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In Quest of Objectivity : A Post-Colonial Defence*

CHINMOY GOSWAMI

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> . . . the power is tolerable only on condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanism.
>
> Michel Foucault[1]

I

The long march on the road to human civilization from the days of cave-dwelling to the multi-storeyed flats is a witness to the tireless efforts of the human intellect to disambiguate its own ambiguous existence, to find some necessity amidst contingencies, to find a cosmos amidst a chaos. In this vast universe, human beings, even as a species, occupy a tiny fragment of space. But human intellect has not only been able to comprehend the vastness of the universe but also the enormous emptiness within an invisible atom. This ambiguity of being a small creature endowed with enormous power, a contingent being capable of inventing necessities has created innumerable tensions not only at the existential but also at the intellectual level. For example, there are conflicting opinions, beliefs or even theories regarding the world, of which we are a part. Even if it is granted that the world is constant, human intellect has constantly been manipulating the data. In the process of manipulation, conflicting results are obtained about the same reality, rendering human intellect helpless in the face of diverse alternatives. However, with every manipulation of the data, the surrounding also gets altered. Consequently, the balance between the self and the surrounding hangs on sharper and sharper edge. The present age may be said to be hanging on a razor's edge where preservation of the self and the preservation of the surrounding are to be balanced. There seems to be a contradiction between the two preservations and a realization of this contradiction is quite manifest in the concerns for ecology (at least at the theoretical level). At the root of all such tensions and sufferings, it is alleged is the act of the *original sin*—the sin of *objectification*. It is an irony of fate that the illusions of scientificity make one commit that sin without ever realizing

it to be a sin. Consequently, a confession is yet to come even if it is in the form of an *unscientific postscript.*

As far as the scientific temperament is concerned, the emergence of it, obviously, is not a dated event. Scientific temperament did not spring forth at an instant of time. On the contrary, it came to the surface through a complex process, the details of which are yet to be worked out by the historians. However, it is generally accepted that the face of science with which we are familiar today originated in Europe, roughly around the end of the sixteenth century due to the socio-economic conditions prevalent at that time.[2] So much so that Jacques Monod puts the blame squarely on Galileo (AD 1564–1642) and Descartes (AD 1596–1650).[3] Subsequently, *science* developed in Europe to such an extent that after three centuries, European science became the symbol of *progress* and *civilization* throughout the world. There can be no denial of the fact that the emergence of a particular form of social and cultural milieu has been conducive at least, if not responsible, for such a sequence of happenings. European community, as a whole, not only gave birth to a child called Science but also nurtured it for more than three centuries without ever casting any doubt regarding its legitimacy.[4] The simple reason being that the child proved itself pretty useful, from its very infancy. Obviously, the possessors of science ruled almost the entire globe—almost every piece of inhabited land was colonised. The colonisers naturally earned rich dividends. It is but recently that shadows of doubts are being cast on the legitimacy of science.[5] The scepticism might have sprung from either a belief that it has outlived its usefulness or from a fear that its usefulness which was solely the prerogative of the European community is going to be shared by the non-European communities as well. If it has outlived its usefulness then, it is but natural that it can be sold out as a second-hand product to the more needy. On the other hand, if the usefulness is also going to be shared by others, then it reduces the domain of domination. The anxiety of loosing the privileged position may easily lead to a condemnation of science. Whatever may be the reason(s) for doubting the legitimacy of the child born out of the European womb, it is a fact of history that many European intellectuals started questioning the unquestionable *science*, especially after the experiences of the two World Wars. Once useful, a very useful, child is now being looked upon as a problem child. Genuine threat forces one to think seriously. The outcomes of science not only provided comforts, riches and economy of human labour but also posed threats for its destructive prowess. As a result, many intellectuals from within the scientific community have posed the question—what is science?—and have sought answers to it. The criticisms levelled against or the modifications suggested to the ideas and ways of scientific practices are merely the attempts to cope with the uneasiness that has cropped up within the tradition and region. Thus, the *problems of science* have not only been intra-traditional but also intra-regional.

From outside the scientific community or even that region, there has hardly been any assessment. What I propose to do here is to take a (fresh) look on the phenomenon called *science* from outside that community. For once, let us forget the huge literature produced by the western intellectuals (also some by the Oriental intellectuals harping on the same western theme) on different issues related to *science* and its multifarious activities. Let us, for once, start as if from nowhere and ask ourselves the question—What is science? Let us view the problem from outside the scientific community. It is, for sure, that neither have we Indians produced the child called science nor do we belong to that community. There are definitely some scientists on the Indian soil but neither they form a community nor have they been able to infuse any scientific temperament among the people of India (not even in the realm of academic activities of the intellectuals).[6] The point will be made clear in the course of the discussion. We shall try to argue that one of the prerequisites of a scientific temperament is a passion for objectivity, an intense desire to reach a consensus.

There can be two possible ways of answering the question 'What is science?'. One approach would be to define what science is and then try to apply this definition to different activities. In this process, the definition gets more and more refined. This approach, as old as Plato or even Parmenides, may appear to be more *scientific* to the scientific community. But we shall not try to tackle the issue in this way. However, we may draw evidences from such approaches to science already made by some belonging to the scientific community. The other way would be to consider the things or the activities we encounter every day and are told that they fall under science. We shall try to understand the mechanisms of such activities and things. Based on our understandings, we shall try to define science. Such an approach may run the risk of being too naive and unscientific. But let us settle for the latter as we too are naive, so far as science is concerned.

II

To begin with, let us take note of the statements made by David Crystal, a linguist,[7] on science :

> In seems to be generally agreed that for any enterprise to qualify as scientific, in the usual sense, it should display at least three major characteristics. Terminology varies somewhat, but I shall label these three explicitness, systematicness and objectivity.[8]

We shall try to argue that there is no need for three different characteristics for a characterization of science, as mentioned by Professor Crystal. In order to arrive at the conclusion, we shall argue that the characteristics of *explicitness* and *systematicness* are dependent on the notion

of *objectivity*. There is no intention on our part to claim that the notions of *explicitness* and *systematicness* are logically dependent on the notion of *objectivity*. All that is being claimed is that the notion of objectivity is central and the other two are related to it in a very special way.

The notion of *explicitness* implies that some statements are made about some *thing* (object) in such a way that the thing or the object is made explicit through those statements. In other words, an object is made explicit through some statements. What is made explicit through these statements is an object.[9] A declarative sentence of the form 'b is Q' makes the object *b*, explicit in terms of *Q*. For example, 'The rose is red' is a sentence which explicates the object 'rose'. Consider the sentences, 'b is Q' and 'b is R'. The two sentences, taken together, make the object, *b*, more explicit than any one of the sentences, taken in isolation, as long as $R \neq Q$. Thus, larger the number of predicates applied to an object, more explicit the object becomes. Greater the object is made explicit, more objective the statements are since the predicates pertain to or the statements are, about an *object*. The degree of objectivity is thus directly proportional to the degree of explicitness. This notion of objectivity has been at the forefront in the discourses about science.[10] In other words, for any scientific enterprise, there is a fixed domain of objects, different from the scientists, the subjects, to be deciphered, to be read, to be discovered, to be predicated.[11] The objects are out there as if waiting for manipulation—the more we manipulate those objects, the more we learn about them and the more we learn about them the easier it becomes to manipulate. Closer and longer a child is with his/her doll, less curious s(he) becomes about it, since all conceivable dimensions of manipulatability become transparent to the child. There is nothing more to learn for the child about the doll. For the doll has become too explicit to deserve any further attention from the child. It has become a mere object to be possessed, thrown or gifted away. But what happens if the doll goose lays golden eggs after every manipulation!

The obvious answer, as we all know, is to break open the doll and look into the mechanism. *Aesop's Fables* could not make mankind free from greed. The obvious motive for breaking open the doll is to make oneself capable of making a replica of it.[12] In other words, the desire is to multiply the production of the golden eggs as they are costly and may serve as an aid to enhance capital. For that matter, the desire is to multiply the production of such geese which can lay golden eggs. This production procedure demands a systematicness, a theory to delimit the relevant from among the multitudes of factors. It is important to note that a theoretical frame is intrinsically interwoven with mass production. Without an explicit systematization regarding the production procedure, it may remain a skilful activity, a craft which can only be transmitted through practice. To turn any production process into an industry, it is necessary that the entire process be also verbalized. The most efficient way to

transmit information (knowledge) to a large populace is to textualize it for to textualize is to systematize. Only through this transmission can knowledge be shared. Plato's bed can form many images for the millions to take rest, a word can be used in many sentences. That is, the personal discovery, when stripped off the irrelevancies gets depersonalized, and objectified. Personal knowledge[13] takes the form of objective knowledge.[14] The passage from the personal to the communal is a passage 'from incompetent professionalism to professionalized incompetence'.[15] Scientific innovativeness or revolutionary enterprise in science turns into craftsmanship or normal science. Following a rule without any examination may not be Socratically an ideal from of life, nevertheless, it gives a kind of security. Examined life inevitably leads to the realization of some kind of inadequacy—an urge for creating rules. Creation of rules, like any form of creativity, is yet to be tested and hence is risky. Placed between the tension of security on the one hand and risk on the other, the majority prefer security and hence lead an unexamined life by following the well-established rules. In fact, there has always been a strong resistance towards any kind of innovativeness. Consequently, it is quite natural that the social forces tend towards craftsmanship rather than innovativeness. This urge towards regularity is somewhat inevitable for community living. This, in turn, invites some amount of regimentation. But community living also invokes a sense of responsibility towards the fellow members of the same community. A sense of community living, of belongingness, injects a sense of responsibility in each individual towards the other members of the community. A role is assigned to each individual and the individuals are put into a slot. This process of standardization has been the very essence of communal living. The standardization is somewhat necessary at the beginning for a community to stabilize, which, if allowed to reinforce itself continuously, leads the community to stagnation. Thus, it seems quite reasonable to conclude that both explicitness and systematicness have a common objective—to attain objectivity, to depersonalize the truth.

The notion of objectivity, as we have seen, may be related to the idea of explicitness by putting the object at the centre. That is, an idea or an information is said to be objective, if and only if it pertains to an object and not to any subject. In other words, the objectivity of an idea or an information is commensurate with the object of which it is an idea or an information and quite incommensurate with the informers. This separation (distinction) between the informer, the subject, and the information about . . . the object, has been an integral part of the myth which guides scientific activities even today. This is clearly an off-shoot of the naive mechanistic *weltanschauung* enunciated by Parmenides, articulated by Plato and sanctified by Descartes. An artefact, created by the subject is only to be viewed as an object, an other, a non-self, a non-subject.[16] The mind is separated from the body not only epistemologically

but also ontologically. There might well have been epistemological compulsions to separate the knowing subject from the known object but those are not sufficient reasons to separate the subject from the object, ontologically. This extreme dependence of ontology on the epistemological enterprises is an obvious consequence of the *original sin* that the European Christian community committed and we are told by our masters to accept the sin in the name of internationality and objectivity of science. The Holy Bible states :

> And God said let us make man . . . and let them have dominion over . . . all the earth and every creeping thing that creepeth on earth. (Genesis I : 26).

The message of domination is clear and sharp and we find this domination everywhere, whatever be the disguise. The domain, the form of domination may get altered and so the name. The subjects of the Crown's domain are gone as the Crown itself has become a mere shining piece in the museum. The millions of subjects are no more subjected to visible political domination under the Crown but the political power, in order to remain in power, has evolved a new formula, has coined a new name—manipulation. Domination as an institution within the scientific European society was apparently uprooted and replaced by a subtler, but a more effective substitute—manipulation. This, at least apparently, does not rob the obedient individual subjects from their self-respect, they feel satisfied to learn that they are not being dominated. In the process, non-physical violence gets legitimized by illegitimizing physical violence. By assigning authority to the law, the authority of the law-givers is successfully concealed. What it means is that the individual subjects are robbed off from even their selves, they are reduced to an automata, a stimulus response complex. The instant success of literary works like Voltaire's *Candide* (1726) or Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726) or Huxley's *Brave New World* (1930) clearly voice the urge to put human beings within the causal chain, to deny the contingencies, to objectify. A more vivid and articulate version is from Penrose :

> By the use of the anthropic principle . . . one might try to show that consciousness was *inevitable* by virtue of the fact that sentient beings, that is 'We' *have to be around to observe the world.* [17]

The above quotation clearly indicates the heroic and untiring efforts of the academic scientists to declare the necessities amidst chance, to cement human existence causally rather than to explore the kaleidoscopic image of man casually. All these intellectual energies try to prove the standardized nature of human beings, to find the essence, under the government sanctioned grants is only to provide a scientific decree that human beings are objects and are to be treated as objects.

The political upheaval in Europe in general and in England in

particular during the early part of the seventeenth century brought the democratic ideas closer to reality. With the decline of the feudal social stratification, the idea of *democracy*[18] and *liberalism* not only seemed to be a viable alternative but inevitable. The centralized, pyramidical power structure seemed to be a hindrance to the large-scale production system. The advent of the capitalistic mode of production brought along with it the realization that millions of subjects were under control merely through political domination. Such a transformation could take place partly due to the fact that the merchants were on their way to gain enough power to influence the political decisions through their control over the capital. After passing through a complex politico-economic process, it was realized that there are many centres of power varying in degrees and areas and for the achievement of a common objective, some kind of an agreement, not only about the objective but also regarding the means for the attainment of the objective, is necessary. This realization marks a crucial turning-point in the social history of ideas in Europe. The different centres of power needed legitimization. This search for legitimization ended up in epitomizing the role of reason. Authority of the religious or political head got replaced by the authority of the law, something apparently impersonal. This is the message spread by the European Renaissance,—the principle of objectivity, scientificity. Objectivity is an inter-personal agreement which can be achieved through reasoned persuasion. Thus, we find that the notion of *objectivity* forms the very basis of scientific activity, as Monod puts it:

> . . . the postulate of objectivity is consubstantial with science and has guided the whole of its prodigious development for three centuries. It is impossible to escape it even provisionally or in a limited area, without departing from the domain of science itself.[19]

III

One may conclude at this point that *science is objective*, i.e. the notions of *science* and *objectivity* are inter-related or scientific acitivity is something similar to the activity which may be characterized as a *search for objectivity.* But the matter does not end here. It is true that the notion of *objectivity* has always been associated with *science* but the notion of *objectivity* itself is quite ambiguous. It may appear quite ironical that one of the primary objectives of science has been to strip intra-theoretical concepts off from their semantic ambiguities on the one hand and attain objectivity regarding them on the other, but the notion of objectivity has been allowed to float freely in the semantic pool even within the discourses on science. The semantic uneasiness associated with the notion of *objectivity* within the discourses on science is inevitable as the objectives of the practitioners of science on the one hand and the users of sciences on the other are to be adulterated by each other without being detected.

Scientific discourses tend to become documents, they are published and referred to. Scientific ideas may originate in the mind of an individual but inevitably they become supra-personal, objective, either due to persuasive reasoning or their potential usefulness (the most effective form of persuasion). More precisely, the scientificity of an idea depends on its potential usefulness, its projected objectives. This is the culture of the scientific community which is well-established by and through the *philosophical transactions* since the twentieth day of November 1660, i.e. the day Royal Society was born. On the other hand, the discourses on science are inter-subjective communications. They are strategies. Being strategies, the semantical fluidity is not only allowed but also perpetuated in order to mask some of its mechanisms.

Hence the need of bureaucratization, standardization, equalization rationalization, and objectification. Words like equality, liberty, fraternity etc., the products of the European Renaissance were sold to the non-European world along with colonial expansion. Even though the European community has started suspecting their viability, it is easy to sell them even today in the Third World countries—these are the hand maidens for the leaders of the present day democracies to manipulate the large number of human objects involved in the production process. Obviously, it is convenient to equate the notion of *objectivity* with consensus or agreement. It is no more the object *per se* that is important but what people say about it or what we can do with it. That is, the object in use, common use so to say, assumes significance. Consequently, the notion of *objectivity* coincides with consensus, an agreement regarding an idea of an object and objectives thereof. Knowledge of an object is directly proportional to the power of manipulating the object in a desired way. When a huge object is to be manipulated, it definitely requires more manpower. Consensus assumes vital significance under the circumstances since a large number of human objects are involved in the production process, in manipulating a huge object. It is only through a successful manipulation of the human objects that one can hope to be successful in manipulating the huge object, to keep the production process going. Any idiosyncrasy on the part of even a few individuals may jeopardize the entire production process itself. Perhaps reflective of a collective uneasiness about such dangers is the seeming ethic among the individuals to try to achieve consensus, falling back on the 'majority rule' only as a second best way of proceeding.[20]

The notion of *objectivity* as we have found so far is associated with either the notion of 'object' or with some kind of agreement. The first idea of *objectivity* is closely related to the realistic conception of *science* of earlier days. The latter view of *objectivity* drowns itself into the societal pool. In either case, what is missed (or deliberately kept concealed) is the point that *objectivity* is an inter-subjective principle of great usefulness. Objectivity, as the term suggests, is utilitarian in character, concerned with objects

and objectives that can be manipulated and attained. Its usefulness as an inter-subjective convention is directly proportional to the strict limitation by and definition of its purpose, its objectives. Precisely because the natural sciences, since the days of their inception had distinct and definitive purposes, objectives, they proved themselves to be so objective and useful :

> The Royal Society and the Academie Royale had at the outset a strong practical bias, their founders and their fellows were convinced that science could be useful and should be planned to be useful.[21]

Ever since the days of Gresham College, the method of abstraction and elimination was practiced so ruthlessly in scientific projects that it eventually succeeded and proved itself effective. Both abstraction and elimination are directly the products of the objectives at hand. It is the objectives that determine the objectivity and not the other way round. The usefulness, the prized objective of science, has increasingly become ambivalent as the objectivity itself has become the objective. Here again, as in any bureaucratization, means become so intrinsically the end that it ended up in a circle. Usefulness is measured in terms of further usefulness, as capital by its own increase, and no more by its objectives. The internalization of the end within the means produces the circle of interest and also hides the circularity from its practitioners, prepares the ground for an eternal play, a field of fixed texts which are to be read again and again. New creations are ruled out as deviant activities. New objectives are to be established in order to break the circle of interest. But a human group or a community is endowed with its own inertia, like a material body. It requires a tremendous 'force to change its state' of being in the circle of interest.

It seems quite clear at the end that objectivity has no necessary existence, as is usually believed, apart from the inter-subjective convention. It has only a limited reality amidst unlimited possibilities. It is constituted by and for specific objectives. Only specific objectives can constitute objectivity. It is a construct of convenience. Objectivity is created by more or less clearly articulated definitions and descriptions expressing more or less clearly the expectations, desires, intentions, *objectives* etc. Only fairly definite objectives, chosen freely or otherwise, create regions of objectivity, spheres of relative certitude and precise meanings. If we cannot see the uncertainties and ambiguities, it is because of the fact that the political power has been quite successful in convincing us that we are in the best of all possible spheres (Leibniz) or the only spheres (Śaṅkara) and thus the objectives that we are pursuing are freely chosen. In other words, we have chosen, of our sweet free will, to pursue the objective of objectivity. It would be wrong to confuse the end with the means or the means with the end. There are many objectivity fields depending upon the objectives that a community takes for granted and pursues with the fullest sincerity.

But it is quite unfortunate to note that under the name of progress and civilization, attaining objectivity has become the sole objective. In the process, it no doubt has created enclosures of apparent safety and stability but it has also imposed order not only on nature but on human nature as well. Law-court, police, prisons, etc. are the symbols of objectivity and also the disguise to legitimize violence and domination. It is an irony that the institutions that (wo)men created and the enterprises they undertook have only marginalized them. In search of objectivity, human beings have become objects, devoid of even any self, not to speak of self respect. If one considers it a sickness then (s)he may take a careful look at the following lines from Wittgenstein :

> The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings, and it was (is) possible for the sickness of philosophical problems to get cured through a changed mode of thought and of life, not through a medicine invented by an individual.[22]

* An earlier draft of this article was presented in an international seminar on 'Science, Ideology and Philosophy,' organized by Aligarh Muslim University. Another draft of the paper was presented in a seminar on 'Gramsci', organized jointly by Joshi-Adhikari Institute of Social Science and Nehru Museum. I am thankful to the participants of both the seminars. I am also thankful to Dr Laxminarayan Lenka for his very useful comments on all the earlier drafts of the article.

Notes and References

1. M. Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, Penguin, 1978, p. 86.
2. For a detailed discussion on the subject see J. Bronowski and B. Mazlish, *Western Intellectual Tradition*, Pelican, 1960/63.
3. J. Monod, *Chance and Necessity*, Fontana, 1970/74.
4. Sceptics are always around, but their voices are reduced to silence by a voice vote, under the pressure of mere number game. Rather we find heroic efforts of the great philosophers, (e.g. Kant) to legitimize the legitimate.
5. It is only since 1960 that we find a phenomenal rise in the number of intellectuals coming out openly against the legitimacy of science and its use. For a detailed discussion on the subject, see S. Cotgrove, *Catastrophe or Cornocopia : The Environment, Politics and the Future*, John Wiley, 1982. Also L. Vibrath, *Environmentalist : Vanguard for a New Society*, New York, 1984.
6. Even a casual look at the contemporary journals reveal a striking anomaly between the number of times the Indian authors are referred to even by the Indian authors and the number of times the western authors are referred to by both the groups. This clearly reflects the fact that there is hardly any attempt on our part to arrive at a consensus to gain objectivity. Rather, there are hectic efforts of lobbying and luring. See note 21.
7. Linguistics may be taken as one of those disciplines which seems to be at the borderline between science and non-science. At least the debate is very much on and no conclusive answer has yet been found. Under the circumstances, it can be safely assumed that a linguist's statements on science are more likely to be of an ideal type. The objectives are to be clearly formulated, if one wants to attain them.
8. D. Crystal, *Linguistics*, Pelican, 1971/76, p. 78. The quotation is deliberately chosen from an introductory book—since 'we *are naive* so far as science is concerned'. An advanced level treatise is more likely to be beyond our comprehension than not, in the proper *sense*.
9. The Aristotelian dictum of splitting statements into subject and predicate gave rise to (by now deeply ingrained in the minds of the intellectuals) the idea that the subject is made explicit through predication. Thus it is believed that an object can be made fully explicit, at least in principle, through a process of predication. But one of the most significant insights of Aristotle on this issue has been either totally missed or deliberately ignored due to the over-indulgence of the Platonic ideas. Aristotle was quite clear on this point that particular sciences do not study the thing (being) as it is but 'cut off a part of being and investigate the attributes of this part', *Metaphysics*, 1003 a 25. I think that Plato, Kant and Popper all went wrong in thinking that order is *imposed* on nature and thus *objectivity* is attained due to some kind of a transcendental subjectivity, while Aristotle was right in thinking that order is *abstracted* from nature depending upon the objective(s) at hand.
10. For a detailed discussion on the relationship between the notions of *objectivity* and *explicitness*, see F. Mulholzer, 'Objectivity', *Erkenntnis*, 1988, pp. 185–230.
11. It is a very common simile in use in the post-Renaissance period where the great book of nature is supposed to be there lying open only to be read and deciphered.
12. Imitating is not only a very primitive instinct to be found among our hairy ancestors but, when combined with intelligence, it has proved very useful. For example, the case of the Japanese experiment in the field of technology after the Second World War.
13. M. Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1958.
14. K.R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, Clarendon, 1972/79.
15. P.K. Feyerabend, 'From Incompetent Professionalism to Professionalized Incompetence', *Philosophy of Science*, 1978.
16. The point is succinctly articulated in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. 'The subject does not belong to the world.' (5.632) 'The philosophical self is not the human being nor the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it.' (5.641) 'There must be objects . . .' (2.026). I have tried to explicate this notion in terms of being-in-the-world and being-off-the-world in C. Goswami's, 'Logical Form of Action Sentences', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, XIX, No. 3, 1992, pp. 187–98.
17. Roger Penrose, *Emperor's New Mind*, Vintage, 1989/90, p. 561.
18. Some of the notions like, 'liberty', 'equality', etc. have not only become co-terminus with *democracy* but also have acquired some strange kind of *sanctity* in the political discourses. Consequently, we find various shades of democracy. The concept of democracy which got sanctified say, roughly around the latter part of the sixteenth century, has passed through a complex and chequered history both in the realm of theory and practice. For detail see T. Bottomore, *Political Sociology*, esp. Ch. II. We need not enter into that debate here. We can assume democracy to mean, perhaps the sense which got sanctified, that the decision-making task for a group of individuals is in the hands of each one of them and each one is equal in ability and status. Certainly, such a sense is utopian but such an utopia was projected not only as possible but actualization of such an utopia was supposed to be the only solution to all the maladies, the pill for every ill.
19. J. Monod, *Chance and Necessity*, Fontana, 1970/74, p. 31.
20. J. Davis, 'Group Decision and Social Interaction : A Theory of Social Decision Scheme' *Psychological Review*, 1973, pp. 97-125. This seems to be the ethic of a highly technological society. In Indian institutions, the usual formula is to try for a majority under the assumption that complete consensus is unachievable. Hence most of the time it amounts to be a rule of the largest minority and never majority, even after hectic lobbying.

21. J. Bronowski and B. Mazlish, *The Western Intellectual Tradition*, Pelican, 1960/64, p. 217.
22. L. Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Basil Blackwell, London, 1938/56, 23(II). These lines were written in the context of the language of Set Theory, especially with respect to Russell's Paradox. However, these lines stand out remarkably even out of that context.

Spontaneity and Spirit: Hegel on Kant's Impasse of Freedom

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It is a truism that Hegel incorporated and developed many of his doctrines from Kant, but it has always been a matter of great dispute as to just what he borrowed, how much he borrowed, and how much he altered and added to the Kantian programme. In order to make the issues clear and precise, I have divided the present article into two parts: (I)—Kant's doctrine of 'spontaneity' (*spontaneität or selbstätigkeit*) and Hegel's critical assessment of it along with Hegel's elucidation of spirit (*geist*) as an alternative to Kantian impasse on freedom; and, (II)—to integrate Hegelian themes against the charges levelled by (a) Feuerbach, (b) Charles Taylor, (c) Foucault and Derrida.

Before I come to Part I of the article, I would like to point out that Kantianism and Hegelianism have made a great stir; not only in the field of philosophy, but also in the fields of psychology, theology and socio-political philosophy. Its advocates were Schopenhauer, Herbart, Beneke, Weisse, Schleiermacher, Marx and Lenin. These are reactions against Hegelianism from two sides—the Right and the Left. Even the present-day Hegel scholars associate themselves to either of the Hegelians (to use the term in the broad sense). Likewise, J.N. Findlay, M.J. Inwood, R.B. Pippin among others interpret Hegel from the Right side whereas Alexandre Kojève, Herbert Marcuse, George Lukacs and others attempt to develop Hegel from the Left side. It is virtually impossible to raise and discuss all these reactions in this short article. I have chosen Feuerbach, Taylor, Foucault and Derrida for three reasons; namely

(i) Feuerbach was the pupil of Hegel and the first to have come out strongly against Hegel's doctrine of spirit during 1828 to 1843;
(ii) Among the present-day Hegelian scholars, Charles Taylor is the one who tries to interpret Hegel's philosophy during 1975–79 by rejecting Hegel's claim for spirit;
(iii) In the last three decades or so, Foucault and Derrida, in their own specific ways, have been rejecting the presuppositions of modernism.

In my attempt to refute these charges, I shall try to re-integrate Hegel's idealism on the basis of his doctrine of spirit and freedom.

I

What is central to Kant's doctrine of 'spontaneity' is the notion of freedom. It characterizes both the cognitive acts and acts required for free-will. These are the two different conceptions of 'spontaneity'—the logical spontaneity which pertains to acts of thought, and the transcendental spontaneity which supposedly pertains to acts of free-will. This distinction was received by Hegel as problematic, because, in the former case, Kantian acts of thought are limited to the phenomena, while, in the latter, it is purely formal without any empirical content and specification.

We are required to elaborate two points; first, what are Kantian epistemological determinants regarding spontaneity which lead him to an impasse of soul or spirit? Second, how does Hegel overcome the Kantian impasse? In my answer to these two questions, I shall club them together.

Kant designates the common structure of soul as 'transcendental unity of self-consciousness'. It consists of the forms of intuition (space and time) and forms of understanding—the spontaneity in the production of concepts[1] which are not static forms, but forms of operation that exist only in the acts of apprehending and comprehending sensibility. The forms of intuition synthesize the manifold of sensibility into spatio-temporal order. By virtue of the categories, the results of the spatio-temporal order are brought to universal and necessary relations of cause and effect, substance, reciprocity, and so on—the receptivity is thus combined with spontaneity.[2] And this entire complex is unified in the transcendental apperception which relates all experience to the 'thinking ego', thereby giving experience the continuity of being 'my experience' which is 'an act of spontaneity'.[3]

Hegel, in his own assumption that the laws of nature spring from the laws of spirit or *geist*, applauds Kant's discovery of the spontaneity of the transcendental consciousness as the ultimate source of conceptual synthesis. Kant's transcendental consciousness is the awareness of an 'I think' which accompanies the unity of our diversified experience. Kant's transcendental consciousness, being the logical presupposition to knowledge, cannot be known. It is in metaphysics that the attempt is made to apply the categories to the 'thinking ego'. The metaphysical arguments that the soul is a simple, a self-identical substance; separate from and opposed to matter, etc. are a series of parallelogisms in which the term 'soul' is used as a predicate and it is a formally invalid conclusion. Hegel approves of Kant's criticism. But this is not, Hegel contends, because the categories overstep their legitimate limits, but

because the soul is a living, active being, just as complex as it is self-identically simple. In fact, its simplicity is its indivisible wholeness, but that is constituted solely by the cohesion and inseparability of its diverse traits, aspects and activities. Kant's objections, according to Hegel, are right but his reasons are wrong.

Hegel takes over the notion from Kant that consciousness is necessarily bipolar, that it requires the distinction of subject and object. Hegel makes this principle his own, and it is part of his general espousal of the view that 'rational awareness requires separation. Consciousness is only possible when the subject is set over against an object.'[4] Consciousness, says Hegel, constitutes the stage of spirit as 'reflection' or 'relationship', the stage of spirit as 'appearance'. These terms which characterize the subject-object opposition of consciousness are basic for Hegel's attempt to supplant Kant's transcendental consciousness. Before Hegel, Fichte and Schelling had sought a concept of pure-ego as self-reflectedness that would overcome the difficulties arising from Kantian dualisms. Fichte took up the principle that the ego posits the non-ego because this is the condition of consciousness. In Kant, the transcendental consciousness, while making synthetic *a priori* knowledge possible, itself remains a merely formal identity expressible only in an analytic proposition, e.g. I = I. Fichte was the first to exhibit a concept of pure consciousness that would not be merely analytic, but would also render the very distinction between analytic and synthetic a distinction arising from ego's own act of self-positing. The act itself would be at once a self-distinguishing one by the ego that constituted the ego, the very self-identity that it is. Hegel makes this principle his own and it constitutes the basis of his exposition of consciousness.

The agnostic impasse concerning Kant's transcendental consciousness is overcome by postulating a noumenal self, i.e. freedom of will. To speak in Kantian terms, we are members of two worlds—phenomenon and noumenon. The transcendental self in us transcends our bodily limitations and hence we are free, but as embodied being, we are subject to laws of nature. 'By freedom', Kant understands, '. . .the power of a state spontaneously. Such causality will not, therefore, itself stand under another cause determining it in time, as required by the law of nature. Freedom, in this sense, is a pure transcendental idea, in the first place, contains nothing borrowed from experience, and which, secondly, refers to an object that cannot be determined or given in experience'.[5] Kant brings out the notion of will and gives a turning point to his concept of freedom. Freedom terminates into the will in order to become practical and transforms itself into empirical consequences. This means that freedom of will is central to Kant's formulation of 'ought' statements as the matrix of categorical imperatives. Freedom, being self-caused is different from the causal necessity operating in nature. In other words,

freedom and causal necessity fall so widely apart that there is no meeting transition between them.

Hegel overcomes the Kantian dualism on freedom and necessity by developing a monistic position which is essentially dialectical. Freedom, Hegel argues, is an appreciation of the dialectical necessity which is manifested in the estranged reality. To appreciate Hegel's dialectic, we have to explain its two operative terms; namely, contradiction and sublation (*aufheben*) and to analyse these two terms, we have to clarify 'mediation' (*vermittlung*) and mediated (*vermittelt*), and the opposites, im-mediacy (*unvermittlung*) and immediate (*unvermittelt*).

To 'mediate' is to be in the middle, to connect two extremes. Everything, Hegel states, is mediated, that nothing exists as 'im-mediate' first, everything is inherently contradictory. Simple im-mediacy is the determination of the identity, of dead being; but contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality. It is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity. In *Logic*, 'mediation' will involve the gradual development of categories to a point where there is nothing that is posited as first and independent. In Hegel's dialectic, the thesis is always regarded as 'im-mediate' or as characterized by 'im-mediacy'. The second term, the antithesis, is mediate or 'mediation'. The third term, the synthesis, is the merging of 'mediation' and emerging as a new 'immediacy'. And this process goes on.

The synthesis of a triad both abolishes and preserves the differences of the thesis and the antithesis. This activity of the synthesis is what Hegel calls *aufheben* or sublation. It may be seen as manifesting three distinct but mutually inter-related moments. First, it has the moment of 'transcendence', in which it goes beyond a 'limit' or 'boundary'; second, it is a 'negation' of this first negation, this 'limit', in which it is overcome' or 'cancelled'; and third, it is the moment of 'preservation', in which what has been 'gone beyond' or transcended is brought again into a new relation. These three moments of sublation, though distinct, form a unitary process of logic which is differentiated into its various components only for the purpose of helping an 'understanding' of the process itself. The very process by which a category 'passes beyond itself' and posits another category to which it is intimately related is, at one and the same logical moment, the process by which it 'transcends' its limited abstract self-identity, 'negates' that identity and emerges into a connected unity or nexus, in which it is preserved as an intrinsic part of some greater whole or unification. The application of categories of *Logic* to the estranged reality supplies it with the form and determination of thought. This action further forms the previously formed, gives it additional determinations, and thus makes it more determinate in itself, further developed, and more profound or what is the same as unified. As unification, this activity is a succession of processes in development which must be represented not as a straight line drawn out into a vague

infinity, but as a circle returning within itself, which, as periphery, has very many circles, and whose whole is a large number of processes in development turning back within themselves. Hegel's analysis follows the following schema, 'The true form of reality requires freedom. Freedom requires self-consciousness and knowledge of the truth. Self-consciousness and knowledge of the truth are essentials of the subject. The true form of reality must be conceived as subject'.[6] Here the concept of subject which seems to be the last step is, in fact, not so. Hegel proceeds to show that the subject is Notion. The subject's freedom consists in self-consciousness and knowledge of the truth. But the form in which the truth is held is the Notion. Freedom is, in the last analysis, not an attribute of the thinking subject as such but of the Truth that this subject holds and wields. Freedom which is thus an attribute of the Notion, is the Notion. The Notion 'exists', however, only in the thinking subject. Hegel says, 'The Notion, in so far as it has advanced into such an existence as is free in itself, is just Ego or pure self-consciousness'.[7]

The Notion presents a unification in which a particular moment appears as the estranged of the universal that governs the unification. Connected with this on a practical level is the fact that, 'actual freedom . . . begins where the individual knows himself as an independent individual to be universal and real, where his significance is infinite, or where the subject has attained the consciousness of personality and thus desires to be esteemed for himself alone. Free philosophic thought has this direct connection with practical freedom: that as the former supplies thought about the absolute, universal, and real object, the latter, because it thinks itself, gives itself the character of universality'.[8]

The individual's subjectivity might best be characterized by the concept of 'spirit' which is the locus of all universal concepts. Spirit externalizes itself in particular things, events and relationships. Thus, we come across estrangement. The estrangement is, however, not the final state of affairs, it carries its own 'negation', i.e. finite things are negative, they never are what they can and ought to be. They always exist in a state that tends of their notion to go over into their opposite, to perish and to change into what they are not. Hegel says, '. . . the object is in one and the same respect the opposite of itself; it is for itself, so far as it is for another, it is for another, so far as it is for itself.'[9] This has the reference to the unification as the reason why a thing comes into being and why it is what it is not. Unification is again located in the spirit, and unification and being are identical terms, the copula 'is' in every proposition expresses a unification of subject and predicate, in other words, a Being. Spirit's activity to unify the estranged reality is motivated by its own essential attribute, i.e. freedom. Hegel thus overcomes the Kantian impasse on freedom by developing the doctrine of freedom as the realization of unity in the estranged reality.

II

(a) It is because Hegel considers spirit as the locus of both freedom and necessity above all that the Hegelians of the 1830s and 1840s have been overwhelmingly hostile to Hegel. In the present century, the challenge to Hegel's doctrine of spirit and his idealism has come not only from critics hostile to Hegel's general project in philosophy such as Karl Popper,[10] but also from writers broadly in sympathy with that project. Hegel's contention that freedom is an appreciation of necessity has been criticized by theologians and philosophers alike; by orthodox Christians, materialists, atheists and post-modernists.

It will perhaps be more important for our present argument to discuss those philosophers, who are in sympathy with Hegel's general project in philosophy and, yet who have held Hegel's claim for spirit to be philosophically indefencible. I want to argue that during Hegel's own lifetime, there emerged two schools which are, to use Strauss's own phrase, known as the Right-wing and the Left-wing Hegelians. There were followers of Hegel who, as if out of respect for spirit, held Hegelianism as the actual end of philosophizing. These were known as Old Hegelians, and, afterwards, the Right-wing Hegelians. They were among others von Henning, Hotho, Förster, Marheineke, Hinrichs, Daub, Conradi and Schaller. Opposed to them, there was another group of Hegel's followers who attempted to develop the spirit of Hegel's philosophy beyond Hegel, even to the point of contradiction. They have come to be known as the Young Hegelians, and, shortly thereafter, the Left-wing Hegelians. As an identifiable philosophic movement, Young Hegelianism endured for two decades, from 1828 to 1848, whereas Old Hegelianism did not produce Hegelianism in a uniform manner beyond the period of Hegel's personal influence. In 1830, all who were to become the central figures of the Young Hegelian school were Arnold Ruge, Feuerbach, Max Stirner, David Strauss and Bruno Bauer. Young Hegelianism can be said to have made one of its earliest appearance in a letter that Feuerbach sent to Hegel on 22nd November, 1828. The letter was enclosed along with a copy of his recent doctoral dissertation, *De ratione una, universali infinite*, and both testify to their author's indebtedness to Hegel. But Feuerbach took the opportunity to introduce his own perception of import of Hegelianism. To Feuerbach, Spirit, after having worked for centuries upon its development and completion, has finally revealed itself in Hegel's philosophy. It is now the mission of Spirit, acting through its disciples—the Hegelians, particularly the Young Hegelians—to rationalize the world. At the initial stage, Feuerbach acknowledges that 'the knowledge gained through the study of Hegel should not merely be directed to academic ends, but to mankind . . . '[11] However, as Feuerbach's work proceeded, he started levelling fresh charges against Hegel's doctrine of spirit.

Feuerbach has levelled three basic charges against Hegel's doctrine of

spirit. First, in *Towards a Critique of Hegelian Philosophy* (1839), Feuerbach's criticism of Hegel's Spirit is, in fact, based on his own conception of philosophical materialism. Says Feuerbach, 'The Hegelian philosophy is, uniquely, a rational mysticism . . . it fascinates in the same measure as it repels. . . . The reason why Hegel conceived those ideas which express only subjective needs to be objective truth is because he did not go back to the source of and the needs for those ideas. What he took for real reveals itself on closer examination to be of a highly dubious in nature. He made what is secondary—primary, thus either ignoring that which is really primary or dismissing it as something subordinate.'[12]

What is primary for Feuerbach is the material substance existing independently of us but wholly accessible to our cognition. Feuerbach's materialism is, in fact, based on his radical humanism as found in his major work *The Essence of Christianity* (*Des Wesen des Christes*) (1841). And this brings us to the second charge against Hegel—he posits the absolute priority of actual human experience, of the directly apprehended world of nature and society in which man lives. His unqualified humanism denies the relevance of the speculative philosophy of Hegel. With his enthusiastic humanism, Feuerbach is opposed to the very concept of philosophy which, according to him, is nothing else but religion rendered into a certain ontological and epistemological position. Rejecting Hegel's Spirit, Feuerbach says, 'The *absolute* to man is his own nature. The power of the object over him is therefore the power of his own nature.'[13] Feuerbach bases his humanism on the foundation of philosophical materialism. In the third charge, Feuerbach, in the *Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy* (1842), says, '*Spinoza* is the originator of speculative philosophy, *Schelling* its restorer, *Hegel* its perfector.'[14]

Feuerbach's criticism of Hegel's doctrine of spirit implies the absolute reduction of God to man, the transformation of theology into anthropology. Feuerbach claims that theological issues would be translated into human issues, and theological criticism would be replaced by social criticism. The question arises, from where does Feuerbach get this insight? Certainly it comes out from Hegel's general philosophic-religious claim that the reality of God gets its justification from thinking consciousness. Feuerbach concentrates on the nature of human consciousness alone. But whereas Spirit or consciousness is the ontology for Hegel, it is simply an attribute to Feuerbach's materialism, simply a product of mechanical interaction in matter. Feuerbach, however, fails to explain how consciousness emerges out of matter. But for Hegel, Spirit, being the ontology, is capable enough to unify the estranged reality. Against Feuerbach's charge that Hegel's Spirit is a 'rational mysticism', one may point out that though the content of both religion and philosophy is the same, viz. Absolute thought, yet there is no one to one relationship between philosophy and religion. As a matter of fact, in the *Philosophy of Spirit*, Hegel develops three modes of Absolute Spirit—art,

religion and philosophy—and says that each of these modes enables us to know the totality of the spirit's life in a different way. The content of spirit is the Absolute which is *thought*. In art, this Absolute thought, the idea takes the form of sense-content. In philosophy, it takes the form of thought, so that in philosophy, content and form are identical. In religion, the content is the same, viz. Absolute thought, but the form is intermediate. It is partly sensuous and partly rational. It is what Hegel calls *vorstellung*—the pictorial or figurative thought. Feuerbach has completely ignored this aspect in Hegel that distinguishes philosophy from religion. Consequently Feuerbach identifies religion with philosophy. Even Feuerbach's criticism of religion fails to furnish an ethical system that can possibly replace the values developed in religion. Hence, Feuerbach's charges against Hegel's doctrine of spirit have no sound basis to survive for long.

(b) Among the present-day Hegelian scholars, there are very few philosophers who are as qualified as Charles Taylor to write a definite study of Hegel. In his two books, *Hegel* (1975) and *Hegel and Modern Society* (1979), Taylor attempts to defend Hegel's philosophy in the changed intellectual climate of Europe. Taylor has a definite way of looking at the emergence and development of Hegel's thoughts and its relevance to the present-day intellectual requirement. In his *Hegel*, Taylor describes the aspirations of the generation of young Romantics of the 1790s from which Hegel sprang and against whom he defined himself. The central problem for Romanticism was human subjectivity. Says Taylor, 'It concerned the nature of human subjectivity and its relation to the world. It was a problem of uniting, two seemingly indispensable images of man, which on one level had deep affinities with each other, and yet could not but appear utterly incompatible.'[15] However, Taylor criticizes, 'Hegel's central ontological thesis—that the universe is posited by a Spirit whose essence is rational necessity—is quite dead.'[16] And as R.J. Bernstein points out, 'It is to Taylor's credit that he does not flinch from taking the notion of self-positing Spirit as Hegel's most central theme. He boldly attempts to show that we can make sense of what Hegel is saying without succumbing to the temptation of thinking that Spirit is some non-substantial mystical force or simply a mystified way of speaking about species being or humanity.'[17] It is this contention of Taylor that is reflected in the Preface to *Hegel*. Taylor says that for 'anyone who wants to understand how Hegel's philosophy was authenticated in his own eyes, and, indeed, how this philosophy and its authentication are inseparable for Hegel, the *Logic* remains indispensable.' In the first two hundred pages of the book, Taylor frequently creates the impression that *Logic* is the only 'real candidate for the role of strict dialectical proof.'

Taylor's later work *Hegel and Modern Society* is, in fact, a condensation of his *Hegel*. In order to make Hegel relevant to contemporary philosophers, Taylor has left out the account of Hegel's *Logic* as well as

the interpretation of *Phenomenology*, and the chapters on Art, Religion and Philosophy. Hegel, according to Taylor, is relevant for evolving the terms in which we think. 'Hegel has contributed to the formation of concepts and modes of thought which are indispensable if we are to see our way clear through certain modern problems and dilemmas.'[18] Taylor tries to show how the problems and aspirations of Hegel's times continue with certain modifications into our time. What is central to these problems is subjectivity and freedom. Taylor says, 'Hegel's writings provide one of the most profound and far-reaching attempts to workout a vision of embodied subjectivity, of thought and freedom emerging from the stream of life, finding expression in the forms of social existence, and discovering themselves in relation to nature and history. If the philosophical attempt to situate freedom is the attempt to gain a conception of man in which free action is the response to what we are—or to a call which comes to us, from nature alone or from a God who is also beyond nature—then it will always recur behind Hegel's conclusions to his strenuous and penetrating reflections on embodied spirit.'[19]

We come across a critical study of Taylor's works by Richard J. Bernstein in *Philosophical Profiles*, etc. In chapter 5, entitled 'Why Hegel Now?', he reflects on the resurgence of interest in Hegel among Anglo-American philosophers. The author traces the amount of influence Hegel has exercised on pragmatic thinkers like William James, John Dewey and others, who sought to clarify and state their own philosophic positions over and against Hegel. The author furnishes an exhaustive account of the history of the influence of and the fight against Hegel in the English-speaking world. The struggle between Hegel's absolute idealism and the analytic positivistic schools of thought gave rise to certain un-Hegelian and even anti-Hegelian thought. 'Hegel's vivid sense of history, and of dialectical struggle by which *geist* realizes itself, played almost no role for the English idealists. Hegel's *Logic* was considered to be the primary text, not his *Phenomenology* or his writings about Objective Spirit.'[20]

The above analysis fits with the contention of Taylor towards his interpretation of Hegel. In addition, one may point out that the rejection of the doctrine of spirit in Hegel is tantamount to a rejection of subjectivity and freedom. It is also not possible to accept the evolution of concepts in Hegel's philosophic-religious quest by rejecting the doctrine of spirit in that system. This is so because it is, after all, the *absoluter geist* from which the concepts and categories are, one and all, deduced. It is therefore a self-contradictory claim on the part of Charles Taylor to appreciate Hegel's contributions to the evolution of concepts, subjectivity and freedom, and, to reject Hegel's claim for the Spirit. The fact of the matter is that Hegel could evolve the concepts in the process of spirit's activity to unify the estranged reality. It is only in the process of unifying the estranged reality that the spirit realizes its freedom. Hence, Hegel's

claim for the spirit is indispensable in order to appreciate his contributions towards the evolution of concepts, subjectivity and freedom.

(c) The current history of philosophy in France is something like postmodern philosophy, which means essentially the reaction against Sartre, Descartes and the German thinkers between them. From the current vantage point of view, I have chosen two main figures in this rebellion—Michel Foucault and his pupil Jacques Derrida. German idealism plays an important but ambiguous role in postmodernism. They have occasioned considerable confusion and misunderstanding, among enthusiasts and detractors alike, as well as some sound criticism. Postmodernism in philosophy is an attack not only on the pretensions but also on the premises and presuppositions of modernism, '. . . it did indeed become the systematic rejection of the most basic premises of modern European philosophy: the celebration of the self and subjectivity, the new appreciation of history, and most of all the already flagging philosophical confidence in our ability to know the world as it really is. It was in a phrase, the wholesale rejection of the transcendental pretence.'[21]

What exactly are Foucault's projects? In an interview in 1983, he summed up his work in this way, 'Three domains of genealogy are possible, first, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents.'[22] It will, however, not be possible to go into the details of these axes. I shall, therefore, dwell upon the general implications which these axes have in Foucault.

Foucault is a holist in his insistence that an element can be identified only by its place in a system and has no identity outside that system. In this formulation, what is rejected is the role of the self which identifies and unifies the system. And it is tantamount to the rejection of human freedom of any kind and to any extent. Foucault's method, known as 'archaeology' has two features, '. . . first, it does not concern itself with the possible permutations of a system but only with its actual, historical instances; and secondly, there is no attempt to eliminate meanings from discussion.'[23] Indeed, language ('discourse') is much of Foucault's doctrines and it can describe actual situations and the changing transformations of meaning. Generally, in the transcendental idealism of Kant as well as in Hegel's absolute idealism, there has always been an attempt to present an all-embracing concept with the help of which knowledge can be derived and freedom can be realized. Foucault has been extremely sceptical about such possibilities from his earliest works and, as his work progressed, this doubt has become stronger. The tradition of German idealism with its doctrine of self as the locus of knowledge and freedom as expansive with the pregnant sense of humanity

within itself; Foucault is indignant at the very thought of humanity's invasion of self, and has no faith in human freedom and reason.

Derrida was a pupil of Foucault but his work is often highly critical of Foucault. This can be seen in Derrida's critique of Foucault in 'Cogito and the History of Madness', and in his allusions to Foucault in his later essay 'Sign, Structure and Play in the Human Sciences'.[24] However, I cannot go into the details of the differences between Foucault and Derrida. What I am primarily concerned with is the way Derrida too, like Foucault, launches an offensive against the basic doctrines of German idealism. Derrida summarized 'the myth of the presence' as,

> Whether this takes the form of the immanent presence of God, or of the world as a determinate entity, or of the self as an inner certainty. This 'theo-ontological tradition' refuses to consider the possibility that there is no such certainties, and even the language we use to talk about philosophy is riddled with distinctions and world that make this myth avoidable.[25]

To develop Derrida's basic contention behind this position, we have to clarify his basic philosophical position. In an interview in Paris in 1981, Derrida said, 'My philosophical formation owes much to the thought of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger.'[26] Derrida hails originally from the phenomenological movement of Husserl, Heidegger and Levinás; and it is within and around this particular framework, more than anything else, that his thinking has evolved. His method is known as 'deconstruction'. Richard Kearney, in a Prefatory Note on Derrida says, 'Derrida was working out his central notion of the irreducible structure of *difference* as it operates in human consciousness, temporality, history and above all in the fundamental and overriding activity of writing (*Lé'criture*). By means of this concept of *difference* a neologism meaning both to 'defer' and to 'differ'—Derrida proposed to show how the major metaphysical definitions of Being as some timeless self-identity or presence (e.g. *logos* . . .), which dominated western philosophy from Plato to the present day, would ultimately be 'deconstructed'. Such a deconstruction would show that in each instance difference precedes presence rather than the contrary.'[27] Derrida's work of rigorous 'deconstruction' attempts to pose a radical challenge to such logocentric notions as the Eternal Idea of Plato, the Self-Thinking-Thought of Aristotle, the *Cogito* of Descartes, the Transcendental Consciousness of Kant and the *geist* of Hegel.

Derrida's critique of idealism, and more specifically of the extent to which he 'takes Hegel seriously', can be nowhere better viewed than in his treatment of Hegel's theory of representation and the sign. As stated by Derrida himself, 'The problematic of the sign derives from a fundamental logocentrism, from a philosophy of consciousness or of the originary subject.'[28] In his celebrated history of the notion of the sign in *Of Grammatology*[29] as well as the shorter version presented in his interview

with Julia Kristeva in *Positions*,[30] Derrida attempts to show that the very concept of the sign has always depended on, or been determined by, that fundamental metaphysical opposition: the sensible and the intelligible. Derrida treats the sign work in various ways in order to show that the metaphysical tradition has always treated the sign as a *transition* or a bridge between these two moments of presence. Since the sign could only function as a provisional reference between presence in the form of the object (the sensible) and presence in the form of self-presence (the intelligible), Derrida views it as the *time of referral* which signifies self-presence : in the case of Hegel, as stated in Part I of this essay, it is the self-presence of the absolute as subject, or 'absolute subjectivity' on which freedom is located.

Derrida has an intense distrust of metaphysics including the metaphysics of self as the locus of freedom. For Derrida, the job of philosophy is not to depend or account for this system, but to 'deconstruct' it. But in rejecting the presuppositions of modern philosophy, Derrida, however, fails to offer a serious and constructive counter-hypothesis to supplant the doctrines of spirit and freedom that lie at the roots of German idealism.

To bring this article to a close, it can be said that Hegel's doctrine of spirit not only overcomes the Kantian limitations on spontaneity, freedom and knowledge, but also provides a comprehensive account of freedom as an appreciation of necessity. Any attempt to reject Hegel's claim for the spirit is bound to result in a philosophical short-sightedness and self-contradiction in whatever way it may come out—Feuerbach, Charles Taylor or Foucault and Derrida.

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13. Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, translated by George Eliot, quotation from *The Young Hegelians*, etc., p. 133.
14. Feuerbach, *Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy* reprinted in *The Young Hegelians*, etc., p. 156.
15. Charles Taylor *Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1975, p. 3.
16. Ibid., p. 538.
17. Richard J. Bernstein, *Philosophical Profiles, Essays in a Pragmatic Mode*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 165.
18. Charles Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1979, p. xi.
19. Ibid., pp. 168–69.
20. Bernstein, *Philosophical Profiles, Essays in a Pragmatic Mode* etc., p. 145.
21. R.C. Solomon, *Continental Philosophy Since 1750*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1988, p. 194.
22. Mike Gane, 'Introduction : Michel Foucault,' in *Towards a Critique of Foucault*, edited by Mike Gane, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London & New York, 1985, p. 4. All three axes were present, *albeit* in somewhat confused fashion in *Madness and Civilization*. The truth axis was studied in *The Birth of the Clinic* and *The Order of Things*. The power axis was studied in *Discipline and Punish* and the ethical axis in *The History of Sexuality*.
23. Solomon, *Continental Philosophy Since 1750*. etc., p. 198.
24. Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, translated by Alen Bass, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976, references to Michel Foucault are from *Folie et dération : L Histoire de la folie á l'age classique*, Gallimard, Paris, 1966.
25. Solomon, *Continental Philosophy Since 1750*, etc., p. 200.
26. Richard Kearney, *Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers : The Phenomenological Heritage*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984, p. 109.
27. Ibid., pp. 105–06.
28. Derrida, 'Positions', an interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta in *Positions*, translated by Alan Bass, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981, p. 61.
29. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1978, pp. 3–140.
30. Derrida, 'Semiology and Grammatology' in *Positions* etc., pp. 15–36.

Ancient Hellenic Philosophy: Between East and West

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INTRODUCTION

As a student of philosophy, I have been puzzled for a long time by the facility and the eagerness of modern British and German historians of philosophy to appropriate ancient Hellenic philosophy as part of what they call 'western philosophy' and to oppose it to philosophies of the East.[1] More recently, in my trips to Greece and India, I was surprised to discover that even these non-northern and non-western peoples have uncritically accepted the above false claim and artificial division. Moreover, I encountered great resistance initially from Greeks and Indians when I tried to tell the truth about this well-set western trap. Therefore, I would like to take the opportunity to express in writing the views which I have voiced frequently in my lectures.[2] My unorthodox views are about the question of the so-called 'western philosophy' and its alleged connection to, and continuity of, the free spirit of inquiry of the ancient Hellenic philosophy, as the West would like to believe and have us believe it too.[3]

I shall argue that the appellation 'western' is a misnomer, when it is applied to ancient Greece in general, and especially to Greek philosophy which, on the balance of the 'West versus the East' conventional division, has historically inclined invariably towards the East.[4] I shall also argue that the coming into being of the first heretical aberration of Judaic monotheism, which is euphemistically called Christianity,[5] is responsible, first, for the strangulation of the free spirit of inquiry and autonomous life, which had given birth to philosophy in ancient Greece as it grew in the pre-Christian Mediterranean world; and second, for the sad fact that for two millennia, the Christian West (including Christianized Greece) has failed to produce any philosophy worthy of its name which is genuine philosophy and not simply 'homonyms' of it.[6]

The expression 'genuine philosophy' is intended to capture the original sense in which φιλοσοφια (*philosophia*) was understood by the ancient Hellenes, who practised philosophy in at least two ways which have been conspicuously absent from the West and its several

'philosophies':[7] first, as an autonomous and intelligent search for truth regarding the nature of Nature and the nature of Man; and second, as a way of life which is autonomous, intelligent, and active in accordance with all human excellences, both ethical and intellectual.[8] I think that this larger problem of the historical relation between *philosophia*, as the ancient Greeks understood it, and the homonymous term 'philosophy', as has been used and abused by the Christian West during the Middle Ages, and especially during the period of European colonialism, clearly relates to the issue of cultural hegemony,[9] and has important implications for the emerging character of our global, but fragile, cultural community.[10]

THE AMBIGUITY OF 'WESTERN' WHEN APPLIED TO GREECE

In the expression 'western philosophy', two ambiguous terms are closely connected and repeated so frequently, that the confusion generated by such infelicitous juxtaposition almost cries out for clarification. Regarding the first word—'western', one would be taxed heavily to point out, in the globe which revolves round the sun and makes day and night, as to where the East stops and the West begins. Even if we follow conventional wisdom and allow that Iceland and England are definitely in the West, while Korea and Japan are in the East, where shall we rightfully place Greece and India? Both are to the east of the first pair, but to the west of the second. Hence the problem. One may think that the problem can be easily solved by comparing the two countries directly to each other in which case it can be said that India is definitely in the East and Greece definitely in the West. But perhaps the situation is more complex than it appears at first glance.

For, even if the Indians were to go along with this solution, I suspect that the Greeks would have great difficulty accepting it for the following reason. Geographically, Greece, like Cyprus for example, belongs to the 'eastern Mediterranean'; in the present time as in ancient times, Greece occupies the tiny peninsula and the Aegean Sea where three continents meet : Africa, Asia and Europe. This fact perhaps explains why the Ancient Greeks conceived the strange notion that the centre of the world, 'the navel of the Earth' as they used to say, was right there in the middle of Greece, at one of the peaks of Mount Parnassus. It was at the holy shrine of Delphi where Dionysius, the God of music and dance, rested from his long journey from India through Asia and Africa, and was welcomed by his brother Apollo, God of light and reason. In this way the East and the West came together harmoniously and from that harmonious union, the classical Greek civilization emerged as a ripe fruit of the human spirit and took its place among the other ancient civilizations of the great rivers: the Nile, the Euphrates, the Indus, the Ganges, and the Yangtze.[11]

In geographical terms, then, the Greeks, like the Indians, tend to think

of themselves as westerners when they face the rising Sun, but when they turn around and face the setting Sun, they consider themselves easterners or non-westerners. Even if we turned to history for assistance, we shall find that it provides no greater help than geography for the correct characterization of Greece as western or eastern, both or neither? Historically speaking, for almost two millennia, from the time of the rise of Rome as a political power in the third century BC to the Italian Renaissance in the fifteenth century AD., Hellenic, Hellenistic, and Byzantine Greece had identified itself with the culturally more advanced East, in opposition to the Latin West which to the Greeks of that time was a synonym of barbarity and lack of civility.[12] Thus, when the Roman Empire was divided into two in the fourth century (AD 395), the division created the Latin West and the Greek East. Not surprisingly, history repeated itself in the eleventh century (AD 1054), when a schism occurred in Christianity between the Catholic Church, which was again Latin and western, and the Orthodox Church, which was Greek and eastern.[13]

These historical considerations seem to tip the balance of placing Greece definitively towards the East. But this is not the end of the story. Since the Renaissance, and more specifically with the rise of the northern European powers of France, England, Germany, and others, the ex-barbarians thought that they would gain in respectability if they claimed as their own not only the Latin, but also the Hellenic classical heritage which they began, at that specific time, to characterize as 'western'.[14] Although some intellectually aware Greeks have always remained sceptical about both the applicability of the appellation and the truthfulness of the claim, the northern Europeans have been quite successful in persuading almost the entire world that there was no difference between themselves—as builders of colonial imperialism, and the creators of the classical Greek civilization.[15]

However, unfortunate as it may seem today, the result of these activities has been that the ancient Greeks are identified as westerners today and are placed along with the British, the French, the Dutch, and the German colonialists of Africa, Asia, and America, by many African, native American and Asian peoples as they struggle for ethnic identity, national recognition, and social reconstruction. This outcome is not only unfair to the Greeks of the past, and of the present; it is also unjust to the African and Asian nations who, as a result of the northern European exclusive claim to the classical Greek heritage, cannot readily perceive the falsity of the claim at their own expense. Thus, they are slyly deprived of a valuable ally, the treasure of classical Greek culture, in their pedagogical, political, intellectual and cultural endeavours. This is truly a tragic irony. It is an unholy monopoly of the worst possible kind.[16] The fraud should be exposed and the truth must be told: the achievements of the ancient Greeks do not belong exclusively, or even primarily, to the Christians and Muslims of the West or of the East. They belong to the

world and to mankind at large, especially to those remnants of pre-Christian and pre-Islamic traditions and cultures with which the ancient Greeks had many affinities, including the love of human and undogmatic wisdom and the tolerant worship of many gods and goddesses.[17]

HELLENIC PHILOSOPHY DEFINED

So much about the perplexities of the adjective 'western' and its misapplication to ancient Greece and to Greek *philosophia*. Since the previous observations show that Greece and the West have, historically and geographically, stood at opposite poles; and since philosophy is legitimately connected with ancient Greece, it would seem to follow that the illegitimacy of the expression 'western philosophy' becomes self-evident. But if we grant the westerners their wish to remove Greece from the middle place which it has historically occupied between the East and the West, the South and the North, as a beacon of light available to every part of the world which seeks enlightenment; and further, if we allow the arrogant northern Europeans, especially the Germans and the British, to claim as exclusively their own the Hellenic classical heritage, especially Hellenic philosophy which, by its very nature, has an ecumenical and pan-anthropic appeal;[18] then we would be doing a disservice, as I said earlier, not so much to the ancient Greeks, whose immortality has been secured by their genius, but to ourselves and to our children who deserve a better future with more philosophical pluralistic *paideia*, and with less religious monotheistic fanaticism.[19]

From these considerations, the following question arises: Seen as an entity distinct and different from ancient Greece, has the Christian West, narrowly defined as the barbarized western part of the Roman Empire, in its millennial history produced philosophers or philosophical schools which are comparable to the schools of Greek philosophy or to the Indian and Chinese schools of philosophy? This is a complex question and cannot be awarded by a simple answer. The nature of the answer depends on the meaning to be assigned to the word *philosophia* which, like *demokratia*, is a very attractive Hellenic concept and has been much abused by many, who, as Plato said, would like to seem rather than be philosophers.[20]

What, then, is philosophy? What is this wisdom with which great minds, the authentic philosophers, are said to fall in love? What exactly did the Greeks mean by the word *philosophia* and how did they distinguish the genuine from the seeming philosophers? In a broad sense, there is nothing mysterious about the inborn desire to learn by asking difficult questions and finding reasonable answers.[21] If we were to isolate any specific criteria by which an authentic philosopher would be distinguished and defined, in the light of the history of Greek philosophers and philosophies of which we have records, we would not be far off the mark,

if we specified the two kinds of Aristotelian excellence, intellectual and ethical.[22]

Accordingly, Aristotle, Plato, or any Hellenic philosopher would say that a philosopher is a noetically self-sufficient and ethically autonomous human being, which means that he has accomplished two important tasks. First, he has carefully examined himself; he has, for a long time, observed the natural and the cultural world around him; he has thoroughly studied the works of other great men and has discussed with friends the great questions of life; and after prolonged and serious thinking, he has formed a cosmo-theory and/or a bio-theory, which articulates his insight into the nature of things and his own nature, so that he can give a reasoned account of it and teach those who wish to listen and learn from him and his wisdom. Second, he not only teaches his wisdom, but also practices his teaching in his daily life; for he is ready and willing to hold himself up to higher ethical standards than the ones which society demands of its members; and he is prepared to set the value of his philosophic freedom higher than life itself, and much higher than wealth and material goods. By so doing he naturally sets his lived philosophy as a model way of living for his pupils and others to follow. Like Socrates or an Indian guru, he is an enlightened man, a passionate lover of truth, a gentle teacher by example, and a beacon of light for the human spirit of posterity.[23]

FROM HELLENIC PHILOSOPHY TO 'WESTERN PHILOSOPHY'

Judging by these high standards, as set by the ancient Greek Socratic philosophers,[24] I seriously doubt if we will be able to find many or any of the so-called 'western philosophers' who would pass the above mentioned tests, especially the second one. Let me explain my sceptical pessimism. By the criterion of noetically self-sufficient inquiry, anyone who takes divine revelations on faith (although they are found in books of uncertain origin), and then uses 'philosophy' (that is, philosophical terminology and arguments) to justify religious dogma, as Christian and Muslim theologians have traditionally done, is clearly disqualified from being called a philosopher, as the Greeks understood and used this honourable name. He may be a good writer and/or a sharp-tongued advocate of the cause of his sect, but a philosopher he cannot be.

Similarly, by the criterion of autonomous, exemplary, and self-sufficient life of excellence, anyone who seriously believes in the efficiency of divine grace by baptismal ablutions in holy waters to produce and sustain a life of virtue, as Catholics, Protestants and other Christians and Muslims traditionally have believed, cannot be called a philosopher. He may be a good man or even a saint, but a philosopher, in the Hellenic sense of this Hellenic word, he will never be.[25] In this light, and considering the fact that the West, in the last two millennia has served under the double

and heavy yoke of Catholic scholastic dogmatism and Protestant puritanical fanaticism, it should not be surprising that philosophy, in the Hellenic sense of the word, has not flourished there, and that genuine philosophers are conspicuously absent.[26]

Perhaps some would find it amusing to see how cautious the philosopher-theologians, and the other so-called 'philosophers' of the western world have been in their writings lest they go against the received dogma of the respective churches and thus upset the ecclesiastical authorities. The list of such persons would include not only Athanasius, Augustine, and Aquinas, and other theologians and Church Fathers, but also Descartes and Kant, Pascal and Berkeley, and Hume, Hegel and Heidegger, and many more so-called 'western philosophers' whose purpose of philosophizing was to explicitly provide support for the revealed dogma or to implicitly make room for the strictly monotheistic (and therefore naturally intolerant) Christian faith in its Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox formulations.[27]

It is true that in the last four or five hundred years, several attempts have been made to revive the classical Greek spirit of free, autonomous, and self-reliable inquiry but, philosopically, they all have failed and for the most part, have been abortive. For example, the hope that the opening of the Florentine Academy during the Italian Renaissance in the fifteenth century would lead to the rebirth of 'Platonic philosophy' was cut short by the coming of the Protestant Reformation from the Teutonic North.[28] Moreover, 'the age of Reason' of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, on which the French *philosophes* had built their dreams for a Europe freed from religious dogma and oppression, ended with the formation of the Holy Alliance and the coming of Romanticism and German Idealism. Thus, once again, philosophy was turned into a handmaid of the Church, as it had been during the Middle Ages.[29]

These historical examples indicate that up to the nineteenth century no genuine school of philosophy had appeared on the horizon of the western world.[30] But the situation, significantly, has not changed since that time, in spite of the multiplication of 'isms' coming out of Northern Europe in rapid succession: Marxism, Existentialism, Phenomenologism, Nihilism, Deconstructionism, etc. These movements and their protagonists can be classified into three categories, none of which can pass the tests of genuine philosophy as specified above, for they are either abortive revolts of the enslaved northern European spirit against the ecclesiastical establishment with no exit to freedom in the walls (e.g. Nietzsche, Kirkegaard, Sartre, etc.); or they simply play the familiar role of 'western philosophers', by providing philosophical coverage and intellectual respectability to the doctrines of the Church (e.g. Marcel, Maritaim, Hegel, etc.); or they seem to shamelessly play the old sophistical word-game and, yet, they pass as 'philosophers' in the West these days (e.g. Ayer, Derrida, Rorty). Even Marxism and Pragmatism, which, since

their inception in the last century, seemed so promising as theoretical structures or for their political implications, have been, discredited by now.[31]

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, philosophically speaking, the western terrain today looks like the thing that it has always been, a wasteland. Hence, the urgent need for the philosophically minded few in the West to return to their philosophical roots which are Hellenic, (i.e. pre-Christian, pre-Islamic, non-monotheistic, non-atheistic), in search for new inspiration for a new beginning of philosophical humanism in the new millennium. I am convinced that if we dig deep enough, we shall discover that these roots, whether they are Greek–Mediterranean, Indian–Asian, Egyptian–African, or even native American, somehow connect in the common underground and point to a common ideal of philosophic diversity, polytheistic tolerance and political civility as the preconditions of authentic life and philosophic freedom. Now more than ever before, it would seem, such a noble ideal is needed for our common global village.[32]

Hence our responsibility as free men, as awakened spirits, and as lovers of wisdom and truth, to do our best to enlighten our Christian and Muslim friends in the West as well as in Asia, Africa, and America, that it is unwise to try to monopolize God because God, as the Greeks knew very well, is both 'the One' and 'the Many'.[33] Since Christians and Muslims, and their teachers of the monomania of monotheism, the Jews, did not succeed in exterminating each other in the name of the one True God in the last two millennia, they should not be allowed to do so in the coming third millennium. They must be taught to tolerate each other either in the name of the One God with the many names or in the name of all gods with the same name. This sensible and saving lesson can be taught by the good and ancient Lady Philosophy.[34]

The time, then, would seem right for the western world to open its 'closed mind'[35] and its cold heart to the wisdom of the East and the Mediterranean world, especially as expressed by the ancient Greek and the ancient Indian philosophers. With the unification of Europe in progress there is some dim hope that the refreshing breeze from the Mediterranean Sea may start penetrating the cold northern part of the continent; some hidden but still surviving seeds of tough Hellenic wisdom may find fertile soil and start sprouting there too at long last.[36] Two millennia under any enforced dogma, religious or other, can produce damage beyond repair. But let us not despair prematurely. The God with the many names or any of the many gods with the same name may still pity the West and save the world from the greatest folly of *avidyā*, the monomania of monotheism.[37]

Notes and References

1. I have discussed two typical cases of such historians of ancient Hellenic philosophy, E. Zeller and W.K.C. Guthrie, in 'Ancient Hellenic Philosophy and the African Connection,' *Skepsis* 4, 1994, pp. 14–75. What follows is only the outline of a thesis which is evolving.
2. The conference on The Role of Philosophy in the Formation of Unified Europe, was organized by the International Centre of Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research at Ancient Olympia, Greece, August 1992; the Conference on Neoplatonism and Indian Thought was organized by the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies in co-operation with The Indian Council of Philosophical Research at Delhi, India, January 1992. I expressed similar views in the lectures that I gave at several Indian universities during my short visit. What made my visit to India enjoyable and exciting, besides the traditional Indian hospitality, was the natural Indian inclination to philosophy, which reminded me of the ancient Greeks as opposed to the modern Greeks. For although the traditional hospitality is still alive in Greece, philosophy, as the ancient Greeks understood it, is as dead there as it is in the rest of Europe in which the modern Greeks are eager to become 'economically' incorporated! I am thankful to the members of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research for their support; and personally to Drs: P.M. Gregorios, I.C. Sharma, R. Ghosh, B. Chandel, R. Balasubramanian, D. Chattopadhyaya, K.S. Murty, and D. Krishna who made it possible for me to visit and lecture at five of the finest Indian universities.
3. In this light, K.S. Murty's following statement would seem over-optimistic and only partly correct with certain qualifications: 'I think modern India and Europe can and do understand ancient India and Greece, and the West and the East also can and do understand each other.' *Philosophy in India: Traditions, Teaching and Research*, ICPR, Delhi, 1991, (revised edition), p. 201. I do not like to be such a pessimist as to doubt the possibility or potentiality of understanding (that is, the modality of 'can') but the historical facts (that is the modality of 'do') do not support Professor Murty's claim, at least in so far as it concerns modern Europe and ancient Greece. For, in the field of philosophy, they are poles apart because of the intervening dogmatism of Christian and Islamic theologies which have affected deeply, I suspect, the European mind. So, if we want to find a spirit which resembles the philosophically diverse, playful, undogmatic, and tolerant spirit of classical Greece, we should look up to ancient India rather than to modern Europe. That is our only hope for better future, philosophically speaking. For northern Europe whether in its mediaeval, modern, or post-modern mental and cultural outlook would seem more like an aberration of ancient Judaism than a legitimate offspring of classical Hellenism. Even within the Christendom, western Catholicism and northern European Protestantism are considered heterodox versions and revisions of the original Orthodox Christianity. The different phases or faces of Christianity, Jewish, Greek, Latin, and Teutonic and their relation to philosophy is an interesting theme which I will explore in a forthcoming study entitled 'Philosophy and Christianity'.
4. The case of modern Greece and its 'westernization' is a very interesting but separate issue. I will say only this: to the extent that it is Christianized, like the rest of Europe, modern Greece has lost its ancient potency for autonomous philosophic activity. In the emerging United Europe, in which tiny Greece is supposedly an equal partner, there is a real danger for Greeks to lose even their cultural and ethnic identity. Most tragic of all, they may also loose the beautiful language which they have inherited from Homer and Plato, and preserved even during the long and dark period of Turkish rule. This is a nightmare for the (intellectually and culturally) awakened Greeks.

5. Christianity is, in A.N. Whitehead's description, 'a thoroughgoing rationalization of the Jewish religion carried through with a boundless naivete . . . .', *Religion in the Making*, New American Library, New York, 1926, pp. 55–56. In this light, Islam would be the second, and more militant aberration of Judaic monotheism. Of course, in some parts of the West, nationalists do not even want to be reminded where Jesus came from. For example, according to B. Russell, 'If you maintain in Germany that Christ was a Jew, or in Russia that the atom has lost its substantiality and become a mere series of events, you are liable to very severe punishment.', *Religion and Science*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980, first edition 1935, p. 247. However, in fairness to the men who initiated the two religious movements, Jesus and Muhammad, a distinction should be made between what they dreamt of and what historically has happened to that dream in the hands of men greedy for power over other men acquired by any and all means. My comments apply to Christianity and Islam as historical phenomena and organized theocracies which have shaped a mentality of intolerance so characteristic of the societies of western Europe and certain societies in the Near, Middle and South East. From this evil, the West and the East must be freed, so that the peoples of the world, their respective gods and cultures, may be left alone to live in peace at long last.
6. According to Aristotle, 'Two things are homonymous if they have in common only the name, while the essence as captured by the definition is different in each case', *Categories* la 1–2. The sad fact is that the same verdict which applies to drama applies to philosophy as well: 'Not all cultures have it and not at all times—it is a fragile and precarious product,' to quote Dr M. Lath, 'The Nāṭya as conceived by Bharata,' in *India's Intellectual Traditions : Attempts at Conceptual Reconstructions*, Daya Krishna, ed., ICPR, Delhi, 1987, pp. 104–14.
7. To avoid confusion, I should explain that by 'philosophy' I will mean in this discussion all the so-called philosophical productions of the Christianized and Islamized western world whether by systematic or edifying thinkers to use R. Rorty's distinction. Rorty also uses 'philosophy' to indicate 'something on the other side of the tradition'. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1979, p. 394. According to Rorty, the 'tradition' is supposed to extend from Plato to Nietzsche, while on 'the other side' he places such thinkers as Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey (Chapter VIII, 'Philosophy Without Mirrors,' pp. 357–94). This is a rather curious division in light of the historical facts and the gulf which separates the mentality of the Christian West and its monotheistic religion from ancient Greece and its pluralistic philosophy. Rorty's division may serve only what he calls 'neo-pragmatism' which is actually a new name for the old art of sophistry.
8. According to Aristotle, *NE* 1103a 4–10, the double sense of moral and intellectual excellence for man is contained in the Greek word *areté*. The ancient Greeks, like the ancient Indians and Chinese, were able to produce genuine and authentic philosophy, probably because in these civilizations the human mind was free and unfettered by religious dogma of the type produced by Christian and Islamic fanatical monotheism. As the 1978 *Report* (of The Expert's Panel in Philosophy in India) wisely put it: 'Philosophy as seeking of truth and freedom cannot be realized in practice without a study and analysis of alternative ideologies along with a critical assessment of their implications for action.' Quoted by K.S. Murty, op.cit., p. 167 (the underlining is not added).
9. On European cultural hegemony and its connection to the Jesuits of the Counter-Reformation period, see A. Biondi, 'La Bibliotheca selecta di Antonio Possevino: Un Progetto di egemonia culturale,' in G.P. Brizzi, ed., *La 'Ratio Studiorum': Modeli culturali e pratiche educative dei Gesuit in Italia tra Cinque e Seicento*, Bulzoni, Rome, 1981. The issue of 'cultural hegemony' has also been recently raised by Mukund Lath in his article 'Aristotle and the Roots of Western Rationality', *Journal of Indian*

Council of Philosophical Research, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1992, pp. 55–68; and my response to it in 'On Western Rationality and Its Alleged Relation to Aristotle,' in the same journal (Vol. XII No. 1). I am grateful to Professor Daya Krishna for his kindness to bring to my attention Dr Lath's article and to invite me to comment on it.

10. Hence my willingness to address this problem briefly here. I think that Nietzsche may be correct in his claim that the ancient Greek philosophers preferred 'the daylight of reason', in contrast to 'the dark desires' which he finds in the depths of the soul of his favourite 'blond beast,' the Nordic man, the Teutonic knight. But he exaggerates grossly when he dogmatically asserts that 'Rationality was at that time divined as a *saviour*. . . .' The time to which he refers was the time of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; but these philosophers, unlike their western 'homonyms,' had no need of saviours. *Saviours* had not yet become fashionable and philosophers had not yet turned into theologians whether docile to the Church (e.g. Descartes, Kant, Locke, and Leibniz) or rebellious against Christianity (e.g. Nietzsche, Marx, Sartre and Kazantzakis). On the dependence of modern western 'philosophy' on Medieval Christian 'philosophy,' see E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, translated by A.H.C. Downes, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1940, pp. 12ff. Gilson believes, correctly I think, that it cannot be a coincidence that modern philosophers, from Descartes to Kant, have tried to establish by 'pure reason' the same doctrines which were taught by medieval theologians in the name of 'revelation,' that is, 'reason mediated by faith'.
11. See on this my article, 'Ancient Hellenic Philosophy and the African Connection', *Skepsis* IV, 1994, pp. 14–75.
12. This was so, in spite of the fact that the Romans (and later on the northern Europeans) did their best to imitate all aspects of Greek culture and left the sensitive Roman poet, Horatius, with the impression that conquered Greece had intellectually conquered the conquering Latin semi barbarians. The process of Hellenization of the Roman Empire continued to the second and third centuries AD when we meet Roman Emperors like Marcus Aurelius, who philosophize and write in Greek, not Latin. It is also a significant fact that the members of one of the last schools of Hellenic philosophy, the Neoplatonic School of Plotinus and Porphyry, which flourished in Rome, used exclusively the philosophical language of Plato and Aristotle in their writings and teaching. See my 'Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry in Philosophia Antiqua', Vol. 48, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1988, pp. 165–81.
13. The schism is still holding today in spite of all the efforts of unification by both parties which have invariably failed.
14. Ironically, Greece at that time was under the heavy yoke of the Ottoman Turks. She did not manage to liberate herself until the war of independence in 1821–1922, which ended with the expulsion and dispersion of more than one million Greeks from their Ionian homes in Asia Minor where Hellenic philosophy and Homeric poetry were born and thrived almost three millennia ago.
15. What an audacity, what a fraud, one may be inclined to think! Yet, the trick seems to have worked well for the Europeans. For multiculturalists who rebel against Eurocentrism, perhaps out of ignorance rather than malice, tend to include the ancient Greeks in the same category as the northern European colonial imperialists. This is unfortunate and unfair. It should not remain uncorrected.
16. It is even worse than the monopoly over God as claimed by the European Christian and the Asian Islamic versions of monotheism.
17. This could be a valuable lesson for the fanatical, intolerant, and monomaniac monotheists, Jews, Christians, and Muslims who, in the dawning third millennium, are about to exterminate each other in the name of the One and only true God, vide, Bosnia and Palestine. What a pity! What a shame! What a degradation of human dignity! This is only the prelude, I fear, of what is coming in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Northern Africa. See also my 'Porphyry's Criticism of Christianity and the Problem of Augustine's Platonism', *Dionysius* XIII, 1989 pp. 51–70; and the forthcoming studies: 'The Conflict Between Hellenic and Christian Platonism', *The Journal of Neoplatonic Studies*, 1996; and 'Platonic Philosophy and European Philosophy', *Skepsis*, 1996.
18. The opening lines of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* tell us that: 'All human beings by their nature desire to know' (translation mine).
19. I do not want to sound like a prophet, but I seriously suspect that the natural fanaticism, which has historically characterized the dogmatically monotheistic religions of Christianity and Islam, will be revived soon with greater force. Since the common threat of atheist communism, which had kept them quiet for a while, has been removed, these two old enemies will ready themselves to battle again over the foolish question of who has the most exclusive revelation of the saving truth as the only 'chosen people' of God! Judaism, as usual, would not be able to resist the temptation of playing one of its aberrations against the other and signing with the victorious part at the end.
20. *Republic*, Book VI, where the true philosopher is described and distinguished from the sophists. Compare it also with the *Sophist*.
21. In this sense, every healthy and normal human being, by its inquisitive nature can become more or less a lover of wisdom, depending on specific natural endowments, cultural environment, and appropriate *paideia*.
22. 'Now virtue also is differentiated in correspondence with this division of the soul. Some forms of virtue are called intellectual virtues, others moral virtues. Wisdom or Intelligence and Prudence are Intellectual, Liberality and Temperance are moral virtues'. *NE* 1103a 4–7 (H. Rackham's translation and capitalization of virtues).
23. Both during his short life on earth and especially, after his death when his wisdom gains a sort of Socratic immortality by being present in the minds of other philosophers and other mortal men. See also my 'Eros and Immortality in the *Symposium* of Plato,' *Diotima* XIV, 1985, pp. 200–11.
24. Or, one may add, the ancient Indian and the ancient Chinese philosophers.
25. In my view, this was the core of the conflict, which developed between Hellenic and Christian Platonism, as typified by Porphyry and Augustine. See my 'Porphyry's Criticism of Christianity and the Problem of Augustine's Platonism', *Dionysius* XIII, 1989, pp. 51–70.
26. The prevailing climate, religious, political, intellectual and so forth, was not conducive to growth of the spirit of Hellenic philosophy in the West and the North, because such a spirit is in need of bright light, free air, unclouded skies, and much more.
27. However, we should not forget what happened to those who dared to think and speak freely and without respect for the established dogma and against the power of the Church. When they were not burned at the stake, like Bruno, they were publicly humiliated, like Galileo, or driven to insanity prematurely, like Nietzsche.
28. This came at the critical time after Constantinople, the capital of the Christian, (but more Hellenized and less barbaric than the Western), Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire had fallen to the Turks in 1453.
29. The difference was that Protestantism replaced Catholicism this time, while Hegel seriously assumed the role of Thomas Aquinas. See, for instance, *Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, P.C. Hodgson, ed., Univeristy of California Press, Berkeley, CA., 1988, especially Part III which is entitled 'The Consummate Religion'.
30. In this light, the verdict of E. Gilson, op. cit., seems perfectly justified. But the conclusions which he draws from this historical fact are very different from mine. He wants to silence those historians of 'Western philosophy' who have raised doubt whether there was any philosophy in the Middle Ages. He claims that, given the dependence of Modern European philosophy (from Descartes to Leibniz, Kant,

and so on) on the Medieval Christian theology, it is unfair to apply the glorious name of 'philosophy' only to the former and not to the latter. The truth is that because of that affinity neither of them deserves the name of *philosophia* in the same sense as the ancient Greek philosophers used the word. This has been my thesis.

31. This is not to suggest that the representatives of these movements would have passed by any means the second criterion of lived philosophy as a model of human excellence and virtue of the type which Socrates and Gandhi exemplified. The sad fact is that philosophy, in the West and in the last four hundred years or so, has assumed the roles of *ancilla technologiae* and *ancilla ideologiae*, in addition to its mediaeval role of *ancilla theologiae*. But it has not regained its ancient Hellenic autonomy and dignity. This is the core of my thesis.
32. For the reasons stated in note no. 19 above.
33. That is, One in Many and Many in One; for god in Greek (*theos*) is not even a name, in the sense of a noun, but an adjective!
34. As one of my students in the class of *Hellenistic Philosophy* asked: 'When men will learn from Epicurus to leave God and the gods alone in their glory in the peaceful heavens, and try to live in peace together on this turbulent globe, our common Mother Earth.
35. See A. Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind*, Simon and Shuster, New York, 1987. The title of the book would be more accurate, I think, if 'American' were to be replaced by 'western', and if the twentieth century were to become the last twenty centuries. Of course, it would then be a different book calling for a different kind of author.
36. Let us hope that this is not a dream dreamt on a mid-winter night, in the unusually severe winter of 1994, in Baltimore, USA.
37. There are some encouraging signs e.g. A.H. Armstrong's view: 'This sort of monotheistic complacency is becoming more and more difficult to maintain as we become more and more vividly aware of other religious traditions than the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic, notably that of India . . . . The Greeks in the end found it perfectly possible to combine this with monotheism, to believe in God without ceasing to believe in the gods . . . . we shall do well to keep their theology and their gods in our thoughts and in our prayers, in the way which seems appropriate to each of us. It is not by one path only that such a mystery can be approached'. 'Some Advantages of Polytheism', *Dionysius* v, 1981, pp. 181–88. However, if it is true, as reported in the news media during the winter Olympics of 1994, that the Norwegian Bishops protested vigorously about the Olympic Hymn which mentioned the name of Zeus, the Hellenic God and Father of gods and men, then it is not a good omen for philosophy and its speedy recovery of its precious, (but lost in the West), autonomy.

Exploring Gaṅgeśa's Pramālakṣaṇa: A Prima Facie View

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INTRODUCTION

Gaṅgeśa's *Tattva Cintāmaṇi* (hereafter *TC*) opens with *maṅgala-vāda* and then he goes directly to discuss on *prāmāṇya vāda*. This section of *TC* presents a serious discussion on the theory of *svataḥ prāmāṇya* and *parataḥ prāmāṇya*. The *svatastva* and *paratastva* of the *prāmāṇya* are again discussed with a view to identify the *utpatti-pakṣa*, and *jñapti-pakṣa* i.e. the *svatastva* with reference to *utpatti* and/or *jñapti* of *pramā*, so also *paratastva* with reference to *utpatti* and/or *jñapti* of *pramā*. Arguments in favour and against have been developed in an unending manner in almost all the schools of Indian philosophy. The issues are very complicated and at times it becomes too difficult to grasp the minute distinction of one view from the other. There is ample evidence of a high order intellectual exercise of the mind in the *prāmāṇya vāda* of Gaṅgeśa.

Prāmāṇya refers to two aspects of the theory, viz. *pramākaraṇatva*, i.e. the state of being the necessary cause of valid cognition and *pramātva*, i.e. the validity of the cognition. Gaṅgeśa mostly deals with the validity of the cognition in his *prāmāṇya-vāda* in order to define *pramātva*. Prior to the *pramālakṣaṇa-vāda*, Gaṅgeśa has discussed the *svatastva* and the *paratastva* theory of *prāmāṇya* at length and the *pramālakṣaṇa-vāda* follows as a consequence of the earlier disussion.

Here, in the *pramālakṣaṇa-vāda*, first of all Gaṅgeśa presents the theories of the Mīmāṃsakas, which he calls *Pramālakṣaṇa-pūrvapakṣa*, i.e. the prima facie views of *pramālakṣaṇa*. Thereafter he goes on to *pramālakṣaṇa siddhānta-pakṣa*, where he establishes the theory of Naiyāyikas.

Gaṅgeśa, first of all, takes up the issue: *pramātvam jātiḥ*, involves the controversy of *jātisāṃkarya*. Gaṅgeśa argues: *sāṃkarya* is *jātibādhaka* and therefore, *pramātva* cannot be taken as jāti. Thereafter, he goes on to take up the issues of jāter *vyāpyavṛttitvam*. This theory is again highly controversial and complicated and incorporates the nature of valid cognition as well as erroneous cognition. The falsehood of the erroneous cognition is established on the ground to *niṣphal apravṛttijanakatva* i.e. when the approach does not materialize, therefore, the Naiyāyikas prefer

the *parataḥ* theory. It is not the nature of error, which is highly controversial, but the first apprehension of erroneous cognition which appears to be true *ab initio*. The nature of first apprehension of erroneous cognition has been defined and discussed differently in different disciplines in Indian philosophy, which is known as *khyātivāda*. Though Gaṅgeśa does not go directly to deal with the *khyātivādas* here, still it is clear from his text that he raises the pertinent issues. It is because one cannot define the *pramātva* alone without, referring to its counterpositive i.e. *apramātva*. This issue dominates the entire section on *pramalakṣaṇa-vāda*, which unfortunately we cannot explain in entirety here. A study on the whole of the section will be more interesting and comprehensive.

In the present study, our main concern is to focus on a new methodology on the translation of the Navya-Nyāya works. We propose a two-tier *translation* methodology of such works and we hope, it will be interesting for those who want to study the Navya-Nyāya works with more seriousness.

A NOTE ON THE TEXT AND TRANSLATION

The idea to present the Navya-Nyāya text in a *samvādi* form came to my mind in the workshop on the Translation of Philosophical Works into English and Regional Languages held under the auspices of ICPR at the Indian Institute of Advance Study, Shimla in the month of August, 1993.

The participants of the said workshop were given passages from different primary works in Sanskrit on Indian philosophy for an on-the-spot translation. On this occasion only, one passage from the present text was translated by me. I had proposed that the 2-T methodology be adopted for translating the Navya-Nyāya texts. First of all, the Sanskrit texts may be rendered in a dialogue form, what we call *samvādi*[1] now. The Navya-Nyāya language is a technical language and therefore, it is different from classical Sanskrit itself. Thus, the first phase translation is needed from a technical language into a classical language. In this case we may otherwise call the Navya-Nyāya language advanced Sanskrit and the language of *samvādi* as classical Sanskrit. This methodology will help a person, who knows Sanskrit but does not know Navya-Nyāya language. To read and understand the techniques and the theories of Navya-Nyāya is very difficult and it is almost impossible without the guidance of a thorough traditional scholar. Unfortunately, the healthy logical tradition is diminishing day by day and there are very few serious takers of this traditional discipline. Therefore, in our view *samvādi* would perhaps be a gateway to the śāstric world, and this is the need of the time.

The significance of *samvādi* lies not just in language but also in content. The Navya-Nyāya works like TC of Gaṅgeśa or the works of Pakṣadhara, Raghunātha, Mathurānātha, Bhavānanda, Jagadīśa, Gadādhara and many others in the school of Navya-Nyāya are *vāda-granthas*. *Vāda* is defined by Vātsyāyana as : *vādaḥ khalu nānāpravktṛkaḥ pratyadhikaraṇasādhano*

'nyatrâdhikaraṇanirṇayâvasāno vākya-samūhaḥ.[2] According to this definition, there are many participants in a dialogue and it is of course necessary to have atleast two *pakṣas* in a dialogue; the tradition calls them—*pūrvapakṣa* (we symbolize it as PP) and *siddhantapakṣa* (hereafter referred to as SP). Our old philosophical treatises in general and *TC* in particular, follow the dialogue form, but still we are deprived of one very important aspect and that is that often we do not know as to who is the PP and who the SP. The authors of such texts refer PP as : *kecit, eke, apare, nanu . . . . iticet, na ca . . . . vācyam, nâpi . . . .* so on and so forth. These terms can be treated as flag markers in these texts to identify the arguments as coming from PP. But it is very difficult to ascertain as to who exactly is the PP—the propounder of these prima facie doctrines. Many a time a wrong assumption is taken by scholars that if the text is on Nyāya, then the Naiyāyika is the SP and the rest of the logical schools are PP and they may either be the Mīmāṃsakas or the Vaiyākaraṇas or the Vedāntin. It appears alright at the very outset; but it is not always true because, some times even the Naiyāyikas take the place of PP to ask counter questions and thereby establish their doctrines. Moreover, many a time the *Naiyāyika-ekadeśinaḥ* play the role of PP. In the present text, we have found similar cases, which is explained in the notes thereon. Therefore, a formal presentation of the text in a dialogue form, i.e. in *samvādi* style will be more useful for a better understanding of the original texts.

Moreover, in a text like Gaṅgeśa's *TC*, each and every statement—with the flag marker like *nanu . . . . iticet, na ca . . . . vācyam* etc.—is presented with an auxiliary doctrine (*avāntara siddhānta* or *avāntaranyāya*) which is not recognized in a direct translation. One cannot understand the whole argument unless the implications of the auxiliary doctrines are explained. The *avāntaranyāyas* are supplied in *samvādi* and therefore, it becomes a lively and interesting work in dialogue form.

The most advantageous aspect of *samvādi* is that: it keeps open the scope of asking questions on the issues, which otherwise does not appear possible. The present tradition of translation of Navya-Nyāya works seems to be very serious to explain the text and it excercises all its efforts in just that. But it is not enough, because it does not keep open the scope for the readers to ask many more questions and challenge the theories. In other words, it appears as if it is a closed discipline, which is not a good sign. Therefore, the need of the time is to present such texts in a dialogue form and then translate it with notes, figures and formulas of western symbolic logic and whatsoever else deemed necessary to explain the text.

This methodology may further create interest in the minds of the readers to examine the original text closely through *samvādi* and thereby the interested scholars may take more interest in investigating the primary works directly which otherwise may take years to be translated. Last but not the least, it will appeal to the readers if it is in an interesting form, else, it appears very dry at the outset.

THE TEXT: *PRAMĀLAKṢAṆAVĀDAḤ (PŪRVAPAKṢAḤ)*

Atha kim tat prāmāṇyam? Na tāvaj jātiḥ. Yogyavyaktivṛttitvena pratyakṣatve pramātvasaṁśayânupapatteḥ, pramātvasyânumeyatvāc ca. sākṣāttvādinā saṁkarâpatteś ca. bījasāmyena guṇe'pi doṣatvāt. tāratvāder utkarṣarūpatayā jātitvaniyame cânanyagatikatayā ca nānātvāt. pramātvanānātve tvananugamaḥ.

Kim caivam apramāyā aṁśe pramātvam na syāt, jāter vyāpyavṛttitāniyamāt. na ceṣṭāpattiḥ. aṁśe saṁvādini-visaṁvādini ca samūhālambane pramātvâpramātvayor anubūyamānatvena ekaśeṣasya kartum aśakyatvāt. atha viparyayasyâṁśe na pramātvam, kim tu smṛtivad yathârthatvam eveti cet—tarhi, yathârthânubhavatvam eva prāmāṇyam, āvaśyakatvāt. na ca tad apîti vakṣte.

Atha yathā bhāvo'bhāvo vā nâvyāpyavṛttir iti niyamam tiraskṛtyâbādhitânubhavabalāt saṁyoga-tadabhāvayor avyāpyavṛttitvam, tathā jātir vyāpyavṛttir eveti vyāptim abhibhūyânubhavabalād eva pramātvatadabhāvayor avyāpyavṛttitvam astu. na ca yad avyāpyavṛtti tan na vyāpyavṛtti, yac ca vyāpyavṛtti na tad avyāpyavṛttîti vyāpteḥ pramātvasya nobhayarūpatvam iti vācyam. saṁyogâtyantābhāve vyabhicārāt. na ca tasyâbhāvadvayam, mānâ'bhāvāt. guṇadoṣyor ekatrasattve vyāpyavṛttitvam ity anythopapatteś ca. anyathā pramātvasyopādher apy atyantâbhāvasāmānādhikaraṇyam na syāt, sāmānyatvāt na syāc cobhayarūpatvam iti.

maivam. avacchedakabhedam vinā viruddhayor ekatrâsāmāveśāt, apratīeś ca. na ca viṣaya evâṁśarūpaḥ pramātvavṛttîāvavacchedakaḥ. tadviṣyatvasya bhrame'pi sattvāt.

Nanu viśeṣyâvṛttyaprakārakatvam viśeṣyâvṛttiprakārakatvam ca pramātvatadabhāvayor vṛttitvâvacchedakam astîti cet—tarhi, tayor eva pramâpramāvyavahārajanakatvam astu, āvaśyakatvāt prathamopasthitatvāc ca, kim jatyā? na ca tad apîti vakṣyate.

Samvādī: the above stated text in a dialogue form.

[Note : Here PP stands for *Pūrvapakṣa* and SP stands for *Siddhāntapakṣa*]

PP [1.0.0]: *Atha kim tat prāmāṇyam? kimu jātiḥ āhosvit upādhiḥ?*
SP [1.1.0]: *Prāmāṇyam na tāvaj jātiḥ.*
PP [1.2.0]: *nanu prāmāṇyasya jātitve svīkāre ko doṣaḥ?*
SP [1.2.1]: *indriya-yogyavyaktivṛttitvena pratyakṣtve pramātva-saṁśayânupapattiḥ;*
[1.2.2]: *pramātvasya nityam anumeyatvāc ca prāmāṇyam na jātiḥ.*
[1.2.3]: *prāmāṇyasya sākṣāttvādinā saṁkarāpatteś ca, sāṁkaryam jātibādhakam kila.*
PP [1.2.3/1]: *nanu prāmāṇya-sakṣāttvayor astu sāṁkaryam. tad idaṃ guṇaniṣṭhasāmkaryam doṣāya nopakalpate.*
SP [1.2.3/2]: *maivam, bījasāmyena guṇe'pi doṣatvāt.*
PP [1.2.3/3]: *kim atra bījam?*

SP [1.2.3/4]: *kāryakāraṇavyavasthābhaṅgarūpam bījam atrânusandheyam.*
PP [1.2.3/5]: *nanu yathā tāratvādinānārūpopādhidvārā śabdatvasya sāṁkaryam na bhavati tathâtrâpy astu iticet;*
SP [1.2.3/6]: *na. tāratvāder utkarṣarūpatayā jātitvaniyame cânanyagatikatayā ca nānātvāt. pramātvanānātve tvananugamaḥ.*
[1.3.1]: *kim ca evam apramāyā aṁśe pramātvam api na syāt.*
PP [1.3.2]: *kim idam ucyate apramāyā aṁśe pramātvam api na syāt iti?*
SP [1.3.3]: *śruṇu, pramātvam jātir ity ucyte kila! jātis tu vyāpyavṛttir iti sarvatantra siddhāntaḥ. ata apramāyā aṁśe pramātvarūpā jātir vartata evety akāmenâpi bhavatâbhyupagantavyam. ata ucyate apramāyā aṁśe pramātvam na syād iti. jāter vyāpyavṛttitāniyamāt.*
PP [1.3.4]: *iṣṭāpattiḥ.*
SP [1.3.5]: *na ceṣṭāpattir iti vaktum yuktam.*
PP [1.3.6]: *katham?*
SP [1.3.7]: *aṁśe saṁvādini aṁśe visaṁvādini iti ca samūhālambane pramātvâpramātvayor anubūyamānatvena ekaśeṣasya kartum aśakyatvāt.*
PP [1.3.8]: *nanu viparyayasya aṁśe na pramātvam, kintu smṛtivat sampūrṇam yathārtham eveticet?*
SP [1.3.9]: *tarhi, yathārthānubhavatvam eva prāmāṇyam iti svīkāryam; āvaśyakatvāt.*
PP [1.3.10]: *bāḍham āvaśyakam.*
SP [1.3.11]: *tad api ca na ity agre vakṣte.*
PP [1.4.1]: *atha yathā bhāvo'bhāvo vā na avyāpyavṛttir iti niyamam tiraskṛtya abādhitânubhavavalāt saṁyoga-tadabhāvayor avyāpyavṛttitvam, tathā jātir vyāpyavṛttir eva iti vyāptim abhibhūya anubhavabalād eva pramātva-tadabhāvayor avyāpyavṛttitvam astu.*
SP [1.4.2]: *nanu, yad avyāpyavṛtti tan na vyāpyavṛtti, yac ca vyāpyavṛtti na tad avyāpyavṛtti iti vyāpteḥ svīkṛte pramātvasya nobhayarūpatvam.*
PP [1.4.3]: *idam tu na vācyam; saṃyogātyantābhāve vyabhicārāt.*
[1.4.4]: *na ca tatrâbhāvadvayam iti prakalpayitum yuktam, mānâbhāvāt.*
[1.4.5]: *guṇadoṣayor ekatra sattve avyāpyavṛttitvam, guṇamātra sattve vyāpyavṛttitvam ity anavasthāpatteś ca.*
[1.4.6]: *anyathā pramātvasyopādher apy atyantâbhāvasāmānādhi-karaṇyam na syāt.*
[1.4.7]: *sāmānyatvāt na syāc cobhayarūpatvam iti.*
SP [1.5.1]: *maivam, avacchedakam vinā (i) viruddhayor ekatrâsamāveśāt; (ii) apratīteś ca.*
PP [1.5.2]: *nanu tatra viṣaya evâṁśarūpaḥ pramātvavṛttāv avacchedaka iti svīkriyatām.*
SP [1.5.3]: *naitad yuktam, viṣaya evâṁśarūpa pramātvavṛttāv avacchedaka iti gṛhyamāṇe, tadviṣyatvasya bhrame'pi sattvāt doṣatādavasthyam iti.*

PP [1.5.4]: *nanu viśesyâvṛttyaprakārakatvam viśeṣyāvṛtti-prakārakatvam ca pramātva-tadabhāvayor vṛttāv avacchedakam astîticet;*

SP [1.5.5]: *tarhi, tayor eva pramâpramāvyavahārajanakatvam astu, (i) āvaśyakatvāt, (ii) prathamopasthitatvāt ca; ataḥ kim jātyā? vastutastu tad api ca na ity agre vakṣyate.*

TRANSLATION AND NOTES

1.0.0: Now, what is it that (called) *prāmāṇya*? Does it refer to *jāti* (generic property) or *upādhi* (specific property)?

Note

Atha kim tat prāmāṇyam—this sentence has been explained variously by the traditional commentators. It seems, the problem for them was whether this is a question or a challenge or just an introduction to a new topic. There are confirmative answers and arguments in support of all these questions. Pakṣadhara[3] thinks, this is a question, otherwise, there would have not been an opening of a discourse on the following issue. Mathurānātha, on the other hand, takes it as a challenge because *jñāna* (knowledge) is a property of self (*ātman*) and a product as well. Therefore, the issue is, what would be the *kāryatâvacchedaka*, i.e. the delimiting factor of productivity. Subsequently he thinks, this sentence could also be taken as a question on the very intrinsic nature of the *kāryatâvacchedaka* of *pramā* (valid cognition).[4] Rucidatta, the author of *Prakāśa* thinks, this is just an introduction to the topic *prāmāṇya*, since, this comes in the context of *prāmāṇyavāda*. Moreover, in the course of discussion, *prāmāṇya*, i.e. *pramātva* has also been defined.

Though Rucidatta says—*prāmāṇyam ākṣipati*[5], here, by the word *ākṣipati*, he does not mean 'challenge'—says the subcommentary, viz. *Nyāyaśikhāmaṇi* on *Prakāśa* by Rāmakṛṣṇâdhvarin[6]. He rejects other possibilities saying: this is neither a question nor a challenge, but an introduction of *pramātva*, which again has two aspects, viz. to be *jāti* or to be *upādhi*.

SP [1.1.0]: Obviously, *prāmāṇya* is not *jāti* (a generic property).

Note

This prima facie view that *prāmāṇya* = *pramātva* is *jāti* (generic property) of course, has a logical base. First of all, according to the propounder of this theory, *pramātva* is a generic property and it is distinct from *nirvikalpakatva*[7] etc. Moreover, the generic property, viz. *pramātva* is an entity having counter-positives just like what absence (*abhāva*) has[8]. The common behaviour (*loka-vyavahāra*) is possible only on this ground like 'this is *raṅga* (borax/porcelain enamels)' and 'this is *rajatam* (silver)'. This

theory is based on the prima facie view that every knowledge is *vyavahārāṅgam*, i.e. accessory to common behaviour and *puruṣa-pravṛttinivṛttyaupayikam*, i.e. the cause of the activities or cessation of the activities of every human being. Once the *pramātva* is accepted as *sapratiyogika-padārtha*, it is to be accepted as singular, like *samavāya*. The underlying theory is *samavāya*—as a *sambandha* (relation)—is also *sapratiyogika* and is only one (*ekam*), accepted so on account of brevity. It cannot be many, because then there will be multiple counter-positives, which is not desirable. Therefore, the contender of this theory suggests:

i) *pramātva* is a generic property,
ii) it has counter-positives and
iii) it is only one.

But all these arguments are refuted by SP on the following grounds.

PP [1.2.0]: Well, what would be wrong if *prāmāṇya* is accepted as *jāti* (generic property)?

SP [1.2.1]: First of all if the *pramātva* is accepted as *jāti*, then there would be no doubt on the validity of the cognition, on account of it (*pramātva* as *jāti*) being perceived due to its presence in the individuals, that could be seen by the sense-organs.

Note

Three arguments have been put forth to show the grave mistake of accepting *pramātva* as *jāti*. Before we discuss the validity of these arguments, the question may be raised regarding the sequence or hierarchy (if any), of these arguments. Could it be the case that the argument 1.2.1 is stronger than 1.2.2 and 1.2.3, or in other words can we justify the order of the arguments? The reply is 'yes'. A thorough study of the whole of the *prāmāṇya* section of Gaṅgeśa's *TC*[9] reveals that the role of doubt (*saṃśaya*) in defining and justifying the validity of cognition has been discussed at a greater length. Therefore, possibly, this issue comes here as the first argument to defend the proposed theory. Moreover, *saṃśaya* (doubt) plays an important role in justifying the *parataḥ prāmāṇya* theory of the Naiyāyikas. *Saṃśaya* has been defined as: *anavadhāraṇātmakam jñānam*[10] or *viruddhakoṭidvayâvagāhi jñānam*, i.e. the knowledge which has a form of uncertainty or the knowledge which refers to two opposite-ends (of a theory or entity). Therefore, the meaning of the term *saṃśaya* comes closer to the theory that: Doubt is the mother of all sciences. Vātsyāyana says in his *Nyāya Bhāṣya* (*NBh.*): *nânūpalabdhe na nirṇīte nyāyaḥ pravartate kim tu saṃśayite 'rthe.*[11]

In the present context, as has already been stated, the *parataḥ prāmāṇya* theory of the Naiyāyikas is based on the subsequent doubt after the first

apprehension of the cognition. It is said that the subsequent doubt would not arise if the validity of the cognition is apprehended *ab initio*[12]. The Naiyāyikas argue that first of all, this is based on the experience of every individual (and an experience cannot be ruled out with the help of logic) and second, according to the meta-rule (*avāntara nyāya*): *yenendriyeṇa yo 'rtho gṛhyate tenaivendriyeṇa tadgatā jātis tadabhāvo 'pi gṛhyate*, i.e. whatsoever entity is apprehended by means of whichsoever sense organ, the generic property of that (entity) and the absence of the same is also apprehended by the same sense organ. Therefore, if the *prāmāṇya* is accepted as the generic property, then it is apprehended by the same sense organ. It means it is a *viśiṣṭa pratyakṣa*. Thus, there will be no subsequent doubt about the validity of the knowledge after the first apprehension—which goes against the experience of every individual. This is precisely the very base of the *parataḥ* theory of the Naiyāyikas. Therefore, Gaṅgeśa gives this as the first argument to refute the proposed hypothesis, viz. *prāmāṇya* as *jāti*.

[1.2.2]: Since the cognition is always being inferred, *prāmāṇya* cannot be treated as *jāti*.

Note

There are two major theories on the validity of *pramā* in the schools of Indian philosophy: (1) *svataḥ prāmāṇyavādaḥ* and (2) *parataḥ prāmāṇya vādaḥ*. To present the theories in a nutshell, the *svatastvam* of *prāmāṇyam* has been defined as: *jñānagrāhakasāmagrīgrāhyatvam*, i.e. that which has been apprehended by the same means as that of the cognition; whereas the *paratastva* of *prāmāṇya* has been defined as: *jñānagrāhaka-sāmagrī-bhinna-sāmagrī-grāhyatvam*, i.e. that which is apprehended by collocation of means other than the means of the cognition. It means, according to the *parataḥ* theory, the *pramātva* is not apprehended by the same collocation of the means of cognition. Therefore, the Naiyāyikas accept that the *pramātva* is always inferred. The form of inference is:

idam jñānam pramā,
samarthapravṛttijanakatvāt,
yan na pramāṇam tan na samarthapravṛttijanakam,
yathā pramāṇābhāsaḥ,
tathā neyam,
tasmāt na tathā.

So the form of the inference is of *kevala-vyatireki* type.

Therefore, since the *prāmāṇya* is apprehended by *anumāna pramāṇa*, which is *jñānagrāhakasāmagrībhinnasāmagrī*, it should be concluded that *prāmāṇyam parataḥ utpadyate jñāyate ca*. In the present context, the author argues that since the *prāmāṇya* is always inferred, it cannot be *jāti* because *jāti* is always being perceived just like the *dravya*. The only difference is

that the former is perceived by the sense-organ contact (*sannikarṣa*), called *samyuktasamavāya* and the latter by *saṃyoga* only.

[1.2.3]: (Moreover) there would be another defect called *sāṃkarya* (mixture) of *prāmāṇya* with *sākṣāttva* etc. Is it not that the *sāṃkarya* is one of the *jātibādhakas*?

Note

The last argument in this connection is: even if the *prāmāṇya* is accepted as *jāti*, there will be a logical defect, namely *sāṃkarya* between *prāmāṇya* and *sākṣāttva*, which is treated as one of the impediments of the generic property (*jātibādhakas*)[13]. The point under discussion is, any perceptual knowledge has invariably a property called perceptuality (*sākṣāttva*) and since it is a *pramā*, it has another property called *prāmāṇya* = *pramātva*—and if *prāmāṇya* is accepted as *jāti*, then the perceptual knowledge will be a substratum of two universal properties. If two universal properties coexist and if they are not related to each other as the pervader and the pervaded (*vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhāva*), then the defect, viz. *sāṃkarya* becomes *jātibādhaka*. In the present context, to distinguish the *sāṃkarya* from the rest of the *jātibādhakas*, especially from *tulyatvam*. Mathurānātha says: since, in the *nirvikalpaka jñāna*, there is no *pramātva* but there does exist the *sākṣāttva*, so also in the inferential knowledge etc., there is no *sākṣāttva* but the *pramātva* does exist; whereas in perceptual knowledge, both these generic properties coexist. Therefore, the *sāṃkarya* is *jātibādhaka* here.[14] Hence, *prāmāṇya* can not be accepted as *jāti*—argues Gaṅgeśa.

PP [1.2.3/1]: Now, let there be the *sāṃkarya* between *prāmāṇya* and *sākṣāttva*, it should not be considered as defective. Because, the *sāṃkarya* which resides in *guṇa* is not taken to be defective.

Note

According to the school of Nyāya, the *jāti* is found in three of the seven basic entities, viz. *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karman*.[15] PP here wants to point out that let the *sāṃkarya* be *jātibādhaka* only when it is seen in *dravya* but not in *guṇa* and *karman*. It seems, PP here refers to the famous context of *bhūtatva* and *mūrtatva* being *jātibādhakas*.[16] The discussion on *sāṃkarya* of two coexistent *jātis*, which are residents in *guṇa* (quality) are not known elsewhere in the *Śāstras*. Therefore, the point made here seems valid.

SP [1.2.3/2]: It is not so. On account of the identity of the primary cause (*lit.* seed) the *sāṃkarya* which resides in the quality is also defective.

Note

The author, it seems, wants to focus on the theory—the knowledge is said

to be a product and *jāti* is one of the necessary causes. Therefore, if the cause, i.e. the *jāti* is found to be defective, then the knowledge would not arise. The *jāti/sāmānya* is also defined as: *anuvṛttipratyayahetuḥ sāmānyam*[17]; i.e. the *sāmānya* is the cause of identical cognition of many similar entities like: *ayam ghaṭaḥ* etc. Thus, there is a cause-effect relationship between the universal properties and the cognition. The *jātibādha* as cause hindrance either in generating the cognition or in apprehending it. Here, *sāṃkarya* being one of the *jātibādhakas* does the same quite effectively. This is the primary cause (*bīja*), which therefore destroys the cause-effect relationship. Therefore, Gaṅgeśa wants to point out here that the *sāṃkarya* may be found in *dravya* or *guṇa* which makes no difference and everywhere it remains the same as the destroyer of cause-effect relationship due to the identicality of the *bīja*.

PP [1.2.3/3]: What is the primary cause (literally seed) here?
SP [1.2.3/4]: Destroying the law of the cause-effect-relationship may be considered here as the primary cause.

Note

Pakṣadhara Miśra in his *Āloka* and Rāmakṛṣṇa Adhvari in his *Nyāyaśikhāmaṇi* state the said argument to justify the *bīja*[18]. Pakṣadhara did not explain how and why this is treated as *bīja*, however, Rāmakṛṣṇ Adhvari gives the justification in the following lines:

> *ghaṭatvam daṇḍajanyatâvacchedakam paṭtvam vemajanyatâvacchedakam iti sarvasiddham. tathâśvatvâdikam api hreṣâdiśabdaviśeṣajanakatâvacchedakam. tathā ca ghaṭatvo-paṭavayo yatra samāveśas tasya ghaṭa-paṭa-sāmagrījanyatvâpattiḥ. tadajanyatve 'tiprasaktatayā ghaṭa-paṭatvayoḥ kāryatâvacchedakatvânupapattiḥ. tathā gotvâśvatvayor anyatra samāveśe śabdaviśeṣakāraṇatânavacchedakatvâpattiḥ. tataś ca kārya-kāraṇabhāva-vyavasthābhaṅga eva tadbījam*[19].

Adhvari takes here the popular examples like *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* as products and *daṇḍa* and *vemā* as the causes, and obviously, the universal properties of these entities like *ghaṭatva, paṭatva* etc. are treated as the *avacchedakas* of the productivity that resides in the products. Then he takes up a hypothetical entity, where he assumes the mixture of both these universal properties. In such cases, one has to assume the collocation (*sāmagrī*) as the cause of the entity. If the law of the cause-effect relationship is not accepted, then the universal properties like *ghaṭatva, paṭatva* etc. would not be treated as the *avacchedakas* of the productivity. Therefore, the *kārya-kāraṇabhāva-vyavasthābhaṅga* is considered as *bīja*. Let us look at the following figure:



Figure – 1



Figure – 2

Yatkiñcit in Fig. 1 cannot be the substratum of *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva* since there is a *sāṃkarya* between these two universal properties. So also, *unicorn* in Fig. 2 cannot possess the *hreṣādiśabdajanakatva* because *unicorn* itself is a fictitious entity and no ontological entity can be caused by mixed universal properties.

PP [1.2.3/5]: Could it not be the case that just like the *sāṃkarya* of *śabdatva* with the multiplicity of the *upādhis* like *tāratva* etc. is not accepted, so also the *sāṃkarya* in the present context not be accepted at all?

Note

This question comes from PP as a desperate attempt to reject the *sāṃkarya* issue between *pramātva* and *sākṣāttva*, so that he can establish *prāmāṇya* as the universal property. Here, PP gives an example of *śabdatva* which is found mixed with *tāratva* etc. and even then the *sāṃkarya* is not treated as *jātibādhaka*. The point under discussion is: *tāratva*, (the state of

high tone) *mandratva* (the state of deep or rumbling tone) etc. are also the other properties found in *śabda*, which are technically called *upādhis*. There is a law, viz. *upadheyasaṅkare 'pyupādhyor asamkarāt*,[20] i.e. even though there is the *sāṃkarya* of the possessor of *upādhis*, there would not be the *sāṃkarya* of the *upādhis*. In other words, the *upādhi-sāṃkarya* causes no problem as far as the generation of the cognition is concerned. But the *jāti-sāṃkarya* does make a difference.

SP [1.2.3/6]: No, the *tāratva* etc. are of the nature of *utkarṣa* (gradation of tone) and that does not go along with the principle of *jāti*, since they are many. But on the other hand, no multiplicity can be comprehended of *pramātva* (it is only one).

Note

SP wants to point out that *tāratva* etc. cannot be compared with *pramātva*, since the former is *upādhi*[21] and the latter is *ab initio jāti*. Moreover, no standard definition of *tāratva* can be given in connection of the highness of the tone. So there could be infinite *tāratvas* of one and the same sound depending upon the individual utterances. Thus, *tāratva* is treated as gradation of sound, i.e. in the form of *utkarṣa*. But on the other hand, *pramātva* is defined and it is only one. Therefore, such comparison is out of question.

Mathurānātha thinks, *utkarṣa* is not different from *jāti*.[22] According to Mathurānātha, the highness of the sounds depends upon the individual sounds like *ka-kāra, kha-kāra* etc. Each individual sound has an invariable property like *katva, khatva* etc. and though *sāṃkarya* between *katva* and *tāratva* is quite obvious, still, *tāratva* can be taken as *jāti*. It is because one is pervasive of the other.

Likewise, the *sāṃkarya* between *pratyakṣatva* and *pramātva* is tenable. To expand the views of PP, Mathurānātha further says *pramātvas* are many, as far as the *pratyakṣatva* is concerned, i.e. they are six in number according to the six sense-organs—the means of perceptual cognition. That apart, one more *pramātva* is accepted which is common in the rest of the valid cognition, viz. *anumiti* (inferential cognition), *upamiti* (simile) and *śābdabodha* (verbal cognition)[23]. Thus, according to PP, though multiplicity of *pramātva* is not ruled out, still there is no *sāṃkarya* between them, because one is pervasive of the others. Therefore, in the present case, there would be no *sāṃkarya* between *pramātva* and *pratyakṣatva* etc. and the *pramātva* could be treated as *jāti*.

But the whole argument is refuted on the ground that multiplicity of *pramātva* can never be comprehended—that is what Gaṅgeśa says—*pramātvanānātve tvananugamaḥ*.[24]

[1.3.1]: Moreover, in that case, *pramātva* would not be apprehended in part of the *apramā* (erroneous cognition).

Note

This is a supplementary statement of SP to pave way for the discussion on erroneous cognition. But Mathurānātha thinks, this point is raised against the *ananugama* view.[25] It seems, according to Mathurānātha, this is pointed out by PP to reject the theory of comprehensiveness of *pramātva* in all cognitions, including erroneous cognition.

PP [1.3.2]: What does it mean to say that even *pramātva* would not be there in part of the erroneous cognition?

SP [1.3.3]: Listen, is it not that the *pramātva* is claimed to be *jāti*? Then, *jāti* is accepted as *vyāpyavṛtti* (all pervasive) in all the disciplines. Therefore, the *jāti*, viz. *pramātva* does exist in part of *apramā* as well. Thus, it is said that *pramātva* would not be there in part of erroneous cognition. (This objection is raised) on account of the theory of all pervasiveness of the universal properties.

Note

In Indian philosophy, the nature of erroneous cognition, like that of the 'rope-snake' (*rajju-sarpaḥ*) or 'nacre-silver' (*śukti-rajatam*) is highly complicated. There are enormous contradictory views found in almost all the schools of thought. But one thing is acceptable to all and that is: at the first apprehension it appears to be true. The first apprehension would not appear to be true unless some *truth* is accepted, even if partially, or in any section of the comprehending mechanism. Therefore, SP raises this issue, so that through the following arguments he can ascertain the *kāryatāvacchedaka* of *pramātva*. Moreover, the prima facie doctrine on *pramātva* is introduced (in 1.3.9) as a consequence of this argument.

PP[1.3.4]: Objection is overruled being desirable.

SP [1.3.5]: No, it cannot be said (in the present context) that, the object is overruled, being desirable.

PP [1.3.6]: How?

SP [1.3.7]: Because, in the context of multi-faceted cognition—where there is the experience of truth and falsehood—which is partly communicative and partly non-communicative; it would not be possible to take resort to either of the aspects.

Note

Erroneous cognition, as has already been stated, is only partly communicative (*samvādin*). *Samvādin*, in the cognitive process, means that which corresponds to the ontological objects and *visamvādin* means that which does not. In case of multi-faceted cognition, no distinct nature

of the same can be presented due to its contradictory nature. Mathurānātha[26] explains *samvāditvam* as *rajatatvavati rajatatvaprakārakatvam*, i.e. the knowledge of an entity made up of silver, which is qualified by 'silverness'; and *visamvāditvam* as *rajatatvâbhāvavati rajatatvaprakāra-katvam*, i.e. the knowledge of an entity which is devoid of silver but (at the same time) which is qualified by 'silverness'. For *samūhālambanajñāna* he gives the example of *raṅga-rajatam* (borax-silver) which has two contradictory universal properties, viz. silverness and boraxness. The contradiction lies in the knowledge (but not in the entity) which is either devoid of silverness or qualified by silverness.[27]

It seems this issue has been given a different turn in the context of perceptual cognition in the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* by Dharmarājâdhvarindra, who is also a commentator of *TC*. His approach seems to give a general definition of perceptual knowledge which includes both, the valid cognition as well as the illusion. To distinguish valid cognition from the other, a qualifying term, viz. *abādhitatvam* is added to the general definition.[28] This refers to the two facets of the perceptual cognition, viz. *samvādipravṛttijanakatvam*, i.e. the one, the effort of which is materialized and *visamvādipravṛttijanakatvam*, i.e. the other, the effort of which is not materialized. On this basis, the Vedāntin, contrary to the Naiyāyikas' theory, establish the *svataḥ prāmāṇya* theory.[29]

PP [1.3.8]: Is it not the case that, the erroneous cognition is not true partially but completely in accordance with the reality, just like the recollection (*smṛti*). If this is proposed, then?

SP [1.3.9]: Then (the definition of *prāmāṇya*) would be accepted as: that being experience in accordance with reality. This (definition) is needed.

PP [1.3.10]: Of course, it is.

SP [1.3.11]: No, that is also not true. It will be discussed later on.

Note

The arguments so far on *prāmāṇya* as *jāti* leads to the *vyāpyavṛttitva* issue of the same. The *jāti* theory was not acceptable because it involves the notion of *sāṃkarya*, which is *jātibādhaka*. It is also observed further that the *vyāpyavṛttitva* concept of *jāti* is to be accepted. In that case, in every instance of erroneous cognition, the truth and the falsehood are to be accepted. Because in every instance of error there does exist an element of truth. This will lead to a highly unacceptable position that how can one and the same instance of cognition inhere the truth as well as the falsehood?

To avoid this situation, PP suggests that let there be complete truth in the erroneous cognition just like in the recollection (*smṛti*). *Smṛti* is defined as: *anubhūtaviṣayâsampramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ*,[30] i.e. indiminishing of the object of realization is remembrance. Though a lot of controversies on the nature

of *smṛti* are found in different śāstric treatises, still on one point every school of thought seems to agree and, that is, *smṛti* is based on or refers to the earlier experience. Moreover, the remembrance is as valid as the cognition itself. It is only Annambhaṭṭa, who classifies *smṛti* as *yathārthā* (valid) and *ayathārthā* (invalid).[31] Otherwise, the whole Nyāya tradition considers *smṛti* as *yathārthā*. Here the *yathārthatvam* of *viparyaya* (error) could be established only on the ground that it goes in accordance with the experience.

SP concludes from the above arguments that, *yathārthânu-bhavatvam* should therefore be considered as a standard definition of *prāmāṇya*. PP happily agrees with this proposal. But SP says 'no', it is not so. The propriety of this definition is discussed later on.

The said definition of *prāmāṇya* is accepted in the school of Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā. According to the theory of Prābhākaras, the *prāmāṇya* should be defined in the widest sense, that it should be able to incorporate all sorts of awareness, including memory and erroneous cognitions as well. Mohanty says '*yāthārthya* or truth in the widest sense, is coextensive with the property of being awareness of. . . ., or of being true to its object [*sarvasya jñānasyârthâvyabhicaritatva* (*niyamāt*)]'.[32] If this explanation of *yāthārthya* is taken into account, then certainly, the definition of *prāmāṇya* as *yathārthânubhavatvam* would not be tolerated by the Naiyāyikas, since it includes *pramā*, *apramā* and *smṛti* also. Gaṅgeśa therefore, says a big 'no' to Prābhākaras' theory.

All the arguments proposed so far rest on two highly controversial notions of *sāmkarya* and *vyāpyavṛttitva*—about which even the Naiyāyikas are not in complete agreement amongst themselves. According to Mohanty, 'If *sāmkarya* is not regarded as *jātibādhaka* and if the notion of *vyāpyavṛtti* with regard to that component where it does inhere, then there appears to be no overriding objection against taking truth to be *jāti*, excepting that such an admission would render the *parataḥ* theory false, at least with regard to *utpatti* of truth.[33]

There is nothing, at least in this context, to disagree with Mohanty. It is true that the Naiyāyikas move from one set of arguments to another with a deeper sense of theoretical networking, in which one theory is connected with the other. Here, in the following set of arguments, PP wants to take up two possible aspects of the *vyāpyavṛttitva* theory.

PP [1.4.1]: Now, just like rejecting the theory that 'existence' or 'absence' are not non-all-pervasive on the ground of indisputable experience, the *avyāpyavṛttitva* (non-all-pervasiveness) of contact (is accepted); in the same manner, rejecting the theory that '*jāti* is all-pervasive', on the ground of experience, let there be *avyāpyavṛttitva* of *pramātva* and absence of *pramātva* as well.

Note

PP—as already we have identified him to be Prabhākara—wants to propose here that there need not be any hard and fast rule like *jātir vyāpyavṛttir eva.* He gives an instance of *bhāva* and *abhāva* which are rejected to be non-all-pervasive entities; but still there is an indisputable experience that *saṃyoga* (contact) which is *bhāva padārtha,* is non-all-pervasive. So also is the absence of contact non-all-pervasive. On the same ground, *pramātva* being *jāti* may be taken as non-all-pervasive.

The *avyāpyavṛtti* of *saṃyoga* and *tadabhāva* are explained with an instance of: *ayam vṛkṣaḥ kapisamyogī,* i.e. this tree has the contact of a monkey. The tree, in the present example, is possessive of contact of the monkey and at the same time it also possesses the absence of contact. This, in other words, means the existence and non-existence of the contact are coexistent in the same tree, since the counterpositive of the non-existence of the contact is the existence of the contact itself. To justify the coexistence of these contradictory properties, the Naiyāyikas use the delimiting (*avacchedaka*) theory. The present introduction is to leads the arguments to identify the *avacchedaka* of *prāmāṇya,* to which Mathurānātha had indicated in the beginning.

SP [1.4.2]: Is it not that—if a *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance)—'which is non-all-pervasive that is not all-pervasive' and 'which is all-pervasive that is not non-all-pervasive'—is accepted, then *pramātva* would not have both the forms.

Note

Vyāpyavṛtti and *avyāpyavṛtti*—to say in modern linguistic/logical terms—are antipodal opposites. Let us translate the above arguments into the symbolic language of modern logic, which may present a clear picture. All-pervasive (*vyāpyavṛtti*) may be symbolized as P(x), where P stands for 'pervasive' and (x) for 'all'. In the same manner we can symbolize 'non-all-pervasive' as P(~x). Then the whole argument shall be symbolized as:

$$P(\sim x) \not\supset P(x)$$
$$P(x) \not\supset P(\sim x)$$

Here $P(\sim x) \not\supset P(x)$ will mean 'that which is non-all-pervasive is not all-pervasive' and $P(x) \not\supset P(\sim x)$ will mean 'that which is all-pervasive is not non-all-pervasive'. In other words it may be said, 'It is not the case that, which is non-all-pervasive is all-pervasive' and 'It is also not the case that, which is all-pervasive is non-all-pervasive'. This can be symbolized as:

$$\sim(P(\sim x) \supset P(x))$$
$$\sim(P(x) \supset P(\sim x))$$

It may further be noted here that only '$P(\sim x) \not\supset P(x)$' or '$\sim(P(\sim x) \supset P(x)$' would normally not mean '$P(x) \not\supset P(\sim x)$' or '$\sim(P(x) \supset P(\sim x))$'. Therefore, both the notations are required. This, in śāstric tradition is referred to as *anvaya-vytireka-krama.*

PP [1.4.3]: This should not be stated so. (It is) because, there will be irregularity (of the *vyāpti*) in the case of absolute absence (*atyantâbhāva*) of contact.

Note

Atyantâbhāva (absolute absence) is regarded in the school of Navya-Nyāya as *nitya* (eternal) and all-pervasive.[34] The *ghaṭâty-antâbhāva* is accepted residing even in the *ghaṭa* itself.[35]

If the said *vyāpti* (in 1.4.2) is accepted, then, it will be a fallacious *vyāpti* with regard to absolute absence. Because it will not hold true either in '$\sim(P(x) \supset P(\sim x))$' or in '$\sim(P(\sim x) \supset P(x))$'. Therefore, such *vyāpti* cannot be accepted.

[1.4.4]: (Moreover) it would not be proper to assume only two absences in that case. There is no such proof (to do so).

Note

PP here refers to the controversies on the acceptability of *atyantâbhāva* and suggests that let there be only two *abhāvas,* viz. *prāgabhāva* and *pradhvamśâbhāva* as per the old school of Nyāya. According to this theory, *atyantâbhāva* need not be accepted, for *atyantâbhāva* contradicts *prāgabhāva* and *pradhvamśâbhāva.*[36] The substratum of *atyantâbhāva* is said to be the substratum of *prāgabhāva* and *dhvamśa.* For instance, the knowledge of absolute absence of *ghaṭa* refers to the *kapāla* which is the substratum of *prāgabhāva* and *pradhvamśâbhāva.* Therefore, the knowledge of absolute absence is not a valid cognition but an erroneous one.[37]

Therefore, according to the old school of Nyāya, the experience of absence, viz. 'absence of the jar' in the substratum of *prāgabhāva* and *dhvamśa* is not identical with the substratum of absolute absence, but is either *prāgabhāva* or *pradhvamśâbhāva.* On this ground, *atyantâbhāva* is unacceptable to the old school of Nyāya. Some others amongst the Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, prefer to accept a typical relational absence (*saṃsārgâbhāva*) instead of *atyantâbhāva* on account of the same reason.

But the neo-school of Nyāya argues that there is no viable proof available on the said contradiction on *atyantâbhāva* either with *prāgabhāva* and *dhvamśa* or even with their *adhikāraṇa.* Therefore, it is simpler (*lāghava*) to accept the *atyantâbhāva* to justify the absence of non-existing colour, taste, sound, smell etc. when one of the same type exists in its substratum. Hence, we may conclude on this issue that one cannot do

away with *atyantâbhāva* and thus, it is to be accepted for logical reasoning.

[1.4.5]: When *guṇa* and *doṣa* are found together, then it is *avyāpyavṛtti* (non-all-pervasive) and when it is found only in *guṇa* then it is *vyāpyavṛtti* (let this be the *vyāpti*. In that case) it otherwise would be proved (*anyathopapattiḥ*).

Note

Guṇa and *doṣa*, in this context, are technical terms, which cannot be translated as 'merit' and 'demerit'. *Guṇa* is neither the twenty-four qualities here. Gaṅgeśa defines *guṇa* and *doṣa* both in the *prāmāṇyavāda* itself which precedes this section; as: *pramājanakatvam guṇatvam, bhramajanakatvam doṣatvam,*[38] i.e. the cause of valid cognition is *guṇa* and the cause of erroneous cognition is *doṣa*. Therefore, the *Nyāya Kośa* defines *guṇa* as: *pramâsādhāraṇakāraṇatvam guṇatvam* and *doṣa* as: *bhramâsādhāraṇakāraṇtvam doṣatvam.*[39]

In case of perceptual cognition, the contact of sense organs with the qualified object is treated as *guṇa*. In the same manner, the distance, the bile etc. are treated as *doṣa*, since these cause erroneous perception.

In the present context, when the arguments in 1.4.4 failed, then PP wanted to raise the issues on *guṇa* and *doṣa*[40] to justify the objections raised in 1.4.1–2. PP's contention is, if he can justify the *avyāpyavṛttitva* of *saṃyoga* (contact) and *tadabhāva* (absence of contact), then, thereby, he can justify the *avyāpyavṛttitva* of *jāti*. On this ground, he can override the objections raised in 1.3.3. This will end in justifying the *prāmāṇya* as *jāti* on the one hand and the *parataḥ* theory of the Naiyāyikas will be proved to be false on the other.

But the Naiyāyikas do not face any problem in defusing the tricks of the Mīmāṃsakas. Here, the clever suggestion of PP is also refuted on the ground of *anyathopapaṭtiḥ*,[41] i.e. it otherwise would be proved. According to the school of Nyāya, if *guṇa* is accepted as the *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* (sufficient and necessary cause) of the cognition, then it will not be sufficient to prove merely the validity of the knowledge. Because, the absence of *doṣa* should also be considered as the cause. In that case, would it be treated as the auxiliary cause? This question cannot be settled. If it is decided in favour of *guṇa*, then why not the same logic be in favour of *doṣa*? Thus, neither the *guṇa* nor the absence of *doṣa* could be counted as the cause of valid cognition. Therefore, '*guṇadoṣayor ekatrasattve avyāpyavṛttitvam guṇamātrasattve vyāpyavṛttitvam*'—such a *vyāpti* cannot be accepted.

Mohanty, after a thorough study on this issue, remarks—'... the entire controversy about *guṇa* vs *doṣâbhāva*—namely, whether truth is caused by special excellences or if it is caused by the general causes of knowledge plus mere absence of frustrating circumstances—seems wide off the mark, the arguments and counter-arguments being offered mere out of zealous attachment to official dogmas rather than out of any consideration of the facts themselves'.[42]

[1.4.6]: Otherwise, the *pramātva* such as *upādhi* would not have the common-substratum (*sāmānādhikaraṇyam*) of absolute absence (*atyantâbhāva*).

Note

The said *vyāpti* must be accepted according to PP, but if it is not accepted and thereby finally the *pramātva* is not taken as *jāti* but accepted as *upādhi*, then the same would not have a common substratum with absolute absence. It is because, absolute absence, being all-pervasive, deserves to be present everywhere along with all permanent entities, but not necessarily with *upādhis*, since they are many.

[1.4.7]: Being common, it would not have both the forms.

Note

Ubhayarūpatvam is that which has been discussed in 1.4.2. Mathurānātha explains this as: *vyāpyâvyāpyavṛttyubhayarūpatvam*[43] which means the same as we had already formalized:

$$P(\sim x) \supset P(x)$$
$$P(x) \supset P(\sim x)$$

SP [1.5.1] No, it is not so; without the delimiting property, (i) the contradictory (properties) cannot stay together, (ii) neither can they be realized.

Note

Now, SP rejects all these arguments on the ground that the delimiting property must be decided here; otherwise, it would not be possible to explain the existence of contradictory properties together. The contradictory properties—*pramātva* and *apramātva*—are found together in the cognition like 'this is silver', which is an instance of erroneous cognition. It should be kept in mind that any knowledge—true or false—prior to detection of its truth and falsehood, is apprehended as true. In other words, every knowledge, irrespective of its erroneous character, is true *ab initio*, unless otherwise proved. But as soon as it is proved to be erroneous, it no more remains valid.

Prabhākaras go a bit too far when they say that no knowledge is erroneous or in other words, there is no cognitive error. But that apart, one has to accept in the first apprehension 'this is silver'—the knowledge cognized is partly *pramā* and partly *apramā*. It means at this stage, that the two contradictory properties lie together. Here, Gaṅgeśa says, it is possible only if the *avacchedaka dharmas* are taken into account. The first

apprehended knowledge—'this is silver' has at least two properties as 'thisness' (*idamtvam*) and 'silverness' (*rajatatvam*). It is only after the erroneous character of the knowledge is established that the *avacchedaka* property, viz. 'silverness' is denied but not 'thisness', which still remains valid. 'Truth' and 'falsehood' can stay together only on the ground of these two properties. Moreover, without these two *avacchedaka* properties, such a knowledge cannot be apprehended at all.

PP [1.5.2]: Well, in that case, the object, which is part of the knowledge (as referent) may be considered as *avacchedaka* (delimiting property) of cognition.[44]

Note

It seems PP wants to focus on the *viṣaya* (object) of the cognition as to be the *avacchedaka* of cognition so that the arguments may take a different turn to focus on *viṣayatā*. The *viṣayatā*, according to the schools of Bhāṭṭas, is considered as *jñātatā*, which will help PP to establish the *svataḥ prāmāṇya* theory. This point is discussed by Gaṅgeśa in this section of *TC* only to refute the *jñātatā* theory.[45] Thus, it is clear from this argument that PP takes resort to Bhāṭṭas' theory.

SP [1.5.3]: No, this is not proper to say so. If the object (*viṣaya*) which forms part of the knowledge is considered as *avacchedaka* of the cognition, then, since *tadviṣayatva* (each and every instance of the object) is found in the erroneous cognition, there will be similar error in both the cases.

Note

In any instance of erroneous cognition, say 'this is silver' where the object—though not correct—is the 'silver'. If the object is treated as *avacchedaka* of the cognition, then the same entity, viz. 'silver' in the present case and the 'silver' in true cognition as well, are treated as *avacchedakas*. In other words, if 'silver' is accepted as *avacchedaka* of *pramā* and *apramā*, the contradictory nature of the knowledge would neither be identified nor cognized.

PP [1.5.4]: Well, if the state of being non-qualifier which does not reside in the (chief) qualificand is treated as *avacchedaka* of *pramā* and the state of being qualifier which does not reside in the qualificand is treated as *avacchedaka* of the absence of *pramā* then. . . .?

Note

Suppose P is an entity which has a property called P_1. And if P is deprived of $\sim P_1$, then only P_1 will be treated as *avacchedaka* of P. Whereas, if P is deprived of P_1, then P_1 cannot be *avacchedaka* of P.

This argument is quite interesting and the same argument has been repeated by Gaṅgeśa with examples in these lines: *bhrame ca śuktivṛttir viṣayatā vyadhikaraṇenâvacchidyate, rajatavṛttis tu samānâdhikaraṇena rajatatvena.*[46] This means in the cognition 'this is silver', if *rajatatva* is coexistent in the object, viz. silver, then the silverness is *avacchedaka* of *pramā*; but in case of erroneous cognition like 'this is silver', (where the referent is *śukti*) if the *rajatatva* is non-existent in the object, then the silverness is *avacchedaka* of *bhrama*.

This argument is of course, quite logical, but it does not describe the nature of *prāmāṇya*. The methodology adopted here is somehow negative or exclusive. Exclusive property does indicate the particular entity but it fails to define it.

SP [1.5.5]: Then let these two be treated as the cause for use of the terms as *pramā* and *apramā* which are (i) of course needed and (ii) which are apprehended at first. Thus, what is the use of *jāti?*

In fact, this is also not (correct). That is stated later on.

Note

As we have seen, the arguments in 1.5.4 are quite logical but SP wants to say that they are not final. This argument helps, however, to reject the first proposal, i.e. *prāmāṇya* is *jāti* (1.0.0. to 1.2.3/6). That is now done. But it is not enough. Gaṅgeśa has to define *pramātva*, which he does in the subsequent work *Pramālakṣaṇasiddhānta Rahaṣyam*. There he defines and discusses *prāmāṇya* at length as: *tadvati tatprakārakatvam*. Gaṅgeśa's intention is not to define *prāmāṇya* in the sense of *pramākaraṇatva* but in the sense of *pramātva*. Therefore, his arguments fall between the *svataḥ prāmāṇya* and *parataḥ prāmāṇya* theories. We hope a serious study on the subsequent passages would be more interesting.

Notes and References

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for their comments.

1. The term *samvādi* is very old and very popular as well, at least in connection with Indian music like *vādi* and *samvādi svara.* It is also used in śāstric tradition as *samvādi-pravṛttijanakatvam* vs *visamvādipravṛttijanakatvam* (see text and note on 1.3.7), which might have some justification in my use. But I have borrowed this term with a little modification from *Samvāda* (Dialogue), edited by Prof. Daya Krishna *et al.*, ICPR, New Delhi.
2. *Nyāya Bhāṣya* (*NBh.*) by Vātsyāyana, on *Nyāya Sūtra* (*NS.*) 1.1.1, *Nyāyadarśanam* (*ND.*), with four Comm., Munshilal Manoharlal Pvt. Ltd., Second edition 1985, New Delhi, p. 57.
3. *Pakṣam ajñātvā na sādhyatadabhāvayoḥ siddhiḥ, hetvabhāvāt, ata eva dharmī sarvatantrasiddhānta ity āśayena pṛcchati—atha kim iti. Āloka* of Pakṣadhara Miśra (with Darpaṇa), *TC.* Vol. I, edited by Umesh Mishra, Darbhanga, 1957, p. 206.
4. *Pramātvam guṇasya kāryatâvacchedakam ity abhimānena pṛcchati,* commentary by Mathurānātha on *TC, Pratyakṣa khaṇḍa,* Vol. I, edited by Kamakhyanatha Tarkavagisha, Reprint edn. 1990, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan, Delhi, p. 372.
5. See *Prakāśa on TC,* edited by Ramanuja Tatacharya, K.S. Vidyapeetham, Tirupati, p. 409.
6. See *Nyāyaśikhāmaṇiḥ* (*NSM.*) in *Prakāśa,* ibid., p. 409.
7. *Pramātvam nirvikalpakādivyāvṛtto jātiviśeṣaḥ, Mathurānātha on TC,* ibid., p. 372.
8. *Tac câbhāvatâdivat saṗratiyogikam,* Mathurānātha, ibid., p. 372.
9. The *prāmāṇya* section in Gaṅgeśa's *TC* runs to about 315 pages—Asiatic Society edn. with commentary by Mathurānātha.
10. *Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha,* Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, Poona, p. 237.
11. See *NBh.* on *NS. ND.*, ibid., p. 35.
12. See details on this issue: J.N. Mohanty, 'Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth', (Introduction), Vishva-Bhārati, Santiniketan, 1966.
13. Six impediments of generic property has been identified in the school of Nyāya. They are: *vyakter abheda tulyatvam samkaro 'thânavasthitiḥ/rūpahānir asambandho jātibādhakasamgrahaḥ. Muktāvlī on Kārikāvalī* by Vishvanātha Nyāya Pañcānana (with Dinakarī & Rāmarūdrī) edited by Atmarām Nārāyan Jere, CSSO, Varanasi, 1982, pp. 75–77.
14. *Sākṣattvâdineti, pramātvam vinā sākṣāttvam nirvikalpake, sākṣāttvam vinā ca pramātvam anumityādau, ekasyāñ ca sākṣātkāripramāyām tayoḥ samkara ity arthaḥ,* Mathurānātha on *TC.*, ibid., p. 373.
15. *Dravyāditrikavṛttis tu sattā paratayocyate.* Kārikāvalī, ibid. 1982, p. 74.
16. See details in *Dīnakarī on Muktāvalī,* ibid., p. 78.
17. Cf., *tac cânuvṛtti-vyāvṛttipratyayahetutvāt sāmānyam viśeṣaś ca bhavati. Nyāyakoṣaḥ,* Bhīmācārya Jhalakikar, BORI, Poona, 1978.
18. *Kāryakāraṇabhāvavyavasthābhaṅâtmakabījasya dravyajātāviva guṇajātāvapi sambhavād iti bhāvaḥ, Āloka* on *TC,*. ibid., p. 206.
19. *NSM.*, ibid., p. 413.
20. *NK.*, ibid., p. 177.
21. See *Āloka* by Pakṣadhara, ibid., p. 207.
22. *Utkarṣastu jātim vinā anyan nirvaktum na śakyate ity abiprāyaḥ, Mathurānātha on TC,* ibid., p. 374.
23. *TC.*, ibid., p. 374.
24. *TC.*, ibid., p. 373.
25. *Nanu anugatabuddhir evâsiddhety ata âha kiñca iti,* Mathurānātha on *TC.*, ibid., p. 374.
26. See Mathurānātha on *TC.*, ibid., p. 375.
27. *Idam jñānam rajatatvapratiyogikatvaviśiṣṭapramātvâbhāvavad eva na tu tādṛśapramātvavat; kim vā rajatatvapratiyogikatva-viśiṣṭa-pramātvavad eva na tu tādṛśapramātvâbhāvavad ity ekaśeṣasya kartum aśakyatvāt ity arthaḥ,* Mathurānātha on *TC,* ibid., p. 375.
28. *Bhramapramāsādhāraṇapratyakṣatvasāmānyanirvacanena tasyâpi lakṣyatvāt. yadā tu pratyakṣa-pramāyā eva lakṣaṇam vaktavyam tadā pūrvoktalakṣaṇe abādhitatvam viṣayaviśeṣaṇam deyam, Vedānta Paribhāṣā* (*VedPari.*), translated and annotated by Swami Madhavānanda, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta, 1989, p. 44.
29. Cf., *tathā hi smṛtyanubhavasādhāraṇam samvādipravṛttyanukūlam tadvati tatprakārakajñānatvam prāmāṇyam, VedPari.*, ibid., p. 143.
30. *Yoga Sūtra*—1.11.
31. *Smṛtir api dvividhā yathārthā ayathārthā ceti. pramājanyā yathārthā. apramājanyā ayathārthā, Tarkasamgraha, Nyāyapradīpa,* Karnatak Govt., p. 169.
32. See J.N. Mohanty, ibid., 1966, pp. 6–7.
33. Mohanty, ibid., p. 57.
34. *Atyantâbhāva* has been defined in *Nyāyapradīpa* as: (i) *prāgabhāvâpratiyogitve sati dhvamsâpratiyogitve sati anyonyābhāvabhinnatve sati abhāvatvam,* (ii) (*athavā*) *tādātmyasambandhâvacchinnaprati yogitākâbhāvatvam atyantâbhāvatvam,* ibid., p. 18.
35. See *Nyāya Kośa,* p. 9.
36. *Na ghaṭâtyantābhāvo vartate. Ghaṭâdiprāgabhāva-dnvamśābhyām saha ghaṭâtyantâbhāvasya virodhāt,* Kīraṇāvlī on *NSM,* ibid., p. 64.
37. *Ghaṭādidhvamśaprāgabhāvavati kapālādau yadi ghaṭâtyantâbhāvavattābuddhir bhavet tarhi tasyā na pramātvam kintu bhramatvam eva,* Kīraṇāvlī on *NSM,* ibid., p. 64.
38. *TC,* ibid., p. 306.
39. Cf. (i) *pramāyā asādhāraṇakāraṇam, NK.*, ibid., p. 261.
    (ii) *doṣo 'pramāyā janakaḥ pramāyāstu guṇo bhavet |*
    pittadūratvâdirūpo doṣo nānāvidhas smṛtaḥ ||
    pratyakṣe tu viśeṣyeṇa viśeṣaṇavatā samam |
    sannikarṣo guṇas tu syāt. . . . || *Kārikāvlī* 131–132.
40. A long discussion on this issue has already been done by Gaṅgeśa in an earlier section, viz. *prāmāṇyavāde utpattivādaḥ* in *TC,* ibid., pp. 288–370.
41. *Anyathopapattiḥ = svâbhāvaprayojyasambhavaḥ,* cf., *NK.* 40.
42. Mohanty, 1966, ibid., p. 59.
43. Mathurānātha on *TC,* ibid., p. 377.
44. We translate *pramātvavṛttau* as cognition because it can be explained as *pramātvam varttate asmin iti pramātvavṛttiḥ, tasyām ityarthaḥ.*
45. *Atha viṣayatāyā āśrayo viśeṣyaḥ, jñānam tatpratiyogi, bharme ca śuktivṛttir viṣayatā vyadhikaraṇena rajatatvenâvacchidyate, rajatavṛttis tu samānâdhikaraṇena rajatayvena, viṣayatā ca viṣaye na jñānâhitā jñātatā-rūpā vivakṣitâpasiddhāntād asiddheḥ, atītânâgatapramāyām tadabhāvāc ca. TC,* ibid., pp. 387–88.
46. See *TC,* ibid., p. 387.

The Mīmāṃsaka versus the Yājñika — Some Further Problems in the Interpretation of *Śruti* in the Indian Tradition*

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In the article 'Mīmāṃsā Before Jaimini' published in the *JICPR* Volume IX, No. 2, I had raised some issues regarding the problems in the interpretation of what was regarded as *śruti* in the Mīmāṃsā tradition of understanding what was regarded as the Veda or rather the accepted text of the Veda according to the *śākhā* to which one belonged. The latter qualification is important, as the text of the Saṃhitās is not the same in the different *śākhās*, as we had pointed out in an earlier article entitled 'The Vedic Corpus—Some Questions' published in the *JICPR* Vol. III, No. 1. The term Veda, in fact, is generally used to refer to a large, disparate variety of texts which have little unity, except the one imposed by the interpretation (which usually is achieved by ignoring or underplaying large parts) of the text which does not support one's preferred interpretation. There are, for example, no known Mīmāṃsā commentaries on the major Upaniṣads or any direct, detailed commentaries on the *Saṃhitā* and *Bráhmaṇa* portions of the Veda by the Vedāntic school of interpretation started by Bādarāyaṇa in the *Brahma-sūtras*. But this large-scale ignoring of what are supposed to be integral parts of the text of the Vedas has not troubled anyone, either in the past or in the present. And yet, scholars go on blithely talking about the authority of the *śruti* in the Indian tradition and the lay public accepting it blindly on their authority.

The situation, however, is far more complicated than this simple dichotomy reveals. It is well-known, for example, that in the Bādarāyaṇa camp which regards the major Upaniṣads as the real *śruti*, there are deep differences between the various *ācāryas* regarding their interpretation, a difference they themselves consider to be so important that they highlight it by repeated emphasis and by criticizing the rival

* This article is dedicated to the memory of Prof. R.C. Dwivedi, a dear friend, a great scholar and a rare person genuinely committed to the cause of renewal of traditional learning in India in the contemporary context, and whose stray remarks in a telephonic conversation were the occasion of the writing of this paper.

interpretations. Not only this, Yāmuna, the first great non-Advaitic *ācārya* after Śaṅkara, tries to establish the *prāmāṇya* of Āgama, along with that of the Vedas in his unjustly ignored book, entitled *Āgama Prāmāṇya* which tries to give the status of *śruti* to the *Āgamic* texts also. But as the so-called *Āgama* texts are various and varied, there is no distinct criterion by which one may decide which to accord the status of *śruti* and which to exclude from that foundational authoritative august status.

The Mīmāṃsā presumably, therefore, had tried to steer clear of all these difficulties and confined the term *śruti* not only to that part of the Vedic corpus which deals with sacrificial injunctions, but also treated the rest as *arthavāda*, that is, as something which was not to be understood literally, but rather in its relation to the sacrificial injunction which it reinforced and supported in some way or the other through its indirect bearing on it.

All this is fairly well-known, though its devastating implications for the concept of *śruti* are seldom realized or, even when realized, tend to be underplayed by most scholars who write on the subject. But there is another dimension to the problem which, as far as I know, has been totally neglected up till now. This is the role of the *yājñika* in the interpretation of the *vidhi* according to which a particular *yajña* prescribed by the Vedas was to be performed. Normally, this is supposed to be the business of the Mīmāṃsaka, and Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* are a classic example of a discussion about these matters. And, most scholars do seem to think that it is the task of the *Mīmāṃsa śāstra* to decide and adjudicate on such matters. But in a recent discussion on the subject, R.C. Dwivedi pointed out that the Mīmāṃsaka's was only a theoretical interest in reconciling the seemingly discrepant and divergent statements regarding the *vidhi* pertaining to the different *yajñas* laid down primarily in the *Brāhmaṇa* texts which they regard as authoritative. But as far as the *actual* performance of the *yajña* was concerned, their authority was only indirect and secondary as there the *yājñika* reigned supreme. This is supported to a certain extent by Staal's observation that the *yājñikas* on being told that the procedures they were following differed from the one mentioned in the texts evinced little interest in the fact or made any attempt to bring their procedure in line with the one prescribed in the text.[1] But, strangely, Staal does not give the details of the discrepancy or see the implications of what he had observed for the theory of *yajña* as propounded in Mīmāṃsā as represented by Jaimini and his chief interpreter, Śabara.

But even if we accept the overriding authority of the *yājñika* in the actual performance of the Vedic *yajña*, the question remains as to who is a *yājñika*, and what is his relation to the mīmāṃsaka. The former question is relevant as, according to the tradition, there is not just one *yājñika*, but many, four of whom are supposed to enjoy special status and authority and are known as the *hotr*, the *udgatr*, the *adhvaryu* and the *brahmā* representing respectively the *Ṛgveda*, the *Sāmaveda*, the *Yajurveda* and the

Atharvaveda. But as it is the *brahmā* who is supposed to oversee, supervise and correct the mistakes of the others, the main authority for deciding what is a correct *vidhi* according to the *śruti* should be his and not that of the others. And this, in spite of the fact that he is not only supposed to be a late-comer into the picture, but also an interloper according to those who do not quite accept the authority of the *Atharvaveda* to be on par with the other Saṃhitās of the Vedic canon. In fact, according to Gonda, even after the acceptance of the four-fold corpus of the Vedic Saṃhitās, 'various later texts continued to speak of the threefold Holy Knowledge'. And, that 'even in modern times there have been brahmins who have refused to recognize the authority of the promulgators of the fourth Veda, because of a certain prejudice prevailing against it. Even today brahmins of the other Vedas do not dine or marry atharvanic (*paippalādins*) of Orissa'.[2]

This, if correct, would result in a strange situation indeed, for the person who is supposed to be invested with the final authority of deciding whether a particular *vidhi* is correct or not in the *actual* performance of the *yajña* when it is being performed, represents a Veda which itself did not enjoy the status of being a Veda for a long time and whose living carriers are discriminated against by brahmins of the other Vedas to such an extent that they do not even dine with them or marry their sons or daughters into their families. Now, it is not clear if Gonda is talking about the actual *yājñikas* who *perform* the sacrificial ritual in the *yajña* concerned, or those who only memorize and study a particular Veda in the traditional manner. For, in case he is talking of the *yājñikas*, then it is difficult to see how other *yājñikas*, belonging to the other Vedas, could possibly avoid dining with him if partaking of what was cooked during the ritual was an integral part of the sacrificial ritual itself.

But whatever be the mutual relations between the *yājñikas* representing the different Vedas in the Vedic *yajña outside* the sphere of the actual performance of the *yajña*, there can be little doubt that they cannot but be cordial and co-operative during the performance of the *yajña* as their functions are inter-dependent and hence have to form a co-ordinated coherent whole for its successful completion. And, this exactly is supposed to be the task of the *ṛtvikas* who have the actual responsibility of performing the *yajña*.

The injunction to perform the *yajña*, whether *nitya*, *naimittika* or *kāmya*, it should be remembered, is given by the *śruti*, that is, that part of the Vedas which contains such injunction. It is the texts known as the *Brāhmaṇas* which are usually supposed to contain these instructions according to which the various Vedic *yajñas* are to be performed. And, it is obvious that the Vedic character of the *yajña* can only be ensured if the *yajña* is performed completely and strictly in accordance with the injunctions laid down in these texts, which *are* the *śruti* for this purpose.

But what are the authoritative injunctions of the texts in regard to

these *yajñas*? There was a pre-Jaimini tradition in this regard which itself was diverse in character and which can only be known and possibly reconstructed on the basis of his refutation of their views in his well-known text known as the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*. The problems raised by the refutation of the earlier interpretations regarding how the Vedic sacrifices were to be performed have been discussed by me in an earlier article entitled 'Mīmāṃsā Before Jaimini—Some Problems in the Interpretation of *Śruti*' in the *JICPR*, Vol. IX, No. 2. But the argument in that article was based on the assumption that the *yajñas* were *actually* performed according to the interpretation given by these thinkers and that the main point of Jaimini's writing the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* was to show that these interpretations were wrong and that the correct performance of the Vedic *yajñas* could *only* be that which he was giving in his *sūtras* unless, of course, the *vikalpa* or the alternative was permitted by the Vedic text itself. Prof. Dwivedi questions this assumption itself and suggests that it is the *yājñika* and not the Mīmāṃsaka who is the final authority regarding how a *yajña* is to be performed in accordance with the injunctions laid down in the *śruti* texts in this regard.

Prof. Dwivedi, unfortunately, is now no more and I do not know if he was exactly arguing for any radical difference between the positions of the Mīmāṃsaka and the *yājñika* in respect of the interpretation of the *śruti* with regard to the *vidhi* according to which any particular Vedic *yajña* was to be performed. In fact, if my memory is not playing any trick, he had compared the actual *yājñika performing* the ritual to the musician who actually plays or sings a *rāga*, and while doing so, interprets it. On the other hand, the mīmāṃsaka is like the musicologist, who theoretically talks about the *rāga* and determines what the *rāga* is, or rather ought to be. The analogy would perhaps be more suitable to western music where the music has a written score which is being interpreted by the players and the music critic can easily determine whether the interpretation was true to the musical score, does justice to it or not.

But neither the Indian nor the western analogy seems to be relevant to this case as, unlike the classical musician in India, the *yājñika* is not supposed to improvise at all and, unlike the western parallel, the mīmāṃsaka does not sit in judgement over what the *yājñika* actually does. There is, of course, a written text which is supposed to govern and play an authoritative, prescriptive role for both as the written score is supposed to do in western music. But neither the average mīmāṃsaka nor the *yājñika* has the original text before him as is the case with their western counterpart. In fact, it is surprising that not only does Jaimini not write a detailed exegetical *Bhāṣya* on the relevant portions of the *śruti* dealing with these *yajñas*, but neither does any other mīmāṃsaka as far as I know. Sāyaṇa is, of course, the best known amongst those who have written such sort of *bhāṣyas*, but then neither he nor they were primarily mīmāṃsakas. Kumārila, who is a mīmāṃsaka *par excellence* may, for example, occasionally

differ with Śabara on whether a particular *sūtra* of Jaimini is to be taken as propounding a *pūrva-pakṣa* or a *siddhānta*, but he is not interested in going to the original *śruti* text for justifying his position to decide on the issue.

A more relevant analogy, perhaps, might be with the written text of a play and the traditions of critical interpretation on the one hand and of its actual performance on the other. The two are independent of each other, though they may sometimes take cognizance of each other, or even be influenced by what the other is saying or doing. The history of Shakespearean criticism and Shakespearean production are examples of this. But even in this case the text is appealed to by both and remains central to them, even though they may be as independent of each other as the Shakespearean critic and the producer or director of a Shakespearean play usually are. The mīmāṃsaka and the *yājñika*, however, do not seem to be concerned with the text, and there seems to have been no real diversity in Mīmāṃsā traditions after Jaimini, though there is ample evidence in his own work that there were plenty of such trends before him. For the actual performance of the Vedic *yajñas*, there has hardly been any attempt to reconstruct their history. Perhaps there were as many schools of *yājñikas* as the families hereditarily specializing in the task from times immemorial.

But neither the actually performing yājñika nor the theorizing mīmāṃsaka ever thought that they were *free* to interpret the Vedic texts enjoining the performance of the *yajñas* in the way they considered proper or even that they were engaged in any activity of interpretation at all. They believed that they were saying or doing what the relevant *śruti* texts enjoined them to say or do. But the crucial difference between them was that the mīmāṃsaka argued, while the yājñika did not. But the mīmāṃsaka could not but have been aware that there were alternative interpretations which he was rejecting on grounds which he regarded as justified and adequate. Thus, though the mīmāṃsaka may not consciously accept that he was interpreting, in actual fact he was doing so. The *yājñika*, on the other hand, was not concerned with disputation at all. He just carried on the tradition as he had learnt it in his family. But even he could not have been unaware that there were other traditions of performing the same *yajña*, at least in other regions, if not in other *ṛtvic* families of the same region. In other words, there must have been different *gharānās* of yājñikas, just as there are *gharānās* in music. Perhaps the various *śakhās* of the *Sāmaveda* were in fact *gharānās* of Vedic music and as almost all the *ṛcs* of the *Sāmaveda* are those which occur in the other Saṃhitās, one may assume that the case with the non-*Sāmavedic ṛcs* of the Vedic Saṃhitās was also the same. The various *śākhās* of the Vedas other than the *Sāmaveda* presumably had a difference not only with respect to the text of the Veda concerned but also with respect to the way the *mantras* had to be recited. The difference in the actual *mantras* of what is

supposed to be the *same* text has seldom drawn the attention of the scholars and hardly any attention has been paid to the disastrous implications it has for the idea of *śruti* in the Indian tradition. Normally, it is assumed that the differences are minor and insignificant and hence do not affect the substantial unity of the text on the basis of which we designate it as that particular Veda. But the differences in the actual *mantras* is substantially large in the case of many of the *śākhās* and hence cannot be dismissed so lightly if we take the notion of the *śruti* seriously.

In fact, a traditional Brahman was always asked not only about his *gotra* and Veda etc., but also about the *śākhā* to which he belonged. This obviously implied that for him the authoritative *śruti* text was of the *śākhā* to which he belonged and this was accepted by everybody else in the tradition. The proverbial plurality of the Indian tradition perhaps derives from the fact that even what is to be regarded as the *śruti* in the tradition depends on the *śākhā* to which one belongs. And, if we further accept that the way the same *mantras* were recited, differed from *śākhā* to *śākhā*, as was the case with the *Sāmaveda*, the plurality of *śruti* is established at the very beginning of the tradition as for a *mantra* to be regarded as the same, not only its *varṇānupūrvī*, but even its *svarānupūrvī* has to be the same.

But, the plurality of the *śruti* that came into being was mitigated by two different factors. The first being that most of the *mantras* are not used in any of the actual sacrifices that are prescribed in the *śruti*, and hence have only an ornamental or subsidiary status in the *yajña*-centric tradition of interpretation of the *śruti*. To use the well-known Mīmāṃsā term, they are either *arthavāda* or *nāmadheya*. The same strategy was also adopted by the *brahman*-centric school of interpretation of *śruti* by making a radical distinction between *parā* and *aparā vidyā*, and relegating a large part of the Vedas to the latter, and considering only the parts dealing with the former as *śruti* proper. The other method adopted in the tradition was to *ignore* the *mantras* which were not an integral part of the sacrificial ritual, to underplay the *svarānupūrvī* requirement and leave it to the *yajña*-specialist that is, the *yājñika*, to recite them the way he thought proper, and forget all those parts of the Brāhmaṇa texts which were not concerned with prescribing the details of the sacrificial ritual. This, of course, was the Jaimini prescription. Bādarāyaṇa's prescription was just the opposite—ignore the *mantras*, treat the idea of *yajña* as metaphorical, concentrate on the Upaniṣads alone and give a *brahman*-centric interpretation of them.

Both the strategies succeeded, particularly with the followers of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, in removing the inconvenient plurality and diversity of the so-called *śruti* even from the consciousness of those who most loudly proclaimed their belief in it. As for others, they simply accepted it on trust and used the word 'Veda' without caring or worrying about what was actually included in it.

The situation is, of course, disturbing for anyone who takes the notion of *śruti-prāmāṇya* seriously in Indian thought. But the *difference* between the *yājñika* and the mīmāṃsaka is more serious as they both opt for the *yajña*-centric interpretation of the *śruti* and do not understand the idea of *yajña* in any extended or metaphorical sense, even if such a sense is found in some of the Brāhmaṇas themselves. But the mīmaṃsaka at least is concerned with the text; in fact, his whole activity consists in reconciling apparently discrepant injunctions regarding how a *yajña* is to be actually performed and *arguing* why the alternatives suggested by others are wrong. The *yājñika* does nothing of the kind. He is not interested in the text—in fact, he may never have seen it himself. He does what he has seen being done in his family, or the way he is taught to do by those who perform the ritual. Still, one expects an interaction between the two and at least a prima facie attempt to ensure that the ritual practices conform to the procedures laid down in the *śruti* texts dealing with the matter. But if Staal's statement is to be believed, there is nothing like that in the case of the Vedic *yajña*. Instead, there is an utter indifference to the text, or rather its interpretation by the mīmāṃsaka, as is often found amongst the actual practitioners of an art regarding what the theoreticians say about it. The situation would, of course, have been different if the *yājñika* had been following some other school of interpretation of the *śruti* text, but the evidence does not suggest so. In fact Staal makes it even more clear in his reply to the comments on the interpretation of *dravya tyāga* by the three great Mīmāṃsā scholars in the pages of the *JICPR*. He emphasizes that the persons who perform the *yajña* were neither Mīmāṃsakas nor knew anything about Mīmāṃsā. Rather, as he writes, 'what they were first and foremost is practising ritualists'. And, 'their knowledge of the ritual was not based upon the Mīmāṃsā or any of the *Śrauta-sūtras* familiar to scholars, through their published editions'. Rather, they had learnt the ritual from their father, or other close relatives. As Staal writes, '. . . C.V. learned the ritual from his father and ITTI Ravi from the father and the grandfather's brother, they practised the rites as part of their tradition which is almost entirely oral'. And, 'In case of conflict between the tradition and the published text of Baudhāyana, Sānkhyāyana or Jaiminīya *Śrauta-sūtras* with which they were not on the whole familiar, they follow the former and not the latter'.[3]

On the contemporary evidence, therefore, it is obvious that what *counts* in the *actual* performance of the *yajñas* as described in the Vedic texts is not what the mīmāṃsakas say or what is *written* in the *Śrauta sūtras* concerning them, but the *tradition* of performing them as it has developed during all these millennia and the way it has been handed down in the families which have specialized in the art of performing the *yajñas* as enjoined in the Vedas. It is, of course, true that according to Staal, 'the differences of the living Nambudiri tradition with Baudhāyana's and Sānkhyāyana's texts as we know them are mostly minor; in the area of the

Sāmaveda, the differences with the *Jaiminīya Śrauta sūtra* are somewhat more extensive'. But, strictly speaking, the deviation in the ritual procedure of a vedic *yajña* cannot be characterized as 'major' or 'minor', for if it is a deviation from the procedure laid down in the *Brāhmaṇa* texts then it will just not lead to the desired result but may even lead, as I argued in the earlier article, to the contrary or opposite of what was desired. One should not forget the warning given by the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* regarding what awaits one if one pronounces ordinary Sanskrit wrongly, let alone the Vedic *mantras* to preserve whose purity of recitation all the various methods were devised to keep not only their *varṇānupūrvī* but also their *svarānupūrvī* intact. As for the *vidhi* of a vedic *yajña*, it has not only to have the relevant *mantras* used in that particular *yajña* recited properly, but also all the other procedures involved in it performed exactly as prescribed in their minutest details in the *śruti* texts devoted to that subject. The so-called 'extensive' deviations from the *Jaiminīya Śrauta sūtras* in the area of *Sāmaveda*, therefore, are not more important than the 'minor' deviations from the procedure prescribed in the Baudhāyana and the Sānkhyāyana texts, provided one accepts these as authoritative. In fact, the *yajña* performed by the Nambudiri priests and extensively documented by Staal in his book *Agni* and also filmed and shown as an *example* of vedic *yajña* to many scholarly and lay audiences cannot be accepted as a *yajña* in the proper Vedic sense if what Staal has written is taken seriously. It will be a pseudo-*yajña* masquerading as the genuine one with all the adverse consequences for both the *ṛtvikas* that is, the Nambudiri brahmans, and the *yajamāna*, that is, Staal, if what I had pointed out regarding the fate of the pre-Jaiminī *yajña* performers in my article 'Mīmāṃsā Before Jaimini' has any validity. Staal, of course, is only a scholar and does not *believe* in the hocus pocus of the Vedic *yajña* and, in any case, he has already got the fruits thereof in terms of scholarly recognition from his peers for what he did. But what is surprising is that even the Nambudiri brahmans did not care whether what they were performing deviated from the correct prescribed *vidhi* or not. They also were perhaps satisfied, like Staal, with the immediate fruits of the *yajña* which they performed for his benefit. At a deeper level still, perhaps neither of them *cared* whether the procedure being followed by them in the performance of the *yajña* was in accordance with the injunctions laid down in the *śruti*, a concern that was paramount with Jaimini and that led him to the writing of the *Mīmāṃsā sūtras*.

The fact that neither of them *cared*, however, seemed to have derived from different reasons. For Staal, it was just a 'subject' of study. He obviously was not interested in 'performing' the *yajña* himself or believed that one could really achieve any fruit by doing it. The Nambudiri brahmans, on the other hand, perhaps genuinely believed in it and like the *yājñikas* of old thought that the correct way of performing the *yajña* was the way they were taught to do it in their tradition, or perhaps that it did not really matter how it was performed, provided the requisite

motive or attitude or *bhāvanā* accompanying the performance was alright. In case it was the latter, it would show the profound influence of the *bhakti* tradition in a realm which was supposed to be completely opposed to it. What is however more surprising is the fact that Staal does not seem to be surprised at the attitude of the Nambudiri brahmans or see its implications for the notion of *śruti* in the Indian tradition. Instead, he sees it only as an anthropological fact and records it as such.

Staal is, of course, not the only student of Indian tradition who does not see the problems which his own observations pose for the notion of *śruti* as it has been usually interpreted and understood in the Indian tradition. Louis Renou tried to expose the myth of the authority of the Vedas in his well-known book entitled *le destin du Veda dans le Inde*. But myths die hard, and recently a scholar of Halbfass's eminence has tried to come to the rescue of the myth. In his recent book entitled *Tradition and Reflection*[4] he has devoted five out of ten essays to this topic. It is not my intention here to discuss in detail Halbfass's contention, but only to show how even a scholar of his stature could be blind to glaring counter-evidence which would nullify his carefully built argument in at least one of the crucial chapters on the subject. The chapter is entitled 'Human Reason and Vedic Revelation as in Advaita Vedānta'. The theme is an over-worked one, as so many scholars have already written on the subject. Prof. K. Satchidananda Murty's *Reason and Revelation in Advaita Vedānta*, written in 1959, is a well-known classic treatment of the subject. Halbfass refers to it, but does not specify where he differs from it. In fact, his references to Indian writing on the subject are so patronizing and full of self-righteousness that one wonders if western scholars would ever get rid of the hangover from the attitudes inherited from the bygone days of the imperial past. In the case of Prof. Halbfass, however, it is doubly distressing as he is not only an extraordinarily sound scholar, but also extremely sympathetic and fair to the multifarious sides of most issues as evidenced in his work entitled *India and Europe*. For such a person to write about the writings of many of the neo-Vedāntins that 'their apologetic goal often overshadows the requirements of philological accuracy and conceptual precision',[5] sounds strange, particularly when he makes no efforts to substantiate the charge. Not only this, his own essays in the volume concerning this subject are neither grounded on 'philological' contentions nor seek any 'conceptual precision' concerning the subject. In fact, they do not even give any evidence of his having learnt anything from his study of Indian philosophy on which he has spent a lifetime and of which undoubtedly he has detailed and profound knowledge, as he does not state the *pūrva-pakṣa* or try to demolish it to establish his *siddhānta*. Not only this, he does not even observe the norms of western scholarship as he gives no reason why he is once again writing on a subject when his conclusion is the same as that of Prof. K.S. Murty and where he differs from him, particularly when he explicitly refers to his work on the very

subject and writes, 'The critical and differentiated treatment of the topic in K.S. Murty's book *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta* (1959; second edn. 1974), which emphasizes the subordination of reason and argumentation (*yukti, tarka*) to the authority of Vedic revelation, is particularly remarkable and somewhat unusual contribution from the Indian side'.[6] However, after this statement, Prof. Halbfass, for reasons best knwon to him, does not return to Prof. Murty's book or discuss anything that he has said regarding the issues therein.

Strangely, neither Prof. Murty nor Prof. Halbfass sees the utter inadequacy of the use of the term 'revelation' in this context. And, this, in spite of the complaint about lack of philological scholarship displayed by Indian scholars who have written on the subject. *Śruti* is not revelation if Koran is treated as the paradigmatic example of what 'revelation' is supposed to mean, or if God is regarded as the necessary source of the revelation in order that it may be considered as 'revelation'. Neither the school of Jaimini nor of Bādarāyaṇa treat the Veda (whatever may be meant by that term as included in it in an extensional sense of the term) in any such way as to fulfil this condition. Nor does Śaṅkara, the founder of Advaita Vedānta, for that matter.

It may be urged that what ultimately matters is the notion of a foundational text whose authority is regarded as overriding and supreme in deciding what is to be accepted or not accepted, and not whether this text is treated as the word of God, or as 'revealed' by him. But even in this sense, does Jaimini or Bādarāyaṇa or Śaṅkara treat the Veda as a foundational text whose 'authority' is to be accepted in *all* matters? First, it is well-known that Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara do not accept the authority of those portions of the Vedic texts which prescribed the various *yajñas*, including those that are supposed to be done for attaining *svarga* or heaven. Similarly, Jaimini and his followers do not accept the authority of those portions of the text which are supposed to deal with *Brahman*, that is, the Upaniṣads. Second, the 'authority' of even these portions of the texts is accepted in a very selective manner, much of what one side takes in a literal manner, the other treats as *arthavāda*, that is, as primarily 'rhetorical' in intention. For Jaimini, no declarative statement has any authority, as only injunctive or imperative statements constitute the Veda. And, Śaṅkara himself has urged that *śruti's prāmāṇya* cannot even be conceived if it goes against what is well established by other *pramāṇas*.[7] (*na ca pramāṇāntaraviruddhārtha viṣaye śruteḥ prāmāṇyam kalpyate*). The statement is far stronger than comes out in Halbfass's own rendering of it in his reference to this as it is not confined to perception alone, even though the examples given by Śaṇkara may seem to suggest that. In fact, a close look at the examples given may suggest that perhaps the issue was not so empirical as may appear at first sight. After all *Śītogniḥ* or 'cold fire' may more appropriately be regarded as a self-contradiction rather than as merely contrary to experience, though the addition that it makes

things wet (*kledayati iti*) may make one think in the opposite direction. But the use of the phrase *śvavacanaviruddham* by Śaṅkara in his *Gītā Bhāṣya* (XIII, 66) which is also quoted by Halbfass, seems to strengthen our line of direction for the interpretation. In fact, Śaṅkara in the *Gītā Bhāṣya* is giving both *pramāṇāntaraviruddhaṃ* and *svavacanaviruddhaṃ* as alternatives and declares that if even a hundred *śrutis* (*śrutiśatam api*) were to say anything having either of these characteristics, it cannot be regarded as true.

Yet, though Halbfass refers to both of these, he does not *discuss* them at all. Rather, he avoids them, and skirts past them as if they had never been said and it was just an accidental, gratuitous, meaningless statement which Śaṅkara might have made when he was not fully alive to the far-reaching implications of what he had said. It is, of course, true that Halbfass does quote other passages which he construes as meaning the opposite of what is implied by these statements. But then, the obvious problem would be how to reconcile the two and not only this, but also what to do with the innumerable, factual, empirical statements scattered throughout the *śruti*. Halbfass does nothing of the kind and goes merrily along as if no serious objections had arisen to his position from these quotations or that there were no fundamental difficulties in the way of his interpretation if the quotations on p. 152 were to be construed the way he has construed them.

Our main interest here, however, is not to discuss whether Śaṅkara treats *śruti* as authoritative in empirical matters, but whether he displays an attitude to *śruti* which is in consonance with its being a *śruti* in the sense in which it is treated as a 'revelatory' text (a term used in this connection by everybody, including both Murty and Halbfass). I hope everyone will agree that one cannot play fast and loose with a text one regards as 'revelatory' or distort its meaning out of all recognition if one doesn't like, or approve of it. In fact, even if one does it with an ordinary text, one forfeits one's claim to intellectual honesty. But if one does it in the case of a 'revelatory' text, then the minimum that one has to say in this matter is that the text is not being treated as 'revelatory' at all in any meaningful sense of the word. Unfortunately, Śaṅkara is guilty of just this and it is surprising that a careful scholar like Halbfass with all his talk of 'philological accuracy and conceptual precision' ignores this glaring counter-evidence to all that he has to say on the matter.

The Upaniṣads, for example, are accepted as the hard core of the *śruti* by Śaṅkara and amongst them the *Chāndogya* occupies perhaps a place which is only less than the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. And even those who try to dispute his authorship of the commentaries on many of them have not questioned the fact of his having written a *bhāṣya* on it. But as scholars are free to dispute anything on grounds which may appear unsatisfactory to them, we will assume, for the purpose of argument in this article that the commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* ascribed to Śaṅkara by the

tradition was actually written by him. In any case, at least Halbfass accepts his authorship of the *Bhāṣya* on this Upaniṣad, if his statement on p. 210 of *Tradition and Reflection* is to be taken seriously. Now if we take the notion of *śruti* in the sense which is accepted by everybody, including Halbfass, and see what Śaṅkara does with the well-known story of Satyakāma Jābāla in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, we will have an embarrassing dilemma on our hands. But, first, let us see what he has done with the *śruti* which he is supposed to have regarded as authoritative and revelatory in character. Here is what the original text is supposed to say regarding this episode. We will quote only the most relevant portion for our purpose. Satyakāma, who was the son of Jabālā, had asked his mother that he wanted to take to the life of *brahmacarya* and hence wanted to know what was his *gotra* or parental lineage. On being asked this question, she replied—*nāhametadveda tāta yadagotrastvamasi; bahavahaṁ carantī paricāriṇī yauvane tvāmalabhe, Sāhametanna veda yadagotrastvamasi. Jabālā tu nāmāhamasmi Satyakāmo nāma tvamasi sa Satyakāma eva Jābālo bruvīthā iti* (4.4).

Now, this is simple and straightforward Sanskrit requiring no philological expertise for its understanding. And, yet Śaṅkara comments on it in the following manner: *Jabālā sā hainaṃputram uvāca nāhamaetātatava gotraṁveda, he tāta yadagotrastvamasi, kasmānna vetsi, ityuktāha - bahu bhartṛgṛhe paricaryājātamathithyabhyāgatādi carantyahaṁ paricāriṇī paricarantīti paricararaśīlaivāhaṁ paricarṇacittatayā gotrādismaraṇe mama mano nābhut. youvane ca tatkāle tyāmalabhe labdhavatyasmi. tadaiva te pitorparataḥ. ato'nāthāhaṁ sāhamaetanna veda yadagotrastvamasi.* We need not quote further as what we want to convey should have become fairly clear to anyone with the least knowledge of Sanskrit.

The turns and twists which Śaṅkara introduces to make the story respectable and the so-called *śruti acceptable* to the social prejudices of his time would have been laughable if they did not also have a tragic aspect to them. Imagine the great ācārya making the poor Jabālā not only a slave all the time entertaining her husband's guests all the twenty four hours every day of the year, but had to kill her husband so that she may be provided an excuse for not knowing what the *gotra* of her son's progenitor was. But, even if we accept all the above hypotheses which Śaṅkara invents to save the situation, the lady could easily have found the *gotra* of her husband by inquiring from other members of his or her family. Such an easy and obvious alternative for finding the *gotra* of the child could be foreclosed only by postulating the simultaneous death of *all* the persons from both sides of the family who would have easily given her the information. But even this would not have sufficed, for there are always others such as friends or neighbours or other members of the caste, clan or *varṇa* who can give the information. Śaṅkara will have to postulate the death not only of all but also of any other *possible* person from whom such information could be derived. Moreover, Śaṅkara gives no reason why

she did not try to get the information after her husband's death, particularly when she must have known that such information would be required at the time of her son's marriage, if not at the time of his studies.

She did not try to find because she *knew* that the information sought for, could not be found. And, this is what she is trying to say in so many plain words whose simple and obvious meaning Śaṅkara is willfully trying not to understand, for that will destroy his private personal conception of what the *śruti* ought to say, or be. Or else, he is afraid of the undesirable consequences of the truth on society and public morality of his times. In either case, Śaṅkara is not being true to the *śruti*, nor displaying an attitude to it which one would expect to be displayed to a text deemed as 'revelatory'. But then, did he not know what he was doing? Did he not understand the plain meaning of the Sanskrit sentences which Jabālā spoke? Or, did he not know the so-called 'facts of life' or the absurdity of the hypotheses he had postulated to hide the truth? And, why did he not ask himself the simple question that if his hypotheses were correct, what was the point of the teacher saying *naitadbrāhmaṇo vivaktumarhati*, for there would have been nothing special in what he said to deserve the praise from the teacher?[8]

The simple and straight question in this context is whether Śaṅkara treats the *śruti* as *śruti*, that is, as something to whose truth his own personal, social and cultural prejudices are to be subordinated and from which he has to *learn* and *accept* whatever it says, even if it be against what one has been taught to believe as right or wrong, true or false, reasonable or unreasonable, rational or irrational. This may seem an impossible demand, as the very act of 'understanding' a text, or of 'interpreting' it implies that one has some implicit idea or ideas regarding what makes 'sense' or what is intelligible. And, if the condition of 'coherence' is accepted to make anything 'sensible' or 'intelligible', as the *sūtra* 1.1.4 of the *Brahma-sūtra* seems to require, then the question what exactly is meant by *samanvaya* or 'coherence' is bound to arise. *Samanvaya*, it should be remembered, can be attempted in more ways than one, and the *demand* for it already implies at least some submission to the requirements of both reason and sense experience. Besides these, the presuppositions of *samanvaya* or *ekavākyatā*, that is, total coherence in any sense, of the revealed text, creates a dilemma for any interpreter as to how far he can fulfil this obligation without being 'intellectually dishonest' to himself. The dilemma is writ large in the history of the exegesis of all texts which have been claimed to be revelatory. But this characteristic of the *śruti* in the Indian context has been radically different from the very beginning than the so-called revelatory texts in the other traditions. First, what was to be really regarded as the *śruti* proper has never been very clear as what is to be included under the term 'Veda' has never been unambiguous. Second, there have been two major traditions of Vedic interpretation, those of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa and thirdly even among the Bādarāyaṇa

school, the great ācāryas and the *saṁpradāyas* founded by them have never agreed about the intepretation of Bādarāyaṇa's own text in the matter.

The situation thus, is deeper and more complicated than the earlier remark of Renou with which Halbfass opens his discussion, as the 'indifference' of the yājñika to the fact that his procedure of performing the Vedic *yajña* departs from what the authoritative texts say in the matter, a fact which Staal duly notes, is rooted in a tradition which treats the notion of '*śruti*' in a way which is unknown in religions deriving from the Judaic tradition. Staal, of course, is not troubled by the startling fact, while Halbfass just ignores the conflicting evidence or minimizes its import when he happens to notice it, as in the case of *Śītogniḥ* or the 'cold fire'. But even if the *yājñika* had tried to make his performance of the ritual of the Vedic *yajña* in accordance with the so-called authoritative texts after finding from Staal that he was deviating or departing from the text, which text he would have relied on for his correction as, according to Yasuka Ikari and Harold F. Arnold 'the *Dvaidha sūtras* (22.1.12) record practices at variance with those described in the main *sūtra* text but authorized by different practitioners of the school, among whom the most frequently cited are Baudhāyana and Śālīki'. (*Agni*, Vol. II, p. 478). Now, this is extremely puzzling as the statement concerns the *Baudhāyana Śrauta sūtra* which presumably was composed by Baudhāyana himself or, at least, belonged to the school founded by him or of which he was the most prominent member. But if it was so, and there seems no reason to doubt it, why should Baudhāyana himself authorize rules which are at variance with those which he framed himself?

The two other texts which are referred to as sources in Staal's book entitled *Agni*, the *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa* and the *Jaiminīya Śrauta Sūtra* do not discuss variations in performance of the Vedic *yajña*. But, interestingly, Asko Parpola, who has translated the relevant portion of the *Jaiminīya Śrauta Sūtra*, suggests that 'most of the *sūtra* portion of the *JSS* is relevant to the understanding of the Kerala Agnicayana ...' (p. 701). And, though he has not explicitly stated why it is so, Parpola's own presentation provides a sufficient ground for this. According to him, Bhavatrāta, who has written a commentary on the *Jaiminīya Śrauta Sūtra*, 'was a Nambudiri brahman who lived in Kerala' and his father Mātṛadatta was spoken of highly by Daṇḍin, who lived around AD 700 (p. 700). If so, it is obvious why Kerala tradition of performing the *Agnicayan* should have been heavily influenced by the *Jaiminīya Śrauta-sūtra*, and not so much by others. This, however, raises the problem of regional traditions where each had its own authoritative *Śrauta-sūtra* and did not care if it differed even in important respects from what the other *Śrauta-sūtras* prescribed in the matter.

But, even if we leave aside the plurality of the *Śrauta-sūtras* and the existence even in them of the *Dvaidha-sūtras* along with the fact that

because of historical reasons some *Śrauta-sūtras* acquired a prepondering authority in some regions and not others, the practising *yājñika* could not have found much help from them at least on the basic issue as to what was to count as a *mantra*, for that was the issue of pivotal importance to him. The reason for this, according to Sāyaṇa, was that there is no single criterion or set of criteria for deciding what constitutes a *mantra* in the Vedic texts. According to him, 'It is a good definition to say that whatever the sacrificing priest calls a *mantra* is such'.[9] So the argument has turned full circle, and we are back from where we started. We had asked the *yājñika* to go to the mīmāṃsakas and the *Śrauta-sūtras* to learn his trade and perform the *yajña* properly, so that the desired fruit may be obtained. But the authorities on the text, or at least one of them, says in turn that they are the only ones who may decide in the matter.

So, was Prof. Dwivedi ultimately correct? Are the mīmāṃsakas and the *Śrauta* texts basically like the musicologists and their musical texts which, though interesting in themselves, are of little relevance to the performing musician? Is the *Yajña-śāstra* then, like Bharata's *Nāṭya Śāstra*, primarily a *prayoga-śāstra*? Isn't *Sāmaveda* an integral part of the Vedic corpus and is it not concerned with 'singing' where it is ultimately a matter of 'doing' or 'performing' and not 'knowing'? And, is it not a fact that in spite of all the emphasis on the preservation of *varṇānupūrvī* and *svarānupūrvī*, the *Sāma* singer had not only to have *anṛka Sāma*, that is *sāma* 'that had no *ṛk* base and was sung to meaningless syllables',[10] but also *stobha*, that is, 'improvisation' which goes against the whole spirit of preserving the Vedic text and the related ritual of *yajña* unchanged in any form whatsoever.

But perhaps the whole business of keeping the *śruti* intact was only a façade which did not deceive anyone in the tradition, as they *knew* that what was 'authoritative' for them was *only* that which was accepted and done within the *śākhā*, *saṁpradāya*, *pradeśa* or region and *kula* or family. That was the *śruti* for them and if others followed other traditions, that was the *śruti* for them. No conflict was seen between the two and no discomfort felt at the situation as it seemed to have developed. Some, of course, did, and like Jaimini, tried to straighten and regularize matters. But no practising *yājñika* seems to have taken the mīmāṃsakas seriously. And, as for Bādarāyaṇa, the various ācāryas who commented on the *Brahma-sūtra*, showed that his attempt to streamline the situation met with as little success as that of his other great counterpart, Jaimini, in the mainstream of the Vedic tradition. Perhaps the ethos of the tradition was too much against any rigid, uni-model, unique interpretation of truth to permit any such attempts at the understanding of *śruti* to last for long. And, in fact, the *śruti* had proclaimed both in its *Saṁhitā* and Upaniṣadic portions that it not only permitted, but *required* multiple interpretations. *Śruti* was like the *Brahman*, formless and every interpretation was an imposition on it, an *adhyāsa* or an *upādhi*, a subjective projection of the

interpreter who read into it what he generally thought to be most important and significant and meaningful in life and experience.

But while the concepts of *adhyāsa* and *upādhi* are negative, the *śruti's* own view of that was positive and was really captured not by Jaimini or Bādarāyaṇa, but by the author of the *Gītā* when he said—*ye yathā mām prapadyante tāṁsatathaiva bhājāmyaham*[11] and—*patraṁ puṣpaṁ phalaṁ toyaṁ ye me bhaktyā prayacchati.*[12] The freedom that this reconstruction of *śruti* restored to it after all the attempts of the *varṇāṇupūrvī, svarānupūrvī* and *kriyānupūrvī* schools to put in as straight a jacket as possible, has not been noticed by most students of the subject. Śaṅkara's attempt to reverse the trend and impose the negative interpretation of plurality did not succeed as the other ācāryas from Yāmuna onwards successfully challenged it. As for Jaimini's own attempt, the performing *yājñikas* had already taken over and they do not seem to have cared much for what the mīmāṃsaka theoreticians said in the matter.

Prof. Richard de Smet in an extremely ingenuous and subtle response to my earlier article on the subject,[13] has suggested that while Jaimini developed his doctrine of *apauruṣeyatva* in the context of the Buddhist and the Jaina criticisms of the Veda, the various ācāryas differed in their interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtras* because of the pre-theoretic 'interpretative' activities with respect to any text whatsoever. But he need not have gone to Gadamer for 'interpreting' the diversity in the interpretation of the *śruti* as, in the Indian context, the *śruti* itself is suppposed to proclaim and demand its multiple interpretation and, so to say, sanctions it through its own authority. Also, the very notion of 'text' and 'authorship' have undergone a serious questioning since Gadamer wrote and to ascribe today the multiple interpretations of a text to the diverse 'prejudices' of its interpreters is to assume that the 'text' has a determinate, unambiguous, fully actualized meaning of its own, an assumption which is highly questionable indeed.

As for the proposed genesis of the *apauruṣeyatva* hypothesis of Jaimini, there can be little doubt that it is highly interesting, though perhaps philosophically more relevant reasons may be found in Jaimini's insight that an 'ought-sentence' cannot be legitimized or grounded either in perception or inference and that ultimately one has to postulate a 'foundational' authority for all 'ought-sentences' from which they may derive their legitimacy, if infinite regress is to be avoided. Beyond these, Jaimini may even be credited with the insight, though there is little to support it in the actual text, that the postulation of any human or divine authority for the legitimization of moral imperatives would compromise their 'unconditionality' as the 'lawgiver' will always be superior to the law he gives. In fact, the philosophical insights and the arguments embedded in Mīmāṃsā and the different schools of Vedānta have to be disentangled from the specific contentions in the interest of which they were presumably first developed and which Prof. Smet has unjustifiably called

'pre-theoretical prejudices'. In fact, his own article makes a significant contribution in this direction.

The idea of *śruti* seems thus to be far more variegated and complex than the manner in which it has been understood in the light of the usual presentations of Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta up till now. It is time that we look at the way the idea of *śruti* has developed over this long period of time and the diverse 'uses' to which it has been put by different thinkers for their own purposes.

Notes and References

1. Fritz Staal, *Agni: The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1983. (See especially Preface and General Introduction).
2. Jan Gonda, *Vedic Literature*, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1975, p. 268.
3. *JICPR*, Vol. XI No. 1, p. 87. Italics author's.
4. Wilhelm Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*, State University of New York Press, 1991, pp. 131–204.
5. Ibid., p. 132.
6. Ibid.
7. *Bṛahdāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya*, III. 22.
8. It is interesting to find that Ānandagiri seems to be troubled by the question as to why Jabālā did not ask anybody else about the *gotra* of her son after his father's death, and suggests that it was due to *lajjā* or modesty on her part that she did not do so. The suggestion of course hardly makes sense unless one also assumes that there were no women members left on both sides of the family from whom modesty would not have prevented her to find the truth.

   The twists and turns of later commentators on the issue are a fascinating example of how human ingenuity is used to hide from oneself and others the unpleasant truth if it is found in a supposedly sacred revealed text. One extreme instance of this is when the guru's praise of the boy for speaking the truth in such a matter is taken to confirm the denial of the access of *śruti* on the part of the *śūdras*, forgetting that if the guru's utterance in this context is taken in the way the learned commentator wants us to take, then the access to this *śruti* will have to be confined to brahmins and brahmins alone and denied to all the other *varṇas*, including the kṣatriyas and the vaiśyas.

   Those interested in knowing these 'twists and turns' at first hand may see the original *Bhāṣya* on *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* by Śaṅkara along with the commentaries of Narendra Purī and Ānandagiri and notes by R. Subramannya Śāstri, Varanasi, Mahesh Research Institute, 1982, pp. 140-41.
9. *Sāyaṇa's Preface to the Ṛgveda Bhāśya* tr., Peter Peterson, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1974, p. 44.
10. Mukund Lath, 'Ancient Indian Music and the Concept of Man', *NCPA Quarterly Journal*, Vol. VII, No. 223, June–Sept, 1982, p. 5.
11. *Gītā*, 4.11. Also see 7.21.
12. *Gītā*. 9.26.
13. Richard de Smet, 'The Presuppositions of Jaimini and the Vedāntins', *JICPR*, Vol. XI. No. 2.

Survey Article

The Deflationary View of Truth

JERRY KAPUS

We want people to tell us the truth. We think that believing the truth helps us to achieve our goals. In more philosophical moments, we read statements such as:

> The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world. (Wittgenstein, 1922, 3.01)
>
> The realist believes that the truth or falsity of our sentences depends (usually) on something external—i.e. on facts which are not (logically equivalent to) experiential facts, facts which are not about sensations (or about language rules, etc.). (Putnam, 1978, p. 113)
>
> The reliability (instrumental or theoretical) of scientific methods at a given time will typically be explicable only on the assumption that the existing theoretical beliefs which form the background for its operations are (in relevant respects) approximately true. (Boyd, 1980, pp. 617–18)

What is the role of the concept of truth in the above cases? Initially, it appears that the concept of truth has an explanatory role, e.g. we are successful *because* our beliefs are true. A proponent of this view typically holds that the explanatory role of truth requires that the concept be analysed as a property of beliefs which ties these beliefs to the world. This is one motivation for the traditional correspondence theory of truth. By a *substantive* view of truth let us mean a view which claims that the concept of truth has a significant role in various philosophical issues, (e.g. realism, semantics, explanations of success) and that accounting for this role requires an analysis of the nature of truth in metaphysical or epistemic terms (e.g. correspondence or coherence). Traditionally, philosophers have accepted the idea that the concept of truth carries with it significant metaphysical and epistemological consequences.

Recently, various philosophers have challenged the idea that truth is a substantive notion. They are found saying things such as:

> Truth is useful, we may say, as a device of (what Quine calls) *disquotation.* Notice, however, that to recognize the utility and naturalness, for each language, of its own disquotation device, is not at all to provide a theory of truth of the sort we have been seeking. To explain the utility of disquotation, we need say nothing about the relations between language and the world, we do not have to give a natural definition—indeed, any definition—of 'true-in-L' for arbitrary L, we need not assign to one

referential relation an important role which we assign to no other. (Leeds, 1987, p. 122)

What does seem right about Tarski's approach is its deflationist character.... Truth is a useful notion, but it is not the key to what there is, or to how we represent the world to ourselves through language. (Soames, 1984, p. 429)

Unlike most other predicates, 'is true' is not used to attribute to certain entities (i.e., statements, beliefs, etc.) an ordinary sort of property—a characteristic whose underlying nature will account for its relations to other ingredients of reality. Therefore, unlike most other predicates, 'is true' should not be expected to participate in some deep theory of that to which it refers—a theory that goes beyond a specification of what the word means. Thus, its assimilation to superficially similar expressions is misleading. The role of truth is not what it seems. In fact the truth predicate exists solely for the sake of a certain logical need. (Horwich, 1990, p. 2)

The position represented by these philosophers has come to be called the *deflationary* view of truth.[1] The deflationary view is characterized by the following claims:

D1) The concept of truth does not have a significant role in philosophical issues.
D2) The utility of the truth predicate for a language consists mainly in its being a device for expressing infinite conjunctions and disjunctions.[2]

For a deflationist, the truth predicate has a purely logical role. It adds expressive power to a language. The utility of the truth predicate does not depend on its denoting a property of any kind, but rather, its utility rests in the fact that it allows us to express infinite conjunctions and disjunctions. This account of the utility of the truth predicate is made plausible by the *disquotational, minimal,* and *prosentential* theories of truth.[3] Each of these theories leads naturally to deflationism.

The aim of this aticle is to provide an overview of the deflationary view of truth. In section I, I present the basic idea of the disquotational and minimal theories. Section II provides an account of the prosentential theory and the deflationary view of the utility of the truth predicate. In section III, I explicate deflationary treatments of two philosophical issues, meaning and explanation of success. The final section surveys criticisms of the deflationary view of truth.

I

The disquotational theory and Horwich's (1990) closely related minimal theory are motivated by Quine's claim that the truth predicate is a device of disquotation:

The truth predicate is a reminder that, despite a technical ascent to talk of sentences, our eye is on the world. This cancellatory force of the truth predicate is explicit in Tarski's paradigm:

'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.

Quotation marks make all the difference between talking about words and talking about snow. The quotation is a name of a sentence that contains a name, namely 'snow', of snow. By calling the sentence true, we call snow white. The truth predicate is a device of disquotation. We may affirm the single sentence by just uttering it unaided by quotation or by the truth predicate; but if we want to affirm some infinite lot of sentences that we can demarcate only by talking about the sentences, then the truth predicate has its use. We need it to restore the effect of objective reference when for the sake of some generalization we have resorted to semantic ascent. (Quine, 1970, p. 12)

These comments by Quine suggest that the sentence

(1) 'Snow is white' is true,

is equivalent in meaning to

(2) Snow is white.

Why is this claim plausible?

If we look at the work of those deflationists who take truth as a disquotational device, then what we are given in explanation of this device are references to Tarski's work on truth, the T-biconditionals, or a 'disquotation schema'.[4] For Tarski, a definition of truth should capture the intuition that if a person asserts '"Snow is white" is true', then he should be willing to assert 'Snow is white'; and conversely. In this particular case the intuition can be formulated as

(3) 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.

Sentences such as (3) are called T-biconditionals. We can see why Tarski placed such emphasis on the T-biconditionals if we view the T-biconditionals as capturing both the extensional and intensional aspects of the concept of truth. Although Tarski did not talk about the T-biconditionals in this manner, he did regard them as partial definitions of truth. Why should the T-biconditionals be taken as such partial definitions?

Consider (3) again. If the facts are such that snow is white then (3) correctly places the sentence 'Snow is white' in the extension of 'true'. If snow is not white then (3) correctly withholds 'Snow is white' from the extension of 'true'. Extensional correctness, though, does not guarantee intensional correctness. The acceptability of the T-biconditionals as partial definitions of truth appears plausible when we come to see that they not only fix the extension of truth but also the intension of this notion. To clarify this idea let us use the metaphor of possible worlds. Consider a set of possible worlds in which the colour of snow varies

between worlds. In each world, (3) correctly determines whether or not 'Snow is white' belongs to the extension of 'true' in that world.[5] These observations might be taken to suggest that (3) is necessarily true in virtue of its meaning and that (1) and (2) are equivalent in meaning.[6]

Generalizing the above remarks, a definition of 'true-in-L' for a language L would be extensionally and intensionally correct if the definition implied a T-biconditional for each sentence of L. This idea is expressed in Tarski's Convention-T. Convention-T can be loosely stated as requiring that a formally correct definition of truth for a language L (the object language), given in a language L' (the meta-language), have as consequences:

(i) for each sentence of L a biconditional of the form

$$Tx \text{ iff } p$$

where 'T' = 'is true-in-L', 'x' is a standard name (e.g. quotation mark name) of a sentence in L, and 'p' is a translation of the sentence into L'

(ii) $$(\forall x)(Tx \supset Sx)$$

where 'S' = 'is a sentence of L'.

It is the prominence which Tarski gives to Convention-T that in speaking of the T-biconditionals he says, in addition to formal correctness, nothing more is to be demanded of a definition of truth than that it 'include all partial definitions of this type as special cases; it should be, so to speak, their logical product.' (Tarski, 1956, p. 187.) This comment suggests that a definition of 'true-in-L' is essentially equivalent to the conjunction of all the T-biconditionals for L. When L contains an infinite number of sentences we cannot simply list the logical product of the T-biconditionals. In this case, Tarski has shown us how to construct a definition which meets Convention-T, and so implies all the T-biconditionals for L. The definition is to be viewed as a device for expressing the infinite conjunction of T-biconditionals.

The disquotational theory derives its plausibility from Tarski's work at two points: it takes the extensional and intensional correctness of the T-biconditionals as indicating an equivalence in meaning between sentences such as (1) and (2); it views the definition of truth for L as essentially equivalent to the conjunction of all the T-biconditionals for L. It should be noted that Tarski's definition does not involve a reduction of truth to any sort of substantive language/world connections, e.g. truth is not defined in terms of causal connections that obtain between the speaker's use of a language and extra-linguistic objects.[7] As Etchemendy (1988) points out, on a Tarskian definition of truth, a T-biconditional such as (3) follows simply from facts of syntax, logic, and set theory.[8] The truth predicate is not to be taken as expressing some property of sentences. In the absence of defining truth as a property requiring a significant metaphysical or epistemic analysis, it is difficult to see how truth can have a substantive role. Tarski's theory is to be viewed as a disquotational theory of truth.

The basic idea of Horwich's minimal theory of truth is straightforward. The minimal theory consists of the infinite conjunction of 'uncontroversial instances' of the equivalence schema

(E) It is true that p if and only if p.

The minimal theory is similar to the disquotational theory in that it takes the infinite conjunction of the instances of (E) to provide a complete account of the meaning of truth. Unlike the disquotational theory, the minimal theory takes truth as primarily applying to propositions rather than sentences. For those who hold that truth primarily applies to utterances, Horwich also provides a minimalist theory for these cases. The minimal theory of truth for utterances consists of all instances of the schema

(D-tr) u is true if and only if p.

where 'u' is replaced by a name of an utterance and 'p' is replaced by a sentence of our language which in our context translates u.

The deflationary implications of the minimal theory follow from Horwich's claims that the minimal theory provides a complete account of our understanding of truth and that it provides an adequate explanation of all the facts concerning truth. On the minimal theory, our understanding of the truth predicate depends on our disposition to accept, without evidence, any instance of (E). Thus, our understanding of truth does not depend on metaphysical or epistemic notions since such notions do not enter into the instances of (E). It may seem that even if such notions do not play a role in the instances of (E), the minimal theory could possibly be explained by a deeper account of truth. Horwich rejects this suggestion since he takes the instances of (E) to hold by stipulation and so to be a priori. In this case, truth is not susceptible of an a posteriori explanation such as might be provided by a naturalistic reduction of truth. If the minimal theory does provide an adequate explanation of all the facts concerning truth, then, given the structure of the minimal theory, the claim that truth is a significant notion is mistaken.

While the disquotational and minimal theories differ in the logical resources employed in their analysis of truth, each of these theories maintains a strong equivalence in meaning between sentences such as (1) and (2). It is this aspect of these theories which leads to the deflationary claim that truth does not have a significant role in philosophical debates. This last point is examined in more detail in section III.

II

The prosentential theory (Grover, Camp, and Belnap, 1975) can be taken as fleshing out Ramsey's redundancy theory of truth. Concerning

the analysis of truth, Ramsey says:

> [T]here is really no separate problem of truth but merely a linguistic muddle. Truth and falsity are ascribed primarily to propositions. The proposition to which they are ascribed may be either explicitly given or described. Suppose first that it is explicitly given; then it is evident that 'It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered. They are phrases which we sometimes use for emphasis or for stylistic reason, or to indicate the position occupied by the statement in our argument. (Ramsey, 1927, p. 157)

This quote from Ramsey suggests that the sentences

(4) It is true that Caesar was murdered,

and

(5) Caesar was murdered,

are equivalent in meaning. Ramsey' s treatment of these sentences hints at a simple translation procedure for eliminating what he takes to be semantically redundant ascriptions of truth to a proposition. The procedure is as follows: For any proposition p, to which 'is true' is applied substitutes the proposition p itself. Ramsey's claim is that the translation procedure preserves semantic content. The claim is supported by comparing the content of the propositions expressed by (4) and (5). This simple translation procedure, though, can be directly applied only in those cases where truth is ascribed to a proposition that is explicitly stated. We should view this procedure as at best a guideline as to how truth-free translations are to be carried out. More importantly, we should view this guideline as encapsulating the idea that ascriptions of truth to a proposition are semantically redundant, Ramsey recognizes that the above translation procedure applies directly only to a limited number of cases.

Ramsey's redundancy theory does not provide an explicit definition of 'is true' in the sense that we can formulate a definition of the form:

(6) p is true iff . . . .

where the right hand side of the definition contains a single expression giving the meaning of 'is true'. What Ramsey attempts to do is to illustrate through examples how the part of English that contains 'is true' can be translated into a truth-free fragment of English. The truth-free fragment of English, though, does not contain any one expression that gives the meaning of 'is true'. In this sense 'is true,' according to Ramsey, is an incomplete symbol.

A problem arises for Ramsey's approach when we look at ascriptions of truth to propositions which are not explicitly stated but only described, e.g. cases involving quantification. Consider

(7) Everything Oliver says is true.

Using quantifiers and the usual logical connectives we might attempt to translate (7) as

(8) For all p, if Oliver says that p then p

The problem is that for natural languages, grammatically correct readings of sentences involving propositional variables require that these variables be attached to predicates.[9] In this case, propositional variables would no longer occupy sentential positions (positions which take sentences as substituends but rather they would occupy nominal positions. Propositional quantification would be construed as a kind of restricted individual quantification (the individuals being propositions and the substituends of the variables being names or descriptions of these propositions).

Consider

(9) $(\forall x)$ (x is human $\supset$ x is mortal).

This is read into English as

(10) For any individual, if it is human then it is mortal.

We obtain (10) from (9) by replacing the first occurrence of 'x' with a common noun and the other occurrences by the pronoun 'it'. In general, readings of sentences involving individual quantification into English are accomplished through the use of common nouns and pronouns.

Consider (8) again. (8) suggests that propositional variables occupy sentential positions and take sentences as substituends. How are we to read (8) in English? If we use the devices suggested for individual quantification, then we obtain

(11) For any proposition, if Oliver says that it, then it.

Grammatically correct use of pronouns requires that pronouns be attached to predicates to form sentences. (11) is ungrammatical since the occurrences of 'it' are not joined to any predicates. The difficulty is that, other than using pronouns and thinking of propositional quantification along the lines of individual quantification, there seems to be no other way of giving readings of these sentences into English. If propositional quantification is to be given grammatically correct readings in English, then propositional variables will have to be viewed as terms which are attached to predicates. The predicate which naturally suggests itself for (11) is 'is true'. This gives us

(12) For any proposition, if Oliver says that it is true, then it is true.

(12) is read back into our semi-formal language as

(13) (∀p) (Oliver says that p is true ⊃ p is true).

The result of these considerations is that the Ramsey translations cannot be carried through for sentences such as (7) since (8) is ungrammatical.

Ramsey recognizes this objection and responds to it by quantifying over the forms of propositions. He states:

> But suppose we put it thus 'For all p, if he assert p, p is true', then we see that the propositional function p is true is simply the same as p, as e.g. its value 'Caesar was murdered is true' is the same as 'Caesar was murdered'. In English we have to add 'is true' to give the sentence a verb, forgetting that 'p' already contains a (variable) verb. This may perhaps be made clearer by supposing for a moment that only one form of proposition is in question, say the relational form aRb; then 'He is always right' could be expressed by 'For all a, R, b, if he asserts aRb, then aRb', to which 'is true' would be an obviously superfluous addition. When all forms of proposition are included the analysis is more complicated but not essentially different . . . (Ramsey, 1927 p. 158)

This response is unhelpful when the number of forms of propositions is infinite. In this case a recursive characterization of the forms of propositions would have to be given. Ramsey's remarks provide no clue as to how this characterization is to be carried out. It is this problem which provides the motivation for the prosentential theory.[10]

Grover, Camp and Belnap's (GCB) prosentential theory of truth maintains the spirit of Ramsey's redundancy view while offering a solution to the problem of providing grammatical readings of sentences involving propositional quantification.[11] We saw above that common nouns and pronouns were utilized to give readings in English of sentences involving individual quantification. Pronouns allow for cross-referencing. Common nouns are used to determine an appropriate set of substituends for the pronouns. In (10) the occurrences of 'it' acquire a set of substituends by their anaphoric relationship to the occurrence of the expression 'any individual'.

To clarify these points, consider the following example:

(14) Dan is in trouble but he will not resign.

In (14) the pronoun 'he' is related to the occurrence of 'Dan' in such a way that 'he' acquires the same referent as 'Dan'. When a pronoun is used as in (14) it is said to be used anaphorically. The word or phrase to which the pronoun is connected is called its antecedent. In cases involving quantification, the relationship between an anaphor and its antecedent differs from that in (14). In (10), if we take the antecedent of 'it' to be 'any individual', then simple substitution of the antecedent for the anaphors gives

(10.1) If any individual is human then any individual is mortal.

Besides being awkward, (10.1) introduces a problem since it could plausibly be read as implying

(10.2) If Bill is human then Joan is mortal.

In these cases the anaphor does not acquire a unique referent from its antecedent since the antecedents are not referring expressions. What the antecedents do determine is an appropriate set of substitution instances for the anaphors, and the anaphors can be thought of as acquiring this set from the antecedent. For example, an appropriate substitution instance of (10) is

(10.3) If Dan is human then Dan is mortal.

In quantificational cases, the anaphoric use of pronouns allows us to see that it is the same individual that is talked about in different parts of a sentence. Common nouns are used to determine an appropriate set of substitution instances for the sentence and pronouns are used to achieve cross-referencing. As remarked previously, the problem for propositional quantification is that these devices lead us to construe propositional variables as terms.

Based on these considerations, it seems that if an analysis of propositional quantification is to be found which does not construe propositional variables as terms, then we need expressions which are capable of anaphoric uses but, unlike pronouns, are not terms. We need expressions which can stand in for sentences in the way that pronouns stand in for proper names or definite description. These expressions are prosentences. Prosentences are characterized as follows:

(A) Prosentences can occupy the position of a declarative sentence.
(B) Prosentences can be used anaphorically in the ways described above.
(C) Prosentences, when used anaphorically, have an antecedent from which they derive an anaphoric substituend or a family of anaphoric substituends (quantificational cases). The substituends are sentences.
(D) Prosentences are 'generic' in that in one use or another any declarative sentence might be an anaphoric substituend.

As an alternative to the standard subject-predicate analysis of 'x is true' GCB suggest that 'is true' is to be analysed grammatically as part of a pro-sentence.[12] The suggestion is that, 'that is true' and 'it is true' are anaphoric pro-sentences. It should be emphasized that it is the whole expression 'that is true' or 'it is true' which is the anaphor. 'Is true' is not to be taken as a predicate attached to an anaphoric use of 'that' or 'it'. The suggestion is supported by checking the use of these expressions against the previously mentioned criteria for prosentences. It is noted

that 'that is true' and 'it is true' occupy sentential positions and can be used anaphorically. These expressions acquire the content of their antecedent or, in quantificational cases, an appropriate set of substitution instances. Furthermore, they are generic in the sense that any declarative sentence could play the role of an anaphoric substituend.

Let us look at some examples to get the flavour of these points.

Bill: Dan is in trouble.
Joan: That is true but he will not resign.

In this case Joan's use of 'that is true' has Bill's comment as its antecedent. It acquires its content from this antecedent. Our previous example involving propositional quantification goes as follows:

(7.1) For any proposition, if Oliver says that it is true, then it is true.

In (7.1) 'it is true' has 'any proposition' as its antecedent and acquires from it an appropriate set of substituends. The substituends are sentences. As an instance of (7.1) we have

(7.2) If Oliver says that he is not guilty then he is not guilty.

In the prosentential theory all ordinary truth talk is taken as involving prosentential uses of 'true'. The prosentential theory provides a development of Ramsey's views while preserving the claim that truth talk is not about a property of propositions, sentences, etc. It is important to notice that, as in the case of the disquotational and minimal theories, the prosentential theory does not analyse truth in terms of language/word connections. 'True' is analysed as a prosentence formig predicate rather than as a predicate which expresses some property. On the pro-sentential theory, truth cannot have a substantial role in philosophical debates since the truth predicate does not have a property ascribing role.

If either the disquotational, minimal, or prosentential theory provides a complete account of the meaning of truth, for what purpose do we need the truth predicate? For each of these theories the response is that the truth predicate is primarily useful as a logical device for expressing generalizations, in particular, for expressing infinite conjunctions and disjunction.

The utility of the truth predicate becomes apparent when we need to express some infinite number of sentences. Since we cannot express an infinite number of sentences by simply listing them, we need some device which allows us to achieve the same effect. On the disquotational theory, the truth predicate is such a device. By ascending to talk of the truth of sentences we can express infinite conjunctions and disjunctions such as

(15) Every sentence of the form 'p or not p' is true.

Although the truth predicate is not eliminable from (15), its disquotational role is revealed when we consider particular instances such as

(15.1) 'Snow is white or snow is not white' is true.

On the disquotational theory, (15.1) is equivalent in meaning to

(15.2) Snow is white or snow is not white.

The move from (15.1) to (15.2) is legitimized by the T-biconditional for (15.2).

The truth predicate is also useful for expressing generalizations such as (7). The disquotational analysis of

(7) Everything Oliver says is true,

treats (7) as having the logical form of

(7.1) For every x, if Oliver says x then x is true.

where the variables range over a domain of closed sentences. As an instance of (7.1) we have

(7.2) If Oliver says 'Dan is a key defence witness' then 'Dan is a key defence witness' is true.

In this case the occurrence of 'is true' can be eliminated by substitution of the equivalent sentence, 'Dan is a key defence witness' in the consequent of (7.2). This equivalence is reflected in the T-biconditional for 'Dan is a key defence witness'. A deflationist can account for the utility of the truth predicate by claiming that it consists mainly in its being a device for expressing certain generalizations. The disquotational theory shows how the truth predicate can be used in this way.[13]

A deflationist also can appeal to the prosentential theory to account for the utility of truth. In fact, the prosentential theory is motivated by the problem of providing coherent readings for generalizations involving propositional quantifiers. On the prosentential account, (15) is expressed as

(16) For every proposition, either it is true or it is not true.

In (16) the truth predicate functions as a constituent of a prosentential construction which acquires an appropriate set of substituends from its antecedent. For example, (15.2) follows as an instance of (16).[14]

It should be noted that on the disquotational, minimal, and prosentential theories truth is not analysed in metaphysical or epistemic terms. Further, each of these theories claims to provide a complete account of the meaning of truth. If these claims are correct, the possibility of a deeper analysis of truth is precluded. If truth has a substantial role in philosophical issues, though, it is typically thought that an account of this role requires a deeper analysis of truth in metaphysical or epistemic terms. In the absence of any such analysis it is difficult to see how truth could have a substantial role. The disquotational, minimal, and prosentential theories lead naturally to the deflationary view of truth.

III

The concept of truth appears frequently in philosophical debates. In these debates truth appears to play a significant role. The deflationary view of truth denies that truth can play such a role. In this section, I present deflationary treatments of two issues with which truth is thought to play a substantial role, meaning and explanation of success.

Truth is held by many philosophers to be the central concept in the theory meaning. If any of the theories presented above are correct, it seems that truth cannot play this central role. The incompatibility of regarding the T-biconditionals as fixing the meaning of truth along with taking truth as the key notion in a general theory of meaning was first brought out by Dummett (1959).[15]

Concerning this incompatibility, Dummett says:

> [I]n order that someone should gain from the explanation that P is true in such-and-such circumstances an understanding of the sense of P, he must already know what it means to say of P that it is true. If when he enquires into this he is told that the only explanation is that to say that P is true is the same as to assert P it will follow that in order to understand what is meant by saying that P is true, he must already know the sense of asserting P, which was precisely what was supposed to be being explained to him. (Dummett, 1959, p. 148)

Dummett's point is that if the T-biconditionals are used to explain the meaning of 'true' then truth cannot be used to give a general account of meaning since our understanding of the T-biconditionals presupposes a prior understanding of the meaning of the rest of our language. Deflationism concerning the connection between truth and meaning follows immediately on this view.

It seems that the only option open to the deflationist for providing a general account of meaning rests in some sort of use theory of meaning. This point is explicitly embraced by Horwich:

> [W]hile understanding a sentence does indeed usually *coincide* with an explicit knowledge of its truth condition, understanding does not *consist* in such knowledge. It consists, rather, in understanding the sentence's constituent words and syntactic structure, which, in turn, consists in knowing their contribution to the proper use (including the assertability conditions) of all the sentences in which these ingredients occur. (Horwich, 1990, p. 72)

If the deflationary view of truth correct then it is easy to show that the truth conditional approach to explaining meaning is mistaken.[16]

Field (1972) argues that the usefulness of the notion of truth suggests that a naturalistic reduction of this notion is required in order to give a proper analysis of truth. He bases his claim on an analogy to the concept of valence in chemistry. Just as the usefulness of valence in chemistry gave us reason to expect a naturalistic reduction of this notion, so the usefulness of truth gives us reason to expect a naturalistic reduction of truth. Leeds (1978) argues that Field's analogy fails to hold. He points out that what gave us reason to expect a naturalistic reduction of the concept of valence was not simply its utility but that the concept was used in stating the law of valences. The analogy to the concept of valence fails to hold since there are no analogous laws of truth. Further, Leeds argues that almost all of the utility of the truth predicate can be accounted for by its role as a disquotational device. In response to Leeds, Putnam (1978) appears to supply the analogous laws of truth:

(17) The laws of a mature science are usually, approximately true.

(18) True beliefs about how to attain our goals tend to lead to success.

Both of these generalizations suggest that truth has a significant role in explaining distinct types of success. The first generalization explains the predictive reliability of mature theories in science. The second generalization explains how our beliefs contribute to our practical success.

Deflationists argue that Putnam's generalizations do not provide truth with a causal-explanatory role, but rather, 'true' is being used in its logical role for expressing generalizations. In response to the claim that the truth of a scientific theory explains its predictive success, Horwich argues that:

> Clearly, any explanation whatsoever may be reformulated in such a way that the word 'true' makes an appearance. If the statement 'P' was involved, one can simply replace it with 'p is true'—to the same explanatory effect. But *truth* does not thereby obtain causal power. For example, what accounts for the Michelson-Morley experiment is that the speed of light is absolute. Of course, one might say that the experiment is explained by the *truth* of Einstein's Principle; but this is not to attribute causal efficacy to the property of being true. Any explanations of the instrumental success of our theories should be located within those very theories; and though any such explanation may be converted into one which employs a truth-predicate, the property of *being true* will not contribute anything of explanatory value. (Horwich, 1982, p. 193)

For Horwich, Putnam's use of 'true' can be seen as an expressive convenience, but it does not supply truth with a substantive explanatory role.

Horwich (1990) also rejects the claim that a substantial notion of truth is needed to explain why true beliefs tend to lead to success. For example, Horwich explains Bill's success at getting a beer in the following way. Bill wants a beer, and he believes that if he nods then he will get a beer. Bill's belief together with his desire for a beer causes him to nod. Furthermore,

Bill's belief is true. Given the appropriate instance of the T-binconditional for Bill' s belief,

> (19) 'If Bill nods then he will get a beer' is true if Bill nods then he will get a beer,

we can infer that if Bill nods then he will get a beer. Since Bill nodded, he was successful at getting a beer. For Horwich, this is a complete explanation of Bill's success. We do not need a deeper analysis of truth beyond that given in (19).

Williams (1986) also rejects the claim that the concept of truth has a substantive role in explaining how our beliefs contribute to our success. In response to Putnam, he says:

> If I want a cold drink and believe that the refrigerator, rather than the oven, is the place to look, I will increase the likelihood of getting what I want. This is because cold drinks are more likely to be found in the refrigerator than in the oven. To say that my having true beliefs makes it more likely that I will attain my goals is just a compact way of pointing to the indefinite number of mundane facts of this sort. It involves nothing so arcane as a physical correspondence theory of truth. (Williams, 1986, p. 232)

For Williams, the truth predicate provides an expressive convenience. What explains our success is our beliefs together with the environmental facts.

For the deflationist, truth does not have a significant role in philosophical disputes. The concept of truth is not needed in an account of meaning, in explaining the success of science, nor in explaining how our beliefs contribute to attaining our goals. When 'true' does occur in these disputes, its role can be accounted for in terms of its utility for expressing generalizations. If we start from the position that either the disquotational, minimal, or prosentential theory provides a complete account of the meaning of truth then this deflationist conclusion is not surprising.

IV

In this section I present what I take to be the main weaknesses in the deflationary view of truth. The deflationary claim that either the disquotational, minimal, or prosentential theory furnishes a complete account of truth faces serious difficulties. The adequacy of the disquotational theory is called into question by Anil Gupta (1994).[17]

Gupta identifies the following four theses as central components of the disquotational theory:

The Disquotation Thesis: The truth predicate is a device of disquotation.
The Infinite Conjunction Thesis: The truth predicate allows us to express certain infinite conjunctions and disjunctions.
The Generalization Thesis: The truth predicate allows us to generalize over sentence positions using variables that are pronominal.
The Connection Thesis: The truth predicate has its expressive functions in virtue of its being a device of disquotation.

The disquotation thesis follows from the claim that the T-biconditionals fix the meaning of truth. It should be noted that this reading of the T-biconditionals is much stronger than the claim that the T-biconditionals are true or that they are necessarily true. The disquotational claim is that the T-biconditionals capture completely our understanding of the meaning of truth. It is in virtue of this strong reading of the T-biconditionals that the disquotationalist can claim that sentences such as (1) and (2) are equivalent in meaning. Gupta also points out that the deflationary claims derived from the disquotational theory requires that the expressive functions of the truth predicate be read in a strong manner. For example, the infinite conjunction thesis should not be read as merely claiming that a sentence such as (15) is materially equivalent to the infinite conjunction of its instances, but rather, it should be read as claiming that the equivalence between (15) and the infinite conjunction of its instances is very strong.

Gupta argues that on the strong reading of the expressive functions of the truth predicate both the connection thesis and the infinite conjunction thesis are false. The strong reading of both of these theses requires that we understand a universal statement as having the same sense as the conjunction of its instances. This requirement, though, fails to hold. Consider the following example:

> (20) All people are mortal.
> (21) Betty is mortal and Bill is mortal and . . . etc.

Clearly, (20) and (21) differ in content. A person could grasp the meaning of (20) without knowing which individuals, in particular, are mortal. Also, a person could understand (21) without knowing that (20) follows since (21) does not explicitly tell us that it contains a conjunct for each person. Further, (20) carries implications concerning counterfactual situations that are not contained in (21). The connection thesis and the infinite conjunction thesis cannot be maintained on the strong reading of these theses.

Gupta also argues that the central claim of the disquotational theory, the disquotation thesis, is false. The disquotation thesis rests on the claim that the meaning of the truth predicate is exhausted by the infinite conjunction of the T-biconditionals. The problem with this view, Gupta argues, is that an understanding of 'true' would require excessive conceptual resources. For example, a complete understanding of the meaning of 'true' would require a grasp of the following biconditional

(22) 'Electrons have negative charge' is true if and only if electrons have negative charge.

In this case, a grasp of the partial definition of 'true' given in (22) involves understanding the concepts of electron and negative charge. For Gupta, the ideology of a definition consists of all the concepts occurring in the definiens of a definition, and the ideology of a term consists of all those concepts that are necessary and sufficient for a complete grasp of the meaning of the term. A definition intended to give the sense of a term should be such that the ideology of the definition matches the ideology of the term. If the totality of T-biconditionals capture the sense of 'true' then a grasp of the total ideology of the T-biconditionals is required for a complete understanding of 'true'. Gupta points out, though, that it is possible to have a complete understanding of 'true' even if one fails to possess the concepts of electron and negative charge. The T-biconditionals should be rejected as an account of the meaning of truth since the ideology of the T-biconditionals fails to match the ideology of 'true'.[18]

In response to the above objection, a disquotationalist might claim that it is not the particular T-biconditionals that capture the meaning of truth, but rather, the meaning of truth is explained by the form of the T-biconditionals,

(T) '___' is true if and only if ___.

Gupta considers the possibility that the disquotationalist might explain the meaning of truth in terms of the general fact that

(GT) All instances of the form T are true.

He rejects this approach since (GT) presupposes the notion of truth that it is intended to explain. In addition, the particular T-biconditionals cannot be derived from (GT), and so the disquotationalist will not be able to exploit the particular T-biconditionals to support their deflationary claims.[19]

An alternative move that the disquotationalist might make is discussed by Putnam (1983, 1991). Putnam considers the possibility that a disquotationalist might explain the meaning of truth by claiming that

(AT) All instances of the form T are assertible.

The difficulty with this approach is that we lack any kind of an account of assertability conditions. Further, Putnam argues that the notion of an assertability condition seems to presuppose a substantive notion of truth. Consider an utterance such as 'There is a chair in front of me.' The conditions under which this utterance is warrantedly assertible would need to include the condition that in front of me there is a chair. We could not restrict the assertability conditions to there seeming to be a chair in front of me without moving in the direction of some sort of sense-datum language. In this case, the assertibility conditions are sufficient for the truth of the statement. As Putnam points out, the distinction between assertability conditions and truth conditions begins to collapse.

It remains open to draw out the divergence between assertability conditions and truth conditions in the case of theoretical statements. For theoretical statements it is easier to see that assertability conditions are more like rules of confirmation rather than truth conditions. Putnam rejects this approach. On this view it follows that any change in the confirmation conditions for an utterance indicates a change in the meaning of the utterance. Our words and utterances, though, do not change their meaning in this way. This problem could be overcome if we could distinguish between changes in confirmation conditions which represent changes in meaning and those which represent changes in our factual beliefs. For Putnam, drawing this distinction requires an objective notion of rightness of judging the appropriate changes in confirmation conditions.[20] Williams (1984) suggests that an appropriate standard of rightness can be grounded in a notion of reform that is guided by satisfying our interests. For Putnam, this amounts to taking the aim of science to be prediction and control. Although he thinks that this may be an acceptable view for understanding applied science, it provides us with too narrow an understanding of most of the human languages. Putnam suggests that an adequate notion of objective rightness incorporates a substantial notion of truth.[21]

The above criticisms of the disquotational theory also extend to Horwich's minimal theory.[22] Horwich's strong reading of the expressive functions of the truth predicate fail to hold. Since the minimal theory consists of the infinite conjunction of the instances of the equivalence schema, it involves an unacceptable reliance on excessive conceptual resources. Also, it is unclear that Horwich can provide an adequate account of a use theory of meaning that does not rely on a substantive notion of truth. In addition to these problems, Gupta (1993) argues that Horwich's claim that the minimal theory explains all the facts about truth is false. He points out that the minimal theory faces difficulty in explaining such basic facts as

(23) The moon is not true.
(24) If one proposition (materially) implies another, and the first one is true, then so is the second.

The minimal theory fails to explain (23) since it does not tell us that only propositions are true, and it does not allow us to deduce (24) since the minimal theory does not tell us that it contains a biconditional for every proposition.

Gupta considers two possible responses to the above objection. The first response claims that (23) and (24) can be explained by the minimal theory plus our other theories. For example, the suggestion is that (24)

can be explained by the minimal theory together with our theory of implication. This suggestion is insufficient since in order to formulate the general facts concerning implication, the theory of implication would have to contain (24) itself. The second response would be to add to the minimal theory propositions such as

(25) The minimal theory contains a biconditional for every proposition.

Gupta argues that this response is unpromising. It is not clear what additional principles would have to be added to the minimal theory in order to sustain the claim that the minimal theory explains all the facts about truth. Also, the addition of further principles to the minimal theory undercuts the claim that the meaning of truth can be given a simple account in terms of the instances of the equivalence schema. Both the disquotational and minimal theories encounter serious problems in explaining the meaning of truth.

The pro-sentential claim that 'true' is semantically redundant follows from the grammatical ties that a pro-sentence has with that antecedent. In this case, the question of whether 'true' is semantically redundant amounts to the question of what evidence there is for accepting the claim that 'It is true' function as prosentences. Kent Wilson (1990) presents evidence from English syntax for rejecting this proposal. The motivation for his argument rests on the idea that the syntactic and semantic constituents of a sentence should roughly parallel each other.

GCB discuss the following case:

(26) John: Some dogs eat glass. Bill: I believe it.
Mary: You believe it, but it's not true.

GCB agree that both occurrences of 'it' in Mary's utterance should be treated in a uniform manner. They acknowledge that if 'it' in 'You believe it' is a separately referring pronoun then it has a proposition as its referent. In this case, the second occurrence of 'it' in Mary's utterance should be treated in a similar manner. The occurrence of 'true' will then have to be analysed as a predicate that denotes a property applied to a proposition rather than as a constituent of a prosentence. GCB responds to this problem by suggesting that sentences such as 'You believe it' be treated semantically as 'You-believe-that it is true', where 'You-believe that' is taken as a non-truth functional connective attached to a pro-sentence.

Wilson argues that evidence from English syntax does not support this proposal. Consider

(27) Bill believes that some dogs eat glass.

The standard approach is to treat such sentences as having a grammatical constituent, 'that some dogs eat glass'. There is syntactic evidence for taking (27) to have this structure. For example, the rule of passive

transformation interchanges the subject and object noun phrases of an active sentence. Applying this rule to (27) we get

(28) That some dogs eat glass is believed by Bill.

If we follow the proposal of GCB and take the object noun phrase of (27) to be 'some dogs eat glass', then we need an additional rule to move 'that' to the front of the passive form in (28). There is no evidence to support this suggestion, and thus GCB's treatment of (26) fails. In (26), neither the occurrences of 'it' nor 'true' should be taken as constituents of pro-sentences.

GCB explain the anaphoric use of prosentences by analogy to pronouns. Wilson points to two important disanalogies in the anaphoric use of pronouns and prosentences which call into question the function of prosentences. It is maintained that a prosentence acquires its content from the content of the antecedent to which it is anaphorically tied.[23] Wilson remarks that a pronoun typically assumes the referent of its antecedent without assuming the content or sense of the antecedent to which it is anaphorically related. In general, anaphoric devices do not assume the content of their antecedent. Further, beyond implications arising from pragmatic features of the use of pro-sentences, prosentences are not supposed to carry meaning of their own in addition to the content of their antecedent. Yet anaphoric devices often do carry meaning of their own. Wilson presents the following examples to illustrate his claims:

(29) Leslie was a wonderful colleague, but he/she was a very private person.
(30) We're not leaving the Chancellor's office until the bastard talks with us.

Given these semantic features of anaphoric devices, GCB's account of the anaphoric use of prosentences appears ad hoc. We have reason to doubt that 'true' is a constituent of prosentences.

The criticisms presented above argue against the claim that either the disquotational, minimal, or prosentential theory provides a correct account of the meaning of truth. The argument for deflationism based on these theories flounders. We will close this article by looking at the implications of these criticisms for the deflationary treatment of the issues of meaning and success.

The deflationary argument ruling out a truth conditional account of meaning centred on recognizing that the T-biconditionals could not be used both to specify the meaning of the truth predicate and to give a general account of meaning since in defining the truth predicate the T-biconditionals presuppose an understanding of the meaning of the rest of our language. This conclusion follows only if the T-biconditionals are read as defining the sense of the truth predicate, that is, if the disquotation thesis is correct.[24] As Gupta shows, the disquotation thesis should be rejected since it employs excessive conceptual resources in defining

truth. Further, the deflationist is committed to providing a general account of meaning along these lines, and Putnam's criticisms of this approach call into question the prospects of developing such an account independent of a substantive notion of truth. The possibility remains open for truth to play a significant role in the theory of meaning.

Williams argues that Putnam's claim that true beliefs tend to lead to success utilizes the notion of truth only in its function of expressing an infinite conjunction. (18) merely expresses a certain sort of infinite conjunction of Bill's beliefs and should not be regarded as an explanatory law. Gupta points out that in order for Williams' argument to be plausible, 'express' must be read in the strong sense of sameness of sense. If 'express' is read only as necessary equivalence, then Williams' claim fails to hold since two statements can be necessarily equivalent and yet one can be a law while the other is not a law. Gupta provides the following examples:

(31) Cicero is Tully.
(32) No chemical reaction will produce caustic soda from saltpetre and sulfuric acid.

(31) and (32) are both necessarily equivalent and yet only (32) is a law. We can infer the law-like character of one statement from another only when their equivalence is something like sameness of sense. Williams' argument then is based on the infinite conjunction thesis. But as Gupta argues, the infinite conjunction thesis is false.

Horwich also argues against Putnam's view by claiming that (18) is sufficiently explained by the appropriate instances of the T-biconditionals which comprise the minimal theory. We go from the truth of Bill's belief to his success at getting a beer by a simple inference from the appropriate T-biconditional for Bill's belief. For Horwich, no further explanation can be given of how truth contributes to Bill's success. Horwich's argument relies on both the disquotation and the infinite conjunction theses. The disquotation thesis blocks off the attempt to give a deeper explanation of success in terms of a deeper explanation of the T-biconditionals. According to the disquotation thesis, the T-biconditionals exhaust the meaning of truth and so no deeper explanation is possible. Also, Horwich claims that since the T-biconditionals explain each instance of (18), they explain their infinite conjunction. By the infinite conjunction thesis, (18) expresses the infinite conjunction of its instances. Hence, the T-biconditionals explain (18).

Horwich's deflationary argument fails because it depends on both the disquotation and infinite conjunction theses.[25] Gupta shows that the infinite conjunction thesis is false, and he gives us strong reasons for rejecting the disquotation thesis. Gupta further points out that Horwich's argument makes the mistake of assuming that an explanation of each instance of a generalization is equivalent to explaining the generalization.

Gupta considers the following generalization: Everyone on the boat died. We might explain each instance of the generalization by saying that Jack had a heart attack; Mohini drowned; etc. These explanations do not explain the generalization since the generalization may have no explanation or it might be explained by something like the boat capsizing. What this example shows is that even if the T-biconditionals explain each instance of (18), we do not have an explanation of (18) itself. It remains open that a substantive notion of truth may play a role in such an explanation.

The criticisms presented in this section provide a strong argument against the adequacy of the deflationary view of truth. The plausibility of deflationism arises from an overly strong reading of the T-biconditionals and the equivalence schema. It is important to note that even if we reject deflationism, it does not follow that we need a substantive notion of truth for philosophical purposes. The deflationary view of truth provides a forceful challenge to the intuition that truth has a substantive role in various philosophical issues. It is incumbent on those who hold this intuition to clearly identify a substantive role for truth and to provide an adequate account of this concept which reveals how truth fulfils this substantive role.[26]

Notes and References

1. In addition to the deflationists quoted above, Grover, Camp, and Belnap (1975), Grover (1981), Fine (1984), Williams (1986), Brandom (1988), Resnik (1990) and Stich (1990) argue in favour of deflationism.
2. Deflationists also point out that the truth predicate is useful as an abbreviatory device and for its pragmatic force, such as expressing agreement. These claims are examined in section II.
3. Each of these theories faces difficulties in dealing with Liar-type sentences. Since the ways in which these theories deal with the Liar is not essential to understanding their deflationary implications, I do not discuss that issue here.
4. In presenting a critique of the disquotational theory, David (1994) presents a formulation of the theory using substitutional quantifiers. See pp. 110–15 where he presents an alternative formulation of the disquotational theory along Tarskian lines.
5. In this case, the sentence 'Snow is white' is evaluated in each world with the meaning that is has in the actual world.
6. For a presentation of a non-deflationary account of what the T-biconditionals and Tarski's theory tell us about the meaning of truth, see Gupta and Belnap (1993).
7. See Field (1972, 1986) for an example of a theory that requires truth be defined in terms of causal relations between expressions of a language as used by its speakers and objects in the world. See Soames (1984) for a defense of Tarski's approach against the requirement Field places on an acceptable definition of truth.
8. See Etchemendy (1988) for a further discussion of how Tarski's definition can be understood in a deflationary manner.
9. See Grover (1972) for a discussion of this problem.
10. An additional motivation for the prosentential theory is provided by Strawson's

(1950) remarks that Ramsey's theory fails to preserve the pragmatic features of our use of the truth predicate. He points out that in asserting that a certain statement is true we are not merely asserting that statement but agreeing, conceding, corroborating, etc. On the prosentential theory these pragmatic features are preserved through the anaphoric use of prosentences.

11. For a deflationary account of the notion of reference motivated by the prosentential theory see Brandom (1984). For a comparison of the prosentential and disquotational theories see Grover (1990).
12. In addition to the truth predicate functioning in prosentential constructions we need the notion of a sentential inheritor to account for the equivalence between (1) and (2). A sentential inheritor is a sentence containing either a name or definite description which functions to locate the antecedent of the sentential inheritor. Sentential inheritors inherit their content from their antecedents. (1) is a sentential inheritor in which "Snow is white" functions to locate (2) as its antecedent. The equivalence in content (1) and (2) follows from the semantics for sentential inheritors, i.e., that they acquire their content from their antecedent.
13. The treatment of the generalizing role of the truth predicate on the minimal theory is similar to that of the disquotational theory.
14. The difference in formal approach between the disquotational and prosentential theories treatment of the use of the truth predicate for generalizing is discussed by Grover (1990).
15. Dummett's insight applies equally to the prosentential theory once we remember that the prosentential theory is motivated by the equivalence schema which is encapsulated in the comments of Ramsey. See Grover (1981) for her reaction to Dummett's argument.
16. See Davidson (1990) for a critique of deflationism and a presentation of his most recent views on the connection between truth and meaning.
17. See David (1994) for a number of technical problems with the disquotational theory. It should be noted that his preferred formulation of the disquotational theory utilizes substitutional quantifiers.
18. Although Gupta rejects the disquotation thesis, he holds that the T-biconditionals should be taken as fixing the extension and intension of the truth predicate. See Gupta and Belnap (1993).
19. From (GT) we can derive that 'Snow is white' is true if and only if 'snow is white' is true, but (GT) does not allow us to eliminate the last occurrence of 'true'.
20. See Wright (1992) for an argument to the effect that the disquotation schema itself reveals that truth and warranted assertibility register distinct norms which govern our practice of assertion. Since deflationism is committed to the view that warranted assertability is the only norm that guides our assertive practices, deflationism is mistaken.
21. It should be noted that although Putnam thinks that truth is an important property of our thoughts and utterances, he does not think that we can provide an interesting account of the nature of truth. It is the attempt to provide such accounts in terms of correspondence which leads to his rejection of metaphysical realism.
22. For additional criticisms of Horwich's minimal theory, see Devitt (1991) and Field (1992).
23. I am ignoring quantificational uses of prosentences.
24. Similarly, explaining 'true' as an anaphoric device presupposes an account of content or meaning. Wilson's criticisms, though, suggest that 'true' should not be taken as a constituent of prosentences.
25. Horwich's treatment of (17) fails for similar reasons.
26. I wish to thank Anil Gupta for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Indian Philosophy, Mysticism and Matilal

This paper is a critical response, at the invitation of the editor, to 'The Significance of Professor Matilal's *Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism* in his Studies of Indian Philosophy'. While it attempts to give a theoretical structure which should be able to stand on its own and needs further treatment, on the whole the paper takes a form which makes sense only if read after the other.

I

If one finds oneself doing 'Indian philosophy' in these last years of the twentieth century, one's hermeneutical situation would be extremely problematic. What is it to do philosophy that is Indian? That apparently banal question sets us on the search for an adequate description of our hermeneutical situation. More than many others, Bimal Matilal made a brave, if for the most part an oblique, attempt to define his situation. And the answer he gave for the question was in many ways a novel and pioneering one. It was and continues to be plagued with many difficulties, and was without doubt an incomplete one; but he never intended it to be definitive in any case. Whatever its difficulties, his attempt to define his work as an Indian philosopher cannot be gainsaid as easily as the author of 'The Significance of Professor Matilal's *Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism* in his Studies of Indian Philosophy' (henceforth SMLI) seems to think.

What is the situation then? First, there is the Indian past, in which the philosophical work was done in Sanskrit and in which religious motivation played a significant part. On the latter characteristic, one is only entitled to say that religious, spiritual or soteriological motives—if they can be identified as such—played a significant role rather than a leading or a dominating one, for such motives have greater or lesser roles for different philosophers and in different texts. This past is relatively homogeneous in its cultural background and is fairly well-defined as to its intellectual horizons (consequently, as Buddhism moves into Tibet, it ceases to engage with the intellectual traditions of the subcontinent, including remaining Buddhist ones). Then there is the historical rupture, a half-millennium of negligible philosophical activity in both Buddhist and brahmanical traditions. Finally, there is the nineteenth and twentieth century rediscovery, when an awareness of the classical texts became evident. This is the time of the influx of heterogenous ideas brought in

by western presence. Indeed, the very rediscovery is often motivated by western scholars. The intellectual horizon widens; it starts to fuse with western traditions. This is not just because of the sheer physical presence of western scholarship in India; it is not even because ideas from the West dominate the intellectual world even at present, but because those who count themselves as Indian intellectuals have access to both the homogeneous and indigenous past and the newly introduced western tradition (through the colonial inheritance, through post-colonial education in India and elsewhere; and in the case of non-Indian, western philosophers of Indian philosophy, through their own native traditions).

It is in this hermeneutical situation that we find ourselves. Since the rupture happened, we must recapture the tradition, for we are not continuously related to it. Such a recapture requires us to interpret for ourselves the past so that we can then come into possession of a tradition which can be shown to be related—authentically, even though discontinuously—to that of the past. But who are we who must so recapture that past? That is to say, what is the nature of the intellect we bring to bear on our attempt to regain the past? Why, surely it is one characterized by being influenced by and having access to western traditions. Who we are—most of us who are aware of rupture—has already been determined by our encounter with western tradition (or by our being western ourselves). Unavoidably, we are biconceptual creatures; history has made us so.

This should not, of course, stop us from attempting to regain that past in whatever form our inescapable interpretive conditioning permits; it is the besetting sin of twentieth century Orientalism that it takes the discontinuity of the Indian tradition and the western influence on contemporary thinkers to together imply the dead, uncapturable otherness of the Indian past. But when we do make the attempt, we must also acknowledge the unalterable presence of western traditions in our midst. But that is not some post-colonial entity. The West is not some crystalline, identifiable alien presence in our intellects. As ideas derived from or influenced by elements of the western traditions pass into our patterns of thought, they become fused into our interpretive capacity; they become part of what we are (or, again, they are constitutive of what we are for those of us philosophers of Indian thought who are born westerners). And we are not strange mutations; we are just creatures of our time and place and as such are people in whose intellects ideas derived from the West play a role. Given this presence, and given the historical rupture, we cannot try and go back to some putative pure tradition from the past. Not only would it be problematic to postulate some such pure past, it is nonsensical to think that we could regain that past without the interpretive capacities we now possess as creatures of the present.

This is how we find the situation and ourselves. We have all sorts of

interpretive tools at our disposal, many of which have undoubtedly survived the historical rupture, and others which have become part of our intellectual constitution by virtue of the historical fact of western presence in our academic and broader lives. We are perfectly entitled to attempt to regain the past, and must necessarily interpret it in order to do so. Such interpretation will unavoidably be influenced by our cognizance of western traditions.

But there is more. For what reasons do we want to regain that past? Fundamentally, in order to claim for whatever we do a certain native authenticity; 'native' I use here in the sense of 'being in some sense within a tradition'. And this may be so in many fields. In philosophy, this takes the form of saying that one can do philosophy which is also Indian philosophy. Now we see what the hermeneutic situation of one who thinks of himself or herself as an Indian philosopher is: an inescapable conceptual inheritance partly determined by the fact of western intellectual presence must needs be used to regain a past tradition whose texts are available but whose intellectual milieu is forever lost. (Of course, even traditions which have not suffered rupture can lose the milieu of past periods.) But access to such texts is never pure. The choice then is this: either, (as an Orientalist might) to deny even the possibility of reinterpretation and regard the material as merely archaeological; or, (as one concerned to revive and continue the tradition might,) to accept the inescapable interpretive conditioning of one's intellect, but take the interpreted material as forming a living tradition, at once derived from the classical past and yet altered through interpretation. Incidentally, I believe that this account can be neutral about whether or not the 'Indian philosopher' is an Indian or a non-Indian philosopher of the Indian traditions.

I have, then, argued for the inescapability of our western conceptual inheritance. But now I want to say something stronger: it is even a virtue to utilize that inheritance. There will, of course, be different ways of so utilizing it, ranging from the mere use of the English language to a conscious mobilization of contemporary western philosophical techniques. Why is it a virtue? Well, because it would be irrational (by most of their own severally enunciated standards), if not downright ethnocentric to recognize the power of that inheritance and yet not use it in one's intellectual activity. This is especially so if it is accepted that, in any case, it is incoherent to suppose that we could identify and retrieve some pure tradition without being conditioned by the conceptual resources we have contingently come to possess. All this amounts to the view that is is absurd to think that we can travel through some conceptual vacuum to a pure past tradition waiting to be regained in a pristine form and brought back to a hermetically sealed present.

This view, in fact, leads to a further claim. A case can be made for telling those doing western philosophy to take the Indian tradition seriously on

cultural or rational grounds. They cannot plead a radical relativized ignorance of the Indian tradition as a justification for ignoring it: they will encounter it as already interpreted by philosophers conditioned to some extent by the very same conceptual inheritance as their (the western philosophers) own. And once past that plea for ignorance, one can turn the argument around and say it would be irrational, not to say ethnocentric, for any philosopher to be confronted by the power of another intellectual tradition and yet not use it. Of course, the achievement of this demonstration of intellectual power is a different matter; all I want to say here is that my account points out why Indian philosophy can be done with certain western ideas and why if done well, it can make a rational case for being taken seriously across cultures and traditions. I think that Matilal's work is an illustration of this hermeneutical situation and that he sought, with varying degrees of success, to accomplish the end of making Indian philosophy trans-cultural.

I want what I have said to be a model by which to understand why there is nothing misguided in taking western philosophy seriously in the process of doing Indian philosophy; in fact, I want to say it is not only not a misguided one but a good strategy for attaining the end of making it a tradition worth being taken seriously across cultures. I want to suggest that understood thus, not many of the objections made by the author of SMLI to Matilal's methodology go through. There is no great difficulty in thinking of Matilal, or anyone else, as doing comparative philosophy in the sense I have described it. There should be no deep concern about the role of ideas derived from western sources in the interpretation of Indian philosophy, and finally, there should be no qualms about working towards a time when Indian philosophical ideas are considered seriously across the traditions.

There are, nevertheless, specific issues to be addressed. The author asks (i) whether such philosophy across and between cultures ('comparative philosophy') is at all possible; (ii) whether Matilal was right in even thinking what he did was viable; and (iii) whether he accomplished whatever it was he set out to do. In the second half of the paper, he tries to use Matilal's inaugural lecture at Oxford to prove that in so far as (iii) is concerned, he failed. I want to say the author is wrong in his 'extreme scepticism towards the claims of comparative philosophy', primarily because he misunderstands Matilal's conception of it; that Matilal was perfectly entitled to think that what he was doing was viable; and that even if he failed to achieve all that he set out to do, that certainly cannot be demonstrated through the sort of analysis of his lecture that is given in the second half of SMLI.

II

Let us begin with the question of whether there can be any 'comparative philosophy' at all. The author of SMLI has a deliberately naive

understanding of comparative philosophy: to establish comparison successfully. This leads to two fears about it: (i) it may fail 'through a failure to identify items that are in fact comparable', and (ii) it may be that 'the fields between which comparison would be desirable are for the present very unequally developed so that attempts at comparison are in fact premature'. The second worry is a *non sequitur* on any understanding of comparative philosophy. Herzberger, quoted in putative support of this claim, is probably right when he says that many elementary questions have not yet been settled in our present study and understanding of Buddhist logic; but that seems to suggest all the more that there is a need to deploy the terms and techniques of a currently available and developed field like western analytic philosophy to help us get a better understanding, ever more coherent interpretations, of such past traditions as Buddhist logic which we assume (for whatever reason) to have had extensive conceptual resources worth recovering through interpretation. Buddhist logic is not going to emerge in all its historical glory from the shadows of the past through the exercise of some pristine native philosophical capacity we possess; the very act of regaining it in some form coherently connected with its ancient richness is going to require whatever conceptual resources we have access to, and it is precisely the presently well-developed western one that is at hand to help us do so. The state of current research on Buddhist logic says nothing about why we should not use western elements in our study of Buddhist logic; if anything, it calls us to so use western elements. One could have this worry only if one had the strange notion that the study of Buddhist logic can proceed, devoid of present interpretive techniques, through the use of some culturally pure, timeless capacity.

As to the first apprehension, that is to put the cart before the horse. It is getting things exactly the wrong way around to begin by attempting to identify comparable concepts, like pinning two butterflies side by side and comparing their markings. This is incoherent. From what cultural perspective could one *begin* to identify comparable concepts? There is no culture-transcendent perspective analogous to the insect-transcendent perspective of the lepidopterist. Comparison can take place only from some particular perspective. But that perspective cannot be one of the compared ones, because then the concepts of the other would be extrinsic to one's intellectual repertoire and could not be represented on their own terms. When one *begins* to do philosophy, one is situated in one tradition and uses the conceptual resources of that tradition. Of course, even if situated in a particular tradition, one could be conditioned by the concepts of another tradition due to the accident of history. I have already argued in support of the (not very original) thesis that interpreting a tradition is not to approach it in some unconditioned way; we are conditioned by dominant conceptual paradigms in our approach to a tradition separated in time or space or both. So, it is inevitable that our

approach to a tradition and the process of our mastery of it are both marked by our conditioned interpretive repertoire. Now, one cannot give a suitable account of a comparable concept in another tradition just by looking at its texts. And there is no tradition-transcendent perspective from which to do the comparison. So, what does one do in the *beginning*? One starts a process of familiarization with another tradition; one starts to understand, master and employ the concepts of another tradition, even as one grapples with one's own. Functioning in a tradition is mastering its concepts; and over time mastery (even if in some fairly modest sense) comes. It is with this mastery that one starts to understand the conceptual layout of a tradition, and one begins to pick out and identify various elements in it. But this picking out is done in terms of that tradition itself, for what is happening is native to that tradition, in so far as any tradition can be said to have something clearly native to it. For there to be comparative identification, one must bring together the conceptual resources one has mastered in different traditions, such that one is now functioning from an inter-cultural (or inter-traditional) perspective. Now, there is no logical incoherence in comparing elements from different traditions; one is now functioning in a composite tradition, formed by one's own biconceptual nature.

Comparative philosophy is therefore philosophy done between and across traditions which one has come to know and function in. With the creation of this inter- cultural, compositional intellectual milieu, one begins to deal with issues which strike one as important. One of them might be the similarities between elements of the two traditions. One might then start seeing what comparable roles they play in their respective traditions as understood by the biconceptualist. But even if this comparison happens, it is one sort of end-product of such philosophizing, not the prerequisite for all such philosophizing. In other words, certain candidate elements might be considered and fail to be comparable in the roles they play. Two conclusions follow, both pointing to how comparative philosophy is still possible. (i) Comparative philosophy should have been done in the first place to arrive at that very conclusion of incomparability. (ii) There is a lot of other comparative philosophy, seen as biconceptual or inter-traditional philosophy, which is not mere comparison of elements.

Of course, Matilal did attempt comparison of elements, but the fact that he did not arrive at a list of comparable elements does not mean, on the account I have given, that he did not do comparative philosoph asy well: he needed to have done it in order even to begin element-to-element comparison. But it is the latter that is important, for Matilal did not conceive of his work as being primarily of the element-to-element sort. It was really the creation of an inter-traditional form of philosophizing, brought about by at least a modest level of mastery of different traditions. It was this conception of his work that led him, late in his life, to tell me that he had become convinced of the disutility of the term 'comparative

philosophy'; unfortunately, he did not have the time or the opportunity to write about this conviction (of course, it would be unfair to suggest that the author of SMLI should have known that and taken it into account). In this understanding of inter-traditional or inter-cultural philosophizing (a term which, when I suggested it, he seemed reasonably happy with even though he never used it himself), comparison is not the point. It is using awareness of the concepts of the traditions one has come to master in order to formulate issues which seem biconceptually relevant. That is to say, these should take the form of questions that could be asked of and in any constituent tradition of the inter-traditional nexus. The issues would, of course, vary depending on one's interpretation of the traditions, but the very act of working across traditions makes philosophizing 'global' in the sense of its not being tradition-specific. For Matilal, of course, the two traditions he wanted to work in were the classical Indian and the Anglo-American analytic ones. It would be perfectly legitimate for someone to say (i) that only one or neither of these traditions is relevant to their version of global philosophizing, or (ii) that the interpretive issues he thought to be biconceptually relevant to those traditions were not in fact so. But I do not think it would be possible to maintain that what he did was not a viable enterprise at all.

The theory of inter-traditional philosophy that I have developed may now be applied to Indian philosophy in general, keeping Matilal's work as a paradigm (though not necessarily a totally successful one) in mind.

1. An Indian doing Indian philosophy is necessarily going to have to use the conceptual resources of dominant western traditions in order to interpret the Indian past. A westerner doing Indian philosophy would, of course, be using the resources of the West, comparatively uninfluenced as it is at present by other traditions. To that extent, to do Indian philosophy now is already to be engaged in some form of inter-traditional philosophizing. No pure, uninterpreted Indian tradition can be regained; that is a myth.
2. But there is nothing inauthentic about what is made out as the Indian tradition now: authenticity is merely the result of intellectual honesty in giving coherent interpretations and acknowledging where possible the sources of one's interpretive techniques. The Indian tradition as it is interpreted can be seen to yield concepts historically and textually anchored in the Indian past. The important thing for making the Indian tradition live is to demonstrate this connection across the historical rupture. That is a matter of scholarship, not methodology.
3. Comparative philosophy, properly understood, is inter-traditional philosophy. It takes the form of acquiring interpretive mastery over different textual traditions, through the use of whatever conceptual resources the interpreter has.
4. In the case of Indian philosophy, history has already determined,

contingently, the nature of both study of Indian texts and comparative work: western conceptual elements predominate in both western and Indian interpreters (except in the largely isolated *pundit* tradition). So, the interpretation of Indian philosophy is inescapably conditioned. But so is comparative philosophy. To do western philosophy is largely to do it with its own native resources, but to do Indian philosophy is to some extent to do it with resources from elsewhere. So initially, the determination of relevant issues will be asymmetrically dependent on western conceptual concerns. A legitimate aim would be to weaken and ultimately do away with this asymmetry, so that Indian conceptual elements, howsoever determined, will also help settle issues of relevance. But this can come only through doing inter-traditional philosophy as it now asymmetrically is. The hope is that the emergence of Indian concepts in the inter-traditional milieu will make them rationally compelling to those of in western traditions. There may be disagreement on how this can be done, but not through spurious worries over identifying comparable elements or the present asymmetry in interpretive development.

With these two sections, I have laid out a largely positive programme for Indian and comparative philosophy; I have also suggested that Matilal be seen in this light. I hope to have given some theoretical structure as an alternative to the one that readers may discern in SMLI. The next section is purely negative and critical. I will attempt there a series of rebuttals of the criticisms that the author of SMLI makes of Matilal. In the last section, I will look at specific criticisms of Matilal's inaugural lecture at Oxford.

III

The author starts by stating that the professionalization of Indian philosophy has been accompanied by the 'regrettable belief' that 'philosophy has context-independent subject-matter'. The contention is that Matilal thought so and that this is regrettable because, if that is the case, what can Indian philosophy offer that the western tradition cannot develop by itself, especially given its present state of strength? Before going further, I think it was partly Matilal's achievement that that question has even come to be asked; a generation ago, it was thought that there was no such thing as Indian philosophy, no such thing as a tradition in India which did in fact have such concerns as are found in the western traditions. Such thoughts are still found, but are no longer as prevalent as they used to be. Matilal's work, however 'impressionistic', achieved at least the cultural end of getting philosophers of another tradition to concede the possibility of finding universal or at least transcultural issues in the Indian tradition. The query now is a purely pragmatic one; 'how

can I find the time to do more than look at my own tradition'? This is very different and very much weaker than: 'is there anything at all in your tradition which is worth conceptually looking at (by anyone concerned to do 'philosophy')?' That we could even think that the pragmatic question is the relevant one today is thanks in part to Matilal's work in establishing the possibility of Indian philosophy's trans-traditional relevance. To not think so is to underestimate the formidable ethnocentricism of many in the western traditions.

The author of SMLI suggests that if philosophy were a context-independent intellectual undertaking, the only way of answering the pragmatic question is by looking for 'lines of thought' in the Indian tradition 'which are of intrinsic importance and relatively unexplored' in other traditions. In this attempt, he stiffly asserts, 'it did not seem to me that he (Matilal) achieved any substantial success'. He is, true, aware that the examples he cites in support of this conclusion are inadequate, given the range and quantity of Matilal's writings. But the examples cited do not give any cause to take his judgement very seriously. He holds that Matilal's work on Nyāya logic would be of interest to someone 'with an overall interest in Indian logic' but not the 'the plain logician', meaning, presumably, the western logician. But why should this be so? No defence is given. Is it because the Nyāya system is in some way radically different from 'plain logic'? Surely not more so than Brouewerian intuitionism is from classical logic. Hilary Putnam gives Polish logic as an example of a radically different way of representing the world from classical logic. Nyāya logic's commitment to a realist ontology, one could argue as Matilal did, serves the purpose of many a western metaphysician better than, say, several of the deviant logics devised in the past fifty years. Arguably, coming to grips with Nyāya logic is no small matter; but neither is it the case with Polish logic. Of course, there is at present a difference, in that many contemporary logics have found applications, but that is merely a call to future logicians of Nyāya to bring some of the material (especially the 'informal' and 'relevance' aspects of the tradition) to bear on contemporary issues. It is a historicist fallacy to deny the interest of Nyāya logic due to a current lack of awareness.

Another example given is that of Matilal's work on perception. This is clearly not a topic whose interest is limited to those concerned with the Indian traditions alone. The relation between conceptual and non-conceptual perceptual states, such a central element in the debate between Nyāya and Buddhism, has a long history in western thought and surely finds a place in contemporary debate as well.

The author of SMLI then argues that Matilal did not do 'fruitful philosophy', though he grants that he did do work that was 'stimulation' to do fruitful philosophy that 'may come to be done sooner or later'. If he has anywhere given a reasoned distinction between these two sorts of work, I must report a failure on my part to spot it. It is not easy to say what

fruitful philosophy is; the more elaborate the criteria the more difficult it becomes to accept, say, more than half a dozen philosophers this century as having done so. Obviously, it should be possible to exclude most undergraduate essays, most doctoral theses and probably the majority of our published papers intuitively. But here is one criterion, for what it is worth, for what makes for fruitful philosophy: a work is fruitful if it gets others thinking and writing in ways they have not previously done. Then, of course, Matilal did do fruitful philosophy; as Roy Perrett pointed out in his review of *Perception* in the *Journal of Asian Studies*, 'part of the intellectual excitement of reading the book is in the many possibilities for future philosophical research that it opens up'. One might have grave misgivings about what people have been doing since reading Matilal; but that is hardly an objective reason for stating that he did not do fruitful philosophy. I want to suggest that the fruitfulness of Matilal's work lay exactly in his efforts to create a biconceptual environment in which scholars could work according to their interests.

There are four central arguments for the assessment in SMLI that Matilal failed in his work: (1) Many of the topics he dealt with appeal only to those already interested in them in the purely Indian context and not to those interested in analytic philosophy. I have already argued in response that this is by no means clear. (2) His work stimulates interest in further research but did not, in a way contribute 'fruitfully'. I have not tackled this directly by looking at what philosophy Matilal did that may be considered 'fruitful' because (a) I have a major problem in understanding what the author could mean by 'fruitful', and have suggested a criterion which (even by the author's own admission) is clearly met by Matilal's work; and (b) a separate piece is needed for me to give my own assessment of Matilal's work, and this essay, which is mainly a critical response, is not the place for it.

Another argument (3) is that Matilal failed to pay attention to the near-total absence of translations in the field. The author of SMLI claims that Matilal's failure to do 'fruitful' philosophy was because of the absence of translation: 'What they (Matilal and co-author Sen in their paper in *Mind*) do not mention as the most obvious obstacle to [the] outcome (of doing fruitful philosophy) is an almost total absence of translation of the chief works in the field'. This is a mysterious argument; why should there be a failure to do philosophy because of an absence of translation? I agree that translation is a perfectly legitimate activity, and an absence of good translation may result in one failure: the failure of those not well-versed in technical Sanskrit (or indeed any Sanskrit) to appreciate the philosophical importance of these sources. But this claim (which is also, correctly, made in SMLI) is different from the one that such an absence must lead us to conclude that Matilal's work was not philosophically important, which latter claim is the one which the author attempts to substantiate with this argument; and this does not work.

Now, the more general question still remains: should we not concentrate, unlike Matilal, on producing translations? This is distinct from the question; should there not be translations? One should, of course, say yes to the latter question. But what is the idea behind the former? The call to concentrate on translations before doing any philosophy is not a new one. The line of thought is roughly this: do translations first, then the ideas in these texts will become accessible to others both in that tradition [but lacking sufficient scholarship] and those in other traditions. This is, to some extent, unexceptionable. It becomes problematic only when translation comes to substitute for philosophical activity. In this situation, one should ask two questions: why do translations? and what would count as acceptable translation? Let us take the second question first. Clearly, a good translation would be one which brought out the philosophical power of the text concerned. But how is the translator to be qualified for it? Surely, he must be philosophically sophisticated. But what is it to be sophisticated in that way? It must be to have a sound grasp of the concepts required for a suitably nuanced and penetrating interpretation of the text. But that is going to come only through actually engaging in philosophy. Of course, if that philosophy is to be Indian, it will come partly through the very process of reading the Indian texts. But even then, the point is made: philosophy precedes, because it is a prerequisite for good translation. I must say that so many translations are bad or more subtly, misleading, because they are done by those who think that their scholarly grasp of Sanskrit grammar somehow makes them good philosophers. (Even worse, this mistaken view of translation as detached from philosophizing contributes to an overtly philological approach to philosophical texts in which even the possibility of sophisticated philosophical content is denied).

There is a need to build up a philosophical discourse in which ideas circulate and feed into the conceptual vocabulary of Indian philosophers, so that they may attempt definitive translations. This last claim is important. I have already pointed out that one could not, at present, be an Indian philosopher without being able to look at the texts; of course, Matilal always did so. But to do philosophy by employing one's understanding of a text is not the same as providing a definitive translation of it. The former understanding is more tentative, more creative, more interpretively removed than a definitive translation. In the former case, one uses texts to develop one's conceptual vocabulary; in the latter, one applies that vocabulary to develop a determinate version in translation of the text. Matilal began conventionally, with a detailed translation in his first work, *Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*. But as time went by, he realized that there was a prior need to widen and enrich the philosophical idiom of those doing Indian philosophy. He thought that primarily this was his task, hoping that others would take up this enriched idiom and apply it

to those texts which he himself had studied and derived ideas from only to present them in the English language discourse of contemporary philosophy. One can take upon oneself the task of attempting definitive translations, but that does not mean one is therefore justified in castigating Matilal for not doing so himself. His work, in an important way, laid the foundation for future, more elegant and philosophically self-aware translations than we have normally had.

Now, for the first question: why do translations? Several inter-related answers come up. First, simply to present a reasonably accurate documentation of a tradition's intellectual history. Second, to help those in search of a better understanding of the past of the tradition to which they take themselves to belong. Both are more pertinent to less esoteric texts than philosophical ones, like poetry, history, legal documents and so on. With philosophy, a third answer comes to the fore: to bring the ideas of texts to those, of whatever tradition, who ought to or might be interested in them. In the present context, one purpose of translating philosophical texts is to bring them to the attention of philosophers in both the Indian and the western traditions. But how will their attention be drawn? The author of SMLI argues that many issues in Indian philosophy are not of interest in themselves to western philosophers. If so, why not? Clearly, because they have not become part of their conceptual vocabulary. But even if certain topics were of interest, the idiom in which they are presented may not always be the one with which such philosophers are familiar. Merely to have a translation is not enough to accomplish this growth in interest; there must be a prior development of such interest so that translated texts command inter-traditional study. From what I have argued before, the next step of my argument should be plain: there is a need to create an awareness among philosophers about the excitement of classical Indian thought, and such an awareness will come only with the development of an area of discourse in which Indian interests, as derived from the texts, are consolidated with the interests of other philosophers. This is nothing other than the idea of creating a biconceptualist vocabulary in which philosophers try to gain interpretive access to the texts of different traditions, such that translations become useful and come to be used.

From this account, there emerges the plea that we must first begin to do philosophy, albeit with our own interpretive grasp of texts, such that a discourse and an interest in the objects and features of that discourse start to develop; then the translations, attempted only after we have ourselves acquired a suitably sophisticated conceptual repertoire derived from whatever sources we think best, will become necessary and useful. On such an account then, it is incoherent to insist on translation being the prerequisite for philosophy and to claim that it was Matilal's failure not to have concentrated on translation.

We will now turn to the last of the arguments, (4) the inter-relation

between religion and philosophy in the Indian schools and the supposedly problematic consequences of Matilal's alleged misunderstanding and ignoring of that inter-relation. I must confess that I am not entirely clear as to what the author of SMLI wants to make of the claim that in the Indian tradition, 'there is an internal connexion between how philosophy is done and some purpose which presides over it', namely, religion. Early on, the author claims that the distinction between philosophy and religious purpose is crucial and must be made the 'right way', but nowhere is it actually stated what that 'right way' is. Indeed, later there is the confession, 'a different view from mine on this question is likely to be reflected in a different view of the value and importance' of the comparative method. So clearly, this is not a constructive claim but the essentially destructive one that at any rate, Matilal did not share the view that religious and philosophical concerns run together, the latter being 'presided over' by the former in classical India. This leads to the conclusion: 'philosophy is not something that need stand aloof from or be in forced opposition to what is widely thought to be distinctive of Indian thought'; the idea being, evidently, that that was what Matilal thought.

The evidence marshalled in this regard is Matilal's claim that he wishes to leave aside the 'mystical and non-argumentative' side of the Indian traditions and concentrate on their 'analytic' side. But this is no evidence at all for the claim that Matilal ignored the 'religious purpose' 'presiding' over philosophy. At least, it would be evidence only if one equated religious concerns with non-argumentative mysticism. But why should one think that Matilal did so? In *Logic, Language and Reality*, for example, he devotes one out of the five chapters to such issues as *karma* and *saṃsāra*, as well as the religious purpose behind the Jaina *saptabhañgi*. Matilal did attempt to delink religious concerns from philosophical activity; he wanted to distinguish between those elements of the tradition which he thought could be argued about and analysed conceptually, and those which he thought were primarily experiential matters not to be argued over but personally felt. If the arguable elements were largely non-religious in nature, that surely is a philosopher's right to decide on what he is interested in.

IV

Let us now turn to the criticism of Matilal's inaugural lecture, 'The Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism' (hence forth *LI*). Let me make it clear that I do not agree with much of Matilal's writing on Śrī Harṣa here. Two extensive papers and a shorter one of mine[1] give an idea of my interpretation of Śrī Harṣa, and will, I hope, fill in the details of what may look like terse remarks on his philosophy in this article. I am just not convinced of the power of the objections raised in SMLI.

The fundamental objection to *LI* is supposed to be 'straightforward': the logical illumination is supposed to be of 'monistic metaphysics'; metaphysics is part of philosophy and therefore monistic metaphysics is a philosophical doctrine; but Śrī Harṣa argues that 'the only truth free of error' is 'inexpressible'; so the reward for a logical study of such a doctrine is silence, and that is 'strange reward indeed'.

Let us look more closely at this argument. I must first mention that I think Matilal's choice of 'monistic metaphysics' as the term for Śrī Harṣa's doctrine was not terribly good, accurate or useful, but that nothing I have to say now rests on that. Let us for the moment go with Matilal's choice. Let us also grant that whatever Śrī Harṣa was arguing for, he had some metaphysical doctrine in mind. But what is the difficulty in thinking that doctrine's claim was one about inexpressibility? Incidentally, I am not sure Śrī Harṣa says anything about 'truth free of error': of what is that a translation of? Śrī Harṣa's central arguments revolve around the difficulty of giving definitions of truth and knowledge, and consequently of building up a metaphysical doctrine which expressess what reality is (howsoever that reality is defined). Giving a critique of definitions of truth, he queries the very use of such a concept; he is concerned to say that the uses of such terms as 'truth' and 'knowledge' are strictly provisional on our merely assuming (*abhyupagama*) that these terms work in describing our empirical lives. So, he obviously cannot make any claims about truth himself.

To return to the issue, let us nevertheless grant that he is at least committed to saying that no expression of what reality is is possible. Now, that is a metaphysical doctrine that can be expressed. But the content of that expression consists in a commitment to inexpressibility. Śrī Harṣa could, undoubtedly have gone the way of mystics and merely not expressed anything, demonstrating that sense of inexpressibility. But, of course, not expressing anything is a practice even we, who claim no mystical experiences, can indulge in. So, he set out to demonstrate the nature of this inexpressibility, primarily in the form of a critique of Nyāya definitions, forming part of what was claimed to be a determinate expression of reality.

The author of SMLI may argue that Śrī Harṣa's apparent success against the best definitions of that time was gained only by his 'misrepresentation' of his opponents' views. This is a *non sequitur*, and is in any case contestable. It is contestable, as a reading of Phyllis Granoff's patient compilation of Śrī Harṣa's sources in her seminal *Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta*[2] shows. But even if there were some truth in that accusation, how does that prove that Matilal's interpretation of Śrī Harṣa was mistaken? The point, surely, is what Śrī Harṣa set out to do, namely, demonstrate the incoherence of definitions; whether or not he succeeded is another matter. If a consensus on success is the desideratum, then Descartes, whom the author of SMLI lauds, is equally to be set aside.

So, what is relevant is Śrī Harṣa's method of demonstrating the incoherence of definitions which go to form an account of reality. And if that is what he was doing, then there is nothing obviously problematic in holding a doctrine of inexpressibility and demonstrating that all efforts at expressing a metaphysical doctrine of inexpressibility and demonstating that all efforts at expressing a metaphysical doctrine through the consistent definition of terms—as evidenced by the best writing of the times—fail due to the failure of those definitions to be consistent. While we are at it, let me, like the author of SMLI, invoke Wittgenstein. One could argue, if one were so minded, that Śrī Harṣa's plan was to *show* that is was not possible to give determinate expression of a doctrine of reality by demonstrating the incoherence of various attempts to do so; and that he had to do this because he was committed to holding, that one could not *say* what that inexpressible reality was. He *showed* what metaphysics he was committed to, because he did not think it could be *said*. Of course this is contentious, and I have spent a lot more time exploring this elsewhere; but all I want to say is that I think, in common with Matilal, that there is no obvious incoherence to engaging in metaphysics while being committed to a doctrine of inexpressibility. Thus, it is getting it exactly wrong to argue that 'Matilal cannot reject Śrī Harṣa's verdict that the ultimate truth (*sic*) which he was seeking was "unsayable", since after all there would be nothing left at the end of his project to say it in.' The whole point precisely is that there should be—and Śrī Harṣa would claim, must be—nothing left to say about reality.

Let us now turn to the issue of scepticism. The author argues that Matilal was misguided in his use of the term 'scepticism'. He distinguishes between Matilal's use of the term and what he takes to be the two versions of scepticism in the western tradition, argues that Matilal's version looks like Descartes' but is not, and that this is so because the Matilalian sceptical version of Śrī Harṣa is 'exactly opposite' in its approach to evidence as Descartes'. There are problems with each of these perceptions.

The first is the author's characterization of western scepticism. He argues radically that Russell was a sceptic because he thought that uncertainty about knowledge is irremediable though inconsequential. This is surely an extraordinary characterization of Russell. All I can see in Russell, at least in his writings on epistemology, is a refusal to 'affirm the existence of anything for which there is no evidence'[3]: his logical atomism, if anything, is based precisely on a foundationalist certainty about giving an accurate and complete description of the world as is possible through evidence. All that one could say of Russell is that he was insisting on a form of verificationism against knowledge of metaphysical entities, including God. If that makes him a sceptic, that is a pretty widespread form of scepticism that any reasonable scientist would be committed to. But let this pass.

Let us look at the classification of scepticism into two categories: the Cartesian, which looks at whether the highest possible criteria for knowledge are met in our claims and offers us claims which are finally held to meet such criteria; and the Humean (and Russellian) in which no candidates which meet the criteria are found but where this absence is taken to be inconsequential. Again, let us ignore the problem of characterizing Hume in this way. Now, the author of SMLI says, improbably, that Matilal's version of scepticism fails. Let us look at the form of scepticism that Matilal took to be nearest to that of the Indian mystic and which the author of SMLI ignores: that of Sextus Empiricus, for whom scepticism consists in the acceptance that ordinary life is lived according to epistemic standards that cannot possibly be met in any philosophical way. Surely, there is some connection here between the notion of *vyavahārika-sattā* and the 'normal rules of life' that Sextus[4] talks of.

Matilal, of course, specifically argues that the sceptical approach in the Indian tradition (Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa apart), does serve a mystical purpose, and in this is different from most western uses of scepticism. And this is where the author argues that Matilal's scepticism is 'exactly the opposite' of Descartes'. I must, incidentally, confess that I am unclear what the issue is supposed to be: is it that Śrī Harṣa can be interpreted in a way which shows him to have been mistaken in his strategy by virtue of being at odds with Cartesian-style scepticism; or is it that Matilal was wrong in trying to say that Śrī Harṣa was a sceptic, because scepticism is what Descartes pursued and what Śrī Harṣa did not? If it is the first, then it is a judgement on Śrī Harṣa's position as a philosopher but it cannot be used to claim that Matilal did not try to say something original about Śrī Harṣa's strategy, because Matilal at any rate thought that Śrī Harṣa was indeed doing something different. If it is the latter, then that is a claim about what scepticism is but again, this cannot be used against Matilal's claim that Śrī Harṣa was doing something radical; at most it can be an argument about whether to label this 'scepticism', which, the author agrees, is not a significant issue.

In any case, the argument turns on the claim that Descartes' strategy was to lay down extremely high standards for epistemic criteria and show that many knowledge-claims fail to meet them, whereas Śrī Harṣa asks for a 'lowering of logical (and, presumably, epistemic) standards.' How is this claim demonstrated in SMLI? As far as I can see, a series of statements are made which are supposed to substantiate it, but (i) in themselves they are problematic, and (ii) in any case, they do not prove what they set out to. The statements are:

1. Śrī Harṣa 'never gives reason a second chance' when he rejects his opponents' views;
2. there is the 'simple point' that a sceptic cannot proceed *ad hominem* and

2a. this is because to 'claim successfully that one can convict one's opponent of contradiction is only to claim that one can refute him not that the thesis he maintains would also be thereby refuted'; and

3. he is able to so proceed only because he 'misrepresents the situation'. Let us take up each point.

Why is it that Śrī Harṣa does not give reason a second chance? A lengthy book devoted to a critique of a staggering array of rational claims about reality is hardly a case of not giving reason a second chance; if anything, Śrī Harṣa celebrates reason but only by demonstrating, in great detail, its inability to give determinate expression to a view of reality. Arguably, it is exactly to give reason every chance there is to build up a determinate, expressible metaphysics that he wrote his book. At least, a better defence is needed of claim 1. Next is the point that a sceptic cannot proceed *ad hominem*; well, no philosopher can and pretend to be other than a polemicist, or worse, a politician. Nobody would argue that attacking the person is the best way of going about attacking the idea (I say this with an only too obvious sense of irony). But now look at 2a: this is supposed to be the justification of the charge that Śrī Harṣa was proceeding *ad hominem*. But it is no such thing. To attempt to 'convict one's opponent of contradiction' is not to attack the opponent personally, for the charge of contradiction is a charge regarding the person's ideas, not the person himself. So, even if Śrī Harṣa were charging his opponent of contradiction, one cannot say he was attacking *ad hominem*, unless one has taken considerable liberty with that phrase. Now, let us look at 2a again. How could one defend the claim that to refute an opponent might yet not be to refute the thesis? Only if one had some fantastically realist theory of an ideal version of a thesis uncontaminated by the imperfect versions of it held by people who have been refuted. One might as well say that to refute the arguments of the flat-earth theorists is not to refute the theory that the earth is flat because there might well be an argument for it which no present-day scientist has yet anticipated. Conceivable but hardly a plausible defence of the criticism of Śrī Harṣa.

The wildness of this underlying vision of what it is to refute a thesis is evidently grasped by the author, for he goes on to admit that the arguments attacked by Śrī Harṣa were the 'best to be found in his time'. This is when he makes the additional claim that Śrī Harṣa was able to refute his opponents' theses only by misrepresenting them. But we have now lost touch with the original argument, which was to claim that Śrī Harṣa asked for lower logical and epistemic standards. All we have is the dispute over whether Śrī Harṣa was able to accomplish his task successfully, and this is not a dispute over his sceptical strategy.

Not only are the stages of the argument confused, they do not in any case work towards establishing the claim that Matilal's sceptic, in the form of Śrī Harṣa, asks for a lowering of epistemic standards. If anything, Śrī Harṣa adheres—or at least is committed to adhering to—the best

standards available to him at that time, that of his opponents. His claim is that no theory of the *pramāṇas*, however elaborately developed, can actually accomplish what it sets out to do, which is to establish a determinate account of what there is in reality. All such theories can do is to demonstrate that we can only assume their workability in our daily lives. We cannot use them to prove that there is a determinate reality from which they are derived, on pain of circularity: there must be demonstrated to be a determinate world from which the *pramāṇas* are derived, but it is with the use of the *pramāṇas* that we hope to accomplish the establishment of such a determinate world. Of course, we can say that our experience is such that the assumption of the *pramāṇas* is acceptable, but that is exactly what the Advaitin means by saying he accepts the *vyavahāra-satta*. This understanding of Śrī Harṣa is not a million miles from the author's own understanding of Nāgārjuna; both essentially argue that the attempt to establish the *pramāṇas* is faulty: 'what is taken to be established is also required to be established in its means' (*siddhasya sādhanam syāt*).

To repeat, I am not convinced that what I have to say here would accord with Matilal's conception of a monistic metaphysics, but that is irrelevant to the point I am making: the arguments in SMLI accomplish nothing like they claim to.

One more point about Śrī Harṣa. The author of SMLI invokes Barry Stroud, and says that Stroud 'equates philosophical scepticism with the claim that we can know nothing about the physical world around us' and claims that therefore, scepticism has nothing to do with the notion of proof as found in Śrī Harṣa. My copy of *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism* says something much weaker: 'In this book I examine the sceptical philosophical view that we can know nothing about the physical world around us'[5]: hardly the view imputed to him. But there is more. Earlier Stroud says, 'scepticism in philosophy has come to be understood as the view that we know nothing, or that nothing is certain, that everything is open to doubt'. He goes on, 'it is thought to rest on many of the same considerations, ancient sceptics [like Sextus, note] might have invoked in freeing themselves from their opinions or opposing the doctrines of others'. This not only ties in with my earlier point that Matilal saw parallels between the Indians and the ancient Greek sceptics, it can readily be interpreted in terms conducive to Śrī Harṣa's strategy. So, Stroud is not quite the ally he is obviously thought to be by the author of SMLI.

We will now move to the case of Nāgārjuna. If it is a matter of personal judgement, I cannot agree with the author that 'it does not need a deep study of Nāgārjuna to think it somewhat strange' to see him as subscribing to the same sort of mysticism as Śrī Harṣa. This is indeed an attack *ad hominem*: the charge is that Matilal did not make a deep study of Nāgārjuna. I do not think it strange at all, given the long history of the claim that the concept of *śūnya* and that of *brahman* are in vital respects

similar, to take Matilal's claim about the commonality of Śrī Harṣa's and Nāgārjuna's mysticism seriously, even if I remain unsure that there is such a commonality. What, in any case, is given in defence of this view?—That Advaita subscribes to something called 'total illusionism' to which Nāgārjuna does not. This amounts to precisely nothing. I am appalled that someone could so blithely gather Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Padmapāda, Sureśvara, Vācaspati, Śrī Harṣa, Madhusūdana, Dharmarāja, all under the cover of some apparently obvious doctrine called 'total illusionism'. If this has to be done, then I want some explication of the very notion of 'total illusionism', and I want to know how the various philosophers of that school may be said to subscribe to a unified doctrine of it. Here, where everything rests on the claim that all Advaitins subscribed to a doctrine radically different from Nāgārjuna regarding mystical experience, appeal to some putative convention regarding Advaitic theory will not do. At another point the author writes, 'this is what the Advaitin Śrī Harṣa says but not the Buddhist Nāgārjuna', as if invoking the different schools is sufficient to establish whatever distinction is required. I look forward to a scholarly, rather longer piece on exactly how, Śrī Harṣa at least, subscribed to a different view of mystical experience than Nāgārjuna, from the author of SMLI; or maybe it is one already written to which my attention has not been brought.

Now, for a couple of particularly troubling claims that I found in SMLI's treatment of Nāgārjuna. Apparently, the Mādhyamika goal is 'attained cumulatively', and not 'in a flash', whereas Śrī Harṣa sees it 'as an emergent condition whose origin comes simply on the *completion of a process* of ratiocination' (my emphasis). The distinction defeats me; neither seems to claim that the *summum bonum* is gained without a long process of gradually giving up problematic commitments and views.

Then there is the enigmatic discussion of *śūnyata*.'Knowing that something is without *svabhāva* must in part consist in knowing that it is deficient in some respect.' Given this, *śūnyata* might be understood by saying 'that there is an inevitable lack of self-nature that goes with the essential nature of things'. I want to know what 'something' is such that it has no *svabhāva*. Is not the very idea of *svabhāva* constitutive of the idea of a thing—anything, something—in the first instance? In order to give any sense to the above view, there must be a construal of 'thingness' (what it is for there to be a thing) that is free of any appeal to and independent of the concept of self/own-nature; and further, it should be found in Nāgārjuna. This task is made even more difficult by the second assertion according to which a thing can have essence (an 'essential nature') but yet lack self-nature (that is how I understand the puzzling phrase 'goes with'). We are well into the realms of the contradictory: this is absolutely the first time I have ever heard of a thing, (already mysteriously defined without appeal to its nature), which has an essence which is nonetheless not itself (has no self-nature). If this is to work at all, much, much more

has to be done to bring it within the realms of the sensible than has been done here.

Finally, a note on a methodological issue. The author claims that if he gives an account of Nāgārjuna which is different from Matilal's, even if the former were not to be 'unquestionably preferable', it is enough if it is plausible, because that would suggest that it is fruitful in a way Matilal's is not. This is all very confusing. First of all, there is nothing here to show that Matilal's understanding of Nāgārjuna was not fruitful, beyond the doubtful claim that Nāgārjuna could not possibly have adhered to a version of mysticism even remotely resembling Śrī Harṣa's. Second, even if a more detailed argument against Matilal's interpretation were to be given, that would merely be to show that Matilal's view was not as defensible as previously thought, without saying anything about its fruitfulness (recall our earlier puzzlement about the unexplained—or if explained, problematic notion of fruitfulness in SMLI).[6] And third, none of this has any bearing on the original, official purpose of this essay, namely, to argue that Matilal was not engaged in any fruitful philosophy at all because of his commitment to a form of comparative philosophy. This is not a persuasive case for a general failure of Matilal's entire methodology.

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C. RAM PRASAD

Devaraja's Theory of Person : Some Reflections

Devaraja's concept of person emanates from his definition of philosophy as 'self awareness or critical awareness of the activities whereby civilized human agents produce value bearing forms of consciousness'.[1] Therefore,

the person is the object of his philosophical inquiry only by virtue of being the end product of man's pursuit of values. Thus, as he himself admits, his definition of a person as a being given to conscious pursuit of values is rather prescriptive, but he denies the charge of its being a persuasive one.[2] For him, a prescriptive definition in a normative discipline is a fact; it is explanatory, evaluative and can also be viewed as a proposal.[3] A philosophical system is mostly constituted by such definitions, he says.[4]

According to his description, the person is essentially a social being with the capacity to use language for the need of communication and co-operation with his fellow beings. Thus, neither a perfect being like God nor imperfect ones like animals, infants, madmen are included in the class of persons. Being social, the person is a moral agent too, with a sense of rights and duties. However, an immoral person, in Devaraja's opinion, is still a person but he is an inferior person due to his selfishness. The difference between moral and immoral men does not lie in their conscious pursuit of values, but in safeguarding or injuring the interests of others in achieving their own ends.[5]

Devaraja further differentiates between a moral and a virtuous person. Accordingly, a virtuous person is not only unselfish but also positively helpful to others even at the cost of his own time, money or comfort.[6] In return he gets affection, admiration and gratefulness from them. A virtuous person may be motivated either by his excess energy and intelligence or by his indifference to mere utilitarian existence. The life of a political reformer or revolutionary is an example of a virtuous person in the former class while that of a detached saint exemplifies the latter.

Thus, though the just order is a necessary condition for the survival of civilized man, yet, moral deeds cannot exhaust the concept of a person. Devaraja asserts, man has the capacity to transcend the moral zone in the creative quest of truth, beauty and contemplative serenity.[7] The creation and appreciation of works of art and thought are noncompetitive or shareable. However, this requires disciplined training and a sense of detachment from purely utilitarian and competitive pursuits. Even the scientists whose discoveries often make life more comfortable, are inspired by the disinterested quest of truth. Such cultural pursuits, in Devaraja's opinion, tend to induct a person into the society of a select few kindred spirits who have been able to move beyond our creaturely existence.[8] Thus, a person's life has an essential reference to his fellow beings; the progress of excellence of a person can be measured in terms of his liberation from egoistic impulses towards a superior kind of happiness which has been described as the state of '*jīvanamukti*' in religious literature.[9]

The chief merit of Devaraja's theory of person as briefly stated above, lies in his emphasis on the value aspect of the person which is generally not well taken care of by the philosophers of other traditions. Much of the discussion of the concept of person in contemporary philosophy

moves around the problem of personal identity to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions that a person at time t_2 being the same as a person at time t_1. Though, as brilliantly argued by Vibha Chaturvedi,[10] the inadequacy of the dualistic Cartesian position in this respect is improved upon by the Strawsonian analysis of the concept of person, that too gives us only the necessary condition of being a person but fails to provide the sufficient one. Thus, the definition of person as a subject to whom both corporeal characteristics and states of consciousness can be ascribed, is indeterminate. Such a concept ignores evolution of man as a biological species from animals; even a monkey seems to qualify as a person. So we need to further determine it by including capacity of self-awareness, language, intentional actions etc., for defining a person. Devaraja, in his own way provides a solution to this problem by defining the person as a being given to conscious, creative pursuit of values; an imperfect being, neither a God, nor an animal. Thus, being a non-believer in any form of transcendent soul or God, he not only avoids the pitfalls of Cartesian dualism, but also does full justice to the spiritual (or cultural) aspect of human life. The emergence of value consciousness is the unique characteristic of man which defines him as a person.

Devaraja's differentiation between inferior and superior person highlights the hierarchical aspect, making his theory not only inclusive but also sufficiently discriminatory to serve as an evaluative standard for a variety of human actions. By his criterion of increasing detachment from merely utilitarian pursuits, one can say that a political revolutionary like Mao is an inferior person as compared to a compassionate saint like Ram Krishna Paramhamsa, but Gandhi is superior to both as he combines both moral and spiritual qualities in his personality.

Devaraja's theory can also be seen as a proposal for betterment of the person. Aware of the conflictual nature of the competitive pursuit of utilitarian values such as wealth and power, one may consciously opt for the quest of truth and beauty. However, realizing the obstacles due to unjust social order in such cultural pursuits, one may decide to fight for better social conditions. Calling for pursuit of moral ideals, this will itself enhance one's status as a person. And, realizing the essential need for co-operation with fellow beings for the success, one will develop as a social being in a deeper sense.

The concept of '*jīvanamukti*', the highest position a person can reach in Devaraja's theory, critically combines the insights of Indian religious tradition with that of humanistic thinkers of the West such as Erich Fromm[11] and Abraham Maslow.[12] Religious values like other cognitive, moral and aesthetic values are also an important part of man's value consciousness. More than the pursuit of other values, religious quest frees a man from egoistic constraints of his creaturely existence. Thus, irrespective of his religious beliefs, a truly religious person for Devaraja, is an embodiment of humanly attainable ideal of superior person.

However, it seems, traditional disregard for material values shown by saints and their followers invariably creeps into Devaraja's theory of person even while discussing enjoyment and creation of works of art and thought. It may be true for some but going through the lives of many great artists and men of thought, one cannot fail to notice their not-so-glorious worldly pursuits of women, wealth and fame as well as their petty jealousies and rivalries. In the lives of political leaders, their love for power and glory is most conspicuous. Therefore, as Milton said: 'the last infirmity of great minds is their love of fame and glory' and as such, it cannot be separated from any creative pursuit of cultural values. Bertrand Russell in his famous study *Power*,[13] has also pointed out the motives of power and glory in various human pursuits of excellence. Similarly, though there is some truth in Devaraja's contention that a virtuous or creative person has excess energy yet one cannot fully agree about its source in the spiritually superior nature of man. Very often this extra time and energy is the result of leisure available to persons of exploiting classes whose subsistence needs are fully met by their dominating status in society. Thus, one may say that the relationship of society with creative pursuit of cultural values is not fully worked out in Devaraja's theory of the person. Only with some such understanding one may explain the lesser recognition granted to artists or thinkers by society in comparison to men of wealth and power.

A prescriptive concept of person, such as that of Devaraja, remains incomplete till it supplements the idea of superior person with a method of achieving that status. This is not just a simple case of being a spiritually superior person. Even the highly creative minds experience the tension between pursuit of utilitarian and cultural values. A proper understanding of such inner conflicts and the need to choose one value instead of the other with the resulting anxiety, will go a long way to enrich Devaraja's theory of person.

Like other attempts to define the concept of person, Devaraja also fails to take note of the unconscious layers of personality. Can the unconscious desires be kept out of a complete theory of the person? One is not sure as to what status he accords to the deviant behaviour of man, but it does not seem to serve any conscious utilitarian or creative cultural purpose. Is the criminal driven by sadomasochistic urges not a person? He is neither a madman, nor does he pursue any pragmatic or cultural values and consciousness may not necessarily be rational and moral all the time.

Another paradox which Devaraja's theory fails to explain is the consistent unconcern shown by a large number of persons for the pursuit of the so-called superior values, even after their subsistence needs are fully met. Why, given time and energy, most persons are more interested in earning wealth and goods than in creating or appreciating great works of art and literature? The more shareable goods and activities are not considered worth sharing. To the question why be moral, Devaraja's

contention that a person is a moral agent does not seem to be a satisfactory answer.

Concluding the discussion, one can not but give full credit to the original contribution made to the theory of person by N.K. Devaraja. Its originality lies in synthesizing the rich humanistic traditions of both the East and the West; yet he remains a critical insider throughout. Some of the unworked out problems, however, are due to the looseness and indeterminateness of the concept of person itself. What we require is a complete theory of man and his destiny and not merely a theory of the person. Devaraja's efforts in that direction however, cannot be dealt justifiably within the scope of this article.

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53, Ashraf Tola, Hardoi ALOK TANDON

A Note on Critique and Alternative in Alasdair MacIntyre

Modernity and tradition are opposed to each other. Notwithstanding the hostility of modernity towards tradition, the idea of tradition is reasserted *albeit* in displaced senses. The reassertion is evident in the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre.[1] He rejects the Enlightenment project and seeks to replace it by the 'classical tradition'. This replacement, for him, would solve the pervasive fact-value dichotomy that infected modern moral theories. In this essay, I argue, that MacIntyre's recommendation poses some difficulties.

MacIntyre rejects the Enlightenment project, as he says we, 'in spite of the efforts of three centuries of moral philosophy and one of sociology, lack any coherent rationally defensible statement of a liberal individualistic point of view'.[2] He attributes this failure to the very format of the Enlightenment discourse, namely, to the 'project of constructing valid arguments which will move from premises concerning human nature as they understand it to be to conclusions about the authority of moral rules and precepts'. A project of this kind, he concludes, is bound to fail, as there is an ineradicable discrepancy between Enlightenment writers' (writers such as Kant, Hume, and Diderot) shared conception of moral rules and precepts, and what was shared—despite much larger divergencies— in their conception of human nature.[3] This failure, according to MacIntyre, leaves no option but to continue to follow the Enlightenment project 'until there remains only the Nietzschean diagnosis and the Nietzschean problematic. . . . ' He conclusively asserts that within the modern discourse there is 'no third alternative'.[4]

To salvage morality from this impasse, MacIntyre recommends while being away from both the general format of the Enlightenment and it's contemporary critique, e.g. the 'Post-Enlightenment relativism and perspectivism'—an alternative in the form of the morality of the 'classical tradition'. The classical tradition for him consists of: the philosophy of Aristotle, the practice of Greek heroic societies and Homer. In the classical tradition, morality is invariably derived from social facts. Hence facts and values are organically related to each other. Elucidating this relation, he identifies three components constituting traditional morality: (i) the notion of 'man-as-he-happens-to-be (human nature in its untutored state)'; (ii) 'the conception of the precepts of a rational ethics'; and (iii) 'the conception of human nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos'.[5] These three aspects are closely related to each other, as each requires the reference of the other two if its own status or function is to be intelligible. This inter-dependency makes it possible to arrive at a viable moral theory.

In contradistinction, the morality of the Enlightenment has no notion of 'man-as-he-happens-to-be'. Instead, human nature is reduced to any one of the aspects. MacIntyre observes:

> Just as Hume seeks to found morality on the passions because his arguments have excluded the possibility of founding it on reason; so Kant founds it on reason because his arguments have excluded the possibility of founding it on the passions; and Kierkegaard on criterionless fundamental choice because of what he takes to be the compelling nature of the considerations that exclude both reason and passions.[6]

This attitude of each seeking to ground morality exclusively either on passions or on reason or on criterionless fundamental choice, almost

structured each framework as solipsistic. Thereby foreclosing the possibility of interaction between them. This mutual exclusiveness is further corroborated by the rejection of man's *telos*. Regarding this, MacIntyre notes with concern the secular rejection of both Protestant and Catholic theology and scientific and philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism. These rejections eliminated any notion of 'man-as-he-happens-to-be-if he-realized-his-*telos*'.[7]

This hostility towards human *telos* is further substantiated by MacIntyre when he states a little later in the same book two obstacles—one social and another philosophical. These impede any 'contemporary attempt to envisage human life as a whole, as a unity, whose character provides the virtues with an adequate *telos*'. They are: (i) the social obstacle where modernity partitions human life into different segments. Work is divided from leisure; private life from public; and the corporate from the personal. This segmentation prevents the possibility of having an idea of a unified human life. (ii) The philosophical obstacle which derives from two distinct tendencies—the analytical philosophy's tendency to think atomistically about human action and in sociological theory and existentialism where 'a sharp separation is made . . . between the individual and the roles that he or she plays. . . .'[8]

The rejection of the human *telos* precluded an occasion for the mutually exclusive conceptions of human natures either to form or culminate into a viable common ground. Thus, the incompatibility at the level of postulating different versions of human nature compounded by the subsequent prevention of the possibility of their culmination at the level of *telos*, left modern moral theories, in MacIntyre's reading, fragmented, and their different versions incommensurable. From this, MacIntyre draws a lesson, and says, that a successful moral theory is always derived from a shared social reality. Extrapolating his argument, we can concede that a social reality can give rise to more than one moral theory. However, in the absence of social reality it's morality cannot be derived.

II

Let us critically scrutinize MacIntyre's position. For him, a successful morality is derived from shared social facts. And,

(a) morality in the classical tradition is derived from shared social facts. However, modern moral theories do not subscribe to shared social facts. Hence they failed to arrive at a tenable moral theory.

So,

(b) in order to arrive at a tenable morality, Enlightenment discourse—from which moral theories including emotivism draw their conceptual resources, must be replaced by the classical tradition.

(i) While I agree with MacIntyre with regard to (a), I contest his positive recommendation namely, (b).

It may be true that in the classical tradition values are derived from social facts. However, we must note the following:

(c) The classical tradition is no longer an existing presence in the modern West. It has been either replaced or transformed by modernity. The modern mechanisms of progress, social change, and developmental programme assisted by science and technology, have succeeded in transforming or replacing the traditional social practices and institutions. There may be disagreements regarding the desirability or otherwise of this transformation: there may even be variety in modernity's attempt at transforming the traditional Western society. But this transformation remains a fact of history and is in need of no further justification. A form of this transformation from the agrarian plural societies to the homogeneous nation state is discussed by Ernest Gellner in his book *Nation and Nationalism*. This obvious fact has serious implications to MacIntyre's recommendation, namely, (b).

Given (c), let us examine MacIntyre's recommendation (b). We can at once conclude that the disappearance of the traditional social institutions and practices within the West makes (b) impossible. That is, while traditional morality is derived from traditional social facts, but given (c), the traditional society is no more an existing reality within the West. Thus, it cannot be evoked as if it is an existing presence. It can at best be recalled through ' sociological imagination'[9]; or through 'art, literature, language, and the cultural "artefacts" of the era in question',—namely, the pre-Modern experience.[10] But this form of recalling does not fulfil MacIntyre's requirement. Deriving morality from an imagined social reality would be as much a fantasy as the abstract notion of morality that MacIntyre attributed to the Enlightenment. Recalling tradition through imagination does not necessarily promise shared experience. Does the modern West revoke its classical tradition in a consensus manner? How much commonness is there even among those who now evoke tradition? Traditional social institutions don't any longer constitute the shared experience of the modern West. Thus, given the absence of the traditional social institutions, MacIntyre's recommendation (b) becomes unrealistic.

Here I am not suggesting that in order to evoke traditional morality there must necessarily exist traditional societies. I am aware of the fact that moral ideals need not necessarily answer pragmatic requirements. I am only arguing that these possibilities cannot be evoked within MacIntyre's framework, as for him a successful morality is always derived from shared social facts.

The classical morality, recommended by MacIntyre, when applied to overcome the contemporary crisis, in the manner in which it is diagnosed by MacIntyre, ceases to have its claims of organicity between morality and social facts. In these changed circumstances the organicity constituting traditional morality becomes organicity or traditional morality. If we insist on traditional morality, then it is not rooted in modern Western

society. And, if we were to opt for organicity between facts and values, then, we have to look for this in instances other than traditional morality. (ii) I shall now discuss another difficulty in MacIntyre. This can be illustrated by invoking his centralization of yet another assertion regarding the allegiance to the inherited traditions. While listing the virtues of heroic societies, he says, 'there is no way to possess the virtues except as part of a tradition in which we inherit them and our understanding of them from a series of predecessors'.[11] This observation could go exactly against his general recommendation of abandoning the Enlightenment project. The immediate predecessors of the contemporary West are Descartes, Hume, Hobbes, Rousseau, Hegel, Mill, Marx and Rawls. if we go along with MacIntyre's earlier idea of abandoning the project of Enlightenment, then what would be our relation to these thinkers mentioned above. In recommending the project of Enlightenment to be abandoned, how would MacIntyre relate himself to those thinkers who contributed to the making of modernity. Does this not force MacIntyre's suggestion regarding inheriting traditions to go exactly against his own plea to abandon the Enlightenment project?

Further, MacIntyre seems to be imitating the logic of the Enlightenment which he seeks to repudiate. Both MacIntyre and the Enlightenment thinkers seek to reject their immediate predecessors. While the latter rejected the tradition substituting in its place new modern social institutions and ideas, MacIntyre, on the other hand, seemed to embark on rejecting the Enlightenment. There is, however, a difference. Modernity, a contemporary name for the Enlightenment, in transforming traditional social realities reduced tradition to a set of ideas. In contrast, modernity is not only an idea but a reality. Given this, what would be MacIntyre's relation to the modern realities? Would he, for instance, do to the modern institutions what Enlightenment did to the traditional institutions? Or would he find other mechanisms? MacIntyre, in my understanding has not offered any explanation to this problem, he does not even seem to be aware of the complexities arising out of his recommendation.

What accounts for these constraints? Why does the radical critique of MacIntyre confront these contradictions and meet dead ends? A possible answer to these lies in the ground on which modernity and tradition are founded in the West. That is, modernity is opposed to tradition. This opposition within the West is grounded on a temporality that is sequentialistic. That is, the relation between tradition and modernity is that of the latter succeeding the former.[12] This ordering of the relation denies the possibility of their coexistence.

Enlightenment thinkers would have clearly endorsed this interpretation of the relation between tradition and modernity. This is evident in Habermas, a sophisticated contemporary interpreter of the Enlightenment project. He says that Hegel conceived the communicative

medium within the framework of an 'ethical totality along the guidelines of a popular religion in which communicative reason assumed the idealized form of historical communities, such as the primitive Christian community and the Greek polis'.[13] Hegel conceived the idea of the communicative medium within the context of the historical communities. Since he did not want to embrace the latter, he abandoned the former. Habermas endorses the Hegelian rejection thus denying the coexistence of modernity and tradition.

In MacIntyre we come across two responses to the above interpretation of tradition and modernity. He at times endorses the contrast and at other times concedes the possibility of their coexistence. The former view can be seen in the context where he admits that both Hume and Aristotle 'simply don't stand in the kind of relationship to each other in which later and earlier adherents of the same tradition stand'.[14] He maintains this contrast when he characterizes traditional world view as based on inheritance of the 'past, family, city, tribe, nation, etc.' and modern individualism on individual choices.[15]

This visible contrast, however, is underplayed at other places where he deviates from his earlier rejectionistic stand-point and concedes the coexistence of tradition and modernity.
He says:

> It is indeed a feature of all those traditions with whose histories we have been specifically concerned that in one way or another all of them have survived so as to become not only possible, but actually, forms of practical life within the domain of modernity. Even when marginalized by the dominant modern social, cultural, and political order, such traditions have retained the allegiance of the members of a variety of types of community and enterprise, not all of whom are aware of whence their conceptions of justice and practical rationality derive. The past of such traditions is encapsulated in the present and not always only in fragmented or disguised form.[16]

He further states,

> . . . just as the older traditions are able to survive within liberal modernity, just because they afford expressions to features of human life and modes of human relationship which can appear in a variety of very different social and cultural forms, so modern liberalism too has had its anticipations in earlier cultures. . . .[17]

While MacIntyre concedes the coexistence of modernity and tradition; tradition in modernity; and modernity's tradition; this, however, assumes a continuity which goes against his earlier radical pose of discontinuity.

There is this ambivalence in MacIntyre. However, his recommendation of rejecting the Enlightenment project and replacing it with traditional morality forces him to endorse their opposition. But the implications of

this relation is not seen by MacIntyre. This failure makes him look for organicity between facts and values, where it is not there. While values are derived from social facts in the classical tradition, there is no continuity between traditional society and the modern society. Further, in the absence of the traditional social realities, it's morality cannot be derived. Hence, MacIntyre's recommendation of traditional morality to overcome the contemporary crisis loses its claims of organicity between facts and values. Thus, the sequentialistic form of temporality in which modernity and tradition within the West is located, makes MacIntyre's recommendation impracticable.

III

The above discussion of MacIntyre's programme is not to be taken as endorsing the project of Enlightenment and rejecting the possibility and relevance of the classical tradition. While I maintain that MacIntyre's project within the West cannot avoid the difficulties discussed above, I don't foreclose the possibility of executing his recommendation in those societies, where modernity and tradition, though opposed to each other, nevertheless exist simultaneously. We can, for instance, look at non-western societies like India where modernity and tradition, instead of becoming sequential, are rooted in a temporality that is simultaneous. We can see, in contemporary India or in Gandhi, a different ordering of relations between modernity and tradition.

In India there exist simultaneously the modern as well as the traditional institutions. India's traditional villages and its modern national state, when juxtaposed, reveal the real advantage of Gandhi over the dissenters of modernity in the West. Let me illustrate this by deconstructing Partha Chatterjee's juxtaposition of Tolstoy and Gandhi. Chatterjee says:

> (Tolstoy's) thorough going anarchism . . . was not accompanied by any specific political programme. There was simply a belief that the exemplary action of a few individuals, resisting the state by the strength of their conscience, would sway the people towards a massive movement against the institutions of violence.[18]

Comparing Gandhi with Tolstoy, Chatterjee maintains, that,

> In one aspect of his thought, Gandhi shared the same standpoint; but his thought ranged far beyond this specific ideological aspect. And it is here that the comparison with Tolstoy breaks down, because Gandhism is also concerned itself with the practical organizational questions of a political movement. And this was a national political movement, required to operate within the institutional processes set up and directed by the colonial state.[19]

While agreeing with Chatterjee with regard to the breaking down of the comparison between Tolstoy and Gandhi, I would supplement this

with a contrasting observation. That is, the comparison breaks down as Gandhi had an axis to fall back on those non-modern realities for his constructive programme. This, however, is not really available to Tolstoy (or to MacIntyre), hence, his critique of civil society (or the project of Enlightenment in the case of MacIntyre,) inevitably translates itself into anarchism or romanticism. Gandhi, on the other hand, while subscribing to Tolstoy's critique of civil society, could fall back on those non-modern social spaces and launch his positive programme. Thus, in order to get at the advantageous side of Gandhi over Tolstoy, we, along with highlighting Gandhi's involvement with the 'practical organizational questions of the political movement,' also have to focus on his involvement in the organizational question of 'Khadi'.

This instance of the relation between the modern and the traditional as available in India, provides a better ground to execute MacIntyre's programme. In Gandhi, we have a critique of modern civilization. His traditional ideals such as *satya*, *ahimsa*, *sarvodaya*, are organically rooted in the Indian society. Thus, the programme that ran into problems within the West can be facilitated in the context of India. This however, requires a careful reformulation of MacIntyre and not blind transplantation. Work toward this direction should be the beginning of another paper.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue?*, Duckworth, London, 1985; by the same author, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, Duckworth, London, 1988.
2. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue?*, Duckworth, London, 1985, p. 259.
3. Ibid., p. 52.
4. Ibid., p. 118.
5. Ibid., p. 53.
6. Ibid., p. 49.
7. Ibid., p. 54.
8. Ibid., p. 204.
9. Anthony Giddens, *Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory*, Macmillan Press, London, 1982, p. 14.
10. Susan Bordo, *The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture*, SUNY,

Albany, 1987, p. 29. Anthony Giddens is perceptive in this regard. Instead of proposing the traditional domain as an alternative, he seeks to retrieve it through 'sociological imagination.' He says, 'the first effort of sociological imagination that has to be exercised by the analyst of the industrialized societies today is that of recovering our own immediate past—the "world we have lost"'. Giddens, 1986, p. 14.

11. Susan Bordo too displays this awareness when she says, 'although we cannot *experience* the world of pre-Modernity, (as it is no longer our own) we can reconstruct it in the imagination', in, 1987, p. 29. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p. 127.
12. Here I tentatively assume that the success of the project of modernity within the West is totalistic.
13. J. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 30.
14. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, Duckworth, London, p. 328.
15. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p. 220.
16. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, p. 391.
17. Ibid., p. 392.
18. Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World : A Derivative Discourse?*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1986, p. 101.
19. Ibid.

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Some Comments on Prof. Guy Bugault's 'Buddhist Anthropology' vis-a-vis Modern Philosophy and Contemporary Neurophysiology

Modern writings on Buddhism generally tend to be either textual or historical. It is only rarely that a serious modern scholar seeks to interpret or assess Buddhist ideas in the context of contemporary thought. Professor Bugault must be commended for such an attempt. He seeks to compare the Buddhist view of man with contemporary scientific views. He begins by saying that 'Early Buddhism was not, strictly speaking, a religion but rather psychosomatic training—In the course of its evolution Buddhism became a religion, mainly under the pressure of laymen'. Even so, Buddhism did not accept the notions of God or soul, creation or revelation.

In this one would like to demur. Prof. Bugault seems to have in mind here a conception of religion which emphasizes the content of belief rather than the character of value-consciousness. Perhaps one may argue that what makes one 'religious' is not what one believes in but what one values. Buddhism does not begin with a belief in some transcendent

metaphysical entity but it does begin with the rejection of all natural values as ultimate and thus implicitly with a transcendent value. It seeks a goal which is infinite and eternal and looks beyond death to deathlessness.1 It believes in its own way in sin, suffering and salvation, in *karman, saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. Buddhism, thus, addresses itself to the same basic quest of man as Christianity and Islam, Hinduism and Jainism, viz. the quest for freedom from existential suffering and mortality.

Prof. Bugault says 'a Buddhist reader is perfectly at ease when he is faced with the achievements of science or with contemporary trends of western philosophy such as logical empiricism and analytical philosophy.' This he attributes to certain common features of Buddhist and scientific approaches. Both 'share the methodological primacy of experience and reason' and both are 'dynamic, not static' owing to their faith in the idea of law or function. Here Prof. Bugault has undoubtedly made a profoundly valid point.[2] Buddhist *prajñā* is basically contiguous with science understood as necessary knowledge. That does not, however, mean that science is to be understood in terms of any particular philosophical school. Some Buddhist thinkers, past and present, have argued in ways reminiscent of some contemporary philosophical schools.[3] This does not make them right, nor does it mean that those who have disagreed with them have been less scientific. Personally, I would like to argue that the positivistic-analytical trends in Buddhist philosophy represent a departure from the original spirit of Buddhism as spiritual *praxis* and illumination (*dhyāna* and *bodhi*).[4]

Prof. Bugault has spoken at length of the analytical reduction of the self to psychosomatic factors, which is the familiar Abhidharmic doctrine of *pudgala-nairātmya*. That the psychosomatic empirical self is not the real Self, has hardly been disputed in the Indian spiritual tradition but that empirical phenomena do not exhaust human reality is equally undisputed. This comes out in Buddhism through the denial of *uccheda*, the acceptance of *nirvāṇa*, and the doctrine of the inconceivability of the *tathāgata* after death. The negation of the selfhood of the mind and body is intended to detach, purify and elevate consciousness into Buddhahood. One cannot help but feel that Prof. Bugault's love for Abhidharma appears to have distracted him from the contrary implications of original or Mahayanic Buddhism. *Pudgala-nairātmya* would need to be corrected by *dharma-nairātmya*, Abhidharmic *prajñā* by *Prajñā-pāramitā*.

Prof. Bugault raises the most important question which must be answered by the positivistic-analytical understanding of Buddhism—'Given that it rejects spiritualism one would expect it to profess materialism'. That this does not happen is explained by him as due to two reasons. Matter like the spirit is nothing apart from experience. The problem of matter versus the spirit is not well-formulated. Perhaps Prof. Bugault is arguing for some kind of phenomenalistic agnosticism but that opens up a new vista of metaphysical doubts. One wishes Prof.

Bugault had dealt with the question in greater detail. Perhaps he would write an independent paper on this question—If Buddhism rejects spiritualism why does it not profess materialism? And one would like to ask, if it rejects spiritualism, why does it advocate the renunciation of life? How, again, are love and compassion (*maitrī, karuṇa*) compatible with the denial of the person?

Prof. Bugault draws an interesting parallel between analytical Buddhism and contemporary neurophysiology. Perhaps this is the observation to which the origin of his paper should be ascribed. The neurophysiologist seeks to interpret psychic or psychomotor activities in terms of neuronal activities. Human phenomena thus became conditioned or functional. But while the scientist forgets this objective truth outside his laboratory or office, the Buddhist work seeks to remain aware that 'he himself, other persons and all things are not beings but products, less entities or pictures than movies or events. The Buddhist training is a flask of ammonia.'

One would like to ask in all humility—The knowledge of neuronal conditioning may help in the cure of some illnesses, can it re-educate the human psyche? Can any kind of psychological analysis, even if it is Buddhistic, do so? If the delusion of selves and things (*avidyā*) is inveterate, why should it be called a delusion? Should it not be called a possible perspective relevant for some purposes and genuine at some level of experience and behaviour, a limited truth which can be transcended only by the larger truth of spiritual reality called by whatever name—God, Brahman, Dharmakaya.

Notes And References

1. Brewster, *The Life of Gotama the Buddha*, p. 43, where the goal of Buddha's quest is described as 'Nibbana free from birth, old age, disease, death, sorrow and corruption'.
2. Cf. my *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism* (3rd ed.), p. 148.
3. K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, 1963; Rosenberg, O., *Die. Probleme der buddhistiochen Philosophie*, 1924.
4. I have tried to argue this in my forthcoming work, *Aspects of Mahayana* (under pub. by Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath).

Allahabad, U.P. G.C.Pande

Author's Response to Professor G.C. Pande's Comments on 'Buddhist Anthropology'

First and preliminary remark. Our respective purposes are not exactly the same. You perfectly guessed the origin of my paper (p. 114 of your

comments). Prof. Changeux is methodologically and implicitly materialist. My aim was to point out that religion and spiritualism, as closely linked to each other in western minds, are not necessarily linked. For instance, in the case of Buddhist anthropology. I think your concern is rather to show that Buddhism, despite some disagreements about 'the content of belief' with other religions such as Hinduism, Jainism, Christianity, Islam, strives towards an ultimate value. On this I do agree with you and moreover, I add something: Buddhism is not only Indian but Indic, born of Mother India, like Jainism, in contradistinction with Christianity or Islam.

Whatever it may be, I now come to your emphasizing the value-consciousness rather than the content of belief (and also of experience and reason as regards Buddhism). One should neglect neither the former nor the latter. For if one loses sight of the latter, one would get from one side the followers of Lokāyata, the Cārvākas and Nāstikas, and all other people from the other side. Such a dichotomy is obviously too simple. Human reality is more complicated.

Besides, Indian philosophers speak at length of values. But any value cannot be a *gandharva-nagara*, it must rest normally on some foundation (*pratiṣṭhā*), v.g. Brahman. In this respect, the original feature of Buddhism is perhaps to be *apratiṣṭhita*.

A good example is certainly the *ātman/ anātman* debate. I shall start by telling you that I do agree with your illuminating pages on 'The Middle Doctrine Beyond *attā* and *anattā*' (*Origins*..., 2nd edn., pp. 504–10) and your praise of the Mādhyamika approach. I am afraid that, more or less, your comments on my paper are not strictly in keeping with the middle doctrine. For instance, you say that Buddhism 'seeks a goal which is infinite and eternal' (p. 112). Now, one can object that it rejects *śāśvatagraha* as well as *uccheda-darśana*.

Let me stress, in the same way, on another word of your interpretation: Spiritual (. . . 'Buddhism as spiritual praxis', p. 112; 'spiritual reality', p. 114QH). Praxis? Yes indeed. Reality? It is somewhat questionable. But how to translate 'spirit' into Buddhist vocabulary? *Manas, citta, vijñāna* would be suitable for the late school of Cittamātra or Vijñānavāda, only.

As for *ātman*, your masterly account of 'The Middle Doctrine beyond *attā* and *anattā*' shows clearly that Buddhism professes neither *ātmavāda* nor *anātmavāda*. In my opinion, it professes *nairātmya*. There is a subtle but very important hue between *anātman* and *nairātmya*. The former is a dogmatic and negative claim, while the latter is but a negative reply to the former in keeping with the *prasajya-pratiṣedha*.

Therewith, let me put forth another remark—p. 113H, of your comments, about the Buddhist 'neither spiritualism nor materialism'. This fact, you say, 'is explained by him (Prof. Bugault) as due to two *reasons*'. Now you start a discussion on the first (*nāma-rūpa*) but surprisingly enough you forget, by the way, the second, namely the use of tetralemma

and particularly its fourth proposition : neither . . . nor. This kind of reasoning is essential to Buddhist praxis.

Hence you can, in your *Origins* (2nd edn., p. 509), suggest a connection, nay a reconciliation between the Buddhist middle doctrine and the Upaniṣadic *neti-neti*. If it is true, one question arises: Why Siddhārtha Gautama did not follow the Upaniṣadic celebration of *ātman* (*BĀU, ChU*) as *neti neti*? Let me put forward one idea and one assumption.

The idea is we come across the subtle difference between *advaita* and *advaya*. Vedāntic *advaita* is said about the revealed *ātman*, it qualifies a grammatical subject even though apophatically. Buddhist *advaya* does not qualify any subject, any matter. *āryas: tuṣṇībhāvaḥ.*

Is there a key to answer the question 'why Siddhārtha Gautama . . .'? Albeit I found no explicit explanation in Buddhist texts, I think I smell something like this. With the claim for an eternal *ātman* one runs the risk of throwing oneself into this *ātman* and going on, so that one keeps alive some kind of *bhava-tṛṣṇā* unwittingly. As a matter of fact, due to human nature, this risk emerged even among Buddhist monks. If not, Nāgārjuna would have had no need of writing—

nirvāsyāmy anupādāno nirvāṇaṃ me bhaviṣyati/
iti yeṣāṃ grahas teṣām upādānamahāgrahaḥ//
MK., 16. 9

GUY BUGAULT

A Note on the Paradox of Obligation or The Paradoxes of Rajendra Prasad

Prof. Rajendra Prasad in his essay 'The Paradox of Obligation',[1] after analysing the phenomenon of attribution of obligation claims, 'A full blown paradox is clearly sighted here. We said that an obligation to X could be attributed to A only when he had the option to choose between X-ing and Y-ing (or at least between X-ing and not X-ing). But we find that his obligation to X denies him the option to do anything else. This undoubtedly is a paradoxical situation. The concept of obligation seems both to require and to deny or cancel the possibility of option' (p. 11). After spotting the monster lurking on the familiar grounds of morality which we have been treading everyday unawares, he undertakes the Herculean task of killing the monster. But in my opinion, as I shall show, his efforts not only are Quixotic but also in the process generate many more monsters.

The familiar grounds of the moral phenomenon are as follows. When we attribute an obligation to a person we presuppose that there are

alternative courses of action from which he can choose to act. This presupposition, in the traditional literature of ethics, is called the presupposition of free will or metaphysical freedom. When an obligation is attributed, then it is declared that the agent ought to perform the action which is declared as obligatory and were he to choose any of the other alternatives to act, it will be wrong for him to do so. This declaration that were he to choose any of the other alternatives it will be wrong is also called the denial of freedom to choose any of the other alternatives. This freedom is understood as social or moral freedom and not metaphysical freedom mentioned above. For moral freedom, the other terms used are 'liberty', 'permission' etc. The denial of moral freedom or liberty or permission does not amount to denial of metaphysical freedom or free will, since the person can always choose not to fulfil his obligation, i.e. the agent may decide to act wrongly even when he acknowledges his obligation. Since the freedom presupposed and freedom denied when an obligation is attributed to an agent are distinct and separate, there is no paradox to begin with and nobody felt anything paradoxical here. So, how can Prof. Prasad think that there is a paradox here? The reason is that he has confused the metaphysical freedom with moral freedom. So, the paradox is based on a confusion: a confusion if made by the beginners of ethics will be an occasion for censure for not having learnt the lesson well enough.

Let us grant that there was a paradox to begin with, which needs to be solved. The simplest solution is to distinguish the metaphysical freedom which is presupposed from moral freedom which is denied when an obligation is attributed to an agent. As shown above, the tradition of moral discussion has always made the distinction and nobody confused the two to feel anything paradoxical here. But Prof. Prasad does not opt for this solution. This solution is not even discussed in his paper. The confusion must have been too deep so as not to be able to see this distinction. And the reason for this confusion is the language he uses. Let us look at the words he uses to state the paradox, 'The concept of obligation seems both to require and to deny or cancel the possibility of option.' This is to use the language quite loosely. When we use precise language, the paradox vanishes. For the situation Prof. Prasad is alluding to must be stated something like this—'The concept of obligation requires (or presupposes or implies) the existence of alternative courses of action from which the agent can choose to act and declares that it will be wrong to choose to act on any other course of action than the one declared to be obligatory', and the paradox vanishes.

Instead of solving the paradox in the manner stated above, Prof. Prasad tries to solve the paradox by bringing in the idea of 'acknowledging an obligation'. His solution is 'that the obligee's option is not negated or taken away by his obligation. Rather, he himself gives it up by, or in, his act of acknowledging the obligation'. What Prof. Prasad has in his mind

is that obligation requires option, hence obligation does not deny or take away the option since were obligation to deny option, it would create the paradox, so it must be something else which denies the option. And that someone else is the agent himself. The agent himself denies the option in his act of acknowledging the obligation.

But this solution proves to be worse than the disease he has spotted. For his logic of acknowledging an obligation prevents the possibility of intentional wrong doing on part of anybody. If the agent intentionally does something wrong, he acknowledges the obligation and yet chooses the other alternative which is wrong. But according to the logic of acknowledging an obligation, it will amount to denying oneself the option and allowing oneself the option which is a logical impossibility. So, there is no possibility of doing anything wrong intentionally. So, there is no possibility of moral censure or punishment in his theory.

Prof. Prasad is aware of this consequence of his theory. For he writes, 'If the present analysis is correct, a fully conscientious man, on occasion has to be a fanatic because of his unfailingly doing what he thinks he ought to' (pp. 23–24). But his next sentence 'And, if any time he intentionally fails to do it to avoid being dubbed a fanatic, then he would surely become chargeable with immorality' (p. 24), is redundant as the antecedent of the above hypothetical sentence is logically impossible in his scheme of things as argued above. So the paradox is not 'that of the fully conscientious man's necessarily being, at least on some occasions either fanatical or immoral' as claimed by Prof. Prasad (p. 24). The trouble is that there is no logical possibility of intentional wrong-doing. And the force of this charge is not completely captured by the admission 'A fully conscientious man, on occasion has to be a fanatic because of his unfailingly doing what he thinks he ought to' (pp. 23–24) because of the occurrence of the adjective 'fully conscientious', rather what follows from his analysis is that nobody fully conscientious or not can do anything wrong intentionally. So, his theory turns everyone into a moral fanatic.

Prof. Prasad is aware that something has gone wrong with his theory. For he writes 'The second paradox, if real would have very damaging repercussions on the present theory because it has been (allegedly) generated by it. If it generates the paradox, it cannot be a sound theory, if it is not, its solution of the first paradox cannot be accepted because the solution it has proposed has given rise to the second.' (p. 24) But unfortunately even though aware of the difficulty Prof. Prasad fails to spot it correctly or to give an adequate solution to it. For he argues, 'A fully conscientious and unacratic person, by definition, is one who unfailingly does what he feels obligated to'. (p. 24) If he is correct it follows 'A fully conscientious and unacratic person is one who unfailing does what he feels obligated to' is analytic. And any statement true or false implies an analytic proposition. So this is not an implication peculiar to his theory. If it were it would damage every true or false statement. This

is how Prof. Prasad seems to solve the paradox. But as argued above, the paradoxical implication of his theory is that it makes it logically impossible for anybody to do wrong intentionally. This implication that nobody can do anything wrong intentionally is not an analytic proposition and so Prof. Prasad must look for some other solution.

To save his theory from this difficulty, Prof. Prasad cannot take recourse to the idea that a person who does something wrong intentionally does not acknowledge the obligation. For if one does not acknowledge the obligation, then according to his analysis, obligation does not bind, and if obligation does not bind, then he could not have done anything wrong intentionally or otherwise.

Prof. Prasad admits that one may even after acknowledging an obligation may not still fulfil the obligation 'because his obligation to X is not a psychical or physical force which would mechanically push him' to fulfil his obligation and pull him away from not fulfilling his obligation (p. 12). But this admission will not solve the problem for Prof. Prasad. This merely amounts to reiteration of the fact that in ordinary morality there is a possibility of intentional wrong-doing. But the question is how is this possibility admitted within his scheme of things. Let us recollect the paradox arises because obligation both requires and denies possibility of option. To generate the paradox 'denies possibility of option' must be understood so as to contradict 'requires the possibility of option'. And as we understand, obligation 'requires the possibility of option' means obligation 'requires that there exist the possibility of option' and hence 'denies possibility of option' must be understood as 'denies that there exist possibility of option'. If 'denies' is understood in any other weaker sense then there will be no paradox to begin with as argued in the beginning of this note and there will be no need on the part of Prof. Prasad to bring in the idea of 'acknowledgement of obligation' to solve the paradox. So, acknowledgement of obligation denies option, must, according to Prof. Prasad's analysis be understood to mean that acknowledgement of obligation denies that there exists possibility of option. If this is the case, then how can Prasad claim that even after acknowledging the obligation one may still not fulfil the obligation and choose another option, for that will amount to denial of existence of possibility of option and admission of possibility of option which is contradictory? So, once we accept that there exists a paradox and it has to be solved in Prof. Prasad's way and not in the manner outlined above, then there is no possibility of intentional wrong-doing on the part of anybody.

Prof. Rejendra Prasad may try one more way out. He may try to get out of the difficulty by arguing that when it is claimed that a person intentionally does the wrong act, then he is both denying himself the option as well as allowing himself the option, then the inconsistency generated is not the inconsistency of the theory but the inconsistency of

the agent who acts wrongly. So, a person who acts wrongly or decides not to fulfil his obligation, is inconsistent. But this reply will not help Prof. Prasad. If the person is inconsistent in both denying and allowing an option then a state of indecision like the state of Buridan's ass occurs and no action can result. But if an action, i.e. the wrong action is performed by the agent, then we must say that the agent did not really acknowledge the obligation (he merely uttered the words). And if he did not acknowledge the obligation, the obligation was not binding and hence he did nothing wrong. We are forced to accept by the logic of acknowledging an obligation that Prof. Prasad's analysis does not admit the logical possibility of intentional wrong-doing. Prof. Prasad can neither take help of irrationality of the agent nor the acratic will of the agent to solve the problem. For on whatever ground, if the obligatory action does not result and any of the other option is performed, it will suffice us to conclude that the obligation was not acknowledged (even though he might have uttered the words to this effect) and hence the obligation was not binding and hence the agent did nothing wrong in acting the way he did. And we can conclude that Prof. Prasad simply leaves no room for intentional wrong-doing in his analysis.

There is another damaging consequence of Prof. Prasad's analysis of logic of acknowledgement of obligation. If one's own acknowledgement of obligation is ground for bindingness of obligation, then by refusing to acknowledge the obligation one can get out of bindingness of obligation or by acknowledging a wrong act to be one's obligation, the agent can justifiably do any immoral act. Prof. Prasad will readily, without any scruple admits the charge without realizing its damaging potentiality for his theory. He writes, 'There is nothing odd in my saying that he is justified in doing what he does (because he does it thinking that it is obligatory), but what he does is wrong (because his ground for thinking it obligatory is not a good ground)' (p. 13). So, it plainly follows that there is nothing odd in Prof. Prasad's opinion in saying that a person is justified in doing what is wrong. So a person can be justified in killing innocent persons (provided he does it thinking that it is his obligation) although it is plainly wrong or immoral (since he is merely accepting obligation on wrong grounds). Only a person whose moral sensibilities are numbed can admit this. So Prof. Prasad, instead of giving an analysis of logic of obligation or moral language, is distorting it. And the reason for this distortion is confusion of two senses of 'reason'. The word 'reason' is used in many senses in the literature of moral philosophy and philosophy of action. In one sense the word 'reason' is used in contrast to 'cause'. As every event has a cause, every action is done for some reason. If we cannot find any reason for an action then it will not be called an action but relegated to the realm of events and we will look for its cause. When an action is done from reason (whether sufficient, or final or with any other structural adjective) in this sense of 'reason', then it does not follow that

a person is justified in doing what he does since justification involves substantive standards of acceptability of reason. What is final or sufficient reason for an agent need not be acceptable to society on its standards of acceptability and the agent will not be justified in acting even on what is final or sufficient reason for him.

There is another sense of the word 'reason' so that a person who acts on reason in this sense of 'reason', is reasonable and 'reasonable' is used in contrast to 'rational', and hence 'reason' acquires connotations of morality as distinguished from efficiency. When a person acts on reason, in this sense of 'reason', then he is justified in acting on that reason. When Prof. Prasad claims that a person's thinking that X is his obligation is sufficient reason for him to do X, then he is using 'reason' in the former sense of 'reason' and he cannot deduce from this that the person is justified in doing X. If a person is justified in doing X then he is acting on reason, reason understood in the latter sense of 'reason' then his thinking X to be obligatory is not included in reason. So, Prof. Prasad is using the word 'reason' confusing the two senses of 'reason' in his argument.

According to Prof. Prasad, 'A moralist may say that it is not the *agents* acknowledging the obligation, but *his being really obligated*, i.e. the validity of his obligation which should be accepted as his most conclusive reason. But this view would give rise to some very serious problems, both theoretical and practical'. (p. 14) He points out two difficulties. One difficulty is the controversiality of any normative theory of obligation and consequent impossibility of deciding what one should do. Controversiality argument is also used by Prof. Prasad to reject the claim that 'ought' presupposes 'can' in the Strawsonian sense. He argues, 'Strawsonian way of distinguishing between presupposition and implication (or entailment) has itself been questioned by some philosophers'. (p. 7) If controversiality is reason enough to reject a thesis, then Prof. Prasad's paper should be the first casualty of this argument.

The second difficulty pointed out by Prof. Prasad is as follows: '... even if all theorists agree about his being obligated to X, the mere fact that he is obligated would not, in itself, be *his* reason or a reason to *him*, for X-ing unless he himself acknowledges that he is so obligated'. This argument is based on a confusion. Consider the arguments :

(A) I am under an obligation to X. Therefore I ought to X. This is the structure of moral reasoning, and it is valid. The argument remains valid even when it is formulated in second person or third person form. That is to say this argument is valid even if it is formulated in the form.

You (He) are (is) under an obligation to X
Therefore You (He) ought to X.

Prof. Prasad seems to be arguing that unless one acknowledges the obligation one cannot even state the premise in the argument (A). So, he moves to the conclusion that it is his acknowledgement of obligation

which necessitates him to do X. This second step of Prof. Prasad's reasoning converts the argument (A) into the argument

(B) I acknowledge that I am under an obligation to X
Therefore I ought to X.

But this reasoning or argument (B) is invalid. Its invalidity is apparent in second and third person formulation.

You (He) acknowledge(s) that
You (he) are (is) under an obligation to X.
Therefore You (He) ought to X.

In this formulation it is quite clear that the conclusion may be false even if the premise is true. So, even in *my* moral reasoning *my* acknowledgement of the obligation is not a sound reason or ground for *my* necessitation to fulfil the obligation as Prof. Prasad claims. Prof. Prasad's claim is based on a confusion, i.e. the confusion of argument (B) with argument (A).

In spite of all the difficulties that one may spot in his paper, all must agree with Prof. Prasad when he says about his own kind of philosophical analysis, that philosophical analysis 'too liberates the mind from, what may be called, conceptual bondage having wide-ranging effects in several aspects of our cognitive life as well as of our praxis' (p. 26). Prof. Prasad has truly liberated himself from all conceptual bondage and he is not bound any more by the structure of our moral *praxis*. But he need not be bothered by the arguments presented here as they are from a slave of conceptual structure of ordinary moral *praxis*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XI, No.2, January–April 1994, pp. 1–27. All the reference in parantheses are to this paper of Prof. Prasad.

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The Structure and Growth of Scientific Knowledge: A Rejoinder to Virendra Shekhawat*

In the Preface to my book,[1] I said that my first book (1983) had assumed its structure and style, *unintendedly* as it were, 'while all along I had had my eyes modestly set on an essay good enough for a scholarly journal of philosophy'. I can think of no better reminder to the reader of that book to keep constantly in mind the disciplinary matrix of the text the Preface hints at. One can always ask what should be the fate of a book, such as my first book (1983), which has not been written after any of the philosophical

fashions, whether Indian or Anglo-American. The western response, as spontaneous as it was challenging to the author himself, came in its publication making it available through the *Boston Studies* in *The Philosophy of Science*. How about the official Indian response? It did not come from the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* where it was most expected.[2] Dr Virendra Shekhawat of Rajasthan University, Jaipur 'reviewed' the book in the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* (Vol. IX, 1992; pp.183–187), which, according to him, 'is by and large representative of the philosophical activity going on in India' (p.183). But was there enough reason why he should have felt so apologetic at the same time? How many books are received or reviewed even by *JICPR*? I recall my own puzzlement over my book (1983) once it was there, with my Ph.D. thesis still lying unpublished. I could, therefore, easily understand that amazement and that inability to understand the nature of this work, which Shekhawat (1992, pp. 183–187) has expressed at several places. My reaction was naturally one of joy when I learnt unexpectedly that the book had found its reader, if not its historian,[3] in him as a young philosopher. But when I read through the pages of his review, I found that he had approached my book with a design already there in his mind, that he had decided to read it with a different aim and intention altogether. At the very outset, he chose to ignore the golden rule that a serious reader will never deliberately divert the attention of the potential readers from the book which is being reviewed, particularly when the author is still there. As my Preface has made it amply clear, my book is neither about the creation of *science* nor about its origins. Diversity of *its* culture-ideology matrix is also not its concern. In a nutshell, there is nothing to its design which is not built into its text. As the title explains, it is mainly concerned with the structure and growth of scientific knowledge, with methodological models of its appraisal, *within* my own conceptualization and disciplinary matrix. To this end, it was not important for me to ask where I was, and was not, born, educated and brought up. Conceptually, it was too early for me to do so, for it was not until the year 1984 that I first set my eyes on a possible research stay in a university outside India.[4] If I have, consciously or unconsciously, left out topics of great historical importance to those who can truly be counted among the experts of the old Indian science, what harm could I do to others by that?

II

According to Shekhawat (1992, p. 183), I have 'shown more or less total lack of awareness of "Indian sciences such as *Ayurveda* or *Jyotirveda* or *Vyākaraṇa*"'. 'The grave limitation of his (Pandit's) book as we see it,' he claims, 'belonging as we do to an independent culture-matrix, is that it appears like a scene of battle between mercenary and adversary soldiers; it is a fine job that Prof. Pandit has done for Greco-European culture, without giving even the slightest hint that he in fact belongs to, has been

educated and brought up in, a different and independent culture-matrix'. Without being apologetic, I said just now that there was no chance to write my book outside India. It had to originate in India as my post-doctoral work. Given the *disciplinary matrix* I had made my own, what better way was open to me as an academic philosopher to present my credentials within the larger philosophy of science community, where my thoughts were shaping best?

If my book (1983) has offended any member of the present-day philosophy community in India, I must express surprise that that was far from my intention. But that may not satisfy Shekhawat (1992, p. 184) who 'bluntly asks: what contribution does the study make to present-day-Indian philosophy? Indeed, Prof. Pandit had a good opportunity in the publication of this book to draw the attention of western intellectuals to methodological thought in the old Indian sciences from which they could perhaps benefit. We are unable to understand why he so completely ignored them as if these never existed/exist. Does he think that these are not even "sciences" properly so understood?' If I guess correctly from my own experience, the Indian experts who are appointed examiners of Ph.D. theses written in Indian universities have a much better reputation in the formulation of the questions they pose to their candidates. The treatment of the candidate is definitely much better. I was a lecturer when I despatched the manuscript of my first book (1983) to the anonymous referees. At that time, it did not occur to me, as a serious alternative, to submit it for a second Ph. D. from an Indian University. In any case, I am not myself so sure how to answer the first question posed by Shekhawat. As to the last question, I know how generations after generations, even those remotely connected with any academic philosophy, must have again and again asked similar questions. But I don't know of any serious academic debate within present- day -Indian philosophy, although endless debates cannot be ruled out even among experts on old Indian science, who know the original texts so well. Whom do we blame if the exposure to original texts of a particular tradition is not a requirement in the colleges and the universities in India even today? And who has the honesty to admit that it is a serious mistake to ignore the original sources and to confuse disciplinary matrix with cultural-ideological matrix of all serious research? The last question asked by Shekhawat is a glaring case of this kind of confusion. After all, this is a question which may be raised by any intellectual against his/her rivals, even without a look at their own or my work. An attempt to see a necessary connection between the two must have its own compulsions, presuppositions and a well-planned design.

How about the charge against me as the author of my book (1983) : that I have ignored completely that which I have neither promised nor undertaken to accomplish? I can imagine the plight of my reader who is faced with a dilemma of his own creation, the dilemma of reviewing the book in order to divert the attention of all potential readers from it, thereby dividing them according to his choicest, even if highly misguided and misplaced imagery of 'a scene of battle between mercenary and adversary soldiers'. In my opinion, a good book is that which is written, when it is written at all, out of *a necessity of thought*. It will carry the imprint of its disciplinary matrix on the body of its text. The author may be there or may not be there any more. If the text is able to establish a relationship with its potential readers, its main purpose will be served. Author's intentions will not matter then at all.

III

Consider now Shekhawat's (pp.184–187) mis-representation of my picture of science as a picture '*within* and *for* a limited framework of contemporary Greco-European thought on the *specific* Greco-European sciences' as if it was opposed to the 'Indian conception of science as a goal-seeking, method-conscious, theoretic systematization of knowledge in a well-defined area of interest'. The central concepts in my picture are not even mentioned by him. For example, no serious reader of my book (1983) can miss the conceptual framework of general interaction theory and the concept of theory-problem interactive systems conceived as *NFCPS* systems worked out within that framework. Nor is it possible for him/her to pay passing attention to the principle of embedded methodology (Pandit, 1983; Pandit, 1991) according to which epistemology enjoys a priority over methodology such that it is reasonable to demand that

> The methodological models of epistemic appraisal in science must be invariably embedded in sound models of structure and growth of scientific knowledge.

Even before this principle receives the attention it deserves, Shekhawat asks us to imagine its reverse. The dramatic effect on the reader here is just this: that it makes him/her feel as if I had never written my first book. True to his strategy, he (pp. 185–187) keeps focusing on scientific activity conceived, in his picture of Indian conception of science, as 'part of a natural pursuit seeking natural goals, though the modes of its affectivity may differ from culture to culture'. The question which I would like to ask is this: Is it not tautologous to say of scientific activity that it is an activity among other types of human activity of employing appropriate means in pursuit of appropriate ends? Who can deny a universal truth as trivial as this? But that was not my problem. Nor do I deny others their freedom to philosophize about science within such a universal picture. In fact, such type of philosophizing is nowadays a fashion even in the West. As to my own view, I refer the reader of my first book (1983) to my second book on *Methodological Variance: Essays in Epistemological Ontology and the Methodology of Science, Boston Studies* 131 (1991), where I develop

my view in a more detailed manner and with much greater attention than in the first book.

Let me add a concluding word to my rejoinder to Virendra Shekhawat. It has been correctly said that *letting the work be, is in the end the task of the critic, and this is no easy task.* Epistemic structuralism, general interaction theory, the principle of embedded methodology, the methodological evolution of science as seen from the point of view of my methodology of theory-problem interactive systems are among the themes I have explored in *The Structure and Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (1983).[5] And I have argued that in its movements *backwards* from problems to theories, a natural science like physics cannot distinguish the working scientist from the historian of science. Similarly, in its movements *forward* from theories to problems *it* cannot distinguish him/her from the philosopher of science. Thus, it has been my aim in the above work to show that it is a mistake to believe that the question of the structure of knowledge has already been settled.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

* See Virendra Shekhawat, 'Review of G.L. Pandit: *The Structure and Growth of Scientific Knowledge: A Study in the Methodology of Epistemic Appraisal*', D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983, in *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol.IX, January–April, 1992, pp. 183–87.

1. G.L. Pandit, *Methodological Variance : Essays in Epistemological Ontology and the Methodology of Science*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991.
2. I say this for two reasons. First, as early as 1983, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* was the first Indian journal to receive from publishers a review copy of my first book (1983). But I am unaware of any review appearing in this journal. Second, it was in this journal that I first proposed an interactive model of the growth of scientific knowledge (G.L. Pandit, 'Epistemology and an Interactive Model of the Growth of Knowledge', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol.3, 1976, pp. 409–36), in its rather embryonic form, which is not only an important precurser to my first book (1983) but an essential ingredient of its disciplinary matrix.
3. See J. Passmore, *Recent Philosophers* (A Supplement to *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*), Duckworth, London, 1985.
4. When I was teaching philosophy at Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan (1971–74), I narrowly escaped, as I recall from old memories that are still there, a chance in order of seniority for a visit to a University in England under the Exchange Programme in force at the Centre of Advanced Study at that time. In fact I was an exceptional case in so far as I myself lacked sufficient motivation at that time to plan such a visit from Santiniketan.
5. See R. Ingalalli, 'Review of G. L. Pandit, *The Structure and Growth of Scientific Knowledge: A Study in the Methodology of Epistemic Appraisal*', 1983, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, pp. xxii+231, in *The Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol.I, February 1994, pp. 161–66; and Richard J. Blackwell, 'Review of G.L. Pandit, *The Structure and Growth of Scientific Knowledge : A Study in the Methodology of Epistemic Appraisal*, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 73, 1983', *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 38 (1984/1985), pp. 673–74.

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Notes and Queries

Is Nyāya Realist?

We have been happily branding the Nyāya standpoint in metaphysics 'a realist standpoint'. Professor Matilal even called it 'Naive Realism'—with some reservations, when he began his book *Perception* with the pregnant remark: 'Naive Realism is not all that naive.' Yet, if the hallmark of realism is the thesis that truth is independent of the mind, then Nyāya can be shown to be non-Realist by the following straight forward argument.

A. Truth or *yāthārthya* is a property of cognitions in Nyāya.
B. The definition of truth is—'*Tadvati tatprakārakatvam*'—(Being true consists in ascribing that qualifier to an object which actually belongs to it).
C. Now *prakāratā*—which is an essential component of this definition is a kind of *viṣayatā*.
D. A *viṣayatā* cannot exist independently of the cognition which confers this objecthood on individuals, characteristics and relations. And of course cognitions cannot exist independently of the self, or some one's self.
E. Therefore truth *cannot* exist independently of someone's cognition.

Apart from the use of 'truth' as an abstract noun standing for the property of beliefs, (or statements etc.) there is another use of that word in western philosophy; to mean the bearers of truth and falsity, or propositions. The fact that grass *is* green is a truth in this sense. That Nyāya does not and *need not* have any room for mind-independent propositions hanging in a Fregean third realm, I think, has been established beyond doubt (see 'Propositions' by Badrinath Shukla in *Saṃvāda: A Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions*, ed., Daya Krishna *et al.*, ICPR, 1991). So, even in this sense Nyāya does not believe that there is any truth, i.e., any objective content like *that a is f*—waiting to be apprehended by us—but existing independently of our cognition or recognition of them.

Thus, even if Nyāya is not realist regarding truth or propositions, is it not realist regarding concrete particulars and universals and —most importantly—about the tie or relation of exemplification called inherence (*samavāya*)? The answer seems to be unquestionably affirmative. Just notice, as unmistakable evidence, Udayana's long refutation of Buddhist Idealism in the second part of *Ātma Tattva Viveka*. This part is called: 'Refuting the view that there exists nothing *outside* cognition', hence its conclusion must be: Things *outside* awareness do exist. From the first

sentence of this second part of *ATV* it looks as if Nyāya's realism goes to the extreme of claiming that even the self cannot exist unless the external world exists ('As long as the idealist *vijñānavādin* is awake, i.e. unvanquished, there is nothing *outside*, so how can there be a self?'). What could be the meaning of 'outside' (*bāhya*) here? The commentaries unanimously say: '*bāhya*' or 'outside' means distinct from and not of the nature of awareness' (*jñānabhinnam* (Raghunātha) or *jñānanātmakam* (Śaṃkara Miśra). Even the Nyāya self is not *essentially* conscious or of the nature of awareness. Even the self can exist independently of cognition and that is why if, as the vijñānavadin insists, nothing can exist independently or outside of cognition then the self's existence is threatened. That the self can exist without consciousness or cognition is shown by the notorious doctrine of classical Nyāya that in the liberated stage the self sheds all awareness. An awareness inheres in the self and makes an external object its intentional target. But neither its seat (the self) nor its structure-giving object (the external object) is made of or dependent upon awareness. They remain outside awareness.

The crucial element of Nyāya realism, as I have already hinted in the previous paragraph, is its insistence on inherence as an objective cognition-independent entity. Although Nyāya does not believe in *facts* as distinct from qualified or property-possessing rich particulars, the cement of the universe for Nyāya is this relation between universals and their exemplifiers, as well as between wholes and their parts etc. Not only do particular things like apples and non-particular things like their fruitness exist outside anybody's awareness, even the cement between the single apple and the universal fruitness exists outside. We are *very* tempted to say that the *fact that this is an apple* or the *fact that the apple is red* exists independently of the mind. We should resist that temptation because of the Tractarian association with the word '*Fact*'. The Nyāya world is very much a totality of *things* rather than facts; but those things include the relation of *being-in*—which exists outside cognition.

Even after this, the general Nyāya dictum that 'Whatever is, is knowable' (*astitva* and *prameyatva* are coextensive) may mislead us to doubt that Nyāya is thing-realist. These two reminders should keep us away from that doubt. First, to be knowable is not to be *known*. Second, even when something is an object of knowledge it retains, according to Nyāya, its independence of and distinctness from knowledge.

It is true that unlike Buddhism and Advaita, Nyāya leaves no room for the distinction between phenomena or empirical transactional reality and noumena or transcendental reality. But why should drawing such a distinction be a necessary condition for being a realist? True, Locke draws such a distinction, establishing thereby a tradition of Scientific Realism which insists upon a sharp distinction between the commonsense 'manifest image' and the 'scientific image' of things as they imperceptibly are in themselves. But drawing this distinction is surely not a *sufficient*

condition of being a realist, for otherwise Kant, Śaṃkara and Digñāga would all be countable as realists. It is equally unclear why this distinction should be a necessary condition of being a realist about physical objects. To be known or to be an object—even a *direct* object—of awareness is not to be dependent upon or made out of that awareness. Being-an-object-of could easily be an *extrinsic* relation. This is precisely what it is in Nyāya. The awareness *in itself* is formless (*nirākāra*) or neutral. The object is not an inherent part of awareness because when two pieces of phenomenologically distinct cognitions like a visual and tactual perception or a perceptual and an inferential cognition grasp the *same* object, 'the object remains strictly the same'. Thus, realism is maintained through the doctrines of *Pramāṇa saṃplava* (various cognitions grasping the same object) and *nirākāra-jñāna-vāda* (formlessness of awareness) and *not* through some scepticism-tinted conjecture of an unknown cause of sense-data.

Is there any engagement in *Nyāya* with the issue of God's knowledge of objects when they exist unnoticed by us? Of course there is. In an elementary text like *Siddhānta Muktāvalī*, Viśvanātha discusses the issue as a gloss to verse 13 of *Bhāṣāpariccheda* which says that knowability, nameability (and *Dinkarī* says, existence or *astitva*) are common properties of all seven sorts of entities. Notice here that the modal notion involved in 'knowable' when understood in a western way cannot strictly find a place in Nyāya. Therefore, 'Everything that is, is knowable' has to be interpreted as 'Everything that is, is actually known by God' ('knowability is the property of being an object of knowledge. This property is in everything because being the object of God's knowledge is an ommipresent property'—(*īśvarajñānaviṣayatayā kevalānvayītvāt*). It is interesting in this respect that the *Dinkarī* defines 'is-ness' or existence as 'relatedness to time' (*astitvam kālasambandhitvam*).

There is no contradiction between the adjective 'non-verbal' (*avyapadeśyam*) as part of the definition of perception and the claim that everything can be given a name. As Jayanta (who spends an enormous amount of critical reflection on this adjective) explains—this adjective only means that perceptual knowledge—even when it is verbalizable and judgemental—is not word-generated like knowledge by testimony. Even *nirvikalpaka* perception which cannot be expressed in words does not pose a counter-example to the thesis 'All that exists is nameable'. There is the cognition itself which could be called by a word (e.g. the word '*nirvikalpaka*'). There is its object—either the bare qualifier or the bare particular or both which also could be called 'jarness', 'jar' or 'jar and jarness'. We must recall here that the bare object is the same as the qualified object. This is a basic Nyāya principle. A cloaked entity is not *other* than the same entity when it is denuded. What *cannot* be verbalized is, for instance, jarness *as it is cognized in a nirvikalpaka awareness*. But jarness as it is so cognized and jarness as it is cognized in a judgemental

predicative awareness are not *two* objects. They are exactly the same—just as the cup which is seen and the cup as it is touched are the *same* cup. So neither *nirvikalpaka* perceptions nor their objects pose any exception to the rule: *whatever is, is nameable.*

In spite of these obvious responses to Prof. Daya Krishna's worries—and we did not go into how numbers could be dependent upon counting-cognition and yet be objective qualities—there is one genuine point that emerges out of his searching questions. The canonical western characterization of realism as the thesis that objects exist mind-independently is difficult to apply to Nyāya. The notion of mind-independence involves the notion of *possibility*: An object of awareness is mind-independent if it *can* or *could* exist without awareness even if it actually is always the object of some awareness (e.g. God's). Nyāya metaphysics cannot make sense of this empty 'can' or 'could', because nowhere in Nyāya do we find any trace of the idea of possible worlds. But Nyāya still would be resolutely realist in the sense that even constant actual *relatedness* to awareness would not make the object *merge* into awareness. Things, even if all of them are actually known, are not of the nature of knowledge. They are distinct. What is central to this realism is the rejection of the Buddhist idealist rule: If two things are always cognized together, then they are identical (*Sahopalambhaniyamād abhedaḥ*).

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Book Reviews

HAJIME NAKAMURA, *A Comparative History of Ideas*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1992, pp. 572, Rs 250.

'A comparative history of Ideas'—not a 'story of philosophy' which could afford to exclude an entire hemisphere—is, in the author's own words 'an attempt to isolate, describe and analyse certain key philosophical problems that have appeared historically in almost parallel development within different cultural areas, East and West'. The notion of cultural area here has obviously been invoked to avoid the old dichotomy of East and West. In fact one of the purposes of this study itself is to expose the conceptual inadequacy of this dichotomy.

It is evident from the procedures adopted by Prof. Nakamura that certain common intellectual problems have arisen wherever man has pondered over his existence. Some sort of comparative perspective seems to have been available since the earliest times : Megasthenes, for instance, as far back as 300 BC, observed many similarities between the Greek and the Indian way of thinking; and Clement of Alexandria had also asserted that philosophy was universal and could be found among various culturally advanced peoples of the East and the West. The question that is formed in the reader's mind is : Does this work offer more significant insights than the ancient and modern hunt for similarities? Does it alter our perceptions of differences in a significant way that could dislodge the formulations of a Hegel or a Max Mueller—not to mention Kipling, who anyway appears much more elusive than either of the two?

It is quite apparent that Prof. Nakamura's perceptions do go beyond the East-West preoccupation to unfold the history of ideas on a global scale. A cursory glance at the table of contents should suffice to indicate this. The first chapter is devoted to 'Thought in Early Agricultural Communities'. This comprehends considerations like the social background, gods and rituals, man's destiny, cosmic law, dimensions of the search for the Absolute, such as the tendency towards monotheism and cosmogony. The second chapter deals with the 'Rise of Philosophy and Development of Heterodoxies'. The former is discussed under the following heads:

(a) The early critical attitude which gave rise not only to a more intellectual yearning for the Beyond, but also to a re-evaluation of the Gods and the Sacrifice;
(b) Elements such as water, ether or space, wind or breath, fire etc., regarded as the fundamental principle;
(c) The concept of the Absolute comprising such themes as the

Absolute and the self, the identification of the Self with the Absolute, the manifestation of the world from Being as such, the source of Beings, the structures of human existence, the Absolute subject and the deified Self;

(d) Problems of practice. As for the 'Development of Heterodoxies', it deals with (i) two vaieties of materialism; (ii) the pursuit of pleasure; (iii) determinism; (iv) scepticism; (v) asceticism etc.

The period of the development of heterodoxies is related with the rise of Buddhism. And since Buddhist faith eventually became a universal religion, it becomes the dominant theme for the third chapter. The fourth chapter discusses the Features of Mediaeval Thought; and the fifth, the Common Features of Modern Thought.

From these structural details, it becomes obvious that Prof. Nakamura presents his history with Indian thought as the underlying norm for exposition. But as the editor's Preface clarifies, although this is part of the genius of the work, it must not be over-stressed because it is based on the *differences* in traditions. 'The Paradox of Prof. Nakamura's book', according to the editor, 'is that many of the problems of what is called "modern thought" did not manifest themselves in India, China and Japan before the period of "westernization" except in scattered and tentative ways'. The difference itself is expressed thus: 'In place of western scientific orientation, however, very human ethical considerations were often emphasized.'

Now, it is precisely this 'western scientific orientation of philosophy'—that is, philosophy conceived and developed as the conceptual control of the universe which has culminated in the so-called world civilization or the Europeanization of the world. 'Homelessness is the destiny of the world in the shape of world-civilization'—as Heidegger has said. In an essay called 'World Civilization : The Possibility of Dialogue', the late Prof. J.L. Mehta quotes Heidegger thus:

> The homelessness is veiled, however, by a phenomenon which I describe by the phrase 'world civilization', which has erupted into Japan also since a hundred years ago. World civilization, this to-day means : the supremacy of the natural sciences, the supremacy and pre-eminence of economics, of politics, of technology. Everything else is no longer even superstructure, but merely a quite fragile side-structure. It is in this world-civilization, which has in the meantime reached the entire earth, that we stand. It is this that thinking is called upon to discuss and analyse. . . . Homelessness is the destiny of the world in the shape of world-civilization.

This is the situation then, towards the close of this century as we move into the postmodern world, 'away beyond occident and orient and never again Greek', as Heidegger puts it. We are reminded here of Śrī

Aurobindo, who, at the beginning of this century, had underlined the urgent need to correct the serious imbalance created by the undue predominance of western mentality in the universal economy of ideas. It sounds as if that very concern is echoed in the question now asked thus—'Given the dominance of the West, can there be a dialogue between civilizations?' But, as Prof. Mehta has observed in that essay, 'With the falling apart of the fourfold balance and the beginning of the modern age, the very meaning of civilization has changed, though it is only since the end of the colonial era that this change is beginning to be perceived as such.' Prof. Mehta here cites not only Hegel but also Paul Ricoeur and Edmund Husserl. After all it was Hegel, who saw history as a movement toward the goal of the so-called world civilization, which meant for him the melting of all diverse civilizations under the nobler brilliance of the sun of self-conscious reason that had risen on the western horizon. 'This hard doctrine', according to Prof. Mehta, 'is an article of faith which the western academic establishment cannot relinquish without seeming to go out of business.'

For Edmund Husserl too, philosophy and science represent the historical movement through which universal reason, inborn in humanity as such, is revealed. His tone too, is unmistakably Hegelian. For him, European humanity might well prove to be the privileged bearer and fulfiller of an absolute idea rather than being merely an empirical anthropological type like 'China' or 'India'. Similarly, Paul Ricoeur also in his essay 'Universal Civilization and National Cultures' presents the idea of a single world civilization and mankind on the brink of it as not only 'good in itself' but also as a 'gigantic progress for everyone'. It is hardly surprising that Prof. Mehta has attributed such a jaunty air of infallibility to an excessively Eurocentric and rationalistic point of view.

Philosophy as a western enterprise—in its 'scientific' orientation—thus, would appear to have originated in what Nietzsche called 'the Spirit of Socratism', which, in Nietzsche's own words, 'down to the present moment and even into all future time, has spread over posterity like a shadow in the evening sun, as the sublime metaphysical illusion and as the disaster slumbering in the womb of theoretical culture'.

This disaster could be defined as the displacement of meditative thinking by calculative reasoning. Metaphysics cast into such a mould and such a destiny is bound to dissociate itself from the religious-spiritual dimensions of experience and follow its own autonomous course. This is what seems to have happened at an early stage of Greek philosophy—a consequence, in Heidegger's view, 'of a metaphysics which clings to the truth of beings and is oblivious to the truth of Being itself'.

One can easily understand why Prof. Nakamura in this study of the history of ideas from a different perspective has resolutely refused to draw the dividing line between religion and philosophy, which has marked the development of European philosophy from the very

beginning. 'If we insist on being too strict in our definitions', he says, 'we fail to catch many common problems. It is possible that an idea or attitude held by a western philosopher finds its counterpart not in an eastern philosopher, but in an eastern religious thinker and vice versa'. Quite so; for an early divorce between philosophy and meditative-spiritual religiosity can impoverish not only philosophy, but religion also. The author himself has illustrated this : 'Bertrand Russell's, *A History of Western Philosophy* completely ignores the thought of western mystics who have so much in common with Eastern thinkers. Nor were they much discussed in Étienne Gilson's *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages'*. This is quite understandable; but what about our own scholarly behaviour? We had started this review with the comment of Ronald Burr, the editor of this work. According to him, 'many of the problems of what is called modern thought by western philosophers did not manifest themselves in India, China, and Japan before the period of westernization'. But, what about such manifestations after the period of westernization? The editor is, perhaps, not interested in them; but the author certainly is. This is what he has to say about it towards the conclusion of his work:

> Another point of interest discovered is that most of the eminent historical works on Indian philosophy completely ignore modern thought in India. In such famous works as S. Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy* or S. Das Gupta's *History of Indian Philosophy*, few references to modern are found. Probably these authors thought that this area was outside the scope of 'philosophy'. But in India, modern ideas are to be found, albeit in their incipient stages; and the depth and originality of these ideas warrants their coming to light. Probably they are of even greater importance for the future of the country than much of the classical thought.

Now, let us look at just one example of such 'modern'—and even postmodern thinking in India : this is something comparable to Heidegger's phenomenology of the invisible—the responsive gesture on the part of man to a call that comes from beyond him. Was it not Śrī Aurobindo in our own times, who restored and reinterpreted the Vedic insights as well as the mediaeval Tantrism—which Prof. Nakamura finds so unique to the Indian tradition? Was it not Śrī Aurobindo, who, alone amongst modern Indian thinkers had felt the urge to come to terms with the philosopher who stands at the very source—pre-Platonic source—of European philosophy? His long essay on Heraclitus—'The Pre-eminent Philosopher of Becoming'—is a lesson to our own academic establishment. We find Prof. Nakamura observing somewhere in this book that, 'a conception of Fire as the fundamental principle of the universe, such as held by Heraclitus did not occur among Hindu philosophers who sought rather a quiet and calm mental condition' (p.30). But Śrī Aurobindo seems to offer a much more meaningful and original insight into this

matter. I quote from his essay on Heraclitus :

> Heraclitus does not exclude Being like Nietzsche. By his conception of existence as at once One and Many, Heraclitus is bound to accept these two aspects of his ever-living fire as simultaneously true. Heraclitus does not solve the contradiction; but he gives an account of its process. That process he sees as a constant change and a changing back in a constant whole.... Between fire as the Being and Fire in the Becoming, existence describes a downward and an upward movement—'Pravṛtti' and 'Nivṛtti' in Indian terminology.

This is what is called speaking from within a tradition and opening up the possibility of dialogue with the other from there. The poet W.B. Yeats had referred to the 'sinking flame of Indian tradition' and there is tragic truth in that characterization; but there have been individuals who have rekindled that flame within themselves—Śrī Aurobindo being one of them. Only a real insider is capable of such reaching forward to the other. Prof. Mehta in an essay mentioned earlier, had suggested, 'how the modern perspectival mental stage in the evolution of human consciousness appears to be giving way to a new 'aperspectival', arational and integral mode of experience, in which the earlier phases are not left behind but transmuted into a diaphanous present.' This suggestion occurs in the context of an illuminating experience of Jean Gebser, which is akin to the philosophy of Śrī Aurobindo, with whose writing, Gebser was then—according to his own admission—not at all familiar. This draws forth the following comment from Prof. Mehta, which, one hopes is not impertinent in our present context :

> From the massive corpus of Śrī Aurobindo's writings, there comes to us a voice charged with a sense of impending breakthrough to a new dimension of consciousness, of a new beginning for humanity, beyond the determination of civilization, religion and culture, of a step being taken beyond the edge of history and the orient-occident dichotomy. Like Nietzsche before him, Śrī Aurobindo speaks of man as a transitional being, but unlike the former he is not led astray by the nihilistic metaphysical adventure of the Western tradition and can therefore say : 'Man's glory is that he is a closed space and secret workshop of a living labour in which superhumanhood is being made ready by a Divine Craftsman'.

Does this sound too arcane or too postmodern? Does it not relate with the hope expressed in this book that 'these investigations will help to foster the concept of mankind as one?' After all, Prof. Nakamura himself recognizes 'the depth and originality' of modern ideas in India and even suggests the possibility of their being 'of even greater importance for the country's future than much of the classical thought'. One wonders what those ideas are and where they are to be found. Also, whether like our

own historians, Prof. Nakamura too finds writings like those of Aurobindo 'outside the scope of philosophy'.

3/2, Professors Colony, Vidya Vihar, Bhopal RAMESH CHANDRA SHAH

VINIT HAKSAR, *Indivisible Selves and Moral Practice*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1991, pp. xv + 250, Rs 225.

This book has ten chapters and three appendices. There is a good Introduction in which the author gives an overview of his argument. In chapters 1 and 2, Haksar discusses the subjective standpoint *vis-à-vis* the objective standpoint, and importance of the unity of consciousness. In chapters 3 and 4, he clarifies the principle of reasonable belief and that of reflective equilibrium. Both principles are essential to his argument. In chapters 5, 6, and 7, he examines the reductionists criticisms based upon split-brain cases, multiple personality cases and the use of imaginary examples against his own non-reductionist view about the nature of the self. In chapters 8 and 9, he completes his argument that our egoistical concerns and our ideas of justice and desert and moral responsibility presuppose truth of the indivisibility thesis about the nature of the self. In chapter 10, Haksar summarizes his conclusions. The appendices at the end of the book include (A) Nagel on the subjective and the objective, (B) Madell's self, and (C) Persons as perdurers.

Haksar adopts the subjective standpoint. He rejects the objective or external standpoint as inadequate on the grounds that it cannot give us imaginative insight into our own nature; for instance, that we are indivisible selves, or that there is unity of consciousness. It is possible that one is faced with two apparently opposing truths from different standpoints. In such a case, he visualizes the possibility of achieving harmony between the two by using the method of reflective equilibrium.

Haksar is very careful in arguing for the central thesis of the book, namely that we are indivisible selves. For *one* thing, this is an imaginative insight which cannot be established empirically. For *another* thing, the thesis is a defeasible conjecture which it is reasonable to believe in unless there is evidence to the contrary. *Third*, it is a metaphysical thesis as opposed to an empirical one, for no empirical evidence need be cited to confirm or infirm it. *Lastly*, it is a thesis which is presupposed by our ideas of the rationality of our egoistical concern, justice, desert and moral responsibility etc.

Haskar's argument is structured on three pillars:

(1) He shows that the reductionists arguments/evidence, e.g. from the possibility of fission, fusion, and duplication of personality, against the unity of consciousness are not conclusive; they leave the issue open. The reductionists in fact have not been successful in defeating our thesis.

(2) Nor is the reductionists' empirical evidence logically relevant to the metaphysical thesis which asserts the unity of consciousness and the indivisibility of our selves. Thus, the reductionists *cannot* show that our thesis is false. Besides, the reductionists theses go against commonsense and our considered intuitive judgements; and their arguments and evidence make assumptions which are at best hypothetical. If one is to choose between two different theses, one of which is hypothetical and the other actual and an integral part of our conceptual framework of commonsense, then by the principle of reasonable faith one chooses the second and not the first.

(3) The reductionist theses about the nature of the self are inconsistent with the metaphysical thesis of the indivisibility of the self or the essential unity of our consciousness. If the indivisibility thesis is consistent and coherent and comprehensive enough for a large spectrum of our existential concerns, then this thesis has a defeasible presumption in its favour. Notwithstanding this, we still keep our minds open on the possibility of its falsifiability. Haksar does not address himself to the question how is a metaphysical thesis shown false when there is adequate empirical evidence against it. Perhaps, he would accept the suggestion that in such a case the metaphysical thesis is abandoned in favour of a better one and not shown false as a factual description of the world.

Haksar's last argument comes from our actual moral practice which presupposes the indivisibility of the self. This presupposition makes sense of our ordinary notions of reward and punishment, and it underlies all our moral thought and practice. This consideration is indeed persuasive, but it does not establish factual truth of the indivisibility thesis. It is possible for one to construe this presupposition as a constitutive principle of our actual conceptual framework of reward and punishment, justice, and moral responsibility, and also to accept it as true in matters of moral action, judgement, and criticism. When seen as a constitutive principle of our actual conceptual framework, the indivisibility thesis is a *requirement*, not an empirical truth; and it need not be set, as Haksar seems to do, in opposition to the various reductive empirically supported theses about the nature of the self.

Haksar's philosophical writing is clear and direct which makes the book highly readable. Indeed, the work is an important contribution to the ongoing discussion on the nature of the self.

University of Delhi V. K. BHARADWAJ

SUNIL KUMAR SARKAR, *A Critique of Phenomenology*, Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi, 1994.

The present book offers a critical enquiry into Husserl's phenomenology from the perspectives of psychology, existentialism, Marxism, Indian philosophy and also from the author's personal point of view. In the concluding chapters, the author mentions the positive contributions of phenomenology to the contemporary philosophical movements. The book is divided into eight chapters.

Such a book, as I understand, needs a clear view of the doctrine which is to be critically assessed. But the book lacks such an analysis, though some of the characteristics of phenomenology are mentioned hurriedly. Before a short exposition of phenomenology, an idea of the theory is given on the basis of the views from different sources. The views are mainly quotations from different books by different thinkers. But the quotations are not elaborated upon to establish an idea of the theory of phenomenology. In stating the characteristics of phenomenology, 'Phenomenological epoche', 'Eidetic Intuition', 'the Problem of Constitution' and 'Transcendental Idealism' are referred to. But the author has not cared to consult what Husserl says about 'epoche' in his writings and so the positive aspect of the 'epoche' is missing. He does not distinguish between phenomenological reduction and Eidetic reduction, for what he says about the latter applies more appropriately to the former. 'Transcendental Idealism' is not properly explicated and as a result, it remains doubtful, as to how it differs from Kantian Idealism.

In distinguishing between *phenomenalism* and *phenomenology*, the author forgets that Husserl speaks of a return to the 'things themselves'. So we fail to understand how it has nothing to do with reality. Regarding Hume, it is true that Husserl calls Hume's epistemology fictionalism, but at the same time we find that he speaks about Hume's *Treatise* as 'the first systematic sketch of a pure phenomenology'. About phenomenological research in India he mentions only two names who are no doubt leading figures in this area, but he could find other sincere researchers working in the field as well, had he paid attention to the various philosophical books and journals of India. In the section 'Criticism From the Point of View of Psychology', the author compares Husserl with Freud and gives the impression that phenomenological experiences are imaginary, if not neurotic. In phenomenology, the attempt is to gain the reality lost in the process of bracketing and so it overcomes the subjective thrust. It is not true that phenomenological experiences cannot be communicated, for Husserl speaks of an exchange of ideas between the different phenomenologists to establish a universal framework. It has been mentioned that phenomenology depends on introspection. But Husserl understands introspection to be a naturalistic method and as such it is replaced by 'reflection'. It is true that Husserl does not speak of the development of consciousness in human life like the psychologists, but that does not mean that intentionality is not an essential feature of consciousness. It is found that children become conscious of objects even before they become conscious of themselves. I can raise other objections against the author's analysis of phenomenology from the point of view of psychology, but perhaps, that is not necessary.

The section on criticism from the viewpoint of existentialism brings to focus some important points. But here again phenomenology has not been given a fair deal. It is said by the author that phenomenology looks at man partially, while existentialism is interested in the whole man. In other words, Husserl does not regard man in his concrete existence. This may be true of the earlier Husserl, but not of the later Husserl. In the *Crisis* Husserl expresses his discontent against the existentialist understanding of man, as it is a relapse into irrationalism. He wants to establish a concrete rationalism in opposition to the abstract rationalism of science on the basis of the 'Life-world'. But it is strange that the author rarely mentions the 'Life-world' concept of Husserl which binds him to existentialism more intimately.

Perhaps, Marxism is the most important philosophical view to the author, as he devotes more space to the criticisms raised by it against phenomenology. But in the list of the Marxist thinkers cited by him he included Berdyayev who is generally known as an important existentialist thinker. The charge against phenomenology is that it is not a philosophy of action. But later phenomenologists like Paul Ricoeur speak of a phenomenology of action. Husserl in his *Ideas II* analyses the Kinaesthetic experiences in connection with an enquiry into 'I can'. The author wants to criticize phenomenology from the Marxist-sociological point of view. In that case it would have been better if the discussion had been directed to an analysis of the phenomenological sociology, side by side with the Marxist approach to sociology. The name of V.A. Lektorsky is emphasized, as he has pointed out the defects of phenomenology. But his criticism of Husserl's method of free variation is not justified, as it and the ordinary inductive method stand on two different levels. The author has tried to salvage phenomenology admirably in his concluding chapter where he points out that for both Marxism and phenomenology, consciousness is object-oriented, (though this was missed in the critical attack). It is also mentioned that Marx, perhaps, approached the idea of Husserl's 'lived experience', though the explanation is rather obscure.

In the concluding chapter some of the criticisms are, if not withdrawn, given a mellow form, and phenomenology does not appear so guilty, as it was attempted to be shown in the polemical part. In this way the author tries to give us a smooth-shaped phenomenology, though the crack is not fully repaired.

I think that in writing such a book, both the sides, the side of prosecution and the side of defence, must be given equal emphasis. Only

in such a situation can a book like this claim the attention of those who read it. The author has a lucid style and his mastery of language deserves praise. In most of the places he has depended on secondary sources, which is not expected in a book prepared from a dissertation. The aim should be 'to the sources', as Husserl may say. Though the book is not satisfactory in all points, it will evoke curiosity in the mind of the readers, specially for its catchy title. I hope the book will serve a useful purpose in making people interested in phenomenology, in spite of its emphasis on its negative aspects.

Burdwan University, Burdwan MRINAL KANTI BHADRA

W.S. BAKHLE, *Clarity and Certainty: An Introduction to Quine's Semantics*, Dattasons, Nagpur, 1993, pp. 136, Rs 150.

This book is introductory. Bakhle mainly discusses Quine's two important theses (1) the indeterminacy of translation of theoretical sentences, and (2) the inscrutability of reference. The indeterminacy theory states that what is meant by linguistic expressions, words and sentences, fails to be objective in the same way as the facts of nature are. This lack of objectivity of meaning makes the translation of theoretical sentences indeterminate. This connects to the inscrutability thesis according to which there is no one right answer to the questions concerning extension or reference of a term. In short, if the translation or meaning of theoretical sentences is indeterminate, then their reference or extension too remains inscrutable.

In the course of his discussion, Bakhle also examines Quine's views on related topics, e.g. ontological commitment, intensional entities, and opaque contexts. Thus, the book is divided into eight chapters, the ninth is a summing up. These chapters are: Meaning and Reference, Meaning and Translation, Reference and Ontology, Analysis as Explication, Opaque Contexts, Necessity, Propositional Attitudes, and Quotations.

Bakhle's work is a good summary statement of Quine's views; but for understanding them and how he develops his argument for them, one must go back to Quine's writings themselves.

I wish the book were thoroughly edited. Lack of good editing takes away a lot from it. But students of Quine's philosophy should find the book pretty useful.

University of Delhi V.K. BHARADWAJ

UJJWALA PANSE, *A Reconstruction of the Third School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, Sri Satguru Publications, New Delhi, 1990.

It is a bold attempt on the part of Dr Panse, to reconstruct the third school of Mīmāṃsā from very scanty references. It is not sufficient to base the conclusions on the four *adhikaraṇas*, whereas the whole *śāstra* consists of about one thousand *adhikaraṇas*. Citing as internal evidence, the editor has relied on three or four references made by the author, viz. *vivaraṇa, pañjika, naya viveka* etc., this again is insufficient. The external evidences quoted by the editor again are very few, viz. Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, Vardhamāna, Ruci Datta and Jagadīśa of thirteenth century and after a gap of four hundred years, she again quotes references occurring in the works of Gadādhara, Annambhaṭṭa, Viśvanātha, Rāmarudra, Gāgābhatta and Ramakṛṣṇ Adhvarin—all belong to seventeenth century AD. There is a complete absence of any reference between thirteenth century to seventeenth century—both internal and external. During this period great Mīmāṃsā scholars have written famous works which are studied by scholars, viz. Śālikanātha Miśra, Pārthasārthi Miśra, Parithoṣa Miśra, Bhava Deva, Bhaṭṭa Someṣwara and others.

There is complete absence of any reference to Murari Miśra in the works of intervening authors mentioned above. How these authors who have written commentaries on *Ślokavārtika, Tantravārtika* etc. as also independent works, overlooked a scholar who has established a third school of Mīmāṃsā and earned a name for himself. This is a mute question to be answered.

It was alright for Dr Panse to work on this topic for her Doctoral thesis but to print that thesis and try to reconstruct the third school of Mīmāṃsā based on such scanty references amounts to treading a path where angels fear to tread. We appreciate her enthusiasm, but the present work cannot be called a reconstruction of the third school of Mīmāṃsā; she has to work hard to unravel further material which may substantiate her statement.

Subject Scholar, Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi. SAMPAT NARAYANAN

NIRANJAN MOHANTY, *The Philosophy of Thakur Sri Abhiram Paramahansa*, Sriguru Prakashini, Puri, 1987, pp. 144.

In his book, *The Philosophy of Thakur Sri Abhiram Paramahansa*, Niranjan Mohanty has done a commendable job in systematizing a philosophical system from the sayings of one of the noted mystic saint of Orissa, Sri Abhiram Paramahansa. Mohanty has made it clear in his Preface when

he writes in a modest way, 'one does not get a ready-made philosophical system straight out of his (Sri Abhiram's) works. He has never consciously tried to systematize his thoughts into a unitary whole' (p. 8). However, Mohanty claims to delineate a coherent logical picture of thoughts embedded in Sri Abhiram's mystic utterances.

It order to articulate a non-dual, monistic philosophy of Sri Abhiram, Mohanty in the first chapter of his book makes a survey of the religious and philosophical traditions of Orissa, just to trace out their bearings on Sri Abhiram's philosophy, specifically on his principle of total offering, *Samarpaṇa-sūtra* which aims to bring an identity of the *jñāna, karma* and *bhakti yogas*. Here, Mohanty refers to five cross-currents of philosophical speculations. First, according to him in the Nāganti tradition of the Mādhyamikas, the concept of supreme silence plays an important role where, 'the destruction of plurality and clamour of conceptual conflict is totally absent' (p. 14). Second, in the Vedāntic tradition, which establishes monism, 'the Supreme Reality as Purushottama, harmonizing *kṣara* and *akṣara* is the ultimate goal of all our Spiritual endeavour' (p. 22). Third, in the Yoganti tradition, two levels of reality—one the transcendent and the other phenomenal, Śiva and Śakti, are not two but one and the same Reality. Fourth, the Siddhānti tradition of Buddhist Tantra also propounds the concept of Universal equality (*samatā*) which establishes a transcendent non-difference (p. 28). Lastly, Mohanty holds Śrī Caitanya's *Prema-Bhakti* tradition and also the *Laya* and *Līlā* tradition of the Pancasakha's which clamoured for nothing but a monistic order in the universe. According to Mohanty, in the background of the prevalent philosophical speculations of Orissa, Śri Abhiram also sought to preach a monistic order in his sayings.

The second chapter of the book is devoted to an interplay of *Laya* and *Līlā* as enunciated by Śri Abhiram where the *layātmaka* or negative aspects of reality and the immanence or the *līlātmaka* or the positive aspects are explained. It seems there is nothing new in the sayings of Śri Abhiram to emphasize the transcendence or the *layātmaka* and the immanence or the *līlātmaka* aspect, as such descriptions of Brahman from the Upaniṣad downwards are amply available in the theistic Indian philosophical systems. However, the novelty of Sri Abhiram's sayings lies in their mass appeal. Mohanty brings in Bernard William's 'Tertullian's Paradox' to express the simultaneous expression of immanence and transcendence of reality without working out the analogy in detail. In the third chapter the discussion on 'an elaborate cosmology in the pattern of Sāṁkhya and Vedānta' (p. 68) has been undertaken. Sri Abhiram holds a sameness between the individual form and the cosmic form of the Absolute. The non-difference between the *bhakta* and *Bhagavāna* has been asserted by him in his sayings. It seems the *Jiva, Jagat* and *Brahman* have been intermingled in Sri Abhiram's writings though they belong to different levels of reality and Mohanty did not make any attempt to bring out the difference.

The fourth chapter devoted to *Samarpaṇa-sūtra*, Mohanty claims, is probably the unique contribution of Sri Abhiram according to whom *'jñāna, karma* and *bhakti yogas* lead to the same end, i.e. to the non-dual absolute' (p. 84). Mohanty also holds that Sri Abhiram prescribes the method of *niṣkāma karma* (p. 90). There are many paradoxical statements in the mystical utterances of Sri Abhiram in his attempt to identify the three yogas, but he is clear in saying 'the end of all these yogas is same i.e. the realization of *abhinnata* or non-difference with the Supreme Reality' (p. 100). It seems faith, realization and self-knowledge do not comprehend a positive, empirical philosophy of action. The last chapter discusses universal sameness (*samata*) in the line of Pancasakha tradition of Orissa which equalizes the form and the formless.

The book is appended with a life-history of Thakur Abhiram Paramahansa but does not provide an Index. However, such a shortening should not undermine the project, i.e. the systematization of a popular philosophical speculation of Orissa.

Dept. of Philosophy, Government Women's College, Puri. RANJIT GHOSE

BHARAT GUPT, *Dramatic Concepts—Greek and Indian*, D.K. Publishers, Delhi, 1994, pp. 215, Rs 290.

This book is in effect a critique of the *Bharatanāṭyaśāstra* (the *NS*) and Aristotle's *Poetics*, but more of the former than of the latter. What's important in dealing with the *NS* isn't just the bare concepts themselves but rather the way the histrionic art materialized itself in actual performance and the broad cultural implications of such theatrical activity as a whole. One often notices an initial difficulty at arriving at it: those who have the necessary competence in Sanskrit scholarship seem curiously handicapped by too narrow and exclusive a vision. While those who can see things in a broader and a more dynamic perspective are likely to be hamstrung as much by their too close an identification with the western *ethos* as by their estrangement from Sanskrit.

That's where Dr Gupt has a distinct advantage. His facility with both Sanskrit and Greek imparts a certain authenticity to the discussion, keeping close to the original terminology, as he says, even at the cost of risking 'the odium of pedantry' which in fact handsomely pays off. In the same way, though the emphasis remains on the *NS*, the theme gains by the added dimension of comparison with the Greek system. However, the method of comparison isn't that of juxtaposing a concept from Aristotle with a parallel one from Bharata as has been done hitherto. What is attempted, as the Preface explains, is to place the two theories

'within the common framework of ancient Indo-European culture and *heiropraxis* or sacred drama for which they were formulated.' This brings up the difference between the modern sense of drama as a word-centred performance text and the ancient view of it as a performance conveyed through a system of visual and aural sign language. The movement has been from semiotics to lexis. The author does well to bring out this difference as a starting point set out in the Preface and Introduction. It also, in a sense, holds the key to the entire inquiry.

Accordingly, the characteristics of the *heiropraxic* drama, both Greek and Indian, are spelt out. The visual was not regarded as representational but as a sign language—all gestures and body movements being codified modes of action which had well-known meanings in their cultural context. A major part of it was dance which was both worship and dramatic representation. The aural content too had a wide range modulating from speech to intricate song. The visual and the aural were integrated to produce a theatrical reality not meant to reflect directly upon the world but designed to be meaningful and absorbing in itself. This unified construct of music, dance, semiotic gesture and speech (lexis) constitutes the 'text' of the drama. So that the *Poetics* and the *NS* needed to be compared as performance modes rather than as theories applicable to dramatic *genres*. For too long had criticism 'regarded dramatic tradition as nothing more than growth of literary *genres*,' assessing them in literary terms as though drama were only prose and poetry in the mode of dramatic narrative and the performatory aspect merely an adventitious embellishment! The preponderance of the verbal discourse in the European theatre has meant a habit of mind which if carried over would vitiate our view of the drama of antiquity. This point is well taken early in the book.

In the body of the work there is evidence of some sound scholarship and competence in various areas, notably Indian musicology and choreography, not to mention an in-depth study of the *NS* itself along with the tradition of Indian aesthetics. This is combined with western scholarship relevant to Greek drama and dramaturgy generally. The range is impressive. For instance, considerable evidence is adduced to place Bharata Muni's *NS* around 450 BC, bringing it in historical proximity to the *Poetics* and placing both in the era between the sixth and the third century BC, when the intellectual gains of the 'axiological' revolution were being consolidated so that the flourishing of the Indian and the Greek dramatic traditions could be regarded as an expression of that global movement.

By way of sketching the background for the comparative study there is first a brief scrutiny of 'beliefs in Greek and Indian drama'—what for instance anthropologists have characterized as the most distinctive feature of Indo-European culture, its preoccupation with 'pollution and purity' connected with primitive rituals of loss and restoration of vitality.

This dynamism of pollution and purity is an ingredient of both the Indian and the Greek cultural patterns. So also things like ancestor-worship, the idea of re-incarnation, the power of oaths, oracles, curses, the continuous cycle of *yugas* and 'beginnings taking place all the time'—*pralaya* being not an end but suspended animation, a waiting to be reborn. . . . How does the force of thought and feeling that is implicit in these beliefs determine the style of dramatization? An important factor that helps answer that question is drama's identification with *festive ritual* which next receives a fairly extended consideration in the book.

Festivities held on auspicious days had the purpose 'unambiguously to celebrate the visitation of something greater than man. Theatre was an integral part of this event.' In Europe, festive drama had died with the morality play, and the Christian Church was inclined to look upon *mimesis* and impersonation as an act of ontological sin. At the same time, it was natural for a desacralized culture to create a dichotomy between ritual and entertainment. And that dichotomy, it would seem, has now become virtually universal. It is true that with the recent spurt of anthropological interest in myth and ritual, (as in Frazer) there was an attempt in the West to see myth, ritual and drama as links in a continuous chain, but that only betrayed a Darwinian mind-set.

Dr Gupt appears to feel strongly about the way the Indian scholar's uncritical acceptance of the lexical and verbal norms of the desacralized European theatre has estranged him from the roots and genius of his own tradition. There is perhaps warrant for such a supposition and cause for concern. Under the tutelage of western scholarship all the prejudices of the realistic theatre tend to be taken over. Drama is viewed as a purely secularized entertainment, and dialogue as its most essential element. Dr Gupt however maintains that the dichotomy between ritual and entertainment isn't a feature of the Indian tradition even today. Whether the North Indian *Ramleela* performance, for instance, is worship or entertainment is simply an absurd question to ask for the audience as well as the players themselves. As to the more general question, 'How does ancient drama differ from the modern secular one if both are performed to entertain?' the answer is: it differs in a very vital way. The ancient theatre sought to please both gods and men. . . . To please divinity and humans simultaneously was quite in harmony with the very nature of a festival in which the sacred and the profane came together. As noted by many, the feast is a twilight time, a 'liminal state', when an abnormal situation takes place, when profane time changes into sacred time.

For such a purpose the basics of the theatre of sacred action (*heiropraxis*) have to be very different from those of secular drama of today. To substantiate this claim, the detailed critique of the two ancient systems of drama that is offered is specially noteworthy for a deep scrutiny of the *NS* bringing out its classificatory verve as much as the probity and reach of its enunciations. Two or three issues dealt with in the course of it might

indicate the author's striking contribution and the quality of his perceptive comment.

One of these is the long standing controversy about the '*Nāṭyadharmī*' and '*Lokadharmī*' modes. The common tendency has been to regard *lokadharmī* as folk art, folk music, folk drama (as in folk traditions like *Bhavai, Yatra,* and *Yakshagana*) and *Nāṭyadharmī* to be classical theatre. It has also been assumed often that *lokadharmi* drama would have leanings towards realism and realistic histrionics. Both these suppositions are strongly discounted here. The 'dharmīs' are seen to be modes of theatrical transformation of reality. 'Where the transformation is simpler and the natural world can be traced in it, the production is called *lokadharmī*, but where it succeeds in creating a world of its own through complex transformation, the production is said to be *nāṭyadharmi*. True, both the modes use लीलांगहाराभिनय । The only difference seems to lie in the degree of artistic sophistication. In the one it is minimally present, whereas the *nāṭyadharmī* is 'the farthest take-off into imagination and adornment', and through intricate gestures creates for *nāṭya* a world of its own.

The question however remains. If this be all, it is difficult to see why the *NS* should seem to be warning us not to neglect the *lokadharmī* mode, for that is obviously the purpose of those repeated references to it. And so, notwithstanding the explanations offered here, the contrast between the two *dharmīs*, the terms themselves and their use in the *NS*, does carry some of the nuance of the 'elite-popular' confrontation, and inevitably so. One feels no need for such reservations when Dr Gupt speaks of another important aspect of the Indian theatre, which also happens to be a neglected aspect of Indian dramaturgy—the use made of the '*Dhruva*' songs in drama. Apart from their use as part of the पूर्वरंग which is chiefly a matter of ceremonial, these were sung or enacted through dance at certain points in the action such as the entry or exit of a character, or after enactment of violent disturbances or unexpected changes of mood as when someone has fainted or is deeply dejected, and so on. These songs weren't a part of the playright's text (*lexis*) but were inserted by the producer as part of the performance technique—the right kind of song at the right occasion—with due regard to the situation, characters and the emotional state to be evoked.

What is truly significant is that their verbal content wasn't directly related to the particularity of the scene to be enacted. They didn't elaborate, comment upon, or spring from the immediate context. That way they were a sort of musical interference. Except that their relevance was of another kind, being concerned, as the name '*Dhruva*' itself suggests, with a stabilizing factor that had a distinctive artistic impact. In fact, a '*Dhruva*' was a literary composition on the sun, the moon, the stars, the clouds, the sea, elephants, swans, cuckoos, bees and the like. One of these creatures described in its sad, love-lorn, frightened, happy or excited

condition would chime with the dramatic situation being staged. Thus, for example a *Dhruva* describing a destructive wind, shrieking and pulling up trees might precede a furious ascetic's entry or a prince setting out for battle. A love-lorn swan's song may herald a Vasantasena's tryst with a Charulata or an owl mauled and chased by crows might be the precursor for the flight of a disreputable gambler from the gambling den!

What is the principle on which the *Dhruva* song works? The quotes from the *NS* which Dr Gupt provides seem to ascribe a deeper basis to the phenomenon: 'That which cannot be said through speech should be said in song.' A certain emotional state is to be aroused to usher in a certain enactment. What the *dhruva* does to convey that precise feeling is to sing about something not too close to that scene, something simple, more universal, large and soothing . . . what relaxes the mind by evoking an image of circumambient nature. And it is a song. The essential element in the juxtaposition seems to be an *analogy*. An analogue is provided to reinforce and also to offset the coming human scene—music and contemplation mellowing its action. Dr Gupt remarks: 'The *Dhruvas* brought on to the stage the whole world of nature as all the simulators (*upamānas*) like the sun, the moon, wind, mountains . . . came from it . . . Man and Nature are thus made to reflect the same reality.'

This has an important bearing upon the central theme of the whole book. A comparative study of Greek and Indian dramatic concepts must come to terms with an interpretation of Aristotelian *mimesis* alongside the *NS* notion of अनुकरण. It is recognized that *mimesis* and अनुकरण are ideas of independent origin, and it is argued that imitation always retains the sense of 'copy' being by definition of an inferior status to the original. This is so not only in the Platonic formulation but also in Aristotle's *Poetics* despite the 'enriching' interpretations commentators like Butcher ascribe to his pronouncements. On the other hand, though the term अनुकरण literally means an activity (करण) in accordance with something else (अनु) its nuances are entirely different from those of *mimesis*. Its success or otherwise is judged not in terms of representation of the world but by its capacity to create a new world. The model is forgotten as soon as the creation is complete. Verisimilitude and realism are expressly ruled out. This is specially stressed by the nature of the medium employed. The resulting कृति is a new world, independent and self-sufficient.

This is where the principle of 'analogy' functioning in the Dhruva songs has pertinance— what should help us understand the nuances of the Indian term अनुकरण right. In the *NS* itself there is indication of the inadequacy of translating अनुकरण as the equivalent of *mimesis* or imitation. The term is used in various combinations like भावानुकरण, अवस्थानुकरण, त्रैअेवयावस्थानुकरण and so on. Moreover, अनुकीर्तन is used synonymously with अनुकरण, though with its nuances of 'telling or narrating', 'publishing or proclaiming', it extends the meaning to possibly include the kind of

cognitive and emotional resonance that an analogy can create. Dr Gupt notices the difference between the two terms but the implications need to be spelt out.

A cultural resource text like the *NS* calls for a high degree of both learning and imaginative sympathy for its elucidation. Without introducing distortion to make it available to modern sensibilities, isn't easy. This is something Dr Gupt has tried to achieve with his competence in Sanskrit and Greek and critical acumen no less. An empathetic closeness to the ancient Indian point of view is one of the book's attractions. All in all, here's a commendable piece of scholarship, at once authentic and illuminative. However, for all the insights and intimacy, this pondering on the dramatic systems of the past could remain just an academic exercise, may be, an admired museum-piece but of little direct relevance to the present. Unless, of course, we take a more comprehensive view of modern drama itself.

True, there has been a sharp break between those past peaks of excellence and the European drama since the Renaissance; but to look upon the flourishing of the realistic theatre of the West as a sort of *negative* development would hardly conduce to bringing 'the old-fashioned topic within the perspective of contemporary thinking'. Individualized character portraiture has now become almost the mainstay of the speech-oriented realistic theatre of modern days. It has its own excellences. Even a Hamlet, the Prince, need not be dismissed (as he tends to be in the context of the discussion here) because his mental stance does not correspond to the Aristotelian 'ethos'—the ability to make (instant?) moral choices. Shakespeare is indeed so like the obvious validation of the new emergent dramatic *genre*. And curiously, Shakespeare himself in his later Romances turns towards myth, music, dance and spectacle, reminiscent of the earlier theatre modes. The new *genre* has to receive its due. What's more, individualized character portraiture too can become an effective vehicle for *rasa* evocation—all the better for being so individualized. That might well become a new dimension of the *NS* mode of drama-as-performance.

In the same way, what has now become a universal habit of mind, namely, the shift towards the lexis-oriented literary text, has come to stay as an integral feature of modern theatre. What's important is a positive attitude to theatre activity as a changing living entity, if we wish to place it in the perspective of contemporary thinking. This may not be so difficult in the context of the Indian theatre where the break has not been that complete, with several folk traditions still surviving. One can imagine the Indian drama, absorbing the enormous impact of the European practices, may still retain its uniqueness. The *Epilogue* at the close of this book sees little hope of such a prospect—in fact, sees the Indian theatre 'groaning under the yoke of European realism' powerless to free itself of the western impositions.

It is still possible that belying these gloomy prognostications a new balance in the use of various communication media of the theatre can be achieved. After all, *genres* aren't immutable. A living culture may eventuate a mutation within the magic circle of theatre as in other areas outside it.

V.Y. KANTAK

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN and V.C. THOMAS (editors), *Perspectives in Philosophy, Religion, and Art: Essays in Honour of Margaret Chatterjee*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 250, Rs 175.00.

The book under review contains a collection of essays written in honour of Margaret Chatterjee. The editors, R. Balasubramanian and V.C. Thomas, besides writing a detailed introduction, contributed an essay each to the volume. The collection bears no direct reference to Margaret Chatterjee's writings. However, the themes covered—philosophy, religion, and art,—are all related to her major interests.

Each essay is thematically complete in itself and unconnected with the rest. This denies the reviewer an opportunity to view the book from a definite perspective and evaluate it. However, it is possible to characterize these essays negatively as belonging to the non-positivistic school of thought. Positivism would have easily branded them non-philosophical. Some of the themes that are covered in these essays are: self-integration, inter-subjectivity, friendship, authenticity, meaning of life, intuition, quest for *ātman*, edification, creativity, inter-faith dialogue, love, experience. Most of the essays seek to reassert the rejected domains of thought by positivism. However, each reassertion caught within the format of an article remains isolated and fragmented.

R. Balasubramanian and R.A. Sinari's articles highlight the importance of mind and *ātman* respectively. Balasubramanian, in stark contrast to the sociologism accepted by the dominant modern western theories, advocated the centrality of 'mind' and 'self-integration,' in bringing out social integration. The author draws heavily from Bhagavat Gītā, Saṅkara's, untings, Upaniṣads and concludes that, 'self-integration and social integration . . . can be achieved through a disciplined mind.' Sinari's essay, 'The Quest for *Ātman*', deals with a primordial problem of philosophy, human subjectivity. Contrasting the denial of human subjectivity by the 'positivist-behaviourist-mechanistic philosophies', he demonstrates the importance of subjectivity in phenomenological-*ātma-logical* approaches.

The papers by Andre Mercier and Raimon Pannikar discuss different aspects of inter-subjectivity. Mercier introduces the distinction between 'person', defined as personal part of the individual, and 'subject',

defined as impersonal part of the individual. He attributes 'love' to persons and states that love can be non-reciprocal. Subjects, on the other hand, are capable of having friendship, which by its very nature is reciprocal. From this he concludes that friendship, not love, is the genuine ground of inter-subjectivity. Pannikar's article distinguishes three aspects of linguistic inter-subjectivity: knower, known and the knowledge. He argues that none of them can be reduced to any of the other. This is succinctly stated by him when he says:

> Each of them represents a different and irreducible mode of reality. The confusion of these three forms has played havoc in many a culture, especially in the modern 'scientific' culture dominated by the one single paradigm of the 'third person' (p. 35).

Further, there are two papers discussing the notion of authenticity. E.A.Moutsopoulos elucidates different facets of philosophical authenticity. V.C. Thomas on the other hand, gathers and interprets existentialist's views on authentic individual existence and temporal existence. The discussion is broadly confined to the discussions of Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Heidegger. For Thomas, true subjectivity is neither mere togetherness nor the transmission of meaning or emotion through language and bodily expression. It is an exchange of being and an emphatic understanding of other's troubles, and realization of one's own destiny. These features of subjectivity, according to him, cannot be accommodated within the existentialist account of self, except in Marcel.

The essay by J.N. Mohanty adds a new dimension to the book. Mohanty refutes the conventional distinction between Western philosophy and Indian philosophy. The former is identified with logic and the latter with intuition. Contesting this received formulation, he shows those instances where, 'Western thinking constantly sought to go beyond logic to the foundations of logic in the structure of subjectivity that itself is reflectively accessible' (p. 85). Regarding Indian philosophy, he notes that, Indian philosopher as a philosopher no more or no less exercises any intuitive grasp or achieves an intuitive experience than his Western counterpart.' (p. 87). However, Mohanty does concede some important distinctions between Western philosophy and Indian philosophy. He nevertheless refutes any clear-cut and coherent distinction between intellect and intuition.

Here it may be noted that to blur the distinction is to correct an epistemological blunder. It is, however, equally important to probe into the origins of this distinction and ask, 'why this distinction?' Mohanty does have an answer when he acknowledges that, 'At a time when the nation was struggling towards political autonomy, this stance (i.e., Indian philosophy is spiritualistic, hence, different from and superior to Western philosophy) helped sustain our self-confidence and our hope for an autonomous intellectual perspective on things.' (p. 83). This actually is

a response from the Indian point of view. As a matter of fact, the distinction was introduced by the West—and Edward Said might allege that it served a political purpose of morally justifying colonialism. Mohanty in this paper does not probe into this aspect of the distinction. How does he analyse the origin of this distinction? His response to this aspect of the debate—given his background both in classical Indian philosophy and phenomenological tradition—could have contributed new themes for discussion in contemporary Indian philosophy.

In the section on religion, Leroy S. Rouner states the difficulties in reconciling dualism (Christianity) and non-dualism (Advaita). He declares his preference for dualism. He says, 'My own position is necessarily dualistic because I am a Christian.' (p. 134). In the second essay, Ursula King argues for a contemporary need to 'pursue a theological probing of the religious meaning of pluralism by relating our seeing, feeling, thinking, acting and praying to more than one mode of being.' (p. 159). While Mercier in an earlier essay rejected love as a proper ground for inter-subjectivity, Rex Ambler identifies it as both an essential and distinctive feature of Christianity. The third essay by Peter Della Santina, seeks to dispel the existing antagonism,—largely created by the 'rigorous application of the analytical method,'—between the two Mahāyāna schools of Buddhism, namely, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. He, in turn, establishes their complimentarity.

The third part of the book has two essays on art. The first one by S.K. Saxena, explores the intricacies involved in John Dewey's attempted relation between the artistic and the every day experience. The last paper by Ranjan K. Ghosh warns any attempt by art historians to reduce the aesthetic value into mere social facts. In such attempts, according to him a work of art ceases to be art and becomes a text.

One can find in this book various projections of positivism and various attempts at coming out of it. The book is of interest to both general readers as well as the students of philosophy.

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ASHOK K. GANGADEAN, *Meditative Reason—Toward Universal Grammar*, New York, San Franscisco, Bern, Baltimore, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Wien Paris, Peter Lang, *Revisioning Philosophy*, Vol. 14, 1993, pp. XXIX+387. Price not indicated.

History of philosophy reveals various sorts of practices of philosophizing. Broadly speaking, philosophical practice is carried on either in a global style or in the form of a micro-investigation. Both of these styles are motivated by different kinds of concerns and have led to various

ramifications. Global style when motivated by ontological concern has led to the search of some basic constituents of all that there is in an irreducible form, when motivated by epistemic concern it has led to the search of a unified theory having overall explanatory deductive systems (in themselves of very different kinds—Spinozistic, Hegelian inspired positivist ideals of unified science exemplify some of them), when moved by ethical or valuational ideals then manifesting in the search of a basic *telos* which would explain the entirety of existence on the one hand and would provide orientation to human life on the other thus leading to a kind of transformative philosophy. Micro-investigation has manifested itself in deep analysis (linguistic, conceptual or logical) of specific and sometimes isolated problems in the various areas of philosophical enterprise.

Meditative Reason (*MR*) by Ashok K. Gangadean (AG) presents philosophical efforts in the global style in which ontological, epistemic and teleological concerns seem to coalesce and which remind the reader of either Greek (specially Platonic) or Indian (specially non-dualistic and spiritualistic) motivations. AG offers a point of view which while claiming to be non-dualistic, remains an anchor for all possible plurality. However, the adjective 'meditative' remains obscure throughout. Either it is left unexplained intentionally or the very nature of meditation may have prevented a precise formulation, I am not too certain.

Gangadean begins by noticing that there has been 'in the global evolution of cultures' a 'perennial and universal theme'—a belief that there is and must be a primordial 'origin' as a foundational source of whatever is there (xi). These cultures include not only Judaic-Biblical, Christian, Islamic, classical Greek, Asian but also Native American and African ones. More specifically in the Indian context, the intuition of the First or the Origin is 'the very essence of Vedic Scriptures and *Upaniṣadic* texts', '*AUM*' the foundation and origin of all names and forms, of all that exists, of all life and intelligence and discourse.' (xi) Gangadean points out that 'effective and intelligible comparative judgements between the discourse of Derrida and Nāgārjuna, or between Heidegger and forms of Zen, etc.', which are legitimate and illuminating to make, indicate a 'universal common ground out of which eastern and western thought has emerged'. If this is so then the issue of the origin needs to be more consciously thematized. (p. 2)

The intuition of the First and its articulation has played out in a magnificent diversity of narrative forms across the range of global culture—the Way of Heaven of Confucius as the revelation of Universal Moral Law, Tao of Lao Tzu as the Absolute Unitive Nameless Field, the original vital force as informing the Bantu religion, Buddhist *Śūnyata* as an indication beyond all objectification, the Infinitely Unitive nature of the Living God, Spirit or Word as it resonates in Judaism, Christianity or Islam, Plato's Good and so on. (xii) Since the Origin '*functions pragmatically*

and *existentially* as the presiding moving force that brings order, regularity, coherence, unity, diversity and relationality to the universe or universal field of reality', the 'diverse alternative strategies, methods and narrative attempts', 'to make sense of things', express 'Natural Reason' (which is no different from Meditative Reason) and its 'Universal Law' (xii -xiii).

The author, however, is fully aware of the great disparity between the pervasive belief in an origin and source of life, order, intelligence and beauty on the one hand and the pathological deviations, evil machinations and destructive tendencies which largely characterize the life we live. 'Despite the recurring Universal and Unitive theme at the heart of diverse cultural forms of life, the provincial, parochial and localizing ethnic forces in cultural practices work pragmatically to discourage, undermine or abort the full flourishing of the Universal Force of Natural Reason. . .' (xiii). Our attempt to think and speak across cultures to identify the universal patterns across cultures or religions are dashed against the 'walls of localized languages and particular grammars of culture and experience which tend to displace, resist and eclipse the real universal common ground . . .' (xiii). These walls come to be erected because of rigid identities or what may be called egological mindings. Artificial limits and barriers are raised leading to 'closure, blinders' binding the mind in 'dogmatic ways' (xvii). Meditative technology of natural reason allows us to see how such a situation comes about and how the life of right reason and universal ethics come alive.

The essays in the book, as the author informs us, occupied him for several years and some of them were done for different contexts and different occasions. Yet they are all motivated by a central concern namely, the experimental articulation of Universal Grammar and Natural or Meditative Reason (xviii). While the themes and issues discussed by the author are of fundamental importance, the presentation of the essays within one jacket has led to unnecessary reiteration and prolixity. (In fact, if one confines oneself to 'Overview' and the 'Postscript' one can acquire the core message of the book without missing anything substantial. Drastic editing would have reduced the book to its half and would have left it much more provoking without lessening a whit of its persuasive power. Another avoidable feature of the presentation and style stems from the author's fondness for several recently coined terms belonging to diverse philosophical approaches and areas, though he uses them in his own specific way. Such terms are 'Universal Grammar', 'Paradigm-shift', 'Deconstruction', 'Bad faith', 'Grammatology', 'Relativity', 'Unified field' and so on. Explaining his usage of Derrida's grammatology, Gangadean writes that he has used it beyond the context of literary criticism and theory of writing to the realm of meditative science. 'In this context "grammatology" is the universal science of all forms of the Word—the grammar of thought, the grammar of experience, the grammar of existence or reality, the grammar of speech, the grammar of

meaning, etc.' (n. 1, p. 161). There seems to be no compelling reason for appropriating a term from a different discourse if suitable expressions are alternatively available. In fact, Gangadean has used other expressions which come more naturely and have an effortless flow.

The titles of the various chapters give some idea of the manner in which the argument of the book advances:

1. General Introduction—Meditative Reason: Toward Universal Grammar
2. Exploration Toward Meditative Reason
3. Meditation, Mind and Matter
4. Universal Theology: Beyond Absolutism and Relativism
5. Meditative Reason and the Logic of Communication
6. Meditative Reason: Foundations for Inter-Cultural Discourse
7. Meditative Critique of Pathology in the Human Condition
8. Meditative Dialectic and Holistic Psychotherapy
9. Meditation, Metaphor and Meaning

and finally a Postscript: Universal Grammar, Natural Reason and Religious Discourse.

The overview preceding these chapters contains a summary of each of these chapters, while the Postscript neatly recapitulates the basic ideas.

The rest of this review would be concerned with a few interesting and important insights that Gangadean allows his readers to share with him and some questions which require further discussion about the main theme of the book.

Gangadean raises the question as to whether there is a universal grammar of thought or a universal unified field for human thought which would provide a common ground and which would embrace the diverse texts situated in eastern modes of meditative thought that go beyond discursive reasoning and texts of the West where discursive reasoning dominates, and answers the same in the affirmative. If the implication of the distinction between eastern and western modes is that meditation is distinctive of Indian thought and analytic reasoning is distinctive of Euro-American thought, it is lamentable. It betrays ignorance of immense philosophical literature of the East which is predominantly discursive and analytic on the one hand, and it is also indifferent to periodical internal criticism of discursive and analytical tendencies in western thought as traceable in Plato, Plotinus, Hegel, Bergson and Heidegger, to name a few. The distinction reflects the banal image almost persistently projected by some western thinkers and which is uncritically accepted by quite a few thinkers in this country. Besides, such a distinction can have some meaning only in the context of rigid identities which Gangadean is anxious to overcome in his meditative framework.

The quest for the First or the Origin or the Primordial in the global

context to be met in almost all cultures and a tendency to supercede one's own ways of thinking seems to confirm, according to Gangadean, that there must be such an origin. Even if one does not question such a reasoning, the idea of the First seems to have for its source the same discursive reason which needs to be transcended. It is surprising that Gangadean is not disturbed by the discussion of this problem as encountered in Kantian antinomies. It is still more enigmatic because he himself uses an expression in this connection which is contrary to the notion of the First—the notion of a continuum which discloses itself as a beginningless and endless Unitive Force (p. 6).

In the autobiographical essay 'Explorations Towards Meditative Reason' Gangadean expresses his feeling of shock when he became aware of the fact that the question of truth and rationality was 'ensnared in the politics of meaning and the control of discourse' that there was 'a political establishment that attempted to control discourse. . . . ' (p. 52), and thereby, he became convinced of the need to get at the 'depth and practical reality of speaking across grammars of thought'. (p. 53) (The word 'grammar' has been used in the text in a highly generalized sense. Wherever there is a structure, system and possibility of interpretation, one can detect the presence of grammar. There is grammar of thought as a narrative of logic clarifying the dynamics and laws of thought, there is philosophical grammar emerging in the attempt to give an account of the primal categories of existence and the structure and configuration constituting the world. (p. 28) Even cultural life instantiates the notion of grammar—'A form of life is a lived grammar which structures a system of sense'. (p. 29) In fact the grammatical idea even articulates ontological commitment in the sense that 'to be is to be grammatical, to exist is to be situated in a grammar of experience that structures the sense of the world.' (p. 29) This accent on grammar, however, doesn't seem to go well with Gangadean's notion of primordial reality which seems to lie beyond all objectification or reification (indicating his fascination for Nāgārjuna).

Using Sommers' slash to indicate a category-term such as/p/ being the union of 'p' and 'in-p' Gangadean points to a universal class or field in which the countrariety of terms is overcome and which when combined with the notion of tree structure leads to the intuition that there 'must be a primitive or original all-encompassing concept or category that revealed the nature of reality and unified all other concepts', (p. 54) pointing further that conceptual space is basically holistic. The all comprehensive character of categorial form embracing all phenomena, facts, existence or reality was an 'exciting discovery' for Gangadean. (p. 61). Categorial form as leading to the interpretation of experience led to hermeneutics which in its turn revealed the mutual involvement of the domains of meaning, experience, thought, grammar and rationality. Though they appear to be divergent, yet in a fundamental sense they 'converge and coincide inherently involving each other'. (p. 71) In this

exciting journey Gangadean came upon the intuition that 'the powerful models of formal analysis found in Śaṅkara and Nāgārjuna had an immediate and direct bearing on the problems of rationality and logical form which' he 'had been struggling with'. (p. 76)

Applying the categorial analysis to the identity of self-existence, the author shows that 'I' as self-existent is opposed to 'not-I' and depends for its identity on the difference involved in this opposition. The process leads to the ground of self-identity and to a higher principle of universal self-unity. This higher self-unity points to a unified field or continuum. Now Gangadean holds that 'the same dynamic of identity replicated within each category as well as in the category configuration as a whole which comprises the universal grammatical field . . . *all* names, concepts, forms, properties, etc., are necessarily specifications within categories—all names and forms are allegedly self-identical particularizations of sub-fields within categorial fields'. (p. 92) The strategy reminds the reader of Hegel's *aufheben* which informed and moved his entire dialectic. In fact, Gangadean uses the expression 'triangular strategy' to indicate categorial dynamics. (pp. 352–53). But he wants to avoid the rigid fixed absolutism which seemed to be associated with Hegelian dialectic. (pp. 98-99) For him absolutism and its expressions in various forms such as fundamentalism, foundationalism and literalism are pathological aberrations which generate the world of rigid identities. (p. 100). In contrast he pitches his hopes on his meditative thinking which sort of opens up the vistas of primal holistic field where pluralities and identities are preserved *but* loose their eccentricities and pathogenic character.

While the technique of categorial analysis seems to be attractive and effective in the first instance, on second thoughts one wonders if the backward movement towards higher and more comprehensive generalities would not lead to purely empty and formal results creating an illusion of convergence and unison. Generality comprehending two opposites must be distinguished from the generality comprehending two different entities. The categorial movement seems to be in the direction of the former while the demand of the reality as conceived by Gangadean requires the latter.

It appears that in spite of the emphasis on overcoming discursive reasoning Gangadean's argument still moves within the scope of discursive reasoning. The tension between actual thinking and the desire to go beyond the realm of analytical thinking is indicated by Gangadean's own descriptions of the relation between discursive reasoning and meditative thinking. On the one hand the two are radically opposed having opposed regulative principles—those of identity and relativity, on the other they are said to have common virtues which Meditaive Reasoning combines. (pp. 8-13)

One now becomes curious enough to ask as to what is understood by *MR*. What the adjective 'meditative' is doing in Gangadean's text?

Meditative mind performs 'a radical deconstruction of the ego-centred voice together with its discursive methods of 'rational thinking'. (p. 5) '*MR* is the universal space of all forms of thinking and thus presides in the workings of every day thought or common-sense' (p. 6). *MR* '. . . as the unitive force of the Universal Unified Field, brings out the full holistic import of things in their mutual co-implication and co-arising' (p. 7) . . . 'when Descartes experiementally crossed over into the Voice of Cogito he entered the powerful existential space in which thinking, existing, acting, speaking, meet in a primitive non-dual univocity' (p. 10) . . . 'The Continuum of Nature cannot be made into an object of thought, it can only be meditated.' (p. 102) 'We have been meditatively explicating the Holistic Thesis which teaches that every possible name/form is a *logos* which derives from *Logos*. And this has shown that the Continuum is the universal meeting point of all possible names/forms/things: all Holistic Names meet and are Univocated in Holistic Synonymy in the Logic of the Continuum'. (p. 108) 'If any item is selected for meditative attention its true import is revealed when its synonymity with *AUM* is realized. The science of Yoga (Self Union) in its highest form expands rational awareness to its universal synonymity with *AUM*. . . . This is not just an altered state of consciousness but the realization of Pure Consciousness or Reason, the realization of Truth itself.' (pp. 156–57) '*MR* is able to discern that Christ is the Universal mediator that heals the splits between opposites—the overcoming of absolute identity itself, the living principle of non-dual unity' (p. 157) 'Meditative speech is centred in the Continuum while the particularistic mind is centred in a *logos* which separates itself from the Continuum.' (p. 172) 'The meditative mind, in thinking metaphorically and symbolically according to universal relativity, exercises a meditative imagination that discerns analogies or synonyms in the Continuum.' (p. 173) 'In the logic of meditation one sees that meditation is not an act of mind, of the ego, not a state of awareness, not esoteric or mystical, but rather the original, natural, spontaneous, ever present light of reason which *already* pervades common-sense. To see that meditation eludes ordinary essentialistic description is already *to be* in meditative transformation. It cannot be described as a state of mind, because it is not a state and it is not of mind; it cannot be described as an act in any ordinary sense, for this would imply the separability of the act and agent, and so on. . . . When the noise of identity is silenced, the speech of meditation may be heard and remembered. . . . In the hermeneutical transformation to meditative reason it may be seen that the light of reason was ever present to the egocentric life although eclipsed by identity. This light breaks through from time to time at high moments in everyday life when the ego temporarily gets out of the way and pure reason shows itself: in moments of creativity, in moments of inspiration, in times of religious experience, in moments of pure action when the ego-agent is not the doer. These fleeting flashes of meditative light

appear to arise spontaneously and to disappear beyond our control and beyond our understanding.' (pp. 235–36) 'Metaphor is a good instrument for the hermeneutical transformation from dual to non-dual unity, for what appears as incompatible for dual reason is presented as unity in metaphor'. (p. 270) 'The transformation from mundane dual consciousness to non-dual meditative (relativistic) cosmic consciousness does not involve the denial of particularity.' (p. 271) '. . . the meditative mind centres itself in the Unified Field and works itself out of the artificial construction of the individuated or subjectified self. In this self-expansion and re-centreing . . . mind enters the gravitational field of the Continuum of Reality. . . As mind expands there is a simultaneous co-expansion of all names and forms as the Holistic Principle begins to emerge.' (p. 283) '. . . as we meditate on the logical form of Logos . . . the holistic narrative overflows any term, any predication, any sentence or paragraph.' (p. 284) 'The meditative dialectic, in exposing the common source of disturbance for any essentialistic life-world, opens the way to true *holistic* logos, true integrated life, authentic meaning, coherent experience, effective action, the liberation of psyche, and the peace and well-being of the person.' (pp. 320–21) 'In meditative "strategies" . . . 'entire ego-centric structure of discourse and space of thought is dismantled, dissolved, deconstructed, surrendered, in order for a very different orientation of mind to emerge.' (p. 371) It is interesting to note that Gangadean does not emphasize any exclusive method or way of meditation. As he remarks 'meditative traditions develop alternative forms of conducting mind and thought as more suitable for approaching what is First—and hence for the conduct of life and for human fulfilment.' (p. 371).

These expressions can be multiplied indefinitely but they give us a fair indication of how Gangadean visualizes meditation and meditative reason. It seems that at least two phases are involved in the meditative exercise as proposed by Gangadean. First, a thorough critique of rigid identities, ego-centred-consciousness, and consequent fundamentalism, foundationalism and literalism, and various pathological closures are to be undertaken. The positive moment in this critique consists of realizing the open texture of terms and concepts by way of categorial analysis as suggested earlier. This phase, it seems to me, operates on the level of discursive reason. In contrast, the second phase requires a kind of conscious leap. Mere theoretical understanding in respect of the limitation of rigid identity or egology cannot always succeed in transporting an individual to the horizons of open and ever-present continuum. That such a transformative experience can occur spontaneously, as Gangadean has himself noticed, shows that deliberate effort has only a limited role. This points to the discontinuous moment between thinking and meditation. It is true that reason has a synthetic phase and it has found vindication in western thought in several philosophical approaches but

can we identify reason with meditation just because it is critical of the analytical phase? I doubt. Consequently, 'meditative' as qualifying reason is questionable.

There are other interesting and significant issues which *MR* offers and which would provoke thinking. Whether a coherent and unified perspective can be discerned within the opposed approaches of Plato and Aristotle; is it possible to get rid of identity completely; do sciences like physics develop and flourish only because they give up their specific grammars and become reflective of their ontological implications (pp. 142–43); if to live is to interpret and to be grammatical, how can one fulfil the demand of Mādhyamika approach requiring non-objectification; if particularities and identities are given up and one moves higher and higher in the quest of life, isn't one moving towards a life-form which can be of only one sort, and would that be desirable; if the dualism between self and the other is overcome, even at the egological level, would that meet the requirement of communication unless we think of communication in terms of silence (p. 336); if the metaphoric perspective is accepted, how then can one account for scientific language and social transactions?—are some such issues.

This, however, cannot be gainsaid that Gangadean's *Meditative Reason* invites attention in respect of the conflicts and polarities which infect contemporary life in its cultural, political and religious dimensions and which pose a serious threat to humanity. The book compels thinking to face this problem on the widest possible plane.

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