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Computers and the Philosophy of Mathematics

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Unlike the experimental sciences, mathematics has the distinction of being precise and infallible. Results in mathematics are not bound to vary with time or place as long as the basic assumptions are the same. Verification of an assertion even in millions of cases does not give it the status of a theorem unless it is proved analytically (that is, by valid arguments from the hypothesis of the assertion). However, are mathematicians always able to prove what they believe to be correct? (These beliefs are called conjectures.) The answer is 'no'. Sometimes they attempt for centuries without being able to establish the validity or otherwise of their belief. In some cases they prove their belief analytically after a long time. Disproving centuries-old conjectures by exhibiting counter-examples is also not rare in mathematics.

In modern times, mathematicians have started using computers in their attempts to settle their beliefs. But can such beliefs, settled affirmatively using computers, be called theorems in mathematics before analytical proofs are supplied? A research mathematician accepts an assertion as a theorem and builds his research on it only after going through its proof and verifying it for himself. Before accepting a computer-aided proof, he has to believe the calculations done by the computer or he has to do all those calculations himself and verify their correctness. The latter job he cannot complete in his lifetime and because of his training and suspicion in the reasoning adopted by everyone else, he will not be ready to believe the computer or the computer manufacturer. But can he neglect the fact that man landed on the earth after walking on the moon at the time arrived at by computer calculations, with only half-a-second difference? Is such accuracy not enough for our day-to-day activities? Is mathematics for a few thousand mathematicians or is it for crores and crores of others who are ready to believe the computers? How can we arrive at a scheme acceptable to all? These are the main questions facing the philosophy of mathematics now. Before discuss-

ing this problem further, let us see two instances where mathematicians have settled long-standing beliefs using computers.

FOUR COLOUR PROBLEM

While colouring the countries on a map, we generally use colour in such a way that adjacent countries get different colours. What is the minimum number of colours needed to accomplish such a colouring of an arbitrary map? For mathematical precision, we need two basic assumptions.

(i) The territory of each country is a contiguous piece.
(ii) Two countries are treated as adjacent only if they have a segment of their boundaries (not just a point of their boundaries) in common.



There are maps which cannot be coloured with three colours. Consider the situation given in the figure. The colours given to the four countries must be distinct as each of them is adjacent to all the others. By analytical methods one can prove even in high school classrooms that five colours are sufficient to colour any map using the concept of 'graphs'. The undecided case was for four colours. For about 100 years it was believed that four colours are sufficient for colouring any map. This was called 'four colour conjecture'. A large number of mathematicians tried to settle this conjecture. Finally in 1976, Appel, Haken and Koch of Illinois University in USA used sophisticated computers to verify several cases and declared that they have 'proved' the four colour conjecture.[1,2] If one wants to verify their proof, he has to run a sophisticated computer for about 1200 hours and must believe the computer. However, in the 15 years that have passed since then, only very few research papers in mathematics have called this a theorem and built their arguments on this result. There are mathematicians who feel that the computer verification has thwarted good research on this conjecture. Mathematicians in their attempt to settle the four colour conjecture have in fact done a lot of beautiful mathematics.

ORTHOGONAL LATIN SQUARES

An array with n rows and n columns such that each of the numbers 1, 2, 3, . . ., n occurs exactly once in each row and each column is called a *Latin square of order* n.

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 3 & 1 & 2 \end{bmatrix} \qquad B = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 3 & 1 & 2 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \qquad C = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\ 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 1 \\ 3 & 4 & 5 & 1 & 2 \\ 4 & 5 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 5 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 \end{bmatrix}$$

A and B are Latin squares of order 3 and C is a Latin square of order 5.

Two Latin squares are said to be *orthogonal* if 'no integer sits over an integer more than once when one of the Latin squares is placed over the other'. Latin squares A and B given above are orthogonal. If there exist n–1 orthogonal Latin squares of order n, we call them a *complete set of orthogonal Latin squares* (CSOL) of order n.

Euler, in 1782, conjectured that there exist no pair of orthogonal Latin squares of order $n \equiv 2 \pmod 4$. That is, for n = 6,10,14,18,22, ... After a gap of 118 years, in 1900, Tarry verified that Euler's conjecture is true for n = 6. Sixty years later in 1960, Bose, Parker and Shrikhande[3] proved that Euler's conjecture is false for every higher value of n. Bose and Shrikhande are Indians and Shrikhande is in Nagpur now.

On the positive side, we have a theorem stating that if $n = p^{\alpha}$ where p is a prime and α is a positive integer, then there exists a CSOL of order n, when n is at least 3. This means that there is a CSOL when

n = 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, . . .
3, 9, 27, 81, 243, . . .
5, 25, 125, 625, . . .
7, 49, 343, . . .
11, 121, 1331, . . .
13, 169, 2197, . . . (Step I)

Bruck and Ryser in 1947 proved[4] the following regarding integers $n \equiv 1$ or 2 (Mod 4), i.e. for integers of the form 2, 6, 10, 14, 18, . . . and 5. 9, 13, 17, 21, . . .

> If the square-free part of n contain at least one prime factor of the form 4r+3, then there does not exist a CSOL of order n.

Let us illustrate this theorem with the number 294. The largest square number dividing 294 is 49 (= 7 x 7). Dividing 294 with 49, we get quotient 6 which is the square-free part of 294. This square-free

part 6 has a factor 3 which is prime and is of the form 4r+3 for r = 0. Hence we can conclude that there is no CSOL of order 294. Similarly we can prove the non-existence of CSOL of orders 6, 14, 21, 22, 30, 33, . . . (Step II).

Thus establishing the existence or otherwise of a CSOL of a chosen order was a problem pursued by mathematicians for a long time. This problem is directly linked to the existence of projective planes. It has been proved that 'there exists a projective plane of order n if and only if there exists a CSOL of order n'.

Comparing steps I and II, we see that 10 is the first number for which the existence of a CSOL is undecided. So mathematicians started concentrating on this case. As a result, Lam, Thiel and Swiercz have recently verified,[5,6] using computers, that there does not exist a CSOL of order 10, i.e. there does not exist a projective plane of order 10. They have used the incidence matrix (rectangular array filled with 0s and 1s) of a projective plane for this verification. A projective plane of order 10 can be represented by its incidence matrix with 111 rows and 111 columns. The computer verification gets hold of every possible binary submatrix with 17 rows and 111 columns which can form part of the incidence matrix of the projective plane of order 10 and shows that it cannot be extended to the incidence matrix of a projective plane of order 10. Thus the incidence matrix of a projective plane of order 10 and hence the projective plane itself does not exist. Hence a CSOL of order 10 does not exist.[7]

Mathematicians have found the practical answer to a question which was perturbing them. Now they can attempt to give an analytical proof for the non-existence of a projective plane of order 10, rather than trying to construct it. But, what is the price? The verification of this conclusion consists of two parts, part A and part B. Part A needs 800 days of CPU time at the sophisticated computer at Concordia University and part B needs 2000 hours of time on a supercomputer.

Can every mathematician with sufficient interest afford to spend such enormous money and time for the verification of computer-aided results? Can he take it as a proved result and build his research on it much against his conscience? Are the present-day computers capable of handling the next undecided case, namely 12? Still, can he throw away the information provided by computer-assisted calculations simply because he is unable to verify them analytically?

Mathematicians will not change, nor will they perish because of the changes. They cannot stop the changes either. They can set directions for their research based on the verifications done using the computers and minimise wastage of their efforts in trying to

prove something which is wrong and vice versa. But such efforts give rise to new techniques and powerful mathematics often.

The world has to give mathematicians a place—rigorous mathematics—mathematics satisfying all the traditional norms of mathematics. Computer-assisted verifications are bound to occur frequently. Such 'results' can be accommodated under some title as 'practical mathematics' or 'quasi-empirical mathematics'. Everything in rigorous mathematics is practical mathematics but not conversely. Mathematical research may then be directed towards creating rigorous mathematics or creating practical mathematics or taking what is there in practical mathematics to rigorous mathematics by providing analytical proofs.

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On Resolving the Twin Paradox: A Philosophical Inquiry

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'The paradoxes', as J.L. Mackie observes, 'constitute a radical challenge to the rationality of human thinking.'[1] The paradoxical conclusions a scientific theory arrives at, are due either to some grotesqueness inherent in the theory or to some misconstrual of the theory. In either case, we may have to review the theory so as to have a proper understanding of it. In what follows, we shall argue that the twin paradox emanates not from any sort of grotesqueness within the special theory of relativity (STR) but from its misconstrual; hence what is required to resolve the paradox is a proper interpretation of the theory. The paper consists of two sections. The first section is a discussion of the twin paradox and the shortcomings of the two important strategies for the resolution of the paradox. The section that follows is devoted to an analysis of the notion of time dilation in the light of which the paradox is shown to be resolved.

I

The basis of the theory of relativity proposed by Einstein is the classical principle of relativity which states: 'Mechanical events which occur in a system moving with uniform speed cannot be distinguished from similar events which occur in a system at rest.'[2] Accordingly, a traveller in a moving train with constant velocity, for example, cannot know whether he is moving or not, without relating his motion to the objects outside. By extending the classical principle of relativity Einstein developed his renowned theory of relativity consisting of two parts—special theory and general theory. The twin paradox being a consequence of the former, we limit our discussion to the special theory only.

STR deals with coordinate systems moving with constant or uniform velocity with respect to another and also with systems having their velocity zero with respect to another.[3] Hence, the theory deals

with coordinate systems at rest and those moving with uniform velocity. It is based on the following two postulates:

1. The laws of nature are equally valid for all inertial frames of reference.
2. The velocity of light is invariant for all inertial systems, being independent of the velocity of its source: more exactly, the measure of this velocity (of light) is a constant, c, for all observers.[4]

TIME DILATION

The notion of time, as introduced by the special theory, is quite novel and puzzling, and the twin paradox may be viewed as a consequence of the conceptual problems created by the new conception of time. The theory, denouncing the older notion of an absolute time sequence, states that the measure of the time of the moving coordinate system depends on its velocity. When two observers move at a constant velocity with respect to each other, each will find that the other's apparatus for measuring time is running slower.[5] As the velocity of the two moving systems A and B increases irrespective of whether they are approaching or departing from each other an observer on the system A, noting the reading of his clock and comparing it with that of B, would find that B's time processes are slowed down. If, on the other hand, B measures A's time he would find that A's time is slowed down.[6] The rate of slowing down is expressed by equation

$$(A) \quad t_1 = t\sqrt{1 - v^2 / c^2}$$

where t is the time when the velocity of the system is zero, t_1, the observed time, v, the velocity of the system and c, the velocity of light. The slowing down of time, accountable only at higher velocities, i.e. velocities comparable to that of light, is known as dilation effect. In a moving system, not only mechanical clocks, but all the time processes such as psychological, biological clocks, a person travelling with a very high velocity, will be ageing slower than his stay-home contemporaries.

THE TWIN PARADOX

The twin paradox is seen as a consequence of the dilation effect. The paradoxical aspect of STR first proposed by Langevin in 1911, can be summarized as follows.[7] Imagine that we have twins on the earth, one of whom is making a voyage to a distant star in a rocket with a velocity comparable to that of light, while the other remains

on the earth. When the 'rocket twin' or the 'space twin', as we often call him, returns he would find that the 'earth twin' has become older, and he himself is biologically younger than his brother. Since the special theory assumes that all motion is relative, it is argued why we cannot consider that the 'rocket twin' is motionless and the earth is moving away from the rocket. Now the rocket twin should find that the earth twin is younger to him, while for the earth twin the rocket is moving away from him and therefore, rocket twin is younger. Which one of them will be younger, as each one finds the other younger, when they reunite on the earth? To say that both of them are younger than each other, is a contradiction and this constitutes the paradox.

As in any other paradox, here, too, ' "The reasoning within the paradox" has two branches and the conclusion of one branch contradicts the other.'[8] In the first place we argue that the earth is at rest, and with respect to the earth the rocket is moving with a great velocity and therefore, the rocket twin's time processes have slowed down, with respect to the earth twin. Then the whole argument is reversed: since all motion is relative, the space twin is considered to be motionless and the earth, to be moving away from the space twin, and therefore, the time processes on the earth have slowed down with respect to the space twin. The conclusions of these two arguments contradict each other and hence the paradox.

VARIOUS APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM

So far, two main resolutions to the paradox have been proposed: one consists in applying the implication of kinematic symmetry to the STR while the other is based on demonstrating the asymmetry of the two situations on account of the accelerations which one of the twins undergoes. These attempts make it imperative for us to analyse them and to pinpoint where exactly they fail to resolve the paradox satisfactorily.

Kinematic symmetry has its origin in an attempt to explain the reciprocity of the observations of time dilation by the two receding observers and thereby to resolve the paradox. Imagine two frames of reference F_1 and F_2. At their spatial coincidence, their clocks are synchronized. Now F_2 moves away from F_1 with a high uniform velocity. The farther they move away, the longer the light signals from each system take to reach the other and hence to each one it appears that the other one's clock is running slower. If F_2 makes a return journey, the whole process will be reversed, i.e., because of the light signals progressively reaching faster and faster from the other system, to each one it appears the other one's clock is running faster. Finally, at their spatial coincidence the observer in

each system finds his clock perfectly agreeing with the other's and so there is no paradox.

This resolution presupposes that both the systems, being inertial frames, are symmetrical as uniform motion cannot affect a body in any way. The conclusion, as it is founded on the first postulate of STR, namely, all laws of nature are equally valid for all inertial frames of reference, demands analysis of the same. It implies that in a frame of reference uniformly moving or at rest, none of the laws of nature will be violated. From the equal validity of the laws of nature in all inertial frames of reference, it cannot be concluded that all inertial frames of reference are symmetrical. It may be pointed out that, according to the postulate, it is not the frames of reference that hold symmetricity but the application of the laws of nature in all the inertial frames of reference. Why do F_1 and F_2 become asymmetric in the previous example? The moving inertial system F_2 has got kinetic energy while the inertial system at rest does not. The distinction makes it clear that the frame of reference uniformly moving away from the other cannot be considered equivalent to the latter in terms of the first postulate of STR, though the observers in both the systems regard the other as the kinetic inertial frame.

The kinematic relativity does not resolve the paradox within the framework of the special theory of relativity. It assumes a universal and absolute time for both the frames of reference which in itself is incompatible with the special theory of relativity. Moreover, kinematic relativity makes time relative to space; the farther a frame of reference moves, the slower its time appears to the other observer. In STR neither is time relative to space nor is space relative to time but space-time is relative to the velocity of the frame of reference. Moreover, the equation (A) states that when a co-ordinate system is moving with the velocity c, its clock does not record any lapse of time. If kinematic relativity is correct, we should be able to receive light signals from such a coordinate system even when it is moving with c. But the equation (A) states that it is not the case. We find that kinematic relativity assumes a universal time reducing the dilation effect merely to an observational phenomenon, and this makes the resolution unacceptable.

The generally accepted resolution of the paradox makes an attempt to show the asymmetry existing in the two situations. The twin travelling at a constant velocity in a straight line would never return without a change in his velocity. As long as the space twin moves in the same direction both he and the earth twin would experience reciprocity in time dilation. But in order to make the onward journey the space twin should undergo a change in his velocity that demands acceleration. On account of its acceleration the space twin is forced to travel along two different world-lines. The

earth twin, on the other hand, remains in his inertial frame without any change of velocity. That means the twin on the earth is always along one world-line whereas the rocket twin has to travel along two different world-lines one after the other. The change in the velocity of the traveller and his shift from one world-line to another account for the asymmetry of the twins.

To calculate the time dilation on the basis of the principles and equations laid down by STR without taking into consideration the accelerations of the moving frame of reference and to argue that the dilation is the result of the accelerations is, no doubt, illogical. The special theory may be inadequate in dealing with the accelerating frames of reference. The inadequacy of the theory does not mean that it is inconsistent. The special theory must be logically consistent in itself and must deal with the paradox within its framework.

The sum and substance of the resolution in question is that there is no paradox because both the situations are not symmetrical. This seems to imply that there does exist a paradox in symmetrical situations. Consider the two distant stationary frames of reference A and B whose clocks are synchronized. Their clocks are said to be synchronized if a light signal emitted from A at the 'A time' t_1A reflects from B at 'B time' tB and comes back to A at 'A time' t_3A, then the clocks in A and B synchronize if[9]

$$(B) \qquad tB = \frac{1}{2}(t_1A + t_3B)$$

Suppose that both of them are approaching each other with an equal and constant velocity. In this case, no one can deny that A and B are in a symmetrical situation and both of them undergo an equal rate of acceleration at the start. At their spatial coincidence an observer in each system can argue that he was stationary while the other one was approaching him; so the other one's clock should be slower. Hence once again the question: whose clock is slower than whose?

II

The strategies discussed above cannot properly deal with the paradox. Whether the situations are symmetrical or not, the self-consistency of STR requires that there be no paradox. A proper analysis of the time dilation designed to bring out the physical foundations of time dilation, can clearly demonstrate the absence of any paradox in the cases of both symmetrical and asymmetrical situations.

The relativity of time means that whenever a frame of reference moves with a high velocity with respect to another the time of the moving frame slows down according to the equation (A). The equation states: nearer the velocity to c, slower its flow of time. That is, the velocity of the frame of reference being nearer to c, its flow of time would be slower. Finally when $c = v$, $t_1 = 0$, that means, there is no flow of time in a frame of reference moving with c. Thus the flow of time is essentially linked with the motion of light.[10] When a frame of reference is moving with c, the relative motion of light with respect to the moving system is nil, and it may be said that time does not flow for such a frame of reference. So it is evident that if light does not move with respect to a frame of reference, its time too ceases to flow.[11]

The invariant relation between light and time in STR can be summed up as follows:

> The flow of time holds a constant ratio with the motion of light in an inertial frame of reference.

This relation of invariance explains the constancy of the velocity of light for all observers. Viewed from one's inertial frame of reference the relative velocity of light with respect to another system can vary in proportion to its velocity. The fact, it is to be noted, is not at all contradictory to the Einsteinean postulate that the velocity of light is invariable for all observers. The observer in the inertial frame of reference at rest and the observer in the moving inertial frame of reference measures the velocity of light in their systems to be c, i.e. 186,000 miles/second. The constancy of the velocity of light in all frames of reference is maintained because of the relation of invariance between the motion of light and flow of time.

The observer in the moving coordinate system always measures the velocity of light to be c. This, in fact, goes against our ordinary intuition according to which if a system is moving with velocity comparable to that of light, the velocity of light relative to it must be less than c. But how is it that c is constant in a moving coordinate system? The answer we often get from the relativists is that it is always found to be so. The question we would like to discuss here is why we find it to be the case. The reason, we shall point out, is that a relation of invariance between the motion of light and flow of time is presupposed in the theory of relativity which explains the constancy of light for all observers. That is to say, whenever a frame of reference is moving with respect to another the velocity of light with respect to the moving frame is slowed down, but we are not in a position to find it out, as time too is slowed down in the system proportionately.

We shall try to clarify this point with the help of a thought experiment. Suppose there is a river flowing uniformly at a constant speed of 10 km/hr. There are two boats B_1 and B_2 in the river at rest relative to each other. The velocity of the boats, it is assumed, would never cross 10 km/hr. The 'clocks' in both the systems are devised in such a way that they record a lapse of one hour only when a stretch of 10 kms of water passes them. Let B_2 move with constant velocity, say 5 km/hr, with respect to B_1 in the direction of the flow. From the point of view of the observer on B_1 it takes more time for a stretch of 10 kms of water to pass B_2. Hence relative to B_1 the time of B_2 slows down. The faster B_2 moves, the slower its clock runs. Finally if it moves with a velocity of 10 km/hr the river is at rest in relation to B_2 and its clock registers no passage of time. The measure of the velocity of the river by B_2 will always be constant, namely, 10 km/hr irrespective of its velocity with respect to B_1 for its 'clock' indicates a lapse of one hour only when a stretch of 10 kms of water passes it. This situation is very similar to the picture of reality represented by STR, and explains well the constancy of c in all inertial frames of reference.

In the light of the presupposition regarding the invariable relation between flow of time and the motion of light the Einsteinean argument that moving clocks run slow can be better understood.

> In all coordinate systems, whether moving or not, there is a constant ratio between the motion of light and flow of time. The velocity of light is a constant c for all coordinate systems whether moving or not.
>
> Therefore the clock in a moving system necessarily slows down.

That is, if there is a necessary and invariable relation between the motion of light and the flow of time in such a way that the motion of light and flow of time are directly proportional, i.e. whenever motion of light increases, the flow of time speeds up and whenever motion of light slows down, time slows down, and if its velocity of light is a constant c in a moving system, then the time of the moving system slows down as light slows down with respect to that system. We can never catch the slowing down of light in a moving coordinate system because of the directly proportional slowing down of time.

The flow of time in an inertial frame, being the ratio of the motion of light with respect to the inertial frame, the difference in the flow of time for two systems moving relative to each other will be the difference in the motion of light with respect to each system. Therefore, the motion of the two coordinate systems are to be compared not in relation to each other but rather to the motion of

light with respect to each one of them, i.e. all motion is relative to the velocity of light and not to other frames of reference. That is to say, the velocity of any coordinate system is to be considered as a fraction of c. In other words, there is only one motion that is not relative, viz. that of light. So the velocity of light is the absolute principle on which the whole of relativity is based.

Now let us try to review the paradox in view of our foregoing discussion. Suppose A is a stationary frame of reference towards which B is moving, say, with the velocity $\frac{1}{2}c$. Each of them assumes that the other one is moving with $\frac{1}{2}c$ and consequently attributes time dilation to each other's clock. Let C be a third frame of reference which can observe A and B. The observer in C comparing both A and B can easily discover the asymmetry of A and B. As he observes the motion of light with respect to A to be faster than that with respect to B, and consequently the flow of time in A is faster than that in B, the light signals emitted at regular intervals from A will be more frequent than those from B. This is the result of the difference in the flow of light in both the systems. Thus A and B receive light signals from each other after and before the expected time respectively and hence the difference in the time of both A and B.

The same argument can be extended to the classical version of the paradox without involving a third observer. It should be admitted that our twins are not in symmetrical situations. But how do their situations differ? Our answer to the question does strike a different note from the usual answer basing on the asymmetry of the situations due to accelerations. The twin who travels with a velocity comparable to that of light finds that light moves at a slower rate with respect to him than with respect to his brother on the earth for whom light travels as usual, i.e., for the traveller light passes at lesser speed compared to the earth twin with the result that his passage of time is slower than that of the earth twin. On the other hand, the earth twin finds that his motion relative to light has not changed, and therefore, there is no change in the flow of time, while the earth twin himself observes that the motion of light with respect to the space twin has slowed down relatively and as a result, in the light of our discussion, time has dilated. That means whenever the space twin compares his clock with that of the earth twin with the help of the light signals emitted at regular intervals he concludes from the earlier arrival of the signals that the clock on the earth is running faster. But comparing his clock with that of the spaceman the twin on earth will find that the spaceman's clock is running slower. On the return trip too, this holds good. Accordingly, when they reunite on the earth, the spaceman will find that he has lost some time with respect to his brother, and therefore he is younger. On the other hand, the earth twin will realize that he has gained some time with respect to the spaceman and therefore he is older. If this is the case, there is no paradox at all.

Now the question whether there exists a paradox if both the situations are symmetrical, remains unanswered. Let two distant synchronized clocks W_1 and W_2 each with velocity $\frac{1}{2}c$ approach each other. W_1 and W_2 emit light signals at every hour in accordance with their own clocks. The motion of light with respect to each being at equal ratio from each other's points of view, their flow of time too will be equal and as a result W_1 and W_2 will be receiving signals after equal and expected intervals. So at their spatial coincidence both W_1 and W_2 synchronize and hence even in the case of symmetricity there is no paradox.

This approach to the problem draws our attention to the frames of reference approaching or departing from each other with different velocity. How will these clocks be affected by the dilation effect? Two rockets R_1 and R_2 are running away from each other from the space station S with identical clocks W_1 and W_2 synchronized with W_3 in S with the velocity 5c and 75c respectively, relative to S. After an hour by his clock, the observer on S, comparing his clock with the travellers' clocks, will realize that the clock W_1 had completed only 51.96 minutes and the clock W_2 only 39.68 minutes according to equation (A). When his time is 51.96 minutes, if observer in R_1 compares his clock with W_2 and W_3, both of them will read 39.68 minutes and 60 respectively. R_2 measures the time of W_1 and W_3 as 51.96 minutes and 60 minutes respectively when his own clock reads 39.68 minutes. This gives us a clue as to which of the reference frames is moving faster (or slower) than the other. The one from which the light signals arrive at a more delayed time after the expected time will be moving faster than the one from which the signals arrive at a less delayed time after the expected time or at a shorter interval. There is no clue as to which of the coordinate systems is moving and which one is at rest as the theory does not license the notion of absolute rest. We can only speak of the systems at rest relative to one another.

Obviously, in the light of our discussion so far, the principle of relative time dilation can be rephrased as follows: When two observers are moving at a constant velocity, each one would find that the other's apparatus for measuring time is running slower or faster relative to its motion with respect to the motion of light. And we have argued that there is no reciprocity of time dilation as the motion of a frame of reference bears a constant ratio with the motion of light in that frame. If understood in its proper sense, STR is logically self-consistent and poses no paradox. The paradox, if any, results from an attempt to interpret the theory of relativity with a Newtonian obsession.

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7. For a detailed account of the Paradox, cf. ibid., pp. 74–80.
8. J.L. Mackie, op. cit., p. 238.
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10. The expression 'motion of light' is used instead of 'velocity of light' because the concept of velocity presupposes the notion of time. As we are, in a sense, engaged in the definition of time in our analysis of the notion of time dilation, the use of the expression 'velocity of light' would lead to circularity. Of course, it is not claimed that 'motion of light' is devoid of all its temporal implications. But we can't help it, because our conceptual framework does not permit a way out.
11. The relation of invariance between time and the motion of light is supported by the general theory of relativity as well. It states that gravity slows down time. Here again the slowing down of time is linked with slowing down of the motion of light. As gravity slows down the motion of light, the light beams passing through stronger gravitational fields become slower than those in weaker gravitational fields. Owing to the very essential relationship between the flow of time and the motion of light, with the slowing down of light time too slows down proportionately. On a very strong gravitational mass, say a black hole, where light does not move due to its intense gravity, time stands still. Thus there is a relation of invariance between the motion of light and the flow of time.

The Expressive Thesis of Avowals: A Critical Appraisal

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The central contention of Wittgenstein's non-cognitive thesis of avowals becomes prominent when he writes: 'It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I *know* I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I *am* in pain?'[1] This also occurs in the remark that: 'I know I have pain' either means nothing or the same as 'I have pain'.[2]

An avowal is the sort of first-person present-tense psychological statement that best fits what Descartes, for example, would say about purely mental contents. That is, an avowal, according to many philosophers, is the sort of statement appropriate to describe as an incorrigible statement of a self-revealing mental state; it is the sort of statement for which privileged access and incorrigible, immediate knowledge are often claimed. Among avowals, first-person present-tense sensation statements, such as 'I am in pain', are an important subclass. With this characterization, Wittgenstein's non-cognitive thesis of avowals may be expressed thus: If 'p' is an avowal, and S is the subject of the avowal, it cannot be the case that S knows that 'p'. For example, I cannot know that I am in pain when I am in pain, or that I am thinking about a philosophical problem when I am doing so.

I

The non-cognitive thesis of avowals is supported by a variety of arguments in Wittgenstein's writings. The most common interpretation of his doctrine of avowals is found in an early review of the *Investigations* by Malcolm.[3] According to this interpretation, the non-cognitive thesis rests on the expressive thesis of avowals. Avowals are conceived of as extensions of natural expressive behaviour. As Wittgenstein says, 'Words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new

pain-behaviour'.[4] What is important to note here is not that the use of the word 'pain' means crying, but that 'the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.'[5] This implies that the words for sensations are related to sensations in the same way as are the primitive, natural, expressions of sensations (viz. crying, groaning, moaning, etc.).

Crying and groaning which are the natural expressions of pain have no grounds; they do not rest on any evidence. They are not used to inform others; they have no purpose, no function. Crying and groaning do not express statements and are not descriptions. Now as, in Malcolm's words, 'my sentences about my present sensations have the same logical status as my outcries and facial expressions',[6] avowals, too, are not statements, but expressions. 'The expression "I have toothache" stands for a moan but it does not mean "I moan".'[7] This shows that the expression 'I have toothache' is very far from a description.[8] In so far as Wittgenstein denies that an avowal is a description, thus far he also denies that it can bear truth-values.[9] Since crying and groaning do not express statements it makes no sense to speak of being mistaken, or of wondering about them. For the same reason, I cannot say 'I am in pain' by mistake any more than I can cry by mistake. Not being a statement, 'I am in pain' is not capable of being either true or false.

There are, however, many differences between 'I have pain' and 'He has pain'. Wittgenstein assimilates only first-person present-tense psychological sentences to behavioural manifestations of psychological states. But the logic of other psychological sentences is different. 'The difference between the propositions "I have pain" and "He has pain" is not that of "L.W. has pain" and "Smith has pain". Rather, it corresponds to the difference between moaning and saying that someone moans'.[10] Moaning is a natural, primitive kind of pain-behaviour, and that someone moans is a criterion for the truth of the assertion that he is in pain. 'He is in pain' is not a part of acquired behaviour, and to utter it is not to exhibit pain-behaviour. It is to say something about someone else in relation to which all the questions and remarks make perfectly good sense. There is nothing absurd in saying, for example, 'I know he is in pain', 'I believe he is pain', and so on. The third-person sensation utterances say something which can be true or false, i.e. about which the speaker may be mistaken. On the other hand, 'I am in pain', as we have seen, is not a description, is not true or false, but is an acquired kind of pain-behaviour. It is, qua utterance, a criterion for the truth of the assertion that he is in pain.

Thus, as has been seen above, the most common interpretation of the doctrine of avowals rests the non-cognitive thesis on the expressive thesis and interprets the latter as denying that avowals bear truth-values. An avowal does not say that the world is thus and so, but it is a manifestation of its being so. Since only what is true or false can be an object of possible knowledge or ignorance, an avowal, being neither true nor false, is excluded from the domain of possible knowledge. It is not the sort of thing that one could be said to know.

II

In order to understand Wittgenstein's analysis of psychological sentences, it is necessary to investigate what exactly it means to call sentences like 'I am in pain' expressions and what exactly is the relation between expression of pain and pain. 'I am in pain', according to Wittgenstein, 'replaces', and is 'equivalent to', 'the primitive, the natural, expressions' of pain. He imagines a child as having hurt himself and then spontaneously crying or groaning. Such unlearned behaviour can be thought of as pain-behaviour, i.e. as behaviour that expresses pain. In place of crying or groaning, the adults who are observing the child might teach him exclamations, such as 'Ow!' or 'Ouch!'. What they are then teaching him is simply a new form of pain-behaviour which can replace the old.

'Wittgenstein is not denying that', as Luckhardt observes, 'pain is something different from ('separate from', if you prefer) the expression of pain. What he is denying is that it is *logically* independent. An expression of pain is an expression of something, and so the expressions of pain are logically related to pain.'[11] If someone stumbles against a stone and screams 'Ow!' or 'Ouch!', then we do not understand him as merely engaging in a certain behaviour and not as expressing pain. We fail to understand him, it is true, if we are to deny that he is in pain. Such persons are no doubt said to be in pain, and Wittgenstein, too, does not want to deny that they are. 'What he does want to deny is that they are referring to private objects that they possess, and stating that they possess them. *Such* objects drop out of consideration, but not such people's pains or their being in pain.'[12]

The point is not that private sensations are nothing, or do not exist; it is rather that nothing can be said about them, and hence they play no part in our language-games. They are 'as nothing' in our language-games, and there can be no such thing as an intelligible description of them. Wittgenstein's position on the matter can be summed up thus:

> 'And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a *nothing*'.—Not at all. It is not a *something*, but not a *nothing* either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing

> could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here.[13]

Thus when Wittgenstein says that 'An "inner process" stands in need of outward criteria',[14] the phrase 'stands in need of' appears to be the important one. An 'inner process' needs outward criteria certainly not in order to exist, but in order to be talked about, referred to, etc. It is only in connection with 'outward criteria' that the concept of pain gets a sense; they determine what pain is. Hence criteria play a fundamental role in Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind.

III

We shall begin our examination of the expressive thesis of avowals by raising the question whether the concept of pain is essentially connected with 'outward criteria' in order to get a sense and whether the actual experiencing of pain itself has any part to play in our understanding of the concept of pain. In Wittgenstein's view, it appears that the actual experiencing of pain itself does not play any part in the language, but what matters in the language-game is the *grammar* of the word 'pain'. That is, the actual experiencing of pain itself, as distinct from pain-behaviour, plays no part in our understanding of the concept of pain. Malcolm establishes this point by citing the case of a person who has never experienced pain, but yet has the ability to understand the concept of pain.[15] Let us consider this point.

If pain-behaviour determines what pain is, then, in fact, even the person who has never experienced pain would be able to identify, through training and observation, the behaviour and expression of pain in others; he would be able to apply the word 'pain' correctly to cases of pain in other people. But, is this all, we may ask, that there is to the understanding of words standing for sensations, feelings, etc.? Can a person who has never experienced pain be said to have as full an understanding of the word 'pain' as a person who has the experience of pain has? Is there no difference between the concepts they have of pain? In fact, it is very difficult to conceive how a person who has never experienced pain would feel any compassion for suffering persons. Thus there seem to be two different cases here: (a) knowledge that someone else is in pain which gives rise to a feeling of compassion for him; and (b) knowledge of pain in others which cannot conceivably give rise to a feeling of compassion, sympathy, etc. Now, corresponding to these two cases, there are two different concepts of pain: (i) a concept of pain connected with the concepts of compassion, sympathy, etc.; and (ii) a concept of pain not so connected. But which one of them is to be regarded as the proper concept of pain?

Wittgenstein would reject any attempt to explain a person's attitude towards a sufferer by a belief in his 'inner state'. In his various remarks, Wittgenstein appears to hold that the attitude a person exhibits towards a sufferer is primitive—an attitude that is wholly independent of his own experience of pain and a concomitant belief that the sufferer experiences the same thing that he does. But this does not seem to be the case. When we attribute psychological states to others, we are, in fact, in a much better position to describe others in terms of those states than to describe the behaviour itself that mentions no inner states. When we say that someone looks angry, it would not at all be easy to describe an expression of anger in terminology that makes no mention of the inner, psychological states; it would be difficult for many of us to give a description of the appropriate facial expressions without mentioning the psychological state they express. Hence Kripke holds that psychological language is not understood without primary reference to one's own 'inner states'.[16] When I attribute pain to a person, I can be said to think of him as having a mind, and in particular as suffering from a pain, in virtue of my attitude and behaviour towards him. It is, therefore, implausible to accept the view that, in Kripke's words,

> For Wittgenstein, my inner experience of pain, and my ability to imagine the sensation, play no real role in my mastery of the 'language-game' of attributing sensations to others, that someone who has never experienced pain and cannot imagine it but who has learned the usual behavioural criteria for its attribution uses this terminology just as well as I.[17]

However, it has been further argued that in the two concepts of pain—i.e. a concept of pain connected with the concepts of compassion, sympathy, etc. and a concept of pain not so connected—the *word* 'pain' will be used in the same way, showing that there is only *one concept* of pain. Hence 'pain', it has been argued, is not the name of a sensation, but merely a word in the language, the use of which like all others requires us to know its grammar. And knowing the grammar of the word does not involve knowing the object but only the language-game in which the word occurs. This argument is strengthened by citing the case of any person born blind who can and does use the word 'see' in exactly the same way as others who can see. As Wittgenstein says,

> We may say a blind man doesn't see anything. But not only do we say so but he too says that he does not see. I don't mean 'he agrees with us that he does not see—he doesn't dispute it', but rather: he too describes the facts in this way, having learned the same language as we have.[18]

It may be the case that a person born blind can use the word 'see' by using almost the same criteria as we do. Looking at a person whose eyes are apparently normal we can still know that he is blind by the way he always walks, fumbles, etc. A blind man, too, uses the same criteria to know that another man is blind. He, too, can observe, though not visually, the difference in the patterns of moving, walking, etc. of persons who can see and of those who cannot. Still a blind man is, *in principle*, debarred from using a different type of criterion which we can use to know that a person is blind, namely, by focusing strong light on his eyes and noting that he does not blink, and so on. If the criteria for the use of a word constitute the rules for using it in a language-game, then even though a blind man can use the word 'see' or the expression 'cannot see' in *almost the same cases* as we do, still there are cases—e.g. of persons suffering from paralysis of hands and feet, persons who cannot move their hands or legs and cannot speak—where a blind man *cannot*, but we can, know whether they can or cannot see.

This point may be explained by considering why a person born blind cannot use *colour words* in the way we do. Even though a blind man can know in many cases that another person, too, cannot see, still he will not be able to *know* that a person is red-blind by observing a difference in his behaviour; he cannot distinguish between, say, a red colour-blind person and a yellow colour-blind person, and so on. A blind man cannot observe the different situations in which a red colour-blind person and a yellow colour-blind person behave differently. To be able to use a word in a language-game it is held to be necessary to be able to behave in a characteristic manner, *or* to observe others who can behave in a specific way. A person incapable of pain-behaviour and incapable of observing pain-behaviour in others will not be able to learn the grammar of the word 'pain'. Still if a blind man *cannot* use 'see' in the same way as we do, it shows that personal experience *or* appropriate behaviour makes a difference in the meaning of a word.

IV

Now we shall argue that Wittgenstein's notion of 'outward criteria'—i.e. 'pain-behaviour' in the case of pain—is suspect, and that the circumstances constituted by forms of behaviour cannot serve as the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the word 'pain'.

The important point is that pain-behaviour often fails to give any indication of someone's being in pain. The reason is that although there are some sorts of behaviour which are symptomatic of some sorts of pains, there is no sort of behaviour which is regularly symptomatic of pain as such. Most of the characteristic behaviours of pain are equally characteristic of those which are not pains. Anxiety, uncertainty, distress, and fear may arise from other causes, and we often find people crying or uttering a moaning sound when they are in such states. It is because of this that we often fail to learn from someone's howling whether he has been hurt rather than frightened or insulted.

The so-called pain-behaviour, therefore, does not seem to be a sure guide to know that someone is in pain. Nevertheless, we can hardly deny that in many cases pain-behaviour gives the indication that someone is in pain. But we have reasons to argue that this is only a *rough* indication, not an accurate one, of someone's being in pain. Although we may know from someone's crying and groaning that he is in pain, we often fail to know in which part of his body the pain is occurring. We cannot know, for example, from the cry of a child, or of a person who is dumb or deaf-mute, whether he has a pain in the head, the stomach, or the foot.

Again, even if we happen to know from someone's crying and groaning that he has pain in a particular part of his body, say, in his head, we cannot claim that we know *everything* of his pain. The reason is that we can discriminate and recognize different particular pains in one and the same part of the body. There are finer differences between what Hacker has called the 'phenomenological features' of pain, such as dull, sharp, throbbing, nagging, searing, stinging, and so on.[19] What should be noted is that we find no different characteristic natural expressions corresponding to such finer differences in the phenomenological features of pain. Hence the supposition that all sensation types are associated with some characteristic external behaviour does not seem to be true. As Kripke also remarks,

> Any view that supposes that . . . an inner process always has 'outward criteria', seems to me probably to be *empirically* false. It seems to me that we have sensations or sensation *qualia* that we can perfectly well identify but that have no 'natural' external manifestations: an observer cannot tell in any way whether an individual has them unless that individual avows them.[20]

Consequently, even if pain-behaviour gives the indication that a person has a pain in his head, it gives no indication whether the pain in the head is dull or sharp, throbbing or nagging, searing or stinging. And if we cannot know these details about pains, we cannot claim that we have known everything of the person's pain in the head from his crying or groaning.

Wittgenstein's dictum that 'An "inner process" stands in need of outward criteria',[21] then, does not seem to be wholly correct, so far as the correct application of the sensation-words like 'pain', etc., is

concerned. The 'outward criteria' alone, as has been seen, are not what the word 'pain' exactly means, and they cannot be considered as the necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of the word. The indication that a person is in pain has less to do with pain-behaviour than with pain-experience. There is, in fact, no more necessity for specific pain-behaviour in establishing the meaning of 'pain' than there is for specific dry-behaviour, for example, in establishing the meaning of 'dry' as applied to sherry. The necessary moans, but feels nothing, he is not correctly described as being in pain. On the other hand, if he feels appropriately, but neither bleeds nor moans, he is correctly described as in pain, either by himself or by someone else. Thus the meaning of the word 'pain' does not seem to be logically dependent only on there being natural expressions of pain. The actual experiencing of pain itself, as distinct from pain-behaviour, also plays a considerable part in our understanding of the concept of pain. Now, if the 'outward criteria' are not what the word 'pain' exactly means, then the truth of Wittgenstein's claim that the verbal expression of pain 'replaces' the natural expression of pain also seems to be in question.

V

Our experience of pain, as we have seen, contains something more than what can be exhibited in pain-behaviour. That is to say, our pain-experience is richer in content than pain-behaviour. However, we can remove all the drawbacks of pain-behaviour when we use a language. As Wittgenstein, too, admits that not only does language replace the natural, prelinguistic behaviour, but also that it serves as an extension, refinement or elaboration of that behaviour.[22] In fact, it is true that the language of sensation provides finer descriptions of sensation than would be possible with the purely natural, non-linguistic behaviour. Thus one can make the finer differences in the phenomenological features of pain by saying, for example, 'My head is aching', or 'My head is burning', or 'My head is splitting'. One can also say, 'It still hurts but not as much as it did yesterday', or 'There is a slight pain in my hip but not enough to bother me.' These reports could not be conveyed in natural, prelinguistic behaviour. Indeed, our language is so well-refined that it has the machinery of doing this sort of thing.

Wittgenstein, however, does not find any difference between the verbal and the non-verbal expression of pain. He holds that the verbal expression of pain itself takes the place of the non-verbal expression, and that in learning the former, one learns 'new pain-behaviour'. The verbal pain-behaviour, according to him, does not 'describe' the non-verbal pain-behaviour, but 'replaces' it. But this

does not seem to be a correct account. If the verbal expression of pain is at all called a 'pain-behaviour', this must be something different from non-verbal pain-behaviour. In other words, we have to accept, in that case, two quite different forms of behaviour: verbal and non-verbal. The non-verbal behaviour is crude without much refinement; it is incapable of revealing the details about pains. From it we have to guess or infer, very roughly, that someone is in what particular sort of pain. But the verbal behaviour has the refinement of expressing the details about pains; it makes explicit what remains implicit or hidden behind the crude forms of non-verbal behaviour. This shows that the verbal behaviour is not related to pain in the same way as is the non-verbal behaviour. It, therefore, does not seem to be wholly correct to suppose that the verbal pain-behaviour 'replaces' the non-verbal pain-behaviour. Rather, we have to hold that the former 'supplements' the latter. The verbal pain-behaviour supplements the non-verbal behaviour by discriminating particular pains and thus bringing out the details about pains.

If the verbal pain-behaviour is not a *mere* replacement of non-verbal pain-behaviour, then it cannot be said that 'my sentences about my present sensations have the same logical status as my outcries and facial expressions'. The verbal expressions of pain cannot be denied of being assertions on the ground that, as Wittgenstein thinks, crying and groaning do not express statements. The expression 'I have a toothache' is a description of an experience—the experience that there is a sensation of aching, not of burning or pricking, in someone's tooth. Thus the avowals of pain can well be used to make reports or assertions. The descriptions of the phenomenological features of sensation, even though not descriptions of an *observation,* are really informative and supply important diagnostic data. There is no natural expressive behaviour which manifests those phenomenological features and our descriptions of them, as we have seen, do not replace any primitive behaviour. Hence it can hardly be denied that the avowals of pain can bear truth-values. In fact, they are ordinarily conceived of as true or false. So they are not excluded from the domain of the cognizable.

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Religion, Ethics and Science: A Dialogue between Wittgenstein and Gandhi*

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It will be useful to begin with an understanding of how Wittgenstein perceived the relationship between religion and ethics. In Waismann's *Notes on talks with Wittgenstein,* he records Wittgenstein's comments on Schlick's conception of theological ethics. According to Schlick, theological ethics contains two conceptions of the essence of the Good:

(i) The Good is good because God wills it, and
(ii) God wills the Good because it is good.

For Schlick the former is the more superficial understanding of the Good. On the other hand, Wittgenstein holds that it is, in fact, the former which is the more profound of the two conceptions of the Good, because it indicates that ultimately there can be no explanation (no reasons or evidence) given as to 'why' it is good—'I think that the first conception is the deeper one: Good is what God orders, while the second is precisely the superficial, the rationalistic one, which proceeds as if what is Good could still be given some foundation.'[1] Here good is being used in the absolute sense, i.e. in the sense of the Good, unlike the way it is used, for instance, when we say 'This is a good knife'. In the case of the expression 'good knife' one can always replace it with statements of fact—that it is sharp, that it is strong, etc. The term 'good' in this case is being used in a relative sense. According to Wittgenstein, while it is possible to show that judgments of relative value are mere statements of fact, no statement of fact is, or implies, a judgment of absolute value. He explains this further with the help of an example: The *right* road is that which leads to an arbitrary predetermined end. But when you say 'the absolutely right road' then everybody, once seeing it, would have to 'with logical necessity' follow it, or feel ashamed of not doing so. In the same

* I am deeply indebted to Prof. J.P.S. Uberoi with whom I discussed this paper at length, and from whose thoughts I have benefited immensely.

way, the absolute good (if it is at all describable) would be a state which everybody, independently of his tastes and inclinations would 'necessarily' bring about or feel guilty for not doing so. According to him, however, such a state of affairs is a 'chimera'. There is no state of affairs which in itself has, what he calls 'the coercive powers of an absolute judge'.[2] It is in this sense that the Good and God's will are the same. Neither of them has anything to do with facts.

One may say that the Good is a central concept of ethics and God's will, a central concept of religion. In so far as this is so, from the above discussion it appears that for Wittgenstein, ethics and religion are in essence the same. It is in this context that he will talk of the 'characteristic misuse of our language' which 'runs through all ethical and religious discourse'.[3] They appear to be used like similes, for example, 'I wonder at the existence of the world'. At first sight, it seems analogous with statements like 'I wonder at the size of this dog which seems larger than any other dog I have seen in my life'. But to say 'I wonder at such and such being the case', makes sense only if it is possible to imagine it not to be the case. If this is so, to say 'I wonder at the existence of the world' is nonsense because one cannot imagine it not existing. The experience of wonder at the existence of the world is just the sort of thing sought to be expressed when one says, 'God created the world'. Expressions such as these—'I wonder at the existence of the world' or 'God created the world' are nonsensical not because one has not yet found the right expressions but because it is their very nature to be nonsensical. There is no fact which will correspond to them because with such expressions one is attempting to go 'beyond the world', beyond significant language.

This is what Wittgenstein means when he says in the *Tractatus* that ethics is transcendental. Ethics has nothing to do with language, thought and reality; it is only the propositions of science that have sense, i.e. it is possible to relate these propositions to reality, it is possible to talk of their truth and falsity. But he does not give any example of a simple object or elementary proposition of science. In fact, he will find it difficult to do so. I will not go into the exact nature of these problems. For our purpose it is enough to know that he will find it difficult to give an example and for this reason, will drop the notion of the simple object in the *Investigations*. Similarly, in the case of ethics, he will not give any example of an ethical event or rule. But in the case of ethics, he will argue that it is not possible to give an example. He will say that the right solution is that which fits the totality and is not in this world.

> If good or bad acts of will do alter the world, it is only the limits of the world that they alter, not the facts, nor what can be expressed by means of language.

> In short their effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.[4]

It is therefore not in this or that respect that good or bad willing will change the world—the world as a whole is seen differently.

In his talks with Rush Rhees, he discusses the example of a husband who is torn between the option either to leave his wife, or to abandon his work on cancer research. Possible arguments for and against the options are taken up for consideration: One may say that it is wrong for him to leave his wife after having taken her out of her home. On the other hand, it is possible to say that for the sake of suffering humanity it is important that cancer research is carried on, and therefore it is right for him to leave her. Another argument would be that he would be worthy of her respect only if he continued his work and therefore it would be better if he left her. Now, once he decides to leave her, and does so, he may, looking back on the decision, either regret making it, or feel happy he had made it. This is a possible way in which ethical solutions are found. So, despite ethics and religion being similar in that no reasons or evidence can be given to say why something is good, ethics is different in that some discussion is possible. But take the case of Christian ethics. If, for instance, the husband in the example discussed had a Christian ethic, then the question whether or not he should leave his wife would not be a problem. This is a question which would not arise in the framework of Christian ethics. The problem will instead be of how best he could reconcile his life with his wife, and at the same time continue his work on cancer research. It would be a matter of doing his best under the circumstances.

From this example, it appears that not only does the situation as a whole change according to the ethical frameworks, but the facts of the case change as well: we look at the facts differently, the questions that arise are different, and the possible solutions are different. In so far as the options open in the different ethical frameworks are different, it is the whole (or the totality) which changes. But in so far as decisions taken within these different frameworks will result in different situations, the facts also change: In the first case the husband may leave his wife and then either regret the decision or feel relieved at making it. In the second case, he will not leave his wife.

What would happen however, if the husband had the first type of ethic and his wife the Christian ethic? There would be no way of resolving such a conflict because, according to Wittgenstein, the question as to which of them is more right/good cannot be asked. One would not know what the criteria would be to decide such an issue though this does not mean that each is right from his own point of view. It only means that there can be no absolute value in

this world. There can be no objective criteria which could help one decide.

Though Wittgenstein wants to say that he does not mean that each one is right from his own point of view, he cannot really avoid relativism in so far as he holds that there are no objective criteria to decide what is right ultimately. He does see clearly that relativism will not do but he is unable, for instance, to establish communication between the husband and the wife, in the case of a conflict. They have reached a stage when no questions can be asked because there are no answers.

It is perhaps for this reason that he says that there can be no theory either in ethics or in religion—'I can only say: I do not belittle this human tendency, I take my hat off to it. And here it is essential that this is not a sociological description but that I speak for myself.'[5] Both ethics and religion become matters of personal intuition (perception?) and conviction.

From this discussion, it appears that Wittgenstein is unable to bridge the gap between fact and value and, that which is related to this, the gap between theory and practice. As we have seen, if we are to accept Wittgenstein's view that value is unrelated to facts, we are unable to keep the two unrelated when we discuss an actual example. If we persist in wanting to keep fact and value unrelated, then it is very difficult to avoid a situation of relativity—there will be no objective criteria, and at this point theory and practice become unrelated; there can be practice according to personal conviction, but no theory will be available.

Is this gap between fact and value, and theory and practice bridged in the *Investigations* and his lectures on religious beliefs? In the *Investigations* he no longer holds the view that only the language of the natural sciences is possible. He introduces a theory of different language games and a word or proposition has meaning within the language game in which it is used. He has therefore discarded the notion of the simple object. In his lectures on religious beliefs, he seems to work out the point of view of the *Investigations* in the case of the language game of religion. Therefore he will talk of how the nature of a religious belief is different from that of others' beliefs and how evidence in the case of religion means something different from what it means in science.

According to Wittgenstein, when one says, for example, 'I do not believe in the Last Judgment', one does not contradict someone who believes in it. It is not that one believes in the opposite. It only means that one is playing a different language game—that 'I think differently', 'I say different things to myself', and 'I have different pictures'.[6] Nor does this mean that one does not understand the person who believes, and uses terms such as 'God', 'the Last Judgment' etc. We only do not have the 'thoughts and anything that hangs together with them'.[7] Someone who is ill talks of retribution, the other does not. They are different ways of thinking. But this admonishing, this picture that the illness is punishment for past misdeeds, makes an enormous difference for those who have it in the foreground, and for those who do not. Does this mean we associate a particular use with a picture? Wittgenstein remarks, 'If I say he used a picture, I don't want to say anything he himself wouldn't say.' Neither is having the picture, just a matter of one's attitude. Wittgenstein gives the following example—saying to a friend who is leaving you, 'We might see one another after death', is not the same as saying, 'I'm very fond of you'.

Again, what we mean by evidence in religion is something totally different from what we mean by it in science. In the case of science, evidence is proof or disproof of a certain belief but indubitability of the belief is not enough to change one's life. But in the case of religion there is unshakeable belief. Neither reasons nor evidence will make a believer discard his belief. There is talk of evidence in religion in terms of historical events, for instance, but they are not treated as ordinary historical facts or empirical propositions. Evidence is seen in terms of the effect it has on the believer—there is no induction, i.e. the accumulation of facts neither proves nor disproves any religious beliefs. There is only hope, terror, etc. in the believer. It regulates his life. Therefore one would say that not to believe is bad.

This, however, does not mean that religion is unreasonable. Wittgenstein would say that it is not reasonable which he emphasizes: To say that something is *not* reasonable is different from saying that it is unreasonable. To say that something is unreasonable is not complementary. When something is not reasonable, it means that reasons don't count. The believer does not treat religion as a matter of reasonability. To make it look as if it is 'reasonable' in the same way that science is reasonable only makes the argument for religion weaker. This is seen in Wittgenstein's comment on O'Hara:

> I would definitely call O'Hara unreasonable I would say if this is religious belief, it's all superstition.
>
> But I would ridicule it, not by saying it is based on insufficient evidence. I would say: here is a man who is cheating himself. You can say: this man is ridiculous because he believes, and bases it on weak reasons.[8]

This statement of Wittgenstein is significant. He will not accuse O'Hara of basing his beliefs on insufficient evidence but he will accuse him of basing it on weak reasons. So, reasons in religion are unlike those in science, and to make them appear like those in

science would be to weaken your argument for religion, not strengthen it. In his discussion of the role of reason and evidence in religion he rightly realizes that either religion is 'not reasonable' or that the reasons will be different from that of science. This is important in so far as he senses that reason is not all that matters in religion—he does not say this in as many words but it is a definite step in that direction.

But the problem will be to say how reason and evidence in science are related to reason and evidence in religion. Wittgenstein says they are different but will not say how they are related. So, in his lectures on religious beliefs, one may say that he has gone a step further from his position in the lectures on ethics, and his discussions with Waismann and Rush Rhees. Earlier, matters of fact and matters of value were different and unrelated (or separate). Now they are different but related. They mean different things in different language games, but he will not say how these different things are related. For instance, he will not say how evidence in religion is related to evidence in science. So if there is a conflict in one's holding a belief in science with one's holding a belief in religion/ethics, for example, the vivisectionist methods of science research, its finding and applications will go against the dictates of religion and ethics. Wittgenstein will not be able to resolve this conflict; he will not be able to say what the criteria for such a resolution will be. This sort of problem was also seen in the example of the husband torn between his duties towards his wife and his work on cancer research where it was not possible to have any objective criteria to decide between the Catholic ethic that his wife held, and his own science ethic. Therefore, one can say that the schism between fact and value, and theory and practice continues in later Wittgenstein thought though it has taken on a different form. Ethics and religion remain a matter of personal intuition; no theory will be available, and the personal will be in opposition not only to the social but also to the professional.

I have attempted so far to look at both the earlier and later Wittgenstein from Gandhi's point of view. What the latter will have to say on the nature of science, religion and ethics, and the relationship between them reveals a perspective completely different from that of the former. For instance, consider Gandhi's views on vivisection which is a problem in ethics as well as in pure science (as against applied science):

> I abhor vivisection with my whole soul. I detest the unpardonable slaughter of innocent life in the name of science and humanity so-called, and all the scientific discoveries stained with innocent blood, I count as of no consequence. If the circulation of blood theory could not have been discovered without vivisection, then humankind could well have done without it. And I see the day clearly dawning when the honest scientist of the West will put limitations upon the present methods of pursuing knowledge. Future measurements will take note not merely of the human family but of all that live . . . so shall we realize in the fullness of time that our domination over the lower order of creation is not for their slaughter but for their benefit equally with ours.[9]

One can see clearly that Gandhi is arguing here that there can be no study of fact/truth which goes against value, or, to say the least, is value-neutral. Similarly, there can be no value which does not affect the state of affairs in this world—this is seen in his talking of putting a limit to the present methods of pursuing knowledge. As a result, the language game of science has to be defined and limited by the language game of ethics, in case of a conflict. This will not be a matter of personal conviction or intuition alone; there will be objective criteria to decide what is the Good. The general principle is stated when Gandhi says that all pursuit of knowledge and future measurements will have to take note not merely of its consequences for the human family but for all that lives, all creation. Such knowledge alone is truly science for it will comprise the 'facts' of the science of existence or living. Then, theory will not be divorced from practice, nor will the personal be divorced from the social and the professional; the methods of science will not be divorced from the so-called truths of science, and both of them together will not be divorced from the applications of science as they are in modern science, for example, in atomic research and its application in the atom bomb.

Even the advantages of so-called applied science for 'peaceful' purposes do not deter Gandhi from holding this view about vivisection as can be seen from:

> My love of nature-cure and of indigenous systems does not blind me to the advances that Western medicine has made in spite of the fact that I have stigmatized it as black magic. I have used the harsh term and I do not withdraw it, because of the fact that it has countenanced vivisection and all the awfulness it means and because it will stop at no practice, however bad it may be, if it prolongs the life of the body and because it ignores the immortal soul which resides in the body.[10]

According to Gandhi only that person can claim to hear the voice of conscience, who has fulfilled certain conditions, who has self-discipline in relationship to himself, and in relation to other human and non-human nature; in relation to all creation. From our earlier discussion one can see that this will be Gandhi's definition not

merely of a good person but also of a good scientist. He will say that the preliminary conditions for a person to conduct experiments with Truth would be the practice of vows such as truth, non-violence, brahmachārya, aparigraha, etc. It is only a person who has adhered to these vows in letter and spirit who can have claims to hearing the voice of conscience, and that too, with humility. Such a person will observe Truth in thought, word and deed, in every 'fact' of his life, personal and professional and this is true knowledge.

It is because of such an understanding that Gandhi can say that, to him, 'Truth is God' and 'God is Truth' convey the same meaning. They are in essence the same. In a discussion about the two definitions of Truth, he says:

> If it is possible for the human tongue to give the fullest description of God, I have come to the conclusion that for myself, God is Truth. But two years ago I went a step further and said that Truth is God. You will see the fine distinction between the two statements, viz. that God is Truth and Truth is God. And I came to that conclusion after a continuous and relentless search for Truth which began nearly 50 years ago. I then found that the nearest approach to Truth was through Love. But I also found that Love has many meanings in the English language at least, and that human love in the sense of passion could become a degrading thing also. I found too that love in the sense of ahimsā had only a limited number of votaries in the world. But I never found a double meaning in connection with truth and even atheists had not demurred to the necessity or power of truth. But in their passion for discovering truth, the atheists have not hesitated to deny the very existence of God from their own point of view, rightly. And it was because of this reasoning that I saw that rather than say that God is Truth, I should say that Truth is God. I recall the name of Charles Bradlaugh, who delighted to call himself an atheist but knowing as I do of him, I would never regard him as an atheist. I would call him a God-fearing man, though I know he would reject the claim. His face would redden if I would say 'Mr Bradlaugh, you are a truth-fearing man, and so a God-fearing man.' I would automatically disarm his criticism by saying that Truth is God, as I have disarmed criticisms of many a young man. Add to this the great difficulty that millions have taken the name of God and in His name committed nameless atrocities. Not that scientists do not commit cruelties in the name of truth. I know how in the name of truth and science inhuman cruelties are perpetuated on animals when men perform vivisection.[11]

These statements 'Truth is God' and 'God is Truth' are an interesting parallel to the two conceptions of the Good that Wittgenstein considers—'God wills the Good because it is good' and 'The Good is good because God wills it'. It is useful to note here that the concept more central to Gandhi's thought is 'Truth' and not the 'Good'. I shall not go into questions which arise in using 'Truth' instead of the 'Good' and for the purposes of this discussion will hold that, on the whole, the study of the good and the study of Truth are concerned with similar issues: 'What is the meaning of life?'; 'What is it to lead a worthy life?', and so on. Unlike Gandhi, however, Wittgenstein will hold the former conception to be the more superficial and the latter to be the more profound. For, according to him, a state of affairs where everybody independently of his tastes and inclinations would necessarily follow the Good, or feel guilty about not doing so, is a 'chimera', i.e. he will say, 'Value is not in this world', or it is relative to the language game in which it occurs. However, Gandhi in his understanding of the self-disciplined person and of science shows how it is possible to have such a state of affairs. It will neither be relative to the persons involved nor their professions. In fact, one would not be able to talk of the two as separate and unrelated. Thus self-discipline would involve not merely self-discipline in one's relationship to oneself (religion) nor merely in one's relationship to other human beings (social science) but in our relation to 'lower creation' (science) as well. It may not be the case that everybody acts in accordance with the good but there will be objective, 'reasonable' and absolute or non-relativist criteria to decide what the Good is, and in the life of a truly self-disciplined person the distinction between his own will, the Good, the truth or God's will vanishes; God's will will be his will, and both will be *in* this world.

Notes and References

1. Friedrich Waismann, 'Notes on talks with Wittgenstein' in *The Philosophical Review*, Cornell University, January 1965, p. 15.
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3. Ibid., p. 9.
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus–Logico–Philosophicus*, Translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinaes, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, Section 6.43.
5. Friedrich Waismann, op. cit., p. 16.
6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, edited by Cyril Barrett, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967, p. 55.
7. Ibid., p. 55.
8. Ibid., p. 59.

9. M.K. Gandhi, *Young India*, December 17, 1925; see M.K. Gandhi, *My Religion*, compiled by Kumarappa Bharatan, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1855, p. 81
10. M.K. Gandhi, *Harijan*, August 11, 1946; see M.K. Gandhi, *Truth is God*, compiled by R.K. Prabhu, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1955, p. 107.
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Śaṅkara Advaita on Truth, Reality and Value

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Words found in any language are not necessarily used only in a single sense. Various meanings are ascribed and thus words are found to have more than one uses. However, conceptual difficulty results when multiple meanings are assigned to a word in one and the same context. In Vedānta tradition in general and in Śaṅkara Advaita in particular, one comes across a number of instances when different meanings are ascribed to one single term. For instance, Brahman is regarded to be *sat, cit* and *ānanda.* It is also held as *satya, śiva* and *sundara. Jñāna* is said to be the means for *mokṣa* and also *mokṣa* is understood as *jñāna* itself (vide Śaṅkara's saying: '*Mokṣasādhanam jñānam*' and '*Brahmabhāvaśca mokṣaḥ*'). It is said that there is no distinction between Brahmaveda and Brahman. It is also held that Brahman is *satya svarūpa, śuddha sattā* and *parama śreya.*

But whatever may be the philosophic depth of such an amalgamation, at the unsophisticated ordinary level this, no doubt, appears to be perplexing. Most probably one never gets a satisfactory explanation when one is told that Brahman is not an ordinary concept where inconsistency would result if different meanings are ascribed to it in the same context. In this regard, it is argued that Brahman is precisely not a concept but rather a meta-concept where any conceptual enquiry is simply irrelevant. *Brahmānubhūti* is not intellectual understanding or comprehensibility but supra-intellectual intuitive realisation for which any analytical investigation is an absolutely unwarranted undertaking.[1] But, to claim Śaṅkara's viewpoint as philosophically significant and at the same time conceding to the saying that it defies any logical assessment is perhaps not convincing at all.

Let us consider the term: *satya* (*sat* + *ya*). It, as an adjective, means *yathārtha, prakṛta, abhrānta vāstava* and *nitya.* In this context, *satya* is almost the same as truth and it is the correct unmistaken description of the fact which is regarded as *satya.* Ordinarily when somebody pointing at a table formulates a proposition that it is a table, then obviously, what he states, namely, a proposition, is regar-

ded as true. 'True' is thus found to be an adjective of proposition. This propositional account of truth, it can be seen, is clearly epistemic and it has concern with the knowledge of the object. The object, e.g. table, in itself is, of course, not true but the report or description of the object as table is regarded to be *satya*.

As indicated earlier, *satya* is synonymous with *nitya* which means something permanent or everlasting. Now, what is the sense in maintaining a true proposition as *nitya*? An explanation is surely needed here. That which is now described as a table cannot obviously have a permanent existence. It is liable to change. But the proposition that it is a table, which refers to a particular fact remains true irrespective of the case at the time of formulation. That Indira Gandhi is the daughter of Jawaharlal remains true whether it is formulated during the time Indira Gandhi lived or not. In this sense facts are dateless and so also truth, being virtually about fact itself, can be regarded as timeless. Hence *satya* as *nitya* carries non-temporal logical significance. The epistemological account of truth is thus found to be well in operation not only in the context of Sanskrit tradition but it is also philosophically legitimate.

Śaṅkara, in his well-known *adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, speaks about *vidyā* or knowledge as '*vastusvarūpāvadhāraṇa*'. It means knowledge (in the sense of true account or *pramā*) must be the comprehension of the object in its essence or object as it is. This criterion is not only applicable to *Brahma-jñāna* but also to the ordinary cases like *ghaṭa-jñāna* (knowledge of pot). If, by genuine perception, a *ghaṭa* is known as *ghaṭa*, then it is *satya* and by no means can it be falsified even if its negation is supported by a number of *śruti vākyas* (scriptural utterances). This shows that so far as truth is concerned, Śaṅkara adopts the procedure that satisfies the epistemic demand. In this context his statement that *jñāna* is *vastutantra* (fact-based) and never *puruṣa-vyāpāratantra* (person-based) is quite revealing. Here knowledge-claim concerning *laukika* (worldly) affairs is acceptable provided such claim is found to be a true account of the corresponding fact. *Vyāvahārika jñāna* is thus never regarded to be false on factual grounds. That definitely carries the sense of objectivity (*astitva* or *sat*).

But, then, what about the status of the saying: '*jaganmithyā*'? What does *mithyā* signify here? Does it not amount to the falsity of all such utterances concerning the empirical world? Śaṅkara's well-known doctrine of *māyā* has been sharply criticised on the ground that it reduces all empirical knowledge as totally false due to *avidyā*. And the stand that all true empirical propositions are not factually genuine is argued, from this point of view of criticism, to be clearly absurd and unacceptable.

Sympathetic exponents of Śaṅkara Advaita have tried to meet such difficulty by referring to the Śaṅkarite distinction between

paramārtha and *vyavahāra*. It has been, on the basis of the said distinction, argued that the truth of the ordinary *laukika* judgment rests upon its practical validity. It does satisfy the *vyāvahārika* or pragmatic criterion. Only such judgment is not tenable from the ultimate or *pāramārthika* standpoint. While *Brahma-jñāna* or philosophic knowledge in Śaṅkara Advaita has *pāramārthika* significance, the empirical knowledge or *laukika jñāna* has *vyāvahārika* significance. This distinction between *paramārtha* and *vyavahāra* is, of course, important. It, at least, clarifies one vital point that truth attained in the context of *Brahma-jñāna* and truth obtained in the context of *laukika jñāna* are not exactly identical. Though, in both the cases there is, as hinted earlier, the emphasis on objectivity or *vastutva*, there remains still an important point of difference. Also in the Śaṅkarite context highest weightage is definitely given to *Brahma-jñāna*. It is argued that the empirical truth, though practically convenient, theoretically remains indefensible. But the *mahāvākyas* like '*Tattvamasi*' (That thou art) signifying Ātman-Brahman identity are incorrigible and therefore are absolutely true. It can be noted here that a criterion of unsublatability (*abādhitva*) is adopted here to justify the higher significance of *Brahma-jñāna* over *jāgatika jñāna*. In this context Śaṅkara's statement in his *Gītā-bhāṣya* may be noted (*yat viṣayā buddhi na vyabhicarati tat sat*).

The word: *sat*, used in this expression, has been interpreted to indicate reality or existence as such (*astitva mātra*). In the Śaṅkarite context it, of course, is indicative of Brahman itself. Brahman is thus said to be *parama satyam* and also *śuddha sattā*. That means it is commonly taken for granted that there is no distinction between truth and reality. Further one finds the grammatical sanction for this identity on the ground that words like *satya*, *sat* and *sattā* also have the common root: *as*, which means to be or to exist.

In some of the recent studies of Śaṅkara Advaita, emphasis has been made on the point that Śaṅkara does depend on the method of linguistic analysis (*śabda pramāṇa/vākyārtha vicāraṇā*) to arrive at his philosophic conclusion. These studies, through different lines of argument and reasoning, have come to suggest that Śaṅkara is not only an analytical philosopher but also one revisionary metaphysician/ontologist and his philosophic pursuit is never grounded on any mystic or intuitive experience.[2] All such attempts are quite refreshing in the sense that those have, in their own ways, drawn our attention to certain subtle points of philosophical interest within Śaṅkara Advaita. But, all the same, it seems that nothing has been advanced in such works to explore a rationally satisfying explanation concerning the identity of truth and reality in Śaṅkara Advaita in particular. In what sense can it be plausibly held that an epistemic concept is non-different from that of ontology?

Now, in spite of the fact that *sat* is defined in terms of *abādhitva*, it is worth noting here that in the Śaṅkarite tradition there is clear indication of three levels of being (*sattā*), namely, *prātibhāṣika, vyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika*. It is argued that there is the mark of objectivity in all the three levels of experience. 'Where there is no object, there can be no knowledge'.[3] But, the point is: there is the logical distinction between knowledge and knowledge-claim. Even if it is conceded that knowledge, by definition, must be grounded on objectivity, knowledge-claim need not necessarily be knowledge. In this way, whatever is claimed to have been known or experienced by means of dream or illusory perception need not justifiably be argued to have knowledge-status or in that way objectivity. So *prātibhāṣika* is not simply real or objective in the sense of either *vyāvahārika* or *pāramārthika*; it cannot have, logically speaking, any sense of reality of existence. That is why, perhaps, it has been remarked that the so-called object seen in the illusory perception is simply a 'no-fact'.[4] This clearly indicates that *sattā* used in the context of *prātibhāṣika* can never stand for existence. The illusory snake is not even really existent while it was perceived. Of course, from this it need not follow that those are subjective and thus are only confined to the perceiver alone. They, however, occur in the field of experience or in the sense-field and are replaced by the subsequent waking experience or veridical experience. Since the very fact that such experiences do occur, the content of such experiences are neither *tucca* or absolutely insignificant nor are real in any sense of existence.

This implies that in the Śaṅkarite context *sattā* must mean something different. It is true that the so-called dreamy or illusory object is not as permanent as objects of waking state. But the sense of temporality or even spatiality is not found to be relevant here because of the point that Brahman being *pāramārthika sattā* is said to be beyond space and time. In other words, *sattā* must at least be used in the same sense in all the three cases in order to have minimum sense of logical consistency. It cannot be that at the *prātibhāṣika* state it means mere experiencing without any mark of existence, at the *vyāvahārika* state it stands for objects within space and time and again at the *pāramārthika* state it stands for pure existence as such that is beyond space and time. This sort of rendering of Śaṅkarite point of view, I honestly feel, does not appear to be at all clear and convincing. There should be at least one common meaning of the term *sattā* which ought to be recognised so far as the three levels are concerned. It cannot be taken as mere experiencing. Because while experiencing is considerably loaded with the import of subjectivity, *sattā* has, in the sense of reality, an objective import.

Well, here some may object to this sort of analytical exploration of Śaṅkara Advaita on the ground that the subject-object dichotomy is not at all relevant in this connection. The Advaita Brahman is neither pure subjectivity nor pure objectivity; rather it transcends the subject-object conceptual framework. Here the distinction between *jñātā* (knower) and *jñeya* (known) does not persist. So long as Ātman is viewed as subject and Brahman as object they can never be treated as one and the same. Hence '*Tat tvam asi*' (That thou art) has been interpreted as signifying the identity of Ātman and Brahman in the sense of intellectual transcendence.

But, then, what is this transcendence? Unless that is made explicit, mere taking recourse to the scriptural saying that Brahman is not established by reason (*tarka apratiṣṭhānāt*) does not carry conviction. Such an approach only puts an unwarranted seal for a meaningful philosophic pursuit. It seems that Śaṅkara is not wholly unaware of this significant point and, as such, he has not kept himself blind to such implication. That is why the scriptural reference to *tarka* in that context has been interpreted by Śaṅkara as a specific type of reasoning (*śuṣka tarka*) which is bare ratiocination or dry logic chopping. If the reasoning is solely engaged in a mere verbal tussle and it does not either directly or indirectly seek to establish any point of human relevance (*puruṣārtha*) then that sort of reasoning is decried. In other words, reasoning is not taken as unbridled bare speculation but, in a distinct sense, regulated and balanced formulation that systematically strives to preserve human values. It need not be entangled with bare imaginative surmises (*utprekṣā*) much away from concrete situations. In this context Śaṅkara's emphasis on *śrutyānugrahita tarka* is noteworthy. Here *śruti* can never suggest blind dogmatic acceptance of the sacred scriptures. Attempts have been recently made to interpret *śruti*, at least in the context of Śaṅkara Advaita, not as scriptural authority but as the method of logico-linguistic analysis.[5] Now, whatever may be the exact account of *śruti* in Śaṅkara's philosophy, it can never stand for dogmatic adherence to scripture. Reasoning that is accepted by Śaṅkara cannot be taken as surrendering to dogmatic authority. That virtually suggests that if Brahman is regarded as both *satya svarūpa* and *śuddha sattā*, a deeper philosophical investigation remains almost inevitable.

Here the Kaṭhopaniṣadic point of distinction between *śreya* and *preya* may be considered. It is held that those men who are after *śreya* in contrast to *preya* are *dhīrāḥ* or the enlightened ones (*dhīrāḥ śreyaḥ hi abhivṛṇite*). They attain excellence here and now (*atra Brahma samasnute*) and this attainment is nothing but *puruṣārtha*. It means that *Brahmopalabdhi* or *Ātmajñāna* does not consist of any transcendent non-secular occult state of other-worldly existence,

nor does it point to any obscurant mystic realisation confined to the individual concerned. There is at least here no such compelling ground advanced either in favour of abstract essentialism or in favour of vague ego-centricism. The worldly empirical existence is not decried in favour of some vague transcendental realm of divine existence. In this connection Śaṅkara's comment that all life even that of Brahma in heaven is short-lived (*api sarvam jīvitam alpam eva*) is significant. The purpose of Upaniṣad as well as that of Śaṅkara is not to question about the reality of the empirical existence in preference to some non-empirical mystical state. Instead of condemning this sensible world-phenomena, opposition is advanced on the view that the sensuous attitude towards life is the only proper attitude. The term *lokaḥ*, in this regard, need not mean the world of existence but only one world-view which places sole emphasis on sensuality, temptation etc., and this view of the world is critically dealt with because of advocating a different valuational standpoint that is based on *śreya*.

The Vedāntic tradition holds that *Ātma-jñāna* or *puruṣārtha* is not possible if one has not desisted from bad conduct (*aviratah duścaritrāt*) and has not turned away from the lure of senses (*aśāntaḥ*). While commenting on the *Kenopaniṣad*, Śaṅkara holds that it is the man (*mauṣya*) who is able to comprehend the oneness of Ātman (*Ātmaikattva*) who realizes the highest truth. As per *Īśa Upaniṣad*, it is held that man who sees all beings in the very Ātman and Ātman in all beings, feels no hatred for others by virtue of that realisation (*yastu sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmani eva anupaśyati sarvabhūteṣu ca ātmānām tataḥ na vijugupsate*). All this reveals that Śaṅkara Advaita is not necessarily opposed to the distinctive uses of the terms *sat*, *sattā* and *śreya* so far as common parlance is concerned. That the term *sat* has an epistemic sense of significance, *sattā* an ontological sense of significance and *śreya* a valuational sense of significance has never been questioned. It is only advocated from a typical philosophical angle that something that is true cannot be unreal and, for the same matter, cannot be held as valueless.

Mokṣa, as the highest value (*parama śreya*), is recommended at the empiric life-situation not arbitrarily but only after a thorough examination of the whole conceptual order with a view to distinguish and discriminate the incorrigible concepts (*avyabhicārī viṣayābuddhi*) from the corrigible concepts (*vyabhicārī viṣayābuddhi*). By grading different concepts on the basis of a criterion, a revisionary framework is advanced as against the existing one. Only after critically surveying, distinguishing and grading different concepts by means of a logical criterion, Śaṅkara Advaita seems to have moved for a modification about the whole conceptual order. It appears that within this philosophical position, conceptual analysis and metaphysical formulation in the sense of adhering to certain ontological bases are not entirely exclusive of each other. It is by the method of conceptual analysis, that a revisionary conceptual order is resulted. It is to be noted here that such an analysis need not be construed as something purely abstract; for it has clear relevance in the realm of practice.[6]

It goes without saying that *sat* and *asat*, *sattā* and *asattā* are analytically distinguished on the basis of a logical criterion. Again *sat* and *sattā* are preferred to *asat* and *asattā* respectively on the basis of a valuational principle. It is precisely here that the concept of *śreya* has come into prominence. Brahman is *sat* not on the empirical plane. The utterance 'Brahman is *satya*' neither connotes reality of a physical existence nor that of a mystical type. It is, on the contrary, indicative of a certain value which is considered to be of highest relevance in the human set-up. Because of adhering to certain normative principles *sat* is preferred to *asat* and so also *sattā* to *asattā*. If one is to have the goal of realizing *sattā* then one cannot resort to *asat*. Because truth alone reveals the real. It is virtually in this perspective alone that *sat* and *sattā* can be construed as non-different.

Śaṅkara's view that knowledge of Brahman means Brahman itself is grounded upon the valuational postulate: *sarva-bhūtān-tarātmā*. The sense of oneness (*ekatva*) prompts the finer sense of fellow-feeling. It meaningfully boosts up the Vedic concept of *ṛta* and in that way *svakalyāṇa*, and *janakalyāṇa* are properly integrated. *Brahmavit* moves on to strike a harmony between the egoistic and altruistic tendencies by means of a balanced intellect (*sama buddhi*) and thereby adopts a state of compositeness (*sthita-prajñatā*). *Brahmāvagati*, from this point of view, is meant as serving the cause of man (*puruṣa*). The analytical subtleties that a Śaṅkarite explores in the field of concepts is significant in the scheme of value. *Brahma-jñānī* is he who does not advocate *ātmaikattva* as a form of sterile rational abstraction but realizes its importance adopting the corresponding valuational attitude at the concrete living set-up. Thus the intellectual quest undertaken at the epistemic and ontological realm seems to have reached its culmination at the plane of value. As far as the logical structure of Śaṅkara Advaita is concerned, proper conceptual analysis and value-awareness are simultaneous and there is no point in supposing a cleavage between the two. In this sense to presume that one is value-conscious and yet indifferent in making suitable changes in his actual dealings is something which never seems to be plausible within the framework of Śaṅkara Advaita.[7]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Vide, in this connection, S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, London, 1948, p. 514; and C.D. Sharma, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, Delhi, 1973, p. 289.
2. Vide G. Misra, *The Advaita Conception of Philosophy: Its Method, Scope and Limits*, Bhubaneswar, 1976; and G.C. Nayak, *Philosophical Reflections*, Delhi, 1987.
3. M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1958, p. 349.
4. K.C. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, Calcutta, pp. 181–90.
5. Vide G. Misra, *Analytical Studies in Indian Philosophical Problems*, Bhubaneswar, Utkal University, 1971; and G. Misra, *The Advaita Conception of Philosophy: Its Method, Scope and Limits*, op.cit. I have tried to interpret the Sāṁkhya concept of *Śruti pramāṇa* as the method of logico-linguistic analysis (Vide my book *Indian Philosophy—An Analytical Study*, Delhi, 1985, pp. 72–80).
6. Here this part of my discussion has been adopted from my article '*Mokṣa* as Value and *Jñāna* as Method in Śaṅkara Vedānta' which is published in *The Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, August 1987.
7. An earlier version of the present article was presented as the Pratap Seth Vedānta lecture at the 65th session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Madurai in December 1990.

The Concept of *Sākṣī* in Advaita Vedānta

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Considering the crucial importance of the basic notion of *sākṣī* it is surprising that its discussion in the Advaita literature is so unsystematic and haphazard. Hints and associations are indeed plentiful but these do not crystallize into precise formulations with the result that the logical contours of the notion are more suggestive than analytic and critical. Sharp distinctions do not emerge and implications are not fully worked out. There is much laxity even in the terminology employed, so that one is never sure what a term really stands for in different contexts. Terms like *sarvasākṣī*, *nityasākṣī* could mean Brahman, *sākṣī* (in the technical sense) or even *Īśvara*. We have terms like *prājña*, *draṣṭā* or *vijñātā*, *antaryāmī*, *Īśvara*, *ātmajyoti* or *svayamjyoti*, and we do not know whether they are completely synonymous or not. Even Śaṅkara describes pure consciousness sometimes as Brahman, sometimes as the witness-self (*sākṣī*) of deep sleep, sometimes as *Īśvara* even. *Pratyagātman* (inwardness of the self) is a favourite topic of discussion for Śaṅkara, but does it refer to the *jīva*, or the *sāksī*, or *Īśvara*? Are terms like Brahman, *sākṣī*, *Īśvara* synonymous? Pañcadaśī eschews the term *sākṣī* altogether, *kūṭastha* being preferred instead. Are the two synonymous then? A modest attempt is made here to make the concept more precise, more securely based on logic, and to make the distinctions clearer.

Advaita, as the appellation suggests, is a theory of non-dualism, rather than of monism. Identity is not so much asserted as difference annulled. Identity remains the primary implicate of all propositions, and cannot therefore itself be expressed through propositions. This negative approach is the characteristic difference between pre-Śaṅkara monistic Vedānta and its transformation by Śaṅkara into non-dualistic absolutism. Every proposition is essentially an identity-proposition, distorted by the apparent distinctions at the surface. The task of philosophy is to remove these accretions, and not to establish the underlying identity which is given in revelation. Philosophy is asymptotic to reality, it leads up to it but then, the goal reached, itself falls away. Philosophy is a sort of cosmic *lakṣaṇā*.

This identity as revealed by the Upaniṣads is Brahman, the ultimate reality and of the nature of consciousness. It is one without a second and one unitary whole devoid of any kind of distinction. It is neutral and passive, neither owning nor repelling the various ascriptions that might be imposed on it. It is characterless, indeterminate, beyond the pale of any kind of predication. It can be characterized only as what could not be characterized; negative description is the only description possible.

If we are left with such a completely transcendent reality, it is difficult to see how man's pilgrimage towards liberation could be possible. Its non-duality would seem to preclude the very possibility of empirical existence. There would be no problem, and consequently no philosophy. There would be no world and no bondage. Reality therefore has to be shown, not merely as sheer transcendence, something 'out there,' but as complete immanence, as the indwelling essence of everything that appears. There is no incompatibility between these two facets of reality, which are really two aspects of the same situation. If empirical existence had a substantial reality of its own, we could talk of transcendence of Brahman. Upaniṣads therefore declare that the world is naught. Brahman alone exists, but is also the reality of the world.

It has thus to be shown how the real gets involved in the unreal and how the initial mistaken step is to be retraced. Ontologically the process never took place, but still the involvement is there as an existential fact. This involvement takes two complementary directions. Being in the world is being a subject confronted with objects. Both are grounded on the same reality and are to be understood as two orders of ascriptions. They appear as two different sorts of entities, but are essentially one and the same reality. That which brings them together, makes one relevant to the other, is Brahman, which is reached as the result of an essentialistic analysis of both the knower and the known. Both are ascriptions, appearances of the same reality. Brahman as the reality to be known, and Ātman as the knower, coalesce in the final analysis.

There is thus a two-fold investigation into the nature of the ground on which all duality is based. There is, unearthing the ground of the world of phenomena, that underlying principle which lends intelligibility to the objects, that because of which the latter can stand out as an 'object' at all. There is also digging into the depths of the subject, an analysis of the complexities of the knowing process, an investigation into how the knowing self is structured and stratified. What is the self? What constitutes the selfhood of the subject? How is it to be demarcated from the object? Could it itself be distinguished as one more object? How does it reveal or illumine its contexts? In his attempt to reach the very foundation of knowing, the Advaitin arrives at the notion of a 'witness-self' (*sākṣī*) which stands behind everything that is known, which is in itself and not in relation to something else, which reveals eternally and without break. This *sākṣī* is the ground of the notion of 'I', the reality to which the 'I' is ascribed.

What then is the self? How is it constituted? In what does its 'radicalness' consist? These questions are the major concern of the Advaita philosopher.

The contrast in empirical knowing between the changing and the unchanging is too obvious to be stressed. Something varies; our experience is a 'stream of consciousness'. All its contents change; all knowledge is in a state of incessant flux. But at the same time these discrete 'atoms' of experience are not left in their isolation, but are gathered up and appropriated by some other factor in experience. Knowledge is not merely a succession but also a fusion or a synthesis. All knowing has to be owned by something, so that what we find is not just knowledge in the abstract, but invariably knowledge *of* somebody. Even if all experience were in a flux, we require a stable perspective or vantage-ground from which the fact of flux is itself to be noted. The assertion that there is change implies the awareness of that change, and this awareness must be something distinct, something which is not a part of what it is aware of. This is the 'I'. All experience has the characteristic of 'belonging'—the items do not just float in a vacuum. The argument is really simple; to know things to be different we require an identical knower for all the differents, which therefore must also be different from the differents. (*yeṣu vyāvartamāneṣu yad anuvartate tat tebhyo bhinnam, yathā kusumebhyaḥ sūtram.*)

The 'I' as the background precondition of all experience is not however a mere form, as it is in Kant. For Kant 'I' is known only as the knower of objects, and not as it is in itself. In Advaita however 'I' is something ontological, not merely the system or frame of reference for the variety of mental states held together. It is *sui generis*, and remains self-identical amidst all change, against the stability of which change itself is to be measured.

The 'I', however, still remains empirical. The continuity of 'I' has gaps in it. During deep sleep the sense of 'I' is lost, to be resumed on waking up, but it is not felt to be another 'I'. On waking up I can certainly say 'I was' but while asleep I cannot say 'I am'. When I become self-conscious, when, for example, I am acutely embarrassed, I seem to become aware of myself as a distinct 'I' confronted with other similar egos. In these cases 'I' itself is objectified, looked upon as one more object among other objects. There is to be posited thus a deeper 'I' behind the 'I' that is objectified. It is a sort of 'impartial spectator', indifferent to the special privileges that the 'I' ordinarily

enjoys. What is the subject that is aware of this 'I'. Not the 'I' itself, since that is already an object of investigation. 'I' cannot both be the subject and object at once, since the two functions are irreconcilable (*karma-kartṛ-virodha*). Hence the 'I', and that which is aware of that 'I', must be different. The 'I' is thus not the ultimate self. The 'I' of which one can be self-conscious is not the real self, and something more basic is required.

Several approaches are adopted in the Advaita, all converging towards that foundational consciousness which illumines, among other things, the 'I' itself. The evidence adduced can be arranged under five different but overlapping categories:

(1) Argument from deep sleep;
(2) Argument from dream-consciousness;
(3) Argument from illusion;
(4) Argument from internal states; and
(5) Argument from waking experience.

The explication of these arguments is basic to our understanding of the Advaita philosophy.

I

What really happens when one goes to sleep? There seem to be intermittent periods of lapsing into total unconsciousness. Though the body is there along with its purely vegetative functions, its presence is not felt or registered, at least during moments of deepest sleep. Sensory knowledge is effaced, and all means of referring to the sleeping 'I' become unavailable. Is consciousness itself present or not? Is sleep a state of complete blank? Had there been a break in the flow of consciousness, one could not, on waking, resume the threads of his personal identity, and could conceivably wake up as some other person. The consciousness of identity is not something inferred from memory and from the present surroundings, but is immediate, without the intervention of any process. All this is inexplicable on the hypothesis of the state of sleep being a mere blank. A gap within consciousness could not leave memory traces to be revived later. It could leave in fact nothing which could constitute evidence for the sense of continuing identity. Personal identity is in any case not felt to be the result of any subsequent investigation as a sort of reconstruction.

Though consciousness has thus to be postulated as being present during sleep, the fact remains that it appears to be absent, and this needs some explanation. It was present and yet was not manifested. There is no consciousness of consciousness itself. It reveals objects but it cannot turn around and reveal itself. And were it to be

revealed by something else. We clearly have an infinite regress. During waking we do not have revelation of consciousness as such but rather revelation of consciousness *as knowing the objects*. Consciousness is relational here and this is indispensable for the revelation of consciousness. Consciousness is not knowledge. The latter is the revelation of objects by means of *vṛttis*, while consciousness is the principle of revelation itself. As such it is not known, directly or immediately, not known as the content of a *pramāṇa*, but only regressively, only as the ground of all knowledge. Without there being this principle of revelation, the entire world would be plunged in darkness (*jagad āndhyaprasaṅga*).

The fact that there is revelation is made known only when there has been *revelation of something*. Object-knowledge therefore is an indispensable precondition of there being 'I'-consciousness. During sleep there is no knowledge of objects, the senses and the mind being dormant. Consequently the knower function or the 'I' too lapses. Light would be indistinguishable from darkness if there were nothing for it to fall on.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the state of sleep is not timeless: there is also the subsequent waking up. And waking up does not transform us into different personalities; we wake up as the same persons we were. The 'I'-ness of the empirical life had therefore been present even during sleep, albeit in a latent or incipient form. The sleeping self and the waking 'I' are not two different selves, and their continuity is maintained throughout. The 'I' had with it, must have been relational. It is neither the pure self, nor the bare principle of revelation, but must be a revelation *of* something. There is a second factor which was revealed during sleep, the presence of which distinguishes sleep from *samādhi*. Though the empirical gross body of waking life has been shed, a subtle body still persists, a causal body which could again give rise to the 'I' as its effect on waking up. The sleeping self is still embodied.

What does this attenuated or residual 'I' reveal? Gross objects have all disappeared, the necessary conditions for their revelation being absent. On waking up one says, 'I slept soundly; I did not know anything'. Paradoxically, this 'not knowing of anything' is itself known. And it must have been known during sleep itself; the subsequent memory is not possible without the primary experience. It is memory and not inference, since no data are available for making such an inference. Had there been no experience of not knowing, there would have been a gap in knowledge, to be reflected later as a gap in memory. What we have is not a mere gap, but a positive confirmation of the absence of all knowledge, indicating an immediate experience of this absence. The absence in question is not negative; it is a positive covering or obstruction, preventing any knowledge from

taking place. This covering is *ajñāna,* not a mere absence of knowledge, but a positive veil of total darkness in which the self is shrouded. The sleeping self is thus revealed as revealing darkness which is a kind of loose embodiment for the self. The sleeping self is the ignorant self, not to be equated with pure self or Brahman.

But can consciousness be covered by ignorance to which it is opposed as light is to darkness? Ignorance is dispelled by consciousness. However ignorance is not simply the absence of knowledge; it is not negative but a privation. Only that can be ignorant which should not have been so. A stone is never ignorant since it could not be otherwise (*jaḍe āvaraṇakṛtyābhāvāt*). If there is to be ignorance at all, it could reside only in consciousness.

We must therefore distinguish between consciousness in which ignorance resides and consciousness which dispels ignorance. Pure consciousness is not antithetical to ignorance; otherwise there would be no ignorance, as it cannot exist in anything else. What destroys ignorance is a particular knowledge (*vṛttijñāna* or *pramāṇajñāna*) which reveals an object by removing its previous unknownness. In the case of sleep the total veil that covers consciousness is not pierced through by any *vṛtti,* so that consciousness and its covering reside in peaceful coexistence.

That consciousness is covered by darkness should not mean that its revelatory nature itself is covered. Ignorance that covers it is also revealed, and that too by the same consciousness that it covers. Consciousness does not remain ignorant of its own ignorance. Otherwise the memory judgment 'I did not know anything' would not have been possible. Of course ignorance cannot be known through a *pramāṇa vṛtti;* knowledge of ignorance through a *pramāṇa* is a contradiction in terms. A *vṛtti* removes the ignorance and cannot therefore reveal it. Hence ignorance is revealed directly and immediately without any intervention.

It may be objected that consciousness, totally submerged in darkness as it is, cannot reveal. But the covering only hides objects, preventing their manifestation. It does not suppress the revelatory nature of consciousness. Revelation is not an activity which could be switched on and off, but is rather its intrinsic nature (*svatva*), which can never be set aside. 'I did not know anything' refers to particular objects not being revealed; it does not imply absence of revelation. In fact consciousness did reveal something, viz. the fact that objects were not revealed. What was revealed instead was the total darkness into which all objects had withdrawn. Ignorance is revealed by the very consciousness which it seeks to cover. An eclipse is visible because of the sun itself. Objects are revealed when present; when they are hidden, consciousness still reveals, but now the covering

itself. Revelation is absolute and timeless, not depending on the adventitious fact of there being something to be revealed.

II

Dreams are a unique experience in many respects. Almost an entire world is created, wholly unreal and yet bearing a perfect verisimilitude, wherein all ordinary norms of credibility are totally suspended. Though creatures of fantasy, the dream objects enjoy an inexplicable air of externality and objectivity. Things seem to happen, not in the mind, but 'out there'. Sense of externality comes from the consciousness of a body. What is inside the body is internal, while the external is what happens outside it. During sleep our body-awareness is weakened, with the result that the distinction between the internal and the external gets blurred.

Embodiment however is not completely shed; association with the gross physical body is absent, but there is the subtle body constituted by the impressions stored in the mind by the desires of waking life. The embodiment is that of the body of desires. Sleeping consciousness is thus not pure. 'I'-consciousness continues, since *antaḥkaraṇa* is still present, though the latter does not function through its *vṛttis,* and therefore external objects are not apprehended. The self of waking life, namely, the *pramātā* is not there. The two selves are however not utterly discontinuous; dream contents are all supplied by the *vāsanās* of waking life, and it is the waking self that has the memory of the dream, appropriating it as its own.

Dream contents, though being shown up as external, are really pulsations of the mind. The mind or rather *avidyā* itself as associated with the sleeping self, gets directly transformed into the dream objects. They do not come from the external world, but are creations of consciousness. Since senses do not function, consciousness has to create them out of its own resources. The objects are not external, and are, therefore, not perceived through the intervention of any *vṛtti.* They are seen directly and not through any *pramāṇa.* The seer therefore is not the *pramātā,* though again not entirely different from it. Dreams are seen by some consciousness which is invariably present along with the *pramātā,* though itself always remaining in the background. Dream experience comes in between waking consciousness by which it is produced, on the one hand, and dreamless sleep on the other, when the objects are all retracted into *ajñāna,* the primary stuff which they are made of.

The importance of the dream state lies in the fact that it is here that the nature of consciousness as self-luminous revelation becomes most explicit. Though the self is never bereft of its self-luminosity, it is not evident during waking life, where the light of self mingles

with extraneous sources of revelation, so that its own specific character is obscured. And during dreamless sleep light seems to be shrouded in total darkness, and even the presence of revelation is not detected. But during dreams all external illumination ceases and yet perception of objects is not hindered thereby. This light can be of none other than the self itself. While everything goes to sleep, something remains awake. Only this self-luminosity is its essential nature, not its creativity, not its being transformed into the dream objects, not even its witnessing of contents standing out before it, but bare revelation, which is unaffected by the presence or absence of objects to be revealed, unaffected whether its revelatory nature is manifested or not.

The characteristic feature of dreams is that everything in them is illusory, including even objectivity or 'thisness' without which no object-experience is possible. Illusions occur during waking life too, but their 'thisness' is itself not illusory. The 'thisness' of the illusory snake is borrowed from its ground, namely, the rope, which is really there. Thus the illusory snake had a location in empirical space and time. But dreams locate no meeting place nor time reference. The references of time, place, objectivity, are all significant only in the particular context of dreaming, and cannot reach out to any external framework. What then is the ground of the dream experience, as there can be no groundless illusion? The required ground cannot be the objectivity of real empirical things, since ties with empirical reality are completely snapped off. Objectivity here is totally spurious. The specious objectivity (thisness) of dream contents is not grounded on anything externally real, and is a part of the illusion. The ground therefore has to be some form of consciousness. This cannot be Brahman, since sublation of an illusion results in the knowledge of the ground, and consequently one would wake up from a dream with *brahmajñāna*. Nor is the empirical 'I' (*jīva*) the ground. The illusory is identified with its ground; in the judgment 'this is a snake', the 'snake' is identified with the 'this'. So the dream-elephant would be identified with the 'I', its putative ground, resulting in the judgment 'I am an elephant'. In fact, everything that is dreamt of would be identified with 'I', so that all dream judgments would have the form 'I am X', where 'X' is any dream content. The most plausible hypothesis is that it is *sākṣī* consciousness on which all dream experience is based. The *sākṣī* witnesses what are essentially its own creatures.

III

Illusion is a privative experience, the appearance of something which should not have appeared. It is not a straightforward ordinary object of cognition. Though it enjoys a spatio-temporal habitat, a closer scrutiny reveals that it was not its own at all. Can we say that the shell-silver existed on the beach at 10 a.m.? I now realize that there had been no silver there at all at any time. Some genuine silver existing at some other place is utterly irrelevant to the appearance in question. The shell-silver refuses to accept any empirical description or predication. That the 'silver' was of a certain size, was very shiny and was half-buried in the sand, are all descriptions of the shell, and of nothing else. The 'silver' has no predicate of its own, no characterization, nothing which could fix its identity. The 'silver' is indescribable.

The illusory is thus nothing empirical; it is a freak out of nowhere as it were. Being non-empirical, it cannot be known by any *pramāṇa* or any empirical means of knowledge. All knowledge takes place as the revelation of some object that already exists, but shrouded in the veil of unknownness, i.e. ignorance. Knowledge removes this veil through a *pramāṇa*; it does not make the object come into being, but merely reveals what has already been there. The illusory object however is never hidden; it has no unknown existence, since it is nothing 'out there'. Its sole existence is in being perceived (*pratihāsamātra-śarīratva*); its *esse* is its *percipé*. Never being hidden, there is no question of revealing it by removing its veil of unknownness. There is no making it immediate, as it had never been otherwise. Hence no *pramāṇa* is available for the revelation of the illusory. It cannot exist but as known.

The illusory, being nonempirical, cannot be known by the empirical 'I' (*pramātā*) which can know only through some *pramāṇa* or other. An in-depth analysis of the structure of illusion reveals the highly complex character of the experience. Four strands in its complex texture can be distinguished, namely *adhiṣṭhāna, āvaraṇa, vikṣepa* and *adhyāsa*.

(a) The illusory is predicateless, has nothing of its own. Whatever is said about the 'silver' really characterizes the shell, so that the 'silver' is a parasite, masquerading under borrowed plumes. In itself it is a sheer naught. It can appear only by presenting forged credentials which belong to something else. It presupposes therefore a ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*) the reality of which it feeds on. There is no illusion without a ground; otherwise it would lack a *locus standi* or a platform, and could not even appear.

(b) The mere presence of *adhiṣṭhāna*, though necessary, is not a sufficient condition for the occurrence of an illusion. Any shell is not mistaken for silver; it may also be seen as what it is. For misconstruing to occur, the shell should not be known as a shell; it should exist but should remain unknown, so that the 'silver' could borrow its reality and character. It must go into hiding (*āvaraṇa*); there must be something that covers it and prevents it from being known.

(c) But mere unknownness of the shell is again not sufficient for the 'silver' appearance. If something remains hidden, it is simply not known, but that by itself does not account for the emergence of a specious appearance. I do not know what lies behind a curtain, but I do not start seeing something else instead. Lack of knowledge would be perceived as a mere blank. But in the case of the silver-illusion there is some filling in of the gap. Something is projected (*vikṣepa*), something that exploits the gap and misappropriates the existence of the ground that is covered.

(d) Even now the picture is not complete. What is projected cannot stand on its own legs, since it has no reality of its own. Shell and silver are not two distinct entities; the latter is nothing in itself and can exist only as imposed on or ascribed to (*adhyāsa*) the shell. When the illusion is sublated we do not have them separately; the so-called 'silver' explodes into nothingness. Hence there is a positive confusion or identification between the two. The 'silver', being nothing apart from the shell, is identical with the latter. The mistake consists in taking a thing amiss; it is the shell that appears as silver.

Illusion is thus a highly complex affair. Its content is not real, as it is sublated. Nor is it unreal, being identical with its real ground. There are two different elements in the judgment 'this is silver', namely, what is ascribed to and the ascription itself. The ground of the ascription is real, and the 'this' part is not cancelled even after the illusion is dispelled. It is not realized to belong really to the shell which was obscured before. The 'silver' part is however totally annihilated as not belonging to the order of reality. Illusion is thus a real-unreal configuration (gestalt), and its constituents are to be traced back to two different sources, belonging to different ontological levels. Hence, Advaita speaks of two *vṛttis* in explaining the genesis of illusion, namely, the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* and the *avidyāvṛtti*. The *antaḥkaraṇa* (internal organ) pertains to the 'this' part which is real. This is covered and is known by uncovering. *Avidyāvṛtti* pertains to the ascribed part, i.e. the 'silver'. The two *vṛttis* get fused into one. They are positively identified, not merely their distinction being non-apprehended, as in *akhyāti*. The *vṛttis* are different, each

having its own object, but both are reflected and consequently identified in the same consciousness. Illusion takes place only when there is positive confusion, and literally one is read into the other.

Since the contents of the two *vṛttis* belong to different levels, they are cognized by two different 'selves'. The 'this' is known in the normal way, by uncovering what was hidden before, and its subject is the empirical 'I' or *pramātā*. The 'silver', however, has no hidden existence and cannot be known by any ordinary or empirical means. It is really perceived by the transcendental self (*sākṣī*). To be known by the *sākṣī* is not to be known without a *vṛtti*, but only without a *pramāṇa*. A *vṛtti* is involved in any case of knowing, whether it is *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* or *avidyāvṛtti*. Though there are two agents of knowing involved here, the 'I' or the *pramātā* appropriates as its own knowledge what is really perceived by the *sākṣī*. The illusory as non-empirical cannot be cognized by the *pramātā*, but the latter owns it up and also makes the subsequent cancellation judgment, namely, 'I perceived the silver, but I was mistaken'. Illusion is a unitary but synthetic experience and its appropriation by the 'I', which cannot in the strict sense own it, indicates the indissoluble unity of the stratified self.

The problem arises as to the necessity of an *avidyāvṛtti* at all. Revelation of the *sākṣī* is always direct and immediate, unlike as in the case of the *pramātā* which could know only by means of a *vṛtti*. The role of a *vṛtti* in the case of *sākṣī*-knowledge is not so clear. Any immediacy, the Advaita maintains, is possible only on the basis of identity. Were the object utterly different from its knower, a gap between them would always be there, and total immediacy could never be secured. For this, some kind of identity is essential. When this basic identity is not explicit, some means would have to be employed for identifying what are apparently not identical. This means of identification is a *vṛtti*. If identity were already given, then of course a *vṛtti* is not called for. But where identity has to be established, a *vṛtti* becomes indispensable.

In the case of an external object, a *vṛtti* has to reach out in order to annul the gap between subject and object, making the latter immediate. In the case of *sākṣī*, however, nothing is hidden, nothing is remote or external. What then is the function of a *vṛtti* here? Some amount of unclarity in this regard is found in the literature. Is *rajatavṛtti* something different from *idamvṛtti* at all?

In any case, the judgment 'this is silver' is both true and false, true in referring to a real 'this', false in referring to an unreal ascription. The real and the unreal are both equally objects of *sākṣī* which reveals everything. Hence *sākṣī*-knowledge is neither valid nor invalid. It cannot make alethaic distinctions which are all made by the intellect (*buddhi*). That knowledge where the *pramātā* with its

antaḥkaraṇa is not involved, that which is known by the *sāksī* alone, is illusory.

IV

Internal states like feelings of pleasure and pain, emotions of anger and grief, and other mental states occupy a peculiar place in the economy of our ordinary experience. On the one hand they are unlike the external objects which are explicitly different from the ego. Objects are obviously outside us and are perceived as such. But I cannot distance myself from my feelings, which seem to be a part of myself and have no independent existence of their own. They can exist only as belonging to somebody. But on the other hand they are themselves objects of cognition. Pleasure and its awareness, inextricably intertwined as they might appear to be, are to be distinguished as belonging to different categories. Consciousness still retains its intrinsic intentionality, its directedness towards something other than itself, but now this intentionality seems to become completely immanent in that its objects do not maintain a distance from itself. Pleasure thus is not absolutely one with the self that knows that pleasure, and could only be ascribed to the latter. In knowing pleasure I perceive, not the self as such, but the self only as characterized by this quality. Pleasure is a quality, i.e. an *upādhi* (modification) of *buddhi* (intellect) in which the real self is reflected. What is perceived are only such qualities, and not the self that perceives them. Distinction between subject and object still remains. Pleasure, etc., are qualities that are ascribed (*adhyasta*) to the self and are not intrinsic to it. Of course empirical pleasure must be distinguished from the serenity and peace enjoyed in deep sleep. The latter is not a quality at all but is the very nature of the self.

The striking feature about the internal states is that they never remain unknown. The illusory, which too has no unknown existence, claims objectivity, pretends to exist just like any other empirical object, and there is an appearance of an unrevealed depth which it does not really possess. In the case of pleasure there is not even the pretense of having an unknown existence. As long as my pleasure lasts it can exist only as revealed to me. It would be odd indeed to say 'I am happy but I am not aware of it'. There is therefore no covering (*āvaraṇa*) for pleasure, and the ordinary mode of knowing something, namely by dispelling the covering of ignorance, would be out of question here. Pleasure is not to be discovered, since it had never been covered at all. There is never any ignorance about one's own feelings. The situation is different when I come to know about your happiness, since then it is as remote as any other object, and ignorance is possible in this case. My own pleasure is directly

revealed to me. A *vṛtti* is still involved as consciousness has yet not shed its intentionality, but it is *vṛtti* of a very different kind. The *sākṣī* has no covering (*āvaraṇa*) and its knowledge does not depend on that type of *vṛtti* which functions by destroying covering (*āvaraṇa-abhibhava*). The *vṛtti* does not have to go out, as pleasure is in immediate contact with the *sākṣī*. It is intimately possessed by the enjoying self, and does not have to be made immediate.

Though pleasure is known at a deeper level than the personal 'I', the intellect (*antaḥkaraṇa*) of which it is a modification is imposed on the *sākṣī*, and as a result the knowledge of the *sākṣī* is appropriated by the *pramātā*. The impersonal self is thus split up into the different personal egos. The empirical 'I' becomes the ultimate enjoyer of pleasure, making possible the judgment 'I am happy'. Feelings are felt as individual or personal.

V

The two basic categories of subject and object, seer and seen, *dṛk* and *dṛśya* exhaust the whole of our empirical discourse. Objects constitute the furniture of the world and exist in their own right. They are completely independent of the knowing act, apart from revelation. Advaita endorses a realistic theory of knowledge. Knowledge is revelation of what is already there (*vastutantra*) and does not add to and distort it in any manner.

The object however is inert (*jaḍa*) and must be evidenced by something else. If it were not revealed, the whole world would be plunged in darkness (*jagadāndhya prasaṅga*). There is something, other than the object, that reveals or witnesses. Knowledge is for us the only index of existence. To say that an object exists is to know it. Even denial of existence presupposes illumination, since denial is a form of awareness. There is no experience that is not witnessed, no *niḥsākṣīka anubhava*. This principle of illumination is consciousness (*caitanya*).

But if the object already existed even before it came to be known, why was it not known then, since both the terms in the knowledge-situation were already available? Something must have come in between, something positive and opaque, that prevented it from being known. Knowing the object is not adding anything to it, but only removing the covering that obstructed knowledge. The obstruction that hides things is ignorance (*ajñāna*) and what removes it is a *vṛtti*.

Even if the object were to be manifested and laid bare, even if it stood completely unveiled, there would still be no knowledge, if the content to be known were a total stranger to the knowledge. The gulf between two totally disparate entities would be unbridgeable. They can come together and be relevant to each other, only if

there were some community or affinity between the two, only if they were essentially the same. All relations presuppose an underlying identity of the relata, but for which they would fall apart. *Abhedapūrvako hi bhedaḥ.* Hence all knowledge is by identity, or rather identification, since the identity is not explicit. But the pradox is that identity would apparently dissolve all relationship. If the knower were one with what it knows, there would be nothing to be known, and there would be no knower either. In order to sustain the knowledge relation, some distance or difference has to be injected into the basic identity. This is the function of the veil of ignorance, which cuts up undifferentiated consciousness into the subject-object duality. The subject or knower is consciousness, but limited by egoism (*ahaṅkāra*), having the adjunct of 'I'. This is *pramātṛcaitanya.* The object too is essentially consciousness (*viṣayacaitanya*), again circumscribed by various limiting conditions. Ignorance prevents the realization that both are essentially the same, so that what is really one with the knowing consciousness appears to be something 'out there', dead and inert, something hidden and alienated, which is to be revealed. A fissure which is not really there opens up between the two which are not really two. Hence some intervening *tertium quid* is required to mediate between them, and reestablish their underlying continuity. That is the role of a *vṛtti* which penetrates through the covering of ignorance, and shows up the nature of both as the same consciousness. Complete identity, which would destroy all empirical knowing, is not manifested since the removal of the covering is only partial. Not ignorance *in toto*, but only so far as a definite object is concerned, is destroyed, and knowledge also takes place only to that extent.

All knowledge is thus made possible by the destruction of the previous unknownness of the object to be known. The object had existed even before it came to be known. But how do we know all this? We know an object only while knowing it; that is a tautology. So how do we know that the object had enjoyed a prior unknown existence? And lacking such an assurance, what could prevent the subjectivist from maintaining that the being of the object was precipitated by its knownness, i.e. it came into being only when it came to be known? Advaita contends that the previous unknownness of the object is also actually known. When knowing the object we also know that the object had existed before, and that we are not creating it. The only way to safeguard the *ratio cognoscendi* of realism is to accept a known unknownness, paradoxical as it may sound. Knowing something now is not possible without having known the previous unknownness.

This kind of knowledge cannot be empirical. Knowing unknownness can only be a transcendental way of knowing. Empirical knowledge is obtained through some *pramāṇa* or other, but there can be no *pramāṇa* for unknown existence, for the simple reason that the object would in that case not remain unknown. The object can remain covered only so long as a *pramāṇa* does not come into play. *Āvaraṇa* exists only prior to *pramāṇajñana*, since the latter destroys it. There must be some consciousness that is never covered, from which *avidyā* cannot hide anything, and everything is revealed to it always. This is the *sākṣī* consciousness, ever uncovered, which can know without a *pramāṇavṛtti*, since it has to know the covering itself that is destroyed by such a *vṛtti.* The *sākṣī* cannot form part of empirical discourse except as its presupposition. It is timelessly present, and forms the background even of waking experience, but it is not distinguishable then. It knows everything directly without the intervention of any *pramāṇa* or *vṛtti.* Even a *vṛtti* has to be revealed directly, since there cannot be a *vṛtti* for a *vṛtti.* Everything is known by the *sākṣī* either directly as in the case of the mental states, the illusory, and the unknownness of things, or indirectly via the *pramātā*, i.e. all *pramāṇajñāna. Ajñāna* is known directly (*sākṣī-pratītisiddha*), in itself (*svarūpa*). Thus the real and the unreal are both equally objects of *sākṣī*, the unreal directly, the real, by removing its covering through a *vṛtti.* The real is covered, the unreal is ever uncovered, having no unknown existence. This is the criterion of distinguishing between the real and the unreal. The unreal is all appearance, having no hidden ontological resources. It cannot exist in any other way except as it appears, and in the process it is completely exhausted (*pratibhāsa-mātra-śarīratva*).

The *sākṣī* thus knows the object both as known and also as unknown. The empirical self is exhausted in generating knownness and has no means of knowing unknown existence. Everything, all *vṛtti* and also their absence, is revealed by the *sākṣī* consciousness. Even prior to knownness, even before a *vṛtti* arising, the object is revealed as unknown. It is only in this way that the consciousness 'I am ignorant' is made possible. How do I know that I am ignorant, except by actually seeing my ignorance? This must be a transcendental seeing, belonging to a pre-*vṛtti* consciousness, since a *vṛtti* and ignorance cannot coexist. Pure consciousness however is not antithetical to ignorance. What is opposed to *ajñāna* is consciousness reflected in a *vṛtti* of *antaḥkaraṇa.* The judgment 'I do not know' implies an identification of *sākṣī* and *pramātā. Sākṣī* perceives ignorance directly while *pramātā* has the notion of 'I'. The revelation of the *sākṣī* is by means of its *avidyāvṛtti*, which is direct revelation. Revelation itself is not a *vṛtti*, not even *avidyāvṛtti*, but is the very nature of consciousness. *Sākṣī* is that consciousness which is reflected in *avidyāvṛtti*, and the latter is known by that very consciousness as a solar eclipse is made visible by the sun itself. Since

the *sākṣī* reveals everything without exception, whether known or even as unknown, it is called omniscient (*sarvajña*). Nothing remains unknown to it, not even unknownness.

How is such a transcendental consciousness to be apprehended? What is the *pramāṇa* for its existence? What kind of evidence is to be adduced for the self? There is really no evidence for the ultimate subject, since nothing empirical could reach it. No *pramāṇa* could be adequate to it, since *pramāṇas* themselves presuppose it. The knower himself cannot be known not by another knower behind him, nor by himself. Self-consciousness is not the real nature of the self, which cannot be known as an 'I'. The self-conscious 'I' is not the self, but is itself an object. The real self is unknown, the seer of seeing cannot be seen (*na dṛṣter draṣṭāram paśyeḥ*). It is the precondition of all knowledge, and cannot be presented as an object, cannot be objectified as a 'this'. It can only be discovered regressively as the presupposition of the very possibility of knowing. It is apprehended as what remains when all apprehension ceases.

Though the self is not known by one who claims to know it, it is yet immediate and is intuitively known in knowing anything whatever. It is self-evident, and is known as such. There is no knowing of the knower because knowing itself is the knower. If consciousness were not self-revealed the whole world would remain unrevealed (*jagad-āndhya-prasaṅga*). It is evident in itself (*svayamprabha*), unknown yet immediate (*avedya and aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogya*). It is evident even when shrouded. It sees the objects and also their apparent seer (*pramātā*). The twin judgments 'I know' and 'I do not know' are both made possible by the underlying principle that always knows. Only it cannot be pointed out by means of a *pramāṇa*, not being an object. Though unknown, its existence is however undeniable, since denial itself is the vindication of awareness.

Self-luminosity (*svayamprakāśa*) does not mean self-consciousness (*svasamvedana*). A Hegelian or a *Sautrāntika* might plead for the latter, and see no difficulty in the same consciousness being its own object. Consciousness for them contains an internal diversity so that it can stand alienated from itself, and be the subject and object both at once. Advaita however thinks that the essence of consciousness is its unrelatedness (*asaṅga*); it is so pure that it is not related even to itself in terms of self-consciousness. It is 'in-itself' (*en soi*) but not 'for-itself' (*pour soi*). Its self-certifying nature means, not that it evidences itself or that it is to be guaranteed by something else, but simply that it does not stand in need of being evidenced at all, being itself the source of all evidence. It is absolutely immediate to which all evidence is finally presented. The question is not about something 'out then' in the wilderness, but about myself, and how

can I get behind myself and treat it as something susceptible of any doubt or controversy?

The object too, it might be contended, is immediate. We make a distinction between something ostensibly given, and something only inferred or learnt from others (acquaintance and description). Perception is the evidence for the immediate givenness of the object. How is then this kind of perceptual immediacy of the object different from the immediacy of the self? It has to be remembered that the object had not been immediate, or rather its immediacy had not been explicit, from the very outset. Prior to being known, its immediacy was suppressed as it were by its unknownness, and a complicated process had to intervene before its immediacy could manifest itself. The immediacy of the object therefore is mediated or conditional. The immediacy of the self, however, is self-evident, being the precondition of all knowing. This immediacy is unconditional or absolute (*sākṣāt aparokṣa*) and does not require the intervention of anything else to make its self-luminosity evident. That is self-evident whose immediacy is irrepressible and whose unknowness cannot take anything away from its illumination. It is immediate (*aparokṣa-vyavahāra yogya*) in spite of its unknownness (*avedya*). Conditional immediacy is something to be brought about, as in the case of the object to be known. Unconditional immediacy, on the other hand, is something intrinsic, in itself. It is *sākṣāt* as there is no distance involved here which would have to be overcome. Immediacy of the self is primary, not derivative (*akṣajanya*).

In ordinary discourse, witnessing is associated with two characteristics, namely consciousness and indifference. The unconscious, being inert, cannot be a witness to anything. Nor should the conscious agent itself get involved in what it sees. It must not sit on judgment and evaluate the merits of the case. It has simply to take note of what happens before it. The *sākṣī* therefore cannot make distinctions of reality and unreality. Both are equally presented to it and it witnesses them with equal indifference. Distinctions are all made by *buddhi*. The empirical 'I' cannot remain indifferent to what it sees and be neutral (*kūṭastha*). It rejects the illusory, which nevertheless was actually revealed by some consciousness, noticing passively even the illusory.

VI

The *sākṣī* is the pure unrelated consciousness, the impartial and timeless witness of everything. That does not mean equating it with Brahman, the absolute. Though in itself unrelated, the *sākṣi* is discriminated only in a relational context. It cannot be evid nced in the absence of something to be illumined. If there is nothing to

see, seeing and not-seeing coalesce into one. Brahman therefore is not the seer, since there is no other to be seen. Brahman is the utter 'beyond', the *turīya*; it is not the *sākṣī*, as even *ajñāna* is not there to be witnessed. The *sākṣī*, the witness of deep sleep (*prājña*) is pure undifferentiated consciousness but it is still covered by pure darkness and is still confronted with duality. Consciousness becomes witness only because of *ajñāna*, it is a *sākṣī* only in relation to the *sākṣyas*, objects to be witnessed. It is still not illusory, since it is the same basic principle of illumination, the ultimate witness, not to be witnessed by anything else. Its witnessing (*sākṣitva*) is not however intrinsic to it; right knowledge dispels both *sākṣyatva* and consequently *sākṣitva*.

The relation between *sākṣī*, the transcendental self, and the *pramātā* or *jīva*, the empirical ego-consciousness, is peculiar. They are not really two independent selves, leading their own private and parallel lives. The subject or the seer, or rather the principle of seeing (*dṛk*), is pure consciousness or the ultimate self (*sākṣī*). It is undifferentiated and one, but is differentiated into a plurality of centres of consciousness because of *upādhis*, so that distinctions emerge between Brahman, *sākṣī*, *Īśvara* and *jīva*. Brahman is not the subject, since the subject-object distinction is meaningless in that context. It is the utter 'beyond', the sheer transcendence of all duality. The other levels of selfhood are all differentiated because of limitations (*upādhis*). So far as the empirical self is concerned, *sākṣī* is the real self. It cannot however be apprehended in isolation, since egoity is always superimposed on it. Though pure in itself, it is never available in its purity. It is unrelated, but is discovered only as the precondition of the primary epistemic relatedness. It is not distinguished by the empirical subject (*jīva*), because ignorance hides the self and projects the ego instead. Egoity or the 'I'-consciousness is thus not the self, but merely imposed on it. The 'I' is an illusionor reflection, being consciousness as reflected in *buddhi*, imagined to be present in the self. A mere reflection takes over the function, namely illumination, of the original, just as a mirror can illumine when it reflects the sun's rays. The illusory takes over the character of the ground. *Sākṣī* is the ground which underlies the *jīva*-illusion. While the *sākṣī* is unrelated and unmodifiable, *jīva* is relational and the sense of 'I' gets modified owing to a change in its external adjuncts, as in the judgment 'I am no longer young'. The *sākṣī* illumines objects when they are present, but is self-luminous even when egoity is absent, as in deep sleep. The 'I' is as much an object of revelation as any other empirical object.

Is the *sākṣī* consciousness individualized, and peculiar to the different *jīvas*, or is it itself one for all of them? The question is difficult to answer. The *pramātā* or 'I' is defined as *antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna* or *antaḥkaraṇa-viśiṣṭa*, but the *sākṣī* is described either as *antaḥkaraṇopahita* or *avidyopahita*. In the first case it would be individual and many. *Antaḥkaraṇa* is always present, even during deep sleep. If this is the *upādhi* or *sākṣī*, then there are many *sākṣīs*, corresponding to many *jīvas*. But who is to witness the different *sākṣīs*? The proposition is not assertible, being self-stultifying. There can be only one *sākṣī*, and it is therefore *avidyopahita*, not *antaḥkaraṇopahita*.

All the complications arise because of the problem of understanding the structure of *Īśvara*-consciousness. On the one hand *Īśvara* is not empirical as the *jīva* is. Though it operates within the framework of ignorance, it is not deluded by the latter. The underlying ground of the world–illusion is never hidden from *Īśvara*. The hiding function of ignorance does not operate here. A distinction is made between *avidyā* and *māyā* and *Īśvara* is associated only with the latter. He creates with the help of the power of ignorance, but is himself not deceived by it. The deception affects the *jīva* who takes it to be real. *Īśvara* sees everything as it really is, namely, a pretense, a make-believe. He sees the underlying reality all the while the creative potentialities of illusion are being played out. He sees thus the real and the unreal at once, and nothing remains hidden from Him. There being no *āvaraṇa* for *Īśvara*, His knowledge is not like that of the *pramātā*. He does not stand in need of a *vṛtti* to remove the veil before things could be known. For *Īśvara* there can be no unknown existence. In all these respects the concept of *Īśvara* is comparable to that of *sākṣi* for which knowledge is direct revelation. But on the other hand, *Īśvara* is a Person, not merely a principle. He has an individuality made possible only by the 'I' consciousness. He is not bound, and has never been in bondage. *Sākṣī* too may be said to be free, but it is not conscious of its freedom, and cannot even make the distinction between bondage and freedom. *Īśvara* makes all these distinctions and has the saving knowledge (*tatvajñāna*) timelessly. He is a free person, but unlike a liberated soul has never been otherwise.

The notion of the liberated soul is another enigma for Advaita. The dispelling of an illusion yields the knowledge of the ground. Brahman is the ground of the cosmic illusion and the negation of the latter should lead to the knowledge of Brahman. But negation of the world should mean freedom for all (*sarvamukti*). As long as there are souls still unfree, world-illusion continues so that realization of Brahman should not have been achieved. Sometimes a distinction is made between *nivṛtti* and *bādha*, corresponding to individual ignorance and cosmic ignorance (*tūlāvidyā* and *mūlāvidyā*). Freedom of one person is not really the total cancellation of ignorance, but merely rendering it ineffective for that person (*nivṛtti*).

Bādha is the final and total cessation of ignorance, so that there would no more be a single soul still in bondage; consequently the world-appearance itself dissipates, not merely for one liberated soul, but for everybody, since the distinction between one soul and another has itself been the product of ignorance. Till that happens, liberation is characterized, not as *brahmabhāvāpatti*, but as *Īśvara-bhāvāpatti* or *sākṣibhāvāpatti*. *Īśvara* is Brahman self-conscious of itself. Brahman cannot declare itself as Brahman, cannot make the judgment '*aham brahmāsmi*'; *Īśvara* alone can. The consciousness of having attained freedom, or rather, getting out of the illusion of having ever been unfree, is being self-conscious of freedom. The difficulty in this view is that a liberated soul has a history; its freedom is an event in time, but *Īśvara* has no history, being free timelessly (*sadaiva muktaḥ, sadaiva Īśvaraḥ*). The most plausible view is to understand freedom as *sākṣibhāvāpatti*. Everything appears before the free person without affecting him in any way. He remains utterly neutral, a passive spectator of the panorama of the cosmic process. Here the difficulty is that *sākṣi* cannot distinguish between the real and the unreal, so that right knowledge (*tatvajñāna*) has no meaning for it. The world-illusion is negated, not by the *sākṣī* consciousness but by the final suicidal act of the *buddhi* (*aṇhaḍākāra-vṛtti*). The *sākṣī* is certainly not in bondage but nor can it be described as free. The liberated soul shares with *sākṣī* its characteristic indifference, but it also discriminates between the essential and the spurious. Not only is it free but it is also conscious of its freedom.

These difficulties simply point to the fact that there can be no theoretic intelligible conceptualization of the transcendent in terms of the empirical. Attempted descriptions are merely 'models and metaphors', indicating the direction of transcendence which however defies all philosophic understanding.

A Pseudo-Problem about Nyāya Definition of Inference and Its Pseudo-Solutions[1]

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Annaṃbhaṭṭa, a famous Nyāya philosopher of the seventeenth century has authored the widely-read popular Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika manual *Tarka-saṃgraha* as also its commentary *Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā*. Many eminent Nyāya scholars like Rai Narasiṃha, Rāmaṃudra etc., have written erudite commentaries on this commentary providing elucidation and rational defence for all those statements in the commentary which may appear recondite or not quite rational. This is how the authoritative character of this work has been preserved till this time.

However, we come across a passage in *Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā*[2] commentary dealing with a problem and its suggested solution both of which appear to be spurious. It is in connection with the Nyāya definition of inference that the problem and the solution are set forth in the work. The definition is usually formulated thus: 'Inference is the kind of cognition which is generated by the complex determinate cognition of the occurrence of the middle, as qualified by its invariable concomitance with the major, in the minor.' The complex cognition referred to in the definition is called *Parāmarśa* in Nyāya terminology and it is almost the same as the conjunction of the major and the minor premises of the Aristotelian syllogism. The objection raised against this definition may be stated thus:

> If looking at a distant object one wonders whether it is a man or a stump of a tree, one cannot have in the next moment the perceptual cognition of the object that it is a tree or a man. But if on walking a few steps towards the object one notices hands and legs dangling from the object there immediately arises in one's mind the complex cognition that the object is endowed with limbs which are invariably associated with a man's body. This cognition gives rise to the cognition, 'Indeed this is a man' which is perceptual in character. But being generated by the above complex cognition the perceptual cognition of man satisfies even the definition of inference.

Obviously, this objection is based on the presumption that the cognition of man resulting from the complex cognition is indisputably a case of perception. This presumption of Annaṃbhaṭṭa is questionable on many grounds. First, as per the non-causal definition of perception, a perception is a cognition which is never mediated by any cognition, it being directly produced by sense-object-contact. In the present case the cognition of man arises only after the complex cognition of hands and legs has preceded it. Without the prior occurrence of this cognition the original doubt cannot be dispelled. Thus the mediation of the complex cognition in the production of the final cognition prevents it from being regarded as a case of perceptual cognition.

The second and more important ground for treating the above presumption erroneous is this. Perception is casually defined as the cognition which is invariably produced by sense-object-contact. Many different types of sense-object-contact have been formulated by Nyāya to account for the perceptions of different types of objects. In the present case the final cognition is said to arise immediately after the occurrence of the complex cognition. No sense-object-contact precedes it. How can it then be regarded as a case of perceptual cognition? Thus the cognition fails to satisfy both the essential and casual definitions of perception.

It may be contended against this that the sense-object-contact needed for the perception of the man is already there as without it the hands and legs of the man cannot be perceived. The contact must have taken place at the time of the occurrence of the doubt itself so that at the next moment the hands and legs could be noticed. This is true. But then there is no reason why the perception of the man should wait for the complex cognition to arise. If it is said that this cognition is needed to eliminate the earlier doubt then the effectiveness of sense-object-contact in generating perception by itself would have to be denied. Absence of doubt would also have to be included among the casual conditions of perception. Perhaps it may be urged against this argument that the sense-object-contact preceding the perception of hands and legs is only partial. It does not pervade the whole body of the man and so it cannot produce the perception of the man. This may or may not be true. Perception of hands and legs cannot ordinarily be segregated from the perception of the whole human body. The body as a composite entity different from its parts (as per the Nyāya-Vaiśēṣika view) is certainly contacted when its limbs are contacted, for there is no contact of the body apart from the contact with its limbs. Besides the whole body can never be contacted by the visual sense by any single contact. If some part is contacted some other parts are left out is visual contact with the man. In case the earlier contact with hands

and legs is regarded only as partial and therefore not capable of yielding the perception of the man then even the complex cognition cannot be supposed to result from it. Mere hands and legs cannot be taken to be invariably associated with a human body. Thus it is clear that the hypothetical case of perception is not really a case of perception at all. It is nothing but an instance of inference.

Let us however concede to Annaṃbhaṭṭa, the point that it is a case of perception. What is then the solution to the problem of the overextensiveness of the definition of inference? Annaṃbhaṭṭa says that one other casual condition of inference, namely *pakṣatā*, not being present before the cognition of man in the above case, it cannot be viewed as a case of inference. *Pakṣatā* is a psychological condition of inference which is supposed to characterise the minor term of inference. The necessity of this condition arises because if the occurrence of the major in the minor is already known non-inferentially it is then not inferrible but if this knowledge is accompanied by a strong desire to have the inferential knowledge also of the occurrence of the major in the minor then the inference does take place despite the non-inferential knowledge being present. In the present case, according to Annaṃbhaṭṭa, the desire to infer is not present and so *pakṣatā* is not present. This remark of Annaṃbhaṭṭa is simply wrong for two reasons. First, the mere absence of the desire to infer does not ensure the absence of *pakṣatā*, for *pakṣatā* is defined as the absence of the knowledge (non-inferential) of the occurrence of the major in the minor as qualified by its coexistence with the absence of the desire to infer. If there is no desire to infer or no non-inferential knowledge of the major in the minor in either case *pakṣatā* will be present. It will also be present when the non-inferential knowledge of the major is present with the desire to infer. This is so because the absence of a qualified entity is entailed either by the absence of the qualifier only, the qualified only, or of both the qualifier and the qualified. In the present case it cannot be contended that there cannot be the desire to infer. There is nothing to prevent such a desire preceding the cognition of man. Perhaps it may be urged that if there is a desire to infer then since the *parāmarṣa* is also there, the resulting cognition cannot but be inferential. There is some justification for this contention. But the mere absence of the desire to infer cannot entail the absence of *pakṣatā* as the non-inferential knowledge of the major term is also absent in the above case. Before the final cognition (inferential or perceptual) of man arises there is no knowledge of the presence of man and so *pakṣatā* as the absence of the qualified entity is certainly present before the cognition of man. The commentators on *Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā* have detected this flaw in Annaṃbhaṭṭa's suggested solution and so they attempt to remedy

it by interpreting Annaṃbhaṭṭa's relevant cryptic remark to mean that *pakṣatā* is not operative as a casual condition in the above case, although it may be present there. What this may mean is that the cognition of man does not depend upon *pakṣatā* though it may be preceded by it.

But how does one decide whether a cognition depends upon the negative condition of *pakṣatā* or not? It is only the positive condition of the production of a thing whose prior existence is sought to be ensured if the thing is to be produced. The negative condition is connected with the removal of obstructions and it becomes relevant only when the obstruction is present. For example if the major's presence in the minor is already known non-inferentially it cannot be inferred unless the desire to infer intervenes. If there is no such non-inferential knowledge of the major there is no obstruction to the inference and so *pakṣatā*, though present before the inference, cannot be supposed to be relevant to its occurrence. Thus it is not correct to say that *pakṣatā* is an operative casual condition in every case of inference but is not so in the above case. Since the cognition of man is not preceded by another non-inferential cognition of man there is no obstruction to the occurrence of the former. As such, *pakṣatā* is as irrelevant in this case as in those of the inferences not preceded by the non-inferential cognition of their objects. Thus even the defence by commentators of Annaṃbhaṭṭa's solution proves to be as untenable as the solution itself.

Now we turn to a recent defence of the solution which finds place in the translation-cum-explanation of *Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā* authored by the late Professor Gopinath Bhattacharya. The relevant passage where the defence is presented is as below:

> The condition described as '*pakṣatā*' would be satisfied only if the absence of 'certainty that is accompanied by the absence of the desire to infer' were to precede the emergence of the perception following a state of doubt. But here though there is the precedent 'absence of certainty' (*siddhyabhāva*) about whether 'That is a man', the certainty is as a matter of fact accompanied by the presence of the desire for certainty. The situation cannot therefore be described as the absence of 'certainty that is accompanied by the absence of the desire for certainty'. And as it is just such absence alone that constitutes '*pakṣatā*' which is a necessary condition for inference, it is clear that for the emergence of the perception under reference, no such condition was operative. . . .[3]

The passage is a web of confusion. The first minor confusion is that between 'the desire to infer' and 'the desire for certainty' which is evident from the indifferent use of these phrases in four

different places in the passage. The second, and very serious, confusion is to regard the absolute absence of certainty preceding the cognition of man as not entailing the absence of the certainty as qualified by the desire for certainty. If there is no certainty at all, there cannot be a specific type of certainty. The third confusion is to presume that the desire for certainty precedes the cognition of man arising after the doubt. As a matter of fact, Annaṃbhaṭṭa's remark on the matter suggests that the desire to infer is not present before the cognition of man. However, there is absolutely no need to refer to the presence or absence of desire if the certainty is not there at all. But a likely question needs to be answered here. Let us consider a hypothetical instance in which both inferential and perceptual casual conditions like the '*parāmarṣa*' and 'sense-object-contact' are accidentally coexistent. Which cognition would ensue in such a situation? The Nyāya answer to this question is that the casual conditions of perception would prevail upon those of inference and as a result only perception would ensue in the situation. This is so because perception is immediate while all other cognitions are mediate.

Notes and References

1. The problem discussed in the paper has been referred to by one *Hadgopulous* in a paper published long ago. But he has just explained Annambhaṭṭa's position on the issue while I have criticised Annambhaṭṭa; his commentators as also a reputed modern expositor of Annambhaṭṭa's manual in which the issue is discussed.
2. *Tarkasaṃgraha* (with nine commentaries), edited by Śaṅkarārama Śastry, Madras 1929, pp. 249–252.
3. *Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā*, translation with explanation by Professor Gopinath Bhattacharya, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta.

The Phala-Tātparyaliṅga as a Principle of Interpretation

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THE HARMONY OF THE UPANIṢADS

Generally the texts of the Upaniṣads are intelligible in themselves. But when we try to connect them and arrive at a view of the Upaniṣads as a whole, difficulties arise. For the gap between texts proves to be very often insurmountable. But it does not mean that the authors of the Upaniṣads thought disconnectedly without grasping the implications of what they wanted to teach. The profound thoughts expressed in sentences and passages prevent us from coming to such a hasty conclusion, for they are complete in themselves and perfectly harmonious. In order to make the Upaniṣads intelligible to us we have to supply the missing thoughts and the connecting steps by suitable methods of analysis. Once this is done all the apparently disconnected or contradictory texts become harmonious and unified. In fact the aim of the author of the *Brahma-sūtras* is to establish that the Upaniṣads are harmonious and have a single subject to teach. All commentators, both ancient and modern, have upheld this tradition without question or reservation, for the Upaniṣads do set forth a consistent view.

THE THREE GUIDING PRINCIPLES

If we take into account the unique nature of the Upaniṣads, a flawless commentary on them must be based upon three important guiding principles. First of all, the scripture must be regarded as the one and the only source of the knowledge of Brahman. Secondly, all texts in the scripture, however divergent they may be, must be treated as having the same degree of validity. Thirdly, between the authority of the scripture and that of reason the latter is always subservient to the former.

(1) The authors of the Upaniṣads arrived at the knowledge of Brahman on the basis of what they saw and heard in their soul. It is for this reason that the teachings of the Upaniṣads are

considered to be infallible and most trustworthy. As the faculties of truth-vision and truth-hearing of the authors of the Upaniṣads are free from the defects associated with the faculties of ordinary humanity, the scripture must be regarded as the only authoritative source for the knowledge of Brahman.

(2) If the scripture is the only authority about Brahman, it follows that all its texts are equally valid and authoritative. While interpreting the scripture, no text must be invalidated in favour of other texts with a view to form a flawlessly logical system. An interpretation that disregards the total validity of the scripture lays itself open to the charge of exclusiveness and of denying equal authority to all texts.

(3) Our knowledge of Brahman is based not only on the scripture but also on the faculty of reason, for it is by a rational process that the thoughts of the Upaniṣads are explicated. Thus knowledge of Brahman depends not on one but two authorities, the scripture and reason. Since reason is employed merely as an aid in analysing the scriptural texts and discovering the thoughts embedded in them, its authority, though indispensable, is subordinate to that of the scripture and cannot be accorded a superior position under any circumstance.

THE TWO TEXTS

If one goes through the Upaniṣads, one finds that there are two kinds of texts concerning the nature of Brahman, the affirmative and the negative. For instance, let us take the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. It gives two accounts of Brahman. In 1–4–7 it describes the *Puruṣa* as the creator. He moves out of the undifferentiated state and becomes differentiated into the world of names and forms. He enters into each form and becomes identified with various functions associated with that form. When He does the function of living, He is called the vital force; when He speaks, the organ of speech; when He sees, the eye; when he hears, the ear; when He thinks, the mind. This is a description of Brahman in affirmative terms. In 3–8–8 the Upaniṣad gives a completely different account of Brahman. Here Brahman is described as neither gross nor fine, neither red colour nor oiliness, neither shadow nor darkness, neither air nor space, unattached, without taste or smell, without eyes or ears, without the vocal organ or mind, without radiance, without the vital force or mouth, without measure, without interior or exterior. It does not eat anything nor is it eaten by anybody. Unlike the previous one, this text describes Brahman in negative terms. In the affirmative text Brahman is presented as the supreme reality which becomes the world of names and forms by a process of transformation; whereas in the negative text the same Brahman is portrayed as an entity devoid of names and forms and untouched by the process of transformation. Thus we have two accounts about the same Brahman, one contradicting the other. Such contradictory texts exist in almost all Upaniṣads and in none of them the contradiction is resolved.

THE PHALA-TĀTPARYALIṄGA AS A PRINCIPLE OF INTERPRETATION

Śaṅkara is of the view that to resolve the conflict and arrive at the intended view of the scripture, we have to rely on the texts themselves and search for the right clues, *tātparyaliṅgas*, in words that occur in the original texts or in texts that follow the original or in similar texts in other Upaniṣads, otherwise we shall be imposing on the texts an authority external to the scripture.

Let us take texts 1–4–7 and 3–8–8 in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and illustrate how Śaṅkara reconciles them. He invites our attention to many texts in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and other Upaniṣads where Brahman is described in negative terms and where Brahman so described is capable of generating certain and fruitful knowledge. 'The sage who has known the great and birthless Self, undecaying, unattached, conquers the dualities. Things done or not done do not trouble him'.[1] 'Knowing this Self one is not touched by evil action. . . . Evil does not overtake him, but he transcends all evil'.[2] 'That great, birthless Self is undecaying, immortal, undying Brahman. Brahman is indeed fearless. He who knows It as such certainly becomes the fearless Brahman'.[3] 'For truly, when one finds fearlessness as support in Him who is invisible, bodiless, undefined, without support, then has he reached fearlessness'.[4] 'By discerning that which is without sound, without touch and without form, undecaying, etc., one is freed from the face of death'.[5] The result (i.e. freedom from the limiting conditions of the empirical world) mentioned in these texts is an important clue. Since no such result is mentioned in the affirmative texts either in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* or elsewhere, Śaṅkara concludes that text 1–4–7 fails to claim equal status with text 3–8–8. Not only does the negative text acquire a higher status but it ceases to be contradictory on account of this status. Hence Śaṅkara says that the real nature of Brahman is declared only in the negative text 3–8–8. In his opinion 'it is the Brahman that is absolutely attributeless and unchangeable that has to be accepted and not the opposite'.[6]

Though Śaṅkara has removed the contradiction between the negative and the affirmative texts, he has one more task to perform upon the completion of which the completeness of his interpretation depends. If one of the conflicting texts contains the true import, then the other cannot be regarded as a valid text. This

amounts to invalidating one text in favour of the other. Does it not imply that the Upaniṣad cannot claim validity for all its ideas and teachings? In fact Śaṅkara holds the view that in the Upaniṣad all texts are valid without exception.'It is not proper', says Śaṅkara,'to interpret some Vedic sentences as having meaning and the others as having no meaning, since they are all valid'.[7] Hence he is obliged to explain the significance of text 1–4–7 and establish that its validity is not undermined.

We have already found that the affirmative text does not contradict the negative text on account of the fact that it cannot claim equal status with the latter, as also that it does not contain the true import of the Upaniṣad. If the affirmative text does not contradict the negative text, then we must know how this text is to be understood. Śaṅkara has formulated a rule for this purpose and it is as follows:'Since in a context, speaking of Brahman, it stands proved that the result (i.e. liberation) accrues only from the realisation of Brahman, devoid of all distinctions created by attributes, therefore when in that context some other fact is heard of that has no result, as for instance, the modification of Brahman into the world, that fact has to be interpreted as a means leading to that realisation.'[8] In practical terms the rule requires that the primary sense of the affirmative text be surrendered in favour of a secondary sense not opposed to the purport of the negative text. Accordingly, the affirmative text is interpreted to mean that the world created by a process of transformation is essentially one with Brahman which transcends all forms of modification.'This text about transformation', writes Śaṅkara,'is not meant to establish transformation as a fact, for no fruit is seen to result from such a knowledge. But this is meant to establish the fact that all this (i.e. the phenomenal world) is in essence one with Brahman that is beyond all phenomenal processes; for some fruit is seen to result from such a realisation'.[9] Thus interpreted, the real intention of the affirmative text is not to speak of the creation of names and forms but to assert that the attributeless Brahman is the very essence of the world.

This illustrates how the affirmative and the negative texts in the Upaniṣads can be reconciled in the light of the *Phala-Tātparyaliṅga*, one of the six principles of Vedic interpretation.*

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PHALA-TĀTPARYALIṄGA

With the help of the principle of *Phala-Tātparyaliṅga* Śaṅkara has reconciled the affirmative and the negative texts in the *Bṛhadāraṇ-*

* उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम्।
अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिंग तात्पर्यनिर्णये।।

yaka Upaniṣad. He believes that his interpretation emerges from the texts themselves and is therefore not imposed from without. But an independent examination of the texts and the interpretation he has put on them reveals that his view is untenable.

Śaṅkara holds that the negative texts alone are capable of generating certain and fruitful knowledge and that this capacity cannot be attributed to the affirmative texts.'It cannot be argued', he says,'that . . . the knowledge of Brahman . . . as an entity transforming Itself into the world is intended to lead to some independent result; for *there is no evidence in support* (italics mine). The scripture reveals only the result arising from the realisation of the unchanging Brahman . . . .'[10] But contrary to this claim of Śaṅkara, one comes across affirmative texts which speak of spiritual freedom resulting from the knowledge of the Brahman which transforms itself into the world. Look at the following texts:

(a) When, to one who has the perfect knowledge, the Self has become all existences, *sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmaiva abhūt*, how shall he be deluded, how shall he have grief who sees oneness everywhere?[11]

(b) The one controlling Self within all existences who makes one form manifold, *ekaṁ rūpaṁ bahudhā yaḥ karoti*, to the wise who see Him in their soul, to them is eternal bliss and it is not for others.[12]

These are obviously affirmative texts, texts that talk about the supreme Self becoming the world and living as the inner Self in the world; besides, they assure not only freedom from delusion and grief but also enjoyment of bliss to the knower of the Self. To say therefore that the negative texts alone are capable of generating certain and fruitful knowledge is to set aside a fact too important to be ignored.

Śaṅkara's position is virtually against all guiding principles of interpretation. His knowledge of Brahman is not based on a total reliance on the scripture; rather he relies on his understanding of the scripture. In effect his interpretation originates from his understanding rather than from the scripture. Though Śaṅkara tries to preserve the validity of the affirmative text by subordinating it to the negative text, he has not succeeded in his effort. His view that the affirmative text does not claim equal status with the negative text and in effect does not deserve to be taken in its primary sense is entirely mistaken, for he has failed to notice that the knowledge of Brahman embodied in this text, as in the negative text, is capable of bringing spiritual freedom to man. With the result, the affirmative text stands deprived of its authority. Śaṅkara's interpretation of the texts amounts to a clear violation of the rule that the authority

of the scripture is superior to the authority of reason, for the interpretation does not originate from the scripture but is forced from without by his preconceived idea of what the import of the scripture should be. This goes against Śaṅkara's own view on the authority of the scripture.'An unwarranted interpretation of the Vedas', says he, 'cannot be regarded as a true interpretation or as helping towards it, for the Vedas do not derive their authority from any other source'.[13] Commenting on Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Upaniṣad, Sri Aurobindo writes:'He does not really approach the *śruti* as an exegete; his intention is not to use the philosophical mind in order to arrive at the right explanation of old Vedānta but to use explanation of the Vedānta in order to support the right system of philosophy.His main authority is therefore his own preconceived view of Vedāntic truth—a standard external to the text and in so far illegitimate'.[14]

The *Phala-Tātparyaliṅga* is by itself a valid principle of interpretation. It is useful in determining the exact import of many of the Upaniṣadic texts. But in reconciling the conflicting texts its utility seems to be limited. It is certainly helpful in cases where one of the conflicting texts receives a greater emphasis than the other in terms of fruitfulness. But in cases where the conflicting texts possess equal strength by virtue of their fruitfulness and where this strength is borne out by the direct sense of the words, it cannot reconcile them, for it is basically a principle of relative strength rather than reconciliation.

We realise that if the affirmative and the negative texts are to be reconciled without doing violence to their sense, *śrutahāni*, we have to carefully search for the reconciling texts in the Upaniṣads themselves, *samanvaya śrutis*, and try to resolve the conflict in the light of such texts—a work in which all students of Vedānta should engage themselves wholeheartedly.

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5. *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, 1–3–15.
6. SBS, 3–2–11.
7. Ibid., 3–2–15.
8. Ibid., 2–1–14.
9. Ibid., 2–1–27.
10. Ibid., 2–1–14.
11. *Īśa*, 7.
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13. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya*, 2–3–6.
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The Contributions of R.D. Ranade to a Correlative Study of Eastern and Western Philosophy

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I

Dr R.D. Ranade, popularly known as Gurudeva, was one of the great Indian mystics and philosophers of our times. His founding the Adhyātma Vidyapeeth at Nimbal and his authorship of very profound books on philosophy and mysticism were the outcome of his constant endeavour to know and live in God. Ranade started Adhyātma Vidyapeeth or the Academy of Philosophy and Religion at Nimbal, in the district of Bijapur, with the purpose of bringing together all those who were interested in a philosophical investigation of the problem of God. He said that the aim of the academy was to be tained research in all the philosophies and religions of the world. He further added that there would also be a number of lectures from time to time on behalf of the Academy at great educational centres in India, which might also help in the propagation of the cause of the Academy.

II

As early as in 1912, Ranade noticed that in philosophic thought the East was East, and the West was West. According to him, it was not desirable. To him the problem of philosophy was one and identical the world over. In the world of thought there was no distinction of country or race. He advocated a definite correlative study of Indian and European philosophy. He wrote an article, 'On the study of Indian and European Philosophy' in 1914. The following is the gist of the article:

> Indian philosophy is as rich and varied as European philosophy. There is a correlation between different types of philosophy in India and Europe. Indian philosophy has great similarities with European philosophy. Deussen was right when he said, 'Indians, keep to your philosophy'.

There is great resemblance between the ancient metaphysical systems of India and the present metaphysical systems of the West. The absolutism of Bradley and the Advaitism of Śaṅkarācārya have great similarities. For both, the Absolute is the only ultimate reality. Both consider God as different from the Absolute. With both, God is unreal compared to the Absolute. For both our souls, our bodies, the objects of the world are ultimately appearances. Both hold that space and time are phenomenal and that they are transcended in the Absolute. With both Śaṅkara and Bradley, the Absolute transcends moral relations; it is super-moral, beyond good and evil. For both, the Absolute is of the nature of intuitive experience.

People may say that Śaṅkara's Absolute is non-being. But it is incorrect. Those who will think deeper will find that Śaṅkara's Brahman, is *sat, cit* and *ānanda*, i.e. being, thought and bliss. In his *The World and the Individual,* Josaiah Royce points out that though Bradley talks of a personal Absolute as being an intellectually dishonest conception, still Bradley's Absolute 'despite all Bradley's objections to the Self, escapes from Self-hood only by remaining to 'the end a Self'.[1] If this interpretation is correct, Ranade observes, Śaṅkara's Absolute consciousness, Bradley's Absolute experience and Royce's Absolute person differ in names only.

Śaṅkara is not a determinist, as is ordinarily supposed. He does allow freedom to souls in the sense that they are free so far as they express the eternal purpose of the Absolute. According to Ranade in this respect Śaṅkara is on par with the other idealists.

The great difference between Royce and Śaṅkara is that while the former says that the soul comes into existence in time, Śaṅkara says that, seen from one point of view it is eternal, while seen from another, and higher point of view, it is merely an appearance as compared with the absoluteness of the Absolute, which is Bradley's position. Ranade says that this is not determinism in the ordinary sense. What he has tried to represent is that Śaṅkara's philosophy may be best described as an Absolutism, or a spiritual monism, but not as a mechanistic, deterministic pantheism.

Ranade treats other philosophers more briefly. Rāmānuja's system is a numerically pluralistic but a qualitatively monistic system. It has its best parallel in the theism of Professor James Ward, and in personal idealism generally represented by such writers as Rashdall. Rāmānuja's Absolute is God and the world, the world including souls. Such is also the theism of James Ward and of Protestant Christianity generally. In his Pragmatism, William James talks of the 'pantheism' of the Anglo-Hegelian school 'having influenced the more studious members of our Protestant ministry, and having already blunted the edge of the traditional theism in Protestantism at large'.[2]

Coming to other systems, Ranade finds a great resemblance between the plural souls of the Sāṁkhya without a ruling God, and the 'system of selves or spirits, uncreated and eternal, forming together a unity but not a conscious unity' of the non-theistic idealist McTaggart. Both of these differ from the theistic monadism of Leibniz, who postulates a God, as pre-establishing the harmony between one monad and another, and between microcosm and macrocosm. McTaggart's philosophy is non-theistic, Sāṁkhya is also *niriśvara* (God-less).

Ranade says that there are many other correlations between Indian and European philosophy. Not only is metaphysical correlation possible, but also epistemological, logical and ethical. We can easily find parallels in European philosophy for the nihilism of the *Mādhyamikas,* the subjectivism of the *Yogācāras,* the representationalism of the *Sautrāntikas,* and the presentationism of the *Vaibhāṣikas.* The resemblances between the Aristotelian logic and the logic of Gautama are clearly written. The Hedonism of the *Cārvāka* may be paralleled by that of the Epicureans, the rigourism of the Bauddhas by that of the Stoics, and the three-fold ethical ideal of the *Bhagavadgītā,* namely, its activism, its ideal of duty, and its self-realisation by those of Eucken, Kant, and Green respectively.

Comments

In the above article 'On the study of Indian and European philosophy', Ranade has made an interesting comparison between Śaṅkara and Bradley. He has also brought out the personal idealism of Josaiah Royce.

His comparison between Rāmānuja and Ward on the one hand, and Sāṁkhya and McTaggart on the other, are brief, but illuminating.

In his book on *The Bhagavadgītā as a philosophy of God-realization,*[3] Ranade works out, in detail, the categorical imperative in Kant and the *Bhagavadgītā.* He speaks of the antinomies in the *Bhagavadgītā* as in Kant. In his discussion on the relation of the sublime to the divine in the *Bhagavadgītā* he again brings in Kant's *Critique of Judgment* and *Opus Postumum.*

III

The first definite period in Ranade's work on philosophic subjects was connected with Greek philosophy. He wrote learned papers such as 'Heraclitus', 'Aristotle's criticism of the Eleatics', 'Thales' and 'Aristotle's critique of Protagoreanism'. In his paper on 'Aristotle's criticism of the Eleatics' there is a section called 'Parmenides'. In it there is a comparison between Parmenides and Śaṅkarācārya.

In his *Philosophy of Ancient India,* Garbe points out the extreme similarity between Greek Eleaticism and Indian monism. He finds in Eleatic philosophy a probable borrowing from the idealistic monism of ancient India. Ranade remarks that the similarities between Greek and Indian thoughts have to be explained on the theory of parallelism, and not on the theory of an unproved and unprovable inter-influence between Greece and India before the days of Alexander. As a specimen of the parallelism of Greek and Indian thoughts he considers how Śaṅkarācārya, who represents an ancient tradition of long duration, should have come to the very position of Parmenides.

Śaṅkara has a philosophy of the one Absolute Existence. It is being and thought, *sat* and *cit.* At the same time he recognises not-being. It is a verbal equivalent of the word *māyā.* It is conceptually antithetical to the idea of being. It is essentially non-existent. According to Advaita the plurality of the world is only apparent. noumenal, the *vyāvahārika* and the *pāramārthika.* It recalls to our mind the Parmenidean distinction of opinion and truth. It would go a long way in enabling us to call Śaṅkara, the Indian Parmenides.

Ranade points out that in an identical way both Parmenides and Śaṅkara argue against the logical Universal. Śaṅkarācārya in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya,*[4] and Parmenides in the Platonic dialogue, *Parmenides,*[5] speak against the logical Universal in the following way.

What is the relation between the Universal and the particular? Is the Universal wholly present in the particular, or only partly? If it is wholly present, it is distributed in so many things; if it is partly present in the particulars, which are many, it is divisible. It thus comes about that the logical Universal is either many or divisible, in either case it is not one, which it ought to be by definition.

Gomperz has an interesting statement, 'If an idealistic interpretation of Parmenides be incredible on other grounds, the last traces of hesitation would be removed by the parallelism to Parmenides which we find in the Vedānta philosophers of India.'[6]

IV

Ranade's remarkable volume, *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy,* was published in 1926. The nucleus of this book was presented for the first time to the public of Bangalore and Mysore in a series of lectures inaugurated under the presidentship of His Highness, the Maharaja Gaekwar of Baroda at the time of founding the Sanskrit Academy in Bangalore, in 1915. According to Ranade, the book would serve as an incentive both to students of European and Indian thought alike.

Ranade was inspired by a lecture on the Upaniṣads delivered by R.G. Bhandarkar in February. 1915. He could discover that the Upaniṣads contained not one system of philosophy but systems of philosophy. They culminated in a view of Absolute Reality worthy of consideration by contemporary Western philosophers.

Ranade presents the Upaniṣadic thought along the methods of Western philosophy. Following Burnet's method of interpreting the early Greek philosophers by reference to the original sources, he culls out sources from Upaniṣadic literature, classifies them into groups according to the various departments of Upaniṣadic thought, arranges them in philosophical sequence, and interprets them with due regard to considerations of philology.

According to Ranade, the Upaniṣads indeed occupy a unique place in the development of Indian thought. All the later systems of Indian philosophy have been rooted in the Upaniṣads. A Garbe or an Oldenberg has partially worked out the indebtedness of particular the relation of all the later systems of philosophy to the Upaniṣads, which Ranade worked out, had been, hitherto, an unattempted task.

Ranade examines the work of Western scholars like Weber, Roer, Max Muller, Böhtlingk, Whitney, Deussen, Oldenberg, Oltramare, Hertel and Hillebrandt. He commends the work of Deussen, Oldenberg and Oltramare. In his work *Die Lehre der Upanishaden* Oldenberg remarks that the true parallel for Upaniṣadic philosophy is to be found rather in the teachings of Plotinus, the Sufis, and the Christian mystics like Eckhart than in the philosophy of Kant. Professor Ranade replies that Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was only the first premiss of a grand philosophical syllogism whose minor premiss and conclusion were respectively the *Critiques of Practical Reason and Judgment,* wherein conceptions of goodness and value supplemented the considerations of pure reason, for, on the grounds of pure reason, what philosophy could there be about the ultimate realities, of human life, the self, the world, and God, except a philosophy of paralogisms that paralyse antinomies, that make one flounder, and ideals which can never be realised at all?[7] He further points out that the '*neti neti*' of Yājñavalkya 'would be a far more sure index of spiritual humility, and consequent possession of reality, than the self-satisfied and half-halting dictates of an agnosticism on the grounds of pure reason, which must destroy knowledge in order to make room for faith.'[8]

Time was when Upaniṣadic philosophy was compared with the doctrine of Plato and Parmenides, and also with the philosophies of Kant and Schopenhauer. Ranade points out that we, who live in the world of contemporary thought can scarcely afford to neglect its parallelisms with the tendencies of the thinking world of today. 'Here, in the Upaniṣads, we have doctrines of absolute monism, of

personalistic idealism, of pluralism, of solipsism, of self-realisation, of the relation of intellect to intuition and so forth,—doctrines which have divided "the philosophic world" of today'.[9]

According to Ranade, the same problems which at the present day divide a Bradley from a Bosanquet, a Ward from a Royce, a Pringle-Pattison from a McTaggart, also divided the Upaniṣadic philosophers of ancient times. Here we have the same conflict of views about the relations between the Absolute and the individual, the nature of immortality, the problem of appearance and the norm of human conduct. The very acute analysis of the epistemology of self-consciousness, which we meet with in the Upaniṣads, can easily hold its own against any similar doctrine even of the most advanced thinker of today.

It is said that the Upaniṣads teach pessimism only. European writers on Indian subjects suppose that all was pessimism and sorrow before the days of Tagore in India, and that Tagore brought the evangel of joy and bliss from the West. Professor Ranade points out that it is nothing of the kind. Tagore's philosophy of joy and bliss is only the crestwave of that great huge ocean of blissful existence depicted in Upaniṣadic philosophy. His *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy* points to the life of beatific vision enjoyed at all times by the mystic.

Dr Ranade had the three-fold purpose in writing this book:

(1) To put into the hands of the Orientalists a new method for treating the problems of Indian philosophy,
(2) To place into the hands of European philosophers a new material for exercising their intellects on,
(3) The ultimate purpose of the work is the spiritual purpose.

The trend of the present volume is to show how all the teachings of Upaniṣadic philosophy converge towards the realisation of the mystical goal. Professor Ranade does not wish to enter here into any cism, nor has he any desire to discuss how the mystic criterion of reality compares with those of the idealist, the pragmatist, and the realist.

In his *Mysticism in Maharashtra* (1933), Ranade discusses the nature of mysticism, some mystical experiences, some general problems in the psychology and philosophy of mysticism, and criteria of mystical experience.

V

Nature of Mysticism

Mysticism, according to Ranade, is not magic, not occult power, nor a mysterious phenomenon. It is a direct, first-hand, immediate, intuitive apprehension of God. It implies a silent enjoyment of God. It is in this sense that mystical experience has often been regarded as ineffable. It is not without reason that the Upaniṣads declare: 'It is that from which speech returns along with the mind without attaining it.'[10] In his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras,[11] Śaṅkara writes that when Bādhva was asked by Bāṣkali to expound the nature of Brahman he kept silent. He prayed again 'Teach me, Sir'. The teacher, however, remained silent and when pressed a second and a third time he said: 'I am teaching you, indeed, but you do not understand, the Ātman is silence.' Plato in his seventh epistle says:

> There is no writing of mine on this subject, nor ever shall be. It is not capable of expression like other branches of study. If I thought these things could be adequately written down and stated to the world, what finer occupation could I have had in life than to write what would be of great service to mankind.[12]

Some Mystical Experiences

Mystics of the East and the West meet in regard to their mystical experiences. Professor Ranade makes this clear as regards the following points:

The vision of the self. Jñāneśvara on the one hand, and Tauler on the other, describe the vision of the self in almost identical terms. Jñāneśvara tells us:

> When the tree of unreality has been cut down, one is able to see one's self, one's own form. This is, however, not to be compared to the seeing of the reflection in a mirror, for the reflection in a mirror is simply another of the seeing man. The vision of the individual self is as a spring which may exist in its own fullness even when it does not come up into a well when water dries up. The image in it goes back to its prototype; when the pitcher is broken, space mixes with space; when fuel is burnt, fire returns into itself; in a similar way, is the vision of the self by the self.[13]

Tauler says: 'when through all manner of exercises, the outer man has been converted into the inward man, then the godhead nakedly descends into the depths of the pure soul, so that the spirit becomes one with Him.'[14]

The identity of self and God. As regards the identity of self and God, Ranade finds identical teaching in Jñāneśvara and Plotinus. Jñāneśvara says:

> Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna were like two clean mirrors, placed one against the other, the one reflecting itself infinitely in the other. Arjuna saw himself along with God in God and God saw himself along with Arjuna in Arjuna, and Sanjaya saw both of them together. When one mirror is placed against another, which, may we suppose, reflects which?[15]

Here Kṛṣṇa is God and Arjuna is the self. Plotinus tells us:

> If then a man sees himself become one with the One—he has in himself a likeness of the One—and if he passes out of himself on an image to its archetype, he has reached the end of his journey. This may be called the flight of the alone to the Alone.[16]

Super-sensuous experience. Super-sensuous experience is common to all mystics, irrespective of time or clime. In regard to the super-sensuous perception of the smell, the saint Nivṛttināth tells us that the

> Experience of God is sweeter than sandal. God is indeed to us more fragrant than jasmine or its manifold varieties. The wish-yielding tree yields whatever we desire, but God is more fragrant than that tree. The light of God to me is fragrance itself, life in such a One is enough for me.[17]

We find a similar passage in St John of the Cross.

> The Awakening is a movement of the word in the depth of the soul of such grandeur, authority and glory, and of such profound sweetness, that all the balsams, all the aromatic herbs and flowers of the world, seem to be mingled and shaken together for the production of that sweetness.[18]

The value of the name. The mystics of the East and the West insist upon the efficacy of the name. Rolle tells us: 'O, Jesus, verily, Thee whom we call Saviour, dost save man, and therefore Jesus is Thy name. Ah! Ah! that wonderful name! Ah!'[19]

Tukārāma says: 'The sweetness of the name is indeed indescribable. The tongue soon gets averse to other kinds of flavour; but the flavour of the name increases every moment'.[20]

The above utterances of the mystics of the East and the West are the consequence of a personal, common, intimate mystical experience. They are in no way the outcome of any imaginable inter-

influence. Heraclitus says: 'Those that are wakeful have one common world, those that are sleeping, each a different world.'[21]

The Problem of the 'Dark Night of the Soul'

The problem is whether the 'dark night of the soul' is a necessary ingredient in the perfection of spiritual experience.

What is meant by 'dark night of the soul? It refers to suffering—physical, moral or mental. In the 'Ascent of Mount Carmel', St John of the Cross tells us that this experience is called 'dark night' for three reasons:

(1) On account of the dark nature of the starting point, namely the evanescent life of the world,
(2) On account of the dark nature of the road by which one must travel, namely that of faith,
(3) On account of the dark nature of the goal to be reached, which is infinite in its nature.

Persons like Bunyan passed through the dark night, Plotinus never experienced it. Tukārām and Nāmadeva fully experienced the 'dark night'. Jñāneśvara seems to be almost free from it. In the chief work of Jñāneśvara, the *Jñāneśvarī,* there is not the slightest touch of this 'dark night'. In his *abhaṅgas* we find some of his experiences embodied in terms of the 'dark night'.

Now as to the question whether the 'dark night' is a necessary ingredient of mystical experience, Ranade remarks that most of the mystics, if not all, have passed through it. Mystical healthy-mindedness is never reached unless it is preceded by a mystical sick-mindedness. As Carlyle has put it, before we pass from the everlasting no to the everlasting yes, we must necessarily pass through the centre of indifference.

Intuition: The Mystical Faculty and Criteria of Mystical Experience

The ineffable character of mystical experience is closely linked with its intuitional character. What is intuition? How is it different from intellect, feeling, and will? Intellect is the faculty of knowing and reasoning. It refers to understanding. In feeling we have the sense of touch. Will is the faculty by which a person decides or conceives himself as deciding upon, and initiating, action.

Students of Kant understand intuition in the sense of sense-perception. According to mystics, however, intuition is a faculty of super-sensuous experience which is aroused in us by proper spiritual initiation and practice. Ranade says that he has known many savants and learned friends, and that with them he had discussions on the subject. Physiologically, the faculty of intuition is concerned with central instead of peripheral initiation. It is not the external outside

sense-experience that counts; it is the experience that is generated inside us in our intuitional process, that is, in the process of following the path of God, that matters.

The following are the criteria of mystical experience:

(1) The element of Universality
(2) The intellectual aspect
(3) The emotional aspect
(4) The moral aspect
(5) The intuitional aspect
(6) supersensuousness
(7) Central initiation
(8) Continuity
(9) Beatification

Ranade observes that among these the intuitional aspect is the greatest criterion. It is a first-hand intimate, intuitive apprehension of God. Plotinus also agrees with this.

VI

Ranade's book on the *Bhagavadgītā* is entitled: The *Bhagavadgītā as a Philosophy of God-Realization.* Here Ranade gives us a critical analysis of the eminent philosophers of the East and the West; synthesizes the differences and concludes that the only clue through this labyrinth is the secure thread of God-realization.

The work consists of five parts. In the first part Ranade shows the relationship of the *Bhagavadgītā* to ancient works and systems such as the Upaniṣads, the *Sāṁkhya* and *Yoga*, and the *Brahmasūtras*. The second part deals with the Vedāntic thinkers such as Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Mādhava and Vallabha on the one hand, and a mystic-poet like Jñāneśvara on the other. The third and fourth parts are important. The third part discusses the opinions of modern scholars of the last century-and-a-half. Among the scholars discussed there are Garbe, Bhandarkar, Lokamanya Tilak, Otto, Mahatma Gandhi and Aurobindo Ghose. In the fourth part, Ranade discusses at length how the theory of God-realization, to which he is committed, proves to be a clue for the labyrinth produced by scholars of the East and the West. Through the course of discussion there emerge three criteria of God-realization, namely, super-sensuousness, central initiation and continuity. The fifth and the last part deals with a section on the relationship between the sublime and the divine.

The Antinomies in Kant and the Bhagavadgītā

In Part IV, Ranade speaks of the antinomies in the *Bhagavadgītā* as in Kant.

Antinomy is a very important word in European philosophy, and particularly in the philosophy of Kant. It occupies a very important place in his *Critique of Pure Reason.* According to Erdmann, Kant's primary desire was to write about the antimonies only, and, in fact, the paralogisms and the ideals which he later discussed along with the antinomies were, in the first draft, included in the antinomies themselves. That is the reason why, along with the discussion of the conception of the world in the Kantian antimonies, there are discussions of the conceptions of the self, freedom and God. Ranade says that the antimonies in Kant represent one of the foremost watermarks in his critical philosophy.

Ranade deals with five antinomies in the *Bhagavadgītā:*

(1) the antinomy of the personal and the impersonal;
(2) the antinomy of the actor and the spectator;
(3) the antinomy of the transcendent and the immanent, so far as the nature of God is concerned;
(4) the fourth antinomy refers to the reality and the unreality of the world; and
(5) finally, in the fifth antinomy we shall be concerned with the destiny of the soul.

What kind of liberation have we to predicate? Whether it is *karma-mukti, ante-mukti* or *jīvana-mukti?*

Kant has solutions of the antinomies where he gives us probable reconciliations, but here in the case of the *Bhagavadgītā* the solutions are found in the words of the text itself.

The antinomy of the personal and the impersonal is reconciled by the doctrine of transpersonalism; the antinomy of the actor and the spectator is reconciled by the doctrine of emanationism. The antinomy of the transcendent and the immanent is reconciled by transcendo-immanence. The doctrines of the reality and the unreality of the world are reconciled in a Carlylean manner by ephemeralism. Finally the antinomy of liberation, through a series of births and liberation at death, is reconciled by the doctrine of liberation here and now.

The Categorical Imperative in Kant and the Bhagavadgītā

In his *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant makes the following general statement in regard to the conception of duty: 'Act on that maxim so that it becomes a Universal law of nature.'

In course of time, Kant specified this general principle. The three specifications of this Universal law are

(1) Act on that principle which might be regarded as a law of nature.

(2) Act on that principle which might be regarded as a law of reason.
(3) Act on that principle which will conform to the concept of the Kingdom of Ends.

Thus man, as an end in himself, sums up the total teaching of Kant, in regard to the categorical imperative.

Exactly in a similar manner, says Professor Ranade, the *Bhagavadgītā* gives us a certain general formulation of the categorical imperative and then its specifications. There is the procedural similarity as well as the similarity of content.

In the first place these are the utterances in the *Bhagavadgītā* in regard to the general formulation:

Karyamityeva yat karma niyatam kriyaterjuna[22]
Karmanye vādhikaraste ma phaleṣu kadācana[23]

You ought to do a thing because it is your duty to do so. You have the right only to act and never to the fruits thereof.

It has three specifications. The first specification is that this duty is to be performed leaving away all attachment and desire for the fruit (*saṁgam tyaktvā phalāni ca*). This rule is applicable, according to the *Bhagavadgītā* not merely to ordinary actions but even to holy actions.

A second specification of the categorical imperative in the *Bhagavadgītā* is:

Yogaḥ karmasu Kauśalaṁ[24]
Siddhyasiddhyoḥ somo bhūtvā samatvaṁ yoga accyate.[25]

We are to do our duty skilfully. Also one must preserve one's equanimity in the midst of success and defeat. Equanimity is called discipline or Yoga.

The third specification is the concept of *yajña*. It is Universal in its nature. Ranade says that it corresponds to the 'kingdom of ends' in Kant. The *yajña* has a social and a spiritual value like kingdom of ends. *Yajña* or sacrifice is not one of ghee, sesamum, rice or sheep. It is a general, Universal conception.

Thus Kant's law of nature, law of reason and law of self, all correspond to the doctrine of disinterested action, the development of equanimity, and the spirit of sacrifice of the *Bhagavadgītā*.

The Sublime and the Divine: A study in Comparative Thought

According to Ranade, the supreme goal of the *Bhagavadgītā* is the sublime vision of God. In the eleventh canto we have a description of the *Viśvarūpa darśana*. In this description there are experiences

such as those of splendour, wonder, terror and joy. These link it up with a Universal philosophy of the sublime.

Part V of Ranade's book, *The Bhagavadgītā: Philosophy of God-Realisation*, deals with the relation of the sublime to the divine. He shows here how the sublime leads to the divine. He takes illustrations from metaphysics and morality.

Under metaphysics he deals with Otto, Kant and Anaximander.

Otto's '*Idea of the holy*' puts forth the doctrine of the '*Mysterium Tremendum*'. It regards the numinous as a complex of the feelings of mystery, wonder, power, terror, reverence and joy. These are closely allied to the feelings expressed in the eleventh chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā*.

In the opinion of Professor Ranade, Kant has done more for the sublime than any other philosopher. His *Critique of Judgement* is almost the final word about the nature of the sublime. He puts the sublime in between taste and teleology. But Ranade regards the sublime as higher than teleology. Kant's classical distinction between the mathematical sublime and the dynamical sublime is illustrated in the universe in the distinction between magnitude and force; but greater than any other force, as he tells us, is the force of inner consciousness. Anaximander, a great ancient Greek philosopher had already linked up the questions of the infinite and the divine, the *Apeiron* and the *Theon*.

Ranade then proceeds to the sublime in morality. No greater statement has been made by Kant than when he says that there is nothing more sublime in the world than the moral will. This is, of course, in his early works, the three Critiques. But when we come to his *Opus Postumum*, a posthumously published work, we find statements which are incomparably higher than what we find in the Critiques referred to. Here he demolishes his old concepts of *summum bonum* and the categorical imperative. The *summum bonum*, he tells us here, cannot lead us to God. It remains only a conception. The categorical imperative instead of remaining a nudity is here regarded as the command of the Inner Being, the voice of the *Imparantis*, who holds Universal sway. And finally 'what is strangest of all' he tells us in cryptic terms, 'I am myself this Being'. In this way Ranade shows how the ideas of the sublime, the moral and the divine may be connected together in any great system of philosophy. Then he shows how these are connected together in the development of the doctrine of the *Bhagavadgītā*.

VII

Among the great in contemporary Indian philosophy, like Sri Aurobindo Ghose and Dr S. Radhakrishnan, Dr R.D. Ranade holds a

unique place of honour. Apart from their temperamental differences and differences in their spheres of work, they are the typical exponents of ancient Indian wisdom as enriched and supported by the great truths that lie embedded in the philosophies and religions of the world, however variously they might have been presented. Their writings indicate a happy blending of the East and the West. If Sri Aurobindo's philosophy may be described as integral idealism (*Pūrṇa Yoga*) and if Dr Radhakrishnan finds the true spirit of philosophy in the philosophy of the spirit (*Ātma Darśana*) it is mysticism (*Ātma Sākṣat-kāra* or self-realisation) which is the quintessence of Dr Ranade's philosophy of life.

Dr Ranade was a practical philosopher, a saint. So he says that the veracity and the virility of any metaphysical theory is to be gauged by its power of making life more divine, and therefore more worth living.

However, he was interested in the intellectual justification of faith also. Therefore he says: 'It would be a problem for the philosophy of the immediate future to place mysticism on a truly philosophical basis. Rational mysticism, which has been hitherto regarded as a contradiction in terms, must now be a truism'.[26]

Throughout his life Dr Ranade was concerned with a philosophical investigation of the problem of God. According to him the search for God remains the biggest problem even today, and a philosophical justification of our spiritual life is as necessary today as it was hundreds of years ago.

Ranade's Academy of Philosophy and Religion had a Universal vision. It may be made apparent from the following quotation taken from the preamble of its prospectus:

> The problem of finding the Universal in the midst of particulars, the unchanging in the midst of change, has attracted the attention of every man of vision, whether he be philosopher or prince. Plato and Śaṅkarācārya among philosophers, Aśoka and Akbar among princes are illustrations of the way in which this Universal vision has been sought. Plato is known for nothing so much as for his synoptic vision of the Universal among the particulars. Śaṅkarācārya spent a lifetime in seeking to know that by knowing which everything else comes to be known. Aśoka in one of his rock edicts forbade the decrying of other people's faiths, for in that way he said one was doing disservice to one's own faith, and he taught the virtue of concourse (*Samaivaya*).

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5. Parmenides, *Parmenides*, 131 A ff.
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9. Ibid., preface, p. 10.
10. *Yato vaco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha.*
11. Śaṅkarācārya, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, III. II. 17.
12. 341 C–2; vide Burnet, *Thales to Plato*, p. 221.
13. R.D. Ranade, *Mysticism in Maharashtra*, 1993, p. 120, also in its preface p. 6.
14. *Sermon for the Fifteenth Sunday after Trinity.*
15. R.D. Ranade, *Mysticism in Maharashtra*, op.cit., p. 137.
16. Plotinus, *Enneads*, VI. 9. 9–11.
17. R.D. Ranade, *Mysticism in Maharashtra*, op.cit., p. 13.
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20. Ibid., p. 321.
21. Ibid., see the *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 69.
22. *Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 9.
23. *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 47.
24. *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 50.
25. *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 48.
26. R.D. Ranade, A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, p. 15.

SURVEY ARTICLE

Studies on Indian Philosophy in Japan: 1963–87*

SENGAKU MAYEDA and JUNZŌ TANIZAWA

PREFACE

The history of the study of Indian philosophy in Japan may be considered to have started on 25 December 1879, when Hara Tanzan (1819–92), a lecturer at the Department of Japanese and Chinese Literature at the University of Tokyo, initiated a course of 'Lectures on Buddhist Texts'. But it was to be more than twenty years later that the study of Indian philosophy in the truly modern sense of the term may be said to have begun.

In 1884, Nanjō Bunyū (1849–1927) returned to Japan after having studied Sanskrit for eight years under F. Max Müller (1823–1900) at the University of Oxford, and the following year, having been appointed lecturer at the University of Tokyo, he started a course in Sanskrit. Already, in the early Heian period, the *siddham* studies of China had been introduced to Japan from the T'ang and had been continued in an unbroken tradition up until that time. But Nanjō was the first to introduce European Sanskrit studies to Japan, and he laid the firm foundations for the modern study of Sanskrit and Buddhism in Japan.

This current was further consolidated by Takakusu Junjirō (1886–1945). He, too, pursued the study of Sanskrit language and literature under Max Müller, as Nanjō had done, and also studied Pāli, Indian philosophy, Tibetan, and Mongolian at German universities in Kiel, Berlin, and Leipzig, after which he returned to Japan in 1897 and began lecturing in Sanskrit as a lecturer at the University of Tokyo the following year. In 1901 a chair of Sanskrit was established at the University of Tokyo, the first in Japan, with Takakusu being appointed its first professor. Then, in 1906, he initiated a course in the 'History of Indian Philosophy and Religion', which was to become the starting point for the study of Indian philosophy in Japan. This course was taken over by Kimura Taiken (1881–1930) in 1912, and the draft notes for the course were published in 1914 as a joint work entitled *Indo tetsugaku shūkyō shi* (The History of Indian Philosophy and Religion). This was the first work in Japanese to provide a conspectus of the history of Indian philosophy and

religion from the time of the *Ṛgveda* to the age of the *sūtras*, that not only was based on secondary sources in western languages, but also referred directly to the original texts.

Subsequently, this tradition of scholarship was carried over and further developed by Ui Hakuju (1882–1963) and Nakamura Hajime (1912–), and today the study of Indian philosophy is being pursued primarily, apart from the University of Tokyo, at institutions such as Kyōto, Hokkaidō, Tōhoku, Nagoya, Ōsaka, and Kyūshū universities. The study of Indian philosophy in Japan now constitutes, together with Buddhist and Sanskrit studies, one branch of Indology (Indic studies) or Oriental studies in Japan.

As has been indicated above, the study of Indian philosophy in Japan does, however, have a history of more than eighty years, starting in 1906, and the amount of research on the subject published to date has reached considerable proportions both in quantity and volume. In the present essay we shall present a survey of research on Indian philosophy published in Japan during the past twenty-five years (1963–87), particularly that relating to the so-called six schools of Indian philosophy (*ṣaḍdarśana*), and based on Mayeda's earlier *Indian Philosophy and Literature* [Oriental Studies in Japan: Retrospect and Prospect 1963–1972, Part II–21 (The Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, Tokyo, 1974)].

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(1) Hara Minoru, *Studies on Indian Philosophy and Literature in Japan, 1973–1983.* Asian Studies in Japan, 1973–1983, Part II–21. The Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, Tokyo, 1985. (This is a continuation of Mayeda's *Indian Philosophy and Literature* noted above.)

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GENERAL WORKS

The distinctive feature of Japanese scholarship in this field lies in the fact that it is a unique combination of traditional Buddhist learning and the western approach. This tradition produced Ui Hakuju's *History of Indian Philosophy* (Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo) in 1932, a standard work for the historical survey of Indian thought and the starting point of further studies in Japan. In 1956 Nakamura Hajime published *A History of Indian Thought*, which is a textbook for beginners and treats briefly the development of Indian thought from the time of the *Ṛgveda* to the present. His work is distinguished from others of this sort in that it treats the vicissitudes of philosophical schools and religions in close connection with the social and historical background in India. Its second revised edition was brought out in 1968. Nakamura also published a historical survey of Hinduism in 1979, in which Indian philosophy occupies an important position.

In 1967 another survey of Indian thought was compiled by mostly young scholars in the first volume of *Lectures on Eastern Thought.* In 1982 Mayeda Sengaku and others compiled a unique manual for students entitled *A History of Indian Thought*, which deals historically not only with Hindu, Jaina, and Buddhist thought but also with Islamic thought in India.

Nakamura published his *Selected Works* in twenty-three volumes, dealing primarily with various aspects of Asian thought. This is certainly a monumental work, representing a rediscovery of Asia by an Asian. The author has already begun to revise and enlarge this work.

The history of thought in ancient India may be regarded as a stage on which two main currents of thought, *ātman* and *non-ātman*, have been mutually interacting and counteracting. Nakamura, the editor, and other Japanese scholars of Indian philosophy contributed studies on this important question in 1963. An investigation of the concept of man in Asia was jointly made by twenty-one leading Japanese scholars and edited by Mayeda in 1987. The concepts of *śabda*, mind, wisdom, existence, and nature in Indian philosophy have been examined by Hōjō Kenzō, Murakami Shinkan, Yamaguchi Eshō, Yuda Yutaka and Watanabe Shōkō.

THE SĀṂKHYA

The Sāṃkhya had perhaps been one of the favourite subjects of research in Japan. Takakusu's *La Sāṃkhyakārikā étudiée à la lumière de sa version chinoise (Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient*, Tome IV (1904), pp. 978–1064), which became the basis for further studies by Indian and western scholars, is probably the most significant contribution by Japanese scholarship to research in this field. Another attempt was made to interpret the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* critically

in 1964 by Yamaguchi Eshō. Of late, voluminous books on the Sāṃkhyan system have been published by Honda Megumu, Murakami Shinkan and Nakamura Ryōshō, and a complete Japanese translation of the *Tattvakaumudī* was also brought out by Kanakura Yenshō.

Honda, Imanishi Junkichi, Nakada Naomichi and Takagi Shingen collected Sāṃkhyan fragments from Buddhist texts and the like, examining their contents and nature. Several Sāṃkhyan topics—for example, *dharma, adharma, jñāna, ajñāna, pratyayasarga, mokṣa, adhiṣṭhātṛ, satkāryavāda* and *anumāna*—have been taken up for consideration by Imanishi Junkichi, Motegi Shūjun, Murakami Shinkan, Nakai Motohide and Yamaguchi Eshō. It is to be noted that Japanese scholars have recently been paying more attention to the *Yuktidīpikā* than ever before.

THE YOGA

Two books have thus far been written on the *Yogasūtra*: one was published in 1958 and the other in 1966; both contain a Japanese translation of the *Yogasūtra*. The former is the result of a study of the Yoga system as a form of mysticism by Kishimoto Hideo, a specialist in religious studies who studied under J.H. Woods at Harvard University, while the latter is a popular introduction to the Yoga system by Sahoda Tsuruji, an Indologist and Yoga practitioner who also translated the *Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā* and *Gheraṇḍasaṃhitā* into Japanese. In 1978 the *Yogasūtra* and Vyāsa's *Bhāṣya* were translated into Japanese with an excerpt translation of the *Tattvavaiśāradī* by Honda Megumu, a translator of fundamental texts of Indian philosophy. The *Pātañjalayogaśāstrabhāṣyavivaraṇa,* attributed to Śaṅkara, has recently attracted the attention of Japanese scholars as well as that of serious western scholars such as Hacker, Leggett, Halbfass and Wezler; Nakamura Hajime published two articles on *Vivaraṇa,* discussing various problems including its authorship, and translated its 'Samādhipāda' into Japanese.

The text of the *Yogasūtra* raises some interesting questions, one of which is that of *kriyāyoga* (=*tapas, svādhyāya, īśvarapraṇidhāna; Yogasūtra* II, 1) in the Yoga system. The relation of Yoga to Buddhism is also an attractive topic for investigation. Takagi, for example, compared the theory of time advanced by the Yoga school with that of Abhidharma Buddhism, and Imanishi re-examined the meaning of the word 'yoga'.

Several concepts of this system, such as *samādhi, saṃskāra, karman* and *pratyakṣa,* have been discussed and various portions of the *Yogasūtra,* such as I.17, III.37, and IV, were taken up for examination

by Hara Minoru and Kashio Jikaku. Kashio compiled a bibliographical survey of Japanese studies on Yoga.

INDIAN LOGIC AND THE NYĀYA

The *Nyāyasūtra* with Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* was completely translated into Japanese by Nakamura, who also compiled a very useful manual of logic terminology and made a Japanese translation of Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* as the first step towards the creation of what might be termed as 'universal logic' or 'structural logic' integrating symbolic, Aristotelian and Indian logic.

Valuable contributions have been made to the study of Buddhist logic by Japanese Indologists such as Hattori Masaaki, Kitagawa Hidenori and Miyasaka Yūshō.

Some topics in Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* were examined by scholars such as Watanabe Shigeaki and Yamakami Shōdō. Yasumoto Tōru stressed the importance of the point of view of comparative logic in studies on the Nyāya system. Akamatsu Akihiko and Hattori examined the Naiyāyika's criticism of the *apoha* theory, and the latter also investigated the topics of *saṃśaya* and *ātman* as well.

A number of scholars have lately paid considerable attention to the Navyanyāya. Marui Hiroshi examined the theory of injunctions, while Nagao Mutsushi investigated various topics relating to the philosophy of language in the Navyanyāya. Miyamoto Keiichi annotated and translated the *abhāvavāda* chapter of the *Maṇikaṇa,* a manual of the Navyanyāya, and published a partial annotated Japanese translation of the same text in collaboration with Ishitobi Michiko. A series of studies of the Navyanyāya by Uno Atsushi, including his study of technical terms of the Navyanyāya, deserves special notice.

THE VAIŚEṢIKA

Ui Hakuju's *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy according to the Daśapadārthaśāstra* (London, 1917) may be the most important contribution to the study of the Vaiśeṣika system made thus far by Japanese scholars.

Some of the important texts of this school, such as the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha,* were translated into Japanese by Kanakura and Nakamura. A few *sūtras* of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* were critically reinterpreted by Hattori, Maṛui, Mikogami Eshō, Miyamoto and others. The *Nyāyakandalī,* a commentary of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha,* was translated into Japanese by Honda. Tachikawa Musashi presented a careful study of Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvalī* and *Kiraṇāvalī.* The Vaiśeṣika philosophy found in the *Carakasaṃhitā* was examined by Miyasaka Yūshō.

The origin of the Vaiśeṣika system has recently been taken up for re-examination. Kanakura maintains that the founder combined several kinds of Indian thought and theory, one of them Jainism, into a new theory, while Sadakata Akira suggests that Aristotelian philosophy gave impulse to the rise of this system. Marui published some articles, especially on perception, and Miyamoto examined several topics such as *pākaja, saṃkhyā, apekṣabuddhi, viśeṣaṇa,* and *vimokṣa.* Nozawa Masanobu paid careful attention to many topics such as *hetvābhāsa* and *saṃśaya.* The problem of *sāmānya* was discussed by Takenaka Tomoyasu and Tomooka Masaya. Some other topics such as *liṅga, abhāva, anapadeśa,* and *ātman* have also been discussed.

THE MĪMĀṂSĀ

The *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* was translated into Japanese for the first time in 1967–68 by Kanaoka Shūyū. The *Arthasaṃgraha* was rendered into Japanese by Kitagawa Hidenori and Yuda Yutaka. The Mīmāṃsā chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* was examined with care, annotated and translated into Japanese with an index verborum by Mayeda Sengaku and Kurata Haruo.

Yamazaki Tsugihiko focused his attention, in his study of the Mīmāṃsā, on Kumārila and his masterpiece, the *Ślokavārttika,* and Hattori Masaaki has made a valuable study of the chapter on *apohavāda* in the *Ślokavārttika.* Kumārila's *abhihitānvayavāda* and Prabhākara's *anvitābhidhānavāda* were taken up for examination by Uno Atsushi. Ihara Shōren discussed the theory of *bhāvanā* as found in the *Tantravārttika.* Kawasaki Shinjō published a partial Japanese translation of Bhavya's *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā,* which refers to some theories of the Mīmāṃsā school, and examined Mīmāṃsā thought at the time of Bhavya.

Some scholars have discussed a particular topic continuously. For example, Harikai Kunio took up the theory of *apūrva* and *śabdārtha* for discussion, and Takenaka Tomoyasu examined the universal in the Bhāṭṭa school. The *Prakaraṇapañcikā* has also aroused a great deal of interest among some scholars such as Kanazawa Atsushi and Kuroda Hiroshi. Special attention has been paid to the significant controversy between the Mīmāṃsaka and the Buddhist.

THE VEDĀNTA

Japanese scholarship in Vedānta studies culminated in Nakamura Hajime's *History of the Early Vedānta Philosophy* in four volumes (1950–56), in which he attempted to reconstruct the history of the early Vedānta prior to Śaṅkara. The first volume of an English translation of this illustrious work had finally been published in India.

Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* was completely translated into Japanese by Kanakura. A word index to the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* I, 1 was prepared on the basis of the Nirṇaya Sāgara press edition (Bombay, 1938) by Ihara Shōren. The *Upadeśasāhasrī,* which seems to be the only genuine non-commentarial work by Śaṅkara, was critically edited and translated into English with a detailed discussion of his philosophy by Mayeda, while the prose portion was also translated into Japanese by him.

Śaṅkara's view of ethics and his unique exegetical method, *anvayavyatireka,* have been taken up for discussion. The Advaita theory of perception with special reference to Śaṅkara was examined. The authorship problem is of primary importance for the historical and critical study of Śaṅkara; several articles were dedicated to its solution. Kanazawa tried to make clear the meaning of the term *samanvaya* as found in Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and re-examined the concept of *brahmātmaikya* in Śaṅkara. Sawai Yoshitsugu paid special attention to the *maṭha* at Śriṅgerī and the legend of Śaṅkara. Miyamoto shed light on Dharmarāja's theory of non-cognition.

Among Śaṅkara's followers, Maṇḍanamiśra and his Advaita work *Brahmasiddhi,* to which western scholarship has recently been paying considerable attention, are attractive objects of investigation in Japan as well; Ihara published several articles on them and translated the *Sphoṭasiddhi,* another important work by Maṇḍanamiśra, into Japanese with annotations. Hino Shōun wrote several articles and a book on Sureśvara and Madhusūdhana Sarasvatī. Shima Iwao has begun to translate the introductory part of Vācaspatimiśra's *Bhāmatī* into Japanese with annotations.

Formerly, no serious attempt had been made in Japan to explore the philosophies of Vedāntins other than the Advaitins. In recent times, however, Yāmuna, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Bhāskara have drawn the keen attention of Japanese scholars such as Ishitobi Sadanori, Matsumoto Shōkei, Ṭokunaga Muneo and Shōshin Kiminori.

THE VYĀKARAṆA

First of all, special mention should be made of a series of studies which have been done by Ōjihara Yutaka in the field of *vyākaraṇa.*

One of the distinctive features of Indian philosophy is that it has *vyākaraṇa* as its basis in one way or another and that the Vaiyākaraṇas developed the philosophy of language. However, there have been only a few Japanese scholars working in this difficult

field. Nakamura first explored Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language in volume 4 of his *History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*.

Several scholars have lately been engaged in research in this field and treated *vyākaraṇa* from a philosophical point of view, and Bhartṛhari, for example, has been dealt with by Ihara Shōren, Shimizu Shin'ichi and Tanizawa Junzō, the latter also clarifying the meaning of *jāti* in the *Mahābhāṣya*. Kiyoshima Hideki argued about the relativity of knowledge in *vyākaraṇa*, and Kamimura Katsuhiko discussed the relation between the Indian rhetoricians' theory of *dhvani* and the Vaiyākaraṇas' theory of *sphoṭa*. Ogawa Hideyo has partly translated Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* into Japanese.

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DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

The Nature of Explanation in Linguistics: A Response to Dasgupta

1

What is language? Contemporary theories of language attempt to answer this question, each with their own pre-theoretical concerns about some specific aspect of language. Thus, there may be a theory of language acquisition, or of linguistic communication, or of speech acts, and so on. In the present paper we will be concerned with a theory of language acquisition, viz. Chomskyan linguistics. We may note at the outset, two important features of Chomsky's work. One is that Chomsky's theory is a theory of syntax: the theory of transformational generative grammar. The other is Chomsky's formulation of linguistic theory as a nativist theory of language learning and his use of the theory to revive the rationalist theory of innate ideas.

One of the central methodological attitudes of Chomsky's linguistic research is represented in the view, held by Chomsky and his followers, that linguistics is the scientific study of language. Thus, explanations of linguistic phenomena are to be understood as causal explanations, at par with explanations in the natural sciences. In direct opposition to this view is the view that language, being a human activity, is not amenable to causal explanations. All that linguistics can hope to do is to offer an explication of the linguistic knowledge of the native speaker-hearer. According to this view, the linguistic knowledge of the native speaker-hearer constitutes his atheoretical knowledge and the explicative descriptions offered by the linguist is the theoretical knowledge of the linguistic knowledge of the native speaker-hearer. The task of explication is to be regarded as distinct from that of explanation: the former is concerned with descriptions of human knowledge, as in linguistics, while the latter is concerned with statements of regularities in the physical world, as in the natural sciences. This view represents the 'hermeneutic challenge' to the status of Chomskyan linguistics as a natural science.

One recent attempt to deny to Chomskyan linguistics to the status of a natural science is made by Amitabh Dasgupta in his paper 'Explanation-Explication Conflict in Transformational Grammar'.[1] Dasgupta argues that generative grammar is unfalsifiable and is concerned with the explication of linguistic intuition rather than with its explanation. This explication is done with the help of grammatical rules that have a formal-deductive relation amongst themselves

and with the sentences that they generate. I will attempt to show below, that Chomskyan linguistics can be regarded as a coherent research programme in spite of the hermeneutic challenge, and that the charges of unfalsifiability and of 'scientism' levelled against it rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of the methodological presuppositions and aims of the Chomskyan scientific heuristic. I will, in what follows, present Dasgupta's arguments against the Chomskyan scientific heuristic and show their irrelevance to the Chomskyan research programme by considering, in detail, its methodological aims and attitudes.

II

Dasgupta undertakes a 'thematic analysis' of Chomskyan linguistics. Thematic analysis of a science consists in a critical examination of its central presuppositions, methodological decisions and judgments. The author attempts to uncover, through such a thematic analysis, a certain inconsistency in the 'thematic origin' of Chomskyan linguistics. On the one hand, the avowed objective of Chomskyan linguistics is to explain the innate linguistic knowledge of native speakers, i.e. linguistic competence. The notion of a grammatical explanation of language L, thus, involves a notion of causal-mentalistic explanation. This view of 'explanation' bears conformity with the 'Deductive-Nomological' model of scientific explanation. On the other hand, a close examination of the nature of the objects of alleged linguistic explanations and of the nature of these 'explanations' themselves shows that grammatical 'explanations' are not explanations at all. In order to resolve this conflict in the background presuppositions of Chomskyan linguistics, an alternative foundation must be provided to transformational grammar on the basis of the notion of explication as contrasted with the notion of explanation. Thus construed, transformational grammar turns out to be a formal deductive system, like formal logic, and not an empirical science offering causal explanations directed to showing how certain mental operations are responsible for the production of grammatical sentences.

The Deductive-Nomological model of scientific explanation has three components: the explanandum, or the description of the problematic fact to be explained; the explanans, or the law-like generalizations; and the antecedent or boundary conditions (included in the explanans) which present factual data and ensure the applicability of the explanans to the problematic fact. The explanandum is deduced from the explanans and the boundary conditions. Any sound explanation must fulfil the conditions laid down by the Deductive-Nomological model:

(a) the explanans must entail the explanandum;
(b) the explanans must include general laws that are necessary for the deduction of the explanandum;
(c) the explanans must be capable of being empirically tested;
(d) the explanans must be true.

These four conditions apply to prediction as well. For example, consider the explanation or prediction of the fact that water turns into ice at 0°C. The explanandum would be a description of the fact, viz. 'A certain fluid has turned (or, will turn) into a solid'. The explanans, viz. 'Water solidifies at 0°C', together with the antecedent condition, viz. 'The fluid must be water and the temperature must have fallen to 0°C', would entail the given explanandum. What enables the D-N model to provide a systematic account of both scientific explanation and prediction is the general, atemporal nature of the explanans (including the antecedent conditions).

With regard to the nature of the grammatical 'laws' that allow inferences from the antecedent to the consequent, Chomsky's view is that these laws are statements of causal or physical necessity. This viewpoint has been clearly stated by Katz:

> Let us suppose that the linguist constructs a theory by inferring hypothetically the cnaracteristics of the mechanism underlying linguistic communication. His inference begins by positing a mechanism of which the observable events of linguistic communication are causal consequences. He invents a theory about the structure of this mechanism and the causal chain connecting the mechanism to observable events, to explain how these internal causes produce linguistic communication as their effect.[2]

Viewed from this realist standpoint, the grammatical rules describe underlying generative mechanisms that are responsible for the speakers' utterances of sentences. These internal mechanisms that produce linguistic behaviour as effects, constitute the linguistic competence of the native speaker-hearer which incorporates the representation of innate linguistic knowledge, i.e. linguistic universals. Dasgupta states the Chomskyan argument in support of psychological realism as follows:

(a) The correct grammar G is a theory that explains the grammaticality of the grammatical sentences of a natural language L.
(b) To learn the grammar of L is to learn that G is true of L, i.e. to learn the grammar of L is to construct G as a theory of L.

(c) But a child cannot construct G solely on the basis of the data given to him/her in experience.[3]

(d) The only explanation, then, is that the general form of G, i.e. the Universal Grammar, is already known to the child prior to his/her experience.

To summarize: Chomsky accepts the Deductive-Nomological model of scientific explanation and, in doing so, is forced to commit himself to psychological realism.

III

Dasgupta raises two points about linguistic explanations which, he believes, are in disagreement with the elements of the Deductive-Nomological model.

(A) If the phenomena that transformational grammar seeks to explain are not utterances but the intuitive linguistic judgments of the ideal speaker-hearer, then transformational grammar explains no events at all, for intuitive judgments are not events as understood in the Deductive-Nomological model, i.e. they do not have spatio-temporal co-ordinates. An additional difficulty in viewing intuitive linguistic judgments as events is the fact that they are subject to variation from individual to individual.

With respect to the latter idea that intuitive linguistic judgments vary from individual to individual, it seems quite implausible that two native speakers of the English language would differ in their linguistic intuitions about the grammaticality of the sentence, 'John loves Mary', or about the ambiguity of the sentence, 'I dislike John's drinking'. Dasgupta cites no examples where individual intuitions would differ with regard to grammatical properties of sentences. As regards the idea that intuitive linguistic judgments are not events at all, I see no difficulty in viewing such judgments as spatio-temporal events if we view mental events from a materialist standpoint.

To avoid confusion about the notion of intuitive linguistic judgments, it is important that we be clear about the Chomskyan motivation behind assigning the status of 'objects of linguistic explanation' to the intuitive linguistic judgments of the native speaker-hearer. This motivation is clearly brought out in the formalization of creativity which has been of central importance in the development of generative grammar.

Natural languages display the feature of 'creativity' or 'open-endedness', i.e. the property which underlies the ability that native speaker-hearers have of constructing and understanding an infinitely large number of sentences of their language, including sentences that they have never heard before. Further, this 'creative'

instruction and understanding is carried out 'naturally' and unreflectingly, without the conscious application of grammatical rules.[4]

A generative grammar would generate, and thereby define as 'grammatical', all and only sentences of a natural language and would not distinguish between those that have been attested and those that have not. Here arises the Chomskyan distinction between 'performance' and 'competence'. Linguistic performance consists of the actual utterances of the native speaker. The actual conditions of utterances may involve extra-linguistic factors, like memory, attention, change of intention in the middle of a sentence, malfunction in the neural mechanism of the brain responsible for linguistic behaviour, etc. Linguistic competence, on the other hand, is part of the methodological presupposition of Chomskyan linguistics that, of the number of underlying mechanisms that are responsible for overt performance, one is solely responsible for the 'pure' linguistic component of actual linguistic behaviour. Apart from 'isolating', for the purposes of scientific study, the 'pure' linguistic component of linguistic behaviour, a specification of linguistic competence will also account for the creative aspect of language by virtue of its generation of all and only the sentences of the language. This means that the generative grammar will generate an infinite number of sentences that will cover entirely the 'creative space' of the native speaker's linguistic competence.

Given this view of linguistic competence and performance, we can now clearly understand the need for postulating intuitive linguistic judgments as 'objects of linguistic explanation': if a theory of linguistic competence is the 'pure' linguistic component of a theory of linguistic performance, then intuitive linguistic judgments are the 'pure' linguistic component of actual production and comprehension of grammatical sentences.

(B) Further, Dasgupta argues that intuitive judgments do not admit of falsification. Moreover, since the rules of grammar describe the native speaker-hearer's knowledge, they are unfalsifiable by definition. Even an individual 'candidate' grammar cannot be regarded as being falsifiable, for a grammar is correct by definition. And incorrect grammar is not a grammar at all.

I will first consider Dasgupta's presuppositions behind this charge of unfalsifiability before dealing with the charge itself. In dealing with Dasgupta's presuppositions, I will mainly try to show what Chomskyan linguistics is not. In dealing with the charge of unfalsifiability, I will undertake a survey of the methodological presuppositions underlying the theoretical framework of Chomskyan linguistics.

(a) Dasgupta would have us believe that there is a fundamental distinction between statements of regularities in the physical world and descriptions of human knowledge: the former are statements about 'what is and the latter are descriptions of what should be'. Having made this distinction, Dasgupta is led to believe that grammar is concerned 'with the notion of a correct sentence and not with utterance events in space and time'. Thus, grammar is concerned with the normative linguistic knowledge of the native speaker-hearer. The key words here are 'normative' and 'knowledge'. I will deal with each of these separately as they involve two different kinds of misunderstandings about the aims and presuppositions of Chomskyan linguistics.

Underlying the use of the term 'knowledge' is the hermeneutic challenge that Dasgupta poses to the 'scientific' methodology of Chomskyan linguistics. The hermeneutic argument rests on the distinction between social, or cultural phenomena, and physical events. Whereas the objects studied in natural science exist independently of our conceptions of them, the objects of 'cultural science' are concept-dependent, i.e. they are concepts of concepts, or concepts of second order. It is argued that since these two classes of phenomena are of entirely different kinds, the methods of the 'cultural sciences' ought to be different from the methods of the natural sciences. Thus, while Chomsky would regard the intuitions of the native speaker as an index of the underlying mental representation of grammar, inaccessible to introspection and theorisable as an autonomous object, hermeneuticians would approach intuitions as having significance for the persons who have them. For them, a grammar is a systematization of those very intuitions and not a model of something in the brain or mind. A grammar is thus a systematization of linguistic rules known with atheoretical certainty by native speakers; it can, in principle, be recognized as true by those to whom it applies.

The reason that Chomsky can sustain his views about a natural-scientific linguistics in the face of the hermeneutic challenge is due to the ambiguity of the concept of concept-dependence. While Wittgensteinian philosophers would believe that a mental representation is both social and accessible to introspection, cognitive scientists think that mental representations need not necessarily be social (learnt, intersubjective) representations or accessible to introspection. Further, recognition of the hermeneutic division of the world into nature and culture does not entail that we must think of the cultural sciences as being radically different from the natural sciences, nor view attempts to extend natural-scientific methods into the cultural sciences as an unacceptable 'scientism'. We may think of the world as complex but essentially unified and not bifurcated into nature and culture. Hence our explanatory structures must allow for interaction between nature and nurture, and our explanation in terms of grammatical rules must be regarded as causal explanations of our behaviour. It follows that we need not necessarily view the world as radically bifurcated into nature and culture, and that Chomskyan linguistics must, therefore, be regarded as a natural science, offering causal-mentalistic explanations of the linguistic generative mechanism that interacts with other underlying mechanisms to produce our observed linguistic behaviour.

The use of the term 'normative' is entirely misplaced, given Chomsky's eschewal of traditional normative styles of linguistic theorising. The term 'normative', in the context of the present discussion, could be used in two ways. However, neither of these pejorative uses can be applied to Chomskyan linguistics. First, an enterprise could be normative in the sense that it lays down prescriptions—either explicitly, or as implied by its methodological attitudes—for correct behaviour. This is the sense in which traditional linguistics, before Chomsky, was normative. The motivation behind traditional linguistics came from the adventitious, extra-linguistic concerns of linguists:

(i) scholars concerned with the preservation and interpretation of classical Greek texts laid greater emphasis on writing than on speech;
(ii) due to the traditional concern with standard, literary language, informal or colloquial usage was regarded as 'incorrect';
(iii) traditional grammars were based on Greek and Latin and were applied with minimal modifications and, often, uncritically to the description of other languages.

The most remarkable feature of Chomsky's break from traditional linguistics was his claim for the autonomy of linguistics from philosophy and literary criticism. This claim of autonomy would, by itself, be an empty claim without the sure foundations of an empirical basis.

This brings us to the second use of the word 'normative'. An enterprise could be concerned with describing normative behaviour. Such an enterprise may, for example, describe the norms and moral beliefs of a certain community. A 'normative' enterprise of this sort can be said to explicate the native's atheoretical knowledge, and to the extent that it fails to do so, it cannot be regarded as an explication at all. Within such an enterprise there can be no clear sense of falsifiability as in the natural sciences. But an enterprise that attempts to account for certain non-normative or empirical facts about human behaviour cannot, conceivably, be held to be liable to the charge of unfalsifiability. What are the non-normative, empirical

facts that Chomskyan linguistics seeks to explain? First, the understanding of the particular natural language that the native speaker-hearer possesses. Two other features of linguistic phenomena that guide theory-construction in Chomskyan linguistics are the 'generality' and 'specificity' of natural-language-acquisition. The 'generality' aspect is accounted for by the fact that all human beings can learn language naturally, and the 'specificity' aspect by the fact that a child brought up in any language community (irrespective of his/her community of birth) can learn the language of that community. Thus, the very nature of theory-construction in linguistics must be such as to account for this dual aspect of language acquisition.

(b) We must now consider the charge that Chomskyan linguistics is unfalsifiable. As we saw above, Dasgupta's arguments for unfalsifiability rest on two ideas: firstly, that intuitive judgments do not admit of falsification; and, secondly, that a grammar, being a description of the native speaker-hearer's knowledge, is unfalsifiable by definition. Now, firstly, the idea that intuitive judgments do not admit of falsification has no bearing on the Chomskyan programme, for what is at issue is not whether intuitive judgments are themselves falsifiable but whether they can falsify a generative grammar or a linguistic theory. It makes no sense to ask whether an event can be falsified; only a theory seeking to explain the event is capable of being falsified or confirmed. The second idea in Dasgupta's argument is that a generative grammar is unfalsifiable by definition since it is a description of the native speaker-hearer's knowledge. This idea rests on the notion of 'normative knowledge', problems regarding which I have addressed above. There, I tried to remove some misunderstandings about the concerns and aims of Chomskyan linguistics by pointing out what it is not. Below, I undertake the positive task of pointing out what it is.

What are the features of generative grammar which allow for its liability to falsification? I will answer this question in two parts. In the first part, I bring out the similarities between Chomskyan linguistics and the natural sciences by showing that both adopt the same methodology in carving out the empirical world for explanatory addressal. In the second part, I take a close look at the theoretical framework of Chomskyan linguistics to elicit its explanatory role and its liability to falsification.

[1] The natural sciences give us statements of exceptionless regularities. Exceptionless regularities are organizations of empirical phenomena that we produce with difficulty in the experimental laboratory. What we are doing in the experimental situation is creating a closed system in which the number and kind of real mechanisms at work and which produce the phenomena in question are strictly controlled. It is about these mechanisms that we make scientific claims, claiming that mechanism X is capable of producing effects a, b, c, . . . , and will produce them, all other things being equal. The experiment is just our attempt to make all other things equal. Outside the laboratory, things are not equal, and so the effects are not produced. But this is not to say that there are no mechanisms at work. The fact that there are no exceptionless regularities does not mean that, as scientists, we should not have, as a primary goal, the isolation and description of the powers and liabilities of individual mechanisms.

Thus, the central tasks of the natural sciences may be seen to be:

(i) isolating and describing the real causal mechanisms at work in producing the world of events;
(ii) explaining events in terms of the conjecturai operations of particular mechanisms.[5]

In relation to (i), the postulation of such underlying mechanisms as the language acquisition device or linguistic competence represents good scientific practice. In fact, such postulation in Chomskyan linguistics is analogous to creating laboratory conditions for experimental observations in the other natural sciences. And the confirmation or falsification of the postulated mechanism is brought about by seeking out situations that present experimental closures. For example,

(i) a study of situations of linguistic deprivation may yield evidence that have a bearing on claims about the innate basis of language acquisition and about the critical period of the growth of language; one such study was made possible by the discovery of the teenage girl 'Genie' and the monitoring of her progress in learning her first language at an abnormally late age;[6]
(ii) a comparison of languages acquired on the basis of limited input, e.g., sign languages (BSL, ASL, etc.) and creoles with other spoken natural languages would yield clearer indications about the constraints of the human mind that underlie linguistic behaviour.[7]

[2] Having pointed out the methodological similarities between the natural sciences and Chomskyan linguistics, let us now explore the relationship between 'explanation' and 'falsification' within the theoretical framework of the latter. The linguistic competence of a native speaker-hearer is expressed as a system of rules that relate signals to semantic interpretations of these signals. This system of rules is generative grammar. A generative grammar has three

components, viz. a syntactic component, a semantic component and a phonological component. The syntactic component contains a syntactic description, an abstract object of some sort associated with a sentence, that uniquely determines its semantic interpretation as well as its phonetic form. For a generative grammar to be 'descriptively adequate' it must give a pairing of signals with their semantic interpretations that meets empirically given conditions on the semantic interpretations that they support. This, then, is one clear indication of the falsifiability of generative grammar. Two grammars may be regarded as 'observationally adequate' if both generate all and only grammatical sentences of a language. But only the one that can assign two syntactic descriptions to sentences like

(1) they don't know how good meat tastes
(2) what disturbed John was being disregarded by everyone

and thus, account for their ambiguity, can be regarded as descriptively adequate. In such cases of ambiguity, the syntactic description will have only one 'surface structure' but must have two 'deep structures'.[8]

Generative grammars are themselves constructed within the broader theoretical framework provided by a theory of generative grammar or linguistic theory. A linguistic theory would include a specification of the general properties of any system of rules that may serve as the basis for a human language, i.e. it would elaborate in detail the general form of language. The development of linguistic theory involves providing the following:

(a) theories of phonetic and semantic representation;
(b) a general account of the notion 'syntactic description';
(c) a specification of the class of potential generative grammars;
(d) a general account of how these grammars function, i.e. how they generate syntactic descriptions and assign to them phonetic and semantic interpretations, thus pairing phonetically represented signals with semantic interpretations.[9]

To bring out the other feature of Chomskyan linguistics crucial to its falsifiability, let us consider the question of the 'explanatory adequacy' of linguistic theory. The notion of explanatory adequacy can be readily understood in terms of the problem of constructing a hypothetical language acquisition device (LAD) that can take as input primary linguistic data of a language and provide as output a descriptively adequate grammar G of that language. This device may be represented schematically as follows:

primary linguistic data → LAD → G

The pursuit of explanatory adequacy may be carried out in two directions:

(a) by providing as rich a hypothesis about linguistic universals (as specified by the four requirements of linguistic theory stated above) as is supported by available evidence; this can then be attributed to the LAD; and
(b) by developing a general 'evaluation procedure' or 'simplicity measure' that can select a grammar on the basis of data.

The specification of linguistic universals and the evaluation procedure both meet empirical conditions provided by the 'generality' aspect of language acquisition stated above. A generative grammar, on the other hand, meets empirical conditions provided by the 'specificity' aspect of language acquisition. Even the linguistic theory may be falsified if it does not meet the conditions of explanatory adequacy. Thus, Chomskyan linguistics is liable to falsification both at the level specified by descriptive adequacy and at that specified by explanatory adequacy. Further, a knowledge of linguistic universals would contribute to the formulation of descriptively adequate grammars for various languages. A falsification of the grammar of any language could entail theoretical modifications at either or both the levels specified by descriptive and explanatory adequacy.

IV

The final thesis in Dasgupta's argument is that generative grammar is an extended axiomatic system. Grammatical rules are nothing but formally necessary truths. Thus, for example, '(NP → the + N, N → man) → the man' is a formally necessary truth which results from a series of derivations. Now, the fact that generative grammar is a formally precise system is really a virtue of the generative enterprise. This, for two reasons. The first is found in the preface to *Syntactic Structures,* where Chomsky states the advantages of formalization in linguistics:

> The search for rigorous formulation in linguistics has a much more serious motivation than mere concern for logical niceties or the desire to purify well-established methods of linguistic analysis. Precisely constructed models for linguistic structure can play an important role, both negative and positive, in the process of discovery itself. By pushing a precise but inadequate formulation to an unacceptable conclusion, we can often

> expose the exact source of this inadequacy and, consequently, gain a deeper understanding of the linguistic data. More positively, a formalized theory may automatically provide solutions for many problems other than those for which it was explicitly designed. Obscure and intuition-bound notions can neither lead to absurd conclusions nor provide new and correct ones, and hence they fail to be useful in two important respects.[10]

Another reason why formalization in linguistics is a virtue becomes obvious when we view linguistics from a computational standpoint. The second half of this century has witnessed the emergence of a committed research interest in the computer modelling of various aspects of human cognitive behaviour, e.g., grammars, meanings, speech acts, etc. Of course, this recent historical fact does not imply that everything that goes under the rubric 'Computational Theory of Mind', is the final methodological word in the scientific study of the human mind. But that rubric does represent a dominant attitude in the current research milieu, and to the extent that Chomskyan linguistics is amenable at all to computer implementation, it is also an active participant in debates that cut across research programmes of the computational variety. Thus, for example, Hausser, a linguist with a communication-theoretic interest, can make the following criticism of the formalism of phrase structure grammars (PS-grammars) used by Chomsky:

> . . . PS-grammar is unsuitable for direct parsing. Parsers for context-free PS-grammars cannot possibly apply the rules of grammar directly because the rules of the grammar rewrite an initial start symbol, while the parser takes sentences as inputs. The standard solution to this dilemma consists of computational routines which reconstruct the grammatical analysis in an indirect way by building large intermediate structures which are not part of the grammar. . . . A syntactic formalism used directly in parsing and generation eliminates the need for a 'procedural' reconstruction of the grammar, ensures that the grammar used by parsers and generators is general and linguistically well motivated, and provides a computational testing ground for competence grammars with tremendous heuristic power.[11]

V

I have shown, in the above discussion, that none of the charges raised by Dasgupta against the status of Chomskyan linguistics as a natural science are tenable in the face of a fuller understanding of its pre-theoretical concerns and methodological motivations. Further, I have pointed out features of the theoretical framework of

Chomskyan linguistics that are in agreement with our expectations of a natural science. In particular, I have shown, with respect to Chomskyan linguistics, that

(a) the hermeneutic challenge fails;
(b) the charge of unfalsifiability fails; and
(c) the logical character of linguistic theorising is an advantage for the generative enterprise as part of a larger theory of linguistic performance and communication.

Thus, Chomskyan linguistics must be regarded as a natural science which attempts to explain the phenomenon of language acquisition and that of the creative aspect of language use in terms of a formally precise specification of the linguistic competence of the native speaker-hearer.

Notes and References

1. Amitabh Dasgupta, 'Explanation-Explication Conflict in Transformational Grammar', in *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. VI, No. 2, 1989, pp. 93–108.
2. J. Katz, 'Mentalism in Linguistics', in *Readings in the Philosophy of Language*, edited by J.F. Rosenberg and C. Travis, Prentice Hall Inc., New Jersey, p. 370.
3. The reasons why a child cannot be said to 'construct' a grammar are as follows: Construction would involve a lot more time and effort than what the child actually seems to require, in the early years of his life, during which he learns his native language. Also, the data given to him are too meagre for him to be able to construct a grammar. Further, grammatical rules are applied unreflectingly and it is unlikely that such rules are consciously constructed.
4. The 'creativity' of human languages must be distinguished from the 'creative' element in the 'sign languages' of certain other species. We know, through the studies conducted by Karl von Frisch, that bees communicate messages with each other. But in the case of communication amongst bees, there is a simple correlation between 'signal' and 'meaning' by varying the intensity of signal movements. This kind of 'creativity' is also found in human languages, as in the case of tonal variations. However, there is a greater 'degree' of creativity in human languages in the construction of new combinations of discrete units. It is this latter feature that is especially complex and has, according to Chomsky, a qualitatively unique grammatical structure.
5. With respect to the study of language, by the term 'conjunctural operations' I mean the inter-related operations of various underlying mechanisms which, together, yield the observed linguistic behaviour.
6. 'Genie' had been kept locked in a room by her father and had no interaction with other human beings for thirteen years before she was rescued by the police. Living in seclusion, 'Genie' could not have learnt any language.
7. Cf. Margaret Deuchar, 'Sign Language Research', in J. Lyons *et al.*, *New Horizons in Linguistics*, Vol. 2, Penguin Books Ltd., London, 1987. Creoles are pidgins which have become first languages through their acquisition by children. Children who are exposed only to the limited input of a pidgin appear to elaborate on this input, thus developing a fully fledged language which serves as their native language. Creoles have certain grammatical characteristics in common, probably because of the way they have developed and because they do not have a long history. The reason that sign languages are

acquired on the basis of limited input is because a majority of deaf children are born to hearing parents who do not sign to them, and because such children do not learn to sign until they go to school.

8. The 'deep structure' of a sentence is that aspect of the syntactic description that determines its semantic interpretation, and the 'surface structure' of the sentence is that aspect of the syntactic description that determines its phonetic form.
9. Cf. Noam Chomsky, 'Topics in the Theory of Transformational Grammar', in *Janua Linguarum*, Mouton, The Hague.
10. Noam Chomsky, *Syntactic Structures*, Mouton, The Hague, 1966, p. 5.
11. Ronald Hausser, *Computation of Language*, Springer Verlag, 1987, pp. 4–5.

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Response to Comments on 'The Development of Advaita Vedānta as a School of Philosophy'

It is kind of Daya Krishna and the members of the panel to consider my comments on Advaita worthy of the attention they have given them. As is usual in such cases, the disagreements noted by Bhattacharyya, Pande, Pandey, Sharma and Venkatachalam seem to me to derive from a combination of mistakes on my part, misunderstanding of my intentions, and some genuinely debatable matters. Let me start by summing up and clarifying what I said and its context.

My paper 'The Development of Advaita Vedānta as a School of Philosophy' (hereafter 'Development') originated in certain portions in an extended set of lectures delivered in Naples almost ten years ago now. Another section of these lectures was later published as '*Vedāntaparibhāṣā* as Systematic Reconstruction' in *Perspective on Vedānta: Essays in Honour of Professor P.T. Raju* (edited by S.S. Rama Rao Pappu), Leiden, 1988. As a reader of this latter paper can easily confirm, part of my intention in developing these lectures was to attempt to combat the common misconception of Indian philosophy, and especially Advaita Vedānta, as mystical and un- or anti-systematic. The *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* is perhaps the best known—though far from the only—attempt to provide a rigorously systematic presentation of Advaita. In my paper about it I labour to emphasize the parallels between the method Dharmarājadhvarīndra follows and very contemporary analytic methods in logical philosophy.

What I was attempting to do in the entire set of papers, of which the two mentioned were prominent but not the only parts, was to defend Indian philosophical systems, and in particular Advaita Vedānta, as serious attempts at systematic philosophy to be placed among other such systems. And it was in this context that I depicted

a system as going through the five stages I describe in 'Development'. Despite all the efforts of classical and modern Indian philosophers and scholars it is still taken for granted by far too many, at least in my country, that 'Indian philosophy' is a misnomer, not being worthy of attention by serious philosophers.

Perhaps my basic mistake lay in publishing a portion of these papers in India. For the papers were written for a western audience, in the hope of winning or renewing interest in systematic Indian thought. Still, it is perhaps not without interest for Indian readers, since the implication of what I was attempting to say is that classical Indian philosophy is as defensible as systematic philosophy as anyone's thought. This is not something easily accepted by westerners and, though I wish I were wrong about this, it is becoming less commonly believed in India.

In 'Development' I am proposing a very broad view about the rise and fall of philosophical systems. A system is born as one or more fundamental insights—the Discovery stage; it (perhaps after a while) is developed into a doctrine—the Development stage; it gets debated and defended—the Polemical stage; it becomes codified for various purposes—the Systematic stage; and it becomes so familiar it is taken for granted—the stage of Decline. I give one or two western illustrations of this process, and attempt to apply it to Advaita. Here is where I am afraid I am being misunderstood.

Sibajiban wonders whether the Discovery stage is not made mythical if it is located prior to the *sūtras*. I suspect that the Discovery stage is always pre-*sūtra*. Certainly in the case of Vedānta it is evident that Bādarāyaṇa was a late comer, but of course there is no 'Vedānta' system, only Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, etc. The basic insights of Advaita seem to stem from portions of the early Upaniṣads or even before. Whether this makes the Discovery stage mythical is a moot point, in that we will probably never know who had the seminal ideas first. The *sūtras* may record the discovery, but they most likely did not constitute that discovery. This also addresses others (Sharma, for example) who defend Gauḍapāda as the discoverer of Advaita.

I also appear to some of my critics to have proclaimed the demise of Advaita. I claim nothing of the sort. Advaita is very much alive. However, it is in the fifth stage, as I see it, the stage where it is so familiar it is taken for granted. Of course, in so far as Advaitins protest at this finding they are resisting progress toward the demise of Advaita, keeping Advaita alive. If my efforts have provoked such signs of life I am indeed happy!

G.C Pande thinks I am doing theology. He evidently understands 'theology' as not requiring belief in God, since he tells us that the atheistic 'Pūrvamīmāṃsā (is) the paragon of all Indian theologies'. He also says Advaita is 'not an attempt *to explain* the insight that

Reality is one and without a second, but to *gain* that insight. . . .' I should say Advaita is neither attempt. It is Advaitins who attempt to explain, gain or comprehend the Fundamental Insight. I was speaking of the rise, maintenance and decline of the philosophical school committed to the promulgation of that insight and to its defence.

I plead guilty to misrepresenting Śaṅkara by seeming to imply he uses the term *pariṇāma* at the outset of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. The term he actually uses is *adhyāsa*, referring to the customary habit of attributing different properties to the self. What I was attempting to suggest is that the entire opening section of the *Bhāṣya* starts from a premiss Śaṅkara rejects, viz. that the differences we naturally assume in order to get on with ordinary life and thought are 'established' *(siddha)*. In due course, after characterizing this 'beginningless and endless superimposition' (*anadhiranantas . . . adhyāsa*) as generally accepted, he announces that it is the understanding of the oneness of the Self (*ātmaikatvavidyā*) which destroys *adhyāsa* and which he will now go on to explain. Prior to that point, however, he is, as I suggested, characterizing the view he will reject. I don't think, as a matter of fact, that Śaṅkara uses either the term *pariṇāma* or *vivarta* in their technical senses in developing his position; these came later to Advaita.

I called Śaṅkara a Mīmāṃsāka, not a Pūrvamīmāṃsaka. It is common among Vedāntins to speak of their view as Uttaramīmāṃsā. Vedāntins, like the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas, appeal to the various principles of exegesis that constitute the Mīmāṃsā methods, and thus Vedāntins, including Śaṅkara, are appropriately called Mīmāṃsaka, though not Pūrvamīmāṃsakas.

Sharma refers to a number of Advaita works as Śaṅkara's. At least one of them, the *Ātmabodha*, is clearly not by the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. Others, such as the *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* and the *Māṇḍūkyakārikābhāṣya*, may be by Śaṅkara, but the ascription is not altogether certain. Indeed, my assessment of Śaṅkara does depend to an extent on which are Śaṅkara's authentic works, and since Sharma doesn't limit those works to the ones I do it is not surprising we come to different conclusions.[1]

Sibajiban and I may have different views about what constitutes a 'decline'. I am not aware of active Sāṃkhya *maṭhas* and *āśramas* (though there may be such), and the 'Sāṃkhya method of self-realization' is, I believe, very often the method of Pātañjala Yoga. Sāṁkhya terminology is still used by Yoga as well as by Advaitins, but as Sibajiban himself suggests, Sāṁkhya lacks very much polemical literature, and perhaps we may say that it failed to develop far beyond the second stage before being taken over by other systems. So, in a sense, that system has not declined—it never reached a point after which the Decline state could occur. I am not, however, entirely convinced by this account, for there *were* a few attempts to systematize Sāṃkhya, though perhaps not very convincing ones, and so perhaps we say that the Sāṃkhya system ran its full course. But I realize this way of applying my five-stage analysis may tend to make it so broadly applicable as to be empty. I take it that is what my critics tend to think. All I can ask at the moment in response is for them to reread the earlier sections of 'Development' where various specific aspects of each stage are described, and ask themselves whether these do in fact apply.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Those interested in my views about Śaṅkara may consult K.H. Potter, 'Śaṅkarācārya: the myth and the man', in *Charisma and Sacred Biography*, edited by Michael A. Williams, Chicago, California, 1982, pp. 111–25.

University of Wasnington KARL H. POTTER

The Concept of Tyāga in Purvamīmāṃsā and in Bhagavadgītā

A response to Dr Staal's observations in the General Introduction to his work 'Agni'

In the rituals described in the *Śrautasūtras* and discussed in Purvamīmāṃsā, the expression *tyāga* is used in connection with the offering of *homa dravya* in the sacred fire. While offering the same a formula is recited: '*Agnaye idam na mama*'. The actual offering is called *prakṣepa,* i.e. putting in the sacred fire, while the thought in the mind represented by the above formula, is called tyāga. The thought conveyed by this formula is withdrawal of one's ownership. (*Sva svatva nivṛitti*). The homa dravya so far belonged to the *yajamāna,* i.e. the sacrificer, now he withdraws his ownership while offering the same to the *agni*. This is tyāga. By this tyāga, the yajamān does not renounce the phala to be realized by performing the ritual but renounces only his ownership of homa dravya. That is why this formula is recited while offering homa dravya both in *Nityakarma* and *Kāmyakarma*. If it were to mean the renunciation of *phala,* then, there would be no need to recite this in *Nityakarma* where there is no phala. Further, tyāga is *arād upakāraka* while *prakṣepa* is *sannipatya upakāraka*. Those items that do not contribute to the structure of the sacrifice are arād upakāraka while those that contribute to it directly or through some other item are sannipatya upakāraka. Prakṣepa as a saṁskāra of homa dravya contributes to the

structure of the sacrifice while tyāga, i.e. withdrawal of the ownership of homa dravya on the part of yajamāna is neither a saṃskāra nor an *aṅga.* It does not form a part of the structure of the sacrifice. It is *dravya* and *devatā* that are the primary constituents of tyāga. Tyāga is a mental act on the part of yajamāna which is conveyed by this formula. The concept of tyāga in Bhagavadgītā is quite different. The phrase '*Mā karma phala hetuh bhūh*' in the Gītā gives a correct picture of the concept of tyāga. '*Karmaphalam hetuh yasya sah mā bhūh*'. Let not the result, i.e. expected gain of the action, be the motive for undertaking the action. According to this guideline, the habit of making the result, i.e. expected gain of an action, the motive to undertake that action has to be renounced. An activity undertaken with this approach is *niṣkāmakarma* in the Gītā. It is the renunciation of making the result the motive of action that is the tyāga of Bhagavadgītā.

A clear understanding of this distinction enables us to get rid of a confusion in respect of the Mīmāṃsā position regarding *kāmyakarma* and tyāga. The confusion is as follows:

(i) Kāmyakarmas of Purvamīmāṃsā are aimed at obtaining the desired result. The tyāga represented by the formula 'Agnaye idam na mama' announces the renunciation of phala. This leads to a contradictory position on the part of Mīmāṃsakas.

This complaint is not justified, because, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā concept of tyāga is not *phala*tyāga as shown above. It is *svatva*tyāga. Therefore this complaint of a contradiction is based on misinformation.

(ii) Incidentally, we may refer to another complaint that some of the Mīmāṃsā rituals are declared as *nitya,* i.e. obligatory, but these are also stated as *kāmya.* This is a contradictory position.

For instance, *agnihotra* is declared both as nitya and kāmya. This is a contradiction. This objection is again due to misinformation about the Mīmāṃsā position in this respect. As per the *Samyogaprithaktva nyāya* of Purvamīmāṃsā, a nitya ritual can also be performed as kāmya. This does not involve *karmabheda* but only elicits *prayogabheda.* 'A' can perform it as nitya while 'B' can perform it as kāmya. 'A' is not interested in any result. He is content with *pratyavāya parihāra.* Therefore, he performs it as nitya. But 'B' is interested in the result recommended by '*Dadhnā indrikāmasya juhuyāt*'. Therefore, he performs it as a kāmya. Now, a ticklish question arises, viz. has he not abandoned nitya, and consequently, does he not have to face pratyavāya? No, his performance of agnihotra as kāmya has also simultaneously resulted in the performance of nitya by the technique of *prasaṅga-siddhi. Prasaṅga* means one performance serving the purpose of the other also. Such

a Prasaṅga is worked out in respect of pradhāna, aṅga, and both aṅga and pradhāna. It is also worked out in respect of *prakṛti, vikṛti* and *prakṛti-vikṛti.* The present instance of kāmya performance of agnihotra serving the purpose of nitya is also an instance of prasaṅga in respect of pradhāna. This is also called *rupasiddhi* prasaṅga. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the Mīmāṃsā position in respect of treating one and the same *yāga* both as nitya and kāmya. The yāga is one but the prayogas are different, the *adhikārins* are different and the *saṁkalp* is different. But the most important point is, one who performs as kāmya has not abandoned it as nitya. This is explained by the technique of prasaṅga-siddhi.

(iii) Another observation in respect of the Mīmāṃsā position is, that the mantras do not convey the meaning, or rather the meaning of the mantras is neither comprehended or taken into account by the priests.

To say that the present generation of priests do not comprehend the meaning is one thing, and to say the very conveying of meaning and the comprehension of it is dispensed with is quite another. Mīmāṃsā specifically states that mantras are to be recited to bring the devatā, dravya etc., items connected with the yāga, to the mind of the yajamāna and other participants. '*Prayoga samaveta artha-smārakatva*' is stated to be the purpose of reciting mantras. Therefore, mantras are meaningful and convey the meaning. To compare the Vedic mantras to tantric chants of meaningless syllables is not fair. The ignorance of meaning on the part of modern priests or a few generations of priests cannot be the ground on which to say that Mīmāṃsakas did not attach any importance to the meaning of mantras. The statement '*Parokṣa priya hi Devaḥ*' has no relevance here.

There are a few other observations that are also based on similar misinformation. The purpose of this article is only to provide information, and if the information given here is also misinformation, then, I solicit more authentic information or more authentic presentation from better-equipped scholars.

K.T. PANDURANGI

Notes and Queries

Did Mahāvīra and Buddha Really believe in *Ahiṃsā?*

The Buddhist and the Jain traditions are supposed to be the greatest votaries of *ahiṁsā* in the Indian tradition. Yet, there are certain authentic sayings ascribed both to the Buddha and the Mahāvīra which not only go against the principles of *ahiṁsā,* but also against what will be regarded as the common moral sense of humanity.

The *Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā, Telovāda Jātaka* 246, cites the Buddha as saying, 'what to talk of other kinds of meat, even if some vile person offers as a gift the flesh of the child or wife after killing them, one who is enlightened and full of compassion and friendship to all beings does not partake of any guilt if he accepts and eats it.' (*Āgama Aur Tripiṭaka,* Vol. 1, p. 435/p. 358). The Buddha also tells the story of 'a couple who satisfied their hunger by killing and eating the flesh of their only son and thus were enabled to cross the forest. They did this only so that they may cross the forest and not because of pride or egoity or embellishment or for something else. Similarly monks, the seekers after *nirvāṇa,* do not eat out of pride or intoxication, but only for crossing the world which is like a forest.'

Surprisingly, Mahāvīra also is supposed to tell, according to the *Ṇāma Dhammakahāo,* a story in which some people satisfied their hunger and thirst by eating the flesh and drinking the blood of their daughter and sister and thus were able to cross the forest and reach Rājagṛha. There was no other motive in this than to cross the forest and reach Rājagṛha. Similarly, the monks also take food to achieve *mokṣa* and not for the taste, or the way it looks, or because it gives strength to the body, or because it is a nice thing, or anything else (Muni Śrī Nagarāja Jī, *Āgama Aur Tripiṭaka,* Vol. 1, p. xxv).

There is a difference between the first and the other two anecdotes, but all of them raise the same moral problems, particularly in the context of the acceptance of *ahiṁsā* as the highest virtue, which is generally claimed pre-eminently for both Buddhism and Jainism. In the story from the *Jātaka,* the person who feeds the monks the flesh of his wife and children is called *'duḥśīla'*, or a vicious person, and it is not denied that he will suffer the fruits of his sinful act, or that the act is sinful, and hence ought not to have been done. What is denied is that the virtuous monk who partakes of such flesh does not partake in any of the consequences of the sinful act that the host has committed. But it is not made clear whether it will be so even if the Buddhist monk had known what had been done and still partakes of the food offered to him. But, aware or not, does not such a statement, coming as it does from the Buddha himself, encourage the monks not to care

how the meat that is offered to them has been obtained, or not to find out what sort of a person is he/she who has invited them for meals at his/her place?

The other two incidents described in the text are primarily meant to suggest that the monk partakes of food so that he/she may work on the path to *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* or *kaivalya*, and thus cross the jungle of the world in which he/she has got lost for some reason or other. But even if this is the purpose, why should there have been such gruesome stories, and why should the justification have been given in terms of such stories?

There is, of course, the question regarding the authenticity of these texts and their acceptance in the Buddhist and the Jain traditions. And there is the question whether these portions have even been regarded as *prakṣipta*, or interpolations, in the tradition. There is also a larger question as to how the practice of eating non-human flesh can be regarded as compatible with *ahiṁsā*, if it is regarded as a virtue by any system of thought or philosophy.

We may, therefore, formulate the following questions for the consideration of scholars well-versed in the subject.

1. What is the authenticity and the authority of the texts referred to by Muni Śrī Nagarāja Jī in his work?
2. Does the repeated reference to the deliberate killing of near and dear ones and eating their flesh for sustaining one's own life mean that it was not only a widely prevalent practice, but also that it was not even morally condemned by anybody, including the Mahāvīra and the Buddha?
3. Is there any essential difference between eating human flesh and eating the flesh of non-human animals, from the viewpoint of *ahiṁsā*?
4. How is the approval by the Buddha of the eating of meat, if it was not expressly and deliberately prepared for one, compatible with his preaching of *ahiṁsā*?
5. Has there been any movement or debate in Buddhism about this issue?
6. Have the Jains ever allowed the eating of meat as a regular or exceptional practice for their *munis* or *śrāvakas*?

We hope scholars will throw light on these and other related issues raised by these extraordinary utterances attributed to the Mahāvīra and the Buddha by texts which, at least *prima facie*, seem to be accepted as genuine by followers of the two great religions which are supposed to believe in *ahiṁsā* as the highest virtue that men ought to pursue and practise in their lives.

MUKUND LATH

Did Mahāvīra Really Talk About Mokṣa?

Some comments on the extract from the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* as given by Muni Śrī Nagarāja Jī in his *Āgama Aur Tripiṭaka* as reproduced in English translation in the *Notes and Queries* section of *JICPR*, Vol. X, No. 1, pp. 197–98.

Muni Śrī Nagarāja Jī's passage concerning what Mahāvīra has to say on *mokṣa* in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* (*Āgama Aur Tripiṭaka: Ek Anuśīlana*, Vol. I, p. 189) is bound to strike any reader as bizarre. I looked up the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* to check the original. The word translated as '*mokṣa*' is '*siddhi*'. It is of course, possible to translate '*siddhi*' as '*mokṣa*' but that is plainly incongruous in the context. Other more cogent translations are possible and available.

I have before me the translation of K.C. Lalwani (Jain Bhavan, Calcutta, 1973). Lalwani renders '*siddhi*' as 'the abode of *siddhas*'. This obviously provides a more satisfactory translation but it also raises the question: 'how is the addition "abode of" to be justified?' K.C. Lalwani has, as he says, relied on Abhayadeva's commentary for his renderings. Presumably, his translation of '*siddhi*' as 'the abode of *siddhas*' is based on Abhayadeva. I have not been able to see Abhayadeva's commentary.

But there is another consideration that provides a clue. Besides the mention of '*siddhi*' in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* in the passage being discussed there is an earlier mention of the term. (Lalwani notes both passages, the earlier and the one under consideration, under '*siddhi*' in his index.) The earlier passage is at the beginning of the text and starts with a eulogy of Mahāvīra where many phrases occur as laudatory epithets. One of these is: '*siddhigai nāmadheyaṁ ṭhāṇaṁ sampāvikāme*'. This, Lalwani renders as: 'intent on attaining the sphere of liberated souls'. A literal translation more useful for our purpose here would be: 'desirous of attaining the place—"abode", "sphere", named *siddhigai* (the goal of *siddhi* or liberation)'. *Siddhi*, short for *siddhigai*, here is the name of a place. The association of the word with a place is, apparently, carried over to the later passage which is being discussed here. Indeed, what Mahāvīra has to say about *siddhi* in the passage under consideration assumes that it is a place. Let us quote Lalwani's translation:

> And then, O Skandaka, you have in mind . . . whether the abode of the perfected souls is with limit or without limit. On this I ordain, O Skandaka, that the abode of the perfected souls is to be viewed from four angles, viz. substance, place, time and *bhāva*. As to substance, this abode of the perfected souls extends over an area of 45,00,000 *yojanas* in length and so also in breadth and with a circumference which is 142,30,249 hundred thousand *yojanas* more or less but still with a limit. As to time, there was no

time, nor there will be any, when the abode of the perfected souls did not, does not and will not, exist. As to *bhāva* the same as with the spheres. So you see, the abode of the perfected souls is as to substance, with limit; as to place, with limit; as to time, without limit; and as to *bhāva* (also) without limit.

I must confess, however, that though this rendering makes more immediate sense of the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* passage than the rendering of Nagarāja Jī, the whole idea still remains odd and incongruous. What has the notion of a special location with spatial boundaries to do with the perfection of the soul, however ethereal, *sūkṣma* or non-material the place might be? Is it a station from where the perfected soul which has shed its *karma* can 'see' everything and thus be a *kavalī*? But why should such a place be necessary? And could Mahāvīra be a *kavalī* when he was not in such a place? And if he was already there, in what sense was he there?

MUKUND LATH

Book Reviews

DOUWE TIEMERSMA: *Body Schema and Body Image: An Interdisciplinary and Philosophical Study*, Swets & Zeitlinger B.V., Amsterdam/Lisse, 1989, pp. xii+397.

Like all architecture, body is the being of the soul, the dweller, its temporary interactive mode of presence. Thus, it reminds us all of human life on earth, of growth and the cycles of life and death on the one hand, and of the life of the spirit on the other. What type of questioning is characteristic of the contemporary philosophy of body, taken in its widest manifestations in existentialism, phenomenology, hermeneutics and other approaches? More precisely, what types of model-building and self-imagining are at work in human life where neurology, psychology, psychoanalysis, medical and environmental ethics might have important advances yet to make? The Dutch hermeneutic philosopher of science and human action, Douwe Tiemersma's recent book is devoted to various aspects of the latter question. In a nutshell, the book is an attempt to rethink the classical concepts of 'body schema' and 'body image' in order to examine their empirical relevance and field of application in clinical settings.

What is the state-of-the-art of body schema and body image research? First of all, how are the terms 'body schema' and 'body image' understood by the neurologists and psychologists who introduced them at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries? The former has been defined 'as the postural model of the body, and as the model of the surface of the body, existing as neural mechanisms of perception and motor coordination'.[1] On the other hand, the latter refers to the 'knowledge' of one's own body, present at the borders of consciousness, or functioning unconsciously. This knowledge is used 'while moving in a room with things and people, without a focal awareness of the routes to take and of the dimensions of body, and in scratching the right spot on the body'.[2] The scientific interest of psychologists in body image research is indicated by their search for answers to the following questions.[3]

(1) How does the individual perceiving being, distribute his/her attention to the various sides of his/her body? How does he/she perceive his/her body, there being a divergence between the perceived and the felt body?
(2) How much does the constancy and stability of body image contribute to our perception of the body?

(3) What is, then, the nature of the non-thematically functioning knowledge of the body?

Douwe considers it worthwhile to undertake a thorough methodological and philosophical study in this very area where research has sharply declined 'after peaking in the 1950s and 1960s'.[4] For what is lamentable is the lack of a clearly encompassing theory 'which can support and direct research and integrate the results'.[5] Thus, we are hardly surprised at Douwe's negative note in thinking of the results obtained in neurology, psychology and psychoanalysis as inconclusive in nature. The reasons for this have to do not only with methodological problems but with the lack of unequivocal definition/theoretical elaboration encountered in the field of body schema and body image research.

Douwe's book is a philosophically sophisticated interdisciplinary study in these concepts taking into account their empirical relevance and their fields of application in clinical neurology, psychology and psychoanalysis. It provides a systematic survey and discussion of the methods of investigation, the results and theories in their socio-historical settings. Thus, the entire range of discussion involves philosophical analysis, philosophy of science and phenomenology in the style of Merleau-Ponty. It makes a significant contribution to deepen our understanding of scientific and philosophical methodology on the one hand, and ontology and practical philosophy on the other, and all this in the forgotten field of body schema and body image research. In this way, Douwe's discussion leads us to an elaboration of what he calls 'inclusive phenomenology'. What is really meant here is a more comprehensive type of phenomenology. It is beyond the scope of the present review to examine Douwe's interesting and bold claim of having set forth, through his discussions, a whole philosophy of the body and human being as a comprehensive existential ontology and as a 'life-field theory' in which interdisciplinary approaches and various categories of empirical data stand integrated.

As for some matters of detail, I find the style of the author quite interesting for it makes the book easy reading for those who are particularly conversant with phenomenology. The first part of the book reviews not only the methods that have been used, but the results of scientific research together with the theories involved. The history of research and the development of the concepts and relevant theories receive here the attention they deserve. As the author himself looks at his enterprise, his book is a case-study in the philosophy of science, epistemology and existential ontology. Thus, on the one hand, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body is not only summarized in Chapter 6 but used as a most relevant starting point for the philosophical discussions (see p. 255ff). On the other hand, however, the author draws on various types of philosophies of science to interpret the theoretical situation, to define the concepts precisely and then to show how by defining their inter-relationships a precise theory of body schema and body image could be developed (see p. 217ff). In Chapter 7, the author examines the relationship between scientific, hermeneutic and phenomenological approaches in order to show how they can be found in the work going on in the field of body schema and body image research. Some general conclusions are then drawn by him from this case-study (see p. 283ff).

The ontological questions of body schema and body image, as Douwe has raised them, naturally lead to an interesting discussion of the relevance of instrumentalistic/idealistic/realistic interpretations, on the one hand, and of ontological pluralism and monism, of relativism, of the metaphorical view, post-modernism and the Kantian view, on the other (see p. 323ff). Questions of practical philosophy, which are relevant in so far as the concepts are used in the clinical and emancipatory contexts, are also discussed (see p. 334ff).

The book ends with the formulation of an integrating theory comprehensive enough to include in its framework several aspects of our knowledge in the field of body schema and body image research. It is presented *first* as a model of subject-object differentiation (Chapter 8, section 8.2).[6] It is then elaborated in terms of the field theory, in which the subject-object possibilities are incorporated. The shift in these possibilities has been presented as a transformation of the field. A tentative description of the categories of the field at the level of life and bodily feeling closes this study (see p. 353).[7]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Douwe Tiermersma, *Body Schema and Body Image: An Interdisciplinary and Philosophical Study*, Swets & Zeitlinger B.V., Amsterdam/Lisse, 1989, p. 1 and bibliography, pp. 355–377.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp. 1–2.
4. Ibid., p. 3.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., pp. 337–40.
7. Ibid., pp. 337–53; see also Douwe Tiemersma, 'Merleau-Ponty's philosophy as a field theory: Its origin, categories and relevance', *Man and World*, 20, 1987, pp. 419–36.

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VIJAY BHARADWAJA, *Form and Validity in Indian Logic,* Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, in association with Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Private Ltd., New Delhi, pp. x+127, Rs 100.

The book which is being reviewed here contains seven papers/chapters: the first four are on Buddhist logic, the next two are on Hindu logic, and the last one is on Jaina logic. The author hopes to discover and present within the modest length of one hundred pages the (or some) representative Indian view(s) of form and validity. He finds 'the substantive results of my study . . . quite interesting. . . .' and he seems to claim some originality in respect of the method of study which he has followed in this book. Vijay Bharadwaja is a Reader in the Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, but he completed this book 'in its present form' during his tenure of fellowship at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla. The author has gratefully acknowledged his debt to the then Director of the Institute, Professor (Ms) Margaret Chatterjee, with whom he held discussions from time to time.

The title, *Form and Validity in Indian Logic,* which the author has chosen for his work encourages the reader to hope that he would find here discussion of such topics of the relevant literature in India which correspond to what are known in (western) logic as form and validity. But quite early in the book the author says: 'Logic is not the right word for me to use' (preface). What he actually means is: 'methodology of knowledge, in Sanskrit *pramāṇa śāstra*' (preface). The reason the author gives for still retaining, in the very title, the word 'logic' may not, perhaps, appear very convincing. He says, 'it (logic) has become conventional'. Bharadwaja seems to mean that the themes he has considered in this book are customarily discussed under the heading logic or Indian logic, presumably by the known writers on the subject in modern times. But according to him most, if not all, of these writers 'have gone wrong in understanding it (the so-called Indian logic)'; and they have gone wrong precisely because they mistook (Indian) 'methodology of knowledge' for Aristotelian or modern formal logic. Under the circumstances, a wrong convention created by some mistaken authors should not have any hold on a discerning writer and scholar like Bharadwaja. Besides, the expressions *pramāṇaśāstra* and (even) methodology of knowledge are quite familiar in philosophical literature (one may note, however, that the author could be more careful about the use of the second of the two expressions). There also occur in the title of the book, the words form and validity. These two words are closely related to each other in the context of Aristotelian syllogistics and modern western logic. Bharadwaja has not only noted this, he is also aware that this conception of validity which is so closely related to

the notion of form is not characteristically Indian (p. 45), it is not even a Buddhist notion. Rather, he has 'reason to believe that the Buddhist philosophers, particularly Dignāga (Diṇnāga?) and Dharmakīrti, did not have the notion of logical form. . .' (p. 44). For an author who never misses an opportunity to emphasize that it is wrong to look at 'Indian logic as a proper sub-set of this or that model of western logic with which we are adequately or inadequately acquainted' (preface), and who is aware of the need 'to choose our tools of analysis and interpretation of *Indian logic* with the utmost judicious care, sensitivity and attention' (emphasis mine), it should not have been difficult to avoid the expressions in question at least in the very title of the book. The choice of the title could still be defended on somewhat better grounds if what he had in mind was to compare and contrast (in detail and with due prominence and importance) western notions of form and validity whatever alternative conceptions the Indian philosophers employed, according to him. But no chapter or even a substantial part of a chapter of the book has been devoted to this specific task. The contents and index guide one to only a single paragraph (discussion on p. 45), where all that the author has to say is, 'they (Buddhists) did develop a concept of validity, i.e. *prāmāṇya* like the following: "an argument is valid if and only if it is inconsistent to accept the *sādhana-vākya* to be true and the *sādhya-vākya* to be false, and also if the *sādhana-vākya* is true and the argument follows all the conditions of *trairūpya*, the *sādhya-vākya* must be true." This concept of validity is free from the paradoxes which plague the concept of formal validity in modern logic.' Such remarks are likely to appear sweeping; and so far as the formulation of part of the Buddhist notion of validity is concerned, it would strike one as a forced adaptation of some familiar formulation of western logic. For not only is there no convincing or detailed argument, the author also gives no reference to source literature of Indian philosophy; no crucial passage from any representative work of the relevant school of Indian philosophy has been quoted.

Discussion in almost every chapter of the book under reference has the following form.

> (a) The author endeavours to show, or claims to have shown, that certain important theses or concepts of some schools of Indian philosophy (which is indicated in the title of the respective chapter) has been misunderstood by a number of modern interpreters (the list of such interpreters includes names like Satish Vidyabhusan, D.M. Datta, F. Stcherbatsky, Richard S.Y. Chi, H.N. Randle, J.F. Staal, Karl Potter, S.S. Barlingay and others).

(b) He also endeavours to show, or claims to have shown, that almost always the misunderstanding of these interpreters could be traced to (i) their adopting 'the misleading models of interpretation borrowed indiscriminately from the West', or (ii) their attempting to 'interpret Indian logic in terms of the sophisticated logical notations of Aristotelian syllogistics or modern logic' without realizing that 'no notation is conceptually innocent. . . . To use a notation is to grant implicitly the assumptions and presuppositions underlying it. Essentially, a notation is a language and to regard it as conceptually or culturally free is to subscribe to a myth. . . . Thus to work with a powerful logical notation in order to make Indian logic intelligible is to run the risk of distorting it.'

(c) What the author does in each chapter, in the third place, is to give his 'own' interpretation, formulation or analysis of the concept or thesis discussed in the respective chapters.

I would like to avoid any substantial discussion of what the author has said in the book in respect of (a). In the first place, any discussion of those points of criticism of others is relatively less important than the positive achievements of the author. Once his positive views are clearly understood and we are convinced of their worth, we can undertake a comparative assessment. But I am afraid that, in spite of all his felicity of diction, Bharadwaja has not always succeeded in driving home the specific points he says he has, or wants to, make in respective chapters. Secondly, serious and discerning readers may not be convinced of the worth or validity of the positive thesis or interpretation of the author only (or mainly) on the ground, even if it is true, that some others fare far worse. It is also doubtful if those whom Bharadwaja has listed as mistaken interpreters of Indian thought are really mistaken where Bharadwaja thinks they have gone wrong. We may consider just this just a grand self-assessment of the author: 'The substantive results of my study have been quite interesting. . . . They are interesting in so far as they raise the question whether the so-called Indian logic is really logic in the formal sense as Aristotelian logic is. My answer has turned out to be in the negative.' I doubt if anybody, or at least many of the writers listed above as mistaken, would give or would have given a positive answer if the question was formulated so broadly and simply. But Bharadwaja says that the substantive results he has achieved in his book appeared paradoxical 'in so far as they suggest that most of the writers on Indian logic have gone wrong in understanding it. . . .' It may be noted, in the next place, that even if we wanted we could not discuss whether Bharadwaja has done justice to so many writers when he examined, in his rather impatient

style, their specific points, arguments or interpretations. First, there is the question of space. Second, there are too many authors with whom Bharadwaja has opened his debate simultaneously. But the greatest difficulty in the matter is the casual manner in which the reference list has been handled and the great reluctance to quote substantive portions of relevant passages from the works being criticized. He gives page numbers of books without mentioning the edition (see note 1, chapter 1: Praśastapāda does not figure in the bibliography and against Kaṇāda, only *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* has been mentioned). In yet other cases, where the edition has been mentioned, the page or chapter numbers are missing (see note 16, chapter 5). Against note no. 31 of chapter V all that one can find is: *Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, Tatvacintāmaṇī*; again, against note 18 of chapter VI, all we have is: G.E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*. There are many such instances. There is an entry in the bibliography which runs thus: Viśvanātha Pancānana Bhaṭṭācāryya, *Bhāṣā-paricchedaḥ* and *Nyāya-Siddhānta-Muktāvali.* (Sanskrit text only) Shrisatinath Bhaṭṭācāryya, 9 Rajakrishna Lane, Calcutta, 1884. The name of the person who actually edited the book or wrote the Sanskrit elucidation with which the book was edited has not been mentioned, or Bharadwaja has mixed up the two names, Visvanātha Nyāypañcānan and Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācāryya. Such carelessness creates great difficulty for the readers and reviewer.

Points (b) and (c) may be discussed together. So far as the second of the listed endeavours of Bharadwaja, i.e (b), one finds that he does the same thing (and perhaps to a greater extent) for which he takes so many scholars to task. He indiscriminately uses concepts of western philosophy and logic, not always with clear understanding and almost never with any explanation. I shall show some examples of this when I come to a discussion of (c). He also uses without explanation many English expressions to translate words of the philosophical Saṃskṛta; and often he appears to translate carelessly. He overlooks, when translating, the difference between '*anumeya*' as *pakṣa* and '*anumeya*' as *sādhyā*. '*Anumeya*' cannot be translated simply as *pakṣa* and translation of '*pakṣa*' as 'thesis' requires some explanation. A whole statement, (a) 'This can be called a tree', can pass for a thesis (p. 2), but to refer to (a) as *pakṣa* or *anumeya* does not add to clarity. It is all the more unbelievable that the expression '"*anumeya sattvam niścitam . . .*" *translates* (emphasis mine) into English as follows: "The *hetu, liṅga*, reason, or the mark must be definitely present in all the members of the class of the locus of inference as well as in other classes".' (p. 4). Similarly, it is not very accurate to translate *tarka* or '*sambhāvanātmaka jñānaviśeṣa*' as 'knowledge which is not merely a report on what the case is *but also* takes into account what the case may be' (p. 64, emphasis mine).

Sentences which translate technical Sanskrit expressions occurring in them are often vague. To give a single example chosen at random: '*anaikāntika hetu*, that is, a vague, too general a *hetu* to support the thesis' (p. 32). Again, there are a number of sentences which must be taken to be the result of carelessness on the part of the author or as betraying the author's confusion. 'This fallacy of the *hetu* is not an error in formal reasoning nor a mistake in the transition from the premises to the conclusion' (p. 32). 'From a strictly logical point of view, the connection is not formally analytical' (p. 64). The connection of *if* and *then* sentences in (K) 'if something is red, then it is coloured, is analytical' (p. 66). All these are cases in point. Bharadwaja repeatedly tells us that most of the interpreters of Indian thought have gone wrong because they used expressions and concepts of western logic or philosophy and (this seems also to be his point) did not take very seriously the examples the Indian philosophers themselves actually used. Now, when he himself writes in English, or interprets in that language, themes of Indian thought, Bharadwaja should use philosophical English with necessary explanation. Ordinary English highly inadequate for translating the developed and technical language of Indian philosophies. In actual practice Bharadwaja dose not seem to follow the principle. He uses such technical notions as justification, predication, methodology of science, contrafactual conditionals, etc. But he objects to the use of expressions like 'middle term', 'major term' and so on, on the general ground that 'these expressions are not conceptually innocent' (p. 10). Sometimes Bharadwaja uses just ordinary English, it seems, to translate/interpret certain Sanskrit sentences in the light of his analysis of the relevant examples to be found in the literature of the respective school of Indian thought. He thinks in this connection that he can 're-read *trairūpya*' in the context of the following sentences in Sanskrit:

(1) *anumeye sattvameva niścitam;*
(2) *Sapakṣe eva sattvam niścitam;*
(3) *asapakṣe cāsattvameva niścitam*

as

(1a) The *liṅga, hetu*, or the reason must be *relevant* (emphasis mine) to the *anumeya, pakṣa* or the thesis;
(2a) It must *support* (emphasis mine) the thesis, i.e. *sapakṣa;*
(3a) It must not support the opposite of the thesis, i.e. *asapakṣa.*

Even if his understanding of *trairūpya* is correct his formulation is vague and not as different, in most cases, in substance from the readings of others as Bharadwaja would like us to believe. Similarly, though the 'methodology of this study', that is, the method followed in his book, namely, 'commonsense analysis of examples' (p. 10) actually used by the Indian philosophers themselves, with a view to making the theory under discussion 'intelligible to the ordinary mortals as we all are' (p. 11), may have much in it which is commendable, the result it has yielded in the book under review is not encouraging. Perhaps 'commonsense analysis' still has a variety of philosophical analyses to be handled with care. But Bharadwaja may have his own understanding of what commonsense analysis is.

The aims of the author throughout this book include: (i) exposing the defects of almost all the interpretations of the respective theory which have been produced earlier, and (ii) to offer his own interpretation. The need for the second arises because all the previous interpretations are wrong. Among the wrong interpreters the recent ones, who use conceptually loaded expressions of different philosophical and logical systems and confuse *pramāṇa śāstra* of India with some kind of western logic, are the greatest sinners. But even the classical Indian philosophers are found to be wrong in many places. Thus, Bharadwaja finds an argument which is 'sufficient to show that both the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsakas *who have their foundations in the Vedas* (emphasis mine) . . . do not have a sound justification for their claim that *arthāpatti* is a *pramāṇa*' (p. 78) and the Nyāya logicians of both the old and the new schools 'failed to see this inconsistency in their conception of *tarka*'.

Bharadwaja avoids, in his interpretation of Indian thought, terms of Aristotelian syllogistics but he uses such expressions as justification, methodology, empirical generalization, law-like logical inconsistency, law-like generalization, and many others. Is there any reason to believe that these are less conceptually loaded? In most of his remarks, assessments and analyses, Bharadwaja appears to be impatient. He has said many things by way of assessment of his own interpretations but never has he substantiated his point.

To end this review it must be said that Bharadwaja is certainly right in claiming that some interpreters went wrong when they did not notice that terms of western logic might not be the best expressions to translate or interpret Indian thought. But the solution is not to select expressions from another area of western thought (say philosophy of science, for example) or resolve not to use philosophical English when writing in that language. The method Bharadwaja recommends in his book as the safest and which he follows in his book is certainly very good: to reflect on the examples which the Indian philosophers and writers themselves used to illustrate their theory. Any modern interpretation must conform to those examples or be consistent with them. But one may ask: Why should one feel the need to reconstruct the relevant Indian theories by reflecting on the examples we find in the

original Sanskrit literature? If the Indian philosophers had used certain examples to illustrate their theory then they had their theory. They also stated and explained their theories themselves. But Bharadwaja ignores them altogether. It seems that he has not consulted the source literature in the original; instead he examined the interpretations and translations of some examples to be found in the secondary literature. To cite just one example, he discusses in detail the theory of *tarka* of the Prācīnanaiyāyikas and the Navyanaiyāyikas; but he does not take note of the example of *tarka*, perhaps the first of its kind, given by Vātsyāyana.

His remarks about the Naiyāyikas (p. 113, note 5) or the Mīmāṃsakas (p. 78, para. 1) are at best sweeping and at the worse thoroughly mistaken. He takes the process of *arthāpatti* to be one of passing from one statement or assertion to another. He says he differs from most of the modern interpreters but he does not always take care to specify the point or nature of difference. Similarly, when he contrasts *arthāpatti* as a contextual interpretation with *arthāpatti* as a logical or epistemological concept his principle of classification or criterion of distinction is not very clear. Most of the things of importance he has to say about Jaina logic are already known.

Considering everything one feels that the book does not bear good evidence of what Bharadwaja is capable of achieving or contributing to the field of contemporary Indian philosophy. But if he has succeeded in driving home the point that the sort of task he is engaged in is difficult, then that is also important.

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R. SUNDARA RAJAN: *The Primacy of the Political*, ICPR and Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 211, Rs 165

Political philosophy in India is virtually non-existent. This is partly due to the dominance of a certain version of Marxism that is neither sensitive to conceptual analysis and philosophical argument, nor attentive to the specific demands of the political domain. It is also due to the pervasiveness of an intransigent model of scientific reasoning exemplified by behaviouralism that tries to expunge ideas, and therefore, all forms of philosophical reflections, from politics. Sundara Rajan's book, impatient with both vulgar Marxism and behaviouralism, is a serious attempt to think philosophically about the significance and proper mode of political conduct. But it does more than just that. It attempts to break away from the individualist moorings of contemporary political philosophy in the West. Much of the liberal-democratic political theory reflects engagingly with issues

surrounding the rights of individuals but has little of substance to say on the public space that undergirds these rights. In this way it ignores a dimension of human existence that was of central concern to classical political thinkers. Sundara Rajan's book belongs to a tradition that grows out of the intersecting critiques of socio-economic reductionism, political science and individualistic political philosophy.

The book opens with an introductory chapter reaffirming 'the primacy of the political', the lynchpin of the political theories of Aristotle and Kauṭilya. Professing this primacy entails, first of all, a critique of contemporary political theory, both liberal and Marxist, that has elevated the socio-economic over the political. But, Sundara Rajan argues, since a constitutive relationship exists between political philosophy and political practices, a bad model of political reasoning necessarily leads to inadequate political practice. Modern political practice is riddled with problems not only due to socio-economic factors but because it is informed by a warped reflection that denies autonomy to the political. At least a part of the blame for the malaise of modern polities must be attributed to the undervaluation of all political commitments and communal identifications. By extolling the virtues of the private sphere and amplifying the value of individualism, modernity marginalizes the political and encourages an instrumental attitude to it. People lead a life and value it only in so far as they have such an instrumental attitude to the political. So, really, classical political theory questions not just liberal and Marxist theories but the entire way of life, the values and commitments, of the modern. Bringing classical political theory back to life entails a substantive critique of modernity, one that makes sense only to those who are willing or have begun to see that modernity with its instrumental stance to politics breeds shallowness with disastrous consequences for the overall quality of human life.

In the second chapter of the book, Sundara Rajan further highlights the contrast between the classical and the modern by focusing on two perspectives on the political, the discourse model that he favours and the behavioural model upon which he launches an attack. For Sundara Rajan the two models differ not only in their basic conceptions of man and society but also over the very meaning of the word political. But the differences between the two are not so radical as to render them beyond relevant comparison. Sundara Rajan tries to refute the claim that the two are incommensurable. Not only does there exist a common measure by which to judge both models, but by relevant standards of comparison one is superior in some fundamental respects to the other. Abandoning radical relativism, Sundara Rajan argues that classical theory is integrally tied to some context-transcending features of language and discourse. He,

therefore, makes the rather strong claim that there is an intrinsically non-relativistic character to classical political theory. Because it can rise above specific contexts and yield a context-independent measure by which to judge its own context-bound claims as well as those of others, it is superior to the behavioural model.

The third chapter shows in greater detail how the political has vanished from the orbit of modern theories. The principal defect of these theories resides in the centrality they accord to the socio-economic. The slide began with Locke who claimed that the political is required only to buttress effective social organization. But the neglect of the political is common across the board from liberals to Marxist-Leninists. Now, one must pause to ask here just what it is that has disappeared from modern political theory. For Sundara Rajan, and indeed for the entire tradition within which he situates himself, what has gone missing from modern political theory is not just the common good, but also a form of reasoning appropriate to it. Modern theories eschew reasoning over the common good. In brief, they no longer have place for political judgment.

The discussion of political judgment forms the main substance of the book and is examined in great detail in the fourth chapter. Sundara Rajan devotes more than half the book to an analysis of the nature of political judgment and how it is related to, but distinct from, other forms of judgment (moral, aesthetic and cognitive). There are three components to his principal claim concerning political judgment. First, that political judgment is a language-mediated capacity. This makes his conception of political judgment hermeneutically oriented and discursive. Second, that a proper understanding of the political requires that we see its constitutive relation to both ethics and rhetorics. Third, the political is differentiated from the social by virtue of its independence from specific interests and goods. Each part of this claim is related to the other and requires amplification. I shall come back later to the linguistic nature of political judgment. For the moment, let me dwell a bit on the second and the third parts of this claim.

Political judgment is related to ethics because it is a capacity that helps us identify the good. Indeed it is the medium in which the good is realized and made transparent to us. But the articulation of the good is not possible without consideration for others and must be conducted in a spirit of friendship towards them. Sympathy with the point of view of the other, the recognition of other voices, is a condition of its adequacy. A common good is common not only because it is the good of all, but because only common deliberation makes possible our access to this good. The individual on her own cannot intuit or know the good. She has to negotiate with others if the good is to be formed at all. This idea of negotiation also links

the political to multiplicity rather than to an undifferentiated unity characteristic of totalitarian systems. Unlike the language of Platonic rule of control and regulation, we now possess a complex dialectic between rule and obedience through the medium of persuasion. This explains the connection of political with the rhetorical.

Sundara Rajan distinguishes his Aristotelian model from other models of politics. In the scientistic model, for instance, the political is severed from both ethics and rhetorics and is to be known by a fully objective, value-free reason. In the moralistic model, the political is seen merely as a continuation of ethics without any connection with rhetorics. Finally, in the sophist model of politics, the political is connected only to the rhetorical and abandons completely its links with the ethical. Political judgment here becomes the effective assertion of power through the medium of language. It is reduced to the art of influencing others. So in the Aristotelian model alone does there exist an irreducible link of the political with the rhetorical as well as the ethical.

Thus, Sundara Rajan makes a persuasive case for a return to this classical paradigm by showing how the problems of modern politics are connected with the deficient model of political reason present in contemporary political theory. Overall, I find the book rich in substance, carefully argued and convincing. It is not entirely without problems, however. I should like to draw the attention of the reader to three such problems that struck me with particular force. To begin with, let us examine Sundara Rajan's claim that the modern neglect of the political is the reason why theories of political development systematically bypass problems of integration and autonomy faced by newly born nations. Furthermore, contemporary political theory ignores not only the nation, but also a proper study of the state. The neglect of the political implies a disregard of both the nation and the state. Indeed Sundara Rajan uses the terms nation, state and political interchangeably. I, for one, would want to keep the three concepts analytically distinct. Besides, after reading several passages in the book, I was left wondering if Sundara Rajan is aware how recent the idea of a nation is. Classical political theory, as he well knows, had an idea of the city-state which was a dense, warm community of real, face-to-face, contact among the people who constituted it. It had no conceptual space for the idea of large-scale solidarities defined by looser, impersonal relationships. Why, one may ask, should a return to classical theory lead to an enhanced emphasis on the nation?

My own view is that a return to classical political theory need not always imply a concern with such imagined communities. Indeed a return to the political may well entail a rejection of the idea of the nation as much as its acceptance. But I do not want to over-stress

this point. Perhaps, Sundara Rajan only means to underscore the importance of community that classical political theory deeply values. It may well be that he wants to revive not the letter but the spirit of classical political theory, and therefore, wishes to rehabilitate not the particular type of community favoured and theorized by the Greeks, but a more general concern with the idea of community, leaving the more complicated matter of the relevant form of modern communities to be decided by context. After all, liberal and Marxist theories have neglected all forms of community, including a proper understanding and explanation of nationhood. Is it not true that no serious political philosopher in the last four centuries can claim to have worked out a plausible and coherent theory of nationhood or has even shown the will to do so? Liberals and Marxists would equally agree with John Dunn that nationalism is the starkest political shame of the twentieth century, a blot on the political history of the world. This judgment may display sound political sense but it also obscures the point that the conceptual resources of both liberalism and Marxism have been rather meagre when dealing with questions of community and in this respect classical political theory, even if its own dated problematic focuses on a form of community that hardly resembles modern nations, is infinitely superior. My own position, therefore, is that classical political theory needs to be juxtaposed with liberalism and Marxism. Unless this is done, we cannot have an illuminating discussion of communities. Not a simple return to classical theory but the necessary mediation of liberalism and Marxism by classical political theory will lead to an enriched discussion of modern communities, including a better understanding of nations. Properly interpreted, classical political theory is likely to sharpen focus on questions of nationhood. This much I am prepared to grant Sundara Rajan but not that any return to the classical paradigm will necessarily do so. Indeed, many western political theorists who highlight the importance of classical political theory are not particularly fascinated by nationalism or nationhood.

My second point concerns Sundara Rajan's thesis that the availability of the political is bound up with language. For Sundara Rajan, the political is that which transcends the specific and the particular, for it forms what is common to all. Secondly, since language makes possible the transcendence of specific contexts, it is in and through language alone that the common good is formulated. These two points are deeply intertwined with each other. The political is necessarily discursive; it transcends contexts only by way of language. All this is very well, but one gets the impression that for Sundara Rajan such context-transcendence is not available to the social; the social and the linguistic are not inextricably bound to each other. Sundara Rajan often, though not always, comes close to saying that individual

or group interests (all specific interests) fall outside the fold of language. The social which consists of specific interests is largely a non-discursive domain. To me this is entirely unconvincing. I do not see why we cannot see language as constituting both the political and the social and why context-transcendence is not also available to the social. I suspect that Sundara Rajan works with a particular conception of the social found among the English contractualists for whom the individual mind is essentially pre-linguistic and pre-social and the social nothing but a concatenation of such minds. If the social is defined as essentially pre-linguistic, then the kind of commonness formed by language falls inevitably outside the sphere of the social. If so, the social is directly antithetical to the political, to be tamed and humanized by it. But why restrict the term social to this meaning? My own view, although this is not the place where I can defend it, is that common deliberation, context-transcendence and language lie at the very heart of everything social, and that the political is one form taken by the social. To be sure, sometimes Sundara Rajan recognizes that language constitutes not only the political, but also the social. But for some obscure reason, the social remains the sphere where language possesses no context-transcending capacity. In contrast, the political is precisely that sphere where this capacity is found. Perhaps two separate claims exist between which Sundara Rajan vacillates. Sometimes he appears to claim that only the political is bound up with language, everything else falling well outside it. At other times, he offers the less radical claim that although the social and the political are equally dependent on language, it is the latter alone which stores a context-transcending capacity. As I have already mentioned, I do not see why this context-transcending capacity cannot be found in the social domain; unless, of course, the political is defined as that part of the social which is shot through with an irreducible commonness.

If formulated in this way, the significant contrast to be noted lies between two kinds of social entities, one of which we call political. But in this characterization, the political cannot be contrasted with or be antithetical to, on a general plane, the social. I am willing to concede that Sundara Rajan himself not not be averse to this way of putting the point. But he needs to formulate it clearly and more sharply than is presented in the book. I believe, therefore, that it is reasonable to claim that the political does not form a domain separate from the social but is a particular kind of human relation, the possibility of the emergence of which is inherent in everything social. However, in certain contexts the political cannot be realized. Sundara Rajan's point that in modern conditions, the formation of the political is thwarted by the specific way in which the social domain is structured is well taken. Because modern conditions obs-

cure or dispel the very idea of common good, the political never shows up. Contemporary political theory, by systematically failing to even mention the common good, registers this plain fact. Therefore, the recovery of the political is possible only by a retrieval of classical political theory; at least we need to suitably adapt it to modern conditions. As Sundara Rajan puts it, 'the classical perspective, by formulating the basic issue in terms of the good of the community, is a most welcome and needed antidote to the paralysing effect of modern theory'.

My final point concerns Sundara Rajan's claim that human reason can transcend its contextual location only within the perspective of classical political theory. Modern political theory by contrast is individuated by its inability to do so. This way of dividing the classical and the modern appears to me to be spurious. The aspiration to transcend specific context is at the heart of at least one major strand of modernity. The claim that we can arrive at an absolutist perspective, look at objects from a point nowhere in this world, reach the God's eye view of the world, is central to the natural sciences. For example, the Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities rests upon the assumption that properties of an object independent of human sensory and mental apparatus can be known to us. And there is a sense in which the rejection of this form of transcendence is characteristic of some early Greek thinkers. It is arguable that the invention of western philosophy and democracy was possible only by shunning what Heidegger later called the onto-theological viewpoint. Thus both, context-dependence and context-transcendence are common, or at least equally known, to modern and classical thinkers. I mention this point only in passing but if true it may undermine the whole edifice upon which Sundara Rajan builds his arguments.

Despite these points of contention, I remain impressed with the book. I must complement the author for the diligence with which he has worked on the important topic of political judgment. I urge the reader to read it along with the detailed work on the same topic by Ronald Beiner. (I was somewhat surprised that Sundara Rajan is not familiar with it.) These two books complement each other, not least because they are both inspired and guided by Aristotle, Kant, Habermas and Gadamer. I particularly recommend Sundara Rajan's book to philosophers and social scientists. To the former, it is a reminder that philosophy and democracy are deeply intertwined both in their origins and their conception; also, that philosophical skills can still be usefully brought to bear upon human problems. To the social scientists, it is an abject lesson that in human affairs the slow, somewhat unsure movement of philosophical reasoning is inescapable and that any attempt to do away with it is not just bad theory but diminishes enormously the very quality of human existence.

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G.C. PANDE: *Jain Political Thought,* Prakrit Bharati Sansthan and Department of Jainism, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, 1984, pp. 118, Rs 40.

Religion and politics are as old as human society itself. The two are closely inter-related. History provides many instances of religions that established huge territorial empires. Similarly, many political ideologies acquired the shape of secular religions in the hands of their proponents. The current years have witnessed rising religious fanaticism and communalism despite repeated proclamation of religious tolerance and secularism. Many people have advocated a dissociation of religion and politics to solve the problems. However, religion in the true sense of the word incorporates an ethical code and a spiritual and moral philosophy. The Jain religion, for example, lays great emphasis on values such as nonviolence, nonpossession and equity. In the present age of violence and consumerism the only hope for individual and society lies in a reassertion of these moral and spiritual values. It is with this underlying assumption that the present book has been written.

According to the author the dominant western concept of political science is that it is (or ought to be) a system of knowledge which is scientific, objective and value-free. The empiricist, positivist and behaviouralist conception of political science accepts the verification theory of meaning. It lays emphasis on the study of facts as facts alone can be objectively studied and empirically verified. It maintains that normative judgments incorporating values and beliefs are matters of personal preference. These are, therefore, non-verifiable and so arbitrary and meaningless. Impressed by the advances in the natural sciences and in their quest for making political science scientific, the behaviouralists claim that they would be neutral as to their findings. Their goal is to formulate a body of general theories based on *brute* data, that could be tested by empirical investigation. Such theory would be intersubjectively transferable and so verifiable. Its purpose is to explain and predict (and control!) behaviour.

It is clear that such a conception of political science is inconsistent with any system of ethics and religion as the former is concerned with values and the latter with faith. Viewed in this context the very title of the book may appear self-contradictory and thus may be questioned. The author, anticipating these charges, answers

them by questioning the very credibility of the western approach. He asserts that there is nothing in the nature of the western approach which makes it self-evident or self-existent truth. If western standards are to be accepted then they should be shown to be necessary and universal. The practitioners are instead engaged in methodological debates on the one hand and the piecemeal observation of wholly ephemeral and particular data on the other. The author asserts that man is a moral and spiritual being and so the life of the state cannot be independent of moral faith. The state is not only a system of coercive power but also a system of moral authority. Its commands are not only backed by force but by right. It somehow spans and joins the order of positive reality and the order of moral reality. The western approach emphasizes the former and overlooks the latter.

The author alleges that the practitioners of the approach are themselves ideological. By eliminating values and evaluation they eliminate the very basis of criticism and creative vision which ultimately results in describing and accepting the prevailing system. Thus, the so-called value-neutrality leads to conformism and conservatism. Further, the author rightly points out that the debate whether political science is a science or not is a perennial one. The issues are still unanswered and will probably remain so.

According to the author the traditional and the modern modes of thought are normally distinguished on chronological or evolutionary grounds. However, the author maintains that they are two perennial modes of thought which have always coexisted but have acquired primacy in different historical ages. Tradition is the handing down of transcendental wisdom by prophets, seers and masters to a special class of custodians and through them to common humanity. Accepted in reverence, it reveals the order of cosmic principles which constitute the ground of human reality, psychic as well as social, and enables man to distinguish between his lower and higher nature and thus to gain inner self-government and freedom. In contrast the modern view is egoistic and naturalistic. Man is the centre of its thought and it holds man to be a natural creature acquiring knowledge through his own tentative efforts. Such knowledge is consequently empirical and changeable and merely reflects the causal order of sensible things. It can be an aid to the manipulation of material objects in the pursuit of natural or instinctive ends. By such an interpretation, the message that the author wants to convey is, it is unbecoming to be excessively modern. The message is of special importance in the present age where the quest for being modern is so all-pervasive. Another important methodological principle which follows from this interpretation is that traditional thought should not be taken simply as the earlier stage of the linear scheme of historical evolution. Consequently, modern thought should not be taken as the standard with reference to which the contribution and deficiency of earlier thought is to be judged.

It is in the wider tradition of Indian thought that the author analyses Jain political thought. According to the author, in the earlier phase of its development, the Jain canon sought to provide an alternative to the traditional Vedic view. The Vedic view of society and the state was theocentric and hierarchical. As against the gods and priests, the Jain view emphasized the autonomous and universal moral law which is grounded in the spiritual nature of man. As against hierarchy it emphasized the spiritual equality of beings to have an absolute right to life and also the right to know the universal moral law. It tended to create a society and a state based wholly on spiritual and moral principles of equality, austerity and nonviolence. However, such an order required a high degree of moral perfection from a much larger number of people than that provided by the monks. As a result, there was an increasing compromise with the older tradition and older social order. Consequently, the latter phase of the Jain political thought presents a variant of the Vedic view.

The most important task of the political thinker, according to the author, is that he should harmonize the empirical understanding with moral insight, '*nīti*' with '*dharma*'. *Dharma* deprecates violence, competitive interests and acquisitiveness. The question that the author poses is: should political science take such a natural man to be ultimate for its purposes and merely seek to devise means of conferring maximum success on the more ambitious of such individuals, classes or nations? If this be rejected, will not political science be required to devise means for regeneration of mankind through its re-education? This education would be essentially moral where man is recognized as a spiritual being, where man is free from his passions, where another is recognized as a self, where acceptance of this spiritual equality necessarily enhances nonviolence, peace, love and justice. Achievement of these values of liberty, equality, fraternity, peace and justice has been, and remains to be, the aim of any and every political order worth the name. The author therefore asserts that, instead of despising spiritual and moral philosophy as irrelevant to political science, one has to realize that the only hope for political science lies in its being viewed in the light of such a philosophy.

Few would disagree about the need for morals in political science or in public life. However, the unanswered question remains as to who, in this immoral world, would initiate the proposed moralistic turn. Since man is to reform and re-educate man and since history is replete with instances when the so-called educators and liberators themselves have plundered humanity, one tends to be very sceptical

and cautious. Human society may have to wait for saints and seers for moral teachings and education.

Another question which confronts one is how the average man, who has turned a deaf ear to the teachings of saints like Jesus, the Buddha, Mahavira and the Mahatma, can be reformed and reformed on a permanent basis. Either the teachings have to be perpetual or the reform has to be of a lasting nature, transcending time and space. This is too much to expect. The present age provides no ground for such optimism.

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M.M. AGARWAL: *Consciousness and the Integrated Being,* Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla.

The present book by M.M. Agarwal aims at an exploration into the nature of consciousness in order to move from the fragmentation of human existence to the integrated being. In the process many things are discussed such as the criterion of consciousness, nothingness, the nature of self, freedom, etc., in the light of the ideas of existentialists like Sartre and Heidegger and contemporaries of the Indian philosopher J. Krishnamurti. The author expresses greater sympathy with the views of Krishnamurti, but he is not averse to the suggestions of the existentialists. Thus, he wants to create a harmony out of the elements of human dreams as viewed by him from two different angles. It is no wonder that he succeeds in his attempt. His writing is neat, clear and illuminating. I do not want to say things just for the sake of criticism but want to put forward my views on this wonderful journey so that they may emerge from cloudy confusion and embrace the aura of sunshine.

The author divides his book into the following chapters: 1. Introduction; 2. The Nature of Consciousness; 3. Being and Consciousness; 4. The Self; 5. Consciousness and Human Freedom; 6. Authenticity and Wholeness; 7. The Integrated Being; and 8. Epilogue.

In the Introduction the author clarifies his aim and points out that man has reached a state of fragmentation due to the divisions which exist in the psychological structure of the society.

This divided mind of the collective gives rise to self-identity. Man has to end this fragmentation to return to the natural wholeness of being. He has to rediscover the natural wholeness. So his aim is to explore the possibility of ending fragmentation so that he can live creatively. Man ceases to become self-seeking and enters into a state of selflessness which is the sole principle of integration within the individual. It is the state of total love, friendship and understanding.

The author tries to understand the criterion of consciousness and points out that privacy cannot be understood as an independent criterion. But it cannot be avoided, even though we know that I cannot be conscious unless others are conscious and if there is a beetle in the box, it cannot be known. It is true that the contents of my consciousness may be public, but the way I feel, what I feel, is different from yours. To say that I can feel your feeling is to bark up the wrong tree. It is difficult to give up the intuitive hunch that we have access to mental states that others do not have. Intentionality is another criterion of consciousness, but mental states like depression or euphoria seem to have no content. Perhaps, we can say that feelings are awakened due to a perception or thought and since they are object-oriented, there is a secondary orientation to feeling. At least Brentano wanted to say something like this.

Consciousness, according to Sartre, is known as an object which it is not and it is only understood in terms of the world from which it is dissociated. Again, consciousness does not make us aware of the ego which creates a division in the flow of consciousness. The ego is not present at the prereflective stage, but is there out in the world. What we call ego is the hypostatized entity of different states of consciousness. It gets its unity from the unity of objects and the unity of the fundamental project. But the question arises: how can consciousness know an object, unless it is aware of itself? This analysis of consciousness being aware of itself has been done brilliantly by the author. He says that consciousness exists as a consciousness of *being* without any reference to itself simultaneously to the consciousness of its object. The author has referred to Sartre's arguments in *Being and Nothingness* and in the *Transcendence of the Ego.* But I think that the point has been very clearly expressed by Sartre in his lecture before the Societé Français de Philosophie, 'Conscience do Soi et connassaince do soi . . . '. (If being is reduced to knowledge, or if it is said that the totality of things which are said to be or exist are dissolved into the totality of intellectual operations which we perform in order to know them or bind them together is to presume without saying that there is a being of consciousness.)

Sartre, as the author says, speaks of the primary mode of existence of consciousness which is being-consciousness. The consciousness of being is the very *being* of consciousness—a spontaneity, a moment-to-moment self-nihilating activity. What we have is a *single* intuition of being-consciousness. It is unanalysable and undefinable. It is the condition of itself and of the consciousness of the plurality of beings.

The author thinks that the temporal associations of the self hinder our understanding of the phenomenon of self-awareness.

He wants to understand by reference to a single instance of cognitive consciousness in which self-awareness is found to be present. The self has to be seized in a single stroke of intuition. After it has been grasped in this way, it can be referred to in its successive manifestations in a time series. The idea is like that of Tagore's, 'He comes, comes, ever comes/Every moment and every age, every day and every night he comes, comes, ever comes.' (*Gitanjali*, 45)

But the ego of Sartre is not the subject, not the owner. The ego is constructed by reflection in virtue of ownness, the capacity to protect and striving to become. The real achievements of the ego are products of illusion with reference to the past and the future. The pure consciousness is delivered to man as structured in the temporality of the ego.

Sartre speaks of consciousness choosing itself, but the structure of consciousness is covered by the features of reflected consciousness. But how can such a structure of the lived person manifest freedom? Krishnamurti says that freedom has to be a rupture with the past. Sartre believes that choice is absurd and it is the person himself. The author criticizes Sartre as to him, choice is without any content and the original choice is not distinct from the act embodying it. He speaks of the chooser and a perpectual I-consciousness which opposes Sartre's non-egological consciousness. If choice has to be understood in the way the author thinks, there will be a confusion between two standpoints—the standpoint of prereflective consciousness and that of reflective consciousness. It seems to me that Sartre speaks of the original fundamental choice which chooses the man himself. If it has to depend on the owner-consciousness and act according to a formula choice, would be subject to objective and inauthentic standards. Choice and consciousness are fundamentally the same. As Sartre has said, we cannot say that consciousness occurs first and subsequently, it becomes free; similarly, we cannot say that consciousness exists and then it chooses. Consciousness being itself of an object and aware of itself is at the same time conscious (of) choosing. It propels itself to the object which is chosen, which at the outset may be man himself.

Of course, Krishnamurti gives another interpretation and according to the author a richer account of freedom. In Krishnamurti, to continue in the nothingness of being requires an enduring self, a chooser, though he agrees with Sartre that the chooser is the choice. But the self is an imaginary construct. The subject carries the past in himself and thus in choice, to Krishnamurti, 'the conditioned past' is reacting. It is not clear from Sartre's account, the author says, how the original choice can be called mine. Sartre cails the for-itself a 'lack' and it is not clear how the lack explains the original choice. To Krishnamurti there is the self-identity of the

chooser, a 'me' which is indeed one's past. It seeks security and wants to identify itself with something greater in which it wants to lose itself. It is not the lack itself, but the sense of lack that drives one to choose. Krishnamurti suggests that in freedom human reality is trying to become something. Freedom has to become free of bondage to the past. Man has to die to free himself from his attachments. In freedom thus *being* is truly *absolutely nothing*. This non-egological awareness of *being* without becoming is the true character of freedom. Though Sartre talks of spontaneity and bliss of creativity, to Krishnamurti freedom is living without attachment and living in the right relation of love. Freedom is then the way of selflessness. It is not freedom *for* the self, it is freedom *from* the self, from the 'me', i.e. from having to be a being condemned to choose. But one thing, I think, can be said of Sartre: that he realized the real goals of freedom only to understand that they are unattainable in the present condition of human existence.

Next, the author discusses authenticity and wholeness. In this he relies more on Heidegger and Sartre though he wants to base his own views on the insights of Krishnamurti on whom he heavily depends. But if he had tried to borrow the ideas of the theistic existentialist thinkers he might have seen that his views could have blended perfectly with theirs. Sartre speaks of the consciousness of freedom as the sign of authentic being, while suppression of such freedom in bad faith is inauthenticity. Heidegger's idea of the acceptance of death as the supreme possibility gives man a sense of authenticity, while life as 'they' live makes man inauthentic. Both Sartre and Heidegger give a grim picture of the barren authenticity in which man simply resolves to be the true individual, but in fact gains nothing. The existentialists, as the author says, fail to distinguish between 'loneliness' and 'aloneness'. It is really a significant coinage about the human situation. It seems to me that 'loneliness' is the negative nothingness in which man is dissociated from *being;* 'aloneness' is the bold encounter of man with the ultimate goal, where he can share his being with others gloriously and with delight. Death is not, as Heidegger suggests, the greatest tragedy of life, it is rather understanding to die in life the so many deaths coming from our greed, love of power and pride. As Krishnamurti would say, it is the death of 'me' and 'I' and it is the annihilation of the 'me' with its operations in the psychological time. 'With such death one would still be in a "being-in-the-world", but one would be a no-one-for-onself'. Such being-towards-death is transformed into being-

for-continuing creativity. Man is not afraid of such death. As Tagore said,

> I shall go where your boat is moored
> Death, to the sea where the wind rolls
> Darkness towards me from infinity;
> (William Radice, *Selected Poems: Rabindranath Tagore,* 71)

For Krishnamurti, in authentic living there must be freedom from desire which requires a radical change in the understanding. It is the fragmentation of existence which creates inauthenticity. As the author points out, the fragmentary self does not understand the significance of thought for life as a whole. Fragmentation is traced to 'becoming'. We never look at life as a whole, complete and indivisible. The world is seen in various relations to me, it is not seen as it is. Man tries to be aware of the severe conflicts with other human beings. The self-concernedness is the cause of fragmentation and inauthenticity when scientific knowledge is utilized as psychological knowledge for one's own petty self-interests; man becomes doomed to fragmentation and the miseries of life.

So man has to end fragmentation and attain the integrated being. It can be done if we perform the act of tremendous simplicity, which is 'looking without the observer'. A state will come into being in listening at great depth—where seeing is whole, inclusive, non-fragmented, a state of no movement from or towards; beyond matrix and all racial memories of man. It is a 'looking in silence' which yields, Krishnamurti claims, an understanding into the very core of human existence. It is a landing into authentic living. In this holistic perception will be found the essential humanity of man (his capacities of love, compassion, understanding, courage, innocence, etc). It is the original wholeness of the non-egological consciousness which lies beyond becoming.

The author has pointed out the insufficiency of existential humanism where the anxiety to do good to man overwhelms man, but he gets a bare formula without a content. Perhaps, the anxiety is not unimportant, for out of this tremendous anxiety is born man's care and concern for others.

Lastly, the author stresses upon the need for the individual to search for his totality and to end the violence and hostility in the contemporary world. Each one must work upon himself, must bring about a radical transformation of himself. But if the greater majority of human beings in whom this call of conscience does not work and they go on living inauthentically for ever, what will happen? Do you not then need another revolution, where the present social set-up is to be thoroughly altered with better economic and social being and with man's freedom for his own destiny? The author's note of optimism, I hope, will go a long way lighting up the paths of to-morrow for discovering the integrated Being.

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KRISHNA SIVARAMAN (ed.): *Hindu Spirituality: Vedas Through Vedānta,* The Crossroad Publishing Company, New York, 1989, pp. xliii+447.

In keeping with its encyclopaedic range, the first volume of *Hindu Spirituality* (which is the sixth volume of *World Spirituality: An Encyclopaedic History of the Religious Quest)* takes on a variety of subjects and style. The Hindu and Jaina scriptures, their philosophy and theology are given as much importance as allied subjects like law (*dharmaśāstras*) and health-care (Āyurveda). As editorial control has wisely avoided stultifying uniformity in format, some essays appear as hair-splitting research while others are descriptive and information-oriented. Here is a volume that is certainly not heavy reading, though the subject is a highly serious one.

Religious quest in India began with the Vedic age. Down the centuries the quest has taken the Indian outside the Vedic fold but Hinduism remains very much within the sub-continent. Indeed the early religious history of India is multi-layered since the 'sramana way' (that gave us Jainism and Buddhism) appears to be as ancient as the Vedic path. Krishna Sivaraman's clearly articulated introduction traces the web of connections among the three major religions, all of which were committed to 'renunciation'. This 'renunciation' could be external or internal:

> To renounce the ego by tracking it in its most far-reaching sweep is true renunciation, and to loosen it from its most insidious claim is true detachment. Conversely, any activity, to the extent that it entails liberation from the hold of the ego, even though seemingly an aspect of being-in-the-world, to that extent is 'worldless' and is revelatory of spirit.

Sivaraman uses the term 'Hindu' in its wider (and truer) significance of 'belonging to Bhāratavarṣa'. The Vedic religions have their base in the idea of *ātman* that has its identity with Brahman. Hence the Vedic religious quest is towards the unification of the two, a quest that is known as *adhyātma vidyā,* 'the science and art of realizing of spirit as such'. The other major wing of the classical spirit, the sramanic, upholds an ascetic withdrawal from life and does not subscribe to the presence of an *Ātman* beyond the physical. Since Buddhism with its Mahāyāna enrichment has grown to be a mighty banyan on its own, it has been assigned a separate volume in the series.

It is inevitable that in a book of this kind, Vedic religion gets the lion's share. Rajendra P. Pandeya flags off the entries with a note on 'the vision of the Vedic seer'. The Vedic poet was essentially a *dṛṣṭa* who *saw* the world as an experienced reality. Pandeya accepts the intuitive interpretation of the Vedic *ṛks* to prove that the hymns are not mere poetry reflecting pantheism:

> . . . the Vedic *ṛṣi* is the revealer of a universal vision in which the conflicts between thought and action, perception and imagination, inner and outer, body and mind, mundane and divine, the one and the many, light and darkness, life and death, and good and the not-good are seen to yield and converge harmoniously at a deeper level of being and understanding. It is a level of being and understanding repeatedly acclaimed in the Veda as beyond all verbal categories, names and forms.

The One without a second, the *Ekam*, gives meaning to the variety seen as this splendorous creation, heard as *vāk* (speech) and realised as *ṛta* (harmony). The Vedic *ṛṣis* had instituted the sacrifice as a means of worshipping this *Ekam*. The Vedic sacrifice has, of course, challenged critics in this century. Is it just a physical ritual and no more? Hriday R. Sharma and Wayne Williar try to get at the inner significance of the Vedic sacrifice. Williar sees the Vedic rituals as 'a cosmological drama dedicated to the overcoming of impurity and the regeneration of life'. However, Williar is prepared to go beyond the possible beginnings of the Vedic sacrifice in the fertility rites of ancient tribes.

With John G. Arapura we enter the realm of the Upaniṣads. He does well to describe the Upaniṣads as granting us speculative thought as well as mystical experience. Though dealing with the high flights of man's consciousness beyond the mental plane, the Upaniṣads are also intensely human documents, 'spiritual poems of an absolute, an unfailing inspiration inevitable in phrase, wonderful in rhythm and expression' (Sri Aurobindo). It is a pity that though Arapura deals *in extenso* with Upaniṣadic thought, he has missed the practical application of this spiritual science brought to us through characters like Satyakāma, the servant-maid's offspring; Raikwa, the cart-puller; Naciketā, the brahmin's son; Kṛṣṇa, born to Devakī, and Uddālaka Āruṇi, the father of Śvetaketu. It is they who transform the arid desert of intellectual speculation into the greenery of realizable experience.

Out of its Vedic–Upaniṣadic origins, India gained Vedānta which has been the backbone of all denominations within the Hindu fold. The three major branches of Vedānta have been Viśiṣṭādvaita Advaita and Dvaita. Dealing with Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita S.S.

Rāghavācār points out how the Vaiṣṇava teacher brought the high plateaus of Upaniṣadic intellectualism within the reach of the common man through the path of *bhakti*. Rāmānuja accepts the ultimate reality of a Supreme self, Parābrahman, but he does not jettison the reality of an individual self in search of self-perfection:

> The individual attains therein his fullness of being as an individual and is engulfed in the rapture of union with, or vision of, God. Further, one does not encounter the Divine from the outside, as it were, but cognizes oneself as an integral factor, or organ, of the supreme object of experience. There is unity between the seeker and the sought, not by way of merger or identification but by the inclusion of the subject in the infinite and immanent object of communion and adoration.

According to Rāmānuja, this two-fold truth is the basis for creations like the *Puruṣa-sūkta*, the *Brahmasūtras*, the epics, the Āgamas as well as the devotional hymns of the Alwars anthologized by Nathamuni as the *Divya Prabhandham*. Neither action, nor knowledge nor devotion is jettisoned by Viśiṣṭādvaita. The way of devotion, again, is not a passive state of counting beads and meditation. It is best exemplified through *kaiṅkārya*, which is 'serving the beloved object of love or at least place himself in eager readiness to serve'. When one finds it difficult to follow the path of devotion, one must simply surrender oneself to the Lord. Such *prapatti* will never fail to evoke the loving guardianship of the Divine.

Krishna Sivaraman's exposition of Śivādvaita shows how Rāmānuja's reference to the supreme as Nārāyaṇa and Srikantha's vision of the supreme as Śiva mark important facets in the Hindu religious quest. Sivaraman considers Srikantha's theological position to be midway between Śaṅkara's Advaita and Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita. Meditation has a special place in Śivādvaita. This meditation is necessarily on Parameśwara who is to be considered identical with one's own self. Such contemplation washes away the defects of bondage from one's own self:

> One that thus attains an intuition of Brahman and becomes equal to Brahman views the world not in its finitude and imperfection but as harmonized with Brahman. He sees, hears, and knows nothing else but Brahman who as Supreme Bliss possesses the form of this world. With his faculties of mind, speech, and sight under self-rule, he becomes Brahman whose body is 'ether'. Not the elemental ether but the effulgent expanse of consciousness (*cidāmbara prakaśa śarīram*).

Mādhva's Dvaita takes us quite a distance away from Advaita, Śivādvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita. His concept of the Supreme as Viṣṇu 'is

more spiritual than theological', says K.T. Pandurangi. 'Mādhva emphatically separates the plane of divine presence from the plane of human adoration. At no stage can these merge into each other or one of them be eliminated as unreal.'

The twain meet but never merge. The meeting is made possible by a hierarchy of godheads like Puṣkara, Brahmā and Lakṣmī. When the bondage of *avidyā* (ignorance) is removed, the soul comes face to face with God. Pandurangi's detailed essay on the Dvaita view of God, self and matter and the means of realizing God is eminently readable and satisfies the expert as well as the common reader.

The Advaita view is presented by the renowned scholar, Kalidas Bhaṭṭācāryya. Sensing the heaviness in his 'Vedānta as Philosophy of Spiritual Life', the editor has appended a resumé that states the central theme of the article as well as of the elaborate sequel which could not be included in the present volume. The importance of intellectual theorising in the experience of the transcendent is underlined in the essay with great fervour. Such theorising safeguards the aspirant in the positive and negative directions: 'The negative procedure consists in intellectually demolishing competing theories and the positive one builds, in addition, a systematic intellectual bulwark around the desired experience.'

So much for philosophical speculation. How about the application of Hindu philosophy to the harsh realities of everyday life? Often inquisitorial voices are raised against Hinduism for its caste structure. How did the much-reviled phenomenon come into being? Kenneth H. Post searches for the spiritual foundations of what now exists as a sociological (dis)order. Eminent teachers like Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara state that *karma* is the cause of *varṇa* (caste). The *Dharmaśāstras* say that loss of caste occurs due to criminal (non-dhārmic) acts. What then is the dhārmic (ideal) life?

K.R. Sundara Rajan posits the example of Rāma. Not that this is an easy task as one has to contend with the killing of Vali. After all, was not Vali following the dharma (moral code) of *his* race? And how was Rāma justified in using harsh words against Sītā in the battlefield? Sundara Rajan just turns away from this important problem by referring to a husband's love for his wife being 'restricted by considerations of personal and family honour and by family loyalty'. Not a word about Ramā's insulting speech that has tarnished the image of *dharma* for all time.

The example of Rāma only proves that *dharma* is an ideal that must be pursued though it cannot be easily realized. Arun Kumar Mookerjee brings us back to the searing episodes when in spite of being an adherent to *dharma* that considers desire for *artha* and *kāma* to be evil, Yudhiṣṭhira had to take up arms for defending *dharma*. Such is the call of duty which is the highest *dharma* though

non-injury is considered the greatest *dharma*. Indeed, as Mookerjee rightly says, when referring to the unenviable position of the eldest of the Paṇḍavas, 'the life of king Yudhiṣṭhira, the central figure of the epic, is the tale of a pilgrim's progress'.

Another practical aspect of Hindu philosophy is yoga. Ravi Chandra and Arvind Sharma take adequate care of this while Harold G. Coward glances at the help rendered by the word in achieving spiritual realization. Word is power, and the repetition of *mantras* can cleanse one's mind and prepare it to receive the divine afflatus. In fact, there is no part of man's life which is not a spiritualizing agent. Klaus K. Klostermaier assures us that Hinduism finds nature itself as the spirit and body of the Supreme: The seeds in a fig tree used by Uddālaka Āruṇi to teach his son Śvetaketu about Brahman; the seed in the uterus employed as an image by Vidyāraṇya; the *Viśvarūpa* in the *Gītā* that sees the entire creation as the body of God. The *Viśvarūpa* idea also explains 'the importance of worshipping the physical image of God through a variety of physical substances'. The Vaiṣṇavas have systematized this worship of the Lord at five different levels. He has to be meditated upon as the transcendent (Parabrahman), as power (*vyuha*), as incarnations (*avatāra*), as the indwelling universal (*antaryāmī*) and as the icon (*archa*).

The all-embracing nature of Hindu spirituality is seen in considering medical texts also as scripture. S.N. Bhavsar and Gertrude Kiem probe the inter-linkage of Ayurveda and Hindu religious thought with special emphasis on the *Caraka Saṃhitā*.

The concluding part of the volume tells us that Hindu spirituality is very much a living experience. R. Balasubramanian deals with two famous Advaitins of our time: Ramana Maharishi and Sri Chandrasekharendra Saraswati. Sri Ramana gained illumination as a teenager and an ashram grew around him in his Tiruvannamalai retreat. But Sir Chandrasekharendra was inducted into sannyāsa at the tender age of thirteen as the sixty-sixth Śaṅkarācārya to head the Kamakothi Pitha at Kanchipuram. His spiritual ministry during the last eight years has been a golden epoch in Hindu religion.

Balasubramanian has carefully analysed the manner in which the two great men have held to their Advaitic view and how they have made the seemingly high philosophy easily assimilable by the common man. This is because Vedānta is a universal religion. It need not be confined by sectarian prejudices. After all, Hindu religion has no name, no founder. It is simply the well-tested 'ancient way', the *sanātana dharma*. As the Śaṅkarācārya says:

> Other religions did not exist before the time of their founders. Ours is a religion which existed long before the founded religions. Obviously, it was the only religion in the world minister-

ing to the spiritual needs of mankind as a whole. There was no second religion from which it was required to be distinguished. Hence, there was no need for a name for it. It was, and even now continues to be nameless.

Since India has always had *acārya samṛddhi* (plenitude of spiritual teachers) and many of the teachers have been great women, Bithika Mukherji brings up the rear with a strikingly emotive essay on Sri Ānandamayi Mā.

And the 'sramana way'? Sagar Mal Jain is the lone sentinel for Jainism in this volume. But every sentence in his 'The Jain Spirit and Spirituality' is packed with rich significance. Jainism has an inflexible moral code and this is perhaps why it could not spread easily. Non-attachment is the vital principle of this atheistic religion which upholds man's supremacy. A blemishless and spiritual life can transform an ordinary man into an *arhat*: 'Just as quartz is by nature pure and white and does not really become coloured in the presence of coloured objects but appears to be so by reflecting their colour, similarly the pure knower is not modified by attachment, etc.' (*Samayasara*). Right insight, right knowledge and right conduct are the three jewels of Jainism. The most significant aspect of Jainism is its broad-minded *anekāntavāda* which commands us to give a respectful hearing to the views of others:

> The view of our opponent may also be true in certain respects, and if it is so, then we have no right to condemn it and declare it to be totally false. Jainism proposes an integral approach for the understanding of the nature of reality, teaches religious tolerance, and advocates a democratic accommodation of viewpoints.

After reading the well-structured essays in this volume, one is still on the road. Such is the rich spread of Hindu spirituality that the centre is everywhere but the circumference nowhere. But then, as the General Editor Ewert Cousins points out, the aim of the series is to draw the spiritual wisdom of different nations 'into the focus of world spirituality, (and by doing so) it can provide a perspective for understanding one's place in the larger process'. Where politics, economics, war machines and language have failed to unite the world's people, its spiritual heritage might yet help man realize the ideal of human unity.

PREMA NANDAKUMAR

YASHDEV SHALYA: *Samaj: Darshanik Parisheelan* (Society: A Philosophical Analysis), Rawat Publications, Jaipur, n.d., pp. 181, (including index), Rs 165.

Samaj: Darshanik Parisheelan offers a philosophical, as distinct from a social, scientific or historical, analysis of society. The difference, as Shalya points out, pertains to both the substantive concern of, as well as the way of pursuing the investigation of, society. For Shalya, society and culture are proper subjects of investigation for the social sciences, history and philosophy, to be sure. However, each of them conceives society and culture in different ways. The social sciences, for example, view society in the context of the behaviour of a group of individuals in a particular time, whereas philosophy views it in abstraction from any particular society.

But how does a society in abstraction, considered independently of the organs or elements constituting it, and freed of its grosser elements, look like? Obviously, such a society will represent an idea, an archetype, which is supposed to inhere in concrete but differentially structured societies. Historical societies are manifestations of this idea of society. But what is this idea and how is it reflected in historical societies? What accounts for deviations of a historical society from the idea of it? These questions must be answered in order to determine what contribution the book under review makes to our understanding of society and culture.

For Shalya, human consciousness is the constitutive element of both the individual and society which represent its two equivalent dimensions. But consciousness is the consciousness of an individual. This may eventually somehow turn into social or collective consciousness influencing and moulding, in turn, individual consciousnesss. On this view, language, communication, culture, history, and other cognate themes and structures assume importance since they impinge on the process through which individual consciousness is transformed into society and culture. In the book Shalya explores through these categories the structures of consciousness that bring into being the individual and social dimensions.

The book under review deserves a longer discussion than is possible here in order to fully appreciate Shalya's distinctive approach. Only a bare outline of his argument can, even at the risk of distortion, be presented here. For him, the term 'man' stands for a particular level of self-consciousness of the psyche which refers not to ego principle but to the self-reflexive action of consciousness itself. By virtue of this consciousness becomes both subject and object and can be generalized and communicated. Undoubtedly, consciousness is personal (not private) but it incorporates the other as a structural component of itself. As such, man is essentially a

social, or more specifically, a cultural man, and consciousness incorporates not only the distinctive attributes of the self but also the presence of the other as a structural prop for the sustenance of the idea of the self itself.

Accordingly, culture is defined by Shalya as expressing a vision of life informed by the exploration of transindividual truth and values, and society constitutes those structures and processes that come into existence for realizing this vision of life. Persons joined together by a commonly held vision of life form a society. As such, the role of communication is of central importance in this perspective. The centrality of communication among individuals does not, however, affirm either that the individual is prior or that society is atomistic. It only delimits the area within which communication among individuals, either directly or indirectly, takes place and becomes instrumental in maintaining the commonality of cultural perspective. Concerned as it is with transcendental truth and values, culture performs the same role with respect to society as the soul does with respect to the individual. The individual is the hub of all self-related activities. But this characterization leaves out one important factor, that is, the goal-seeking nature of man. It is this aspect that endows meaning and directionality to man's activities. And the purposive dimension of man's existence is the domain of culture.

Culture as the soul of society is not a haphazard collection of norms and principles but a well-structured entity guided by a central organizing principle or tendency. That is why a particular culture can transform itself into collective consciousness, on the one hand, and influence individual motivaion and action, on the other. For Shalya, then, central to human existence is consciousness. Different individuals are simply its manifestations. When consciousness is attuned to the exploration of truth, reality and meaning, it generates culture which, in turn, provides both individuals and societies with their respective models for organizing their existence and constructing their self-image. Thus, individuals and cultures both evince a central tendency which defines truth, reality and meaning for them. History is simply a progressive denouement of this tendency, a record of self-expression or self-illumination of meaning.

But society is more than the manifestation and structuration of consciousness; it is also a political system which must concern itself with the problems engendered by the conflict between the good and the right. Moreover, it is also an entity that has to respond appropriately to the pressure of change. Shalya therefore discusses these aspects of society in the last five chapters. But the very inclusion of these diverse themes seems to raise questions about the adequacy of the theoretical perspective employed by him. First, the term 'consciousness' itself creates problems. Are the principles of

generalizability and communicability of consciousness, attributes with the help of which consciousness is transformed from personal to social, adequate to instal consciousness as the master principle? If consciousness represents, as Shalya insists, the ultimate principle (similar to *manas* in the Upaniṣads, especially *Vājasaneya Saṃhitā*, 34.1.6), which explains or accounts for them, it cannot tolerate rival principles no matter how important or necessary they are if they are logically or empirically not integrated into the framework.

A closer look at *Samaj: Darshanik Parisheelan* indicates that this is not the case. This is exemplified very clearly by the way Shalya handles the phenomenon of change. Consciousness, as Shalya seems to imply, is, in its original form, unembodied and therefore immune to the process of change. But when it manifests itself in history, it has to undergo a process of becoming or change. Shalya seems to stand here not on very firm theoretical or philosophical ground. If consciousness is central to the constitution of the individual psyche and social life, the process of change must be explained in terms of changes in consciousness itself. But, then, is this process of change willed by consciousness itself or caused by some other factors? If it is the former, consciousness assumes a kind of Hegelian character. It is then difficult to pass a value judgment on 'what is' or 'what happens to be' since it is due to the cunning of consciousness. If it is the latter, then consciousness does not remain a central and autonomous concept.

Shalya argues that the phenomenon of social change cannot be explained in terms of changes occurring in the exterior of society, that is, in its material aspects, but in the cognitive dimension, changes that have to do with how one looks at the world. Such changes cannot be branded as totally malign. It is true, to be sure, that these changes, as exemplified by the increasing pace of industrialization, have meant the emergence as well as disappearance of certain institutions and attitudes. However, they have also brought about certain beneficial consequences. For example, Shalya argue that the modern age is characterized not only by consumerism, instrumental rationality and alienation; it also projects humanism and social justice as preferred values. However, the fact is that the various elements composing the modern sensibility including the ideals it swears by are incommensurable. Consumerism can erode and has, in fact, led to the progressive erosion of both the ideals because the modern vision of the good life sets up the impossible task of creating a virtuous collective existence out of the private passions of self-defining subjects. If we take into account the loss of conviviality in modern times due to the strong tendency towards commodification of time itself, we will not

reject out of hand the proposition that change in externalities, too, makes for internal, cognitive and perspectival change.

Thus, it is not enough to say that the ongoing process of change is due to change in the ways one looks at the world. It is also necessary to explain how this change comes about in the first place. Needless to say that the growth and decline of social vitality cannot explain this since it has itself to be explained by something else. And that something else cannot be consciousness because it lacks, as Shalya defines it, the capacity to generate the principles to discriminate between progress and regress, good and bad, right and wrong, etc. Consciousness means consciousness of something. In the modern sense, it refers to the mind as a receptacle of information about self, others and the world. Shalya does not mean this. If he did, consciousness itself would be determined by the ongoing process of change in the external world. And then the freedom of the individual will consist in making, as best as he can, ceaseless adaptation to the flux of change affecting the external world.

If, on the other hand, consciousness means attunement to a still higher entity, the divine ground of being, for example, which enables the individual to imbibe the virtue of right superordination and subordination of the forces in the soul, then, consciousness becomes self-reflective by being touched by a higher entity. It is the consciousness touched by the flash of eternity beyond time that not only becomes the ground of individuality and sociality but also furnishes standards for ascertaining right and wrong, progress and regress, etc. But Shalya does not imply this. His conception of consciousness implies that it is self-subsistent and autonomous. It by itself is capable of providing the ground for individuality, the basis of society and culture, and of generating principles of discrimination. However, in the lack of substantive content, consciousness, as defined by Shalya, is only formal; it cannot by itself generate criteria for evaluating what society is and what it becomes when it changes.

There are other problems. But the lack of space does not allow their discussion. However, the preceding analysis is enough to indicate that *Samaj: Darshanik Parisheelan* does not offer any definitive formulation of what society is or ought to be.

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