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KAUSHAL KISHORE SHARMA
INDUS

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with a Foreword by
PROF. DAYA KRISHNA

Presented with best compliments
to Prof. Daya Krishna
Kaushal

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KANT'S
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

A Commentary on KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

KAUSHAL KISHORE SHARMA

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Immanuel Kant was born in Koenigsberg, the capital of East Prussia on April 22, 1724, and died there on February 12, 1804, without ever having left his native city. His grandfather had come from Scotland, his father was a master-saddler. He entered the University of Koenigsberg as a student in 1740. From 1746 until 1755 he was compelled to earn his living as a private tutor. Then he resumed his university career, graduated as doctor and qualified as *Privatdozent* or reader. In 1770 he obtained the chair of logic and metaphysics at the university, finally resigning in 1797 after an academic career of forty-two years. Kant was by stature small, and his appearance feeble. He was little more than five feet tall and was deformed in the right shoulder. Yet, with these physical imperfections he was the greatest thinker ever produced by the German race.

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FOREWORD

Kant's three *Critiques* are justly regarded as having provided a foundational reorientation to Western philosophical thought after which philosophical enterprise in the Western hemisphere has never been the same as before. And, as Western modes of intellectual thought have now gained a global acceptance the understanding of this great thinker has become relevant for anyone interested in the intellectual life and history of mankind today.

Kant is not an easy writer to understand. Nor has posterity given equal recognition to all the three *Critiques* that, at least for him, were equally important for the understanding of his thought. Even the first *Critique*—the *Critique of Pure Reasons*—has not been seen in that totality or has had the type of impact which its author wanted it to have. For posterity, it is primarily the Kant of the *Transcendental Aesthetic* and the *Transcendental Analytic* who matters even though it is the *Transcendental Dialectic* which takes more than half of the book. The positive results of the transcendental analysis of perception in the first and of the intellectual cognitive judgment in the second provide the hard core of Kant's contribution to philosophical thought. But for Kant himself it is the negative result elaborated in the *Transcendental Dialectic* which is the heart of the matter. For him, the negative result of the transcendental critique of pure reason has a positive aspect also. And this is that reason, by itself, which is intrinsically unable to pronounce on anything transcendent, whether positively or negatively. This, for him, leaves the field open in the sense that some other faculty in man may achieve what pure reason has failed to do as it was intrinsically not suited to the task at all.

Will was the other faculty to which Kant turned to find the way to the transcendent which was inaccessible to pure reason. But this accessibility could not have been the accessibility to knowledge, for that had already been shown to be impossible by the results of the first *Critique*. Yet it has to be as, or even more, real than that to which knowledge gives certainty in the cognitive

enterprise of man. This, Kant finds in moral action which forms the subject of the present *Critique*, the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The *Transcendental Dialectic* of the first *Critique* provides the transition to the present *Critique* and, in fact, may be seen as the elaborate introduction to it. The claims of knowledge have to be exposed before the search for some other aspect of experience may be undertaken to discover any clue to the transcendent reality. Kant finds it in the realm of will and thus it is the present *Critique*, that is, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, which is central to his own philosophical thought.

Knowledge, however, has always been of greater interest to philosophers than action and it is hardly surprising that subsequent philosophical thought has found the first *Critique* more fascinating than the other two. Also, Kant's reflection in the present *Critique* is not so much on action as on moral action. This has perhaps been an additional reason why the present *Critique* has not aroused as much interest as the first. Philosophers who have been interested in theoretical reflection on action have seldom felt the need for making a radical distinction between moral action and other types of human action. Even such a thinker as Schopenhauer, who was definitely inspired by Kant, chose to reflect on will outside the context of morality. So also was Nietzsche, who himself was influenced by Schopenhauer. As for modern philosophers who have written on the philosophy of action, they have seldom, if ever, made moral action the central focus of their philosophical concern.

Kant's interest in morality, it may be noted, is not like that of other thinkers who have also made ethics the subject of their special philosophical concern. Rather, his interest in it derives from his interest in the possibility of metaphysics. Having found that metaphysics was not possible through the cognitive exercise of man's rational faculty, he turned to its exercise in the practical domain to discover whether metaphysical truth could be reached through it. Thus Kant is a unique thinker—perhaps the only thinker-who tried to seek metaphysical truth through a reflection on the moral experience of mankind. But, strangely, his reflection is so determined by the negative results of the *Transcendental Dialectic* in the first *Critique* that instead of there being an independent reflection on action or even moral action in the present

Critique, his thought seems to revolve only around God, freedom, and immortality of soul, whose quest was the major concern of the first *Critique*. But the foundational assurance that Kant was seeking for these metaphysical truths on the basis of moral experience seems highly dubious in his own formulation, even though he himself seemed to have thought otherwise. First, the metaphysical status of the three truths is not of the same order. It is only the first, that is, freedom, whose ontological reality is supposed to be a direct correlate of moral action or even completely identical with it. One is free to the extent one is moral and as one can never know with complete certainty whether one has acted morally or not, one cannot be certain whether there is freedom or not. In a fundamental sense, perhaps, only the holy will can be said to be free in Kant. But if it is so, then at the human level, freedom can only be an ideal for which one may be said to be striving and hence one could never say with any certainty that freedom is.

Freedom, it should be remembered, is not a postulate for volitional action for Kant. Rather, it is identical with moral action itself. In the strict sense, therefore, there can be no *responsibility* for wrong-doing as the notion of free choice is inapplicable in the situation. At a deeper level, there can perhaps be no notion of evil in Kantian framework, for if "good will" alone is good, how shall we conceive of evil. To will evil knowing that it is evil, is not permitted in the system as there is no such notion of freedom that it is equally manifested in good and bad actions alike.

As for God and immorality of soul, they fare even worse. God is required only to provide a surety for their being an adequate proportional relationship between virtue and happiness, a relationship demanded by the moral consciousness itself even though the pursuit of happiness has nothing to do with morality. Immortality of soul, on the other hand, is required by the demand for perfectibility which obviously cannot be fulfilled in this life. However, it is not clear what "perfectibility" could mean in Kantian framework except the transformation of the moral will into the holy will. This, in a sense, is easily achieved by the abolition of the very locus of desires and inclinations, that is, the empirical self, after death. On the other hand, if "perfectibility" means anything else, then that cannot be ensured by just postulating

immortality of soul but rather perennial rebirth, conceived more positively in the Indian tradition.

In a sense, the reason given by Kant for asserting his second postulate, that is, God could also entail the third postulate, that is, survival after death, for if there has to be ensured a proportionate relationship between virtue and happiness and if it does not obtain in this world then obviously one would have to have some sort of life after death so that the requirement may be fulfilled. But for that what one would require is not "immortality", but just sufficient "after-life" to strike the balance between virtue and happiness. The balance between evil and suffering cannot be permitted in the Kantian system without transforming radically his distinctive conception of freedom. The moment we do this, we will be back to the familiar Chiristian concept of Heaven and Hell where immortality is postulated to provide eternity of bliss or suffering, not in proportion to one's virtue or vice, but in relation to one's faith or lack of it in Christ. Immortality, in fact, would, or rather should, be immoral in Kantian perspective for the simple reason that the reward of happiness for eternity will be out of all proportion to the virtue that one may display in one's life. The objection that virtue is not the sort of thing that can be quantified, though perhaps correct, will run counter to the idea of proportionality which Kant himself has given for postulating the ontological reality of God.

But Kant seemed to have been living in a pre-Newtonian or pre-Galilean world as far as the question of the moral intelligibility of the universe was concerned, for he failed to see that no *agency* need necessarily be required for understanding the relation between human action and its consequences in terms of happiness for the person who did it. Mīmāṅsā solution was not only far more radical, but also modern in the sense that no external agency was considered by them as necessary for understanding the relation between cause and effect in the moral world. Further, Kant did not ask himself the question how the soul could feel happy after the death of the body unless its very nature was supposed to consist of bliss. Nor did he ask the question whether there will be an ontological plurality of free beings, each with his or her own differential share of happiness in proportion to his or her virtue in empirical life, and if so, what will be the relation between them.

These observations are meant primarily to focus attention on the centrality of metaphysical preoccupation in Kant, which generally have been treated as marginal or secondary in character. Much of Western philosophy is theocentric, though its projected self-image, at least in recent times, is different. What is surprising, however, is the fact that the non-Western world has accepted this self-image of the Western philosophical tradition as its true, real image. Kant is no exception to this unless, of course, we treat Kant as the Kant of the first *Critique* alone. But even Kant's reflection on the moral experience in the present *Critique* is severly restricted by his metaphysical preoccupation. Had Kant reflected on morality independently of the metaphysical obsessions of his first *Critique*, he might have made even greater contribution in this direction than those for which he is justly famous and yet which seem to fall far short of his achievements in the sections on the *Transcendental Aesthetic* and the *Transcendental Analytic* of the first *Critique*.

Yet, inspite of this severe limitation, Kant's present *Critique* deserves a more thorough study than it has yet received in the English-speaking world. And, as far as Indian scholarship is concerned, it has scarcely paid any sustained attention to any other *Critique* except the first one. Whether it be K.C. Bhattacharya or N.V. Banerjee, Rasvihari Das or N.A. Nikam, their interest has revolved around the first and the first *Critique* alone. It is to the credit of Shri Kaushal Kishore Sharma, the author of this work, that he has not only taken the present *Critique* seriously, but also tried to make it accessible to the general student of Kant. Normally, few persons, even amongst those who are professionally supposed to pursue the subject, go to the original writings of a thinker to understand him. The secondary and even the tertiary sources suffice most of the time. Yet, the delight and the shock of encountering a thinker in the original always outweighs the seeming self-assurance and know-it-all-attitude of those who have known the thinker only from secondary sources.

Shri Kaushal Kishore Sharma has been a careful student of Kant for a long time and I have had many occasions of discussing with him various aspects of Kant's philosophy. Almost invariably, I found in all these discussions that he had always a textual support from Kant for the position he was arguing for. This is a rare

situation to be met with anywhere, least of all in India. If we remember further that Shri Kaushal Kishore Sharma has not been a regular academic person attached to any university or college in this country, his achievement seems even more remarkable. In this, he reminds us of another outstanding philosophical mind that this country has seen outside the usual academic institutions, Shri Yash Dev Shalya, whose own article on Kant published elsewhere is one of the most original and fresh contribution to the understanding of this thinker from the perspective of the Indian philosophical tradition. But Shalyaji has had the advantage of being in touch with the philosophical community in India, which Kaushal has not had, except marginally.

I would like to add here that this work has been seen by Dr. Rajendra Gupta of the St. Stephens College, Delhi, who not only has pursued the study of ethical problems in philosophy since more than three decades, but also studied Kant in the original German language and has also written on him in it. He was as full of praise for Shri Kaushal Kishore Sharma's work as myself. Expressing his opinion, he said that "it is an excellent piece of work, clear, mature and authoritative. It would well deserve to be published. My compliments to the author". In my opinion this work deserves to be widely known amongst those who are interested in Kant's moral philosophy.

DAYA KRISHNA

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Kant's moral philosophy is simple and yet profound. He deduces the moral law from his firm belief in human freedom. He holds that though the moral law leads to freedom it is freedom which lies at the root of the fundamental moral law, the 'categorical imperative'. Kant felt that because we are free, we feel ourselves bound by the moral law. Actually, it is much more than a mere 'feeling' for Kant. We are just what we feel ourselves to be. The consciousness that we act as we were free bears out the reality of freedom according to Kant.

Kant is very well known for his formalism and egalitarianism. He teaches us that the moral law commands us to adopt for ourselves a maxim which, being absolutely independent of the moral content of an action, could become a universal maxim of our conduct. Kant writes: "Act only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law".

What, then, is the content of the moral law? Kant answers that it is the sense of *oughtness* that leads us to act in such a manner that the basis of our action could become universal principle valid for all times and under all circumstances. In other words, we should not will actions which contradict each other.

In the final analysis, the acceptance of the moral law leads us to the acceptance of God whose existence Kant had overthrown in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He declares that belief in the existence of God is a necessary postulate of practical reason, for we can never achieve the cherished object of our desire—the *highest good*—without the help of God.

There is no lack of short and comprehensive expository commentaries on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, but all those who are interested to know what Kant has to say in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, a masterpiece on Ethics since Aristotle's classic *Nicomachean Ethics*, cannot fail to be concerned with the dearth of expository works on this major, though neglected, work of Kant.

I hope this slim volume, which avoids the extremes of being

unduly critical and technical or unhelpfully sketchy and brief, will do something to make up the deficiency.

I believe a study of this work will help the students and readers of European thought in India to a better and clearer understanding of the impact of the *Critique of Practical Reason* on the post-Kantian philosophical and theological thought in the West, particularly in Germany.

Throughout this work the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Critique of Practical Reason* and Kant's small treatise on ethics entitled the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* will respectively be referred to as the first *Critique*, the present *Critique* and the *Groundwork*.

It may be stated straightaway that the present *Critique* presupposes a knowledge of the contents of the first *Critique* and the *Groundwork*. To make the Preface to the present *Critique* and the first *Critique* itself sufficiently understandable, it is in order that we may familiarise ourselves with the philosophical investigations of the first *Critique* and the results of the ethical enquiries of the *Groundwork*.

KAUSHAL KISHORE SHARMA

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Commentary on

CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

PREFACE

1. The Preface discusses the title and purpose of the present *Critique*. In addition, it contains a summary statement of critical theories expounded in the first *Critique* and a reference to the ethical formula of duty worked out in the *Groundwork*. The concluding portions deal with Kant's polemics against the contemporary critics of his philosophical and ethical theories.

The topics of the Preface will be taken up in the following sections. Some of the philosophical terms which occur in the Preface and are of great importance to these topics are set forth and explained in the present section.

Reason

In theoretical philosophy Kant uses this term in three senses.

First: It is used in the sense of a special mental faculty which is the source of ideas of absolute completeness and the unconditioned. The ideas of absolute completeness and the unconditioned are called ideas of pure or speculative reason. They are the ideas of the unconditioned subject, the unconditioned object and the unity of the unconditioned subject and the unconditioned object (God or ultimate reality). They are also called transcendental ideas because they do not apply to or are constitutive of objects of experience. Even if these ideas do not enable us to determine objective reality, they are of value as regulative principles or ideals within the realm of scientific experience or natural sciences.

Second: It stands for all those mental faculties which are characterised by spontaneity rather than receptivity. In this sense reason includes both pure form of sensibility which is the source of *a priori* forms of perception or intuition (space and time) and understanding which is the source of *a priori* forms of synthesis or categories (twelve in number). The pure forms of sensibility and understanding are the conditions of experience.

Third: It is the source of all synthetic *a priori* judgements which are contained as principles in all theoretical sciences of reason

(Mathematics and Physics). In this sense reason includes sensibility, understanding and ideas of pure or speculative reason. When Kant says that reason is the law giver to nature,[1] he uses the term in the third sense.

In practical or moral philosophy, reason is called pure practical reason. It is an *a priori* legislative faculty. This faculty is the source of the moral law. The moral law is pure. It is not derived from experience.

It must be pointed out at the outset that Kant insists on the unity of reason. Theoretical reason and practical reason are not two independent reasons. They are two different applications of one and the same reason which is operative in the theoretical and practical sciences. The unity of reason is the one absolutely essential characteristic of Kant's thought in general.

Metaphysics

The objects of traditional or dogmatic metaphysics were freedom, immortality and God. Metaphysics was regarded as a com-

1. In his philosophical writings, Kant uses the term *nature* in divergent senses. To mention a few, it stands for (a) a physical world of mechanical laws, (b) a non-physical world of freedom, (c) a realm of moral and teleological ends and purposes, (d) a creator of all beings including human beings endowed with intellect and will. Here are a few quotations:

"Teleology views nature as a kingdom of ends; ethics views a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In the first case the kingdom of ends is a theoretical Idea used to explain what exists. In the second case it is a practical Idea used to bring into existence what does not exist but can be made actual by our conduct—and indeed to bring it into existence in conformity with this Idea" (*Groundwork*, footnote, p. 104).

Hence it appears to us that nature has behaved in a stepmotherly way in the matter of providing us with a cognitive faculty required for our moral end (German edition of the present *Critique*, p. 281).

"For the first idea, as concerns its ground, already brings us beyond the world of sense, since the unity of the supersensible principle must be regarded as valid in this way, not merely for certain species of natural beings, but for the whole of nature as a system" (*Critique of Judgement*, p. 228).

Kant also uses the term in the widest possible sense to designate the existence of things under laws.

pletely pure or speculative science which rested on pure concepts only, and not on their application to intuition or sensible objects. No rationalist philosopher of the 17th or 18th century doubted the reality of traditional metaphysics.

They based the truth of the supersensible or transcendental objects on the 'mere ideas' of these objects. In other words, they derived the reality of these objects from a mere analysis of the concepts of these objects. Kant's critical philosophy destroyed the reality of the three great supersensible objects of traditional metaphysics. The traditional metaphysics of the supersensible reality was replaced by the metaphysics of nature or experience.[2]

Critical Philosophy

Kant's critical philosophy is called variously criticism, transcendentalism or transcendental philosophy. The critical philosophy challenges both the dogmatic Wolff and the sceptic Hume. If we assume with the dogmatic Wolff that pure or speculative reason without the aid of intuition can determine the nature of ultimate reality, then it is possible to prove with equal logical validity that man is and is not free, that soul is and is not immortal and that there is and is not God. When the dogmatic assumption that reality of supersensible objects is determinable by pure ideas of reason is found to result in contradictions, the empiricist Hume concludes that the supersensible is a figment of our mind and declares that sense experience is the sole criterion of our knowledge. Empiricism ultimately leads to scepticism. The sceptic not only denies that the supersensible can be brought within the range of experience, he affirms dogmatically that there is no reality beyond the world of sense.

Kant says that both dogmatism and scepticism argue on the basis of the common assumption that reason has no other than a purely formal function. That is to say, reason is concerned with

2. Kant dismisses the claims of dogmatism or traditional (speculative) metaphysics that it has knowledge of supersensible objects which lie beyond the sphere of experience. Speculative metaphysics is not a legitimate part of knowledge and the only metaphysics which is possible is "immanent metaphysics" or metaphysics of experience which is solely concerned with the discovery and exposition of *a priori* concepts and principles which make experience possible.

purely logical relations between ideas or concepts as distinct from knowledge of matters of fact or sense experience. The dogmatic Wolff disregarded the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements, and maintained that judgements about reality could be derived from a mere analysis of concepts. The sceptic Hume held that no synthetic use of reason was possible and restricted its activity to comparing and association of ideas. Thus both dogmatism and scepticism denied the synthetic or spontaneous activity of reason in their own way.[3]

The critical philosophy asks the question whether reason may not under certain conditions (when sensations or sense data are provided) have a synthetic power (synthesizing of sense data according to pure forms of perception and thought) which has been overlooked by both dogmatism and scepticism. To answer this question, Kant subjected the whole faculty of reason to a careful scrutiny with the object of determining whether the principles (the principle of causality etc) which the theoretical sciences legitimately apply to objects of experience (phenomena) do not produce a mere illusion of knowledge when their application is extended to the supersensible objects (noumena).

It, therefore, follows that if the supposed self-contradiction of reason can be traced to a natural but illegitimate application of principles beyond the world of sense, the claim of dogmatism to a knowledge of the supersensible objects through pure conceptions is as untenable as the denial by scepticism of the knowledge of the supersensible objects. In other words, criticism or critical philosophy is a systematic attempt to free reason from self-contradiction by an examination of the conditions under which it works.

What has to be kept in view is that transcendental philosophy[4] is a philosophy of pure and merely speculative reason. It consists

3. Kant holds that reason or mind (transcendental subject or self) is the source of pure forms of intuition (space and time) and pure forms of thought (categories). In Kant, reason is not the source of sense data. Sense data is given to reason by sensibility. The synthetic or spontaneous activity of reason or mind consists in arranging or ordering sense data according to fixed forms of intuition and thought.
4. Transcendental philosophy is solely concerned with the study of absolutely *a priori* concepts, namely, space and time, categories and ideas of (*Contd.*)

of knowledge wholly *a priori*, Accordingly, practical or moral philosophy does not form part of transcendental philosophy.[5] Kant says in the first *Critique*: "Although the highest principles and fundamental concepts of morality are *a priori* knowledge, they have no place in transcendental philosophy, because, although they do not lay at the foundation of their precepts the concepts of pleasure and pain, of the desires and inclinations, etc., all of which are of empirical origin, yet in the construction of a system of pure morality these empirical concepts must necessarily be brought into the concept of duty, as representing either a hindrance, which we have to overcome, or an allurement, which must not be made into a motive. Transcendental philosophy is therefore a philosophy of pure and merely speculative reason. All that is practical, so far as it contains motives, relates to feelings, and these belong to the empirical sources of knowledge (first *Critique* A 14-15—B 28-29).

A Priori Synthetic Judgements

A judgement consists in some form of relation between subject and predicate. But it is important to determine the precise character of the relation, because upon it depends the fundamental

(*Contd.*)
reason. These concepts have their origin in transcendental thought (transcendental subject or self). This philosophy excludes all empirical or sensuous elements (sensations and feelings of all kinds). Transcendental philosophy is a theory of scientific knowledge and methodology, and as such it should not be classified under rational philosophy or science in general. In Kant, all rational sciences whether theoretical or practical contain two kinds of elements—pure or *a priori* element contributed by mind and empirical or *a posteriori* element contributed by sensibility (receptivity for sensations).

5. Kant divides philosophy into theoretical philosophy (philosophy of nature or experience) and practical philosophy (philosophy of morals). Theoretical philosophy is the philosophy of experience or nature as determined by the natural law of causation, while practical philosophy is the philosophy of moral subject who is subject to the law of freedom or free causality. However, we must bear in mind that when Kant makes such a distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy, he bases it upon two mutually exclusive concepts, namely, the concept of natural causation and that of freedom, though both have their origin in reason, the former in reason as theoretical (understanding) and the latter in reason as practical (will).

distinction between the content of analytic and synthetic judgements. That is to say, the distinction between the two kinds of judgements is based on the nature of evidence required to establish their truth.

A judgement expresses an analytic truth if the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject. Thus, "All bodies are extended in space" and "All husbands are male" are instances of analytic judgements because the concepts of extension and maleness are already contained in the concepts of body and husband. Such judgements are certain and necessarily true. They can be derived by the mental process of analysis of our own concepts and ideas in accordance with the law of contradiction which is the supreme principle of all analytic judgements. But an analytic judgement does not tell us more than what we already know. It cannot affirm anything whatsoever about the existence of the subject it mentions.

Synthetic judgements, on the other hand, are extensive and enlarge our knowledge because they are derived from experience. 'Some objects are heavy' and 'the average life of a man cannot be more than 100 years' are examples of synthetic judgements. Such judgements refer to experience. Their truth or falsity can be found out by experience. In contrast to analytic judgements which are *a priori*, the synthetic judgements are called *a posteriori*.

Thus we see that synthetic judgements are not *a priori* (certain and necessary) and that analytic judgements do not affirm the existence of objects corresponding to the concepts or ideas contained therein. The combination of *a priori* and synthetic characteristics in our judgement seems to be an impossibility. But unless we can show the possibility of judgements or propositions which are at once *a priori* and synthetic, we can have no science. The Analytic of the first *Critique* has demonstrated that all scientific truths (principles of mathematics and physics) can be expressed in *a priori* synthetic judgements which are necessarily true and therefore can be derived neither from experience nor from a mere logical analysis of the concepts they contain.

How are, then, *a priori* synthetic judgements possible? Kant answers that they are possible because mind gives form and system to the elements of perception supplied to it by sensibility in

sensible experience. The previous philosophers, he argues, ignored the fact that mind or reason contributed something to the determination of the object. They assumed that knowledge must consist in the apprehension of the object, the nature of which is determined independently of the mind which apprehends them. It is through the synthetic activity of the mind that Kant accounts for the possibility of *a priori* synthetic judgements. The synthetic activity consists in synthesizing or ordering sense data according to fixed modes of thought (categories) which are the products of the self-activity of reason.

On this view, the *a priori* synthetic judgements of mathematics and physical sciences are not possible, unless sensible elements are supplied to the mind in order to be reduced to form and system. Kant says in the first *Critique* that thoughts without sensible intuitions or objects are empty and sensible intuitions without thoughts or concepts are blind. In other words, it is only through their union that knowledge can only arise. But this view leads us into great difficulty when metaphysics attempts to determine the nature of the supersensible reality. The kind of knowledge we have in the special sciences of mathematics and physics is a knowledge only in regard to sensible objects. But the supersensible from its very nature is such that it contains no sensible element whatsoever. As such, we cannot have a knowledge of the supersensible at all. In other words, our existing psycophysical build up absolutely precludes the possibility of forming *a priori* synthetic judgements about the supersensible objects of traditional metaphysics. The question, how *a priori* synthetic judgements of morality are possible will be examined in the next section.

Experience and the Unconditioned

It follows that if our knowledge is limited to sensible experience, then it would seem that metaphysics or science of pure reason or reason itself has miserably failed to establish and determine the nature of the supersensible reality. But Kant contends that this failure on the part of metaphysics accounts for the enigmatical character of the critical philosophy, which lies in the fact that we must renounce the objective reality of the supersensible objects (God, soul and freedom) on the basis of theoretical reason

in order to assure their objective reality on the basis of practical reason.

If the objects of sensible experience were ultimate realities, it would necessarily follow that the supersensible must disappear, since the supersensible by its very nature can have nothing sensible in it. In Kant, the supersensible, the unconditioned, the self-complete and thing in itself are synonymous terms.

It is an inherent character of reason that it cannot be satisfied with anything short of the unconditioned, but the world of experience is not compatible with the existence of the self-complete or unconditioned object. The reason is that all sensible objects are in space and time. But space and time are themselves of such a character that they cannot be self-complete. In other words, the unconditioned object cannot be presented in the sensible world. The same is true in the case of the unconditioned subject. An unconditioned subject is absolutely self-determined subject. Since the subject known to us is in time, and nothing unconditioned can be known in time, it is obvious that an unconditioned subject cannot become an object of perception or experience. Lastly, we cannot find the unconditioned in the sense of the ultimate reality (God) which includes both the unconditioned subject and the unconditioned object on the supposition that reality is spatio-temporal. The idea of God, in other words, must be a fiction, if the world of sense is an absolutely real world.

However, Kant goes on to say, if the unconditioned is freed from the limitations or conditions of the sensible world, there is nothing to hinder us from maintaining the existence of the supersensible objects in general and God in particular, not on the basis of scientific knowledge, but upon some other basis. This some other base, as we shall see, is for Kant the practical reason which underlies morality in contrast to theoretical reason which underlies scientific knowledge. Practical reason is moral consciousness. Thus the critical philosophy explains how there can be *a priori* knowledge of the sensible and at the same time prepares the way for a defence of the supersensible without which the moral phenomena will remain inexplicable.

Phenomena and Things in Themselves

The distinction between phenomena and things in themselves

(noumena) may seem, as Kant says, to yield only a negative result. By this he means that it may appear to give us no help in determining whether there is any supersensible reality, and if there is, what its nature is, but merely warns us to keep within the bounds of sensible experience.

Kant, however, maintains that the critical investigations are not merely negative but positive in as much as they open the door for a defence of the supersensible reality. The distinction between phenomena and noumena is the only way in which the supersensible reality can be defended consistently without prejudicing the stability of the sciences. Unless we recognize that the forms of perception (space and time) and forms of thought (categories), which are the necessary conditions of scientific experience, have no meaning when they are applied beyond the limits of experience, it is impossible to maintain the freedom of man, the validity of the moral law and the existence of God.

The result of the critical investigations into conditions of knowledge is to show that the principle of causality, among other principles, applies to every event in the world of sense. Practical philosophy is concerned with volitions or acts of will. Now, our volitions are no less events than physical events in the world of sense, and we must bring them under the same principle of causality as other events. But when we do so we reduce our volitions or actions to conditioned phases of a purely mechanical system. Thus freedom or self-activity disappears. Freedom means self-determination. The principle of causality involves determination of an event by some other event. If, therefore, a distinction is not made between things as they appear and things as they are, we must conclude that freedom is a dream.

Two Points of View

Reason cannot accept the contradiction that a given volition is at once determined causally and determined freely, as long as the volition is considered from the same point of view. Our volitions as phenomena or events in the world of sense and our volitions when they are regarded from the point of view of ultimate reality (noumena) differ fundamentally. From the phenomenal point of view, a volition is simply an event in the chain of events and therefore to it must be applied the principle of causality, but

a volition looked at from the higher point of view may well be the outward expression of the self-activity of a free subject. Morality is essentially the law of a free subject, and unless we presume freedom or free causality we must give up the concept of moral obligation or duty as mere fancy.

However, Kant makes it clear that we are not required to prove that we have actual knowledge of a free subject. All that we need to show is that we can think of a free subject without contradiction. So far as theoretical or practical reason can go, there is no actual knowledge (perception) of a free being, because our knowledge is always conditioned by the forms of perception and thought. That is, knowledge in us can never transcend the limits of experience. It is, therefore, essential to deny knowledge of God, freedom and immortality, if we are to maintain the reality of these ideas in the interest of morality. If we assert knowledge of these ideas we shall at the same time be compelled to apply to them the conditions of knowledge and thus drag down the supersensible into the realm of the sensible.

Concept of Freedom

We cannot provide objective reality for any idea but for the idea of freedom, and this is because freedom is the condition of the moral law, whose reality is an axiom[6]. We do know the moral law. The ideas of God and immortality are, on the contrary, not the conditions of the moral law. They are only conditions of a necessary or *a priori* object of a will which is determined by the moral law. That object is the *highest good*. Therefore, says Kant, the possibility of these two ideas must be assumed in the practical context without our knowing them in a theoretical sense. Thus

6. Kant hold that we have a direct consciousness or awareness of the moral law. A direct awareness of the moral law is the starting point of Kant's moral philosophy. Just as in the theoretical philosophy we start from the *datum* of experience and ask for its *a priori* conditions, so in moral philosophy we start from the fact of moral consciousness and ask for its *a priori* condition. The *a priori* condition of moral consciousness is found to be freedom (free subject or moral subject) through our own reflection on the moral law.

The concept of freedom which is merely a negative principle of theoretical reason acquires a positive character through the consciousness of the moral law.

it is through the concept of freedom that the ideas of God and immortality gain objective reality and subjective necessity in the sphere of pure reason.

Moral Law and Maxims

In Kant, there is but one moral law which in the case of human beings (who are not completely rational beings) expresses itself through a categorical imperative, the standard version of which is this: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (*Groundwork*, p. 88). The abbreviated form of the moral law valid for human beings only is *ought*. It has its origin in the noumenal or intelligible nature or part of man; it is not subject to temporal conditions, and it is an ideal which ought to be followed by all human beings for a harmonious life in the sensible world.

The maxims, in contrast to the moral law, have their origin in the phenomenal or sensuous nature of man. They are not ideals characterised by *ought*; they are practical principles, rules of conduct or practical precepts upon which we do act. Self-interest, the greatest happiness of the greatest number principle, benevolance and prudence are a few examples of maxims which provide us with concrete directives about actions to be taken.

Kant also uses the term *maxim* in the sense of a particular moral principle or rule which is in conformity with the supreme principle or law of morality, the categorical imperative.

We shall know more about the moral law and the maxims in subsequent sections.

2. *Title of the Critique*

In the first paragraph of the Preface Kant discusses the title of the present *Critique*. It is called *Critique of Practical Reason* and not *Critique of Pure Practical Reason*, although its parallelism with the first *Critique* seems to demand the latter title. Kant chooses the shorter title. He says that pure practical reason, like pure (speculative) reason, does not stand in need of critical examination, because it does not overreach itself by claiming knowledge of the supersensible objects. Pure practical reason, unlike the speculative reason, is real. It shows its reality and that of its

concept in action[7], while speculative reason cannot show the reality of its object in any possible experience. The phrase "pure faculty itself" means pure faculty of cognition or knowledge (sensibility and understanding) in contrast to pure faculty of will or volition. Kant's arguments may be elaborated as follows:

a) Reason in its theoretical employment is constitutive of experience. Theoretical reason is the source of those *a priori* synthetic conceptions which are essential to the constitution of the orderly system of nature. In other words, theoretical reason shows its reality in experience. The conception of freedom is a negative principle of theoretical reason because it only tells us that a free subject, if such a subject exists, must be independent of all sensuous or empirical determinations i.e. natural desires and inclinations.

b) Reason in its pure or speculative employment is not constitutive of experience. Nonetheless it has an excellent and indispensably necessary regulative employment which serves to give experience "the greatest (possible) unity combined with the greatest (possible) extension" first *Critique*, A 644—B 672). Pure reason is simply theoretical reason freed from the limitations of sensibility. It is the source of *a priori* concepts (God, soul, immortality, the unconditioned etc.) to which no objects can be found in experience. That is, pure reason, without the matter of sensibility, cannot form *a priori* synthetic judgements with regard to its objects. We can think of supersensible objects, but we cannot know them for knowledge, as we have seen, can never come to us through the mere operation of pure thought.[8]

c) Reason in its practical employment is free, autonomous and self-legislative; it is the source of the moral law. The moral law for human beings is the categorical imperative which is characterised by *ought*. The categorical *ought* is *a priori* synthetic proposition. The conception of *ought* can neither be derived from a mere analysis of the conception of an absolutely good will which necessarily acts in conformity with the moral law, nor can it be derived synthetically from experience because we cannot point to a single instance in which we can affirm with absolute certainty that an action is morally good i.e. done from duty. Kant says that pure reason is actually practical. It proves its own reality and that of its concepts in action. Like the pure or speculative reason, it does not presumptuously overreach itself through pretensions or false claims of knowledge of ultimate reality or things in themselves.[9]

7. Pure practical reason (free or moral subject) shows its reality or activity in the formulation of the moral law (the categorical imperative). This activity (action) cannot be an object of sensory experience because it is not possible to have cognition (perception) of free subject in action. The reason is that the free subject has intelligible character, the cognition of which requires a faculty of non-sensuous or supersensuous intuition, which we do not possess.
8. As to the question what makes mathematics possible, Kant replies that it is space and time as necessary forms of pure intuition that make mathematics (pure) possible.

3. *Purpose of the Critique*

The first *Critique* examines reason's pure faculty of cognition or knowledge with a view to finding out the limits of theoretical knowledge. The task of the present *Critique* is to examine reason's entire practical faculty in general (pure as well as empirical) to show—

a) That pure reason can be practical i.e. a synthetic use of pure practical reason is possible through the formulation of the moral law, which is *a priori* synthetic practical proposition.

b) That pure practical reason, like sensuously or empirically conditioned practical reason, does not make false claims that it is possible to realise the *highest good*, which is an idea of pure practical reason, by an individual in this life.

c) That pure practical reason restricts the empirical practical reason to its proper limits, when the latter starts from the objects of natural desires and seeks an unconditioned for them in the sensible or empirical world.

d) That pure practical reason does not contradict the critical findings of the first *Critique*.

e) That without collision with the speculative reason, pure

9. Pure practical reason overreaches itself when it seeks to derive motive or incentive for action from the ideas of the supersensuous or intelligible world which can never become an object of experience or cognition. To derive motive for action (object of will) from the world of things in themselves is to claim knowledge of that world which, as we have seen, is impossible.

practical reason converts the problematic and negative idea of freedom into necessary and positive idea of freedom, which is required to serve as a basis for morality.

f) That dialectic of pure practical reason is a conflict between the moral law which demands absolute conformity to duty and desire which by demanding conformity to natural law of causation induces us to transgress the demands of duty.

g) That theoretical and practical reason are not two separate reasons, but different applications of one and the same reason for viewing or considering objects from theoretical (scientific) and practical (moral) points of view, though the limitations of our cognitive faculty precludes the very possibility of knowing the principle of unity underlying them.

4. *Relation to the Groundwork*

The *Groundwork* contains three sections. The first section analyses the common phenomena of morality (duties or moral actions) in order to know what the condition (ground or determination) of moral action would be. In the second section, the analysis of the concept of duty results in the discovery of the universal and necessary condition or formula for moral action. The formula is the categorical imperative, which is presupposed by the present *Critique*. There is only one categorical imperative, the standard version of which is "Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to become a universal law". Kant follows the analytic method in the first two sections of the *Groundwork*. He deduces the general moral law and the concept of duty from an analysis of commonly accepted specific moral judgements (particular categorical imperatives) such as, one should not commit murder, one should not tell a lie and the like. But analytic method based on analysis of concepts will yield only analytical judgements. The categorical imperative, as we shall see in the next para and in section 15, is *a priori* synthetic practical judgement which cannot be deduced by an analysis of concept of a purely or completely rational will.

To the question, how is a categorical imperative possible?, Kant answers in the third section of the *Groundwork*. It is made possible through the positive idea of freedom, which proves that man is a member of the intelligible or transcendental world. The

intelligible and the sensuous elements are inseperably united in man. If man were only a member of the intelligible world, all his actions would automatically harmonise with the laws of the intelligible world.[10] The law of the intelligible world proceeds from the *autonomy* or freedom of the will. The will entirely belongs to the intelligible world and its laws proceed from itself alone. If again man were purely a member of the natural world, all his actions would have proceeded from desire, which entirely belongs to the natural world and is subject to the law of natural causation. But, as man belongs both to the intelligible world and the sensuous world, the laws of the intelligible world come to him in the form of an imperative, commanding that his actions ought to conform to the universal and necessary law of morality, notwithstanding the hinderances of desire. The actions enjoined upon by the categorical imperative are duties. The categorical *ought* is therefore *a priori* synthetic practical proposition in so far as there is synthetically added to our will, as affected by sensible desires, the idea of the same will belonging to the intelligible world, pure and practical in itself. In other words, the categorical *ought* is made possible through the synthetic activity of the will or pure practical reason when affected by sensible desires. The third section also effects a transition from the *Groundwork* to the present *Critique*.

It may be remembered that desire being one of the natural causes of actions in the sensuous world cannot be the cause of the *ought* which is an absolutely non-sensuous concept. The *ought* can come from the activity of reason as practical and not from that of desire as a natural cause.

5. *Polemics of the Preface*

The critics and reviewers of the *Groundwork* and the present *Critique* raise the following objections against Kant's ethical theories.

a) There is circularity in the relationship between freedom and the moral law. Each is alleged to prove the other. This objection is refuted in section I of chapter I of the *Analytic*.

b) The concept of the good was not established before the

10. He would always act as he ought or as the moral law requires.

moral principle. This is admitted and defended in chapter II of the *Analytic*.

c) There is inconsistency in the fact that we must deny the objective reality of the categories of the understanding in respect to the objects of speculative reason and still assert their reality in respect to the objects of pure practical reason. This objection has been sufficiently dealt with in section 1 of this book. Further discussion on the subject will be found in section II of chapter I of the *Analytic*.

d) There can be no *a priori* knowledge at all. Kant's answer to this objection lies in his criticism of Hume's empiricism which, if accepted as the criterion of knowledge and morals, will destroy both science and morality.

INTRODUCTION

THE IDEA OF A CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

6. In the *Introduction* Kant again discusses the title and purpose of the present *Critique* and then proceeds to compare the structure of the two *critiques*.

A critical examination of the pure faculty of cognition reveals that when theoretical reason departs from the realm of experience, it plunges itself into self-contradictions. Theoretical reason turns itself into speculative reason, when it liberates itself from the conditions or limitations of sensibility. We have seen in the Preface that pure reason, in venturing beyond the sensible world, cannot show its reality or objectivity by presenting objects corresponding to its ideas in any possible experience. The unreality of pure reason is a direct corollary of Kant's *a priori* synthetic theory of knowledge.

The reality of pure practical reason is the keystone of Kant's moral theories. If reason can demonstrate its reality in action, then critical examination of pure practical reason is not at all required. What is required is a critical examination of practical reason as such or in general, in order to distinguish pure practical reason also called unconditioned practical reason from empirical practical reason also called empirically or sensuously conditioned practical reason.

It may be noted that pure practical reason and empirical practical reason are not two reasons, but two employments of one and the same practical reason. In Kant's ethics, they may most usefully be seen in opposition to one another in the study of human conduct or volition. Pure practical reason has the power to determine the will, if not the capacity to produce the desirable objects (moral objects or actions) in the sensible world, independently of natural desires and empirical considerations i.e. according to moral principles. Empirical practical reason, on the other hand, asserts the sensible or empirical origin of all our practical principles and concepts. It has the capacity, but not the

good will or motive, to produce objects (non-moral objects or actions) in accordance with general principles derived from experience.

Further, the critical examination of the faculty of practical reason as such, as we shall see at the proper places, not only prevents the empirical practical reason from presuming to be the only ground of determination of the will, but also exposes its presumptuous claims about theoretical knowledge of the unconditioned good, which is an idea or object of pure practical reason[1].

7. The concluding para of the Introduction compares the structure of the two *Critiques*.

The first *Critique* is divided into the Elements and the Methodology. The divisions of the Elements are Aesthetic and Logic. Logic is divided into Analytic and Dialectic. Analytic is further divided into Analytic of concepts and Analytic of principles. This completes the division of the first *Critique* according to cognitive faculties, namely, sensibility (aesthetic), understanding (concepts) and reason (principles). Aesthetic or sensibility constitutes a necessary condition of *a priori* synthetic knowledge of objects of nature.

The present *Critique* is divided into the Elements and the Methodology. The Elements is subdivided into the Analytic and the Dialectic. The Analytic in its turn has its first part as an Analytic of moral principles and its second part as an Analytic of moral concepts. The order in the subdivision of the Analytic is the reverse of that in the first *Critique*. The Dialectic is concerned with the exhibition and resolution of illusion in the judgements of practical reason. The subject matter of Methodology is peculiar to pure practical reason and will be considered at the proper place.

There are two points to be examined about the absence of aesthetic and the order of reversal of the parts of Analytic in the present *Critique*.

1. It is a practical enterprise of reason to expose the false claim of empirical practical reason. The unconditioned good, as we shall see at the proper place, is an idea of pure practical reason. No object corresponding to this idea can possibly exist in the world of sense. Any claim of theoretical knowledge of the unconditioned good by empirical practical reason is therefore frivolous.

First: Since practical philosophy does not form part of transcendental philosophy, Kant excludes aesthetic or sensibility from his system of pure ethics. When Kant says that we will 'If possible, go into the senses' he seems to have in his mind the relation between man, as a sensuous being, and the moral law, or the effect of the moral law on man in his sensuous capacity. The mode of sensibility which is relevant in Kant's moral philosophy is not the sensation which, in theoretical philosophy, enters into the constitution of the objects of experience, but a special kind of feeling called moral feeling which has no cognitive function. The moral feeling or reverence for the moral law constitutes the aesthetic' in Kant's moral philosophy and is known *a priori*.

Second: The parts of the Analytic in the present *Critique* are divided in the reverse order to that which is there in the first *Critique*.

In the first *Critique* we start from the sensible objects as determined by forms of pure intuition (space and time) and proceed to show that it is only with reference to the sensuously or empirically given objects that we can establish the objective validity of the formal principles of pure understanding (causality, necessity, reciprocity etc.), while in the present *Critique* we begin with the fundamental principle of morality (the categorical imperative) and seek to show that we cannot conceive objects as absolutely or morally good and evil prior to/or independently of the moral principle. The subject will be presented in detail in chapter II of the Analytic "The Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason".

The term 'causality' in the context of practical philosophy means 'will' which is determinable by reason or by inclination. A will determined by inclination is empirical practical reason, and a will determined by reason is pure practical reason. Kant also uses the term 'causality' in the sense of the power of self-determination of a rational being. The expression 'Empirically unconditioned causality' means causality or will not determined by empirical conditions (inclinations and desires).

PART I

DOCTRINE OF THE ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

BOOK I

ANALYTIC OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

CHAPTER I

PRINCIPLES OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

1. *Definition and Remark*

8. The Elements is divided into Analytic of Pure Practical Reason (Book I) and Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason (Book II). The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason is sub-divided into Principles of Pure Practical Reason (Chapter I, Book I) and The Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason (Chapter II, Book I).

9. The Analytic is called the 'rule of truth' in practical philosophy. In the *Groundwork*, Kant adopts an analytic method in deriving the moral law. He begins with an analysis of duties towards ourselves and towards others with a view to finding out the moral law of duties. The moral law is the categorical imperative. Since the present *Critique*, unlike the *Groundwork*, follows the synthetic or progressive method[1], it does not begin with the

1. Kant distinguishes the analytic method from the synthetic method. The former begins with the conditioned, the composite and the grounded and proceeds to the unconditioned, the simple and the ground. By contrast, the latter follows the reverse order. In his writings, Kant calls the first the ***regressive*** method and the latter the ***progressive*** method.

   In Kant, the concept of the moral law is simple, abstract or formal while that of duty is composite or concrete. Duty combines within itself sensuous element (inclinations and desires) and an element of constraint from the idea of the moral law. The element of constraint, in the notion of duty, implies that there is some thing which we should or should not do, regardless of the demands of our natural urges and drives.

consciousness of duties, but with the moral principles (Chapter I), applies them to the concepts of objects of practical reason (Chapter II, Book I) and then examines the possibility of their application to sensuous faculty of man (Chapter III, Book I).

The objects of the Analytic of the present *Critique* are:

a) To show that there is a pure *a priori* law of morality, the awareness of which can be a motive for acting in accordance with the law.

b) To prove that the transcendental and positive concept of freedom lies at the root of the moral law.

c) To distinguish the theory of happiness (self-love or desire for one's happiness) based upon the practical precepts (precepts of skill or prudence) of empirical practical reason from the pure theory of morality based upon the practical precepts (moral precepts or particular categorical imperatives) of pure practical reason.

d) To determine the relation between the moral law and man who is not a perfect rational being, but a sensuously affected or imperfect rational being.

The aforesaid objects of the Analytic are all connected with one another, and they all complete one another. A study of the Analytic will reveal that an insight into the one gives an insight into the other.

10. There are notable points of similarity between Kant's theory of morality and his theory of knowledge. Just as the distinction between sense and understanding is fundamental for Kant's theoretical philosophy, so is that between inclination and reason for his moral philosophy. In a similar way, just as the nature of human knowledge is explained in the first *Critique* by reference to the hypothetical notion of an intuitive understanding, so is that of human morality clarified in the present *Critique* by reference to the indeterminate notion of holy will or 'absolutely pure will'. For a will of this kind there would be no distinction between reason and inclination. A being possessed of holy will would act by its intrinsic nature in conformity with the moral law. It would not have the concept of duty or moral obligation which are only where there is opposition between reason and inclination. In the case of human beings, the opposition between reason and desire co-exists in perpetual conflict.

Hence it follows that in the case of a human being whose will is not absolutely determined by reason, the moral law appears to him in the form of an imperative, which is characterised by *ought*. The *ought* contains an element of constraint and necessitation, because if reason completely determines the will, the action will, without exception, take place according to the moral law. However, it should be a matter of satisfaction to us that a law whose commands are to be obeyed by us for their own sake are not commands issued by some alien authority, but by the self-legislative power of our own reason.

11. In Kant, human reason in relation to sensible objects is called intellect or understanding, and in relation to desire it is called human will. Kant identifies pure practical reason with pure will or moral will. Will (pure will, moral will or pure practical reason) is regarded by Kant as a cause or causality. It is found only in rational beings. Freedom (free will or moral will) is that kind of causality in which the actions of a rational being (man or moral subject) are not determined by a cause other than by reason itself. Natural causality, on the other hand, is that form of causality which is found in non-rational beings whose actions are determined under external influences or causes.

12. As a form of causality, freedom or free causality must not be regarded as independent of all law, but as independent of natural law. A free cause conforms to law, but it is law of its own. Natural cause, on the other hand, expresses a sort of causality which is determined to activity by something other than itself. In other words, natural causality or cause is not self-determined. Freedom, therefore, must consist in *autonomy* or self-determination, i.e., in a will or reason which is a law into itself. In other words, the will is to be determined by no maxim (principle or cause of action) other than that the object of which can be universalised without contradicting the rational will. This is the formula of the categorical imperative or the supreme principle of morality. Hence a free will is a will which conforms to the moral law.

The most provoking aspect of Kant's ethics is his theory of free or moral will. The free will wants to will the moral law; but is

thwarted by impulse in willing it. "Free elective will is a will undermined by feeling at the time of willing, even though it is destined to be sanctioned and confirmed by a subsequent accrual of feeling" (Rogers Dictionary of Philosophy). Such a will, according to Kant, is a free will. The term feeling[2] here means impulses and inclinations which compel a man to act contrary to the demands of the moral law. It follows that Kant's notion of free will is absolutely different from the commonly accepted philosophical concept of free will which postulates that man is able to choose and act according to the dictates of his own will. In other words, man is able to do good or evil at his own sweet will.

13. In Kant, a proposition expresses a general condition or ground of any affirmation or denial. A theoretical proposition refers to the object and states the general condition of the possibility of cognition of the object. The general condition is intution. Theoretical propositions belong to theoretical sciences of mathematics and natural sciences. A practical proposition, on the other hand, states the general condition under which the existence of an object becomes possible or can be brought into existence. The general condition here is the possibility of free action. Practical propositions belong to practical or moral sciences (ethics and politics).

14. Kant observes strict dichotomy in the division of practical propositions or principles. They are either maxims or laws.

Maxims are purely subjective or personal principles of action. They hold good under psychological and environmental conditions peculiar to this or that individual. Kant gives an example of a subjective principles of action. A man may make it his

2. Feeling is technically regarded by Kant as one of the elementary or original faculties of mind characterised by receptivity for sensations of pleasure and pain which solely relate to the subject, to the exclusion of all cognitive or perceptual sensations which relate to external objects. To quote Kant: "For all faculties or capacities of the soul can be reduced to three, which cannot be any further derived from one common ground: the *faculty of knowledge*, the *feeling of pleasure and pain*, and the *faculty of desire*" (*Critique af Judgement*, p. 13).

maxim to let no offence pass unavenged and yet may see that this maxim cannot be harmonised with the will of every rational being, when he likes himself to be excepted from being avenged for an injury done by him to some other rational being. In other words, he would not hold his maxim to be a universal law, because it is not consistent with itself. The universality of a maxim is the criterion of its being a moral law.

Laws, on the other hand, are objective principles. They are valid for all rational beings or rational beings in general. An objective principle is one on which every rational being will necessarily act if reason has full control over his will, but in the case of a being (man) whose will is not fully determined by reason, i.e. whose will is tempted by desires to act otherwise, the law appears in the form of an imperative characterised by *shall* or *ought*. The obligation never to make a false promise is an instance of an objective principle or law. The law commands us not to make a false promise. As morally or practically necessary, the law is a categorical imperative and is binding upon the will of every imperfect rational being, irrespective of the consequences anticipated by the subject or actually following from the observance of moral law in the sensible world. The tacit assumption in Kant's argument here is that non-observance of this obligation will render social dealings or conduct impossible.

15. Kant divides imperatives into conditional or hypothetical and categorical. In the case of a hypothetical imperative, the will is determined in respect to a desired effect or end and the means of attaining it. The categorical imperative, on the other hand, determines the will simply as will, without reference to any desired effect and the means of attaining it in the world of sense.

The conditional imperatives are the products of empirical will or empirical practical reason. They always prescribe practical precepts (precepts of skill or prudence derived from experience[3]) for the attainment of desired objects in the phenomenal world. They are analytical principles, because the practical precepts which prescribe the ends or objects (happiness, wealth etc.) also prescribe the means for attaining them.

3. Experience here may be historical or personal or both.

In contrast to conditional imperative, the categorical imperative is the product of pure will or pure practical reason. It is concerned only with the act of willing the moral law (*ought*) without asking whether the will has efficient or effective power[4] or necessary means of producing the desirable objects in the sensible world. The categorical imperative is *a priori* synthetic principle, because the notion of *ought* can neither be obtained from a mere analysis of the concept of a perfectly rational being nor from that of a completely irrational being, but only from that of a being (man) who is a sensuously affected, though not sensuously determined, rational being.

16. Kant explicitly holds that imperatives are objectively valid and are quite distinct from maxims which are subjective principles. He further holds that hypothetical or conditional imperatives, though practical principles, are not laws. Laws are categorical. Hence all moral laws must be categorical. The following points are of interest in this connection.

a) The morality of an action depends entirely on its motive and that the only unconditionally good motive is a sense of duty.

b) No action done from pleasure or inclination is moral.

c) Pleasure and happiness are worthy of acceptance as the reward of virtue, but they are not good in themselves.

d) Duty expresses itself in categorical imperatives such as "thou shall not steal" as distinct from hypothetical imperatives which are associated with desires (do not steal if you want to be trusted by others and such other pragmatic precepts).

e) The particular categorical imperatives are moral rules or precepts which are valid for all moral agents and are therefore attributed by Kant to practical reason. They are valid under a universal moral law.

f) It is true that the doing of duty may give pleasure and its

4. Can the will (pure practical reason) vary in power? No. This is because the will belongs to the intelligible world and not to the sensible world. Its power can neither be increased or decreased within the moral subject. In other words, the will is not subject to the theoretical principle of Anticipation of Perception: In all appearances, the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree.

neglect pain, but pleasure and pain cannot be the motives of moral actions, since they depend on *a priori* recognition of the rightness of such acts as the sole motive for doing them.

g) There is an irresistible feeling among us as moral beings that there should be concordance between virtue and happiness in life. Since experience tells us that no concordance or union between virtue and happiness can he established by human contrivance, Kant argues for the existence of an omnipotent Being who has the power to unite the two heterogeneous elements. Since we also know from experience that union of virtue and happiness is not observed in the present life of man, Kant takes recourse to moral argument[5] for the existence of immortality to ensure linkage between virtue and happiness.

17. In the three following theorems with which the present *Critique* begins, Kant argues that all determinations of the will by objects (matter) is in reality the determination of the will by pleasure and that the determination of the will by anything other than itself cannot be the source of the moral law.

2. *Theorem I*

18. The determination of the will by an object[6] of the faculty of desire[7] produces without exception empirical and not practical principles.

5. Kant does not use the term 'moral argument' in the present *Critique*. But this term is widely used by writers on Kant to convey the sense that it is necessary to assume or postulate the existence of God and immortality of soul in the interest of morality. See note I, section 32 and sections 44 and 45 of this book for details.
6. An object of desire is not necessarily material (sensuous). It may be non-material (intellectual or spiritual). But that will not affect Kant's argument because, in any case, the determining ground of the *will* will be some object other than the moral law itself.
7. Are the alternatives only between 'desire' and 'duty' as the determining ground of the will? We can consider three possibilities in this connection; first, the will is determined by a moral law which emanates from the world of desirable objects; second, the will is determined by a moral law which is self-existent i.e. existing independently of the human volition; and third, the will is determined by a moral law which has its origin in the will itself. (*Contd.*)

Two ideas underline the theorem:

a) There are *a priori* laws of morality.

b) The theory of pleasure in any form whatsoever can never furnish *a priori* or universal and necessary laws of morality.

By "an object of the faculty of desire", Kant means an object the knowledge of which excites in us a desire for pleasure. The term "determining ground" means motive, ground or condition of action. This theorem seeks to show that if the desire for pleasure is made the basis of moral laws, then, in the first place, it is obvious that the determining ground of the will is empirical. This is because the practical principle of the will in such a case depends upon the manner in which the actual or imagined object of desire acts upon the sensibility (subjective or sensitive susceptibility of our mind). It is impossible to say *a priori* how a given object will affect our susceptibility, just as it is not possible to say *a priori* which particular sensation will arise on the presentation of a given object to our senses. The determining ground of the will to action, then, must in this case be empirical, and so will be the principle based upon it.

In the second place, a practical principle which depends upon the subjective susceptibility of our mind to pleasure or pain and which cannot be known except empirically can only furnish a maxim, not a moral law. A maxim is subjectively valid for this or that rational being, in contrast to a moral law which is objectively valid for all rational beings as such.

3. *Theorem II*

19. All material practical principles[8] do not differ in kind; they

(*Contd.*)

The first possibility, as we shall see, will not yield a universal moral law valid for all rational beings and is therefore discarded. Kant's critical findings forbid us to say anything positive about the world of self-existents (the world of things in themselves). We can rule out the second possibility on this account. The third possibility will be found to be consistent with Kant's moral doctrine of the 'self-legislation' of the will, as it is only in this case that the will can determine what ought to be. Hence, there is strict dichotomy between desire (the cause of contingent moral actions) and duty (the cause of necessary moral actions).

8. A material principle is one which places the motive of action in an object of desire (happiness).

belong to the category of general principle of self-love or desire for one's own happiness.

This theorem is in continuation of the previous theorem. The person who desires pleasure desires happiness. But the pleasure that an agent takes in the actual or imagined existence of an object depends upon the peculiar susceptibility of the agent as related to the desired object. One person is susceptible to the influence of one object, another to the influence of a different object, and as such susceptibility varies from person to person. Hence, a practical principle which is based upon the desire for pleasure expresses a material principle. All material principles are empirical in character and, as such, are disqualified to be moral laws.

Now, pleasure belongs to sense or feeling and not to understanding. In Kant, feeling is a conscious subjective impression which does not involve knowledge of an object. Feelings are of two kinds, pleasure and pain. They represent nothing in objects, but reveal the mental state or condition of the subject. Kant saw in pleasure and pain, respectively, life promoting and life destroying forces. Pleasure results from the harmony of an object with the subjective condition (agreeableness) of life and consciousness, while pain is the awareness of disharmony (disagreeableness).

Kant sharply distinguishes between sense or feeling from reason or intellect. The former is the source of individual impulses of pleasure or pain. The latter is always the source of conceptions or ideas. In the sphere of theory, the understanding constitutes objects of experience through the categories which are *a priori* modes of synthesis of the manifold of sense. In the sphere of practice, reason is the source of practical laws through the practical employment of pure category of causality. Reason is identical in all rational beings in the form of will or practical reason.

In contrast to practical reason which is identical in all rational beings, pleasure is peculiar to this or that sensitive subject. It can have an influence on action or be practical only insofar as it acts on the imagination of the subject, leading him to anticipate a specific or peculiar kind of satisfaction in the realisation of an object. Now there is a manifold of desires for pleasure. If we generalise the desires for various forms of pleasure, we get the general concept of happiness as the unbroken experience of agreeable feelings of pleasure continuing through the whole of life.

Thus, all material principles which place the motive of action in the pleasure or displeasure to be received from the realisation of some object of desire are of the same kind and can be reduced to the principle of self-love or individual happiness. The term 'kind' refers to a class to which all material principles belong. Self-love is their common characteristic. A moral law cannot be derived from the principle of egoism, which regards individual's own happiness or welfare as the only thing that is ultimately desirable by him.

Corollary

20. All material practical principles ground the determination of the will in the lower faculty of desire, and the denial of the formal principles as the determining ground of the will would rule out the possibility of the higher faculty of desire.

Remark I

Some philosophers have distinguished between the lower faculty of desire and the higher faculty of desire with reference to their respective sources in sense or feeling and understanding or intellect. It is further held by them that the pleasures of the body come from the former faculty, while joys of the mind come from the latter faculty.

Kant does not accept the aforesaid distinction in the form enunciated by the philosophers of his time or his predecessors. According to him, all pleasures are of the same kind, whether they are pleasures of sense (joy, mirth, gratification of sensual desires etc.) or pleasures of understanding (peace of mind, tranquility of soul etc.). He says that whatever may be the source from which they originate, however they may differ in content from one another, all pleasures in so far as they serve as motives to action agree in kind. They have one element in common, and their common character is that they can only be known empirically. Pleasures of understanding or reason differ only in degree (intensity, extensity and duration) from pleasures of sense.[9]

9. A question arises, what about the pleasure of self or self-pleasure for a being itself? Kant answers that pleasure of self is a pleasure in the consciousness of freedom in one's own person or self. Freedom consti-

(*Contd.*)

So, if we act from the idea of a moral law, but act from it only because of the pleasure we expect to receive from so acting, or the pain we thereby wish to avoid, our act is contrary to the idea of the moral law. It is, for instance, not a moral act to be just and honest from fear of consequences, because the motive in such a case depends upon the particular pleasure or avoidance of pain which is expected to result from the performance of the act.

Kant gives an example to illustrate his point. A man who uses gold to pay his debts does not care whether the gold was dug up in the mountains or washed from the sand, so long as it has the same value in exchange. Similarly, a man who values his life solely by the pleasure or delight it brings does not ask whether the agreeable feeling springs from the understanding, or from the sense, but asks only how much pleasure they produce and how long it will last. Only those who deprive reason of the power to determine the will to action without any aid from feeling of pleasure allow themselves to fall into the inconsistency of first referring all actions to one and the same principle of pleasure, and then arguing as if pleasures were of different kinds.

It is a matter of common knowledge that we take pleasure in the mere exercise of our natural powers which overcomes obstacles in the way of the cultivation of our intellectual talents. We rightly call these intellectual pleasures and enjoyments more refined than coarser pleasures of sense, because the former are more under our control than the latter and thus strengthen our capacity for greater enjoyment and cultivation of our culture. But it would be absurd to maintain that they determine the will in a different way from pleasures of sense, when in reality they would not be felt as pleasant, if there were not in us a natural disposition to enjoy the refined pleasures of the understanding.

(*Contd.*)
tutes the essence of one's own self. Pleasure of self is also called self-contentment. Self-contentment arises from moral disposition, not from happiness which depends on physical conditions.

If self-contentment were to extend to the whole of our life, it would be called blessedness. However, Kant says that perfect self-contentment cannot be attained by a finite rational creature like man in whom virtue (moral disposition) and natural desires are in continuous opposition. See also *virtue* in section 37.

The idea that the enjoyment of intellectual pleasures is essentially different from the gratification of coarser bodily pleasurers resembles the error of those dabblers in metaphysics who conceive of an extended substance or matter reduced to the utmost fineness as a thinking substance or spiritual being.

If we accept the theory of Epicurus that virtue determines the will merely by the pleasure it promises, we have no right to blame him for holding that this refined pleasure is same in kind with the coarsest pleasure. So far as we know Epicurus did not advocate the pursuit of all or any pleasure, but only of those which were consistent with intelligence and moderation. Joys of the mind were superior to pleasures of the body, but this did not prevent him from maintaining that pleasures which come from the intellect or mind are exactly of the same kind as pleasures which come from sense or feeling. Epicurus, of course, held that understanding and reason (the higher faculties of knowledge) may be employed in promoting happiness. But this in no way proves that the determining principle of the higher faculties of desire contains any other motive than that of the lower faculty of desire. In either case, the determining ground is pleasure.

What, then, is the conclusion to be drawn from the foregone discussion? There is either no higher faculty of desire, or that pure practical reason is the truly higher faculty of desire, which is genetically different from the lower faculty of desire. In other words, if we accept the higher faculty of desire, then it is no other than pure practical reason itself which determines action independently of all feeling of pleasure or pain. It may be recalled that by pure practical reason, Kant means a mere form of the practical law without presupposing any feeling of pleasure or displeasure as the content or matter of the faculty of desire.

Remark II

21. Every finite being desires to be happy. Happiness is an unavoidable ground of determination of his faculty of desire. Satisfaction or contentment with his whole existence is not an inborn possession or bliss, which is a state of tranquility due to the consciousness of his independence and self-sufficiency. It is rather a practical problem forced upon him by his finite nature. Unlike the theoretical problem which can be solved through the acquisi-

tion of natural knowledge, the practical problem has to be solved through the exercise of our will or action guided by maxims (practical rules of conduct) which are in conformity with the supreme principle of morality i.e. the categorical imperative or the *autonomy* of the will.

Man insofar as he is a sensuous being has wants, needs or desires and they constitute the matter (contents or material ground) of his will. The matter is always related to a basic subjective feeling of pleasure or pain which determines what he requires in order to be satisfied with his condition of existence.

But just because we can discover the material ground of determination of the will only by experience, it is impossible to regard the principle of happiness as a moral law. A moral law, in order to be objective, must contain the same ground of determination of the will in all cases and for all rational beings at all times. It is indeed true that the idea of happiness furnishes a kind of unity of all the different objects of desire, but it is a mere general title for all the subjective motives of the will. Consequently, the empirical principle of happiness cannot yield any principle of determination of the will which could give us the specific direction that we require from a practical or moral principle for the solution of a practical problem. It is the particular feeling of pleasure or pain, experienced by each man, which determines his idea of happiness. Even if we confine ourselves to the same subject, we find that man's feelings change, so also do his wants. The principle of happiness, however, subjectively necessary is, therefore, a contingent principle because it may or rather must be very different in different subjects, and hence it can never have the force of a practical law. In the desire of happiness. it is not the form of law, but solely its matter which determines the will. In following the principle of happiness, our concern is only with the quantity of pleasure we may expect by obeying this law. Principles of individual happiness or self-love may no doubt contain universal rules of skill, telling us how to adapt means to ends, but in that case they are only theoretical principles based upon the intellectual relation of cause and effect. On the other hand, no practical precept based upon intellectual or theoretical principle can ever be universal because the desire of object is determined by the feeling of pleasure or pain, which cannot be universally

directed to the same object, as the same object may at one time arouse in us a feeling of pleasure and at another time a feeling of pain.

Even if we supposed that there was an absolute agreement among all finite rational beings regarding the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of displeasure, it would nevertheless be true that no universal moral law could be based upon the principle of happiness. Unanimity of opinion in regard to the same object fitted to bring pleasure is not the same thing as an objective law, for under the supposition made, the principle determining the will would still be self-love or desire for individual happiness. The motive would, therefore, be subjective and empirical, as distinguished from an objective motive based upon *a priori* grounds.

It would be better to maintain, says Kant, that there are no universal practical principles but merely general practical principles derived from experience.

4. *Theorem III*

22. A rational being can regard his maxims as practical principles only when he conceives of them as principles determining his will not by their matter but by their form.

The matter or object of the will either determines the will or it does not. If matter determines the will, the will is obviously subjected to empirical conditions. It is determined by a feeling of pleasure or pain. If this is the case, there can be no practical law but only maxims based upon the ever changing subjective states and conditions of the subject. It, therefore, follows that a finite rational being cannot conceive of his maxims[10] or subjective principles of action as laws binding upon all rational beings, or his will must be determined purely by the form of law itself (*ought*). In short, it is the form of a maxim and not its matter, which alone can serve as a universal practical law.

Remark

23. The life of rational being is governed by numerous maxims.

10. A maxim has both matter (subjective element) and form (objective element). Maxims are distinguishable from one another by virtue of their matter (subjective conditions, ends or objects) and not by their form which is common to all. When matter is abstracted, the common or objective form remains.

If he wants his maxims to serve as universal and necessary laws of action, he must conceive of them as determining the will, not by their object or matter, but only by their form (*ought*). Kant gives an example to illustrate his point. Supposing that I make it my maxim to increase my wealth by every safe means, and further suppose that I hold in trust money for others, without any document to prove that I hold the money, the question is, can I act on the maxim that any one who holds money in trust may use it for his own use? If every one were to act on this maxim, it is obvious that we fall into self-contradiction, for in a society in which it was recognised that money left in trust could be utilised by the trustee for his personal ends, then no one would leave money in trust. This example shows that a practical law must be applicable universally. If my will is to be in conformity with the practical law, then it must be free from the influences of all personal material ends which are based on natural inclinations.

Kant wonders at the wisdom of those philosophers who make desire for happiness the determining ground of the will merely because the desire for happiness is universal. It is true that desire for happiness is present in each and every finite rational being, but we cannot make it the basis of a universal practical law. The reason is that the wills of all do not have one and the same object of interest.[11] Each person has his own interest in view, which may accidently agree with the interest pursued by others. This accidental agreement will not be sufficient for a law, because the instances of disagreement would destroy the law, which is universally valid without exceptions.

5. *Problem I*

24. Find out the nature of the will when the ground of its determination is the form of the maxim.

The problem is to find out the character of the will, when it is

11. The supposition that men may have one and the same object of interest is contradicted by experience. As a matter of fact, we have diverse objects of interest. Let us take an object of interest-happiness. We all desire happiness. But happiness is so personal a matter that happiness or good of others only enters into it incidently and not essentially.

determined by the mere form of the law, and not by the objects of sensuous desires. It is Kant's basic position that form cannot be derived from the senses. It is not an object of sense. It can only be a product of the self-activity of reason and, therefore, a will which is conceived of as being determined by the mere form of law cannot in principle belong to the world of appearances. The principle which is to determine the will is essentially different from the principle which determines relation of objects to one another in the sphere of nature. They (sensuous desires) are all subject to the law of natural causation. But, if the will is determined by the form of law, which can only be comprehended by reason, it must be independent of the natural relation of cause and effect, to which all sensuous desires are subject. Kant says that such independence is called freedom in the strictest or transcendental sense. Hence, a will which is determined purely by the legislative form (*ought*) of the maxim must be a free will. The character of such a will is, therefore, transcendental and not phenomenal. It belongs to the transcendental world and not to the phenomenal world of experience.

6. *Problem II*

25. Find out the law which is capable of determining a free will necessarily.

The supposition is that there is a free will. The problem now is to discover the law which alone is fitted to determine it.

The matter or object of a practical law cannot be given except empirically. Since a free will must be entirely independent of all sensuous conditions and yet be determinable, it must be determined independently of the material of the law (pleasure or pain). The will being free from all empirically or sensuous conditions, it's determining principle can only be the law itself, taken in abstraction from the matter of the law. If we take away the matter, there is left nothing but the form of the law. Hence, the form of the law, insofar as it is contained in the maxim, is the only thing which is capable of determining a free will.

Remark

26. Freedom and moral law, as the two problems have shown, imply each other. We may ask ourselves whether the moral

law springs from freedom or freedom from the moral law. We may also ask ourselves whether the unconditioned moral law is the self-consciousness of a pure practical reason and is therefore identical with the positive concept of freedom. These questions cannot be answered at this stage because our initial knowledge of freedom is negative. The question now is as to how knowledge of them is possible. Should we start from the knowledge of freedom and infer morality, or should we start from morality and infer freedom?

We cannot start from freedom because we cannot know freedom (free will, free cause or free being) immediately. This is because our initial knowledge of freedom is negative, i.e. it arises in contrast to the natural law of causation which is a law of phenomena. There is no positive knowledge of freedom. This has been well established by Kant in his first *Critique*. Can we derive freedom from experience? Not at all. Because experience deals only with phenomena and reveals us only the laws of phenomenal objects and consequently the mechanism of nature, which is the opposite of freedom.

The answer to our question, then, is that we are not directly conscious of freedom, but of the moral law. We immediately become conscious of the moral law as soon as we frame maxims for our conduct. In other words, the moral law is revealed intuitively or immediately by the pure rational will in the strivings of a moral agent to obey only that law which can be willed universally without contradiction and regardless of consequences or results.

In Kant, the question of intuitive or immediate consciousness of the moral law is not a matter of philosophical or speculative haggling, but it is an axiom on which his entire moral philosophy rests.

Since reason prescribes the moral law as a principle of action, a principle which is entirely independent of all sensuous conditions, the consciousness of the moral law forces us to presuppose freedom. While we infer freedom from the moral law, it must be clearly understood that freedom is the condition of the moral law, because if there were no freedom of will, there could be no moral law. We may, therefore, say that freedom is the condition of the actual willing of a universal moral law, while the consciousness of the moral law is the basis upon which we justify the actual possibility (not logical possibility) of freedom. In short, it is the moral law which leads directly to the concept of freedom in the positive sense.

Kant holds that there is neither inconsistency nor arguing in a circle when we say that freedom is the condition of the moral law and later assert that the moral law is the only condition under which freedom can be known. "Freedom is the *ratio essendi* of the moral law, the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom".

7. *Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason*

27. Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.

Remark

This law, for Kant, is the most fundamental formulation of the supreme principle of morality or the categorical imperative, since it leads us straight to the idea of freedom or *autonomy* of the will. The consciousness of the moral law is a fact of reason, because it cannot be brought by reason under any law higher than itself. This unconditional law is independent of empirical conditions, and consequently is the condition of all particular moral maxims or rules. Since the law cannot be resolved into anything higher than itself, it cannot be derived from the consciousness of freedom as we cannot establish the existence of a free subject on the basis of knowledge. We have no knowledge or cognition of a free subject. The reason why Kant denies that we can have any knowledge of a free cause is that for him knowledge is identical with experience. The conceptions of understanding or reason taken by themselves are empty, for it is only in relation to sensible experience that knowledge of them is possible for us. Since a free cause is an idea of reason, it can never become an object of sensible experience.

If we possessed an intellectual intuition, then we could have actual knowledge of a free subject. But since our understanding is discursive i.e. works with concepts, we have no knowledge of freedom. While knowledge of a free being is denied to us, the consciousness of the moral law is in a sense given to us as a fact

of practical reason or moral consciousness. It is given only insofar as it is originated purely by reason, and in this case, reason declares itself to be the source of the law.

COROLLARY

28. Pure reason becomes practical by virtue of its own causality, and it gives us a universal law which is called the moral law.

REMARK

The principle of morality prescribes a univeral law which is binding upon all rational beings regardless of the compulsion of inclinations. A law which is thus absolutely universal applies by its nature to all rational beings who have a will. It is, therefore, the supreme ground of determination of their will. Hence, it is not to be conceived simply as a law for man, but as a law for all other finite beings possessed of reason and will, if there are such beings. This law is for infinite Being also. But, since in the case of finite beings, the natural desires oppose reason, the law in their cases takes the form of an imperative. No finite being, including human beings, possesses a perfectly rational will which by its very nature wills the moral law. Such a perfectly rational will exists only in an infinite Being, a being who by its very nature wills the good. According to Kant, a perfectly rational will always will the good. A perfectly rational will is a holy will, a will which does not act contrary to the law, i.e. its action is not arbitrary, but is the necessary manifestation of the absolute moral nature of the being. But in the case of a human being, who has to struggle against impulses and desires, a good will appears in the form of duty, which contains an element of constraint. Thus human goodness, in contrast to divine goodness, can be understood with reference to the concept of duty, which consists in overcoming the obstacles placed in its way by unruly impulses. But it must be understood that the concept of duty would not apply to a perfect or holy will, which has no obstacles to overcome.

Although holiness is unattainable by finite human beings, since that would mean complete transcendence of sensuous conditions of existence, it yet serves as a practical ideal or model which man can set up as the goal of all his strivings, and towards which he can make continuous progress. Where, then, does lie virtue? It

lies in the conviction that, while our will cannot absolutely conform to the practical ideal, we are nevertheless making steady progress towards it.

8. *Theorem IV*

29. The *autonomy* of the will is the only one principle of all moral laws and moral obligations; *heteronomy* is the opposite of *autonomy*.

Kant defines *autonomy* of the will as subjection of the will to its own law, the categorical imperative, in contrast to *heteronomy* of the will as subjection of the will to a law outside the rational will. This definition implies the freedom of the rational will to legislate to itself, which constitutes the basis for the *autonomy* of the moral law, i.e. the categorical imperative.

Autonomy of the will, or determination of the will purely by reason itself is the sole principle of all particular moral laws (particular categorical imperatives) and the duties that are in conformity with them. *Heteronomy* of the will or determination of the will by ends other than itself (hypothetical and non-moral ends based upon natural desires) cannot be the basis of moral obligation or duty, for no universal law binding upon all rational beings can be derived from hypothetical ends, such as happiness or gain either for self or others. In fact, the *heteronomy* of the will contradicts the principle of obligation, since the only principle of morality of the will is that supplied by reason. The sole principle of morality, then, is the determination of the will through the mere universal form of the law (*ought*).

Now, independence of reason of all desires is freedom in the negative sense, while, as we have seen, the self-legislation of pure practical reason or will (*autonomy* of the will) is freedom in the positive sense. If desire exercises the slightest influence on the will, then it loses its *autonomy* and becomes *heteronomous*.

It is therefore impossible that desire and reason can be combined in morality. Kant argues that if the will is influenced by desires, it must be dependent upon the natural law of causation, and it is the very character of the natural law of causation to be opposed to freedom, which is the foundation of morality. Further, if the will is influenced by desire, the function of reason will not be to supply motive of the will, but only to provide the necessary means for the attainment of end set up by desire.

The term 'choice' in this section may be understood with reference to *autonomy* of choice or independence of the will from natural desires, or *heteronomy* of choice or dependence of the will on natural desires. The principle of *autonomy* of the will and the categorical imperative are one and the same thing. Moreover, all heteronomous laws or principles are hypothetical imperatives implying material maxims of action.

Remark I

30. This remark contains Kant's objections to altruism, a term which has come to mean the pursuit of good of others, in conscious contrast to egoism, which is motivated by self-love or self centred-interest.

As a matter of fact, every finite being does seek his happiness. But we cannot base upon this fact a law that every one ought to seek his happiness. In other words, Kant denies that the moral law can be based upon the general concept of happiness, which has been formed by a mental process of induction from the individual experiences of happiness. The altruist argues that every one desires his own happiness and, therefore, we are entitled to say that happiness of others or happiness of all is the true end of life. Kant objects to this reasoning. In the first place, if we grant it to be a fact and he admits it to be a fact that every one desires his own happiness, we cannot pass from this principle to the conclusion that every one ought to desire his own happiness. We must, therefore, distinguish between what is desired and what is desirable. In the second place, it is admitted that everyone promotes his own happiness, but we cannot derive from this the law that everyone ought to promote the happiness of others.

Kant admits that there is a feeling of pleasure in the satisfaction of one's desires. He also admits that there is a subjective feeling of want, a sympathetic disposition in all rational beings, which gives pleasure or satisfaction in the happiness of others, but such a subjective feeling of want or sympathetic disposition however present in all rational beings cannot form the criterion of an objective moral law because the happiness of others is as variable and fluctuating as one's own happiness. There is, thus, no possible way of establishing the moral law except on the ground that a maxim must be universalised, removing from it all

references to the matter or content i.e. individual happiness, happiness of others or both.

Remark II

31. Kant's classification of all material practical principles is as follows:

Subjective

External	*Internal*
Education (Montaigne)	Physical Feeling (Epicurus)
Civil Constitution (Mandevile)	Moral Feeling (Hutcheson)

Objective

Internal	*External*
Perfection (Wolff and the Stoics)	Will of God (Crusius and other theological, moralists)

The above table divides clearly all material practical principles, which have been proposed as the basis for morality, into two groups. The first group comprises subjective or empirical principles, while the second group mentions objective or rational principles. The following is a summary examination of each principle in the two groups:

Education (*Montaigne*): Montaigne, a popular French writer, derived morality from customs, conventions, examples etc. (grouped under the title 'Education'). He held that all ethical truths were relative. The rightness and goodness of an action depends on the attitude taken towards it by the individuals or group. In other words, ethical disposition in a man is formed by the operation of external forces upon him. Such a theory, according to Kant, cannot provide universal and necessary criterion for morality.

Civil Constitution (*Mandeville*): The ethical principles are reflections of political principles legislated by the sovereign power in the interest of the society. The criterion of rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the will of the ruler or the ruling class in every period of history. What is permitted by the ruler is

right and what is prohibited by him is wrong. This theory is attributed by Kant to Mandeville, an English philosopher of the seventeenth century. This view is not acceptable to Kant because it reduces ethical duties to juridical duties or obligations imposed upon us by an external authority.

Physical Feeling (*Epicurus*): Epicurus taught that pleasure and happiness are the natural (internal) ends of life. He reduced the principles of morals to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Kant has already rejected this theory in his general condemnation of the hedonistic foundation of ethics.

Moral Feeling (*Hutcheson*): The prominent Scotish philosopher, Hutcheson, held that every man is endowed with a natural (internal) faculty which he calls moral feeling or inborn conscience. The moral feeling directly or immediately without any prior knowledge of good and evil approves ethical (virtuous) actions and disapproves unethical (vicious) actions. The ethical actions, according to the theory, give pleasure while the unethical actions give displeasure. Kant contends that this theory is not at all suited to serve as the basis of universal and objective moral laws because in the last analysis it seeks to establish the empirical base for moral judgements through the moral faculty.

Perfection (*Wolff and the Stoics*): Kant is here not concerned with ontological perfection as is found in the concept of God. The practical or moral (internal) perfection is in question. The theory of ethical perfection states that the cultivation of natural talents or endowments is the ultimate end at which we ought to aim. Both Wolff and the Stoics subscribed to this theory. Kant rejects this theory on the ground that it makes ends (cultivation of talents, skill etc.) as the determining ground of the will. If an end or object determines the will, then the determining principle is empirical and not a universal practical precept. In other words, the ends (the material of the will) must be defined with reference to the form of the will and not vice versa. The preceeding sections have made this position abundantly clear.

Will of God (Crusius and other theological moralists): The theological moralists regard the perfection of God as the source of ethical principles. This is contrary to Kant's theory of ethics. Ethical principles, as explained in earlier section 29, proceed from practical reason (will) in man and not from the will of any external divine Being.

The material practical principles (*heteronomous* or empirical) having been rejected by Kant as the foundation of moral laws, there remains nothing but a purely formal law through which the will is to be determined to action.

I. Of the Deduction of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason

32. The Analytic of practical reason has to show, in the first place, that pure reason does supply a principle by which the will may be determined to action and that we have a direct knowledge of the moral law through pure practical reason or moral consciousness. In the second place, the Analytic has to show that we are compelled to infer[12] the existence of freedom or free cause from the consciousness of the moral law. Kant says that the moral law is bound up with the consciousness of freedom of the will, and is identical with it.

A rational being is conscious that in his will he does not belong to the sphere of nature, but is capable of rising in idea above the law of nature, although he also knows that insofar as he belongs to the world of sense, his will must be subject to the law of causation, which is universally and necessarily applicable to all phenomena.

There is a noteworthy contrast between the Analytical part of the present *Critique* and the Analytical part of the first *Critique*. In the present *Critique* we begin with principles and proceed to concepts (good and evil) and only then, if possible, go to particular acts or objects (duties enjoined upon us by the moral law) that can be produced by our free will in the world of sense. But in the first *Critique*, we start with the data of sense (objects of perception) as ordered by the *a priori* forms of sensibility (space

12. The employment of such terms as proof, inference, argument, deduction, conclusion etc. in moral discourses and discussions is invalid according to the laws of reasoning. To deduce or infer the existence of free or moral cause (factual conclusion) from the consciousness of moral law or *ought* (practical or value-premise) is formally or logically incorrect.

    Although it is formally invalid to use these terms in moral arguments which consist in drawing factual or existential conclusions from value-premise or premises, yet their usage informally suggests the meaning they intend to convey in moral discourses .

and time) and forms of thought (Categories) and then show that certain laws are universally and necessarily applicable to all actual and possible objects of experience. As we know, the result of critical investigations conducted in the Analytic of the first *Critique* is that pure reason is compelled to deny a knowledge of all objects lying beyond the boundaries of experience. We have no positive knowledge beyond objects of experience i.e. concerning things as noumena. By positive knowledge, Kant means *a priori* synthetic knowledge of objects determined by the forms of sensibility and the forms of thought.

It is true that the speculative reason cannot give us positive knowledge of noumena or things in themselves, because all knowledge is conditioned by the forms of perception (space and time) and understanding (forms of thought or categories). However, the speculative reason succeeded to the extent that it asserted with certainty the concept of noumena, i.e. it asserted not only the possibility but the necessity of thinking of them. It has shown against all objections that the idea of noumenon (free cause or free subject) is not self-contradictory. There is nothing inconsistant with the nature of our knowledge in the supposition that there is a free cause which is independent of empirical determinations. This kind of cause, which is negative in character for speculative reason, prepares the way for practical reason to establish the existence of objects corresponding to its ideas (free cause, immortality of soul and God). In other words, the speculative reason cannot give us knowledge of objects corresponding to its ideas. Nor does even practical reason bring us in contact with the intelligible world to which the idea of a free cause belongs, for that would mean the extension of knowledge beyond the realm of phenomena. As we shall subsequently see, the practical reason has no interest whatsoever in the knowledge of noumenal objects. Its interest is merely confined to practical or moral matters.

What does then the pure practical reason give us? Kant answers that it supplies us with an indubitable fact of our consciousness of the moral law which presents itself to us as binding upon all rational beings. From this fact of moral consciousness we cannot fail to see that the idea of the moral law is unintelligible without the supposition of freedom or free cause. The moral law implies

the idea of freedom. It cannot be conceived unless we suppose freedom. Now this fact of the moral law implying freedom also indicates that beyond the sensuous world there is a supersensuous world, and that the law of this supersensuous world is *autonomy* or freedom of the will, which expresses itself in the moral law. Thus the moral law is the expression of the autonomy or freedom of the will. The *autonomy* of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them.

So far as rational beings possess sensuous nature, their existence in the world is under empirically conditioned laws, and therefore it is, from the point of view of reason, *heteronomy*. So far as the same rational beings possess intelligible nature, their existence in the same world is under the law of *autonomy*, which is independent of all empirical conditions and which, therefore, belongs to the autonomy of pure practical reason. Now, this law of *autonomy* is the moral law, which is the fundamental law of the intelligible world or of man as a purely rational (intelligible) being.

Though the intelligible world exists in idea, yet it is the concept of a world whose counterpart must exist in the sensible world without interfering with the laws of the intelligible world. The intelligible world might be called the archetypal world, which is the source of the ideal or pattern after which rational beings should order their conduct, while the world of sense, insofar as it is the effect of the action of free beings whose action conformed to the *autonomy* of the will or the moral law to which the intelligible world is subject, might be called the ectypal world.

The moral law issues absolute commands. It lays claim on all men as rational beings that they ought to realise it in the world of sense. But, we cannot ignore the fact and it is not always possible for a finite being (man) to overcome the natural obstacles which prevent its realisation in the world of sense. In such a situation, the moral law commands that a rational being must always act from the idea of the moral law, and insofar as he acts so, his action is in conformity with the law of the intelligible world, even if the consequences of his actions are contrary to his expectations.

As a matter of fact, we do not find that a man is by nature

determined to act by the moral law. The reason is that he is not completely rational. He has his sensuous side. He seeks the satisfaction of private inclinations which are opposed to the laws of reason. The law or maxim to which private inclinations or particular desires are subject is not moral, but "pathological[13] (physical) laws".

The aforesaid considerations enable us to distinguish between the laws of system of nature to which the will of a rational being is subject and a system of nature which is subject to the will of rational being. In the former case, the will is determined to act under the influence of a natural desire for an object which is expected to bring pleasure. In the latter case, the will is the cause of the object or, what is the same thing, the will is determined to act purely in accordance with the idea of reason, and when this is the case, reason is actually practical i.e. it determines the character of the will in accordance with the moral law.

What has been said constitutes, according to Kant, deduction or justification[14] of the supreme principle of practical reason. As the principle is an *a priori* synthetic practical proposition, we have to prove that it actually is objective or universally valid. In other words, we have to show that this principle of the will is universally and necessarily binding upon all rational beings or rational beings in general (men and supermen). Kant admits that the deduction or justification of this principle is difficult, while that of the principles of theoretical reason is not so. The deduction of the latter is easier, because it can be shown that without the principles of theoretical reason or understanding we can have no system of experience at all. It is different in the case of the supreme principle of practical reason, i.e. the principle of the *autonomy* of the will. Here we cannot appeal to experience at all, because this principle, supposing it to be valid, applies not merely within the limits of experience, but with absolute universality to the intelligible world[15] as well. How can we establish the existence of a law which, supposing it to exist, must proceed purely from the idea of reason? We can think of a free subject. We have now to prove the existence of an object adequate to our thought.

13. Kant does not use the term 'pathological' in the medical sense of human diseases and maladies. He uses it in his philosophical writings in the sense of what is physical or natural as the exact opposite of what is free or moral.
14. Kant's basic position is that we have direct awareness of the moral law. Strictly speaking, the moral law then does not require any deduction. What it requires is an exposition.

We cannot establish the objective reality of the moral law (*ought*) by an appeal to theoretical reason or experience. However, we can establish its reality through free self-reflection[16] (moral-reflection). We have intuitive certainty of the existence of the moral law. The moral law does not require any deduction or demonstration. It is a firmly established fact, which forms the basis upon which we establish the reality of a free subject. The moral law[17] does not require any deduction, because it could not exist unless it were originated by a free subject. We can now reason back from the fact of moral law or moral consciousness to the existence of a free subject or autonomous will.

Just as the law of natural causation is the condition of the sensible world (existence of sensible world under the universal

15. The moral world is also called the intelligible world. It is the idea of a non-sensuous world inhabited by perfectly rational beings who order their lives in complete conformity with the moral principles. They live in a state of bliss which is a state of existence in absolute independence from the evil influence of desires and inclinations. The moral world is ruled by a supreme Reason or a moral Being who "can be likewise posited as underlying nature as its cause". See the first *Critique* for details (A 809-810—B 837-838).
16. Free self-reflection cannot become a reality in the sphere of empirical world conditioned by mechanical laws, but only in that of the will determined by free causality.
17. Is not this the Cartesian argument for the *cogito*? Descartes famous argument is *cogito ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am or exist). Descartes concludes the existence of transcendental subject of thought from the bare thought or consciousness of I. Kant rejects this argument in the first *Critique*. Since we have no external intuition of I, we are not at all justified in applying the category of existence to it (I).

    Kant deduces the existence of free or moral self from the bare consciousness of the moral law or ought. Notwithstanding its practical significance, the deduction of theoretical or factual proposition (existence of free cause or being) from practical proposition (moral consciousness or ought) is formally invalid.

    Thus, both arguments are invalid on different grounds, the former on transcendental ground and the latter on logical.

natural laws), so the moral law is the condition of the supersensible world (existence of supersensible world under the universal moral law). Thus the practical reason is able to do what speculative reason failed to do, i.e. to give objective reality to the conception of a free cause which belongs to the intelligible order of things.

We have seen that there is no free cause in the realm of phenomena. Nothing can be found in the series of events which is not dependent upon a prior event. For, every cause is itself an event, and therefore it is useless to attempt to defend freedom by maintaining that certain events are exempted from the law of causation. That is to say, we must deny that within the sphere of phenomena there is any self-determined cause. At the same time, we find that reason cannot be satisfied with anything short of the unconditioned. It sets up the idea of a self-determined causality or free cause. But, since we cannot find in experience any instance of an action which is the effect of an unconditioned or self-determined cause, the only way in which the speculative reason can defend the idea of a free cause from attack is by showing that a being who on one side belongs to the world of sense may on the other side belong to the supersensuous world. Having thus shown that freedom is not self-contradictory, i.e. that reason may quite consistently maintain freely determined cause, regardless of the fact that we have no knowledge of a free cause. But it is only by the practical reason that the actual reality of a free cause is established. Although speculative reason does not in any way gain any additional knowledge of a free cause, yet it acquires certainty in respect of a free, self-determined cause through practical reason. But, we cannot say that when we have established the objective reality of a free cause through the practical reason, we have extended the conception of causality itself beyond the world of experience for it still remains true that the conception of causality has no objective signification or meaning except in its application to phenomena.

In fact, the practical reason has no interest in extending the natural law of causation to the intelligible world. All that it requires, in order to establish the objective validity of the moral law, is the certainty that we are free subjects and that we are capable of determining our actions in accordance with the dictates of the moral law.

II. Of the right of pure reason to an extension of knowledge in its practical employment, which is denied to it in its speculative employment

33. In this chapter Kant (a) shows the inadequacy of Hume's theory of causality in the light of his critical investigations made in the first *Critique* and (b) justifies the extension of the pure concepts of understanding, specially that of causality, beyond phenomena not for theoretical but for practical purpose, in order to ensure the existence of free or moral will. By right Kant means authority.

a) *Kant and Hume's Theory of Causality*: Hume says that the concept of cause is one which involves the necessity of a synthetic connection between different existing things or between different properties of the same thing. When A is granted, we recognise that B, something entirely different from A, must necessarily exist also. A necessary connection cannot be derived from experience, because experience gives us knowledge of what exists and not of what necessarily exists. A necessary connection can be known only *a priori*. But there is no *a priori* knowledge, since all knowledge comes from experience. Hence the necessary connection between two entirely different things or events is not given in perception. Nor could we derive the concept of causality from reason, because the connection between A (as cause) and B (as effect) is not one whose denial is self-contradictory. From the foregone, Hume concludes that the concept of cause is itself "fraudulent and deceptive".

However, Hume admits that we do use the concept of cause not only in common parlance but also in formulating scientific judgements. From which impression or perception, then, is it derived? Hume answers that when we regard events or things as causally connected, all that we observe is that they are frequently and uniformaly perceived together. Now in this manner of togetherness, the impression or idea of the one brings with it the idea of the other. A customary or habitual association is formed in the mind, and as in other forms of habits or customs, so in this one, the working of association is felt as necessary. It follows that a causal relation between any two objects is not in them, but in the habituated mind. In other words, Hume puts causal

connection in custom (a subjective necessity and not in objects themselves as an objective necessity). Thus the concept of cause, Hume says, can never be legitimately acquired or verified, because it demands a connection which in itself is void, chimerical and untenable before reason. It is a connection to which no object can ever correspond.

Kant rejects the very premise from which Hume derives his theory of causation. Hume's premise is that objects of experience are things in themselves. He assumes that in immediate perception we have the knowledge of objects that are permanent, or persist even when they are not experienced or perceived. If we grant this premise, then Hume is correct in declaring the concept of cause to be deceptive and illusory, because it cannot be understood with reference to things in themselves which exist independently of the knowing mind, why if A is given, then something B must also be given. But Kant did not accept such *a priori* knowledge of things in themselves.

Kant's critical investigations in the Analytic part of the first *Critique* show that the objects which we encounter within experience are by no means things in themselves but only appearances or phenomena. If we grant that they are things in themselves, it is impossible to understand how it would not be contradictory to deny the necessary connection between A as cause and some altogether different B as effect. But on Kant's explanation that objects of experience do not exist independently of the knowing mind, it is quite understandable that A and B may be connected in one experience in a special manner with reference to a temporal relation and that they cannot be separated without contradicting that necessary temporal connection by means of which experience is possible. The special manner in which A and B are inseparably connected in our experience in the present case is made possible through the synthetic activity of the understanding (mind or intellect) in determining them in time in fixed, constant and irreversible order. This special mode of synthesis of elements of perception A and B in irreversible and objective order is the concept of necessary and objective connection (the law of causality) between two entirely different objects A and B.

In this way, Kant not only proves the objective reality of the concept of causality with reference to objects of experience but

also deduces it as *a priori* concept because of the necessity of connection it implies. That is, Kant shows the possibility of the concept of causality from pure understanding (reason) without any empirical sources.

A difficulty arises. Kant deduces the objective reality of the concept of causality only with reference to objects of possible experience. How can this concept (and similarly all the others) be applied to things which are not objects of experience but lie beyond its boundaries? It seems at first sight as if this were not possible. But the difficulty disappears if we remember that Kant shows in the first *Critique* that by virtue of the pure categories objects may be thought without being determined *a priori* with reference to objects of possible experience.

From the very fact that the categories have their origin in pure understanding, and are independent of all sensuous conditions, there is nothing to prevent us from applying them to objects in general, whether sensuous or supersensuous. If any thing is lacking for the application of these categories, specially that of causality, to supersensuous objects it is the condition of intuition. When this condition is lacking, the application of categories for the purpose of theoretical knowledge of the object as noumenon is not possible. Hence the theoretical knowledge of the objects as noumena is impossible and absolutely forbidden.

Even if the concept of causality cannot be used for theoretical knowledge of noumena, it can nevertheless he used or determined for some other purpose, such as practical, because of its origin in pure understanding and its objective validity with reference to objects in general, as explained in the foregone paras. This could not be so if, as Hume asserted, that this concept contains something inconceivable or is self-contradictory.

b) *Extension of Pure Reason for Practical Use*: It is out of the consciousness of the essentially limited character of knowledge that there arises by way of contrast the idea of possible rational life which is not subject to the laws of experience. In this way, the very consciousness of the limitation of reason in its theoretical use points beyond itself to use in which it is free from that limitation. The only other use of reason is practical.

Is there any evidence to show that this practical use of reason is not fiction? Kant's answer is that we have direct evidence to

the effect that our reason has a causality. We impose upon ourselves imperatives, which imply that we are conscious of having in us a power of self-determination. There is obviously no sense in speaking of obligation in cases of lifeless things or animals because neither of them have will or practical reason.[18]

Besides its relation to theoretical knowledge (objects of experience) the reason or mind has also a relation to desire, and in this connection we speak, not of intellect or understanding, but of will or practical reason. And as reason in relation to desire may issue in action purely through the concept of the moral law, it is rightly called in this case pure will or pure practical reason. The objective reality of a pure or moral law (pure practical reason) is given to us as a fact of moral consciousness. The concept of a will contains the idea of will as a cause, and therefore the concept of a cause that is not subject to the law of nature, and therefore cannot be shown to exist by reference to objects of experience. There is no possible way of justifying the existence of a free will except through pure practical law or moral consciousness.[19] Now, the idea of a being who has free will is that of a noumenal cause (causa noumenon). That there is nothing self-contradictory in the idea of such a cause is evident if we observe that the conception of cause proceeds from the pure understanding (reason freed from the conditions of sensible experience) and that we can justify its objective validity only on the ground that it is independent of all sensuous conditions. As regards its origin, there is nothing in the idea of a cause itself to limit it to phenomena. In other words, there is nothing to prevent us from supposing that pure conception of cause is realised in a being (subject of free will) that does not belong to the sensible world. Since we have no object to which we can apply the idea of a cause except that which presents itself within experience, it is not possible for us to claim knowledge of a free cause, and therefore

18. How will we know about others that they have will? The question is theoretical and it can only be answered by reason in its theoretical capacity. Practical reason presupposes that there are rational beings, besides ourselves, who have will.
19. It is ontological argument—which Kant rejected on theoretical grounds —in moral form with substantial moral import, which he entertains on practical considerations.

for theoretical reason or purpose it remains an empty concept. We are not required to hold that our knowledge must be extended beyond phenomena, in order to ensure the existence of a pure will or free cause. The conception of cause being of non-empirical origin, there is nothing to prevent us from maintaining that there actually exists a free cause as the determining ground of the moral law.

Since we make no other use of the concept of a free cause except that in relation to the moral law, we hold that we are justified only in making a practical use of it. In other words, even though we have no intuition to show its objective theoretical reality, it nevertheless has a real application exhibited *in concreto* in intentions or maxims of the will. This is sufficient to justify the application of the category of cause, and all the other categories through it, to noumenal or intelligible will (pure will, free will or free cause) in the practical or moral interest.

We can, for example, apply the pure category of substance to the intelligible will without theoretical knowledge or experience of the unchanging substance of the intelligible will in which nothing sensible happens (because it is not in time). But from this it must not be concluded that the application of the category of substance to the noumenal will has no objective reality because we can present no object corresponding to the category in supersensuous intuition. The objective reality of the category in question in relation to the noumenal will is only of practical or moral significance without the least pretension of theoretical knowledge of the noumenal or pure will. Kant reminds us that the application of the categories to the supersensuous objects from a practical point of view does not give to theoretical reason any encouragement to act without restraint in the transcendent or supersensuous world.

Similarly, all the other pure categories of the understanding can be applied to the intelligible or pure will and to all beings as intelligible beings (intelligences) including God for moral purposes without claiming knowledge of those objects.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF AN OBJECT OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON[1]

34. In order to pronounce an object good, we must know what sort of object it should be. That is, we must have a concept of it. A concept defines an object or gives an essence of it.

An object is called good either when it is a means to something else, namely, something pleasant or useful, or when it is good in itself. In both cases, there is implied the concept of an end or purpose, and therefore the relation of reason to a possible act of will. Further, the good is that the very concept or idea of which satisfies us as rational beings. In other words, the good implies a satisfaction of a peculiar kind.

The question in regard to the object of pure theoretical reason is quite different from the question in regard to the object of pure practical reason. In the former we ask whether an object can exist or he brought into existence in nature in accordance with the natural law of causation, while in the latter we ask whether an action ought to be willed assuming that we have the power to bring into existence the object to which our will is directed. It is thus a question of moral possibility that we have to consider here, for it is the law of the will, (pure practical reason, freedom or free subject) with which we have to deal.

1. This chapter is divided into three parts: (I) The concept of an object of pure practical reason. (II) Table of categories of freedom with reference to the concepts of good and evil. (III) The type of pure practical reason.

The first part (section 34) defines the concepts of good and evil with reference to the moral law.

In the second part (section 35), Kant makes brief references to the categories of freedom in relation to the concepts of good and evil.

The third part (section 36) describes the criterion by means of which to judge the rightness or morality of action. The criterion is that an action is morally good if it rests on a maxim which is not self-contradictory when universalised. See section 50 for details.

If we exclude all objects presented to us within the sphere of knowledge or experience, the only objects we are left with are those of good and evil. The good is the necessary object of desire, while the evil is the necessary object of aversion. But both rest upon the principle of reason, i.e. the relation of cause and effect or the relation of means and end.

We have seen that pleasure and pain cannot be originated by pure reason. They depend upon the relation of a real or an imagined object to the subject as susceptible to them.

The feeling of pleasure and pain cannot be linked to any concept or idea of an object *a priori*. On the basis of experience, we would call good that which is a means to the pleasant and evil that which is a cause of unpleasantness or pain. Pleasure and pain are mere sensations which are limited to individual subjects and their susceptibility. They are not products of the faculty of reason (products of reason) which is common in all human beings and therefore any attempt to base necessary and objective moral judgements upon the feeling of pleasure and pain cannot be successful.

All hedonistic theories identify the good with the pleasant (happiness, will being etc.) and the evil with the unpleasant or painful (woe, bad, ill etc.). If we accept this conception of good and evil, we must deny that:

a) There is any difference between *das Gute* (the good) and *das Wohl* (well-being) on the one hand, and between *das Bose* (evil, wicked) and *das Ubel* (bad, ill) or *das Weh* (woe) on the other.

b) There is nothing which is good or evil in itself i.e. moral good or moral evil.

Every rational being will acknowledge that we express two quite distinct judgements when we consider our action in regard to its goodness or wickedness or in regard to our weal or woe. The terms 'weal and woe' are employed to express respectively the feeling of pleasure and pain as excited by certain objects. They always refer to our sensible condition as one of pleasure or pain in relation to an object we desire or avoid, just as pleasant and unpleasant do. They do not refer to the rational or moral condition of man. Kant gives examples to make the distinction between the two concepts quite clear. A man who submits him-

self to a surgical operation undoubtedly feels it to be a bad (ill) thing, but by reason he and everyone else acknowledges the operation to be a good thing. The cries of a Stoic in the severest paroxysm of gout betray the evil character of pain, but he has no reason to concede that there is anything morally evil about the pain for, though bad or ill, it only diminishes his physical condition (worth) and not at all his moral worth.

The states of 'weal and woe' cannot be originated by pure reason. Good and evil, on the other hand, have strictly speaking no meaning except in relation to the will as determined by the law of reason[2] to make something its object. The will which wills the good (the good will) is never determined by the concept of a given object as fitted to bring pleasure, but solely by the universal law. Good and evil in this sense have nothing to do with the state or feeling of pleasantness and unpleasantness of the agent, but are affirmed of his actions. It follows that if there is anything absolutely good or evil, it cannot be the object of the action, but only the manner of acting or the maxim (motive) of the will by which the agent is determined to act. Consequently, the absolute good or good in itself is nothing but the good will which acts or determines itself to act in accordance with the moral law and the absolute evil or evil in itself is nothing but the evil will which acts contrary to the moral law.

Now, admitting that there is a principle capable in itself of determining the will, that principle will be *a priori* law of action and pure practical reason will supply from itself the motive for determining the act. An action so determined is good in itself and not as a means to experience of anticipated pleasure. Hence a will, the maxim of which is in complete harmony with the moral law, is absolutely or in all respects good and the supreme condition of all good actions. On the other hand, when the maxim (motive) presupposes an object fitted to bring pleasure, the motive is not in harmony with the moral law. In other words, it is not a moral motive. If in such cases we speak of actions as good, we do not mean that they are good in themselves, but only that they are

2. The moral law is called a law of reason because it is produced by reason as practical. It does not originate in sensibility or understanding. The moral law is not subject to the laws of sensibility and understanding.

good as means to an end which lies outside the will itself. Such maxims can never be laws, but are merely practical precepts.

Kant now explains the paradox of method in a critical examination of practical reason that the concept of good and evil must not be defined prior to the moral law, but only after and by means of the moral law. In other words, the concept of good and evil must be defined in terms of the moral law which is the *a priori* law determining the will.

If we begin with the concept of good in order to deduce from it the law of the will (the moral law), then the concept of an object (as a good object) will be the sole determining ground or principle of the will. Since the concept does not have any practical *a priori* law to determine it, the only criterion of good and evil can be placed in the agreement of the concept with our feeling of pleasure and pain. This will destroy the synthetic or spontaneous activity of reason, for the use of reason will only consist in first defining pleasure or pain associated with our existence and then determining the means of securing to ourselves the object of pleasure. Now, since only through experience can we find out the concept whose object conforms to the feeling of pleasure, and since by hypothesis the practical or moral law is to be based on that concept, the very possibility of practical laws *a priori* is ruled out. It does not matter whether we place the object of pleasure in happiness, in perfection, in moral sentiment or in the will of God, because in every case the determining ground of the will is *heteronomy* from which no *a priori* universal commanding moral law can issue. In this context Kant observes that the ancients revealed their error when they posited an object (the *highest good*) as the determining ground of the will in the moral law. Instead, they should have first searched for a law that would first determine the will *a priori* and then would determine the object in accordance with itself. Now that the moral law, says Kant, has been established by itself and has been shown to be the direct determining ground of the will, the *highest good* can be presented as an object to the will (pure practical reason) whose form has been determined *a priori*. It will be shown in the Dialectic part of the present *Critique* as to how this can be done.

35. Table of the Categories of Freedom[3] with Reference to the Concepts of Good and Evil

1. *Categories of Quantity*
   Subjective, according to maxims (intentions or opinions of the individual's will)
   Objective, according to principles (precepts)
   A priori subjective and objective principles of freedom (moral laws)
2. *Categories of Quality*
   Practical rules of commission (*praeceptivae*)
   Practical rules of omission (*prohibitivae*)
   Practical rules of exceptions (*exceptivae*)
3. *Categories of Relation*
   Relation to *personality*
   Relation to the *condition* (*state*) of the person
   Reciprocal, of one person to the condition (state) of another person
4. *Categories of Modality*
   The *permitted* and the *forbidden*
   Duty and that which is *contrary* to duty
   Perfect and *imperfect* duty

The following are our comments on Kant's exposition of the categories of freedom in relation to those of nature.

The role of the categories of theoretical reason (also called the categories of nature) is well defined and illustrated in the first *Critique*. They are *a priori* forms, modes or rules of synthesis of intuitions into perceptual objects in a connected system of experience. Kant says that these categories of nature are only forms of thought which, by means of universal concepts, designate in an indeterminate manner objects in general for every intuition possible to human beings. This means that the categories of nature can be applied to objects in general or all species of objects, whether sensuous or non-sensuous, on the condition that the objects are given in *intuition*. Now, the only forms of intuition which are possible to human beings are the sensuous forms of intuition (space and time). The categories, therefore, can be applied to sensuous or natural objects in general which are given to us in or through space and time. Since nature has not endowed us with the faculty of non-sensuous or supersensuous form of intuition, the application of the categories of nature to the supersensuous objects, as we have seen in the Dialectic part of the first *Critique*, drives reason into the dark woods of self-contradictions and perplexities.

3. Here 'freedom' means transcendental freedom and not absolute freedom. Transcendental freedom belongs to imperfectly rational or rational natural beings (human beings) who insofar as they are rational are subject to the laws of freedom; and insofar as they are natural, they are under the laws of nature. Absolute freedom (freedom completely unrelated to sensuousness), on the other hand, is the possession of perfectly rational beings (holy beings) including God. Hence, it will be relevant to maintain that 'the categories of freedom' concern sensuously affected human reason and not any other reason other than the human one. In short, they concern human reason and not reason in general.

When Kant passes from the categories of nature to the categories of freedom, he encounters a host of problems which belong to the realm of practical or moral philosophy. Here, we are dealing not with natural or scientific experience but with moral experience or moral consciousness. The theoretical categories are *a priori* conditions of the possibility of scientific experience. Can we advance such a claim on behalf of the categories of freedom (which may also be called practical concepts or categories) that they constitute the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of moral experience or moral consciousness? The answer is simply no. This is because the moral consciousness in the Kantian system of morality is a fact of pure practical reason. It is primary, absolute and unconditioned. All concepts and judgements in order to be moral must presuppose the moral consciousness which manifests itself in the form of the moral law. According to Kant, the elementary practical concepts are based upon the form of a pure will which has its origin in pure reason and thus in the faculty of thought itself. These elementary practical concepts are not derived from any other faculty. In the context, 'the elementary practical concepts' are the categories, 'the form of a pure will' is the moral law and 'another faculty' is either sensibility or understanding. The conclusion is that the categories of freedom have as their foundation the moral law which has its origin in

the faculty of thought or reason; neither in the faculty of sensibility nor in that of understanding. It is interesting to observe that a converse position obtains in respect of the categories of understanding which are presupposed in the *a priori* synthetic principles[4] or judgements of scientific or theoretical experience.

With some understanding of the distinction between the two species of categories, we shall now turn our attention to Kant's references to the categories of freedom. Surprisingly, Kant reserves a small amount of space (One and a half page) to the categories of freedom in the present *Critique*, where he makes brief observations about the categories, which at first sight appear to be profound, but which on closer examination will be found to be inimical to his philosophical thought in general and ethical thought in particular. He says that these categories only apply to practical reason in general, and so they proceed in order from those which are still morally indeterminate and sensuously conditioned to those which are morally determined and sensuously unconditioned.

Kant's own version of the categories is that they concern only practical reason in general and that there is transition from sensuously conditioned (morally undetermined) categories to sensuously unconditioned (morally determined) categories. This version is extremely bitter and hostile to his philosophical thought in general that there cannot be any real or objective transition from what is sensuously conditioned to what is sensuously unconditioned. The sensuously conditioned represents what is or what takes place as a matter of fact within nature according to the necessary natural laws, without requiring any command or prohibition to be uttered by us. On the other hand, the sensuously unconditioned refers to what ought to take place, and which in fact does not take place within nature, and which is therefore valid only as a demand, an ideal or something similar. There is a gulf between is and ought, between the actual and the ideal, between the sensible and the supersensible and the conditioned and the unconditioned in the Kantian system of thought. Kant is not

4. The fundamental principles of understanding are classified as (a) axioms of intuition, (b) anticipations of perception, (c) analogies of experience, and (d) postulates of empirical thought in the Analytic part of the first *Critique*.

tired of arguing in his critical writings that there is an immeasurable gulf between the realms of nature and freedom and that human reason is too weak to bridge the gulf. However, we are faced with a difficult point in Kant's thought that natural necessity and freedom co-exist in the same subject, without coinciding with or running into each other.

Moreover, it may be borne in mind that Kant's ethics deals not with practical reason in general (willing in general), but with pure practical reason (a special kind of willing) which wills what is morally good. A morally good will or the act of moral willing, though sensuously affected, is not sensuously conditioned or determined, and the goodness of such a willing manifests itself in acts (motives, intentions and aspirations) which are in conformity with the moral law.

We are, therefore, free to conceive transition from morally undetermined categories and judgements to morally determined categories and judgements by sacrificing Kant's fundamental philosophical position that there is no continuity between the sensuous (phenomenal) and the supersensuous (noumenal) existencies. The realms of nature and freedom do not constitute one realm. Understanding which is the source of natural concepts and reason which is the source of the concept of freedom carry on two absolutely different functions. Kant observes: "Understanding and reason excercise, therefore, two distinct legislations on one and the same territory of experience, without prejudice to each other. The concept of freedom as little disturbs the legislation of nature as the natural concept influences the legislation through the former" (*Critique of Judgement*, p. 11). Therefore, all references of transition or passage of what is sensuously conditioned to what is sensuously unconditioned are untenable in the light of Kant's own basic philosophical position.

Ignoring obscure and vague references, there remains one noteworthy account according to which the categories are elementary practical concepts which determine the free faculty of choice. The elementary concepts should be regarded as moral and not non-moral concepts because they have as their foundation the form of a pure will which is given in reason and therefore in the faculty of thinking itself. But this account of the categories that they are moral concepts which determine the free faculty of

choice to moral judgements is not maintainable on survey of the table of the categories. As we shall see, Kant employs the categories in both moral and non-moral senses in the determination of maxims or rules of conduct or action.

Kant springs a surprise when he concludes the subject by remarking that he need not add anything further here to elucidate the table because it is sufficiently intelligible. To make the table sufficiently intelligible requires something unequivocal, which we cannot find in Kant's treatment of the categories. Like the categories of theoretical reason or nature which are systematically derived from a common principle, namely, the faculty of judgement, Kant makes no attempt to derive the categories of freedom from a single principle. We cannot say whether the failure to make the subject of the categories sufficiently intelligible arises in us or in Kant or in the nature of the subject matter itself.

It appears that Kant picked the so-called categories of freedom up from all types of practical judgements (moral and non-moral) employed in moral discourses and writings, and arranged them arbitrarily under the four heads of quantity, quality, relation and modality.

Since we must by no means pass over the table, we have to see how far we can successfully interpret the categories that occur in practical judgements in terms of the moral law, which is the only guiding principle in matters concerning practical philosophy.

Categories of Quantity

The quantity of judgements based upon the personal or private inclinations and desires of the individual are subjective. The subjective form of judgements are based upon the subjective feeling of pleasure or pain peculiar to each individual. The good corresponding to such a kind of judgement (maxim) is subjective good, i.e., good for this or that individual. It is not a moral good according to Kant. The subjective maxims are derived from experience and are not moral maxims or precepts in the strict sense of the term.

The quantity of judgements based upon maxims or precepts which are valid for human beings "insofar as they agree in certain inclinations" are objective. The good corresponding to such

a kind of judgement is objective good or happiness which is desired by all human beings. Happiness without virtue is not a moral good according to Kant. The objective maxims are derived from experience. Strictly speaking, they are not moral precepts.

The quantity of judgements which ought to be universally and necessarily valid for all human beings are *a priori* principles of freedom. Kant calls them both subjective and objective (laws). They are not derived from experience. The good corresponding to the *a priori* principle of freedom or the moral law is the moral good.

Categories of Quality

Practical or moral judgements as regards quality are rules of commission of actions, rules of omission of actions and rules of exceptions from a class of actions.

Examples of the good which arise through commission of actions which are in conformity with moral rules or precepts are—Develop your natural talents, help your neighbours etc. Man is an intelligent being. Nature has endowed him with spiritual, mental and bodily powers. It is his paramount duty to cultivate his natural powers as means to all possible rational ends. He owes it to himself, as a moral being, not to let his natural predispositions and capacities to ramain unused. Further, Kant holds that it is our ethical duty to love, help and respect other men.

Examples of the good which arise through omission or prohibition of actions which are not in conformity with the moral principles are—Do not commit suicide, do not lie etc. According to Kant, it is a duty of man to himself as an animal being to preserve himself. The opposite of self-preservation is suicide. Further, it is man's duty to himself as a moral being not to indulge in the vices of lying, avarice, and false humility (servility).

Practical rules of exceptions from a class of morally considered good actions follow from the proposition that ethics does not give laws for actions but only for the maxims of actions. Kant explains that if the moral law can command only the maxim of actions and not the actions themselves, then this means that the law leaves in its obedience or observance a latitude for free

choice as regards maxims of actions and not as regards actions themselves which are contrary to duty. Therefore, the practical rules of exceptions (or limitations) do not give permission to make exceptions to the moral maxim of actions, but only give permission to limit one maxim of actions by another maxim of actions. For example, it is within the moral framework if we contingently or arbitrarily choose to limit our duty to help the strangers by our duty to help our kith and kin.

Categories of Relation

Moral judgements as regards relation are relation of the good to the personality (or moral person), relation of the good to the condition[5] of the person, and the relation of the good of one person to the condition of another (other persons). We have now the following categories of good corresponding to each relation.

The good which issues from a person (or moral personality) who is subject to no laws other than those which he gives to himself (the moral laws) is a moral good or good in itself.

The good which issues from the condition of a person is a subjective end or good which serves as a means for his own existence or preservation amid changing conditions of his life.

The good which issues from the relation of one person to the condition of another person is an objective end or good which consists in preserving and promoting the existence of other persons by virtue of the rational nature common to all human beings. The formula of the end itself sums up the three relations: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always as an end, never merely as a means.

Categories of Modality

The moral law permits and forbids certain actions. The permitted is morally possible action while the forbidden is morally impossible action. The permitted or the morally possible action is good. The forbidden or the morally impossible action is evil.

5. Kant does not specify the meaning of the term 'condition' in the context. It may mean the changing physical, mental and moral conditions of a person in relation to the unchanging moral laws.

In his ethical writings, Kant uses the categories of 'possibility' and 'impossibility' with reference to the moral law. That which is in conformity with the moral law is morally possible and that which is not in conformity with the moral law is morally impossible.

Duty is that which is enjoined by the moral law (the categorical imperative). That which is not enjoined by the moral law is contrary to duty. Further, the moral law is the form of duty and duty is the form of morally good actions. An action is morally good, if it is done from a sense of duty. Kant is here concerned not with specific moral actions, but with the formal principles under which actions are morally possible or good.

Perfect duties are negative duties, i.e., duties of omission directed against the vices which are against duties one has to himself and to others. They are directly commanded and admit of no exceptions in the interest of inclinations and desires. They are universally and necessarily valid under the moral law. Examples of perfect duties are ban on committing suicide and making false promise to others.

Imperfect duties are positive duties, i.e., duties of commission which admit of permissible latitude in the choice of actions. The permissible latitude follows from the proposition that ethics prescribes laws not for actions but for maxims of actions. Consequently, "we are bound only to adopt the *maxim* of developing our talents and of helping others, and we are to some extent entitled to decide arbitrarily *which* talents we will develop and *which* persons we will help. There is here certain 'latitude' or 'playroom' for mere inclination" (*Groundwork*, Analysis of the Argument, p. 31).

I. The Type of Pure Practical Judgement

36. We have seen in the previous chapter that morally good or evil actions have no existence except in relation to pure practical reason which is rational will.

The question is, how are we to judge or determine whether certain actions proceed from a practical rule of pure reason (universal and necessary moral law) or from some material and contingent principle based upon the feelings of pleasure and pain? It

is the function of practical judgement to answer this question by the theory of type or typic of practical judgement. By type, Kant means, model, symbol or analogue.

What is judgement? It is the faculty of applying a concept or rule to a particular case. The practical judgement is the faculty of applying a universal rule or law to concrete objects or instances of moral import. In other words, a practical judgement must subsume a given object under a universal law, or it must apply to concrete cases of actions, actual or possible, the universal form of law prescribed by practical reason. The law here is the categorical imperative.

In the sphere of theoretical knowledge, there is no problem in applying the fundamental judgements or principles of the understanding to concrete cases, because there we are dealing with objects of sensible perception. Thus the principle or law of causality, when applied to objects of sensible perception, gives rise to the schema of causality, i.e. the invariable, irreversible and objective succession of one event upon another. That is to say, the principle of causality can be applied to phenomena through schema which is always relative to time. A schema is a determination of time. The unschematised or pure category of cause is the conception of ground and consequence, or the logical dependence of one thing upon another, but the pure or logical conception of causality is devoid of all objective significance, i.e., it cannot be directly applied to objects of sense. It can only be applied to objects of perception when it is schematised. It is the time component which gives objective meaning to the pure category of causality and also to other pure categories of the understanding. In other words, the schema must imply the relation of the sensible to time in some way. Hence the special form which the schema assumes is that of ordered, regular and uniform succession of objects of perception in the external world of sensory experience.

However, a special problem arises in the sphere of practical reason, where no schema is available to mediate between the universal rule or law and concrete cases of morality. This is because pure practical reason does not operate with sensible objects, but with ideas which cannot be exhibited *in concreto*. The concept of the absolutely moral good is the object of pure practical reason.

It is supersensuous and nothing corresponding to it can be found in sensuous intuition. It is an idea of practical reason which, as we have seen, ought to be realised in the empirical world. Further, the moral law is the law of reason. It is derived from reason and not from understanding whose concepts and principles can be presented *in concreto* or sensuous experience. Since reason as practical operates not with schema of sensibility (condition of time) but with formal aspect of principles or laws, and as in the sphere of practical reason the moral law is formal, the practical judgement does not employ a schema, but a type. In the sphere of morality we cannot admit that a free subject operates under the inviolable law of natural causation. However, we can admit the form of an inviolable law of nature as an analogue, as a manner in which the free subject determines itself with regard to moral actions. This does not mean that we shall use natural law to judge our actions as good or not, but only that we shall employ natural law to serve as the type or analogue of a law of freedom to determine whether our actions are morally good or evil. In other words, the moral law must have the universality and inviolability characteristic of the law of nature.[6] As Kant says that laws as such are all equivalent regardless of the faculty of their origin.

A moral being, insofar as he is a member of the intelligible world is not under the reign of the inviolable laws of nature, but he is free to use the universality of natural law as a pattern to guide him in judging whether his maxim of action is moral or not. We may take natural law as a type of the intelligible nature, so long as we are careful to observe that reason must govern itself simply by the form of the law without subjecting itself to the influence of natural inclinations. It is common with all laws, whether those of nature or of a free subject, that they must be universal. The rule which looks to inviolable law of nature as a type of practical reason is this: If the action you propose to do were

6. All that Kant means is that reason as practical must govern itself by the form of natural law and not by its contents (natural desires). The characteristic of universality is common to all laws, whether those of nature or those of freedom. In other words, they are equivalent in respect of being universal in form, however being different as regards their contents.

to take place according to a law of nature of which you are a part yourself, ask yourself whether you would regard the proposed action as a possible result by means of your own will. This formula says that we should act as though the maxim of our action were by our will to become a universal law of nature.

In point of fact, every man of sound moral susceptibility can intuitively and immediately decide by the application of this formula to concrete instances of actions in the world of sense whether they are morally good or bad. If the maxim of action cannot be cast into the mould of the form of natural law in general, it is morally impossible, although it may still be possible in nature as a non-moral maxim of action. It is sound common sense which judges the rightness or wrongness of actions in accordance with the aforesaid rule.

By the application of this formula, Kant contends, we can at once determine the moral character of any proposed course of action. Take as an illustration the question whether a man is justified in shortening his life as soon as he is thoroughly weary of it. In order to test the moral validity of the proposed course of action (suicide), the individual is asked to consider the result if not merely he but every one acts in the same way. The result must evidently be a contradiction, for it is impossible to conceive a system of nature in which the same natural feeling of self-preservation which is present in all human beings should by a natural law of nature lead to self-destruction.

It may be objected to this reasoning of Kant that the validity or invalidity of an action or maxim of action cannot be established by asking whether it can be or cannot be universalised. There is nothing self-contradictory in universal suicide or self-annihilation of mankind. What underlies Kant's argument is the tacit assumption that life is good in itself. It, therefore, follows that the annihilation of life is contrary to the law of rational will.

In the two concluding paras of this chapter, Kant warns us against the error of confusing the sensuous world with the intelligible world (the moral world or the realm of ends). This will introduce empirical elements in morality. Empiricism, as we have seen, will destroy the purity of morals. Kant also warns us against confusing a type with a schema. We are allowed to use the sensuous world as a type of the intelligible world without carrying

the intuitive temporal element[7] of the former into the latter. That is to say, we should guard against the mysticism of practical reason, which converts a type or symbol into a schema of a non-sensuous intuition and thus confuses the ideal thought of a realm of ends with a presumptuous intuition or knowledge of an actual realm of ends.

7. It is true that time is an *a priori* element. But it has only empirical employment. It is a form of perception or perceived objects and has no application to supersensible objects which can never become objects of perception or experience. Kant has made this position of time sufficiently clear in the first *Critique*.

CHAPTER III

THE INCENTIVES OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

37. We have seen that the conception of morality is inseparable from the conception of freedom. This does not prove that man actually is free, but only that insofar as man is a rational being, he must be free.

We have also seen that every man endowed with reason must act under the consciousness of freedom. In other words, a man must act from the consciousness of a universal moral law. But it may be asked, why should I act from the consciousness of the moral law when I am not compelled to do so by any interest in the moral law? What, in other words, is the difference as regards feeling between action that is determined by natural desires and action that is determined by regard for the moral law? The difficulty which Kant feels in this case is that all actions which proceed from an incentive or interest seems to him to be actions in which the will is determined by something other than itself. This he expresses by saying that the subject has an interest in the object he is said to will. The moral law, as Kant contends, precludes the operation upon the will of anything but the moral law itself, but then we seem to be left in the position that we must will the moral law without a motive, i.e. without personal interest in the moral law.

Kant sometimes appears to hold that reason itself in the practical field can motivate action, or that reason itself can serve as a dynamic or conative factor in willing a moral act. In other words, a simple recognition of duty can stimulate a man to obey the moral law. But he also refers to a special kind of sense or feeling which he calls 'reverence' for the law and suggests that it is this 'reverence' which impels us to do our duty. Does he then come back to Hume's view that reason alone cannot move us to action? But one thing is certain. There must be some sense in which, though we do not act from interest, we yet take interest in the moral law. As we shall see, Kant seeks to solve the problem here raised by drawing a distinction in kind between all sensuous desires as motives or incentives and the simple motive of reverence for the moral law. The feeling of reverence for the moral law, Kant says, is a purely rational feeling or emotion which is not a species of general affection of our sensibility. This feeling is unique. It is not so much that which acts upon the will as rather the feeling that arises in the free subject when he acts from reverence for the moral law.

Keeping the aforesaid position in view, we may proceed with Kant' arguments on the subject.

The will must be directly determined by the moral law, if the action is to have moral worth. The induction of any kind of feeling whatsoever into the will will destroy the moral purity of the act, because in that case the will is not determined solely by the moral law, and the act, even when it is in accordance with the moral law, is merely a legal act and not a moral one. If the action thus occurs not for the sake of the law, it has legality, but not morality.

Divine Will and Human Will

It follows, in the first instance, that no incentive or motive can be attributed to the divine will because such a will by its very nature wills the moral law and, in the second place, the only moral incentive of the human will and that of every created rational will can never be anything other than the moral law. In other words, the divine will has no incentive or motive. It is so constituted that it acts according to the moral law by internal necessity.

Now from the conditions of our knowledge it is not possible for us to understand how the human will can be directly determined by a law that is not the law of nature or phenomena. To our theoretical modes of thinking, a will that has a motive is one that is acted upon by something other than itself, but in the present case the will must act purely from itself. In other words, it seems as if it could not legitimately act from any motive. It is impossible for us to explain how we may act purely from the moral law, and yet act freely. But it is not necessary to show how a free agent determines himself by the moral law. The existence of the idea of moral law (consciousness of the

moral law) compels us to postulate freedom. It is, therefore, enough that we see the influence of the moral law on the will, insofar as that law supplies the motive of action. What Kant here refers to is the feeling of reverence for the moral law.

Feeling of Reverence

Kant claims that the feeling of reverence is not an ordinary pathological feeling, but a peculiar and singular kind of feeling which arises in a sensitive being when his sensuous nature is subjected to practical reason or the moral law. It is not a feeling received from outside influences, but from the consciousness of immediate determination of the will by the moral law. It follows that this kind of reverence does not arise in a being of non-sensuous nature, because he is not subjected to the influence of sensuous desire. The moral motive must always be the moral law, and nothing but the moral law. The acts of a free agent are determined purely by the moral law without the mediation of sensuous impulses. The will which is free must restrain all natural inclinations that run counter to the moral law, and when they are completely hostile to the moral law, it must not only restrain or control them, but reject them outright.

Pure Practical Reason and Feeling

It is common knowledge that when the will is determined by natural inclinations or sensuous desires, the motive takes the form of a feeling, which is fitted to bring pleasure. The moral law, since it checks the influence of feeling upon the will, must itself exercise a certain influence upon the desiring subject. When the natural inclinations are thwarted, there arises a feeling which can be called a feeling of pain. We must observe that it is the kind of pain that only a rational being who possesses a sensitive nature can experience. Moreover, this is the only instance in which we can show *a priori* the relation of pure practical reason to the feeling of pain or pleasure.

Self-love and Self-conceit

There are two sources of natural inclinations, namely, self-love and self-conceit, both of which may be regarded as specific forms of self-regard. Self-love is natural to all rational beings who

possess a sensuous nature, for it is quite natural and reasonable in such beings to desire their own happiness. Practical reason does not affirm that self-love is necessarily in conflict with the moral law. In other words, the moral law does not say that it is impossible to desire one's own happiness and at the same time to be moral. Practical reason merely checks self-love or selfishness. It merely brings self-love into harmony with the moral law, and it is then called rational self-love. The moral law is not averse to happiness. What it demands is that happiness must not be willed, though it may be the result or consequence of willing the moral law. Doing what we ought and pursuing happiness are two entirely different things. The claims of the moral law should preceed those of happiness. Practical reason, on the other hand, completely strikes self-conceit or moral arrogance down since it claims merit for obeying the moral law. No being can claim merit or worth for obeying a law which he ought to obey as an imperfect rational being.

Moral Feeling

The moral law, though its influence may seem to be negative, is in reality positive. It is in fact the form of an intellectual causality, i.e. the form of a free being who is a member of the intelligible world and is capable of acting freely. Now, so far as the moral law brings self-love into harmony with itself, it produces in the rational subject a feeling of reverence or respect and in so far as it strikes down or humiliates self-conceit, it produces the highest respect. This feeling is not of empirical origin. Respect for the moral law is a feeling produced by an intellectual cause. It can be known *a priori*, because it is the result of the action of the moral law upon the desiring subject.

It is true that the feeling of reverence will not arise in a being who is not capable of being influenced by sensuous desire as motive to action. All sensuous motives are external to the will. They act externally upon the will. But the feeling of reverence, on the other hand, is not an external motive. It is the moral law itself, in so far as it is made the motive of the will.

As reverence or respect for the moral law is the effect of the action of practical reason on the sensibility of a rational being, it presupposes the sensuous and the finite character of such a

being on whom respect for the moral law is imposed. It, therefore, follows that this feeling of respect cannot be attributed to the supreme Being and even to a being who is free from all sensibility. In other words, this feeling arises in a being in whom there is conflict between reason and desire.

Personal Esteem and Moral Law

The conflict between reason and desire results in limiting or restraining all inclinations to the condition of obedience to the moral law, and upon this obedience all personal esteem is based. The restraining of inclinations by reason has an effect on the sensibility, and gives rise to a feeling of pain, which can be derived *a priori* from the moral law. So far the effect of reason on sensibility is negative. Reason prevents the subject from being determined by inclination, and makes him feel that apart from the moral law he has no personal worth. Thus the effect of the moral law on our feeling is to humiliate us. It is true that we cannot discover in the feeling the power of the moral law as a motive, but only its resistance to sensuous motives. But as this law is in the idea of pure practical reason a direct and objective ground of determination of the will, and as this feeling of humility is merely relative to the purity of the moral law, that which on the sensuous side humiliates us, strengthens and intensifies our reverence for the moral law on the intellectual side. Hence this feeling is known *a priori* as positive, when we consider its intellectual origin.

The knowledge of the moral law is the consciousness of an activity of practical reason or will on objective grounds. The activity of practical reason or will is only prevented from manifesting its influence on our actions by subjective or pathological grounds. Hence, reverence for the moral law, so far as it weakens the opposing influence of natural desires by humiliating our self-conceit, must be regarded, though indirect, the effect of that law upon our sensibility, and therefore as a subjective ground of determination (motive, incentive or interest) for obedience to the moral law.[1]

1. Reverence for the moral law is a unique subjective feeling having its origin in the moral disposition which is present in all men and embodi- *(Contd.)*

Duty, Moral Law and Personality

The notions of the categorical imperative, the autonomy of the will, duty and obligation are bound together in Kantian ethics. Duty and obligation express our relation to the moral law. No doubt we are legislative members of a realm of morality, but we are at the same time subjects, not sovereigns, in that realm. We should not disregard the authority of the moral law, which is a holy law. This view is in complete harmony with the teachings of the Gospel which commands us to "Love God above all and thy neighbour as thyself". But it must be understood that the Gospel commands practical or moral love, not pathological love which is based on inclination. Love to God as inclination (pathological love) is impossible, for He is not an object of senses. Further, love to man cannot be an imperative. That is to say, we cannot be commanded to love another man against our own will. To love God means to obey his commandments. To love one's neighbour means to practice all duties towards him. But the moral law that makes this the rule of our actions does not require us to have a permanent disposition or temper to act according to its dictates, but only requires us to strive after it. Nor can the moral law create in us a settled disposition to act in conformity with it.

A command to undertake something gladly would be a contradiction, for if we already know what we are obliged to do, and are also conscious of the pleasure in doing it, then no command is necessary. If, on the other hand, we do our duty without pleasure from mere reverence for the law, then a command that makes this reverence a motive of our action would produce displeasure or pain because our will by its very disposition (being sensuously affected) is not in agreement with the moral law. The moral law is to be regarded as setting true moral disposition before us as an ideal of perfection, which is not attainable by a finite

(Contd.)

ed in their being. The disposition is passive and becomes active under the influence of the objective moral law. The moral law which has its origin in reason is an active faculty of the mind. In other words, reverence for the moral law is the effect of the moral law on our sensibility (subjectivity or subjective moral disposition). See sections 48 and 51 for details.

creature. Yet the ideal disposition serves as the pattern which we should strive to approach, and in an interrupted but infinite progress attain it.

Virtue

The highest moral state in which a finite rational being can maintain himself is virtue and not holiness. Virtue is moral disposition in constant conflict with inclination. It is goodness which maintains itself through ceaseless conflict with natural desires. Holiness, on the other hand, means the attainment of perfect purity of mind and will. There is no possibility of there being in holy man a desire which could tempt him to deviate from the moral law. To such a level of moral disposition no creature can ever attain. In man, virtue is a mere idea to which no adequate empirical representation can correspond. Strictly speaking, in Kant, virtue is more an ideal than a matter of actual realisation.

Duty and Personality

Duty is the necessitation or constraint to an action by the moral law in the consciousness and conduct of a person who does not by nature act as the law requires. The supreme law of duty is the categorical imperative. It follows that the notions of duty and the categorical imperative are not applicable to non-sensuous rational being who by nature acts as the law requires. The *ought* of the moral imperative is an *is* for such a being. The will of non-sensuous rational being is holy. A holy will, like the unholy will of a sensuous rational being (man), is not under the discipline of reason.

Despite man's will being unholy, i.e. being under the influence of unruly natural impulses, he is a person having dignity and an element of holiness. He has a personality. Personality is consciousness of freedom from the mechanism of nature. A person is subject to laws given by itself (*autonomy*). An empirical self, having only negative freedom, is subject to his own personality (transcendental self) which belongs to the intelligible world. The categorical imperatives for the empirical self are the laws of the intelligible self, i.e. the should (*ought*) of the former is the would of the latter. While man empirically regarded is unholy, personality and humanity in him are holy. It may be noted that the

personality and humanity are ideas of practical reason, to which no sensuous representations can be found.

Moral Fanaticism

The stage of moral life on which man and, so far as we can see, every rational creature stands is that of reverence or respect for the moral law. The disposition of mind that ought to bind him to obey the moral law is the sense of duty, and not a spontaneous inclination to duty. As we have seen, the highest moral state in which a man can maintain himself is virtue, i.e. a goodness which continually maintains itself in conflict with natural impulses, and not holiness, which would involve a perfect purity of the disposition of the will. It is nothing but moral fanaticism, exaggerated self-conceit and vanity when we exhort men to do certain actions because they are noble, sublime and magnanimous. By such exhortations we ignore the plain motive of duty from which actions should be done. The harm of acting on any principle other than that of plain duty is that it produces in us a vain, high-flown and fantastic way of thinking which flatters ourselves as though we were in possession of spontaneous goodness which needed neither spur nor briddle nor any command. In other words, we forget our duty in the vain ideas of our own merit and effort. We may indeed praise actions of others which are done with great sacrifice as noble and sublime, but we must make ourselves sure that such actions have been done from a sense of duty and not from natural impulses of self-love or sympathy.

If fanaticism, in the most general sense of the word, oversteps the limits of human reason, then moral fanaticism transcends the bounds which pure practical reason sets to mankind (finite rational beings). The pure practical reason commands that subjective determining principles of moral actions should be placed nowhere than in the moral law itself.

I. Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason

38. This section is devoted to three topics:

a) Comparison of the Analytic of pure practical reason with the Analytic of pure theoretical reason.

b) Distinction between the doctrine of happiness and the doctrine of morality.

c) Resolution of the apparant contradiction between freedom (free causality) and mechanism of nature (natural causality).

The first two topics have been sufficiently dealt with in the previous sections. The third topic requires elucidation or examination. The original problem, it will be recalled, is that of reconciling what we seem to know about the causal order of nature with what we seem to learn from our moral consciousness which is intextricably bound with moral responsibility. Our moral consciousness tells us that we alone are responsible for our acts, while the study of nature tells us that every event is the inevitable and necessary consequence of its causal antecedents and hence our behaviour, if it takes place within nature, is determined by the conditions under which we happen to find ourselves. It, therefore, follows that no judgement according to the moral law can make any change in our behaviour and that the transcendental concept of freedom which lies at the foundation of all moral laws and accountability to them is delusory.

Kant says that the contradiction between natural causality and free causality with reference to the same object or event is only apparent. There is no real contradiction between the two concepts of causality if we bear in mind the discoveries of the first *Critique*. The law of natural causation has a meaning only in reference to objects which are events in time, and therefore this law stands under the condition of time. Now, our actions have a phenomenal character. They present themselves to us as events in time. Consequently, no act can be done without antecedent conditions.

It will also be admitted that our acts, in so far as they belong to the past, are no longer within our control. This means that we are not free in relation to the past. But insofar as we are conscious of ourselves as free beings, we see that all our past actions should have been freely determined by us. From this point of view we can say in all earnestness that every unlawful act which we have done we could have left undone. This consciousness that we could have acted otherwise does not conflict with the fact that from the phenomenal point of view our acts in the sensible world belong to the chain of natural causality. But from the point

of view of our freedom we can very well see that the whole series of acts in the phenomenal world has been affected by us for ourselves, that is, the whole series of acts has been determined by our free action. Hence from the point of view of our freedom or independence of all external influence, we regard ourselves as responsible for the whole chain of actions which are the phenomenal manifestations of our noumenal or real self.

Kant has now to reconcile the contradictory concepts of natural causation and free causation in the case of a being who belongs to the world of sense. The question is, how is it possible that a being can be free, if it is at the same time conceded that all reality proceeds from God as the universal primordial Being? If God is the creator of all things he must also be the creator or cause of man in his noumenal as well as his phenomenal character. The actions of man must, therefore, ultimately be attributed, not to himself, but to God, a being external to him.

The inevitable result of this position will be the triumph of fatalism, which will destroy moral responsibility or accountability of action altogether.

The aforesaid difficulty may easily and clearly be resolved, if we remember that God is the creator of noumenal or free acting being.[2] The actions of free being appear to himself as events in

2. Here we are drawn to a number of questions. How do we know that God or nature is the creator of the noumenal being? How can the notion of creator of a noumenal being make sense in Kant's moral system? Is Kant's position deistic or theistic in matters concerning morality? What is the relation between noumenal and phenomenal elements within the unity of man? How does Kant reconcile freedom and mechanism in man and in nature?

The above questions are interrelated and we shall try to answer them in the light of Kant's philosophical thought in general.

I) Let us begin with man and consider him under the following alternatives:

a) Man is self-created: Like the God of Spinoza, man will then be above morality. This supposition runs counter to Kant's basic moral position that man is morally bound to fulfill the moral law.

b) Nature created man as a completely sensuous being and placed him under its inviolable mechanical laws. Under the supposition, there is no reason or room for freedom of man at all.

c) Nature created man as a completely rational being. The conscious-

(*Contd.*)

time, though this mode of outer representation of inner workings of his noumenal self in no way affects his existence as a free cause of being. We cannot speak of the creation by God of the sensuous forms (space and time) in which objects and actions present themselves. The beings that are created are the beings as they are in themselves, and not as they appear to us or to themselves. Man in his true nature is free. It would be a contradiction to hold that God created man in his phenomenal and noumenal character at the same time, because that will destroy freedom which, as we know, is the only one necessary idea of

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(Contd.)

ness of conflict between reason and sensuous impulses contradicts this supposition. Moreover, when the conflict is ceaseless, man will lose his interest in the moral law.

d) Man's existence is totally phenomenal and God is the creator of all phenomenal things. The findings of the first *Critique* do not support the assumption. The phenomenal order of things is the result of encounter between sense and thought.

e) Man is the unity of intelligible being and sensuous being. God is the creator of intelligible being, while nature is the creator of sensuous being. It is on the basis of the dual character of man that Kant resolves the contradiction between freedom and mechanism in him. Moreover, the position in which God figures as the creator of the noumenal being meets the moral requirements of man. We shall see during the course of discussion in the following sections that by surrendering the idea of God we will be surrendering the demands of morality. In other words, the idea of God is indispensable to the realisation of the *highest good* which is the ultimate object of our moral endeavour.

II) On the question of deism or theism in the context of moral philosophy, Kant is definitely inclined towards theism. The deist certainly believes that there is a cause of the world, but he leaves it indefinite whether the cause is a morally acting being. The theist, on the other hand, conceives of God as a living God who possesses the moral attributes of holiness, justice and benevolence.

No doubt, Kant admits that intelligible and sensuous beings are related in man in some way, but he cannot define the exact nature of relationship between them because the intelligible is not an object of observation. Likewise, Kant does not deny the influence between noumena and phenomena in the sensible world, but he leaves the mode of relation between them undefined. It is a debatable question whether the relation between noumena and phenomena can be mutual because mutual or reciprocal relation holds good among phenomenal objects as per the findings of the first *Critique*.

pure reason, which can be known and proved by an apodictic law of practical reason. The other two ideas of God and immortality gain reality only through their connection with it.

The above argument rests on the admission that existence in time has a meaning only in relation to phenomena. We have already shown that man from the very fact that he has the consciousness of the moral law is free. The freedom of man cannot be destroyed by the admission that in his phenomenal and not noumenal existence he is dependent upon the Creator, because it is man as a noumenon and not as a phenomenon whom we must suppose to have been created. There would be a contradiction if we maintain that beings in the world of sense were real or noumenal beings, for in that case the creation of man would mean that he was created as subject to the law of causation. But there is no contradiction in holding that noumenal and not phenomenal existence of man proceeds from God.

Interestingly, though not understandably, Kant has all the time in his philosophical writings admitted an influence between nature and freedom or between phenomena and noumena. In his theoretical philosophy, noumena is conceived as the ground of phenomena. In his system of practical philosophy, the relation between nature and freedom is visible in the concept of virtue or morality. This concept contains as characteristics (1) the notion of positive freedom which appertains to the intelligible subject, (2) the concept of duty, and (3) the concept of constraining or resisting the force of desires, which belong to the world of sense, on the free subject, insofar as they run counter to duty. In other words, Kant does not deny the mutual influence between phenomenal objects and their external effects and noumenal or intelligible subject (the subject of moral law and duty) in the sensible world. In order to maintain his arguments on theoretical and practical subjects, Kant sometimes regards natural causality in a relation of subordination to free causality. The two kinds of causality, though isolated in thought, are conceived as co-existing or lying together in the organic unity of man. However, the manner in which they are related to each other remains unknown and inexplicable on account of the limits of our theoretical and practical knowledge.

BOOK II

DIALECTIC OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

CHAPTER I

A DIALECTIC OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON IN GENERAL

39. Pure reason is dialectical or subject to transcendental illusion, whether it is employed theoretically in the acquisition of knowledge or practically in relation to conduct. Dialectic, part of the first *Critique*, discloses a peculiar character of pure or speculative reason. The peculiar character of pure reason lies in the fact that it can in no sense be satisfied with anything short of the unconditioned or the totality of conditions as the necessary presupposition of any given conditioned. But as the unconditioned for any given conditioned cannot be found in the sphere of phenomena, reason leaves the world of experience and attempts to reach it in the sphere of things in themselves. Unfortunately, reason cannot succeed in this venture. It cannot penetrate to things in themselves, because the conditions of theoretical knowledge are such that without sensuous preceptions our conceptions or ideas have no objective application. We cannot, therefore, by the theoretical use of reason find the unconditioned in the world of sense. We can only pass from condition to condition in search of an unconditioned, which from the very nature of the case cannot be found as an object of experience.

However, reason is so convinced of the necessity of the unconditioned for every conditioned that it naturally and unavoidably falls into the illusion that the unconditioned can be found in the realm of phenomena. It continues to harbour the illusion, until it is betrayed into absolute contradictions. It is only then that it becomes aware that the unconditioned cannot be an object of experience and that the application of the rational ideas of totality or unconditioned cannot be applied to phenomena which are not things in themselves. Such an application is unwarranted and unjustified from the critical point of view. This is because the

idea of totality is not derived from experience. Hence it cannot be an object of experience. This idea is a concept of pure reason, whose object can be met with no where in experience.

The truth that the unconditioned cannot be found in the phenomenal world comes to light through a critical examination of the whole faculty of knowledge in its theoretical use or employment. The contradiction or antinomy into which reason falls serves as the means of revealing a higher immutable order of things. In fact, the contradiction turns out to be a blessing in disguise. Hitherto, reason has been treating phenomena as things in themselves or ultimate realities. It is now led to see that:

a) Phenomena are not things in themselves.

b) The unconditioned does not lie in things as we know or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in themselves, beyond the realm of our knowledge.

c) The natural dialectic or transcendental illusion disappears on the recognition of distinction between phenomena and things in themselves.

d) The ultimate reality is of a higher order than the objects of sensuous experience.

As reason is dialectical in its practical employment as well, the present *Critique* must seek for an explanation of the illusion which arises in this case also. Here, reason demands the practically unconditioned (the *highest good*) for the practically conditioned (conditioned good or goods) for its own satisfaction. Just as in the sphere of knowledge it sought for the unconditioned in reference to sensible objects, so in the sphere of practical reason (morality) it starts from the objects of natural inclination or desire (conditional or empirical goods) and demands the unconditioned for them in the world of experience. It is now for the Dialectic of the present *Critique* to expose the illusion into which reason falls when it demands the unconditioned for the practically conditioned in the world of sense.

In order to understand Kant's arguments on the subject, it is necessary to dissect the concept of the *highest good*, which is very important in his practical philosophy. In fact, Kant's moral philosophy stands or falls with the possibility or impossibility of the concept of the *highest good*. This concept has the following characteristics according to Kant.

a) It is not a simple, but a composite concept consisting of two heterogenous elements (virtue and happiness).

b) It is an *a priori* synthetic concept, since it requires a necessary connection between the two heterogenous elements.

c) It has both form and matter (the moral law as form and happiness as matter).

The *highest good*, as we shall see in the following section, involves the conception of the realisation of perfect morality or virtue and the realisation of complete happiness. This is an object which reason demands but it must be remembered that the concept of the *highest good* cannot be the motive by which the will is to be determined. The only pure determining ground or motive of the will is the moral law (which is one of the two elements of the *highest good*), because if the will be determined by an object called the *highest good*, which is a composite concept involving both form and matter, it will not be determining by the moral law. As we have seen in the Analytic, it is necessary to morality that the will be determined by the form of the universal moral law (*ought*) and not by an object called the good.

CHAPTER II

THE DIALECTIC OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON AND THE CONCEPT OF THE HIGHEST GOOD

40. This section analyses the concept of the *highest good*. The *highest good* (the *summum bonum*) contains two elements which must be distinguished from each other. They are the supreme good and the perfect good. The supreme good is the unconditioned condition i.e. the condition which is subordinate to no other condition. It presupposes nothing higher than itself. The perfect good is the totality of all the goods called happiness. Now the condition of virtue or worthiness to be happy is the supreme condition of all that we can regard as desirable and, therefore, it is the supreme condition of all our pursuit of happiness. It has been proved in the Analytic that virtue is the supreme good, but this truth does not imply that virtue is the entire or complete good. To make virtue the entire or complete good, happiness is also required. The finite beings not only seek to obtain happiness, but the impartial reason declares it to be the legitimate object of desire.[1] The *highest good* in a possible world must therefore consist in the union or harmony of virtue (the supreme good) and happiness (the perfect good) in the same person i.e. it must consist of happiness in exact proportion[2] to morality.

By the *highest good* is therefore meant the whole or complete good. The *highest good* is not subject to any other good. It is

1. Man is a unity of animality and rationality. Animality and rationality are inextricably united in the unity of man. Kant's point is that insofar as man is an animal being it is legitimate on his part to pursue or seek happiness, and insofar as he is a rational being it is equally legitimate on his part to subordinate happiness to the moral law. In other words, Kant will not sacrifice happiness at the altar of the moral law. Man's legitimate desire for happiness, insofar as he is an animal being, must be acknowledged by reason.
2. Kant does not use the term 'proportion' in the mathematical sense of ratio between two quantities; he uses it loosely to denote harmony or concordance.

not a means to any other end, object or purpose of human conduct. What has to be particularly observed, however, is that virtue or the supreme good is the necessary condition of the perfect good or happiness, since no one has a right to expect happiness unless he is virtuous. Happiness is thus not of itself absolute good in every respect but is only a good under the condition that it is in conformity with the moral law.

Thus we see that happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being the complete good. Reason does not approve of happiness (however much inclination may desire it), except as united with morality. On the other hand, morality alone is likewise far from being the highest or complete good, without the prospect of happiness. In other words, in the practical idea of the unconditioned good, both happiness and virtue should be combined.

The problem, "How is the *highest good* practically possible"? could not be resolved by the ancients. The Stoics asserted virtue to be the entire *highest good*, and happiness was only the consciousness of being virtuous. They reduced happiness to a mental state of consciousness or placed it in a cheerful heart. It had nothing to do with any state of physical satisfaction whatsoever. On the other hand, the Epicureans stated that happiness was the entire good and that virtue provided only the rational means for the attainment of happiness. The Stoics identified virtue with the *highest good*, while the Epicureans identified happiness with the *highest good*. Thus both schools conceived virtue and happiness according to the principle of identity by making one either a cause or a part of the other.

But it is clear from the Analytic that the maxims of virtue and the maxims of happiness are completely heterogeneous principles. Happiness and morality are two essentially different elements of the *highest good* and, therefore, their combination cannot be known analytically. The *highest good* is a synthesis of two heterogenous concepts. It is thus *a priori* synthetic connection of morality and happiness into a whole called the *highest good*. In Kant's practical philosophy *a priori*, practically necessary and morally necessary mean one and the same thing.

I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason

41. The *highest good* demands the necessary union of virtue and happiness. This concept is practical for us, i.e. one to be made real by the determination or action of our will. Now the conception of virtue does not necessarily imply the conception of happiness, nor does the conception of happiness necessarily imply the conception of virtue. Still, they are thought of as necessarily combined in the concept of the *highest good*. The question is, how can two such heterogeneous concepts be combined in the concept of the *highest good*? We cannot pass from the one to the other by a purely analytic process, since we very well know from experience that virtue may not bring happiness or happiness may not be the cause of virtue.

As we have seen in the Analytic, the desire for happiness, if made a principle of action, is the contradictory of virtue. The only way in which we can think of uniting virtue and happiness in the concept of the *highest good* is by a synthetic principle which can connect the one with the other through the *a priori* conception of cause and effect. Now the whole question of connecting the two concepts of happiness and virtue is possible through the will or action. Hence we must say either that the desire for happiness must be the necessary and sufficient cause of virtue, or that virtue must be the cause of happiness. The former is absolutely impossible as has been proved in the Analytic. Any one who makes happiness the motive of virtue thereby destroys the morality of his action. This is because happiness depends upon circumstances and prudence, not upon mere intention and purity of heart. The latter is also impossible in another way. A man may will the moral law, but it does not follow that the result of his action will secure happiness in the present life. Our actions may conform to the moral law and yet we may not be happy. Mere conformity to the moral law may exist without happiness, since happiness is dependent upon (1) a complete knowledge of the connection of things in the natural world and (2) adequate physical capacity in us to use such a knowledge for the attainment of desirable ends.

A finite sensible being does not possess complete knowledge of the laws of nature as well as the physical power to make use of them in the attainment of the *highest good*.

It, therefore, follows that the combination of virtue and happiness in the concept of the *highest good* through the power of our will in this world will always remain a practical impossibility, a practical problem incapable of solution by reason. But the practical impossibility concerning the *highest good* does not baffle reason at all, because reason is convinced of its power to solve all problems to its entire satisfaction. The *highest good* is *a priori* necessary object of pure practical reason and "is inseparably related to the moral law". The moral law is real and objective. The impossibility of the *highest good* would mean the impossibility of the moral law. If it is not possible to realise the *highest good* according to practical or moral rules, then the moral law which commands us to further the realisation of the *highest good* must be fantastic, inherently false and figment of our imagination. We shall now see how reason converts practical impossibility into practical possibility relating to the *highest good.*

II. Critical Resolution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason

42. The third antinomy in the Dialectic of the first *Critique* presents a conflict between natural causality and free causality. Both put forward equally valid claims for their acceptance. The only question is whether we can unreservedly say that every event follows upon another event in accordance with an inviolable rule, and at the same time to maintain that they proceed from a free or spontaneous cause.

The contradiction can be resolved by giving up the ordinary assumption that phenomena are things in themselves. If we do not get rid of this assumption, then the problems of freedom or free causality is absolutely insoluble, because no absolutely free cause can possibly be conceived as underlying the realm of phenomena. The intelligible cause, being entirely free from the conditions of phenomena, is compatible with the idea of a free or spontaneous causality. In other words, the only way to resolve the contradiction between the two opposite conceptions of causality is to maintain that the principle of natural causality is a law only of phenomena and, therefore, the recognition of a different

kind of causality, that is, free causality, or intelligible cause, belonging to the realm of noumena, is not incompatible with the natural causality.

By a similar method of solution, Kant resolves the antinomy of happiness and virtue in the practical reason. The proposition that virtue is the result of striving for happiness is absolutely false. Happiness is incompatible with virtue, when it is made the determining ground or condition of moral action. But the second proposition that happiness is the result of virtue is not absolutely false. It is a persisting demand of reason that the agent who is moral is worthy to be happy and, therefore, ought to be happy in this world. The second proposition is conditionally false. Kant says that it is false only if I assume the existence in the phenomenal world to be the only mode of existence of a rational being. The contradiction depends upon the assumption that the world of sensible experience is ultimate. But the critical examination of the faculty of pure reason has shown that the world of our experience is not ultimate. Not only is my existence as noumenon in the world of intelligence possible, but the moral law is of such a character that though it is a purely intellectual principle, it is yet capable of determining my action as manifestation in the world sense.[3]

There is, therefore, nothing impossible in the idea that virtue and happiness must be united with reference to an intelligible world of which man is member as a rational being. What we must deny is that they are directly united. But this does not prevent us from supposing that they may be united indirectly, not by us for we have no power of controlling and regulating the constitution of nature for the purpose, but by an intelligible agent who is the Author of nature. It follows that a connection between virtue and happiness through an intelligence other than ours is the only way in which we can conceive the union of two heterogeneous

3. What would it mean to be happy in a non-empirical world? It would mean *bliss* in the non-empirical world. However, we cannot have positive experience of bliss because it requires transformation of our sensuous nature into supersensuous nature, which is impossible under the conditions of our existence.

   Bliss is a peculiar kind of pleasure experienced by a being who is not affected by desire or inclination.

concepts to be effective. In other words, an intelligible cause, or a being who is not subject to the laws of phenomena, can unite happiness and virtue in the same person.

Thus the apparent contradiction or antinomy in the present case arises from the fact that practical reason demands the union of virtue and happiness, while on the other hand, morality is possible only if the pure moral law and not happiness is made the determining ground or motive of action. However, we have seen how a way of escape from this apparent self-contradiction is provided by the distinction between phenomena and noumena for the ultimate end and object of moral will is seen to coincide with the demand of reason for the combination of virtue and happiness through the medium of an intelligible power.[4] Kant thus resolves the antinomy on the basis of practical or moral assumption that there is an intelligible world, apart or beyond the natural world, in which there is a moral Ruler (God) who will give happiness to all those persons who possess worthiness to be happy under the natural conditions of their existence.

III. The Primacy of Reason as Practical in Its Union with Reason as Speculative

43. In the history of philosophy the doctrine of 'Primacy' examines the various relations of co-ordination and subordination between the intellectual and volitional activities in order to decide the superiority of either one of the faculties over the other. But in Kant, this doctrine acquires a special meaning in that it dogmatically or authoritatively subordinates the intellect (theoretical or speculative reason) to the will (practical reason).

4. The question, how can reason be aware of happiness (one of the two components of the *highest good*)? cannot be answered. The concept of the *highest good* is a concept of pure practical reason. Since no intuition or object corresponding to this concept is given in experience, we cannot know how reason can become aware of happiness. In other words, an answer to this question requires a theoretical determination of a concept of pure practical reason, which is impossible under the human conditions of knowledge. Reason's demand for the unity of happiness with virtue is there, but the principle or cause underlying this demand is not known to us in terms of Kant's theoretical position. Kant bases the demand on purely practical considerations.

The following are Kant's philosophical positions on the subject:

a) Reason is a unity. Practical reason and speculative reason are not two independent reasons. They are two employments or interests of one and the same reason. The two interests of reason are distinct or distinguishable within the unity of reason or in one cognition, but they are not opposed to each other. The unity of theoretical and practical reasons is asserted throughout the present *Critique*.

b) Theoretical knowledge is limited to the realm of sensible objects. The ideas of pure or speculative reason (freedom, immortality and God) concerning which no theoretical knowledge is possible emerge as postulates of practical reason. Theoretical reason gives us a negative idea of freedom and thus paves the way for the positive determination of freedom on the basis of practical reason or moral consciousness. Similarly the immortality of soul and the existence of God may also be asserted on the basis of practical reason. Thus Kant establishes the primacy of the will or practical reason over the pure or theoretical reason because the former converts the mere ideas of the latter into noumenal existences, which are beyond the reach of pure reason.

c) The unity of practical and speculative reasons cannot be maintained on the principle of equality because that will destroy the unity of reason as such. Both reasons will be free in their respective spheres if we accept the principle of equality as the basis of unity between the two employments of reason. There will be no link between them. But this is not so. Practical reason borrows from speculative reasons the empty idea of freedom, enriches it with fruitful contents and makes it the supreme condition of the fundamental law of morality, i.e. the categorical imperative.

d) Again, Kant argues that the unity of practical and theoretical reasons cannot be maintained on the principle of co-ordination. In that case, each will try to regulate the affairs of the other. That will amount to intrusion or interference in the realm of each other. The introduction of natural causality in the sphere of practical reason will destroy morality, while the induction of free causality or freedom in the field of theoretical reason will disrupt the reign of law in nature.

e) There is no conflict between practical reason and specula-

tive reason because the former does not claim knowledge of freedom, immortality and God. Practical reason does not "assume and think as given anything further that what speculative reason affords" in the domain of knowledge. What will happen if the practical reason were to assert knowledge of the supersensible objects? We will be compelled to apply the forms of sensibility (space and time) and the forms of thought (categories) to the supersensible objects, and that would drag down the supersensible into the realm of the sensible. The supersensible will thus be sensualised and the reality of freedom which forms the basis of morality will be destroyed. The sensualising of the supersensible will open the way to every kind of nonsense and delusion of the imagination of which the Muslim vision of paradise and the theosophist vision of fusion with the Deity are the two manifest examples. Here, pure moral consciousness or practical reason has been sensualised, and so long as practical reason is sensuously conditioned, it has no right to claim the primacy over theoretical reason.

f) There is another reason why speculative reason should yield primacy to practical reason. Human life has an intrinsic or unconditioned value or end. The only unconditioned and final end of life to which all practical use of our theoretical and speculative knowledge must ultimately refer is practical. Thus, everything gravitates towards the practical or morality which is the final end set forth by nature for us, to which all our ends are subject or subordinated.

IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason[5]

44. The *highest good* or the union of virtue and happiness is

5. In this section and elsewhere, Kant uses speculative and theological notions of eternity, infinity, immortality etc. to establish certain practical or moral positions without first defining or describing them in positive terms. As a matter of fact, it is beyond reason's power to do so, because that will require theoretical determination of non-sensuous concepts, which is impossible under the conditions of human knowledge. Take an example: the idea of time is characterised by succession and a series of irreversible moments, finite or infinite in number, while the character of that which transcends succession is the notion of eternity as the constant 'now'. Since no intuition underlies the constant 'now', we cannot form any determinate idea of this notion, and similarly of others notions.

the demand of practical reason. But the realisation of this end by reason is demanded on the sole condition that the moral law or the supreme good should be willed. In other words, the moral law or virtue (as ground) should be the condition of happiness (as consequent).

Now the willing of the supreme good at every moment of our life in the world of sense, as rational but sensible beings, is impossible. It is possible only in case of a being who is completely rational. A completely rational being is a holy being whose will is in perfect harmony with the moral law. The complete harmony of the will to the moral law is holiness. But in an imperfectly rational being such as man whose desires and inclinations are in constant conflict with reason, the conformity of the will to the moral law is possible only by endless progress. Since the *highest good* is a requirement of pure practical reason, it is necessary to assume that such an endless progress is the real object of striving of our will.

The infinite progress is possible only under the presupposition that the existence of an imperfect rational being is prolonged to infinity. Moreover, the being must retain his personality or unity of self throughout the infinite progress towards perfection, otherwise, he will not be a free agent (only a free agent has personality) capable of willing the moral law. The *highest good* is, therefore, practically possible on the presupposition of personal immortality or the immortality of soul.[6] Thus the immortality of soul is a logical

6. There are two main concepts of immortality of soul in the history of Western thought—the Greek and the Christian.

The Greek concept is characterised by absolute dualism between soul and body. Man is composed of soul and body. The soul is immortal. The body is mortal. After the physical death of man, the soul is dissociated from the body and continues in existence in divine or eternal realm.

The Christian dogma, on the other hand, emphasises the *resurrection of the body*. The body is conceived as the whole personality composed of soul and body in natural or organic unity. The body (person or man) dies and is then raised up by the power (grace) of God, rather than by its own inherent power of immortality or deathlessness, to a new life called "life eternal" or "everlasting life". In common parlance, the Christians use "life eternal" as a synonym for *immortality of the soul*.

(*Contd.*)

consequence of the conception of a moral being. It is a necessary postulate of pure practical reason in the sense that it is an inseparable corollary of an *a priori* unconditional moral law.

However, it must be borne in mind that personal immortality cannot become an object of demonstration, because all demonstration depends upon the employment of the law of natural causation. It is only a necessary postulate of practical reason i.e. a proposition on which the existence of an unconditioned practical law necessarily depends.

Continuing his arguments on the relation between the moral law and the immortality of soul, Kant says that a finite rational being cannot possibly at all times will the moral law. Only endless progress from lower to higher stages of moral perfection is possible to a rational but finite being. All that the moral imperative requires of a rational finite being is that his willing should be capable of an infinite progress or approximation[7] to moral perfection.

At this stage, Kant introduces the idea of God who demands holiness as the condition of the participation of each person in the *highest good*. Since God knows our deeds or conduct, he is conscious of the degree of holiness as realised, and whether one is making a continuous and steady progress towards moral perfec-

(*Contd.*)

Kant postulates immortality of soul in the interest of morality as a ground or premise of accord between moral conduct and well-being. However, we cannot say which of the two concepts of immortality he had in mind when he made it one of the three postulates of pure practical reason. The matter is that Kant shrewdly passes over this question in silence. Further, since we have no intuition or visuality of *soul* and *resurrection*, these concepts remain mere speculative for all theoretical purposes.

7. Kant uses such terms as approximation, continuation, endless progress, endless duration etc. in his argument for immortality of soul. These terms have no ethical significance. They acquire meaning with reference to spatiotemporal relations.

However, it will not serve any purpose to enter into controversy as regards the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the usage of these expressions in moral discourses because it is quite manifest that Kant employs them to express human striving or endeavour for the realisation of the *highest good* possible (union and harmony of morality and happiness) on the existential plane.

tion. In order to be true to His justice, God ensures that each rational but sensuous being must secure happiness in exact proportion to his conformity with the moral law at every stage of his life. It is true that rational finite being cannot claim such a conformity during the tenure of his present existence (in the world of sense). But if he has in the past made a progress from lower to higher degree of morality in his present life, he may hope for a further uninterrupted continuance of this progress even beyond this life. It is, therefore, quite reasonable for a man to expect that in the infinite duration of his existence he may harmonise his conduct with the moral law in the full knowledge and consciousness of God. However, it may be remembered that perfect harmony of our conduct with the moral law, like holiness, is an idea of pure practical reason, which can be contained only in the totality of infinite progress and thus is never fully attained by any creature in a limited and finite span of his life on this earth.

V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason

45. The second postulate is the existence of God. The first postulate of the immortality of soul differs from the second postulate of the existence of God. The former is directly based upon the idea of the supreme good (the first condition or element of the *highest good*). It implies the conformity of the will with the moral law, but in the conception of the perfect good (the second condition or element of the *highest good*), there is also implied the realisation of perfect happiness. The second postulate is based upon the concept of combination of two elements of the *highest good* i.e. virtue and happiness. In other words, reason must postulate the existence of God as necessarily belonging to the possibility or realisation of the *highest good*.

Reason rightly demands the realisation of the *highest good*, which implies the attainment of happiness proportional to morality. Now we can conceive the union of happiness and morality or virtue to be affected by God, as the only cause adequate to produce the union of the two heterogeneous elements i.e. morality and happiness. Happiness or the continuous experience of the satisfaction of our desires is possible under the condition that

nature is so constituted or regulated that it is fitted to secure for us the satisfaction of all our desires on the condition that we will the moral law.

But, as acting rational beings in the world, we are not at the same time the cause of the world or nature itself. There is no ground in the moral law for a necessary connection between morality and proportionate happiness of a human being who belongs to the physical world as one of its parts. The human being is dependent on the mechanism of physical world or nature. Not being nature's cause, the course of nature does not adjust itself to his moral merit. In other words, it is not within his power to bring the hostile nature into complete harmony with the moral law.

The argument is that while the willing of the moral law is within our power as rational beings, we have no power over the forces of nature. Since the laws of moral actions cannot be derived from the laws of nature, there is no reason to affirm that even perfect harmony of our action with the moral law will result in the attainment of happiness proportionate to virtue. At the same time, we find that pure practical reason necessarily postulates the harmony between virtue and happiness. In other words, we as rational beings are under absolute obligation to seek the *highest good*. From the foregone practical premises, we are compelled to postulate the existence of a cause of nature as a whole.

Now that the cause of nature or God has the power to connect happiness and morality in exact proportion to each other, and such a cause by virtue of being the cause of nature will ensure that it shall be in complete harmony with the moral character of the rational being. Moreover, such a Being must be not only intelligent (rational) but also moral. Thus the idea of the *highest good* implies the existence of God.

What, then, is the connection between duty and the *highest good*? Kant's answer is that it is not only our duty to promote the *highest good*, but the very idea of duty entitles us to presuppose that the *highest good* must be realised. In other words, duty or moral obligation demands the realisation of the *highest good*. This realisation is, however, possible only under the presupposition of the existence of God. Thus the concept of duty is inseparably

connected with the *highest good*, which in its turn is inseparably bound up with the presupposition of the existence of God. That is to say, it is not possible to explain the possibility of morality without the necessary presupposition of the existence of God.

It must, however, be carefully noted that this moral necessity of presupposition of the existence of God is merely subjective. It is a demand of our moral consciousness. It is not objective in the sense that it is not itself a duty, which is an objective concept. There cannot be a duty to assume the existence of any thing or being, which can only be a matter of theoretical conviction. Nor can the assumption of the existence of God be made a basis of duty which rests, as has been conclusively proved in the Analytic, upon the *autonomy* of the practical reason itself. Kant means that duty is directly based upon the *autonomy* of practical reason or will itself, and not upon the existence of God. It is rather the existence of God which is based upon or derived from duty. Our duty can only be to endeavour to realise and further the *highest good*. But as our reason finds this (the promotion and realisation of the *highest good*) conceivable only on the presupposition of a supreme Being, The assumption of a supreme Being is necessarily bound up with the consciousness of our duty, although the assumption itself belongs to the theoretical reason. The assumption of a supreme Being in relation to the theoretical reason is regarded as a principal of explanation or hypothesis, while in relation to the practical reason, it may be called "faith and even pure rational faith", because the source of its origin is pure reason, both in its theoretical and practical employments. For Kant, the *highest good*, God and immortality are the chief articles of pure rational faith. The acceptance of these articles of faith are theoretically indemonstrable yet necessarily entailed by the indubitable fact of freedom.

The Greek Schools were never able to solve the problems of the practical possibility of the *highest good*. It was because they made freedom of the will as the sole and self-sufficient condition of the possibility of the *highest good*, apart from all consideration of the existence of God. They were certainly correct in saying that the principle of morality is independent of the postulate of God, that it can be proved from the relation of reason to will, and that it is therefore the supreme practical condition of the *highest good*, but

it never occurred to them that the principle of morality could not be the whole condition of the possibility of the *highest good.* They did not recognise the composite character of the concept of the *highest good* The Epicureans made happiness the supreme principle of morality, and for the moral law substituted a maxim of arbitrary choice, dependent upon each man's inclination, and attainable through human prudence and practical skill. On the other hand, the Stoics made virtue the supreme condition of the *highest good.* They regarded it as completely attainable in this life by man's own efforts. Kant says that they not only exaggerated the moral power of man to attain virtue, but they refused to admit that happiness (the second element of the *highest good*) is a special object of human desire.

The doctrine of Christianity, Kant says, supplies a conception of the *highest good* (the kingdom of God) which is adequate to the strictest demand of practical reason. It possesses the following characteristics:

a) The moral law is holy (free from the influence of inclinations and desires) and demands that we conduct ourselves in accordance with the holy law.

b) Nature and morality are united together in a harmony, not by the conception of either taken by itself, but by a holy Author of the world who makes the highest derivative good (the best possible world) possible.

c) The holiness of morals is prescribed to us even in this life as a guide to conduct, but the well-being or happiness proportionate to it, which is bliss, is thought of as attainable only in eternity.[8]

d) The principle of morality is not itself theological. It is not the *heteronomy*, but the *autonomy* of pure practical reason, for Christianity does not make the knowledge of God the condition of the moral law, but makes the knowledge of God the condition

8. Just as happiness should be proportional to goodness, should unhappiness be also proportionate to evil? This question is beside the point in the context of moral philosophy. It is justice, not morality, which demands that unhappiness in the form of punishment or suffering be also proportionate to evil.

   Can we have happiness or suffering in eternity? This question cannot be answered because we have no insight into the realm of eternity.

of attainment of the *highest good* provided that the moral law is obeyed.[9]

e) Christianity does not place the true motive of obedience in the desired consequences of actions, but solely in the idea of duty, the true observance of which alone makes us worthy to obtain the desired results.

In this manner the moral law, through the concept of the *highest good* as the final object and end of pure practical reason, leads to religion. There is nothing fantastic about this because, as we have seen, it is only with the help of a perfect (holy and benevolent)[10] and omnipotent Author of the world (God—the highest object of religion) that we can hope to realise the *highest good*, the striving of which is our duty under the moral law.

From this it can be seen that God's final end in creating the world was not the happiness of rational beings in this world, but the realisation of the *highest good* which is a harmony of happiness and morality. It is through the moral law that we can hope to attain happiness "with the help of a *wise* creator".

VI. The Postulates of Pure Practical Reason in General

46. The postulates of pure practical reason are derived from the principle of morality which is not a postulate but a law by which reason directly determines the will. A postulate is not a theoretical dogma but a theoretical proposition of necessarily moral import. It may be defined as an indemonstrable practical or moral hypothesis such as immortality of soul, freedom and God, belief in which is a moral necessity for the performance of our duty.

The postulates in no way extend our speculative knowledge,

9. Kant regards Jesus Christ in his reflections on Christianity as the symbol, model or archetype of moral perfection, which we should imitate in our persons. The historicity of Jesus has no relevance for Kant in his ethical thought.

   Further Kant rejects the dogma of revelation as the source of the moral law because it, if accepted, will prejudice the autonomous and self-legislating activity of human reason. The church condemns Kant's interpretation of Christian articles of faith in the light of his moral philosophy as heretical.

10. Benevolence is one of the three moral attributes of God; the other two being holiness and justice.

but merely enable us to affirm the reality of the ideas of speculative reason for practical or moral use. A postulate is a theoretical proposition, but it is not a proposition that is theoretically certain or demonstrable, because all demonstrations have reference to actual or possible experience (perceptions). Since we can have no knowledge of objects (supersensuous)[11] corresponding to these postulates, they remain mere presuppositions demanded by the character of man as a moral agent for the realisation of the *highest good.*

There are three postulates, namely, immortality, freedom and God. The first postulate arises from the demand of reason that the supreme good should be realised. This demand of reason can only be fulfilled provided that the moral agent is immortal. The second postulate is based upon the presupposition that man as a free agent is independent of the natural law of causation, and so is capable of determining his will in conformity with the law of freedom. The law of freedom[12] is the law of the intelligible world. The third postulate comes from the necessity of presupposing God as the only condition under which the *highest good* can be realised. This is how the practical reason by its postulates solves the problems of immortality, freedom and God, which the speculative reason could not resolve to the satisfaction of reason.

Immortality

The conception of immortality of soul involved the speculative reason in a paralogism. A paralogism is a logical fallacy resulting from the ambiguity of the term "subject" in the theoretical arguments for the immortality of soul. The ambiguity lands reason into the inevitable confusion of the phenomenal with the real subject. Reason, demanding an unconditioned subject, was led to confuse the unity of self-consciousness of the thinking subject with the supposed knowledge of a real self, conceived as independent of nature, substantive, simple, permanent or immortal.

11. Nature has not endowed us with a faculty of supersensuous or non-sensuous form of intuition to enable us have cognition of supersensuous objects corresponding to the postulates of pure practical reason.
12. Is the law of freedom the only law of the intelligible world? Apart from the moral law, there are teleological laws of the intelligible world, which Kant discusses in the *Critique of Judgement*.

But, what reason in its theoretical use was unable to prove was actually established by reason in its practical use by postulating the immortality of man because, as a moral agent, he must have "the requisite duration" for the realisation of the *highest good* through the supreme good or the moral law (the first and principal part of the *highest good*).

Freedom

Speculative reason in its demand for the unconditioned sets up the cosmological idea of an intelligible world and our existence in it, and is thus involved in the antinomy of free and natural causation. But from the limitations of our knowledge to objects of experience, it is unable to resolve the antinomy. But here again the practical reason, by its postulate of freedom, enables us to establish on the ground of rational faith, what could not be based upon theoretical knowledge i.e. to prove that man actually is free.

God

Speculative reason led to the conception of a first Being, but was unable to prove that it was more than a transcendental ideal.[13] Practical reason, on the other hand, shows that a first Being actually exists as the supreme condition without which the *highest good* cannot be made possible or realised in the world of sense. It is worth noting that one cannot provide nor prove the objective reality for any idea but for the idea of freedom. This is because freedom is the condition of the moral law, whose reality is a fact. The reality of the idea of God can be proved only through the moral law and, therefore, only with the practical interest in view.

But do these postulates really widen our knowledge? The postulates of immortality, freedom and God are transcendental ideas for speculative reason. Are they immanent and constitutive for practical reason? Kant answers that they are immanent and constitutive

13. A transcendental ideal for Kant is the idea of an absolute individual existence which contains within itself all possible reality and all possible attributes. Theoretical reason cannot demonstrate the existence of actual being (God) corresponding to the ideal. Kant describes the transcendental ideal in detail in the first *Critique*. A 573-583—B 600-611.

only in the sense of being presupposed in the moral consciousness. Practical reason cannot bring the free subject, the intelligible world and a supreme Being directly within the sphere of knowledge. In other words, it cannot enable us to have intuitions or perceptions of these ideas. All that practical reason can do is to show that these three ideas are bound up with the practical conception of the *highest good*. Their reality is based purely on the basis of the moral law. The character of our experience does not permit us to have positive knowledge of a free cause. All that we can say is that there must be a free cause, because without it there can be no moral law. The same is true of the other two ideas. Though knowledge of these ideas is impossible, yet no sophistry can shake our conviction in their reality.

VII. How is it Possible to Extend Objective Reality of Pure Reason for Reason as Practical Without Extending the same for Reason as Speculative?

47. The three ideas of pure reason are not objects of knowledge. They are mere thoughts of indeterminable objects, and thus are devoid of any objective reality for theoretical reason. However, they acquire objective reality for practical reason in the sense that they are essential to the realisation of the moral law. We cannot doubt the existence of objects corresponding to the ideas, but we cannot know how they are related to these objects, as we cannot make any theoretical synthetic judgements about them.

While there is no extension of our knowledge through these ideas, the sphere of reason is itself widened in the sense that we are now in a position to assert that there are actual objects corresponding to them. Even this indefinite knowledge about the ideas is due solely to reason in its practical employment.

It is true that in the sphere of practical employment of reason the ideas, which for theoretical reason were transcendent and without objects corresponding to them, become immanent and constitutive, because they contain the grounds of the possibility of realising the *highest good* which is the necessary object of practical reason. Theoretical reason finds in the ideas merely regulative principles. Their value lies in the systematising of our experience, but they in no manner enable us to gain any certainty regarding the existence of an any object beyond experience.

Continuing his argument, Kant says that once the practical reason becomes certain of the existence of an object beyond the sphere of the empirical and conditioned things through the moral consciousness, it employs speculative reason to characterise or determine these ideas, with a view to strengthening its own position against its two opponents, namely, anthropomorphism[14] and fanaticism. Speculative reason, as we have seen, operates with pure conceptions of the understanding (categories) without intuitions (sensuous or supersensuous). Anthropomorphism, as the source of a superstition, pretends to enlarge our knowledge of the ideas by making them objects of sensuous experience, while fanaticism pretends to a similar enlargement of knowledge of the ideas by making them objects of supersensuous experience. Thus both anthropomorphism and fanaticism are obstacles in the way of the practical employment of reason and their exclusion from morals and theology may be regarded as the only possibility of an extension of knowledge of the ideas from the practical point of view.

Will not the characterisation of pure rational ideas of reason with predicates (intelligence and will) derived from our own nature make these ideas sensuous (which is equivalent to anthropomorphism) and thus charge us of claiming an illegitimate "transcendental knowledge of supersensuous object"? Kant answers that the application of the predicates of intelligence and will to the pure rational ideas of reason cannot charge us of anthropomorphism which pretends to claim knowledge of the supersensuous objects. These predicates, when divested of their empirical characteristics which are peculiar to human intelligence and will, are not incompatible with the intelligence and will of God. Hence we do not attribute to him a discursive intelligence; nor do we regard his perceptions as successive in time, or his will as dependent

14. Broadly speaking, Anthropomorphism is the application of human form or shape and mental qualities (wit, intelligence, will, emotions etc.) to natural forces and the supposed supernatural beings including God.

Here Kant uses the term Anthropomorphism in a special sense; it denotes the transfer or application of sensuous characteristics, peculiar to human beings, to supersensuous ideas of reason including the idea of the Deity.

for its satisfaction on the existence of object to which it is directed. When all the psychological determinations are eliminated from the being of God, the only predicates that remain are those which belong to a pure intelligence as necessary to the possibility of the moral law. Thus we have only such an apprehension of God as is required to account for moral action. But it must be borne in mind that such an apprehension does not entitle us to claim positive knowledge of God. Though we conceive of God as having a perceptive intelligence and a creative will, this does not enable us to have access to His nature, but this much of apprehension of God is sufficient from the practical point of view. It is the same with the application of pure predicates of intelligence and will to the ideas of intelligible world (the kingdom of God) and immortality (soul) in the manner required by the nature of the moral law.

VIII. Faith and Pure Reason

48. The term Faith means rational faith or practical belief. Rational faith is an *a priori* faculty which is not subject to the conditions of theoretical knowledge and whose objects are not sensuous but supersensuous. The three postulates of pure reason, namely, freedom, immortality and God are practical or moral beliefs needed by reason in its practical employment as the necessary conditions for the realisation of the *highest good.* It must be remembered that faith or belief, however rational it may be, remains contrasted with knowledge.

It is characteristic of practical reason that it demands the realisation of the *highest good* and also the conditions required for its realisation. The conditions are God, freedom andim mortality. It does not require to be proved that it is our paramount duty to promote the *highest good* with all our strength. This duty is based on the moral law which is independent of all theories in regard to the inner nature of things, the secret end of the world order, or the existence of a supreme Ruler of the world.

The influence of the moral law on the agent, prompting him to seek to promote the *highest good* of which he is capable, presupposes the possibility of its realisation. Hence, though the moral law is for us subjective (based on mental disposition or feeling

which is present in all sensuous rational beings), it is also objectively (from practical or moral point of view) the basis of faith in God, freedom and immortality, because without postulating these ideas, the *highest good* cannot be realised.

The righteous man, knowing that the moral law is binding on all rational beings as a command, has a moral right to say: There is God; I belong not only to this natural world but also to the supernatural world; the duration of my life is without an end and no sophistical argument can shake my faith because I am fully conscious as a rational being that this faith is determined by my moral interest.

This is the voice of faith or assent arising from the consciousness of majesty and grandeur of the moral law. Kant explains that this unshakable faith in the moral law arises not from the subjective feeling of need or want based upon inclination or natural desire, but from the objective need of practical reason, which is necessarily binding on all rational beings.

It might almost seem that the *highest good* with its conditions is based on a common rational faith. In order to prevent misconception about the *highest good,* Kant reminds us that this notion contains two components viz. virtue and happiness. The entire concept is not based on rational faith, or rational faith cannot be a motive of our assuming the possibility of the *highest good* with its three conditions. The first component gives a command which is a product or determination of our own will. The second component cannot issue us a command to be happy, because the natural or physical conditions on which the possibility of happiness depends are not under our control. In other words, it is beyond our power to produce or determine the conditions which are necessary for the attainment of happiness. But reason expects or demands exact correspondence between moral worth and happiness. This correspondence is made possible on the supposition of a moral Author of the world, which is an object of rational faith.

We, thus, see that the second component of the *highest good* i.e. happiness necessarily concerns the existence of a wise Author of nature. This conception of a wise Author is based upon a practical point of view. It is a faith of pure practical reason.

IX. Nature's Wisdom in the Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties to His Practical End

49. Kant tells us that we are commanded[15] by reason to strive for the attainment of the *highest good*. If the *highest good* were not possible, the moral law would be null and void.[16] It is for this reason that it seems to him to be so essential to assert the possibility of the *highest good*. It may be recalled that the *highest good* is an idea of pure practical reason. We have also seen in the preceding sections that this idea is rationally connected with the supersensible realities (freedom, immortality and God) which are the conditions of the possibility of the *highest good*.

The question is, if human nature is called upon to seek and promote the *highest good*, are our cognitive faculties so constituted by nature as to enable us to realise the ultimate end of our endeavour i.e. the *highest good*? This question is relevant because, according to Kant, the moral activity is pivotal to all other activities and as such the theoretical and speculative activities must show their use in attaining and furthering the unconditioned and final end of human life. But the first *Critique* has demonstrated its complete inability to make any use of theoretical knowledge for the attainment of this end. There is an unbridgable gulf between the realm of knowledge and the realm of morality. Has, then, nature been unfair to us in not endowing our cognitive faculty with the necessary capacity for the attainment of ultimate goal of our life.

Now, Kant's thesis is that knowledge of the supersensuous is incompatible with the needs of morality. His argument is that if knowledge of the supersensible were possible, it would merely be extension of theoretical knowledge which would introduce into the supersensible realm the laws of nature, particularly the natural law of causality, which would utterly destroy freedom or

15. It is a moral command issued by the moral subject himself. No alien power or agent can command or force a man to strive for the attainment of the *highest good* which is an idea of pure practical reason, having its seat in his own person. It is a self-command which arises from the moral disposition itself.

16. There is no idea on acting on the moral law, if virtuous conduct is not accompanied by happiness. The *highest good* will always remain the object of our moral endeavour.

autonomy on which is built the entire structure of morality. Further the induction of theoretical or speculative procedure and theories in the world of noumena will completely rule out a new and different employment of reason, i.e. the practical employment. That is why Kant has found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith, so that practical reason may have full scope for developing and showing its full force in the sphere of morality.

There is a class of persons (theosophists and mystics) who allow validity to experience in regard to supersensible objects. Their belief, according to Kant, is erroneous. If we assume with them that it is possible to have knowledge of the supersensuous, then this knowledge, so long as our whole nature remains unchanged, would make virtue impossible. "God and eternity in their aweful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes". Their presence before us will throw us in a state of stupefaction. Virtue or moral disposition, which is a continuous struggle of the moral law to bring unruly inclinations under its control, will be weakened and gradually obliterated. The activity of practical reason will come to a standstill. And the moral worth of actions, on which alone the worth of the person and even of the world depends in the eyes of supreme Wisdom, would cease to exist. The reason is that most actions conforming to the moral laws would be done from fear of God and not from duty or reverence for the moral law. Moral laws which are the determinations of practical reason will then come to us in the form of divine commands. They will not be self-imposed laws, but laws imposed upon us by God, who is a Being external to us. In this way, Kant makes us aware of the dangers to morality inherent in the notion of attaining knowledge of the secrets of the supersensible world.

Kant extols the wisdom of nature in not adapting our cognitive faculties to a knowledge of the supersensible. In the absence of such a knowledge, respect for the moral law allows us a conjecture or glimpse into the mystery of the ultimate reality. God and eternity in their aweful majesty do not present themselves before our eyes, and thus do not impair the *autonomy* of our will. It is, therefore, good that we do not know that there is God but only believe Him. In other words, our practical vocation or call does not require knowledge of the supersensible. Only belief in the supersensible is sufficient for the demands of morality.

PART II

METHODOLOGY OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

50. To appreciate the full significance of the contents with which the methodology of pure practical reason concerns itself—a subject which we have reserved for the following sections—we wish to describe some of the fundamental ethical concepts more specifically than we have previously described them. They are:

Moral Action

In the scheme of Kantian moral philosophy, an action done in accordance with the moral law (the law of duty), assuming that we have power or effectiveness in us adequate to it, is moral. Actions which are not done in absolute obedience to the moral law, but for the sake of desired consequences of obedience to the moral law, are placed in the category of non-moral actions. Kant totally excludes immoral or criminal acts (e.g. theft, murder etc. which are in direct violation of man's duties to himself and duties to other men) from his theory of virtue.

Moral actions have intrinsic worth or are good in themselves. Non-moral actions however desirable, munificent or in complete accord with the established norms of legality are void of moral virtue because the real incentive for obedience to them is not the morality of intentions or the conception of duty itself. The criminal denies or repudiates the moral law as such through the arbitrary exercise of his power of freedom. His lawless acts attract judicial punishment and Kant holds that they should be dealt with according to the strict law of retribution.

Moral Maxim

Throughout his ethical writings, Kant contrasts maxims with actions (observable sensory movements). While the latter may be automatic and instinctive, the former are always determined by a concept or consciousness of what we are doing. Such a concept can be formulated as a rule or maxim (inward or mental principle) on which we act or propose to act.

An important feature which stands out distinctly in Kant's moral philosophy is that when we praise any action, we only praise the maxim from which it springs and regard its visible sensory movements as mere external manifestations of the maxim in the mind. The maxim is invisible. The visible performance has no moral quality. Thus, the ultimate object of moral import is the invisible maxim and not the outward action consisting of a series or manifold of visible acts, which are appearances in the world of sense.

Moral Law

It is a matter of common experience that men act on diverse moral rules or maxims in life. The moral rules are sometimes mutually conflicting. Since our practical reason, like theoretical, has no insight into the realm of objective and self-existing values, it is not possible for us to have intuitive knowledge of the rightness of any particular moral rule on which we act or propose to act under the circumstances of time and place. Equally, it is impossible for us to establish with certainty the moral character of this or that moral rule on the basis of knowledge of our human nature (sensuous or empirical), because we cannot have knowledge of human nature in its completeness as such a knowledge will come from experience which can never be complete.

Kant, therefore, rightly sees that the rightness of a particular moral rule or maxim can only be judged with reference to a moral (universal and necessary) law whose source lies within human reason. Reason (rational element present in all human beings) in its practical employment creates or originates the moral law through its own activity, without the help of any agency—natural or supernatural.

Lacking insight into the objective realm of values and knowledge of our sensuous nature in its completeness, we can judge the rightness of any action by asking ourselves whether the maxim on which we propose to act is in conformity with the formal character of the moral law. It amounts to saying that the possibility of morally good actions rests on such maxims which are not self-contradictory when universalised.

Accordingly, from the point of view of Kant's metaphysical position, our reason in its practical employment or activity can-

not produce morally good subjective or actual maxims of actions, but can only provide the objective (formal) criterion in the form of universal and necessary moral law by reference to which the rightness or wrongness of subjective maxims of actions may be judged or tested.

Moral Respect

The human will (moral subject or agent) is determined objectively by the moral law and subjectively by respect or reverence for the moral law. As for the moral law, we have already seen that it has its source in pure practical reason which being self-active exhibits its activity in revealing the moral law in the consciousness of the moral subject. However, it may be added that respect for the moral law has its origin or root not in pure practical reason but in the subjective disposition which, though not active, becomes active under the influence of the objective moral law and shows its activity in generating respect for it in the moral subject. In short, respect to the moral law is the effect of the moral law on human sensibility (subjectivity or disposition).

To sum up: the moral law and respect for the moral law are respectively the objective and the subjective determining ground of one and the same human will.

51. Kant distinguishes the methodology of pure practical reason from that of theoretical reason. However, we must bear in mind that when Kant makes such a distinction, he bases it on two entirely different objectives to be achieved by pure practical reason and theoretical reason.

Theoretical reason, as we have seen at work in sciences, provides us certain *a priori* or necessary rules of synthesis for the purpose of organising the manifold of knowledge (objects of experience) into a logical system.

Pure practical reason, on the other hand, does not lay down any rule or method for the use of our will for acquiring scientific cognition (perception or intuition) of freedom (free or moral subject) under the theoretical conditions of knowledge. It only tells us the way or manner by which we can make objective practical reason also subjectively practical.

To the question, what makes the objectively practical reason

also subjectively practical, Kant answers that it is personal respect, reverence or regard for the objectively practical reason (universal and necessary moral law which is valid for all rational beings) that makes it also subjectively practical. What, then, is respect for the moral law? It is the effect of the moral law on human mind which is receptive to moral feeling or respect for the moral law.

If we are to combine the recognition or consciousness of the moral law with a subjective or personal feeling of respect for it, there must be a ground of combination of the two elements. Kant believes that the ground of combination or synthesis lies in the moral disposition or propensity which nature has implanted in all human beings.

Thus, the expression how to make the objectively practical reason also subjectively practical simply means how to produce in man (moral subject) a feeling of respect for the moral law. It must be emphasised that our respect for the moral law should be absolute. We should respect the moral law "out of mere respect for it."[1]

Of course, the question how to produce respect for the moral law would not have arisen in us if we were completely rational beings (holy beings). The two elements subjective (feeling of respect) and objective (consciousness of the universal and necessary moral law) coincide with or fuse into each other in a holy being. He would always act on the objective moral law because he must. In such a being, no incentive (subjective element) other than the objective motive to act on the moral law for the sake of the moral law is thinkable. Further, the concepts of duty, obligation, necessitation and the moral law in its imperative character will be foreign to the nature of such a being, since these concepts enter where reason and desire find themselves in a state of continuing opposition.

It is only in case of an imperfect rational being like man that an incentive is required to act in obedience to the moral law. The reason is obvious. Man's sensuous nature hinders him at every stage of his life from willing the moral law. The unceasing hosti-

1. It may be emphasised that recognition or consciousness of the moral law and respect or reverence for the moral law, though distinct or distinguishable from each other in consciousness, co-exist as inseparable elements in a real or genuine moral experience.

lity between sensuous and rational natures in man makes the realisation of perfect virtue impossible in the world. He has the moral disposition (good will) to will the morally good action, but lacks adequate power to act according to the moral law. What he can possibly do is that he can unite the objective moral law with a subjective feeling of respect for it in his consciousness.

52. A striking feature of Kant's moral philosophy is that man, though not moral by nature, is endowed with a natural disposition to morality. This disposition has a subjective receptivity to the moral law. It is the spring of moral respect or feeling for the moral law and striving after virtue. The natural disposition has to be stimulated in the interest of the moral law which imposes a moral obligation on all human beings to develop a feeling of respect for it even when they do not obey it.

The problem before us, therefore, is how to stimulate and cultivate the natural disposition in the growing child and popularise moral education among the common public. This subject concerns moral education, which is a part of pedagogy proper.

However, Kant makes it clear that, strictly speaking, morality cannot be taught. This is so because in morality we are concerned not with outward actions but with their inward principles (motives or maxims). We can have a method for acquiring only a particular technical skill. There are, for example, logical rules of correct reasoning. But there is no fixed or standard method by which moral education may be imparted to a child or a young man because morality is a matter of willing and not of knowing. A systematic exposition of the moral law, exhortations, admonitions and sermons cannot instill moral spirit in us. All allurements arising from enjoyments, everything which may be counted as happiness or threats of pain and harm cannot force us to act out of respect for the moral law. Juridical legislation can only make us act in conformity with the letter of the law (legality) and not with the spirit of the law (morality). Juridical legislation is external. Ethical jurisdiction being internal, the spirit of the law (morality) would be found in our intentions or motives and not in our visible actions as explained in earlier sections.

Kant does not support the contention of those philosophers who hold that moral principles can be erected on short lived feelings. He repeatedly warns us that conscience, sympathy and pity can never provide a solid foundation on which a durable edifice of morality can be constructed.

There are some popular writers who derive morality from examples of noble, heroic and magnanimous behaviour of great persons. Kant rejects this view saying that exemplary actions cannot serve as a model for moral action. Exemplary actions themselves can only be judged morally good or bad with reference to universal moral principles which already exist in our reason. If there are examples of morally good actions, it is because they have been done in conformity with universal rules of morality.

Kant further points out that those who make meritorious actions (actions which call for reward, praise applause, honour etc. from others) a model get frustrated when they do not produce the desirable public response. No frustration is caused when actions are done from duty, regardless of their favourable or unfavourable reactions.

At the same time, Kant does not agree with the philosophers of the Enlightenment[2] who profess that progress in scientific education and general culture will lead to moral progress. He never admits that an educated man knows more about morality than an uneducated man. Kant, more than any other philosopher of his age, respected the ordinary moral consciousness of the common man and completely rejected the view held by the rationalists that philosophy can become the basis of sound ethics. In other words, the true principles of morality cannot be derived from a philosophical analysis of abstract formulas and theoretical doctrines concerning virtue and vice. Kant believes that where the philosopher remains undecided and in a state of doubt as regards the moral value of any specific or concrete action, the common man, guided by the habitual use of the established rules of morality, has always differentiated between the rightness and

2. The Enlightenment (or the Age of Reason) was an intellectual-cum-revolutionary movement spearheaded by Locke in England and by Holbach, Voltair, Rousseau, Herder and many others on the continent in the 17th and 18th centuries. Of all the idealistic or philosophical assumptions that lay at the base of the Enlightenment, the most relevant is that man by nature is neither good nor evil but malleable by environment, education, reason and experience.

wrongness of any action just as he has known the difference between the right hand and the left hand by means of experience.

Is there, then, any service which philosophy can render to morality? Kant answers that the only service which philosophical analysis or study can render to morality is that it can defend it from its external enemies (hedonists and fatalists) and its internal foes (mystics and moral fantics).

But it must not be concluded from what has been said above that interest in moral questions is confined to the societies of the common man alone. It is our experience that questions of moral import also secure a widespread and favourable reception in educated, business and cultural circles. Even the morally depraved person not only feels the pricks of conscience in his own person, but is ready to protect the entire moral worth of other persons against the unjust charges of dishonesty, hypocrisy and wickedness. Kant says that all these things are clear proofs that our mind is receptive to morality and that the thought or consciousness of duty is not mere fancy.

53. Kant believes that moral education to children can be best imparted by the Socratic method. The essence of the Socratic method is that the teacher by a process of patient questioning brings the student to recognise some true conclusion without his ever telling the student what the true conclusion should be. In the Kantian system of ethics, the teacher, by patient questioning, can bring the student to recognise the intrinsic worth of duty and other allied ethical notions. The pupil will be made to depend on his own resources (natural disposition or good heart to morality) to recognise that one has no right to be happy without being worthy of happiness and that the only incentive to morality is respect for the moral law, which is the law of duty.

To sum up: It cannot be denied that the Socratic method of putting questions of moral import to young students for answers from themselves will exercise a powerful influence on the maxims of their conduct. It seems to be the only method which, as Kant claims, can stimulate and cultivate the disposition to goodness, as it tends to transfer the disposition into a cast of mind by which the young pupil begins to develop a feeling in his heart that an action done from respect for duty without any other admixture of non-moral motive or incentive has real moral worth.

CONCLUSION

54. Two aweful things: the starry heavens above and the moral law within.

The "starry heavens above" represent the boundlessness, immeasurability and ever-changing character of the universe (the world of sense). Further, man's consciousness of tremendously hostile or indifferent natural forces which beset him on every side may create in him a feeling of fear or dread. But 'awe' is more than wonder or fear. It is reverential fear, that is, fear mingled with reverence. It should be readily granted that awe is extended to only holy beings and sacred places which are believed to possess supernatural or supersensuous (intelligible) powers or qualities.

Man may revere or value the moral law within him because he knows that it is the expression of his own free or intelligible nature. But he has no ground, objective or subjective, to fear the moral law as he is well aware that it is only morally binding, without any external coercion, on him.

Do we not feel God's aweful majesty or presence in the contemplation of the external world and the moral law? This mystic approach—an approach to which Kant is vehemently opposed—to the interpretation of the meaning of the two aweful things, is not a piece of mere fantasy or a vagary of vain speculation because it is Kant who keeps us constantly dwelling on the thought that the ultimate ground of all things is centred in some supersensible reality.

It may be remembered that God in the theistic conception of Kant possesses the excellence of aweful majesty by virtue of being the author and at the same time the moral governor of the world. He is a moral ruler and just judge who constantly sustains us and keeps a constant watch on moral delinquents.

55. In the next two paras of this chapter, Kant gathers up into the briefest compass a revolutionary achievement of human reason i.e. the development of scientific method based on observation

and experiment. The scientific method paved the way for the rise and growth of modern astronomy and natural sciences by delivering them from the evil influences of astrology and religion. This method also led to the discovery of the critical method which, by instituting special investigations of the conditions of human reason, gave a scientific orientation to metaphysical thought and made ethics an independent and autonomous science. Kant's two *Critiques* testify to these human achievements.

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