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SPECIAL ISSUE ON
THE PHILOSOPHY OF K.C. BHATTACHARYYA

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KRISHNACHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA

(1875—1949)

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's Concept of Philosophy

HERBERT HERRING

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1

It was in 1974, when preparing a lecture for Max Mueller Bhavan, Madras, on *The Image of German Philosophy in Contemporary Indian Thinkers,*[1] that I dealt for the first time with the philosophy of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya(henceforth referred to as KCB), in particular with his *Studies in Kant,* based upon the lectures he gave at the Calcutta Philosophical Society in 1935–36; and although as a Kant scholar I was rather opposed to his interpretation of basic concepts and principles of Kant's Transcendental Idealism, I realized that here I had come across an original thinker, one of those rare specimens among the vast number of mere historians of philosophy occupying most of the university philosophy chairs in the East and West. However, since I was predominantly involved in my own studies on Kant and besides with a new edition of the main works of the great philosopher, mathematician and scientist, G.W. Leibniz, I missed the opportunity to read more of KCB's works.

The opportunity came with an invitation from the Dr Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, to participate in the national seminar *Perspectives on Neo-Vedānta* (24–26 December 1990) and, if possible, to produce a paper on KCB. Thus I challenged myself to deal in greater detail with the thoughts and ideas of a philosopher whose relatively small number of publications, until recently scattered over various books and periodicals, had hardly been given the recognition they deserve; and yet, this philosopher, less talked about than others of a minor calibre, has shaped a whole generation of Indian academic philosophers.[2]

It would certainly be too bold an attempt to work out the main concepts, principles and ideas of KCB's thought system in one short essay, all the more since his is a very concise, condense style—in the words of Rasvihari Das, one of his disciples—a 'very terse and sometimes even cryptic' style, 'and one cannot always be very sure as to its proper import'.[3] Instead I shall try in this paper to indicate the importance of KCB's concept of philosophy for a genuine

understanding of basic doctrines of Vedānta and why he is rightfully—albeit slightly eulogically—called by Kalyan Kumar Bagchi, another student of his, 'the philosopher of Indian renaissance'.[4] The term *renaissance,* however, not misunderstood as a simple unreflected revival of ancient ideas and values for the sake of satisfying some aesthetic sense of beauty or religious piety; renaissance understood in the way Kalidas Bhattacharyya, KCB's son and intellectual heir, does when saying: '. . . what happens in genuine renaissance is that under the impact of some powerful new ideas people with a living tradition adjust those ideas to that tradition. . . .'[5]

That living tradition to KCB was Hinduism as a way of living and thinking, a way of life, and the new powerful ideas that had come to India in the wake of western rationalism and its method of critical analysis. These two spiritual sources and forces have distinctively and decisively shaped KCB's *Weltanschauung,* and thus his published writings and a considerable number of those unpublished during his lifetime (written down, more or less, for the sake of self-articulation) are on the whole, studies in Vedāntism—as representative of KCB's firm rooting in Hinduism, and studies in Kant—as indicative of his critical approach to philosophical problems.

When now turning to his concept of philosophy, I refer to the article of the same title, first published in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy.*[6]

II

The first sentence of this article reads thus:

> An explication of the concept of philosophy appears to me more important than the discussion of any specific problem of philosophy.[7]

Indeed, before having a clear and distinct concept of what a philosopher is doing when thinking, one could hardly judge any problem as being philosophical or non-philosophical, and hence without such a concept our business as philosophers would rather resemble a ragfare than a thoughtfully organized bureau of intellectual investigation.

There are, of course, different answers to the philosopher's self-reflection on what he is doing when philosophizing, these different answers constituting the history of philosophy—answers to the same perennial fundamental problems such as the nature of the self, the world *in toto,* the absolute, freedom of will, space and time, causation, unity and plurality—different answers given by different thinkers in different regions of the globe and at different times.

The answer KCB gives to the question of a philosopher's introspection of his philosophizing reads thus: Philosophy is the elaboration of different kinds of spiritual experiences, or, in another more modern terminology, philosophy is the systematic elaboration of symbolic concepts; and it is this concept of philosophy he develops against the backdrop of Kantian Idealism which he takes as that exemplary form of western rationalism that could help to throw new light on an unbiased interpretation of the Upaniṣads and their basic theme of the identity, the primeval and ultimate unity of *Ātman* and *Brahman,* the Self and the Absolute.

One difficulty to grasp the true meaning of KCB's statements in his highly economical, frugal use of language is the often untraditional and thus—at least to a western scholar—unfamiliar meaning he attributes to fundamental concepts, such as knowing and thinking. When he declares: 'My position is, on the one hand, that the self is unthinkable and on the other hand that while actually it is not known and is only an object of faith, though not necessarily only of moral faith, we have to admit the possibility of knowing it without *thinking.* . . .'[8], then KCB takes range and content of the term 'knowledge' to be wider and more comprehensive than the term 'thought', which of course, is the Vedāntic view. For Kant 'thought' is the wider and more comprehensive concept. For him knowledge is the result of the relating of our *a priori,* subject-immanent forms of sensuous intuition plus the equally *a priori* forms of thinking, i.e. the categories, to a given thing which, subsumed under these *a priori* forms, takes the ontological structure of an object. This means that the so-called things as such, thought of as being unrelated to a knowing subject, is a mere thought without content, thinkable but not knowable; thinkable it is in analogy to the interrelation of objects as appearances within the mind, and in this sense even the transcendent comes symbolically close. That is to say, knowing without thinking makes no sense, is nonsense; or in the famous dictum of Kant: 'Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.'[9] KCB's position is entirely different. Theoretic consciousness involving the understanding of a speakable—be it in the form of 'spoken of' as, for instance, in scientific judgements, informing about facts, or be it as simply 'spoken', meaning the self-evident manifestation of the self-evident—has four grades which are really grades of speaking:

(1) Empirical thought (referring to an object perceived or imagined to be perceived), its content being facts.
(2) Pure objective or contemplative thought (referring to an object though not necessarily a perceived one), its content being self-subsistent objects.

(3) Spiritual thought (being subjective, without any reference to an object), its content being reality in the form of the real subject.
(4) Transcendental thought (which has reference neither to subject nor object), truth being its content.[10]

Out of these four grades of theoretic consciousness, empirical thought is the realm of the sciences, whereas pure objective, spiritual and transcendental thought are the realms of philosophy. Accordingly we have three branches or disciplines of philosophy, these being in escalating order: philosophy of the object, i.e. metaphysics and logic; philosophy of the subject, i.e. epistemology; and philosophy of truth amounting to transcendental consciousness or consciousness of the transcendent. If all contents of theoretic consciousness are speakable, and if the so-called grades of thought are actually grades of speaking, it follows that all philosophy as theoretic consciousness must be speakable but obviously not only in word-language but also in the form of symbols or other semiotic ways. Does this then mean that all philosophy as principally speakable must also actually be spoken? To this KCB states: 'In philosophy, the content that is spoken is not intelligible except as spoken.'[11] This means, as I take it, that the highest form of communication as practised by sages and mystics, namely speechless communication in silence (as for example, referred to by Śaṅkara in *Brahma Sūtra-bhāṣya* III, 2.17, in the dialogue between Bādhva and Bāṣkali), is not philosophy but another form of experience or knowledge based on direct intuitive awareness of the absolute independent of perception and inference and any other means of theoretic consciousness. Philosophy for KCB is not a body of judgements like the ones that constitute science, 'Philosophy is self-evident elaboration of the self-evident. . . . The self-evident is spoken but not spoken *of*', the self-evident in the sense of 'what is independent of the spoken belief of an individual mind.'[12] And then comes what I would call his declaration of what he takes to be the essence of genuine philosophy (a declaration, for it can neither be called statement or proposition in the scientific nor in the logico-metaphysical sense): 'Philosophy deals with contents that are not literally thinkable and are not actually known but are believed as demanding to be known without being thought.'[13]

This means, if I am not mistaken, that logic, epistemology, ontology, metaphysics and ethics are but necessary instruments to be applied for showing what reality, what truth, what the absolute are not—instruments, well in Kantian sense, to make us realize the bounds, the limitations of objective knowledge (based on the testimonies of the senses and categorial inference); but at the same time they demand of us to look across these bounds—in a sort of

natural inclination, a natural need of man, *Naturanlage des Menschen* to speak with Kant—to firmly believe in the presence of something transcendent as the origin and final aim of the universe *in toto* and man in particular.

In this context the concept 'symbol' asks for some explanation. To quote KCB, 'Metaphysical reasoning is only the systematic exposition of symbolic concepts.'[14] It seems to me that here the term 'symbolic' means pointing to something believed to be known in analogy to other theoretically conscious experiences. A symbol or sign is that which represents something to the cognitive faculty. We do not think or know facts, objects; we think and thus speak of facts and objects using symbols, be they words as in ordinary language or symbols as in symbolic logic, mathematics and the sciences. According to KCB the verbal form of thought, as understood by itself in logic and apart from its symbolizing use, is not thought in the strict sense. 'The logical forms are shadows of metaphysical symbolism and are as such themselves to be understood as symbolisms.'[15] Kant's use of the term 'hypotypose' can make this a little clearer. For Kant 'hypotypose'—as he calls the sensualizing or illustrating of a concept—is either schematic or symbolic. It is schematic if a given concept has a corresponding *a priori* intuition; symbolic it is when though there is no such corresponding intuition we create one in analogy to perceived objects.[16] Thus symbols are stopgaps, as it were, for lack of concepts of the real and the true, i.e. of the transcendent.

And what meaning is attributed to the term 'belief'? Right in the beginning of the essay we read that philosophy, as part of theoretic consciousness, 'presents beliefs that are speakable or systematically communicable';[17] and a few sentences later we have the statement (which, as many other statements of KCB, reminds me in its harsh, categoric formulation of the early Wittgenstein): 'To speak is to formulate a belief.'[18] The meaning of the term 'belief' may perhaps become more distinct with reference to the term 'absolute'. 'What is called the absolute is a positively believed entity that is not negatively understood. It is an entity that cannot be understood as it is believed, and is speakable only by way of symbolism', that is—as we have seen—by analogy.[19]

But here we have to question as to how the absolute can be called an entity if it is to be understood as the origin and ultimate goal of all entities, if 'absolute' in the traditional understanding of the term means being independent of anything, being self-sufficient, perfect, infinite and as such indefinite? The absolute as an entity seems a contradiction in terms, even so when KCB states that when saying 'the absolute *is*, we mean by "is" not reality but truth.'[20]

In talking of the absolute as a positively believed but only negatively understood entity KCB seems to mean by 'believe' the intellectual presupposition of something which cannot be thought of nor be known as it is, yet must nevertheless firmly be taken for granted as being, if to talk of thinking and knowing should make any sense. The absolute means that which ontically lies at the root of and ontologically transcends all acts of theoretic consciousness, and in the form of being literally unspeakable it 'may be said to be self-revealing' or truth.[21]

Here we are confronted with theoretic consciousness as spiritual and transcendental thought, and these forms of knowing experience clearly show KCB's firm rooting in the Hindu world-view, for the aim of this world-view as *darśana* is not to satisfy one's intellectual curiosity or to discover (in the literal sense of uncover, lay open) reality; it is rather release from the bondage of *saṁsāra* and thus the attaining of *mokṣa*, leaving behind the illusory realm of *māyā* towards the reunification with the absolute as the identification of *Ātman* and *Brahman*.[22] This is not a theoretical but a practical attitude towards life and world, finding its expression in the religious acts of direct (not sense-bound) intuitive awareness, that is to say, in existential (not merely intellectual) encounters with the absolute which cannot be encountered in any other way. 'Spiritual consciousness is not mere consciousness of reality but reality itself.'[23] In such consciousness we have a non-theoretical experience (I would prefer to say an existential experience) of self-abnegation, 'it is consciously *being* nought and not consciousness *of I* as nought.'[24]

It is in such an existential encounter that all distinctions between I and All, subject and object, *Ātman* and *Brahman* make no sense, are nonsense and give way to the experience of the self as the basis and origin of any kind of knowledge as *vidyā* and is hence identical with *Brahman*. This identity of *Ātman* and *Brahman* the philosopher cannot attain as philosopher, but it is in the shape of religious reflection (which is not identical with philosophy of religion as a discipline of theoretic consciousness) that the philosopher can come closest to this goal, which is to say that only philosophy as *sādhanā*, as the spiritual performance directed towards the attainment of liberation from any form of *avidyā*-based knowledge, can procure and realize the identity of *Ātman* and *Brahman*, can procure and realize *mokṣa*.

There is, however, a manifold of unique religious experiences as the individual's personal encounter with the absolute which cannot be systematized by reason; they can, of course, be presented in theoretic forms as philosophy of religion and according to the plurality of religious experiences we may have a plurality of

philosophies of religion.[25] This follows from KCB's metaphysical thesis that the universe is the unfolding of each singular being in all other singular items, each single item meaning every other item or the entire universe.[26] This reminds me strongly of Leibniz and his conception of 'monad' as individual substance, being an image of each other single substance and the universe *in toto*.

If, according to KCB, philosophy in the genuine sense is not confined to the realm of spatio-temporal things, but rather finds its highest, most sublime and most valid expression in the individual's direct intuitive, existential awareness of the self-revelation of the absolute (a revelation which, if at all, can only be communicated symbolically), then philosophy in this sense ceases to be philosophy, from which it follows that there is no such thing as *the* system of philosophy: 'There is no question of philosophy progressing towards a single unanimously acceptable solution. All philosophy is systematic symbolism, and symbolism necessarily admits of alternatives.'[27]

III

KCB refers to Kant's Critical or Transcendental Idealism as a shining example of agnosticism which he would like to 'tone down'. For Kant the cosmological idea (universe), the psychological idea (soul or self), the theological idea (god, absolute) are not constitutive, knowledge-providing principles but only regulative ones, i.e. in approaching these ideas reason is only used hypothetically and is thus meant to approximate (*naehern*) our knowledge to universality. 'That the self is believed in and is yet actually unknown is itself to me ground for holding that it is knowable without thinking and has to be known.'[28] Such and similar statements KCB uses in order to explain that the totality of beings, the self, the absolute we are able to know without being involved in antinomies, for otherwise the Upaniṣads would not have said that we should know them; they are simply spoken (not spoken of) in the sense of being uttered as a non object- or fact-bound spiritual insight. And when we read towards the end of his essay on the concept of philosophy that 'The absolute is conceived rigorously as truth in (Advaita) Vedānta'[29], and when KCB acknowledges this authoritative position of a sacred text, many a western thinker would immediately raise objections and point out that Hindu thought was thoroughly dogmatic, uncritical as relying on the unconditional belief in indisputable sources; that Hindu thinkers, even the most respected and reputed ones as Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Mādhva or Vivekānanda, Aurobindo, Radhakrishnan or also KCB were mere commentators of sacred texts and no philosophers in the proper sense.

To this one could, of course, object that apart from the fact that there is not *the* concept of philosophy, those who hold the view that

Hindu philosophy has always been lacking in originality due to its being mere footnotes on certain authoritative scriptures (*Upaniṣads, Bhagavadgītā, Brahma Sūtras*) base their verdict on a complete misunderstanding of the meaning and character of *bhāṣya. Bhāṣya* is more than a commentary, an explanation and clarification of the wording of a given text, aiming at an easier understanding of its general outline and main doctrines. This a *bhāṣya* certainly also does, but it is not its essential character. A *bhāṣya* deals with the problems of a given text in a rather free and critical manner, thus revealing a good deal of original thinking. What T.M.P. Mahadevan has said with regard to the *Sūtra-bhāṣyas* can be applied to *bhāṣyas* in general: 'The commentators seek to explicate the meanings of the *Sūtras.* And in so doing, they allow themselves the freedom to expound their own philosophical perspective, systematically and consistently.'[30] This concept of *bhāṣya* is meant when KCB writes in the Introduction to *Studies in Vedāntism:*[31] 'The attitude to be borne towards the present subject should be neither that of the apologist nor that of the academic compiler but that of the interpreter which involves, to a certain extent, that of the constructor, too.'[32] KCB certainly was a constructive thinker, to me one of the most original, innovative thinkers in twentieth-century Indian philosophy, and it is part of the trademark of such a thinker that his thoughts and the language, the specific terminology, the nomenclature used to convey these thoughts are not easy to grasp and understand. (Hegel is reported to have complained on his death-bed that there was only a single one among his students who he thought had understood him, but that even this one had misunderstood him.)

It may be due to my limited familiarity with the concept of philosophy among Vedāntins that more than once in preparing this article I felt somehow let down by KCB when coming across a statement which seemed to me doubtful and contestable, for instance that reality in the I, the ego, as being self-evident, must be distinguished from truth as the absolute. How, I asked myself, is this compatible with the demanded identity of *Ātman* and *Brahman*? And then he speaks of the absolute in plural, as three absolutes; but here at least I seemed to have found the explanation in his own words when reading: 'There is no sense in speaking of the absolute as the unity of truth, freedom and value. It is *each* of them, these being only spoken separately but not *meant* either as separate or as one.'[33] (Here I would have preferred to speak of three different aspects of the absolute.) How can we call the absolute in the first form truth, in the second freedom, in the third value? Is this not contrary to the Upaniṣadic teaching that the absolute—if spoken at all—can only be spoken *per viam negativam, neti, neti*? Is this not incompatible with

KCB's own thesis that the absolute is neither spoken of, nor simply spoken, nor at all speakable?

There seems to me also a certain inconsistency or vagueness in the use of such terms as 'symbol', 'belief', 'revelation', and as I have already indicated, there is no doubt a misunderstanding of the concept 'transcendental' as the key-term of Kant's philosophy. For Kant 'transcendental' does not mean the realm of non-empirical things in themselves as against the realm of empirical objects; there are for him no different realms of being, only different modes of our human approach to being, the most prominent and reliable approach named by him *Transcendental Idealism,* i.e. a thought system which is not so much concerned with things but with our *a priori* knowledge of things. When KCB, with reference to Kant, uses the term 'transcendental', what he mostly means is 'transcendent' in Kantian terminology; for if he would really use the term 'transcendental' in the sense Kant does, he would—like Kant in his understanding of philosophy proper as against the fortune-telling of traditional metaphysics—restrict all human knowledge to what is given as spatial and temporal and under the *a priori* categories of the understanding; and this restriction of human cognition marks precisely the point where KCB is utterly opposed to Kant.

What I have called a certain vagueness of terminology may partly be due to some vagueness of Upaniṣadic teaching itself, as for instance when speaking of *Brahman*'s relation to the individual soul and the physical universe. But here we have to bear in mind that the Upaniṣads were not meant to be systematic treatises in philosophy. As to that vagueness T.M.P. Mahadevan writes that the sages whose intuitions are recorded in the Upaniṣads 'pour forth their findings in the form of stories and parables, informal discussions and intimate dialogues. The method they adopt is more poetic than philosophic . . . in many places symbolic expressions are employed which hide the meaning rather than make it patent. Sometimes there are puns on words and mystic explanations of certain abstruse terms.'[34] This being so, I think that it could be extremely helpful for an intrinsic study of KCB's work and for making its methods, means and aims more known, if someone would get down to register its main concepts and to explain their often analogous and (seemingly?) ambiguous meaning in the respective context.

In the concluding sentences of his Introduction to *Studies in Vedāntism* KCB says with regard to Vedānta:

> A true philosophic system is not to be looked upon as a soulless jointing of hypotheses; it is a living fabric which, with all its endeavour to be objective, must have a well-marked individuality. Hence it is not to be regarded as the special

property of academic philosophy-mongers, to be hacked up by them into technical *views*, but is to be regarded as a form of life and is to be treated as a theme of literature of infinite interest to humanity. [35]

KCB's philosophy is Vedānta, making use of modern rationalistic and analytic methods and terminology, which is to say that it is an elaboration, explanation and evaluation of Upaniṣadic thought within and by means of the conceptual framework of our times.

Notes and References

1. A slightly different German version has appeared in *Kant-Studien*, 70/2, 1979.
2. First edition of his collected writings entitled *Studies in Philosophy*, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1958; second revised edition, Vol. I, New Delhi, 1983. This, unfortunately, contains a number of disturbing, sometimes even severe, misprints, for instance p. 465: 'It' (namely the self-evident's independence of speaking) 'is not part of the meaning of a scientific content which is understood without reference at all to be linguistic expression of it.' It should, of course, read '. . . without reference at all to *the* linguistic expression. . . Or p. 470: 'All that can be achieved in this direction' (namely the philosopher's piecing together the results of the sciences into a world-view) 'is an imaginative description of the world, which would be not only actual knowledge but not even a hypothesis that is intended to be turned into knowledge.' This must read: 'which would be *not* only not actual knowledge. . .'
3. 'Logic, Metaphysics and Religion', *Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya* Memorial Volume, Amalner 1958, p. 48.
4. 'Tradition and Change in Indian Philosophy', *Indian Philosophical Annual*, 18, Madras, 1985–86, p. 185 ff. It should be mentioned here that Neo-Vedānta as a reappraisal and new critical interpretation and evaluation of the *prasthānatraya* must be seen as part of a more general movement which started early in the nineteenth century aiming at making the Hindus aware of their ancient spiritual values as the solid base of a free nation. This found expression in the Brähmo Samāj, founded by Ram Mohun Roy in 1826, which especially under the leadership of Debendra Nath Tagore, pronounced itself as a religious and political movement for the revival of genuine Hinduism based upon the unquestionable testimonies of the Upaniṣads. As against and almost in opposition to this, Dayananda Saraswati founded, half a century later, the Ārya Samāj, a more radical and nationalistic organization, footing on the spiritual revelation of the Vedas. Both these movements received some unexpected support and encouragement from outside India when in 1875 Helena P. Blavatsky, a Russian countess of German descent, together with Henry Steel Olcott, a retired colonel of the American Civil War, called into being the Theosophical Society in New York, and after moving to India in 1879 made Madras (Adyar) their headquarters (1882). Helena Blavatsky wanted to convince the world that Hinduism and Buddhism were infinitely superior to all religions and philosophies of the West, a doctrine—however uncritical—which Annie Besant made use of to strengthen the self-confidence and self-respect of the Hindus in their struggle for spiritual and political independence. But an even more stronger support from abroad came from the academic disciplines of Comparative Religion and Oriental Studies with their special branch of Indology; and there it was first and foremost Friedrich Max Mueller, the German scholar, operating from his academic abode at Oxford, whose first ever critical edition of *Rig-Veda* (6 vols. 1874) and *The Sacred Books of the East*, published with the help of an international team of experts in 51 volumes, out of which no less than 31 were dedicated to Indian texts, meant, *inter alia*, a boost to the renaissance of Hinduism. F. Max Mueller was also actively engaged in contributing towards a dispassionate, unbiased understanding of India and Indianness in the West as also in India herself; of this his links with such great Indians as Debendra Nath Tagore, Keshub Chandra Sen, Lokamanya Tilak and Vivekananda—to name only these—bear ample witness.
5. Quoted from K. Bagchi's article, cf. note 4, p. 188 f.
6. Edited by S. Radhakrishnan and J.H. Muirhead, London, 1936.
7. All quotations from K.C. Bhattacharyya's works according to the 1983 edition.
8. Op. cit., p. 462.
9. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A51/B75. Kant writes in the second revised edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787): 'We had established in the analytical part of our critique the following points: first, that space and time are only forms of sensuous intuition, therefore conditions of the existence of things, as phenomena only; secondly, that we have no concepts of the understanding, and therefore nothing whereby we can arrive at the knowledge of things, except in so far as an intuition corresponding to these concepts can be given, and consequently that we cannot have knowledge of any object, as a thing by itself, but only in so far as it is an object of sensuous intuition, that is, as phenomenon. This proves no doubt that all speculative knowledge of reason is limited to objects of *experience*, but it should be carefully borne in mind, that this leaves it perfectly open to us to *think* the same objects as things in themselves, though we cannot *know* them.' (B XXV ff.)
10. Op. cit., p. 464.
11. Ibid. One should compare KCB's distinction between the knowable and unknowable, the speakable and unspeakable with the distinction made by one of his most eminent students, N.V. Banerjee, in his posthumous work, *Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy*, 1985.
12. Ibid., p. 465.
13. Ibid., p. 469.
14. Ibid., p. 474.
15. Ibid., p. 462.
16. *Critique of Judgement*, p. 59, chapter entitled 'Of Beauty as a Symbol of Morality'. See also his essay *What are the Actual Progresses of Metaphysics in Germany since the Times of Leibniz and Wolff?* A 62 f.
17. Op. cit., p. 463.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 478.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. *Darśana* is rather inadequately translated as 'philosophy', the German term '*Weltanschauung*' in its widest range would be more appropriate—from the unreflected world-experience of the ordinary man, the scientific results of the fact-finding researcher, the analytic or speculative mind of the philosopher up to the revelations of the seer.
23. Op. cit., p. 476.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 477.
26. Ibid., p. 473.
27. Ibid., p. 477.
28. Ibid., p. 462.

29. Ibid., p. 479.
30. *Invitation to Indian Philosophy*, New Delhi, 1974, p. 78.
31. First published by Calcutta University, 1907.
32. Ibid., p. 5.
33. Op. cit., p. 478.
34. Op. cit., p. 28.
35. Op. cit., p. 6.

The Concept of Freedom and Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya

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I

The concept of freedom expounded by Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya (henceforward KCB) seems to me highly original and deserves careful consideration.[1] Though in this paper I primarily address myself to the view of KCB, it will not be my exclusive concern. In the process of examining KCB's view on the subject I propose to take other collateral views, especially the Kantian, the Vedāntic and the phenomenological ones, into account. KCB's assimilation and appropriation of others' views, as we find them, are not at all exegetical or documented. This significant style of delineation of the concept of freedom is an important feature of KCB's creative philosophizing. Unlike most of the contemporary approaches to freedom, KCB's approach is not mainly social, ethical or aesthetic. This is, however, not to deny its larger implications. His concept of freedom, one may perhaps rightly say, is basically ontological or metaphysical. Its dimensions range from the physical via the somatological and the psychological to the psychical and the spiritual. With amazing analytical skill and care he describes the disclosive process of freedom *in* the world, *in* our relation to the world of *objects*, *within* the contexts of psychological and psychical *subjectivity*, and *beyond* them. In brief, KCB is in search of what may be called reality of freedom, or, perhaps more appropriately, freedom as reality. Negatively speaking, to him the physical and other dimensions of freedom, though not unreal, are only transitional, facilitative of real freedom, not determined or negatived by the 'lesser', real-unreal levels of freedom.

II

In order to explicate what freedom is KCB, to start with, makes use of such paired concepts as subject/object, meaning/meant and feeling/felt. The initial duality between subject and object, meaning and meant, etc., are intended to be shown gradually as

continuities, unities and finally sublated, vindicating the primacy of subject over object, meaning over meant, and so on.

The subject is said to be distinct and therefore distinguishable from all objects.[2] Unlike the object, the subject has a being of its own which, from the ultimate standpoint, has nothing to do with the former. But at no stage, initial or final, is this sort of absolutistic status accorded to the object. The subject is source of all meanings. 'Meaning' may be construed in two different ways, as an active process of meaning and as a self-contained and abstract product. Meaning may or may not lead to some object other than itself. Meaning itself cannot be meant as an object. The point may be clarified in this way. The subject may have a feeling of pain. But the object which is responsible for or is a referent of this feeling may not itself be present in the concerned pain-consciousness. The subject's pain-consciouness may be confined only to the feeling of pain itself and without reaching out to that object which is 'causing' it. In other words, the objectward consciousness of the subject is, in a relative sense, free from the causal compulsion of the objective world. This possibility is claimed to be indicative of the subject's ability or intrinsic character of disengaging itself from the world of causal objects, including *other* subjects as well. Subjects as other are quasi-causal and social, not physical, in their presence and influence.

The subject/object asymmetry has been shown in a somewhat different way by the Kantian.[3] The constitutive apparatus necessary for the constitution of objects are *a priori* or independent of what is constituted by it. The forms of constitution are not open to the influence of the objective world. On the contrary, the causal impact on and orderliness in the objective world are to be found in the constitutive powers of the subject. It is plain that the objective causal world is not personal or private. Its intersubjective availability is to be ascribed to the regulative principles not peculiar to this or that empirical self. What is constituted is also regulated. The process of objectification is subject to two sets of principles, regulative and constitutive, subjective and intersubjective, empirical and transcendental, epistemic and ontic. Both the Kantian and KCB recognize the distinction between, as well as the relation of, the said two sets of principles. The acts of object-constitution are said to be sustained or regulated by the 'I-consciousness' or 'I-think' principle. While the Kantian highlights the distinction between the constitutive principles and the regulative ones, KCB emphasizes their unity. In this respect his position seems to be nearer to the Vedāntin's position rather than to the Kantian's.[4] However, in fairness to the Kantian one has to admit that he also does recognize the importance of correlation and cooperation between the constitutive and the regulative in making object possible.

KCB takes pains to point out that 'I' as a word is self-expressive. But the same cannot be said of its (I's) meaning. Because, he argues, what 'I' means is not the word 'I', but 'I' as the subject, as self-expression, as the source of meanings. One has to draw a line of distinction between the linguistic 'I' and the ontological 'I'. The speaker's understanding of the meaning of 'I' is bound to be different from the hearer's understanding of the same. But the very fact that the hearer can grasp, though incompletely, what the speaker means by 'I', is based on the ontological indentity of the speaker of 'I'. Linguistics and especially its semantic past are ontologically grounded. Otherwise unities of word-meanings and sentence-meanings and their more or less successful communication could hardly be accounted for. Meaningful compositionality of different parts of language is founded in reality itself.

The basic character of subject can be indicated in another way. It is known in itself, whereas object is known as distinguished from subject. Objectivity is admittedly subject-linked but subjectivity is not object-linked in the same way. Subject may be known by introspection, by inwardization of consciousness, which involves abstraction from object. But this abstraction is not total and therefore introspective self-knowledge remains in a way object-linked, accompanying a sense of knownness.

Consistent with his noetic dualism, the Kantian draws an important distinction between the *thinkable* transcendental subject and the *knowable* empirical subject.[5] Again, he hastens to add that the thinkable and the knowable, the empirical and the transcendental, though distinguishable, are functionally or epistemically inseparable. Moving a step forward he adds further that knowing itself may be known by reflection, reflecting on what is known through intuition, imagination and understanding via their forms or categories. Reflection shows that the underpinnings of knowledge by reflection are simultaneously objective and subjective.

A similar line of argument is traceable in the thought of the Vedāntin. It is pointed out that 'I' as determined by body, bodily and mental dispositions, *vṛttis* due to *avidyā*, is differently manifested. But the different levels or layers of manifestation are grounded in and sustained by the self-same 'I' as reality. The transcendental subject is neither knowable nor thinkable. It is only realizable. The Vedāntin's accent is on what may be called knowledge by identity, as distinguished from knowledge by difference or empirical knowledge. Gradual inwardization of consciousness or step-by-step withdrawal from the objective modes and determinations of consciousness is symbolic of increasing self- or subject-realization, getting into being.

In the phenomenological types of philosophy, largely influenced by Husserl, one can clearly notice a line of thinking which stands

very close to KCB's construal of the relation between subject and object, meaning and meant, etc. The phenomenologist maintains that 'I', the transcendental self, is the main source of all meaningful activities, theoretical as well as practical.[6] To put it differently, the main source of meaning-bestowing capacity is traceable to what is called transcendental subjectivity. However, this is not to deny that the empirical ego or self has also the power of meaningful object-constitution within it. All objective unities or meaningful unities are grounded in different levels of active consciousness, corporeal subjectivity, empirical subjectivity and transcendental subjectivity. At the corporeal level consciousness is primarily objectward and the objects available at that level are mainly hyletic or material-physical. This 'naturalistic mode of consciousness' remains present, of course in lesser degrees and transformed ways, also at the levels of empirical or psychical subjectivity. The unification and the reduction achieved by the levels of 'I-consciousness' are open-ended, open to higher forms of reduction and unification, *eidetic* and transcendental, for example. At the relatively lower levels consciousness moves both ways, *to* and *from* object. To the extent consciousness is immersed in the world of objects, it lacks in freedom. Conversely speaking, by deploying its higher constitutive powers when consciousness can disengage itself from the lower or the naturalistic modes of objective consciousness, it succeedes in achieving higher degrees of freedom Freedom, both cognitive and practical, marks the passage of consciousness from the naturalistic mode to the transcendental one. It may be pointed out here that 'I' always works with, in and through others. Negatively speaking, its cognitive journey or practical exploration never proves solo. Even its freedom is not totally without the presence of others. Others' bodies, language and speech acts, historical and cultural specificity impart a sort of ambiguity to human freedom. This ambiguity, broadly speaking, is due to the corporeality, linguisticality and historicality of human consciousness.

As noted earlier, the Vedāntin also speaks of different ways of knowing or encountering 'I'. For example, the embodied or the corporeal 'I' is perceptible externally and 'I' as determined by *vṛttis* is perceived internally. Interestingly enough, neither the Vedāntin nor the phenomenologist draws any sharp line of distinction between the 'I' as perceived from without and the 'I' as perceived from within. They seem to agree that both the representations of 'I' are continuous. The phenomenologist may even go to the extent of asserting that when one perceives another's body one perceives at the same time another's mind as well. In a way it may be stated that perceiving 'I' is like perceiving a person, a unified individual, not a conjunction of body *and* mind, two different entities.

The whole matter may be put in another way. Perceptual apprehension of body may be taken as apprehension of body as marked by absence of mind in it. But this absence is indicative (and even inclusive) of absence of the reality of mind in it. It is distinctively an absence (of mind) in body. Body is like an image or representation of body. It is a determinate consciousness from distance, spatial or temporal. Or, this imagist consciousness apprehends mind in body in absentia. This apprehensive unity is differentiated, i.e. it is neither strictly unitarian nor purely differential.

Let us look at the issue from a Kantian perspective. 'I' as object in space, as empirical self, is intuitable. At the level of intuitive apprehension what is *not* given, i.e. negation, is derivative, derived from what is given. Positively speaking, it is not constituted. Intuition as a faculty of representation is weaker than imagination. While the former is basically concerned with the given, the latter as a productive or constitutive capacity within it can add something more to the given. That is why image is not what can be entirely culled out or derived from the intuited given. The imagist apprehension of 'I' is a sketchy, not concrete, unity. At a still higher level, at the inferential one for instance, 'I' is apprehended as a unity of the manifold of related judgements. Even this inferential apprehension is not the best possible one of 'I'. The Kantian is known for his extreme caution against any attempt to grasp what is not at all available in intuition. The metaphysical-transcendental not given through intuition is said to be illusory, totally unknown. But it is thinkable and presupposition of whatever is known as objective unity. It is graspable as self-shining and undeniable reality.

To pave epistemologically his way to the top, the subject as free reality, KCB is obliged to deal with different grades of non-perceptual knowledge, different modes of representation. Our bodily 'I' may be known from within and that knowledge need not be perceptual. Secondly, what our self is may be immediately apprehended from its absence. Absence here works as presence. Thirdly, memory also enables us to grasp in a way what self or 'I' is. Memory may fail us at times but it is not necessarily fallible. Fourthly, productive imagination can also take us to the realm of 'I', the subject proper. But the subject available in productive imagination is sketchy, in the form of glimpses only, not really concrete. Finally, the possibility of inferential knowledge of the subject has to be admitted. Though mediated, cognitive consciousness in its inferential form is not debarred form knowing the self. The interesting point to be noted here is that KCB speaks of perception as a standard point of reference in the context of different grades of non-perceptual knowledge. This is bound to remind one of the

Kantian caution and concern for the bounds of sense. Not committed to 'the primacy of perception' as understood by Merleau-Ponty, he is in favour of scaling the transcendental peak along the perceptual route, to start with. The assumption is clear. The path to freedom lies in and through transcendence, transcendence of the perceptual and also the non-perceptual modes of cognitive consciousness mentioned above.

To KCB, the transcendental–metaphysical, though seemingly illusory, is real. It is incompletely real and only as such available in different perceptual and non-perceptual forms of knowledge. While the Kantian says that it is the presupposition of different forms of knowledge, KCB asserts that it is 'known as unknown'. Even as unknown it is claimed to be a ground of further knowing, enlargement of the area and height of what is known. It is also symbolic of freedom in the world of objects—epistemic, ethical and aesthetic. KCB's paradoxical expression 'known as unknown' is a measure of his distance from the noetic dualism of the Kantian. In the world of consciousness he is not in favour of drawing a sharp line of distinction between the empirical and the transcendental, between the physical and the metaphysical.

The Kantian dualism mentioned above is more or less criticized by the Vedāntin, KCB and the phenomenologist. However, the considerations underlying their anti-Kantianism are more or less different. Before this difference is indicated, perhaps it is pertinent to point out that Kant's own dualism is substantially qualified partly in the *First Critique* itself, more so in the *Second Critique*, and explicitly in the *Third Critique*. In the very intelligibility of the causal world the Kantian finds the presence of freedom. More positively speaking, to him, freedom and nature exist together.[7] To the transcendental self as noumenon, nothing (spatio-temporal) happens though it acts as the principle responsible for the intelligibility and unity of the phenomenal world. To put the matter differently, the objective fact of the causal world is backed up by its sustaining (from-behind) 'I think' principle. The natural domain of the causal unity seems to be teleologically informed of a transcendental harmony. Otherwise, one could not be a free moral agent under the causal influence of nature. Apparently, natural influence cannot take away one's freedom of will. To realize subject/object dissociation and thus to be free in will, one's will needs to be purged of all traces of unreason. However, on the Kantian's own admission, this realization is not easy to achieve. The necessary condition of making our will completely free, free from the influence of body and objective facts (subject to causality) cannot be easily satisfied. Somewhat similarly, it is not easy to cut out or judgmentally form aesthetic objects out of the materials gathered

from nature. All these assertions are unmistakably indicative of the Kantian's hidden dualism. But his elaborate arguments in support of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments in ethics as well as in aesthetics are clearly purported to smoothen the rugged edges of his basic dualistic approach.

The perceptually insistent dualism between nature and freedom is sought to be overcome by all the thinkers I have here in view, viz. the Vedāntin, the phenomenologist and KCB. Of course their approaches are different, despite some kindred characteristics of their basic positions. The point will be clearer in what follows.

In so far as the Vedāntic position is concerned, the cut between the empirical and the transcendental is only apparent or practical and makes sense only from the end of the empirical self subject to *avidyā* (nescience). When the empirical self realizes (through identification) the transcendental self, the 'practical' cut-off line just disappears. According to this account of self-realization, the highest form of freedom is not achievable by will, not even by rational will. Because, it is argued, different forms of will and their follow-up actions generate some such dispositions and propensities (*vāsanā, vṛttis, saṃskāras*, etc.) in us, instead of facilitating our freedom, they make it difficult for us to be free. Rather, they bind us strongly to the empirical world (*saṃsāra*). By implication what is said is this, the world of ethics marked by the difference between good and bad, right and wrong, etc. is purely empirical. But, interestingly enough, this empirical world, though transcendentally informed, is non-existence from the transcendental point of view. Strictly speaking, *mokṣa* (self-realization) is not an ethical end as ordinarily understood. It is like getting the got. It is like knowing the known. Even these expressions are inadequate, but *not* absolutely inappropriate, to express what *mokṣa* or the reality of the highest freedom is.[8]

The distinction between the illusory, the practical and the transcendental alluded to by the Vedāntin is taken note of by KCB in his own way. He draws important distinction between what he calls objective fact, psychic fact and spiritual fact. The highest spiritual fact is *sui generis*, though it lends itself to be grasped in different, alternative but 'absolute' modes *(anekānta)*, as truth, as *rasa* (aesthetic feel), as (objectless) subjective spirituality or freedom. This formulation of the different faces of the highest reality does not require KCB to deny the distinction, for example, between objective fact and psychical fact. On the contrary, it is necessary for him in order to relate his own concept of philosophy to the natural sciences and thus to enrich the former and unify the latter. Relative to objective fact, psychical fact is said to be more real, concrete and disclosive of freely appropriable reality. Briefly

speaking, object (nature) is an appearance to subject (psyche). Neither (Kantian) subject-object duality nor (Hegelian) subject-object unity is acceptable to KCB. Their duality is symbolic of their felt (mutual) dissociation. Their unity is an intellectual or surface construal of their deep underlying identity.[9]

At this particular point to recall the phenomenologist's view seems to be in order. According to him, the transcendental (subjectivity) is neither *a priori* nor anti-empirical. It is claimed to be 'surplus' over the empirical (subjectivity), making it available to us in the forms of knowledge, aesthetic experience and ethical consciousness. The difference between subject and object, between intending consciousness and what is intended, is said to be valid throughout the scientific line of enquiry, in the realm of ethical enterprises, etc. But these forms of difference are in no way quite promising in carrying out the programmes of eidetic and transcendental reduction. Within the highest domain of 'rigorous science' (science as philosophy) the difference and specificity of different forms of life, different modes of experience, historical epochs and cultural forms tend to disappear, because it is claimed that all forms of diversity and difference are increasingly appropriated and comprehensively constituted and reconstituted by transcendental subjectivity. Of course, what is thus appropriated and constituted is not fixed and permanent but internally assimilated and reassimilated and horizonally expansive, endlessly expansive. Unlike KCB's idea of the highest form of freedom (as reality), the phenomenologist's highest form of reality is knowledge in its essence. To KCB, knowledge is only one of the many faces of reality, one of the many roads to freedom. It is a sort of gradual disengagement *via negativa*.

III

The question of disengagement (as freedom) is to be understood against the background assumption that subject at its sub-psychic, perceptual or bodily level, is intimately related to its environment. Undoubtedly it is a body among bodies, an object among objets of various types, physical, biological and psychological. But, KCB points out that among bodies as objects the percipient's body has a singularity, unique dissociatedness, of its own. For example, I cannot be conscious of my body in that way in which I am conscious of other types of bodies and those of other human beings. How I can or rather am obliged to single out my body, in spite of its association with other bodies, appears to be 'mystical'. The percipient's awareness of its singularity and dissociation is somehow (according to

KCB, mystically) informed of the underlying subjectivity. Subjectivity is not only psychical or psychological but also somatological.

This somatological awareness or feeling of one's own body is available from two different but related ends, inside the concerned body as well as from outside. Body-feeling is said to be sensuous but not perceptual. From this it is clear that KCB draws a distinction, however tenuous it may be, between the perceptual and the sensuous. In some cases at least, as it is in the case of our body-consciousness, the sensuous need not be perceptual. Felt body is like a presentation which is not tagged to some perceptual object. One's feeling of one's own body can thus be said to be non-perceptual. The difference between object and its representation is noteworthy. A presentative awareness (body-feeling, for instance) need not be representative of some object.

Another point to be noted in this connection is this. Our body-feeling is to be distinguished not only from the objective-representative fact, but also from the psychic fact. But the distinction between body-feeling and psychic fact is not sharp because the former holds out the promise of the latter. Somatological feeling may, not necessarily does, develop into psychic fact. For making this development possible introspection or a sort of phenomenological exploration is called for. Unlike the phenomenologist, KCB does not maintain that consciousness is necessarily active or projective. It can be so but it is not necessarily so. That explains how and why disengagemental forms of consciousness are attainable. In introspection our body-feeling starts getting resolved into psychic feeling. This is a sort of anti-projective or regressive 'withdrawal' of consciousness within a deeper layer of itself. The feeling of detachment or disengagement from object, in this case from body, provides us the 'first' or an inarticulate taste of freedom. The higher and enlarged forms of freedom are analogous to, and an outcome of, further deepened exploration of freedom from the felt body, from the level of sub-psychic consciousness.[10]

KCB's account of self-knowledge has a clear Kantian ring to it. Equally clear is its proximity to the Vedāntic line of thought. But a close perusal of his position brings to one's notice his assimilation of some Sāṁkhya insights, especially subject-object duality, at the initial stage of developing his own position.

The Kantian clearly asserts that soul cannot apprehend itself as quite dissociated from the object in adjoining space. Its self-encounter is therefore bound to be embodied and objective, mediated by its body in the world of objects. Freedom or dissociation of soul from body is stated to be a matter of degree only. Like 'pure matter', 'pure soul' is an abstraction. Soul is and works in communion with other souls. And this communion is mediated through the

representation of the material world. The proclaimed 'privilege' of one's self-knowledge appears to be confined only to the lesser degree of mediacy. This sort of mediacy, however, is not to be confused with immediacy. By implication, the possibility of immediate self-encounter is ruled out.

Self-experience without outer experience of object is impossible. The Cartesian view that except self nothing is immediately 'provable' is rejected by the Kantian. Self, being initially embodied as it is, cannot be proved immediately. This line of reasoning is a reiteration of the Kantian's commitment to dualism. All objects, objective bodies, including the embodied selves, are external to one another. This mutual externality is due to their spatial situatedness. More fundamentally speaking, in space everything is external to other things. But, interestingly, space itself is *in* us as a form of intuition. From this intuitional standpoint all things, both external ones and myself, may be said to be immediately self-witnessed, myself primarily in inner sense (time) and other things in outer sense. The immediacy argument, though understandably feeble at the level of sense, can perhaps be somewhat strengthened by recalling the fundamental Kantian view to the effect that when I say 'I sense', what in fact I sense (including the form of sensing) is backed up by the higher principle (in the form of) 'I think'.

The role of body in the context of knowledge in general is consistently ambivalent. On the one hand, it helps ourselves to know life in nature and, on the other, it proves a hindrance to our thought for the beyond. In a different form the Kantian thesis of somatological ambivalence is discernible also in KCB's theory. But, unlike the Kantian, he affirms that this ambivalence is only initial and not 'consistent' or final. On the said point of difference between the initial position and the final position KCB's own view is akin to the Vedāntin's and bears no distinct Kantian or dualistic imprint. The issue may be briefly indicated in the following way.

Body is said to be the enjoyer *(bhoktā)* of the empirical world *(samsāra)* and self witnesses it without being involved in it. This formulation of the Vedāntin is somewhat like that of the defender of the Sāṃkhya position. But the difference between the two, though not negligible, need not detain me here. The objects constructed by the embodied *jīva* (self) are in the nature of dream objects, i.e. cancellable in course of time. In contrast, the objects constructed by God are experienceable at the waking stage. Although more durable in character, God-made objects, like dream objects, are also corrigible. To explain the overlap between the said two types of objects the Vedāntin deploys such concepts as *citta, buddhi, ahaṃkāra, and antaḥkaraṇa.* Without using the resources contained in these concepts the origin and existence of the

empirical world remain an inexplicable enigma. *Brahman* is the *nimitta* (efficient) and *Prakṛti* the material cause of this enigmatic world. The projective and the suppressive powers of *māyā* conjointly with the powers of *prāṇa* and *avidyā* are claimed to be the ground of this world of sense, of the sense-perceptible object.

The distinction between body and self is sought to be clarified in terms of the analogies of sun and ray, *paṭākāśa* (boundless sky) and *ghaṭākāśa* (the sky 'bound' or available within a jar), etc. Also extensively used in this context is the *sarpa-rajju* (snake-rope) analogy of superimposition (not contact, not real relation). Self is both self-evident and self-evidencing. It is not object but it reveals all objects. While body as object is known through desire, memory, efforts and perception, self-knowledge is nothing but the negation of the knowledge of not-self. Like all other objects, body is merely a *vivarta* (appearance) of *Brahman.* With self-realization, as and when the identity of *Ātman* (self), individual self, with the *paramātmā* (supreme self) is realized, body (rather, our body-sense) gets dissolved.

Brahman alone is said to be supremely subject (and, strictly speaking, having no object for itself). *Jīvas* are objective subjects, or to put it differently, subjective objects. *Brahman* is nameless and formless. But in it is grounded all nameables and formations. Body is name-and-form *(nāma-rūpa). Jīvanmukti* (liberation-in-life) and embodiedness go well together. But *videhamukti,* the highest stage of self-realization, has nothing to do with body. Body, as locus of *vāsanā,* is needed for *karma* giving rise to the craving for enjoyment of the fruits of *karmas,* but has apparently nothing to add to our liberation *(mokṣa).* Interestingly, from the empirical point of view, without negation of and disengagement from this body, 'freedom of the subject' makes little or no sense.

Extensive use of such concepts as *mukti* and *mokṣa,* liberation and salvation, etc., may give one the false impression that the concepts of freedom that I am trying to delineate are basically theological. They are not. Careful attention would make it abundantly clear that the exercise is mainly ontological and epistemological. What is being attempted is to ascertain the relation, different grades of relation, between subject and object. In the process the properties of different grades of object and subject are being discerned and explicated.

For clarification of the issue let me take up once again the phenomenologist's approach to it. Naturally the idioms used for the purpose would sound secular and correct to those who are anti-theologically disposed. To the phenomenologist, body is a dynamic field of inertia (passivity). The simultaneous presence of dynamic and inertial properties in body often leads one to characterize

human body as systematically ambiguous. Body is credited as the main link of our consciousness to the world of objects. Its passivity and motility make it ideally suitable to work as the most effective linkage between the seemingly two worlds of our being, objective and subjective. Body is *self*-grounded and as such it is obliged to return to, and get itself replenished by, its own resource, its *self*-source. The projective character of the body is evident from its objectwardness, its enworlded orientation. Not only is it thrown into the world, but it also returns therefrom to its originary resource.[11]

Even this formulation of the relation between body and world, bodily subjectivity and object world, may appear somewhat figurative. Let me, therefore, put it in a slightly different manner. The human body, being essentially consciousness as it is, has both intentional outwardness and self-affirming consciousness in it. Broadly speaking, object-referring and subject-returning movements characterize our somatic consciousness. In the forms of lack, absence, need, effort, will, etc., it goes out of us (to the world). In the forms of presence, availability, satisfaction, fulfilment, etc., it returns to itself. In the changing contents of willing and feeling our body not only goes out of itself but, at the same time, also explores varying depths and regions of its own consciousness. *Pari passu*, it surveys the area of its communion with other selves.

Negatively speaking, our bodily self is not, rather cannot, remain self-enclosed. Like other objects (bodies) self's own body is open as a possible object of knowledge in two different but complementary ways, both from within and without. From without, when as a simulated outsider I look at my body, I cannot grasp it without a sense of uniqueness attached to it. Even for myself it is difficult to ignore *totally* the uniqueness 'attached to' other human bodies. In a way I am ontologically obliged to recognize not only my own somatic subjectivity, but also the same of and in others. True, the articulate sense of uniqueness present in my own subjectivity is not there in my apprehension of others' subjectivity. In the latter case it tends to get more or less subdued or faint. But one thing is clear: I am not free ontologically, or really free, to ignore the uniqueness of others.

This brings out, among other things, my spatial spread-outness or community consciousness even at the somatic level. This 'outgoing' perception reveals and brings back an inward depth of its own at every stage. It is implicitly active all the time in the sense of uniqueness attached to our somatic consciousness. Even amidst others, other human beings of our own or of different cultures, we cannot completely cease to be what we are. Forgetfulness of self-identity beyond a point is impossible even at the level of body. With progressive exploration of this identity we start getting back to ourselves, gradually freeing ourselves from an alien sense of

objectivity, and slowly acquiring a taste of freedom as subjectivity in our own being.

This way of arriving at freedom, an intermediary stage of freedom, may be understood from another point of view. I mean the epistemological point of view.

Freedom at the level of thought is to be distinguished from that at the level of image. Image is intimately related to object whereas thought's relation to object is mediated by both image and sense-percepts. All images, productive or creative ones, of the poet and the painter, for example, are often found to be 'abstract' in the good sense of the term. Objective root or perceptual lineage of the creative image is not easily traceable. However, this is not to deny altogether the objective reference of this type of image. But, unlike image, argues KCB, thought is self-contained in a strict sense. It is 'detached', 'a completed product', and not tied to any space-time position. Thought can be said to be *meaning* in the sense that it is self-presentative and not representative of this or that object. For example, when one says 'I am trying to think' what one means is that one is engaged in grasping some meaning (of which perhaps he has only a very vague idea). In other words, 'trying to think' is a cognitive quest for meaning and not a search for a perceptible or positional object.[12]

The Kantian ways of explicating what image is are various. First, it may be a faded perception of an object. Second, it may be a schema, a mental anticipation, of possible object(s). It is a clue to objective application. Third, it may be a product of what is called reproductive imagination. This aspect of the Kantian theory of image has received very pointed attention by Coleridge both in his theoretical and poetical works.[13] Fourth and final, image may be a product of *a priori* imagination. The form of imagination, which has no root in any perceptually ascertainable object, may also yield a definite image. The latter, unlike other sorts of image, does not have any space-time address or empirical lineage.

The Vedāntin's account of the relation between imagination and thought is also indicative of gradual disengagement or detachment of the self's consciousness from its objective moorings. Like the empiricist, he readily concedes that sense-perceptions leave behind them their traces *(saṃskāras)* to be found in our consciousness. With the passage of time these traces, unless reinforced by appropriate and repeated sense-perceptions, tend to fade away. But the more effective ways of removing these *saṃskāras* are meditation and contemplation. For the *saṃskāras* the meditative and contemplative consciousness proves to be an inhospitable habitat.

The whole process of epistemic freedom may be put very briefly in this way. From the material corporeality of the objective world our

consciousness can disengage itself step-by-step, through somatic consciousness, introspective (psychological) consciousness, essential consciousness and transcendental consciousness. Transcendental subjectivity or constitutive consciousness of the highest form appropriates and assimilates all 'lesser' forms of consciousness. This apparently regressive movement of consciousness is really intended to be progressive attainment of the higher levels of freedom-consciousness.

IV

Thought is fulfilled meaning. In KCB's philosophical scheme of thinking it symbolizes the high watermark of 'psychic subjectivity'. Beyond it is the realm of what he calls spiritual subjectivity. It is marked by the absence of object or what is meant. But this subjectivity is not itself meaningless. It has a meaning of its own which is quite dissimilar from objective meaning. When, for example, pointing at the book before me, I say, 'this book', the ostensive word 'this' is intended to ostened a particular book as object which is perceptually available to other normal human beings. But when I feel myself and use some such expression as 'I feel myself', the word *I* is not intended to ostened my body or a part of it. *I* does not stand for my body. Rather, I am different from my body. But, strictly speaking, unless a meaning, a more or less definite sense, could be given to the word *I* the derivative expression 'my body' cannot be given any meaning at all. Obviously it does have a meaning. Otherwise my identity, position, or address in the world could not be determined and, therefore, my relation with other subjects, family members, debtors, creditors and properties, could not be successfully determined. The determinability of the said relations (marked by an element of indeterminateness) indicates that the word *I* does have a meaning. While the meaning of *this* is objective, that of *I* is unobjective or subjective. What *I* means is not necessarily either uniquely singular or general. It mainly depends upon the context of the use of the word. For example, what the utterer means by *I* is different from what the hearer understands, having heard the word. Again, in the books of English grammar *I* as a personal pronoun has a general meaning of its own which is not uniquely attached to this *I* or that *I*.

The introspective awareness of meaning is unobjective. So is our feeling. Positively speaking, feeling is subjective and what is felt as its content is believable even if it is unknown. While the content of thought seems to be distinguished from thought itself, the content of feeling, the felt, is not analogously so. This distinction between the two is evident in our introspective awareness. Feeling, though

bound up with thought and imagination, is characterized by the consciousness of its difference from these two modes of consciousness. In the cases of thought and imagination their objects are somehow present. But in introspection the presence of the felt in feeling is not known but remains merely symbolic.

While in feeling the subject's dissociation or disengagement from objectivity is nearly complete, in willing the subject's identification with objectivity is clearly evident. KCB thinks that at its initial stage willing is a free expression of feeling. But in feeling consciousness gets distanced from its objective content, however inarticulate that may be. In willing the objective content is sought to be won over or conquered. The possible way out from the blindness of objective 'conquest' and the possible error inherent in distant feeling seems to lie in knowledge. Knowledge has in it both consciousness of the unknown (in the form of feeling) and self-projective objectivity (in the form of willing). Also, it is more promising in being free from the blindness of feeling and the error of aggressive willing. Feeling is marked by its two stages, freedom from *actual* thought and freedom from *possible* thought. In actual thought self-being is present. But in possible thought self stands negated or is absent in a way. Possible thought is linked to actual thought. Conversely speaking, the former is an anticipation of the latter. Somewhat similarly, the feeling of self-negation is sustained by feeling and, additionally, is itself a feeling. Reflexively, feeling may be its own content. And therefore to speak of feeling of feeling is not mere verbiage. Through feeling the subject may explore and attain another feeling of a deeper or higher reach. But there are forms of feeling beyond the ken of thought or meaning. To use KCB's terminology, there are two levels of subjective exploration of consciousness, 'unmeant' and 'unmeanable'. He speaks of two types of unmeanable, 'meant unmeanable', self-contradicted knowledge, and 'mere function of meaning', knowing without object. The meant unmeanable is feeling of feeling and pure knowing function is a complete detachment from the felt content.

An analogous line of thinking is traceable in Kant. He speaks of 'aesthetic' and 'sensibility' elements in feeling. He mentions also two types of sense-perception: (i) sensation (*Empfindung*), which informs us of the world and of our bodily states, and (ii) feeling *(Gefühl)*, which is primarily subjective, not representation or information of particular objects. In aesthetic judgment two senses of feeling, subjective and objective, need to be united or fused.

Causal sensibility cannot coerce *human* will. Causality operates in a different way at the animal level. At this level sensibility can casually affect the concerned animal's will, need or want. On the degree of affection/affectivity depends the degree of its (possible) freedom.

It is reason which imparts the 'ought' (end) character to human will and thus lifts it above the level of causal necessity and puts it in the realm of moral necessity. For the sake of consistency the Kantian is obliged to admit that notwithstanding the animality of its bodily locus, there is 'something' in human will which makes its compatibility with embodiedness possible.

Feeling may be other-oriented without being self-abnegative. Feeling as self-reflexive is self-searching. That which is searched is objective in sense, a gradually dissolving sense, and that which is meant gradually gains in objectivity. The latter however continues to remain grounded in subjectivity. That partly explains how the subject as artist can form aesthetic objects which are judgeable and inter-subjectively sharable.

The Vedāntic way of explicating bodily feeling, as indicated earlier, has two aspects, viz. body as affected from without and body as getting gradually freed from its objective co-relates' pressure. Body-feeling, both subjective and objective, is psychically and spiritually informed, though at varying levels. It can neither be completely autonomous in the ideal Kantian sense, nor totally assimilated in our inward psychic consciousness. Human consciousness is obliged to put up with the obduracy of body-feeling. At the same time, it is conceded by the Vedāntin that our body, human body, despite its material character and psychical composition *(nāma-rūpa)*, is suffused with a higher-level consciousness. Feelings, particularly of pleasure and pain, affect will *(vāsanā)*. The object-linked *vāsanās* make our nature, psycho-somatic nature, more and more active (*karma*), gluing us more and more to *karmaphalas* (fruits of action), whereas the *vāsanās* devoid of pleasant/painful character lead the self to perform *niṣkāma karmas*, actions without cravings of fruits/effects to be enjoyed (or suffered). *Niṣkāma karmas* also successfully induce the self to search itself more and more deeply. In a way it paves the way of freedom *(naiṣkarmyasiddhi)*. Depth of freedom gets increasingly broader in horizon. Traces of objective determination or negation start gradually disappearing. Self thus gets restored to its true and own self-shining nature (freedom as reality).

The phenomenologist's construal of freedom, like Kant's, rests, at least to start with, on a sort of dualism between the nature studied by different physical sciences and our free will as explored by psychology—phenomenological or spiritual. The element of dualism appears less articulate in the works of the Vedāntin and KCB. If the first is called dualism, the second may be called duality. Like all modes of human consiousness, will is also characterized by what Husserl calls intentionality or objectwardness. Taking cues from Husserl, thinkers like Ricoeur speak of a sort of initial antithesis

between 'the voluntary' and 'the involuntary'. The former designates the realm of freedom and the latter that of nature. To speak of (in terms of) confrontation between freedom and nature would be unnecessarily dramatic, dramatizing the compatible, if not complementary, relation between human freedom and the natural world within which it is available.[14]

The basic locus of freedom is man or, one may even say, fallible man. Phenomenologically described, our will seems to disclose at least three different stages. To start with, willing is a type of *decision*-making. In decision one forms a *project*. When I say, for example, 'I will', what I do is to form a project, a project of action with a direction or goal built into it. This first part of chalking out the project largely depends on my abilities, propensities and dispositions. Secondly, I cannot will without willing something, i.e. it must have its object or content. Will cannot be emptied of all contents. Of one's will it can perhaps be plausibly said that 'will can will itself', but the point to be borne in mind is this: what is willed, the will as content, is different and distinguishable from the acts of willing of this or that person. One should be extremely cautious in accepting Hegel's well-known criticism of Kant's notion of Good Will as 'will that wills nothing'. Will may well entertain or will *form* or *structure* (of action) as its content. One may not be conscious of this or that specific action falling within or exhibiting a particular form (as content).

Will to act and to act are quite distinguishable. Wilful or active consciousness tends to culminate in actual action, irrespective of the latter's consequences. On the consequences of my action my will to act may not have a direct bearing or relation. This brings to the fore the third stage of the relation between the voluntary and the involuntary, between nature and freedom. The main reason why one's proposed course of action or project cannot be fulfilled to one's own satisfaction is the insistent presence of *other* as nature, *others* as human beings, or, as it happens in most cases, both. The relation between one self and the other self, even between one self and the physical nature around it, knows no permanent and fixed boundary line.

The elaboration of the last point brings out the role of self, or subject, endowed with will in the formation and execution of its project. For example, the natural scientist does not encounter or discover a readymade object. In effect he encounters the object of which he himself is an author or co-author. This authorship or constitutive agency is not confined only to the natural object but also extends to our own bodies as objects and minds as objects. However, it has to be admitted that our ability to objectify physical objects, somatic objects, mental objects, cultural objects, etc., is not

uniformly or unilaterally determinable by our self, by our will. For, as already pointed out, the realm of the involuntary cannot be appropriated and assimilated without residue within the voluntary. In other words, objects cannot be totally internalized or transformed into subjective entities. In a sense freedom remains always more or less limited. But its limits can well be pushed behind, i.e. the horizons of freedom can be endlessly expanded.

V

In order to understand KCB's account of what he calls spiritual subjectivity one of the steps which appears most advisable to me to bear in mind is as follows: While the existentialist-phenomenologists like Ricoeur always speaks of (i) the *objectwardness* of consciousness (a variation of Husserl's thesis of 'consciousness *of* . . .'), and (ii) the *reciprocity* of subject (as free will) and object (as nature), the former at all different stages (of course with varying accent) reminds us of the detachmental or disengagemental character of the subjective consciousness. Further, by implication, given the basic thrust of his concept of freedom, KCB is not required to harp on the idea of reciprocity. Nor is he obliged to fall back upon the Kantian thesis of teleological harmony for the purpose. After all, KCB, unlike Husserl and Ricoeur, was not working under the Kantian burden of undoing the double effects of noetic dualism and ontological dualism.

Introspective awareness reveals that subjective fact is distinct in itself and at a level lower than feeling it brings out the dissociation of the knowledge of the fact from the object. At the level of feeling one becomes conscious of this dissociation. Introspective awareness of feeling, notwithstanding the known distinction obtained within it, is recognitive or self-identificative in character. Pure subjectivity stands for not only conscious absence but also impossibility of meaning. To quote KCB himself on this very complex and important point: 'Introspection is a subjectivity that is detached both from being and from negation, being positive as freedom.'[15] It is taken to be the first person *I*, identical with the function of believing or meaning, itself neither believed or meant nor even meanable, and as such not doubtable. In feeling, in the psychic fact, the distinction between 'I' and its felt body is present only in a 'ghostly' manner but not totally annulled. However, the *possibility* of total annulment, complete detachment, starts sending its signals at this psychic level.

Elaborating the point, KCB once again brings out the difference between Kant's approach to self and his own. The self, to Kant, is the thinking function, thinking of a thought or 'accomplished meaning'. The speaking or meaning function is to KCB more fundamental than thinking. The introspective self is not only

detached from thinking and feeling, but also undeniably self-knowing. Secondly, one can hardly fail to note another difference between Kant and KCB *vis-à-vis* their modes of denial of the objectivity of the self as first person *I*. Kant's denial of the self as object is total because, according to him, it is in the self that the very possibility or constitution of object is grounded. But when KCB states that *I* is neither meanable not unmeanable the statement is to be understood as follows. It is 'not meanable' in the way different objects, different bodies, for example, are meant. It is 'not unmeanable', i.e. meanable, in a special non-problematic sense. If we take, as KCB does, *meaning* as 'the thinnest presentation of object', the introspective self can be said to be meanable. For example, when as a speaker I call myself *I*, this word *I* is understood *qua* word and not through its meaning. Here the word is credited to have a meaning function or *I*-function, not a meaning (as such). In Kant's philosophy, *I* as thinking *I* is said to be capable of thinking itself, the speaker's self. But, KCB maintains, *I* as an expression of introspection or a linguistic use has nothing, not even negatively, to do with thought. While to me *I* as the speaker is introspectively available, to the hearer it is available differently, as awareness of a possible introspection, introspection of how the speaker introspects.

In quest of spiritual subjectivity beyond introspection, KCB points out that the word 'I' is simultaneously symbolic and symbolized by the introspective self. This meaning-value or symbolic-value of 'I' as used by the speaker is indicative of a higher grade of consciousness than one's actual introspection. Actual introspection as unrealized knowledge is only self-evidencing (to another) and not self-evident (to itself). The *missing* self-evident character of the self is indicative of the necessity of a spiritual enterprise for (higher or the highest possible) self-realization. Actual introspection is implicitly social. It is self for other. Others' knowing of the self and the self's knowing of others are co-present in self-evidencing introspective awareness. The self-evident character or level is still elusive. But it is possible for the self to grasp this missed, elusive and higher-level character of self-consciousness. The introspective awareness of the possibility of a higher-level self-consiousness is half-dissociated from the introspective self. Complete dissociation of this awareness is achieved when its content, a subjective state, is grasped as illusory and not merely missing, absent, elusive or possible. Somewhat like (but not *quite* like) one's illusion about the objective, one may be under illusion even about the subjective. When my present subjective state discovers that my previous or another subjective state (in relation to its object) is mistaken (because of the discovered mistaken identity of the concerned object), even then I am obliged to have 'faith' in my present subjective state which is

corrective and sublative of the mistaken or illusory one. It is true that in principle my corrective subjective state may itself be corrected by a subsequent and another corrective and appropriative state of (introspective) subjectivity, but this corrective/corrected or appropriative/appropriated distinction available in the introspective awareness of self-identity does not appear to be open to the charge of infinite or indefinite regress (*anavasthā doṣa*). In order to fend off the possible objection on the point KCB argues that illusion-detectivity or the appropriative function of the introspective self is not essential but only an accidental, and therefore 'eliminable', feature of the self's self-identity. To this self-identity the distinction between itself and subjective fact is unknown. In brief, this intuitable self-identity, when actually intuited, is self-evident and is in no need of any other evidence to sustain it. But until and unless that stage of intuited self-identity is attained, a very faint trace of distinction is present in the self-revealing self. The vanishing distinction is, in a sense, a subjective illusion and as such it is both 'something' to be recognized and superseded. As and when '[t]he non-being of [this] distinction is finally understood . . . the conception of the absolute self [as freedom]' is also understood.

It is in and through its progressive-regressive movements that the introspective self, conscious of a demand to know itself as subject, cognitively goes up annulling step-by-step its distinction from the bodily self, the psychic self and different grades obtained within them. Essentially subjective in nature, introspective awareness of the subject is neither thought nor meant, neither feeling nor its absence. It is not even to be taken as distinct as the subject to which it reveals itself. It is not in the nature of mere negation, nor is it the awareness of an indefinite. Though definite and positive, it cannot be said to be not known in any ordinary sense. As actually undissociated from object it cannot be claimed to be known either. Only the awareness of dissociation provides glimpses of *I* (the subject) as (the realm of) possible freedom.[16]

From the above it appears that KCB's phenomenological way of delineating the concept of freedom has been influenced, among others, by the Vedāntin's sublative and transcendental method of *neti neti* ('not this', 'not this'). In the subject's way of achieving its freedom (as reality) it has to negotiate several turns, positionally objective, bodily subjective, object-related image, objectless image, objective feeling, feeling as such (without object), known object, knowing subjectivity, etc. At the higher stage of subjectivity, in feeling, for example, one arrives at the *faith* in the achievability of freedom. In introspection even the feeling of achieved freedom gets negated and the subject knows for the first time the possibility of freedom. Every turn of the subject's consciousness of the object

and object-related itself is attended and impelled by a *neti* ('not this') consciousness. It is in this way that different grades of perception/percept, image/imagination, representation and presentation are grasped and transcended. Bipolarity of the objective and the subjective is both recognized and sublated by and in the subject's higherlevel subjectivity. The recognition of the distinction is a prelude to its annulment. But one annulment gives rise to another higher-level distinction, to be annulled again. But every stage of distinction and its annulment is informed of a consciousness which itself is not marked by distinction or duality or bipolarity. At the highest level freedom is available in 'my' consciousness and its revelation in 'me' must not be taken as qualified (*upādhi*) by my 'I' or self. At that level freedom is 'de-individualized but not . . . indefinite'. It is, affirms KCB, absolute and self-evident.

From the positional or spatio-temporal specificity of object to de-individualized and indeterminate freedom as reality is a long journey. The Vedāntic way of tracing it, as we have already noted briefly above, is to a great extent anticipative of the view defended by KCB. After we briefly recapitulate it and recall the Kantian approach to the matter, I would like to indicate my own view on it.

The specificity of object is due to *vṛiti* of *antaḥkaraṇa,* but the general form *(ākṛti)* of object *(viṣaya)* is due to *buddhi* (intellect) grounded in self-consciousness. Both the objectivity of object and the subjectivity of subject more or less lack what may be called a permanent clearcut character or bipolarity. *Antahkarana, buddhi, ākṛti,* etc., underlying the available forms (rather formations) not only of object but also of subject undergo change and, in the process, the subject-object relationship changes too. For example, the object of feeling, the felt, does not remain fixed irrespective of the modes of its representation to the self. In the primary stage of sympathetic feeling object seems to stand apart from subject as it were. But when sympathetic feeling reaches the level of contemplative consciousness, object starts losing its sharp distinguishing edge, the *saṃskāras/vṛttis* of its subject start dissolving, and gradually freedom starts dawning on our self-consciousness. The origin of this 'dawning' is not from without the self but lies within itself.

Rasas (aesthetic feeling), particularly *śāntarasa,* the feeling of quietude, though disputed, know no sharp distinction between subject and object. At a lower level, *rasa* may be enjoyable in relation to an object but its essence is claimed to be an eternal feeling or an eternal value. At a relatively higher level of sympathy, the self though conscious of the concerned *rasa's* objective content, is more or less free to enjoy it, partly because of the

endless variety of words and sounds *(ukti-vaicitrya* and *dhvani-vaicitrya)* of its presentations and partly because of the self's 'heart-universality' *(sahṛdayatā)*, the ubiquity of sympathy. Beyond the primary (object-linked) sympathy and the relatively free subjective sympathy, there is contemplative sympathy. The first is marked by expression, the second by detachment and the third by eternity. At the third or the final stage all distinctions get immersed in the contemplative *I*-consciousness. It is freedom in feeling, aesthetic feeling *par excellence.* In *rasa* space-time difference and subjective-objective distinction gradually disappear. In this sort of feeling distance is significantly annihilated, difference substantially reduced or even altogether abolished, and human intersubjectivity is restored in the form of universal self-identity. It is self-expressive in a unique way. Its mediumistic aids and adjuncts (like meaningful words, sweet and rhythmic sounds, beautiful colours, their forms and composition), though they appear merely useful to start with, are indispensable indeed at the level of 'penultimate' communication. Ultimately, however, through self-consciousness as *rasa* the self becomes self-fulfilling and free.[17]

It is indeed very interesting to note that not only the analysis of the structures of our cognitive and moral experience, but also that of the structure of our aesthetic experience provides a deep insight into the nature of freedom. The point has been convincingly brought out by Kant in his *Critique of Judgement.*[18] In this work the main thrust of Kant's argument is to show that in our aesthetic judgement, which is reflective in character, the relation between the felt object and its appropriate concept always leaves room for free play of imagination. The object that pleases me, my aesthetic taste, is not (cognitively) peculiar to me but its beauty satisfies all others endowed with aesthetic sensibility. What lifts the object from its 'positional specificity' and makes it universally enjoyable is the joint effect of our imaginative and cognitive powers brought to bear upon the concerned object. The titillating pleasantness of the aesthetic experience is rooted in the harmony between the given object and the 'elusive' concept.

When the basic or categorial features of the judgment of taste (quality, quantity, relation and modality) are clarified. Quality is to be understood here as (object-affected) subjectivity. But our feeling-response or affection is in a way disinterested, not fastening us to it as an object of desire, and free from the question of existence or non-existence, of reality or imaginary nature, of the object. Secondly, it is indefinite, neither singular nor general (in the ordinarily accepted logical sense). The 'positionality' of the aesthetic object cannot be empirically singled out. An element of ideality or generality is inherent in it and that at least partly explains

both its positional indefiniteness and its intersubjective availability (availability in others' feeling). Thirdly, the aesthetic judgment is marked by a seeming teleology. One feels that the structure or form of the object is purported to promote a harmonious interplay of imagination and conception. Teleology or purposiveness, according to Kant, exists wherever some will is found to be satisfying or exemplifying some object. Aesthetic purposiveness may be attributed to an object even if it is not known to have a concept imposed upon it by some will. It brings out the *as-if* or supposed character of teleology. What makes the conformity of object to concept possible, to what their harmony is due, may remain theoretically unknown, and yet we are aesthetically *free* to contemplate it (provided of course the formal unity of the object is borne in mind). Finally, modally speaking, the aesthetic judgement is *necessary,* in the sense that it ought to be shared by everyone. This intersubjective sharability or universal communicability of aesthetic feeling is sought to be transcendentally grounded by Kant in what he calls a 'common [aesthetic] sense'.[19]

One can easily liken, not without justification, KCB's theory of aesthetic intersubjectivity, on the basis of 'heart-universal', a term used by him meaning a sort of non-intellectual sympathy, to Kant's concept of aesthetic commonsense. Kant has been accused of not having at all a 'phenomenology of the knowledge of others' and also of cluttering up his concept of commonsense with various epistemological considerations.[20] This pro-Husserlian criticism of Kant as formulated by Ricoeur seems too harsh. However, this is not to deny the importance of the pains taken by Husserl to develop an elaborate theory of the constitution of the 'Other'. The Husserlian way of *constituting* the Other proves understandably incompatible with the empirical realism of the Kantian and therefore unacceptable to the latter. The Kantian and the Husserlian accounts of the transit route from the empirical object to the transcendental self (or subjectivity) are considerably different. While to the Kantian the self is a thing-in-itself and as such (as a regulative principle) supports from behind the empirical self's knowledge of all objects, including the embodied self itself and other selves, to the phenomenologist even the transcendent self (or subjectivity) is self-constitutive and the acts of self-constitution and other-constitution know no fundamental division between them. To account for the categorical unity of phenomenal objects Kant is obliged to draw rather heavily on the presupposed resources of the synthetic unity of apperception. Strictly on *theoretical* or speculative grounds it is difficult to explain the transcendental unity of selves-in-themselves, but without this intersubjective postulation not only (a) the universality, harmony and objectivity of *aesthetic* judgement and (b)

the *practical* unity of the kingdom of ends, but also (c) the objectivity of natural science remain puzzling. Husserl's phenomenological approach dispenses with the Kantian division between the theoretical and the practical reason, between phenomena and noumena. But the conclusion regarding the nature of transcendental subjective or intersubjectivity they arrive at is bound to remind one of Leibniz's law of continuity between perception and apperception and the view of both intramonadic and intermonadic harmony.

Without the harmony between the monads, says Leibniz, this world cannot be logically regarded as the 'best possible world'. Without the harmony between the ends of different selves, asserts Kant, the universalizability requirement (of the moral law) cannot be satisfied. Without transcendental subjectivity, argues Husserl, the constitution and availability of a unified and rigorous philosophy (as science) remains an unrealizable task. Without *heart*-based (but not-totally-unrelated-to-head) sympathy, possibility of togetherness (*sym)* of *pathos* (suffering or joy), the harmony of aesthetic judgements of differently accultured persons remains a mystery. Whatever is achievable in common by differently situated selves, be that known or knowable (truth) or feeling or felt content (value) or willing or willed content (reality as freedom), cannot be ascribed exclusively either (i) to diverse, discrete and unrelated objects or bodies, or (ii) to mutually unintelligible, unsympathetic and socially non-communicative selves. It is through appropriation, recognition and/or negation of the former, i.e. multiple objective unities, that the latter, i.e. mutually intelligible, sympathetic and communicative selves, can grasp truth, realize value and be free.

VI

Roads to freedom are said to be diverse. KCB himself speaks of three different and alternative roads. In Sāṃkhya and Vedānta freedom has been construed in cognitive terms. Freedom as self-realization has been portrayed by Sāṃkhya as discernment (*viveka),* discernment of self *(puruṣa),* from nature *(prakṛti).* Being inactive as it is by its very nature, the *puruṣa's* freedom is a sort of reflective awareness and not the attainment of a goal actively explored and attained. The Vedāntin thinks, as already indicated before, *mokṣa* or ultimate freedom is not an alien goal to be reached. Positively speaking, it is the very nature *(svarūpa)* of self itself. The self is required to know by *sādhanā* that its sense or feeling of bondage is illusory. Though its *sādhanā* is primarily cognitive in nature, it does not necessarily exclude the secondary role of *karma* (action) and *bhakti* (devotion). The other road to freedom lies through feeling,

devotion and surrender. Many Christian mystics have also spoken of freedom in terms of mysterious feeling. According to Yoga and Kant, freedom is primarily in the nature of willing, while in Yoga the road to freedom has been described, rather paradoxically, 'as will not to will', 'as freedom from willing', or 'will to *nivṛtti'* and not to '*pravṛtti'*. The highest form of freedom is spiritual, *not* intellectual, and spiritual activity itself consists essentially of *nivṛtti,* arrest of the hedonic propensity of will *(bhoga).* The Kantian formulation of the freedom of will highlights the rational activity of the self to purge its will of all sorts of natural inclinations. For, the Kantian argues, the surrender to somatic-hedonic inclinations makes the self highly individualist, if not egoist, consequently making it impossible for the self to be the author of what is called the *universalizable* moral law. In fairness to Kant, it has to be admitted that his concept of goodwill as the ground of universalizable moral law does leave room for emotion and feeling in it, provided these do not prove inconsistent with the universality of the fundamental moral law.

The talk of 'roads to freedom' in terms of number, one, two, three or more, makes no sense to KCB. These are all said to be figurative expressions. One who can be free in knowledge can also be so in feeling or willing. The other interesting point highlighted by KCB is that the realization of freedom, irrespective of the nature of the road (cognitive, emotive or conative) leading to it, is spiritual and super-religious. Strictly speaking, a Vedāntin or a Vaisnava need not be religious in the accepted sense of the term.[21] While some thinkers, not necessarily philosophers, prefer to speak of freedom in religious idioms, others are inclined to use spiritual, secular or neutral idioms in this context. Naturalists like the followers of Sāṃkhya and the modern science-friendly thinkers are generally found to be interested in explicating the concept of freedom without offending the naturalistic sensibility or directly questioning what may be called scientific images of rationality. The reason for my consciously using the word 'images' is to remind ourselves that the concept of rationality has not been used by all naturalists or scientists in a unique way. For example, in defence of freedom Sāṃkhya found it necessary to posit the ontological dualism between the self (*puruṣa)* and the not-self or nature (*prakṛti).*[22] Kant, on the other hand, finds it necessary to speak in terms of tripartite reason, of theory (knowledge), of practice (willing), and of feeling because, he feels that without the bounds of theoretical reason the glory of freedom cannot be fully vindicated.

A comparable, essentially pro-Kantian, line of thought is discernible in Wittgenstein. Somewhat like Kant, the latter points out why the future of human actions, not subject to the sweep of causality, cannot be predicted or described. The world consisting of

the totality of facts and as determined by the facts has nothing to do with our will(s), my will or your will. The limits of one's own language set limits to one's own world. Since our everyday language is claimed by Wittgenstein to be in perfect logical order, such expressions as 'my world' and 'my life' are quite legitimate. But 'the self' which lends sense to the above expressions is neither the human body, soul or being, rather the 'philosophical' or 'metaphorical subject'. As per the Tractatarian language this subject, its feeling, willing, their contents and values cannot be said to be in this world and cannot even claim to be logically sayable. Like life itself, the problems of life are not part of the world and cannot be put into the words of scientific philosophy. Yet, Wittgenstein concedes, the problems of life, death and values make themselves *mystically* 'manifest'.[23]

It is a set of particular views about philosophy, logic and language which makes it impossible for Wittgenstein and his followers to allocate any place to life, death and values in 'this' world as defined by him. But one can always challenge the correctness of the views unilaterally propounded by him by raising some pertinent questions. 'Must philosophy be necessarily scientific?' 'Must truth-functional logic be allowed to dictate the boundary lines between "the sayable" and "the unsayable" or "the mystical" and decide what is a genuine problem and what is not?' 'Must we be prisoner of one particular image of science which Wittgenstein or anyone of the like had in the back of his mind?' 'Must the meanings of such logical constants as "and", "or" and "not" be identical in all logico-mathematical systems?' 'Are we all fated only to watch "ghostly" or "mystical" shadows on the walls of the Platonic cave while the Reals are eternally away in the transcendental world?' Those who, like me, are inclined to answer the above questions in the negative are not obliged to accept the Wittgensteinian 'unsayables' as really unsayable. Śabdādvaitavādins or Sphotavādins like Sureśvara and Bhartrhari have a very simple and positive answer to the questions. I do not like to enter into this view here. My own view of freedom has been worked out elsewhere.[24]

Kant breaks the boundary in one way. Schopenhauer does it in another way. How do Sāṃkhya and Vedānta tackle the related issues we have already briefly alluded to. Even Wittgenstein feels obliged to take cognizance of these 'manifest' issues of life. But whereas science-friendly philosophers like Kant and Wittgenstein make a long detour to express (without firmly committing) themselves on the fundamental problems of life and their possible solutions, or at least ways of tackling them, the Vedāntin and philosophers like KCB show admirable ingenuity and dialectical competence to indicate how the immense resources of human consciousness as available in

philosophical concepts and theories may help us to break the barrier between theory and practice, between science and non-science. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that most of the Indian philosophers refuse to accept the dramatized distinction between the above pairs of concepts and their cognates. For example, Sāṃkhya, Buddhism, Vedānta, as well as contemporary thinkers like Sri Aurobindo and KCB never fail to take note of what we call the empirical or scientific world *(saṃsāra)*. To most of them science-friendliness does not mean negation or denial of the persistent issues of values like freedom.

The main motive-force behind KCB's philosophy has remained steady and almost uniform throughout his life.[25] Thoroughly opposed to 'the illusion of the identity between the mind and body', he painstakingly defends 'the true theory of being' or metaphysics based on self-knowledge in *life*. This early view ('Mind and Matter', 1906) is found to be reiterated in his later works like 'The Concept of Philosophy' (1936). To him '[p]hilosophy is . . .[a] self-evident elaboration of the self-evident.' Obviously, this concept of philosophy, very akin to his concept of freedom, is not likely to be endorsed by the modern pro-scientific philosopher, although I have already mentioned why it should not be interpreted as anti-scientific. Further, there is no compelling reason why the hegemonistic concept of rationality found in a currently ruling paradigm of science has to be accepted by all alike irrespective of their domains of study or areas of interest. One who, like KCB, is basically interested in the ontology of freedom, need not enter into a subsidiary alliance with other-evident natural science or even sociology of knowledge. Although, as I have briefly suggested, KCB's concept of freedom is not inconsistent with science, at least not in principle, one can easily assert in a more positive vein that, but for the existence of the causal nature recognized and studied in science, the question of realization of freedom makes hardly any sense. The road to freedom runs through landmarks like '*not* physical nature', '*not* bodily nature', '*not* mind', '*not* verbalized language', '*not* psychic subjectivity', and '*not* introspective self-awareness'. Now there is no gainsaying the fact that this *via negativa* method, though not opposed to science and society in principle, puts its focus elsewhere and that its recognition of science and society is purported only to derecognize the same later on, as initial steps on the road to objectless subject as freedom.

Even within the unitarian, complementary or dualistic frameworks of science KCB's concept of freedom cannot be fitted in without emasculating it. If reality is taken as a causal *unity* of physical, biological and mental or cultural objects, freedom cannot be placed in it. Secondly, taking both mind or self and matter as equally real,

freedom cannot be accommodated together with them. For in the process one has to either place freedom within the realm of mind, implying thereby that the realm of matter knows no freedom in it, or to admit straightaway that they are not ontological at par, i.e. not equally free. Thirdly, that the (body-mind or matter-mind) identity theory is absolutely inhospitable to freedom has been affirmed by KCB and therefore rejected by him. Fourthly and finally, even a weaker version of dualism like the theory of complementarity, although it may be claimed to be free from the blemishes of the straightjacketed unitarian image of science, cannot be shown to be positively hospitable to the type of ontological theory of freedom defined by KCB. Whether these irritants in the relation between some contemporary theories of science and the concept of freedom primarily presented in this paper are good enough ground to give up the latter is a large question, too large to be taken up here.

Notes and References

1. Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya (KCB), *Studies in Philosophy* (Vols. I and II bound in one), edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, second revised edition, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1983. Though for the purpose of my paper I mainly followed his long paper, 'The Subject as Freedom', originally published as a monograph in 1930, a close reading of my exposition of his position would make it clear to the reader that I have freely drawn upon several other relevant papers included in the above volume.
2. Ibid, pp. 385–89.
3. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillan, London, pp. 143–44, 210–11, 219ff, 336–37, 450ff, 455ff, 515ff, 546-47, 550ff, 564ff, 645ff. See also, Jonathan Bennett. *Kant's Dialectic*, Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp. 260–80.
4. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 135–61, 362–72, 381–83, 450–54, 515–18, 564–70; see also, KCB, *Studies in Philosophy*, pp. 382–87, 663–68, 702–11; and Samkara, *Vākyavṛtti*, translated by Swami Jagadananda, second edition, Sri Ramakrishna Math, Madras, 1953, pp. 26–34; *Vedānta Sūtras* with the commentary by Śamkara, translated by George Thibaut, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1968, I.I.1 to I.I.10, pp. 3–60; *Upadeśasāhasrī*, translation and summary by Swami Jagadananda, Sri Ramakrishna Math, Madras, 1949, pp. 8–13, 33–44, 88–91, 101–27.
5. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 136, 141, 153, 158, 161–62, 270–71, 380–83.
6. Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Vols. I and II, translated by J.N. Findlay, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1970, pp. 143, 540–49, 561–62; *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (Ideas)*, translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson, Collier Books, New York, 1962, pp. 48–50, 53–57, 91–113, 331–49, 374–77; *Cartesian Meditations*, translated by Dorion Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, pp. 25–26, 44–53, 83–90, 148–57; *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Crisis)*, translation and introduction by David Carr, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1970, pp. 106–11, 116–17, 153, 170–72, 178–89.
7. J.N. Findlay, *Kant and the Transcendental Object*, Oxford University (Clarendon) Press, 1981, pp. 61–62, 170–75, 302–06, 308–10, 312–13, 336, 371; see also,

Roger J. Sullivan, 'The Categorical Imperative and the Natural Law', in *Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress*, Vol. II/2, edited by Gerhard Funke and Thomas M. Seebohm, (eds.) Centre for Advanced Research in Phenomenology (CARP) and University Press of America, Washington D.C., 1989.

8. *Katha Upaniṣad*, Section III 3–14. For *Śaṃkara-bhāṣya* see, for example, Som Raj Gupta, *Wisdon of Śaṃkara: The Word Speaks to the Faustian Man*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1991, pp. 333–43.
9. KCB, *Studies in Philosophy*, pp. 392, 404.
10. Ibid, pp. 420–25, 429–30.
11. Husserl, *Ideas*, pp. 39, 53-54; *Crisis*, pp. 106-08, 161-63, 216-19, 331-32; see also, Paul Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature*, translation and introduction by Erazim V. Kohak, Northwestern University, Evanston, 1966, pp. 86–88, 214–16, 231–307, 463–69; KCB, *Studies in Philosophy*, pp. 412–23.
12. KCB, *Studies in Philosophy*, pp. 428–33; Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 182–84, 242–47; Findlay, op. cit., pp. 137–43, 327–28; see also, Donald W. Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory*, University of Wisconsin Press, 1974, pp. 75–77, 87–90, 117–21. The word *imagination* has been used in different senses in Indian philosophy. In one sense it is construction (*kalpita*) in terms of *nāma* and *rūpa* and due to *buddhi* (Saṃkara, Upadeśasahasrī); in another sense it gives rise to different alternatives *(vikalpa)* due to *māyā (Gaudapādakārikās)*. In a still different sense it is simply a misconception (Śamkara's *Chandogyopaniṣad-bhāṣya)*. Buddhists like Dignāga, Vinītadeva, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita have also made use of the concept of *kalpanā* in order to distinguish its content from that of non-erroneous perception *(abhrānta pratyakṣa)* as valid knowledge *(samyagjñāna)*. See, for example, in this context, Satkari Mookerjee's *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1980, pp. 273–91.
13. I.A. Richards, *Coleridge on Imagination*, London, 1950. See also, KCB's 'Objective Interpretaton of Percept and Image', in *Studies in Philosophy*, pp. 627–29 and 'Studies in Kant' in *Studies in Philosophy*, pp. 671–72, 697–700.
14. Ricoeur, op. cit., pp. 348–53; and KCB, *Studies in Philosophy*, p. 673.
15. KCB, *Studies in Philosophy*, p. 443.
16. Ibid, pp. 452–54.
17. Ibid, pp. 354–57. See also, K. Krishnamoorthy, *The Dhvanyāloka and Its Critics*, Kavyalay Publishers, Mysore, 1968, pp. 138–42, 218–24; V.M. Kulkarni (ed.), *Some Aspects of the Rasa Theory*, Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology, Delhi, 1986; D.P. Chattopadhyaya, *Rūpa, Rasa O Sundara* (Bengali) [Form, Aesthetic Feeling and Beauty], Riddhi India, Calcutta, 1980.
18. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, translation and introduction by J.H. Bernard, Hafner Publishing Co., New York, 1972.
19. Ibid, pp. 75–77.
20. Paul Ricoeur, *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, translated by Edward. G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1967, p. 196. Findlay also observes that Husserl's 'treatment of intersubjectivity remains covertly solipsistic', op. cit., p. 366.
21. KCB, *Studies in Philosophy*, p. 289.
22. Gerald James Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharyya (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. IV; *Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1987, pp. 369–71 (from Aniruddha's *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti)* and pp. 382–87, 399–400 (from Vijñānavikṣu's *Sāṃkhyapravacana-bhāṣya)*.
23. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1972, pp. feeling/*Gefül*

61232, 645; mystical/*Mystische*, 644, 645, 6522; say(ing)/*sagen* 3031, 4115, 561, 562, 651, 653; *aussprachen* 3262; *aüsdrucken*, 55151; value (*Wert*), 641; will *(Wille/wollen)* 51362, 5631, 6373, 6374, 6423, 643.

24. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, *Knowledge, Freedom and Language*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1989. See especially chapters 6, 7, 8, 11 and 15.
25. Kalyan Kumar Bagchi, 'An Indian Interaction with Phenomenology: Perspectives on the Philosophy of K.C. Bhattacharyya', in *Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy*, edited by D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Lester Embree and Jitendranath Mohanty, Indian Council of Philosophical Reasearch and Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, and Suny, Albany, 1992.

Dissociation, Reduction and Subjectivity

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Perhaps, it is not impossible to discover a phenomenological trend in Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's (KCB) philosophical investigations. In his famous philosophical treatise, *The Subject as Freedom*, he speaks of a spiritual progress which proceeds to the realization of the subject as free.[1] The study of such progress is called spiritual psychology by him.[2] He thinks that the task of spiritual psychology is to 'interpret empirical psychology in terms of the positively felt and believed freedom of the subject from objectivity, and next to elaborate modes of freedom that have no reference to object at all.'[3] In the objective attitude the object appears to be known or felt as positive. Knowing or feeling appears to be its problematic negation. In the subjective attitude the matter is reversed. Freedom is positively felt. The relatedness of the object to the subject appears as constructed. It does not appear as belonging to the object, as change belongs to it. It is understood as the self-negation or alienated shadow of the subject. In the objective attitude *this* or object is thought to exist beyond its *this*-ness or relatedness to the subject. In the subjective attitude the transcendent is rejected as meaningless. *This*-ness, which means the so-called psychological entities, knownness or feltness appears not to be given as distinct to introspection. It is thought to exist only as distinguished or constructed. The distinguishing or constructing is felt as less certain than the self-evident subject behind it. From the standpoint of spiritual psychology the transcendence of the object is meaningless. According to KCB, 'the attitude of metaphysics like that of the sciences including psychology is objective. It seeks to know reality as distinct from the knowing of it, as objective, at least in the sense of being meant.'[4] In KCB's opinion, metaphysics is the quest of a chimera. He points out that the facthood of knowing function and of subjective function in general is believed though not known. It is elaborated into a system of symbolisms in a new philosophical study 'which may be called spiritual or transcendental psychology'.[5] He says further that spiritual psychology symbolizes the subjective attitude by the attitude from which it seeks to be freed. It is stated clearly by him that the modes of subjectivity are the modes of

freeing oneself from the modes of objectivity.[6] It is said by him that all so-called metaphysical problems are symbolisms for modes of freedom to spiritual psychology. These are the forms of spiritual discipline by which the objective attitude is to be renounced. The positive subjective functioning has to be reversed in direction towards the realization of the subject behind it.

In describing the nature of spiritual psychology KCB mentions that there is a specific discipline or consecutive method of activity for realization of the self. The consciousness of perfection, freedom or salvation as the end is a demand for some kind of activity of the subject towards itself. He calls it the cult of the subject which takes various forms. But all these forms involve a feeling of dissociation of the subject from the object. It is an awareness of the subject as what the object is not. The specific activity which is demanded primarily is the inwardizing direction. Secondarily, it is in the direction of creating objective or social values. There is one demand among other demands and all such demands are absolute. It is the demand that the subjective function of knowing of the object as distinct from it be known as fact. It is to be known as the self-evidencing reality of the subject. This would be called the cult of the subject *par excellence* by KCB. It is a spiritual discipline of the theoretic reason and a method of the cognitive inwardizing.[7] Its possibility is not ordinarily recognized.

KCB wants that the possibility of such a method has to be exhibited in spiritual psychology. A method involves a series of consecutive steps for the realization of an end. The steps in this case would be a gradation of subjective function which are modes of freedom from the object. We are first of all identified with our body. Our freedom from the perceived object is in actuality realised in our bodily consciousness. But this freedom is imperfectly realized. We can call our bodily consciousness conscious body. There is no dissociation of the subject from the body at this stage. But the extra-organic object is known to be distinct from it. In the next stage of freedom the perceived object including the body is distinguished from the ghostly object which appears in the form of the image, idea and meaning. These may be called presentation. Consciousness may be undissociated from such presentation. But it is dissociated from the perceived and felt body and may be called presentational or psychic subjectivity.[8] We come to the next stage of freedom when the subject or consciousness is dissociated from presentation which is conceived as a kind of object. The three broad stages, according to KCB, would then be the bodily, the psychical and the spiritual. Each would have sub-stages. We are wedded to our body and as such, actual freedom is felt only in bodily subjectivity. But the freedom in higher stages as suggested by psychology is believed not to be actual,

but as what has to be achieved or realized. The different grades of subjectivity imply the different kinds of objectivity; the terms are to be understood in a reactive sense. The psychical is objective to spiritual subjectivity and the bodily existence is objective to psychic subjectivity. The extra-organic is objective to bodily subjectivity. At a particular stage the objective is known as distinct from the subjective next to it. But this subjective is not known as distinct from the objective, but only felt and believed to be free or dissociated from it. KCB concludes his discussion on 'The Notion of Subjectivity' with the remark, 'The elaboration of these stages of freedom in spiritual psychology would suggest the possibility of a consecutive method of realizing the subject as absolute freedom, of retracting the felt positive freedom towards the object into pure intuition of the self.'[9]

We may note the following elements in KCB's notion of subjectivity.

(1) Object appears to exist beyond its *this-ness* or relatedness to the subject. This is the objective attitude in which the knownness of the object appears to be positive.
(2) In the subjective attitude the relatedness of the object to the subject appears as constructed. Freedom is positively felt.
(3) From the standpoint of spiritual psychology this transcendent object is simply meaningless.
(4) The modes of relating are the different modes of freedom from objectivity. The different modes of freedom are the bodily subjectivity, the psychic subjectivity and the spiritual subjectivity.
(5) These modes of freedom are realized by dissociation from object, presentation including body, and psychic subjectivity. The grades of subjectivity which are realized are the bodily subjectivity, the psychic subjectivity and the spiritual subjectivity.

In addition to the points stated above KCB says that object is what is meant which includes the object of sense-perception as also all contents that have reference to it. Object which is meant is distinguished from the subject or the subjective. There is an awareness of the subject which is different from the meaning-awareness of the object. In his opinion the subjective cannot be a *meaningless* word. To be distinguished from object it must be a significant speakable. But if it be a meant content, 'it would be but object'.[10] It can then neither be asserted nor denied to be a meant content. What cannot be denied need not be assertable. Thus, 'Apparently the significant speakable is wider than the meanable: a content to be communicated and understood need not be meant.'[11]

This idea of the object as beyond *this-ness* or transcendent is similar to Husserl's thesis of the natural standpoint. He says,

> Our first outlook upon life is that of natural human beings, imaging, judging, feeling, willing, '*from the natural* standpoint'. I am aware of a world, spread out in space endlessly and in time becoming and become without end, I am aware of it, that means, first of all, I discover it immediately, intuitively, I experience it.[12]

Husserl says further that corporeal things somehow spatially distributed are *for me simply there.* I precisely 'know' that they are there. He goes on stating that he finds continually present and standing over against himself the one spatio-temporal fact-world to which he himself belongs. This 'fact-world' is found to be out there and is taken just as it gives itself to us as something that exists over there.[13] But now Husserl wants to alter his standpoint, and he proposes to do it radically. Following Descartes he thinks that the attempt to doubt any object of awareness in respect of *its being actually necessarily conditions a certain suspension of the thesis.*[14] Husserl thinks that this alteration of standpoint is quite unique. The thesis which is adopted may not be abandoned. There is no change in our conviction. Yet the thesis undergoes a modification. Whilst remaining in itself what it is 'we set it as it were "out of action", we "disconnect it", "bracket it".'[15] In Husserl's words, 'the thesis is experienced as lived, but we make "no use" of it.'[16] 'We are dealing with indicators which point to a definite but unique form of consciousness, which clamps on to the original simple thesis'[17] and the thesis is transvalued in a quite peculiar way. Husserl points out, 'This transvaluing is a concern of our full freedom and is opposed to all cognitive attitudes.'[18]

An examination of Husserl's natural attitude and suspension of that attitude reveals that he begins with what is objectively real. But consciousness in its freedom can be discovered, once we have changed the attitude of natural standpoint and replaced it with the attitude of suspension or disconnection of what is believed to be there. The thesis of the natural standpoint may continue to be as it is itself like the bracketed in the bracket, like the disconnected outside the connected system. But no use is made of the thesis. In KCB's notion of subjectivity the subjectivity has to be dissociated or disconnected from the object. But he will not say that the consciousness of the object continues as lived. Rather, he will say that the knowing of an object *is* only in being distinguished from it, as relating. It is not distinct from the distinguishing as the free reference of the subject to the object.[19] The subject, he thinks, is free from the object in the sense it is known by itself and not as

related to the object either in the way of identity or distinction.[20] The subject, according to KCB, is felt as freedom in dissociation or disconnection from the object. This dissociation, as we have seen before, takes various forms—dissociation from the object, from the psychic entities. Husserl also speaks of his phenomenological bracketing as various forms of disconnection from the transcendent object of the naturalistic standpoint, scientific theories, theories of history and culture to reach the transcendental subjectivity. The world and the different objects including body, material nature, animal nature, psychic reality, are constituted by transcendental subjectivity. In KCB's opinion the relatedness of the object to the subject appears as constructed. It is understood as the self-negation or alienated shadow of the subject. This idea of the object appears to be similar to Husserl's idea of constitution. With these ideas of dissociation and construction KCB speaks of a method of spiritual or transcendental psychology which exhibits a phenomenological trend in his philosophy, though his idea of spiritual subjectivity differs greatly from Husserl's transcendental subjectivity. We shall mainly be concerned with KCB's concept of bodily subjectivity and show how it compares with Husserl's phenomenological constitution of the body. This will give us an idea of both the philosophers' quest towards the subject as freedom, for freedom is felt in its subjectivity first at the level of the body.

Before we come to a discussion of KCB's notion of bodily subjectivity we would like to see how Husserl reaches the pure ego through a series of disconnections. In both KCB and Husserl the quest is for the pure self, or transcendental subjectivity, though the nature of the self may be different. Husserl thinks that his design is to discover a new scientific domain through the method of disconnection or bracketing.[21] As he says, the general thesis which belongs to the essence of the natural standpoint is put out of action. This entire natural world which is there continually for us, present to our hand, and will ever remain there, is a fact-world of which we continue to be conscious is put in brackets. The sciences of the natural world are also disconnected, even though they stand on a firm foundation as ever. He does not make any use of their principles and laws and does not apply any of these propositions as his own. Not only the sciences, but also the transcendence of God is suspended. The phenomenological reduction is extended to this 'absolute' and to this transcendent.[22] The region of religious belief remains disconnected. Husserl states further that to every sphere of individual being there remains an ontology; to physical nature, for instance, an ontology of nature, to animality an ontology of animality; all these whether maturely developed or disciplines set up for the first time, succumb to the reductions.[23] He would include

even formal logic and the entire field of Mathesis generally in the disconnecting epoché. He would claim nothing that cannot be made essentially transparent to ourselves by reference to consciousness.[24] Thus the whole world as placed within the framework of nature and presented as real in experience has no validity. Similarly, all theories and sciences, positivistic or otherwise, which are concerned with this world, no matter how good they may be, are subjected to the same fate.[25]

These steps are, according to Husserl, necessary steps towards the attainment of the end, the discovery of the essence of 'pure' consciousness. In our natural experience individual consciousness is interwoven with the natural world. In respect of this intimate attachment with the real world what is meant by saying that consciousness has an essence of its own?[26] In what way is the material world to be excluded from consciousness? How can consciousness separate itself out from that within it of which we are conscious, namely the perceived being, 'standing over against' in and for itself? In this case perceiving is simply considered as consciousness. Apart from the body and the bodily organs it appears as something in itself essenceless, an empty looking of an empty 'ego'. It is directed towards the object itself which comes into contact with it in some astonishing way. Husserl comes to think that consciousness and real being are in no sense co-ordinate forms of being. In his language,

> Between the meanings of consciousness and reality yawns a large abyss. Here a being which manifests itself perspectively, never giving itself, absolutely merely contingent and relative; there is a necessary and absolute being fundamentally incapable of being given through appearance and perspective patterns.[27]

Consciousness, in spite of all talk of a real being of the human *ego* and its conscious experience in the world and of all that which belongs to it in respect of psycho-physical connections, has a purity. It is to be considered 'as a self-contained system of being, as a system of absolute being into which nothing can penetrate and from which nothing can escape'.[28] It has no spatio-temporal exterior and can be no spatio-temporal system. It cannot experience causality from any thing or exert causality upon any thing. It is presupposed that causality involves the normal sense of natural causality as a relation of dependence between realities. The whole spatio-temporal world has a mere intentional being. It is a being in the secondary relative sense. It is a being which is posited by consciousness in its own experience.

Husserl establishes that all real unities are 'unities of meaning'. They presuppose a sense-giving consciousness which is absolute and not dependent on sense 'bestowed on it' from any other source. If the concept of reality, Husserl thinks, is derived from natural realities, and we consider 'universe', 'nature as a whole', as the totality of *being*, to make it absolute is simply nonsense. Reality and world as used by Husserl are just titles for certain valid unities of meaning, namely unities of 'meaning' related to certain organizations of pure absolute consciousness. This consciousness dispenses meaning and reveals its validity in certain *essentially* fixed ways.[29] Husserl shows that phenomenological reduction, as a method of disconnecting us from the natural standpoint and its general thesis is possible. When it is carried out, the absolute or pure transcendental consciousness is left over as phenomenological residuum to which it is absurd to ascribe reality.[30]

Husserl advises us to reduce till we reach the stream of pure consciousness. But after carrying out the reduction we do never stumble upon the pure ego as an experience among others within the flux of manifold experiences. 'The ego', Husserl writes, 'appears to be permanently, even necessarily, there and this permanence is obviously not that of a solid unshifting experience, of "a fixed idea".'[31] The ego in his opinion remains self-identical. Every *cogitatio* can change in principle. But in contrast the pure ego appears to be *necessary* in principle and it remains absolutely self-identical in all real and possible changes of experience. It cannot be in any sense reckoned as a *real part* or phase of the experiences themselves.[32] If the pure ego remains as a residuum of the phenomenological suspension of the world and empirical subjectivity that belongs to it, we should not be free to suspend it. But for many inquiries the problem of the pure ego can remain *in suspense*. The pure ego can be considered as a phenomenological datum. It is given with pure consciousness whereas all theories concerning it should be disconnected.[33]

It has been pointed out by Jolm Scanlon in his foreword to the English translation of *Ideas II* that *Ideas I* and had emphasized the absolute character of pure consciousness. It appeared that all concern with the real world of human life was neglected. Though the world was bracketed, Husserl wanted to restore what he had lost through constitution of meaning or noemata. But *Ideas I* had focused only on the elementary instances of the constitution of perceptual objects. 'The world of the natural attitude', Scanlon observes, 'preserved as modified referent of complex noematic sense within the reduction, might seem to have been attenuated to mere, theoretically conceived nature, to spatial phantoms alone.'[34] According to Husserl, once we have emancipated ourselves from the

previously unnoticed blinders of the naturalistic version of the natural theoretical attitude, we know what they can disclose.

In *Ideas I* Husserl had shown that consciousness can be worldly only by having a body. The body has a special role in the constitution of the 'full intersubjective world'. In *Ideas II* he elaborated for the first time the theory of the body and provided a constitutive analysis of the body. The constituting role of the body is also elucidated for giving an idea of the constitution of nature. In his *Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, the importance of the body was recognized. In our life-world everything has a bodily character. The life-world depends on the fact that we are unities of body and mind, 'so that our experience of the world is ultimately mediated by our senses and the functions of the sense-organs'.[35] In Husserl's opinion consciousness is transcendental in the sense that everything transcendent is constituted 'in' and 'for' consciousness. He thinks that there are two ways for consciousness to be inserted in the real world: (1) through bodily incarnation and (2) through perception.[36] It is through bodily incarnation that consciousness is integrated into the world. He says, 'only through the empirical relation to the body does consciousness become real in a human and animal sense, and only thereby does it win a place in nature's space and time—the time which is physically measured'.[37] Absolute consciousness, it is thought by Husserl, is involved in the real world in and through the body. It is incarnated in the body and in this way it is manifested as the state of consciousness of a real human being. But the epoché suspends the incarnation of consciousness. Through the suspension of the incarnation the thesis of the world is put out of action. Consciousness becomes unworldly, pure experience. The world is no longer the real world; it is a mere constituted phenomenon. The epoché brings to man his absolute subjectivity which was so long concealed in the natural world through an attachment to the body. Man's natural existence, though not unreal, is a mere constituted phenomenon. From the point of view of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology the body is a constituted phenomenon. It is constituted in the acts of transcendental consciousness.[38]

Husserl establishes that the intuitive qualities of the material thing are dependent on the body. The qualities of the material things as they present themselves intuitively to me are dependent on the qualities of the experiencing subject. They are to be related to my body and my sensibility. The body is in the first place the medium of all perceptions. It is the organ of perception and is necessarily involved in all perception. Body, as Husserl points out, is the zero point of orientation. It is the bearer of the here and now.

Out of this here and now the pure ego intuits space and the whole world of the senses.[39]

The body is revealed as an organ of perceiving. To understand what this revelation is we can shift our attention to the local sensations which the body bears. The case of double contact is the most revelatory. In touching my left hand with my right my body appears twice, once as what explores and once as what I explore.[40] The touch sensations are localized in the hand, but they are not its constitutive properties. To speak of it as a physical thing I have to abstract from these sensations. If they are included the physical thing is not only richer, it becomes the 'body'. Hence, Husserl says, the 'body' is originally constituted in a double way. It is a physical thing, *matter*. 'Secondly, I find on it and I *sense* "on" it and "in" it.'[41] Sensation announces its belonging to a psyche and reveals the body as mine.

Touch, Husserl thinks, has a privileged position. The eye does not appear visually. The same colour cannot show both the object and appear localized as sensation. There is no 'seeing-seen' like 'touching-touched'. I do not see myself, my body, the way I touch myself. What is the seen body is not something touching which is touched.[42] Then the kineasthetic sensations reveal to me my freedom of movement, not the ownness of the body. It is as if the ego, indistinguishable from this liberty, could, on the kinaesthetic level move, the material thing called 'the body' with immediate freedom.[43] Body is also to be seen just like any other thing, but it becomes a body as it incoporates tactile sensations, etc. The visual body also participates in the localization, as it coincides with the tactual body.

Body as a field of localization is its distinctive feature of setting it as distinguishable from all material things. In particular body is an *organ of the will, the one and only object,* which, for the will of my pure ego, is *movable immediately and spontaneously* and is a means of producing a mediate spontaneous movement in other things.[44] Ricoeur points out that the sense of the body revealed by tactile sensations is that of a sentient body which 'has' sensations. The psyche 'shows itself spread out in the lived through spatiality of the body and reciprocally the body is lived through as the field of localization for the psyche'.[45] The subject which is constituted as a counter-member of material nature is an ego. It is to it that the body belongs as a field of localization of sensations.[46] The ego has the faculty to move freely through this body. It is able to perceive the external world by means of it.

Other sensations participate in the constitution of the corporeal subject. Sensual feelings such as tension and release, pleasure, sadness, agreeableness, disagreeableness, etc. are the material of

intentive subjective processes. Values are elaborated in these processes. These affective processes are charged with a dual function. They carry on intending towards. . . . At the same time they exhibit an immediate though diffuse corporeal localization. Thus they reveal their immediately intuitive belonging to the body as owned body.[47] The whole material infrastructure of consciousness gives itself as immediately localized. The intentional moments or conscious states are not immediately localized, as the intentive subjective processes do not form a stratum of the body.[48] The very sense of consciousness, its intentionality, is indirectly localized by the material structure.

In discussing Husserl's constitution of the body Ricoeur maintains that to perceive a body as thing is also to co-apprehend its sensoriality. Certain sensorial fields belong to this body-thing. This belonging is an application of the relation of dependence. The hand is 'apperceived' as a hand with its sensorial field and with co-apprehended sensorial 'states'. Husserl sees no opposition between the body as seen and the body as lived through. To understand an animate body we have to grasp it as a thing impregnated with a new stratum of extra-sensorial properties. They make it a physical, aesthetic unity. In respect to it the physical and the aesthetic are only abstractions. The body, as Ricoeur suggests, is the thing as which 'has' localized sensations. In virtue of sensations it is the bearer of the psyche.

The animate body remains a quasi-reality. It has properties that almost conceal its intra-mundane character. In the first place it is the 'zero-origin' or centre of orientation. It is the 'here' for which all objects are 'there'. Under the solipsistic perspective my body is not somewhere in an objective place. It is the original 'here' for 'there'. It is impossible for me to vary the angle, side or aspect under which my body appears to me. I cannot step away from it. We are thus led to the ambiguity of the psyche. It participates also in objectivity,. since it is the soul has its body. It participates also in objectivity, since it is the body-thing which has sensations. This body is a part of things and the psyche which inhabits it is the centre around which the rest of the world is grouped. The psyche, Ricoeur remarks, is open to causal relations, and yet it is the point where causality emerges from the physio-psychic order moving towards the ideo-psychic order.[49]

We have seen how the body is constituted through the acts of transcendental consciousness in the phenomenology of Husserl. The body is both object and subject and thus we reach an idea of the body-subject. In KCB's *The Subject as Freedom* we find an analysis of body-subjectivity. It is shown how the body is realized as subjectivity through dissociation. It has been pointed out earlier that

the idea of dissociation may be treated as similar to Husserl's notion of phenomenological reduction. We will now try to show how KCB reaches the idea of body-subjectivity.

KCB states that the body as externally and internally perceived, as observed and felt, may be regarded as the subject in relation to the environment. In psychology we have to start with this bodily subjectivity.[50] It is mentioned that materialism cannot account for the unique singularity of the body. Objectivity of other perceived objects is constituted by their position relative to the percipient's body. The body is felt as *mine*. It is true that everybody's body is felt in the same way. Even so, the feeling of the body as being *mine* cannot be dismissed by an objective interpretation. The percipient as his body is dissociated from the external world. The world as perceived is distinct from his body. But he imagines himself as included in the world of objects, though his body may be a privileged object.

One's own body is half-perceived and the rest is filled by imagination. To imagine the unseen half of his body another observing body is placed differently. In this respect also one's own perceived body is uniquely different from other perceived objects. The world is constructed out of the perspectives of may observers. But it is a world organic to a subject that feels dissociated from his body. Even if the subject is taken as nothing but one's own perceived body, it involves the knowledge of something unknown in the object. It cannot be understood in terms of the perceptible objects in the merely objective attitude. It implies the mystic awareness of dissociation from the object in which subjectivity consists.[51]

One is aware of one's body from within, besides its being perceived from outside. It is the feeling of the body. The bodily feeling is but the felt body. It may not be known to be other than the perceived body. Yet the felt body is distinct from the perceived body, as the former is an 'interior' that is never perceived.[52] The felt interior of the body may be regarded as the prototype of the observed interior. The awareness of the body from within is sensuous. But it cannot be called sense-perception. It is only not denied to be perception, though the perceived body is distinguished from the body as felt as within. The perceived and imagined body is always an exterior. It may be felt, but the felt interior can never be imagined as perceived. There cannot be any introspection into body-feeling, as we are not aware of it as dissociated from the perceived body. Body-feeling and felt body are only verbally distinct. There is no conscious duality of presentation and object in body-feeling. Body-feeling may not be regarded as psychic, but its potentiality. The problem of dissociating it from the objective body

has not yet arisen, but the possibility of dissociation is there. In the actualization of such body-feeling there is a transformation into psychic fact. As KCB remarks, 'Actually in body-feeling we are not interested in withdrawing from the environment; it is only an interest derived from higher stages of subjectivity that suggest such withdrawal'.[53]

Body-feeling may be considered in relation to psychic fact. It may also be considered with reference to the perceived body and the perceived object. The perceived body is potentially dissociated from the perceived object. There is no explicit dissociation from the object. As position relative to the body is a constitutive character of the object, it may not be analysed in perception. The object being half-distinguished from the body, the body is only potentially dissociated from it. But the object is fully distinguished from the felt body. Corresponding to the full distinction from the felt interior, there is actual but imperfect dissociation or freedom of the felt body from the perceived environment But the felt body does not appear even imperfectly dissociated from the perceived body. The perceived body is only half distinguished from the felt body, as one who observes his body as exterior may not feel it.[54]

The perceived body is fully distinguished from the imagination of the body. There may be consciousness of the body as *mine*, and at the same time as not other than *myself*. But the consciousness of the object which if felt as *mine* is felt not as *me*. The felt body is only half distinguished from the psychic fact. It is the feeling of the body on the one hand and is not actually dissociated from the perceived body on the other. Psychic fact is only potentially or implicitly dissociated from the felt body. In introspection into psychic fact, this potential dissociation becomes actual. There is no awareness of the psychic fact which does not involve bodily feeling at all, though bodily feeling as the felt body is other than the psychic fact. The felt body begins to get resolved into a bodyless psychic feeling in introspection. It may be fully resolved, when introspection is realized as assured knowledge. Our awareness of the felt body in ordinary introspection is not other than the perceived body from which the psychic fact is felt to be completely detached. It is the awareness of a psychic fact felt as detached from the perceived body. It is half-detached from the felt bodily interior which is also half-detached from the bodily exterior.[55]

Subjectivity is constituted by this feeling of detachment which is freedom. It is in the feeling of the body that the first hint of freedom is reached. When the perceived body is distinguished from the felt body, we have an explicit feeling of freedom from the perceived object. KCB thinks that the first given feeling of freedom in body-feeling is involved in all freedom of higher grades.

Subjectivity without spiritual discipline is rooted in bodily feeling and is only imagined as dissociable from it. Psychic fact is fact because of the knowledge of object or the presentation which it involves. It is not detached from the felt body, though detached from the perceived body. In introspection there is the initial detachment from the felt body. But introspection is also a fact only as a fringe of some psychic fact, as it is undetached from the felt body. This initial detachment is only imagined. The felt body has not yet been transformed into a psychic feeling. Introspection is only the faith that the detachment can be realized. 'The realization of this freedom from the felt body is the pre-condition of all distinctly spiritual activity', KCB concludes.[56]

We have tried to establish that KCB's investigation into the nature of bodily subjectivity moves on a similar transcendental plane as that found in the phenomemology of Husserl. In the constitution of the body both refer to the sensations of feeling, the felt body in KCB and the sensation of touch and kinaesthesis in Husserl. The latter speaks of the body as the organ of will. In both we find a series of dissociations as remarked by KCB and reductions as understood by Husserl to reach the point of freedom. Body is the psyche where freedom begins, but the goal of freedom is the pure transcendental subjectivity which can be arrived at through the gradual stages of the bodily, psychical and the spiritual subjectivity, as we find in KCB and the absolute pure consciousness through different types of successive reductions, as we find in Husserl. But Husserl does not make an end of his journey, after reaching the pure subjectivity. We can say that his journey towards the subjectivity has an upward and a downward direction. After reaching the pure subjectivity he tries to show how from the subjectivity we can reach the world and the sciences through the constitution by the transcendental phenomena. But KCB, once he reaches the spiritual subjectivity which is the subject as freedom, wants to remain in eternal meditation and enjoyment of the pure self. His is a spiritual quest, where the epistemological enquiry is just the ladder which helps the upward climbing. But once the top is reached, the ladder is thrown away. In Husserl, however, the epistemological inquiry leads to the realization of the absolute subjectivity in which is constituted the objective world, self, other beings and nature. Husserl wanted to complete the journey which was started by Kant in his Copernican revolution. But Husserl pointed out that Kant recognizes the objectivity of the objective world as a 'subjective accomplishment because he overlooks the abstractive and interpretative character of sciences at the most fundamental level.[57] A similar criticism against Kant is also found in KCB who says that epistemology is not so much a branch of transcendental psychology to Kant, as a prolegomena to

it, concerned not with the personation of subjective fact, but with the meaning of the preposition *of* in 'knowledge of object',[58] the facthood of which is implicitly taken for granted. The transcendental turn in Husserl and KCB are a, quest for the pure subjectivity though the attainment of such and its nature are not same in all respects.

However, such discussion is also possible on the notions of psychic subjectivity, and spiritual subjectivity which are higher grades of freedom, as found in KCB's *The Subject as Freedom.*

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Ontological Argument and Ontology of Freedom

A perspective on K.C. Bhattacharyya's theory of subjective freedom

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I

Traditional ontological argument has been equally traditionally discredited. Traditions, however, die hard; and so, in spite of all disclaimers issued by the proponents of the argument, the prejudice against the argument lingers on. The jejune criticism of the argument runs thus: if the argument is ontological, it is no argument, and if it is an argument it is not ontological. Arguments are concerns for logic, and logic is ontologically neutral. Or, in the Kantian diction, bereft of the undoubtedly important logical point in Kant's refutation of the argument—existence is no part of a definition—the argument does no more warrant the passage from the definition of God to reality of God than there is any warrant in the transition one may attempt to make from the thought of hundred 'thalers' to their actual existence. St Anselm's or Descartes' theological interests apart, Kant's logical point apart, all the critiques of the argument have cast a suspicious eye on the attempt to conjure 'being' out of 'thought'. But though it may be freed from its theological trappings, the argument yet exudes a kind of confidence which smacks of a distinctive philosophical atmosphere, viz., the atmosphere of rationalism, in which 'thought' or 'reason' *par excellence* is knowledge and knowledge is not merely ontologically rooted, grounded in reality, it *is* reality. In the natural or 'clear' light of reason, *à la* Descartes, one is face to face with reality. Reason clarified and distinct *is* reality; 'confused' reason, *à la* Leibniz, is materiality and not rationality, i.e. reality.

Now, one of the different ways in which Kant would 'discipline' reason, clip its wings, is by demonstrating the ridiculous procedure of the argument in question. But a 'critical' philosopher as he was, Kant did not stop short with questioning the argument. The argument was bred in an atmosphere which he questioned no doubt, but then he took upon himself the task of bringing home to philosophers the fact that the argument was just a symptom of a deep malaise

inherent in human cognitive enterprise, viz., the congenital incapacity of knowledge to make access to anything *extra-cognitive*, although to all appearances *and* to all intents and purposes, knowledge is nothing if not *of* something objective. The inaccessibility of 'being' to 'knowledge' was, for Kant, the instructive failure of rationalism.

It is not, however, too late in the day for an Indian student of philosophy to see how the argument can be revived and reformulated from the point of view of one native tradition of his, viz., Vedānta; and in this matter, he can do no better than to seek light from Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya (KCB). In his thought, as we have tried to interpret it here, 'knowledge = being' This would be his solution to what has been regarded as the 'knowledge problem'. (The *problematic* of the problem has to be clearly brought out, as we have tried to do.) And if this is his solution to the knowledge problem, then it embodies in its own way an ontological argument.

II

As the 'knowledge problem' *vis-à-vis* Kant has been discussed in his book *The Subject as Freedom*,[1] we shall mainly concentrate on that book. But then since a philosopher has to be understood as a whole, we shall have to refer to KCB's other publications and writings. If one ignores these latter and interprets KCB as just a Vedānta philosopher on the basis of the book, which itself expressly declares in the preface that the 'subject' is conceived there 'after Vedānta', one not only fails to understand him as a whole, but also mistakes that there is no whole to understand, *and*, what is more, one forgets that the task of a philosopher is vastly different from that of a mere historian of philosophy. To adopt what KCB himself said in another context, here 'exegetical interpretation shades off into philosophic construction'.[2]

III

So we now turn to the knowledge problem. But to appreciate the *problematic* of the problem, a brief account of the machinery of knowledge after Kant should be given.

There are two sides to knowledge, viz., receptivity of the materials of knowledge and interpretation of those materials. The materials are received in sensibility; and interpretation is the work of understanding. Not that they are two faculties: 'sensibility' *is* the receiving of the materials and 'understanding' *is* the interpreting of those materials. Their distinction comes to light only in a reflective analysis of knowledge. In the Kantian diction we have been

familiarized with, 'intuition' *cum* 'categorization' as knowledge. Materials of knowledge are received or 'intuited' in sensibility and interpreted or 'categorized' in understanding. *But*—and this is a big but for the Kantian theory,—what is *not* received in sensibility, what is not 'intuited' is not 'categorized' and so not 'known'. If there is anything out of all relation to sensibility, if there *is* a 'thing-in-itself', it is not 'intuitable', so not 'categorizable', so not 'knowable'. The suspicion of there being a 'thing-in-itself' arises because, according to Kant, even in receiving the materials, sensibility confers on them its own forms (space and time). It is a form-matter complex which is 'intuited' material to be 'categorized'.

The spectacle of an inaccessible 'thing-in-itself', refusing to be brought within the boundary of knowledge with its categorical or interpretative network, would not haunt human knowledge if it were not for the duality of 'intuition' and 'categorization' with which Kant starts. Sensibility can only intuit, understanding can only categorize; sensibility cannot *categorize*, understanding cannot *intuit*. Were there or if there is a supra-human intelligence which should or which can combine 'intuition' and 'categorization', which in intuiting could *intellectualize the materials* of knowledge or in *intellectualizing could 'intuit'* those materials, then for such supposed intelligence the Kantian problem would not arise. It certainly did not arise for Kant's rationalist predecessors for whom reason *par excellence* becomes so 'clear and distinct' (to use the Cartesian terminology) that it immediately, i.e. intuitively, grasps reality. So, too, the Kantian problem did not arise for Kant's great successor, i.e. Hegel, for whom, to the extent sensibility progressively, i.e. 'dialectically', advances, it realizes or actualizes the hidden rationality in it, so that when such actualization becomes complete there remains no longer anything 'other' to 'reason'. Bosanquet, Hegel's great follower in England, put it thus: 'Ultimate judgement is the whole of reality predicated of itself.'[3] To Kant, however, there is no such welcome possibility of a way out. But why?

The foregoing statement of Kant's view of the machinery of knowledge would appear to be just elementary, naive, bald and all-too-simplistic *if* the Kantian duality of 'intuition' and 'conception' does not help the Kant-interpreter bring out that:

(i) the knowledge *problem* that Kant felt was the expression of an 'aching void', as it were; and
(ii) the important consideration that weighed with Kant, viz. that of *fixing the boundary or frontier of knowledge in order to forestall the introduction of metaphysical considerations in the epistemological or noetic context.*

Constituted as it is, human 'intellect' cannot cross the boundary of 'sense'. Fixing the boundary of knowledge in order *not* to allow anything *a*-noetic from the *other side* of knowledge amounts to, what Kant calls, Transcendental Idealism; and, we may add, it is *Transcendental Idealism on the objective side.* One cannot rest content with just conceiving the 'bounds of sense' and ridiculing the doctrinal fantasies of Transcendental Idealism as Peter Strawson does.[4] One cannot take half a fowl for cooking. One *either* appreciates that Kant's 'aching void', his doctrine of the duality of 'intuition and 'categorization', his doctrine of human intelligence failing near the transcendent or failing to step out of the 'bounds of sense', etc., are interwoven in his general doctrine of Transcendental Idealism; *or* does not appreciate Kant at all. The Kantian *problematic* has to be 'empathetically' (if we may say so) understood.

We have seen that the Kantian problem,—knowledge problem specifically—does not arise for philosophers who, so to say, intertwine epistemology and metaphysics. There are, however, philosophers of a different mien altogether, viz., the sceptics who might be said to have raised the problem. Scepticism has different varieties, but almost all the sceptics are concerned with such questions as to whether our knowledge of the external world with its things and its persons *other than ourselves* and with its past and future has good grounds, whether we can draw any legitimate distinction between 'knowledge' and 'belief', etc. These questions raised by the sceptics have often been sought to be answered by considerations of verification, pragmatic success, coherence within our belief-systems, etc. But none of these considerations of can dislodge the sceptic from his position, for it may be said that success, verification, etc. are after all criteria suggested with an eye to the knowledge of the world which itself is suspect.

Into the long-drawn controversy between the sceptic and his critics in the history of philosophy, we need not go. As Kant is engaging our attention for the present, let us see what Kant's reply has been to the sceptic. And we can formulate the reply on these lines: the world of our knowledge, with reference to which the sceptic wants to find unflinching assurance, is after all 'constructed' by the principles which belong to an order that is different from the order of our knowledge. The two orders are differently named by Kant, viz., 'transcendental' or 'a priori', and 'empirical'. Our empirical enquiries regarding the world with its things, persons, history, etc. are different from our philosophical enquiry regarding how such enquiries could at all be possible. Philosophy is concerned not so much with our knowledge of the world as with the *way* we

know the world. Philosophy is 'criticism' of the knowledge of the world, and knowledge can be known by going behind and beyond it.

The Kantian reply to the sceptic, distinguishing between the orders of our enquiry regarding the external world and our enquiry regarding the construction of the knowledge of the world, goes on to uncover, so to speak, the constructive, *a priori* presuppositions of our knowledge. They are called 'transcendental' in the important sense that they are 'non-empirical'.

IV

Now, the very important lesson that we derive from Kant's critique of scepticism is the need for distinguishing the two orders of enquiry indicated before. Recognizing the importance of the distinction in the context of transcendental philosophy—which will come into clearer relief to us when we turn to the understanding of KCB—we may at this stage raise a two-fold question:

(i) Has Kant succeeded in burying the sceptic ghost ?
(ii) Does Kant's answer to scepticism resolve his own problem concerning knowledge?

In trying to answer these questions, the importance of KCB's reconstruction of Kant will emerge. Thereby the rather long discussion on Kant *vis-a-vis* the sceptic will be found to be quite relevant to our principal task and to be not at all any digression on our part.

The two-fold question may be sought to be answered both through a *historical study* of Kant's text and an *immanent philosophical study* of the Kantian problematic. In answer to the first question, we may observe that, what to speak of the sceptic, Kant himself has a haunting suspicion that our knowledge fails in respect of an independent thing-in-itself. And this lurking suspicion about this latter acting as a *foil* to our knowledge from outside throws overboard the insight behind the Kantian problematic; and so we perforce return a negative answer to the second question. Is it not a standing fact that Kant, while replying to the sceptic, 'deduces' the *a priori,* transcendental subjective functions constructing 'objects' of knowledge and yet *retains* the notion of *a* thing-in-itself which is plainly contrary to the spirit of his professed *noetic* enquiry?

But what accounts for such *inharmony* within Kant's *Critique*? And here we try to account for it: the knowledge problematic cannot consist merely in *stating* the problem, 'how does knowledge, professedly objective, yet fail in respect of the *independent* thing-in-itself?' ; it must also ask, '*why does the knowledge problem arise?*' *This* and *this* problem uniquely determines the problematic and

constitutes an immanent study of it. And *as soon as we raise this 'why' problem,* the Kantian problematic *assumes a new dimension as it does in the hands of KCB.*

V

The transcendental or 'critical' problem, clearly brought out by Kant, is rooted in the necessity to distinguish the 'order' of our knowledge of objects and the 'order' of the objects that are known. This is the quintessence of the Kantian contention against scepticism. When we see how Kant who makes so much philosophical advance follows it up with the lurking suspicion about the thing-in-itself, we can only say that what he gives by one hand he takes away by the other, and then we have to account for the deep malaise in Kant's thinking.

Kant's malaise persists and *the 'critical' problem persists,* even after his 'deduction' of the constructive subjective 'functions', *because the appearance of 'objectivity'* (into which 'object' *per se* is resolved in Kant) *persists. In the appearance itself KCB finds the way out of the Kantian problematic.*

The primordial consciousness of 'objectivity' is, as KCB points out, the subject's immediate, intuitive, indubitable awareness of itself as 'I' or 'I am'.[5] My self-consciousness is incarnated in 'I am'. And it is on this immediate awareness of self *intertwined* with the primordial awareness of 'objectivity'—in so far as self is aware of itself in the *word* 'I'—that KCB insists upon founding 'critical' philosophy. Thereby *objectivity' is shown to be rooted in self's incarnation.* Its alien appearance which frustrated the solution of the Kantian problematic goes, and 'critical' philosophy now appears *in a new hue altogether:* it gets transformed in the hands of KCB, the Vedānta philosopher, into the 'spiritual' problem of (i) self's objectifying or incarnating itself and (ii) freeing itself from such incarnation. *In self's symbolizing consciousness, in its objectifying itself, all sceptical, i.e. a-noetic considerations are forestalled. A-noetic considerations intrude upon Kant's philosophy because he does not, as KCB, does, fix his philosophy on the firm foundation of the immediate consciousness of self as 'I'.*

VI

It may, however, be insisted that Kant does forestall a-noetic considerations in, what he calls, the 'transcendental deductions' of the subjective 'categories'. 'Deducing', taken in the juridical sense of 'justifying', consists, for Kant, in *arguing back* to the synthetic subjective functions which have to be presupposed if we are to account for the object of knowledge as a 'unity'.[6] In fairness to Kant, it ought to be admitted that he takes the principle of the 'deduction' to be 'transce dental', i.e. a principle governed by *noetic*

considerations. Thus, according to the 'deduction', what has to be admitted in order to account for 'object' (as a unity) is what makes it *'object' for knowledge.* To account for 'object' accordingly, synthesizing subjective 'functions' have to be admitted. The synthetic structure of knowledge presupposes the synthesizing subjective functions, viz. those of 'synthesis of apprehension in intuition','synthesis of reproduction in imagination' and 'synthesis of recognition in concept'.[7]

The question arises, 'can knowledge of object as a synthetic structure confer upon the subjective, constructive functions the kind of immediate certitude which, as KCB shows, is involved or implicated in self-consciousness as symbolized or "incarnated" in "I"?' *Suppose the entire structure of our knowledge comes to be suspect to a Martian.* How can Kant settle accounts with the Martian? Structure-bound knowledge may have internal coherence, adequacy, comprehensiveness, etc. and a thousand other excellences. But it cannot be a substitute for self-knowledge, for self's immediate, felt, intuited certitude. It would be absurd to say that self-knowledge or self's immediacy is *owing to* the 'structure'! In so far as it has immediacy, it does not owe its immediacy to anything else; if it does, it has no immediacy. If the question is raised, 'what is the logic of the entire structure?' it cannot be replied that logic is 'internal' to the structure and so one *cannot ask an 'external' question about the 'logic' of a 'logical structure'.* For the question really *spills over* to the demand for *getting at the 'immediacy' of self-(knowledge) with which the 'critical' problem begins.*

VII

One way of still insisting that Kant remained steadfast to his original 'critical' or noetic intentions may lie in distinguishing his enquiry from Hume's. As he shows, even the Humean 'associational' principles (for binding the 'impressions' of the senses) are to be accounted for by his 'synthetic' principles rooted in the unity of the *self-conscious subject.*[8] Now, while we may thus distinguish between the two enquiries by referring to their different modes—'cognitive' synthesis in Kant and 'associational' synthesis in Hume—and by also referring to their principles—'transcendental' in Kant and 'empirical or 'associational' in Hume—*and* while we may also insist, following Kant, that 'habitual' synthesis itself is to be *certified* in self-consciousness, we yet find some shortcomings in Kant's 'transcendental deduction'. The 'deduction' proceeds in this manner: 'if knowledge of object is a unity, it must presuppose the self-conscious unity of the subject'. But there are two objections to this way of arguing back to the self-conscious subject

which—admittedly for Kant—is the 'transcendental' or 'noetic' principle of knowledge of object. *First,* in a philosophical enquiry what is philosophically first (here the 'self-conscious subject') should be accorded precedence over what is historically first (here 'knowledge of object a unity'). *Secondly,* is it not Kant's shortcoming that he *ends* with the self-conscious subject as a *presupposition*? The first objection may indeed be countered by saying that Kant's enquiry is precisely philosophical, not historical. It is not more historical or factual than the procedure of an inferring agent who may for himself state the conclusion first in the order of time and the premises later (again in point of time), whereas what is important, *logically speaking,* is that he understands the logical relationship between the premises and the conclusion. So too Kant—it may be said—understands the structural relationship between our knowledge of object as a synthetic unity and the self-conscious unity of the subject. But why this laborious task? What has become of the self-conscious subject in such procedure ? Is it from the *logic* of the structure of our knowledge that we go to the self-conscious subject? It is said by many philosophers of mathematics that in mathematics the logical structure is determined by the basic primitives. *Given the latter,* the entire structure can be derived. Mark the proviso 'given the primitives'. It is clear that no logical structure as such is self-evident. Self-evidence, whatever it is, lies elsewhere, not inside a structural or logical relationship.

VIII

An extension of our point relating to the philosophical precedence of self-consciousness over the (supposed) logical relationship between the conclusion of Kant's transcendental deduction (i.e. our knowledge of objects as a unity) and the premises (i.e. the self-conscious unity of subject) concerns itself with Kant's professed agnosticism of self; and on this score we make our second objection to the 'deduction'. Self is not 'known' for Kant, there being no 'intuition' of it. We hold, following KCB, that because Kant's philosophy does not start with the actual knowledge of self—which is, *à la* KCB, self-symbolizing in 'I'—Kant has to end perforce with self as 'presupposition' of our knowledge of the objective world. There is indeed some basis, in Kant's philosophy itself, for the interpretation of his 'Transcendental Argument' in terms of what some Indian philosophers regard as a *pramāṇa* or means of knowledge, viz., *arthāpatti.*[9] Appeal to such *pramāṇa* is made to resolve some puzzle in our experience as when, for example we *assume* the fact (*artha*) that Devadatta must be taking food at night when we find that he is getting fat and yet does not take food at

daytime. *Similarly,* it may be said, to explain the unity of our knowledge of objects we must *presuppose* the (Kantian) synthetic unity of self-consciousness. Indeed, many of Kant's arguments are of this form. To take up some of these at random: 'Geometry is a body of synthetic *a priori* judgments; so it must presuppose space which is (independent of geometrical demonstration of course) synthetic *a priori';* 'Time which is synthetic *a priori* must be presupposed to account for arithmetic as a body of synthetic *a priori* judgements'. And then of course the very general argument in the 'deduction', relating to the presupposition of our knowledge of objects, which have been engaging us throughout.

A bit more on Kant's shortcomings and instructive shortcomings at that. The *a priori* presuppositions to which Kant *argues back,* as we have said, to account for our knowledge of object as a 'unity' are called by him 'functions'. And it is just here that Kant's shortcomings afford the basis for further advance in the direction of 'spiritualizing' the critical enquiry, a point hinted at already following, KCB. Now, the *a priori* presuppositions are 'functions' because they are not *at* par with the objects of knowledge which they construct. But if so, i.e., if they cannot be understood in objective or *non*-subjective terms, the only alternative way is to understand them as the functions of the subject's symbolizing itself, symbolizing its consciousness of itself in 'I', or 'I am'. *If the Kantian 'functions' are thus understood as but the self-symbolizing of subject, following the lead of KCB, then not only is the subject of which the Kantian a priorities are 'functions' more intimately related to the subject (than they are in Kant's philosophy) but also the subjective point of view is pinpointed. Self-consciousness is understood thereby as necessarily symbolizing consciousness, and the symbol (of objectivity) is no longer the a-noetic object which frustrates the Kantian transcendental programme.* Illuminating indeed is KCB's description of the transcendental programme, viz., it is subject's 'experimenting' with itself. To quote KCB: '. . . the transcendental procedure is an experimental knowing, the experiment being consciously made with the self itself. . . . It is . . . a matter of . . . realizing of the objective fact as being bodied forth by the subject'[10]

IX

It now becomes clear to us that *transcendental enquiry has different directions in Kant and in KCB.* In Kant, the direction is from our knowledge of object to subject as 'presupposition'; whereas in KCB the direction may *indifferently* be taken from the self-conscious subject to its incarnating itself in 'I' as it may be taken from *what appears first as a-noetic towards the self-symbolizing of the subject.* And if

this two-fold (latter) procedure is understood as involved in transcendental enquiry, then we may say that the whole exercise (in making such enquiry) is one of *phenomenology of the self-conscious subject.* So it is that Kant's apparent *logical* procedure of arguing back from our knowledge of object (as a unity) to the self-conscious unity of subject as its 'presupposition' is reinterpreted by KCB by saying that the *'so-called "deduction" is not inferential' but is 'more symbolization by logical form of what is immediately believed "as spiritual fact".*'[11]

X

We have said that Kant, who did envisage 'transcendental' enquiry, could not *phenomenologize* his enquiry. And we have pinpointed the reason of his failure; he could not, as KCB could, entertain the idea of self being aware of itself by symbolizing itself. What inhibited this insight for Kant was the context and tradition in which his thought moved. So to understand Kant's shortcomings we have to understand his intellectual biography. But we would not thereby dabble in history. What will appear to be *philosophically* important after we understand the historical context of Kant's thought may be indicated: working within the Newtonian scientific context, *Kant could not clearly distinguish between 'epistemology' and 'philosophy of science' and that is the reason, according to us, why Kant failed to sustain and consolidate the subjective point of view and accordingly to phenomenologize his enquiry.*

Under the influence of Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry, Kant took it as though he were writing a grammar of Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry for which the presuppositions were to be listed (i.e., the different judgments about the principles of 'conservation of energy' and 'conservation of matter', the different judgements about space, etc.). In modern terms, Kant was writing a philosophy of science. *But Kant remained a philosopher independently of his being a philosopher of science.* Who else but a philosopher could *at least envisage* a transcendental enquiry?

Unfortunately, however, *Kant failed to distinguish between his task as a philosopher of science and his task as a philosopher.* But in faulting him on this count, we do not imply that a philosopher cannot have any concern with science. He may try to understand the very *concept* of 'science' and that would be a philosophical enquiry. While a philosopher of science, or, a scientist turned reflective in respect of his enquiry, may study the presuppositions of the scientific enterprise, a philosopher *qua* philosopher, may understand the *constitutive* presuppositions of science. And a study of the constitutive presuppositions of science is a philosophical study, not of science but *about* science. It is *more than* philosophy of science. It is not dictated

by the internal structure, aim, requirements, etc. of science. So it is *beyond the confines of science;* and the presuppositions it studies are shown to constitute science. Now, the need for a philosophy of science which studies the axioms, postulates, methodological principles, etc. of science is felt *after* science goes about its task. Maybe the scientist wants to recall the steps he has taken, maybe he gets stuck somewhere and so has to *reflect* upon how he proceeded in his task; or, one may reflect upon the scientific procedure in an interest which is not *overtly* scientific. Such a reflective study may be called a *second-order study supervening upon* science. Here 'reflection' is nothing but 'review'. 'Review' may, and often in fact does, involve passing judgments (upon the scientific activity in question). But still the reviewer here does not go on to ask, as does a philosopher, 'How is science possible?'.

As different from the second-order activity of 'reviewing' science, a philosophical study of the constitutive principles of science is a *first-order activity.* It is *consciousness' unrolling of itself* in the forming of science, to show how science as a conscious enterprise is 'constituted'. It is consciousness' introspectively viewing how, to adapt the Husserlian expression, its 'mundaneity' in which science is rooted, is 'constituted'.

XI

Now, we would expect Kant to distinguish between these two ways of understanding science, between a *review* of science and a *reflection* on science, between a philosophy of science and, what may be called, a phenomenological or introspective elaboration of the constitution of science. Kant, in fact, does not clearly distinguish these two. On the contrary, Kant the philosopher of science almost invariably gets the edge over Kant the phenomenologist of science (implicitly so, if the unachieved aim of sealing the *a*-noetic infiltrations into his enquiry is taken into consideration). His 'epistemology' is of course conceived to be a *philosophical* study. Philosophy, says he, stands in need of a science of the *a priori.* And epistemology is just *that* science. It is, an enquiry into the constitutive or 'categorical' presuppositions of science. *But still the enquiry into the 'categorical' presuppositions of science, with all its overtones of 'transcendental deduction', is hedged in the concept of 'science'* or the idea that knowledge is 'categorization' of what is 'given'. What cannot be given and 'categorized' is not known. The insistence upon the materials of knowledge being 'given', the idea of the 'categories' being *applied* to object (of course, through being 'schematized')—all these are coloured by the idea of science which is world-centric. What does not conform to the scientific idea or

requirement of knowledge is not 'known'. No wonder, *Kant is led perforce to the agnosticism of self.*

XII

Close attention should be paid to the two points: (i) the scientific idea of knowledge that influenced Kant considerably, and (ii) Kant's agnosticism of self, if not for anything but for the only reason that the former positively determines the latter. Moreover, it seems that *Kant conceived science of knowledge, i.e., epistemology as patterned after knowledge of science.* It will not do to ignore that *science itself has a conception of knowledge:* knowledge, according to the scientific idea of it, consists in seeking information regarding the world around us,—whatever it is that information may consist in, for example, describing, defining, law-formulating, predicting and so on. In this world-centric conception of knowledge, in this 'mundane' attitude of consciousness, self is as though *immersed* in the world. No wonder, one who is under the spell of the scientific idea of knowledge (as Kant was) is led to agnosticism of self and fails to elaborate the processes in the formation or 'constitution' of the objective or mundane attitude.

XIII

The foregoing observation might indeed be countered. It may be ask, 'What harm is there if one does not understand the "constitution" of science?' Again, 'need a critique of science necessarily amount to phenomenologizing the scientific or mundane attitude (*à la* Husserl)?'; 'Is not a decision made already in favour of phenomenologizing the Kantian critique in *derisively* characterizing scientific activity as mundane?'

Our reply is: the theory of the constructive *a priori* functions must be placed in its proper perspective, viz., the transcendental programme of stalling *a-noetic* considerations in epistemology. And, as we have been insisting throughout, such a programme in respect of the *a*-noetic or objective side can only be achieved by understanding the *a priori* functions as rooted in the subject's self-consciously symbolizing itself objectively. Critical philosophy cannot merely *list* the *a priori* functions; similarly, a philosopher grappling with the knowledge-problematic should not rest content by merely *stating* a problem and trying to solve it. *The knowledge problematic demands not so much to be solved as to be dissolved* through the exercise of reconciling the immediate certainty of self (symbolizing itself as 'I') with the apparent independence of 'object'. Such exercise amounts to consciously recognizing 'object' as subject's objectivity. Hence the *demanded reconciliation which is woven into the knowledge-problematic is not theoretical or intellectual but introspective, i.e., a matter of deepening our self-consciousness.* Unless the apparent independence of the object, in respect of which the immediate certainty of the subject is not available, is *at least conceived* to be resolved into the self-symbolizing activity of the subject, unless the Kantian *a priori* 'functions' are *at least understood to be subject's introspective deepening functions, scepticism or agnosticism will continue to stare us in the face.* KCB himself admits, 'After the resolution of the objectivity of the object into the knowing function, the independence of the object becomes inconceivable *though it continues to be believed'.*[12] But *such a belief cannot also be rejected.'*[13] 'Realism should, therefore, be held as suspect though idealism is only a faith and not a knowledge. But the faith has to be cherished and there should be a subjective discipline to get rid of the persisting realistic belief.'[14] We claim that by phenomenologizing the critical enquiry, a philosophical discipline that articulates the 'faith' can be founded. 'Critical philosophy' is, at bottom, as KCB re-christened it, 'spiritual psychology'.[15] From its viewpoint, the knowledge problematic of Kant's *theoretical* enquiry is but the *felt* tension between the subject as immediately believed fact and the object appearing as *alien* to the subject. As it is, the *felt* tension cannot be dismissed. To borrow KCB's expression in his 'Śaṅkara's Doctrine of Māyā'—of course the context of discussion there is different—it is a contradiction that is 'given',[16] not a logical contradiction that is not given. A logical contradiction demands to be *solved,* but the kind of contradiction we are confronted with now, viz., the contradiction between subject as 'immediately believed' and object as 'alien' to the subject which yet clings on to it wants to be *dissolved.* The 'felt' contradiction affords the breakthrough to a wider possibility; it is but the subject's *inchoate or inarticulate introspective or reflective enquiry,* viz., *'how, being free, am I yet glued to object?'* And the solution is implicit in the question itself: the 'object', which provokes the tension, is the self-conscious symbol of the subject and *being so* it points the way in two directions in which the subject's freedom works: it is the subject's 'free efflux', *Līlā,* which the subject has sportively put forth, but *māyā* or *moha* which the subject chases in absolute self-forgetfulness, an attitude which Husserl called 'mundane' or 'naturalistic'.

XIV

The failure on Kant's part to find a subjective solution, in the way indicated above, to his critical problem has given rise in contemporary times to some theories which conceive of *a priori* principles by dissociating them from the Transcendental Idealistic context. While Kant's shortcomings are undoubtedly responsible for

this watered-down version of the *a priori*, in dealing with them we shall see how KCB's viewpoint comes into bolder relief than before.

C.I. Lewis conceived of the *a priori* as 'a stipulation which might be made in some other way if it suited our bent or need'.[17] Lewis is not for anything sacrosanct or fixed about *a priori* principles. Felix Kaufmann once spoke of the 'principle of permanent control',[18] exercised over the structural principles of science which might be revised or rearranged in the light of varying empirical situations. From these viewpoints, the *a priori* may not have anything more than 'operational significance', as Bridgman put it.[19] And nowadays we are told that we can as continuously revise our conceptual schemes as we can operate with our inherited schemes, even as we can repair a boat—we do not burn it—while undertaking a voyage. Relative to our demands, we can revise our conceptual systems.

Well, surely we do not have to burn our boats! But why the continuous revision of our conceptual schemes if it is not for a *lurking suspicion* about our intellectual enterprises? It may indeed be said that as continuously are our doubts (regarding conceptual schemes) laid to rest as they arise: so that there is no *general* doubt about our intellectual enterprises as such. Doubts arise in *a* sphere of enquiry, they are resolved and new doubts may arise regarding *other* parts in our intellectual enquiry and they too may be resolved in the way previous ones were, or in a new manner according to the requirement of the enquiry concerned. There can therefore be no *general* scepticism, no scepticism about our intellectual enterprise as such. Such supposedly general scepticism regarding our intellectual enquiries is absurd.

To this the reply would be two-fold. *First,* pragmatism, operationism, relativism, etc. are all *symptoms.* By describing a symptom, one does not explain a disease or its etiology. *Secondly,* what is urged by the foregoing alternatives to subjectivism is true, but *beside the point.*

Why do pragmatism, operationism, etc., arise? What is their *etiology,* They arise because we demand certainty or assurance (with reference to some field of enquiry). But *in respect of what* do we demand certainty? We *misplace* certainty in trying to find it in anything *non*-subjective. Doubtless, certainty belongs to me or to you, it is either *my* psychological state or *your* psychological state. But the basic or primordial certainty is, it is not too late in the day to recall Descartes, 'I am', the certainty of self as *being,* and not of any mental *state.* The demanded certainty in all intellectual enterprise is but the reflection of the subject's immediate certainty. The subject as a unique speaker of 'I' cannot be doubted. Nor can 'I am' be doubted, for 'I' = 'am' = 'subject as speaker', so that 'I am' is no

proposition which is asserted nor therefore doubted or denied (of this more later on).

XV

How does 'I am' which we have pressed into service from KCB's viewpoint, how does this which was *overlaid* by Kant's agnosticism, go on all fours with pragmatism, etc.? It does *not.* It is not intended to be so. For pragmatism, etc. have nothing to do with immediate certainty of self as symbolized in 'I am'.

Yet the point of discussing pragmatism, etc. in the context of KCB is this: the theories in question (i) *introduce a-noetic considerations* in (ii) denying (by implication though) immediate certitude of 'I am' which is *absolute,* being indubitable (the difference between 'I am' as viewed by Descartes and 'I am' as viewed by KCB will be brought out later); and those considerations do not fit in with our transcendental programme. Of course, it may be replied that (i) does not follow from (ii). Epistemology, it may be said, may be relativized, contextualized, 'naturalized' (cp. Quine) and for such a relativizing programme 'I am' is of no worth.

Now, here we are back to the point we made before, viz. the considerations which are urged on behalf of pragmatism etc. are true but irrelevant. Those theories are quite consistent within their defined considerations. Changing human interests, success in achieving aims in life, progress or lack of it, etc. are the constraints upon the pragmatic success of theories, contextualistic revision of them, relativizing our theories and so on. But why at all the search for relative, contextual certainty at least? The search cannot be explained with reference to what is intended to be sought or to the results of the search. The search for certainty, in whatever context, is the search for 'I am' = 'Am = Am' = 'Being'. I am incarnated in 'I' or 'I am'—which means I am not spoken *of, not* a *meant* content, *not distinct* from the speaking of it : 'I' 'annuls' all distinct being. In so far as 'I' annuls all distinct being, 'I' is the fixed point for Transcendental Idealism to encounter scepticism.

To bring the distinction between 'subject' and 'object' into sharper focus, KCB introduces a two-fold consideration:

(1) The subject is the 'unique speaker' of 'I'.
(2) The subject as unique speaker of 'I' cannot be doubted or negated.

To explain and elaborate (1) and (2): We have said, following KCB, that the subject is the 'unique speaker' of 'I'. *As used, it is always user-specific;*[20] that is, when it is used by *a* speaker, it is *that* speaker, *that* 'I' which is expressed. *No two persons use the word in the*

same sense. When a speaker uses the word 'I' to express himself he wants it to be conveyed to his hearer as the expressing of himself; and he surely does not convey a 'meaning', that is, he does not convey to the hearer that he is an *instance* of a *general* 'I'! So it is that for KCB subject is the 'unique speaker' of 'I'.

More acutely speaking, the subject is not even the speaker of 'I' ; it is the speaking 'I', the speaker who 'incarnates' his 'self-consciousness' in the word 'I'.[21]

Subject as 'I', we have seen, is no meaning, no 'generality'.[22] It is not spoken *of* in 'I', being the speaking 'I', so no *padārtha,* no *viṣaya.* And because subject as unique speaker of 'I' cannot be asserted or negated as an object or a meant content can be, so strictly speaking, subject is not known (object). But 'subject is not known' is not a negation. Negation, like affirmation, is an assertion. But subject as 'I' cannot be asserted to *exist* nor (therefore) be asserted *not* to exist. Truly speaking, 'subject is not known' = 'subject is not meant'. But again, 'subject is not meant' is not the same as 'subject is unmeanable like *avracadabra'.* 'Abracadabra' is not believed. But subject is believed. It is 'believed' but not 'known'. We have a 'believing awareness' of the subject which yet is not knowing, i.e. is not an awareness of 'object'. To say, we have a believing awareness of subject is to imply that we have a feeling of *being* 'I'.

XVI

We pointed earlier to the need for phenomenologizing the 'critical' enquiry. Phenomenologizing the critical enquiry is not just building upon the immediate certainty of self-consciousness as incarnated in 'I': it must also bring out how the transition from the 'mundanized' self to the immediately evident self is made. In his book *The Subject as Freedom* both the *hint* of such transition is given and the *actual transition* is delineated. And both are indicated in the observation of KCB's that the subject is the unique speaker of 'I'. The subject's self-consciousness is 'incarnated' in 'I'. 'I' is not, as used by the speaker, a word like other words used by him/her.

Does the word 'I' have a 'meaning'? It does. This ninth letter of the alphabet stands for a word which 'means' 'a speaker or a writer who uses this word to refer to himself'. But KCB distinguishes between the 'meaning' of 'I' and 'I' 'as *used* by a speaker'.[23] When I use the word with reference to myself, I am of course understood by the hearer, but then he understands me 'not through the meaning' of the word but 'through the word'.[24] He takes 'I' as used by me to *be* a subject 'expressing itself'.

While the subject as speaker is indicated by the word 'I', the word 'this' may be taken as 'symbol of the object or what is meant'.[25] An

objection is here anticipated by KCB himself. If 'I' as *used* is not a 'meaning' and 'this' is 'symbol' of 'what is meant', then there cannot be any occasion where one can say 'this is I'. But, as KCB himself points out, ' "this" may stand for myself who *spoke* the word *I;* and in answer to the conceivable question "who is this speaker", I may say "This is I".' Here KCB's answer is that 'This is I' *stultifies the suggestion of 'this' being distinct from 'I'.* As he says, 'The answer would imply not a judgement but a correction: it would mean "this" speaker is not *this* or object to myself, *this* as distinct from "I" is false, the fact being *I.*[26] Again, '*I spoke' does not amount to any judgment* like 'A past I spoke' or 'There is an identity between the present I and the past I'. For *first,* identity is a *relation.* It is a relation *between* terms which are in some ways different. Now, for *another person* there is an identity between my past I and my present I, i.e. between *the two objective situations* in which he meets me. *But for me,* there is no such difference. And since there is no such difference *for me,* there is, *for me* again, no question of asserting the identity between a (supposedly) *present* I and a (supposedly) *past* I. *Secondly,* it cannot even be said that 'I spoke' can be rendered by me into a judgment about my personal identity of some such form, viz., 'I who *spoke am* I who is *speaking',* or '*The* I who was present then *is the* I who is present now'. For *in the first place,* as already pointed out, it is only for another person that there is any question of asserting my personal identity. *For me,* there is no question of asserting my identity in a judgment. *In the second place,* for me there cannot be any 'the I'. For 'I', as used by me, is no indicative expression, but a verbal symbolization of my self-consciousness. 'The I' is but '*this I'* for any speaker. *In the third place,* there is *for me,* no 'present' I or 'past' I. The present 'I' is but the 'presently speaking I', not a subject which belongs to the present temporal context. *In the fourth place,* since there is also no 'past or then I' *for me,* 'the then I' is *not even tried to be conceived to be different from* 'the present I'; and, therefore, *no Cartesian doubt about self arises for KCB.* 'I am', therefore, is viewed differently by KCB from the way it *was* viewed by Descartes. There is, for KCB, no question of *abandoning* the attempt to doubt the existence of self (as speaker of 'I') *after* it has proved a failure. 'Am I the same I', or 'There must be a demon who dupes me into believing that the *then* I is the *present* I', cannot be formulated by me because of the reason indicated, viz., 'I' cannot be tried to be *meant* by me. To doubt (or negate) me, I as speaker must be able to conceive my 'I' as at least *speakably different,* which is not possible. Again, to formulate a significant negation 'I am not', I as speaker must at least speak *of* 'I' as the *negatum.* But there is for me, i.e., for any speaker, no 'I' *apart from* the *speaking* 'I'. Thus negation of self is unmeaning.

Lest KCB's intentions should be lost sight of, there should be a word of caution here. Russell once spoke of 'ego-centric particulars'.[27] Egocentric words, said he, 'can be defined in terms of "this".'[28] And about 'I' he wrote, 'I *means* "The biography to which this belongs." '[29]

From KCB's point of view, our reply would be that not every 'this' does or can belong to a biography and *the* 'this' that *does* belong to a biography can belong to it only by virtue of its being *a part of autobiography*. If so, we are back at KCB's point that 'I' as used is no 'meaning'.

What about 'I am'? Truly 'I am' = 'Am = Am'. For, *'am' is neither predicative, nor attributive here.* 'I am' is an apparent judgment, not a false judgment, not even a pseudo-judgment, not again a degenerate judgment (*à la* Ayer) of which 'am' might be said to be a 'sleeping partner'; for *'am' is a necessary facade for the subject 'I'* which *demands to dissociate its existence* from object and yet symbolizes itself in objective form.

KCB's imagination finds in that pithy 'I' or 'I am' the hint towards larger construction. In my *'ahambodha'*, in my feeling of *being* 'I', in my incarnation in 'I', I not only distinguish myself as 'I' as unmeant, indubitable, as immediately certain; I also symbolize myself in objectivity. The subject's self-consciousness is not just a matter of being expressed in 'I' or 'I am'; what is *far more important than such verbal points*—verbal if the self's incarnation in 'I' is not understood—is that the subject, through being 'I', freely symbolizes itself in objectivity and by so symbolizing itself achieves the other side or the other aim of phenomenologizing the critical enquiry, viz., *removing the distancing of the object per se.* What a brilliant example of the insight of a philosopher starting with the apparently innocuous word 'I' and then proceeding towards larger construction, i.e., a new interpretation of 'critical' enquiry according to which it is the elaboration of the freedom of the subject as symbolizing itself in objective life (which, therefore, is the starting-point in the elaboration of the stages of subject's freedom), *a metaphysic of experience* in short!

Phenomenologizing the Kantian 'Critique' as he does, KCB finds his roots in his native Vedānta tradition. He himself writes in the preface to *The Subject as Freedom* 'The subject or subjectivity is conceived here after Vedānta as conscious freedom or felt detachment from the object.' Now, we have seen that the phenomenologizing programme has both an *objective* side and *subjective* side: the object is felt by the subject as *its* symbolizing in 'I' or 'I am'. So we may say that though he supplements Kant with Vedānta, KCB parts company with the transcendentalistic version of Vedānta which inculcates negativism in respect of the objective

world. KCB founds a metaphysic of experience of which the ground plan is 'I am'; and to all appearances, this is contrary to the orthodox interpretation of Vedānta according to which Vedānta is *Māyāvāda* in respect of the objective world.

So *is Vedānta of Śaṅkara compromised in KCB?* All depends upon how KCB understands 'object' within his re-interpretation of Vedānta. Here we may hazard the opinion: KCB brought his Vedānta heritage to re-interpret the 'Critical Problem'. As we have already seen, the 'critical' problem is this: Self is immediately certain, "not meant" (in KCB's language), but "object" is "meant", they cannot be combined. But the fact remains that they *are* combined in our normal experience. There is a *wonder* how 'I' the subject, could be related to object. What is there in the object to make it known? Such a statement of the 'critical' problem has a strange echo in Śaṅkara: *Satyānṛte mithunikṛtya aham idam mama idam iti naisargikah ayaṃ lokavyāvaharah.*[30]

To what extent does KCB's idea of subject symbolizing itself in experience square with Vedānta? This is the question of questions in the present context. *Does KCB introduce an element of realism in Vedānta?*

No, KCB is quite positive that Śaṅkara is an acosmist.[31] But apart from his interpretative work on Vedānta,[32] his own philosophical formulation adds a new dimension to the school. The idea of metaphysical reality being symbolized in experience is what he wrings out of his Vedānta studies, and this is where *exegesis and philosophical construction meet.* After all, philosophical study is no historical study.

Here is a string of quotations from KCB which appear to be quite in tune with the Vedānta spirit.

> 'The object . . . appears as a contradiction—an emanation of the self and yet a mere idea. . . .' The remark is made with particular reference to the 'Critical' problem.[33]

> An illusion, unlike a thinking error, *excites wonder* as it is corrected. One's apprehension of something as illusory involves a peculiar feeling of the scales falling from the eyes. To be aware of our individuality as illusory would be then to wonder how one could feel as an individual at all.[34]

> The notion of *adhyāsa* or the false identification of the self and the body would never occur to a person who has no experience of himself as a spirit and of the object as distinct from the subject . . .[35]

> It is only one who felt such a distinction of the self and the body that would wonder at his own implicit belief in their identity.[36]

> The notions of the individual self, of the individuality of me as false, and of the eternal self as the I that is never me are born in one and the same spiritual consciousness.[37]
>
> The individuality is understood as *me,* i.e., as the illusory objectivity of the subject . . . [38]

The spirit of the foregoing quotations permeates, what KCB calls, the 'epistemology of illusion'[39] from the analysis of which a three-fold point emerges: (i) the illusory is *given*[40] or presented, (ii) all given reality is illusory,[41] and (iii) truth is *un*given, self-shining.[42]

The point that emerges out of an exegetical and interpretative study of the foregoing quotations *may indifferently be described according to the idioms of exegesis and philosophy:* (i) Brahman is immanent in our experience and (ii) a metaphysic of subject is the self-symbolising elaboration of freedom.

Really, what KCB presents is a *hemeneutics of Vedānta.*

XVII

And reverting specifically to the philosophical vein we can say that in KCB's thought metaphysic of experience reaches a new dimension which makes it fundamentally different from Kant's. KCB's is not an 'immanent' metaphysic of experience as Kant's was. KCB *pinpoints a demand* which is woven into our experience and is the foundation of metaphysic. Here KCB's *exegesis* on Śaṅkara's doctrine of *Māyā* helps him derive the point that illusion is something positive, that the self-shining reality of *Brahman* is hidden *in* normal experience and detects itself consciously. From this he goes on, as a *philosopher,* to formulate his theory of *metaphysic as symbolizing the demand of experience to deepen itself to attain self-clarification.* Here what is important to note, in view especially of the context of the philosophy of the recent past, is that *philosophy for KCB is no mere clarification of language or concepts, not even 'deduction' of the 'categories' of experience (cf. Kant) but consciousness' self-clarification* pari passu *with conceptual or linguistic clarification or 'deduction'.* In the light of such a conception of philosophy, the transcendental programme of philosophy consists in the reflective or introspective exercise, (i) progressively *getting rid* of the 'naturalistic' attitude of the apparent independence of object, and (ii) *maturing* self-consciousness to the extent that consciousness is not just conscious of self, but self is realized as *real,* as 'annulment' of and free from all distinct being. This is 'Freedom' with a capital 'F'—Freedom that is not 'meant' and that is therefore not doubted. There being nothing distinct from it, nothing to foil it, it is necessary.

Thus KCB's book *The Subject as Freedom* proceeds to formulate a theory of necessary freedom, Freedom which is, in Vedānta diction, eternal (*Nitya*). Though it is absolute freedom, in the sense that no scope is left on this level for *any further move* towards freedom yet within its structure there is always a *process* of achieving it. *The idea is that though as an ideal limit consciousness' absolute freedom has to be conceived, yet there goes on, within the limiting framework of freedom, consciousness' continuous process of achieving self-clarification and self-deepening.* In Kant, too, freedom remains an idea of reason; but then, *Kant does not entertain the idea that freedom is continuously being actualized.* And that can be explained by *Kant's failure—contra KCB's success on that score—to found a phenomenology of consciousness' acutalizing its freedom,* his failure to phenomenologize the 'critical' programme. In KCB, *the transcendental programme not only conceives ideally but also achieves actually the unity of consciousness' freedom and what continuously foils it, i.e., the object per se and what as continuously is taken up into the unity of freedom and objectivity, i.e., its objective expression. So re-understood Kant's Transcendental argument gets transformed in KCB into ontological argument.*

XVIII

Before we close, we have to refer to one important European philosopher whose views on freedom have not only similarity with KCB's but, what is much more important than the facade of similarity, appear to be kindred in spirit. We refer to Nicolai Hartmann. It was in Hartmann that freedom and necessity were linked. Hartmann was thereby combating Kant's theory of practical reason. I am, says Kant, phenomenally determined but noumenally free, i.e., free as a member of the ideal, rational or intelligible world. So at the end of the chapter freedom remains with Kant an idea of reason. Hartmann, on the contrary, insisted that practical reason is ontologically grounded. According to Hartmann, values or 'oughts' have an 'ideal', 'modal' self-existence; by holding that they have a 'modal' existence, Hartmann prepares the ground for establishing that they *demand*[43] to be real.[44] The traditional theory of modality—which distinguished between possibility, actuality and necessity—was mainly 'gnoseological'.[45] But since values demand to be real, since the ought-to-be is through and through Ought-to-be-*real,*[46] the 'valuableness of a content must indicate its necessity detached from any reference to real possibility or impossibility, at the same time floating free'.[47] Only in Ought-to-be, only in the axiological sphere, there is detached, 'free necessity'.[48]

Now, while making the comparison between KCB and Hartmann, one must be on one's guard against stretching it too far. For the

contexts and the considerations of the two thinkers are different. Hartmann's thought moved in the context of Kant's theory of practical reason and the theory of, what he calls, the 'modal structure of the ought'. KCB's thought moved in the context of Kant's 'critical' philosophy and his native Vedānta tradition. Also, it is evident from the foregoing quotations from Hartmann that he emphasizes the *freedom of necessity,* while KCB emphasizes the *necessity of freedom.* Yet the fact remains that when they link freedom and necessity they have the same kind of conceptual considerations although these have different dictions in the two thinkers. Thus KCB distinguishes between the subject as 'freedom' and the object that is 'meant'. And Hartmann writes: '. . . the valuableness of a content must indicate its necessity detached from any reference to real possibility or impossibility.'[49] KCB maintains that the subject is no 'meaning'. Of course, the modal category of 'necessity' (also of 'asserting' and 'problematic') and the semantic category of 'meaning' are different, rooted as they are in different kinds of considerations. But Hartmann goes beyond the traditional theory of modality when he characterizes it as 'gnoseological' which therefore needs to be transcended for building up his philosophy of values and the philosophy of ideal being.[50] So too, KCB goes beyond a mere semantic analysis of 'meaningful' propositions—freedom for him is not 'meant as unmeanable'. And the kindred thought that binds them is this: freedom is not 'meant', not object (KCB), not 'real' but 'ideal' (Hartmann), therefore not dubitable (KCB), a 'must-be', a real not-to-be-escaped-from; a cannot-be-otherwise (Hartmann).[51] The conception of freedom that is necessary as 'must-be', indubitable as 'unmeanable' binds the two thinkers. In the light of this comparison, we may revert to KCB's main concern and restate it thus: *Transcendental Idealism is the philosophy of transcendence or freedom which is 'ideal' and not 'meanable'.* That absolute 'freedom' is the 'annulment' of all that is 'distinct' from subject, i.e. all that is 'meaning', is the point with which KCB winds up his discussion on subjective freedom in the two concluding chapters of his book *The Subject as Freedom. Once more, combining exegesis and philosophy,* we may conclude that *Brahman* of Vedānta is no *viṣaya* of Nyāya, no *padārtha,* but *a-padārtha;* or absolute freedom is transcendent of all *'meaning'. The ontology of freedom is the process of consciousness' achieving self-classification—its becoming self—through the meaning-categories by reflectively discovering the constitution of the meaning categories: it has thus at once the side of 'meaning' and the reflective side of meaning-'constitution'.*

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The Person as Knower and Known

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It might not be inappropriate on this occasion when the contributors to this special issue of the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* have been invited to celebrate the philosophical achievements of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya (KCB), among which must surely be counted his analysis of the human subject, to reflect upon some of the implications that might follow from his initial insights regarding the subject as knower and known. I have often thought that the greatest tribute one can pay to a philosopher is not so much to talk or write *about* his work as such but to think *with* him about a problem that one knows was one of deep and lasting concern to him. I want to reflect, then, on the theme 'The Person as Knower and Known' in such a way as hopefully to extend KCB's own interest in it.

I

In his complex, but extremely important, work *The Subject as Freedom*, KCB states initially that the word 'I' is always used as part of a kind of private language game; for

> Object is what is meant, including the object of sense-perception and all contents that have necessary reference to it. Object as the meant is distinguished from the subject of which there is some awareness other than the meaning awareness. The subjective cannot be a *meaningless* word: to be distinguished from, it must be a speakable and yet if it be a meant content, it would be but object.[1]

He goes on to remark that :

> A meaning that is conveyed by a word must be intelligible to the hearer as what he would himself convey by the word. What the speaker means by a word must be capable of being meant by the hearer if he were to use it. . . . The word 'I' as used by a speaker is not understood by the hearer to convey what he

> would himself convey by the use of it. If he used the word, he would intend himself and not the speaker.[2]

But KCB then allows:

> Actually however when he understands the word 'I' as used by the speaker, he understands it to stand for the speaker. He may accordingly be sāid to understand the thing intended by the speaker through the word but not through the *meaning* of the word.[3]

The word 'I', then, for KCB, is indeed a 'referring expression'; but of a very special kind. It refers always to a particular person as used by him. 'You' can be applied indiscriminately to any individual/person; it can be part of the domain of what is 'meant'; but 'I' calls for a radical particularity. Its use affirms an inviolable subjective—and finally free—consciousness as the centre of personhood.

Kant—who was perhaps KCB's favourite western philosopher—argues that we can never know ourselves as we are but only as we appear to ourselves. An 'I think' always accompanies our representations, but the ground of that 'I', the transcendental unity of apperception, the noumenal self, cannot be an object to itself. And we lack, Kant says, the kind of (intellectual) intuition that would allow us immediate access, as it were, to ourselves. But suppose we had the kind of intuition which Kant denies we have: the question would still remain as to its noetic character in relation to its object. Just as the self is not an object or thing, so, it would seem, it is not something to be 'intuited'. It is rather a state of being which, as the Vedāntin would say, needs to 'realized'. If part of the definition of intellectual intuition is that of 'a mind entering into its object', then this intuition functions within a subject/object situation; albeit it partially overcomes it in its consummation. Realisation, on the other hand, is altogether unintelligible in subject/object terms.

According to çlassical Advaita Vedānta, what stands in the way of our having an adequate self-knowledge is a fundamental and pervasive self-confounding of our own making. We incessantly and, according tọ Śaṅkara, quite naturally, misidentify ourselves and wrongly attribute to ourselves characteristics which properly belong only to our individuality; we 'superimpose' (*adhyāsa)* attributes of the non-self onto the self and of the self onto the non-self. In our ordinary consciousness of ourselves we are thus subject to a profound ignorance (*avidyā; ajñāna*). Śaṅkara in his oft-quoted introduction to his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras,* writes:

> It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the subject, whose respective spheres are the notion of the 'Thou' (the Non-Ego) and the Ego, and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong to superimpose upon the subject—whose self is intelligence, and which has for its sphere the Ego—the object whose sphere is the notion of the Non-Ego and the attributes of the object; and vice versa to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the subject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a natural procedure . . .[4]
>
> This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be nescience *(avidyā)*, and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the self) by means of the discrimination of that (which is superimposed on the self) they call knowledge *(vidyā).*[5]

For example:

> Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the self, if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children, and so on are sound and entire or not. Attributes of the body are superimposed on the self, if a man thinks of himself (his self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking or jumping. . . .[6]

In other words, we quite naturally misidentify ourselves by attributing to *the self* qualities and characteristics that belong only to *an individual.* When I conceive of myself as—when I believe that I really, as distinct from only empirically, am—of a certain height and weight, with such and such an IQ, possessing this or that thing, I am subject to *avidyā,* to ignorance, and am engaged in *adhyāsa,* superimposition. 'My' self is *saccidānanda*—being *(sat),* consciousness *(cit)* and bliss (*ānanda).* 'I am reality'—*ahaṃ brahmāsi.*

The Advaitic analysis suggests that we need to distinguish carefully between *the self* and *an individual* and look to see the different ways in which they are known. I think it is necessary as well to distinguish both of these from the concept of *a person* and then to look at the different ways in which these are *known* and are *knowers.* I distinguish them as follows.[7]

An individual is a concentration of all the given conditions of his or her being (the accidents of birth, of environment); in short, an individual is constituted by whatever is objectifiable in and of the human being as the given physical, intellectual, social, cultural materials of that given human being.

The self is undifferentiated, without time or space but is nevertheless realized as the enduring ground of one's being, as one's primordial spiritual spontaneity.

A person is a creative articulation, in varying degrees of rightness, of his or her individuality within the matrix of social community and the enduring reality of the self. A person is thus an achievement, not a given. A person is a dynamic integration of the conditions of his or her individual being as grounded in the self.

An individual, in principle, is *explained* by universal laws; he or she is, we have come to believe, an 'instance' of them. A person, on the other hand, is *understood* only as the being which he or she has become; which is to say, only as he or she is the particular person that one is. Although I may understand a person only if I see the degree to which he or she has realized certain universal potentialities (of spirit), it is nevertheless always a particular person that is being understood in his or her particularity. A person is a unique achievement and thus is understood only through sensitive recognition.

Transcending all the conditions of ordinary knowing and understanding (time, space, form; in short, the entire subject/object situation) the self is unknowable and cannot be understood. The self nevertheless can be realized in the immediacy of experience, which realization is utterly self-certifying.

For an individual nothing other than his or her bare unity is in principle hidden. An individual is defined precisely as that which is objectifiable in human being—and is thus knowable by description and acquaintance. There is, however, always something about a person that eludes public inspection: his or her creative spontaneity; his or her subjective depth.

A person is necessarily *social* in the profound sense of one's being articulated only in contexts of relationships with other persons and things. A person is understandable, therefore, only when seen relative to the kinds of societal relations in which one enters, seeks to contribute, and derives fulfilment. These relationships are often quite subtle, and are not reducible to the rather more ordinary and conventional (albeit central) relationships associated with one's occupation, one's family, one's so-called 'social life'. The manner, for example, in which one relates to one's 'personal possessions' is very much part of a person's articulation: Does he or she care for them or merely use them? When caring, if he or she does, is one attached to them as though they belonged to one ontically or does one respect their integrity and act more as their custodian rather as their owner, and so on.

It is often thought that although one cannot know oneself directly (because as a subject, one cannot be an object to oneself) one can nevertheless know oneself indirectly through others' perceptions of one. I can know myself as others' know me.

But before another person can know me (in any interesting or significant way) and not just evaluate me according to his or her own values and interests, must the other not know one's self first?

It has often been observed that once one learns how to perform a certain action (say, riding a bicycle) one is able subsequently to perform that action with relative ease, even after a lapse of many years. It is as though the body were educated and had a remarkable memory of its own.

In any event, it is clear that we do acquire various body-habits or dispositions to act in certain ways; and these contribute significantly to the kind of identity we have as persons. Our self-knowledge consists to a considerable extent in our awareness of what we can do. 'Who I am' and 'What I am able to do' are interrelated.

And it is here that the social dimension of personhood once again becomes evident. Much of what I am able to do—and especially the manner in which I do what I am able to do—is socially informed. I am educated to do a rich variety of actions in addition to those which I do instinctively (like digesting). The vast majority, in fact, of one's everyday actions, from eating to talking, reflect one's learning how to do these things in certain ways. One's self-knowledge, then, is at the same time one's knowledge of one's culture.

II

Human consciousness, like personhood itself, is not simply an attribute that one possesses by virtue of being human; it is rather something that each person realizes in a unique manner from within the given conditions of one's individuality and the rich intricacies of one's experience. Persons *appropriate* their various mental capacities and exhibit this in their perceivings, their reasonings, their evaluatings, and so on, in ways that make these capacities their own. Mental appropriation is thus the taking-up of the mental conditions of one's individuality into the matrix of one's personal identity and involves the educating of these conditions for various forms of concentrated awareness.

And it is the appropriated mind that thinks. Although there have been many contemporary philosophical rejections of mind/body dualism in the West, especially of a Cartesian sort, we are still so accustomed to believe, and to express in everyday language, that it is some isolable mind or pure intellect that thinks that we find the plain assertion that it is not a mind as such but a person who thinks quite startling. Nevertheless, is it not obvious that just as it is a person, a concrete psycho-physical, historically placed man or

woman, who suffers pain and expresses joy, who talks and walks, writes letters and entertains friends, and not some bit or piece of the person as such, so it is the person who thinks, and not some separate disembodied mind? If this is the case then a whole range of implications follow which challenge many of the basic assumptions which underlie a good deal of epistemology—West or East. Let us examine a few of these implications.

III

Particularity

If it is a person who thinks then all acts of knowing have a pronounced, and not merely trivial, particularity. Each and every one of a person's cognition is coloured by his or her past experience (*karma)* and reflects present interests and future expectations. One's ability to follow an argument to its conclusion, to concentrate on relations obtaining between things, to see intricate connections between ideas—all the factors that constitute 'rationality'—will, to a considerable extent, be a function of one's basic capacities as these have been disciplined by one. No two thinkers will be the same with regard to these factors. Every mental act will reflect what we might call the mind-style of the thinker. The universality of pure rationality is thus a chimera.

Now this, of course, does not mean that rational agreement and mutual understanding is impossible. Knowing is particularized, but certain universal or at least general elements may be present as well, for the maturation of the mental is informed to a great degree by cultural factors. What and how one sees and thinks is largely a shared experience within any culture. In short, the mental conditions that get appropriated by persons are similar in many important ways; culturalization, in spite of many particular features, is much the same for most persons during any given historical epoch; what we take to be canons of intelligibility will be shared widely; and the languages we employ will of necessity be 'public' in character. Particularity does not rule out generality: it does, however, lay bare any pretensions of 'reason' to a simple universality.

'Changing your mind'

One cannot, it seems, alter another person's basic understanding of reality and the ultimate concerns that inform that understanding by mere argument. I might be able to persuade you, if I am clever enough, that there are numerous inadequacies in the way in which you understand the world and organize your experience in ontological terms. I might be able to persuade you that your very notion of what is rational is incoherent, and so on. But I will not

succeed in replacing that 'world-making' of yours with a better one until I am able to effect a change in your personhood. To change one's metaphysics is to change oneself. One's experience, in its deepest value-laden dimensions, provides the foundations for one's world-view, and a change in view requires a change in experience—a change in the person.

Error

Closely related to this is the problem of error. KCB writes:

> I am said to correct an error of mine when I disbelieve in what I am aware I believed.[8]
>
> The consciousness of a belief has been shown to involve disbelief in its content. As to be conscious of any subjective fact is to be conscious of a belief, all reflective consciousness may be said to involve disbelief in the content of the corresponding unreflective consciousness. Thus the consciousness of the subjective and vice versa. We are necessarily aware of the false and the subjective together.[9]

Western philosophers for the most part (going back to Descartes) have tended to attribute error to the 'will' or, as is also the case with Indian philosophers, to the waywardness of perception, but not the person as such. Errors or mistakes, it is believed, unlike with primary *avidyā* are correctable without having to alter a person's way of seeing or manner of being.

Although the terms are often used interchangeably, we need, I think, to distinguish between 'mistakes' and 'errors'. A mistake occurs when one does or says something incorrectly within the framework of a rule-governed system of action or of speech. I mistype and misspell words; I sometimes say the wrong thing (in both a social and purely linguistic sense), especially when speaking a 'foreign language', and so on. Simple mistakes are correctable. 'One learns from one's mistakes.'

Nevertheless, as Freud has convincingly shown in his 'pathology of everyday life', many of our mistakes are not made by sheer ineptitude, or by one's hand or mouth as such. It is not just my foot which hits the leg of the table, spilling soup over an unwanted dinner companion; it is not some defect in my hand-movement that is the source of my writing 'My dear fiend' in a letter. In their full intentionality these mistakes are *my* acts and express (indicate, show) my hidden propensity to do certain things, revealing thereby my 'true' intentions.

For the most part, we are quite capable of discriminating between those mistakes of a compulsive kind, as it were, from those of a more mechanical sort. We have little difficulty in distinguishing between

the case of someone who always makes mistakes in subtraction whenever she is making a deduction in her cheque-book from the case of someone who is just learning to add and subtract and oftentimes gets her figures wrong.

An error, on the other hand, applies primarily to beliefs and judgments. And here too a further distinction needs to be made between those errors which come about because of the necessity we often face to act and to make decisions without our having sufficient knowledge, information or evidence concerning the situation, from those of a more fundamental person-based kind. Most of the trivial and many of the gravest decisions we make are made in the context of our simply not having adequate knowledge of all the relevant facts, with the beliefs informing those decisions thereby turning out to be erroneous.

On the other hand, many errors of belief and judgment, like those of compulsive mistakes, have their source more fundamentally in our entire psycho-physical person in the form of our having propensities to err in certain ways with respect to certain things. This is exhibited most clearly in interpersonal relationships. It is often observed that there is a strong tendency for people to commit over and over again their errors of judgment in the closest relations they have with others. The divorced woman who has been unhappily married suddenly appears with a new mate who is strikingly similar to her previous one. Whereas we learn from mistakes, we tend to repeat errors—which is only quite natural, as our beliefs and judgments are informed by our total experience. We acquire, one might say, dispositions to err—habits *(saṁskāras?)* become deeply ingrained in our entire personality.

In short, many, indeed most, of the crucial errors as well as mistakes which I make are a reflection of 'me'. For these to be altered or eliminated requires a change in me. There is little mystery as to why we err. It is rather something more of a miracle that we sometimes get things right.

Non-person truths

If it is the person who thinks, with his ideas always thereby having a particularized aspect and being grounded in relatively stable ontical-value structures, with the errors in his beliefs and judgments being attributable to his very person, then those noetic acts that rightly claim to be self-certifying, to transcend ordinary subject/object relations, to involve an identity between knower and known *(scientia intuitiva; jñāna; intelektuelle Anschauung; prājñā)* do not belong as such to the person. They are not *his* intuitions. In the wonderful words of the *Kena Upanisad* (II, 3): 'To whomsoever it *[Brahman]* is not known, to him it is known: to whomsoever it is known, he does

not know.' The 'higher knowledge', in short, is essentially non-personal. *Paravidyā* knows nothing of 'me'. The 'I' is absent when it is present.

Perception

According to KCB:

> To knowledge, the object is *there* and the body *here* is its presupposition; and as knowledge deepens, there is a regress to prior presuppositions, the felt-body etc. up to feeling. . . . Each presupposition persists undistinguished in a lower stage and hence feeling may be said to inform even the perceived object. . . .[10]

Phenomenologists (Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty) have analyzed closely the role of the body in perception, especially as it 'positions' a perceiver to perceive an object from a determinate standpoint. Where I am physically (my 'object-body' in public space/time) will influence mightily how I perceive the objects in my visual field. Aron Gurwitsch writes:

> The fundamental phenomenon which the phenomenological theory of perception must consider first and take as its point of departure is that of perceptual adumbration. By this we mean the essential onesideness of every particular perception of a material thing. For instance, we stand before a building and look at it from a certain point of observation. Accordingly the perceived building presents itself from one determinate side, say its front side, and not from a different one; it appears as near, as located straight before us, as seen as street levels, and so so on.[11]

And not only one's present position but past positions as well influence perception, for every act of perception involves one as a person with a history—with certain dispositions to see things in certain ways, with certain interests that contribute to the selection of what one sees, with certain memories of previous experience which colour present contents. Where one has been, as much as where one now is, forms a central part of that 'perceptual adumbration' which is a feature of all experience.

In sum: If we take seriously, as I believe KCB would have us do, the notion/fact that it is a *person,* and not a disembodied rational 'mind' as such, which thinks and knows, then not only are various dimensions of our human being (individual, self, person) known in different ways but all our knowledge contains various elements of particularity. Each person is a knower in a very special and unique way: every mental act of a person will involve a certain 'mind-style'.

But this does not mean that each person is locked within oneself, a windowless monad, for a person is throughout social in nature, is part of a culture which informs his or her every action. Nevertheless one needs to look to the particularities of experience in order to see to what extent that experience controls a person's basic values and thereby thoughts. To change a person's view concerning the most fundamental metaphysical (religious, spiritual) commitments requires, not simply a convincing rational argument, but a change in the person. This is made most evident in the mistakes and errors we make, for at least one form of these clearly show them to be 'mine', that is, to belong entirely to the person.

Still there remains what might be called 'non-person truths' which are those associated precisely with those 'experiences' which transcend the ordinary subject/object relations that constitute the framework of our empirical and rational knowledge.

The latter, however remains always as body-based and not just of 'mind' or 'intellect'. One's entire history—one's 'past positions'—as well as present situation determines who and what we are as thinkers.

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Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya and the Plurality of *Puruṣas* (*puruṣa-bahutva*) in Sāṃkhya

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INTRODUCTION

At the conclusion of his introductory remarks to his *Studies in Vedāntism*, Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya (KCB) comments,

> A true philosophic system is not to be looked upon as a soulless jointing of hypotheses; it is a living fabric which, with all its endeavour to be objective, must have a well-marked individuality. Hence it is not to be regarded as the special property of academic philosophy-mongers, to be hacked up by them into technical views, but is to be regarded as a form of life and is to be treated as a theme of literature of infinite interest to humanity.[1]

Just before these comments, he describes his method as follows:

> The attitude to be borne towards the present subject should be neither that of the apologist nor that of the academic compiler but that of the interpreter which involves, to a certain extent, that of the constructor, too.[2]

Gopinath Bhattacharyya, the editor of KCB's work, speaking about this method of 'constructive interpretation', remarks:

> From a consideration of his actual procedure it would appear that by 'constructive interpretation' the author means much more of construction than of interpretation, and the method in substance amounts to speculative re-construction based on a few pivotal tenets rather than an objective exposition based on a detailed study of the more important texts of the particular school of philosophy that is claimed to be interpreted. The method is apparently a risky one and may easily be taken to be a fanciful reading of one's own thought into others' thinking. The author was quite conscious of this risk. . . .[3]

Even more than in *Studies in Vedāntism*, the method of 'constructive interpretation' or 'speculative re-construction' is to be found in his monograph, *Studies in Sāṃkhya Philosophy*.[4] In the area

of Sāṃkhya philosophy, however, the method is much more than an interpretive choice. As KCB rightly understood, 'constructive interpretation' or 'speculative re-construction' is the only possible way to proceed. Says KCB:

> The interpretation of all ancient systems requires a constructive effort; but while in the case of some systems where we have a large volume of literature and a continuity of tradition, the construction is mainly of the nature of translation of ideas into modern concepts, here in Sāṃkhya the construction at many places involves supplying of missing links from one's imagination. *It is risky work, but unless one does it one cannot be said to understand Sāṃkhya as a philosophy. It is a task that one is obliged to undertake.* It is a fascinating task because Sāṃkhya is a bold constructive philosophy. Sāṃkhya is not the avowed formulation of religious experience which Vedānta is primarily, nor analytical and critical like Nyāya, but is based on speculative insight and demands imaginative-introspective effort at every stage on the part of the interpreter.[5] (italics mine)

One of the more interesting conundrums in classical Sāṃkhya philosophizing is the puzzling claim that there is a plurality of *puruṣas (puruṣa-bahutva)*. No aspect of Sāṃkhya philosophy has been so thoroughly ridiculed by philosophical interpreters, both ancient and modern. Usually it is explained away as a historical anomaly, the lame result of a compromise between an old nature-philosophy and the self-doctrines of the Upaniṣads.[6] It is to the great credit of KCB not to have accepted this conventional line of criticism but, instead, to attempt to think through what the ancient Sāṃkhya *ācāryas* meant by this crucial notion.

My own view in these matters is that KCB was clearly on the right track in trying to give a philosophical justification for *puruṣa-bahutva*, that indeed the 'plurality of *puruṣas*' makes much more philosophical sense than the old religious cosmic *ātman* of the Upaniṣads and later *Advaita Vedānta* philosophy, and that the notion of *puruṣa-bahutva* could possibly be interpreted in ways that would allow traditional South Asian reflection about the non-intentionality of consciousness to provide some interesting insights into certain contemporary discussions within the field of philosophy of mind. I shall present my analysis in three sections, or perhaps better, on three levels of discourse: (i) a structural level in which I want to place the Sāṃkhya *puruṣa-bahutva* in its Indian environment *vis-à-vis* the Vedānta position; (ii) an interpretive level in which I shall utilize KCB's discussion by way of showing the rational justification for *puruṣa-bahutva* in Sāṃkhya; and (iii) a brief comparative level in which I want to show how *puruṣa-bahutva* may be utilized for discussing certain issues in philosophy of mind.

The Structural Level: The One and the Many in Sāṃkhya and Vedānta

The classical Sāṃkhya interpretation of *puruṣa* is set forth in *Sāṃkhya-kārikā (SK)* 17–21 and is best summarized by simply quoting the *kārikās* as follows:

> 17. The *puruṣa* exists, (a) because combinations exist for another; (b) because (this other) must be apart or opposite from the three *gunas* (together with what this entails as mentioned earlier in *kārikā* 11); (c) because (this other) (must be) a superintending presence; (d) because of the presence of an enjoyer; and (e) because there is a basic urge towards freedom (in all beings).
> 18. (Moreover), there is plurality of *puruṣas (puruṣa-bahutva)*, (a) because there is diversity of births; (b) because there is diversity of deaths; (c) because there is diversity of organs (both cognitive and motor) (in different beings); (d) because (beings) pursue their various goals at different times and in different ways; and (e) because (beings) are made up of different combinations of the three *guṇas*.
> 19. (Furthermore), since *puruṣa* is opposite from that (*prakṛti* or the unmanifest), it follows that *puruṣa* is (a) a witness; (b) (grounded in or the basis for) freedom; (c) indifferent; (d) a ground or basis for subjectivity; and (e) characterized by non-agency or incapable of action.
> 20. Because these two (namely, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti)* are in the presence of one another, the unconscious one (that is, *prakṛti)* appears as if possessed of consciousness. Similarly, the indifferent one (that is, *puruṣa)* appears as if it is an agent or doer involved in the activities of the *guṇas*.
> 21. The presence of these two to one another (that is, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*), (functioning in a mutually beneficial way) like a lame person and a blind person, has for its purpose the conscious illumination of the natural world (by *puruṣa)* and the manifestation of the radical freedom of pure consciousness (by *prakṛti)*. The world unfolds by means of this (mutual presence).[7]

I have discussed these verses and the notions of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* at great length in other contexts, and there is no need to repeat those discussions here. They are easily accessible to the interested reader.[8] Similarly I shall assume that most readers of this journal are fully familiar with the classical expression of the Advaita Vedānta position in terms of *ātman, Brahman, māyā* and *avidyā*.[9]

What I do wish to call attention to in this context is the little noted contrast between the Sāṃkhya structuring of the problem of the one and the many and the Vedānta structuring of the problem of the one and the many as a result of the divergent interpretations of consciousness in the two systems. Usually Sāṃkhya and Vedānta are contrasted in terms of dualism versus monism, and that, of course, is a true enough distinction as far as it goes. What is more interesting by way of contrast, however, is what might be called the 'double reflection' antithesis between Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta regarding the one and the many that grows out of their divergent assertions about consciousness.[10] A simple chart reveals the contrast at a glance:

ONE	MANY
Śaṅkara's	Sāṃkhya's
ātman-Brahman	*puruṣa-bahutva*
Sāṃkhya's	Śaṅkara's
prakṛti	*māyā-avidyā*

Śaṅkara's one and the many is the exact antithesis, or perhaps better by way of keeping the 'reflection' metaphor, the mirror reversal of Sāṃkhya's one and the many. For Śaṅkara and the Advaita Vedāntin generally, contentless consciousness (*ātman*) is always one, whereas the multiplicity of the phenomenal, empirical everyday world is a bewildering and, finally, illusory, or at least irrational, many (*māyā, avidyā*). For Sāṃkhya, the exact opposite or the mirror reversal is the case. Contentless consciousness (*puruṣa*) reveals itself as many, whereas the multiplicity of the phenomenal, empirical everyday world is a completely intelligible, rational one *(prakṛti or mūlaprakṛti* as *traiguṇya)*. For Śaṅkara, a single, cosmic consciousness disperses itself into a random and finally unintelligible multiplicity. For Sāṃkhya, many consciousnesses reside in a single, rational world. For Śaṅkara, contentless consciousness *(ātman)* can never be particular or individual; it can only be general or universal. For Sāṃkhya contentless consciousness (*puruṣa)* can never be general or universal; it can only be particular or individual. For Śaṅkara, what truly is and what is truly intelligible and what is ultimately satisfying (that is, what is *sat, cit* and *ānanda*) can only be the sheer transparency of contentless consciousness (*ātman)*; anything else is an unintelligible, mysterious otherness. For Sāṃkhya, the world itself is truly intelligible and rational; what is unintelligable and mysterious is my particular or individual presence in it.

Whatever else might be said about this 'double reflection' or mirror-reversal between Śaṅkara and Sāṃkhya on the level of systematic structure, it surely cannot be explained away as the result of some sort of lame, historical compromise, as so many conventional interpretations have suggested. What we see here is a clear philosophical difference that calls for careful philosophical interpretation, and as mentioned earlier, it is to the credit of KCB that he clearly saw this. But let us move on now to our second level of discourse, namely the interpretive level.

The Interpretive Level: The Many as Warrant for Community and Certitude

KCB introduces the issue of the plurality of *puruṣas* with the following comment:

> Sāṃkhya admits a plurality of pure selves or *puruṣas.* The plurality is also taken to be inferred from the circumstances of the birth, death, organ, willing and feeling differing in different embodied selves (*SK* 18). A prior inquiry, however, is how a body other than mine is known to be of another self, for such knowledge is obviously assumed in the above inference. The *kārikā* starts with the commonsense belief in other embodied selves, but the inferences of many pure selves would be invalid if the datum can be shown to be due to illusion, as it is sought to be shown by the Vedāntist.[11]

Kārikā 18, in other words, which sets forth the arguments for *puruṣa-bahutva,* begs the question. It assumes what is at issue. It asserts the commonsense belief in a plurality of beings or entities and then simply assumes that contentless consciousness *(puruṣa)* must likewise be plural. KCB continues, however, with the observation:

> The Sāṃkhya view . . . can be defended if *buddhi* in its pure *asmitā*-function is taken to yield knowledge of I as in a community of I's or in reference to the object, if my certitude about an object be taken to involve others' certitude about it. This would be holding that the commonsense belief in many selves cannot be due to illusion corrigible as in the Vedānta view within *buddhi*-knowledge.[12]

KCB then proceeds to argue that the Sāṃkhya view is indeed defensible precisely because of the nature of contentless consciousness *(puruṣa)* as reflected in the *buddhi.* Says KCB:

> The self is known in *buddhi* in its pure *bhāva* not only as not finite (i.e. as above *ahaṃkāra)* but as not me (i.e. as object to itself). Now the self as infinite I can only mean I as involving all I's. Infinity in Sāṃkhya is infinity as in the finite. It is in reference to the finite phenomenal object the universal and in

reference to a constituent of one's exclusive body the corresponding cosmic substance, but what is it in reference to the subject 'I'?[13]

This latter question is, of course, crucial. Whereas it is clear enough what the 'infinite' might mean in terms of phenomenal objects or in terms of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas* of *prakṛti,* it is not at all clear what the 'infinite' could possibly mean with respect to the 'I as involving all Is'. With respect to phenomenal objects, the 'infinite' would obviously be the universal—for example, cows as sharing in the 'infinite' universal 'cow-ness' *(gotva)*. Or with respect to the Sāṃkhya *tattvas* of *prakṛti,* the *tattvas* that make up my embodiment can be seen as exemplifications of the cosmic make-up of *mūlaprakṛti*—for example, the exclusive *tanmātras* that make up my embodiment may be seen as exemplary of the cosmic *tanmātras* of the universal *prakṛti* or *mūlaprakṛti.*

Regarding *puruṣa,* however, I cannot assert a universality or 'infinite' on analogy with 'cowness' or 'cosmic *tanmātra'* (substance), for that would be to reduce *puruṣa* to the realm of phenomenal objects or to a *tattva* of *prakṛti.* The 'infinite' or universal of *puruṣa,* namely *puruṣa-sāmānya,* is of a peculiar kind. It is, to be sure, an abstraction, but not an abstraction along the lines of 'cowness' or 'cosmic *tattva'* (substance). What then is it? Says KCB:

> It is an abstraction in the sense that it cannot be represented like a universal or a substance as really or apparently comprising individuals (or modes) under it, being intelligible only as the *svarūpa* (or character of being itself) of the individual.
>
> The subject is manifest as what has no character *(nirdharmaka),* but this characterlessness is itself taken as its character of self-manifestness. Thus the subject is manifest simply as individual thing, as being itself. The pure individual is necessarily intelligible as individual among individuals. The subject that is consciously manifest as simply individual is manifest to itself as a self among selves.
>
> The self is essentially individual, any individual implying others. The term 'I' is to the person who uses it singular though he is necessarily aware that others can use it of themselves. *Puruṣa-sāmānya* or selfhood is this necessary universality of a singular, being universal only if uniqueness or the unique-in-general is universal. Unique-in-general means *any* unique, not *all* uniques. 'All A is B' indeed means 'any A is B' but 'any A is B need not mean 'all A is B', for even the distributive *all* has an implied collective character. As applied to the object, *any* and *all* may be regarded as equivalents but not as applied to the subject . . . . In point of being, each subject is absolute. . . . In this sense we may say that the self is known in *buddhi* as having with it a community of selves.[14]

Puruṣa, in other words, is the singular universal or the universal singular in the sense that its very individuality requires plurality. *Puruṣa-bahutva,* therefore, rather than begging the question, shows itself instead as the only intelligible way of formulating the question of contentless consciousness within *buddhi*-awareness.

In a similar fashion, *puruṣa-bahutva* in *buddhi*-awareness is related to issues of intersubjective certitude. Says KCB:

> So far as I know through *buddhi,* I know the object as not to me alone but to any knowing. This applies both to the phenomenal object and to the objective *tattva.* The *bhogya* is indeed relative to me as exclusive *bhoktṛ* but it is nonetheless taken by me as given, as having an existence that is for any *bhoktṛ.* So when the body, mental and material, is viewed through *buddhi* as object not only to me but to all, the constituents of the body become manifest as cosmic *tattvas.*[15]

KCB, then, brings together the various strands of his 'constructive interpretation' with the following comment:

> The self is thus known in pure *asmitā* as an individual involving a community of individuals, each being an infinite or *Īśvara.* There is no suggestion in Sāṃkhya of a self really or illusorily differentiated into many selves, nor of a single *Īśvara* as in Yoga distinct from the selves and mystically working within them. Each self is essentially *Īśvara* and pure *buddhi* as revealing and embodying the many infinite selves is called *mahat* or the great which gets restricted by *rajas* and *tamas* conditioning the movements towards *bhoga.* Of the self as *mukta* which to one's final reflection is absolute (*kevala*), we cannot say if it is an individual aware of itself involving a community of individuals. There is no reason to regard it as not individual in being, but all we can assert of it is that it is contentless consciousness, not consciousness of itself as object.[16]

K.C. Bhattacharyya, finally, concludes his discussion of *puruṣa-bahutva* with the following intriguing comparative comment:

> The distinguishability of *puruṣa-sāmānya* in the *puruṣa* known in *asmitā* lapses when the *asmitā* lapses, and hence the *mukta* self is at least not consciously individual. To Vedānta, unconscious being or individuality of the pure self or consciousness is meaningless. To Sāṃkhya the being of consciousness can be manifest only to *buddhi.* When *buddhi* lapses, the self would not be aware of its being. Vedānta would take it

> to be then ecstatically self-conscious. Apparently to Sāṃkhya, the being of the *mukta* self or absolute consciousness is then unmanifest or unconscious. Whether it is then individual or not can never be asserted. The conflict between Vedānta and Sāṃkhya on this point may, therefore, yet disappear. Only Sāṃkhya would insist that through *buddhi* you cannot know the individuality of the self as illusory. Apparently, Vedānta will rely on some spiritual feeling or *Śāstra* for its denial of individuality and seek not to disprove individuality by reason (*buddhi*) but only to disprove objections to the faith in its illusory character.[17]

The ironic upshot of KCB's interpretation, in other words, is that finally the Vedāntist is left with no rational justification for a single, universal self and an illusory plurality of *jīvas*. The only basis for a cosmic, universal *ātman* is 'spiritual feeling', *śruti* and 'faith'. It is hardly an accident, therefore, that Śaṅkara considered Sāṃkhya his main philosophical opponent. Not only did Sāṃkhya rationally justify its claims. Its very rational analysis, at least if KCB's 'constructive interpretation' is a plausible interpretation of Sāṃkhya's *puruṣa-bahutva*, showed the Vedānta analysis to have no rational basis whatever beyond its assertion in *śruti*. But let us move on now briefly to our third and final level of discourse, the comparative.

The Comparative Level: Contentless Consciousness as the Singular Universal

In the history of western thought, it is, of course, Hegel who treats in depth the problem of the 'concrete universal' or the 'singular universal' in his discussion of the notion (*der Begriff*) in *Wissenschaft der Logik*.[18] For Hegel, however, the singular universal or the concrete universal is finally the most completely determinate. It is that which has the most content, the most character. It is the most completely intelligible, the fully rational and the fully real. Substance is finally subject as absolute *Geist*, and the rational is the real. Such, however, is hardly the 'singular universal' to which KCB is referring in his treatment of the Sāṃkhya *puruṣa-bahutva*. If there be any point of contact in South Asian philosophizing, one would have to look to the Advaita Vedāntin's cosmic *ātman, mutatis mutandis*, for a South Asian equivalent to the Germanic absolute *Geist*.

A better locus for the Sāṃkhya equivalent to *puruṣa-bahutva* in the history of European thought would be Hegel's *Gegenspieler*, namely the great Kierkegaard, who refused to be reduced to Hegel's system. I have in mind here the famous and seminal essay on Kierkegaard by Jean-Paul Sartre, first presented at the UNESCO Conference on Kierkegaard in April 1964, and later published in *Situations* with the title 'Kierkegaard: The Singular Universal'.[19]

Kierkegaard's 'lived experience' in its sheer singularity becomes a 'non-knowledge' in the very heart of knowledge, or put somewhat differently, Kierkegaard's simple presence'. . . . constitutes itself within knowledge as irreducible non-knowledge.'[20] Says Sartre about Kierkegaard: '. . . the anchorage of the individual made this universal into an irreducible singularity'.[21] Or again: 'Kierkegaard . . . wanted to designate himself as a transhistorical absolute. . . . The subjective has to be what it is—a singular realisation of each singularity.'[22] Hegelian 'knowledge' knows everything that can possibly be known about Kierkegaard but, finally, really knows nothing about Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard, says Sartre, shows himself as a . . . singularizing accident . . . . it produced his most intimate self as a pure historical contingency, which might not have been and in itself meant nothing'.[23] Sartre continues: 'Kierkegaard lives on because, by rejecting knowledge, he reveals the transhistorical contemporaneity of the dead and the living.' In other words, contra the absolute determinism of the Hegelian project, Kierkegaard shows us '. . . the inaccessible secret of interiority', 'the human singularity of the concrete universal', and the remarkable revelation that '. . . each of us is an incomparable absolute'.[24]

We are back, *mutatis mutandis*, to KCB's discussion of the Sāṃkhya *puruṣa-bahutva:* 'In point of being, each subject is absolute . . .' and again, 'In this sense we may say that the self is known in *buddhi* as having with it a community of selves.' 'The subject is manifest as what has no character (*nirdharmaka*), but this characterlessness is itself taken as its character of self-manifestness' (or, in other words, a 'non-knowledge' in the heart of knowledge). And finally: '. . . this necessary universality of a singular, being universal only if uniqueness or the unique-in-general is universal. Unique-in-general means *any* unique, not *all* uniques.'[25] If, as mentioned above, the Advaita Vedāntin's cosmic *ātman* is, *mutatis mutandis*, a South Asian equivalent of the Germanic (Hegelian) absolute *Geist*, then surely Sāṃkhya's *puruṣa-bahutva* is, *mutatis mutandis*, the South Asian Danish (Kierkegaardian) reply. Put directly, just as Kierkegaard's 'singular universality' refused to be embraced by the Hegelian system, so Sāṃkhya *puruṣa-bahutva* can never be assimilated into the murky fog of Vedānta's cosmic *ātman*.

But let me conclude by moving outside the abstractions of European continental philosophizing in order to suggest another context in which the Sāṃkhya notion of *puruṣa-bahutva* could prove useful in dealing with certain problems in comparative philosophy. I have in mind some of the recent discussions regarding the nature of consciousness in philosophy of mind, and in particular I am thinking of the debates between the dualists and the reductive materialists or physicalists in the philosophy of mind.[26] Dualists for the most part

maintain the traditional distinction between mind and body or thought and extension, and the materialists and physicalists maintain a largely reductionist, scientific realism that simply discounts any separate notion of selfhood or non-materialist (or non-epiphenomenal) consciousness. Some recent philosophers of mind, and here I am thinking primarily of Paul Churchland, Michael Devitt, *et al.*, have argued that both traditional dualists as well as many reductive materialists and physicalists operate largely with a kind of 'folk psychology' paradigm that has been very much a part of western philosophy since its beginnings in pre-Socratic times. By trying to salvage traditional dualism or by attempting to reduce the propositions of 'folk psychology' into modern scientific discourse, many philosophers of mind are not really getting anywhere, since the 'folk psychology' orientation (namely a 'subject' that somehow 'believes' or 'desires' x, and so forth) is hopelessly outdated and largely false. Instead of a 'reductive materialism', they argue, we need an 'eliminative materialism' whereby the traditional western 'folk psychology', like phlogiston-theory, is simply dropped as false.[27] Why try to salvage what is so obviously naive and false?

Roughly speaking, then, on the materialist or physicalist side, one can identify what might be called a traditional materialist position, a reductive materialist position and an eliminative materialist position. Similarly, on the dualist side, one can identify a simple dualist position (e.g. Descartes), a reductive dualist position (e.g. some of the work of J.C. Eccles) and a possible 'eliminative dualist' position. Regarding this latter possibility, Paul Churchland comments:

> The third possibility here . . . is one that to my knowledge has never been cited before, but it is real just the same. . . . The ontology of the P-theory (i.e. the 'person'-theory of folk psychology) would thus be eliminated in favour of the ontology of the more general theory that displaced it. We might call this possibility 'eliminative dualism'![28]

What is interesting to me as a student of Indian philosophy is that indeed an 'eliminative dualist' position has been argued, and that position is that of the classical Sāṃkhya *puruṣa-bahutva. Puruṣa* is contentless consciousness that is nevertheless 'the necessary universality of a singular'. 'The subject is manifest as what has no character (*nirdharmaka*), but this characterlessness is itself taken as its character of self-manifestness'.[29] What Sāṃkhya represents philosophically in its philosophy of mind is an intriguing synthesis of the dualist and materialist positions in an 'eliminative' mode. That is to say, the conventional 'person' is encompassed within a general materialist ontology of *prakṛti* (as *buddhi*, etc.), and intentionality is dealt with in terms of *buddhi*-awareness in a reductive materialist

fashion. At the same time, however, a claim is made for the presence of a contentless (that is, non-intentional) consciousness that is nevertheless absolutely singular and unique but, finally, impersonal, inactive and unknowable (precisely because it is contentless).

CONCLUSION

But let me quickly conclude. The great genius of KCB is that he took traditional Indian philosophy as a starting-point for his own creative philosophical reflection. He refused to allow the insights of traditional Indian philosophy to be 'hacked up' by the 'academic philosophy-mongers' (and one might well add that great company of pedants known as 'Indologists' and 'Orientalists'). He really believed that Indian philosophy has an important role to play in modern philosophy. He was surely right, and all of us who claim to do Indian philosophy should really start doing it!

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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2. Ibid., p. 5.
3. Ibid., p. xi.
4. Ibid., pp. 125–211.
5. Ibid., p. 127.
6. See, for example, A.B. Keith, *The Sāṃkhya System*, YMCA Publishing House, Calcutta, 1949, pp. 94–95; and D. Chattopadhyaya, *Lokāyata*, People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1973, pp. 383 ff.
7. For text and translation of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, see Gerald J. Larson, *Classical Sāṃkhya*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1979, revised second edition, pp. 255–77. For an exhaustive discussion of the Sāṃkhya system overall and the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* itself, see also G.J. Larson and R.S. Bhattacharya (eds.), *Sāṃkhya, A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987; *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. IV, General Editor, Karl H. Potter, pp. 3–103 and 149–63.
8. Ibid.
9. A useful recent exposition is Karl H. Potter, *Advaita Vedānta up to Saṅkara and His Pupils*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981, *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. III, General Editor, Karl H. Potter, pp. 3–100. A precise discussion of the relation between Sāṃkhya and Śaṅkara may be found in Gerald J. Larson, 'Saṅkara's Criticism of Sāṃkhya and the Sāṃkhya Response', in *Classical Sāṃkhya*, op. cit., pp. 209–35.
10. By 'double reflection' I have in mind the debate between Vācaspatimiśra and Vijñānabhikṣu regarding the Sāṃkhya-Yoga relation between *buddhi* and *puruṣa* in terms of a theory of single reflection (*pratibimba*, maintained by Vācaspatimiśra), or a theory of 'double' or 'mutual reflection' (*anyonya-pratibimba*, maintained by Vijñānabhikṣu). Herein I am suggesting that a metaphor of 'double reflection' or *anyonya-pratibimba* may be helpful by way of

showing the structural difference between Advaita Vedānta and Sāṃkhya regarding the problem of the one and the many.

11. K.C. Bhattacharyya, 'Studies in Sāṃkhya,' op. cit., p. 194.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 195.
14. Ibid., pp. 195–96.
15. Ibid., p. 196.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., pp. 196–97.
18. G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, translated by A.V. Miller, *Hegel's Science of Logic* foreword by J.N. Findlay, Humanities Press International, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1989; translation based on George Allen & Unwin edition of 1969, pp. 600–22.
19. Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Kierkegaard: The Singular Universal', in *Between Existentialism and Marxism*, translated by John Mathews, Pantheon Books, New York, 1974, pp. 141–69.
20. Ibid., pp. 147 and 152.
21. Ibid., p. 156.
22. Ibid., pp. 147 and 145.
23. Ibid., p. 157.
24. Ibid., p. 167.
25. K.C. Bhattacharyya, op. cit., pp. 195–96.
26. A useful anthology that nicely brings together almost all of the important papers concerning these debates is David M. Rosenthal (ed.), *The Nature of Mind*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991. Two books by Paul M Churchland are also helpful by way of understanding the manner in which the current debates are being framed, namely Paul M. Churchland, *Matter and Consciousness*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988, revised edition; and Paul M. Churchland, *Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.
27. Churchland, *Scientific realism*, op. cit., p. 114.
28. Ibid., p. 108.
29. K.C. Bhattacharyya, op. cit., p. 195.

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's Theory of Meaning

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Underlying and scattered throughout *The Subject as Freedom*[1] there is a well-developed theory of meaning to which I would like to draw attention in this essay. In this theory, meanings are understood not merely as linguistic meanings, but also as correlates of appropriate modes of subjectivity. Let me start with formulating the central core of that theory which consists in the following theses:

1. Object = meant content.
2. Meanings must be communicable and sharable between the speaker and the hearer.
3. Meanings as entities emerge from images through ideas and finally in pure thought.
4. The indexical 'I' does not have a meaning.

Let us start by looking at these theses somewhat closely.

Thesis 1 may be construed in a manner which would make it amount to saying that the object is what is referred or intended. Such a construal will get rid of meanings as intermediate entities and identify them with referents. However, it does seem to me that Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya (KCB) did not quite subscribe to a referential theory of meaning. On the contrary, he speaks of meanings as 'ghostly entities' (p. 42) and gives an account of how such ghostly entities emerge (thesis 2). Therefore, by saying that the object is the meant content, KCB must have in mind the thesis that objects are referred to, or posited, always through meanings, and never without them. Thus we have a Fregean-type—but not quite Frege's—theory.

Although meanings must be communicable and sharable between the speaker and the hearer—here he would agree with Frege—KCB holds that contents which are not meant (i.e., which are not therefore objects) may also be communicated and understood. This is the case with the speaker's uttering the word 'I'. The word I', according to KCB, does not have a meaning (thesis 4). The reason given by him for this thesis is that 'The word I as used by a speaker is not understood by the hearer to convey what he would himself convey by the use of it' (p. 2). Nevertheless, the word is *understood*

by the hearer to stand for the speaker. This understanding is not grasping of a meaning. As KCB puts it, in this case the word itself, but not the meaning, carries the intention of the speaker. This is what he means when he writes that the speaker's self-consciousness is *incarnated* in the word 'I' (p. 3). We should not assume that by denying that the word 'I' expresses a meaning, KCB avoids Frege's predicament of having to admit incommunicable senses. Does the word 'I' then simply refer to myself (not to *any* speaker, not also to me as *the* speaker)? Here KCB's view regarding 'I' departs from a Russellian sort of theory which treats 'I' as a logically proper name. The term is not even a singular term, for different people do not use it of the same thing (p. 179). According to KCB's theory, even if 'I' does not have a meaning, it nevertheless has a meaning-function, it expresses the speaker's actual introspection by incarnating it (pp. 179–80). How should we understand this claim? Why does he speak of meaning-function, and what does he mean by it?

There is a distinction between meaning-function and actual meaning with regard to demonstratives, which is upheld, amongst others, by Husserl and Perry. Husserl distinguishes between *'anzeigende Bedeutung'* and *'angezeigte Bedeutung'*,[2] and Perry between the role and the value of the indexicals. [3] In each case the former is grasped in understanding, the latter is determined, amongst others, by context. Both ascribe to indexicals, including 'I', a meaning-function as well as a meaning. KCB denies to 'I'—but not to 'this'—meaning, but ascribes to it a meaning-function. (It should be noted that consequently KCB does not give a unified theory of indexicals. He has one theory for 'I' and another for 'this'.) What then does he mean by 'meaning-function'?

I think what he means is two-fold. For one thing, the I (who is incarnated in any use of 'I') is just and simply the function of speaking. The speaker (who utters 'I') is not first someone who then says 'I'. She is rather one who is the I in the sense of the 'I'-speaker. 'It is just the first person I, the speaker who is not an object to introspection but is simply the function of speaking' (p. 175). Being *I* and being 'I'-speaking are one and the same. For another, speaking 'I', therefore being-I, is the same as introspecting. 'Introspection is not believing in the I, it is the I' (p. 175). If Kant regarded the self, not as a substance, but as the thinking function, KCB regards the self, at a more fundamental level, as just speaking, saying 'I' (and introspecting). The function of speaking is the meaning function which the use of 'I' expresses, although it does not refer to an object (the alleged self) through a meaning. If it did so refer, then the self would be an object in accordance with thesis 1, being a meant content. However the self incarnated in 'I' is a functioning (speaking, introspecting) subject.

When the expression 'morning star' is understood, one grasps its meaning. When the word 'I' as uttered by a speaker is understood, one does not grasp a meaning, one does not have a 'mystic intuition' either. The subject is being literally communicated by speech, and is so understood, and so known. Though 'unmeanable', the I is knowable. As contrasted with both 'morning star' and 'I', 'abracadabra' is just unmeanable and is not understood at all.

Unlike many other philosophers who have advanced a theory of indexicals, KCB gives a different theory in the case of 'this' than in the case of 'I'. 'I', as we have noted, does not, according to him, express a meaning, The word 'this' however may be used by two persons to refer to the same object in the same sense. Thus 'this' has a general meaning, and the availability of any other general meaning requires that individual things to which such a meaning applies can be identified as *this*. 'This' therefore is paradigmatic of words that refer to objects—primarily the perceivable objects, but also to generalities.

I have said earlier that KCB does speak of meanings as objects of a sort, as rather 'ghost-like' objects. But can we ascribe to him then a Platonic theory of meanings (such as Frege's) according to which meanings are abstract entities having a mode of being of their own, independently of being grasped by a mind or of being expressed in a language? Apart from the rich ontology it commits one to (which by itself does not worry me), KCB's own theory would lead to undesirable consequences if combined with such a Platonic theory. If objects are meant contents (thesis 1), and if meanings are objects of a sort, then meanings must also be meant contents—in which case there would be second level meanings through which the first level meanings are meant, and so on *ad infinitum*. (The Fregean theory does not entail this consequence, for according to that theory although objects are referred through senses, objects need not be referred at all, so that they cannot be *defined* as meant contents. Senses become referents only under intensional contexts, and only then are higher order senses required.)

One response to the Platonic reification of meanings is the Husserlian: meanings are better construed as ideal contents of intentional acts[4] so that ideality preserves their irreality while being contents of intentional acts they resist reification. Does KCB follow such a route?

A definitive answer to this question would require us to determine, in the first instance, what KCB's position *vis-à-vis* the intentionality thesis is. The following sentence from *The Subject as Freedom* is relevant: 'The ordinary view of the ghostly psychic fact as coordinate with objective fact ignores the experienced non-distinction of presentation from its object. . . ., (p. 90). Elsewhere,

he writes: 'Presentation and object are so related that while the latter is given distinct from the former, the former is not given distinct from the latter, being only abstracted or tried to be distinguished in introspection' (p. 57).

In valid perception, the object alone is there, not its distinction from presentation. In illusory perception, after the illusion is corrected, only presentation is there but no object distinct from it. The usual formulations of intentionality state that all consciousness (here presentation) is of an object. But the two, presentation and object, are never given as distinct—if KCB is right—in primary cognition. Only introspection abstracts presentation from the object, and distinguishes object from presentation. The intentionality thesis presupposes such introspection, and is not a description of primary perceptual cognition.

KCB calls meaning a presentation in a text where the image, idea and meaning are all taken to be 'ghostly objects', and all are designated presentations. (Recall Frege's characterization of *Sinn* as a mode of presentation.) As a presentation meaning is not given as distinct from the object, except to introspection, especially, to introspection into non-perceptual knowledge. These modes of presentation may themselves be objectified, in which case consciousness would be detached from them, thereby becoming non-presentational or spiritual subjectivity. What is relevant for my present purpose is a two-fold thesis. First, that meaning is a presentation, originally not distinguished from the object but capable of being so distinguished in introspection and therewith also objectified. Second, image and idea and pure thought are stages through which meaning develops. The image is a quasi-object, has an objective form but no objective position in space and time; when introspected, it shows itself as a process of forming, of imagining, it appears 'as a form being formed' (p. 140). As 'the finished form that interprets the forming', the image is to be called an idea (p. 142), which is originally given as 'a fringe of the image', not yet separated from it. The dissociated idea is thought—at first pictorial, but then thought proper which is presented as 'unpicturable meaning' (p. 145). In this account of the genesis of meaning, KCB recognizes the appropriate validity of the image theory of meaning, of a conceptualist theory of meaning, and of a Platonic theory—each being true of a stage of development of meaning. Again seeking to avoid a Platonic reification, he adds: 'Thought is still presented as meaning, as the unobjective something about the object, being characterisable only in reference to the object as what the object is not.' Is not the Fregean *Sinn* defined in relation to the *Bedeutung*, as what is not the *Bedeutung* and as what yet determines the latter? Why then did he call it a kind of entity, a quasi-object, a 'ghostly

object'? Let us suggest: functionally, it is unobjective, it becomes an object, or rather a quasi-object, only for introspection. But KCB hastens to add: 'The introspective awareness of meaning as distinct from the image is awareness of the explicit unobjective' (p. 152). I think, with regard to the question of the ontological status of meanings, KCB wavers between according to them a quasi-objective status and regarding them as purely unobjective functions. But this wavering may indeed correspond to the nature of the matter at hand. It may indeed be that here there are two complementary modes of describing the phenomenon, no one of which exhausts the nature of meanings.[5]

Notes and References

1. K.C. Bhattacharyya, *The Subject as Freedom*, The Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, Bombay, 1930. References to this work are to this original edition, and all page reference cited within the paper are to this edition.
2. E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Max Niemeyer, Vierte Auflage, Halle, 1928, pp. 79–86.
3. John Perry, 'Frege on Demonstratives', *Philosophical Review*, LXXXVI, 1977, pp. 474–97.
4. Cf. J.N. Mohanty, *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Third Edition, 1976.
5. In *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning* I had suggested the importance of what I there called the Principle of Complementarity for a theory of meaning.

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya on Factuality, Falsity, and Contradiction

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My object in this paper is to elucidate and interpret Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's (KCB) thoughts on factuality, falsity, and contradiction. The three terms exhaust among themselves a considerable area of metaphysical inquiry. It would, therefore, be sheer pretence on my part to claim to attempt within the compass of a single paper anything more than a more or less sketchy consideration of the meaning of the terms in question as understood and expounded by KCB. The importance they have for him may be gauged—and this is specially true of 'falsity', which is KCB's one great preoccupation—from the simple fact of the enormous amount of intellectual labour that he has expended on the treatment of them. I have taken the liberty of offering some observations which, in my view, a sympathetic appreciation of a philosophical view sometimes demands and deserves. If but incidentally, I have also raised a couple of issues which seemed to me to arise from KCB's treatment of the subject.

The two key terms in which KCB's discussion of the above theme is anchored are 'belief' and 'thinkability'. All the three—fact, falsity, and contradiction—have to do with these two terms (or their lack) in one way or another. It would be of help if we begin our discussion with the concept of factuality and KCB's preliminary understanding of the term in relation to belief and thought.

KCB's initial view of fact is apparently quite unusual if not also downright obscure. Viewing fact solely in terms of or as equivalent to the given, as laymen and even philosophers are generally wont to do, would be to him plainly improper. Fact, he declares, 'does not admit of an impersonal definition' (p. 169).* He links the notion of fact with that of belief and thinks them to be unseverable. The relation conceived by KCB between fact and belief is, however, no ordinary one. 'Fact', he says, 'means what is believed: what a person believes is fact to him' (p. 169). This may seem quite an

* All page numbers within parentheses in the body of the article refer to K.C. Bhattacharyya's *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1958.

extraordinary statement on the face of it. For even if one were to grant, as many would do, that fact is on the whole unintelligible apart from belief, a much less objectionable statement would perhaps be: *what is believed is taken to be fact.* This formulation has the advantage that it provides for the possibility, never in principle deniable, that a belief may turn out to be false and so need correction. It would be noted that the latter half of the above statement of KCB's—what a person believes is a fact *to him* (my italics)—seems to make amends for the view the first half articulates. It approximates to our formulation above. If we ponder the psychology of belief we will find that our predisposition always is to take as fact what we believe, even though this does not detract from the (other) fact that truth or falsity is not something beliefs 'wear on their sleeves'. Our beliefs are not self-evidently true even though we presume them to be so as a matter of course and even act upon them without feeling the need, unless otherwise warranted, to engage first in any elaborate reasoning process to back up our judgments. So when in the above KCB says, what a person believes is a fact to him, he seems to be saying no more, though also no less, than that there is a side to fact which cannot be understood except as a category of reflective (and not merely conscious) thinking.

Besides, as KCB himself clarifies elsewhere, his definition: Fact is what is believed, indicates the *use,* not the linguistic definition, of fact.[1] So what the statement in effect comes to is not that what is believed is for that reason always a fact, nor even that it is always facts that we believe. That would be to suppose KCB too naive. KCB's meaning rather is that there is a clear sense in which the logic of fact-talk or 'fact-stating type of discourse' cannot be fully understood apart from a reference to the use of the word, and its meaning-as-use cannot be fully understood in abstraction from all reference to the epistemic (or subjective) attitudes of belief and disbelief. And this is anything but denying facts their legitimate ontological status or their rightful place in the world.

If facts are tied at one end to belief they are tied at the other end to reality. And it can't probably be helped, given the nature of the case. The two-fold function which fact thus performs as a part of the belief-expressing speech-act can be understood as follows.

On the one hand the referent *p* of the fact-stating statement 'It is a fact that *p*' cries to be placed in the world and taken as existing (because of its setting up that claim) *independently* of the belief and the corresponding speech-act. On the other hand the same referent (along with its features described and symbolized as *p*) gets *characterized as a fact* by reason of its being believed to exist or to have taken place. Fact thus has a two-ended movement, one towards the world of objects and events and the other towards an

attitude—epistemic attitude—of the speaker. Some philosophers' attempt, therefore, to banish facts from the world altogether is misconceived and ends in failure. The world may consist of things but it consists of things which have facts holding about them. Facts, therefore, though belonging in a clear sense to the world, yet do not exist in the same way as objects and events do with the features that characterize them. This does not, however, mean that they (facts) are of a lesser reality. In one word, things acquire the title of facts as they are believed or asserted. It is a different thing though that acquirement of this title is always at bottom *provisional.* In saying 'It is a fact that *p*' I claim a certain status for the state of affairs represented by *p.* It is of course true that my belief that *p* does not by itself make *p* a fact; some further conditions, enquiry into which is beyond the muttons, are necessary for that to be the case. But this does not alter the fact that for something—whether true or false—to be asserted as fact it needs to be the object of a belief. We cannot in the same breath say 'I believe that *p* but *p* is not a fact' or '*p* is a fact (or 'it is a fact that *p*') but I do not believe that *p*'.

We have said that something asserted as fact points also in the direction of the real. Now this real, KCB would say, while it keeps at bay the unreal, must accommodate side by side with the existent, the possible too. Sometimes it is thought that the notion of fact, properly speaking, has only to do with the existent or the actual. Facts on this view hold only about those things—'thing' in the widest sense—which are actual. How can one speak of facts about something non-existent? Just as, as the corresponding theory has it, no predicate can legitimately be attributed to that which does not exist,[2] nothing true, it is urged, can possibly be meaningfully said or known of the non-existent.

KCB would here draw a distinction. The non-existent or non-actual would, according to him, be of two types. There is the non-existent which not only does not exist but concerning which no question of existence can actually be fairly asked either. This KCB calls 'false' or 'unreal'.[3] In fact, to KCB even its non-existence—the non-existence, e.g. of the snake when it has been discovered that it was actually a rope—cannot be called a fact for the simple reason that (to repeat) no actual question of its (possible) existence is ever raised (during disbelief). The other non-actual is that which although not actually existing is capable of existence. And what is capable of existence is a *possible* existent for the question about its existence can always in reality be asked or entertained. Both the existence and the non-existence of the possible existent are thus conceivable and therefore, if believed, so far facts. These latter are, in KCB's favourite phrase, facts which are 'thought' or 'thinkable'. Thinkability however need not be the defining characteristic of

fact. There may be things—for example the moral *ought* or freedom—which are neither classifiable as existent nor as non-existent but which are believed and are therefore that far facts. Such facts as such involve no question of existence and hence even though believed cannot, on KCB's conception, be called thinkable. Thus, barring such cases as these all such contents, concerning which the question of existence is askable, are believable and hence thinkable facts. 'What is thought is either the possible existent or the existence or the non-existence of the possible existent' (p. 169).

The upshot is that thinkability (or thought) has to do with the question of existence—with the real, in other words. A square circle, for example, cannot be said to be thought, not only because it does not actually exist but also because its existence or non-existence does not admit of conception. Which means, in other words, it is neither a possible existent nor a possible non-existent. One can entertain in thought the non-existence only of that whose existence also is conceivable or possible.

This restriction of thought's jurisdiction to contents as imply actual questions of existence is not without consequences. In the first place, it undermines the myth of the 'subsistent'. The subsistent is generally supposed to belong to some 'third realm' (beyond existence and non-existence) and therefore as not really involving the question of existence. And yet this circumstance, it is contended, does not prevent the asking of some other questions with regard to it—the questions for example relating to its compatibility or coherence with other thought-contents (within a system). KCB does not immediately deny this latter possibility nor does he deny that subsistents have meaning or thought-content. He queries however whether the said compatibility with other thought-contents is such that one could with justification cite it as an instance of a thought-content involving no actual question of existence. In his view this is impossible. This is further shown by a consideration of a contradictory thought. A square circle, for example, is a contradictory idea. But is awareness of its contradiction also thinking (or thought-content) proper? In a square circle there are two meaning-contents in clash with each other. The clash or contradiction itself however is not an additional meaning (p. 170). KCB concludes then that the subsistent is in fact a possible existent and hence a thinkable. A content loosened from its possible existence cannot even survive as a subsistent. And even when it is (if at all) thus loosened it ceases to be a meaning- or thought-content, though it can be called a 'significant speakable'. (That way even a contradiction—which too like the above is no thought—is a significant speakable.) It is an important tenet of KCB's philosophy

that the 'speakable' (—capable of being expressed at all—) is a category wider and more inclusive than the 'thinkable'. All thinkable is speakable but all speakable need not be thinkable.

Thought always chases the real. And it is to the real that thought repeatedly returns in its endeavour to find truth. Those who question this assumption owe it to themselves to explain how severence of thought from reality can become a possibility in the first instance, and further, how the existence question can be circumvented so unmindfully. Is thought's concern merely with the meaning-contents and their possible mutual relations such as a certain type of logic would have it? Does not thought impoverish itself by passing by silently the issue of existence or reality? Does not thought by undermining its relation to reality commit suicide? And if so, what remains of its *raison d'etre*? What justification can thought offer for cutting away its umbilical cord—which is its relation to reality—which alone sustains it and provides it nourishment? These are important questions and seem to determine KCB's view of the essential business of thought. Thought cannot but be ontologically engaged—this seems to be the central teaching of KCB. And here he seems to agree with some other philosophers, especially the idealists.

Thought operates through judgments, and the latter cannot but be concerned with reality. (Relieved of this duty, a judgment remains a frivolous pretence.) All this follows from the simple two-fold consideration:

(1) that judgements *must* be true or false, and
(2) that this they cannot be in themselves but only through a reference to the real which is beyond them.

But there is another consideration which we can invoke to affirm thought's intrinsic relation to reality. This consideration gains in force and clearness as we ponder the fact (i) that we implicitly but unquestioningly believe that the world is in principle capable, however, partially or inadequately at times, of being known—'knowability' here meaning the same as availability to thought, and (ii) that the only way we can decide as to the relative adequacy or otherwise of a thought form in representing the form or structure of a corresponding fact is by scrutinizing the thought form. And we believe that the world is knowable because we find or believe that we find nothing in the world which, in principle, prevents its being known. The sum and substance of the preceding discussion is that existence, possible existence, and non-existence of a possible existent are all bound up with thinkability, and so is consequently bound up the notion of fact with these in so far as it relates to reality.

Let us now turn to consider KCB's conception of falsity and contradiction and their relation to belief. For the sake of convenience, we will first discuss contradiction.

We have seen that all thought implies, in one way or another, the question of existence. All existence, in so far as it lends itself to thought, is according to KCB, significantly speakable. All speakable content however need not be thinkable too. A speakable which raises no actual question of existence is no thinkable though it is not wholly unmeaning, for it is significant. This specially is true of the contradictory and the false. A contradictory thought like a square circle is no thinkable content—it involves no question of existence. It is not however wholly unspeakable and non-significant. We do after all speak of contradictories, and the idea of a square circle does elucidate what it means for two contents to be contradictory and so incompatible. And it is also thus that the idea of a square circle makes its unreality known. But is not the idea of a golden mountain also unreal? KCB would agree but point out that unlike the golden mountain the idea of a square circle demonstrates the unreality of content in terms of *incompatibility*. We try to combine in a single thought or at a single place the idea of a square and the idea of a circle but find we cannot do so. A contradictory thought (in the loose sense of 'thought') however, is a significant speakable and not simply meaningless like (e.g.) a random conjoining of letters. But though it is not meaningless, the contradictory being an unthinkable content bears no relation to factuality. No actual question of existence is askable in the case of a square circle. A contradictory content, though unreal like the false and the imaginary, is (KCB seems to suggest) unreal from the first. It is unreal from the first because it is unthinkable from the first. We don't even so much as imagine a square circle as existing though we imagine—in some sense of imagination—a golden mountain as existing. If a false or unreal idea has a reference to existence at all it is this possible or imaginary reference. The imaginary, however, like the contradictory, but unlike the false, is never believed as real. In the statement 'golden mountains are imaginary', 'being imaginary' cannot by any artifice be made into a property in the sense in which for example 'being finite' is the property of men in 'men are finite'. 'Golden mountains' cannot here by any chance be willed into existence as a subject of possible predicates.

In the above statement we only state that we imagine mountains to be made of gold and that no mountains are made of gold. No question therefore arises of accommodating golden mountains in the realm of being.[4] No actual question of existence is meant to be entertained here.[5] The difference between the imaginary and the contradictory cannot however be ignored. The imaginary entity, the

golden mountain, is a single (albeit unreal) idea. The contradictory, the square circle, on the other hand, does not yield one thought. We have an idea of the square and an idea of the circle but no single idea of a square circle. Our effort to *try to think*, that is, to conjoin in a single content the property of being a square and the property of being a circle ends in nothing but failure.

There is a sense according to KCB, in which the false and the imaginary, though without doubt they do not allow of an actual question about their existence, do admit of a possible and imaginary question about or in reference to their reality. With regard to the contradictory (like square circle) such a question or reference is not even imagined (p. 171). Thus even though KCB classes them all—the false, the imaginary and the contradictory—as forms of unreality or as no-fact, he thinks that a subtle and significant distinction does obtain between them.

At this point a question must be squarely faced—the preceding discussion makes it inevitable—regardless of how KCB himself might have responded to it. The contradictory, KCB has said, is unthinkable, and this is a proposition which I think is accepted on all hands. There is a clear support for it in the law of contradiction. The law of contradiction (as also other laws) is (are) supposed to hold in the realm of thought and language. The question now is: can that principle be also said to hold good so far as the actual world of things and objects is concerned? The overwhelming philosophical opinion would seem ranged against such a suggestion. How can a principle of logic which is supposed to regulate our thought and our use of language have ontological applicability? The very thought of it would be regarded as scandalous.

Our considered view however—which can be here only briefly stated without so much as any arguing out—is that there is nothing in the principle itself which should prevent it from exerting its relevance in the sphere of the world of fact too. That since it holds good of thought and language, it cannot hold good of the actual world, is a bad argument. If contradiction is only a regulating habit of understanding and rule of language, how is it that we encounter no samples of contradictions within the world. In fact it is possible that it is because we find no contradictions happening in the world that we come to look upon the contradictory thought as no thought. We shall not, however, press this point concerning genesis. What we mean is that the view which limits the field of operation of the above law only to thought and language should in principle be incapable of preventing contradictions from occurring in the world. We shall then possibly encounter contradictions in the world every other minute. But if we do not meet with them in the world, as I think we don't, it must be either because no contradictions take

place in the world as a matter of contingent fact or because the above principle obstructs our perceiving those contradictions which may actually be occurring. But would not this be a very lopsided kind of talent? What justification do we have for asserting this kind of partisan ability? Doesn't it seem quite amazing that while we should often succeed in spotting contradictions in, for example, philosophical argument or reasoning, we should congenitally fail to detect them in the affairs of the world? And it is a fact that we come upon no contradictions in the world. At least history preserves no catalogue of them. But this might (by sceptics) be called a pure chance implying that the possibility of contradictions starting to take place any moment from now cannot be ruled out. After all (it may be argued), there is nothing to suggest that if the world has been free from contradictions so far it will ever remain so, just as there is nothing to suggest that if the sun has been rising every day from times unknown it will continue to do so in all future. This contention, of course, has a certain appeal. We will not, however, counter it, though it can, I think, be effectively countered. Our point is different. It is that rejection of the ontological validity of the laws of logic just on the ground that they were intended primarily only to have force in the realm of thought is a dogma born of prejudice. To forestall any misunderstanding on this score, it needs to be emphasized that the fact that the actual world cannot bear contradictions in respect of its states of affairs would be due to the intrinsic nature of the world, and not because there is a law of logic which luckily happens to hold true of the world.

Our contention as to the applicability of the law of contradiction to states of affairs finds support from some respectable quarters. Repudiating the contention that the laws of logic are bare forms which we can so take in hand, F.H. Bradley observes:

> The Principles of Identity, of Contradiction, and of Excluded Middle, are every one material. Matter is implied in their very essence. For without a difference such as that between the letters A and B, or again between the A in two several positions, you cannot state or think of these principles. . . . And the nature of these differences is clearly material.[6]

Opposing any wholesale sundering of logic and reality, Russell, Blanshard and others make in their own way a powerful case for the overall ontological relevance of the laws of logic. Russell explicitly calls the view that the law of contradiction is only a law of thought, 'erroneous'. 'The belief in the law of contradiction is a belief about *things,* not only about thoughts'.[7] Blanshard attempts to show how on all the three views of their nature put forth by Sir Karl Popper, the laws of logic must be seen as saying something about matters of

fact.[8] He goes on to argue that the ontological relevance of the laws of logic remains unaffected by the protest that they are not propositions but rules of symbolism. The logician for a start may stipulate any rules but once he tries to think out the implications of these rules he cannot help turning, for arbitration, to reality.[9] Likewise, Morris Cohen suggests in no uncertain terms that these laws even in their common formulation 'rather make affirmation of existence: whatever is, is; nothing can both be and not be; everything must either be or not be. Would it not be better to call these propositions invariant laws of being or existence?'[10] It would seem then that non-contradictoriness is as much a native and primal demand of reality as it is of thought.

But here another question crops up, and it is this: can the same be held with regard to possibility?[11] For KCB the possible too is fact—thinkable fact—in so far as the question of existence is entertainable about it. And the question of existence can properly be asked only with respect to a content which is thought capable of existence—even if as a matter of actual fact it does not (for some reasons) come to exist. The fact of being non-existent does not, in fact cannot, make such difference to the possible—even though it evidently makes some (important) difference—as to render any and every idea about its existence and character unentertainable in principle. For there is a point where possibility and actuality must meet. The pattern which a possibility as possibility and not as mere figment of the imagination exemplifies, as regards its existence or character, cannot be radically different from that exemplified by the actual. The possible is conceived—else it is not a possible—as to its basic determinations after the actual. The possible, for example, cannot be thought of as capable of existing in a fundamentally differently ordered saptio-temporal world.[12] Similarly, if actuality cannot appropriate contradictions as regards its existence or character then the possible too cannot bear contradictions as regards its existence or character. One cannot accept the former and reject the latter without incurring self-contradiction. This means that the contradictory cannot even exist as a possibility: the contradictory and the possible are, like the contradictory and the actual, irreconcilable. They cannot coinhere or co-exist. And so forth.

Compared to contradictoriness, the problem of falsity is a much more complicated affair. The contradictory is rejected from the first. There is never any question of entertaining it in belief and so never any question of assuming it to be real or fact. The false, on the other hand, is what once appeared or presented itself as real. What causes error is a large question and cannot be attempted here; there

is even the question of relevance. But, that misperception is an error on the part of the perceiving subject is questioned by none.

Now, to error attaches one great difficulty. There seems to be no third thing which falls or which we can choose between non-existence and reality. The false *as* false, on the other hand (as our philosopher would tell us), stubbornly refuses to be categorized as either. In misperception, for example, something appears and is taken to be real. This apparent content cannot be a contradictory content. The latter is never believed and is from the start excluded from the realm of the real. A false content, on the other hand, though finally unqualifiedly discarded, is superficially not at odds with reality in character and conception. Taken by itself it is perfectly conceivable and seems possible, and thus in a sense claims to exist somewhere. But when discovered as such, i.e. as false, it seems to lapse into God knows what. It then is felt to come from nowhere and cannot also be placed anywhere. It appeared—that is all we feel we are sure about and that is all we tell ourselves we have a right to assert. Saying anything more seems then to us to step beyond the bounds of legitimacy. But how can an appearance—and this is the most difficult question of all—which is once believed (and is accepted as fact that far) be declared, as it later on is on apprehension of its falsity, as a homeless something? How can the discovery of a content as false deprive it even of its character as objective content? These are some of the questions which we shall address as we now proceed to consider falsity.

In a way, the idea of falsity presents a quite different, even puzzling, picture. Here, according to KCB, no actual question of existence is ever implied or entertained: it is (for that reason) through and through unthinkable. It bears no concern with the factual, and so none even with the non-existent. The false is what is 'unreal', declares KCB. And though it is (he says) a speakable content it cannot be taken as a proposition which is affirmed or denied in a judgment. Falsity is no thought-content and is therefore beyond affirmative or negative judgment, the object of a judgment always being a proposition with a meaning or a thought-content. True, it is rejected but this rejection in itself is no conscious thought-content. If it is a negation ('negation' in a certain sense) it is a negation unaware of itself as a thought-content, unaware of itself as a negative judgment. And if it is sometimes (loosely) spoken of as a proposition, we, urges KCB, have to treat it as a merely 'speakable' proposition. And that is entirely different from being a thinkable proposition.[13]

In calling a content a merely speakable proposition what is meant is that the nature of that content is wholly exhausted in the *mere* speaking of it. We do not feel convinced that in order to exist it

need not be spoken of, or that its relation to our speaking of it is not a matter of accident. Specifiable only as the *what* of a state of awareness it foils all attempt at independent—independent, that is, of the epistemic attitudes—objective determination of itself. It thus resists contemplation in any objective mode of speech with the result that one does not feel interested (theoretically, not psychologically) in pursuing any enquiry into its actual ontological standing. No expeditions are launched or sponsored to find out the truth about it. In fact we feel persuaded that it does not even make sense to try to ask whether it falls outside or within reality.

A nagging question may however still persist. Why is it not a negative judgment to reject falsity expressly? Don't we here mean consciously to deny the reality of something which we think or discover to be false? KCB would here invite attention to the following consideration. Although (he would say) a negative judgment also implies rejection or disbelief, the rejection (or disbelief) here is never total or absolute. It is conditional and qualified. It is qualified in the sense that while something is denied something is asserted, while something is disbelieved something is affirmed (as/or believed). Denial of the existence or character of something is here at the same time affirmation of the existence or character of something. That is one major difference, KCB would point out, between falsity and negation (of a negative judgment). The judgments 'S is not p', while it denies the proposition 'S being P', also at the same time affirms the proposition 'S being not P'. In fact even in the negative existential judgment like 'A is not' the disbelief in the existence of A is a positive belief in the non-existence of A, 'non-existence being understood as a factual determination of the possible existent A' (p. 171). Similarly, in a statement like 'There are no dragons', the disbelief in the existence of dragons would be, to KCB, a positive belief in the non-existence of 'dragons'.

The assertion of falsity, on the other hand, implies 'pure' disbelief 'that is not equivalent to any belief' (p. 171). The content disbelieved, being not even viewed as a possible existent and so as (naturally) implying no question of existence, does not qualify as a thinkable or thought-content. Consequently it is neither affirmed nor denied in a judgment. It is, to repeat, the thought-content having a reference to the existence question which becomes the object of affirmation or negation in a judgment. This typical Bhattacharyyan view of thought's essential involvement with reality proclaims his idealistic bias, though we soon find him parting company with the idealists on the question of the nature of error.

The idealists do not deny, in fact they positively acknowledge, that there is error, even a good deal of it, in the universe. They also

agree or would agree—unlike, for instance, philosophers like Descartes[14]—that error is no privation. They will contend however that no error is so complete and so absolute as to deserve banishment from the all-inclusive reality. The distinction between truth and error is with Hegelian idealism one of degree rather than of kind. All error contains some truth, for it has a content which in some sense belongs to the universe. (Similarly every truth is in some sense infected by error and is therefore never absolute.) Error committed in and expelled from one world—and there are according to the idealists diverse worlds within the universe—as discrepant with that world finds a place in some other world by some sort of transmutation just as, for example, evil committed in the world gets (according to the idealists) transmuted so as to render the ultimate reality to be on the whole good in the end. All error thus becomes partial truth (or partial error)[15] and is accommodated alongside other truths within the one vast whole. An error with a pretence to absoluteness is intrinsically incapable of accommodation within reality and so must look for a place outside of that reality.[16] This, however, is inadmissible on the idealistic premisses.

The above account would not be acceptable to KCB. Falsity in his conception is neither here nor there. It is, as we remarked above, homeless. As such the false content raises no demand for its ontological determination. And KCB finds here nothing baffling. However, before we examine this aspect we need to understand KCB's overall conception of falsity in some further detail.

KCB addresses himself to that aspect of falsity—in fact to him this is the only form of falsity, properly speaking, can have—which is connected with disbelief, which later often takes the form of denial ('negation' in a certain sense) or rejection. This rejection cannot take place unless there is awareness of falsity, i.e., awareness of a content *as* false. We however find that this awareness of a content as false can in the nature of things only take place against the backdrop of a prior belief in that content. This is the one most important determination of falsity. Falsity as a fact about our cognitive effort or about the world has its *prius* in a previous belief. This is so in so far as disbelief is a giving up of, or ceasing to believe, a certain content.[17]

Rejection of a content does not here mean that the said content is as such unintelligible. It is very much intelligible but only in the way of a possible content. It is a possible content, however, not as belonging to the present but to the *past*. Were it a present possibility it could not have been treated as categorically false and so deserving of unqualified rejection. If it is rejected in the present it is rejected only as a content which was previously believed and exists now as a past possibility. To quote KCB's own succinct words:

> When we disbelieve the content of a belief, we understand the content . . . not by itself but *as* what we believed. We are thus conscious of the belief as past but as the belief is now understood *only* as rejected, we may say that to reject it is to *have* it now in the mind as *past*. 'As past' means 'as rejected': the consciousness of the pastness of the belief is but the consciousness of the belief being rejected. (p. 198)

The foregoing reflections enable us to understand the well-known Bhatacharyyan thesis that since falsity attaches, if and when it does, only to the belief previously held, no present belief can, properly-speaking, be *known* to be or *said* to be false. It is not that a presently held belief cannot *be false*. Correction arising from disbelief is therefore not of a false belief presently held: it is of a belief previously held[18] (but now discovered to be false). Correction of falsity or error does not therefore admit of being expressed in any single 'unitary form' (p. 196)—form here meaning only the content of thinking and not the thinking itself. It always needs two sentences (in the event, for example, of mistaking a rope for a snake): '*This* was taken *as this snake*' and 'What *this* was taken to be was no fact.' And it is plain that it is impossible logically to combine the two into one (p. 182).

We are now in a position to appreciate why correction of falsity, though arising in the wake of disbelief, cannot be adequately logically expressed apart from the past believing of it. Reference to the subjective fact of a past believing is unavoidable—nay is a positive must—in any expression of correction in respect of the content of a believing. What is now known to be false (the snake in our example) is what was believed-as-this-snake. When we discover that what we thought to be a snake was in fact a rope the present experience which is belief in *this* being a rope cannot be, without incurring grave impropriety, described as disbelief in *this snake*. The reason, thinks KCB, is that for the present consciousness now there is no such thing even to disbelieve. The content *this snake* was true when there was belief in it (recall the words 'Fact means what is believed') and *is* now false in reference to the present belief (expressed as *this rope*). At the time of believing it there is no consciousness of the content *this snake* as being false; else belief loses its *raison d'etre*. In other words, *this snake* was a unity in the past, in which was incarnated the previous belief as a single experience.

Error does not mean mere non-distinguishment. In correction we may not be exactly conscious of having experienced or felt a definite unity (of content) at the time of believing—a unity which was there to all intents and purposes; but it is undeniably true that we do not feel that we were aware of an indefinite content, i.e., that

we were aware of *this* and *snake* as *unrelated.* The real dilemma is different. It is: what was then believed as *this snake* cannot be 'said' to have been false and what is now known as false is not, rather cannot be, referrable as *this snake* (p. 187). Now that I disbelieve I find it impossible to describe in objective terms what it was that I then believed. But neither can I aver that there was then only the subjective fact of contentless belief. The content is neither fact nor absolute nought[19] (p. 190). It is not characterizable either way. It may be protested, specially by the idealists (see above), that the false *this snake* is not so much rejected (even if it is thought to be rejected), as it is included and absorbed in the true belief *this rope.* And ideal inclusion, to be sure, need not be complete nonsense. There is however one fact which militates against this suggestion and that is that the incompatibility of the contents, specially in a perceptual situation, is directly felt. Besides, it is difficult to *show* that the true content is indeed wider and more inclusive.

We know that whatever its cause, for error there is nowhere else to be except in the erring subject. And since all error is a retrospective discovery, correction of error implies disbelief not only in the previously believed content but also in what we are now aware of having once believed. In other words, awareness (in disbelief) of falsity is awareness of the subject as having been in error. That is why the disbelief and the concerned correction of the subjective error—which latter characterizes the previous belief—takes a form which cannot be aptly called otherwise than by the name of reflective consciousness. This reflective consciousness already represents a higher plane of consciousness in comparison to that of the corresponding prior belief. The reflecting subject now (i.e., during correction) discovers itself as having been in error.[20] And since this discovery of error takes place against the evidence of the present (i.e., subsequent) belief or experience, the latter can oppositely be regarded as a higher-order experience which stands at one degree higher than the former. Beliefs may or may not be the result of reflection but disbelief, in KCB's conception, is always the achievement of reflection.

The above account of disbelief brings into bolder relief the truth and the significance of KCB's teaching that as always implying correction of a false content, disbelief is a positive mode of consciousness and is no mere privation of belief. Falsity therefore cannot be a content detachable from the believing of it, and the belief cannot in the present be contemplated without reference to the present disbelief. 'Disbelief, indeed, is a conscious reference to the prior belief but the prior belief can be spoken of at the time of disbelief only in reference to the disbelief' (p. 197). Little surprise then that KCB feels impelled to conclude that the consciousness of

the false and the consciousness of the subjective imply each other. The first part of this thesis KCB expresses thus: 'The consciousness of the false is consciousness of a content that is not speakable except as the content of a belief which, again, is not speakable except as that the content of which is false' (p. 195). And further: 'To be conscious of the false is . . . to be conscious of the subjective' (p. 197). This 'consciousness of the subjective', which consciousness of the false is said to imply, is not the ordinary introspective awareness of oneself as the subject of a certain psychic state. It is rather an acknowledgement, a confession if you will, of oneself as having gone wrong in one's judgment. It is not so much an indictment of the false content as it is of one's having believed falsely. And this has the consequence that the disbelieved content comes to be seen as really unassertable and so indistinguishable from the (subjective) disbelieving of it.

That was as far we were concerned to understand and explicate KCB's notion of falsity and our awareness of the same. We must now turn to the other critical question, namely what account, in strictly ontological terms, can be given of the false? In fact we find ourselves faced with a still prior question: is it possible even to talk of the ontology of falsity? In other words, does it make sense to ask the question of the ontological status of a false content and to try to determine its place in relation to reality?

There are a couple of statements of KCB's which give us an inkling of what can be reconstructed as his more or less precise position. KCB sometimes uses 'false' and 'unreal' as interchangeable and suggests: 'The snake can be . . . spoken of indifferently as false or unreal' (p. 172). His meaning becomes further clear from his view which explicitly denies that the false is but the objective fact of non-existence (p. 195). To be an objective fact of non-existence, the false has to be a possible existent regarding which an actual question of existence can be asked. The false, however, as we discover, is not a *present* possibility.

It would be wrong to read this to mean that KCB is oblivious to the distinction which exists between falsity and unreality—the term 'false' often being taken as a predicate assertable of a proposition and the term 'unreal' being often presumed as assertable of something in respect to which there is a possible question of existence. While not exactly meaning to deny the usefulness of such a distinction KCB doubts whether that is all there is to it, doubts, that is, whether the distinction can with reason be sustained even in the case of the perceptually false or the illusory. The perceptually false is a content once taken (or believed) as existent, this perception being expressed as 'This is a snake'. When however, the error is detected and the correction effected, the said

correction is of the false content. Which means, in other words, that it is the object snake as apparently perceived and no propositional judgment which is known to be false. The correct form in which the correction is then expressed is 'This snake is no snake', rather than 'This is not a snake'. It is the distinctive experience of perceptual annulment or cancellation which is symbolically expressed in the form of a judgment, this apparent judgment being in fact no judgment proper. The correction 'This snake is no snake', says KCB, is not a thinking denial of some proposition for the simple reason that the proposition 'This snake being snake' cannot be denied. To put it in more precise and specific terms, it is with respect to the correction proper that the falsity (or false thing) (corrected) can be spoken of as 'unreal'. In other words, the 'false' is properly characterized as 'unreal' only when this 'false' comes to be exposed as to its real character.

'Unreality', however, may well appear in other forms, so that 'unreal' and 'false' need not be regarded as synonyms. 'Unreality' surely is a wider term than 'falsity' and to this KCB is duly alive. It is not necessary for a content to be regarded as 'unreal' that it must have been previously believed or that the question of its existence must have been asked. The only requirement for qualification to the title 'unreal' is that the content in question should be disbelieved and that, further, no actual question of its existence should arise *during* the disbelief.[21]

Now this contingency of falsity being at bottom nothing but a species of the unreal may tempt one into believing that the false must have a being of some sort. And some philosophers indeed maintain that the unreal must in some sense exist.[22] Soon, however, we find, much to our chagrin, that the false frustrates all attempt at any definite ontological determination of itself. The earlier hopes of an either/or answer to the question of its existence or character are now felt upset by the rather unforeseen circumstance of the experience of failure. As believed a false content was existent but as now disbelieved it is declared non-existent. What kind of being then it may be said to be possessing such that its (previous) claim to serve as a subject of possible predicates could be regarded as justified. But, as it turns out, we discover that the false as now discovered in its falsity is describable neither as existent nor as non-existent, that it can now be only characterized, paradoxically to all appearance, as the objectively uncharacterizable 'what' of 'what was thought', which now cannot be taken apart from thought and projected as something—whether a something which exists or a something which does not exist. Earlier, the false content *as believed* proclaimed independent existence as one among the objects of the world (see above). Now, however, with the ascertainment of its false

character the content not only drops the previous claim but finds that it cannot break free from the believing of it and so cannot find independent residence in the world of fact. No more entertainable as 'is' or 'is not', the false content now puts to shame all further (ontological) enquiry and renders its winding up the only honourable philosophical course left. (One had better avoid embracing what one clearly knows to be forbidden.) The question, what was it that one believed when one believed falsely, now falls outside the bounds of legitimate inquiry.

SOME CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Is the above theory as an account of falsity adequate? Is it even exhaustive? How does the theory fair when called upon to explain certain other apparently genuine cases of false beliefs? Is it fair to regard the false as neither-existent-nor-non-existent? These are some of the questions which are certain to arise even on a superficial reading of KCB's doctrines. A full and detailed examination of these cannot, however (as we intimated in the beginning), be attempted within the limits set for this essay. I would therefore confine myself to making a few critical remarks and entering a few caveats.

(1) To recall some of the things KCB has said. KCB calls falsity a species of the unreal and this on the ground—which he seems to regard both as a necessary and a sufficient condition—that falsity properly attaches to a content which was previously believed (as real) but which is now (i.e., in the present) disbelieved and corrected. (Distinguishing the other unreals from falsity he says: 'An unreal content is properly said to be false if it was believed and hence could be the subject of an actual question') (p. 172). Disbelief is no disbelief if it does not involve rejection of a content which was once believed.

Now, we ask, is not this notion of falsity too subjectivistic? Are not the qualifications laid down for the title of 'false' somewhere arbitrary and one-sided? What I mean is that KCB's conception of falsity apparently fails to take care of certain instances which are by common consent recognized to be those of false beliefs. To illustrate: imagine a situation in which a person *X* believes that the sun revolves round the earth. Imagine also that he conveys this belief of his to a hearer *Y* who, however, does not agree with him and asserts instead that it is the earth which revolves round the sun. Suppose further that both *X* and *Y* categorically reject each other's beliefs in the light of their own respective beliefs, of the truth of which they are (somehow) convinced. Suppose also that since the time they can recollect, *X* and *Y* have held these very beliefs so that

in their respective cases the question of the rejection of a previous different belief in respect of the same state of affairs does not simply arise.

Now the immediate paradox is *not* that contrary beliefs are being held by two persons which, on KCB's teaching, will both be facts so far as these respective believers are concerned. It is rather that both *X* and *Y* are dismissing *as false,* contents which in the first instance they have themselves never believed. In other words, here is a situation where a content is being disbelieved and corrected without having ever been believed. But for something to earn the title of 'false' it is necessary, in KCB's view (to speak quite generally), that it be both the object of a past belief and of a present disbelief. Shall we then say that *X's* and *Y*'s rejection of each other's beliefs is utterly without consequence so that the contents rejected are not false *to X* and *to Y.* (Note that at the moment we are not concerned with the question, which of the two beliefs is actually false.)

It is difficult to surmise how KCB would respond to this. But if they are fit examples of *awareness,* on both *X's* and *Y*'s part, (of a content as false), then it is clear that the concerned contents (viz. 'The sun revolves round the earth' and 'The earth revolves round the sun'), since they (on KCB's meaning of falsity) are not characterizable as neither-existent-nor-non-existent, cannot also be regarded as unreal. Here, then, is a case of awareness (and rejection) of falsity which on the face of it remains unexplained on KCB's theory but which cries for explanation.

(2) Our philosopher holds that the false of an illusory situation, the snake in our example, belongs nowhere. It defies any attempt at ontological placing. No actual question of existence is asked about the false, and hence even its non-existence cannot be a fact. But, we ask, doesn't the snake exist? The question may be laughed away and the reply may be made that the reference here is to the snake which was *believed* to exist but which turns out to be actually absent or non-existent. To this we agree but we yet want to say—which again may to some seem platitudinous—that the snake, even if it is to be called unreal because of its false character (the quarrel here is not over terminology), differs from the two other unreals—the imaginary-unreal and the contradictory-unreal—in a very fundamental way. The imaginary and the contradictory, the golden mountain and the square circle respectively, are *never* believed. A question of existence is never entertained about them and hence they can be called unthinkable on KCB's notion of 'thinkability'. But, and this is the crux of the matter, they are unthinkable perennially: their unthinkability is not relative to any particular knowing subject. The case with the snake is, on the other hand, different. A snake not only becomes the object of wrong belief or

judgment; it can also figure as the object of true belief or judgment. Its falsity in a certain context is therefore through and through relative—relative to a misperceiver. It is not absolute or unqualified as is the case with the golden mountain or the square circle. The object called snake has its place in the world of objects and is, therefore, so far real. Its actual absence (or 'non-existence') in a certain context is tentative and precarious. *The content snake is not by itself an impossible aggregate of incompatible contents.* It remains (in misperception) a content presented and so is an apparent content which an imaginary or a contradictory never is. What is annulled or falsified is its *appearance* or, if you are very particular about a certain terminology, *presumed* existence, not its reality, when it was actually absent. Otherwise the snake is a real object, as real as the rest of reality or, in case one rejects the reality of the world, as unreal as the rest of the world. In fact, to permit ourselves this manner of speaking, it appears *because* it is real somewhere—as real as the rope. Presumably a creature of fantasy it is yet not fantastic.

(3) There is a related second point. An illusory content (snake) is of a fundamentally different order from that of a dream content. In a (perceptual) illusion something appears and is taken as real, in place of some really present thing. In dreams, on the other hand, though here also objects appear and are taken as real, they do not make their appearance in place of something. The explanation of falsity must then be that in a false belief one of the really present entities is mistaken for another equally real, though absent, entity. In other words, the appearance of an illusory content is, to put things in this way, a *real* appearance while the appearance of a dream object is an *apparent* appearance.[23] And thus, as it turns out, ironically and amusingly enough, it is the property of being real which differentiates one appearance from another appearance.

Our use of the expression 'real appearance' in the preceding may lead one to accuse us of misapplying a concept generally associated with the name of Leibniz. And it is true that one of the English equivalents of Leibniz's notion of *phenomenon bene fundatum* is 'real appearance'. I may, however, clarify (though my scholarship in this matter is not to be trusted) that Leibniz's term connotes—in contradistinction from ours, which means illusory and which is not interpersonal (or universal, say) and so not a well-founded phenomenon—an appearance which forms an orderly and uniform system of experience. This is not to deny that there can be, alongside private illusions, universal illusions too which affect the whole species of thinking beings. The difference, however, is—and this is critical—that the kind of dependable, systematic and uniform relationship universal illusions, according to Leibniz, enjoy with the fundamental and ultimate reality, individual illusions do not.

(4) Finally, there is a still more basic question. KCB tells us what it is to believe and what it is to disbelieve, what it is to be aware of a content as false, and what it is further to declare that content as ontologically indeterminable. His teachings on these and related issues contain rare insights and are valuable. KCB, however, does not intimate us, at least in clear and precise terms, what it is for a belief to *be* false? He does not tell us, in other words, what the falsity of a belief consists in; or what we mean when we reject somebody's belief or our own belief as false.

Differently stated, the question is: where are we to look up in our search for the basis or ground of falsity? That falsity must have an explanation cannot be denied. For in the absence of that we are left with nothing absolutely on the basis of which to pronounce a content as false. In fact, as it seems to this writer, both falsity and truth must have some common ground which alone makes determination of their content as false or true a possibility in the first instance. What could be that common ground? I think the following remarks should be of help here.

In the beginning we made the point that all belief makes an implicit claim to truth. And this implies that every belief commits us to the fact or the state of affairs it professes to represent. In one stroke the believed content seems to break loose from the believing of it and demands to be placed in the world. In one word, all beliefs claim or profess to make a reference to reality. Even if we quite generally reckon that beliefs sometimes turn out to be false and that therefore the possibility of a discrepancy erupting between the asserted content and the actual reality cannot in principle be discounted, the fact of a belief having a truth-claim built into its structure prevents explicit admission (during the belief) of that possibility's actualization. Now false beliefs are properly those beliefs which even though professing, *qua* beliefs, to refer to a certain object or fact, do not *really* do so. The profession or presumption in their case is characterized by a reference failure. An impassable chasm comes to exist between their claim and their achievement.

In the light of these considerations it seems certain that if falsity and truth are to have a common ground—and I cannot presently conceive of any other alternative—it can only be *reality* or (shall we say?) a belief's *relation to reality*. That the relation to reality both in case of false beliefs and true beliefs cannot be of the same sort, also seems certain. The working out of this relation is, however, well beyond the scope of this inquiry and can only be the subject of a future effort.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. This clarification KCB gives in reply to Rasvihari Das' criticism of his definition. Das' criticism appeared in *Philosophical Quarterly*, 7, 1932, pp. 387–96. KCB's rejoinder appeared in the same number of that journal, pp. 397–404. I owe this information to George Bosworth Burch (ed.) (with an Introduction), *Search for the Absolute in Neo-Vedānta: K.C. Bhattacharyya*, University Press of Hawaii. Honolulu, 1976, pp. 16–17. It seems necessary to clarify here that for all practical purposes the word 'fact' as used in this essay means, unless otherwise indicated, only a certain class of them, called by KCB 'thinkable' facts (see below).
2. There is a principle—namely that in order to be something or to have any predicate it is necessary to exist—which modern western logic expresses in the form: $Fa \rightarrow (Ex)\ (x\text{-}a)$. See Bernard Williams, *Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry*, Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1978, p. 92; J. Hintikka, 'Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?' in W. Doney (ed.), *Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Anchor Books, Garden City: New York, 1967, pp. 113–14, attempts to illustrate through an example—'Hamlet thought, but Hamlet did not exist'—the possible plausibility or consistency of '*Fa*, but *a* does not exist'. For a reasoned reply to Hintikka see A. Kenny, *Descartes: A Study of his Philosophy*, Random House, New York, 1968, p. 61.
3. 'Unreal' with KCB also includes the imaginary and the contradictory. (See below)
4. Existence cannot also be a matter relative to a universe of discourse so that one could with justice maintain that golden mountains are real at least in so far as for example the fairy tale in which we find them mentioned, is concerned. The tale as a fact may be real; as a piece of writing it has its place in the actual world but not so everything imagined or stated in it, unless there are other reasons for thinking so.
5. The false, on the other hand, is, as we shall later see, what was once believed and taken as fact.
6. *The Principles of Logic*, second revised edition, Oxford University Press, London, 1922, Vol. II, p. 519.
7. *The Problems of Philosophy*, first edition 1912; reset 1946 and reprint, Oxford University Press, London, 1964, p. 89. (My italics) For details see Chapters VII and VIII.
8. Brand Blanshard, *Reason and Analysis*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1962, p. 25: '[T]he reality of which our thought is true is itself governed by logic. If contradictory assertions cannot both be true, it is because the reality of which they are asserted does not admit contradictory characteristics.'
9. Ibid., pp. 424–27; also pp. 271ff.
10. Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature*, second edition, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953, p. 203.
11. However tempting, the question of possibility and its relation to actuality cannot be pursued here and this not only for reasons of space but also for reasons of competence. I therefore confine myself to offering just a brief remark which is perhaps nothing more than a commonplace.
12. Compare Scott Buchanan, *Possibility*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., London, 1927, p. 79: 'Pegasus may have his home in the sun and use the infinite sky for his pasture, but even there he travels the road, though it be of his own making.'
13. It is in contexts such as these that the compulsion of having to use language and the limits of language are at once both acutely felt. There is a saving factor, however. Language has a way of *indicating* what it cannot otherwise appositely bring out. It can point to, and speak of, what it yet cannot describe

or comprehend: hence the importance of the word speakable. Regardless of what KCB himself may mean to subsume under the category of the speakable, we are convinced that rightly or wrongly, or perhaps more rightly than wrongly, language has to provide for ideas (and also a relish for them) which even while relatable to the question of reality or existence, and so unfit to be called 'thinkable' (in KCB's sense of that term) are yet not for that reason wholly meaningless. (In fact, in coining the term 'speakable' KCB himself seems to share this view).

These ideas may include such things as the moral ought, freedom, etc. (regarded as facts by KCB) on the one hand, and fictitious things (or ideas) such as a golden mountain, dragons, and so on, on the other. After all, the possibility that all such things may at one time or another become the object of significant discourse, or at least communication, cannot be straightaway denied. In fact, it is possible even to regard them 'public' in some sense of the term, such that men often feel the urge to share their opinions about them. Any *absolute* banishment of these things from our language would mean undermining the very possibility' of discourse about such concepts as 'impossibility', 'contradiction', 'falsity', 'unreality'. (Some of the above-mentioned things can at least serve to illustrate what it means to be impossible or contradictory.) After all, as we all know, even contradictory things or ideas are a conglomeration of properties, which even though incompatible, are, taken separately, instantiated by the real objects. I may add that a dogmatic attitude in this matter would even make unintelligible such a concept as that of 'meaningful falsity'. So it seems both necessary and proper to retain the category of the 'speakable'.

14. Thus, according to Descartes, '[E]rror is not a pure negation, but rather a privation or lack of some knowledge which somehow should be in [us].' Rene Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, with Selections from the Objections and Replies, translated by John Cottingham, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, Fourth Meditation, p. 38. Descartes goes on to affirm that it is privation 'which is all that the essential definition of falsity and wrong consists of'. Op. cit, p. 42.
15. Cf. Bradley's talk on degrees of truth (and degrees of error) and degrees of reality.
16. For a reasoned account of truth and error along the idealist lines see for example F.H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, first edition 1914, reprint, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1950, Chapter IX ('On Appearance, Error, and Contradiction'). Also see Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, second edition with an appendix, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1897, Chapter XVI.
17. The existence of disbelief as a fact is proved by introspection.
18. 'The false is what is corrected or disbelieved. Properly, "disbelief" should mean correction or rejection of what was believed', (*Studies in Philosophy*, p. 195) and not of what is merely suggested or imagined. This latter is only belief in non-existence.
19. Burch's complaint (op. cit., p. 57, note 32) that he does 'not quite understand' this statement of KCB's in view of his definition of 'fact' as what is believed, turns out to be baseless in view of the preceding explication of KCB's viewpoint.
20. It may be noted that 'reflective consciousness' as used here does not mean the same as the usual 'reflection' or 'self-consciousness' of the kind 'I am aware of such and such state', nor does it mean awareness of oneself as the subject of experiences.
21. This requirement, the reader will notice, is duly met by the imaginary and the contradictory too. When we refer to the entity golden mountain as an example of the imaginary or to square circle as an example of the contradictory we already disbelieve them and regard them as unreal; the question regarding their existence seems settled for us from the first, and any suggestion to the contrary seems a pretension.
22. Thus F.H. Bradley says the following on the unreality of the contradictory: 'The self-contradictory, I suppose most of us would agree, is unreal. And yet since we discuss it, it is clear that the self-contradictory in some sense exists.' *Essays in Truth and Reality*, p. 269. This doctrine, variants apart, goes as far back as Parmenides: 'What can be said and thought of must necessarily exist.' Quoted by Jaakko Hintikka in his *Knowledge and the Known*, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, 1974, p. 23.
23. I would not be taken as very particular about the terms I am using so long as the difference pointed out is understood in the right spirit. These are the terms that strike me presently.

Some Reflections on Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's Vedāntic Logic with Special Reference to the Philosophy of Language

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I

The present paper deals with a critical and explanatory notice on some problems concerning philosophy of language as discussed in the *Āgama pramāṇa* portion of Vedāntic logic which is found in Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's (KCB) *Studies in Vedāntism.* An effort has been made to justify KCB's philosophical position on some aspects of Vedānta philosophy in most cases in the light of the traditional Advaita Vedānta system, though in some cases I am not able to agree with him. In these cases I have shown my own departure from him as well as from Advaita Vedānta. By way of doing this an effort has been made to bring out the significant contributions of KCB in the field of Advaita Vedānta.

II

KCB starts with the concept of *vākya* or sentence which is accepted as an independent *pramāṇa.*[1] In order to appreciate this *pramāṇa* the understanding of a certain theory of language is required. When it is said 'a word means a thing', what is meant is not that the word reminds of the idea of a thing. It is true that through this we remember or visualize the idea, but this remembering, according to KCB, is not understanding the meaning of the word. Any idea of which we are reminded by a word, is a part of its meaning. That is why it is said in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* that the word directly refers to the thing, expresses the thing and touches it.[2] Hence, a free concept not only requires a name for its support but is identical with it.[3]

This view may be explained in the following way. There are two types of awareness: a perceptual awareness which, being purely private, cannot be communicated to others and another, perceptual awareness, which though not wholly manifested, cannot be denied fully. The latter type of awareness cannot be expressed, because there is no substitute (*vikalpa*) for expression. The 'concept' (in the sense of mental construction) of an object becomes a substitute for

expressing it. The mental constructions that are borne by 'pure object' (which is described by KCB as 'free concepts') are called concepts. Names, colours, universals, etc. are borne by an object and hence they are called 'concepts' (*dhāraṇā*). The 'pure object' is called the substratum (*ādhāra*) while the 'concepts' are called the superstrata (*ādheya*). The concepts serve as substitutes for expressing that 'pure object'. This phenomenon is well explained in the Buddhist theory of perception, according to which, 'free concept' means *svalakṣaṇas* having no name, etc. These *svalakṣaṇas* require some support in the form of name etc. for their expression. These are not only *kalpanā* as termed by the Buddhists but are identical with the objects. In any conception the determination of self and its objectification is highly essential. The determination of self gives the name and the concept a identical object-reference. This unity of name and the concept acts unconsciously everywhere, even in perception.

In the present context KCB has tried to develop a theory regarding the apprehension of the meaning of a word. If someone thinks that he gets the idea after the utterance of a word, he is not correct, because the concept does not come as a consequent idea, but is identical with the word. The 'actual object' or 'bare object', free from any name etc., is described by KCB as the 'presentative' element of perception and in the same way the name, *jāti* etc. (that are called *kalpanā* by the Buddhists), by which the 'real object' is represented is called the 'representative' element of perception. These are so called because without the help of these representation of the object is not possible. These two elements are identified.[4]

That the sentence refers to some object is known from belief. When a sentence is employed, a belief is generated to its object if the sentence is complete and bears certain conditions. This belief is associated with the cautiousness induced by experience. In this connection KCB has made a significant point: 'If it is only thought, it is at any rate continuous with knowledge. The mere absence of conflict with other evidence is sufficient to turn it into knowledge, we do not require a positive confirmation by other evidence.'[5]

This is a very philosophically significant remark, because it conveys to us the truth that if there is any thought or thought construction, it is surely knowledge. In order to confirm that it is knowledge, the absence of conflict with other evidence is sufficient. If there is conflict with evidence, it is not to be taken as knowledge, but *pseudo-knowledge.* This statement of KCB is similar to the Nyāya concept of *vādhitatva* which is described as follows: '*Yasya Sādhyābhāvaḥ pramāṇāntareṇa niścitaḥ saḥ vādhitaḥ*'.[6] That is, when the absence of *sādhya* is proved by other sources of knowledge, it is

called *vādhita.* If someone says that 'fire is not hot', it is not true, because the absence of the heat in fire is proved through perception. As there is no conflict with other evidence, it is called knowledge, which does not require confirmation from other evidence.

In Advaita Vedānta also the possibility of such conflict with other *pramāṇas* is not ruled out. The phenomenon of *manana* is prescribed to be adopted only to remove such conflict. *Manana* is a kind of mental act which gives rise to some favourable arguments for justifying some conclusion if there is possibility of conflict with other evidence.[7] If the conflict is removed through favourable argument (*anukūlatarka*), the standpoint or knowledge is correct. If not, it is incorrect. This possibility of conflict with other evidence is not limited to the knowledge of the epistemic world; it may exist in any standpoint or conclusion adopted by the Advaita school. That is why the Advaitins laid much importance on the phenomenon of *manana.* Whether the conflict with other evidence can be removed with the help of some arguments or not is to be known through the process of *manana.* KCB perhaps made the above-mentioned remark keeping these points in view.

III

'The understanding in judgment transcends them and points to the Ideas of the Reason or *noumena*'.[8] This point made by KCB needs some clarification. He said that the understanding in judgment transcends them. He has clearly pointed to the fact that as per Advaita theory self can be expressed through judgments. Self or consciousness expressed in judgments is *sopādhika* (having limited adjunct), because language can express only the 'limited' which comes to our awareness at the phenomenal level. As these are limiting adjuncts of the self, these are not the true nature of the self. Hence, judgment which expresses self after some stage transcends the same and points to the real self or consciousness which is *nirupādhika* (having no limiting adjuncts). Such consciousness is described by KCB as 'Ideas of the Reason or *noumena*', which are to be realized only in ecstatic intuition. The term 'Ideas of the Reason' borrowed by KCB from the West (particularly from Kant) stands for *noumena* or the absolute or *Brahman* in Vedānta. Just as 'Ideas of the Reason' pervade the whole world, *Brahman* does so which is evident from the etymological meaning of the term— *Bṛhatvāt bṛṁhaṇatvāt Brahma*)—that which is large in quantity or which can expand itself to any account is called *Brahman.* In the West it is believed that all our knowledge follows from Ideas of the Reason which pervade the whole world. It is

perhaps with this particular view in mind that KCB has described *noumena* as such. There is a type of intuition which is of the ordinary type by which 'necessary thought' of them is constructed. The name, generality, etc. are described as ordinary intuitions which give rise to the thought construction of 'Ideas of the Reason'. These ordinary intuitions are essential till 'Ideas of the Reason' are realized. These ordinary intuitions like name etc. are to be taken as the promoters or means to having such an Idea, but not the support or expression of such an Idea. From this statement it follows that KCB, by way of justifying the Advaitin standpoint, denies the name etc., or rather language as the medium of expressing the Idea. As language is very much inadequate to express it, there cannot be *vācya-vācaka-bhāva-sambandha,* i.e. relation between the expresser and expressed. In ordinary expression a conventional word gives some meaning which is identified with the thing. In the case of *Idea* language or conventional words are too inadequate to be conceived.

The Advaitins are of the view that only *Brahman* is real while others are false. The main spirit of the statement is that, when an individual is identified with *Brahman,* he loses his own identity and is submerged in *Brahman.* When *Brahman* is realized, it is not all external objects vanish. It is true that objects are there, but there is lack of awareness of their existence. A particular object at this stage is not seen as such, but as the manifestation of *Brahman.* Such awareness, being purely subjective or private, is non-communicable to others. Before the attainment of this stage an individual takes refuge of language in order to express his emotion and thought. When *Brahman* is realized, language becomes *vādhita* or contradicted, which will find support in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā.*[9] In connection with the definition of *pramā* (valid knowledge) Dharmaraj Adhvarīndra has said that all objects become *vādhita* or contradicted or illusory after self-realization. In the transmigratory state there is no question of *vādhitatva* and hence language is inevitable due to the notion of duality. When this notion of duality ceases, there arises the falsity of language.[10] It is true that conceptual designations are usually denied of Supreme Reality, still they are necessary means and aids to the human intellect and help in preparing the ground for the latter's realization. Though language cannot give us a full picture of reality,[11] it can be index and pointer to the truth. All languages existing in scriptures etc. are taken as superimposed (*adhyaṣṭa*) after the realization of *Brahman.*[12]

KCB always maintains a distinction between a sentence revealing phenomenal object and that revealing the supersensuous. An ordinary sentence, though it seems to be impersonal having a direct objective intention, may be false or ambiguous if it refers to phenomenal truth, because the subjective personal element must

play a vital role in determining the meaning of the sentence. At the same time KCB does not overlook the basic presuppositions of Advaita Vedānta that a sentence belonging to *śruti* is always taken to be true (i.e. *svataḥpramāṇa*) as it is a statement about the supersensuous where the personal element is eliminated. As the Vedas are said to be the revealer of all true statements about the supersensuous, they must be true as these are true revelations. As the statements are true or sacred, this sacredness remains in every word or sound composing it.[13]

IV

KCB considers a great philosophical question about whether word or sound is eternal or not. He explains the Advaita view that the system of sounds is not created but manifested. When someone utters a sound, it is not created but 'manifested in the sensuous form' (*dhvani*). That which is not created is called eternal. As a sound is produced, it is nothing but the recognition of that sound. Any sound when manifested is not at all new, but recognition of that sound.[14]

This view may be justified in the following way. Such a type of recognitive knowledge is accepted in Advaita Vedānta in a different way, which is similar to this argument. It is accepted in Indian aesthetics that any type of aesthetic pleasure (*rasa*) is the dwarf image of the Primordial *Rasa,* i.e. Supreme Reality as in the Upaniṣad. It is described as '*Raso vai saḥ*'. *Brahman* in the form of *rasa* is recognized in aesthetic pleasure. In like manner, the Advaitins accept the recognition of the primordial sound in any manifested sound.

When a sound is manifested, this manifestation is in time, but the sound-form is eternal. That is to say, though sound is eternal, its manifestation is temporal. The eternity of 'names' (*nāmarūpa*) has been admitted by KCB in spite of the impersonal reality of the word. He says, 'The manifestation alone is in time but the sound form is eternal. Thus the eternity of "names" (*nāmarūpa*) and the impersonal reality of the Word are intelligible'.[15] The Word manifested to us is to be regarded as word existing 'in previous cycles, now freely remembered and manifested by *Īśvara*'.[16]

The view mentioned above, I think, is not always tenable. While justifying the Advaitins' position KCB says that 'the manifestation alone is in time, but sound-form is eternal'. After this he accepts the eternity of 'names' (*nāmarūpa*). This is not logically consistent. The *nāmarūpa* of an object cannot be eternal, because all these names are imposed on the object by an individual conventionally. As these are imposed by persons, the change of name of the same object in

course of time may be justified. The names are meant for the *lokavyavahāra,* i.e. for verbal communication in this society. Hence, there may be a change of name of a word or a change of meaning of the same word. That is why, the Navya Naiyayikas have rejected the thesis that God or God's desire is the cause for generating the potency of a word.[17] There is, I think, no necessity of bringing God into giving the *nāmarūpa* of a word. The initial verbal usage of an object (e.g. the word 'jar') may be introduced by a particular person, which is followed by later generations. In fact, it is found in our everyday life that a new object is initially described by a scientist or researcher with the help of some name which is followed by others. Hence, for an explanation of the *nāmarūpa* of an object there is no logical basis to accept God. Hence KCB's position that word is manifested by God is not logically sound.

KCB's interpretation of the eternity of *nāmarūpa* may be justified if the notion of *nāmarūpa* is taken in a different way. Before the actual *nāmarūpa* which is known or manifested to us there might have been some notion of non-manifested *nāmarūpa.* The non-manifested *nāmarūpa* of an object may be eternal. It becomes non-eternal as soon as it becomes manifested to us. This is evidenced from his following statement. 'The question of the *primum cognitum* naturally leads to the theory of the eternal pre-existence of all differences that come to be manifested.'[18] Acceptance of 'the eternal pre-existence of all differences' presupposes a different type of *nāmarūpa* among the objects. Otherwise, how can the pre-existence of all differences be understood. At this level a different type of *nāmarūpa* is accepted for justifying the notion of *vahutva* (differences) which is eternal and non-manifested.

If the above-mentioned view is accepted, the problem is not resolved. For, the *vahutva* is known in terms of *nāmarūpa* which is non-manifested. If *nāmarūpa* is not manifested how can *vahutva* be established? If *nāmarūpa* is not manifested, the *vahutva* would certainly be non-manifested. How do we come to know the non-manifested form of *nāmarūpa* and also non-manifested *vahutva*? If in order to understand *nāmarūpa* which is at present the existence of another type of *nāmarūpa* is accepted, we have to accept another one for the justification for this. In this way, there would arise the defect of 'infinite regress'. The traditional Advaitins accept manifested *nāmarūpa* to describe something at the phenomenal level. When someone transcends this, he becomes free from name etc., i.e., language. When there is the realization of *Pārmārthika Sattā,* it is alien to all speech, *avācya,* as it is a kind of *aparokṣa-sākṣāt.* At this stage language is not enough to express the Absolute. Hence, the names etc., though *māyā,* may serve as promoters to the attainment of Absolute Reality. After the attainment of the goal,

language which consists of names and other words is not at all essential. When KCB advocates the eternity of sound or word, he wants to mean that there is at least one stage which is 'languageless', i.e. language without its manifestation. Language, if not manifested, is tantamount to languagelessness. If 'silence' is described as an eternal sound having no manifestation, there is, I think, no harm. Hence, KCB is very consistent in this matter.

V

KCB has emphasized on the fact that *lakṣaṇā* or implicative meaning is not the function of a single word but of the whole sentence. The sentence, he observes, reacts on each word that it contains.[19]

This view, I think, is not tenable. In some exceptional cases or under certain contexts implication may exist in the single word where something else is indicated. When someone says (in a certain context) the word '*dvāraṁ*' (door), it implies asking to close or to open the door. In this case, though a single word is uttered (*not* the sentence), we get an implicative meaning. In like manner, when someone utters the word 'rickshaw' or 'taxi', it means 'rickshaw-puller' or 'taxi-driver' through implication. Though in most cases the implicative meaning lies in the whole sentence, it may remain in a single word, also as evidenced from the above discussion. Hence, KCB's view is not tenable.

The combination of words having *ākāṅkṣā* (syntactical connection), *yogyatā* (compatibility of meaning), *āsatti* (proximity of the parts) and *tātparya* (objective intention), constitutes a true sentence. KCB has said that *tātparya* is 'the capacity of a sentence to produce objective knowledge'. He added:

> It is not the subjective intention of the person uttering the sentence, though in cases of ambiguity the subjective intention has to be taken into account. It is the objective intention which, in cases of ambiguity or the like, is not contradicted by the subjective intention. So a true sentence, even when uttered by one not understanding or misunderstanding it, has an intrinsic *tātparya.*[20]

This view is, I think, inadequate to express the theory concerning linguistic communication. In order to understand the *tātparya* of a sentence particularly used in Vedānta or *Śruti* the context under which it is spoken or the intention of the speaker who has said this has to be taken into the account. Any sentence may be interpreted as ambiguous, because there is a chance of interpreting as such. In fact, the *tātparya* of a sentence is to be known if there is chance of ambiguity. Had there been no ambiguity, the meaning of the

sentence could be known through *ākāṅkṣā*, etc. What is the use of accepting another condition called *tātparya*? When the sentence, '*Tattvaṁ asi*' is said, the inner import or *tātparya* cannot be known through *ākāṅkṣa* etc. alone. In order to know the main *tātparya* of the sentence, we have to look at the context and the intention of the speaker. Hence, *tātparya* is accepted in order to know the ambiguous sentence only. Further, some statements may seem to be nonsensical if *tātparya* in the sense of speaker's intention is not known. If the sentence '*Tattvaṁ asi*' is uttered by someone in the context of Vedānta, it means the absolute identity between *jīva* and *Brahman*. In other contexts it may not refer to this meaning.

In fact, a non-ambiguous sentence can give rise to meaning with the help of the *śakti* existing in words. When the direct meaning of it becomes inconsistent, the implicative or suggestive meaning is to be known. Whether the direct meaning or implicative meaning of a sentence is to be taken into account depends on the context (*tātparya*). For example, the word '*yava*' occurs in both Aryan and non-Aryan speeches in different denotations (viz., barley and a wild grain called *priyaṅgu* respectively) and one is preferred to the other in an expression on the basis of contextual and personal factors. The question of conveying meaning by either a standard form of a word or a dialectal form too refers to human factors. Thus, the context or the intention of the speaker is essential for the attainment of meaning. Hence, KCB's contention that *tātparya* is the capacity of a sentence to produce objective knowledge is not always true. *Tātparya* means the context in which a sentence is uttered or the intention of the speaker in uttering a particular sentence. Thus, not only in the case of ambiguity but in all cases the subjective intention has to be taken into account.

KCB is a little inconsistent between statements made in the beginning of the essay and at the end of it. At the beginning he says, 'Though every *vākya*, as having direct objective intention, has the appearance of impersonality, yet as it may be ambiguous or false . . ., a subjective personal element has also to be taken into account' (p. 84, para 115). At the end of the same essay (p. 87, para 121) he says that the capacity of a sentence is to produce objective knowledge, but the subjective intention is not to be taken into account. It may be taken into account only in the case of ambiguity.

From the two statements made by KCB it seems that he has accepted the role of the personal or subjective element for determining the intention of the sentence. To him, the impersonality is nothing but appearance, not real, because in each and every sentence there is the chance of ambiguity. In the latter statement it seems that he prefers to describe a sentence as having

a purely objective intention. The subjective intention is to be taken into account if and only if, there is ambiguity.

Though there is a slight inconsistency between two statements, the earlier statement, I think, is more logically tenable. Each and every sentence may always be ambiguous or false. If an individual wants to interpret a sentence in a different way under a certain context, he is at liberty to do so and the sentence also bears the potentiality of giving rise to such different meanings. As it is applicable to all the sentences under a certain context, the personal or subjective element plays an important role in determining intention. The other reasons for considering the subjective element in determining the intention of the sentence have been mentioned earlier.

VI

Let us examine the contribution of KCB in the field of Vedāntic logic.

First, KCB has described *Brahman* as Ideas of the Reason or *noumena*, which is very novel and unique in Vedāntic literature. If all that exists in this world is divided, we shall get two parts—phenomenon and noumenon. Phenomenon is that which is seen through our sense organs. This is described by the Vedāntins as *prapañca*, which is opposite to *Brahman* or Absolute. *Brahman* or self is only non-*prapañca*, which cannot be realized by sense intuition. Phenomena can be expressed through sense intuition, but not *Brahman* or self. For understanding the same there must be some intuition which is not of the ordinary type. It gives rise to the realization of *Brahman*, which is described as Idea of the Reason. In the Upaniṣads there is evidence to describe *Brahman* as truth (*satya*), knowledge (*jñāna*), bliss (*ānanda*), infinite (*ananta*). The description of *Brahman* or Absolute as Idea of the Reason which is possible in the Advaita framework is first found in KCB's philosophy. In the West it is accepted that Idea of the Reason is the source from which all knowledge follows. *Brahman* or Absolute is metaphorically described as Idea of the Reason because *Brahman* is also the source of all knowledge etc. Like Ideas of the Reason *Brahman* is only noumenon.

Secondly, KCB, by way of substantiation of the Advaita position, has put forth the view of the Naiyayikas. Though formally he has refuted their views, it is observed from his philosophical deliberations that he has taken some notions from the Naiyāyikas and Buddhists. When he says, 'With some *naiveté* with which we objectify our ideas in perception, we *objectify the word*' (p. 83, para 112), it reminds us of the Buddhist theory of perception. From this

the influence of Buddhism on KCB's thought is assumed. The details about this are discussed at the beginning of this paper. That he was influenced by the notion of *vādhitatva* as propounded by the Naiyāyikas is evidenced from his remark, 'The mere absence of conflict with other evidence is sufficient to turn it into knowledge'. It has already been explained in detail. Like other independent thinkers he has shown his own wider philosophical vision by snythesizing the logical aspects of all the systems in Indian philosophy. From this it cannot be taken for granted that KCB has only synthesized the conclusions of different systems of Indian philosophy. It is to be kept in mind that he has shown his departure in some aspects though he is influenced by some philosophical points given by others.

Thirdly, KCB has shown his respect to the Advaita conclusions and hence, he has justified their position with the help of some logic which was not explicitly present in the Advaita literature. The logical illumination of Advaita conclusions is one of the contributions of KCB. Though he has given justification for the ascertainment of the meaning of a sentence in various ways, he has accepted that in the case of revealed texts, the meaning is evolved through mutual criticism and *not* through any *pramāṇa*. He felt that the main essence of Advaita theory lies in the apprehension of the meaning of the revealed text. Though he has given emphasis to the apprehension of the meaning of the secular sentence, he has not forgotten that the apprehension of the meaning of the Vedic sentences is essential in Vedānta philosophy. That is why he has explored the possibility of the understanding of meaning in two ways. If someone wants to apprehend the secular sentence, he has to acquire it with the help of knowledge of the topic through other evidences. As topics of the Vedic sentence cannot be known through other *pramāṇas*, the meaning is to be known through their mutual criticism of the texts (*mīmāṁsā*), for, other *pramāṇas* fail to speak about the supersensible. KCB observes:

> The ascertainment of the meaning of a sentence, however, may be aided by the knowledge of the topic through evidences, as in the case of sentences having secular reference. In the case of revealed texts, however, the meaning is evolved through *mīmāṁsā* of the texts themselves, i.e. through their mutual criticism and not through any extraneous *pramāṇa*; for no other *pramāṇa* can speak of the supersensible.[21]

In the above-mentioned passage KCB's interpretation of the term '*mīmāṁsā*' as 'mutual criticism of the texts' is novel in character, which reminds me of the meaning of the term as *vedārthavicāra*. From this interpretation he wants to mean that the *Mīmāṁsā* system

is not to be taken as isolated from Vedānta, but for understanding the Vedāntic conclusion about the supersensible the mutual criticism of the texts is highly essential. As meaning comes to our mind with the help of this, it does not come through other *pramāṇas*. Through such expression KCB has indirectly honoured to the intrinsic validity (*svaṭaḥprāmāṇya*) of Vedic sentences particularly. In short, Vedic texts have the same intrinsic power, which through mutual criticism gives rise to the meaning. In these cases, KCB has accepted the conclusions of the Advaitins and these are substantiated through some arguments that are not found in the traditional Advaita texts.

Lastly, KCB admits three stages of subjectivity: (a) bodily subjectivity (b) psychic subjectivity and (c) spiritual subjectivity. In the first stage the self identifies with the body. In the second stage (which is called the psychic stage) two broad divisions, image and thought are admitted. At this stage the subject identifies itself with the psychic life—images and thoughts. A negation of this stage leads to the third stage of subjectivity—spiritual subjectivity. According to KCB, man's true nature is known in 'I-function'. He says, 'The self is known in the form "I am I" which is an analytic self-identity'.[22] Commenting upon the Vedāntic concept of self he says that waking life, dreams, dreamless sleep and ecstasy are attempts to point out the gradation of existence. In the lowest subjective stage self completely forgets the objective. In the ecstatic stage, self denies not only the existence of everything but denies the denial itself. It is the stage of 'pure subject'.[23]

KCB conceives the Absolute as what the subject 'I' is not. The 'subject as pure freedom' and 'the Absolute' are but different names of the same principle. The Advaitins have accepted the identity of self with reality as *Brahman* in the sentence, '*Tat tvaṁ asi*' KCB has accepted the complete identity between man in his transcendental aspect and the Absolute.

For KCB 'I' is expressible in the spoken word 'I'. The Absolute is not speakable, being completely indefinite. He observes:

> If then we say that the Absolute *is*, we mean by 'is' not reality, but truth. Reality is enjoyed but truth is not. The consciousness of truth as what is believed in but not understood either in the objective or in the subjective attitude, as not literally speakable at all, but speakable only in the purely symbolic way, is extra-religious or transcendental consciousness.[24]

For KCB man is the 'free subject' while Absolute is 'subject as freedom'. Man is described as a stage which is prior to the Absolute. It has been already stated that man is the subject which is expressed

by the word 'I'. When this stage is negated, it will lead us to the Absolute.

These are, in short, the contributions of KCB in the field of Advaita Vedānta philosophy.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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3. *Studies in Vedantism*, p. 83.
4. Ibid., p. 83.
5. Ibid., p. 83 (para 113).
6. *Tarkasaṁgraha*, edited by N.C. Goswami, Calcutta, p. 427.
7. *'Mananaṁ nāma śabdāvadhārite'rthe mānāntara-virodha-saṁkāyāṁ tannirākaraṇānukūla-tarkātmaka-jñāna-janako mānasavyāpāraḥ'— Vedānta-paribhāṣā, prayojana pariccheda.*
8. *Studies in Vedantism*, p. 84(para 114).
9. *Pramātvamanadhigatāvādhitārtha-viṣayakajñānatvaṁ'—Vedāntaparibhāṣā, (pratyakṣa pariccheda).*
10. *'Brahmasākṣātkārānantaraṁ hi ghaṭādināṁ vādhaḥ, . . . Na tu saṁsāradaśāyāṁ vādhaḥ yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaraṁ paśyati'iti śruteḥ.'* Ibid.
11. *Sarvaṁ hi vākyaṁ nedamtaya vastubhedaṁ bodhayitumarhati'— Bhāmatī* on Brahma Sūtra, Nirnay Sagar Press, 1917, p. 124.
12. *'. . . Śāstrāṇi ātmani varṇāśramavayo'vasthādiviśeṣādhyāsamāśritya pravartate'—Adhyāsa-bhāṣya.*
13. *Studies in Vedantism*, p. 84 (para 115).
14. Ibid., p. 85 (para 117).
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. *'Navyāstu īśvarecchā na śaktiḥ, kintu icchaiva'—Siddhantamuktāvalī* on Verse 81.
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The Concept of Demand in Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's Philosophy

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Lexically the term 'demand' means to require, to need, to ask or call for as a right or with authority, or to claim or seek as due by right.[1] Taking into consideration these various literal meanings of the term 'demand' we are naturally faced with the questions: Why does a demand arise at a particular spatio-temporal point? What are the circumstances, physical or psychological, that cause a demand? What are the characteristics, necessary or accompanying, that constitute a demand in a given situation?

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMAND

A demand is a mental state. Though it may be for a physical or a non-physical object yet it does not occupy a locus in the physical world. An attempt at a causal explanation of the term hints at certain peculiar psychological factors involved in it. (i) At first we demand something because we desire and therefore need it. The desire again is caused by a 'feeling of want'. Man's longings and cravings for the object, the want of which is felt at a deeper level, take the form of a need. But then we cannot demand anything simply because we need it. The poor may need all the amenities of life just as others do but cannot demand them. (ii) This suggests the second factor inherent in demand. We can demand something only when we feel that we deserve it or we are capable enough to have it. So while demanding something we are at the same time conscious of the capability that causes the awareness of the right towards its fulfilment. This element of right turns a demand into a 'claim made with authority', just like the 'demand' of a creditor for payment. The analysis suggests that (i) the feeling of want and so the need, and (ii) the awareness of right towards its fulfilment constitute the defining characteristics of a demand. These two psychological factors form the *sine qua non* of a demand.

VARIOUS FORMULATIONS OF DEMAND

A demand can be formulated variously according to the need of the situation. In economics demand means a desire for a particular commodity coupled with the ability to pay for it which ensures the consumer's right to purchase. Any one of the two by itself is not capable of turning a simple desire into a demand. The longing of the poor for a particular commodity sans the ability to pay for it is reduced to a mere wish. Likewise the rich man's ability to pay without desire for it cannot also be a demand for that commodity. In the legal field a demand stands for the asking for or seeking what is due or claimed as due. Here also asking or need plus claim or right constitute a demand. In history we often hear of the demand of particular socio-economic or political situations helping the emergence of a hero and his role in the transformation of society. This invariably is the case with all great personalities like Buddha, Christ or Muhammad. They are all products of the demand of a particular situation. In their cases the precise historical situation as well as their traits or personalities created a desire, and so the need for the emancipation of the harassed and the oppressed. Aided by their struggle ensuring the right to achieve the cherished goal: these constitute the demand of the situation which in turn becomes a means powerful enough to bring about such momentous changes in society.

DEMAND AS CONCEIVED BY K.C. BHATTACHARYYA (KCB)

The concept of demand has been assigned a very important place in KCB's philosophy. Before coming to the dynamic role it plays in the development of his metaphysical scheme it would be better to understand how he conceives 'demand'. In his monograph *The Subject as Freedom*, KCB comprehends demand as a 'conscious spiritual demand'. The demand is 'for the intuition of the subject as absolute freedom . . . for the intuition of the freedom as evident'.[2] We have already observed that demand is essentially non-objective having no *locus standi* in the objective world. Hence, it is mental and of the nature of consciousness. KCB observes 'The consciousness of perfection, freedom or salvation as the end is . . . a demand for some kind of activity of the subject towards itself'.[3] Demand as conceived by him is necessarily conscious and spiritual by implication. It is conscious because it stems from the very depth of the consciousness itself for the realization of itself. In a sense the demand is of the consciousness, by the consciousness, for the consciousness. Further, the demand is not for any worldly object but for absolute freedom. It marks the spiritual progress of the subject. According to KCB spiritual progress means the realization of the subject as free,[4] and

the demand is essentially for the realization of the subject as freedom, hence it is spiritual.

EMERGENCE OF DEMAND

For a correct appreciation of KCB's conception of demand and to understand the circumstance that necessitates the emergence of demand we must keep in mind his general philosophical position. A Vedāntist by temperament, he conceives the self, or the subject as he prefers it, after Advaita Vedānta, as pure consciousness and interprets it as free function or freedom, or rather, in his own words, as 'felt detachment from the object'.[5] As such, the subject is what the object is not. The basic nature of the subject has been described by him as the 'cult of the subject',[6] or the subjectivity which consists in the awareness of the distinction of the subject from the object. As he observes 'This cult of the subject, as it might be called, takes various forms but they all involve a feeling of dissociation of the subject from the object, an awareness of the subject as what the object is not.'[7] One basic difference between the subject and object is that while the object is a meant entity,[8] the subject is not a meant entity.[9] The subject not being a meant entity follows from KCB's conception of meaning. A word is taken to mean something when the speaker and the hearer could use the word to understand the self-same entity.[10] The object has a meaning-content in this general sense and hence it is referred to by a general term 'this', whereas the subject does not possess a meaning-content in this general sense and is best expressed through the spoken word 'I'. The word 'I' when spoken not only represents the self but also the self as speaking, communicating or expressing itself. His self-consciousness is not merely expressed but also incarnated in the word 'I'.[11] As so expressed the subject is absolutely distinct from the object, rather it is free from the object. KCB observes that the 'modes of subjectivity are the modes of freeing oneself from the modes of objectivity'.[12] His transcendental psychology analyses 'the positively felt and believed freedom of the subject from objectivity' and also elaborates the 'modes of freedom that have no reference to the object at all'.[13]

It is at this point that we face a serious problem. The much assured freedom of the subject is not felt as evident. The subject as pure consciousness as intended by or rather as 'what intends by the word I',[14] as not only essentially free but as 'freedom as evident',[15] is not realized in its purity in common consciousness. Surrounded by the world of object as we are, our freedom is always limited. Even worse is our feeling to be wedded to the physical body which keeps at a distance the freedom so ardently felt in the depths of our heart. Hence, a feeling of restlessness on the part of the subject, a feeling

of missing, of not having something which ought to have been realized. Yet there is the belief of this freedom being evident. The subject is all the time conscious of its freedom, of its felt detachment from the object. Hence, the feeling of missing the freedom and the vigorous belief in its achievability cause the emergence of demand at each level of subjectivity. The subjective attitude appears as a demand for the specific activity primarily in the inwardizing direction. The subjective function being essentially the knowing of the object as distinct from it, knowing which is only believed and not known as fact, has to be known as fact, as the self-evidencing reality of the subject itself.[16]

> The idea of realizing the subject (i.e., the demand) arises only because we are identified with the body while we are introspectively aware of ourselves as not objective and yet as definitely positive. We do not know ourselves as dissociated from the object, yet we are aware of a possible dissociation or freedom.[17]

Had there not been the feeling of missing the freedom coupled with a completely assured faith in its achievability[18] there would not have been the demand for its realization.

SIGNIFICANCE OF DEMAND

As so conceived, demand in KCB's philosophy appears to be an inner force which continuously drives the subject towards the realization of its absolute freedom. It is the pre-condition of the self-realizing activity of the subject. The demanded actual dissociation passes through various stages taking the form of different modes of subjectivity involving higher and higher grades of perfection.[19] The process starts as early as at the stage of the objective. We know the self not as object but in knowing the distinction of the object from it, or in knowing the object as distinct from it. In KCB's expression 'the object is through the self-alienation of the subject' and 'the subject is not known except by a denial of the object'.[20] Hence, there is the demand for dissociation from the object. This leads to the assertion of bodily subjectivity. The subject is primarily intended by the word 'I' and as the body is identified with the 'I' it is permissible to speak of the bodily subject.[21] In this stage the self dissociates itself as embodied from all extra-organic objects. KCB holds that the feeling of detachment from the object is the feeling of freedom and the 'first hint of this freedom is reached in the feeling of the body'.[22] But even then the body cannot be identified with the subject as 'I' because the I-consciousness itself involves an awareness of the dissociation between 'I' and the body. Yet the

dissociation in question is not only imperfect but also potential at the lower stages of the subjectivity. There we find merely a demand for actual dissociation.

At the psychic stage the subject as identified with image and thought realizes for the first time an actual dissociation from the object. But the dissociation is not perfect, for both image and thought though dissociated from the object, yet somehow retain their relation with it. The subjectivity, therefore, involves an awareness of its distinction from psychic activities also. So even at this stage there is a demand for a still higher perfection, a demand 'pointing to the positive freedom from objective meaning'. It, therefore, negates its identification with its thought-content that ultimately leads to the stage of spiritual subjectivity.

Spiritual subjectivity consists of three sub-stages, namely feeling, introspection and beyond introspection. The demand at the stage of thought is two-fold: (i) to have pure subjectivity by itself and (ii) to have it as a being.[23] The first demand is realized in feeling which, according to KCB, represents the stage of complete dissociation from objectivity.[24] Subjectivity as pure subjectivity without any reference to object is first understood as dissociating itself from objective meaning in feeling. It consists of two stages: (i) freedom from actual thought and (ii) freedom from possible thought.[25] The first or the lower stage of feeling involves a feeling of a growing absence of meaning and the second or the higher stage involves the feeling of accomplished absence of meaning as unmeanable. But even then the absence of meaning in both stages somehow stands as meaning, as meaning the unmeanable. This is contradictory, which again necessitates a demand for the realization of purer form of subjectivity. The subjectivity tends from now to realize the second demand, i.e., to have itself as a pure being. The demand is to be completely dissociated from all actual and possible meaning.

This second demand is realized at the stage of spiritual introspection, which, according to KCB, is self-revealing through the word 'I'.[26] The introspective self is a self-evidencing self which although known by another self, is not known by the introspector himself.[27] It is self-evidencing only to another and not self-evident to itself. As such it is unrealized knowledge. But at the same time the introspective self has the awareness of the other self as a possible introspector. The other self's (or hearer's) understanding of the self-evidencing self (or the speaker, the I) is a possible introspection to the self-evidencing self. The awareness of these possibles in oneself, according to KCB, indicates the necessity of a spiritual discipline of realization of the self already implied by the

introspection.[28] The self so far only self-evidencing to another demands now to be self-evident to itself.

However, this demand remains unfulfilled at the stages of actual or possible introspection. According to KCB, though the subject is free at the stage of introspection yet it is not realized as freedom as evident. The realization of the subject, that is absolute freedom, is only a possibility[29] at the stage of introspection. The introspective self is the individual subject which knows itself as a distinct individual[30] but at the same time it is also aware of the possibility of realizing its true nature—the absolute self which is free even from the I-consciousness. Therefore, there is a demand now to transcend its individuality, its I-consciousness.[31] KCB maintains that true subjectivity consists in a going beyond the 'I' in a denial of the 'I'. The demanded activity for a going beyond the 'I' appears at first glance impossible. Yet KCB holds that the individual self is all the time aware of the possibility of this self-transcendence. It possesses the consciousness of the possibility of being capable of annulling all its actual and possible distinction from itself and thus of realizing the de-individualized absolute self, that is freedom, as evident.[32]

It is evident that the self's ascent from the stage of the objective to that of absolutely unobjective absolute freedom[33] is possible only on the basis of a conscious striving for and an assured belief in the achievability of its highest destiny which takes the form of a spiritual demand. The demand emerges at the end of every stage when some basic difficulties arise which cannot be resolved at that stage. Therefore, it takes the form of an inner demand for going beyond that stage.[34] The elaboration of these stages suggests the possibility of realising the subject as absolute freedom, of retracting the felt positive freedom towards the object into pure intuition of the self.[35]

Notes and References

1. Webster's *Dictionary of the English Language*, Encyclopaedic Edition, Chicago, 1979, p. 482.
2. K.C. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1958, pp. 88, 90.
3. Ibid., p. 32.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., Preface to *The Subject as Freedom.*
6. Ibid., p. 32.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 19.
9. Ibid., p. 23.
10. Ibid., p. 19. It seems that while taking this view of meaning KCB had the referential theory of meaning in mind.
11. Ibid., pp. 19–20.
12. Ibid., p. 28.

13. Ibid., p. 29.
14. Ibid., p. 86.
15. Ibid., pp. 90, 92.
16. Ibid., p. 32. G.B. Burch interprets this demanding attitude as the subject-oriented self-realizing activity (*mokṣa*) vide *Search for the Absolute in Neo-Vedānta: K.C. Bhattacharyya*, The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1976, pp. 58fn.
17. K.C. Bhattacharyya, op. cit., Vol. II, Editor's introduction, p. xxix.
18. Ibid., pp. 89–90.
19. The modes of subjectivity and the gradual realization of subject's freedom have been elaborated in the author's forthcoming monograph entitled *Absolute, Self and Consciousness: A Study in K.C. Bhattacharyya's Philosophy*, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta.
20. K.C. Bhattacharyya, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 195.
21. Ibid., Editor's introduction, pp. xxv–xxvi.
22. Ibid., p. 54.
23. Although the two demands emerge simultaneously they are realized successively. The second one is realized after the first in response to an anomaly. This second realization of pure subjectivity as with being is realized at the stage of introspection which is a self-maturation as much of thought as of feeling. Vide Kalidas Bhattacharyya, *The Fundamentals of K.C. Bhattacharyya's Philosophy*, Saraswat Library, Calcutta, 1975, pp. 136–37.
24. K.C. Bhattacharyya, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 75.
25. Ibid., p. 77.
26. Ibid., p. 91.
27. Ibid., p. 85.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 89.
30. Ibid., p. 88.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. The dialectic involves ten steps in all: external object, perceived body, felt body, absence, image, thought, feeling, introspection, beyond introspection and freedom.
34. Demand in this sense justifies at each stage the denial of whatever is illusory and the transcendence from the given to the absolute elimination of the givenness vide, author's article entitled 'K.C. Bhattacharyya's Concept of Negation: An Appraisal', *The Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, August 1986.
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The Concept of Rasa as Explicated by Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya

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Bharata is supposed to be the author of *Rasa* Theory in stage-drama, poetry and art. He picked up the word *rasa* from the *Atharva-Veda* and used it in the context of stage-drama (*Rasān Atharvaṇādapi*. NS 1). Since then the term has been carried down to us through Bhattanayaka, Abhinava Gupta, Visvanatha, Mammata, Jagannatha and many others as our precious cultural inheritance. But during this *transfer* of property it was used in different ways and many a concept was foisted on it. Bharata had used it as some kind of object in the presentation of drama (an object that is appreciated) just in the same way as we presuppose *jñeya* is the object of knowing. But just as *anuvyavasāya* or *pratyabhijñā* is not something material, but only belongs to the epistemic world, similarly, Abhinava had pointed out that the concept of *rasa* belonged to the universe of appreciation itself (*vijñanavādāva lambanāt*), and on the analogy of the distinction between *jñeya* and *jñāna* he continued to accept the distinction between *āsvādya* and *āsvāda* which was originally made by Bharata. But during the last one-and-a-half centuries the distinction was almost erased and *rasa* was taken as appreciation or *asvāda* and it was equated with 'pleasure, beatitude, rest and lysis'. Dr Shankaran, Dr Raghavan, Dr Nagendra, Dr Watve and others seem to be the protagonists of such a view. Even Dr Manamohan Ghosh's translation of *Nātya Śāstra,* must have indirectly led to such a view.

On this historical background it would be worthwhile to understand Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's (KCB) interpretation of the concept of *rasa.* He has studied and analysed the concept of rasa without any prior prejudice and has made so valuable a contribution to the *Rasa* Theory that if we follow KCB's interpretation it would be easier to understand the growth of *Rasa* Theory from Bharata to Jagannath and after.

According to KCB there is no English equivalent for the word '*rasa*'. Literally, '*rasa*' means (1) essence and (2) that which is

either tasted or felt. These two meanings are assimilated into the aesthetic conception of *rasa. Rasa* thus stands for two 'things', it is an eternal feeling—the essence of feeling—and still it is the object of further feeling. It also stands for an eternal (aesthetic) value that is felt.

Essence is an intellectual concept, but KCB does not take it as logical universal. If logical universals are apprehended in feeling then we would get a confused concept of *rasa.* Logical universal is an ideal of life while aesthetic essence is an ideal of feeling. *Rasa* is neither an idea nor a universal truth. It is not such ideal that is realized or not yet realized. It should be understood purely through feeling, and in terms of feeling. Intellect or will has no place in artistic feeling, so what appears valuable to artistic feeling may not appear the same to the intellect or to the will. Here feeling governs. In upholding such a view KCB seems to be influenced on the one hand by Kant's *Critique of Judgement* and on the other hand by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinava Gupta. One should remember here that Bhaṭṭanāyaka distinguished between two uses of the term *rasa,* one in the singular and the other in the plural, and in all probability regarded that the singular use of *'rasa'* stood for value, standard, parameter or norm, while its use in the plural was merely the illustration or dṛṣtānta of the norm.

As pointed out earlier, according to KCB, *'rasa'* means either aesthetic enjoyment or that which is aesthetically enjoyed. For explicating the concept of *rasa* he distinguishes three levels of feeling. They are (i) primary feeling; (ii) sympathetic feeling and (iii) contemplative feeling. He distinguishes aesthetic enjoyment from other types of feeling.

He states that artistic feeling is not merely a feeling among feelings but the 'feeling par excellence' and for understanding it he explains the different levels of feelings and shows that 'aesthetic enjoyment (*rasa*)' belongs to the 'highest level'. The levels emerge from mental evolution and thus KCB emphasizes the study of mental levels of the enjoyer.

PRIMARY FEELING

KCB starts with primary or direct feeling and distinguishes it from the feeling of feelings. He assigns the word sympathy to the feeling of feelings. It is interesting to see that Bharata too, distinguishes between sthāyī-bhāva and kaviantargata-bhava. He and following him, Abhinava Gupta, distinguished between two situations, say, *A* and *B*. To take an illustration from the Rāmāyaṇa story of the Kraunca couple, *A* would depict the mental state of the Kraunca birds. But *B* would depict the mind of the poet Vālmīki, which would

have the story of the Kraunca birds (as understood by the poet, i.e. *A*) and also his reactions. Thus *B* would depict a more complex situation and it is such complex situations which KCB would call sympathy or the feeling arising out of a basic feeling situation. It may also be pointed out that what Buddha calls *misery* or *duḥkha* depicts the situation *A*, whereas the *karuṇa* which it evokes in other observers depicts situation *B*.

According to KCB, in the case of primary or distinct feeling, that is in the enjoyment of an object, the object is not the mere means of enjoyment for the enjoyer. The enjoyer does not feel the difference between enjoyment and the object enjoyed. The duality becomes obscured. The subject of enjoyment unconsciously affects and is affected by the object. The object for the enjoyer is more than a fact—it has a value. It gets an enjoyable look or expression. Even the subject does not feel detached from the object. He feels that he is attracted by the object or weighed down by the object. This is the direct feeling which is influenced by the object. This feeling is limited to the object. KCB gives the example of a child playing with a toy. Here the child is glued to the toy.

SYMPATHY

This is the case of feeling of feelings. It depicts a reaction to the primary feeling situation. It does not emerge from the object itself. It is the joy of joy which emerges in the separate—different—mind. The second man imagines the feeling of the first man. That the second person sympathizes means that he feels or reacts to the feelings of the first person. So his feeling (the child's enjoyment of the object) is the direct object for the second person. The object of his sympathy is not the direct object as in the first case. The resultant feeling emerging from the first is the object of the second. KCB calls it sympathy. Primary joy (feeling) is confined only to the subject-object. It is bound. But the second-level feeling—feeling of feelings—i.e., sympathy, is freer than the primary, as that feeling can be enjoyed by more than one person in the house. For example, the grandfather or the mother watching the child's enjoyment and imagining it, feels his feeling. Here the joyous look or expression is not projected unconsciously. The second person feels like imagining it. He is not fascinated by or glued to the object. This feeling is freer than the primary but not totally free, as it is coupled with interest. Subjective feeling is there. That feeling is for a particular person. We cannot enjoy the feeling of somebody else's child. So it is still limited by subjective feelings. Thus 'freer than the first' stands on a higher level but does not constitute aesthetic enjoyment as it is not totally free. It is bound by

individual fact. Every feeling affects its object by lending a look or value to it. Sympathy is not affected by the direct object. The look or value is imagined in sympathy. Sympathy is detached from the fact, as floating on it or as shining beyond it, while the feeling is as adjectival to the fact. The freedom of the sympathetic feeling is reflected in the object as the detachment of expression from the given fact, as expression 'in the air' without substratum. KCB explains this stage by two analogies:

(1) A person who is directly feeling the terror from a terrible object and another person who is feeling his feelings. The second person is not directly involved in it.
(2) A mother who is worried by the sufferings of her child and a visitor who is sympathizing with her and who can imagine her feelings. He is not directly involved in the worry.

The second feeling, though it stands on a higher level, is not aesthetic feeling. Beauty is not presented as an adjective or quality of the object; it emerges from the reflexes of an object feeling. Thus aesthetic enjoyment stands on a still higher level than the level of feeling for the object and also from the level of sympathy. At the level of sympathy detachment is felt from objective fact but not from a subjective one.

Now KCB brings in experience at another level. He calls it sympathy with sympathy or duplicated sympathy.

DUPLICATED SYMPATHY

This is sympathy with sympathy. Here a third person, say a writer, is sympathizing with the second person who has sympathy with the first person's feeling and thus is unaffected by feeling. In the level of duplicated sympathy a feeling can be emotionally contemplated in a detached way, felt as dissociated from its character as a given subjective fact realized as self-subsisting value. It has a felt independent reality on which the given object is only a kind of symbol. It is totally detached from the particularity of fact, it becomes a kind of eternal reality, a real eternal value. Here again KCB has Bharata's concept of *rasa* and its interpretation by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinava Gupta in his mind. While understanding the concept of *sthāyī-bhāva* Lollaṭa and Śankuka had asked the question, whose *sthāyī-bhāvas* are evoked in a drama? Are they the *sthāyī-bhāvas* of the characters in 'history' or are they the characteristics of heroes in the drama depicted by the dramatists, or are they the *sthāyī-bhāvas* of the actors? It will be pertinent to see that Bhaṭṭanāyaka brought here the concept of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*, which in all probability influenced KCB's interpretation. KCB also

seems to have in the background the explanation which James Ward offers, in his *Psychology of Sensation and Feelings*.

According to KCB, *beauty* belongs to such an eternal value and accordingly aesthetic enjoyment (*rasa*) belongs to the level of duplicated sympathy—sympathy with sympathy. At this stage the beauty of an object appears to be seen rather than imagined; this shows that a feeling of such an experience has a reality not inferior to that of the object as a given fact. But it is not seen as a quality or adjective of the object even though it appears as adjective or subordinate to it. The relation of the object and its beauty should be recognized here as a peculiar relation—the relation of the symbol to the symbolized, it is just like the logical relation between a word and its meaning.

Thus aesthetic enjoyment belongs to *sympathy with sympathy* or duplicated sympathy because it is totally free from individuality and becomes impersonal. KCB explains it with the following example. He says, 'I may enjoy contemplating an old man affectionately watching his grandchild playing with a toy, contrast here the child's joy in the toy with the grandfather's sympathetic joy and this again with my contemplative joy.' Here the child is immersed in the enjoyment of the toy—the old man is not immersed in the toy, but still his feeling is not yet of the artistic character. It is still of the nature of a personal selective interest in a particular child and his feeling. But in contemplative joy such personal complexion is suspended. In such joy we are interested in the child's feeling reflected in the grandfather's heart as an eternal emotion or value. We enjoy the essence of the emotion, get immersed in it even like the child in the toy, without getting affected by it and without losing our freedom. Our feeling and the child's feeling become one just as the feeling of the old man and the feeling of the child become one. Our personality dissolves but still we are not involved in the object as the child is involved. We freely become impersonal.

So aesthetic enjoyment is a feeling for another actual person, feeling for a third actual person. In other cases, one or both of these persons may be imaginary. KCB explains the imaginary second person with the following example. In the aesthetic contemplation of a poor waif in the street—while calling it beautiful we contemplate what the child would be to its mother who is an imaginary second person.

In the case of an imaginary third person we contemplate a mother treasuring the toys of her dead child. She sees the same value in the toys as though the child were still alive and playing with them. The child in this case is imaginary but the mother's emotions are actual or personal and to the person contemplating on it, the emotion is a beautiful theme for art. When we contemplate a character in a

drama both the persons are imaginary—the characters is an imaginary third person as also the primary subject. Then there is a question of who is sympathizing with the second person. We have to understand here the difference between imagining an object as actual and imagining it as imaginary.

In imagining it as actual the object is imagined as presented to an actual feeling of the person, imagining as a savoury dish would be imagined by a hungry person.

In imagining it as imaginary the feeling bodying forth the image is itself imaginary. The object is imagined as what would be imagined by another person having the actual feeling. The character in the drama is not imagined as an actual person. It is an imagination of someone imagining the character as an actual person and we sympathize with this imaginary 'someone' as the second person. This imaginary second person has the value of the concept of a person in general as he is not a particular person. Here we have in the concept an *efflux* of feeling and not of the intellect. This person is felt, not thought, by us who are contemplating aesthetically. The felt person is semi-mythological. KCB calls it *Heart Universal.*

Artistic feeling according to KCB is contemplated as reflected in or sympathized with by this Heart Universal and the feeling of the contemplating person merges his personal or private heart in the Heart Universal.

Self-consciousness should be dropped in artistic enjoyment and the enjoyed feeling should be detached from an individual subject (third person). They are eternalized in the Heart Universal.

KCB concludes,

> we can say that there are three levels of feeling—they are primary, sympathetic and contemplative. Beauty of an object implies three features distinguishing it from the object—expression, detachment and eternity. These are the projections of primary feeling, sympathetic feeling and contemplative feeling. All the three feelings are combined in one person who is the aesthetic enjoyer at three different emotional levels at the same time. And so aesthetic enjoyment is not merely a feeling among feeling but the feeling par excellence.

Rasa should be interpreted in terms of feeling, without any reference to the intellectual Idea or the spiritual Idea. Artistic enjoyment is free from entanglement of fact but has eternal value. They are identified without losing freedom.

We enjoy in the object its beauty which is an eternal self-subsisting value to which the object is related as a symbol.

While talking of Indian art, he says that it is contemplative in character. It is not dynamically creative. *Rasa* is conceived as a subjective absolute rather than as an objective absolute or beauty.

To conclude, we may say that KCB does not consider natural beauty in the context of *rasa* as natural beauty belongs to primary feeling.

Aesthetic beauty must be freed from all interest. It must become universal, i.e. impersonal.

It is evident that though influenced by Kant he differs from him in judgement of beauty, but perhaps Kant's sublime belongs to the category of *rasa* as it is of contemplative character. But he is certainly explicating Bharata's Theory of *Rasa* as interpreted by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinava Gupta.

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya and Anekāntavāda

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Gopinath Bhattacharyya said about Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's interpretation of Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Vedānta that it is development in new directions of some fundamental tenets of these schools.[1] 'It is development not in the sense of necessary amplification of what is potential therein; it is rather the discovery of new potentialities.'[2] This comment is also very true of Krishna Chandra's interpretation of the Jaina theory of *Anekānta*. In fact, instead of saying that it is an *interpretation* of the old concept, it would be more correct to say that it is an *extension* of his own fundamental position, keeping the Jaina concept in the forefront. In this paper I have tried to present my thoughts on KCB's views about *Anekāntavāda* along these lines.

Krishna Chandra himself said that ordinary realism is committed to the conception of a 'plurality of determinate truths'.[3] We find that this is very true of the traditional Jaina concept of *Anekāntavāda*. But Krishna Chandra reads the theory differently. He describes it as ultra realism. His position is that according to the Jainas the given can be presented in various ways, all of which need not necessarily be determinate and definite. This he explains by interpreting the seven modes of truth advocated by the Jainas in his own way.

I have prefaced my presentation of Krishna Chandra's views, with two short summaries. In the first, I speak of *Anekāntavāda* as it has been developed in traditional texts. Here the seven *bhaṅgas* have been seen as alternatives; but they are all coordinate and each of them is definite. In the second I have talked about *Anekāntavāda* as it has been interpreted by Bimal Matilal. I take him to be an ideal interpreter, for he looks at *Anekāntavāda* and the associated views from our position, and consistently brings out the various implications, using the contemporary philosophical tools lying at his disposal. In the concluding section I speak of Krishna Chandra.

In the last section of the 'Jaina Theory of Anekānta' Krishna Chandra describes it as a theory of indeterministic truth. He holds that truth need not necessarily be determinate; what is presented in experience can be definitely thinkable or not definitely thinkable. In different papers he has spoken of the indefinite. He urges for the 'admission of the indefinite in logic, side by side with definite

position and definite negation'.[4] According to him the indefinite has found a place in metaphysics. The list, in which he gives a few examples of the indefinite chosen at random, includes 'the negative matter of Plato, the *māyā* of the Vedāntists, and the *śūnyaṁ* or void of the Buddhists'.[5] He mentions many more, and it seems that whatever is indispensible for a particular system of thought but cannot be defined rationally and definitely, has been termed by him indefinite. He speaks of the indefinite as homeless in logic. However, his search for it ends in the Jaina system, where the indefinite has been accepted as an integral part of logic.

Krishna Chandra thinks that the seven expressions of the seven-valued logic of the Jainas, reflect seven faces of the real and their relationship is not *togetherness* but *alternation.* He comments about Jaina philosophy that 'The faith in one truth or even in a plurality of truths, each simply given as determinate, would be rejected by it as a species of intolerance.'[6] While this would not be denied by the Jainas, it is to be noted that they accept each of the expressions as determinate, and they do not clarify the exact nature of alternation. Further, because of their appeal to standpoints, in order to answer the charge of incompatibility, their seven expressions can be interpreted to stand for a collection of truths. From this, Krishna Chandra's position is definitely different. In order to understand him even in broad outlines, we shall have to enter his own realm of thinking and decipher such concepts as 'togetherness', 'definite-indefinite', 'alternation', etc., which he used in his own specific sense. Let us see how far we can understand this highly original thinker.[7]

I

Anekāntavāda and *Syādvāda* are closely associated with each other. *Anekāntavāda* literally means the theory of non-onesidedness. In his introduction to *Anekāntajayapatākā,* the editor says, '*Anekāntavāda* stands for a many-sided exposition.'[8] Historically, *Anekāntavāda* originated as a protest against the *Ekāntavādas* or the one-sided absolutistic systems, such as Buddhism, Vedānta, etc. But we find that *Anekāntavāda* also has an ontological significance and it asserts that reality is non-onesided. In this sense it holds that reality has infinite facets. But this is not mere pluralism. It claims that reality has opposite faces. For example, it is said that the real is *anekātmaka* being both universal and particular, or being both substance and attribute.[9] The Jainas not only hold that the real has contrary features, but they also assert that contradictories, such as existence and non-existence, are also aspects of the same real.[10]

Syādvāda on the other hand is fully a theory of predication. It recommends that the epithet '*syāt*' should be attached to every expression. '*Syāt*' is said to be an indeclinable, which literally means 'may be'.[11] But, 'may be' might suggest a subjective sense of uncertainty, which is unwelcome to the Jaina realist. '*Syāt*' is thus taken to mean 'in some respects' in this context. Thus *Syādvāda* asserts that all expressions are relational, being attached to different perspectives. Further, it implies that every predication is true, but it never expresses the whole truth.

We see that Kapadia claims that *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādvāda* are synonyms.[12] He quotes from *Syādvādamañjari* of Mallisen Suri to make his point. The quotation asserts that '*Syat,* the indeclinable signifies non-onesidedness, so it is *Anekāntavāda.*' But this approach overlooks the fact that *Anekāntavāda* has its ontological nuances. Strictly speaking, *Syādvāda* is meant to emphasize the partial and the relational nature of the judgments, and as such it has no necessary connection with *Anekānta* reality. But *Syādvāda* as coupled with the seven-valued logic of the Jainas, the *Saptabhaṅgīnayavāda,* is founded on *Anekānta* ontology.

Vādi Devasuri says that a word in expressing its object follows the law of sevenfold predication.[13] *Saptabhaṅgī* is defined by him as use of seven sorts of expression, regarding one and the same thing, with reference to its one chosen particular aspect, without any inconsistency by means of affirmation and negation, either severally or jointly, being marked with 'in some respects'.[14] Obviously, the apparently inconsistent predications are possible because of the '*syāt*'. Vādi Devasuri makes it clear that seven types of predication are made about each of the infinite faces of the real.[15] So it holds that the real is infinitefold and its faces are sometimes opposed to one another. Thus *saptabhaṅgī* is dependent upon both *Syādvāda* and the *Anekānta* nature of reality.

In the seven-valued logic the first two forms of expression are positive and negative, 'S is' and 'S is not' respectively. Naturally, these are mutually incompatible. All other criticisms directed against this particular Jaina position are traceable to this fundamental charge of inconsistency. The Jainas assert that in the non-onesided reality these mutually opposed features exist in the same substance, and from different standpoints opposite predications are possible. Through analysis of concrete examples they present their position. From the theory of inference they give their example. It is urged that the *hetu* should have both *sapakṣasattā* and *vipakṣasāttā,* i.e., the *hetu* must exist in the *sapakṣa* and not exist in the *vipakṣa.* Thus in different locations existence and non-existence are features of the same *hetu* and we can consistently assert that 'in some respects the *hetu* exists' and 'in some respects the *hetu* does not exist'.[16]

The '*syāt*' which means the indefinite 'in some respect' has been amplified to include definite determinants like space, time, substantiality, etc. The list remains open and many other determinants might be added. By varying these determinants, 'S is' becomes 'S is not'. The pitcher which exists as solid does not exist as liquid; that which is existent at Kānyakubja is not existent at Mathurā; that which is existent in summer is non-existent in winter; that which is existent as black is non-existent as red; and so on. In all these expressions we are talking about reality. Thus both in reality and in corresponding expressions, mutually opposed features are co-present.[17]

In the third form, the first two are combined consecutively; this is called *kramārpaṇa*. Because of the time difference, there is no incompatibility. Thus it is said that 'in some respect, the pitcher exists and it does not exist' or 'in some respect, S is and S is not'. In the fourth form or *sahārpaṇa* the first two expressions are to be conjoined simultaneously. It is impossible to say that the pitcher exists and it does not exist, without sacrificing the law of contradiction, unless one is talking figuratively. But the Jainas are doing serious consistent logic, and they say that here the pitcher is inexpressible. As is well known, by combining the fourth *bhaṅga* with the other three, we get the last three forms of the expression: 'In some respects, S is and is inexpressible', 'In some respects, S is not and is inexpressible' and 'In some respects, S is and is not and is inexpressible'.

The Jainas have further added that none of these seven forms is more basic than the others. One must not hold that the positive forms are more fundamental and the negatives lean on them. A word does not express a negation indirectly. Their general tenet is that something can be presented indirectly, only when it has been known directly.[18] Sometimes it is claimed that the fourth predication is absolutely true, whereas the other forms are relatively true, i.e., true in some respects only, so it must be assigned a special position. But this is not acceptable to the Jainas, for according to them an absence of a viewpoint is itself a viewpoint and the description 'inexpressible' does not exhaustively express the nature of the given.[19] So all the forms of expression are coordinate according to the Jainas.

Further, it is said that the predications are meant to distinguish an object from other objects. thus each of these expressions indicate the definite and determinate nature of the object.[20]

Both these two points are important for us for we shall see how Bimal Matilal dwells upon both of them and how KCB drifted away.

We feel that the Jainas, who claim to be realists, should have worked out the *Anekānta* ontology in further detail. The general

idea is that these expressions are not merely different subjective ways of knowing reality, but there is some objective reality corresponding to these. What is the exact ontological status of these correlates of the seven forms of expression? If these be *paryāya,* or modes of the real, in their own turn, then the critic would urge that each of them should again be judged in seven different ways which would naturally lead to infinite regress. The Jainas did not raise this issue. The mutual relation of these expressions was supposed to be alternation, these were presented as alternative descriptions of the same reality. The Jainas do not comment on the nature of this alternation.

II

Bimal Matilal has been interested in the concept of *Anekāntavāda* and has dwelt upon it in many places. He makes a number of valuable observations, but here I have picked out only one or two of them, which are relevant for our discussion.

He presents *Anekāntavāda* as a philosophy of synthesis and reconciliation. Like many other commentators, he also maintains that 'the Jainas carried the principle of non-violence to the intellectual level, and thus propounded their *Anekānta* doctrine'.[21] This view has been favoured by many, including Krishna Chandra. Bimal further continues that the Jainas, like the Buddhists, saw the evils of onesided philosophies, and while the Buddhists rejected the extreme views and prescribed the middle path, the Jainas held that all rival conclusions might be retained and reconciled, provided they are asserted with proper qualifications and conditionalizations.

By directing our attention to this prescription of the original Jaina theory, he brings out the latent weakness of the Jaina position. He shows that the *syāt* operator does not mean 'perhaps' or 'may be', it does not indicate any hesitancy on the part of the knowing subject, but it stands for 'conditional *yes*'.[22] He shows that the expressions '*Syāt* S is' and '*Syāt* S is not' actually stand for 'From standpoint 1, S is' and 'From standpoint 2, S is not'. Thus they can be easily represented by two conditionals, 'If m, then S is P' and 'If n, then S is not P'. So, although the pair of categorical propositions look mutually inconsistent, the conditionals are not at all incompatible with each other. This translation shows that the charge of incompatibility cannot be levelled against the Jainas. But it also shows that in the sevenfold scheme of propositions, the Jainas are not talking about the same ontological situation. The two expressions 'If m, then S is P' and 'If n, then S is not P' have no logical relation at all, the antecedents being different. He clearly shows that the different *bhaṅgas* in the sevenfold scheme are

conditionals having the appearance of categoricals. Variable determinants are hidden behind the same epithet '*Syāt*'.

Although in their commentaries the Jainas have clearly asserted *that the epithet 'syāt'* stands for different conditions in different expressions, still the use of the same word '*syāt*' has often been misleading. Readers are inadvertently led to think that the judgements are made under the same condition. Bimal's discussions bring out this point. Pradeep P. Gokhale says that the specification of the '*syāt*' amounts to distortion of the original logical form of '*syat*'. He says that 'the peculiarity and the beauty of *Syādvāda* lies in indicating the existence of *some* standpoint, *some* condition or *some* respect which makes the given statement true'.[23] So he says that Bimal's recommendation that the so-called categoricals in the seven-valued logic are actually definite conditionals, fails to capture the exact implication of '*syāt*'; he however, does not deny that here expressions are tied to varying standpoints. So without entering into a critical evaluation of his own scheme, we may say that he would agree with us that even if Bimal's translations distort the original vagueness associated with *syāt*, it establishes clearly that *Syādvāda* is a doctrine of standpoints. But we see that it also shows that the judgments do not converge upon the same reality and they cannot be accepted as alternative descriptions of the same reality. So though the charge of incompatibility cannot be levelled against the Jainas, their theory no more remains significantly valuable. The seven *bhaṅgas* become a collection of seven judgments asserted about a pluralistic reality. Their mutual relation can no more be called alternation.

When the Jainas originally talked about different philosophical theories about Reality (with a capital R), their theory made some sense. They held that differences of standpoints, of categorical frameworks, of priorities, accounted for philosophical differences of various theories and with proper explanations these can be reconciled. But the defect of the Jaina position becomes clear through the discussion of empirical propositions.

Bimal Matilal puts his position even more clearly in his last article on *Anekāntavāda* in *JICPR*, Vol. VIII, No. 2. He shows that indexical elements are responsible for the determination of truth value, and thus by varying these elements, we can say 'yes' and 'no' to the same proposition. This is a very consistent and at the same time revealing rendering of the Jaina position that propositions are always tied to standpoints, and no position is absolutely true. But after drawing out many other corollaries of the Jaina position, he is aware that in and through his interpretation the core of the *Anekānta* metaphysics is lost, the core which emphasized the 'contradictory and the opposite sides of the same reality'.[24] However, he points out that in spite of

all our explanations, we cannot explain away the fourth expression where contradictory predicates are asserted simultaneously of the same reality, under the same '*syāt*', and the predicate emerges as a 'separate and non-composite value called *avaktavya*'.[25]

He does not himself satisfactorily explain how each expression can be assigned this value without flouting the law of contradiction, and what is the precise nature of the real which answers this description. Perhaps the '*syāt*' here stands for the viewpoint of 'no viewpoint' or the condition of unconditionality. He draws many analogues from modern logic, but is not fully satisfied with any of these. The Jainas are aware that here opposed predicates clash with each other, they accept it as a standpoint coordinate with other standpoints, but they do not positively explain what this standpoint stands for.

I think that Bimal gives a faithful interpretation of Jaina logic. Here Krishna Chandra's attitude is radically different. He is basically interested in *Anekānta* ontology, and his logic is tied to his ontology. Within reality he sees various facets and their mutual relation is indetermination and alternation. He does not speak of empirical standpoints at all. His starting point is that the given real is both particular and universal. Then he turns to the mutual interrelation of these two categories and derives all the seven *bhaṅgas* from it. I turn to Krishna Chandra in the next section.

III

Krishna Chandra is looking for seven ontological faces of reality, which would correspond to the seven *bhaṅgas* of the Jaina logic. The experienced object before all metaphysical dissection has been called the determinate existent. One face of this given object is its particularity. This particularity is conferred to the given object by experience. But Krishna Chandra is quite aware that according to realism experience does not constitute objects, but it merely discovers. Thus, corresponding to the experience or thought of positing a particular, there must be a face of the real object. This face is called 'being' and it corresponds to the first *bhaṅga* of *saptabhaṅginaya*, viz., 'S is'. But the same determinate existent is existence universal, shorn of all its particularity. Existence or thinghood, being universal is opposed to particularity. The determinate existent has a definite position in experience and the given is experienced as universal, existence only through rejection of its particularity. So the same given real bereft of all particular characters is called negation, by Krishna Chandra. It corresponds to 'S is not'.

Krishna Chandra here comments that 'The same logic is sometimes expressed by saying that a determinate existent A *is* in one respect and *is not* in another respect.'[26] But it is amply clear that this 'respect' is very different from the traditional Jaina concept of standpoint. Instead of recommending a shift in the empirical perspective, he is dwelling upon the interrelation of two ontological categories. The Jaina thinker Vādi Deva has said that the real is both universal and particular being infinitefold, but he did not interpret the *bhaṅgas* in this way.[27]

The determinate existent has been described here as 'definite definite'. The first 'definite', or the adjectival definite, indicates the definiteness of experience, it is the objective counterpart of thought. The second definite, the substantival definite, stands for the content of experience. As the objective face corresponding to the position or assertion of the given as particular and the objective givenness as existence are definitely distinct from each other, their relation is differenced togetherness, or definite distinction. This answers the third *bhaṅga* of the Jainas, which is 'S is and S is not'. In traditional thought this is consecutive presentation or Kramārpaṇa. Krishna Chandra is merely stating here that both the faces are present in the real and he is logically analysing the content and is not talking of temporal consecutiveness.

But in experience the given is not necessarily always definite. When we focus on the clashing nature of the two faces, in co-presentation or *sahārpaṇa*, the faces tend to erase and cancel each other. The two cannot be present in the real simultaneously, they seem to drive away each other. It is not possible to analyse the content of this expression by using positive assertions; through double negations the content is described as—not a particular position, nor non-existent.[28] This analysis shows that there is an inexplicable surd in the content of the given, but being given in experience, its claim to reality is undeniable. The content is called indefinite; it is described as 'definite indefinite' by Krishna Chandra. The experience and its objectivized face is definite, but the content is indefinite; the two incompatibles combine here through the relation of non-distinction. Here Krishna Chandra uses two unusual concepts, the concept of indefinite and that of 'non-distinction'. In the earlier part of the article he analyses both the concepts.

He develops the concept of indefinite through two illustrations. In the first one he analyses the concept of knowledge of knowledge. For realism there is no distinction between knowledge and known, for both are equally objective. Pure realism does not accept the difference between contemplating and enjoying, for it both the object and knowledge belong to the realm of the known. But the difficulty arises when we dwell upon the concept of

knowledge of knowledge. How do we differentiate between knowledge as known and the object as known? Knowledge has to be known as different and distinct from the known. Krishna Chandra takes here two easy steps: knowledge has to be known as *unknown* (i.e., as distinct from known). This is self-contradictory, but yet it is presented in experience; thus it is known as indefinite. Whatever cannot be rationally articulated, but is presented in experience, is said to be indefinite.

He introduces the concept of the objective indefinite by referring to Hobhouse. According to Hobhouse, in simple apprehension, what is apprehended is definite, but it has an indefinite background. The indefinite is here apprehended too, but it is apprehended as indefinite. The indefinite which Krishna Chandra introduces in the context of the *anekānta* reality corresponds to the '*Avaktavya*' of the seven-valued logic.

While analysing the different faces of reality and their mutual relation, Krishna Chandra speaks of three basal categories, viz. 'distinction, distinction from distinction as other than distinction, and the indetermination of the two'.[29] When the relata are distinct and determinate their relation is distinction. According to Krishna Chandra ordinary realism is satisfied with distinction. In the third mode of reality the relation between the positive and the negative face is distinction. This has also been described as 'differenced togetherness'. The relation which is distinct from distinction should have been identity. But Krishna Chandra does not accept identity as a determinate relation. By discussing Hegel and Nyāya, Krishna Chandra shows that identity always involves distinction, and here either identity or distinction becomes more predominant than the other. If within identity, both are accepted as coordinate, then the relation should be more aptly called distinction from distinction. The relation between being and negation in the fourth mode is this distinction from distinction, which has also been described as indeterminate distinction or non-distinction.

Krishna Chandra next introduces the third type of relation, which he calls indetermination or alternation. As we have seen, according to Krishna Chandra the mutual relation of particularity and thinghood is both distinction and non-distinction. As distinct their relation is 'differenced togetherness' which corresponds to the third mode; as non-distinct their relation is 'undifferenced togetherness' which corresponds to the fourth mode. The relation between each of these modes is alternation or indetermination. He says that 'particularity and thinghood are in each relation without being in the other relation *at the same time*'.[30] The relation between all the four forms is this relation of indetermination. The whole analysis is

ontological, so this relation is to be understood as a relation between the faces themselves.

Krishna Chandra next explains the three other modes of reality. He says that there is a basic distinction between the 'definite given' and the 'indefinite given'. The first three modes are the three faces of the definite. The fourth one is indefinite as such; it is to be combined with the first three modes. In the first, the indefinite itself is taken to be a particular, and as such is to be combined with objectivised position. In the next one it is to be seen as many particular negations fused together and in the last one it is combined with the definite determinate existent itself.

Thus we have seven modes of truth, which are the seven faces of the real too. These are:

(1) Particular position (substantive corresponding to the verb positing).
(2) Universal thinghood, which is the negation of the particular.
(3) Position and negation, together with their distinction. This is the determinate existent.
(4) Indefinite, in which the particular and the universal are indistinguishably together. There is no clearcut distinction between the two, yet they do not collapse into identity.
(5) This indefinite as being.
(6) This indefinite as many negations together.
(7) The indefinite as distinct from the determinate existent.

No other eighth mode is possible as that would be identical with the indefinite.

Krishna Chandra says that each of these modes implies the other modes and implication as objectivized is alternation. Each of these modes is distinct, but as they converge upon the same reality they are also non-distinct. The alternation between the equally undeniable but mutually exclusive faces is said to be the essence of reality. This alternation is not a subjective sense of vacillation or hesitancy, but an objectively real relation.

The concept of the indefinite occupies a very important place in Krishna Chandra's philosophy. This becomes specially evident in his interpretation of the last three modes. In the traditional Jaina logic the fifth expression is that the given object is and is indescribable. According to Krishna Chandra the indefinite itself is a being or a particular position. Similarly, in the traditional thought the sixth expression asserts that the given is not and is indescribable, whereas he speaks of it as asserting that the given indefinite is a fusion of many indistinguishable negations.

His theory of expressions just reflect reality. True to his assertion that according to the realists thought only discovers and does not constitute reality, his theory of judgments only reflected the real, so that the role of the '*syāt*' operator is minimal. The charge of incompatibility is answered by him through the concept of alternation. His position is that the clashing faces of reality are all real if they are given in experience. Their mutual relation is alternation and not co-presence or just togetherness. Thus the charge of contradiction is bypassed through alternation and indetermination.

Here I return to the comment of Gopinath Bhattacharyya, quoted by me in the introduction. Bimal amplified the potentialities present in the traditional *Anekāntavāda*. But, Krishna Chandra discovers new potentialities, such that the theory changes beyond recognition. He calls this ultra realism. But if *Anekāntavāda* is different from realism, it is so only after Krishna Chandra's interpretation. Krishna Chandra says that realism believes in a plurality of deterninate truths; we have seen that traditional *Anekāntavāda* after Bimal's interpretation is almost reduced to such a theory. Krishna Chandra reads *Anekāntavāda* as a theory of indeterministic truth, which holds that what is presented is thinkable in alternative modes, definite or indefinite, but this reading is specifically his own contribution.

Notes and References

1. In a footnote attached to 'Acharya Krishna Chandra's Conception of Philosophy' published in *The Journal of Indian Academy of Philosophy*, Vol. II, Rasvihari Das writes, 'Many people perhaps do not realize that in India we traditionally refer to our great men by their proper names and not by their surnames as is done in modern Europe. Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, etc. are all surnames whereas Shankara, Ramanuja, Udayana, Gangesha, Raghunatha, ... even Radhakrishnan are all proper names. The present vogue of referring to people by their surnames appears to be a legacy of western influence on our culture'. Following his footsteps, I have spoken of K.C. Bhattacharyya as Krishna Chandra in this paper.
2. K.C. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I, edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1956, p. xii.
3. K.C. Bhattacharyya, 'The Jaina Theory of Anekānta' (henceforward referred to as JA), *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1956, Section 1.
4. K.C. Bhattacharyya, 'Place of the Indefinite in Logic', *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1958, Section 1.
5. Ibid., Section 1.
6. JA, op.cit., Section 30.
7. Those who studied philosophy directly under him have agreed that he was a profound thinker, but it is very difficult to understand him properly. In the paper mentioned in Note 1, the author writes, 'Krishna Chandra was perhaps the acutest philosophical thinker of modern India', but adds 'that his writing

was very terse'. Again, in his preface to 'The Fundamentals of K.C. Bhattacharyya's Philosophy' Kalidas Bhattacharyya remarks 'his writings are extraordinarily terse' and his 'analyses are bafflingly subtle'.

8. Haribhadra Suri, *Anekāntajayapatākā*, edited by H.R. Kapadia, GOS, 1940, p. IX.
9. Vādi Devasuri, *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṁkāra*, edited by H.S. Bhattacharyya, Bombay, 1967, Chapter V, *Sūtra* 1, *Sāmānyaviśeṣādyanekātmakaṁ vastu.*
10. Haribhadra Suri, *Anekāntajayapatākā*, edited by H.R. Kapadia, GOS, 1940, p. 11, *vastvekaṃ sadasadrupaṃṃ.*
11. The *'syāt'* epithet has also been derived in other ways. Bimal Matilal in *Logic, Language and Reality*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1985, p. 305 breaks it as follows: as + potential/optative third form, singular, which indicates probability.
12. Haribhadra Suri, *Anekāntajayapatākā*, op.cit., quotation from *Syādvādamañjari* of Mallisena, p. x, *Syādityavyayamanekāntadyotakaṃ. Tatah syadvādo' nekāntavādaḥ.*
13. Vādi Devasuri, *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṁkāra*, op.cit., IV, *Sūtra* 13, *Sarvatrayam dhvani vidhiniṣedhabhyāṃ svārthamabhidadhāna saptabhaṅgimanu-gacchati.*
14. Ibid., *Sūtra* 14.
15. Ibid., *Sūtra* 38.
16. Ibid., on IV, *Sūtra* 16.
17. Haribhadra Suri, *Anekāntajayapatākā*, op.cit., p. 36. *svadravyakṣetrakālabhāva-rūpeṇa sad vartate, paradravya-kṣetrakālabhāvarupeṇa cāsat. Tataśca saccāsacca bhavati.*
18. Vādi Devasuri, *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṁkāra*, op.cit., IV, *Sūtra* 25, *kvacit kadācit kathañcit prādhanyenāpratipannasya aprādhānya anupapatteh.*
19. Ibid., *Sūtra* 30, *tasyāvaktavyaśabdenāpyāvacyatva prasaṃgāt.*
20. Ibid., *Sūtra* 15. Commentary: The predication thus indicates the definite and the determinate nature of the thing.
21. Bimal K. Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, op.cit., p. 314.
22. Ibid., p. 305.
23. Pradeep P. Gokhale, 'The Logical Structure of Syādvāda', *JICPR*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, 1991.
24. Bimal K. Matilal, 'Anekānta: Both Yes and No', *JICPR*, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 1991, p. 9.
25. Ibid., p. 10.
26. K.C. Bhattacharyya, 'The Jaina Theory of Anekānta', *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I, op.cit., Section 26.
27. See note no. 9.
28. K.C. Bhattacharyya, 'The Jaina Theory of Anekānta', op.cit., Section 27.
29. Ibid., Section 24.
30. Ibid.

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's Theory of Value

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I

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya (KCB) is one of the most original twentieth-century Indian philosophers and one of the most insightful constructive interpreters of the classical Indian thought. He has his own conception of philosophy and philosophical method and has developed his own philosophical terminology.[1] When he develops his own philosophy, he does not quote any other philosopher. In his article 'The Concept of Value' he gives his own analysis of the concept of value and does not give an exposition, interpretation and criticism of someone else's thought. His thoughts are profoundly original.

Even on a cursory reading of the article, one is struck by sentences such as the following.

> We speak of value either of a known content or of a willed content. Value is itself a felt content. (p. 285)
>
> The so-called value judgment is not reflective knowing but reflective feeling. (p. 286)
>
> Value is not a known content. (p. 286)
>
> Properly speaking value is no adjective of the object. (p. 289)
>
> Value judgment is an exclamation disguised as information. (p. 291)
>
> Moral valuation is not only not judgment, its expression as information is symbolical and not literal. (p. 295)
>
> Valuation, whether aesthetic or moral, is not judgment. (p. 295)
>
> Value judgment is primarily an exclamation somehow toned down into information. (p. 290)

These are not stray statements picked up from the periphery of the article; they express his central thought about the nature of value. Anyone who is familiar with the recent discussions about the nature

of value judgment in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, cannot fail to notice the similarity between KCB's analysis of value and the emotivist or non-cognitivist theories. In another article, 'Knowledge and Truth', KCB talks of beauty and sacredness as 'the non-cognitive value of the object known' (p. 157). These articles were written by KCB roughly at the time when A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson propounded the emotive theory of value.[2] Though KCB seems to be aware of the positivists (p. 100) his non-cognitivism is in no way influenced by these linguistic versions of non-cognitivism. His non-cognitivism has a distinct Indian flavour. It is rooted in, and probably grows as a result of, his study and reflection on Vedānta, Kant and the *Rasa* Theory. This article is an attempt at giving an exposition of his theory of value by placing it in the total framework of his philosophy and by showing to what extent and in what respects it differs both from the Kantian and the linguistic versions of non-cognitivism. It, however, does not attempt at tracing the roots of KCB's non-cognitivism.

II

What I have called the linguistic version of non-cognitivism is either a by-product of logical empiricism with its two 'dogmas'—dichotomical division of propositions into analytic (tautological) and synthetic and the verification criterion of cognitive or literal meaning; or it is a description of the functions value judgments perform, in ordinary language. Underlying these theories is a conception of philosophy as the logical analysis of language. To many this linguistic conception of philosophy with clarity and not truth as its aim appears to be 'trivial'. As Mackie complains[3] these philosophers do not even raise the question of the ontological status of values. In KCB, one does not find any such commitment to empiricism, to the dichotomical division of propositions, to the verification theory of meaning and to the linguistic conception of philosophy. In him, one does not find such 'trivialization'. He talks of value as 'a felt being'. It is not one of the aspects of the Absolute considered as a unitary something but is one of the alternative forms of the Absolute considered as 'an un-unifiable triplicity' (p. 121) or 'as an alternation of truth, value and reality' (p. 143). He treats value as the absolute for feeling.

However, it does not seem to be proper to treat KCB as a transcendent metaphysician. Like Kant, he seems to deny the possibility of transcendent metaphysics. He says, 'I understand Kant's Idea of the Reason to be not only not knowledge, but to be not even thought in the literal sense' (p. 100). He compares his standpoint with positivism and says, 'Some present-day positivists,

who deny not only metaphysical knowing, but also metaphysical thinking, would not go so far as to deny logic itself to be a body of thought' (p. 100). We know that for the positivists logic is analytic knowledge and hence is literally or cognitively meaningful. They take 'logic to be pure thinking' (p. 100). But for KCB, 'Metaphysics, or more generally, philosophy including logic and epistemology, is not only not actual knowledge, but is not even literal thought' (p. 101).

KCB draws a sharp distinction between science and philosophy, though he regards both as forms of theoretic consciousness. He defines theoretic consciousness as 'the understanding of what can be spoken' (p. 102) or 'understanding of a speakable' (p. 101) and even identifies the four grades of theoretic consciousness with the four grades of speakables. Does this emphasis on speech, speaking, speakability, what can be spoken, in any way resemble the emphasis on language by the linguistic philosophers? Firstly, all forms of consciousness as involving the understanding of a speakable are sometimes called 'thought'. Of these only science or empirical thought, which deals with facts, is 'literal thought'. Secondly, fact can be spoken of as information and understood without reference to the spoken form. Speakability is a contingent character of the content of empirical thought.

The other three grades of consciousness—pure objective thought, pure subjective or spiritual thought and transcendental (not transcendent) thought—constitute philosophy. These three grades of thought which constitute philosophy are 'symbolistic thought which', says KCB, 'should not be called "thought" at all.' Further, speakability is a necessary character of the content of pure philosophic thought. 'In philosophy, the content that is spoken is not intelligible except as spoken,' (p. 103). Since the content of pure thought is not distinguishable from pure thought itself, it is 'sometimes regarded as a fiction, philosophy being rejected as a disease of speech' (p. 103). It is true that KCB does not treat philosophy as a disease of speech. But nor does he regard it as giving knowledge of some 'facts' or 'objects' which are independent of our thinking. Thus he seems to be more Kantian. For KCB, the contents of philosophic thought, though not fiction, are not also assertable as facts. Fictions are spoken beliefs of individual minds, facts are not only independent of individual minds but are also independent of thinking and speaking itself. The contents of philosophic thought are not independent of speaking, though they are independent of an individual mind. They seem to be like Kantian categories or forms of intuition, which are independent of individual minds, purely formal, *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experience.

In philosophy, we think of the contents of pure thought in the objective, subjective and transcendental attitudes. Thus we have philosophy of object (objectivity), and philosophy of subject or spirit (subjectivity). When we transcend the objective and subjective attitudes we have the absolute for thought or congnition—neither as object nor as subject—namely the truth, the absolute for will is freedom and the absolute for feeling is value.

Philosophy is transcendental and starts in reflective consciousness. 'Reflection is the awareness of a content as to a mode of consciousness' (p. 125). The central question for transcendental philosophy, therefore, seems to be, 'what is the relation between content and consciousness in all the three modes of consciousness?' According to KCB, it is wrong to assume that this relation is the same for all the three modes of consciousness. This mistake is committed both by the Idealists and Realists—the former holding that the content of consciousness is constituted by consciousness the latter maintaining that it is distinct, independent and unconstituted by the act of consciousness in all the three modes. According to KCB, however, the relation between content and consciousness is different for each mode of consciousness. He says,

> the content of knowing is perfectly distinct from knowing and is unconstituted by it. The content of willing is imperfectly distinct from willing though distinct in itself and is constituted by it. Content and consciousness make a unity in the case of feeling but not in the case of knowing and willing. There are thus three modes of distinction of content and consciousness of which we are reflectively conscious. (p. 130)

For understanding KCB's concept of value it is important to know the distinction between the relations of content and consciousness in the three modes of consciousness. These relations we know only in reflective consciousness. What is meant by reflective consciousness? KCB says,

> There are apparently two kinds of reflection on a conscious process: it is either the distinguishing of the conscious process from the content or distinguishing content from the process. The former is . . . psychological introspection in which attention is withdrawn from the content of the conscious process and fixed on the process itself which is thereby sterilised and turned into a ghostly temporal event. In the latter, it is the content of the conscious process that is attended to as in the unreflective stage. (p. 286)

It is the reflection in the latter sense that is philosophically illuminating.

When we attend to the content of a knowing act, we find it to be unconstituted by the act. 'The particular act of knowing discovers and does not construct the object known.' In the case of willing the content of willing, viz., an act or an end, 'is constituted by willing in the sense that apart from willing it is nothing at all'. It is not

> a future fact that is known in the willing. Willing is, indeed, some form of consciousness of the future but the future here, unlike the future that is said to be known, is not a fact but a contingency, not what will be but what would be if it were willed, not as already determined but what is being determined by the willing and as therefore apart from, the willing nothing at all. Yet the content of willing is distinct from willing as what is constituted is distinct from what constitutes it. (p. 129)

> In the case of feeling, the content as felt is indistinguishable from feeling. Unlike in the case of knowing, we do not discover the felt content, and unlike in the case of willing, it cannot be said to be constituted by feeling, it cannot be said to be nothing at all apart from feeling. What is perfectly distinct from another or what is constituted by another is definite in itself. But the content of feeling of which we are reflectively aware is not a definite content because it is imperfectly distinct from another and unconstituted by it. What we are definitely conscious of in reflective feeling is the imperfect distinction itself of content and consciousness, this indefinite as such being in fact their unity. (p. 130)

This analysis of the relation between content and consciousness in the three modes seems to be the key to the understanding of KCB's concept of value. That value is necessarily connected with feeling or that evaluation involves a feeling component is, I believe, accepted by all—even the cognitivists and intuitionists. But KCB makes a stronger claim that value can only be felt and cannot be turned into a known object. This is for two reasons. Firstly, to feel that something is only known, is to feel it 'as unfelt, neutral or indifferent. To the extent a known object appears flat and uninteresting, is it felt as merely known' (p. 288). If value is regarded as known, it would be felt as unfelt, flat and uninteresting. It would be a fact and would cease to be a value. Therefore, value to be a value must be a felt content. This argument shows why value cannot only be known but it does not show why it cannot both be known and felt. KCB's second argument is that no content can be both known and felt simultaneously because in that case it will at once be completely and incompletely distinct from consciousness. And this is not possible. Thus value can only be felt and not known.

Now, even if a philosopher admits that value can only be felt and not known, this admission does not make him a non-cognitivist. The traditional subjectivists, for example, hold that to regard an object as valuable is to have a favourable feeling of approval towards it. They treat value judgments of the form 'X is beautiful' to mean 'I approve of X or I have a specific feeling of joy with X'. Thus a value judgment, according to them, is only a description of the speaker's feeling or approval. It is a proposition capable of being verified. KCB, as a non-cognitivist, rejects this view. He holds not only that value is only felt but also that it is an expression of feeling and not 'an assertion or a description of it'.[4] Of course, this is not KCB's idiom. He expressed this distinction in terms of 'speaking' and 'speaking of' and holds that 'a value judgment speaks the reflective feeling and does not speak of it' (p. 288). The proper form of a value judgment, according to him, is exclamation. He says,

> In exclaiming, we speak our feeling and not speak of it, and when we command, we speak and do not speak of the command, what we thus speak may be however, spoken of in a symbolical or periphrastic way. When we speak our feeling in the way of exclamation, we may also artificially speak of it or express it as information in the form 'this is my feeling about the object' or 'the object has this value'. When we speak of a value in an object then we only indirectly express as information what we should speak exclamatorily in a form like 'how fine is the object'. (p. 288)

Thus, KCB's theory of value can be legitimately/properly regarded as a form of non-cognitivism, though its statement and the considerations which have led KCB to hold this view differ widely from those of the linguistic and the Kantian versions of it. We have already alluded to the linguistic version and the framework in which it was put forward. Let us now allude to the Kantian version. Firstly, Kant does not propound any general theory of value as KCB does but he writes separately on moral and aesthetic values. Secondly, Kant does not talk directly about reality, beauty or goodness but he discusses the formal and *a priori* conditions of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments in different spheres like those of science, mathematics, metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics. Thirdly, KCB's notion of the 'absolutes' for cognition, will and feeling is absent in Kant. Fourthly, in Kantian ethics we find 'no self-subsistent value which the will is to realize', says KCB, (I, p. 332) and in Kantian aesthetics, we may add, no self-subsistent beauty, a kind of eternal reality, a real eternal value of which the given object is only an expression or an embodiment or a kind of symbol, which is found in KCB. Lastly, while for Kant the question of the existence

of the object is totally irrelevant in aesthetic evaluation, KCB says, 'we speak of the value either of a known content or of a willed content. Value is itself a felt content and so the value of a felt content is but a higher grade of the value of a known or willed content' (p. 285). So the problem of value, in KCB, takes the form of the relation between a felt content and a known or willed content.

III

With this general outline of KCB's theory of value, let us now see how he analyses the value judgment of the form 'The object has this value' or 'This rose is beautiful' in which a known object is evaluated. It cannot be understood to mean that the object, the rose, is known and the value, the beauty, is felt because 'there can apparently be no relation between the incommensurable contents' (p. 285). Objects and their value are not contents of two separate acts of knowing and feeling. Nor can we eliminate knowing and say that the real judgment is 'We thus feel the object' or 'We feel the rose beautiful'. What does 'feel' as a transitive verb mean in reference to the object? It cannot mean simply 'We thus feel when we know the object'. Moreover, how can one speak of 'we' having the feeling in respect of the object? Whether we say 'value is a felt content' or 'we thus feel the object', it symbolizes the same mystery. How is any relation spoken of between the known object and the felt value?

What is at least meant literally by saying that 'The object has this value', according to KCB, is that there is a single consciousness of the two terms, the object and the value. However, knowing and feeling cannot make up one single consciousness and the object cannot be said to be the content of such a single consciousness because 'it would be at once known and felt; at once completely and incompletely distinct from the consciousness' (p. 285).

KCB's solution is that though 'the knowing and the feeling cannot make up one consciousness, (but) it may be that there is a single reflective consciousness of both' (p. 285). The reflective consciousness that he postulates to give an adequate account of the value judgment is not psychological introspection in which attention is fixed on the process of knowing and feeling but it is consciousness of the contents of these processes, viz. 'of the object and the value as known and felt respectively'. To understand the value judgment, 'the object and the value should be taken as the contents of reflective consciousness of knowing and feeling' (p. 286).

Is this consciousness reflective knowing or reflective feeling? Though the judgment form suggests that this consciousness is

reflective knowing, KCB contends, 'that the form is only artificial, if not symbolic and that the so-called value judgment is primarily reflective feeling . . . value cannot be said to be reflectively known though, like value, the object to which it is referred may be said to be reflectively felt' (p. 286).

Why does KCB not admit that the value is felt by the direct feeling of the object and why is he required to posit a higher reflective feeling to account for the value judgment? One consideration discussed above is to show that the object and the value constitute content of a single consciousness. Since on the primary level knowing and feeling do not make up one consciousness, they are regarded as content of single reflective consciousness. But in his article 'The Concept of Rasa', he provides another significant reason for positing higher feeling. He distinguishes between the direct feeling of an object and feeling of such a feeling. On the level of direct feeling of an object, the person feels no distinction between his feeling, say, of enjoyment and the object of enjoyment and hence unconsciously tends to project the joyous look or expression on the object and claims to see it there in the object. He rejects the contention that 'we seem to directly enjoy the beauty of an object and the beauty appears to be just as much seen there in the object as the terrible look of an object to one who feels terror'. 'Where', he asks, 'is the distinction between such enjoyment and an ordinary object-feeling like terror?' (I, p. 351)

A child enjoying his toy is an example of direct feeling of an object. The child is interested in the toy, feels fascinated by it, feels attracted to and glued down as it were, to the toy and thus unconsciously projects the joyous look on the toy. But consider another person, say, the child's mother, sympathizing with the child's enjoyment. The direct object of the feeling of sympathy is not the toy but the child's feeling. It is a feeling of feeling. The mother does not find or see joy in the toy but can imagine the child with whom she sympathises, seeing or finding it in the toy. Thus 'sympathy with joy is also joy but it is freer than the primary joy' (I, p. 350). By reason of this freedom feeling of feeling may be taken as constituting a higher level than the direct feeling of an object. But even the mother's sympathetic joy is rooted in her personal interest in the child. KCB invites us to imagine a third person who sympathizes with the mother's sympathy for the child's feeling of enjoyment. Since this third person has no personal interest either in the child or in the mother, his sympathetic joy is contemplative and impersonal. The aesthetic feeling is higher than the child's direct feeling of the object and even than the mother's sympathetic feeling rooted in personal interest in the child. It is detached both

from the particularity of the objective fact and from the particularity of personal subjective fact. He says, 'the artistic sentiment is not merely a feeling among feelings but the feeling par excellence, standing as it does on a new grade or level altogether as compared with other feelings' (I, p. 349).

It would be worthwhile to compare KCB's view with that of Kant. For both, the aesthetic appreciation must be contemplative and devoid of any personal interest. For Kant though such a feeling is different both from the feeling of the agreeable and the feeling of good, it is not necessarily higher, while for KCB it is necessarily higher than the agreeable. Secondly, for KCB, the aesthetic judgment is passed on the known object, for Kant it is not so.

According to Kant in aesthetic appreciation, the representation is not referred 'to the object by means of understanding with a view to cognition, but by means of imagination, we refer the representation to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure'.[5] This means that when one says that this rose is beautiful, it is irrelevant whether the rose-appearance is a real rose or a picture or merely an image in the mind. This rose is, therefore, not a known object in the sense that the representations are organized through concepts of understanding into an object.

Kant distinguishes the aesthetic pleasure from the feeling of agreeableness that brings in gratification and the feeling of good that brings in the notion of objective worth. 'The agreeable is what gratifies a man, the beautiful what simply pleases him, and the good what is esteemed (approved), i.e. that on which he sets an objective worth.[6] Since the other two delights—delights in the agreeable and the good—are coupled with interest, they are 'determined not merely by the representation of the object, but also by the represented bond of connexion between the subject and the real existence of the object. It is not merely the object but also its real existence that pleases. On the other hand, the judgment of taste is simply contemplative, i.e. it is a judgment which is indifferent as to the existence of an object and decides how its character stands with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.'[7]

Thus for Kant it is not on the object as known but only on object as felt that the aesthetic judgment is passed, while for KCB, it is on the known object that the aesthetic judgment is passed. Hence the problem how the known content and the felt content are related in a single consciousness. Kant does not face such a problem.

When KCB talks of value of a known object, he may have in his mind not only aesthetic evaluation but also moral and religious evaluations of the object as clean and sacred and he proposes to give a single theory for all these types of evaluation of known objects. He seems to suggest that what is relevant or important for a value

judgment is not transcending of practical interest (because value judgment is passed on known objects) but transcending of personal interest in the particularity of fact and treating the given object as only a kind of symbol embodying a real eternal value. He also suggests a gradation from direct feeling of an object to the sympathy with such feeling and a feeling of sympathy with sympathy and says, 'Aesthetic enjoyment thus stands on a level higher than ordinary sympathy which again constitutes a level higher than primary object feeling' (I p. 352).

Thus value judgment is not reflective knowing but reflective feeling.

> Valuation implies a feeling consciousness both of the felt content as such and of the known content as such. The known content does not cease to be known by being reflectively felt and the felt content . . . though not known, is endowed with a kind of objectivity by reflection. Both being objective in a sense to the same reflective feeling, they can be spoken of as though they were related in a judgment. (p. 287)

KCB explains how the felt content is objectivized in reflective feeling. Very often I know of another person's feeling on the evidence over and above the mere evidence of my feeling. 'But', says KCB,

> sometimes I am also aware without any such evidence that one must or should feel the way I feel. I am here implicitly aware in my feeling towards the object that it is not my feeling only; that the object would be so felt by anyone or what is the same thing that the felt content is somehow in the object.

When I take something to be beautiful, for example, I feel implicitly that anyone will find it so, as I believe, when I take it to be of the colour red. I do not say that it is red to me but only that it is red and so I say it is beautiful. If asked how I know it is beautiful to others, I would say it must or should be so and if it is falsified, as it well may be, I would doubt as I would doubt my senses.

> To believe unquestioningly without evidence that we feel in a certain way in respect of the object and to believe that the felt content is in the object are one and the same belief, neither being prior to the other. Here then the feeling that I reflectively feel is not taken as anyone's feeling in particular: it is unappropriated or impersonalized rather than universalized. The content of it also is consciously distinguished from it and taken to be on the level with the object to which it is referred. Thus the content of a reflective feeling as the feeling of the impersonal feeling of the same content is definitely objectivized through the mediation of impersonal feeling. (p. 287)

The known content and the felt content are both objective but not objective in the same sense. The known content is objective in the sense that it is capable of being spoken of without reference to the consciousness of it. But felt content is objective in the sense that it is a felt content of impersonalised feeling and not in the sense that it can be spoken of without reference to the feeling-consciousness. Therefore, value cannot be said to be a known content.

Moreover speakability of value is different from the speakability of a known content. To mark this distinction he distinguishes between 'speaking' and 'speaking of'. He says,

> We can speak of the known content and this value together as both objective to the reflective feeling. To speak of their relation would be really to speak the reflective feeling and not to speak of it. In exclaiming, we speak our feeling and not to speak of it and when we command, we speak and do not speak of the command (p. 288).

As pointed out earlier, KCB here anticipates the emotivist distinction between the 'assertion of feeling' and expression of feeling and the view that value judgment evinces, expresses emotion or feeling and does not describe it. However, two points must be noted here. According to KCB, (i) what is expressed in a value judgment is not the first level feeling but the reflective feeling, and (ii) the first-level feeling is impersonal feeling. The proper form of evaluation, therefore, is not 'the object is beautiful', but 'how beautiful is the object'. He says that we express ourselves in this way, 'to mark the objectivity of the feeling-content induced by the impersonalization of the feeling to indicate in fact that it is not arbitrarily that we thus evaluate the object' (p. 288).

In evaluating a known object, the known object is subjectivized and the felt content is objectivized. To know an object is not to feel it as unfelt. But to feel that something is merely known is to feel it as unfelt, neutral or indifferent. 'To the extent a known object appears flat and uninteresting it is felt as merely known' (p. 288). 'In valuation, we are feelingly aware of the known object as unfelt even when the object is being felt.' In evaluating an object, its neutral or unfelt character is distinguished from its felt character or value. The object is understood as having the former and as not really having the latter. 'Value is thus referred to the object, which is understood as not really having it and may in this sense be called a floating or free adjective of the object' (p. 289).

The value of a known object is a content felt to be one with the object and the object is felt as other than the felt content. That is, unless the known object is felt as unfelt at the time when we feel towards it, the felt content cannot be called value. The objectivity of value consists in feeling oneness of the felt content with the object and this felt content is the content of an impersonalised feeling in respect of the object. 'The reflective feeling of the value as felt and the object as known is the feeling of the objectivity of value and of the unfelt character of the object' (p. 289). To evaluate an object is to become feelingly aware of it. And in this awareness, the object is known to have a certain character independently of how we feel it and is felt to have a certain character in an impersonalized feeling. The latter is contrasted by KCB with the former by calling it a free or floating adjective.

Though KCB draws a distinction between an adjective like red and an adjective like beautiful and calls the latter a floating adjective he raises the question whether value is an adjective at all. He explains the distinction between substantive and adjective by saying 'the substantive is one with adjective which is however distinct from it' (p. 289). Red colour is not a flower but flower is a red colour. Applying this criterion he says, 'value is not felt as other than the known object but the known object is felt as other than the value. So properly speaking value is no adjective of the object' (p. 289).

However, KCB is aware that there is a general intellectual prejudice that though value is not an adjective it is in some sense subordinate to the object because 'while the object does not imply value, value has necessarily to be referred to the object' (p. 290). He thinks that unless we get rid of this notion of subordination, this necessary reference of value to object, value as such will not be understood. He proposes to show by critical examination of valuation that not only is value judgment no judgment (amounting to knowledge) but also that value should be independent of valuation.

According to KCB, value judgment 'is primarily an exclamation somehow toned down into information' (p. 290). 'An exclamation disguised as information' (p. 289). Because 'we cannot primarily speak of value, that we really speak the value and then artificially speak of it. Thus the speakability of value as information is in the last resort a necessary illusion like the speakability of the unspeakable' (p. 291). Therefore value judgment is not informative, is not a judgment claiming to give knowledge. It is an exclamation. This view of KCB appears to be similar to the emotivist view. Ayer says, 'Such aesthetic words as "beautiful" and "hideous" are employed, as ethical words are employed, not to make statements of fact but simply to express certain feelings and evoke a certain response.'[8] However, KCB's understanding of exclamation is quite

different from that of, say, A.J. Ayer. While Ayer compares value judgments as exclamations and expressions of feelings with cry of pain and as expressing no genuine proposition at all,[9] for KCB, 'Exclamatory speech is like an impersonal proposition: the predicate is all and the subject seems to be nowhere' (p. 290). Let me put KCB's view in his own words:

> A person exclaims 'grand' and so he can say 'lightning' or 'rains'. There is a difference however, for when the exclamation 'grand' is completed into a sentence, we should say 'how grand is this scene' and 'not this scene is grand', the predicate still retaining the principal position. This indicates the relation between object and its value: the known content here is subordinate to the felt content. 'How grand is this scene' means that grandeur—the value, is expressed or embodied in the scene. In the platonic way we may say, the scene partakes of grandeur as the individual partakes of the Idea. Expression appears to be the least mystical description of the relation. Value is expressed in the object as a feeling is expressed in the face. Both the terms here—object and value—are substantive and both are interesting though we are interested in the object because of the feeling or value embodied in it and not in the latter because of the former. It may be, the object *as expressive* is as interesting as the value expressed, but the object *as merely known* is in any case subordinate in the so-called value judgment, to the value expressed in it. Value, we said, is not appreciated as such till the object to which it is referred is felt as known or unfelt or neutral. When the known object is so felt, it is felt to be subordinate to the value, being so felt because of the value. The neutral character of the object is as we pointed out within the content of the feeling that is felt. (p. 290)

KCB illustrates the difference between three levels of feelings in the following way. A person says informatively, 'It is a cool breeze'. This expresses the felt character of the breeze and not the subjective feeling of it. The person may exclaim, 'How cool is the breeze'. This expresses the feeling. But the person may say 'How I enjoy the cool breeze'. This expresses the feeling of feeling. He says,

> To speak exclamatorily of the cool breeze is to express reflective feeling but to speak exclamatorily again of the reflective feeling is to express feeling of a higher grade. The value of an object gets freed as a substantive from the object of which it appears as an adjective and acquires the status of an absolute only in this feeling beyond reflective feeling. (p. 291)

KCB distinguishes between relative and absolute value and thinks that the word value should properly be confined to the absolute value. He says , 'value is nothing if not absolute' (p. 292). This, according to him, is

> a stage of feeling beyond reflective feeling, an absolute or transcendental feeling the expression of which is not only no information but not even a speakable valuation. It is a pure exclamation in which we do not speak of anything or rather in which we symbolically speak of the unspeakable as such. (p. 292)

IV

The main difference between valuation of a willed content and that of a known content is that the latter is properly expressed as exclamation, while 'the former is an exclamation that is at the same time an imperative' (p. 292).

> To say that an act willed is good is a periphrasis for 'how good is this act', which again means 'how we should all act thus'. To say 'how we should act thus' is not simply to utter an imperative but is to wonder at this universal or impersonal obligatoriness, to feel the sacredness of the *ought.* (p. 292)

KCB distinguishes moral evaluation of a willed act from (i) moral or spiritual evaluation of a known object as clean or sacred; (ii) admiration for a willed act as noble or magnificent, this being a sort of aesthetic valuation of the look of the act; and from (iii) the consciousness of right or wrong willing in the willing itself, which is not the valuation at all (pp. 292–93). 'Moral valuation proper would be the valuation of the act—not as it looks but as the inner willing that is finished—as good or evil.' (p. 292)

As we have seen earlier a willed act, i.e. the content of willing is distinct from willing and has an empirical embodiment which however apart from the willing is not even a known content. KCB takes an example of a mere bodily act, namely an acrobatic feat. An acrobatic feat is like an object and is valuated almost wholly in the aesthetic way. Yet the fact that it is willed makes some difference. 'It is not merely the outward look of the act that is judged' but it is the look as expressing the success of the psychic effort, the willing, put forth that has value. Let us take a bodily act of moving a limb. The movement of the limb is not something given to and passively observed by consciousness as I perceive movement of some physical object or even of someone else's body. It is a motor experience of doing something, of moving the limb or having it moved. It is not given to willing but is constituted by and the embodiment of willing.

'The embodiment then of a willing is no content at all apart from the willing' (p. 294) and yet is distinct from the willing.

KCB says,

> To say that the acrobatic feat is splendid is to say that the will is wonderfully efficient though the will is judged because of its triumphant expression in the body.
>
> At a higher stage we speak of a splendid act of bravery. Here the psychic act is judged more or less aesthetically; though its value consists in the measure of freedom of willing behind it which however would not be judged as splendid but for its expression in the psychic act.
>
> Everywhere then the judgment on an embodied willing is aesthetic relatively to the judgment on the ideal willing that determines it though the value depends on or involves the moral of the ideal willing. (p. 294)
>
> Thus an acrobatic feat is judged aesthetically as an embodiment of the psychic act of bravery, which is judged as an embodiment of free willing. This willing too is judged good or evil only as it is taken to have some kind of being. It has to be understood at least as *this* act in order to be valued even morally. (p. 294)

Valuation ranges from the pure aesthetic valuation of an object to the moral valuation of an act considered simply as the finished being of free willing without any further empirical determination. Beauty, we have seen, has an objective, though not a known, being, the objectivity being mediated through an impersonal feeling. Moral value is objective in the sense of being mediated through an impersonal willing, goodness consists in being eternally or impersonally willed 'But it is not objective being but objective negation or freedom that is eternally willed' (p. 295). Negation is information when a predicate is denied of the subject which is not itself denied at least as a possible existent. But when it is so denied, there is nothing about which the information is given. Now, to say that an act is good is to say that it is free. This is to deny the bare temporal or empirical being of the act. Such a free act is real beyond all empiricality; that is real as constituted by the free willing, without willing it is nothing.

Aesthetic evaluation is no judgment because the subject of the judgment, i.e. the object valued, is subordinate to the predicate 'beauty', which appears at least as a floating character and is really no adjective but a substantive that is expressed in the substantive subject. In moral valuation the subject of the judgment, i.e. the act valuated, is considered as a being in the sense simply of being finished or having a bare position in time. Its value, i.e. goodness is

only felt freedom. Thus moral evaluation or judgment on the one hand turns the process of willing into a finished act with bare position in time—this is the subject of moral valuation, i.e. the act evaluated, on the other hand, by calling it good that is free, it negates the objectivity of the subject, because freedom being the essence of the act, the act is nothing apart from willing. Thus the reason why moral valuation is denied to be a judgment is different from that of denying aesthetic evaluation to be judgment 'Moral valuation is not judgment because it is not even literal information.' (p. 295)

To say that an act of willing is evil is to say that it is not freely willed; it is not an embodiment of willing but there was an illusion of willing. The illusion of willing consists in subjectively feeling that one is freely acting when one is really being dragged by some emotion or passion or interest or self motive. Even in good willing there is the consciousness of not having sufficiently exercised one's freedom. 'To exercise freedom is always to work against the downward current—*pāpavahā Nādi*—which however, is still will or freedom and not nature, the freedom to be not free' (p. 296). Moral self-approbation is the consciousness of having exercised our freedom, which could have been however further exercised, while moral self-condemnation is the feeling of not having exercised our freedom against this downward current.

KCB's account of moral judgment differs from that of Kant and also from the linguistic version of non-cognitivism. Moral judgments as prescriptions or categorical imperatives like, 'Promises ought to be kept' are not judgments because they are not indicative sentences. But judgments asserting an action to be good are judgments because they assert that it fulfils the moral law or the ought to will or that it is such as ought to exist as an object. 'Neither ought-to-will nor ought to be', says KCB, 'is a value; value is nothing if not at least partially actualized in an object, while ought means what completely transcends the actual' (p. 332). KCB, therefore, says, 'In Kantian ethics at any rate, there is no moral value, for the "good" means nothing apart from 'ought to will', no self-subsistent value which the will is to realize' (p. 332). Moral judgments as Kant treats them in his second critique are not value judgments proper. For KCB moral judgments are passed on acts conceived as embodiment of willing. Kant does not at least explicitly treat act as an embodiment of willing.

Though KCB's analysis of moral judgments share in common with the linguistic version of non-cognitivism, the idea that moral judgments are not only expressions of feeling but they also involve imperative, it differs from the latter in raising questions about the relation between content of will and will, in holding that an act is an

embodiment of willing, in holding a different conception of freedom of will and so on.

Thus KCB seems to reject the cognitivist theory of value judgments—both naturalist and non-naturalist or intuitionist—that value can be a known content. His non-cognitivist version differs from the linguistic version of non-cognitivism in regarding value judgments as exclamation in which the subject is subordinated to the value predicate and is regarded as an embodiment either of eternal real beauty—the absolute for feeling, or freedom—the absolute for will. He has been able to transcend the national and geographical boundaries in philosophy and has been able to make a genuine contribution to the theory of value which cannot be dubbed as either Indian or western, classical/traditional or modern, but one which has a genuine universal appeal.

Notes

1. The writings of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya referred to in this article are from his *Studies in Philosophy*, Vols. I and II, edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1956—especially Vol. I, Chapter 7, 'The Concept of Rasa'; Vol. II, Chapter 2, 'The Concept of Philosophy'; Vol. II, Chapter 3, 'The Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative Form'; Vol. II, Chapter 13, 'The Concept of Value'; Vol. II, Chapter 4, Section VI, 'Judgements of fact, value and ought to be'. Page numbers given in brackets, when given without volume numbers, refer to pages from Vol. II.
2. K.C. Bhattacharyya's 'The Concept of Value' and 'The Concept of the Absolute and Its Alternative Forms', were published in 1934, 'The Concept of Philosophy' in 1936. A.J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* was published in 1936 and C.L. Stevenson's article 'The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms' was published in *Mind* in 1937.
3. J.L. Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*, Pelican, 1986, pp. 20–25.
4. A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, Victor Gollancz, London, 1964, p. 109.
5. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgment*, translated by J.C. Meredith, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 41.
6. Ibid., p. 49.
7. Ibid., p. 48.
8. A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, op.cit., p. 113.
9. Ibid., p. 109.

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[According to the editor of the above volumes, 'These *Studies in Philosophy* represent all the published and only a few unpublished philosophical writings of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya. There remains over an immense mass of manuscripts which will, perhaps, remain unpublished for all time to come'.·

The two volumes bound in one have been published by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi in 1983, with a preface by Kalidas Bhattacharyya.]

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'Artistic Enjoyment'—This unpublished essay, written in 1925, came out in *K.C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume,* Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, 1958. Not included in *Studies in Philosophy,* vols. 1 and 2, referred to above.

'The Beautiful and the Ugly'— This unpublished essay written in 1925, came out in the *Memorial Volume* of 1958. Not included in *Studies in Philosophy,* vols. 1 and 2.

[The above two articles were later combined by Bhattacharyya into one article entitled 'The Concept of Rasa' which too remained unpublished during Bhattacharyya's lifetime but was later included in *Studies in Philosophy,* vol. 1, edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1956.]

'Neo-Hegelian Conception of the Individual Self' in *Philosophica,* Calcutta, 1975. This article was read by the author to the

Calcutta Philosophical Society in 1919. It is not included in *Studies in Philosophy* above.

'Swaraj in Ideas', *Visva-Bharati Quarterly*, vol. 20, 1954, pp. 103–14. This was Bhattacharyya's address to the students of Hooghly College, Hooghly, West Bengal of which he was Principal during 1928–30.

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Notes and Queries

Is *mokṣa sānta* or *ananta*?
MAHĀVĪRA'S ANSWER TO THE QUESTION

[With this issue, we are starting a new section entitled *Notes and Queries* in the *JICPR.* Most students of the subject have always some problems with what they read, or will like something to be clarified about which they are in doubt as to whether what they understand is correct or not. The section will provide a forum for all such queries and it is hoped that eminent scholars of the subject will help in elucidating and clarifying the issues so raised. Readers are invited to take advantage of this new forum in the *JICPR.*—Editor]

Muni Śrī Nagarāja Jī in his monumental work entitled *Āgama Aur Tripiṭaka* reports an incident where Mahāvīra is supposed to answer the question whether *mokṣa* or liberation has also an end or is endless. The answer is tantalizing in the extreme, as it says that from the viewpoint of substantiality and spatiality, it has an end, while from the point of view of temporarility and existence, it has no end. Furthermore, the answer gives the exact extent of the space which *mokṣa* is supposed to occupy. This would make *mokṣa* spatial in character and hence as, necessarily, having parts of itself and divisible in nature, if space is regarded as necessarily so. Also, as *mokṣa* is being considered from the viewpoint of being a substance which occupies space and time and has states of itself (if the term '*bhāva*' is interpreted in this sense), then it would be an object like any other object.

Moreover, as the same approach is adopted in answering other questions which have been troubling Skandaka for a long time, it will follow that all entities have to be understood in terms of *dravya, kṣetra, kāla* and *bhāva* and there can be no entities which can be conceived independently of any of these or all of them together. It will also be interesting to know if there are any other entities which have the same characteristics as *mokṣa* and if so, how is it distinguished from them.

The exact statement as given in Muni Śrī Nagarāja Jī's book is the following:

Mahāvīra—Oh Skandaka, you also asked yourself if *mokṣa* has also an end or not. This question too will have to be considered from the point of view of *dravya* (substance), *kṣetra* (area or space), *kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (being or existence). From the point of view of *dravya, mokṣa* is one and it has an end. From the point of view of *kṣetra,* it has a length and breadth[1] of forty-five lakh *yojanas* and its

paridhi or total area is a little more than one crore, forty-two lakh, thirty thousand and two hundred and forty-nine *yojanas*, and it has an end. From the point of view of time, it cannot be said that there *was* a time when there *was* no *mokṣa*, or that there *is* a time when there *is* no *mokṣa* or that there *will* be a time when there *will* be no *mokṣa*. From the point of *bhāva* also, *mokṣa* has no end. And so *moksa* has an end from the point of view of *dravya* and *kṣetra*, but has no end from the point of view of *kāla* and *bhāva*.[2] (English translation of original Hindi version which is based, according to the author himself, on Bhagavatī Śa. 2 ua. 1)[3]

The way Mahāvīra is supposed to present the temporal perspective on *mokṣā* would imply that it is *nityasiddha* and hence cannot be an object of *sādhnā*. Nor can it be not available to anybody in principle. Both these implications seem to go against the positions which are usually ascribed to Jain thinkers by most people who have written on the subject.

The following issues that arise in this connection, therefore, need to be clarified:

1. What is the authority of the text in the Jain canon on the basis of which this statement is attributed to Mahāvīra in the book by Śrī Nagarāja Jī?
2. Is this the generally accepted position of Jain thinkers on the subject?
3. Is *mokṣa* and *sarvajñatā* of the *kevalin* the same? If so, will the *sarvajñatā* also be limited by the *kṣetra*, as *mokṣa* is said to be by Mahāvīra in this quotation?
4. Can the *kṣetra* be larger than the amount mentioned by Mahāvīra in the context of *mokṣa*? If so, is it finite or infinite?
5. What is the difference between the *paridhi* and the *āyāma-viṣkaṃbha* mentioned in the quotation?
6. What is meant by saying that there was never a time when there was *no mokṣa*, as is asserted in the statement?
7. Does the statement imply that, according to the Jain theory, there are no entities which are non-spatio-temporal in nature? If so, how would they account for the spatial character of, say numbers or reason?

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The exact word used is '*āyāma-viskaṃbha*'. I am not sure how it should be translated. Or, how it should be distinguished from *paridhi* which is mentioned later, and how the two are related.
2. Muni Śrī Nagarāja Jī, *Āgama Aur Tripiṭaka* (Hindi), New Delhi, Concept Publishing Company, second revised edition, 1987, p. 189.
3. Ibid. See footnote on p. 190.

Book Reviews

Kathleen Lennon: *Explaining Human Action*, La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, 1990, 176 pp., price not mentioned.

A central issue haunting the recent philosophy of mind and action-theory is the role of beliefs, wants, desires and intentions in the description and explanation of human actions. The on-going persistent, but inconclusive, debates concerning the aims and methods of understanding and explanation of human actions have revealed the limitations of divergent claims and counterclaims over this issue. When the various protagonists find that the competing interpretive, teleological and causal models of explanation are too simple for coming to terms with the enigmatic human condition; instead of rejecting them or going beyond them, it seems more convenient to make these models further complicated. Sometimes the discussion seems to reach a point where the unresolved old issues are presented in a new guise to provide an account of human actions compatible with the author's preferred position.

Kathleen Lennon's *Explaining Human Action* is written with the assumption that reason-giving explanations 'provide a model of understanding which is fundamental to both our view of ourselves and our view of others. . . . To reject such a model of understanding ourselves seems scarcely intelligible, indeed self-defeating' (Preface, p. 11). Lennon contends that in viewing ourselves as rational, purposive creatures, we ascribe ourselves intentional states and explain our actions by giving reasons for them. Lennon rejects the view that our everyday descriptions and explanations of human actions need to be 'replaced by a genuinely scientific account'. She tries to resist such a suggestion as she holds that 'the commonsense psychology reflected in such explanations has the status of a causal explanatory theory'.

Lennon's causalist account of explanations of human actions assumes that action consists in behaviour which is caused by appropriate intentional states such as beliefs, desires and intentions. In the first chapter, 'Reason-giving Explanations', Lennon distinguishes between 'intentional action' and 'involuntary reflex movements'. She also contends that explanations of bodily movements do not differ from those scientific explanations which are offered for the other natural phenomena. Such behaviour, explicable by reference to antecedent causes, is 'governed by some scientific law valid for all relevantly similar sequences'. What distinguishes intentional actions from mere behaviour is that the quest for making sense of them takes a different form. In our attempts to understand human actions, we are seeking to

understand the meaning or purpose of the activity 'from the agent's point of view'. This position is reiterated by Lennon in the third chapter also: 'What distinguishes intentional acts from mere bodily behaviour is their susceptibility to a kind of explanation—explanation in terms of the agent's intentional states' (p. 60). She claims that her 'primary concern' is to adopt an 'explanatory framework' which reconciles the conflicting requirements that (i) 'we explain our behaviour in a way that reflects the meaning we ourselves attach to it', and (ii) 'if we are engaged in science we must search for causal regularities' (pp. 13–14).

Lennon's arguments for the claim that reason-giving explanations are a sub-species of causal explanations are based on an acceptance of Donald Davidson's well-known account of reasons as causes of actions (pp. 17–30). She contends that although intentional explanations exhibit the reasonableness of an agent's activities in the light of his or her beliefs and desires, their explanatory force lies in the agent's reasons being causes of his or her behaviour. However, she concedes that the reason-giving link is not a purely descriptive one. 'Giving reasons is a *justificatory* and *explanatory* activity' (p. 33). But the reader is soon assured that 'the normative nature of reason-giving links is not such as to render them less factual. It is a matter of fact whether or not reason-giving links hold between certain sets of intentional states' (p. 34).

In the context of the distinction between justificatory and explanatory reasons, it would be relevant to recall that Davidson had used the distinction to defend the assimilation of 'reasons for action' in the category of 'causes of action'. The distinction between explanatory and justificatory reasons was drawn on the ground that to give a good reason for an action is to justify the action but to give the agent's real reason is to explain the action. Thus, actually operative reasons are explanatory reasons. Emphasising the relevance and significance of explanatory reasons as distinct from justificatory reasons, Davidson had claimed that actions are to be explained in terms of a pro-attitude (a want or a desire) in respect of some object, combined with the set of beliefs that the action to be explained was necessary for the fulfilment of the want or desire. Davidson had argued that the intentional states, constituted by beliefs, wants and desires, preceding the action, could be regarded as the cause of action.

In his subsequent writings, Davidson had expressed his doubts about the possibility of an adequate account of intentional actions by providing sufficient event-causal conditions. These doubts acquire additional significance in the light of the well-known criticism against Davidson that his analysis had neither foreclosed the plausibility of a non-casual account of human factions nor provided a

complete causal account. Lennon does not pursue these issues any further except characterising the limits of Davidson's account as a 'minimal causal account'. She points out that Davidson's account of reason-giving explanation accepts:

(a) that reason-giving intentional states cause action;
(b) that causal claims require the support of general laws; but which rejects;
(c) that the generalisation linking intentional states and intentional acts have the status of causal laws. (p. 49)

Lennon contends that Davidson's account rests on a distinction between two different kinds of causal connectives:

(i) Cause' as an extensional relation which holds between events irrespective of how they are described; and
(ii) 'causally explains' as explanatory statements reflecting the kinds linked by causal laws governing the sequence concerned.

On the basis of this distinction, it is claimed that, 'For Davidson, the intentional states which the agent has which provide the reasons for acting *cause*, but do not *causally explain*, her action' (p. 49). To support his account of causal relations between reasons and actions, Davidson had expounded a version of physicalism which he had characterised as anomalous monism. In this version, it was argued that every particular mental event is contingently identical with some physical event or the other. However, it was denied that there are any laws connecting mental event-types with physical event-types. Lennon emphasises that Davidson's thesis requires an ontology of token-states as 'particulars' each one of which may be described by means of many non-synonymous sentences. Consequently, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to provide an account of identity-conditions of such particulars.

Emphasising the limits of Davidson's 'minimal causal account', Lennon moves away in search of some promising way to 'defend a causal explanatory view of intentional kinds and to be a materialist without accepting the reduction of intentional kinds or laws to physical ones' (p. 105). She suggests that the relation of supervenience could provide a way out. She hopes that if the distinctions, proposed by her, between supervenience and reduction, supervenience and causality, are accepted; it would be possible to 'utilise the notion of supervenience to articulate a materialism compatible with the anti-reductionist arguments which establish that mental or intentional cannot be reduced to physical kinds'. It is further claimed that materialism, characterised in terms of supervenience of the intentional causal connections over physical

causal connections, requires neither type-type nor token-token identity theories.

In proposing a modest materialism, Lennon holds that

> if we wish to retain our intentional theories we need an account of the relation between the psychological and physical antecedents of actions, which ensures that our intentional explanations are *vindicated*, not replaced. . . . The reason we look for vindication rather than replacement is that our psychological explanatory claims are central to what we take to be distinctive of us as persons and govern all our everyday interactions with one another. (pp. 129–130)

The last three chapters of the book are devoted to this end. But in her attempt to achieve this goal, instead of offering clear and independent arguments in defence of her claims, Lennon often refers the reader to the positions taken by other philosophers. There are several references to the recent writings of Stephan Stich, Patricia and Paul Churchland, G. Harman, H. Field, J. McDowell, B. Loar and H. Putnam, in Chapter six; and T. Burge, J. Fodor, C. McGinn, P. Petit and S. Stich in Chapter seven. Writings of these philosophers are referred to with a view to acknowledge their relevance and significance in the ongoing controversies relating to the analysis of intentional terms, intentional kinds, intentional contents and intentional descriptions from the competing perspectives such as holism, individualism, realism and anti-realism. However, a rather sketchy and brief discussion of these writers tends to further complicate rather than clarify the issues.

It would not be possible for me to take up all the issues discussed by Lennon for a detailed consideration. But I do wish to share my reservations and differences. Lennon's analysis and defence of 'our everyday descriptions and explanations' of actions in purposive, intentionalist, reason-giving idiom becomes unnecessarily restricted due to her implicit but exclusive concern with 'agent's successful and well adapted interactions'. A careful look at the exigencies of the human condition is always helpful to remind ourselves that in pursuit of our diverse goals, we achieve not only successes but also face failures. We have to live not only with bitter disappointments but also accept pleasant surprises. Any account of human actions which ignores the unforeseen or unanticipated, foreseen but unintended consequences of actions tends to forget that as finite, imperfect beings, we are not as rational as we may aspire to be in our endeavour to follow the normative ideal of rationality.

The debates regarding the appropriateness of assimilation of reasons into the realm of causes are conducted with the stereotyped illustrations taken from normal adult activities generally involving

bodily movements. Unfortunately, in most of the philosophical discussions, we do not care to pause and look at the role of learning and teaching, training and education in the acquisition and improvement of various skills which are so central to our diverse activities. As philosophers, we often tend to forget that in learning our language, we learn to use the concepts in a social background constituted by practices, norms, institutions and roles. We also forget that making mistakes is central to learning which can never come to an end except as a manifestation of a refusal or an incapacity to learn. Learning a language enables us to ascribe emotions, wants, desires, intentions and motives to our fellow human beings and to ourselves. These ascriptions are intimately linked with our judgments and evaluation of our own activities as well as those of others. In seeking and giving reasons for actions, we are concerned not only with sharing information about our plans and goals, beliefs and desires but also about the appropriateness or inappropriateness, correctness or incorrectness, rightness or wrongness of our activities. Learning to perform certain kinds of actions involves learning the normative principles of their appraisal. Any pursuit of excellence involves a willingness to learn to do things well. For this, one needs to learn the normative criteria with the help of which it becomes possible to distinguish between correct and incorrect, perfect and imperfect ways of doing things. These criteria are independent of any particular individual's beliefs, wants and desires.

The normative criteria of appraisal of actions are not something private or internal to isolated individuals. These are learnt, applied and further improved upon with the support and cooperation of other fellow human beings. No infant can learn a language on his own nor can he acquire any other skills without the help and care of the adults around him. If we close our eyes to these diverse steps by which it becomes possible for us to move from the domain of mere behaviour to paradigmatic cases of human actions, we are doomed to remain perplexed by the intractable riddles concerning the difference between 'actions done for reasons' and 'causally controlled behaviour'.

In any attempt to make sense of human actions, we cannot do without invoking the terminology of wants, desires, preferences, motives, intentions, decisions, commitments, evaluations, and so on. Neglect of the fact that many of our mentalistic ascriptions (such as being jealous, ambitious, greedy, caring, considerate, contemptuous, obedient, etc.) make sense only within relational situations in broader social contexts often results in the reification of the language of human action by postulating an inner world of mental events, processes and states. This mystifying reification lies at the root of a misplaced search for a causal theory or explanatory account

of some mysterious inner lives. We gain an understanding of our own deeds and those of our fellow beings not merely by identifying physical causes or social conventions, but by carefully investigating, describing imagining and evaluating the facts and possibilities, categories and criteria that not only constitute but also guide our ways of living, thinking and acting.

Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, and Panjab University, Chandigarh SATYA P. GAUTAM

Satyapal Gautam: *Samāja Darśana* (in Hindi), Haryana Sahitya Akademi, Chandigarh, 1991, 164 pp., Rs. 40.

Samāja Darśana is an introductory essay concerned with the various philosophical issues relating to the nature and dynamics of society, addressed mainly to the lay reader but may also interest the specialist. The style of presentation is a welcome departure from the usual text-book writings which merely list the various views on the various problems and fail to engage the reader in a reflective process.

Gautam remarks that it is difficult to draw a sharp line between social sciences and social philosophy. This becomes clear when the distinction between natural and social phenomena, the disciplines concerned with them, is kept in view. Social facts are not just simple facts waiting to be recorded and measured. They involve interpretative and normative elements. The author points out that though it is possible to transgress social laws it is not possible to violate natural laws. The social scientist finds himself inevitably confronted with those aspects of social phenomena also which, in a more exact sense, would be better placed in the domain of philosophy, such as, social change, social progress, ideal social structures and so on. Philosophy of society is sometimes distinguished from the philosophy of social sciences, the latter being concerned with the problem relating to objectives, methods of social sciences while the former having for its subject matter problems relating to the existence and ideal of society, mutual relation between individual and society. But this distinction, the writer tells us, does not mean that the two domains have no mutual bearing.

The author believes that a philosophical enquiry into the nature of society cannot be carried on without taking into account the concrete human situation which endows the general and abstract notions relating to social phenomena with semantic substance. The book would have a greater interest for the Indian student as the

problems relating to society are presented by having the contemporary Indian situation in the background. The orientation of Indian constitution as constituting the values of equality, liberty and secularism besides, of course, the political and social justice, freedom of expression and worship forms the point of departure for the enquiry. For the reviewer, this strategy has led to an unbalanced treatment of social content *vis-à-vis* the political content and has prevented the author from giving sufficient attention to social institutions, language, culture, to name a few.

An interesting point to be noted is the mention and discussion of the phenomenon wherein the desire to maintain *status quo* or a structure favourable to a section in the society leads to positing of grounds for such structure in nature or divine design. This kind of reasoning prevents one to see that a social structure could be man-made, may be questionable and hence changeable. Allowing the *status quo* it militates against the demands of equality. Similarly freedom gets delimited because of the techno-economic constraints as determined by the intervention of so-called development politics (pp. 16–17). One of the crucial problems to which the author has drawn our attention is that of social control vs. freedom of the individual.

According to the author, social life depends more on cooperation, sympathy and tolerance than on constant opposition and competition (p. 147). A just society should provide conditions in which security, peace, welfare are taken care of and members are able to pursue their creative potentialities and interests freely without injury to others (p. 144). The possibility of such a society would depend on an ideal transcending space and time but which may render human dignity, equality, reason, needs of freedom and mutual cooperation concrete and actual (p. 154).

The reader placed in the contemporary situation would find the book absorbing and stimulating. The language of the book is lucid, elegant and has a natural flow. A glossary of Hindi terms with their English approximates is added to the book in the end. However, the absence of an index is inexcusable. It would have been better if the bibliography given, included some classical texts and works on social philosophy by Indian authors. Academies (publishing books in Hindi) must raise the standard of their production.

University of Rajasthan, Jaipur R.S. BHATNAGAR

Krantiprabha Pande, *Kant's Theory of Beautiful*, Bombay, Shalaka Prakashan, 1990, 191 pp., Rs. 75.00.

This book has seven chapters, four appendices, a bibliography and a Foreword by Prof. K. Saccidananda Murty. The *Introduction* gives a perspective and plan of the work. Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to Kant's statement of the analytic of beautiful and judgment. Differences and similarities of laws, principles, rules, and maxims are brought out in Chapter 4. Chapters 5 and 6 include a detailed discussion on the logic of universality and necessity of aesthetic judgment. The status of 'beautiful' is discussed in Chapter 7. Appendix 1 contains a biographical note on Kant; the next two appendices are—Waisman on rules, and Wittgenstein on rules, in that order. The last appendix is on Kant's notion of the sublime.

On Krantiprabha Pande's account, in a judgment of cognition, for example 'This rose is red', 'red' is a logical predicate, but in a judgment of taste like 'This rose is beautiful', 'beautiful' is not a logical predicate in the same sense in which 'red' is; for 'beautiful' is essentially an evaluative expression. She thus subscribes to a sharp distinction between the descriptive and the evaluative,—a distinction which is consistent with Kant's own account of the nature of aesthetic judgment. She also maintains that sentences of the form 'X is the case', 'X should do Y', 'X ought to do Y', 'X is good', and 'X is beautiful' are all of them quite distinct in their logical role. For instance, the sentence 'X is beautiful' expresses the speaker's attitude to X, while 'X is a red rose' describes a certain state of affairs or a fact.

In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant discusses at length the universality and necessity of aesthetic judgment. Krantiprabha Pande feels that Kant's account is not fully satisfactory. For, in her view, aesthetic judgment is neither descriptive as an empirical generalization is, nor is it of the nature of a law like the categorical imperative. She suggests that the universality and necessity of aesthetic judgment is best elucidated on the model of Aristotle's concept of singular propositions which he classifies as universal and affirmative. She opines that he regarded them as necessary also. Her choice of this model is consistent with her fundamental insight that an aesthetic judgment is essentially a singular proposition containing an evaluation. Thus, she explains that aesthetic universality and necessity are different from the universality and necessity that are to be found in other sciences' (p. 10).

On the question of how to find criteria of judging something as beautiful, she suggests that, on Kant's view, there are no specific criteria for beauty, nor can 'beautiful' be entirely defined in terms of form alone. From this she argues that when we say something is

beautiful or when we say art is beautiful, we must certainly attach some kind of purposelessness to it'. Thus, on Kant's view, says she, 'art has purposeless purpose. It follows from this that there would not be any logic of aesthetics (p. 10). I do not quite agree with Krantiprabha Pande's argument. But then she has made her point; and I think it is worth pursuing in further studies

In my opinion, Krantiprabha Pande's *Kant's Theory of Beautiful* is a good book; its careful study will lead to a deeper interest in the study of Kant's aesthetic theory. The book is a welcome addition to the world of Kantian scholarship.

University of Delhi VIJAYA BHARADWAJA

OBITUARY

Gaurinath Shastri: A Tribute

Professor Gaurinath Shastri was born on February 2, 1909 in Calcutta. He had a brilliant academic career having stood first with a first class in MA from the University of Calcutta in 1931, received the coveted Premchand Roychand Scholarship in 1935, and obtained D.Litt. from the University of Calcutta in 1952 and later on 'Shastri'.

Professor Shastri took over as principal of Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta where he worked for ten years (1957–67). He was also vice-chancellor of Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi (1967–70 and 1981–84); president, Asiatic Society, Calcutta (1978–79). He was a visiting professor in a number of universities, both in India and abroad.

Professor Shastri received many awards and titles including the 'Certificate of Honour' by the President of India in 1977 and D. Litt. (*honoris causa)* by the Jadavpur University in 1980.

As a university teacher and an exponent of the philosophical heritage of India, Professor Shastri founded a school of young scholars in India. He held a conspicuous position in the field of Indology by rejuvenating the semantic *sphoṭa* philosophy of Bhartṛhari, the grammarian-philosopher of ancient India. He devoted his life-time study mainly to the promotion of the semantic philosophy of Bhartṛhari, especially amongst modern scholars in philosophy, linguistics and Indology. Besides being a teacher and scholar-exponent of traditional Indian philosophy, Professor Shastri proved to be an able administrator of institutions of Sanskrit education and learning in modern India. As the principal of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta and the vice-chancellor of the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi, he promoted and reorganised the publication schemes of the two learned premier institutions. He himself edited some major Sanskrit works on Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and music in addition to writing treatises on the philosophy of Bhartṛhari. His original works are:

Philosophy of Word and Meaning (Calcutta, 1959); *A Study in Dialectics of Sphoṭa* (1937: Calcutta, 1980); *Concise History of Classical Sanskrit Literature* (Calcutta, 1974); *Saṁskṛta Sāhityer Itihās* (in Bengali, Calcutta, 1969); *Saṁskṛta Sāhitya kā itihās* (in Hindi, Varanasi, 1967); *The Triune Path: A Reading of the Bhagavadgītā*

(Varanasi, 1982); *Śabdārthamimaṃsa* (in Hindi, Varanasi); *The Philosophy of Bhartṛhari* (Delhi, 1991).

The classical Sanskrit texts critically edited by him are the following:

Kiraṇāvalī (with Bengali translation and commentary, Calcutta 1956–91); *Saṅgītadāmodaraḥ* (Calcutta, 1960); *Anumitermānasatvavicāra* (Calcutta,1959); *Tattvacintāmaṇi-mayūkhaḥ* (Calcutta, 1980); *Kāvyaprakāśaṭīkā of Paramānanda Cakravartī* (Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 2 Vols., 1976); *Abhijñānśākuntalam* (New Delhi, 1980); *Maṅgalavādaḥ* (with Professor Shastri's commentary 'Prabhā', Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1979); *Kiraṇāvalī* (with Hindi translation, Varanasi, 1980); *Kiraṇāvalīrahasyam* (Varanasi, 1980); *Nyāyakandalīdarpaṇam* (Varanasi, 1982); *Uṣārāgodayā* (Varanasi, 1979); *Tattvacintāmaṇi-Prāmāṇyavādaḥ* (with Professor Shastri's commentary 'Prabhā', Varanasi, 1983); *Muktivādaḥ* (Naimiṣāraṇya, 1982); *Nyāyamañjarī* (Vol. 3, Varanasi, 1984); *Sāhityamīmāṃsā of Maṅkhaka* (Varanasi, 1984).

Professor Shastri was a great humanist and had an unassuming nature in spite of being an authentic Brahmin. It would be appropriate to mention here the remarks made by Professor A.L. Basham:

> Always imperturbably cheerful and self-confident, he relaxed none of his traditional norms of Brahmanic behaviour throughout his trip, cooking all his own food, accepting nothing but fruit from the hands of the *mlecchas,* and yet treating those *mlecchas* with the same courtesy and affectionate respect as he showed to his *Kulin* friends back in Calcutta. I felt then that there could be no better advertisement for the ancient traditional culture of India, and I realized more than ever before the strength and dignity which the observance of Brahmanic rituals gave to man's character. I have never been formally taught by Gauri Babu. But I have learnt from his personal example to appreciate and understand classical Indian culture in a way that I would not have done otherwise.*

Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi BIKASH K. BHATTACHARYA

* *A Corpus of Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Professor Gaurinath Shastri, Calcutta:* Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1980, p. 414.

C.T. Krishnamachari

In the recent death of Dr C.T. Krishnamachari, former head of the Department of Philosophy at Madras Christian College (MCC) and a member of the British Society for Psychical Research, India has lost one of the most dedicated scholars and thinkers in the country.

Known widely in academic circles as Professor C.T.K. Chari, he died in his sleep on the night of January 5, 1993, at the age of 83. He leaves behind him his daughter and her family.

Professor Chari had to his credit contributions ranging from philosophy of science and parapsychology on the one hand to comparative religion and social and political philosophy on the other. One of his last concerns was to 'correlate the problems of philosophy of science with mysticism'.

After doing his F.A. at the Presidency College, Madras, Professor Chari joined MCC in 1928 for the BA (Honours) course in philosophy and studied under people like the late Revd Skinner and under the legendary Dr Alfred Hogg, the latter having been the teacher of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan too.

With a first rank at the Madras University, Dr Chari continued as a university research scholar working under Dr Hogg. After teaching at MCC for one year, Professor Chari went on a teaching assignment to the American College at Madurai in 1933. He came back to MCC in 1940, continued with his research and was awarded a Ph.D. degree by the Madras University in 1950. In 1957, Dr Chari became head of the prestigious philosophy department of MCC and in 1969 the University Grants Commission honoured him with a fellowship.

A remarkable teacher living true to the Socratic image of being a 'Gadfly', Dr Chari's two major areas of interest were philosophy of science and parapsychology. He wrote a lot on problems of 'spatial representations of time', in philosophy of science. He contributed a number of papers to international journals such as *Synthese, Methods, Methedes,* and *Language and Thought.* Dr Chari had also been a correspondent for the *Journal of Parapsychology* and the *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research.*

What was Dr Chari's philosophy? In a rare interview to the *Cogito,* the magazine of MCC's Philosophy Association in 1979, Dr Chari after his retirement, said: 'My philosophy? I have no faith in finished systems. Any system which alleges absoluteness absolves itself from responsible reasoning. A philosophy is fundamentally the product of an interaction between man and his era. One should be systematic and disciplined in conducting an enquiry, but should not systematize'.

Dr Chari firmly believed that as long as philosophy 'is attuned to the culture of the age and so long as it does not (not) contradict science, it is bound to make a tremendous impact on all facets of human life'. However, he was disappointed with the attitude of the majority of the twentieth-century Indian philosophers, whose 'entrenched conventionalism' only fostered a 'malignant attitude towards the scientific method'.

Observing that new questions arose as new problems confronted us, Dr Chari said in that interview that 'philosophy that is founded on understanding of an earlier epoch is a stagnation and at best an apology'. The 'characteristically Indian phenomenon' of emotional attachment to tradition had stultified creative philosophical thought, Dr Chari had then said, adding, 'Conservatism has been the bone of our progressive urges'. How prophetic it sounds in the contemporary context.

M.R. VENKATESH
A Former Student of
Madras Christian College, Madras

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