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The Situation of Philosophy Today and the Question of Interculturality

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Freiburg im Breisgau

'Interculturality' is obviously a new concept which owes its origin to the political situation of modernity. In this regard it seems to be basically a political concept responding to the evident need to prevent the interaction of different cultures from plunging humanity into violence. Modernity seems inevitably to be faced with 'fundamentalism'. Fundamentalism, as it springs up in all parts of the world, might be understood as the basic claim to withdraw historically 'grown up' cultures from the alienating process of western modernity by reaffirming the supposed or real 'fundamentals' of its—very different—way to conceive of human life. As such it is a specific modern counter-reaction against the process of modernity—the globalization of western technology and its underlying scientific patterns and practical values. From the perspective of cultural intersubjectivity, the political problems raised demand a political solution organizing the interaction of different cultures on the level of their pragmatic coexistence within the unity of the world community—but not a genuine philosophical questioning. A genuine philosophical questioning responds with the specific means of the epistemic discipline called 'philosophy' to a philosophical problem—and it is not very clear, how the *political* issue of 'interculturality' should become *philosophically* relevant. Why should 'interculturality' become a major issue of philosophical thinking today? Doesn't that imply that, first of all, we have to reformulate a *philosophical* concept of 'interculturality' in view of the very specific challenge that modernity might be to philosophical thinking? It is quite significant that 'interculturality' has until now never been a theme of philosophical thinking—neither in the western nor in the eastern tradition. Most likely the historical process of modernity itself has produced now and only now the need for an intercultural inquiry. The political issue of 'interculturality' might thus merely be a symptom hinting at some deeper problem. If fundamentalism is a 'counter-reaction', and if every counter-reaction is rooted in the primary action by which it is solicited and provoked, then the question of fundamentalism is basically identical

with the question of what is happening to humanity through the historical process of modernity. This seems already a more pertinent philosophical question. If the historical process of modernity affects 'human being' as such, philosophy cannot stand apart as if its way of understanding what is, and what human being is all about, would not be deeply challenged by the situation of modernity. It is this perspective which I will try to explore within the following pages in order to reformulate an 'intercultural' concept of philosophy.

THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE

The starting point for any philosophical reflection about something should be the conceptual clarification of the terms in which this 'something' is conceived. In our case the concept of 'interculturality' implies an understanding of 'cultures' as being different from one another. There can be no *inter*-culturality without there being differences of 'cultures'. But what do we mean by 'culture'? And in what way are the presupposed differences of 'culture' not only apparent and superficial differences of manners and behaviours, but differences of human being? This means that in order to think—and not to abolish—the concept of 'interculturality' we need a strong concept of difference. That is, we require a concept of difference that does not break up the identity of the reference term—'human being'—but rather conceives of it as basically 'differential'. In view of what?—Not in view of an '*a priori*' concept of what human being—notwithstanding its factual reality—is supposed to be but in view of the phenomenon of human being itself as revealed by its factual reality. Therefore, our task will be to clarify our immediate pre-understanding of 'culture' and to rethink it out of the phenomenon of human being itself. We will thereby pass to a phenomenological concept of 'culture' which should enable us to conceive of 'interculturality' as a difference in human being that pertains to the factual reality of what humans are.

In our immediate pre-understanding we refer to 'culture' as the specific fact of human existence. Every concept of 'culture' will therefore imply a certain concept of human being. But 'culture' denotes more specifically the intersubjectivity of human existence to be shared with others: It is never the 'culture' of one, but of many. Humans share their lives with each other in so far as they constitute a certain community distinct from other communities by their customs and rules, their basic orientations and their beliefs as expressed in their common judicial and political institutions, their art and their religion. Whatever we discover as 'cultural phenomena' will refer in one way or the other to this intersubjective reality of human being. But human being is individual human being. It is 'my' or 'your' being that is human, and every kind of 'intersubjectivity' will necessarily

imply 'subjects' as beings that denote themselves by personal pronouns. The individual will be said to belong to a certain 'culture' in so far as he or she shares its basic orientations about human life and the world in general. But how does the individual 'share' these orientations? Because he or she decided to do so—on any grounds whatsoever? Surely not; human life is not individualized before, outside of or in exclusion of its intersubjective participation in a common 'culture', but as being-together-with-others. The individual as such is constituted by being-together-with-others. It is the intersubjective reality of the individual's 'culture' that shapes his or her life and specific way of dealing with things. This points to the very essential fact that 'culture' is *pregiven* with respect to individual existence. It is pregiven not only in the historical and external sense that it has been founded by others within the succession of generations—the 'tradition', but in the very systematical sense that it is the condition of the possibility of existing in a common world. 'Culture' pre-intentionally shapes the intentional relations to the world in general that constitute a human community. That is why we immediately recognize the other as belonging to our own or a different 'culture' in view of his or her way of relating to things. We will—sometimes easily, sometimes with quite some difficulty—realize that a certain way of dealing with things is obviously guided by a different comprehension of their being. What seems 'instinctively' evident *to us*—meaning beyond the quite natural variability of particular human behaviour—might not be for somebody else, and we will most likely account for this difference by referring the other to another 'culture'. Only this encountering of the other may make us aware of our own 'culture' as something which already, pre-intentionally and without explicit knowledge constituted our way of relating to things in general, the very 'substance' and 'reality' of our being. In discovering our own 'culture' through the mediation of the Other, we might discover how little of what we ascribe to ourselves by personal pronouns we really owe to 'our Selves'. But this is only one aspect of the phenomenon of 'culture'. Human being is never without the awareness of its specific 'culture' as its intersubjective way of relating to what is. It is never without the awareness of the Other. This awareness is not necessarily or exclusively the empirical knowledge about other co-existing communities but, in the first place, knowledge generated by the culture's diachronical memory of its own predecessors, that is, of those who have lived before it, who founded and modified the tradition, and who—in the vast course of 'history'—were involved in different relationships with things. We should already note here that 'interculturality' is not—as usually taken—a mere synchronic concept of simultaneously co-existing 'cultures', but includes the diachronic differences a specific tradition realizes as its 'historical genesis'. In a very general but philosophically very important sense we

can say that every 'culture' is aware of its contingency; it is aware that the prevailing 'rules' of interacting with what is are not unconditioned laws prevailing by themselves. If they prevail, they prevail only because they are enacted by the participants of the community, thus implying the possibility of their transgression. The relationship to what is *could be otherwise* than it actually is. It is this awareness of the possibility of 'being-other' that is already included in every awareness of 'culture' as such. The constitution of the 'We'—constitutive of every individualizing personal pronoun—delineates the prevailing measures under which human beings are pre-intentionally socialized and associated *as* cutting across an indefinite variety of other possibilities. No authority claims, no myths of the original institution and foundation of a 'culture', no attempt to rationalize the rationality of a cultural heritage would have been made without the consciousness that the relationship to things could be completely different from what it actually is. Cultural awareness is by itself the awareness of the contingency of 'culture'. By becoming the intentional object of an 'awareness', 'culture' ceases to be only pre-intentionally 'valid'. It becomes the object of validations and rejections, modifications and transformations. 'Culture' as the pre-intentional 'substance' and 'reality' of human being is thereby never withdrawn from intentional activity that places 'culture' at the disposal of its participating 'subjects'. We would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of cultural intersubjectivity if we were to try to play off the constitutive and equi-original moments of 'culture's' pre-intentional constitution against its intentional constitution by its partaking subjects. In other words, 'culture' is at the disposal of its individual subjects only from within. It would be equally erroneous to think of 'culture' as a mere 'conditioning' of individuals as to view it as a product of mere subjective dispositions. The seemingly paradoxical result of these considerations is that 'culture' as the intersubjective way of relating to the world is originated within this relation itself. It presupposes itself. In presupposing itself, 'culture' exists only by way of 'tradition': its 'mode of being' (*modus essendi, tropos tou einai*) is 'history', i.e. the diachronic intersubjectivity of human being.

What exactly does 'culture' consist of? If the 'cultural awareness' generated by the Other reveals 'culture' as a specific—intersubjectively valid but contingent—relationship to what there is in general, then our central concern from the point of view of a philosophical concept of 'culture' has to be the following question: What do we *ultimately* refer to when we refer to a certain 'culture' as being distinct from others? Certainly not, as we may immediately be inclined to answer, a linguistic or political entity. People belonging to linguistically distinct communities might very well belong to one and the same 'culture'; the occidental and the Indian 'cultures' comprise quite a variety of

different languages which we would not refer to as 'cultural' differences in the same sense as the opposition of occidental and Indian. Why? Because we discover a unifying pattern of 'cultural intersubjectivity', such as Christianity, that creates the distinctive feature of 'occidental culture' for example. The 'Indian culture'—not participating in the fundamental religious paradigm of Christianity—will be a *genuinely* different 'culture' while Anglo-Saxons, French, Italians, Germans, etc. will recognize each other as fundamentally sharing the unity of a 'culture', even if they belong to linguistically and politically distinct unities with quite some differences in lifestyle, manners and behaviour, customs and traditions. These will be assessed as rather superficial differences compared with those prevailing between the Christian and the Indian 'cultures'. On the other hand, we might very well discover politically unified communities, such as the Roman Empire or maybe in modern times the Soviet Union or even India, which in reality and with reference to the very heart of their specific relationships to the world could be seen as being constituted by 'different cultures'. We will fail to give an adequate account of 'culture' as long as we do not conceive of it in terms of the maximum of its possible difference, because it is precisely this maximum of possible difference that has to reveal the amplitude of the concrete possibilities of human being to organize its relationship to what is. A concept of 'culture' generated with regard to the maximum of possible difference in the human relationship to the world will always also be applicable to minor differences while the reverse is obviously not the case. If we derive the concept of 'culture' from the difference between the German and the Italian 'cultures', we will not be able to define the difference between occidental and Indian relationships to things in terms of 'culture'. As a sufficient concept of 'culture' has to be able to give an account of the most extreme 'cultural' divergence, we will have to direct our philosophical attention towards the phenomena of the utmost differentiation of factual human being.

With reference to the opposition of the occidental and Indian 'cultures' we have already alluded to such an extreme differentiation of factual human being and ascribed it to Christianity, i.e. 'religion'. 'Cultural difference' would then ultimately be referred to as a difference in 'religion'. But this will confront us with the following very difficult question: What is religion? Without a conceptually satisfying answer to this question we will be unable to make any headway in our search for a phenomenological concept of 'culture'. However, in the present context it seems impossible to survey a phenomenology of religion. It would be perhaps possible to simply introduce a certain concept of 'religion' dogmatically without any attempt to show its validity for all religious phenomena. Such a 'tour de force' would surely cut the Gordian knot but leave in theoretical suspension the

whole question of interculturality as a philosophical issue. As neither of the proposed solutions is really satisfactory we should simply bypass the whole question of 'religion' and regard it as a mere hint at something that we should be able to conceptualise in another way. The question is how to avoid the complexity of a phenomenology of concrete phenomena of human being and still give a phenomenological account of human being itself. A solution to this riddle is more easily found than might be suspected. We must simply remember that we have been characterizing the phenomenon of 'human being' as a relationship to what is in general. This is a very formal and abstract characterization with the undeniable advantage of offering a steep but short path to a phenomenological clarification of the concept of 'culture'. From the perspective of this formalization, 'culture' appears to be the concreteness of a specific intersubjective way of relating to the world or being in general. Thus, the question of what we are ultimately referring to when we refer to 'culture' is nothing more than the question of what is the ultimate root, the ground and the foundation of the human relationship to the world? A conceptually adequate answer to this question can only be attained if we take our own formulations seriously. What do we mean by 'human relationship to the world'? What reveals itself to be the condition of this relationship's possibility?

Human relationship to what is does not simply mean 'acting' and 'interacting' with things in general as all living beings might do. It is basically an intentional relationship that finds whatever it is relating to before it. The intentional relationship is not only directed towards something—as any directed action might be—but towards something *as something*. It indicates the epistemic relationship to what there is as awareness, consciousness, knowledge and understanding of whatever is being related to. We are not just behaving or acting blindly towards a given stimulus but within an open relation to something that is *in itself* revealed (known, understood) *as* what it is. The intentional relationship consists in relating to something *as* this something *is in itself*; it presupposes the revelation of what we are relating to by a certain comprehension of what it is, that it is and how it is. To deal with things—in terms of theoretical cognition or practical action—means for us always to deal with them in the light of a certain pre-comprehension of their being. We would not be able to treat a chair as a chair if we have not previously understood what it means for the chair to be a chair 'previously', i.e. as a condition of the possibility of relating to it. Therefore also 'pre-comprehension': because the intentional object of our relationship is not primarily our comprehension of the being of the things, but the things themselves. They are pre-intentionally understood in their being in order to be the intentional objects of our relationship to them. The intentional

relation to what is is rooted in and made possible by a pre-intentional comprehension of being in general. In our everyday life this remains the unthematical and hidden background that enlightens and guides all our intentional activities. We might only become aware of it when we lose it—in moments of astonishment, terror or anguish—not knowing anymore how to relate to things, i.e. ourselves and everything else. By this awareness the pre-intentional comprehension of being may become the intentional object of our theoretical inquiry into its truth and falsehood, thus making us 'philosophize' about what is.

As the root and foundation of the human relationship to the world we discover the pre-comprehension of being. It is this pre-comprehension of being which is as such the ultimate point of reference for the concept of 'culture'. It therefore has to show the same characteristics as those analyzed with regard to the concept of 'culture', i.e. that it is pre-intentional and intersubjectively shared with others, and handed down by tradition, but at the intentional disposal of its subjects in so far as they are unthematically aware of how they have understood human being and being in general. Different 'cultures' as different intersubjectively shared relationships of man and world will ultimately be rooted in different pre-comprehensions of being in general. And it is quite evident that these constitute radical differences in the factual reality of human being such as we discover between radically different 'cultures'.

It should be no secret that this attempt to phenomenologically reconstruct the concept of 'culture' is entirely guided by Heidegger's concept of human being as 'being-in-the-world'. Without entering into the theoretical details of the latter concept and its phenomenological foundations[1] I would like to point out some of its aspects that seem particularly important for a genuine inquiry into the cultural and historical differences of human reality.

According to Heidegger, 'being-in-the-world' means that human being is in itself and with regard to its innermost epistemic structure of understanding being-in-general (world) opened to what is. On the ground of this epistemological opening to things man is his being as intentional relationship to world. This is nothing but a conceptually completely neutral description of the phenomenon of human being without any conceptual, hermeneutic or cultural prejudice. Only man exists as knowing what is; this 'knowledge'—as the pre-intentional comprehension of being—'possibilizes' the specific human relationship to the world that constitutes in so many—synchronically and diachronically—different ways his factual intersubjective reality, i.e. his 'culture'. The concrete form of this pre-comprehension of being is itself the object and purpose of different explicit 'cultural' activities such as art and poetry, mythology and religion, ethical wisdom and philosophy. As the different 'foundational instances' of different ways

of 'being-in-the-world' (cultures), they will also be the primary objects of any diachronic or synchronic intercultural analysis. To know a 'culture' always means in one way or the other to know its 'religion' or 'philosophy'. The concept of 'being-in-the-world' thereby meets all the indispensable requirements of a philosophically adequate concept of 'culture', i.e. phenomenological evidence and adequacy, applicability and operationability.

But the decisive point is what I would call its 'cultural neutrality'. This is a basic methodological requirement for any research about 'interculturality'. The concept of being-in-the-world avoids introducing a culturally specific and ontologically predetermined concept of human being which would as such immediately serve as an evaluative criterion of cultural differences such as is the case with the traditional occidental 'definition' of human being as 'animal rationale'. The latter is much more than just a 'logical definition' of man without any deep ontological implications and cultural determinations: 'Animal rationale' expresses the prevailing self-comprehension of occidental being-in-the-world and is completely unknown and even alien to every other 'culture'. First of all, it implies a certain ontological comprehension of Nature, of Man's position in it and his way of relating to it—including his own 'naturality'. Second, it stands for a certain comprehension of knowledge (understanding, consciousness, spirit) and truth. In the third place, the comprehension of knowledge and truth assembled under the common name of reason (*Logos, Nous*) is highly equivocal as it contains all the semantical transformations to which the concept of reason was subjected from the period of Greek philosophy up to the modern concept of rationality. And fourth, it is axiologically and ideologically absolutely overcharged. This is due not only to its historical function of serving as a promoter of what human being—according to changing philosophical and ideological conceptions—*should be*, but also because of the logic of the 'definition' itself. A 'definition' delimits the 'essence' of something—its 'true being'—in opposition to its factual way of being—its appearance—thereby serving as a 'standard', a means of measurement to evaluate factual reality. If, how and to what extent, a factual reality corresponds to a thing's true being is known by referring to its definitory concept and if man is a 'rational animal' and this is his supposed 'true being', which he permanently fails to actualize as his factual reality, then every human being will be measured and evaluated in his or her very quality of being 'human' by this concept. It is a more normative than descriptive concept that throughout occidental history as well as in modern times primarily had the ideological function of dogmatically affirming, promoting and universalizing the thinker's own values: To associate one's private prejudices with the concept of rationality suffices to condemn the other to the silence of 'irrationality' and deprive him of the quality of

being human. There can be no doubt that these ontological implications and ideological functions of the concept of reason spoil right from the beginning any attempt at intercultural inquiry. Since the concept of human being as 'animal rationale' already contains all the answers a philosophical questioning has to investigate, it thereby blocks our view of the phenomenal reality of human being instead of opening up a perspective allowing for its adequate treatment. Quite the opposite is the case with the concept of being-in-the-world. It sets free a perspective for understanding human being in itself without any ontologically normative prejudice originating in a specific way of being-in-the-world ('culture'). It makes little sense to speak of a *more* or *less* being-in-the-world and we inevitably have to speak of *more* or *less* 'rational cultures' once we apply the historically and culturally determined concept of reason. The formal concept of 'comprehension of being' remains open to different conceptions of human knowledge (understanding, consciousness) and truth and, thus, enables us, to see the specific determinations which constitute its occidental concept as 'reason'. 'Cultural difference' will not be of the superficial quantitative order of a 'more' and 'less', but a difference *in* human being itself. The indefinite variations of possible human relations with things are not by themselves, but only with reference to a distinct comprehension of being, indications of a difference in culture. The pre-intentional comprehension of being does not unilaterally determine one specific relationship with things, but rather opens up a well-circumscribed space of possibilities that in the indefinite variety of particular behaviour might all be developed within one and the same 'culture'. 'Cultural difference' in the sense of different ways of being-in-the-world should never be confused with mere physical and practical differences in dealing with things. While spicy food is not an indication of 'cultural difference', vegetarianism very well may be.

Let me sum up the result of our first step in rethinking a philosophical concept of 'interculturality'. We started with the general remark that the concept implies a *difference* of 'cultures'. I then tried to show that 'cultural awareness' is mediated by the Other thus revealing 'culture' immediately as a particular and contingent way of intersubjective being-in-the-world. Otherness was referred to what—according to Heidegger's phenomenological analysis—has to be considered the foundation of the relationship of Man and World: the pre-intentionally underlying comprehension of being-in-general (world). 'Interculturality' then means the relation between different ways of being-in-the-world and ultimately between different comprehensions of being. Such a relation *between* different comprehension has to be qualified as a 'hermeneutical relation'. It indicates basically the relation of comprehension of human reality. 'Interculturality' indicates the hermeneutical interaction of different

comprehensions of being. The theoretical thematization *of* 'interculturality' will consequently have to deal with this hermeneutical interaction of different comprehensions of being. The *concept* of 'intercultuality', thus, still remains based on the presupposition that there *really are* different ways of being-in-the-world and consequently different comprehensions of being. In every other case the concept of 'interculturality' will be a more provisional guide exploring the apparent differences of factual human being that ultimately dissipate in view of a fundamental and all-embracing unity of human comprehension of being. This possibility, of course, remains open. The concept of 'interculturality' is nothing but a hypothesis serving as a heuristic-methodological device to explore factual human being without anticipating any of its possible outcomes. It will be the task of concrete hermeneutical research to explore and experience the 'reality' of this concept. But I think there can be no doubt that the overwhelming evidence of even limited hermeneutical experience in synchronical and diachronical different ways of being-in-the-world should suffice to ascertain the reality of the concept.

In conclusion, I would like to point out a very important consequence for the philosophical inquiry into interculturality that already shows up here but will be elaborated only in the subsequent steps. This consequence follows immediately from the change in the prevailing concept of human being from 'animale rationale' to 'being-in-the-world' and entails the dismissal of any kind of 'comparative philosophy' which up to now has almost exclusively claimed the title of the theory of interculturality. 'Comparative philosophy' consists basically in comparing different entities in view of the generic unity of reason that is supposed to particularize itself into different forms or types of rationality that are historically all—more or less—contributing to the realization of humanity. For 'comparative philosophy' 'reason' is the substantial reality of human being unfolded within the historical reality of humanity to different degrees and altered by its constitutive 'naturality' (animality). 'Comparative philosophy' is a branch of historicism which involves the transformation of philosophy into a historical discipline—the 'History of Philosophy'. The hermeneutical subject of 'comparative philosophy' is basically identical with its object, i.e. human reason; due to his historically posterior position the hermeneutical subject will even hold a rationally privileged position qualifying him immediately to evaluate the different realizations of reason according to the standard of his own rational evidences and insights. The hermeneutical subject of 'comparative philosophy' will immediately claim for himself the right truth-position in order to evaluate the historical and cultural particularizations of rational activity with regard to its truth and falsehood, its cognitions and its mere fantasies or illusions about being-in-general. The (historically achieved)

rationality of the hermeneutical subject will function as the basic criterion of the truth and objectivity of any synchronically or diachronically differing 'culture' as represented by its art, mythology, religion or philosophy. 'Comparative philosophy' never really deals with 'interculturality'. 'Interculturality' remains a transitory appearance of an underlying substantial identity of human being which is defined by the truth-position of its hermeneutical subject. If we reject the prevailing concept of human being as defined by reason we will thereby also immediately dismiss all 'comparative philosophy'. This is primarily a consequence of the formal property of the concept of 'being-in-the-world' itself. It is not a *generic* concept denoting the substantial reality of Man particularized in an indefinite number of historically different cultures, but a *formal* concept devoid of all concrete determinations. Every concrete reality will fulfil its prerequisites without any difference in regard to its formal structure.[2] As every simple subject-predicate sentence—no matter what its concrete terms are—will entirely fulfil the requirements of the formal structure 'S is P', every concrete 'culture' will—without any deficiency, alteration or specification—fulfil the formal concept of 'being-in-the-world'. Unlike different realizations of the substantial *being of reason* different ways of being-in-the-world are equally and completely likewise 'being-in-the-world'; they are not specified, particularized, and thereby imperfect and deficient fragments of something 'above' and 'beyond' them, but the reality of being-in-the-world itself. This applies, of course, in the same way for the hermeneutical subject of any inquiry into culturally different ways of being-in-the-world. There is absolutely no truth-privilege to be claimed by the subject nor is there any substantial content in the concept of being-in-the-world that the subject could refer to as a measure or criterion for evaluating the concrete reality of human being. The subject's theoretical position is without reference to a presupposed measure or truth about being; it is nothing but the recognition of the facticity of human being-in-the-world as such. In the approach we have adopted, therefore, we are assisting the promotion of a basic change in the theoretical *attitude* towards human being; and as a comparison is always an evaluation in regard to the common substantial reality, it is quite evident that from this perspective it will no longer make sense to 'compare' different ways of being-in-the-world. Thus, the *purpose* of theoretically thematizing different 'cultures' will also be other than that of 'comparative philosophy'. It should suffice here to point out that the new philosophical thematization of 'interculturality' cannot consist of the comparative evaluation of different ways of being-in-the-world or their underlying ontological paradigms. What the philosophically more adequate approach to 'Interculturality' positively consists of will be revealed in our following steps.

REASON AND PURPOSE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION OF 'INTERCULTURALITY'

In our second step we should try to clarify why and in view of what we are motivated to engage in a *philosophical* thematization of 'interculturality'. If 'interculturality' is a new concept arising out of our historical situation the hermeneutical understanding of this situation will be constitutive for any attempt to respond to it in a philosophical manner. It would be philosophically quite naive to see thinking as a mere reaction to any given 'problem' presented by everyday life. At least this immediate way of reacting is not the way genuine philosophical thinking constitutes itself *as* 'philosophy' with regard to specific philosophical issues. Thus, the question, why and in view of what we are motivated to engage in a *philosophical* thematization of 'interculturality' has to be taken very seriously. It touches on the hermeneutical situation of thinking constitutive for its specific philosophical way of dealing with the issue of 'interculturality', and pertains therefore to the very foundation of any form of 'intercultural philosophy'. It is quite evident that the present issues emerging around the general topic of 'fundamentalism' and the socio-economic, ecological and political problems of modern civilization in general can very well be faced from within the frameworks of traditional philosophies, which—as already pointed out—lack the dimension of an 'intercultural inquiry'. There is at least no obvious reason why the present situation of modernity should require a new 'intercultural approach' in philosophy and in what way such an approach would entail a modification of philosophy's traditional patterns. Philosophy should not be overcharged with the problems only politics, and in the ultimate instance the behaviour and interaction of concrete individuals, can solve. The task of philosophy is neither to legitimate the existent nor to invent concepts that would assuage common sense. Philosophy converts into ideology where it tries immediately to meet the needs of its time. The project of 'intercultural philosophy' has suffered to quite some extent from pretensions to functionalize thinking for the common need of a harmonic world-view, which in reality would leave things unchanged. We can only be sincere in philosophical thinking if we critically examine the motives that guide us in our questionings and the problems out of which they arise. Philosophy must always counter-balance the human need for illusion and self-betrayal which is even reinforced by the pressure of the actual historical situation. If this situation is what makes us think then it might only be the acute awareness of the historical process of modernity which can reveal to us the possible 'reason' for a *philosophical* inquiry into interculturality. In this second step I will therefore try briefly to summarize some of the essential features of 'modernity' that have become relevant to

contemporary philosophy and to relate them to the question of 'interculturality'.

The term 'modernity' refers to the historical way of being-in-the-world which originated within the occidental tradition some three or four hundred years ago. In promoting a new scientific-technological way of dealing with reality, 'modernity' has profoundly revolutionized human being-in-the-world. Through a series of ruptures in the foregoing patterns of human existence, such as the development of the new physical and historical sciences, the industrial revolution and—on the political level—the French Revolution, all deeply indebted to the reformulation of human values propagated in the period of Enlightenment, 'modernity' has asserted itself as the prevailing way of being-in-the-world covering all realms of human existence. As has been extensively analyzed within modern philosophy itself, 'modernity' is rooted in the 'principle of subjectivity', thereby indicating its underlying 'comprehension of being' as the condition of the possibility of the specific *modern* relationship of man and world. I would simply characterize the concrete reality of this 'comprehension of being' by using the term 'scientific-technological rationality'. Scientific-technological rationality organizes and determines all specific modern ways of human relationship to what is—not only in the field of science and technology, but also in all other domains of contemporary life. It delimits a certain constellation of man and world and functions as the underlying ontological paradigm of our theoretical and practical relation to things. At this point I will neither bother to repeat what has already so pertinently and comprehensively been worked out by others as the underlying ontological paradigm of modernity nor will I try to embark upon a phenomenology of the modern life-world and its basic orientation pattern—scientific-technological rationality. In this regard one can refer to one's own experience of historical reality and the modern conception of human being as subjectivity, and its rules of self-conscious and autonomous relationship to being as objectivity will be known to everyone who has studied modern philosophy from Descartes onwards. The important point for our present purpose is rather to outline some of the fundamental features of this historical reality itself that have inevitably become constitutive determinants of the contemporary situation of philosophical thinking.

One of the first things to recognize is that dealing with a historical reality—even if this is supposed to be rooted in an certain ontological pre-comprehension of being—is something very different from dealing with a 'theory' that we might reject or accept on grounds of intellectual insight. This sounds very evident and even trivial, but is not. What we have to consider—put in a more technical language—is the 'mode of being' (*modus essendi, tropos tou einai*) of what we call 'historical reality'. We might easily accept that 'historical reality' as *such* does not exist in

the way physical beings do and that, in distinction to physical reality, it implies a 'consciousness' (knowledge, understanding) which produces, acknowledges, modifies or rejects the prevailing pattern constituting the intersubjective reality of human being. Unlike physical reality, the being of historical reality seems to be entirely dependent upon intersubjectively enacted epistemic functions that prevail by reason of the comprehensive-hermeneutical acts of its participants. To change the participant's consciousness means to change their historical reality, i.e. their specific way of being-in-the-world. This, exactly, is the difficult point: because it gives to historical reality the appearance of having something like a 'quasi-theoretical' existence. We all know that a change in historical reality is something much more than 'just' a change in what we usually call 'consciousness'. The individuals belonging to the same common historical world may indeed have very divergent ideas and explicit understandings of Man's place in the world and his relation to it. Especially in our contemporary world, we are witnessing quite an inflation of private 'ideologies' and 'meta-theories' about what is without any impact on human beings' concrete relationship to things which basically remains determined by scientific-technological rationality. Thus, if historical reality consists in an 'ontological paradigm' which has as such only a 'mental existence' within its subjects, this 'mental existence' has strictly to be distinguished from any intentional, theoretical and individual mode of being of 'mental entities'. The comprehension of being as the foundation of a historical world 'exists' as the intersubjectively unified pre-intentional way of the actually enacted relationship to all beings—ourselves and everything else. The validity of the underlying ontological paradigm does not depend on the intentional-theoretical recognition of its truth but consists of the mere facticity of being enacted within the concrete relations that constitute a specific historical reality. This is why a change in the underlying comprehension of being will necessarily entail a change in the concrete historical practice of interacting with what is; and vice versa, every change in this practise will indicate a change in the intersubjectively unified pre-comprehension of being. Even if the individuals of a certain historical time—or their philosophers—were all entirely convinced that the actually prevailing way of interrelating with things and its underlying ontological pre-comprehension of their being is completely 'wrong', 'false' or 'illusory', this would by itself not *affect* the historical reality in any way. Historical reality exists—and this is my point—without the recognition of its subjects and will constitute the structure of their common being-in-the-world notwithstanding any question regarding its theoretical or practical truth. This is exactly what makes historical reality a *reality*, i.e. something quite distinct from just a mentally intentioned object whose existence would depend entirely on the intending subject and its conceptual capacities. If

historical reality is at Man's disposal this never occurs in the way we usually dispose of intentional objects. Moreover, it would be—and has often already been—a very fatal error of thinkers to ignore the autonomy of historical reality as if this reality could be subjected to Man's intentional and conceptual disposition.

These remarks may suffice to make clear that in dealing with the historical reality of modernity we are dealing with a very specific intersubjectively shared practice of being-in-the-world—scientific-technological rationality as an autonomous reality, 'autonomous' with regard to the explicit and intentional creeds, beliefs and values of its subjects. Historical reality is in this sense 'anonymous' and without any assignable 'subject'; it is the mere intersubjective 'substance' of its individual subjects. Every explicit and intentional relation we might establish with regard to the historical reality of modernity on grounds of theoretical insights has to take into account that this relation can only be a secondary *re*-action to something that exists independently. But the historical reality of modernity is not primarily something outside and detached from us which we can externally relate to or not; it constitutes rather our very being that by its socialization has become intersubjectively unified into the common modern way of being-in-the-world. Our primary and immediate way of thinking and acting, of relating to and interacting with ourselves and others, as well as the structures and conditions of our understanding something as true or false, right or wrong, good or bad—arise out of our identity as 'modern subjects', i.e. as sharing one common world. It is only against this background that we might develop our own ways of being 'modern' or that—to any extent whatsoever—we might reject and overcome our own modernity. Relating to 'modernity' is relating to one's own intersubjectively constituted identity.

Turning our attention now to the historical process of modernity itself, we will meet two basic phenomenal features of this process that are constitutive for our specific modern situation of being-in-the-world. I will call the first one 'nihilism', indicating by this the rupture of modernity with all foregoing traditions, and the second one 'universalization' thereby hinting at the phenomenon of the unification of all humanity within the ontological paradigm of scientific-technological rationality.

(1) The term 'nihilism' indicates neither a theoretical position nor a practical or moral judgement but the historical phenomenon of 'modernity' asserting itself as an overall revolution in the human relationship to world with regard to *everything* that has been handed down by tradition as the prevailing measure of human existence. Modern scientific-technological rationality constitutes itself *as* the prevailing measure of human relationship to things only in so far as it entails the annihilation of *all* those orientational patterns which up to

now have served as the foundational instances of human being-in-the-world, i.e. art, mythology, religion, metaphysics (philosophy). 'Modernity' is in this sense the absolutely unique 'invalidation' of human history in general. The innovative uniqueness of scientific-technological rationality breaks not only with an indeterminate past but with the foregoing principles of human relationship to what is in general, thus leading to a complete revolution in human being itself. The modern subject constitutes itself *as such* by the hermeneutical privation of his own tradition; it simply no longer makes 'sense' how previous humanities related to the world, and it is basically this 'non-sense' which constitutes the modern conceptual understanding of religion and metaphysics thus giving rise to the hermeneutical effort of 'historical sciences' to reconstruct a 'sense of the past'. The 'invalidated tradition' alone becomes the object of historical sciences; modern historicism originates as the entirely new relationship to the traditions of human being as invalidated forms that might at the most enjoy an aesthetic appraisal of their way of dealing with things. 'Nihilism' as the outstanding event of modernity points basically to this loss of traditional patterns to organize the human relationship to world; they become marginalized as mere private and subjective ideologies which everybody might have. What has been called the 'end of art' or the 'end of religion' 'end of philosophy' as well as the 'end of religion' does not indicate the ceasing of a specific intentional activity but the functional change to which they are subjected in the realm of modernity. Art, religion, philosophy and metaphysics lose their force as the prevailing *foundational instances* of the intersubjectively unified way of relating to being and cease to constitute the historical world even if by way of their marginalization they might attain an increasing and even overwhelming relevance for the individual subjects. The 'anti-metaphysical' essence of scientific-technological rationality might very well be 'counter-balanced' (or even frenetically abolished) on the subjective level of its participating individuals without any consequences for its being the prevailing measure of intersubjective being-in-the-world. One of the central phenomena of the age of scientific-technological rationality is the tendency to produce an indefinite variety of 'metaphysical', 'meta-religious' and 'meta-scientific' theories that constitute the inner ideologization of modern society as an indefinite number of private meta-worlds. This profound dissociation of the individual from the historical world he or she belongs to points to the fact that the ontological paradigm of scientific-technological rationality creates a completely new form of human intersubjectivity devoid of 'persons' and constituted only by 'rational subjects' equivalent to each other. 'Nihilism' denotes not the mere passage from one to another way of being-in-the-world but characterizes rather the specific modern

relation of Man and World on all the subjective and intersubjective levels of its concrete reality.

(2) The second fundamental feature of modernity is that its way of being-in-the-world does not remain restricted to the geographic region of its origin but tends to become the foundational ontological paradigm of all humanity. The absolutely unique and singular fact of modernity is that for the very first time in the history of Man we are dealing with a global unification of mankind into one exclusive and singular way of being-in-the-world. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility that there are and always will be indefinite variations of how human beings deal with their affairs and handle their lives. But on the deeper level we are witnessing an entire revolution of human being-in-the-world which is turning cultural differences into the singularity of the one historical world of scientific-technological rationality. It goes without saying that 'nihilism' thereby becomes a global phenomenon pertaining to every culture that is absorbed by the process of modernity. The historical experience of the last two centuries has shown clearly enough that there seems to be no way of withdrawing anything from this revolutionary process of *ontological homogenization* of, what in the past used to be, 'different cultures'. The contemporary supersession of the manifold traditions of being-in-the-world and their constitutive comprehensions of being by the *one ontological paradigm* of modern subjectivity seems to be one of the most tremendous and breathtaking events in human history and inevitably will inaugurate a completely new phase in the historical being of Man. I think we would miss the point completely if we try to understand this process of universalization in terms of colonization and imperialism or with reference to the historical spreading of religions like Buddhism, Christianity or Islam. The process of modernity has—by virtue of its nihilistic features—been as overwhelming for the occidental world as it is now for the African and Asian cultures, which of course does not mean that the occidental origin of scientific-technological rationality is purely accidental.[3] Nevertheless, the outstanding fact remains that scientific-technological rationality is not globalized by external domination but by converting the innermost attitude of man towards things in general. This globalization occurs without any explicit recognition or intentional belief in the 'truth' of scientific-technological rationality. It is the technological product itself that conveys a certain ontological message, converting the subject that makes use of it to a certain 'mentality' that defines itself by exactly those rules of interaction with what is that were needed to produce it. There is something deeply magical about modern technology and its irresistible way of transforming all humanity simply by means of its products into one intersubjectively valid ontological relationship to the world thereby marginalizing all the

regional differences of cultures and peoples into folkloristic or historical reminiscences of the past.

The foregoing remarks may suffice to make clear that the concept of 'interculturality' emerges at the very moment interculturality—as the possible relation between *different* historical worlds—is about to disappear. The question of 'interculturality' arises where interculturality as a basic reality of human existence vanishes. Paradoxically, the concept of 'interculturality' is conceived in a historical situation which by its own inherent force tends to abolish entirely every different way of being-in-the-world. Thus, 'interculturality' is *almost* a diachronic concept retaining the memory of pre-modernity as a condition of human existence from which we are radically excluded. What then makes us think 'interculturality' is nothing but the uniqueness of our historical situation operating a revolution within human being-in-the-world never seen before. It is in view of the historical situation of 'nihilism' that the concept of 'interculturality' arises as a positive orientation pattern of philosophical thinking destined to counter-balance its immediate historical truth. The 'modern subject' committing himself or herself to a philosophical inquiry about 'interculturality' will be a subject who no longer shares a belief in the exclusive claim of modernity to yield its ultimate truth to humanity: It is basically the 'broken subject' of modernity who becomes the hermeneutical subject of a 'philosophy of interculturality'.

This perspective will also enable us to understand the field of contemporary philosophy as the depiction of the different possibilities to react to the process of modernity. The scale of these reactions will vary from the complete acceptance to the entire rejection of scientific-technological rationality as the normative measure of the (theoretical and practical) truth of human being-in-the-world, passing by an intermediate position which would attempt to reconcile modernity with the 'rational essence' of the religious and metaphysical traditions such as Transcendental Philosophy or Speculative Idealism (Hegel):

Affirmation	Intermediate Positions	Negation
← — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — →		
Logical Empiricism	Kant/Fichte/	Nietzsche
Analytical Philosophy	Schelling/Hegel/	Adorno
Philosophy of Science	Marx/Husserl	Heidegger

This diagram may give sufficient support to my thesis that the field-structure of contemporary philosophy is not so much generated by divergent theoretical insights as by different hermeneutical comprehensions of the historical situation of modernity. The decisive foundational question of contemporary philosophy becomes whether the ontological paradigm of scientific-technological rationality is or is

not to be taken as the definitive measure of human being-in-the-world. But in view of what and on what grounds can such an alternative be decided? If philosophy is—according to its Greek definition—the science of the first principles of Being or at least a radical inquiry into the constitutive presuppositions of our knowledge about what is, then it seems quite legitimate to demand that contemporary thinkers give some account of those issues they have already decided about in order to generate their philosophical position in the field of contemporary philosophy. However, as this account would have to be philosophical in nature—and not just the narrative of a private option or preference—contemporary philosophy would have to engage in some sort of hermeneutical research about the constitution of the historical situation of modernity. If only the investigation into the truth-principles of modern scientific-technological rationality and their historical of modern scientific-technological rationality and their historical constitution can reveal to us the foundations of the modern way of being-in-the-world then our initial question—what is happening to human being today?—would thereby be raised to the rank of a foundational question of contemporary philosophical thinking itself. It might very well be that this is exactly the systematical place of a genuine philosophical inquiry into 'interculturality'.

This is indeed the point I want to make: The question of 'inter-culturality' is not a subordinate and incidental question that would join philosophical thinking casually as just another interesting topic. Rather, the question pertains to the foundation of philosophical thinking in so far as philosophical thinking generates its specific intellectual position only through the mediation of a hermeneutical understanding of the historical situation of modernity. This hermeneutical comprehension of the historical situation of modernity decides upon the question if and to what extent its underlying ontological paradigm of scientific-technological rationality is the absolute truth condition of human being-in-the-world in general. Every position of contemporary philosophical thinking therefore already implies a certain decision about human history in general. We can easily see that the affirmative and intermediate positions imply a concept of history as the 'teleological' realization of Reason while the negative position will necessarily entail a more or less 'nihilistic' comprehension of human history. Modern scientific-technological rationality will appear either as the overall 'telos' of all human history, absorbing all factual differences of human being-in-the-world, or as just another illusion threatening Man with the utmost loss of his quality of being human. As this foundational question of contemporary philosophy is systematically involved in the hermeneutical understanding of the historical world, the systematical place for the question of 'interculturality' is what has traditionally been called the 'philosophy of history'. The 'philosophy of history' will in this sense

no longer be one philosophical discipline among others but 'First Philosophy' (*prote philosophia*) as the foundation of philosophical thinking itself. I think that this is the genuine philosophical perspective of the question of interculturality that contemporary philosophy has to deal with in order to cope with its own claim to be—in any way whatsoever—the fundamental discipline of human knowledge.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion we should now be able to outline a concept of an 'intercultural philosophy' as distinct from 'comparative philosophy'. Because the concept of 'intercultural philosophy' is systematically related to the factual historical being of Man and therefore the 'philosophy of history'—but now in the quite new sense of exploring the foundation of thinking itself which inevitably transforms the common traditional concept of the 'philosophy of history'—I will rather speak of 'interstorical philosophy'. The title 'interstorical philosophy' should not only point out this concept's systematical connection to the (revised) concept of 'philosophy of history' but also the primary diachronical orientation of 'intercultural' questioning which moves in between historical worlds and their foundations. If the reason, the necessity and the condition for the possibility of a philosophical thematization of 'interculturality' lies entirely within the historical situation of modernity, as the process of the global unification of mankind within the single ontological paradigm of scientific-technological rationality, then it is—quite paradoxically—the disappearance of 'actually' (synchronically) possible 'intercultural' relations that is constitutive for 'intercultural thinking'. The only exception to this might be the field-research of cultural anthropology and ethnology. The possibility of actual synchronical experience of 'interculturality' is increasingly marginalized and restricted to very exclusive practical and theoretical adventures even if its traces, as the touch of cultural difference, are still distinctly tangible with any shift to geographically different world-regions. However, the relation between, for example, western and Indian, Japanese or Chinese (etc.), philosophers will not be an 'intercultural' relation given that they are—by reason of their life-world as well as their professional education—'commensurated modern subjects' *equally* uprooted from their cultural traditions, notwithstanding the fact that this uprootedness is asymmetrical with regard to the cultural inheritance which generated 'modernity'.[4] This is why there will be no privileged access among different philosophers coming from different cultural heritages to either of the divergent traditions but only a professional distribution of competence within the realm of one intellectual identity. The modern Indian or Japanese philosopher might very well have greater philosophical competence in dealing with western philosophy than his western colleague, who in turn may prove to have a more pertinent comprehension of eastern ways of thinking. The

divergent traditions will be equally objectified by basically one and the same 'modern consciousness' whose hermeneutical position towards them will be—with regard to its immediate access—external. The 'intercultural relation' will therefore predominantly consist in the diachronical relation to textually documented or orally preserved traditions of pre-modern historical worlds; it will not be the relation, for example, between a European and an Indian scholar but of both of them to the Greek or medieval Christian, the Buddhist Hinayana or Mahayana worlds.

As that what makes us think 'interculturality' is basically a profound change in human being itself the central purpose of an 'interstorical thinking' is to explore the question: What is happening to human being today? Its main object will therefore be to thoroughly investigate the origin and meaning of the ontological paradigm of scientific technological rationality in regard to the diachronical succession of occidental ways of being-in-the-world and their ontological pre-comprehensions of being. But this is neither thematically nor methodologically possible without taking into consideration other traditions that obviously did not generate scientific-technological rationality but were only magically seduced by it. The thematization of non-occidental ways of being-in-the-world will not merely serve as a means to delineate better the specific determinations that the occidental relationship of man and world has realized but also to open up the question of another comprehension of human being. It might very well be that the aporetic and nihilistic situation of the unified modern world can only be overcome by generating a different kind of thinking that finds its essential point of departure in the encounter with the non-occidental traditions. The basic diachronical orientation of 'interstorical thinking' relates not historically to the past but systematically to the future possibilities of human being. Although this orientation is inevitably centered in what is today—and therefore 'eurocentric' because of the actual universalization of Europe—it is nonetheless directed towards possible changes in the relationship of man and world that might encounter the lost traditions of occidental and non-occidental thinking in a new way. Thinking is 'interstorical' in between the horizons of different historical worlds that might result in a new constellation of man and world.

I think that at this point the difference between 'interstorical' and 'comparative' philosophy needs no further explication with regard to their different attitudes, questions and purposes of thinking. 'Interstorical philosophy' is not 'comparing' but 're-constructing' the conceptual results of different traditions—their 'ontological paradigms.' This implies also a basic difference between the hermeneutical subjects of 'interstorical' and 'comparative philosophy'. While the hermeneutical subject of 'comparative philosophy' will be the 'modern

subject' as basically identical with the truth-prepositions of scientific-technological rationality, the hermeneutical subject of 'interstorical philosophy' will be, as already pointed out, the 'broken modern subject', i.e. one who has basically dismissed his modernity as a valid framework for mediating objective knowledge about being. This dismissal is not an ontological commitment but constitutes the methodological attitude of interstorical thinking—the condition of the possibility of a methodologically adequate hermeneutical reconstruction of the ontological basis of other historical worlds. I will take up these methodological questions of interstorical thinking in my third step.

METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS AND THE IDEA OF
PHENOMENOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS

A 'method' consists basically in the spiritual/cognitive attitude of the subject in dealing with something—the object to be cognized—in view of a prevailing purpose or interest in cognition. The methodological reflection will then have to ask how this spiritual/cognitive attitude has to be constituted in order to achieve the theoretical or practical purpose of cognition. As I have already tried to point out, the theoretical subject of intercultural or interstorical thinking will be a 'broken modern subject'. This 'brokenness' will, in its immediate appearance, be existential and emerge out of the hermeneutical situation of the subject in the context of his historical world, thus giving origin to new theoretical perspectives and orientations, questions and investigations. Without this brokenness the subject will remain within the auto-sufficiency of his tradition lacking any motive to pass beyond the given conceptual framework. This has been largely the case in western philosophy, but has also occurred in the different non-occidental traditions too secure about themselves to bother with what has been thought elsewhere.[5] Nevertheless, it is also quite evident that this 'brokenness' itself has been experienced differently by 'occidental' and 'non-occidental subjects' according to their divergent historical situation thus leading to different methodical approaches in dealing with another cultural tradition. The hermeneutical subject coming from the occidental tradition discovered the 'non-occidental' as the other that could be critically held against the prevailing western way of being-in-the-world. His 'brokenness', transformed into the methodological attitude of 'critique', basically disposed him to look upon the other traditions as possible compensations for the deficiencies of his own. We discover here the origin of the rather 'idealizing' attitude of so many western thinkers towards the eastern traditions, especially that of India but also those of China and Japan. The cognitive attitude towards the other, i.e. the non-occidental, is constituted by a

basic truth expectancy generated by the disappointment of the subject's own cultural heritage.[6] On the other hand, the subject coming from non-occidental traditions has constituted his hermeneutical attitude largely under the impression of the overwhelming 'success' of western scientific-technological rationality, with which his own lost tradition was now called to compete. The 'truth' of western rationality, overwhelming on the scientific-technological level, was readily assumed as the prevailing measure for a re-validation of the own tradition. From this perspective the basic hermeneutical effort had to consist in showing that the own tradition had fundamentally developed the *same* 'rationality', i.e. the same truth of human being; and the purpose of this hermeneutical effort is simply to be recognized from the (internalized) occidental standpoint of view *as human beings* who might even dispose of a spiritual superiority over the westerner. Indian philosophers discovered their own tradition in the light of the changing intellectual fashions of Anglo-Saxon philosophy; and the explicit maxim and device of the founders of the Kyoto School of Philosophy in Japan was to prove the 'superiority' of eastern over western thinking.[7] The general attitude of philosophers coming from non-occidental traditions is still today marked by the deep and almost ineradicable tendency of competition whose basic evaluative parameters are—paradoxically—all 'un-critically' and even 'un-consciously' adopted from modern western rationality.[8] Instead of the western attitude of 'critique' we meet the eastern attitude of 'competition' as an almost 'negative idealization' of modernity which has also used—if not 'abused'—the western 'critique' of modernity to quite some extent, as it seems to be the case in the Japanese reception of Heidegger's interpretation of occidental history as 'nihilism'.

These few reminders of the well-known hermeneutical situation in the field of 'intercultural philosophy' may suffice to show the basic methodological question, namely how to convert the existential 'brokenness' of a (differently experienced) historical situation into the discipline of a spiritual/cognitive attitude capable of generating adequate objective insights and truths about the realm of its intentional objects. The undeniable *heuristic* value of the diverging experiences of 'brokenness' in the historical situation of modernity should not make us forget that they will inevitably distort the theoretical truth value of methodical research. The elaboration of a methodologically clarified theoretical attitude of cognition requires a sort of 'invalidation' of the subject's own truths and evidences as mere presuppositions. Accordingly, in my proposed first step I made the methodological claim that an intercultural inquiry requires a 'culturally neutral' concept of human being. Put in general terms, this claim consists in stating that the conceptual framework of the hermeneutical subject (which is essentially the underlying ontological pre-comprehension of being of

scientific-technological rationality), has to be radically suspended in view of a possible reconstruction of another way of being-in-the-world and its underlying ontological paradigm. This is easier said than done. It requires us to confront the following quite difficult theoretical questions about the nature of 'understanding' and 'comprehension' taken as the fundamental terms of human knowledge and cognition:

(1) If the comprehension of being *pre-intentionally* functions as possibilizing every practical and theoretical relationship to what is, we 'live' in it rather than know it intentionally and thematically; in our immediate relationship to things it is necessarily un-thematic and therefore 'un-known' and 'un-conscious' *as such*. But how can we cancel and invalidate something methodically without knowing what we are supposed to cancel and invalidate? We have to become aware of this pre-intentional comprehension of being thereby turning it into an intentional object thematically known as such. But how can we become aware of it and ascertain methodically of knowing it *as such*?

(2) If the comprehension of being pre-intentionally functions as *possibilizing* every practical and theoretical relationship to what is, we will cease to understand being whatsoever by cancelling and invalidating this comprehension. We will be plunging into complete nescience and ignorance about what is. How can we possibly understand anything by cancelling the conceptual framework which is the condition of the possibility of our comprehension of anything? How can we 'reconstruct' another conceptual framework *out of itself* and without any reference to a presupposed conceptual framework of our own? What is the inner 'condition of the possibility' for the 'comprehension of being'—if not another presupposed 'comprehension of being' or, put somewhat differently, on what grounds do we understand 'being-in-general' at all? What does this understanding of being-in-general refer to and how is it generated?

(3) Even supposing a reconstruction of different ontological comprehensions of being were possible, how can we thematize their 'truth' or 'falsehood'? If the *assumed truth* of a given conceptual framework is the measure and criterion to decide upon 'true' and 'false', 'right' and 'wrong', 'good' and 'bad' (etc.), how are we then able to relate the reconstruction of conceptual frameworks to the question of the 'truth' of human being? Are we not bound to affirm the equal truth of all different comprehensions of being as self-validating constructions of ontological knowledge if we reject a transcendent criterion—such as 'reason' and its constitutive principles? Can the result of this rejection be other than a complete 'relativism'? But how should the interstorical inquiry then attain its purpose to investigate about the 'truth' of modern scientific-technological rationality? Can a spiritual/cognitive attitude which cancels right from the beginning every 'truth-presupposition' ever return to the question

of truth without simply making an arbitrary decision and thus forfeiting its genuine philosophical claim?

It is of course not possible within the scope of the present essay to discuss these fundamental methodological issues of an 'intercultural philosophy' thoroughly and to unfold their implications for any possible solution.[9] The central question obviously touches the concept of 'comprehension of being' as the foundation of human being-in-the-world and whether 'truth' can at all be a valid and sufficient parameter of thinking. Maybe that seeing 'truth' this way is a very 'occidental presupposition' which in the context of an intercultural inquiry would become quite questionable, thereby also affecting the exclusive 'ontological definition' of human being inherent in the concept of 'comprehension of being'. An initial and provisional approach to the subject-matter of 'interculturality' may have to work with concepts that, in the course of its thematic research, will change and transform their initial meaning and exclusive relevance. These concepts still may serve—in the platonic sense—as unavoidable 'footboards' on the way to a more genuine comprehension of the issues of 'interculturality'. What I am trying to suggest is that it is precisely the hermeneutical experience of interculturally different ways of being-in-the-world that will transform the sense of these questions and resolve them into a different awareness of human being which is neither ontologically related to 'being' nor theoretically to 'truth'. But as these issues are not treatable in the present context I will restrict myself to the necessary conceptual clarifications of the methodical approach which should open up and mediate new 'intercultural' perspectives on human being-in-the-world. This task basically amounts to the exposition of the methodological concept of 'interstorical thinking' as distinguished from 'comparative philosophy'. I will entitle this methodological concept 'phenomenological hermeneutics' as opposed to 'receptive hermeneutics', which refers to the underlying methodology of 'comparative philosophy'.

'Receptive hermeneutics' stands for any way of understanding the other within the conceptual framework of the hermeneutical subject's own being-in-the-world: the other way of being-in-the-world and its underlying comprehension of being is entirely 'received'—appropriated and interpreted—on the basis and by the means of the ontological paradigm of the subject. This 'reception' is undoubtedly the most common hermeneutical behaviour. Every 'culture' understands other 'cultures' on the grounds and within the horizon of its own ontological pre-comprehensions and will relate to them accordingly. But it is quite bewildering that this immediately 'instinctive' attitude has almost never been radically and systematically broken up when it came to the theoretical cognition of 'historical sciences'. The 'non-receptive' part of their cognition remained largely restricted to casual insights or the

unique hermeneutical efforts of individual researchers without ever becoming the object of a methodology established and shared by a 'scientific community'. The fundamental claim of theoretical cognition as pretending to cognize its object *as it is in itself*—and not merely 'for' or 'in' the realm of the conceptual presuppositions of the respective hermeneutical subject—should undoubtedly be a 'non-receptive' hermeneutics which operates what Husserl called an 'epoche'—the 'invalidation' of the subject's own conceptual framework. I believe that the phenomenological method elaborated by Husserl and—with decisive improvements—Heidegger[10] can provide us with the conceptual means and possibilities for deriving a feasible methodological concept of a genuine theoretical—'non-receptive'—hermeneutics.

The fundamental point of such a 'phenomenological hermeneutics' is less the 'epoche' than what it leads to, i.e. the phenomena a conceptual framework has hermeneutically appropriated itself. What is left when we cancel our conceptual interpretations of phenomena is the pre-conceptual awareness of these phenomena that, by way of a hermeneutical appropriation, have become conceptually known *as what they are.* Consequently, a 'comprehension of being' will be understood as a specific hermeneutical appropriation of the phenomenal unconcealment of what is. The purpose of the interstorical inquiry will then be the 'reconstruction' of a given 'comprehension of being' out of its phenomenal reference *as* the specific hermeneutical appropriation of these phenomena. The 'comprehension of being' is basically seen as the transformation of phenomenal being into conceptual knowing. To explore this transformation is to explore the foundations of the culturally specific ways of being-in-the-world. Thus, while a 'receptive hermeneutics' basically deals with traditionally handed-down and documented 'opinions' about what is, arguing pro and contra their truth or falsehood, 'phenomenological hermeneutics' will deal with 'the things themselves', i.e. the phenomena as transformed into a conceptual knowledge which reveals them in what they are in themselves. The principle of this transformation will not be a presupposed 'transcendental ego', 'consciousness' or 'reason', but 'thinking' in its respective factual and historical formation as generated by this transformation itself. 'Thinking' is nothing but that which is generated by itself within the transformation of the phenomenal appearance of being into knowing, i.e. originating a specific 'comprehension of being'. The plurality of historical worlds in the sense of both 'comprehensions of being' and 'ways of thinking' is nothing but the plurality of originally different ways of transforming phenomenal being into knowing which have constituted different traditions in their intersubjective relationships to the world. The 'truth' of such 'comprehensions of being' can therefore only consist of these comprehensions' fulfilment of their internal hermeneutical criterion

rendering what is 'understandable' to anyone who shares these comprehensions. We will not doubt, for example, that the 'vedic' or the 'homeric world' was as understandable to its participants as ours is to us.

We can now, thus, delineate the idea of a phenomenological hermeneutics as opposed to the constitutive distinction that governs all contemporary philosophy. Modern research in philosophy distinguishes a 'primary' from a 'secondary' literature. Philosophy, which primarily deals with what is, has separated from a secondary historical discipline dealing with the accumulated opinions or theories about what is. Thus, systematical and historical research, philosophy and history of philosophy, reason and tradition, have broken apart. But the differentiation between systematical and historical research does not make sense any more where the historically assumed knowledge about what is is reconstructed systematically out of its phenomenal realm of reference and every systematical insight into what is is nothing but the conceptual-hermeneutical appropriation of being. Phenomenological hermeneutics subverts the distinction between 'systematical' and 'historical', between 'primary' and 'secondary' literature, and thereby proves to be a genuine philosophical method, overcoming the usual distinction between reason and history. As a concept of philosophical research phenomenological hermeneutics may integrate the 'intercultural' situation of contemporary philosophy into the more genuine perspective of a differential ontology which does not separate 'the thing' from the factual-storical way of 'being-known'. Instead of a transcendentally supposed unique way of constituting the knowledge and consciousness of being we are thereby able to deal with the manifold factual-storical ways of transforming being into knowing: into a 'comprehension of being' which is *originally divergent*. The Aristotelean insight into manifold determinations of being '*to on pollacho legetai*' (being is said and determined in many different ways.) may acquire the entirely new sense of denoting the original dispersion of 'reason' and 'being' in itself. This may still be a very 'occidental' way of responding philosophically to the challenge of our contemporary historical situation. But nothing precludes the ontological determination of occidental thinking by way of such inquiry from being resolved into a non-ontological way of dealing with what is.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See for this my monograph, *Heidegger. Sein und Wissen. Eine Einführung in sein Denken.* Wien, 1993.
2. The philosophical insight into the fundamental difference between generic and formal concepts respectively between generic and formal generality or universality is due to Aristotle; its importance has been emphasized again in this century by Husserl (Ideen § 13). See for further explication my

monograph, *Aristoteles. Sein und Wissen. Bd. I* (forthcoming 1995).

3. There is in a strict sense no western domination of the world, but the only temporary advantage of the West over the rest of the world due to the fact that scientific-technological rationality originated within the western tradition. As the example of Japan and other far eastern cultures shows, this advantage might soon be overcome and forgotten; it belongs not to a cultural predisposition but to a temporary phase of the scientific and technological revolution of the world due to its historical origin.

4. See as an example for such a missed 'intercultural discussion': *All-einheit. Wege eines Gedankens in Ost und West. Hg.* von D. Henrich (Veröffentl. d. intern, Hegel-Vereinig. Bd. 14), Stuttgart, 1985.

5. See for this, for example the remarks of M.P. Rege (in *Samvada*, edited by Daya Krishna, Motilal Banarsidass, 1991, XXIII), on the intellectual situation of traditional Indian pandits; according to him, the 'geographical isolation was itself partly the result of the mental isolation into which the Brahmins had retreated owing to pride based on ignorance. They, perhaps, took unduly seriously the boast of the Mahabharata that in matters of *dharma, artha, kāma* and *moksa* what is not here is not found to be elsewhere'.

6. See, for example, the works of Heinrich Zimmer, especially his *Philosophies of India*, 1951.

7. See, for example, the introduction of M.P. Rege (in *Samvada*, edited by Daya Krishna, Motilal Banarsidass, 1991) for the Kyôto School Ryôsuke Ohashi (Hg.), *Die Philosopie der Kyôto-Schule.* Freiburg/München, 1990.

8. As a recent example, see J.N. Mohanty, *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought*, 1992. Already the title is a contradiction in terms.

9. See for this my monograph *Heideggers Begriff der Geschichte und das neuzeitliche Geschichtsdenken*, 1994.

10. Husserl—with the typical lack of historical awareness of the Other due to an overall view of history as a 'teleology of reason'—never applied the phenomenological method of history nor did he make any use of it in his interpretations of other philosophers; it is the merit of the young Heidegger to have developed the method of 'phenomenological interpretation' which became the methodological paradigm for so many works on the 'history of philosophy'. But what still seems lacking today is a conceptual elucidation of this methodological practice widely spread in 'continental philosophy' and quite opposed to the methods of 'analytical interpretation' commonly applied in 'Anglo-Saxon philosophy'. See, for further conceptual clarification of phenomenological hermeneutics, my monograph *Was ist und wozu überhaupt—Philosophie?* (1992), pp.87–98 and *Heideggers Begriff der Geschichte und das neuzeitliche Geschichtsdenken*, 1994, pp. 159–72.

The Interesting and Uninteresting Privacies

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I

In this section, we solve a puzzle without casting any doubt on its clues and directions. The title question of the puzzle is, 'how do we distinguish the philosophically interesting versions of private language from the uninteresting ones?' Granted that the interesting and uninteresting are mutually exclusive, the question turns to: 'What is a philosophically interesting private language?' That is, in short, 'What is a private language?' I emphasize, the question is 'What is a private language?' and it should not be confused with 'Can there be a private language?'

We are provided with just two clues. One is a programme for communication, another is a chart of interesting and uninteresting types of privacy. The programme given in the first clue is this:

> When A is a speaker and B is a hearer, the fact that A successfully communicates p to B entails that
> 1. A intends to say that p,
> 2. A intends B to recognize that A intends to say that p,
> 3. B recognizes that A intends to say that p, and
> 4. B understands what A means.

The chart on which different types of privacy are given under the interesting kind and the uninteresting kind is on the left hand side of the two columns we mention below. The directions given to us for how to approach the puzzle or how to use the clues are: Find the possible types of private language in accordance with the first clue, that is, in accordance with the above programme for communication, and match these types with those in the second clue. In short, the puzzle is, how to characterize private language by comparing the

possible unsuccessful communications on the one hand, and the two sets of private languages on the other. We solve the puzzle in the following way.

In accordance with the first clue, we find 14 types of private language. Out of the 16 possible arrangements of the truth value of the four conditions, the one in which all of the four are true represents a cent per cent public communication, and the one in which all of the four are false represents no communication. The other 14 are private *qua* less than cent per cent public. The required comparison is shown by an arrangement in which any one of these 14 types corresponds to only one of those under the left-side column.

The Interesting Types

The Cartesian privacy:	1	2'	3	4
The Diary privacy:	1	2'	3	4'
The Learner's privacy:	1	2'	3'	4
The Mystic privacy:	1	2'	3'	4'
The Beetle-Box privacy:	1	2	3	4'
The Crusoe privacy:	1'	2'	3	4'
The Pretender's privacy:	1'	2	3	4'

The Uninteresting Types

The Code privacy:	1'	2'	3'	4
The Blind Man's privacy:	1'	2	3	4
The Teacher's privacy:	1	2	3'	4'
The Fool's privacy:	1	2	3'	4
The Machine's privacy:	1'	2	3'	4
The Machine's Cod privacy:	1'	2	3'	4'
The Lover's privacy:	1'	2'	3	4

[1, 2, 3 and 4 stand for true. 1', 2', 3' and 4' stand for the falsity of the corresponding propositions.]

Look at the arrangements of the truth value of 1, 2, 3 and 4 corresponding to the interesting versions. In each of them, we find, at least, 1, 2' or 3, 4'. This common feature of the interesting versions is absent in the uninteresting versions. What does this common feature signify? It signifies that a philosophically interesting private language presupposes one or both of the following.

  a. The speaker can mean something through a sign which he does not recognize as a sign for communication of what he means.
  b. The hearer can understand what is meant through a sign which he does not recognize as a sign for communication of what is meant to him.

In both the above cases, it is presupposed that meaning is independent of language. The only difference is that the first case is associated with the speaker and the second with the hearer. Thus the answer to 'How do we distinguish the philosophically interesting versions of private language from the uninteresting ones?' is this: A version of private language is philosophically interesting if its acceptance presupposes that meaning is independent of language and its rejection presupposes that meaning is necessarily dependent on language. And, needless to say, a version is uninteresting if it is not interesting.

<div align="center">II</div>

In this section, an explanation of our solution and justification of the validity of the clues and directions are given later. What follows immediately is a brief account of the 14 types of privacy.[1]

The Cartesian privacy insists on the privacy of a person's consciousness. If A is conscious of his pain and he intends to say what he is conscious of, he does not intend others to recognize what he intends to say when he utters 'I am in pain'. On the other hand, others recognize that A intends to say that he is in pain and, also, they understand that A is in pain.[2]

In *The Diary privacy*[3], like the Cartesian privacy, A does not intend others to recognize what he intends to say: a peculiar sensation which he records in his diary by writing 'E'. If we open his diary and find 'E' (the capital E), we recognize that A has referred to a peculiar sensation. But we do not understand what that peculiar sensation is. Say, for example, it is neither a pain sensation nor a pleasure sensation but something else, of a peculiar kind.

In *The Learner's privacy*[4], like the Cartesian and Diary privacy, A intends to say but does not intend others to recognize that he intends to say, for example, 68+67=125. On the other hand, others, particularly his teacher, understand what A means without recognizing that A intends to say that 67+68=125. Because, no less than the learner himself, the teacher realizes that A is not sure of the result. But he understands how the learner has got the wrong answer.[5]

A *mystic* is an un-understandable Cartesian learner. Like a Cartesian, he intends to say, without intending us to recognize, that he has seen God. It is not that he wants to hide something, nor that he insists on the privacy of his consciousness. He is yet to learn how to teach that he has seen God. Like a learner, he is not sure of the result, namely, of his teaching. And, no doubt, we do not understand what he means since what he means is something mysterious. So also, we do not recognize what he intends to say, what he intends to say is what he indents to mean; a mysterious thing.[6]

The Beetle-Box privacy[7] : Suppose every one of us has a box and inside every box there is a beetle. No one is allowed to look into anyone else's box. The question is, 'Can any one of us inform others what is in his/her box if, *ex hypothesi*, for each one of us, the word "beetle" means the beetle inside one's own box?' Obviously, it is not possible. However, for the private-language user, the case would be different. By uttering 'beetle', he intends to say and intends others to recognize that he intends to say that there is something in his box; others recognize that he intends to say that there is something in his box.[8] However, they do not understand what he means. Because, he means the beetle, the beetle in his box.

If we consider *The Crusoe's privacy* in terms of the Beetle-Box privacy, the speaker, that is Crusoe, has an empty box. So, even if we recognize him speaking of something in his box, he does not intend to say that, nor does he intend us to recognize that. And, like the audience of the Beetle-Box privacy, we do not understand what Crusoe means. Because, *ex hypothesi*, we cannot look into his box. In other words, Crusoe does not have a language through which he can express anything nor does he intend us to recognize that he wants to express something; we interpret it from his behaviour to mean that he intends to say something. And, due to this superimposition of our language on Crusoe's private language, we do not understand what he means.[9]

Pretender's privacy[10] : Suppose A is a child and A is pretending to cry. It is false that A intends to say that he is in pain. But, A intends B, his mother, to recognize that he intends to say that he is in pain. B recognizes that A intends to say that A is in pain. But, it is false that B understands what A means.

The Code privacy: A belongs to a group of thieves who use the word 'turmeric' as a code for gold. It is false that A intends to say that he has got 100 gms of turmeric; and it is false that A intends B (his mate) to recognize that he intends to say that he has got 100 gms of turmeric. Also, it is false that B recognizes that A intends to say that A has got 100 gms of turmeric. But, it is true that B understands what A means, 100 gms of turmeric. But, it is true that B understands what A means, namely, A has got 100 gms of gold when A utters 'I have got 100 gms of turmeric'.

The Blind Man's privacy: A blind man does not intend to say, for example, that he sees the blue shirt, but he intends B to recognize that he intends to say that he sees the blue shirt. B recognizes what A intends to say and also understands what A means. This is analogous to the fact that a blind man does not see but shows something which is shown to others and others do see that.

The Teacher's privacy: The teacher intends to say, for example, how 57+68 becomes 125 and intends his students to recognize that he intends to say how 57+68 becomes 125. The students do not recognize that the teacher intends to say how 57+68 becomes 125, nor do they

understand what the teacher means, they are yet to understand what he means.

The Fool's privacy: A is a fool. He intends to say that he finds something similar to a rope; he also intends others to recognize what he intends to say. But others do not recognize that. However, they understand what he means, namely, an elephant is similar to a rope.

The Machine's privacy: A machine is a blind teacher who has some students. They never show him the road but see many things, thanks to him. Like the blind man, the machine does not see but shows. However, the audience does not recognize what exactly goes on inside the machine even though they understand what the machine means or shows. This seems to be a metaphor. Just change the 'machine' to a 'mechanical behaviour'. Suppose, A is an actor in a play. A is playing the role of a king. A does not intend to say that he wants war, but A intends the audience to recognize that A intends to say that he wants war. The privacy of the actor, while acting, is that he does not want to be recognized as A but as a king. On the other hand, what the audience understands is what A intends to say, that is, the king wants war; even though they do not recognize that A intends to say that he wants war.

The Machine's code privacy: Suppose the actor of the above example is playing a role which remotely signifies the current situation of politics in India. Consequently, it may so happen that the audience does not understand what A means, that is, his role in relation to present politics.

The Lover's privacy: By uttering 'Let us go to the canteen', Mini does not intend to say that she is hungry, nor does she intend Muna to recognize that she is hungry. Because, she is too late for the breakfast and too early for the lunch. However, Muna recognizes that Mini intends to say that she is hungry and he understands what Mini means.

Now we explain the way we have solved the puzzle and justify the validity of the clues and directions.

First of all, one may ask: Even if we accept the first clue, that is, the programme of communication in terms of the four conditions, why should any item of the second column represent a private language? In other words, why should an unsuccessful communication be called a private communication? Of course all unsuccessful communications are not necessarily real (interesting) private communications; there are unsuccessful public communications. But all the so-called real private communications are naturally unsuccessful (public communications). Hence, *private* and *public* cannot be exclusive of each other. Since all the private communications are unsuccessful public communications, we outline all the possible types of unsuccessful communications in order to distinguish the real (interesting) privates from the fake (uninteresting) privates. The uninteresting versions are associated with the unsuccessful communications which appear to be private but public in reality. On the other hand, the interesting versions

are associated with the unsuccessful public communications which can be, *ex hypothesi*, turned to successful (private) communications by means of private language.

Secondly, one may doubt the conclusion we derived from the common feature of the interesting versions. One may ask: How does 1 2' signify that the speaker means something through a sign which he does not recognize as a sign for the communication of what he means? Similarly, (b) is questionable with respect to 3 4'. To explain these, I would introduce a concept, namely, *transitivity of meaning*.

If you cry, it means you are in pain; and if you are in pain, it means you are hurt. Consequently, if you cry, it means you are hurt. The transitivity of meaning takes place from 'crying' to 'being hurt' through 'pain'. However, this is an uninteresting instance of transitivity of meaning. Because, crying can directly refer to 'being hurt' as much as it can refer to 'pain'. This may fit into the uninteresting versions of privacy. For example, in appropriate contexts, 'Let us go to the canteen' can directly refer to 'I am hungry' instead of calling for the lover's privacy in between. The interesting aspect of transitivity of meaning that a private language-user presupposes is like this:

There is some X which means crying and crying means pain. So. the X means pain. Now substitute crying by the word 'pain'. It turns to the idea that there is some X which means the word 'pain' and the word 'pain' means pain. Consequently, X means pain via the word 'pain'. And the private language-user presupposes that this transitivity of meaning is conceivable only by him, by no one else, because, even if it is public that the word 'pain' means pain, it is not public how 'X' means the word 'pain'. In other words, the relation between the word 'pain' and the use of the word pain is public whereas the relation between X and the word 'pain' is private. So when A intends to say that he is in pain and yet does not intend B to recognize that he is in pain, he believes that the word 'pain' is not the sign which can exactly represent what he means by X. In the diary privacy, for example, A writes (the capital) 'E' in his diary whenever he experiences a peculiar sensation. Writing (the capital) 'E', he intends to say that he has that very peculiar sensation. But he does not intend others to recognize that E stands for that very peculiar sensation. Because, not that he wants to hide that sensation, he believes that, even if E is publicly understandable as a sign for his peculiar sensation, E is not the real sign which represents his sensation. In a sense, E is a sign of the sign that only he can use. And this transitivity of meaning, from what his private sign means to the object meant via the meaning of the public sign E, can be made out only by A, no one else can make out. In other words, he believes, he can mean that he has a peculiar sensation, E, while he does not recognize E as a sign for communicating that very experience to anybody else. He can mean something through a public

sign which he does not recognize as a sign for the communication of what he means. Similarly, we can find that the privacy due to 3 4' presupposes the hearer's belief that he can understand what is meant through a sign which he does not recognize as a sign for communication. For example, the audience of Crusoe recognizes what Crusoe intends to say on the basis of observing Crusoe's external regular behaviour, but the audience does not understand what Crusoe means because he does not recognize the observable behaviour as the sign for communicating what Crusoe means.

Now let us question the clues of the puzzle. First of all, what is the validity of the first clue? That is, how do we know that the given programme for communication is a valid one? Secondly, how do we prepare the two sets—interesting and uninteresting—of privacy before we find any common characteristic of the interesting ones? The answer to this second question is just a note of reference to the text. Philosophers have already argued for or against the possibility of private language. Directly or indirectly, they have discussed the interesting ones while dismissing the uninteresting ones. The following is the answer for the validity of the first clue.

If you cough due to a cold, you do not mean that you have caught a cold. Your coughing is a natural symptom of your illness. If, by coughing, you want to draw my attention, then, you intend to say that I should pay attention to you. So also, if you want to inform me that you have got a cold, you intend to say that you have got a cold, when you cough. And so your cough is no more a natural symptom.

However, what you intend to say is not enough for communication. Suppose you have not switched off your lamp in the drawing room and you intend to say that you are inside. But, unless you intend me to recognize that you have intended to convey that, you don't communicate anything to me; even if, seeing the light, I understand that you are inside. That is, when A successfully communicates that p, not only that A intends to say that p, but also, A intends B to recognize that A intends to say that p.

However, B may not recognize what A intends to say even if A intends B to recognize. B may not consider A as the speaker or, even if he does, he does not recognize what A intends him to recognize. I may understand that you are inside the room without recognizing that you have kept the light on to mean that.

Moreover, even if I understand what you intend to say, I may not understand what you exactly mean. You may intend to say that p but mean something other than p. For example, by closing the window, you may intend to say; 'Let us go' and you mean 'Let us go to the canteen' whereas I understand that you mean 'Let us go to the bus stop' due to the fact that I have forgotten, we have already decided a few minutes ago, that we should go to the bus stop after a cup of tea.

Thus, for a successful communication, the above four conditions are necessary.[11]

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I should clearly state my purpose behind the above discussion. What remains in the background is, no doubt, Wittgenstein's private language argument. But, equally important is Grice's theory of meaning. Of course, Grice considers Wittgenstein a 'relatively minor philosophical figure'.[12] So also, for Wittgenstein, any programme of communication, including that of Grice, would have been philosophically insignificant. For, according to Wittgenstein, a philosopher is not supposed to advance a theory or programme of communication, but explore the logic or grammar of language. However, even if in a sense one is empirical and the other is philosophical both are concerned with meaning and language. And being faithful to Wittgenstein's dictum, 'look, don't think', we have simply looked but looked by means of a microscope, not by means of coloured spectacles. This much justification, at least, I may give for my looking into the problem of privacy through a programme of communication.

In so far as Wittgenstein's private language argument is concerned, everyone knows that he rejects 'private language'. But no one is certain of Wittgenstein's conception of private language and, hence, what Wittgenstein is up to. I mean, no interpretation of Wittgenstein's private language argument is un-challengeable; neither on the conceptual level nor on the level of textual evidence. That is why we need an answer to 'What is a private language'? I don't claim my characterization answer of 'What is a private language'? I don't claim my characterization of private language, namely, 'meaning is independent of language' must be the view that Wittgenstein held. But, no doubt, I attempted to establish that and, therefore, I feel responsible to defend that.

In so far as the interpretation of Wittgenstein's text, particularly the *Philosophical Investigations,* is concerned, I would suggest the following two points.

First, none of the examples accounted in connection to the private language argument is sufficient for the rejection of private language, if they are taken separately. That is, each one of the interesting versions has to be refuted if private language is to be refuted. The rejection of all the interesting versions, taken together, is sufficient for the rejection of private language.

Secondly, though I have not worked it out, I strongly believe that each of the major conflicting interpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language adheres, exclusively, to one of the interesting versions of private language. Thus, if our solution of the puzzle is theoretically sound, it can be concluded that the conflicting

interpretations are due to an exclusive concentration on one or other version of private language, though they all agree to the fundamental premise; a private language is that which presupposes 'meaning is independent of language'.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The given account does not correspond in detail to the texts of Wittgenstein, nor to that of his interpreters and critics. Nevertheless it represents their conclusions. That is, a defender has to defend and a critic has to reject what has been maintained in each of the interesting privacies.
2. B fulfils the second and third condition in the sense that we use 'pain-language' even though A, as a private language user, insists that 12'. However, A too really need not bother about whether or not B recognizes or understands what he intends to say or mean. Because, what suffices to his claim to be valid is just 12'. This is perhaps the reason for which the Cartesian privacy is the most debated privacy. The idea is that if the minimum requirement of a private language is demolished, private language is impossible. So also, the minimum requirement has to be defended if the possibility of private language is to be defended. However, as we will discuss below, this is not a sufficient ground.
3. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, third edition; 1976 reprint, Sec. 258.
4. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* op. cit., Sec. 143–47, 385.
5. The teacher has a mastery which is yet to be acquired by the learner. Like Wittgenstein, any critic of private language (of the kind in question) would suggest that the learner does not mean anything by using the signs which mean the thing that he is yet to learn. Because, to use a language means to have a mastery of that language. To state it metaphorically, the learner is outside the boundary of a field and, therefore, he cannot kick the ball with which we are playing on the field.
6. Cf. L. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty,* edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. vonWright, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, 1977 reprint, Sec. 236–45. To use the above metaphor, a mystic is outside the boundary but, like a Cartesian, he is inside the boundary of another field.
7. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* op. cit., Sec. 293.
8. Of course, according to Wittgenstein, others cannot recognize that the speaker intends to say that there is something in his box since his box may be an empty box. But, suppose, the speaker draws the picture of the beetle on his box. We cannot recognize what he intend to say even though we cannot understand what he means since what he means is the beetle and not the picture of the beetle. That is, we cannot recognize the picture without recognizing the beetle. For a private-language user, it is possible in the way 3 and 4' is possible at the same time.
9. A.J. Ayer, 'Can there be a private language?', *The Concept of Person and Other Essays,* Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1963; also in H. Morick, (ed.) *Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds,* McGraw Hill Book Company, New York, 1969, pp. 82–96. Ayer's defence of private language ultimately leads to such a conclusion. If we notice the difference between the Cartesian privacy and Crusoe's privacy, we can find how Ayer argues in favour of Crusoe's privacy and, strictly speaking,

not in favour of the Cartesian privacy. He emphasizes that regularity can be maintained by Crusoe in using a particular sign and hence Crusoe fulfils Wittgenstein's demand that a rule is not followed just for once but more than once and, not arbitrarily, regularly in a certain way. However, one may question: Does Crusoe know that the act of pointing towards a banana plant, for example, means that he wants some bananas or is it simply that he has been conditioned to behave in a way that is no better than a dog's wagging its tail when you show it a piece of biscuit? If he is not aware of that he does something meaningless in the sense that animals do. If he is aware of that, then not only that he can intend to say but also intend us to recognize that he wants some bananas; because, he too follows a rule which we are used to, namely, the rule for asking or requesting for something. Consequently, he is not using a private language. That is why, Ayer perhaps uses a private language for himself in the sense that, as the audience of Crusoe, he interprets or recognizes that Crusoe intends to say on the basis of observing Crusoe's behaviour but he does not understand what Crusoe means to say, because, he does not recognize that observable behaviour as the sign for the communication of what Crusoe means.

10. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* op. cit., Sec. 228–29.
11. H.P. Grice, 'Meaning', *The Philosophical Review,* LXVI, 1957, pp. 377–88. The first three conditions approximates to Grice's (1957) account of meaning. However, our account differs from that of Grice on two points: (i) His conditions of meaning in terms of utterer's intention are necessary and sufficient whereas we claim only the necessity of the four conditions. (ii) Grice has not given due importance to hearer's understanding and hence he does not need our fourth condition.
12. H.P. Grice, 'Reply to Richards', *Philosophical Grounds of Rationality.* edited by R.E. Grandy and R. Warner, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 45–106, esp. p. 66.

The Causal Theory of Meaning

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Many contemporary philosophers accept the theory of direct reference as the correct semantic theory for a proper name. According to this theory, the sole semantic content of a name is its referent. A consequence of this theory is that co-referential names have the same meaning. The theory of direct reference, along with some other theses, constitute a theory which I call 'Naive Theory'. The following is the Naive Theory.

THE NAIVE THEORY

(1)   The content of a proper name (if it has one) is its referent.

(2)   The content of an indexical, or a demonstrative in a context (if it has one) is its referent in that context.

(3)   The content of a predicate (if it has one) is a property or relation.

(4)   The content of a sentence (if it has one) is a proposition. A proposition is a structured entity, containing individuals and/or relations as constituents. The propositional content of a sentence contains the contents of the sentence's meaningful parts as constituents.

(5)   The content of a logical connective (for example, 'not', 'and') is an appropriate property of propositions, or a relation between propositions.

(6)   The content of a quantifier (if it has one) is a second-order property or relation, that is, a property of properties, or a relation between properties.

Truth conditions for sentences and propositions are the following:

(7)   A sentence is true (in a particular language) iff its content is a proposition that is true (that is, it expresses a true proposition).

(8)   Let F be a proposition of the form $\langle x_1, x_2, x_3, \ldots x_n, F_n \rangle$ where x_1 through x_n are individuals or relations and F_n is an n-place

relation. Then F is true iff x_1 through x_n *instantiate* F_n. (Or F_n holds of x_1 through x_n.)

(9)   Let F be a proposition of the form <Q, NEG> where Q is a proposition. Then F is true iff Q is false. If F is not true, then it is false.

(10)   Let F be a proposition of the form <Q, R, CONJ> where Q and R are propositions. Then F is true iff Q is true and R is true. If F is not true, then it is false.

For example, the semantic content of 'Twain' is Twain. 'Twain is an author' expresses a singular proposition which contains Twain and the property of being-an-author as constituents. According to this theory 'Twain is an author' and 'Clemens is an author' express the same proposition, since 'Twain' and 'Clemens' refer to the same individual.

Michael Devitt[1] tries to argue against the Naive Theory using problems about cognitive value. Devitt also tries to solve these problems by proposing a causal theory of meaning. I discuss his views here to show that his theory does not have a satisfactory solution to the problems of cognitive value.

THE PROBLEMS ABOUT COGNITIVE VALUE

The Naive Theorist holds that 'Twain is an author' and 'Clemens is an author' express the same proposition. He also holds that believing what the first sentence expresses is just believing what the second sentence expresses. But the cognitive values of the two sentences seem very different. One can understand both sentences, accept the first as expressing the truth, while not accepting the second. The same problem arises with indexicals. Imagine that you see a man about to be mugged by a prominent philosopher of language.[2] Unknown to you, you are witnessing the scene by means of a series of mirrors. Unfortunately, suppose that the next time you are the intended victim. In such a context it is plausible to suppose that different thought contents are expressed by 'He is about to be attacked' and 'I am about to be attacked'. You may accept the former as expressing the truth while rejecting the latter. All of this is some evidence that these pairs of sentences express different propositions, contrary to the Naive Theory.

The beliefs expressed by utterances such as those in the mirror example typically lead to dramatically different actions apart from assents and dissents. A speaker who accepts 'He is about to be attacked' as expressing the truth may come to help the person or may do nothing more than express a friendly concern. On the other hand, the speaker may do no such thing, not even express any concern, while he rejects 'I am about to be attacked'. But the propositions

believed, according to the Naive Theorist, are the same. If the same proposition is the object of those beliefs, then it is hard to explain the different actions effected by those beliefs. According to the Naive Theorist, the content of a belief is the proposition it expresses. The beliefs in question then have the same content. Now the problem for them is to explain how the beliefs having the same content can lead to different actions.

According to the Naive Theory, 'Twain is Twain' expresses the same proposition as 'Twain is Clemens'. In other words, the proposition that Twain is Twain and the proposition that Twain is Clemens are the same proposition. In that case the propositions must not differ in their properties. However, the former proposition seems to be analytic and *a priori*. The latter proposition seems to be not analytic and not *a priori*. The Naive Theory appears to be suggesting that the proposition is both analytic and not analytic, *a priori* and not *a priori*. This is a serious problem for a Naive Theorist. Further, the latter proposition seems to be more informative than the former proposition, in some intuitive sense of 'informative'. The Naive Theorist owes an explanation for the alleged incoherence.

DEVITT'S THEORY

Devitt's theory of meaning is about names, demonstratives, pronouns and definite descriptions. Devitt claims his theory explains the meanings of these expressions. The theory supposedly explains how an expression gets its meaning, what that meaning is, and why an expression has that meaning. Devitt's causal theory of meaning is different from the causal theory of reference proposed by Kripke and Donnellan. The causal theory of reference[3, 4], explains how a name gets it referent. The causal theory of reference is not committed to the view that meaning of a name is solely its referent. The Naive Theory, on the other hand, is committed to the view that the meaning of a name is its referent and that the name has no other meaning. Devitt's theory challenges the Naive Theory. Let me explain the difference between the causal theory of reference and the Naive Theory to avoid confusion.

According to the causal theory of reference, a name designates an object solely by virtue of a certain sort of causal or historical chain connecting the name to the object. For example, let us say a baby is born. His parents call him by the name 'Twain'. They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. The name is spread through various sorts of talk as if by a chain. Someone who says something about Twain will be referring to Twain even though he can't remember from whom he first heard of Twain. A certain chain of communication reaching ultimately to Twain does reach the speaker. A causal connection between the name and a use of the name is created by this

chain of communication. A particular use of the name refers to Twain by virtue of this connection. The connection created between the referent and its name by such a chain of communication is also called a 'historical connection'. The connection is historical in the sense that the history of the use of 'Twain' in the community leads to Twain as its referent.

The Naive Theory does not say anything about the connection between a name and its referent. It does not say how a name refers to its referent. It does not explain, for example, why 'Twain' refers to Twain but not to another individual. The Naive Theory makes a very simple and precise claim about a proper name, namely that the meaning (semantic content) of a name is its referent. A name has nothing else to its meaning. Devitt challenges this thesis of the Naive Theory. Devitt's theory posits more than one meaning for a proper name, while the referent is the only meaning of a proper name according to the Naive Theory.

I will be concerned with Devitt's theory, for his theory, if correct, refutes the Naive Theory. I will reject his claim that a proper name has more than one meaning. The main thesis of Devitt's theory that raises concern is this:

> (MT) The meanings of a proper name are its referent and its non-descriptive sense.

The reasons for the thesis that Devitt gives are the following:

> (JMT1) The causal theory of meaning solves the traditional problems.
> (JMT2) The causal theory of meaning serves the purposes of semantics.
> *and* the causal theory implies (MT).

I will contend that some traditional problems are not the problems of semantics. Their solutions do not demand the putative meanings suggested by Devitt. I will also argue that Devitt is mistaken in identifying the purposes of semantics. In short, my argument, in general terms, is that since the goal (the allegedly semantic goal) is not acceptable, the means (the causal theory of meaning), no matter how efficiently it achieves the goal, is not acceptable. Any conclusion (about meanings for proper names) drawn from the theory is not justified by the theory since the theory is not acceptable.

Devitt cites two purposes of semantic theorizing.

> (a) Explaining the behaviour of a speaker
> (b) Obtaining information about reality

We have to find out whether explanation of the behaviour of a speaker is a legitimate semantic goal. Our inquiry has to be very distinctive

with regard to a speaker's behaviour, for psychologists, economists, sociologists, political scientists are also interested in studying the behaviour. A semanticist who wants a share must show that he is interested in a special kind of behaviour which needs unique explanation that is not available anywhere else. This special kind of behaviour presumably would be the linguistic behaviour of a speaker. For example, suppose a speaker has asserted 'Twain is Twain' but denied 'Twain is Clemens'. A psychologist, if at all interested in the assertion and the denial, would explain the responses of the speaker by psychological states like beliefs, desires, memory, recollection, perception, recognition and many more such things, along with some established theories and laws, if any. A philosopher, on the other hand, has many possible ways of explaining the phenomena. One way is to offer a theory of mind which would explain how the linguistic units are processed by a speaker and how she responds to those. Typically it would be a problem in the philosophy of mind. Another way is to search for an explanation in those sentences of the language and see if anything pertaining to those sentences could help explain the phenomena. The latter approach makes those phenomena a problem in the philosophy of language. If the semantic properties of those sentences are relevant to the explanation of the behaviour, then that makes the phenomenon a problem in semantics.

This division appears to be neat. However, Devitt probably will not agree with this division. His disagreement comes from a general consideration of the thoughts of the speaker and the meaning of the expressions of a language. The speaker understands what the sentences mean. The responses are due to his understanding the meanings of the sentences. The speaker's thoughts pertaining to the sentences are relevant to the explanation of the behaviour. Besides, the thoughts of a speaker convey information about the way the world is. For example, people produce and respond to say, 'It is raining', because it is about the weather and the production of the sentence indicates that they have thought about the weather and they want to convey that by producing the sentence. Thoughts have meaning, just like an utterance of an expression has meaning. Linguistic symbols are expressions of thoughts. If we are going to explain the meanings of the expressions in a language, we have to consider speakers' thoughts. Semantics should deal with thoughts. Thus, the division collapses according to Devitt.

In my view, the issues about whether thoughts determine the meanings of the expressions of a language or thoughts derive their senses from meaningful expressions is a very complex issue. We can settle issues about what the meanings of words are without entering into these issues.

Devitt says that the explanation of behaviour is relevant to semantics, since the behaviour results from understanding a sentence's meaning.

Let us pursue the matter further. There is more or less unanimity that semantics deals with meaning, truth, and reference at least. Even Devitt would agree to this, though he differs from most other philosophers regarding what constitutes meaning. Consider the example of economics. Economics deals with money, wealth, and capital, irrespective of what these amount to. Economics does not cease to be economics if money now happens to be paper notes instead of grains. Money has occupied economists in every age. Similarly, meaning, truth, and reference have occupied semanticists in every phase of the development of semantics. Thus, for historical reasons and current practices, there is good reason to hold to the view that semantics deal with, at least, meaning, truth and reference. However, there are prima facie reasons for keeping an open mind as to what constitutes meaning, since semanticists, like Perry, Kripke, Kaplan and Devitt, disagree with each other as to the nature of meaning.

Why should we accept that the meaning of a sentence has to be invoked to explain the behaviour of a speaker? I am not suggesting, by asking such a question, that the meaning of a sentence is not relevant to the explanation of the behaviour of a speaker. I am suggesting that the behaviour of a speaker can be explained without ascribing any meanings to 'Twain is an author' and 'Clemens is an author', other than what the Naive Theory ascribes.

A prima facie reason for ascribing additional meanings is that understanding the meanings of the expressions has caused the responses. But this prima facie reason has to be compelling and convincing. We have to make sure that no other non-semantic factor has contributed to the behaviour. Let us go into the details of a case. A *competent* English speaker understands what 'Twain is an author' means and also understands what 'Clemens is an author' means. He assents to the former but denies the latter. His affirmation of the former sentence indicates that he believes the former sentences to be true. His denial indicates that he believes the later sentence to be false. Actually the speaker does not entertain the thought that 'Twain is an author' is true when he assents to 'Twain is an author' after he hears the sentence. A competent speaker does not concentrate on the sentence upon hearing it. His focus is on what he believes to be said by the sentence. He tries to recollect anything similar to what he believes to be said by the sentence. For example, he could recollect that his teacher had said that same thing the day before. He would then affirm the sentence. If he cannot recollect anything with regard to 'Clemens is an author', he could deny it.

The above explanation talks of beliefs of a speaker in order to explain his different responses. Whether 'Twain = Twain' and 'Twain = Clemens' mean the same or different doesn't matter here. All that matters is his beliefs. If a speaker believes that 'Twain = Twain' is true,

but doesn't believe that 'Twain = Clemens' is true, then he may assent to 'Twain = Twain' while dissenting from 'Twain = Clemens'. If we can find a plausible explanation of how a competent speaker can understand both the sentences, and yet believe the former sentence to be true while not believe the latter sentence to be true, then we can explain his assent and dissent without distinguishing the meanings of these sentences. According to the Naive Theory, a competent speaker believes that Twain = Twain when he understands 'Twain = Twain' and believes that Twain = Clemens when he understands 'Twain = Clemens'. If this is so, then we have to find a plausible explanation of how a speaker can believe that Twain = Clemens, but not believe that 'Twain = Clemens' is true.

Some people think that the Naive Theory cannot provide this explanation, since every competent speaker must know that 'Twain = Twain' is true, and on the Naive Theory, the sentence expresses the same proposition as that expressed by 'Twain = Clemens'. Thus a speaker who understands 'Twain = Clemens', also knows that Twain = Clemens. Thus there is no way of explaining how a speaker can believe that Twain = Clemens, but not believe that 'Twain = Clemens' is true.

But I think there is a way to avoid this objection. If we think of the belief that 'Twain = Clemens' is true in terms of the belief that Twain = Clemens is true via the believing state + Twain = Clemens +[5], then the objection can be avoided. We can say that a speaker believes that Twain = Clemens when he understands 'Twain = Clemens' , but he doesn't believe that Twain = Clemens is true via +Twain = Clemens+. A speaker can dissent from 'Twain = Clemens', if he doesn't believe that Twain = Clemens is true via +Twain = Clemens+.

A speaker's belief about what a sentence means, and what the sentence actually means are two differnet matters. Nevertheless, those beliefs arise while entertaining the sentences. In some sense those beliefs are generated by some linguistic properties of the symbols. Thus, there is scope for theories that would explain the behaviour. I sketched a theory in my PhD dissertation[6] of how sentences of a language generate believing states of a speaker. Such theories are about language. They explain how the symbols affect a speaker. They explicate the properties of the symbols of a language. Symbols do have various properties that affect a speaker's mind besides their semantic properties. To assume that only the semantic properties of symbols affect the beliefs of a speaker is very naive.

A theory that explains how a language, or a part of it, influences the beliefs of a speaker and his behaviour is, no doubt, a theory in philosophy of language. But that need not be a theory in semantics. A theory in semantics is a theory in philosophy of language. But philosophy of language contains more than theories of semantics. The explanation of behaviour does not have to be the goal of semantics.

Thus, any theory of meaning that draws its justification from explaining behaviour lacks sufficient reasons in favour of it.

The identity problem is a problem about cognitive value. It is not a semantic problem. Must we suppose that two sentences that differ in cognitive value also differ in meaning? I think that we do not have to differentiate the meanings of two sentences if they differ in cognitive value. For example, the meaning of 'Hesperus = Hesperus' is the same as the meaning of 'Hesperus = Phosphorus', according to the Naive Theory. But they seem to differ in cognitive value. The problem of opacity, the problem of existence and the problem of empty names do seem to pose semantic problems.[7] Solutions to the identity problem do not need a theory of meaning or so I am arguing here. I will show how Devitt solves the first traditional problem. The problems his theory has would offer ample reasons to reject his theory. Let me describe his theory first.

To understand Devitt's theory of meaning, we must understand first his causal theory of reference. We must know Devitt's view about how names refer. According to Devitt, a name like 'Aristotle' refers to the famous Greek philosopher Aristotle, in virtue of a *causal network*[8] stretching back from our uses to the first uses of the name to refer to Aristotle. Let me explain what a causal netswork is by Devitt's own example. Consider the case of Devitt's cat. Devitt and his wife acquire the cat as a kitten. His wife says, 'Let's call her "Nana"'. Devitt looks at Nana. He looks at his wife. He hears the naming sentence. He perceives Nana. He looks at the ceremony that names her 'Nana'. He knows which the cat and the ceremony that names her 'Nana'. He knows which the cat and the ceremony when he perceives the cat and the ceremony. As a result of the causal interaction among his wife, Nana, and himself, Devitt gains an *ability to designate*[9] the cat by 'Nana'. An ability to designate Nana is a mental state of Devitt brought about by perception of the naming ceremony. If Devitt utters the name in future, the utterance of the name will be produced by the mental state. What exactly this mental state is remains unexplained in Devitt's theory. The ability to designate Nana is *grounded*[10] in Nana if Devitt perceives the referential connection between 'Nana' and Nana. Grounding is the connection between a token of a name and the object named.

Later when Devitt says 'Nana is hungry', his use of the name designates Nana. The use of the name designates Nana because it is produced by the ability to designate Nana which Devitt acquired from the naming-ceremony earlier. Devitt's first use of 'Nana' is causally linked to Nana. Devitt's present uses of 'Nana' are causally linked to Nana. The sequence of events which is a causal connection between a use of the name by Devitt and Nana is a *designating chain*, or a *d-chain*.[11]

Those who were not at the ceremony may borrow the reference from Devitt and his wife, directly or indirectly. If Devitt says to a

friend, 'Our cat is called Nana', or 'This is Nana' in Nana's presence, the friend gains the ability to designate Nana directly. If he says 'Nana is our cat', or 'Our cat is called "Nana"' in Nana's absence, the friend gains the ability to designate Nana by 'Nana' indirectly. The friend's use of 'Nana', is causally linked to Nana via Devitt's remark about the cat. Devitt can even pass on the link between Nana and 'Nana' to someone by using the name in ordinary predication. He can say 'Nana is hiding' and a competent speaker of English who can figure out that 'Nana' is used as a name, will borrow the reference from Devitt. The friend of Devitt's who borrows the reference from Devitt either directly or indirectly has a d-chain that links a use of 'Nana' by him to Nana.

When Devitt used the name 'Nana' for the first time, he used a token of the name. The *token d-chain*[12] is the causal link between the token Devitt used and Nana. The d-chain of the token in question is a sequence of events that started with Devitt's perception of the cat at the naming ceremony, the perception of ceremony, his acquiring the ability to designate Nana by 'Nana', and finally the connection finishing at Devitt saying 'Nana' for the first time.

A token d-chain plays a very significant role in the evolution of the d-chain of a name. Generally, as Devitt's cat example shows, a token d-chain of a name starts with a face-to-face perception of an object. Let us take another example. Suppose that Steve is the director of a company. Debbie, a new employee of his company, sees Steve in a party. Steve introduces himself saying 'I am Steve'. The visual perception of Steve in that circumstance causes a certain experience in Debbie. The token of 'Steve' that Steve utters gets linked to Steve by Debbie's experiences. When a token has been linked to an object in this way, a grounding has occurred. In our example, Debbie realized that the token of 'Steve' refers to Steve. A sequence of causally linked events connected the token of 'Steve' to Steve. That sequence of events is a d-chain of the token.

Consider a different circumstance. Steve is attending a meeting of his subordinates. He enters the conference room and introduces himself saying 'I am Steve'. Steve utters 'Steve' for the second time after the party. It is the second token of 'Steve'. The first token was uttered in the party in front of Debbie. Walter perceived Steve in that setting. Now a sequence of causally linked events occurs. Walter connects the second token of 'Steve' to Steve. This is a different token d-chain. When Walter talks about Steve later to someone, he will pass the link between a token of 'Steve' and Steve of the person. The person will have a token d-chain which contains Walter saying 'Steve' and other relevant events that will link that token of 'Steve' to Steve. The person will borrow the reference from Walter. If Walter talks to Debbie, they will pass the link to each other. Each one will have two token d-chains that originate from the two different sources. For

Debbie, one token of 'Steve' was linked to Steve by the d-chain that originated in the party. The other link for a different token originates from Walter saying 'Steve'. She now has two token d-chains. She realizes that the two tokens are linked to Steve. She has now a *personal network*[13] of token d-chains about Steve. Similarly, Walter has a personal network about Steve. personal network of one person gets linked to the personal network of another during successful communication. It is now obvious that several token d-chains involving one object and a name are possible for each user of the name.

Sometimes a user of a name may have two sets of token d-chains that originate from two different sources but the user does not realize that both of the sets of token d-chains link to the same individual. For example, let us add some more suppositions to our example about Steve. Suppose Steve leads a double life. He is also a British agent spying for that country in America. Suppose that Steve is on a spying mission and has changed his appearance in such a way that no one will recognize him. Debbie, who is ignorant of Steve's double life, visits a hotel in which Steve is staying in disguise as the spy. A friend of Debbie points to Steve and whispers into Debbie's ears, 'That man's name is "Steve" and he is a British spy'. During the stay in the hotel, Debbie and her friend become curious about Steve's activities and watch him closely. One day Debbie sees Steve talking to someone on phone with a suspicious voice. Later Debbie tells her friend 'I saw Steve talking to someone with a suspicious voice'. Debbie's use of the token of 'Steve' is linked to Steve by the token d-chain that started with her friend's remark. Another day, Debbie sees a person talking to a waiter and giving an envelope to him. She hears the person saying, 'Please give this envelope to Steve'. Debbie sees the waiter walking towards the table Steve is sitting at. She sees the waiter putting the envelope on Steve's table and Steve slip the envelope into the pocket of his jacket. Debbie tells her friend later 'Today I saw Steve receiving an envelope from a stranger'. The token of 'Steve' Debbie uses is linked to Steve by a token d-chain that originated from the stranger's request to the waiter. Debbie has unified both of the token d-chains into one network about Steve. This personal network of Debbie's is different from the personal network of hers that has token d-chains that started with Steve introducing himself to Debbie in one case, and Walter talking about Steve in another case. According to Devitt, the examples show that Debbie has two distinct personal networks, each containing a set of token d-chains distinct from the other.

The *sense*[14] of a name for a speaker is a d-chain. But it is not a token d-chain of the name. The sense of a name is a *d-chain type*. D-chains are of the same type if they are in the same causal network. In our example, a sense of 'Steve' for Debbie is the causal network that connects Steve to 'Steve' with regard to his normal life. The name has another sense

for Debbie, a causal network that connects Steve to 'Steve' with regard to his spy life. According to Devitt's view a name may have more than one sense for a user of the name. A d-chain type for a user of the name, it appears to me, is the causal chain that runs through each use of the name by the user in a causal network in virtue of which the user is able to designate the object by that name. The d-chains are of the same type when they are linked together by the inner processing of a speaker into one network.

Another important aspect of Devitt's theory is what he says about how a speaker acquires beliefs. A speaker who uses a name has a set of beliefs associated with that name. Every set of beliefs has a d-chain type underlying it. Devitt is not explicit at all about the connection between a d-chain type and a set of beliefs. My hunch is that a speaker acquires a set of beliefs as a consequence of being hooked up to a d-chain type. Devitt says that a set of beliefs is associated with a name.[15] The relation is a little mysterious.

Two names differ in sense for a user only if the personal network involving one name is distinct from the personal network of the other. Two distinct sets of beliefs are always associated with two distinct personal networks. Two names have the same sense when their two d-chains are of the same type.

The personal network of a speaker may have several token d-chains linked together. A speaker may have two distinct networks for the same name. The token d-chains of a network are not linked to the token d-chains of the other network. Each personal network is a union of d-chains. Each set of d-chains yields a set of beliefs for a speaker.

Devitt is not clear about the characteristics of the link between the d-chain types of a set of personal networks. According to his theory 'George' may have two different senses. Usually it has one sense. It has one sense when two uses of 'George' are linked together by a grounding in the same object. Consider the following example that Devitt gives. There is one person leading a double life with such success that one wrongly thinks that there are two look-alikes. Here the same grounding occurs but two uses of 'George' generate two distinct networks and differ in sense for a user of the name. Devitt also says that two uses of a name have the same sense if they are in the same network. Two tokens are in the same network if the d-chains of those tokens are linked. What is this link? When does it occur? The link is the hooking of the d-chains to the same individual. It occurs when the user of the name realizes the connection. Nothing more is clear about the linkage of d-chains.

Suppose that exactly the same thing happens in the case of 'Twain' and 'Clemens'. One wrongly thinks that there are two guys. So two distinct networks are created. The names differ in sense in Devitt's view.

Two uses of 'George' have the same sense if the d-chain types lead to the same individual and the speaker realizes that the two things are identical. This suggests that 'Twain' and 'Clemens' will have the same sense if the d-chain types lead to the same individual and the speaker realizes that the two things are identical. According to Devitt's view, it seems, the same grounding and same reference borrowing are necessary conditions for two names to have the same sense, but they are not a sufficient condition. He says:

> Different types of grounding cannot be essential to a difference in sense.
> . . . . different types of reference borrowing cannot be essential to a difference in sense.
> What is essential to a difference in sense is that members of the speech community process the input involving the names differently and hence keep the networks distinct; the names are associated with different 'files'. Evidence of this is that two names are involved in distinct sets of beliefs.[16]

From what he says about difference in sense, it seems that what really matters is what a speaker thinks about the name. If what is essential to a difference in sense is that a speaker processes the input involving the two names differently, and so keeps the networks distinct, and that names are associated with different sets of beliefs, then the same grounding in one object and the same referent borrowing is not a sufficient condition for two names to have the same sense.

Mostly we have been discussing how a speaker designates an individual by a name. However, a name is not just a name for a single speaker. A name is a name for many people. A name is a part of a public language. How does a name such as 'Aristotle' refer to Aristotle? Devitt explains the reference of name in terms of the *network of a community*.[17]

The network of a community for a name is the *union*[18] of the personal networks of the members of the *community*[19]. The process of reference borrowing in communication helps a link pass from one user to other users in the community. Devitt is not very clear about what this union of personal networks is supposed to be. I will try to explicate what the network of a community is from what he has said about the personal network of a person, the causal chain that connects a use of a name by a user to the object, and reference borrowing.

The network of a community is a causal network. For simplicity let us confine our discussion to spoken English. Every speaker of a name borrows its reference from someone else. There is a causal link between a speaker's use of the name to the speaker from which he borrowed the reference of the name. A speaker is able to designate a referent by its name by virtue of the causal link between the name and the referent.

When another speaker borrows the reference in successful communication, the causal chain expands. Each use of the name by a different speaker is part of that causal chain. The causal chain will continue for every successful borrowing of the reference. It appears that a name refers to its referent by virtue of a causal chain that contains several speakers' use of the name to refer to its referent. It is very difficult to ascertain the exact nature of this chain from the discussion by Devitt. But it is obvious from Devitt's view that a name refers to its referent by virtue of a causal chain which contains several speakers' uses of a name to refer to its referent.

The sense of a name for a speaker is the d-chain type which is associated with the name for that speaker. In other words, the personal network of the speaker is the *speaker's sense*[20] of the name. Since the network of the community is the union of the personal networks of the speakers in that community, it is plausible to suppose that the sense of a name in a community, that is, the *conventional sense*[21] of a name is the union of the personal networks. However, it is not immediately clear what that conventional sense of a name could be.

There is some hope in explicating the conventional sense of a name in terms of beliefs. Devitt said that the set of beliefs associated with a name for a speaker is essential to the sense of the name for that speaker. The conventional sense of a name, presumably is a set of beliefs that a community associates with the name. Devitt says that some individuals may have two speaker's senses for a name while the name has one conventional sense. He gives the example of 'Russell'. Suppose a speaker associates the belief that Russell is a logician after processing the name. The speaker also associates the belief that Russell is a peace marcher after processing the name. However, the beliefs is a peace marcher after processing the name. However, the beliefs come from two different sources, that is, the speaker has two distinct personal networks. The speaker cannot identify the referent of one network with the referent of the other network. Then the name 'Russell' has two senses for the speaker. On the other hand, the name has one conventional sense. Assuming that the network of a community is the union of personal networks of speakers in the sense that the referent of one personal network gets identified with the referent of every other personal network, the beliefs associated with the name from one personal network will be associated with the beliefs associated with the name by every other personal network. In that case the conventional sense of a name, in terms of beliefs, is the conjunction of the beliefs associated with each personal network. However, the idea of the conventional sense of a name being the conjunction of all the beliefs of every speaker of the community is so implausible that I take it not to be meant by Devitt. Further, there is a problem in so far as speakers in a community might have conflicting beliefs. One way to understand the conventional sense of a name in terms of beliefs is to

consider only the semantically relevant beliefs to constitute the conventional sense of a name. Devitt, however, seems to stop at the d-chains while explicating the notion of a speaker's sense of a name, which does not give us much of a clue about the conventional sense of a name.[22]

Let us see how Devitt's theory of meaning explains the identity problem. 'Twain is an author' differs in cognitive value from 'Clemens is an author' because 'Twain' differs from 'Clemens' in a speaker's sense, that is, the d-chain type brought out by processing 'Twain' is different from the d-chain type brought out for 'Clemens'. The file that is accessed for 'Twain' contains a set of beliefs which is distinct from the set of beliefs accessed for 'Clemens'. Devitt is not clear about what is accessed. Is it the d-chain or the set of beliefs? If it is the d-chain, then there is a problem. A d-chain is presumably a sequence of chain by which a speaker acquires some beliefs while processing events by which a speaker acquires some beliefs while processing 'Twain' initially. There is hardly any convincing evidence for the claim that people access the sequence of events by which they come to have some beliefs. Perhaps Devitt only wants to say that when one *accesses* a d-chain, one's present beliefs are partly *caused* by the d-chain.

If a d-chain is a sequence of causally linked events, the sequence of events is not a good candidate for what is accessed. Debbie, in our example, would hardly be able to access all the events that occurred while Steve introduced himself. Devitt says that the circumstance in which a name is acquired is part of the d-chain. However, people often forget in what circumstance they acquired a name. They cannot recollect the circumstance in which they learned the name while they consider the name later. Perhaps, recollection of a d-chain is not required for access, in Devitt's sense of 'access'. However, people often recollect some beliefs pertaining to 'Twain'. It is more plausible to claim that it is the associated beliefs which are accessed. Assuming that this is what happens, Devitt has to give an account for the distinctness of the two sets of beliefs. Difference in d-chains is not useful in most cases. People simply cannot recollect how they come about the names 'Twain' and 'Clemens'.

If a difference in the sets of beliefs is appealed to in order to explain the behaviour of the speaker, d-chains are redundant. D-chains underlie the set of beliefs that a speaker has at a particular name. There are two possible ways, at least, to explicate the relation between d-chains and a set of beliefs. It may be a causal relation or it may be a relation of association. If the relation is causal, then the d-chains cause the beliefs. We are not sure how recollection works, but it is plausible to suppose that beliefs about a name are more readily accessible than the d-chains. I do not think Devitt would like to say that people access d-chains without having beliefs about them, after he accepts beliefs to be essential to the sense of a name. Let us suppose

that responses are caused by either beliefs or the d-chains or both. We have assumed that d-chains cause beliefs. Now it seems reasonable to suppose that the beliefs are the proximate causes of the behaviour. The beliefs seem to be more directly relevant to the explanation of behaviour than the d-chains.

Maybe the relation between d-chains and the beliefs is an association in the sense that a speaker associates some beliefs with the name which he acquires during a sequence of events. In that case, the speaker may be able to recollect some of the events that occurred when he acquired the name. For example, Walter may recall that Steve took out a pen from his pocket while saying 'I am Steve' in the conference room. But it is highly plausible that a speaker will not be able to recollect a whole sequence of events. Further, it seems that taking out the pen is not essential to the recollection of the link between 'Steve' and Steve. That shows that not all events in the d-chain are semantically relevant. What seems semantically relevant is Steve saying 'I am Steve'. However, if Walter does not believe at the moment that Steve said that, he would not be able to connect the current token of 'Steve' to Steve. It seems that whether the relation between a d-chain and the set of beliefs is causal or an association, the importance of beliefs cannot be ignored in Devitt's theory of meaning.

If beliefs have to be evoked to explain the assent of a speaker to 'Twain is an author' and his dissent from 'Clemens is an author', then there has to be some difference between the set of beliefs associated with 'Twain' and the set of beliefs associated with 'Clemens'. The distinctness of a set of beliefs has to be made either in the number of beliefs or the type of beliefs a set contains. For example, a speaker could recollect that Twain wrote a book while processing 'Twain'. Suppose the speaker has only this belief in the set that is associated with 'Twain'. On the other hand, she could recollect that Clemens is an American while processing 'Clemens'. Suppose again that this is the only belief in the set that is associated with 'Clemens'. In that case the number of beliefs in the first set is the same as the number of beliefs in the second set. Both sets are quantitatively the same. The difference in those two sets cannot be determined by appealing to the numbers of beliefs they contain. The sets have to differ in the type of beliefs they contain. The difference in the types of beliefs, in the light of the explication of the distinctness of the d-chains, has to be explained in the lack of link between the sets. In other words, the beliefs in the Twain-set cannot be linked to the beliefs in the Clemens-set. What does this lack of link amount to? Is it that the speaker cannot infer one belief from the other? Is it that the speaker cannot bring about the belief that Twain is Clemens?

Let us pursue the idea of explaining the lack of link between the two sets in terms of a speaker's inability to infer a belief about Clemens

from the beliefs about Twain in order to understand Devitt's view. There is nothing psychological or logical in the belief that Twain is an author which lets a speaker infer the belief that Clemens is a young country boy. So the speaker cannot infer one belief from the other. We may explain the lack of link in terms of the speaker's inability to infer one belief to the other. If he can infer that Clemens is a young country boy from the beliefs about Twain, then we may say that there is a link between the set of beliefs for 'Twain' and the set of beliefs for 'Clemens'. For example, let us suppose that the speaker has read a biography about Twain. A paragraph in the book describes Twain looking at a mirror before going to a party. He saw gray hairs and lines in his face. Suddenly he could see beyond those lines and gray hairs. He imagined looking at the reflection of himself as a young country boy. The paragraph describes Twain's experience in front of a mirror in these words, 'Twain saw the reflection of Clemens, the young country boy'. Now the speaker who heard that Twain is an author could access a belief that Twain saw the reflection of Clemens, the young country boy in the mirror. The speaker could infer from that belief that Clemens is the young country boy. This would imply that both sets of beliefs are of the same type. Hence 'Twain' and 'Clemens' have the same sense after the inference.

But Devitt will not accept that conclusion. He probably will not accept the inference of the belief that Clemens is a country boy from the beliefs associated with 'Twain' as sufficient for sameness of sense, unless the speaker has the belief that Twain is Clemens. A speaker's belief that Twain is Clemens is a very crucial belief for ascertaining the similarity in the speaker's sense of two names if we are going to explicate Devitt's view about the similarity of sense, in terms of beliefs, that the speaker associates with each name.

It seems to me that a speaker can integrate the beliefs associated with 'Twain' and the beliefs associated with 'Clemens' into one set of beliefs about a single individual only if he realizes that Twain and Clemens are the same person, that is, if he believes that Twain is Clemens via +Twain is Clemens+. Since in our example the speaker can infer the belief that Clemens is a country boy from the beliefs associated with 'Twain' without having the belief that Twain is Clemens via +Twain is Clemens+, we may reject the idea that linkage could be explained in terms of inference of one belief set from another in case of two different names. Mostly the d-chains of a single name are linked together. If that is the case, let us see if we can make a case for linkage for a single name as an inference from one belief set to another.

Suppose the speaker acquired the name 'Twain' by reading his book, *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*. Subsequently, he met a visitor who introduced himself as 'Twain' and said that he was an author. But the speaker does not recognize him as the author of the book, *The*

Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Now the speaker has two sets of beliefs for 'Twain'. One set of beliefs has as its source his reading the book. The other set of beliefs has as its source his meeting the stranger. The first set has the belief that Twain wrote *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* and the belief that Twain is an author. The second set has the belief that Twain is an author. Strictly speaking, the second set has also the belief that Twain is an author of *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*. This is so, if we accept the view that propositions are objects of beliefs and that the propositions of one set are the propositions of the other set. Both sets contain the same propositions because 'Twain' in both contexts refers to Twain and the beliefs are associated with 'Twain'. So we can say that if the speaker has the beliefs of the first set, then he also has those beliefs as the beliefs of the second set. We can also hold its converse. Thus, there is a link between the set of beliefs that has as its source his reading the book and the set of beliefs that has as its source his meeting the stranger. The set of beliefs are of the same type. So the two occurrences of 'Twain' should have the same sense. The speaker should say 'yes' to 'Twain is the author of *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*' when asked. He should also say 'Yes' to 'Twain is the author of *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*', when the visitor is pointed out and he thinks of Twain as 'the stranger he met'. But he might say 'No' to the latter. Inference from one belief set to another as a criterion of distinguishing the sets, when applied in such cases fails to explain the difference in behaviour.

Let us see if the explanation of the sense of a name in terms of d-chains will help in finding an explanation of the sense of a name in terms of the beliefs associated with the name. The token d-chains of 'Twain' unify into one personal network if the speaker identifies the referents of all the tokens of the name to be the same referent. The same conditions hold for 'Clemens'. Both the names have the same sense if the speaker unifies the networks of the names into one network by identifying the referent of 'Twain' of the first network with the referent of 'Clemens' of the second network. So if a speaker accepts 'Twain is Clemens', then 'Twain' and 'Clemens' have the same sense for him. Further, a set of beliefs are associated with each name for the speaker. It seems plausible to suppose that according to Devitt's theory, two names will have the same sense if the speaker unifies the two sets of beliefs into one set of beliefs. The unification of the beliefs will be possible if the speaker has a belief that Twain is Clemens.

It seems that what ultimately matters according to Devitt's theory is what speakers think while using a name. If they have slightly different sets of beliefs associated with two names due to some differences in d-chains, they may end up not only with two different senses for two different names, but may also end up with two senses for two tokens of the same name. For example, 'Twain' and 'Clemens' may have two

different senses. Further, two tokens of 'Twain' may have different senses. But the problem with the explanation of the sense of a name in terms of the beliefs associated with the name is that co-referential names may be associated with the same set of beliefs. Suppose the belief associated with the name 'Twain' is that Twain is an author, and the belief associated with 'Clemens' is that Clemens is an author. But these are the same belief, assuming that beliefs are considered to be propositional objects, that is, propositions are objects of beliefs, and the proposition that Twain is an author and the proposition that Clemens is an author are the same belief. That they are the same belief, follows from Devitt's view and a certain view about propositions. They are the same belief if the propositions that are objects of those beliefs are the same proposition. If so, then the speaker's sense of 'Twain' cannot be differentiated from the speaker's sense of 'Clemens' by appealing to the belief associated with the names.

The heart of the matter, I think, is that the speaker has two different believing *states* (not beliefs) with regard to 'Twain' in those cases. It is those believing states that cause the responses as well as explain why the difference has occurred. If the speaker says 'No' to 'Twain is the author of *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*', that is because the speaker does not have the believing state +Twain is the author of *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*+ but says 'Yes' when he has the believing state in question. The apparatus of d-chains and networks may explain why the speaker has certain believing states, but they are redundant here. If they are redundant, why keep them?

If the explanation of behaviour is the goal, then the set of beliefs, the believing states, and the psychological processes involving two believing states are relevant and enough for the explanation. All of these d-chains and networks are burdensome additional apparatus and unnecessary.

If communicating reality by sentences containing names is the goal, then d-chains and networks are irrelevant because they are not the kinds of things that are conveyed by sentences. Suppose 'Twain' has a meaning which is constituted by the referent and the network of the community N. For example, suppose Jean is the school teacher in a small town. The people of the town associate the belief that Jean is the school teacher with the name 'Jean'. The belief that Jean is the school teacher is a part of the network, hence part of the meaning of 'Jean'. However it is very unlikely that the belief is passed every time someone in the community talks about Jean. Suppose Jean is supposed to attend a community meeting. She fell sick and realized that she would not be able to attend the meeting. She sends a messenger to the chairman of the meeting with the message that she cannot come to the meeting. The messenger boy delivers the message to the chairman by saying 'Jean cannot come to the meeting.' Now the question is whether the

messenger boy communicates to the chairman that Jean is the school teacher. It seems that the messenger boy does not communicate the belief that Jean is the school teacher when he says 'Jean cannot come to the meeting'. Further, it seems that the chairman can fully understand what the messenger boy said without having a belief that Jean is the school teacher. It seems that the belief is not essential to understand the message.

Furthermore, all styles of writing, various verbal expressions of the sentence 'Twain is the author' and its versions in other languages have the same meaning. It would be extremely difficult to translate the English sentence 'Twain is an author' into another language if a d-chain is considered to be part of the meaning of 'Twain'. For example, consider the community of Americans who understand 'Twain' and the community of Oriyas who understand an Oriya version of 'Twain'.[23] Some of the stories and books of Twain are translated into Oriya. I am an Oriya. I read some of the stories in Oriya. I think the causal network, for the Oriya version of 'Twain', includes the name's appearance in books and magazines, literary conversations and Twain's pictures that are accessible to Oriyas. On the other hand, the causal network in America for 'Twain' doesn't seem to include this stuff. I think Devitt's view entails that the Oriya version of 'Twain' has a meaning for Oriya speakers that is different from the meaning of 'Twain' for American speakers. However, I think that both the names have the same meaning. I do not think the translator considered any causal network while translating 'Twain' into Oriya. I also think that I fully understood the Oriya version of 'Twain wrote *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*'. I did not have any problem in understanding the Oriya version of 'Twain'. It seems to me that there is no plausible way of translating a causal network of a name in a language into another language. Further, translation of names does not seem to be hindered by lack of any convenient way of translating the causal networks of those names.

Let us see how Devitt's theory fares if we just stick to the idea that the sense of name is the causal chain, that is the causal network of the community. Competent speakers grasp the meaning of the expression they understand. Assuming that a causal chain is part of the meaning of a name, a speaker will be expected to grasp the causal chain when he understands 'Russell is a philosopher' because a competent speaker grasps the meanings of the words that he understands. There is hardly any evidence of a competent speaker being aware of such a chain.

Devitt gives another argument from considerations concerning methodology for the conclusion that 'Twain' and 'Clemens' differ in meaning. He suggests that when constructing a semantic theory, one should start with judgements about *similarities* and *differences* in meaning, and construct a theory in order to accommodate those judgements. I

think Devitt is right about that. In general terms, this is what a semanticist does in order to test a theory. Devitt claims that his theory accommodates some examples of judgements about similarities and differences in meaning. I think, on the other hand, that the examples he considers are very controversial and that his theory is not vindicated by those examples.

Devitt offers some examples which he claims to be noncontroversial instances of judgements about a difference in meaning. For example, he claims that most people judge 'John believes that Twain is an author' and 'John believes that Clemens is an author' to have different meanings. He further claims that the sentences differ in meaning. I believe, to the contrary, that the examples concern a very controversial issue about belief ascriptions. There is no plausible agreement on how beliefs' reports are to be interpreted. There is the problem of individuation of beliefs and the content of a belief. Solutions to these issues would contribute significantly to the issue of accurate belief ascriptions. Devitt gives the impression that there is no problem in belief ascriptions and starts from there. He starts with the controversial issue of belief ascription and arrives at what he claims to be unquestionable evidence for putative meanings for proper names. I think this area should be avoided. Some other area of meaning attribution, such as simple sentences, should be fairly non-controversial and should be considered as a starting point for the search for meanings.

Devitt says that a name has a non-descriptive sense, a network of d-chains. A name has a speaker's sense and a conventional sense. Let us consider the conventional sense. The conventional sense of a name is the union of all personal networks. Each personal network has several d-chains which are grounded into one object. A psychological process helps a person link all these d-chains by realizing that all these d-chains are grounded in the same object. Let us consider the use of a name in communication. Let me spell out, first, some general assumptions about the communication I am making. I believe the assumptions I am going to spell out are plausible assumptions about language and communication.

Language is a vehicle of communication. Words, phrases and sentences are used to communicate. Speakers express their emotional states as well as speak about the world by using language. For example, one can express anger, remorse, frustration, hope and many other emotions by using a simple indicative sentence (in a context) such as 'Bill Clinton is the President now.' For example, suppose Steve and Dan spent some of their valuable time campaigning for Bush's re-election. Steve may use the previous sentence to communicate anger and frustration to Dan shortly after Clinton's victory. Besides communicating those states, Steve also communicates that Bill Clinton is the President now. Speakers may use a sentence in many different ways to

communicate, for example, by changing the tone and stressing a part of the sentence. However, not everything a speaker wants to communicate is a part of the meaning of such a sentence. Irrespective of the context, the style, and the psychological process of the speaker, other speakers understand him and acknowledge something they grasp. A competent speaker grasps what the sentence says and communicates that to other speakers. Every use of the sentence is supposed to retain that, and every user of the sentence is supposed to grasp and communicate it to others by virtue of using the sentence. Whatever the speaker grasps and communicates is supposed to be the meaning of the sentence. When a speaker hears or reads the sentence 'Bill Clinton is the President', what seems to be grasped by him is that Bill Clinton is the President. Given these assumptions about language and communication, no union of networks seems to be grasped and understood by the speaker. When he tries to communicate, he does not try to communicate how he came to know who Bill Clinton is. He just communicates that Bill Clinton is the President by using the sentence.

I have tried to show in this paper that Devitt's causal theory of meaning does not solve the traditional problem, that is, the problem about assent and dissent, in any satisfactory way. Further, I raised some questions about the viability of his causal theory of meaning as an alternative to the Naive Theory.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Michael Devitt, 'Against Direct Reference' *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 14, 1989, pp. 206–40.
2. This is Wettstein's example. Howard Wettstein, 'Has Semantic Rested On a Mistake?', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 83, 1986, p. 195.
3. Keith Donnellan, 'Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions', in *Semantics of Natural Language,* edited by D. Davidson and G. Harman, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1972, pp. 356–79.
4. Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980.
5. I have sketched a theory of believing states in my PhD dissertation—'The Problem of Cognitive Value and Theories in Semantics', a dissertation of the University of Rochester, New York, 1994. See the dissertation for a discussion on believing states.
6. The dissertation was submitted to the University of Rochester, New York for a PhD degree, 1994.
7. There is a complaint that the theory of direct reference makes 'Aristotle exists' trivial and 'Aristotle does not exist' meaningless. This complaint has come down as the problem of existence. The empty-name problem is a complaint that non-referring names like 'Santa Claus' makes a sentence lack complete meaning. I have kept these two problems aside.
8. Michael Devitt, *Designation,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1981, pp. 25–32; see also, Michael Devitt, 'Against Direct Reference', *Midwest Studies in*

Philosophy, op.cit., pp. 227–28.
9. Michael Devitt, *Designation*, op.cit., pp. 7–8, 40–3, 278.
10. Michael Devitt, *Designation*, op.cit., pp. 27–34; see also, Michael Devitt, 'Against Direct Reference', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, op.cit., pp. 227–28.
11. Michael Devitt, *Designation*, op.cit., pp. 129–57, 239–40; see also, Michael Devitt, 'Against Direct Reference', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, op.cit., pp. 227–28.
12. Ibid.
13. Michael Devitt, 'Against Direct Reference', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*', op.cit., pp. 227–29.
14. Ibid., p. 227.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 228.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
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22. Ibid.
23. The pronunciation of 'Twain' in Oriya is similar to the pronunciation of 'Twine'.

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Fallibilism and Putnam

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I

From the many topics in Putnam's philosophical writings which might profitably be discussed I am going to choose one in the present paper: fallibilism.

It might be agreed that one major obligation imposed upon philosophers is to seek an intelligible account of the whole reality or, if you like, of the world as a whole. Hilary Putnam, in his attempt to offer a view about the world, claims that there may be, and in fact are, different views of the world as a whole at the same time. For, according to him, any view of the world emerges essentially from within a specific conceptual scheme and is intelligible only if considered in terms of that particular scheme. This, if true, at once gives birth to the thesis that there could simultaneously be different intelligible world-views, since there could simultaneously be different viable conceptual frameworks. In this way, Putnam concludes that ' . . . there is more than one true version of reality . . .'[1]

Now a question may be raised whether or not any such true version of the world is true once and for all. Putnam replies in the negative. He argues, to put the point briefly, that since man is essentially fallible, no such view could be taken to be immune to revision. Thus, Putnam makes the essential uncertainty of any world-view contingent on man's essential fallibility. This is how, as I see, Putnam exploits the thesis of *fallibilism*. In the sequel, I shall deal with this trend of Putnam's philosophy.

II

Let me start the discussion of Putnam's fallibilism with the following statement:

Even a statement that really is analytic is not immune from the revision, for even if a statement is *in fact* a law of logic, . . . we are not *prohibited* by any methodological canon from revising it; we shall just be making a mistake if we do . . . (. . . 'Fallibilism' does not become an incorrect doctrine when one reaches the truth in a scientific inquiry).[2]

Let us accept Putnam's view that we can never argue that any statement is immune from revision. In the light of this, Putnam's assertion that we would be *mistaken* in making a revision with respect to a 'really analytic' statement, seems to be rather unwarranted or at any rate idle speculation. For one thing, we could never be in a position to ascertain that any statement is 'really analytic' and hence is immune from revision, and consequently we could never seriously ascertain that we could be *mistaken* in making a revision with respect to any statement whatsoever.

If, on the other hand, it is admitted that we could see and ascertain that a given statement is 'really analytic' and hence *is* immune from revision, then Putnam's position, as expressed in the above lines, would become hopelessly problematic. For, this admission entails that we can legitimately claim to have revised a certain statement even if we acknowledge that the statement is immune from revision and hence we *are* mistaken in revising it. That is, a revision would make sense and be legitimate even if it is mistaken. It would be quite silly to treat ourselves as fallible if it is *simultaneously* admitted that we have made a genuine revision with respect to a certain statement and that we are mistaken or even may be mistaken in making the revision, so that the statement in question may nevertheless well be true. How could we be said to be fallible if our fallibility can never ensure falsity?

In the same article, Putnam remarks: 'We never have an absolute guarantee that we are right, even when we are'.[3] This suggests that we can never assuredly conclude that we *are* wrong on a certain issue, since it may be that we *are* right on that particular issue. In other words, it is really possible that we are all the while right, although we cannot really possible that we are right on any issue. But this entails a rather serious claim that we are right on any issue. But this entails a rather serious point about our fallibility. It is usually agreed that to say that we are fallible is to say that it is *possible* that we are always committing mistakes. But then if we can *never* ensure that we *are* wrong on *any* issue, how could we ensure that we *are* fallible? If we never have an absolute guarantee that we are right, could we ever have an absolute guarantee that we are wrong? If Putnam is to be consistent, he must answer, 'No'. So we never have an absolute guarantee that we are *wrong*. Consequently, we could never ensure that we are fallible. It thus seems that, if we accept the statement just quoted with all its implications, we could never conclude that man is a fallible creature.

In another article, Putnam writes:

> The claim of the moderate doctrine (which Putnam accepts) is that there are no truths which it would never be rational to give up; for every truth or putative truth, there *are* circumstances under which it would be rational to accept its denial.[4]

But, then, Putnam immediately warns us that the statement that there are no *a priori* truths should not itself be taken to be true *a priori*. For, as Putnam argues, this position, that there are no *a priori* truths, has been reached and acknowledged 'on the basis of an induction from the history of science'.[5]

Now the crucial question is whether induction could ever give us the licence to *conclusively* conclude that a certain position necessarily holds good. The answer should be, 'No', and Putnam would, I hope, agree, since Putnam does not take inductively reached conclusions to be *absolutely* true once and for all.

But, then, he himself concludes, as just quoted, that 'for every truth . . . , there *are* circumstances' that *would* lead us 'to accept its denial'. This suggests that, according to Putnam, *every* truth *would* someday turn out to be rationally unacceptable. How is he so sure of it? Does he obtain *this* truth from some non-inductive grounds? If so, and if this is absolute, then there *is* at least one absolute truth, namely, no truth that is inductively obtained is absolute. To avoid this self-inconsistent position, Putnam should have rather said that a truth which is now taken to be rationally acceptable *might* (and not *would*) turn out someday to be rationally unacceptable.

At one place Putnam urges that whatever statement we take to be true or rationally acceptable, we do so from 'within a theory of rationality'.[6] As long as we continue to accept this theory of rationality, we could not rationally judge the statement in question to be not true or rationally unacceptable. And *if* a change takes place in future with respect to the theory of rationality we endorse, the rational status of the alleged statement would in all likelihood be affected. But this does not—and this I want to emphasize—entitle anyone to conclude that any such change *is forthcoming.*

Putnam believes[7] that anyone at any point can speculate whether 'an ideal theory of rationality' would permit us to believe in the truth of rational acceptability of the statement as we now do believe, and hence Putnam treats every truth as theory-relative and 'provisional'. So he considers it to be 'a really important thesis' that 'no statement is totally immune to revision'.[8] But this view commits Putnam—whether he is aware or not—to accept that *no* given theory of rationality could strictly be regarded as 'an *ideal* theory of rationality', since, in Putnam's view, *any* statement that is regarded as true in *any* theory of rationality is not totally immune to revision. Surely it would not be in order to

regard a theory of rationality as an *ideal* one if every statement it ensures as true is open to be discarded.

But if *no* given theory of rationality could be regarded as *ideal*, the claim that in future 'an ideal theory of rationality' would or even might emerge becomes baseless or at any rate dubious—even as a speculation.

But even this view—which seems to be a consequence of Putnam's claim that any statement is revisable—that no given theory of rationality could be regarded as ideal is confronted with a difficulty. The trouble consists in specifying the exact ground on which one could conclude that no given theory could be regarded as ideal. Putnam might answer: this is the lesson we should take from the history of science. History of science teaches us that a theory which was acknowledged to be a quite rational theory at a given period of time came to be rejected at a subsequent period. But this sort of argument—which is basically inductive in character—at best entitles us to conclude that the theory of rationality that we now acknowledge to be true *might* (again not *would*) fail to continue to be so in future, and consequently that the 'truths' that we now endorse in terms of our theory of rationality *might* (not *would* once again) fail to be so endorsed in future.

All this shows, once more, that what Putnam should and could claim is that all truths *may be* or are possibly provisional and not *are* provisional. This being so, Putnam appears not justified when he states, ' . . . our answer (i.e. an affirmative answer to the question, 'Is it rational to believe in the truth of s?') itself *is* a provisional one and . . . the true shape of future theory *will be* different in many unforeseen ways, from what we now envisage'.[9] He should have replaced 'is' by 'may be' and 'will be' by 'might be'.

It is important to notice what implications the 'possibly provisional' thesis bears for our *fallibility*. The most important point that is entailed by the 'possibly provisional' thesis is that man's fallibility does not imply the awkward thesis that every statement is fated to be rejected or revised. It (fallibility) rather implies that man should always remain prepared that what he now finds quite rational to accept *may* turn out to be rationally unacceptable, that what he now finds unquestionably true *may* eventually become modified and even cancelled. There is no denying that man commits mistakes. But there is no necessity that man is systematically committing mistakes. No doubt man is always in the *risk* of error. But it would be too much to hold that man is all the time in the midst of error. Furthermore, if the fallibilist argues that *every* statement *is* false or (more weakly) *is* liable to be false, then the fallibilist's own statement would not itself hold water. Put in these terms fallibilism becomes self-defeating.

Truly speaking, in order to sustain his thesis, the fallibilist need not deny the thesis that as long as we do not come across any good reason

to question or abandon the truth of a statement, we have every right to be totally sure that the statement *is* true and not is *likely* to be true. It is sometimes urged that, at any rate, the reasons that people find, at any point of time, for acknowledging the truth of, say s, are to be inadequate, since s might turn out in future to be false. But it is crucial to recognize that so long as we do not find any good reason to abandon s, we are entitled to claim the reasons for accepting s to be *adequate*. Or else, we must not claim that s is true in the first place. To be sure, to hold that the reasons on which we accept s as true are not adequate is virtually to withdraw the claim that s is true. We cannot really claim truth on admittedly inadequate reasons. To do so is to render all truths tentative, and in that case we would have constantly to wonder if we are ever able to establish the *truth* of any statement. I am not saying that the reasons we provide in support of truth of any statement *have to be* final. But then it is silly to say that they *have to be* inconclusive. To repeat, we are entitled to treat the reasons we now find to be the reasons for the truth of s as convincing and adequate, until we come to have further convincing grounds to question the former as adequate reasons for the truth of s. So there is nothing for the fallibilist to be constantly haunted by the thought that we are mistaken. Only we must not dogmatically hold on to a so-far-accepted truth, if convincing reasons are found for questioning it. But to say this is *not* to say that we must always accept that our *present* views are not free from error.

At this point, I want to add a rather interesting and unnoticed point about our fallibility. It is often urged, quite correctly in my opinion, that man can never claim that the 'truths' he now admits of are ultimate or final; they *might* be questioned, revised and even abandoned in future. Thus I entirely agree with Putnam when he puts the revisability-thesis in a guarded manner: ' . . . we cannot be sure that it would *never* be rational in *any* context to give up a statement that is regarded (and legitimately so *in a given context*) as a "necessary" truth'.[10]

But then it is rarely noted that the same holds good equally of falsity.[11] If man might be erroneous in acknowledging some statement as true, he might, by the same token, be equally erroneous in concluding that a certain statement is false. Fallibility, provided it holds, must hold in either case in the same way. This, if correct, entails an extremely important point which is this: Man can never conclude either (a) that any experiment—however crucial—has *proved* or established a theory *for ever*, or (b) that any experiment—however severe—has *refuted* a theory *for ever*. If, because of human fallibility, there could be no terminal foundation in respect of *truth*, then, by the same token, there could be no such foundation with respect to *falsity* either. The attitude to the fact of human fallibility is different on the part of

pessimists and optimists in philosophy. The former say that our knowledge is an endless chain of errors and delusions, whereas the latter view it (knowledge) to be an endless chain of better, less faulty understanding of the world. In truth, however, as just noted, there is no ground for our being either a pessimist or an optimist with respect to our knowledge, if only for the reason that, because of our essential fallibility, at no point can we ensure that what we (now) know is incorrigibly erroneous or irrevocably correct. In brief, if nothing can be asserted finally and irrevocably, then all assertions, comprising acknowledgments *and* refutations, are tentative.

The implication of all this for the present context is clear. The 'version' which man *rejects* as a correct version of the world might well turn out at a later time to be a *correct* version of the world, since man might be erroneous in acknowledging something as rejectable. So, just as an admittedly true version of the world, i.e. a version we may have reason to accept, might turn out to be a false version of the world, similarly an admittedly false version of the world, i.e. a version we may have reason to reject, might turn out to be a true version of the world. To deny any of the two possibilities is to assume our own infallibility. Invoking Hume, we can say: A true fallibilist will be diffident of his philosophical doubts as well as of his philosophical convictions.[12]

If I am correct in the foregoing, then I have something of consequence to observe about Putnam. Putnam seems to endorse the view that man's fallibility indicates that his judgements are infinitely perfectible.[13] In other words, in his view the discourse of human judgements is, in terms of man's fallibility, getting progressively more and more 'perfected'. But, as just noted, because of man's fallibility, there could be no guarantee that a subsequent world-view would be a *better* version of the world than an earlier one. Since man may be erroneous in rejecting *as well as* accepting a world-version, there could be no guarantee that every subsequent world-view would be more perfect than the (preceding) one which it replaces or revises; on the contrary, it might transpire on a still later revision that it is the former world-view that is really the correct version of the world. No doubt this rarely happens. But the possibility of this cannot be *a priori* excluded. Consequently, it would be a hasty, if not faulty, observation that the 'striving forward' would necessarily be *progressive* in nature. Human fallibility, rightly understood, reveals that the growth of any human study does neither presuppose its imperfection nor entail its development.

I shall conclude my essay by saying something more about Putnam's thesis of 'ideal rational acceptability'. In an article, Putnam writes: 'A statement is true, in my view, if it would be justified under epistemically ideal conditions for many sorts of statements. . . '[14] In another article, he remarks: ' . . . truth itself in my view, is an idealization of rational

acceptability'.[15] He reaffirms this view again in yet another article in which he says: ' . . . I . . . believe that the only notion of truth that makes coherent sense is the . . . view that sees truth as an idealization of rational acceptability'.[16]

Now all these statements entail Putnam's favourite thesis that genuine truth can be had only from 'the ideal rational theory', only if deemed acceptable from the 'ideal perspective of rationality'.

It might be enquired whether man could ever come to own the 'ideal perspective of rationality' ensuring thereby genuine truth, i.e. the truth that is not subject to further revision only because it has been ensured in an *ideal* perspective of rationality. Putnam would respond in the negative. He unambiguously declares: ' . . . we (i.e. men) cannot really attain epistemically ideal conditions, or even be absolutely certain that we have come sufficiently close to them'.[17] Indeed, Putnam must insist that man can never ensure genuine truth, i.e. the truth once and for all, for otherwise Putnam would not be able to maintain his other pet thesis that all human truths are revisable. (In fairness to Putnam, I must report in parenthesis that he exempts at least, and perhaps at best, one proposition, viz. 'Not every statement is true' from the scope of revisability.[18] But I think this concession would not affect or alter Putnam's overall position that all important human truths are revisable. He himself considers the above truth as a 'trivial' one).[19]

Now from both of these theses—one, man could never come to own the 'ideal perspective of rationality' which alone could ensure genuine, i.e. eternal, truth, and the other, every human 'truth' is revisable, it follows as a corollary that man can never *know* genuine truth. For we cannot say that we *know* a truth to be genuine and eternal, and admit at the same time that this truth is revisable. We cannot have the cake and eat it at the same time. To make room for human knowledge to encompass genuine truths, Putnam would have to say either (a) that a revisable truth is still a genuine truth thereby abandoning the thesis that genuine truth is to be had only in the 'ideal perspective of rationality'; or (b) that it is at any rate possible for man to own the 'ideal perspective of rationality' and hence to know genuine truths, thereby abandoning the thesis that all human truths are revisable.

Putnam, however, gives the impression in one of his books that he is against *dehumanization* of any ideal perspective of rationality. There he appears to be against the idea that there could be any perspective—however 'ideal' or 'rational' it might be—which would be totally free of human mistakes in interpreting the world.[20] Here Putnam deprecates the notion of absolute perspective of rationality and regards each and every perspective as temporary and revisable. He holds at another place: 'Truth, in the only sense in which we have

a vital and working notion of it, is rational acceptability (or, rather, rational acceptability under sufficiently good epistemic conditions; and which conditions are epistemically better or worse is relative to the type of discourse in just the way rational acceptability itself is)'[21].

So any 'rational acceptability under sufficiently good epistemic conditions' derives its rationale or credibility from the 'appropriate type of discourse', i.e the type of discourse in which it is acknowledged to be operative. But if so, then—and it is crucial—no 'rational acceptability under sufficiently good epistemic conditions' could be said to suffer any jolt, as long as the 'appropriate type of discourse' would obtain for it. In the 'appropriate kind of discourse', each is *absolute.* You might say here that *a certain rational acceptability under a certain set of sufficiently good conditions* would at any rate lose its rationale or operative force only if the 'appropriate type of discourse' ceases to obtain. So how could any of them be *absolute?* But, then, it is important to keep in mind that any such rational acceptability is claimed to be absolute *only* in relation to the particular appropriate type of discourse; that is to say, each 'rational acceptability' is meant and expected to be valid *only* in 'the appropriate type of discourse'. So every 'rational acceptability under a set of sufficiently good epistemic conditions' is *absolutely* valid *within* its appropriate type of discourse. Consequently, it makes little sense to treat any specific 'rational acceptability under a set of sufficiently good conditions' as better or worse in respect of *its* appropriate type of discourse. If any such 'rational acceptability' is deemed better or worse in respect of some *different* type of discourse, that would clearly be not its virtue or fault, only because it has not been meant to sustain itself as 'rational acceptability' in any *alien* discourse.

Putnam, in any case, contrary to his humanization of 'rational acceptability', does not seem ultimately to like the idea that truth be confined to the territory of any particular spatio-temporal discourse. He concludes one of his essays with these words: 'We don't have an Archimedean point; we always speak the language of time and place; but the rightness and wrongness of what we say is not *just* for a time and a place.'[22]

Given Putnam's discourse-relative view of truth I find these lines a bit puzzling. His discourse-relative account of truth suggests that we invariably acknowledge something as true solely in terms of the rules and criteria available and prevalent in our discourse. *If* Putnam allows that we could and do exploit rules and criteria of any alien discourse for recognizing the rightness or wrongness of what we say, then his view that 'we always speak the language of a time and place' would lose its poignancy. And if *this* be the case, then it must be admitted that *some* rules and criteria are present and operative in both of the two discourses in question. But, then, inasmuch as what *we* say is right

(or wrong) is *also* right (or wrong) in another discourse, it is not strictly true that we always speak *only* in the language of our time and our place.

It might be urged that there is after all a difference between *saying something* and *recognizing the rightness or wrongness of what is being said.* Well, nobody ever denies that people at a certain time and place always *speak* in the language available to them, i.e. the language of their time and place. But then this question would be raised: Do they *recognize* the truth-value of what they say solely in terms of the rules and criteria available in their language alone? If Putnam replies, Yes, then he would have to revoke his thesis that the rightness or wrongness of what we say is not just for a time and a place. If he replies, No, then he would have to admit that we do *not* recognize the rightness or wrongness of what we say invariably in terms of the rules and criteria available in our own language alone. And this admission would ultimately lead to the acceptance of some *universal* rules and criteria present in all human languages. I do not know whether Putnam would concede this.

To put the above point slightly differently: It is true that *saying that X is right* has to be governed solely by the rules and criteria of a particular space-time-bound language. But, as Putnam, himself admits, it is the *rational acceptability*—and not just saying—of X's being right that ensures the rightness of X. Now Putnam urges in the lines quoted above that the rightness (or wrongness) of what we say is not confined to a particular space-time-bound discourse. Consequently, Putnam has to accept that the *rational acceptability* of rightness (or wrongness) of what we say transcends, at times at least, the limits of the given language and hence of the given discourse. I do not know, once again, whether Putnam would accept this.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Hilary Putnam, 'Models and Reality' in his *Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 19.
2. Hilary Putnam '"Two Dogmas" Revisited' *Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 96.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 98, 'There is at least one *a priori* truth.' My emphasis.
5. Ibid.
6. Hilary Putnam, 'Analyticity and Apriority' *Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 130.
7. Cf. Ibid.
8. Hilary Putnam, '"Two Dogmas" Revisited' *Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 95.
9. Hilary Putnam, 'Analyticity and Apriority' *Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 130.

10. Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 84.
11. Karl Popper once speaks of 'the uncertainty of every empirical falsification' and he adds that this uncertainty 'should not be taken too seriously . . . There are a number of important falsifications which are as "definitive" as general human fallibility permits'. (See his *Realism and the Aim of Science*, Hutchinson, London, 1983, p. xxiii).
12. Cf. David Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book-I (Edited by D.G.C. Macnabb), The Fontana Library, 1962, p. 322.
13. See Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 167.
14. Hilary Putnam, 'Reference and Truth', *Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 84.
15. Hilary Putnam, 'Philosophers and Human Understanding', *Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 200.
16. Hilary Putnam, 'Quantum mechanics and the observer', *Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 267.
17. Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 55.
18. See Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 83.
19. See Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 84.
20. See Hilary Putnam, *Representation and Reality*, A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1988, pp. 91–92.
21. Hilary Putnam, 'Why reason can't be naturalized', *Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 231.
22. Ibid., p. 247.

Understanding Śaṅkara Vedānta[*]

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Understanding Śaṅkara Vedānta is a problem of enormous complexity, as different scholars of genuine philosophical concern have understood Śaṅkara in different ways and also because Śaṅkara's own writings, on account of their richly suggestive character, seem to accommodate diverse interpretations with an apparent ease. Under the circumstance it would be wrong to suppose that there is an ideal mode of understanding Śaṅkara Vedānta and that there is something like *the understanding* of the subject. One can at best expect to highlight certain significant aspects of Śaṅkara Vedānta by following the text as closely as possible and understanding in this sense of some significant aspects that would leave the possibility open for further aspects to be highlighted by some other scholar.

With this preamble, which is not merely a ritual but a real necessity in this context, I would draw the attention of all concerned to the fact that Śaṅkara's philosophy needs to be understood, not as an isolated phenomenon but in the background of a vast Vedāntic literature of which it claims to be an authentic representation. It is well-known that all along in his work Śaṅkara not only gives profuse reference of Vedāntic passages but also speaks of his own philosophy as the Upaniṣadic Philosophy (*aupaniṣadaṃ darśanam*[1]). It is significant that Śaṅkara with all his philosophical acumen and brilliance as the propounder of Advaita, a philosophy that does not have a parallel in the history of human thought, is designated as a faithful commentator (*Bhāṣyakāra*) of the great Vedāntic tradition. It is at the same time interesting to note what Śaṅkara, the philosopher, does with the Vedāntic texts and the manner in which he deals with them for propounding his Advaita philosophy.

Śaṅkara pointed out that the Vedāntic literature refers to an existing reality in Brahman and that the passages like '*Tattvamasi*' (That thou art) are meant to refer to this existing reality, not to any injunctions or

prohibitions. So Brahman can be realized only by concentrating on such passages from Vedānta. That the whole of Vedānta literature (*śruti*) is meant to highlight this existing reality which is non-dual, being identical with the very self of the enquirer, is evident from his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, 1-1-4., *Tattu samanvayāt.* A word here regarding the recent-day interpretation of *śruti* as logical analysis of meaning and *śabda* as linguistic analysis[2]. *Śruti* or *śabda* cannot, I am afraid, be interpreted as mere linguistic analysis, for in the appropriate context Śaṅkara refers to different passages belonging to the entire body of Vedānta literature and also grades them for his purpose. So some of the passages which are regarded as *śabda* or *śruti*, no less than others, are relegated to a secondary status as either not being conducive to illumination or possessing only figurative significance, as for example the passages speaking of creation. Moreover, Śaṅkara explicitly speaks in Brahma Sūtra 4.1.3., of the *abhāva* or cessation of *śruti* when true knowledge (*prabodha*) dawns, by referring to a passage from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, viz., *Vedā avedāḥ*. All this is inconsistent with the interpretation of *śruti* as mere logical analysis of language. Are we supposed to understand that logical analysis of linguistic forms ceases to function after enlightenment? So the entire body of Vedānta literature was being considered when Śaṅkara was speaking of *śruti* or *śabda* as a *pramāṇa*. When he was talking of *vākyārthavicāraṇa* or analysis of the meaning of a sentence in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, 1.1.2., he was advocating the theory that an analysis, of the meaning of the Vedānta passages found in the body of Vedānta literature which has come down to us as *śruti* or *śabda*, needs to be carried out for the comprehension of *Brahman* (*Brahmāvagati*). And the context of his remarks is not to be lost sight of in this connection. The idea was to refute the Mīmāṁsakas who interpreted the entire *śruti* as a body of injunctions (*vidhi*) and prohibitions (*niṣedha*), and to establish that the Vedānta passages refer to an existing reality whose realization is the *parama puruṣārtha* or the final goal of man. When we get rid of the multiple forms created by *avidyā* or ignorance through an analysis of the meaning of the *mahāvākyas* like Tattvamasi, we come to realize *Brahman* or non-duality which is the ultimate reality, according to Śaṅkara.

Śaṅkara's conception of reality is derived from the criterion of unchangeability. Whatever is permanently of one and the same nature is real, and knowledge about it is regarded as right knowledge[4]. Śaṅkara's point is that there cannot be any controversy in matters of knowledge. There cannot be any difference of opinion regarding the fire being hot. And the knowledge of fire being hot, therefore, is right knowledge (*samyak jñāna*) according to Śaṅkara. Taking this clue from our ordinary linguistic usage (*loke*), he builds an ontology of *Brahman*, the ultimate reality which never changes. And *Brahma jñāna* is the

realization of such unchanging reality. All those distinctions that we see, being subject to change, can only be regarded as fabrications of *avidyā* or ignorance. When ignorance vanishes through analysis, what remains is the unchanging, non-dual reality. Analysis is a method by which ignorance can be removed and *Brahma jñāna* arrived at, provided it is accompanied by all other paraphernalia such as *śama, dama, titikṣā, uparati*, etc. along with *nididhyāsana* or constant concentration on the truth which, of course, is not a mere linguistic one. On the other hand, it should also be borne in mind that *nididhyāsana* is not concentration on some ontological entity called *Brahman*, because that would imply a distinction between subject and object which is not acceptable in the context of *Brahma jñāna*. That is why it is properly understood as *Brahmānubhava* or *Brahmāvagati* as distinguished from knowledge in ordinary discourse. This *Brahmāvagati* alone is the final end (*puruṣārtha*) to be achieved through analysis of the meaning of the Vedānta passages (*vākyārtha vicāraṇa*), according to Śaṅkara, and *mokṣa* or liberation is nothing other than that either (*Brahmabhāvaśca mokṣaḥ*).

In this way one can have a proper understanding of Śaṅkara's philosophy as a comprehensive system which has been lost sight of in the maze of piecemeal linguistic analysis imposed on Śaṅkara by some recent interpreters.[5] The impression that is given by these interpreters is that Śaṅkara was concerned only with an analysis of a sort and that too the linguistic analysis of various types of discourses. They even go to the extent of asserting that the Advaitin is talking of various structures of language and that his aim is to reveal the depth structure which is the eternal structure in contrast to the surface structure. '*Brahma satyaṃ jagat mithyā*', these well-known expressions ascribed to Śaṅkara are interpreted to mean that the logical subject is eternal and incorrigible whereas the logical predicate is corrigible. Moreover, the well-known criterion of Reality put forward by Śaṅkara in *Gītā Bhāṣya*, viz. '*yad viṣayā buddhiḥ na vyabhicarati tat sat*', is taken to refer to an idea, not to the reality, the interpretation given being 'that idea in our discourse which is not capable of change is the eternal or *sat*'.[6] But in fact Śaṅkara here is speaking of the criterion of *reality* (N.B., *yad viṣayā buddhiḥ*), *not* of mere *idea* in our discourse, nor is there any justification for reducing the distinction between *Brahman* and *jagat* (the world) to a distinction of the logical subject and the logical predicate. Certainly *Brahman* of Śaṅkara was not meant to be identified with a mere logical subject. The logical subject has only a specific and restricted use in its tradition. My point is that there is a peculiar ontic reference in Śaṅkara which cannot be eliminated, and this ontic reference cannot be brought out by pointing out the role of the logical subject in language. Such exclusive talk of logical subject–logical predicate distinction in Advaita not only involves the fallacy of reductionism but also amounts to a sort

of philosophical anachronism. Śaṅkara does advocate enlightenment through analysis, no doubt, but analysis here is to be taken as the analysis of *akhaṇḍārthaka vākyas* in so far as it is conducive to the eradication of *avidyā* resulting in enlightenment with regard to the nature of ultimate reality. Ignorance or *avidyā* is pervasive and deep-rooted, and as language reflects this ignorance, analysis of language becomes necessary for eradication of ignorance. But what is important is that ignorance about the nature of reality be eradicated and illumination about the nature of the same be obtained—not illumination about linguistic form alone—which would constitute *mokṣa* or liberation according to Śaṅkara.

Avidyā or *adhyāsa*, according to Śaṅkara, is to have the idea of something in something else (*atasmin tadbuddhiḥ*). In this particular context it would signify the idea of the self being confused with that of the object and the idea of the object being confused with that of the self. For Śaṅkara the *lokavyavahāra* or our normal day-to-day transactions are based on *adhyāsa* and are expressed in ordinary language such as 'I am this', *'aham idaṃ'* and 'this is mine', *'mama idam'*. The issue thus, is ontological, not merely linguistic. It is the all-pervasive and deep-rooted ignorance of the non-dual reality in Śaṅkara Vedānta which is at the basis of our ordinary transactions expressed in the form of linguistic expression, 'I am this' and 'This is mine'. The confusion expressed in the form of our ordinary language is based on a deep-rooted ignorance which is regarded as *anādi* (beginningless), *ananta* (endless), and *naisargika* (natural). Confusion such as a man considering himself hale and hearty or the contrary so long as his wife and children, etc. are hale and hearty or a man taking himself to be stout, lean, fair, mute, deaf or blind, etc. are all expressions of a deep-rooted ignorance or *avidyā* in Śaṅkara Vedānta. Not only this, the entire transactions of man as an agent or an enjoyer are based on this ignorance.

It is true that ordinary language reflects ignorance, but this is only in case of those who take ordinary language to be revealing the nature of ultimate reality, that is to say so far as ordinary language is taken to be something more than *vyāvahārika*. A philosophically enlightened person may use the same language knowing fully well that this is of mere practical value and all the while he is not misled by the distinction expressed in the form of ordinary language. Language, therefore, does not necessarily create the illusion of which Śaṅkara speaks, nor is it a fact that the confusion here is merely verbal.

Ignorance consists in seeing distinctions where in reality there is no distinction. Ignorance of non-dual reality is all-pervasive and affects one and all, and this deep-rooted character and universality of ignorance are emphasized by the term *'māya'* in Śaṅkara Vedānta. *Māyā* is not to be regarded as a mysterious explanatory principle by means

of which the origin of the multiple universe from non-dual *Brahman* is somehow explained by Śaṅkara, for Śaṅkara as a philosopher was not at all concerned with or interested in advancing any such speculative hypothesis about the process of creation. The fact is that everyone sees multiplicity where there is distinctionless non-dual reality and is deceived by varieties of linguistic forms is simply designated here as māya[7]. Distinctionless non-dual reality has an ontic status in Advaita Vedānta and the error is therefore, an ontological one, expressed in the form of our behaviour, normal transaction, and in ordinary language. In this context it would be worthwhile to remember that *vidyā*, for Śaṅkara, is *'vastusvarūpavadhāraṇa'* or the ascertainment of the nature or Reality, not mere linguistic illumination.

Analysis is no doubt a means to eradicate error, but it has got to be an analysis of the Vedāntic type; unless the Advaita is realized through such analysis, mere linguistic clarification will not do. It is, therefore, essential to make a distinction between mere understanding of the linguistic forms through analysis on the one hand and the eradication of ignorance and consequent realization of Advaita which is effected through analysis on the other. What exactly is the difference between the understanding of different forms of language and the understanding that eradicates *avidyā* through analysis? This will be clear from the word *'adhyavasāna'* which is used by Śaṅkara immediately following the words *'vākyārtha vicāraṇa'*. Vācaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmatī* has very rightly explained *'adhyavasāna'* as *'savāsanā avidyādvayochheda'*, i.e the eradication of two types of ignorance along with their tendencies. Ignorance manifest in the ordinary language and in our normal transactions, when we regard a person as ignorant in the usual sense (*tūlāvidyā*) as well as ignorance in the sense of having deep-rooted ignorance (*mūlavidyā*) which is no less reflected in ordinary language, need to be eradicated, and then only will there be *Brahmāvagati* which of course is *puruṣārtha*. If this point is lost sight of, as it has been in the case of those who regard linguistic illumination to be the be-all and the end-all in Śaṅkara Vedānta, how is one going to explain Śaṅkara's condemnation in *Vivekacudāmaṇī* of the *vidvān*, one who is learned in Vedānta (*Vedāntanayāntadarśī*) as Śaṅkara calls him? The word *'vidvān'*, however, has been used in Śaṅkara Vedānta also to refer to a *Brahmajñānī* whose ignorance has been removed, for example when Śaṅkara speaks of *viduṣaḥ sarva pravṛttyasambandhaḥ* in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra 1.1.4. To my mind it is very important to draw a distinction between these two types of *'vidvān'* as envisaged in Śaṅkara's literature. The point which I want to make is that mere understanding of the logic of language in the sense of clarifying the distinctions between subject and predicate or distinguishing between the various types of discourses like prescriptive, descriptive or referring, is not the same as *Brahmajñāna*. Knowledge of these distinctions may be necessary,

but my point is that it is not sufficient. Śaṅkara explicitly points out that even if one is intelligent, scholarly, clever and full of insight into the most subtle meanings of the śāstras, still on being enveloped by *tamas* he regards the unreal to be the reality[8]. Here the implication is that knowledge of subtle distinctions of meaning is not enough. Moreover, one fails to understand how on the radically linguistic version of Advaita Vedānta one would explain Śaṅkara's statement that the knower of the six systems of philosophy including Vedānta is not fit for liberation whereas one who is free from the bondage of attachment towards objects alone is fit for liberation[9].

A word of clarification here concerning *Brahmānubhava* or *Brahmāvagati*. I fail to understand how it can be construed as intuitive experience of *Brahman* when *Brahman* is not an object of any experience whatsoever and when analysis is supposed to lead to enlightenment consisting in *Brahmānubhava*. I would rather construe *Brahmānubhava* or *Brahmāvagati* as realization, comprehension or understanding of the nature of ultimate Reality consequent upon the analysis of the meaning of the Vedānta passages. There is little support to be found in Śaṅkara's writings for intuition being regarded as a means of enlightenment. In any case *Brahmajñāna* is certainly not a matter of having an intuitive flash, and therefore, it is definitely misleading to suggest that *Brahmānubhava* is a sort of intuitive experience[10].

<div align="center">II</div>

'Can the Analytic Approach "save" Śaṅkara as a philosopher?'—this is the subtitle of a learned article included in *Perspectives on Vedānta*[11] published in 1988, its main title being 'Analytic Philosophy and Advaita'. The subtitle is indeed thought-provoking and is, to say the least, suggestive in an interesting way. From the subtitle itself one gets the impression that Śaṅkara as a philosopher is perhaps in urgent need of being saved and that some attempt has already been made to save him by a sort of *ad hoc* approach, viz. the analytic approach. The author of the learned article, Professor Klive, now raises the question whether such an approach can 'save' Śaṅkara as a philosopher. It should be noted in this connection that the learned professor, while referring to those who have tried to interpret, in some sense or the other, Śaṅkara Vedānta from the perspective of analytic philosophy, has put them all in one basket. This may be a convenient device, practically speaking, but it is, to say the least, a misleading distortion of fact, as will be evident to those who belong to analytic philosophy itself in some sense or the other. Here I will devote myself only to some of the points which are specifically raised by the learned professor in connection with my approach to Śaṅkara, with a view to reassess my own position *vis-a-vis* his observations, specially because this discussion

is expected to throw further light on certain important aspects of Śaṅkara Vedānta.

First of all, I should clarify that my approach to Śaṅkara Vedānta has all along been that of an enquirer (*jijñāsu*) wanting to understand what it is all about. Throughout my career, since the days (1954–56) when I was post-graduate student of philosophy at Allahabad, I have been trying to understand the *Ācārya* in his own terms as far as possible, without trying to impose any methodology or idea of my own And this is how it should be when we are confronted with the work not only of an *Ācārya* of the stature of Śaṅkara, but also with any work for that matter. It is of course another matter if I have subsequently been equipped with the technique of present-day linguistic analysis, and have tried to see how far, if at all, Śaṅkara could be understood in this light. But as far as my knowledge goes, it has all along been an attempt on my part to understand Śaṅkara's own formulation; I have never tried to impose an alien method or technique on an indigenous soil nor have I tried to 'save' Śaṅkara as a philosopher through an analytic approach. For me, Śaṅkara, being a philosopher in his own right, does not stand in need of being saved by any approach, but what is important to note at the same time is that the exact nature of Śaṅkara's philosophical illumination needs to be brought out, rather rediscovered, from time to time so as to be intelligible in the conceptual framework of the age to which one belongs. And this is all that I have done in my discussions on Śaṅkara; my task, all along, has been to see what, if any, is the nature of philosophical illumination imparted by the *Ācārya*. Is it illumination through intuition or illumination through analysis? What is the status of *śruti* in this connection, according to Śaṅkara Vedānta? What exactly is *avidyā* or *adhyāsa*? Is it mere linguistic confusion? What exactly is the nature and status of *māyā* in Śaṅkara? These are only some of the questions which have kept me occupied from time to time, and my approach, even if analytic in some sense of the term, has never been meant to run parallel to or independent of Śaṅkara's own writings with a view to 'save' him as a philosopher but has been meant to appreciate his position as a philosopher with the help of the conceptual tools available to us without doing any sacrilege to the *Ācārya's* own writings.

In trying to understand, one of course runs the risk of misunderstanding, and I do not rule out the possibility that I might have misunderstood the *Ācārya* at least in a certain context. Regarding this I can say that I should be only too glad to improve my knowledge through learned criticism. As a matter of fact, a part of the thesis advocated by me in *Essays in Analytical Philosophy* which mainly provides material for criticism at the hands of the learned professor has been modified somewhat by my later understanding of Śaṅkara incorporated in my article in that very volume, *Perspectives on Vedānta*, although at the

same time I must point out that the general spirit of my approach throughout, including that of the present paper, remains somewhat uniform.

Now I will concentrate on three different points raised by Professor Klive in connection with my approach to Śaṅkara. The first one is regarding the question whether Śaṅkara was a mere commentator (*Bhāṣyakāra*) or an independent, 'free', thinker. Klive seems to suggest that Śaṅkara was a scriptual commentator, not an analytic philosopher. 'What if', asks Klive, 'Śaṅkara did not want to be a "free thinker" in Nayak's sense of the word? What if he had other goals and interests in mind (e.g. religious goals)? . . . maybe Śaṅkara wanted to be and remained authoritarian'. The last point, however, does not need to be taken negatively, for we know that 'authoritarian' thinkers often make as many, if not more, contributions to the development of cultural life (and even philosophy) as 'free thinkers'. Now I fully agree with the learned professor that 'authoritarian' thinkers have also made significant contributions to the cultural life and even to philosophy. But the question is whether Śaṅkara was 'authoritarian' in the sense in which Klive wants to make him appear. It is well-known that Śaṅkara was a commentator on the *Brahma Sūtras, Upaniṣads* and the *Bhagavadgītā*, and that he is popularly referred to as *Bhagavān Bhāṣyakāra.* But this is not the point at issue. The question is whether this stands in the way of Śaṅkara being an analytic philosopher or a free thinker, not in a trivial but in some significant sense. Śaṅkara advocated enlightenment through analysis of a sort of the Vedāntic statements and he freely chose those Vedāntic statements, e.g. *Tattvamasi,* from within the context of the whole of *śruti* which alone, according to him, are conducive to enlightenment through analysis. And as enlightenment in respect of the nature of ultimate reality was the goal to be achieved by him, he even resorted to analysis of secular statements whenever it suited his purpose. Analysis thus plays a significant, and even at times the central, role in achieving illumination in Śaṅkara Vedānta, but it is also true at the same time that everything in Śaṅkara Vedānta cannot be reduced simply to linguistic illumination through linguistic analysis, for the comprehension of non-duality (*Brahmāvagati*) is the final end (*puruṣārtha*) to be realized through analysis. If I as the author of *Essays in Analytical Philosophy*[12] had given any such impression that for Śaṅkara the highest end lies in obtaining a mere linguistic illumination through linguistic analysis, it certainly stands in need of modification[13], but at the same time it must be pointed out that Śaṅkara does not for that very reason cease to be a free thinker or an analytic philosopher and become 'authoritarian'.

The second point which Klive raises is that Śaṅkara's interpretation of the *Mahāvākyas* in my terms does not retain any meaning whatsoever. The function of *Tattvamasi,* according to us, is to point at or gesture

towards the fact without giving any information about it. Klive points out that the *Mahāvākyas* in that case will be reduced to sheer meaninglessness, for 'we simply would not be able to recognize such a gesture as a gesture of some significance'. 'Quite on the contrary, *'tat tvam asī'*, says Klive, 'finds its meaning within some previously given context. This context is informative and specific. Otherwise, Śvetaketu remains at a loss as to what is being said or pointed at'. There is no reason why I should disagree with this. The context in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* is well-known and how *'Tattvamasī'* features at the end of the dialogue between the father and the son—Āruṇi and Śvetaketu, is also known to any student of Vedānta. There is no question of denying the context in which *Tattvamasi* becomes meaningful, for I also fail to see how the analysis of *Tattvamasi* (*vākyārtha vicāraṇa*) can be carried out at all in a vacuum without any context whatsoever. It is, according to me, uninformative no doubt, but what I mean by this is that it is factually not informative, in the empirical sense of course. *Tattvamasi,* when analysed appropriately within the context (*vākyārtha vicāraṇa*) does give us *Brahmajñāna* or *Brahmāvagati,* and this certainly is not information regarding an empirical object or even a non-empirical one for that matter to be achieved through certain means. I fail to see how and why the learned professor has because of this taken me to be unaware of the context in which *Tattvamasi* becomes meaningful and also of the fact that this context itself is informative and specific. It seems that in philosophic discussions, in spite of the best of intentions, we sometimes inadvertently talk at cross purposes on account of over-enthusiasm to make our own point.

The third point raised by Professor Klive is whether *māyā* is an explanatory principle in Śaṅkara Vedānta. *Māyā,* according to me, is not an explanatory principle, for Śaṅkara as a philosopher was not at all interested in giving an explanation of how this world of ours has come into being. The universality of ignorance is simply pointed out by Śaṅkara through the terminology of *māyā.* According to Klive, however, '*māyā* seems to remain an explanatory principle, regardless of whether it is taken to be the *śakti* of the Lord, or the descriptive use of language. Our language and its uses—defective or misleading as they may be—belong to the world and to offer statements about linguistic uses is to make explanations. They may be different kinds of explanations, but nevertheless they are explanations'. Here again, my purpose is served if the learned professor admits that *māyā* is not a theory of explanation in the sense of explaining how the world is created out of Brahman. It is certainly not a mystifying theory nor is *māyā* an 'undefinable mysterious stuff', as Professor Dasgupta[14] would like to call it. My purpose has been to show, and it is served only if it is seen that *māyā* in Śaṅkara Vedānta is not a causal theory mysteriously explaining somehow the origin of the universe from Brahman. The

talk of *māyā* or magical power of God in Śaṅkara Vedānta is only an indirect way of saying that everyone is numbed and dumbfounded as it were by the compelling ignorance which, being manifest in and through our ordinary descriptive language, creates multiplicity where there is nondual reality. And if this is also a way of explaining the nature of how things are, I have no objection to the use of the word 'explanation' so long as it is borne in mind that here there is no explanation in terms of causal theory. Once it is admitted that there is no casual explanation given by the *Ācārya* in terms of *māyā*, the further point of *māyā* being an explanation in terms of elucidation of the nature of how things are can be conceded to without any difficulty or controversy and this, though informative, is to my mind somewhat trivial in the present context.

Finally, I would like to submit here that throughout I have tried to *understand* Śaṅkara in his own terms. And, whether right or wrong, this certainly is a philosophically significant enterprise. The question of saving or destroying Śaṅkara is not at all important, for any effort either to save or destroy a philosopher in an *ad hoc* manner is simply revolting, to say the least, for a genuinely philosophic mind. Such an effort may be meaningful as a part of some proselytising activity perhaps, but not when, as a philosopher, one is concerned with *jñāna* (knowledge) which, in the words of *Ācārya* himself, is *vastutantra*, not *puruṣa-vyāpāra-tantra*. Objective fact, whatever that may mean in this particular context, and not any personal whim, should alone be the determining factor. And there is no royal road to the objective fact, whatever that may be. Roads are many, methods are diverse, and pitfalls are numerous. Advancement is possible, not by an exclusive and whimsical claim to the truth but by adopting a method in earnest with constant vigilance about pitfalls, while at the same time keeping one's mind open for discussion regarding possible alternatives. There is nothing like *the understanding* of the fact in all its multifarious aspects, but there are more or less right or wrong approaches conducive to understanding or misunderstanding different aspects which come to light as we proceed through different checkings and cross-checkings. And with this in mind, my approach may be regarded as being conducive to a better understanding of Śaṅkara Vedānta, while at the same time throwing it open for further discussion.

When we come to consider some of the practical implications of Śaṅkara Vedānta, we learn from Śaṅkara that a spontaneous tendency to do good to others and an attitude of tolerance towards all forms of dualism should be the natural outcome of the realization of Advaita or non-duality. In *Viveka Cūḍāmaṇi* Śaṅkara points out that those who have crossed the ocean of *saṃsāra* through the realization of Advaita (non-duality) are inclined to do good to others like the spring[15]

naturally and effortlessly (*vasantavallokahitamcaraṃtaḥ*), and Śaṅkara, while commenting on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā*, states that the Vedic philosophy of non-duality has no rivalry with mutually opposing doctrines of dualism in the same way as one is not opposed to one's limbs. As a matter of fact, one who has realized non-duality is the very self of the dualists, says Śaṅkara[16].

In actual practice, it may be difficult indeed to find such Advaitins. But it would not be impossible to find one. The lives of Ramaṇa Maharṣi and Rāmakrishna Paramahaṃsa could be cited as examples in this context. There could be other examples as well.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Cf. *Brahma sūtra Śaṅkara Bhāsyam*, 2.1.37, *Tasmādanatiśankanīyamidama-upaniṣadaṃ darśanaṃ*.
2. Cf. G. Misra, *Analytical Studies in Indian Philosophical Problems* (Bhubaneswar, 1971) and *The Advaita Conception of Philosophy: Its Method, Scope and Limits*.
3. Cf. *Brahma sūtra Saṅkara Bhāsyam*, 1.1.2. "*Vākyārtha vicāraṇādhyavasānanirvṛttā hi Brahmāvagatiḥ, nānumānādi pramaṇāntaranirvṛttā*.
4. *Ibid.*, 2.1.11, '*Ekarūpeṇa hyavasthito yörthaḥ sa paramārthaḥ, loke tadviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ samyagjñānamityucyate—yathāgniruṣṇa itī*'.
5. Misra, *op. cit.*
6. G. Misra, *The Advaita Conception of Philosophy: Its Method, Scope and Limits*, p. 18.
7. Cf. *Kathopaniṣad Bhāsya*, '*Aho atigaṃbhīrā duravāgāhyā vicitrā māyā ceyaṃ yadayaṃ sarvo jantuḥ paramārthataḥ paramārthasatattvöpyevaṃ bodhyamānöhaṃ paramātmeti na gṛhṇāti*'.
8. Cf. *Viveka Cuḍāmani*, '*Prajñāvānapi panditopi caturöpyatyanta sūkṣmārthadṛk, vyāliḍhastamasā na vetti vahudhā saṃbodhitöpi sphuṭaṃ*'.
9. Cf. *Ibid.*, '*Viṣayāśā mohapāśādyo vimuktaḥ sudustyajāt,—Sa eva kalpate muktyai nānyaḥ ṣaṭśāstravedyapi*'.
10. Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II (London, 1951), pp. 510–518, where Radhakrishnan speaks of intutional experience and translates 'anubhava' as intuition. Cf. also C.D. Sharma, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (Delhi, 1973), p. 289, where Sharma speaks of 'supra-relational true intuition'.
11. Cf. Visvaldis V. Klive, 'Analytic Philosophy and Advaita' (Can the Analytic Approach 'save' Śaṅkara as a Philosopher), *Perspectives on Vedānta*, edited by S.S. Rama Rao Pappu, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1988.
12. Cf. G.C. Nayak, *Essays in Analytical Philosophy*, Santosh Publications, Cuttack, 1978.
13. Cf. G.C. Nayak, 'Does Śaṅkara Advocate Enlightenment through Analysis?', *Perspectives on Vedānta*, op. cit.
14. Cf. S.N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, 1952, Vol. II, p. 73.
    Cf. also Radhakrishnan, op. cit., where Radhakrishnan says, 'The theory of *Māyā* serves as a cloak to cover the inner rifts of his system'.
15. Cf. *Viveka Cūḍāmani*, 37, '*Śāntā mahānto nivasanti santo, vasantavallokahitaṃ carantaḥ*', etc. Cf. also Sureśvara, *Naiskarmya Siddhi*, IV.69, '*Utpannātmaprabodhasya tvadveṣṭrtvādayo guṇāḥ, ayatnato bhavantyasya na tu sādhanarūpiṇaḥ.*'
16. Cf. Śaṅkara's commentary on *Māṇḍukya kārikā*, 17 and 18, '*Tairanyonya-*

virodhibhirasmadīyōyaṃ vaidikaḥ sarvānanyatvādātmaikatva darśanapakṣo na virudhyate yathā svahastapādādibhiḥ. . . . paramārthato Brahmavidātmaiva dvaitinaṃ. Tenāyaṃ hetunasmatpakṣo na virudhyate taiḥ'.

Some Observations on the Views of B.K. Matilal and P.K. Sen on 'The Context Principle and Some Indian Controversies over Meaning'

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I

The purpose of this paper is to take a critical and explanatory notice of Professor B.K. Matilal's (henceforward BKM) and Professor P.K. Sen's (henceforward PKS) views on 'The Context Principle and Some Controversies over Meaning.'[1] In this paper an effort has been made to concentrate on the interpretation given by these renowned philosophers specifically in connection with the Indian controversies over meaning. I have tried to look into some philosophical problems arising in the way of understanding the position of the Indian philosophers as explained by BKM and PKS.

It is very interesting to note that BKM and PKS have thrown some light on the controversies over the theories of meaning called *anvitābhidhāna*, i.e. 'connected designation', and *abhihitānvaya*, i.e. 'designation before connection', while discussing the context principle in the philosophy of Frege.[2] These two celebrated thinkers have tried to make a comparative estimate between Frege's view on the context principle and the long-drawn Indian debate on this. In this paper an effort has been made to make some critical observations that are confined to what they have said regarding the controversies over the Indian theories of meaning.

II

The theories have been beautifully represented by BKM and PKS in the following way.

According to the Bhāṭṭas, designation is received through words at first and the 'designata are connected to form a unity.' So far as the Prābhākaras are concerned, they advocate that the meaning of the whole sentence is known first after hearing the constituent words that are put syntactically together. This is called the theory of 'connected designation' (*anvitābhidhāna*).

This distinction is not always intelligible. Hence it is observed by BKM and PKS: 'Phrased in this way the distinction may seem trivial, but it is not really so.'[3] They have taken recourse to a metaphor in order to

make us understand these theories, which is very much unique and convincing. The meaning of the independent words are compared to 'building blocks'. In the first case, an individual first obtains 'these self-subsistent building blocks (meanings)'. The inter-connection of these meanings is compared to the phenomenon of cementing, which can give rise to the connected meaning of the sentence. This theory indicates that 'the distinction between word-meanings and sentence-meaning is one of the building blocks and the building itself.' Hence, the words do not have meanings only in the context of the sentence.

BKM and PKS have rightly pointed that, according to the Prābhākaras, an individual recognizes the meaning of the sentence *directly* from the words without having intermediate function of knowing the individual word-meanings one by one. The word '*directly*' implies that 'there is no intervening event such as that of our getting hold first of the so-called word-meanings as building blocks, between our knowledge of the words (through hearing) and our knowledge of the meaning of the sentence made of such words . . . '[4] From this theory it is implied that the meanings of the words are not context-free. When a word gives a meaning, it is always related to or connected with the meanings of the other words in the sentence. In other words, a particular word attains a particular meaning only in the context of a sentence. That is, for the realization of a particular word, the sentential context in which it occurs is to be considered.

The Bhāṭṭas have justified their position with the help of an example. Seeing a white flash moving swiftly and hearing the noise of the hoofs and neighing, one judges perceptually 'a white horse runs'. BKM and PKS describe this case as 'a perceptual judgement constructed out of the bits and pieces of the sense-given'.[5] In this particular case the bits of the sense-given are white flash, hoof-noise and neighing, but after connecting these bits with the help of the mind a judgement is reached. In the same way, the mind connects the bits and pieces of isolated meanings and thereby gets the connected sentential meaning. The explanation of the above-mentioned example as given by BKM and PKS is highly significant. According to them, the three bits of isolated meaning are comprehended through three different sources of knowledge, *pramāṇas*. To him, (1) the white flash is presented visually, (2) the concept of horsehood presented by inference from hearing the neighing and (3) the notion of running presented by the inference from the noise of the hoofs.[6] On this account I must express my disagreement. Actually, the first bit of isolated meaning, I think, is attained through perception but the second and third bits of isolated meaning are apprehended through inference. Though the three bits of meaning are apprehended at different times, the three are known through two different *pramāṇas*, i.e. perception and inference, and not *three* as suggested by BKM and PKS.

This view may partially be justified in the following way.

The spirit of the statement is very significant on account of the fact that there might be some cases where three *pramāṇas*, or more may be essential for knowing different bits. As different *pramāṇas* are applied for knowing two or three bits of isolated meaning, they are grasped 'as unconnected bits of objects'. Hence, a judgemental knowledge is possible simply on the basis of the attainment of the isolated object-atoms themselves. When these isolated meanings are apprehended, there arises a judgement of the connected sentence-meaning. Through *arthāpatti* the mutual relation of the meaning of the words is apprehended.

Both the systems of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* have their own justification in propagating their views. The Prābhākaras think that there is no necessity of computing meanings from words and syntax first and then grasping such meanings into a whole if given in the sentence from the very beginning. Without depending on the meaning of individual words, we can straightway 'derive the connective meaning whole, objects with action, quality with the qualified, and a relation with a relatum'.[7]

The Bhāṭṭas are of the opinion that meaning of the individual words is to be known first, because it is the potency (*śakti*) which exists in the word, but not in the sentence. With the help of the meaning of individual words one can have the connected sentential meaning through *arthāpatti* which is translated by BKM and PKS as 'suggestive inference'. To them 'it is a proper inference from the given data'.[8] It is true that our knowledge of the missing connectors between two word-meanings is suggested by *arthāpatti*. It is not proper to describe it as 'proper inference' as done by them. The happier term of this expression, I think, should be 'presumption' or 'assumption'. In the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* we find a statement in support of this expression, where Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra opines that in the case of *arthāpatti* the apperception is not 'I am inferring it' but 'I am assuming it from this' (*Ataevārthapattisthale numinomīti nānuvyavasāyah, kintvanenedaṁ kalpayāmīti*.)[9] Hence, it is a proper assumption (but *not* inference) from the given data.

The Prābhākaras' view as interpreted by BKM and PKS is not satisfactory to me due to the following reasons. The Prābhākara proceeds thus: first he concedes that the expression 'cow' means the object cow with infinite possibilities of linkage; the function of the other phrase 'bring' or 'is white' is to exclude possibilities other than the intended one. The second phrase performs this function by *its mere presence*, not by contributing its own meaning. Prābhākaras think '[this] theory recognizes that the second element's contribution lies only in excluding all other possible combinations, save one that is intended by the sentence'.[10]

On this point I beg to differ from the interpretation given by them.

It is not supportable that the contribution of the second phrase lies only in excluding all other possible combinations excepting the intended one. When someone uses the word 'walks' or 'is white', it can exclude other possibilities no doubt, but how? It has been stated that the second phrase performs this by its *mere presence*, but not contributing its meaning. If the meaning of it is not taken into account at all, how can it exclude other possibilities. Generally a verb is used after noticing the compatibility to the subject. Nobody would think of using the verb 'is drawing a picture' with regard to 'cow' due to its incompatibility (*ayogyatā*). Hence, the verbs like 'is white' 'walks', etc. which are quite compatible can be added to the subjects 'cow', etc. From this fact it follows that the second phrase performs its function not by its *mere presence*, but through its meaning also. In other words, the differentiating factors exist not only in word but in meaning also. The word whose meaning is not known to us, is not generally used in a sentence. For, a sentence is used only to express something. Moreover, it has been stated that second element's contribution lies in excluding all other possible combinations excepting one which is intended. If a word does not contribute any meaning, how can it be known as intended? The intended meaning of the sentence is known to us and hence it can differentiate (*vyāvartaka*) it from other possibilities, i.e. non-intended meanings. The differentiating element (*vyāvartaka*) is defined as *itarabhedaka* (that which distinguishes an object from another). The sentences—'The second phrase does not contribute its own meaning' and 'second element's contribution lies in excluding all other possibilities save one that is intended'[11], are self-contradictory to each other and hence not at all acceptable.

In a different place it has been pointed out by BKM and PKS 'we can, of course, recognize the unconnected "own" meaning of each constituent word just as we can observe the individual function of all parts of the moving wagon, which cause it to move,'[12] which is very much similar to the view of Dummett. This statement is quite opposite to the earlier one where the exclusion of other possibilities is admitted by the word's *mere presence*, but not by contributing its meaning.

One justification can, of course, be given in favour of views expressed by BKM and PKS in the following way. The main intention of such statements is slightly different which may not be properly reflected in their expression. It is not the case that each and every word excludes other possibilities through its *mere presence*, but *not* contributing its meaning. But the main point to saying this lies in the fact that, though word-meanings are required, yet they are not taken as unconnected word-meanings. They can be taken as separate entities if and only if they are in combination with others.

This point has been clarified by BKM in his last work '*The Word and the World*'. To him, when a word 'cow' is uttered, one can understand

the meaning of it after linking it with all the possibilities (not given here). On account of this one is not aware of a specific meaning of it. He remarks—'This is an incomplete and hence a very vague awareness of meaning. For a thirsty person a salty ocean is no better than a dry, dreary desert. This analogy is from Jayanta. The vagueness of meaning, when all possible linkages are taken into account, is like the saltiness of the ocean-water. Knowledge of the object with all possible linkages is equal to no knowledge at all'.[13]

In fact, the Prābhākaras believe that the designative power or potency of a word becomes '*effective*' if it is combined with other words in the sentence. What a word would mean should not remain as an isolated phenomenon, but an object with a linkage with other words. If it is so, word-meaning has got no 'independent meaning' beside the sentence-meaning. Perhaps keeping this aspect in mind BKM and PKS have made remarks that a word can exclude other possibilities by its mere presence, but not contributing its own meaning. Actually, an individual word has its own meaning which unless connected with other words cannot be a perfect one. A word-meaning may sometimes be misleading or may seem to be ambiguous if it is not uttered in a particular sentence. A word, in point of fact, conveys to us its own meaning if combined with other words in a sentence.

Though the Prābhākaras have made an attempt to substantiate their position in various ways yet their views cannot remain unchallenged. The Bhāṭṭas too have made their philosophical footing more firm through some independent logic developed according to their own presuppositions and framework. BKM and PKS seem to have shown their sympathy towards Prābhākaras when they say that 'it became a more defensible theory about meaning, which avoided the problem of sentence holism as well as that of unconnectedness which the extreme forms of atomism might imply.'[14] Moreover, BKM and PKS have made another remark. 'The Bhāṭṭa makes a mistake of constraining them [the word-meanings] as separate reals and identify them with other objects like pot, jar, etc.'[15]

In this connection the position of the Bhāṭṭas, I think, may equally be defended. The logic which is given by them in connection with the *Abhihitānvayavāda* is very much unique and I think it is more convincing. Hence, I do not agree with the view expressed by BKM and PKS. My view which is in favour of the Bhāṭṭas is based on the arguments that follow.

First, the view of the Prābhākaras that a word cannot give its accurate meaning unless it is known to us, or else its specific linkage is not at all tenable. The word 'cow' for example, can give us its meaning even without specific linkage with other words. It is not wise to say that the meaning of the subject-word is determined on the basis of what it predicates. When the word 'cow' is used, we can understand its meaning

and only after that what is said about it is understood. It is also not correct to say that the knowledge of an object with all possible linkages is equal to no knowledge at all. Many things or attributes, etc. may be ascribed to an animal, i.e. cow. If the ascriptions are not known, it does not follow that the meaning of the term 'cow' is not known. There is certainly the absence of definiteness about what is said about it, but from this the meaning of the term 'cow', I think, is not affected. Moreover, the view that the second phrase performs the function of excluding other possibilities excepting the particular intended one by its mere presence is not tenable for the reasons already mentioned. Without contributing its meaning a phrase cannot exclude other possibilities. When it is said 'The cow is black', the second phrase 'is black' can exclude other possibilities of being otherwise only by contributing its meaning. When the sentence is used, one is completely aware of the meaning of the term 'black' otherwise how can we know that it is intended by us and it can exclude others.

Second, when an individual learns the meaning of a word, it starts from the word-meaning. A child comes to know the primary relation of a term with its meaning at first from the verbal usages of the seniormost persons (*Vṛddhasya śabdādhīnavyavahārādeva*). When a man who is aware of the meaning of a term (*Vyutpanna*) asks another man who also knows the meaning of the same term to bring a cow, the person asked to bring a cow by a senior person brings it after hearing the word of the senior. On observing the performances of the man a child infers the meaning of the word.[16] In this case, the Bhāṭṭas admit that there is the denotative power in the individual words which can give meaning. The Prābhākaras contention that the denotative power of a word gives us not simply object or action or relation but each item's possible connection with other items is not always supportable. Sometimes it is true that a word can give rise to a clear meaning if it is understood in the context of a sentence. But such is not the case with every word. Sometimes the meaning of the individual word helps us to understand the meaning of the sentence. When a word is uttered, it can give rise to the meaning with infinite possibilities. If its meaning is vague, let it be vague for the time being. Even the meaning of the sentence may seem to be vague if one does not understand the intention of the speaker. If someone utters the word '*Saindhavaṁ*', one will understand it vaguely as either salt or horse. This vagueness is not resolved even if it is understood in the context of the sentence '*Saindhavaṁ ānaya*' (i.e. bring *saindhava*), as it still may mean 'Bring either horse or salt'. The vagueness or ambiguity may be resolved if the real intention of the speaker is known.

It may also be understood with the help of another example. One can understand the meaning of the sentence if one can understand the context under which it is spoken or the intention (*tātparya*) of the

speaker. If a teacher asks his student to do something after uttering the word—'door' (*dvāraṁ*), and pointing this out to the student may mean 'the closing of the door or the opening of the same'. Let us suppose a situation when the door remains closed and there is suddenly a power-cut. The teacher who is taking the class says the word—'door' to a student. It would surely imply 'the opening of the door'. In other words, by uttering the word 'door' the speaker means—'open the door'. If the situation is otherwise, i.e. the door is open and suddenly a dust storm comes, the teacher says the same word 'door' to the student, it would mean—'close the door' (*dvāraṁ pidhehi*). Thus, a word combined with other words can give its perfect meaning if the proper context is known by the hearer. The role of *tātparya* (intention of the speaker or context) has also to be accepted as the fundamental basis of having a sentence-meaning. Hence, the contention of the Prābhākaras that a word with a specific linkage would give us a right meaning is not always correct.

Fourth, this theory of *abhihitānvaya* of the Bhāṭṭas will find support in the *bhāṣya* of Śabara so far as my understanding goes. Śabara was in favour of this theory after considering perhaps its importance in the field of the attainment of the sentence-meaning. From the exposition of Śabara's theory of *vākyārthavodha* (apprehension of the meaning of the sentence) it is clear to us that he emphasizes the fact that the *padārthas* known independently through *padas*, if related through *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*, can convey the sentence-meaning which is clearly indicated in the conclusion: '*Viśiṣṭārthasaṁpratyayaśca Vākyārthaḥ*' (i.e. the notion of qualified object constitutes the meaning of the sentence). The Prābhākaras may have some arguments or justification of their own in favour of *Anvitābhidhāna* theory. But in the *bhāṣya* we do not find any support of this theory and hence, Bhāṭṭa's theory is more relevant in the context of Śabara's theory of *Vākyārthavodhaḥ*[17] as well as in context of the understanding of common men.

Last, it has been argued by the Prābhākaras that if the Bhāṭṭa-view is taken into account, it will go against the law of parsimony (*lāghava*). Because they accept three dispositional properties: first is in words on account of which the hearer can understand the meanings of these, second is in word-meanings themselves so that they can generate a hearer's cognition of the linkages among themselves and third or last one also in words for which they can generate dispositional properties in word-meanings capable of generating the cognition of the linkages. If the Prābhākaras' view is accepted, it will be free from logical cumbrousness (*gaurava*) as we have to accept only one dispositional property in words capable of producing in the hearer their meanings and linkages.[18]

This view, I think, is not tenable. For, if we accept three dispositional properties—two in words and one in word-meanings, there is no harm

on account of the fact that we generally acquire the knowledge of the sentence in such a procedure. First, we understand the meaning of the words individually and afterwards we try to link them up through *ākṣepa* or *arthāpatti*. As someone is habituated (*abhyāsadaśa*) in going through this procedure, it does not seem to be a complicated one at all. If the view of the Prābhākara is accepted, it will lead to more complications. Moreover, even if the procedure as prescribed by the Bhāṭṭas involves *gaurava*, it may be treated as of a virtuous type which may be described as *phalamukhagaurava* (i.e. *gaurava* which does not stand as an obstacle to our understanding but leads to the clarification of the concept). Such a *gaurava* is not a defect, but accessory to our understanding. Though the Bhāṭṭa-view seems to be complicated, the rationale behind its postulation is quite justifiable. Therefore, I do not think that the Prābhākara-view is a more defensible theory about meaning as observed by BKM and PKS.

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Emerson's Approach to Evil in the Context of Indian Thought

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The question of Emerson's attitude to evil might interest us since it is also a basic problem at the heart of the eastern tradition of the Great Self. That tradition however would necessarily pose the problem on its own terms. Emerson had glimpses of the eastern solution without being wholly able to participate in the state of mind and soul that it implies. But he did honestly hold out that position for himself and for others. There is something American about this openness, a specifically American quality, which is reflected in his difficult essays like 'Experience' and 'Circles'—two of the essays which have somehow seemed to me of the pith and heart of Emerson.

To hang in between the transcendent experience and experience of the phenomenal world, to be content to belong to this side of the grave in the company of ordinary men, and not fall for any kind of specious resolution, is part of that openness. He stoutly opposed 'idealistic' solutions and Utopian enthusiasms. To cite one instance, asking Alcott to explain his *Brook Farm* scheme (as a journal entry for 1842 informs us), and listening to those perfervid projections he quietly concludes: 'Their doctrine is spiritual but they always end with saying, "Give us much land (more) money."' He was content with making do with what there was, not shun the secular everyday affairs, plunge into the phenomenal world and yet gain spontaneity, saying 'I can get along with what there is.' Emerson appeals to us especially because he expresses exactly what an intelligent, thinking, even scholarly, but at heart ordinary, individual must find himself in.

In 'Goethe, the Writer' he had said, 'Nature has clearly at heart the formation of the speculative man or scholar. It is an end never lost sight of and is prepared in the original casting of things'. Emerson affirms that his comprehensive eye is indispensable to man and quotes the *Bhagavadgītā*: 'Children only, and not the learned, speak of the speculative and practical faculties as two. They are but one, for both obtain the self-same end . . .' and so on. (सांख्ययोगौ पृथग्बालाः प्रवदन्ति न पंडिताः।।)

To begin with, what is the problem? Good and Evil are concepts

which do occupy a very important place in the Christian tradition of the West; and Emerson's seems to be a rather differing approach, and significantly so. Western critical comment has often considered Emerson wanting in the full recognition of the nature of evil. Does he lack the 'vision' of evil or is it merely that his point of view doesn't accord with the way, in that tradition, the opposition of Good and Evil is formulated? How far does that differing point of view declare its closeness to the Indian traditional position? A number of passages may be recalled where the question of evil is present to his mind. And they seem to say variously and in vaguely recognizable ways that evil is not final, or even that 'Evil tendencies cancel' as the title of a Robert Frost poem puts it challengingly. Such, for instance, is the effect when, in that early Divinity School address, Emerson declares: 'Good is positive. Evil is merely privative, not absolute: it is like cold, which is the privation of heat. All evil is so much death or nonentity. Benevolence is absolute and real.' And the whole address sounds like an effort to evolve a 'naturalistic' basis for morality and religious sentiment with the tradition of the Great Self in the immediate background. It is also where Emerson declares: 'Europe has always owed to oriental genius its divine impulses.'

Thus we might come away from many a passage with the same conviction of where it all points. True, that conviction may not be unmixed with a certain uneasiness. We may even feel that Emerson constantly dwelt in possibility, a fairer house than prose. But all the time, there can be no mistaking which way the flow of his thoughts turns—no mistaking its Indian direction. To take a few examples:

> 'All stealing is comparative. If you come to absolutes, pray who does not steal? Saints are sad because they behold sin from the point of view of the conscience, and not of the intellect; a confusion of thought. Sin seen from the thought is a diminution or less; seen from the conscience or will, it is pravity or bad. The intellect calls it shade, absence of light, and no essence. The conscience must feel it as essence, essential evil. *This it is not*; it has objective existence, but no subjective.' (*Experience*)

> 'There is no virtue which is final; all are initial. The virtues of society are vices of the saint. The terror of reform is in the discovery that we must cast away our virtues, or what we have always esteemed as such, into the same pit that has consumed our grosser vices. . . . I am gladdened by . . . beholding in morals that unrestrained inundation of the principle of good into every chink and hole that selfishness has left open, yea, into selfishness and sin itself; so that no evil is pure, nor hell itself without its extreme satisfactions.' (*Circles*)

Or this, when Emerson looks at evil in nature outside man:

> 'Nature is always consistent though she feigns to contravene her own laws. She keeps her laws and seems to transcend them. She arms and equips an animal to find its place and living in the earth, and at the same time she arms and equips another animal to destroy it. . . . The direction is forever onward.' (Nature–18)

where Nature contravenes her own laws by making the stronger animal destroy the weaker one she herself has made! It is like Robert Frost's 'backward wave' in the 'West-running Brook'. But this is a *feigning*, though of course, it involves the mortal agony of the smaller fish being eaten by the bigger. Presumably, so is the evil and pain in man's life. It is only when you can see the forward and the reverse as one movement that the reality is revealed!

Or to take evil in a still more difficult context, one in which no man can be held responsible: In the brief reference to the death of his little son Waldo, hardly six, he describes his grief as something that 'falls off from me and leaves no scar'. It is caducous, perishable! This may look strange in the sensitive man that he was, but it is really his attempt to live in the light of the *First Cause*. For, as he had stated, there are several levels on which we live. 'The consciousness of each man is a sliding scale, which identifies him now with the First *Cause*, now with the flesh of his body, life above life in different degrees . . . . And the question ever is not what you have done or forborne, but at whose command you have done or forborne it.'

So to come to the passage most commonly known and commented upon—that exhortation at the end of the 1836 essay 'Nature', perhaps the first full statement of the Transcendentalist position:

> 'Build therefore your own world. As fast as you conform your life to the pure idea . . . so fast will disagreeable appearances, swine, spiders, snakes, pests, mad-houses, prisons, enemies vanish; they are temporary and shall be no more seen. The ordure and filth of nature, the sun shall dry up and the wind exhale. As when the summer comes from the north the snowbanks melt, and the face of the earth becomes green before it, so shall the advancing spirit create its ornaments along its path . . . ; it shall draw beautiful faces, warm hearts, wise discourse and heroic acts around its way, until evil is no more seen.'

Evil is no more seen. How does one realize that position? What exactly comes in the way? Saying and believing are one thing; realizing it in one's own experience, quite another. Shall we explain it away as a figment of our mind caused by our ignorance or delusion? And what we have is enormous evil that goes on causing havoc all around us? Nor is it only the bigger fish eating the smaller. What horrors men's frenzied egoisms perpetrate! How to wish away all the sorrow, all the crassness of fortune, tragedies great and small? 'Misery is misery still

and will not let us rest.' Could we rest the beating mind on the promise that an elevation to a higher order of sentience would expunge it all away as *maya*? (Or, maybe, what Emerson recognized to be the goddess *Yoganidra*, the great illusory energy of Vishnu by whom as utter ignorance, the whole world is beguiled?). Yet Emerson, at the age of 57, could honestly say in his journal entry for June 1861, 'I could never give much reality to evil and pain.'

Should we inquire how it is in the Indian context, we will find that there are many ways in which the Indian tradition elaborates evil and its origin. Perhaps one of the simplest, that from the *Bhagavadgītā* Adhyāya III, might serve our purpose. All the more so because the *Bhagavadgītā* aims at being the common man's guide to conduct rather than a systematic metaphysical disquisition. To Arjun's query, 'If sentient beings can recognize what is good and what is evil how does it come about that men do evil as though helplessly impelled into it?

अथकेन प्रयुत्कोयं पापं चरतिपूरुष:।
अनिच्छन्नपि वार्ष्णेय बलादिव नियोजित:।।

The answer is कामएष क्रोध एष:रजोगुण सभुद्भव: and so on. Again, in Adhyāya XVI and elsewhere we have more detailed references to evil and evil-doers in which we notice how the emphasis is squarely placed on the origin of evil within men impelled by wrong urges like *kāma, krodha, lobha,* etc. The source is in the psychies wrapped up in dense delusion, though there are deeper aspects to the Indian position to which this sort of a bald statement would do far from justice. In fact, for an understanding of the Hindu view of the mystery of evil, curiously, we may catch useful glimpses of it in an 'outsider' observer like the agnostic Forster of *A Passage to India.*

Forster makes Godbole the mouthpiece who roundly asserts that *when one does evil all do evil*—which occasions in the novel a certain strain of humour and irony but also genuine bewilderment in the face of that mystery. Godbole explains, 'When evil occurs, it expresses the whole universe; similarly when good occurs.' The skeptical Fielding (and with him the agnostic Forster) asks: 'Do you mean to say there is no difference between good and evil? Both are the same?' 'No, no,' says Godbole, 'They are indeed very different as their names suggest. But they are both aspects of the Lord. He is present in the one and absent in the other. The difference is great. Yet absence implies presence; absence is not non-existence. . . . Therefore we are entitled to repeat (calling on Krishna) "Come, come, come, come, come. . .".'

'What about suffering?' asks the exasperated but well-intentioned westerner, 'You will say, everything is anything and nothing something.' To which Godbole replies, 'Suffering is merely a matter for the individual. It is of no significance to the universe. It is an isolated matter. Good and evil are a different matter. They are not what we

think them; they are what they are and each of us has contributed to both.' Forster, the liberal agnostic, may have started with the portrayal of 'an unexplainable *muddle*' but he seems to have had a shrewd suspicion that it could be a mystery to which they had lost the key, which they had not the apparatus for judging. This becomes clearer when we come to the business of the Marabar Caves *echo*. The echo is always evil though the original sound may be harmless. Response to the echo is the test of the character's ability to go down to the roots of India. It troubles the 'laudable little party of Englishmen', indeed baffles them utterly, because it represents what is inherent in their attitude to evil, and to good. What is inherent is exclusiveness and conceptual dominance. Characters who belong to the 'black and white' tradition of Europe and the Near East live by rigid moral and aesthetic discriminations, it appears.

What comes in the way is the instinct to exclude; the echo pursues them. Election to the good implies for them repudiation of the bad. Yet to shout 'Go to Hell' to the echo only redoubles it, like the reverberation of one evil giving rise to another. 'There is no stopping the echo—that is the attribution of evil to everything which we exclude from our rigorous concept of the good.' It is because of this 'echo' that Adela succumbs to the suggestion that Aziz was capable of all evil. . . . Fielding (and Forster, his creator) have indeed brushed against something the enlightened West finds it hard to come to terms with and dismisses as a 'muddle.' Those words of the *Isha* Upaniṣad come to mind: 'Those who worship *avidyā* enter blind darkness, but those who indulge in *vidyā* enter an even denser darkness!' The knowledge of good and evil of such as see them in terms of a diagrammatic, irreconcilable opposition seems to fit the sense here. (They are the ones who are विद्यायां रता:) The greater thing is the realization that holds together—both *avidya* and *vidya*—as one.

In a simplified form, however, we may still maintain that the Indian attitude to evil is that once the film of deluding ignorance (*avidyā*) is removed, one sees through direct perception or '*darsana*' that evil as evil no longer exists, is resolved, becomes part of a greater harmony. No doubt the actualization of that harmony on our pulses, so to say, in our flesh and blood, in our actions, still remains. And that implies in the Indian tradition a rise to higher states of the soul. The western view would seem to have isolated the concept and perception of evil giving it a prominence that is out of proportion to the rest of the situation, introducing a kind of distortion.

Emerson's effort is to modulate that rigid position by blunting it, rounding off its edges, as it were. This he does by proposing *circularity* as a possible approach to it. Everything seen as circular in dynamism, giving rise to a system of ever-widening circles, helps us to grasp the situation better. His great essay *Circles* holds out that resolution; which

is only one more way of graphically stating the situation just as the oriental's pre-occupation with ignorance and delusion is another. After all, one needs some symbolization or other to state the unstateable. And Emerson's insights themselves are experimental, derived from many sources, notably Swedenborgian, as we know. Hence, he puts it thus in his *Uriel* which Robert Frost had once called, the greatest western poem yet: 'Evil will bless and ice will burn.' Since everything is circular and has a return movement, our ideas of evil are but blundering attempts at formulation:

> Line in nature is not found;
> Unit and universe are round;
> In vain produced, all rays return;
> Evil will bless and ice will burn.

So that no evil is pure, nor is Hell itself without its extreme satisfactions . . . that realization bends 'the balance-beam of Fate' and rends 'the bounds of good and evil,' the poem goes on to say. And a sad self-knowledge, witheringly, falls on the beauty of Uriel! Isn't it the same with a Shakespeare?—the curious may ask.

Speaking of the western attitude to evil one thinks of Shakespeare—as a refreshing contrast or diversification. He seems to show that western attitude wasn't so monolithic after all, that the renaissance mind could easily accommodate the dogmatic along with the experiential. So we go to him to gain perspective, and ask what of Shakespeare who, we know, is constantly concerned with morals but never as a moralist? What makes for the difference? An Iago's malignity that seemed 'motiveless', or a Claudius's, a Regan's, an Edmund's that is fully motivated, or even that of a Macbeth can yet answer to that description: 'Evil is privative, not absolute.' That they are such *roundly* realized figures is an element which in itself makes for a significant difference. They cannot easily be squeezed into that 'black and white' analytic mould. You can't get at their essence that way; their vitality spills over any such so-called 'rational' containers. And as Emerson had said, Shakespeare, in his book of life 'read the wiles of innocence and the transitions by which virtues and vices slide into their contraries'. Placed by the side of characters of a play like Ben Jonson's *Volpone* or even Shakespeare's own *Richard III* designed to fill a different kind of pattern, we sense the difference at once.

Moreover, one knows what Shakespeare thought of puritans and moralists. The Malvolios and Angelos serve as warnings—though only such as Falstaffs, Sir Tobys and Lucios be their accusers! And it is all too obvious that the stern moral discipliners of evil like Duke Vincentio or ex-Duke Prospero do not get away with it quite. If the discipliners of evil begin to look like schoolmasters more than a little, the point isn't that there is any compromising on the perception of evil. That

sense remains as sharp as ever. But that Shakespeare's presentation leaves open an approach *ab initio*, other than the one which leads to the supposedly 'rational' dualism of good and evil—that deceptively neat and agonizing mental *cul-de-sac.* Such is indeed the quality of Shakespeare's integrity. And however much we might dub it an enigma that eludes us, or may be, raise once again Emerson's rhetorical question: 'Could Shakespeare give a theory of Shakespeare?' one thing is clear: His projections shake us out of a mental habit which is all too common in regard to perception of evil. And Shakespeare does it variously—in the last plays, for instance, by a deft shifting of planes of reality as well as a recourse to music and the graphic arts.

That's Shakespeare's way of articulating a larger truth in terms such as the renaissance mind would easily grasp and appreciate. That's what the shifting perspectives on evil in the last plays achieve. An Othello's jealousy is so re-enacted in Leontes, the malignity of Lear's daughters re-lived in Cymbeline's atrocious queen, or Macbeth's treachery in the villainy of Antonio and Sebastian—all now in entirely new contexts and with Flora-like Perditas and Mirandas from the world's springtime, Hermione-statues coming to life, and miracles wrought by Prospero's magic wand! All that becomes meaningful, and the problem of evil reviewed under this new light wears a new face. It modulates, as it were, to a detail of a greater harmony. If that doesn't actually characterize evil as the result of *avidyā* it puts us in a frame of mind receptive to such a new meaningful perspective.

Thus does Shakespeare restore to men their integrity as spirits and parts of a great circle of being, by re-establishing what Emerson calls 'the penetrating keynote of nature and spirit—the earth-beat, sea-beat, heart-beat, which makes the tune to which the sun rolls, and the globule of blood, and the sap of trees.' Most western perception of evil—a Shakespeare apart—disrupts that keynote. Emerson is deeply conscious of the harm done by dogmatic formulations of good and evil, God and Satan, the divine and the infernal. We realize this when he stigmatizes such a narrowness in Swedenborg, the mystic, from whom he derived profound insights—the notion of correspondences, forms and circles and vortices. He owns that debt freely, speaking with the warmest enthusiasm of that side of Swedenborg's genius, considering it great enough to be 'complementary' to Shakespeare's.

However, Emerson is equally unsparing when it comes to the narrowly theological view of the Swedenborg who admitted no conversion of evil spirits. Emerson calls it 'theological cramp' and 'pernicious theological limitation'. . . : 'Under the same theological cramp many of his dogmas are bound. His cardinal position in morals is that evils should be shunned as sins. But he does not know what evil is, or what good is, who thinks any ground remains to be occupied after saying that evil is to be shunned as sins. . . .'

At this point I would like to broaden the scope of this inquiry somewhat. It is necessary to consider certain essential aspects of Emerson's reflective life, as a background. Though some of these do not directly bear upon the question, one sees how in Emerson's case, would bring his perception of evil so very close to inner developments the Indian. And if that doesn't amount to direct acceptance of the Indian view it surely indicates the basis from which such a perception could arise. Since in the Indian experience evil can be meaningfully seen as the result of अविद्या or delusion the crucial question is how far could one claim the ability to see it as such. Which implies attainment of a piercing vision that can approach the real through the phenomenal world. Emerson was acutely aware of his own limitations in this regard. He even seems to struggle against being carried away, so to say, mesmerized by his own 'transcendental' eloquence! He informs us: 'I have inherited from my sire a formality of mannered speech, a passionate love for the strains of eloquence . . . for I have hoped to put on eloquence as a robe.' But he knows that in his eloquence the whole man doesn't always act. He has the honesty to confess that though he found his own thoughts and spirit in Thoreau, 'Thoreau takes a step beyond and illustrates by excellent images that which I should have conveyed in a sleepy generality.' He is sure, women are our superiors in this. 'They must speak clearly and simply as a song.'

We mustn't overlook this Emerson, this very human Emerson. We are so used to the transcendentalist sage, so apt to be under the spell of his eloquence that it is easy to miss the untranscendentalist Emerson underneath! For there was one, an anguished man for whom life wore a visionary face and yet denied him entry into the *sanctum*, into being what he yearned for all his life, and experiencing the *noumenon*. He remained painfully on the threshold, 'elected' yet an outsider; called, not merged—close enough to be dazzled by the illumination but not irradiated by it himself. He remains for us a triumphant commentator on mysticism rather than one who has had the mystic experience himself. The thought, the belief, are there and are strong but what of the realization in the phenomenal world? Unlike the pure mystic, the transcendentalist does not seek to annihilate the visible world. His is a divided vision. A precarious stance is called for if the perceiver is at once to transcend and to participate in the visible world—the reason why Emerson seems to teeter uneasily between belief and participation.

He is honest unto himself to own up to this 'discrepance' as he calls it. So he does in the most heart-searching of his Essays, the one on 'Experience' which begins with: 'Where do we find ourselves?' 'I have set my heart on honesty in the chapter', he says. And that is the burden of those last three paragraphs—containing the celebrated 'the lords of life' passage setting out an excruciating self-appraisal and recognition. The point is pertinent to Emerson's Indian connection.

For this is also what the sages of the ancient Indian scriptures have tussled with, and said so in so many words. Such an accord with men in distant ages and climes was assurance to sustain Emerson in defeat. . . . To hang thus suspended between 'I would' and 'I could' is the fate of man.

Even his being an artist comes in the way. As a writer and artist he describes that elusive, wished-for, experience, its form, but is unable to convert it into force, into life-energy, and live it. 'You who see the artist, the orator, the poet, too near . . . and pronounce them failures, not heroes but quacks, conclude that these arts are not for man but a disease.' Nature has made us that way. The boy who gazes at a drawing, or a cast, entranced may be one of the millions of the incipient writers and sculptors. A little more, and he runs to seize the pen or the chisel . . . is lured away by *the form.* Nature drives, nature joins with his enemy. What of the realization? To the extent he is lost in the form, he is led away from being what he describes. 'A man is a golden impossibility. The line he must walk is a hair's breadth. The wise through excess of freedom is made a fool.' Which calls to mind the क्षुरस्य धारा image of the Upaniṣads. And this comes at the close of instructions how to realize the Great Self: 'An intelligent man should suppress his speech and his mind . . .' and so on.

That then is the problem—basic to the Emersonian perception of evil and its resolution that his closeness to Indian thought makes it possible for him. His is basically the Indian approach; but to make it integrally his own, he is aware, interposes a hurdle and a constraint. Yet what is it that while denying him total identification with that approach curiously brings him closer to it more than ever? To see evil as the result of अविद्या, in terms of a larger harmony, would necessarily imply a transcendental experience. The problem thus resolves itself into a broader issue, the issue of how to 'realize' the transcendental experience—how to *live* those fleeting glimpses of another order of existence, confirm and authenticate them in our day-to-day existence.

The difficulty is common to both the Indian tradition and Emersonian thought. But here a fundamental difference seems to emerge: Emerson's impulse is to rely on the force of the contemplative life . . . which confirms him in the role of the Central American sage—wrapped up in the light of his own higher perceptions and affections, not a little isolated from the mundane activity around, the buzzing life of his 'beknighted' fellow human beings, in lone confrontation with primary forces of nature. In that serene landscape man himself might begin to seem an impertinence. Emerson was always something of a recluse, which explains the much-regretted embarassment he suffered when with people.

Whereas the mainstay of the Indian religious and philosophic tradition has been *action*, 'karma'—even in one's effort to infuse the

quotidian with the higher intuition. And this, in spite of the acceptance of different paths to the same goal. The importance of ज्ञानयोग and भक्तियोग notwithstanding, the focus is squarely on the conduct of life. For that reason the *Bhagavadgītā* is more a guide to practical life than a systematic philosophic disquisition, and is cast in the form of a dialogue in a concrete and critical war situation. Emerson's bias in this context is very clear. The whole force and natural bent of his genius is towards a meditative self-sufficiency rather than towards action. This is evident in the characteristic tone of his writing, its singular, intensive, reflective quality—the mind turned on itself. That is the pervasive sense of an essay like 'Experience'. How variously and in what subtle ways that preference for the contemplative declares itself! 'I gossip for my hour concerning the eternal politics. I have seen many fair pictures not in vain. A wonderful time I have lived in. . . . Let who will, ask where is the fruit? I find a private fruit sufficient. This is the fruit—that I should not ask for a rash effect from meditations, counsels and 'hiving of truths. I should feel it pitiful to demand a result. All I know is reception. . . . Also that hankering after an overt or practical effect seems to me an apostasy. I am willing to spare this unnecessary deal of doing. Life wears to me a visionary face. Hardest, roughest action is visionary too. It is but a choice between soft and turbulent dreams. People disparage knowing and the intellectual life, and urge doing. I am very content with knowing.' (*Experience*).

Again and again, he holds contemplation in plain opposition to action, sees the whole circle of persona and things, of actions and events as one vast picture which God paints on the instant eternity for the contemplation of the soul. 'It accepts whatever befalls as part of its lesson. It is a watcher more than a doer, only that it may the better watch.' If we raise the cavil: After all, how far and how deep does this contemplative effort penetrate? Can it ever grow into a becoming? One may point to at least two ways in which the Emersonian position admits a plausible explanation: Firstly, there is his firm conviction about the different degrees of sensations and state of mind, different degrees of unison of the soul and the object of contemplation. So in that famous passage already referred to: 'The consciousness of each man is a *sliding scale* which identifies him now with the First Cause, and now with the flesh of his body . . . in infinite degrees.' Every time it is the plane from which the contemplation has issued that matters and at whose command. The more central the source, the greater it is.

Secondly, transcendentalists had developed their own idea of perception and understanding of the epistemological-ontological relationship. Some of them like Sampson Reed (who was also a

Swedenborgian) have offered several elaborations of the perceptual process antecedent to transcendental experience. Corresponding to that sliding scale of consciousness there are different kinds of perception and different levels of understanding. Ordinarily, when we say 'we understand something that we percieve' there isn't much of participation; the awareness is not deep enough; we do not enter the beings of those objects but touch them minimally and remain on the verge. But when we are aware of the one and the many at once, the diversity of nature with the unity, the phenomenon with the *noumenon*, the material manifestation with the hidden spiritual significance—in one act of perception—the individual is enabled to transcend the limitations of space and time of the common human experience in order to participate in a higher order of being and meaning. Then the mind becomes a solvent of the objects contemplated—for an understanding of which position we have to refer to that celebrated doctrine of *correspondence*, one of the Swedenborgian legacies.

The idea of correspondence is indeed basic to American transcendentalism, though to convert it into a sort of mechanism of transcendence, as is the fashion with critics, takes away most of its usefulness by over-schematizing it. That's a habit of mind liable to swallow up the very thing it tries to save. The concept has some important corollaries: Since the spiritual parallel exists in a timeless realm, when the individual embarks upon it, the past and the future collapse into the present, so to say. 'Memory and participation are lost or dissolved, as it were, in correspondence.' In other words, we look forward to the modern phenomenologist's position in the now familiar terms of the Husserlian 'intentionality' and 'epoches'. The past and the future become 'horizons' of the present act of consciousness; the past is present as 'memory' and the future as 'anticipation'.

That explains Emerson's constant emphasis on the present lived moment, on the timelessness of the present, on salvation being earned here and now. Which makes even the process of growing old a misnomer: 'Whilst we converse with what is above us, we do not grow old, but grow young.' Reminding us of Emily Dickinson's defiant, 'We grow not old in years but newer every day.' Emerson declares, 'In nature every moment is new; the past is always swallowed and forgotten.' And what about the future? 'Every man is not so much a workman in the world as he is a suggestion of what he should be'. Men walk as prophesies of the next age. 'So that nothing is secure but life, transition, the energizing spirit . . . . People wish to be settled; only as far as they are unsettled is there hope for them.' Emerson reminds us that past and future are mental constructs. For the full receptiveness needed to experience correspondence the whole person has to be present. He then confers with the environment without conceptualizing it or forcing

it into pre-conceived patterns, and without prospect or retrospect. To this the natural objects make a like response: 'Those roses under my window make no references to former roses or to better ones; they are for what they are. They exist with God today. There is no time to them. . . . He (man) cannot be happy or strong until he too lives with nature in the present, above time.'

Everything hinges on our ability to experience these correspondences. It is only through such an experience that the resolution of evil as a part of a great harmony could be realized. Emerson elaborates the process bending all the force of his genius to the task. He declares his conviction that 'every natural fact is a symbol of some spiritual fact' and that 'every appearance in nature corresponds to some state of mind.' But there is need for the right angle of vision. The beholder's eye must be in the right relationship to fact, so that 'A ray of relation passes from every other being to him.' (That's where he talks of seeing the world upside down from between our legs—seeing it as a picture by shifting the point of view.) And in confirmation he offers us his personal experience in that 'transparent eye-ball' passage—when time and space vanish and the spirit converses with truths that have always been spoken in the world: 'Standing on the bare ground—my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite space—all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eye-ball. I am nothing. I see all. The currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or parcel of God.' Transcendence has taken place. The problem of evil presumably has been resolved; and what was held out as a possibility in that 1836 Essay, *Nature* ('Build therefore your own world . . . until evil is no more seen.') has been realized.

The pertinent question is, isn't this rather different from the trend of thought and the spirit of the Indian texts? Their enormous concern and pre-occupation with *karma* seems to proclaim a deep bias for action. And, in any case, there's so little there of this lofty distancing—aesthetic or logocentrist—that some might detect in the Emersonian *transparency*. In the *Bhagavadgītā*, of course, the term *karma* may claim pride of place as the most over-worked lexical item. You meet it everywhere; in the Upaniṣads, too. Say for instance, in that incantation to be uttered at the point of death as in the *Isha:*

वायुर्निरुम्भृतमथेदं भस्मांतम् शरीरम् ।
ऊँक्रतोस्मर कृतंस्मर क्रतोस्मर कृतंस्मर।

What is to be brought to mind at the dissolution of the body is *kratu*, the sum of all the volitional acts you have lived through in your life, the core of the innermost 'pravrittis', the confirmed and crystallized form of your identity, which will decide the nature of a new birth. So as the *Chhandogya* declares: 'A person consists of purpose (क्रतुमय: पुरुष:)'

and that 'according to the purpose a person has in this world does he become on departing hence. So let everyone form a purpose for his life, (स क्रतुं कुर्वीत)'—decide, so to say, the main direction of its dynamism.

So also with reference to evil. What is contemplated in the Upaniṣadic tradition is not so much evil as an ineluctable, devastating force that impinges on the world bringing chaos and destruction to life all around and suffering to human being in its wake. What is pondered again and again in eastern scriptures is rather the source of evil in the individual self—and the damage it does to the self itself. Not that there isn't awareness of evil as a social reality and its pervasive vitiating action on public and private lives. But just that the one eventuates the other, begets it. That is, after all, the meaning of Krishna's assurance that he incarnates himself whenever times are out of joint—

परित्राणाय साधूनां विनाशायचदुष्कृतान

—and so on. Such an awareness is the basis of the *Bhagavadgītā* situation itself, that is implied in his calling upon the reluctant Arjuna to stand up and fight the evil that has gathered and made head around him, and not get lost in deluding compunctions like some pale and hesitant proto-Hamlet!

But the more intense probing is given to what causes evil and how to fight it at the source in the self. At every step you come across this concern in one form or another. Freedom from the tyranny of the internal enemies

काम क्रोध लोभ मोह मद मत्सर।

is already seen to be inherent in the *Bhagavadgītā* plea for निष्काम कर्म or अनासक्तियोग. To cite another example at random, an Upaniṣad like *Maitri* groups such qualities as mental confusion, fear, depression, intoxication, anger, atheism, ignorance, jealousy, cruelty, stupidity, shamelessness, conceit, and so on, under the category: 'the constituent of nature called "darkness"', and qualities like inward craving, cloying love, passion, greed, wishing others ill (हिंसा), hatred, secretiveness, envy, instability, distraction, ambition, acquisitiveness, favouritism, reliance on worldly wealth, aversion for objects repellent to the senses, and attachment to objects attractive to them, churlish speech, gluttony, and so on, under the category: 'the constituent of nature called "passion"'.

Thus does *Maitri* make a careful inventory of the forces of darkness within. With amazing analytic vigour it examines all the ingredients at various levels of body, mind and soul. Such probing into the constituents of the self is an essential characteristic of the Indian tradition; and the *Maitri* notes down all such evil dispositions that are a regular part of the human composition: 'The individual self is replete

with these and subject to them. Therefore it takes on many a different form,—yes, it takes them on,' declares the Upaniṣad.

Now, there is no smack of the Emersonian 'transparency' in any of this, but rather an active tussle with oneself—an inner dynamism. And yet all this is not to deny the Indian source of Emerson's insights in this context, but only to mark a difference that persists. However, since that very context of Indian thought is in question, it is necessary to guard against a possible misunderstanding lest the Indian affiliation appear only peripheral rather than central. Despite all such differences as we have noticed there are those factors running deeper—more pervasive and vital—which always drew him closer to the Indian stance on evil. One may point to at least two aspects of that affiliation which declare a profound kinship. There is first, the extreme stress on the individual which is a common feature of both; and further, there is the deep realization of the unity of life, the unison of the subject-self with the self of nature which provides the background to Emerson's approach to evil. These features are such as should leave us in no doubt about the Indian kinship.

Emerson's individualism is very much of a piece with the Indian and oriental preoccupation with the self. The charge that Indian religious and philosophic thought is exclusively individualistic, that it has little concern for 'other' individuals may be laid at Emerson's door with equal fairness, perhaps. I have a feeling that the Emersonian emphasis on the self is apt to be misunderstood in the West because of its specifically eastern moorings. It is obvious that Emerson's main effort in this was addressed to rescuing or releasing the authentic self from the 'depersonalization' that modern life forces upon us. He wished to rescue it from the process of what he called 'otherism' which sets in as socio-economic forces increasingly become ends in themselves . . . and 'man is metamorphosed into a thing'.

'Society is a mental framework', and the social institution produces what he called 'decorum'. This decorum becomes a subtle kind of tyranny that enforces an other-directed form of behaviour, and the individual becomes a victim of 'seeming'. Emerson's plea is that instead of 'seeming' he must *be*. 'In all things I would have the island of man inviolate', he had said. His is an effort to rescue the self from a besetting *inauthenticity*, to restore it to its original power of responding to experience as a natural and total organism, to open his inner communication so that the individual person puts himself back at the centre of his world where he belongs. It wasn't however an anti-social stance necessarily, because Emerson could declare, 'Solitude is nought, and society is nought' and, at the same time, that 'A man must ride alternately on the horses of his private and his public nature'. In this, Emerson's approach fully accords with what is in-built in the Indian tradition.

All the same, in the context of western thought, this attitude is open to some serious misunderstanding. On the one hand, it may look like a sheer selfish hedonism; on the other, to a more sympathetic view, it might appear to be a form of psycho-therapy predating and anticipating psychotherapists like Carl Rogers, Eric Fromm, or R.D. Laing who seek to stave off the peculiar psychological sickness that threatens selfhood. Interpreting Emerson's position to be a form of psychotherapy would obviously be too narrowing though many a modern commentator may find that Emerson meant 'self' to refer to the realm of psychology, not philosophy—to realizing the existing potential rather than moving towards a transformation of personality. What such a critic would find confusing is that this same prophet of individualism should be noting in his journal: 'That which is individual and remains individual, in my experience is of no value'.

Trusting and cultivating the 'ego' in the psychological sense is just the opposite of what Emerson is urging. The same is true of the New England movement of 'self-culture' to which Channing, Alcott, Emerson and Margaret Fuller had contributed. Commitment to self-culture did not mean encouraging egotistical or asocial tendencies. The self-culturists put the stress on the essentially selfless quality of the soul. The doctrine had obviously a metaphysical underpinning to it. That is the crux; that which is individual has to rise to the transcendental or it is nothing. It were then only a selfish hedonism without such a foundation. That is where the Indian affiliation becomes acutely relevant. As with the Indian tradition, so with Emerson, the emphasis on the individual is redeemed by the possibility of a higher evolving self. The tradition too has come under censure. The tendency of Indian philosophic thought, it is said, is to make the individual's relation to the Absolute all in all, and utterly exclusive so that it has little relevance to his relation with other individuals.

This again is a very debatable issue. And the various references in the Indian texts where a contrary attitude is clearly in evidence might appear to some to be apologetic attempts to make up the deficiency. When the question of human relationships is raised we tend to view it in the modern humanitarian perspective. So that expressions like सर्वभूतहितेरतः (devoted to strenuously striving for the well-being of all living things) or बोधयन्तःपरस्परम् (seeking to enlighten each other) are apt to seem mere sentimental bits of moral exhortation. Excised from their context of a metaphysical reality reduces them to that level. And when we are confronted with a statement like

यस्तुसर्वाणिभूतानि आत्मन्येवानुपश्यति सर्वभूतेषुचात्मानम् ततो न विजिगुप्सते। ।

we are unable to grasp the experiential whole of which the human relationships are a part. However, one thing is clear about both Emerson and the Indian tradition. In their concern for the self they

emphasize 'influence' at the inter-personal level. They imply a world in which such an inter-personal approach is not only possible but open, unconstrained and essential.

Related to this stress on the individual (and the self) and of equal import is the other feature that is common to Emerson and the Indian tradition—namely, the realization of the unity of all life. Notwithstanding the difference between the Emersonian *penchant* for contemplation and the *Bhagavadgītā* view of निष्काम कर्म there is one sure ground on which to repose our perturbed souls! It all rests on the firm realization of the unity of our being, unity of all life, unity with the universe of things, unity of self with The Self. When that becomes the mainstay of our consciousness, the question of all dual-isms—द्वंद्वs—and disturbing forces like evil yield to a stance which could only be described as 'joy'. There is no other word for it. Hence the Upaniṣads ask: When that unity has been grasped where is there scope for delusion; what occasion can there be for lamentation and sorrow?

यस्मिन्सर्वाणिभूतानि आत्मैवाभूत्विजानतः तत्रकोमोहः कःशोकः एकत्वमनुपश्यतः।।
                                                                    —*Isha.*

Anguish is put aside like a cloak.

But, ordinarily, we miss the point of this Upaniṣadic wisdom: 'How can seeing the unity of life assuage the essential pain of our condition?' we ask. 'Seeing' is one thing, 'realizing' is quite another. Perception of that unity can take place at various levels. A mere 'notional' assent doesn't involve any change. We may recognize the point when we relate it to the agony we go through on account of evil. To the extent you can rest your whole soul on that 'unity', so to say, partake of it, that anguished state must yield to a deep state of understanding and acceptance, while an indescribable calm must descend upon you. Emerson sees it as 'joy'—it is the same Emerson as had once said, he missed cheerfulness even in a Jesus! But, for him, it would appear, a 'meditative unity' was enough or the only one possible, since he believed the soul to be more a watcher than a doer, and a doer only that *it may the better watch.* Such doing occurs more in the contemplation of nature rather than in performing one's नियतकर्म in the spirit of योगस्थकुरूकर्माणि and योगः कर्मसुकौशलम् and so forth. It might appear as though, for the transcendentalist, the trance-like state that such contemplation induces stands for all that is implied by इन्द्रियनिग्रह, the conquest of कामक्रोध, etc. or अनासक्ति योग which the *Bhagavadgītā* describes.

It is possible, that may be like casting the Emerson of the 'transparent eyeball' too much in the role of a *muni* of the Indian definition:

दुःरेष्वानुद्विग्नमनाः सुखेषु विगतस्पृहः वीतराग भयक्रोधः स्थितधीर्मुनिरुच्यते।।
                                                              —*Bhagavadgītā* II.

One thing is clear: The Emersonian *evangel* (if one may use that term) is very much an aesthetic experience. Poetry is one of its primary ingredients. Not that he was unaware of its risks. Infatuation with *the form* can turn art into a disease, he had thought. Yet the importance he attached to this aspect is evidenced everywhere. We sense it, for instance, in the peculiar want he found in Swedenborg: 'It is remarkable', he said, 'that this man, who by perception of symbols saw the poetic construction of things, and the primary relation of mind to matter, remained entirely devoid of the whole apparatus of poetic expression, which that perception creates'. Hence Emerson is led to ask, 'Was it that he saw the vision intellectually?'

By implication, his own was more than merely an *intellectual vision*. So we come back to our earlier problem of being what we perceive. For the कर्मयोगि as for Emerson—living and reifying his 'transparency'—the difficulty of realization remains. How far does it all reach? So faltering, so uncertain, this waiting upon those few fitful visionary glimpses of the beyond? A Harold Bloom thought bleakly: 'I venture the generalization that Emersonian transcendentalism is not transcendentalism at all, but is the program of attaining this transparency, which is the peculiar American mode of the Romantic epiphany or privileged moment', and that 'the American transparency gives us the Divine through the world, is discontinuous in the extreme and as much an ebbing out as a flowing in'.

However one may characterize that transparency, nothing brings to our minds this 'untranscendental' Emerson so poignantly as his heart-rending references to the death of his son, Waldo, when not yet six—heart-rending sorrow because it is mute, because it ruthlessly puts all his grandiloquence to the bitter test, and puts him on the rack. How to explain this evil? Is it an evil at all? How to take it? This common but enormous something you cannot ascribe to any source in the self but is the very condition of life itself? How to see it as a part of the whole? As the समदर्शिन् would see it? Yet Emerson must say bravely: 'The only thing grief has taught me is to know how shallow it is. . . . That, like all the rest, plays about the surface and never introduces me into the reality. . . . In the death of my son, now more than two years ago, I seem to have lost a beautiful estate—no more. I cannot get it near to me . . . something which I thought was a part of me which could not be torn away without tearing me nor enlarged without enriching me, falls off from me and leaves no scar'.

These thoughts some have stigmatized as callousness; they are muffled because they are an effort to stifle an anguished later Emerson who quests after the meaning of necessity, the serpent *Ananke*, fate or the reality principle—howsoever one comprehends it: 'In short, there ought to be no such thing as fate', he declares, 'as long as we use this word it is a sign of our impotence and that we are not yet ourselves.

There is now a sublime revelation in each of us. . . . I know that *the whole* is here—the wealth of the universe is for me, everything is explicable and practicable for me, and yet whilst I adore this ineffable life which is at my heart it will not condescend to . . . say to me why I have a son and daughters born to me, or why my son dies in his sixth year of joy. Herein, then, I have this latent omniscience coexistent with omni-ignorance. Moreover whilst this deity glows at the heart . . . I know . . . I am a dwarf and I remain a dwarf. As long as I am weak I shall talk of Fate. Whenever God fills me with his fullness, I shall see the disappearance of Fate. I am defeated all the time; yet to victory I am born'.

Coming to terms with little Waldo's death as part of the delusion born of अविद्या couldn't but be a sore trial with heart-strings wrung. These dark broodings reveal the human Emerson all his Indian connection notwithstanding. Is this Emerson any the lesser? Or is he actually all the richer for it? What is more, isn't the Indian connection itself all the richer for such an Emerson?

We talk of the untranscendental Emerson who saw the beckoning light in the East but did not quite get there. He held on, hopefully husbanding those brief moments, spoke out, exhorted, sermonized, trying to strengthen his own defenses against the Goddess Necessity. What sustained him finally was that the Indian outlook was hitched on to a plenitude. Despite all the demand to curb or control the life of the senses and feelings, the temper of the eastern mind was far from ascetic or moralistic or suppressive. It was inclusive . . . and so enfranchising. To absorb an event like little Waldo's death into that inclusive harmony was not easy. But the effort persisted. Nor could it be said with certainty that 'evil' was not absorbed, since there is no stop, no frame that declared the effort defeated. The stream moves on. 'Only life avails, not the having lived'.

Faced with this kind of 'ultimate' challenge, may be, Emerson still remained on the threshold teetering. Even so, because of the broad, holding, Indian foundation he towers monumentally with the strength, not of any sectarian origin but of Man.

J.P. Sartre and Baudelaire

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Students of both philosophy and literature have been taken by surprise at the covert, disguised fusion of the two at almost all times and in all languages; but in the post-second world war era such overt and undisguised adventures have compelled them all to take this phenomenon more or less for granted. Though there can be no genuine literary creativity without a philosophy however imperceptibly distilled in the form of the author's concepts or attitudes concerning man and the universe, two recent daring attempts have assumed challenging proportions in the history of modern thought. It is certainly not a mere accident that in the same year, 1947, appeared Bertrand Russell's *History of Western Philosophy* containing a full chapter on the English Romantic poet Lord Byron (1788–1824) and J.P. Sartre's longer study of the nineteenth century French poet Charles Baudelaire (1821–1867). An English philosopher discussing the philosophy of an English poet, not of the highest rank, seems to have no apparent relation with the study by a French philosopher of a French poet, but there is undoubtedly a deeper connection. Baudelaire knew this English poet well and mentions him in his *oeuvre*; not only that, he cherished the ambition of becoming as famous as Byron. Posterity has not upheld Baudelaire's estimate of Byron while Baudelaire's criticism since 1945 has firmly and admirably stood all attacks and investigations, including that of Sartre.

Sartre's study of Baudelaire stands apart as a school of criticism in itself like other schools and non-controversial studies such as New Criticism, Aestheticism, Structuralism, etc. This study was written by Sartre as an Introduction to *Ecrits intimes de Baudelaire* (les Editions du Point du Jour, 1946; (Collection) Incidences, 1947). Though Baudelaire has been hailed as the first modern poet and has been studied and commented upon in all major languages of the world, including Chinese, Sartre's attraction towards the author of *Les Fleurs du Mal* (Flowers of Evil) and *Le Spleen de Paris* (Petits poèmes en prose) (The spleen of Paris; Small Prose Poems) has a deeper reason: that of some striking

resemblances between the early lives of both. The main decisive fact of resemblance was the death of the fathers of both during their childhood when Baudelaire was 6 and Sartre 11, and the remarriages of the widows—a hasty one of Baudelaire's mother in about one year and a half. Sartre picks up this single incident of Baudelaire's life and studies it as the turning point of Baudelaire's life which moulded his character once for all. Since all subsequent consequences flowed from Baude-laire's sudden discovery of his loneliness and responsibility in child-hood, Sartre considers it legitimate to concentrate mainly on the study of Baudelaire's original choice. In the words of Michel Leiris '. . . l'auteur de cette introduction s'arrête au seuil lorsqu'il se risque, dans les toutes dernières pages et à titre d'épreuve de la justesse de sa démarche, à un examen non, certes, de la poésie mais de ce qu'il appelle—posant ainsi explicitement sa limite—le "fait poétique" baudelairien.'[1] (The author of this introduction stops at the threshold when he takes the risk, in all the latter pages and as a proof of the correctness of his attempt, of an examination, not, certainly, of the poetry, but of what he calls—thus explicitly posing his limit, the 'poetic act' of Baudelaire).

'Sartre est, enfin, un critique de grande valeur. Il précise la "situation" de chaque écrivain' (Sartre is, in a word, a critic of great merit. He pinpoints the situation of every writer) say the authors of *Histoire de la littérature française* [2] which tends towards Marxist theory of criticism. Sartre's point of view, in spite of being one-sided prompts us to reconsider our position because it remains by all standards original though highly controversial. Sartre does touch upon a few aspects of Baudelaire's achievement as a poet at the end of this study; but again and again he returns to his main thesis that Baudelaire's original choice was a faulty one and this coloured his entire life and poetic activity.

Sartre marshals his arguments in a masterly fashion and conviction, applies existential psychoanalysis to assess Baudelaire the man and judges him partially by ignoring Baudelaire's own insistence that an author must be assessed as a whole. Though Michel Leiris maintains that 'the enterprise of Sartre, though surely very daring, doesn't express any irreverence as regards Baudelaire's genius, nor any misappreciation either of the power of poetry' (p. 13), Sartre's tenor is indicative throughout of an ineradicable prepossession which is vitiating sound judgement.

II

Sartre begins with enumerating the contradictions of Baudelaire's life. He disagrees with the view that Baudelaire didn't get the life he deserved. Consider, for example, these facts. This obstinate man

adopted once for all the most banal and strict morality of the contemporary society; this clever man frequented the most miserable prostitutes; it was his thirst for misery that kept him close to the lanky skeleton of the appalling Sara la Louchette, and his love for the dreadful Jewess prefigures that of Jeanne Duval; this solitary figure dreads solitude and never stirs outside without company; he cannot work for long and regularly; he dreamed of unknown countries; he complained against his family counsellor but does nothing to get free from his clutches; he dreams of leaving home but hardly goes on journey. Once he sailed for India but managed to return from Mauritius. There is a long list of contradictions. Sartre now puts this question: "Et s'il avait mérité sa vie? Si, au contraire des idées reçues, les hommes n'avaient jamais que la vie qu'ils méritent? Il faut y regarder de plus près.' (And if he deserved his life? If, contrary to accepted ideas, men had never got but a life they deserved? It is necessary to look into this more closely.) (p. 18)

According to Sartre the root of all Baudelaire's contradictions lay in his widowed mother's hasty remarriage within two years of his father's death. Baudelaire was thrown into an individual existence with the responsibility of looking after himself. 'On this subject Baudelaire was untiring and his terrible logic summed up like this: "When one has a son like me—like me was implied—one doesn't remarry."' (p. 20)

Sartre draws his conclusion:

> Nous touchons ici au choix originel que Baudelaire a fait de lui-même à cet engagement absolu par quoi chacun de nous décide dans une situation particulière de ce qu'il sera et de ce qu'il est. (Here we touch upon the original choice which Baudelaire made for himself, upon the absolute commitment by which each one of us decides in a particular situation what one shall be and what one is.) (p. 21)

Baudelaire has made himself another, that is, other than his mother. This chink (fêlure) in infant Baudelaire's mind led to his conscious choice which was his destiny. Baudelaire avenges by aiding the criminals within his family with his solitude, misery, longing for death, even attempt at suicide. The psychoanalysts call it autopunition (self punishment). Sartre goes further and dubs this attitude as 'pride'. This stoic pride is as disastrous as it is pure because it runs free and is nourished by itself, always unsatiated, always exasperated, it exhausts itself in the act wherein it affirms itself; it rests on nothing, it is in the air.

Georges Blin in his admirable essay[3] begins the examination of Sartre's study by referring to *L'Être et le Néant* and Sartre's character young Philippe in *The Reprieve* (who has an analogous life to that of Baudelaire) by observing that '. . . la psychanalyse existentielle prétend

"déchiffrer" l'homme en totalité par la détermination de son choix originel.' (Existential psychoanalysis claims to decipher man in his totality by the determination of his original choice). The problem of Baudelaire and his mother, says Henri Peyre, has assumed such an amplitude in the criticism of the present time that we cannot elude it under the pretext that it has inspired a great many exaggerations and nonsense. It touches other diverse problems: what could there be abnormal, sadistic, masochistic with Baudelaire and to use his language, the problems of evil and the abyss.[4]

The hypothesis with which Sartrean psychoanalysis starts is the same with which the medical study of Dr René Laforgue begins.[5] Baudelaire is a neurotic congenitally. Though both these authors start from the same hypothesis, observes Eva Kushner, their conclusions are different.[6] For Laforgue the mechanism of Baudelaire's self-punishment affects all human relations and is aggravated by the fact that he suffers also for the fault of his mother. Considering the congenital neurosis of Baudelaire Dr Laforgue maintains that the unconscious mechanism of Baudelaire was so strong and absolutely determinant that he could not get rid of and overcome it, so that Baudelaire could not have chosen differently while Sartre argues the opposite.

'The argument of Sartre is undisputably of great force, even for him who doesn't accept the existential premises and refuses to follow the prophet of this new philosophy by believing in the decisive importance he accords to the choice and the condemnation he pronounces against whoever shirks before the commitment to universal responsibilities,' says H. Peyre and asks:

> Doit-on cependant admettre que 'l'on n'est rien d'autre que sa vie', lorsqu'on laisse une oeuvre qui transcende cette vie? Sartre excelle dans la description psychologique et ses analyses de détail sont admirables; elles mettent à nu les misères de la chair et de l'aboulie baudelairiennes, les traits peu édifiants de son attitude religieuse. Mais l'ensemble reste par trop dénué d'impartialité.[7]

> (Must one, therefore, admit that one has nothing else than his life, when one bequeaths a work which transcends that life? Sartre excels in his psychological description and his analyses of detail are admirable; they lay bare the suffering of the flesh and the mental disease resulting in loss of will-power of Baudelaire, the not many edifying traits of his religious attitude. But the whole remains very much devoid of impartiality.)

The second theme of Sartre is that Baudelaire is bent over himself 'Il se penche sur lui-même . . . Penché sur soi, comme Narcisse.' (p. 26) (He is bent over himself . . . bent over himself like Narcissus.) Narcissus-like to assert his singularity, Baudelaire never examines an object except when it enables him to observe himself. Sartre quotes

from Baudelaire's prose poem 'Les fenêtres' (Windows) and 'L'art philosophique' (Philosophical art) to illustrate how for Baudelaire the external world is irreal and he is full of himself. 'Baudelaire is the man who chose to see himself as if he were another; his life is only the history of this fall.' (p. 32)

In this Narcissism begins Baudelaire's tragedy: imagine the white crow born blind because the very great reflexive light amounts to blindness. No self-analysis is possible and the famous lucidity of Baudelaire is only an effort at recovery. And to see himself; but to see oneself, it is necessary to become two. Since Baudelaire cannot do that, self-analysis is impossible for him. His *ennui* is the pure *ennui* of living; it is the taste which a man has necessarily for himself; thus the *ennui* is a metaphysical sentiment, the internal landscape of Baudelaire and constitutes the eternal material of Baudelaire's joys, anger and pains. Baudelaire cannot act; he is brooding all the time on the same complaints and grievances; so much so that had Baudelaire's letters not been dated by him, it would have been difficult to classify them. None is farther from action than Baudelaire. He is a man of creation, not of action.

Baudelaire received without questioning moral ideas from others. Not once did he defend the contents of *Les Fleurs du Mal* during trial; rather than challenge the charges against his masterpiece he accepts the secret shame of lying over the meaning of his work. He took his values ready-made and utterly failed to create his own values. Therefore he never outgrew his childhood. This inaction explains Baudelaire's love for artifice—paint, rouge, jewellery, which proves man's grandeur, and man's power to create as also Baudelaire's myth of the modern large city. 'The large city is the reflection of the abyss: human freedom' (p. 53). Baudelaire, continues Sartre, 'qui hait l'homme et la "tyrannie de la face humaine", se retrouve humaniste par son culte de l'oeuvre humaine.' (Who hates man and the tyranny of the human face, rediscovers himself as a humanist by his cult of the work of man.)

II

Baudelaire's poems were substitutes for the creation of good; they are entirely useless; they affirm in each verse what Baudelaire himself calls 'surnaturalisme'; each poem 'represents the symbolic gratification of a desire for total autonomy, a thirst for demiurgic creation'. (p. 86) The contradiction here is that Baudelaire's freewill is acting for ends his own, but masks and limits his responsibility by accepting pre-established norms of theocracy. Therefore, the only one way out for his freedom is to choose Evil (Le Mal). Baudelaire is a doer of Le Mal for Le Mal. Sartre's interpretation of the famous utterance in *Mon coeur mis à nu* (My heart laid bare), XI, that 'Il y a dans tout homme, à toute

heure, deux postulations simultanées, l'une vers Dieu, l'autre vers Satan.' (There are in all men, at all times, two simultaneous postulations, the one towards God, the other towards Satan) is that these two forces are not independent, two contrary and autonomous forces applied simultaneously at the same point, but the one is the function of the other. Crépet and Blin make this more clear: '. . . ce qui permet de faire le Mal: "pour le Mal", c'est-à-dire sans cesser d'adhérer entièrement au Bien.' (Which allows to do evil: for Evil, that is to say, without ceasing to adhere entirely to good.)[8] Similarly, the horror and the ecstasy he experienced during his childhood (*Mon coeur mis à nu*, XL) are two contradictory sentiments, but not independent of each other. The horror of life is the horror of the natural, while ecstasy is screened by all its barriers. It is a mixture, all Baudelairien, of contemplation and delight, this spiritualized pleasure that he calls by the name of *volupté* (delight) is the discreet, cautious product of Le Mal, begged for and acquired thus at the expense of Le Mal. The point is that for Baudelaire sin is primarily erotic; he ignores all other forms of evil altogether such as treason, meanness, envy, brutality, avarice, etc. He is a voyeur who does not surrender, an obscure shudder runs through all over him, while, dressed up to the neck, he contemplates a nudity without touching her. (p. 96)

Starting from Baudelaire's belief in the double postulations the internal climate of his life becomes easy to describe. This man has all his life, through pride and rancour, tried to make himself an object (a thing) in the eyes of others and in the eyes of his own relatives. He adopts Mal for doing Mal; and he does Mal to render homage to good. Thus Baudelaire's original choice is originally a bad faith. All the traits which constitute his image must be conceived as affected with a subtle and secret nothingness. We should avoid using words he doesn't deserve; we remember, if we want to glimpse the lunar landscape of this desolate, that a man is never but an impostor! (p. 102)

Baudelaire is always haunted by his sinfulness; nor is he the master of his bad faith; his remorse precedes his faults which is auto-punition. There is not a single event which Baudelaire didn't deserve. His whole life was a punishment. Every punishment was meditated by him for long, that is to say, in other words, that Baudelaire sought his own suffering. His ostentation of suffering has a twofold purpose: first, to assuage his rancour he writes to his mother wishing to give remorse to her. The second is more complex: with reference to his mother who is at once for him both judge and the good. Before the judge Baudelaire humiliates himself and seeks condemnation and absolution; but the good he hates and respects at the same time. Thus Baudelaire's sufferings were the harassing phantoms, not a reality; they are created by his inner life, not by any external events. His suffering is a permanent state and unchanging. He revels in his discontent. Hence it is not an

accident that Baudelaire envisages Satan as a perfect type of sorrowful beauty. 'Conquered, fallen, culpable and denounced by the whole nature, condemned by the universe, weighed down by the memory of the inexpiable guilt, wasted by an unsatiated ambition, transpierced by the sight of God who freezes him in his diabolic essence, constrained to the depths of his heart to accept the supremacy of the good, Satan still prevails over God himself—Satan's master and conqueror, by his suffering, by the flame of sad dissatisfaction, which in the moment itself when he consents to this crushing loss, shines like a reproach which cannot be expiated. The vanquished carries the victory. Proud and defeated, pierced by the sentiment of his 'unicity' in the face of the world, Baudelaire likens himself to Satan in the recesses of his heart. (p. 123–24)

In the latter part of his study, Sartre refers to Baudelaire's aversion to Nature, i.e. vegetation; that vice is natural to man while goodness is a product of artificiality. There are other meanings of Nature and Baudelaire's use of it is ambivalent.

Sartre traces the influence of Marxism and the industrial revolution. This anti-naturalism tempted Baudelaire to consider things as solidified and objectified thoughts. Natural realities have little significance for him. 'Baudelaire est un citadin: pour lui la vraie eau, la vraie lumière, la vraie chaleur sont celles des villes . . .' (p. 132) (Baudelaire is a city-dweller; for him the real water, the real light, the real heat are those of the towns.)

Closely connected with anti-naturalism is his dandyism. It is the cult of the self of which he is the priest and victim. It is a closed aristocracy which is as much difficult to break as it is based on the most precious and indestructible faculties and on the celestial gifts which money and drudgery cannot confer. It is an institution above the law. Sartre analyses this concept in some detail. It is a personal reaction to the problems of the writer's social situation. The word dandy implies a quintessence of character and a solid intelligence of the whole moral mechanism of the world; but on the other hand, the dandy aspires to insensibility. Sartre doesn't refer to Baudelaire's poem 'Don Juan aux Enfers' (Don Juan in the Hades); the poet's Don Juan is neither a libertine nor an idler, but a dandy defying both God and humanity, notes Claude Pichois.[9]. Dandyism is the last glow of heroism in the decadences, is a setting sun and suicide is the supreme sacrament of dandyism. It is a club of suicides. For Sartre, Baudelaire's dandyism is a defence of his timidity; it is with a deep sentiment of guilt that Baudelaire becomes a dandy; it is a dream of compensation, a sterile wish for the eternity of poetry.

Sartre repeats and reinforces the same premise again and again that Baudelaire is succumbing to external influences; he is nothing more than a puppet whose strings we pull. He duly admits Baudelaire's

capacity to travesty and as a comedian and compares him with Arthur
Rimbaud. Rimbaud snaps his bourgeois nature and achieves disorder
of senses to create, but Baudelaire breaks nothing at all; 'his labour at
creativity is only to travesty and arrange' (p. 200). Baudelaire is a pure
creator of form. Rimbaud created form and matter. (p. 201)

In this introduction to Baudelaire's *Intimate Diary*, Sartre finds
nothing new because few lives are more stagnant than Baudelaire's. At
25 he lost everything for ever! Baudelaire repeats himself; he took no
sincere interest in the Revolution of 1848; he undoes himself rather
than evolve. He missed the spirit of his times. All nineteenth century
discoveries and inventions missed him and he is turned towards the
past. He turned his back on the future. He is therefore schizophrenic
and melancholic.

The past offers Baudelaire the image of the impossible synthesis of
being and existence. He resembles Faulkner in turning away from the
present for the sake of the past; and confused it with eternity. In this
rapport with the past, Sartre, in this last part of his introduction,
examines what he calls the poetic activity (le fait poétique) of
Baudelaire. Each poet pursues, in his own way, the synthesis of existence
and being which Sartre thinks is impossible. Their quest leads them to
elect some worldly objects as the most telling symbols of this reality
wherein existence and being mingle by means of contemplation. This
past represents the spiritual in Baudelaire's poetry: 'Le spirituel est le
fait poétique baudelairien', says Sartre. (The spiritual is the
Baudelairien poetic activity). The spiritual is a being and manifests it-
self as such. (p. 220) It has the objectivity, cohesive permanence and
identity of being, yet not fully manifest, it remains in suspense between
nothingness and being. Blin insists that this Introduction is a
preliminary sketch of existential psychology as delineated in Part III,
Chapter III of *L'Etre et le néant*. When Sartre thinks the past as
representing in this poet the 'spiritual dimensions par excellence',
the reader is not far from discovering that Baudelaire moves in the
intermediate space between being and existence. Similarly, we
understand that with Baudelaire, in the first place, evil obtained by
choice and effort is good; and, secondly, suicide for the dandy is self-
control; third, suffering is pleasure, and lastly, poetic creation of *Les
Fleurs du Mal* is an absolutely barren activity. Baudelaire's poems are
embodied ideas which is again a return to Narcissism.

The last pages are devoted to Baudelaire's concept of Beauty which
is neither Platonic nor Aristotelian. Beauty in Baudelaire is always par-
ticular, yet it is not sensual perfection, but above all it is suggestion.
The essences matter less to him and the Socratic dialectic is a stranger
to Baudelaire. The universal and the particular differ in degree. The
illustration is from Baudelaire's poem 'Le Flacon' (Flask) where the
old flask drenched in smell makes for spirituality: here both the thing

(flask) and its meaning (sense) are singular because it revives the
memory.

Baudelaire resembles, concludes Sartre, the prisoner in a flooded
cave leaning his head backwards in the hope of remaining above the
flood for the longest possible time. He chose the symbolic death and
kills himself every week. Evil with him is a counter-good possessing all
the characteristics of the good affected only with a change of sign.

The poems are only his own image, a restoration of his memory in
the present which offers the appearance of a synthesis of being and
existence. Hence Baudelaire's poetic creation is sterile and all this is
the consequence of his original choice. From the first to the last day
Baudelaire remained unchanged so that 'le choix libre que l'homme
fait de soi-même s'identifie absolument avec ce qu' on appelle sa
destinê'. (The free choice a man makes of himself is absolutely
identified with what we call his destiny.) (p. 245)

III

Sartre takes no note of the fact that for Baudelaire Art has its own
morality and the artist who commits himself to any point of view is not
an artist. Baudelaire, says Blin, would not have failed to classify this
Sartre among his enemies who pushes the poets into the *mêlée* under the
pretext that they are living in a social situation. The artist's function is
aesthetic and art as an *ersatz* is monstrous. Sartre failed to enter into
the spirit of Baudelairien morality. Sartre's name would come easy on
the tongue as a specific example of the 'Hypocrite lecteur,—mon
semblable,—mon frère!' (Hypocritical reader, my fellow, my brother!)
(Au Lecteur).

Modern criticism has laid bare almost all aspects of Baudelaire as a
poet and prose writer. Jean Prévost discusses Baudelaire's *mimétisme*
and his chameleon-like quality. Baudelaire is *many*, and he identifies
himself with his subject.[10] Jean-Pierre Richard in 'Profondeur de
Baudelaire' proves that Baudelaire is a happy person: 'We have often
spoken of the fall of Baudelaire, the following pages would demonstrate
a happy Baudelaire.'[11] Baudelaire is not a split personality but has a
unified sensibility because his method was to transform his delight
into knowledge and his aim was to express the infinite in the finite.
Other studies are so numerous that Baudelaire is, like Shakespeare, in
a real danger of being lost in the flood of commentaries (The
bibliography at the W.T. Bandy Center for Baudelaire Studies at
Nashville, still unpublished comprises around 70,000 items).

Why Sartre totally fails to mention Baudelaire's essay on the *Heroism
of Modern Life* is puzzling. Baudelaire is looking to the past because he
is haunted by original sin; but he is a poet of the present listening to
'the eternal bulletin of the entire globe'. (Le Voyage) Again, Sartre
doesn't attempt to discover why Baudelaire glorified his lack of

commitment to the Revolution of 1848. M. Adereth accepts Aragon's explanation that it was due to 'wavering stand and his fear of revolutionary changes by the weakness of popular forces at the time and the poet's dejection at their successive defeats.'[12] But the external causes are not the only reason; Baudelaire condemns all systems as heretical and says he is content with feeling only. (*Exposition universelle de 1855*). There is no question of bad faith. Rather Baudelaire is a poet of disillusionment.

Sartre's criticism has become dogmatic, says G. Poulet. He has abandoned the principle of identification of the two consciousnesses of the critic and the criticized. 'It is not, therefore, wrong to say that if Sartre, in his criticism, dissociates himself more and more from *intention* of the writers of whom he speaks, he associates himself, on the other hand, more and more with the external conditions in which these writers were situated. There is here a clear turn towards a Marxist point of view.'[13]

'Who shall dare to show us the true Baudelaire?' ask W.T. Bandy and Claude Pichois.[14] 'Is he one of the Catholics, Marxists, Mystics, Occultists, Parnassians, Aesthetes of Art for Art, is he the virgin poet or the lover of the rope-dancers? Who would be able to distinguish what he was from what he wanted to be; from what he would have wished himself to be . . .' Baudelaire's biography and legend are impossible to disentangle.

Sartre is one of the several critics who have failed to know the true Baudelaire.

Notes and References

1. J.P. Sartre, *Baudelaire*, Gallimard, idées nrf, 1947. (All quotations in French are from this edition and indicated by the prefix (p.) followed by page number.)
2. P.G. Castex, P. Surer, G. Becker, *Histoire de la littérature française*, Hachette, 1974, p. 897.
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The Ideal of Rationality and the Exclusion of the 'Feminine': A Study in Plato's Theory of Knowledge

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FOREGROUNDING THE THEME

The exclusion of women from philosophy is implicit in Plato. When we first read his Dialogues, we might not be aware of this exclusion. But when we read with interest, more than two thousand years later, the detailed discussion of issues that is still relevant to human life. Knowledge, education, the 'good' life; justice, in the individual and in the state; the nature of reality—these perennial themes absorb one's attention. Indeed, the writings of Plato are a valuable intellectual heritage.

However, there are passages that puzzle and bewilder us. There is something jarring; something that does not quite fit in. One is struck by an odd word, an off-hand phrase, which indicates that Plato did not, perhaps, have all human beings in mind when he discussed issues relating to human conduct and human thought. Or rather, if he did have all human beings in mind, he perceived them in terms of strict hierarchies, placing them in very different categories. From the realm of philosophy, for instance, not only were women excluded, but also slaves, and 'barbarians' (non-Greeks).

Let us pause for a while. Would Plato's exclusion of women, slaves and non-Greeks have any relevance for us, for the world today? How significant would this be? I think that there is a relevance. Plato was only one such tradition that systematically categorized, divided and hierarchized. Through the millennia, mainstream western philosophy has provided intellectual resources for validating hierarchies based on gender, race, nationality and class.

The intellectual traditions of the West have had an impact upon our lives, our minds. Geographical boundaries have not checked the processes of diffusion, or of colonization. Western culture, western thought has helped to shape us, in collusion with a multitude of indigenous traditions.

Even as we continue to read the classics of western philosophy, it is possible to develop critical acumen. We can note, pick out the flaws, the distortions. Surely there is a need to do that. Surely we—non-Greeks, non-whites, and/or women—need to reclaim the realm of philosophy of Thought, Reason, Knowledge, as a realm in which we can participate.

There is a need to reclaim our legitimacy as philosophers—not mere transgressors upon alien territory.

In this process, as we scrutinize the discipline of (western) philosophy, the discipline itself might undergo some changes. At the very least, it would grow more responsive to a range of issues which it earlier barely understood (or noticed).

In the present discussion, the primary focus will be on the treatment of gender in the Platonic Dialogues. I will show that Plato provides justification for the separation of women and men into separate spheres of activity. The separation is based on notions of different natural capabilities and aptitudes. In the subsequent history of western philosophy, this separation was developed further in diverse ways. By the time of the 'Enlightenment', there was a sharp polarization between the categories of male and female. The notion of natural distinctions, leading to social hierarchies, is a powerful one, which has resonated, with a rich variation of notes, down the ages. The theme has serious implications for an understanding of western social and political thought.

The female sphere is assumed, in Plato and thereafter, to be fundamentally inferior to the male. The feminine is seen as inferior to the masculine.[1] Women's subordination to men is thus legitimized. In pre-Socratic philosophy too, men were characterized as superior to women (and masters as superior to slaves, Greeks to 'barbarians'). But these were expressed as analogies, rather than in the form of detailed hierarchies.[2] From Plato onwards, hierarchization within the social order became accepted as philosophical fact. Intricate hierarchies within the 'great chain of being' were worked out.[3]

As the separation and asymmetry between the feminine and the masculine was elaborated upon, down the centuries, there was increasing complexity and sophistication in the arguments deployed. As we shall see in Plato's work itself, 'masculinity', the privileged category, is associated with a constellation of attributes; perhaps the most important of these is the attribute of 'Reason' whereas 'femininity' is defined by its lack. It is defined as a negative, the negative of 'masculinity' which alone has a positive content.

In the broad current of western philosophy, 'woman' is to 'man' as 'irrationality' is to 'rationality'; as 'body' is to 'mind'; as 'nature' is to 'culture'. Foundational elements of this framework are evident in the fourth century BC, in the corpus of work that we will examine here.

CONTRAST BETWEEN 'WOMEN', AND 'PHILOSOPHERS'

In the *Apology*, Socrates describes the true philosopher as one who willingly embraces death. Condemned to die, Socrates behaves with exemplary fortitude and courage. His words invoke our respect: '. . . I have seen men of reputation', he says, 'when they have been

condemned, behaving in the strangest manner; they seemed to fancy that they were going to suffer something dreadful if they died. . . . I think that such men are a dishonour to the State, and that any stranger coming in would have said of them that the most eminent men of Athens, to whom Athenians themselves give honour and command, are no better than women. . . .'.[4]

The words are inspiring, that is, up to the last phrase above: that phrase makes us stop short. We re-read the passage—it does not explain at all why women are rejected in this summary fashion. The possibility of women behaving in an honourable way is not even considered, and women are mentioned merely to indicate a despicable contrast. While the true philosopher is characterized as one who stands undaunted in the face of death—nay, one who welcomes death with open arms—women are mentioned only to illustrate the opposite tendency. Socrates *assumes* that all women, in such circumstances, would necessarily insist on 'weeping and wailing and lamenting',[5] generally behaving in a most disgraceful manner.

On the morning of the day that Socrates was to die, his wife Xanthippe makes her one appearance. It is trivial, and yet necessary, to note the fact that women rarely make an appearance in the Platonic Dialogues. The conversations are exclusively between men. Women appear but briefly, their appearance allowing us a glimpse into the nether world of females.

In the present brief passage, from the *Phaedo*, the setting is the public jail. While Xanthippe is visiting Socrates, several of his friends also arrive. One of these, Phaedo, reports later, to Echecrates: '. . . On the last morning we assembled sooner than usual. . . . On entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippe, whom you know, sitting by him and holding his child in her arms. When she saw us she uttered a cry, and said, as women will: "O Socrates, this is the last time that either you will converse with your friends, or they with you." Socrates turned to Crito and said: "Crito, let someone take her home." Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and beating herself.'[6]

Socrates finds Xanthippe's behaviour so intolerable, so despicable, that he dismisses her in person. He dismisses his wife's weeping and lamenting, her emotional outburst. Clearly it is not romantic love, caring, or mutual respect that have kept this couple united. Yet, they have been living together for years and years, and have produced a sizeable family—the youngest child, as seen here in the Dialogue, is still a baby. This child too is dismissed along with the mother. This is the last time that Socrates is to see his wife or child—or they him.

The most striking fact about the passage quoted is, in fact, Socrates' downgradation of emotion. He seems to characterize emotion as dishonourable, indicating that it is disorderly and unreasonable. For

the philosopher certainly, the expression of emotion is deemed inappropriate.

He displays, also, a lack of respect for others' feelings. Emotion is contrasted to reason: it is identified with 'unreason'. Women are strongly associated with emotion, and thus, in this scheme, with irrationality. They are therefore deemed unfit for honourable conduct, for political life, or for participation in learned conversation. Hardly can they be eligible, then, to step into the rarefied realm of philosophy.

In the *Timaeus*, Plato recounts a myth of evolution in which it is explicitly stated that no woman can be a philosopher: she must wait until after death, when her soul might be reincarnated in the body of a man. If however a man fails to live his life well, his soul is punished by being reincarnated in the body of a woman.[7]

INTERLUDE: THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN PLATO'S TIME

It is often argued, in defence of Plato and Socrates, that they were creatures of their time. Greek society in those days did not admit women into the public realm. Women, as well as slaves and foreigners, were not eligible to be citizens, they were excluded from the activities of the *polis*. Not admitted as citizens, women occupied some different realm: 'In Plato's time', says Jowett, 'the well-bred, respectable Athenian woman spent her life in almost Oriental seclusion in the women's quarters of her father's or her husband's house.'[8] But the fact of women's low status in a given social order can hardly stand as a defence of those thinkers who acquiesce in the arrangement, who provide justification for that low status.

Here we have thinkers who believe in questioning, in inquiry, in critical scrutiny, in teasing out contradictions. As is evident in Plato's writings, Socrates questions much that exists in the Athenian society of the time. If at the same time he dismisses women summarily, taking their incapacities for granted, the dismissal can hardly be ascribed to oversight, or an accident. Rather, it must be part and parcel of his way of viewing, of defining, the world.

With respect to gender hierarchy, the characterization of all women as unreasonable would provide a powerful justification for the existing patterns of women's subordination. As is evident from some of the early Dialogues, such as *Apology* and *Phaedo*, Socrates colluded in a pattern, already established by the fifth–fourth century BC, of women's subordination to men.

In Athenian society of the time, women of the middle classes were confined to the household. Men too perceived the household as a realm of duty, but they were required to spend only minimal time in this realm. The conjugal relationship had as its sole end and purpose the reproduction of the family. Women were to bear and bring up the

young—who *belonged* to the paterfamilias. The analogy of seed—sown by the male, in the female field of the womb—was regarded as a matter of fact. So the female was seen, biologically, as merely a passive receptacle, as matter, in which the male member supplied form. (Note how the child Xanthippe is holding is described, in the passage quoted above, as 'his', i.e. Socrates', child).

Dutifully, then, the male citizen of Athens produced offspring and maintained a household. But his heart was not in it. His desires sought satisfaction elsewhere. His desires and ambitions—whether intellectual, political, physical or sexual—found expression and fulfilment in the company of like-minded people. These kindred souls were, with few exceptions, other men, similar to themselves.

The Athenian women of Plato's, an aristocrat by birth, class were legal non-entities. Excluded from participation in the political affairs of the city-state, legally they were life-long minors under the guardianship of males. Female children were often exposed at birth and left to die, the decision resting with the father. Pre-marital and marital chastity were strictly required of the women, while the men could enjoy sexual gratification from young men, slaves, *heterae*, or lower-class women. Respectable women spent most of their life indoors, while men of their class spent most of their time in public places.[9]

It is an undisputed fact that Athens in the fifth-fourth century BC was a class society with slavery, and thoroughly patriarchal. Recent anthropological scholarship has shown that the 'establishment of patriarchy was not an 'event' but a process developing over a period of nearly 2,500 years, from approximately 3100 to 600 BC.'[10] Research indicates that the archaic states were organized in the form of patriarchies; that the domination of men over women, by an appropriation of women's sexual and reproductive capacities, pre-dated the institutionalization of slavery; that for some time after women were sexually and economically subordinated to men, they continued to play active and respectable roles in mediating between humans and gods, as priestesses, diviners, seers and healers; that powerful goddesses were dethroned following the establishment of strong and imperialistic kingships; creativity and procreativity were subsequently ascribed to a male godhead, and female sexuality associated with sin. The symbolic devaluing of women in relation to the divine, as well as in relation to human males, became founding metaphors of western civilization. By the sixth-fifth century BC, the subordinate position of women was assumed as a given.

Greek philosophy put its seal upon gender hierarchization in the systems of Plato and Aristotle. They were not the only philosophers to collude with patriarchy, but they were extremely influential in defining the terms in which discussion would continue for centuries thereafter.[11] Women's inferiority came to be seen as 'natural', a conception built

into the very foundations of the symbol system of western civilization, hence rendered invisible. It is this which firmly established patriarchy as an actuality and as an ideology.

If patriarchy was already well developed by 600 BC, and the classical philosophers lived and wrote in such a time, then their work helped to secure the foundations of the system.

Nor can we say, in defence of our philosophers, that, given the existing social and political structures, they could hardly have envisaged something radically different. In fact, Plato's position is far more complex. As the dialogues of his middle years clearly indicate, Plato goes beyond his early formulations (such as in the passages of the *Apology* and *Phaedo*). He entertains serious doubts about women's subordinate position, and dares to formulate a more positive conception of women's worth. However, he fails to develop the ideas that he stallingly proposes, and these remain replete with contradictions and ambiguities. Moreover, towards his later years he explicitly withdraws (in the *Laws*) most of what he had proposed (in the *Republic*), vis-à-vis the role of women.

It is instructive to note that there was ample material upon which the philosophers could draw, in visualizing the various elements of the social order. In terms of gender, there were several alternative conceptions available to them. Thus, in Macedonia there were strong women, even powerful rulers. In Sparta women were educated on par with men, they were even trained in the arts of warfare. Lesbos had a tradition of women poets and musicians. Dramatists in Athens itself were portraying extremely complex women characters. Myths and legends of the Greek goddesses, of prophetesses and female oracles, as well as of the Amazonian warriors, abounded in the popular culture of the time.

Within their own milieu, the philosophers undoubtedly encountered women who did participate in public life. Women of the lower classes performed dozens of tasks in the outside world, as well as in the household. Some foreign-born women conducted trade and business. *Heterae*, or female 'companions' were well accepted in Athenian society.[12] There were women intellectuals: Aspasia of Miletus and Diotima of Manitea are explicitly described, in the Dialogues, as teachers of Socrates.[13] Plato's Academy (the university he founded in 388/7 BC, and prototype of western universities since then) had women students, though they must have been only a minority: the names of Axiothea of Philesia and Lasthinea of Manitea are on record.[14] There were several women philosophers among the Pythagoreans.[15] By his middle years, Plato was far more exposed to these alternatives to the designated female role. We find him assailed by doubts. There is no longer such an easy dismissal of women. This is evident in the *Republic*,

wherein Plato explores the issues of women's nature and role in greater detail than he does anywhere else.

But the assumption of women's inferiority is deeply entwined in the very bases of the philosophical systems formulated by these thinkers. Their categories and definitions are shaped by an implicit exclusion of the 'feminine'. Qualities associated with the philosopher overlap with the attributes of 'masculinity', whereas 'femininity' is defined as the negative of 'masculinity', and is therefore obviously deeply antithetical to the pursuit of knowledge.

PHILOSOPHY AS THE PURSUIT OF RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE

In Plato's scheme *reason* is the faculty by which human beings pursue knowledge. How does he conceptualize this faculty? How do human beings pursue knowledge? What *is* knowledge? Socrates (470–399 BC), son of a sculptor and a midwife, 'was interested in man as a rational being, a being whose good consists in knowledge.'[16] This is also the starting point for Plato's theory of knowledge. Knowledge is necessarily linked to truth: to know a proposition implies that the proposition is true. In the *Meno*, Plato states that knowledge involves being able to provide explanatory *reasoning* (*logismos*). In the *Republic* he advances the view that knowledge is infallible. The infallibility of knowledge is related to the unchangeability of the objects of knowledge.

The proper objects of knowledge are the 'eternal, unchanging, absolute realities', which he calls 'forms'. The ordinary items of the world are the objects of our belief and opinions, they are the subject matter of our ordinary judgements of the world around us. Plato holds that forms exist in another realm altogether. For instance, the ordinary world might have particular instances of beautiful things, but these are not the object of philosophical knowledge. Only the form of the beautiful—'the beautiful itself'—is the object of philosophical knowledge. This is beautiful in an eternal, unqualified way. Nor can it ever be observed by the senses. Since its nature is wholly abstract, it has to be grasped purely through the intellect. The pursuit of knowledge implies, therefore, a move away from the ordinary everyday world, revealed by the senses, to a separate world whose objects can be comprehended only by the intellect. In order to attain knowledge, then, a person must move away from ordinary sense-perception and direct his mind upwards to the objects of pure understanding.

The pursuit of knowledge thus necessarily involves, in the Platonic scheme, a move from the visible world to the world of forms. Included in the scheme is a notion of essences and boundaries—since the form is that which has the essential characteristics common to its worldly representations. It is logically possible to locate the essence of any set

of objects, and therefore to clearly define the boundaries of different objects.

The Platonic scheme involves also the figure of the philosopher as one who is able to withdraw attention from the ordinary world and devote this attention to the world of forms. Rational thought is defined in this context. It is through the faculty of reason that human beings pursue knowledge. Moreover, since it is this faculty that distinguishes human beings from animals, it is the defining characteristic of human beings. In the philosopher, the faculty of reason is most highly developed.

In the *Republic* Plato likens the life of the ordinary person to that of a chained prisoner, watching flickering images projected against the wall of an underground cave. The would-be philosopher must move out of the cave, away from the murky physical world to the higher world of life and sunshine, that is the realm of knowledge and forms. Once out of the cave, he can embark on the voyage towards knowledge, that is, contemplation of the forms.

Plato's 'extraordinarily evocative picture of the road to true knowledge—has had a profound influence on philosophy in general'.[17] The dismissal of the senses as a source of knowledge, and therefore the requirement that the mind be systematically freed from the world of empirical observation and commonsense belief, has been particularly influential. Apart from being the fundamental tenet of rationalism it has helped shape the popular (as well scholarly) image of the thinker, the philosopher, as one distanced from the everyday world, and engaged in abstract contemplation of abstract matters. The philosopher, according to this perspective, transcends the world of contingency and, through contemplation, partakes of the absolute realities.

A basic requirement which a philosopher must fulfil is therefore, that he/she must be in the situation which allows for withdrawal from the everyday physical world, for extended lengths of times. This requirement would, in any historical epoch, have been fulfilled at any given time only for a limited set of people. In the Athenian context, there would have been no possibility of its fulfilment either for slaves or for women.

MIND, BODY, KNOWLEDGE AND LOVE

'Plato's self-imposed task is to forge a theory of knowledge that is immune to the subversive powers of the irrational, that allows mind to achieve transcendence even while it remains compromised by immanence. His solution is radical. It is to define the proper object of knowledge as lying entirely outside the domain of temporal, material nature. Mind undergoes a parallel purification. 'As nature is dematerialized, so is mind disembodied.'[18] For Plato, knowledge

involves a relation within human beings (between mind and body, according to his early Dialogues) that replicates the broader relation between knowable form and unknowable matter.

The knowing mind, like the forms which are its objects, transcends matter. Knowledge involves a correspondence between rational mind and equally rational forms. The identification of rational thought and rational universe was achieved by deliberately downgrading matter to the realm of the non-rational, contingent and disorderly.

In the *Phaedo,* Socrates portrays intellectual life as a purging of the rational soul from the follies of the body. At death the soul is released from the body which has been its prison-house. Reason, which the philosopher has cultivated, enables the soul to escape free, returning to 'the pure, and eternal, and immortal'. For the ordinary person however, who has not cultivated pure reason during his/her life, the soul is defiled by contact with the body, and is 'weighed down and dragged back to the visible world'.[19] The rational soul should, therefore, rule over the slave-like body, during life.

In his later thought, Plato develops a more complex location of the non-rational—it is seen as part of the soul. Within the soul, then, there is a perpetual struggle between the rational and the non-rational parts. This more sophisticated model, of a soul internally divided, allows for richer accounts of the conflicts within human nature, and the relation between the rational and the non-rational. In the *Philebus,* Socrates postulates that a life that combines pleasure with knowledge and wisdom is better than a life that has knowledge and wisdom but no feelings such as pleasure or pain.[20] Thus, while the cultivation of reason remains central to the good life, non-intellectual elements are also incorporated into the life of the soul, as an energizing psychic force on which reason draws. Here, the role of emotion is seen in a more positive way.

The later Plato saw passionate love as the beginning point of the soul's journey of liberation through knowledge. In the *Phaedrus* Plato has Socrates argue that passionate love has two sides to it—one negative and the other positive. On the one hand there is emotional turmoil and jealousy, on the other hand there is a 'growing of wings' which impels the soul to pursue knowledge, onwards to an immortal joy.[21] Attraction to physical beauty thus has two aspects—one gross and vicious, the other noble—and the two are in conflict in the lover's soul.

In the *Symposium,* Socrates reports what Diotima, a wise woman, had taught him about love and about knowledge.[22] Diotima, he says, taught that knowledge is a form of love—'love' being defined as all desire of good and happiness. The aim of love is birth in beauty, whether of body or soul, expressing mortal nature's longing for immortality. As a form of love, knowledge is connected with immortality. Just as physical

procreation is the desire for immortality through generation, the pursuit of wisdom is a spiritual procreation, aiming at a superior sort of immortality.

The pursuit involves a move, step by step, from the particular to the general, and from the physical to the intellectual, to a realm of pure rationality. Socrates states that, according to Diotima, '. . . he who proceeds aright in this matter should begin in youth to visit beautiful forms, and first, . . . to love one such form only. . . . Soon he will of himself perceive that the beauty of one form is akin to the beauty of another . . . . And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will become a lover of all beautiful forms; in the next stage he will consider that the beauty of the mind is more honourable than the beauty of the outward form. . . . And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards. . . . Going from one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows that the essence of beauty is the . . . pure and clean and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and varieties of human life. . . . In that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty but realities. . . .'[23]

In Diotima's version, reason does not simply shed the perturbations of passion, but assimilates their energizing force. Reason is itself construed as a passionate faculty, and a creative, productive one. The lover of wisdom—the philosopher—'gives birth in beauty'. Love is generative, and Platonic wisdom—or knowledge—is its highest form.[24]

RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE AS TRANSCENDENCE OF THE FEMININE

In pre-Socratic Greek philosophy, femininity was symbolically associated with what reason left behind—the cults of earth goddesses, their mysterious female powers. In Plato's refinement of the notion of reason, these symbolic associations lingered.[25] In the Pythagorean table of opposites, formulated in the sixth century BC, masculinity was aligned with active determinate, orderly form, and femininity with passive, indeterminate, disorderly matter.[26] The form-matter distinction—a dualism which is retained and strengthened in Plato—remains associated with the masculine-feminine distinction—the first term, in each case, being construed as superior to the second term.

The sexual mores and beliefs of Athenian culture form a crucial backdrop against which the significance of these notions in Plato's philosophy can be understood. His own writing is informed by sexual imagery, which forms, as we see, an important substructure of his work.

In Plato we find the traditional Greek understanding of sexual reproduction, that is, the belief that the father provided the formative principle, while the mother provided only the matter which received form, and nourished what the father had produced. In the *Timaeus*, Plato explicitly compares the role of form to that of the father, and the role of matter to that of the mother.[27]

Let us return now to Socrates' account of Diotima's version of knowledge. We saw there that knowledge—the highest form of love—is generative. What and how does the philosopher create?

'Those who are pregnant in the body only', says the philosopher, 'betake themselves to women and beget children. . . . But souls which are pregnant—for there certainly are men who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies—conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive—wisdom and virtue . . . Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? . . . There is Solon, too, who is the revered father of Athenian laws; and many others there are in many places, both among Hellenes and barbarians, who have given to the world many noble works, and have been the parents of virtue of every kind; and many temples have been raised in their honour for the sake of children such as theirs. . . .'[28]

In this important passage, Plato/Socrates/Diotima characterizes 'spiritual procreation', such as the philosopher is capable of, as far superior to physical procreation. The distinctions drawn are between men[29]—the superior sort of man who aims at philosophizing, and producing works of poetry, or philosophy or law; and the inferior sort of man who produce only earthly children. In both cases, women are exempt from any active role. Whereas in the context of physical procreation, the woman is seen as but a passive receptacle and vessel, in the context of spiritual procreation she is marked by her absence. Not only is her role in physical procreation seen as secondary, but physical procreation itself—in which women's participation is at least acknowledged as necessary—is downgraded. And spiritual procreation is preserved as an exclusively male realm.

It is only fitting that this appropriation of fertility by the male philosopher goes hand in hand with a homosexual ethos. Fertility and creativity of the superior kind, which is a characteristic of rational endeavour, is defined in such a way as to transcend the female world, but need not preclude—in fact, explicitly includes—male homosexual desire. Plato's model for spiritual begetting is the love of man for man. If knowledge is the product of a divine union of kindred essences, i.e. rational mind with rational forms, then the first impetus for the journey is provided by the physical desire of man for man.

Plato's distinction between homosexual and heterosexual love echoes a division institutionalized in his larger culture. The most highly valued

model to Plato was the relationship between an adult male (the lover) and a youth (the beloved). Physical desire energizes the desire for, and pursuit of, knowledge. Thus, the lover of wisdom 'when he comes to maturity desires to beget and generate. He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring—for in deformity he will beget nothing—and naturally embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed body; above all, when he finds a fair and noble and well-nurtured soul, he embraces the two in one person, and to such a one he is full of speech about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man; and he tries to educate him; and at the touch of the beautiful which is ever present to his memory, . . . he brings forth that which he had conceived long before, and in company with him sends that which he brings forth; and they are married by a far nearer tie and have a closer friendship than those who beget mortal children, for the children who are their common offspring are fairer and more immortal. . . .'[30] According to this exposition, kindred souls can, together, produce offspring that are far superior—of a higher order altogether—than the human offspring produced as a result of heterosexual intercourse. Works of art, or intellectual endeavour, are the soul-children of such a union of like-minded men.

Homosexuality between men of comparable social standing was the only sexual model, among the options available in Athenian society, which could be obtained between social equals.[31] Plato's vision of a spiritual coupling between mind and form, being a union of kindred essences, required a higher degree of reciprocity than allowed by any of the other models. Plato's ideal model is of a relation between two participating lovers. He adds a new element, that is, the denial of final consummation, and its transmutation into imaginative and intellectual energy.

The lovers are led, in tandem, ever higher, towards absolute beauty and truth. Consummation threatens the return of the irrational and aggressive. However strongly passion is drawn from bodily impulses, finally the attainment of intellectual knowledge is possible only if the impulses are restrained.

Knowledge, guided by love, requires a division not only of order from disorder, but also of the erotic from the aggressive.[32] Love—the erotic—is, like knowledge, restricted to the masculine realm, the realm of intellect. Aggression, on the other hand, is associated with sensible, material nature—with the feminine. The physical body as non-rational matter, is associated with femininity. In Plato's schematic pursuit of knowledge, the physical body remains a slave—subordinate to, and excluded from, the realm of thought. Rational thought demands, finally, a transcendence of, a withdrawal from, the physical body as such. It follows that the philosopher's quest for knowledge requires ultimately transcendence, a leaving behind, of the feminine realm.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN'S STATUS

Plato has some awareness of contradictions in the positions he holds, and this is nowhere more obvious than in the *Republic.* He approaches the discussion of the role of women in the ideal society, with more than usual hesitation and circumspection. Before launching into the discussion, his Socrates muses as follows: '. . . the danger is that I shall miss the truth where I have most need to be sure of my footing, and drag my friends after me in my fall'.[33]

Soon enough however, Socrates proffers a truly radical suggestion: that 'the birth and education of our women be subject to similar or nearly similar regulations' as that of men—a proposal, he adds, that 'would be thought ridiculous . . . according to present notions.'[34]

Having expressed willingness to counter social opinion, if need be, Socrates proceeds in the exploration of what women's roles ought to be. Here he comes up against a tough problem—an inconsistency, for 'different natures ought to have different pursuits'; and 'men's and women's natures are different'. He goes on to explore 'the meaning of sameness or difference of nature', and proposes that 'if the difference consists only in the women bearing and men begetting children, this does not amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect to the sort of education she should receive. . . .'[35]

However, he proceeds to systematically dismantle this radical proposal: at root, the claim is that women do differ from men in other ways as well, quite apart from the bearing and begetting of children.

He lists the following (three) differences, which distinguish one person from another—one is quick in learning, another is slow; one deeply absorbs what is learnt, another soon forgets; one has an obedient body, the other's body is a hindrance. With regard to these individual differences, he now poses the following question: 'Can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female?' Before Glaucon can respond, Socrates summarily disqualifies certain pursuits—'Need I waste time', he asks, 'in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of pancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be great, and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the most absurd?'[36]

Glaucon's reply follows suit—'You are quite right', he says, 'in maintaining the general inferiority of the female sex'.

A sleight of hand is involved. Having already identified the 'pursuits of mankind' with 'the pursuits of man' (that is the 'human' with the 'masculine'), having ridiculed and disqualified the particular pursuits of women in the prevailing social context, the philosopher concludes as follows: 'all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also, but in all of them a woman is inferior to a man.'[37]

He admits of a range within each sex, so that a few women who are

at the superior end of the scale (among women) might even be better, in important ways, than some men (who are towards the low end of the scale among males). This makes it theoretically possible that some women be fit to take up superior pursuits—which have already been characterized as masculine pursuits. It is even possible that a very small number of exceptional women qualify for training as guardians—the ruling class in the ideal society.

So Plato's radical stance towards women amounts, in practical terms, to a few women being admitted as capable of pursuing public life. This would certainly be a concession to womanhood, in a context in which all power was vested in male hands. However, the advance would be won at great cost: the sphere of work to which most women would continue to be restricted was, in effect, defined out of the range of 'human' pursuits. This paved the way for a long line of thinkers to similarly discredit, disregard and trivialize the work that most women would continue (perforce) to perform. Allowing a few women to lead a superior (read 'masculine') life would in no way enlarge the range of options available to most women. The few women who would escape female seclusion and drudgery would do so on sufferance, they would continue to be judged on male terms and standards.

Book V draws towards the well-known conclusion, that 'philosophers should be kings. . . some natures ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the state', while 'others are not born to be philosophers and are meant to be followers rather than leaders'.[38]

Do we really need to think long before we figure out where most women will be in this authoritarian state, which Plato describes as a Utopia? The reins of power are to be in the hands of 'men of Reason'—philosophers, among whose ranks a few token women may be counted—those who are deemed to qualify on account of the 'masculinity' of their minds. Power—any say in matters of the state, including those that crucially affect one's own life—is to be denied to any others. Since only the philosophers 'may be said to have knowledge and not opinions only', 'the multitude' are therefore not worthy to hold or wield any power.[39]

In the Utopian state, as in the actual city-state of Athens, most women remained embedded within the family, subservient to the authority of the male head. Denied education, denied space in the public world, denied any voice as citizens, they remained cut off from any systematic pursuit of rational knowledge.

CONCLUSION

We have shown that the following tenets follow from Plato's theory of knowledge:

(a) Philosophy is defined as rational activity, a matter purely of the

intellect, which therefore implies a withdrawal from engagement in daily-life activities.

(b) Women are seen, in the Platonic dialogues, as immersed in daily-life activities. The category of the 'feminine' (i.e. that which is appropriate to women) involves an association with mundane, non-intellectual activities. Since women are fit to perform such activities their souls must be reflective of this lower order of things.

Thus, they must be unfit to qualify for the life of the mind. It is to be noted that Plato clearly sees the different sets of activities—the intellectual and the non-intellectual—as exclusive to one another. A particular person is fit to perform either one or the other set of activities.[40]

(c) Women's roles as housewives, cooks, child-minders, and so on, are characterized as natural. That this realm is the natural feminine realm is not open to question, in the Platonic scheme. At the same time, these activities are ranked as inferior to the intellectual pursuits—a ranking that is, again, seen as self-evident and natural. No need is felt to establish this ranking: it is an *a priori* assumption on the part of Plato.

(d) Plato opens and closes the question of women's education, and possible intellectual capacities. We have seen that at one point in his career, he allows that a few women may even qualify as philosophers, if they are found suitable, that is, capable of rational thought, then they are to be admitted into the ranks of the guardian class. They would be accepted as full members of this highly disciplined, powerful class. They too would be philosopher-kings.

That Plato fits them into the same status, rather than calling them 'philosopher queens',[41] is revealing: it is not an oversight on his part. Rather, it is an affirmation that these are 'masculine' women. They are admitted into the ranks of the superior because they are as good as men: they are admitted as duplicate men. They are exceptional among women, freak cases, who cross over the boundaries, from the realm of femininity to the realm of masculinity. The categories of 'masculine' and 'feminine' remain unaffected, unchanged. A 'rational'—'masculine'—woman who is admitted into the ranks of the guardians must shed her attributes of femininity—housework, childcare, and an embeddedness in emotional attachments.

(e) The female 'philosopher king' is to take part in sexual copulation, just as the male guardian must—at the behest of the state, each doing whatever is required of her/him in order to produce offspring, who will immediately be put into state-run nurseries. It is clear that, for Plato, the category of the 'feminine' lies not in

Jonathan Cape, London, 1985, pp. 141–50; and Elise Boulding, *The Underside of History*, Westview Press, Colorado, 1976.

10. Gerda Lerner, *The Creation of Patriarchy*, O.U.P., New York, 1986; pp. 8–10.
11. It should be clear that we are concerned with understanding the terms in which the western philosophical tradition has represented and justified gender hierarchy, rather than in denouncing particular philosophers per se. Philosophers are only a part of a process—not its designers or originators.
12. Certainly the philosophers were well aware of these facts, Boulding, n. 9, notes for instance that Archeanassa, a leading *hetaira* of Athens, was companion to Plato; and Herpyllis to Aristotle.
13. Aspasia figures in Plato's *Menexenus*, and Diotima in the *Symposium*.
14. See Mary Ellen Waithe (editor) *A History of Women Philosophers, Vol 1—Ancient Women Philosophers, 600 BC—500 AD*, (Martinus Nijhoff, Boston, 1987, p. 83.
15. Ibid., Waithe discusses Themistoclea, Theano I, Arignote, Myia, and Damo among early Pythogoreans, and Aesara of Luciano, Phyllis of Sparta, and Perictone I among later Pythagoreans.
16. J.E. Raven, *Plato's Thought in the Making—A Study of the Development of His Metaphysics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1965, p. 119.
17. John Cottingham, *Rationalism*, Paladin, London, 1984, p. 18, Cottingham provides a lucid introduction to Plato's theory of knowledge in Chapter 2 of this book (pp. 13–26). See also I.M. Crombie, *The Midwife's Apprentice*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1964, and J.E. Raven, *Plato's Thought in the MakingA Study of the Development of His Metaphysics*.
18. Evelyn Fox Keller, *Reflection on Gender and Science*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985), p. 22. Keller's discussion of Plato, relevant to the present theme, is contained in her first chapter, 'Love and Sex in Plato's Epistemology' (pp. 21–32).
19. *Phaedo*, n. 6, pp. 113–23.
20. Plato, *Philebus, in The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. II, Random House, New York, 1937, pp. 353–4, translated by B. Jowett, , pp. 353–4.
21. Plato, *Phaedrus*, in *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 250.
22. Plato, *Symposium*, in *Plato—Five Great Dialogues*, n. 4, pp. 155–216. Diotima's theory is reported by Socrates, pp. 192–203. See Waithe, n. 14, for a meticulous discussion of Diotima as a historical personage. Interestingly, no one questioned Diotima's historicity until, in 1485, Marsilio Ficino published his *Oratio Septima II* in which he remarked on the absurdity of thinking that a woman could actually have been a philosopher! Since Waithe shows that there is no reason to think of Diotima as a fictitious character, she also identifies Diotima's thought, as distinct from Socratic or Platonic thought. This is a valid step to take—but we will not enter into this controversy.
23. *Symposium*, ibid, pp. 201–03.
24. Genevieve Lloyd, *The Man of Reason—'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy*, Methuen, London, 1984, has a very lucid discussion of some of the themes that we have elaborated upon in this subsection, on pp. 18–22.
25. Ibid., pp. 2–10. See also Emile Brehier, *The Hellenic Age* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1963).
26. Ibid., p. 3, comments: 'The Pythagoreans saw the world as a mixture of principles associated with determinate form, seen as good, and others associated with formlessness—which were seen as bad or inferior. There were ten such contrasts in the table: limit/unlimited, odd/even, one/many, right/left, male/female, rest/motion, straight/curved, light/dark, good/bad, square/oblong. Thus 'male' and 'female', like the other contrasted terms, did not here function as straightforwardly descriptive classifications. 'Male', like the other terms on its side of the table, was construed as superior to the opposite; and the basis for

this superiority was its association with the primary Pythagorean contrast between form and formlessness'.
27. Ibid., p. 4, citing Plato, *Timaeus*, in *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. II, Random House, New York, 1937, translated by B. Jowett, p. 32.
28. Plato, *Symposium*, n. 22, pp. 200–01.
29. Michael Stokes, *Plato's Socratic Conversations—Drama and Dialectic in Three Dialogues*, (Athlone Press, London, 1986), discusses Diotima's words in some detail. He notes, of the present passage—'. . . I confess to a suspicion that Plato had in mind, here at least, only the feelings of the male—and that despite Diotima's womanhood' (p. 162); '...It looks as if Plato's use of language is due to a desire to appear to be talking about all sexual love without actually talking about the female's love of the male' (p. 163).
30. Plato, *Symposium*, n.22, pp. 200–01.
31. Stokes, ibid, notes that in his *Symposium* speech, Socrates is addressing Agathon, 'a poet of strong and well-known homosexual disposition'; 'so it is urbane and dialectically skilful to suggest that everyone believes a great poem more worth producing than a live child' (p. 172).
32. I am indebted for the insight to Keller, n. 18. Indeed she opens up a psycho-sexual dimension to the study of the present theme, which is highly illuminating. In the present paper, however, we are not pursuing this direction any further.
33. Plato, *Republic*, in *Plato—Five Great Dialogues*, n. 4, p. 334. On p. 337, Socrates reiterates that he has 'long been afraid and reluctant to take in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and children'.
34. *Republic*, ibid., p. 336.
35. *Republic*, ibid., pp. 338–39.
36. *Republic*, ibid., p. 340. ;
37. *Republic*, ibid.
38. *Republic*, ibid., pp. 362–63.
39. *Republic*, ibid., p. 368.
40. Susan Moller Okin argues, both in her book *Women in Western Political Thought*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1989; and in her article 'Philosopher Queens and Private Wives: Plato on Women and the Family', Mary Lydon Shanley and Carole Pateman (editors), *Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991, that Plato fails to discard the family structure, and it is due to this failure that he is unable to accord due place to women in his ideal state. In the *Laws*, Plato withdraws whatever space he had granted to (some exceptional) women: Okin links this to his withdrawal, in the *Laws*, of the community of guardians, as envisaged in the *Republic*.
41. Okin, in her writings on Plato coins the phrase 'Philosopher Queens'.
42. Lloyd, n.24, pp. (ix)–(x).

Induction and Doubt*

Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya's *Induction, Probability and Skepticism*** is one of the most comprehensive treatments now available to us on the subject of probability and induction, and the attending skepticism. The treatment is not only comprehensive, it is also thorough, very fair to all parties in the disputes, and above all, wonderfully imaginative. The imaginative quality of Professor Chattopadhyaya's work is such that it inspires aesthetic analogies: The canvas is vast, the brushstrokes are bold, coming in all kinds of colours, and the effect accentuated every now and then by attention to minute details. One cannot but be deeply impressed by this extraordinary achievement of one of our leading philosophers.

Induction, Probability and Skepticism is really so vast in its scope and coverage that it is, I think, impossible to do justice to it in a single review; and, for me, when I look at the sheer table of contents, the very wide variety of topics it ranges over and the diverse forms and modes of philosophizing it makes room for, it makes me feel utterly inadequate to perform the task of giving a comprehensive review of the work. So, what I propose to do here is to pick up a few—just a few—central theses, Professor Chattopadhyaya's ideas and concerns for discussion, hoping that the comments I shall offer will be worthy enough of some response from him. My discussion will, in fact, be confined to some sections of Chapter 4 on 'Probable Knowledge: Confirmation and Correction' and Chapter 7 on 'For and Against Skepticism: Moore and Wittgenstein'.

I

One of the central theses of the book is that the solutions to the traditional problem of justifying induction lies, ultimately, in recognizing the interactive relationship of theory and practice. (This interactive relationship is called 'dialectic' by Professor Chattopadhyaya. Although what he means by this term is clear enough, I am a little hesitant in using the term, for the associations of the term are too many, and they are not all relevant to the issues that occupy Professor Chattopadhyaya, and thus may distract us from our real concern.) The Popper-Carnap controversy, he says, is a case of 'the ongoing theory-practice dialectic'. This illustrates 'a simple but basic truth', namely, that 'the problems that we face in

practical life and those we encounter in the *theoretical* sphere are not quite separate.... Theory provides guidelines for taking up and pursuing the practical courses of action. The latter, in the process of their execution, encounter different problems not envisaged by the theoretical plans behind them. In the light of the problems theories must be reviewed, reconstructed, and reapplied.' (p. 98)

With this general account of the relationship of theory and practice I agree entirely. It is certainly true that behind every practice there is a theory, in fact a whole set of theories, in whatever rudimentary form it may be. On the other hand, the very significance of the theories that we have lies in the relevance they have to our practice. (No theory can be said to have any significance unless it makes some difference to our perception of the world; and this difference in our perception of the world must show through in our practice. In what other way can it do?) But, while I am thus in full agreement with Professor Chattopadhyaya on this general view of the relationship of theory and practice, I am not really sure that the Popper-Carnap controversy can rightly be treated as a case of this theory-practice 'dialectic'.

The only way in which we may present the Popper-Carnap controversy as a case of the theory-practice 'dialectic' is the following: Popper gives in his account of scientific investigation a description of the actual *scientific practice*, of what people actually do when they do science. Carnap tries to give a *theoretical* representation of this very practice. Thus, unless there is the scientific practice, Popper describes, there is nothing for Carnap to give a theory of; and, unless it is possible to have a theory of the kind Carnap is trying to have for the scientific practice Popper describes, the scientific practice has no right to exist. (It cannot be assured an achievement of the goal which gives its *raison d'être* as practice.) The relationship of Popper's 'logic of scientific discovery' and Carnap's reconstruction of 'the logical foundation of probability' is to be understood, according to this idea, in the analogy of the relationship of our actual linguistic practice and its various theoretical representations in grammar, logic, semantics (as a truth theory), and a theory of meaning (as a theory of linguistic understanding and communication). These theories are not necessarily disjoint with one another, however. But it is not quite clear to me how this analogy would succeed. What seems to me to weaken this analogy has been noted by Professor Chattopadhyaya himself in the relevant sections of his book. I should like to call his attention once more to that.

What seems to weaken the analogy in question is the crucial difference Popper sees between the *probability* of a hypothesis, of which Carnap is offering a theoretical explication, and the *degree of corroboration* the hypothesis receives from withstanding attempts at refuting it, what Popper is talking about. It is the *least* probable hypothesis which receives the *highest* degree of corroboration from a failure to refute. So, it seems

that Carnap and Popper are talking about two different things altogether. If this be true, how can one of them be describing a practice of which the other is giving a theoretical representation?

But I suspect that my reading of Professor Chattopadhyaya's construal of the Popper-Carnap debate is wrong. For there is a further problem, rather obvious, with this construal if my reading is correct. It is that the relation between a practice and a theoretical representation of the same practice can hardly be one of *opposition*, but that is precisely what Professor Chattopadhyaya's terminology suggests. At least it does so on occasions, especially when he talks of theory-practice 'dialectic'. But—I must hasten to add—he does not always talk of a conflict or opposition in describing the relation between practice and the corresponding theory. In fact, in the passage I quoted earlier on, this relation is construed as one of mutual enrichment through correction as well as sustenance. But then my problem is that I do not know how to construe the relation between Popper and Carnap as one of mutual enrichment and sustenance if, basically, they are talking about two different things—this at least is what Popper thinks—namely, the measure of probability and the degree of corroboration.

II

In the present section I want to discuss a profound observation—only one of the very many made by Professor Chattopadhyaya throughout the book—on the nature of induction and its relationship with deduction. On p. 101 he writes: 'If induction is in need of justification, so is deduction. As logic they are at a par.' It would be worth our while to try and find out how far there is a parity between the two, induction and deduction, in so far as the question of justification is concerned.

That deduction is in *need* of justification, and that the justification of deduction raises more problems (perhaps) than that of induction are widely recognized now. But one may still maintain—and that is the prevailing view even after all the intricacies of the problem of justifying deduction have been brought to light by recent investigation—that while it is possible to find some solution to the problem of deduction there is no possibility of finding a solution to the problem of induction, not at least of the kind we can find for deduction. Now, if either no solution to the problem of induction can be found or the solution which can be found is of a radically different kind, then the claim made by Professor Chattopadhyaya that there is a perfect parity between these two forms of reasoning becomes questionable. So I want to explore for a while the possible parity between deduction and induction in the context of the demand for justification.

Let us consider very briefly what kind of justification we can offer for deduction; or, to start right from the very beginning, what kind of

problem, or problems, can be said to arise with regard to deduction. At the lowest level, the problem of justifying deduction is the problem of justifying individual deductive inferences. The solution usually offered is given in terms of the rules of inference, like *modus ponens,* the laws of addition and contraposition, universal instantiation or existential generalization. The problem of justification now arises at the second level regarding these laws or rules of inference themselves: how are *they* to be justified? To make a very long story short, these rules are justified ultimately by deriving them from a few rules that are *self-justifying.* These self-justifying rules are in fact the introduction and elimination rules for the logical constants which play the pivotal role in deductions. The introduction and elimination rules are self-justifying because they are what give, to the logical constants, the very meaning they have. The problem of justifying deduction arises also at a third level. At this level the problem is one of justifying the very *practice* of deduction, it is one of explaining why we should at all be engaged in deductive reasoning. The problem arises because, apparently, there is a conflict between the condition an inference is to satisfy if it is to be valid as a deduction *and* the condition it has to satisfy if it is to have any *utility.* If deduction is ultimately validated by the introduction and elimination rules for the logical constants, these rules also require that—to put it in the way it has been by Michael Dummett—the *ground* of the assertion (of the premise) and the *consequence* of the assertion (i.e. the conclusion) must *coincide.* But if they do, it seems that there is no possibility of making any epistemic advance through a piece of deductive reasoning. In short, logical validity seems to be incompatible with epistemic advance, or, what is the same thing, *novelty.* (The story of which I have just given an extremely short version has been told by Michael Dummett[1] and retold with some differences by me[2].)

The problem of justifying deduction that arises at the third level does not have any analogue, it seems, in the case of induction. It seems that epistemic advance is guaranteed in the case of induction: if induction is a way of knowing at all, it is a way of knowing something new, something which is not covered by the premise or premises. In fact, one could say, it is precisely this feature of induction which is also its bane. The novelty in the conclusion also creates a logical gap between the premise and conclusion, a gap which can never be overcome. So, I shall concentrate upon the problem of justification as it is found arising at the first and the second level. What I want to speculate upon is whether it is possible to move in the matter of justifying induction in the way in which we can, as I have explained, in the case of deduction. I want to do this because it is only if we can do something like this that we can make the kind of claim which Professor Chattopadhyaya apparently makes, namely, that the two forms of reasoning are on a par with one another, at least so far as justification is concerned. The question here, of course, is not whether

we can give the same justification for both the kinds of reasoning, but whether we can give the same *kind* of justification. (Had it been possible to give exactly the *same* justification for both, the distinction between the two would perhaps have disappeared altogether.)

To find parity between deduction and induction in the matter of justification we shall have to say, *first,* that an individual inductive inference, like an individual deductive inference, is always validated by some rules of inference, and, *second,* that these rules themselves are validated by some rules of inductive reasoning that are *self-justifying.* If we can say both these things, we shall have to ask next whether it is possible at all to substantiate the claim that the rules of induction which are claimed to be self-justifying can also be regarded somehow as introduction and/or elimination rules for some logical constants, or at least for the relevant logical concepts, and as rules which can also be construed as giving their very meaning.

As far as the first requirement of the parity, or analogy, is concerned, I do not think that there is any problem. Individual inductions *are* justified by general rules of inference (at least by those who think that 'inductive inference' is no misnomer). That is the very purpose of having a logic of induction at all. It would at least tell us whether or not a particular induction is justified, and it would certainly tell us this in terms of the rules of induction that are general. But what about the problem of induction, i.e. of justifying induction, which can be raised at the second level now after the analogy of deduction? Can we say that the different rules can all be traced ultimately to some self-justifying rules? It seems to me that even if this has not been said by inductive logicians in so many words, this is what they will say if they are pressed hard enough for an answer, for the need to fall back upon self-justifying rules is actually created by the very idea of justification. If the process of justifying is not to lead either to a vicious circle or to a vicious infinite regress, it must be given ultimately in terms of something self-justifying. (Even if this need for falling back upon something which is self-justifying is not created in every case, it is created in the case of the kind of justification we can legitimately think to be adequate for logical principles.) So, I conclude that the inductive logicians would eventually trace all the rules of induction to just a few, with regard to which they would claim that they are self-justifying. But as we have already seen in the case of deduction, the very claim that some rules of inference are self-justifying is in need of justification. (This is not to be confused with a demand for justifying the putative self-justifying rules, which would be self-inconsistent, it is a demand for justifying *the claim that such and such rules are self-justifying.*) This demand is met in the case of deduction by arguing that the self-justifying rules are rules for the introduction and/or elimination of the relevant logical constants, i.e. the logical constants which determine the validity or otherwise of the deductions in which they occur. But can we do

anything comparable for the rules of induction that are claimed to be self-justifying by our inductive logician? I think that even here there is something to be considered. I am not in favour of ruling out the possibility of doing something analogous without giving the idea a fair trial. I propose that we take a look at the kind of inductive logic envisaged by Carnap.

In Carnap's view an inductive inference consists in assigning to the conclusion (of the inference) a certain degree of probability relative to the evidence, the degree of probability being something conferred by the evidence on the conclusion. If this be right, the conclusion of induction is always a proposition with a probability operator, as we may call it, the operator 'it is probable (to the degree n) that'. Now, the basic rules of induction which are deemed self-justifying, can be treated as *rules for the introduction of the probability operator*, and some of them, perhaps, for the elimination of this operator; and, furthermore, these rules may be taken to confer upon the operator whatever meaning it has. To pursue this idea, we can try to locate a few other operators that are also pivotal to inductive reasoning, and identify rules of inference which can be claimed to confer upon the operators their very meaning.

I do not know whether this idea can really be worked out in full. I do not know whether it is intuitively acceptable or formally sound. But I am inclined to suppose that Carnap's thinking did move along this line. This supposition is prompted by his judgement that all the principles of the probability theory he is constructing are analytic. Certainly, this is not a *conclusive* argument in support of my reading of Carnap's work, but the suggestion is really very strong. So, let us grant that this is what Carnap really had in his mind, at least for the sake of the argument that there is a *perfect* parity between deduction and induction in respect of justification. But the view that an inductive inference is a derivation of a probability statement by help of rules which confer upon the probability operator its meaning seems to have consequences which are not acceptable, as far as I can see, at least to Professor Chattopadhyaya. The consequence is that it would virtually obliterate the difference between deduction and induction. Induction, on this view, looks like being a *deduction* of a probability statement from a set of evidential statements. This way of looking at induction would be very different from, say, Keynes'. According to Keynes, the evidential premise e makes the inductive conclusion h probable; it is not the case the e makes '*it is probable that h*' necessary. (One may, however, argue that the first *entails* the second.) So, while Keynes was keen on retaining the distinction between *entailment* (or logical implication) and *probabilification*, Carnap has taken steps which are bound to lead to an obliteration of this very distinction. And, also, this seems to be the price that one has to pay for having a perfect parity between the two forms of reasoning. We are thus faced with a dilemma: If there is to be a parity between induction and deduction, especially in respect of

justification, the difference between the two must eventually collapse; if, on the other hand, there is no parity between the two, there cannot really be any justification, worth the name, of what we call induction. How shall we tackle the dilemma? (Even as I formulate the dilemma I have an overwhelming feeling that it is contrived, and not a genuine dilemma. But still I present it to Professor Chattopadhyaya in the hope that his response to it would give us a better understanding of his stand on the question of the justification of induction.)

III

One of the many noble sentiments which give Professor Chattopadhyaya's work its lofty character is his respect for the great masters, both old and new, and Indian as well as western. Among the great masters whose thoughts and ideas Professor Chattopadhyaya has always kept before him, and has tried to incorporate into his own thinking, is Immanuel Kant. The relevance of Kant's work to the philosophy of science is amply recognized by him, and that one of the main motives behind Kant's critique of pure reason was to legitimize Newtonian physics is pointed out again and again. (It is rather strange that it is only more recently that Kant's relevance to our understanding of science is being recognized by philosophers after a kind of oblivion for a long time. The present recognition is, however, prompted by the preponderance of the conceptual scheme idea among metaphysicians and philosophers of science nowadays. But we should not identify Kant's thought with this idea of a *conceptual* scheme. To do this is to ignore a profoundly significant part of Kant's thought, his *philosophy of mind* which postulates different *faculties* of the mind that make their *distinctive* contributions to the growth of knowledge, including *scientific* knowledge. It is just not true that everything that is contributed by the mind, even *a priori*, is a *concept*. Should we not keep in mind that the faculty of sensibility contributes two pure *intuitions*?) On most of the points I agree with Professor Chattopadhyaya both in his exposition and in his evaluation of the philosopher's work. But there are a few points on which I cannot agree with him. I want to discuss one of these here.

On pp. 101–02 Professor Chattopadhyaya writes the following:

My brief survey shows that scientific research has two different but very intimately related aspects—explorative and systematic.

The explorative aspect is guided primarily by a sort of *informed* realism and the historical view of knowledge. Realistic orientation proves somewhat corrective of the excessive zeal for formalization. The forms we frame and use to formalize our knowledge, knowledge of the world, are required to take note of the forms of the world itself. Unfortunately we have no *a priori* valid ways of grasping the latter. In this respect the Kantian-Copernican Revolution overshot

its target. In the process of refuting the Humean skepticism it claimed to have found a final (and yet scientific) view of the world. Kant's claim, his excessive systematization, leaves little room for exploration and arrogates to itself the task of unilaterally giving *forms* to the world of science.

The general principles enunciated in this quotation are, to my mind, absolutely unexceptionable, and I fully agree with Professor Chattopadhyaya. But I cannot agree with his indictment of Kant in the last few lines. I do not think that Kant has failed to recognize the importance of empirical investigation in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. Let me explain why I do not.

The main objective of scientific investigation, Kant would agree, is to discover the laws of nature, including the causal laws. These causal laws, the *particular* causal laws like 'heat expands metal' and 'fire burns', are to be discovered by *empirical investigation*, and *not* by *a priori* reasoning. To this extent, there is no difference between Kant and Hume. Where Hume went wrong, Kant argues, is that he thought that there was nothing *a priori* involved in our causal thinking and causal judgements. First, it is the *concept* of cause which is *a priori*, the thought of necessity which is an inextricable part of it bearing witness to that. Second, the general principle of causality, namely, that every event has a cause, is also *a priori*, an example of the synthetic *a priori*. But this does not mean for Kant that the individual causal laws can be discovered by us *a priori*, independently of empirical investigation. The very application of the pure category of causality is made possible by the schema of the category, which is *regular succession*. And whether or not events of specified kinds are related by way of regular succession is something to be discovered by empirical means, in straightforward experience. The entire doctrine of schematism has been developed by Kant to explain how we can apply the pure categories of understanding to the matter of sense on the basis of some empirical clues. What we can know *a priori* about any given event is that it has some cause, for that is what follows from the principle of universal causality; but what we cannot know *a priori* is that this or that particular thing is the cause. What particular cause the event has we have to find out by experience. This is what Kant has certainly maintained. It is only the general framework of our thinking about the world that is provided by pure reason, not the particular discoveries in terms of which we draw our picture of the world. If Kant is to be indicted for giving this non-empirical status to the most general framework of our scientific thinking about the world, so will all the philosophers who talk so freely about conceptual scheme have to be. If these other philosophers have not committed themselves to *apriorism*, they have managed to avoid doing this only because they have not faced fairly, and squarely, the question: if the conceptual scheme is not an outgrowth of experience, where does it come from? (If this is an indictment, it is an indictment of W.V. Quine too.)

I must admit, however, that the charge of neglecting, at least underplaying, the role of experience in scientific inquiry levelled against Kant by Professor Chattopadhyaya is not entirely unfounded. In his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* Kant does maintain that the Newtonian laws of motion are *a priori* principles, indeed paradigm examples of synthetic *a priori* knowledge. This does justify the charge of 'overshooting the target'. But what I want to say in defence of Kant is that although he has sometimes betrayed an excessive reliance on pure reason, i.e. reason unaided by experience, it would be unfair to say that he thought that there is no role played by experience in scientific investigation.

IV

Induction, Probability and Skepticism offers us one of the most sustained examinations of skepticism. Professor Chattopadhyaya shows with great care that there is no single view, or standpoint, which can be called '*the* skeptical view'. Skepticism runs into a bewilderingly large number of varieties. And there is no doubt that this is one of the things which make it so difficult to deal with the skeptic. If skepticism is the philosophy of doubt, and in particular of doubt regarding the very possibility of knowledge, then what skepticism is would surely be determined by what we take 'knowledge' and 'doubt' to mean. On pp. 180–81, Professor Chattopadhyaya illustrates by help of examples various uses of the term 'know', and also gives a list of the different senses of the term 'doubt'. The following are his examples of the various uses of 'know'.

1. Churchill knows Mahatma Gandhi.
2. The devil knows how to drive a racing car.
3. I know what toothache feels like.
4. Fear is unknown to God's nature.
5. I know my enemy's mind about my promise to help him.
6. I know that there are three sofa sets in my drawing-room on the other side of the wall.
7. I know what is in the safety deposit box of that liar.
8. I know that this hand is mine.

Regarding the diverse uses of the word 'doubt', Professor Chattopadhyaya writes the following:

> Doubt may mean so many things: questioning, suspicion, disbelief, unbelief, distrust, mistrust, incredibility, untenability, unreliability, misgiving, and self-doubt.

This double ambiguity must make it extremely difficult to tackle the issue of skepticism. And I think that it would not be too uncharitable to remark that skepticism at least partially thrives on this ambivalence of the key notions. The great resilience which it shows in the face of attack from the anti-skeptics, attracting the description of 'a slippery eel', is due

largely to the fact that the ambivalence makes it possible for the skeptic continually to shift the ground. That is the reason why it seems to me that the best strategy for tackling the skeptic is to try and pin him down to some definite sense of the crucial terms. I suggest that we begin with what can fairly be said to be the (widely) accepted senses of the two key terms, 'knowledge' and 'doubt', and see how the skeptic fares on them.

Take 'knowledge' first. The standard sense of the term is the one in which knowledge is always propositional, in the sense that what is known is always a proposition, i.e. that something is the case. The examples 6 and 8 in Professor Chattopadhyaya's list would thus be cases of knowledge in this sense. The example 2 is a case of *knowing how* and so belongs to a different category; and the other examples of knowledge would be so treated that, if not in a direct manner, in an indirect manner at least they can all be shown to be cases of propositional knowledge. But let us not worry about the success of this reductive exercise. We just concentrate on the propositional sense of knowledge. Then, according to the standard view, knowledge is, (at least) *justified true belief.* ('At least' because of the problem raised by Gettier. We can leave aside the Gettier problem for the time being. We can do that for the skeptic does not depend for his case upon the Gettier problem after all.) Take next the term 'doubt'. Although Professor Chattopadhyaya lists a large number of senses of the term, he does not mention one sense which comes immediately to our mind, namely, 'uncertainty', standing for that which falls in between belief and disbelief. The term in Professor Chattopadhyaya's list that comes closest to this is 'unbelief'. If we thus take the two key terms in the senses just mentioned, skepticism should stand for the view that we can never be certain about the claim to have a justified true belief with regard to any proposition whatsoever. To put the same thing in a slightly different way, the three conditions that are necessary for knowledge, (i) belief, (ii) justification and (iii) truth, are such that we can never be certain that they are all fulfilled in any case. Time would not permit me go into that, but I think that once we try to substantiate this claim (or, if you like, counterclaim) made by the skeptic it becomes more and more difficult to do so if we keep the skeptic pinned down to the determined senses of the key terms and do not allow him to waver between all the varieties of the skeptical stand, concealed, and thus protected, by ambivalence. I wonder whether we can ever handle our skeptic adequately by trying to be so 'fair' to him as Professor Chattopadhyaya in his generosity tries to do.

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DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

The Moral Issues of Abortion

The moral issues involved in abortion have drawn the attention of many thinkers all over the world. It is a problem over which thinkers have fought bitterly against one another. Sometimes arguments in favour of abortion have got the upper hand, while at other times arguments against abortion have sounded more convincing. While abortion has been made legal in many countries, controversy regarding its moral issues continues to rage unabated. In this paper I will try to analyse the major ethical issues of abortion and explain my own views with regard to this problem.

Abortion, as we all know, means destruction of life after conception and before birth. This implies that abortion has to be distinguished from non-conception on the one hand, and from infanticide on the other. People who think that some abortions at least should be permitted have a tendency to lay emphasis on the early stages of pregnancy and to point out that an early abortion can hardly be distinguished from contraception. On the other hand, people who condemn abortion, at least in general, tend to draw attention to the late stages of pregnancy and insist on showing that no hard and fast line can be drawn between abortion and infanticide.

The main moral issue involved in abortion is: Can abortion be said to be ethically acceptable at any point of fetal development? There are people who think that abortion is *never* ethically acceptable. They would permit it only if it is necessary to save the mother's life. This is the view which is often known as the conservative view. Opposed to the conservative view is the liberal view which holds that abortion is *always* ethically acceptable at any point of fetal development. Besides these two extreme views there is a *moderate* view, the proponents of which believe that abortion can be permitted up to a certain point of fetal development, that abortion can be justified in some cases. The questions that are often asked in these discussions on the ethical acceptability of abortion are: What is the moral status of the fetus? What kinds of rights, if any, does the fetus have? The conservatives think that the fetus has a full moral status. The liberals, on the other hand, believe that the fetus does not have a moral status that is of any significance; it does not have any rights. Advocates of the moderate view think that the fetus can only be said to enjoy a subsidiary or partial moral status. The question that is often asked in these discussions on the moral status of the fetus is: At what point in the continuous development of the fetus does a 'human' life emerge?

(Here 'human' implies full moral status.) Another way of posing the problem is to ask: When does one become a person or, how can the humanity of a being be determined? Let us now proceed to see what the conservatives and the liberals have to say with regard to this question.

The conservatives insist on 'drawing the line' at the time of conception. Conception, they argue, is the only point at which the line between 'non-human' and 'human' can be precisely drawn. The conservatives lay emphasis on the fact that there is a continuum between a zygote and a child, and that to abort is to kill a person or human being. This conservative position can be regarded as an updated version of the traditional theological view regarding abortion. The old Catholic argument against abortion is that the fetus or the unborn child has a soul, and if it is killed before it is baptised, it cannot go to heaven. Contemporary conservatives, however, point out that the original Christian position had no relation to theories of infant baptism.[1] They argue that it is not difficult to translate the theological concept of 'ensoulment' into humanistic language if one substitutes 'human' for 'rational soul'. What makes a man a man is a problem with which both theologians and humanists are concerned. What the traditional view wanted to emphasize is that human beings should not be discriminated on the grounds of the different potentialities they might have. If one is conceived by human parents, and thus has a human genetic code, one ought to be treated as a human being. In other words, conception is considered to be the moment at which one starts being a person, because it is then that the genetic endowments of the future adult are fused into one unit. An objection is sometimes raised at this point. Until two weeks have lapsed after conception, one cannot definitely say how many individuals will be born because monozygotic twins can split at any time during this period. This objection, however, can easily be answered if the conservatives slightly modify their claim and say that conception is definitely the moment at which at least one person emerges.[2]

A more serious objection that is raised against the attempt to make conception the boundary between non-human and human is that a fertilized ovum is vastly different from what is generally considered to be a person. ' . . . such an egg is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree, a caterpillar is a butterfly or a bowl of unbaked ingredients is a cake.'[3] This objection may not sound sufficiently strong to a committed conservative who can readily say: 'A cake is still a cake, even if it is an unbaked one.' The opponents of the conservative position would say that it is true that the conservative cannot be refuted empirically and that no logical error is involved herein, but the fact remains that whoever considers a fertilized ovum to be a person is applying the word 'person' beyond its usual scope. Such a revision of the concept of person is made because those who do so already have an opinion regarding the treatment that a fertilized ovum ought to receive.

Various other attempts have been made to find a dividing line between a fetus and a child. Some consider birth to be the dividing line, some think it is viability which should be the boundary, while some others are of the opinion that quickening or the first movement of the fetus marks the dividing line. One can very well understand why birth is suggested as the dividing line. It is only after a baby is born that he or she is accepted into the human community and it is only at birth that the baby can first express his or her distinctive personality. The conservatives, however, point out that birth cannot be taken as the line deciding whether or not a being may be killed. The fetus, they say, is the same entity, whether it is inside the mother's body or outside it, having the same human characteristics (whether they can be seen by us or not) and the same sensitivity and degree of awareness. A premature infant may be less developed than a full-term fetus, but the abortionists do not consider it wrong to kill the latter. The anti-abortionists wonder how the mere location of a being can make such a difference to the wrongness of killing it.

Those who make viability the dividing line argue that the point where a baby can survive independently is crucial. This is the time when a being becomes a potentially independent creature for the first time. This argument can overcome one objection that was raised against making birth the dividing line: the viable fetus is seen on a par with the prematurely born infant, at the same stage of development. Two objections can, however, be raised against the argument for viability.[4] First, this argument makes potential physical independence a necessary condition of being a person. But suppose, with improved technology, a very old person is kept alive by making him/her dependent on another person's body. In this case the old person would not be viable, but we would definitely continue to recognize him or her as a person. Those who advocate viability should explain why they consider viability to be the boundary at one end of life alone, and not at the other end as well. The other objection raised against the argument for viability is that viability is a boundary that is liable to shift. While twenty-eight weeks is sometimes considered to be the time when a fetus begins to be viable, this boundary is not a fixed one. There are babies who are not viable even when they are more than eight weeks old, and there are babies who survive although they are born earlier.

Viability is also said to vary with the state of medical technology.[5] A premature baby born two months before the due date could not easily survive thirty years ago, but now improved medical technology can help a six-month old fetus survive. Similarly, chances of survival also vary according to the place where the baby is being born, that is to say, they depend on whether the place of birth is a big city with medical facilities or a remote small village. The abortionists think that the fetus has no right to life independent of the wishes of its mother because it owes its

survival to its mother. The anti-abortionists consider this argument to be wrong because they think that there are cases where one person's life depends totally on another, and yet we do not think that the latter has the right to decide whether or not the former will continue to live. A son cannot decide whether or not his elderly mother has a right to life just because she is totally dependent on him. Similarly, the fact that a nonviable fetus is dependent on its mother does not give her the right to put an end to its life.

Quickening or the first movement of the fetus felt by the mother is sometimes considered to be another dividing line. In traditional Christian theology it was believed that the fetus acquired its soul at this moment. To traditional Christians this might be important because according to Christianity, it is the possession of a soul that distinguishes man from non-human animals. But Catholic theologians of today no longer believe that it is at the time of quickening that the fetus gains its soul. Hence the argument loses its significance. The fetus is alive before its movement is first felt. The fact that it acquires the capacity to move at a particular time does not mean that other people decide whether or not it has the right to live. Paralysed people do not lose their right to life just because they are unable to walk any more.[6]

The above discussions on birth, viability and quickening, the conservatives point out, show that it is difficult to find a morally significant dividing line between the fetus and the newborn baby. They insist that the development of a human being from a zygote is a thoroughly gradual process.

Let us now take a look at the liberal position. The liberals generally believe that the fetus continues to remain non-human even when it reaches the most advanced stages of development. The liberals do not intend to deny that a fetus is a human from the biological point of view. The point that they want to make is that the fetus cannot be said to be human in any morally significant sense, that it does not have a significant moral status. A lucid discussion of this approach can be found in Mary Anne Warren's article 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion'.[7] Warren draws a distinction between two senses of the term 'human': the genetic sense and the moral sense. In the genetic sense any member of the species *Homo sapiens* is a human being; members of no other species can be human in this sense. An individual can be said to be human in the moral sense when he or she is a 'full-fledged member of the moral community'. Whatever is genetically human, Warren says, need not also be morally human. By a moral community she understands a community that consists of *persons* only, rather than genetically human beings. This naturally leads to the question: what makes a human being a person or what are the characteristics that entitle an entity to be considered a person?

The characteristics that Warren considers to be basic to the concept of personhood are as follows:

(1) consciousness (of objects and events, both external and internal), and particularly the capacity to feel pain;
(2) reasoning (the *developed* capacity that enables one to solve new problems or problems that are relatively complex);
(3) self-motivated activity (activity which is not dependent on either genetic or direct external control);
(4) the capacity to communicate an indefinite variety of things in different ways;
(5) the capacity to form concepts about oneself, and self-awareness, either individual or racial or both.

Warren is right in saying that any being which satisfies none of these five conditions is definitely not a person. The concept of a person, she further points out, is one that is common to both pro-abortionists and anti-abortionists, though unfortunately neither group fully realizes that this concept plays a crucial role in resolving their disputes. The concept of a person, as Warren rightly points out, is in part a moral concept. To recognize someone as a person is to admit that the person has a right to be treated as a member of the moral community. If one accepts the above-mentioned five conditions as the main criteria of personhood, one can see why genetic humanity is neither necessary nor sufficient to prove that an entity is a person. A being can be genetically human, and yet not be a person. A man or a woman may continue to live with permanently impaired consciousness; in that case we shall say that he or she continues to live, not as a person, but as a human being. A fetus, too, is a human being which is yet to develop as a person, and does not have full moral rights.

But can the problem of abortion be fully solved in this way? The abortionists would have to answer the following question: Can it be said that a fetus does not have a right to life simply because it is not a full-fledged member of the moral community? Anti-abortionists would say that even if a fetus does not have full moral rights and is not fully a person as yet, it is still (i) *like* a person, and (ii) has the potential for becoming a person, and thus has a right to life. Let us see how these questions can be answered. Warren admits that living beings which resemble persons but do not fulfil the requirements of being a person may have moral rights. But the point she wants to emphasize is that the more person-like a being is the stronger reasons does it have for claiming a right to life, and the stronger its right to life is. So it is true that if the biological development of the human individual is continuous, the development of his/her moral rights, too, might be similarly continuous. Yet, the point to remember is that the attributes which decide whether or not a being

is enough like a person to be regarded as having some of the same moral rights are not different from those which decide whether or not a being is fully a person, that is to say, they are no different from the five conditions of personhood mentioned above, and genetic humanity, or possession of human physical features or the capacity to survive outside the mother's body, are not among these relevant attributes. Warren therefore concludes that even if a seven-month or an eight-month fetus arouses in us as powerful a protective instinct as is generally aroused by a small infant, it is as unlike a person as a small embryo is. It is true, she further says, that it does have sensitivity to pain and a rudimentary form of consciousness, yet it is not conscious in the way a few months-old infant is and does not fulfil the criteria of personhood. '. . . if the right to life of a fetus is to be based upon its resemblance to a person, then it cannot be said to have any more right to life than, let us say, a newborn puppy (which also seems to be capable of feeling pain), and that a right of that magnitude could never override a woman's right to obtain an abortion, at any stage of her pregnancy.'[8]

Warren has refuted other anti-abortion arguments as well. Thus she says that the new techniques of abortion (such as artificially inducing labour during the third semester) have minimized the threats of death and other health hazards on the part of the mother. She further says that abortion cannot be opposed by saying that people often feel revulsion at the thought of doing abortion in the later stages of pregnancy. Mere emotional responses cannot decide what ought or ought not be permitted. Nor can abortion be said to erode respect for human life and thus lead to an increase in unjustified euthanasia or other crimes. Warren says that making people aware of the moral distinctions that we have been discussing would be a better way of dealing with that threat.

We now proceed to consider how far the fact that the fetus has potential personhood can justify anti-abortion arguments. There is no doubt that if a being is a potential person, it does have a prima facie right to life. But the question is: Can such a right outweigh a woman's right to do an abortion? As Warren has rightly pointed out, if the rights of any actual person conflict with those of any potential person, the former invariably outweighs the latter. '. . . a woman's right to protect her health, happiness, freedom, and even her life, by terminating an unwanted pregnancy, will always override whatever right to life it may be appropriate to ascribe to a fetus, even a fully developed one. And thus, in the absence of any overwhelming social need for every possible child, the laws which restrict the right to obtain an abortion, or limit the period of pregnancy during which an abortion may be performed, are a wholly unjustified violation of a woman's most basic and constitutional rights.'[9]

The arguments advanced by proabortionists are sometimes described as 'Woman's Rights Arguments'.[10] These arguments claim that the question of abortion is basically one of a woman's right to self-defence,

or of her right to have control over her own body. Let us take a look at three such arguments. First, let us consider the argument based on a woman's right to self-defence. In her famous article 'A defence of abortion',[11] Judith Jarvis Thompson has argued that if a woman's life is threatened by a pregnancy, she has a right to defend herself at the cost of the life of the fetus. Even if her life is not in danger, Thompson further says, she is under no moral obligation to continue with the pregnancy. To save one's own life, it might be necessary to put an end to someone else's life, even if such a being is innocent. Two objections are sometimes raised against this argument. First, it is sometimes said that killing innocent people cannot be justified even on the ground of self-defence. Secondly, it is said that even if it is sometimes right to kill innocent people there is no way of proving why saving one's own life gets an automatic priority. The second argument or the ownership argument says that a woman's body is her own property, and that a woman should have the freedom to make her own decisions regarding her pregnancy. The objection that is commonly raised against this stand is that it is not right to give such importance to property rights when people's lives are at stake. It is said that mere ownership cannot confer on someone the right to kill innocent beings whom one considers to be one's property. The third argument or the priority argument says that the woman's right to control her own life should be given priority over the interests of the fetus. No body should be deprived of anything which is both necessary for his/her continued existence and to which he/she has a right. It is said that the fetus has a right to use the mother's body only if the mother has a 'special responsibility' for it, that is to say, has assumed the responsibility, either explicitly or implicitly. The mother is said to have no responsibility for an unwelcome fetus, and as such the fetus is seen as having no right to use the mother's body. Helping someone where no rights are involved is an act of charity: the question of carrying out a moral duty does not arise here. But the objection that can be easily raised is: Is it plausible to draw a sharp distinction between people towards whom we have moral duties and people to whom we may or may not show charity?

We turn now to consider some of the moderate views that have been put forward. Unlike the conservatives and the liberals, the moderates do not condemn or condone abortion sweepingly. Some abortions are considered to be morally justifiable, while some are not. Four kinds of moderate views often figure in discussions on abortion.[12] Some moderates believe that the fetus has full moral status ever since it is conceived, but that does not mean that abortion is morally impermissible in all cases. Some abortion cases, these moderates believe, may be regarded as permissible on grounds of self-defence. This may be called moderation of the conservative view. Those who try to moderate the liberal view argue that although the fetus does not have a significant moral status even in the latest stages of pregnancy, it cannot be concluded that all cases of

abortion are morally permissible. The practice of abortion continues to raise moral problems because it has negative social consequences. Abortions done in the later stages of pregnancy are said to have harmful effects on those involved and may often erode respect for human life. Moderate views have also been put forward with regard to what we have earlier referred to as 'drawing the line', the line between a fetus and a human being. While the conservatives tend to draw the line between human and non-human at conception, and the liberals do the same at birth (or sometime after birth), some moderates insist on drawing the line somewhere between these two extremes, such as the time of implantation or the time when brain activity begins. And finally, moderate views have also been advanced with regard to the assignment of moral status. Some moderates are of the opinion that the fetus has some sort of a subsidiary or partial moral status. It is said[13] that if a woman has respect for the sanctity of human life, she should not support abortion. However, a woman has duties towards herself, her family, society, etc., and in certain circumstances such duties might 'override the prima facie duty not to abort'.

So far we have tried to give an idea of the major moral issues involved in the problem of abortion. We have studied the problem in the light of the three main views, the conservative, the liberal and the moderate, that are widely discussed in the contemporary literature on abortion. I proceed now to explain my own stand with regard to the problem of abortion. I am inclined to support the last variety of the moderate view that we have discussed in the above paragraph. I believe that every person should have respect for the sanctity of human life, but I also think that every person is an autonomous being and hence should have the right to make free decisions regarding his or her own life. Abortion, I think, should not be seen as an easy method of birth control. A late abortion can lead to severe emotional distress. A woman's fertility, and sometimes even her life, may be in danger in some cases. Possibilities of risk are negligible in cases of early abortion, but late abortions are major operations and may lead to severe complications or even to death. Recent world health statistics show that about one-fourth to one-third of maternal deaths are caused by complications of abortions that are carried out illegally or without adequate medical competence. Early abortions, however, particularly those which use the suction method, are much safer, less expensive and also less disturbing to the surgeons and nurses performing the operation. I believe that every woman has the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. If a pregnancy that is willingly accepted turns out to be threatening to her life, then, too, she has right to opt for an abortion, because a living being's right to life outweighs that of an unborn being. Abortion not only involves issues regarding a woman's autonomy: it also raises social issues. It seems to be that if a woman happens to know beforehand that her unborn child will suffer from a

severe handicap, she has every right to opt for an abortion, not only for her personal happiness, but also for the well-being of society at large. Terminating unwanted pregnancies (performed at an early date and with adequate medical supervision) should also be viewed as a duty that one owes to society in view of the burning problem of population explosion that faces the world of today.

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On Richard DeSmet S.J.'s Article,
'The Presuppositions of Jaimini and the Vedāntins'

(A) COMMENTS BY S.L. PANDEY

Our well-known Vedāntic friend, Richard De Smet, S.J. has published a searching paper in *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Volume XI, Number 2, January–April, 1994. Its title is 'The Presuppositions of Jaimini and the Vedāntins'. But, as a matter of fact, it deals with the conceptions of sentence that are found in the *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā* of Jaimini and Vedānta. Undoubtedly, it is an informative paper and has rendered a signal service to the understanding of *Vākya Śāstra*. De Smet deserves thanks from all the students of the *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā* and Vedānta for his remarkable articulation.

His formulations concerning Advaita Vedānta, however, betray a

sort of non-Advaitic interpretation. Apparently, they appear to be the summations of the popularly current perspectives on the Advaitic conception of sentence. But, like all sorts of populism, it is fraught with misconceptions. Some of them are given below:

First, the Advaitic theory of the meaning of sentence is called the Theory of Indivisible Selfhood (*Akhaṇḍa Ekarasa*) and it is contrasted to the theory of association of words and the theory of qualification. De Smet concentrates on the theory of qualification according to which a sentence means that some attributes qualify a subject (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya bhāva*) and he discusses its two forms that are due to the distinction between real qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) and unreal qualification (*upādhi*). He does not deal with the main theory that emerges from the rejection of these two theories. A small tract, *Vākyavṛtti*, clarifies the Advaitic position in the following way:

> *Saṁsargo vā viśiṣṭo vā vākyārtho nātra saṁmataḥ.*
> *Akhaṇḍaikarasatvena vākyārtho viduṣāṁ mataḥ.*
>
> *Vākyavṛtti*, verse 38

It means that Advaitic theory of sentence is not propositional. It does not maintain that a sentence is to be understood as SPR (subject-predicate-relation). Nor does it hold that the real meaning of a sentence emerges from the association of words that constitute it—the meaning of a sentence rests neither on the relation of conjunction nor on the relation of qualification. It rests, on the other hand, on the nature of self that is existentially unchanging and numerically identical. It is not logically implied by any proposition either. As self is unconnected (*Asaṅga*), beyond all qualifications (*Nirviśeṣa*) and unconditional (*Nirupādhika*), the semantic theories based on conjunction, qualification, conditioning and implication are rejected for understanding it. When a proposition like 'Thou Art Tenth' (*Daśamastvam asi*) or 'That Thou Art' (*Tat tvam asi*) is uttered, its real indication is towards the reality of the self as 'I am'. Such propositions cannot be understood in terms of any relation at all.

Amalananda neatly describes the Advaitic theory of meaning as *Akhaṇḍa* in the following inimitable words.

> *Aviśiṣṭaṁ aparyayānekaśabdaprakāśitam.*
> *Ekam Vedāntaniṣṇātā akhaṇḍam pratipedire.*
>
> *Vedāntakalpataru*, 1.1.2

i.e., *Akhaṇḍa* (the sole denotative meaning) is that which is unqualified and indicated by numerous words which are not synonymous. Similarly *Citsukha* has described it critically in *Citsukhī* 1.19. All these formulations point out that indication has nothing to do with intellectual or textual construction or desconstruction.

Secondly, De Smet's description makes Brahman an object of

knowledge. His use of *Jahad-ajahad lakṣaṇā* shows that Brahman is a thing that is indicated thereby. Morever, his view that intellect unifies all significations of signs syntactically confirms it. But Śaṅkara has tried to indicate that Brahman is not an object or a thing. It cannot be known as this (*idam*) and is known only as 'I am' (*aham*).

Śruti itself does not describe Brahman as an object, as 'this', or as 'it is'. It describes Brahman as Ātman or as 'I am'. This is the reason why there is no contradiction between *śruti* and immediate experience of the self (*Aparokṣa Anubhūtiḥ*).

De Smet takes the relation of indication (*Lakṣya-lakṣaṇabhāva*) as a sort of coordination in the indication of the sentence, '*Satyam jñānam anantam brahma*'. But indication points out to the sole denotative meaning of these terms and does not refer to their connotative meanings. In fact *Jahad ajahad lakṣaṇā* is used to indicate only the denotation of a term that is called *Prātipadika* or the real subject and that cannot be described in terms of predicates. It is beyond the reach of predicative logic. All predicates ultimately signify denotatively the numerical identity of existence. To relate their significations connotatively is an exercise that is non-Advaitic and fruitless. All indications converge only on their denotative meaning that is the self.

Thirdly, De Smet rightly describes that Śaṅkara's theory of meaning is paratextual. We shall, however, go further and state that his theory is also para-linguistic and para-epistemic, for all languages or theories of signs and all theories of knowledge presuppose the self. But it does not mean that the self also presupposes something or some conditions. It is called irrelative. In modern terms it is presuppositionless.

Fourthly and lastly, De Smet appears to think that Advaita Vedānta accepts only two kinds of definition that are called *Svarūpa Lakṣaṇa* and *Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa*. But this is only a half truth. There are as many as eleven kinds of definition that are fruitfully used by Advaitins. All these kinds of definition are well described and illustrated by Dr Swayam Prakash Pandey in his book '*Tattvānusandhāna kā Darśana*, Darshan Peeth, Allahabad, 1986, pp. 47–50. Those who are interested in knowing these details may consult this book on the present topic.

But in spite of these sharp criticisms, I am not ashamed of confessing the fact that I have been enlightened by going through the well-argued and well-documented paper of De Smet. Perhaps, within the limited bounds of his paper, he could not describe those issues which I have raised here and was confined to the general description of the *lakṣaṇa* theory only. But I do not wish to offer any apology for the views, I have expressed here, whether De Smet agrees or disagrees with me. I shall, however, be glad if he finds that my formulations are, at least, worth the ink they have consumed. The more they are, the happier I am.

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Rev. De Smet's attempt to reply to Daya Krishna's objections to the divergent approaches of *Mīmāṃsā* and Vedānta to vedic authority does not seem to be quite satisfactory. For one thing, Daya Krishna questions the very identity of the vedic corpus and for another he does not see any justification in *Mīmāṃsā* and Vedānta treating different portions of the vedic corpus as of secondary import. The age-old doctrine of the eternity or the non-human origin of the Vedas is also called into question by Daya Krishna. De Smet has nothing to say regarding the identity or the exact coverage of the vedic literature. On the second and third of the above points however De Smet has a good deal to say. According to him *Mīmāṃsā* and Vedānta presuppose different conceptions regarding the nature and import of significant sentences and as a result they fix upon different portions or texts of the Veda as meaningful in the primary sense, relegating the other portions as secondarily or cumulatively meaningful. As to the view upheld by all orthodox Indian thinkers that the Vedas are eternal, he suggests that it may have been the Buddhist assault on vedic authority that prompted *Mīmāṃsā* and Vedānta to trot out the view that the Vedas have no human (or even divine) origin. On the justification (or rational explanation) of this view however De Smet has nothing to say.

It is obvious that he does not meet Daya Krishna's objections squarely. His contention that the conceptions of sentence and its import adopted respectively by *Mīmāṃsā* and Vedānta are different is only partially correct. Non-vedic sentences used in common parlance, like 'This is a cow', 'That tree is very tall', and so on, are declarative in their import and yet they would not be discarded as meaningless or as only secondarily meaningful by *Mīmāṃsā*. Nor would Vedānta deny primary meaning to nondeclarative sentences of common parlance like 'Bring the pot', or even the vedic imperatives like 'The seeker of heaven should perform the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice'. It is also not the meaningfulness of the imperative or declarative texts of the Veda that Vedānta and *Mīmāṃsā* respectively call into question. At least Vedānta is not concerned to deny the meaningfulness of vedic imperatives. What it only insists on is the secondary nature of actions enjoined by vedic imperatives vis-à-vis the realization of the truth of Ātman which is described in certain declarative sentences of the Vedas.

That *Mīmāṃsā* is not averse to admitting the meaningfulness of declarative sentences is evident from the fact that the theory of '*Abhihitānvaya*' (or the sentence—meaning as directly constituted by or synthesized out of non-injunctive direct word-meanings) is propounded by the very founder of the main school of *Mīmāṃsā*, namely Kumārila. There is, as a matter of fact, no dispute regarding what sentences are meaningful and what are not so, between *Mīmāṃsā* and Vedānta. If there is any dispute between these schools it turns on the question of absolute

authority or intrinsic validity of certain sentences and invalidity of certain other sentences. For *Mīmāṃsā* Vedic injunctions are valid by their very nature while for Vedānta only the exhortations contained in the Mahāvākyas are self-valid. It is the very content of these sentences that renders them intrinsically valid. The religious rituals enjoined in the Vedic imperative must be absolutely valid or obligatory according to *Mīmāṃsā*. Its authority cannot be derivative from any human or non-human origin of the sentences by which it is expressed. Contrariwise the truth conveyed by the *Mahāvākyas* must be absolute according to Vedānta simply because the truth is imparted by a competent teacher to a qualified disciple.

Thus while *Mīmāṃsā* upholds the primacy and absolute obligatoriness of ritualistic activity, Vedānta maintains the ultimacy and supremacy of Ātman-realization. As a consequence of these divergent views of the goal of existence respectively upheld by these schools, they have come to look upon different portions of the Veda as of central importance. One may even say that imperative sentences and certain declarative sentences (the *Mahāvākyas*) are the respective paradigms of independently veridical or intrinsically—valid sentences for *Mīmāṃsā* and Vedānta. A religious or moral injunction loses its religious character or moral force if it is sought to be justified or is justifiable on the basis of its divine or human origin. Similar is the case with the truth communicated by a master to his disciple.

Nagpur

N.S. DRAVID

Notes and Queries

[In *JICPR* Vol. XI, No.2, a query was raised entitled 'Does Mīmāṁsā treat the theory of *Karma* as *pūrva pakṣa*?'. Replies were received in Sanskrit from Dr N.S.R. Tatacharyaswami, Shri Surya Prakash Shastri, Shri E.S. Varadacharya, Shri L. Laxminarayan Murti Sharma, Shri N.K. Ramanuja Tatacharya and Shri N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. The English translation of these appeared in *JICPR* Vol. XII, No. 3. The present issue contains the replies in the Sanskrit original—Editor.]

श्री दयाकृष्णमहाभागानां प्रश्नस्य सारः

जैमिनि: कश्चित् कर्म करोति चेदेव फलं प्राप्नोति इति नियमं आश्रित्य पूर्वपक्षं प्रस्तूय यजमानस्य सर्वकर्माङ्गजातम् कर्तुमशक्तत्वात् परिक्रीतै: ऋत्विग्भि: उत्सर्गदक्षिणादानव्यतिरिक्तकर्मकरणं, उत्सर्गदक्षिणादाने च तत्कर्तव्ये इति सिद्धान्तितवान्।

परन्तु प्रकरणान्तरे स एव उद्दिष्टं आशासनीयं फलं यजमानस्याध्वर्योर्वा भवति इति शङ्कित्वा यजमानस्यैव फलमाशासनीयम् इति प्रथमेऽधिकरणे सिद्धान्तं कृतवान्। तदुपरि अधिकरणे अध्वर्यो: फलमाशासनीयम्, यदि अध्वर्यो: फलभागेन कर्मणो भवति उपकार: इति आह। अनन्तराधिकरणे यदि साक्षात् व्यपदेश: तदा अध्वर्यो: फलमाशासनीयम् इति जगाद।

इदानीं संशय:–य: कर्म करोति तस्यैव फलमिति नियम: जैमिनिना स्वीकृतो वा न वेति।

डा. एन्. एस्. आर. ताताचार्यस्वामि

य: कर्म करोति तस्यैव फलमिति जैमिनिना स्वीकृतमेव। यजमानस्य सर्वाङ्गकरणाशक्ते:, ऋत्विज: परिक्रीता: तस्य साहाय्यं कुर्वन्ति। प्रधाने यजमान: कर्ता, अङ्गजाते ऋत्विज इति भेदेऽपि यजमानस्य सर्वस्मिन् कार्ये मुख्यप्रयोजककर्तृत्वयोरन्यतरस्य कर्तृत्वस्य सत्त्वात् तस्यैव फलमित्यत्र न विरोध:।

एवं चेत् प्रकरणान्तरे कथं अध्वर्यो: फलं श्रूयते इति चेत् कर्मनिष्पत्त्यौपायिकं अध्वर्युफलं श्रूयते चेत्, अनन्यथासिद्धद्विवचनादिना उभयो: फलं श्रूयते चेत्, तत्राध्वर्यो: फलं स्वीक्रियते अन्यत्र कुत्रापि परिक्रीताध्वर्युकृतकर्मणां स्वफलार्थत्वं नास्ति, किन्तु यजमानफलार्थत्वमेवेति।

श्रीमन्त: सूर्यप्रकाशशास्त्रिण:

ऋत्विग्भि: कर्मकरणे यजमानेन फलभागे च फलभोक्तृत्वसमानाधिकरणकर्तृत्वरूपाधिकारित्वं यजमानस्य न स्यादिति शङ्कायां उत्सर्गमात्रं कुर्वतापि यजमानेन सर्वकृतं भवतीति भाष्ये उक्तत्वात् न यजमानस्य कर्तृत्वाभाव इति समाधानम्।

श्रीमन्तः ई. एस्. वरदाचार्याः

योऽयं संशयः-परिक्रीतैः ऋत्विग्भिः यजमानस्य प्रयोजककर्तृत्वात् तस्य फलं भवितुमर्हति चेत्, अग्नाविष्णू मावामवक्रमिष इत्यादौ अध्वर्युकृतप्रार्थनायाः कथं तदीयफलजनकत्वं स्यात्? अन्येषु अध्वर्युकृतकर्मस्विव यजमानगामिफलजनकत्वं कुतो न स्यात् इति, तत्र समाधानम् कर्मजन्यफलमेव यजमानस्यैव नाध्वर्योः इति कथितम्। एतत्प्रार्थनायाः फलं तु कर्मसंपत्त्यर्थमसंतापरूपम् इति न विरोधः। किमर्थं यजमानेनोत्सर्गमात्रं कर्तव्यम् अन्यत् सर्वं ऋत्विग्भिरिति नियम इति शङ्का तु सूत्रकारेणैव समाहिता ३-७-१९, ३-७-२० सूत्राभ्याम्।

श्रीमन्तः स. लक्ष्मीनारायणमूर्तिशर्माणः

१ स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता इति वत् तत्प्रयोजको हेतुश्चेति शास्त्रेण **प्रयोजकस्यापि कर्तृत्वसिद्धिः**।

२ न च यजेतेत्यात्मनेपदविरुद्ध्यते इति वाच्यम्, तस्य साक्षात्प्रयोजकसाधारण्येन अकर्तरि फलप्रतिषेधकत्वेन वोपपत्तेः।

३ न च सर्वकर्मसु यजमानस्य साक्षात्कर्तृत्वं संभवि, 'ऋत्विजो वृणीते' इत्युक्त ऋत्विग्वरणस्य दक्षिणादानस्य च श्रौतस्य वैयर्थ्यापत्तेः।

श्रीमन्तः ना. कृ. रामानुजताताचार्याः

''तन्त्रो सहे'' त्यत्र यत् अध्वर्योः फलं कथितं तत् कथं संगच्छते इति प्रश्नः।

अत्रेदं समाधानम्-अङ्गफलकीर्तनस्य तत्त्वेन न तात्पर्यम्, किन्तु अर्थवादत्वमेव, अङ्गानां स्वातन्त्र्येण फलाभावात्। अत्र अङ्गेषु ऋत्विक्-द्वारा, प्रधाने तु स्वयमेवेति साङ्गप्रधानकर्तुः स्वर्गादिफलभोक्तृत्वमिति।

एन्. एस्. रामानुजताताचार्यः

पूर्वमीमांसायां तृतीयाध्याये सप्तमे पादे सप्तमेऽधिकरणे (यजमानभिन्नकर्त्रन्तर प्रतिपादनपरे) त्रीणि सूत्राणि। तत्र प्रथमं सूत्रं - (३-७-१८)

''शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि तल्लक्षणत्वात् तस्मात् स्वयं प्रयोगे स्यात्'' इति। तत्रैवं संशयः -दर्शपूर्णमासादिकं कर्म किं साङ्गप्रधानं सर्वं यजमानेन कर्तव्यम्? उत हविस्त्याग-दक्षिणादानात्मके द्रव्योत्सर्गे यजमानः कर्ता, अन्यत्र यजमानोऽन्यो वेत्यनियमः, किं वा द्रव्योत्सर्गे यजमानः कर्ता, अन्यत्र त्वन्य एवेति नियमः इति। तत्र पूर्वपक्षः-'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इति शास्त्रगम्यं फलं प्रयोक्तरि-साङ्गकर्मकुर्वाणे भवति। कुतः तल्लक्षणत्वात्-फलस्य साङ्गप्रधानानुष्ठाननिमित्तकत्वात्। 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इति साङ्गप्रधानभावनायाः त्र्यंशायाः फले निधानात्। यतश्च साङ्गप्रधानकर्तुरेव फलमवगतम्, तस्माद्धेतोः स्वयं यजमान एव साङ्गप्रधानानुष्ठाने कर्ता स्यात्। ''ऋत्विग्भ्यो दक्षिणां ददाति'' इति दानविधिस्तु ''आत्रेयाय हिरण्यं ददाति'' इतिवत् अदृष्टार्थतयाप्युपपद्यते। यजमानस्यैव होता अध्वर्युः इत्यादिसमाख्या तत्तत् कर्मनिमित्तिका भविष्यति।

अथ द्वितीयपक्षप्रतिपादकं सूत्रम् -''उत्सर्गे तु प्रधानत्वात् शेषकारी प्रधानस्य तस्मादन्यः स्वयं वा स्यात्'' यजमानस्य देवतोद्देश्यकद्रव्योत्सर्गात्मके भाग एव कर्तृत्वस्य मुख्यत्वात् प्रधानस्य शेषकारी-अङ्गानां कर्ता तस्मात् - यजमानात् अन्यः ऋत्विक् स्वयं वा-यजमानो वा स्यात् इत्यनियमः। ऋत्विजां दक्षिणया परिक्रयो हि सहायार्थमन्यपेक्षायां भवति। सहायापेक्षा नाशक्तावेव लोके दृष्टा। ततश्च शक्तौ सत्यां यजमान एव सर्वं साङ्गप्रधानं करोति। अशक्तौ तु अन्येनाङ्गानि कारयितव्यानि। परिक्रयविधिश्च तत्रैव दृष्टार्थो भविष्यति।

ननु तर्हि अशक्तौ सत्यां द्रव्योत्सर्गेऽप्यन्यस्य कर्तृत्वं स्यादित्यत्राप्येतदेवोत्तरम्-उत्सर्गे तु प्रधानत्वात् इति। उत्सर्गे तु देवतोद्देश्यकद्रव्यत्यागे दक्षिणादाने च यजमान एव कर्ता स्यात् प्रधानत्वात् स्वामित्वात्। न ह्यन्यदीयं द्रव्यमन्यस्मा उत्स्रष्टुं शक्नुयात्।

अथ सिद्धान्तसूत्रम्-''अन्यो वा स्यात् परिक्रयाम्नानाद्विप्रतिषेधात् प्रत्यगात्मनि।'' वाशब्द एवार्थे। सत्यामपि शक्तौ द्रव्योत्सर्ग एव यजमानः कर्ता। अन्यत्र तु अङ्गजातेऽन्य एव कर्ता। कुतः? परिक्रयाम्नानात्। परिक्रयो नाम द्रव्यदानेन भृत्यस्वीकरणम्। तदर्थं दक्षिणादानविधानादित्यर्थः। तत्र दक्षिणादानं प्रत्यगात्मनि-स्वस्मिन् न संभवति। कुतः? विप्रतिषेधात्-विरोधात्। न हि स्वस्मै स्वयमेव दातुं प्रभवति, दानस्य स्वस्वत्वपरित्यागपूर्वकपरस्वत्वापादनार्थकत्वात्। न च परिक्रयविधिः अशक्तयजमानविषयक इति वक्तुं युक्तम्। लोके प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणवशात् अशक्तौ सत्यां अन्यस्य परिक्रयेऽपि मानान्तरागोचरस्य भागस्य नित्यवच्छ्रुतपरिक्रयविधिबलेन नित्यमेव परिक्रीतपुरुषकर्तृ-काङ्गसाध्यत्वावगमात्।

तथा चैतत् सिद्धं द्रव्योत्सर्गे यजमानस्य मुख्यकर्तृत्वम्, तदितरत्र तु अङ्गजाते प्रयोजककर्तृत्वम्। उभयसाधारणकर्तृत्वमेव च स्वर्गकामवाक्यादवगम्यत इति। प्रधाने यजमानः कर्ता, अङ्गजाते ऋत्विजः कर्तारः इति जैमिनीसिद्धान्तः।

एतत्सिद्धान्तविरुद्धतया जैमिनिः तृतीयाध्यायाष्टमपादे २५ त: २९ पर्यन्तेषु सूत्रेषु किमप्युक्तवानिव दृश्यते इति केचित् आशङ्कन्ते। तन्निराकरणाय तेषु सूत्रेषूक्तं विषयं प्रथमतः पश्यामः।

सू. ऋत्विक्फलं करणेष्वर्थत्वच्चात् (जै. सू. ३-८-२५) आध्वर्यमिति समाख्याबलात् ऋत्विक्कर्तृकं यत् समित्प्रक्षेपेण आहवनीयाग्निप्रज्वालनरूपमग्न्याधानं तत्करणतया 'ममाग्ने वर्चो विद्वेष्वस्तु वयं त्वेन्धानास्तनुवं पुषेमेति पूर्वमग्निं गृह्णाति' इति वाक्येन विनियुक्तो यो ममाग्ने वर्चः इत्यादिमन्त्रः तत्प्रकाश्यं वर्चः प्रभृतिफलं ऋत्विजः एव। मन्त्रस्यैव मम इत्यस्मच्छब्देन तस्यैव मुख्यवृत्त्या बाधनात् इति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तः।

स्वामिना वा तदर्थत्वात्। (जै. सू. ३-८-२६) इति। वाशब्दोऽवधारणे। मन्त्रप्रयोक्ता अध्वर्युणा वर्चः प्रभृति फलं स्वामिनः यजमानस्यैव आशासितव्यम्। तदर्थत्वात्-यजेत इत्यात्मनेपदश्रुत्या साङ्गप्रधानभावनाविषयाङ्गफलस्यापि यजमानगामित्वावगमात्। तथा च मन्त्रस्थस्य ममेति शब्दस्य मदीयस्य यजमानस्येत्यर्थः। यथा राजनि वर्तमानं जयं अस्माकमिति वदन्ति सैनिकाः तथायं मम देशः।

वेदसंमतश्चायं न्यायः इत्याह-लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च (जै. सू. ३-८-२७) वाक्ये शेषादित्यर्थः। ''यां वै कांचन यज्ञे ऋत्विज आशिषमाशासते यजमानस्यैव सा'' इति वाक्यशेषो यजमानफलमेव एवं

जातीयकेषु सिद्धवत् दर्शयति, वैशब्दस्य प्रसिद्धिद्योतकत्वात्। अतोऽपि याजमानमेव फलमिह विवक्षितम्।

त्रिसूत्रेणानेनाधिकरणे क्वचित्करणमन्त्रप्रकाशितं फलम् ऋत्विज एव इति स्थापितम्। तथा हि–अस्ति दर्शपूर्णमासयो: दक्षिणातिक्रमणमन्त्र:–''अग्नाविष्णू मा वामवक्रमिषं विजिहायां मा मा संतासम्'' इति। अग्नि: आहवनीयाग्नि:। विष्णुर्यज्ञ:। ''यज्ञो वै विष्णु:'' इति श्रुते:। यज्ञसाधनं वेद्यामासन्नं हविरिह विवक्षितम्। हे अग्नाविष्ण आहवनीयहविषी। वां–युवाम्, मावक्रमिषं–नाक्रमेयम्।विजिहायां–मयि कोपं त्यजतम्।मा–मां युवयोरन्तरा दक्षिणा अतिक्रामन्तं मा संतासम्–न संतापयतमित्यर्थ:।अत्रासंतापलक्षणं फलं किमध्वर्युणा यजमानगतमाशासनीयम् उत स्वगतम्? इति संशये पूर्वाधिकरणन्यायेन यजमानगामि फलमेव आशास्यमिति प्राप्ते सिद्धान्तयति–''कर्मार्थं तु फलं तेषां स्वामिनं प्रत्यर्थवत्त्वात्'' (सू. ३-८-२८) तुशब्द: वैषम्ये।''ममाग्ने वर्च:'' इत्येवंजातीयकेषु करणमन्त्रेषु याजमानस्यैव फलस्य आशास्यत्वेऽपि ''मा संतासम्'' इत्येवंजातीयकेषु करणमन्त्रेषु तेषां–ऋत्विजामेव संबंधि असंतापलक्षणं फलमाशास्यं न तु यजमानगामि। कुत:? यत: कर्मार्थम्–असंतापादिलक्षणं हि फलं कर्मसिद्ध्यौपयिकम्। न हि संतापादिदोषग्रस्ता: कर्म कर्तुं शक्नुवन्ति। तत: सामर्थ्यात् ऋत्विग्भि: स्वात्मन्येवासंतापादिलक्षणं फलम् आशासनीयम्। नन्वेवं सति यजेत इत्यात्मनेपदश्रुतिविरोध इत्यत आह–स्वामिनं प्रत्यर्थत्वात् इति। अर्थ्यते प्रार्थ्यत इत्यर्थ: कर्मणि घञ्। प्रार्थनीयत्वात् इत्यर्थ:। ऋत्विग्गतस्यैव असंतापादिरूपफलस्य स्वकीयकर्माविघातार्थं स्वामिना यजमानेन प्रार्थनीयत्वात् नात्मनेपदश्रुतिविरोध:।

अनेन यजमानकर्तृककर्मसिद्ध्यौपयिकं चेत् ऋत्विग्गतमपि फलं स्वीक्रियत इति सूत्रितम्।

अनन्तरसूत्रं–व्यपदेशाच्च (सू. ३-८-२९) इति। ज्योतिष्टोमे दक्षिणस्य हविर्धानशकटस्य अधस्तात् चत्वार:उपरवाख्या:अवटा:।तत्र मिथो हस्तौ निवेश्य अध्वर्युं यजमान:पृच्छति–'अध्वर्यो किमत्र'इति।''भद्रम्''इत्यध्वर्यु:प्रतिवक्ति।तत:''तन्नौ सह''इति यजमान आह।तत्–पूर्वमन्त्रप्रस्तुतं भद्रं नौ आवयो: अध्वर्युयजमानयो: व्यासक्तं भवतु इत्यर्थ:।

अत्र भद्ररूपफलस्य असंतापादिवत् कर्मसिद्ध्यनौपयिकतया अध्वर्युगामित्वेन रूपेण यजमानेन प्रार्थनीयत्वाभावात् यजेत इत्यात्मनेपदानुरोधाच्च यजमानगाम्येव भद्राख्यं फलं विवक्षितम्। नौ इति द्विवचनमेकत्वे लाक्षणिकमिति पूर्वपक्षे प्राप्ते सिद्धान्तयति व्यपदेशाच्च इति।

च: भिन्नक्रम:। भद्रलक्षणमिदं फलं यजमानस्य अध्वर्योश्चेह विवक्षितम्।कुत:? व्यपदेशात्–नौ इति द्विवचनेन विशिष्य उभयनिर्देशात्।''ममाग्ने वर्च:'' इत्यादौ अजहत्स्वार्थलक्षणया मम इत्यस्य अस्मदीयस्वामिन: इत्यर्थाश्रयणात् स्वार्थत्यागाभावात् युक्तमात्मनेपदश्रुत्या लिङ्गबोधनम्। इह द्विवचनस्य एकत्वे लक्षणाभ्युपगमे स्वार्थस्य द्वित्वस्य अत्यन्तबाधप्रसंगात् आत्मनेपदश्रुतेरेव द्विवचनं बाधकम्। अतश्च द्विवचनबलात् ऋत्विग्यजमानोभयगाम्येव फलम् आशास्यमिति सिद्धम्।

एवं च उत्सर्गत: यजमानगाम्येव फलम्। कर्मनिष्पत्त्यौपयिकत्वे श्रूयमाणे चेत् ऋत्विग्गतमपि फलमभ्युपगम्यते। यत्र तु अन्यथासिद्धद्विवचनादिना उभयो: फलं श्रुतं तत् तथैव अङ्गीक्रियते इति व्यवस्था जैमिनेरभिमता। नात्र कोऽपि पूर्वापरविरोध:।

Is Nyāya Realism or Idealism?

The Nyāya puts forward the thesis which predicates that 'existence' (*astitva*), 'knowability' ('*jñeyatva*') and 'nameability' (*vācyatva*), are co-extensive, meaning that whatever exists is also knowable and nameable. It would also follow that only what exists is knowable. It would also follow—but is it true?—that whatever is nameable exists. What about Pegasus?

The issue raised by Daya is: if existence and knowability are universally co-present, i.e. if whatever exists must be knowable then the attribution of realism to the Nyāya is seriously compromised. There are many other side issues, e.g. with regard to the so-called epistemic entities, *jñānīyapadārthas* such as *viṣayatā*. There is no reason why a realistic ontology shall not admit entities that are either purely mental or 'hybrid'.

Let me focus on the *vyāpti* between existence and knowability. Note that for the Nyāya, the *vyāpti* is reversible; whatever is knowable exists. The latter thesis requires that the object of false cognition is also a real entity, that there is no false, non-existent, object. In the thesis 'whatever exists is knowable', 'knowledge' or *jñāna* must be first taken in the broad sense to include *a-pramā*, but then one can add, legitimately I think, that whatever is an object of *a-pramā* is also a possible object of *pramā*, so that everything that exists (the addition of the phrase 'that exists' is redundant, for there are, in the Nyāya view, no non-existent things) is a possible object of *pramā*.

Another point to note is that the *vyāpti* obtains, not between existence and being-an-object-of-knowledge, *jñānaviṣayatva*, but rather between existence and knowability. But there is an asymmetry in this thesis, which is hardly noticed. 'Knowability' is a modalized concept, 'existence' is not. It is not being said that whatever is capable of existing, is capable of being known. What is being said is that whatever exists is so capable. There is, as a matter of fact, no equivalent modalized concept with regard to 'existence' in the Nyāya system.

The idealist thesis '*esse est percipsii*' asserts the *identity* between 'existing' and 'being perceived'. The Nyāya thesis asserts, not identity, but *invariable co-occurrence* of the two properties: such invariable co-occurrence requires that the two properties be different. However, granted that what we have is a universal coexistence of the two properties, one still has to look closer into the nature of this universality. I will, in this context, draw attention to only two aspects of the thesis. First, *vyāpti*, on the Nyāya view, is an extensional relation. In the celebrated case of smoke and fire, the *vyāpti* is not to be understood intensionally as a necessary relation, but rather extensionally as a relation of mere co-presence. To say that there is *vyāpti* between S(smoke) and F(fire) is *not* to say 'It is impossible that there is a locus

of S, in which F is absent', but rather to say 'It is not the case that F is absent in a locus of S'. When the Nyāya holds that whatever exists is capable of being known, what it means to assert is not a logically necessary relation, but a factual relation of co-presence. Whatever exists is knowable, but *not necessarily so.*

Secondly, what is asserted in saying 'whatever exists is knowable' is this: if the causal conditions for knowing an object exist, then it will be known, i.e. it will be the object of appropriate cognitive state which, however, *need not be perceptual.* As a matter of fact, in many cases it may be inferential. Berkeley spoke of 'being perceived'. Idealism needs this in order to reduce the putative external object to an idea in the mind. That idea must be a mental picture and that is so in the case of perceptual cognition. Nyāya speaks of *jñeyatva*, which does not mean 'capable of being perceived'.

Note that for Nyāya, cognition, even *pramā*, is an occurrence *caused by* various causal conditions, amongst which *its* object is one. The cognition of O is produced, amongst others, by O, then O must be independent of that cognition. But—it may be asked—does not a cognition have a cause even in the Yogācāra Buddhist theory which countenances no mind-independent external object? Amongst the four-fold causes of a cognitive event, on the Yogācāra theory, one is the *ālambana-pratyaya*—each of the four being a *pratyaya:* this is an attempt to incorporate the entire causal story into an idealistic framework.

To see, then, the basis of Nyāya realism, one needs to consider not only the causal story, but also the nature of a cognition as the Nyāya understands it. As regards the latter, the decisive point is that on the Nyāya theory, a cognition is *nirākāra*, 'form'-less. I need not go into the arguments in support of this thesis, but let us focus on its consequences: if a cognition is *nirākāra*, then any *ākāra* or form which appears in cognition must fall outside it, and cannot be *in* it (as its immanent content or structure). Add to this the further thesis that a cognition is not self-revealing: what follows, as a consequence, is that what, in the first instance, is presented could not be a form of the cognition but only a form which is other than the cognition, namely the object. These two theses combined constitute the most forceful argument for realism. There are other arguments—e.g. the one deriving from the theory *Pramāṇa samplava*—which I will not expound on this occasion.

The thesis then that everything is a possible object of consciousness, does not lead to a presumption against realism—not as long as by 'everything' is meant all that exists, *and* as long as 'existence' is construed as a real predicate (which the Yogācāra denies).

The Advaita Vedānta, especially the Vivaraṇa school advances an interesting thesis which resembles the Nyāya thesis, and it would be instructive to compare them. On the Vivaraṇa school view, all things

are objects of the witness-consciousness either as known or as unknown ('*sarvam vastu jñātatayā ajñātatayā vā sākṣicaitanyasya viṣaya eva*'). This thesis makes room for things that I do not know of: they are still objects of consciousness but as yet unknown. Those which are objects of consciousness as known, i.e. as manifested by an *antahakaraṇa pramāvṛti*, logically have *had* unknown existence. Thus a realism is preserved, but brought under an overarching idealism. The Nyāya does not have these resources and its realism is not provisional but final.

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Nyāya Is Realist Par Excellence

That Professor Daya Krishna, a distinguished philosopher, who had been instrumental in establishing effective academic communication between Nyāya scholars and modern Indian philosophers should seriously ask the question, 'Is Nyāya Realist or Idealist'?[1] is rather puzzling. No indigenously-trained student of Nyāya would ever entertain the slightest doubt about the realistic character of Nyāya. Certain confusions seem to have engendered this doubt in Daya Krishna's mind. To sustain the doubt a few questions also have been set forth by Daya Krishna. We take up these questions first for discussion.

The first question asks whether in the Nyāya view anything that is real is also 'knowable' and 'nameable'? The answer to the question is an unqualified 'yes'. The Sanskrit terms standing respectively for the real, the knowable and the nameable (more precisely, 'the denotable'), viz, '*sat*', '*prameya*' and '*abhidhēya*' are supposed to have identical denotations, namely 'everything in the universe'. The connotations of these words however differ from each other.

The second question following from the first is, 'what exactly is meant by the terms 'knowable' and 'nameable' to which the answer is as follows:

The knowable or '*preeya*' in Sanskrit is that which can be the object of a true cognition. Even if an object is not already known the possibility of its being known is always there. An unknown object may not be known in its particularity yet as an object belonging to any one of the seven established categories of reals, it can certainly be known. That there are and can be only seven categories or types of reals is determined by means of valid arguments.

The 'nameable' can be defined as 'that which can be the denotend of a word'. If a thing is knowable even as a thing of a certain type, say as a substance or a quality, etc., the word for the substance or the quality, etc. can denote the thing.

The third question asks if knowability and nameability can exclude

each other partially? The answer to this question is an emphatic 'No.' Every knowable is a nameable and every nameable is a knowable. The reason for this equivalence is this. To know a thing is to have a determinate cognition of it as 'such and such'. The knower on the basis of such a determinate cognition of the thing can refer to it by using the term denoting it. If the conventional denotative term is not known to the knower of the thing some other term can be used for it by him or her. It is however not necessary that there should be a user of such a term or terms. It is enough that there are such terms having the capacity to denote the things known.

The fourth question is about the unreal. It asks whether the unreal is unknowable and unnameable. Yes, the unreal is neither real nor even knowable or nameable. As the great Nyāya philosopher Udayana says in his *Ātmatattvaviveka*, 'when some person of perverted intellect discourses about the unreal (hare's horn, barren women's son, etc.) a sober, knowledgeable person cannot but remain silent.'

The fifth question, 'Are the above terms symmetrical?' is materially the same as the third question and so it does not call for a separate reply.

The sixth question is partly asnwered by the answer to the first question. As stated in the answer, the denotations of the three terms mentioned are exactly the same but their connotations are quite different from each other. Knowability is one kind of property, nameability and reality are quite other kinds of properties and these respectively determine the denotedness pertaining to the terms and characterize everything in the world denoted by them. Daya Krishna refers here to 'the semantic imports' of the terms. Are there non-semantic imports too from which Daya Krishna wants to distinguish imports that are (in his view) only semantic? It is not clear what is meant by this expression.

In the second part of the question it is asked if the above terms are 'synonymous although their pragmatic associations and visual or auditory identities are different?'. The answer to the first part of the question is that in the usual sense of the word 'synonymous' the terms are synonymous (with identical denotation but differing connotations). In the second part of the question it is first asked if the pragmatic associations of the words are different. What does Daya Krishna mean by the pragmatic associations of words? Does he mean 'suggestions of some kinds of action that the utterance of a word in a certain context may make'? For example, if a person utters the word 'door' pointing to a door in the presence of his hearer then the word may be supposed to suggest the word 'shut' or 'open' and through it the activity of shutting or opening the door. But none of these suggestible actions enter the meaning of the word 'door'. All schools of Indian philosophy share the same view on this point. Only the aestheticians hold the view that even suggested entitles can form part of the meaning of a word, but they too do not regard actions alone as the suggested meanings. Nyāya simply discards such a view. What made Daya

Krishna suspect such a thing about Nyāya is beyond comprehension.

But more incomprehensible is the suggested association of the above terms with 'visual and auditory identities'. What are these identities and how can the above terms be supposed to be associated with the identities? Perhaps Daya Krishna is suggesting here that all visual objects are meant by one or more of these terms and all auditory objects are meant by the other term or terms. But such a classification of objects cannot be comprehensive. Supersensible and even some sensible objects would be excluded from this classification. It is extremely surprising how terms recognized by all Indian philosophers to be universal in their denotations and expressly stated to be so by Nyāya are suspected to be of such limited denotation by Daya Krishna.

The next question is an important one and deserves some serious thought. It is asked that if nameability is a universal property residing in every object—perceptual and non-perceptual, then the qualification '*avyapadeśya*' meaning 'that which cannot be named' introduced into the definition of perception in the Nyāya aphorism would be rendered inconsistent. It should be particularly noted here that in the said aphorism we are concerned with the definition of perceptual cognition and not the perceptual object. The above-mentioned qualification is introduced into the definition in order to specify the form under which the perceived object appears in the perceptual cognition. There is the view of the philosophy of grammar expressed in the following verse of Bhartṛhari, the author of *Vākyapadīya*

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके
    यः शब्दानुगमादृते।
अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं
    सर्वं शब्देन सर्वदा॥

which says that 'there is no cognition whatever which does not have the word as its (essential) constituent because every cognition is always determined by words.' According to this grammatical view, the determinate perception of a thing must apprehend its object as the bearer of the name by which it is named. The aphorism of Gotama refutes this view by using the above-mentioned qualification to qualify the perceptual object. (Perceptual cognition does not apprehend the name of the object perceived as its identifier or determinant.) The percipient while perceiving the object may recollect its name but the recollected name does not become the object of perception.

From this clarification, it would be obvious that the nameability of all things is not in the least affected by the exclusion of the name from the perceptual cognition. A thing may be endowed by a large number of properties but this does not entail that all these properties or a particular one of these properties should be invariably perceived when the thing is

perceived. A man is a rational animal as also a laughing animal. But to perceive or know a certain man is not to perceive or know him as both a rational and a laughing animal.

To the eighth question which asks whether '*avyapadeśya*' is the same as *nirvikalpaka* the answer is an emphatic 'No!' Words aren't involved in either determinate or indeterminate perception according to Nyāya. But the two kinds of perception differ radically from each other. Whether to call or not to call the *Nirvikalpaka* perception as 'knowledge' is a question of terminology. If knowledge is defined as determinate and true cognition then *nirvikalpaka* does not qualify to be called knowledge as it is neither determinate nor true. But if it is not true it is not false either. It is neither true nor false simply because it is a purely referential or discrete cognition of the individual, its genus and the relation joining them. It is a non-judgemental cognition.

In the ninth question it is asked, 'What is '*Buddyapekśa*? is and "If certain qualities are *Buddhyapekśa*" does this not affect their status as objects independent of knowing?' To answer these questions it is necessary to clarify the precise meaning of the above Sanskrit word. The correct meaning of the word is 'dependent upon cognition for its genesis as any effect depends upon its cause for its genesis'. In Nyāya's view numbers other than unity are the products of the enumerative cognition. If enumeration is not made numbers like two, three, etc., it cannot come into being. The origination of all numbers above unity is caused by enumerative cognitions. In Nyāya's view, the effect is not the same as the cause despite its dependence upon the cause.

Daya Krishna could have strengthened his case by referring to a different kind of dependence of things upon cognition. It is the dependence of the object of cognition upon the cognition. If the cognition is not there, there is no object of cognition. For example, if I perceive a tree then the tree as the object of my perception will be there. But if I do not perceive the tree it will not cease to be a tree although it will not be a perceptual object during the absence of the perception. This clarification takes care even of the last question posed by Daya Krishna.

Now, we turn to the earlier part of Daya Krishna's critique of Nyāya realism. Referring to a reformulation of the Berkeleyan principle 'Esse est percipi' in terms of the knowability of real, Daya Krishna says '. . . a reformulation of Berkeley's position in terms of the 'perceivable'; . . . would bring it closer to the Nyāya formulation'. A serious student of Nyāya would be shocked to read such a statement.

In the Nyāya view things are sometimes known and sometimes not; when they are not known they are *knowable* because the possibility of their being known is not ruled out. Such is not the case with things in Berkeley's view. According to it, it is not enough for the reality of a thing that there should be a possibility of its being known. According to Berkeley the essence of things consists in their being actually known.

Thus, things are totally dependent upon knowing for being real. But for Nyāya *knownness* is an adventitious property of things.

Proceeding further in his comparison of Nyāya's with Berkleyan and Lockeyan thinking on knowing and knowability Daya Krishna says that '. . . the issue of the 'independence' of the object of 'knowing' from the 'act of knowing' does not seem to have been focally raised in the (Nyāya) tradition as it was by Locke in the context of 'secondary qualities'.

This is another very shocking statement in Daya Krishna's small note. Even a beginner in Nyāya would know that the object of knowledge is independent of knowledge so far as its being is concerned, simply because an object is not known always. Even things like qualities which are dependent upon substances which are their substrates throughout their existence are not supposed to be dependent upon the latter for their *being*.

The passage coming next to the above is simply mind-boggling. There Daya Krishna says that 'even the essential "knowability of reality"' in the Nyāya context implies that the structure of knowing and the structure of 'reality be isomorphic in the sense that the *"sattā"* must be of the nature of *dravya* which is related to *guṇa* and *karma* by *samavaya*.' The 'real thus has to be "rational" . . .' It has already been explained that things are always knowable but knownness does not constitute their very nature. So, there is no isomorphism between knowing and the structure or nature of reality. One may perhaps say that there is isomorphism (if the use of such a diffuse term in the Nyāya context be permitted) between 'knowability' and the 'nature of reality'. But, even granting per impossible the kind of isomorphism. Daya Krishna speaks of, how can he draw the conclusion that he does from the said isomorphism?, Is '*sattā*' the same as *dravya* in Nyāya? If it is so what are *gunas* and *karmas*? Are they other than *sattā*? If all these are *sattā* and not '*sat*' what of the four remaining categories? And how all of a sudden the 'rational' creeps in here to determine the nature of *sattā* which is the same as *dravya* for Daya Krishna.

In the end we would like to urge that while discussing the views of Indian philosophy and specially those of Nyāya one has to be very careful in the use of words—both technical and non-technical. Nyāya lays the greatest stress on this in the interest of arriving at correct conclusions. It is very regrettable that Daya Krishna should take so much liberty with technical words like *sattā, buddhyapeksa,* etc. and try to base his arbitrary version of certain Nyāya views on his interpretation of the words.

A few words are called for by way of providing broad definitions of different possible versions of idealism so as to make it clear that Nyāya does not fall under any of the definitions. There is first the Buddhist idealism, according to which consciousness, which is a purely subjective entity, projects itself as objects in the world and assumes different objective forms (or objects are no other than different forms of consciousness). In the idealism of *Advaita* there is no reality outside

consciousness. Unlike the Buddhist view this view does not admit consciousness to be endowed with objective forms. Berkleyan idealism regards the being or the essence of reality to consist in its objectivity or its objective relation to consciousness (or idea). This means that the real is essentially related to consciousness. Then there is Kantian idealism according to which the (empirical) real is a composite of certain ideal forms or categories and non-ideal matter. Hegelian idealism maintains that the real is rational which means that the real is constituted by reason itself in the form of concepts. Nyāya's view of the object does not accord with any of these versions of idealism. When things are cognized they are endowed with the cognitive relation and become cognitive objects. But even as cognitive objects things do not forfeit their cognition-independent nature. In the absence of this relation things remain unknown. But even in the condition of their unknowness the possibility of their being known by a subsequent episode of cognition cannot be ruled out. There is nothing intrinsically obstructive of this possibility. This is why knowability, not knownness is regarded by Nyāya as a universal property of things. If knownness were regarded as such a property then Daya Krishna would have had some ground to foist idealism on Nyāya.

It may here be asked, 'what can it be in things that makes them knowable except some kind of affinity they may have to knowledge or consciousness?' The answer to the question is that no special property (or relation to consciousness) in a thing need be assumed which may make it knowable. If mere relation of a thing to consciousness is made into a ground to treat it as dependent upon consciousness then on the same ground consciousness too can be treated as dependent upon things. Consciousness cannot be the consciousness of a thing unless it is supposed to depend upon it. But such a dependence is really the dependence of a relational entity upon the relation that gives rise to it.

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The Concept of *Āhārya-jñāna:* Some Queries

I have been recently looking into some works by Viśveśvara Pāṇḍeya, a thinker of the earlier part of the eighteenth century. Lively and innovative, Viśveśvara has written on a number of subjects. In *vyākaraṇa*, he composed a new commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyayī* of Pāṇini, taking especial note of philosophical issues. The first three chapters of this work have been published. Viśveśvara was also concerned with philosophy more directly and has two works on Nyāya or rather Navya-nyāya: the *Tarka-kutūhala*[*] and *Dīdhiti-prakāśa*; these works, so far as I know, are unpublished.

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[*] The *Tarka-kutūhala* has been published.

What interests me here is a work of Viśveśvara on *alaṅkāra*, the *Alaṅkāra-kaustubham.* It seems to be one of the first works of its kind to make detailed and extensive use of the full force of Navya-nyāya methods and terminology in the area of poetics. It defines different *alaṅkāras*, figures of poetic speech, with Navya-nyāya precision, carefully distinguishing one *alaṅkāra* from another through definition and analysis, raising questions, presenting counter-examples of *avyāptis* (examples which the definition should include but does not), and *ativyāptis* (examples that should lie outside the definition but do not) and taking up arguments seeking to demolish the definition presented. This is a procedure which, at its best, in seeking to demarcate boundaries with articulate finesse, imparts, interestingly, a richness of conceptual detail and nuance to the area that lies *within* a boundary.

Using Navya-nyāya logic and language, one cannot avoid bringing in Navya-nyāya ontology and epistemology—or so it seems to me. Viśveśvara, indeed, *uses* them deliberately for his own purposes, as my query, I hope, will show.

A distinction—which Viśveśvara makes at length and with great deliberation—is made between two major *alaṅkāras, upamā* ('simile', which depends on '*sādṛśya*' or 'similarity' between two disparate things) and *rūpaka* ('metaphor', which leans on *abheda* or 'identity'). In Viśveśvara, as in all good Ālaṅkārikas, one is aware of the distinction at two different levels: the intuitive, or rather the aesthetic, and the structural or the linguistic, that is, the different words and expressions through which the two *alaṅkāras* are articulated. Viśveśvara, like other Ālaṅkārikas seeks meaningfully to combine the two levels in his exposition. The main focus is on capturing the unique 'feel', the individual evocative force of an *alaṅkāra*—its *vicchitti-viśeṣa* in Viśveśvara's own words—as different from others. In doing so, Viśveśvara, with his love of Navya-nyāya, devotes great attention to the logical analysis of the language used to express the two *alaṅkāras.* He grants, however, that language in poetry has an evocative power or *vyañjanā*, not amenable to a straight-forward structural analysis, and that, structurally or grammatically, the same language that expresses a simile is also used to express an inane, quite *vicchitti*-less, similarity. The judgement of the *sahṛdaya*, therefore, must be kept in mind. Conceptual finesse lies in the skill with which this judgement itself can be articulated, especially in distinguishing *alaṅkāras* like *upamā* and *rūpaka* which, though distinct, are yet also felt to be close to each other (Viśveśvara describes 63 distinct *alaṅkāras*). The attempt, to take an example from another field, is like discriminating discursively between different *rāgas*, close in structure to each other.

What I have tried, briefly, to sketch above is to introduce the context of my queries and what Viśveśvara is intent upon, for it is my feeling that few, if any, of my readers even among those who are Naiyāyikas, would have heard of this evidently important thinker, who is better known to

Ālaṅkārikas. I do not wish to expound Viśveśvara's thought here which, obviously, needs a lengthier and fuller deliberation.

Let me come now to my queries. They concern a concept used by Viśveśvara in distinguishing *rūpaka* from *upamā*. The concept of *āharya-jñāna*. According to Ālaṅkārikas, what distinguishes *rūpaka* (expressed in the standard example as, *mukhaṁ candraḥ*—'face-moon') from *upamā* (expressed as *candra iva mukhaṁ*—'moon-like face') is an overpowering sense of *abheda* (non-difference or identity). Both *upamā* and *rūpaka*, it is argued, share a sense of *sādṛśya*, similarity, between two disparate things, but in *rūpaka* this *sādṛśya* is pushed to the background and overpowered by *abheda*, the feeling that the two things are one and not separate, and this is what distinguishes *rūpaka* from *upamā*. 'Everyone agrees', Viśveśvara remarks at the end of his discussion of *rūpaka*, 'that the body of the *rūpaka* is formed through a *sādṛśya* (similarity) between two distinct things and is, thus, based on a sense of *bheda* (difference)—*bhedagarbhasādṛśyasya rūpakaśarīratvena sarvasammatatvād...*'. However, its soul, which marks it as *rūpaka* and distinct from *upamā*, lies in *abheda*. Viśveśvara expresses this in his formal 'definition' of *rūpaka*, embodied in a *kārikā*, which initiates his discussion of *rūpaka*. His 'definition' is as follows: '*rūpaka* is the *alaṅkāra* where there is *abheda* (non-difference) between that to which something is compared (this is the *upameya*; the *mukha* in our example), and the thing it is compared to (the *upamāna*; *candra* in our example)—*tadrūpakaṁ tvabhedaḥ syādupamānopameyayoryatra*'. (see pp. 203–14 of the *Alaṅkāra-kaustubham*, with Viśveśvara's *Kārikās, Vṛtti and Vyākhya*, reprinted by Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi, 1987).

The peculiar feel or *bodha* of *abheda*, lying in a tension between similarity and identity, that marks a metaphor, had posed a kind of theoretical challenge to interested thinkers and many Ālaṅkārikas had tried to characterize the *bodha* through different conceptual moves. Viśveśvara summarises and discusses the more 'modern' of these moves which had by his time already begun to travel the pathways of Navya-nyāya.

The Naiyāyikas (meaning the Navya-naiyāyikas), he says, make use of the concept of *āhārya-jñāna* in this context. *Āhārya-jñāna* may be roughly translated as 'make-belief knowledge'. The dress an actor assumes in becoming someone he is not, is known as *āhārya*; though I am not sure if this association—obvious to me—is also present in the Naiyāyika's mind in using the word '*āhārya*'. It does not seem so.

The Naiyāyika argues: when we utter a sentence such as, *mukhaṁ candraḥ*, identifying the *mukha* with *candra*, there is a *bādha* or rather the knowledge of a *bādha*, a *bādha-jñāna*, an obstructive knowledge, which prevents the two words to be conjoined into a sentence. In *mukhaṁ candraḥ* (very roughly, just to present the words, 'face-moon'), the togetherness of *mukha* and *candra* has a grammatical intent of producing a sense of *abheda* or identity between *mukha* and *candra*. But we know that the two are distinct things and cannot be identical. This *bādha-jñāna* comes in the

way of even letting *mukhaṁ candraḥ* become a meaningful sentence. How, then, do we actually take the expression as a *rūpaka*, despite the *bādha-jñāna*? It is here that *āhārya-jñāna* comes into play. It overrides the *bādha-jñāna*. *Āhārya-jñāna* functions through my *icchā*. When I have an *āhārya-jñāna*, I willingly, out of my own *icchā*, overcome *bādha-jñāna* and allow a knowledge to take place which would not have otherwise taken place. The standard example given here is, *vahninā siñcati*—'wets with fire'—an instance where *bādha-jñāna*, for the Naiyāyika, totally obstructs sense, since we know that fire cannot wet. Here, too, Viśveśvara says, *āhārya-jñāna* can, according to certain Naiyāyikas, function, allowing *vahninā siñcati* to make sense. This for the Naiyāyika is a really extreme example. Viśveśvara does not, however, specify, what kind of sense *vahninā siñcati* now makes. Is it a figure of speech? He does not say so. From what he says, it appears that *āhārya-jñāna* is granted the force of rendering the (for the Naiyāyika) nonsensical jumble of words that is *vahninā siñcati* into an ordinary meaningful sentence.

In Nyāya thinking it is necessary that a *yogyatā*, a 'fittingness' be there for two words to be related in a certain way in verbal knowledge, and *yogyatā* depends not upon grammar but upon the nature of the things being related. *Vahninā siñcati* lacks *yogyatā*, since fire cannot be instrumentally related to the act of wetting, and hence is absurd; it cannot give rise to any knowledge at all. Nyāya, I should think, can yet allow the possibility of sense here through more than one move, *lakṣaṇā* for example. The Ālaṅkārikas among the *Naiyāyikas* had chosen to bring in the concept of *āhārya-jñāna*. *Āhārya* works through my desire to have the knowledge. I willingly grant *yogyatā* (and so it is called *āhārya-yogyatā*) where it is not otherwise there (allowing fire, in our example, an instrumentality it does not have, and conjoining *mukhaṁ* with *candraḥ* with a relation of *abheda*).

This is an interesting move, but to my mind it gives rise to a number of queries.

(1) It appears to me that the concept of *āhārya-jñāna* itself has no conceptual *yogyatā* (if one might use such a term) to be allowed a place in the Nyāya scheme of things. Nyāya has a kind of essentialism which insists that *yogyatā* is given in the very nature of things and their relations; expressions which flout it cannot, in principle, give rise to *śābdabodha* or verbal knowledge. How, I wonder, can the concept of *āhārya-jñāna*, then, be at all accommodated in Nyāya? Also, there is the question of the relation between *icchā* and *jñāna*, a question interesting in itself; but taking the question in regard to Nyāya, I cannot see how *icchā* can be instrumental in *producing* knowledge, as it is in *āhārya-jñāna*? One can imagine 'desire for knowledge' (*jñāneccha*) in Nyāya but how can one think of 'knowledge produced through desire' (*icchā-janya-jñāna*)? *Lakṣaṇā*, Nyāya allows, and *lakṣaṇā* can get rid of *bādha*. But *lakṣaṇā* has an associative logic of its own and functions as a means for removing quirks in language, arising out of usage. It is not *icchā*-produced, and thus

not incongruous in Nyāya. But *lakṣaṇā*, some thought, might straighten out a wayward sentence, translating it into a 'correct' one. It cannot fully explain metaphor.

Viśveśvara reproduces a line of argument concerning the inadequacy of *lakṣaṇā* for *rūpaka*. The argument was that all *lakṣaṇā* can do in a case of metaphor such as *mukhaṁ candraḥ* is to project similarity through association (*mukha* is similar to *candra* for it shares the attributes of beauty, radiance, pleasingness and the like which *candra* has), and thus removing the *bādha* produced by the awareness that *mukha* is not *candra*, conjoin *mukhaṁ* and *candraḥ* into a sentence. But then what we will have is a simile and not a metaphor. Because for metaphor a sense of *abheda* is essential, and it is for this reason that it becomes necessary to bring in *āhārya-jñāna*.

Another thing I remember in this context is that during the *saṁvāda*, which was later recorded in the book *Saṁvāda: A Dialogue Between Two Philosophical Traditions* (ICPR and Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, 1991), Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharyya had raised the question: how does the Naiyāyika understand the meaning of the sentence, *śabdo nityaḥ*—'sound is eternal'—since for him the sentence is as meaningless as *vahninā siñcati?* And if the Naiyāyika does not understand the sentence, how does he refute it (*Saṁvāda*, p. 151, etc.)? In his interesting answer Badrinath Shukla had used some intriguing concepts to explain the Naiyāyika's comprehension of such sentences, but not the concept of *āharya-jñāna*. The question is, could the concept have been used?

(2) This brings me to another puzzle. *Āhārya-jñāna*, it appears, is believed by Naiyāyikas to be possible only in *pratyakṣa*, 'direct perception'. (This may have been why Badrinathji did not use it). But such a notion seems even more incongruous in the Nyāya scheme than the notion of *āhārya-jñāna* itself. Illusions are another matter; they are not the wilful seeing of one thing as quite another. And illusion disappears when the thing is perceived for what it is. *Āhārya-jñāna*, on the contrary, comes into operation upon seeing things as they are and then moving into a world of imagination. The question, however, is how can *pratyakṣa* in Nyāya accommodate *āhārya?*

It seems, though, from what I have understood from the *Nyāyakośa* of Bhīmācārya Jhalkīkar (see under *āhārya*) that *āhārya* could not only mean a kind of willing perception but it could also be somewhat similar to *bhrama* or illusion. It was seeing something with an attribute the 'opposite', so to say, of what it actually had (*svavirodhi-dharma-dharmitāvācchedaṁ svaprakāraṁ jñānam*). For example, seeing a mountain with fire as without fire. Such 'seeing', or such *āhārya-jñāna*, has not been characterized by Jhalkīkar as a 'willing knowledge', as Viśveśvara clearly characterizes the *āhārya* that he speaks of (*'satyapy ukta bādhajñāne mukhatvāvacchinnaviśeṣyatāka abhedasaṁsargakā candratvāvacchinna prakāraka bodho jāyatāmiti yogyatājñānaṁ sambhavatyeva, icchadhīnajñāne bādhabuddherapratibandhakatvāt'*, op. cit., *Vyākhyā*, p. 207, where the *Vṛtti*, explained in the *Vyākhyā* here, takes up *āhārya-jñāna*, calling it a Naiyāyika's

concept). Jhalkīkar notes other examples of similar *bhrama*-like *āhāryas* which appear to be different kinds of the same species. These are not imbued with the spirit of a conceptual reaching out towards the world of imagination, which Viśveśvara's *āhārya* has, and, moreover, one cannot help wondering why they should not be included under *bhrama?* Why form a new category? The Ālaṅkārikas among the Naiyāyikas, who brought in *āhārya*, had, evidently, felt that they needed a concept which was distinct from *bhrama* if one were to properly comprehend metaphor. Still, one is bound to ask how the concept was made to fit into Nyāya, if at all. Or, how can a Naiyāyika do so within the system, even though it may not have been done earlier.

(3) Intriguingly, the *bhrama*-like *āhārya* and the *icchā* produced *āhārya* have both been made to share a strange property. They are both limited to *pratyakṣa*. But metaphors are expressed in language, and should be a species of *śābdabodha*, how, then, can an *āhārya* which is confined to *pratyakṣa* be meaningful in explaining them? One would think that *āhārya* belongs to the field of *parokṣa*. It is a concept meant to articulate fiction, and some Naiyāyikas, it appears—though not Viśveśvara—had extended it to *śābdabodha*. On what grounds, I do not know. In *pratyakṣa*, too, one can, I think, imagine instances of *āhārya-jñāna*. Theatre comes immediately to mind. Besides, there are games where one willingly assumes one thing to be another: a chair could be monster 'who' will eat you if you sit on it. . . . Such a thing is done even in explaining lay-outs: a glass on the table can become a house from which another glass, the house we want to reach, is shown to be lying at such a distance, in such a direction. And so on. But Naiyāyikas, even if they be Ālaṅkārikas, do not seem to have such examples in mind, so far as I know. They do not extend the scope of *āhārya* beyond metaphor into a realm of *āhārya* worlds in general. Is this merely accidental or is there something in the grain of Nyāya which goes against it?

(4) But can *āhārya* not be extended to 'virtual' worlds in general, even to theoretical models and theory-making? Can we, in fact, not talk of *āhārya* worlds of different kinds? Let us make some Nyāka-like argumentative moves and probe at possible *vyāptis* and *vyāvṛttis* in order to see how far we can extend the concept of *āhārya*. (Such moves may not be exactly Nyāya-like, where the usual move is the other way round: to intuitively assume a field and define it through *lakṣaṇa*, examining it for *avyāptis* and *ativyāptis*, and modifying it for a better fit, but they are, I think, quite in the same spirit.) Taking metaphor as the basic (*mūrdhanya*) example, the *vyāpti*, I feel, can be extended without difficulty to the world of fiction, theatre, games, and the like. But let us take a possible *vyāvṛtti*. Is the world of dream, for example, an *āhārya* world? The *vyāvṛtti* here lies in the fact that *icchā* does not play a 'voluntary' role in producing the *jñāna*, the awareness, of a dream. I say, 'voluntary role', purposely, because *icchā* can be argued to produce dream in a deep and latent sense,

icchā functioning as *vāsanā*, as some would put it. But even if we grant that *icchā* causes dream in some such sense, this, clearly, cannot be a function of *āhārya-jñāna*, because there is no *willing* suspension of *bādha* here. There is indeed no *bādha* even, which needs to be removed; *bādha* might arise later on waking up, but that is another matter. But what about day-dreaming? The world of day-dreaming is a willingly created world; it is a world of the fulfilment of *icchā* and we enter it through *icchā*, wifully pushing the real aside. Take the man in the famous story who found a jar (a philosopher's *ghaṭa*), and began weaving a wish-fulfilling dream: the jar, he imagined, will buy him a hen, its eggs will fetch money to buy more hens; he will become rich and marry a lovely wife; and when she disobeys him give her a lusty kick, like this. Here the story takes an ironical turn. The *ghaṭa* breaks into pieces with the sweep of his leg, and the dream comes to an unwished-for end; but the question is, can we consider such a dream as an instance of *āhārya-jñāna*? Or does it lie outside the area covered by the concept? Or, rather, does it really, as it might also seem, lie on the periphery of *āhārya*? How should one place it?

Let us take a different and a more serious instance, from truth rather than imagination. What about scientific hypotheses? Or even 'established' scientific theories. Are they not cases of *āhārya-jñāna*? In conceiving a hypothesis, I enter into a virtual world, a world of imagination, which though concerned with truth is not actually true. One might here argue that such a world is not really one of make-belief, and is conceived as possibly true; the *bādha* here, thus, is itself a virtual, or provisional *bādha*, and not an actual one. But then one would have to modify the *lakṣaṇa* or characterization of *āhārya-jñāna* we have set out with, and a good Naiyāyika will do this, if he feels that the objection is well-taken. (The question, of course, can arise that in comprehending metaphor, too, can we really speak of a *bādha*, or is it that the Naiyāyika feels so because he takes a certain sense-perceived world to be given and true? But let us not raise this question here). Yet, supposing we modify our *lakṣaṇa*, we can, may be, move to divide *bādha* itself into two distinct kinds, (1) actual and (2) virtual or possible. The problem, then would be to understand the concept of a possible or virtual *bādha*. Can such a *bādha* really be a *bādha*? But let us make a further move in what we had been saying earlier. A scientific hypothesis is just a step towards a scientific theory. But if the theory, according to a well-known principle, is to be considered essentially falsifiable, then is the *bādha* not built into the very fabric of the scientific conception of truth? Why should we not consider scientific knowledge *āhārya-jñāna*? A scientific theory, one might object, is plainly different from a metaphor. But why should the concept be limited to metaphor and not extended to scientific theories—or the world of theories in general—if this can be done without a proper and valid *bādha*? For if there is a *vyāvṛtti* here, it has to be shown. The concept of *abhyupagama* in Nyāya seems to me to come close to the making, or at least the consideration of

hypotheses, why should the knowledge of *abhyupagama* not be *āhārya-jñāna*? *Siddhānta* in Nyāya, however, seems to have been made immune to *āhārya*. But is it really so? For a non-Naiyāyika, for example.

But let me also try and take up what appear to me as some *avyāptis*, which the *lakṣaṇa* of *āhārya* as the knowledge of imaginary worlds should, ideally, include but does not. *Āhārya* assumes the privileged knowledge of a 'real' world, which creates a *bādha* when we wish to enter a world of imagination; and we must willingly suspend or override the *bādha* if we wish to do so. What about music then, the pure music of *rāgas*, or pure dance, *nṛtta*, or abstract painting or even pure design? These appear to be worlds created through imagination, yet can we speak of *āhārya-jñāna* here? If so where is the *bādha* projected by the knowledge of a real world? We just slip into these worlds of the imagination, without anything obstructing us. Perhaps we can speak of an *icchā* here, bu on what grounds can we speak of a *bādha*? And if there is no *bādha*, can we speak of the knowledge (which is a willing, absorbed awareness) of these worlds as *āhārya*? But why limit ourselves to the arts, granted generally to be realms of imagination. What about some realms of thought: mathematics and logic, for example. Can we not place them in the arena of the *āhārya*? But mathematics, it may be argued, is certainly different from music in the sense that mathematics can apply to reality. But what about those areas of mathematics which have no such application? Would they be *bādhita* and need *āhārya-jñāna* for us to be able to enter them? These pure worlds of the arts and of thought have each a sense of *yogyatā* or appropriateness of their own. Hence we can speak of *bādha within* them. Is this *bādha* in any sense analogous to the *bādha* arising in the Naiyāyika's *āhārya*? If so, can we suspend or override it through an analogous *āhārya*? It does not seem so, and so it would appear that *āhārya* functioning through an *icchā*-created *āhārya-yogyatā* is out of bounds here.

What I have said may have strayed and meandered, somewhat frivolously, perhaps, at places, but I feel it has not strayed away from the questioning and argumentative spirit of Navya-nyāya. I hope it will elicit response, making clarifications and perhaps even stringent or dismissive counter-arguments, that will help in making the concept more transparent. Hopefully, there may even be sympathetic responses, carrying the line of thought into more meaningful directions. I found the concept of *āhārya-jñāna* exciting. Hence this note.

Jaipur   MUKUND LATH

Book Reviews

Ramsey in his review of the *Tractatus,* which to this day remains one of the most reliable expositions and amongst the most penetrating criticisms of the work, described it as the 'most important work containing original ideas on a large range of topics, forming a coherent system'. According to Alberto Coffa '*Tractatus* may well be the most difficult philosophical book written in this century'. It is but natural that such a work has been widely noticed and written about. J.J. Thompson wrote in 1961, 'The literature on the *Tractatus* is starting to resemble the literature on the real meaning of the white whale.' And A.P. Rao in 1977, and again in 1985, asserted that 'Wittgenstein exegesis has turned into a capital-intensive and cost-ineffective large-scale industry in the Anglo-American world in which is engaged a large labour force'. Since then a lot more has been written on the *Tractatus.* Probably that is what Wittgenstein also wished. He had replied to the charge levelled by Broad that *Tractatus* was 'syncopated' by saying 'Every sentence in the *Tractatus* should be seen as the heading of a chapter, needing further exposition.'

The Tractarian scholarship has reached a stage where blatant errors like '*Tractatus* is a kind of commentary, on Whitehead, and Russell's *Principia Mathematica*'; and the misconceptions like, the book would be understood only by those who have had similar thoughts which imply that 'only a mystical communion with souls (that is a communion not demonstrable empirically or rationally) guarantees that the meaning of a phrase be understood by someone other than the person uttering it' can no longer be upheld. However, a close and sympathetic reading of *Tractatus* leads to some other difficulties. These difficulties arise from Wittgenstein's atomistic ontology and his assertion that value can enter the world, and therefore the world can have a moral dimension only through a relation to the willing subject. This view among others lead to the following dilemmas:

(1) Wittgenstein's atomistic ontology on the one hand forces him to reject any real connection between events in the world rendering it difficult to see how the will could effect the world at all. Yet, on the other hand he upholds that atomistic world devoid of any real connections should not only effect the world but also 'wax and wane as a whole'.

(2) Wittgenstein on the one hand says that the whole point of the

Tractatus was 'ethical' yet he fails to explain how a contingent of *Sachverhalten* (a term which has been translated by Ogden as 'atomic facts', and by Pears and Mcguiness as 'state of affairs'), each valueless in itself, allows for the presence of value? Given the situation how and where in the world can morality find a foothold?

To resolve these dilemmas we have to reconcile the ethical monism of the closing passages of the *Tractatus* with the ontological pluralism of its opening passages. To do so either the last one-third portion of the book is to be ignored or two-third of the portion in the beginning is to be rejected. The 'scientific philosophers' regard the closing one-third of the book as *obiter dicta* and ignore it. But doing so would be contrary to the intentions of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein explicitly expressed his intention in a letter to Ludwig von Ficker. Interest in *Tractatus* studies have been rekindled ever since this letter was brought to light. In the letter Wittgenstein wrote:

> The book's point is an ethical one. . . . My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have *not* written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the only *rigorous* way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just *gassing*, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it.

As a result of this A.J. Ayer had to admit that 'it has now become clear that, in one central respect, the outlook of the *Tractatus* was misunderstood by the members of the Vienna Circle and the young English philosophers, including myself, who were strongly influenced by it'. Some other scholars of *Tractatus* have asserted that 'there are two kinds of remarks in *Tractatus:* (1) those which I do not understand and the value of which I am, therefore, unable to evaluate; (2) those which though seem to be understandable give an indeterminate impression and therefore it is impossible to either accept or reject them'.

One of the reasons for this misunderstanding and puzzlement has now been traced to their failure to grasp the fact that Wittgenstein's primary philosophical concerns arose in the context of Schopenhauer's view of the world, and man's relation to it, even though he rejected much of the substance of Schopenhauer's work namely, his *World as Will and Representation.* Bryan Magee was probably the first to trace Wittgenstein's debt to Schopenhauer.

Brockhaus in *Pulling Up the Ladder* traces the cause of this misunderstanding and the source of this puzzlement of earlier Wittgenstein to the general feeling that 'finding out what point in Frege or Russell Wittgenstein is reacting to is half the battle won'. This feeling is misleading because the real issues dealt by Wittgenstein lie 'much

deeper' and the logico-mathematical import of Frege and Russell does not begin to exhaust the sources of problems which Wittgenstein takes on in the *Tractatus.* According to him this feeling stems from the failure to understand Wittgenstein's intimacy with a number of Schopenhauerian preoccupations as well as with what Wittgenstein perceived as inconsistencies in Schopenhauer's philosophy. He examines the debate regarding the putative neo-Kantian influences on Wittgenstein and shows that the debate illustrates 'a misunderstanding' of Kant which parallels the positivist's misreading of Wittgenstein. He concludes that 'there is no evidence of more than a casual reading of Kant on Wittgenstein's part'.

Brockhaus advocates the theory that a unifying philosophical elucidation of earlier Wittgenstein can be found if we see the *Tractatus* as 'an extremely purified version of Schopenhauer's voluntaristic monism cleansed of objectionable elements through interaction with Frege's robust logical realism and through modification of Hertz's views on the nature of scientific laws'. The book upholds the thesis that 'Wittgenstein holds in an extremely rarefied version the Schopenhauerian view that there is an irreducibly *human* world, although we must carefully limit the meaning of 'human' to exclude the psychological or biological. There are many such 'human worlds', each composed of two invisibly linked although wholly disparate components, one of the greatest possible generality (a generality so great that its assertion is impossible), the other of the greatest possible uniqueness (so unique that it too escapes language). The first is so general that it represents the bare *possibility* of a world, the latter so particular that its duplication is inconceivable. These two elements, i.e. logic and metaphysical ego respectively are the elements of what Wittgenstein terms 'my world'. To support his thesis Brockhaus explains Schopenhauer's system of the world as will and representation; examines the notion of metaphysical ego and its relation to value. Employing Wittgenstein's metaphor of 'my world' investigates Frege's realism and his rejection of psychologism; Hertz's conventionalistic philosophy of science; and analyses the relationship between the *Tractatus* and Russell's treatment of incomplete symbols and logical types.

The book surveys the skein of complex, vast and sometimes inconsistent literature on the *Tractatus* and shows that though some of the difficulties faced by scholars are real, serious, and absolutely central to understanding Wittgenstein's projects they are not fatal to the aims of the *Tractatus.* It examines Schopenhauer's neo-Kantianism, his views on universal voluntarism, nature of science, art and morality, and concludes that Wittgenstein rejects any appeal to transcendental principles in logic because such appeals in Wittgenstein's opinion amount to regression to psychologism. Though he discards Schopenhauer's approach to these themes, he retains very fundamental Schopenhauerian attitudes concerning rejection of other worldliness, his emphasis on the unity of

ethics and art; his attitude concerning analysis of suicide as pointless and therefore a 'primal sin'; and a certain pessimistic attitude towards science. These attitudes form the bedrock upon which the edifice of Wittgenstein's early philosophy is built. We do find striking parallels to these attitudes in the *Tractatus.*

After fully explaining the development of Schopenhauer's Voluntaristic Transcendental Idealism which was thought by Wittgenstein to be 'fundamentally right, if only a few adjustments and clarifications were made' in it, Brockhaus examines Frege's logical realism and the purifying effect it had on what Wittgenstein thought to be the inconsistencies and confusions prevalent in Schopenhauer's picture of the world. In the process he develops a realistic critique of psychologism of Mill and Boole in the main and Husserl and Sigwart in the passing. This discussion of realism and psychologism is central to the understanding of *Tractatus* for two reasons. One, in the last twenty years or so the extent of Wittgenstein's anti-psychologism and the range of things he calls 'merely psychological' has not been fully appreciated, and therefore, is a source of confusion. Two, the philosophers of the Vienna Circle were motivated by an empiricist epistemology. One of the implications of Wittgenstein's realistic critique of psychologism is that it shows that empiricist epistemology was quite foreign to his thought. It also demonstrates that for Wittgenstein any psychological intrusion into logic is an anathema.

The realistic account of meaning and truth gives birth to the problems concerning existence and Being. In a rather long and polyglot chapter titled 'Analysis and Denoting' Brockhaus examines the internal workings of both language and the world. He gives a detailed and lucid account of Russell's Theory of Descriptions, his Theory of Incomplete Symbols, and their implications to show how Russell evolves a procedure for eliminating the 'puzzles'. Through this discussion he convincingly shows that the problem of negative existentials is 'intimately connected with the traditional metaphysical thesis that contingent existents must be based on or supported by a realm of entities which are *not* contingent'. This thesis forms the root of Tractarian notion that non-contingent existence cannot be *composite.* The world on this account resolves into *Sachverhalte,* and the language into elementary propositions. This gives rise to the problem of the relationship between language and the world. This problem gives rise to the following questions: How does a given elementary proposition mean a given *Sachverhalte?* What is the relationship between names and objects? How is it possible for a proposition to represent the world? How is it possible that a proposition has a relation to a possible fragment of the world such that the proposition *means* that fragment? How, for that matter, is it possible for a proposition to be true or false? As is well known, Wittgenstein's answer to these questions is embedded in his 'picture theory of proposition'. Brockhaus concludes that picture theory's pre-requisites are: (1) a proposition with *any sense that we desire,*

(2) the proposition must have a *perfectly determinate sense* without any vagueness. This conclusion leads him to the most crucial and central theme for understanding Wittgenstein, namely that *intention* is the fundamental link between symbol and the symbolized. More particularly, one can say that in the *Tractatus* 'Naming is as it were an act of "*pure intending*". This intending being a sort of willing, it requires a *willing subject*: the knowing subject . . . cannot perform this vital act.' This is a crucial move because it shows that Schopenhauerian 'world as will' can find foothold in the impersonal realistic ontology of the *Tractatus.*

In 'The Picture Theory of Propositions' is embedded the distinction between saying and showing. Wittgenstein asserted that every meaningful proposition or a set of propositions, at least that of elementary propositions with a sense, shows something and says something. Logical propositions though they say nothing, show the framework of the world. Brockhaus through a somewhat otiose, though interesting, discussion of Russell's 'Theory of Types' highlights the semantic basis of the show/say distinction. This distinction provides the key to understanding the superfluity of the 'Theory of Types' because what the 'Theory of Types' attempts to say can be shown only by a correct symbolism. The distinction is also crucial to realizing the inexpressibility of ethical truths because what one wants to say about ethics can be shown only by contemplating the world *sub specie aeternitatis.* The upshot of this discussion is that there can be no first meta language, and that all modal propositions are dumped in the category of pseudo-propositions. Another important conclusion of the discussion of Wittgenstein's treatment of logical propositions is that there is no real connection between *Sachverhalte,* i.e. atomic facts, or states of affairs. This conclusion becomes particularly important when we see Wittgenstein's concern about ethics and religion. In his discussion of ethics and religion he strongly asserts that real moral preaching is not just ineffective but impossible.

In order to rebut scholars of *Tractatus* like Anscombe who claim that Wittgenstein never thought much of Schopenhauer's world as will and to consolidate his own position, namely that Wittgenstein thought Schopenhauer to be 'fundamentally right' though he rejected two of his claims, viz. the nature of the scientific laws and the nature of the self, Brockhaus discusses Wittgenstein's philosophy of science. As far as Wittgenstein's philosophy of science is concerned, Brockhaus traces it to Hertz's reactions to Mach's and Schopenhauer's models of science. Wittgenstein after examining Schopenhauer's model of science and comparing and contrasting it with Mach's notion of complete explanation, concludes that the 'Schopenhauerian attempt to see the universal applicability of scientific laws as a reflection of underlying metaphysical reality of the world is misguided'. On the contrary he upholds, (1) that the world of science alone is not a reflection of something deeper or higher, it *shows* as much as can be shown by the totality of true propositions;

(2) that the theories which differ only conventionally will give us radically differing pictures of reality.

Having given a realistic account of Wittgenstein's philosophy of science, Brockhaus examines the Tractarian analysis of the self and the world. By tracing the development of Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement the book presents a positive account of Wittgenstein's own Theory of Propositional Attitudes. Wittgenstein's critique of Russell shows that the latter's position is a blend of psychologism and formalism. This blend represents a mistake for it fails to take into account the intentional element in propositional representation and mistakenly upholds that mental images are self-interpreting. Wittgenstein's own analysis of propositional attitudes implies that behind the psycho-physical (empirical) ego stands a metaphysical ego whose active intending turns signs into living symbols. The metaphysical ego provides 'life' to 'dead' propositional signs. Whereas the empirical self is an aggregate of thought, the metaphysical self is philosophically more interesting as it is the key to link 'world of facts' with the 'world of values'. Moreover, the world in so far as it can have any possible significance for me is 'my world'. 'My world' is bounded at the 'outer' limit by logic and its 'inner' limit is the metaphysical subject. Logic provides structure to the world, and metaphysical self provides life to it. The 'logical world' and 'my world' manifest themselves everywhere though it is difficult to talk about them. The difficulty lies in the fact that logic permeates everything, thus making it difficult to say what would fail to be a logical world. Also, the world has to be 'my world' since any world which I can conceive has to be mine. The steps of the ladder, Brockhaus concludes, about which Wittgenstein says must be climbed in order to see the world right and then discarded, consists of the two propositions 'The world is a logical world' and 'The world is my world'.

Having clarified the notion of 'my world' Brockhaus investigates how value is compatible with the view of the world which is forced on Wittgenstein by his semantics. In the course of this examination he also examines why Wittgenstein thought that the two experiences namely those of wondering at the existence of the world, and feeling perfectly, safe in it can qualify as candidates for 'value experiences' and as description of 'absolute value'. Through an extensive discussion of 'The Will and Ethics', 'The Will and the World', 'God, World and the Self' in Wittgenstein's early writings, he concludes that value finds a foothold in human life through the notion of metaphysical self. The metaphysical self by its nature is unaffected by the world of facts. It permeates 'my world' and since 'my world' is a possible world it shares a common substance with the world—the world of facts. To grasp the importance of this conclusion one has to try to say it. But when we say it we realize the emptiness of such phrases as 'my world', 'my life', etc. So, we must throw away the ladder after we have climbed it.

Pulling Up the Ladder: The Metaphysical Roots of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is a bold, challenging and innovative attempt to present Wittgenstein's early philosophy in a manner which makes it consistent. It is a well-researched work, based on primary sources. It treats secondary sources with scepticism. The footnotes are as important as the text, for they guide the reader to a more serious inquiry, and apprise him of the vast literature on the *Tractatus*. The book is a positive contribution to Tractarian scholarship. Many 'traditional' scholars of the *Tractatus* are sure to react with a renewed vigour to its thesis.

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GEORGE PANTHANMACKEL, MSFS, *One in Many: An Investigation into the Metaphysical Vision of Karl Rahner*, Indian Institute of Spirituality, P.O. BOX 5639, Bangalore 560 010, India, 1993, pp. xxvi + 342, Rs 380.00, $26.00 (postage included).

Karl Rahner (1904–1984) is considered by many as the greatest Catholic theologian of Europe in this century. But it is impossible to be a full theologian without being also a master of philosophy. Although most of his writings have been translated into English and there is a considerable amount of literature in English about his teaching, he is little known in India. The book under review can serve as an able introduction to his philosophical teaching.

Rahner's philosophical works, chiefly *Spirit in the World* and *Hearers of the Word*, were born at the confluent in his mind of St Thomas Aquinas, Joseph Marechal and Martin Heidegger. As an undergraduate in philosophy, Rahner had discovered the famous 'Fifth Cahier' of Marechal's *Le point de depart de la metaphysique (The Starting-point of Metaphysics)*. He had been definitely influenced by its investigation of the role in man's awareness of his unlimited intellectual dynamism and particularly of the implicit desire for the vision of the divine essence which is at work in it as its key necessary *a priori* condition. This was the key *a priori* missing in Kant's transcendental analysis of pure reason. Marechal had recovered it from the works of St Thomas interpreted in the language of Kant. Rahner went back from Marechal to St Thomas and realized the correctness of this interpretation. He assimilated it as the fertile soil from which his own thinking could develop.

Later on, in Freiburg, he came under the influence of Heidegger whose seminars he attended assiduously. The article which he published in French in 1940, 'An Introduction to Heidegger's Conception of Existential Philosophy', (see p. 12, note 26) represents the essentials of what he retained from him.

Our author, who hails from Kerala and received his undergraduate training in philosophy from Jnanadeepa Vidyapeetha, Pune, had no difficulty in recognizing the nature and importance of the Thomistic-Marechallian notion of man's intellectual dynamism tending towards an intuition of the divine essence as its fulfilling goal. Had not Śaṅkara likewise stated this as his starting-point, saying that 'there is in every man an innate desire for a knowledge of Brahman which will culminate in intuitive comprehension for that is the end of man'?

The aim of the author's investigation is to arrive at a vision of Rahner's total metaphysics from the viewpoint of the ontological problem of 'one and many'. To better discern what is properly Rahnerian at every step of his enquiry, he will in succession examine the contributions to that step of St Thomas, Marechal as answering Kant, and Heidegger since these three form the immediate context of Rahner's thinking. Then he will state accurately what may be considered Rahner's synthesis of those contributions.

Thus he examines successively their conception of metaphysics and their philosophical method, their notion of being, their assertions or reservations regarding the absolute Being, their notion of matter and spirit and of the being-present-to-itself-in-its-being-present-to-another, i.e. of man as the knowing subject with special attention to his dependence on his senses and his agent-intellect whose role is to process the sense-data for the act of intellection which belongs to the receptive intellect, then to the return to the sense data (traditionally called *conversio ad phantasmata*). Through this knowing, man is what Heidegger called a being-in-the-world and, hence, the notion of world has to be similarly examined as well as what Rahner means when he calls man 'spirit-in-the-world'. This implies man's transcendence to the world and his immanence to it as well as his freedom and responsibility in the development of history.

It is not possible to present here even a summary of the profusion of information provided in the chapters around those topics. The author's method is such that the reader comes to know about the Thomistic-Marechallian doctrine (*thesis*), that of Heidegger (*antithesis*) and that of Rahner (*synthesis*). The latter is shown to be marked by four characteristics:

(1) *It is an anthropologically centered metaphysics.* Metaphysics is the formulation of all the *a prioris* which are constitutive of man. Hence, 'it is not, as are the separate sciences, the discovery of something hitherto unknown, but is the methodical, reflective knowledge of that which one has always known'. Indeed, it is not the knowledge of being as exterior to us but the knowledge of being on the basis of our knowledge of self; it is the self-exposition of man's own self-presence.

(2) *It is theologically oriented.* Because it knows both the unlimited range of its desire for knowledge and the limits of its grasp short of enough information and light, it culminates in expectation, the expectation of the supplement of information and light which could only come as a complementary gift from the Absolute itself. In short, it awaits a possible divine revelation for receiving which its conceptual structure is prepared.

(3) *It is transcendental.* It is faithful of Kant's 'turn to the subject' and to Marechal's corrective amplification of the results obtained by Kant from his transcendental analysis of pure reason. To the latter Rahner integrates easily Heidegger's existential method but goes beyond Heidegger in his recognition of God, the absolute Being.

(4) *It is a vision of one in many.* In so far as being is being-present-to-itself, it is 'one'; absolute Being is Being-present-to-itself-absolutely; matter is the principle of being-present-to-another (namely, the world); hence, through its integration with being-present-to-itself, it is the principle of plurality, the principle of the 'many'. Human knowing is being-present-to-oneself-in-one's-being-present-to-another and, hence, already 'one-in-many'.

Jnana-deepa Vidyapeeth, Pune   RICHARD DeSMET S.J.

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Mīmāṃsāmañjarī

R. THANGASWAMI SARMA

The present work, written in lucid Sanskrit, deals with various concepts pertaining to Mīmāṃsā philosophy, besides general and technical issues in epistemology. The significance of each *pramāṇa* has been discussed according to various other systems with suitable examples. The categories (*padārthas*) accepted in the Mīmāṃsā system have also been described with their variations compared to other systems of philosophy. The basic tenets of Mīmāṃsā and the doctrine, etc. are justified. Besides describing the position of Mīmāṃsā among the other philosophical systems of India, the sub-schools of Mīmāṃsā are also discussed in detail. The technical terms of this system are explained with their meanings. The book also describes the authors, texts, commentaries and super-commentaries, etc. in Mīmāṃsā philosophy starting from the *sūtras* of Sage Jaimini till date in alphabetical order. A chronological list of authors and texts has been provided separately. Detailed illustrations are added for easy understanding. Some of the maxims related to this system are also explained in this work.

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