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Language and Thought

CHANDIDAS BHATTACHARYA
Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal

I

There are two extreme groups—we can term them as the specialists and the non-specialists—who hold diametrically opposite views about the primacy of language over thought. Most philosophers are, however, moderate and are inclined to bypass the question of primacy of language over thought or vice-versa. Some philosophers prefer to talk only in terms of interdependence of language and thought. No doubt the question of primacy of either over the other is a tricky one, since to assume the primacy of language over thought might amount to saying that there is no thought without language. Should we for that reason avoid any reference to the question of the primacy of language over thought, or of thought over language? I feel that we should not do so. On the basis of such a distinction as 'epistemological primacy' and 'ontological primacy', I believe it would be possible to argue that language enjoys some sort of (epistemological) primacy over thought without staging any absurdity or implying that thought is the same as language.

We need to pay attention to the contrasting attitudes of the specialists and non-specialists to the question of the relation between thought and language, which is primarily related to the question of primacy of one over the other. Most philosophers generally avoid this question, because it is disturbing. Particularly the non-specialists' understanding of the issue deserves serious consideration because of their being 'uncorrupted' by various alien issues and opinions. Non-specialists do not look into the issue from any alien motives, e.g., for solving some other philosophical issues. But language and thought do matter to both specialists and non-specialists.

Everyone is concerned with language, but only specialists raise such questions as:

(1) Does thought exist independent of language?
(2) Does thought have any significance independent of language?

These questions reflect concern about the relation between thought and language and I shall address myself to these.

First of all, I shall direct attention to certain views of non-specialists and specialists about thought and language. It is necessary to point out that throughout my discussion, I shall take 'language' as it is used *seriously and creatively*. Non-serious or non-creative use of language is very much possible, but it falls outside the scope of this work, because non-serious utterances can only be obliquely or remotely relevant to thought. I am even ready to say that non-serious and non-creative use of language has nothing to do with thought.

The following utterances are common among non-specialists:

(a) Think before you speak (common guidance).
(b) Learn to think and you will learn to write, the more you think, the better you express your ideas (Sala, G.A.).
(c) Language is the dress of thought (Samuel Johnson).
(d) There are thoughts in the mind that can't be captured (Tagore).
(e) . . . clear thought easily finds words to fit (Schopenhauer).
(f) The notion that thought can be perfectly or even adequately expressed in verbal symbols is idiotic.
(g) . . . The most glorious poetry that has been communicated to the world is probably a feeble shadow of the original conceptions of the poet (Shelley).

Specialists often make the following utterances about the relation between language and thought:

(a) It is wrong to say good language is important to good thought merely; for it is the essence of it (Charles Sanders Pierce).
(b) To think is to make a verbal pattern consciously. To make a verbal pattern consciously is to think (Charles Morris).
(c) They (thoughts) can rise and exist only on the basis of linguistic materials (Stalin).
(d) Thinking is the talking of the soul with itself (Plato).
(e) His (a poet's) word is equal to his experience (a poet's opinion).
(f) Only in so far as man speaks does man think (Heidegger).

For the non-specialist, language is a medium or vehicle for 'transporting' the result or content of a thought, maybe from the inner abode to the outer world. This is also quite implicit in Locke's theory of language and also in the form of common admonition:'think before you speak' (can we also add—'wish or imagine before you speak'?). This view about the relationship between language and thought assumes primacy of thought over language. Davidson points out that this commonsense view of language is based on the idea that language serves no other purpose than the conveying of thought[1]. Implicit in this commonsensical view is the belief that there is a sharp distinction between thought and language. A realist can agree with this view whole-heartedly[2]. Use of language as such does not create a

thought but acts merely as a stimulus for some (new) thought. It is common knowledge that a sentence can provoke a new thought. Nevertheless, conceptual and ontological priority of thought is 'not disturbed'.

Under a certain interpretation of thought, that 'thought product' is sharply divided from 'thought process', the sharpness of the distinction between thought and language would also follow. The operational view of language (proposed by Wittgenstein) can either reduce thought to language or make the two fall completely apart. The tool simile of language, for instance, can lead to these two opposite trends. To speak of one trend, 'tool' cannot be the material cause which could embody a thought: Naiyāyika's concept of *nimitya kāraṇa* makes this point clear. But if manipulation of language as a tool itself is identified with thought, we are led to the other extreme view. Analytical philosophers, most notably Quine, gives supreme importance to the process of saying things. He emphasized the logical regimentation of language, and the canonical notation. Generally, the emphasis on the ideal form of language may be due to the bias that *thought is impossible without language*. For otherwise, why should there be so much fuss about the *ideal, correct or logical way of articulation*?

However, the commonsense view about the relation between language and thought has different degrees of sophistication. The common man in his sober mood would not fail to see that language can at least act as an instrument for generating a new thought which was 'nowhere', that language makes a thought usable by rendering it more precise or elaborate, according to the need. We have to agree that when a thought is contrasted with or combined with another thought, we can have a better understanding of that thought. But then, to 'compare' and to 'contrast' one thought with another is possible only through language. Even a non-specialist may agree:

> Thinking cannot be clear till it has had expression—we must write or speak or act our thoughts or they will remain in a half-torpid form. (H.W. Beecher)

Yet, it is not categorically confirmed whether language is internal to thought or whether a thought could be *real* without language. For even in a sober commonsensical view, the possibility of thought and language falling apart is not ruled out. It is sometimes believed that thought can be known in silence. It is also not logically impossible to think of directly transferring a thought or a belief by establishing some connection between two persons' nervous systems. Even if use of language is taken to be both necessary and sufficient for deliverance of thought, gap between language and thought would not be filled up. Language even in that case can be regarded as merely *regulative to thought*, or language may be counted as an *evidence for a thought*. When

somebody uses language in a characteristic way, in an involved way, etc., we know he has a thought, but that is all.

However, the common man, if pressed enough, would have to agree to the following as the outcome of his understanding of the relation between thought and language:

(1) There are two aspects of thought—thought-product and thought-process.
(2) Use of language has something to do very essentially with thought-process but not with thought-product.
(3) There is a sharp distinction between thought-product and thought-process, though not between though-process and language.
(4) The gap between language and thought-product is unbridgeable.

These two sets of views are largely opposed to one another. While the non-specialist takes language as a medium or a tool, the specialist takes it as a sign of thought. I believe that each has a point to make and hence they pose a dilemma for us, the solution of which would pave the way for a better understanding of the relation between thought and language. The solution lies in a moderate view. But it is not easy to determine which is the moderate view.

II

I now desire to trace some basic reasons for these diametrically opposing views about the relation between language and thought. The common man sees language and thought as somewhat falling apart. There are various reasons for this 'wrong' outlook. Thinkers who see language and thought as *falling apart* do so under a particular impression of the use of language. Language can be operated in so many fashions and styles allowing us to make such distinctions as : artificial and natural use of language, spontaneous or non-spontaneous uses, or very broadly, ideal and non-ideal uses of language. For example, a shoe company's advertisement officer who advertises the merit of his company's production with the help of special words selected for him by a linguist on payment, uses a language in one particular way.

In a somewhat artificial operation of language, there is a tendency to somehow correlate a 'thought' with a pre-existing linguistic expression, or pegging a thought to 'some name called sentences and words'. Schopenhauer perhaps tries to make this point when he remarks,

> They (those who rely upon pre-existing expressions) take words readymade and commit them to memory. Whence they write, it is not so much words as whole phrases that they put together.[3]

When Hamlet utters, 'words, words, words!', he might have in his mind use of some phrases and sentences which are forced on us because of some extraneous conditions such as a linguistic habit, rote learning, too much familiarity with some type of sentences, etc. On the other hand, ideal use of language not only calls for freedom in the choice of words, but also intentional composition of sentences through the process of trial and error and conjecture. The compositional nature of language is beginning to get its due importance only in the recent times. The composition of sentences, their arrangement into paragraphs, viewed ideally, is not a hackneyed affair. It is not simply to be equated with combination and permutation of some linguistic atoms. It is important to note that one may feel called upon to compose a sentence of a kind for some reason or other, without being able to do so. The desire to compose a sentence, having the requisite skill is not to be equated with the actual production of it. Composition of a single sentence may remain an ongoing recurring process.

In an ideal use of language, which is indispensable for expressing views and opinion, we have to seriously take the case of a planned sentence. It is composed through the painstaking process of mending and amending, say, a perfunctorily written sentence; various kinds of exotic changes may be introduced. In this process, a simple and short sentence my grow into a much longer and complex sentence. The renovated sentence in its turn may act as an incentive for the next perfunctory sentence and rejection of some. The process goes on till the final sentence is composed. Composition of a sentence is thus similar to an arduous journey.

Composition of a sentence in this manner can be significantly described as *intentional but not deliberate.* The raising of a hand can both be intentional and deliberate. Just as we cannot will a thought or an idea, but only hope for it, so also *we cannot will a sentence.* We can only hope to compose a sentence of our choice and make preparation for it. Nor can a sentence be caused. Linguistic rules, norms and conventions, and linguistic learning cannot act as a *cause* for a sentence—they only act as directions for the birth of a sentence. On the other hand, in an ideal use of language, linguistic deviations and digressions are often indulged in : 'Day and night embracing at dusk', 'A sky the shade of faded blue jeans'; 'creating Eve was the first splitting of the Adam'. At least it is not incumbent upon one to rely on prefabricated expressions, one may be only inspired by some prefabricated expressions to start with.

There are other features associated with the *ideal operation* of language on the basis of which it is possible to apprehend the intimate connection between language and thought. Language has to be

operated upon with *freedom* so that one can genuinely be responsible for the birth of a sign. And *this alone authorizes one to make a claim on some belief or thought as one's own. If we cannot lay claim to an expression as our own, we cannot lay claim to a thought either.*

Again, only ingenuous use of language is coextensive with making 'speech acts'. If we generate or utter some definite sentence under compulsion or by accident, we cannot be said to be performing a 'speech act'. The crucial roles of intention and linguistic freedom in the composition of a sign, when properly grasped would bring home the speaker's responsibility as a linguist. This linguistic freedom may be only an approximation, since we can never determine what is the highest form of this freedom. Similarly, ideal operation of language is an approximation, there being no upper limit of an ideal use of language and the highest ideal use of language is difficult to determine. *There are various factors which influence us to select words and phrases; to arrange them into a definite pattern.* All of these influencing factors are not conducive to operation of language with freedom and spontaneity, *only a few are.* Atleast we can make a distinction between there being linguistic freedom and there being none or between constrained and less constrained use of language. It may not be possible to provide a measuring rod for determining what is exactly an ideal use of language, but the importance of ideal use of language can hardly be exaggerated, since there is something called 'style'. Tagore says,

> The uniqueness of a speaker lies in his capacity for linguistic craftsmanship and style and not so much for the theme or the content which can be found common to many writings. Someone or other would bring the theme to light[4].

And 'style is man's own' or 'style shows the man'.

The whole argument will be guided by the idea of the possibility of linguistic freedom which implies 'unpredictability' or 'spontaneity of speech' (Quine). The point that I want to make is that when the specialist tends to identify the use of language with thought, *he ought to have an ideal use of language in his mind.* On the other hand, he who makes a sharp distinction between language and thought is not aware of the distinction between an ideal and non-ideal use of language. It can be shown that there is an *obvious affinity* between ideal use of language and thought. In an ideal use of language there is style, mood, fervour and involvement. There is a sense of responsibility towards the signs brought to life. On can expect appreciation for his style of speech. *So also a thought can be said to be owned.* One can be praised or blamed for a thought. *Ideal use of language has growth and development, so also has the thought that one owns.* Thought that one 'receives', has no true growth and development.

But it is to be noted that both ideal and non-ideal uses (stereotyped,

cliché expressions) of language are common. At least there are customary and habitual or ritualistic uses of language which may indicate no thought proper. If both ideal and non-ideal uses of language are to be equated with the use of language, then of course, language cannot be said to be coeval with thought. Only if an ideal use of language is asserted to be coeval with thought, the specialist thesis may seem acceptable with some qualifications.

There is another presupposition which partly accounts for the difference between the specialists' and the non-specialists' ideas about the relation between language and thought. The non-specialist asserts the possibility of prelinguistic thought while the specialist is non-commital on this point. A break-through is possible between these two opposite presuppositions. And this will help us to arrive at a correct way of perceiving the relation between thought and language.

Another reason for these contrasting attitudes to the relation between thought and language is different estimations of the capacity of language. It seems to me that specialists tend to take language as adequate for thought in principle. The non-specialists find language inherently inadequate for thought. Wittgenstein as the representative of the specialists has to admit that language is adequate for thought, but a non-specialist like Shelley holds the opposite view:

> . . . The most glorious poetry that has ever been communicated to the world is probably a feeble shadow of the original conceptions of the poet.[5]

III

In any case, there seems to be a dilemma in both identifying or not identifying thought with language.

Recent thinking on this issue by the linguists, psychologists and philosophers has elevated the status of language to the point of near identification of some characteristic type of uses of language (ingenuous and ideal operation of language) either with *thought-process* or *thought-product.* One at least no longer suffers from a sense of awkwardness in identifying thought and speech, or in taking speech as a basic condition for thought.

Even then the relation between thought and language has been left somewhat vague and periphrastic. Also, in contradistinction to the specialists, the non-specialists have some uneasiness about either identifying or even not identifying thought with language. Only a commonsense view does not suffer from any sense of uneasiness about the thesis which assigns language only the role of a midwife. This uneasiness of the recent philosophers can be sensed in their roundabout way of expressing the relation between thought and language or in their mode of characterizing the relation between

thought and language in terms of 'logic of thought' and 'logic of language'. To quote Davidson's provocative ideas on this issue:

> Some concepts which are necessary to describe language are also an integral part of the description of mental states and attitude.[6]
> This strongly suggests that attribution of desires and beliefs (thoughts) must go hand in hand with interpretation of speech.[7] (bracket mine).

Of course, I do not deny that some of Davidson's remarks like 'without speech we cannot make finer distinction between thoughts' suggests the possibility of a more direct approach to the question of the relation between thought and language. Such a direct approach is also implicit in the Naiyāyika's version. According to the Naiyāyikas, there can be perception without language but it is of an indeterminate kind and remains beyond our awareness of it. Perception of which we are aware must be articulated. This clue about the nature of prelinguistic state or perception can be extended to other forms of mental phenomena—wish, belief, hope. There just might be an embroynic stage of a wish or hope, etc., without our being aware of it.

There are reasons for this uneasiness about identifying language with thought, or even seeking *the fundamental condition of thought in language.* When thought is taken as a whole, it seems counter-intuitive to identification with a sentence or a group of sentences (language) as it is counter-intuitive to identification with behaviour. Thought is an on-going process whereas a sentence has a beginning as well as a terminating point. Language may always seem to be inadequate, incomplete in comparison to a thought. Some introspective reports about thought will resist such attempts, for instance:

(i) We often complain that we do not find words for our thoughts.

(ii) We are sometimes satisfied that atleast we have found the right words for our thoughts.

(iii) We often disown a suggested expression or a self composed expression as inadequate, or modify it to make it more adequate for the thought.

But on the other hand, it can hardly be doubted that thought and language are at least coeval, the logical or temporal priority of any of them may remain a suspect. It seems impossible to obey the counsel 'Think before you speak' literally. A representative of this view says,

> Desiring to say something before a way of saying is found, does this imply saying something is not just a way of saying? Can there be a case where we knew exactly what we want to say but it is not yet put into words? Even in understanding that some ways of saying is not found, some ways (of understanding that some ways of understanding are not found) are found.[8]

Often specialists hold that we think, wish, desire while (through the process of) talking, writing, paraphrasing, etc. Even when a child thinks or wishes, he might do so in his characteristic unlearned language.[9] When somebody is asked to think about the nature of communalism in India, if he is successful in doing so, he must be aware of his thoughts and he can be aware of them only if he has found some words for his thoughts. For only by comparing one thought with another, can someone realize what his thought about communalism is, whether he himself believes in communalism in some form or the other or not. And such comparison is possible by putting language into action. Before one attempts to say anything about communalism in India, either he has no thoughts about it or he is not aware of his own thoughts, if there are any. *But can one own a thought without being aware of it?* Similarly, sometimes we just wonder what to say, or what to think about a particular issue. But suppose we just happen to come across some particular phrases or sentences, we may realize at once that these sentences express what is acceptable to us, or express our own thought or something very similar to our own thought. The right use of quotation marks is appreciable on this account. Of course, it is only in the process of searching, and not so much in chance meetings with such readymade expressions that one becomes aware of his/her thought. In such a chance meeting we may only agree with other's thoughts.

Thus, it seems that both the specialists and the non-specialists have to admit that at some stage or the other, thought gets entangled with language. The non-specialists, however, would describe this stage of thought-entangling language as '*the processing stage of thought*' and distinguish it *from the thought as the final stage, or 'product*'. Only thought as 'product' may be taken as non-linguistic. *The non-specialists would have to undermine the processing stage of thought in order to undermine the importance of language* or to explain the possibility of thought, independent of language. Now, even without going to the question whether the final stage of thought (?) could be language neutral or not, the question can be raised against the non-specialists' undermining *the processing stage of thought* where (obviously) language plays a vital role. Modern thinkers who are concerned with the relation between language and thought, however, stress on the stage where thought inevitably gets entangled with language.

Let us see what insights work behind the growing trend of emphasizing 'process' in the frame of 'process–product' distinction, or not emphasizing the process–product distinction. The Zulus, for instance, have fewer words for colours than the English. Consequently, the Zulus' colour description (the process) ought to be different from that of the English. One may thus surmise that the Zulus' colour

description is also somewhat different from that of the English. Similarly, differences in linguistic style may be correlated with differences in conceptualization. Whorf, for instance, suggests some conceptual differences between people who speak Hopi language and those who do not. People who speak Hopi use expressions like '4th day', '5th day' and never speak in terms of four days, five days. According to Whorf, this means that Hopi people have no idea of discrete time, they take time to be continuous. (Of course, one may say that Hopi people's use of a characteristic expression for time is caused by their mode of experiencing time i.e., experiencing time as something discrete. However, if we refrain from raising the question as to which is the cart and which the horse here, then it can be argued that the availability of these characteristic expressions for time subsequently does have some influence upon the thought of the members of the Hopi community). This tendency to emphasize the process of articulation has an important consequence—*this may lead to the near identification of thought and language.* Consequently, with an over-emphasis on 'process', thought itself can be taken to be something *incompatible with finality*, for, linguistic process itself is always penultimate and compares well with the performing art. But there is no reason to believe in the finality of a sentence, there being always the scope of reorganizing a sentence for achieving a better effect. Or at least we cannot decide if a sentence could not be improved upon for the sake of the thought—for expressing, identifying, or 'crystallizing' a thought. (These are all different terms—see the Conclusion).

As we have already seen, this over-emphasis on 'process' by the specialists, leads us to—*the near identification of language and thought.* According to Austin, 'when we examine what we should say, what words we should use in what situation, we are looking not merely at words. . . but also at the realities . . . we are using sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of'.[10] Chomsky draws our attention to Juar Huarte's (a Spanish physician) insight that the nature of human mind can be grasped in its generative power (*Language and Mind*). And it is but one step to identifying the generative power of the human mind with its power to *generate sentences.* What is important to note is that linguistic constraints which we invariably undergo in trying to express ourselves pushes us into the troubled waters of innovation. What word to use, what phrase is to be attached with its counterpart and in what fashion, are some of the linguistic constraints. Awareness about linguistic constraints, if it were not due to incompetence, is to be welcomed. *It is the sign of the birth of a thought. This sharpens our awareness of the central theme.*

Although, language is interwoven into all spheres of human experience, the crucial roles of language can be more easily appreciated in certain specific spheres. A particular idea about poetry could hardly

be entertained without a characteristic phrase like, 'Poetry is the impish attempt to point the colour of the wind'. Similarly, we could hardly conceive of a joke without such a sentence as 'Be careful about reading medical help books, you might die of a misprint'. This is also true about thought involving more complex structure, for instance, counting. Hence, it is possible to isolate some cases where the crucial role of language is easier to appreciate. Simon Blackburn has referred to one very interesting feature of thought, i.e., 'the movement of thought' in terms of which the crucial role of language in thought is to be understood.[11] To move on we need to move along a path or a line. 'The movement of thought' along the line of language is perspicuous in some spheres of thought and experience. It can be shown that at least in some spheres of our mental life, the very possibility of thought and experience, independent of some distinct functions of language is very much questionable, whether or not we can conceive of some other spheres of experience, for instance, emotional experiences, where the role of langauge may not be equally vital. It seems that we can be angry without words to express our anger. We may have a feeling of uneasiness without being able to identify its cause and articulating it. But in some spheres of experience where 'identification', 'connection', 'reference', etc. are indispensable requisites, articulation seems inseparable from the reality of those experiences. Consequently, the role of language there is easier to grasp. It would thus be profitable to identify those spheres of thought and experience. For example:

(a) Generalization: All men are mortal.
(b) Mixed or multiple generalization: All saints desire that everyone is loved by someone.
(c) Intentional thinking: My friend is a friend of the manager of the State Bank of India in Siliguri who is known for his unscrupulousness; my friend is thus a friend of an unscrupulous bank manager.
(d) Minutely discriminated experience: I had a bitter, pungent and metallic taste in my mouth after prolonged fever.
(e) Counting: There are exactly two hundred and twenty-nine guests who must be served an equal number of dishes.
(f) Realizing finer thoughts: Men are like rivers, the water is the same in one and all, but every river is narrow here, more rapid there. . . (Tolstoy).

(a) It is difficult to have an idea of generality without some employment of words like 'every', 'most', 'at least one', 'at the most two', or words like 'blue', 'cow', i.e., general words. Nominalists explain generality in terms of language. We can at best have an idea of a definite individual, without any employment of words. We often think of some friend

without being able to remember his name because of some kind of lasting impression we have of our friend. But we are never confronted with 'most men' or 'an average man'. So we have to use some characteristic phrase: 'most men' and have an idea of 'Most men' by interpreting the phrase. For instance, we have contrasted 'most men' with 'John' or 'all men' and have a grasp of 'most men'. In comparison to 'John', 'all men' is more abstract, so is 'most men' in comparison to 'all men'. 'Most men' involves a sharper abstraction than 'all men'. We may conceive that the world (actual and the possible world together) is populated by all men as the actual world is populated by John. But it seems that it is more difficult to think of some men since no one can locate 'some men' in any world. Similarly, there are only specific blue objects in the world. To think about blue of a definite shade, we have to use some words, 'azure blue', for instance. 'Most men', 'blue', maybe also 'all men'—do not refer to anything and we cannot have any image corresponding to them. They have to be understood 'through' some kind of interpretation. *It thus seems that relevance of language is more keenly felt where the limitation of sense experience is universally acknowledged.*

In mixed quantification, we feel the need of theoretical grouping and regrouping or bracketing, and bracketing within bracketing of individual items quantified in different degrees. Distinct contrast is made between variously grouped and regrouped items. The world contains only individuals, grouping of the individuals is a manipulative act of ours and here language comes to our aid. In the above example of (b), all saints are contrasted with the group which includes every person, including the saints. Again a clear contrast is shown between a group which includes all men and a group which includes only some men or at least one man. 'Each man (all men) is to be loved by some man or the other'. It does not matter if one man manages to love all men, although this may be impossible, but what is intended is that no man should go unloved. Clearly, certain movement of thought is involved here—from 'a group consisting of one man' to 'a group of groups of one man', or from 'a group consisting of one man' to 'a group consisting of one man' so as to exhaust all men. Of course, there is no physical movement as ordinarily understood, but it is a 'movement' of some kind, and it is in the line of language.

In intentional thinking (c) also, there is a journey of thought from one part of truth or belief to another. It is through the path of language, i.e., fixing on an expression as a step in the ladder that one realizes that belief or true belief about something necessitates belief in something else. Two distinct pieces of beliefs need to be presented before us in linguistic form so that we can inspect them and come to the conclusion that believing one necessitates believing the other. In other words, in the example (c), there must be a way out of

understanding that the 'unscrupulous friend of my friend' is interchangeable with 'an unscrupulous bank manager'. 'Interchangeability' is a linguistic phenomenon, since it makes no sense to speak of 'interchangeability of two individuals' just as it makes no sense to speak of identification of two individuals (as Wittgenstein has shown very clearly). Like the concept of 'identity', the concept of 'interchangeability' is linguistic, or at least it is to be linguistically captured.

The overwhelmingly linguistic involvement of example (d) is clear. Till such words as 'bitter', 'pungent', 'metallic' are used, the identity of certain tastes would not be clear even to the subject or the owner of the taste.

To explain (e) it would be best to quote from Simon Blackburn:

> . . . counting is a procedure which requires some kind of tally—a process of ticking off something against each of the elements of the set counted.[12]

Counting thus requires a kind of operation which can alone certify that counting is actually taking place. Ticking or putting numerals in successive order of course, is a kind of linguistic operation. Each of the numerals is representative of some or other element of the set. Things of various kinds may exist in reality independent of language or mind. But counting is an arrangement of things of some kind arranged successively, as in example (e), guests numbering two hundred fifty are arranged serially.

CONCLUSION

Let me begin with a quotation from Wittgenstein:

> I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there must be what is called a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc. (*The Blue and Brown Book, p. 41)*

In speaking of language and thought, we may thus give up the locution 'expressing a thought'. This locution presupposes the possibility of 'a pre-linguistic thought'. The traditional locution gives the impression as if thought were merely to be brought to the outer from its inner abode through the vehicle of language. This sort of a partial understanding of language is also evident in Croce, according to whom all language is merely expressive. We may instead profitably coin a new phrase 'crystallizing of a thought', 'his thought crystallizes into these sentences', . . . 'Crystallization of thought is possible', etc. This way of looking at language and thought is implicit in Stalin's

idea, 'The material existence of thought is in language'. The crystallization of thought can be sharp or blunt, mostly in-between. *'Crystallization' implies a process, which has been emphasized above as the basic feature of thought.* Further, what is perhaps more important to note (see also in the sequel) is that 'crystallization' suggests that thought is being individuated in a labyrinthine process *ab initio.* To individuate a thought is to sprout a thought by employing the myriad and multifarious devices in-built in a language. 'Device' in the widest possible sense includes schematic tools like words, punctuation marks, underlining, gaps and non-schematic tools like sentences, half finished sentences, paragraphs, etc. (I am inclined to accept these tools as the material cause or *samavāyi kāraṇa* of a thought). The non-schematic tools assume a great significance, because they assure us *more freedom than the manipulation of the schematic or the fixed tools.* Words, punctuation marks are something given and we have to use them according to the relatively rigid conventions prescribed to them. Different types of activities are involved in the manipulation of these various tools—word-hunting, word-choice, word-placement, . . . to effect, pun, rhythm, alliteration, illusion, perspicuity. With the help of these two kinds of tools diverse activities are performed:

Giving orders, and obeying them—
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements—
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—
Reporting an event—
Speculating about an event—
Forming and testing an hypothesis—
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams.[13]

Even to be dimly aware of the enormous means available in language and of the diverse things that could be performed with them is to become aware of what 'crystallization' of thought in language means. What is important to note is not only the availability of the diverse means but also the minutely varied things that can be performed with them. It is also interesting to note how gross as well as subtle thoughts can be captured by the varied manipulation of the same kind of linguistic tool. It is very much possible to achieve striking results by affecting the slightest deviation of some linguistic convention—'Santa Claus: A *Jowly* good fellow', 'Former chief minister is 70 on *Saturdays*'.

If sufficiently *detailed description* of these two kinds of tools could be given, one could be easily convinced that indeed materialization of thought or the sprouting of thought is achieved in language. For instance, it is extremely important to be aware of what a quotation mark can do for us as distinguished from a comma, or a word like 'any' can do for us as distinguished from its synonym 'every':

(1) If every member contributes, I will be surprised.

(2) If any member contributes, he gets a sweet.

The characteristic difference between (1) and (2) is primarily due to 'any' and 'every'. (1) simply indicates that certain conditions being fulfilled, something would follow. 'Every' in (1) is only connected with 'member' and not with 'one who would be surprised'. But in (2) 'any' is connected both with 'member' and also with 'one who would get a sweet'. 'Any' also indicates that only among 'the members' there is a chance of getting a sweet.

More than the given rigid linguistic forms and conventions, *linguistic style and fervour* are also indicators of crystallization of thought in language. Our fondness for verbosity shows how a thought gets individuated. We hardly say 'I am hungry' unless the context is rich enough. Instead, we say 'I am too hungry', 'I am hungry now', 'I am getting hungry'. Quine talks about *'eternal sentence' like* 'it is raining in Boston, Massachusetts on July 15, 1968, at 2 p.m. . . .' in a different way explains how a thought gets crystallized in the *snowballing* of sentences.

There are commonplace utterances as well as exotic utterances. Sometimes a commonplace utterance would seem indispensable for bringing about a certain thought—'All men are mortal' (in logic). Sometimes only an exotic expression can do the job—'Moonlight threading the eye of a cloud'. Even an ill-formed sentence or a misspelt word can do a better job—'Misstake in spelling does not always hold up idea'—at least in the case of picturesque expressions like—'Day and night embracing at dusk', 'A floating, bright red balloon towing a child's dream', 'She laughed, and the shadows departed'—*Could one genuinely doubt if there* were certain, thoughts before these expressions were generated?

All this is tantamount to denying the possibility of pre-linguistic thought, as if, before crystallization of thought there were no thoughts at all. But how then does the linguistic move for the crystallization of thought get started—one may ask. Or is there no starting point of a thought as we imagine there being no starting point in creation? Everything is in a chain process. There are other issues which have to be sorted out before the primacy of language could be established. We can begin with the foremost one around which other issues seem to revolve.

Non-existence of pre-linguistic thought or mental state may seem incompatible with some of the facts about use of language. There is the fact of the feeling of dissatisfaction with production of signs. We often experience dissatisfaction with a sentence constructed by us even though it is grammatically acceptable. Sometimes we do not find words for our thoughts. If there were no thought in some sense or the other,

prior to the production of the sentence, how do we account for such dissatisfaction? For, the said dissatisfaction with a sentence and the desire to improve upon it, to look for a substitute expression, etc. should presumably be due to some pre-existing 'thought'. Moreover, since 'process' has been given a vital place in the individuation of thought, the phenomenon of 'dissatisfaction' must be taken very seriously for this dissatisfaction is a part of the process of production of a linguistic sign. But the question is how to account for the dissatisfaction. Do we need to assume the existence of a pre-linguistic thought? Many philosophers feel that we have to. It seems that only because of lack of matching between a pre-linguistic thought and a merely grammatically acceptable sentence, the linguistic dissatisfaction arises. So we feel an urge for a new form of sentence. But do we need to presuppose a pre-linguistic thought which we can be *aware of*? We have shown that awareness of a pre-linguistic thought is not possible, nor do we need presuppose such a pre-linguistic thought to account for the dissatisfaction with a sentence composed by us.

Here I desire to introduce a distinction between *'thought-in-itself'* and *'thought-in-awareness'* in the manner of Kant's distinction between *'thing-in-itself* and '*appearance*' (thing-in-awareness'). 'Thing-in-itself' is beyond our ken but the appearance is within our awareness. Prior to the use of language, if at all we are to speak of 'prior to language', what we get is '*thought-in-itself* of which we cannot be aware of. 'Thought-in-itself' can have only an ontological status, presupposed out of necessity. Prior to the use of language there can be no content of thought which we can be aware of, which we could compare and contrast with other thoughts. 'Thought-in-itself', although it may not be nothing, neither is it an object of awareness. *We have no jurisdiction over it*, we have jurisdiction only over thought-in-awareness, which has a distinct manifestation. We can accept or reject, or improve upon *thought-in-awareness* as distinguished from *thought-in-itself*. This way of looking at the issue would do justice to some aspects of thought which stand in the way of near identification of thought with language. We thus have taken note of Shelley's admonition:

> ... And the most glorious poetry that
> has ever been communicated to the
> world is probably a feeble shadow of
> the original conception of the poet.

It is generally believed that a poetic theme is not born like Athena, prior to it is representation in language. A rudimentary theme—what sense we make of it has to be delineated. Why cannot we hold a similar view about thought? It remains to be seen that pre-linguistic thought is *poor enough in comparison to the richness of thought-in-awareness. Thought-in-itself is lacking in too many interesting features ascribable to thought-in-awareness.* It is isolated and atomic, for instance. The atomic 'thought-in-itself' is nothing more than a kind of 'disturbance'. It resides in the region of dim light. However, *one crucial feature which we need to attribute to it is that it is inherently capable of inducing us to make a linguistic move*—catch on a word or phrase, a sentence . . . Kant's 'thing-in-itself' also is supposed to have certain *causal efficacy*. The same is true of Naiyāyika's *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. The Naiyāyika's idea of *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* of *ghatatva* has a bare existence *without itself being an object of awareness*, but that bare something is to be accepted as a cause or condition of determinate perception (thought-in-awareness). The indeterminate perception or thought-in-itself is thus conceived as the 'prime mover' for the determinate perception or 'thought-in-awareness', or the perception which is *crystallized or sprouted in language*. One of course, may doubt if thought-in-itself could be a prime mover for linguistic manoeuvering necessary to crystallize thought, since thought-in-itself is beyond one's awareness. But the only alternative to the hypothesis that thought-in-itself, even without being an object of awareness can be an efficient cause of inducing the use of language is the hypothesis that 'there is nothing like even a pre-linguistic thought'. The alternative assumption would make way for a more extreme thesis, namely, 'thought is identifiable with language'. Now, since it is extremely difficult to think that there are human beings without thought at any stage, it becomes necessary to assume that at no stage human beings are without language of some form and it would be necessary to assume that a human being can have an *unlearned language*. There are thinkers like Jerry A. Fodor, who almost advocates the possibility of *an unlearned* language. But then the problem is, can this extreme hypothesis, which identifies thought with language account for our sense of dissatisfaction with language? May be this could be done, but I am not aware of the means.

Absolute emphasis 'on ways of saying things' for the sake of crystallization of thought has to face another objection. There are different ways of saying things, some better, some fair, worse; but *there does not seem to be any best way of saying things.* It has already been pointed out that the process of saying things involves linguistic manoeuvre of diverse kinds. It involves choice and rechoice of words, phrases; arrangement and rearrangement of sentences and so on. All these are undertaken because we are often dissatisfied with our way of saying things. Since there is no way of deciding if we could not have crystallized our thought in a better way, we perhaps cannot even claim to have achieved perfect individuation of thought. But then it would seem difficult to speak of identification of thought. For 'identity' is accepted as an achievement verb; we cannot speak of 'more or less identification of thought'. We cannot say 'this set of sentences more or less identifies my thought'. There is also some practical difficulty in admitting the

possibility of a partial identification of thought in the moral and communication spheres. We even could not ever claim to have understood another's wish or request, or even our own. All kinds of communication then would have to be judged as incomplete, if not called pseudo communication. But on the other hand, a certain shortcoming of language as such is not to be ignored. As great a mind as Whitehead believes 'It is merely credulous to accept verbal phrases as adequate statements of propositions'. He maintains that language is incomplete and fragmentary and merely registers a stage in average advance beyond ape-mentality. Bhartṛhari, on the other hand, denies that there is any thought there is a fullfledged sentence. 'Searching for words' implies absence of thought proper. In view of this dilemma, the possible escape seems to be the following.

We have to accept that identification of thought is *time bound and relative to its specific articulation in language.* Let me elaborate.

In passing judgements about success in identification of thought, the owner of the thought, i.e., the first person speaker enjoys a certain privilege. The answer to the query, 'Does the sentence S_1 identify Mr. X's thought?', given by the first person speaker seems to be final. We may thus hold that the identification of thought is achieved the moment a competent language user (using language creatively) is satisfied with the sentence that he works out to incarnate his thought, when he is satisfied with a particular move he has made. It does not matter much if an addressee disagrees or points out that the sentence in question is anomalous or vacuous. The first person's satisfaction with the sentence in normal condition cannot be wholly arbitrary if he is sincere. It is not arbitrary since when someone says 'I could say what I wanted to mean', 'I could not say what I wanted to', 'I have not finished yet', etc., such cases of satisfaction or dissatisfaction are surely grounded on certain conditions. What is required as the minimum condition is the meaningfulness of the sentence in question. When a meaningful sentence is constructed, and a genuinely *spontaneous and responsible linguistic move is made,* the thought can hardly remain nascent. The first person speaker, however, may afterwards become dissatisfied with his earlier linguistic move and may wish to introduce *nominal, substantial* or even *drastic changes,* or he may desire to make *a fresh move.* If the linguistic change is *drastic* (it may be problematic to decide when a linguistic change is drastic) or the new sentence is non-synonymous with the earlier one, then we have to admit that the person's thought in the meantime had undergone a radical change. Or we have to come to the decision that he has improved upon his original thought. That is to say, a renewed linguistic move need not be necessarily reckoned as an attempt at a better or fuller identification of thought. Amendment of a sentence or a fresh move is of course, caused in all cases by some dissatisfaction with the sentence constructed earlier.

This dissatisfaction is thus not *sui generis.* Sometimes it is only owing to a minor inadequacy of the expression itself. An expression may be cumbersome, too involved, relatively cliché-ridden and so on. But this kind of dissatisfaction is insignificant for the simple reason that there is no definite criterion to decide when an expression is *adequate enough in all respects.* There can only be an improvement upon an expression. But some dissatisfaction can be due to a felt inadequacy (inconsistency) of thought itself, which is individuated. Here also there is a problem, how to decide when the inadequacy is pertaining merely to the style and when it is pertaining to the content itself. I cannot elaborate on the question right now, although it is so interesting. I only desire to remark that it is better to avoid the extreme stand of Quine, according to whom any linguistic change in a sentence is indicative of a change of thought or meaning. Also, I do not think that one can reasonably subscribe to the other extreme that no change in a sentence is indicative of a change in thought. It is safer to take the stand that some characteristic type of change of language is pertaining to a change of thought, and that other types of changes are pertaining to merely the style. Frege for instance maintains that a large part of linguistic changes that one may introduce are limited to the change of style and emphasis only.

Now, the kind of dissatisfaction with a sentence or change in a sentence that is pertaining to some trouble with the thought itself is more interesting. More often than not, this leads to the generation of a new thought. Usually, however, an amendment of a sentence, not to speak of a fresh linguistic move *signals the identification (birth) of a new thought.*

Of course, we should not be blind to the fact that the possibility of endless emulation of a sentence or a set of sentences may go counter to the thesis that thought is crystallized in sentences. It may suggest to some that the need for sentence mending is felt because an expression appears to be *inadequate to map a thought.* But this is only a possible interpretation and a weaker one. There is another better way of looking at 'the possibility of endless emulation of a sentence'. It can be argued that it is only because a thought has somehow got individuated in the sentence which is subjected to endless emulation (supposing that the sentence is not too awkward to mean anything), that we feel the need to improve upon it. Had a thought been not identified in the sentence subjected to endless emulation, the question of emulation would not have arisen. Nor would there have been any possibility of generation of a new thought. Only in the case of a meaningless sentence is there no individuation of thought. But a meaningless sentence is not subjected to emulation either; it is rejected.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

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2. See Frege's 'Thought, A Logical Enquiry', in *Philosophical Logic*, edited by Strawson, Oxford University Press, 1967.
3. 'On Style'.
4. See 'Sahitya', in *Rabindra Rachanabali*, Centenary edition, 1962, Government of West Bengal, Vol. XIII, p. 743f.
5. 'In Defence of Poetry'.
6. See 'Thought and Talk', in *Mind and Language*, edited by Gotttenplan, p. 4.
7. See ibid., p.15.
8. See G.. Hunter, *Essays after Wittgenstein*, p. 8.
9. See Jery A. Fodor, The Language of Thought, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1986, specially p. 55f.
10. 'A Plea for Excuses', in *Philosophy and Linguistics*, edited by Colin Lyas, Macmillan, 1971, p. 84.
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13. Wittgenstein, p. 1.

Max Weber on Explanation of Human Actions: Towards a Reconstruction

KOSHY THARAKAN
University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad

Recent discussions on the explanation of action are permeated with two divergent models of explanation, namely causal model and non-causal model. For causalists the notion of explanation is intimately related to that of causation. As Davidson contends, any rudimentary explanation of an event gives its cause. More sophisticated explanations may cite a relevant law in support of a singular causal claim. Nevertheless, it is erroneous to consider that an explanation ceases to be one without the relevant law.[1] Hence, a causal explanation need not be mechanistic nor even a nomological one. An explanation in terms of purpose, a teleological one, can be a causal explanation if we construe the motive behind the action as its cause. Thus, a causal model of human action considers the motive or reasons as its cause. The non-causalists, on the other hand, hold that when we explain an action we do not ask for the cause, rather we try to understand the action in terms of its meaning. Moreover, they argue that the causal model fails to account for the conceptual priority of human agency. The aim of this paper is to show how Max Weber attempted a synthesis of the two divergent models of explanation in the realm of human actions. The first section of this paper gives an expository account of Weber's theory of explanation. In the second section an attempt is made to interpret Weber's thesis so as to assimilate the two divergent models of explanation.

I

Weber's writings on the methodology and definitive problems of social sciences were a reaction to the 'battle of methods' (*Methodenstreit*) in the German context. Weber found this controversy as one between two equally objectionable methodological positions, the positivists who represent the 'law orthodoxy' and the anti-positivists who moved towards the other extreme with their 'intuitionist idealism'. Weber's solution to this controversy was his *verstehen* thesis and the formulation of 'ideal types'.

For Weber, the subject matter of sociocultural sciences is 'meaningful' human conduct. To understand the behaviour of an agent, a mere description of the physical movements is inadequate. According to Weber the essence of what happens is constituted by the meaning the agents ascribe to their behaviour. He says that it is this subjectively intended meaning that 'regulates' the course of their behaviour. Without this meaning, Weber asserts, 'an action is empirically impossible and conceptually elusive'.[2] The *verstehen* thesis states that to understand human action is to identify its meaning as understood by the actors. This very meaning constitutes a sociocultural fact. Weber says that the meaning of the observable behaviour of the actors can be conceived in two ways. First, we can conceive the meaning as 'idea'. By 'idea', Weber means a sort of 'norm' for the behaviour or action of the agent. The action is based on this norm and the norm provides the meaning of the action. That is to say, it is both constitutive and regulative. Given this norm, we can formulate the course of behaviour that logically follows from it. In other words, we would be able to derive the implications that follow from the meaning or idea which we as observers ascribe to the behaviour in question. From such a standpoint we can 'evaluate' the actual development of the behaviour. Using this conceptual analysis as a standard we could 'measure up' the actual conduct. On the other hand, we can see the agent's action as a 'means' to realize certain 'results'. In view of the agent's experience or knowledge of the world, he sees his action as a 'means' for achieving certain ends. This means-end understanding of the agent's action reveals the meaning of their behaviour. It implies that the agent's action has an intended purpose. So, in explaining human action what we try to do is not the identification of the events as cause and effect, rather we try to understand the subjectively intended meaning of the action.

Weber conceives motive as a complex of meaning which seems either to the agent himself or to the observer as constituting the meaningfulness of an action. According to Weber, the observer has to interpret the meaning of any action in order to achieve certainty. Certainty can be achieved either by rational understanding or by empathetically reliving the experience in question. Rational certainty is achieved when we interpret the action intellectually so that the intended complex of meaning is revealed in its entirety. We have empathetic certainty when we 'relive' the agent's action in our imagination. This does not mean that we have to be the agent in order to empathetically experience the action. Weber often emphasizes the dictum that 'one need not be Caesar in order to understand Caesar'. There are two stages involved in the interpretation of *verstehen* method. At an initial stage we have direct understanding or *aktuelles verstehen.* Then we can have explanatory understanding or *erklarendes*

verstehen. When we understand the meaning of '2x2=4' we are said to have direct understanding. Similarly, we directly understand that someone is in pain when we see tears trickling down his cheek. We are said to have explanatory understanding only when we grasp the complexes of meaning into which a directly intelligible action fits in virtue of its intended meaning. So, when we understand '2x2=4' as part of a business calculation or the pain as a result of humiliation, we have explanatory understanding. Thus, when we understand the subjectively intended meaning as the agent's motive, we have adequacy at the level of meaning.[3]

However, an explanation of human action should also be adequate at the level of causation. By causal adequacy Weber refers to a sequence of events that follow the same course with a probability governed by empirical laws. The problem of causality, according to Weber, is concerned with the correlation of concrete effects with concrete causes and not with abstract uniformities. It is the prerogative of social sciences to show whether an agent's doing of an action 'X' has led to the end 'E' or not. Hence, the need to check the probability which will ensure the causal adequacy. Nevertheless, we cannot state the probability of the cause–effect relationship between the facts and sociocultural object numerically. Numerical probability is attained only in the sphere of 'absolute chance'—for example in the throwing of a dice or the drawing of balls of various colours from a box. However, there is no way to assert that a particular way of throwing the dice or shaking the box will effect the desired outcome. Weber calls this type of causality as a 'chance causality'. In chance causality we cannot dictate the outcome with empirical rule. Weber rightly says that in the sphere of social sciences the ability to assign a numerical value of the probability is absent, as such an assignment presupposes the existence of 'absolute chance'. Still, we can offer, generally valid judgements about the occurrence of a type of reaction similar in certain respects, from the agents with a high degree of likelihood.[4] This implies that even in the realm of social sciences there are certain law-like regularities even though its nature differs from that of natural sciences as the former is context-dependent.

The causal imputation takes place not by simple observation of the course of events. On the other hand, it takes place through a series of 'abstractions'. According to Weber, we make a mental construction of the course of events with a modification in certain directions. It involves mental isolation of the given data so as to construct a complex of possible causal relations. It is done by the use of 'ideal types'. An ideal type is a mental construct that has one sided accentuation of different vantage grounds. However, it is not a jumble of contradictions. It is rather a unified analytical construct that synthesizes various concrete individual phenomena. It is ideal in as much as it cannot be found in

its conceptual purity in the realm of empirical reality. It is a heuristic device which embodies various possible causal relations, out of which only some correspond to reality. Hence, ideal type is a means for explicitly and correctly assigning a cause for particular event thereby to eliminate other causal imputations. Ideal type thus consists of the motives for the agent's action, as well as the course of behaviour for the given motive. We arrive at the adequate causes by first separating the given into various components and fitting them into an 'empirical rule'. Then we can determine with what probability the effect could be expected by the continuous reference to empirical rules. To use a Wittgensteinian expression the 'form of life' suggests as to what extent we should expect the outcome. In other words, our understanding of an action is based on what Weber calls 'ontological knowledge'—that is knowledge of certain facts belonging to the historical situation, as well as 'nomological knowledge'—that is knowledge of certain empirical rules that is concerned with the ways in which human beings are likely to react in a given situation. Hence, we should analyse the object of our sociocultural enquiry into its various components, till we could apply this nomological knowledge derived from our own experience, to our ontological knowledge. Once we have done this we can make a decision whether these facts could bring about the effect which is expected. If it does bring about, then it should be regarded as an adequate cause.

The causal analysis of personal actions takes place in the same way as the causal analysis of the sociocultural object. That is, it involves isolation, generalization and the construction of the judgments of possibility. Weber asserts that the analysis of one's own action which is erroneously thought to be directly given and hence does not require the above causal analysis in fact proceeds the same way. It is not at all distinct from the analysis of the action of the third person. Weber gives the example of a mother who beats her child for his misdeeds. But when the mother who hears the cry of the child afterwards feels sympathetic towards him and when the husband points out that such a reaction towards the child is not the solution, tries to give an explanation as follows: She was agitated by the quarrel with the cook a while ago and in her usual self she would not have reacted in the same fashion. This is to say that the punishment she gave was an accidental one and not an adequately caused reaction.

Weber's writings on the logic of cultural sciences illustrates the causal relations between certain features of a given sociocultural fact and certain empirical facts. He shows the various logical standpoints from which we can appraise the facts of cultural life causally through an example of Goethe's letters to Frau Vonstein.[5] It is not the written paper, the perceivable fact that is treated as the sociocultural object. It is only the means of knowing the fact that Goethe had such sentiments

towards Frau Vonstein. The meaning of the entire discourse becomes intelligible when we correctly interpret the content of Goethe's letters. Thus, by interpretation of the meaning of the object of our enquiry the historical fact is disclosed. Now, we can integrate this fact into an historical causal context so as to reveal its effects in Goethe's personality or to trace its impact on his writings. Weber says that if it is proved in some way that these experiences have no influence on Goethe's personality, still it is valuable, in spite of its causal ineffectiveness, as a heuristic means in characterizing Goethe's historical uniqueness. That is to say, we can derive from them an outlook on life which was peculiar to Goethe. Then we can integrate this as a real link in the causal nexus of Goethe's life. Suppose these experiences contain nothing characteristic of Goethe as distinct from his contemporaries, rather it represents the typical life pattern of German elite of those days. Then, even if it does not tell anything new about Goethe it serves as a paradigm of mental and spiritual life of those days so that we can integrate these historical facts into a cultural historical causal context as real cause and effect. And finally, let it be the case that those experiences contain nothing which is characteristic of any cultural epoch. Still, a psychiatrist who is interested in the psychology of love relationships could view it from a variety of standpoints as an ideally typical illustration of certain ascetic disturbances. So we could take these facts either as a heuristic means to disclose the causal sequence or as a causal component of a historical nexus.

Weber thus attempts a synthesis of two models of explanation. In line with the non-causalist model, Weber insists on understanding the action in terms of its meaning. At the same time, he retains the causal model by insisting on the causal adequacy.

> Without adequacy on the level of meaning, our generalization remains mere statement of statistical probability, either not intelligible at all or only imperfectly intelligible. . . . On the other hand, from the point of view of its importance for sociological knowledge, even the most certain adequacy on the level of meaning signifies an acceptable *causal* proposition only to the extent that evidence can be produced that there is a probability . . . that the action in question *really* takes the course held to be meaningfully adequate.[6]

II

Weber's insistence on the adequacy of cause in the explanation of actions led many philosophers of social sciences to conceive him as offering a causal model of explanation. Those who do so adduce the following remark of Weber to stake their claim.

> . . . purpose is the conception of an *effect* which becomes a *cause* of an action. Since we take into account every cause which produces or can produce significant effect, we also consider this one.[7]

This is to say that purpose or goal motivates the action and motive is the cause of the action. However, they fail to understand what Weber means by a 'cause'. The readily identify the cause Weber refers here to that of Humean notion of cause. Humean model of causal relation holds between two events that are contingently and externally related. It also assumes that cause is temporally prior to the effect. Adherence to this view of causality in the explanation of human action is vulnerable to the criticisms as raised by Melden. Melden argues that to regard motives as causes of action, that they explain the action as events are explained by their causes is a logical error. According to him, to explain an action causally is to identify the bodily movement as the one that occurs when the action is performed. Thus, to explain my action of raising my arm by invoking motive as the cause of the bodily movement that constitutes my arm going up, we have to conjoin the statement that describes the causal relation with a further statement that connects the bodily movement with the action. Now, Melden says that no further descriptions of the bodily movement will provide the link that bridges the gap between action and movements.[8] Hence, Humean model of causal explanation fails in the domain of human actions.

The 'cause' which Weber here refers to can be understood as distinct from the Humean notion of cause. In Descartes we see that it is possible to regard a thing as its own cause. That is, the cause and effect need not be two distinct events.

> . . . I did not say that it was impossible for something to be the efficient cause of itself. This is obviously the case when the term 'efficient' is taken to apply only to causes which are prior in time to their effects, or different from them. But such a restriction does not seem appropriate in the present context. First, it would make the question trivial, since everyone knows that something cannot be prior to, or distinct from itself. Secondly, the natural light does not establish that the concept of an efficient cause requires that it be prior in time to its effect. On the contrary, the concept of a cause, is strictly speaking applicable only for as long as the cause is producing its effect, and so it is not prior to it.[9]

According to Descartes, 'time' is discrete. The two separate segments of time are independent of each other. Hence, a body which has existed 'from itself', without a cause requires some 'power' in it which enables it to 'recreate' itself continuously. When we could not see any such 'power' in the idea of a body we can immediately conclude that the body might not have derived its existence from itself. Certainly, this notion of cause is different from the Humean notion of 'cause'. It is possible to construe the 'cause' Weber refers to, when he speaks of motive as the cause of an action, as similar to one that Descartes holds. Even though Descartes speaks of this 'cause' with regard to the existence of 'God', who is the 'first cause', the philosophical insight it provides us is helpful to understand the relation of motives or purposes to human action. In Cartesian terminology 'motive' can be construed as the 'power' inherent in action.

John Searle propounds a concept of cause that is very similar to that of Descartes. According to Searle, what is central to the notion of action is the notion of 'intentionality'. To say that an action has intentionality is to say that it is directed to something. Echoing Descartes, we can say, the 'inherent power' in action gives intentionality. Intentionality, according to Searle, has two components, namely 'content' and 'psychological mode'. The 'content' is that component of intentionality which makes it about something or directed to something. The 'psychological mode' is the way in which the content is characterized say, by my desire, belief or hope. Moreover, these intentional states have what he calls 'conditions of satisfaction'. That is each state for itself determines its truth conditions or conditions of fulfilment. Now he says, sometimes these intentional states cause things to happen as in such cases the cause and effect are internally connected. It is internally connected because 'the cause is a representation of the very state of affairs that it causes.[10] Here the cause both represents as well as brings about the effect. Searle calls this type of causation 'intentional causation' which is different from Humean notion of causation.

Thus, we see that the cause Weber talks about in the context of action is akin to the 'Cartesio-Searlian' notion of cause in the realm of human action. Hence, for Weber motive is inseparable from, and inherent in action. And this is what the non-causalists hold. According to them, motive is conceptually bound up with action. It is because the agent has such and such a motive, we expect him or her to act in such and such a manner. For example, if I am highly possessive in my motive in falling in love with a young woman, then I am likely to marry her, rather I would try to marry her by all means. Here my motive is not distinct from action, any talk about the priority of motive to action is quite unintelligible. Motive is the means by which we understand the action.

The above analysis shows that Weber's theory of explanation of human action acknowledges the primacy of agency. An action, according to him, is purposive and the purpose motivates or directs

the action. Weber's notion of agency comes near to that of Taylor. For Taylor, the essential aspect of human agency is the subject's power of self-evaluation. He distinguishes between two kinds of evaluation: weak evaluation and strong evaluation. In weak evaluation we are concerned with the 'outcomes' whereas in strong evaluation we evaluate the quality of our motivation.[11] In Weber, we find that the agent regards his action as a means to realize certain ends. This means-end evaluation can be called a sort of weak evaluation, since it is concerned with the result of the action. However, his thesis does not preclude the scope for strong-evaluation. Weber says that we desire something either 'for its own sake' or as a means to achieve something which is more highly desired. The agent has the ability to weigh the desirability of a goal or motive not just in terms of the consequences or outcome but in terms of other values. Weber says that the evaluation of goal or purpose cannot be omitted from the deliberation of an agent as he acts with a sense of responsibility. An agent 'weighs and chooses from among the values involved according to his own conscience and his personal view of the world. . . . The act of choice itself is his own responsibility.[12]

Let us see in what sense Weber has synthesized the two models of explanation. Our discussion has thrown light on his notion of adequacy at the level of meaning. An action is inherently meaningful as the agent bestows subjectively intended meaning on his act. In other words, the meaningfulness of an action consists in the inseparable motive of the agent. Nevertheless, Weber's theory of explanation has a causal component. We can compare Weber's model of causal imputation by means of mental construction of possible causal relations with what Tuomela calls 'conduct plans'. A conduct plan serves to explain the agent's action. It involves the agent's beliefs regarding various means for the attainment of his goal. 'Practical syllogism' is a species of conduct plan. Basically, it has two premises and a conclusion. The first premise states the agent's intention to fulfill the desired end. The second premise states the agent's beliefs in the means to achieve the end. That is, his doing a particular action is factually or conceptually necessary for attaining the desired end. The conclusion states that the agent resorts to such an action that is required of him. Thus, it has the following form:

A intends to achieve an end E.
A believes that an action X needs
to be done in order to achieve E.
A does X.

In the practical syllogism, the connection between the premises and the conclusion is conceptual in a normative sense. As Tuomela says, one should use the verb 'to intend' in the sense that at the right time one performs what one intends, so that it could be considered as

a linguistic norm within the community of agents. However, this norm is internalized by every normal human being so that he obeys it or it guides his behaviour. Now, Tuomela claims that this kind of internalization presupposes a causal mechanism as one cannot internalize the norm if it were not causally effective in producing the desired effects. This type of causation, which at the same time retains the conceptual connections is called 'purposive causation' by Tuomela.[13] In Weberian terminology, we should analyse the object of our sociocultural inquiry into its various components till we could apply our nomological knowledge, derived from the agent's life-world to his ontological knowledge. This ontological knowledge, we should say, incorporates the language of event causation of concrete effects. It is the knowledge about two concrete events that stand in causal relation. Nomological knowledge, on the other hand, illuminates the meaning aspect. That is, the meaning of an action is based on the idea or norm which not only constitutes but also regulates our action. Since the norm is regulative too, we have to ascertain that the action in question really follows. Though the understanding of rules is essential to understand the meaning of an action, it does not guarantee that the rules are followed in practice. Hence, the need for causal adequacy. Thus, the synthesis that Weber attempted is carried out at two levels. At the level of meaning, he conceives motive as conceptually bound up with action and at the level of causation he emphasizes the need for checking whether the action in question has really taken its course.

From the above discussion, we have seen the nature of the synthesis of the two models of explanation in Weber's theory. The causal model of explanation has its roots in the positivistic tradition and the non-causal model has its roots in the anti-positivistic tradition. Weber's theory of explanation is an attempt to overcome the limitations of these two diverging models. Such an attempt is very significant in the realm of social sciences. In philosophy of social sciences, the controversy regarding the object of sociocultural explanation is well known. Some regard human actions as the data of explanation, whereas others regard the consequences of action as the only relevant thing to social scientific explanation.

However, a preoccupation with the consequences of action ignoring the study of actions themselves serves the positivistic ideals. On the other hand, an exclusive concern with human actions themselves gives an idealistic turn to social sciences.[14] As we have noted, Weber's theory of explanation takes care of both the subjectively intended meaningful human action as well as its effects, the intended or unintended consequences. This is evident from his insistence on the adequacy of meaning as well as of cause. Thus, we can say that Weber's theory of explanation aims at understanding social reality in its entirety.

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Buddhist Conception of Selfless Self-identity: A Critique

N.S. DRAVID
Nagpur

Buddhism is known as '*Nairātmya Vāda*', a Sanskrit technical term meaning 'the doctrine of selflessness'. Among the various philosophical schools of India, both orthodox and heterodox, Buddhism is the only school with the exception of Cārvāka (which is mostly ignored), which denies the reality of the self. If may be thought that it is the spiritual principle which is the basis of moral and eschatological phenomena in human life and sustains individual identity, which is the object of Buddhist denial of the self. This is only partly true. Buddhists deny the self but they do not deny any of the phenomena supposed to be associated with the self. Moral retribution, rebirth or reincarnation, spiritual growth through successive births culminating in Nirvāṇa or absolute cessation of human personality or configuration of different so-called mental states, are all admitted to be real by the Buddhists. The self, which is regarded as the substantive locus or agent of these phenomena and is supposed to remain eternal and unchanged in its being is what the Buddhists do not admit to be real. This denial is extended to entities other than the self. Some of these, like space, time, etc. are supposed to be eternal and others durable, if not eternal. These too are regarded as selfless, that is, non-substantive. There is no substantive entity. Only attributes or characters in various configurations obtain and it is the configurations that are mistaken for substances. Thus, the no-self-theory of the Buddhists is in reality a no-substance-theory denying the substantive nature both in the subjective and the objective spheres of the world. If we add to this theory of self denial other theories like the theory of momentariness, discreteness, non-compositeness, uniqueness or self-definedness, mututal exclusiveness, and so on of all 'reals'—which are logically deducible from the no-self-theory, we get the Buddhist notion of a full-fledged metaphysical analysis. So, the Buddhist theory of selflessness is in reality the metaphysical counterpart of the contemporary logical theory of logical atomism. Here we wish to consider how the concept of self-identity has been explained by the Buddhists despite their denial of all that makes for identity in the not-self and the self. Space, time, substance,

universals, relations and similarity are supposed to be the ingredients that make for the identity of things. Space, which is the ubiquitous substratum of all things lends them uninterrupted identity despite their frequent displacements. Time, which is eternal, endows things with durability through all the qualitative changes that they undergo. Substance holds together different attributes and their changing phases so that these do not make for the disintegration of their substratum. The universe constitutes individuals into different classes thereby investing them with generic identity. A more or less similar function is performed by similarity. Relations of various types bring together the above identity-fostering ingredients and things. The Buddhist denial of self is the blanket denial of all these ingredients and it is sustained by rigorously logical arguments. We need not go into any of these arguments here. Our main concern in this article is to see how far Buddhists have succeeded in explaining the felt identity of things and persons without compromising their basic theory of 'selflessness' in its broad connotation.

In regard to external objects or the not-self, there is not much risk in maintaining that every moment these objects come into being and go out of being, that is to say, every moment a new object apparently similar to the immediately previous one comes into being only to be replaced at the very next moment by another object apparently similar to itself. Thus, every durable object is in reality a series of momentary objects. The appearance of identity (durability or continuity) is only an illusion. Even modern science seems to subscribe to some such view. The Buddhist cannot be easily faulted in maintaining the momentariness of all external reals. His real difficulty lies in upholding the momentariness of the self or the elements constituting the self and thus denying a durable subject of cognition, volition and conation. If there is no self existing even for two moments, even the recognition of the illusoriness of the appearance of durability of external entities cannot be satisfactorily explained. That a certain cognition is illusory can be known only after the cognition has already taken place, that is, in the moment subsequent to that in which the cognition comes into being. This is also the moment at which the cognition goes out of being. But the illusory cognition and the cognition of illusoriness have both to be given to the same cognizer in order to ensure that the latter sublates the former. The disillusioning cognition of one person cannot (normally) sublate the illusory cognition of another. The disillusionment may or may not be followed by the reflective cognition, 'I who was deluded a moment ago am now disillusioned.' But the subject of illusion and disillusionment has got to be the same.

The Buddhists may meet this difficulty by supposing that the cognition of disillusionment itself plays the role of the subject or agent in the above case. The reference to the past illusory cognition having the form of immediate memory may be supposed to be embodied in the cognition of disillusionment and thus the emergence of a cognition cancelling another earlier cognition can be explained.

But the possibility of false memory may create difficulty for this explanation of disillusionment (or the recognition of illusion as illusion). A false reference to an illusion which has not occurred in the past is quite possible for a cognition in the present. Nothing of the past, even of the immediately preceding moment, exists in the present. The memory of the past which may testify to the past occurrence of the illusion is identical with the cognition of disillusionment. There cannot also be some impression or memory-image of the past surviving the illusion as this too cannot be other than the disillusionment. If memory or memory-image differed from the disillusionment-cognition, it would precede it and so it cannot be present when disillusionment arises. But a cognition which is simultaneously the recollection of a past illusion and also a sublation of the illusion cannot attest its own veridicity if it is questioned. Even if no illusion occurred in the past—recent or remote—a false reference to it is not impossible. Unless some connection of the present with the past is admitted the supposedly in-built reference to the past of the present recollective cognition cannot be maintained. For the upholders of the momentarist doctrine this is not possible. Nyāya does not have to face such a diffficulty. According to its view of bimomentary existence of all mental states, a cognitive or other state lasts for only two moments and is replaced by another state similar or dissimilar to it which emerges into being in the second moment of the existence of its predecessor. At this moment the previous and the later states co-exist. At the third moment the previous state goes out of existence making way for the existence of the later state. Thus, because of the momentary co-existence of the past and the present and the supereassion of the past by the present, the reference to the past contained in the present recollective cognition can be satisfactorily explained by Nyāya which is not possible for Buddhism.

It is possible to get around this difficulty in either of two ways for the momentarist. It may be contended that the veridicity of recollection, if questioned, can be certified by a cognition arising after the recollective cognition and affirming that the reference to the past contained in the preceding cognition was real. For making this affirmation, the latter cognition would have to refer back to the cognition preceding it (and also indirectly to the cognition preceding the latter). This (second) reference may or may not be true and so its veridicity also may be questioned. To remove the doubt, recourse may be taken, as in the previous case, to a subsequent confirmation-cognition. Another and a better solution to the difficulty is the theory of the self-consciousness of all cognitions advocated by certain

Buddhists. If cognition is self-conscious then a cognition would be cognized and even certified by itself. This does not mean that false memories are impossible. Even a self-conscious cognition may go wrong. But if it goes wrong, its wrongness can be detected by another self-conscious cognition which would be more complex in content than it. Thus, all successive cognitions following a certain simple cognition would be more and more complex in content but actually unconnected with any previous or succeeding cognition. Each cognition in a series would be like the Leibnizian monad mirroring the previous cognition along with all its direct and indirect objects.

The fact of recognition expressed by the statement, 'I who was deluded earlier am now disillusioned,' referred to even earlier, can also be explained on the above view of the self-consciousness of cognition. Recognition is a kind of self-consciousness which in the Buddhist view has to be ascribed to cognition, instead of a self transcending the cognition. One and the same cognition can be supposed to cognize itself and the cognition cognized by itself. Just as in self's recognitive cognition the past cognition is present only in the form of recollection, so in the self-cognitive cognition advocated by the Buddhist, the past cognition may be taken to be involved as a memory-image and the sublating cognition as the present cognition of disillusionment; what is not involved in the cognition is the felt fact of the self being the common substratum of both the past and the present cognitions. However, the self-cognitionness supposed to characterize cognition may be taken to replace the substantive relation of self to the earlier and latter cognitions by the epistemic relation of disillusioning cognition to itself and the illusory cognition.

But the self in recognition represents the principle of continuity, the ontological factor that connects the past with the present in the conscious as well as the subconscious life of the individual. It is experienced to remain the same through the whole span of the bodily life of an individual (if not through eternity). Changes of mental states and even the states of the body go on uninterrupted throughout this period. The important question that needs to be tackled by the Buddhist is how the series of mental states which are all utterly discrete and momentary and which alone constitute the life-history of the individual (bodily sensations are included here among mental states) can give rise to the sense of self-identity from birth to death of the individual. Before considering the Buddhist attempt to answer this question, we may dispose of a facile reply to the question which contemporary western thinkers generally regard as quite satisfactory. The reply is that it is the identity of the living body which sustains the felt identity of the self throughout the life of the individual. So long as the body continues to be active biologically, the bodily existence of the individual as a particular individual is sustained. So, there is nothing

more to the identity of the individual than the observed identity or continuity of his or her body. While considering the adequacy of bodily identity as the only or primary basis of self-identity (or personal identity), we have to make sure of two important things: one, whether there really is bodily identity to sustain personal identity and, two, whether it is the self-identity as experienced by the person who is the owner of the body or the identity as visible to an observer (but not introspectable by him or her under any circumstances) that is sought to be explained. There is no doubt that there obtains bodily continuity from birth to death in the life of every living being. But the changes that go on incessantly inside and outside the living body do not remain the same even for two moments. Even physiologists concede this fact. The body cannot be regarded, either as a collective unity of its descrete and changing parts or as a compound of these parts, for then it would not be able to function as a unitary organism if one or more of its parts is or are afffected or separated from it. Of course, there must be something which holds together the incessantly changing parts of the body and remains intact despite the loss of some of these parts (none of which may be indispensable for the preservation of the integrity of the former). And the more the nature of this hypothetical element or principle integrating the changing parts of the body is examined, the more mysterious it appears to be.

But leaving aside this issue if we turn to the second issue referred to above as to whether it is the felt or observed self-identity that is to be explained then what cotemporary western philosophers say on the issue is found to be totally irrelevant. According to most of these philosophers, the bodily identity as observed by an external observer is the basis of the self-identity as felt by the owner of the body. As if there has always to be some external observer to keep the individual owning the observed body alive and conscious of his or her self-identity. It is just like the *deus ex machina* invented by Berkeley for keeping unperceived things in existence (as their existence is thought to depend upon their being perceived by some sentient being or the other). If someone spent all of one's life in utter isolation in some secluded place, then such a person would be completely deprived of any sense of self-identity. Could one say in reply to this that even one's own observation of one's body is sufficient to sustain one's sense of self-identity? No! One cannot observe one's whole body, and that too at all times. One cannot see one's backside, or one's face unless in a mirror. The inside of one's body is completely hidden from one's gaze. Even if it were possible to observe the photograph of one's body this photograph cannot be distinguished from the photograph of another's body unless one of the two photographs is already known to be the photograph of one's own body. The point of the argument is that mere external observation of the outer surface or even the inside

of one's body cannot be the basis of one's sense of self-identity. The body has to be felt or internally experienced to be one's own. This feeling the external observer of another body can never get in relation to it however closely he or she observes it. But will then the internal feeling called 'co-anaesthesia' and somewhat akin to the moderate sense of general well-being of one's body sustain self-identity? Perhaps not because it is dificult to say with certainty that such a feeling persists in the state of dreamless sleep. But even in this and similar other states one does not cease to be oneself. If for argument's sake it is conceded that the feeling of co-anaesthesia is a lifelong feeling or experience clinging to one's mind, it has to be decided whether the said feeling develops from out of the various feelings and other experiences that one goes through in one's childhood or, in some form or other it pre-exists all experiences and invests them with its quality (or character). The latter alternative would mean that co-anaesthesis is innate to human beings and not a resultant of various experiences that the human child goes through immediately after its birth. If co-anaesthesic is underlived then no bodily experience can account for it. Instead every bodily experience must be supposed to be what it is, that is, the experience belonging to a particular body and not to any other-only because it is associated with a certain experience of co-anaesthesia.

The first of the above two alternatives maintaining the derivative character of co-anaesthesia may be upheld if it can be explained why certain experiences give rise to the self-feeling pertaining to a certain person and not to any other. My experience of hunger and thirst for example are just like those belonging to any other. Why then do my experiences of hunger and thirst give rise to my self-feeling and not to any other person's self-feeling? It has to be admitted that the self-feeling is primitive and underived from any bodily experience and every one of the bodily experiences is eo ipso infused through and through with self-feeling.

Faced with this difficulty some western thinkers and certain Buddhists too have tried to explain self-identity with the help of memory connecting the past with the present in man's life. The experiences of one's own life are remembered by an individual. No one ever remembers the events of another's life. Everyone's past may be supposed to be enshrined in his or her memory of it. But it must be noted that in the Buddhist view, memory cannot be an experience over and above the past and the present experiences. The present experience itself embodies the impression of the past experience. If any one of the series of experiences occurring one after another were not recollective of the immediately-previous experience, the memory-link with the past will be disrupted and consequently the identity of the individual would suffer an irreparable loss. But it would be quite wrong on this account to assume that every experience in a man's life is remembered by some experience coming after it. It is quite possible that many things that happen to us are irrevocably forgotten. Even on being reminded of them, we are unable to recall them. The traces or some kinds of impressions of the forgotten experiences may remain embedded in our brain or mind but if they do not come alive they are as good as useless. The conscious self-feeling cannot be based upon the unconscious or subconscious traces of experiences. Besides, it is counter-intuitive to assume that even the most trivial occurrence that ever made the slightest impact on his or her mind is and has to be remembered by a person if he or she should not forfeit his or her self-identity.

Another device which a majority of Buddhist thinkers have adopted to explain self-identity is to base it on the causal relation holding among the terms of the experiential series. The terms are held together in the sequential relation by causality whose nature has been referred to earlier in this essay. Although every experience is momentary and discrete, it comes into being necessarily at its own moment and also goes out of being at the very next moment. This is the causality which the Buddhists regard as the basis of self-identity.

There are many difficulties in this view. First, can one speak of causality as explained above, to be a relation relating the experiences occurring successively on their own at their appointed moments of origination? There is no relation at all between one thing and another in the Buddhist view. What is there then to take the place of self-identity? Necessity of origination and destruction are confined to each individual entity. It does not relate anything with anything else.

Second, what is there to prevent the experience belonging to one individual (forming part of a series) to be the basis of another individual's self-identity? The desire for food of one hungry man is similar to another hungry man's desire. There is nothing to distinguish the two desires from each other. Why then one person's desire does not form part of some other person's experiential series? To say in reply to this that the desires of different persons having the same object are intrinsically different from each other is not at all satisfactory. The so-called intrinsic difference is not intrinsic and inexplicable. It needs explanation by the Buddhist. As a matter of fact, we find experiences of different persons causally connected with each other. If a teacher imparts instruction to his students then the experience-series constituting the teaching-activity of the teacher leads to the enlightenment of the student, thus giving rise to another experience-series. So it cannot be contended that the causal relation does not obtain between different experiences.But if the causal relation between

different series is admitted then a teacher should feel self-identity with his student or any other person with whom he communicates intelligently.

Here, it should be noted that causality involved in the generation of the experience-series constituting the enlightenment of the student by the instructions of the teacher is what is called efficient in philosophical terminology. The causality of the self, in relation to its experiences is quite different in nature from efficient causality. It is known as material causality. The Buddhist seeks to interpret material causality in terms of the efficient causality of experiences in the experiential-series. It is therefore not possible for him to avoid the above difficulty as experiences belonging to different persons happen to be related by efficient causality, Besides, the Buddhist does not entertain the notion of material causality at all. All causes are only efficient but it is only the totality of efficient causes that is productive of the effect in the Buddhist view.

But the most serious difficulty in the above explanation of self-identity is quite different. Which is that none of the explanations based on causality serves the purpose for which it is set forth. The identity of the self is conscious identity. It is not the identity of a stone-like object. Causality however, is a totally unconscious property of things (or experiences). How can such a property do duty for the conscious identity? Everything associated with the self is conscious which is sought to be explained by what is absolutely unconscious. Is it not a paradoxical fact?

This entire discussion would appear to be simply artificial if one considers seriously the nature of this activity of discussion and also the nature of the agent of the discussion. Discussion is an intelligent and meaningful discourse or a series of significant statements or assertions made by people who know what they mean to say before they say it. Can such statements be nothing but a series of experiences or their verbal expressions without any person or assertor asserting them? If there is any assertor then there will be another series of experiences in the form of the assertor and this series will be related to the series which is the expression by some relation. Can the statements be meaningful if there is no intelligent human being to utter the statements? Only because verbal statements express the intention of their author or speaker that they are regarded as meaningful. But is there any place for speakers, their intentions, the statements embodying their intentions or assertions in the Buddhist theory? Can one speak of any theory at all if there is nothing over and above the series of discrete experiences? By their own intellectual activity aimed at refuting the theories of their opponents, the Buddhists have pragmatically refuted their theory of selflessness and the illusoriness of self-identity.

Three Meditations on Oneness: Conversations with My Selves

MICHAEL KRAUSZ
Milton C. Nahm Professor of Philosophy,
Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania

PREFACE

In the spring of 1992, I was fortunate to have two converging yet opposing sorts of experiences concerning issues that have periodically preoccupied me since early childhood. The circumstances, which resist characterization as mere coincidence, involved several days of public dialogue with Swami Shyam at the International Meditation Institute in Kullu, India. In the course of these discussions, certain themes were expressed repeatedly, which I now come to see are as distinctive of this particular sage as of the Hindu tradition from which he arose. I should emphasize that despite such origins, Swami Shyam speaks not in the voice of Hinduism uniquely but as a universalist. I am not a religious scholar so I shall not attempt to distinguish to what degree his orientation is Hindu in an orthodox sense. But for present purposes that will not matter.

Both before and after those exchanges I was privileged to have had some illuminating discussions with a number of Buddhist monks, the most significant of which was in a private audience with His Holiness the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala. In the course of my conversation with him I came to see ever more clearly the differences and similarities between a basically Hindu-inspired vision and that of the Tibetan Buddhist. Throughout, I sought to place some of those concerns in the context of my own struggles with religious questions that arose from a background in religious Judaism and then were secularized in my more adult life.

The present dialogue personifies three voices, each of whom has found clearer articulation in these recent experiences. I have come to discover that all three voices have been inchoate in me, and I venture here to make their exchanges public. The statements of these voices are idealizations of positions which I associate with their respective traditions. But, as I say, the positions taken presume no scholarly accuracy. Wherever necessary I have taken the liberty of amplifying

positions on behalf of each of these voices. One might say, then, that the positions taken are rhetorical constructions.

I have not assumed the names of my primary inspirations—Swami Shyam or Tenzin Gyatsu, the Dalai Lama—since, first, I do not wish to misrepresent their own learned views, and second, their voices are not precisely those that I have internalized. Besides that of Michael Krausz, I have adopted names of two others. They are Gyaan Swaroop, which in fact is the name bestowed upon me by Swami Shyam. And, for the Buddhist voice, I simply use 'Bhikkhu,' the title of a Buddhist monk. In fact, my conversations with four other Buddhist monks, besides His Holiness were especially edifying. They were Dhammananda Bhikkhu (whom I met in Sarnath and who lives in Bangkok), Khamtul Rinpoche (who I met in Dharamsala), Bhikkhu Santitthito (whom I met in Chaingmai, Thailand), and Phra Sommuk Somavaro (whom I met in Bangkok). While these monks represent distinct sub-traditions within Buddhism, their intramural differences will not concern me here. Bhikkhu's voice is an idealization or an aggregate of all of them. I trust that Bhikkhu's slant will not be too far from the views of each of these Buddhists.

Copies of an earlier version of this dialogue were sent to Swami Shyam, to Dhammananda Bhikkhu, and to Bernard Harrison whose thoughtful comments helped to make appropriate adjustments. In May of 1993 I returned to India where I had further opportunity to consult with Swami Shyam in Kullu as well as Geche Damcho La and Tenzin Sherab at the Institute of Buddhist Dialectics in Dharamsala. I also wish to acknowledge the insightful suggestions of Jitendra Mohanty.

Meditation One. Gyaan Swaroop and Michael Krausz
Oneness, Asking About Oneness, Oneness as the Possibility of Forms, Experiencing Oneness, Non-Dualistic Language, Oneness as Consciousness, Consciousness as Emergent, Blasphemy, Ego-Self and Possessiveness, Persistence of Questions, Morality, Sin.

Meditation Two. Bhikkhu and Michael Krausz
Emptiness, Inherent existence, Impermanence, Emptiness as Final Principle, Persons, Spiritual Materialism, God, Religion, Morality, Reincarnation, *Nirvāṇa.*

Meditation Three. Gyaan Swaroop, Bhikkhu, and Michael Krausz
Overcoming Ego, Expanding Ego-self, Body, Creating and Dissolving into *Ātma,* Who is Conscious?, Quietism, Final Stage, Relation Between Religions, Paradox of Refinement, Rightness, Organizing Principles, No Questions, End of Questions, The Author(s), Agreement.

MEDITATION ONE

M Gyaan, thank you for receiving me so graciously. I find that I am able to speak freely about some issues that are important to me. In fact, when I talk with you it feels as if I am not so much talking to somebody else as that I am really talking to myself.

G It is a gift that you feel this way, since in a sense it is true that you are talking to yourself, even when you are talking with me. So then, let us begin. What are the issues that you have in mind?

M I suppose they are religious questions.

G What are the questions?

'Oneness'

M Well, since I was a boy, I have always had certain questions about the most central declaration of Jewish faith.

G What is that?

M It is the *sh'ma,* 'Hear O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one.'

G And what questions do you have about that?

M They concern God, and more especially Oneness. For example, is God a creator God? Is God a he or a she or an it? Is God a personal God? Does God listen to requests or consoles? Does God officiate over all that there is? Is God part of everything, or does God stand apart from everything that there is? But I suppose that my central concern is about the meaning of Oneness.

Asking About Oneness

G You mentioned a number of questions. Perhaps we can address them all in good time, but let us begin by taking up the question of the meaning of Oneness. Let me ask you what you think it means. But first I must ask what is your goal in asking about the meaning of Oneness? What will happen to you if you understand Oneness?

M Why do you ask me this question?

G Because if you do not understand why you want to understand Oneness you will not evolve. Your understanding of Oneness involves understanding why you want to understand it.

M Very well. I want to know your view abut Oneness.

G And why would that matter to you?

M Because it might lead me to God.

G When you say that your understanding my view of Oneness might lead you to God, you must have some concept of God. What is it?

M It is not clear to me. I have never been able to understand the

idea of a creator God, for example. Such a God would have to be separate from everything else. I cannot fathom the idea of a God before there was a world of existing things, however formless they might appear. I cannot fathom the idea of a God independently of what there is. Let me ask you, do you embrace the idea of a separate creator God?

G No.

M So, then to what sort of God would you be led by your understanding Oneness?

G I would not reach for God through my understanding of Oneness. The understanding of Oneness does not lead to the understanding of a separate God. It is not the case that you are here and God is there. Your understanding of Oneness here will not lead you to God there.

M Then what will the knowledge of Oneness bring?

G As you evolve, your awareness will expand and you will have the power to see what Oneness is. Your knowledge about Oneness, about the highest Awareness, will make you a person at peace with yourself. That will be the result of the knowledge of Oneness.

M Have you equated the knowledge of Oneness with the knowledge of God? Have I understood you rightly?

G I do not wish to use the word God. It is misleading. But if you must use it I would say that when you have knowledge of Oneness, then you already have reached God—or no God as the case may be. You have reached blue space, you have reached Awareness or Consciousness. You have reached everything. There will be nothing where Oneness is not. So, talk of God would be unnecessary.

M Are you saying that I should drop the talk about God?

G Yes. And Oneness is Knowledge, Awareness, and Consciousness. And Oneness is you. Oneness is a kind of Awareness that will permeate your entire being. When you have understood this, you will be free from all these questions. You will be unconcerned. It will give you ease and happiness. Of course, you may still ask these questions if you like. But it will not matter.

M I suppose I am not there yet, so let me pursue my questions about Oneness.

G Yes. By all means.

M Then, what does it mean to say that 'All is One?'

G First, the idea of Oneness resists all dualisms. So, 'All is One' does not mean that there is a whole with separate parts. If the whole were comprised of separate parts then it would be a collection of dualisms, and that goes against the idea of Oneness.

M So the idea of Oneness would also go against any dualism between a God on the one hand and the rest of the world as a separate thing on the other hand. Is that right?

G Yes.

M So then if Oneness is not made up of parts, how should we understand it? Of course, one is a number. Should we distinguish Oneness from twoness or threeness, for example? Should we understand Oneness in a numerical sense?

G No. The numerical sense of Oneness again implies dualisms with twoness or threeness. The important point is that there is no dualism in Oneness.

M Then how should we understand Oneness if not in contrast with twoness or threeness?

G I would say that Oneness is connected with the idea that all things are inter-connected, that there are no truly separate parts of the world, that there are no people or things that are truly isolated or independent of each other. In other words, to say that all is One is to say that no particular things stand alone and are independent in the world. Everything depends on everything else.

M I suppose it could be misleading to characterize Oneness in terms of inter-connectedness. Saying that something is inter-connected might still suggest that there are parts that make up the whole, that it is those parts which are inter-connected.

G Yes. We should not be misled by this possibility. In Oneness there really are no parts that are then inter-connected. The very idea of parts is artificial. There is a deeper primary unit which goes beyond talk of parts.

M So you think that we should not understand Oneness in such terms that give priority to parts. Rather, we should give priority to the whole to start with.

G Yes. And when we give priority to the whole we should not understand that whole merely as a collection of parts. The whole is the primary thing.

M It would seem that the whole cannot in turn be inter-connected with anything else, since otherwise the whole would be yet another part of yet larger whole.

G Yes. The whole cannot be connected with anything else if it is the whole, the unity, the One. And that Oneness includes all.

M Am I right to think that when we experience the Oneness we experience the prior unity between ourselves and everything else?

G Yes. When we experience Oneness we overcome all artificial dualities.

M Your idea of Oneness sounds very ecological.

G If you must give it a label, that one is all right, so long as you do not assume that the whole is just a collection of parts.

M All right. But now what about the world as a whole? If all is One in this ecological sense that nothing stands alone, what about the world as a whole? Does it stand alone? And if it does, does that

not contradict the claim that nothing stands alone? Otherwise it would be the whole world that stands alone.

G That is a good question. And that is why there is no limit to the world. There is no limit to what there is. So the question, 'What is separate and beyond the world?' does not even arise.

M I take it then that the world as such could not be separate from anything beyond it.

G That is right. The world could not be separate from what some people think is a God separate from the world. They think of a creator God like this. They think there is the world, and then there is a separate creator God who made it. That idea would be dualistic.

M So the idea of a further context beyond the world or beyond what there is would not apply.

G That is right. The world as such has no limit, and this is one reason why Oneness should not be understood in the numerical sense.

M So if the world is unlimited, as you say, there could be no creator who stands apart from what is created. Otherwise, the world would not be unlimited. If there are no limits to what there is, the idea of a creator God would seem misplaced.

G Yes. The idea of Oneness resists the idea of a God that is independent of the world. Oneness embodies a still deeper unity and inter-connectedness in what there is.

M So then if one were tempted to talk of Oneness with the label God, it would not be a creator God who is separate from what there is.

G Exactly.

M Then if one were to say that God is One, that would not be a creator God. And Oneness would not be a numerical claim.

G That's right. The claim that God is One would be a claim about the identity of God with all that is. God would be the name for all that is which exhibits this underlying unity and inter-connectedness. I myself do not call this God. I call it *Atma.*

Oneness as the Possibility of Forms

M Even if we were to agree that all things are One in this primary sense, how does that relate to the possibility that there are particular things? We do, after all, distinguish between you and me, and tables and chairs, and fountains and gardens, and all kinds of things.

G Yes. We should also think of Oneness as that which makes it possible for particular forms to be related at all. Without Oneness, neither a subject nor an object can be conceived or experienced as having independent existence of its own.

M So, Oneness is necessary in order for there to be any particular thing, including subjects and objects?

G Yes.

M But doesn't such a possibility already have some form or other?

G What do you mean?

M Suppose I say that it is possible to make a fountain out of marble. Doesn't that require that there is marble and that one can shape it into a fountain that could hold water? Doesn't the marble and the craftsperson already have some form or other?

G What are you getting at?

M It is this. If the possibility of form has form, then what are the preconditions of its having form? What makes it possible for it to have form? There seems to be an infinite regress here.

G Oneness has no particular form, although it is the possibility of particular forms. Oneness is not like your uncarved marble or your craftsperson. So, there is no infinite regress concerning the possibility of form, as you say. Oneness is prior to particular form. It does not itself have a particular form. Otherwise it would be dualistic after all.

M I see that Oneness itself cannot be another thing or some relation between things.

G No.

M If Oneness were another thing, one can ask what is beyond that thing and that can go on infinitely. And if Oneness were a set of relations between things it could not be the possibility of forms as such, since sand the relations between them would already have form.

G Yes. It would be misleading to say that Oneness is yet another particular thing or that it is a set of relations between particular things.

M Then I am puzzled what this Oneness is.

G Your puzzlement might arise from your view of what you think there is. What sorts of things do you think there are?

M My own view is that there are things which are in relation with each other, and that neither such things nor relations should be given priority. They are symbiotically related to each other.

G So, you think that one can't have things without relations and one can't have relations without things?

M Yes. For example, you can't have a leg of a table independently of the table, and you can't have a table independently of its legs. You can't have the table top resting on top of its legs without the legs, and you can't have the legs of the table—as opposed to some other kinds of supports, say—without the table top. There need be no final Being, no final Oneness, even if it is the possibility of form.

G But even your symbiosis between things and relations, as you say, must take some form. Where does the possibility of that form come from?

M I cannot say. But perhaps that is because you are asking for a final principle of some kind, and I am not. Am I right to think that for you Oneness is a kind of final principle, a final principle of Being?

G Yes, you can put it that way if you like.

M I confess that I have doubts about the very idea of a final principle.

G What doubts do you have about such a principle?

M While I think that all that there is are things and the relations between them, all that there is is always changing. So there is no final principle. We are always in the middle of things. But still, at any particular time, there is a symbiotic relation between things and relations between them.

G But notice that when you say that all things change, you assume that there are things and their relations. What seems not to change is that there is change and that change is understood in terms of things and their relations. It sounds to me as if you too embrace final principles no less than I do.

M I see what you mean. But I should add that even my statement that everything changes should be understood from a particular point of view at a particular time. And I make no claims about the impossibility that it could be otherwise from some other point of view at some other time. So, these statements sound like final principles, but they really are not.

G So on your view it seems that everything is relative to a particular point of view or a particular time.

M Yes.

G In that case you cannot speak of anything that is absolute.

M That's right.

G But Michael, when you say that all is relative to particular point of view or relative to a particular time, can you conceive of the possibility that things might be different from another point of view or at another time.

M Yes.

G So you think that things and their relations can be different under other circumstances.

M Yes.

G But then not everything is relative as you say.

M Why not?

G Because you are still talking of things and their relations. Whatever specific form they take, they must be absolute. Things *per se* and relations *per se* are not restricted to any particular point of view or time. Otherwise you could not even conceive of the possibility that things could be different.

M I see what you mean. Then I must say that these are absolute assumptions from my point of view in my time, that I cannot conceive of change in other terms.

G Then you are committed to embracing some final principles.

M I don't think so. All I have said is that I have basic assumptions, and without them I cannot conceive of change. That is all. I have not said that there are final principles beyond my point of view or my time.

G You want to remain silent about anything that goes beyond your point of view. Is that right?

M Yes.

G And you say that it could be otherwise outside your point of view.

M Yes.

G But even to say that it could be otherwise beyond your point of view is to go beyond your point of view.

M Yes. I see. So perhaps I should not even say that it could be otherwise beyond my point of view.

G You may remain silent about it. But then what you call your basic assumptions turn out to be the same as what I call final principles. They work in your world the same way as they work in the world. There is no difference.

M Yes there is. There is a world of difference between my world and the world.

G But even to say that—that there is a world of difference between your world and the world—is to go beyond your world. And, so it seems that you cannot really remain silent about everything that is beyond your point of view.

M Then perhaps I should not have said that there is such a difference, but should only have remained silent about it.

G That is your choice.

Experiencing Oneness

M Would you say that you experience Oneness as a final principle?

G Yes.

M Do you mean that when you experience the absolute you know that it is the absolute?

G Yes.

M What sort of experience could that be? I mean, however powerful such experiences might be—the blue space, as you say, or oceanic experiences or peak experiences, as some others call it—is there something in these experiences that says that it is of the absolute?

G Yes.

M While I have had oceanic experiences, they did not carry evidence that they are experiences of an absolute. You attach the label of

'absolute' to them. But how do you know that what you experience is in fact the absolute?

G What words would you use?

M Well, such terms as vastness or the beyond would seem more neutral than the absolute.

G What do you mean?

M Well, the vastness or the beyond makes no commitment to an absolute, for example. It might be that, for any given limit there is a beyond, but that does not mean that there is an absolute beyond which there is no beyond.

G Experiencing the vastness need not in itself be experiencing the absolute. But I also experience the absolute.

M How do you know that? I mean, to say that it is the absolute is to interpret your experience. How can you be sure that the interpretation of what you have experienced is absolutely right?

G I have experienced it, and others have experienced it. And in a certain way we can communicate with each other about it.

M Please tell me more about your experiences of Oneness as the final principle.

G Actually it is difficult talking about them.

M Why is that?

G While I said that Oneness is the final principle, the experience of Oneness is different.

M What do you mean?

G A principle is a certain kind of statement.

M Yes?

G And statements depend upon dualities.

M What are you driving at?

G Oneness is a name for something beyond the word. Oneness cannot really be understood in terms of dualities. You will not be able to grasp or experience Oneness in this way.

M But it is only in terms of same dualities that one can understand anything at all.

G That is true for a certain sort of understanding, call it a cognitive understanding.

M Are you saying that one cannot grasp Oneness in a cognitive way?

G Yes. But you can grasp Oneness experientially. But if you understand yourself only in terms of dualities, say, in terms of a subject as opposed to an object, you will never understand yourself as something beyond such dualities.

M I see. But in order to believe anything at all there must be dualities. Otherwise, how could I believe Oneness? We are just able to say what is different as well as what is the same. We must have dualities to be able to state the truth and believe it.

G If in order to believe something you must approach it with a dualistic mentality, then perhaps you can't believe it.

M But then how can you believe Oneness?

G I didn't say I believed it.

M What do you mean?

G I mean that if belief requires a dualistic mentality then I can't believe it. But that is not to say that belief is the way to relate to or to be at-one with Oneness.

M I see. But still, whatever it is that I do experience, I have no way of assessing that it is the ultimate.

G So, you have not experienced the absolute, otherwise you would know it is the absolute. What do you experience when you meditate?

M When I close my eyes and meditate, sometimes I experience blue space or a sense of boundlessness. Sometimes my consciousness travels within a tunnel-like space which accelerates toward a light which then becomes indistinguishable from the light itself. I have these sorts of experiences. In this way, sometimes I do feel I am more in touch with the Oneness, if you want to call it that. But there is nothing in that experience itself which labels it as the absolute.

G That is your experience. If you say there is nothing in that experience which shows you that it is the absolute, you could not say that you have experienced the absolute.

M I have simply experienced what I have experienced.

G I have to respect that. If you have not experienced the absolute you could not say that you have. On the other hand, I have experienced the absolute. And you should respect what I say about my experiences in the same way that you expect me to respect what you say about yours.

M May I then ask you about your experiences?

G No. You won't comprehend my experience unless you reach the absolute. I have already said it is the absolute. More than that I will not be able to say.

M Then how should I be able to measure your claim of having experienced the absolute? What would you say if one were to claim that beyond your absolute there is a further stage that is relative, and that your absolute is itself only relative?

G It cannot be measured in your non-absolute terms. You will ask me, 'Bring your absolute down to my non-absolute level of understanding.' I will not do that. I am respectful of your questions, and I am loving you in light of the absolute and ultimate because I have experienced that.

M So to experience Oneness one needs to go beyond the word Oneness.

Non-Dualistic Language

G Yes. As I said before, there is also a problem with language. Language is always dualistic.

M Yes, I agree. If we are to understand a given term we need to contrast it with other terms.

G This is how language usually works. It puts us into a dualistic mentality.

M Then, how do you communicate something that transcends dualities?

G We can use such words, inadequate as they are, to bring us to a point of meditation, which will allow us to experience these things. Though these words arė inadequate to describe the experience of the absolute One—even here I must use these words—they really are pointers to a realm beyond that restricted by these words. They are pointers, and so we should not fix too much attention on their literal cognitive significance. We should fix our attention on the direction they point us to.

M I see. So, some of your concepts should not be taken in opposition to other concepts.

G That's right. For example, by saying that the One is pure Consciousness or pure Awareness—by using the word 'pure' this way—I indicate that what the words 'Consciousness' and 'Awareness' point us to is something beyond dualities, beyond the opposites of non-consciousness and non-awareness. Of course, paradoxically, even the idea of pure is ordinarily contrasted with impure. But I do not use it in this way. I use 'pure consciousness' and 'pure awareness' as a pointer to that realm which transcends such dualities.

M I see. So for such dualistic terms as absolute in relation to relative, or self in relation to other, you raise the initial term by designating it as pure. So, absolute becomes pure absolute when it is no longer contrasted with relative. And the same thing for pure Self, pure Awareness, pure Consciousness, pure Oneness, and so on.

G Yes. And by doing this I want to overcome the duality that our ordinary understanding of these words assumes. They are words that are no longer to be contrasted with their opposites. They are no longer part of the lexicon of dualistic thinking.

M But if we speak of pure Consciousness, for example, the dualism is still there, since we can understand such a term also in contrast with ordinary consciousness. There seems no getting away from speaking in dualistic terms. Even your pointers seem to be dualistic. In fact one might hold that the Absolute is relative to the Relative. Why not say that the Relative is the truth, and the Absolute is mere appearance?

G It is true that with such words, understood in a literal cognitive way, I cannot express the blue space, pure Oneness, purė Consciousness, pure Awareness. We must transcend that limitation. So I use 'pure' to signal that we are no longer talking in a literal cognitive way.

M I see now you mean to point beyond that which is expressible in ordinary language. Although such words as consciousness and awareness exhibit a boundedness, there is something beyond them as indicated by your special qualifier of 'pure'.

G That is right. It may be paradoxical for me to use 'pure' in this way, but it is a paradox in the service of moving beyond language.

M I see. But if we come to the limits of language perhaps we should go no further. I suppose I agree with the philosopher Wittgenstein who said 'Whereof one cannot speak, let us remain silent.' I simply make no judgement about that which is beyond the speakable.

G That is fine with me.

M How can that be fine with you? You have been speaking quite a lot about Oneness.

G But I have been speaking in no ordinary sense. I have been pointing. And I have also been advising that you should meditate on what I am pointing toward.

M Then is pointing a kind of speaking? If it is, and if we should remain silent about that about which we cannot speak, then perhaps we should not point either.

G Pointing suggests a direction beyond the tool of pointing. If pointing is a kind of speaking and we should remain silent about that of which we cannot speak, then perhaps we should nót point either. But I am not so sure that pointing is fully captured by the speakable. Be that as it may, if we can't speak about it, or if we can't point about it, perhaps we should dance about it, or make music about it, or make art about it, or just be about it. But we should also be mindful of the attitude with which we do these things.

M What do you mean?

G We can be very serious or playful and lighthearted about pointing. We should be joyful when we do so. The attitude with which we point can facilitate our actually coming to see the direction pointed to.

M Why is the attitude so important?

G Because it will effect what is pointed to. And it will make people open or closed to looking in the direction that is pointed to.

Oneness as Consciousness

M You said that Oneness is conscious of itself.

G Yes.

M I am puzzled by this idea.
G What is puzzling about it?
M Well, it would seem to me that in order for there to be consciousness there must be some agent who is conscious and there must be something that that agent is conscious of.
G You mean there must be a separation between subject and object.
M Precisely. And without that separation I don't see how one can be conscious or aware of anything.
G You think there can be no consciousness without a separate agent who is conscious.
M Yes. But if there is a separate agent who is conscious, there would of course be the dualism that you want to avoid. And if there is no separate agent who is conscious, I don't see how there can be consciousness at all. This puzzles me.
G Let us begin with the case where there is a dualism between subject and object. Let us say that you are conscious of the cup on this table.
M Very well. I am the agent that is aware of this object.
G Here there is a distinction between subject and object. Would you agree?
M Yes.
G Now, I would ask you when there is consciousness of Oneness, what is it that would be conscious of it?
M You or I would be conscious of Oneness.
G Not so fast. Here there is a difference.
M What do you mean?
G In Oneness there is no separation between subject and object. So you cannot presume that the subject is conscious of the object. You cannot deal with Oneness as an object of consciousness in that way.
M Are you saying that the kind of consciousness that is involved in the consciousness of Oneness is different from the kind of consciousness that is involved in knowing that that is a cup on the table?
G Yes. So it would be misleading to say that I am conscious of Oneness. It would be better to say that Oneness is experienced.
M But isn't there still a distinction between subject and object? Wouldn't you say that when I experience something it is I who is experiencing that separate other thing that is being experienced?
G Have you ever been in love?
M Yes.
G Would you say that it is you, separately, who experiences the other person separately? Or would you say that when you love someone there is a melding or merging with the other person?
M I would say that there is a melding, as you put it.

G So, there would be no separate subject who is experiencing.
M Yes.
G And so when we talk about experiencing love, it is not a separate subject who is experiencing something separate.
M Yes. I agree with that to a degree. But at the same time there is a difference.
G If there is experience of Oneness, then it is not a kind of experience that assumes the separation between subject and object.
M So, in truly experiencing Oneness there is no separate thinker or being who conceives of subject and object.
G That is right. Oneness is consciousness without a separate object of consciousness. It is knowingness without a separate knower. This knowingness is the great cosmic 'I' or the great Self or *Ātma*. And if a person is at-one with this larger Oneness or Self, then he or she experiences infinity and eternity in the here and now. If a person is at-one with the cosmic 'I' he or she will have overcome his or her possessive limited egoistic self and will be blissful.
M Why do you identify this Oneness with an 'I' or with a Self? Why not leave it just as Oneness? Again, this seems to introduce a separate knower.
G You assume that if there is knowingness there must be a separate knower. But knowingness does not require that there is another separate knower.
M I see.
G This Oneness is all that there is—in the past, present, and future. So when I speak of the 'I' or of the cosmic Self I am not talking of something separate again. I am using the word 'I' or the cosmic Self or the *Ātma* to refer to all there is.
M So you use the words Oneness, Self, and Consciousness interchangeably?
G Yes.
M Why not call this Consciousness Not-Self rather than Self?
G It does not really matter what you call it, except that it is pure Consciousness.
M So there is nothing beyond Consciousness which is conscious. Consciousness is all pervading, as you said.
G Very right. you have understood correctly. There is no such thing as who or what is conscious. The Being who is conscious is the same as Consciousness. They are One. And that explains the Oneness.

Awareness as Emergent

M You say that Oneness is eternal, that it existed always.
G Yes.

M And you say that Oneness is conscious of itself. It is pure Consciousness.
G Yes.
M So pure Consciousness must be eternal.
G Yes.
M Now is it not possible that consciousness is emergent, that is, that it could arise at a certain moment in history and not always have been there? And could it be possible that at a certain time consciousness could no longer exist?
G What do you mean?
M Well, one might say that before there were persons there was no human thought; and presumably if all persons died off the face of the planet there would cease to be human thought. Is that sort of possibility not open in the case of pure Consciousness of a more cosmic kind? In other words, why should pure cosmic consciousness have to be eternal?
G How could pure Consciousness not be immortal? That is, when persons became aware of things—say that they were able to grow their own food, or that fire could be both helpful and harmful—they became aware of some real possibilities. Such human consciousness evolved at a certain time, as you suggest, Michael. But the possibility of their becoming aware of these things required that these possibilities were real.
M But what makes something real?
G Something is real if some Self can be aware of it.
M But there is a significant difference between something which can be the object of awareness, and making actual awareness the condition for its being real.
G Yes, but consider this. If something can be the object of awareness it must be coherent.
M But I don't see how you move from saying that real things are coherent to saying that there is awareness of those things.
G Imagine if it were otherwise. If all real things were coherent, that is, they could be made sense of in awareness, but that awareness had nothing to do with the coherence of real things, that would be such an extraordinary coincidence that it would be nothing short of a miracle. It would be miraculous, first, that real things were coherent and, second, that there could be consciousness or awareness of those things, all the while there being no connection between these facts.
M I am not sure I have understood your argument. Are you suggesting that if there were some real coherent things before humans were aware of them, then there must be some cosmic Self, pure Consciousness, that was always aware of them?
G Yes.

M So, pure Consciousness or pure Awareness is eternal.
G Yes.

Blasphemy

M Let me then ask you about your mantra, 'I am immortal, I am blissful.' Do you mean that literally?
G Yes.
M And when you say that, do you also mean to say that you are immortal and blissful?
G Yes.
M That sounds to me as if you are assuming the voice of God. Do you mean that?
G Yes, if by God you mean *Ātma.*
M But saying that you are immortal in the voice of God sounds blasphemous.
G What do you mean by blasphemy?
M It is taking the name of the Lord in vain. It is falsely assuming the position of the One. It invites worshipping another person or thing—in this case you yourself—as the One. Blasphemy involves displacing the infinite One for the messenger.
G To start with, the idea of blasphemy depends upon a certain view of God. So, we should ask which God would be insulted if we spoke in his or her name. If it turns out that I am at-one with the God or *Ātma* in whose name I speak then I am not being blasphemous.
M I see what you mean. If one already assumes that, for example, a creator God is separate from persons, and that there can be no identity of persons with God, then one who speaks in the name of God must be blasphemous. But we do not need to embrace a view of God that is separate from persons.
G Exactly. And, as you said, we have to be clear about who is saying these things. If it is my egoistic possessive self that is saying these things, it would be false to claim them—false in the sense that an egoistic possessive self just is not immortal. But if it is the *Ātma* who is speaking through me, if I am the embodiment of the *Ātma,* I will have transcended my egoistic possessive self and be at-one with the cosmic Self. The 'I' would be the cosmic Self who would be saying these things as a report about who 'I' really am. In such a case there would be no blasphemy. It would simply be an accurate report about who 'I' am.
M I see. Once one understands that it is not the finite 'I' that is speaking but the infinite 'I', there would be no blasphemy.
G Yes. And, in fact, from the point of view of the infinite 'I', it would be blasphemous to say that I am mortal.

M That is an interesting reversal. But how can you be sure which 'I' is speaking? You may claim to be the immortal 'I' that speaks when you say, 'I am immortal'. But couldn't you be mistaken? Couldn't you be self-deceived? Couldn't you think you are immortal just because you wish it were so? What grounds would you have for making such claims? How could we check this kind of claim?

G This is a very important issue. When I say these things I perceive that I speak in the name of the immortal because my possessive egoistic self has been overcome. And that is something that you or anyone else can perceive if you meditate and concentrate on these things. In other words, if you meditate on the immortal and the blissful, you will see that your possessive self will change—that the voice who speaks is not the same voice which spoke before. You will experience this, and you will understand the difference. You can also sense it by observing my behaviour with others.

M Are you saying that in meditating you actually become more immortal and blissful?

G Yes.

M How could it be that by meditating on these things you could become so?

G It is not odd? It is not as if by just saying these things you become so? Rather, in meditating on these things you come to recognize that you—even as a possessive egoistic self—are interconnected and in that interconnection you are immortal and blissful.

Ego-Self and Possessiveness

M I take it that it is the pre-occupation with the dualistic egoistic self which gives rise to various forms of possessiveness, including greed and malice. And these things, in turn, are the sources of bad behaviour to ourselves and others.

G Yes. And if we see that as limited beings we are inter-connected with the larger Self, we will see that to serve others is to serve ourselves as well. The principle of self-interest for the limited self breaks down. But self-interest for the greater Self—where we have compassion not only for other humans but for all living and non-living things—this will serve our individual selves as well.

M But in that case truly identifying with the *Ātma* would no longer be serving ourselves in as limited a way as before.

G What do you have in mind?

M Serving the cosmic Self would no longer be serving such a limited self. We would have transcended the limited self. We would cease being the limited selves we started with.

G You are right. It is not quite correct to say that as possessive selves we would benefit from serving the larger Self, because in serving

the larger Self we will no longer be quite the same possessive selves we were. So the thought that it would be in our self-interest to serve the cosmic Self is not quite right. But we can say that in undergoing such a transformation we will be better off. We will be more blissful, whatever that 'we' will have become. This too is behind my mantra, 'I am immortal, I am blissful.'

M Does that mean that if I inflict bad consequences on others I can't avoid bad consequences for myself?

G Yes it does.

M So inter-connectedness means, at least, that we are all causally interrelated.

G Yes.

M Then I wonder in what way the limited self really can be transcended.

G What do you have in mind?

M Well, if the individual ego-self comes to be overcome or is no longer a distinct or separate 'I', what individual is it that has a causal relationship with others? What does it mean to overcome the ego-self and what is left after the ego-self has been overcome?

G Transcending the possessive individual ego does not mean there is no longer a person who is in a network of causal relationships. One can transcend the possessive ego-self and still be in causal relationships with others.

M And if we transcend our ego-self, can we still be morally connected or be in moral relationships with others? Might there not be a problem there?

G How are you using the idea of being morally connected?

M By moral connectedness I have in mind the kind of connectedness that unites parents and children, husbands and wives, lovers, friends, and so on. It concerns their bonds, their mutual support, their allegiances, commitments, and responsibilities.

G We may be inter-connected morally as well.

M But now it doesn't look as if the possessiveness of the self is necessarily a bad thing. It doesn't look as if we necessarily ought to transcend the possessive self.

G Why do you say that?

M Well, familial bonds, friendship, and other moral relationships seem to involve an irreducible element of belonging.

G What do you have in mind?

M Take the case of a family bond. To make my point, imagine a case in which there is a poisonous spider which has thoughts and emotions—in other words, it is sentient or has consciousness.

G All right.

M Now, suppose that I find one in my mother's house. I know that, sentient or not, it may bite her. And, if I don't destroy the spider

it will get away and might hide somewhere. Later my mother may stumble upon it and get bitten.

G What is your point?

M Well, does the fact that the spider is sentient—which may permit it to be at-one with the *Ātma*—relieve me of my clear duty to destroy it?

G I don't think so.

M Oh. So you agree with me that I should protect my mother.

G Yes.

M My point is that I think that I should protect her, partly because she is *my* mother. And this a possessive attitude in which the possessive ego-self reasserts itself.

G I agree that while you might feel compassion for the spider because it is sentient, as you say, you still have a duty to your mother to protect her and kill the spider. But you may be protective of the spider too. You may feel possessive of it, or possessive of all living things. That is the point of developing compassion.

M What do you mean?

G Well, if you develop a moral relationship with the spider, it might get more complicated as what your duties really are.

M How would that be?

G Well, you and the spider might get to be friends, for example. Perhaps it may come to sit on your hand waving its forelegs as it engages you in conversation. You trust it not to bite you as it trusts you not to close your hand and crush it or throw it into the fire. And if a visitor suddenly intrudes and is terrified at the sight of the spider and offers to kill it, you might say, 'Stop! That spider is my friend.' And perhaps, as a consequence, the spider will similarly ask other spiders not to bite you or your friends.

M Yes. Then in a sense we would belong to each other, as friends belong to each other. The point is that we would be possessive of each other, just as my mother and I are possessive of each other. It seems that you can't have moral obligations without moral relationships, and you can't have moral relationships without possessiveness. My mother and my friends are *my* mother and *my* friends, and I have obligations to them because they are mine.

G When you say that we may be possessive of each other we should be careful not to mean that we own each other.

M No.

G We may possess each other in the sense that we empathize with each other deeply and we have special interest in each other's well being. In that sense we may be possessive of each other. In this sense family and friends may be possessive of each other. Moral relationships involve affirming and safeguarding the well being of certain individuals.

M But even with this qualification, isn't the self affirmed, and doesn't that go against the idea of transcending the self?

G You are wrong to think that transcending the ego-self is to lose one's individuality, to lose the ability to have causal relationships or moral relationships. The individual is also to be served. We have to maintain the idea that the individual is served by being at-one with the cosmic Self. Each individual is in need of service. If you drop the idea that the individual will be served, then the individual will be disappointed. It is not correct to say that in being at-one with the Oneness you will no longer serve the individual. But as well as you overcome your limited ego-self, you find that that which you are possessive of becomes ever wider and wider until it includes the One—includes all that is.

M I see that you have distinguished the ego-self from the individual. The ego-self may be transcended, but that does not mean that the individual is no longer in causal or moral relationships.

G That is right.

M So, while a person may overcome his or her ego-self by becoming at-one with the cosmic Self, that doesn't mean that the ego-self just becomes merged with the cosmic Self. One doesn't lose one's individuality.

G That's right.

M It occurs to me that there are at least two ways of describing the overcoming of the ego-self. One way is to talk of the ego-self as a thing that is left behind.

G I do not say that.

M I see. Another way is to talk of a change of attention from the ego-self's pre-occupations—like desire of possession of material things, advancing social status, and so on. The first way involves thinking of the ego-self as an entity which somehow gets left behind. The second involves a shift of attention. What is involved in moving beyond the possessive ego-self?

G When the ego-self says, 'I am Michael Krausz,' and does not say, 'I am the Master,' the Master has chosen to forget himself and start identifying with his manifest form. At another time the Master may decide that Michael has learned enough, that he has gained enough, that he has experienced enough. It will be the same being who knows that wherever Michael is, he may now be taken back to the source, and, in meditation, rest at the source. It is one Being, one Master who does these things.

M So putting aside the ego self as an entity, or shifting attention away from ego self concerns, are both decided by *Ātma*, the Master Self. Is that what you are saying?

G Yes.

Persistence of Questions

M I don't think I have seen what you have seen. But does it matter that what I have seen is or is not absolute or ultimate?
G Yes. It obviously matters to you.
M But I wonder if I can put aside the question of whether it is of the absolute or the ultimate. It looks as if I cannot put that question aside. Am I right?
G It is your question to put aside or keep in front of you.
M If I put it aside, it may not go away. It may come back.
G I do not say this. You are the master of your own questions. If you put it aside forever, it will not come back.
M I am the master of my own questions?
G Definitely. Who else is asking the question?
M It is not clear to me who is asking the question. Perhaps it is the limited ego Michael Krausz who is asking the question.
G He can ask.
M But might there not be the deeper Self who can still press the question, even if the limited ego puts it aside?
G No. That is not characteristic of the deeper Self. The deeper Self will act with the characteristics of the deeper Self. So if you have put the question aside, the deeper Self will not mind it. The deeper Self will not say, 'Why did he put the question aside?'
M So even the limited ego self is the master of his questions?
G Yes
M I am not quite sure why you say this, since I believe that it is precisely this questioning that belongs to the deepest self, while the not-asking and the silence really characterizes my surface self.

Morality

M But let me ask what is the relation between *Ātma,* and how we should live our lives? How does it relate to difficult moral cases?
G What do you have in mind?
M According to certain traditions moral cases should be decided according to certain abstract principles, like the ten commandments. Do you believe that moral issues can be decided according to such principles?
G Yes and no. If we are at-one with the *Ātma* there will be no need to formulate abstract principles, but such principles help as a guide. What kinds of cases do you have in mind?
M I take the question of the treatment of our planet to be a moral issue. I take the affirmation of human's rights to be a moral issue. How you would deal with such cases?
G People learn about principles after they already know what is moral and what is immoral. Principles matter for those who already

have a moral sense. That sense provides awareness of the welfare of one's family, the families of others, society at large, as well as for the animals and for this planet. So before we take up any principle like the 'Don't steal,' 'Don't kill,' or 'Don't upset the balance of the nature,' the sense of the values is there before the principles are enunciated.
M Does that mean that there is no place for principles?
G No. Principles are important for certain purposes. They may help guide those who already have such an awareness, as well as those who don't.
M Gyaan, where do these principles come from?
G When there were no persons on earth, there were no principles. Therefore, it is very obvious these principles came from the intelligence of human beings who suffered because of the behaviour of immoralists.
M So moral principles are invented by persons.
G Yes. Even when one tries to teach principles to immoralists, they do not change.
M Are you saying that moral behaviour does not come form the principles but from awareness that precedes the learning of principles?
G Yes. They all come from the awareness of human needs.
M But often different groups embrace different principles, and each claims to be right.
G Yes. Some people who live in a Himalayan village hold totally different principles from some others. They live in villages—even though they are in vast spaces—because of the fear of the cougar, the hill tiger, or the hill cat which might come and pick up small children or even kill adults when they are all alone, especially in the night. So they live together and have evolved the principle of cohesiveness or togetherness. So the principle of cohesiveness is based on fear of death from the tiger. Of course, their principles evolved differently from those in other countries.
M So are you suggesting that one's principles are tied to the needs and resources of a particular community?
G Yes. And another group will stick to their ideas. And two such groups will never accept each other's ideas. That is fine, provided both the communities and villages can live together.
M You have been talking about the possible conflicts of people of different communities. But what about people from the same community who appeal to opposing principles. This might happen, I suppose, because they fix upon different needs. Or maybe they don't really see themselves as members of the same group.
G This sometimes happens because some cherish their ideas rather than love the people to whom the idea is supposed to apply. They

will come in conflict with the person who loves the people rather than the idea.

M Are you suggesting that the one who genuinely loves the people on whom any principles are supposed to apply will know which principles to apply?

G Yes. But sometimes that love is not there, and so all that one has to go on are the abstract principles that one has grown attached to.

M What you say now concerns love for persons.

G Yes.

M But sometimes the conflict amongst people of a given community over different principles involves competing notions of what a person is.

G What do you mean?

M Let me give an example. In America there is a pressing issue about abortion, and two sorts of groups favour two competing principles about what constitutes a person. One group holds that a person is constituted at the earliest moments after conception and that any termination of life after such a moment would constitute killing. On the principle that one should never terminate the life of a person, abortion is seen as a case of killing.

G They begin with this principle.

M Yes. Now a second group holds that an organism is a person only after it has developed sufficiently to have feelings or thoughts or something of the kind. There are disagreements about when, in the course of the development of the foetus, this takes place. But it is agreed that it is not at the time of conception.

G That is a disagreement about what a person is.

M That's right. Now there might be a conflict between principles. For example, some people might concede that a foetus is a person, but they might hold that under certain circumstances it is all right to terminate its life because of another principle.

G What is that?

M They might say that it is all right to terminate life if the life that would be lived would be without quality. That is, if the foetus were to come to term and it were clear that the born baby would be incurably diseased, or if it could not have proper care, or something of that kind, then there would be justification to terminate the foetus. Here there would be a conflict between the principle that one should never terminate the life of a person and the principle which holds that sometimes it is all right to terminate the life of a person We have these confrontations between people within my community.

G It seems that the same issues would be involved at the other end of the life process, concerning old people who are very ill.

M Yes. Some people hold that sanctity of life should be understood in terms of quality of a certain kind, and others hold that it should not be.

G What do you think these examples show?

M You said before that principles get formulated based on people's awareness.

G Yes.

M But sometimes it is difficult to get at that awareness, since principles have already been formulated and people's views have been shaped according to them. For example, what a person is, is not unproblematic, and even when that is decided it is not clear how awareness would tell us which principle to apply.

G The recitation of principles will not change the thinking of a person who is pregnant and is wanting to eliminate that child, say, out of fear for her own life, or out of fear for the shame that her society might bring upon her. If you tell that person that abortion is not good, she will not accept your idea if she is given the chance to have the abortion. She will do what her awareness indicates will lead to her greatest happiness.

M So you don't think that either principle, as general principles, is right?

G No. Principles alone will not do. Principles will do if the person thinks that if the principle is not obeyed she will be declared an outcast from her group.

M So the answer would be specific to the person in question depending upon that person's mentality. There would be no fixed set of general principles.

G That is right.

M Then it is conceivable that if two women were in the same situation, facing the question whether or not to abort, there would be no general answer to the question?

G Yes.

Sin

M Now, if sin is the transgression of moral principles, and if, as you say, principles are secondary to awareness or consciousness, am I right to think that sin would not be central to your view?

G If someone were to forgive you for your past sins, who would it be that would be forgiving?

M Presumably it would be the person whom I wronged.

G But what is it about such a person that gives him or her the capacity to forgive sins?

M I'm not sure I understand.

G For one to forgive a sin one must be in the position of withdrawing the label of 'sin' from a person.

M And who or what would that be?
G It is the infinite 'I' in the other person or in you that could forgive sins.
M I do not quite understand. Why could I not, as a finite self, forgive someone of a sin done to me? Why must the 'I' who forgives be the cosmic or infinite 'I'?
G Excusing a sin requires that you remove or distance yourself from the position of the one who has been sinned against. So, when you excuse the sinner, the label of 'sin' would no longer apply. That is another way of saying that you no longer identify yourself with the limited ego-self that was sinned against. It is the cosmic 'I' that forgives.
M Can the label of sin apply to that infinite'I'?
G No, the label of sin does not apply to the infinite 'I', nor does it apply to the infinite 'I' that is in you.
M Do you mean that sin is a human invention?
G Yes, and it is divisive. For this reason, in the state of Oneness there is no sin.
M Gyaan, you have helped me to understand better what is involved in Oneness. Perhaps we might talk again after I have a chance to listen to what Bhikkhu has to say about these things. Would you care to join us at a later date?
G By all means.

MEDITATION TWO

M Bhikkhu, I have been talking with Gyaan about Oneness, and it would be very helpful if you might answer some of the questions that arose in that discussion.
B And what does Gyaan say about Oneness?
M It is difficult to summarize, but I shall try. First, he says that Oneness is the Absolute. It is sometimes called *Ātma*, the cosmic Self or the cosmic 'I'. Oneness is pure Consciousness or pure Awareness or pure Existence. Oneness is infinite. But Oneness is not a number. It is not a collection of parts. It is the field from which particular forms arise. But it cannot be captured by dualistic language. There is no creator God that exists before Oneness. Oneness is all there is. Becoming at-one with Oneness involves transcending the possessive ego, and that will make us immortal and blissful. The way to do that is to meditate. When we become at-one with *Ātma* we do not lose our individuality. Gyaan's mantra, 'I am immortal, I am blissful' is not blasphemous. It is a report of the cosmic 'I.' When we are at-one with the Oneness we will know how to conduct our lives, because then we will know what we should do. Am I right to think that you do not agree with Gyaan's thoughts about a larger cosmic I, the Self, the *Ātma*?
B Yes. You are right. Buddhists hold that there is no independent permanent self or 'I'. There is no inherent cosmic Self or cosmic 'I,' just as there is no inherent individual possessive self. So, when we overcome our possessiveness we do not become at-one with a larger 'I' or Self. Yet we do remain individual persons. And we may achieve nirvāna—or salvation from pain and suffering—when we realize emptiness and meditate on it. The central doctrine of emptiness captures the insight that there is no inherent existence.

Emptiness

M What is the principle of emptiness? Does it say that in the end there just is nothing?
B No. The principle of emptiness should not be understood in terms of a void, although some Buddhists talk this way. There is no void. There is no abyss. Buddhism is not nihilistic. That view is very misleading.
M What then does the principle of emptiness affirm?
B The principle of emptiness affirms only that there is no inherent existence. There is existence, and this saves us from the abyss. It is just that such existence is nominal. The principle of emptiness denies that anything exists inherently.

Inherent Existence

M I am not sure that I understand your idea of inherent existence.
B Something is said to exist inherently if it exists on its own, or intrinsically. It would be uncaused or unconditioned. No circumstances could have any effect on it. On the other hand, anything that does depend upon causes or is conditioned is empty inherent existence. The Buddhist view is that there are no phenomena that exist of inherently, and that includes the self.
M But how can there be nothing that exists inherently? Surely there must be some things that exist inherently in relation to which other things can be non-inherent.
B It may appear that certain things, say, the cup on this table, exists inherently. But the cup is a cup because we impute it as a cup. We see that it can be used to drink from, for example. But that doesn't mean that it embodies a cupness, so to say, in virtue of which it is a cup. It is a cup because we humans assign a function to it. There is nothing inherently in it which makes it a cup. In this way it is conditioned by us to be a cup. It is not a cup from its own side, as Buddhists say.

M And you say that this is true for all things?

B Yes.

M But without something that exists inherently, it seems that we may after all fall into an abyss.

B Why is that?

M Well, if there is nothing that exists inherently, then there would be no stable measure in terms of which one may judge that something is right or wrong, or true and false. How can we make any objective judgements at all if there are no absolute or ultimate or inherent existents?

B Why do you assume that there can be no standards for right or wrong or truth and falsity if there is no inherent existence?

M Well, if there is no inherent existence there seems no real existence. And if there is no real existence—if everything is imputed, as you say—there seems to be no possibility of standards.

B But to deny that there is inherent existence is not to deny that there is real existence. Everything that we ordinarily experience remains real. It just isn't inherent. That is, whatever there is, is conditioned. That's all. We can still discriminate between the true and the false, or between the real and the non-real when we say there is no inherent existence.

M Then how can we discriminate between the real and the illusory?

B At a very general level all phenomena—including emptiness—are illusions in that they don't exist as they appear to the conceptual mind. But I expect that you are asking that, within the realm of the conceptual mind, how can we distinguish between what we call the real and what we call illusion.

M Yes.

B Consider the water in this cup and the illusion of water in a hot desert horizon.

M All right. How can we discriminate between them if neither, especially the real water, is non-inherent?

B One characteristic of water is that it is located in some determinate place. But no matter how far we pursue what appears to be the water in the desert, we cannot reach it. Another characteristic of water is that it is wet to the touch. But we cannot touch that water and feel its wetness. For these sorts of reasons we say that the mirage is illusory. At the same time, if I can see the water in this cup and touch its wetness, I can say that it is water and is not an illusion.

M So when we say that something is real and not illusory we say so because the real can sustain a longer story. It can withstand more and more tests as we continue to experience things.

B Yes.

M But then in what sense can we speak of a correct general picture of the real world? When you say that the correct picture is that nothing exists inherently, does that mean that there is a state of affairs—inherently—that the inherentists are wrong about? Clearly that would be contradictory.

B No. When I say that a certain picture of the real world is mistaken, I mean that in a non-inherent sense too.

M So the judgement of its falsity is also not inherent. There is no absolute falsity, just as there is no absolute truth. Is that right?

B Exactly.

M So the usual tests for whether or not the perception of something is right or wrong are the same as one might imagine them to be if you embraced the idea that existence requires inherent existence.

B Yes, except for the important fact that those tests which do establish that your perception is right and that what you perceive is real do not show that what is real is inherently so. It remains that they are conditioned.

M In what way are they conditioned?

B Well, your eyesight, for example, is conditioned, as is your sense of touch. As well, your ability to discern location is conditioned, and so on. These are not things that exist inherently. They exist in virtue of many complicated causes and conditions.

M And my eyesight may be wrong, and my sense of touch defective, and I may lose my place.

B Of course. But you can say that only on the condition that there might be a right sense of sight, touch and location.

M And how do you check that?

B Whatever you say is real is right only if it can be sustained by other's reports about their experiences too.

M But couldn't everybody be massively mistaken?

B If somehow everybody were massively deceived—we could not even communicate with each other at all. It would be no less than a miracle if we did communicate with each other. And I think we do communicate most of the time.

M I agree that we communicate with each other most of the time, and that does not require perpetual miracles. So I suppose that I don't think we can be massively mistaken.

B I take it then that we agree that we judge a perception to be right or wrong if it can sustain a longer story about the experiences of all possible people.

M Yes. And nowhere in your view are you required to appeal to something that inherently exists.

B Precisely.

M But even if it is true that our perceptions and everybody else's

perceptions are conditioned, why not say that the real water is inherent? The fact that our senses are conditioned seems a separate matter from whether the water exists inherently.

B There is nothing from the side of the water that makes it water. We designate it as water. We designate that liquid which we say has the molecular structure of H_2O as water. To start with, we designate that it is liquid and that it has a molecular structure of some kind. We designate that its elements include hydrogen and oxygen.

M But we don't make it what it is by designating anything. It is what it is and we try to describe it or use whatever language we have to explain it. It is what it is without our designating anything at all.

B Would you say that there is water in this cup here and not there?

M Yes.

B Would you say that it's being here rather than there is inherent in the water?

M What do you mean?

B I mean that whether this water is here or there is not intrinsic to the water. It is not a fact established from the side of the object. Nothing is established from the side of the object. All of its characteristics are established by its relation to other things. And there is no water above and beyond the characteristics that it has in relation to other things. There is no independent *it* that is the bearer of its characteristics. It is what it is fully in virtue of its relation to other things. In this way, the water is not inherently here, although it is here.

M I see. But I would not have thought that hereness would have been intrinsic to the water anyway. But if I understand you rightly, you want to say that there are no intrinsic characteristics.

B Yes.

M It might help if you made your point with another example.

B Very well. Take the North Pole. The North Pole was not the North Pole until it was imputed as the North Pole.

M I don't quite understand how anyone could discover the North Pole if it was not there—inherently—to be discovered before anybody imputed anything at all. I mean nobody invented the ice-covered land.

B No. But whatever there was, it did not always have the identity of the North Pole. The very idea of the North Pole is a human invention.

M That may be. But the ice-covered land was not a human invention.

B The land was there. It was real. But nobody just discovered the land. It was caused by the physical conditions as well as by the designation as such in some conceptual system.

M But what about the land? Could we not say that the land inherently existed before it was designated as any particular thing?

B But even the land, in contrast to the sea or air, is what it is in virtue of its having been distinguished as one kind of thing as opposed to another kind of thing. And such a distinction itself has been imputed and designated in one way rather than another way. In so far as any phenomenon is distinguished from another phenomenon it shares this characteristic.

M It seems odd to say that there was nothing there to discover before the land was designated as such.

B I am not saying that there was nothing there. I am saying that what was there, the land, did not have the characteristics that it does without being conditioned. This is what Buddhists call dependent-arising.

M Following your own logic, then, couldn't you go on to say that what makes up the land, say bits of dirt, are also imputed? And then, you could say that those bits of dirt are also imputed to include bits of iron oxide. And then you could say that that too is imputed in terms of other elements in the periodical table of elements. And then you could also say that those elements are imputed in terms of molecules, and those in terms of atoms, and those atoms in terms of sub-atomic particles like electrons, and those electrons in terms of quanta, and on and on. There seems to be no basis, finally, for stopping this infinite regress.

B Yes and no. It is true that one could go on infinitely in understanding the smaller and smaller constituents of what there is. And at each stage what there is dependently-arises as you suggest. But this is a benign thing, since at each stage what exists, exists because of its relation to other elements. At no stage does something inherently exist. So your so-called infinite regress is not something to resist. It only shows that there is no end to our questioning about what there is. It shows, rather, that infinity is embodied in every smallest bit of matter.

M I see. So all phenomena depend upon other phenomena. No phenomenon inherently exists on its own. No phenomenon exists from its own side, as you say.

B Yes.

M And what if one does not equate existence with inherent existence? What if one does see the world to exist non-inherently? What difference would that make in our lives?

B Those who see the world this way will avoid the abyss of the void. They will be able to make discriminations between particular things. More positively, though, they will not cling to a false security of inherent existence. This will liberate them. When they see that

all things are empty of inherent existence they realize that they too, do not inherently exist as selves. And they can dissipate their destructive emotions that arise from a false picture of existence. Their attitude of clutching themselves and their loved ones will be loosened. They will be more at peace with each other, even with their enemies.

M Since everything is non-inherent and is a matter of imputation or designation, as you say, I assume that we are to understand emotions in the same way.

B Yes. Anger and the persons to whom we direct our anger do not exist from their own side. They do not inherently exist. Like any other thing, anger is comprised of other conditions and together they combine to perform a certain kind of function. In this way we impute anger to be what it is. But anger's constituent elements and functions can be dissipated if we see that there is no inherent existence to anger as such. When we see this we can be liberated from its destructive effects.

M That seems to be a great benefit. Now I see why you make the principle of emptiness so central to attaining peace and tranquillity. But I wonder what you would say about other emotions like love.

B What do you have in mind?

M Well, you might be able to dissipate anger in the way that you suggest. But you might not want to dissipate love. Somebody might suggest that love exists and it exists inherently, and that is a good thing. There is no liberation in dissipating it.

B Love too does not exist inherently. There is no enduring inherent thing called Love. In fact, when people regard love as inherent, they characteristically become possessive of it. People who are enraptured of one another often wish to fix their love and make it exist inherently. But that is a direct way to destroy love itself.

M So there is no such thing as love. Is that what you are saying?

B No. On the contrary. There is love. But the best way to keep it alive is to see that it cannot be made into something inherent. It cannot be fixed as something that exists from its own side. Indeed, if we see this point about love, it will change our attitude about possessiveness of anything at all.

M I see.

Impermanence

M But someone might still object that without permanence of some kind there seems no basis for finally grounding one's values that guide one's life.

B But efforts to secure absolutes are vulnerable to the impermanence of all things. The very 'permanents' or 'absolutes' which are creations of persons and cultures are impermanent. They are permanents or absolutes in name only. They are really 'impermanent' permanents or 'relative' absolutes.

M Does that mean that such distinctions as those between permanent and impermanent or between absolute and relative are themselves human products and are themselves impermanent?

B Yes. Just as they may have been formulated and found useful in certain contexts for certain purposes, they may cease to be so at other times. So, paradoxically, the idea of permanence cannot be permanent.

M But couldn't one say the same thing about impermanence? Couldn't one say that impermanence is also constructed by person for specific purposes?

B Yes. The idea that all is impermanent itself cannot be absolute, because it is a concept that is opposed to the permanent. This is a human distinction made for certain purposes. And humans may change and their purposes may change.

M So in that sense impermanence is not absolute either.

B That's right. All we can do is to apply this idea of impermanence for certain purposes. Beyond that we cannot say.

M Would you say the same thing about the absolute?

B Yes. The absolute is not really absolute because the absolute is a human invention.

M So everything is relative.

B Yes, but we must be careful here. If we conclude that everything is relative, we should be clear that even the relativity of everything is not inherent. The relativism of things should be understood as nominal, as a human invention. Relativism should not be understood as yet another permanent category.

M Does that mean that everything is not inherently relative, since the relative is also a human invention?

B Exactly. The idea of the relative cannot capture the way things are independently of imputation. In that sense there is no such thing as an absolute relativity.

Emptiness as Final Principle

M In so far as it posits how things are in the end, it sounds as if emptiness is a kind of final principle. It sounds as if emptiness is taken to be a description of the final condition or the absolute condition.

B No. Paradoxically, emptiness itself is empty of inherent existence. Some people may call it the absolute or the ultimate truth, but that is a mistake. It is itself the product of conditioning. To say more would be contradictory, as you suggest.

M Then what should we say about the status of the principle of emptiness if it is not absolute? Is it relative?

B Again, it would be relative in the special sense that all things that are conditioned are relative to those conditions. The principle is itself conditioned and it does not exist inherently from its own side. The principle of emptiness accommodates itself.

M But that seems to me precisely the problem. By saying that it can accommodate itself it approaches the claim that it is absolute.

B It may approach it. But there is no reason to jump from the observation that the principle can accommodate itself—which I expect you would agree is logically welcome—to the claim that the principle must be absolute. I simply do not attach such a label to it.

M I see. So, emptiness is empty of inherent existence.

B Yes. And this is especially true of the self or the 'I', be it the individual 'I' or the cosmic 'I'. There is no 'I' above and beyond its characteristics, all of which are in relation to other things.

M So then do you deny the existence of the individual 'I' and the cosmic 'I'?

B Yes. I deny the existence of either the individual or the cosmic 'I' in that they do not exist inherently. The principle of emptiness concerns the emptiness of inherent existence. Gyaan seems to think that the cosmic 'I' exists inherently, ultimately, and absolutely. This is not my view.

M So then you agree that there is Oneness, that it exists.

B Yes. But it does not exist inherently. This is the chief point that separates Gyaan and me. He believes that there is an inherent cosmic Oneness as established from its own side, and I believe that there is no inherent cosmic Oneness as established from its own side.

M But even if non-inherent, you think that all is inter-connected.

B I agree that all things are interconnected, but I take a different view of what I am inter-connected with. Again, according to the principle of emptiness, there is no quality—immortality or blissfulness—that I am inter-connected with. When one realizes emptiness there would be no voice or consciousness which would say anything like 'I am immortal, I am blissful,' as Gyaan suggests.

M What do you mean, Bhikkhu?

B If there were a voice saying 'I am immortal, I am blissful' I could not accept that as arising from the realized stage. For me, at that stage there is no voice. Ironically, no 'God' would say 'I am immortal.' To say, 'I am God' is still too limiting. To be truly without limit would resist being captured by words and names. Reciting such mantras as 'I am immortal, I am blissful' as Gyaan does, might be a way of coming to a certain stage. But in the end—like a ladder—even saying such things would have to be set aside. In the end we should meditate on emptiness combined of course, with actions that benefit sentient beings.

M But, as Gyaan asks, who is it that would be aware of that emptiness? Without awareness, how can meditation on silence or emptiness take place?

B There is no inherent self that is aware. And there is no awareness, if that is understood in an inherent way.

Persons

M Let me go back and ask what is a person.

B There is no fixed or inherent soul or essence that makes a person a person.

M How could that be?

B Again, a table is a table by virtue of its being comprised of a top on top of legs, and its legs are legs by virtue of supporting a top. It is a table because it is imputed as a table with a certain function. There is no tableness or essence above and beyond these things.

M So there is no soul above and beyond mind and body?

B In the sense of inherent existence, that's right.

M But earlier you said that there might be a self, only if it is not inherent. Now you say that there is no self altogether.

B There may be non-inherent selves, but they would be nothing above and beyond mind and body.

M You mean that if there is a self there would be no substantial self?

B Yes. That's right. So Gyaan may call all that there is Oneness. And he may call it a cosmic Self if he wishes. My only point is that what it is that comprises it is not something above and beyond mind and body, and these are not inherent existents.

M It seems that you and Gyaan do share a concern to overcome possessiveness.

B Yes. I agree with Gyaan that goodness will come from overcoming egoistic behaviour.

M I take it that when you meditate you see this larger context in which you come to understand your own impermanence.

B Yes. And that permits me to overcome my possessiveness. I come to understand that the person I am is nominal and impermanent. When I meditate, I concentrate on the fact that while I may see that I have a body, at a deeper level that is an appearance of something that is imputed or constructed. My body is made up of bits of matter that decompose over time. It is only impermanently that this body is connected with this mind. As well, thoughts are fleeting and dissipate too. So the person that I am is an imputed construction. It does not inherently exist. It is not a thing that lasts. All in the end is emptiness.

Spiritual Materialism

M I take it that the temptation to reify ourselves into inherent beings is related to what some Buddhists call spiritual materialism.

B Yes, spiritual materialism is a kind of error. It occurs when one has progressed somewhat in overcoming the possessive ego-self, and then one congratulates oneself for having done so. In that attitude it is the possessive ego-self that is reasserting itself and is seeking to take credit for having progressed, but that is precisely to undo what progress may have been made. This is an obstacle in overcoming the possessive ego-self.

M You speak of spiritual materialism in the case of the individual person. What about the group?

B Yes, a group may assume a congratulatory posture about its collective spiritual achievements, but this is a possessive attitude and it inhibits further development.

M I take it that you are suggesting that if one is a member of a religious or cultural group that has attained significant enlightenment—say, Judaism in the introduction of a monotheistic creator God, or Christianity through the teachings of Jesus Christ—that the attitude of self congratulation really undermines past achievements and inhibits the further development of religiosity.

B Yes. This sense of religiosity is called Dharma. It goes counter to individual or collective spiritual materialism.

M It would seem, then, that it would not be conducive to the path toward enlightenment if you followed a traditional religious belief just because it is your tradition. Following a tradition just because you take pride in that tradition is an attitude that will inhibit your journey.

B Yes, that is right. But that should not preclude you from embracing your tradition as a way of moving on with your journey—but without the attitude of possessiveness. False pride will inhibit just the kind of religiosity which your tradition might have in fact played such an important role in fostering in the first place.

M So, in your view one should not pursue the idea that there is one creator God or the thought that all is one just because it is Jewish, Christian, or Hindu, and one might be proud of those traditions. That would be religious materialism.

B Yes. But one might well embrace such beliefs to get on with one's journey that involves overcoming the possessive ego-self.

M There seems to me to be a kind of paradox.

B What is that?

M Being religious—including religiously Jewish or religiously Christian or religiously Hindu, or anything else—is to let go of a prideful or possessive attitude toward, for example, Jewish or Christian or Hindu religion, culture, or history.

B Yes.

M So, to be Jewish or Christian or Hindu in the religious sense of Dharma is not to be Jewish or Christian or Hindu in a possessive religious materialist sense.

B Yes.

M Correspondingly, not to be Jewish or Christian or Hindu in a materialist way may well be Jewish or Christian or Hindu in your authentic religious sense of Dharma.

B Precisely.

M What, though, is Dharma?

B It is religiosity that provides a sense of place in the world. It does not require that one embrace anything like a creator God to be religious.

M I am remained of an episode which contrasts with this idea of religiosity. It took place in the American Express Office at Calcutta where I was in line waiting to cash some money.

B This is an episode which contrasts with the Dharma sense of religiosity?

M Yes. I overheard two young Americans behind me who were striking up a conversation. One was a missionary who was 'walking across India,' as he said, from Calcutta to Bombay. He said that his aim was eventually to walk across all the continents of the earth. He said it would take him about fifteen years.

B Was he then walking across India?

M Yes. He described carrying a one-hundred-and-twenty-pound cross. On wheels it was about seventy pounds to pull. He said that this regularly attracted attention. Crowds would gather to hear him talk about Christ. Of course, he was looking for converts. This young missionary said that he had recently married an Indian woman whom he had converted and she was travelling with him. They were joined by one or two others.

B You say that he was talking with a student.

M Yes. The student, who was asking non-confrontational questions, asked what reception he was getting. The missionary said that he was generally well received. But some people said that while they in fact believed his message, they could not adopt his way because it was too disruptive to their lives.

B And what did the young missionary think of that?

M He thought it a great pity that they did not, on his view, have strength of will or fortitude to accept and live by what they thought

was the truth. He thought they should break away and risk being ostracized by their communities.

B What does that story mean to you?

M To me, the missionary did not see that being religious—in your sense of Dharma—is precisely a matter of making a harmonious life, of finding one's place. Seen in this way, the missionary was trying to do an irreligious thing by trying to disrupt their lives. What do you think?

B Yes. I would agree.

God

M Given the principle of emptiness—that all phenomena arise dependently—you do not think there is a creator God.

B That's right. We do not accept a creator-God. There is no God in the sense of an almighty creator. But there is a highest compassion, and that is what Buddha embodied. Every person has the potential to become Buddha, to become the embodiment of compassion. Each has the seed of Buddha. All persons have the potential of becoming such a compassion-God.

M But isn't it a bit confusing to equate God with a highest compassion?

B It all depends upon what you mean by these words. But it is not such an important question. As I pray, I become more like Buddha in order to help others. That is the Buddhist concept.

M But then prayer for you must be rather different from prayer for Christians, for example.

B Actually it would be more accurate to call it meditation. When I meditate I do not worship a creator-God or some ultimate force.

M Then what is meditating?

B Meditating is an activity in which I try to overcome my ignorance by realizing emptiness. I do this to bring enlightenment and compassion. And by becoming more enlightened, I overcome suffering.

M I see.

B Christians hold that God created the world, but that God is uncaused and unconditioned. Such a God is self-caused or self-conditioned. The Buddhist does not embrace such an idea. For the Buddhist there is no first cause. All phenomena arise dependently.

M This suggests too that the *Ātma*, the cosmic 'I', also really arises dependently. So would you reject the idea of *Ātma* on similar grounds?

B Yes. *Ātma* is understood as uncaused and unconditioned. As Gyaan says, it is absolute, ultimate and eternal. Such an idea opposes the principle of dependent-arising. *Ātma* is understood to exist inherently. It is understood to exist from its own side.

M But why not say that all things arise dependently, or that all things exist non-inherently, except the Hindu *Ātma* or the Christian God? Why must the principles of dependent-arising and emptiness be made to apply to everything?

B Consider the alternative. Buddhist scholars point out that if God created everything, like a mother who gave birth, God too must have changed that process. So God too must be subject to change. But that goes counter to the idea that God is unconditioned.

M Are you saying that if God is unconditioned he cannot create? And if he creates, then he is not unconditioned? That one cannot both be a creator and be unconditioned?

B Yes.

M This depends on the thought that in creation both the creator and the created product change.

B Yes.

M And what about the idea of *Ātma*?

B In so far as the idea of *Ātma* holds that it is unconditioned, it runs into this difficulty.

M But Gyaan could say that there is nothing in the idea of *Ātma* that says that it does not change. He could agree that all that is changed.

B Yes, but he also says that it is absolute and eternal. It is that thought that goes counter to the principle of dependent-arising. When I say all phenomena arise dependently I mean that there are no absolutes.

M I see. So it does not matter that Gyaan does not embrace a creator-God. His view of *Ātma* still opposes your principle of dependent-arising since *Ātma* is understood to be an inherently existing being.

B Yes. It is understood to exist from its own side.

M I see. Clearly your idea of a compassion-God, if I can put it that way, is quite different from Gyaan's idea of God as *Ātma*. When Gyaan speaks of *Ātma* as God he means Oneness with Consciousness of itself. When you use the idea of compassion-God you are using the term God to designate a kind of highest moral principle.

B Yes. And you have touched upon an important point here. That is, one should not deify compassion either, because from a Buddhist point of view one should not deify anything.

M So your compassion-God is not really a deity.

B That is right. Compassion arises spontaneously as one develops a deeper insight into the way of awakening. And as one becomes more Buddha-like, one must set aside the individual ego.

Religion

M Some people hold that the belief in a God is necessary for one to call a religion a religion. Yet you do not embrace a creator God. Should we still call your view a religion, Bhikkhu?

B There is no creator God. But there is a God in the sense of infinite compassion, which belongs to individual beings through training. Compassion which focuses on the welfare of all beings, because they are infinite, itself becomes infinite. In that way individual compassion becomes infinite.

M But should we call this a religion?

B One should not beg the question by defining religion in terms of a creator God, nor in terms of some entity or force. If we regard religion as Dharma, that is, as concerned with making oneself at home in the world, then I don't see why we ought not to regard Buddhism as a religion. In any case, I don't think it matters very much whether you call it a religion or a psychology or something else. That is not important.

M But sometimes we do need to be clear about this for practical purposes. In the practical world many things depend upon what we call it.

B Then we should answer in accord with the practical functions that are required. Remember that, just as there is no inherent existence altogether, so religion has no inherent existence. The point is to see that there is no inherent existence and to move on from there.

M Some people think that in addition to making one at home in the world, religion should tell us what to do. And perhaps that will become clear when certain prayers are answered.

B I think that that is asking too much of religion. It is a mistake to ask of religion what to do. If it provides a sense of place in the world that is a very great deal. We ask too much of religion if we expect it to tell us what to do. Let us lower our demands of religion, and then we will be more satisfied. Religion can provide something more general—an attitude to life. And that will be a great help.

Morality

M Bhikkhu, if there is no creator God to issue moral principles, how do you teach people to be good?

B I can answer you in terms of the concepts of Dharma, again, and Karma. Dharma is religiosity or righteousness without divinity. It is the sense that all things have their place and should be in their place.

M And what is Karma?

B Karma concerns actions. According to the Karmic law, actions have their consequences often much wider than one might initially think. That which is sown will be reaped—if not in this lifetime then in the next one. This is so not only for individuals but for groups as well.

Reincarnation

M Bhikkhu, you say that according to the law of Karma we will reap what we sow, if not in this lifetime then in another lifetime. This seems to involve the theory of reincarnation.

B Yes.

M But if there is life after death it must be so different from what we call life that it seems misleading to call it life. That is, it is misleading to call life without bodies 'life'.

B We should remember that Buddhists don't embrace the theory of the transmigration of the soul. There is no soul to be transmigrated.

M But you do hold that some persons do live after a particular bodily life.

B Yes. But even the life as embodied in one physical body is not 'our' life. This truth arises from the doctrine of emptiness. It is a mistake to think that your particular life really is your particular life in an inherent sense.

M What do you mean?

B On the Buddhist view, what many people call life—that is, the idea of a particular life attached to a particular body—leads one to see life in a very limited way to start with. Rather, the idea of life does not require a particular bodily form. Yes, we are in some bodily form. And yes, we can say that now I am young, or now I am middle-aged, or now I am old. But to say these things is to say things about a non-inherent identity.

M So life need not be understood as attached to a particular bodily form, although it is attached to some bodily form. Is that what you are saying?

B That is right. And it is misleading to say that our lives are our lives in an inherent sense. It is a mistake to think of life in terms of ownership connected with a particular bodily manifestation.

M Perhaps you have answered my question about how there could be life after the death of my particular body. But I am still worried about identifying my life as my life when I take on another bodily form.

B The truth is that you are mistaken to think that it is your life to start with.

M When I say it is my life I don't mean that I own it. I say that rather

to identify me—as opposed to you, Bhikkhu—to distinguish one person from another.

B Of course, we do distinguish between persons. But that is a construction, an imputation for certain purposes—be they legal or social or other. And these purposes change, and so the grounds that are assumed for distinguishing between one another change accordingly. There is no inherent or permanent existence over time. There is nothing that each of us inherently 'is'. And just as this is true within the life of one embodiment, it is true for our lives across embodiments.

M I see.

Nirvāṇa

B The aim is freedom. We should seek to come to a place where there is no fragmentation, no duality between subject and object. Where there is no subject and object there is no mediation between them. In *nirvāṇa* that very dualistic distinction drops away.

M But if it does drop away, how can we talk of experiencing anything at all? It seems to me that we cannot experience without a point of view. We cannot see thngs as they really are, if there really is a way in which things really are. To see things unmediated at all is to see nothing at all.

B This sense of experience will be transcended in *nirvāṇa*. Experience as such will have become something else.

M Then why should one aspire to *nirvāṇa*?

B All beings want to avoid suffering and to be happy. In the state of *nirvāṇa* one overcomes suffering and is happy.

M But it is not clear to me that even if, through emptiness, one does manage to avoid suffering, that that also maximizes happiness. Can we equate the alleviation of suffering with happiness? Does emptiness really make us happy?

B One changes with enlightenment. Enlightenment no longer carries with it the kinds of things we ordinarily call happiness or bliss. What the enlightened one experiences is no longer characterizable in terms of these words. It transcends such language.

M I can see that some of your views coincide with those of Gyaan. At the same time, there is a very great difference between your view of emptiness and his view of *Ātma*.

B Yes.

M It would be very useful, I think, if the three of us could talk about the similarities and differences between your views. Would you be willing to do so?

B Yes. That would be fine.

MEDITATION THREE

M I am delighted that we are meeting together to exchange views about Oneness and other related issues. Perhaps we might begin by exploring to what extent you agree and disagree with us.

G Yes. That would be helpful.

Overcoming Ego

M It seems that you both agree that we should overcome our possessive ego selves through meditation, but each of you understands that in quite different ways.

B Yes. I agree that our aims are rather different.

G Yes. While I say that meditation should help us to overcome the possessive ego-self in order to become at-one with *Ātma*, Bhikkhu says that we should meditate on emptiness to see that all is impermanent and does not exist inherently. And that includes *Ātma*. Yet we do agree that the individual possessive ego self should be overcome.

B I agree that in general we both seem to want to overcome the individual possessive ego self. But can we really say that in aiming at different things, we are really doing the same thing?

G How does that difference affect the fact that we are both trying to overcome our individual possessive ego-selves?

B Well, if I describe my overcoming my possessive ego-self as one directed toward liberation, and you, Gyaan, describe your overcoming your possessive ego self as one directed toward *Ātma* isn't the very idea of overcoming our possessive ego-selves itself affected? Perhaps what we are meditating for changes the nature of the meditation itself.

G I see what you mean. When you say that you perceive emptiness, which for you is the instrument of liberation, you may experience something very different from what I experience when I am at-one with *Ātma*. What we are really doing might be very different after all.

B I think so. But we still can agree that bad things arise from possessive ego selves. We agree that the possessive ego-self should be overcome, although for quite different reasons.

G Yes.

M But what is actually involved in overcoming the ego-self? Does it mean that there is a thing, an entity, that needs to be dissolved somehow? Or should we just focus our attention on things that are not so centred on selfish aspects of our lives?

B There never was a substantive inherent ego that needs to be dissolved as such. So for me, overcoming the possessive ego means

that we overcome our ignorance of this fact. Overcoming ego is to overcome the ignorance that we are non-inherently existents.

G I don't agree. When we meditate we overcome the ego-self to become at-one with the cosmic Self, which we really are. We come to see ourselves for who we really are, that is, particular forms of the cosmic Self. Yet, the cosmic Self does inherently exist.

M So Gyaan, is becoming at-one with *Ātma* a kind of melding of an actual ego-self into the cosmic Self? Is there a merging of substances?

G I would not put it that way. Rather, we are the cosmic Self to start with. And overcoming the possessive ego-self is a matter of reclaiming or reconnecting with the cosmic Self that is within us to start with.

Expanding the Ego-Self

M I see. It seems that in overcoming the possessive ego you mean to become expanded.

G Yes. I do not aim to dissolve the ego self into nothingness but to expand it. I meditate to remove the sense of otherness, and that involves the self incorporating the other. That is the Oneness. It is not the void. It is not emptiness.

M But the other may be the limited possessive ego-self as well as your physical body.

G Yes. The limited ego identifies itself with a limited changeable body. But through meditation it leaves its attachment to bodily existence and comes to know its true self as pure existence, pure consciousness, pure bliss. And this is unchanging, everlasting knowingness.

M So *Ātma* includes the body as well?

G Yes. But I do not remain possessed by an ego attached to the body. I meditate for the sake of unfolding that power of consciousness which will permit me not to be possessed by body attachments. And there will be delight for everyone who is thus enlightened.

Body

M I am not sure why it must be that consciousness must be detached from the body.

G What do you mean?

M I think that one can give an account of consciousness that is fully in terms of bodily states, say, in terms of physiology.

G What would that look like?

M According to such a view, consciousness would be understood as a refined kind of neuro-physiological state. Why separate consciousness from the body?

G Because if you don't separate consciousness from the body, it becomes dependent upon the body. But if one's body dies it still remains that there is consciousness—consciousness by a cosmic Self of its Self.

M Bhikkhu, I know that you agree with Gyaan that we should not understand ourselves in terms of particular physical states. But are we not also physical states, even if non-inherently?

B Yes. But I would not identify myself as myself in terms of any inherent thing—neither with particular physical states nor with a cosmic Self.

Creating and Dissolving into Ātma

G But Bhikkhu, how can things arise from *Anatma*, from a void? No, all things must arise from *Ātma*.

B I cannot accept your question as you pose it.

G Why not?

B Because there are no inherently existing things. So the question of how they arise is misplaced.

G But surely you must agree that there are things with certain forms at particular times. You, for example, are a man with a certain form now—both physically and mentally. It would be an appropriate question to ask how you came about.

B Yes, but *Anatma* does not hold that there is a void, as you say. It holds, rather, that there is nothing that exists inherently. That is different from saying that there is nothing.

G What does it mean to say that there is no inherent existence?

B It means that all things arise dependently. There is nothing that exists in virtue of itself from its own side, even *Ātma*.

Who is Conscious?

G But *Ātma* must exist inherently, since otherwise who or what would be conscious even of your emptiness?

B There may be consciousness of the fact that all arises dependently, that all is empty of inherent existence. But there is no need to posit the inherent existence of a cosmic Self to allow that there may be consciousness of a non-inherent kind.

M Isn't there something odd about your question, Gyaan?

G What is odd about it?

M Well, as I mentioned in our first meditation, Gyaan, to me consciousness seems to require an agent. Somebody or some thinking thing needs to be aware or conscious.

G Yes. That is the *Ātma*.

M But you have said that the *Ātma* is everything, and not something separate from what there is.

G Yes.

M So you think that there can be an agent that is aware or conscious but is not separate from the objects of awareness or consciousness.

G That is right. There is self consciousness by all that there is.

M Even so, wouldn't consciousness require a kind of dualism to start with ? I mean, even if you say that all that there is, *Ātma*, is conscious of itself, would you still want to say that there is an object of consciousness that is different from the agent of consciousness—even if, in the end, *Ātma* is self-consciousness? Wouldn't you want to say that in *Ātma's* being self-conscious it is capable of holding itself up for its own self-awareness?

G Yes. That would be a way of putting it.

M But Then would we be introducing a dualism all over again?

G No. The dualism that I resist is one in which the agent of thought is separate from the object of thought. And that is not the case for *Ātma*.

M I see.

Quietism

M Bhikkhu, how does the Buddhist idea of emptiness bear on the idea of individual rights?

B It is all right to speak of rights in a sense that suggests that because an individual is part of an ecological complex, he or she should be respected and cared for. But it is a mistake to think of a human person as an atomic, autonomous, inherent existent in itself. And therefore it is a mistake to think that he or she has corresponding inherent individual rights. Whatever rights a person has are a function not of his or her individual inherent self—for there is no such thing—but is perhaps a function of his or her inter-connectedness with the whole. Just as there are no inherent selves, there are no inherent rights.

M Gyaan, what do you think of this?

G Bhikkhu, I agree that there are no individual rights based upon an individualist idea of the self. So our morality must be ecological, as you say. Of course, I disagree with you about the nature of the cosmic Self.

M Does this ecological morality lead to a kind of quietism, that is, an attitude that takes initiative or motivation from the individual person? It seems that there might be no particular stake in one's own personal future, and therefore one would not seek to improve one's lot.

G Of course, possessive self-interest has been the source of a great deal of suffering in the world. At the same time, there is nothing in this ecological morality which suggests that one should be passive

about one's situation in the present. It makes as much sense for the ecological moralist to improve present conditions, just because it is in the interest of the whole to do so—and the individual is part of that whole, of the One.

M Bhikkhu, do you agree with Gyaan that this ecological morality need not be quietist?

B Yes. I agree with Gyaan that the ecological view of persons does not necessitate a passive role, because the well-being of persons does depend upon the well-being of all persons generally. That is what motivates my view that the overarching moral value is compassion—for all. Compassion must motivate one's behaviour.

M So the life of compassion need not be quietist. Is that what you are suggesting?

B Yes. The life of compassion may be anything but quiet or passive. Indeed, living such a life may be very active. I think it is a mistake to think of the individualistic view of selves as necessarily being more active than the ecological view. The search for a harmonious life may be anything but quiet. It is in the service of the whole and its people.

M But Bhikkhu, have you not now given inherent value to the whole, much as Gyaan has done, but which you deny?

B I give value to the whole, but not inherent value to the whole.

M So the compassion for others derives from you giving non-inherent value to the whole. It that a fair way of putting it?

B Yes. That is right.

Final Stage

M You, Gyaan, set at-oneness with *Ātma* as your final stage. And you, Bhikkhu, set liberation through the realization of emptiness as your final stage. Perhaps we can distinguish a final stage from an interim stage. Holding *Ātma*, for example, as a final stage, couldn't one embrace *Anatma* as an interim stage toward *Ātma*? That is, could one meditate on emptiness as a transition to the final stage of realizing *Ātma*?

G Yes, if one has not really understood on what to meditate, in the interim stage one could meditate on *Anatma*. Then meditating on *Anatma* would be a way of coming to be at-one with *Ātma*, with pure Consciousness. But in the final stage, *Anatma* is opposed to *Ātma*, and *Ātma* is opposed to *Anatma*, as darkness is opposed to light and light is opposed to darkness. *Ātma* is the realized stage and it is self-effulgent. *Ātma* is the light which is pure Consciousness, pure Existence, pure Bliss.

M But Bhikkhu, couldn't you say the converse? That is, holding

Anatma as the final stage, could one not embrace *Ātma* as a transitional stage and meditate on *Ātma* toward the realization of *Anatma*?

B Yes, I agree with that. Meditating on *Ātma* might well be a useful interim stage.

M So, at least as interim stages, the ideas of *Atma* or *Anatma* may be embraced by both of you as legitimate objects of meditation?

G No. When you conceive of *Ātma* or *Anatma* in these ways you are no longer really talking about *Ātma* or *Anatma*. That is, for me *Atma* is not an interim stage, and I expect that Bhikkhu does not understand *Anatma* as an interim stage. Am I right about that Bhikkhu?

B Yes, that is right. *Anatma* is not an interim stage in the path. It is the final stage in realizing how things are.

G So Michael, while you want to make our views compatible, you have changed the very meanings of *Ātma* and *Anatma*.

M But when you have come to a certain stage of realization, how would either of you know whether you have in fact come to the final stage? If you, Gyaan, say that you experience *Ātma*, how do you know that there is no further stage yet? Or, Bhikkhu, how do you know that when you realize emptiness, it is the final stage?

G That is a matter of experience when you have arrived in oneness with *Ātma*.

B Yes. It is a matter of experience. When you perceive emptiness you will know that it will be emptiness, and you will see that it must be the final stage. Only after arriving there will you know what it really means to have arrived.

M But Gyaan, wouldn't you say the same thing of *Ātma*?

G Yes. *Anatma* could not be the final stage, because some consciousness would have to know that it is. The very consciousness that there is emptiness affirms that there is something—and that consciousness is *Ātma*. Even the possibility that there could be consciousness of *Anatma* affirms that there is *Ātma*. So as I said, while one might meditate on emptiness, that cannot be the end of the process of the journey.

B Gyaan, there might be a contradiction if one held that in *Anatma* there is also consciousness of the *Anatma*, and whosoever is conscious of *Anatma* exists inherently. But I do not say this. *Anatma* resists consciousness by any inherent existents. But that doesn't mean that there can be no consciousness of *Anatma*. *Anatma* is not a void. So, there is no contradiction in my saying that the *Anatma* is the end stage.

M So you think that one could be conscious of emptiness?

B Yes.

M As I see the situation now, both of you agree that the realization of *Ātma* and *Nirvana* via *Anatma* are understood as final stages in the journey. They are not interim stages. Gyaan suggested that there is something contradictory about *Anatma* because consciousness of *Anatma* is inconsistent with *Anatma*. But Bhikkhu said that in *Anatma* consciousness of emptiness need not be consciousness of or by something that inherently exists. That which is conscious need not inherently exist. So there is nothing contradictory about *Anatma*.

B Yes, that is a fair way of putting it.

M Both of you answer the question how you know whether *Ātma* or *Anatma* is in fact the final stage by meditative experience. But you disagree about the results of your experiences.

G It seems so.

M But if one does not experience *Ātma* or *Anatma* as the final stage, couldn't it still be that for either *Ātma* or *Anatma*, there could always be a further stage where either of these may be followed by the other?

G In such a case there would be no end stage at all. It could go on infinitely.

M Yes. I am suggesting that perhaps we should look at the assumption that both of you make—namely that there is a final stage. Perhaps the differences between you may be dissolved by adjusting this shared assumption.

G But there must be a way things are—finally. And that is Oneness. There is nothing more basic than Oneness. What could it be if not Oneness? All things are part of the One, and Oneness is in everything. That is basic. It is the end stage. Everything else comes from there. There must be a dynamic Consciousness full of potential to manifest all forms out of itself. Emptiness cannot do that.

M But why could we not say that there is no final stage, that within the journey *Ātma* holds and *Anatma* also holds but at different stages?

G But, as we have said, that changes the very idea of *Ātma*, and I am sure that Bhikkhu would agree that would also change the idea of *Anatma* as well.

B Yes. That is right. I any case, Michael, the suggestion that there is no end stage is yet another statement about the end stage—namely there is no end stage.

G Yes, if you say in the end there is no end, you are saying, if negatively, how—in the end—things are.

M I am not sure it is right to say that the statement that there is no end stage commits me to agreeing that that statement is itself a remark about an end stage.

B How could that be?

M I withhold judgement as to whether there is an end stage, leaving the matter open still to proceed on with my journey. The issue need not be settled in order to get on with meditating and overcoming possessive ego concerns, such as those that arise in ordinary life. When I said that in the end there is no end I meant that for me the very idea of 'the end' is unintelligible. I cannot grasp it. So I remain agnostic about whether there is such a thing as an end or what its character might be.

G I see. So you are saying that for you now you cannot make sense of the idea of a final stage, whether it is my *Ātma* or Bhikkhu's *Anatma.*

M That's right.

G Perhaps with further development you might make sense of this condition. It might happen that you could come to see that the idea of end stage is intelligible.

M That is a possibility that I must leave open.

G While this may be how you are thinking now, it is not possible to leave the matter perpetually open.

M Why not?

G Because if you do so you will not understand the context of your own journeying, and if you had that understanding it would change the nature of the journey itself.

B Yes. I agree that your understanding of the context would change the nature of your journey. But, of course, I disagree with Gyaan's understanding of the context.

Relation Between Religions

M What, Gyaan and Bhikkhu, is the relation between your two views? Do they contradict each other? Is one right and the other wrong? Or, in the end, are they in different ways trying to get at the same underlying insight?

B I don't believe we both are trying to get at the same underlying insight. Some of our central aims diverge.

M What do you mean?

B Consider the analogy of an academic curriculum. In secondary school all students share more or less the same courses. They learn reading and writing and arithmetic. Correspondingly, all religions share the aim of encouraging people to be good—to be contributing and caring members of a community. Then at the more advanced university level, people specialize and follow different areas of interest. Again, different religions are interested to pursue different aims. For the Buddhist it is enlightenment through emptiness. For the Hindu it is salvation through becoming at-one with the *Ātma.* For the Christian it is salvation in heaven, and so on. These are not the same things.

M But why are these not different aspects of the same thing?

B The Buddhist theory does not accept the concept of heaven for the final judgement. The idea of a final judgement or heaven is based on the concept of a creator God. We do not accept such a concept. We embrace a concept of salvation that is explained through the concept of emptiness. In order to achieve salvation one must meditate to realize emptiness. Salvation through emptiness is an individual mental state which completely purifies all the negative emotions. That mental state is *nirvāṇa.*

M Your view and Gyaan's are very different, especially as regards Gyaan's assumption that Oneness inherently exists. But there is an important similarity. He too holds that, in Oneness there is a mutual interconnectedness. That all things are connected.

B Yes. Oneness exists. But it is non-inherently real.

G But this is not Oneness. Oneness is absolute and eternal.

Paradox of Refinement

B Michael, I appreciate your efforts to reconcile our views. Perhaps we should try to resolve our differences as much as possible. But there is something else one should be mindful of.

M What is that?

B I think you are facing a paradox of refinement.

M What is this paradox of refinement?

B Sometimes it is reasonable to press for clarification so as to be sufficiently sure that whatever you embrace suits your temperament, that you can live with it. But there may well come a point when it might no longer be reasonable to press for assurances that might not be obtainable at a particular point.

M What do you mean?

B Suppose that you have good reasons for rejecting possibilities A and C, and so you are disposed to pursuing B. But at the same time, you demand that you shouldn't actually embrace B until you are absolutely sure about the rightness of B. So you try to sharpen B—reformulate it, redescribe it, reshape it, and so on.

M Yes, that seems like a reasonable course of action.

B But that can go on forever. There will come a certain point when reconsidering can become something of a fixation or a fetish, especially when—in order to obtain the fruits of embracing B—you must embrace it and begin to live in terms of it. If you already will have rejected A and C, and if you remain aloof from all three possibilities—A, B, and C—then you are without any of them. I am saying that if you remain with that attitude for an indefinitely long period of time—in fact, some people make that their whole life's attitude—then you have the benefit of none of these possibilities.

M I see. In fact I have known people who won't embrace any possibility for fear that they will be criticized by somebody who doesn't agree with them. I also know people who only publicly present themselves this way, but they privately embrace a view which they then don't have to defend to anybody.

B Yes. Both of those are unfortunate, though not equally so, The first approach is unfortunate because it leaves the person impoverished altogether. The second is unfortunate because it robs the person from beneficial discussion. In any case, what is most important is that one should not remain neutral or passive or agnostic about getting on with the journey—whatever its shape takes.

M But, of course, even a neutral attitude is an attitude on the journey. So the possibility of not taking some attitude or other is not a live option.

B Yes.

G I agree with that.

Rightness

M But if we haven't reached the point of the paradox of refinement where questioning itself undermines our journeying, and if we come back to the question of who is right, how shall we proceed?

B Perhaps we might consider what is involved in the question of who is right.

M What do you mean? You both say that your views are true, don't you?

G Yes.

M What about you, Bhikkhu?

B That depends upon what you mean by true.

M Do you hold your views to correspond with the way things are?

B Different schools of Buddhism try to refute other schools of Buddhism and other religions. In that sense they attempt to demonstrate their superiority. For example, the higher schools seek to refute the extremes of eternalism and nihilism. But if there is no inherent way how things are, and the idea of truth requires that, then I am not sure how I can call my view true, or how someone else might call it false for that matter.

M Then how would you characterize them?

B I would say that it is a correct attitude to live and grow by. Perhaps it is not right to talk about truth or falsity.

Organizing Principles

M What do you have in mind?

B Take the statement that there are no inherent existents. One may fashion one's life around it without calling it true.. It would be more like a presupposition of one's life. Perhaps it is more like a kind of organizing principle for a way of living. There might be no point in pursuing the question of truth or falsity for such a statement.

M I see. It might be better to ask whether it helps us get on with our lives, and gives us a comfortable sense of place.

B Perhaps it is best not to think of it as true or false.

No Questions

G This idea of whether to embrace *Ātma* or *Anatma* as an organizing principle of one's life is connected with the stage at which questions are stilled.

B How so?

G Well, when one has found a sense of place from which to comfortably experience the world—Dharma, as you say—other options just are not real. They are not really open to you. And when the questions are stilled, the issue of truth or falsity drops out as well.

M Taken that way, neither of you could say that your views are truer than the other.

B Quite so.

G But if not in terms of truth and falsity, how could I convince people that they should embrace my view?

B For those who can benefit, you can recommend your view as a useful way of situating themselves in the world. That is all.

G I see.

M And Bhikkhu, I expect you would have to say the same thing about your view.

B Of course. In any case, questioning which view is true or false is to be still functioning within the context of discursive language—where there is a dualism between truth and falsity. And I think both Gyaan and I want to go beyond that.

G Yes. We both want to arrive at a level beyond such questioning. There the question of truth and falsity cannot really be asked.

M It seems that, for both of you in different ways, the final stage involves the silencing of questions.

G Yes. Only in that way will you experience the blue space.

B I agree about the silencing of questions. But when Buddhahood is attained there is both meditation and action simultaneously and spontaneously.

End of Questions

M I guess that for me the aim is to keep the questions open rather than to close or still them. As the British philosopher R.G. Collingwood said, questions are the cutting edge of knowledge.

G They may be the cutting edge of a certain kind of knowledge. They are the obstacles for another kind of knowledge. The knowledge I am concerned with is experiential knowledge of the Oneness, and there questions can be impediments.

M I see.

The Author(s)

M Before we close these meditations I must ask who is speaking?

G What do you mean, Michael?

M Well, each of us has been speaking in one voice. At the same time, the meditations are presented as a conversation between different selves of a particular person.

B But who is that?

M As a matter of convention, that person is referred to as Michael Krausz.

B But, Michael, you are a voice in this dialogue, along with Gyaan and me. How can Michael who is one voice in this dialogue be the same Michael Krausz in whom all three of us are voices?

M The conventionally identified person is not the same as one of the voices within this dialogue.

B So we are all voices within this person?

M Yes.

G I am much relieved to hear that. I should not want any one of our voices to have any special status just because it happens to have the same name as the person who people refer to by the name Michael Krausz. But, Michael, why do you say that there are three selves who are speaking here?

M What do you mean?

G In this discussion you say that there are three selves talking to each other. But there is one Self. Why do you say there are three?

M Because there are three views expressed here, although they are embodied in one person who is the author. I guess you would say, Gyaan, that in the end all is One, all three of us are One.

G Yes.

M And you would say, Bhikkhu, that since in the end there are no inherent selves, then we three selves do not inherently exist.

B That is right.

M Then what are we?

B We are imputed positions in a critical space in this dialogue. We are not selves that inherently reside in a person.

M And if I am right that in the end there is no end, we may be no selves, or we may be several, or we may be One at different stages. And our relationships might be described in different ways at different stages.

B What then are we?

M We are constructions by an author. And I leave the philosophical characterization of that author open for the time being.

Agreement

G But in the end don't you think that the person whose selves we are should speak with one voice, whichever of us that might be?

M Why should that be? Why not leave these incongruent voices unresolved indefinitely? Why should our person speak with one voice?

G If he speaks in conflicting voices his life will be full of dualities and will invite strife.

B Yes, if his voices are not resolved, our person will be at odds with himself, that is, until he detaches himself from the very idea that he must speak in any particular voice at all. Michael, do you think that he should speak in many voices?

M For now, our person speaks with different voices, perhaps for different purposes on different occasions. That may or may not change, depending upon the nature of the conflicts between his voices and upon practical considerations. I have no special suggestion about how he should proceed with this question 'in the end'. I don't think there is anything to be said about anything 'in the end'.

G It seems that we are unresolved about whether we should be resolved.

B Then why not say that there is one person who moves between three views? Why not say that?

G But they contradict each other. And one should not hold contradictory views.

M But I don't think I should be forced to choose, and I don't think that Michael Krausz should either.

G So you postulate that there are several selves so that you can, after all, hold these various views which are contradictory between them.

M Yes. How would you handle this situation?

G I would not postulate three selves. I would say that you and Michael Krausz are one self that is asking many questions and trying to evolve. And, as you do, Michael Krausz's three selves will resolve themselves into one, the One. And the question about whether there are three will drop away as you experience the Oneness. You will become less concerned with this question, because as you evolve there will not be three views that need to be logically accommodated.

M So you would say it does not matter if these views are contradictory.

G For now, no. What matters is how they serve you in your evolution. Michael Krausz does not need to be protected from the embarrassment of being inconsistent. In such processes inconsistency

can be very useful in his evolution. Sometimes it is helpful to be open to them.

M So would you say that by identifying himself in terms of three selves he is not protecting myself from inconsistency, but he is doing so needlessly?

G Yes. But now I must ask who is speaking.

M What do you mean?

G You and I have been talking about the wisdom of multiplying selves in order to protect oneself from inconsistency.

M Yes.

G Well, who is speaking? Is it one of these three selves, all of them, or someone else?

M I would say that it is Michael, one of the speakers in this dialogue who has introduced the three selves.

G But that cannot be. There must be some consciousness above and beyond the speakers in this dialogue who has decided that in order for the author to avoid contradiction there must be three separate voices.

M I see what you mean. But why not then say that the one who is doing this is a person, the author Michael Krausz, and that the person has three selves?

G The word person is just another word. It solves nothing. You would have the same problem all over again.

M What do you mean?

G Well, suppose our person, if you want to call him that, was said to have three selves, and that the three selves had contradictory views between them, then that person would be contradictory, even if it was only that separate parts of him which held those views. The person would be holding contradictory views.

M I see. So the idea of shielding oneself from contradiction by introducing different selves would not work either.

G No. So why not say that there is one self, one person, who is evolving, and let it take its own form. You don't have to control it. The One will take care of itself.

M Is this what it means to overcome one's ego-self?

G This is one form it may take.

M Bhikkhu, what do you think about who is speaking here?

B I suppose I agree with Gyaan in questioning that there are three selves here.

M Why? Do you think you are the same self as I am or as Gyaan is?

B No. I just don't find it useful to say that I am a self, or that you are a self, or that Gyaan is a self. There are no selves. There are no inherently existing things at all.

M I understand that. But clearly some voices are being heard. We are talking with each other. If you do not say they are selves, what are they?

B They are non-inherently existing beings.

M The author of this dialogue has separated us out as separate selves in order to avoid the contradictions between our views. That author wishes not to be contradictory. What do you think about his having done so?

B I think that is fine if he wishes. But it is the beginning of a process which will continue.

M What do you mean?

B Well, I agree with Gyaan, that there is no need for embarrassment about being contradictory while one is evolving, so it is not necessary to introduce several selves to shield him from embarrassment. But the postulation or the imputation of several selves is the start of a movement to show that there is no inherent existence of anything, including his own self or person or being, or whatever word you want to call it.

M What is involved in that movement?

B Well, for any would-be self or person or being or voice, whoever or whatever is evolving will come to realize that, that will dissolve into something else, and that continual transformation is perpetual.

M So that too is an instance of what you mean when you say that nothing is permanent.

B Yes.

M But, again, isn't the continual transformation you are talking about itself permanent?

B Yes. You can state it like a contradiction if you like. But as you move on with this process, you will go beyond the formulation of the principle of impermanence—as a principle—and experience the transformation. And that is the important thing.

M I see. So you think that the relationships between us and the author is nominal—that we are really fictional entities that are undergoing perpetual transformation.

B Not quite. I don't think we are fictional. We three voices are quite real in a way that is clearly different from the way that the author is. But we, like him, are non-inherently real in the sense that our realities arise dependently. We come to be and transform in virtue of our relation to everything else.

M What seems to be emerging is that at least we are not inherently existing selves. For you, Bhikkhu, we are not inherently existing because nothing is. For you, Gyaan, we are not inherently existing because we are en route toward the inherently existing cosmic

Self. Either way, we are not inherently existing. This much we can agree with. Given this present situation let me ask what attitudes each of you has towards it?

G I have compassion for both you and Bhikkhu. In the end you will see that all is one and that you will enjoy the bliss of this realization—although, as I said, when you come to such a realization it will not be ego-centered bliss at all.

B I also have compassion for both of you. In the end you will realize that there is emptiness only and this will relieve you of all pain and suffering, as you will be detached from it all. You will even be detached from your present selves and understand them to be non-inherently real. This will be *nirvāṇa.*

M I wouldn't say that I have compassion for either of you if that is connected with the idea that eventually you will come to see how things really are in the end. Rather my attitude is one of irony or of delight in the very activity of this exchange.

B And which direction then do you expect your present self, as you call it, will go?

M I do not know.

B Then perhaps for the time being we have gotten enough from these conversations for our evolution.

G Yes. Perhaps it is time to meditate. Your experiences will begin to answer Bhikkhu's question about your direction.

M I agree with you both. It is time to meditate. And perhaps we can talk again after a spell.

A Case for Phenomenological Realism

RAVINDRA M. SINGH
Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi

The present paper is premised on a general agreement with Merleau-Ponty that after Descartes both the classical responses to the man-world problematic, namely, the one which conceives of man as a mere product of his natural and social milieu, and the other which regards the world as a creation of man or some other supernatural being, have proved to be unsatisfactory. We can object to the first response 'on the ground that, if man were indeed one thing among many, he could not know any of them because he would be locked in his own limits like this chair or that table, present at a certain location in space and therefore incapable of representing to himself all the others.'[1] Similarly, the latter response can be objected to on the ground that it makes man's insertion in the world, whether natural or social, unintelligible. With such a view of either man or things, all attempts at understanding the human condition turn out to be quite superfluous and futile.

In my view, the failure of these responses necessitated that man be granted a mode of being that is capable of accounting for both his freedom and his finitude. It is in this context that the contributions of Husserl and Sartre need to be situated. The importance of these contributions, in my view, seems to lie in allowing us to understand the dilemmas of human condition by according to man a special mode of being, namely, intentional being. In this paper, it is my endeavour to examine the extent to which Husserl and Sartre succeed in providing a satisfactory solution to the man-world problematic.

HUSSERL: FROM IDEALISM OF SENSE TO IDEALISM OF BEING

Though the term 'phenomenology' was first used by Hegel to describe his way of philosophizing, its first precise formulation as a distinct method is to be found in the works of Edmund Husserl. Concerning Husserl, however, it needs to be noted that his own thinking underwent many significant changes in course of its development. In my view, it is necessary to bring out these differences while assessing the value of Husserl's contribution. For example, the revolutionary nature of

Husserl's early philosophy of *Logical Investigations* consists in its overcoming of reductionisms, especially psychologism which aims at providing naturalistic explanations of logic, philosophy, and consciousness.[2]

However, the importance of the philosophy of *Investigations* consists not only in its rescuing the laws of thought from the purview of naturalistic explanations by establishing their autonomy, but also in its laying the foundation for ontological pluralism. While Husserl's 'logical absolutism', which asserts that idealities are what they are even when they remain undiscovered or untouched by concepts, may pose certain difficulties in accounting for the subjective conditions of the possibility of a theory and understanding of changing aspects of language and thought, the *Investigations* still remain relevant in providing a descriptive analysis of various acts that constitute human subjectivity.[3] However, Husserl himself was not unaware of the limitations of his early reflections. In some of his later works he attempts to overcome the limitations of his static theory of constitution as developed in *Investigations* by incorporating temporal and genetic aspects.

Furthermore, while it is true that all that the intentional character of consciousness requires is to make objects 'present' themselves (whether the objects are possible or impossible, real or ideal, etc.), the thesis of ontological pluralism demands that we provide some criterion for distinguishing self-givenness of one mode of being from its other counterparts. It is in this context that we need to situate Husserl's theory of 'self-evidence', for the very distinction between 'transcendent' and 'immanent' objects is based on differences in self-givenness of different modalities of being.[4]

Now, with regard to the being of the transcendents it turns out that in principle they cannot be given 'immanently'. But from this can we conclude, as Husserl indeed does, that the being of consciousness is such that it will not be affected in its own proper existence even on 'nullifying of the thing-world'?[5] Doesn't such an assertion falsify Husserl's entire theory of self-evidence? How can we demand apodicticity or any one specific kind of self-evidence, an evidence which is peculiar to a mode of being, from each and every region of being? If my understanding of Husserl's theory of self-evidence is not incorrect, than apodictic self-evidence is merely a kind of self-evidence. Accordingly, it cannot serve as a measuring rod for the reality of other 'regions of being'.

As regards the role of phenomenological epoche or suspension of 'primordial doxa' (*Urdoxa*) in deciding the reality of transcendencies, it needs to be noted that this concept was initially introduced by Husserl on purely methodological grounds as a metaphysically neutral phenomenological tool. Such a phenomenological tool can thus neither create a new world nor can it deny attribution of reality to the one

already existing. How can it therefore be used to decide the reality of the 'reduced' world? It is indeed possible to agree with Husserl that everything is not lost on performance of the phenomenological epoche and some phenomenological residue (for example, the noema or the essences), is always left over on the object side after the epoche. But from such methodological considerations does it follow that the givenness of these givens can always be doubted with regard to the claims of their reality? For Husserl, such a move seems possible as, for him, to doubt the existence of everything except consciousness is always conceivable. It appears that this move made by Husserl is guided by the Cartesian logic of possibility. Any logic of possibility when applied to the world of things is, however, quite problematic.

Firstly, such a move goes against the spirit of Kantianism which has provided very weighty arguments against any logic of possibility 'which sees in the actual an accidental formation out of many possibilities'.[6] In the second place, Husserl's idea of immanent objects as certain and transcendent objects as doubtful can never establish anything beyond the sphere of the indubitably certain.Thirdly, his own principles of constitutive genesis, i.e. the principles of active and passive genesis, do not permit such a move. Such is the case because the characteristic feature of the first principle is that it is always 'pooled in a sociality', while the latter always gives things 'with the originality of the "it itself", i.e. before all "spiritual" activities, which begin with active grasping'.[7] Moreover, even Husserl's finer distinction between secondarily passive genesis (i.e. 'processes which have become sedimented, habituated, typified'.) and primarily passive genesis (i.e., processes which are devoid of all such features) cannot do away with the role of passivity. It merely brings out the role played by sedimented habitualities in the generic constitution of things.

The interplay of the elements of active and passive genesis in the constitution of objects is thus undeniable as the objects are neither passively received nor constituted *sui generis*. It is indeed through synthetic deliverances of these on-going processes that 'there is always already available to the concrete human ego a set, indeed a veritable world, and already constituted complex, of objects'.[8]

Lastly, such a move is permissible only if an idealistic reduction of all transcendencies to the realm of transcendental consciousness is accepted. This would render Husserl's own philosophy as reductionist, something he himself had opposed in *Investigations.* Furthermore, being a reductionist, such a move will tend to conceive of the entire world of transcendencies, in both their sense and their being, as a result of consciousness' constitutive activities. In the light of such a move Husserl's philosophy can no longer be treated as 'metaphysically neutral description of the "things themselves" as they present themselves in experience'.[9] This metaphysically speculative trend in Husserl's

thinking seems to go against his original and genuinely phenomenological impulse to confine phenomenology only to that which 'shows itself as given'.[10] Therefore, isn't Husserl guilty of 'equating without argument the meaning of the being of the world with the mode of its verifications'.[11]

The independence of the world's being is thus not to be proved but presupposed, and that too in the manner of a necessity. Regarding the nature of the being of the world 'in itself', phenomenology perhaps cannot do much and has to rely on the discoveries of science. What appears more important for phenomenology is to explicate the significance that world's being has for man because the world and the Other are not constituted after constitution of my own subjectivity but they are 'born from the original ekstasis' and are thus contemporaneous.[12]

The world *qua* world is accordingly given to man in a primordial pre-theoretical attitude, 'in practical relationship with the environment through affective-emotional experience, through action and practice'.[13] It is through human action that the world is disclosed and 'the idea of things is thus inseparable from the idea of practice. In fact, the world of things is a world of practical relationships, actual and possible, a horizon of actual and possible activity'.[14] Husserl's experiment at world annihilation and the suggestions regarding the possibility of a disembodied (*leiblos*) self, contingency of death, etc., are therefore quite misplaced and even speculatively metaphysical.

In opposition to such speculations, which do not appear to be phenomenological in character, I would like to assert that any apprehension whatsoever demands that the object of apprehension be capable of having a being of its own. For example, it is possible to distinguish between the having of an emotion and the emotion that we are capable of having as such even in the cases of immanent having of emotional experiences. An emotion might be unique in the sense that it may never recur, but without means of identifying it, we cannot even talk about it. Furthermore, the fact that the same object can be given in perception, judgement, etc. indicates that the object is bestowed with a certain kind of independence for its varying modes of apprehensions to be possible. Otherwise, how else are we to account for the identity of the object, which is maintained amidst its differing modes of presentations?

Following Merleau-Ponty, we need to note that not all 'supposed doubt is always genuine doubt. There is therefore no good reason to attach to the immanent acts of the cogito any greater certainty than to the transcendent cogitata. . . [for] cogito is my being-present-with-in-the-world (*etre-au-monde*). It would be misleading to think of this new cogito as illusion-proof'.[15] Thus the most important lesson that the idea of reduction can teach us is 'the impossibility of a complete

reduction. . . (because) radical reflection (merely) amounts to a consciousness of its own dependence on an unreflective life which is its own dependence on an unreflective life which is its initial situation, unchanging, given once and or all'.[16]

Furthermore, Husserl's persistent demand that we accept the possibility of a complete epoche with regard to the world and the other transcendental consciousnesses seems to involve him in a kind of conceptual contradiction. Such is the case as 'it does not seem possible to doubt or to try to doubt the existence of the object experienced and at the same time to experience it. Husserl seems to imply that it is possible to remain in the natural attitude and yet to bracket it as if the "experience-of-the-thing-as-bracketed" were a modified experience which was founded (*fundiert*) or built upon experience simpliciter. . . . But this is incompatible with the attempt to doubt the existence of these objects. It is impossible because it is a conceptual contradiction'.[17]

Therefore, we cannot bracket the entire background or horizon of experience for we can never 'be sure that one really leaves the normal horizons of reality behind rather than taking them along in a modified fashion'.[18] A complete bracketing is thus only possible in imagination and consequently it cannot affect the being of things, i.e. their existence *per se*. The existence *per se* of things is what *it is*. The form of existent things can perhaps be changed within limits prescribed by their mode of being through human *praxis* (for example, cognition or labour) but they cannot altogether be annihilated in their being. The bracketing, therefore, has no meaning without givenness of something to consciousness as that which is to be bracketed.

Doesn't the idea of a complete epoche mistakenly presuppose 'a subject which is proximally worldless or unsure of its world, and which must at bottom, first assure itself of a world'?[19] It appears that while Berkeley's idealism made 'all being dependent on psychological consciousness. . . Husserl's idealism relates being to the transcendentally reduced consciousness'.[20] Will not such an epoche go against Husserl's own intentionality doctrine since the basic function of the intention is to relate sense 'to an object which is itself not part of the act, but "transcendent" to it'?[21] Will it not lead to 'a contraction of intentional consciousness into itself: a kind of Brahmanic annihilation of consciousness'?[22] Furthermore, if intentional object is 'not conceived as the pre-existent referent to which the intending act refers as already given, but as something which originates in the act,'[23] then how are we to establish the existence of the hyletic data? How is one to distinguish, if not through some psychological ideas like intimacy, etc., the givenness of the external world from the givenness of the subjective states? After the performance of the complete epoche what remains as the evidence for there being any pre-givens at all?

Moreover, it is language that facilitates epoche as it allows us to turn away from the realm of transcendents. But if the objects to be bracketed are all products of 'sociality and culture', as demanded by Husserl, then will not such a bracketing also include language? I do agree with Husserl that language can possibly be considered apart from its connections with 'sociality and culture'. What is, however, more important is whether it will be 'possible to use such a language in the description of phenomena and still preserve the qualities of certainty and universal validity in the results one obtains'.[24]

In this regard, following Cunningham, I would like to maintain that it is not possible to use such a language because 'within the reduction there is no reliable criterion for consistency in the use of language'.[25] Thus, 'if one hopes to achieve any degree of certainty one needs some criterion for consistency . . . where the social context of language has been bracketed out of consideration, this criterion cannot be provided'.[26] It can perhaps be argued in Husserl's favour that reference, as intrinsic function of language *qua* language, merely means intended reference without any guarantee that it would find a foothold in reality. In this context, however, it needs to be noted that such a rendering of the language problematic is acceptable if and only if constitution is not interpreted ontologically, i.e. as creation. But such is not the case with Husserl because his post *Investigations* philosophy seems to move in a direction where constitution has to be interpreted as creative for how else can one make sense of Husserl's assertion that the being of transcendental consciousness is antecedent to being and sense of the world.[27]

That constitution acquired a more involved role in Husserl's later philosophy is being recognized by almost all leading Husserl scholars. Alfred Schutz, for example, notes that:

> At the beginning of phenomenology, constitution meant clarification of the sense structure of conscious life . . . for it remains true that whatever is exhibited under the reduction retains its validity after return to the natural attitude of the life-world. But unobtrusively, and almost unaware, it seems to me, the idea of constitution has changed from a clarification of sense-structure, from an explictation of the sense of being, into the foundation of the structure of being; it has changed from explication into creation (*Kreation*). The disclosure of conscious life becomes substitute for something of which phenomenology in principle is incapable, viz., for establishing an ontology on the basis of the processes of subjective life.[28]

Therefore, if existence and non-existence are mere meanings whose very being is constituted in and through creative acts of consciousness, then 'the distinction between the denotative and designative uses of

language collapses'.[29] Consequently Husserlian consciousness can merely remain locked in its solipsistic circle.

SARTRE'S DUALIST ONTOLOGY AS AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OUT

It is in the light of these problems associated with Husserl's turn towards transcendental idealism that we need to situate Sartre's charge that Husserl neither ever posed the ontological question of the being of consciousness nor could he return to the world from his phenomenological epoche. According to Sartre:

> Husserl for the length of his philosophical career was haunted by the idea of transcendence and surpassing. But the philosophical techniques at his disposal, in particular his idealist conception of existence, removed from him any way of accounting for that transcendence; his intentionality is only the caricature of it. Consciousness, as Husserl conceived it, cannot in reality transcend itself either toward the world or toward the future, or toward the past.[30]

For Sartre, therefore, the very intentionality of consciousness amounted to establishing of the ontological distinction between consciousness and that of which the consciousness is conscious. The very appearance of the phenomena of being indicates such a distinction as the very possibility of any judgement, whether affirmative or negative, presupposes a witness consciousness as judgement making consciousness. Only an ontological grounding of the being of objects vis-a-vis being of consciousness can thus overcome the absurd conclusions of philosophies of immanentism. It is only through maintaining an ontological distinction between the being of objects and the being of consciousness that objects' being doesn't get reduced to psychic functions or states of consciousness.

Associated with this ontological distinction is Sartre's insistence that consciousness' awareness of itself is different from its awareness of objects. For Sartre, while consciousness' awareness of objects is positional in character, its awareness of itself is always 'non-positional', i.e. consciousness is always conscious of itself without positing itself as an object. It is prior to every kind of reflection as revealing intuition of objects—a 'spontaneous relation without a self-dirempting objectification'.[31] As a pure spontaneity transcendental consciousness is also not inhabited by an ego because at the level of lived experience it does not exist as a personalized consciousness. At the level of lived experience the transcendental consciousness is not personalized because for any personalization to be possible, it has to adopt the attitude of reflection on its lived experiences. Therefore, in so far as the question of lived experiences is concerned, there is nothing in

consciousness over and above its positional awareness of objects and non-positional awareness of itself. The transcendental consciousness at the unreflective level thus always exists as 'impersonal spontaneity'.[32]

Consequently, there are only two reasons which could justify acceptance of a pure/transcendental ego in the intentional life of consciousness. These are:

(i) Its acceptance is necessary to account for the unity of the primordial stream of transcendental consciousness; and

(ii) Its acceptance is necessary to account for the personalized life of transcendental consciousness.

However, if these two functions/roles can be fulfilled by an ego uninhabited transcendental consciousness, then acceptance of an ego within the internal structures of transcendental consciousness has no *raison d'etre*, there is no function that it can serve.

Following Husserl's own reflections on the temporal unity of the primordial flux of consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, the unity of transcendental consciousness seems accounted for without introduction of any element of opacity into it. Even in *Cartesian Meditations* the immanent temporal constitution of transcendental consciousness seems to have been preserved.[33] The hypothesis of a pure/transcendental ego to account for the temporal unity of consciousness is thus not required.

Concerning the question of personalization of consciousness, Sartre has very convicingly argued that the primordial stream of consciousness remains pre-personal prior to the acts of reflection which may subsequently be directed on the unreflected stream of consciousness. If the latter is to acquire a personal character, then a second order operation of reflection is necessary. It is thus only through subsequent reflective acts that consciousness comes to be inhabited by an ego and gets personalized.

While these reflections seem to constitute a movement forward in clarifying the nature of consciousness, Sartre's final rendering of consciousness' life, in *Being and Nothingness*, as useless passion seems to involve him in a number of formidable controversies. Before embarking on a critique of Sartrean phenomenological ontology, it would perhaps be useful to situate Sartre's thought in its historical and intellectual context.

As has often been pointed out by critics, Sartre's philosophy of *Being and Nothingness* appears to be an attempt at bringing together fruitful themes from the philosophies of Husserl, Heidegger, and Hegel. From Husserl, Sartre borrows the idea of intentionality without any bracketing of the world; from Heidegger, Sartre takes up the idea of consciousness' necessary togetherness with the world and at the same time criticizes Husserl for having remained locked inside the

cogito; from Hegel, or to be more precise from Kojeve's Marxist-Heideggerian rendering of Hegel, Sartre brings dialectics to his system. Sartre's synthesis of these three trends, however, appears to be quite problematic because:

(i) for Husserl the life of transcendental consciousness is monadological;

(ii) for Heidegger the idea of death and its awareness remain fundamental to philosophy; and

(iii) Hegel transmutes death into a higher form of life, namely, history.

Sartre's synthesis is problematic because in Sartre's *Being an Nothingness* there is no remedy from the interpersonal conflicts. Such is the case for several reasons. Firstly, Sartre's definition of the 'being-in-itself' as a being which is what it is and his emphasis on the 'coefficient of resistance' that the in-itself offers to the human endeavours seem to be incompatible with each other. For 'we may grant that the universe offers no meaning or purpose. But natural process remains. It is hardly possible to argue that Nature in itself is inert passivity, even if we cannot say that there is motivated action in Nature'.[34]

Secondly, Sartrean consciousness seems to lack the opacity required to explain perception or any social involvement. For Sartre, any notion of consciousness that allows habitualities to reside in consciousness is a consequence of an act of bad faith as it amounts to denying consciousness its agonizing freedom. However, it appears that Sartre follows Husserl's idealism of sense too closely which includes viewing of language as a finished product. Otherwise, how would Sartre account for the primordially linguistic character of all understanding which 'occurs against a background of already constituted meaning'.[35]

In this context, however, it needs to be noted that Husserl's early views on language were also problematic and, as noted above, he had to give up his static theory of constitution in favour of a genetic one. Husserl's conception of consciousness could therefore account for passivity through the postulation of a necessary transcendental ego inhabiting all acts of consciousness. For Sartre, however, any such claim amounts to an absurdity. But if the validity of the principles of genetic constitution and usefulness of the concept of noema are to be denied, then how would Sartre account for the realm of idealities and empirical essences? How will such a consciousness reveal an inert and independent world without a language that has its own ambiguities, inertia, constraints, internal logic, etc.? 'The function of language does depend on our knowledge of the external world but it also depends on the organization which we impose on that world with language.'[36] This does not render language as a close-ended enterprise

ruling out possibilities of changes in it. In fact, language always remains open to 'the initiative of the Subject (as well as to the brute contributions of invasions, fashions, and historical events), always capable of the displacement of meanings . . ., and the functional substitutes'.[37]

Introduction of such structures into consciousness through language would have, however, deprived Sartrean consciousness of its absolute translucency and freedom. It required of consciousness to be involved in the world and constitute it in a deeper sense by transforming it. But in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre did not accept any definite patterns and laws because being involved in the world would have amounted to becoming like the world, 'passive, rigourously ordered, unfree'.[38]

Sartre, thus faced a dilemma for 'if the in-itself is an undifferentiated *massif*, then all differentiations within the world and situations must originate in difference of character in the for-itself'.[39] To accept such a view, however, is to commit the 'Husserlian error of allowing substantiality or opacity into consciousness. It would be to substitute essentialism for existentialism, to give priority to essence over existence. On the other hand, acceptance of Sartre's doctrine that the for-itself is translucid and even more featureless than a *tabula rasa* means that . . . the original state of the in-itself which for-itself negates cannot be characterless; and it must have character before the for-itself's upsurge'.[40]

Furthermore, while it is possible to maintain with Sartre that the realms of meaning and significance come into being with the upsurge of the for-itself, it is quite unjustified to overlook concrete socio-historical conditions that facilitate such creations. It is thus not merely a question of inescapability of sado-masochistic circularity, and hence 'absolute pessimism' of Sartre's early philosophy but a problem of accounting for concrete social determinations of the for-itself—'the relations of production, the family of (for-itself) . . . childhood, the historical past, the contemporary institutions (etc.)'.[41] These problems with Sartre's alternative conception of consciousness, however, need not come in our way of accepting his basic idea that a 'self-transcending reference belongs to the very essence of consciousness'.[42]

TOWARDS PHENOMENOLOGICAL REALISM

In the preceding paragraphs, I argued that Husserl's thinking underwent many significant changes in course of its development and two quite opposite trends could be discerned in his thought: the one which recognizes a plurality of regions of being without involving reduction of any one region of being to any other; and the other which idealistically reduces all regions of being to one single region of being, i.e., consciousness, which is the primordial region of being for Husserl. In this context, it was proposed that the latter trend went

against Husserl's own contention that phenomenology aims at metaphysically neutral description of 'things themselves' as they present themselves to consciousness in their selfgivenness. This point was further supported by having recourse to a recurrent theme in Husserl's thought, namely, his theory of 'self-evidence'.

Following this, it was argued that Sartre's phenomenological ontology represents yet another attempt to return to Husserl's genuinely phenomenological concerns. But a critical examination of Sartre's phenomenological ontology indicated that his over-emphasis on consciousness' absolute translucency, sadomasochistic circularity and conflicts as the essence of intersubjective relationships lead him into difficulties. Such was the case because Sartre's alternative conception of consciousness lacked the required opacity to explain consciousness' social involvement.

In the light of these problems associated with the ideas of Husserl and Sartre, it appears that their attempts have only partially succeeded in providing a satisfactory solution to the man-(consciousness)-world problematic. the basic question that they seem to have left unanswered is: Can we give something to consciousness without giving it either everything or nothing?

In this context, I would like to propose that if phenomenology is to avoid a reductionist approach, then it has to accept the existence of different regions of being without reducing them to one another. Phenomenology also cannot subordinate human existence, as later Heidegger seems to do, to any revelations. On the contrary, it has to evolve some rigorous criterion for deciding the reality status of different regions of being. One such possible criterion could be provided by distinguishing between different levels of givennesses of objects in accordance with the modes of being of the objects in question. Moreover, if we believe that an adequate phenomenology is not possible without taking into account man's necessary situatedness in the world, then it is necessary to show how, for example, the knowledge of things in themselves is possible.

Though like many others, I am also of the view that ascertaining consciousness's constitutive limits, whether of meaning or of being, is only a desired ideal and not a given fact of life, I would like to suggest, following Herbert Spiegelberg, the following preliminary guidelines for deciding the reality of the world of transcendencies or 'non-subjectival phenomena':

(i) These phenomena exhibit the characteristic of 'already thereness',[43] i.e. we confront them as already being there.

(ii) These phenomena are always given in a perspectival manner, i.e. their givenness is always temporally and spatially determined. Such a givenness indicates that the being of these phenomena is such that they are capable of being there without us.

(iii) These phenomena always present themselves to consciousness with certain incompleteness, multiplicity and openness which guarantees their autonomy and intersubjective accessibility.

(iv) These phenomena are characterized by a certain co-efficient of resistance with respect to human endeavours. This characteristic is a further proof of independence of their being.

(v) Finally, their being is such that these phenomena are 'dubitable in principle'[44] without being actually dubious.

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Seeing and Seeing *As:* Pradhan and Panneerselvam

Some Comments on R.C. Pradhan's *Language and Experience: An Interpretation of the Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein* and S. Panneerselvam's *The Problem of Meaning with Reference to Wittgenstein and Śaṅkara: A Study in the Philosophy of Language.*

In this discussion I wish to evaluate the reactions of two Indian Wittgensteinians, R.C. Pradhan and S. Panneerselvam, to Wittgenstein's distinction between *seeing* and *seeing as.* If the duck-rabbit picture has helped Pradhan to convert Wittgenstein into a Kantian, this picture has helped Panneerselvam to convert Wittgenstein into a Vedāntin. Of course, Pradhan is playing a safe game. So many western interpreters of Wittgenstein find Wittgenstein closer to Kant. A very few philosophers have deviated from the Kantian interpretation. So Pradhan is only giving expression to the majority view. But Vedānta is unknown to the Western interpreters of Wittgenstein; therefore Panneerselvam's work is challenging. Except R. Balasubramanian, I do not know of any other Indian philosopher of repute who is bold enough to give a Vedāntic interpretation to Wittgenstein. Therefore, Panneerselvam deserves congratulations for comparing Wittgenstein with Śaṅkara, and putting down his thoughts in the two-dimensional script.

The works of both Pradhan and Panneerselvam were originally submitted as doctoral dissertations. The title of Pradhan's work is *Language and Experience: An Interpretation of the Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein* (published by Anu Prakashan, Meerut, U.P.; the date of publication is missing perhaps because the author does not wish to remain dated). Panneerselvam's work has a lengthy title, *The Problem of Meaning with Reference to Wittgenstein and Śaṅkara: A Study in the Philosophy of Language* (published by Madras University, Philosophical Series-51, in 1993). So the book is fresh from the oven. Though Panneerselvam's book contains a rich bibliography, and mentions several Indian authors, it fails to mention Pradhan's book. Perhaps Pradhan's book failed to travel from the north to the south of India. Language is not sufficient to link people with each other. The people should have a wish to know each other. Intellectuals are no exception. But it hardly matters. Pradhan is certainly not interested in Indian authors. The bibliography of his work does not contain a single book or an article by an Indian author. May be Pradhan wrote his book for western readers; maybe he wished to introduce himself to the western audience. Therefore, an Indian need not take any interest in his work; his intrusion is not

required. But whether or not Pradhan is aware of it, only Indians will take interest in him and his work. Panneerselvam's work is not restricted to the West, it has an Indian dimension. Therefore, Panneerselvam avoids the tragic situation of Pradhan.

Since Pradhan is a senior Indian Wittgensteinian, his work requires consideration. His work is an embodiment of painstaking scholarship. This is not the occasion to review his book. Reviewing a serious work requires time and patience. At present I have neither time nor patience to do that. However, a discussion of the thrust of his book is essential in order to understand Pradhan's moves concerning issue which we have taken up for discussion in this article. As has already been pointed out, Pradhan has written his book with his Kantian prejudices which he shares with so many important Wittgensteinians of the Western world. There is some similarity between the views of Wittgenstein and those of Kant. Maybe the similarity is only on the surface. At a deeper level their views are quite different.

Some remarks in the *Tractatus* have made it easy for philosophers to find the Kantian elements in Wittgenstein. According to Wittgenstein, all philosophy is a 'Critique of Language'.[1] This expression sounds like 'Critique of Reason'. Reason is generally equated with thought. And for Wittgenstein thought 'is a logical picture of the proposition, and therefore it is just a kind of proposition'.[2] Since the Tractarian concept of language is the concept that reduced language to its propositional character, it has led Stenius to say that 'The *Tractatus* could be called a 'Critique of Pure Language'.[3] Following Stenius, Pradhan is led to say that 'the philosophy of the *Tractatus* can be called 'Transcendental Lingualism' or 'Linguistic Idealism'.[4] There is no doubt that Stenius has used very charming metaphors to describe the Tractarian thought. To characterize 'idealism' as linguistic is like characterizing moon as made up of cheese.[5] And if by referring to the 'Critique of Language' Wittgenstein has become a 'Transcendental Lingualist' then by referring to the 'Critique of Reason' Kant should have become a 'Transcendental Rationalist', or better, a 'Transcendental Reasonalist'. But Kant was no kind of a Transcendental Rationalist than he was a Transcendental Empiricist. He rejected the claims of both, reason and experience, for self-sufficiency. Of course, 'lingualism' is an apt description for the views of those philosophers for whom language is an end in itself of philosophy, for whom 'reality' is an appendix to be removed from the body of philosophy to avoid the possibility of appendicitis. Metaphysical aggravation is like the aggravation of appendicitiș Appendicitis reminds one about his pre-human existence, metaphysics about his pre-lingualistic days. But Wittgenstein was not a lingualist of any kind. He rejected language, even the language of the *Tractatus*. What was not written in the *Tractatus* was more important for Wittgenstein than what was written in it.[6]

As matter of fact, like many other philosophers of our time, Pradhan himself suffers from extreme lingualism, and he has projected his own lingualism to Wittgenstein. According to Pradhan, 'We cannot go beyond language. We are epistemologically locked up in our language. . . . Therefore, we know reality only as it is confronted within language. This may be called apparently a 'categori-centric predicament' but it is difficult not to see its importance'.[7] Pradhan has derived his 'epistemological locking up' from Petrie.[8] Similarly, his 'categori-centric predicament' comes from Kattsoff.[9] Pradhan is not denying that there is some such thing as 'reality'. What he is denying is simply that we can ever have a direct confrontation with it. Language stands as a big barrier between us and reality. Of course, language does not hide reality, it reveals it. But how does it reveal it? How do we successfully encounter reality in language? One way is that language is transparent. It has no form of its own, no logic of its own. Its form or logic is that of reality. In this sense language is no kind of a barrier. Why should there be any anxiety to have direct confrontation with reality? All that is to be known about reality is known through language. Language exposes reality rather than hiding it. Once language is detached from reality, its forms and concepts are dissolved. All the forms and concepts of language are rooted in reality.

At places, though not always, Pradhan accepts the interpretation of Wittgenstein which is best suited to the transparency of language. Pradhan writes that language, 'according to Wittgenstein, is self-revealing, i.e. it shows its logical form in the propositions. Thereby it also shows the form of reality which it represents.'[10] Since the form of reality is already mirrored in the propositions, there is no necessity of confronting reality directly. One's confrontation with propositions is sufficient. A proposition reveals its own form. This is the same thing as revealing the form of reality. Self-revelation of language is nothing but the revelation of reality. Language could show the form of reality only when it is transparent, when it has acquired the logical form of reality.

Calling language as pictorial or representational, etc., speaks volumes about the transparency of language. Pradhan accepts 'the most essential condition of the possibility of language for Wittgenstein, is its representational or pictorial relation with reality. . . . Language is thoroughly representational, since its very possibility presupposes the fact that propositions are pictures of facts, i.e. of the world. Language, therefore, has sense only as a representation of the world.'[11] Thus, the world is ontologically prior to language, and the human language is nothing if it is deprived of its pictorial or representational character. The logical features of language are nothing but those which it has derived from reality. If there had been no world, to say in blunt language, then language would have been an idling engine, for it has no other function except mirroring the world. A mirror that fails to

mirror anything is no mirror. A camera that fails to produce pictures is no camera.

From the acceptable interpretation of Wittgenstein, Pradhan falls into a prejudiced interpretation. The prejudice is an attempt to give a Kantian interpretation to Wittgenstein. Superficial similarities between Kant and Wittgenstein have led Pradhan to think about the identity of their views. Thus, Pradhan is led to say: 'Wittgenstein's Copernicus Revolution consists in his idea that the world must conform to the forms of language: that is, the limits of language determine the limits of the world. This idea runs through Wittgenstein's philosophy in general, from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations.*'[12] Forms of language are not rooted in reality, rather they are imposed on reality by language. The fashion in which reason in Kant imposes its categories on reality, language imposes its forms on it. 'Language' is Pradhan's substitute for Kant's 'reason'. Thus, the reality or the world is formless, it acquires its forms through language. This idea is further elucidated when Pradhan says, 'Kant had affirmed that the necessary forms of our thought about things are not determined by the things themselves, but originate in us. Wittgenstein in a similar spirit has said that the way we speak and think . . . are not determined by the things, i.e., the world we speak and think about.'[13] Obviously, according to Pradhan they originate in us. If this view is correct then the things about which we speak and think are nothing but a by-product of language.

Since the *Tractatus* has been treated as closer to the *Critique of Pure Reason,* it would be better to restrict oneself to the *Tractatus.* Language that has been prescribed by the *Tractatus* is truth-functional. Elementary propositions are the foundations of a truth-functional language. And elementary propositions are complexes of *names.* Names *mean* object.[14] Shall we say that names in language have *created* objects in the world? But this would mean that a name is original, and an object is its representative in the world. 'The world must conform to the forms of language.' But Wittgenstein thought otherwise. He thought that 'a name is the representative of an object'.[15] Similarly, in the *Notebooks* he thought that names 'go proxy for objects.'[16] If Pradhan is right, then Wittgenstein should have considered names as being original, and objects as their derivatives. But unfortunately Wittgenstein considers objects original and names as their derivatives. He makes language to conform to the world. Therefore, through *Tractatus* Wittgenstein has not initiated a Copernican Revolution in philosophy, but an Aristotelian Counter-revolution. He has given primacy to metaphysics over epistemology; to the world over human language.

Pradhan's Kantian prejudice works in handling the distinction between 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. According to Pradhan, 'all experienced situations which we represent in language are "concept-structured" situations, since in representing the experiential situations language puts conceptual patterns into them'.[17] Pradhan uses the expression 'concept-structured' after some philosopher or scientist bearing the name Donald A Schon.[18] Applying his thesis, Pradhan is led to say about the 'duck-rabbit' picture used by Wittgenstein, that 'in the perception of the "duck-rabbit" figure, we may see it as a duck or as a rabbit, but in either case we are interpreting the given situation with the concepts of duck and rabbit respectively'.[19] In order to justify his general thesis, that experience is concept-structured, Pradhan has used Wittgenstein's analysis of seeing *as.* Whether you see the duck-rabbit figure as a duck or as a rabbit you apply the concepts of duck and rabbit respectively. Reinforcing his argument he further says concerning 'seeing as': 'since it is a seeing with an interpretation, and, as Hugh G. Petrie points out, for Wittgenstein, 'seeing as' is an amalgamation of both seeing and thinking.'[20] All this has led Pradhan to conclude 'thus "seeing as" is more than seeing, and is conceptually governed, the object seen as something is also conceptually structured.'[21]

Pradhan recognizes the distinction between 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. He himself says '"seeing as" is more than seeing'. And it is concerning 'seeing as' that he has shown that it is 'conceptually governed' and its object is 'conceptually structured'. But what about 'seeing'? It would be free from the imposition of concepts and its object will not be conceptually structured. If 'seeing as' is an amalgamation of both seeing and thinking, then *seeing* would be free from this amalgamation. But if *seeing* is free from thinking and concepts, then Pradhan's general thesis concerning 'experienced situations' is false. For Pradhan wishes to show that 'all experienced situations are concept structured'. Pradhan cannot doubt that *seeing* presents an experienced situation. And *seeing* is free from thinking, and therefore, free from concepts. Wittgenstein himself refuses the intrusion of thinking into seeing. Pradhan quotes from the *Investigations*: 'to interpret is to think, to do something; seeing is a state'.[22] To say that seeing is a state means that seeing is not a process like that of thinking or drinking. A process has a beginning, a middle and an end. Seeing does not have these distinguishable parts of a process. Therefore, there is no question of thinking involved in seeing.

Pradhan has quoted Hanson in support of his view. But what Hanson says really goes against his view. Hanson considers 'vision pictorial' and 'knowledge linguistic'.[23] To accept the pictoriality of vision is to reject the linguistic involvement in vision. And to reject the linguistic involvement is to reject the conceptual involvement. It is not clear why Pradhan introduced Hanson in this context.

If the Kantian prejudice of Pradhan does not allow him to understand the significance of the distinction between 'seeing' and 'seeing as', the Vedāntic prejudice of Panneerselvam does not allow

him to understand this distinction either. Panneerselvam has interpreted Wittgensteinian thought in terms of Śaṅkara's thought. Panneerselvam has put Wittgenstein's photograph alongwith Śaṅkara's photograph on the title-page of his book. There is nothing wrong in interpreting Wittgenstein in terms of Śaṅkara. Wittgenstein never wished his work to be restricted to the West. Rather he was conscious that what he wrote went against the spirit of the western civilization. In an early draft of the foreword to *Philosophical Remarks* he writes, 'This book is written for those who are in sympathy with the spirit in which it is written. This is not, I believe, the spirit of the main current of European and American civilization. The spirit of this civilization makes itself manifest in the industry, architecture and music of our time, in its fascism and socialism. And it is alien and uncongenial to the author'.[24] Wittgenstein finds himself alienated from the western civilization. The spirit in which he wrote, whatever he wrote, was not in tune with the civilization in which he was born. Wittgenstein concludes his foreword—'I have no sympathy for the current of European civilization and do not understand its goals, if it has any. So I am really writing for friends who are scattered throughout the corners of the globe'. It is not clear that Wittgenstein understood the current of Indian civilization or he had any sympathy for it. But he was certainly not totally ignorant of it. He was charmed by Tagore[26] and enjoyed reading him. One can hardly doubt that in spite of all mystification, Tagore's thought was closer to Vedānta if not identical with it. Even if Wittgenstein had no knowledge of the Indian civilization, he wrote for friends scattered throughout the corners of the globe, India not excluded. How would the Indian friends of Wittgenstein react to his views? Some (like Pradhan) would react to his views in the spirit of a Western man. But then Wittgenstein did not write in that spirit. Perhaps it would be more rational for an Indian to react to Wittgenstein in his own Indian spirit. Perhaps Panneerselvam's work exhibits this spirit. He has attempted to understand Wittgenstein in terms of Śaṅkara.

But Panneerselvam has compared Wittgenstein with Śaṅkara on several issues where no comparison is possible. Wittgenstein's reactions on the duck-rabbit figure cannot be compared with Śaṅkara's rope-snake example. Of course, comparison in other areas is not denied. Through the duck-rabbit picture Wittgenstein wishes to establish an epistemic distinction between 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. He has not used this picture for obtaining any metaphysical consequences. But for Śaṅkara, the rope-snake example is useless if it is deprived of its metaphysical consequences. Wittgenstein is simply not interested in the illusory perception, and Śaṅkara's example is about illusory perception. Wittgenstein is concerned with the situation of veridical perception.

Concerning the nature of 'seeing', the crucial remark of Wittgenstein

has already been quoted in the context of Pradhan. As has been pointed out, according to Wittgenstein, to interpret is to think, to do something; 'seeing is a state'. By saying 'seeing is a state' Wittgenstein wishes to say that 'seeing' does not refer to a process, to some activity which may continue in time. Seeing takes no time. This is similar to Aristotle. According to Aristotle 'I can say "I have seen it" as soon as I can say "I see it"'.[27] In the words of Ryle the verb 'to see' is a verb of 'perceptual detection', it is not a process-verb, like 'to look'. One may be looking for his pen for full ten minutes. Ultimately, he *sees* it, under his book. One cannot say that he has been seeing the pen for the last ten minutes, he has only been looking for it. So far as seeing of the pen is concerned, he has taken no time. Seeing was the termination of his search for the pen. Consider a similar situation, the situation of a game. One may be playing a game for ten minutes, then one suddenly wins it. Can we say that he has been winning the game for ten minutes? Not winning but playing has taken time. The verb 'to see' according to Ryle is like the verb 'to win'. Both are achievement verbs. And they are unlike 'to play' and 'to look' which are process verbs. On the nature of 'seeing' there is hardly any diagreement between Wittgenstein and Ryle. Since there is no such thing as a process of seeing, Ryle was led to conclude: 'Neither the physiologists nor I myself can catch me in the act of seeing a tree—for seeing is not the sort of thing in which I can be caught'.[28] Obviously, for catching someone it is required that he be doing something. But seeing is not any kind of 'doing'. It may be a termination of doing.

Wittgenstein, however, thought that there is another sense of seeing, 'seeing as' which is quite complicated. It is to explain this sense that he introduced the duck-rabbit picture. This is not a picture of any possible animal. Of course one can imagine an animal which can be described as duck-rabbit. When it is in water it swims like a duck, its rabbit function is totally stopped. However, when it reaches the dry land its duck function stops and rabbit function starts working. It immediately starts running in the field. Such an animal is expected to create problems for philosophers. While the duck part may start laying eggs, rabbit part may give birth to bunnies. But then there is no new birth of a duck-rabbit. The generation may come to an end as soon as it starts.

But Wittgenstein is not concerned with the solution of the problems created by the duck-rabbit animal. He is concerned with the problems created by Jastrow's duck-rabbit figure. This figure has been used by Wittgenstein to explain the 'two uses of the word "see"'.[29] One use is quite clear, the use when it does not stand for a process. But there is another sense in which seeing seems to stand for a process. This sense is expressed by 'seeing as'. When we *see* some figure 'now as one thing now as another', does it mean that we '*see* it as we *interpret* it'?[30] Does it

mean that interpretation precedes seeing? It is in connection with these anxieties that Wittgenstein has used Jastrow's duck-rabbit figure.



The above figure can be seen as a rabbit's head or as duck's. But if you first see it as a rabbit's head and then as a duck's head, a new aspect dawns on you. Now you see a duck's head when you earlier saw a rabbit's head. In order to explain the nature of the 'dawning of a new aspect', Wittgenstein draws attention to an actual rabbit. He abandons Jastrow's duck-rabbit figure and takes you to the fields where rabbits can be seen. 'I look at an animal and am asked: 'What do you see?' I answer: a rabbit. I see a landscape; suddenly a rabbit runs past. I exclaim 'A rabbit!'[31] If the former reaction shows the nature of 'seeing', the latter reaction adds something new to it. What is the nature of the new element added?

Continuing with his 'flashing of an aspect', Wittgenstein writes, 'Both things, both the report and the exclamation, are expressions of perception and of visual experience. But the exclamation is so in a different sense from the report: it is forced from us—it is related to the experience as cry is to pain'.[32] The issue is clarified further—'If you are having the visual experience expressed by the exclamation, you are also *thinking* of what you see'. [33] All this has led Wittgenstein to conclude that 'the flashing of an aspect on us seems half visual experience, half thought'.[34] To say that 'flashing of an aspect' is half visual and half thought does not mean that there are two distinct occurrences, the occurrence of thought followed by the occurrence of visual experience or vice versa. To say that thought precedes the visual experience is as absurd as to say that crying preceds pain. Of course, 'seeing' may be different in two cases, the case in which seeing is not the result of any flash of aspect, and the case in which it is such a result. But in neither of the two cases 'seeing' refers to a process. It is an achievement.

Consider further reaction of Wittgenstein. 'When I know my acquaintance in a crowd, perhaps after looking in his direction for quite a while,—is this a special sort of seeing? Is it a case of both seeing and thinking? Or an amalgamation of the two, as I should almost like to say'?[35] Wittgenstein's final response on the issue is 'the very expression which is also a report of what is seen, is here a cry of recognition'.[36] The cry of recognition is not a numerically different item from the report of what is seen, one occuring after the other. Looking in the direction of a face in the crowd, then exploring the

features of the face, and, then suddenly recognizing that the face belongs to a friend, is not qualitatively different from the situation in which one is looking for his pen and finally finds it under a book. 'Seeing of one's friend's face' is not a qualitatively different kind of activity from 'seeing of a pen'. There may be a host of psychological processes preceding seeing in the two cases but they are not parts of seeing. They may be of interest to psychologists and physiologists but not to philosophers. There may be *causes* for 'noticing an aspect', but its *causes* according to Wittgenstein 'are of interest to psychologists'.[37] Wittgenstein is concerned with a philosophical and not a psychological investigation.

Wittgenstein finds that 'seeing as' is properly used only when one is reporting on the visual experience of others. Someone else could have said of me. 'He is seeing the figure as a picture-rabbit.'[38] However, 'it would have made a little sense for me to say 'now I am seeing it as . . . ' , as to say at the sight of a knife and fork 'Now I am seeing this as a knife and fork'.[39] But this shows that 'seeing as' is non-operative even in the case in which a new aspect dawns on me. I saw a duck in the duck-rabbit picture. Now a new aspect dawns on me, and, as a result I see a rabbit. But this does not mean that I should describe my experience by saying 'now I see it as a rabbit'. Dawning of a *new* aspect would lead me to see a new object. It would not be a change in my *seeing*, it would only be a change in the object *seen*. There is no *special* kind of seeing involved in seeing a rabbit, qualitatively different from the seeing which was involved when earlier I saw a duck. The hypothesis that seeing is 'an amalgamation of seeing and thinking' is entertained by others, not by me when I first see a duck and then a rabbit. The puzzle does not exist for me, it exists for others.

Panneerselvam clearly misses the thrust of Wittgenstein's discussion on the 'two uses of the word "see"'. Wittgenstein has introduced puzzle-cases to test whether there is any special sense of seeing, different from seeing ducks, rabbits and human beings in their natural habitation. Jastrow's duck-rabbit picture is not a realistic representation of either a duck or a rabbit. It is meant for creating perceptual confusion. Unless it succeeds in creating confusion it would have been of no value to Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein believed that the function of philosophy is to clarify confusions. Unless confusions are created there is no scope for philosophers to intervene. And Jastrow's 'duck-rabbit' figure is not the only figure Wittgenstein has introduced to create perceptual confusions. Consider the illustration:



In Wittgenstein's own words we can see this 'illustration now as one thing now as another'.[40]

See again the following 'picture-face':[41]

This is certainly not the realistic picture of a human-face. One has to read a human-face in it. So this picture too is not very unlike Jastrow's duck-rabbit. In drawing our attention to the illusion of snake in a rope, Śaṅkara is not drawing our attention to a puzzle-picture. Panneerselvam misses some of the puzzling character of Wittgenstein's pictures when he remarks 'in the "duck-rabbit head", one may see either a rabbit's head or a duck's head but not both.'[42] This is reading Śaṅkara in Wittgenstein. Explaining the position of Śaṅkara, Panneerselvam writes 'An interesting feature in the 'rope-snake' example is that one cannot see both a snake and a rope at the same time. When the snake is present, the rope is absent. It is because the snake is superimposed on rope and this is due to erroneous cognition. Similarly when the rope is present, the snake is absent. It is because of true cognition and it is here the superimposition is removed'.[43] How dissimilar is the duck-rabbit picture from the rope-snake situation of Śaṅkara. Referring to Jastrow's figure Wittgenstein reacts 'I am shown the duck-rabbit and asked what it is; I *may* say 'It's a duck-rabbit'.[44] So there are three possible responses. One response could be 'It is a rabbit'. The second could be 'It is a duck'. And the third response could be 'It is a duck-rabbit'.

Śaṅkara prohibits the third response. One cannot at the same time see both a rope and snake. But one can at the same time see both a duck and a rabbit. When one sees a duck-rabbit head, rather than merely seeing a rabbit's head or a duck's, one retains the balance of both the aspects, one does not allow one aspect to dominate over the other. Further, suppose one sees a duck in the duck-rabbit figure. Then a new aspect dawns on him and he sees a rabbit. Does it mean that his earlier cognition was erroneous? Does it mean that the duck was superimposed on the rabbit? Could it be said that now he has a true cognition? Switching over from duck to the rabbit is not like switching over from snake to the rope. The cognition of rope is veridical, the cognition of snake is not. The cognition of rope is veridical implies that there are 'objective criteria' for accepting it whereas there are no objective criteria for retaining the perception of snake. Are there any objective criteria for retaining the cognition of a rabbit and rejecting the cognition of a duck? Wittgenstein is not interested in establishing a distinction between veridical perception and illusory

perception. He is not making explicit the conditions governing the veridical perception. The distinction between 'seeing' and 'seeing as' cannot be explained in terms of 'real' and 'illusory' perception.

In his attempt to read Śaṅkara into Wittgenstein's face, not very unlike reading a human-face into a picture-face, Panneerselvam has converted reality into a puzzle-picture. Panneerselvam says, 'It is the same thing which appears to me now as this and on another occasion as something else. It is the same thing which is seen as 'rope' now, was seen as 'snake' on previous occasions. This means that one can see different aspects of the same thing. We interpret what we see and see what we interpret.'[45] This means that Panneerselvam gives the same importance to ordinary physical objects like ducks, rabbits, boxes, chairs and human faces which he gives to the Wittgensteinian puzzle-pictures. 'When I see a duck in real life, I am seeing only one aspect, the aspect of the object *as* a duck. It may have other aspects. So also when I see a box, I am seeing only one aspect, the aspect of the object as a box. It may have other aspects. A real duck, swimming in the lake, is not at all unlike Jastrow's duck-rabbit. May be what I see as a duck swimming in the lake now may be seen as a rabbit after sometime. I should suppress my desire to have duck-eggs for breakfast. Not only because the duck may possibly become a rabbit, but the duck-eggs brought from the kitchen may become ping-pong balls. And I would certainly not like to eat balls, not only because of their taste but because of the possibility that they may explode into my mouth. There is no guarantee that the balls are not powerful bombs. 'We interpret what we see and see what we interpret'.

Śaṅkara was certainly not interested in solving the confusions created by the puzzle-pictures of Wittgenstein. He has used what is called the Argument from Illusion for explaining the Vedāntic position. As Panneerselvam says 'Śaṅkara's 'rope-snake' example applies *equally* to one's cognition of reality. The snake which is cognized in a rope has no being of its own apart from the rope, the substratum, on which it is superimposed. . . . Similarly, the world does not exist and has no being or status of its own, apart from Brahman which is its substratum.'[46]

It would not be proper to say that 'Śaṅkara's "rope-snake" applies *equally* to one's cognition of reality'. For this exmaple has no other purpose except its application to one's cognition of reality. Śaṅkara is not a psychologist, describing the nature of illusory perception. He is a metaphysician, taking advantage of the illusory perception. Illusory perception has been used as an *analogy* to establish the reality of Brāhman. Śaṅkara is involved in a philosophical exercise which is qualitatively of a different sort from the exercise in which Wittgenstein is involved. The 'snake-rope' example is too wide to be accommodated in the small frame of 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. If the snake is also one

aspect of the object like the rope-aspect, then the distinction between illusory and veridical perception will disappear.

Both Pradhan and Panneerselvam have learnt one common lesson from Wittgenstein and i.e., 'We interpret what we see and see what we interpret'. Does this lesson throw any light on the distinction between 'seeing' and 'seeing as'? Is this distinction legitimate? It must be legitimate, for Wittgenstein wishes to know the 'two uses of the word "see"'. There is hardly any doubt that one knows many things about Kant after reading Pradhan. So also one knows many things about Vedānta after reading Panneerselvam. They have, therefore, enriched our knowledge about Wittgenstein.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4.0031.
2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks*, p. 82.
3. Erik Stenius, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, p. 220. Quoted in Pradhan's *Language and Experience*, p. 97.
4. *Language and Experience*, p. 97.
5. There is no doubt that the idealist philosophers have been described in various ways. If Berkeley is a subjective idealist, then Plato is an objective idealist. If Kant is a transcendentalist then Hegel is an Absolutist. If Wittgenstein is a linguistic idealist, then there must be some philosopher who is a linguistic realist. What would lead one to say that someone is a linguistic realist?
6. See letter to Ludwig Ficker, *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein*, Englemann, 1967, p. 144. Wittgenstein's transcendentalism preaches silence. Philosophers should not unnecessarily use vocal chords and fingers.
7. *Language and Experience*, p. 113.
8. Hugh H. Patrie, 'Science and Metaphysics', *Essays on Wittgenstein*, ed., E.D. Klemke, p. 153. Quoted in Pradhan, p. 113.
9. L.O. Kattsoff, *Logic and the Nature of Reality*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1967, p. 53. Quoted in Pradhan, p. 113.
10. *Language and Experience*, p. 63.
11. Ibid., pp. 56–7.
12. Ibid., p. 37.
13. Ibid., p. 79.
14. *Tractatus*, 3.203.
15. Ibid., 3.22.
16. *Notebooks*, p. 51.
17. Pradhan, p. 12.
18. Pradhan refers to Schon's work *Displacements of Concepts*, 1963, p. 8.
19. Pradhan, p. 122.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 123.
22. *Investigations*, II, ix, p. 212.
23. N.R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery*, Cambridge, 1958, p. 25. Quoted by Pradhan, fn., p. 123.
24. *Culture and Value*, edited by G.H. Von Wright, translated by Peter Winch, Oxford, p. 6. The draft was made in 1930.

25. Ibid.
26. See Ray Monk, *Wittgenstein*, 1990, pp. 408–10.
27. Quoted by Gilbert Ryle in his *Dilemmas*, Cambridge, 1954, p. 102.
28. *Dilemmas*, p. 102.
29. *Investigations*, II, p. 193.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 197.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 198.
37. Ibid., p. 193.
38. Ibid., p. 195.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 193.
41. Ibid., p. 194.
42. Panneerselvam, *Wittgenstein and Śaṅkara*, p. 161.
43. Ibid., p. 165.
44. *Investigations*, II, p. 195.
45. Panneerselvam, *Wittgenstein and Śaṅkara*, p. 165.
46. *Wittgenstein and Śaṅkara*, p. 166. The emphasis on 'equally' is mine.

University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad SURESH CHANDRA

Seeing and Seeing *As:* A Response to Suresh Chandra

In this discussion I wish to respond to Professor Suresh Chandra's critical comments on my book *Language and Experience: An Interpretation of the Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein* in general and my interpretation of Wittgenstein's concept of seeing and seeing as in particular. In his paper 'Seeing and Seeing As: Pradhan and Panneerselvam', Suresh Chandra has devoted a large part of his attention to the problem of seeing and seeing as. However, he has made very insightful observations on the main thrust of my interpretation of Wittgenstein. Therefore, it is appropriate that I respond to those observations first before I could meet his criticisms on my understanding of the nature of seeing and seeing as. Suresh Chandra's main criticism is that my interpretation of Wittgenstein is overwhelmingly Kantian and therefore there is a fundamental flaw in my understanding of Wittgenstein's seeing and seeing as. He argues on the premise that a Kantian way of understanding Wittgenstein leads to confusion rather than clarity. My response is precisely to the effect that a transcendental approach to the understanding of language and experience is within Wittgensteinian parameters and so there is no possibility of distorting the central philosophy of Wittgenstein.

TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE *TRACTATUS*

Suresh Chandra has been most critical of my reading of the *Tractatus* since he finds that I have allegedly read too much of Kant into it. According to him, I have made Wittgenstein a Transcendental Lingualist whereas there is no trace of lingualism in Wittgenstein. Suresh Chandra writes:

> But Wittgenstein was not a lingualist of any kind. He rejected language, even the languages of the *Tractatus*. What was not written in the *Tractatus* was more important for Wittgenstein than what was written in it (p. 4).

This is in fact in the spirit of Wittgenstein's well known letter to Ludwig Ficker expressing his interest in the trans-linguistic realm of the mystical. Wittgenstein has reiterated this point when he asks us to transcend the propositions of the *Tractatus* 'to see the world aright' (6.54). Wittgenstein's ladder image reminds us of his trans-linguistic interest. But does this mean that Wittgenstein had no genuine interest in language, or that he prescribed an absolute transcendence of language? What can such transcendence really mean? Can it mean that we have to be outside language? Ruling out such a possibility Wittgenstein wrote in the preface of the *Tractatus*:

> It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (p. 3).

This makes it clear that transcending language in the absolute sense may mean transcending into nothingness. If Suresh Chandra thinks that Wittgenstein has recommended the dissolution of language along with philosophy itself, then it is difficult to see how that dissolution can be attempted at all. It is ultimately in language that we can talk of transcending language and dissolving philosophical problems. Thus, it follows that we cannot run out of language and so a lingualism of some sort follows inevitably.

Wittgenstein's lingualism does not dissuade him from taking a genuine interest in the reality. In fact, his interest in the world is the strongest in the *Tractatus*. His concern is to show how language is related to the reality, that is, how the world is made transparent in language. If the transparency of the world would have been already given, philosophical analysis and clarifications would be unwarranted. In fact, as Wittgenstein admits, language 'disguises thought' (4.002). Hence, the need of transparency and the warrant for philosophical analysis. Wittgenstein's critique of language is therefore an attempt to show that language mirrors the reality in spite of the surface appearances to the contrary. Suresh Chandra questions that there is any problem at all about the language-world relationship. He thinks

that language is transparent anyway and it mirrors the world without being a barrier between us and the world. According to him, language is transparent as 'it has no form of its own, no logic of its own' (p. 4). But if transparency is defined in this way, then it is difficult to see how language can be relevant to the world except in the trivial sense that it is a shadow of the world. If language has no logic of its own and also no form, it cannot mirror the world. A formless language is no language at all and so cannot be transparent in any sense. Suresh Chandra is aware that language has a logic but only that it is the shadow of the logic of the world. The logic of language is, according to him, really the logic of the world, since 'once language is detached from reality, its forms and concepts are dissolved. All the forms and concepts of language are 'rooted in reality' (p. 4). This is indeed an odd way of looking at the logic of language. Forms and concepts of language are logically to be found in the language and not in the world, though I shall argue that the world conforms to the forms and concepts of language.

Suresh Chandra's worry is that language cannot have any form independently of the world, that is, it cannot have a logic in the absence of the world. So he argues that in the absence of the world, 'language would have been an idling engine, for it has no other function except mirroring the world' (p. 5). Thus, the ontological primacy of the world is argued for. In fact, Wittgenstein himself admits the *a priori* existence of the world when he says that the idea of mirroring the world presupposes that the world exists. Language is a representation of the world on the condition that the world exists and that its logical form is the logical form of language. Without language the question of representation does not arise. Unless therefore language has an *a priori* form, it cannot mirror the world at all. If language is an idling engine in the absence of the world, the world also becomes an unintelligible existence in the absence of language. It is language which confers intelligibility on the reality.

Now the question inevitably raised is: does language conform to reality or reality conform to language? According to Suresh Chandra, language conforms to reality since language acquires the form of the reality. This view does not seem to be convincing as I have already argued that reality cannot be intelligible without the forms of language. Without the linguistic models of reality, we cannot raise the question about the structure of the world. We, in fact, cannot know what the structure of the world is except through language. This much is clear in my argument that the world conforms to language. There will be a serious flaw if we argue that language reveals reality only by deriving its form from the latter. If the form of language is a gift of reality, then there is no reason why language should be said to be a picture of reality, it should be reality itself. In that case not only language but

also philosophy of language should be impossible. Reality should take care of itself. Language is then an unnecessary nuisance. Wittgenstein, in fact, argued to the contrary. He believed that language should take care of itself and not reality since the latter is in need of an intelligible structure.

Suresh Chandra suspects that my position leads to a kind of idealism, especially of the Kantian variety. His suspicion is confirmed by my open advocacy of the transcendental method as a plausible method in philosophy of language. I, however, wish to suggest that there is no open armed espousal of idealism in my understanding of Wittgenstein. It cannot be ruled out that language takes an upper hand in our understanding of the world. There is no suggestion that language creates the world, though. All that a transcendental framework entails is that language is the only model or picture of the world and we cannot have any non-linguistic representation of the latter. Thus, one can argue that the so called idealistic tendencies are contained within the linguistic talk since the world is not reduced to a by-product of language.

Suresh Chandra has not been sympathetic enough to see the deep similarities between Kant's idea that human thought has a logical structure which the world shares and Wittgenstein's idea that language models the world on its logical scaffolding. Of course, I do not mean that Wittgenstein has been a follower of Kant in bringing about a linguistic revolution. All that is suggested is that in our understanding of the world, language plays no less a decisive role than thought. Language is the method of representation of the world and therefore there is reason to believe that it is language which imposes its forms on the reality. This itself is not a concession to a superficial comparison between Kant and Wittgenstein.

It is no wonder that Suresh Chandra favours a strong form of realism in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus.* This is obviously due to his firm conviction that the world pre-exists language and that language is only a representation of the preformed world. This is reflected in his declaration that 'Wittgenstein considers objects original and names as their derivatives' (p. 7). But this realistic construation of names and objects does not fit in with the Tractarian model of language analysis. First of all, Wittgenstein is not concerned with ordinary names and objects. Secondly, he is dealing with logical objects which have a pure existence in the realm of logic. Thus considered, it is not easy to say whether names are prior or the objects. It seems to me that both are logically co-existent and so both sink or swim together. In a highly metaphysical model it is fruitless to stick to a naive realism of the type favoured by Suresh Chandra. Wittgenstein is conscious of the realist option available in his understanding of the world. He introduces facts and objects to explain how the world could be conceived. But this is not enough to establish realism in the *Tractatus.* Rather a form of logico-linguisticism pervades this text. This can properly be situated in a transcendental context as an argument for the logical grammar of language and the world. The logical grammar is the analogue of Kant's transcendental logic of synthetic *a priori* laws.

FROM THE *TRACTATUS* TO THE *INVESTIGATIONS:* WHERE TWO PHILOSOPHIES MEET

Wittgenstein's transcendental framework could have been easily missed had he not written his later philosophy. His later philosophy brings the undercurrents of his early philosophy into bold relief. Suresh Chandra has not taken note of this aspect possibly because it is not inconvenient to see the *Investigations* in the light of Kant. However, it is not at all important that Wittgenstein should fit into a Kantian model. What matters is that his approach to language is not construed in terms of naturalism and anthropocentrism. Wittgenstein scholars are yet to recognize that Wittgenstein had a trans-empirical interest in language and the world. Either he is typified as one interested in the other-worldly realm of the mystical or he is characterized as a naturalist involved in the messy taxonomy of language-uses. These stereotypes are more misleading than often realized. Even when Wittgenstein called for the transcendence of language and the world, he vigorously searched for the roots of language and the world. His interest in language and the world remained undiminished even when his interest in the mystical waned. That is precisely the reason why he called his philosophy a grammatical investigation (Cf. *Investigations* sect. 90).

Wittgenstein's *Investigations* is a text of unusual linguisticism, for here Wittgenstein is at his best in exploring the territory of language even at the cost of the philosophical interest in the world. But that does not make him detach the world from language. He is aware that the world is very much a part of the territory of language. The territory of the world is benchmarked in language itself. The harmony between language and reality is fully manifest in the grammar of language. Wittgenstein writes:

> Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language (*Zettel,* sect. 55).

The grammar of language is the index of what happens in the world, i.e. 'grammar tells what kind of object anything is' (*Investigations,* sect. 373).

If Suresh Chandra's interpretation of Wittgenstein is correct, we will fail to understand why Wittgenstein is talking of harmony at all. Can it be a mere play of words? Of course, not. The reason is: the

harmony between language and the world is fundamental to our understanding of language and the world. To reiterate the point made earlier, the world conforms to the forms of language and makes the latter intelligible. Grammar outlines the contours of the reality in such a way that without the former the search for reality is a misnomer. Wittgenstein writes:

> What looks as if it had to exist, is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language; something with which comparison is made (*Investigations*, sect. 50).

It is obviously the case that language reveals the reality in the sense that in the language alone reality has a foothold.

Wittgenstein's overriding interest in grammar has not made the language-world relationship obsolete. He has only realized that a picture theory becomes unnecessary because the voice of language is loud and clear. Language speaks for itself and also on behalf of the world. In that sense language represents the world and there lies its transparency. Wittgenstein writes:

> If it is asked: 'How do sentences manage to represent?'—The answer might be: 'Don't you know? You certainly see it, when you use them. For nothing is concealed' (*Investigations*, sect. 435).

Transparency of language contributes to the transparency of the world. The world is only a short notice away from language. Thus, Wittgenstein has continued to assert the supremacy of language vis-a-vis the world.

Those who tend to reduce language to a mere instrument of world-representation cannot easily accept the fact that language is an autonomous reality. Wittgenstein is conscious of the fact that if language is a mere natural fact it cannot even have the semantic properties of meaning and reference. So we are constrained to situate language in a grammatical space that falls outside the realm of the natural. But there is no escape from the fact that the natural is co-existent with the grammatical. Autonomy of language and grammar does not demand insulation from the natural. Herein lies my idea of a transcendental dimension in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, according to which it is language alone which determines the limits of the natural. That is, in language alone the idea of setting limits to the natural can at all arise. Wittgenstein therefore did not find it difficult to make language the frame of reference for the world and the realm of the natural.

Suresh Chandra has been consistently averse to the idea that language can determine our world-view i.e. the conceptual scheme. That is why he is unhappy with the idea that language determines our experience of the world or that our experience is structured through concepts. Experience is as much a grammatical phenomenon as the linguistic expressions thereof. Therefore there is no scope for the argument that experience is not a public phenomenon or that it does not obey the dictates of grammar. It must be recognized that experience cannot be taken as a private affair or as an inner domain of subjective states. Wittgenstein has argued against the possibility of a private language in order to do away with the concept of experience that does not conform to the rules of grammar.

My understanding of Wittgenstein's later philosophy revolves round the central notion of the grammatical which I consider to be the key concept in the spectrum of other concepts. The concept of the grammatical brings into focus the idea that all that matters in philosophy is the 'perspicuous representation' of our language and everything we do in language. So Wittgenstein writes:

> The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?) (*Investigations*, sect. 122).

This is an index of Wittgenstein's involvement in the question of logic and grammar that provide the transcendental horizon of understanding the concepts of experience, mind, world, etc. The two philosophies meet on the availability of the all comprehensive perspicuous grammar.

THE GRAMMAR OF SEEING AND SEEING AS

The concept of seeing and seeing as is central to Wittgenstein's grammatical approach. Seeing and seeing as are of grammatical interest since they involve aspect-seeing, concept-formation and rule-following. Wittgenstein develops a grammar of seeing to accommodate such puzzling pictures as duck-rabbit, double-cross, etc. The concept of seeing as is introduced to make the so-called puzzle pictures look less puzzling. Suresh Chandra has rightly found that there is nothing puzzling about them except that they appear unusual to the ordinary eye. Jastrow's duck-rabbit loses its psychological underpinning and is invested with a grammatical significance. Thus viewed, there is reason to believe that the analysis of seeing and seeing as is not a wasted labour.

I find that Wittgenstein's seeing and seeing as are predominantly concerned with the problem of aspect-seeing. In aspect-seeing there is the seeing of one aspect or more just as in the case of the duck-rabbit picture. Here the problem is not one of how one psychologically manages to see the duck's head or the rabbit's alternately. The problem is one of 'fixing concepts' (*Last Writings*, sect. 579). To fix a concept is seeing an object under that concept and thus to play the appropriate language-game. This involves what Wittgenstein calls the dawning of an aspect. But, as Wittgenstein admits, 'here it is difficult to see that

what is at issue is the fixing of concepts. The concept forces itself on one. (This is what you must not forget)'. (*Last Writings*, sect. 591). Suresh Chandra continues to forget that aspect-seeing involves concepts and concept-formation, since, for him, seeing an aspect is not thinking but only seeing. We need further analysis of the concept of aspect-seeing before we can effectively refute the above interpretation.

The seeing of the duck-rabbit as either duck or as rabbit involves a sort of organization of visual experience under two different aspects. Both aspects are recognizably well defined and clear. So seeing either aspect requires an awareness of the concepts involved. It cannot be the case that one completely unacquainted with the concepts of duck and rabbit can see the aspects of duck and rabbit. He must be the master of our language-games in which the concepts of duck and rabbit are used. This grammatical requirement is the necessary presupposition of the experience of duck-seeing and rabbit-seeing. Wittgenstein explains in the following way:

> If I saw the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, then I saw: this shape and colour (I reproduce them exactly)—and I saw besides something like this: and here I point to a number of different pictures of rabbits. This demonstration shows the difference between the concepts (*Last Writings*, sect. 467).

Thus, the difference between the aspects is shown in the difference between the concepts.

Now, the question arises: Does seeing involve thinking or not? Suresh Chandra has raised a very fundamental point regarding this. He admits that seeing as is not devoid of thinking though he denies that there is any interpretation involved. Let us separate the two issues of thinking and interpreting and take them one after the other. Wittgenstein admits thinking in aspects-seeing as he says that 'astonishment is essential to a change of aspect and astonishment is thinking' (*Last Writings*, sect. 565). Further he says 'So what dawns? The aspect of a rabbit, for instance. And therein, that could only be expressed that way, lay the thought' (Ibid., sect. 567). Thus it is not denied that thought or concepts are involved in the seeing of an aspect. This is inevitable as one cannot experience an aspect without inviting the concept under which the experience is organized.

The idea of interpretation is not the same thing as having thought. To interpret is to deliberately think in a particular way. This presupposes the act of thinking in the sense of a psychological process. This seems to be quite repugnant so far as seeing an aspect is concerned. Wittgenstein is not interested in the psychological process at all. Besides, as Suresh Chandra has pointed out, seeing is not a process but a state. Wittgenstein says:

> Do I see something different each time, or do I only interpret what I see in a different way? I am inclined to say the former. But why?—To interpret is to think to do something: seeing is a state (*Investigations*, p. 212).

Here it is denied that in seeing an aspect one has to interpret, for to interpret is to engage oneself in a process of thinking. The dawning of an aspect is sudden and spontaneous. The concept is forced on us rather than that we force a concept into seeing an aspect. So interpretation in this sense is ruled out from seeing as.

The question which worries Suresh Chandra more is whether seeing is concept-structured at all. He is not bothered whether seeing as, which is a different use of 'seeing' is concept-structured or not. His question is whether seeing can have concepts involved at all. His answer is in the negative for the obvious reason that seeing is an achievement and not an activity. Be that as it may, seeing is not like 'looking' for instance. In seeing somebody or something we do not undergo a process. It is the termination of a process. Wittgenstein did mean that no other activity, mental or physical, is involved in seeing. That is why he took 'seeing' as more or less a settled concept. But so is not the case with 'seeing as' which introduces aspect-seeing. Wittgenstein had taken the latter concept seriously. Suresh Chandra has not taken aspect-seeing as a focal issue for the reason that it introduces nothing more than what seeing does. Seeing is as good as seeing as. But this does not seem to reflect Wittgenstein's concern.

I have therefore taken the view that aspect-seeing is not a deviant form of seeing. It is complementary to seeing and in a sense more revealing than seeing. My argument is that it is only in seeing as that we can find that seeing is concept-structured and that seeing involves thinking as distinguished from interpreting. It is not that seeing is an amalgamation of seeing and thinking in a literal sense. All that is meant is that aspect-seeing would not have been possible if concept-fixing would not be involved. Suresh Chandra has objected to the idea of amalgamation of thinking and seeing as if two processes are present in seeing as. I really did not mean this. Seeing as is not a process at all. After all it is a kind of seeing. I have not denied that seeing involves concepts. I only said that seeing as is 'more than seeing' in the sense that it is only in the former that concepts are more prominent. Seeing is relatively unassuming whereas seeing as tells a whole story about conceptual connections. Wittgenstein therefore suggests that in the seeing of an aspect a new organization takes place and a set of internal relations is established (Cf. *Last Writings*, sect. 492). In fact, one plays a new language-game and participates in a new form of life.

A change of aspect is not a matter of varying the aspects from, say,

duck to rabbit or from rabbit to duck. It is a more involved affair. That is to say, it involves not only change of concepts but also attitudes. In a way there is a new language-game. There are rules that guide us in initiating the game. For example, we can see a duck-rabbit as either duck or rabbit but not as a cat or dog. That is because there is a conceptual limit to the whole game of seeing as. Wittgenstein takes the example of schematic cube and says,

> I can see the schematic cube as a box—but can I see it now as a paper, now as a tin box?—What ought I to say, if someone assured me he could?—I can set a limit to the concept here. (*Investigations*, sect. p. 208).

The conceptual limit is very important in this respect. It reveals the grammar of aspect-seeing and of seeing as.

Thus my disagreement with Suresh Chandra is not on the details but on method. He finds my grammatical method too much Kantian and in fact accuses me of seeing concepts everywhere. This he calls a Kantian prejudice. Suresh Chandra is right when he says that the concepts of seeing and seeing as are two uses of the word 'see' but he has not taken into account the use of 'seeing as' in its grammatical perspective. Though it is undoubted that statements of seeing as are perceptual reports, there is the aspect of their being placed in a language-game. Thus there is the involvement of concepts and rules in the statements of seeing as. Suresh Chandra is prejudiced against concepts and finds them as unnecessary intrusions into seeing. But this cannot be philosophically justified. Seeing itself belongs to a large network of language-uses and conceptual connections.

Suresh Chandra has done a commendable job in criticizing my views on Wittgenstein. He has been critical of my transcendental interpretation of Wittgenstein. He rightly observes that I am not alone in this interpretation. That, however, does not absolve me of the responsibility of defending this line of thinking. I have here tried only to restate an earlier position I had defended in my book.

University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad R.C. PRADHAN

Seeing and Seeing *As*: A Reply to Suresh Chandra

I am grateful to Professor Suresh Chandra for his probing examination of one part of my book. My response shall have three parts, first, some disclaimers; second, Wittgenstein's understanding of the distinction between 'seeing' and 'seeing as', and third, the nature of problem

involved in Śaṅkara's rope-snake example and the application of Wittgenstein's 'seeing' and 'seeing as' to it.

DISCLAIMERS

In the beginning of his paper, Suresh Chandra says that 'seeing' and 'seeing as'—the duck-rabbit picture of Wittgenstein has helped me to convert Wittgenstein into a Vedāntin. I am afraid that this is nothing but a clear misunderstanding of the intention of my book. My primary aim was to show some parallels between these two thinkers, namely, Wittgenstein and Śaṅkara in the background of the philosophy of language based on the problem of meaning (p. xiii). My attempt was to understand the problem from two different perspectives. The following passage from my book would prove this: 'It should be noted here that we are not going to argue that much of what Wittgenstein had to say was anticipated by Śaṅkara long back. A detailed study of coincidences which can be traced between Wittgenstein's ideas and the philosophy of Śaṅkara is undertaken in this book as the primary objective. In doing this, it seeks to use the standpoint of thinker as a tool for interpreting the other' (p. 4). Also I have shown how Śaṅkara could be discussed and understood in a more analytical way by using the Wittgensteinian model. Suresh Chandra has failed to look into the 'two-dimensional aspects' of my book.

It is not the case that I was not aware of the metaphysical consequences of Śaṅkara's rope-snake example, which is absent in Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit figure. I have, for example, in Chapter III of my book, shown how metaphysical implications serve as the basis for Śaṅkara. What I wanted to emphasize was how both Śaṅkara and Wittgenstein use two different examples wherein one can see 'seeing' and 'seeing as', though their aim is different. Suresh Chandra misses many points which I have discussed in my book and analyses one particular comparison alone which has led him into some trouble. Suresh Chandra says: 'Wittgenstein is concerned with veridical perception whereas Śaṅkara with illusory perception'. Though I am in full agreement with Suresh Chandra about this distinction, my basic idea was to explain how one object could be understood as another. Though Wittgenstein and Śaṅkara used the duck-rabbit and rope-snake respectively to achieve their own points, the idea namely, that one and the same object or figure could be viewed as something different, is the same in both cases. I will develop my argument in the second part as follows.

WITTGENSTEIN'S 'SEEING' AND 'SEEING AS'

Taking support from Ryle, Suresh Chandra argues that there is hardly any disagreement between Wittgenstein and Ryle with the nature of

'seeing'. No doubt, the nature of seeing is a problem neither for Wittgenstein nor for Ryle. Even for Śaṅkara, seeing cannot be a problem. The problem comes only with regard to the nature of 'seeing as' and it is a problem to the whole philosophical community. Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations* allots nearly twenty pages to explain the nature of 'seeing as'. It is the problem of how one is seen *as* another. By giving various pictures and diagrams like, duck-rabbit, double cross, cube-picture, triangle, etc., Wittgenstein argues that a given object can be seen in more than one way. Let me take support from two eminent thinkers to strengthen my case. N.R. Hanson gives an imaginary situation in which two scientists who have different theories in a particular field, look at certain important data which might be expected to resolve the differences between them. Yet the reports of their observations show differences. Hence the question that arises here is this: Do both of them (who are looking at the same spot) see the same thing? As Hanson puts it:

> Let us consider Johannes Kepler: imagine him on a hill watching the dawn. With him is Tycho Brahe. Kepler regarded the sun as fixed: it was the earth that moved. But Tycho followed Ptolemy and Aristotle in this much at least: the earth was fixed and all other celestial bodies moved around it. Do Kepler and Tycho see the same thing in the east at dawn?[1]

Though Kepler and Tycho see the same thing, they *interpret* their data differently. It is the interpretative element which decides the nature of 'seeing as'. When Wittgenstein says that one figure could be seen as another, he has this interpretative element in his mind. Hence, all 'seeing as' consists of visual component and the interpretative element. It is the interpretative element which helps a man to see a duck as rabbit or rope as snake.

Strawson also gives a similar example to show how one object is seen as another due to the interpretative element.

> I am looking towards a yellow flowering bush against a stone wall, but I see it as yellow chalk marks scrawled on the wall. Then the aspect changes and I see it normally, that is I see it as a yellow flowering bush against the wall.[2]

Here, the yellow flowering bush appears as yellow chalk marks due to visual component and interpretative element. Wittgenstein, by his various examples, shows how one object can be seen as another when one is suddenly struck by a new aspect. What is important in the case of seeing as, is the *momentary* or *instantaneous* character of the being struck by the new aspects.[3] Strawson very rightly puts it as follows:

> To see an aspect, in this sense, of a thing is, in part, to *think* of it in a certain way, to be disposed to *treat* it in a certain way, to give certain sorts of explanations or accounts of what you see in general to *behave* in certain ways.[4]

In short, in the case of seeing as, one *explains* how the seeing has to be interpreted.[5] The following remarks of Wittgenstein prove this: 'The flashing of an aspect on us seems half visual experience, half thought'.[6] 'Is it a case of both seeing and thinking? Or an amalgam of the two?'[7] 'It is almost as if 'seeing the sign in this context' were an echo of a thought in sight'.[8]

In the duck-rabbit figure, Suresh Chandra says, '. . . there are three possible responses. One response could be "it is a rabbit". The other could be "it is a duck" and the third response could be "it is a duck-rabbit"'. He further says, 'Śaṅkara prohibits the third response. One cannot at the same time see both a rope and a snake. But one can at the same time see both a duck and a rabbit.' I have some problem with regard to the third possibility which he speaks of. Let me go a little further.

Both duck and rabbit or rope and snake are figures which are seen or experienced. What you have seen or experienced is expressed through language. Thought and experience expand and concepts are absorbed into experience.[9] G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker remark on this as follows:

> To see the duck and the rabbit in Jastrow's figure, to see a triangle as standing now on its base, now on its side are *experiences* accessible only to language-users, since the experiences themselves are run through, saturated with concepts.[10]

The duck-rabbit (the third possibility according to Suresh Chandra), i.e., a figure which is *both* duck and rabbit is not what I have experienced. The visual experience is *irradiated* by, or *infused* with, the concept; or, it becomes *soaked*, with the concept.[11]

Another significant point which can be discussed in this context is the distinction between veridical and illusory perception which Suresh Chandra is very much concerned with. He says: 'Wittgenstein is not interested in establishing a distinction between veridical perception and illusory perception. . . . The distinction between "seeing" and "seeing as" cannot be explained in terms of "real" and "illusory perception". But is it not the case that to have illusory perception, one must have veridical perceptual knowledge of the same? Unless I know what a snake is, I cannot perceive a snake in a rope. This means that both veridical and illusory perceptions are, to some extent at least, interrelated.

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM IN ROPE-SNAKE EXAMPLE

In the rope-snake example, first of all, when a person perceives a rope as snake, he commits perceptual error. Secondly, the erroneous

cognition has an objective reference. It points to an object. Thirdly, the object is seen first as one thing and then as another by the sublating cognition (*bādhaka-jñāna*). It is seen as snake at first and later as rope. The cognition of the object is thus characterized immediately. The cognition which is non-real gives rise to what is real, such as fear, trembling, perspiration, loss of speech, and so on in the person who *claims to have seen* it. Then the aspect changes and the person *sees* the real nature of rope. In the example of Śaṅkara, it is true that one cannot see *both* rope and snake and hence the third possibility is ruled out. Śaṅkara does not face the problem which Wittgenstein or Suresh Chandra faces because there is no place for the third possibility in his rope-snake example. According to Advaita, in all cases of error, three conditions are present.[12] (1) The substratum whose generic feature alone is perceived, (2) *avidyā*, the material cause of error which suppresses the true and suggests the false, and (3) the impression due to the previous experience of the object superimposed. The third condition is very important for our discussion. The impression caused by the previous experience is very much essential, though the Advaitins make it clear that the object cognized *earlier* need not be real. What is essential is the residual impression of the object *experienced earlier*, though it is real or illusory. The impression of a snake, for example, caused by the experience of a toy-snake, can give the erroneous knowledge to mistake a rope for a snake in a given situation. This implies that without concepts, visual experience is not possible. But by allowing the third possibility, which is not based on experience, Suresh Chandra will find it difficult to accommodate it in reality.

In short, as in the case of duck-rabbit figure, one can see how the aspect changes when rope is first seen as snake and then as rope. Wittgenstein's notion that it is the same thing which appears to be now as this and then as something else due to change of aspects, is not totally alien to Śaṅkara.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. N.R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery*, The University Press, Cambridge, 1958, p. 5.
2. P.F. Strawson, 'Imagination and Perception', in *Experience and Theory*, edited by Lawrence Foster and J.W. Swanson, Duckworth, London, 1970, p. 46.
3. Ibid., p. 45.
4. Ibid.
5. L.B. Cebik formulates an imaginary conversation to explain the duck-rabbit figure when presented to a person:
   'What do you see?'
   'A *rabbit*.'
   'Good; now what else?'
   'A platypus.'

   'Wrong: that is not one of the options.'
   'It must be. Look at its bill, eye and head.'
   'That is not a platypus. It is a duck. See how neck goes. Platypus necks are broad and short in contrast to that long, thin neck.'
   'Yes, I stand corrected. I agree with your reasons. What I see is a *duck*.'
   L.B. Cebik, 'Seeing Aspects and Art: Tilghman and Wittgenstein' in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXX, No. 4, p. 6. Also quoted in my book, p. 182.
6. *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 197.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 212.
9. G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, 'The Grammar of Psychology: Wittgenstein's *Bemerkungen Über die Philosophie der Psychologie in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, edited by Stuart Shanker, Croom Helm, London, 1987, Vol. II, p. 363.
10. Ibid.
11. Strawson, *op.cit.*, p. 46.
12. R. Balasubramanian, *Advaita Vedānta*, Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1976, p. 95.

Department of Philosophy
University of Madras, Madras
S. PANNEERSELVAM

Notes and Queries

Comments on 'Does *Mīmāṁsā* treat the theory of *karma* as *purva pakṣa*'

[In *JICPR*, Vol. XI No. 2. January–April 1994, a query was raised entitled 'Does *Mīmāṁsā* treat the theory of *karma* as *pūrva pakṣa?*' The issue raised in the query was summarized in Sanskrit at Tirupati and circulated amongst eminent *Mīmāṁsā* scholars in the tradition. Replies were received from Dr N.S.R. Tatacharyaswami, Shri Surya Prakash Shastri, Shri E.S. Varadacharya, Shri L. Laxminarayan Murti Sharma, Shri N.K. Ramanujatatacharya and Shri N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. The replies received from them were translated from the original Sanskrit into English by Pt. Kalanath Shastri of Jaipur. The same are published herewith along with the English translation of the summary in Sanskrit sent to these scholars by Professor S.B. Raghunathacharya, the Vice-Chancellor of the Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati. The Sanskrit originals will be published in the next issue of *JICPR*, so that concerned scholars may judge for themselves the adequacy of the translation into English and point out the deficiencies, if any.—Editor]

A GIST (ESSENCE) OF PROF. DAYA KRISHNA'S QUERY

Jaimini establishes the rule that one who does the *karma*, gets its *phala*. Then he raises the question regarding *yajamāna* and *ṛtvikas* and then expounds the theory that since a *yajamāna* is not able to do the whole *karma* other than *utsarga* (Release of the *dravya* for the gods) and *dakṣiṇādāna* (defraying the fees of *ṛtvika*). The *yajamāna* does these two *karma*—*utsarga* and *dakṣiṇādāna* which are his *karma*.

But in a different section Jaimini raises the question—who will get the desired *phala*? Will the *phala* go to the *yajamāna* or the *adhvaryu*? In the first *adhikaraṇa* he propounds the theory that the *phala* is to be prayed for the *yajamāna* alone. Elsewhere, in a different section, he says the *phala* is to be prayed for the *adhvaryu* if the apportionment of the *phala* to *adhvaryu* contributes some benefit to the *karma* as such. Again, in a different section he says 'If there is a specific mention that the *phala* will go to *adhvaryu*—then it is only to be prayed for *adhvaryu*.'

Here the doubt arises whether Jaimini accepts the principle that whoever does the *karma*, its *phala* goes to him only.

COMMENTS

Jaimini accepts the theory that whoever does the *karma* gets the *phala*. Now, if the *yajamāna* is unable to do the whole *karma* himself, he hires the *ṛtvikas* who help him in the *karma*. Thus, in the main *karma*, the *yajamāna* is the doer (*kartā*), in its accessories, the *ṛtvikas*. This difference, of course, exists. But the doership (*kartṛttva*) applies to the

yajamāna also, although it may be one of the two kinds, the actual (or main: *mukhya*) doership and the causer-doership: *prayojaka kartṛttva*. Therefore, if the *phala* goes to the *yajamāna*, there is no contradiction.

Now, there may be the doubt—why in a different section the *phala* is mentioned for the *adhvaryu*? There we say that if in a *karma* which is auxiliary or accessory—the *phala* is denoted or attributed to *adhvaryu* or alternatively, by a common dual number the *phala* is attributed or apportioned to both—there alone the *phala* is said to go to the *adhvaryu*. Nowhere else does the *phala* go to the hired *adhvaryu*. It goes only to the *yajamāna*. The *karmas* of hired *adhvaryus* reap fruit not to them but to *yajamāna*.

N.S.R. TATACHARYASWAMI

One may raise a doubt that if the *ṛtvikas* do the *karma* but the *phala* goes to the *yajamāna*—how the doership and the reapership exist in two different agents? In that case the *phala* should not go to the *yajamāna*.. But this is not the case. The *bhāṣya* clearly says that since the *yajamāna* does the *utsarga*, by that deed he does the whole thing. Therefore, we cannot say that the *yajamāna* is not the doer. There is not *kartṛttva's abhāva* in the *yajamāna*. This is the *samādhāna*.

SURYA PRAKĀŚ ŚĀSTRI

The doubt is said to be—when the hired *ṛtvikas* do the different auxiliary partial *karma kalāpās*—but the *yajamāna* who is the causer or sponsor (*prayojaka*) *kartā* gets the *phala*. Applying the same logic we can ask—in a prayer to *Agni* and *Viṣṇu* which is offered by the *adhvaryu* that the *Agni* and *Viṣṇu* should not be furious with him nor should *Agni* burn or scorch him, why its *phala* also not go to the *yajamāna* who is the sponsor? Wherever the *phala* is said to go to *adhvaryu*, why that also should not go to the *yajamāna* since he is the sponsor? The *samādhāna* is that the *phala* of the whole *karma* goes to the *yajamāna* but not of the contributory *karmas* which are auxiliary for the completion of the *karma* itself. Now, the prayer is only regarding not scorching the *adhvaryu* while he is doing the *karma*. Hence, there is no contradiction. As regards the doubt as to why should the *yajamāna* do only the *utsarga* and all the other works are to be done by the *ṛtvikas*, these doubts have been settled by the *sūtrakāra* himself in the two *sūtras*—3-7-19 and 3-7-20.

E.S. VARADACHARYA

1. *Kartā* is defined in two ways by *Śāstras*, '*Svatantra Kartā*' that is the doer *per se* and also *tatprayojaka hetuśca*—the cause which gets the doer to do the *karma* can also be called *kartā*. Hence the *kartṛttva* lies in the causer also.
2. Now, the doubt may arise why is there the use of *ātmanepada* in '*yajeta*'—(which connotes direct result accruing to the doer). This can be settled by explaining that the doer himself and the causer, both are *kartās*, hence if the *karma phala* is going to either of them or to both, there is no contradiction. It can also be understood in the way that '*phala* should not go to the non-doer'; this was the intention, therefore *ātmanepada* is used.
3. It is obvious that the *yajamāna* cannot be the direct doer in all the *karmas*. '*ṛtvijo vṛaṇīte*' ordains that the *yajamāna* will hire (or select) the *ṛtvikas* and will also present *dakṣiṇā* to them. If the *yajamāna* were to be the only and direct doer of all *karmas*, this ordaining *sūtra* would get infructuous.

LAXMINARAYAN MURTI SHARMA

The point in question is '*tannosaha*' ('the goodwill accrue to both of us together') is spoken by the *yajamāna*. How will one explain this? This can be settled in this way. The *phalas* of auxiliary or accessory (*aṅga*) *karmas* are also mentioned somewhere at times and they also are purported to be the *phalas* (but not therefore the *phalas* of the principal *karma*). This is only *arthavāda*, and does not form the main *vidhi* because the auxiliary *karmas* do not yield any independent result. In the auxiliaries the *ṛtvikas* and in the principal the *kartā* directly gets the *phala* of *swarga-gamana*, etc. This is the distribution in the case of the principal and the auxiliary doers.

N.K. RAMANUJATATACHARYA

In the third *adhyāya*, 7th *pāda*, 7th *adhikarana* of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* there are 3 *sūtras* which provide for a '*kartā* other than the *yajamāna*'. The first *sūtra* 93-7-180 reads—'*Śāstra phalaṁ*, etc.' *Śāstra* ordains the *phala* for the performer since that is the principle—therefore he should do the performance (approximate meaning of the *sūtra*). Here a doubt arises—whether the *yajamāna* himself will do all the works—*karmas* of *darśa* and *pūrṇamāsa yāga*, etc., including the principal *karma* and all auxiliary *karmas*? Or the *yajamāna* should be the *kartā* in *haviṣṭasa* (release of the performance material) and *dakṣiṇādāna* (defraying of fees)—which is called *dravyotsarga* and in other works there should not be a hard and fast rule as to the *kartā*, that is, they may be done either by the *yajamāna* himself or, alternatively, by either the *yajamāna* or by others. Still another alternative is that such a strict rule is intended that in *dravyotsarga* only the *yajamāna* should be the *kartā* and in all other *karmas* only others should be *kartās*. On this a *pūrvapakṣa* is

given—the *phala* intended by the *sūtra* '*swargakāmo yajeta*' (*yajña* should be performed by one who wishes to go to *swarga*) goes to the doer who does the total *karma*, that is the principal and its accessory *karmas*. Why? Because it is provided. *Phala* is the result of the total performance which consists of the *pradhāna* (principal *karma*) comprising auxiliaries. *Swargakāmo yajeta* epitomises the triple idea of *aṅga*, *pradhāna* and *phala*. And, since the doer of the total whole (the principal *karma* supported by the accessories) is purported to reap the fruit, the *yajamāna* should be the *kartā* in the whole *karma* comprising the '*pradhāna* with the *aṅgabhūta* (auxiliary) *karmas*'. So far as the defraying of fees ordained by the *sūtra* '*ṛtvikebhyoḥ dakṣiṇām dadāti* is concerned, it can be understood 'as not required' by explaining through *adṛṣṭakartā* as in '*atreyaya hiraṇyam dadāti*'. Therefore, the *yajamāna* himself will assume the title of *hotā*, *adhvaryu* etc., as and when he performs these rules. The following *sūtra* supports the second postulate—'*Utsarge na*' (as the *utsarga* or the release of money and material is the principal *karma*, therefore for doing the other auxiliary works there may be others (helpers) or he himself may do them. The principal *karma* is the release of material for the gods; therefore, the *yajamāna* is the *kartā* of this principal *karma*. As to the other accessory *karmas* they can be done by the *ṛtvikas* or by the *yajamāna* himself—there is no specific restriction. Hiring of *ṛtvikas* by giving fees is done only if you require the help of others. Now, help is required in the world only when one is unable to do it oneself. If there is no inability (there is ability), then the *yajamāna* should do everything himself. If there is inability then the auxiliaries should be got done by others. Only in that case the hiring and the fees will apply.

Now, one can argue that if there is inability in the *dravyotsarga* (release of material : the principal *karma*) also, then he can get it done by others. To settle this we shall forward the same answer—*utsargetu pradhānatva*—*utsarga* is the principal *karma* and therefore release of material and defraying of fees is to be done by the *yajamāna* himself. Why? Because he is the *pradhāna*—the owner—therefore he can give his material to others. One cannot give somebody else's property to others. This is provided by the *sūtra*—'*anyo vā syāta*' ('Or there may be another as there is provision of hiring, prohibiting the possibility of direct self'). Here *vā* means *aivam* i.e., 'or' means 'only'—which transpires into saying that others only will be the doers (not he himself). Even if he is able to do everything, and there is no inability, still the *yajamāna* will be *kartā* in *dravyotsarga* only. In all auxiliary works, only others will be *kartās*. Why? Because there is a mention of hiring. Hiring (*parikraya*) is employing of an employee by money. Defraying of fees is done for hiring. Such a hiring or giving of money is not possible for self. Why? Because it would be contradictory. How can one give fees to oneself. Giving requires cessation of ownership of self (the giver) and

creation of ownership in the other (taker). Nor can you say that such a giving is prescribed only in case of inability of the *yajamāna*—because it is only in other-worldly affairs that in cases of inability other's help or hiring is required. But in the case of the *yajña* the authority is the *śāstra* which gives clear understanding that the hiring ceremony is necessarily required. Since the *parikraya* (hiring) is ordained as a rule, the auxiliary *karmas* are to be performed by the hired persons alone.

Thus, it is proved that in *druvyotsarga* only the *yajamāna* is the principal *kartā*; in all other works he is only the causer *kartā*—and the commandment that one who wishes for *swarga* should perform *yajña* contemplates both types of performership—that of direct or principal *kartā* and also that of indirect or causer *kartā*. Therefore, Jaimini's principle is: *Yajamāna* is the *kartā* in the principal *karma*, *ṛtvikas* are *kartās* in auxiliary *karmas*.

Now, some may doubt that Jaimini appears to have said something against this principle in the *sūtras* 25th to 29th of the 8th *Pāda* of the third *adhyāya*. In order to set aside their doubt let us discuss the meanings of these *sūtras*.

'*Ṛtvika phalam . . .* ' (Jaimini *sūtra* 3-8-25) [*Ṛtvika* gets the *phala* in contributory work if that is so rodained']. There are certain works which are prescribed for the *adhvaryu*. Hence kindling of *āhvanīya* fire and the *mantra* which is chanted at that time '*Mamāgne varcoḥ*', etc., are the *karma* of the *adhvaryu* and the prayer for that *karma*. Now, in this *karma* the *phala* prayed for by the *adhvaryu* should go to the *adhvaryu* himself as there is first person (*mama*) used by *adhvaryu* which means 'I should emerge virtuous'. This is the *pūrvapaksa*. To ward off such interpretations Jaimini gives another *sūtra* '*Svāmīno vā tadarthvyatu*'. ['There prayers should yield *phala* for the *swāmī*'.] Here '*vā*' means '*aivam*' i.e., the *phala* prayed for should go to the *swami* 'alone' (not either—or). The *phala* is understood to be going to the *yajamāna* in spite of the fact that *ātmanepada* is used in '*yajeta*'. Therefore, here when *adhvaryu* says '*mama*', he virtually means—'to my *yajamāna*'. Just as the soldiers fight for the king, when they become victorious, the victory belongs to the king but the soldiers also say 'we have become victorious'; in the same way the first person here means the *yajamāna*. And this arrangement is approved by the Vedas also. Therefore, Jaimini says *lingdisichha*. (Jaimini *Sūtra* 3-8-27). When prayer is offered by *ṛtvikas* in the *yajña* it is for *yajamāna* only. This interpretation clearly proves that in all such circumstances, the *phala* is purported to belong to the *yajamāna*.

This portion comprising three *sūtras* is devoted to establish that whatever *phalas* other than the principal *karma phalas* are mentioned or prayed, also go to the *yajamāna* in spite of being the *phalas* of auxiliary *karma*.

Now, we find that in a later portion the *phala* acquired by the

supporting or auxiliary *mantras* is prescribed to be going to the *ṛtvikas*. For instance in *darśa* and *pūrnamāsa* there is *dakṣiṇātikramaṇa mantra* '*agnaviṣṇu* . . .' etc., which means 'O Agni and O Viṣṇu (*agni—āhvanīya agni* and *Viṣṇu—yajña*, but here by the word *yajña*—only *havi*, the material of oblation is expressed)—let me not overtake or encroach you, Do not be enraged, and do not scorch me when I pass through the intermediate path which is between you both'. Here the *phala* of the prayer of 'not scorching' is required to go to the *yajamāna* or to himself? This is the *śaṅkā*. On this according to the tradition described in the earlier sections, it should be explained as going to the *yajamāna*. This becomes the *pūrvapakṣa*. But it is not so. Therefore, he establishes the final principle—'*karmaryam nu*'—[*sūtra* 3-8-28]. Here *nu* expresses exception.

He says that in such auxiliary *mantra*—conventionally the *phala* should be explained to be going to the *yajamāna* but looking to the prayer the *phala* should go to the *ṛtvikas* and not to the *yajamāna*. Why? 'For the performance'. Absence of scorching, etc. is required only for the completion of the performance. If you get scorched, performance will not be completed. Therefore, according to the law of property, the *ṛtvikas* must be praying for the *phala* to themselves. Now, you may question 'why then is the *ātmanepada* used in *yajet* which indicates that the *phala* should go to the *kartā*.' To answer this he says that the main *yajamāna*, also prays that the *phala* should go to *ṛtvikas* . Because the *ṛtvikas* are doing the *karma* for *yajamāna*, therefore, the *yajamāna* prays that fire should not scorch his *ṛtvikas*. Hence, there is no contradiction in *ātmanepada*.

This proves that the *phala* prayed for is applied in a performance which is contributory, accessory or auxiliary then the *phala* can be explained as going to *ṛtvikas* also.

Then there is a *sūtra* '*Vyapadeśāstra*' (3-8-29).

In *Jyotiṣṭoma* there are four receptacles below the right receptacle for oblation material. In this the *yajamāna* places his hand and asks the *adhvaryu* 'O *Adhvaryu* what do you find here'. *Adhvaryu* replies 'Everything good'. Then the *yajamāna* says 'Let that good go to both of us'.

Here the *phala* should be supposed to go to the *yajamāna* alone because here it is not an auxiliary or accessory performance prayer which should be purported to be going to the *ṛtvika* also. The dual number (both of us) is only formal and it really means singular. This is the *pūrvapakṣa*. But it is not acceptable. Therefore, he propounds the final principle '*Vyapdessauchh*'.

Here the 'good' is wished for both the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtvika* and hence it should go to both and not the *yajamāna* alone because there is a specific provision made here by the dual number. In other cases like '*mamgne varchḥ*', one may take recourse to *lakṣaṇa* but here the

ātmanepada is expected by *dvivacana* which overrules *ātmanepada*. Therefore because of the dual number the *phala* is explained as going to both.

Thus, finally it can be established that as a rule the *phala* goes to the *yajamāna* alone but as an exception, where the *phala* is only intermediary or required to be effective for the auxiliary performance only—there the *phala* is explained to be going to *ṛtvika* also. And where an unequivocal and clear dual number, etc., clearly prescribe the *phala* for both, there the *phala* is explained as going to both. This is the intention of Jaimini. And, there is no contradiction.

N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya

Comments on Prof. Daya Krishna's 'Kant's Doctrine of the Categories'

Let us approach the problems raised in the note through Kant's theory of judgement in general in the Critique of Pure Reason. In this connection, table of categories and table of judgements are given below side by side:

Table of Categories	*Table of Judgements*
I	I
Of Quantity	Of Quantity
Unity	Universal
Plurality	Particular
Totality	Singular
II	II
Of Quality	Of Quality
Reality	Affirmative
Negation	Negative
Limitation	Infinite
III	III
Of Relation	Of Relation
Inherence and subsistence (*substantia et accidence*)	Categorical
Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)	Hypothetical
Community (reciprocity between agent and patient)	Disjunctive

IV	IV
Of Modality	Of Modality
Possibility-Impossibility	Problematic
Existence-Non-existence	Assertoric
Necessity-Contingency	Apodeictic

2 It is stated in the paper that 'the categories are the transcendental forms of thought, particularly in the context of what he has said technically called "understanding"'. Here, a distinction does not appear to have been made between general forms of thought and transcendental forms of thought, or between general logic and transcendental logic. The categories listed in the table are general or formal forms of thought, they acquire transcendental or material character only after they get themselves schematized in terms of temporal determinations. Similarly, understanding in its general character requires to be distinguished from its transcendental character. According to Kant, understanding in general shows its specific transcendental nature in the process of schematizing its pure forms of thought called pure or unschematized categories of understanding. In other words, we have to take cognizance of multiple employments of the faculty of understanding: Logical, transcendental, empirical, rational, etc.

3. General logic abstracts from all content whether sensuous or nonsensuous, for it concerns itself solely with the forms of thought. On the other hand, transcendental logic abstracts from all empirical content, but not from *a priori* determinations of space and time, as pure content of transcendental aesthetic. That is, the pure forms of perception form the content of transcendental logic. It will not be surprising if we say that pure categories can be applied to things in themselves if elements of nonsensuous intuition are provided to understanding for their synthesis into objects. Kant makes it plain: 'the categories in their pure significance, apart from all conditions of sensibility ought to apply to things in general, *as they are*, and not, like the schemata, represent them only *as they appear*. They ought, we conclude, to possess a meaning independent of all schemata, and of much wider application. Now, there certainly does remain in the pure concepts of understanding . . . a meaning but it is purely logical, signifying only the bare unity of representations' (A/147.p.186).

4. It is fundamental to Kant's thought that the nature of pure categories is tied up with that of the pure forms of judgements. Kant did not borrow the pure categories readymade from his predecessors or picked

them up from the given range of experience, but derived them from an examination of logical forms of judgement. It is clear from the table that to each judgement there corresponds a category, and that there is exactly the same number of judgements as there are categories. Kant writes that 'there arise precisely the same number of pure concepts of understanding which apply *a priori* to objects of intuition in general, as, in the proceeding table, there have been found to be logical functions in all possible judgements' (B/105.p. 113).

5. Keeping the aforesaid in view, we shall look into the specific questions raised in the note about the nature of the categories, particularly the sub-categories under 'relation' and 'modality'.

6. Since the pure categories are derived from the pure forms of judgement, the nature of the latter will be reflected in the former. Let us take the category of causality and dependence under 'relation' and the category of possibility —impossibility under 'modality'.

7. A judgement in the hypothetical form takes the form, 'If A is B, then C is D'. It makes an affirmation under a condition. Hence, the category will be the relation of dependence or conditionality. The category in question is not an aggregate of two conceptions, but a *relation* of conditionality between two conceptions. This is likely to be an explanation of the dual character of the category.

8. The first form of the modal judgement is problematic, 'A may be either B or not B'. The assertion is neither conditional nor unconditional. The category in accordance with this form of judgement is possibility—impossibility. There does not seem to be any, 'intrinsic opposition', for each category represents a distinctive moment of the judgement itself. If we accept Kant's traditional method of logic as a guiding principle for the discovery of categories, then objections against them in the note seem to be hardly tenable. The dual characteristic of the category of possibility—impossibility represents the intrinsic dual nature of the corresponding judgement, and a similar situation holds good in respect of other categories under 'modality'.

9. The first question (p. 144) may be viewed in the light of what has been said above, keeping in mind that the categories are moments of thought or judgement in general. Thought in Kant is a unity and its unity is presupposed in the unity of consciousness or mind. Kant's holistic conception of thought is required to be noted against Hume's atomistic conception of thought.

10. The second question (p. 144) has received fair treatment in 4 to 9.

11. The third question may be clarified with reference to the peculiar character of the judgements and the corresponding categories under 'quality' and 'modality'. In the affirmative judgement, the subject is unconditionally thought under the predicate, while in the negative it is posited outside the sphere of the latter, and the relative categories are reality and negation respectively. As to modality, the case is that the entire judgement comprising subject and object is referred to the subject or the faculty of cognition. The categories here are existence and non-existence. The category of *reality* cannot be the same as *existence* and that of negation as non-existence, since the modes of judgement from which they are derived cannot be the same. The whole philosophy of Kant seems to rest on distinctions between various types of judgements and the categories thought through them.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by N.K. Smith, Macmillan, London, 1950, pp. 107 and 113.

Delhi KAUSHAL KISHORE SHARMA

As the first 'essential unclarity' to be rectified in Kant's doctrine of the categories, Daya Krishna mentions the number of categories, whether there are only these twelve transcendental or constitutive forms of thought and whether all of them or only four, 'one each out of the subset given under quantity, quality, relation and modality' must be present.

Comment: Though Kant declares that in his transcendental classification of the concepts of pure understanding he had followed Aristotle's logical classification of judgements[1], he leaves no doubt that with regard to nature and number of the categories no final reason could be given:

> 'This peculiarity of our intellect that it can bring about *a priori* unity of apperception solely by means of the categories, and only by these and that particular number, is as little capable of further explanation as why we have just these and no other functions of judgement, or why time and space are the only forms of our possible intuition.'[2]

Kant however insists that these twelve categories offered by him are the basic/fundamental/primitive categorial concepts for and of any

cognitive performance (*Stammbegriffe*). Pertaining to the basic concepts of quantity, i.e., unity, plurality, totality, Kant concedes that there are also other concepts of quantity which he calls derivative (*abgeleitete*) concepts or *Prädikabilien*, yet he maintains that none of these are basic, meaning that they are not needed in every act of knowing and hence no necessary formal elements of logically correct and objectively valid judgements/ propositions.[3] Hermann Cohen, founder of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, had already emphasized in his *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* (1873)[4], that it is of minor relevance whether there are just these twelve or some more categories; what does matter is only that there are such basic concepts as the necessary *a priori* conditions of any valid onto-logical knowledge.[5] Though I would not reckon Heidegger among the most qualified interpreters of Kant, his often sidelined fundamental statement in the introduction to *Sein und Zeit* (p. 12), that the ontical distinction of *Dasein* consists in *Dasein's* being ontological (meaning that the substantial characteristic of *Dasein* is the ability to intellectually understand, to have reliable knowledge of one's own and other beings' being) marks adequately Kant's conception of the self-object relationship, self and object not being independent entities but correlated elements of all possible cognitive experience; for in Kant's doctrine the categories are not, as in Aristotle's, ontical structures (*Seinsformen*) but ontological concepts, formal structures of thinking (*Denkformen*).

As to the sub-question whether all twelve categories must be present in the act of knowing, one must realize that in the exposition of the categories as the *a priori* conceptual forms of the understanding, Kant distinguishes between the ones of quantity and quality (the mathematical categories) and those of relation and modality (the dynamical categories); of these the former only refer directly to what is given in sense-perception/intuition and are thus constitutive of the time-space manifold as such, whereas the latter are constitutive of *objects* in space and time, which Kant formulates in the highest principle of synthetical judgements:

> 'Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of a synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in any possible experience.'[6]

This means to say that the categories have no meaning and serve no purpose apart from spatio-temporal intuitions:

> 'The notion of connection involves besides the notions of the manifold and of its synthesis the notion of unity. Connection is the representation of the *synthetic* unity of the manifold.'[7]

Knowledge, in Kant's interpretation, is not the comprehension of a natural, an ontically present relation between things, which is there independent of a knower; knowledge is rather the creative act of

establishing a relation between what is given in sense-perception/ intuition and its *a priori* concept, the result being knowledge itself, a *relatio transcendentalis* which Kant expresses in the fundamental principle (*Grundsatz*) of his Transcendental Idealism that

> 'the conditions *a priori* of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience.'[8]

Kant's definition of 'object' however depends on his definition of 'nature' in the transcendental (not transcendent) sense, i.e. nature as the sum-total of all objects of experience.[9] He emphasizes his intention to show how

> 'the conditions *a priori* of the possibility of experience are at the same time the sources from which all the general laws of nature must be derived.'[10]

These conditions being the *a priori* categories permits him to proclaim the human understanding/intellect in itself as the source of laws of nature:

> 'The understanding does not derive its laws (*a priori*) from nature but prescribes them to it.'[11]

And since nature is to be understood as the realm of objects, in the above mentioned sense, the categories (not as material structures of being but as formal structures of thinking) in co-operation with the *a priori* forms of spatio-temporal sense-perception are the principles of all generally valid/scientific knowledge.

In each and every cognitive statement in the form of a synthetic judgement *a priori* at least four of the twelve categories are to be employed, one each of the four sets. And Kant concedes that others, the derivative concepts, may also be at work in the process of knowing; but he 'maintains that these twelve connective concepts are distinctive among other concepts in being intellectual rather than sensible concepts, in being pure rather than empirical concepts, and in being basic rather than derivative.'[12]

Yet Kant seems to apply special importance to the categories of relation, and if one has some difficulties, to cite Daya Krishna, with 'the dual nature of the sub-categories under "relation" and "modality"', one should remember Kant's remark that his table of categories might evoke some rather meaningful reflections with regard to the scientific form of all theoretical knowledge, one of them being that the third category of each of the four classes arises from a connection of the second and first of its class; so is, for instance, totality nothing else but plurality under the aspect of unity, limitation nothing but reality connected with negation, community is the interactive causality between substances, and necessity is nothing but existence granted by its possibility.[13] Kant seems to propose or even to hold that the third category of each set is present in every judgement/proposition, it being the synthesis of the two others of the same set which are, in this synthesis, annihilated as well as conserved in an encompassing concept. Stated in a more neutral form one could say that 'there will then be one elementary *a priori* concept or category for each of the different ways in which objective empirical judgements confer objectivity and generality on the corresponding perceptual judgements.'[14]

Coming to Daya Krishna's question pertaining to the first two categories in the class of quality and the second pair under modality and his *prima facie* impression that 'reality' seems to be the same as 'existence' and 'negation' the same as 'non-existence', we should turn to that part of the Transcendental Analytic which deals with the synthetic *a priori* principles of the understanding (*Analytik der Grundsätze*), part II; there we find in the paragraph entitled *Anticipations of Empirical Perception* (*Antizipationen der Wahrnehmung*) the statement that

> 'In all appearances the real which is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree.'[15]

Here the concept of 'reality' is restricted to what is given in sense-perception/intuition and not to a thing as such, a thing as a subject-independent entity. In this sense 'reality' refers to something being in time and 'negation' to something not being in time. What in empirical intuition corresponds to sensation Kant calls *realitas phaenomenon*. Empirical reality means objective validity of appearances; the contrasting concept would be that of transcendent reality as the mere (empty) thought of a thing in itself.

The concept of 'existence' is not identical with that of 'reality', since existence is not a certain qualification or determination of a thing but the thing's *absolute position*, the concept of 'position' taken as identical with that of being. Hence, Kant says under the heading *The Postulates of Empirical Thought* (*Die Postulate des empirischen Denkens*), a sort of an introduction to his refutation of (material) idealism (Descartes, Berkeley), in contrast to his own transcendental/theoretical idealism:

> 'Whether, therefore, perception and its train can reach, according to empirical laws, there our knowledge of the existence of things can also reach. But if we do not begin with experience or do not proceed according to the laws of the empirical connection of appearances, we are only making a vain display to guess and discover the existence of anything.'[16]

We may hold that there exists a necessary being which we are used to call God, but this is a mere, empty thought and not an empirically

verifiable concept of such a being, which is to say that its empirical reality cannot be scientifically proved by means of the *a priori*/pure concepts of the understanding; and we may therefore conclude that not everything that might be thought of as existing could also be proved as having empirical reality, and hence the concept of 'existence' has a wider range than that of (empirical) 'reality'; it transcends the realm of pure transcendental or theoretical reasoning into that of the postulates of pure practical reason.

To sum up: The categories are basic/fundamental concepts of an object in general and as such *a priori* forms of every objectively valid knowledge; they are not in themselves knowledge but mere forms of thought for constituting knowledge from given sense-perceptions/intuitions. An application of a category to what presents itself in sensible experience becomes possible only by means of a transcendental temporal determination which Kant calls *schema*: hence, for instance, the schema of 'substance' is continuity (*Beharrlichkeit*) of what is real in time.

Whether my comments can serve as a clarification of Daya Krishna's queries or whether they might even have complicated them is not for me to decide; but when working on these comments I realized once more the validity of Schopenhauer's commencing sentence of his *Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie* in the Annexe to Vol. I of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (The World as Will and Idea):

> 'It is much easier to point out the faults and errors in the works of a great mind than to present a distinct and complete exposition of its value.'[17]

Notes and References

A First edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1781.
B Second edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1787.
Prol. *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, 1783.
N Indicating the items of Kant's Nachlass (left papers) as listed in *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften* (Kant's collected works), ed. Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Prussian Academy of Sciences), Berlin.
Körner S. Körner, *Kant*, Penguin Books, 1955.
Dryer D.P. Dryer, *Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics*, 1966.

1. A 79 ff./B 105 ff.
2. B 145 f.
3. Dryer, p. 137.
4. Kant's Theory of Experience.
5. *Ontology* Kant identifies with his design of transcendental philosophy for it is solely concerned with the *a priori* concepts and principles of any objectively valid knowledge (B 873). Ontology 'can inform us . . . only of the conditions *a priori* under which we can obtain knowledge of things generally in experience'. (N 5936)
6. A 158/ B 197.

7. B 130 f.
8. A—111 ; also A 158/B 197.
9. Prol., A 74 (§ 16).
10. Ibid., A 77 (§ 17).
11. Ibid., A 113 (§ 36).
12. Dryer, p. 113.
13. B 110.
14. Körner, p. 49.
15. A 166/ B 207.
16. A 226/ B 273 f.
17. For a more detailed information on Kant's Epistemology and Ontology I refer to my books *Das Problem der Affektion bei Kant*, Cologne 1953 (Supplement 67 of Kant-Studien) and *Essentials of Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy*, Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1993.

Madras HERBERT HERRING

What Exactly is Meant when We Talk of Different Types of Philosophical Texts in the Indian Tradition?

Philosophical literature in India is usually characterised as *Saṃhitā*, *Saṅgraha*, *Samuccaya*, *Kāṇḍa Kaṅḍikā*, *Kārikā*, *Sūtraadhikaraṇa*, *Bhāsya*, *Vyākhyā*, *Prakaraṇa*, *Vārtika*, *Vṛtti*, *Ṭīkā*, *Nibandha*, *Kroḍapatra*, *Panjikā*, *cūrṇi*, etc.

What are the exact differences between them and how does one demarcate one from the other? Are the texts designated by these terms characterized as such by later writers on the basis of the characteristics they had or their authors themselves had characterized them as such. When did the distinctions get crystallized and was there any overlapping between texts which could be designated as either?

Different Forms of *Advaita*: What do They Mean?

What is the exact difference between the following: *Advaita*, *dvaitādvaita*, *acintyabhedābheda*, *anubhevādvaita*, *Kāśmīra Śaivism*, *Śaiva Siddhānta*, *Vīra Śaivism*, and *Viśiṣṭaśaivādvaita* and *Śaiva Vedānta*.

DAYA KRISHNA

Review Articles

WILHELM HALBFASS, *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*, State University of New York Press, New York, 1991, pp. 425.

Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought is in the nature of a sequel of the author's earlier book *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding* (Suny Press, 1988). It is made up of ten interrelated essays on fundamental issues of traditional Indian self-identity, which are:

(1) The Idea of the Veda and the Identity of Hinduism,

(2) The Presence of the Veda in Indian Philosophical Reflection,

(3) Vedic Orthodoxy and the Plurality of Religious Traditions,

(4) Vedic Apologistics, Ritual Killings and the Foundations of Ethics,

(5) Human Reason and Vedic Revelation in Advaita Vedānta,

(6) Śaṅkara, the Yoga of Patañjali, and the so-called *Yogasūtra-bhāṣyavivaraṇa*,

(7) The Therapeutic Paradigm and the Search for Identity in Indian Philosophy,

(8) Man and Self in Traditional Indian Thought,

(9) Competing Casualities: *Karma*, Vedic Rituals and the Natural World; and

(10) Homo Hierarchius: The Conceptualization of the *Varṇa* System in Indian Thought.

These chapter-headings are self-explanatory and deal in a systematic and comprehensive manner with the self-understanding of Bhartṛhari, Kumārila, Śaṅkara, Udayana and other leading exponents of orthodox Hindu thought. The book also makes an attempt to examine certain concepts like *Saṁsāra-mocaka* (liberators from *Saṁsāra*) and the notorious *Thagas (Thaka)*. The author's approach is partly philosophical, partly historical and philological. It is also to a certain extent comparative. Never before has the Indian tradition with its subtle complexities been so thoroughly and so critically examined by a foreign scholar as by the present author, Halbfass. The present exploration of Indian tradition is so deep as well as so thorough that no reflection over it remains untouched. The ten chapters mentioned above, are, though mutually independent and different, also somehow, the foundational issues of Indian traditions.

Halbfass joins issues with Louis Renou's view that the history of the Veda in India is ultimately a history of failure and loss (depredation).

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From an early time, the Veda ceased to be a 'ferment of Indian religiosity; in the end, the Vedic world was nothing but a distant object'. Halbfass asks: is this the final word on the role of the Veda in India? Are Vedism and Hinduism essentially different religious and world views held together only by ideology of continuity and correspondence? Is the Veda, which the *Dharmaśāstra* and the 'orthodox' systems of Hindu philosophy present as a measure of orthodoxy, actually a projection and a fiction?

As such, Halbfass admits that in addition to his research on the Veda, Renou has done much to document and explore the ways in which the Veda is present in the later Hindu tradition. His study *Le destin du Veda dans l'Inde* (the Destiny of the Veda in India) contains much useful information on the role of the Veda in post-Vedic India, such as the forms in which the Veda was preserved, the attitudes towards the Vedic word, and the application, interpretation, and critique of the Veda at various levels of religious life and philosophical reflection. Halbfass rightly observes that what Renou calls 'the destiny of the Veda in India' is a wide ranging phenomenon of extraordinary complexity and ambiguity. He himself examines various approaches towards the Veda, the orthodox traditionalism of the *Mīmāṁsā*, the theistic traditionalism as well as the anti-Vedic critique and polemics of the Buddhist, Jains and materialists.

The different approaches to the Veda are not just different interpretations of a text, and commitment to the Veda is not, even primarily, the acceptance of a doctrine. In another and perhaps more fundamental sense, it means recognition of a primeval event, and a response to a fundamental reality. The Veda itself is the alpha and omega for those who accept it. According to Bhartṛhari, the Veda is the 'organizing principle' (*Vidhātṛ*) of the world. It is not only its 'teacher' (*upadeṣṭṛ*) but also its underlying cause and essence (*prakṛti*) (*V.P.* I. 10). The *Manusmṛti*, as well as other *dharma*-texts maintain the Veda as the real basis of social and natural world. Halbfass holds that such statements are not metaphorical. He emphatically holds that the Veda is the foundation of language, of fundamental distinctions and classifications in the world, and of those rituals which are meant to sustain the social and natural order (p. 15).

In a sense, the Veda precedes or transcends the entire semantic dimension. This controversial thesis is held by Kautsa who is categorical about it and says that *mantras* have no semantic status. The traditional advocates of the Veda such as Yāska, Śabara and Sāyaṇa however reject Kautsa's notion of *mantras*. But even they recognize the protosemantic dimension of the Vedic language. The later Hindu thought favours the Veda as 'primarily word' (*śabdapradhāna*) as distinguished from the *Purāṇas*, which are supposed to be *arthapradhāna*., that is, texts in which 'meaning' and 'information' predominates. Halbfass himself poses all possible questions raised against the Veda by Renou and others but he very emphatically and correctly maintains'There would be no Hinduism without the Veda: its identity and reality depends upon the idea, or fiction, of the Veda' (p. 7).

According to some radical Western scholar, Hinduism has neither a well-defined, clearly identifiable creed nor a coherent organizational structure, and that it is not a religion in the sense of Christianity and Islam. The reality of Hinduism itself has been questioned. W. Cantwell Smith says: 'There are Hindus but there is no Hinduism'. H. Von Stietencron observes: 'Hinduism is a European invention', 'an orchid bred by European scholarship . . . in nature it does not exist'. P. Hacker's observations, 'Hinduisrn is nothing but a 'collective label' (*Sammelbezeichung*) amounts to the same.

Halbfass has thoroughly examined all these views in his book and finally given his thoughtful verdict: 'The West has imposed its methods of research, its values and modes of orientations, its categories of understanding, its "epistemic absolutism" upon the Indian tradition and alienated the Indians from what they really were and are. It now takes the liberty to remove such superimpositions, to release the Indians into their authentic selfhood, to restore their epistemic and axiological sovereignity. This self-abrogation of Eurocentrism is at the same time its ultimate affirmation' (p. 12).

Concluding the first chapter, 'the Veda and the Identity of Hinduism' Halbfass maintains that the questions about the coherence and identity of Hinduism are most significantly rooted in the concept of *dharma*. Explorations of Bhartṛhari, Kumārila, Śaṅkara, Jayanta, Vācaspati and Udayana, etc., might be philosophical, historical or even philological but they do contribute to a real understanding of the fundamentals of traditional Hinduism.

The second chapter examines 'The presence of the Veda in Indian Philosophical Reflection'. The criterion of 'othodoxy (*āstikatā*), is the recognition of the validity and authority of the Veda. Traditional as well as modern Indian doxographies agree on the point as six or more 'orthodox' systems of Hinduism are usually contrasted with the 'heterodox' systems of Buddhism, Jainism and Cārvākas. However, within this 'orthodox' domain of the acceptance of the Vedic revelation, there is much room for variations. It is a fact that on the one hand there is an intense apologetic and exegetic commitment to the Veda, on the other hand, there are very loose and casual references and to even explicit disregard for the Veda. The variation in attitude is wide enough when the positions of classical *Sāṁkhya* and *Yoga*, *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*, *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* and *Uttaramīmāṁsā* (i.e. Vedānta) as well as numerous systems of theistic Vedānta are examined. Even *Āgamic* systems such as Śaivism and Śāktism do accept the validity of the Veda.

While contrasting the traditions of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* on the one

hand, and of *Mīmāṁsā* on the other hand, Halbfass has quoted the useful investigation of G. Chemparathy. According to Chemparathy the tradition itself has developed 'in dependence on the Veda, *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* on the other hand, were not originally genuinely affiliated with the Veda. They recognized the Veda as a source of knowledge (*pramāṇa* and committed themselves to its defence, in a retroactive manner, after they had established themselves as philosophical system. According to him while *Mīmāṁsā* and Vedānta are genuinely exegetic traditions, *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* are primarily apologetic traditions.

Jayanta himself declares that the *Mīmāṁsā* is not a science of the validity of the Veda (*pramāṇvidyā*) but only an exegetic discipline, a science of the meaning of Vedic sentences (*vākyārthavidyā*). The Nyāya itself is *ānvīkṣikī*, investigative science and reasoning, but it is also *ātmavidyā*, 'science of self'. It tries to integrate both roles into that of an *ānvikṣkyātmavidyā*.

The *Mīmāṁsā* being an auxiliary science (*vedānga*) is originally exegetic and text-oriented afterwards it engages itself into epistemology and logic.

The contributions of Kumārila, Prabhākara, Mandana and Śaṅkara towards the defence of the notions of *svataḥprāmāṇya*, the 'self-sufficient validity', *apauruṣeyatva*, 'authorlessness' and *nityatva*, 'eternity' of the Veda are most significant and challenging episodes in the history of Indian philosophy (p. 20).

All subject-matter related to *dharma* is ultimately obtained from the Veda. The Veda alone is the absolute and unconditional authority in this respect. The *Mīmāṁsā* school combines the roles of both, apologetics as well as exegesis as they cannot be separated in this case. Relegating the *dharma* absolutely and exclusively to the Veda, yet advancing justifications for such relegation through reasoning and argumentation amounts to the apologetic procedure of the *Mīmāṁsā*. Reasoning is used to safeguard the *'vedamūlatva'* of *dharma* against rational and empirical critique. Despite *mīmāṁsa* being an auxiliary science (*vedānga*) it comes forward to uphold certain social and religious constellations, specially the *varṇāśrama-dharma* and the identity of the *Ārya* tradition in an era of philosophical argumentation. It uses philosophical reasoning for the toughest defence of the Vedic concept of *varṇāśrama-dharma*. What then is the relationship between philosophy and Vedic exegesis and apologetics in *mīmāṁsā*?

Kumārila is the most important representative of classical *mīmāṁsā* thought and apologetics, as well as the most effective advocate of Āryan and brahminical identity. He uses the philosophy of his time such as *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika* and the philosophy of grammar to suit his purposes with modifications and expansions in accordance with the requirements of apologetics. Is it not true that the entire philosophy of Kumārila is simply a defence of brahmanical ideology? A very intelligent and appropriate question is raised by Halbfass and still more intelligent is his answer, 'it is difficult to answer'. He further observes: Despite Kumārila's apologetic motivation his commitment and conceptual ability cannot be doubted. In his case, exegesis and apologetics are, undoubtedly, vehicles of radical philosophical reflection. Kumārila's theory of *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*, *apauruṣeyatva* and *nityatva* of Veda abundantly illustrate the integration of philosophy and exegesis. Such concepts as *bhāvanā*, *vidhi* and *niyoga* deal with the motivating power of the Vedic word but they also refer to problems of ethics. Debates between the schools of Prabhākara and Kumārila well illustrate an unconditional, categorical commitment to what ought to be done (*kārya*). The competing theories of *abhihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhidhānavāda* enrich the philosophy of language.

Śaṅkara accepts that the Veda reveals the *dharma* as well as *Brahman*, the Absolute from which the bewildering mass of phenomenal world originates.

Among Śaṅkara's predecessors, Bhartṛhari produced much more comprehensive and systematic metaphysics of the Vedic word as well as the general philosophy of language. According to Bhartṛhari the 'word-*brahman*' (*śabda-brahman*), the Absolute, unfolds itself into the world, it extends into the social and natural world as its underlying structure and locus. Through its inherent powers (*śakti*) the one and undivided principle unfolds itself into the world of multiplicity and separation. Human thought and reasoning is ultimately nothing but the powers and manifestation of these words (*śabdānāṁ eva sā śaktiḥ tarko yaḥ puruṣāśrayaḥ*). Bhartṛhari, Kumārila and Śaṅkara do articulate genuine philosophical concerns. They are well aware of ethical and religious pluralism and relativism. They also know the unfoundedness of human reason which is used as well as abused as a mere instrument. Why have these problems not been raised as such? Why so much emphasis on one text, the Veda? It might be that they are well aware of the limits of human reasoning and understanding, an awareness of confusion and spiritual vacuum human reasoning may produce.

The Veda itself does not teach a coherent philosophical doctrine, a system. It contains a multitude of different, apparently incompatible layers and sections. It contains *karmakāṇḍa*, *jñānakānda*, a great variety of forms of expression and instruction. The strength of the Veda lies in its internal multiplicity and variety itself, this challenging and suggestive chaos that accounts for the significance of the Veda in Hindu philosophy. It does provide an illusive and ambiguous guidance. Bhartṛhari, Kumārila and Śaṅkara have given genuine philosophical approaches within the framework of the Vedic thought.

Halbfass correctly observes that there is a certain structure in the 'seeming' chaos of the Veda. There are mutual references and explicit interpretations and hierarchies between different parts of the Veda;

there is also a great deal of self-reference, self-proclamation in these texts. All this provides hermeneutic suggestions and prototypes for later approaches to the Veda. 'In its structural multiplicity, through its different layers and types of statements, the Veda seems to anticipate basic possibilities of human thought and orientation, of reflection, debate, and disagreement; it appears as a framework that can accommodate and neutralize the challenges of Buddhism and other traditions of 'merely human' origin. . . . Thus, the Veda represents not only prototypical variety, but also an illusive, yet highly suggestive orientation towards unity and an inherent tendency to transcend and supersede itself' (pp. 40-41).

The next chapter examines 'Vedic Orthodoxy and the Plurality of Religious Traditions'.

It is true that Hinduism or what is commonly described as *sanātana-dharma* is not a religion among religions; it is said to be the 'eternal religion', 'religion in or behind all religions, a kind of 'metareligion', a structure potentially to comprise and reconcile within itself all the religions of the world. Halbfass rightly quotes S.V. Ketkar, according to whom '"religion" is an "exclusively European term", which is not applicable to the comprehensive synthetic superstructure of Hinduism'. Once the entire Hindu civilization was in the process of spreading itself over the whole world', 'before it was "arrested" by the sectarian religions, Islam and Christianity. The religions will take the same place in any future cosmopolitanism as the *sāmpradāyas* have taken under Hinduism' (p. 52).

The Neo-Hindu, specially Neo-Vedāntic references to the classical tradition that are meant to document or illustrate the all-inclusive character of Hindu *dharma* and its openness to reconcile and accommodate religious plurality range from the *Ṛgvedic—ekam sat viprā bahudhā vadanti* to many more recent texts, such as the *Prasthānabheda* of Madhusūdana Saraswatī. Plurality of 'paths', 'methods' or 'names' is accepted and 'tolerated' as being conducive to one and the ultimate goal. There is so much room for plurality in the Veda and within the tradition based upon it that Śaṅkara sees no reason to organize, justify or explain the general, merely man-made, extra-Vedic plurality of views and traditions (p. 59).

The Veda is the absolute and ultimate authority of all knowledge with regard to *dharma*, ritual and religious propriety. It is one and the only source which is self-evident and self-validating. Bhartṛhari goes a step further and claims that differentiation of seeing (*darśana-bheda, bhinnam darśanaṁ*) has to be understood as being fully compatible with the unity and identity of its object (*V.P.* I. 75; 110; II. 136 edited by W. Rau). He recognizes that insight gains distinctness by the study of different traditional views: *prajñā vivekam labhate bhinnair āgama-darśanaiḥ*-(*V.P.* II. 489). He further maintains that the different

branches of learning, which teach and educate mankind, proceed from the major and minor 'limbs' of the Veda:

vidhātus tasya lokānām angopānganibandhanaḥ
vidyābhedaḥ pratayante jnānasaṁsakāra hetavaḥ
(*V.P.* I. 10)

Śaṅkara accepts the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* concept of *adhikāra* in accordance with its interpretation by Śabara and Kumārila.

The fourth chapter is devoted to examine Vedic Apologetics, Ritual Killing and the Foundations of Ethics.

Ahiṁsā and Dharma

H. P. Schmidt rejects the view of L. Alsdorf that *ahiṃsā* is basically foreign to the Vedic tradition and that its origins should not be sought in the teachings of the Buddha and the Jaina either, but rather in non-Āryan sources. Instead, he argues that Vedic ritualism itself is its original basis and context (p. 87). *Ahiṁsā* is said to be the 'supreme *dharma* (*paramo dharmaḥ*). Together with the 'golden rule' of not doing to others what one will not like to be done to oneself it is presented as *dharmasarvasva*, as the totality and quintessence of *dharma*. Such and similar claims are an obvious challenge to the 'orthodox' understanding of *dharma* as a set or rules which are laid down in the sacred texts and specified according to time, place and qualification (*adhikāra*) which cannot be reduced to or derived from one basic principle, and which give, in fact, explicit legitimacy to certain well-defined acts of killing. The response, as documented in such texts as the *Manusmṛti* has often been more or less apologetic, and in general, there has been a considerable variety of attempts to balance, reconcile or integrate *ahiṁsā* and the scriptural *dharma*, to interpret the Vedic precepts to limit the scope of *ahiṁsā*.

Kumārila rejects the concept of a universal cosmic causality, a general law of retribution that would cause the pain or injury inflicted upon a living creature to fall back upon its originator. This magico-ritualistic notion of cosmic retribution, which is based upon the pre-supposition of universal balance and reciprocity, is obsolete for Kumārila. If reciprocity were indeed the foundation of *dharma* and *adharma*, or reward and punishment, how could this apply to such obvious, though 'victimless' violations of the norm as illicit drinking? And if benevolence and the production of well-being or pleasure were *dharma*, would a sexual act with the wife of one's guru, a mortal sin (*mahāpātaka*) according to the *dharmaśāstrās* not be an act of *dharma*?

Kumārila deals with another knotty issue: Doesn't the Veda itself prohibit killing and injuring? If so, how can sacrificial killing be legitimate? Does the Veda contradict itself? Indeed, the Veda contains some very specific prohibitions about killing; in particular, the killing

of a brahmin is one of the 'mortal sins' (*mahāpātaka*). But according to Kumārila, generalizing and universalizing such prohibitions indicates a basic misunderstanding of the Vedic *dharma*, which relates all acts to a specific frame of reference. Just as the identity of the *jyotiṣṭoma* ritual depends on its being performed by a *vaiśya*, the identity of the *agnihotra* depends on its being performed at the right time of day, so acts of violence are specified by their *dhārmic* situation. Killing that is an integral part of a positively enjoined, legitimate ritual such as the *jyotiṣṭoma* can certainly not have any negative value or effect. Concluding this discussion, Kumārila emphatically observes that one who denies the special status of sacrificial *hiṁsā* and claims that it is conducive to evil because of the common denominator of being *hiṁsa* (*hiṁsatvasādharmya*) is guilty of contradicting the sacred tradition.

Śaṅkara is in complete agreement with Kumārila and maintains that since *dharma* and *adharma* are specified according to 'place, time, occasion' (*deśa, kāla, nimitta*), only the sacred texts can tell us what they are. It they tell us that the *jyotiṣṭoma* ritual, which includes the killing of animals is an act of *dharma*, this has to be accepted. The fact that elsewhere the texts prohibit the killing of living creatures does not constitute a contradiction. The specific injunction to kill an animal for the *agnisomīya* offering that is a part of the *jyotiṣṭoma-agniśomīya paśuṁ ālabheta*—is an exception (*apavāda*) which is stronger than the general rule (*utsarga*); an act enjoined in this manner cannot imply *adharma*.

Ahiṁsā is not a rule that in itself would be 'rationally' or 'morally' self-evident, its validity depends on scriptural enjoinment. According to Kumārila, there is no independent, extra-scriptural authority to the principle of *ahiṁsā*. Even in the case of non-ritual *hiṁsā*, we do not actually find any 'defects'; our uncertainty or uneasiness (*vicikitsā*) in this case itself, is based upon the teachings of the sacred texts; *na hi hiṁsādyanuṣṭhāne tadānīm doṣadarśanam/bahyė pi, vicikitsā tu śāstrād eva upjāyate* (p. 95). We may conclude that here 'morality' is derived from 'legality'. Moral claims of *ahiṁsā* are rooted in scriptural injunctions: *na ca āryāṇām viśeṣo 'sti yāvac chāstram anāśritam* (p. 98).

So far as the issue of *saṁsāramocaka* is concerned, it is subject to further investigations. In this regard, Wezler's observation appears very authentic that the *saṁsāramocaka* so far seems to have been overlooked by the historians of Indian religions. We may add that the term itself has often been misunderstood by Western scholars as well as modern Indian pandits (p. 98).

So far as the problem of thagism is concerned modern European historians such as H. Jacobi, R. Garbe and G. Pfirrmann opine that thagism is a symptomatic product of the Indian religious environment or even a reflection of the essence of Hinduism. W. H. Sleeman called India the 'congenial soil' for thagism (p. 106). We would like to say

that had India not been a 'congenial soil' for thagism, it would not have been a victim of thagism of foreign rule. In this context Halbfass very appropriately quotes R.J. Blackham who observes that among the devices employed by the 'throttling thags' the strap was allegedly introduced under western influence (p. 105). The Sanskrit commentary by Purnakalasgani's paraphrasing of 'thaga' as '*dhūrta*', 'rogue', 'deceiver' is very accurate and appropriate. (If Halbfass examines this concept in the context of contemporary political framework he can easily conclude whether the West is past-master in the art of thagism or the East). If the word 'thaka' means rogue, who is it? Halbfass also quotes in this context G. Pfirrmann who observes: 'Such under the rule of Satan is human nature'. If so, the word 'Satan' itself is of Semitic origin. The concluding remarks of Halbfass are very appropriate: Both the 'thaka' and '*saṁsāramocaka*' illustrate an ethical and religious aberration. They exemplify the potential perversions to which human nature is subject if it abandons the guidance of the Veda (according to Hindu orthodoxy) or the universal principle of *ahiṁsā* (according to the Buddhist and Jaina critics of the Veda) (p. 107).

The fifth chapter deals with 'Human Reason and Vedic Revelation in Advaita Vedānta'. Śaṅkara quite frequently quotes *śruti* and emphasizes the supreme and exclusive authority of the Vedic revelation in matters of metaphysical and soteriological relevance, that is, concerning the ultimate, liberating truth of *ātman/brahman*. Reasoning which is opposed to the Veda is to be rejected. Śaṅkara denounces the idea of an independent, extra-Vedic authority and usage of human reasoning and the worldly means of cognitions. Human reasoning as such is said to be groundless, restless and helpless without the light and guidance of the Veda.

So far as the refutations of rival systems are concerned Śaṅkara acknowledges reasoning as 'autonomous' (*svatantra*) and without the support of scriptural statements (*vākyanirpekṣa*). But he condemns unguided reasoning as dried up (*śuṣka*), fruitless and groundless. So far as the Vedic revelation is concerned, that is supreme and absolute for Śaṅkara. There would be no Hinduism without the Veda; its reality and identity depends upon the idea or fiction of the Veda.

As for the concept of *anvayavyatireka* there are different approaches and interpretations. According to J.A.B. Van Buitenen, it is an exegetic device (logical method) designed to bring about the understanding of *tat tvam asi* as an identity statement, the positive procedure of *anvaya* determining what is identical in the meanings of *tat* and *tvam* and the negative procedure of *vyatireka* excluding from *tat* what is not in *tvam* and vice versa.

S. Mayeda describes this method as a 'meditational method', rather than an 'exegetical method' and associates it with *parisankhyāna*

meditation. He interprets it as 'essentially' the same as *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*. G. Cardona has utilized this method in the grammatical literature. Śaṅkara does not always use the expression *anvayavyatireka* as a means of achieving *viveka*, 'discrimination'. He also uses such terms as *vyabhicāra/avyābhicāra*. The *Upadeśasahasri* illustrates it in the second prose chapter. What is essential never 'deviates' or 'departs' (*vyabhicāra*), while what is 'accidental' may always be discontinued and cease to accompany what is essential. Śaṅkara goes on to assert that this 'nondeviating' essence persists in deep sleep, since only the objective contents (*dṛṣṭa*) are denied in this state, but not awareness or 'seeing' (*dṛṣṭi*) itself: *paśyams tarhi suṣupte tvam, yasmad dṛṣṭam eva pratiṣedhati, na dṛṣṭim.* In the same way, the 'known' or 'knowable' (*jñēya*) may be said to 'deviate' from 'knowledge' (*jñāna*), while on the other hand *jñāna* never leaves *jñēya* unaccompanied: *na jñānam vyabhicarati kadacid api jñēyam.*

Halbfass devotes the sixth chapter to the problem of Śaṅkara, the Yoga of Pātañjali and the so-called *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa*. It is more appropriate to call it *Pātañjalayogasūtravivaraṇa* which was published in 1952 as volume 94 of the Madras Government Oriental Series. Its editors, who worked on the basis of a single manuscript preserved in Madras, did not hesitate to recognize this work as a genuine work of the great Śaṅkara. It was P. Hacker who for the first time identified it as an early work of Śaṅkara, who, Hacker said, converted himself from Yoga to Advaita Vedānta (Hacker's monograph *Śaṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin, einige Beobachtungen*', WZKS 12/13 (1968: Festschrift E. Frauwallner), (pp. 119-148); also in *Kleine Schriften*, edited by L. Schmithausen, Wiesbaden, 1978, pp. 213–42). P. Hacker's identification of its authorship was based on his research paper, Śaṅkarācārya and Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda. Preliminary remarks concerning authorship Problem'. (New Indian Antiquity, 9, 1947, pp. 175–86; revised version: Kleine Schriften, pp. 41–58). After Hacker, another leading Vedānta expert, H. Nakamura agreed with the opinion of Hacker but he questioned Hacker's claim that Śaṅkara 'converted' himself from Yoga to Vedānta. S. Mayeda also tends to regard the text as authentic, with certain vacillation. T. Vetter in his *Studien zur Lehre und Entwicklung Śaṅkaras* also holds the same view. Halbfass reveals that neither the editors of the 1952 edition nor P. Hacker and his successors could notice the fact that a part of the text was already published in 1931 in Volume 6 of the *Madras University Sanskrit Series*, as an appendix to Mandana's *Sphoṭasiddhi* with the commentary *Gopālikā* by Parameśvara, and that its editor, S. K. Rāmanātha Śāstri, was not at all inclined to accept the *Vivaraṇa* as a work by the famous Śaṅkara, author of *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. In a recent study of the *Vivaraṇa* by A. Wezler, he concludes that the question of authorship of the *Vivaraṇa* has to remain unanswered for the time being.

The seventh chapter makes an enquiry into 'The Therapeutic Paradigm and the Search for Identity in Indian Philosophy'. Till quite recently general histories of philosophy used to tell their readers that philosophy originated in Greece, and it was genuinely and uniquely an European phenomenon and that there was no philosophy in the true and full sense in India and other 'oriental' cultures. The 'oriental' according to this theory did not pursue pure theory, 'theoria', 'knowledge for the sake of knowledge' which distinguished the Greeks from other peoples. The questions and problems posed by the Greeks were purely disinterested ones and were motivated by wonder and curiosity alone. This was a unique feature of the Greek mind. It is true that the Indian approach towards philosophy is just the opposite. It maintains that the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is an idle pastime and an aimless intellectual enterprise. Authentic knowledge has to serve a purpose, it has to be a means (*sādhanā*) towards an end. Accordingly, Indian philosophy is committed to a spiritual and soteriological goal, it advocates knowledge for the sake of life. Indian philosophy is human goal-oriented (*puruṣārtha*). Not only this, the ultimate aim of Indian philosophical inquiry is liberation, freedom (*mokṣa*) from worldly suffering, re-birth and other imperfections.

Indian philosophy is not only theory but also therapy and medicine. The Buddhist 'four noble truths' illustrate this fact. Following H. Kern's *Geschiednis van het Buddhisme in Indie* (1882) numerous scholars such as H. Zimmer, E. Frauwallner and A. Bareau have argued that the scheme of 'four noble truths' was borrowed from the medical method and that the Buddha followed the procedure for the physician of his day. Śaṅkara himself more than once has emphasized the therapeutic paradigm. Śaṅkara observes in the very introduction of *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad, rogārtasya iva roganivṛttau svasthatā, tathā duhkhātmakasya ātmano dvaitaprapancopaśame svasthatā.* P. Demieville rightly noted that the medical principles of diagnosis, etiology, recovery and thus therapeutics can be easily associated with, or even substituted for, the 'four truths'. His classical 'byō' in *The Encyclopedia Hobogirin*; which has now been translated into English is worth seeing. Philosophy is identified with therapy, a good teacher with good doctor, a metaphysician with physician. *Bodhisattvas* are great medical experts (*bhaiṣajaguru*). They know how to 'remove poisoned arrows, the afflictions and defilements that have struck the suffering human being'; they know how to procure peace and well-being. The Buddha, Siddhartha Gautam himself is the 'king of physician' (*vaidyarāja*). Good teaching is healing, the disciples are patients. Besides, the identification of philosophy with therapy the reference to four-fold division of medicine is abundantly found in older medical literature. The most significant one occurs in the *Carakasamhitā*:

hetau linge praśamane
rogānām apunarbhave
jnānam caturvidham yasya
sa rājārho bhiṣaktamah [*Sūtraṣthāna* IX, 19]

The philosophers have been using the medical goal of health. Their use of terms like *ārogya, svasthatā* and *svāsthya* in this context is very significant. There is no dichotomy between theory and practice in Indian philosophy. In this context, the declaration of the *Bhagavadgītā*, *śankhyayogau pṛthakbālāḥ pravadanti na tu maniṣinaḥ*' is worth recalling. In the Indian tradition, brahmin students used to study Pāṇini's grammar but it was not a vocational subject, therefore, they used to study Ayurveda, Jyotisa and Karmakāṇḍa also. It is true that India did not proclaim 'pure theory', knowledge for the sake of knowledge in the manner the Greeks declared it, yet it does not mean that Indians lacked theoretical orientation, only they viewed the relationship between 'theory' and 'practice' in a different perspective in which abstract speculation had to be tested and verified in a palpable, concrete human context.

The eighth chapter is entitled 'Man and Self in Traditional Indian Thought'. At the beginning of the nineteenth century and in the early days of modern Indological research, one of the most influential but equally most controversial of western philosophers, George Wilhelm Friederich Hegel, claimed that 'man . . . has not been posited' in India and that Indian thought sees the concrete human individual only as a 'transitory manifestation of the One' of an abstract Absolute, and as being without any 'value in itself'. Halbfass rectifies Hegel's misconception about the nature and quality of Indian philosophy when he observes that Hegel was not an Indologist, nor did he try to understand non-eastern traditions in a neutral and impartial manner. He was one of the most effective philosophical spokesman of history, progress and European supremacy. And thus, his statements about the role of man in Indian thought betray his general Eurocentric bias.

More than a hundred years after Hegel, Betty Heimann, herself a Western Indologist supporting Hegel, emphasized in her own way the Indian indifference towards man as man, the lack of interest in singling him out among other living beings. While the West claims man's uniqueness as a thinking, and planning creature, propagating and promoting his domination over the natural world and his unique capacity for cultural development and historical progress, Indians, according to Betty Heimann, have never tried to separate him from the natural world and the unity of life. Is Hegel right? Is Betty Heimann right? Here on this point, I simply wonder why the observation of Halbfass himself is a little confusing: There is no tradition of explicit and thematic thought about man as man in India, no tradition of

trying to define his essence and to distinguish it from other forms of life' (p. 266). Does he not contradict himself (on p. 269) while expounding the nature of man in the light of *Aitareya Āranyaka* (11, 3, 2). Halbfass in the remaining pages of this chapter simply expounds the unique glorification of man as man, *mānuṣyam durlabham, na mānusādśresthatram hi kimcit.* Halbfass betrays the traditional Eurocentric bias, when he analyses Śāṅkara's Vedānta: In trying to discover the self, man has to abandon his humanity; he has to discard himself as rational animal (p. 281). Śaṅkara neither talks of abandoning humanity nor discarding the self; rather he talks of identification with humanity and the realization of self. He talks of discarding ignorance and egoism and finitude of man for the realization of his infinity. Śaṅkara named his commentary *Śārīraka bhāsya. Sarīraka* means a concrete man embodied man. This concrete man, who thinks himself finite and limited due to ignorance, is really infinite and unlimited, absolute. All worldly evil and suffering is due to ignorance, that is why he begins his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* with a detailed analysis of the nature of ignorance. Śāṅkara's Vedānta elevates man from finitude to infinity, from the individual to the Absolute. The realization of that thou art (*tat tvam asi*) is, I feel, the highest to which man could be elevated. According to Western philosophy man is only condemned to be free. He can realize only 'freedom of' but not 'freedom from'. It is only Śāṅkara's Vedānta which talks of man's capacity for realization of 'freedom from'.

The ninth chapter takes up for dicussion on the competing causalities. The doctrine of rebirth, *karma* and *saṁsāra* in the Indian philosophical tradition is preceded by the idea of *punarmṛtyu* which presupposes the concept leading to that of *punarāvṛtti*, return into earthly existence. Halbfass is correct in so far as he observes that the idea of cycles of death and birth, of transmigrations through many lives of the lasting and retributive efficacy of our deeds is the most recurring idea in the Upaniṣads . . . in subsequent literature (p. 291). But he seems to lose track when he remarks: 'However, its formulation in the older Upaniṣads are still tentative and partial; it is still open to basic questions and doubts, not organized and universalized into one complete and comprehensive world-view'. (p. 291). Here he refers to a famous passage of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* that tells us how Ārtabhāga received this teaching from Yājñavalkya. Not only here, but to a certain degree even in such texts as the *Mahābhārata*, it appears still in competition with other theories and concepts, for example, those of *kāla* and *niyati* (pp. 291–92). Is not the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* one of the older Upaniṣads? The above mentioned concepts are well articulated in this *Upaniṣad* which is very popular among Indian students even at the level of graduation. His analysis and evaluation of the allied notions of

akṛtābhyāgama and *kṛtavipraṇāśa*, i.e., the occurrence of what is not due to *karma* and the disappearance of *kārmic* results are quite significant. But Halbfass in this chapter has contradicted himself at a few places. To illustrate just one instance: On the one hand he observes that the theory of transmigration and *karma* is not found in most ancient and venerable documents and seeks support in J.N. Farquhar who observes: 'There is no trace of transmigration in hymns of the Vedās' (p. 291), but not much later Halbfass admits: The doctrine of *karma* and *saṁsāra* is projected into the most ancient texts, including the Vedic hymns and quotes (*R.V.* IV, 27). Such obvious slips tend to mar the value of an otherwise well-planned and systematically argued book.

It is true that in its totality, the doctrine of *karma*, which causes the existence of the world is a very complex phenomenon, both historically and systematically (*gahana karmaṇo gatiḥ*). It is an unquestioned presupposition as well as an explicit theory, in popular mythology as well as in philosophical thought. In its various applications, it has at least three basically different functions and dimensions: *karma* is (1) a principle of casual explanation of factual occurences in this very complex world (2) a guideline of ethical orientation (3) the counterpart of and steppingstone to final liberation. These three functions are balanced, reconciled, and integrated in various ways. Each system has its own philosophical device to adjust and explain the operation of the doctrine of *karma*.

All the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy including Buddhism and Jainism agree that the wheel of *saṁsāra* (*saṁsāracakra*) is upheld by the spokes (*ara*) of merit and demerit (*dharma, adharma*), pleasure and pain (*sukha* and *duhkha*), attachment and aversion (*rāga, dveṣa*). In spite of their close similarity, the ideas of *karma* and rebirth are not identical. Questions about the apparent unevenness and injustice (*vaiṣamya*) in the realm of life. Questions such as why is it that living beings are not alike or why are some handsome, and some ugly, some happy and some unhappy have been answered through reference to the operation of the *karma*. Śaṅkara states (*BSS* II, 1, 34) that the Lord, in his role as creator of an uneven world, takes into account the good and bad *karma* of creatures, and that therefore, there is no unfairness of cruelty (*vaiṣamya, nairghṛnya*) on his part: The creation is uneven in accordance with the merit and demerit of creatures: for this, the Lord cannot be blamed (*atah sṛjyamānaprāṇi dharmādharmāpekṣā viṣamā śṛṣtir iti naayam īśvarasya aparadhah*). What is the scope and nature of *kārmic* causality? As a rule, the realm of *kārmic* causality is the realm of life. According to Śaṅkara and others, the hierarchy of pain and pleasure coincides with the objective hierarchy of creatures from plants and low animals to human and finally divine beings. The *Mīmāṁsā* concept of *Apūrva* and the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* concept of *Adṛṣta* are technical terms through which these systems try to explain the operation of *karma*. The

whole world is only a stage for *kārmic* play. The world-causality is rooted into the *kārmic* causality. Halbfass has quoted Śaṁkara according to whom the Lord (*Īśvara*) is the only subject of transmigration (*saṁsārin*); in an even more radical sense, there is no *saṁsārin* at all. But this statement is made by Śaṅkara in the context of *Ekajīvavāda*, according to which, there is only one Reality through which avidyā becomes *Jīva* and thus becomes *saṁsārī*, subject of transmigration.

The tenth and last chapter examines an important sociological aspect of Indian thought, namely its conceptualization of the *varṇa* system. It is true that there is an old and oft-repeated assertion that classical Indian philosophy does not concern itself with social matters and that India has never had a tradition of political and social philosophy comparable to that of Plato's concept of state and the Marxist programme of secular philosophy. I feel the charge is not true or highly exaggerated at any rate. Hinduism which is called *sanātana dharma* cannot be understood without the system of *varṇāśrama dharma*. I wonder if any other religion has as many *dharmaśāstras* and *smṛtīs* as Hinduism has. The articulation of division of labour for each caste in a particular *āśrama* is so elaborate and subtle that it is sometimes difficult to understand it. The 'homo hierarchicus' is the pervasive hierarchy of living beings, which extends 'from Brahmā to the blades of grass (*brahmādistambaparyanta*). The Indian authors have used a variety of terms to characterize this hierarchy-gradation (*tāratamya*) such as *ucchanīcabhāva, utkarṣāpakarṣa*, etc. This hierarchy involves different levels of merit and demerit (*dharma, adharma*), pleasure and pain (*sukha, duhkha*) and the acquisition of excellences such as knowledge, sovereignty, and so forth (*jñānaiśvaryābhivyakti*) and the station and status of *saṁsāra* itself. These hierarchies are both, vertical as well as horizontal. We do not go into the controversy of *varṇa* and *jāti*. As a matter of fact, they are quite different but some authors have taken them as synonyms. Basham is right when he says that the 'indiscriminate use' of 'caste' for both *varṇa* and *jāti* is 'false terminology.' But it is a fact that from an early time, there has been this overlapping. The orthodox systems trace the origin of *varṇa* system in the *Ṛgvedic* hymn X, 90. The doctrine of *karma* and rebirth, which was gradually consolidated, came to provide a natural framework for this approach. [The *Bhagavadgītā* introduces the concept of *svadharma* and the *Sāṁkhya-Yoga* systems adopt in this context the *guṇa* theory.] Manu utilized these two concepts in his law book and presented a 'mixed hierarchy'. It is said that the philosophical theories have played no great roles in the social and political discussions of modern India. But I would like to say that what is known as the Indian Renaissance is rooted in the Neo-Vedānta and India won freedom due to them. Today we are living in a multi-religious society. Only the Advaitic Absolutism can provide an underlying unity among the diversity of

beliefs without disturbing their individual peculiarities. In Hinduism there are diverse sects like Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva, Śākta, etc., and the concept of interdependence and mutual supplementation is intrinsic to Indian thought.. The whole is present in each part, while each part is indispensable to the whole as is well illustrated in the *Puruṣasūkta*. The explanation given in the *Vivaraṇa* of how humans, animals, and gods are supposed to support each other, and how they contribute to the sustenance of all other entities in the world is not a solitary example. The same idea is very beautifully depicted in the *Bhagavadgītā* when it declares: *parasparaṁ bhāvayantaḥ*. On the whole, the author of this masterpiece is a wonderful scholar of Indian tradition. I wonder if anyone else could be as thorough and so widely informed as he is and at the same time he is an unbiased critic. His reflection is thorough and complete. I congratulate him and suggest in utter humility to the students of Indology in general and the scholars of Hindu tradition in particular that their study would remain incomplete without the study of this beautiful monograph.

Hamburg University, Germany REWATI RAMAN PANDEY

Book Reviews

TANDRA PATNAIK, *Śabda: A Study of Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Language*, D.K. Print World (P) Ltd, New Delhi, 1994, XVII + 178 including Preface Foreword, Glossary, Bibliography and Index, Rs. 180.00.

It is pleasing to find that Tandra Patnaik in her little but assiduous monograph entitled *Śabda: A Study of Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Language* has attempted to satisfy the need for Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Language in modern idioms and to emphasize its relevance to modern western philosophical thoughts with a conspicuous ability. The author has studied some of the exceedingly recondite problems of Bhartṛhari's *Philosophy of Language* and has compared them with the thoughts of one or the other among the western philosophers like A.J. Ayer, Frege, Wittgenstein, Austin Searle and Davidson. This is really a praiseworthy attempt by Tandra Patnaik. Although she has not discussed the points of similarities and dissimilarities to the extent warranted by the problems she has raised in the book, the points indicated by her may be accounted for her useful contribution which is of much help for the further researches in the field of philosophy of language in general.

In order to impart to the book a pattern of organic unity the author has brought it out into nine symmetrically arranged chapters. The first chapter studies some issues of general interest like scope and limits of philosophy of language. The author has included some themes like 'Linguistic turn, the Indian point of view' and 'Bhartṛhari: the new way of looking at language', (less explored so far), for discussion which heightens the worth of the chapter. *Śabdādvaitavāda*, the metaphysics of Bhartṛhari's philosophy which is the content of the second chapter of the book under review is a problem widely and frequently studied by almost all the authors on Bhartṛhari's philosophy. The significant point which needs to be emphasized regarding Bhartṛhari's metaphysics is not, to my opinion, an exposition of his concept of *Śabda-Brahman* but the explanation of a link between his concept of *Śabda-Brahman* and the language in use or expressions, otherwise, it would be difficult to show any philosophical relevance of his assumption of *Śabda-Brahman* to an explanation of the language in use. However, her few remarks like 'consciousness is not possible without word' (p. 28), 'For Bhartṛhari words can only refer to the universal of objects' (p. 29), 'He transfers the word universal to thing universal' (p. 29) are confusing and hence the use of terms 'possible', refer to, and 'objects' respectively needs clarification. Her statement, 'He transfers the word universal to thing universal' is confusing if examined in his trend of philosophy. The verse *Śabdasya Pariṇāmoayam*

. . . (*VP.* 1/120) cannot be put as a textual base because that verse advocates ontological understanding of transference of *Śabda.* As a philosopher of language, in use Bhartṛhari does not accept transference of word to meaning. It will be difficult to distinguish Bhartṛhari's theory of meaning as what is non-differently revealed in the mind by *sphoṭa* from that of *yogācāra* idealism if the transference of word to thing is accepted. In Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language *Śabda* is the only reality and meaning is what figures non-differently by words in the mind and the identical cognition of the two comprise the world of cognition or communication, the interpretation of which is the aim of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of *Vākyapadiyam.*

Discussing 'thought and language' the author has very befittingly pointed out Bhartṛhari's view of 'word loadedness of thought' on one hand and Wittgenstein's view of 'thought and language' on the other hand. What is striking to the mind of a comparative reader of Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein is that the arguments in support of Bhartṛhari's concept of 'word-loadedness of thought' have not been given on one hand and Wittgenstein's disputable contention of 'referring a symbol to right referrent without mediation of thought' on other hand, is left undiscussed.

Concluding the fourth chapter of the book, the author has tried to present a comparative account of the views of Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein on 'diversity of meaning'. She sums up her discussion with the remark given as follows: 'Wittgenstein perhaps would say that the form of language duped Bhartṛhari too. The picture of word as all pervasive phenomena held him captive.' In our opinion the author has not discussed how the charge of 'being duped' may not be levelled against Bhartṛhari's philosophy which aims at interpreting cognition, as revealed by words in the mind in usual communications. Bhartṛhari does not bother much about the form of the language but about the interpretation of cognition, as accomplished by it and thus 'being captive of the form of language' is not applicable to the trend of Bhartṛhari. To pass a remark on something without giving a justification of it is not justified.

The learned author has acquired an understanding of Bhartṛhari's philosophy on the basis of what she has uncritically found basically from late Professor *B. K. Matilal's* celebrated works like Perception (1986) *Analytical Philosophy in Contemporary Perspective* (ed.), *Logic, Language and Reality* (1985), *The Word and World* (1990) and also from Grammarian's volume of Karl Potter's *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (1990). She often concludes her chapters with passages quoted from B.K. Matilal's works which simply heighten the value of the book.

Sphoṭa, Pratibhā, Upacāra-Sattā and *Yogyatā* are fundamental concepts of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language. In interpreting and estimating these concepts. One has to keep the fact in mind that Bhartṛhari has adopted a three tier approach in discussing the issues of *Vākyapadiyam.* As a metaphysician, he believes in *Śabda-Brahman* as the only reality who manifests all diversities. As a grammarian he explains nature and function of words, syntactics and semantics of the Paninian system of grammatical rules, and as a philosopher he interprets the cognition as revealed by *Śabda* in usual communications.

Philosophically, *Vākyapadiyam* is an explanation of communication (*Vyavahāra*) on the basis of cognition, as revealed in the mind by *Śabda* and a philosophical study of it must give importance to the cognitive approach made by Bhartṛhari. From the cognitive point of view, *sphoṭa* cannot be taken as unitary and undifferentiated ground of meaning (p. 51) as an unit of meaning (p. 51), language principle (p. 47), or linguistic potency (pp 50, 51, 53). Philosophically, *Sphoṭa* is an inner unit of communication and comprehension, it illuminates itself and the meaning and as such it can be defined as meaning-revealing-*Śabda* which is inner and an indivisible real unit of communication. *Sphoṭa* for Bhartṛhari is not a vehicle of meaning because in his system of philosophy *sphota* is fundamental and foundational reality which reveals meaning non-differently in the mind. Although the manifestation of inner *sphota* requires verbal noises in order to be manifested, the meaning is revealed by *sphoṭa.* Verbal noises are instrumental in the manifestation of *sphoṭa* and the meaning is revealed non-differently by the *sphoṭa.* Meaning, for Bhartṛhari is also indivisible, clear and distinct flesh of understanding or awareness (*Pratibhā*) revealed non-differently by *sphoṭa. Pratibhā* from the philosophical point of view is meaning—meaning of *śabda* revealed non-differently by it. *Pratibhā* taken as potency of language (p. 56), a capacity to directly grasp the meaning (p. 78, 166), intuition (p. 56), and intuitive linguistic disposition (p. 56) cannot be explained as meaning of *śabda* because they suggest an ontological character of *Pratibhā*, but it is suggested that *Pratibhā* for Bhartṛhari as a language philosopher is the meaning, a clear specified meaning, revealed non-differently by *sphota* in the mind. *Pratibhā* as meaning and *Pratibhā* as mind or intuitive capacity (p. 162) must be distinguished and the paper entitled. Some remarks on Bhartṛhari's concept of *Pratibhā* by Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonethi published in *Journal of Indian Philosophy* Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1990 (pp. 95–113) distinguishes the different uses of the word *Pratibhā* very clearly. *Pratibhā* as meaning or cognition by *śabda* is an epistemological concept and *Pratibhā* as capacity to directly grasp meaning is an ontological concept and the latter cannot be confused to be the meaning of words because meaning is as revealed by *śabda* in the mind cannot be identified with the mind itself. Meaning and mind ontologically may be identical because ontologically Bhartṛhari maintains 'one is all' but cognitively or epistemologically meaning is cognized as revealed by *śabda* in the mind and mind is known by

implication as the ontological base of the meaning cognized by *śabda*.

The world of *śabda* (words) and *artha* (meaning) is distinguished by Bhartṛhari as *Upacārasattā*. For a philosopher for whom the *śabda* is only reality and meaning is what is revealed non-differently by it, *Upacārasattā* is the only Being which is revealed by *śabda* and on the basis of which communications are accomplished. Kant as a philosopher of visual perception said that philosophers should study the things as they appear in the mind (phenomena). More than fourteen hundred years ago Bhartṛhari said that a philosopher's enterprise is limited to the Being; figures in the mind by *śabda*. He makes a strong appeal to the philosophers of language to be aware of their limit of philosophical reflection and investigation to what he calls *upacārasattā* (Beings figure in the mind by śabda).

Bhartṛhari's phenomenalism cannot be understood without the true and clear conception of *upacārasattā*. Professor B. K. Matilal, C.K. Rājā, and influenced by them, the author of the book in review, Tandra Patnaik, take *upcārasattā* as metaphorical-existence (pp. 37,131,137) which seems to me highly objectionable. *Upacārasattā* for Bhartṛhari, is a being revealed by *śabda*, independently of physical things and as such it is a self-restrained world of ideas or thought-objects figured in the mind by *śabda*. Bhartṛhari, as it is evident from *Vākyapadiyam* is not a philosopher of metaphor or metaphorical language. He is a philosopher who interprets cognition as revealed by *śabda* in usual communications (*Vyavahāra*). And the world of communication (*Vyavahāra*) according to him is *upacārasattā* which is the proper field of philosophical reflection and investigation (see *VP* 3/3/32–33 and 41–59). Taking *upacārasattā* only as the world of thought-objects his philosophy of communication may be distinguished from the philosophy of metaphorical existence.

Now, coming to the concept of *Yogyatā sambandha*—the relation between a *śabda* and *artha*—between *grāhaka* and *grāhya* is for Bhartṛhari a natural or given relation. The *Yogyatā sambandha* cannot be understood as a compatibility which inhere in (p. 65) or as inherent capacity of words (p. 66). The distinction between natural relation and inherence or inherent capacity (p. 168) must be taken into account. Bhartṛhari in *Sambandha-Samuddesaḥ* (*VP* 3/3/34-37) is seen as allergic to the inherence as the relation between the word and meaning and he philosophizes that even the word *Samavāya* inherence' is naturally fit to express its meaning only by its natural fitness which is understood by convention known to us by the observation of the use of the words by elders. To define Bhartṛhari's *Yogyatā* as compatibility in the context of 'word meaning relation' is confusing because this definition presents *Yogyatā* as of an attributive or predicative character but relation is not a predicate or attribute which can be expressed by words as relata. How can relation be defined as a relata? Relation is

the natural fitness of words by which they come into use as expressers (*vācaka*) of expresseds (*vācya*).

To disagree with anyone's approach is human. One may disagree with the author's interpretation of certain issues of the book but one cannot deny the labour the author has taken. However, it is remarkable that the author of the book has accomplished an uphill task by presenting a thought-provoking and comparative account of some of the problems of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language which have perennial significance in the realm of philosophy and analysis in general and Indian philosophy of language and analysis in particular. The contents of the book have all the potentialities to be explored by further researches in the field of philosophy of language.

L.N. Mithila University, Darbhanga, Bihar D.N. Tiwari

Sushil Kumar Saxena, *Art and Philosophy: Seven Aestheticians*, (Croce, Collingwood, Ducasse, Dewey, Santayana, Langer, Reid), Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Delhi, 1994, pp. 362, Rs. 240.

In the Indian philosophical and literary circles aesthetics as an autonomous branch of study has not been accorded its due place. Though some authentic and excellent books are available on Indian aesthetics, largely due to the interest of the Sanskrit scholars, the development of aesthetics and philosophy of art in the West in the twentieth century remains an inaccessible area for the Indian students and scholars of aesthetics. Sushil Kumar Saxena's book *Art and Philosophy* holds a promise for a solution to this problem for those who are interested in this area of study. He undertakes the stupendous task of offering a 'clear, comprehensive and fairly critical account of some select aesthetician's theories of art and aesthetics'. The task is stupendous because most of the aesthetician's theories discussed in this book are highly abstract and not very easy to understand. Besides, it needs a long training and insight to maintain a perfect balance between an objective exposition and an unbiased critique of such high-profile aestheticians. In such presentations it is not very easy to avoid one's own predilection for the one or the other theory; especially for a writer who has been seriously involved with aesthetic studies and has some very original works to his credit. Surprisingly enough he meticulously avoids this trend. The book is a text-based objective analysis wherein each concept is carefully analyzed with the help of original writings.

The book has seven chapters, each devoted to the seven aestheticians the author has selected for discussion—(i) Art as intuition-

expression–Croce (ii) Art as imagination–Collingwood (iii) Philosophy of art–Ducasse (iv) Art as experience–Dewey (v) The sense of beauty–Santayana (vi) Art as expressive form-Langer (vii) Art as embodiment–Reid. Why he chooses these seven aestheticians out of a series of eminent modern thinkers is not without any justification. As per the author's own admission he prefers to start with Croce, for he may be said to have 'opened the aesthetic discussion in this century'. It is no doubt a fact that Indian scholars have access to the history of aesthetics right from Plato to Croce through some excellent work in this area; especially the monumental work of K.C. Pandeya entitled *Comparative Aesthetics*. But the line of thought from Croce onwards is not pursued by Indian writers. There remains a big gap after Croce, so far as books on western aesthetics by Indian writers is concerned. There is definitely a dearth of easy-to-understand, yet authentic books on the development of western aesthetics since Croce. Of course, Indian scholars have produced some authentic works on specific dimensions of aesthetics. Still the beginners as well as the general readers find themselves confused and at a loss when it comes to getting a comprehensive account of modern western aesthetics. This book, therefore, largely fulfills the longstanding demand for such a work.

The author tries to connect Croce's philosophy of art with the subsequent works which extend or add new dimensions to the foundation provided by Croce. Therefore, the author's choice of Collingwood and Ducasse is more than justified. These two aestheticians, though differing in many respects, can be said to have provided further insights to Croce's theory of art as intuition and expression. Inclusion of Dewey's and Santayana's theories are most welcome since they add refreshingly new dimensions to the understanding of art. These two American aesthetician's contributions have not been properly highlighted either in India or in the West. And it is obvious that no account of modern aesthetics can be complete without referring to two eminent contemporary aestheticians—S.K. Langer and L.A. Reid. So, the author's choice of these seven aestheticians is not arbitrary but well thought out.

Another important reason for selecting these seven aestheticians may be connected with the title of the book, *Art and Philosophy*. Aesthetics (though as a specialized branch of study of recent origin) has a long history of its own. Philosophers have been inquisitive about the mysteries of human creativity, which neither conforms to the rules of experience nor to the logic of conceptualization. Right from Plato's theory of Art as imitation to Reid's theory of art as embodiment—there has all along been a marked effort by the philosophers to search for the definition and essence of art. However, in the modern times, aesthetics as a specialized branch of study has freed itself from the extra burden of connecting itself either with metaphysics or religion.

The renewed attempt to provide an autonomous conceptual structure to art and aesthetics has allowed the modern aestheticians to interpret the subsidiary issues like the nature of aesthetic experience, aesthetic response, aesthetic meaning, poetics, etc., in a rigorous way. The seven aestheticians presented here are in the true sense concerned with the philosophy of art. Their primary concern is to find the ultimate essence of art as an unique form of human activity. The selection of these seven aestheticians will help the readers to gather a panoramic picture of the philosopher's way of looking at art.

The methodology adopted by the author is unusual in many respects. His approach is purely analytical. However, the analysis is done in a most innovative way. Extensive quotations from the original texts, italicized at right place, allow the reader to grasp the subtle nuances of the meaning of the text. Whenever there is a need for further explanation, the author takes practical illustrations from Hindustani Music, rythm, dance and poetry, so that the targeted Indian readers can delve into the true significance of highly abstract concepts through their own cultural milieu. Illustrations at places are very fascinating. For example, the presentation of Subramania Bharati's powerful poem *Guru Govind* as a concrete example of what Croce means by 'transforming feelings into images' and 'going straight into poetic heart' is more than just effective. Similarly, the author's own analysis of Blake's poem the *Echoing Green* is very original. Such illustrations make the reading an elevating experience.

The book, though dealing primarily with the general theories of art, highlights two more specific aspects of aesthetics—'poetics' and 'reader's response'. In view of the renewed interest of the scholars of English literature and literary criticism, the expositions offered by the author will inspire Indian students to venture into this area of interesting study.

However, a reader with some acquaintance with Indian aesthetics may expect certain comparative analysis from the author. For the theories, at places come close to the Indian aesthetical concepts like *Sahṛdaya, Preeti, Camatkāra, Sādhāraṇikaraṇa, ānandaghana Śānta rasa,* etc. But such comparative accounts might not have fitted well with the author's original intention in writing the book.

The book though written primarily for the beginners and young readers of aesthetics has immense value as well for teachers and general readers interested in aesthetics, philosophy and literary criticism

Department of Philosophy, Utkal University
Bhubaneswar TANDRA PATNAIK

Alok Tandon, *Man and His Destiny—with special reference to Marx and Sartre*, Indus Publishing Company, New Delhi, pp. 223, Rs. 275.

The original of the present modified version of Alok Tandon's doctoral thesis might have earned him the degree of an Indian University, but this printed text is sure to raise the eyebrows of discerning readers. As Buffon said; 'the style is the man himself', the proclivity to self-adulation is evident on the second flap ('inquisitively sharp mind') and in the repeated claims of 'impartial' evaluation of the two Western philosophers which insinuate themselves as constituents of that style. The argument of encouraging young writers notwithstanding, it is baffling to see the style (language, syntax, idiom, spelling, etc.) lagging far behind the importance of the subject. The style must adapt itself to the theme's profundity and must not repel the reader by linguistic defects and awkward sentence constructions. There are hardly a few pages free from howlers of all kinds (including the factual ones) which are not simply misprints. A short list will be in place.

Proper names are wrongly spelt. Epicurian (p. 18), Protagorus of Abcdera (p. 18) thrice misspelt on this same page and the fourth time on p. 19, Hobbe's view (p. 31), Schopenhour (p. 36), Neitzsche (p. 36), Radha Krishnan (pp. 37 and 216), Democratean (p. 39), Goldman (p. 74), Murdock (pp. 104 and 134), Berdyayev (p. 104), and so on throughout the 206 pages of the book excluding the Bibliography and Index.

Spellings of other words are equally hopeless ; arithmatic (p. 19), theoretical (p. 23), quite discourse (p. 24), persuit (p. 31), speices (p. 41), persuing (p. 44), later (for latter, pp. 48 and 185), hypocracy (p. 52), theses (p. 59), alientation (p. 61), unability (p. 73), preposition for proposition (p. 59), Greek for Greece (p. 104), disintrigate (p. 108), looses for loses (twice on p. 115), Lis chemins de La Liberte for *Les chemins de la liberté* (p. 116), world (p. 117), illucidated (pp. 140 and 197), effect (pp. 156 and 182), there for their (p. 163), fearfull (p. 163), independence (p. 180), perpectually (p. 192), in (p. 193 for is), irradicating (p. 201), and so on.

Add to these the author's total ignorance of the correct use of definite and indefinite articles : a, an, the. Thus, destiny of man (p. 19), for ship reaching (p. 21), the Plato's (pp. 22 and 25), without first moving cause (p. 230, with second coming of Christ (p. 25), spirit of Greeks (p. 27), effects of the sin (p. 28), universe is a machine (p. 30), respect other (p. 31), The mind is merely abstract (p. 32), Kant called it 'categorical imperative' (p. 34), into third position (pp. 34–35), But the world is great deal more (p. 47), in weak sense (p. 50), most important activity is (p. 54), have greatest influence in moulding the character (p. 55), in sense that human world (p. 60), reality is Absolute Idea (p. 61), an universal (p. 72), the Althusser's (p. 74), The both

concepts of freedom (p. 97), the another (p. 111, twice,) lies in future (p. 112), dualism in Cartesian sense (p. 113), to be full picture (p. 116), being supreme power (p. 117), though former is (p. 118), known as scientific concept (p. 119), man is free project (p. 120), if human being does not (p. 125), sympathies with downtrodden (p. 137), to be petti-bourgeoisie (p. 137), The way of child lives (p. 140), called the Marx's definition of man (p. 187), world as means to (p. 187), concern of fully developed man (p. 187), it is test of (p. 187), chief merit of Marx's concept (p. 187), put in different context (p. 189), comes to conclusion (p. 190), is a clearest example (p. 190), guide to the action (p. 202), friend to the nature (p. 202), man and the nature as well (p. 202), and so on.

Other linguistic howlers are so conspicuous that they are no less detracting from the worth of this study. Awkward sentence constructions affecting their meaning abound. Factual mistakes are just not an oversight. A few examples may be picked up at random. 'The primary duty of man is to look after his own soul first and help others in looking theirs afterwards.' (Better say: 'looking after theirs later', p. 20). 'It is different from the objects in which it appears but it cannot exist without those objects' (p. 21). This apparently means that Plato's (theory of) Ideas cannot exist without the particular and concrete objects. 'More closer' (p. 22), 'Is not an automata' (p. 29), 'But he decried freewill for its preference of desired to the true' (p. 29)—not quite intelligible! *The Social Contract* of Rousseau was published in 1762 and not in 1962 as printed on p. 33. 'He rejected religion as irrational and to free man from it' (p. 39). This apparently means that he rejected both religion and freedom of man, remain to be attended (p. 46), 'By establishing worthfulness' (p. 46), 'have been remained unknown' (p. 47), A person's all abilities (p. 48), the whole mass of machinery are (p. 87), My future actions and view of the world is (p. 113), there is not body and soul dualism in Cartesian sense (p. 113), 'is not alone centre of reference (p. 113). They necessarily endanger conflict (p. 114), This can due to any reason (p. 123), but he (Marx) wants to retain and eat his cake both which does not (p. 186), how far man has travelled from animals (p. 187), is one of the important achievement of Marx (p. 188), his concept of lack and man (p. 200), he could transcend his this phase of thought (p. 200), and so on.

Two Hindi books are included in the bibliography, p. 214, which makes one wonder about the authenticity of such works thrice removed, like the concrete world from the Platonic essences, from reality. In all probability these Hindi works are a translation or a rendering or derive from some English translation of the French text of Sartre. I am disapproving this for the simple reason that translations of Sartre's French works into English have not always been good. Speaking of Sartre's *Situations*, Frank Kermode says that 'The translation (except

of the Sarraute piece, which was done years ago by Maria Jolas) is slapdash and at times worse than that . . . '[1] The point needs no further elaboration.

II

'AFTER SUCH KNOWLEDGE, WHAT FORGIVENESS?'[2]

So much has been written on Marx that he is already lost in the flood of commentaries in various languages. There is, I think, hardly any scope to say something that has not already been said: *tout est dit.* Even before Marx, under the unrelenting pressure of scientific, psychological, biological and other researches, our concepts of man and that of the universe had been undergoing constant changes. Man was no longer considered the crown of creation and our earth no longer the centre of the universe. More recent astrophysical and other scientific and psychoanalytical researches have totally debunked the traditional concepts of man and the universe. This is too well-known to be elaborated further here. As an inevitable consequence of this, philosophical ideas and other values of life could not remain unscathed. To mention only two instances; Aldous Huxley said that debauchery was considered as a moral sin half a century ago, but today it is only a medical affair; while Somerset Maugham argued that suffering never makes a man noble: on the contrary, it makes him cruel, wicked, and suspicious. Anguish, ennui and suffering began to be seen as the quintessence of *la condition humaine,* especially after the two world wars and the atomic holocaust. The philosophy of the Absurd is the latest manifestation and expression of it. Marx is one of the foremost thinkers who studied the causes of human suffering in the industrial capitalist society of his times. This human predicament is complex enough and remains an unresolved enigma. 'What is the answer?' asked Gertrude Stein while dying; but failing to get a reply said, 'In that case, what is the question?' This unresolved enigma is not the destiny of the post-Marxian man only, it is the perennial bewilderment that Pascal expressed long ago in *Pensées* and other thinkers before and after him.

Marxism may have failed in Russia and its prophecies gone wrong but its importance remains unquestioned even today. Marx's sojourn in Paris and London was the most fruitful and even today French and English Socialists and communists exercise considerable influence in their respective countries. Albert Camus and Raymond Williams, among others have addressed themselves to the basic issues of Marxist philosophy, especially with reference to France by the former and England by the latter. Both have offered an intelligent critique with reference to the aftermath of the second world war.

Marx asserts that 'The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of man that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.' Raymond Williams quotes Marx from the *Eighteenth Brumaire,* showing how the theory becomes complex from its very inception:

> 'Upon the several forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence a whole superstructure is reared of various and peculiarly shaped feelings, illusions, habits of thought, and conceptions of life.[3]

If, therefore, the concept of man and his destiny is rooted only in historical data and economic production and there is no traffic the other way round, what is the structure and the superstructure of which they speak. Engels said something by altering the emphasis:

> 'If therefore somebody twists this into the statement that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms it into a meaningless, abstract and absurd phrase.'[4]

The economic situation is considered the basis and the other factors have their place and importance in the complex web of life. Apply any one or all theories to explain life and they fall short of fully explaining it, for life escapes any neat and tidy classification. The prime mover may be economic change but it is not all.

Apart from thus devaluing intellectual and imaginative creation, the Marxist theory makes us raise this question: whether the economic element is in fact determining. According to Raymond Williams, this is an unanswerable question because this factor never appears in isolation. 'We can never observe economic change in neutral conditions, any more than we can, say, observe the exact influence of heredity, which is only available for study when it is already embodied in an environment. . . . Capitalism appeared only within an existing culture'. And 'if we are to agree with Marx that "existence determines consciousness", we shall not find it easy to prescribe any particular consciousness in advance, unless . . . the prescribers can somehow identify themselves with existence.'[5]

Further, modern communist practice rests to a very large extent on Lenin who said: 'The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness.'[6]

In spite of all this complexity and confusion, the concept of the destiny of man, according to Marx, remains 'From everyone according to his faculties, to every one according to his needs.' The notion of faculties and needs is nebulous and encapsulates all that a way of life involves.

Albert Camus has a very penetrating evaluation of Marxism in *The*

Rebel and of the Socialist party of France in *actuelles, écrits politiques ideé.s*[7] This book is available in a good English translation by Anthony Bower, Penguin, 1978.[8] Its brilliance and philosophical sweep forbid a summary or stray quotations and must be read in the original. The basic argument, however, is continued from *actuelles* (political essays on the present situation) containing an article 'Réponses à Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie' wherein Camus more or less supplements Raymond Williams argument:

> It appears unthinkable to me that Marx himself, in face of the splitting of the atom and in face of the terrifying intensity of the means of destruction, might not have been led to recognize that the objective data of the revolutionary problem have changed. Certain Marxists do not want to see the changed objective data, and they have not taken into account the things that have happened in the last half century. It is because they prefer the idea of history they have made out to history such as it is.[9]

Camus continues :

> Marx a cru qu'il avait corrigé Hegel. Mais ce qu'il a véhiculé de Hegel a triomphé de lui cheż ses successeurs. La raison en est simple et je vais vous la dire, non pas avec le dédain des juges, mais avec l'angoisse de quelqu'un qui connait trop bien sa complicité avec son époque entiée pour se croire lavé de tout reproche . . . En vérité, malgré vos affirmations, la justice n'est plus en cause. Ce qui est en cause, c'est un mythe prodigieux de divinisation de l'homme, de domination, d'unification de l' univers par les seuls pouvoirs de la raison humaine. Ce qui est en cause, c'est la conquête de la totalité, et la Russie croit être l'instrument de ca messianisme sans Dieu.
>
> (Marx believed that he corrected Hegel. But what Marx carried away from Hegel triumphed over him with his successors. The reason for this is simple and I am going to tell it, not with the disdain of the judges, but with the anguish of someone who knows very well his involvement with his whole epoch for believing himself absolved of blame. . . . Truly speaking, justice is no more the question. What is in question is the prodigious myth of deification of man, of domination, of unification of the universe by the sole powers of human reason. What is in question is the conquest of totality, and Russia believes to be the instrument of this messianism without God.)

This point is further taken up by Camus in 'Le socialisme mystifié' (Socialism mystified) in this same study *actuelles.* He poses the question: What can oppose terror which is the greatest constituent of the *malaise* of the minds and nations in our time? This is the problem of Western socialism. Terror is justified only if we admit the principle of the end justifying the means. And this principle can be accepted only if the efficiency of an action is posed as an absolute end as is the case with Nihilistic ideologies where everything is permitted, what matters is success or in the philosophies which consider history as an absolute (Hegel and Marx), the aim being the classless society, for everything which leads to it is good.

This is the problem posed to the French socialists. Before the German occupation, they had known violence and oppression only in the abstract, but now they see it at work during the Resistance. Under the pressure of circumstances and influence of Leon Blum, French socialists have put at the topmost rung of the ladder of their preoccupations some moral problems (the end doesn't justify all the means) which they had not emphasized so far. They all stick to Marxism; some because they think that one cannot be a revolutionary without being a Marxist; the others, by virtue of their fidelity to the history of the party which persuades them that one cannot either be a socialist without being a Marxist. The party could not reconcile these two irreconcilable principles.

For, it is clear that if Marxism is true, and if there is a logic of history, political realism is legitimate. It is equally clear that if the moral values extolled by the socialist party are grounded in justice, then Marxism is absolutely false since it claims to be absolutely true. From this point of view, the famous overstepping of Marxism in an idealistic and humanitarian sense is only a joke and a dream without importance.

The contradiction is common with all of us who want a happy and dignified society and who wish that man be free in a just order, but who hesitate between a freedom where they know justice is finally duped and a justice where they see liberty suppressed at the very start.[10]

Camus concludes that either they shall admit that the end conceals the means, hence murder can be legitimized, or they abandon Marxism as an absolute philosophy limiting themselves to retain the critical aspect which is often valuable still. The first choice will end the crisis and the situation shall be clarified; the second will mark the end of ideologies, i.e., of the absolute Utopias. Another Utopia, less ruinous and more modest has to be chosen—a hard question!

In his lecture on Philosophy and Politics, Bertrand Russell is equally severe on Marx and Marxism. He observes:

> If it is certain that Marx's eschatology is true, and that as soon as private capitalism has been abolished we shall all be happy ever after, then it is right to pursue this end by means of dictatorships,

> concentration camps, and world wars; but if the end is doubtful or the means not sure to achieve it, present misery becomes an irresistible argument against such drastic methods. If it were certain that without Jews the world would be a paradise, there could be no valid objection to Auschwitz; but if it is much more probable that the world resulting from such methods would be a hell, we can allow free play to our natural humanitarian revulsion against cruelty.[11]

Marxism has become a dogma because it is unquestioned by the present day Marxists. Says Russell, 'If you know for certain what is the purpose of the universe in relation to human life, what is going to happen, and what is good for people even if they do not think so; if you can say, as Hegel does, that his theory of history is "a result which happens to be known to *me*, because I have traversed the entire field"—then you will feel that no degree of coercion is too great, provided it leads to the good.' [12]

George Orwell's *1984* and *Animal Farm* depict a reasonably true picture of the dehumanization of man and his destiny under totalitarianism. The problem is still unresolved because of its complexity and changed situation of the world. The concept of man in Marxist philosophy is not wholly acceptable nor that of his ultimate destiny. In spite of all advancement, one cannot help the inclination to appreciate the myth of Sisyphus (see Camus' book of this title) as the only reality about man and his destiny, perhaps for all the time. 'Sisyphe accomplit éternellement sans faibless, mais sans illusion, une tâche inutile'.[13] ('Sisyphus performs eternally, without weakness, but without illusion, a useless job'.) and André Malraux comments that 'Sisyphus too is eternal'.[14]

III

Sartre, like Bertrand Russell, is the *enfant terrible* of modern philosophy; and Alok Tandon, by and large, faithfully depicts Sartre's achievement. Man depends only on himself to give meaning to his life. The human condition is subject to an *ensemble* of historical and material conditions which define his situation. All human consciousness exists 'for-itself', but is opposed by an objective reality enclosed 'in-itself', opaque and impenetrable. The problem for each one is to live his own experience and to rely on his own strength. We must consider ourselves in effect as 'forsaken', i.e. left to ourselves. This forsaken condition has given rise to 'despair' because it is the sentiment of not expecting any help either from the heavens or from any readymade doctrines. It produces 'anguish' also which is the consciousness of our 'total and profound responsibility'.[15]

The Marxist strain is present throughout in Sartre's thought. He himself called Marxism as a philosophy and existentialism as an ideology, and saw it as 'wishing to integrate itself into Marxism'. He also notes that Marxism is out of touch with actual experience, and accepts Engel's remark that 'men make their history themselves, but in a given environment which conditions them.' It is man who makes history, not history—not the Past—which makes man. Maurice Cranston observes: 'Thus Sartre would have us believe that he is out to achieve a purification of Marxism, rather than a dilution of it by the assimilation of existentialist insights.'[16]

Thus, characterizing Sartre as a 'Marxist existentialist' and not as 'Existentialist Marxist' would oversimplify his categorization for, as Bertrand Russell says, 'And with most philosophers ethical opinions involved political consequences . . . and the fundamental problem of ethics and politics is that of finding some way of reconciling the needs of social life with the urgency of individual desires.' Classifying authors according to movements is a typical French tendency; the British spurn it. Sartre's political thought may be Marxist and influences his philosophy to the extent it overlaps his humanist concerns. His concepts of man and his destiny remain fundamentally unaltered as can be inferred from the last pages of Simone de Beauvoir's *Adieux, A Farewell to Sartre*, Penguin, 1984. Her long interview with Sartre describes why Sartre rejected the most coveted honours: The Legion of Honour, Professorship at the College de France, and the Nobel Prize. By no means an ordinary renunciation by an avowed atheist whose ethics needs to be studied in depth. Further, he expresses his conviction that 'there was nothing after death, except for the immortality that I saw as a quasi-survival' (p. 433). Then follows this final, because perhaps the last and mature, expression of his concept of man and the world:

> The absence of God was to be read everywhere. Things were alone, and above all man was alone. Was alone like an absolute. He was a curious thing, a man. That came to me gradually. He was both a being lost in the world and consequently surrounded by it on all sides—imprisoned in the world, as it were—and at the same time he was a being who could synthesize this world and see it as his object, he being over against the world and outside. He was no longer in it, he was outside. It's this binding together of without and within that constitutes man.

Sartre set out to 'make a philosophy of man in a material world' (p. 436). Man has to rebuild a world set free from all divine notions 'putting themselves forward as an immensity of in-itself'.

Simone put this question to Sartre : 'You think that the way for man to cure himself—to do away with his alienation— is first of all not to believe in God', Sartre replies: 'absolutely'. Simone continues: 'It means

taking man alone as the measure and the future of mankind.' This conversation goes on to elaborate his evolving views which defy a neat and clean categorization. The complexity and difficulty of his thought are the result of the complexity of the forces swaying the post-second world war world, but the fundamental strain remains unaltered.

Alok Tandon has totally ignored Sartre's Plays and Novels which form an important segment of his evolution as a philosopher who has been brilliantly studied by Everette W. Knight in her book *Literature Considered as Philosophy*, Collier Books, 1962. Sartre's practice is unlike that of Marx. Sartre's first novel *Nausea* is a must for following his evolution for it explicitly illustrates concretely almost all his fundamental tenets concerning *la condition humaine contemporaine*. It is, I think, a grave omission. Antoine Roquentin writes in his diary that existence had suddenly unveiled itself to him. Existence is a curve. In fact the latter part of the novel is a statement of his philosophy of the Absurd and in literature it is called the anti-novel. The concept of man is depicted by Roquentin thus :

> We were a heap of existents inconvenienced, embarrassed by ourselves, we hadn't the slightest reason for being there, any of us, each existent, embarrassed, vaguely ill at ease, felt superfluous in relation to the others. *Superfluous* that was the only connexion I could establish between those trees, those gates, those pebbles. . . . I understood that I had found the key to Existence, the key to my Nausea, to my own life. In fact, all that I was able to grasp afterwards comes down to this fundamental absurdity. Absurdity: another word; . . . But here I should like to establish the absolute character of this absurdity.

The entire novel is the essential Sartre and is considered as his best literary work illustrating his entire philosophy. There seems to be almost nothing Marxist about it. From *Nausea* to what Simone records in *Adieux* is an evolution and not the former and the later phases of Sartre's achievement contradicting each other.

Another omission is his study of Baudelaire which was written as an introduction to Baudelaire's *Journaux Intimes*. Alok Tandon mentions (p. 201) his study of Genet and Flaubert but surprisingly omits Baudelaire. Sartre studies Baudelaire the man, the individual, and not the poet, essayist, and critic. This study is highly controversial, but important for it applies existential psychoanalysis to Baudelaire and bases his entire argument on Baudelaire's original choice which was in Sartre's view wholly wrong and in bad faith. Baudelaire chose to remain uncommitted, chose his solitude and suffering. This brilliant introduction ends with the well-known remark which sums up Sartre himself : 'the free choice which man makes of himself is completely identified with what people call his destiny.'

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Jodhpur DURGALAL MATHUR

R.P. MISHRA (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: A Dialogue of Cultures*

Man is supposed to be the most intelligent of the creatures living on the earth. He alone is conscious of himself and his actions. He has the capacity to distinguish between good and bad and the power to bring about changes in his surroundings, physical and social, to enable him to live a better life. But the sad reality today is that it is due to his own actions that the very planet he lives on is threatened with total destruction. His tampering and manipulation of the natural environment has caused dangerous upheavals in the ecological system. The Greenhouse effect, ozone layer depletion, rising of the sea level, loss of biodiversity, extinction of several forms of life, weather changes, water and air pollution, etc., are only some of the hazards that defy solution. No one can afford to sit back and wait for others to initiate action to check these calamities. It is in our self-interest to address ourselves to these problems and act to save our planet and the life on it from total annihilation.

The Sustainable Development Foundation, New Delhi, and Gandhi Bhavan, Delhi University, jointly deserve great appreciation for the publication of *Environmental Ethics—A Dialogue of Cultures* which would go a long way in serving the noble cause of active awareness amongst different sections of the society about the hazards posed by environmental pollution.

Professor R.P. Mishra, a well-known and highly acclaimed scholar,

administrator and social worker, President of Sustainable Development Foundation, New Delhi, and Director, Gandhi Bhavan, Delhi University, is the editor of the book, which is a collection of papers based on the proceedings of a three-day pre-UNCED consultative National Symposium on Environmental Ethics held in March 1992 in Delhi, under the auspices of S.D.F., New Delhi and Gandhi Bhavan, Delhi University. The Symposium was co-sponsored and assisted by several national and international agencies connected with and committed to environmental concern.

Not only academicians of high repute, but representatives from a cross-section of the society, both national and international, actively participated in the deliberations of the symposium. 'Environmental Ethics' is truly a dialogue of cultures which brings together the well-considered perceptions of ecologists, government officials, NGOs, school teachers, executives of national and international institutions, freedom fighters, advocates, and of course academicians, on environmental issues.

The foundation and goal of environmental ethics is to bring about changes in the physical and social world to enable humanity to live in peace with itself as well as with the natural environment. It is obvious that a teleological, i.e. purpose-oriented approach and not a deontological, i.e. intrinsic value-oriented one, is being taken in dealing with the basic issue. The need to evolve an environmental ethical code is, thus, to put it in Kantian terminology, an assertorial imperative and neither a categorical nor a hypothetical one. Of course, this point is debatable.

In accordance with the nine sessions of the symposium the book contains as many chapters, in which various facets and aspects of the problems related with environmental ethics are discussed in a very educative, informative as well as thought-provoking manner. An attractive feature of the book which brings freshness to such discussion is the retention in the published work of the original dialogical form of presentation and deliberations at the symposium. While the reader has the privilege of a playback of the lively symposium with its occasional excitement due to the conflicts of views, which makes it more enjoyable reading, he does not have to postpone his own queries and objections with regard to particular views and opinions till the conclusion of the book, as is usually, and a bit uninterestingly, the case. In other words, the reader gets a feeling of active participation in the discussion, even while reading the book. The book also lives up to its laudatory mission of dissemination of knowledge and awareness about environmental ethics by ensuring that the discussion is carried out in a lucid and comprehensible manner, keeping technical jargon to the minimum.

The succinct 15-point executive summary of the observations and recommendations at the very outset complements the no-nonsense rigour clearly discernible throughout the book.

The observation that 'unless people seek meaning in life and living beyond the narrow ends of consumerism and exploitation of nature and fellow human beings, new technologies will bring only new and more miseries', and the recommendation of 'a more austere style of life, laying greater emphasis on cultural enrichment and less on the amount of goods consumed' are well taken. The key to the solution of many man-made problems lies here, but it requires strong determination and will to use this key! Unfortunately, the present global trend is not conducive to this need. How can the more powerful and more free be coaxed, if not forced, to give up greed to enable the weaker to satisfy their needs?

'Laws must support ethics, and ethics the laws'. True, but again, 'environmental ethics cannot be imposed by law'.

The possible points of conflict between the developed nations and the developing ones on an agreed environmental policy are clearly brought out in the eighth, the tenth and the fourteenth of the recommendations viz. delinking of aid and trade with environmental policies, equitable development of global economy and ecology and reduction of production and consumption by the developed nations. The mighty Big Brother has always established his right to the larger chunk of the chocolate by brow-beating the weaker one!

In his inaugural address to the symposium, a minister with sincere concern for the agenda observed that the western capitalist system and the idea of conservation are incompatible. As to the alternative of leading a more austere lifestyle as a remedy to environmental degradation he maintained that 'culturally and philosophically the thought of simple lifestyle is alien' to the western people. 'For them this alternative does not exist, it never existed before'. The sharp divergence between the very perceptions of the developed and the developing nations on the whole matter was aptly brought out in his observation that 'man-induced environmental damage is interpreted by western nations, as merely a scientific and economic issue and not as an ethical or philosophical one. To us Indians, and to much of the Third World, it is only an ethical issue'.

The reason behind this divergence is not far to seek. It lies in the basic attitude and approach of a community towards human life and natural environment and their relation. This attitude is shaped by the philosophical foundations which sustain and support a community through its cultural history. While the eastern thrust has been on a search for unity and synthesis, the western focus has been on diversity and analysis. 'Indian philosophical system is marked by two-fold unity of outlook—spiritual unity and moral unity.' Western philosophy, as

rooted in Greek thought was not much far away from this 'until about 17th century A.D. when Rene Descartes promoted the concept of dualism of mind and matter as separate substances' which 'ultimately gave rise to two streams of knowledge. The philosopher studied the mind, and the scientist the matter.' 'The spectacular achievements of science and its applied derivative technology led us to accept its omnipotence. The necessary social wisdom and enlightened conscience of man to use these powerful ideas and techniques did not develop'. In the words of Russell, 'One hundred and fifty years of science have proved more explosive than five thousand years of pre-scientific culture' It has added the fourth dimension to what is desirable: Truth, Beauty, Goodness and *Utility*. Utilitarianism makes a slave not only of nature but also fellow human beings. The tolerant East has traditionally espoused conservatism, the aggressive West has been seduced by consumerism. To transform 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' into 'worthy life for all' the Gandhian vision of *Sarvodaya* should be implemented.

Colonialization of the weaker countries by the stronger West cut the former from their philosophico-cultural roots. They were brainwashed to glorify the 'gun culture' nd 'greed mania'. The sun might have set on the colonial empires, but only to reveal the dark ominous clouds of greed for material prosperity at the cost of cultural impoverishment.

The present world order (the product of the Industrial Revolution, which in turn is the product of European Renaissance and Enlightenment) is still colonial, though in a new sense. It continues to be divided between the rich and the poor; between the powerful and the weak; between the developed and the undeveloped. But both are over-exploiting nature and human beings in the name of progress and development. The cumulative effects of this mad race are environmental upheavals, social tensions and economic disparities. Environmental hazards such as the ozone layer depletion, the Greenhouse effect, climatic changes, the rise of sea level, loss of biodiversity and social evils like AIDS, terrorism, ethnic strife, drug abuse stare us in the face. Redirecting our energies to evolve a style of life sensitive to ecology and human welfare is the pressing need of the hour. Unfortunately, the present world order does not pay heed; the haves refuse to risk their vested interest, the have-nots cannot afford to stake their very survival by dropping out of this uneven competition. Attempts by persons like Medha Patkar and Sunderlal Bahuguna to raise their voice are silenced by power and/or politics. The Bhopal and Chernobyl disasters are brushed aside as avoidable stray accidents.

The present world order cannot continue, but it cannot be dismantled in a day, either. 'The Cartesian world view can no longer be sustained. It has to be replaced by what one may call a Gandhian

world view. But if Rome was not built in a day, peace too cannot be brought in a day.'

Several chapters discuss in detail how this peace can be brought about through a concerted effort on the part of all concerned, by a proper understanding and appreciation of the related issues of environmental problems and a realistic appraisal of the viability of the remedial measures available. These are:

(1) formal legislation to prevent environmental abuse
(2) equitable sharing of tribal and rural experiential knowledge of nature
(3) revival and propagation of religio-cultural values conducive to man-nature harmony
(4) evolving realistic measures to arrest population explosion and eradication of poverty
(5) exploration and implementation of eco-friendly technologies to replace the hazardous ones
(6) substitution of the global consumeristic, growth-oriented commercial outlook with a more meaningful, humane, sustainable and just approach to life
(7) restructuring the educational programme by (a) introduction of a holistic approach in place of a fragmentary one; (b) inculcation of environmental awareness by induction of compulsory courses on environmental matters at all levels of formal instruction; (c) utilizing the services of religious institutions and mass-communication media in a more efficient and effective manner.

Environmental Ethics: A Dialogue of Cultures is undoubtedly a valuable and inspiring contribution in the direction of sustainable development education. It is no exaggeration on the part of an executive of the UNESCO to close his foreword to the book by saying, 'These deliberations on various aspects of environmental ethics could serve as mirrors for readers for checking, correcting and developing on their part the needed ethical values and responsibilities in everyday life and in the decision-making process with respect to the holistic nature of the environment, sound management and rational use of resources and protecting and improving the environment for a decent, sustainable and equitable quality of life of the present and future generations.'

One would like to strongly recommend the book to educational institutions, public libraries and research institutes.

There is every possibility of the book enjoying several editions; hence, the editor would do well to get the numerous glaring printing mistakes corrected and provide a lucid and brief explanation of phenomena

like the Greenhouse effect, ozone layer depletion, etc., for the benefit of the less informed amongst the readers.

Department of Philosophy,
University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad ANANDA V. WAZALWAR

MADAN MOHAN AGRAWAL, *Essence of Vaiṣnavism—The Philosophy of Bhedābheda*, Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1992, pp. 157.

From time immemorial, philosophers have struggled hard to determine the nature of reality. All the Vedantic systems of philosophy depend upon the Upaniṣads, Brahmasūtras and the *Bhagavad-Gītā* for this purpose. In other words, the Upaniṣads alone reveal the real nature of reality as the other two scriptural texts, viz. the Brahmasūtras and the *Bhagavad-Gītā* are mere expositions of the Upaniṣadic philosophy.

While discussing the nature of reality philosophers are often confronted with the problem—whether *bheda* (duality) or *abheda* (non-duality) or *bhedābheda* (duality-cum-non-duality) is the real nature of reality. Discussing this problem in his *Vedārtha Saṅgraha*, Acharya Ramanuja poses the question whether duality or non-duality or duality-cum-non-duality is stated in the Upaniṣads. Answering the question, he says all the three concepts are acceptable to the Upaniṣads. Similarly, Nimbārka has accepted *Bhedābheda* as the real nature of reality, which includes *Bheda* and *Abheda* also.

In his work *Essence of Vaiṣnavism—The Philosophy of Bhedabheda* the author gives a succinct account of Nimbarka's dialectics. He has rightly pointed out in his introduction that hardly any critical editions of the basic texts of this school are available. Even the basic texts available are full of misprints. Apart from this, if treatises and texts delineating the doctrines are hardly available as most of the *ācāryas* and followers of Nimbarka school of philosophy were deeply involved in *upasana* of the Almighty. Hence, the present work has fulfilled a long felt need in the philosophical literature of the Nimbarka school.

The work is a comprehensive and compact edition covering all the common and unique aspects of this philosophy. Presenting the concepts of Nimbarka philosophy mentioned in Sanskrit texts in modern English is an uphill task. The author has successfully accomplished this task, culling out information from *Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā* of Acharya Kesavakasmiri Bhaṭṭa, (one of the distinguished followers of Acharya Nimbarka), a comentary on Brahmasūtras. Kesavakasmiri Bhatta is the mainstay as far as the theoretical part of this philosophy is concerned.

The author begins his thesis with a description of the life, date and

works of Kesavakasmiri Bhaṭṭa. He then goes on to deal with the epistemological aspects of the philosophy in detail. Further, he makes a critical analysis of the *Svabhāvikabhedābheda* theory (of Nimbarka) and *Aupādhika Bhedābheda, Viśiṣṭadvaitavāda* and *Acintyabhedābhedavāda*. This is a great contribution to the field of comparative philosophy (though it seems that the author's knowledge of other philosophies, like what he quotes as *Saiva-visistadvaitavada*, leaves much to be desired). Towards the end of the work, the author discusses at length the contribution of Acharya Nimbārka to Indian philosophy, logic and metaphysics.

The author has a lucid style, by means of which, he represents even minute philosophical concepts in an understandable manner. The language is simple and expressions are crisp and to the point. The manner in which he has summarized all the aspects of this system of philosophy is commendable.

The book consists of a very valuable introduction by Professor R.V. Joshi, which covers some very interesting and hitherto unknown facts such as the time of Nimbārka.

It is said that Nimbārka was associated with Melkote, a small town in Mandya District of Karnataka, during the time of Rashtrakuta dynasty. This may shed some light on the cultural heritage of Melkote then.

On the whole, the book is a welcome addition to the field of philosophic literature as it not only throws much light on the Nimbārka system of philosophy but also helps comparative study of the same with other systems of vedantic philosophy.

Director, Academy of Sanskrit Research
Melkote, Karnataka M.A. LAKSHMITHATHACHAR

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Announcing

B.K. MATILAL LECTURESHIP IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AT THE KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON

The institution of B.K. Matilal Lectureship at the King's College, London, was announced on 1 June, 1995, at a function held there to celebrate Mrs Karabi Matilal's donation for the lectureship with a conference on Indian philosophy at the occasion. The conference was hosted by the Department of Philosophy of King's College, London, to mark the setting up of the lectureship in Indian philosophy within the college. The lectureship was made possible by a donation from Karabi Matilal, wife of Professor B.K. Matilal, in memory of her husband, and Professor Richard Sorabji who helped her in the venture. Daya Krishna, Peter Strawson, Arindam Chakrabarti, Friedhelm Hardy and Julius Lipner were the speakers at the occasion.

1 June, 1995 would have also been the sixtieth birthday of Professor B.K. Matilal and the date for inauguration of the lectureship was chosen to commemorate his long services to the cause of Indian philosophy in the UK and elsewhere. The function was attended, amongst others, by Dr L.M. Singhvi, India's High Commissioner in the UK, and Gopal Gandhi, Director of the Nehru Centre in London.

It was a memorable occasion to mark the memory of one of India's foremost thinkers in the field of Indian philosophy and to celebrate the institution of a lectureship devoted to Indian philosophy at such an old, venerable and scholarly place as King's College, London.

All financial and academic effort needed for strengthening and running of the lectureship are being supervized by Richard Sorabji, Professor of Ancient Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, King's College, London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK, to whom all persons interested in fostering and developing the initial effort may contact in this connection.

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Prof. Daya Krishna
Editor
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B/189–A, University Marg,
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