, Rs 700.

1. George Cardona does not need any introduction. He is like a Ṛṣi, who has devoted his life to the study of Pāṇini. His work speaks volumes for his vast scholarship. His being constantly busy in the Sārasvata Yajña is very conspicuous by his publications one after the other in quick succession.

2. The way Professor Cardona has introduced the subject is unique, especially for those who know little of Sanskrit. His classification of संज्ञा, भूवादयो etc. is very good. In style of description, Professor Cardona has knowingly or unknowingly avoided discussing controversial topics.

3. Śnam is an augment as well as a suffix. He has accepted it as a suffix and in that case its place will also be determined by the Adhikāra sūtras प्रत्ययः परश्च. It should not be guided by the rule मिदचोऽन्त्यात्परः, which determines the place of the augment ending in म्. In the same way चरट् being a suffix will be added after the base, not in the beginning (आद्यन्तौ टकितौ). Accordingly, if we accept मिदचोऽन्त्यात्परः as a विधिसूत्र, we should also accept आद्यन्तौ टकितौ as a विधिसूत्र.

4. The word 'Sanskrit' does mean that which is purified, but so far as the language is concerned, it should not be termed as a refined language. Pāṇini used 'Bhāṣā' only for the post-Vedic language. Pālī and Prākṛta (originated from Prakṛti) used to be the *lingua franca*, and Sanskrit (originated from Sanskṛti) was used by cultured people in the society. The name Sanskrit came to be known because it was used by cultured people and not because it had been purified by someone. To my mind, the languages Pālī and Prākṛta etc. are of later origin.

5. The introduction of grammatical techniques in a traditional order is definitely easy to comprehend and consistent with the spirit of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. The order of the sūtras of the Aṣṭādhyāyī arranged in the Siddhāntakaumudī conforms to prakriyā and demands much more labour for comprehension. That is why the grammatical work and style of Candragomin did not attain the fame as that of Pāṇini did.

6. As I read the work of Professor Cardona, I came across some discrepancies, which I am listing for his kind consideration. If these discrepancies are taken care of, I believe, it will add to the value of the scholarly work.

(1) At p. xxvii, line 19, he has written 'rājan-as-Puruṣas-s' instead of 'rājan-as-puruṣa-s'.

(2) P. xxxii, line 33. A quotation from the Mahābhāṣya, reads न चाप्येवं विग्रहं करिष्यते. It should, I think, be न चाप्येवं विग्रहः करिष्यते.

(3) P. lxi, line 13, the author spells 'iḷe'. I think it is better to spell it like 'iḍe'. If not, then how to write ऌ?

(4) P. 18, lines 10–12: Professor Cardona translates लघु as light and गुरु as heavy. So far as weights are concerned, the terms used would have been in order, but in grammatical terminology, *shortened* for लघु and lengthened or extended for गुरु appear to be more appropriate.

(5) P. 34, line 8: He has given many significative appellations of वृद्ध. But vṛddha also means a learned or mature intelligent man (न सा सभा यत्र न सन्ति वृद्धाः).

(6) P. 89, line 31: Instead of the term pre-verb for उपसर्ग, the prefix could convey better sense. And what would be the term for गति?

(7) P. 177, line 31: In place of 'have recite', better would be 'make one read' or 'cause to read'.

(8) P. 203, line 25: It should be such as 'in *sentences'* not 'a *sentences* like'.

(9) P. 270, line 5: It is better to write 'praccha' rather than 'prach'.

(10) P. 283, line 19: The better word is 'absolutely' instead of 'absolutedly'.

(11) P. 293, line 24: It should be 'ṇidi' instead of 'tuṇidi'.

(12) P. 550, lines 18, 19: Yarvāṇa and Tarvāṇa were only two ṛṣis. The plural use with their names is to show respect. (Comp. Mahābhāṣya, Navāhnika by Pt. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṁsaka, p. 73).

7. Below is the list of printing errors with the hope that the next edition will be free from them:

Printing Errors

	Page & Line	*Printed as*	*Correct form*
1.	xxxix–4	toether	together
2.	3–12	singlular	singular

3.	17–30	उच्चैरुत्तदात्त:	उच्चैरुदात्त:
4.	90–13	ones	one's
5.	98–14	sniha	sṇiha
6.	112–27	stigha	sṭigha
7.	119–23	stama	sṭama
8.	133–32	Ganapātha	Gaṇapāṭha
9.	166–5	one 'of' is superfluous	—
10.	213–32	vāgbih	vāgbhiḥ
11.	241–20	donotes	denotes
12.	296–10	ārdhādhātuka	ārdhadhātuka
13.	323–6	अड्डतरादिभ्य:	अद्ड्डतरादिभ्य:
14.	331–33	Laksā-thak	Lākṣā-ṭhak
15.	334–22	samaprasāraṇa	samprasāraṇa
16.	350–4	sniha	sṇiha
17.	361–3	One 'is' is redundant	—
18.	367–2, 7	murkhena/na	mūrkhena/ṇa
19.	383–14	मतुप	मतुप्
20.	429–7	One 'be' is superfluous	—
21.	477–28	straighforward	straightforward
22.	509–26	sytem	system
23.	588–24	मेनोयोर्ग	मेनयोर्ग
24.	588–33	द्ववम	द्वय
25.	589–31	applelations	appellations

Page-Column-Line

26.	608–1–7	स्याशाब्दसंज्ञा	स्याशब्दसंज्ञा
27.	612–2–10	सुमुच्चयेषु	समुच्चयेषु
28.	614–1–20	चथुर्थ	चतुर्थ
29.	614–2–3	प्रादाय:	प्रादय:
30.	615–1–12	विभाषा प्राणिषु	विभाषाऽप्राणिषु
31.	617–1–7	अजेरर्व्यघञपो:	अजेर्व्यघञपो:
32.	625–1–20	व्यजनापण	व्यजापण
33.	628–1–15	आर्धहातुकं	आर्धधातुकं
34.	628–2–6	ष्क तद्धित:	ष्कस्तद्धित:
35.	628–2–30	पूतक्रतोरैच	पूतक्रतोरै च
36.	628–2–32	वुसिदाना	कुसीदाना
37.	636–1–8	कोपाधाच्च	कोपधाच्च
38.	644–2–21	ष्ठन्वा	ष्ठञ्वा
39.	645–2–6	सामविचने	सामिवचने
40.	646–1–26	च्विविधिावभूत	च्विविधावभूत
41.	646–1–34	सप्तम्योरर्बहुलम्	सप्तम्योर्बहुलम्
42.	647–1–7	अह्नोक्न	अह्नोऽह्न

43.	650–2–35	पारास्करप्रभृतिषु	पारस्करप्रभृतिषु
44.	651–1–32	षट्त्रिर्ष्वतुर्म्यो	षट्त्रिचतुर्भ्यो
45.	653–2–28	उदराश्वेषेषु	उदराश्वेषुषु
46.	655–2–32	कृत्वमसुचः	कृत्वसुचः
47.	658–1–13	श्रूड	शूड
48.	660–2–21	वास्तव्य	वास्त्व्य
49.	661–1–9	आष्टाभ्य	अष्टाभ्य
50.	662–2–30	अपरिहृवृत्ताश्च	अपरिहृवृताश्च
51.	664–1–7	सावन्त्ययोः	सावनन्त्ययोः
52.	665–1–21	क्वाादेः	क्वादेः
53.	665–2–1	शमामाष्टानां	शमामष्टानां
54.	666–1–6	नध्यो	नद्यो
55.	670–1–34	वोरुपधाया	वोरुपधाया
56.	670–1–36	उपध्यायाञ्च	उपधायाञ्च
57.	670–2–5	ऽश्रूद्रे	ऽशूद्रे
58.	670–2–31	प्रैशेषु	प्रैषेषु
59.	671–2–15	शरिसी	शिरसी
60.	673–1–15	णोपदेश्यस्य	णोपदेशस्य
61.	678–1–22	prāyekriyāphale	prāye kriyāphale
62.	678–2–5	neyaṅyuvaṅ	neyaṅuvaṅ
63.	679–1–8	karmaca	karma ca
64.	679–1–22	aṇikartā	aṇi kartā
65.	681–2–49,50	vibhāṣāprāṇiṣu	vibhāṣā'prāṇiṣu
66.	683–1–6	dadhipayaādīni	dadhipaya ādīni
67.	688–1–44	chalādeḥ	ca halādeḥ
68.	690–1–16	vṛṣaiṣa	vṛṣeṣa
69.	690–1–38	vasyasi	vayasi
70.	694–2–17	madhubabhvor	madhubabhrvor
71.	695–1–45	vṛddhasyca	vṛddhasya ca
72.	696–2–14	sūtrac ckopadhat	sūtrācca kopadhāt
73.	698–2–52	śāṇḍikā	śaṇḍikā
74.	699–2–16	ārthavaṇikasya	ātharvaṇikasya
75.	705–2–17	dantaśikharāt	dantaśikhāt
76.	706–1–31	dārhilau chandasi	dārhilau ca chandasi
77.	707–1–20	c	ca
78.	707–2–30	anaṇtyantagatau	anatyantagatau
79.	707–2–31	sāṃavicane	sāṃivacane
80.	716–1–36	cvibhāṣā	ca vibhāṣā
81.	716–2–17	kṛtvamasucaḥ	kṛtvasucaḥ
82.	716–2–34	śeṣasyāṇtarasyām	śeṣasyāṇyatarasyām
83.	719–2–33	chau	ca hau

8. I, from the core of my heart, congratulate Professor Cardona for this *magnum opus*. At some places, there may be difference of opinion, but only one who walks is likely to falter or stumble, not the one who is sitting idly or standing quietly. I wish him a very healthy long life so that he keeps on worshipping the Goddess of learning and produces many more good works from his pen. Om Śam.

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AVANINDRA KUMAR

SATNAM KAUR: *Three Basics of Sikh Religious Thought: Faith, Grace and Prayer*. Delhi, 1997: Pragati Publications, pp. x + 279, Rs 495.

In recent decades, Sikhism has drawn considerable attention of scholars interested in the philosophy of religious faiths. Since the publication of Max Arthur Macauliffe's six-volume treatise on The Sikh Religion, nearly a century ago, an English rendering of the scripture, *Guru Granth Sahib*, has been available, in part as well as in full, to the general reader. On the basis of such attempts, coupled with the interest of Sikh academics familiar with the original text in Punjabi, studies have appeared in India and abroad which have brought to light the rich metaphysical and ethical content of the *Granth*. Dr Satnam Kaur's volume that discusses Faith, Grace and Prayer in the context of Sikh religious thought, is based upon her doctoral thesis approved by the University of Delhi.

Dr Kaur has chosen three basics of Sikhism for intensive study, nowhere pretending that these three are the *only* basics of Sikh faith. She, as a Sikh scholar, must be keenly aware that there are several other basics, such as Akaal (the non-temporal), Hukam (Divine ordinance), Simran (contemplation of God), Seva (voluntary service), Sangat (congregation) and Guru (the enlightener), besides faith, grace and prayer. It goes to her credit that she has admirably brought out the import of the chosen concepts, with comparative insights from the writings of philosophers both Indian and Western, as well as from the expositions of various religious traditions. We find quotations from Mahatma Gandhi and Vivekananda, Kierkegaard and Marcel, Aquinas and Augustine, intermingled with the expositions of Sikh faith by Vir Singh and many others.

The author has succeeded in her approach to the Sikh scripture with her training in philosophic methodology. She has probed the *Guru Granth*

with the help of tools shaped by the philosophical tradition, particularly in the 20th century. Of course, there is a good measure of autonomous status of the religious language. The terms and phrases used in a religious text or discourse may not mean the same when used in science or even philosophy proper, though philosophy of religion has affinity with religious language.

Satnam Kaur takes up analysis of the concept of faith in the first part of her thesis. She examines the implication of faith as projected in the Sikh scripture, where it is held as unfailing support for the spiritual emancipation of man. The devotee must have unflinching trust in God and the *guru*. However, it seems appropriate to add that the cultivation of faith on the part of a follower is made possible through the study of a scripture. And this involves an intellectual approach, resulting in an enlightened faith, in contrast to the variety of faith usually held as 'blind'. Gurbāni (poetic compositions of the holy *Granth*) insists that God be contemplated with the aid of intelligence (*Akli Sahib seviye*). Here, says the author, 'implicit trust in the Lord is not merely to put oneself under His shelter, but to do so with the conviction that He is the ocean of mercy, and so can be expected to redeem us.'

The second part of the work deals with the concept of Grace as delineated in Gurbāni. According to the teaching of the Gurus, our faith makes us 'surrender ourselves to His will, though this surrender is accomplished only through His Grace.' Before analysing the concept of grace, which she has done painstakingly over a major part of the book, Satnam Kaur makes explicit the various terms, such as *kripa, nadar, mihar, prasād, dayā, bakhshis, karam* and so on, all covered under the blanket term 'grace', in the text. Here again, comparative insights help her in arriving at the distinctive features of the philosophy of grace in Sikhism.

St Paul interprets grace as the gift of the love of God, which is 'spontaneous, beautiful, unearned, and *at work* in Jesus Christ for the salvation of sinful men'. The Gita portrays the Lord as urging man to take refuge in Him alone; assuring man that He will liberate the devotee from all sins. Rāmānuja believes that God's descent into this phenomenal world does not in any way affect the essential nature of the Supreme Person imbued with His gracious qualities. Gurbāni puts forth the view that *prasāda* (grace) is given by the Lord to His devotees for the sheer joy of helping them. His *mihar* is given free, as a gift. Man's experience of grace comes as an ever-operating blessing of God which is a ray of divine beauty. When He casts His glance of power (*nadar*), the consequence for man is tranquillity, mitigation of suffering, and blissfulness.

Another aspect of the Sikh view of Divine Grace is that, by virtue of it, man has access to the right kind of *guru*. Gurbāni clearly holds that an important prerequisite for obtaining a vision of God is the true *guru's* grace, 'which sets the individual on the road to the consummation of his destiny'. According to the scripture, our 'life itself is gift of His *kripa*. Therefore it must be properly lived, that is, in a spirit of devotion and gratitude to God'. As Dr Kaur notes, we can never know Him *fully*, but we do know *something* about Him. 'The whole life of devotion would become impossible if the devotee is *not* somehow *convinced* that God is merciful.'

The author pertinently raises a question of philosophical interest in relation to the Law of Karma. How is this law related to Divine grace? As she avers, here the *gurus* are clearly of the view that 'the grace of God can override the operation of the law of *Karma*'. She concludes the discussion of grace in Sikhism in terms of Love as an outgoing power. 'The experience of grace is inseparable from the conception of God as the God of love.' However, she makes no claim as to the distinctive feature of the Sikh view of grace, as different from other religions' conceptions.

In the final part of the study, Satnam Kaur takes up prayer as one of the 'basics' of Sikhism. The Sikh practice of prayer is an important way to invoke Divine grace. Prayer involves commitment to God, faith in Him and in His goodness. Here the devotee experiences God as a living reality. In prayer man is waiting on God. Apart from petitionary prayer, meditative prayer, and formal prayer in congregation, the author draws attention to worshipful contemplation of the glories of nature, service of God's creatures and of saints in particular, as forms of prayer in Sikhism.

One merit of the study under review is the neat selection of relevant passages from the *Guru Granth*, together with their translation and interpretation, in support of the assertions made. This effort fructifies in making the reader familiar with the textual message of the *gurus* and *bhaktas* represented in the Granth. Dr Satnam Kaur deserves commendation for the impressive work undertaken; her guide and supervisor, Professor S.K. Saxena, whose erudition leaves its imprint on the finished product, deserves no less felicitation.

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Obituary

PROFESSOR NAND KISHORE DEVARAJA

On 11 January 1999 the philosophical and literary world suffered a heavy loss in the death of Professor Nand Kishore Devaraja in Lucknow.

Born on 3 June 1917 in Rampur (UP), Dr Devaraja did his postgraduation in English Literature and Philosophy, both in first class, from BHU (1936) and Allahabad University (1938) respectively. He obtained his D. Phil. in Philosophy from Allahabad in 1942. Besides, Dr Devaraja took courses in Sanskrit and Oriental Philosophy (Vyākaraṇa Madhyamā and Shāstri).

He served several institutions, including a college in Arrah (Bihar), Lucknow University and Banaras Hindu University where he held the Sayaji Rao Gaekwad Chair of Indian Civilization and Culture. He also headed the Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy in BHU.

Dr Devaraja had deep knowledge of the country's intellectual and spiritual heritage. His scholarship ranged over vast areas of both the Indian and the Western traditions, covering metaphysics, aesthetics, philosophy of culture, religion, philosophy of religion and many other fields. He propounded his own variety of Humanism as an ethical theory which he called 'Creative Humanism'. His writings have a unique combination of traditional scholarship and critical modern approach. His creative talent did not remain confined to philosophical pursuits alone; it extended to literature also. A prolific writer, Dr Devaraja authored dozens of books in literature ranging over poems, novels and literary criticism. His poetic books are: *Pranayageet* (1939), *Jeevan Rashmi* (1949), *Dharti Aur Swarg* (1954), *Urvashi Ne Kaha* (1960), *Ithihas Purush* (1965), *Ila Aur Amitabh* (1972), *Subah Ke Baad* (1975), *Āhat Aatmaayen* (1979), *Upaalambha Patrika* (1989), *Kiran Vyooh Bahurange* (1989) and *Rituchakra* (1997). His novels include *Path Ki Khoj* (1951), *Bāhar Bhītar* (1954), *Rode Aur Patthar* (1958), *Ajay Ki Diary* (1960), *Main, Ve Aur Aap* (1969), *Dohri Aag Ki Lapat* (1973), *Doosra Sutra* (1978), and *Na Bheje Gaye Patra* (1985). To literary criticism he contributed *Sahitya Chinta* (1950), *Pratikriyayen* (1960), *Chhāyāvād* (1975), *Sāhitya Samīkshā Aur Sanskritik Bodh* (1977) and *Ādhunik Hindi Kāvya* (1989).

The book, *Sanskriti Ka Darshanik Vivechan,* authored by Dr N.K. Devaraja, was given an award by the Hindustani Academi. Besides this book, Dr Devaraja made the philosophical world richer by authoring

Philosophy of Culture (1969), *Mind and Spirit of India* (1967), *Hinduism and Christianity* (1969), *Introduction to Sankara's Theory of Knowledge* (1972), *Philosophy, Religion and Culture* (1974), *Towards the Theory of Person and Other Essays* (1975), *Indian Philosophy Today* (edited) (1975), *Hinduism and Modern Age* (1975), *Humanism in Indian Thought* (1988), *Freedom, Creativity and Value* (1988), *Philosophy and Religion* (edited) (1989) and *Limits of Disagreement* (1993).

After having retired from BHU Dr Devaraja started a journal, *Yugasākshi*, of which he was the editor. *Yugasākshi* was both a literary and intellectual magazine, the continued publication of which was ensured by Dr Devaraja despite big obstacles of various kinds.

Having led a long and distinguished academic career, Dr Devaraja won many awards and honours. Besides achieving the Hindustani Academi Award for his book on Culture, he got a Sāhitya Sammān from the UP Hindi Sansthān in 1987, the Swami Praṇavānanda Darshan Puraskār from the Akhil Bhāratiya Darshan Parishad in 1985–86 and the Anushansā Puraskār of the UP Hindi Sansthān in 1992 for his journal *Yugasākshi*. Dr Devaraja graced the position of the General President of Indian Philosophical Congress in 1972 and was sectional president in several national and international conferences. He was invited for delivering many coveted endowment lectures and held Visiting Professorships in many Universities in India and abroad. In 1957–58 he received the UNESCO Grant for Cultural Studies. Professor Devaraja also held the position of Advisory Editor of the reputed journal *Philosophy East and West* from 1967 to 1982. Before holding this position he was also the Indian Editor of this journal for four years. In 1969 Dr Devaraja founded the journal *Anvīksikī* and remained its Chief Editor for many years.

Throughout his life Dr N.K. Devaraja showed rare devotion to academic pursuits. Even during periods of institutional and personal disturbances he continued to read and write. Just before his death he was working on three books, one of which he could complete. The completed book is on Kalidas. One of the other two books is a novel which is incomplete and the other is on diverse philosophical themes. While leaving this world Professor Devaraja has left the worlds of philosophy and literature much richer, for which the scholars of both these areas will always remember him with fondness and gratitude.

Dept of Philosophy, Lucknow University
Lucknow

ROOP REKHA VERMA

Academic Activities of the Council During the Year 1990–2000

Director of Seminar	*Seminar/Workshop/ Conference/Refresher course*	*Venue*	*Dates*
	Essay competition cum Young Scholars' Seminar on the concept of Swadharma	ICPR office	6–8 July 1999
	National Annual Lectures by Prof. Rama Rao Pappu on the following topics:		
Dr. R.P. Singh	1. Modern Hindu Dharma; The Secular and the Scared	J.N.U. Delhi	15 July 1999
Prof. V.C. Thomas	2. Secularisaton of Hindu Polity	Pondicherry University	26–27 July 1999
Prof. Y.V. Satyanarayan	3. Secular India	Andhra University	30–31 July 1999
Prof. R. Venkat Reddy and Prof. Amitabha Das Gupta	11th International Congress of Vedanta	Osmania University, Hyderabad	9–12 Aug. 1999
Sh. G. Rangacharya	Seminar/Dialogue on 'Tarka Tandava' of Shri Vyasateertha	Constitution Club, Rafi Marg, New Delhi	8–9 Sept. 1999
Prof. S.R. Bhatt and Prof. D. Prahladachar	Workshop on Vidhi-Viveka	Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati	25–31 Oct. 1999
Prof. E.R. Mathwale (Local Secretary)	44th Session of the Akhil Bharatiya Darsan Parishad	Shri Guru Buddhiswami College, Purna, Nanded (Maharashtra)	26–28 Nov. 1999

Prof. S.R. Bhatt & Prof. George McLean	International Colloquium on Indian Roots of Chinese Buddhism with special focus on Value	J.N.U., Delhi	2–3 Dec. 1999
Prof. S.R. Bhatt	Refresher Course on 'Indian Logic'	Academic Centre, Butler Palace, Lucknow	1–25 Dec. 1999
Prof. S.R. Bhatt & Prof. Kutumbasastry	Workshop on 'Vidhi Viveka'	Pondicherry University	19–25 Dec. 1999
Dr. Shukla Sinha (Local Secretary)	74th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress	Magadh University, Bodh Gaya, Bihar	28–30 Dec. 1999
Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyaya	Seminar on Rethinking of Swarajya	India International Centre New Delhi	24–25 Jan. 2000
Dr. K.L. Sharma	3-day National Seminar on Dimension of Mind	Jaipur	First week of Feb., 2000
Prof. V.C. Thomas	National Seminar on the Philosophy of Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyaya	India International Centre	23–25 Feb. 2000
Prof. V.C. Thomas	National Seminar on the Philosophy Prof. R. Sundara Rajan	Pondicherry University	14–16 Mar. 2000
Prof. S.R. Bhatt	Platinum Jubliee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress		28 Dec. 2000– 1 Jan. 2001

Book Received

1. *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya: Chapter from the Samdhinir Mocana Sūtra (Study, Translation and Tibetan Text),* John Powers.
2. *Jaina Philosophy and Religion,* Tr. Nagin J. Shah.
3. *The Supreme Wisdom of the Upaniṣada—An Introduction,* Klaus G. Witz.
4. *Between Tradition and Modernity. India's Search for Identity,* Ed. Fred Dallmayuyr and G.N. Devy.
5. *Transformation as Creation,* Mukund Lath.
6. *Problems of Indian Philosophy,* Ed. S.P. Dube.
7. *On Certainty,* Tr. Ashok Vohra, Ed. G.E.N. Auscombe and G.H. Von Wright.
8. *Karma, Freedom and Responsibility,* Aparna Chakraborty.
9. *Illuminations—A Proposal,* A.K. Saran.
10. *On the Intellectual Vacation,* A.K. Saran.
11. *A Glossary of Technical Terms in the Commentaries of Sankara Ramanya and Madhia on the Brahma Sūtras,* K. Jayammal.
12. *The Philosophy of Life,* S.P. Dubey.
13. *Renaissance Humanism Studies in Philosophyes and Poetics,* Ernesto Grassi.
14. *Heidegger and the Question of Renaissance Humanism,* Ernesto Grassi.
15. साक्ड़ोतिंक तर्क शारध्म्, Dharmanand Sharma.
16. *Tat Tvam Asi Vol. I,* Pathikonda Viswambara Nath.
17. *Tat Tvam Asi Vol. II,* Pathikonda Viswambara Nath.
18. *Living in God,* Roy Engene Davis.
19. *Ayurveda: The Gentle Health System,* Hans H. Rhyner.
20. *The Nietzschean Vision of Mau,* Shirley Jethmalani.
21. *The Burden of Poetic Consciousness,* Ed. Shirley Jethmalani and Prafulla C. Kar.

ANNOUNCEMENT

The *JICPR* proposes to bring out an Issue devoted to the following subject:

Life-Worlds: Private and Public—
Love and Friendship-Power and Welfare.

Articles may be sent to the *JICPR*, B/189-A, University Marg, Bapunagar, Jaipur 300015. The last date for the receipt of the articles is 30th September, 2000.

ANNOUNCEMENT

The Indian Council of Philosophical Research nominates one Senior scholar every year to visit Paris under the Indo-French Cultural Exchange Programme. Interested scholars may send their Curriculum Vitae to the Council's address.

ANNOUNCEMENT

The special issue of the *JICPR* devoted to Development in Philosophical Logic will now be published in a book-form entitled *Circularity, Definition and Truth*. This has become necessary as the articles received for it amounted to more than 360 pages and hence cannot be accommodated in a single issue of the *Journal*.

In view of this, a decision has been taken that the subscribers of the *JICPR* may acquire the book at a discount of 33% of the price of the book when published.

Editor

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophic Research

Editor: DAYA KRISHNA

Volume XVII Number 2 January–April 2000

D.P. AGRAWAL: *Language Origins, Archaeology and Animal and Human Consciousness*

R.K. KAUL: *The Anglo-Saxon View of Future and Fate: An Essay in Grammar and Theology*

CASSIAN R. AGERA: *Religious Language as Analogical: A Study in Aquinas*

R.C. PRADHAN: *On the Very Idea of Relative Truth*

NAYEEMA HAQUE: *Russell's Argument Against Fregean Sense*

ANIRUDDHA CHOWDHURY: *Jameson and Historicism*

LATIF HUSSAIN KAZMI: *Iqbal and Sartre on Human Freedom and Creativity*

M. PRABHAKARA RAO: *A critique on the Concept of Jiva*

Discussion and Comments

Agenda for Research

Focus

Notes and Queries

Book Reviews

Comments on Reviews

Forthcoming

Call For Papers

3rd Bimal Matilal Memorial Conference on Indian Philosophy

Date: 27th January 2001
Place: King's College London, UK

Papers are invited in all areas of Indian analytical philosophy.

Papers presented should take 30 minutes to present and will be followed by a 15 minute discussion period. Submissions will be acknowledged as received. Manuscripts should be prepared for anonymous refereeing, typed, double spaced and will not be returned (emailed submissions will not be considered). The author's name should appear on a detachable cover sheet.

DEADLINE: 30 JULY 2000
Results to be conveyed no later than 15 October 2000

There will be two sessions with invited speakers (Prof. J. N. Mohanty, Temple University and Dr. J. L. Shaw, Victoria University, Wellington) and four sessions (two concurrent) for the submitted papers.

For more information please contact:

Aruna Handa
Joerg Tuske
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King's College London
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jpt22@cam.ac.uk

ANNOUNCEMENT

JICPR Research Advisory Service: the *JICPR* announces the provision of a Research Advisory Service for its readers so that any one, at any level, may approach it for help, guidance and advice regarding any problem or difficulty that he/she may be encountering in his/her research work. This includes even such things as the selection of a promising topic for research, bibliographical guidance and help in getting photocopies of material required for research in case it can be located. The help and counsel of experts in all fields of philosophy, both in India and abroad, who have been associated with the *JICPR* in various ways will be available to our readers in this task. Persons seeking advice in this regard may write directly to the Editor, *JICPR*, B-189-B, University Marg, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur, making specific mention of the *JICPR* Research Advisory Service announced in this *Journal*.

EDITOR

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Managing-editor: GOPAL SAHU, Ph.D.

The Philosophical Quarterly (PQ) is one of the oldest philosophy journals in India, published from the reputed institute, Pratap Center of Philosophy (formerly Indian Institute of Philosophy), Amalner. Since its first publication in 1918, PQ has provided a platform for quality debate and discussion of philosophical issues by well-known philosophers from India and abroad. The publication was discontinued for several years. Since 1995, fortunately the publication of the journal has been resumed at the behest of **North Maharashtra University, Jalgaon** in a New Series.

PQ welcomes original and unpublished articles in all areas of philosophy, both in Eastern and Western tradition. Articles from other disciplines relevant to philosophy may also be considered for publication. PQ invites articles, short-notes, discussions, book-reviews etc. from the desirous contributor for publication. The manuscripts will be reviewed by the members of the editorial board and contributors will be communicated the editorial decision about the publication of their MSs within 3 months from the receipt of the same.

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All contributions to the journal, editorial inquiries, request for subscription, business inquires like purchase of institute publications, advertisement in the journal etc. should be addressed to:

The Managing Editor
The Philosophical Quarterly
Pratap Center of Philosophy
AT/PO. Amalner - 425 40
Dist. Jalgaon, Maharashtra.

ANNOUNCEMENT

The *JICPR* is seriously thinking of forming a Network Group consisting of those of its readers who would like to receive the contents of its special features such as 'Focus', 'Agenda for Research' and 'Notes and Queries' before their publication so that they may become aware of them as soon as they are received and may respond to them in case they would like to do so.

The *JICPR* is at present published three times a year and thus it takes a long time for items under these sections to be published and brought to the attention of our readers. In order to avoid the delay, it is proposed that those who would like to be actively involved in the on-going discussions may write to us expressing their desire to become members of the *JICPR* Network Group so that they may be sent the material immediately as soon as it is received by us. Those interested may kindly write to the Editor.

EDITOR

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