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BOOK REVIEWS

Objective Knowledge and Psychologism

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Popper has often talked about 'psychologism', especially in connection with the empiricist theory of knowledge. It seems that he denounces psychologistic theories because they fall short of the requirements of knowledge (although he holds that knowledge can never be justified). One who takes his 'anti-psychologism' seriously can find the working of German academic tradition behind it. I shall first examine the continental anti-psychologistic trend led by Kant; Popper's kind of anti-psychologism will be discussed next; and finally the issue of objective knowledge and its relation to psychologism shall be raised to examine the question whether or not an objective theory of knowledge necessarily requires to be anti-psychologistic. I shall argue that although the alleged trace of 'psychologism' found in Popper's own philosophy can be explained in various ways, psychologism in a certain sense is not incompatible with an objective theory of knowledge. In fact the 'information processing' model of knowledge involves a kind of 'psychologism' in the Popperian sense but is an adequate theory of knowledge which can also endorse Popper's own view.

I

No one can transcend Kant in giving understanding a central position in any account of knowledge. The methodological demarcation between different sciences first appear in his attempt to systematize the characteristic requirements of valid knowledge. True to the victory of Newtonian tradition, he looks for this requirement in the realm of science—the paradigm of objective and 'valid' knowledge. In other words the answer to his classical self-posed question—'are synthetic judgements a priori possible?'—finds a positive answer in the realm of the natural sciences including mathematics. Therefore, he concludes, any knowledge-claim should fulfil the features found in scientific judgements, namely being a priori and synthetic, which also imply universality and necessity. No judgement which is either not a priori or not synthetic can have any epistemic value. Now the 'synthetic' part is not so difficult to be established and has already been sufficiently

argued for by the classical empiricists and established by Newton's Laws. The problematic issue lies in epistemic judgements being 'a priori'. Kant realized it and laboured at great length not only to argue for it but to 'prove' it by two sets of reasons, 'metaphysical' and 'transcendental'—'expositions' in the case of space-time and 'deductions' in the case of the categories of understanding.[1]

In this venture, Kant also tries to undermine any view which overlooks the a priori element in knowledge and denounces that view as psychologistic. Historically, Kant's anti-psychologism is motivated by two reasons: (i) classical empiricism's apparent popularity and its inevitable scepticism which is a threat to any theory of valid knowledge; (ii) vindication of Newtonian Mechanics against possible sceptical onslaught. It is interesting to note that Newton himself was a thorough going inductivist and shared Bacon's despise for hypothetico-deductive models for scientific knowledge.

Kant shares the same intuition as Popper that the most important feature of knowledge lies in its objectivity, but unlike the latter, he ties this feature with some a priori (and therefore necessary) preconditions of knowledge. Kant distinguishes between the subjective, the variable in the fleeting manifold as it is presented to us, and the principle, the invariable which enables us to recognize the unity. The former is subjective and psychological but the latter is objective and therefore epistemological in nature. Now, if this unity of association had not also an *objective* ground which makes it impossible that appearances should be apprehended by the imagination otherwise than under the condition of a possible unity of this apprehension, it would be entirely accidental that appearances should fit into a connected whole of human knowledge. Kant rightly transcends Hume in recognizing the objective and invariable in the 'given', and rebukes psychologists (including Hume, it seems), for overlooking the active role of imagination in perception which cannot be fully explained in terms of disconnected impressions and laws of association.[2] But in his view, objectivity of knowledge cannot and need not be explained by any factors outside the understanding. It is grounded a priori in the unity of apperception. 'The abiding and unchanging "I" (pure apperception) forms the correlate of all our representation in so far as it is to be at all possible that we should become conscious of them'.[3] When Kant speaks of objectivity it is better to take it with a grain of salt for his notion of objectivity is far from the realistic notion of it and even further from the sense in which Popper uses it as a characteristic feature of scientific knowledge. Objectivity to Kant is almost synonymous with necessity and invariability as opposed to subjectivity which is fleeting and passive. Sensibility is the faculty that gives us forms of passive reception, whereas understanding is spontaneous and active; it gives

us rules. These rules he calls 'objective', because they necessarily depend upon the knowledge of the object.

The rules are also called laws. Disregarding Kant's elaborate terminology and repetitive application of similar statements, it is possible to notice a reasonable picture emerging out of it which is astonishingly close to the picture of commonsense realism.[4] It can be simply stated as a view which denounces the sceptical assertion that there is no table in front of me but a series of sense-impressions in flux bound only by some psychological laws of association (by continuity in space and time etc.). This psychologistic account of knowledge assigns to the mind the role of a passive recipient that follows only physical and biological laws. Kant denies all these in a novel way; perception of an object is possible only by a synthetic unity among the manifold receptions of sense which are in a flux. So the unity is a priori and a precondition of knowledge. Valid knowledge is objective and necessary because it conforms to this a priori principle. Apart from the well-known problem inherent in such a notion of objective knowledge, namely the problem of explaining error and illusion—Kant's account suffers from another fundamental difficulty—it implies that valid knowledge can be justified because it is objective and necessary. For that he has to make another big assumption that there is a kind of conformity (almost like a pre-established harmony) between objects found around us and a principle of synthesis within us that makes knowledge possible. Kant argues that the fact that we can have knowledge about the empirical world proves that there are a priori rules or principles which justify knowledge. I am not going to make a critical estimate of this account of valid knowledge, for Kant has been severely criticized by philosophers[5] in this regard. In the present context, however, we can concentrate only upon the issue of distinction between subjectivist and objectivist theory of knowledge with regard to the issue of anti-psychologism.

As I mentioned before, Kant is equally concerned with the task of salvaging validity of scientific knowledge from the sceptical onslaught. An empirical motivation for the whole of the *Critique* is his conviction in Newtonian science. Science has *actually been* possible, therefore there is no doubt about its validity; the only problem he feels is to account for it. Popper's optimism about the possibility of valid knowledge is comparable in spirit to Kant's enthusiasm about vindication of scientific knowledge as objective. But that is where the agreement ends; for Popper agrees with him neither about the features of validity nor in the obsession for 'proofs' to demonstrate the validity of scientific knowledge,

Kant's legacy of resistance to psychologistic or subjective account of knowledge is carried on by nineteenth century continental philoso-

phers. A leading Marbourg Neo-Kantian Paul Natorp needs a special mention here. Natorp argues against psychologism and against what has come to be called the 'myth of the given'. He renounces immediate givenness in favour of the 'ongoing process of knowing from which subjectivity and pure objectivity are abstracted limits'.[6] The viewpoint presented here resembles the anti-positivistic views of Quine and Sellars.

The central position of the subject in Kant (consider his claim to bring a 'Copernican Revolution' in philosophy), however, leaves one to wonder whether he still retains a residual psychologistic element. Popper equally faces a charge of 'psychologism' against which he himself fought so many times.[7] Heidegger tried to free Kant from subjectivism and so did Cassirer who maintains that scientific knowledge needs some a priori *principles.* The two criteria of aprioricity are strict universality and strict necessity. It does not need any *subject.* The object of scientific knowledge is nothing but a problem or task. Principles are the bases of scientific enquiry.[8] Popper rejects the notion of strict 'necessity' and 'universality' of these principles in his account of knowledge but the general epistemic framework nevertheless retains the Kantian structure. It is not even chance similarity. Popper shares Kant's anxiety to salvage validity of knowledge from the 'bucket theory of knowledge'. Popper holds hermeneutics and the general Kantian tradition responsible for the psychologism prevalent in philosophy. 'In spite of the vogue of anti-psychologism which started with *Logische Untersuchungen,* 1900–1 (second edn. 1913, 1921), psychologism—that is: neglect or even denial of the third world—is still powerful, especially among those interested in the theory of understanding (hermeneutics). Husserl's anti-psychologism was without doubt the result of Frege's criticism of Husserl's psychologistic *Philosophie der Arithmetik, Psychologische und Logische Untersuchungen,* 1891'.[9] Popper describes psychologism as 'a neglect or even a denial of the third world'. In the same footnote he quotes Husserl again to establish a connection between his own philosophy and that of Husserl. The letter states: '"In all . . . sciences we have to insist upon the fundamental distinction between three kinds of interrelations: (a) the interrelations or our *cognitive experiences. . .*"; (this is, what I here call the *second world*) (b) "the interrelations of the *objects under investigation. . .*"; (especially my *first world*—but it can be any of the others) and (c) "the *logical interrelations. . .* "(these belong to my third world. . .).'[10] These statements, especially the ellipsis after (a) refer to the psychological interrelations of 'judgements, insights, conjectures, questions'. These passages from Husserl may have been responsible, Popper alleges, for the prevalent psychologistic tendencies in epistemology. And obviously he (Popper) is out to witch-hunt these tendencies with almost the same fervour as the logical positivists' enthusiasm for chasing metaphysical nonsense away.

It is of historical as well as philosophical interest that Popper himself makes the task easy for us by tracing his intellectual stance back to continental philosophers. In various places he refers to Frege, Gomperz and Bolzano[11] in connection with the 'distinction between thought in the objective sense and thought in the subjective sense'. In fact Popper mentions that Frege's *Der Gedanke* being written ten years after Gomperz's work must have been influenced by the latter. Frege's *das dritte Reich* which Popper calls 'world 3', therefore, must have been originally thought about by Gomperz, although Popper thinks the latter 'fell back in the end on a psychologistic theory'.[12] I want to make a provisional representation of Popper's distinction between subjective and objective in the following way:[13]

W2 approach = subjective approach/psychologistic/cause
W3 approach = objective approach/anti-psychologistic/behaviouristic/effect (such as a problem), an explicandum to cause (an explanatory hypothesis).

II

I shall now proceed to examine these identities and try to disambiguate the notion of 'psychologism' and assess Popper's attempt to free epistemology from it. The traditional concept of psychologism was put forth by some nineteenth century philosophers and logicians as a theory according to which philosophy and logic were to be conceived of and pursued as important branches of what was further thought to be the 'one sovereign discipline of psychology'.[14] Consider Kant's contempt for the Humean concept of 'conceivability' in this connection. If the above sense of psychologism is to be accepted, then philosophers today may feel assured that philosophy has been safely 'de-psychologized' and autonomy restored for epistemology which put it back to the same status as logic. But unfortunately psychologism may have a different meaning and in that sense it is traceable in the writings of philosophers (including Popper) who attack it in the traditional sense. One can call the above mentioned concept of psychologism a reductionist doctrine because it assumes that logic and philosophy should be reduced to and founded upon the laws of psychology.[15] Hume's case is a paradigm case of this variety and the contemporary trend of cognitive psychology is another such effort.

Pandit makes a distinction between two kinds of psychologism and argues that philosophers often make a confusion between these two kinds which he calls (1) reductive psychologism and (2) methodological psychologism and both the types are found in the so-called anti-psychologistic philosophers. Reductive psychologism is the doctrine that confuses logical or philosophical issues with psychological ones. A more 'subtle variety' of it however, is found in the 'procedure of

formulating a philosophical explication with the help of a psychological concept—i.e., the procedure of either formulating an explicandum with the help of a psychological concept or a psychological concept being assigned a classificatory role within the formulation of a philosophical explication'.[16] The author tries to show in this passage that a kind of irreducible psychologism (use of psychological concept) creeps into the methodology of many philosophers.

Let us see if the 'methodological psychologism' is traceable in Popper's writing as has been alleged. I shall first examine the 'two different contexts' in Popper's *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* where Pandit finds a kind of confusion between two kinds of psychologism. The first one is in the context of Popper's definition[17] of epistemology as the logic of knowledge, where Popper rejects the problem of induction and 'empirical basis' or foundation of knowledge on the ground of involving psychologism (i.e., confounding epistemological issues with psychological ones).[18] This is clearly a case of what Pandit calls 'reductive psychologism' that Popper talks about and eventually rejects. In another context where Popper warns us about his use of the term 'observable' against any apprehension that he is allowing some kind of psychologistic concept to 'slip back' in theory.[19] Pandit does not say clearly that the second case is an example of 'methodological psychologism'—but from his comments 'Popper's use of the term "psychologism" in these two different contexts is an excellent case of the ambiguity of "psychologism"'—it appears that he (Pandit) thinks so. It is not clear what exactly Pandit has in mind when he says that the term 'psychologism' is used ambiguously. One can argue that psychologism is any theory where an explanation is given of a certain phenomenon in terms of psychological concepts—be it a cognitive or a conative act. Pandit cites Carnap's well-known thesis of material mode of speech and formal mode of speech not only as an excellent example of methodological psychologism but also as being of great methodological value. Why should this kind of psychologism be basically different from Pandit's 'reductive psychologism'? Those who have a reductionist theory about knowledge like Carnap will also have a corresponding methodology to implement it. Carnap's 'translatability into formal mode of speech' is such a strategy. So, unless Pandit can show some cases of reductionist psychologism which are not necessarily methodological also or vice versa—there is not much gain by the alleged distinction between these two types of psychologism. Leaving this linguistic quibble aside, a more important question can be raised here: Is Popper's epistemology purely anti-psychologistic and anti-behaviouristic as he claims? And a further question follows: why, if at all should we avoid psychologism for an adequate theory of knowledge? In the next section I shall try to examine (and answer) these questions and probe into the issues that are raised.

III

Popper's anti-psychologism: The most famous and typical passages revealing Popper's aversion to psychologism are to be found in Section 2 of *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* called 'Elimination of Psychologism'. In this section he argues as he does at many other places[20] that the processes by which ideas are arrived at are irrelevant in the context of evaluating their worth. We cannot 'rationally reconstruct' the thought processes of, say, a scientist's discovery, because there may be always an element of irrationality in the process. Moreover, tracing the psychological origin is also not relevant for epistemological issues. Psychologism is, according to Popper, the fallacy (committed by all kinds of foundationalists) of confusing the psychology of knowledge with the logic of knowledge. Notice that although Popper denies both 'rational reconstruction' of the processes leading to knowledge and the possibility of logical justification of it, he nevertheless recognizes the logical status of epistemology. Arguments for this position are as follows: although our knowledge (or rational beliefs) can never be logically justified (as Hume rightly says), there is however, a way to judge its validity. Knowledge as belief is subjective/non-testable, but knowledge (theory, conjecture, hypothesis) as linguistically expressed is objective because it transcends the knower and becomes testable/falsifiable by a set of basic propositions. Knowledge for Popper exists only in the latter sense. It is anti-psychologistic and objective. Although a product of the mind (by the way of origin), it is autonomous and universal.

A superficial glance over the general scheme may lead one to wonder whether Popper's testability criterion and 'basic propositions' resemble Carnap's reductionist programme. Let me lay down the conditions for a basic statement in this connection to examine whether Popper's scheme also is a case of 'reductive psychologism' (to use Pandit's terminology) or not.

(a) *Formal Condition:*	Basic statements have the form of singular existential statements, which means that they can never be deduced from a universal statement without initial pre-conditions.
(b) *Material Condition:*	Basic statements must be inter-subjectively testable by observation, which means that they must speak about a non-vacuous world.

It is the material condition of a basic statement (as I mentioned earlier)[21] that may lead one to find a kind of psychologism to 'slip back quietly' in Popper's theory as he himself anticipated.

But there is nothing to fear; he is not going to fall for any psychological account since the term *observable event* 'might just as well be replaced by "an event involving position and movement of macroscopic

physical bodies." Or, we might lay it down, more precisely, that every basic statement must either be itself a statement about relative positions of physical bodies, or that it must be equivalent to some basic statement of this "mechanistic" or "materialistic" kind'.[22] Popper leaves 'observable' as a primitive, undefined term without any psychologistic connotations. Popper is right about himself when he says that merely the use of the term 'observable' should not be confused with psychologistic approach; nor should forms of speech be either, for they speak of 'occurrence' in a certain space-time region only.[23] Basic statements work as potential falsifiers of a theory as well as in corroboration of it. Popper is emphatic that these statements are[24] different from the sentences which represent immediate experience that can justify our immediate knowledge. In his search for a basis of scientific language, Carnap lands into some sentences which are ultimate with reference to the analysis of all other kinds of scientific sentences (theories). These ultimates are the irreducibly simple sentences that he calls 'protocol sentences'. Popper calls this move psychologistic although Carnap (unlike Fries and Reininger or other philosophers of psychologistic leanings) recognizes that *only* statements can be compared with statements. But language speaks only of 'words' and not of objects; therefore our ordinary (material mode of speech) statements must be translated into the proper (formal) mode of speech and ultimately reduced to a class of protocol sentences. A significant point should be noted here. No sentences are ultimate to Popper in any sense. Basic statements are also falsifiable (by another basic statement). Even trite statements like 'this is a glass of water' are not verifiable by observation for they contain universals like 'glass' and 'water'. Surely universals always transcend immediate experience. Therefore Popper concludes that there are no ultimate sentences that can represent our 'immediate experience'. Any attempt at such reduction is futile.

One point at least is clear here (even if Popper is wrong about Carnap): basic statements are neither ultimate nor do they represent anything psychological and therefore although Popper characterizes them as 'observable', they are by no means psychologistic in either sense, as implied by Professor Pandit.

Besides 'observability', there is another notion which worried many philosophers including Pandit about its psychologistic import. It is the much-maligned concept of 'conceivability'.[25] Popper uses this concept to explicate the notion of scientific theory and its falsifiability, and thus himself falls within what is called 'methodological psychologism'.[26] He uses it in the context of explication of a *theory* when he says: 'A theory which is not refutable by any *conceivable* event is non-scientific'. He uses it for explication of the notion of falsifiability when he writes: 'The criterion of *falsifiability* is a solution to this problem of *demarcation* for it says that statements or systems of statements, in order to be

ranked as scientific must be capable of conflicting with possible or *conceivable* observations'.[27] Now, it is unfortunate that Popper uses a term loaded with ambiguity and potential psychologistic connotations especially since Hume's use of it in the context of necessity. The concept may have at least two possible connotations. One is logical conceivability (i.e., consistency) and the other is psychological conceivability (imaginability). Hume's celebrated example of salt remaining 'undissolved' in water tries to overthrow necessity from causal relations by reference to this distinction.[28] This ambiguity can be resolved in various ways[29] but so far as Popper is concerned, there is not much scope for either ambiguity or its being used in the latter sense of being 'psychologically conceivable'/'imaginable' for his use of the word 'possible' in the second passage quoted above is crucial. 'Possibility' is a modal term and modality is indeed a logical concept. It has nothing to do with psychological con-cepts like 'imaginable'. 'Possible' in this sense implies self-consistency to rule out contradiction. Simple rules of modal logic can show that Popper must have logical possibility in mind when he uses 'conceivable events' or 'conceivable observations'. Therefore mere use of the term 'con-ceivable' by Popper cannot brand him with psychologism of any kind merely because the term has a long association with empiricist vocabulary.

One important feature of Popper's anti-psychologism lies in his insistence that 'psychology' (i.e., an account of how it originates) of knowledge alias scientific theory is not only irrelevant but also difficult for having a 'logical' account. Once the theories are made (by whatever means), they are subject to logical evaluation. One may question, however, even this modest claim and allege that 'Popper does not advocate a real "logic of discovery"'.[30]

Musgrave's discovery of psychologism in Popper: The argument for such allegation is based on the distinction between 'scientific practice' and 'traditional conception of knowledge'. Musgrave argues that Popper has conflated these two conceptions of knowledge and while he (Popper) is *right* about the logic of scientific knowledge having nothing to do with the contributor of a theory or a particular scientist, he is *wrong* about overlooking the role of 'subject' or the knower in the ordinary sense of knowledge. I agree with Musgrave's general point that traditional conception of knowledge 'demands that any item of putative knowledge be analysed with reference to *who* claims to "know" it. One man's knowledge may be another man's vain superstition, we must ask whether the alleged "knower" really does know the item of knowledge in question'.[31] Indeed the claim to valid knowledge (if you are not ready to be called a sceptic) should take into consideration the knower's perceptual experiences and other grounds such as logical and epistemological framework to exclude the possibility of accidental hitting at truth. In fact we can brandish Popper's own example of a 'clairvoyant'[32]

arriving at a startling theory (which happens to be the same as another theory of quite sophisticated scientific tradition) at him for establishing the importance of relevance. If Popper admits 'background knowledge' (as he actually does), to have an important role in discovery, then he cannot omit the relevance of the history (or psychology) of a theory (or knowledge). As I have argued earlier, Popper steers clear of subjectivism by rejecting the reductionist dogma that observation statements can be *justified* finally by reference to psychological experiences. Statements, he rightly says, can only be compared with other statements. '. . . the decision to accept a basic statement . . . is causally connected with our experiences—especially without *perceptual experiences*. . . . Experiences can *motivate a decision*, and hence an acceptance or a rejection of a statement, but a basic statement cannot be justified by them—no more than by thumping the table.'[33] But Popper nevertheless requires at least a *critical* approach (or attitude) to theory, otherwise his 'empirical' basis of theory cannot be acceptable without a foundationalist account. Musgrave points out a very serious possibility in this connection which might land Popper into a kind of much-dreaded 'psychologism' to which he is so apathetic. The argument runs this way: to Popper no knowledge can ever be justified. Even trivial statements like 'there is a glass of water' are not fully error-proof. All knowledge is fallible. Therefore *we* should have an open critical mind to look for a possible knock-down of our 'favourite' theories. Now, the requirement of a critical mind ready to find falsification has a very close resemblance to Bacon's (or Cartesian) open and unspoilt mind, unprejudiced by any previous theory. So, Popper's requirement implies two serious consequences which he would be the last one to want for himself—first, 'critical mind' seems to include a 'psychologistic' concept. Second, such an open and unspoilt mind is impossible to find. With Popper's general epistemological stance, these two possible consequences are incompatible and thoroughly undesirable. So, one who is sympathetic to Popperian methodology of science would try to save Popper from such colossal inconsistency. And Musgrave, loyal to his intellectual forefather, surely made some honest attempts[34] to save Popper from the possible charge of 'psychologism' as well as to explicate him from treacherous terms like 'critical attitude', 'sincerity', which reek with psychologistic flavour. I shall examine these attempts in the following section.

IV

A way out: First about Popper's requirement of a severe test of a theory against possible falsification. 'Severe test' is a vague term and one may find it a methodologically difficult rule to follow. For it needs, first of all, to look for a negative instance and then to give up the theory

which is thus falsified if one finds it. It is also psychologically difficult, however much Popper may dislike the 'psychological factor'. Popper must have (although he never recognizes it) realized the psychological difficulty (of wishing the death of one's favourite brainchild) because he often talks about the 'sincerity of the scientist' to devise tests which may knock down his theory. But what is the mark of this sincerity? For, Popper admits that the 'requirement of sincerity cannot be formalized', although his formula C (h,e) 'must not be interpreted as degree of corroboration of *h* by *e*, unless *e* reports the results of our sincere efforts to overthrow *h*'.[35]

Musgrave reads in the above quoted lines a 'distinctively psychological' tone 'to depend upon the state of mind of him who performs it'. Evidence that corroborates a hypothesis must not be taken seriously unless the scientist is sincerely trying to refute it. But the problem is: how to determine the sincerity of the tester? It cannot be formalized. So there lurks an imminent threat of psychologism that may lead to subjectivism which Popper always dreaded. This is a problem. And so Musgrave thinks that the requirement of a tester's sincerity before judging the severity of the test may 'infect' Popper's philosophy of science 'with an admittedly mild form of a dangerous subjectivist disease'.[36] But Musgrave is not afraid as he explains: 'Fortunately a *remedy* is at hand: Popper also gives an *objective* analysis of the severity of tests, an analysis which needs no recourse to the sincerity of testers'.[37] The 'objective analysis' consists of predicting an unexpected effect (given the existing corpus of scientific knowledge) of the hypothesis *h*. The prediction of an hitherto unknown consequence would be considered a mark of 'severity' of test. In other words, more precise the prediction, more severe is the test of a theory, because then it is more likely to be falsified. A less precise prediction is, on the other hand, less vulnerable to falsification.[38] Although implicit in his earlier writings, Popper makes it very clear when he says that we can 'compare the severity of tests objectively'.[39] I do not see how 'severity' of test can work as a proof of sincerity, because finding out or at least conceiving of a possible counter-example depends not so much on 'insincerity' of the tester as it does on the power of scientific imagination and/or a little bit of luck. One may be very 'sincere' in devising the test but that neither guarantees an 'unexpected' consequence of the said theory nor shows that the scientist has the requisite ingenuity to discover 'new effect' of his theory. Musgrave also notices the point when he says 'It is probable that *sincere* critics will be more *likely* to produce severe test, but sincerity is neither necessary for severity nor sufficient.'[40] This fact did not escape Popper either, because he recognizes the irreducible and unformalizable aspect of devising a severe test. But once we let irreducibility and ingenuity (or imaginative capacity) play a role in corroboration of a theory, be it a confirmation or a falsifica-

tion, it is difficult for Popper to avoid 'epistemology with a mind'.

Musgrave considers another response of Popper to the question of 'requirement of sincerity'. It is his contention that confirmation is an easy matter (any one can find out a positive instance) whereas looking for a possible counter-example is not trivial; it needs background knowledge, competence and sincerity to test the theory in question. Here again we find problems apart from the famous problem of 'paradox of the ravens'.[41] The problems I have in mind here are the problems of psycho-logical concepts creeping into Popper's methodology. Granting that Popper can avoid the so-called paradox,[42] the 'requirement' of sincerity still hovers around concepts like 'competence', 'sincerity', i.e. *genuine* desire to look for a negative instance all of which has a psychologistic flavour.

Musgrave also examines some general remarks of Popper that may lead one to think that Popper could not avoid some ordinary psychologistic concepts like 'attitude'. Musgrave is right in his reading of this term in a non-psychologistic way. Critical attitude in Popper's terminology stands for a 'method' or 'policy' rather than a mental tendency. To Popper 'critical', 'rational', 'scientific' stand for the same method—a method that can be applied by and can depend on the existence of an intersubjective community of fellow-scientists. Critical attitude does not necessarily mean a certain mental make up but only a certain readiness to accept refutation of a theory when a severe test demands so. Critical attitude also denounces any ad hoc method (such as adding an auxiliary hypothesis) to save a theory in the face of threatened falsification.[43] So, critical attitude can be understood without recourse to a psychologistic reading of it. But Musgrave finds a kind of psychologism in Popper's methodology which he (Musgrave) calls 'critical defence of a hypothesis'. The ground for this lies in Popper's somewhat loose admission that a kind of dogmatic attitude for one's theory is a necessary ingredient of scientific method; otherwise the strength or the weakness of a theory may not be fully known. Remember the phrase he often uses—'a scientist should love his own theory'. But then how can one have a critical attitude (that is readiness to give up a theory if it meets a formidable counter-example) and 'sticking to a theory as long as possible' at the same time? Popper never makes this clear. Maybe we can grant him the necessary premise that the 'dogmatic attitude of sticking to a theory' should precede the critical attitude of readiness to give it up.[44] But nevertheless it still remains[45] to be seen how he (and Musgrave on his behalf) can claim objective and non-psychological analysis of scientific knowledge.

I think there are two possible moves for Popper to opt for if he claims to retain a non-psychologistic and objectivist analysis of knowledge. One: a naturalized kind of epistemology based on the approval of a linguistic community. Two: a rational (involving reason and hence

mind) but objective analysis based on the inter-subjective approval of a cognitive (say the scientific) community. I shall argue now (i) that Popper's anti-positivist stand about theory (knowledge) and its relation to observation (evidence) is closer to Quine's arguments for the underdetermination thesis than usually thought, although his view about ontology is crucially different. And hence the colossal disagreement over the issue of epistemic and ontic status of scientific theories. (ii) Among all the arguments[46] Popper offered for showing that psychologism is false, his reasons based on 'autonomy of sociology' are the most convincing. In my opinion Popper does not need Musgrave's vindicative defence for his 'objective analysis'. (iii) I shall nevertheless hold a version of psychologistic analysis of knowledge which is consistent with objectivism and also compatible with Popper's view in a more adequate way.

(i) *Epistemology de-naturalized*: Although Quine never seems to share Popper's fervid awe at the creative genius of the practising scientists who dream up and find out great overarching hypotheses of science, he would nevertheless agree with Popper that it is not by logical procedure or as a result of 'any sort of compelling evidence' that the scientist thinks up his theories. In this respect Quine would insist, like Popper, that the affair of how hypotheses occur to scientists is a matter of psychology and not logic. He would also agree with Popper that no sort of decisive evidential warrant, be it either logical or empirical, can be given for the theories at the time of their inception or later. Regarding empirical basis of science also, Quine would not demur at the Popperian attempt to debase induction as a method of science. Popper's insistence that scientific hypotheses are neither derivable from experience nor verifiable in experience is somewhat echoed by Quine when he contends that not only scientific hypothesis, but even everyday judgements about the nature and identity of ordinary objects like chairs and tables are underdetermined by experience. An inevitable question becomes pertinent to both Quine and Popper at this stage. Granted that there is no logical or empirical basis for the invention of a scientific theory, must not there be some ground or reason for accepting it, even if we leave aside the question of how it is devised as psychologistic? The answer to this question is precisely the juncture where Quine parts company with Popper. Popper's answer to the above question would be like this: our hypothesis cannot be verified by experience (any attempt to do so would lead to the fallacy of affirming the consequent). But it can nevertheless be falsified by experience. Therefore falsifiability in principle is a methodological reason for accepting a theory.

Popper's well-known argument against psychologism is that philosophers should distinguish between epistemological questions and their logical validity on the one hand and their psychological (or whatever)

origin on the other. As I have already said—Popper thinks that epistemological issues cannot be reduced to psychological ones. He has another not-so-well-known argument in this respect. The argument is contingent, based on (or at least he claims so) empirical ground. Since he had 'access to the psychological laboratory', Popper claims that he found out by various[47] experiments that there are no such things as 'sense data', 'simple ideas' or 'impressions' to which our knowledge can be reduced. This is fictitious, based on no empirical findings. He seems to hold the view that knowledge does not arise from images, that we think rather in terms of problems and their tentative solutions. Popper does not contribute to the Gestalt view but[48] then it is not clear how his view of 'psychology of knowledge' is different from the Gestalt's. I am not in a position to judge how much importance we should attach to Popper's experimental findings, for psychology as a science at that time (in the late nineteen twenties) was not what it is now and tremendous work has been done on psychology of cognition since the days of Gomperz, Oswald Kulpe, Buhler or Otto Selz. But if the experimental processes are too complex and rich to be reduced to perceptual 'atoms', that surely will be to Popper's advantage. Let us turn towards another alternative, namely of explaining epistemology in terms of physiology of stimulus-response.

It is the Quinean approach. Traditional epistemology is mistaken about its attempt to give a logical account of knowledge (because there is not any). Therefore, Quine thinks epistemology should only try to give a naturalistic explanation of knowledge in terms of sensation-stimuli relationship. This move by Quine, known as naturalized epistemology has a behaviouristic twist but one can argue that Quine's proposals[49] can have a non-behaviouristic interpretation. Someone can argue that the Quinean programme (even if not the only legitimate replacement for traditional epistemology) is 'actually much more reasonable in a non-behaviouristic framework'.[50] Recent tradition of cognitive psychology may enlighten some of the issues concerned. Quine argues that the problematic introspectionist trend in psychology and philosophy is already abandoned in the light of accepting 'unconscious states'. The more recent work in perceptual psychology is already contributing to the project of his proposed naturalized epistemology. The experimental finding that linguistically competent subjects tend to hear a large range of acoustic stimuli as one or another of a relatively small set of phonemes—is considered by Quine as contributing to his project of naturalized epistemology. For this sort of account contributes to the project of naturalized epistemology by contributing to the explanations of how beliefs are adjusted on the basis of perception. He says, 'Perceptual norms . . . could be taken as epistemological building blocks, the working elements of experience'.[51] The sensory input is the basis of our 'cognitive mechanism' and the basis of inductive processes.

According to recent theories in cognitive psychology, the organism is to be seen as receiving raw representations of its sensory input which are successively transformed into more abstract and more useful representations. Two examples from two different fields of sensory input may be considered for establishing this point. According to one well-known theory of visual perception, visual input is transformed into a sketch-like representation of two dimensions and then into a sketch with representations of depth and finally into a representation of three-dimensional structure.[52] And according to one theory of *speech-recognition,* acoustic input is transformed successively into a phonological representation. The types of representations that can be formulated[53] at each of these levels of representations are, in effect, 'epistemological building-blocks': they are taken as premises in the inductive adjustment of the organism's beliefs.

It appears that naturalized epistemology is still in the Quinean line (if it can shake off the behaviouristic stigma usually attached to it) and can give a more or less rational account of how people come to hold the beliefs they do. In other words, cognitive psychology sounds true in its claim that naturalized epistemology may not necessarily be behaviouristic. These accounts of course are given in terms of individual beliefs. We can hope that adjustment of individual beliefs on the basis of perception tends to be rational. But again there are further problems in this project too, such as those regarding contextual presuppositions of mental state ascriptions.[54]

(ii) *Institutionalist defence for anti-psychologism:* Behaviouristic or not, no such explanation of the origin of our 'cognitive mechanism' will have any appeal to Popper because all these accounts deal with individual beliefs and their fixation.[55] Psychologism stands also for a different sort of view that tries to explain social principles as reducible ultimately 'in terms of human nature'. This approach to sociology is called (methodological) psychologism by Popper and he tries to reject it by reasons based on 'the autonomy of sociology'. In Popper's view the 'main thesis of psychologism' in this context is 'the doctrine that society being the product of interacting minds, social laws must ultimately be reducible to psychological laws, since the events of social life, including its conventions, must be the outcome of motives springing from the minds of individual men'.[56] One of the chief proponents of this view is J.S. Mill. The only aspect of Marxism that Popper congratulates is its anti-psychologistic stance.

Popper's arguments against psychologism are launched from an institutionalistic perspective. The arguments are as follows:

(i) Motives are not sufficient for explanation of an action. Environment plays an important role as explanans. Human actions especially need a reference to *social* environment. Social institutions and their functions therefore play a significant part in

explanations of human action. Sociological principles cannot be reduced to psychological facts (like motives, hopes, desires) and their organizing rules. Sociology therefore is autonomous.

(ii) Indeed the structure of our social environment is 'man-made' in a sense, namely that it is not a creation of God, nor of nature, but a product of human decision. But this does not imply that institutions (once they are caused by human actions) can be explained in terms of human needs, hopes or ambitions. Neither are they always consciously designated. Even if they are, it is not unlikely and in fact quite usual that many social institutions may 'grow as the undesigned results of human actions'.[57] In other words, Popper emphasizes the indeterminate character of social events and institutions and in that vein rejects psychologism as an inadequate and incorrect theory of social institutions.

(iii) The most important inadequacy of psychologism in Popper's opinion however is that 'it fails to understand the main task of the explanatory social sciences'.[58]

The main thrust of these arguments is to thwart all efforts to undermine the autonomy of sociology, for our actions are 'to a very large extent explicable in terms of the situations in which they occur'. Of course Popper never denied some element of motives or other psychological factors in such explanations; he only limits its contribution as trivial compared to the determination of such actions by 'the situational logic', i.e., the analysis of the social situation which involves more than psychological elements like hopes and desires or motivation.[59]

A significant deviation of Popper's tone is to be noticed in this context from the anti-psychologistic reasons he presents for epistemology. The role of psychological (or social or historical) origin of a belief is not at all relevant for the consideration of its validity. Popper's stand here is in very clear and unequivocal terms. In the present context however, his anti-psychologism is somewhat mellowed down and his position is rather one of a compromise, if not ambivalent. He recognizes the importance of psychological studies and also warns that psychology is just but one kind of social science. He admits nevertheless that many concepts such as 'craving for power' are both social and psychological. Psychologism (of Mill's variety) is right, Popper thinks, about advocating methodological individualism and opposing methodological collectivism. By the latter Popper means all attempts of explanation in terms of collectives such as states, nations, races etc. Psychologism however is mistaken in its attempt to reduce all social phenomena in terms of human actions and psychological phenomena. This tendency is not only wrong but also dangerous because it might lead to historicism which is inadequate for explaining unintended repercussions of intentional human decisions. In brief, psychologism

falls short of sociology as the latter deals with concrete human situations which are unpredictable and indeterministic in nature.

We should distinguish at this stage between the two different positions one can ascribe to Popper and examine whether he can hold both without any inconsistency. First, Popper is an 'anti-essentialist' in the sense that he would reject explanations of the structures in question in terms of any essential or defining properties they might be said to possess.[60] Second, Popper accepts what he calls 'methodological individualism' which he wishes to distinguish from any form of 'psychologism' or any attempt to explain all human behaviour in terms of psychological laws. One can suspect however, that his methodological individualism does commit him to a reductionism which insists that there can be no behaviour of actions of societies, classes and institutions.[61] One way of describing Popper's methodological individualism would be to say that it insists that only individual persons can be treated as 'concrete'. Popper is emphatic in rejecting the claim (which he attributes to Troeltsch and Mannheim) that history deals with 'concrete individual wholes' which may be persons, events or epochs.[62]

Joseph Agassi has shown how Popper's methodological individualism[63] can avoid some of the limitations of both psychologism and holism. He regards what he calls 'institutional individualism' as the most adequate expression of Popper's situational logic which is explanatory to both Popper and himself. He (Agassi) does not explicitly discuss the issue of reductionism, but his institutional individualism concedes that institutions *exist*; though not in the sense in which individual persons exist, and institutions form part of the 'circumstances in which individual persons act, but institutional individualism denies that social wholes or institutions have "distinct aims or interests of their own" and that society rather than the individual is primary'. This is a deviation from mainstream Popperianism according to which no whole whatsoever (be it an institution or society) exists, in the sense in which individuals exist. In other words, as Agassi rightly suggests, methodological individualism bypasses the ontological issue regarding the different senses in which individuals exist and wholes (say institutions or epochs) do not. One may however argue that an explanation of social phenomena will always be in terms of the behaviour of individual agents. It is also possible to make a distinction between 'individual human beings' and 'social individuals'. 'Examples of social individuals might be social classes (the German bourgeoisie in 1618), national groups (the Bavarians), religious organizations (the Protestant Church), large-scale events (the Thirty Years War), large-scale social movements (the Counter-Reformation) etc.'[64] In the present context I am not directly concerned with the problems raised by methodological individualism but the following observation can be made regarding

the present application of it as a response to psychologistic explanation of any historical event including knowledge. Psychologism appears to be deficient because general observation about uniformities of human nature, even if valid, seem unable to explain the varieties of human conduct without the mention of institutions. Holism, on the other hand, seems unable to provide an explanation of the importance of institutions without 'reifying' them in various ways, for example, by insisting that they have aims and interests distinct from those of individual persons. Popper's insistence upon the importance of the unintended consequences of intentional human behaviour needs mention here. One reason for the belief that institutions have a life of their own is perhaps that the actions of persons in institutional contexts, and in following rules of various institutions, may have results not intended by these persons or sanctioned implicitly or explicitly by the rules under which such institutions function. One may note in this connection Popper's alienation from Marxism at an early age when several unarmed young socialists and communists were killed in a demonstration held in Vienna.[65] As a follower of Marxism he felt himself responsible in a way for these deaths since Marxism demands that class-struggle should be intensified. One may, however, doubt whether Marxist theory (a man-made affair), although demanding class-struggle to be intensified, may require innocent lives to be sacrificed. So, this episode can exemplify a case of unintended consequences of intentional human actions. It is possible to cite many such examples. One very significant instance of such unintended consequence is of a welfare state and paternalistic economic institutions which show less efficiency and lack of initiative (and hence less productive capacity) on the part of individual human beings. But surely a socialistic policy never intends a less prosperous society and lazy members in it. Again I reiterate the point that Popper's methodological individualism can also be confronted with problems[66] (although different from the problems encountered by holism on the one hand and psychologism on the other). So, methodological individualism cannot be a fool-proof alternative to either psychologism or holism.[67] Therefore Popper's rejection of psychologism as an explanatory theory of either social phenomena or cognitive phenomena does not necessarily give him an edge concerning objective theory of knowledge. I shall now argue for a certain variety of 'psychologism' which I think is not inconsistent with any adequate theory of knowledge and is a more comprehensive explanatory model that can accommodate Popper's theory too.

(iii) *Knowledge as information-processing:* Psychologism, as we see, implies a family of views. We can make a distinction between *epistemological psychologism* which denies that there is any logical rule of cognition beyond the question of whether it is in fact followed in practice and *metaphysical psychologism* according to which the laws of logic and the

characterization of rationality that epistemology seeks to formulate are about human mental activity. Frege (with what is known as the 'subsistence argument') refutes this kind of psychologism and Popper joins him there by virtue of more or less similar kind of reasons. Popper denies the truth of epistemological psychologism both as an empirical issue as well as a methodological rule although he also denies any logical procedure by which the scientist or an ordinary man arrives at his theory/belief as irrelevant for judging validity of the theory or belief. Another version of psychologism regards the rules of correct reasoning or valid epistemology as having psychological reality.

I shall argue for a position which holds that an information-processing model of knowledge is 'psychologistic' in the last sense but can adequately explain knowledge in the Popperian sense of 'objective'. Therefore it is not necessary that an adequate theory of knowledge has to be 'anti-psychologistic' for being objective, as Popper presumes.

Let me now explain and analyse the information-processing model as I differentiate it from 'information-carrying'[68] model. An information-processing model in psychology must show how inputs (in whatever way they are acquired) are transformed into outputs and how the items so transformed contain information. What will be considered as inputs and outputs vary from one case to another. Any attempt to undermine the different stages of processing would lead to reductionism of various sorts. In a model of this type, for an auditory perception, the posited mechanism must show how the distinct sounds of different wavelengths are represented as, say, a certain familiar voice or a tune. During this process the transformation of the auditory stimulation into first a non-linguistic judgement or hypothesis and then finally a linguistic representation is significant. It needs rules of inference also for such transformation. Psychologism would be an implausible thesis (Popper is right about it) if one thought of psychology as behaviourists do or if one held that explicitly physicalistic explanations are the only legitimate ones. Frege's classical attack against psychologism is based on the fact that psychological processes are idiosyncratic. In other words, mental images vary from person to person while linguistic behaviour is invariant. This kind of anti-psychologism tends to differentiate between the context of discovery and the context of justification with the assumption that the former deals with origin, psychological variant and is therefore irrational. The latter however, is logical, invariant and therefore rule-guided and rational. The kind of information-processing model I have in mind does not necessarily suppose so. It is not an a priori thesis but based on empirical studies which show that psychological investigations into how people solve problems suggest that there may be significant cross-section uniformities in the context of discovery and learning.[69] The pioneering work on some simple problems of concept-formation reveals that there are a small number

of definite strategies that subjects tend to use as discovery procedures.[70] In similar stimulus situations, people do come up with similar value-situations. In, say, stimulus situation of a certain aesthetic value, people tend to have similar value judgement. Indeed this sort of data is hardly conclusive; it suggests nevertheless that there may be common underlying mechanism at work in the procedures that different people use when confronted with problems of everyday and scientific discovery. Recent works on cognitive psychology tend to show that processes of perceiving, language acquisition, hypothesis-formation in the contexts of both discovery and justification work in the same way regarding ordinary cognitive beliefs and scientific hypotheses. So, one need not have a special sacrosanct model for explanation of scientific theories and the logic.

One may however doubt at this stage that even if these rules of inference are psychologically real, there is no guarantee that all of them are correct. And here enters Popper with his logic of hypothesis which is tantamount to saying that no amount of psychological reality can render these laws as rules of logic. We do not have any logic of discovery nor of justification for our beliefs. The latter are nothing but conjectures about the world, ready to be knocked down any moment.

Indeed there is a standard for their evaluation. One theory is *better* (more acceptable) than another if it is more falsifiable, has more content and is therefore more informative.

Knowledge as information-processing is not incompatible with Popper's view of knowledge and in fact it strengthens his objective theory of knowledge. Therefore objective theory of knowledge need not be anti-psychologistic in the above sense of psychologism.

I warn here against any temptation to compare this model with that of Kant's a priori apparatus which explains how it churns out inter-subjectively valid knowledge from the necessary and a priori mechanism of human understanding. I have no intention of referring to an a priori model of any kind nor of talking about rock-bottom foundation of knowledge of the invariant which can be distinguished from the disjointed and incoherent flow of 'appearances'. Nor does my model require that (contra Kant) the laws of logic are constitutive of laws of thought. So the problem of explanation of error and irrationality that confronts Kant's model does not arise here. Knowledge as IPM (henceforth called so) involves many intervening stages in between the input and output at the final stage. Error or irrationality can appear at any one of the stages. For example, if I report 'red' in case of the perceptual phenomenon of grass, then the error may be due to various reasons: (a) I may be colour-blind at the root level, (b) may not have learnt the word 'green' or (c) may have forgotten it or simply made a deliberate mistake to mislead people. So error need

not necessarily be explained by 'the unobserved influence of the sensibility on the understanding, or . . . the judgement.'[71] Nor is it necessary to explain error by the 'sickness of a deranged *reason* or positive unreason'.[72]

These models posit a mechanism[73] which endows people with perfect rationality or with grammaticality (in case of Chomsky) and then posit various devices which provide inferences with the perfect functioning of the basically 'correct' mechanism. An error of irrational belief may be explained by intervention of factors like lapse of memory, ill-health and so on. Psychologism does not depend on our being perfectly rational. Because one may very well posit a rule of inference based on irrationality.

IPM may better be compared to a rule-guided rational system somewhat like a computer which may function like a 'structural hierarchical system' (S-H system) or 'control hierarchical system' (C-H system) of Pandit.[74]

In other words in IPM, as an explanatory model, a belief-system has different stages, which can have a hierarchical order or/and a control or any other functional relationship.

A diagrammatic representation of IPM as a rational system that resembles a digital system is given on the following page.

One can observe here that IP does not have a 'foundational' look, although strictly speaking it contains 'psychologistic' elements. It is like the hardware of a computer; and judgements after the NLJ stage are 'software' of knowledge and information. Most anti-psychologistic moves try to meet various sceptical challenges; one of these challenges consists of the assertion that we do not have any rational basis for our belief. An epistemologist therefore should try to answer the sceptic by first characterizing the concept of rationality and then giving an account to show that his theory fulfils the conditions of being rational. Carnap's 'rational reconstruction' programme is one such move. But what does it really show? His 'justificatory' strategy can at the most show that if we in fact had arrived at our beliefs in the way he describes, then our beliefs would be justified; in other words, it provides a basis for possibility of knowledge. As I have said earlier, both Popper and Quine would argue that genetic questions (even if they are legitimate) are irrelevant for epistemological (logical?) questions about justification. But then knowledge is never justifiable to either of them although for different reasons. Trying to justify our beliefs by referring to the procedure by which we arrive at them is like pointing out a mere possibility. Causal theories of knowledge in fact try to explain knowledge by giving a genesis of belief. But that itself is not sufficient for meeting the sceptical challenge against the rationality of these beliefs.

The sort of psychologism we are discussing here acknowledges a certain empirical possibility of logical rules or principles of correct



IP = Input of various sorts. It is not necessarily non-inferential. It may include existing theory, problem, imagination, perception, feeling bias, etc. which follow some organizing rules.
OR = Organizing Rules.
S_1–S_n = Intervening stages between IP and the final (which is by no means immutable) stage which are constantly being processed and fed by IP and more and more OR.
OP = Total Output = Knowledge/Theory
NLJ = Non-Linguistic Judgements, variable but rule-guided and have psychological reality.
LJ = Linguistic Judgement = hypotheses/belief/knowledge, guided by logical/methodological and linguistic rules. Hence carry objective information.

reason that epistemology seeks to discover. These rules are *actually* used in the information-processing systems of rational beings. Moreover, there is some amount of evidence from the work of psychologists to suggest that cognition may well have the characteristics that psychologism attributes to it. On the basis of this contingent consideration, one can venture on a philosophical enquiry into the nature of rational belief and argue that if S rationally believes that P, then P must have been arrived at by a rational method R. With the naturalistic/psychological assumption that a significant number of our beliefs are rationally held, it seems reasonable to hold that our methods of information-processing closely approximates the one which epistemology seeks to discover.

The information-processing model endorses Popper's kind of theory in the following ways:

1. It recognizes content or information which is crucial in Popper's account to make knowledge 'interesting' and about a non-empty class.
2. Processing involves interpretation or constructionist element. For Popper also, even trite statements like 'Bring me a glass of water' transcend perceptual experience and include theoretical element.
3. IPM also stands for an explanation where there are no ultimate epistemological building-blocks. Notwithstanding the informative content, the input is loaded with 'theory-problem'[75] kind of conceptual element.
4. Psychologism in this sense provides a similar principle both for ordinary and scientific beliefs by positing a mechanism that accounts for invariant rules for concept-formation. It can thus give a rational basis of belief that can face the sceptical challenge. In fact Popper never offers any criterion for rational belief (except falsifiability) that can meet the sceptic's doubt.
5. Knowledge in IPM is fallible and not indubitable because there is no rock-bottom foundation of the input in which the output can be reduced.
6. So, this model is compatible with fallibilism and objective theory of knowledge, and thus avoids the problems (say of explaining error and irrational beliefs) posed to any reductionist/foundationalist programme.
7. Lastly, it has an edge over Popper with respect to relevance of the method by which a belief is arrived at in connection with the question of its rationality. Consider Popper's example of a clairvoyant conjuring up a theory which later happens to be shown true by a scientist (after long and laborious research). Surely we cannot ascribe *knowledge* to the clairvoyant because the method by which he arrives at it is *not rational* and therefore not

amenable to empirical investigation. Psychologism (of the above type) with the recognition of psychological reality of certain rules of inference can help Popper out in providing a basis for holding why the clairvoyant's claim to knowledge is unwarranted whereas the scientist's theory can be regarded as acceptable. Popper's theory alone cannot give an adequate explanation of the knowledge-ascription without reference to the input and the organizing rules of the scientist's discovery which can only explain the latter as a rational endeavour (or conjecture) and the clairvoyant's accidental hitting at truth as irrational because in the former case the circuit of the input-output relationship is sufficiently rich and rule-guided whereas in the latter case the input is either negative/non-existent or at most sparse and not guided by any rational rule at any stage of the information-processing procedure.

Notes and References

1. Immanuel Kant, 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and 'Transcendental Analytic', *Critique of Pure Reason.*
2. Kant, ibid., A 122. Also see Allison, 'Transcendental Affinity—Kant's Answers to Hume' in *Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress.*
3. Kant, ibid., A 124.
4. Professor J.N. Mohanty first pointed this out to me at the University of Oklahoma, 1982.
5. Among numerous Kant scholars I can mention only a few who made a comprehensive analysis of it: Cassirer, Reinach, Allison, Bennett, Strawson, Beck are some of them. Also see G. Brittan, *Kant's Theory of Science,* Princeton, 1978.
6. Paul Natorp, 'On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge'. A translation with the editor's notes of an 1887 essay in *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology,* October 1981.
7. See A. Musgrave, 'The Objectivism of Popper's Epistemology', in *The Philosophy of Karl Popper,* edited by Schilpp.
8. See W. Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics* and W.H. Walsh, *Kant's Conception of Scientific Knowledge.*
9. Karl Popper, *Objective Knowledge,* p. 162, fn. 12
10. Cited by Popper in ibid.
11. Popper, ibid., p. 152 fn. and 'Intellectual Autobiography' in *The Philosophy of Karl Popper,* I, n. 89, p. 61.
12. *Unended Quest,* n. 89.
13. *Objective Knowledge,* pp. 114–15.
14. Paul Edwards, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* Vol. 6, pp. 520–21.
15. G.L. Pandit, 'Two Concepts of Psychologism' in *Philosophical Studies,* December 1971.
16. Ibid.
17. Popper, *Logic of Scientific Discovery,* pp. 30–31. I warn here that Popper would not like the term 'definition' because he does not believe in giving a definition of anything. He is closer to Wittgenstein in this respect than any other philosopher.

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 103.
20. Popper, in *Objective Knowledge: The Open Society and its Enemies,* Vol. 2 and *The Poverty of Historicism.*
21. Ibid.
22. Popper, *Logic of Scientific Discovery,* p. 103.
23. Ibid., Sec. 25, for his basic statement as describing an occurrence in a 'realistic' mode of speech.
24. Ibid., pp. 94–95.
25. See W. Kneale, *Probability and Logic,* Part 1, especially the section on Hume's theory of causation.
26. Consider David Hume, *Treatise and Enquiries* for the use of this concept in arguing against the view of causality as a necessary connection.
27. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations,* p. 39.
28. Kneale, 'Hume's Theory of Antecedent Cause', in *Probability and Logic,* Part 1, for a thorough criticism of this notion of necessity.
29. As tried by A. Pap in *Semantics and Necessary Truth,* p. 75.
30. As has been done by his close follower, A. Musgrave in 'Objectivism of Popper's Epistemology' in *The Philosophy of Karl Popper,* p. 68.
31. Ibid., p. 568.
32. *The Open Society,* pp. 218–19.
33. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery,* p. 105.
34. Musgrave, in *The Philosophy of Karl Popper,* pp. 576–88.
35. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery,* cited by Musgrave, ibid., pp. 576–77.
36. Musgrave, ibid., p. 577.
37. Musgrave, ibid.; the first italic is mine, the second is of Musgrave.
38. Musgrave, *Conjectures and Refutations,* Appendix 2.
39. Ibid., p. 220.
40. Musgrave, in *The Philosophy of Karl Popper,* p. 578. The first italic is mine and the second is of Musgrave.
41. D.C. Stove, C.G. Hempel and N. Goodmen's treatments of this problem are well-known.
42. As has been argued by J.W.N. Watkins in 'Confirmation, the Paradoxes and Positivism' in *The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy,* edited by M. Bunge.
43. Popper calls this uncritical method 'conventionalist stratagem'.
44. Notice how it resembles Cartesian method turned upside down. For Descartes, initial scepticism and then dogmatism. For Popper, initial dogmatism and then scepticism.
45. Again the picture emerging of an open-minded critical body of scientists may not appeal to the intuition of many philosophers of science. The picture resembles too closely the Baconian idea of science as an open inductive machine which will surely not please Popper. Moreover one may argue on the contrary that the scientific community is often a close community dogmatically solving 'puzzles'. Cf., Kuhn.
46. To be candid, I should say 'statements' rather than arguments because Popper's premises and conclusions are not always clear and sometimes missing.
47. Popper, 'Autobiography' in *The Philosophy of Karl Popper,* Vol. I, pp. 59–60.
48. Ibid., p. 60.
49. The limitations of Quine's scientific approach to epistemology are discussed in B. Stroud, 'The Significance of Naturalized Epistemology' in *Mid-West Studies in Philosophy,* Vol. VI.
50. E. Stabler, 'Rationality in Naturalized Epistemology', *Philosophy of Science,* March 1984.
51. W.V.O. Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays,* p. 90.

52. D. Marr, 'Representing and Computing Visual Information' in *Artificial Intelligence: An M.I.T. Perspective,* edited by Winston and Brown.
53. K. Forster, 'Levels of Processing and the Structure of the Language Processor' in *Sentence Processing,* edited by Cooper and E. Walker.
54. As has been developed by Putnam in 'The Meaning of Meaning', *Language, Mind and Reality,* and Fodor in 'Methodological Solipsism considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology', *The Behavioural and Brain Sciences,* 3.
55. Quine offers an interaction theory however, for showing the control of mind over bodily processes. It is the mind that decodes the coded information about the visual field received from the retina and on this basis forms expectations about the world.
56. Popper, *The Open Society,* Vol. II, p. 90.
57. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism,* Part II, p. 122.
58. Popper, *The Open Society,* p. 94.
59. There are various areas such as (i) kinship relation, (ii) economic development, (iii) language, where actions do not depend on human decisions but on societal factors. See especially D.P. Chattopadhyaya, *Individuals and Societies;* also P. Gardiner, *Theories of History.*
60. See the discussion on essentialism and nominalism in *The Poverty of Historicism,* Sec. 10.
61. See Chap. 14 of *The Open Society,* II, especially p. 91.
62. Ibid., p. 270 and *The Poverty of Historicism,* pp. 80–81.
63. In 'Methodological Individualism', *British Journal of Sociology,* 11, 1960, pp. 244–70 and 'Institutional Individualism', *British Journal of Sociology,* 26, 1975, pp. 144–45.
64. See A.C. Danto, 'The Historical Individual' in *Philosophical Analysis of History,* p. 266.
65. Popper, 'Autobiography', in *The Philosophy of Karl Popper,* Vol. I, pp. 23–29.
66. One difficulty is the 'reality' of the various relations among individuals that makes the reduction of social wholes to individuals so problematic. If we shift from Popper's example of three apples in a plate (*The Poverty of Historicism,* p. 82) to three individual persons, the relation among them is crucial in determining as 'more than a sum' if, say, one of them is Einstein or Hitler.
67. There is also a possibility of confusing individualism and psychologism, and one may criticize Popper's individualism with institutionalist argument (as done by Ackerman in *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*).

    To Popper the sociologists' proper study should be 'analysing the unintended social repercussions of intentional human actions' (*The Open Society,* p. 95). If the sociologists task is to analyse the unintended consequences of purposive social action—we must first know that these consequences are *not* intended. To know that one needs to know what are the intentions and that the outcome to be explained are different from the original intentions of the agent. Therefore the agents intention far from being trivial or irrelevant becomes crucial for any sociological explanation, even in Popper's account. See T. Ball, 'Popper's Psychologism' in *Philosophy of Social Sciences,* II.
68. G.L. Pandit has developed such a model in 'The Structure and Growth of Scientific Knowledge', *Boston Studies in The Philosophy of Science,* p. 73.
69. G.L. Pandit has argued with the help of a theory-problem interactive system (such as a language system) that some forms of learning common to all the systems whatever can account for a sort of 'essentialism'. See his 'Epistemological Ontology and the Special Sciences'—paper read at the ICPR sponsored National Seminar, Chandigarh, March, 1985, later published in *JICPR.* His model as well as mine can stand against relativism/subjectivism.

70. See especially the essay by Jerome Bruner, Jacqeline Goodnow and George Austin, in *A Study of Thinking,* edited by John Wiley.
71. Kant, *Introduction to Logic,* p. 44.
72. Kant, 'On Deficiency and Diseases of the Soul with Respect to its Cognitive Power', in *Anthropology,* Book I.
73. One might find the same kind of explanation of error and irrationality in Chomsky's distinction between *competence and performance.* See his *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.*
74. See G.L. Pandit, 'Theory-Problem as an Interactive Model', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly,* July 1976 for a critical account of Popper's methodology.
75. G.L. Pandit, 'The Structure and Growth of Scientific Knowledge'.

Epistemic Justification and the Possibility of Empirical Evidence

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INTRODUCTION

Since knowledge is traditionally analysed in terms of justified true belief, the task of epistemology is conceived as one of justifying beliefs. Further, in the empiricist tradition, the required justification, must, ultimately be based on experience. However, 'justification' and 'experience' are such vague and ambiguous concepts that they lend themselves to different interpretations. Consider the ambiguity of 'justified belief': what is it that is justified? Obviously, belief. But belief is ambiguous between the act of believing and the object of believing, i.e., a proposition. Taken in the first sense, it is the act that is justified and since an act must belong to a person, it is the person who is justified (with respect to his act of believing). Taken in the second sense, what is justified is the belief. A person may hold a certain belief for the wrong reasons and hence not be justified, though his belief may be quite a reasonable one. Again, take the notion of 'experience': Must an experience be propositionalized, if it is to function as justifier? Or can 'pure' unconceptualized experience do the job? These questions are not new, nor are the answers. What is important is to note that these different answers can be traced to these and some similar ambiguities regarding certain fundamental epistemological concepts. It would seem that the present situation where even the very possibility of epistemology has come to be questioned, can be traced to such ambiguities. Therefore, what is required is to evaluate these questions and answers in terms of their ability to achieve the epistemological objective. When judged in this manner, many of these answers would reveal themselves as misconceived and misdirected attempts at doing epistemology. It is like the story of a man who was found searching under a street light in the middle of the night for the house-key he had lost in the bushes. Upon being queried why he was looking for it under the light rather than in the bushes, his reply was, 'Because there is light here.' Only by looking in the right direction can we find the object of our search.

In this article I propose to clarify some of these misconceptions and

misdirections arising from the ambiguities of the two concepts: 'justification' and 'experience'. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first I argue that (1) if epistemology seeks justification with a view to settling cognitive disputes, then epistemological justification proper must be of a proposition and not of the person who holds the belief; further, (2) if experience is to serve as empirical evidence in justification, then the possibility of such evidence requires its conceptualization. This is basically the Kantian position that for experience to be possible there must be cognitive structures. These structures need not be totally invariant, but need to have an invariant common core. The second part explores the real possibility (as differentiated from the logical possibility explored in the first part) of finding such a common core. I conclude by suggesting that the possibility of such structures, and hence, of empirical evidence and epistemology itself, may be found, neither in the world outside nor in the structures of cognition, but further back in the consciousness itself.

I

The Epistemological Task

The analysis of knowledge in terms of justified true belief is based on definite understanding of the epistemic task. This task is seen as that of facilitating a transition from belief to knowledge by means of justification. This understanding has not grown in a historical vacuum. Historically, it is closely linked to divergent and often contradictory claims to knowledge and the related problem of scepticism. The problem, then, is how to separate the grain of knowledge from the chaff of mere opinion and belief, the *doxa* from the *episteme*. The epistemological task, then, is to adjudicate between propositions competing for the status of truth; and this is done by the means of justification.

Epistemic justification may be defined as the process of making out the defence of a knowledge-claim over its rivals by enumerating the evidence in its favour. Evidence is that which is brought to support the defence, and it is this that distinguishes a mere belief from knowledge. Kant, in a famous passage, makes the following distinctions between opinion, belief and knowledge.[1] A belief is distinguished from mere opinion by the certainty or conviction that a person has about the truth of the matter. What distinguishes knowledge from a mere belief is the evidential support that the former has. Thus, knowledge is characterized by both the certainty of the believer as well as the availability of evidence. Of these, the first is characteristic of any belief; and the distinguishing feature of knowledge is its evidential support. Thus, while the concept of justification plays the most important role in the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief, it is the notion of evidence that is crucial to justification.

Thus, in judging a proposition to be true or false if it is evidence that serves as the criteria and makes the crucial difference between a knowledge-claim (belief) and knowledge, such evidence could come from various quarters: testimony, authority, scripture, revelation, experience, and reasoning from known propositions etc. Further, the empiricists claim that of all these, experience enjoys a unique position: all justification must ultimately ('at the end of the day') turn on to the evidence available to the senses.[2] Empiricism, thus, is basically an appeal to experience as the final arbitrator, the supreme court, so to say, in cognitive disputes.[3] Thus it is opposed not only to all forms of dogmatism but also to the possibility of turning to any other authority (revelation, testimony etc.) as the final court of appeal. It is such experiential support that is meant by the term 'empirical evidence'.

With the transcendental turn in epistemology, the focus shifts from experience itself to the possibility of experience. To speak in terms of the juridical metaphor, while empiricists give ultimate juridical powers in settling cognitive disputes to experience, transcendental philosophy seeks not so much to pronounce judgements on particular cognitive claims, but to establish the nature and scope of this supreme court by inquiring into the possibility of experience in general. Or to use the foundational metaphor, while the empiricists zeroed in on experience as the foundation of knowledge, transcendental philosophy sets out to explore the nature of the foundation itself. Thus, transcendental philosophy's quest to unearth the conditions of the possibility of experience is very much in continuity with empiricism and this quest, whether of Kant, or of the 'linguistic Kantians',[4] i.e., the logical empiricists can equally well be characterized as explorations into the possibility of empirical evidence in epistemic justification. For, when Kant and the logical empiricists rule out certain knowledge-claims (such as religious and ethical claims to knowledge) as unwarranted, they do so not on the grounds of lack of actual experiential evidence, but on the grounds of even the possibility of such evidence. Thus, the search for empirical evidence becomes one of the *possibility* of empirical evidence.

Types of Justification

In classifying epistemic justification there are two considerations that are important: the 'what' (the object) and the 'how' (the process) of justification. From the perspective of the object being justified we can draw a distinction between *doxastic* justification and *propositional* justification.[5]

The object to be justified i.e., belief, is ambiguous. It may mean the act of believing and object of believing. Taken in the first sense, since an act is attributed to a person, it is the *person* who believes (with respect to his doxastic state) that is the object of justification. This, we call doxastic justification. In the propositional justification, by contrast, the object to

be justified is the *belief* itself which is, so to say, impersonalized in a statement or proposition and not the person's belief-state. Here it does not even matter if the concerned belief can be attributed to any person at all. What is being justified here is a sort of 'objective' entity, a member of what Karl Popper calls the 'third world'.[6] However, to say that the object of epistemic justification is independent of any believer does not mean that the task of justification can be carried out without the involvement of persons, nor does it imply an 'epistemology without a knowing subject'. Quite the contrary. What is being contended is only that the object being justified is quite an impersonal one and whether anyone actually believes it or not is an irrelevant question. This would be unthinkable in doxastic justification since the object being justified there is the person and his doxastic states.

If the present distinction between doxastic and propositional justification concerns the object being justified, the next distinction relates to the process of justification. If the process is public, i.e., if the evidence cited is available to inter-subjective scrutiny, such a justification is *interpersonal*; if the process is not public and the believer has privileged access to the process (as when the evidence cited is inaccessible to the other investigators), such justification may be called *intra-personal*. The Cartesian doubt whether the world I experience is a dream-world or an actually existing one, and its resolution by means of 'clear and distinct ideas,' inasmuch as the process lacks an inter-subjective dimension, may be considered as an example of intra-personal justification. So also is the case of those empiricists who rely on private, unconceptualized phenomenal experiences like sensations to justify knowledge claims about the world. They are convinced that their perceptual judgements give them authentic information about the world and they go about justifying them by citing phenomenal happenings as evidence. What intra-personal justification achieves is primarily one's own satisfaction about one's epistemic stand.[7] The person who believes may be certain about the truth of a claim and may still want to demonstrate to himself that his certainty is well-grounded. The characteristic mark of inter-subjective justification, in contrast, is at least the possibility of inter-subjective agreement, if not actual agreement, in the justificatory process.

Thus, we have four different kinds of justifications:

(a) *Intra-personal doxastic*: Whereby a person satisfies himself that *he* is not being irrational in adhering to certain beliefs or in having a certain doxastic state (of believing, doubting, being certain etc.). Here the object of justification is one's own doxastic state and the believer has a privileged access to the evidence cited.

Take, for example, the case of the child who believes that there are awesome creatures living on the stars who visit the earth to keep a watch on wicked children. The child could ask: 'Am I justified in making this

act of belief?' Or, take the case of a 'reli-gious' person who believes that the end of the world is to take place at midnight on 31 December of the coming year. Here also the question is: '*Am I justified* in making this act of belief?', or alternately, '. . . in committing myself to this belief?' In both cases, the believer may cite evidence by appealing to authority, testimony, personal experience, and so on with the proviso that they are of a type to which the believer has a privileged access. Authority here would involve remembering the teaching of the parents or of the religious leader. What is more, the evidence could even be experiential: visions and dreams that the person had etc. In both these examples, we have what I have called intra-personal doxastic justification.

(b) *Inter-personal doxastic*: In this kind of justification, as in the previous case, it is the person of the believer with respect to his act of believing that is justified. However, unlike in the previous case the question is raised not in the first person but in the third person. Thus, in the above examples, the question would be: 'Is the child or the said "religious" believer justified in holding the concerned belief?' Consequently, the process of justification is characterized by an inter-subjective context. It would be generally agreed that the child is justified in believing on the authority of his parents that there are awesome creatures living on the stars. Equally, it would also be agreed that an astronomer, holding the same belief on the same grounds, is not justified; he has to cite independent evidence for it. This type of justification, in spite of its inter-subjective character, is relative to the epistemic responsibility of the person who believes.

(c) *Intra-personal propositional*: It is a justification where a person satisfies himself that his *belief* is based on evidence and hence, rational. As in intra-personal doxastic version the question asked is in the first person; but it differs from its doxastic version with respect to the object being justified; in one case the object is the person, and in the other case it is the person's belief, i.e., a proposition. This similarity and difference gives rise to a question which is also similar and different from the other two. The question is: 'Is my belief *p* justified?' In both cases, the process of arriving at the final judgement remains the same: it takes place within the person of the believer and he uses evidence to which he alone has a privileged access. Whether others would give any weight to the evidence cited is not a question that is raised in such a justification. In as much as the justificatory process is devoid of an inter-subjective dimension, this kind of justification can achieve only self-satisfaction.

(d) *Inter-personal propositional*: Herein, both the object as well as the process of justification are inter-subjectively available. Irrespective of the persons concerned, the possibility of inter-subjective agreement on the

truth of a given proposition is at stake here. This differentiates inter-personal propositional justification from inter-personal doxastic justification. While the latter is relative to the epistemic responsibility of the person who believes, the former is not. Inter-personal propositional justification has no room for such a notion as epistemic responsibility, since we have seen that a proposition need not even be believed by any person. It also differs from intra-personal propositional justification to the extent that though the belief to be justified in the latter case is proposi-tional and inter-subjectively available, the evidence that justifies it may be private phenomenal happenings like sensations or unconceptualized 'pure' experiences which are not available to inter-subjective scrutiny. In inter-personal propositional justification, in contrast, public evidence alone would be permissible. Thus both the justificans and the justificandum are public in this case.

The Type of Justification Proper to Epistemology

The point of making these distinctions is to show that the only type of justification relevant to epistemology is the last. From the distinction and the examples cited, it seems obvious that doxastic justification, even of the inter-personal kind, is irrelevant to the epistemological task. This is so because doxastic justification, though intended to serve the epistemological end of determining truth, ends up with only a moral judgement. It is easily seen that a person may be justified in adhering to a belief for reasons other than a conviction regarding truth. In the example of the belief in the end of the world I may consider the evidence available to me in favour of the proposition to be inconclusive or insufficient and yet I may choose to believe it for reasons of social acceptability or fear that not believing it would pose a danger to my life, and so on. In this case the person is justified in having a doxastic state, though in being so justified it contributes nothing to the epistemological task. Thus, inasmuch as the epistemological objective is truth and not morality, doxastic justification is irrelevant to epistemology. The bearer of truth is not so much the act of believing as the object of belief (i.e., a proposition).

However, it is a standard practice to talk in terms of 'person *S* being justified in believing proposition *P* etc.', which, of course, leaves room for interpreting it either way. Perhaps it is the fact that the traditional analysis of knowledge is couched in terms of justifying beliefs, and that there could normally be no beliefs without some person or other making the act of belief that has led to such formulations. Whatever the reasons, it leaves much to be desired in terms of clarity. Consider for example, the following contention: 'Justification (epistemic) applies basically to certain persons with respect to their having beliefs.'[8] Is it the person being justified or the belief? Such Janus-faced formulations are confusing, to say the least. Even when such confusions are avoided and a clear distinction is

made between a *person* being justified and a *belief* being justified, there are epistemologists who hold that the former is the proper realm of epistemology and go on to consider notions like epistemic responsibility.[9] The above distinctions help us to see clearly that epistemic justification must be of propositions and not of persons who believe. Personal considerations are irrelevant to it. What is being ruled out here is what William P. Alston calls the 'deontological' concept of epistemic justification, 'according to which one is justified in believing that p *if* one is not subject to reproach in doing so, one has not violated any intellectual obligations in doing so'.[10] There is, indeed, room for talking about intellectual obligations and epistemic responsibility, but then we would be talking not of epistemic justification but of moral justification of the person's act of believing.

Having ruled out doxastic variants, let us turn to intra-personal propositional justification which is a more serious contender to the status of epistemic justification. There are any number of authors who hold that phenomenal experiences such as sensations could be cited to support a knowledge-claim. Hence it requires a more detailed treatment. Upon this view, since what justifies a proposition can be such phenomenal happenings as sensations, I shall refer to this theory as phenomenalist and consider it in some detail.

The most discussed form of phenomenalism is the linguistic version according to which 'sentences about physical objects can be analysed without residue into sentences about sense-data'[11] or sentences that describe how things appear to persons who have experience. Our concern here is with phenomenalism as a theory of epistemic justification. Expressed in terms of justification, the above position would amount to saying that the evidence for knowledge-claims about the world of physical objects is given by statements about how those objects appear to persons who have the experience; and that such justification is conclusive. What is to be noted in this version of phenomenalism is that it maintains a double thesis: one, that the ultimate justification for knowledge about independently existing objects or state of affairs (as opposed to knowledge about one's own mental states and sensations) is provided by phenomenal happenings or statements; second, that such justification is conclusive. It is the latter thesis that has prompted the vigorous attempts to translate physical object statements into phenomenal 'appeared to' statements. Today philosophers have generally come to view such a programme as unattainable, even in principle. But there are many philosophers who still hold on to the first thesis, especially with regard to perceptual beliefs. P.K. Moser, for example, contends that 'certain events of experiencing or sensing can function as justifying reasons for beliefs of a certain kind'.[12] Similarly, John Pollock, who argues (quite rightly, I think) that we do not ordinarily have beliefs about appearances (ordinarily our beliefs are what he calls 'physical object beliefs'), and even if we had such

appearance beliefs, we do not have enough of them to base all our knowledge on them, still maintains a kind of 'direct realism' that appeals to our being in some perceptual states for justification of perceptual beliefs.[13] Further, it may even be maintained that such justification is not conclusive, provides only a prima facie justification, which is all that we can have for empirical knowledge. In other words, theories of conclusive phenomenal justification are out; but the theory of phenomenal justification or intra-personal propositional justification that does not require an inter-subjective context is very much intact. In arguing against intra-personal propositional justification, it is this version of phenomenalism that is being targeted.

The decisive argument against this position is that it cannot achieve the purpose of epistemic justification. This could be shown at least in two ways. The first is a simple intuitive consideration from what we have earlier considered as the goal of epistemic justification, which is to settle cognitive disputes. Cognitive disputes worth the name can arise only in an inter-subjective context where there are adherents to, or at least proponents of, conflicting beliefs. There may be conflicts and doubts within a person regarding the truth a knowledge-claim. But in such cases he cannot be said to *believe* the proposition, since belief, by definition, requires at least a subjective certainty. How he obtains that certainty is not the issue here, but once he has obtained the certainty and can truly be said to believe, then how that belief could be justified is the issue at stake. At the level of opinions there could be differences and yet precisely because they lack certainty on either side there is no claim to knowledge and hence, there could be no cognitive dispute either. Thus, if cognitive disputes require an inter-subjective context, it is hard to see how they can be settled outside that context. Saying that they only provide prima facie justification is of no help because in the first place, normally a person is in a given doxastic state or believes what he does, because he is convinced of its truth, either on account of his experience or other available evidence. In other words, a person believes because he considers his belief to be prima facie justified. Can intra-personal justification add anything more to it? The most that it can achieve is that the experiencer can become consciously aware that his belief is indeed justified, and thus be more convinced of it than before. However, epistemic justification is not concerned with the strength of a person's conviction or with how things appear to an individual person, but with how persons endowed with similar sense-capabilities and intelligence would treat the case. Thus, it is hard to see how a phenomenal statement, which is about how things appear to an individual could ever function as evidence of an objective state of affairs unless it could also appear in the same manner to other observers endowed with similar physical and mental abilities. It would normally be considered as a sign of desperation if, when challenged to cite evidence for a claim, instead of sighting inter-subjectively available

evidence, one were just to assert that 'things appear to me thus'.

A more complex argument is that a phenomenalist cannot be consistent, and if consistent, cannot achieve the epistemic goal. Thus, he must either be inconsistent or abandon epistemology. The phenomenalist position is not that sensations play a causal role and give rise to beliefs in a person; the contention, rather, is that such phenomenal items are sufficient as evidence for the justification of belief. The inconsistency arises from the fact that normally it is held with regard to one or more particular classes of beliefs but not extended to other experiential beliefs. Thus, it is commonly held that perceptual beliefs are justified phenomenally, but not others. A religious believer might extend it to beliefs arising from religious experiences, which then, is disputed by the sceptic. While accepting the validity of perceptual experiences in this manner, Antony Flew, for instance, objects to the religious believer's claims to knowledge on the basis of religious experiences. Empirical tradition as a whole shows a remarkable reluctance to permit the status of experience to anything other than ordinary perceptual experiences.

However, such arbitrary exclusion of other experiences is not supported by the ordinary use of the word 'experience.' There are very many other candidates who would normally be considered experiential but to whom the phenomenal justificationist would not grant the status of being justified on phenomenal grounds. Ruled out of the ambit of phenomenal justification are all higher level cognitions, i.e., any immediate apprehension or insight into the nature of reality other than what occurs in our ordinary perceptual consciousness. Religio-mystical experiences, immediate and sudden insights into the laws of nature or into human relations etc. come under this category.

The experiential nature of religious experiences is granted even by sceptics like Flew.[14] But he goes on to distinguish 'experiencing as objective' from the 'experience of objects.' But phenomenally (from the first person perspective), can the one be distinguished from the other? It is not clear how such a distinction could be made. Even in making such a distinction, Flew is taking a third person perspective, and not the first person perspective of the one who has the experience. The phenomenalist can rely only on standard items like the involvement of the senses, immediacy etc. which would not help us to make the required distinction. Take another example of higher level cognition—the experience of Archimedes in the tub or of Newton and the apple. Newton is said to have discovered the law of gravitation when he saw an apple falling. Obviously his senses were involved in the process, and presumably it was not the first time he saw an apple fall from the tree. Further, the insight was not the result of a process of reasoning seeking to explain what was available to his senses: it was an immediate experience, a sudden flash, so to say. If the possibility of being mistaken is an argument against such insights being counted as experience, it is applicable to perceptual experiences as well.

Similar is the case of Archimedes's experience.

Thus, all the characteristics we normally associate with experience—immediacy, passivity of the experiencer, an insight into the experienced reality—are as much present in such cases as in ordinary perceptual experiences. If so, can any reason be given for their exclusion from the class of experiences? Once it is granted that they too are experiences, what is there to prevent one from applying phenomenal considerations as justification for them? Nothing, except that no scientist, and presumably no philosopher of science, would be willing to take such a stand. However, this preference for ordinary perceptual experiences is not new. I have argued elsewhere that even when Kant talks about the possibility of experiences in general he takes ordinary perceptual experiences to be paradigmatic of all experience.[15]

What is being contended is not that this prejudice in favour of a particular class of experience is wrong, but that from a phenomenalist position, it is arbitrary. Once phenomenalism is given up, there is room for admitting even higher level cognitions as experiences and yet finding reasons for preferring ordinary perceptual experiences in justification. Contemporary philosophy of science makes a clear distinction between the process of discovery and the process of justification. Insight into the laws of nature as formulated in a hypothesis could come in different ways, experience being one of them. The cases of Archimedes and Newton come under this category. The consequent claim to knowledge is prima facie an insight into reality, a candidate for truth.

However, that in itself would not be counted as a justification of the claim. Justification comes from perceptual (visual, auditory etc.) cognitions and not from higher level cognitions operative in forming a hypothesis that helps to explain a large domain of perceptual phenomena. Having made this distinction between a cognitive experience and justificatory experience, it is contended that knowledge claims at other levels—irrespective of how they come about (i.e., either through immediate experience or in some other manner)—must stand in a certain logical relation to this particular class of experiences. If the scientific practice is any indication, this relation is one of confirmation or disconfirmation by observations. Thus, though experience is not to be identified with perception, justificatory experiences are all perceptual, which, when expressed linguistically become 'observation sentences'.

The distinguishing mark of the latter is that they are universally available to all human beings endowed with normal perceptual faculties, and not merely to certain geniuses (whether in science or in religion). Further, the universality of these experiences can be checked inter-subjectively. Thus, the general preference of the empiricists for perceptual experiences is a reasonable one.

Now, if justificatory experiences are universal in this manner, it follows that they permit of universal agreement, and then the need for

phenomenal justification does not even arise. Thus, the predicament of the phenomenalist is this: if phenomenal experiences are permitted a justificatory role and if higher level cognitions are ruled out, then one is not consistent; if one does not rule them out, that is a sure recipe for epistemological anarchy where anyone could make claims to knowledge on the basis of one's alleged phenomenal experiences. Then epistemology would be powerless to abjudicate between such disputes, which is its very *raison d'être.* Thus if a phenomenalist is consistent, he makes epistemology impossible; if he is not consistent, he is arbitrary. To avoid such arbitrariness it must be possible to arrive at an inter-subjective agreement about preferred class of experiences, which in turn, would be possible only if they are inter-subjectively available. How could anything be so available, if it cannot even be conceptualized and expressed? On the other hand, if it is capable of being conceptualized and expressed, and hence, inter-subjectively available, it would mean that the need for phenomenal considerations does not arise. The upshot of all this is that intra-personal propositional justification, of which the phenomenal version is the most common, is perverse and arises from forgetting the goal of epistemic justification itself. Thus, it turns out that epistemologically the most important and the only relevant concept of justification is the inter-personal propositional type. In other words, Kant, inasmuch as he is concerned with the possibility of justificatory evidence, is indeed right in ruling out non-categorical perception.

This conclusion is applicable to phenomenal justification in general, including justification of perceptual beliefs. However, since the tendency to make an exception in the case of perception is so widespread, it is worth asking the reasons for this tendency. It seems to me that this tendency be attributed to the primacy of perception in justifying non-perceptual beliefs, together with a failure to distinguish between two distinct functions of perceptual experience: that of justifying other knowledge claims and that of itself being a truth-candidate, a cognition or a statement that claims to be informative. In this latter capacity, it stands as much in need of justification as any other belief. While justifying non-perceptual beliefs, the reliability of perceptual knowledge is taken for granted, and upon this assumption higher level beliefs are sought to be justified by relating them to perceptual experiences. However, the moment we raise the question of the justification of perceptual beliefs themselves, such taken for granted justification is no longer sufficient because we are no longer considering perception in its justificatory function. As long as the distinction between the two functions of perceptual experiences is not made, the tendency to pass from one to the other and to conflate the two functions is likely to continue. Once the distinction is made, we need not ascribe both the functions to one and the same perceptual experience. Justification of a disputed perceptual claim can be settled by other members of the class, not intra-personally,

but inter-personally. The universality of perceptual experiences makes the need for any phenomenal justification of perceptual beliefs absolutely unnecessary.

However, to reach this conclusion is not to rule out the possibility of unconceptualized experience, if there is such a thing. Experience in itself may be private and phenomenal and we have not considered any reason to rule that out. Thus, unlike Kant who claimed that conceptualization is necessary for the possibility of any experience whatsoever, and unlike those who treat all perceptual experience as conceptualized,[16] the claim here is more limited: inasmuch experience is sought to be cited as evidence for the justification of a belief, it must be conceptualized.

Earlier, in emphasizing the importance of inter-subjective context of the epistemological enterprise, inter-subjective context was characterized in terms of how persons with similar physical and intellectual abilities as the cognizer would treat the matter. What is assumed here is that such agreement is possible because besides the soundness of the physical senses, logical abilities etc., there are also certain shared cognitive structures which make experiences not merely a private affair but an inter-subjectively available one. It was assumed that these cognitive structures are shared in the sense of being beyond the confines of particular languages and cultures. Further, once we grant that justificatory experiences are all perceptual (which stand in a hypothetico-deductive relation to higher level cognitions), we can also say that the possibility of empirical evidence does not require all human cognitive structures to be universal in this manner, but only that the structures of our perceptual cognition be such. The contention is that if empirical evidence, and hence, empirical epistemology is to be possible, such shared structures of perceptual cognition must be available. Traditionally, philosophers have assumed their availability as a matter of course. This was the assumption upon which Kant based his explorations into the possibility of experience and the language empiricists sought to base their theory of knowledge.

This same assumption has come to be questioned from a variety of quarters—the analytic philosophy of later Wittgenstein, the hermeneutic tradition, especially in its post-modern incarnation, the phenomenological explorations of perception which show its perspectival character, the explorations into the sociology and history of the natural sciences led by Kuhn, Feyerabend and others that rule out there being any theory-neutral observations, and so on. The cumulative effect is epistemological anarchy and relativism. If so, we seem to have landed up exactly where we started, and the whole enterprise of epistemology itself seems to be an impossible dream. There are some (like Derrida, Feyerabend and Rorty) who celebrate this conclusion and consider the dismantling of epistemology itself as the ultimate liberation of human reason.

However, it seems too early to write any obituary of epistemology,[17] for there are some die-hard epistemologists who refuse to give up. As a result, new vistas continue to open up which, while giving up the possibility of absolute foundations to knowledge, still provide a normative, juridical role to it. As is only to be expected, even these steps are tentative and lack a definite direction. But a major trend seems to be a growing conviction that even if we grant the theory-ladenness of higher level cognitions, and a degree of historico-cultural influence on the categories of ordinary perception, there does seem to be a common core to the structures of ordinary perception that is relatively stable and independent of particular cultures. This also seems to have a certain intuitive support. As Joseph Runzo, an advocate of the radical conceptualization of perceptual experience writes: 'I live in the same *perceptual* world as you because I exist in the same *conceptual* world as you.'[18] Writers as varied as Noam Chomsky, Edmund Husserl (especially in his discovery of the life-world, where ordinary perceptions take place) and naturalized evolutionary epistemology in general (with its concept of mesocosm suited for ordinary perceptions), subscribe to this. So does Quine who otherwise holds that observations are theory-laden. What is more important to us is not the fact that these varied writers subscribe to there being a common core to the structures of perceptual cognition, but that if empirical evidence is to be possible, there must be such a common core. Otherwise there would be no possibility of inter-subjective agreement even in the case of perceptual judgements and the very dream of epistemology to abjudicate cognitive disputes with the help of empirical evidence would remain just that—a dream, and nothing more. On the other hand, if there is such a common core, not only would espistemology be possible, but the theory-ladenness of higher level cognitions can be to its advantage since it is the theory that would tell us what to look for and observe in ordinary perception as confirmation of the theory.[19]

II

To speak in terms of a relatively stable common core to the structures of perceptual cognition is not very illuminating. It admits of a degree of historico-cultural variations in these structures and at the same time affirms a common core that is invariable. How is that possible? Obviously, such talk does not make much sense unless we move on from the general talk about cognitive structures to their detailed description. However, in attempting to do that our inquiry has shifted from the possibility of empirical evidence to a description of the cognitive structures which make empirical evidence possible.

If we are to give even a minimal description of cognitive structures, we must first have an entry point into these structural explorations. Where do we begin? For Kant these structures are a set of concepts and

principles. Now even if it is granted that the abstract categories he enumerates are a pre-condition to any experience whatsoever (including perceptual), it is obvious that in terms of empirical evidence of knowledge claims they are useless.

Let us see if the language empiricists can help us—they not only grant that we need shared conceptual structures if we are to have knowledge, but also locate them in language. This has a definite advantage over the abstract Kantian categories since empirical evidence is invariably in terms of ordinary observation statements (cf. argument of Part I) which uses the concepts and categories of natural languages. However, it did not take them long to realize that natural languages, with their variety and the various uses to which even a single language is put, do not disclose any such invariable structures. Hence the attempts to construct an ideal language. It is not the failure of such attempts that is important here, but the fact that cognitive structures could not be identified with the categories of natural languages. However, if the argument of Part I has any force, the fact still remains that these structures are closely linked to language. Thus, though the two cannot be identified, there does seem to be a close connection between language and cognitive structures.[20] And therefore, language gives us a valuable entry point to gain insight into the nature of cognitive structures. Further, once it is clear that we are not looking for cognitive structures in general, but only those structures that are operative in ordinary perceptual cognition, we can concentrate on the categories available in ordinary observation statements. To repeat: learning from the history of language empiricists, we must not identify cognitive structures with linguistic structures. However, linguistic categories do provide us with an entry point to cognitive structures. With this insight let me describe some of the characteristics of cognitive structures.

Description of Cognitive Structures

A basic feature of the linguistic categories is that they structure experience. In other words, they set up relatively stable boundaries and thus give us a sense of completeness and determinacy about the material within these boundaries. While this boundary itself is flexible and not permanently fixed (cf. horizontal structure, below), it is of utmost importance that at all times there be some boundaries. Otherwise, categories and structures shall make no sense.

Having such boundaries implies that either something fits into the structure and is taken in, or else it does not fit in and is kept out. Thus, something is either a cow or it is not; either it is within the fence or it is without. There are no fence sitters here. If fence sitters do arrive, either they modify the boundary itself or are rejected outright, but in no case is the boundary done away with. This, then, is the primary function of a cognitive structure.

Another notable feature of these categories is that taken individually, these boundaries are indeterminate or insufficiently determinate. That is to say that:

> *Within* a given category, some members are regarded as good or typical examples; the very best are called 'prototypes'. Other members of the category are relatively more marginal, and the category boundary is often poorly defined. The prototypical chair, for example, is the four-legged, straight-backed kind often seen in dining rooms. Modernistic, single-pedestal armchairs are much less typical of the category, while beanbags and bar stools hardly count as chairs at all.[21]

Eleanor Rosch calls this internal gradedness of categories as their horizontal structure.[22] It is not hard to see that this kind of graded structure appears almost in every kind of category. Now, if the primary function of categories is to set up boundaries and yet individual categories are insufficiently determinate, it raises the question: how then, can the required boundaries be set up? That links us immediately to the vertical or hierarchical organization of categories.

The third feature of the categories is their hierarchical organization. The categories, 'armchair', 'chair' and 'furniture', for example, stand in a definite hierarchical relation. Without going into great details it suffices to say that 'chair' is a basic level category, and 'furniture' is a superordinate one. Similarly 'cow', and 'dog' are basic level categories, but belonging to a different superordinate set than 'furniture'. This feature of the categories is not a new finding; it has been put to use by both Aristotle and Kant to arrive at their list of categories. However, here we are not interested in arriving at the highest predicables as Aristotle was, or at the pure 'a priori' categories as Kant was; but in seeing how the structures are combined and organized in the process of arriving at determinate perceptual judgements. Here we find that categories cannot be combined at random. Even in making a perceptual judgement such as 'This is a chair' (which is a basic level category) there is the influence of this superordinate category, 'furniture'. In the language of information processing it means that the information received at the bottom could not be processed as a 'chair' unless it were controlled from the top by the programme for 'furniture' and not the one for 'animal'.

This feature of higher level structures influencing the lower level ones is even more clearly visible when we consider the superordinate categories. The superordinate categories are defined by still higher level structures which Lakoff, Neisser, McCauley and others call Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs).[23] ICMs are larger assumptions that underlie the meanings of words. They are 'theories' about the world (of nature and/or of culture), and as these theories change, the categories also change.[24] What is important is to note that such words cannot function apart from their appropriate ICMs. Indeed, superordinate categories are defined by

their cognitive models. As idealized models they simplify the world for us by ignoring or underemphasizing a large number of possible features. Therefore, we can and do have several different sets of categories and models for the same domain. Thus, 'Mars' could also be referred to as a 'red star'; but it would be based on a different ICM than that used in astronomy. 'Both models are consistent with a sub-set of objective facts, and both have their uses.'[25]

Now we can answer the question raised earlier about what determines the boundary of a horizontal structure. The answer is found in the vertical organization—i.e., a higher level structure determines the boundary of the lower level ones (which by themselves are ill-defined). In other words, the task of defining boundaries is not so much a function of individual categories as of the whole categorial structure in their inter-relationships.

Another characteristic of these structures is that they are not purely formal; they have content as well. This is a conclusion that Kant accepted;[26] yet in his preoccupation with the 'absolutely *a priori*', he relegates the categories that we actually use in making perceptual judgements to the empirical sphere. Whether Kant succeeded in keeping his categories free of all content, and whether the traditional dichotomy between structure and content of knowledge is tenable is a matter of dispute.[27] What concerns us is only that the categories that we actually use in making perceptual judgements are not totally formal, but have content. This is also implied in the Kantian claim that his categories are synthetic, which means that they have content. In any case our categories are semantic rather than logical.

However, these structures also have a formal function. In the language of information processing it means that cognitive structures function like a format: the information must be of a certain sort if it is to be accepted into the processor; or else it would be ignored.[28] Having seen three levels of structures (basic, superordinate, and ICMs) in operation, it must now be clear that the input from the environment, the sensory stimuli, would be processed and result in a perceptual judgement only by being placed in its *appropriate* structure; and that the criterion for this appropriateness is coherence. Thus, sensory stimuli must cohere with certain basic level structure; this basic level with a superordinate one, and so on. Thus, the basic level category 'cow' would be rejected as inappropriate by the superordinate category 'furniture', because the former does not cohere with the latter. In other words, the content taken into any structure will be homogeneous.

These structures are also a priori in a sense that is at once continuous and discontinuous with Kant. The priority of categories may be conceived in three ways: temporal, genetic, and logical. Temporally, as a pre-condition for the possibility of experience, these structures are already there, prior to the experience; or else there could be no

experiential judgement. Genetically, the Kantian claim is that they are totally independent of all experience, not only of the present, but even of the past. Logically it means that our knowledge of cognitive structures is not obtained from experience, but from the analysis of the concept of experience, and in the present case, it is more specifically from the analysis of the concept of experiential evidence required for epistemic justification. Of the three, the temporal and logical priority of structures can be accepted without any difficulty. As for the genetic thesis, the sort of 'dynamic Kantianism' advocated by Piaget and the evolutionary epistemologists seems more plausible; but we do not need to take a stand on this matter at present for we are concerned only with describing the structures and not with explaining them.

A few general observations are in order. First, some of the above characteristics seem opposed to each other—on the one hand, they have formal function and on the other, they have content; on the one hand individual categories are indeterminate and on the other, setting up boundaries is their primary function and so on. Second, much of what we have seen, especially the influence of the higher level structures on the lower level ones, seems to support the theory-ladenness of observaiton. There should be no difficulty in granting that there is a degree of cultural variation even in everyday perceptual judgements. Thus, a person brought up in Antarctica would obviously see more details about the snow-conditions that would ordinarily escape a visitor to the place; a scientist would see more in his field of specialization than a layman, and so on. Third, there must be *some* structure at the topmost level in the hierarchy of structures. This follows from two considerations: One, since the insufficiently determinate individual categories are made determinate by the higher level ones in the hierarchy, inasmuch as our perceptual judgements are determinate, it follows that there must also be some highest level structure. Two, the hierarchical organization of cognitive structures, together with the fact that cognitive structures have also content makes it inevitable that there must also be some topmost structure that guides ordinary perceptions, because though human knowledge may be potentially infinite, it would be absurd to claim that it is actually so. The important question is whether there is any *one* structure, an overall 'theory' (which may turn out to be a non-theory) at the top of the hierarchy that directs perception. Once we grant that ordinary perceptions have certain constancy that is independent of cultures, we would be forced to answer this question in the affirmative. Then, what is it that can be considered as the topmost structure? Further, what could be the invariable common core of that structure? The point of describing cognitive structures is to find if there is anything that satisfies these descriptions at the topmost level.

I conclude with a few nascent thoughts. I feel that the concept of the life-world, originally discovered by Edmund Husserl and further developed

by Alfred Schutz and others needs further exploration to see if this, together with the idea of the mesocosm of evolutionary epistemology would help us find a structure that satisfies these descriptions. It is possible that the answer lies in the concept of the life-world taken in an evolutionary perspective. It seems to me that this would satisfy all the descriptions given above of cognitive structures and yet find a core which is invariable for all human beings. The practical concerns that define the everyday life-world, and the survival concerns of evolutionary epistemology, both take us beyond the linguistic and the conceptual structures to certain goals, concerns, and attitudes of the cognizing organism. Inasmuch as these are universal it would also give a universal core to the cognitive structures. More specifically, inasmuch as the practical attitude is universal and invariant, and if the life-world is structured around this attitude, we would have arrived at the invariable factor in cognitive structures. The conceptual structures would then develop in interaction of this invariant structure of consciousness with the diverse environments and situations. What is remarkable about such an invariant structure is that it is found as a structure of consciousness itself. If so, then we would reach a seemingly paradoxical conclusion that for the possibility of empirical evidence and epistemology, there must be cognitive structures, which, in turn, are founded on the structures of consciousness. It is paradoxical because empiricism, which at one time tried to eliminate consciousness itself, may have to turn to it for the possibility of empirical evidence and epistemology. However, these are matters for further investigation; all that can be said for the present is that if empirical evidence is to be possible, then, there must be some variably invariant cognitive structures operative in ordinary perceptual judgements.

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Notes and References

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 820; B 848.
2. Properly speaking, this justificatory thesis about experience is more appropriately attributed to twentieth century empiricism, as opposed to classical empiricism which emphasized that all knowledge must originate in experience.
3. This juridical metaphor is Kant's. Another metaphor commonly used for this tendency to accord supremacy to one sort of evidence over others is that of foundations of knowledge.
4. This term is taken from N. Frankenberry, *Religion and Radical Empiricism*, State University of New York Press, Albany,1987, p. 60.
5. Unfortunately there is no uniformly accepted terminology used for making these distinctions. A.I. Goldman, for example, begins with a division of mental states into those that have a propositional content and those that do not (e.g., 'sensations like pain, itchy feelings, and perceptual experiences'). The former he terms propositional attitudes (those that require a purely intellectual assent) and subclass of propositional attitudes is termed 'doxastic' or 'credal' attitudes. See Goldman, *Epistemology and Cognition*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 14. John Pollock uses another sort of classification and uses 'doxastic' to mean almost just the opposite as meant here, which is then contrasted with non-doxastic, under which he brings not only internal mental states, but also such externalist theories as reliabilism and probabilism. See John Pollock, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, Hutchinson, London, 1986. A major defect of his approach is the failure to distinguish between a person being justified and a proposition being justified. The use of 'doxastic' and 'propositional' adopted in this essay follows P.K. Moser's use of these terms. Moser uses the term 'doxastic' to mean a person's being justified in believing some proposition and 'propositional' to mean some proposition's being justified for a person. See P.K. Moser, *Empirical Justification*, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1985, p. 3. However, he does not make the distinction between intra and inter-personal justification and opts for a phenomenal version of intra-personal justification. Hence the present division.
6. Karl Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972. According to Popper, knowledge consists of propositions that exist in a non-physical, non-mental, 'third world'. (The first world consists of physical entities, the second of mental entities).
7. The claim here is not that any of these philosophers thought of justification to be meant primarily for their own satisfaction; the claim, rather, is that their approach to justification, since it lacks an inter-subjective perspective, can only amount to this. This would enable us to appreciate better the Kantian contribution towards making inter-subjective justification possible.
8. Moser, *Empirical Justification*, p. 2.
9. A clear example is Joseph Runzo, 'World-views and the Epistemic Foundations of Theism', in *Religious Studies*, 25, 1989, p. 32; Runzo is not alone in talking about epistemic responsibility. See Moser *Empirical Justification*, p. 4, 125 etc. For a good overview of the concept of justification, see Alvin Platinga, 'Justification in the Twentieth Century' in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. L, Supplement, Fall 1990, pp. 45-71. Platinga shows the incoherence of the concept of justification as traditionally conceived which is in terms of epistemic responsibility.
10. William P. Alston, 'Epistemic Circularity', in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XLVII, 1, September 1990, p. 4.
11. A.R. Lacey, *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1976.
12. Moser, *Empirical Justification*, p. 4
13. John Pollock, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*.
14. See Antony Flew, *God: A Critical Enquiry*, Open Court Publishing Company, La Salle, Illinois, 1984, pp. 118 ff.
15. This Kantian prejudice in favour of ordinary perceptual experiences is discussed in some detail in my 'Knowledge and Religious Consciousness' in *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 1, pp. 44, 46.
16. See for example, Joseph Runzo, 'The Radical Conceptualization of Perceptual Experience', in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 19, 3, July 1982.
17. See Susan Haak, 'Recent Obituaries of Epistemology' in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 27, No. 3, July 1990.
18. Joseph Runzo, 'Radical Conceptualization', p. 216.
19. Moreover, there seems to be a general consensus even about higher level cognitions that we are moving 'beyond objectivism and relativism'. This is the conclusion of Richard Bernstein who in his book of the same title examines various postempiricist

philosophies like that of Kuhn, the hermeneutic movement led by Gadamer, critical theorists like Habermas, and others. What is ruled out is not only relativism, but also objectivism; that too not only the physicalist objectivism advocated by the pre-Kantian empiricists and still adhered to by a lot of post-Kantians, but also the structural objectivism initiated by Kant.

20. One attempt to articulate this connection, and which seems to have an initial plausibility is that of M. Arbib and M. Hesse in *The Construction of Reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 138 ff.
21. Ulric Neisser (ed.), *Concepts and Conceptual Development: Ecological and Intellectual Factors in Categorization*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 3. Much of the discussion here on the structural organization of categories is based on the various articles in this book.
22. See 'Principles of Categorization', in E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (eds.), *Cognition and Categorization*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, New Jersey, 1978, p. 35. The vertical structure of categories presented here is also based on Rosch's work.
23. Neisser, *Concepts and Conceptual Development*, pp. 18–19.
24. The difference between ICMs and theories is in the greater degree of formality (systematicity?) and complexity which characterizes the latter. See R. McCauley, 'The Role of Theories in a Theory of Concepts' in Neisser, ibid., pp. 288–309.

    A useful example of an ICM considered by Neisser is one that underlies the word 'bachelor', which is ordinarily defined as 'unmarried man'. What this obvious definition conceals is the fact that the definition itself depends on a certain model of social life such as the existence of a primarily monogamous society where most men get married and few who do not are thereby free to adopt a different lifestyle. '"Bachelor" becomes almost vacuous where that model does not fit: that is why we do not readily apply it to the homosexuals or to the pope' (ibid., p. 18). Neisser also discusses the ICM that underlies 'furniture' and the 'scripted' ICMs that underlie 'dessert' (scripted: 'appears at the end of meals') and 'teacher' (scripted: 'when in school . . .').
25. Ibid., p. 21.
26. 'General logic abstracts from all content of the predicate (even though it be negative); it requires only whether the predicate be ascribed to the subject or opposed to it. But transcendental logic also considers what may be the worth or content of a logical affirmation' (*Critique of Pure Reason, A 72/B 97*).
27. Cf. T.K. Seung, 'Kant's Conception of the Categories', in *Review of Metaphysics*, 43, September 1989, pp. 107–32; Donald Davidson questions the form-content dichotomy itself. C.f. 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984; reprinted in 1985. This essay is also included in P.K. Moser and A. Vander Nat (eds.), *Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987.
28. Neisser describes what he calls the 'anticipatory schemata' involved in perception, in similar terms. See Neisser, 'Perceiving, Anticipating and Imagining' in C.W. Savage, *Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology*, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. IX, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1978, p. 98.

On Western Rationality and Its Alleged Relation to Aristotle

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INTRODUCTION

The history of ancient Hellenic philosophy is like the old Hellenic pantheon, in which the names of Greek gods have been replaced by the names of great philosophers such as, Thales and Anaximander, Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, Parmenides and Empedocles, Xenophanes and Xenocrates, Pythagoras and Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, Zeno and Pyrrho, Epicurus and Epictetus, Aristippus and Leucippus, Antisthenes and Theothrastus, Plutarch and Proclus, Plotinus and Porphyry. Of these twelve pairs, Plato and Aristotle is perhaps the most famous and influential pair. They represent, respectively, the loftiest spirit and the sharpest mind produced by a millennium of philosophical activity in ancient Greece.[1]

There are historians of philosophy who tend to emphasize the similarities between the two philosophers and, following A.N. Whitehead's characterization of the history of western philosophy as nothing but 'a series of footnotes to Plato', see Aristotle's philosophical writings as the first and the best of these notes.[2] On the other hand, those who want to stress the points on which, in their view, the two philosophers differ, face the question of how to evaluate the respective merit of Plato and Aristotle. For them, the question may take any of the following forms: Which is better, the Platonic or the Aristotelian philosophy? Plato's metaphysical idealism or Aristotle's ontological realism? Plato's mathematical rationalism and the method of deduction or Aristotle's empirical inquiry and the method of induction? The political utopia of Plato or the pragmatic reform of Aristotle?[3]

Since the beginning of such questioning in late antiquity, the fortunes of Aristotle's philosophy, on the balance of the West's appraisal, has changed several times. At times, especially during the Middle Ages, Aristotle's authority seemed to be held high, since he was praised as *the* philosopher by Christians and Muslims, typified by Thomas Aquinas and Averroes respectively. For reasons which were not (simply and strictly) philosophical, the followers of these two dogmatically mono-

theistic (and, therefore, naturally intolerant) religions thought that Aristotle had (perhaps providentially) provided the world with a complete philosophical system which could be put to good service. For they claimed that *the* philosopher had established by pure reason, the same 'truths' which god had later revealed to mankind in two books, the Bible and the Koran.[4]

At other times, especially during the 'Platonic Renaissance' of the fifteenth century and during the 'scientific revolution' of the seventeenth century, Aristotle has been anathematized and (perhaps unfairly and unreasonably) held responsible for the ecclesiastical scholasticism and the concomitant philosophical and scientific stagnation of the previous centuries. In fact, the West had witnessed a regression in science and *philosophia naturalis* for more than a millennium but Aristotle was hardly the cause of it.[5]

In more recent times, the name of Aristotle has been used in order to give a philosophical facade, and to provide authoritative justification to the basic 'cultural myth' of western imperialism which is, to use Dr Lath's description of it: 'The idea that the culture of the West is distinguished from all other cultures in being rational'.[6] It is alleged that the 'roots' of this 'western idea' go back to Aristotle who is, thus, turned into a champion of western *ratio* and *imperium*. According to Dr Lath, this myth has been dressed up in 'scientific garb'; it has been vested with the authority of sociology by Max Weber and Claude Levi-Strauss; and it has unfortunately become 'an unquestioned dogma' not only in the West and for Westerners but 'among the "educated" in other cultures too, who have been socialized into Western modes of thought'.[7]

It seems that Dr Lath's diagnosis is correct and touches upon a culturally sensitive issue which is in need of open discussion. Having made the diagnosis, he could have proceeded to question whether the above 'dogma' of modern European imperialism has its roots in ancient Greece and has the sanction of Aristotle's philosophy and authority. Instead of following this reasonable approach, Dr Lath has opted for something else. He seems to believe, rather uncritically, that 'The march of Western rationality is traced back to Greece, and sometimes specifically to Aristotle, often considered the prime mover, the major guru of Western rational thought' and that 'The contours, or the seeds, of the idea of demarcating societies on the basis of rationality and the notion of the West as a uniquely rational society, with all the prejudices and problems such a concept presents, is first articulated in Aristotle from whom it has entered later thought'.[8] Entertaining such beliefs, Dr Lath wants to get to 'the root' of the problem and to resolve the 'unresolved tensions of Aristotle's scheme which still remain in Western thought', through a sociological interpretation of certain isolated passages selected at random, mainly from the *Politics*.[9]

I do not claim to be a sociologist in any sense and, since my knowledge of Indian society and its extraordinary complexity is very limited, I would not be in a position to judge the import of the observations, which Dr Lath makes about Indian society as possible evidence which may be utilized for the verification or falsification of the sociological hypotheses of Weber and Levi-Strauss, and their assumed connection to Aristotle.[10] Rather, I would like to give a brief account of man's place in the Cosmos as conceived by Aristotle, in order to provide an appropriate context for Aristotle's political views, which have often been misunderstood by western and non-western scholars.[11]

In what follows, therefore, I shall argue that Aristotle is something more than merely a western rationalist. In reading his works we should keep in mind the fact that the basic concepts of logic, ontology, psychology, ethics, politics, and other areas of human experience, are expressed, in words which are, as Aristotle often emphasized in *pollachós legomena* (i.e. ambiguous, homonymous, polysemantic terms which have more than one meaning, or sense, or reference). If we do so, we will have a key to understanding Aristotle's philosophy correctly and judging it judiciously. For his views on God and man, on Cosmos and cosmos, on *physis* (nature) and *polis*, on poetic and noetic activity, on ethics and politics, on virtue and the common good, on domestic relations and political associations, are all ontologically connected as parts of a whole which is held together by the method of dialectic as developed by Platonic Socrates and as perfected by Aristotle.[12]

For Aristotle, research into any of the above subjects will inevitably lead to all the rest with which it is ontologically and methodologically connected. For instance, the ultimate ethical and political *telos* (end, goal, good) of man would call for an inquiry into the human nature which would lead to psychology, to ontology, to theology and to cosmology. As Aristotle envisioned it, 'the good for man' is to be identified with the well-being of the entire political community.[13] Consequently, the organization of the *polis* should make it possible for each of its members separately, and all of them together, to actualize their respective potential, so that the best among them would be allowed to rise to the top. The road to the top is to be followed by the enlightened philosopher, as he tries to traverse the ontological distance separating the man-goat (or satyr) of Greek mythology and dramaturgy from the man-god (or sage) of Pythagorean, Socratic, and post-Socratic philosophy.[14]

Like the Platonic Socrates,[15] Aristotle was convinced that the love of wisdom, working slowly upon the life, the soul, and the mind of the ascending man, who has climbed step by step all the way up the *scala amoris*,[16] can bring in contact what is divine in us (the *nous*, the intuitive intellect in the human micro-cosmos), and God (that is, the divine *Nous* of the Cosmos or the macro-cosmos).[17] At such privileged mo-

ments of noetic contact and enlightenment, the energized human intellect becomes beloved to God, the eternally active Intellect which moves, by its power and attraction, the entire Cosmos as if in an orderly, eternal, and erotic dance. Thus, a kind of peripatetic apotheosis seems to take place at the end of the long road of dialectic where *logos* (discursive reason) yields to *nous*: Man (conceived as a living, sensible, reasonable, noetic, communal, political, and potentially divine being) becomes actually divine for a brief moment; the philosopher is transformed into a demi-god (thanks to the love of wisdom). The *nous* (the intuitive intellect) in us is thus recognized to be in its *ousia* (substance, essence) of the same kind as that of the divine *Nous* (intellect, God). The perfected political animal (*zoon politikon*) and the eternal Aristotelian god are identified as essentially one. They are, ultimately, related and united as two beloved friends. This is, briefly, the Aristotelian road to enlightenment. The method of dialectic, as Aristotle practiced it and as I see it, ultimately leads to the same goal as the Indian Vedānta.[18]

In this light, Aristotle would appear to be someone else, different, better and nobler than the mould of a philosopher into which he has been turned in the West; that is, the advocate of a rationalistic philosophy in the service of revealed theology or scientific technology, which would turn knowledge into power and place power in the hands of capitalists and imperialists who are bent on controlling and exploiting both the natural and the cultural resources the world over for profit. This western portrayal does *not* seem to me to resemble the true Aristotle at all; that is, the philosopher who wanted to see in theory the entire Cosmos; to admire its eternal beauty; and to find in it a proper place for both God as *Nous* and for the human noetic self or *nous*. Certainly it does *not* fit the acuity of Aristotle's dialectic in all its flexibility and complexity as is displayed in the extant texts.[19]

It is this other (and ignored in the West) side of Aristotle's philosophy that my thesis will attempt to revive because it is needed now and will be needed more in the future than ever before. With the failure of Communism in *theoria* and in *praxis*; and as the old divisions of mankind along the dreadful lines of monotheistic intolerance and religious fanaticism begin to re-surface in Europe, Africa, America, and Asia, where dogmatic monotheists (Christians, Muslims, Jews) and other persons (who are neither monotheists nor atheists) have to learn to live together in peace, the need to revive the ancient spirit of religious tolerance and philosophical pluralism is felt deeply by some sensitive fore-seeing people.[20] Thus, Aristotle's views on man and nature, on Cosmos and God, on the common good and on political community, and their respective multiple relations become relevant once again; and, by extension, so do the views of other traditions, and

cultures which are relatively free of fanatical intolerance and religious dogmatism.[21]

THE ARISTOTELIAN WAY: FROM *LOGOS* TO *NOUS*

For anyone wishing to discover the roots of rationality as it developed in the West, Aristotle is a reasonable *terminus a quo*. Greek philosophy reached its apex in his thought. Whatever little the mediaeval West knew about Greek philosophy was related to Aristotle's *Organon*.[22] Even the revolt against Aristotle which followed, and which led to the revival of Platonism in the fifteenth and to the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was largely fought with the weapons of Aristotelian logic. For such an inquirer, therefore, and for these reasons, the following questions acquire some urgency: Was Aristotle the 'first cause' of the rising of rationalism in the West in the last few hundred years? Does western rationality really have its beginnings in Aristotle? Can his philosophy (without distortion), and his dialectic (without misapplication), provide justification for dogmatic and unjustifiable claims of cultural hegemony which were advanced by Northern European powers to justify the colonial exploitation of Africa, America and Asia? What do the philosophical terms 'reason', 'rationality', 'rationalism' mean? Was Aristotle a rationalist, pure and simple?[23]

The answer to these questions, especially the last one, cannot be simple; it may be affirmative or negative depending on the sense which is attached to the word *ratio* which was itself a clumsy attempt to render into Latin the Greek word *logos*. This word has as many meanings and shades of meanings as Proteus has faces and shapes. Basically it means meaningful or significant speech, the human language and all the concepts, thoughts, feelings, values, and visions, which can be symbolically expressed by such a powerful tool, either orally or in writing.[24]

As an epistemological concept employed in modern theories of knowledge and in the histories of 'western philosophy', rationalism is usually contrasted to empiricism and to intuitionism which are considered alternative theories of knowledge. Its method is called deductive because it is supposed to move from general, self-evident, and axiomatic principles to implications which follow necessarily from such principles when they are combined in proper syllogistic forms according to specific logical rules of inference. Thus, Plato, Pythagoras, and Descartes, who were mathematicians as well as philosophers, are considered to be rationalists. They were willing to follow the hypothetico-deductive method of reasoning as the only correct way of obtaining reliable scientific knowledge. As pure rationalists they did not trust the evidence provided by sense experience. In this respect, they differed from the

empiricists like Democritus, Epicurus, and Hobbes for whom the senses were the only source of trustworthy information about the real (which, for them, was identified with the material) world.

Where did Aristotle stand on this epistemological divide? Was he a rationalist and 'the root' of western rationality, as Dr Lath and other historians of philosophy have maintained? Or was he to be found in the opposite camp of the empiricists where Kant has placed him? In fact he was both an empiricist and a rationalist because his common sense and his open mind allowed him to see that each side was correct in some specified sense, but neither one provided the whole truth.[25] On this matter, as in so many others, Aristotle opposed the hard core dogmatist.[26] He was so undogmatic and critical of the dialectical deficiencies of different theories that he was able, among other things, to praise the senses but to criticize empiricism;[27] to define syllogism and the deductive method, as used by mathematicians, but to admit that induction and intuition played an important role in ascertaining the first principles and the major premises of valid deductions;[28] and to conceive of truth as neither a revealed dogma nor a private property of a philosopher regardless of his accomplishments. Rather, for him, truth was a common property belonging to mankind as a whole, a commonwealth to which all (more or less) contribute, even when they are in error, since others may learn how to avoid them.[29] The following statement is very characteristic of Aristotle's mind and method at work:

> Now our treatment of this science [Ethics] will be adequate, if it achieves that amount of precision which belongs to its subject matter. The same exactness must not be expected in all departments of philosophy alike, anymore than in all the products of the arts and crafts. . . . For it is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits. It is equally unreasonable to accept merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict demonstration from an orator.[30]

There is no need to add more passages like the above in order to make the point that dialectical flexibility, sharpness of questioning, and moderation of expression are characteristic of Aristotle's method.[31] He had learned from his teacher Plato, and the teacher of his teacher Socrates, the importance of dividing and defining, of clarifying and qualifying, of distinguishing and analysing the terms involved in a given question or a proposed problem. With unsurpassed confidence and acuteness, he practised the method of dialectic to the best of his ability in the service of truth and humanity. As a Hellenic philosopher, Aristotle wanted to ascertain the facts in each case and 'to save the phenomena'; to review 'the received proverbial wisdom' of 'the many'

and of the few and the 'wise men'; and to suggest solutions which might pass both the test of time and, more importantly, the test of competent friendly criticism and self-criticism, always seeking the truth.[32]

The flexibility of his method, the honest search for truth, and the sharpness and openness of his mind, all combined to make Aristotle one of the best representatives of the classical Greek mind and Hellenic philosophy. Carefully following the flexible but slippery path of dialectics, Aristotle succeeded in embracing not only the claims of empiricism and rationalism, but also the claims of intuition and of noetic vision. Aristotle was able to do so because he did not limit human experience to sensations and sense data, or to cogitations and rationalizations. For him, besides the realm of animal *aisthēsis* (sense perception) and the realm of human *logos* (discursive reasoning, rational discourse, meaningful speech), there was the realm of human νους (intuitive, intellective, immediate grasp of first and true principles; non-discursive reason, intellect). The door to this realm opens, at certain privileged moments, to the lover of wisdom who follows the road of dialectic to the end.[33] More significantly, the Hellenic philosopher, considered as an intellect engaged in the theory of the Cosmos was not alone at all, unlike the existentialist soul of ex-Christian Europeans which feels lost.[34] For the philosophically conceived Hellenic Cosmos was orderly, beautiful, and intelligently governed, at the highest level, by *Nous*, the eternally energizing and active Intellect, which Aristotle named God; and by a plurality of other lesser intellects including the one which is in us, the human noetic mind or *nous*.[35]

Consequently, Aristotle, the philosopher who invented the syllogism and systematized logic for the Greeks; the man who practised and perfected the Socratic method of dialectic, perhaps more than any other Greek philosopher; the same man did not hesitate to describe the Cosmic God, the ultimate *ousia*, in poetic language which would have pleased even a great poet. His God is noetically conceived as the inexhaustible source of noetic energy which erotically attracts and harmoniously and powerfully moves everything in the world towards It-Self. It is the great beauty with which the entire Cosmos seems to be in love. It is the Great Light and the source of enlightenment for the philosophical mind, the lover of wisdom, in his triple Socratic manifestation: as lover of *music*,[36] that is, poetic rhythm, harmonious sound, and all audible beauty; as lover of *eidos*, that is, visible pattern, symmetrical form, and all optical beauty; and as lover of *dialectic*, that is, logical form, principled life, rational discourse, and intuitive grasp of first principles.[37]

ARISTOTLE ON GOD AND MAN: THE TEXTUAL EVIDENCE

The above perception of Aristotle is certainly different from that of *the* philosopher with whom the western world is accustomed. For it is framed around the Greek terms of *Nous* and *nous* which are not even easily translatable into English. The noetic affinity and friendship which exist naturally between (the philosophically conceived) God and the (truly godly) philosopher who is engaged in *theoria*, are expressed by Aristotle in language which is more poetic, noematic, and enigmatic than the logic and discursive reasoning with which he is identified in the West. I would like, therefore, to allow Aristotle to speak on behalf of his noetic philosophy and in support of my unusual thesis, by providing sufficient textual evidence for the consideration and enlightenment of any non-prejudiced person regarding this part of Aristotle's mind and its political implications in the triangle of important relations—West/Greece, Greece/East, and East/West. Consider, therefore, the following three paradigmatic cases of enlightenment.

A. The Ontological Question Leads Aristotle to Cosmic God

'We have said in the *Ethics* what the difference is between art and science and the other kindred faculties; but the point of our present discussion is this, that all men suppose what is called Wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things; so that, as has been said before, the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessor of any sense-perception whatever, the artist wiser than the man of experience, the master-worker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of wisdom than the productive. Clearly then, Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes. Since we are seeking this knowledge, we must inquire of what kind are the causes and the principles, the knowledge of which is wisdom. . . .[38]The subject of our inquiry is substance;[39] for the principles and the causes we are seeking are those of substances. For if the universe is of the nature of a whole, substance is its first part; and if it coheres merely by virtue of serial succession, on this view also substance is first, and is succeeded by quality, and then by quantity. . . .There are three kinds of substance—one that is sensible (of which one subdivision is eternal and another is perishable; the latter is recognized by all men, and includes, e.g. plants and animals), of which we must grasp the elements, whether one or many; and another that is immovable. . . . On such a principle then, depend the heavens and the world of nature. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its activity is also pleasure. And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and which is thinking in the fullest sense. And thought thinks of itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with, and thinking, its object, so that thought and object of thought are the same. . . . If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better, this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God.'[40]

B. The Psychological Question Leads Aristotle to the God Within

'Holding as we do that, while knowledge of any kind is a thing to be honoured and prized, one kind of it may, either by reason of its greater exactness or of a higher dignity and greater wonderfulness in its objects, be more honourable and precious than another, on both accounts we should naturally be led to place in the front rank the study of the soul. The knowledge of the soul admittedly contributes greatly to advance of truth in general, and, above all, to our understanding of nature, for the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life. Our aim is to grasp and understand, first its essential nature, and secondly its properties. . . .[41] Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. . . .What has soul in it differs from what has not, in that the former displays life. Now this word has more than one sense, and provided that any one alone is found in a thing we say that thing is living. Living, may mean thinking or perception or local movement and rest, or movement in the sense of nutrition, decay and growth. Hence we think of plants also as living (besides animals and human beings). . . . Certain kinds of animals possess in addition the power of locomotion, and still another order of animate beings, i.e., man and possibly another order like man or superior to him, the power of thinking, i.e., mind (*nous*). . . . Thinking, both speculative and practical, is regarded as akin to a form of perceiving; for in the one as well as the other the soul discriminates and is cognizant of something which is. Indeed the ancients go so far as to identify thinking and perceiving. . . . Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body. . . . And in fact mind, as we have described it, is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state of light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours. Mind in this sense of it is separable, impassiable, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to passive factor, the originating of force to the matter which

it forms). Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but in the universe as a whole it is not prior, even in time. Mind is not at one time knowing and at another not. When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears just as what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal, and without it nothing thinks.'[42]

C. The Ethical Question Brings Together the Two Aristotelian Gods

'Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been defined to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends. . . .[43] Now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. . . . But if happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the intellect (*nous*) or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already that this activity is the activity of contemplation. . . . Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level; not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is divine; and by as much as this something is superior to his composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man's thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in power and in value it far surpasses all the rest. It may even be held that this is the true self of each, inasmuch as it is the dominant and best part; and therefore it would be a strange thing if a man should choose to live not his own life but the life of other than himself. Moreover what was said before will apply here also: that which is best and most pleasant for each creature is that which is proper to the nature of each; accordingly the life of the intellect is the best and the pleasantest life for man, inasmuch as the intellect more than anything else is man; therefore this life will be the happiest.'[44]

The above and similar passages from the Aristotelian corpus provide us with a clear picture of Aristotle's conception of God and man

and their respective place in the Cosmos, especially when they are read in the context of his philosophy as a whole and in its relation to other Hellenic philosophies of nature and *polis*. The kind of life of which man is optimally capable, as well as the communal and political arrangements, which would make possible the flourishing of such a life for the citizens, are recognized by Aristotle not as arbitrary recommendations of the philosopher-king to be, but as the fulfilment of an entelechy, a *telos* which is present in the human soul and in the human nature *qua* human.[45] The same ordering principle which pervades the Cosmos is also present in the individual human soul and its most precious manifestations in various forms of natural associations including family and the *polis*. Thus, to understand Aristotle's *Politics* correctly, one should place it in the context of his *Metaphysics*, *De Anima*, and *Ethics*. We will attempt to do so in the following section.

ARISTOTLE'S MOVE FROM ONTOLOGY TO OUSIOLOGY

Aristotle's model of the Cosmos is more complex than any of the other models which were advanced by his predecessors from Parmenides to Plato. It is the antithesis of the Parmenidean Being. The Parmenidean Being had been transformed by a series of revisions of the formula either 'It is' or 'It is not'. For Parmenides the disjunction: Being or not-Being was an exclusive disjunction; for between the Being and the abyss of non-Being, nothing else could be. Being was to be conceived as One, the One which was identical with *Nous*, eternally immovable and unchangeable, and internally undifferentiated and indivisible.[46] It was Anaxagoras who set the two spheres apart, the sphere of Being and the sphere of knowing, matter and mind, the material and sensible world from the noetic and knowable world. Like a powerful but aloof ruler, the Anaxagorean *Nous* being *ocmigēs* and *apathēs* (unmixed with anything else and impassable), ruled the Cosmos from afar.[47]

To simplify the process by which Plato attempted to correct and complete the Parmenidean conception of Cosmic Being, it may be said that in him we find each of the old dividends, Being and non-Being, subdivided again and made double. So we have two spheres of each. By mixing the two spheres (one of Being and one of non-Being), Plato was able to create the sphere of *Becoming* which is interposed between the sphere of pure Being or *Kosmos Noetos* (the noetic world of the Forms or Ideas, the Model or *Paradeigma*) and the sphere of non-Being (Nothingness). The sphere of *becoming*, the world of sense experience (*kosmos aisthetos*, the copy, the image or *eicon*), is the result of the mixing of certain images of the Platonic *eidē* (ideas or forms) with that part of non-Being which receives them (the receptacle). Thus the multiplicity of the perceptible entities, which populate the Cosmos,[48]

and the Cosmos itself came into being[49]

With this background in mind, we notice that Aristotle's conception of the Cosmos differs significantly from that of his predecessors, although he borrows from them and builds upon their foundations. The Aristotelian Cosmos is, in a sense, like the Parmenidean sphere, since it is one ungenerated, indestructible, and eternal; but it is movable and ultimately moved by the Unmoved Mover. It is a dynamically and organically unified whole whose parts are differentiated and partially interchangeable. This conception of the Cosmos avoids both the fragmentariness and randomness of the Leucippean/Democretian model, as well as the abstractness and artificiality of the Platonic/Pythagorean model. Its orderliness is not explained in terms of *tychē* (chance) and *anankē* (necessity), as in the former; nor in terms of *technē* (art), *anankē* (necessity), and *peithō* (persuasion), as in the latter; but in terms of *physis* (nature), *zōē* (life), and *noús* (intuitive and self-knowing mind), as if it were a living being.[50] Ontologically, the Aristotelian Cosmos is a vast collection of different kinds of *ousia* which are the most important of the *onta*. However, the process by which Aristotle moved dialectically from ontology to ousiology is rather complex and needs further elaboration.

For Aristotle the Greek word *to on* (that which is, that which is to be, being) does not have only one sense; that is, it is not a monosemantic word as it was for Parmenides, for it does not mean the One Being in its uncompromising opposition to non-Being. Rather it is, to use Aristotle's favourite phrase, a *pollachós legomenon*; for it has as many meanings and senses as there are kinds of things which have a categorical claim in Being. In fact, Aristotle specified as many senses of the word 'being' as there are items enumerated in the Aristotelian list of categories (*Kategoriai Tou Ontos*).[51] The tenfold division of beings, then, is simplified by reduction into a twofold division, *ousia* (substance) and *symbebekos* (accident, property, accidental property), under which are subsumed the kinds of beings which belong to any of the other nine categories: being qualified (quality), being quantified (quantity), being related (relation), being in position, being in possession, being in place, being in time, being active and being passive. The most important of the ten categories is the category of substance (*ousia*) on which all the other depend ontologically.[52]

However, for Aristotle, the word *ousia*, like the word *to on*, *legetai pollachós* (it is predicated in many ways, it has more than one sense). It may refer to the primary substances, the concrete individual entities, each of which is a composite of matter and form; or to secondary substances, that, is the species and the genera which are predicated of the primary substances essentially. But even within the limited sphere of the primary substances, there are many subdivisions. It was the search for the most primary among the primary substances that led

Aristotle to discover God and the linkage between God and man *qua* man, that is, the human species as represented by the enlightened philosophers. Thus the traditional Greek ontology, the theory of Being, the inquiry into the nature of Being, is transformed by Aristotle primarily into an ousiology, the theory of substance and the inquiry into the nature of substance.[53]

Strictly speaking, the Aristotelian Cosmos is populated by a great number of *prōtai ousiai*, i.e. primary substances which are classified in terms of the following pairs of contraries: perishable or imperishable, temporal or eternal, organic or non-organic, sensible or non-sensible, movable or immovable, mortal or immortal, and potential or actual.[54] The first terms of each pair apply to man, the less valuable; to God the second and more valuable one. God is conceived as a very special primary substance, unlike any other in that it is not composite, but simple; a living and active Intellect (*Nous*) which eternally energizes other divine Intellects, and occasionally even the intellect (*nous*) which is potentially in us, in every human soul.[55] The soul of man is a complex of powers, nutritive and reproductive (which is shared by all living beings), sensitive and kinetic (which is shared with other animals), logical (in the double sense of *logos*, as reason and as articulate speech) and noetic (which is shared with other divine substances).[56] By the stimulus of philosophy and the political *paideia*, offered by the well-organized *polis* to its citizens in accordance with right principles, the human potential can be actualized and some human beings can flourish optimally by becoming enlightened and God-like in so far as it is possible to the composite primary substance of man.[57] Thus, by slowly following the road of Aristotle's dialectic, we have reached the place where the 'end of man' and the human good are located, that is, the *polis* and the art of *politics*, 'the architectonic art' for Aristotle and the Aristotelian and Platonic philosophers of Greece.

ARISTOTLE'S *POLITICS*: PERFECTING THE POLITICAL ANIMAL

The *raison d'être* of the *polis* was the securing for all of its citizens the conditions of the good life according to their respective merit, so that the optimal actualization of human nature and freedom would be accomplished.[58] The citizens who would entertain any hopes of reaching such political peaks would have to have extraordinary natural endowments, good education, and luck.[59] For a citizen would have to be all of the following, in a complete course of human life from childhood to maturity and to old age: (1) naturally, well-endowed with powers of the body, soul, and mind; (2) educationally, well-trained in the excellences of character and intellect; (3) personally, well-ordered so that his soul rules over the body wisely, the rational part of the soul rules over the irrational part gently, and the noetic part

enlightens the rational part of the soul by providing the appropriate principles of living and acting virtuously; (4) domestically, well-equipped with wife, children, servants, parents and moderate property; (5) politically, so organized that he learns to rule and be ruled by his equals in turn; and (6) divinely, well-protected by the gods of the city. At the end, if all went well, he would have: (a) survived the just wars in defence of the *polis*; (b) seen his sons take his place in the hoplite ranks; (c) freed his domestic servants;[60] (d) seen his beloved wife ageing honourably and gracefully; and (e) dedicated himself to the service of God through *theoria*.[61]

According to Aristotle, the nature of the *polis*, in the Greek sense of the word, as a city which is also the centre of a state, is not artificial, conventional, and man-made as European political theorists have maintained, following Glaucon's 'social contract' theory.[62] It is as natural as the union of male and female, the growth of the family tree, and the formation of a small village which, with the passage of time, may branch out and give birth to other small villages; when these villages of common ancestry unite for better protection, exchange of goods, and self-sufficiency, and the good life of virtue, then a *polis* comes naturally into being and political life begins.[63] The defence and protection of the political community necessitates the division of labour among males, in an analogous way as the survival and preservation of the human species has naturally necessitated the roles of the father (male) and the mother (female).[64] Domestically then, the wife was to play the role of the queen of the house, while the husband *qua* citizen was to become the protector of the family as a whole and its property by the art of war and the art of politics, and in co-operation with other citizens of equal status who were themselves heads of families.[65] Since the arts of war and politics at that time were very demanding in terms of physical and mental powers and capabilities, the males who would not measure up to prevailing standards were naturally assigned the servile role of assisting in the domestic production.[66] The master-servant relation, as understood by Aristotle, is for the good of both parties. In this it differs from the husband-wife and parent-child relations which serve the exclusive interest of the protected parties. Enslavement by force is condemned by Aristotle. So is equality among unequals. But equality among equals (i.e. citizens of a given state), and natural servitude is approved.[67] A few additional comments on possible and reasonable contemporary objections regarding Aristotle's views on these sensitive issues may be in order here.

SOME REASONABLE OBJECTIONS TO ARISTOTLE'S *POLITICS*

First possible objection. Aristotle's views about natural servitude and 'slaves by nature' is bound to be offensive to contemporary ears as it was to some people at Aristotle's time who had declared that by nature all men are born free and that slavery, without exception, is by convention and against nature. Others justified slavery as an outcome of war in which the vanquished lose everything, including life and freedom.[68] By following his usual method of dialectic division of the question of slavery, in search of a mean between two extreme positions, Aristotle rejected the universal custom at that time of the enslavement of the prisoners of war and of man-hunting and selling for profit men who were born free and capable of taking care of themselves.[69] But Aristotle insists that, given the natural growth of the *polis* out of the village and the family; and given the necessity of the division of labour in any community working towards common goals, some men, whose natural endowment is not up to the demand of the martial and political arts, would have to depend on others for their survival and the survival of the free community. These men would be better off in serving the domestic needs of the warriors, citizens who would thus have more time to dedicate themselves to the service of the common good of the city-state.

Furthermore, in a serious sense, according to the Aristotelian understanding of human nature and political life, no man is totally free, independent, and self-sufficient unless he is a god or a wild beast.[70] Within the family, naturally, children are dependent on the parents who serve their offsprings' needs with dedication; the servant may obey the orders of his master or mistress but he may also control other servants, domestic animals, and tools; even the citizen-warrior, who as head of his family may play the role of ruling over his servants despotically, over his wife gentlemanly, and over his children royally, must learn to obey the officer in the battle line, the magistrates in the assembly, and the laws of the city—always. In other words, master and servant are relative terms within a community whose common good is to be served well by the proper and fair organization of its component parts.[71]

Second possible objection. Aristotle's preference for hierarchical social and political structures, which seem to be dominated by males in the roles of fathers, warriors, and civil office holders, is again bound to be objectionable today when the women's movement and the equal rights movement are in progress. These movements and their extreme claims are the inevitable outcome, Aristotle would say, of the modern tendency to make the individual, as opposed to the family, the foundational unit of the state and the political organization of contemporary states.[72] In Aristotle's organic conception of the *polis*, on the contrary, each citizen was supposed to represent not himself and his interests, as an individual citizen in the assembly of the citizens who were equal *qua* citizens; but the common interest of the extended family which ordinarily would include wife, children, elderly parents, servants, and other

relatives whose natural incapacities had relegated them to the status of natural servitude. Aristotle, of course, was well aware of the ambiguities and the controversies surrounding the demand for equality. Equality among equals in certain respects is one thing, but equality among unequal men is quite a different matter. Aristotle wisely found fault with both claims: the democratic claim that citizens must be equal in every respect, since they are equal in terms of political freedom; and the oligarchic claim that their share in political power should be unequal because their property holdings are unequal.[73] Aristotle thought, correctly in my view, that neither wealth nor high birth but *aretē* i.e., excellence, virtue, capability, should be the only criterion for distributing political offices and honours. The ability to serve the commonwealth well should count more than other considerations. Even if we agree that all citizens are born equal as human beings, their capacity for virtuous activity is differentiated as is their capacity to run the marathon or to solve mathematical equations. Aristotle was in favour of the rule of the best among the citizens which is the true meaning of aristocracy.[74]

Third possible objection. Aristotle's division of the Greeks and the Barbarians is also bound to be objectionable these days when the Barbarians, as the philosophical poet Constantine Cavafy has said, are hard to come by, or even to be found in the horizon, much to the despair of the decadent European man.[75] Several things should be clarified in this connection. To begin with, every group of human beings which managed to acquire historically recorded civilized life, like the Egyptians, the Chinese, the Hebrews, and the Indians, thought of themselves, and still think, as somehow superior to the outsiders. The Greeks were no exception to this politically incorrect rule. As Herodotus has reported, they probably learned this distinction, as so many other good and bad things, from the Egyptians.[76] In Aristotle's time, because of the political struggle of the Greeks against the Persians, the latter were invariably identified as the Barbarians in comparison to the Egyptians, whom they had enslaved, and whom the Greeks encouraged in their resistance to the Persian despotism. Also, to the Greek eyes, the Persian people and the other Asiatic peoples who did not resist the tyranny of the Persian rulers as vigorously as the Egyptians and the Greeks, appeared to be slaves by nature.[77]

Consequently, Aristotle thought that these people would be better off if they were to serve the well-educated citizens of an ideally organized Greek city-state where the hope for freedom was always present to domestic servants of any nationality who could prove that he/she was a slave by misfortune rather than by nature. To Aristotle, as to other Greek philosophers, the world as a whole would be perhaps a better place to live if it were to be ruled by the intelligent Greeks than by some brutish Barbarians, because of their natural possession of qualities

which would lead them sooner or later to moderation rather than to excess. But if he had to choose between the cultivated, intelligent and pleasure-and-profit-loving Asians on the one hand, and the wild and wine-and-war-loving northern Europeans on the other, the choice would not have been difficult for Aristotle or other Greek philosophers.[78]

Fourth possible objection. The fact that in the Aristotelian *polis*, even under ideal conditions, only a few persons will be able to reach the highest point of virtuous activity and intellectual development, will also be found objectionable these days, when politics seems to be more attuned to the feelings and the flattery of the masses than it was at that time. How are the many to be saved? Is there immortality for them too? Like the symposiast Platonic Socrates, Aristotle would say that immortality in some sense is open to all human beings as well as other living beings by the natural process of reproduction; but in some other sense it is a privilege of the gods, who enjoy eternally the life of *Nous*, and those very few mortals who have succeeded in making themselves god-like at the end of a life spent in virtuous activity and service to their political community and in search for the unclouded truth. Their good deeds and their honours will survive their death; and if the gods would welcome any mortals to their company, the perfected philosopher would have a better chance than any other mortal.[79]

But this is really besides the point. For Aristotle was politically interested in this life, not in the next, for the simple reason that in 'the next life' the meaning of 'life' would change radically and there would be no need of politics.[80] Even so, for Aristotle, the life of virtue, here and now, is worth living for the sake of that which is best in us and divine (*nous*). As the body is more valuable than the cloak, so is the soul more valuable than the body; and as the thinking and ruling part of the soul is more valuable than the irrational and obedient part, so is the noetic and theoretic life more valuable than the political life.[81] As many of us as possible should strive for this kind of life because it is the best for man not *qua* man, but *qua nous* which is the divine presence and potency in man's soul.[82]

CONCLUSION

This, then, was Aristotle's conception of the end for man, as a living, sensible, reasonable, communal, political, logical and noetic animal; and his place in the scheme of the Cosmos and his potential connection with God. In his heroic attempt to grasp the whole Cosmos in its multiplicity of beings including man, and God as the Being, and to provide a reasoned account (*logos*) of it all, and a theory (*theoria*), Aristotle succeeded in reaching beyond reason towards the realm of *nous*. He thus created one of the most complete philosophical systems

which the Hellenic culture produced. As our discussion has shown, his 'reasoned account' was based on sense experience (*empeiria*) and discursive reasoning, as well as on the intuitive and self-validating activity of the intellect (*nous*).

In this sense, Aristotle would seem to have been something more than a 'rationalist', simple, cold and dry. If so, I would like to think that I have done my peripatetic duty of defending Aristotle against those who would like to dump on his lap all the accumulated waste of the western world in the last two millennia. Neither Aristotle nor any other Socratic philosopher would have approved of what the western man, in his barbaric greed for gold and in his demonic drive for power has done to philosophy and to science which, for the Hellenic philosophers, were supposed to contemplate the Cosmos (not to change it); to understand and to live in harmony with nature (not to control and pollute it); to provide the conditions for the artistic flourishing and the philosophic freedom of the human spirit (not its degradation and enslavement to machinery).[83]

Hence the urgent need for the philosophically minded few to return to those genuine philosophical roots which are Hellenic, non-Christian, non-Islamic, non-monotheistic, and non-atheistic, in search for new inspiration for a new beginning of philosophic humanism in the new millennium. I am convinced that if we dig deep enough, we shall discover that these roots, whether they are Greek or European, Indian or Asian, Egyptian or African, or even Native American, somehow connect in the common ground and provide a common ideal of philosophic diversity, polytheistic tolerance and political civility as the pre-conditions for an authentic and humane life. Now more than ever before such noble ideal is needed for human sanity and for the common good of our global community.[84]

Notes and References

1. From Thales of Miletus, early sixth century BC, with whom the history of ancient Greek philosophy conventionally began, to the closing of the Platonic Academy by Justinian, the Emperor of the Christianized Roman Empire, in AD 529 when it officially ended.
2. D.R. Griffin and D.W. Sherburne (eds.), *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, The Free Press, New York, 1978, p. 39; also L. Bargeliotes, *The Revised Subjectivism of A.N. Whitehead*, The University Press, Athens, Greece, 1984; and my review of the book in *The Greek Philosophical Review*, Vol. III, No. 8, 1986, pp. 195–97 (in Greek).
3. In the light of these questions, the history of the western world can be picturized as a pendulum moving rhythmically from left to right and back again; or it can be read as a dialectical process between the two opposite poles provided by the perceived polarity between the Platonic and the Aristotelian modes of philosophizing, the ascending and the descending, as immortalized in a Renaissance painting by Raphael, 'The School of Athens'.

4. Aristotle would have been certainly surprised to hear of this strange coincidence between his common-sense and down-to-earth philosophy and the religious revelations which have dogmatically inspired blind faith in the souls of so many people in the West for so long. In Pletho's view, he would have rejected such a gross abuse of his philosophy which was intended for autonomous persons, for free spirits, and for minds without fear and superstition. See *La' De differentiis, 'de Plethon*, edited by B. Lagarde, *Byzantium*, 43, 1973, pp. 312–43.
5. For a recent appraisal of the changes in the concept of nature and the philosophy of nature, see Ivor Leclerc, *The Nature of Physical Existence*, The Humanities Press, New York, 1972, especially Parts III and IV.
6. Mukund Lath, 'Aristotle and the Roots of Western Rationality', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1992, pp. 55–68. I am grateful to Professor Daya Krishna who brought this article to my attention and asked me to comment on it.
7. Lath, ibid., p. 55.
8. This statement is definitely incorrect. Aristotle and Plato, as I have shown elsewhere, had great respect for non-Greek cultures, especially the civilization of Egypt which was admired for its political stability and its cultivation of the arts and the sciences. See my article 'Ancient Greek Philosophy and its Connection to Egypt', *Shepsis*, ,Vol. IV, 1994, pp. 14–75.
9. Lath, 'Aristotle and the Roots of Western Rationality', pp. 56–58. In Dr Lath's view, these tensions stem from Aristotle's conception of men as political and rational animals, that is, living beings which are endowed by nature, but in varying degrees, with the capacity of *logos* which means speech, reason, analogy, and proportion, (among others). This naturally leads to the development of the structured partnerships of the family, the village and the *polis* which is the merging of a few villages into a common city, the city-state, the small-scale state as opposed to modern national states and federated united states.
10. Aristotle's theory of human nature and its potential for virtuous activity, whether at the ethical and political or at the spiritual and noetic levels of excellence, has deeper ontological roots as will become clear from our discussion. For a very recent re-thinking of 'rationality', 'rational belief', and 'rational decision-making' along the lines of what may be called neo-Utilitarianism and neo-Pragmatism, see Robert Nozick, *The Nature of Rationality*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1993.
11. It seems to me that the ancient philosophers were serious about the seeking of the truth. In this respect, they differ from their western interpreters, whether they be mediaeval metaphysicians and theologians, modern sociologists and logicians, or contemporary deconstructionists and language analysts. These men seem to be more interested in word games or in serving the revealed religious dogmas and other non-philosophical interests, than in the free search for truth from pure Socratic love of wisdom and regardless of the personal pain which such search may entail. For the basic characteristic of the Socratic philosophy is, like Mohandas K. Gandhi's *satyāgraha*, that is, 'passionate adherence to truth'. P.T. Raju, *Structural Depths of Indian Thought*, SUNY Press, Albany, N.Y., 1985, p. 547. During his trial, we may recall, Socrates told the jury that he was prepared 'to die a hundred deaths' rather than give up the pursuit of truth and the philosophic way of life. Plato, *The Apology of Socrates*, 30b.
12. In Aristotle's hands especially, the method of dialectics became a powerful *organon* of inquiry into any conceivable area or aspect of nature and culture.
13. Even A. MacIntyre, who attempts to provide an open-minded approach to Aristotle's theory of virtue, seems to have missed this point. See his *After Virtue*, University Press, Notre Dame, 1981, Chapters 9, 11, 16, and 18; and my review

of the book in *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, 1983, pp. 132–34.

14. This was the true philosopher, a god-like man among common mortals. By his autonomous pursuit of truth and his ethically impeccable life, the true lover of wisdom was expected to be able to give up the brutish ways of self-indulgence in self-centred pleasures of the flesh and other banalities of ordinary human life, and to rise towards the stars and the gods. Thus, for the Pythagoreans, between the mortal men and the immortal gods, there was a third category of beings such as Pythagoras; for the Socratics, like Plato (*Symposium* 212a) and Aristotle (*NE* 1177b–1178a), the true philosopher is the only mortal worthy of the company and friendship of the gods; and for Epicureans, like Lucretius, he who would follow the precepts of Epicurus would live 'like a god among men', for 'man loses all semblance of mortality by living in the midst of immortal blessings'. *Greek and Roman Philosophy After Aristotle*, edited by J.L. Saunders, The Free Press, New York, 1966, p. 52.
15. The Platonic Socrates is different from 'the Socrates' of modern and contemporary western scholarship. See, for example, G. Vlastos' *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1991 and my review of the book in *Journal of NeoPlatonic Studies*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1992, pp. 133–41.
16. The Platonic *scala amoris*, as described by Socrates in the *Symposium* should not be confused with the *scala naturae* as used by A.O. Lovejoy in *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1936, 2nd edn., 1964, pp. 58–60; also my article 'Eros and Immortality in the *Symposium* of Plato', *Diotima*, Vol. 13, 1985, pp. 200–11.
17. Aristotle's conception of God is closer to the eastern than the western (i.e. the Christian, the Islamic, and ultimately the Jewish) conception. Consider, e.g., A.N. Whitehead's view on this matter: 'The eastern Asiatic concept of God is that of an impersonal order to which the world conforms. This order is the self-ordering of the world; it is not the world obeying an imposed rule'; in contrast to this, 'The Semitic concept of God as a definite personal individual entity. . . is the rationalization of the tribal gods of the earlier communal religion', *Religion In The Making*, New American Library, New York, 1926, pp. 66–67; also by the same author, *Process and Reality*, pp. 342ff.
18. In other words, it is the Hellenic way of expressing the same truth as that which is captured by the Indian formula *tat tuam asi*. Or, as Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan put it, 'The Upaniṣads speak to us of the way in which the individual self gets at the ultimate reality by an inward journey, an inner ascent. . . . The goal is identity with the Supreme', *Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1973, pp. 38 and 85.
19. Aristotle, then, would appear very different from what we find, for example, in G.E.L. Owen's *Logic, Science and Dialectic*, edited by M. Nussbaum, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1986.
20. Consider, for example, A.H. Armstrong's judicious judgement: 'This sort of monotheistic complacency is becoming more and more difficult to maintain as we become more and more vividly aware of other religious traditions than Judaio-Christian-Islamic, notably that of India. . . . The Greeks in the end found it perfectly possible to combine this with monotheism, to believe in God without ceasing to believe in the gods'. 'Some Advantages of Polytheism', *Dionysius*, 5, 1981, pp. 181–88.
21. Philosophical traditions and cultures, like the ancient Greek, the ancient Indian, the ancient Chinese, the ancient African, and the Native American, have much to teach the world of how to live in harmony with nature, with respect for each other, and with tolerance for beliefs and gods who are different from our own.
22. As transmitted to the West, especially by the commentaries of Porphyry and the translations of Boethius. See my article 'Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry', *Philosophia Antiqua*, Vol. 48, E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1988, pp. 164–81; and the extensive bibliography there.
23. In the sense in which, for example, Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza are said to be rationalists; or even in the sense in which Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke may be called 'rational' empiricists. Would Aristotle have felt at home in the company of either of these groups of northern Europeans? Not exactly in my view, because he was a philosopher of a more versatile, flexible, noetic, dialectic, and undogmatic character. Aristotle was a true Hellenic philosopher of the type which the Aegean and the Ionian Seas used to produce in abundance until their waters were polluted by the spread of the 'decadent' spirit of perverted Judaism, as Nietzsche characterized Christianity. See *Twilight of the Idols and The AntiChrist*, translated by R.J.Hollingdale, Penguin Books, New York, 1985, pp. 55ff; also A. Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985; and my review of the book in *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. XL, No. 3, 1987, pp. 592–94.
24. According to Aristotle: 'Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience, and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. . . . A sentence (*logos*) is a significant portion of speech, some parts of which have an independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance, though not as an expression of any positive judgement'. *De Interpretatione* 16a–b.
25. He was also a lover of *nous*, the intuitive mind, as we will see below. In this light, Kant's judgement is incorrect: 'In *respect to the origin* of the modes of "knowledge through pure reason" the question is as to whether they are derived from experience, or whether in independence of experience they have their origin in reason. Arsitotle may be regarded as the chief of the empiricists, and Plato as the chief of the nouologists'. *The Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by N.K. Smith, St Martin's Press, New York, 1965, p. 667.
26. It must be credited to the rhetorical skill and ingenuity of Christian and Muslim theologians, who managed to persuade the mediaeval and the modern world that they had found in Aristotle's philosophy some support for their respective revealed *dogmata*.
27. 'All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others, the sense of sight with not only a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing to everything else'. This is the opening statement of the first book of Aristotle's first philosophy which, in the West, is known as *Metaphysics*, 980a, pp. 22–24 (the translation is that of W.D. Ross). After this statement, Aristotle proceeds to show how the human understanding moves from sense experience to the reasoned accounts of the arts and sciences, to the noetic grasp of first principles and causes, to the ultimate and intuitive knowledge of God as *Nous* and of the human self as *nous*. This, in a nut-shell, is the core of my argument.
28. 'A syllogism is a discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity for their being so. I mean by the last phrase that they produce the consequence, and by this, that no further term is required from without in order to make the consequence necessary', *Prior Analytics*, 24b, 18–22 (A.J. Jenkinson's translation); but compare this to the conclusion of the *Posterior Analytics* (100b, 5–13): 'Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premises by induction; for the method by which even sense-perception implants the universal is inductive. Now of the thinking

states by which we grasp truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit error—opinion, for instance, and calculation, whereas scientific knowledge and intuition (*nous*) are always true; further, no other kind of thought except intuition (*nous*) is more accurate than scientific knowledge whereas primary premises are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge is discursive. From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premises, and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premises—a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge. . . . '

29. 'The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not collectively fail, but everyone says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed'. *Metaphysics*, 993a, 30b, 6. Compare this statement to the Indian wisdom as expressed in a Jaina saying: 'Perfect truth is like an ocean: it is the *jīva's* omniscience; and all philosophical views are like rivers'. Quoted by K. Satchidananda Murty, *Philosophy in India: Traditions, Teaching and Research*, Motilal Banarsidass and ICPR, Delhi, 1991, p. 190. It is enlightening indeed to contrast these sensible eastern views on truth to the statements made by the most un-dogmatic representative of western philosophy—Kant: 'In this inquiry I have made completeness my chief aim, and I venture to assert that there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved. . . . Metaphysics, on the view which we are adopting, is the only one of all the sciences which dares to promise that through a small but concentrated effort it will attain, and this in a short time, such completion as will leave no task to our successors save that of adapting it in a *didactic* manner according to their preferences without their being able to add anything whatsoever to its content. For it is nothing but the inventory of all our possessions through pure reason, systematically arranged. In this field nothing can escape us.' Thus spoke the author of *The Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 31. But a few years later G.W.F. Hegel was to prove Kant wrong in this arrogant claim and beat him sorely in this especially German word-game which they call 'metaphysics'. For as G. Lightheim put it, in his introduction to Hegel's *The Phenomenology of the Mind [or Spirit]*, Harper Colophon Books, New York, 1967, p. xxi: 'Kant's rather bleak rationalism in turn provoked a Romantic reaction—of this Hegel's *Phenomenology* may be regarded as an example, in so far as its author did not disdain the use of metaphor for purposes other than illustration'. As expected, *The Phenomenology* ends appropriately at 'the Golgotha of the Absolute Spirit' (p. 808), and the 'imaginative idea' (*vorstellung*) that: 'The Divine Being is reconciled with its existence through an event—the event of God's emptying Himself of His Divine Being through His factual Incarnation and His Death' (p. 780). So much about 'modesty' and 'truth', as expressed in German 'Rationalism' and 'Idealism' representing the best of 'western Philosophy'. See also G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, edited by P.C. Hodgson, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1988, p. 489; Part III, 'The Consummate Religion', is very revealing.

30. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1094b, 13–28 (H. Rackham's translation, in The LOEB Classical Library). Compare this to Kant's endeavour to make metaphysics a 'science' of the same precision and exactness as Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics, by the critical method of 'pure reason' applied with 'German thoroughness' to 'the subject' as seen in the light of the 'Kantian Revolution', which again was patterned after the 'Copernican Revolution'. See *The Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by N.K.Smith, St Martin's Press, New York, 1965, pp. 13–25. At the end, however, Kant confesses humbly on page 29: 'I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith', (that is, faith in the existence of God, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul, just as E.Gilson would have expected!) His *Critique* ends with his declaration of faith in the threefold dogma of his 'moral theology' which cannot be demonstrated but, nevertheless, is 'postulated' as the demand of the Supreme Will: 'Thus without a God and without a world invisible to us now but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of approval and admiration, but not springs of purpose and action' (p. 640). In other words, Kant, the philosopher of the Protestant West wants: 'To make him (Christian and Western man) *fear* the existence of a God and a future life' (p. 651). How alien is all this to the Greek philosophers, to 'the wonderful Greek' as Kant calls them!

31. Absent from Aristotle's thinking and writing is the arrogance, the dogmatism and the obfuscation which characterizes what has been coming out of the western world, especially out of Northern Europe in the last few centuries under the homonymous term 'philosophy'. Also see notes 11, 29, and 30 as stated above. On this issue I will have more to say in my forthcoming article 'Ancient Hellenic Philosophy: Between East and West', to be published in the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*.

32. The proverbial *Amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas* seems to capture this trait of Aristotle's philosophical mind, which is very Socratic, Platonic and Hellenic. It is also found in Indian thought and is perhaps best expressed by Gandhi's 'passionate adherence to truth' (*satyāgraha*), the lived truth of the philosophical life.

33. The Aristotelian perfected philosopher, as described in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book X) and *Politics* (Books VII–VIII), fits the Platonic pattern as developed in the *Republic* (Books II–VII). As a human being, that is, as a composite entity of body, soul, and mind, he must have been naturally well-endowed and culturally well-prepared by the appropriate *päideia*, which he would have received as a citizen of the Greek *polis*, through gymnastics, music and the liberal arts. The more an actual city-state would approximate the ideal *polis* as envisioned by Plato and Aristotle, the greater the hope would be for the perfection of the citizens of that city.

34. I have in mind existentialist philosophers and writers like, for example, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and Martin Heidegger. I use 'theory' here in the original sense of the Greek words *theōria* (noun) and *theōrein* (verb), that is, to look and see, to have a view of something, to contemplate.

35. As an Indian philosopher put it ,'The real which is at the heart of the universe is reflected in the infinite depths of the self'. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles Moore (eds.), *A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1973, p. 38. It would seem that the Aristotelian relation between *Nous* and *nous* is analogous to that between *Brahman* and *ātman* of which the Upaniṣads speak. On this relation, and the corresponding double intuitive knowledge (*vidyā*) of self and the Self, the Vedānta system of thought is based. For more information on this see, K. Satchidananda Murty, *Philosophy in India*, pp. 3–7. Professor Murty renders *vidyā* as 'science'. But its meaning may be something more than this. A better translation would be 'intuitive knowledge' or simply 'intuition' to capture the meaning of 'seeing' which is at the root of this beautiful Indian word *vidyā* as it is in the beautiful Greek words *idea* and *eidos*.

The same ancient Greek word, *nous*, has also been used for something di-

vine in us by the Greek poets from Homer to Nikos Kazantzakis whose magnificent *Odyssey: A Modern Sequel*, a poem of 33,333 lines, ends with the death of Odysseus and the liberation of the *nous* in him as follows:

'Then flesh dissolved, glances congealed, the heart's pulse stopped and the great mind (*nous*) leapt to the peak of its holy freedom, fluttered with empty wings, then upright through the air soared high and freed itself from its last cage, its freedom. . . .'. Book XXIV, lines 1390–1394, Kimon Friar's translation, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1958.

36. The importance of music for the development of Greek philosophy, especially in its Pythagorean, Socratic, Platonic, Aristotelian, and Neo-Platonic lines, cannot be overestimated. Greek music was always connected to mathematics and the theories of number (*arithmos*) and proportion (*logos*). A comparative study which would consider Greek music, arithmetic, and philosophy, and compare it to possible parallel developments of Indian music, mathematics, and the various philosophical systems, would be very interesting and welcome. I would not be able to do it here (or elsewhere for that matter); but I would say that Dr Lath's comments (p. 60), regarding Aristotle's theory of music and harmony and its political implications seem to me rather superficial and very inadequate.
37. It implies, the first principles of primary being, of indubitable knowing, and of virtuous living. According to my thesis, this third road, the road of dialectic, which would culminate in a noetic vision of the whole Cosmos, including God and man and the end of man *qua* citizen, was Aristotle's long road to enlightenment.
38. The inquiry, of course, is what in the West is known as *Metaphysics* 981b 25–982a 6; but for Aristotle it was simply First Philosophy, since it dealt with the first principles and causes of *to on* (being, that which is to be) which is *pollachōs legomenon* (that is, it has many senses or meanings and is categorically predicated in many different ways), and whose central meaning is focused on what Aristotle called primary substance (*protē ousia*).
39. By applying his dialectical method and his theory of the *kategoriai* (categories) Aristotle succeeded in transforming the traditional inquiry of being (ontology) into an inquiry of substance (ousiology), since *ousia* is the most important of the categories of being and of the senses in which 'being' is predicated to different kinds of entities. On this see my book *Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry* in the series *Philosophia Antiqua*, Vol. 49, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1988, and the extensive bibliography in the same volume, pp. 188–204.
40. *Metaphysics*, 1069a, 18–34; and 1072b, 14–29. That Aristotle's conception of God had no part of the despotic, dogmatic, moody, mean, and jealous character of Jehovah, the Jewish conception of God, which has influenced both Christianity and Islam, is evident also from the following remarks: 'That it is not a science of production is clear even from the history of the earliest philosophers. For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize. . . . Evidently then, we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage; but as the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another's, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its own sake. Hence also the possession of it might be justly regarded as beyond human power; for in many ways human nature is in bondage, so that according to Simonides "God alone can have this privilege", and it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him. If, then, there is something in what the poets say, and jealousy is natural to the divine power, it would probably occur in this case above all, and all who excelled in this knowledge would be unfortunate. But the divine power cannot be jealous (nay, according to the proverb, "bards tell many a lie"), nor should any other science be thought more honourable than one of this sort. . . . All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better'. (Ibid., 982b 11–983 12).

41. This is the opening statement of the *De Anima* 402a 1–8. The other passages are from Books II and III. (This translation by J.A. Smith is rather unfair to the Aristotelian text and style, but it is considered a standard translation in the West).
42. Ibid., 430a 14–25. In a parenthesis which I omitted, Aristotle explains why the freed mind, after its separation from the body by death will have no memory of its earthly adventures: 'we do not, however, remember its former activity because, while mind in this sense is impassible, mind as passive is destructible'.
43. This is how the *Nicomachean Ethics* opens in W.D. Ross' English translation. In Greek it reads as follows:
Πασα τεχνη και πασα μεθοδος, ομοιως δε πραξις τε και προαιρεσις, αγαθομ τινος εφιεσθαι δοκει. διο καλως απεφηναντο ταγαθον ον παντ ǝ εφιεται. διαφορα δε τις φαινεται των τελων . . . . . 1094a 1-4.
44. *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a 13–18; 1177b 29–1178a 8.
45. I have discussed some aspects of this problem in a paper entitled 'Even Friends Cannot Have All Things in Common: Aristotle's Critique of Plato's *Republic*', which was presented to the International Conference on Aristotle's Political Philosophy, August 22–29, 1994, Greece, and will be published in the proceedings of the Conference.
46. One revision of this scheme was made at the school of Leucippus and Democritus who split the sphere of the Parmenidean Being into a multiplicity of biengs, *atoma* (i.e., the invisible, indivisible, perpetually in motion particles of matter) which move randomly in the *kenon* (void, empty space), collide and give birth to every-thing in the Cosmos. Thus not only the Absolute Oneness of the Parmenidean Being has been replaced by the multiplicity and solidity of atoms, but also the Parmenidean non-Being has been compromised by becoming part of the sphere of Being as the void. While Parmenides' Being is of the same stuff as *Nous*, in Democritus' world, the minds and souls of human beings as well as those of gods are made basically of the same atomic matter (*hylē*).
47. Thus the Parmenidean identification of ειναι (to be, Being) and νοειν (to think, Thought), was temporarily abandoned by Anaxagoras, but it reappeared in Plato who, by incorporating Pythagorean insights into his ontology was able to introduce the most elaborate revision of Parmenides which prepared the way for Aristotle's move from ontology to ousiology and his conception of God as both *Nous* and *ousia*.
48. Actually they are spacialized, temporized, magnified, dimensionalized, quantified, qualified, relativized and, in one word, materialized copies of the Platonic forms.
49. According to Timaeus' story, the Cosmos is conceived as the only offspring of the unique metaphorical couple: the active, creative, and begetting principle, the Demiurge (*Nous*, Mind, Father) and the passive, receiving, nurturing principle, the Receptacle (*Hyle*, Matter, Mother). As part of the Platonic Cosmos, human beings are also double, composed of body and soul, matter and form, the hylic and the noetic parts, the maternal and the paternal principles in each, with a double life and destiny after death.
50. But it is not alive in the sense in which the Platonic world of becoming was alive as endowed with a soul. See on this the 'likely story' of the making of the World as told by Timaeus in the *Timaeus*.
51. See my article, 'The Plotinian Reduction of Aristotle's *Categories*', *Ancient Philosophy*, 7, 1988, pp. 147–62.

52. *Categories*, 2a, pp. 35–36; where we read, in H. Apostle's translation: 'Everything except primary substances is either said of a subject which is a primary substance or is present in a substance which is a primary substance (*ousia*)'.
53. Aristotle's *Metaphysics* or *First Philosophy* is devoted to this ontological and ousiological inquiry and its implications. The question *Ti To On* is changed into the question of *Tis He Ousia*: 'And indeed the inquiry perplexity concerning what being is, in early times and now and always, is just this: What is a substance?' (1028b, pp. 4–6).
54. The central books of *Metaphysics* seek to explicate these contrasts in search for the most special kind of *Ousia*, God. On this see Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*. The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, Canada, 1963; and compare it with Werner Marx, *The Meaning of Aristotle's Ontology*, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1954.
55. See cases A and B, above.
56. See cases B and C, above.
57. For due to its composition, human nature is servile and unfree in many ways. Also see cases C and A, above.
58. 'When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society (family and village) are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end'. *Politics*, 1252b, pp. 27–32.
59. On luck in Aristotle's ethical theory see, M. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1968; and my review of the book in *Skepsis*, I, 1990, pp. 210–16.
60. If they happened to be of a servile nature, which was the only type of slavery or servitude to be approved by Aristotle; if they had learned through their service to a good man how to take care of themselves as well as of others who were of a servile nature; and if they so wished to be freed.
61. This would be a difficult task to accomplish but it would not be impossible with the help of the appropriate political *paideia* as proposed in the last two books of the *Politics*. Those who fail to see the philosopher as a citizen growing in a political environment with its many demands, are bound to argue about the compatibility of the theoretic and the practical life and their contribution to happiness. See, for example, S. Broadie, *Ethics With Aristotle*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, pp. 366–438; J. Cooper, 'Contemplation and Happiness: A Reconsideration', *Synthese*, 72, 1987, pp. 187–216. By the same author, *Reason and Human Good in Aristotle*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975; and D. Keyt, 'Intellectualism in Aristotle', *Paideia*, 1978, pp. 138–57.
62. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau probably found in Plato's *Republic* (the opening of Book II), the beginning of the theory of 'social contract' which they helped popularize in the West. Needless to say, neither the Platonic Socrates nor Aristotle could take seriously Glaucon's hypothesis that there ever was such a political contract. Their insight into human nature and the nature of *polis* helped them avoid the blunders of western 'philosophers' regarding this matter.
63. 'Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity. . . . That man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech, *logos*.' *Politics*, 1253a, pp. 1–10.
64. In view of the difficulties of giving birth, infant mortality, and child rearing at that time, it is not surprising that the female contribution to the state was exhausted in fulfilling the fundamental function of producing new citizens for the *polis*. If, instead of such primary need, the ancient city-states had a problem of over-population, and given his common-sense and open mind, Aristotle would have probably assigned additional political roles to the female portion of the population of the city.

65. Aristotle would of course, have approved of Manu's wise requirement that: 'Women must be honoured and adorned by their fathers, brothers, husbands, and brothers-in-law who desire (their own) welfare' (*Manusmriti*, III, 55).
66. As Radhakrishnan put it: 'Each one has to perform the function for which his nature best suits him'. *Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy*, p. 172. Aristotle and the Platonic Socrates of the *Republic* would have agreed with this statement, but for them, unlike Manu, the capacities of individual men are not to be determined by caste, but by nature and *paideia*.
67. These are the men to whom Aristotle (innocently it seems, though shockingly to us) refers as 'natural slaves'. This has become the target of severe criticism including that of Dr Lath. In this connection, I would like to suggest that Aristotle's 'servant by nature' corresponds to the *śudra*, although he did not believe in a caste system like that of Manu where we read: 'He (a *śudra*) was created by the Self-existent to be the slave of a brahmin', 'A *śudra*, though emancipated by his master is not released from servitude; since that is innate in him, who can set him free from it'? *The Laws of Manu* 413 and 414, as quoted by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, *Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy*, p. 189.
68. *Politics*, 1254a–1255a.
69. 'But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature? There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but also expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule. . . . But those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of convention—the law by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator who brought forward an unconstitutional measure: they detest the notion that, because one man has the power of doing violence and is superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference of opinion. . . . Hence, where the relation of master and slave between them is natural they are friends and have a common interest, but where it rests merely on law and force the reverse is true'. Ibid., 1254a 17–1255b, p. 15.
70. Ibid., 1253a pp. 28–29.
71. Aristotle predicted that if the tools could do the necessary work by themselves, then the masters would not need the service of their servants, but the servants (if they are by nature servile) would still need the protection and help of their masters to cope with the demands of life.
72. States which are founded on such principles tend to be not only appealing to democratic feelings, but also inherently anarchic and unstable.
73. Consider for example, 'All are agreed that justice in distributions must be based on desert of some sort, although they do not all mean the same sort of desert; democrats make the criterion free birth; those of oligarchical sympathies wealth, or in other cases birth; upholders of aristocracy make it virtue', *Nicomachean Ethics* 1131a, pp. 25–30.
74. In Greek it means literally the rule of the best, both morally and intellectually.
75. See the exquisite poem, 'Expecting the Barbarians', in *C. Cavafy: The Collected*

Poems, translated by Rae Dalven, Hardcourt, New York, 1976:

'What are we waiting for, assembled in the public square? The barbarians are to arrive today . . .

Why this sudden unrest and confusion? (How solemn their faces have become).

Because night is here but the Barbarians have not come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, and said that there are no longer any Barbarians.

And now what should become of us without any Barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution'.

76. See my paper, 'Ancient Hellenic Philosophy and the African Connection', *Skepsis*, Vol. IV, 1994, pp. 14–75.
77. 'The Barbarians are of a more servile nature than the Hellenes', *Politics*, 1285a, p. 20, (my translation). This clearly means that both the Greeks and the Barbarians, as human beings, are by nature un-free in many ways, as he has stated explicitly elsewhere; see *Metaphysics*, 982b, p. 29.
78. 'Those who live in a cold climate and in Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence, skill; and therefore they retain comparative freedom, but have no political organization, and are incapable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are always in a state of subjection and slavery. But the Hellenic race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and also intelligent. Hence it continues free, and is best-governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the world. There are also similar differences in the different tribes of Hellas; for some of them are of one-sided nature, and are intelligent or courageous only, while in others there is a happy combination of both qualities'. *Politics*, 1327b, pp. 23–36. I discuss this Greek predicament in 'Ancient Hellenic Philosophy: Between East and West', in the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* (forthcoming).
79. 'Hence if, as men say, surpassing virtue changes men into gods, the disposition opposed to bestiality will clearly be some quality more than human', *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1145a, pp. 23–25. For more about these possibilities of immortality, see my article, 'Eros and Immortality in Plato's *Symposium*', *Diotima*, XIII, 1985, pp. 200–11.
80. See case C, above. Aristotle does not speak of the immortality of the human soul as a whole, or even of the intellect as a whole. The 'passive intellect' is perishable, and only 'active intellect' is immortal or more accurately, eternal. Wisely though, he refrains from speculating about these eschatological issues in any detail.
81. 'But again it (practical wisdom) is not *supreme* over philosophic wisdom, i.e., over the superior part in us, any more than the art of medicine is over health'; *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1145a, pp. 7–8.
82. See case C.
83. An echo of this Hellenic and Aristotelian understanding of the close relation between philosophy and freedom is to be found in the following statement: 'Philosophy is a means of education through and for freedom'. *The Teaching of Philosophy*, UNESCO, Paris, 1952, p. 189; the same spirit echoes in the conception of 'philosophy as seeking of *truth* and *freedom*. . . .' The Experts' Panel in Philosophy Report of 1978, as quoted by K.S. Murty, *Philosophy in India*, p. 167.
84. The tragic case of Bosnia may be just the prelude of a much larger scale tragedy to unfold in the former USSR where Islam and Christianity seem destined to collide again. I leave out Judaism, not in order to avoid the charge of anti-Semitism, which is made so easily and so frequently these days in the West that some of my Jewish friends are afraid that this false prophesy will become self-fulfilling; but because I believe that there is a basic difference between the benign Hebraic monotheism and the Christian and Islamic versions of fanatic, missionary, militant, and malignant monotheism. It is regrettable that militant Zionism and militant Hinduism tend to imitate fanatic Christianity and militant Islam. May the gods pity men for their abysmal folly, (*mōria , avidyā*)!

The Significance of Professor Matilal's *Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism* in His Studies of Indian Philosophy

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In Professor Bimal Krishna Matilal's death (when only in his mid-fifties), contemporary Indian philosophical studies have undoubtedly lost their leading writer, and the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* a founder-editor whose philosophical personality shaped its present special standings as the leading journal in the field to which it is dedicated. Those who have followed his work over two and a half decades, and are saddened by their loss, can draw some comfort from the impressively large corpus of published writing he has left behind (while hoping that his unpublished work will before long also become available). In fact the quantum of his already published work is not only impressively large but also varied enough to make it possible to offer a statement of his place in the field of Indian philosophical studies and the point of view which characterized his work in it.

While Matilal undoubtedly broke new ground, more visibly perhaps in the study of Indian logic than elsewhere, even at his most innovative he hardly ever departed from what has undoubtedly been the mainstream of work in the field of Indian philosophy in this century. He shared with almost every other writer in the area of Indian philosophy the assumption that the object of their philosophical studies was similarly, if not equally, also of a philosophical nature. That this has in fact been the assumption will seem an innocent exaggeration once we see that aesthetics and philosophy of science have not received much attention from writers on Indian philosophy, so that what is mainly at issue here is the status of religion. By describing the category of mysticism which was the subject of his inaugural lecture 'The Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism'[1] of the variety described by him as 'the bed-rock of Eastern mysticism'[2] as 'monistic metaphysics',[3] Matilal committed himself to this assumption, since in terming it as metaphysics one needs must take it to belong to the domain of philosophy.

But Matilal can hardly be blamed for making an assumption which has also been made by others. Parallel to Kuhn's view that scientific

work is governed by historically dominant paradigms, we might say that this assumption is constitutive of the operative paradigm in the field of the history of Indian philosophy. Generally such an assumption is bound to give rise to a good deal of looseness in how philosophy is conceived, the opposite was true in Matilal's case. At least what he takes to be of importance in Indian philosophy is treated by him as professional philosophy treats its subject-matter in the West—as constituting a purely intellectual discipline and like mathematics and physics falling solely in the domain of the intellect. Hitherto, work on Indian philosophy on the whole lacked the intellectual firmness which has been increasingly evident in recent decades and Matilal has provided us with perhaps the most striking and consistent example of the kind of professionalization of philosophy to be found in the West that has come increasingly to have its home in the university. We might say that as this phenomenon reaches a high-water mark, it seems natural to associate his name with it more than with that of any other writer.

While this sharpening of focus is in itself to be welcomed, it is increasingly accompanied by a regrettable belief that philosophy has an unvarying subject-matter whose content is determined independently of the context in which it is pursued (which is common to both the East and the West), so that it is but a natural expectation that there is a continuing dialogue between them as much in the domain of philosophy as in some other vaguely identified field like religion. In practice this translates itself into a plea that philosophers in the West should take a real interest in Indian philosophy, and show much more than the benevolent curiosity that is already in evidence, since western philosophy in one conglomerate or another already constitutes the major part of philosophy courses in the Third World. Even if we allow that a plea of this nature can have some validity in the absence of a denial on the part of Indian philosophers of a strong internal connection between the activity of philosophy and the religious and spiritual concerns which have always existed alongside it in the Indian context, it can hardly be denied that such a plea can carry more than a vague message only if an assumption of this kind is actually made with some clarity of conviction. I myself do not think that such an assumption can be harmlessly made; at least its full significance is in need of scrutiny. But Matilal does not seem to have thought so.

It is not that nothing can be gained by what undoubtedly seems to be a very unnatural dissociation. But what can be gained in this way is quite minor compared to the importance of a unique opportunity which, as I shall argue, is once again being missed just when circumstances have become distinctly more propitious. For now when Indian philosophy is thought to have been brought into recognizable proximity with western philosophy, the busy western philosopher is entitled to say, or we might say on his behalf, 'Have I not enough already on my

plate? Why should I divide my attention in the way proposed?' He can hardly refuse the claims the history of his own tradition makes on his time; why should he now have to attend to the claims of an historical tradition very different from his own? Given the long history of western philosophy as a field of intellectual enquiry and debate how can the Indian philosopher hope for more than encouragement to engage in a satellite activity or perhaps to be made an object of benevolent curiosity? Thus while the scene seems to have changed, the relation between the two traditions remains much as it was before. Since one of the two has ceased to be creative it is the idiom and categories of the one which is still going strong which sets the pattern for both of them or at least determines a shared domain of possibilities. Clearly Matilal did not acquiesce to so derivative a place for what is by now the criterion of quantum of activity, a flourishing field, even though the bulk of his work consists in drawing parallels and showing apparent similarities which seldom come to life. (Thus by his own admission the purely philosophical outcome of his own work in an extensive area of what he terms 'global philosophy' is recorded by him only 'impressionistically').[4] Nevertheless by treating philosophy as an activity serving, except contingently, no other ends than the claims of its own distinct subject-matter, he painted himself into a corner. Indian philosophy still remains in a subsidiary position, left alone to do its own work only because the important action takes place elsewhere. But speaking a priori things ought not to be quite so bad. The picture is gloomy, perhaps because the necessary desideratum is never set forth in clear terms. To be justified in claiming the attention of those who are now in the mainstream of modern-day philosophy, more is needed than impressionistically made comparisons; the less prominent tradition needs to show its capacity to extend to those in the other tradition when it invites their attention. And there is no convincing way of doing so except by actually sometimes engaging the latter's interest in the way good philosophy is able to.

This can happen in two ways, one radical and the other moderate. Taking the former, we might describe philosophy as a subject whose nature can, like literature or art vary from one culture or civilization to another; just as students of English literature find their understanding of some of the deeper questions of life altered while seriously studying Greek tragedy. To find oneself making a perspectival change in this way is to be enriched in one's conception of an activity without being a novice in it. The kernel of such success lies in a willingness to engage in an area which itself is not included in the domain of philosophy. But Matilal seems to have thought that the philosopher's important work has to be done in the domain of philosophy's own problems.

The last claim is strictly speaking an exaggeration and in need of some explication. I shall come back to it shortly.

Despite my misgivings about the possibilities of fruitful exchange on the basis of a shared conception of philosophy as a purely intellectual undertaking following a logically autonomous path, a degree of optimism which would allow someone in the Indian tradition to look for lines of thought which are of intrinsic importance and also relatively unexplored in the other, cannot be altogether denied justification. For the most part I think this is how Matilal saw the situation in which he did his work. It does not seem to me that he achieved any substantial success in this regard and this opinion will not seem unfair or unduly stern if we bear in mind the following distinction. A set of ideas in a particular field can have importance in virtue of its relation to the rest of what is to be found there, but on its own its significance remains in extreme doubt. Thus the ideas in Navya-Nyāya explored by him as his most important single interest, are of importance to someone with an overall interest in Indian logic. But to the plain logician their importance remains extremely doubtful. So there are lessons to be learned by paying closer attention to the question of how topics of this nature are best investigated.

Such a conclusion can no doubt easily be thought to be sweeping, and given the range of Matilal's writing one would need a book to fully justify it. Nevertheless, the likelihood of the kind of failure I am describing becomes strong when we examine closely one or two of the examples of such work, especially when it is spread over a good deal of space. Thus his long account of the controversy in the field of perception (*pratyakṣa)* between the Buddhists and the Nyāya can hold one's interest if one has an independent interest in it. Similar reflections can be made on Matilal's work on Navya-Nyāya. The student of Indian philosophy naturally aims to understand in modern terms what went on in the sophisticated world of the new logic of Gaṅgeśa and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. And we must also mention the Mīmāṃsā's philosophy of language. In each such case his wish to understand a different subject is to be respected.

A further consideration can be adduced in my defence by appealing to a distinction which Matilal himself makes, between the history of ideas and the history of philosophy. The latter appellation is deserved only when what is so designated rises to become worthwhile philosophy. His longish article 'The Context Principle and Some Indian Controversies Over Meaning' (*Mind*, 1988), authored jointly with P.K. Sen provides a good elaboration of this distinction. The authors of this paper expressed the hope that their work would be 'philosophically fruitful' (apart from its value as a useful exposition). But the parallels they make and the differences they report are at best stimulations to interest and can hardly be taken to be fruitful philosophy in themselves.

What they do not mention as the most obvious obstacle to such an outcome is almost a total absence of translation of the chief works in this field; in fact for the most part even the Sanskrit texts are accessible only to the specialist in the field. Surely it would be far better to have made a beginning with publishing annotated translations of the work of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara so that when they are established as important texts their importance as sources of fruitful philosophy is no longer in need of proof. Only by study of texts is the importance of the French adage *La verité reste dans les nuances* shown and the dangers of 'vulgarization' made evident.

The distinction between what is fruitful in the latter way and what is useful without qualifying as fruitful philosophy which concerns us here is in need of some emphasis, partly to ensure that I do not seem to be doing Matilal any injustice. If we assume that fruitful philosophy may come to be done sooner or later in an area of enquiry then work done before them could have its utility to the philosopher who accomplishes such results. I think a good deal of Matilal's work is undoubtedly useful in this sense, while a lot, perhaps most of the writing on Indian philosophy in European languages, does not deserve to be so described.

I need hardly say that in offering an appraisal of Matilal's work I am concerned mainly with its success or failure in achieving his declared aim of doing history of philosophy rather than history of ideas by attaining the level of fruitful philosophy. We may therefore now ask, what specifically did he aim at in having such a goal? I shall begin my answer to this question by saying that he saw such work to be a contribution to the study of what he more than once calls 'global philosophy' (as for instance in *Perception*, p. 1). Now we do not speak of global literature or art because we do not believe literature and art have always a common core whatever their kind, and also we do not speak of global science presumably because our interest in the history of science is of a very different kind from our interest in science *per se*, and earlier manifestations of this activity are superseded by those that follow.

What then in philosophy is 'global'? It can hardly be doubted that for Matilal there is a central part which is worthy of such a description, not being a matter of history or geographical locus, which he in common with mainstream Anglo-Saxon philosophy calls 'analytical'. Whatever the motivation from which an interest in its topics may originate, the topics themselves are in his view not difficult to identify. So we find him writing in the introductory chapter of *Perception* that 'while the basic philosophical motivation of the ancients might have been very different from that of present day philosophers several important questions and puzzles discussed in the classical Indian tradition do seem to coincide to a considerable extent with those discussed today'.[5] This is shortly followed by his claiming to be justified in 'leaning over

backwards' in his writings as alleged by a reviewer, 'to show the analytic character of Indian philosophy'.[6] The shared common area between the two traditions is seen by him to be 'analytical' and stands in contrast to the non-global part of 'soft-heartedness', with its 'tender nature'.[7] This second constituent is adjudged by him as 'mystical and non-argumentative'and can be presumed to be quite secondary in philosophical importance.

Now although Matilal is not altogether happy with such a contrast he offers no alternative description which he sees to be more appropriate, and in effect comes close to saying that the analytical part alone is worthy of a philosopher's interest. I think that this contrast is mistaken and ought to be replaced, when we are thinking of Indian philosophy, by the distinction between philosophy and the religious purpose which presides over it. Much more than in western philosophy it is this distinction that ought to be treated as central. The extreme difficulty of drawing this distinction in the case of Indian philosophy is not a fault but corresponds to the crucial importance of making it in the right way. If this distinction has anything like the importance I want to attribute to it, then it would seem that philosophy is not something that needs to stand aloof from or be in a forced opposition to what is widely thought to be distinctive of Indian thought, and when this seems to happen it may be escapable divergence rather than something intrinsic to the field.

Having seen that for Matilal global philosophy has a large core of identifiable common problems which Indian philosophy shares with analytical philosophy in the West, our next question is what kind of study of Indian philosophy is envisaged by him as likely to lead to fruitful philosophy. The answer to this question is provided in the very title of the book *Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective* which he edited jointly with S.L. Shaw (1985). The comparative perspective in respect of a set of common topics and questions he speaks of in this book is in fact what constitutes the chief mark of his study of Indian philosophy. No doubt the word 'comparative'admits a considerable degree of looseness in its use, but in fact he thought of his own efforts in this area as reflecting something clear and definite enough to be called a method.

In employing what we may call the comparative method, the distinction I have made above between the conditions for successful comparison and conditions which also ensure fruitfulness has to be given its application in the correct way. For the former we need to be able to identify with distinctness the terms of the comparison we are trying to make and also to succeed in placing them in a common domain. But even when these conditions have been met, the comparison successfully made may fail to yield anything interesting by way of being philosophically fruitful. Now while two people may well differ in their estimation

of the value of a piece of comparative study, the question whether the objects of a putative comparison have in fact been successfully brought into a relationship of comparison is likely to be more straightforward and admit of a clear and categorical yes or no answer.

When we apply the test of successful identification of the terms of comparison we have to bear in mind that our concern is not to make comparisons between items from the same tradition, but between items taken from two different traditions. The items identified in this way must be capable of comparison, i.e., as a dictionary definition says, they need to be brought into relation by showing some resemblance or difference between them. In other words, comparison presupposes that there is a common generic feature between the compared items.

Therefore one obvious way in which a putative comparison may fail is when the compared items do not in fact belong to comparable domains. A good example of such failure is provided by Matilal's discussion of the categories, a topic to which he returns several times in his writings. In *Logic, Language and Reality*, (p. 161), he tells us that Navya-Nyāya accepts seven types of categories of 'entities' which range from substance (treated by it as substratum) to *abhāva* (absence). This itself makes the situation here somewhat vague and the most we can say is that the common feature here is that they are in some unclear sense ontological. Matilal is unable to relate them to Aristotle's theory of the categories through a failure to see the importance of Aristotle's account of them in the *Categories*.[8] He would have come to admire the latter's success in bringing them together as categories in the domain of logic through his definition of first substance as that which is neither predicated of nor is in something.[9] Otherwise, what comparison can you make between the Aristotelian account and the Nyāya bag of 'entities'?

Now if we consider the *Mind* article by Matilal and Sen, which I mentioned earlier with a view to elicit from it the light these writers can shed on Indian philosophy of language by employing the comparative perspective, then the question whether the same issues are being dealt with in both instances acquires a changed countenance. The dispute between Bhartṛhari and the Mīmāṃsakāras Kumārila and Prabhākara is not about meaning in the way in which that which centres on the 'context principle' derived from Frege has been conducted. So only by an excess of generosity can we describe Matilal's work in this area as successfully establishing a comparison. Philosophy of language proceeds in relative independence in the latter, whereas in Bhartṛhari meaningful utterance is not simply conformity to usage but utterance resting on timeless *śruti* when understood as attributable to a comprehensive principle of universal selfhood. (See Kāṇda I of the *Vākyapadiya* especially).

The advocate of the comparative method can be expected to claim

that there is nothing decisive in this part of Bhartṛhari's thought as regards how the meaning of a sentence is constituted, and that in consequence we are entitled to make an appraisal of his doctrine of the primacy of the sentence while putting this part aside. But in doing so he would be putting himself in the position of having to answer some awkward questions. For we can now ask why Bhartṛhari's sentence-holism takes the form of maintaining that words taken by themselves are no more meaningful than are the separate *varṇas* constituting a particular word. What seems clearly to make such a claim untenable is the fact that although single words when not functioning as sentences do not *say* anything, nevertheless, simply by virtue of being words they do have an assured place in the realm of meaning. So we may well ask: how can Matilal treat Bhartṛhari's theory of meaning with a respect comparable to that which he gives to Quine's and also attribute such a strange parallelism to him without attempting to provide an elucidation of it which will remove the impression of paradox from it?

There is no escape from this question. But in answering it we must distinguish between what Matilal and his co-author are in a position to say and what someone unencumbered by the strategy adopted in their paper could say on this matter. It is extremely significant, as it is rather extraordinary, that what is undoubtedly the pivotal notion in Bhartṛhari's account of language, that of *sphota*, does not get a mention in their paper and similarly, the two key notions of *Vedāpauruśeyatvam* and the *nityatvam* of *śabda* denied all mention in their treatment of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. It is only through this twin omission that the Indian discussion of meaning can be reduced to the level of semantics at which the debate over the context principle enunciated by Frege in the *Grundlagen* has taken place in twentieth century analytical philosophy. The illusion of a parallelism cannot even begin to work without doing so.

Much has been written about the *sphota* theory and much more remains to be said. If there is a component of it which is mysterious, no less importantly are there components which are not, and at least the following has already been proved. We can say that despite the fact that to be a word is *ipso facto* to have meaning, the utterance of a word is not any kind of saying nor anything to be understood as an achievement compared to what we achieve when a sentence is uttered while fulfilling the conditions requisite for its proper utterance. The *sphota* doctrine serves to highlight this special leap into significance.

Similarly the extreme contrast between the sentence-holism attributed to Bhartṛhari (and to what Frege commits himself to in the *Grundlagen*) and the so-called atomism of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa becomes untenable, and the two schools of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā are freed from the Procrusteanism inflicted on them.

It is important to keep in mind that the Veda is the paradigm of

speech for the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, the operative notion in its case being that of validity (*pramāṇam*) and not that of truth as it has come to be treated in the now dominant Tarskian approach to this concept.

Having seen the consequences of Matilal's zealous adoption of the comparative method in his study of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā with its aim of presenting it in close analogy with the terms in which the context principle first enunciated by Frege has been discussed among writers belonging to the analytic tradition, I must now point out that in doing so he did provide a needed corrective to the failure of writers of an earlier generation to do justice to its real philosophical worth. Thus even a writer of the repute of Radhakrishnan failed to recognize the achievements of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra as philosophers.

The difficulty is that a truncated approach such as Matilal's can at best stimulate serious enquiry without being itself a source of fruitful philosophy. A proper appraisal of their doctrines of 'designation before connection' (*abhihitānvaya*) and 'connected designation' (*anvitābhidhāna*) requires far more than a simple sketch of how they were officially enunciated.

Now while successful comparison may fail to be made through a failure to identify items that are in fact comparable through one cause or another, it is also possible that the fields between which comparison would be desirable are for the present very unequally developed so that attempts at comparison are in fact premature. This is the feeling Professor Herzberger expressed when he said in his essay, 'Three Systems of Buddhist Logic', contributed to *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology* (edited by B.K. Matilal and Robert D. Evans):

> It seems to me that we are still pretty much groping in the dark so far as Buddhist logic is concerned—the most elementary questions about this subject remain unsettled and quite controversial. (p. 60).

Now it is important to distinguish between comparisons across traditions between specific items in them and *comparisons between* two traditions. When a comparison is offered which sets one tradition taken as a whole in some contrast with another, the question whether anything is to be gained by doing so, and how far confusion is a more likely outcome of it, has to be faced squarely. No less importantly we may be obliged to doubt whether such a bringing into relation of two traditions can properly be called an act of comparison. It would be a serious mistake to accept such a comparison to be valid simply on the ground that there are no lexicographical grounds to rule it out.

Just for this reason I think it is necessary that in dealing with the next type of case, we do not get caught in questions of terminology. (In any case Matilal's comparisons are not of the second kind). In his recent book *Reason and Traditions in Indian Thought: An Essay on the*

Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking, J.N. Mohanty points out that Indian logic and epistemology never came to distinguish between analytic and synthetic truth and between necessary and contingent truths, and importantly, and perhaps rightly, claims that these are to be regarded as 'absences' and not 'deficiencies'. He claims that it is to comparative philosophy that we owe this understanding, and that this big difference points to deep differences of structure. What requires our maximum attention here, is the fact that by remarking on this feature of Indian philosophy, Mohanty opens up a new line of thinking for us to explore in. But how such enquiries are to be described is a question which does not have a simple answer. It is to be noted here that once holistic considerations begin to call for attention, other claimants spring to mind even more pressingly. For instance, the uniqueness of the Buddhist concept of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) which is pivotal to the whole of Buddhist thought. But enquiries prompted by such questions are bound to be difficult.

In the meanwhile there are more rewarding tasks which are well within the reach of the most able scholars in Indian philosophical studies. Thus, why not translate and annotate some of the principal texts of Indian philosophy which have remained outside the reach of most students in the field? And even some of those that have been translated deserve far better translations than those on offer.

In extreme contrast to the situation in a field of studies when the level realized by them is not high enough to yield firm conclusions in respect of a topic of importance, we may find that in respect of a different question the situation is its very opposite. In the latter case we may in fact be able to glean materials for a satisfactory resolution of it entirely from the resources of one tradition alone leaving behind the other for the most part struggling and attaining only very qualified partial success. Here Mohanty in his article 'Psychologism in Indian Logical Theory'[10] makes just such a claim in regard to the topic of logical inference. Neither the Platonist's anti- psychologism coming from Frege nor the psychologism of a writer like J.S. Mill seems to work, as Mohanty suggests. But he tells us that Nyāya 'finds the logical in the texture of everyday actual processes of reasoning'. Using the notion of 'intentional content' he suggests that 'structural analysis' and reflection on the 'inner cognitive events' can supplement one another to yield a theory which would overcome the dichotomy of inference as mere formal validity and inference as an activity of a private subject. Here it is worthwhile to suggest a reading of Mohanty's book on Gaṅgeśa for supplementing the suggestions offered in this article. When a tradition offers material which can bring one to an absorption in a question to the degree that history and comparative ideas lose their appeal, then we are in an ideal situation in our study of it and comparative studies and history have lost their importance.

The possibility I have recommended for recognition in the previous paragraph is I believe potentially the most rewarding. But in doing so I have only distinguished a rubric that covers much ambiguity and which cannot be put to good results without some awareness of the pitfalls intrinsic to it in the context of Indian philosophy. Thus what takes on a separate existence as a locus of independent interest may be a group of closely related questions, or simply a great classic like Plato's *Republic* or Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtra.* What is perhaps most important to recognize here is that in successfully identifying things of independent interest we do not fail to see how very differently this can happen.

While in the field of logic and theory of knowledge, what is identified is likely to have its importance simply as philosophy,whereas elsewhere this may not be so. And as we move away from such analytically demanding areas, the possibilities of strong and fundamental disagreement sharply increases. Taking now an example from the world of Jewish thought a reading of Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed* could well bring home to one the importance of getting clear perspective in such matters. Lacking an original philosophical tradition of their own even writers who have remained close to their own Talmudic world have had to do their work in the categories of another.

In such a situation it is very possible to misjudge the nature of what has been written in this way. Thus the *Guide* has been described as a work essentially belonging to the domain of mediaeval Arab philosophy, when its careful study would have shown beyond doubt the correctness of the established Jewish view that it is a book whose inspiration as well as execution place it firmly in the world of Jewish thought.

It is significant that mistakes in matters of this kind are not easily recognized despite their being egregious mistakes. Competent philosophy does not after all arise *ex nihilo.* There is no possibility of achieving it except by participating in a tradition with some continuity and a creative life that is still in place. So we find that Jewish writers who have enriched the world of Jewish thought have also been contributing to the tradition from which they have taken a lot of their vocabulary and philosophical tools. Maimonides in his amazingly busy life found time to write on Aristotelian logic, displaying considerable competence in doing so, while also being the leading codifier of Jewish law. To describe the *Guide* without describing its Jewish perspective by, say, trying to isolate its supposedly purely philosophical parts is not to describe it but something which has lost its identity.

But reconstructing a perspective or a particular set of ideas in the vocabulary of a world far removed from the world of its origin is not easy, and sometimes there are, almost inevitably, signs of unmistakable clumsiness. What is needed is not to get disheartened by the enormous difficulties inherent in such endeavours.

If we now compare the situation of the Jewish writer to that of someone writing on Indian philosophy in some European language in this century, we shall find the difficulties of the latter to be of far greater magnitude. There are two main reasons which account for this. Firstly, the Jews have never experienced anything like the rupture with the past which took place in the last century in the Indian context. Most of Judaism's major writers have continued to write in Hebrew while also writing in Arabic and later in a European language like German or English, and often when a major work like the *Guide* or Jehuda Halevi's *Cuzari* was written in Arabic, it was soon afterwards translated into Hebrew. This did not happen in the case of Sanskrit, which until this century, was the Indian language for philosophy.

Nowadays no writer of any importance writes in Sanskrit. This has gone so far that from having been reduced to a very secondary position, so far as the writing of philosophy is concerned, it has passed into virtual supersession. Secondly, inheriting such a rich world of philosophy is not necessarily always an advantage and in effect that's what determines the extent of a task whose real nature also remains to be grasped. Having been catapulted into a very exacting world we seek to claim a heritage the conditions of whose acquisition seem to entail nothing less than a veritable reincarnation in the forms of our present westernized ambience.

Having acknowledged the scale of the difference between the Jewish achievement and what is somewhat analogously needed in the Indian case I can hardly rest my case by citing examples from the former, and unless I can do something substantial by way of corroborating the plea I have just made, it is bound to sound hollow. Had the first impression of Matilal's work on Navya-Nyāya persisted in me, I would certainly have cited it as my most important corroborative example. But I cannot do so now, especially after I have recognized the relative modesty of the claims that were in fact made in his *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation.* My earlier reading seemed at least to introduce a sympathetic reader to a collection of ideas in the domain of logic and theory of knowledge which were very different from their western counterparts; but it did not take me long to feel that what was being introduced was something very unfamiliar and that no clear perspective seemed to emerge as to its actual character.

At a later stage I came to see that the comparative method adopted by Matilal was in fact a kind of shackles. Only things that are comparable ought to be subjected to comparison. Otherwise the unfamiliar item one is trying to describe by reference to what is already known has unavoidably to be put on Procrustean beds.

The *L.I.* by virtue of its ambition seems to overcome the difficulty of a limited scope while still employing arguments which have a familiar ring. Philosophers in the West too have sometimes argued that discursive discourse is essentially flawed and that the claims of intuition and an understanding that rises above what reason can yield can be shown to be capable of achievement.

The question that I shall soon take up for consideration in the rest of this article is whether Matilal does in fact succeed in making out a case for what he calls Indian mysticism and whether by showing the essential Indianness of a doctrine which seems to rise above philosophy itself he wins for it as an autonomous area of understanding. In enquiring as to its success I shall for the most part concentrate on questions of validity and invalidity of argument and claim. My verdict will be that of stark failure, and the fundamental reason why I am forced to this conclusion is that while seeking to work within a comparative framework he in fact does not give to Butler's dictum, 'everything is what it is and not another thing' the respect due to it.

Now to show the strength of an approach it is hardly enough if one merely shows that the results of applying some other approach are poor. But since I have already stated my intended unfavourable verdict on Matilal's ambitious project in his *L.I.*, in so far as achieving the kind of success under consideration now is concerned, when I show in the sequel how I come to reach, it the story of failure I shall then be telling will be told without putting it in contrast to an actually existent example of success as its accompaniment. I must in fairness to Matilal also say that he undertook it where success is perhaps hardest to achieve, in an area of high metaphysics and philosophy of religion. And frankly I do not myself have a clear idea of how it might be found in such areas. I do think however that we must at first be content with a more modest kind of success which I believe is likely to be found in logic and epistemology rather than elsewhere. The success I have in mind must also strike one as clearly a success.

Having stated our desiderata let us recall that Mohanty's suggestions on the Nyāya view of inference did seem to give us an example of the treatment of a topic which is not to be seen as an exercise in comparative philosophy but rather in terms of a contrast between autonomous success and a clear record of failure to achieve the sought end-result. Such a contrast does after all mean that we can find in the Indian tradition a satisfactory account of inference and that we do not need to look elsewhere for it. But when we ask where in fact does this point our real difficulties begin. We are still plagued by the trouble which gives the comparative method the stamp of futility. The question why anyone already well-inducted into western philosophy should study Indian philosophy has still to find an adequate positive answer.

That once in a while something like what Mohanty has found concerning the topic of inference can be found can hardly be enough for doing so. We still do not know how we are to look for more such gems. And by his own tacit admission a similar result could also be

reached by a possible extrapolation from what was already available to him from his work on Husserl (as he claims in *Tradition and Reason*).

The ingredients for good answers to such questions are, as I have recently discovered, to be found in the work of Professor S. Bhattacharya on the Navya-Nyāya. In Part I of his *Gadādhara's Theory of Objectivity* entitled *General Introduction to Navya-Nyāya Concepts* he has achieved in respect of this school a result which comes close to being a paradigm for the future, thus surpassing in quality any other work in a European language on the study of Indian philosophy. (Part II which is an annotated translation of the *Viśayatavāda* is of a similar quality in its achievement). Although its richness makes it impossible to give a short account of its contents, it is possible to state the general nature of its success. It manages to provide a good answer to the question to which no other writer on the Nyāya has ever been able, even remotely to provide an answer, namely, what makes Nyāya a *darśana.*

The salient feature of this book is perhaps that it achieves such a result by means of a cumulative process. Most of the questions dealt with in Bhattacharya's account of the Navya-Nyāya are found to have answers which point in the same general direction. For instance the category of relation, unlike in Aristotle, is given an amazingly large scope by describing a relation (*sambandha*) as the object of a cognition when such an object is an ordered pair. This scope is further enlarged when the notion of abstraction is introduced so that a relation itself becomes a term in a higher-order relation. We might say that as cognizing beings, whatever we can come to concern ourselves with comes when we fall in the category of relation. This is an intoxicating kind of intuitionism which sets the Navya-Nyāya in radical opposition to the Platonism of modern logic.

A universal similarly is not simply whatever has unrestricted generality but what uniquely belongs to a kind. Universals, in this approach, are marks of the things that come to us as of special importance.

And, almost equally interestingly, definition is not à la Aristotle simply stating something's nature *genus per differentiam*, but in one of its two Navya-Nyāya types it is to be seen as an act by which a *probans* is provided by which others can distinguish the object defined from everything else. So things known to us can only be defined to others and this mode of definition ought to be treated as primary.

In this way the basic categories of discourse are described so as to give us a perspective which most facilitates the superior purpose of the kind of understanding a *darśana* is meant to give. And this is something other schools can share with it. Thus Yoga for instance does not have a logic of its own. But why the Buddhists and the Advaitins do not do so is a question that too can be answered. But I shall not do so here.

A major reason for my extreme scepticism towards the claims of comparative philosophy lies in my view of the nature and task of the activity of philosophy—in the claim I made earlier in this paper when I said that there exists an internal connection between how philosophy is done and some purpose which presides over it when it is done as a distinguishable activity. This purpose in the case of Indian philosophy has been in the main religion. A different view from mine on this question is likely to be reflected in a different view of the value and importance of this method. Thus Mohanty is quite optimistic about its scope, and correspondingly we find him wanting to extend the application of the term 'philosophy'to the *darśanas*. But even he makes reservations about its use when he writes about Indian philosophy of language in *Tradition and Reason.*[11] Similar evidence appears when he comments on inference in Indian logic.

But if a mistakenly liberal understanding of the scope of philosophy can lead to excessive faith in the comparative method, an over-zealous pursuit of it can also arise from a misapplication of an important philosophical category or an absurd attribution of success to a certain kind of philosophical argument. Thus nobody would have accused Matilal for the lack of philosophical ambition—we already had evidence of the extreme range of his work. But he was not content simply to range widely in his choice of philosophical topics. In his inaugural lecture on Indian mysticism we find him attempting something of a very ambitious nature. I shall now show that in his work on this theme he was in fact able to write with extreme ambition while formally still remaining within the terms of the comparative method only at the cost of aberrances falling in the latter category.

Matilal's *L.I.* undoubtedly has the hallmark of the purpose of delivering something striking and visibly significant when taking up an important chair. What characterizes its ambition is not the originality of the thesis put forward in it but the nature of the arguments deployed in its support. The claim that the categories by using which reason does its work are inevitably flawed to the extent of being generative of contradiction was made by F.H. Bradley and was followed by an attribution of a similar claim to Śaṅkara by Indian writers, and more recently a similar attribution was made about Nāgārjuna. Whether any of the latter two actually made such a claim is a matter of dispute. But we cannot be in any doubt that Śrī Harṣa in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* did in fact make such a claim. The originality of Matilal's *Logical Illumination* lies in its employment of the resources of modern logic for this purpose. His arguments are refined further in a later paper entitled 'Scepticism'[12] where we get a putative version of scepticism which is very different from the familiar Cartesian form of scepticism. I shall stress the importance of understanding this contrast, as also of the former's 'criticism'of the notion of proof itself when he attacked

the Nyāya theory of *pramāṇas*. Technically this is still comparative philosophy, since what is placed in a framework of comparison are two versions of scepticism, and judging by its ambition alone it is heady stuff.

In the *L.I.*, the logical illumination he offers is that of the version of the 'monistic metaphysics' which in his view is the 'bed-rock of Eastern mysticism', this being the Advaita Vedānta of Śrī Harṣa and the Mādhyamikā of Nāgārjuna. In doing so he puts forward the best case he can muster in its support. But since he does not put forward any criticism of it, it would appear that he is persuaded by its reasoning. But there are serious difficulties, in fact insuperable ones, in describing what it is that its success would in fact establish. The source of these difficulties, as we shall now begin to see, lies in the fact that what looks like a very positive claim is sought to be proved solely by means of negative arguments of refutation. In essence, we are being told that when the philosophical work of the logical refutation of error has been done, the great truth of mysticism can be handed over to the would-be mystic on a plate. He writes: 'In other words, for the mystic, the truth is self-evident as soon as the veils of wrong views are lifted'.[13]

A very straightforward criticism of Matilal's central claim as I have just described it may be stated very briefly. Since the logical illumination Matilal offers in his lecture is of what he terms 'monistic metaphysics'and since metaphysics is a basic constituent of philosophy, if such an illumination succeeds then its success would be success in illuminating something in the nature of a metaphysical doctrine. But the doctrine in question is in fact the form of mysticism Matilal attributes to Śrī Harṣa and Nāgārjuna as something they both share. Since however the former is at pains to argue in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* that the only truth free of error is 'inexpressible' (*anirvacanīya*), we have before us a supposedly metaphysical doctrine which must for ever remain beyond speech. This is indeed strange reward for a philosopher's labour. To anticipate a possible objection I shall point out that undoubtedly philosophers do sometimes claim that something in their field cannot be expressed. Thus Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* held that logical form is of this nature. But logical form is a philosophical category while the truth of mysticism is put entirely outside the domain of the categories of discursive discourse by Śrī Harṣa. The truth which according to Śrī Harṣa is unsayable is so not because all saying is generative of contradiction (it would then be not truth) but because it is something beyond which language can concern itself with, and just for this reason we cannot think of it as a metaphysical truth.

Now in fairness to Śrī Harṣa it must be pointed out that since 'philosophy', 'metaphysics' and 'mysticism' are words in the English language while Sanskrit does not have words that carry the meanings

of these English words, we cannot blame him for claiming something he regards as unsayable to belong to the domain of philosophy.[14]

But Matilal's is a different case. Having described mysticism (the kind he was concerned with in his *L.I.*) as monistic metaphysics he is under obligation to say what is further characteristic of it apart from its being monistic. This obligation he has tried to meet elsewhere but not in *L.I.*

In *Logic, Language and Reality* (p. 317) he says that he is only prepared to defend a form of cognitive mysticism. So the reality that his kind of mystic claims to know is known by means of cognition, albeit not of the familiar kind we know to belong to us. But on such an understanding of 'cognition' what would be a kind of non-cognitive mysticism Matilal does not anywhere tell us.

The simplest clue to the kind of mysticism Matilal is dealing with which for him constitutes the 'bed-rock of Eastern mysticism' is given when he describes Nāgārjuna as a mystic sceptic.[15] The philosophical road to mysticism lies through certain sceptical arguments. Here by sceptical arguments we are to understand the arguments which the philosophical sceptic employs for his special purposes. Now scepticism has played a big part in the history of modern western philosophy. Since according to Matilal the Indian variety of mysticism which is taken by him to occupy a central place in Indian philosophy employs scepticism as its principal means we have to ask how like or unlike it is to the scepticisms we find in modern philosophies of the West. It is this question from which I believe stems the crucial test by which we may judge the value of what is truly innovative in Matilal's work in Indian philosophy for those studying the history of philosophy only because they believe that doing so is also a good way of doing philosophy. I shall argue in what follows that his scepticism is very unlike the scepticism the student of western philosophy concerns himself with.

We may distinguish two broad categories of scepticism. I shall describe the scepticism of Descartes, with which modern philosophy may be said to begin, as a constructive scepticism, since its purpose is to place human knowledge on more secure foundations. In the *Meditations* he begins by doubting whatever can be doubted. In doing so he employs criteria of certainty which are very much higher than those we normally employ. But although such doubting is described by him as 'hyperbolic' it is nevertheless not idle so that in resolving it in terms which satisfy these criteria he gives us (that is, purports to give us) conclusions which have the kind of evidence he wants to give us for them. The second kind of scepticism is that of Hume and Russell. The uncertainty that it is taken to give rise to is irremediable and has no consequences, and calls at most only for recognition. Matilal's scepticism is rather of the former kind despite its extreme difference from that of Descartes.

The mystic whom Matilal describes as a sceptic mystic is determined to guide us to a goal of supreme grace by employing his own particular kind of doubts, so that at first blush one has an uncomfortable feeling in giving it the description of scepticism. Both forms of western scepticism have one very important feature in common. Both, in fact any variety of scepticisms I have come across in my study of western philosophy declare our commonly employed criteria of truth and validity to be insufficiently high and do their work by applying stricter and more exacting criteria. But Matilal makes the very opposite approach. His sceptics need a lowering of standards so that much stronger, and amazingly sweeping negative claims can be made even though the arguments adduced at their greatest success prove very much less. And once or twice he expressly asks us to do so, if we are to get an understanding of Indian mysticism. Thus in 'Scepticism' Matilal while admitting that Vātsyāyana was perhaps in a position to meet Nāgārjuna's charge of infinite regress against the *pramāṇas* theory, claims that an inability to give a satisfactory description of the logical argument against the possibility of knowledge does not invalidate the sceptical strategy which relies on the mode of refutation employed by Śrī Harṣa in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* (being designed to show the opponent's position to be untenable solely by applying the very rules which the latter has adopted). But as we shall presently see, it is vitally important to determine just what Śrī Harṣa's strategy accomplishes, and while rigour is what the sceptic prides himself in, it is just rigour which is in fact being sacrificed in his arguments. So it is natural to ask whether a scepticism which makes its case by a lowering of logical standards can be called genuine scepticism. In fact we find Matilal urging us in his book *Perception* not to 'dispute too much over labels but to pay attention to the formulation of a position (in the Indian context) and the argument in favour of it.'[16]

But if the sceptic's claims in respect of what he has shown are unreasonably inflated, then describing what he is attempting to prove, in fact the very nature of his enterprise is apt to become obscure; indeed even to himself. So we find him in *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar* of 1971 making the statement that there are 'two universal marks' of all types of mysticism, these being, first, 'a belief in the possibility of a kind of knowledge which we may call revelation, even direct confrontation with reality', and, second, 'belief in unity, which tends to reject all diversities and differences as illusory appearances'.[17] Now 'revelation' is hardly the right word to describe something unsayable; what for instance was revealed to Moses at Sinai he was able to record in the language he shared with his people. Perhaps when Matilal wrote his *L.I.* he would not have spoken in this way.

There is nevertheless a very serious difficulty arising from the very fact that Matilal cannot reject Śrī Harṣa's verdict that the ultimate truth which he was seeking was 'unsayable', since after all there would be nothing left at the end of his project to say it in.

It is not difficult to see that there is no way in which this difficulty can be surmounted while remaining in the realm of metaphysics, which Matilal was determined to do. Śrī Harṣa says that when error has been removed the truth will emerge of itself since the removal of error is all that is needed for this to come about. But it is not some one error or other which has to be removed, but at the very least the very substantial list of the Naiyāyika's categories and his theory of *pramāṇas*. Śrī Harṣa wrote his voluminous *Khaṇḍakhaṇḍakhādya* to achieve this. We do not expect a philosophical work to succeed in every important objective it sets itself. In the whole history of philosophy no book has ever succeeded to such an extent. But let us suppose that he does perform such a unique feat; why must we accept his claim that something vastly superior in a non-discursive realm will willy-nilly fall into our laps thereafter? Why should we not reach a wholly nihilistic conclusion? Here the contrast with Descartes is very pertinent. When he had done all the doubting that he was able as a rational being to do he found a way of showing that it was yet possible to overcome such doubts while remaining within the bounds of human reason. To use his metaphor he had examined each apple in his basket and found after a good scrutiny that they were in fact all sound. Śrī Harṣa's rejection of the claims of his opponents is however in each case final and reason is never given a second chance.

In fact, there is a complete contrast between Descartes' 'method of doubt' and Śrī Harṣa's scepticism. Cartesian doubt is radical doubt only about the reality of the external world and not about the ways in which reason does its work. Here it is worth mentioning that Barry Stroud in his *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism* equates 'philosophical scepticism' with the claim that 'we can know nothing about the physical world around us' while excluding lesser scepticisms about the claims of morality or religion (Preface, pp. vii–viii). In fact the kind of scepticism which focuses on the notion of proof which the Nyāya calls the doctrine of the *pramāṇas*, as does Śrī Harṣa, does not receive a hearing from him. We shall soon see how right Stroud is in the latter regard, and that in fact 'scepticism' is not a suitable rubric under which to deal with the kinds of failures that we need to deal with in this area.

Śrī Harṣa's claim that without putting forward any claim of his own he can prove his case simply by proceeding from his opponent's own postulates was endorsed by his translator Ganganath Jha and is equally unqualifiedly accepted by Matilal. But to do so is to err egregiously. Firstly there is the simple point that a philosophical sceptic cannot proceed simply *ad hominem*. To claim successfully that one can convict one's opponent of contradiction is only to claim that one can refute

him not that the thesis he maintains would also thereby be refuted. The *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* is a very boastful book but even when successful in its strategy it can claim nothing more than *ad hominem* success. Descartes on the other hand was certainly not arguing *ad hominem*.

Let us however assume that the *pramāṇas* that the Naiyāyika subscribed to had received from him formulations which were the best to be found in his time. Even so the notion of a *pramāṇa per se* was not thereby shown to be incoherent. It is only because the Advaitin misrepresents the situation that it appears to be the case. But it is important that we do not get into confusion here and give way to despair and leave Śrī Harṣa's glee unchecked. To this end I shall make use of Quine's distinction between a paradox and an antinomy,[18] which Matilal appeals to in note no. 10 of his *L.I.* On Quine's distinction, a paradox is something which on a closer look leaves things much as they were. It could be false and then like a false alarm it dissipates itself as soon as we see its falsity. But if it is in fact 'veridical', then it is something we have to learn to accept, and even be gainers from it. A good example of such a paradox is Gödel's theorem about the incompleteness of arithmetic. In grasping its proof we put ourselves on the way to being reconciled to an important truth in proof theory.

Against what is merely a paradox, as Quine uses this term, an antinomy establishes that some tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and be henceforth avoided or revised.[19] This latter notion is of crucial importance; we have here the clear idea that it is sometimes possible to prove that a part of what can be said in a given language is generative of an inconsistency or something equally bad. It is nevertheless reassuring, as Quine also tells us, that an antinomy bears only on some part or the other of the things we do when we reason, and that when we are obliged to abandon it and no longer view it as part of our present methodological vocabulary, it may still be possible to make a revision or modification that would free it of this fault.

Unfortunately the notion of an antinomy as Quine deploys this notion does not find any role in Śrī Harṣa's book. There is a kind of militancy which is not to be found in the writings of the great Ādi Śaṅkara which casts doubt on the importance of the former's philosophical purpose.

We may make a Wittgensteinian addition to what I have said about Quine's useful distinction between what can create a genuine problem and what is at worst a kind of constraint we may have to live under. Wittgenstein sometimes urges us not to be so frightened of encountering a contradiction. A formal system or a part of language is not rendered useless when we discover a contradiction in it. We may still be able to make excellent use of it by keeping within the constraints

the presence of a potential contradiction places us under. It is not necessary that we should find a good way of dealing with a paradox (using this term now in its ordinary philosophically familiar sense), such as Russell's paradox, before again using the language in which it has arisen. And this brings us to what Matilal has to say about Nāgārjuna, the second of the two writers he was principally concerned with in his *L.I.* I think Nāgārjuna's is a very different case and Matilal's writing on him is a clear case of an opportunity repeatedly missed—an opportunity to do constructive philosophy as a way of offering the student of western philosophy something that would extend him.

It does not need a deep study of Nāgārjuna to think it to be somewhat strange that Matilal saw him as subscribing to the same kind of mysticism as that which he attributes to Śrī Harṣa. In fact from a reading of the *L.I.* one cannot see any difference between what is attributed by way of conclusion to the former and what is attributed in it to the latter. But the total illusionism in respect of what falls under human cognition is characteristic only of the Advaita. Things in the world of *vyavahāra*, the mundane world, are lacking in self-nature since they have no *svabhāva*, and originate in a form of dependence which gives them a fundamental conditionality. (The term used to denote this aspect of things is *pratītyasamutpāda*). Matilal rightly focuses on the short treatise *Vigrah-vyāvārtinī* in the *L.I.* since it is Nāgārjuna's work which is most pertinent to the purpose of giving an account of the kind of dependence we are concerned with in Buddhist thought. But Nāgārjuna is also reported to be the author of a great and bulky treatise on wisdom, the *Mahāprajnaparāmitāśāstra*. The Mādhyamika goal is that of wisdom (*prajñā*) which does not come in a flash but is gained cumulatively while the Advaitin according to Śrī Harṣa sees his *summum bonum* as an emergent condition whose origin comes simply on the completion of a process of ratiocination.

There has been quite a spate of writing in recent times on Nāgārjuna and divergent views of his thought have been put forward. So while just as we cannot accept that Matilal's interpretation of him has evident validity so also any contrary view I may present is not to be taken as unquestionably preferable. But I need not make any such claim. It would be enough if I am able to suggest one plausible line of interpretation which has the philosophical fruitfulness Matilal's view fails (as I have been arguing above), to achieve.

The cumulativeness of understanding which for Nāgārjuna characterizes wisdom (*prajñā*) cannot be represented as simply the shedding of error, but needs must be seen in its connection with the reality of *dukha* (sorrow). I have no doubt that the importance of this notion in Nāgārjuna (as indeed in Buddhism generally) cannot be gainsaid and I believe that Matilal would not have wanted to deny this strong connection.

But in doing so we can hardly fail to recognize that knowing that some object of thought is without self-nature requires for its happening the recognition of something that is the case. So even before the meaning of *śūnyatā* is properly understood there is awareness of certain truths albeit they are largely negative truths. Knowing that something is without *svabhāva* must in part consist in knowing that it is deficient in some respect. But in order to know that something is deficient we do not need also to know in precise terms what its deficiency consists of. (So in a crucial sense there is room in Nāgārjuna for imperfect knowledge which cannot be dubbed as illusion as there is not in Srī Harṣa's work.) This difference, I suggest, may be described in terms of the notion of *svabhāva* in the following way.

According to Matilal this term is to be translated in English as essence. But this is a serious mistake. For then Nāgārjuna's doctrine of *nisvabhāva* is to be taken to claim that nothing has an essence, as indeed in the Aristotelian use of this term certain objects of experience do not, so that everything is without substance. But this is what the Ādvaitin Śrī Harṣa says but not the Buddhist Nāgārjuna. For the latter many things in the world have essence without being able to operate unconditionally in their essences. (One might in more metaphorical terms say that there is nothing in the world which is capable of keeping all the promises it seems to make to us.) Describing *śūnyatā* in general terms we might say that there is an inevitable lack of self-nature that goes with the essential nature of things.

Since Matilal wants to attribute the very same mysticism to both the writers he has selected for discussion, he has to resort to a simplification, which no doubt he finds to be perfectly unobjectionable, which eliminates further discussion about self-natures. So he writes: 'To simplify matters for our discussion, let us substitute for this statement of Nāgārjuna's "Nothing has its own nature" (I will call it NS) the statement "No statement is true" or 'All statements are false"'.[20] In positing this substitutability he moves into the domain of formal semantics hoping to find there some way of establishing that statements of this nature can be given expression without generating paradox, and thereby to gain plausibility for the view of Śrī Harṣa that our discourse is flawed by inconsistency. I think even if the supposition that the equation he chooses to make in the above quotation is valid, he does not achieve much success in the argument he constructs on its basis. But before going into his argument I want to deploy an argument against the substitution adopted by Matilal. I think it is of some importance that such a substitution is questioned but there is a further reason for my doing so. The argument I shall put forward in doing so will be of help to me later when I make my claim that there is a philosophically more constructive way of understanding Nāgārjuna's thought.

Now there is a difference between the semantic domain and the domain of value which is irreducible. Statements fall in the former domain; a statement is false when it contradicts something we take to be true, whether it is something empirically established or demonstrated from certain premises. But it is very doubtful if we can indict a statement as false simply because it employs a category such as substance or cause, which defies our attempt to give a satisfactory characterization of it. There is at least a non-transitivity at work here. With things which the Buddhist wants to say are without their own nature there is a clear transitivity. What is true at the categorial level is also true at the level of its instantiation. Although we are here in an area in which disagreement and obscurity abounds I can clinch the issue by taking an example from the early *Pratityasamutpāda-Sūtram* which occurs in Frauwallner's presentation of some of its content in his *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*. Thus contact (*berührung*) is without self-nature because it can only be made when that with which it is made is something one is sensitive to (i.e., has *empfindung* towards), and this is generative of thirst (*dürst*).[21] The dependence or conditionality is here intended to be both conceptual and causally at work in each instantiation, however multiform its manifestation may be. This means, as I shall explain in more detail later, that there is a fundamental difference between the Advaitin's reasoning and that of the Buddhist. The former purports to be logical and operative in the semantic mode while the latter is valuational and in a certain sense ontological. At the level of instantiation the difference between them becomes quite transparent. In terms of the example I have used above, the fact that sensitiveness has the implication of making one prone to be put in Aristotle's category of passion is a certain disadvantage or vulnerability. And this is certainly not a fact of logic but of the way things in our lives are.

But Matilal ignores this line of thought for some reason. (Since we cannot doubt his scholarship I am obliged to say this.)

Given the equivalence posited by Matilal, the Naiyāyika objection dealt with by Nāgārjuna in the *Vigrah-Vyāvārtinī* that everything is without self-nature becomes the objection that arises when making the statement 'No statement is true'. Briefly, that is, it now acquires the fault of generating a semantic paradox, somewhat in the way a standard form of the Liar paradox is generated by the statement 'Every Cretan is a liar' when it is made by a Cretan. Here Matilal thinking that it will serve his special purpose in the *L.I.* well turns to a solution of this paradox proposed by A.N. Prior in a fascinating paper on Buridan entitled 'Some Problems of Self-Reference in John Buridan'[22] which is based on a suggestion Prior finds in the *Sophismata* of this mediaeval logician of great acumen. As a good deal turns on the real fate of this venture I shall now deal with it as briefly as doing justice to it permits.

In his paper on Buridan, Prior distinguishes two theories which he believes were held by Buridan, an earlier and a later theory. In the former theory propositions signify in virtue of their form alone that they are true, but in the later they do not. He was forced to reject the earlier theory because a proposition e.g., 'No proposition is negative', which asserts or implies its own falsehood asserts both its truth and also its falsehood and is thus bound to be false. Prior points out that the earlier theory is also unsatisfactory because it draws a distinction between what a proposition 'formally' signifies and what it 'virtually' signifies which still entitles us to say that what a proposition weakly (formally only) signifies can nevertheless be still the case. So the kind of proposition that leads to paradox will in this latter account also generate a contradiction; as without being signified to be so things are as what such a proposition signifies and they are not so if they are so signified. Prior argues however that the semantics of the former theory offer a satisfactory way of overcoming our difficulties. Plausibly suggesting that 'possible' as an adjective applied to sentences can be understood simply as 'possibly true', he proposes a theory in which, as in Buridan's earlier theory, any sentence x means that it is true, which can solve Buridan's version of the Liar paradox much more elegantly than could a theory of language-hierarchies. A theory of this kind will have, he claims, a semantics not unlike that of the Zermelo-Quine alternative to the former. We could then say that 'No proposition is negative' is 'possible' in the sense that the proposition 'It could be that no proposition is negative' is true. It is the addition of 'It could be' to 'No proposition is negative' which makes it possible to imagine a state of affairs that an omnipotent being like God could bring about.

Now since Prior clearly tells us in his paper that for Buridan 'proposition' means simply sentence and that the possibility of propositions as non-linguistic items was considered by him only in respect of affirmative propositions, the existence of a state of affairs in which there are no negative propositions would be assured simply by an absence of sentences from it, which is certainly entirely within God's powers. It is only this definite kind of possibility which Prior had in mind in the following sentence which Matilal has quoted in his paper 'Scepticism' (included in his collection of papers entitled *Perception*): 'But if God were to annihilate all negative propositions, there would in fact be no negative propositions, even if they were not then being asserted by any "proposition"'.[23] But since we are not told that he was using 'proposition' in this way it is not easily noticed that this is what he in fact intended to say. What then do we learn from this bit of philosophizing? Clearly not that a radical form of doubt is coherently describable but at most only that a very counter-factual situation is conceivable. And when we have said this we ought also to say that there is no going further beyond such a result of semantic enterprise,

which was in any case a special achievement by a gifted logician.

It is understandable that Matilal was fascinated by the achievements of modern logic. But the very logician whose work on Buridan gave Matilal what was for him a vital step in his argument, namely Prior, bravely, and very wisely said something that is also worth quoting at this stage of my discussion. He said that 'Semantics however it is done is a mess', and even God's language, if such there be, would not be without blemish. This was not any kind of blasphemy, nor a counsel of despair, since it seemed quite remarkable to him that in Buridanian language it was possible to speak about this language itself (i.e., language L that contains the expression 'means in L').

The resourcefulness of language arises from its very nature and its difficulties are not an indication of some kind of fatal imperfection. The following passage from the *Vigrah-Vyāvārtinī* expresses something analogous in a more interesting way:

> But things like a cart, a cloth, etc., though devoid of an intrinsic nature (*svabhāvaśūnya*) because of being dependently originated, are occupied with their respective functions, e.g., carrying wood, grass and cotton, containing honey, water and milk, and protecting from cold, wind and heat. Similarly this statement of mine, though devoid of an intrinsic nature because of being dependently originated, is engaged in the task of establishing the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic nature of things' (*Nihsvabhāvatatvaprasādhane bhāvanām vartate*).[24]

This passage gives us a clue why Nāgārjuna's purpose in claiming that the notion of *pramāṇas* is subject to an infinite regress argument was not a negative one intended to show that reasoning achieves nothing. At XLI and XLII of the *Vigrah-vyāvārtini* Nāgārjuna says that since nothing is a *pramāṇa* without being a *pramāṇa* of something we have in this notion something in the nature of a fault (*doṣaḥ*) because what is taken to be established is required to be established again (*sidhasya sādhanam syāt*). Now this reasoning may not be wholly satisfactory but whatever paradox is alleged can arise only in the supposition of the success of a *pramāṇa*. Sometimes such a success is all one needs, so that the logically dependent condition of a *pramāṇa* on something else does not cause complete frustration. Thus the infinite regress here is not a vicious one. Success and limitations of success are interconnected. How else could things be? So we find him saying in the *Maādhyamika Kārikā* (Ch.XXIV, verse 10) that only through *vyavhāra* is *parmārtha* expressed (*vyavhārman āsritya paramārtha na desyate*).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The temptation to give an account in formal terms of Buddhist doc-

trines is very prevalent. In what is perhaps the most useful piece of writing on the *catuskoti*, another important Buddhist concept (apart from that of *pratītiyasamutpāda*) we have been concerned with in this article, Dr Seyfort Ruegg in his article 'The Four Positions of the Catuskoti'[25] informs us that though the term does not occur in Nāgārjuna, it has an important place in the literature of the Mādhyamika school. Here too we see a division between those who favour a logician's approach and those who want to stress the centrality of the soteriological aspect of this notion. (Matilal in his essay 'Ineffability'[26] adheres to a two-valued logic in dealing with it while Staal favours putting it within a multi-valued logic). But the basic objection that Nāgārjuna held that neither formal nor informal discourse is completely subject to alethic failure cannot be met by resorting to the methods of modern logic.

Persuading modern philosophers that in the Indian tradition there is much genuine philosophy and that the popular impression that spiritual edification and mysticism expressed in picturesque terms (sic!) is not its chief characteristic is no doubt a worthwhile objective, but it is hardly enough by itself to arouse a genuine interest in it. One way of doing so would be by focusing on points of great contrast. Thus the notion of wisdom has for long been all but banished from western academic philosophy. In Buddhism, *prajñā* (wisdom) has a central place, and an explanation of Buddhist thought would uncover possibilities of seeing its importance in the philosophy of action, in ethics and certain dimensions in the philosophy of religion. I believe similar possibilities exist in the study of Yoga. But there may be no shorter way of showing that they exist than by establishing the reality of some of them.

Notes and References

1. Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Logical Illumination*, Oxford University Press; I shall henceforth refer to it as *L.I.*
2. *L.I.*, p. 13.
3. Ibid.
4. *Perception*, Introduction, p. 1.
5. Ibid., pp. 2–3.
6. Ibid., p. 4.
7. Ibid.
8. It is important to see that the first component of this definition is satisfied by first substance alone and thus states a uniquely sufficient condition while the second is neither necessary nor sufficient. See Aristotle's *Categories* and *De Interpretatione*, translated with notes by J.L. Ackrill, pp. 5–11.
9. Ibid., p. 3.
10. Contributed to *Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective* (edited by Matilal), pp. 203–11.
11. Ibid., pp. 54–5.

12. Included in *Perception*, Chapter 3.
13. *L.I.*, p. 17.
14. Matilal indeed claims '*ānavīkṣikī*' to be a synonym of 'philosophy'. But I think this claim is quite untenable. The fourfold classification which includes *ānavīkṣikī* by Kauṭilya in his *Arthaśāstra* (on the strength of which this claim is made by Mohanty in 'Psychologism in Indian Logical Theory', p. 286) attributes to this notion far less than what is generally included in the domain of philosophy.
15. *Perception*, p. 68.
16. Ibid., p. 50.
17. *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar*, p. 166.
18. *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*, revised and enlarged edition, first essay.
19. Ibid., p. 14.
20. *L.I.*, p. 9.
21. Ibid., Band 2, p. 4.
22. *Essays on Logic and Ethics*, edited by P.T. Geach and A.S.P. Kenny, 1976.
23. Quoted at p. 23 in *Perception*.
24. I use here Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya's translation. See *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, XX11, 1971.
25. *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 1977.
26. Included in his *Logical and Ethical Issues of Religious Belief* as its sixth chapter.

Is the Experienced World a Determinate Totality? Vācaspati on *Anyathākhyātivāda* and *Anirvacanīyakhyātivāda*

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Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmatī*,[1] a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, represents a major attempt to give a consistent exposition of some of the central tenets of Advaita philosophy, which in Śaṅkara's own work tended to be stated in a cryptic and sometimes ambiguous manner. Any theory which attempted to present a metaphysics of objects and cognition would have to say more about error, in that there has to be an explanation of how, if experience is of objects, there could be 'unruly' cognition. Merely to appeal to a law-like system did not seem enough to the Indian philosophers; something had to be said on how a given metaphysical view of the order of objects could be consistent with the occurrence of cognition without an appropriate object (in error). There is, however, more to it than this. Vācaspati attempts not only to develop a theory of error for the purpose of explaining the possibility of cognition without an appropriate object, but also eventually to find enough in this explanation to substantiate the original Advaitic thesis on the nature of the order of objects, albeit with some alterations.

In this article, I shall look at the consequences that Vācaspati's critique of Nyāya's theory of error has for the Advaitic claim that the world is indeterminate in some sense. Now, this critique occurs in that section of the commentary in which he examines various theories on how erroneous judgement occurs and what is in the content of a cognition in such a case. And how does a study of erroneous cognition become a statement on the metaphysical status of the world? And particularly, how does his view on what Nyāya says on error become a statement on the indeterminacy of the world? Before we answer these questions, however, we must first define some of the terms to be used in this argument.

COGNITION, CONTENT AND REPRESENTATION: NOTES ON THE INTERPRETATION OF SOME SANSKRIT TERMS

Our analysis will involve examination of the content of a cognition. The notion of content is this: Every cognitive episode is held as being directed at some object. A *qualificative* (*viśiṣṭa*) cognition is one which intends, in the sense it purports, to represent an *object* (*viṣaya*). This relation between a cognition qualified by an object, and that object, is described as an abstract or general relation. In it, the object is a complex entity which, under a condition of cognitive directedness (at it), possesses those characteristics which make the cognition the cognition of just that object (in a correct cognition). *Content* is given, as it were, by the 'content-ness', or 'content-giving structure' (*viṣayatā*) which relates the object to its cognition. Then, *representation* may be seen as a relation (called *viṣayatā*) between cognition and its object wherein there is resident (*niṣṭha*) in cognition a general state of being conditioned (*nirūpita*) by the objects it is intended to be the cognition of.

When an object conditions a cognition by virtue of that cognition being of that object, then the cognition represents that object. When we say that there is a representation of the object which gives content to cognition, we have in mind the existence of a relational state of *viṣayatā* between object and cognition in which the object is defined in terms of a cognition of it, and a relational state of *viṣayitā* in which the cognition is defined in terms of its object. An example of the characterization in terms of *viṣayatā* is the judgement, 'This is the ring I saw last Tuesday', where the object is defined in terms of the content of a cognition of it (namely, the cognition last Tuesday). An example of characterization in terms of *viṣayitā* is the judgement, 'What I saw last Tuesday was this ring' (or 'my cognition last Tuesday was of this ring'). Here, the cognition is defined in terms of the object. So the term *viṣayatā* is used to describe the situation when the ring *gives content* to the structure of my cognition, while the term *viṣayitā* is used when my cognition *represents* the ring.

Finally, one may say that a cognition is individuated by that object which is *intended* as the object of cognition. The Prabhākaras and the Naiyāyikas argue with each other over whether such individuation can occur only under the condition where the intended object is the sole causal basis of the representation, or whether it is sufficient that the components of content have some causal basis for that content to be individuated by the intended object.

When talking of 'representation', no substantive point is being made about the conceptual and non-conceptual constitution of the representation. There is a history of debate on what Matilal calls 'conception-loaded' and 'conception-free' cognition,[2] but it will not be gone into here. Also, nothing is being said about the 'non-representational' content of cognition. For example, nothing is said here on whether or

not the eyes *see* the shell as silvery in *both* erroneous and correct cases (as with the Müller-Lyons lines which appear one longer than the other even when the subject knows that they are of equal length). Further, the judgement consequent on cognition will itself have content which is independent of the cognitive episode. So, I am neutral to the phenomenal use of 'looks' or 'tastes' or whatever, in this context. There must therefore be a distinction between the content of experience and the content of judgement.[3] In fact, I also distinguish between these two and the content of cognition. This is because 'cognition' is used in the tradition as an episode in experience, which cognition, if valid, is an episode of knowledge (*pramā*). It may help to look at a cognitive episode strictly interpreted as an arbitrarily well-defined experiential occurrence. This is to recognize that experience includes the entertainment of psychological states such as joy, sorrow, expectation, etc., while cognition is seen as limited to experience relevant to epistemic advance.

Let me now stipulate usage in this article. The paradigm case of cognition will be perceptual demonstratives of the form (using the standard example of Vācaspati's), 'this is (a piece of) shell'. The components of the content of such a cognition are, simplified, two: a demonstrative object α ('this' *idāntā*) and what it is cognized as, F (a piece of shell). The result would be a cognition the form $F\alpha$. A cognition could also then be that Ga 'this is (a piece of) silver'; this would be erroneous if it were the case that Fa (this were a piece of shell). But there should be some other veridical cognition that Gb ['this (other thing) is (a piece of) silver'] in some other case.

ERROR AND ITS PLACE IN A METAPHYSICAL THEORY

All ontologies are built to explain the fact of cognition; no ontology can be coherent which does not accord with the features of cognition. This is because cognition represents a world (whatever that world is in any particular ontology), and it is this representation which we call experience. So, a theory of what objects are, or what the world is made up of—i.e., an ontology—must be consistent with how cognition represents these objects. For example, a phenomenalist may claim an ontology of fleeting and non-repeatable qualia, but cannot leave it at that because cognition does not represent the world in that way. Instead, he must interpret his ontology so as to explain why cognition represents stable, mid-sized objects like tables and snakes. So, cognitions must in general be accounted for if an ontology is to be defensible. Since particular cognitions represent particular objects (howsoever those objects are construed in an ontology), and have content given them by those objects, any given individual cognition must also be accounted for if a theory of what the world is to be defensible. Now,

with some ingenuity, it is comparatively easy to fit an account of a cognition with one's chosen theory of what the world is like. Of course, some seem to have it easier than others in this regard. The robust realist, of the Nyāya type, explains the cognition that this is a piece of shell in front of me in terms of an ontology in which the world has a piece of shell in front of the observing subject. A phenomenalist must introduce sophisticated intermediaries in order to explain the same cognition: he must have perceptual states constituted by qualia of colour, shape, etc. The debate on the plausibility of such accounts, however, is not what we will deal with here. It is with the testing case of a cognition which is considered to be erroneous that we are concerned.

Whatever may be the theory of determining error (and different theories may generate different answers on whether some particular judgement is right or wrong), it is undeniable that there has to be some account of how error occurs. Let us take the simple perceptual demonstrative judgement of the form 'this is a piece of silver' as a case which most responsible theories will accept as capable of being erroneous on account of the relevant object being a piece of shell. Now the situation becomes more complex. It is one thing to explain how cognition of particular things in the world accords with one's theory of what those particular things are which make up the world. But what does a cognition, which is considered erroneous, or at any rate, a cognition which has as a consequence a false judgement, say about its object? There is no longer a straightforward case of fitting the features of cognition with a theory of the nature of its objects. For clearly, if a cognition is erroneous, its error lies precisely, in some important way, in there being no such object as represented. If that is the case, the question would be: how can cognition be related to the object it represents, for in error, there is no such object to function as a relatum? And if no relationship can be offered, it follows that the cognition itself cannot be explained as to its features (i.e., its representation of an object in a certain way) in terms of the constituents of some ontology. If that happens, then we would be forced to the conclusion that cognition cannot be explained, which would amount to the failure to provide an explanatory ontology. So it becomes imperative for any account of what the world is to explain how a cognition can misrepresent, or can have content given by an object which cannot by definition be what the cognition represents it to be. This then is the challenge: such an account must accept that certain cognitions have the features they do (such as representing a glittering piece of silver in front of the visual apparatus), and explain their occurrence in terms of a relationship between such cognitions and the chosen ontology. If the occurrence of such cognitions can be traced to elements of the chosen ontology then the content of cognitions could

be explained in terms of a relationship between cognitions and the objects of the chosen ontology. That chosen theory of the world would then be consistent with the given features of cognition.

From all this, it follows that if a theory does explain how erroneous cognition occurs, it also provides a defence of its ontology. We will not rehearse here Vācaspati's critique of various schools' attempts to do this. The Vijñānavāda Buddhists, for example, have an ontology in which all objects are cognitive constructs. So they explain an erroneous cognition as another cognitive construct which nevertheless fails certain criteria for correct construction (such as successful consequent action). The Prabhākaras, being strict realists, want to have an ontology of external existents whose reality extracts a strict conformity from cognition. In their view, the reality of objects consists partly in the occurrence of cognition if and only if there is an appropriate object. Thus they deny the possibility of cognitive misrepresentation altogether; which is to say, they deny the possibility of any cognition occurring which does not have a relationship with an object as represented. Of course, this bold denial, while securing an account of cognition which fits with their chosen ontology, leaves them with the difficult task of explaining the experience of error; they do so by appeal to wrong linguistic practice, which is a highly original but very difficult strategy to defend.

In this article, I wish to focus on the most natural of views and the most intuitive: the Nyāya theory of how error occurs. Their ontology is one of a world of independent existents upon which cognition is dependent. Therefore, it becomes their task to reconcile the claim of a world of such objects with the occurrence of misrepresenting cognitions, without losing the required explanatory relationship between cognition and objects. Their account reveals a certain view of the world as a whole, and it is this view which the Advaitin finally challenges. Given what we have just discussed, the nature of the argument becomes clearer: the Naiyāyika must give an account of error which coheres with his chosen view of the world; the problems which this account faces lead to an alternative claim to another, very different view of the world. In the details of the Advaitic analysis of the Nyāya view of error lies a deeper controversy over the metaphysics of reality.

Now that we have an idea of the interrelatedness of the issue of cognitive error and a metaphysical theory of the world, we can provide a justification for the structure of the argument. It consists mainly in a close analysis of competing theories—Nyāya and Advaita—on the content of cognition in veridical and erroneous cases. But even as that analysis proceeds, it uncovers the underlying and contrasting metaphysical theories of the world held by the two schools (at least, according to Vācaspati). The analysis looks at Vācaspati's formulation of the Advaitic theory of error, which introduces the vexed and famous concept of indeterminacy (*anirvacanīyatva*). In the latter part of the article,

I will take up this concept and put forward some preliminary thoughts on a plausible intrpretation for it.

ERROR AND EPISTEMIC INDISTINGUISHABILITY

To begin with, let us formulate a rule which sets out what it is for a cognition to be veridical or erroneous. The rule then is this:

(RC) A cognition is valid or invalid if it discriminates between that object and all others or fails to do so; this discrimination is correct identification. An expression of identification involved is true or false if the identity claimed in the statement holds or not, i.e., if the object is discriminated or not. An action (*pravṛtti*) is successful or unsuccessful (ideally), if the intended object is or is not actually the object of that action.

(RC) is accepted by the two sides concerned here.

It is obviously easy enough to say (under some construal of 'exist') that when it is represented in cognition that *Fa* and *a* exists, the qualificative cognition is correct in identifying an existent as *Fa*. It is, however, problematic as to what one would say when there is a cognitive misidentification that *Ga* and *a* is not *G*. There has after all been a cognition whose content purports to be that *Ga*. It is clear that any such cognition must include the application (*adhyāsa*) of a concept derived from memory and the percept, the demonstrative 'this' (*idam*). The apparent (*avabhāsa*) content of this cognition is sublated by a corrective cognition (*bādhakapratyaya*). [I use 'sublation' to mean the incidence of a later cognitive episode whose valid representation of its object results in the judgement that the content of a prior cognition was not a representation in totality of its purported object. In that case, the valid cognition is held to have sublated the earlier cognition; usually, this is equivalent to the contradiction (and correction) of a judgement consequent on the earlier cognition due to the truth of the epistemic claim consequent on the later cognition. However, it must be noticed that the sense of sublation is slightly different from that of contradiction and correction: it implies the supersession of the content of a cognition by the content of a later cognition. When there is sublation, the subject does not think any longer that what was formerly assumed to be apprehension of an object was really such an apprehension; there is no longer a disposition to hold that cognitive act to have been a proper representation of an object. Correction would involve a semantic relation between the truth-value of two propositions, while sublation is used to convey the relation between cognitive instances.]

The discussion of error works with a crucial consideration: it is that the subject of cognition represents an object in a certain way, regardless of what it is that the relevant object is (or even if there is no object).

In other words, a subject does not know, at the time of having a cognition, as to which one of the disjunctions under (RC) holds in her case; she does not know whether her cognition is discriminatingly picking out the object it represents. Put simply, whether or not a cognition is correct, it seems to the subject that it is. (In contrast, a subject would not be considered to be in error if she is aware that her perceptual mechanism, for example, is misrepresenting, as in the case of a stick which appears to be broken when it is seen dipped partially in a glass of water.) Erroneous cognition, then, represents an object as if it were veridical. Let us call this the 'epistemic indistinguishability' of erroneous cognition.

THE 'MISPLACEMENT' THEORY OF ERROR

Now the situation is this: a subject has a cognition of the form, 'this is silver' when it is actually shell. The subject therefore fails to distinguish between silver and shell. The *anyathakhyāti* theorist explains epistemic indistinguishability between correct and erroneous cognitions by following up a clue given in the statement of the condition under which cognitions have content. The basic requirement for a cognition to have content is that there must exist at least an object which figures in the perceptual instance, and at least a concept caused by another object, of a past cognition, which is now remembered. From the point of view of the psychological typology of the subject's relationships with object, both correct and incorrect cognitions would have their content constituted by the occurrence, in recollection of (*smṛti*) and/or perception (*pratyakṣa*), of the manifestation (*avabhāsa*) of elements of the empirical world (*vyavahāriksattā*). That is to say, they have a characteristically existential nature (*sattā-mātram*). Epistemic indistinguishability is explained because constituents of the content of both correct and erroneous cognitions have the appropriate contact (*sannikarṣa*) with extrinsic elements.[4] On this view then,

(E) Error occurs when there is cognition which is individuated by representation of a specific object (which does not exist as represented), representation of which object is constituted by the characteristics of certain other objects; and these objects exist such that discriminating representation of them individuates the content of *correct* cognitions.

Take two cognitions: one is a veridical cognition representing its object as *Gb*, and individuated by *Gb*. The other is erroneous because it represents its object as *Ga* when it is the case that *a* is *F*. Since the latter represents this object as qualified by *G* just as in the veridical cognition that *Gb*, it (the erroneous cognition that *Ga*) is epistemically indistinguishable from the cognition that *Gb*. In the erroneous cognition,

'this is silver', both the thing demonstrated and the silver exist. There are two objects involved, technically speaking: the demonstrated object, shell, is the 'contextual' object (*tattva*), while silver is the 'principal' object (*pradhāna*) of cognition[5]. *This* particular demonstrative will take the object-place in a correct cognition, '^this^ is shell'; and silver takes the identification place in some other demonstrative instance (in this case a past cognition, whose recollective nature is not apprehended), '*this* is silver'.[6] Erroneous cognitions occur because of these causal antecedents from existent entities. First, their contents are constituted by elements that exist and thus justify the subject's constructive misapprehension; second, because they are constituted by representation of such elements as can contribute to veridical cognitions, they deliver the condition of epistemic indistinguishability that the incidence of error requires.

With these considerations in mind, let us give a fairly precise if intuitive formulation of the Nyāya view of correct and erroneous cognitions respectively.

(NC) A cognition that *Fa* has content, and is correct, if and only if for some object *a*, *a* is *F*, and *Fa* is represented in cognition. Consequently, the expression of that cognition, '*a* is *F*' is true and action appropriate to *Fa* is (ideally) successful, if it is the case that *Fa*.

(NC') A cognition that *Ga* has content, but is erroneous, if and only if for some object *a*, *a* is *F*, and there is some object *b* such that *b* is *G*, and the cognition purports to represent an object *Ga* when there is no such object. The judgement that *Ga* is then false and action unsuccessful (because inappropriate) if made, and taken respectively.

The account that the Naiyāyika gives is obviously one that supports a certain metaphysical view. It is the realist predilection of the Naiyāyika that motivates the *anyathākhyāti* theory. Quite simply, the explanation of error summed up in (E) which coheres with (NC) and (NC') is based on the contention that for there to be cognition, there must exist causally efficacious objects to which the content of a cognition can be traced[7]. This thesis has the merit of being commonsensical and, for its proponents, robustly, but not radically realist. It asserts that (a) an erroneous cognition involves a complex judgement and must therefore involve complex causal factors; and (b) these factors are existents, being causally efficient.

In order to defend the claim that we have knowledge of a world, the Naiyāyika wishes to show that our cognitive states occur by virtue of being dependent on the way that world is. The Nyāya realist, like the other non-sceptical philosophers, must explain erroneous judgement. However, he wants to do this in a realist way without counter-

intuitively denying erroneous cognitions; in any case, he is convinced that such a strict denial does not accord with the correct explanation of error. He attempts to account for the content of an erroneous cognition by deriving it from the causal antecedents (*upādāna*) of the cognition. The point is that such causal antecedents are found in the world; consequently, error is explained within a realist account of cognition (i.e., within an acount of cognition as dependent on objects in the extrinsic world).

The content of an erroneous cognition can be 'deconstructed', and each of its constituent elements traced back to the subject's epistemic contact with various objects. Error can thus be understood as the result of a conception (*vikalpa*) of what the grasp of the demonstrated element (*idānta-grahaṇa*) consists in, where that conception 'deviates' (*vyabhicarati*) from the correct identification of the presented object as required for valid judgement.

THE 'MISPLACEMENT' THERY OF ERROR AS AN ARGUMENT FOR 'GENERAL REALISM'

The Nyāya account of error fits into a general realist theory of the world. The realist is one who claims that there is a world, external to and independent of the cognizing subject. We cannot here go into the defence of the claim that the world is external; but we do not need to because that is not the issue in the debate between Nyāya and Advaita, as Vācaspati sets it up. So let us concentrate on the claim of independence, for it leads to the claim about determinacy which is central to the debate here. The realist's ontology is constituted by the objects of such an independent world. A world of objects which are independent in the ontological sense is a world in which objects would be exactly what they are even if it were the case that there were no cognitions of them. Taking out the modal terminology (which does not fit in well with traditonal Indian discourse), we may say: the identity of an object in a realist world is specifiable independent of any reference to cognition of it. The world is specifiable because the objects in this world form a determinate whole: they constitute a whole world, independently of cognition of them.

But of course, this determinate totality is knowable, because cognition is dependent on it: when there is a cognition, it can only be because cognition in general is dependent on the objects in this world. Consequently, if cognition occurs, there must be objects in the world on which it is dependent. That is to say, every cognition is individuated as to its content by the objects of the world. Since the objects of the world form a determinate whole, cognition is always determinate as to its content. Given the metaphysical view, the Nyāya realist has to argue that for every cognition which occurs, there must be determinate

content; but such content can be given only by determinate objects. Obviously, the object of an erroneous cognition cannot exist as represented (as this is the definition of erroneous cognition). So the realist is left with this task: on the one hand, to accept that cognitions can occur without there being objects as represented, and on the other to save the determinate content of cognition by reference to the objects on which they are dependent. This he does by claiming that erroneous cognitions are given content by the appropriate causal links upon which they are dependent: namely, the perceptual object and the remembered object. These two are determinate (i.e., specific, individual existents). Error occurs because of the subject's failure merely to pick out the remembered nature of the remembered object. Failure to discriminate (between perceptual and remembered components of content) does not imply failure (of such content) to be determinate. If content is then determinate even in error, the basic realist claim that cognition occurs by virtue of the causality of determinate objects is substantiated. The elements constituting the content of an erroneous cognition are traced back, in the Nyāya account, to specifiable objects in the world, i.e., objects which have status as existents in an independent world.

The point of the realist analysis of error is this: it gives an account of erroneous cognition which requires that there be objects which are determinate entities in a whole, i.e., the determinate world. If Vācaspati is to challenge this metaphysics, he must start by looking at what is wrong with the realist analysis of error.

THE PROBLEM WITH THE NYĀYA ACCOUNT

The account of the *anyathākhyātivāda* that Vācaspati ascribes to the Nyāya system is one that he himself had developed in the Nyāya commentary *Tātparyaṭīkā*.[8] In the *Bhāmatī*, though, it represents a piece of intellectual hijacking, for he appropriates some of its basic material for use in the Advaita doctrine of error. Vācaspati seems to doubt not so much the correctness of the Nyāya analysis as its completeness. It is correct in so far as it gives a causal account of the components of a cognition's content, and takes cognitions to be individuated by or to represent purported objects, even when lacking a discriminating grasp of those objects. It is incomplete in that it does not take into account what the notion of a set of causally indiscriminate constituents of a cognitive object implies for the metaphysics of experience, i.e., what it implies for the epistemic interaction of the subject with the experienced world. In experience, what the subject cognizes is some identified object, not the logically disparate elements of the demonstrative qualificand and identifying qualifier. In other words, the representation of the object of cognition is constituted by a cognitive complex,

not a mere list of cognitive elements. For that reason, it is not sufficient to argue, as Nyāya does, that an account of the constitution of a cognition be restricted to a description of the causal antecedents of the constitutive elements of the content of that cognition.

The Advaitin agrees that error shold be explained in terms of epistemic indistinguishability, where there is no apprehension of difference (*bhedāgṛahāgṛhītaḥ*) between the contents of distinct and individuated (*svarūpa*) cognitions. But the Naiyāyika seems to think that a third-person description of the difference in content between valid and erroneous cognitions will suffice for this purpose. The Advaitin, on the other hand, wants a first-person account as well. The third-person account picks out the causal elements involved in the erroneous cognition of a given subject who is not the giver of that account. In that sense, it explains, from outside the subject, as to what happens to the subject. The giver of the third-person account presupposes that he, at any rate, has fixed the causal elements in their correct relationship, and therefore also presupposes that he has a veridical representation of the state of affairs. In fact, the third-person account is even more strongly realist than that—it attempts to give a description of a subject's cognition as an objective one, i.e., as if it were not from any particular (another first-person) point of view at all but independent of any person's point of view whatsoever. The first-person account, of course, must not make that presupposition; there is an error precisely because the causal elements have not been determined by the subject of cognition. Yet it is the representation in the subject's cognition which concerns us as analysts of error. That is to say, there is something more to the account of erroneous cognition than the third-person, putatively subject-independent description of the causal elements involved; there must also be a first-person description of how the causal elements are represented in the subject's own cognition. The Advaitin's claim is that the Nyāya account, as given in (NC') is insufficient for the purpose. Let us look at (NC') again.

(NC') A cognition that *Ga* has content, but is erroneous, if and only if for some object *a*, *a* is *F*, and there is some object *b*, such that *b* is *G*, and the cognition purports to represent an object *Ga* when there is no such object. The judgement that *Ga* is then false and action unsuccessful (because inappropriate) if made, and taken respectively.

The Advaitin's contention is that this only says that *a* and *G* must occur in the content of the erroneous cognition. He argues that (NC') does not account for the entirety of the representation that *Ga*. There is a gap between fixing the various or separate causal elements involved in the cognition and accounting for the particular relationship

in which they occur in the representation which constitutes the content of the erroneous cognition.

The representation that *Ga* is constituted by more than a description of the causal roles played by *a* and *G*. Vācaspati argues for this by pointing out that the assertion and action consequent on the cognition are motivated by the notion of a mistaken unitary object *Ga*. It is all very well to say that it is the silver of the prior cognition that causes the action appropriate to silver, in the present case; but Vācaspati asks, why is it that if that is all there is to it, the action is in any way pertinent to the currently ostended 'this'? If the cognition really just consisted of not knowing that this was not silver, then why does a subject act as if it were indeed silver? Of course, one cannot act upon 'knowledge' that this is silver, because it is not silver. Then again, if its not being silver means that one cannot know that it is silver, why is one just not indifferent to it? One is indifferent if one knows that it cannot be silver; but then that is not an erroneous cognition, whereas we are trying to explain action in consequence of an erroneous cognition. There must be something about the represented 'object' of the erroneous cognition in consequence of which the subject acts as if she knows that it is silver, when it is not. Merely the causal disjunction of *a* and *G* in itself does not get us far enough to explain this epistemic state.

THE ADVAITIC THEORY OF ERROR

It would clarify matters somewhat to claim that an intended object *Ga* forms the content of the cognition and is constituted by an imposition of the conception of *G* (from the valid cognition that *Gb*) upon the object *a* that is *F*. The nature of the object of the erroneous cognition according to the Advaitin, can now be described—

(i) As with an object in a recollective cognition, the object represented is not present in the time-space at/in which it constitutes the content of a cognition.[9] Though that would be valid for a memory-demonstrative, a perceptual demonstrative needs to be in immediate causal contact with the cognition that represents it.[10]

(ii) The qualifier which denotes the identification in the cognition is derived from cognition formed through contact with what was previously presented (*pūrva-dṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*). If that prior cognition was valid, an episode in which that object is remembered as it was once cognized would be a memory in which that object was correctly represented and properly spatio-temporally indexed.

Then it is this memory that, loosely, may be taken to motivate the subject to identify the object on hand as just that formerly encountered object. This, of course, is in agreement with the element of causal explanation in the Nyāya theory. But, importantly, the imposition of the identificatory qualifier *G* in the current case is not causally related to *Gb* in so straightforward a manner as the Naiyāyika's theory suggests. As pointed out under(i), the truth-conditions of memory- and perception-demonstrative cognitions are not the same. Also, if the validity of a prior cognition were to determine the validity of a memory-episode, the object of that prior cognition must be represented in the memory-episode as the object of a prior cognition, and hence with different indices [as pointed out under (ii)]. The remembered *G* in the identification that *Ga*, is different from the *G* of the formerly perceived *Gb*. As remembered-*G*, it is the identificatory constituent of the representation in memory that *Gb*; the truth-conditions of a cognition of correctly remembered *Gb* will be different from those of the current (erroneous) perceptual cognition that *Ga*.

(iii) The object that is the perceptual base (*pratyakṣālambana*) of the cognition, or what has been described as that which occasions the judgement that *Ga*, is *a* that is *F*; *a* as *F can* pass into the content of a valid cognition. In erroneous cognition, however, identification of an object as *G* is indexed by the qualificand *a*, i.e., on a spatio-temporal basis different from what would constitute valid identification of an object as *G*, which latter basis is determined by the qualificand *b*. So, error consists of an indexing by *a* of an identificatory qualifier validly indexed by *b*.

The content of erroneous cognition takes the form of the attribution of *G*-ness to *a*. The object that is so constituted in cognition is a superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the identity of the memory-demonstrative on the perceptual one. This is because the ascription of *G*-ness deviates from the representation required for correct ascription, namely, the inclusion of the recollective (rather than perceptual) nature of the object identified as being *G*. The cognition that *Ga* is thus constituted by representing two distinct demonstrated objects (*a* and *b*) as being the same single qualificand of *G* (by the process described as cross-reference (*samānādhikaraṇya vyapadeśaḥ*). Taking *a* to be *G* in consequence of having the recollection that *Gb*, is to take *a* to be *b*. Vācaspati quotes Śaṅkara's gnomic definition of erroneous cognition.

> It is the representation, as with a memory-demonstrative, of an entity apprehended in a prior presentation, but as located in another indexed region.[11]

The translation of *paratra* as 'another indexed region' is an attempt to capture the sense of another place, another time, that the word conveys. But more importantly, Vācaspati's point is that the representa-

tion in erroneous cognition shares a property with a memory-demonstrative, namely, the absence of the represented object at the time and place of its representation.[12] An erroneous cognition must be taken to have content, whose purported content-giving object is causally related to both memory- and perception-demonstratives. The Advaitic version of an erroneous cognition will then be a development of (NC').

(AC') A cognition that *Ga* has content, but is erroneous, if and only if for some object *a*, *a* is *F*; there is some object *b*, such that *b* is *G*; the cognition has causal connections with *a*,*G*; and *a*,G are represented in a cognition that *Ga*. The judgement that *Ga* is then false and action unsuccessful (because inappropriate) if made, and taken respectively.

The thrust of (AC') is that while causal antecedents must play a part in the description of an erroneous cognition, they do not entirely account for the representation of an object in an erroneous cognition.

THE ADVAITIC THEORY OF ERROR AS AN ARGUMENT FOR 'NON-REALISM'

According to Vācaspati, this is what happens in the cognition that *Ga*: the subject ought to be aware of the truth-conditions of an identification of a demonstrated object as *G*. Such an identification, however, is not true, given the conditions on hand. Yet the subject does not remember in entirety the conditions under which the *G*-identification is true, namely, in a situation other than the current one (and in fact in the paradigm case, one that existed at some time in the past for the subject). That is to say, the subject knows how to take something to be ^that^ piece of silver, but does not remember that ^that^ piece of silver came to be grasped in some other cognition of a demonstrative, and is not present now, where *this* is. The memory-demonstrative's identificatory attribute is thus imposed (*āropayati*) on the cognition of the perceptual demonstrative that is the presented object (*āropaviṣaya*). It is true that ^that^ piece of silver exists; it is true that *this* exists. It is false that silver exists as *this*; it is false that silver exists as *this*; it is that false ^that^ silver is *this*. The cognition therefore exists by coupling the true with the untrue. The erroneous cognition is formed only by treating those conditions which do not exist as if they were existent (*abhūtatad bhāvārtham*).

Swiftly, and not surprisingly now, comes the question of what such an object is that is so individuated in erroneous cognition. No commitment is made to the existential status of *Ga* in (AC'). This is a deliberate ambiguity. The Advaitin now exploits it by giving two construals of the existential status of *Ga*. He draws upon two fairly uncontroversial principles (in the Indian tradition):

(Pi) the assertion of the existence of an object requires that there be a properly justified cognition (perceptual, inferential or any other mode) provided for by the *pramāṇa* theory;[13] and

(Pii) Non-existents do not give content to any cognition, for what does not exist is not experienced at all.[14]

Now, let *F* and *G* be incompatible qualifiers such that *Fa* if and if not-*Ga* and *Gb* if and only if not-*Fb*.Then we have this pair of contradictary arguments.

A1. *Ga* exists (premise)
A2. The object *Ga* is cognized (utilizing Pi)
A3. Therefore the object represented in cognition is *Ga*(consequence of A2)
A4. But corrective apprehension of causal objects shows that the cognition was caused by the distinct perceptual object *Fa* and the recollective object *Gb* (principle of corrrection/sublation)
A5. The cognition that *Ga* is therefore not caused by an object *Ga* (consequence of A4)
A6. Therefore it cannot be the case that *Ga* exists (failure to fulfil epistemic requirement Pi as given in A2)

Yet, on the other hand:

B1. *Ga* does not exist (premise based on A6)
B2. There is no cognition that *Ga* (utilizing Pii)
B3. But there is cognition that *Ga* (fact of experience)
B4. Therefore existents must give content to the cognition that *Ga* (argument utilizng Pii)
B5. The constitutive elements of the object represented in the cognition are *a* and *G*, but that *Ga*
B6. But the cognition is not that *a* and *G*, but that *Ga*
B7. Therefore *Ga* exists

So, neither the claim that the object exists nor the claim that it does not are free from being contradicted by relevant principles.The object is not existent; it is not non-existent. It cannot both exist and not exist, for that is a contradiction.[15] The superimposed object of erroneous cognition is not existentially determinable (*anirvācymevaāropaṇīyam*). This then is the *anirvācanīyakhyāti* ('the determinacy of cognition') theory.

ANIRVĀCANĪYATVA AS INDETERMINACY

The Advaitic position then is that a proper and complete analysis of erroneous cognition, utilizing a causal account, suggests that it is not determinable as to whether or not an object of such cognition exists

(on some construal of 'exists'). But this analysis of erroneous cognition can be applied generally to all cognition. This extension comes in the wake of a consideration to do with the difference between third-person and first-person accounts of erroneous cognition which we have already mentioned. The main characteristic of the third-person account of a subject's erroneous cognitive state is a presupposition that its own determination of the causal elements involved in the erring subject's cognition is veridical. This assumption of veridicality is precisely the assumption of the objectivity or subject-independence of the account of cognitive error. This presupposition also implies that the provider of the third-person account himself has–or has had–veridical cognitions of the causal antecedents involved in the present erroneous cognition. But whence the guarantee for such veridicality?

In a profound sense, one must take seriously the sceptical point that we are all trapped in our own respective first-person accounts of cognition. In other words, the veridicality of cognition in the third-person account is provisional; the cognitions of the giver of the third-person account are equally potential candidates for error. This provisionality is quite general. All third-person accounts of cognition presuppose their veridicality. They must, because if the giver of a description of cognition is already assumed to be in error, there would be no way of even attempting to give a true description of another cognition. Of course, the cognition of the giver of the third-person account might be shown to have met the tests of the *pramāṇa* theory. But that is not that much help in the context of a general scepticism. As we have seen, the prime mark of an erroneous cognition is the epistemic indistinguishability of that cognition from a veridical one, at the moment of its occurrence. So there is no proof that the cognition of the giver of the third-person account of the erring subject is itself not erroneous, independently of the *presupposition* that the tests of the *pramāṇa* theory have been passed. In other words, the most that can be said is that the cognition of the giver of the third-person account of error is presupposed to satisfy (RC) while the cognition of the erring subject fails (RC). Let us remind ourselves of (RC).

(RC) A cognition is valid or invalid if it discriminates between that object and all others or fails to do so; this discrimination is correct identification. An expression of identification involved is true or false if the identity claimed in the statement holds or not; i.e., if the object is discriminated or not. An action (*pravṛtti*) is successful or unsuccessful (ideally), if the intended object is or is not actually the object of that action.

The Advaitic point here is a quasi-sceptical one: by virtue of what is it

asserted that the cognition of the giver of the third-person account of error has in fact satisfied (RC)?

A valid cognition is discriminating; but how is it determined as to whether it is discriminating or not? Only by the judgement of another cognition. As the Indian philosophers in general do not have a Cartesian sense of a subject's privileged access to cognitions, the other cognition required for judgement is not only likely to be another cognition of the same subject (for example, at a later time) but the cognition of another subject. In a sense then, every cognition requires a third-person account; that is to say, every cognition from the first-person perspective lacks a guarantee that the object presented to it is as it is represented in cognition (i.e., lacks a guarantee that that cognition is veridical). Every cognition is thus potentially erroneous. The point is brought home forcefully with this thought: what if *every* cognition is akin to the cognition that this is a piece of silver, in that it fails (RC)? From the first-person perspective it would be epistemically indistinguishable as to whether it was veridical or not; but as we have just seen, since every third-person account itself is a first-person cognition merely presuming veridicality, no independent judgement as to the veridicality of original cognition is possible. At the same time, the very notion of testing a cognition [i.e., requiring it to satisfy (RC)] presumes a theory of veridical and erroneous cognitions and true and false judgements. Such, indeed, is the task of the *pramāṇas*.[16] In other words, the very conception of the veridicality and erroneousness of cognitions requires a theory under which cognitions are determined to be veridical or erroneous. To determine whether a cognition is veridical or erroneous is just to determine whether its object exists as represented or not. Vācaspati's argument is that this is precisely what cannot be done.

What then *can* be done? What can be done is to determine, *for any particular cognition* whether it is sublatable or not. Relative to other cognitions, then, we can determine the content of a paticular cognition. But this is not at all the same as determining whether cognition by itself—*in general*—is given content by determinate objects. To do so would be to determine what *objects in general* are which give content to cognitions in general; but this is just what is not possible. It is not possible because to determine what objects are in general is to determine what the world is as a determinate whole. But to so determine it is to determine it independently of cognition. But all the *pramāṇa* tests are bound by and applied to the truth or veridicality of *cognitions* of objects in the world. So, any determination is determination only of objects of particular cognitions, not of objects as they are independently of cognitions.

So Vācaspati says that the metaphysical object is indeterminate; it is

indeterminate as to what it is independently of what is presented as in cognition.

> Since the imposition of what does not appear is impossible, what is required for there to be content to cognition is what is qualificatively presented, not what must exist.[17]

Given this, we now have the central claim of non-realist metaphysics.

> Of what is imposed on cognition, even when standardly presented, 'independent existence of objects' (*vastu-sattvam*) cannot be guaranteed, by any means or manner.[18]

Thus is the nature of non-realism brought out. The Advaitic non-realists do not deny that there are objects of cognition, unlike the *asatkhyāti-vādins*; but, like them, they do accept that there is a sceptical point regarding the limitations of what we could ever assert about the existence of such objects. They do not deny that experience (presentation to cognition) is of objects extrinsic to cognition, unlike the *atmakhyāti-vādins*; but like them, they do accept that the existential status of objects cannot be established independently of cognition. They do not deny the very occurrence of erroneous cognitions in an effort to secure veridical cognitions, unlike the *akhyāti-vādins*; but, like them, they do accept the need to secure veridical cognitions. They do not accept the unproblematic existence of subject-independent, third-person-accessible objects, unlike the *anyathākhyāti-vādins*; but, like them, they accept the need for a plausible causal account of cognition in terms of the objects of cognition.

It is in evolving this metaphysical view of objects that the Advaitins come up with the notion of indeterminacy. Vācaspati's argument is that while it is possible to determine the existential status of objects of cognition (and thereby determine the validity or invalidity of cognitions), it is indeterminate as to whether objects as a universal whole are, independently of particular cognitions of them, existent or not.

ANIRVĀCANĪYAM: A POSSIBLE CLUE FROM BRENTANO'S 'INEXISTENCE'?

Now, it must be admitted that the nature of this 'indeterminable state' is not given a substantive explanation. One of the suggestions that has been offered is that it could be like Brentano's 'inexistence'.[19] Brentano argued that the existential status of an entity which is the object of a mental state, in the sense of that state being described by a psychological verb, cannot be determined merely by its being the object of such a state. If so, the parallel in terms of our discussion would be that there are certain objects which neither exist as stable spatio-temporal continuants (or as objects which can be reduced to such a state) nor

fail to exist in the manner of logically impossible square circles and physically non-existent flowers in the sky or golden mountains. There is, however, content in the cognitive state consequent on intention to refer to them. They could belong to some third category under which they exist due to their content-giving nature, but under which they do not exist as causal entities. They could 'inexist'. In the absence of any clear explanation in the text, it is a matter of speculation, and Matilal offers it as such,[20] but himself holds no further brief for it. Let us explore this possibility just a bit more. If the argument about error is supposed to be analogous to a transcendental argument about the subject-object relationship, then, the Brentano-style reading would go something like this: in the empirical case, objects are inexistent when under a system of validation, it is settled that certain entities are existents and others not, such that the remainder are merely 'inexistent'. Suppose the quasi-sceptical point is made that there is no further proof of the validity of the system of validation itself. Then the analogy from the discussion on the psychologistic category of inexistents would be that the order which is experienced is such an order by virtue of the content of experience; it is like the experience of silver where there is no subsequent correction possible that it is not silver. We actually could be having experience of an order which neither exists nor fails to exist, but has the status of being the object of psychological states.

Let us for the moment ignore the fact that Brentano himself later discarded this idea. There may be some worth to the parallel itself, but it leaves us with a quite mystifying view of the world. Though the soteriological argument of the Advaitins is anything but obvious, as indeed is any attempt to blueprint mystical experience, I think it would be fair to say that the majority of the Advaitins strove to be as systematic and empirically robust as the Naiyāyikas (though that is not to say that no confusion resulted in their arguments). And in this respect, far too many questions remain: from where does the concept of the existence of objects come? If the world merely 'inexists', how do we ever have the regulative notion of 'existence' in the first place? And what would be a substantive ontological description of inexistent objects? Indeed, far from setting up an empirically cogent example of the problematic relationship between causal objects and object-independent cognition for the purpose of explicating the transcendental theme, this construal would lead to further questions of ontology, which certainly are not dealt with in this context. All this is not to say that the Advaitins could not have held this view, or intended to hold it. I shall not argue against such an interpretation, either on textual grounds—because admittedly, this is an interpretative rather than an exegetical matter—or on philosophical grounds, for this thesis is not so much concerned with the defence of a particular metaphysical position as such as with

the development of a position which may plausibly be attributed to certain Advaitins.

ANIRVACANĪYATVAKHYĀTIVĀDA AS NON-REALISM

The conclusion ought not to be that there is actually an object of erroneous cognition, whose existential status must be established, but rather, that the conventional existential status of that entity cannot be established. The psychologistic explanation that there is some state in which such objects occupy a place in the world may or may not be plausible. But in a fundamental way, that hypothesis does not impinge on the point Vācaspati wants to make. We may be able to construct an ontology where there are objects of different existential status, probably by giving substantive definitions of existence under the various categories and by assuming that each cognition must have an object, even if that object is merely an 'inexistent' one. Vācaspati's concern, however, lies elsewhere. He wishes to establish that it is possible for cognitive states to have content constituted by the representation of even those entities which do not individuate such states. His claim is that cognitions can be supposed to be of certain entities (i.e., can—mistakenly— represent them in content) even when those entities do not actually or really cause (and therefore individuate) those cognitions. Such is the case with error. This is in contrast to the veridical cases where cognitions represent (are held to be of) just those objects which actually or really do individuate (determinately cause) them. There can be instances of cognitive activity purportedly of a certain object without there being any such object (and therefore no individuation of the cognition that purports truly to represent that object). Vācaspati argues that it is not necessary, when there is a cognitive instance, for whatever is supposed to be the object of that instance to 'exist' in some appropriate way. That is to say, it is not necessary for that object to exist, under some construal of 'exists', for it to be represented in the content of (an admittedly erroneous) cognition. There can be cognition purportedly of a certain object without that object existing as it is wrongly represented in cognition as existing. There can be a cognition which purports to represent a golden mountain, and even though the content of that cognition is constituted by a (purported) representation of a golden mountain, one need not argue that such a mountain must 'exist' in some metaphysically significant way.

Error need not push us to conclude that objects of erroneous cognition must necessarily have a status in the non-subjective order, or that merely from cognition it cannot be established what existential status an object has. The first is ontologically contentious, the latter epistemologically basic. Instead, it should alert us to the possibility of cognitive states which do not involve determinate objects (even though

different objects can play causal roles, as Vācaspati's acceptance of some of the tenets of the *anyathākhyātivāda* showed).

As long as we have a definition of what determinate object-involving cognitive states are, we can pick out certain cognitive states as failing to be so object-involving. But that definition is available, according to the Advaitin, only because of the nature of the cognitive order itself. If Śaṅkara's point—that no method of determining the nature of the elements of the world, no system of validation which determinately establishes the existence or non-existence of those elements is available independently of the material of cognition—is valid, we must face the possibility that the available definition of objects and determinate object-involving cognition may not be exhaustive and necessarily complete. Which is to say, if a question is asked whether the objects of the cognitive order are, independently of what they are to that cognitive order, just those objects, the Advaitin replies that it cannot be shown either that they are or that they are not. It is not merely that the question must remain an open one. The Advaitic argument is that the determinacy of the world is proved only in so far as its elements are accessible to cognition. So long as all attempts to prove the existence of a determinate world are so constrained by cognition, there is no non-cognitive proof that the world is determinate. But it can be concluded that the world is determinate independently of cognitive access only if there is some cause to do so. That cause must take the form of a proof, free of such cognitive constraints as the *pramāṇas*, that the world is determinate. To insist without such a proof that nevertheless the world is determinate is merely to assert an unprovable proposition. That is the true import of the cognitive constraint.

Vācaspati seems to claim that his analysis leads us to the conclusion that the experienced order cannot be established as existent in the way the realist wants it [even if, in cognitive access, its members obey the conventional laws of inherence in the class of existents (*sattā-sāmānya-samavāya*) and practical efficiency (*artha-kriyā-kārita*)]. His aim is to establish the claim that determinacy (or determinate existence/non-existence) is applicable only in terms of cognitive access. Consequently, we have the Advaitic argument that the limitation of determinacy by cognitive access means that there is no non-cognitive way of establishing that determinacy, and that therefore, independently of cognitive grasp and experiential access, there is no way of showing that the world is determinate.[21] *Ergo*, it is reasonable to conclude that the world must be indeterminate (*anirvācanīya*) independent of the cognitive constraint.

Let us take any anti-realist position to more or less claim that the nature of the world is somehow logically determined by our capacity to recognize that nature. In that sense the Advaitic position is anti-realist, with this proviso: the opponent of the anti-realist should be a

realist whose position is that the independence of the world from our capacity to recognize its nature implies it is logically capable of never being recognized. In contrast, the usual opponent of the Advaitin is the Naiyāyika, for whom the independence of the world consists in the logical possibility of there being proof that the world exists as it does even without that proof being dependent on the causal role the world plays in forming cognition. That is to say, independence consists not in the logical possibility of an uncognized, yet determinate world, but just in the logical possibility of giving an explanation for the causal i.e., cognition-determining world, without being constrained by the nature of that very cognition. Nyāya holds that all objects are knowable.[22] This must be so because the Naiyāyika thinks that it is only because cognition is regulated by a causally efficient world that the nature of the elements of that world is partly constituted by these elements being objects of cognition. The debate is therefore on these lines: can it be proved that there must be a totality of elements comprising a world of objects such that every cognition which exists does so because of causal determination by elements of that world? Or can it only be proved that cognition requires such a world; and that there is nothing to prove that there must be, for every cognition, an element of the determinate totality which renders that cognition determinately correct or erroneous? The Naiyāyika thinks that it can be argued that the cognitive life can be what it is only if it were determined by the world being the way it is; the Advaitin thinks that even if the world determined cognition, it cannot be proved that that world which is held to determine cognition is other than just what fulfils the requirement for cognition to possess the features it does.

THE INDIAN DEBATE ON REALISM IN TERMS OF DETERMINACY

It is thus possible to look at the debate on the nature of the world in terms of determinacy, depending on whether or not one thinks that there is such a world which comprises a determinate totality such that causally dependent cognitions cannot but be determinate. A philosopher can support one or the other view, depending on the manner in which the determination of the world of objects is accounted for. Both Advaitin and Naiyāyika may agree that 'empirically', individual cognitions are determined by their individual objects. But the discussion on error leads up to the point that determination plays a role in the validation of cognitions only because of the nature of the cognitive order which provides instances of correlation and absence of correlation with the objects of cognition. That has been taken to substantiate the Advaitic transcendental point that logically, the nature of the world of objects cannot be determined as other than that world required for cognition; everything the *pramāṇas* accomplish is subject to this cogni-

tive constraint. The issue therefore is this: either there is a transcendental proof that the fact of there being objects determines cognition, or there is a transcendental argument that what objects are is determined by the fact that there is cognition of them, even though the conception of what objects are includes the feature of their being the causal determinants of cognition. [The latter position is not equivalent to saying that objects are cognitive constructs, or dependent on inter-subjective (or inter-cognitive) ratification of some sort, though it could be adopted as such by an idealist.]

In terms of determinacy, the 'realist' believes that it is a totality of objects which determines cognition of its elements. For each cognition, therefore, it must be the case that a judgement is determinately true or false. With the *anyathākhyāti* theory, the Naiyāyika attempts to show how there can be both a causal determination of each cognition by causally efficient objects *and* erroneous cognition (with false judgement). If that is the case, then the Naiyāyika may be held to defend the principle of determinacy. So the metaphysical question is whether it is determinately true or false that there is an independent, causally efficient world. To that the Naiyāyika is disposed to answer, from all that has been argued, that it is true that there is such a world. Every cognition is given content determinately by objects; and in general that is so because there is a totality of cognition-determining determinate objects.

The position diametrically opposed to this is one which maintains that it is determinately false that there exists such a world of objects. The Buddhists deny the determination of cognition by extrinsic objects; the totality for them is comprised of the conception of objects in the cognitive faculty. Therefore, it is determinately false that there is such a determinate world.

That leaves the non-realists saying something like what western anti-realists may be taken as saying. The *metaphysical* anti-realist position is that while we may understand what would be the case with conditions beyond recognition, we nevertheless understand only because we grasp what it would be to recognize (or experience) those conditions.[23] So in a fundamental way, our understanding is bound by our recognitive capacity. Consequently, even though there may be recognition-transcendent truth-*conditions* for the comprehension of statements, the statements we make require that those conditions be bound by our capacity to grasp what it would be to experience them. So those conditions must be in principal *cognizable*; we must have a conception of what it would be to experience them. They must be within the bounds of our cognition. If they transgress such bounds, they will have no truth-*value*. They would not, in Putnam's sense,[24] *refer* to conditions within the bounds of recognition, and would therefore not have any validity or invalidity by the standards of truth-evaluation we possess and under-

stand. Statements about such conditions would, even if they are meaningful (for we would grasp under what conditions they would hold), be indeterminate as to their truth-value (for there would be no way of determining what would constitute their being true or false, since our standards for truth and falsity are dependent upon the limits of our grasp). On the other hand, any statement about conditions within the experienceable realm would be determinate.[25] The non-realist argument of the Advaitin is somewhat akin to this metaphysical position. The non-realist says that any particular cognition has its object and every judgement in consequence is determinate, if tested and evaluated by the *pramāṇa* system of validation. But there is no way, beyond applying such a system, to determine whether judgements are determinate or not. This is exactly the case with the metaphysical judgement about the world. What is this judgement in question? It is that 'there is a world made up of objects, which is cognized but whose existence is independent of such cognition'. (It might be noted that this idea of 'independent existence' is conventionally translated as 'real'; I have avoided this because such a usage can lead to further difficulties.)

It was noted in the second section that the challenge for any ontology was to provide for an adequate account of the features of cognition; if the stated ontology did not accord with that account, then such an ontology must be discarded. It was also pointed out that the real task of such an ontology was to account not only for veridical cognition, but erroneous cognition, because it was with erroneous cognition that the relationship between objects (of the ontology in question) and cognition was thrown into question. What Vācaspati's analysis of the Nyāya theory of error has shown is that the Nyāya ontology of determinate objects in an independent world cannot in fact account for the features of erroneous cognition. In other words, the features of erroneous cognition do not fit a realist ontology of a determinate world. What is offered instead, is an account of erroneous cognitions which fits with a rather more complex ontology. In this ontology, objects are determinate *only to the extent* that particular cognitions of them are corrected (or sublated) by certain epistemic standards. But that cannot be done to *cognition as a whole* for there would be no *further* cognitions to sublate them.[26] In that context, the analysis of error suggests that the status of cognized objects is indeterminate. The Advaitic ontology is therefore one in which the world is determinate only to the extent of there being an evaluation of cognition—i.e., only to the extent of epistemic grasp. It is indeterminate as to what the world is independently of cognition.

Of course, another question remains regarding the Advaitic position itself: is it determinately true that the world is indeterminate? Or is that too indeterminate in itself? This requires a separate study. The Advaitin, in any case, cannot settle on what must comprise the elements

of a determinate world, though of course, he cannot reject the claim that there may be such a totality.[27] This is, whatever else they may disagree on, a fundamental tenet of Advaitic philosophers. It is the explication of this tenet which marks out the different sub-schools; but it is to Vācaspati that we must credit the seminal Advaitic claim that the world is indeterminate. This paper does no more than to introduce the concept and offer some very tentative suggestions on the direction in which a deeper inquiry of the concept should go—in this sense, it is only programmatic.

Notes and References

1. Edited by N.A. Krishna Śāstri and V.L. Sāstri Pansikar, Nirnayasagar, Bombay, 1917.
2. *Perception*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, Chap. 10.
3. Following Peacocke, *Sense and Content*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, p.6. Conceivably, the content of the experience of looking at the lines could indicate that they are of unequal length, but the judgement would vary according to one's knowledge of optical illusion.
4. These elements are usually held to be known by the subject through some principle of acquaintance, so that the ability to attempt identification in a current case of direct contact is taken as caused by a prior case of direct cognitive contact. This should be seen as a simplification in the discussion of paradigm cases of perceptual error, rather than a more general constraint on the mode of acquisition of discriminative grasp of objects.
5. For the use of such translation see Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1985, p. 241.
6. The notations are meant to alert one to the fact that there are two entirely different objects involved, not a single one which is both the 'this' in the perceptual demonstrative and the 'that' in the memory demonstrative. So ^that^ piece of silver, if presented now in perception, would be ^this^ piece of silver; *this* currently perceived shell would, when remembered, be *that* shell. The disjunction between each demonstrative and that object as it is identified, is more than a grammatical distinction between the pairs of adjective and the noun. It is indicative of the logical disjunction between the bare ostended element of cognition and the identified object.
7. Cf. Vātsyāyana, 'The non-existence of everything refuted', *Nyāya Bhāṣya* on Akṣapāda Gautama's *Nyāya Sūtra*; edited by A. Thakur, Mithila, Darbhanga; *Nyāya Sūtra* 4.2.35-35.
8. The *Nyāyavārttika tātparyaṭīkā*; edited by A.N. Thakur, Mithila, 1967.
9. *Asannihita-viśayatvam ca smṛtirūpatvam*; pp. 19-20.
10. *Sannihita-viśayam pratyabhijñānam samīcānam iti*; p. 20.
11. *Smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvavadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*; Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, Introduction.
12. There is a complication with recognition, where it is vital that the memory and perceptual demonstratives match; but it will be obvious that the temporal index o. the memory demonstrative would still be different.
13. Refer to C. Ram Prasad's, 'Dreams and Reality: The Śaṅkarite Critique of *Vijñānavāda*', in *Philosophy East and West*, July 1993, for a fuller treatment of the epistemic requirements of the *pramāṇa* theory. I have since developed a differ-

ent treatment of the theory in forthcoming works, but this earlier one suffices for my purposes here.

14. *Na cedam atyantam asat . . .tasya anubhavagocaratvānupapatteḥ*; p. 26.
15. *Tasmān na sat nāsat na' pi sadasat parasparavirodhāt*; ibid.
16. See C. Ram Prasad's 'Dreams and Reality' for this interpretation.
17. *Apratītasyāropāyogād āropyasya pratītirupayujyate na vastu-satteti*; p.17.
18. *Tasmād akāmenāpi prakāśamanasyāpi āropitasya na vastu- sattvam abhyupagamanīyam*; p.22.
19. Brentano, 'The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena', translated by D.B.Terrell in R.M.Chisholm (ed.), *Realism and Background of Phenomenology*, Free Press, Glenco, Illinois, 1961, pp. 39–61.
20. *Perception*, pp. 190–92.
21. Nobody has argued for this better than Śri Harṣa. See the author's 'Knowledge and the "Real" World: Śri Harṣa and the *Pramāṇas*', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, June 1993.
22. See e.g., S.C.Chatterjee: *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, Calcutta, 1939; D.H.H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951, p.39.
23. Michael Luntley, *Language, Logic and Experience*, Duckworth, London, 1998.
24. Hilary Putnam, 'Brains in Vats', in *Reason, Truth and History*, C.U.P., Cambridge, 1981, p. 14ff.
25. The orthodox or semantic anti-realist position is that since we manifest understanding of statements, we must be able to recognize the conditions under which those statements are true or false; we must recognize truth-conditions. We would not be able to either acquire or manifest that understanding if the conditions which statements advert to are recognition-transcendent. Therefore, any statement which adverts to recognition-transcendent truth-conditions must fail to have truth-value, since whether or not that statement is true, cannot be determined. Against this is the usual criticism that as a matter of fact we do exhibit understanding of statements which advert to conditions *ex hypothesi* beyond recognition.
26. Of course, in fact, the Advaitic claim is that there is indeed further sublating cognition in the form of Brahman-realization. But that is a soteriological matter with which we cannot deal here.
27. He can claim that there is a totality beyond this indeterminate world by appeal to the scriptures, but that is a different matter.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

On the Radical Distinction between the *Kṛṣṇa* and the *Śukla Yajurveda* and Professor Heesterman's Remarks Thereon

The distinction between the Vedic and the Sramāṇic traditions is well-known to students of the Indian civilization, as also the conflict between them and the identification of the former with the primacy of the life of the householder, and of the latter with that of the renouncer, so graphically illustrated in the wandering ochre-clothed *sanyāsis* of India. The division, opposition and conflict is supposed to be epitomized in the well-known example of a Sanskrit compound where two opposed beings are joined together in a linguistic unity, such as *ahi-nakula* or *brāhmaṇa-śramaṇa*. As the *brāhmaṇa-śramaṇa* pair comes after the *ahi-nakula* or serpent-mongoose pair, the latter are, by implication, supposed to be opposed to each other in as deadly a manner as the former. At least, Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* seems to think so and, presumably, reflects the general opinion held in his time.

Yet, though widely held, the view has been seriously challenged by Professor Heesterman who has tried to show that the renunciatory act was an integral part of the Vedic ritual, at least as presented in the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* which, according to him, is not only earlier than the *Śukla Yajurveda* but represents an earlier form of the ritual which gets radically transformed in the latter, even though the two are treated as the same and called by the same name. This thesis of radical difference between the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* and the *Śukla Yajurveda* and the contention that renunciation, not in the sense of *dravya tyāga* as embedded in the formal, ritualistic dedication to Agni in the formula *agnye idam, na mama* but as a lifestyle, has however not been noticed by most scholars interested in Vedic studies in India.

When this came to my notice, I thought we should have a discussion in the *JICPR* along the lines of the earlier discussion we had on Staal's view of *dravya tyāga* (*JICPR*, Vol. XI, No.1) and of Potter's view regarding the stages of development in Advaita Vedānta. However, as traditional scholars in the field of the two *Yajurvedas* were not known to me, I sought the help of Shri Kireet Joshi, the then Director of the Rashtriya Veda Vidyā Pratiṣṭhāna, and he agreed to contact some eminent Vedic scholars and try to get their comments on this issue which has far-reaching implications for the understanding of Indian civilization in general and the *brāhamaṇa-śramaṇa* relation in particular.

Later, Shri Kireet Joshi informed me that Dr Kansara and Dr Fateh Singh, two well-known scholars of the Veda, had agreed to help us regarding this matter, and examine the contention of Professor Heesterman if I would provide them the relevant material he had written on the subject. Thereupon, following the earlier pattern, we requested the late Professor R.C. Dwivedi to prepare a summary in Sanskrit of the main points made by Professor Heesterman in his article entitled 'Brahmin, Ritual and Renouncer' contained in his book entitled *The Inner Conflict of Tradition*, to be sent to scholars who generally do not know English and whose language of intellectual discourse happens to be, even now, primarily Sanskrit as it used to be in the ancient times. We also sent the summary in Sanskrit to Professor Heesterman in order to confirm if his views had been correctly presented and if no injustice had been done to him in the rendering of his views in Sanskrit. In spite of many letters, both registered and unregistered, we did not get any reply from him. But, luckily for us, both the scholars who had agreed to comment knew English well and in fact, requested for the whole of the original English text of the article so that they could get a better idea of his views than was available from the Sanskrit summary of the English original which itself was a translation from the German in which the article had first been written and published.

The lack of any response from the author created a number of problems for us, as we were not even sure whether he wanted his views to be discussed by traditional Sanskritic scholars in India today, as most of the Indologists in the West, and many in India also, *use* them as *sources* for information instead of peers who could be engaged in a dialogue or *questioned* on an equal footing regarding what they had said or written. Moreover, Professor Heesterman had elaborated his views in other writings of his which were not easily available in India. A summary of these was available in the *Vedic Bibliography* published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute at Poona, but summaries are not a very reliable guide to the details of the argument of the author. But even if they had been available, we would not have known, in the absence of any communication from the author, whether what he has said was being correctly represented or not.

In the face of this academically understandable silence from the author, there seemed no option left but to rely on the article we had in hand and publish the comments we had received from Professor Kansara and Dr Fateh Singh who had written them on the basis of the article which *alone* we had been able to supply them for the purpose. However, in the absence of any communication from the author, we do not feel free to publish even that portion of the article on which the comments are based. Interested readers will have to find it for

themselves in *Inner Conflict of Tradition* in which the article entitled 'Brahmin, Ritual and Renouncer' occurs.

Professor Kansara gives a profound scholarly background to his comments which is valuable in itself while Dr Fateh Singh deals directly with the issues raised by Heesterman in his article. We hope the readers of *JICPR* will benefit from the discussion and that others will also join it as it relates to one of the most fundamental issues that have figured up till now in the understanding of Indian civilization.

DAYA KRISHNA

Dr Kansara's Comments

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Vyāsa Pārāśarya Kṛṣṇa Davipāyana is traditionally known as the celebrated compiler of the Vedas, Itihāsas and the Purāṇas. He divided the single Veda into four and arranged them, and so was called Vyāsa. He had four disciples and entrusted to each of them one Veda, viz., the *Ṛgveda* to Paila, the *Yajurveda* to Vaiśampāyana, the *Sāmaveda* to Jaimini and the *Atharvaveda* to Sumantu.[1] The statement that he arrranged and divided the four-*pāda* Veda into four individual ones suggests that, (i) though *Ṛc, Sāman*, and probably *Yajus* and *Atharvan* were distinguished before, yet they had not been treated distinctly, all coexisted as four *pādas* in one general Veda, and he definitely separated them and constituted them respectively as four distinct Vedas; or (ii) that, at any rate, he expressly and formally fixed the four-fold division and completed the canon of each Veda into definite shape, which became finally subject to small modifications afterwards.[2]

Tradition supplies some indications touching the compilation of the Veda. The hymns composed by Dīrghatamas, Bharadwāja, Atri, etc., seem to have formed incipient collections (*saṁhitās*) among the Viśvāmitras, Bhārgavas, Āṇgirasas and Ātreyas about the commencement of the *Tretā* age. And the institution of sacrifice (*yajña*) developed soon after Bharata's time. Tradition suggests that the *Tretā* age began about Sāgara's time,[3] and most of the *ṛṣis* who composed the great bulk of the hymns were much later, chronologically.[4] Those collections would have grown with fresh hymns composed by later *ṛṣis* and especially during the great advance of brāhmaṇism under the various branches of the Bharatas, when and by whom sacrificial rites appear to have been largely developed.[5] The next stage to be noticed is that of the division of *Ṛc, Yajus* and *Sāman* which had apparently come into

existence before the time of Hiraṇyagarbha, king of Koṣala, because he and his disciple, King Kṛta, constructed *saṁhitās* of *sāmans*, which were called the eastern *sāmans*, and the chanters of them were called *kartās*. This and the following compilations were in the *Dvāpara* age, and the statement that the Vedas were arranged in that age is true.[6] By the time of King Brahmadatta of South Pāñcāla, the collections of hymns appear to have been largely constituted, for they were definitely combined into a whole by his two ministers, Kāṇḍārīka (or Puṇḍarīka) and Śubālaka (or Gālava) Bābhravya Pāñcāla. Kāṇḍarīka is described as *dvi-veda, chandoga* and *adhvaryu*, and as the promulgator (*pravartaka*) of the *Veda-śāstra*. Bābhravya Pāñcāla was *bahvṛca* and *ācārya* and knew all the *śāstras*; he composed the *śikṣā* and instituted it; he also devised the *krama*, mastered it thoroughly and instituted it. Tradition thus declares that the first substantial compilation and study of the hymns of the Veda in its triple departments of *Ṛc, Yajus* and *Sāman* were made in South Pāñcāla by the two brāhmaṇ ministers of Brahmadatta, whose position may be estimated as about a century and a half before the Bharata battle. But Kāṇḍarīka's compilation of the Vedas was not as we have it now, first, because certain hymns, such as Devāpi's for instance (*RV* X.98), could not have been included since they were later; and second, because tradition is unanimous that Vyāsa 'arranged' (*vivyāsa*) the Veda, which means a real arrangement of the Veda as it was finally settled. The final compilation was thus made about half a century later, because hymns are attributed to Asita or Devala, who was a contemporary of the Pāṇḍavās and so of Vyāsa. Vyāsa must have added all the hymns that were incorporated later, and completed that canon. Tradition entirely supports this. Only a *ṛṣi* of commanding ability, knowledge and eminence could have made it a canon accepted unquestionably thereafter, and that is exactly the character and position which tradition unanimously attributes to Vyāsa, a *ṛṣi* pre-eminent above all others.[7]

Paila made two versions of the *Ṛgveda* and gave them to his disciples, one to Indraparamati and other to Vāṣkala.[8] Vaiśampāyana made eighty-six *saṁhitās* of the *Yajurveda* and all his disciples received them except Yājñavalkya, who was discarded because of his presumption. Jaimini taught his *Sāmaveda* to his son Sumantu, he to his son Sutvan, and he to his son Sukarman. Sumantu divided his *Atharvaveda* into two and taught it to Kabandha.[9]

The eighty-six disciples of Vaiśampāyana fashioned the *Yajurveda saṁhitās*, and comprised three groups distinguished geographically, the northern, the *madhyadeśya* and the eastern, the chiefs of which were respectively Śyāmāyani, Āsuri and Ālambi. They were all called Carakas and Carakādhvaryus, and Taittirīyas Yājñavalkya, called Brahmarāti, fashioned independently separate Yajuses, and had fifteen disciples,

Kaṇva, Madhyamdina, and others, who were all called Vājins, or Vājasaneyas, since Yājñavalkya was Vājasaneya.[10]

The *Pañcaviṃsa* and *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇas* are the most archaic of the regular Brāhmaṇas. The *Pañcaviṃsa*, though its home apparently lay further east, contains minute descriptions of sacrifices performed on the rivers Sarasvati and Dṛṣadvatī, and has no allusion to the Kuru-Pāñcālas; hence it was apparently composed before the blending, and while the Kurus still reigned at Hastinapura and over Kurukṣetra, (say) soon after 800 BC. The *Śatapatha* is posterior to the *Kauṣītaki* and the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇas*. The Brāhmaṇa period ended apparently before or about 600 BC.[11]

There are references in the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*[12] and in the Mahābhārata[13] to the effect that both the *devas* and the *asuras* were following the same system of the sacrifice, but when a conflict arose between them, the *devas* selected a different line, which enabled them to score a victory over the *asuras*. The references testify to the fact that whatever the gods did in the sacrifice, the *asuras* did; but the *devas* differed in performing the ceremonies known by the names: (i) *Anvāhārya* connected with Prajāpati; (ii) the offering, one on eleven potsherds for Agni and Viṣṇu, an oblation for Sarasvatī, after performing the full-moon sacrifice; (iii) the *Agnihotra* as the vow, the full-moon rite as the animal sacrifice to Agni and Soma, the new-moon rite as the animal sacrifice to Agni, the *Vaiśvadeva* as the morning pressing, the *Varuṇapraghasas* as mid-day pressing, the *Sākamedhas*, the sacrifice to the fathers, and the offering to *tryāmbaka*; (iv) the overpowering *homas*; (v) putting down of *aksnayāstomīyā* bricks in one place after reciting in another; (vi) establishing the sacrifice in *upānsu*, and the *antaryāma* cup; (vii) choosing a boon by drawing cups for *Śukra* and *Manthin*; (viii) seeing the cups with the *āgrayaṇa* at their head; and (ix) causing the metres and the pressings to find support in the *adābdhya*. Further, the conflict seems to have arisen due to the competitive mentality between them, as a result of which the *asuras* resorted to foul play. Thus they are referred to[14] as having torn and eaten the libations made by the *devas*, and, the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* specifically mentions that the *devas* and the *asuras* were in conflict (*saṃyattā āsan*).[15]

Now, as regards these *devas* and *asuras*, we find that both are mentioned hundreds of times in the *Ṛgveda*, and the *devas*, like Varuṇa and Indra are addressed as *'asura'* too.[16] Kaśyapa, the son of Marīci, is called the father of the *devas* and the *asuras*.[17] Brāhmaṇism originally was not an Aila or Ayan institution. The earliest brāhmaṇas were connected with the non-Aryan peoples, and were established among them when the Ailas entered. This is corroborated by the close connection that existed between them and the *daityas, dānavas* and *asuras*. *Usanas-Śukra* and the *daityas* and the *dānavas* could not have been the production of later times, when the Bhārgavas were a renowned family and those

people were regarded as demonic. The *Dānava Śambara* is represented as devoted to brāhmaṇs. It is said that the Bhārgavas were *purohitās* to Hiraṇyakaśipu, the original *daitya* monarch, and that 'Vasiṣṭha' was his *hotṛ*. Further, it is often declared that Indra incurred the sin of brahmanicide (*brahma-hatyā*) by killing Vītra and Namuci, implying that those two famous *dānavas* were brāhmaṇs. Indeed, in the *Ṛgveda*, Indra is often praised for slaying Vṛtra and other demons, so that these ideas must be more ancient still, and the tradition has preserved ideas more primitive than the hymns that speak of these matters. And Kaṣyapa, Aṅgiras, Atri, Bhṛgu, Vasiṣṭha and others are all connected with non-Aryans too. What the very early brāhmaṇs were is evidenced by what is said about their doings. They were sometimes connected with sacrifices, especially in later tales and versions of older tales, but what is constantly associated with them is austerities (*tapas*). That was their chief pursuit and the main exercise, and its efficacy was in their belief to acquire superhuman powers which would enable them to dominate the natural and supernatural worlds: hence it is often alleged that by *tapas* they (and other men also) gained from the gods the boons they wanted, or that the gods were terrified and endeavoured to break their *tapas*. It was in that age what sacrifice became afterwards. Their reputation rested on their claim to possess 'occult' faculties and powers and the popular belief that they possess them. Thus, it appears that the original brāhmaṇs were not so much priests as 'adepts' in matters supernatural, 'masters' of magico-religious force, wizards, medicine-men. Their reputation won them very high rank, equal to that of their princes. They do not appear to have constituted a caste then. It is said that brāhmaṇs were united (*saṅgata*) with kṣatriyas originally, and there was no difficulty in early times in kṣatriyas becoming brāhmaṇs.[18]

Tradition supplies some indications touching the compilation of the Veda. Thus it is said, that the *mantras* were put together (*saṃhitā*) in the *Tretā* age, that the Vedas were put together at the beginning of the *Detā* age and were arranged in the *Dvāpara* age; and that sacrifice (*yajña*) was instituted at the same time, and so *dharma* was constituted then. Tradition does not indicate any marked stage for a long time afterwards, except that it suggests that in the time of Vasu, *Caidya-uparicara* the question became acute, whether animals should be offered in sacrifices or only inanimate things. He was the foremost monarch of his day. He was appealed to as an authority on *dharma*, and declared that the practice of sacrificing animals was quite permissible, and so incurred the anger of brāhmaṇs who asserted the doctrine of *ahiṃsā*; though it is said he made a great sacrifice in which nothing living was offered.[19]

YAJURVEDA: ŚUKLA AND *KṚṢṆA*

It was Vaiśampāyana who inherited the *Yajurveda* from Vyāsa. And all the 86 *saṁhitās* made by him were inherited by his disciples, Yājñavalkya being one of them. They were all called Carakas and Carakādhvaryus, and Taittirīyas. Thus Yājñavalkya as Vaiśampāyana's disciple fashioned independently separate *Yajus-mantras*, and his teaching appears to have been adopted by King Janmejaya III for, it is said, he established the Vājasaneyaka school in disregard of a Vaiśampāyana one in spite of his curse, but ultimately abdicated.[20] It should also be noted that Yājñavalkya was also a disciple of Vāṣkala and was given one of the four *saṁhitā* versions, the rest of the three being given to Bodhya, Agnimāṭhara and Parāsara. This is important from the point of view of the genesis of the *Śukla Yajurveda*, as distinct from the *Kṛṣṇa*.

The *Caraṇavyūha* specifically explains the reasons why the two nomenclatures are applied to these two main versions of the same *Yajurveda*. *Śukla* is due to its emphasis on the *sāttvika* outlook, and due to its being devoid of spoiled or rejected matter,[21] as against the *Kṛṣṇa*, which is a mixed text, comprising *mantras* in various metres, and *brāhmaṇa* portions in prose. The commentator Mahīdāsa seems to confirm this when he remarks that there are 1900 *mantras* of *Ṛc* collection in the *Vājasaneyaka* which endows it with *śukra*, i.e. whiteness,[22] and hence it is *Śukla*. He also gives one more justification in that the study of the *Śukla Yajurveda* is traditionally started in the bright half (*śukla-pakṣa*) of the lunar month on the full-moon day in the early morning when the fourteenth night is about to end, while that of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* commences on the first day (*pratipāda*) of the dark half of the lunar month in the early morning when the full-moon night is about to end.[23] He also gives one more justification for the nomenclature *Śukla* in that it was imparted to Yājñavalkya by Āditya at noon, when the day is the brightest.[24]

It is beyond question that the *mantras* of the *Taittirīya* must have been developed in that school from a common stock, which also afforded the origin of other *saṁhitās*, and especially the *Kāṭhaka*, the *Kapiṣṭhala*, and the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitās*. All these texts show a generic similarity, which marks them off, as tradition asserts, from the white *Yajurveda*, as represented by the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* and the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. The mere fact of the careful separation of *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* shown in those texts proves that they were thus arranged deliberately as an improvement on the confusion of the *Taittirīya* and other texts. It is true that this confusion may be overrated: the great fire-piling ritual in *Taittirīya* IV, in *mantra*, is separated clearly from the *brāhmaṇa* in V and I. 1–4 is also purely *mantra* with a widely separated *brāhmaṇa* (*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, iii, 2, 3; *Saṁhitā* vi) and there are similar distinctions in other texts. But the fact remains that in many cases *mantra* and

brāhmaṇa do go hand in hand, and in some cases even in the *Taittirīya* they are found adjacent in the same section, a feature more common in the system of division of the *Kāṭhaka* and *Maitrāyaṇī* texts. And we cannot doubt that our existing *saṁhitās* were constructed when the importance of the speculation was at least as great as that of the *mantras*, which were taken over as an integral part of the texts and as a basis for the speculations.[25]

It is perfectly clear that the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* in the text is inferior in originality to the text of the black *Yajurveda*: it has evidently been altered in course of time and before its present reduction to correspond closely with the text of the *Ṛgveda*, and indeed in one recension the *Ṛgveda* treatment of *ḍ* between vowels as *ḷ* has been adopted. The conclusion is, therefore, justified that the *Vājasaneyi* was reduced to its present form when the influence of the *Ṛgveda* was more and more predominating,[26] as is evidenced by the traditional connection of Yājñavalkya with the *Ṛgveda* too.

The evidence of language does not suggest any very serious difference in position between the *brāhmaṇa* portions of the *Saṁhitā* or the *Brāhmaṇa* or the *Āraṇyaka*, and this conclusion is fully justified by a consideration of the contents of these works. It is clear at once that the *Brāhmaṇa* is a composite work, and doubtless it owes its existence to the desire of the Taittirīya school to emulate the *Ṛgvedic* tradition of *brāhmaṇa* and *saṁhitā*, which led to the separation of both in the *Vājasaneyi* reduction. But the whole form of the work proves that its materials were merely then collected, not created. It shows as great a confusion of the *mantra* and*brāhmaṇa* sections as the *Saṁhitā* itself.[27]

It is worthwhile to note the importance that the *Sūtras* accord in recognizing the whole content both of the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Āraṇyaka*. Thus Baudhāyana (ii.1) enumerates the whole content of the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Āraṇyaka*, and excluding the Upaniṣads and the *Svādhyāya* section (*Āraṇyaka*, ii), he deals with practically the whole text of those works known to us. Similarly Āpastamba covers the ground fully, though naturally he does not deal with the Upaniṣads. The *Sūtras* do not recognize any distinction between the *Araṇyaka*, the *Brāhmaṇa*, or the *Saṁhitā* as regards their *brāhmaṇa* portions. The term '*brāhmaṇa*' is constantly used in Baudhāyana and Āpastamba to cover either the *brāhmaṇa* parts of the *Saṁhitā* or the *brāhmaṇa* parts of the *Brāhmaṇa* or the *brāhmaṇa* parts of the *Āraṇyaka*. *Brāhmaṇa* indeed does not have a technical sense as a reference to a definite text or portion of a text, but merely as a ritual explanation, which in certain cases is sufficiently detailed to render further detailed description needless; e.g., in Āpastamba (xix. 15. 16, 18) it is briefly stated that the *Āruṇaketuka* and the *Divaḥśyenayaḥ* rites are explained in the *brāhmaṇa*, the first being found in the *Āraṇyaka*, i, and the latter in the *Brāhmaṇa*, iii. 12. 1, 2. So far as we can judge, there is no trace of any distinction being felt by

the *sūtrakāras* between the nature of the texts before them; they all fit into one of the two categories, either *mantra* or *brāhmaṇa*. Moreover, these *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* portions were arranged in *anuvākas*, and these *anuvākas* were classed in sections by subject-matter.[28]

The question of the dating of the *Saṁhitā* will probably always remain a matter of speculation. The *mantra* portion is probably earlier than the *brāhmaṇa*. This may, of course, be doubted, and Bloomfield in particular has repeatedly questioned the view that the *mantra* can be regarded as preceding in time the *brāhmaṇa* portion of the texts, even as regards the *Ṛgveda* itself. The two are, he considers, closely interlaced, and separation is dangerous to our understanding of the problems of interpretation presented in the hymns. Moreover, he has illustrated his theme by various examples, in his interpretation of the myth of the Gāyatrī as the eagle and as the bearer of *soma*, or the legend of Trita as the scapegoat of the gods and so forth. It is possible that Bloomfield's theory may have a better chance of interpreting the facts. Nor can it be doubted that the *Yajus mantras* and the *Brāhmaṇa* texts appear to reflect a very similar religious and cult outlook. The differences between the two are not differences between the *Ṛgveda* and the *Brāhmaṇa*, but of a minor and less important order.[29]

The *mantras* and the *brāhmaṇas* of the *Saṁhitā* show in general the closest and most intimate relations, pointing to the dependence of the latter on the former. The *brāhmaṇa* portion of the text does not attempt to deal in full with every verse of the *Saṁhitā*. Only what is of importance or of interest from a theological point of view attracts attention, and the points dealt with could easily be increased indefinitely. It is impossible then to seek to show that the whole of the *mantras* of the *Saṁhitā* were before the framers of the *Brāhmaṇa*, and recourse must be made to the negative argument, that no portion of the text can be shown to be deliberately ignored in the *Brāhmaṇa*.[30]

THE ROLE OF THE PRIESTS IN THE SACRIFICE

When the priest-poets started evolving the idea and practice of the sacrifice, they had to define their position in relation to the divinities towards whom the sacrifices were directed, the patrons who supported their sacrificial activities and also the actual performances that they would undertake. As long as a proper balance in this triple relationship was maintained, the system of sacrifice developed on proper lines, in its turn, helping the cause of general social progress. It is for this reason that we find the social structure standing well-balanced with proper importance attached to all prevalent sections. With the mechanization of the idea of sacrifice, however, the balance was disturbed and consequently the form of social structure also changed.[31]

The seers of the *Ṛgvedic* hymns looked upon and cultivated the no-

tions of this three-fold relationship in a way which indicates the nature of the sacrifice they were trying to evolve. Though the divinities were conceived mainly for the purposes of rendering help to human beings and the sacrifice, for the sake of divine propitiation, both the ideas were being progressively evolved. The divinities have not deteriorated merely into rendering help nor has sacrifice attained the form of merely a means of ensuring or buying the divine assistance. Among the divinities, Agni has got functions very much akin to those of the human priests and hence gets epithets like *hotṛ, purohita,* etc. But we find that in the hymns of the *Ṛgveda,* the importance of Agni as divinity has never dwindled; nor have the priests been glorified beyond any reasonable proportions. While the priest-poets have become progressively conscious of their significant contribution to the cause of sacrifice, they have not been blind to the importance of the other agencies instrumental in the growth of the sacrifice and hence have maintained their role of the followers of the system, which they aspired to develop. Their work is compared with the carving of a chariot and for which they have been complimented as intelligent (*sudhayaḥ*).[32] It is this intelligent service that came to be emulated and made a poet express the desire that he should be one of those who offered the *soma* worship.[33] The patrons looked upon the priests as indispensable for the purposes of sacrifice. Just as the priests came to be compared with Agni in respect of the similarity of certain functions in the sacrifice, viz., *purohita* and *hotṛ,* so too the patrons came to be compared with Indra in respect of his liberal gifts (cf. *maghavan*) and glory (cf. *sūri*) in the sacrifice. It can be said that as long as the sacrifice was not well-developed, the class-distinction did not become so rigid. There is no evidence to say that right from the beginning, the class of the priests started to shape the sacrifice in a way favourable to their predominance because the class of the singer-priests was in a pretty mobile condition in the early stages. Thus, the evolution of the class of the priests is essentially based on the evolution of the idea and practice of sacrifice and it is from this point of view that the introduction of the different categories of priests has to be noted with interest. It is clear that the family tradition has come into existence at a pretty early stage of the *Ṛgveda* sacrifice.[34]

Dakṣiṇā

The word *dakṣiṇā* is used a number of times in the *Ṛgveda* and at a number of places, it carries the sense of 'the gift given to the priest in the sacrifice'; but it also appears that the sense of the word is evolved out of certain associations with the sacrifice. The word is used occasionally in a metaphorical sense of the 'oblations given to the gods' or the 'gifts given by the gods'. As the word *dakṣiṇā* means 'right', and as the ladles are referred to as circling towards the right-hand side, whatever was thus given by the right hand, was considered as a liberal gift and so *dakṣiṇā* appears to have come to mean either 'the liberal gift' of the gods or their liberality in general. It is the rich liberality of Indra that has come to be referred to as *dakṣiṇā maghon* at a number of places, viz., *Ṛgveda* 2.11.21; 2.15.10; 2.16.9; 2.17.9; 2.18.9; 2.19.9; 2.20.9. Thus, when the word came to mean liberality in general, it appears to have come to be applied to the sacrificial gift because it was also given liberally. This liberality in sacrificial gifts, apart from being referred to in a number of *dānastutis,* is referred to in a general way as *dakṣiṇā* in *Ṛgveda* 1.168.7 and 1.169.4, where the gift of the gods is compared with the gift of the patron in respect of liberality. Indra is said to be inspiring the patrons to give rich gifts, viz., *Ṛgveda* 6.37.4. It is thereafter that *dakṣiṇā* appears to be personified and its position in the sacrifice glorified as in the case of the pressing-stones. It is personified in *Ṛgveda* 3.62.3 and an entire hymn (10.107) is devoted in glorification of *dakṣiṇā.* Sometimes the *dakṣiṇā* was given even before the pressing of the *soma*-juice, maybe as some sacrificial offerings, as in *Ṛgveda* 9.71.1.[35]

The sacrifice has grown to its larger proportions, principally on account of the support it received from rich and liberal patrons. It is true that the patrons too stood to gain by the sacrifice; still the poets appear to be stressing the importance of the patrons during the different stages of sacrifice in the *Ṛgveda.* In fact, the system of sacrifice marks the early stages of the co-operative experiment that had been set up by the intelligentsia in the social structure of those times, though co-operation on a smaller scale and in a limited sphere of activity must have been known earlier. It is for this reason that the poets are pretty frequently wishing prosperity both for themselves, as well as their patrons jointly, as in *Ṛgveda* 1.136.7; 1.140.12; 2.2.11; 5.65.6; 6.10.5; 6.46.9; 7.3.8; 7.8.9; 10.20.4; 10.98.12; and 10.115.5. A majority of the passages indicate an attitude of humility towards the patrons. In course of time, however, when the performance of sacrifices became more elaborate, the scale of importance turned in favour of the class of priests.[36]

Patrons are in this way not only grateful to the priests for the prosperity attained through the sacrifices but also to the gods through whose favour the prosperity is attained. This conception of mutual helpfulness between the divinity and the human beings through the sacrifices can thus be perceived to be the underlying idea of the institution of the sacrifice as it was being developed in the Aryan society. It has thus been emphasized by the author of the *Gītā* as leading towards social emancipation, as in *Bhagvadgītā* (3.11). It is explicitly stated in a number of passages in the *Ṛgveda.*[37]

Among the people referred to as undertaking sacrificial performances, there appear to be a number of non-Aryans as well. When it

is remembered how strongly the Aryans were pitched against the Dāsyus and the Pāṇis,[38] it is significant that some of them have been converted to the Aryan cult of sacrifice very successfully. This would indicate the assimilative attitude adopted by the Aryans on the one hand and the importance they were attaching to the cult of sacrifice on the other. It would almost appear that the sacrifice had come to be equated with the Aryan way of life and had become a symbol of their culture and civilization.[39]

With the growth of the tradition of sacrifice, the class of non-sacrificers also appears to be getting distinguished, among whom there appear to be some Aryans as well, who are referred to as non-sacrificers (*a-yajvānaḥ*).[40] Their attitude has been analysed by a poet (*Ṛgveda* 10.2.5), indicating how the protagonists of the sacrifice were thinking intelligently to find out ways and means of promoting their cause. It is partly because of such opposition that purity in sacrifice has been emphasized and Agni is compared with a chaste lady, indicating the standard of purity required in social life as also the sacrifice.[41] The description of a non-sacrificer as inhuman, and the non-offering of sacrifice as a type of social calamity,[42] shows how vital a part of social life the sacrifice had become. Indeed, the sacrifice is said to be an oasis in the desert.[43] It is indicated as a binding force between the divinities and the human beings and as a social duty for the latter.[44]

Among those who raised physical obstacles in the way of sacrificial performances, Pāṇis and Dāsyus in general appear to be quite prominent. The attempt of Pāṇis to steal away the cows of the gods appears to be a very systematic effort to put obstacles in the way of the sacrificial performances. It is, however, said to have been frustrated with the help of *soma* sacrifices, where Aṅgirasas are referred to.[45] Dāsyus appear to be an obstacle in the way of the general progress of the Aryans, and in the field of the sacrifice too, they appear to have played their role of opposition. Aryans are said to be getting the better of the *Dasyus* because of their sacrificial rites.[46] How far a Dāsyu was away from the sacrificial cult of the Aryans is indicated by the fact of their being referred to as '*anyavrata*', '*amānuṣa*', '*akarma*' and '*adevayu*'.[47] Here a different cult of the Dāsyus appears to be indicated. Some of these non-sacrificers appear to be challenging the authority of particular divinities or some specific modes of offering worship to them. An interesting way of reviling divinity was resorted to, possibly by some non-Aryans, who would prepare the oblations and then swallow them by themselves; such persons are further referred to as '*bāhukṣadaḥ*'.[48] This anti-Indra tendency is expected to be put down by fostering Indra worship.[49] Godlessness in general is said to be in opposition to sacrifice.[50] Certain Aryans are also referred to as being against Indra-worship, while others are against the worship of Mitrāvaruṇa.[51] It is not clear as to what shape this violation of the laws

would take but obviously it would be a violation of an aspect or aspects of sacrifice associated with them; they are described as '*ayajñasācaḥ*'. If they were non-Aryans or Aryans who merely opposed the sacrifice, they could have been dismissed as audacious. But this could not be done so easily. Probably, they were persons who had rendered some signal service to the sacrifice like the Ṛbhus and were demanding a place among the divinities. Some of these non-believers in the sacrifice of the Aryan conception appear to raise objection regarding the appearance of the divinities to receive oblation in the sacrifice.[52] The non-sacrificers are referred to by various epithets and in general they are expected to be punished for the sake of the sacrificers.[53] Some of the non-sacrificers are referred to as opposed to certain aspects of the sacrificial performances merely in contrast with others who perform the sacrifices, and are expected to be punished.[54] Some persons indulging in undesirable or censurable modes of worship appear to be indicated by the words '*murādevāḥ*', '*anṛtadevāḥ*' and '*śiśnadevāḥ*',[55] the last one being considered as repugnant to the protagonists of the *Ṛgvedic* sacrifice. But the intellectual and cultural background of the society combined with the soundness of the ideology being evolved through the sacrifice, appears to have helped the Aryan ritual to stand against its rivals, since sacrifice was associated with all that was noble and glorious in human life by the denunciation of the non-sacrificer as being away from humanity and truth. The foundation of the idea of sacrifice has been laid on a firm footing by denouncing the idea of 'not giving gifts' (either to the gods or the sacrificing priests) and by emphasizing the desirability of equitable distribution of wealth.[56]

Ideas of ethical importance for the well-being of society were also being evolved through the tradition of sacrifice. The first code of moral and social behaviour is said to have been brought into existence through the sacrifices inasmuch as even the gods are said to have undertaken the sacrificial performances, which were considered as the basic principles for the guidance of society.[57] Sacrifice was expected to do away with all the evil in the society, and was considered to be the touch-stone of the rightful activity. The right way of earning wealth was said to be through the sacrifice, which was considered to be the practical aspect of the theoretical *ṛta*, the fountainhead of all moral activity.[58] Sacrifice, again, was not conceived as meant merely for the sake of selfish gain. Thus, when a poet asks for cows and gold, it is for enabling him to undertake more sacrificial performances.[59] In the light of these ideas about religion and ethics, associated with the sacrifice, the myth of the *Ṛgvedic* religion being of the 'give and take type' stands exposed. The approach of the *Ṛgvedic* poets to the divinities does not appear to be so frivolous as would be made out by the description. We do not get an impression of their approaching the divinity merely as an agency to grant them their desired objects in

return of some oblations. It could have been considered as a barter if it were devoid of sentiment, which has characterized their mutual relationship. The idea of divinities entertaining affectionate thoughts about their worshippers in their minds is also occasionally stressed, indicating that it was not a sort of business relationship that was in view of the poets of the *Ṛgveda*.[60]

As long as the devotional approach to the sacrifice was maintained, the emotional appeal of the idea of *dakṣiṇā* also prevailed; but with a little mechanization of the idea of the sacrifice, *dakṣiṇā* came to be associated with social prestige or freedom from blemish and promises of social welfare came to be given on the basis of the award of the *dakṣiṇā*.[61] This new technique of the sacrifice required the dependence of others on the class of the priests and hence the balance between the two classes, which was well maintained in the days of the *Ṛgveda*, came to be disturbed in the days that followed, necessitating a fresh exposition of the idea of sacrifice in the *Gītā*.[62]

THE TECHNIQUE AND THE RATIONALE OF THE RITUAL

In the *Yajurveda*, the priests record the procedure to perform a ritual; in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, they attempted to explain the reasons for it. Unfortunately, their manner of presentation often places a difficult barrier between the word and the reader. And over the centuries, changes in language, meaning, and ideas have taken place, making the barrier insurmountable, but usually sufficient coherency remains to make the patient reader *aware* of the complexities and subtleties of brāhmaṇic thought.[63]

So the question: Why a ritual of sacrifice? One simple answer must be to obtain satisfactory results. The ritual had worked in the past; the same actions performed in the present must gain similar results. One can observe the priests labouring, step by step, precisely placing a blade of grass this way, facing a piece of wood that way, almost in a state of terror lest a detail be altered or overlooked. It lends to the tendency of the priests, a majority of whom were dogmatic ritualists. The dogma of the ritual was also its doom because fear of an error in the tedious, infinitesimal actions led to legends of unfortunate sacrificers whose ritual went wrong. Ritual performed with such concern for correctness shows a neurotic concern with maintaining the correctness of outward signs.[64]

And therefore the many specialist roles within the priesthood, the most important being: *udgātṛ, hotṛ, dhvaryu*, and brāhmaṇ. The *udgātṛ* chanted the *Sāmaveda* hymns. The *hotṛ* summoned the gods to participate in the sacrifice. He is 'the navel of the sacrifice' or 'the centre of the sacrifice',[65] and he relates the Pāriplava legend in the *Asvamedha*.[66] The *adhvaryu* followed the *Yajurveda* to perform the practical actions

of the rituals and continued this function as is well-known in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. Since Bṛhaspati was the brāhmaṇ priest of the gods, and representative and impersonation of human priesthood, his function generally appears to be that of instigator, organizer, and overseer; he was to recite the *Apratiratha* hymn as Bṛhaspati's representative.[67] Each of these specialists was assisted by as many extras as the sacrificer could afford, for each priest was given *dakṣiṇā*. Although the gods accepted slaughtered animals as their portions, the priests liked to receive the *dakṣiṇā* 'on the hoof', and one thousand cows was a figure to a brāhmin's taste, along with gold, clothes and a horse.[68]

Along with these physical accoutrements of ritual, the Aryans were aware of a sacred dimension. This was especially evident in their careful selection of a site, which must be enclosed by specified boundaries so that only the priests, the sacrificer and his wife must enter there, and so that all objects not needed in the ritual might be excluded therefrom. There was to be an unobstructed vista eastward to the rising sun. The priests were aware of the need to ritually cleanse and sanctify the sacrificer. Before the ceremony proper, the sacrificer and his wife went through a form of ritual cleansing in which water was used as an outward form for an inner shedding of sin and guilt: 'He bathes. For impure, indeed, is man; he is foul within, in that he speaks untruth;—and water is pure; because one is consecrated after becoming pure; and water is cleansing, because consecration is done after being cleansed; this is the reason why he bathes.'[69] And the text does usually imply ritual uncleanness a moral transgression. For example the wife must confess to the priest any extra-marital sexual intercourse: 'Now when a woman who belongs to one (man) carries on intercourse with another, she undoubtedly commits (a sin) against Varuṇa. He therefore asks her, lest she should sacrifice with a secret pang in her mind; for when confessed the sin becomes less, since it becomes truth; this is why he asks her.'[70] After her confession, both she and her husband refrain from sexual relations for the duration of the sacrifice—from three days to twelve months. When holiness becomes intense, or purification from contamination essential, the sacrificer is bathed and dressed in new garments.[71] And finally, to complete the sacrifice, the sacrificer was fully immersed in a stream so that he may be ritually desanctified and prepared for his return to normal life.[72]

In collecting so many varieties of water, the priests collected the vigour and essence of the waters. The water was not made 'holy' by depriving it of its mundane qualities, but its properties were enriched and its efficacy increased by moulding of diversity into one.[73]

The priests abhorred the slaughter of animals and, despite the fact that to sacrifice an animal was the code of the sacrificial system, the killing was usually represented euphemistically, as for example, 'they quiet the animal'.[74]

In the *Aśvamedha* ritual, after the return of the horse, a ceremony involves a dialogue of obscenities,[75] and the priests commented upon it saying: 'but, indeed, the vital airs pass from those who speak impure speech at the sacrifice'.[76]

In the *Agniṣṭoma*, a *soma*-sacrifice, the sacrificer was prepared for his consecration by ritual bathing, shaving of the head and beard, clipping of nails, and the donning of a new linen garment. At the same time, but outside the hall, his wife was purified and annointed by an assistant priest who then brought her into the sacred area. The priests maintained their ritual purity by constant renewal, but especially were priests and sacred vessels cleansed and purified each morning of the sacrifice.[77]

THE CONTEXT OF THE PASSAGES OF *KĀṬHAKA* (23.6; 34.7.11) AND THE *TAITTIRĪYA SAṀHITĀ* (7.2.10.3) AND OF *ĀPASTAMBA ŚRAUTA SŪTRA* (3.6.4.6)

(a) The *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā* passage (23.6) forms a part of the thirteenth *sthānaka*, entitled *dīkṣitam*, and pertains to the ceremony of consecration. The passage proper prescribes that the consecrated sacrificer should not offer oblations in fire because the consecrated sacrificer is himself an oblation.[78] It further declares that consecration subjects the sacrificer to the noose (*pāśa*) for Varuṇa, which enables the latter to receive the offerings made by the sacrificer. For the same reason the priests are restrained from eating the food of the sacrificer, lest they would partake of the sins of the sacrificer, in three manners. Hence, the priests should not eat the food of the sacrificer, nor utter impure speech, nor accept any donation from him, so long as he is consecrated.[79]

(b) The *Kāṭhaka* passage (34.7) forms a part of the thirty-fourth *sthānaka*, entitled *ekādaśinī*, i.e., a group of eleven *yūpas* and *paśus*. The passage about *dvādaśāha* proper mentions that the *devas* and the *manuṣyas* were undifferentiated (*avyāvṛttāh*) and the *devas* obtained the *dvādaśāha* sacrifice, and they purified themselves by consecration. So, a wise person should obtain the *dvādaśāha* and purify himself by consecration.[80]

(c) The passage (7.2.10.3) of the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, forms a part of the seventh *kāṇḍa*, dealing with the *mantras* used for *Aśvamedha* sacrifice, wherein the second *prapāṭhaka* describes *ṣaḍarātra* and other ceremonies. The tenth *anuvāka*, therein, deals with special *dīkṣā* or the twelfth day of the *dvādaśāha* sacrifice, and mentions that Prajāpati made Indra, who was born later on, dependant on his younger brother or very inferior (*ānujāvaraḥ*), sacrifice with the *dvādaśāha* sacrifice; and then indeed did Indra become Indra; therefore they say, 'It is the sacrifice of the inferior', for he by it first sacrificed.[81] Then, the passage further restrains the priest to accept a present at this sacrifice, since the act of

accepting a present at this sacrifice is as despicable as eating a human corpse or the corpse of a horse: 'He eats a corpse who accepts a present at a *sattra*; a human corpse or the corpse of a horse'. . . . 'He who eats his victim, eats his flesh, who eats his sacrificial cake, eats his brains, who eats his fried grain, eats his excrement, who eats his ghee, eats his marrow, who eats his *soma*, eats his sweat, and also he eats the excrements from his head, who accepts (a present) at the twelve-day (rite). Therefore, one should not cause one to sacrifice with twelve-day (rite), to avert evil.'[82] Thus, there is no mention of the priest taking over the sin of the sacrificer nor of the sacrificer being 're-born' as a result of his *dīkṣā* for a sacrifice.

(d) Now, as regards the reference to the *Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra* passage (13.6.4.6), it is neither clear nor specific. We may, therefore, try to ascertain the views of the *Kalpasūtras* in general pertaining to the *dvādaśāha* and about the *dīkṣā*, *dakṣiṇā* and relation between the priest and the sacrificer.

The *Śrautasūtras* describe many minor varieties of the *ahīnas* of which the *dvādaśāha* is important. The *soma* sacrifices having two to twelve pressing-days which are termed as *ahīnas*, and those with more than twelve pressing days are known as *sattras*. But a *Soma* sacrifice with twelve pressing days (*dvādaśāha*) is regarded both as an *ahīna* and a *sattra*. Several varieties of the *dvādaśāha*, e.g. *bharata dvādaśāha*, *saṁkrama dvādaśāha*, are mentioned in the ritualistic texts. The main points of difference between the other forms of *soma* sacrifice and the *sattras* are that the performance of the *sattras* is optional; that only the brāhmaṇas are entitled to perform the *sattras*; that they should preferably belong to the same *gotra* and *pravara*, though this rule is relaxable; that all the performers of a *sattra* and their wives should undertake *dīkṣā*; that all of them are equally entitled to the reward of the sacrifice; that there is no separate sacrificer; and that one of the participants becomes the *gṛhapati* (householder) who discharges the duties of the sacrificer, while the others simply touch him at that time. The priests taking part in the performance of a *sattra* do not perform any other rite such as the *agnihotra* and the *darśapūrṇamāsa* during the period of the *sattra*. The participants in a *sattra* are required to observe certain rules of conduct during the period of its performance. For instance, they should eschew sexual intercourse, falsehood, anger, singing, dancing, laughing without covering their mouth with their hands, plunging into deep water, climbing a tree or a boat, and contact with non-Aryans. There are no sacrificial fees in a *sattra*.[83]

The *dvādaśāha* is described as the model of all *sattras*. The twelve *soma*-pressing days of the *dvādaśāha* comprise one day of the *prāyaṇīya* (introductory rite as an *atirātra*), six days of the *pṛṣṭhya ṣaḍaha*, four days of *chandomas* (or three days of *chandimas* plus one *avivākya* day), and one day of the *udayanīya* (concluding rite) which is also an *atirātra*. The

ritualistic texts suggest some variations in the constitution of the *pṛṣṭhya ṣaḍaha.* Moreover, these texts lay down rules for the constitution of the *dvādaśāha* in the *sattras* of different periods.[84]

In the *Āpastamba Śrdutasūtra,* the *kaṇḍikās* 1 to 14 of the *praśna* 21, discuss the *dvādaśāha* proper. It begins with the statement that one is indeed reborn, qualified from heaven, and establishes himself firmly in this world.[85] Since it is both a *sattra* and *ahīna,* and since the consecrated one is helped by the non-consecrated ones to perform the ritual in *ahīna,* and since the same persons are both the priests as well as the sacrificers at a *sattra,* it is said that one should not perform a *dvādaśāha,* to avert evil.[86] There is nothing in the above *kaṇḍikās,* which might support the observation that a sacrificer drops his impure form and takes over a pure form by means of *dīkṣā* of which *dakṣiṇā* is an essential part. On the other hand, the text specifically mentions that one who does not perform penance cannot be associated with the result of this rite; hence only one who performs penance is recommended for its performance, and he is ensured of the expected result of the sacrifice.[87]

The central point which is sought to be stressed in chapter 2, entitled 'Brahmin, Ritual, and Renouncer' has nothing to do with the 'radical distinction' between the *Śukla* and the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda.* The point he has stressed is that the institution of renunciation is already implied in classical ritual thinking. The difference between classical ritualism and renunciation seems to be a matter rather of degree than of principle. The principle is the individualization of the ritual, which could not but lead to its interiorization. Renunciation is therefore not necessarily anti-brāhmaṇical. He further observes that there seems to be a close relationship between ritualistic and renunciatory thought and practice. The question that occupies religious thought does not appear to concern the affirmation or rejection of sacrifice, but rather what is the true sacrifice; the latter being, of course, the interiorized sacrifice. Nor does the question turn on brāhmaṇa superiority or its rejection, but on the point, who is the true brāhmaṇa? On this point, orthodox and heterodox thinkers seem to agree to a great extent. Thus, for instance in the Jain canon—*Uttarājjayaṇāiṁ,* chapters 12 and 25—the monk does not condemn the institution of sacrifice as such; on the contrary, he exhorts the brahmins to perform the true sacrifice—that is, the renunciatory way of life of the monk—and he declares that the true brahmin is the monk. In the same way the Buddhist *Kūṭadanta Sutta* (*Dīgh Nikāya* 5) gives a hierarchy of sacrifices, the highest sacrifice being the way of life of the monk and final emancipation. The above observations of Professor Heesterman are quite impeccable and correct.

Now, as regards his observations pertaining to the relation between the *purohita* and the *yajamāna,* and about the difference between the older pattern and later classical system in the matter. We take up his points serialwise.

(i) 'Here in this older, preclassical pattern, purity and impurity are complimentary to each other. The *yajamāna* who has undergone the *dīkṣā,* is not pure,but on the contrary is charged with the evil of death to which he has to submit in order to be reborn.' In support of this he quotes from the *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā* (23.6) which has been discussed above. We should remember here that the passage pertains to the ceremony of consecration, particularly for the twelve day sacrifice. Now, the sacrifice known as *dvādaśāha* of the *ahīna* type is under discussion here. The *yajamāna* has to be consecrated because he has to undertake a sacrifice. Of course, for the duration of the sacrifice, the prescribed vows, and these are meant to purify him, i.e., to rid him of his normal habits of worldly life of enjoyments and passions and sublimate him; and after the completion of the sacrifice he is free to return to his normal life. This concept of 'purification' is a sort of ethical quarantine which when undergone occasionally, helps the *yajamāna* to inculcate it as habitual in the course of time in his advanced years, ultimately preparing him to become a true brāhmaṇa. On the contrary, the priests are not required to undergo the consecration because they are enjoined as brāhmaṇas to lead a life of a sort of perpetual *dīkṣā* since they have to perform *agnihotra* twice daily, along with the fortnightly sacrifices of *darśa* and *paurṇimāsa;* they are already 'pure' on that account. 'To be reborn pure' does not involve 'death' in the sense of dying. 'Rebirth' here signifies only a sort of ethical sublimation; otherwise, the *yajamāna* would have to be taken as dying again to relapse into his previous impure state just after the end of the sacrifice! Accepting food, accepting clothes by way of gifts, and pronouncing the name of *yajamāna* are supposed to involve 'evil', because of their acquisition by the *yajamāna* in his pre-consecration impure state. Here, the law of *karma* is involved, and everything connected with an impure person is liable to taint the donee, psychologically and astrally. All this, of course, is not elaborated specifically by the texts; it is realized from actual practice in the course of sublimating pattern of ethical vows, which form an integral part of sacrifices. Professor Heesterman's ideas about the relationship between patron and officiant, particularly through the exchange and reversal of roles, are his own inferences, and they do not follow from the texts proper as such, necessarily.

(ii) Actually the patron-brāhmaṇa pair, surviving in the classical ritual, stands for two opposed groups co-operating in the life-winning ritual. . . we may safely assume that the co-operation of two opposed groups, which is not mentioned in the white *Yajurveda* anymore, belongs to the pre-classical system. The cooperation between two opposed parties seems to have been characterized by rivalry. Indeed, the classical ritual still contains, though under a stylized form, many contests, espe-

cially chariot races and verbal contests. . . . That ritual competition was a normal phenomenon is indicated by the fact that the full- and new-moon sacrifices are characterized as *samṛta-yajña*, 'competing sacrifice'. We are reminded here of the rivalry between the *devas* and *asuras*, who in the Brāhmaṇa texts are often described as competing in the ritual. Their (competitive) exchanges of food and gifts suggested by some passages seem to fit very well into their continuous rivalry. . . . It seems possible, then, that originally, brāhmaṇas and kṣatriyas were not closed, separate groups. It has already been mentioned that the *yajamāna*, to whatever *varṇa* he belongs, is ritually reborn a brāhmaṇa. The kṣatriya's transformation into a brāhmaṇa is made even more explicit in the *rājasūya*; . . . Indeed, we hear of kṣatriyas becoming brāhmaṇas, for example, the famous King Janaka of Videha. . . . On the other hand, brāhmaṇas do not seem to be excluded from becoming kings and warriors: for instance, the brāhmaṇa Paraśurāma after finishing his conquest performs a sacrifice, or even an *Aśvamedha*, at which he hands over the conquered earth to the brāhmaṇa Kaṣyapa, who eventually hands it over to kṣatriyas'. Here, Professor Heesterman discerns the ancient system of exchange and reversal of roles.

CONCLUSION

Professor Heesterman's assumption about the patron-brāhmaṇa pair being 'two opposed groups', although 'cooperating in the life-winning ritual' is rather far-fetched. So also is his invention of these two 'opposed parties' being 'characterized by rivalry' rather than 'co-operation'. It smacks of a sort of class-conflict. It seems he has read too much in the 'many contests, especially chariot races and verbal contests (e.g. in the *mahāvrata*, the *vājapeya*, the *rājasya*, the *aśvamedha*), for which he has relied on the second-hand evidence of Kuiper, rather than on the first-hand reference to the texts proper. There is a reference to *brahmodya*, i.e., a discussion or disputation regarding the nature of the *Brahman*, in the form of a dialogue, in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (4.6.9.20) in the course of the treatment of the *mahāvrata*. This dialogue or discussion was held between, or among, the priests and not between the brāhmaṇas and kṣatriyas. And as regards the chariot race (*ājidhāvana*), it is described as part of the *Vājapeya* sacrifice, in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (5.1.4–5.2.1) of the *Śukla Yajurveda* too. Whether these two ceremonies—*brahmodya* and *ājidhāvana*—are 'under a stylized form' or whether they are 'very much pushed into the background or transformed into liturgical operations in which there is no real contest any more' is a matter of subjective conjecture, since these *brahmodyas* and *ājidhāvanas* were essentially symbolic entertainments invested with ceremonial significance, rather than a spirit of rivalry and competition, between the patron and the priest.

As to the rivalry between the *devas* and the *asuras*, I have discussed the point above. It should be noted that these two signified different attitudes to life, rather than different races. We may also note a few Vedic references to the rivalry between them. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (11.1.6.1–11) relates an acount of the origin and nature of the *devas* and the *asuras*. According to this text, Prajāpatī created the *devas* by his upward breathing and the *asuras* by his downward breathing; they were like the day and night, quite opposed in natural disposition, although the progeny of the self-same Prajāpatī. And it was because of the social order that their natural disposition was yoked to benefit society in the life-style which adopted the *deva* aspect, while those who chose to reject it were styled the *asuras* who were militant, emotional and robust in outlook; and in terms of materialistic matters, they were more successful than the *devas*, who were rather mystical, quiescent and world-renouncing.

The difference between the pre-classical ritual as represented by the Vaiśampāyaṇa tradition of the black *Yajurveda* and the classical one represented by the white *Yajurveda* of Yājñavalkya, as has been sought to be discovered, lies in the tilt towards the divine aspect in the latter. But, on the whole, the line of investigation of Professor Heesterman is quite correct and refreshing.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Ādi. Mahābhārata*, P. 63, 88-99 (Nīlakaṇṭh edn. of Kinjavdekar):
   Brahmaṇo brāhmaṇānāṁ ca tathā'nugraha-kāṇkṣaya
   Vivyāsa Vedan yasmat sa tasmad vyasa iti smṛtaḥ/ Vedān adhyapayāmāsa mahābhārat-pañcamān// Sumantuṁ Jaiminiṁ Pailaṁ Śukaṁ caiva svam ātmajam ,Prabhur varistho varado Vaiśśampāyanam eva ca
   F.E. Pargiter, *Anc. Ind. Hist. Trad.*, p. 21.
2. Macdonell, *Sanskrit Literature*, pp. 47–50.
3. *Śānti. P. Mbh.* p. 327, 26-27.
4. Pargiter, *Anc. Ind. Hist. Trad.*, p. 315.
5. Ibid., p. 316.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., pp. 316–18.
8. Ibid., p. 322.
9. Ibid., pp. 322–25.
10. Ibid., p. 323.
11. Ibid., p. 326.
12. *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 1.7.2.3: *Devā vai yad yajña kurvata tad asurā akurvata te devā etam prajāpatyam anvāhāryam apasyan tam anvaharanto deva abhavan parasura. . .*; 3.2.2.4; 3.4.6.1; 5.3.3.1; 6.3.1.4; 6.4.6.1; 6.4.11.1; 6.6.9.1.
13. *Śānti. Mbh.* P. 347, 28-33; particularly 33: *Mama Vedā hṛtaḥ sarve dānavābhyām balād itaḥ/ Andhakarā hi me loka jatā vedair vinā kṛtaḥ//*
14. *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, 6.2.1.10.
15. Ibid., 1.5.1.1; 2.2.11.6; 2.3.7.1: *devāsurā saṁyattā āsan . . .* etc.

16. *Ṛgveda* 1.24.14; 1.174.1.
17. Pargiter, *Anc. Ind. Hist. Trad.*, p. 189.
18. Ibid., pp. 306–09.
19. Ibid., pp. 314–16.
20. Ibid., p. 324.
21. *Caraṇavyūha*, 61: *Yajurvedaḥ kalpa-taruḥ śukla-Kṛṣṇa iti dvidhā. Sattva-pradhanāc śuklākhyo yātayāma-vivarjitat.*
22. Ibid., p. 39: *Dve sahasre śataṁ nyūne mantre vājasaneyake/ ṛg-gaṇaḥ parisaṁkhyātam etat sarvam sa-śukriyam//*
23. Ibid., *Mahi. Bh.*: *Vedopakramaṇe caturdasi-yukta-paurṇimā-grahaṇāc cuklayajuh/ Pratipadā-yukta paurnimā-grahaṇāt Kṛṣṇayajur iti//*
24. Ibid.: *Madhyāhne śukla-varṇena suryeṇa dattaḥ sa-sukra-yajñaḥ parisaṁgata ityarthaḥ/*
25. Arthur Barriedale Keith, *The Veda of the Black Yajus School entitled Taittirīya Saṁhita*, H.O. Series, Vol. 18, Part I, Introduction, pp. lxxxv-vi.
26. Ibid., p. xxxvii.
27. Ibid., p. lxxvi.
28. Ibid., pp. ixxviii–ix.
29. Ibid., p. lxxiv.
30. Ibid., p. lxxiv.
31. K.R. Potdar, *Sacrifice in the Ṛgveda*, pp. 138ff.
32. *Ṛgveda* 4.2.14: *Rathaṁ na kranto apasā bhurijor ṛtaṁ yemuḥ sudhya āśuṣaṇāḥ.*
33. Ibid., 10.148.3: *Te syāma ye raṇayanta somaiḥ.*
34. Potdar, *Sacrifice in the Ṛgveda*, p. 140ff.
35. Ibid., pp. 119–21.
36. Ibid., pp. 170–71.
37. Ibid., pp. 192–93.
38. *Ṛgveda* 2.12.4 : *Yo dāsaṁ varṇam adharaṁ guhākaḥ*: 6.53.7/ *Ā rikha kikirā kṛṇu panimām hṛdaya kave athemasmabhyam rādhaya.*
39. Potdar, *Sacrifice in the Ṛgveda*, p. 272.
40. *Ṛgveda* 1.33.4-5/
41. Ibid., 5.62.6; 1/73/3/
42. Ibid., 8.70.11' 10/63.12.
43. Ibid., 10.4.1: *Dhanvann iva prāpa asi tvam agna iyakṣave purave pratna rājan.*
44. Ibid., 8.32.16.: *Na nūnam brāhmaṇam ṛṇam prasūnam asti sunvatām/ Na somo aprata pape//*
45. Ibid., 10.60.6; 7.6.3; 1.93.4; 10.108.11.
46. Ibid., 1.58.8; 6.14.3; 9.41.2.
47. Ibid., 8.70.11; 10.22.8; 5.20.2.
48. Ibid., 8.18.16; 10.27.6; 1.51.5.
49. Ibid., 1.133.1; 4.23.7.
50. Ibid., 7.98.5; 8.70.7.
51. Ibid., 10.38.3; 6.67.9.
52. Ibid., 10.39.5.
53. Ibid., 10.27.1.
54. Ibid., 1.122.8-9; 1.152.2; 10.79.1.
55. Ibid., 7.104.14; 10.87.2; 7.104.14; 7.21.5; 10.99.3.
56. Potdar, *Sacrifice in the Ṛgveda*, pp. 194–206.
57. *Ṛgveda*, 1.164.50: *Yajñena yajñam ayajanta devās tāni dharmāṇi prathamāny āsan.*
58. Ibid., 9.97.16; 9.110.1; 9.97.18.
59. Ibid., 8.32.9; 8.95.6; 10.7.1.
60. Potdar, op cit., pp. 273–275; Bloomfield, *The Bel. of the Veda*, pp. 63–70.
61. *RV.* 10.107.3, 7–8.
62. Potdar, *Sacrifice in the Ṛgveda*, pp. 271–72.
63. Naam Drury, *The Sacrificial Ritual in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, pp. 9–10.

64. *Kātha. Saṁ.* 26. 1; *Nābhir vā eṣā yajñasya yadd hotā.*; *Tait. Sam.*, 3.3.8.10 : *Madhyaṁ vā etad yajñasya yadd hotā.*
65. *Śat. Br.* 13.4.3.2.
66. Ibid., 9.2.3.1,5.
67. Ibid., 4.3.7.4 : *Catasro vai dakṣiṇāḥ/ Hiraṇyam gaur vāso śvaḥ.*
68. Ibid., 3.1.2.10: *Atha snāti. Amedhyo vai puruṣo yad anṛtaṁ vadati tena pūtir antarato, medhyā vā āpo, medhyo bhūtva dīkṣā iti, pavitraṁ vā āpaḥ, pavitra-pūto dikṣā iti, tasmād vai snāti.*
69. Ibid., 2.4.3.20: *vāruṇyaṁ vā etat strī karoti yad anyasya saty anyena carat atho nen me'ntaḥ-salyā juhvad iti tasmāt pṛcchati, niruktaṁ vā enaḥ kanīyo bhavati, satyaṁ hi bhavati, tasmād eva pṛcchati.* Julius Eggling, *The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (2.5.4.20), Pt. I, pp. 391–97.
70. Ibid., 13.8.4.6: *Snātvāhatāni vāsāṁsi paridhāya.*
71. Naam Drury, *The Sacrificial Ritual*, pp. 15–17.
72. Ibid., p. 17.
73. Ibid.; *Śata. Brā.* 13.2.8.1: *Enam adhi saṁjñāyayati.*
74. Beginning with *Yajurveda* 23 cd, viz., *Ā'ham ajāni garbhadham* . . . etc., up to 32.31. viz., *Śūdro yad āryāyai jāro na poṣam anu manyate.*
75. *Śata. Brā.* 13.2.9.9: *Apa vā etebhyaḥ prāṇāḥ krāmanti ye yajñe'-pūtāṁ vācaṁ vadanti.*
76. Naam Drury, *The Sacrificial Ritual*, p. 27.
77. *Kāṭh. Saṁ.*, 23. 6: *Na dīkṣitena hotavyaṁ, havir vai dīkṣito rudra*, etc.
78. Ibid.: *Pāsena vā eṣo'bhinito yo dīkṣito varuṇyaḥ pāsas tasya yo'nnam atti varuṇa enaṁ grāhuko bhavati tasmād baddhasya nigasya cāntam nādyāt . . . tredhā vā etasya pāpmānaṁ vibhajante yo dīkṣito yo'nnam atti, . . . yo'ślāṁ kīrtayati/ Tasmād dīksitasya nānnam adyān nāślāṁ kīrtayen na nāma gṛhṇīyād dānāya vā/*
79. Ibid., 34.7: *Ubhaye vai devās ca manuṣyās cāvyāvṛttā āsaṁs te devā etam dvādasāham upāyaṁs te dīkṣayaivātmānamapunatopasadbhir yajñaṁ samabharanta . . . ya evaṁ vidvān dvādasāham upaiti dīkṣavaivātmānam punīta/*
80. *Tait. Saṁ.*; 7.2.10.1: *ya evaṁ vidvān dvādasāhena yajate . . . tenendraṁ prajāpatir ayājayat tato vā indra indro'bhavat. Tasmād āhur anujāvarasya yajña iti sa hy etenāgre'yajate.* Keith, *The Veda of the Black Yajus School*, Pt. 2, p. 581.
81. Ibid., 7.2.10.2: *eṣa ha vai kuṇapam attiyaḥ satre pretigṛhṇāti ṣakuṇapam aśvakuṇapam vā. . .* 7.2.10, 4–5: *yo vā asya paśum atti māṁsaṁ so'atti, yaḥ puroḍāsam mastiṣkam sa yaḥ pari-vāpaṁ purīsam sa ya ājyam majjānaṁ sa yaḥ somaṁ svedam so'pi ha vā asya sīrṣaṇyā niṣpadaḥ prati gṛhṇāti yo dvādasāhe pratigṛhṇāti, tasmād dvādasāhena na yājyam pāpmano vyāvṛttaye/* Keith, ibid.
82. Ram Gopal, *India of the Vedic Kalpasūtras*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1983, p. 556.
83. Ibid., pp. 556ff.
84. *Āp. Śr.S.*, 21.1: *Dvādasāāhena pra iva jāyate'bhi svargaṁ lokaṁ jayaty eṣu lokesu pratitiṣṭhati/*
85. Ibiḍ., 21.3–5: *Satram ahīnas ca /3/ Dīkṣitam adīkṣitā yājayeyur ahīne. Eta eva rtvijo yajamānas ca satre /4/ Tasmad dvādasāhena na yajyaṁ, pāpmano vyāvṛttaye /5/*
86. Ibid., 21.1.10: *Yo'tapasvā syād asaṁśliṣṭo' sya yajñaḥ syāt. Yajñam eva tat saṁśleṣayata iti vijñāyate /10/*
87. Dr. R.N. Dandekar, *Vedic Bibliography*, Vol. II, 3.31 (p. 16); 54.40 (p. 362); 80.53 (p. 570); Vol. III, 3.75 (p. 24); 54.71 (p. 534), 54.72 (p. 534 ff.); 54.73 (p. 535); 54.75 (p. 535); 67–18 (p. 671); 80.114 (p. 822); 80.115 (p. 823); 80.116 (p. 823); 80.117 (p.823); 82.147 (p. 881); 93.69 (p. 1004); Vol. IV, 34.92 (p.

309); 48.146 (p. 534); 54.112 (p. 679); 54.113 (pp. 679–680); 54.114 (p. 680); 54.115 (p. 680); 65.63 (p. 810); 66.17 (p. 830); 67.10 (p. 844); 71.44 (p. 876); 79.207 (p. 973); 80.180 (p. 1035); 82.216 (p. 1172); 83.60 (p. 1172).

88. Acharya D. Prahladachar of the Sanskrit Department of the Bangalore Vishva Vidyalaya, drew the attention of Shri Daya Krishna, the editor of *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Jaipur, to this problem—of radical distinction between the *Śukla* and *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*—on the basis of the passages discussed above from the texts of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*. I have requested him to kindly supply me the sources—original research articles or publications or the information about the exact references to—on which he has based his observations about Prof. Heesterman.

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'Brahmin, Ritual and Renouncer' A Comment by Dr Fateh Singh

Professor Heesterman's article, entitled 'Brahmin, Ritual and Renouncer', is written with the definite purpose to highlight what the author calls 'Sanskritization'. This term was used probably for the first time in the *Comparative Grammar of Dravidian Languages*, written by Bishop Caldwell, about a century ago. There, with reference to the Sanskrit words used in those languages, the bishop significantly remarks that these words remind one of the bygone age when the brahmin of the north came to the south and imposed his own faith, culture and language on the Dravidians. This remark, propagated by imperialist writers and missionaries resulted in an anti-brahmin, anti-Sanskrit and anti-north movement, demanding at one time the total separation of Tamil Nadu from the Republic of India.

Professor Heesterman also seems to have a similar aim, when he defines 'Sanskritization' as 'the confirming to brahmanical norms of respectability among non-brahmins and especially among harijans'. And he goes on to conclude his essay in the following words which speak for themselves:

> As a specialist of religious merit, the brahmin can be called a priest. But in this sense he can only be a priest by virtue of renunciation. The position of the brahmin is, therefore, as precarious as it is eminent. His monopoly of Vedic knowledge should enable him to hold this position without falling for the temptation either of worldly involvement or of total abandonment. But, in the end, it is all by himself that he must bridge the gap that separates renunciation from the householder's world. The brahmin, then, is the exemplar

of the irresolvable tension that is at the heart of Indian civilization.

The 'tension' that he finds at the heart of Indian civilization is indeed of his own making. What he calls pre-classical and classical ritual is basically the one and the same *yajña* in its two aspects, namely the *śukra* and *kṛṣṇa*, as described by the *Yajurveda* in the following two passages respectively:

(1) तेजोऽसि शुक्रमसि अमृतमसि धाम नामासि प्रियं देवानाम् अनाधृष्टं देवयजनमसि
(*M.Y.V.* 1.31)

(2) कृष्णोऽसि आखरेष्ठोऽग्नये त्वा जुष्टं प्रोक्षामि वेदिरसि बर्हिषे त्वा जुष्टां प्रोक्षामि बर्हिरसि स्रुग्भ्यस्त्वा जुष्टं प्रोक्षामि
(*M.Y.V.* 2.1)

Thus the former (*śukra*) is the sacrifice to God (*Devayajanam*), dear to gods in general and characterized by lustre, immortality and immutability. Its name is *dhāma*. The latter (*kṛṣṇa*) is obviously a sacrifice for the fire god on the altar with all the paraphernalia attached to it.

From this description, it is clear that the *śukra* sacrifice is what Heesterman calls *ātmayajña* or 'the interiorization of the ritual', whereas the *kṛṣṇa* sacrifice stands for external ritual of fire worship. The word *kṛṣṇa* has been wrongly taken to mean black. In fact, it is a technical term with many other cognates like *kṛṣa, kṛṣti, kṛṣi* and *kṛṣasva* in the Vedas. All of them derived from *kṛṣn*, 'to draw', should be understood with reference to the 'tug of war' between good and evil, existing within man. *Kṛṣṇa* points to the state where there is no such conflict and, therefore, no need of the process to draw (*kṛṣa*) the *kṛṣti* (human soul) away from evil. This is the state where a spiritual power, as if the *killer of kṛṣti*, arises on the scene and the *kṛṣti*, leaving aside its cover (*vavriṃ*), goes to his father (God) and purifies its kith and kin (*tanā*):

प्र कृष्टिहेव शूष एति रोरूवदसुर्यं वर्णं नि रिजीते अस्य तम्
जहाति वव्रिं पितुरेति निष्कृतमुपप्रुतं कृणुते निर्विजं तना।
(*RV.* 9.71.2)

Anyway, the *kṛṣṇa yajña* of the *Yajurveda* is not something black. It refers to the beautiful spiritual fire, having a *kṛṣṇa* path, similar to the sky (*RV.* 2.4.67) and possessing the far-reaching effulgence that destroys darkness (*RV.* 6.10.43). In other words, the *kṛṣṇa* ritual is the path to the same conflict—free ritual which is described as *śukra* or *śukla*. Thus the *saṁhitās* of the *Śukla Yajurveda* and *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* are respectively expected to cater to the needs of the interiorized and exteriorized aspect of the same ritual. This accords with the dichotomous character of human personality, described as *śūdrāryau*[1] in which the *śūdra* stands for the extrovert and *ārya* for the introvert aspect of man.

To guard against all the ills of the dichotomous man, the only medicine is the holistic view which is the gift of the thousand-eyed God (*AV.* 4.20.4 5 8). Hence arises the need to worship God externally as well as internally. Man is a born *śūdra,* says Manu. He requires proper discipline and education to be twice-born by assimilating the *āryan* virtues hidden within him. This is made possible by the divine speech (*vak*[2]), that comes to man through the birth of *brāhmaṇa* and *rājaṇya* in him, and then produce the dichotomy of *śūdra* and *ārya,* leading to the eventual evolution of an *Ārya* (*a* + *arya*) society[3] in which the individual *Ārya* does his duty and refrains from doing what is not, thereby sticking to the natural law of behaviour:

कर्तव्यमाचरन् राजन् अकर्त्तव्यमनाचरम्।
य तिष्ठति प्रकृताचारे स आर्य इति स्मृतः।।

To guess as to how this metamorphosis of man is brought about, it will be worthwhile to resort again to the aforesaid sacrifice of the individual as well as the thousand-eyed cosmic spirit (God) of *RV.* 10.90 which also has a passage adding *vaiśya* to the former trinity of *brāhmaṇa, rājaṇya* and *śūdra.* The relevant passage reads thus:

ब्राह्मणोऽस्य मुरनमासीद् बाहू राजन्यः कृतः।
उरू तदस्य यदु वैश्यः पदम्यां शूद्रो अजायत।। (*RV.* 10.90.12)

To the great surprise of those who discovered the origin of caste-system here, the term *vaiśya* means a pool of *viśvedevas,*[4] the *viś* powers entering supramental and transcendental depths.[5] The two higher ones (*urū*) and the two lower ones (*padbhyāṃ*) respectiively accounting for the origin of *vaiśya* and *śūdra* here may be taken to be respectively the higher and lower form of the pair of *brāhmaṇa* and *rājaṇya* who import their *lokī* nature of *vaiśya* and *sūdra.*[6]

But then what is *brāhmaṇa* and *rājaṇya* in this context? *Brāhmaṇa* is originally the divine power which the individual soul can partake from *Brahman* (God). The same figures as *brāhmaṇa soma* (*RV.* 1.15.5; 2.36.5), the *saṃvit* of the sacrificer who is identical with *brāhmaṇa yogi,* and finally a unified *yajña* that can be diversified by the spiritually elevated (*RV.* 8.58.1). It is in this sense that the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* speaks of *yajña* as a *brāhmaṇa* and the *Maitrāyani Saṁhitā* calls God *Soma* a *brāhmaṇa* (*MS.* 2.13.20.). When *Soma Brāhmaṇa* is addressed as *Rājan* (*RV.* 10.9.22), its descendant form is called *rājaṇya,* imparting its lustre to the mental and physical levels of a *yogi.* The illuminating power of the *Brāhmaṇa Soma* is sometimes conceived as *brahmajāyā* (wife of God) or the mysterious cow whom the *Soma Rājan* gives to *rājaṇya* (*AV.* 5,17.2; 15.18.1–2), its own descendant form. As the *rājaṇya* moves to and fro between the supramental and mental level, it is described as the two arms in *RV.* 10.92.12, quoted above.

Again, the descending *Soma* (i.e. *rājaṇya*) is conceived as 'the

brāhmaṇa being born and a born *lokī: Brāhmaṇa jāyamāna ēvā lokī jayate* (J.B. 244). It is, therefore, no wonder that we earlier talked of *brāhmaṇa* and *rājaṇya* as imparting their *lokī* nature to *vaiśya* and *śūdra,* though not equally. In fact, what *rājaṇya* gives to *vaiśya* at the mental level is communicated to *śūdra* at the physical level. This gift from the higher power enables *śūdra* (lit. the shatterer of *Sū*) to transform into *śūra* (see *RV.* 2.5.2; 10.114.9) comprising five senses, mind, ego and the super-ego (*mahat*). This is possible only when the *śūdra* has access (though indirect through *vaiśya* and *rājaṇya*) to the *śukra* (lit. crossing the *Sū*) *yajña* at the higher level.

This end is achieved by what is called *kṛṣṇa yajña* which is described as *ākharéṣtha,* i.e., seated in the all round motion of the said eight-fold *śura.* Thus it is evident that the *kṛṣṇa yajña* is only a complementary step to bring down the *śukra yajña* and transform the *śūdra* into *śura,* the protecter of *Sū* which is only the ॐ सु without which the human behaviour cannot be the श्रेष्ठतम कर्म, a *yajña.*

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Yajurveda*—14.30; *Atharvaveda*—4.20.4; 8.
2. यथेमां वाचं कल्याणी मावदानि जनेभ्यः ब्रह्मराजन्याभ्यां शूद्राय चार्याय च। (*Yajurveda*—26.2)
3. संऽसमिद्युवसे वृषन्नग्ने विश्वानि अर्य आ (*RV.* 10.191.1)
4. वैश्वदेवो हि वैश्यः (काठ 37; तै. ब्रा. 2, 7, 2, 2)
5. विशो (+वै माश 5, 5, 1, 10) विश्वेदेवाः। माश 2, 4, 3, 6; 3, 9, 1, 16।
6. ब्राह्मणाच्च राजन्याच्च वैश्यो लोकी इतरो न हि तथा लोकी (जै 1, 244)

FATEH SINGH

Notes and Queries

Is Nyāya Realist or Idealist?

Nyāya is usually described as a realist system by most people who write about it in the English language. In fact, many consider it as a realist system *par excellence*, and even identify the one with the other so completely that the two terms seem interchangeable to them. But, is it really so?

Nyāya is supposed to maintain that everything that is real is knowable and nameable. If we keep aside the issue of 'nameability' for the present and confine our attention to 'knowability' alone, then the contention that 'to be real' is 'to be knowable' seems suspiciously close to the idealist contention that '*eesse*' is '*percipi*'. 'To be, is to be perceived' is the well-known Berkeleyan formulation in the western tradition. 'To be perceived' of course means 'to be known' in this context. However, as Berkeley's discussion of the problem is in the context of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities on the one hand, and their inherence in a substance which is 'known' only as their substrate and is expressly designated as a 'know-not-what' outside this reference to its being the 'support' for the qualities that inhere in it, it may appear that the 'qualities' about which both Locke and Berkeley are talking are the sort of qualities that can be apprehended through perception, and perception alone. But if there are qualities which need not be known through perception, or which cannot be known through sense perception, then the Berkeleyan formulation is obviously inadequate and the Nyāya formulation in terms of knowledge superior to that of Berkeley.

"To be known', however, is different from 'to be knowable' and the Nyāya position is supposed to be the latter rather than the former. But a reformulation of Berkeley's position in terms of 'the perceivable' rather than 'the perceived' would bring it closer to the Nyāya formulation. The distinction will become even less if we remember that for Berkeley, God's '*percipi*' cannot be 'sense perception' and that his '*percipi*', therefore, has to be understood as 'knowledge' rather than 'perception'. 'To be', thus, would either be 'to be known' or 'to be knowable'. The latter, of course, would be true only for finite minds like those of human beings. In the case of God, the distinction between 'known ' and 'knowable' is irrelevant as everything is supposed to be 'known' by Him. It is only in the case of human beings that this distinction may be said to make any sense.

It is not clear whether God plays any such analogous role in Nyāya as it does in Berkeley's system. Perhaps the issue did not engage the

attention of the Nyāya thinkers not only because they did not see the problems posed by the distinction between 'knowing' and 'knowability', but also because the issue of the 'independence' of the object of 'knowing' from the 'act of knowing' does not seem to have been focally raised in the tradition, as it was by Locke in the context of 'secondary qualities' in the British empiricist tradition. The notion of '*buddhyāpekṣā*', which comes closest to Locke's distinction, does not appear to have triggered the same set of problems as it did in the western tradition. But if the notion of '*buddhyāpekṣā*' is accepted in respect of some qualities, then at least in respect of those qualities Nyāya could not be regarded as holding a 'realist' position.

Moreover, even the contention of the essential 'knowability' of 'reality' in the Nyāya context implies that the structure of 'knowing' and the structure of 'reality' be isomorphic in the sense that the *sattā* must be of the nature of *dravya* which is related to *guṇa* and *karma* by *samavāya*. The 'real', thus, has to be 'rational', and as *Nyāya* does not accept the notion of an 'unknowable thing-in-itself', there is no distinction between 'phenomena' and 'reality' or noumenon, as in Kant's case. If this is not out-and-out 'idealism', what else is it?

The terms 'idealism' and 'realism' had arisen in the context of western philosophizing to describe certain philosophical positions which make sense in the perspective of questions that were being debated in that tradition. In traditions where this sort of questions did not trouble the thinkers, it may not be illuminating to describe their position in those terms. But as the term 'realism' has been used to describe the Nyāya position by almost everybody who has written on it in the English language, it may not be remiss to raise a question about its adequency in describing the position which is usually ascribed to Nyāya thinkers in the Indian tradition.

The following issues, therefore, need to be clarified before any reasonable answer may be attempted to the question regarding the adequacy of the characterization of the Nyāya tradition of philosophical thought in India as 'realist'.

1. Is it correct to say that Nyāya holds that anything which is 'real' is also 'knowable' and 'nameable'?
2. If so, what exactly is meant by the terms 'knowable' and 'nameable' in this connection?
3. Are the two terms 'knowable' and 'nameable' independent of each other? In other words, can something be 'knowable' without being 'nameable' and *vice-versa*?
4. If all that is 'real' is 'knowable' and 'nameable', then is that which is 'unreal', 'unknowable' and 'unnameable'?
5. Is the relation between that which is 'real' and that which is 'knowable' and 'nameable' symmetrical? In other words, is everything that is 'knowable' and 'nameable' also 'real' by virtue of that very fact?

6. In case there is complete symmetry between them, are they just different words with the same semantic import and thus synonymous with each other except in their pragmatic associations and visual or auditory identities?
7. In case the 'nameability' condition is essential to 'reality' for Nyāya, how will this be compatible with the definition of perceptual knowledge as given in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* 1.1.4, if *avyapadeśya* is understood as that which cannot be 'named'?
8. Is the idea of *avyapadeśya* the same as that of *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*? If so, what is meant by treating it as 'knowledge'?
9. What exactly is meant by '*buddhyāpekṣā*'? Does Nyāya accept this notion in the context of some qualities, and not of others? What is the ground of the distinction? And, in case it does accept the notion, does it not affect its so-called 'realist' position in the sense of 'independence' of the object 'known' from the 'act of knowing'?
10. What exactly is meant by this 'independence' on which the usual claim for Nyāya being a 'realist' system is generally based?

These are some of the issues that need to be clarified before we may meaningfully characterize Nyāya as an 'idealist' or 'realist' system.

DAYA KRISHNA

'Does Mīmāṃsā Treat the Theory of *Karma* as a *Pūrvapakṣa*?': Two Responses to the Query

[We publish below two responses received to the issue raised in the 'Notes and Queries' section of *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 2, entitled 'Does Mīmāṃsā Treat the Theory of *Karma* as a *Pūrvapakṣa*?' Śrī Ram Śarma's original response was received in Sanskrit. It was translated by Mrs Shyama Bhatnagar of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur with some minor corrections and editing by me.—Ed.]

Before answering the question, I must explain the word *karma* and the various senses it conveys. *Karma* means (1) an action, a transitory movement, lasting as much time as the action actually taking place and (2) the subtle effect left by such an action, lasting for a longer time—say, up to the moment the effect or reaction is experienced by the doer of the action. This is called *apūrva*; it is of several kinds. It is analogous to *dharma* and *adharma* or *puṇya* and *pāpa* of other systems. It is a non-matter, which needs a matter as substratum to inhere in. *Ātmā* is the substratum for it, of the doer. 'Doership' is of two kinds—direct and indirect. Normally, all such effects produced by actions reside in the *ātmā* of the doer, but in the case of, actions which were *caused* by another, the effects go to the *ātman* of the person who

caused that action to be done. The actual doer was just an instrument in the hands of the causal agent. He did not perform that action on his own volition. The performer was purchased for the purpose and he did not also desire the resultant effect. *Vedic injunctions* say that specific actions are to be performed by specific persons to obtain one consolidated effect. There are some intermediary effects which go to the actual performer. Here the deciding factor is the injunction.

The third chapter of *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* with *aṅga karma*— auxiliary rites— most of which are performed by ṛtviks for the *yajamāna.* Therefore, the actual affects go to the *yajamāna,* who pays for the services. There are some specific auxiliary rites which not only help the *pradhāna karma,* but also produce intermediary results. These intermediary results are of two kinds—those which go to the *yajamāna* and those which go to the *ṛtvika.* Here too the *Vedic injunction* is the deciding factor and not logic. Desire for the fruits of the sacrifice is the first requisite for taking up the performance. If a *ṛtvika* is entitled to desire a certain fruit of a particular sacrifice, either singly or along with the *yajamāna,* then that *phala* goes to him.

Thus we can see that there are three kinds of *phalas—pradhāna karma phala, aṅga karma phala,* independent of *pradhāna phala,* which goes to both the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtvika;* and those which go to the *ṛtvika* alone, and those that go to the *yajamāna* alone.

Therefore, no generalization can be made with regard to *phala* in general. They should be particularized and the rules applied accordingly.

Therefore, there is no room to conclude that Jaimini held two views about the *karma* theory. A warrior fights for the king and wins a war, and the king enjoys the kingdom, not the warrior. '*Mana eva kāraṇam manuṣyāṇām bandha mokṣayoṇ*'. This clarifies the position. The motive with which one does an action is the deciding factor.

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The question 'Does Mīmāṃsā treat the theory of *karma* as *pūrvapakṣa?*' refers to three *adhikaraṇas* in order to show that they involve a contradiction. The *adhikaraṇas* are, first, 3.7.8, *sūtra* 18; second, 3.8.25/26; and third, 3.8.28/29. In 3.7.8 the *bhāṣya* is 'parts of the action (*aṅgānām*) can be performed by someone else (that is, other than the agent)'; and the *vārtika* asserts, 'the agent can be other than the *yajamāna*'. In the same way, in 3.8.25/26, the *bhāṣya* says , 'one should expect for the *swamī-phala* in the *karaṇamantras*'. The *vārtika* is, 'the fruit expressed in the *karaṇamantras* belongs to the *yajamāna*'. In 3.8.28/29, 'the fruit for which the *karma* is undertaken in *karaṇanantra* belongs to *ṛtvija*' says

the *bhāṣya;* and the *vārtika establishes,* 'the fruit expressed in the *karaṇamantra,* being instrumental for the action, belongs to *ṛtvija.*'

Now, a doubt arises: 3.7.18 says, 'being the *kartā* in the *yajña* one is to get the fruit; being the *kartā* in the part of process (*sānga*) one obtains the fruit; one who works for oneself gets the fruit'. 'Therefore, the *ṛtvija* is entitled to expect the fruit.' 'I shall be powerful', says the *adhvaryu*—thus he would be zealous.'

In 3.8.28, '*ṛtvija* is entitled to expect fruits', 'sometimes *ṛtvijas* are also entitled to expect fruits.' In 3.8.29, 'Therefore, *adhvaryu* should expect fruit.' In these statements from the *Bhāṣya,* it is stated that the *yajamāna* gets the fruits. At one place it is said that the *ṛtvijas* get the fruit and at another place that 'the agent *yajamāna* alone gets the fruit', this is *karma-siddhānta.*' How can the two go together? Did Jaimini assert this? Is there a tenet of this sort in Mīmāṃsā or not?

In this context it should be understood that in the three *adhikaraṇas* the matter dealt with is different and it is so in this way. In 3.7.8 *adhikaraṇa, sūtra* 18, the fruit of the action prescribed by the *śāstra* will be available only to the agent. '*Swargakāmo yajet*', etc., says that one who desires *swarga* has to perform the *yajña* in order to obtain the desired fruit. Thus the principle that one who is the agent is the one who obtains the fruit. If one thinks that there can be only one agent then this is not so. To be an agent is to do the action for oneself or to have it performed by paying for it to a *ṛtvija.* The *vārtikakāra* illustrates this by mentioning *darśapūrṇamāsa,* etc., as example of an action in which the performer is paid for. This is said about the main action. In this, one who is the *kartā* obtains the fruit. This is the principle. Such a doctrine is generally known as *karma-siddhānta.*

In 3.8.25/26 *adhikaraṇa* in the *karaṇamantra,* utters the *adhvaryu,* 'Oh, Agni, may I get the power (*varcaḥ*) in *yajña*'. The question is, for whom is the fruit of the power being elicited? Using the word '*mama*', a declension of '*asmad*', suggests that the fruit would go to the *adhvaryu* who utters the *mantra.* This, however, is the *pūrvapakṣa.* As the *adhvaryu* is serving against payment, the fruit should go to the *yajamāna.* That proves the same principle. In the *bhāṣya,* an example of a *śruti* is also given in this context. 'The blessings desired by the *ṛtvijas* go to the *yajamāna.*' This *adhikaraṇa* is related with the intermediary fruit which is mentioned in the *karaṇamantras* or the auxiliary *mantras* involved.

In 3.8.28/29 *adhikaraṇa,* in the *karaṇamantras* themselves it is mentioned that the fruit is obtained by both the *adhvaryu* and the *yajamāna,* that is, the *yajamāna* and the *adhvaryu* spread their hands in the centre of their bellies and grasping each other's hands, the *yajamāna* enquires, 'what is there in it, *adhvaryu*'; The *adhvaryu* answers, 'well-being'. Then, first the *yajamāna* declares 'that is for me' and then the *yajamāna* asks a second time, 'what is it here?' and the *adhvaryu* answers, 'well-being'. Then the *yajamāna* says, 'that the well-being is for us together'. Obvi-

ously, in situations like these the *śruti* clearly declares the fruit for both. Therefore, the fruit goes to both. This is the principle. However, this example relates to the intermediate fruit only. It is not concerned with the main fruit, such as *swarga*, etc.

Thus, in this connection, there are several *adhikaraṇas* in which, at some places, fruit is mentioned in relation to the *yajamāna* alone, and at other places in relation to both the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtvija*. But this does not lead to any contradiction as they are concerned with different subject-matters. The fundamental points here are as follows.

1. The fruit relating to the main action belongs to the *yajamāna* alone who performs the action. As it is ordained by the Veda that the services of the *ṛtvija* can be purchased, the action can be performed by someone other than the *yajamāna*. But such an action can only be performed by the *ṛtvija*, on payment and by no one else.

2. The fruit of the auxiliary action, even though aspired to by the *ṛtvija*, goes to the *yajamāna* alone.

3. Where, because of the utterance, the fruit of the intermediary action goes to the *ṛtvija* and as even that leads to effectiveness in the action relating to the *yajña*, it too, being a part of the *yajña*, would go to the *yajamāna*.

4. And where the fruit of the auxiliary action is available for both, that is so because it is what the Veda says in the matter. Apart from the effectiveness, etc., that sort of fruit is available to *ṛtvijas* just as it is available to the *yajamāna*.

This does not demolish the *karma siddhānta*. Examples of such behaviour are found in worldly affairs also, as in the tilling of land. The landlord, with the help of money which he pays to the labourers, gets the proper action performed by them appropriate to the expected crop, without himself touching anything and yet is known as a peasant and is also the owner of the fruit. Similarly, if some labourers eat a few mangoes in the garden, they are not called the ones who get the fruit. The *yajamāna* alone owns the fruit.

Another example of this may be seen in textile factories. The workers may get something additional to their usual wages such as bonus but that is not the main fruit. It is not the consumption of the main fruit. Nor does that create a claim on the part of the workers regarding the ownership of the factory. The consumption of the intermediary fruit constitutes no barrier for the *yajamāna* in obtaining and enjoying the main fruit.

Such is the case in respect of *karma* here. In fact, the sanction of *śruti* has permitted the bonus to be paid to the workers. This does not damage the doctrine of *karma*; the fruit goes to the doer.

However, the principle of fruit being enjoyed by the agent alone has some exceptions.

1. For example, 'the father should name the newborn son on the tenth day'. Further, there is this injunction: 'in the *jātyeṣṭī yajña* which is performed on the birth of a son, the fact of naming enables him to be addressed and the *yajña* promises him a bright future; these fruits here are enjoyed by the son and not by the *yajamāna*' who performs the *yajña*.

2. Similarly, the *paitṛka karma* performed for the dead, has for its consequence getting a better place, *uttama loka*, for them and this fruit is enjoyed by the dead and not by the *yajamāna*.

Yet in these cases the Veda commands the *yajamāna* that 'he should do so'. In case he disobeys the command, the *yajamāna* will suffer. Here the reason for performing the action is by itself the fruit, and the fruits consequent on *jātyeṣṭī yajña* and *paitṛka karma* are enjoyed by the son or by the dead father, though the *yajamāna* initiates the *karma* as a *kartā*. This is so because the action is commanded by the Veda for him to be performed. By initiating that action, therefore, the *yajamāna's* fruit is the achievement of a state or situation which is free from obstacles. The naming and bright future, *abhyudaya*, and the fruit of obtaining a state of well-being, *sadgati*, would go to the newly-born son and the dead person respectively. Except for these two instances, the *kartā* himself is the enjoyer of the main fruit. This is the principle.

It should, however, be clearly understood that there is no independent doctrine of *karma* which may be regarded as the Mīmāṃsā principle. Neither the *bhāṣyakāra* nor the *vārtikakāra*, nor even Jaimini have any doctrine of their own. They only gave a consistent meaning to the various *Veda-vākyas*.

Except the earlier mentioned exceptions, everywhere else this is the Mīmāṃsā principle. The *kartā* alone is the enjoyer of the fruit. Hence, one should never doubt thinking that there is a self-contradiction or mutual opposition in the *adhikaraṇas* or the lack of any principle in the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra*, for all these together are called *śāstra*. Such a usage is generally accepted in practice also.

ŚRĪ RAM SHARMA

Book Reviews

HERBERT HERRING, *Essentials of Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy*, Ajanta Publications, New Delhi, 1993.

The first chapter of the book offers biographical sketches and glimpses into pre-critical writings of Kant on the basis of available evidence.

In the following three chapters, there are points where one may not feel satisfied with Herring's treatment of some topics in the light of modern researches and writings, but his overall presentation of Kant's theory of space and time, nature of synthetic a priori judgement, categories and ethical questions in the form of summary statements with text-proofs is successful, clear and useful. He is to be congratulated in furnishing us with an excellent introduction to Kant's theoretical and practical principles, and it is hoped that this book will stimulate in us a deeper and wider interest in the ideas of the great German philosopher.

However, when we think of clear and understandable things that Herring has said, we also feel provoked to give serious thought to what he appears to have said with a measure of certainty about the controversial notion of the transcendental object. He writes (on page 29), 'this new and critical position removes any idea of an ontological dualism. There are not two different separate realms of being—on the one hand the realm of appearances and on the other that of things in their essential structure. Appearance and thing in itself are taken as two different transcendental aspects, transcendental denominations of the one thing which Kant calls the 'transcendental object' (*transzendentaler gegenstand*).

Herring says in effect that appearance (representing the phenomenal objects) and thing in itself (representing the noumenal objects) in Kantian literature are two transcendental aspects, denominations, determinations or sides of one and the same transcendental object.

The term 'transcendental object' frequently occurs in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as the ground or substratum of phenomenon in general, and wherein its synonymity with the thing in itself is well-established. To see this point, consider these examples:

(i) 'But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are mere presentations, which in turn have their own object—an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named non-empirical, that is, transcendental object—x' (Kemp Smith, A/109).

(ii) 'Neither the transcendental object which underlies outer ap-

> pearances nor that which underlies inner intuition, is in itself either matter or thinking being, but a ground (to us unknown) of the appearances which supply to us the empirical concept of the former as well as of the latter mode of existence' (Kemp Smith, A/380).

Here we have as full and clear a statement of Kant's position about the transcendental object. It is the non-empirical ground or underlying principle of appearances, or else we have to find out a place in the *Critique*, where Kant explicitly says that things in themselves are one of the two aspects (the other aspect being appearances) of the transcendental object.

It is true that it will be contrary to Kant's thesis to say that there are two kinds of realities, viz., appearances (phenomena) and things in themselves (noumena), since this positive division of objects or being will mean conversion of appearances into things in themselves. But at the same time, it will be misleading to say that appearances and things in themselves are two aspects, sides, forms or attributes of one and the same object called the transcendental object by Kant.

We may ask Herring if he wants to say that the two aspects are merely two names—instead of being anything else to remove any kind of ontological dualism in Kant—of the transcendental object, so that the object is at the same time both appearance and thing in itself, and if he says that he does, then it is very much likely to be said that his mode of thinking and writing is Spinozistic or mystical rather than Kantian. It will be argued that he seems to have in his mind Spinoza's notion of substance (to which corresponds the concept of transcendental object in Kant) which is not merely extended and thinking in appearance but is really extended and really thinking. In short, it will be said that he had modelled transcendental object-appearance and thing in itself relation with a Spinozistic tendency. Next we may ask Herring whether his characterization of things in themselves as transcendental denominations of the transcendental object in the quoted passage will not bestow on them reality or positive affirmation and thereby raise them to the existential level of objects of experience in terms of a priori forms of intuition and thought, since all transcendental denominations (determinations) of being, according to Kant's theory of transcendental or critical idealism, are conceivable within the schematized categorial structure.

Furthermore, Herring becomes a critic of his 'two aspects' interpretation when he writes (on page 34 of his book) that the 'transcendental object alone can be taken as the something "affecting" our senses. . . '.

Since Kant insists that thing in itself (transcendental object) exists, he clearly distinguishes in the *Critique* between thing (object) as it exists for consciousness and thing (object) as it exists apart from consciousness. He holds that appearances or sense-perceptions arise only

as a result of action of the transcendental object on the subject of an object. The object which is the occasion of 'affection' must be the thing in itself (*Ding an sich*). Now Herring's two aspects interpretation and Kant's theory of 'affection' concerning the transcendental object can hardly be reconciled.

The concluding chapter of the book on 'friendship' with beautiful citations from Kant, Goethe and others makes it enjoyable reading.

KAUSHAL KISHORE SHARMA

RAJENDRA PRASAD: *Ends and Means: In Private and Public Life*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, 1989.

Legal, moral and political philosophy have had to grapple with the delicate and complex nature of the relation between ends and means, both in public and private contexts of life. Human life being purposive, there are ends or goals of life, and the pursuit of goals inevitably requires the adoption of means which are, at least, feasible within the social setting of particular human existence. But the question arises inevitably, and also immediately, as to whether the means adopted for a particular end is justified solely by the end, or the means is such that it is self-justifying on intrinsic grounds, or unjustified on grounds intrinsic to it.

This is a perennial problem around which the history of ethics has woven webs of theories like deontology and consequentialism, theories that are means-centred and end-centred respectively. But, like other recalcitrant issues in philosophy, the means-end problematic has eluded theoretic attempts at neat solution. It has been found, time and again, that human existence involves far too complicated interlocking relations of actions, purposes and social settings to admit of a precise, well-demarcated assessment of the justifiability or otherwise of certain means adopted in view of definite ends, let alone the further question of the evaluative status of the ends in question. Given the complexity of many actual life scenarios which urgently demand immediate practical measures, whether a private matter like abortion or of endorsing and executing some administrative decision on a particular public issue, the human agent involved in the situation is very likely to fail to perceive clearly either that there is *the* right means for her to adopt given the end in question, or that the end is such as to justify any of the means at her disposal. Indeed, it is extremely difficult to codify, or even state, the general principles that govern the agent's decision to resort to some particular means to attain her desired ends in a conflict-free way.

The basic point of difficulty is the fluidity of the boundary of the means and the ends when it comes to certain complicated situations of life. It is this fluidity that constitutes, very roughly, the major theme of *Ends and Means: In Private and Public Life.* Most contributors have variously argued for the claim that the means-ends relation should be understood, not as the relation between two neatly isolate units, but as constituents of a complex, the means-ends continuum. Seen as a continuum, this relational complex can be illuminated analytically by outlining the family of concepts to which it belongs, argues Margaret Chatterjee in 'Ends and Means: New Aspects of an Old Problem'. This family of cognate concepts is that of guidelines, strategies and not-too-neatly formulated policies. Her point is that we hardly talk about ends in actual practice, but concentrate on guidelines, strategies and 'loose' policies in our engagement in the course of purposive life. Thus, when the otherwise esoteric notion of end is operationalized in these more realistic or practical terms, they make a continuum with the means. The image of a continuum allows to take into consideration the relevance and appropriateness of the surrounding circumstance to a proper adjustment of means and ends. Chatterjee writes: 'There is a fine line to the attribution of failure to circumstance and resort to excuse. The wise adjustment of means and ends requires not only an eye for the target but for the surrounding terrain as well. . . (p. 59).

If the means-ends relationship has to be understood as a complex or continuum, it must be shown how it is different from the cause-effect relationship. Rajendra Prasad in 'Means, Ends and Pictures of Good Life', provides an analytical account of this difference. What differentiates the means-ends relation from the cause-effect relation is that while the former 'involves a necessary reference to an agent and his intention' (p. 110), the latter is a non-intentional, objective, natural relation determined by facts or nature. If a particular action is equally likely to have as its effects E_1 and E_2, and E_1 would be the end if the agent acts with the intention of bringing about E_1, even though her action actually results in E_2. The intended end provides the reason for the agent's action. And M is a means rather than a cause only if the agent adopts it with a view to attaining the intended end E. With this analytical clarification, Prasad goes on to maintain that while the means-ends complex is in itself amoral or morally neutral, it is by reference to pictures of good life or a theory of ethical norms that the morality or otherwise of a means-ends complex can be assessed. In the end Prasad illustrates the fluidity of the means-ends complex in terms of the 'ethics of compromise' frequently involved in a political (give-and-take) solution. A political solution often is prone to compromise our adherence to some values or norms on demands of social life, even though it may seem, on other relevant grounds, unethical to do so.

While Prasad draws attention to the point that one has to be 'an utilitarian in order to have faith in the institution of political solutions' (p. 121), M.P. Rege, in 'Ends-Means Continuum: A Normative Perspective', criticizes utilitarianism for misconstruing the means-ends relationship as an isolable unit. He claims that no principle of justice is deducible from the principle of utility, and 'the normative character of actions is not entirely derived from their causal connection with the agent's ends' (p. 127).

Rege's criticism of the teleological ethical theory (or utilitarianism) is a way of putting the validity of the dictum 'ends justify means' to test in concrete particular contexts of practical deliberation. P.K. Sen, in 'Ends and Means', subjects this dictum to rational scrutiny and says that 'although the dictum sounds very simple (in logical form), it in fact suffers from multiple ambiguities' (p. 162). One of the four interpretations that he provides of this dictum, and this one being claimed to be what we mostly have in mind when we use this dictum, is that there are some ends—ultimate ends or ideals of life—which justify the means adopted for their realization. However, since such ends or ideals include certain normative ways of life, 'the question of the nature of the means adopted in the pursuit of the ends become equally important' (p. 166).

Whether in administrative-professional context or in academic-theoretical context, the general tendency is to discuss the ends-means issue in the form of an exercise of adjudicating between Gandhi and Marx. Bhuvan Chandel, in 'Ends versus Means: Controversies and Beyond' takes Marx to advocate that ends justify the means and Gandhi to hold that they do not, though both are unanimous on the belief that the aim of the individual in society should be the emergence of an ideal society. Chandel sides with the Marxist position for the reason that some concession to the purity and nobility of the means may be necessary for having total commitment to one's ends. But whether one accepts the Gandhian or the Marxist model, whoever is concerned with social change has to face the most difficult question of how one would decide when, and to what extent, one should go in the direction of making concessions. The magnitude of this difficulty is rightly appreciated by Apala Chakravarty in the context of having to make a choice in a situation like abortion. In 'Choice of Ends and Means' Chakravarty argues that the problems of the choice of a means in such a situation 'seems particularly difficult for the reason that we have to weigh between things each of which constitutes some basic good to life' (p. 42). In other words, sometimes we do permit the choice of some means that is injurious to some aspect of the good life, without our being able to enunciate any normative principle governing the permissibility of such concessions.

S.P. Banerjee contends in 'Ends, Means and Administrative

Efficiency', that since 'for the administrator there is no algorithm for taking a decision, just as there are no fixed, definite rules for the striker to score a goal' (p. 17), the choice of a means for the administrator (that is, administrative decision-making) is more a strategic than a theoretical matter. The decision to adopt a certain means is justified so long as it is 'optimally rational'. Endorsing Banerjee's optimal rationality thesis of administrative ethics, Manmohan Singh, in his identically entitled paper, emphasizes administrative innovativeness, that is the administrator's creative role in conceiving of new and effective means and modifying existing rules, especially because, as the editorial says, 'no rules can cover all possible cases which are relevant to it, and no means can be eternally good' (xvi). R.C. Dutt, in 'End and Means in Indian Administration', speaks imperatively about commitment to the goals laid down in the Indian Constitution on the part of Indian administrators, with an uncompromising stance towards unscrupulous politicians whose political will may have to be turned towards constitutional norms and goals. He also draws attention to a basic conflict between the values enshrined in the constitution and those now held by the dominant social classes, and it is due to this conflict that the ends are not achieved properly: 'both ends and means suffer from lack of clarity as well as will to achieve' (p. 74).

In 'Ends and Means' D.P. Chattopadhyaya brings to light the ways in which the means-ends relationship is rooted in the interfacing areas of the private and the public. The collectivist holds that public ends determine private ones, and the liberationist as well as the utilitarian tries to derive the ends and means of the public from those of the private life. But ends which appear to be obviously public have clear private overtones, just as ends which seem to be obviously private have equally clear public overtones.

Freedom and justice are important theoretical exemplifications of this criss-crossing of the public and the private, and the individual's voting behaviour and its motivations provide its good empirical instantiation. Chattopadhyaya advocates the practice of 'deliberative rationality' as 'the most promising approach to bridge the gap between private and public ends and means' (p. 8). What underpins the notion of deliberative rationality is the phenomenologically sound idea of the person, an idea that duly recognizes the personal, agent-relative dimension of goods and values. Value-concepts like utility and well-being cannot be impersonalized through theoretical abstractions or formal methodological devices, in the name of impartiality, without thereby tarnishing the human face's social reality.

Chhatrapati Singh, in 'The Dialectics of Law', argues for minimizing the privacy of the laws that relate to groups. He highlights the rationality of the legal system insofar as it is designed to regulate human behaviour and rationally resolve conflicts of interest. Presumably the

rationality of law is a form of deliberative rationality that is suited to bridge the gulf between the private and the public. Legal rationality sets as its end not only the limits of self-interest and curbs egotistic excesses, but also a vision of the good life for a collective whole.

While the rationality of an action is usually assessed in terms of the agent's belief that doing it is a means to achieving the intended end, this interpretation of rationality (i.e., instrumental rationality) is by no means the only plausible one, nor is it the one that applies to all actions. For there are actions which are not done as means to some end, but as ends in themselves, e.g., writing a poem, performing a religious ritual, or a moral act. Mrinal Miri argues—in what seems to me to be the best article of this volume, 'The Means-Ends Distinction, Rationality and the Moral Life'—that such acts done, not as means but as ends, can be rational if the ends themselves are rational. He then adds that moral ends are intrinsically rational; moral acts are never means to any further ends from which they derive their rationality. The moral life, in Miri's vision, is such that 'the rationality of the moral end is guaranteed, first, by the fact that it is a matter of knowledge . . . and secondly, by the closely related fact that the moral endeavour is . . . in its essence a continuous pursuit of the truth' (p. 97).

In 'Means, Ends and Artistic Creativity' Rekha Jhanji maintains, through her observations on some practicing artists, that there is no a priori end in art, or in the aesthetic situation in general. And 'the distinction between means and ends is entirely contextual, what is taken as an end in one case may be taken as a means in another' (p. 85).

A.K. Saran's 'On Ethics: Public and Private' is a detailed sociological analysis and critique of modern scientific-technological civilization in relation to the problem of private and public morality. Saran points out many absurdities and irresolvable difficulties involved in the socio-scientific means-ends model of human action, which dominates much of modern thought.

V.K. Bharadwaja, in 'Ethics of Social Intervention', hints at the 'possibility of rich co-operation between the moral philosopher and the social scientist' (p. 24) inasmuch as the agent of social change must bear the moral responsibility of the consequences of its social intervention. Shefali Moitra, in 'Self-regarding and Other-regarding Duties: The Dilemma of Indian University Teachers', is of the opinion that an inter-disciplinary, empirical as well as conceptual study of the ethics of the teaching profession can illuminate some of the dark zones of the means-ends continuum relating to private and public morality.

In 'Ends, Means and the Ethics of Legal Profession', M.L. Upadhyaya relates the ethics of legal profession to the general 'crisis of ends-

means conflict or the gap between public morals and private morals and the falling standards of professional ethics', which 'are lined with the universal phenomenon of a crisis of character and all round erosion of moral values' (p. 206).

There seems to be an inconsistency or incoherence in the Indian ideal-end of life, *mokṣa* or salvation, as propounded in the *Gītā*. The famous doctrine of *niṣkāma karma*, action without a desire for the result, quite naturally leads us to classify the ethic of the *Gītā* as non-consequentialist or deontological. But the repeated assurance that performance of such action should lead to a blissful liberation from the cycle of birth and death seems to justify a teleological interpretation. Can this inconsistency be avoided by resorting to any alternative conceptualization of the ethic of the *Gītā*? In 'Ends, Means and the Art of Life', Arindam Chakravarty proposes a very imaginative solution by construing *mokṣa* as the end of life, not in the ethical teleological sense, but in the causal temporal sense. 'The non-attached agent does not act for the sake of *mokṣa* . . . . *Mokṣa* comes to him, as it were, unsolicited, because a pure non-attachment itself is *mokṣa*, rather than a means to *mokṣa* (p. 31). In other words, though the good life is not a life lived for the sake of eternal happiness attendant upon liberation, nevertheless the living of the good life is guaranteed to end, naturally or causally, in the attainment of liberation and its attendant happiness.

On the whole, this book embodies a cluster of articles on many interesting aspects of a primarily ethical problematic. The editorial introduction is both comprehensive and judicious, given the multifariousness of angles and aspects that the book covers. But the book suffers from the lack of an Index and typographical errors.

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SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA: *Gadādhara's Theory of Objectivity, Viṣayatāvāda* (Part I and Part II), published by Indian Council of Philosophical Research in association with Motilal Banarsidass.

It is a matter of great joy that Prof. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya has brought out *Viṣayatāvāda* of Gadādhara in two volumes. Volume I contains a detailed study of the text and volume II the English translation of the text with explanations.

Volume I is a distinct contribution of Prof. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya in the sense that here he has made a serious attempt to understand the Navya-Nyāya logic and philosophy in a comparative framework of western philosophy and logic.

He has explained the Navya-Nyāya logic first and then he has tried

to compare it with corresponding logic of the West, wherever it has been possible. The aim seems to acquaint philosophers and logicians trained in western philosophy and logic with the logic and philosophy of Navya Nyāya. Intelligibility of his exposition may be decided by those who are trained in western symbolic logic. Needless to say, this book is not for general readers.

The main issue of the Sanskrit text *Viṣayatāvāda* is to examine whether or not 'objectivity' is an independent category of entities. One section of the Navya-Nyāya philosophers wants to grant it the status of an independent entity, while the other section does not. In order to understand this, one has to go to the past history.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy accepted seven categories of entities—such as substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karman*), universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), inherence (*samavāya*) and absence (*abhāva*). The logicians (Naiyāyikas) thought that the entire universe can be categorized in these seven categories only and there is no need to posit any more categories of entities.

It was Raghunātha Śiromaṇi of Bengal who challenged the tradition and held the view that there are many entities like *viṣayatā* 'objectivity', *viṣayitā* 'containerness' and the like which cannot be included in the list of the seven categories. And thus the list must be kept open.

The traditional position was whenever there arose a chance of increasing the number of categories, they tried to avoid it by declaring that that is a particular self-linking relation (*svarūpasambandhaviśeṣa*). Thus, *kāraṇatā, kāryatā, pratiyogitā, anuyogitā* and the like, if treated as self-linking relations, will not be anything more than *kāraṇa, kārya, pratiyogin, anuyogin*, etc. and they can all be included in the list of the given seven and in that case there is no need of positing additional number of categories of entities beyond seven.

As against this, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi wanted to keep the question open and favoured the increase in the number of categories. He has argued in favour of this position in his *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa.*

Viṣaya means 'content of a cognition' and *viṣayatā* is 'the state of being the *viṣaya*'. I, therefore, prefer the rendering of *viṣayatā* as 'contentness' to 'objectivity', as Prof. Bhattacharya has done.

An entity is related to its cognition through the relation of *viṣayitā* 'containerness' and the cognition is related to its content by the relation of *viṣayatā* 'contentness'. Now, where could these properties *viṣayitā* and *viṣayatā* be included? The older view is that these could be included in the given seven because *viṣayitā* and *viṣayatā* are mere self-linking relations and hence either the *viṣaya* or *viṣayin* may be treated as performing the role of similar relationship. Thus, when *viṣayin* is included in the already accepted category of quality of the soul and *viṣaya* in any of the seven, there is no necessity of accepting them as independent categories of entities.

Raghunātha did not agree with this view and allowed additional categories of entities.

There are two texts by the same name: one written by Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa and the other by Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya. I translated with notes and introduction the text of Harirāma which was published in 1986 by the Centre of Advanced Study, in Sanskrit, University of Poona. The text of Gadādhara is presented with English translation, explanations and study by Prof. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya. The issue in both the texts is the same as pointed out above. While my aim was to explain the text without any comparison, Prof. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya presents with comparison. My aim was to reveal the thought-structure and hence I used the method of diagrams to achieve my goal. Each and every argument has been presented by me through a diagram. Prof. Bhattacharyya presents them with notations of symbolic logic. Thus, Prof. Bhattacharyya aims at those readers who have a thorough knowledge of symbolic logic.

As said above, Prof. Bhattacharyya presents his study in two parts—Part I and Part II. Part I analyses some fundamental concepts of Navya-Nyāya and in Part II the Sanskrit text is presented with English translation and explanation.

Part I has eight chapters followed by a glossary, bibliography and an index. Chapter I deals with the theory of relation as held by Navya Nyāya. Chapter II compares the notion of 'being in' in Aristotle and Nyāya. Chapter III discusses the idea of universal in Navya Nyāya. It contains discussions on analysis and universals. The problem of universal has been discussed from all the three angles of ontology, epistemology and logic. Chapter IV contains discussions on Navya Nyāya theory of abstraction. Chapter V deals with the theory of definition. Chapter VI is a survey of the theory of causation. Chapter VII compares Frege and Gadādhara on 'reference', 'sense', and 'modes of presentation'. It also discusses Gadādhara's theory of language. Chapter VIII discusses determinate and indeterminate cognitions.

Thus, it can be observed from the content of this part that Prof. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya has taken up some very important issues of Navya Nyāya logic for discussion and comparison with their western counterparts.

This exercise involves two aspects: (1) understanding a Navya Nyāya concept within the framework of Navya Nyāya philosophy and logic and (2) highlighting the points of commonness and difference. The exercise should be from (1) to (2) and not from (2) to (1). Prof. Bhattacharyya has been quite successful in this exercise.

However, he has experienced difficulty in this task of comparison. We shall take up one or two such cases as examples.

While discussing the Navya Nyāya concept of a relation, Prof. Bhattacharyya faces problem with the terms *pratiyogin* and *anuyogin*

(Part I, oo, 15–17). He takes two sentences—(1) Daśaratha is the father of Rāma and (2) A jar is the object of the cognition of a jar.

In (1), according to him, Daśaratha is *anuyogin*, and Rāma is *pratiyogin*.

In (2), the cognition of a jar is *pratiyogin* and jar is *anuyogin*.

So the direction in both the cases is



where *a* is either Daśaratha or cognition and *b* is either Rāma or jar.

In western tradition, Prof. Bhattacharyya finds that in the above cases *a* is always a predecessor and *b* is a successor term of a relation. Thus, he finds it difficult to explain the terms *pratiyogin* and *anuyogin* of Navya Nyāya. And finally he suggests: 'To avoid any confusion of the sense or direction of a relation we shall describe the relation as relation of the *pratiyogin* to (in) the *anuyogin* instead of using the relation—sentence or its symbolization. In diagrams, however, we shall write *anuyogin* as the predecessor and the *pratiyogin* as the successor, i.e., in the same order as they occur in the sentence although the direction of the relation will be from the successor to the predecessor as in Tarski's symbolization of functions, thus



I think all this is created because of perhaps an assumption that *a* is always a *pratiyogin* and *b* is always an *anuyogin*. As a matter of fact in Navya Nyāya, both can be both, although not at one time, depending on the *intended* direction of the relation. There are three possibilities with a two-term relation. One can express such a relation in any of the following three ways:

(1) There is a relation between *a* and *b*

(2) *a* is related to *b* and

(3) *b* is related to *a*

The first statement does not specify any particular direction and hence either *a* can be *pratiyogin* or *b* can be *pratiyogin* or either *b* can be an *anuyogin* or *a* can be an *anuyogin* depending on what is intended.

Thus, in the sentence 'Daśaratha is the father of Rāma', Daśaratha can be a *pratiyogin* as well if it is so intended. Similarly, in the sentence 'A jar is the object of the cognition of jar', the jar can be the *pratiyogin* as well according to the intention of the speaker. Of course once the direction is specified, *a* and *b* both cannot be *pratiyogin* and *anuyogin* simultaneously as in the statements (2) and (3). As a matter of fact, there are two traditions on the expression of a relation. One tradition goes with the generalization:

anuyoginiṣṭhaḥ dharmaḥ sambandhaḥ

'The property of an *anuyogin* is the relation'.

And the other tradition goes with the following generalization:
pratiyoginiṣṭhaḥ dharmaḥ sambandhaḥ
'The property of a *pratiyogin* is the relation'.

As per the former view one will say—
Rāmaḥ pitṛva-sambandhena Daśarathe anveti

and as per the later view one will say
Rāmaḥ putratva-sambandhena pitari Daśarathe anveti

But in any case there is no confusion between a *pratiyogin* and an *anuyogin.*

Similarly, Prof. Bhattacharyya has difficulty in translating the term *svarūpa-sambandha.* Normally, it is rendered as 'self-linking relation'. But Prof. Bhattacharyya suggests that it should be rendered as 'self-relating term'. But I think that 'self-linking relation' is a better rendering since it will remain closer to the Sanskrit term *svarūpa-sambandha.* Although it is true that self-linking relation does not form any distinct category of entities, it gives an idea that an already accepted category of entities plays an additional role of a relation.

I hope Prof. Bhattacharyya will reconsider his remark on p. 22 (part I) about *svarūpa-sambandha* which runs as follows:

> In the literature the Navya-Nyāya term *svarūpa-sambandha* has been translated as self-relating or self-linking relation. This translation is misleading because what the term *svarūpa-sambandha* means is that ontologically a reality which is a term of the relation is also the relation itself. This is, of course, the consequence that the term relates itself by itself to the other term. So it will be more proper to translate *svarūpa-sambandha* as a self-relating term; rather than a self-relating relation.

There is no dispute regarding the explanation of the term *svarūpa-sambandha.* But if we render it as a self-relating term, then whether it is a relation or it is playing the role of a relation (*sambandha*) is not emphasized. Thus, till we coin a better expression we may continue with the rendering of Prof. Ingalls and others.

Similarly, I would like to translate the term *paramparā-sambandha* as 'indirect relation' and not as 'chain relation' as Prof. Bhattacharyya does on p. 33 (part I). The opposite of *paramparā* is *sākṣāt* 'direct' in Navya Nyāya.

These are very minor points. Both the parts of Prof. Bhattacharyya's work are examples of an outcome of a very serious study and fine scholarship. Part I presents important concepts of Navya Nyāya in comparison with the corresponding concepts of the West.

Although the tradition of such comparative study of Navya Nyāya goes back to Prof. Ingall's *Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya,* Prof. Bhattacharyya has gone a step further by attempting further

clarification of Navya Nyāya concepts and comparing them with parallel western concepts of many more western logicians and philosophers which were not considered before. For serious students of Navya Nyāya and western logic, Part I does provide a solid base.

As said above, Part II contains the Sanskrit text, English translation and notes. My general impression is that Prof. Bhattacharyya has tried to remain faithful to the Sanskrit text to a great extent while rendering it into English. But I am of the opinion that certain rendering does not convey exactly what is intended by the Navya Naiyāyikas. For example, he translates *vyavasāya* as 'awareness'. But I think 'awareness' will be a better rendering of *anu-vyavasāya* and *vyavasāya* may be translated as 'determinate cognition'. When one says 'this is a pot' it refers to a definite cognition, but when one says 'I have knowledge of a pot' it implies that he is aware of his cognition of a pot. Thus, 'awareness' for me will be 'cognition of a cognition'. Hence I would like to differ from Prof. Bhattacharyya when he says 'cognition is same as awareness' (p. 4, Part II).

'(Secondary) introspective cognition' for *anuvyasāya* does not give the intended meaning to me.

On page 7 (Part II) Prof. Bhattacharyya translates क्लृप्तेन स्वरुपेणैपोपयत्तौ यत अतिरिक्तकल्पनायाः अनवकाशात as: 'As it is necessary to postulate that everything has its own nature there would be no scope for postulating an additional entity, if the problem (of the ontological status of objecthood) is solved by holding that objecthood is the nature (of its terms).'

In my understanding the translation of the phrase क्लृप्तेन स्वरुपेणैपोपयत्तौ should be as follows: 'when it is possible to explain (the ontological status of contentness) by the already established forms (of *padārthas*)'.

In other words, when it is possible to show that contentness can be included in any of the seven categories of entities, there is no necessity of postulaing any additional category of entities such as *viṣayatā.* Naturally, the explanation of text no. 4.1 of Prof. Bhattacharyya is erroneous.

I have given this example to show that Prof. Bhattacharyya is not always close to the text. He has taken freedom, sometimes, to make it readable English. But there one has to be very careful, especially with regard to a Navya Nyāya text. Nevertheless, he is mostly close to the text.

This, however, does not undermine the value of his work which is a fine example of excellent scholarship. The text of *Viṣayatāvāda* needs to be studied from the point of view of the issues discussed by me above, and Prof. Bhattacharyya's study and translation will prove to be a great help in that direction. In part I and in the explanations in part II whenever Prof. Bhattacharyya has entered into a discussion and has tried to make a point by referring to the Navya Nyāya views, persons

like me who are eager to go to the original would have been immensely helped had he indicated the original source of Navya Nyāya as he has done so with regard to the western views. We expect it in the second edition of the work. Both the Sanskritists and the scholars trained in western logic and philosophy will remain grateful to Prof. Bhattacharyya for this work.

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BASTIN J. PARANGIMALIL: *Toward Integral Holism in Psychology*, Inter India Publications, New Delhi, 1990, (price not quoted as yet).

In his book *Toward Integral Holism in Psychology*, Bastin J. Parangimalil attempts to present a unified and holistic model of the person in psychology. The author is of the view that a holistic humanistic psychology can be formulated on the foundations of true Christian Humanism. Though the thrust of the book is towards evaluating the adequacy of Abraham Maslow's humanistic psychology in the light of Christian Psychology, Parangimalil makes a laudable effort to demonstrate that Maslow's system arose as a reaction and challenge to overcome the shortcomings of the reductionist psychologies which have dominated the field of psychology during most of the twentieth century. The author considers Maslow's humanistic psychology to be a significant achievement and an important step towards a truly integral and holistic psychology. The implication is that a genuinely holistic-humanistic psychology will be an authentic Christian psychology.

There are a number of dominant themes in the book—*Toward Integral Holism in Psychology*. First, the author systematically traces the philosophical roots of integral holism in psychology and indicates that holism can be studied as three types, in psychology viz., preventive, descriptive and integral. Preventive holism is characterized by dissatisfaction with and aversion to the limitations of the reductionist approaches in non-psychological fields. Descriptive holism considers personality as an organized whole, having unity and order, where there is a movement towards higher perfection with self-actualization as the chief motivation. The neo-Freudian views, Gestalt Psychology and Maslow's system represent descriptive holism in psychology. Integral holism holds that there is an integrating inner rational nature in man. Aristotle was the originator of this theory. Parangimalil then indicates the historical and philosophical roots of holism beginning with Aristotle's naturalistic holism, also known as hylomorphism. Thomas Aquinas adopted the Aristotelian biopsychology and perfected it in the light of divine revelation, consistent with Christian humanism. Mercier, Brentano, Pace and Moore were some of the other significant

figures of the neo-scholastic period who made attempts toward integral holism in psychology.

In the second section of his book, Parangimalil succinctly indicates the distinct influence of reductionist philosophies on the reductionist trends in psychology. In this context, the role of Democritan atomism and Platonic idealism has been delineated by the author. The clear influence of Cartesian dualism and Leibnitz's psychophysical parallelism on various schools of psychology have been indicated. Dualistic thinking represented by psychophysical parallelism and psychophysics, along with associationistic philosophy, were the foundation of structuralism. The author very aptly points out that materialistic theories of evolution and associationism influenced functional psychology and Freudianism. Behaviourism was indebted to positivism and operationism. The author also indicates that in addition, the theories of Kant, Hegel, Herbert, Lotz, Helmholtz and Fechner exerted considerable influence on psychology. In this way, the author furnishes an excellent account of the antecedents of reductionist thought in psychology.

In the next section, Parangimalil reviews the important reductionist systems in psychology and indicates that with the birth of scientific psychology in 1879, the drift away from holism reached a significant point. Structuralism of William Wundt and Titchener; Functionalism of James, Dewey and Angell; Behaviourism and Freudianism represent some of the departures from holism in psychology. Parangimalil then gives an insightful commentary on the psychological systems which emerged during the end of the nineteenth century onwards, as a reaction against the shortcomings of the reductionist psychologies which were dominating the discipline at that time. These include phenomenological and existential psychology, neo-Freudian psychologies of Jung, Adler Horney and Fromm. The influence of these individuals and their systems of psychology on Maslow's thinking is also highlighted. The author continues with an exposition of the holistic trends in modern psychology and emphasizes the contributions of the Gestalt psychologists, Goldstein, Allport and Frankl towards integral holism in psychology. The influence of some of these systems on Abraham Maslow's and his humanistic psychology are also indicated.

The attempt of the author, thus far, has been to delineate the historical and philosophical roots of holism and reductionism in psychology and to review various reductionist and holistic systems in mainstream psychology. To this end, Parangimalil has done a commendable job. The latter sections of *Toward Integral Holism in Psychology* present Maslow's humanistic psychology and its affiliation with Christian humanism. First, factors from outside psychology influencing humanistic psychology and Maslow's system are discussed. These include both eastern and western systems such as Taoism, Zen Buddhism,

Spinoza's Pantheism, Hasidism, Bergson's Creative Evolution, Smut's Holistic Evolution, naturalistic humanism, naturalism and humanism. Then, a detailed account of the holistic trend in Maslow's system of psychology has been presented by Dr Parangimalil. The author qualifies Maslow's holism as 'descriptive holism', which falls short of being an 'integral holism'.

The latter section and the conclusion of Parangimalil's book appear to be rather controversial. The author asserts that humanistic psychology seems to join the other major systems of psychology, in either ignoring or denying the transcendental dimension of human personality and belief in the supernatural. Being, humanistic naturalistic psychology, is shown to be the antithesis of dualistic Christian psychology which denaturalizes and super-naturalizes man by placing him, or at least his mind and soul outside of and above nature. The author further asserts that there is a need for concerted efforts to return to a true Christian or holistic humanism in psychology. True Christian humanism, in the light of the divine revelation is that man is created in 'the image of God'. God is the centre of man and everything else is a Christian humanistic position, as opposed to the humanistic position that man is the centre of himself and of all other things. Because man is created in the image of God, he shares the light of the divine mind. The human intellect surpasses the mere world of things which were observed by the senses. Man can see realities beyond the natural order.

Several objections can be raised against the author's assertions. First, Maslow's 'humanistic psychology' is taken to be the standard against which other systems of psychology are rated to assess the degree of integral holism in them. It must be pointed out that Maslow's 'humanistic psychology' is in itself a controversial subject in mainstream psychology. Leaving aside issues of scientific credibility and metatheoretical issues, apart from generating interest towards neglected subjective issues and intra-psychic processes, Maslow's system may have little to offer. Elsewhere, Parangimalil evaluates Maslow's 'humanistic psychology' in the light of Christian psychology and finds Maslow's system lacking in a number of ways. Many of the author's arguments pointing to the shortcomings of Maslow's system seem to be forced. The contradictions within Maslow's system do not appear to be as distinct as the author takes them to be.

From the start, Parangimalil assumes the importance of integral holism in psychology but does not demonstrate the necessity of the same. The author supports the rejection of reductionism and shift in focus towards holism in psychology, but does so on ideological rather than metatheoretical and methodological grounds. Christian humanism and the integral holism inherent in that system may hold appeal to the author, but his arguments in support of the same are not very convincing. Reductionism in psychology has been challenged by a

number of authorities on metatheoretical and methodological grounds and strong arguments have been posited against it, none of which have been cited by the author. At the same time, it must be pointed out that attempts are underway to formulate a more integrated and holistic system within mainstream psychology based on theoretical and metatheoretical issues, Anand Paranjpe being a significant contributor in this area.

In short, the author has provided an excellent account of the historical and philosophical background and development of holism and reductionism in psychology. But when it comes to a conclusion, it appears to be a poorly disguised attempt to promote Christian religion in the name of psychology. No clear arguments are offered by Parangimalil as to why we should accept Christian humanism as the ideal system of psychology.

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OBITUARY NOTICES

KANTIBHAI J. SHAH
8 September 1922–17 September 1994

Wittgenstein is walking in Cambridge with an Indian student. This is a fragment of their conversation.

Wittgenstein	:	Shah, with that name, you must be a Muslim?
Kantibhai Shah	:	No, Professor Wittgenstein, I am not a Muslim.
Wittgenstein	:	Then you must be a Hindu.
Kantibhai Shah	:	No, I am not a Hindu either!
Wittgenstein	:	What are you, then?
Kantibhai Shah	:	I am a Jain.

At this point the young K.J. Shah launched into an animated diatribe against the tenets of Jainism. Suddenly Wittgenstein stops and angrily says to Shah:'Shah, you think you are very clever. You think all those great men who thought about the intricacies of your religion were fools.'

K.J. Shah returned to India after completing his degree and made the study of Indian thought his life's work. He never worked on Wittgenstein, though Wittgenstein remained a constant mental presence. Many years later, while introducing his seminal essay on Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* (a classical text dealing with the management of affairs of the state, mistakenly compared, often, to *The Prince*) he said:

> I have taken the thought of the past seriously: i.e., I have allowed it to speak for itself before judging it to be more or less adequate compared to any contemporary understanding of the same issues.

In this sense, he devoted his intellectual energies to explaining, clarifying, making explicit what was only implicit, and bringing into sharp focus the status of an enquiry. While doing so, he was enormously interested in the question, what does it mean for humans to learn. For him, 'Know Thyself ' meant *learning to* know oneself.

Some people thought of Professor Shah's attitude to intellectual questions rigid, and they often spoke of his dogmatism. This, of course, is a serious misunderstanding. If an idea seemed contradictory or absurd to him, he would rely entirely upon his own judgement. He admitted he could be wrong, and often he was, but reliance upon his own judgement and his own intellect, while being open to rigorous persuasion, was the only way of discovering the truth. This made him impervious to prejudice, fashion, cant, snobbery and self-interest. He

believed in asking fundamental questions that could initiate debate. Yet, he always saw his work only as a preliminary step, a beginning. For him the moral aspect was inseparable from the intellectual aspect: the latter was meaningless without the former.

Gandhi's philosophy provided Professor Shah an opening into studying Indian thought. He was worried about the tendency among Gandhian scholars to attribute to Gandhi what *they* thought or what they wanted Gandhi's thought to be. This prevented lucidity about what Gandhi's thought actually was. Professor Shah sought to situate Gandhi in the wider context of the Indian tradition.

Apart from Gandhi's philosophy, whether it was his work on the *Arthaśāstra*, or on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* (a classical text on aesthetics), or on the linguistic philosophy of Bhartṛhari, certain questions remained central to him. Can Indian philosophy be called philosophy? Or is it religion? Or is it both? Is Hinduism a religion? Who knows what Hinduism is?

In asking these questions, Professor Shah's purpose was twofold. One, to credit Indian thought with being grounded simultaneously on philosophy and religion, and to argue for tradition. However, this tradition was not a Spenglerian cultural prison. His mastery of western thought was phenomenal, but by arguing for his own tradition he wanted to bring out the possibilities and limitations of both traditions. The other purpose was to intervene, however circumspectly, in the current intellectual and social debates of the country.

But Professor Shah was no 'book in breeches'. He was capable of much laughter, and was an excellent cook. His eyes would light up at the mention of Iris Murdoch, a friend of his Cambridge days, with whom he kept up a lifelong, though irregular correspondence. His wild flowing hair, deep penetrating eyes, and remarkably sensuous mouth set many a female heart aflutter. Indeed, one of his more memorable aphorisms was on the nature of love: Love is the ability to take the maximum amount of strain.

At the time of his death, he was at his creative best, intellectually. His last words echoed his teacher Wittgenstein. He said he had had a good life, a life without regrets. For his students and friends he will remain the touchstone of their moral and intellectual pretensions.

JYOTIRMAY SHARMA

KARL RAIMUND POPPER
28 July 1902–17 September 1994

Karl Popper (Sir Karl Popper since 1965, when he was knighted by the Queen of Great Britain) was born on 28 July 1902 in Himmelhof in the Ober St Veit district of Vienna. In 1925, while working with neglected children in Vienna, Popper enrolled as a student at the newly founded Pedagogic Institut of Vienna city. It was here that he met his wife Josefine Henninger, a fellow student at the university. As a student , Popper studied mathematics, physics and psychology, and philosophy later on. By this time, Popper had already begun grappling with the problem of method, particularly against the background of David Hume's rejection of *induction* as a possible means of rational justification of our scientific knowledge of the natural world. Rationality of scientific knowledge was problematized by Hume, reducing it to a matter of habit and custom, because inductive reasoning failed to justify that the present scientific knowledge—and our belief in its validity—would retain its validity in the future as well. Like Immanuel Kant, Popper took Hume's challenge seriously. His great contribution to the theory of scientific knowledge and the methodology of the sciences lies in this: he raised the discussion on science, scientific method, growth of knowledge and the rationality of scientific revolutions to a new and higher level. In the year 1934, he published his book *Logik der Forschung* (English translation, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, Hutchinson, London; Basic Books, New York, 1959). In 1963 *Conjectures and Refutations* (Routledge & Kegan Paul) and then in 1972 *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach* (Oxford), were published.

Much of the atmosphere at home and in Vienna into which Popper was born had to do with books and music. His mother Jenny Popper was a pianist. Popper recalls in his *Unended Quest* (1976, p. 54) that he was always a conservative in the field of music. He liked and admired the great composers Schubert, Bruckner and some Brahms (*The Requiem*). His passion for knowing contemporary music led him to enroll as a member of the 'Verein fuer musikalische Privatauffuehrungen', 1918: Society for Private Performances, which was presided over by Arnold Schoenberg and dedicated 'to performing compositions by Schoenberg, Alban Berg, Anton von Webern', among other contemporaries such as Ravel, Bartok and Stravinsky. Besides the musical influences, Popper, in *Unended Quest* (p. 9), recalls his childhood memories: 'The sight of abject poverty in Vienna was one of the main problems which agitated me when I was still a small child—so much that it was almost always at the back of my mind. Few people now living in one of the Western democracies know what poverty meant at the beginning of this century: men, women and children suffering from hunger, cold and hopelessness. But we children could not help.

We could do no more than ask for a few coppers to give to some poor people.'

Before Popper wrote and submitted his thesis— 'Zur Methodenfrage der Denkpsychologie'—in 1928 for his Ph.D. to the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Vienna, he had already read Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922) and come to know about the Ernst Mach Society and the Vienna Circle. The latter had formed itself as a nucleus of the school of philosophical analysis which is known as logical empiricism. The Circle itself came into being around 1924–25, with Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath among its prominent members. Popper's own teacher, Hans Hahn, was a member of the Circle. Before meeting Herbert Feigl and other members during the years 1929–30, Popper came in touch with Victor Kraft, with whom he could discuss his opposition to the doctrine that the natural sciences were *inductive* in their method instead of being *deductive,* in particular the doctrine of the Vienna Circle that metaphysics, as against science, was all nonsense. Soon, with the publication of his *Logik der Forschug* (Julius Springer Verlag, Vienna, 1934), Popper changed the whole scenario of discussion on science, on the search for knowledge and the rationality of scientific change. Popper's official opposition to the search for a logical empiricist criterion of meaningfulness became a major source of relentless criticism, debate and change within the philosophy of science. Popper's formulation of his falsifiability criterion of demarcation—which requires that a theory is scientific in character only if it is falsifiable or refutable by possible observational statements called potential falsifiers—of demarcation enabled him to distinguish science from non-science without rejecting metaphysics as meaningless. These major changes within the philosophy of science took a Darwinian turn with Popper propounding his thesis that scientific knowledge grows by trial-and-error elimination, by searching for difficulties and contradications in our best scientific theories. Thus, a scientist is a problem-solver who can turn Popperian falsificationist methodology against his/her own theory, after proposing it as a trial solution. The theory is tested empirically in those aspects which entail novel and risky predictions, with a view to its refutation (= error- elimination). The main steps in this Darwinian process of natural selection are these: Problem (p_1) → Tentative Theory (TT) → Evaluative Error-Elimination (EE) → Problem (p_2)...

Popper shared with the Galilean philosophy of science the realism and the rationality of the scientist's interest in those theories which possess *verisimilitude* (= *distance* from *truth, truth* being the aim of science) in varying degrees, and which can also be subjected to a generally acceptable and logically sound methodology of crucial theory-testing and theory-choice. Although science aims at *truth,* it always begins with problems, and ends with problems after its theories have undergone

critical rational evaluation.What makes Popper's approach normative is his view that science aims at truth and that what we call science is a matter of decision and convention. But it assumes an evolutionary Darwinian character at the same time, Popper himself having extended the Darwinian evolutionary paradigm for describing the changes in the living world to those changes which can take place in the Popperian objective world$_3$ of scientific knowledge. Popper believed in the abstract character of the reality and relative autonomy of the world$_3$, which consists of musical compositions, works of art—in short, the creative products of the human mind. Popper separated and designated as world$_2$ all those states of consciousness, as states of the human mind, which result from its interactions with nature and the physical world—the latter was called by Popper the world$_1$ of physical objects, their properties and relations and so forth.

According to the view which Popper developed, the rationality of science and scientific change demand that the scientist designs crucial tests for competing theories—such as Newton's and Einstein's theories of gravitation—in order to eliminate those which far exceed their rivals in the field in respect of false predictions about *reality* . To this very end, a proper methodology of theory-testing and theory-choice must be governed by the supreme rule which says that all other rules of method are to be so designed that they do not protect a scientific theory against falsification by the *modus tollens* of classical logic. Thus, as a critical rationalist Popper viewed the rationality of science as having to do with the scientist's relentless search for that method, among all possible methods, which tests a theory for its false consequences. A deeper logic of falsifiability as a distinguishing mark of those theories which are scientific is already at work here. A scientific theory rules out the existence of certain possible states of affairs—the class of its potential falsifiers is never empty. Popper held the view that the more the theory rules out, the more highly falsifiable and predictively informative it will be. On the contrary, think of a theory or an unrestricted universal statement of law which permits too many things in the sense that it tends to be confirmed every time it is used to explain this or that type of phenomena—the theory will be non-scientific if the class of its potential falsifiers is empty.

By these very rigorous standards, all utopian and historicist models of society and social transformation fail to qualify as being scientific in character. Realizing that his theory of knwledge and method had far-reaching consequences for understanding human states-of-affairs both from a practical and philosophical point of view, Popper published his celebrated work in *The Open Society and its Enemies*(1945, Vols. 1/11) and *The Poverty of Historicism* (1957). Thus, Popper formulated devastating criticism of the utopian and perfectionist models of society based on historicist and essentialist approaches—notably those of

Plato's *Republic*, the Hegelian Dialectic and Marxism. On the one hand, Popper warned us of the dangerous consequences of the totalitarian utopian models, which have been responsible, at least partly, for the rise of communism and national socialism. On the other hand, Popper formulated his conception of an open society as a system which depends on piecemeal engineering for bringing about improvement and progressive change in society.

It was during the years 1935–36, which witnessed the end of the Vienna Circle following the assassination of its leader Moritz Schlick, that Popper came in contact with important scientists and philosophers in England, Ernst Gombrich and Erwin Schroedinger among them. From 1937 to 1945, Popper held the position of Senior Lecturer at Canterbury University College, Christchurch, New Zealand; from 1945 to 1949, that of Reader in Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics; and in 1949–69 he was Professor of Logic and Scientific Method (*Emeritus*). In 1977, together with Sir John Eccless, Popper made a major contribution to an interactionist philosophy of the mind and brain by publishing *The Self and Its Brain*. Then came the publication of the long-awaited *The Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery* (edited by W.W. Bartley, 1982–83). Popper's intellectual creativity did not diminish with age, nor with the death of Josefine Anna Henninger in 1985, whom he had married in 1930. When he became 85 on 28 July 1987, *Die Welt* interviewed Popper on subjects ranging from politics and physics to philosophy, resulting in the publication of *Ich weiss, dass ich nichts weiss - und kaum das* (Ullstein Sachbuch, Frankfurt/M., Berlin, 1987/1990). Popper was awarded many honorary degrees, and received several rare prizes before and after the unification of Germany in October 1989. He published *A World of Propensities* in 1990 and *In Search of a Better World* (a collection of essays and addresses) in 1992. On 17 December 1993, Popper went to Berlin to receive the most prestigious Otto-Hahn Freedom Medal from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen. Sir Karl Popper died on 17 September, 1994, aged 92. His latest book, *Alles Leben ist Problemlösen* (1994) has just been published by Piper, München/ Zürich.

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Journal of Indian Philosophy

Journal Highlight

The *Journal of Indian Philosophy* encourages creative activities among orientalists and philosophers along with the various combinations that the two classes can form. Contributions to the journal are bounded by the limits of rational enquiry and avoid questions that lie in the fields of speculative sociology and parapsychology. In a very general sense, the method is analytical and comparative, aiming at a rigorous precision in the translation of terms and statements. Space is devoted to the work of philosophers of the past as well as to the creative researches of contemporary scholars on such philosophic problems as were addressed by past philosophers.

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