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Living Thinking

TYSON ANDERSON
Dade City, Florida, USA

Rudolf Steiner's understanding of 'thinking'—when it is viewed as imagination in the broad sense, as discussed by Mary Warnock[1]—is both important in itself and for its potential as a guideline in doing comparative philosophy. Richard Rorty has recently expressed his interest in approaches to philosophy which might reconcile the scientific, religious, and artistic aspects of life, and he has noted, moreover, that philosophical resources are to be found in novels and other literary works whose relevance has been overlooked by much analytic philosophy.[2] I believe that Steiner's idea of thinking—especially '*living* thinking'—is a seminal concept that can assist us in developing such a reconciliation. For Steiner, it is living thinking which liberates people from bondage to ideas, shows us the real harmony that exists between our more humanistic concerns and a properly understood scientific world view, and paves the way for cross-cultural understanding. Building on an insight of B.K. Matilal, I argue, moreover, that Steiner's notion of living thinking also gives us a new perspective from which to view *avidyā*, namely as a condition which is rooted in the very way in which thinking normally operates. Furthermore, when living thinking as imagination is related to the works of selected Western authors this will show that 'Chinese rationality,' as it is explained by Roger Ames and A.C. Graham,[3] is not only far from being 'oxymoronic' but is a fundamental—in fact, unavoidable—part of the thinking of Indo-Europeans and indeed, of anyone.

A brief comparison of Steiner's philosophy with more widely known philosophers will help orient us initially to his thought. Steiner characterizes his approach as being empirical, scientific and based on the nature of human beings, and in this he—despite the fact that much of his argument is preoccupied with Kant—is reminiscent of Hume. In the Introduction to the *Treatise* Hume says: '[A]s the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation'.[4] In his preface to the revised edition of *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity*, Steiner says he wishes to attain 'an insight into the nature and being of the person which will provide a foundation for all else that comes to meet us'.[5] And the full title of the work is: 'The

Philosophy of Spiritual Activity. The basic elements of a modern world view. The result of observing the human soul as natural science observes nature'. Unlike Hume, however, Steiner does not have in mind here a Newtonian or mechanistic model of natural science but rather one in accord with Goethe's approach.[6] Whenever possible, moreover, Steiner's 'scientific' method includes a preference for 'a simple description of what everyone experiences in his own consciousness. . . . I am not concerned with the way in which science, until now, has interpreted consciousness, but with the way in which it is normally experienced'.[7] In keeping with this concern for ordinary life, Steiner's philosophical writing is straightforward, clear and accessible in a manner more characteristic of Descartes, British authors, and the later Wittgenstein than Kant, Husserl and the word-play of Heidegger and the deconstructionists.[8] Steiner also anticipates Husserl's *Lebenswelt*—'the forgotten meaning-fundament of natural science'[9]—without going through the latter's repeated efforts to find 'apodicticity'. As Wittgenstein was later to argue, such efforts are misplaced: if doubt has no meaning regarding a given proposition, then neither does certainty: 'The game of doubting presupposes the game of certainty' and 'a doubt about existence only works in a language game'.[10] The certainties of ordinary life and its language games come first and are in fact presupposed by all later philosophical reflection and doubting.

In some ways the thinker most similar in philosophical interests to Steiner may be his younger contemporary, Nishida Kitaro during the period of his *An Inquiry into the Good*.[11] Both writers wanted to base their ideas on experience. Both began their works with epistemological concerns and went on to offer an ethics. They both admired Goethe's view of nature and opposed materialism, and both wanted to integrate religion, art, and science into a holistic viewpoint. There are differences, of course. Nishida's comparative interests were evident from the start while Steiner's became un- mistakable from the time of his October 8, 1902 lecture to the Giordano Bruno Bund in Berlin. More importantly, Steiner's thought clearly represents the viewpoint of a strong western-style ego and sense of individuality, and his key term is not 'pure experience' but 'thinking'.

It may be surprising, perhaps, to discover that Wittgenstein, the analytic philosopher par excellence, had anything in common with the founder of anthroposophy. Yet Wittgenstein and Steiner shared several concerns and interests. They both made an issue of the problem of bondage to ideas. The last sentence in Steiner's revised and final 1918 edition of *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity* is this: 'One must be able to face the *idea* in living experience, *or else* one falls into its bondage',[12] (As the development of Steiner's thought eventually shows, the Indian connotations of the final word—'bondage' [*Knechtschaft*]—are in order here). The 1918 edition had put the first (1894) preface at the end of the book, so this sentence from that preface is also in fact one of the first things that Steiner was concerned to say. Wittgenstein said: 'A *picture* held us captive'[13] and 'Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language'.[14] Like Steiner who was the editor of Goethe's scientific papers, Wittgenstein was an admirer of Goethe, and one of the methods which he selected for attacking bewitchment was Goethean in spirit. Wittgenstein once remarked in a lecture in the 1940's that 'what I give is the morphology of the use of an expression'.[15] It was Goethe who coined the term 'morphology'.[16] Earlier, in a work on which he collaborated with Waismann, this is said:

> Our thought here matches with certain views of Goethe's which he expressed in the *Metamorphosis of Plants* . . . [Goethe addresses] the problem of synoptic presentation. . . . We see the original form of the leaf changing into similar and cognate forms. . . . We follow the sensuous transformation of the type by linking up the leaf through intermediate forms with the other organs of the plant.
>
> This is precisely what we are doing here.[17]

And in the *Philosophical Investigations* we read:

> A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words—our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connections'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate cases*.[18]

Note that the translations 'command a clear view of', 'perspicuity', and 'perspicuous', miss the Goethean and consistently holistic connotations of *uebersehen, Uebersichtlichkeit,* and *uebersichtliche.* Goethe was interested in the details that led one to grasp the wholeness which was manifesting in particular forms. As Goethe was against the materialistic and reductionist attitude being taken towards plants and animals by thinkers of his day, so Wittgenstein opposed the reductionist, analytic method which thinks it gets to the meaning of things primarily by breaking them down into parts.[19] There are, to be sure, important differences between Wittgenstein and Steiner, most notably the former's emphasis on language. It is true that whereas Steiner described his approach as 'scientific', Wittgenstein did not, but this latter difference should not be over-emphasized. Wittgenstein said only that he was not concerned with 'theory' or 'anything hypothetical'. 'We must do away with all *explanation* and description alone must take its place'.[20] As compared to the *Tractatus,* there is in fact a strong empirical orientation to the *Investigations,* and this accords very well with Steiner's own high regard for observation.

Steiner combined empiricism with pronounced existential and aesthetic concerns. In his first preface he says:

> Nor do we want a knowledge which has become rigidified into

academic rules and preserved in encyclopaedias as valid for all time. Each of us feels that we are justified in starting from facts that are near to hand, from our immediate experiences, and from thence advance to a knowledge of the whole universe. . . . All science would be only the satisfaction of idle curiosity, did it not strive to enhance *the value of existence for the human personality*.[21]

Eight years earlier in his work on Goethean epistemology Steiner had complained that 'philosophical works are at present read only by professional philosophers,' and he had gone on to urge that philosophers should deal with 'the great questions that move humanity'.[22] There is a clear kinship here with some of Nietzsche's concerns, but although Steiner discovered Nietzsche's writings in 1889 and was most sympathetic with them, he flatly states in his autobiography that 'Nietzsche's thought had not the least influence' on *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity*.[23] Steiner had a highly developed aesthetic sense; he even created a new art form, eurythmy, which is 'speech made visible'. This sensibility led him to anticipate Dewey's remark that 'philosophy like art moves in the medium of imaginative mind'.[24] Thus according to Steiner: 'In composing, the laws of the theory of composition serve life, serve actual existence. In exactly the same sense, philosophy is an art. All true philosophers are *artists in the realm of concepts*. . . . Abstract thinking is endowed with concrete individual life. Ideas become life forces'.[25]

The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity shares a common aim with David Bohm's work[26] in that it shows an overall concern with displaying the unity of life against the modern tendency of knowledge to fragment itself.

The realms of life are many. For each of them special sciences develop. But life itself is a unity, and the more deeply the sciences enter into their separate realms, the more they withdraw themselves from viewing the world as a living whole. A knowledge must exist which seeks in the separate sciences the elements that lead human beings back to the fullness of life.[27]

Indeed, Steiner assures us, 'the history of our spiritual life is a continuing search for unity between ourselves and the world. Religion, art and science are all equally in pursuit of this goal'.[28] How did this unity become broken? How did it come about that we are in bondage to such a fragmented world view? These are the questions to which we now turn as we consider Steiner's concept of thinking and apply it towards understanding the phenomenon of *avidyā*.

According to Steiner, 'there can be no more fundamental starting-point than thinking, when investigating the world'.[29] Philosophy should begin not with assumed entities such as atoms or the will or the unconscious but with that which is last in evolution, and 'the absolute last to arise in the evolution of the world is *thinking*'.[30] He had already argued as early

as 1886 that 'pure experience' could not be the starting-point since it consists of 'an endless unrelated multiplicity' and an 'absolute want of meaning'[31] which require thinking in order for relations to be established and meaning to be perceived. In his doctoral dissertation Steiner preferred to speak of 'the directly given world-picture'. He noted that the division between this pre-cognitive situation and the condition of cognition 'will not in fact coincide with any stage of human devleopment', and that 'no one proceeding to consider epistemological questions could possibly be said to be standing at the starting point of cognition'.[32] To get some idea of the precognitive situation, we would, he said, have to imagine the experience of a being created out of nothing.[33] In *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity* Steiner returns to the same theme. He says that human consciousness is typically not free of concepts and thoughts; rather it 'is at any given moment permeated with a variety of concepts'. But here, a being created out of nothing is said to be aware of 'the content of pure observation,'[34] for in *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity* the 'two fundamental pillars of our spirit' are observation and thinking.[35] And according to the book's subtitle, the work itself presents the results of 'observation'. This shift in terminology is of some importance, I believe, because, since 'observing' connotes an observer, it has the effect of emphasizing the emerging role of the 'I' and the side of the subject in knowing.

Steiner's idea of 'pure experience' should be distinguished from William James' notion of it as 'the one primal stuff or material of the world'.[36] For Steiner, the essential nature of the world—its 'stuff'—'does not become clear to us unless we ourselves build up reality out of the given and the activity of thinking'.[37] Thinking is that which takes us away from the blindness of pure experience. Steiner's idea also differs from Nishida's. According to Nishida, pure experience is 'the state of experience just as it is without the least addition of deliberative thought'.[38] 'This is the most refined type of experience' and 'all mental phenomena appear in the form of pure experience'.[39] For Steiner, pure experience is the *least* refined form. 'The true shape [of the world] is not the first in which reality comes before the "I", but the shape that the "I" gives it. That first shape, in fact, has no significance for the objective world. . . . [I]t is [the shape that the "I" gives] which . . . is *subjective:* the subjective shape is that in which the "I" at first encounters it.'[40]

Taking our thinking as the starting-point of philosophic reflection, Steiner believes, has a certain quality of inescapability or unavoidability. The materialist would like to give an explanation of the world, but 'every attempt at an explanation must begin by forming *thoughts*'.[41] Many philosophers hold that we should begin with consciousness instead of thinking. Yet 'if I want to understand the way in which thinking is related to consciousness, I must think about it. In so doing I presuppose thinking'.[42] The same applies to the notion of concepts and ideas as the

starting-point: they too presuppose thinking.[43] And if I contemplate thinking itself, 'the perceived object is qualitatively the same as the activity which is directed upon it'.[44]

Thinking also has a self-originating quality. In the case of certain objects, I first have knowledge of what I am going to do and then I make the objects. That is not true in the case of thinking. 'If we waited with thinking until we had knowledge of it, we should never accomplish it. We must resolutely plunge straight into thinking, and only afterward, by looking at what we did, can we gain knowledge of it. In the case of thinking we ourselves create the object to be observed'.[45] In *Truth and Knowledge* Steiner made an observation which is a corollary of this fact about thinking: '[W]ith thinking, all proof ceases. For proof presupposes thinking. . . . [O]ne can never prove proof as such. We can only describe what a proof is. In logic, all theory is pure empiricism; in the science of logic there is only observation'.[46] This insight is very close and similar in spirit to the later Wittgenstein's emphasis on describing language games: 'Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a "proto-phenomenon". That is, where we ought to have said: *this language game is played*.' And: 'The question is not one of explaining a language game by means of our experiences, but of noting a language game'.[47]

According to Steiner—and this may be one of his principal discoveries—this thinking that is our starting-point normally *forgets itself*. 'That is the characteristic nature of thinking: the thinker forgets thinking while doing it'. Thus, '[t]he first observation we make about thinking is that it is the unobserved element in our ordinary intellectual life'.[48] For example, when I observe a table or a tree, 'I do not at the same time perceive my thinking about these things. . . . While the observing of things and events, and thinking about them, are everyday occurrences filling my ordinary life, the perception of thinking is a kind of exceptional state'.[49] One could perhaps more accurately say here that in normal life one confronts the world with the *results* of thinking—i.e. thoughts, but the thinking itself is overlooked.[50] If, as Gadamer says, language itself has an 'essential self-forgetfulness',[51] how much more subtle would be the self-forgetfulness of thought? The immediate corollary of this fact about thought is that normal life is lived in a state of forgetfulness, and with this observation we quite suddenly find ourselves at the core of the problem of human bondage: people are typically unaware not only of the *thoughts* that structure their understanding and perception of the world but also of the *thinking* activity behind their thoughts; the thought-and thinking-component of reality is not seen and what is unconsciously thought to be the case is taken for reality itself. This fact is the basis for the phenomenon of prejudice, whereby we end up unknowingly relating ourselves not so much to certain things or people but to our false thoughts about them. The mind is naturally 'idolatrous' in a quite general sense,[52] and as John

Calvin observed, produces idols 'just as waters boil up from a vast, full spring'.[53] In Steiner's later lectures where he became more concerned with language, human thinking and therefore prejudice is seen to be linguistic in nature. 'Their first ideas of things-in-themselves come to men straight out of language itself, and they know very little about such ideas except in so far as language preserves them'.[54]

B.K. Matilal remarked that the idea of '*avidyā*, divested of its sectarian meanings' does not mean a simple lack of knowledge but rather 'false beliefs, misconceptions, and wrong convictions'.[55] The tenacity of *avidyā*, I would suggest, is due at least in part to the forgetfulness which characterizes normal thinking and which underlies the phenomenon of *avidyā*. But before going further, some remarks on my approach may be in order here. I believe that Matilal's concern to avoid 'sectarian meanings' is well taken. While I agree with Gadamer that we 'can try to come to agreement about everything,'[56] I also think that competing language games and vocabularies themselves usually *preclude* agreement (one might even think, somewhat cynically, that such conceptual tribalism is part of their intended purpose), and that, therefore, agreement—if it is to be sought at all, which I think it should—must typically be sought outside of the usual doctrinal boundaries. (This, of course, amounts to not accepting the traditional notion of 'doctrinal boundaries'). In this respect, my approach resembles Rorty's in so far as he wants to 'outflank one's opponent',[57] except that I prefer a more dialogical model than that which the polemical 'opponent' suggests. In *A River Runs Through It*, Norman Maclean remarks on 'how strange reality has been'.[58] Rather than a Rortian sense of 'irony', my own motivation derives more from respect for the strangeness of reality and the limits of 'common sense', all of which substantially weakens one's enthusiasm for drawing hard boundaries between aspects of life. Moreover, if anything like the doctrine of *avidyā* should be true, then there would be much reason to be cautious lest our ordinary ego 'find' barriers whose appeal fades with the weakening of the ego. In India there are, of course, a multitude of '*avidyās*' just as there are in the West a plethora of christologies, and there is little reason to expect agreement among the various doctrinal groups. For my purposes, I am interested in the idea of *avidyā* in so far as it holds that normally people have misconceptions concerning their true nature and their true relationship to the world and that they are in some way bound—attached—to their misconceptions. This is, from an ordinary point of view, a somewhat unsettling claim. It would be even more disturbing to come to think that the normal operation of the mind—including especially, perhaps, the normal academic mind—ensures that the misconceptions remain in force. But this may be what in fact happens.

Now the quality of being *bound* to a persistent misconception of our true situation is, as I was saying, founded on the forgetful condition of

normal consciousness. There is more, of course, to *avidyā* than being bound in forgetfulness, and one of Steiner's central concerns is to disclose another fundamental aspect of ignorance, namely, the experiential split of reality into 'I' and the world. In the second chapter of *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity*, entitled 'The Fundamental Desire for Knowledge', Steiner notes that a human being 'always demands more than the world gives him of its own accord', and in particular what human beings want is answers to questions raised by their thinking. But our seeking an explanation of the facts 'splits our whole being in two; we become conscious of our polarity to the world. We face the world as independent beings'.[59] Steiner sees thinking as a two-edged sword, existentially speaking: it 'takes me beyond myself and unites me with the objects. But at the same time it also separates me from them, placing me as subject over against them'.[60] Now this separation is in fact an illusion, strengthened by the fact that we are, in various ways, limited beings, for e.g., in respect to our bodies, how we perceive things, and in how we think about things. 'It is due to our limitations that things appear to us as if they had a separate existence, when in fact they are not separate at all'. Our separating ourselves 'is a subjective act, which is due to the fact that the human being is not identical with the universal world process, but is a being among other beings'.[61] In so far as we take ourselves to be separate, we are mistaken not only about nature and the world but about ourselves, that is, we normally exist in a natural state of ignorance about what we are. Since thinking forgets itself, normally people unconsciously take their common-sense and mistaken thoughts about themselves as being simply the truth of the matter, and the result, of course, is bondage in forgetfulness to this unseen 'macro-prejudice,' as I have called it.[62] *This* prejudice is embedded in our lives so thoroughly that 'we ourselves are the error, we cannot simply correct it, for, think as we will, it is there'.[63] It is logically equivalent to those 'certainties' which, as Wittgenstein pointed out, are not matters of information but are rather so much a part of our way of thinking that they can be said to form 'the river-bed' of our thoughts.[64]

It is a central contention of Steiner's that one of the ways in which thinking is unique is that for it to occur the 'I' must be present. Thinking 'is based on our own activity'; 'we ourselves bring it forth'.[65] He restates Descartes' *cogito* as follows: '[W]ithin the whole world-content, it is only in my thinking that I take hold of myself in an activity which is uniquely my own.'[66] Such thinking is active and willed and must be distinguished from merely 'having thought-images'.[67] Perception and feeling are not uniquely my own in the same sense. They simply occur, and, of course, nonhuman beings also have these faculties. It is only beings with an 'I' who can 'think' in Steiner's sense.

This 'I', like other objects, can be perceived. Usually I am absorbed in a given object and am not conscious of myself. but sometimes I am 'conscious not only of the object, but also of myself as the being who faces the object and perceives it. Not only do I see a tree, I know also that *it is I* who see it'.[68] Indeed, '[h]uman consciousness must of necessity be at the same time self-consciousness because it is a *thinking* consciousness'.[69] But it is important to distinguish between simply becoming aware of ourselves and defining ourselves by *thinking*. Self-perception can be just as incomplete, illusory and in need of correction as any other perception. As Śaṅkara observed, while everyone is, in a sense, conscious of the self since one 'never thinks "I am not". . ., there is a conflict of opinions as to its special nature'.[70] Perception of oneself as a limited being for instance, may lead one to view the self as a separate being. But self-perception also discloses that there arises from the self an activity—thinking, which is not just another object of perception because 'it is produced by our activity' and it is capable of establishing the overall unity of things.[71] 'In thinking we have the element which amalgamates our particular individuality with the cosmos. In that we sense and feel (and also perceive) we are separate entities, in so far as we think *we are* the all-one being that pervades everything'.[72]

From Steiner's consistently stressing the importance of the individual I, one might be led to conclude that it is the individual *subject* who thinks, but this would be a mistake. '[T]he activity the human being performs as a *thinking* being is not merely subjective, neither is it objective; it transcends both concepts'.[73] Thus where Nishida said, 'It is not that there is experience because there is an individual, but that there is an individual because there is experience',[74] Steiner says, 'the subject does not think because it is a subject; rather it appears to itself as subject because it can think'.[75] Here Steiner anticipates the kind of approach to 'the scandal of philosophy' (Kant) which Heidegger employed when he said regarding 'proofs' of the 'external world that '[i]f Dasein is understood correctly, it defies such proofs, because, in its Being, it already *is* what subsequent proofs deem necessary to demonstrate for it'.[76]

This 'subject', it should be noted, is our everyday 'I,' and *this* being lives in forgetfulness and in ignorance of its true identity. In order for it to break free from its bondage to ignorance, it must first perceive its thinking and then move on to experiencing thinking. These are two different movements of the spirit.

The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity is divided into two parts. Having in the first part established the centrality of the activity of thinking for human cognition, Steiner in the second part considers the experience of thinking itself as the foundation of our knowledge of human freedom. But first, in a section which was rewritten for the 1918 edition, he introduces the idea of intuition as 'a conscious spiritual experience of purely spiritual content. Only through an intution can thinking's real nature be grasped'.[77] This description of intution is *different* from that found in the first part where it is said to be 'the form in which . . . [the content of thought] first appears. . . . Intuition is for thinking what

observing is for perception'.[78] There is a continuity of meaning, but 'intuition' in the second part is an experience of an intuition of intuitions, that is, it is not simply an awareness of past, habitual thoughts that happen to arise, nor is it simply creative thinking, but an *experiencing* of living thinking. Steiner in fact made this distinction unmistakeably clear as early as 1897 with the publication of *Goethe's World View.* Somewhat to Steiner's discomfort, he was aware that Goethe had said that he himself never thought about thinking at all. Steiner's response is: 'Goethe did not make the distinction between thinking about thinking and *looking at thinking*'.[79] There is a difference between, on the one hand, thinking in a nonhabitual, creative, 'living' way and, on the other hand, experiencing such thinking intuitively. The former is commonplace—particularly in the learning of children, but the latter is most unusual, as is evidenced by the fact that a creative thinker of the stature of Goethe did not even acknowledge its possibility. *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity* itself, says Steiner, presupposes the actual experiencing of living thinking,[80] 'which, with light-filled warmth, delves to the depths of the world's phenomena'.[81] Steiner believed that it was just this kind of experiencing which enabled him to give an accounting of Goethe's world view which Goethe himself was unable to give. Now, in the nature of the case we cannot *analyse* ourselves out of *avidyā*, but if we raise our level of experiencing, we can, so to say, *experience* ourselves out of it, and the experiencing of living thinking is the beginning of such an awakening.

As a preparation for discussing Steiner's relevance for understanding Chinese rationality, it will be necessary at this point to consider Mary Warnock's study of the imagination. Here is a summary of her conclusions:

> [T]here is a power in the human mind which is at work in our everyday perception of the world, and is also at work in our thoughts about what is absent; which enables us to see the world, whether present or absent as significant, and also to present this position to others. . . . And this power, though it gives us 'thought-imbued' perception . . ., is not only intellectual, it's impetus comes from the emotions as much as from reason, from the heart as much as from the head.[82]

I will comment briefly on each of these claims. Wittgenstein had once said: 'We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough'.[83] In this spirit of this observation Warnock gives close attention to the place of thought in perception, particularly as this relates to Wittgenstein's remarks on 'seeing as' and phenomena such as the 'duck-rabbit'.[84] Near the end of his discussion Wittgenstein says that 'seeing as' is similar to 'having an image', and that in the dawning of an aspect—when, for example, one sees the duck-rabbit as a duck, one feels there is 'an echo of a thought'.[85] Warnock's comment is that 'Wittgenstein's phrase "the echo of a thought" seems appropriate in *all* cases if in any'.[86] But not separating thinking from perceiving, Warnock concludes, 'entails both that we must think of perception as containing a thought-element, and, perhaps, that we must think of thinking as containing a perception-element'.[87] The same power, i.e., the *imagination*, which is involved in our perceiving is also at work when we think of things that are *not* present, including the past and the future. Wittgenstein had been interested in 'seeing as' in so far as it throws light on our understanding language. Warnock observes:

> This suggests that at least some part of our perceptual experience must be described in terms of the significance which we attach to what we perceive. That I may take a certain object to be such and such, or recognize a face as the face of a friend, is a fact to be laid alongside the fact that when you utter the word 'march' I may take it as an order or as the name of a month.[88]

Our ordinary perception of the world as recognizable and familiar—or as not familiar, as in cases of mental disorder—presupposes the operation of this power according to which we not only perceive the world but *interpret* it. Sartre had wanted to exclude imagination from his understanding of perception: the oiliness, sliminess, and viscosity of objects are taken by him to be symbolic of the real being of things. But, says Warnock, 'if we allow that imagination is at work in the perception, then we may certainly allow that it is at work in the interpretation of what is perceived'.[89] This power is the same one that is at work in creative and artistic endeavours, and, as Coleridge and especially Wordsworth knew, it is necessarily connected with feeling. This point, says Warnock, is illustrated in Sartre's example of an actress doing an imitation of Maurice Chevalier. 'The Chevalier-feeling,' says Warnock, 'far more than the Chevalier-appearance is what makes us grasp the absent Chevalier imaginatively'.[90]

We should note that Warnock's account of *imagination* fairly well describes Steiner's view of *thinking*. When Steiner, as noted above, rejected 'pure experience' as an epistemological starting point, it was because the world that we perceive is already imbued with concepts. Thinking is a part of perception, and living thinking is the basis of human learning and creativity in the major areas of life, such as art, science, and religion. Indeed, it is understanding this fact that can lead to a reintegration of these disciplines. Seeing the imaginative character of cognition prepares us for appreciating the universal, simply human aspects of Chinese reason.

In his study of Chinese rationality Roger Ames recalls David Hall's and his distinction between a 'logical' sense of order which has been dominant in our Indo-European world view, and the 'aesthetic' sense of order which has been dominant in China.[91] Drawing on A.C. Graham's notion of 'correlative thinking',[92] he extends the distinction 'to focus important differences between dualistic and correlative modalities of thinking, and

the kinds of "reasoning" that attend them'.[93] Briefly stated, the logical sense of order presupposes some transcendent principle which establishes order in a top-down fashion, and it emphasizes analytic, linear, and causal thinking in dualistic categories. The aesthetic sense of order envisions a 'dynamic, autogenerative, and self-directing world of uniquely different particulars where order is immanent and emergent'. Here the Yin and Yang opposition is fundamental. '[I]t is a correlative pairing which expresses the mutuality, interdependence, diversity and creative efficacy of the dynamic relationships that. . . pattern and valorize the world'.[94] From the perspective of an aesthetic sense of order, Ames goes on to say, 'imagination has a more respectable status' and feeling is more important: 'the cognitive and affective are integrally and inextricably entwined: one "feels" one's thoughts. Thoughts are coloured rather than black and white'.[95] Part of the problem with Ames' argument, it seems to me, is its success. That is to say, if indeed the aesthetic sense of order is as important for human life as he thinks, then it is not *Chinese* rationality that would be oxymoronic but any other! And if this is so, then human—and therefore Indo-European rationality is in fact fundamentally 'Chinese' (which is, approximately, *Steiner's* position) and he has, therefore (in what would seem to be a rather Indo-European manner), overdrawn the contrast between Chinese and Western thinking. Graham himself is more circumspect in this regard, noting indeed that in the West correlative thinking was *dominant* in physical science until 1600, and in biology in German *Naturphilosophie* it held sway into the nineteenth century, and that, moreover, it still lives in 'occultism'[96]—which would, of course, include Goethean approaches, such as Steiner's.

Let us look more closely at Graham's idea of 'correlative thinking'. He says that '[b]efore thinking in sentences we already "think" in the broad sense that we pattern experience in chains of oppositions and expect the filling of gaps in the pattern', and that science presupposes this correlation: 'the correlation of concepts precedes their analysis'.[97] The operation of language, he adds, is 'the one activity to which correlative thinking is *perfectly* adequate'. Wittgenstein's notion of 'family resemblances', Graham says, shows that 'the absolute distinction between the literal and metaphorical meanings and fixing the former in a system of mutually definable terms seems baseless outside logic and mathematics'.[98] The general thrust of these claims is sound, I believe, for it amounts to agreeing with Steiner's and Warnock's idea that human cognition is *imaginative* from the ground up. If anything, Graham, in excluding logic and mathematics understates the case, for in the very location where Wittgenstein introduces the notion of family resemblance—he uses *numbers* as his example: 'And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way'.[99] In fact a major point of *Philosophical Investigations* is that logic and mathematics have no meaning outside of the forms of life and language games in which they operate. One should also be

cautious about breaking 'sentences' down into 'words' which can be 'correlated'. For originally there is not the distinction between words and sentences—as we can tell, according to one of Steiner's students, from an infant's learning to speak

> [S]peaking begins, not by naming things, but rather in such a way that a single word designates a great fullness, a whole landscape of experience. . . . The syllable, 'Meee', is not only the designation for milk as liquid or food, but it may also mean, 'I want milk. . . .', 'The mother who brings the milk', or even 'the clouds', which are sometimes as white as milk.[100]

In describing Chinese rationality, Ames focuses our attention on *li*, noting that its fundamental meaning is related both to the patterns in jade and to the craftsman's working on jade, that is, to order immanent in both natural and cultural situations. *Li* designates an 'aesthetic' coherence, and reason in this context is 'an awareness of those constitutive relationships which condition each thing and which, through patterns of correlation, make its world meaningful and intelligible'.[101] As already noted, Ames says that for such reasoning the imagination and feeling are important elements. 'Way' imagery occurs throughout the *Analects*, he observes, and imaging is, of course, crucial in the *I Ching* and the art of calligraphy. As for feeling, its centrality to Chinese reasoning is indicated by the need to translate *hsin* as 'heart-and-mind'. *Hsin* doesn't mean sometimes 'heart' and sometimes 'mind'. 'It always means both'.[102] Again, it is difficult to disagree with much of what Ames says. As Steiner and Warnock believe, however, the seeing of patterns, the use of images, and the functioning of feeling are all fundamental to *anyone's* thinking, Chinese or non-Chinese. Moreover, one recalls Fingarette's emphasis on ritual order and gesture in Confucius[103] and is reminded that Steiner develops thinking out of speaking and speaking out of gesturing: an infant's speech is rooted in its first gestures.[104] Both speech and rite have their origin in the 'magic' (Fingarette) of those first gestures of imagination. Significant gestures are basic to our 'form of life' (Wittgenstein). As for calling this kind of thinking 'aesthetic', this seems preferable to the somewhat pedestrian 'correlative', but for holistic purposes it may be better to say that human life is 'imaginative'. This would ground artistic, religious, and scientific activities in the same power, thereby showing that science has no monopoly on conceptuality and art has no corner on the market for creativity. Also, it is clear that the Hebrew prophets exhibited plenty of feeling and abundant imagery in their perceptions of a people facing divine judgement,[105] but seeing this as their *imagination* seems more illuminating than to call it their *aesthetics*, particularly in view of the latter term's strong connotation of beauty and the prophets' well-known readiness—eagerness, one might say, to utterly condemn human enthusiasm for creating and admiring beautiful images.

As part of my effort to soften the boundaries between science, religion, and the arts (itself a 'Chinese' aspiration[106]) I want to conclude by considering the notion of living thinking—especially in its function as creative imagination—as it relates to Goethe and four American authors whose writings have an imaginative, affective, and, I argue, 'Chinese' character to them: Thoreau, Wallace Stegner, Terry Tempest Williams, and Norman Maclean.

In the case of Goethe, although he was a literary giant, it is his writings on nature that are the most relevant for our topic.[107] Concerning *li* and the discovery of order in dynamic processes, Goethe's studies of colour, plants and animals offer a prime example of a nonmechanistic and affective understanding of things. Steiner believed that Goethe applied his highly developed *aesthetic* abilities to the study of nature and said that 'his thinking was a perceiving, his perceiving a thinking'.[108] A.C. Graham noted that the perception of anomalies was important for Chinese science. Likewise, in Goethe's work on colour which attacked prevailing Newtonian notions, he made much of optical illusions and colour blindness, leading him to say at one time: 'optical illusion is optical truth'.[109] So fruitful is this approach that Arthur Zajonc is moved to say that Edwin Land's challenge to dominant views on colour theory in his 1957 presentation to the National Academy of Sciences was in the tradition of Goethe. One of the foundations of Goethe's thinking was polarity, and he based his theory of colour on the polarity—the correlative realities, as Graham would have it—of darkness and light, the yin and yang of colour, one might say. According to Henri Bortoft, Goethe's method consisted primarily of two elements: an *active* observing and 'exact sensorial imagination'. There was, Bortoft notes, a meditative aspect to Goethe's approach and it produced a 'deautomatization' of perception and thinking which freed up the imagination to produce new understanding.[110] Steiner's way of putting this was to say that Goethe allowed nature to *speak through* him, while Bortoft says that for Goethe 'the phenomenon becomes its own language'.[111] Bearing in mind the dynamic and diversified universe of the Chinese, we note that according to Steiner, Goethe thought of the truth spoken by nature as 'not some petrified, dead system of concepts, capable of assuming only one form; it is a living sea, within which the spirit of man lives, and which can show on its surface waves of the most varied form'.[112]

Turning our attention to literary examples from the United States, it would be difficult to find an author more western—not to say self-consciously American—and yet more sensitive to the 'way' of nature and persons, than Thoreau. He had a unified vision of order and he perceived a meaning in nature which was of great significance for those who could bring themselves to see it. He was unusual in his ability to combine a great capacity for silent meditative perceiving with a high regard for writing. Like the Chinese, Thoreau had a keen sense for detail. Robert Bly even

suggests that one reason Thoreau later abandoned poetry was the difficulty of putting such exact insights into metre. 'The details he loved appeared in prose sentences composed with immense care for rhythm and vigour of expression'.[113] Here I simply want to call attention to some of Thoreau's remarks about language—especially his own language—and reading and writing.

> I fear chiefly lest my expression not be *extravagant* enough. . . . *Extravagance!* It depends on how you are yarded. . . . I desire to speak somewhere *without* bounds; like a man in a waking moment, to men in their waking moments; for I am convinced that I cannot exaggerate enough even to lay the foundation of a true expression. The words that express our faith and piety are not definite; yet they are significant and fragrant like frankincense to superior natures. . . . The volatile truth of our words should continually betray the inadequacy of the original statement. Their truth is instantly *translated*; its literal monument alone remains.[114]

Most people are 'yarded' (perhaps by sharply dividing religion, science, and art), asleep in their habitual perceptions and expressions. But living thinking, imagination, steps outside these bounds—although it may seem vague and indefinite from the standpoint of common sense, 'the sense of men asleep'.[115] Being attached even to creative expressions is to sleep through the flowing truth that lives in awareness in the moment and to mistake the monument for the man. (Awareness of this fact makes it impossible to take seriously the 'doctrinal boundaries' referred to earlier). For those of us who read writers of a stature like Thoreau's, it would follow that our own *reading* itself must also be 'extravagant', i.e., it too requires a truly living thinking which trespasses. Thoreau, himself no logocentricist, thought that great literature is 'what we have to stand on tiptoe to read and devote our most alert and wakeful hours to', and that we must 'be born again' for this task, for such writings 'are as far behind or above the fleeting spoken language as the firmament with its stars is behind the clouds'.[116] The poetic power of Thoreau's prose has led one critic to observe that Thoreau can be read on two levels: 'the level of the dramatic present and the level of the prehistoric past'.[117] But these levels are a unity. Steiner's view was that poetry is the original form of our speech and that speech itself was not a human invention but human beings are, so to say, inventions of speech. This notion mirrors the native American perception of the crucial creative importance of their stories. Leslie Marmon Silko (Laguna Pueblo) writes of Thought-Woman, the Creator: 'I'm telling you the story/she is thinking', and she adds: 'You don't have anything/if you don't have stories'.[118] Thus Thoreau's dramatic presentation of what he freshly perceived is primordial in its creative power and this originality is the stars behind the clouds of ordinary speech.

Our next author is Terry Tempest Williams, a naturalist and a poet from Salt Lake City. Some remarks by another writer from the American west, Wallace Stegner, will serve as an introduction to her recent work. One of Stegner's favourite themes was the aridity of the American west and the adaptations this required for intelligent living, particularly cooperative living, like the Mormons learned, as opposed to the popular western myth of cowboy individualism. This aridity called for a certain deautomatization of perception, says Stegner.

> We have had to learn to quit depending on perceptual habit. Our first and hardest adaptation was to learn to see all over again. . . . You have to get over the colour green; you have to quit associating beauty with gardens and lawns; you have to get used to an inhuman scale; you have to understand geological time. . . . Perception, like art and literature, like history, is an artefact, a human creation, and it is not created overnight.[119]

The Kiowa author, N. Scott Momaday, says that parts of the American west positively encourage new perceptions: 'Loneliness is an aspect of the land. All things in the plain are isolate; there is no confusion of objects in the eye, but *one* hill, or *one* tree, or *one* man. . . . Your imagination comes to life, and this, you think, is where creation was begun'.[120] Terry Tempest Williams is from a generation of authors who have developed these new capacities. Her *Refuge* deals movingly with cancer in her family from the perspective of a Mormon living in Utah who is intimately familiar with the lessons of aridity and the need for new perceptions. Her own imaginative powers of observation have a Goethean and Thoreau-like quality to them.

> [T]here have been times I have felt a species long before I saw it. The long-billed curlews. . . were trustworthy. I can count on them year after year. And when six whimbrels joined them—whimbrel entered my mind as an idea. Before I ever saw them mingling with curlews, I recognized them as a new thought in familiar country.[121]

Steiner said that Goethe was able to 'live into' the natural beings which he was studying.[122] Notice how Williams' imagination lets her feel cognitively: living thinking is a feeling that understands. Sometimes this understanding occurs in solitude where she can at last hear nature speak in its own tongues.

> I know the solitude my mother speaks of. It is what sustains me and protects me from my mind. It renders me fully present. I am desert. I am mountains. I am Great Salt Lake. There are other languages being spoken by wind, water, and wings. . . . We are no more and no less than the life that surrounds us. My fears surface in my isolation. My serenity surfaces in my solitude.[123]

Her imagination also lifts her to healing perceptions of other people at critical moments. Her mother, near the end of her life, reported that she was 'moving into a realm of pure feeling. Pure colour.' Williams relates the following concerning her mother as she was dying. 'There is a crescendo of movement, like walking up a pyramid of light. And it is sexual, the concentration of love, of being fully present. Pure feeling. Pure colour. I can feel her spirit rising through the top of her head. Her eyes focus on mine with 'total joy—a fullness that transcends words'.[124] These experiences, one gathers, are born of subtle organs of perception, perhaps similar to those which she had developed through years of imaginative attention to nature. Her powerfully cognitive feeling and her wide range of perceptions are 'extravagant', in Thoreau's sense, but surely none the less real for that.

Whereas Thoreau's reflections centred around a pond and Tempest's meditations have the Great Salt Lake as a backdrop, Norman Maclean's title story has rivers at its heart. Here, too, new perceptions—although subtly held in the background for the most part—are very much in evidence, the dramatic present and the prehistoric, geological past interweave, and if we do not, as Thoreau said, 'stand on tiptoe' while reading Maclean, we will miss the real thrust of his work. Water as a symbol is common to both the east and the west, of course, but there is also a particularly biblical precedent for Maclean's emphasizing the role of fishermen in enabling us to imagine and therefore understand what is important in life. In *A River Runs Through It* we are told 'it is not fly fishing if you aren't looking for answers to questions,' that often you won't see something important unless you think of it first, and that to engage in this thinking properly one must actively 'feel about' things.[125] Ironically it is Paul, the most flawed brother, who best describes living thinking: 'All there is to thinking . . . is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing, which makes you see something which isn't even visible'.[126] There are more invisibilities to life than hidden fish, however, and in Paul's case he expertly applied thinking to fishing but was unfortunately unable to wake up to his own habits of character that would inexorably result in his brutal murder. Although the story which Maclean tells began one day while he and Paul were fishing the big Blackfoot river, it was some time after Paul's death that their father, a Presbyterian minister, said to his son, the English professor:

> After you have finished your true stories sometime, why don't you make up a story and the people to go with it?
> 'Only then will you understand what happened and why.
> 'It is those we live with and love and should know, who elude us.[127]

At nearly every turn in the story there is the river which is, we are told, founded on 'something that will never erode'[128]—something deeper even

than the rocks, for beneath the rocks lie words. In their last fishing trip together with Paul, his father, by then retired, was resting and reading the Greek New Testament.

> [I]n the part that I was reading it says the Word was in the beginning and that's right. I used to think water was first, but if you listen carefully you will hear that the words are underneath the water.
>
> 'That's because you are a preacher first and then a fisherman,' I told him. 'If you ask Paul, he will tell you that the words are formed out of water'.
>
> 'No,' my father said, 'you are not listening carefully. The water runs over the words. Paul will tell you the same thing'.[129]

'Listening carefully' requires new perceptions, imagination, living thinking; its reward is a new faculty which can hear that which creates things in the first place. Maclean was seventy when he began *River* and by that time, he tells us, he mostly fished alone.

> I often do not start fishing until the cool of the evening. Then in the Arctic half-light of the canyon, all existence fades to a being with my soul and memories and the sounds of the big Blackfoot river and a four-count rhythm and the hope that a fish will rise.
>
> Eventually, all things merge into one, and a river runs through it. The river was cut by the world's great flood and runs over rocks from the basement of time. On some of the rocks are timeless raindrops. Under the rocks are words, and some of the words are theirs.
>
> I am haunted by waters.[130]

For Rudolf Steiner, at the heart of things there moves a stillness which speaks. We are a river of thinking—of imagination—which we forget. We forget both the deep activity of thinking and the thoughts on the surface that define the world for us. We are attached to this forgetfulness which founds the ignorance, the *avidyā*, that characterizes normal consciousness. Indeed, we *are* this way of forgetful, sleeping thinking. But we are also capable of awakening in a thinking that is active, creative, and living. Thinking is an activity of the imagination which interprets the world. *Avidyā*, while normal, is a false interpretation which dulls our perceptions and separates us from each other and the 'river'. The fundamentally imaginative nature of thinking is well exemplified by 'Chinese rationality', but this rationality is in itself universal. Through the power of the relative imagination, i.e., living thinking, we all naturally make gestures, learn to speak, and, with feeling, perceive through images—even fictionalized images—the wholeness of the natural, cultural, and personal order of things within which we live and die. Much of what is thought of as Chinese in fact abounds in western thought and literature. Living thinking, when it solidifies, is the basis of our ordinary world view and, yet also, in its 'extravagance,' it floods the boundaries of common sense, liberates us

from bondage to old ideas and perceptions, and thereby provides us with a basis for comparative philosophy which values particularity while also recognizing universal features of human life and thought.

Notes and References

1. Mary Warnock, *Imagination*, University of California, Berkeley, 1976.
2. Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Cambridge University, New York, 1989, p. 93; 'A Pragmatist View of Rationality and Cultural Difference,' *Philosophy East and West*, 42, 4, October 1992, pp. 592–93.
3. Roger T. Ames, 'Chinese Rationality: An Oxymoron?' *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, 9, January-April 1992, pp. 95–119; A.C. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao*, Lasalle, IL, Open Court, 1989.
4. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* [1739], Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, p. xx.
5. Rudolf Steiner, *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity* [1984], translated by Rita Stebbing, rev. ed., Rudolf Steiner Press, London, 1992 p. ix. Hereafter *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity* will be abbreviated as *P*. The German edition is Rudolf Steiner, *Die Philosophie der Freiheit*, Dornach, Rudolf Steiner Verlag, 1987. References to the German edition are abbreviated as G plus the page number. The popular Michael Wilson translation (currently out of print), like Stebbing's first translation (1988), is entitled *The Philosophy of Freedom*, Rudolf Steiner, London, 1964; Wilson places the first preface at the beginning of the book, 'following normal English practice', p. 231. The William Lindemann translation is entitled *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity*, Anthroposophic Press, Hudson, N.Y, 1986. For a discussion of the reasons for the different titles, see Wilson's Introduction, pp. xivf.; Lindemann, p. 262; and *P*, p. vii. In 1922 Steiner himself said that '*Freiheit*' should be translated as 'spiritual activity'. But what he gained in precision with 'activity' he lost with 'spiritual', which in english has all kinds of unintended associations. Even Stebbing's revised edition retains 'freedom' for '*Freiheit*' in the chapter titles.

   Where Steiner writes *Mensch* or *menschliche* I avoid using 'man' as the translation. Here for '*menschliche Wesenheit*' (G7) I have 'the nature and being of the person' instead of Stebbing's 'the nature and being of Man'.
6. In his first epistemological study, Steiner said: 'A science of knowledge based upon Goethe's world-conception lays its chief emphasis upon the principle of remaining always true to experience'. A *Theory of Knowledge Implicit in Goethe's World Conception* [1886], translated by Olin D. Wannamaker, Anthroposophic Press, Spring Valley, NY, 1978, p. 32; 'implicit' is not in the German title: Grundl*inien einer Erkenntnistheorie der Goetheschen Weltanschauung*.
7. *P*, p. 27.
8. Steiner, to make something of an understatement, did not lack either imagination or an appreciation for the creative possibilities of language. His spiritual writings are often quite consciously, artistically arranged. But he had little interest in philology for philosophical purposes. He says: 'Nothing can be known concerning the nature of the triangle by showing how the word "triangle" has been evolved.' *An Outline of Occult Science*, translated by Maud and Henry B. Monges, Anthroposophic Press, Spring Valley, NY, 1972, p. 37.
9. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences*, translated by David Carr, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 1970, p. 48.
10. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, translated by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, para. 115 and 24.
11. Nishida Kitaro, *An Inquiry into the Good* [1910], translated by Masao Abe and

Christopher Ives, Yale University, New Haven, 1990.

12. P, p. 178.
13. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Macmillan, New York, 2nd edn.,1958, para.115.
14. Ibid.,para 109.
15. Ludwig Wittgenstein, quoted in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, Oxford University, London, 1966, p. 50.
16. Henri Bortoft, *Goethe's Scientific Consciousness*, Institute for Cultural Research, Tunbridge Wells, England, 1986, p. 51.
17. Friedrich Waismann, *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, edited by R. Harre, Macmillan, New York, 1965, pp. 80–81; quoted in Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*, Free Press, New York, 1990, pp. 303–04.
18. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, para. 122.
19. See *Philosophical Investigations*, para. 60 regarding an 'analysis' of 'My broom is in the corner'.
20. Ibid., para. 109. See *Tractatus* 4.111.
21. *P*, pp. 176–77. 'Science'—*Wissenscheft* (G 271)—here means human knowledge.
22. Steiner, *A Theory of Knowledge Implicit in Goethe's World Conception*, pp. 2, 3.
23. Rudolf Steiner, *The Course of My Life* [1925], translated by Olin D. Wannamaker, Anthroposophic Press, Bell's Pond, Hudson, NY, 1951, p. 187. Steiner had met Nietzsche's sister when she visited the Goethe-Schiller archives in Weimar. She invited him to visit her and took him into the ill Nietzsche's room. According to Steiner, he saw 'a soul which, from previous earth lives bore a wealth of the gold of light within it, but which could not in this life cause all its light to shine'. *Course of My Life*, p. 190. In 1895 he published *Friederich Nietzsche: Fighter for Freedom*, translated by Margaret Ingram de Ris, Spiritual Science Library, Blauvelt, NY, 2nd edn., 1985. After the publication of this book, Elizabeth Forester-Nietzsche asked him to put Nietzsche's library in order.
24. John Dewey, 'Intelligence in the Modern World', *John Dewey's Philosophy*, edited by Joseph Ratner, Modern Library, New York, 1939, p. 996.
25. *P*, p. 177.
26. David Bohm, *Wholeness and the Implicate Order*, Ark, London, 1983, chapter one: 'Fragmentation and Wholeness'.
27. *P*, pp. 176–77.
28. Ibid., p. 23.
29. Ibid., p. 36.
30. Ibid., p. 38.
31. Steiner, *Theory of Knowledge Implicit in Goethe's World Coneception*, p. 19.
32. Rudolf Steiner, *Truth and Knowledge* [1882], translated by Rita Stebbing, Steiner books, Blauvelt, NY, 2nd edn., 1981, pp. 53, 54. The subtitle is: An Introduction to a 'Philosophy of Freedom'. Note that the 'Starting-point of *epistemology*' differs from the 'starting-point of *cognition*'.
33. Ibid., p. 52.
34. *P*, p. 43. 'Observation' here translates as '*Beobachtung*' (*G*61). Stebbing, as she often does, here uses the less clear 'perception' which is also used to translate '*Wahrnehmung*'. Wilson and Lindemann use 'observation'. Generally, Steiner wants to say that what we become aware of through 'Beobachtung' is 'Wahrnehmung' (p. 36; *G* 62). It is true, however, that Steiner sometimes uses the terms interchangeably.
35. Ibid., p. 29. Later, Steiner says that 'the elements which constitute the reality of every object or event come to us from two sides, from *perception* and from *thinking*' (p. 60). Here the term is '*Wahrnehmen*' (G 88).
36. William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* and A Pluralistic Universe , E.P. Dutton, New York, 1971, p. 5.

37. Steiner, Truth and Knowledge, p. 86.
38. Nishida, *Inquiry into the Good*, pp. 3, 4.
39. Ibid., p. 4.
40. Steiner, *Truth and Knowledge*, p. 86.
41. *P*, p. 24.
42. Ibid., p. 37.
43. Ibid., p. 41.
44. Ibid., p. 35.
45. Ibid., pp. 35–36.
46. Steiner, *Truth and Knowledge*, pp. 64–65.
47. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, para. 654 and 655. Anscombe's translating '*Feststullung*' as 'noting' weakens the reference to the detailed descriptions in which Wittgenstein is interested and the Goethean connotations of establishing and determining '*Urphaenomene*'.
48. *P*, pp. 31, 32.
49. Ibid., p. 30.
50. Following the interpretation of Steiner made by the Hungarian philosopher, Georg Kuehlewind. See his *Stages of Consciousness*, translated by Maria St. Goar, MA, Great Barrington, Lindisfarne, 1984, pp. 26–28.
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109. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, quoted in Arthur Zajonc, *Catching the Light*, Bantam, New York, 1993, p. 194.
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126. Ibid., pp. 100.
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128. Ibid, p. 69.
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The Cognitive-Emotive Theory of Desire

WARREN A. SHIBLES
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin

'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.[1]

The definition of desire (D), e.g., by Aristotle, Hume, Schopenhauer, and contemporary commentators, is still in question.

a. Is D a cause of an action (A)? $D \rightarrow A$?
b. Is D an emotion (E)? $D = E$?
c. Is D a bodily feeling (F)? $D = F$?
d. Can a cognition (C) cause an A? $C \rightarrow A$?
e. Can D cause A? $D \rightarrow A$?
   $E \rightarrow A$?
   $F \rightarrow A$?
f. Can C cause D? $C \rightarrow D$?
g. Are both C and D needed to cause A? $C, D \rightarrow A$?
h. Is A included in the meaning of C and/or D? $C = A$? $D = A$?
i. What are the possible objects of C, D?
j. Is D good or bad?
   etc.

We may begin to clarify the nature and extent of the word 'desire' in its ordinary usage by examining its 'word-field'.[2] Common dictionary definitions and synonyms present this term as being based on the following elements:

a. feeling: feel desire for, passion for, long for, feel inclined to, have enthusiasm for, strive for.
b. value: feel good toward, enjoy, like, take pleasure in, be attracted to, love to, adore, think worth doing or having, prefer.
c. hope, intention (future oriented): aim, goal, purpose.
d. physical urge: hunger, lust, craving, appetite.

There are degrees of desire: need (strong desire), require, demand, set one's heart on, greed, avarice.

Desire is not typically seen as an action. Nor is it a volition (decision, command, choice). 'I desire x', is not the same as 'I will do x'. A desire is a desire whether or not it is pursued. And it is independent of its

fulfilment.

Desire may be seen as an emotion. As Marks points out, 'The dominant view in contemporary analysis of emotion is a cognitivist one. . . .[3] Both philosophers and rational-emotive therapists are in fundamental agreement in analysing emotion by means of the cognitive theory of emotion.[4]

A number of characteristics of desire may be deduced from the fact that it is an emotion:

1. D is not merely a bodily feeling. $D \neq F$. Therefore, it is always misleading to say, 'I feel a desire for x'. It is more descriptive to say, 'I think-feel a desire for x'.
2. D is a cognition (C) which causes F. $D = (C \rightarrow F)$. [C refers to nonmentalistic assessments, ideas, reason, or beliefs (true or false statements) which are self-talk, utterances and language-use]. Although D no longer exists, as such, it will be used to stand for $C \rightarrow F$, where C is a certain kind of assessment as indicated by the word-field above.
3. D can be radically changed, prevented and/or eliminated by changing C. Thus, D is not a necessary or innate feeling or emotion.
4. D can, to some degree, be changed by changing F (e.g., relaxation, prescribed drugs, etc.).
5. In the case of D, C is based on a positive value assessment, such as, 'I would like to x', 'x is worth doing', 'It would be good to x'.

The meaning of C, therefore, depends on one's theory of value. If we regard value terms as open-context terms or valences, meaningless until something is substituted for them, D is an open-context term. If no meaning is given for 'good', D is groundless. If a fallacious instantiation is given for 'good', D becomes irrational. We often desire impossible things.

Both beliefs and desires involve cognitions. It is not a case of reason versus emotion, rational versus irrational. Both beliefs and desires can be rational or irrational. The view that beliefs are cognitions, whereas desires are irrational feelings, is unacceptable.

Furthermore, belief itself may be regarded as an emotion. $E = (C \rightarrow F)$. Because we are always experiencing cognitions as well as bodily feelings, however calmly, there is an F accompanying every C, including belief. $B = (C \rightarrow F)$, $(B = C) \rightarrow F$, $B = E$. Beliefs become emotions. But because beliefs lack value assessments, they are different than desires. $B \neq D$.

Just as the dictionary usually defines 'irrationality' as the emotion of madness, craziness, wildness, and unreasonableness, rationality is defined as the emotion of calmness, reasonableness, being temperate, and balanced.

This position may be contrasted with that of Vadas (1984), who argues that it is an 'Affectionist Fallacy' to hold that all desire must be affective. There are supposedly goal directed 'non-affective desires', like belief-desires (an oxymoron) without feeling, which cause action. $B \neq (C \rightarrow F)$, $(B \rightarrow A)$. Rather, one might have argued for affective beliefs. $[B = (C \rightarrow F)]$. On the cognitive view, neither belief nor desire cause action.

Vadas defines 'affective desire' as a feeling or 'felt urge.'[5] The circular definition is given, 'Feeling is usually how it feels to be',[6] emotions and desires are defined, as mere feelings $(D = F)$. On the cognitive view, however, emotions are not mere feelings without cognition, $[E = (C \rightarrow F)]$. Feelings cannot cause or even motivate action. They are, in general, not assessments at all. (In a strict sense, on another contextual level of analysis, a cognitive analysis could also be given of bodily feelings, such as pain).

The Stoic, Chrysippus, held the view that beliefs do involve feelings: It is not the case that $C \rightarrow F$, rather F is part of C. For him, all judgements involve feelings or emotions. There is no such thing as an emotionless C.[7]

Irrational desires and negative emotions, like faulty beliefs, may be seen as informal logical fallacies.[8] Thus, the area of critical and rational thinking becomes relevant to specifying, clarifying and eliminating irrational desires.

In addition to ethical values, desires may involve aesthetic values. 'Good' may refer to a moral action or to an aesthetic experience. In the latter case, we may speak of aesthetic desires or aesthetic emotions.

6. D can be changed by changing the value assessment (C). (e.g., 'It is not terrible that my leg is broken, but a fact').
7. We can never have the same D twice. There is no D as such. And there is not one D. For each D, there is a different C and F. Thus, D = C1, C2, C3, . . . plus F1, F2, F3, . . . each D is to a greater or lesser degree different than every other D. D1, D2, D3 . . . can be distinguished especially by their different cognitions.

   We cannot have twice the same C or F (or combination thereof: C1, 2, 3, . . . F1, 2, 3, . . .). Thus, we cannot have precisely the same D twice. Repetition of fixed ideas can, however, produce similar desires.
8. Several major fallacious ideas which form the basis of irrational desire are: a) failure to accept the reality of the situation, b) failure to understand the fact that we can only do that which is within our power, c) failure to see that the desired goal is within our power (e.g., yearn for what is readily available), d) misuse of value terms (e.g., think something is good-in-itself, or give irrational or supernatural substitutions for 'good'). Marcus Aurelius wrote: 'The offences which are committed through desire are more blameworthy than those which are committed through anger.'[9]

He was one of the foremost rational-emotive theorists, as he held that:

we cause our own emotions by our assessments; emotions are not externally caused; we must accept reality as it is; we can only do what is within our power; negative emotions are due to faulty thinking about ethics and faulty thinking generally.

9. D is not 'released', emotions are not mentalistic inner states, psychic energy, or entities which, like steam, must be released by an escape valve. If D does not exist as an entity, it cannot be released. If $D = (C \rightarrow F)$, and D is to change, C and/or F must also change. Rather than release of D, C is altered by removal of faulty thinking. Rational thinking takes the place of release.

In the case of physical desire, this may be seen as a physical state such as a headache, rather than as an emotion (for e.g., thirst may be quenched). It may be altered by a change in F. Physical desire may be distinguished from cognitive desire.

Because $D \neq F$, it is not an inner sensation or tension that needs to be satisfied. Bodily feelings (F) are like pains and symptoms, not like emotions. Thus, in the word-field of desire, physical urges such as 'hunger' are not like desires involving value assessments.

10. D is not a cause. As $D = (C \rightarrow F)$, only the latter can be a cause.
11. Because $D = (C \rightarrow F)$, D is caused by oneself (C), not by external events. We subjectively assess some event to be, for example, 'wonderful'. Nothing is in itself 'wonderful', or 'terrible,'. Only we can ourselves make it desirous. Objects and other people, or events, cannot alone cause one to have emotions. Therefore, nothing is desirable as such or in itself. We do not desire things because they are desirous. No one can make another desire them.
12. Because D is mainly a cognition, we must be conscious of it. There is no unconscious desire. 'Desire is always conscious . . . of its own end'.[10] If our desires have been forgotten or become habitual, they are no longer desires. This means, for example, that in law it would be a *non sequitur* to argue, 'The accused did x, therefore she desired to do x'. Because $D = (C \rightarrow F)$, neither is unfeeling desire.
13. D is not an action. $D \neq A$. One may desire financial security without doing anything to bring it about. A desire is not a command. 'I want to eat', is not the same as 'I will eat', or telling oneself, 'Eat'! A desire may be a motive or reason, but may or may not lead to action. Unlike 'I desire to eat', to say 'I will eat', and then not eat, is to break a promise. A voluntary action is a cognition of some kind, resulting in action.

We are able to bring about a physical action or behaviour (A) by means of a complex process we may call a command cognition (CC). CC functions like an instruction. $CC \rightarrow A$. $CC \rightarrow A$ is like $C \rightarrow F$, but with a special volitional cognition.

CC is admittedly a hypothetical, not a descriptive construct. For Hume, the will is what comes between desire and action.

A belief, being only a description of what is the case, cannot cause A. $B \nrightarrow A$. A desire is an assessment of what we would like the case to be, so it also does not cause A. We 'perform' an action, but only 'have' a desire. $D \nrightarrow A$. Only a CC can do that.

On this model, Hume is correct in saying that $B \nrightarrow A$, but wrong in saying that $D \rightarrow A$. Neither causes A. On the other hand, B and D may cause CC. Thus, (B and D) $\rightarrow CC \rightarrow A$. Facts can serve as a basis of values which can serve as a basis for our commands. B and D are informative, but powerless. CC is powerful, but uninformed. CC requires information, planning and goals (values) to be an intelligent command. Both commands and desires can be rational or irrational.

In accordance with this model, Dewey holds that values and intelligent decisions are based on inquiry and knowledge of consequences to achieve desired goals. Shakespeare wrote, 'My desires had instance and argument to command themselves'.[11]

REASON VERSUS PASSION: DAVID HUME

'Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will'.[12]

'Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions'.[13]

Compare the following:

a. 'The bridge has collapsed.' B, C (Factual).
b. 'We should repair the bridge.' D, E, C (Value).
c. 'Fix the bridge.' (To oneself.) CC (Volition).
d. 'We will fix the bridge.' B, C (Promise, Intention).

A descriptive statement (a), is not a value statement (b), nor is it a volitional statement (c), nor a promise or intention. Thus, 'a reason alone can never be a motive' because a descriptive statement is not a value, volitional, or intentional statement. A present or past event (a) is not a future event (b, d).

Hume believes that desires alone can cause actions ($D \rightarrow A$). But here and in the previous section, it is suggested that neither B nor D, but rather only CC can cause A.

D is sometimes regarded by Hume as a feeling or felt impulse which causes A. But for him, 'desire for x', is a feeling caused by the contemplation of the idea of x. Thus, it conforms to the cognitive theory whereby emotions are not feelings (F) but rather $C \rightarrow F$. Feeling is a bodily state, and so could not cause or motivate action. $D \neq F$. Feeling is not a cognition, but more like a headache.

On the other hand, even perception involves cognition. For example, 'This is a dangerous dog'. Seeing is 'seeing-as' something. If feelings were

desires, one could think, 'I will kill no one,' yet kill someone because of a bodily feeling. But a bodily feeling is neither a), b), c) nor d) as stated above.

Desire may not cause action, but it may be a motive for, or constant conjunction with, action, because if there is no value, there is no goal to be accomplished. Hume partly instantiates the value variables in desire with pleasure (good) and pain (bad). 'I desire x', = 'It would be good to have x', = 'It would be pleasurable to have x'. 'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises toward any object'.[14]

Depending on the paragraph cited, however, diverse diagrams could be given for Hume's theory. Space and topic preclude such analyses here. Reason (B) is, for example, *not* the slave of the passions for Hume, because reason for him can indirectly influence, alter, and form the passions. The passions yield to insight. In addition, reason may be thought of as itself a 'calm passion'.[15]

But by reducing ethical terms to naturalistic terms, Hume turns value statements into law-like, empirical statements. The fallacy of not obtaining an 'ought' from an 'is' is undermined. On a naturalistic theory of ethics, since ethical terms are open-context terms, if they are to be intelligible they must be reduced to naturalistic terms.

If so, reason and desire are on the same footing. On Dewey's theory, for example, we can see how we can obtain an 'ought' from an 'is', and how desire is and must be based on inquiry and sound knowledge (B). B → D. 'Thought is not the slave of impulse [D or F] to do its bidding'.[16]

Objects of Desire

Desires have objects. There are no objectless desires-in-themselves. Even free-floating desire is about something. One cannot merely desire. The objects of these future intentions may be rational or irrational. In either case, desire is a positive evaluation (P) producing an enjoyable experience of desiring. We 'look forward to something', open up our possibilities and savour them.

If desire involves a negative assessment (N) as well as a positive one, it is a mixed emotion (N and P) and, as such, is no longer purely a desire. It becomes a negative emotion:

anxiety is fear (N) of not obtaining what is desired (P).
envy is wanting (P) what someone else has (N).
selfishness is wanting something (P), while hurting others (N).
jealousy is a form of selfishness or faulty assessment (N and P).
ambition is excessive desire (N) for power (P).

On the above model, one cannot, without an overriding desire, without contradiction, desire negative things such as anger, apathy, hatred, desirelessness, enemies, or failure. 'Desire is always more or less pleasurable'.[17]

Greed, coveting, yearning, pining, impatience, obsession are by definition negative emotions and are not to be confused with desires. Those who wish to reject desire may be confusing it with these negative emotions.

Lack of fulfilment of desire does not make the desire and desiring less positive. Desires are satisfying whether or not there is a final satisfaction. If unfulfilled, it is not rational to be disappointed. Disappointment is based on the faulty expectation of thinking that everything will always turn out well.

Desires are neither demands nor needs. On the emotional level, needs are excessive desires. On the descriptive level, they are scientific laws (hypotheses), such as, 'In order to live, one *must* have water'. No one needs to live. Some desire to, others enlist.

In sum, if a negative emotion occurs in connection with desire, it is not appropriate to implicate the desire, but rather to cope independently with the concomitant negative emotion. By definition, one cannot have negative desires. Desire includes the notion of alternative possibilities as much as does the notion of future itself.

THE DEATH OF DESIRE : SCHOPENHAUER

> Every desire springs from a need, a want, a suffering, and that every satisfaction is therefore only a pain removed not a positive happiness brought.[18]

If a desire is a 'want' or 'need' (strong desire), the sentence is circular; and to say a satisfaction is a 'pain removed', an irony.

By their negative assessments, pessimists create their own negative emotions. By a perverse rhetoric, Schopenhauer appears to regard possibility as failure, desire as suffering a lack, fulfilled desire as boredom, blocked desire as frustration, happiness as an 'apprehension about misfortune,'[19] pleasure as absence of pain, the best poetry as tragedy, and the only perfectly satisfied desire is obtained by 'extinguishing' both desire itself and individual consciousness, [*nirvāṇa* (Sanskrit): extinguishing]. We must put out the flame of desire. 'Most miserable is the desire that's glorious'.[20] And certainly Schopenhauer is right. If we see the world as suffering, it is and becomes suffering, because we create our own emotions by our own assessments.

But his logic is curious. If I wish to save a) myself, b) my consciousness, c) the thinking, speaking and feeling which is what is meant by being alive and human, I can only have them if I 'extinguish' them. Light is to be shed by extinguishing the candle. Where does the light go when the light goes out?

It is a perverse circularity (*Teufelskreis*) to say that desire is a lack. Certainly, if we desire an object, we do not already have it. We do not seek to possess that which we already own. On the cognitive analysis given

earlier, desire was seen to be a positive emotion. We cherish and enjoy our desires. There is no life without desire. The attempt to obliterate desires only serves to show how important they are. As desires, they are not illusions or even failures in the long run. We suffer 'pain'; we do not 'suffer' desire. If desire is suffering, it is by definition no longer desire.[21] Though without benefit of a theory of emotion, Soll argues against the rejection of desire, observing that we would not want a world in which we had no interests or desires and nothing to look forward to.[22]

Although Schopenhauer claims not to have understood the Pandora myth,[23] it is relevant because it symbolizes the contradictions of desire; how one can still have hope, or the salvation or hope of calmness and satisfaction when all the tantalizing desires are released. Pandora is deadly delightful, beautifully evil, *beau mal, femme fatale,* with a mysterious dowry of vice with hope, suffering with desire.[24] We may call this 'Pandora's Paradox.'

Schopenhauer did not see that: a) negative emotions are caused by our own faulty assessments, b) they are not necessary, and c) positive emotions may be created by us. Wherever any negative emotion occurs, it is due to faulty thinking. Thus, suffering is not necessary. However, in his solution to the problem of suffering, he does hold a form of Kantian cognitive theory (see later section on 'Metadesire').

It is optimistic for pessimists to think that if anything can go wrong, it will go wrong. They may well fear that things will go right, and can only hope that they will not. There is, however, a way to guarantee success. If we have no desires, it assures that they will not be fulfilled

'Will' is presented confusingly as irrational, positive and negative desires, the self, inner intuition, action, feeling, etc. It is irrational, like stimulus-response (S-R) with no thought in between. 'Man acts just like a stone falls.'[25] It is totally a blind animal desire ($D \neq (C \rightarrow F)$, $D = A$).

The logic appears to be: if there is no reason, there are no fallacies; if there is no desire, there is no suffering; if there is no self, there is no one to suffer (and no selfishness); if there are no value judgements, nothing can be bad (or good); if there are no goals, one cannot fail-to-achieve-them. One can only achieve goals one does not have. Desire is the disease, and the death of desire cures all disease.

On the cognitive theory, emotion and desire are not blind, irrational impulses. It is not S-R, or F→R, but rather S - E - R, or S - (C → F) - R. Stimulus-response theories typically treat human behaviour as if the subject does not speak, (think) or have imagery. The behaviourists' and Pandora's 'black box' of desire between S - ? - R may now be opened. Out of it fly not Schopenhauer's dark desires, but Dewey's rays of hope. We can express our desires (C → F).

Beck makes it clear that although the depressive may not know what causes the depression, it is based on a clear syndrome of prior negative

assessments. To 'fall in love' or 'out of love,' is not just a sudden feeling, but based upon prior cognitions.[26]

The syndrome of Schopenhauer's philosophy may be compared with that of anxiety. The word-field of anxiety (Bergenholtz, 1980) indicates that it consists of:

i) apprehension; future events are seen as threatening and are negatively assessed,
ii) avoidance; dread, for example, is the extreme fear of, and reluctance to face, future events,
iii) self-preoccupation; mulling, brooding, negative evaluations resulting in self-pity and depression. (cf. Soll, 1989, on Schopenhauer's negative personality).
iv) lack of courage; a faulty or statistically unsound fear of failure or danger,
v) doubt; not accepting what is, or what is true, or even the possibility that something (good) could be true. This creates mistrust of people and distrust in the reliability of things. If something can go wrong, it will go wrong.
vi) demand for certainty; fear of any pain is so unbearable that there is a quest for absolute certainty and perfectionism to eliminate it. (Schopenhauer argues that no satisfaction is acceptable unless it lasts forever[27]). Even rationality, because arguments can go both ways, may be denied in order to achieve absolute certainty. There is a demand for absolute knowledge where absolute knowledge cannot be had;
vii) there is doubt which does not involve wonder, questioning and excitement, but rather a disturbing doubt that the worst will happen. It is not hope which is the anticipation of possible pleasure. 'Hopeful anxiety' is an oxymoron;
viii) there is wavering between decisions because either choice can possibly be wrong;
ix) fixed ideas; there is a self-justificatory, absolute and fixed belief system;
x) fear;
xi) inferiority (or superiority based on inferiority);
xii) pessimism;
xiii) phobia;
xiv) worry;
xv) desire; one desires too much and cannot accept not obtaining what is desired;
xvi) depression.

Not all of the above elements fit all cases.

The DSM-*III-R*[28] classification of anxiety reflects these characteristics. A few types are:

313 Overanxious Disorder. Involves excessive anxiety or worry, especially about future events.
300.02 Generalized Anxiety Disorder. Unrealistic anxiety and worry.
309.89 Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. One re-experiences a traumatic event with intense fear and helplessness.
301.40 Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder. Obsessives think they must be perfect, avoid all criticism, and will be severely punished for their imperfections.

There is a similar symptomatology of anxiety in Schopenhauer's pessimistic philosophy. Schopenhauer's personality has been characterized by Safranski[29] in words such as the following: universal hostility, misery of life, boredom, ironical and grumpy, inferiority, surliness, humiliation, expects the worst, excludes love and friendship, withdrawal, etc. He claimed that all people of superior eminence are melancholic. Was his philosophy in some part a working out of his anxiety? Schopenhauer's solution to Pandora's Paradox will be discussed subsequently under the topic, 'Metadesire'. In any case, the theoretical and clinical literature on the cognitive theory of emotion makes it clear that anxiety and pessimism can be treated.

LIFE AFTER DESIRE: BUDDHISM

We are on fire with desires. They show a lack, frustration and disappointment. Ambition, jealousy, etc., are born of ignorance. Cicero said, 'Nothing for which you do not yearn troubles you'.[30] Instead of trying to constantly fulfil our desires, we should eliminate them. We may compare this with the following:

If we do not marry, there is no divorce.
If we accept our illness, it needs no cure.
If people do not try, they cannot fail.
If we cannot fail, we cannot succeed.
If we do not enter the race, we cannot lose.
If we do not love, love cannot be lost.

But if negative emotions are eliminated in this way, so also are positive emotions. For e.g. rehabilitation by capital punishment has never worked. We do not risk disappointment, but we also do not risk happiness. To not desire is to not make value judgements. Nothing is bad or wrong anymore. But nothing is good or right either.

An expansion of this dualistic view would yield:

We cannot have (1):	*Because we cannot have* (2):	(1):	(2):
anxiety	composure	hate	love
apathy	passion	hostility	friendliness

avarice (greed)	desire	humourlessness	humour
aversion	desire	insecurity	security
boredom	excitement	irrationality	rationality
depression	joy	jealousy	selflessness (altruism)
disappointment	satisfaction		
disinterest	interest	panic	composure
dislike	like	pessimism	optimism
disrespectfulness	respectfulness	pain	pleasure
dissatisfaction	satisfaction	revenge	mercy
envy	selflessness	sadness	happiness
	(altruism)	selfishness	selflessness
fear	fearlessness		

If all human desires are eliminated, the following questions arise: a) How can the Buddha be passionate? b) How can the surrender of desires lead to composure and joy? c) How can human consciousness and experience remain? d) Do supernatural and surrealistic desires replace human desires? This is to give supernatural substitutions for 'good' (cf. section 8(d), on ideas which form the basis of irrational desire).

The elimination of human emotions could not produce apathy because apathy is also an emotion. How can the elimination of desire lead to joy? Positive emotions are brought back in a new form. They are brought back by not being brought back. A paradox is created. How can we achieve our desires without achieving them? Oxymora can represent the conflict:

To deny desires is not to deny desires.
Do not seek and you will find.
Give up desires so they may be fulfilled.
Desires can be achieved if one has none.

How can there be values without values? One way is by action. The meaning of life is to live. No value judgements are needed. No dualistic distinctions. D = A. Joy is not a goal but a quality of life. Every (selfless?) action is a nail in the coffin of desire.

Buddhists claim to cultivate compassion, joy, friendliness, and equanimity. But not if desired. These positive emotions seem to be guaranteed by surrealistic or supernatural means. 'Compassion' replaces compassion. 'Desire' replaces desire. By regarding desire as action, we can comprehend the Zen sayings:

'Only when seeing is no-seeing is there real Zen'.

'Since there is no gate, let me tell you how to pass through it'.

'What is Tao? Ordinary mind is Tao'.

Monk: 'What is the fundamental teaching of Buddha?'
Master: 'Is there enough breeze in this fan to keep me cool?'

Monk:	'Please instruct me in Zen'.
Master:	'Have you had your breakfast yet, or not'?
Monk:	'Yes, master, I have'.
Master:	'If so, wash your dishes'.

RATIONAL DESIRE: JOHN DEWEY

Any supernaturalism or essentialism is eliminated by Dewey.[31] On his pragmatic theory, desire does not mechanistically and in a Humean way cause action ($D \rightarrow A$). Desire is action ($D = A$) or (D includes A). It is a kind of 'executed insight'.[32] 'To desire is to show one's desire'.[33] 'Value is a verb, not a noun'.[34] Neither feelings, emotions, nor desires cause action. Desire includes the action or effort, the belief and the value cognition. D includes both B and A. $D = B + C + F + A$. This is the case in ordinary language. Emotive terms refer to a cognition, feeling, action and situation; for example, violent rage. Desire may, for practical purposes, be treated as: $B\ (C \rightarrow F) \rightarrow D\ (C \rightarrow F)\ CC \rightarrow A$.

Marks even speaks of 'belief desire' as one word and one thing.[35] Dewey treats all of the constituents of desire as relational aspects or functions rather than separate, atomistic entities.

On the cognitive theory, although emotive words often include actions in their meanings, an emotion is not an action. William James holds that emotion is the feeling of bodily changes. But because perception of the object and awareness of the feeling involve cognitive assessments, he has a covert cognitive theory of emotion ($\text{perception} \rightarrow F) = [(C \rightarrow F) \rightarrow F]$. Seeing involves the cognition of seeing something as something; 'seeing as'.[36] For Dewey, even appetitive desires are 'reason-laden'.[37]

Dewey's naturalistic theory of values clarifies the cognitive evaluation component of desire. Values are based upon bringing about our wants (ends-in-view) on the basis of inquiry and knowledge of consequences. Ethics is reduced to a factual statement. 'The "ought" always arises from and falls back into the "is", and (secondly) that the "ought" is itself an "is"—the "is" of action.'[38]

Nothing is right or wrong in itself. Nothing is desirable in itself. Each individual must determine which ends or goals to seek: 'There is nothing more divine or transcendental in resolving how to save my degraded neighbour than in the resolving of a problem in algebra. . . .'[39] But after inquiry, adequate holistic priorities are attained.

Thus, rational desires are based on inquiry, and irrational desires are based on dogma, superstition, and faulty thinking. Dewey's ethics can provide a naturalistic grounding for the cognitive theory of desire.

When value terms are based on humanistic facts, good may reduce to truth and, in this sense, what is desired (interesting, beautiful) is true, and what is not true is not desired. 'In night' quoth she, 'desire sees best of all'.[40]

Rational emotion is based on well-founded assessments, which then produce positive bodily feelings. An ordered society gives, as Hobbes once said about the social contract, a 'feeling' of being civilized. Love, a form of desire, which is without negative emotions and is based upon honest, open communication and rationality, can produce the emotion of 'rational love'. It is not an oxymoron. It can be more enduring and passionate than romantic love with its false idealizations and therefore disappointments. Schopenhauer's desire, as a lack, becomes a lack of a positive, well-grounded desire.

THE PASSIONATE STOICS

Sextus Empiricus, the sceptic, held that we should suspend all judgement beyond immediate experience, not judge if things are good or bad. As desire includes value judgement, this would eliminate desire. On his views, no strong feelings should accompany any belief, for all arguments are equally probable. The goal in argumentation was to attain happiness or unperturbedness (*ataraxia*). This is happiness in action, and satisfaction of one's physical needs.

Gould states that the Stoics, Zeno of Citium, and Chrysippus held that all emotions and all desires are bad.[41] But this should apply only to negative emotions. The latter are false judgements.[42] This coheres with the cognitive theory of emotion.

It was argued earlier that, in addition to desires, beliefs are also emotions. For the Stoics also, all judgements involve emotion. ($D = E$) ($B = E$). All judgements are seen as changes in personality. (Wittgenstein also sees philosophy as therapy.) We do not first judge, then feel the effect; rather F is part of C. There is no purely emotionless intellect.[43] In the healthy state, correct judgements are emotions.[44]

It would follow that, if all emotions are removed and all judgements are emotions, then all judgements should be removed as well. This is, however, not the case.

The position of Aurelius is not that we should have no emotions or desires at all and be passionless; rather, he opposes violent excitement[45] (an oxymoron). He encourages cheerfulness and humour.[46] Do every act of your life as if it were your last.[47] Have 'good emotions,'[48] and 'happiness'.[49]

The Stoics advocated only the removal of negative desires and emotions. Rational judgements produce positive emotions, for e.g., happiness (*eudaemonia*). Rist argues that the Stoics did not advocate apathy.[50] In the cognitive theory, apathy is a negative emotion. For the Stoics, it means 'without disturbance'. The wise person experiences the joy, happiness and even exhilaration which comes from living a rational life in accordance with nature.[51] In a healthy state, correct cognitions are identical with positive emotions.[52] Rist argues that they produce 'rational feelings'[53]

only 'the picture-book Stoic wise man is devoid of passions'.[54] Gould gives us such a storybook picture: For Zeno, 'all emotions are bad.'[55]

And Rist in his book *Stoic Philosophy* says, 'Anyone who seeks *apatheia*, in the sense of total elimination of all feeling and emotion, is asking for a state when all activities, even mental activities, are suspended. Such a state would be equivalent to death'.[56]

METADESIRE

The assessment one has of desire itself produces an emotion. It is a stance towards desire itself, a metaemotion, a desire or emotion regarding desire (E or D or C regarding D). We can have desire while eliminating desire by creating new metadesires. Pandora's Paradox of how we can let free troublesome desires and still have hope is resolved. Hope is a newly created metadesire.

Theories of desire themselves produce new emotions of desire. This is the case with each of the philosophies discussed. Dewey and the Stoics create enlightened rational desire as well as 'undesirable desire'.[57] Buddhism creates a surreal, supernaturalistic, nondualistic emotion of 'no-desire' or 'awakening'.

Schopenhauer, on one level, creates desirephobia and anxiety. In what he regards as the most important part of this work, he says we can achieve satisfaction (calmness, serenity, salvation) by the following:

1. realizing that we cause our own suffering by our desiring (in Kantian fashion);
2. realizing that our everyday desires cannot be fulfilled;
3. resignation;
4. rejecting the self and selfishness for a oneness with other (s) (Monism). In sum, desire is overcome by reflection about desire; by metadesire.

The new desire becomes a Platonic Desire of eternal ideas removed and distanced from life. Through art, one supposedly transcends the individual into a world of non-individual eternal desire; a higher, aesthetic desire in a changeless world. This quest for, and creation of certainty was earlier seen to be part of Schopenhauer's symptomatology. In another sense, desire becomes for him the recognition of unity of life and all living things. An egoistic pessimism passes by means of understanding into some kind of altruistic emotion of compassion.

CONCLUSION

We have, for our purposes, come to the end of our discussion on desire. But the model, the story, could have been told differently. The cognitive theory is not intended to be an essentialistic or absolutistic model. It is not just a philosophical theory, but is pragmatic with a firm basis in

clinical practice in the form of rational-emotive therapy, with extensive supporting experimental research. It avoids mentalism by reducing cognition (thought, will, belief) to self-talk and utterance, and reveals the relationship between value and emotion which have previously been confused in the analysis of desire. Old paradoxes become resolved, and new problems arise for those who desire to solve them. There is much still to be learned about desire.

Marks wrote, 'What we *say* about desire—the theory which develops—will be decisive for the very existence of desire.'[58] 'Perhaps this very book is about the use of a word and not about a unified "thing" at all'.[59]

Desire needs to be further analysed in terms of its specific rhetoric and language-games. Additional analysis needs to be given of the various sentences used to 'express' desire. The theoretical cognitive analysis is not the whole story.

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Culture and Cultures

G.C. PANDE
Allahabad, U.P.

There are three major approaches to culture, which may be called the scientific, the historical and the metaphysical. The scientific approach is essentially modern and is exemplified by the social sciences, especially anthropology and sociology of the mind. The historical approach is both modern and traditional depending on the conception of history one has in mind. The metaphysical approach is essentially traditional and has two varieties. One of these identifies metaphysical or transempirical truth with the systematic content of orthodoxy. The other identifies it with the content of mystical revelation or intuition.

It is this last approach which seems to me to be the nearest to culture which would then be essentially nothing but the tradition of *philosophia perennis, sanātana dharma* or *āryamārga*, a universal and perennial but occult tradition of wisdom (*āmnāya, vidyā)* which has been diversely interpreted and expressed in different symbolic traditions (*āgama*) of value- seeking (*puruṣārtha–sādhanā, arya-paryeṣaṇā)* embodied in historically given societies or civilizations.[1] This would immediately appear to be open to many objections. Anthropologists, sociologists of culture, and historians of civilizations are apt to find this use of culture, somewhat Pickwickian. Most modern philosophers and Western specialists of comparative religion as well as traditional theologians generally, would find the idea of a universal and perennial tradition of wisdom, which is not to be identified with any of the historical traditions of religion and morality, as unwarranted and in fact without substance. That historic civilizations are rooted in inner spiritual culture would appear to be an unprovable supposition. That their religious and moral culture is a particular reflection of a universal tradition of wisdom, would appear, if possible, even more speculative.

Before turning to details I would like to give a general reply to such objections. The idea of an occult tradition of wisdom accessible to earnest seekers anywhere is an idea which has been endorsed by many spiritual masters. It seems to me to correspond to the needs of human spiritual seeking and to offer a plausible explanation of the parallelisms between diverse historical traditions. One of the lessons frequently drawn from a genuine study of the history of ideas and cultures is that of

the relativity of dominant intellectual perspectives to organized social practice including institutionalized values. Underlying this overt structure of culture may be discerned a much vaguer but nonetheless significant outline of what has been popularly called a philosophy of life or *Weltanschauung*. As an operative idea of life as a whole it enters into the making and working of institutions. As faith it guides the individual person's quest for what is right and authentic, what constitutes excellence and the ultimate good. As a fragmentary glimpse of cosmology and anthropology, a metaphysic, essential but without formal definitions and system, it functions as the matrix of fundamental suppositions for the thinkers of the age. This basic faith or *Weltanschauung* itself springs from an intuitive vision or revelation of an essentially spiritual character which is inseparable from *praxis* and being expressed symbolically enters into the social tradition. Vision (*vidyā*), *praxis* (*sādhanā*), tradition (*āgama*), structure of norms and principles of practice (*dharma* and *nīti*) constitute the underlying basis of a culture or a distinctive macro-society.[2]

Turning to the initial semantic question it needs to be noted that the use of 'culture' is itself culture-relative and its understanding depends essentially on intersubjective communication. Without going into the controversies over word and meaning, I would like to premise that the origin of language lies in the expressiveness of consciousness and that meanings are neither real objects nor mere usage but contextual constructs, a means of constructing structures of interrelated objects and subjects: while dealing with the experience of reality in diverse ways. It would be necessary to distinguish the type of context in which a word is used to determine its meaning. There is the commonsense use of plain words like 'yellow' or 'tree' referring to physical objects. The context may be described as the practical-cognitive context of interaction between man and the natural world observed in sensory experience. The dictionary meaning of such words is definite enough and the nature of the classes of objects to which they refer is a matter which may be determined by empirical research. Although such words are used by common people and the specialists alike, the latter know more about the nature of what is meant. The painter and the student of optics, the gardener and botanist clearly know more about the nature of what is meant by 'yellow' or 'tree'. Such words are primarily constructive devices to recognize, identify and demarcate classes or subclasses of sensory objects. The meanings of such words thus are definitely ascertainable and communicable though they are connected with an area of growing and corrigible empirical knowledge.

Such names as 'Rāma' or 'Kṛṣṇa' are on a quite different footing from class words since they not only refer to some particular, demarcated from all other members of its class, but to an entity which is the sole example of its identity. Names cannot be translated and, what is more, someone must give a name. Indeed, a name in this sense can properly belong only

to a sentient being who recognizes it, though by extension one might even name what belongs to such a being. In the case of class words, the knowledge of their meaning begins with acquaintance but progresses in terms of descriptions based on empirical investigation. 'This is that', or '*Nīloyam*' is the paradigmatic case of the use of the common descriptive language which is the tool of practical-cognitive activity classifying empirical objects as part of man's interaction with the natural world. In the case of names, however, one might recognize what is named through the description of some 'accidental' property but it is through a growing acquaintance that one might learn to truly recognize the meaning of the name where sense and reference coincide. 'I am I' is the paradigmatic case of naming which belongs to the evocative language of personal affective relationship. '*Sumirat nāma rūpa binudekhe āvat hṛdaya saneha bisekhe*'.

Definitional words like 'circle' and 'atom' belong to a technical and abstract part of the pragmatic-descriptive language, a part which may be said to be theoretical-speculative. While the meanings of such words depend on the definitions, the definitions themselves need to conform to the natures of the objects meant which are discovered in the process of seeking to know natural objects better. While the ontological status of the objects meant by definitional words lacks the contingent actuality of natural objects, it has a necessary aspect which is yet relative to some specific context of abstraction. These meanings too are definitely communicable and tend to be alike in similar contexts interculturally.

In contrast to these uses where words refer to physical or ideal objects which may be apprehended perceptually or logically, words like 'epic' or 'gentleman' appear to have only a conventional meaning which may be apprehended only as items within some particular world of opinion. The conventional nature of the force of such words, however, does not mean that the conventions are arbitrary. They are often expressive of some intersubjectively recognized sense of psychic reality or its modes and attitudes, aesthetic, moral or religious. The emphatically conventional characteristics of the signification of such words merely reflects the need of intersubjective attestation in the apprehension of their meanings which are neither purely objective nor purely subjective. The objects meant are inaccessible to mere sense perception or mere logical abstraction or mere subjective feeling, like language itself. They are subjective-objective modes of collective self-consciousness. Their obvious context is that of man's awareness of other selves or persons or of a larger self or consciousness and of the attitudes, relations and forms emerging in the process. It is the context of being, knowing and expressing oneself as associated with others.

This classification of words and meanings in terms of their basic context includes a fundamental division into two classes. There are words describing perceptual or logical objects in a practical or cognitive

situation, or words expressing the self-exploration of the intersubjective consciousness of a society. We have thus a class of meanings which could be called inter-cultural constants. These are meanings given to consciousness objectively. Words signifying them in different languages and cultures are, in principle, more or less exactly translatable in specific practical or scientific contexts. On the other hand, there are meanings which are clearly accessible only in social self-consciousness. The corresponding words differ in different cultures and their meanings too are nebulous and variable. No strict parallels or equivalents for these can be found. 'Culture' itself is one such word. All cultures have their own reflective notions about what they are or ought to be, i.e., they have their own notion of 'culture' which comprises a general view of the nature, condition, ideals and means of human life, the proper way of being human.

Although the distinction of nature and nurture, of man's biological and social heritage is an ancient and universal one and is perceived inevitably in the task of bringing up children and governing men, this distinction was generally seen earlier in terms of education, tradition and law which were regarded as of universal and perennial validity despite the fact that those societies were perfectly aware of the fact that their norms and values did not hold beyond their borders. They tended to dismiss the outsiders as barbarians, identifying their particular civilizations with civilization in general. Men were regarded as properly belonging to the State governed by law and nurtured and disciplined by an educational and moral tradition. They were expected to live by performing their duties and pursuing the good within the frame-work of the social tradition. It is this sense of a traditionally given stable and worthy order which was the counterpart of 'culture' in ancient civilizations.

The traditional notion of culture, thus, was that of the refinement or *re-formation* of human nature in a broad sense. It would be noticed that there are three obvious and interconnected dimensions of 'culture' in this sense. There is first the process of improvement (*saṃskāra* or *bhāvanā* or *sādhanā*) effected in man as an individual.[3] In the second place, culture would have the sense of an objective order of rules, goals and symbols belonging to a specific society of men, which impels and guides this transformation of the individual,[4] and lastly there is the historical tradition of that society and of mankind in general within which the specific socio-cultural order subsists as a changing form or structure.[5]

It may be pertinent to remark here that apart from this most general sense of culture as developmental re-formation which distinguishes it from nature, there is another well-known, though a narrower and stricter sense of culture which distinguishes it from society. In this stricter sense culture refers to the ensemble of such activities as language and learning, art and literature, religion and morality, science and philosophy.[6] What is common to these activities? They have been characterized as symbolic

or symbolic-expressive. If the idea is that they use symbols, then there is hardly any social activity which does not. If the idea is that they consist solely in the use of symbols, then it is plainly false because many of the above mentioned cultural divisions include practical and cognitive activities which go beyond mere symbolism. While art and literature could be characterized as symbolic-expressive, such a characterization would be quite inadequate for religion or morality. The distinction between the social and the cultural could perhaps be more adequately described in terms of the goals pursued in them. Society is organized around the pursuit of particular and urgent but often competitive interests through practical action and gestures. Cultural *praxis* aims at realizing ideal goals or values. Their pursuit is perfectionist, their empirical-social subject is at least ideally liberated and transfigured.[7]

It would seem, thus, that the meaning of culture as the transformation of nature ranges over many levels. It includes the transformation of a natural being into a social being working for the particular interest of ego and the group with which it identifies itself. It also includes the transformation of a social being who identifies himself by social roles (*Varṇāśramādyabhimāna*) into a spiritual being who identifies himself with self-conscious being in its autonomy seeking absolute values. Instinct and social activity (*pravṛtti* and *vyavahāra*), social ethics and rational policy (*dharma* and *nīti*), spiritual *praxis* and wisdom (*adhyātma-sādhanā* and *vidyā*), cognitive and creative activity (*vijñāna* and *śilpa* or *kāvya*) are distinctions which have been differently defined and understood in different traditions. Just as man develops a sense of his subjective identity and projects an image of his personality, so he also recognizes the unity of the human world within which he lives and acts. An intersubjective consciousness in various degrees tends to come about in any society about its identity and its underlying unifying principles. While both the individual and society may be subject to false consciousness, it may still be stated that the sense of culture is the sense of excellence or value in the self and the recognition of an overarching and distinctive unity in the ways of perceiving and doing things *appropriately* in a society.

The current concepts of 'society' and 'culture', 'historic civilization' and 'evolution', 'political revolution' and 'economic development' are hardly two centuries old as are the sciences of sociology and economics, anthropology and psychology. Not only is the concept of culture so called modern, it is intimately bound up with the notion of modernity. The new sciences view the human tradition not as static or superhumanly ordained or as universal but as a historically evolving particular and multiple product of human creativity and labour. The modern views of society and culture have emerged in response to the awareness of the vast revolutionary change through which man is passing as a result of his own effort aided by scientific knowledge and technology.

The concept of culture in the modern sciences is the concept of the

form of behaviour in its totality in a society[8] or of its symbolic-expressive aspect. As behavioural form, culture is an empirical social fact which, it is expected, might one day be fully explained scientifically.[9] Being determined by sufficient social causes, cultures vary in different societies and thus their scientific understanding has to be deterministic, relativistic and pluralistic. Although generally conceived as branches of positive knowledge, the modern sciences subscribe to a philosophy of rational or scientific humanism. They seem to believe that implicit in the nature of man is the ideal of a universal culture based on rationality, science, technology, and humanistic values which have been generally interpreted as freedom and creativity, equality and justice, welfare, progress and peace.

These two ideas, the unity of human nature and the ideal of culture, on the one hand, and the multiform plurality of actually given cultures need to be reconciled by some pervasive principle. Modern social sciences attempt it through the ideas of evolution, development and progress. Thus, prehistoric cultures are regarded as primitive and the history of civilization as subject to the long-term trend of linear evolution. Human culture, thus, has come of age in the modern West and is now spreading over the globe. This seems to presage the future unity of human cultures in terms of capability and basic social ideals though it does not exclude diversity in the symbolic-expressive area. Western Europe, for example, has a common civilization today but has many different national cultures with different languages, literatures, arts, etc. Similarly the erstwhile Soviet Union expected to create a common socialist society and civilization within which many national cultures would be free to flourish. In India it is officially believed that there is a composite culture of many ethnic, regional, linguistic and religious constituents and yet increasingly it is a modern civilization.

The current view, thus, is that an actual multiplicity of cultures is due to the diversity of developmental and evolutionary as well as ethnic and historical conditions. The ideals of individual, ethnic, and national freedom not only make this cultural plurality acceptable but also desirable. On the other hand, the ideal of development and progress as well as the need for world peace require the idea of a single world culture. Between the ideas of cultural pluralism and world culture there is a manifest tension. Culture as creatively rooted in freedom posits pluralism as an expectation as well as a value. On the other hand, culture as rationality and capability posits universality. The two dimensions of culture are united by the assumption that a socio-economic order based on techno-scientific capability provides the best means of maximizing the freedom of life-styles consistent with the requirements of social justice and the limitations of social choice.

It may certainly be possible to alleviate specific wants and wrongs afflicting specific persons or groups but will it be feasible to alleviate the

wants and sufferings of all persons and groups? Apart from the fact of conflicting interests in a world of scarce goods and limited possibilities, it would be highly unrealistic to think of the *demos* as a homogeneous set of equal numbers, and national interests would in any case claim priority over the interests of outsiders. Can '*Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam*' be practised without practising *ākincanya*? Has the concept of maximizing satisfaction any concrete meaning outside 'rational' economic activity? Can pleasures be compared, at least interpersonally, and summed up? Can pleasure and duty be compared? Can utility be the sole objective of economic, let alone ethical action? Can values such as personality and freedom, equality and justice, love and compassion be reduced to calculable interest satisfaction? Can they be given any adequate and constant objective content?

It is unnecessary to go on with such criticism which has been made before. Culture, it may be recalled, has a dual meaning. It signifies the rational pursuit of security and satisfaction as well as of ideal values. Traditionally the former was regarded as a necessity or concession, the latter the true meaning of culture. It was believed that it is the elite (*adhikārī, sréṣṭha*) that are privileged to participate in culture which is a stable, perennial and universal order. The differences in the actual cultures of different societies, in their laws and customs or beliefs and arts were not regarded as contradicting the unity and universality of culture which is an ideal order recognized by the elite to whom its tradition is accessible, not a mere contingent and variable social actuality. In the modern view, however, the ideal of culture is only the limiting conception of the rational development of cultures. The emphasis is not on an old and given tradition propagated by seers and sages, philosophers and prophets which requires men to believe and act as ordained by it patiently and dutifully since their highest fulfilment does not lie within their mortal career. The emphasis now is on creating and changing the tradition so that men may discover new means of fulfilling themselves on earth.

The foundational assumption underlying this view is that the only valid means of knowing anything originally available to man are, sense-perception and reasoning. So the history of modern thought began with the waning of faith, the rise of scepticism and the attempts to formulate the methodologies of knowledge. Humanism and a secular view of life were the inevitable products of this rational outlook which came to be well established between the Renaissance and the *Aufklarung*. All three continue to be the basic assumptions of the modern sciences of culture which were inspired by the spectacular success of the application of logical and experimental methods of investigations to nature in the 19th century. During the last two centuries the social sciences, or rather the *Geisteswissenschaften* have discussed man, society and culture in their diverse branches and schools divided by methodological as well as

ideological disputes. But whether it is the positivism of Comte and Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, or the scientific and historical humanism of Marx and Weber, or the philosophical anthropology of the Critical School, the basic assumption of a scientific rationalist, humanist and secular view of life pervades all of them. These assumptions are not themselves scientifically demonstrable or philosophically necessary for scientific research. They seem to be of the nature of faith defining modernity itself even though they are described as articles of Critical Reason constitutive of any genuine, scientific understanding of culture. Although like the traditional views, the modern view is itself a particular, culture-experiential meaning-construct, it arrogates to itself the status of a universal scientific doctrine.

Now it is unquestioned that the use of logical methods is necessary in all cognitive enterprise but is it true that the knowledge of all real objects must begin with sensation? Is it necessary to regard the positivistic assumption of natural science methodology as valid for the human or social sciences? For example, the study of psychic reality simply through bodily behaviour cannot be said to go much beyond physiological or psychosomatic studies, nor can it unravel the mysteries of the mind such as is claimed for Yoga. Perhaps it could be argued that modern psychology begins by denying the distinct or independent reality of the mind. Even if the mind were not independent of the body, its awareness as a distinct reality is common to all mankind. Reductionism or indirect causal correlations, in any case, do not further the understanding of the mind in its distinctness or freedom. That the only means of knowledge are sense perception and inference or that all reality must be material are alternative expressions of the same idea which is no more than a highly disputable and implausible philosophy. My knowledge of my thoughts or the positivist philosopher's knowledge of his own philosophy are not the objects of anyone's sensory perception and consequently of any inference because the association of the imperceptible with the perceptible is not itself perceptible. Thus to seek to reduce the human person to an easily misunderstood construct of his bodily behaviour, seems to miss the most obvious fact about him which is his immediate self-consciousness, his being as being-for-self. The human person knows himself immediately and indubitably as the subject of experience. What he thinks of himself as an object is variable and constructed and sometimes, if not always, demonstrably false. What is contended, therefore, is not that there cannot be a science of man; but that such a science cannot be a positive science of behaviour.

Culture has been defined as '*nothing but* an abstraction from or for behaviour'.[10] Now the idea of abstraction implies a loss of reality only on nominalistic assumptions. As a matter of fact, logical abstraction cannot be arbitrary but must be based on the recognition of form in the objects of perception. It must also be remembered that all intelligible forms do

not have corresponding physical forms. For example, the temporal form of past, present and future cannot be represented spatially. In fact, the autonomy of forms as intelligible essences has been argued by philosophers from Plato to Husserl. Acute empiricists familiar with mathematics have been puzzled over the derivation of universals from empirical particulars and have had to resort to the illusively abbreviating role of language or symbolic systems. Nor can poetic images be rendered physically. The moon-face is an imaginatively felt form but cannot be represented physically. Ideas, images and symbols, thus, cannot be regarded as being necessarily representations of sensible form. Sensible phenomena, rather, are held together by immaterial forms or systems of relations which are intelligible. It follows that culture as abstracted or symbolic form must be an intelligible form of meanings which cannot be identified fully with behavioural features perceptible in themselves. Nor indeed can human behaviour be understood without reference to meaning and purpose.

The concept of culture as an abstraction from behaviour, thus, signifies not that culture is less real than behaviour but that it is necessary so that behaviour may be intelligible. Culture as abstraction or abstracted form is not an abbreviated or incomplete descriptive schema of real particulars but their idea or standard. It is not an abstract but a concrete universal, the immanent idea or standard of cultural behaviour.

That culture is a form or pattern has been widely held. Anthropologists have sought to describe the total way of life of relatively isolated and stationary, face to face societies with a clear sense of their own identity. Now although different scientific researchers do not have the same theory of culture, they agree on some general features and these imply a certain notion of cultural form too. In general these theories assume man to be a wholly natural creature and the form of his culture to be socially determined and historically evolving. Thus cultural form has to be regarded as an empirical fact constituted by a complex set of inter-related variables dependent on causal-formative processes. Among these processes scientific knowledge, technology and natural environment are given the place of pride, though these factors become operative at any point of time within the parameters provided by organized society itself as a 'reality *sui generis*'.[11]

However, it is the common experience of mankind that the causal determinants of human behaviour include the free will of man. In what man does or makes the idea of the object or the product, again, is an important kind of cause, the formal cause of the effect. And even if final causes are ruled out in nature, they cannot be ruled out in social behaviour which is pervaded by purpose. Freedom and design, meaning and purpose are integral moments of social action of which the forms or patterns cannot be derived merely from the knowledge of the physiological or instinctive nature of man. The drives of hunger or sex do not determine the modes of production and cooking or of marriage and

family, much less the artistic representation or philosophical conception of labour or love. Given a state of science, alternative technologies are possible and the choice between them has to be made on non-technological grounds. Nor does technology uniquely determine the forms of culture as culture or value-seeking. The paintings at Altamira or Ajanta, Sistine Chapel or on the canvas of Picasso belong to vastly different technological ages but these have little demonstrable connection with their aesthetic value or immanent intention.

It may be argued that the growth of science and technology gives man knowledge of his own reality and greater control over the natural environment and thus the ability to realize his own freedom better by rationally fashioning the forms of his culture which would be constituted by the rational adaptation of real and effective means to the genuine ends of man as understood in the light of scientific knowledge. As stated before, culture would then be the rational form of life to be attained progressively. In its archaic and traditional forms, culture was organized around the delusions of myth and ritual, theology and metaphysics and various other kinds of ideologies. Owing to the arbitrariness of speculative fancy, the diversity of environments and the accidentality of history, these cultures exhibited much diversity of forms at the collective level but did not permit much freedom at the individual level. On the other hand, the future culture of the scientific age is bound to display universal rational forms and at the same time permit greater freedom in personal life-styles, a proposal whose attractiveness was mentioned before.

These arguments, however, appear to be extremely simplistic. The increasing power of man over his natural environment has not given him a comparable power over his own social and cultural environment. It has not given him any mastery over himself or any wisdom about the perennial questions of life and death which he cannot avoid asking. It tends to project man as a natural object for which neither consciousness nor death can have any meaning. It obscures the basic question of the authenticity of the form of life by that of its scientific organization in the context of objectifiable ends and means best illustrated in current economic science and policy. The real question about the form of culture relates to its meaningfulness and authenticity, not its efficiency, nor yet to its sheer *facticity* as a causally determinate product.

If one argues over the continuity of nature and culture and the value-neutral character of nature, culture would have to be held as an impossible illusion. How can blind natural forces produce a self-conscious moral being? If they can, can they be really blind, unconscious forces? Whatever the authenticity of the concept of natural evolution for natural species, it does not apply to human societies and culture in time because evolution is supposed to operate through genetic mutation, not acquired social heritage. The evolutionary formation of human cultures is only their historical formation. The question, however, remains—is the result of such a process a consistent form or pattern or merely a conglomeration of heterogeneous elements and processes?

Take, for example, the debris of a burnt down palace buried under the earth, or for that matter, the whole of the human past buried under the earth. The archaeologist needs to identify each part of it separately and seek help from the relevant science in understanding it. The archaeologist doubtless notices diverse characteristic forms in diverse areas of human activity in different ages, tool-forms, ceramic forms, graphic forms, settlement patterns, art forms, etc. He also notices some interconnection between different forms in an age or culture and is thus able to identify, for example, a newly discovered site as Harappan or non-Harappan. But such multifaceted, multi-dimensional forms or identities of historical individuals cannot be reached by any theory since their origin lies in the accidental coming together of numerous, disparate causal streams. The notion of form in the scientific sense is hardly relevant here.

Nevertheless the sense of an overarching form in a cultural epoch or community has often been shared by archaeologists, ethnographers and historians, though there is rarely any precise agreement in their perceptions. What is really perceived is some kind of a suggestive protean unity in a culture which changes but persists despite accidental changes. Thus the family or the worship of gods has persisted over millennia. So many complex structures of such elements have survived for long ages as historic civilizations. The unity of such structures may be derived from the social inter-dependence of those who engage in cultural activity coupled with the dominance of certain ideas and attitudes, which itself has been attributed to the dominance of some social classes or alternatively to the influence of moral, spiritual, or intellectual leaders. This unity or *Zusammenhang* has been sought to be rooted in the patterns of values, a *Weltanschauung* informing the *Zeitgeist*, a cosmology, or the absolute presuppositions of thought, a phase in the realization of the Absolute Idea. On the other hand, it has been attributed to the deterministic influences of the natural environment or the techno-economic substructure of society, or the inherent structuralizing tendency of the human mind.

Such theories which seek to define the nature and source of cultural form fail to reflect that there is a basic difference between two types of unity, subjective and objective. Where the object is not a mere aggregate but a distinct whole, its unity depends on the orderly interrelation of its constituent parts which in the case of actual objects have to be elements in a dynamic causal process. Thin strands of a thick string co-operate to give the latter its strength. Hydrogen and oxygen atoms combine to produce water. Different notes produce a combined melodic effect. The unity of the complex object as a whole is understood in terms of the systematic operation of causal rules discoverable empirically. In the case of ideal objects or abstract creations there is an essential identity or

identity-in-difference between the whole and its parts, and its constituent relations may be in principle fully analysable as in the case of mathematical forms but may not be so in the case of imaginative creations which are not as a matter of fact primarily objective forms but significant forms imaging subjective unity. Although being for the subject is the foundational condition of objectivity itself or any phenomenal unity, the unity of the subject is the unity of self-consciousness. All cultural experience includes not merely a subjective but an intersubjective reference as well as a dimension of valuation. The sense of identification or alienation, appreciation or rejection, a sense of concern for what is significant for the self are pervasive ways of cultural experience, which could be described as an experience of self-realization in some form. Not only can one not tell the dancer from the dance, but the spectator must forget and rediscover himself in the spectacle. The thinker incarnates himself in his thoughts, even the cook would be hurt if his cooking were not treated as representing him appropriately. Genuine participation in culture is a process in which 'the subject is realized, the object idealized'.

It is as an embodied consciousness that man becomes aware of nature as sensible forms in space and time and constructs them as a world with the categories of objectivity as quality and quantity, substance and action. At this level of the understanding of being as Nature, consciousness does not reveal its own subjectivity as a thing apart. Man is only a body, one object among others, subject to its innate drives and laws of motion, of action and reaction. It is only with reflective consciousness that the subjective-objective world of culture can be apprehended. If nature as a world of objects has its being for consciousness, culture has its being for a consciousness which is self-conscious. The apprehension of nature begins when we sense the pressure of an alien reality and it grows into the idea of a regular and invariant order of being constituted by causally operative substances and forces underlying the changing appearances of qualities and quantities in sense perception. The awareness of culture begins with the discrimination of the ideal and the actual, of what is appropriate to the self or authentic and what is merely given or appears forced upon the self. It is the awareness of an ideal order of being which constitutes a worthy end or goal of man's authentic seeking. The ideal is not given or importunate like the actual, limiting human freedom, but is only glimpsed as a possibility though it has its own inner urgency which constitutes the awakening of true freedom since freedom lies in the voluntary choice of ends worthy of realization. Where the bodily instincts are accepted at their face value and reality treated only as means to further instinctive drives, we have only a state of nature. If egoism and instincts are totally uninhibited, we would not have the co-operation necessary for a civil society and in its absence no education, tradition or culture would be possible. If the Hobbesian man with the help of a calculating reason were to build a civil society in which the maximum

satisfaction of the instincts were attempted by utilizing natural resources through positive science and technology, we would have a civilization which being amoral could not be called cultured in any traditionally acceptable sense. If this were considered merely semantic, there is still a deeper question—is such a society or civilization really possible? Love and self-sacrifice, trust and loyalty, compassion and justice, and a disinterested search for knowledge are necessarily required elements in any society and civilization. Even Hobbes had to premise the sanctity of promise and the recognition of mutual interest in a contractual obligation. His civil society has place for virtue as well as for science. The fact is that egoism and hedonism are merely philosophical assumptions seeking to reduce man's social and moral life to a naturalistic psychology. The egoistic-social character of man, his *Ungesellige Geselligkeit*, cannot be understood without reference to his inherent capacity to discriminate right from wrong, sense of duty, higher emotions like love, the use of symbolism and the quest for knowledge. As a moral being, man distinguishes his duty from his interests. In his feelings he distinguishes the higher from the lower emotions. As an intellectual being he distinguishes appearance from reality, error from truth. The discrimination of value from disvalue in different dimensions is, thus, the essential feature of man as a conscious being and is the source of cultural life. Culture is not like Nature, an order of facts and principles indifferent to human consciousness. It is the social expression of a value-seeking, symbolically expressive human self-consciousness. The discriminative-critical character of the consciousness makes its seeking dialectical. At the same time, to seek a value is to progress in an infinite direction, for it is the nature of value to be a standard of perfection which judges all attainments to fall short of the ideal. Thus whereas Nature has no history, culture as value-seeking is inherently historical as it is bound up with a social and symbolic tradition within which its dialectical and 'developmental' process operates.[12]

Value implies seeking, choosing, approving. Something is valued because it is desired and its desiring rationally approved. Owing to this duality no purely naturalistic or purely rationalistic theory of value can be fair to it. Value is neither a mere desire-construct like interest, which is relative to the subject and circumstances, nor a timelessly self-subsistent order of intelligible forms independent of any subject. Desire and feeling give an immediate intimation of value in terms of some particular object or experience while critical reason indicates the imperfect or even erroneous character of such an identification of value. Value-seeking, thus, tends to be a dialectical and progressive process where ideally one moves towards a perfect and infinite realization in which the immediacy of feeling and cognitive certitude would be found together. Such a state would be the unity of being and knowledge, in which the self or consciousness realizes itself fully. 'Human nature exists at many levels,

from the biological to the purely spiritual, seeking self-fulfilment at each level. Consequently the gamut of values extends from self-preservation to mystical communication. Since the lower realizations are only virtual (*aupādhika*), they contain an inherent urge for self-transcendence. From the lower realization of the self in terms of finite accidents (*upādhis*), to their complete transcendence in pure self-experience, the human seeking follows a process of dialectical evolution'.[13]

The dialectic is a self-critical tendency in human consciousness and as the matrix of enlightenment, is latent in empirical consciousness in which its actual finitude is juxtaposed to its notion and aspiration after infinity. It is not necessarily a purely logical dialectic of contradictions nor even a 'spiritual' dialectic of distincts or complementaries. Nor is it a historical dialectic working ideally to ensure a unique, necessary or predictable course of actual happenings or progressing through natural or social conflicts. Nor indeed is there any reason to suppose that there is a unique and perfect dialectical system given eternally in the Absolute Idea for the Idea being a succession of finite determinations is endlessly dialectical and cannot represent the Absolute as a completed system much less reflect self-consciousness as a concrete universal. No logical idea can represent the Absolute which can only be intuited as an imponderable horizon in self-consciousness or value-consciousness. It is this imponderable intuition of the self as value that is the driving force of all cultural *praxis* or *sādhanā*. If there is a pattern laid up in heaven, no adequate account could be given of it as a system of principles because all such accounts would lack logical inevitability and remain open to criticism in terms of a Mādhyamika-like dialectic. The archetypes could of course be ritually symbolized or imitated. There would be alternative systems and none would, in any case, be able to uniquely represent the richness and variation of the experiential pilgrimage of the spirit as actual self-consciousness. Man learns by experience and self-criticism and the dialectic of value-seeking is the dialectic of self-transfiguration through the interaction of vision and *praxis*. It implies not merely a process within a plane of consciousness but a change in the plane of consciousness.

It was mentioned before that value is neither a merely subjective non-cognitive mental attitude nor a purely objective logical idea. It is a mode of self-consciousness which critically seeks authenticity. Now consciousness is the presupposition of all discourse but its essence is self-consciousness, and self-consciousness is the original as well as the paradigmatic case of value-experience. 'All things are loved for the sake of the self' and the self is universally present and undeniable, yet the self is erroneously confused with what it is not. The empirical self is a paradoxical union of the self and the non-self, the subject and the object, in a self-consciousness which is actual in a temporal world of objects and other selves and yet constantly pulled inwards by its own eternal and pure nature. 'Compounded of mutually super-imposed subjectivity and objectivity, human self-consciousness is subjected to contradictory pulls. The true self or authentic being is obscured by inauthentic images and its autonomy is lost in the heteronomy belonging to the representations of Nature. The struggle of authentic and inauthentic self-awareness is, thus, perpetual in human life.'[14] This struggle constitutes the core of the dialectic of value-seeking at all levels, individual, social and cultural, though culture being the tradition of value-seeking enshrined in symbols has also the role of guiding men individually and collectively by communicating the vision of the ideal and the tested ways of *praxis*. All *praxis* is designed to subordinate or sacrifice the lower to the higher so that the object to be used by the ego and the ego itself are offered to and become the vehicle of a higher consciousness. In so far as the lower is used to reveal the higher, it may be said to assume the character of a symbol. To seize this immediate symbolism and give it an external form within a process of communication, constitutes the birth of a tradition which subsists and grows by way of an educational process. The primary origins of a cultural tradition, thus, lie in the revelation or discovery of new meanings in phenomena given at various levels, a process which begins in individual psyche but enters social tradition creatively as a symbol.

From human self-consciousness springs the dialectical quest of value which is symbolically expressed and communicated within an inter-subjective world and as an educational tradition constitutes culture. But although conceptually autonomous, culture is in fact found embedded in the life of historical communities in space and time even as consciousness is found actualized, and individuated by human bodies and educatively formed by a social tradition. The dim spark of consciousness manifested through the human body needs to be nurtured by tradition speaking through signs and words even as the body needs to be nourished and trained through personal care and food. One may thus speak of the social body of a culture and call culturally animated societies civilizations. The social body enables the survival of men and traditions, culture gives it identity and character.

Civilization is sometimes understood as a developed state of culture, sometimes as a culture with emphasis on its material values. It may, however, be considered as the order of means which gives power to a society. A society is recognized by institutionalized cooperation and civilization by collective achievements of quality and power. Culture as a pervasive moral order binds society and civilization and gives them a characteristic identity and direction. Whether it is the order of immediate-affective relations as in a family or the cooperative and *quid pro quo* relations of the techno-economic order, or the legal-political order backed by force, the moral order is pervasive. Without an immediately felt but objectively recognized coherent order of duties and obligations, no society or civilization can even survive, let alone develop. This moral order presupposes the formulation of the vision of the good into a path

of *praxis* leading up to it. Alternatively one could speak of the institutional structure of a society or civilization as based on a system of values and the values themselves as preferred ends and means resting on faith and knowledge. It is as moral faith (which mediates between vision and *praxis*) that culture animates society and civilization. The three, however, are only conceptually distinct, these cannot be found separately in reality. Cultures, in short, are moral traditions interpreting the vision of the good in characteristically diverse ways owing to their being embedded in historical societies or civilizations. But how are cultures recognized and identified?

While the identity of a natural phenomenon is independent of its recognition, the same cannot be said of a cultural phenomenon. Water, for example, remained a compound even when it was misidentified as an element for a long time. It cannot, however, be said that the holiness or divinity of the *Ganga* subsists outside of its recognition. The understanding of a natural object is completed by placing its perceptible features within a network of cause and effect. A cultural object, on the other hand, *qua* an item in the cultural world does not necessarily belong to any causal scheme. The holy *Ganga* thus belongs to a symbolic order representing moral and spiritual purification. Even where the causal power of a cultural object belonging to it by virtue of its natural aspect is relevant to its cultural status such as in the case of sacrificial fire, the object nevertheless is also imbued with social meaning and moral significance. In entering the cultural world, a natural object becomes a sign or symbol of meaning and purpose. A tractor, for example, is not merely a material thing but also a form of property, a sign of social status and, in a developing country, a symbol of progress.

Culture and cultural recognition are thus mutually relative. We cannot identify a cultural world without taking into account the matrix of awareness from which it proceeds, a matrix which is fashioned by history and subsists by way of a symbolic tradition. Identifying a culture, thus, is not like identifying a natural species on the basis of observation from without. It is rather like the critical determination of the essential form and meaning of a poem or a philosophy, which is impossible without entering into the spirit of what is sought to be determined. The discovery of cultural identity thus requires a coordination of two enterprises, viz., researching and interpreting the meaning of tradition hermeneutically and thus viewing it from within, and viewing it in the larger context of universal history. The historian has to participate in the tradition without necessarily accepting it. He must view it *as if* he belonged to it. Only then will the tradition become accessible and yield its inner meaning and form and yet be objectified sufficiently to be placed within the context of history. The identification and understanding of a culture, thus, is possible in the main only through the critical and hermeneutic enquiry into its recorded, symbolic tradition and its reconstruction as a

world of consciousness through historical empathy. It is not possible merely or primarily through empirical observation and ahistoric comparison of cultures assumed to be *given as such*, because as pointed out before, cultural forms are self-determinants of consciousness, not merely causal structures of meaning-free behavioural segments. A common objection to such an understanding of culture is that it would be largely bookish and unreal, the dead ideology of an elite lost in the past, not the living culture of the people today which can be described and analysed by the sophisticated methods of empirical research developed in the social sciences. However, the distinction between the ordinary folk and the elite, or the past and the present in a living civilization has only a limited significance. Whether a civilization is alive or not, depends on its continued creativity. So historical and empirical methods remain complementary, not exclusive.

From this essential ideality as well as historicity of cultural identity, it follows that empirically developed frameworks of categories within the modern sciences of culture cannot *ipso facto* be universal because even when they are comparative, they presuppose the characteristic *Weltanschauung* of modern culture and tend to misinterpret myth and ritual as well as traditional social ethics, religion and wisdom. It has been argued on the other side that if such a universal framework were to be rejected, the unity of the discipline studying culture will break down as also the possibility of intercultural scientific collaboration. These objections, however, are superficial. An analogy from the study of languages will clarify the truth. Different languages have different structures and use different sets of sounds. What is more, each language seems to analyse the world of experience differently. All this certainly makes communication from one language to another more difficult than communication within the same language. Nevertheless, it does not make languages wholly opaque to other languages.

In all cultures so far, the basic determinants of identity have to be sought in their system of values and symbols, the 'system' being used loosely to cover the evidence in parts of any kind of conglomeration or assortment. Religion and social ethics constitute the primary value system while language, ritual and art illustrate the symbolic systems; art as, in fact, both realizing as well as symbolizing value.

Cultural identity in this sense tends to be circumscribed by the barriers of communication. The Arabs, for example, had no difficulty in learning science from the Greeks and Hindus, but there was an obvious barrier as far as communication in the sphere of religion was concerned. It is easy to multiply such examples. The contact of India with the West since the nineteenth century is itself illustrative of the difference in communication between different levels of culture. In fact, the awareness of Indian culture in the modern sense arose from the encounter. Different approaches to the discovery and exposition of Indian culture arose

naturally and the present crisis of cultural identity in India may itself be traced to the continued effort to distinguish the essential from the inessential in the cultural tradition so that it may be understood as a creative continuation with contemporary relevance rather than as a dead burden on its way to the scrap heap of time.

If we think of culture as characterized by its values and area of communication, it would seem at first sight difficult to discover the unity of Indian culture in any distinctive sense. Since cultures of human beings show generic similarities, it is obvious that if we think of Indian culture with sufficient abstractness, we would be universalizing it. On the other hand, in individualizing our characterization we must not forget that no culture with a continental spread and a long history can be homogeneous or monolithic. Thus the individuality of Indian culture must be so interpreted as not to militate against the universality of human nature and value-seeking. At the same time, the unity of Indian culture has to be interpreted with sufficient catholicity to include the numerous communities, regions and epochs which have historically entered into its making. This search for the cultural identity of India, individual but aspiring after universality, one but inclusive of differences, continuous but developing, is a task which arises from the awareness of India's historic traditions. It should not be confused with the search for national integration at the political level. While it is true that the historical boundaries of Indian culture and civilization have been variable, they could never be identified with the political boundaries of any given age.

Reference was made above to religious and moral values as constituting the fundamental values of culture. From this it would seem that since Indian civilization is obviously multireligious, we could not really speak of a unified culture in India. This, however, is not the case because the spiritual tradition of India accepts the validity of alternative religious systems, *dharma-samavāya*, as the greatest ruler of India expressed it. The confusion would perhaps be removed if we were to substitute the phrase 'religious and moral values' by 'spiritual values'. Traditionally the mystic or the saint with personal realization has been given the highest respect in India. Seeking spiritual realization, called *sādhanā* or *yoga*, has been held to be the highest kind of value-seeking. *Sādhanā* implies the dedicated and disinterested performance of one's duties whatever it might be so that we may move forward towards self-realization. The stories of *Dharmavyādha* and *Tulādhāra* illustrate how a hunter or merchant could be engaged in spiritual advancement just as much as a learned Brahmaṇa or ascetic. The legends of Bodhisattva striving after enlightenment in all stations of life illustrate the same universality of *sādhanā* and show that it transcends the distinction of sacred and secular as well as the bounds of dogmatic religion. If *dharma* be the traditional counterpart of the notion of 'culture', the deepest character of Indian culture could be indicated by quoting '*ayam tu paramo dharmo yad yogenātmadarśanam*', i.e., the highest

ideal is to seek self-realization through *yoga*. And we could not seek a better or more inclusive definition of *yoga* than what the *Gītā* offers, viz., '*yogah karmasu-kauśalam*', i.e., *yoga* is excellence in work. It may be added that such excellence is traditionally held to require disinterestedness as well as absorption. This subjective modality is as essential to *yoga* or *sādhanā* as work itself. In fact, differentiation between them and overemphasis on one at the expense of the other and then again seeking to reunite them, have led to a dialectical development of alternative modes of spiritual life. This dialectic of *sādhanā* is indeed the innermost dialectic of Indian culture. We can thus see the Vedic age as one of emphasis on work followed by a long period of the dominance of gnostic negation—*jñāna* or *mukti*—and attempts at synthesizing the two ideals of *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*. The pre-eminence of *bhakti* in the middle ages saw the emergence of a new kind of subjectivity in spiritual life just as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have again sought to rediscover the emphasis on work which the Vedas and the *Gītā* reveal.

The foregoing reflections may be summed up in a few simple propositions so as to facilitate discussion. Cultural identity can be discovered only from within a cultural consciousness through its historical tradition and in which we need to participate as critical observers. The framework for identity will also have to recapitulate the articulation of cultural self-consciousness. It would be necessary at the same time to have a sense or glimpse of the imponderable vision and *sādhanā* which lie behind and above its ideal form. So culture may be described as an order of values, which derives from transcendental wisdom and its *praxis* and thus aspires after universality but is actually limited by manifesting *upādhis*, historic conditions and the barriers of communication. The communication relevant in this context is not the communication of mere facts or positive knowledge or value-neutral forms. Real cultural communication implies the communication of value as value. This will not necessarily lead to an acceptance of uniform values but will certainly lead to the acceptance of difference and richer harmony. The spiritual history of India is an illustration of this process. The social ethos which corresponded to this spirituality, oriented with multireligious value-pluralism, was naturally one of tolerance and co-existence where different communities with their different traditions were not required to enter any uniform order. This is the social implication of the doctrines of *ahiṁsā* and *svadharma*. We have, again, to note particularly that cultural identity is not a static but a developing thing and that the most important factors influencing it are the inner dialectic of the spiritual quest of the culture and its dialogue with other cultures. I may add that the value-pluralism which I have mentioned is only the acceptance of a plurality of interpreting spiritual truth in conceptual or practical terms. Value in itself remains singular being nothing but the spirit.

Cultures, however, as mentioned before are necessarily embedded in

societies organized for survival and adaptation. This combination of the order of ideal values with the actual order of social organization and all its purposes and pursuits, ideal as well as empirical, has sometimes been called civilization. Civilizations, in this sense, tend to be more universal with respect to their science and technologies than with respect to their values. Up to a point in her history, India's civilization constantly absorbed influences creatively from her contacts with other civilizations and remained progressive or alive, but this process apparently slowed down as is apparent from Alberuni already in the 11th century. This tended to create an imbalance between spiritual creativity and the institutional life of the civilization with the result that by the nineteenth century Indian culture seemed to find its identity in terms of timeworn stereotypes rather than in terms of the imponderable archetypal creativity underlying them, a confusion which the Renaissance and the Reformation of that century sought to remove through a dialogue with the past as well as with the culture of the West; a task complicated by considerations of politics or fanaticism.

To sum up, I would like to recall that 'culture' refers to a family of meanings which are expressed differently in different languages and cultures. Generally these meanings include the ideas of value, form or order, and tradition. In the light of the universal tradition of wisdom, value is ultimately the spiritual principle in man and the cosmos. Though 'eternal', it is manifested under limitations as a particular tradition of wisdom at the *right* time, of which the logic is inscrutable to the human mind. It is wisdom that provides the moral justification of the social order and gives to tradition the aspect of truth rather than of mere convention. Traditionally, thus, culture is not mere social convention, nor the mere product of natural or accidental causes. Modern sciences of culture tend to look upon it primarily as a structured social fact which may be understood and explained on scientific principles. Their principal achievement may be summarized as the idea of the social and historical relativity of cultural forms especially as brought out in the sociology of mind. A similar achievement stands to the credit of social history mainly inspired by Marxian ideology. On the other hand, the sociology of culture is asymmetric between science and religion, which only shows its modernist bias. Similarly the idea of unilinear evolution in history reflects an ethno-centric and ideological bias. The universal culture of man is not constituted simply by science and humanism but even more deeply by spiritual wisdom without which man would not be a moral being and humanism will prove a mirage.

I would like to close by quoting a famous verse—

Śrutayo vibhinnāh smṛtayo vibhinnāh
Naiko munīr yasya matam na bhinnam /
Dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhāyām
Mahājano yena gatah sa panthāh //

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. On the meaning of 'tradition'—Alwyn Moore and R.P. Coomarswamy (eds.) *Selected Letters of Coomarswamy*, pp. 9, 45; Rene Guenon, *Hindu Doctrines*, Delhi, 1993, pp. 87ff; G.C. Pande, *Meaning and Process of Culture*, 2nd edn.
2. G.C. Pande, *An Approach to Indian Culture and Civilization*, pp. 21–22; G.C. Pande, *Bharatiya Parampara Ke Mula Svara* 2nd edn.; G.C. Pande, *Foundations of Indian Culture*.
3. Cf. Manu, 2. 27–28; *bhāvanā* for *adhyātmaguṇas* or *sādhāraṇa-dharmas*.
4. This corresponds to *dharma* as *vidhi*.
5. This is *paramparya*—Manu, 2.18: '*Yasmin deśe ya ācārah pāramparya-kramāgahta*'; cf. BG.3. '*Evam paramparā prāptam imam rājarsayo viduh*'.
6. Cf. Ralph Linton, *Culture and Mental Disorder* (1956), pp. 5–6 where society is described as an organized group of individuals while culture is described as a group of common ideas, habits and emotional responses. The distinction has also been made as a distinction of normative and symbolic orders; cf. White, *Science of Culture*. For Kroeber, society and culture are counterparts 'like the two faces of paper'—*Anthropology*, p. 267.
7. Cf. G.C. Pande, *Mulya-mīmāṃsā*, pp. 250 ff.
8. Tylor, *Anthropology*.
9. Cf. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, *A Natural Science of Society*, p. 3: 'a theoretical science of human society is possible, and there can be only one such science'.
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Wittgenstein on Forms of Life: Towards a Transcendental Perspective

R.C. PRADHAN
Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad

In this essay I propose a transcendental reading of Wittgenstein's well-known concept of form of life. I will argue that a naturalistic reading like that of J.F.M. Hunter's[1] is too restrictive to bring out the full meaning of the concept. My strategy is to provide a transcendental framework in which the concept of form of life can be situated. I assume that such a framework is available for understanding Wittgenstein's later philosophy.[2]

THE REALITY OF FORMS OF LIFE : THE LIMITATIONS OF A NATURALISTIC TAXONOMY

Forms of life, for Wittgenstein, are as real and as diverse phenomena as language. Like the latter, they are given in the most conspicuous sense of 'given'. The given forms of language are 'language-games':[3] they are the forms of life, since each language-game displays or embodies a form of life. Wittgenstein writes,

> Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or a form of life.[4]

A language-game is an activity performed in language. So it 'brings into prominence' a form of life. The language-games listed at *PI*, Sec. 23 all embody activities or systems of activities which could be characterized as forms of life.

A form of life is the other face of a language-game. The language-game presents, on the one hand, the linguistic face, i.e. the form of its rule-governed existence and the other, it presents the form of life, i.e. the action 'interwoven' with it (cf. *PI*, Sec. 7). There is a single reality here, that is, the reality of a language-game being *played*. The 'playing' of the language-game is an action, i.e. the form of life, whereas the language in which the action takes place is constitutive of the form of life. Wittgenstein's emphasis is on the form of *life* which enlivens a language-use. That is, the emphasis is on the *phenomenality of the language-use* in the connected system of language-uses. Wittgenstein says,

> Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at

> what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said: *This language-game is played.* (*PI*, Sec. 654) (italics original).

Language-games as well as forms of life are thus the 'proto-phenomena' which are 'presented' in the network of the linguistic discourse. They are not isolated happenings in a discontinuous linguistic space. They constitute the continuous space of linguistic phenomena.

The two features of forms of life which thus come to philosophical reckoning are: (a) their grammatical texture and (b) their proto-phenomenality. The grammatical texture signifies the 'formal' character of a form of life, that is, its compactness as a structured phenomenon. Each form of life is, therefore, delimited in its formal composition. Each is a proto-phenomenon as well owing its phenomenality to its givenness, that is, its being presented in the grammatical space. This feature we may call its 'visuality', that is, something which can be 'looked at' (cf. *PI*, Sec. 654). The physiognomy of a form of life is its visible structure which can be 'described' and 'noted' (cf. *PI*, Sec. 655). Wittgenstein puts this as follows:

> What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—*forms of life* (*PI*, p. 226).

The taxonomy of forms of life must recognize the fact that forms of life are diverse and they make up a multiplicity of phenomena. It is this multiplicity which must be argued for in Wittgenstein's philosophy of forms of life. The reason why forms of life must not be a single phenomenon but a plurality of phenomena is to be sought in the fact that the grammatical space[5] is not a monolithic space. It contains a diversity that allows for the proliferation of an endless variety of language-games and forms of life. 'And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten' (*PI*, Sec. 23). This endless flow of forms of language and life constitutes the panoramic picture of the grammatical space that keeps them 'holding' together. Forms of life, though diverse, tend to hold together.

Forms of life do not cancel one another, each occupying a place alongside the other. Each is, therefore, independent of the other. This is evidenced in the fact that by no magical trick can we reduce one form of life to another. If, for example, doing mathematical calculation is a form of life, in no way does it contradict the form of life of praying or composing a song. Each activity here is a unique form of doing things and so is not colliding with another form of doing things. In this way, there is the whole mosaic of activities which are diverse, and independent, and yet are holding together. This holding together is textured into the grammatical space in which a form of life gets its identity and individuation. Forms of life, like language-games, have their unique identity and derive their reality from the pluralistic grammatical space.

Now the question arises, how do the forms of life have their boundaries delimited? That is, how do they uniquely individuate themselves in what I have called the 'grammatical space'? Wittgenstein's grammatical taxonomy does keep room for the individuation of forms of life. The first criterion for such individuation is the grammatical one, that is, it is through language that we can individuate a form of life. As Wittgenstein puts it, 'to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life' (*PI*, Sec. 19). It means, in other words, that wherever language is used, there lies the form of life. 'Language, I should like to say, relates to a *way* of living.'[6] The second criterion is the surroundings which situate a form of life. The surroundings provide the occasion or the unique station for a form of life. It is in these surroundings that an expectation is an expectation (*PI*, Sec. 581) or a hope is a hope (*PI*, Sec. 583). Wittgenstein tells us in so many words:

> Could someone have a feeling of ardent love or hope for the space of one second—*no matter what* preceded or followed this second?—What is happening now has significance—in these surroundings. These surroundings give it its importance. And the word 'hope' refers to a phenomenon of human life. (A smiling mouth *smiles* only in a human face). (*PI*, Sec. 583).

It is, therefore, in these surroundings which include the human language and other social practices that we can situate 'the complicated form of life' called hope (cf. *PI*, p.174). Similarly, '"Grief" describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, in the weave of our life' (*PI*, p. 174). It is the web of our life's activities that ultimately grounds a form of life.

The third and no less important criterion which could be adduced is the practice or the standard of use which a language-game and a form of life conform to. This aspect is prominently displayed in the fact of rule-following[7] which Wittgenstein takes to be a central idea in language-use. For him, '"Obeying a rule" is a practice' (*PI*, Sec. 202) and 'it is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood and so on—To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are *customs* (uses, institutions)' (*PI*, Sec. 199). It is in these practices that a form of life is fully manifest. A form of life is a publicly accepted mode of life that implicitly brings in the standards or norms that confer significance on it. Instead of being an isolated, a 'private'[8] mode of life, a form of life is shared by many and becomes the standardized form of life. So, says Wittgenstein,

> What in a complicated surrounding we call 'following a rule', we should certainly not call it that if it stood in isolation (*RFM*, p. 335).

Also,

> In order to describe the phenomenon of language, one must describe

a practice, not something that happens once, *no matter of what kind* (*RFM*, p. 335).

Thus forms of life, though grammatically interspaced, are socially woven into the collective life of mankind. This 'common behaviour of mankind' is the 'system of reference' for all forms of life and language as such (cf. *PI*, Sec. 206).

Grammatical taxonomy, as presented above, does not intend to present a naturalistic classification of forms of life according to their natural origin. It is not investigating their reality as a natural fact. Wittgenstein's investigation is 'grammatical' (*PI*, Sec. 90) and, therefore, it is concerned with the 'possibilities of phenomena' (ibid.), rather than the empirical experiences of them. In view of this, a naturalistic taxonomy, e.g., Hunter's well-known organic interpretation[9] of forms of life seems to be unwarranted. This interpretation aims at showing that forms of life are living and organic formations which have a natural history of their own are forms of *natural* life which are 'broadly in the same class as the growth or nutrition of living organisms, or as the organic complexity which enables them to propel themselves about, or to react in complicated ways to their environment'.[10] What are thus called 'forms' of life are really, according to the naturalist, 'facts' of life. They are *acts* rather than *rules*, and *performances*[11] rather than *practices*. That is, it is their *act*-character that makes forms of life natural occurrences. The naturalist taxonomy thus prefers to be an account of what *happens* in a form of life rather than what the human agent *does* in a complicated surrounding. Forms of life are, therefore, taken as 'responses' rather than 'actions' or 'undertakings'. The latter are the 'responsibilities' on the part of a grammatical agent *vis-a-vis* other agents and the world.

Wittgenstein's grammatical account does not dismiss the fact that 'commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing' (*PI*, Sec. 25) and are, therefore, part of the organic history of human beings. Besides, it is not denied that learning of language involves many procedures that involve training in a natural setting, that is, learning is a kind of 'adjusting mechanism to respond to a certain kind of influence' (*PI*, Sec. 495). But all this does not substantiate the idea that our forms of life are biological processes involving no mental[12] considerations and are, therefore, sheer natural happenings of a very complicated sort. Language-learning and language-use are not blind or mechanical processes; they are not instinctive responses, not involving language-mastery. To liken language-use to a mechanical process and the activity of rule following to a biological process alone, is thus to disregard the fact of normative and rational behaviour on the part of human beings.

Hunter's naturalist account intends to divorce forms of life from their linguistic interwovenness precisely to canvass that 'it is language-using, rather than language, which is described as a form of life'.[13] It highlights

the 'using' or the 'activity' of use as the sole content of a form of life. But this understates the fact that a form of life is not merely an activity but a 'form' as well which can be instantiated by many similar activities. Wittgenstein's effort is not to deny the importance of the particular instance but to see that there is a form or essence which the instance has. The essence lies in its being a *form* of life, not in being a mere isolated instance of an activity. When Wittgenstein says that human beings agree not 'in opinions but in form of life' (*PI*, Sec. 241), he does not mean that agreement is in an *act* alone; it is far more entrenched in the reality of the 'form' of life.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL *UBERSICHT*: DENATURALIZING NATURAL HISTORY

A transcendental overview (*übersicht*) is in order to present a fair case in favour of a non-naturalistic account of forms of life. Forms of life by virtue of their polymorphous character demand a framework in which they can be situated and their meaning, i.e. 'possibilities' unfolded. There is a pressing demand from within the taxonomy presented earlier to bring out the non-naturalistic significance of the concept of form of life.

In a fairly well-known sense, Wittgenstein announces his intention that forms of life are not mere reference points for him in his investigation of language and meaning. They constitute the ultimate 'bedrock' so far as the 'descriptive' account of language is concerned (cf. *PI*, Sec. 124). In fact, it bears out ultimately that in describing language as it is, one comes to noting a language-game and a form of life. 'The question is not one of explaining a language-game by means of our experience, but of noting a language-game', writes Wittgenstein (*PI*, Sec. 655). The fact is that by 'noting' a language-game and so a form of life one does not explain it or justify it. One simply records what is already given. In fact, it is a 'mistake' to 'look for an explanation' (*PI*, Sec. 654). Wittgenstein acknowledges that when justifications are exhausted one reaches the bedrock and one is inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do' (*PI*, Sec. 217). Thus forms of life are the ultimate limit of our noting or describing language.

One cannot, therefore, be enamoured of the possibility that forms of life are just facts of natural history. No doubt, forms of life have their givenness in the spatio-temporal continuum of natural history, but they at the same time constitute the 'bedrock' of language and reality. The significant philosophical point is not that they are 'natural' facts but that they constitute the 'given' in language. Though admittedly philosophy supplies 'remarks' on 'the natural history of human beings' (*PI*, Sec. 415), yet philosophers do not do 'natural science; nor yet natural history' (*PI*, p. 230) since 'we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes' (ibid.). The question is not whether forms of life are natural or not, but whether philosophy is interested in the natural facts at all.

Philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, is interested in grammar and not in the 'facts of nature' which are obviously there (ibid.). Being interested in grammar, philosophy recognizes only the importance of the 'concepts' (*PI*, p. 230) and the 'statements' (*PI*, Sec. 90) concerning the phenomena under consideration. The fictitious[14] natural histories and forms of life are as important as the actual histories so far as they remind us of the grammatical possibilities, i.e. the logic of the forms of life.

It is in this grammatical perspective that the transcendental question regarding the fundamental sense of forms of life can be raised. The question can be made straight like this: how do the forms of life, though given as part of natural history, constitute the bedrock of all phenomena? That is, how do the forms of life themselves constitute the foundation of all that can be made intelligible in language and reality? This question can be called transcendental[15] in the wider Kantian sense that it is not regarding the phenomena themselves but regarding their possibilities. That is, the question raises not a justification problem but a problem regarding intelligibility. Wittgenstein himself made philosophy an account of intelligibility or meaning rather than of justification and explanation. He says,

> Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. One might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions (*PI*, Sec. 126).

Thus philosophy as dealing with 'what is possible' is very much transcendental in its concerns, since it has nothing to do with the empirical, natural and the causal (cf. *PI*, p. 230). It takes account of the non-empirical in so far as the latter alone sheds light on the empirical.

With regard to forms of life, the accent of the philosopher is not on their having natural history, but on how, having natural history, they make sense as the ground of all reality. The aim is to lay bare their status, metaphysical or otherwise, in the understanding of language, self and the world. There is no demand that a metaphysics of forms of life alone can reveal their status. What is demanded is their grammatical (logical) status, so that their 'essence' is revealed by 'grammar' (*PI*, Sec. 371). This philosophical perspective centred round grammar is meant to bring out the 'sense' of forms of life so far as the latter, as indicated earlier, are placed in the grammatical (logical) space. The grammatical space is the ultimate order which forms of life partake of so that they make a coherent system of language and reality possible.

The transcendental overview of the order as mentioned above is one of 'seeing connections' (*PI*, Sec. 122) and integrating them into a system of interrelated forms of life. This is likely to result in 'an order in our knowledge of the use of language' (*PI*, Sec. 132) which, though not *the*

order, is at least one of the possible orders which serves our purpose (ibid.). The transcendental order on hand intends to present an order in which forms of life shed their naturalness and are seen as conditions of understanding of natural language and the world. From this perspective natural history is itself denaturalized so as to reveal the unconditioned character of forms of life. There is, as Jonathan Lear[16] very aptly points out, a possible co-existence of two levels—one naturalistic and the other transcendental—in Wittgenstein's framework. The naturalistic level provides for the availability of natural history whereas the transcendental level offers a reflective account of the possibilities of natural phenomena. The transcendental point of view through its account of grammar tells us 'what kind of object anything is' (*PI*, Sec. 373) and thus unfolds the conditions of the natural phenomena. These conditions themselves are unconditioned and need no further justification. Forms of life, considered thus, are the unconditioned conditions of our integrated understanding of language and reality.

There is admittedly a strong undercurrent of what Lear calls the 'empirical anthropologist's'[17] standpoint regarding forms of life. This standpoint presents forms of life as a plethora of practices, customs and institutions which evolve through the history of mankind. These cultural and anthropological phenomena make a large presence in the empirical taxonomy of forms of life. But this aspect of their presence is rather a matter of tokening what is logically important. These tokens are given in an empirical setting and are, therefore, not important for philosophy. What is considered important is how these practices and customs are woven into our language and how they themselves are made intelligible. All these considerations and many more constitute the transcendental *übersicht* we have been arguing for so far.

LANGUAGE, SELF AND THE WORLD

The final question which the transcendental account of forms of life raises is regarding the problem of self or subjectivity that is so intimately connected with language-use and rule-following. Forms of life display the internality of rule-following in language-use and thereby focus on the inevitable grounding of language-use on the *user*, i.e. the subject. The user is the human being who, anthropologically speaking, lives in a human community. Thus the community of language-users is the anthropological requirement for the fact of language-learning and language-mastery. But this is not what the transcendental account is concerned with. It requires a transcendental subject as the unconditioned condition of language-use.

Now the question is: do the forms of life solve the transcendental problem of self? Wittgenstein seems to have opened up the possibility of a transcendental solution to this problem in his idea that the self of a

language-user is not an anthropological or psychological fact in the world. The self is not an anthropological entity, i.e. it does not belong to the category of the human being in the empirical sense. The concept of human being in the empirical sense highlights only the *factuality* of the psycho-physical being in the world. It does not tell what it *means* to be a human being, that is, it is silent over what it is that which makes a human being the subject of language-use. The latter question is obviously a non-empirical and non-anthropological issue.

The subject in the transcendental sense cannot be an item in the world. So Wittgenstein views it as philosophically misleading to suggest that the 'I' stands for an entity in the world, i.e. a person. He says,

> But at any rate when you say 'I am in pain', you want to draw attention of others to a particular person—the answer might be: No, I want to draw attention to myself. (*PI*, Sec. 405).

The self is like the proverbial owner of the visual field[18] who is 'not to be found in, and there is no outside' (*PI*, Sec. 399). So Wittgenstein suggests,

> Think of a picture of a landscape, an imaginary landscape with a house in it. Someone asks, 'whose house is that?'—The answer, by the way, might be, 'it belongs to the farmer who is sitting on the bench in front of it'. But then he cannot for example enter his house. (*PI*, Sec. 398).

The transcendental self is like the absentee owner of the said house in the imaginary landscape. It is the necessary condition of there being language and language-use at all, yet it is not an item in language and the world. As Wittgenstein says, 'The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is the limit of the world' (*Tractatus*, 5.632).

The forms of life themselves suggest that the self or subject is the limit of language and the world rather an item in them. Forms of life, as indicated earlier, constitute that limit which is the unconditioned presupposition of all that we do and are in the world. A form of life as a set of actions implies an actor or agent who is not the actions themselves but the centre of those actions. Therefore, a language-game implies a *player* who is not within the former but must yet logically be presupposed by it. This is the connection between the self and the form of life: a form of life is the form of activity attributed to a self. That is, it is the form of life of a self. The form of life is manifest in the language-game, so there is a phenomenality to the form of life and the language-game. But the self is only the *limit*. It can be talked about in philosophy (cf. *Tractatus*, 5.641) without its being a part of language and the world.

What is, however, amply clear is that forms of life wear the mantle of anthropologicality rather too thickly. They appear in language and the world enmeshed with details of practices, rituals, ceremonies and cultural variabilities. They are very easily associated with tribes, cultures and their

relative world-views.[19] This anthropological cloak can be dismantled only if we see through them to their logical significance. That is, only in a transcendental standpoint can we overcome the anthropologicality of the forms of life. But this need not mean that we are immediately in need of a metaphysical subject[20] as lying outside the world. There is the need of a limit-self because that is what philosophy shows to be non-anthropological. The transcendental self is not only the limit of the anthropological standpoint as Lear[21] supposes it to be, but also the limit of language and the world. Here the question is not whether we, the bearers of forms of life, are in the world or not, but whether we can conceive *ourselves* as the rule-followers engaged in linguistic activities. The latter conception of ourselves does not coincide with the anthropological one of falling within a tribe or social group. It takes our selves beyond by positing us as the necessary ground of all social (ritualized) activities. This non-empirical self of ours is the point of vital interest for those who take a transcendental point of view.

In the absence of a Metaphysical Subject[22] in Wittgenstein's philosophy which can demand an ontological status of its own, there is the limit-self in the transcendental sense which can be characterized as the transcendental 'we'.[23] It is the 'we' that not only preserves the full-blooded sense of the anthropological 'we', but also invests itself with the transcendental significance of the self. There is no effort here to deny the plurality of the language-users, i.e. the empirical 'we'. Rather, in the plurality itself we are seeing the transcendental 'we' in their manifold activities. That is, in the plurality of forms of life themselves there is direct evidence of the plurality of the transcendental self. Now the question: is the plural 'we' an altogether non-realistic and non-anthropological reality? Wittgenstein can admit that it is.[24] He can hold that there is a definite non-anthropological[25] sense in which the transcendental 'we' appears as the new category of signifying the non-contingent truth about ourselves as language-users. Williams very aptly states,

> Leaving behind the confused and confusing language of relativism, one finds oneself with a *we* which is not one group rather than another in the world at all, but rather the plural descendant of that idealist 'I' who also was not one item rather than another in the world.[26]

If the transcendental 'we' is established as the descendant of the transcendental 'I', there is not only an end to the anthropological route to relativism[27] but also there can be no scepticism as to whether a transcendental sense of the forms of life is possible at all. In fact, the transcendental sense of forms of life ensures the non-contingency associated with them *vis-a-vis* the contingency of the world.

THE CONTINGENT WORLD AND THE NON-CONTINGENT FORMS OF LIFE

The transcendental account we have pursued so far reveals the basic

discontinuity between forms of life and the world. This discontinuity is eminently shown in the fact that the world is contingent whereas the forms of life are non-contingent. That is, whereas the world as it is presented in our empirical experience is contingent, the forms of life as constituting the bedrock of our experience of the world are non-contingent. Forms of life turn out to be the framework of reference for the world and so they prove to be the ways we act in the world.

As we have argued earlier, forms of life embody not only the acts themselves but also the language in which the acts are embedded. So a form of life posits a rule-constituted way of acting in the world. The world is not standing apart or away from the forms of life; it is a partner in the form of life and the language embodying the latter. The partnership is of course logical in that the form of life and the language-form together constitute the form or essence of the world.

Wittgenstein is not vocal on the problem of the world in his later philosophy not because he is not interested in the problem of the world as he was so obviously in the *Tractatus*, but because he has altogether a new way of articulating the essence of the world. The accent on the representations or pictures[28] is superseded by the accent on the actions embodied in language-games, i.e. forms of life. The language-games are not meant basically as representations but they achieve the same purpose as the pictures, i.e. reveal the essence of the world insofar as the latter is revealed in the former. The essence of the world is the *same* as the essence of language and the forms of life. What the world logically contains is revealed by the forms of life. The way language is used and the forms of life that are manifest shows what the world is. Wittgenstein writes,

> You have a new conception and interpret it as seeing a new object. You interpret a grammatical movement made by yourself as a quasi-physical phenomenon which you are observing. . . . What you have primarily discovered is a new way of looking at things. As if you had invented a new way of painting; or, again, a new metre, or a new kind of song (*PI*, Sec. 401).

Wittgenstein thus keeps the entire philosophical focus on language and the forms of life, since the world itself is revealed in them. A form of life is like a new way of looking at things, so that if the form of life is there, there lies before us the things we are concerned with. So we can say, 'What looks as if it *had* to exist, is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made. And this may be an important observation; but it is nonetheless an observation concerning our language-game—our method of representation' (*PI*, Sec. 50).

Once the problem of the world is set in the grammatical perspective, it is all the more important why forms of life get the primacy in philosophy. It is because forms of life are now the key to the reality, that

is, the forms of life make the world manifest. If, therefore, forms of life are themselves contingent, can they reveal the essence of the world? The contingent world is of course not the concern of the philosopher. He is interested only in what makes the world intelligible. In that sense, forms of life are the necessary conditions of the world. The world gets its necessary structure from the forms of life and not the other way round. Language-games embody the necessity, i.e. the necessary truths which are otherwise known as 'grammatical propositions'[29] (cf. *PI*, Sec. 251). The world accomplishes only the application of the grammatical rules in the very stream of language-use. It cannot constitute those rules of grammar.

Now we can clearly recognize that in according primacy to grammar, Wittgenstein has shifted attention from the contingent truths about the world to the necessary truths which alone pertain to grammar. The necessary truths are grammatical not because they describe how language functions but because they show what it means for language to be what it is, i.e. the form of life and the world. That is, grammatical truths show that language is the ultimate ground of all intelligibility. It is in language that we make all truth-claims about what happens in the world, and also we claim to have acted in a certain way in the pursuit of truth. These actings and claims pertain to our forms of life. Hence the appearance of contingency in the forms of life themselves. But once we realize that the grammatical truths underlie the apparent contingency, we see forms of life as the sole repository of our grammatical responses. Forms of life reveal in a more dynamic form what grammar conceals in its essentialistic structure.

Even if grammar is the standing guarantee against forms of life dissolving into purely contingent social habits or practices, there is, in a philosophical sense, no guarantee for grammar itself and, for that matter, for forms of life themselves. They are 'arbitrary'[30] (cf. *PI*, Sec. 497). What makes them arbitrary is that there is no reason why a particular grammatical rule prevails and not another. Similarly, there is no explanation of why a particular form of life is the case. Wittgenstein writes,

> Grammar is not accountable to reality. It is grammatical rules that determine meaning (constitute it) and so they themselves are not answerable to any meaning and to that extent are arbitrary. (*PG*, p. 184).

There is absolutely no justification for grammar and its rules except that they are there and they determine the very scaffolding of any other fact of nature.[31] Thus there is no question of Nature justifying grammar or the world conferring necessity on the latter. Wittgenstein puts this as follows:

> We have a colour system as we have a number system. Do the systems reside in *our* nature or in the nature of things?

> How are we to put?—*Not* in the nature of numbers and colours. (*Z*, Sec. 357)
>
> Then is there something arbitrary about this system? Yes and no. It is akin to what is arbitrary and to what is non-arbitrary (*Z*, Sec. 358).

This is to reassert that the grammar of colour and number systems derives its necessity from the fact of being the only ones given to us, i.e 'reside in our nature'. They are the ones we do not have to argue about and seek justification but from the grammatical point of view they are non-arbitrary. They are absolutely the ones we have been so constituted to have. As he says, 'These are the fixed rails along which all our thinking runs, and so our judgement and action goes according to them too' (*Z*, Sec. 375). Thus we reach the non-arbitrary bedrock of our thought and action, i.e. the forms of life.

OURSELVES AND OTHERS

The contention that *our* forms of life are unique to ourselves and are thereby constitutive of ourselves is a grammatical and so a transcendental truth abut ourselves. Much of the contemporary debate on whether a transcendental account[32] of ourselves is possible is resolved by Wittgenstein's account of forms of life. The crucial question is: can we represent ourselves as the rule-followers engaged in multifarious language-games in a non-linguistic manner? This way of representation presupposes that we are more than what our language and actions reveal. Hence classically, the self was taken as a metaphysical reality on its own. But Wittgenstein made it mandatory for philosophy not to seek a metaphysical representation of self, since it was considered to be the presupposition of all representations and so must itself remain inexpressible (cf. *Tractatus*, 5. 631). This seems to be the underlying theme of Wittgenstein's later account of forms of life involving the multifarious activities undertaken by the language-centric conscious beings. The language-users' forms of life cannot be represented in a higher language removed from forms of life. There is, therefore, no point of view outside language from which the forms of life can be looked at. If such a point of view exists, it must be within the space of forms of life. Philosopher's reflective activity is one amongst those forms of life on which it reflects. Thus the selves which engage themselves in these activities are not representable at all.

What is so important about the space of forms of life is that it constitutes ourselves, i.e. makes us what we are, including our thoughts and actions. There is an indelible stamp marked on these activities as *ours*. There is no ambiguity about what we consider our forms of life. They are transparent to ourselves. We agree in all that we call our thoughts and actions. This is, however, not an 'agreement in opinions but in forms of life' (*PI*, Sec. 241). This agreement in forms of life is rooted in our consciousness of being ourselves. In fact, our consciousness of being ourselves is fully constituted by our agreement with others, i.e. by the intersubjective sharing of forms of life.

But the severest challenge to this settled fact comes from the idea of the deviant other. The deviant other is the one who refuses to share our forms of life and declares himself independent. Here is one who shapes his own colour-grammar and his methods of calculation and measurement alongwith similar others (cf. *Z*, Sec. 338–341). Describing such a deviant situation, Wittgenstein writes,

> For here life would run on differently—what interests us would not interest *them*. Here different concepts would no longer be unimaginable. In fact, this is the only way in which *essentially* different concepts are imaginable. (*Z*, Sec. 388)

This piquant situation reflects back on our forms of life, since it does not tell whether such situations are possible but it tells that if they are possible they are not intelligible to us: 'We could not possibly make ourselves understood to them. Not even as we can to a dog. We could not find our feet with them' (*Z*, Sec. 390). This shows how our forms of life are constitutive of ourselves. We would cease to be ourselves if there could be other forms of life than the ones we call *ours*.

The imaginability of deviant forms of life is, however, not the test of their being genuine alternatives[33] to ours. It is well argued that the fact of our forms of life is ultimate[34] about us and so there is no reason to suppose that our forms of life are contingent. These forms of language and life are the *only* ones *we* have been given, and that is the final truth about them. This in a way takes away the sting from relativism which threatens the transcendental view of forms of life.

The grammatical divide between ourselves and the unintelligible others is unbridgeable, to say the least. Wittgenstein has not considered the deviant other as anything but a symbol of protest against any dogmatism about our own beliefs, thoughts and concepts (cf. *PI*, p. 230). This protest is a grammatical device of accentuating the necessity of our own conceptual structures.

Once we thus give a settled logical shape to our forms of life, the topology of our language-games takes a stable form and a new logic of connecting language-games takes a stable form and a new logic of connecting language-games emerges on the scene. The new logic is the transcendental logic[35] of locating forms of life in their proper place, i.e. in the grammatical space containing all possible and actual language-games. Transcendentally viewed, forms of life present the viable system of reference which make intelligible to us our language, world and above all, ourselves. As a result, the deviant other is reduced to an empty symbol.

Transcendental logic of the possible topology of forms of life introduces a new way of tackling the problem of scepticism, subjectivism and solipsism. These problems have challenged the very possibility of language

as an intersubjetive phenomenon. Scepticism[36] not only questions the possibility of language but also the intelligibility of our commonly inhabited world. Solipsism has posed the possibility of all our experiences being 'private'[37] and so unintelligible to the other. Thus it abolishes the 'other' altogether (cf. *PI*, Sec. 403). Transcendental logic settles the issue of scepticism by making it clear that it is language itself which makes the statement of scepticism possible, and so the sceptic's doubt cannot be regarding the possibility of language itself. Wittgenstein writes,

> ... the *questions* that we raise and our *doubts* depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.[38]
>
> That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are *indeed* not doubled (*OC*, Sec. 342).
>
> My *life* consisits in being content to accept many things. (*OC*, Sec. 344).

Thus scepticism regarding our common fund of fundamental judgements is proved to be a vacuous philosophical move. It is because the certainty accruing to these judgements is well evidenced in our language and forms of life. 'This kind of certainty is the kind of language' (*PI*, p. 224), as Wittgenstein puts it. Logic as 'descriptive' of language-game (*OC*, Sec. 56, 82) thus makes it sure that certainty is guaranteed in our language.

Solipsism[39] as the philosophical denial of the other runs into a head-on collision with transcendental logic. First of all, solipsism is inconsistent because in the very declaration of its truth it denies its own possibility. So if it can be expressed, it must be meaningless (*Tractatus*, 5.62). Wittgenstein's argument is that since solipsism always tries to express itself in language as a kind of redescription of facts (*PI*, Sec. 402), it must always be meaningless. Thus solipsism as a doctrine of language and world must be rejected. This idea is built into Wittgenstein's transcendental logic in which the plurality of the self is admitted, and the intersubjective and public nature of language and the world is emphasized.

Wittgenstein's private language argument (*PI*, Sec. 243–310) demonstrates that the subjectivism and solipsism of the sort which intends to rupture the intersubjective fabric of our language and conceptual system by posing a language of the 'private' kind must be a wrong grammatical move. The grammar of our language denies the possibility of private rule-following (*PI*, Sec. 202) and so of private language-use (ibid., Sec. 269). This only proves that any subjectivist and solipsistic construction of grammar is against the very conditions of grammar as transcendentally intersubjective and necessary. Transcendental logic rules out the privatist argument that the forms of life are contingently rooted in our psychological awareness of being cut off from the public world.

Transcendental logic thus liberates us from the solipsists' metaphysical threat to cancel the public language and the world. It is no doubt the case that such a threat is 'a cloud of philosophy' which can be 'condensed into a drop of grammar' (*PI*, p. 222) by exposing the threat as a grammatical mistake. The sceptics, subjectivists and solipsists have misconstrued the language-forms and have projected pictures or models which have no basis in language. Transcendental logic invites our attention to language and the forms of life as they are given to save us from the 'misinterpretation of our forms of language' (*PI*, Sec. 111). In transcendental logic, 'what we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand' (*PI*, Sec. 118).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To conclude, I have argued that a transcendental understanding of Wittgenstein's concept of forms of life is possible. I have argued for the following theses:

a. Forms of life belong at one level to natural history and yet at another they constitute the ground of our language and the world.
b. It is the second level, i.e. the transcendental level that brings the forms of life into a logical order in the 'grammatical space'. Forms of life thus grammatically held together reveal the forms of language and the world.
c. The transcendental framework ensures the logic of the intersubjective discourse that dissolves the appearance of contingency in the forms of life and the discourse itself. Thus it undermines the very possibility of scepticism and solipsism regarding our discourse.

My plea, therefore, is that Wittgenstein's 'forms of life' can provide clue to our transcendental understanding of language, self and the world so as to ensure the necessity of intersubjective language and the world.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See J.F.M. Hunter, '"Forms of Life" in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*', in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, Vol. 2, edited by Stuart Shanker, Croom Helm, London, 1986.
2. See the author's 'Wittgenstein and the Availability of a Transcendental Critique', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1992, pp. 153–66.
3. See, for more discussion on the concept, Jaakko Hintikka, 'Language-games' in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, Vol. 2, edited by S. Shanker. See also Max Black's 'Wittgenstein's Language-games' included in the same volume.
4. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (hereafter called *PI*), translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953, Sec. 23.
5. By 'grammatical space' I mean something like 'logical space' in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (1.13, 3.42). It stands for the *system* of connected language-forms in this context.

6. Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (hereafter referred to as *RFM*), translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford, 1956, p. 335.
7. See Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, Harvard University Press, Massachussetts, 1982.
8. Ibid.
9. Hunter, pp. 109–15.
10. Ibid., p. 109.
11. Ibid., pp. 116–18.
12. Ibid., p. 112.
13. Ibid., p. 118.
14. Wittgenstein posits 'fictitious' natural histories like the languages of tribes to suggest that philosophy is not obsessed with the actual. It is the 'possible' that matters. See *The Brown Book*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1978, Sec. 30–50.
15. For the original meaning of the word 'transcendental' see Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by N.K. Smith, McMillan, St. Martin's Press, London, 1920, A12. For further explication of the meaning of the term, see J.N. Mohanty, *The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy*, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1985, pp. xiii–xxxii.
16. See Jonathan Lear, 'Transcendental Anthropology', in *Subject, Thought and Context*, edited by P. Pettit and J. McDowell, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 267–98.
17. Ibid.
18. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, (hereafter referred to as *Tractatus*), translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, Routledge, Kegan and Paul, London, 1961, Sec. 5.633.
19. See Bernard Williams, 'Wittgenstein and Idealism', in *Understanding Wittgenstein*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 7, 1972–73, Macmillan, London, 1974, pp. 85–92.
20. Cf. Lear, p. 292.
21. Ibid.
22. Even in the *Tractatus*, 5.633, the metaphysical subject was conceived as a limit-self.
23. Cf. Williams, pp. 92–95.
24. Ibid.
25. Cf. Lear, pp. 277–93.
26. Williams, p. 92.
27. Ibid.
28. See *Tractatus* (2.1–3.01) for the notion of pictures. The notion has receded into the background in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. For a full discussion see Hintikka, pp. 89–105.
29. The notion of 'grammatical proposition' is predominant in Wittgenstein's later thought. For discussion on this concept see Debra Aidun, 'Wittgenstein on Grammatical Propositions', in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, edited by S. Shanker, Vol. 2, pp. 142–49.
30. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar* (hereafter referred to as *PG*), translated by A. Kenney, Blackwell, Oxford, 1974, p. 185.
31. Cf. Wittgenstein, *Zettel* (hereafter referred to as *Z*), translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, Sec. 350.
32. See Mohanty, pp. 223–46.
33. Cf. Barry Stroud, 'Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity', in *Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations*, edited by G. Pitcher, Macmillan, London, 1966, pp. 477–96.
34. Ibid.
35. Wittgenstein conceived of logic as transcendental in the *Tractatus* 6.13. He pursues transcendental logic in his later works as the one that goes into the possible structures of language and reality.
36. For discussion on scepticism, see Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, chapter 2.

37. Ibid.
38. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty* (hereafter referred to as *OC*), translated by D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford, 1974, Sec. 341.
39. For further discussion see P.M.S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1972,Chapter VII.

The Reception of German Philosophy in Contemporary Indian Thought: A Survey

HERBERT HERRING
Indira Nagar, Madras

Since the second half of the seventeenth century much has been contributed, specially by German Indologists, to the creation of an image of India in the West. In this context the name of Friedrich Max Mueller can be taken as representative of many others. But what about the influence or the image of German thought upon or in the Indian mind? The investigation of such a question can best be done, as I think, by analysing the present situation in Indian academic philosophy, for here alone—and not in the minds of a few poets, religious leaders or mystics—can one expect a critical approach towards the leading heads and themes in German philosophy, past and present.

Hence when asking myself—after having been concerned for almost twenty-five years with the complex and complicated presentations of Indian philosophies—whether there is at all an impact of German philosophy on Indian thinkers, and if so what this impact is like, I was drawn back about four decades in time to Oxford University where I was a Recognized Student in the academic year 1951–52; there I had the good fortune to attend some of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan's lectures and seminars on Comparative Philosophy and Religion, during his last year as Spalding Professor of Eastern Religion and Ethics. He took pains to introduce us to the basic themes and patterns of Indian thought, comparing them to those in the Western philosophical tradition. And here I had the impression, which was confirmed in later years through numerous direct discussions with Indian colleagues and friends, that the image of Western thought was created mainly by comparing problem solutions with those of Indian thought systems, especially of Advaita Vedānta. I do not think that I am much mistaken in stating that for the majority of traditional Indian philosophers there is on the one hand the unique vast and deep ocean of Indian thought and religion and on the other the many rivers and tributaries of the Western philosophical and religious schools which (these Indian thinkers are convinced) will one fine day merge with this ocean of a universal spirit.

Western thought as pre-occupied with and dominated by scientific reasoning, as restricted to the spatio-temporal realm of appearances, as

mainly concerned with theoretical investigations, thus dwelling in the suburbs of the capital of the fundamental and final identity of *ātman* and *Brahman*, so to speak—this has been, by and large, the image of Western philosophy in the minds of traditional Indian thinkers.[1]

But here we might ask whether the image of Indian thought in Western philosophy, among Western philosophers, has been a more objective, a more unbiased and critical one. With the exception of a few unprejudiced thinkers such as Deussen, H. Zimmer, Frauwallner, Jaspers and at present Halbfass (a German philosopher who for almost twenty years has been professor of Indian philosophy in the US University of Pennsylvania), the non-Western way of thinking was simply labelled as Eastern, meaning a train of thought imbedded in an impenetrable jungle of mysticism and dogmatic metaphysics; and this was one of the negative heritages of Hegel:

> Hegel's influence in the history and historiography of philosophy has been far-reaching and complex.... Among the historians of philosophy in the nineteenth century, Hegel's negative statements on India and the Orient in general, and his pronouncement that 'real philosophy' begins only in Greece, found wide acceptance, and they were taken as a justification to dismiss Indian thought entirely from the historiography of philosophy, or to relegate it to a preliminary stage.[2]

And I dare say that a direct line can be drawn from Hegel's misinterpretation and misrepresentation of non-European thought to those of Husserl and Heidegger in our times.

Yet even when admitting that there is a qualified image of German philosophy among Indian philosophers (though this image, for instance of Kant and Hegel, until very recently has hardly been an original adaptation but one transmitted to India mostly through the spectacles of British philosophers like Adamson, Bosanquet, Caird, Bradley, Mc Taggart, Dawes Hicks, Kemp Smith and Paton) this does by no means prove that German philosophy has exercised any *influence*, has had any impact on Indian philosophy. It is on the other hand also a plain fact that despite the works of our much reputed German Indologists, Indian philosophy and the whole of Eastern thought has hardly had any decisive influence on our Western way of philosophizing: 'The histories of philosophy written by Western thinkers totally ignore Indian or Eastern philosophy. Some of these writers justify the title *History of Philosophy* on the ground that, east of the Suez, there never was genuine philosophy.'[3] Why, then, is this so? Why do philosophical ideas and systems not spread about the world—hither and thither—like economic or social theories, scientific discoveries and technological achievements? The answer, at least one plausible answer, could be that philosophical ideas and doctrines do not have a direct practical meaning, they cannot be directly applied

to social situations of people and nations because they are not concerned with solid facts as such but instead with theories about facts, i.e. with non-factual principles.

And there is another reason which has so far prevented a mutual exchange, a real dialogue between the East and the West in the field of philosophy: this reason being almost every school of thought's claim for exclusiveness, i.e. its dogmatic pronouncement of being the one and only true interpretation of reality. For example, as long as the Advaitin would not concede that his interpretation of reality as non-dualistic is but one amongother legitimate interpretations, and as long as the Kantian would not be prepared to acknowledge that there might be a legitimate human knowledge which is not restricted to the realm of spatio-temporal entities, there could be no real dialogue between those two; since a real dialogue requires equal unbiased and tolerant partners and is surely something completely different from an echo of one's own statements.

An open and liberal mind as Swami Vivekananda once stated: 'I do not simply say I tolerate religions. That is an insult to God. I worship all religions. Every religion which helps us to reach God and realize His nature is something very dear to me. I am not prepared to reject any of them.' This statement, when modified suitably, applies also to philosophy inasmuch as one should be prepared to not only tolerate different philosophical doctrines. This would be an insult to truth. We should accept all doctrines in so far as they help us to reach the truth and to realize truth's very nature. Hence we should not be prepared to reject any of them.

Only when subscribing to such a view, the ground is cultivated for a real dialogue, carried out by applying the means of comparative philosophy. Unless we subscribe to such an undogmatic way of thinking we cannot deal impartially with other philosophies and are thus, from our lofty prejudiced standpoint, inclined to call Śaṅkara (if we are Kantians) an early forerunner or herald of Kant, or (if we happen to be Advaitins) to regard Kant as a late witness of Śaṅkara's teaching.

It is therefore somewhat misleading to say that Śaṅkara went farther than Kant, as, for instance, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan has done in chapter eight of his *Indian Philosophy*. Going farther than another one suggests that both have tread the same path together for some distance, and that one has proceeded beyond the point where the other had made a halt. But we would certainly not be inclined to say that Śaṅkara and Kant in their philosophical approach to truth and reality walked the same way for a while. They may be said to have tackled the same basic problems, but certainly in entirely different ways and from entirely different motives and intentions.

Facing these problems which made me doubt whether there is such a thing as an image of German thought in Indian philosophy, I shall nevertheless try to show in this survey where there are tendencies in

Indian academic philosophy of today that could lead to a dialogue with German philosophy.

There are a number of contemporary Indian philosophers who explicitly state that works of eminent German philosophers were of great importance for the shaping of their own philosophical world-view. Thus S.C. Chatterjee (born 1893 and died in the seventies; for many years Head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Calcutta), declared that his philosophical perspective was formed by the study of Kant, Hegel, Bradley and—of course—the Vedānta.[4] His teacher K.C. Bhattacharyya (1875–1949), who has decisively influenced a whole generation of Indian philosophers, gives in his essay 'The Concept of Philosophy' an exposition of his general standpoint by stating where and how far he disagrees with Kant's view.[5] His *Studies in Kant*, based upon lectures to the Calcutta Philosophical Society in 1935/36, deals in a very subtle way with the fundamental topics and problems of Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy, such as the idea of a Transcendental Philosophy; mind as phenomenon and noumenon; space and time; causality; judgements of fact and of value; freedom and morality. These investigations are to me the most laudable approach to Kantian thought from the shores of the Vedānta.[6] A.C. Mukerji (1890–1968), Allahabad University, confessed that he had been always impressed by Kant's thought, and that a comparative study of Kantian philosophy and Advaita would lead into new lines of constructive thought through a synopsis of Western and Indian traditions in philosophy. Hence he attempts to sketch the main lines of such a synopsis in 'Suggestions for an Idealistic Theory of Knowledge,'[7] in 'Kant's Analysis of Scientific Method,'[8] and in particular in his comparative study of Śaṅkara and Hegel entitled 'Some Aspects of the Absolutism of Śaṅkaracharya'.[9]

Nikunja Vihari Banerjee (1897–1982), disciple of K.C. Bhattacharyya, Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy for a long time in the University of Delhi and subsequently, from 1965–67, professor of philosophy and comparative religion at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, is another eminent Indian thinker who shows himself greatly impressed by the philosophy of Kant and German Idealism in general, especially in his books *Concerning Human Understanding* (1958, his first published book) and *Language, Meaning and Persons* (1963). In 1957, during his lecture tour in Germany, he met Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers with whom he entered into a discussion on the problem of being. And in 1969, when, as an official nominee of the Government of India, he delivered lectures at universities in Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, he took the opportunity to revisit Germany and lecture at the University of Mainz, then and since the early fifties a centre of Kantian and Phenomenological research.[10] In our context, Banerjee's book on Kant deserves particular attention. Originally submitted as his Ph.D thesis at the University of London in 1932, it might still be slumbering in the archives, had it not been for the persistency of Margaret Chatterjee, Banerjee's colleague at Delhi during the years 1956 to 1964, that the thesis was traced and its author was persuaded to have it published.[11]

The book *Kant's Philosophy of the Self*, eventually appeared in 1974 and was 'Dedicated to the memory of Immanuel Kant on the occasion of the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of his birth'. I consider this study a most remarkable approach to the crucial problem of distinction and interrelation of inner and outer self. His posthumously published *Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy* (1985) also proves Banerjee's profound acquaintance with German philosophy, in particular with Leibniz, Kant and Hegel.

In 1966, Syed Vahiduddin (born 1909), prominent among Indian Muslim philosophers, moved from Osmania University, Hyderabad, where he had taught for more than twenty years, to the University of Delhi, as Professor and Head of the philosophy department. Of the older generation he is the one who established closest contacts with German philosophy and some of its outstanding contemporary representatives when studying in the universities of Berlin, Marburg, and Heidelberg. Vahiduddin took his doctorate at Marburg in 1937, with a comparative study on 'The Experience of Values in the Context of the Cultures of the East and the West.' Rudolf Otto, in whose house at Marburg he lived for two years, Karl Jaspers in Heidelberg and in Berlin Nicolai Hartmann—three thinkers who then, besides Heidegger, dominated the philosophical and, in the case of Rudolf Otto, the theological stage in Germany—were greatly responsible for Vahiduddin's philosophical development.[12] His critical assessment of Kant's thought system as well as his research in phenomenology and the Neo-Kantian movement of the Southwest German School (Windelband, Rickert) would certainly not have been so successful without his direct exchange of thoughts with these eminent thinkers. Thus Vahiduddin writes in his essay 'Man and God' (An Essay in Transcendental Personalism): 'In my philosophy of values I am chiefly influenced by the current of the German axiological thought, by the teachings of Lotze, Scheler, N. Hartmann, Windelband and above all by the excellent investigations of H. Rickert.'[13] This decisive influence is also obvious in his considerations on 'Man's Consciousness of Death'.[14]

A comparison between Advaita Vedānta and German Idealism in the shape of Hegelianism is the main objective of Poola T. Raju (born 1903), for instance in his book *Thought and Reality: Hegelianism and Advaita* (1937) and in his article 'The Hegelian Absolute and the Individual'.[15] His comprehensive study, *Idealistic Thought of India*, 1953 (German edition 1969), reveals his deep insight into Kant's and Hegel's specific types of Idealism: 'In his *Thought and Reality—Hegelianism and Advaita*, Raju compares the two idealistic systems on a logical level. In his *Idealistic Thought of India* this method of conceptual comparison is very admirably

undertaken.'[16]

Raju, a close friend of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, taught philosophy and psychology at Jaipur University from 1949 to 1962 and, after shifting to the USA, in the University of Illinois; he was Professor of Philosophy and Indian Studies at Wooster College, Ohio. In the early sixties he also held a guest-professorship in the West German University of Mainz. A sort of stock-taking of his being at home in Eastern and Western thought and their encounters is available is his *Introduction to Comparative Philosophy*, 1962 (first Indian edition, Delhi, 1992). With reference to Western, Chinese and Indian philosophy, Raju deals in detail with subject matter, aims and methods of comparative philosophy.

K.C. Bhattacharyya, Poola T. Raju and other interpreters of Hegel in the first half of our century have undoubtedly been benefited from the studies in Hegelianism of the grand old master, so to speak—Hiralal Haldar (1865–?), whose Ph.D. thesis at Calcutta University on Hegelianism and Human Personality (1910) and whose profound study in Neo-Hegelianism (1927) though considerably influenced by the Hegel interpretation of British thinkers, prove Haldar's expert insight into the basic motives, methods and doctrines of Hegelian philosophy. In the preface to *Neo-Hegelianism* he writes:

> For such philosophical ideas as I have, I am indebted to no system of thought more than to Neo-Hegelianism, except Hegel himself. The study and interpretation of Hegel and the philosophical movement which has arisen from his influence has been the chief occupation of my life.

Haldar, who held for some time the prestigious King George V professorship in Calcutta University, may be called without exaggeration one of the pioneers of academic philosophy in India, and it was mainly due to his and K.C. Bhattacharyya's new approach to philosophy, their new interpretation of the concept of philosophy, that 'Calcutta University became the first major centre of academic philosophical study in the Western sense'.[17]

Whereas the chief occupation of Haldar's life was, as we have seen, the study of Hegel and Hegelianism, the chief occupation of Jitendranath Mohanty's life as a philosopher has been the study and interpretation of Husserl and the movement of phenomenology. And with Jitendranath Mohanty (born 1928) we have mentioned one of the small but important number of contemporary academic Indian philosophers who have conducted at least a considerable part of their studies in Germany, with reputed German philosophers as their guides or friends and who, because of their fairly good knowledge of the philosophical scene in Germany, its historical and systematic roots, seem to be specially qualified partners for such a dialogue as mentioned above. Mohanty hails from Calcutta University where he was a student of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, K.C. Bhattacharyya's son and intellectual heir. His teacher writes about him:

> Mohanty, one of the finest thinkers and scholars of the present day . . . was one of my closest students for many years and I have been going through his writings since he first took to it. And my first lessons in phenomenology and neo-Kantian philosophy I had from him.[18]

Mohanty took his Doctorate of Philosophy at the West German University of Goettingen where he came under the influence of 'Goettingen Phenomenology' and Nicolai Hartmann's Critical Realism. He shows himself deeply indebted to Hermann Wein, Hartmann's disciple, who wrote the Foreword to Mohanty's *Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred North Whitehead. A Study in Recent Platonism* (1957). Mohanty, in return, contributed an article to the felicitation volume on Hermann Wein's 60th birth anniversary, 1975, entitled *The System and the Phenomena: The Kant-Interpretations of Nicolai Hartmann and P.F. Strawson.* This together with his essay 'The Principles of Kant-Interpretation in Modern German Philosophy'[19] prove Mohanty's familiarity with Kant and Kantianism also. Yet he has been under the spell of Husserl since his early years at Calcutta when he read Husserl's *Ideen zu einer reinen Phaenomenologie und phaenomenologischen Philosophie* in English translation, a book—he confesses—'which introduced me to the philosopher trying to comprehend (and interpret) whom, I had to spend the rest of my life.'[20]

Indeed, there is no philosopher, writing in English, who has contributed so much as Mohanty to a genuine understanding and adequate interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology. I mention only some of his books and leave out more than thirty articles on the subject matter: *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning* (1964; 3rd edn. with a new introductory essay, 1977); *Phenomenology and Ontology* (1970); *Transcendental Phenomenology. An Analytical Account* (1989), are profound investigations into essentials of phenomenology and at the same time testimonies of Mohanty's permanent attempt to bridge the gulf between Western and Eastern thought by comparing certain key concepts and principles of modern European, especially German philosophy from Kant to Husserl with those of the Vedānta and the logical realism of Nyāya. And in so doing he tries hard to mediate between the phenomenological and the analytical ways of philosophizing. Mohanty was Assistant Professor of Indian philosophy in the research department of Sanskrit College Calcutta and then Vivekananda Professor of Philosophy at Burdwan University. Most of his research has, however, been done after moving to the USA, as Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, Graduate Faculty, in the prestigious New School for Social Research, New York, and as Director of the Husserl Archives there. At present he is at Temple University, Philadelphia.

Despite his deep reverence for Husserl, Mohanty has never been an uncritical follower of his master's voice and way; this becomes obvious

when going through the contributions to the felicitation volume, *The Philosophy of J.N. Mohanty*. I think one could agree with R.A. Mall's assessment there:

> Is Mohanty a Husserlian? That he is a phenomenologist in his own right would be made amply clear in the course of this paper. . . . Mohanty *is* and *is not* a Husserlian. He is a Husserlian to the extent that he remains faithful to the original spirit of the phenomenological programme of clarification of meaning by following the ideal of pure description beyond all interpretation, justification, idealization and theory formation. He is not Husserlian when he does not try to be (wish to be) a Husserl-philologist. Thus, he differs from Husserl just to meet him.[21]

Closely related to Mohanty was Jarava Lal Mehta (1912–88) of whom Mohanty writes in his introduction to Mehta's posthumously published collection of papers from 1970 to 1988, entitled *Philosophy and Religion:*

> In the mid-fifties in India, J.L. Mehta and I were possibly the only two philosophers preoccupied with contemporary German philosophy. He was reading Heidegger, I was reading Husserl—these, to be sure, were our main focus of study. This forged an intimate inner link between us. He was in Banaras and I in Calcutta (. . .) I had returned from Goettingen, he was about to leave for Freiburg. . . . I knew that Banaras did not give him his due. At Harvard he received that recognition. The Heidegger book—a work of great scholarship, clarity of understanding and remarkable insight alone should have earned him what he deserved back in India. But academic politics being what it is, he had to leave.
>
> Hannah Arendt, during a conversation at the New School, said to me: 'Do you know that the best book on Heidegger, in any language, is written by an Indian?'[22]

Mehta taught philosophy at Banaras Hindu University for two decades. From 1971–73 he was guest professor in the University of Hawaii, Honolulu; from 1968–71 and 1973–79 he was visiting professor at the Centre for the Study of World Religions at Harvard. He returned to India, settled at Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh, went again to Harvard in May 1988 to continue some research on the *Ṛg Veda* and the *Mahābhārata*, and passed away there on 11th July 1988.

The obituary of *JICPR* VII, 2, 1990 says: 'He was . . . one of the few Indian philosophers conversant with modern German philosophy and an internationally recognized Heidegger scholar.' His studies in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger have, indeed, secured him international reputation, in particular his book *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (1967), a slightly altered version of his doctoral dissertation of 1963, the revised edition of which appeared in 1976 under the title *Martin Heidegger. The Way and the Vision*. In the preface to this book he writes:

> This work could not have been written without the benefit of the ten months I spent at the Universities of Cologne and Freiburg during 1957–58. I am grateful to the Alexander-von-Humboldt-Stiftung for the award of a grant which made this stay possible and to Professor Dr. Heinz Heimsoeth for his continued help and encouragement, both personal and academic.[23]

He then mentions among his guides and supervisors the phenomenologists Ludwig Landgrebe, Walter Biemel (whose Heidegger biography Mehta translated into English in 1976),[24] Eugen Fink, and he continues:

> Above all, I am profoundly grateful to Professor Martin Heidegger for allowing me the privilege of meeting and talking with him, more than once, in his house, for his cordiality and his kindness in arranging contacts helpful in my study of his thought.[25]

Mehta reveals his familiarity with contemporary German philosophy in his references to thinkers like Gerhard Krueger, Karl Loewith, Otto Poeggeler, Walter Schulz, Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck and especially to Hans-Georg Gadamer.

He could not, however, in spite of his unrestricted reverence for Heidegger (in whom he even discovers a 'Western kind of rishi'),[26] overcome the master's complete disregard of ancient Indian philosophy:

> From Immanuel Kant to Karl Jaspers, German philosophers have exhibited, in varying measure, an awareness of ancient Indian philosophy which is completely absent in Martin Heidegger's writings. This appears strange in a thinker whose knowledge of Hegel and Nietzsche was so intimate and whose personal contacts with Karl Jaspers and Max Scheler were so close. It is true that he does refer a couple of times to Indian philosophy, but he does that only to declare that there is no such thing, and to make the point that 'philosophy' is in essence a Greek-Western phenomenon.[27]

Mehta is inclined to think that Heidegger's restriction of the terms 'philosophy' and 'metaphysics' to the form of thought that is based on ancient Greek foundations and developed in the West is not an arbitrary one:

> What is important here . . . is not whether these terms may legitimately be used for the Indian tradition of thought, but to see each tradition in its particularity, that is, in its uniqueness as a historical phenomenon. Heidegger's archeological critique of the Western tradition, his quest for the 'meaning' enables us to see it in its otherness, liberating us from the prevailing Hegelian notion that Indian thought is only 'a first sketch', in Merleau-Ponty's words, of the Western mode of thought

and a failure in the same kind of undertaking.[28]

Mehta, though intimately acquainted with Western thought, felt yet at home in the Indian spiritual tradition, and hence—as a wanderer between two worlds—was always concerned with the problem of a mutual understanding of the two entirely different philosophical aproaches to life and the world, an endeavour for which the collection of essays, *India and the West: The Problem of Understanding* (1985) offers convincing testimonies as, for instance, this:

> Can we simply turn our backs on our past, just discard it, and appropriate the final fruits of Western self-understanding as *the* inner telos of man universally and as such, or shall we reject the spiritual-philosophical endeavour of the West altogether as of no consequence and seek to entrench ourselves into a specifically Indian philosophizing in the language of the past and supposedly undisturbed by the alien world of meanings embodied in the English language we employ for the purpose? Or shall we begin to *understand* both in their mutual otherness, to learn the language of each and so to evolve ways of thinking and talking which will be truly appropriate to our membership of both worlds, striving in such fashion to transform it into one?[29]

'Problems of Understanding' is also the title of Mehta's last article, based on a lecture held at Harvard on 13th June 1988, less than a month before his death. And problems of understanding are essentially the core of what is called 'hermeneutics' in contemporary philosophy. Looking back at his studies in Germany, Mehta writes:

> As a student of philosophy I had long been under the spell of Martin Heidegger's thought and then of Hans Gadamer's writings on philosophical hermeneutics and the debate generated by the publication of his *Wahrheit und Methode* in 1960.[30]

And then he quotes a sentence from this work of Gadamer's which could just as well pass as Mehta's basic principle when approaching a philosophical work or its author:

> We do not really understand and explicate a text . . . so long as we take it only as a historical document and do not translate it so that it speaks to us in our present concrete situation, so long, in other words, as it is not applied to the historical point where we stand, here and now.[31]

Ten years after Mehta's dissertation, Chintamani Pathak published his (revised) disssertation on 'The Problem of Being in Heidegger' (1974). Pathak, then teaching at McMaster University, Canada, who during his stay at the University of Munich, Germany, had some exchange of thoughts with Johannes Lotz and Hans-Georg Gadamer, attempts—as he writes in the preface—to 'thematize the central problem of Being and

hermeneutics in Heidegger's thought', which in his opinion has never been done before. This sounds surprising in view of Mehta's subtle study, and indeed Pathak mentions Mehta's standard work in the bibliography only, whereas he refers in the text to many less relevant books and essays of other authors. Far from satisfying his above cited claim, Pathak's small book could nevertheless serve as a first introduction for Indian students to Heidegger's thought, its problems and method.

Mehta was succeeded at Banaras University by N.S.S. Raman (born 1928) on whose philosophical development German thought has exercised a decisive effect. He spent four years in West Germany, 1964–68, and took his D.Phil. at the University of Mainz with a thesis in German on Karl Jaspers. His guide and supervisor of studies was Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen (1898–1979), best known for his investigations in Ethics and Axiology and his opposition to Heidegger. Besides, Rintelen was well informed about extra-European trends in philosophy and had participated in several international philosophers' meetings, even in India. Raman, who was Rintelen's assistant professor, has a very solid command over the German language which enables him to analyse, even linguistically complicated notions and terms in Husserl and Heidegger satisfactorily, as, for instance, the slight but important nuances in such notions as 'Widersinn' and 'Unsinn' in Husserl, the content and range of 'Erlebnis' in Heidegger or also Jaspers' subtle distinction between 'Geschichte' and 'Historia'. His solid and erudite knowledge of German enables Raman to an authentic conduct of comparative studies which are meant to be more than a mere omnibus account of similarities and differences of various Eastern and Western systems and schools of thought. Of his numerous publications I mention, in our context, the following: 'Kant's Doctrine of the Self and Its Relevance to Existenzphilosophie',[32] 'Reality of the Self and the Categories of Thought',[33] which is a critical discussion of Kant's dichotomy between phenomenon and noumenon, appearance and reality. Indispensable for anybody working in the field of comparative philosophy are Raman's 'The Problem of Philosophical Translation'[34] and 'Is Comparative Philosophy Possible'?[35]

With Rajender Kumar Gupta, (born 1930), I now turn to another Indian philosopher who was exposed to the direct influence of German philosophy during his years in Germany and who, perhaps not so much through voluminous publications but more through his teaching, has evoked in his students the disposition for an open-minded, unprejudiced dialogue with the West. Gupta, for decades and till his recent retirement (July 1993) Head of the Department of Philosophy at St Stephen's College, New Delhi (and anybody being familiar with the Indian academic scene knows that this is a noble address for higher studies), spent the years 1952–55 as a research scholar for doctoral work in philosophy at the University of Bonn where he was closely associated with Gerhard Funke,

a phenomenologist who in later years, since 1972, became the successor of my former teacher, the late Gottfried Martin, as chief editor of *Kant-Studien.* In 1955 the philosophical faculty of the University of Bonn conferred on Gupta the degree of D. Phil. for his thesis on 'The Conception of Intrinsic Value in Moore—An Evaluation in the Light of the Phenomenological Value Philosophy of Max Scheler.' In 1961 he was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship of the Alexander-von-Humboldt-Stiftung, doing research at the University of Mainz from 1961–63, again with Gerhard Funke.

R.K. Gupta is mainly concerned with studies in ethics, which is also the title of his book written in German and published in Germany: *Studien zur Ethik* (Bonn 1967), his investigations being rooted in Kantian and Phenomenological philosophy. Among his numerous essays dealing with German, especially Kantian philosophy, I mention: 'Eine Schwierigkeit in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunftund Heideggers Kantinterpretation';[36] 'Ethical Theories';[37] 'Kant's Groundwork of Morality';[38] 'Kant's Problem of the Possibility of the Categorical Imperative';[39] 'Does Kant Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy?';[40] 'Kant's Definition of an Analytic Proposition';[41] 'Kant's Definition of an Analytic Proposition. A Further Consideration'.[42]

Finally I turn to Margaret Chatterjee (born 1925) who as an academic teacher and as an author has contributed much towards a mutual understanding of European and Indian thought, in their traditional roots as well as in their present encounter. From 1956 to 1990 she taught philosophy in the University of Delhi, with two short interruptions when, in 1976–77, she was professor of Comparative Religion at Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, and in spring 1983 being a visiting professor at Drew University, Madison, New Jersey, USA. In 1987–88 she also held the post of Director of the Indian Insitute of Advanced Study at Simla. Referring to her activities after retirement she wrote to me in January 1992:

> I retired from Delhi University in September 1990 and have been peripatetic ever since. I taught in Birmingham for a term and was Spalding Visiting Fellow at Wolfson College Oxford. I then had a Commonwealth Fellowship at the University of Calgary, Canada, in the Department of Religious Studies.

At present and since 1992 Margaret Chatterjee has been teaching in the Department of Religious Studies at Westminster College Oxford and is now looking forward to the challenge of her teaching assignment as Lady Davis Visiting Professor at Jerusalem Hebrew University in 1994.

Of her books the one that impressed me most was *Philosophical Enquiries* (1968, 2nd edn., 1988). Under this rather neutral title is hidden the whole history of (Western) philosophy *in nuce,* envisaged from a problem-oriented point of view. What makes this book most interesting to me, as

one who was trained and is still used to philosophizing in the Kantian tradition, is that the author's dealing with such fundamental problems as space and time, freedom and necessity, mind and body, the existence of God, the problem of evil, the nature of value, philosophy and science, philosophy and religion, the possibility of metaphysics *et al.* is being carried out as a permanent dialogue with Kant and his critical/transcendental method of philosophizing, whereby Margaret Chatterjee's firm command of German makes the textual sources (Kant, Hegel, N. Hartmann, Heidegger and others) directly accessible to her. This becomes also obvious in her book *The Existentialist Outlook* (1973) which is based upon a series of lectures in the philosophy department of Poona University in February 1972. The book brings out clearly the difference of German *Existenzphilosophie* as fundamental ontology (Heidegger, Jaspers) and French *Existentialisme* (Sartre, Camus) with its politico-social attitude and intention. Margaret Chatterjee, R.K. Gupta, N.S.S. Raman were also most valuable participants in the first All India Kant Seminar which I, as the then Head of Max Mueller Bhavan, Madras, in co-operation with the Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, under the directorship of T.M.P. Mahadevan, conducted on 6th and 7th December 1974, in commemoration of Kant's 250th birth anniversary. Among the other participants were such well known philosophers as R. Balasubramanian and T.N. Ganapathy, Madras, and Pritibhushan Chatterji, Calcutta.[43]

Of late, too, we notice that the main topics of Indian studies in German philosophy have remained the same, namely Kant, Hegel and Phenomenology. Here is a selection:

T.N. Ganapathy, Madras, 'The Aporias in Kant's Theory of Being', *Indian Philosophical Annual,* 9, Madras, 1973–74.

Pritibhushan Chatterji, Calcutta, 'The Moral Imperative: A Comparative Study', *Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses,* II, 2, 1974.

K.K. Bagchi, Santiniketan, 'Kant's Enquiry and Transcendental Analysis', *Akten des 5. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses,* 1, 2, 1981.

R. Sundara Rajan, Poona, 'Reflection and Constitution: Kant, Hegel and Husserl', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research,* III, 1, 1985.

P.K. Sen, Jadavpur, 'Kant's Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories,' *Journal of the Indian Academy of Philosophy,* XXVIII, 2, 1989.

K. Sundaresan, Madras, *Political Philosophy of Immanuel Kant,* 1989.

The author who passed away on 30th January 1992 at the age of forty-four has left to us a subtle study into an often neglected part of Kant's thought. Due to Sundaresan's detailed explanation of basic concepts and principles, the book could even serve as a reliable introduction to Kant's philosophy in general.

B. Dhar, Darjeeling, 'Some Reflections on Husserl's Approach to the Problem of Transcendence, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly,* Students' Supplement, New Series, XVIII, 1, 1991.

K.P. Yadav, Banaras, 'The Problem of Moral Freedom and Nicolai

Hartmann' (ibid.).

P.K. Das, Burdwan, 'The Concept of Ego in Husserl's Philosophy', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Students' Supplement, New Series. XVIII, 2, 1991; 'The Problem of the World in Husserl's Phenomenology', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, VIII, 2, 1991.

S.K. Pal, Burdwan, 'Significance of the Theory of Life-World in Husserl's Phenomenology', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Students' Supplement, New Series, XVIII, 3, 1991; 'Phenomenology as the Foundation of Psychology', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, VIII, 2, 1991.

As to comparative studies in Indian Philosophy and Phenomenology/*Existenzphilosophie*, I should also mention M.K. Malhotra who was Professor of Psychology in Bergische Universitaet Wuppertal, West Germany from 1972 to the late eighties. I refer to his articles (written in German) 'Die indische Philosophie und die Phaenomenologie Husserls: Der Begriff der "Wahrnehmung" in den beiden Denkrichtungen',[44] und 'Die Philosophie Karl Jaspers' und die indische Philosophie'.[45] The latest important addition to the numerous investigations into 'Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy' is the collection of essays under this very title. On noticing among the contributors such names as K.K. Bagchi, R. Balasubramanian, S. Bhattacharyya, Margaret Chatterjee, D.P. Chattopadhyaya, J.L. Mehta, J.N. Mohanty and R. Sundara Rajan one cannot doubt relevance and reliability of this publication.[46]

One would have noticed that the majority of the Indian philosophers mentioned in this survey are from the north of India whereas the south is only represented by a few, albeit important, thinkers. This may have many reasons, one certainly being that the Dravidian south has always tried to keep aloof from the Aryan north and thus of Western influence. Many a thinker in the south is still convinced that their indigenous culture was the cradle and is the climax not only of Indian philosophy but of that spiritual activity which really deserves the name philosophy (though there is no proper equivalent in Sanskrit or any Dravidian language for the Greek word *philosophia*). And the mental attitude of such thinkers towards Western philosophical thought systems and their representatives does not seldom amount to intolerance and inclusivism. In the West, on the other hand, there has developed a similar attitude of arrogant neglect towards Eastern, in particular Indian thought; and speaking of Germany I would repeat what I have said in the beginning of this survey, that in this respect of disrespect a direct line could be drawn from Hegel via Husserl to Heidegger and his epigones.[47]

As I have said before, to those who deal with the philosophy of other cultures only in order to exhibit their inferiority to their own thought, the term 'World Philosophy' makes no sense. World Philosophy in the sense of *Philosophia Perennis* means that the history of philosophy is not just a chronological sequence of different, often contradictory trends and

schools of thought, but that it should be taken as the ever anew tackling of the pervading fundamental problems by various thinkers at various times and in different regions of the globe; and such an idea of World Philosophy can thus be represented only by those who—by means of impartial critical analyses and with an unprejudiced open mind—aim at a real image of other, foreign philosophical thoughts and not at their caricatures or dummies. In the words of Poola T. Raju: 'The philosopher who thinks that his own philosophy is the absolute model does not gain anything from comparative philosophy. He is already self-assured, and his interest can at the most be one of vain curiosity or self-glorification.'[48] Yet there are enough thinkers, east and west of Suez, who take the arrogant stand attributed to Caliph Omar of Alexandria: 'If other philosophies say the same as mine, they are unnecessary; if, however, they do not say the same, they are simply false.'

As to my knowledge, relying on many years of direct experience in India, an image of German philosophy has not yet been created in Indian thought, and I would not subscribe to T.M.P. Mahadevan's statement that there is 'in India, among those who study philosophy, a fairly intimate acquaintance with the major thought-systems of Europe and of the West'.[49] This is surely true, for obvious reasons, concerning British philosophy, but I doubt whether this holds also for an acquaintance with German philosophy, let alone a real image of it. Yet there is at least some indication that the works and teachings of Indian philosophers such as mentioned in this survey (those whom I have forgotten to mention may pardon me) have contributed to create such an image and to evoke in the minds of their students a response to the challenge from across the ocean—an exchange of thoughts towards which this survey might be a humble contribution.

Notes and References

1. I quote from N.S.S. Raman's 'Is Comparative Philosophy Possible?', in *Indian Philosophy Today*, edited by N.K. Devaraja, Delhi, 1975, p. 213: 'Advaita Vedānta in India has always believed that the whole of the tradition preceding it necessarily leads to its own philosophy. All the preceding systems of philosophy are stated to be just various inadequate forms of Advaita. Carrying the argument further, the Advaitin regards even some of the aspects of Western thought as 'inferior' to Advaita. The refusal to grant independence to other views has led to dogmatism bordering on religious bigotry.'
2. W. Halbfass, *India and Europe*, Delhi, 1990, p. 98.
3. T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Invitation to Indian Philosophy*, Delhi, 1974, p. 409.
4. *Current Trends in Indian Philosophy*, edited by K. Satchidananda Murty and K. Ramakrishna Rao, Waltair, 1972, p. 294.
5. *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, Muirhead Library of Philosophy, London, 1936.
6. Herbert Herring, 'Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's Concept of Philosophy', in *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. X, No. 1, September/December 1992, pp. 1–12.

7. In *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, London, 1936.
8. In *The Review of Philosophy and Religion*, VI, 1, 1935.
9. In *The Allahabad University Studies*, 1928.
10. I take the liberty to mention that I took my D. Phil. degree at Mainz University in June 1953 with a thesis on 'Das Problem der Affektion bei Kant' published as *Kant-Studien*, Supplementary Vol. 67.
11. Cf. 'The Philosophy of Nikunja Vihari Banerjee', edited by Margaret Chatterjee, ICPR, Delhi, 1990, Preface.
12. In 1935 Rudolf Otto had published a new translation of the *Bhagavad Gītā*. A year earlier his book *Die Urgestalt der Bhagavad Gītā* (The Original Form of the Bhagavad Gītā.) had aroused a passionate discussion among Indologists and Theologians. His opus magnum *Das Heilige* (The Idea of the Holy), 1917, became a 'bestseller, with 22 editions/impressions within fifteen years. (In comparison, Heidegger's famous *Sein und Zeit*, 1927, had its sixth edition in 1949 only.)
13. In *Current Trends in Indian Philosophy*, Waltair, 1972, p. 274.
14. In *Freedom, Progress and Society, Essays in Honour of K. Satchidananda Murty*, Delhi, 1986.
15. In *Philosophy*, July 1934.
16. N.S.S. Raman 'Is Comparative Philosophy Possible?', *Indian Philosophy Today*, Delhi, 1986.
17. W. Halbfass, op. cit., p. 294.
18. In *The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya*, edited by Daya Krishna, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Poona, 1985, p. 202.
19. In *K.C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume*, Amalner, Indian Institute of Philosophy, 1957.
20. In *The Philosophy of J.N. Mohanty*, edited by Daya Krishna/K.L. Sharma, ICPR, Delhi, 1991, p. 201; Mohanty reports in his article 'The Concept of Rationality', in *Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy*, ICPR, Delhi, 1992, p. 8, that it was in the private library 'of that indefatigable scholar|RashVihari Das' that he got hold of Boyce Gibson's translation of Husserl's *Ideas*, the same R.V. Das (another disciple of K.C. Bhattacharyya's) whom we owe a valuable contribution to Indian research in Kantianism for his *Handbook to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*.—That first encounter with the work of Husserl, to which Mohanty refers, happened in 1949; hence what he had read was Volume I of Husserl's *Ideas for A Pure Phenomenology*, i.e. the general introduction which had appeared in 1913. Volumes II and III appeared only posthumously in 1952.
21. R.A. Mall, *The Philosophy of J.N. Mohanty*, p. 94. (Mall has been teaching philosophy in Germany for years, first at Bergische Universitaet Wuppertal and presently at the University of Bremen.)
22. J.L. Mehta in *Philosophy and Religion. Essays in Interpretation*, ICPR, Delhi, 1990, p. v. Mehta's *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* has three parts: (I) Heidegger's Way of Thought; (II) Being and Time; (III) The Roots of Western Metaphysical Thinking (dealing with the early essays and the Western metaphysical tradition). Here Mehta demonstrates his genuine knowledge of Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche.
23. I remember that Heinz Heimsoeth, who was also my revered teacher of philosophy in the University of Cologne from 1946–50, once remarked in a discussion with me (I used to visit him on my home leaves during my first stay in India, from 1969–75) that if among Indian philosophers there were such brilliant scholars as Mehta, there was something to be hoped for the idea of World Philosophy.
24. Besides T.R.V. Murti and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Landgrebe and Biemel were the other examiners of his doctoral thesis.
25. J.L. Mehta in Preface to *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*.
26. Cf. *Philosophy and Religion*, pp. 26 ff.
27. Ibid., p. 49.
28. Ibid., pp. 16 f.

29. J.L. Mehta, *India and the West; The Problem of Understanding*, 1985, p. 159.
30. In *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. XXXIX, 1, 1989, p. 3. An English translation of Gadamer's book appeared 1975 under the title *Truth and Method*.
31. Ibid., p. 10.
32. In *Immanuel Kant*. Proceedings of the Seminars Madras/Calcutta, 1974, A Max Mueller Bhavan, Madras, 1975.
33. In *Indian Philosophical Annual*, University of Madras, X, 1974–75.
34. Ibid., VII, 1971.
35. In *Indian Philosophy Today*, Delhi, 1975.
36. In *Zeitschrift fuer Philosophische Forschung*, Meisenheim/Glan, Germany, XVI/3, 1962.
37. In *Kant-Studien*, 1, 1969.
38. In *Studi Internazionali di Filosofia*, 3, 1971.
39. In *Kant-Studien*, 1, 1973.
40. In *Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, II, 1, 1974.
41. In *International Studies in Philosophy*, I, 1, 1976.
42. In *Akten des 5. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, 1981/I, 1.
43. Papers presented published in *Immanuel Kant*, see note 32.
44. In *Zeitschrift fuer Philosophische Forschung*, XIII, 1959.
45. Ibid., XV, 1961.
46. *Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy*, edited by D.P. Chattopadhyaya, L. Embree, J. Mohanty, ICPR, Delhi, 1992.
47. As to the study of Hegel, in particular his understanding of Indian thought in the context of the history of philosophy, Ignatius Viyagappa (born 1942), a Jesuit and member of the teaching staff at Satya Nilayam (Institute of Philosophy and Culture) Madras, should be mentioned. He has conducted research in Italy and Germany, and his knowledge of German enabled him to directly approach the texts critically. His doctoral thesis on 'G.W.F. Hegel's Concept of Indian Philosophy' (published as *Documenta Missionalia* 14, Gregorian University Rome, 1980) is an erudite study of the essential motives and principles of Hegel's system, especially of his concept of history in its intimate interrelation with the concept of individual freedom, meaning the individual's gradual conscious awareness of freedom. It is under this aspect that, according to Viyagappa, Hegel's at first sight entirely negative assessment of Indian thought must be judged, namely as not being philosophical in the genuine, proper (Hegelian) understanding of philosophy. Based upon this doctoral thesis are the Swamikannu Pillai Endowment Lectures 1979–80 which Viyagappa delivered at the University of Madras from 1 to 3 December 1980, entitled, 'G.W.F. Hegel's Critique of Indian Religion and Philosophy' (published in *Journal of the Madras University*, Vol. LV, 1, January 1983, part II, pp. 1–124). I should say that these lectures, delivered in a lucid language, could be recommended as a guide to Indian students when setting sail to face the rough waters and unfathomable speculative abysses of Hegel's thought.
48. Quoted from Archie J. Bahm's 'Standards for Comparative Philosophy', in: *Philosophy East and West, Essays in Honour of T.M.P. Mahadevan*, edited by H.D. Lewis, Bombay, 1976, p. 82.
49. *Invitation to Indian Philosophy*, Delhi, 1974; p. 2.

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Some Comments on Professor Sundararajan's book entitled *Towards a Critique of Cultural Reason*

Prof. Sundararajan has recently developed the Kantian perspective in relation to the realm of culture in his book entitled *Towards a Critique of Cultural Reason*. Building on Ricoeur and Kant, he has distinguished between 'signification' and 'symbolization' on the one hand and the 'determinative' and the 'reflective' judgement on the other. The former distinction relates to the context-bound and the context-free distinction of meaning which is derived from Ricoeur's distinction between speaking and writing which he has discussed earlier. The other distinction between 'determinative' and 'reflective' judgement is based on the distinction where the concept or the essence determines '*completely*' the nature of the perceptual object which falls under it, while the latter, that is, the 'reflective' judgement, is supposed to be about those perceptual objects which have an immanent organic unity in them which, though perceived and comprehended as such, cannot be exhaustively articulated in any finite set of judgements because there is no pre-existent essence outside the organic unity of the work which is perceptually apprehended. Prof. Sundararajan makes another distinction among objects which are apprehended as organic unities and whose comprehension is articulated in a 'reflective' judgement. This is the distinction lying in the fact that while an aesthetic object is normally apprehended in terms of itself, the cultural object is always related to a whole background set of meanings to which it is essentially related and thus functions more as a symbol or rather as a product of symbolization than what he has called signification. Prof. Sundararajan further makes the interesting point that both the aesthetic and the cultural objects are revealed by a disinterested feeling of pleasure which in this context performs a cognitive function.

In spite of the very interesting theory that Prof. Sundararajan has built around some of the major insights of Ricoeur and Kant, he does not seem to have realized that the dichotomous distinctions on which he is relying are basically untenable not only in practice but in principle also. The distinction between signification and symbolization, for example, is untenable on the ground that the latter is not as context-free as Prof. Sundararajan tries to make it. The context may be larger or narrower or even completely specific like those of the indexical expressions such as 'I', 'you', 'there' or 'here' or those which assume a whole *weltanschauung* or a cultural context for the apprehension of their meaning. Language itself, which is a cultural object *par excellence* and is the primary vehicle of

meanings, is embedded in a whole set of syntactical and semantic relationships through which it acquires its specific meaning. Similarly, the distinction between 'determinative' and 'reflective' judgement, though supposed to be derived from Kant, is basically defective because there is always an interplay between the concept and the percept as the concept also gets modified in the light of our perceptual experience in case it is found to be necessary. Also, there are always borderline cases where it is difficult to determine whether the percept falls under the concept or not, thus leading to a situation where we have to choose between coining a new concept or changing the connotation of the old concept in such a way that it can possibly accommodate the new percept which has created the problem.

Prof. Sundararajan's other distinction between the 'aesthetic' and the 'cultural' suffers from the same serious limitations. It is true that an aesthetic object can also function as a cultural object as he points out, but it is not quite correct that a cultural object is discerned by a disinterested pleasure as aesthetic objects usually are. In fact, cultural objects are generally not the objects of disinterested pleasure. Rather, they are cultural objects because they are seen as partisan and specific and as standing in opposition and contrast to the symbolic objects of other cultures. A temple or a beautiful sculpture of the Buddha can arouse aesthetic joy in an orthodox follower of Islam but as a cultural object it can only arouse hostility, repugnance and an impulse to destruction.

The problem of decontextualizing an object, whether in the context of cognition or feeling or action, which Prof. Sundararajan has raised, has perhaps to be seen in a different light. The issue basically relates to the potential utilizability of what is apprehended, even though what is so apprehended or experienced occurs always not only at a particular point of space and time but also in a determinate context, whether the context be of persons or events or even natural surroundings or any other such things. The potential freedom from the bondage of 'origins' is a function of many factors including both the nature of the object apprehended or felt or willed and the mode of apprehending or feeling or willing. There are cognitive objects which are easy to be freed of the context of their origins. Mathematics and knowledge relating to natural phenomena are well known examples of such a kind of cognition. However, even here it must be remembered that the context from which this knowledge is freed is the spatio-temporal context on the one hand, and the subjective personal context on the other. But it cannot and does not become free of the context of related knowledge in mathematics or the natural sciences. Rather, its necessary inter-relationship becomes more and more evident as our knowledge increases and the relative non-contextuality which appeared to be so 'self-evident' earlier seems to be illusory in the context of a fuller knowledge. The same appears to be true of certain kinds of technologies which, because of this character, easily

travel from one cultural zone to another and are freely borrowed by those who had no share in their invention. But this capacity of being free from a certain kind of context of origin is not equally available to all products of human consciousness, though it will be difficult to say if there are any which do not enjoy this capacity at least to some extent because of the simple reason that all men have the capacity of imaginative empathy to enter into a world different from their own. Perhaps, it is those realms where feelings and emotions are integrally involved in the cognitive apprehension itself, which present a greater difficulty in the achievement of such freedom, since it is difficult to summon them at will. There are habits of emotions as there are habits of action and thought. But while it is relatively easier to change one's habits of thought and action, it is far more difficult to change those of feelings and emotions. Not only this, feeling and emotions are more intimately bound to the object which arouses them and this may be the reason why one primarily responds only to those kinds of works of art to which one is habituated in one's culture. The so-called 'disinterested pleasure' which most aesthetic objects are supposed to arouse is 'disinterested' only in the context of what are known as the pragmatic ends of action. They are not disinterested either in the sense that they are unrelated to one's earlier experience of that sort or in the sense that one does not seek them because one had experienced them earlier in relation to the same or similar kinds of objects. One returns back to the aesthetic object which had given one the so-called 'disinterested' pleasure so that one may get it again and hence the return can at least not be said to be as 'disinterested' as it might have been in the first instance. Moreover, the 'disinterested pleasure' is not a 'decontextualized pleasure' as Prof. Sundararajan thinks.

Prof. Sundararajan seems to have been misled by taking Prof. Ricoeur's distinction too seriously and misreading the Kantian enterprise in the field of knowledge. However, the issues to which he has addressed himself are important and deserve an independent study on their own.

University of Rajasthan, Jaipur DAYA KRISHNA

The Tryambaka Mantra: Its Meaning and Significance

THE TWO INTERPRETATIONS

Innumerable are the hymns of the *Rg Veda.* But some of them are considered to be very important, for in them the thought of the Veda is

without a veil and expresses itself in its natural grandeur. And one such hymn is found in 7–59. It runs as follows:

> We adore Tryambaka, possessor of divine odour and increaser of fullness. May I be separated from the bondage of death like a cucumber, not from immortality.[1] (12)

Though this is clearly a prayer for freedom from death, a theme very dear to all Aryan poets, it is difficult to grasp its whole significance. It is so on account of two expressions which occur in the mantra, *viz. urvārukamiva* and *māṁṛtāt*, for they are interpreted differently by different scholars.

The mantra has two distinct parts, one dealing with the attributes of God Tryambaka and the other with a prayer to Him for freedom from death. As we are mainly concerned with the prayer of the devotee, we shall confine ourselves to the second part of the mantra. Before we arrive at a complete understanding of the second part, we shall see how it is interpreted by scholars, both ancient and modern.

Sāyaṇa, the foremost among the ancient scholars, gives the following interpretation: 'Just as a cucumber is severed from the stalk to which it is attached, so do thou deliver me from the cycle of death (*maraṇāt saṁsārādvā*) till immortality (*āmṛtāt*) i.e., till I realize oneness with immortality (*sāyujyatā-mokṣa-paryantam*).[2] According to Sāyaṇa, it is a prayer for removal of the cycle of death as well as attainment of immortality.

Raimundo Panikkar, author of a recent work on the Veda, *The Vedic Experience* (1983), explains the second part of the mantra thus (p. 539): 'The poet . . . knows only too well that Death does not wait for the fruit to fall from the tree by itself through its own impulse. He uses the metaphor of the plucked fruit and asks to be saved from the embrace of Death and handed over to Immortality. The cucumber dies when plucked; Man enters Immortality (when removed from Death)'. In his view the devotee's prayer is simple—he is asking God Tryambaka to remove him from the cycle of death to Immortality.

THE THREE FORMS OF DEATH

Death, according to the Aryan poets, is the limitation of all limitations, the only limitation that matters most. Hence their chief aim is the elimination of death and the possession of that which is unassailed by death, *amartyam*. Hymn after hymn in the Veda deals with the subject of passing from death to freedom-from-death. This passage is referred to as a journey to the self-empire, *svarājye* (5–66–6).

Death is of three forms: one, death occurring before the appointed time; two, death arriving at the end of a full life or in old age which is the appointed time; three, death binding the soul by its cyclical process, a process in which the soul is repeatedly pushed out of the body. We shall see how the Vedic poet deals with them.

Physically speaking, the human body is capable of living a hundred years unhindered by death. Yet this inherent capacity may be impaired by factors such as disease, poison, accident, etc. As a result, death may occur before the appointed time. Hence the Vedic poet seeks the aid of the gods in his effort to overcome untimely or unnatural death. It is a constant theme of the hymns that he must be allowed to live a hundred years here unassailed by death. 'O god Agni, who know all good fortune, extend the days of our existence here' (1–94–16). 'May thou prolong for us the life span yet to be lived' (10–59–5). 'May we live a hundred winters' (6–4–8). 'May we live a hundred autumns' (7–66–16). 'Do not break the natural course of our life in the middle' (1–89–9). 'May you proceed forward, effacing the foot-steps of death and prolonging your span of life' (10–18–2). The poet's desire for a long-extended life is not due to fear of death or attachment for embodied life, for his is a desire resulting from a true perception into the nature of human body—the perception that a hundred years of life for the human body have been ordained by the gods themselves, *devahitam* (1–89–8). 'May the full span of life determined by the gods', hymns the poet, 'be ours' (10–59–4).

Not only does the poet insist on overcoming untimely death by living a full life, *dīrghāyu* (10–62–2), but he is also aware that living a hundred years here represents the highest limit of his physical existence. Like any other body, the human body is a product of perishable substance and by the law of this substance it cannot stay longer than the duration allotted to it. As distinguished from unnatural death, this death, occurring at the end of a full life or working through the ageing process is natural and inevitable. We must bear in mind that whenever the poet is asking for freedom from physical death, his intention is to escape the unnatural and not the natural death which is inevitable.

Death signifies not only the destruction of the body but the departure of the soul as well, the soul that lived and enjoyed habitation in the body. The Vedic poets affirm that at the time of death the soul leaves the body and proceeds to the nether world where disembodied souls live so that it may stay there till conditions are favourable for its return to this world with a new body. 'O Jatavedas', says the poet, 'putting on new life let him approach the surviving, let him reunite with a body' (10–16–5). Just as death is followed by birth, so also birth is followed by death. This is an endless process. A soul subjected to this process goes back and forth helplessly as if mounted on a machine, *yantrārūḍha*. In Vedāntic parlance it is called the cycle of birth (*punarjanma*) or the cycle of death (*punarmṛtyu*). Like living a short life, the cycle of death is a limitation. It is a limitation on the consciousness of the soul and therefore eradicable by raising the consciousness to the Highest beyond the cycle of death, *amartyaḥ* (1–164–30).

In one of the hymns (1–164–32) the sage refers to the soul, *jīvaḥ*, shrouded within the womb of the mother, *mātur yonā parivīto antar*, and

passing through the process of repeated births, *bahuprajāḥ*.[3] On account of its exclusive identification with Nature (*mātuḥ*) the soul is forgetful (*parivītaḥ*) of its true Self (*amartyaḥ*) and subject to the necessity of rebirth (*bahuprajāḥ*). In another passage (5–15–4) the sage tells us that after repeated births the soul grows wide in consciousness and is finally led to the firm Foundation, from which there is no return, and to the Vision, which removes all ignorance, *bharase paprathāno janaṁ janaṁ dhāyase cakṣase ca*. i.e., by rising from the limited to the vast consciousness the soul is released from mortality and established in its native home of immortality. For in reality the mortal soul and the Immortal are the natives of the same imperishable world, *amartyo martyenā sayoniḥ* (1–164–30).

Thus there are three forms of death with which the Vedic poet is concerned. Of them one is inevitable and therefore a natural end of his physical life in the world. Like this death, the other two are not inevitable. They are subject to the will of man and therefore eradicable by his effort. While unnatural death is overcome by living a long life in the body, the cycle of death is overcome by attaining the Immortal in the soul, *amartyam*.

THE MEANING OF THE METAPHOR

As a metaphor, the word *urvārukam* is employed by the poet with a view to convey a complex idea by means of an image. What then is the idea the poet wants to convey by the metaphor?

Let us see how Sāyaṇa interprets the metaphor. To him it is a cucumber severed from its bond, *bandhanād-urvārukam*. He sees that the cucumber is similar to the poet because both are bound,—the former by the stalk (*vṛnta*) and the latter by death (*mṛtyu*). He also sees that the prayer for deliverance from death must be understood on the analogy of severance of the cucumber from the stalk. We shall see how he explains the first part of the prayer. 'Do thou deliver me from the cycle of death (*saṁsārāt*) in the same way as a cucumber is severed from the stalk (*yathā bandhanād-urvārukaṁ. . . mucyate*)'. Unfortunately this does not help us much in understanding the poet's prayer for two important reasons. First, Sāyaṇa has not thrown sufficient light on the sense of the metaphor; second, he has not related the metaphor to the poet's prayer so as to show how exactly the poet wants to be delivered from death.

Why has the metaphor not been given the attention it deserves? Is it because the sense of the metaphor is too obvious to demand that attention? If the cucumber is severed invariably by the same cause, then we may assert that the sense of the metaphor is obvious. But this is not the case. As the cucumber is severed differently by different causes—violent or adverse or natural, the sense of the metaphor is known only when the severance of the cucumber is viewed in the light of the most appropriate cause. Therefore there is no valid reason to believe that the sense of the metaphor is obvious and to pay scant attention to it. It is no exaggeration to say that Sāyaṇa's is an explanation that explains nothing—neither the metaphor nor the poet's prayer of which the metaphor is an essential part.

As if Sāyaṇa is conscious of this lacuna, he makes a suggestion. He tries to explain the metaphor indirectly by suggesting that the aim of the poet is to be delivered from death only through the grace of God, *tvatprasādādeva*.[4] It is putting the cart before the horse. Sāyaṇa has compounded the original difficulty by not showing how his suggestion arises from the sense of the metaphor. The right order of explanation is to move from the metaphor to the poet's prayer and try to understand the prayer by understanding the metaphor. As long as the sense of the metaphor is not carefully explained and related to the poet, the poet's prayer does not make sense.

Apart from this difficulty, Sāyaṇa's construction *bandhanād-urvārukamiva* is based on a wrong perception of the parallelism between the cucumber and the poet. In his view *bandhana* and *mṛtyu* are parallel to each other. As we know, the term *bandhana* has two distinct senses, a tie or a bond and a fetter or a bondage. As a bond, it is not a parallel to *mṛtyu* (death) which is a fetter and an enslavement very difficult to escape. As a bondage, it is surely a parallel to *mṛtyu*. By holding *bandhana* as a parallel to *mṛtyu*, Sāyaṇa insists on the sense of bondage. But at the same time he uses the term *bandhana* to signify the bond, namely, the stalk by which the cucumber is tied. He does not realize that *bandhana* signifying the stalk cannot be a parallel to *mṛtyu*. 'Both bind; therefore both are parallel to each other' is an over-simplification and a blindness to their essential differences. The underlying discord between *bandhana* as a bond and *mṛtyu* becomes visible when we notice how the stalk and death are basically apart and opposed. While the stalk supports, nourishes and protects the cucumber, death enslaves the poet and takes away his freedom of natural growth. One is helpful and the other is harmful. Therefore we have to set aside Sāyaṇa's construction and try to understand the prayer as it is where the metaphor is *urvārukam* and not *bandhanād-urvārukam* and the term *bandhanād* goes naturally with *mṛtyu*, showing how death acts aggressively on the poet, *bandhanān-mṛtyoḥ*.

To turn to Panikkar's interpretation. It is not any better than Sāyaṇa's. He sees the cucumber as a 'plucked fruit', a fruit plucked by Death. He says: 'Death does not wait for the fruit to fall from the tree by itself through its own impulse'. A cucumber plucked by death is not only dead but put to death by violence. Panikkar himself admits that 'the cucumber dies when plucked'. The prayer of the poet is to be delivered from death. He uses the metaphor to unfold by suggestion the full significance of what he is praying for. If we accept Panikkar's interpretation, the metaphor does not perform the intended function; on the contrary, it destroys the original sense of the poet's prayer. The metaphor, as he

explains, signifies a violent removal by death which is contrary to the sense of the prayer where the poet is asking for the destruction of death and its hold upon him.

If Sāyaṇa fails to offer a clear explanation of the metaphor and its significance for the poet, Panikkar goes to the other extreme of putting a wrong interpretation on the metaphor and making it most unsuitable for the poet's purpose.

As the poet compares himself to a cucumber, the first suggestion is that the comparison is between two physical entities—the fruit and the poet's body. Second, as the cucumber and the poet's body are both perishable substances, the poet does not aim at removing the death which destroys through the ageing process. Third, his aim is rather to remove another form of death which destroys through a different process, to which both the cucumber and the poet's body are subject and from which both can be saved. It is within this framework that we have to study the metaphor and its significance for the poet.

The poet is thinking of a cucumber well taken care of by a gardener. The gardener gives full protection to the cucumber and carefully avoids all adverse circumstances which cause destruction to it. By his unbroken support and nourishment, the cucumber is allowed to stay on the plant for the whole time allotted to it and swell into a full-sized ripe fruit. So viewed, the poet is referring to a cucumber saved from destruction which is caused by adverse circumstances, and allowed to enjoy full life and growth under the loving care of a good gardener.

This brings out the intended sense of the poet's prayer as clearly as possible—the sense that he must be separated from unnatural death which operates through adverse circumstances and live to a ripe old age under the benevolent care of God.[5] This not only makes the prayer of the poet intelligible to us but shows very clearly how his aspiration for freedom from unnatural death is consistent with the established attitude of the Aryan poets in general. We have already seen how they are insistent upon living a full life till one reaches old age and not departing from the world before the appointed time.

THE MEANING OF MĀMRTĀT

The prayer as expressed in the first part of the second line of the mantra has become clear to us,—the prayer for freedom from unnatural death and living to a ripe old age. Now we shall proceed to the second part of the prayer, *māmṛtāt.* Its interpretation is organically related to the one given to the first part.

Sāyaṇa takes *mṛtyoh-mukṣīya* to mean freedom from the cycle of death, *maraṇāt saṁsārādvā mocaya.* Evidently it is a prayer for going beyond the cycle of death and attaining immortality. But this does not agree with the second part of the prayer where the devotee is asking God not to deliver him from immortality, *māmṛtāt mukṣīya,* as if he has already become free

from the cycle of death and attained immortality. Further, the second part of the prayer assumes that God is intent upon taking the poet away from immortality. If God is so intent, then why does the poet address his prayer to Him as though He is the deliverer from death? Therefore Sāyaṇa concludes that *māmṛtāt mukṣīya* must be understood as *mām āmṛtāt mocaya* (do thou deliver me till immortality i.e. till I realize oneness with immortality). Note that the original terms *mā* and *amrtāt* have been respectively changed as *mām* and *ā+amṛtāt.*

Though Sāyaṇa's interpretation of *māmṛtāt mukṣīya* is ingenious and grammatically permissible, it is unnatural and unfaithful. Unnatural, because it does violence to the natural sense of the original terms; unfaithful, because it fails to bring out the true intention of the devotee. Unless we recognize that the term *amṛtāt* refers back to *bandhanāt* in the first part of the prayer and is used in a rhetorical form by the poet with a view to make his prayer complete and persuasive and that the former term should therefore be allowed to remain a single word giving the same ablative sense as the latter without changing it into an *avyayībhāva* compound (*ā + amṛtāt*) and reading into it a different ablative sense, our interpretation of *māmṛtāt* can be neither natural nor faithful.[6] But Sāyaṇa may say that if we allow *amṛtāt* to be a single word like *bandhanāt,* the prayer makes no sense. It is true. It makes no sense, not because the poet is confused in his thinking but because Sāyaṇa has no insight into the words of the Vedic poet and does not follow the sequence in which the latter has arranged his thoughts.

There is also a serious flaw in Sāyaṇa's interpretation. According to him, the poet is asking God to deliver him from the cycle of death till he realizes oneness with immortality. It supposes that when one is delivered from the cycle of death, one does not necessarily attain immortality. This is absurd. Since the deliverance itself is immortality, a soul delivered from mortality is necessarily a soul united with immortality.

Now we shall turn to Panikkar. He takes the first part of the prayer as referring to the poet's desire for freedom from the cycle of death that binds the soul. As for the second part, he also sees that it makes no sense as long as *māmṛtāt mukṣīya* is allowed to stand as it is. Hence he takes it as an affirmative idea phrased negatively, an idea arising directly out of the first part of the prayer—'hand over me to Immortality'. This too, like Sāyaṇa's, is far from satisfactory. For Panikkar does not explain why the affirmative idea is stated negatively or why it is not stated affirmatively.

As we have already indicated, *māmṛtāt* has been carefully chosen by the poet with a view to produce the best rhetorical effect in relation to the first part of the prayer *mṛtyoḥ bandhanāt mukṣīya.* More important than this is that *māmṛtāt* is intended to eliminate a limitation inherent in the first part of the prayer—the limitation that the poet is concerned with the removal of untimely death alone and does not care to remove the cycle of death that separates his soul from immortality.

Both Sāyaṇa and Panikkar consider *māmṛtāt* unintelligible because both commit the same mistake—they take *mṛtyu* in the prayer to mean not the physical death but the cycle of death that binds the soul.

THE MANTRA: ITS MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE

We shall now return to the original passage. In the first part of the prayer the devotee is asking Tryambaka to separate him from death and in the second part he adds that he must not be separated from immortality. If we take the prayer as a whole, one important thing becomes clear. When the first part of the prayer is granted, he will certainly be separated from death. But this does not mean that he will be free from the cycle of death which keeps the soul separated from immortality. Hence the prayer that he must not be separated from immortality, *māmṛtāt mukṣīya*. This clearly indicates that in the first part of the prayer the devotee is not asking for freedom from the cycle of death but *something else*. This gives us a vital clue as to what the first part of the prayer precisely means.

We now understand that *mṛtyoḥ-bandhanān-mukṣīya* does not refer to the freedom from the cycle of death. Nevertheless, its reference is to some form of death from which the poet wants to be free. Now the question is this: what kind of death is it if it is not the cycle of death that binds this soul and separates it from immortality? As we have stated in the beginning, the Vedic poet is concerned with two forms of death—the death that binds his body and the death that binds his soul. We have also seen that for the Vedic poet physical death is mainly the death that occurs before the appointed time or before reaching old age. Now it is easy to decide which kind of death is spoken of in the first part of the prayer—it is the death that works through adverse circumstances and cuts short his full span of physical life in the world. We come to the same conclusion when we carefully analyse the metaphor *urvārukam* and put the right interpretation on it.

Now we have understood the prayer as a whole. The poet is praying to God Tryambaka for the fulfilment of two things, one concerning his body and the other his soul. First, he wants to live a full life without having to face physical death till he reaches a ripe old age, even as a cucumber, when separated from untimely death caused by adverse circumstances, attains full growth and becomes a ripe fruit. Second, he does not want at the same time to enjoy merely a full life in the body and remain separated from That which brings freedom to the soul from the cycle of death and bestows upon it the bliss of immortality. The aim of the Aryan poet is therefore to achieve fullness of life outwardly as well as inwardly: outwardly, it is a fullness of physical life; inwardly, it is a fullness of spiritual life. This explains why he has chosen to address his prayer to a God who is the increaser of fullness, *puṣṭivardhanam*.

This mantra which embodies the highest thought of the Veda is

significant in three important respects: first, it shows how the Vedic poet is far advanced in his mental perceptions and in his ability to think clearly and cogently; second, it helps us to understand how he views embodied existence in the world; third, it is a shining example of how the Veda is the ultimate origin of the Vedānta.

(i) In the eyes of the Western scholars, the Vedic poets belong to a society of primitive men whose thoughts have not transcended the limits of the physical and therefore express themselves often in terms of images drawn from the physical world. Further, they maintain that on account of this limitation the poets cannot think clearly or arrange their thoughts in the right order.

If we carefully read the mantra, we find that it does not in the least lend support to the above view. Let us first take the metaphor *cucumber* and see how it is used by the poet. He is thinking of his body. He sees that there are adverse circumstances which can destroy his body and shorten his physical life. But at the same time he sees that his body is capable of living a long-extended life and arriving at a ripe old age, for that is the will of God. As a poet, his aim is to find a suitable literary device by which he can express this complex idea without using abstract language. This he achieves by using *cucumber* as a metaphor. Evidently he uses the metaphor not because he is incapable of going beyond the physical and thinking in abstract terms, but because he sees in it good poetic value, a form of speech that carries multiple significances and so serves as the best means of expressing his abstract ideas.

Now we shall examine the poet's capacity for cogent thinking. Not only is he skilled in giving poetic form to his abstract thought but he moves from idea to idea with the great ease and accuracy of a disciplined thinker. His thoughts have been arranged as perfectly as the notes of a melodious tune. He begins with the prayer that he be separated from untimely death and allowed to live a long life, like a cucumber. Then he realizes that God may think that he does not care if he is not freed from the cycle of death that separates his soul from immortality, and may confer upon him only the boon of a long-extended life. Hence he closes his prayer by asking God not to separate him from immortality, *māmṛtāt*. This testifies to the fact of how the Vedic poet is far advanced in his capacity to think cogently and express his thoughts in the right sequence.

(ii) We cannot think of a better passage than this mantra to understand how the Vedic poet views embodied existence in the world. If we carefully read the second line of the mantra, we find two important things in it. First, the poet is asking for two boons—a long life for the body and immortality for the soul; second, by deliberately connecting the two parts of his prayer through the word *mukṣīya* he suggests that the first is incomplete without the second. A long life in the body is a partial fulfilment of his desire for freedom which becomes complete when the informing soul in the body attains conscious union with immortality.

A long-extended life in the body is sought not for the ignorant soul who is separated from immortality and subject to all that is evil, *viśvāni. . . duritāni* (5–82–5), but for the awakened soul who has attained conscious union with the Immortal who uses the human body as His habitation and lives there as the master of the habitation, *gṛhapati* (4–9–4). United with the Immortal, the soul too becomes a master and uses the body as an instrument for God's work in the world. By so using the body, the poet becomes a doer of divine works, *sukṛtaḥ* (4–13–1). The body is put to a right use when it becomes a good instrument that lives and works for a hundred years in utter obedience to the will of the liberated soul. We find an echo of this Vedic teaching in one of the early Upaniṣads, *īśāvāsyam idaṁ sarvaṁ* (all this is for habitation by the Lord) and *kuruvanneveha karmāṇi jijīviṣet śatam samāḥ* (one should desire to live a hundred years here doing works) (*Īśa Upaniṣad*, 1 and 2).

(iii) We find that nowhere else as in the above passage the intimate connection between Veda and Vedānta is so strikingly evident. A careful study of this mantra and the *Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad* reveals that from this Vedic seed the whole Upaniṣad has been developed. The formula of freedom as set forth in the Upaniṣad in verses 11 and 14—a prolonged life in the body (*mṛtyuṁ tīrtvā*) and a conscious possession of immortality and its manifestation as the law of living in the same body (*amṛtam aśnute*)—is a Vedāntic version of the Vedic mantra.[7]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे सुगन्धिं पुष्टिवर्धनम्।
   उर्वारुकमिव बन्धनान्मृत्योर्मुक्षीय मामृतात्।।
2. *Ṛg Veda Bhāṣya*, 7–59–12.
3. *bahuprajāḥ* is glossed by Sāyaṇa as one who has gone through many births, *bahujanmabhāk*.
4. *Ṛg Veda Bhāṣya*, 7–59–12.
5. Cf. *Ṛg Veda*, 2–33–2. 'By the most salutary medicines given by thee, O Rudra, I would attain a hundred winters'. (*tvādattebhī rudra śaṁtamebhiḥśataṁ himā aśīya bheṣajebhiḥ*).
6. Cf. Sāyana's reading of *māmṛtāt* in his commentary on the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, 1–8–6–5. Here he reads it as *mā + amṛtāt*.
7. For a detailed account of this view the reader is asked to see *Mother India*, Pondicherry, February 1993, pp. 122–30.

Surya Kanti Nagar, Pondicherry N. JAYASHANMUKHAM

Comments

In the *Bṛhadaraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (1.3.28) there is a prayer which is very much similar to the one interpreted in the paper. '*Asato ma sadgamaya, tamaso ma jyotirgamaya, mrityor ma amritamgamaya*' (from evil lead me to good, from darkness lead me to light, from death lead me to immortality. The Upaniṣad itself interprets *asat* (evil) and *tamas* (darkness) as death, and good and light as immortality. The last part of the prayer—from death lead me to immortality—is clear or its meaning is not hidden as the Upaniṣad puts it. If evil and darkness are interpreted as death then that death is not physical death, as immortality, in the Indian context does not mean continued existence or deathlessness. Again in the context of Indian tradition, either Vedic or Vedāntic, immortality is not something that is to be achieved or granted as it is conceived to be the real or ontological nature of man (*ātman*), and no one can be prevented from its realization as it is one's own real nature. Similarly physical death is inevitable as it is natural for anyone born, to die. Both are facts; one is physical and the other ontological. And if death is natural it cannot be escaped, and most importantly, it cannot be conceived as bondage. If bondage is natural like death, it cannot be bondage and there can be no freedom from it. If immortality is the real or ontological nature of man, its realization cannot be prevented. It is only when bondage is due to certain factors one can hope to be liberated from bondage by overcoming those factors that prevent one from realizing his real nature of immortality.

The basic point of Sāyaṇa's interpretation of the hymn is that the prayer is addressed to the deity, traditionally identified with Śiva, to liberate one from bondage which is death, and help him or guide him to immortality.

About the metaphor of cucumber, one should wonder why the poet chose the example of cucumber but not any other fruit. The peculiarity of cucumber is that though it is ripe and even if the plant is dead, it remains attached to the plant, and does not drop down naturally like any other fruit because of its fibrous stem. It has to be detached from the plant, otherwise it remains attached to it. Some effort is required to detach the fruit from the plant, and this is the point the poet intends to compare with the state of man in bondage, to overcome which he prays for divine grace or help. If freedom from bondage is natural, then no effort is required, and also there is no need for divine grace. As the state of immortality is the real or ontological status of man, no effort is required to realize it, but some effort, including divine grace, is necessary to free oneself from the factors that prevent him from realizing his real nature of immortality.

Therefore Sāyaṇa is not far from truth, keeping in view the general context of Indian tradition, in interpreting the death as signifying

bondage from which one wants to be released and attain immortality. And this idea is appropriately communicated with the help of the metaphor of cucumber which is to be detached from the plant. Death and immortality are not to be taken literally as they signify in the spiritual life of a person darkness, evil or ignorance and light, good, divine respectively. As the hymn is a poem, certain words may have only symbolic significance, and the symbols are to be interpreted keeping in view the total context of the tradition. Therefore Sāyaṇa is not wrong in interpreting the hymn as a prayer for divine grace to overcome bondage and attain immortality. As death is not in this sense natural one can pray for divine grace in overcoming it.

If the author of the paper thinks that death here means untimely or unnatural death its prevention or avertion does not lead one to immortality, as immortality is not the same as freedom from death, a natural event. Immortality is a state of realization in which one has to understand and realize his true nature but not something that is automatic which man can attain by escaping from the cycle of life and death. Furthermore, if one is immortal ontologically, then death cannot belong to him, and if one is mortal by nature, one cannot hope to be immortal. If one is really immortal but yet suffers mortality it is due to certain adventitious factors which should be overcome to realize one's real nature of immortality. Towards this end one can evoke divine grace or help.

University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad A. RAMA MURTY

Author's Response to the Comments

Three points have been raised against my interpretation. (1) 'Death' in the prayer cannot be taken as referring to natural death, for natural death is inevitable and what is inevitable cannot be removed. Hence 'there can be no freedom from it' (page 111, para 1, lines 18–19). (2) If 'death' in the prayer is construed as unnatural death, then freedom from this death will only be 'a natural event' (page 112, para 2, lines 1–4), and not immortality which is 'the real or ontological nature of man' (page 111, para 1, line 19). (3) 'Sāyaṇa is not far from truth, keeping in view the general context of Indian tradition, in interpreting the death as signifying bondage from which one wants to be released and attain immortality' (pages 111–112).

None of the points raised by the Referee is legitimate, for his points are not related to the text of my article. They are based on ideas and statements for which I am not at all responsible.

As for the first, I have not said anywhere in the article that 'death' in the prayer refers to natural death. On the contrary, I have said that it refers to unnatural death. Please see page 106, para 5, lines 1–4.

> This brings out the intended sense of the poet's prayer as clearly as possible—the sense that he must be separated from unnatural death which operates through adverse circumstances and live to a ripe old age under the benevolent care of God.

As regards the second, I have not written anywhere that immortality is freedom from unnatural death; nor have I denied that immortality is the real or ontological nature of man. I have always maintained that immortality is freedom from the cycle of death that binds the soul. Please look at the following lines from my article (page 104, para 2, lines 5–7).

> While unnatural death is overcome by living a long life in the body, the cycle of death is overcome by attaining the immortal in the soul, *amartyam.*

Regarding the third, I do not deny, as is evident from several passages of my article, that death is a bondage to be removed. But what I have said is that the term death in the poet's prayer signifies the unnatural death and not the death that cripples the soul and separates it from immortality. Please note the following passages from my article.

(i) the term *bandhanād* goes naturally with *mṛtyu,* showing how death acts aggressively on the poet, *bandhanān-mṛtoḥ* (page 105, para 3, lines 20–21).

(ii) Now it is easy to decide which kind of death is spoken of in the first part of the prayer—it is the death that works through adverse circumstances and cuts short his full span of physical life in the world (page 108, para 3, lines 9–12).

(iii) We now understand that *bandhanān-mṛtyor-mukṣīya* does not refer to the freedom from the cycle of death (page 108, para 3, lines 1–2).

Besides these three points, the Referee's remark towards the end of his report is quite startling and sounds strange (page 112, para 2, lines 4–6).

> Immortality is a state of realization in which one has to understand and realize his true nature but not something that is automatic which man can attain by escaping from the cycle of life and death.

If immortality is not escape from the cycle of death and life, I wonder what else it is. This indicates how he is writing under a great confusion.

In the end I find all objections to be illegitimate and do not deserve to be discussed in any manner, much less in a *purvapakṣa.* I may be pardoned if this sounds harsh. I say this only to clarify my position rather than to sit in judgement over what the Referee has written.

Thus there are two alternatives—either to accept the article without

modification or to send it to another Referee for his expert opinion. Whichever alternative you choose, I shall gladly accept it.

N. JAYASHANMUKHAM

The Artist's Intention

Has the artist's intention any relevance for the *understanding* and assessment or *evaluation* of the work of art produced by him? This deceptively simple looking question, which seems to invite a plain affirmative answer, claims a good deal of attention and space from the author of the monograph *Concepts and Presuppositions in Aesthetics*, Dr Ranjan K. Ghosh, himself a practitioner and connoisseur of the pictorial arts. He hopes, in the first instance, to throw light on the problem by turning 'to the stand-point of the artist vis-a-vis the art object'. And this he proceeds to do on his own, in what he modestly calls an informal manner, avoiding needless references, quotations, etc. However, as the discussion proceeds, the problem grows in complexity and the author is hard put to finding and offering a neat solution.

Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that Dr Ghosh embarks on the journey without having taken the necessary care and trouble to make clear either for his own or for the reader's benefit the meaning of the key concept of intention. Instead he seeks to illuminate the situation by resorting to examples and analogies. The method, it may be admitted, has merits of its own. Intention, according to the author, is more or less synonymous with 'purpose' or 'goal' that inspires and sustains the efforts of the conscious agent. Bereft of such inspiring purpose or goal, Dr Ghosh rightly observes, art-works—and not only these but all works undertaken by conscious human actors—would be indistinguishable from 'objects or things made by chance or accident' (p. 1). Such objects, needless to say, would not admit of any sort of evaluative assessment or critical evaluation.

Dr Ghosh draws a crucial distinction between the goal or purpose inspiring an artist's work and that operative in the case of makers of other types of objects such as chairs and tables. The carpenter, for instance, is driven by a definite purpose in fashioning a chair; that goal or purpose is to make a definite object, i.e. a four-legged seat, which is comfortable to the user. This goal or purpose is not private, known only to the carpenter; to the contrary it is public in the sense of being known alike to the maker and the users of the chair. As against this the artist's intention, if any, is known only to him and to none other.

Here the question arises: how far and in what sense may the artist claim

to have an intention or purpose in producing an art-work, such that it may be considered relevant for the *understanding* and *evaluation* of that work? In this connection Dr Ghosh draws another distinction, that between the carpenter's or the artist's *intention* and his *motive* in producing an object. In either case the motive, e.g. earning money or reputation, is irrelevant. So far so good. One obvious objection to taking into consideration the artist's intention for the understanding (interpretation?) and/or evaluation of his creation is that the device is unavailable in case of the artist's belonging to remote or even recent past. Another difficulty is hinted at by Dr Ghosh himself: it is not quite correct to say that the artist has a clear-cut intention or goal in view before or at the moment when he starts his work; rather he 'tries to discover it in his work' (p. 7). Even that may not be a cent-per-cent correct description of the situation in so far as the specifically 'artistic intention' is concerned; that intention gradually materializes or realizes itself by steps as the creative act progresses. Here it may be pertinently surmised that the artist's original intention, better called ambition, may, in the end, fail to be realized as envisaged by him. This is pointedly expressed in a cryptic, ironical remark of a sanskrit aphorist: *Vināyakam prakurvāṇo vacayāmāsa vānaram*, 'aiming at making a likeness or image of the god Gaṇeśa, he actually produced one of a monkey!' Even the purely artistic aim of creating an object which is aesthetically satisfying may meet, due to various reasons, with only partial success. Even when such radical discrepancy between the 'intended' and the actually achieved or accomplished does not occur, the original intention may prove elusive to the connoisseur or critic. This is sensed and admitted by Dr Ghosh himself when he makes the following pregnant observation:

> On the one hand I am saying that the 'artistic intention' determines the very character of the 'work of art' and thus constitutes the 'internal meaning' of the work. But at the same time *I do not regard it as fixed, definite and fully determinate.* Whatever the 'internal meaning', it is not *a priori* in the sense that even the artist must *realize* this (p. 20, italics in the original).

And again:

> There are then 'possibilities' with regard to the 'artistic' intention in the context of a work; in fact, the notion of *work* or 'work of art' is itself problematic. E.g., 'X', 'X1', 'X2', 'X3' . . . 'Xn' stand for different instances of the intuited 'artistic intention' in the context of a particular work' (p. 21).

These perceptively subtle remarks attest the author's insightful appreciation of the ambiguous metaphysical status of the entity called the work of art. That there is some sort of design or plan or even an idea

which the artist seeks to express or embody in a particular medium would probably be conceded by most, if not all, theorizing critics of art; a majority of them may also be made to see that the idea in question, unlike a crude, propagandist notion, may find expression in ways ambiguously suggestive and unaccountably appealing. Before, however, hazarding further comments on the matter, we may consider some of the objections advanced by two well-known proponents of the 'intentional fallacy', W.K. Wimsatt and Munroe C. Beardsley, in an essay entitled 'The Intentional Fallacy' included in *The Verbal Icon* (University of Kentucky Press, 1954).

The main contention of the authors of the essay in question is succinctly stated in the opening paragraph: '. . . the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art. . . .' The reason is that the poem 'is not the critic's own and not the author's; it is detached from the author at birth and goes about the world beyond his power to intend about it or control it' (page 5). Elaborating the point the authors go on to observe that: 'The poem belongs to the public. It is embodied in language, the peculiar possession of the public, and it is about the human being, an object of public knowledge' (p.5).

Now, there is something fishy about this attractive looking statement, for neither the language of the poem nor the human being considered as its focal concern are things comprehensible with ease and luminous clarity. For one thing the several levels of meaning and various dimensions of significance intended by the astist or suggested by his composition, e.g., sensuous and intellectual, moral and metaphysical, may fall flat on ears and minds unequipped or ill-equipped in respect of sensitiveness and/or intellectual-spiritual culture vis-a-vis the author of the poem. Analogous remarks apply to readers belonging to different ages and cultural areas. This alone may account for the commonly observed phenomenon of different ages, with their special cognitive convictions and moral prejudices, tend to view a given work of art, e.g., the play *Hamlet* or *Phedre*, in divergent lights. Even within the confines of one and the same culture, the spectacle of unlike approaches and differing interpretations gives rise to sceptical doubts as to the identifiable individuality of a work of art. Wrestling with this problem in his important monograph *The Work of Art*, Stephen Pepper is driven to assert that the peculiar unity and identity that an art work may be seen or shown to exhibit is due to the *imaginative control* exercised by its creator. For this reason alone the work of art necessitates reference to its creator with his peculiar temperamental and cultural make-up. The circumstance also sheds light on the relevance of a measure of acquaintance with the age and circumstances affecting the growth of the artist's personality. Needless to say the knowledge of the aforesaid factors is likely to facilitate the comprehension or *understanding* of the art-work in question, which, in its turn, may lead to better, relatively fuller appreciation of its merits. Here

it may be specifically pointed out that the age and the milieu of the artist, with their peculiar problems and approaches relating to cognitive-axiological concerns, constitute for the artist the raw material for the exercise of his creative talents; and the extent of his grasp of that material and his ability to put it to creative use may provide the critical reader with one important criterion for judging the worth of the work being contemplated by him. Another significant measure of the merit of the work may be the extent of its capacity to engage the minds of connoisseurs belonging to different ages and cultures. Every work of art, and thought, it may be remembered, *adds* to our knowledge of the possibilities of human mind and spirit as related to external and internal realities; it thereby brings about enlargement of the realms of meaningful facts and phenomena it seeks to seize in its contemplative vision. Thus both the potentialities of the medium and the dimensions of the knowing and feeling human mind experience unsuspected growth and expansion under the impact of an important work of art or thought. Different connoisseurs of such works participate in these processes of growth and expansion to the extent permitted by their disparate tastes and temperaments, equipments and receptivities, and their capacities to attune themselves to the rhythm or rhythms of the work under contemplation.

These considerations, while undermining the presuppositional bases of the thesis of intentional fallacy, set new problems for reflection for both the creators and the critics of art. The creative process that results in the production of art works, poems and the like is generally held to be partly conscious and partly unconscious. The artist or the poet, and even the thinking scientist and philosopher, can hardly claim credit for the sudden flashes of insightful inspiration that enter into the texture of his vision of the new meaningful whole to be brought into being, viz. a work of art or thought. Both the credit and the responsibility for whatever merit or worth the work finally comes to have may be shared, on the one side, by the quality and richness of the cultural atmosphere of the age and community to which the creative worker belonged, and, on the other, by the latter who, driven by restless curiosity and hunger for experience, managed to collect meaningful raw material and later succeeded in carving out and shaping into a significant whole the relevant parts of the rich store of that experience through hard work and the exercise of his critical intelligence. For the proper comprehension of the meaning and worth of the created object the critic, too, has to be fairly well-acquainted with the age and the cultural milieu wherein the aforesaid work of the creative person was accomplished.

The foregoing considerations undermine the presuppositional bases of the advocates of Intentional Fallacy, by highlighting the role mainly of the cultural factors as determinants of the import of linguistic structures constituting literary works. I happen to be closely associated with the

realm of those works. How far the factors in question affect creations of art objects in other fields may be better left to Dr Ghosh himself for elucidation and comment.

N.K. DEVARAJA

Review Articles

KALYAN SEN GUPTA, *Mentalistic Turn: A Critical Evaluation of Chomsky*, K.P. Bagchi & Company in collaboration with Jadavpur University, Calcutta, Rs 100.

The book under review, *Mentalistic Turn* by Kalyan Sen Gupta, is probably the first in India which offers a full length philosophical critique of Chomsky's theory of language/grammar. Philosophers these days often show their interest in Chomsky's work, reference to Chomsky's theory is often found in their respective works with a motivation to either criticize his theory of language or to use it to support their philosophical theses. However, such philosophical deliberations are not always associated with an objective assessment of Chomsky's work. I think a philosopher who is interested in Chomsky's theory of language must find out the reasons which make this theory philosophically worth considering. Unless this is done, Chomsky's theory will be always philosophically problematic and even puzzling at times. In this respect Professor Sen Gupta's work on Chomsky strikes out to be most distinctive and significant because he offers a balanced and at the same time a critical account of the philosophical issues that are involved in Chomsky's theory of language. Here I shall note at a general level the two important features that characterize the distinctiveness of this work. First is the approach. Professor Sen Gupta, unlike many others, tried to locate Chomsky's mentalism through a considerably detailed study of Chomsky's system of grammar. I think it is a correct strategy because Chomsky's mentalism cannot be thought of, let alone discussed, in isolation from his linguistics. On the basis of his account of Chomsky's linguistic theory, Professor Sen Gupta discussed and examined some of the specific issues pertaining to Chomskian mentalism. It is here, I find, the second important feature of his work. The issues that he discussed are those that make Chomsky's theory philosophically important. These issues, together, indeed give rise to a mentalistic turn in philosophy. Professor Sen Gupta discussed each of these issues with utmost care and showed their untenability on a philosophical ground. As I understand, the ultimate thrust of his work is the idea that language is primarily social and it should be chiefly defined as a system of communication. In the following I shall give a brief description of the book and in the end I would like to revise certain issues regarding the various themes discussed in the book.

The first chapter of this book is 'Transformational Generative Grammar within the Orbit of Mentalism'. As is evident, the main thrust of this chapter is to argue how Chomskian mentalism is intrinsically connected

with his theory of grammar. In Chomsky's own admission the central objective of transformational generative grammar is to account for speaker's knowledge of language which is mentally represented. In this respect the author has gone into the historical development of transformational grammar. He discusses the various stages of its growth, such as, nature of transformational rules, incorporation of semantics, rules of universal grammar, etc. However, all these discussions have never lost their focus. They are all directed to show how Chomsky establishes his basic claim that knowledge is mentally represented. This discussion is used as a platform on the basis of which the author critically examines some of the philosophically important issues pertaining to Chomsky's mentalistic theory of language.

Thus, we find that in the second chapter entitled 'Competence and Creativity', the author makes a highly critical discussion of these two central notions which undoubtedly provide the very conceptual basis of transformational grammar. In this respect the author's strategy is first to understand what is meant by these two notions. To this effect he shows that Chomsky does not hold any uniform position regarding competence and creativity. As a result, we find that there are several definitions of competence and creativity offered by Chomsky. The author's next move is to show that these various positions are mutually conflicting with each other and thus there lies an inherent inconsistency in Chomsky's position on competence and creativity.

The notion of competence, as the author shows, becomes a contentless notion without the rules of use or speech act. His constructive proposal is that for the notion of competence to have significance it must incorporate the social dimension of language. The notion of competence cannot be restricted only to the know-ledge of the rules of grammar but also to the rules of language use.

After the discussion of the notion of competence the author takes up the issue of innateness in chapter three, entitled, 'A Plea for Innateness'. It is said that in the recent past Chomsky has revived the theory of innate ideas. In fact, if Chomsky is right, that a child is born with the knowledge of universal grammar, it will have a drastic consequence on analytical philosophy since one of the basic tenets of analytical philosophy is that learning of a language is a matter of acquiring certain skills or conventions and nothing more. Chomsky's theory of innate ideas, therefore, came as a threat against which most of the major analytical philosophers reacted sharply. The present author also follows the same path set by his illustrious masters.

The author starts his criticism by questioning a well known thesis of Chomsky that the mastery of language is unique in itself since it is radically different from the mastery of any other non-linguistic fields, such as, intellectual, social, artistic and so on. Unlike these areas, mastery of language is not affected by extra linguistic factors. In other words, there is an innate capacity in man which is responsible for acquiring competence in language.

As against this, the author argues on the basis of the evidence from socio-linguistics and psycho-linguistics that the mastery of language is affected by various environmental factors. Continuing with this, the author suggests that the child does not learn language by forming hypotheses in terms of his innate schema so that he can learn language 'all at once'. Instead, he learns in a gradual process where it is not the hypothesis formation but something like trial and error method that works and enables the child to go from simple to complex use of language. Accordingly the author argues for a conception of language which is defined purely in social terms. Language is thus defined by a system of common social practices which expresses a form of life. Even the linguistic universals of Chomsky have a social origin. The author argues that the various common features found in languages are not the expressions of innate linguistic universals: referring to the views of Putnam, Osgood and Habermas, the author claims how the existence of the various linguistic universals can be explained on the ground of a social consideration. The significance of this chapter is that it offers an alternative to Chomsky's explanation construed in terms of his theory of innate ideas.

The main objective of chapter four, entitled, 'The Quest for Meaning' is to examine Chomsky's mentalistic account of meaning. Consistent with the author's earlier critique of innate ideas he rejects the mentalistic basis of meaning in favour of the social nature of meaning. He starts his discussion by presenting briefly the idea of semantics that Chomsky developed in his *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.* Along with this he also mentioned the views of Katz and Vendler whose works on meaning have been developed within the broader mentalistic framework of Chomsky.

The author questions the crucial idea on which this account of meaning is based, namely, that there are innate prelingusitic concepts called 'semantic markers' in the light of which the humans are able to understand the meaning of words.

The author rejects entirely the mentalistic basis of meaning. He uses the familiar Wittgensteinian argument for his criticism. There are two basic arguments that he directs against the mentalistic conception of meaning. First, there is nothing called language or concept distinction. To learn the meaning of words we do not require to relate them to some innate prelinguistic concepts. Instead we learn by looking at how the language works. Secondly, our concepts and the various categorizations that we make are socially determined. Hence the very question what is and what is not semantically acceptable cannot be, as the author concludes, 'culture invariant'. It is, on the other hand, 'culture specific'.

The author correctly recognizes that there is a significant change in Chomsky's position on meaning. Chomsky, no longer holds mentalistic

conception of meaning in the way he, or for that matter, Katz used to hold it earlier. However, the author thinks that Fodor's language of thought is a continuation of this conception of meaning.

The final chapter of the book is called 'Language and Mind'. The basic issue of this chapter is to examine Chomsky's well known but much controversial thesis that language is not primarily a matter of communication. On this issue the author particularly attacked Chomsky's idea that one can use language without having any intention to communicate. But can we think of a community, as the author asks, where language is used without the purpose of communication? Further, even if we agree with Chomsky that there are such uses of language, the question is: 'how does it go against the primacy of the communicative use of language'? The point that the author is making is that the entire argument of Chomsky does not serve any purpose unless he shows as to why communicative use of language is not primary. Chomsky has to make precise as to what he means by the word 'primacy'. In the absence of this his argument does not stand on a firm ground.

To give primacy to the communicative aspect of language is, in other words, to suggest the intrinsic social nature of language. Thus, the author discusses the importance of context in determining the semantics of language. In this connection the author questions the competence/performance distinction that Chomsky made in the study of language. In an admirable way the author argues against Chomsky's attempt to exclude performance from the study of language. The author argues both from philosophical and linguistic point of view. At a philosophical level he argues that language is a shared practice where the speaker's knowledge of language, 'is [a] part of [these] background assumptions and practices'. The author then goes to the specific point that Chomsky raised concerning the the ungrammaticality of the spoken sentences. Referring to Lobov's work in socio-linguistics the author seeks to establish the mythical nature of Chomsky's thesis on performance, namely, the myth of the ungrammaticality of the spoken language. Chomsky's reason for excluding performance from the study of language, as the author argues, does not seem to have any foundation.

That language is intrinsically social and, therefore, a mentalistic construal of it is bound to fail is the central theme of this book. This is the theme to which the author comes over and over again in all the chapters of the book. His entire effort is to show that the various theses of Chomsky which support his mentalism in language are inherently defective since they do not take cognizance of the fact that language is intrinsically social.

I think the review of this critical work will be incomplete unless I speak about the issues which I find to be problematic. There are places where I do not feel comfortable with the author's treatment of the various problems discussed in the book. There are arguments which I find it difficult to accept. Hence, in keeping with the critical spirit of this brilliant work, I would like to raise some issues relating to the basic theme of this work.

The theme discussed in the first chapter of the book is undoubtedly significant. As the name of the chapter clearly indicates that the main objective of this chapter is to show how, for Chomsky, mentalism is the part of the very structure of his theory of language. While this is an entirely acceptable theme the trouble comes with the author's treatment of the problem. The author discusses almost chronologically the development of Chomsky's grammar with the aim to show how mentalism is involved within this theory of grammar. I think for this purpose to go into the details of the history of transformational grammar is quite unnecessary. First of all such details are so easily available in any standard book on linguistics that one does not need to repeat them in a philosophical work like this. Given its philosophical thrust the author could rearrange the entire Chomskian paradigm with a view to bring out its methodological implications for philosophy. This he can do by showing that Chomskian linguistics behind all their theoretical details represent a conceptual organization in terms of which the inseparable connection between mentalism and the theory of grammar may be understood. In the following I shall briefly indicate the way I see the conceptual organization that Chomskian mentalistic linguistics represents.

The conceptual organization of transformational grammar can be presented in terms of its three constitutive elements. These three elements are really the three theses forming the conceptual organization that Chomsky's theory of grammar represents.[1] The first thesis is that language should be viewed as a cognitive state rather than a type of behaviour. This will be really to show how for Chomsky language cannot be understood as a system of habits, or conditioned responses, or dispositions to verbal behaviour. Alternatively, the positive part of the thesis says that language should be studied as a manifestation of a system of knowledge. It is a knowledge of grammar that is put to use in speech and thought.

The positive part of the thesis articulates Chomsky's conception of language and specially of grammar. The various revisions of his theory of grammar are proposed from the point of view of how best a theory can explain the speaker's knowledge of grammar. The same thing can be done with the help of a few appropriate examples conveying the linguistic significance.

The second thesis concerning the conceptual organization of transformational grammar is mentalism. This is a continuation of the earlier thesis. In the context of this present work this thesis has special importance. The major philosophical works on language, such as, the work of Wittgenstein or of Quine are all directed to show the untenability

of mentalistic explanation of language. In these inquiries there is no place for abstract accounts of linguistic competence. Whereas, in the context of Chomsky, mentalism in the study of language is a theoretical necessity. To ignore this will be to ignore a whole domain of reasonable inquiry. The structure of human language is of such a domain which demands mentalistic explanation. Chomskian mentalism is thus a part of the methodology of his scientific linguistics.

The third thesis is about language acquisition conceived as a theory construction. The most distinctive feature of Chomsky's linguistics is the thesis that the fundamental aim of linguistic theory is to explain how does a child learn language. In this respect Chomsky's argument is that the acquisition of language can be best studied as a kind of theory construction where a child on the basis of his linguistic experience deduces the grammar of the language to which he is exposed. The implication of this remark is that a child in learning his language starts with certain *a priori* notions. These *a priori* notions constitute what is known as universal grammar. The process of learning a language, as Chomsky says, involves a few distinct cognitive states. Thus, for example, knowing English is a cognitive state which starts from the initial state and it reaches at the steady state. Note that the initial state which exists as prior to experience starts interacting with it during this process of succession. The initial state is common to all members of human species and by definition it is innate. It consists of rules and principles which are specific to the language faculty. These rules and principles together form what is characterized as universal grammar.

The greatest significance of transformational grammar lies on this part—the universal grammar as represented by the initial state of language learning. Thus when Chomsky says that the fundamental aim of linguistic theory is to explain acquisition of language, it is the explication of the universal grammar that is implied by this statement. In order to study language acquisition one is compelled to study universal grammar because the latter forms the initial state of the whole process. It is in this sense, as Chomsky claims, that language acquisition can be studied as a kind of theory construction in which the child, on the basis of his linguistic experience, deduces the nature of the grammar of the language to which he is exposed.

In the above I have only indicated the idea of a conceptual organization or pattern that transformational generative grammar represents. As I understand, from a philosophical or methodological point of view this may be an effective way to bring out the mentalism of Chomskian linguistics and its implications for philosophy. What has been suggested is a different procedure to reach the same goal as that of the author's.

The author's discussion in the second chapter on competence and creativity is, indeed, a highly critical discussion leading to the rejection of competence—the central notion with which transformational grammar

is essentially concerned. The main ground on which he rejects it is that this notion is inconsistent and, therefore, one fails to understand its meaning. I think to hold this is quite uncharitable to Chomsky. Let me explain the reasons:

The author finds Chomsky holding (or it seems so), the two mutually inconsistent positions on competence. At one level, Chomsky takes competence to be totally separated from performance and at another level, he defines 'competence' as 'competence for performance,' i.e. ability to use language. This, indeed, is an inconsistency. But how far is this correct?

In one of his later works Chomsky[2] admits that his use of the term 'competence' which also implies ability, has been the source of a completely erroneous view—a view that competence, for Chomsky, is necessarily meant to be a 'competence for performance'. Chomsky, in no uncertain terms, makes it clear that he does not want this term to be interpreted as a matter of ability. In fact, he keeps himself away from any such association between competence and ability. The greatest evidence of this is found from his theory of language itself which identifies grammar with competence. In order to leave no room for confusion, Chomsky in his later writings explicitly defines competence to be a knowledge of language where knowledge does not denote any capacity or ability to do something or a system of disposition of some kind. It is, on the other hand, a mental state—'a mental structure consisting of a system of rules and principles that generate and relate mental representation of various types'.[3] Earlier, while referring to Chomsky's theory I have said that learning of a language passes through different mental states. The initial state in this process which consists of a set of rules and principles forms the universal grammar. Now the term 'linguistic competence' should be understood in the light of these theoretical considerations.

Here, a question may be raised as to whether the knowledge of language, alongwith the knowledge of syntax also includes the rules regarding the appropriate use of language? If so, then the claim may be made that these rules or principles which constitute the speaker's pragmatic competence become a part of the universal grammar. But the point is: it is true that pragmatic competence can be characterized by a system of constitutive rules, but this however, by itself, is not enough to include it in the initial state or the universal grammar. The greatest obstacle to it is the inductive nature of these rules. To come back to the earlier point, it is the initial state—the universal grammar which essentially matters when Chomsky talks about competence. Considering this, 'competence' cannot be defined as 'competence for performance'.

It is in the light of the same distinction drawn between competence and performance that one has to understand Chomsky's idea of the 'creative use of language'. In this connection I particularly refer to one

of the papers of Chomsky[4] which exclusively deals with his thesis on the creative aspect of language use. In fact, answers to many of the objections that the author has raised can be found in this work.

The author's anxiety that one is not sure whether Chomsky's thesis on creativity should be placed on the side of competence or on performance can be shown to be unfounded in view of Chomsky's assertion that the creative use of language 'is an aspect of language use (i.e., performance), which is not to be confused with competence'.[5] Chomsky in his early writings as well as in his later writings always maintained the need for a distinction to be made between what the speaker of a language knows and what he does. The task of transformational grammar is 'to discover and exhibit the mechanisms that make this achievement possible, namely, achievement of the creative aspect of language use'.[6] In this sense there is certainly a very close relationship existing between the creative use of language and the concern of linguistics. However, this does not imply that the rules of transformational grammar provide a full account of the creative aspect of language use. The reason is that the latter belongs to the study of linguistic performance which goes beyond the scope of transformational grammar. This is the reason why the creative aspect of language use, for Chomsky, remains a 'mystery' because we do not have a full account of it. Chomsky, therefore, makes it absolutely clear that 'the rules and principles of grammar provide the means for the creative aspect of language use'.[7]

Next is the author's discussion on Chomsky's thesis on innateness concerning which I don't want to go into any details. However, I would like to briefly point out some of my difficulties that I have felt while going through his discussion.

As I understand the author's account of Chomsky's innateness, hypothesis is based on the model of language acquisition that Chomsky proposed in 1965. It is in that model that Chomsky argues that the child constructs the rules of grammar in the same way as the linguists construct the rules which essentially involve the making of hypotheses. Thus the learning of language is essentially a matter of forming hypotheses by the child in terms of his innate schema. The large part of the author's discussion is based on this analogy because one of the objectives of the author is to show that a child does not follow any such Chomskian procedure while learning a language.

But this picture of language learning, as Chomsky later felt, was not adequate. There is nothing like forming hypotheses by a child while learning his language. The reason is the ease and the rapidity with which children learn a language is different from the plodding progress of the linguist. In fact, the contrast between the two is so glaring that it is felt that this particular model of language learning needs a radical revision.

The change came due to the drastic change in the linguist's conception of the rules of grammar. As a result, the earlier conception that the child

formulates rules of grammar in much the same way as the linguists do is no longer taken to be true. The reason is that there are no rules of grammar to formulate. The earlier idea that there are rules corresponding to different grammatical transformations is now abandoned. Thus, in view of this, a question like: 'How does the child formulate the rule of passive?', does not make any sense. In this revised picture, passive is just a name 'given to one of several ways of fronting an NP in order to make it a 'topic' (in a 'topic-comment structure').[8] In other words, passive is only a name for a function. There is now only one rule that is involved, known as '*Move*'. It is a universal rule which forms the part of universal grammar and, therefore, it is not learnt. This brings a change in Chomsky's model of language acquisition. This is not the place where one can go into any details. However, it is always possible to talk of its general significance.

In this new perspective the entire thrust of the innateness hypothesis lies on universal grammar. However, in his revised model Chomsky takes special care to explain the most important fact of language acquisition, namely, how does one arrive from universal grammar to a particular language to which he is exposed? In fact, the uniqueness of his theory is that it seeks to relate the two, namely, the universal grammar on the one hand and the linguistic differences on the other. Chomsky does not have any quarrel with the social aspect of language that the author emphasized. But given his system of thought it is competence which gets primacy in the study of language. There are important reasons for this Chomskian consideration. Apart from the methodological importance that language should be studied under idealization there is also an important theoretical reason. In one of his recent writings[9] Chomsky argues at length that it is not *language* but *grammar* that becomes the fundamental concern of his inquiry. Language, for him, is a derivative concept since it follows from grammar. This position indeed seems to be outlandish because normally we assume that it is grammar which follows from language and not the other way round. But given Chomsky's thrust on universal grammar this whole scenario is changed and we can see the importance of it. This distinctive fact of Chomsky's theory cannot be overlooked since it explains why the social aspect of language, in spite of its importance, does not get its primacy in his research programme.

The next is the author's discussion on Chomsky's mentalistic account of meaning. The author's basic argument is that there can not be anything called mentalistic conception of meaning; because meaning, as the author seems to argue, by definition, is something social. While I appreciate the author's argument for the social nature of meaning I cannot at the same time wholeheartedly go along with him. I particularly think that the conception of meaning which Chomsky offers cannot be rejected on such a straight cut ground. I don't think Chomsky will ever deny the social aspect of either language or of meaning. To show this, it

is essential to reconstruct his position on meaning. This will, of course, be a philosophical reconstruction with an aim to show that Chomsky offers a theoretical perspective which provides a new interpretation to one of the most important philosophical conceptions of meaning.

The conception that I have in mind may be characterized as the theory of literal meaning. In contemporary time, Frege is probably the most important philosopher in whose writings we find the clear expression of this conception of meaning. As Frege says:

> Whatever may be the speaker's intention and motives for saying just this and not that, our concern is not with these at all, but solely with what he says.[10]

The phrase 'what he says' assumes an enormous significance since it speaks for the literal meaning. Following Frege, the notion of literal meaning may be defined as the thought-content expressed in language which is prior to its use. The notion of literal meaning expresses the competent speaker's knowledge of language. The use of language, on the other hand, includes sociological contexts, the intentions of the speakers and so on. Now given this distinction it is apparent that at the level of meaning the same Chomskian distinction between competence and performance holds.

As is well known, Frege's notion of literal meaning has been subjected to severe criticism. I think a completely new defence to Frege's theory can be given in the light of Chomsky's linguistic theory and particularly in the light of competence-performance distinction.[11] Chomsky's grammatical theory distinctly supports a notion of semantic competence which says that a speaker possesses an idealized knowledge about the semantic structure of language. The notion of literal meaning is the expression of this semantic competence. I am providing the following argument to support literal meaning as the expression of semantic competence.

To put the argument briefly, in the suggested framework meaning relations are defined within language itself and certainly not in relation to empirical facts. Thus, a sentence like 'Cats are feline animals' is taken to be an analytic sentence on the ground that cat means feline animal. But suppose, if cats are discovered as robots, to quote Hilary Putnam, then the sentence, 'Cats are feline animals' is neither true nor analytic. This possible counter-instance shows that meaningful relations are determined in relation to empirical facts. But does this discovery show that cat means robot and not feline animal? This is where, as Katz[12] argues, there is a need to distinguish the two claims, namely, 'Cat means feline animal' and 'Cat means robots'. The former is a linguistic claim which says that the concept of cat and the concept of animal are analytically related. Whereas the latter is an empirical claim. The meaning relations as expressed by the sentence 'Cats are feline animals' are independent of empirical facts. This is a language or fact distinction

which corresponds to the distinction between knowledge of language and use of language or between competence and performance. At the level of semantic competence, both meaning and reference of a sentence are determined purely by linguistic considerations. But at the level of semantic performance both are determined by extra linguistic considerations. This is precisely the situation that Putnam is talking about.

The point that I am trying to make is that at the level of dis-tinction between semantic competence and semantic performance a new defence can be given to the notion of literal meaning.[13]

Chomsky, however, may not agree to the above interpretation. The reason is that Chomsky himself is quite critical of his earlier theory of semantics on which the present interpretation is based. True, that Chomsky is critical of his earlier position on semantics but this does not undermine the present interpretation as offered here. Even in his recent writings, Chomsky accepts that there is a legitimate domain of meaning, —a meaning that is grounded on linguistic considerations. As Chomsky argues[14] the sentence 'I persuaded him to leave', analytically entails the sentence 'He intends to leave'. It is the features of lexical items which produce this analytic connection, namely, 'someone who is persuaded to leave will intend to leave'. Finally one needs to see that in what sense Chomsky's theory of semantics can offer a new perspective on the philosophers' discussion on meaning. This, indeed, calls for a philosophical reconstruction of Chomsky's theory. The above proposal that there can be a new theory defending the notion of literal meaning on the basis of competence-performance distinction in semantics is such a philosophical reconstruction.

The author ends his book with a highly critical discussion on language and mind. This may be regarded as the author's final blow to Chomskian mentalistic linguistics. Consistent with his basic theme that language is social, the author now argues that the primary function of language is communication and that the essential nature of language cannot be understood without taking into account of this function. This, indeed, is the very opposite of Chomsky's thesis which holds that the primary function of language is not communication. The author's refutation of Chomsky's thesis is based on two principal arguments. First, Chomsky does not clarify in what sense communication is not the primary function of language, and second, knowledge of language which constitutes linguistic competence cannot be dissociated from social practice. In the following I shall briefly respond to both of these arguments. The best way to approach this problem will be to spell out a general strategy which will help us to decide whether communication is or is not a primary function of language. To do this, first, one needs to define both communication and language and second, to see whether or not the defining principles of communication necessarily enter into the definition of language.

Chomsky adopts a similar strategy which shows why communication cannot define the essential nature of language. Here also the distinction between competence and performance plays a crucial role in formulating his strategy. To begin with, it is wrong to say that Chomsky denies the importance of communication *per se.* His attempt, on the other hand, is to keep a place for communication in the total context of language. Communication is thus placed in the domain of what is called the use of language as distinguished from the other domain, namely, the knowledge of language. As stated earlier, knowledge of language is independent of its use since, as Chomsky claims, it is possible to specify what constitutes knowledge of language without taking into account as to how this knowledge is put to use. Note that one very important implication here is that language is taken in the sense of a 'code' and one can specify it without referring to the use of language. In fact, as Chomsky argues, the use of language plays only the activating role in the child's acquisition of the knowledge of language.

Now, the crucial question is: How does Chomsky arrive at this position? What is his proof? For this Chomsky employs twofold strategy, namely, empirical and conceptual. At an empirical level he specifies what constitutes the knowledge of language in man by formulating a set of principles that, as he shows, do not depend on man's communicative abilities. At a conceptual level, Chomsky as against the philosophers, such as John Searle, defends the autonomy of formal grammar by which he claims that it is possible to formulate the principles of grammar without referring to any such notions like communication-intention. These two together establish that in what sense communication, for Chomsky, cannot be the primary function of language. It does not define the essential nature of language.

There is one more argument which refutes the primacy of communication in language. Chomsky points out that we use language to perform various functions which include, among other things, transmitting information, expressing thoughts, creating poetry, establishing personal relations and so on. Now it will be an error to isolate one particular function as essential to language. The reason is people take interest in all these functions in their own different ways. However, none of them can be regarded as essential to language because they do not explain the structure of language. In this respect the debate that Chomsky had with Searle is very instructive. Searle[15] seeks to establish his point that the structure of language cannot be studied independently of its function in the same way as the structure of heart cannot be studied independently of its function, i.e., to pump blood. Chomsky[16] while accepting Searle's analogy goes further and argues that this particular function of the heart, however important it may be, does not explain the basic facts, such as, why the heart has the structure it has?, and again, why is it developed in the same way in every individual? The reasons are

biological. Human beings are biologically or genetically so constituted that the structure and the development of the heart is accordingly determined in a particular way. This makes it evident that the structure and the development of the heart can be studied independent of its functions. Now using the analogy of the heart, the same can be claimed to be true of language. Language is thus conceived as a mental organ whose structure and development can be studied without reference to its functions.

I am afraid the review has become too long. But in view of the challenging nature of this work one is provoked to go for such a discussion. Before I end, once again I congratulate the author for this profoundly scholarly work. I am sure this book will indeed be recognized as an important contribution to the studies on Chomsky.

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13. I am not suggesting that there is no difference between Frege and Chomsky. On the contrary, the biggest difference between the two is that Chomsky accepts the psychological reality of language whereas Frege is anti-psychologist. However, a reconstruction of both Frege's and Chomsky's positions on psychological reality will reveal that on this issue there is a common ground which both of them share. Frege may be said to be anti-psychologist in the sense that he is against replacing semantic analysis by the empirical description of what is happening in the actual minds of the individuals. But Frege never denies the implication of his theory for the study of 'the mind' which forms the subject matter of theoretical psychology. At an abstract level, he assumes the relationship between language and mind. Chomsky also shares a similar view. But he goes further. In the abstract level of psychological relevance he goes to the conditions of learnability where he explicitly connects learning of language with psychological mechanisms. Chomsky, thus, accepts different levels of psychological relevance in which along with Frege he shares an abstract level involving the relation between language and mind. See, J.M. Moravcsik, 'Frege and Chomsky on Thought and Language', in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy,* VI, University of Minnesota Press, 1981.

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Department of Philosophy, AMITABHA DAS GUPTA
University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad

Deconstructing the Driving Forces of Human Knowledge

D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA, *Induction, Probability and Scepticism*, State University of New York Press, 1991.

I

In the developmental history of the sciences, scepticism and knowledge mark their co-presence and correlation sufficiently enough to make any scientific inquiry into scepticism, an inquiry into knowledge. Thus, viewed as an inquiry into scepticism, *Induction, Probability and Scepticism*, written by D.P. Chattopadhyaya, deserves the careful attention of those who are well-versed in the epistemological and methodological traditions of Eastern and Western philosophy. What strikes me as its most important and singular feature is the style in which it focuses our attention on scepticism, the philosophical correlate of *science* as a search for knowledge. Its sheer range evokes the reader's admiration for the entire text. In this review article, I shall pay some attention selectively to the text of the Introduction, and chapters 8 and 12. Thus, I shall mainly draw the attention of the reader to those questions or problems which the text itself generates. It is here that the strength and power which the text is able to exercise over the reader's mind can be tested. I would, therefore, like to ask three or four questions, based on the text, as follows:

1. Can we determine, or rationally reconstruct, what might be called the authentic driving forces of human knowledge? Can we find rational answers to the very question of the nature of such forces?
2. Can we answer the question: At what point in our search for knowledge must scepticism intervene?
3. Can we conceptualize the fallibility and incompleteness of knowledge—and therefore, the growth of knowledge—independently of any investigation into scepticism?
4. How can we distinguish human interest in human knowledge from other types of human interest?

At the very outset I find that scepticism is not so easy to define. On the contrary, it co-varies with paradigmatic philosophical problems by which philosophy as the correlate of the sciences is best known. Nevertheless, it appears, in my opinion, mainly in two recognizable forms, when it appears at all. I will call them *deep* scepticism and *shallow* scepticism respectively. As examples of the former, think of Zeno's or Russell's paradox. On the other hand, as examples of shallow scepticism, the famous names of David Hume, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend among others come readily to mind. If I am not seriously mistaken, it is this latter form of scepticism with which the book under review is essentially concerned. By shallow scepticism, I intend to refer to those *strategies*[1] which philosophers are prone to invent under the following kinds of circumstance:

(i) The accepted or given criteria of rationality of knowledge are first shown to be undermined, whether in theory or in practice; and
(ii) as a consequence, the relevant subjects of predication/ appraisal are sought to be changed anarchistically beyond recognition (Hume, Feyerabend, Kuhn, Wittgenstein).[2]

But by deep scepticism I am strictly referring to those paradoxes/ questions which pose challenging paradigmatic philosophical or scientific problems as candidates for rational solutions. Unlike shallow scepticism, deep scepticism leaves us groping for possible solutions which may never be in sight in our life-time.

II

'The basic thrust of the main arguments of this book', declares D.P. Chattopadhyaya, 'is to show that the strong criticisms repeatedly leveled against scepticism are exaggerated, trivially true at best, and inconsistent with common sense at worst'.[3] The relevant sense of 'scepticism' is explicated by him in the last chapter, titled 'Scepticism as the Critique of Search: An Epilogue.'[4] n this context, it seems possible to *dis-cover* those aspects of *it*, which can throw new light on our search for knowledge. In particular, we would like to explore the nature of the driving forces of knowledge and ask: Is not scepticism itself a most important driving force of knowledge? Such an enterprise is likely to turn out a highly *deconstructive* one, if it *re-locates* these driving forces and results in a change in our perspective on human knowledge, its nature and possibility on the one hand and on the question of the limits of relevant evidence on the other.

In what follows, I shall quote those passages from the text where knowledge$_1$, which is incomplete for various reasons and leaves room for the unknown, is conflated with knowledge$_2$ which is itself fallible and leaves room for its own refutation. Although either of these two types of negative feedback makes our search for knowledge deeply significant, there still remains the question: What can we call the authentic driving

forces of human knowledge? To quote the author himself:

> Human reason cannot be so comprehensive as to make futile all our search for further truths or new facts. At no stage of the appropriation of our experience can we feel that what we have known is absolutely certain. This sense of uncertainty is constructive and explorative, not crippling or paralyzing in any way. Rightly understood, *skepsis* is both a driving force and a seeking influence. It drives us from within and goads us to search what is unknown or adds clarity to what is already known. It is a seeking influence in the sense that it is fostered in us by some external or 'distant' influence, critical or constructive.[5]

Chattopadhyaya then goes on to say:

> On my part I fail to see how I honestly can possibly claim to have that reason in me which would make my new experience uninformative and searching speculation uncalled for. Always on reflection I find that the information available to me is inadequate and more intriguing than satisfactory or certificatory. . . . In various other ways experience works as a driving force, endlessly driving. Partly this explains my search for what I already know but not adequately or satisfactorily enough. In this *skepsis*-haunted disposition of mine I find nothing wrong. On the contrary, I always have a feeling, an informed feeling, that I know much less than what I originally wanted to know in the areas of my interest. . . . It only expresses my sense of discontent with my own present state of knowledge and available . . . arguments both for and against it. Simultaneously it expresses also my will to know more about it and its evidences and examples, both supportive and contrary. This sense of cognitive dissatisfaction and the resulting search and research are what I basically mean by scepticism.[6]

This certainly signals a deconstructive turn in scepticism as a reflection on the *dis-contents* of knowledge, experience and evidence. For a long time, scepticism became synonymous with the strategies blocking our access to all possibilities of knowledge, with or without the evidences to make our knowledge credible and reliable. The deconstructive turn makes it now a critique of search for knowledge, where knowledge remains fallible. But there arise out of Chattopadhyaya's discussion on this theme the following questions:

(i) What kind of role do human interests, in this or that kind of project/plan of action/form of life, play in our search for knowledge?
(ii) If there are other types of interest which are the driving force of our search for knowledge, how far can the deconstructive turn in scepticism sustain itself?
(iii) How exactly are the contents/*dis-contents* of experience correlated with our search for knowledge? Is knowledge itself a kind of information? If yes, how?

In a nutshell, scepticism as a critique of search for knowledge would make sense if our interest in knowledge is primary and the other types of interest are a secondary consequence of this primary interest. In case we find that the converse is true, then there is no need to defend scepticism in order to find a place for it in the critique of our search for knowledge.

III

How do most of the ancient Indian philosophical schools view the human interest in knowledge? Chattopadhyaya himself suggests that knowledge is not viewed by them as an end in itself.[7] Thus, our interest in knowledge is not, in this context, primordial in nature. On the contrary, it is meant to serve other types of human interest—e.g., removing biases, prejudices, saṃskāras, of the human mind or helping fellow human beings to be good and right and, eventually, to be free.[8]

But what about outside this context? To use the famous metaphor of Galileo, it can be argued that the human interest in reading the Book of nature is the kind of interest which is primordial or original in the sense that it itself is not derivable from any other types of human interest.[9] On the other hand, other types of human interest depend on the success of the human pursuit of the human interest in knowledge.[10] Here knowledge is understood as *scientific knowledge* which can grow under the conditions of its own fallibility and empirical reliability. Thus, we can significantly speak of the scientist's interest in the growth of knowledge in this sense. But it is not at all possible for us to cover, or recover, in this conceptualization the so-called interest in scepticism. Is there a need to defend scepticism, whatever the variations that it has already undergone and whatever its historicity?[11] If yes, then there must be sound reasons for human pursuit of human interest in scepticism. I think that we must leave scepticism all alone and let philosophical or scientific theories defend themselves, where necessary, against its strategies. For the advantage is this: we do not run the risk of *trivializing* scepticism, with all its historicity, to the point of defending it against itself. If, instead of doing so, we raise elaborate defence mechanisms for scepticism, we are bound to land in the kind of confusion worst confounded, where we are no longer clear as to how knowledge is fallible and incomplete at the same time and yet not necessarily open to sceptical strategies of rationality. In support of what I just said, let me quote from Chattopadhyaya:[12]

> . . . its testability in terms of other statements (observational or theoretical) is the hall mark of scientific knowledge. Once we understand this characterization of knowledge and its implication we have no option but to concede that knowledge is open to doubt: It is

fallible. If the possibility of doubt or fallibility is recognized in principle, scepticism cannot be disowned—not, at any rate, in practice?

IV

Dubitability of knowledge is always dubitability, in my view, with respect to those criteria of rationality which are variable from time to time and from one scientific community to another. Fallibility and incompleteness of knowledge, on the other hand, are inherent to the objective and normative appraisals of scientific change and growth of knowledge. It is one thing to submit our knowledge to ordeal by scepticism.[13] It is quite another thing to submit it to the methodological appraisals of its growth according to a certain rational pattern. Scepticism, when it is deep, refers to our abiding interest in finding answers to the paradigmatic philosophical problems. These involve either paradoxes or crises in rationality. Inquiring into deep scepticism, therefore, makes an altogether different kind of inquiry into those problems themselves, without being forgetful of their historicity.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See G.L. Pandit, *Methodological Variance*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991.
2. See ibid. and G.L. Pandit, *Structure and Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983.
3. See D.P. Chattopadhyaya, *Induction, Probability and Scepticism*, 1991, p. xxxi.
4. Ibid., pp. xxvii, xxviii, xxx, xxxi, 217, 231.
5. Ibid., p. 399.
6. Ibid., pp. 399–400.
7. Ibid., p. 217.
8. For an original discussion on 'The Hindu Systems of Thought as Epistemic Disciplines', see David B. Zilberman, *The Birth of Meaning in Hindu Thought*, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1989.
9. See G.L. Pandit, *Methodological Variance*.
10. Ibid.
11. See John Watkins, *Science and Scepticism*, Hutchinson, 1984.
12. See D.P. Chattopadhyaya, *Induction, Probability and Scepticism*, p. 231.
13. See G.L. Pandit, 'Rationality of an Optimum Aim for Science', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, 3, 1986, pp. 141–48.

Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi G.L. PANDIT

Report

Christian Contribution to Indian Philosophy

The Indian Council for Philosophical Research and Satya Nilayam Research Institute, Madras, held a three day national symposium at Satya Nilayam from 1st to 3rd March. Fourteen papers by Christian scholars working in India were presented, while fourteen non-Christian scholars offered their comments followed by clarification sessions. It was indeed the first time that such an encounter had taken place in the Indian academia.

Delivering the key-note address, Prof. K. Satchidananda Murty pointed out that Indian philosophy till now has been understood as having a base made up of two strains: Śramānic and Vedāntic. The Vedāntic strain includes Advaita, Visishtadvaita, Dvaita, Nyāya, Vaiśeśika and other disciplines. The Śramānic has two chief exponents: Buddhism and Jainism. In recent centuries other implants have taken place. The coming of the Parsis, Mohammedans and Christians has brought about certain changes in philosophical attitudes as well. Nineteenth century witnessed a good deal of interaction between Hindus and Christians with Henry Vivian Derozio, Keshub Chunder Sen and Brahmabandhab Upadhyaya contributing to it. Of course, recently there has been a veritable explosion of Christian-Hinduism studies, thanks to the desire of many Christians to have a wider horizon while they bring the message of Christ to a people who primarily belong to the Hindu culture. Such an interaction as the one envisaged by the symposium could prove to be of immense good for a unified vision that would help the integral character of the nation. Dr. M.M. Thomas then released the book, *Role of the Philosopher Today*.

On the 1st day, five papers were presented. Dr. Richard De Smet who has specialized in Śaṅkara's Advaita said that he was drawn to the subject when he heard S. Radhakrishnan refer to it as 'a great example of a purely philosophical scheme'. He finds Śaṅkara's method theological (*śruti*-based *brahma-jijñāsā*), as the teacher is mainly engaged in explaining the Mahāvākyas that define Brahman. Since he found reasons to doubt the authenticity of the *vivarana* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and excluded it from his Śaṅkara studies, he was also relieved of explaining the Māyā (illusionistic acosmism) theory. Many of Dr. De Smet's arguments relied heavily on Thomas Wood's *The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Agama Śāstra*. However, commenting on the paper, Dr. R. Balasubramaniam said Wood's reading of Sanskrit words and phrases in the *Māṇḍūkya* were erroneous and his explanation of 'Esh Iswara' blasphemous. God is never equated with the world by Śaṅkara; God is not *mitya*. We cannot do violence

to the text because we cannot understand it. Appreciating Dr. De Smet's own contribution, Dr. Balasubramaniam commended his message on the teaching of Indian philosophy:

> The whole of my teaching career has been shaped up by a twofold conviction, namely, first, that I could not teach philosophy in India without knowing Sanskrit and understanding the long history of Indian thought, and second, that I could not do it without frequently encountering and conversing with colleagues of the Indian universities. I also made early the option of answering their requests for written contributions rather than pursuing an autonomous course of writing what it would please me to write.

Dr. K.S. Murti intervened to say that one should not take too far the position that a philosophy cannot be understood unless one knew the original language. And we should not place a harsh dividing line between philosophers and theologians. Theologians necessarily deal with philosophy; and even those philosophers who swear by Wittgenstein are theologians in one way!

Describing his personal experiences as a Christian theologian in the Indian context, Dr. John Chettimattam called for 'a philosophy from below' to effectively function in a world increasingly given to material progress and economic independence. 'Starting from the side of the infinite and immutable divinity, the finite material world has nothing to add. But if we start from below and look at the world as the fullness of Christ, the Son of God who could really become incarnate without any change in the divinity, the world has a real meaning. Theos was exemplified for Christian believers in the mysteries of the Immaculate Conception and Assumption of Mary, the Mother of Christ.'

Anubhava (personal experience) is important for Indian philosophy and this should be kept in mind when students trained in the Objectivism of the West seek to study it. Reality of God can be understood but it is not so easy to understand the reality of Man. Man can be understood only by starting from the lowest, i.e., suffering man. It must be remembered that Greek philosophy begins on wonder whereas Indian philosophy starts with suffering. Hence man's consciousness (*chit*) becomes important. Once a sublime thought enters man through his consciousness, his mind gets filled with the vastness of God.

Dr. John Vattanky took the seminar to the intellectualist system of Nyāya with a lucid paper on his researches in Navya-Nyāya that has sought to establish the existence of God, and which has influenced all the other schools of philosophy. A gist of the arguments of the seminal *Tattva-Chintamani* indited by Gangesa of eastern Bengal led Dr. Vattanky to opine that the Nyāya system could help 'the creation of a truly Indian theology': 'For all its speculation and abstract logic, what Nyāya mediates through in its in-depth analysis and seemingly hair-splitting arguments,

is an understanding of the human being in which God is pivotal.' Dr. Joseph Jaswant Raj compared 'Tiruvarutpayan' and the 'Letters of St. Paul' to arrive at the theory of Grace. In both the religions (Śaiva Siddhantham and Christianity), man's situation is one of bondage (*anavamalam*, Original Sin) and in both conditions God is moved by loving kindness known as '*Charis*' in the West and 'Arul' in Tamil.

On the second day, Dr. Dayanandan Francis spoke of his works in Tamil and English. Tamil hymnology (including that of Ramlinga Adikal and Thiru Vi. Kalyanasundara Mudaliyar) had opened his eyes to the cosmic significance of Christ. Christianity must not stop with the adoration of a personal Christ. Christianity must accept secularism and religious pluralism in the Indian context. The Biblical language 'is not sufficient to delineate the greatness of God's revelation in Christ', as the Bible contains 66 Books written at various times and the terminology could mislead Indian Christians themselves.

Dr. Francis strongly advocated borrowing words and phrases from Tamil hymnology in the way shown by renowned Christian poets like Vedanayagam Sastriar and H.A. Krishna Pillai. Religious and communal harmony being the need of the hour, he called for 'a willingness to adapt ideas and concepts which challenge, readiness to be available for dialogue and carefulness in making an account in clear terms of what I believe and practise' could be the best time-table for theologians and philosophers.

Dr Ignatius Puthiadam's 'Dialogue—its basis in Reality' sought answers for the question: 'How to live, move and have our being in this pluralistic world meaningfully, joyfully, creatively? How to understand and interpret the facts we experience?'. All religions are sustained by dialogues within. Christianity 'affirms that God and the human being are in constant communion.' The Upaniṣads, Buddhism, Western literature and thought have all thrived because of dialogue. While a dialogue is no negotiation, it helps to promote mutual understanding. As long as the driving force is love, there will always be a generation of light. The moment truth is seen, both should willingly surrender to it.

While not identifying Christian and Advaitic experiences, Dr. Francis Vineeth sought to prove that one could achieve 'an Advaitic understanding of Christian experience' in his paper:

> Generally, Christians think that they have the fulness of revelation in Christ. This is technically correct, since in Christ the *Logos* itself has become flesh. But since no revelation can be without its own concealment, revelation is never complete or exhaustive in the strict sense of the word. Christianity has to admit that it has a 'finite' revelation of God in Jesus Christ, though what is being revealed is infinitely rich. Advaita, with its radical assertion of the absolute over all particular forms of revelation, reminds us of the inexhaustibility of the content of the *Logos* which is pure consciousness, or consciousness of the Father.

However, the paper drew strong protests including one from Dr. M.M. Thomas who said that if we give up the Old Testament background, much will be lost. To dissolve Christ into Advaita is no good! Dr. Israel Selvanayagam's 'A Journey of Understanding Hinduism through Study and Dialogue' touched upon the concept of Ahiṃsā which was tied up with violence in the *Gītā*. He did not consider conversion by itself an uneasy act. 'It is widely recognized that conversion is possible even in the process of paradigm shifts in the field of scientific research.' He also did not want Christian contribution to Indian philosophy to remain confined 'to repeating and reproducing the classical philosophies for boasting our knowledge':

> Understanding the plurality of traditions and their inter-action through the study of scriptural texts, and living dialogue alone can help us to know the dynamics of Indian culture and society and to work for necessary change. It is a journey having a long path ahead. How much encouragement we get from the Church for venturing into this understanding is a question. However, as I have argued in most of the rest of my writing, both in English and Tamil, studying Hindu religious traditions with openness will challenge the Indian Church to initiate a process of change on all fronts, from the liturgy to social service, which is not less than a new reformation.

The day concluded with Dr. Srinivasa Rao's submissions on the three *Margas* in Indian Christian philosophy highlighting the work of Bishop Appaswamy in the light of *bhakti*, Swami Abhishiktananada in the light of *jñāna* and M.M. Thomas in the light of *karma*. Bishop Appaswamy described Jesus as an incarnation, a *Poorna Avatar*. Swami Abhishiktananda has used words with a sacral approach to describe Christ's ministry and M.M. Thomas believes in humanism as the main plank of the Christian presence in India.

On 3rd March, the pride of place was given to Dr. Francis X. D'Sa's 'A Hermeneutic Reflection on Text and Tradition'. The closely argued paper led to a lively discussion on the definition of a 'discourse' and 'text'. Next came Dr. M.M. Thomas who was listened to with wrapt attention when he spoke of his strivings as a Christian in India's social, political and philosophical context. A Gandhian who raised his voice against the Emergency (his *Response to Tyranny*, 1979, contains 31 comments on the Indian Emergency) and a former Governor of Nagaland, Dr. Thomas said that his main theme in all his writings has been how ideologies have responded to the problems of humanity in the modernizing process. Three forces confront us in the modern world: science and technological revolution, the rebellion of the oppressed people (including women) and religious pluralism. These have tremendous potentialities but they also contain tremendous possibilities for distortion. Mere metaphysics is of no use today. Christianity must help

in humanizing technology. Jesus Christ must be seen in the new humanity; in him a new community responding to the Gospel of Forgiveness should be formed. It must be remembered that the Bengal artistes painted only the crucified Christ as they identified him with the suffering humanity. That is genuine humanism. Religious revivalism must be countered by a religious reformation.

Dr. Felix Wilfred then spoke on his concept of 'transparent humanism' where suffering is easily noticed. He felt sad that inspite of anthropocentrism, there was so much genocide, killing and marginalization of the masses. Apparently we are indulging in a kind of 'selective anthropocentrism'! Dr. David Scott's paper on 'Impermanence and Eternity in Indian Art and Myth' pointed out that India's oral texts like the *Ṛg Veda* managed to be fixed while an epic like the *Mahābhārata*, though committed to writing, tended to have plural texts. Since Indians felt life was impermanent, they did not value nor trust 'physical incarnations of art and literature'. Dr. Scott expressed distress that the art of the story-teller was dying fast:

> And even more threatening than the possibility that the particular craft of the storytellers and performers will die out is the undeniable fact that, already, the contexts for storytelling and folk performances are fast dying out—the occasions when stories are told and performed—the moments of quiet work at the loom or the mending of nets, the long winter evenings around the fire or the warm summer nights under the stars.

The paper-reading sessions came to a close with Dr. Anand Amaladass giving an account of his personal encounters with Indian religious, philosophical and critical texts which included Anandavardhana's *Dhvanyaloka*, Manavala Mamuni's *Artiprabhandham* and the *Bhagavad Gītā*. He said that an Indian approach (say, a *dhvani* reading) to the Christian scriptures could unravel 'the power (and even the mystery) of language that is used to communicate the revealed message.' Throughout the nine sittings when the fourteen papers were presented and commented upon, there were questions, answers, discussions, and clarifications. The sage guidance of Dr. M.M. Thomas assisted by Dr. R. Balasubramaniam, Dr. De Smet, and Dr. Kunjunni Raja among others made the sessions analytical and critical.

Dr. Herbert Herring's summing-up at the valedictory session was graceful and meaningful. He said that Christian contribution to Indian philosophy could take different shapes, propound and expound several concepts like Indian and Western metaphysics, mystic experience as a meeting point of the East and the West, and an Advaitic understanding of Christianity. It is obvious that Christian thinkers in India are no more locked up in their own metaphysics. They are prepared to interact. The very fact that there were plenty of discussions (for instance, whether the

Gītā advocated violence turned out to be a hotly-debated subject) yet nowhere was any rancour seen was a pointer to the success of the symposium: 'I need not deny my own identity by nature and nurture, but in the attempt to discover the truth, I can accept the existence of the Other (the real basis of tolerance) though the other person's view may be quite different from my own'. The primacy of the practical was accepted by everyone. Our concern for the downtrodden must have primacy in religious and philosophical endeavours, he concluded.

In his concluding remarks, Dr. R. Balasubramaniam, Chairman, Indian Council for Philosophical Research said that the unusual symposium owed its existence to the inspiration of Daya Krishna, K. Satchidananda Murty and D.P. Chattopadhyaya. One can make a significant contribution only after understanding the issues involved, and understanding comes only from dialogue. Hence the prime need for such meaningful seminars. Dr. Vijay Prabhu, Principal, Satya Nilayam, proposed a vote of thanks.

Srirangam PREMA NANDAKUMAR

JICPR—XI-3.

Notes and Queries

KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES: SOME PROBLEMS

Kant's famous doctrine of categories suffers from an essential unclarity which needs to be rectified so that an adequate understanding of Kant's position may be possible and its assessment done on that basis.

For Kant, the categories are the transcendental forms of thought, particularly in the context of what he has technically called 'understanding'. There would have been no problem with respect to this except for the fact that the twelve categories he has mentioned have themselves been divided by him into those of quantity, quality, relation and modality. These are the four headings under each of which there are further sub-divisions, leading thus to the famous twelve categories of Kant.[1]

The categories under quantity are:

I. Unity
II. Plurality and
III. Totality

The categories under quality are:

I. Reality
II. Negation and
III. Limitation

The categories under relation are:

I. Inherence and Subsistence
II. Causality and Dependence and
III. Community (reciprocity between agent and patient)

The categories under modality are:

I. Possibility—Impossibility
II. Existence—Non-existence and
III. Necessity—Contingency

It is obvious that the categories are not all on a par for while the categories of quantity and quality have only a simple trinity under them, those under relation and modality seem far more complex even in Kant's own presentation. Under 'modality', we have an intrinisic opposition built within the category itself while under 'relation' the categories seem to have a dual character almost in all the three sub-divisions under it. This dual characteristic, however, does not seem to derive entirely from the fact that a relation generally holds atleast between two terms and hence may be seen from the point of view of either of them. 'Subsistence', or to use Kant's term '*accidens*', is certainly not the complementary of 'inherence' (*substantia* in Kant's language). Similarly there is hardly any

notion of reciprocity or community between 'agent' and 'patient' as given in Kemp Smith's translation.

The generalized problem with respect to the categories mentioned by Kant is that neither can they be regarded as being necessarily a transcendental form of thought, nor can *all* of them *together* be considered as such, for the necessity only is that at least one of the categories under each of the four sub-headings need be there. However, there is no necessity as to which one should be there. To talk of twelve categories therefore is to be basically mistaken, for, in each act of thought or understanding what need be present is only one of the categories under the four headings of quantity, quality, relation and modality and not all of them.

The first question that needs to be clarified, therefore, is whether all the twelve categories have to be inevitably present in every act of thinking or understanding as they are the constitutive forms of what it means to be 'thought' or only four need be present, one each out of the sub-set given under quantity, quality, relation and modality.

The second question is: what is the relationship between the dual nature of the sub-categories under 'relation' and 'modality' for, in actual fact, we have not three but six categories under them. Thus it needs to be clarified as to what is meant by the necessity of one of the categories under 'relation' and 'modality' being necessarily present in every act of thinking and understanding for it is obvious that, at least under 'modality', both possibility and impossibility cannot be present together. Nor, for that matter can existence and non-existence go together. On the other hand, while cause and effect, that is, causality and dependence can be present at the same time, one is not sure if this is possible in the case of inherence and subsistence.

There seems to be also a difference between categories under 'modality' and those under 'relation'. For, while it is clear that out of the categories under 'modality', only one of each pair can obtain in a judgement, the situation is not so clear-cut in the case of the categories under 'relation'.

The third question that needs to be clarified is the relation between the first two categories under 'quality', that is, reality and negation and the second pair of categories under 'modality', there is existence-non-existence for, *prima facie*, 'existence' seems to be the same as 'reality' and 'non-existence' the same as 'negation'.

These are some of the problems regarding Kant's doctrine of the categories which needs to be resolved, for unless these are clarified the exact import of Kantian thought cannot be understood.

Notes and References

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillan, London, 1963, p. 113.

Daya Krishna

Book Reviews

D.P. Chattopadhyaya, *Induction, Probability and Scepticism*, Satguru Publication, Delhi, 1992, pp. xxxi + 448.

I

There can be no two opinions that Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyaya's *Induction, Probability and Scepticism* is a welcome addition and a contribution to contemporary Western/Indian Philosophy. His rich experience in philosophy allows him to command ability for critical examination of a large compass of Western thinkers centreing on major philosophical debates of this century, showing at the same time awareness of relevant thinking in indigeneous Indian *Darśana Śāstrās* of Ārṣa, Buddha and Jaina trends. We ought therefore to evaluate his *work* as characteristically the response of an Indian philosopher/*dārśanika*, to these contemporary debates in philosophical issues led largely by Western thinkers.

The two perennial problems of philosophy, namely of *error* and of *doubt* are perhaps as old as human history itself. These were perceived by Indian *ṛṣis* quite early—1000–800 BC, and later by Greek philosophers. These were, however, tackled quite differently in the two cultures and therefore have different and perhaps independent histories. Thus, while the dichotomies of induction and deduction, probability and certainty, and dogma and scepsis were clearly formulated in Greek thought, the situation was not so in early Indian thinking. Similarly, the bifurcation of two major schools of 'rationalism' and 'empiricism,' and their characteristic approach towards these dichotomies is also a feature that is not present in early history of Indian thinking. Western thinkers of this century have tackled these dichotomies in novel ways in the light of emergence and growth of *modern* science (AD 1600 onwards) and its methods of generation, presentation/ construction and appraisal of knowledge and information stressing its *growth* aspect. A fairly clear picture of such activity in Western philosophy is presented by Prof. Chattopadhyaya; after a cautious and careful dissection of this picture, he espouses *anthropological rationalism* giving allowance to human *fallibility* (both theoretical and practical/empirical), and to human *propensities* towards both dogma and scepsis. This has particular social significance, more so in contemporary times and specifically in Indian society. Thus, Prof. Chattopadhyaya also gives due regard to *common sense* which has always played a foundational role in ancient Greek thought or sciences as well as in modern Greco-European thought/sciences.

II

If we recapitulate, Greek philosophers properly recognized the significance of *observation* only after Aristotle. Due to powerful impact of Greek geometry on Plato, reason alone was allowed as the source or means of knowledge thus visualizing dialectic/reasoning with universals on the model of geometry. Aristotle, however, saw that universals as such do not constitute knowledge, —it is rather the universal *statements* that constitute knowledge. But universal statements themselves cannot be obtained without induction by enumeration of particular/singular statements which in turn originate from perception. But since perception as such may be fallible, it is the observation—careful, repeated perception—which has to be recognized as a source of knowledge and perhaps even more fundamental than reason which is activated, so to say, only during induction by enumeration of the observed. Deduction subsequently plays its role in generating *less-known* statements from better known particular/existential statements and/or universal statements as premises. Thus, in scientific or rational inquiry or in *natural* philosophy, induction has a value where generalization matters, whereas deduction is valuable where proof has significance. This latter notion of proof in Aristotelian syllogistic terms was sought to be modelled on the notion of proof in Euclidian geometry.

Mere rational discovery of Platonic forms cannot give us satisfactory account of the world and it is indispensable to know by means of causes. But if causal account of the world is the ideal, then it has to be strictly determinate and *certain*, —at least in principle so that when the causal chain of phenomenon under investigation is discovered, its statement will provide an isomorphic syllogistic chain thus explaining the phenomenon. However, since human faculties have *limitations*, certain causes cannot be known and probability/uncertainty become unavoidable. Aristotle thus tended to be more realistic and down-to-earth than Plato; he advocated the cultivation of sound common sense as much as of rational contemplation.

Further, there are clear indications in Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* that although dogma is obstructive to progress, it is indispensable for preservation of the valuable in society. Thus, although not founded in reason, it is that which is received as custom from generation to generation. But it is also true that the *novel* cannot be discovered without scepsis, the paradigmatic example of which was Socratic inquiry. Scepsis meant questioning the obvious and refusing to be satisfied unless adequate grounds for acceptance have been advanced or discovered. It was thus the crux of dialectics or dialogue.

The dichotomies of induction and deduction, of certainty and uncertainty and of dogma and scepsis were thus recognized by the Greeks and it was perhaps also recognized that if taken to their extremes, these may become dangerous maladies of human cognitive pursuit. Yet

several post-renaissance Western thinkers have tended to consider these in their extreme formulation. Professor Chattopadhyaya has shown how, if human/anthropological rationalism is considered the 'centre', these thinkers have variously deviated from it and thus created avoidable problems. Thus, for example, the induction/deduction dichotomy got a fillip due to somewhat extreme positions of Descartes and Galileo and in recent times of Popper and Reichenbach. Similarly, the probability/certainty dichotomy got a fillip by efforts of Einstein and Bohr and has given rise to two schools within the monolith of quantum mechanics. The dichotomy of dogma/scepsis has been a more sensitive issue due to involvement of Judaism and Christian faith though Kant did make attempts to accomodate scepsis as an indispensable part of philosophical method. Human rationalism then purports to be a more balanced approach or truer golden mean between these extremist adherences tending to become opposing dogmas of sorts. Further, scepticism as a critique of search is considered an ally of human rationalism. That is how we see the message of Prof. Chattopadhyaya, if the work aims at any message at all.

III

Indian seers approached the problems of error and doubt in a different manner, because these arose—right in the beginning of the Upaniṣadic period—in a different context, namely the context of inner seeing or *sākśāta*. *Sākśāta* refers to some sort of elevated consciousness whereupon the person starts emitting intuitions and it was presumably naturally given to the seers. The Upaniṣadas consisted of *upādeśas* and *ādeśas* of these seers unsupported by any reasons. Thus, a dichotomy of *sākśāta* and *loka* arose as the *lokavādī* understood *sākśāta* and the ensuing concepts of *ṛta/dharma* as dogma whereas the seers understood the *lokavādī* criticism as scepsis. A prolonged debate between the seers and different varieties of 'sceptics' thus began which forced a gradual transition from *vedānta* to *siddhānta* (Sāṁkhya and Surya), from *prākṛta* speech to *vyākṛta* speech and from *śruti* to *smṛti*. Of the two Siddhāntas, Sāṁkhya Siddhānta presented general cosmology supporting its conclusions by *yukti* and developing a notion of *siddhi*; and Sūrya Siddhānta presented special mathematical cosmology employing symbolic language—*anka-rekhā-gaṇita*—and developing the notion of *upapatti*. Pāṇini systematized the available Vedānga Vyākaraṇa, Vedānga Nirukta etc. into a single system developing the notion of *samskṛta* language or the ordinary spoken language subjected to *saṁskāra* of analysis, classification, rule-governance etc. Manu systematized the *smṛti* on grounds of historically recorded conduct of seers and judgements of seer-kings providing *ācāra* and *vyavahāra* rules. This transition thus stressed the role of *yukti, pramāṇa, utsargāpavāda vidhividhāna* in systematization of knowledge though *sākśāta* was not

completely rejected but given a subsidiary place in such systematization. This interesting phase of inquiry, then, led eventually to formulation of causality/*kāraṇatā* principle, to *sāmānya-viśeṣa* principles, to *karma doṣa* and *saṁvāda doṣa* principles etc. culminating in a conception of *darśana śāstra* as joint pursuit of *samādhi* and *saṁvāda* and of *śabda śāstra* discovering underlying linguistic regularity by means of *utsarga* and *apavāda* method. Both the *śāstras* were considered as *basic* for without employment of *vyākṛta* speech, linguistic errors cannot be avoided making *saṁvāda* itself as inadequate at roots; without pursuit of *samādhi* reason itself cannot be purified of *karma doṣa*; and finally without pursuit of *saṁvāda*, appraisal and improvement would not be possible. *Darśana śāstra* in particular involved *sarga vidyā* or cosmology, *samādhi vidyā* or inner-seeing and *saṁvāda vidyā* or theory of rational theorization in general.

The only criticism that we can presently make of Chattopadhyaya's effort is that although he has not completely ignored Indian attempts relevant to his theme, he has paid relatively less attention to this early history of the grappling of the Indian mind with these problems of error and doubt in a characteristically Indian style and shaping various *śāstras* as systematic bodies of knowledge grounded in *pramāṇa* and established by *yukti, tarka, vāda, upapatti* etc. It is well known that treatment of *saṁśaya* and *viparyay* or *bhramā* is quite elaborate in *darśana śāstra*, the former being indispensable to theorization and the latter accompanying man at every level of consciousness. It is, however, clear that mere rationalism, howsoever refined, will not suffice for a *dārśanika* since an even more fundamental search of *samādhi* and *vyākṛti* is required.

University of Rajasthan, Jaipur VIRENDRA SHEKHAWAT

PALL S. ARDAL, *Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1966, (1989, 2nd edn.), pp. xxxix+220, $ 12.95 (PB).

The domain of moral experience and evaluation is generally associated with the volitional aspect of human nature or practical reason. However, the perspective within which the eighteenth century British moral philosophers investigated moral phenomena was delineated by a contrast between the cognitive and affective aspects of human nature. As Hume remarked in his *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, the controversy concerning the general foundation of morals, current in his times was between the contending claims of reason and sentiment (Nidditch edition, p. 170). The scenario as Hume sketched was determined by the issues: 'Whether we attain the knowledge of' the foundation of morals 'by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether like all sound judgement of truth and falsehood,

they should be the same to every rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species' (ibid.). The controversy does not seem to have lost its liveliness even to-day though the linguistic garb, logical style and temporal context in which the debate continues to be carried on may prevent us from recognizing it as such for they have lent it a radically transformed profile. Some of the articles[1] that appeared in the various journals in recent years cover in some measure the areas relating to the issues Hume had engaged himself with and have in their core the fundamental problem of objectivity of moral discrimination. Some of these issues are: What is the origin of obligation and evaluation, whether the role of reason in morals is instrumental only, what motivates one to act—desire or reason, whether ethics is descriptive or prescriptive, whether freedom of will is illusory or real and what is it that a moral statement expresses—likes or dislikes, attitudes, beliefs or what.

Ardal's work seems to fall in place in such a landscape. The book retains its freshness and relevance even in the second edition which comes after twenty-three years of its first publication. By choosing *Treatise* as the text for investigation the author has chosen a more difficult terrain, for *Treatise* is generally held to be a more diffused and difficult text as compared to Hume's *Enquiries*. As Selby-Bigge observes in his introduction to the *Treatise* the pages of the *Treatise* 'are so full of matter, he says so many different things in so many different ways and different connections, and with so much indifference to what he has said before, that it is very hard to say positively that he taught, or did not teach, this or that particular doctrine' (Nidditch edition, p. vii). As such, the *Treatise* can be seen as a tempting challenge to an intrepid mind.

With meticulous, perseverant and critical skill the author has attempted to project a sympathetic and near consistent account of Hume's moral philosophy. Ardal attaches great importance to the second book of *Treatise* dealing with passions, considers it philosophically interesting and 'vital for proper understanding of Book III on morals' (p. ix). In agreement with Passmore, the author points out that the main aim of the *Treatise* was 'to establish the science of human nature on a firm foundation' (2). Keeping this in focus the disparate and inconsistent formulations within the three books of the *Treatise* should be relegated to a subsidiary concern though they need not be pushed under the mattress. With this focus in mind the author has critically discussed Hume's concept of passion which he believes to be intimately related with Hume's concept of virtue.

Against critics like Kemp Smith, Ardal insists that Hume's psychological analysis and description of passion was relevant to ethical evaluation. The propriety of this view becomes obvious when it is realized that Hume conceived Ethics as a part of psychology (p. 190). Hume was not so much

concerned with the *basis of ought* as with the *genesis or origin of evaluative consciousness.* Book II is also interesting for its conceptual analysis involved in the distinction between pride, joy and love. Not merely that "an 'objective judgement' can influence our attitudes only arousing passions" but passions are relevant to 'objective point of view also' (p. 40). Though Hume had called his work on moral thought as an attempt to introduce 'experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects' (as on the fascimile of title page of Book II), Ardal points out that Hume's presentation is dominated by his literary style. Ardal seems to suggest that such a style may well prove to be a fruitful aid to philosophical methodology. In the introduction to this second edition he observes, 'the most efficient way of displaying and exploring important concepts may be the telling of stories exhibi-ting the core of the concepts and drawing their boundaries . . .' and further that 'art is in some important sense also concerned with throwing light upon reality' (p. xxxvi). As an analytic philosopher the author believes that art should not be looked at as an alternative to analytic philosophy. In fact "written philosophy is literature and international philosophical conferences are rather like gigantic theatrical workshops. There is, however, room for concrete illustrations as well as 'abstract' analysis" (p. xxxvii). These remarks follow author's own illustrations in the form of brief stories (having interestingly, Hume and Kant for the main characters) by way of clarifying an important aspect of the concept of 'promise'. The author assures that such a literary mix would transform philosophical enterprise into a pleasant occupation rather than leaving it as a boring pompous performance.

Besides the two introductions, the book has nine chapters. The first one identifies passions as simple impressions and defends the position that the simplicity of an impression is no bar to its being compared with another impression as resembling it. The second chapter deals with indirect passions. Hume has classified passions in several ways—as direct and indirect, as calm and violent. In direct passions he lists desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, security. These passions arise from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. In the indirect ones are listed pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, pity, envy, malice, generosity. They are called indirect because besides having their origin in pain and pleasure they are also connected with some other qualities. Hume does not further elaborate the distinction that he introduces between these two types of passions and chooses to discuss first the indirect ones. He mainly concerns himself with pride, humility, love and hate. Ardal follows Hume in his presentation. 'These passions are the basic favourable and unfavourable evaluations of persons: virtues and vices are qualities of mind or character loved or hated, when they belong to another person and causes of pride and humility, when they belong to oneself' (p. ix). Chapter three describes and discusses the principle of

sympathy which is distinguished from benevolence, pity and compassion. This principle explicates the manner of communication of a feeling of a person to another. It is stated to be indispensable to an account of Hume's views on the nature of evaluation (p. 41). The principle of sympathy does not imply psychological egoism as some commentators think. Principles of contrast and comparison are evoked to explain the effects opposite to those of sympathy. The next chapter examines Hume's views regarding freedom of will. According to Ardal it is misleading to think that Hume comes down 'on the side of determinism' (p. 92), for the libertarians whom Hume refutes are those who equate freedom with chance (p. 92). The fifth chapter is concerned with the notion of a calm passion. Hume identified calm passions as those which are experienced 'on the mere contemplation of beauty and deformity in action and external forms, and may accordingly be further described as being modes of approval and disapproval' as Kemp Smith is quoted to have explained (p. 95). Passions as evaluations are determined by their qualitative character. This is so because they arise from special causes and have their specific objects. Now these passions may be calm or violent, just as ideas may be forceful or vivid in various degrees. Though the violent passions seem to have a great power over will, yet this is also the case that with the help of reflection and backed by resolution calm passions succeed in controlling them in their most furious moments (pp. 105–6). In Book III, part III, section I, Hume refers to reason as 'a general calm determination of our passions, founded on some distant view or reflexion' (Nidditch edition, p. 583). Chapter six is concerned with approval and disapproval of character which are treated as variants of the indirect passions (p. 6). The discussion about approval and disapproval and the role of sympathy in relation to them precedes the discussion of the origin of the moral sentiments. Approval and disapproval are passions or sentiments. The moral sentiments may be pleasant or painful. The pleasure or pain that is involved in the sentiments of approval or disapproval is of 'particular kind', as Hume has pointed out (p. 110). Earlier Hume had insisted that morality is something felt rather than judged of, 'it is not reasonable to go on to ask. . . of what nature are these impressions' (ibid). As Ardal tell us later, moral sentiments cannot be further defined. One can only point out those circumstances from which and within which they arise (p. 115). The views of Adam Smith and Hume regarding sympathy are discussed and distinguished from each other. The relationship between sympathy, imagination and virtue is discussed in the next chapter. Approving virtues requires that an objective standpoint is assumed. This involves an imaginative effort besides a sympathetic relationship. Virtues are qualities of mind, of character which are immediately aggreeable to others, and similarly useful to the person as well as to others (pp. 151–55). In the penultimate chapter, the author has discussed the virtue of justice which is supposed to be an artificial one in

the sense that it depends on convention (p. 174). It is distinguished both from benevolence and prudence. In an indirect way restricted benevolence and self-interest, though obstacles to order and justice in society, work as motives and create conditions for the conventions to be devised through which justice is to be established (p. 177). This is not to give a historical account of the genesis of justice but to make it intelligible as to how justice may have arisen (p. 178).

In the last chapter the author points out that Hume's moral doctrine should be treated as Emotionism rather than as Emotivism or Subjectivism. For the subjectivist, a statement like 'x is virtuous' is a statement *about* the feeling of the speaker. Such a statement can be considered as true or false according to whether or not the speaker *has* the corresponding feeling. For the emotivist such a statement can neither be treated as true nor as false. In contrast to both these positions, Ardal holds that evaluation is itself emotion. He explains by referring to Hume, 'moral judgements are statements of psychological fact', that is, it is a sort of feeling we have in contemplating a character which we would call praise or admiration (p. 200). Hume's concern was not elucidation or the function of evaluative language as is the case with the emotivist. He was rather concerned with the origin and nature of evaluation itself (p. 195). Ardal has also maintained that it would be wrong to call Hume a naturalist for he did not attempt to define moral concepts in terms of non-moral concepts (pp. 191–93).

Just as reason is found inadequate in explaining why any particular conduct manifests virtue so is the case with moral sense. Explaining virtue by referring to moral sense would be like saying 'that a drug puts you to sleep because it possesses a "*virtues dormitiva*"' (pp. 163–164). It is interesting to note that for Hume external aspect or dimension of action had little value or merit, 'unless it is taken as a sign of motive at work in the agent' (p. 165).

In this sketchy summary it has not been possible to give any idea of the rich and intricate, sympathetic but penetrating comments and arguments which the reader encounters in the book almost at every turn. However, I would like to mention an enigmatic problem which seems to emerge out of this discussion of passions and value and which, to my mind, remains unresolved. One can appreciate Hume's view that the apprehension of value or virtue in human conduct and character is basically affective in nature. What is evil must be disagreeable, unpleasant or painful. In opposition, what is good, virtuous and valuable invites our admiration. We feel happy about it. But can we also rightly assert that everytime that we are miserable it is because something evil is going on or whenever we feel pleased something good is taking place? Surely not. As Ardal has clarified, for Hume 'not all pleasures and displeasures are the kind that make us praise or condemn' (p. xxix). In fact Hume points to the ambiguity underlying the use of the term pleasure, 'under the term *pleasure*, we comprehend sensations, which are very different from each other.' (*Treatise*, Nidditch edition, p. 472). A page earlier, Hume remarks (as quoted by Ardal), 'An action, or sentiment or character, is virtuous or vicious; why? because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind' and further 'to have the sense of virtue is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character' (*Treatise*, Nidditch edition, p. 471). However, it is not very clear as to how this 'particularity' is to be identified. There are some considerations which bear on the problem: an emphasis on overcoming personal bias and interest, a need to abstract from the special relations and personal peculiarities, a tendency to objectivity, cooperation and communication and above all the calm passion which in one of the passages quoted by the author has been equated with reason itself. Obviously this impassionate view of reason or dispassionate view of passion cannot be the import of the use of the term 'reason' in the notorious quote relating to its slavery. Hume's indiscriminate and interchangeable use of the terms—emotion, passion, sentiment, approval or disapproval, and even reason, fails to blur the distinction between the reason preoccupied with cognitive verity and formal relations, and the reason having intimate affinity with calm affective state of mind. Thus, how the two reasons or the two aspects of reason can be seen to belong to an integral constitution of human understanding remains as problematic as one finds it later in Kant's *Critiques*.

A related issue has to do with volition and action. In his analysis Ardal shows that passions are not motives by themselves. They are 'not desires and their object is not something to be brought about' (p. 19). Will is supposed to be an impression of which we are conscious 'when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind' as Hume had defined (p. 81). Ardal clarifies on the basis of this definition that 'will' does not name a passion (p. 82). Thus passions, desires and 'will' are distinct. If passions are neither desires nor 'will', they cannot move one to act. They are no more powerful than reason in initiating a volition. Would it not indicate that passions and reason both serve desire? Passions as states of evaluative awareness—positive or negative, and reason providing cognitive inputs would be allies then. In the *Treatise* (Book II, Part III, Section III) Hume points out that we 'speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and reason'. The combat is really between one desire or impulse of passion and the other. Thus it is the substance of a desire which would move one to act. Passion would merely register the quality involved in the action or character.

Ardal's book would interest those Indian philosophers who find the intricate fabric of *nīti* (ethics) as woven by *bhāvana* (feeling and sentiment), *vāsana* (passion as temptation), *tṛṣna* (desire), *sīla* (character), *sadācāra* (right conduct), *puruṣārtha* (values) and so on. The relationship between

these various concepts as understood in the Indian ethical thinking presents an alternative model of moral system inviting comparison with the model presented in *Passion and Value.*

I have noticed three misprints in the book otherwise well produced: 'theses' in place of 'thesis' (p. ix), 'charscter' in place of 'character' (p. xvii) and 'propanda' in place of 'propaganda' (p. xxviii).

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R-4 University Campus, Jaipur R.S. BHATNAGAR

RITA GUPTA, *Essays on Dependent Origination and Momentariness*, pp. v + 251.

This is a collection of ten essays on certain important topics in Buddhist philosophy by R. Gupta published earlier in different philosophical journals. As the title of the collection indicates, the essays deal with the different aspects of the famous doctrine of *Pratītya samutpāda* which has a pivotal status in all the schools of Buddhism. The copious references and the bibliographical notes appended to each essay testify to the author's wide knowledge of the texts dealing with the topics of the essays and their skilful handling of all available material for a coherent presentation of Buddhist and non-Buddhist views on the subjects dealt with in each essay. The essays fall into two groups, each consisting of five essays. The first group is mainly concerned with the doctrine of *Pratītya samutpāda* as it is expounded in the Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda, and Nyāyavāda sects of the early Buddhism and the Mādhyamika school of later Buddhism. The theory of *hetus* and *pratyaya* as advocated by the first three of these schools is considered in great detail in the first three essays. Much of the discussion in these essays is quite elaborate and even repetitive. It seems to have only exegetical significance. The second

group of essays is concerned with a critical presentation of the Nyāya-Buddhist polemics on the doctrine of momentariness which is scattered in the treatises authored by great Buddhist and non-Buddhist savants like Dharmakīrtī, Shantakaksita, Kamalasīla, Ratnakīrtī, Udāyana etc. The last essay in the group presents views on time upheld by different Indian philosophical schools. In her introduction to the essays the author remarks that '. . . the doctrine of . . . dependent origination and *Ksaṇabhaṇga* are complementary. On the one hand *ksaṇabhaṇga vāda* draws all the support it needs from the doctrine of *pratītya samutpāda.* On the other hand the specific features of the doctrine of *pratītya samutpāda* . . . is the result of the Buddhist logicians' attempt to devise a special theory of causation to suit his metaphysics of ceaseless flux'. It is stated in this passage that there are two doctrines, namely, the doctrine of *pratītya samutpāda* and that of *ksaṇabhaṇga* which complement each other. Is it a correct statement? The different schools of Buddhism have interpreted *pratītya samutpāda* in different ways and as a consequence they have arrived at their respective central doctrines of *ksaṇsbhaṇga, bāhyārthabhaṇga* and *śūnyatā.* The doctrine of *ksaṇabhaṇga* is the result of the interpretation which the Sauntrāṇtika school has put upon *pratītya samutpāda.* So strictly speaking, there are not two different doctrines complementary to each other but one single doctrine for each school based upon its own interpretation of *pratītya samutpāda.*

In all the essays of the first group the author stresses again and again that the notion of the producer and the produced which is part and parcel of the common idea of causality, is anathema to the Buddhist view of causality. According to this view, the causal relation is best understood as the relation of the condition and the conditioned. It may here be pointed out that the emphasis of the Buddhist denial in regard to the general notion of causality falls mainly on the alleged substantiality of the cause. Buddhism does not and cannot deny that there is that which causes and that which is caused. What it denies vehemently is the substantive enduring nature of the cause. This is why the non-self theory (Nairātmyrayavāda) of Buddhism applies equally to the individual self and the objective world. That which is sought to be denied in both the subjective and objective spheres is the substantial character of the subject and the object. Consciousness, will, etc., which together with substantiality of their alleged loci are supposed to constitute the full-fledged individuality and agency of the self are not at all denied by Buddhism.

While dealing with the *pratyayas* and *hetus* the author seeks to distinguish them by describing the former as 'indirectly responsible' and the latter as 'directly responsible' for the emergence of the effect. This does not seem to be a felicititous description of the distinction. A causal condition is necessary but not sufficient while the totality of causal conditions is both necessary and sufficient for the emergence of the effect. The *pratyayas* are a certain type of conditions but the *hetus* not being both

necessary and sufficient severally for the production of the effect, cannot be regarded as directly responsible for it. So only the sum-total of the *hetus* can be both necessary and sufficient and so directly responsible for the emergence of the effect.

The author's detailed criticism of the doctrine of *hetus* and *pratyayas* is, on the whole quite justified but exception may be taken to what she says on the subject in the following concluding passage (p. 100):

> The intimate connection between production and causation thus makes it extremely difficult to explain causation solely in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.... Suppose that 'a' is the cause of 'b'. This means that according to this analysis it logically follows that 'b' is also a necessary and sufficient condition of 'a'. Now one of the difficulties involved here is that logical equivalents are also necessary and sufficient conditions of each other yet neither of them is the cause of the other. The relation of logical equivalence is non-temporal and non-productive, whereas the relation of cause-effect is a temporal relation and one of the relation is productive of the other. Hence if we tend to view causes as merely necessary and sufficient conditions, we will be facing the dilemma of having to admit even logical equivalents as causes and effects.

It is obvious from these remarks that if the cause is understood only in terms of the necessary and sufficient condition of the effect, it cannot be distinguished from the terms which are logically equivalent to each other as such terms imply and are implied by each other. This is however a totally incorrect view. If 'a' is the cause of 'b', then it is the necessary and sufficient condition of the emergence of 'b'. But 'b' is only the effect of 'a' and as such it is not the necessary and sufficient condition of 'a'. In fact in the usual sense of the word, 'condition' 'b' is not any kind of condition of 'a'. How then can it be logically equivalent to 'a'?

In the second group of essays the author gives a direct presentation of the arguments for and against the doctrine of momentariness as they are discussed in important Sanskrit treatises of Dharmakīrti, Ratnakīrti and Udāyana. A wise selection of passages dealing with the arguments in these treatises has been made by the author. More or less all the five essays are expository in character. They help to bring out the different aspects of the Nyāya-Buddhist controversy over the doctrine of momentariness. The English rendering of the Sanskrit passage is quite faithful to the original.

By way of her own independent evaluation of the arguments and counter-arguments of Dharmakīrti, Ratnakīrti etc. on the one hand and Udyotakāra, Udāyana etc. on the other, the author has to say very little. She is frank enough to admit in the essay on Udāyana that . . . ' we do not know how to reconstruct the Buddhist position in such a way that it can be saved from the devastating criticisms of Udāyana'. It may here be pointed out that many of the arguments of Udāyana contained in his work '*Ātmatattvavivēka*' have been presented by the author in her essay on Ratnakīrti although she has devoted a separate essay to Udāyana's arguments.

Perhaps due to inadvertence, an incorrect remark happens to have been made by the author while elucidating a certain argument of Nyāya (p. 221).

The remark is as below:

'The perceptible properties are pervading properties . . . of the unperceived entities. . . . Since the pervading properties are necessarily connected with the pervaded . . . we are entitled to assert the existence or non-existence of the entities that are pervaded by them, on the basis of our perception or non-perception, of these pervading properties'.

It may here be pointed out that the non-existence of the pervader implies the non-existence of the pervaded but the existence of the pervader does not imply the existence of the pervaded as is stated by the author.

Nagpur N.S. DRAVID

ALF HILTEBEITEL, *The Cult of Draupadi: Mythologies from Gingee to Kurukṣetra* Vol. I, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1991, pp. 487.

This book is an ethnological enquiry into the cult of Draupadi prevalent in regions of South India, specially Gingee and its adjoining areas. The phrase 'Cult of Draupadi' is usually construed in anthropological literature as the institution of 'fraternal polyandry' practised by the Khasa Rajputs of Jonsar Bawar region of the Shivalik hills but this is not the case in the present context. The author of the present work has highlighted the religious worship of Draupadi as *Śakti*—the Mother Goddess—in the South Indian temples located in a broad area covering regions of Tamilnadu, Andhra and Karnataka. There are 408 temples (p. 25) spread out in this region exclusively devoted to the worship of Draupadi—the queen heroine of the *Mahābhārata* who is completely transformed from her classical sombrous morally fragile image to the exalted status of 'pure virgin', 'chaste lady' and all powerful divine 'mother goddess' (supreme *Śakti*).

The guiding intent of the author in conducting this study has been to comprehend the 'relation between the South Indian, Tamil 'folk' traditions of the Draupadi cult and the pan Indian, 'classical structure of the Sanskrit epic'.

This ethnological account is proposed to be worked out in three volumes. The present book is the first volume in the series devoted to the

study of the epic mythology in its transposition from the classical to folk versions and vice-versa.

Volume two, which remains to be published, is devoted to the study of the other related aspects of the same theme, viz. 'Draupadi cult rituals', a topic that the author strives to 'delve deeper into—historically as well as geographically', and the proposed volume three of the trilogy seeks to provide a 'retrospective on the Sanskrit epic from the standpoint of the Draupadi cult, that is *Mahābhārata* interpreted through the centrality of the goddess' (p. xviii). The study is in fact, an endeavour to understand the cultural dynamics of a civilization—an anthopological venture to study a tradition in its diachronic movement. This approach was introduced by the Chicago School of Anthropology which laid greater emphasis on the study of the dynamics of culture in a civilizational perspective than on the conventional monolithic holism of the single habitat microcosmic studies, viz. single village or the single-tribe monographs.

The present study too is a single cult inquiry but of a different kind which the author claims to be the most representative of the 'popular devotional Hinduism' than the other prevalent regional cults of various deities like Khandoba's or Tamil cult of Ankālaman studied by other scholars. In addition there are other cults also, like village goddess cults, cults of lineage and caste deities, possession cults, hero cults etc., besides the Sanskritic-Brahmanical cults of great Hindu tradition like Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva, Murukan, Devi, Ganeśa, etc. emanating from different *Purāṇās*.

The author claims that as compared to these cults, Draupadi cult is 'singularly representative' of the popular devotional Hinduism for it 'incorporates dimensions of all such cults' and 'working dynamics and inner tensions of lived Hinduism', both. In order to bring in the civilizational holism, i.e. 'ideal' and 'the behavioural' reality into a single frame of reference, the author deviating from the conventional single point empirical ethnographic approach adopts a two pronged 'text-context' integral methodology which includes the textual study of the epic (*Mahābhārata*) for finding out the ideal mythological source of the cult as well as the contextual enquiry of the empirical reality obtaining in the practiced rituals and dramatic ceremonies.

This bifocal approach of comprehending facts of 'behaviour' in correspondence with the ideality of 'values' is no doubt the most suitable method of studying complex and developed civilizations with long historical pasts like India which distinguishes this inquiry from other segmental studies confined exclusively to the contextual study of the facts of behaviour.

According to the author, the cult of Draupadi invites one to review and rework many 'reflexive' oppositions characterizing Indological and parallel studies like folk/classical, Vedic/Hindu, Brahmanical/popular, or village vs region, region vs pan-Indian, historical vs mythical, *Saṁsāric* vs *Mokṣik*, etc.; for pivotal to all these representative oppositions, are the two dimensions of the Draupadi cult whose combination makes it so singular: one, the 'centrality of the goddess' and two, the 'determinitiveness of *Mahābhārata*'.

This work, therefore, in a good deal seeks to study the 'continuities and discontinuities in the cult of the goddess and the transmission of the *Mahābhārata* as they relate to each other, and as they work together to sustain the fundamental values and vitality of Hinduism. And more generally, it is an attempt to study some of the more far-ranging themes and issues of Hindu mythology through the dynamics of this ongoing relation' (p. xix).

Thus the author tries to trace the trajectory of the mythology of Draupadi cult from pan-Indian *Devi-mahātmyam* and Dushehra rituals, buffalo sacrifice etc. to regional and local caste goddesses and *Mīnākṣi* and *Kāmākṣi* worship of South Indian brahmanical temples on one hand and a correspondence between the classical epic mythology and the Tamilian folklore and its subsequent adaptation from the north Indian Sanskritic form to South Indian vernacular form on the other.

Thus the epic of *Mahābhārata* is conceived to be more of a cultural process of 'transposition'—a movement of tradition back and forward—than merely a sacred literary text. The author by proceeding from relatively unfamiliar Gingee-folklore to familiar classical *Mahābhārata* has tried to make these two mythologies viz. classical and folkloric 'intelligible in their regional, historical and sociological contexts'.

In addition to the temple worship of Draupadi-idols the other cultic ceremonies dramatized the folk-loric *Mahābhārata* for eighteen days enacting one *parva* (chapter) each day. The ritual ceremonies start with the *Ādiparva*, with local songs of praise invoking the grace of mother goddess Draupadi shifting to the drama and rituals connected with other *parvas*, viz. *sabhā parva* where Draupadi was gambled away by the Pāṇḍavas and molested by Kauravas, to *āraṇyak parva* enacting the classical exile of the Pāṇḍavas, to *virāṭa parva*, *udyog parva*, etc. and of course to the central metaphysical theme of the occasion of *Bhagavad Gītā*—The Lord's Song. The eighteen-day ceremonies end with the defeat of the non-righteous Kauravas and victory of Yudhiṣṭhir (*Dharma*) and his final enthronement.

The entire ritualism combining the classical *Mahābhārata* tradition through its local folkloric adaptations with the mother worship cult grants the entire ritual structure a powerful religious strength seen in its hypnotic effects upon the participants and the actors enacting different scenes of *Mahābhārata* like fire-walking ritual and disrobing of Draupadi by Duḥśāsana. In fact this hypnotic vigour of the cultic rituals emanates from the folk-loric synthesis of the South Indian mother worship cult with the epic tradition and is not solely the strength of the classical epic *Mahābhārata*. In fact it is a combination of *Śri* (the power of prosperity and auspiciousness symbolized by mother Draupadi) with the 'absolute'

divinity of the Lord (Kṛṣna) that is idealized and ritualized in this rich folk-loric cult. To put it in anthropological jargon, it is this combination of absolute 'purity' (sacred) with the faculty of 'auspiciousness' that constitutes the quintessence of Indian religiocity and cultural tradition. Sometimes this combination is known as *abhyudaya* and *niśreyas*. This centrality of Indian *Weltanschauung* has not been given due emphasis in the present study by the author. As regards the methodological rigor of the inquiry it provides a good ethnological account of a religious cult practiced in a regional setting but unless the manifest and concrete details of a cultural system are properly articulated with its quintessence and core values it cannot be called a 'representative' enquiry of a macro or great cultural tradition.

In fact the 'epic' and the 'cultic' characters of Pāṇḍava queen Draupadi too have two different images and connotations. While the popular epic image of Draupadi is that of a vilified woman with five husbands, the 'cultic' image is that of the mother goddess who can never be defiled for she is the supreme *Śakti* and auspiciousness incarnate. These two dimensions of woman-existentiality constitute two extremities in which the status and image of the Indian woman has continued to oscillate incessantly from the ancient times. The North Indian Khasas of Jonsar Bawar have imitated the secular womanhood of Draupadi in their institution of fraternal polyandry and the South Indian Tamilians have sought to adore her divinity as the symbol of universal Mother (*Śri*) wedded to *Dharma*.

The epic tradition contains the seed of all such variegations manifesting and expressing differently in different socio-cultural milieus. Thus while to North Indian Khasas the epic character of Draupadi served an 'instrumental' role, idealizing and rationalizing their practice of polyandry, to the Tamilians it served a deeper cultural and 'expressive' role of religious significance. It is quite difficult to understand such a wide sweep and its central civilizational perspective unless a proper correspondence between the textual symbolism (its hermeneutic understanding) and the local mythology and its ritual component are properly worked out. Cults are myriad but to work out and decipher their underlying civilizational unity is a challenging task which an ethnologist has to undertake carefully.

Womanhood in Indian cultural tradition has never been a uniform and monolithic phenomenon. Take for example the characters of *Sati Anusūyā* or *Sītā* from the epic of *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Kuntī* or *Draupadi* from *Mahābhārata*. While the value load of *Rāmāyaṇa* is to idealize and emphasize monogamous fidelity to one's husband, the other epic *Mahābhārata* does not denigrade a woman subjecting herself either to *niyoga* or polyandry or even to premarital motherhood. Kunti the mother of Pāṇḍavas, who is subjected to premarital as well as extra-marital motherhood instead of suffering any moral demerit or social stigma has been adored as eternal

virgin and a *satī* and Draupadi the polyandrous wife shared between all the Pāṇḍava brothers is also not only treated as physically and morally pure but even worshipped as divine mother goddess as is the case in the Draupadi cult of Tamilnadu.

The mystique involved in such enigmatic mythic characters and their value import cannot be comprehended unless the notion of absolute and relative 'purity' closely related to the concepts of absolute and the contingent *dharma* and the relation between 'pure' and the 'auspicious' are not properly understood or worked out. It might again be mentioned that just as *Kuntī* and *Draupadi* are revered as virgins and *satī* among women characters, amongst the male characters *Kṛṣṇa*—the divine hero of *Mahābhārata* who, as the mythology goes, had 16,000 wives is also regarded as *brahmachāri* (eternal celibate).

The concept of righteousness and morality in Hindu tradition in fact is not a bi-polar, or unilinear rational concept but a hierarchical and mystical or transcendental notion where the higher reality and moral order subsumes and circumvents the lower order value or reality. This approach even juxtaposes and contrasts the two different orientations, viz. the rational-bi-polar on the one hand and the mystical-holistic one on the other. Indian cognitive tradition being predominantly an aestheticmystic approach does not perceive reality in contrasts and factual constructs but through pattern recognition. Thus though a prostitute can be abhorred socially, the dust of her feet may be treated as sacred in the emaking of clay idol of goddess *Durga* for the religious worship during *Pooja* celebrations in Bengal!

Thus, through the study of Draupadi cult, the mystique involved in the status and image construction of Indian woman in her dual projections i.e. as an earthly woman and as divinity could have been worked out by the author but such an exercise is conspicuous by its absence. Probably he might dilate on such issues in the other two volumes he proposes to publish on this theme. It is quite laudable that instead of treating the cult of Draupadi in structural or functional categories, the author has tried to study it as a process, i.e. as a creative continuity of Hindu epic tradition but, the dialectical relationship between *Sri* (auspiciousness and prosperity) and the sacred (immutable 'purity' of the divine), the two ideals symbolically represented by the principal epic characters of Draupadi (epic heroine) and Kṛṣṇa (divine hero) on the one hand and their relationship with *dharma* as well as with other humanly Pāṇḍavas together with their counter-relationship with the *Asurik* or non-righteous Kauravas remains to be worked upon.

The book is divided in two parts carrying nineteen chapters and two appendices—one giving details of the Lunar dynasty from its classical origin to Draupadi's second advent at Gingee and second appendix giving outline of the Gingee history. The author has also illustrated this study with a good number of plates and tables. While part one of the book

is devoted to the Gingee mythology of the cult, part two is devoted to its epic mythology.

For printing outlay and scholarly input the O'pus deserves all appreciation. Any student working on epic mythology and cult study will find this study quite stimulating and useful.

University of Rajasthan, Jaipur ANAND KASHYAP

BADRINATH CHATURVEDI, *Dharma, India and the World Order*, St Andrews Press, Edinburgh, 1993, pp. 351.

The book brings together a number of essays Sri Chaturvedi had written from 1989 to 1992. The essays are reasonably well integrated. What is remarkable is that there is a central concern in the book. That concern is to work out a theory of society based on *dharma*. It may help in understanding Chaturvedi's central concern to see him as looking for a third way to understand relationships of all kinds, including the individual community relationship.

The author is tormented by the increasing violence everywhere in the world. In the West, particularly, he notices a collapse of all certainties when, according to him, certainties had been a part of the European tradition. The author empahsizes the need to look for an alternative to this which he finds in the Indian way of thinking. The Indian way, according to him, regards reality as extremely complex and refuses to see things, as Lohia also pointed out, in terms of mere either/or. According to Chaturvedi, most philosophies like Christianity, Marxism and Islam have failed to resolve the problem of conflict in human society because they all view human relationships in dyadic terms. Their view, the author argues, is derived from the Aristotelian view of excluding the middle. In his opinion this tradition of thought denies the nature of reality and issues in policy proposals which tend to aggravate conflict.

The challenge, therefore, is to develop a new point of view which will enable the opposites to exist without destroying or suppressing the other. Most of Sri Chaturvedi's effort is devoted to this task. Here he is inspired especially by the writings of Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo.

The fulcrum of this third view is the idea of *dharma*. It is, according to the author, a secular view of life and not a religious one as is generally believed in common parlance. Religion by nature divides and *dharma* unites. It lays stress on the idea that everyone has a right to live and right to order his or her life according to his or her given temperament, capacity and circumstances. The author accepts the traditional view as expressed in the *Mahābhārata* which emphasizes the unity of life in terms of unity and diversity of wholes which constitute it. The *Mahābhārata* is

based on the idea that conflict is the common fact of life. It springs from self-interest and finds its expression in the pursuit of pleasure and wealth. But in order to secure happiness of all it has to be resolved in terms of *dharma*. Chaturvedi, too, does not discard self-interest as such, for according to him also, it constitutes life. What he rejects, however, is what he calls the myopic view of self-interest. He accepts the *dharmic* method of conflict resolution and asserts that it is superior to the Marxian one because it highlights that 'if conflicts arise from one's relationship with self and others, then their resolution must also arise from that very relationship'. Its strongest point is that it is a method of respecting limits. Principles like self-control and charity (*dāna*) are nothing but attempts to highlight limits. This idea of respecting limits extends from personal life to the state. The authorities must provide conditions of freedom in which each person may develop, as Sri Aurobindo would put it, according to the laws of his own being.

Chaturvedi applies this principle to understanding of such issues as regionalism, nationalism and the world order. According to him, it is necessary to define each identity and enable each identity to develop itself according to its own temperament and potential. In Europe and America, regional revolts took place, he argues, because of the dominance of Church and its ruthless attempt to suppress diversity of faith and living. Indian tradition, on the other hand, allows full scope for this diversity. He concedes that there is nothing which is separated from the rest, life is indeed a set of inter-connections. But within it each has its own identity. The *dharmic* thought recognizes this and seeks to create a balance between these identities. A most powerful symbolic representation of this view of man and the world is, according to the author, found in the architecture of temples in Tamil Nadu.

Most of the book does not break a new ground, all the ideas are already contained in the earlier enunciations, including my own. But the way in which it connects them to the central problems of our own time is novel. The concept of *dharma*, of *swabhāva* and limits are used to provide an account of what it means to be an identity in relation to other identities. For instance, according to this view, the national in *dharmic* thought has a meaning only in reaching out to the universality. The principles of *maitrī* (friendship) and *karuṇā* (compassion) are but abiding elements of this balancing act.

Sri Chaturvedi attributes our failure in resolving problems of Punjab, Kashmir or Assam to the faulty thinking we have borrowed from the West. He also comes out heavily on the Mandal formula. The Mandal Commission, according to him, has resurrected word for word, the early British missionary denunciation of Indian society. He makes a strong plea that we must transcend the Western view. According to him, each person has a *swabhāva*, and that should constitute the context for him of how he shall develop in a society which is irreducibly complex. There is

no one universally valid formula that every individual, region or nation must follow. On the other hand, it is possible for each person or group of persons to decide keeping in mind the need to balance in terms of balancing limits.

I have not much to say by way of criticism as I have in my own humble way developed similar ideas. But given the high level of Sri Chaturvedi's scholarship, I would have expected him to develop a more concrete view of the individual *qua* individual or *qua* person and his relationship with institutions such as the family, class and caste. Also, it would have been a great help if he had developed a concrete account of tradition because what distinguishes a *dharmic* man is the way in which he approaches tradition. For Chaturvedi the key criterion is the development of identity in terms of coherence. A person develops his/her identity when he or she develops according to his/her *swabhāva* and *swadharma*. Chaturvedi is right in disallowing religious fundamentalism or strong ideological positions. What seems crucial to him is a certain awareness of complexities of life and open-mindedness about them. A *dharmic* person, he rightly holds, is working to challenge any authority because he knows that autonomy springs from recognition of diversity. But would the encompassing of diversities mean that one must learn to live with incoherence and see different, and at times contradictory aspects of life as separate identities with different principles governing them. Isn't it necessary to postulate a hierarchy of values to which the *dharmic* society should wed itself? Hasn't the idea that we must learn to live with incoherences been the chief cause for the failure of Indian tradition? In practice, hasn't it given rise to practical dilemmas in which no unequivocally best decision can be found?

What is being claimed is that the *dharmic* way of life is not only superior to the Western way but that it is actually embedded in the life processes of Indian civilization. But the unfortunate fact is that we have insurmountable problems of our own too. We have been walking too long looking up at the starry heaven, oblivious of the pits on the ground. The result has been our fall leading to cracks and fractures throughout the body of our social life. How do we explain our regrettable neglect of science and technology, the so called material world, as also our acquiescence in the worst kind of inhumanity against the lowest rungs of our own society? It would have been a great help if he had tried to account for the moral bankruptcy of our own tradition today. I don't see how in such a state of decay we can escape the impact of the West. I share his denunciation of its crass materialism and uni-dimensionalism but aren't we the same today, and in a much crasser way?

There is one more problem. Although Chaturvedi is careful to stress limits on autonomy, weighing up of different pros and cons, he is not clear whether processing is a private or a public affair. Will he accept the enunciation of identity as a collective affair, achieved in society through

discussion and debate? He is hostile, and rightly so, to all isms, including those which give collective account of identity. He stresses the need to join in a common search for the best way to live and he also recognizes that what may be the best way may vary according to time, place and situation. But it is not clear how an actual situation will be handled in terms of personal or collective interpretation. I am raising this point because in the ultimate analysis, our tradition, to my mind at least, notwithstanding its recognition of the organicity of human life and our obligation to repay our debts to it, puts greater emphasis on the individual soul. Even Manu had declared that in the last instance one may even abandon the entire world for the sake of the soul. The place of conscience or soul or some such entity is critical to the way in which the individual's relationship to society and the state is governed.

When all is said, there is much to commend in the book. Chaturvedi is always clear and profound in what he writes. Some of his criticisms of the West are telling and his reflections on *dharma* and its application to different spheres of life are extremely illuminating.

University of Rajasthan, Jaipur VRAJENDRA RAJ MEHTA

SHYAMALA GUPTA, *Saundarya Tattva-Mīmāṁsā*, published by Sima Sahitya Bhawan, (first edn.) Delhi, 1992, pp. 262, Rs 300.

The present work in Hindi is intended by the author, who has been a senior teacher of philosophy for three decades, as a suitable text-book for university students. Aesthetics is being taught at the graduate level, but there are hardly any books in Hindi which would give the student of philosophy adequate help in this area. The attempt of the author is thus clearly well conceived.

The book is divided into two parts; the first deals with Western thought in 210 pages, the second deals with Indian thought in 50 pages. The plain disproportion between the two parts reflects possibly the emphasis followed in the syllabus which the author has in mind. The book aims at giving a reasoned and systematic summary of some of the principal topics of discussion in standard treatises on aesthetics. The first chapter, thus, discusses the concept of aesthetics as a branch of philosophy concerned with a distinctive realm of value and in this context gives a brief history of its evolution in the West from Plato down to recent times. The second chapter discusses the relationship of beauty and art. The third chapter analyses the different aspects of the art-object and presents both the formalist as well as the representationist views. The fourth chapter is rather long and attempts a comparison of art forms. The fifth chapter explains the principal theories of art—imitationist, representationist, expressionist. The sixth, seventh and eighth chapters consider the

relationship of art to science, morality and games. The ninth analyses aesthetic experience, discussing its source, characteristics and nature. The tenth and eleventh chapters are concerned with aesthetic attitude and judgement. The twelfth chapter discusses some contemporary theories, Marxist and analytical. The thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth chapters summarise the leading ideas of Indian aesthetic thought.

The book is comprehensive in its range and systematic in its presentation. Although fairly eclectic, it is balanced in its treatment which brings out clearly the main problems and arguments as they emerge from different philosophical points of view. The thoughtful reader should be able to see the many-sided complexity of the subject and be prompted to go deeper into questions of coherence. Thus, a major theme which runs through the book is the division between subjectivist and objectivist approaches to art and aesthetic values. The division between holistic and piece-meal approaches to aesthetic questions is mentioned at several places.

The book is based on an extensive and critical study and deserves to be commended for its lucid, systematic and reasoned exposition of the subject. It ought to be of immense use for the student as well as the non-specialist reader.

University of Allahabad, Allahabad ANUPA PANDE

OBITUARY NOTICE

Paul Feyerabend
(13 January 1924–13 February 1994)

At the end of its concluding session, the afternoon of 15 March, the participants of the *IWCR: PCPISK** (held at Delhi University, 10-15 March 1994), rose to observe a minute's silence in memory of Paul Feyerabend. On this occasion, an obituary written by John Watkins of LSE was read out by Robert S. Cohen, Centre for Philosophy and History of Science, Boston University. In his obituary, Watkins describes him as 'one of the most gifted, colourful, original and eccentric figures of post-war academic philosophy'.

Paul Feyerabend married Grazia Borrini. He died in Geneva on 13 February 1994 and was buried in Vienna, where he was born on 13 January 1924. He had attended high school in Vienna. Later he served in the German army from 1942 and became a lieutenant in the Pioneer Corps. From 1945 he had to use a wheel-chair to recover from the disability suffered during action in the war, until he was able to walk again with the aid of a crutch. In 1946 he returned to Vienna to study theoretical physics, history and philosophy at the university. In 1951 Feyerabend obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Vienna for a thesis on theories of basic statements. It was during this period that he met Karl Popper, Elizabeth Anscombe, von Wright and Arthur Pap, besides his teacher Victor Kraft, the lone survivor in Vienna of the famous Vienna Circle. During 1952-53 he visited LSE as a British Council scholar to study philosophy of quantum mechanics under Karl Popper. In 1955, Feyerabend took up a lecturership at Bristol University where he gave a paper on the same subject at the famous symposium on philosophy and physios which Stephan Körner had organized in 1957 with the physicist David Bohm and others. In 1958 he moved to Berkeley. From there he visited the famous Minnesota Centre for the Philosophy of Science regularly. He published his well-known essay 'Problems of Empiricism' (1965) during this period. He made notable contributions to Paul Edwards's *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (1966) on Boltzmann, Heisenberg, Planck and Schrödinger. In the year 1968-1969, he defended Niels Bohr and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics against Karl Popper's criticisms. He published his book *Against Method* in 1975, already a bestseller. This was followed by his other books, *Science in a Free Society*

* International Workshop on Constructive Realism: Problems of Cultural Progress and Improvement of Scientific Knowledge.

(1978), *Philosophical Papers* in 2 volumes (1981), *Farewell to Reason* (1987) and *Three Dialogues on Knowledge* (1991).

It was 'partly to defend scientific practice from the rule of philosophical law' that he wrote *Against Method* (1975). In that work, as also in his *Science in a Free Society* (1978), he was still grappling with the burning issues in terms of *abstractions*, whether it was incommensurability or epistemological anarchism. His *Farewell to Reason* (1987) proposes a farewell *at last* to all concern with such abstractions. As he put it, 'my concern is neither rationality, nor science, nor freedom—abstractions such as these have done more harm than good—but the quality of the lives of individuals' (*Farewell to Reason*, p. 17). To this end, Feyerabend warned, any advice for change and improvement should come from friends and not from those whom he called 'distant thinkers'. In other words, it was he who reminded us of the following: that being beneficial, instead of being rational, should be the criterion both for recognizing a cultural form and for cultural choice, where the quality of life and of harmony and happiness are our concern.

Paul Feyerabend contributed an essay on 'Realism' to Carol C. Gould and Robert S. Cohen (eds.), *Artifacts, Representations and Social Practice: Essays for Marx Wartofsky* (1994). He had completed an autobiography before he died. To quote John Watkins again: 'He was a free spirit, irreverant, brilliant, outrageous, life-enhancing, unreliable and, for most who knew him, a loveable individual.'

Delhi University G.L PANDIT

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

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