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Contents

The Condition of Postmodernity and the Discourse of the Body

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Only a society governed by the principles of justice, a society structured for the realization of democratic pluralism, can fulfil the diverse needs deeply implicate in the nature of our bodies . . . Given the fact that the order of our bodies is an order structured by reversibility, it is clear that what the body needs for its fulfilment is a social order governed, at the very least, by forms of reciprocity and an ethics of communicative rationality . . . Working for social justice today calls for 'promoting new forms of subjectivity' . . . And this means collaborating with the pre-social order of our bodies to achieve in society at large a level of moral development in which questions of social justice, and the communicative procedures that reflection on these questions require, are of paramount concern: a possibility we cannot recognize, without understanding that neither the monadic ego (in the discourse of Cartesian metaphysics) nor the disorganized body of drives (in the discourse of Freudian psychoanalysis) should continue to represent for us the distinctive social character of the human self.

DAVID M. LEVIN[1]

[For Merleau-Ponty] The mind's body is not the objective body, not the body thought of the mind, but the phenomenal body, the field that reverses everything in it as sensible, as content or dimensionality of being-in-the-world. The mind's body is a scheme of difference, of the doubling of the world's insides and outsides . . . Although I would warn against any anachronistic attribution of postmodernity to Merleau-Ponty, I think it is fair to say that his meditations on structuralism go beyond that paradigm . . . Merleau-Ponty's post-structuralism, if you will, lies on the side of his concept of the flesh of the world: the lived body whose structures of practical relevance necessarily sediments into body's habits and cultural gestures.

JOHN O'NEIL[2]

THE PROBLEM

The postmodern condition is characterized by a particular discourse of and attitude to space and time, a particular configuration of 'space-time compression'.[3] As two of its most recent commentators write: 'For the very foundation of postmodernity consists of viewing the world as a plurality of heterogeneous spaces and temporalities'.[4] In the condition of postmodernity, it is space that is becoming the center of material practice and people's consciousness. Various commentators contrast this centrality of space in the postmodern condition with the preoccupation with 'time' and 'history' in the structure of modernity.[5,6,7] Heller and Feher go as far as to characterize the postmodern condition as a 'post-historie' condition.

It is interesting to note that when David Harvey and Edward Soja make a contrast between the modern centrality of time and the postmodern centrality of space, Harvey Cox makes a contrast between the modernist preoccupation with mind and the postmodern celebration of the 'body'.[8] Both space and body constitute the 'unalterable' materiality of human existence.[9] The similarities in the perspectives of Harvey and Soja on the one hand and Cox on the other challenge us to explore the connection between the centrality of space and the centrality of body in the postmodern condition. While the discourse of space and time have been given much thought in the commentaries on the postmodern condition, this paper explores the discourse of the body in the condition of postmodernity. Here my objective is to paint a sketch of the discourse of the body in our contemporary times and then to locate the genealogy and contours of this discourse in the ongoing structural and cultural transformation of the advanced societies in particular and the world at large in general.

As we will see, the current understanding of the significance of the body as a creative agent has implication for the current debates about tradition, modernity and postmodernity. It has also its implication for rethinking political development and human development. A changed understanding of body as not simply the servant of the mind encourages us to create an embodied polity in so far as the challenge of political development is concerned. Human development also means a creative process of learning with a significant role of the knowledge of the body which is to some extent a priori and 'prehensive'.[10] But in this paper my objective is not to discuss and analyze all the significant correlations between rethinking body and rethinking politics, though I tangentially touch upon this issue. My objective here is to describe the 'discursive field'[11] of body in the condition of postmodernity and then to locate this field in the wider context of social and cultural transformation.

Since World War II and especially for the last two decades. body has been thought of differently in various paths of human knowledge—from philosophy to anthropology. The work of philosophers Wittgenstein,

Ryle and Merleau-Ponty; anthropologists Pierre Bourdieu, Emily Martin, and Michael Jackson and sociologists Anthony Giddens and Bryan Turner show that body is not simply a constituted 'thing' upon which the overwhelming power of culture and society write their script, but also, and more fundamentally, a constitutive and transformative agency of culture. In the social sciences, there is a growing challenge to the imperialism and determinism of the mind and an empowering effort to give back what is due to the body. In many fields of human knowledge, there is a concerted effort to go beyond the body-mind dualism and to operate with a non-deterministic view of 'embodiment' in the understanding of social and cultural reality.[12] In this context, it is worth exploring the significance of Derrida's philosophy of 'differance' from the point of view of the discourse of the body. In the condition of postmodernity, body is perhaps the ultimate 'differance'.

From the point of view of sociology of knowledge, the key question here is what accounts for this particular shift in the discourse and representation of the body? In other words, why body is no more thought of as totally governed by mind and culture? This paper discusses the transformation in the structure of modernity that has made the transformed discourse of the body possible. In the modernist regime, the superiority of the mind was a legitimizing basis for the subordination of human categories and groups (children, women, primitive people, the tribes and the colonies) thought of body-like. In this context, the changed relationship between centre and periphery and structure and agency in the postmodern world might suggest a clue to the changed signification and discourse of the body. Moreover, the recent crisis of nation-state and the rise of creative grassroots movements has created the sociological context in which the relationship between mind and body is being perceived in a new way by the ordinary citizens of the world.

RECENT TRANSFORMATIONS IN MIND-BODY DISCOURSE: THE PORTRAIT OF A COMMUNICATIVE BODY IN PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY

Mind-body dualism is a fundamental archetype of several deeply entrenched dualisms in western culture such as mind and matter, objective and subjective which constitute the fundamental elements of the deep structure of modernity. In western philosophy, this mind-body dualism can be traced more recently to Descartes and as far back as to Plato. For Descartes, there is not only a dualism between mind and body but also a supremacy of mind over the body. Descartes argued that mind's reports of its own affairs have a certain superiority to the best that is possessed by its reports in the physical world. But there have been 'Post-Cartesian Meditations'[13] going on in western philosophy at least for the last five decades leading to important insights for

reconceptualizing the human condition: the nature of language, thought, culture, body and praxis. Wittgenstein, Ryle and Merleau-Ponty have been significant pioneers in post-Cartesian meditations and have effected a marked transformation in mind-body discourse with their portrait of a 'communicative body'.[14]

Gilbert Ryle (1969) finds many absurdities in Descartes' theory which he calls the 'official doctrine'. These absurdities are parts of a 'category mistake': the mistake to represent the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one category. It also refers to the mistake of allocating concepts to logical types to which they do not belong. As Ryle writes: 'My destructive purpose is to show that a family of radical category mistakes is the source of the double life theory'.[15] For Ryle, to be intelligent is not merely to satisfy criteria, but to apply them. In the words of Ryle: 'Effective practice precedes the theory of it.' Moreover for him, 'intelligent practice is not a stepchild of theory. On the other hand theorizing is one practice among others and is itself intelligently or stupidly conducted'.[16] Ryle argues that it would be quite possible for a boy to learn chess without ever hearing or reading the rules at all. This goes against the 'official dogma' that an internal shadow performance is the real carrier of intelligence. But Ryle not only shows these category mistakes in Descartes but also traces their long pedigree. As Ryle tells us, 'Descartes was reformulating already prevalent theological doctrines of the soul in the new syntax of Galileo. The theologian's privacy of conscience became the philosopher's privacy of consciousness, and what has been the bogy of Pre-destination reappeared as the bogy of Determinism.'[17]

Like Ryle's deconstruction of Cartesian 'category mistakes', Wittgenstein also shows the dangers in mistaking the unity of a supposed category such as language. For Wittgenstein, the word language is not the name of a single phenomenon, rather it is the name of the class of an indefinite number of language-games. Language is not the sovereign operation of mind, rather it is an aspect of human play, use and practice. Contrary to the mentalistic view of language, Wittgenstein argues that language does not simply depict the logical structure of facts. Of course, such a view of language as an aspect of human use rather than of mental dictation belongs to the later Wittgenstein rather than to the earlier Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*. For the later Wittgenstein of *The Blue and Brown Books* and *Philosophical Investigations*, to discover the meaning of a statement is not to discover what it may describe or refer to, but to discover its use. As Wittgenstein puts it: 'If we want to study the problems of Truth and Falsehood . . . we shall, at great advantage, look at primitive forms of language in which forms of thinking appear without the confusing grounds of highly complicated processes of thought.'[18]

While Ryle and Wittgenstein have striven to transform the Cartesian

mind-body dualism through meditations on body, mind, language, intelligence and thought process from the inside of western philosophy, Gregory Bateson brings his anthropological 'views from afar' to bear on the body-mind problem.[19]

If Ryle complains about 'category mistake' in Cartesianism, Bateson is critical of the universalization of a particular cultural condition in the Cartesian agenda. Bateson shows that the personality of the Balinese character is illustrated at every joint of the body.[20] In some Balinese characters, someone might have lost one's head, but one's body is animated. For Bateson, as for Ryle, the view that mind controls matter is a fake anyway. 'It is one of those abstractions which is not represented by anything in the real world.' As Bateson argues: 'But when you separate mind from the structure in which it is immanent, such as human relationship, the human society, or the eco-system, you thereby embark, I believe, on fundamental error which in the end will surely hurt you.'[21]

Bateson argues that the step from mind to body is the step from state to difference. For Bateson, what perception depends upon is difference. This insightful phrasing of the problem by Bateson and the very occurrence of the term 'differance' in his statement perhaps prepares the appropriate context for exploring the transformation in the mind-body discourse wrought by the deconstructionist philosophy of 'diffe'rance.' Deconstruction intervenes to displace the metaphysical subject and 'his' hierarchical system of modernist inequality where mind and its mirrors have the unquestioned sovereignty over body and its metaphors. As Pheby argues: 'Deconstruction reveals what logocentrism conceals—domination—and the deconstructive posture reaches out to the exteriority of the absent, the other that the dominant culture relegates to the abyss of "non-being".'[22] The modernist project has been an evangelical and world-conquering project of incorporating all differences into a system of inequality. This tradition also confuses 'difference' with 'opposition'.[23] On the other hand, deconstruction teaches one to attend to 'gestures of exclusion'.[24] Derrida argues that 'such philosophical oppositions as nature/culture, theory/practice, mental/manual, and life/death are differentially constituted'.[25] Differences resist incorporation into a totalizing system of inequality through both spatial and temporal deferral.[26] As Derrida writes, 'We shall designate by the term differentiation the movement by which language, or any code, any system of reference in general, becomes "historically" constituted as a fabric of differances'.[27] Moreover, the project of deconstruction does not privilege language, rather it shows how any such privileging (mentalistic and idealistic) is a 'regional function produced by . . . weave of differential relations . . .'[28] Deconstruction also denies that 'there is any boundary essence between what we call language and what we think of as non-language'.[29]

THE WORK OF THE 'COMMUNICATIVE BODY': RETHINKING CULTURE AND SOCIAL THEORY

In his discussion of postmodern social theory, John Murphy argues that for Derrida, space is a 'diffe'rance'.[30] Following this, we can argue that for Derrida, body is also a 'diffe'rance'. Body provides a focal metaphor for a postmodern sociological analysis. If mind and rationality were the fundamental rhetorical constructs through which society, culture, state and structure used to be visualized in modernist sociology, postmodernism operates with a view of society and culture as embodiment. As Murphy explains, 'As a result of . . . Cartesian influence, . . . sociologists have exhibited a propensity for conceptualizing order as "centered" . . . order is associated automatically with reason . . . society embodies reason, while persons are passionate. Reason, in fact, is given the power to suppress passion.'[31] But postmodernism displaces any such centred rational construct. It displaces logocentric centres and part of this displacement 'concerns a refusal to acquiesce to the power of the centre, a refusal to adopt the belief that the dominant structures somehow have a privileged access to meaning and truth'.[32]

The transformations in the discourse on body-mind dualism has also its implication for rethinking the notion of culture. For the postmodernists, '. . . culture is not the guardian of reason, but simply imaginary. A specific culture represents a modality of imagination . . . Postmodern society spawns a "culture of immanence"—a style of culture that embodies human inspiration'.[33] Here culture is not viewed solely as super-organic, but primarily as praxis,—embodied praxis—as a field for the Giddensian 'structuration situation', where with the resources of body and memory, structure and agency are engaged in an incessant transformative play.[34,35] To understand the emancipatory potential in such a reformulated and transformed understanding of culture, it has to be noted that the mentalistic and the super-organic view of culture has tended to act in an exclusionary way. The view that culture is the sovereign domain of the mind and testimony to its 'magical power' has 'served as token to demarcate, separate, exclude and deny; and although at different epochs the excluded "natural" category shifts about among peasants, barbarians, workers, primitive people, women, children, animals and material artefacts, a persistent theme is the denial of the somatic, a turning of blind eyes on the physical aspects of Being where our sense of separateness and distinctiveness is most readily blurred'.[36]

The very processes of human thought are also being rethought and reconceptualized in philosophy and social sciences. Now the emergent view is that thinking is not a disembodied activity. Rather we think through metaphors; our moral and linguistic universe is full of 'metaphors we live by'.[37] Metaphors, in most cases, are bodily and such embodied metaphors are not merely a figure of speech. All these bodily metaphors demonstrate the corporeal and sensible way of reading what the world means.[38] Anthropometric metaphors simply reflect the fact that, ontogenetically, the first language of life is gestural, postural and bodily. Moreover, metaphors show the unity of body and mind. For Jackson, the etymology of the most abstract words often refer to the body. However, Jackson makes clear: 'This is not to say that all mental forms should be reduced to bodily practices; rather, that within the unitary field of body-mind habitus it is possible to intervene and effect change from any one of these points'.[39] As Bourdieu so rightly points out, 'The mind born of the world of objects does not rise as subjectivity confronting an objectivity. The mind is a metaphor of the world of objects which is itself but an endless circle of mutually reflecting metaphors'.[40] Lyotard also provides additional support to the argument that we think analogically and metaphorically, rather than logically.[41,42] Following Dreyfus, Lyotard characterizes human thought process as reflective rather than determinate. For Lyotard, analogical processes 'constitute the experience of a body, of an "actual" or phenomenological body in its space-time continuum of sensibility and perception. . . . '[43]

The postmodern reflection on body also finds its support in the contemporary striving of a postmodern theology and spirituality. Thus, it is no wonder that David Griffin writes in his *God and Religion in the Postmodern World*: '[The postmodern vision does not] suffer from the mind-body problem that undermined the first-stage of modernity, the problem of how experiencing mind could interact with nonexperiencing matter. According to the postmodern view, the body itself is composed of experiencing individuals'.[44] In the postmodern view, all things are embodiments of creativity.[45,46] David Griffin, perhaps reminding us of Gilbert Ryle, quite rightly points out that 'the mind-body problem was paralleled by a God-World problem. . . '[47] But for Griffin, 'The postmodern God does not coerce, but persuades'.[48] Moreover, for him, twentieth century developments in science support a 'new animism', a 'postmodern animism', as Griffin calls it, where a 'unit is first an experiencing subject expressing self-determination, then an experienced object expressing efficient causation' affirming a 'non-dualistic interactionism'.[49]

But what is the nature of this body discussed so far? This body, following Merleau-Ponty, is a communicative body. As O'Neil tells us: 'The communicative body is the hinge of our world; it establishes an identity-within-difference that overrides the subject-object dualism of transcendental phenomenology'.[50] This communicative body is also a phenomenal body which is not only a vehicle of communication but also a creative agent of communicative action.

Merleau-Ponty's idea of a 'communicative body' avoids the dualism of objectivism and subjectivism through a focus on the lived body as a mode of being-in-the-world. But this communicative body is not to be confused with the Foucauldian body despite Foucault's illusive notion

of bio-power. In Foucault, body is constituted by the discourse of bio-power, rather body itself constituting this discourse. Here, 'Discourse, thus, becomes the monologue of power or, rather, the chorus of micropowers'.[51, 52, 53] Moreover, Foucault's idea of power is 'disembodied' and reminds one of Talcott Parsons' view of power as the positive and enabling feature of a social structure.[54] Foucault looks at power as an aspect of discourse and addresses its play 'within the dark underside of these very same [Parsonian] "positive social organizations"'.[55] Perhaps for this reason, Habermas argues that Foucault's discourse on power and body confines itself to the technology of power and lacks any meditation on the technology of the self.[56, 57] Foucault's subjects are formed by processes of subjection and his 'conception of body makes it impossible for us to empower the body with any capacity to talk back to history. . . . '[58]

THE DISCOURSE OF THE BODY IN THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: LOCATING ITS GENEALOGY AND CONTEXUALIZING ITS SIGNIFICANCE

What is the sociological and historical genealogy of the recent transformation in the discourse of body-mind dualism? If, as Sohn-Rethel[59] has shown us, the distinction between head and hand and intellectual and manual labour has something to do with the abstraction of commodity exchange under capitalism, then the challenge is to explore whether the contemporary transformation in body-mind discourse has something to do with the social and historical transformations of modernity. This requires meditation on the ongoing transformations in the structure of modernity leading to an embodiment of the condition of postmodernity. This requires a double tack on both modernity and post-modernity not so much as teleological historical phases, the latter inevitably supplanting the former, but as emergent cosmoses and perspectives, contesting for generation and voice in a common historical womb. Before exploring the genealogy of the contemporary discourse of the communicative body, it is essential to remember that 'Postmodernity is an experience of "the end of history" not the appearance of a different, or a newer, stage of history itself'.[60, 61]

The modern experiment in human history has been characterized by the state formation at home and colonialism abroad. Both these processes have derived motivation from native western cultural resources and from native 'folk psychologies'. In his study of the cultural psychology of colonialism, Nandy[62] has shown that the western folk cultural psychology of the superiority of the male over the female has provided impetus to conquer the supposedly feminine foreign virgin territories with the masculine forces of empire and industry. It is perhaps for this reason that Mahatma Gandhi in India did not fight back with the intimate enemy of colonialism on 'his' own terms—on his masculine

and rationalist terms. Rather he used the supposedly feminine indigenous resources such as non-violence and 'Satyagraha' and supposedly irrational devices such as myth to deconstruct the colonialist phallus and the mind.[63, 64] The demise of the colonies, hence, precipitate challenges to the western folk psychologies of male domination. The revolutionary birth of post-colonial societies, hence, has played its role in challenging some of the deeply entrenched dualisms of modernity.

At home in western societies, male-female dualism increasingly turned more oppositional with the march of modernity. New reproductive biology in nineteenth century has succeeded in establishing absolute dichotomy between the male and the female where once existed homology. Even the discourse of civic humanism in early eighteenth century Britain was an exercise in 'the most authoritative fantasy of masculinity' which represented civic freedom not only as a freedom from servility but as an emancipation from the feminine desire.[65] Here it has to be noted that the male-female dualism in modernity is based upon the body-mind dualism. Hence in the discourse of modernity, woman has been constituted as the body. In this context, it has to be noted that the feminist movement in the post-war era has not only challenged phallic authority but also has questioned the power of the mind to act as an endless mirror of all dominations. Feminists have realized that it is important not only to question what philosophers have said about women, but also what philosophers have said about mind-body distinction.[66] Hence it is not a coincidence that challenge to mind-body dualism has been precipitated in philosophy in the same post-war era which has also been characterized by post-colonial and feminist social struggles.

So much about the connection between the folk psychology of gender and colonialism, what about the connection among mind, modernity and state formation? One important place to look for this connection is to explore the link between body and the French Revolution. In her study of the French Revolution, Outram tells us, '. . . the public body on which the middle class founded its political legitimation during the Revolution was that of Homo clausus, the male type validated by his separation of affect from instinct . . . Homo clausus legitimated itself by his superiority to the somatic relationships enjoyed by other classes—aristocracy, peasants and workers—and by the other gender. In other words, what he possessed was a body which was also a non-body, which, rather than projecting itself, retained itself. In doing so, it became the location of abstract value-systems, such as rationality and objectivity'.[67] Hence after the French Revolution, the state that came into being anchored itself upon the sovereignty of the mind rather than upon a communicative body. As Outram makes clear, 'The history of [French] Revolutionary bodies is the history of a self-image of rationality, reflexivity, universality, autonomy . . . '[68] After the French Revolution,

both medicine and political culture tended to 'desacralize the body'.[69] Hitler was perhaps able to make the best use of this modernist discourse of the 'desacralized body'. Hence the desacralized bodies of millions of desacralized Jews could be easily dispensed with under the 'rationalist' organization of the Holocaust. In the words of Zygmunt Bauman, 'Modern civilization was not the Holocaust's sufficient condition; it was, however, most certainly its necessary condition . . . It was the rational world of modern civilization that made the Holocaust thinkable'.[70]

POSTMODERN STRIVINGS AND THE TURN TOWARDS THE BODY

If modernity characterized the triumph of the mind and the subjugation of the body, entry into postmodernity, in the wake of the post-war anti-colonialist struggles, civil rights' movements, students' movements and women's movements precipitated challenges to the epitomes modernist rationality: nation-state and bureaucracy. The economic and political crisis of the state and the bureaucratic manifestation of social democracy, welfare state and socialism, have led to the shrinking legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the common citizens of advanced societies. These continuing contestations have led to fundamental restructuring of the relationship between state and civil society—between the disembodied 'System World' and the embodied 'Life World'. In this restructuring and deconstruction of the state, 'the new social movements' have played a transformative role. These movements have brought a significant measure of participatory democracy to the 'system world' of state and bureaucracy. Moreover, these movements embody a non-deterministic relationship between structure and agency making the 'Return of the Actor' possible.

THE BODY OF POSTMODERNITY AND THE CRITICAL MOVEMENT OF THE BODIES

In contemporary collective actions vis-à-vis the operation of a monological state, body is an important tool of struggle. The communicative body of the actors works as both a medium and a message. In almost all the alternative movements what R.B.J. Walker[71] calls 'critical movements' in varieties of social order in the contemporary globe, body is being used as a very important tool and also perhaps as a mark of the ultimate 'diffe'rance.' In the Chipko movement, a popular environmental movement among the hill women of the Himalayas, the activists tie themselves to the trees preventing the contractors to touch the lived body of the tree. In the Baltic states in the former Soviet Union, the movements for independence made use of the strategy of the human chain: thousands of people holding hands over hundreds of miles to create a field of empowerment, embodiment and solidarity. These instances reiterate the centrality of the body in contemporary critical

movements. The work of the communicative bodies in collective actions is now almost universal. In this connection, Dorinda Outram's observations are extremely insightful, 'Even in western states it is increasingly true that the politics of even legal protest is becoming differentiated from establishment politics by its large-scale use of the human body; one thinks here of the tactics of CND and Greenpeace groups, of large-scale mass demonstrations, of human chains linking hands across Scotland, and of passive resistance. The construction and use of a dignified individual body which can be employed as a source of authority in conflicts in the public realm can thus be seen as a hallmark of late twentieth-century political change . . .'[72]

Besides the use of body in non-violent social and cultural movements, body is also being used decisively in the terrorist movements of our times where other people's bodies are mediums of contestation against the State. Though in its 'construction of terrorism'[73], the late-capitalist state has created a sacrificial scapegoat to hide its inability to comprehend the roots of terrorism in the state-centric discourse and to cope with it as a global contingency, the significance of terrorism as a challenge to modernity and Statism must be appreciated. Terrorist violence, as David Apter tells us, constitutes an 'antitext, the object of which is to challenge or supercede legitimacy, explode conventionality, and "deconstruct" that developmental "structuration" that expresses functional rationality of ordinary life'.[74]

But while in terrorism it is the body of the Other that is sacrificed, in some other sacrificial movements against the state, it is the body of the Self that works as both the medium and the message. Here one instantaneously remembers the recent movement of self-immolation led by some sections of Indian students in September 1990 in their fight with the Indian state over its policy of caste-based reservation. The Union of India had promulgated a new policy of job reservation for the economically and socially backward classes which students from the middle-class origins felt as politically motivated. This led to a vigorous anti-government stir in which some students immolated themselves. In the anti-reservation stir, students deployed their bodies as a source of ultimate authority in their use to fight against a strong state which played the politics of number.[75] This movement of self-immolation can be looked at as a prime example of the contemporary significance of the body in the movement against the state.

The significance of body can also be appreciated in the movement of 'glasnost' to create a 'post-totalitarian mind'.[76] Critical movements in the socialist societies challenged the very idea of the Party invested with the mind and power to regulate ordinary citizens categorized as bodies. In socialist societies, the party used to be the head of the proletariat. According to Lefort, '[The party] merges with the body as a whole, while at the same time, it is its head.'[77] What is at stake here is the 'integrity

of the body'.[78] But the movement for democracy in these societies has led to the revitalization of the body.[79] Social movements in the former socialist societies questioned not only the mind of the political party, it also questioned the mind of the bureaucracy. The movement of perestroika challenged another epitome of modernist rationality, the bureaucracy, perhaps striving to create a 'post-bureaucratic' social order.[80] The striving for creating a 'post-bureaucratic' and 'post-Taylorist' social order and work organization can also be found in the advanced capitalist societies. In advanced societies, there is an increasing realization that Taylorist forms of bureaucratic organization are incapable of coping with the reality of new technologies. In the words of Governor Mario Cuomo of New York: 'The old fashioned assembly lines emphasize a hierarchical, top-down management style. The new technologies require a different style.'[81] Taylorism had based itself upon the distinction between head and hand, conception and execution.[82] Hence the emergence of Post-Taylorist forms of work organizations and embodied groups of co-workers engaged in the innovative challenge and play of new technologies create the sociological context for rethinking body-mind dualism and experiencing one's labouring body as a 'communicative body'.

In contemporary movements for justice and peace, the communicative body is also becoming the model of law, polity and a just social order. Zillah Eisenstein (1988) shows that when this [communicative] body becomes a model of law, it leads to a reconstruction of the concept of equality. Eisenstein takes the pregnant body as the model of equality and community. She argues, 'The pregnant body decenters the phallus without centering itself; instead, it allows a heterogeneous viewing of equality that recognizes the particularity of the human body and constructs a notion of diversity that is distinctively compatible with equality'.[83] The law that takes body as its model seems to be reconstructing the notion of equality 'through a completely pluralized notion of difference(s), one that rejects a politics of inequality and demands a radical egalitarianism'.[84] This law also does not dispense with the contingent dimension of the case under review. Postmodernism reconceptualizes law as nothing more than 'contingency formulae'.[85] The law whose metaphor is the body also engages itself in a process of self-transformation transforming itself from the modernist legality to a postmodern interpretiveness.[86]

The operation of this law and its moral reasoning is leading to a renewed significance of 'casuistry' which refers to the mode of practical resolution of moral issues. Johnson and Toulmin (1988) argue that in the last few years 'discussions of specific circumstances and cases have at last returned to favour'.[87] There is a revival of interest in case ethics. In this transforming situation, there is a renewal of interest in Aristotle. For Aristotle, ethics cannot be a science, rather it calls for 'a recognition

of significant particulars'.[88] What is striking about Johnson and Toulmin is that, unlike many philosophers, they do not see it as simply an internal development within philosophy. They themselves write: '[The] moral ambiguities are only aggravated by obsolescence of the nation-state . . . '[89] They further note, 'The historical reasons for this change are complex and still are partly obscure, but they had less to do with developments within philosophy than with the challenges to authority and expertise that were evident in many other areas of life at this time.'[90]

In the social field of postmodernity, differences are proliferating. These differences are not simply surfacing to find their niche in a garland of surrealistic appearances, rather they are discovering their embodiments in the politics of contestation. Perhaps for this reason, Ihab Hassan writes, 'Critical pluralism is deeply implicated in the cultural field of postmodernism.'[91] This critical pluralism constitutes the heart of the differential politics of our contemporary discursive as well as social movements. While in case of the discursive movements, this manifests itself in the 'decontructivist critique of absolutist concepts',[92] in case of social and cultural movements it involves the critique of the absolutist states. In both these critiques, we must note the significance of the body. Thus John Murphy argues that the postmodern striving is a striving of radical democracy whose objective is to institute the body politics in the body of people. In the words of Murphy, 'Postmodernism is consistent with what might be called radical democracy. With the periphery suddenly everywhere, a decentralized polity is not an anomaly. . . . With the omnipotence of authority placed in question, decisions can finally be made that embrace public sentiments . . . The body politic is thus instituted. This is the thrust of what Lyotard calls "libidinal politics"—desire becomes real. And desire is not self-effacing . . . desire does not need to be infused with reason in order for society to survive; creativity is a sufficient political motive.'[93]

The dispersal of the centred authorities and the creativity of political practice that Murphy presents as characteristic of the body of postmodernity also constitutes the heart of the contemporary rethinking of development.[94, 95] The contemporary discursive critique of modernist rationality finds a societal parallel in the critique of development as a sovereign operation of state and bureaucracy. Contemporary movements of development as an enhancement of people's capabilities and as a pursuit of ever-widening webs of 'positive freedoms'[96, 97] requires an embodied politics which will have the courage and vision to combine 'food and freedom' in a great saga of human liberation.

REALITY OF BODY IN THE POSTMODERN CONDITION

If such is the discourse of the body in the condition of postmodernity, then the question is whether such a discourse is only utopian? Of

course it is true that in the contemporary condition, 'We need a utopian-emancipatory discourse on the body no less than we need the critical analytic discourse . . . '[98] But still the question is whether the discourse of the body as a transformative agent is simply a utopian philosophical projection or has it some actual ethnographic referents in the contemporary world? This brings us face-to-face with the ethnography of the postmodern condition.

A FRAGMENT OF THE REALITY: EMBODIMENT, EMPOWERMENT AND ALTERNATIVES

In her study of the bio-politics of the menstrual women in contemporary American society, Emily Martin shows that the embodied experience such as menstruation provides some women (those who have not already been indoctrinated by the modern medicine) a vantage point to see the inequities of a gendered social world.[99] Moreover, their phenomenological experience of menstruation has the potential to give them a cyclical experience of time, as an alternative to the mainstream linear, industrial configuration of time. Cox also makes a similar point: 'Because menstruation cycles link them [women] more closely to natural cycles than men, women hold a key to the past that men do not have . . . Kristeva believes this exclusively female vantage point enables women to touch the two forms of time consciousness that men, as non-menstruating creatures, can discern only with much greater difficulty.'[100]

The processes of embodiment are also leading to the generation of a critical consciousness in other domains of contemporary advanced societies. Here the abortion contest is a case in point. Ginsburg's (1989) study shows how the embodied experience of childbirth is central to the generation of a critical consciousness on the part of both pro-choice and pro-life activists. Childbirth gives rise to a sense of crises in these women's lives which is a product of the 'dissonance' they feel between the conditions they face and the available resources to cope with it. As Ginsburg tells us, 'In their [women activists'] constructions, reproduction is a key turning point, not as a biological recurrence but as a class of life-cycle events that forced an encounter with the inequalities of a gendered social world. These encounters, as told in stories, lead the women to reconsider their relationship to and understanding of their assigned place in society. Subsequently, their activism took discursive shape as a concern not only with the place of procreation in women's lives, but with the reproduction of culture as a whole.'[101] The politics of embodiment in case of the pro-life movement is also leading to a profound cultural critique of the prevailing division of labour between home and work. It is to be reiterated here that this politics is not simply the conservative politics of the 'Women of the New Right',—the conservative politics of the 'reprivatizers'.[102]

The portrait of the body as a transformative agent is also becoming marked in varieties of postmodern theologies. Modern theology and modern Christian religious practice (especially as manifested in the mainstream Protestant denominations) is very rationalistic and cerebral. But the contemporary resurgence of feminine Christian piety seems to be transforming this. Commenting on the contribution that feminine spirituality is making to the generation of a postmodern theology, Harvey Cox writes, 'Women speak frequently of the need to restore the human body with all its senses fully alive to a Christianity that has become arid and cerebral . . . Poor white church people do not theorize about it much; but what always strikes middle-class visitors about lower-class Protestantism, is its embodied energy.'[103] This embodied feminine spirituality reminds us of the embodied spirituality of the medieval female Christian saints. Medieval women reflected in their visions a general sense of body as necessary for salvation. In the women saints' visions, 'humanity included not merely senses and agonies but bones and flesh, even sticks and stones . . .'[104] These saints also emphasized the fact that 'Christ's humanity is truly flesh and blood' which led to 'an increasingly literal sense of what "imitation" of Christ meant'.[105]

In another area of contemporary Christianity, imitation of Christ also refers to celebrating Christ's 'flesh and blood'—celebrating the bleeding Christ as a symbol of the bleeding and suffering in the contemporary world caused by varieties of class and corporate conflicts. In liberation theology, it is the bleeding body of the Jesus that is being worshipped in an embodied way. The practitioners do not worship Jesus individually, but as members of an embodied community, known as base communities. These base community movements with their embodied politics are transforming the fundamentals of modernist Christianity laying the ground for a second reformation.[106]

BODY AS A POSTMODERN SIMULACRUM

Contemporary ethnography of the postmodern condition also sensitizes us to the reality of the body as a postmodern simulacrum. For instance, the obsession of having a slim figure seems to be all pervasive among both males and females in contemporary American culture. In case of American women, this is sometimes leading to what Kim Chernin has called 'the tyranny of slenderness'.[107] As Brumberg tells us, 'In the 1980s anorexia nervosa constitutes a modern credo of self-denial . . . it appears to be a secular addiction to a new kind of perfectionism, one that links personal salvation to the achievement of an external body configuration rather than an internal spiritual state'.[108] She further writes: 'A woman obsessed with the reduction of her flesh may be revealing the fact that . . . she has not been allowed to develop a reverential feeling for her body.'[109] This also reveals another fact about

the late capitalistic cultural condition: the fact of the flight from concreteness and a new hegemony of the abstraction. Ewen shows the parallel between the flight from the body and the flight from cash exchange (as demonstrated in the craze for more and more abstract credit cards such as gold cards) as part of the same logic of flight from concreteness in contemporary culture.[110]

Baudrillard has characterized contemporary condition as a simulacrum. For Arthur Kroker, body is also participating passively in this postmodern simulacrum. As the Krokers write: 'Everywhere today the aestheticization of the body and its dissolution into a semiurgy of floating body parts reveal that we are being processed through a media scene consisting of our own (exteriorized) body organs in the forms of second-order simulacra.'[111] The postmodern fashion style is contributing to the creation of this passive body. In postmodern fashion's 'logic of planned obsolescence . . . the body is decoded and recoded [endlessly] in order to define and inhabit the newest territorialized spaces of capital expansion'.[112] For Faurschou, 'Postmodernity then is no longer an age in which bodies produce commodities, but when commodities produce bodies: bodies for aerobics, bodies for sports cars . . .'[113] But even in the discourse of the body as a postmodern simulacrum, there is apparently a note of dissent. Charles Levin argues that body is not reducible to the structures and conventions of its 'invaders'.[114]

The Krokers show us how the postmodern simulated body is also invaded by all the languages of postmodern power—'from fashion scene and panic viruses to the proliferating signs of consumer culture'.[115] In this invasion, the nation-state in advanced societies is creating a postmodern panopticon which Arthur Kroker calls 'Body McCarthyism'.[116]

BODY MCCARTHYISM OF ADVANCED NATION-STATES

Nation-states are now deploying new tools to incorporate bodies in a new mode of bio-power. As Terry argues, '[Now] the "person" has become the site of illegal searches through the seizure of body fluids and other things that lie beyond the threshold of the skin.'[117] The mandatory drug testing proposed by state is leading to the screening of even the urine. 'Since quite a business has developed in the sale of drug-free urine, now there's talk of drug testing requiring urination under observation'.[118] In this 'urinal politics', body is being constituted anew as 'the target of the power of the panoptic'.[119] This also shows the evangelical zeal with which the nation-state is pursuing the rhetoric of clean bodily fluids. In her ongoing work on immunology in contemporary American culture, Emily Martin records some of the similar operations of 'Body McCarthyism.' She shows how science portrays the body as a 'nation-state at peril of being invaded by outsiders'.[120] She relates this 'imagery of the body to the fear of the

nation-state's being invaded by outsiders in a world increasingly dominated by transnational capitalism'.[121] Body McCarthyism also sustains itself 'on generalized panic fear about the breakdown of the immunological systems of American society'.[122]

Another arena of exercise of contemporary Body McCarthyism is the body of the pregnant woman. The pregnant woman is being screened to ensure that her body and blood is free from alcohol and drugs which might endanger the fetus. There are several instances of arrest of pregnant woman on the charge of fetal abuse. A Michigan court has recently held that custody of a newborn could be seized by the state if there was evidence to show fetal abuse.[123] But these stances 'heighten the imaginary division between the fetus and the pregnant woman,' a division which can only complicate the contemporary abortion debate.[124, 125] This also gives an opportunity for the 'adulterated' mixture of the rhetoric of the anti-abortionists and the neoeugenecists. This adulterated rhetoric endows 'the fetus with a right to be born so long as it is to be guaranteed freedom from defect'.[126] In this strategy, the pregnant woman is constituted alone and the structures that have created her alcoholism and drug addiction are completely ignored.

In contemporary American society, there is also a growing effort to make one's body 'fit'. In contemporary USA, fitness has been a marketable commodity. A number of governmental agencies, councils, institutes and fitness clubs are engaged in the marketing of fitness. All of them are also engaged in appealing to what Bjorn Claesson calls 'the notion of a deficient lifestyle'.[127] Here individuals are alerted about their deficiencies and vulnerabilities. Consumption of knowledge of fitness does not necessarily increase the ability of the citizens to cope with their predicaments. Rather it produces a 'deficiency of comprehension, increased anxiety and dependency on experts'.[128] Now different companies and factories are also starting their own fitness programmes and especially exhorting the workers to participate regularly in it. These companies strive to erase the boundary between the management and the workers and the operation of fitness centres. In one factory called Champion which Claesson has studied, 'many workers choose not to use the fitness center because they strive to keep their distance from the company'.[129] Commenting on the mandatory use of computers in the fitness centres, one of Claesson's informants says, '. . . there is nothing confidential there . . . if you know what the keys are, you could read my whole history. . . . I do not have the trust in Champion'.[130]

The fitness drive strives to create a feeling of vulnerability—a feeling of being 'at risk'.[131] In this discourse of fitness and 'being at risk' the nation-state and different corporations who deal with disease and disability have their own stake. They reify 'the risk factors, so that even when they are environmental (such as exposure to a toxic substance) they are attached to the individual and counted as a part of his or her

portfolio of risks, as though each risk factor were located inside the boundaries of the person. The discourse refers to people as "having risk factors", an expression that situates the factor in the person rather than in the socio-economic structure or in public policy'.[132] While being at risk becomes a question of individual genesis, those who are at risk are constituted as a dangerous collectivity threatening not only themselves, but also others. Moreover, as Stone argues, 'health risk classification in insurance and labour markets cast off individuals who cannot make the grade and puts them outside the social-welfare pale'.[133] People with good health risks are attended to by the insurance companies while those at risk take recourse to the welfare state. Such bifurcated paths followed by the citizens subsequent to their health risk classification further heighten the already shaky foundation of the American welfare state which, as Skocpol has clearly shown, is based upon a representational dichotomy between the citizens and the clients.[134, 135]

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DISCOVERING BODY AND TRANSFORMING THE SELF:
MODERNITY, POSTMODERNITY AND BEYOND

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Such is the complex picture of body in discourse and society in the condition of postmodernity. This shows us how modern man tired of the 'hermeneutic circles' of the mind is coming back to body for concreteness and grounding. But as fragments of the reality of the postmodern condition show us, the postmodern celebration of the body has also been narcissistic. Postmodernism embodies an urge to come to our senses but is not still very clear about an 'anthropological revolution'[136] that will address the vital question of whether we are going to be bound by our senses. The postmodern quest, it seems, despite the work of scholars such as Agnes Heller who writes in her *Beyond Justice* that 'Beyond has the connotation of "higher", and not only of being different'[137] is still imprisoned in a narcissistic horizontality. Here a dialogue[138] with other cultures and traditions is important for a spiritual opening of our contemporary deconstructivist vision which will link sense and spirituality in ever-widening webs of creativity.

Much before the contemporary critique of modernity, Sri Aurobindo of India had sensitized us to the limitations of the mind. Sri Aurobindo's critique of mind and modernity also involved a celebration of the body where the body shall remember the secrets of our spiritual origins and spiritual transformation. But in Sri Aurobindo, the celebration of the body and the critique of the mind is part of a wider spiritual project of the transformation of self where the self will strive for the realization of a supramental consciousness and a 'supramental time vision'.[139] Sri Aurobindo's critique of mind is part of a transformative striving of the self for the realization of the supermind. Sri Aurobindo's 'supermind' is not an extension of the mind but a transmutation of the mind where both body and mind will discover their relationship of identity and

difference in a continued spiritual quest of self and social transformation. The postmodern discourse of body can confront the challenge of 'developing a more perfect and a divinely instrumental body'.[140]

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The Mind–Body Problem: A Comparative Study

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Intellect: 'Ostensibly there is colour, ostensibly sweetness, ostensibly bitterness, actually only atoms and the void.'
Senses: 'Poor intellect, do you hope to defeat us while from us you borrow your evidence? Your victory is your defeat.'

DEMOCRITUS[1]

INTRODUCTION

The relation of mind to the world is surely a crucial issue which has confronted, and continues to confront, philosophers from the East and the West. The issue is obviously relevant to philosophical anthropology, for some of the factors which must be taken into account in arriving at a view of the nature of human being are answers to questions such as, 'What is the connection between mind and body?', 'Are we essentially mind, or are we body?', 'Is there mind at all?' Our responses to these queries are indeed more than 'another set of factors among many'—they influence and shape the very fabric of our general view of human being. Under the identity theory (mental phenomena are identified with particular brain states[2]), for example, human interaction, or the *being* of human being, seems to be reduced to so many electrochemical neural firings and interactions.

The analysis of culture from the identity theory's perspective will certainly look quite different from the understanding one derives of human beings' situatedness in culture from standpoints which are not so extremely reductionist. Our ethical theories will also be affected if man is conceived of as nothing more than a sophisticated electrochemical machine. Such a position is, as Karl Popper says,' . . . prone to undermine a humanist ethics'[3] because humans may be thought to be replaceable in the same way as machines are. The weighty significance of the mind–body problem becomes all the more apparent when one recognizes that the very langauge and mode of inquiry about human beings seems to be fundamentally grounded in the kind of theory one professes regarding it.

In this paper I shall not attempt to present a definitive solution to the mind–body problem. Such an undertaking cannot possibly be pursued here, given the complexity of the issue and the staggering amount of

philosophical attention which this problem has enjoyed over the centuries. My aim is less ambitious: I shall discuss some theories[4] of the West concerning the mind–body problem, and their weaknesses. Views in contemporary analytic philosophy are the primary topics of study. I will then focus on the Indian tradition and attempt to find the closest western counterpart to the Carvakas (Indian materialists).

However, I am sympathetic to the view that mind is ontologically irreducible to matter, for I think that to so reduce it leaves the phenomenon of mind out of the world. This still leaves the possibility that mind is causally dependent on the brain. During the course of this paper I hope to challenge this notion. In the final section, I shall sketch a framework, Upaniṣadic in flavour, within which a different understanding emerges which moves beyond 'mental' and 'material/ physical', towards a deeper ontology of unity.

SUBSTANCE DUALISM

Descartes is arguably the progenitor of this position. The basic idea is that mind and matter (including body) are entirely different kinds of substances. The former is non-extended, whose essential property is thinking (*res cogitans*), while the latter is essentially extended (*res extensia*), and is in space. Human beings have two aspects, a body and a mind (each human being possesses his/her own distinct mind and body, however one ought to identify oneself essentially as a mind, as a thinking thing[5]), and despite their radical difference, mind and body causally affect each other, and are somehow linked together. The body's sense organs cause sense impressions in the mind, and the desires, and decisions of the non-physical mind give direction and purpose to the body. Thoughts, emotions, will, and numerous other mental events are essentially non-physical—they are, plainly and simply, an altogether different kind of substance than the physical, spatial body. When the body dies, the mind's connection to the body is severed, and the '. . . mind may continue to exist and function'.[6] The mind, *qua* it is *res cogitans*, is immortal.

A modern version of a kind of substance dualism is worked out by Karl Popper. It is in fact a substance tripartitism.[7] Popper identifies three ontologically independent domains of human existence which causally interact and influence one another (Popper characterizes his view as 'interactionism'[8]):

> World1: This is the physical world, including all the sorts of forces and fields and particles.
> World2: '. . . the world of mental states, including states of consciousness and psychological dispositions and unconscious states'.[9]
> World3: '. . . the world of the contents of thought, and indeed, of

the products of the human mind'.[10] Popper includes mathematical and logical truths, theories, stories, myths, and the like in World3.

The *meaning* of art, too belongs to World3. Many of the 'objects' of World1 can be *embodied* in World1—books, paintings. For example, a sculpture is a World1 object, but Popper's point is that there is more to a sculpture than just its shape and colour, and so forth—it has a deeper content which transcends its purely physical features, and this content exists in World3.[11]

The fact that these three domains can change because of their causally influencing one another (causal interaction) motivates Popper's granting each ontological independence. One conjectures something is 'real' (at least in science), Popper claims, when one observes its effect on something else which is known to be real: 'We accept "things" as real if they can causally act upon, or interact with, ordinary material things'.[12] Thus, though physical forces and fields are not 'stuff', we grant that they are real because they interact directly or indirectly on material things.[13]

Similarly, Popper thinks, we ought to grant the reality of objects of World3 and World2—they are even less concrete than physical fields and so forth, but nonetheless they exercise great power on World1.[14] Ambition, for example, is a World2 phenomenon which produces remarkable changes in World1. Popper seems to suggest that the efficacy of World3 and World2 on World1 prevents reducing World2 and World3 phenomena to World1 phenomena.[15] The former set has inviolable reality and integrity apart from World1, and this prompts the tripartite division.

Though Carteisan dualism and Popperian tripartitism differ in detail, their general strategy seems similar—the physical, and the mental, are different kinds of being altogether in the sense that one cannot ontologically be reduced to the other. A particle in World1, for example, cannot be said to be conscious, for consciousness belongs to World2. Another important similarity is the claim that the mental can, by its own power, causally act upon the physical (the body) to produce changes in the material sphere. However, this is precisely where a difficulty arises which threatens the dualist project. If the mind and body are so fundamentally distinct, how can they be said to interact with one another? The puzzle is 'how something ponderous and spatial can interact with something entirely nonspatial'.[16] This seems to be particularly damaging to Descartes' position, but Popper's conception seems less vulnerable.

For Popper World2 and World3 are 'emergent'—they are relatively new products of ongoing evolution. What Popper is suggesting is radical—he thinks that the material universe has evolved itself out of its materiality.[17] Thus, there is *more* to the universe now than just space, and the objects in space. Darwin is right about evolution, but evolution

has been more than just physical—the universe has become in a sense creative, for it has evolved beings which are creative, and since new 'spaces' of creativity (World3, World2) are non-spatial, the universe has transcended World1. It is fairly uncomplicated to see how this removes the problem of accounting for interaction. Because the universe itself has become 'multidimensional' (it has become more than spatial), where World2 and World3 are like new 'forces', it is not inconceivable that these new forces act upon the older World1, and vice-versa. The conceptual difficulty is lightened because the extension of 'universe' is itself broadened by nicely appealing to evolutionary principles.

However, it is not at all clear how World1 could have produced World2 and World3 in such a way that the latter pair are ontologically and causally independent of World1. Popper admits, 'Now I want to emphasize how little is said by saying that the mind is an emergent product of the brain. It has practically no explanatory value, and it hardly amounts to more than putting a question mark at a certain place in human evolution.'[18] Churchland prefers to put the 'question mark' on the notion that matter transcends itself:

> [The irreducibility of mind] sits poorly with the joint claim that mental properties emerge from nothing more than organizational achievements of physical matter [evolution]. If that is how mental properties are produced, then one would expect a physical account of them to be possible. The simultaneous claim of evolutionary emergence *and* physical irreducibility is prima facia puzzling.[19]

I agree with Churchland, and note that one of the reasons for Popper's attraction to dualism is that he finds materialistic monism unpalatable, for he thinks that materialism cannot adequately account for the fact that World2 and World3 causally effect (through the brain) changes in World1.[20] So it seems not too far from the truth to say that Popper likes dualism because he dislikes materialism. We will have occasion to present Popper's objections to materialism later on in this paper.

PHILOSOPHICAL BEHAVIOURISM

I shall be explicating in this section what is called 'logical behaviourism'. The logical behaviourist draws inspiration from the work carried out by the Vienna Circle, and tries to extend logical positivist criteria of meaning to psychological sentences. The gist of the behaviourist position can be succinctly stated thus: ' . . . in so far as psychological sentences are intelligible, they describe "physical behaviour"'.[21] Comprehending the behaviourist's reasoning for this claim involves examining the theory of meaning endorsed by the behaviourist.

For the logical positivist, in addition to tautological statements, only

sentences which are in principle empiricially verifiable as true or false are meaningful. Hempel declares:

> *The meaning of a statement is established by the conditions of its verification.* In particular, two differently formulated statements have the same meaning or the same effective content when, and only when, they are both true or both false in the same conditions. Furthermore, a statement for which one can indicate absolutely no conditions which verify it, which is in principle incapable of confrontation with test conditions, is wholly devoid of content and without meaning.[22]

Hempel is clearly saying that only sentences which have as their content objectively accessible facts are meaningful. This necessitates analysing psychological sentences such as 'Joe has a backache' (if they are to be sensical) into a set of behavioural facts about Joe which show that he does indeed have a backache. These sentences have to be analysed into behavioural statements because behavioural statements are objectively verifiable. So the only way, within the logical positivist framework of meaning, for any psychological statement to have content is if that statement were a 'short-hand' manner of expressing a publicly observable (everyone must have access to the phenomena) set of behaviours. This follows because the meaning of a sentence is a function of the various conditions of verification, and certain behaviours are the only ways of verifying that the corresponding psychological statement is true or false. In other words, since there is no way that one can have access to another's mind, the only remaining option is to take behaviour, which is publicly accessible, as the meaning of the psychological sentence (this is the consequence of a verificationist theory of meaning). The privacy of mental phenomena precludes the possibility that we can meaningfully refer to them in language.

Let us consider, for example, 'Joe has a backache'. Now, in order to determine its meaning, we should ask ourselves the question, says the behaviourist, 'What are the conditions of verification of this statement? (When would we say that it is true or it is false that Joe has a backache?)'. There are clearly a number of such conditions, but a few of them would look something like:

(a) Joe's rubbing his back, groaning, grimacing or making some such signs.
(b) When asked, 'What's the matter?' Joe utters the words, 'My back hurts', in a sulky sort of voice.
(c) Inflammation is observed on the back.
(d) Certain processes are occurring in Joe's nervous system in such and such ways.

The behaviourist *denies* that the above statements express the *symptoms*

of backache—rather these statements (there can be, and there are, many more of course) *are* the meaning of 'backache'. To think that these are symptoms of backache is as absurd as thinking that the system of physical test sentences which determine the temperature of a place are symptoms of temperature. For a place to have a certain temperature amounts exactly to saying that the thermometer in the place reads 70 degrees, the molecules in the air are jostling each other in at a certain pace, and so on (imagine an exhaustive list) and these 'physical test sentences' are not symptoms of something else which is called 'temperature'.[23] Similarly certain behaviours and bodily conditions exhaust the extension of 'backache', and 'backache' does not refer to something over and above these 'test stentences' of which the behaviour and body states are symptoms or indicators.

All this leads directly to the conclusion that the mind–body problem is a myth created out of philosophers' careless use of language. The meaning of all mental/psychological terms and statements can only be linked to behaviour and body/brain states, for meaning consists of nothing but objective facts. This does not deny that there are mental phenomena, but only that to talk about mental phenomena, and to articulate a science of mental phenomena is fundamentally meaningless and nonsensical. To deny that mental phenomena exist (in a sense which excludes the physical) already presupposes that 'mind' has meaning apart from the behaviour which is associated with it, and this is precisely what the behaviourist does not grant—the behaviourist thinks that it is absurd to talk of 'mind' as standing over and above a certain set of physical processes[24] (human bodies behaving in such and such ways). 'Mind' simply stands for the set of behaviours which is displayed when it is said that one possesses it—talking, laughing, crying, etc. And by physics these behaviours are properly describable, in principle at least.[25]

Quite frankly, the behaviourist doctrine seems incredible. I will list three objections (there are very many of these in the literature), which, when taken together, convincingly explode it. The obvious flank of attack is frontal: it is plainly absurd to assert that one cannot talk about mental events that everyone experiences for oneself. The fact of the matter seems that there are mental occurrences, like pain, and one is aware of one's mind, and its various contents, and one can clearly and meaningfully refer to one's feelings and thoughts. When I am in pain I do not mean by 'pain' a set of 'objectively verifiable behaviour'—I mean pain, the kind that I feel. This kind of direct awareness of pain is something fundamental, and as H.H. Price says, ' . . . if anyone says he cannot understand what I am talking about, I do not know how I can help him . . . everyone knows for himself that being aware of something is totally different from any kind of bodily happening. . . .'[26]

Putnam has formulated a thought experiment which shows that 'pain' must mean something over and above relevant behaviour. The

logical behaviourist holds that 'pain' is to be identified with the appropriate set of behaviour and bodily states. Imagine, Putnam asks us, a community of 'superspartans', who have trained themselves over generations not to exhibit any sign of pain whatsoever. 'They do not wince, scream, flinch, sob, grit their teeth, exhibit beads of sweat . . . .'[27] Does the fact that they do not show any sign of pain, then, necessitate our not ascribing pain to them? Putnam does not think so, and it seems obvious that one can be in pain without displaying any of the associated behaviour.[28] This suggests that 'pain' means, *contra* the logical behaviourist, the mental state of pain of which certain behaviours can be considered *symptoms.*

The second objection strikes at the heart of the behaviourist view—the idea that meaning ought to be determined by verification (the notion that the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions used to show its truth or falsehood). In *Investigations* Wittgenstein compellingly shows that meaning is fluid, and varies according to use and purpose.[29] If this is the case, the verificationist principle of meaning is merely a kind of usage, and it is not *the* only way sentences or words may be used meaningfully. If one restricts meaning to verification, then one is merely playing a certain language game, and has not provided a model of language itself. So we simply deny that the only meaningful sentences and words are those which can be in principle objectively and empirically verified. It is meaningful to refer to mental processes despite the fact that only person who has access to one's mind is oneself—this is our language game![30]

The third flaw lies in the fact that it seems impossible to reduce certain mental features like beliefs and desires to purely dispositional/behavioural statements without recourse to other beliefs and desires.[31] This poses an intractable difficulty for the progress of the behaviourist programme. Consider the propositon, 'John believes that it is going to rain.' Since we require a behavioural analysis of this belief, we may look to see if John is going to close the windows or not (or something in a similar vein). But John is going to close the window only if he also *desires* that water not flow into the room. This introduces a desire into the analysis of a belief, and this desire is itself in need of being expressed in terms of behaviour. However, according to Searle, if we begin to analyse this desire, another belief enters into the picture, and soon we lose sight of the original belief, and we get nowhere in our attempt to give a purely behavioural restatement.[32] This suggests that the contents of psychological words and propositions are the respective *mental* states.

The many difficulties of philosophical behaviourism makes it an awkward position to defend. The flight of philosophers from it, Churchland notes, was swift when other alternatives were articulated.[33] We shall follow these philosophers' varied flight paths, though we may not necessarily rest where they finally might have.

IDENTITY THEORY

Feigl, Place and Smart seem to be the main scholars of the mid-twentieth century who advanced the notion that mental states are identical with brain processes. Place and Smart are concerned to defend identity theory by denying that the identity asserted can be dismissed on logical grounds.[34] The discussion centres around the identity of sensations with certain brain processes (whatever is argued for sensations can be extended to other mental events as well). The brain process doctrine, Smart tells us, is *not* the claim that sensation terms (like 'pain') *mean* the same as certain brain states of some kind, rather it is the claim that the 'something' which is referred to by 'pain' is a particular brain state describable by neurobiology (and therefore, ultimately by physics).[35] The analogy given is that though 'lightning' does not mean the same as 'electrical discharge', lightning nonetheless refers to, and indeed is identical with (according to modern science) electrical discharge. This seems to rescue the identity theorist from an objection to the effect that because mental statements are not translatable into the language of neurobiology (because no mental term even remotely means anything neurochemical or neural), mental statements are not to be identified with brain activity.[36] Indeed, Smart is willing to grant a logic, and an independent meaning domain to mental statements which are utterly different from the logic and meanings of brain process propositions. However, this fact does not entail that what are being talked about by mental statements are in reality brain processes, just as even though the concept 'nation' has a pattern of use and meaning distinct from statements about citizens, the primary *constituents* of nation are its citizens. Smart says, '. . . the fact that the logic of A-statements is different from that of B-statements does not insure that As are anything over and above Bs.'[37] Hence, the fact that mental statements are different from brain statements does not ensure that mental phenomena are anything over and above brain processes.

Smart, then, is saying that mental words like 'pain' do not refer to psychical entities or processes—indeed such entities cannot exist, in the same way an independently existing entity, nation, does not exist in addition to the citizens, if the identity theory is true. The term 'pain' here becomes topic-neutral, or quasi-logical. That is, our ordinary use of 'pain' leaves open the question of what pain is (its ontological nature), according to Smart. This motivates him to assert, partly because of the advances made in the sciences regarding brain research, and partly because of the greater parsimony achieved, that there is only one class, the material, and not two classes of substance.[38] It also means that the dualist is wrong in concluding, from the fact that people speak of pain, and other sensations (people give introspective reports), that there indeed are psychical entities or phenomena.[39]

In addition to there not being substances, identity theory also requires

there not even be two kinds of properties or features (there cannot be properties which are non-physical), for if there were non-physical properties, they will be outside the theoretical sphere of neuroscience, and we would then not have strict materialism, and thus we would not have identity theory. Unfortunately or fortunately, this is where the identity theory seems to fail to hold water. Suppose someone tells us that he saw an after-image of a colour. J. Shaffer now argues that there was something that the person noticed which he described as an 'after-image', and furthermore, that this something has a feature which enabled him to discriminate that the something which he was reporting was an after-image as opposed to, say, a thought, or a pain.[40] This 'feature' which allows the man to distinguish an after-image from other phenomena (which are also objects of introspection) cannot be physical, for the man, when he is introspecting ('perceiving' the after-image with his 'inner eye'), '. . . does not notice that his brain is in some particular state, nor does he notice any external stimulus and the neurological response'.[41] In other words, there is nothing about this distinguishing feature (that by virtue of which the man tells after-images apart from other mental phenomena) which reveals brain process, or neuronal activity, or anything physical at all. Yet we cannot deny that he must be noticing some distinguishing feature. This implies that the distinguishing feature must be psychical, contra the identity theorist.

Churchland valiantly tries to defend the identity theory from the above line of assault, but I am afraid that he is acting like Don Quixote. Churchland argues as follows:[42] We know that colours and tastes, heat, a table, and the physical world in general is not what it seems like—the world is really made up of particles and fields, and so forth. Why do not our senses reveal this? Because they are not sensitive enough—they are not powerful enough to show the atoms jostling each other in a table, for instance. Nor can they reveal that red is electromagnetic radiation of such and such frequency. Similarly, our inner sense (introspection) must also not be sensitive enough to detect that what it is really 'perceiving' when it sees an after-image is a brain process. In effect, Churchland is finding a way around the intuition that the 'distinguishing feature' mentioned in the previous paragraph is not physical. Churchland would consider the 'distinguishing feature' as really being some brain state; and our not perceiving it thus just reveals the crudeness of our faculties of introspection. Hence the 'distinguishing feature' is not psychic, and there is no need to postulate non-physical entities.

I would like to offer two criticisms of Churchland. First, it is questionable whether introspection is like the other senses—whether it is another 'organ'—I do not think there exists some part of the brain whose sole function is to be able to perceive brain processes. Moreover, there seems to be no reason, except Churchland's alleging so, to think that introspection is imperfect as our physical senses are. If we stop here

we have a stand-off, and I am inclined to think that the opponent of the identity thesis is at an advantage. It is easier to conceive of our being able to perceive gradually, if our power of sight were gradually increased, the atoms of a table, but it seems impossible that if the power of introspection were so increased, that we would gradually be able to make out our neurons firing away at the 'spot' of consciousness where I am seeing the after-image of the colour green, for example.

Second, Churchland does not pay sufficient attention to the ontological nature of the appearance-reality distinction. It is not the case that the *sensation* of heat is the kinetic energy of fast-moving particles. Heat itself might be kinetic energy of the movement of particles, but I do not *feel* the particles moving—I do not feel any particles at all. Churchland would say that my experience of heat is unrefined—if I really felt heat *fully*, I would sense the movement of the molecules. But the important point is that my experience is still an experience, albeit unrefined, and therefore it is real, and *mine*. Someone else who is less sensitive to heat might not 'feel it' as much I do (he is even less sensitive to the movement of particles than I) and that is his subjective experience of heat, and it is also real. Now, since this subjective experience of heat is quite real to most of us, let us ask what it is. Well, the identity theorist would argue that it is a brain state—i.e. a set of neurons shooting electrochemicals (roughly)—call these 'neural-firings 1'—in response to having come in contact with heat (fast-moving particles). But my *subjective experience* of heat does not feel like that at all—I do not sense any neural activity in my *feeling* of heat. Churchland would now quip, 'Aha, but if you could only feel [introspection] your *feeling* of heat in a finer way [if you were only more sensitive to your subjective experience of heat] *then* you would feel the neural activity.' Very well, let me concede Churchland's point. So now I will say that I cannot perceive that my *subjective experience* of heat is identical to neural-firings 1, but my subjective experience is the vague experience (this must be *very* vague indeed, because I have no clue at all about any neurons when I feel heat) of neuron-firings 1.

Let us take stock. My subjective experience of heat is allegedly identical to neuron-firings 1. However, I cannot *feel* neuron-firings 1 in my experience of heat. Churchland's explanation: my experience of heat is a 'rough feeling' of neuron-firings 1, just as red is a rough perception of electromagnetic particles at a certain frequency. My experience of heat, then, is the vague experience of neuron-firings 1. Another way to put this is that my *vague experience* of neuron-firings 1 is the *appearance of neuron-firings 1* and my vague experience is not the neuron-firings 1 themselves (for if this were so, I could have felt the neurons blasting away). Now, clearly this appearance is not unreal—appearances are not nothing—they exist; however, obviously, the appearance is not identical to the reality, for if this were so, the

appearance would cease to be considered an apprearance. Therefore, the *appearance of neuron-firings 1* is ontologically distinct from/is not identical to, neuron-firings 1 (though the latter may be said to cause the fomer). Well, what shall we do with the *appearance of neuron-firings 1?* Any sensible person will have to say that it is something undeniably mental. But according to identity theory, it must be identical to some neural activity (call this neural-firings 2), and according to Churchland, I do not feel it as neural activity because my 'feeling capacity' is not sensitive enough. Thus, the *appearance of neuron-firings 1* will have to be considered the appearance of neuron-firings 2. It is obvious that we will have to proceed *ad infinitum* if we want to pin down the appearance of neuron-firings 1 to some neural activity. Churchland's suggestion, coupled with the identity theory, leads to absurdity.

Churchland does not seem to appreciate what Searle has neatly stated: '*Where appearance is concerned we cannot make the appearance–reality distinction because the appearance is the reality.*'[43] Churchland runs into difficulty in the previous paragraph because he fails to realize that if he holds that a sensation is really a 'vague image' of a brain state, he must concede that this 'vague image' is the *appearance* of the brain state. But this does not make the 'vague image', the appearance, nothing—it has an ontological status, it is real, as Searle says. But now the identity hypothesis kicks in—we will have to concede that there is another brain state which is identical to the vague image. However, this vague image does not look anything like this second brain state, and soon we will be postulating more brain states, and however many we postulate, we will not ever be able to reduce the vague feeling of a brain state to the brain state.

The identity theory, in addition to being vulnerable to J. Shaffer's argument, uses a *pattern/form* of argument which would support idealistic monism, something which the proponents of identity theory would find most repulsive indeed, being the materialists they are. Very roughly stated, if identity of mental with the physical is granted, then why should we read the identity from left to right? Perhaps the physical ought to be reduced to the psychical? The materialist will no doubt point to various experiments which suggest that we ought to read the identity from left to right—we stick electrodes into the brain, and lo and behold, a memory is triggered, or something else of the sort might happen. I contend that this does not prove much. Let me give an analogy. Consider a boy pushing a little wagon in front of him. Clearly the boy is causing the movement of the wagon. Imagine now, that in his youthful exuberance, he fails to notice a small rock in the path of the wagon. The wagon's wheels collide with the rock and the boy is thrown forward because of the wagon's stopping—the boy is affected. Now, I am suggesting that it is conceivable that the relation of mind to brain is like of the boy to wagon respectively, and the rock's stopping the

wagon, and the resulting effect on the boy is comparable to a scientist poking an electrode into the brain, and the resulting effect on the mind. Clearly, the fact that the wagon stopped, and the result that the boy was affected (thrown forward) does not imply that the wagon is identical to the boy. Why should not the situation be similar in the case of mind and brain?

So, perhaps one can hold that, given the identity thesis, it is really the brain which is identical to mind, and the rest of the world, too, is really mental stuff. Of course one cannot render a full account of all this yet—the science of mind has not progressed that much (though it seems to have in some eastern cultures). One can claim that the usual meanings of physical and mental terms are different, but all physical terms refer to mental entities and processes. This would just reverse the identity theorist's pattern of argument so that the opposite view, idealistic monism, would emerge. All in all, identity theory does not seem to fare well.

Before I move on to the next section, I want to discuss Popper's attack on identity theory. Popper says, 'Before starting to criticize the identity theory, let me make it quite clear that I regard it as a perfectly consistent theory of the relation of mind and body . . . the theory *may* therefore, be true.'[44] What Popper is talking about here is not so much the notion of ontological reduction, but the idea of causal reduction of mind to matter. Popper does not seem to argue along the line followed by Shaffer and others[45] who share Shaffer's intuition that one cannot ontologically reduce the mind, which is essentially subjective, to the objective physical world.[46] Rather, he takes it for granted that there is a sense in which mind is real, at least in so far as it is an appearance. What he isolates for criticism is the idea that mind may be causally impotent—everything which the mental is said to have caused is really caused by some brain process, the identity theorist urges (and so do materialists in general, if I may add). Popper thinks that causally reducing the mind to brain processes runs counter to Darwinism, and hence identity theory is untenable.

Popper recasts the identity theory into his terminology: World2 and World3 phenomena are really World1 phenomena, and so World2 and World3 are not needed—the world works without the latter pair. This, Popper contends, contradicts Darwinism: 'Darwinism explains the emergence of things or processes only if they make a difference. The identity theory adds a new aspect to the closed physical world, but it cannot explain that this aspect is of advantage in the struggles and pressures of World1.'[47] Popper seems to be suggesting that we cannot grant the identity thesis (or materialism) because the follwing obtain:

(a) Only real things/processes are causally efficacious[48] —appearances are not.
(b) According to Darwinism, nature evolves only causally

efficacious processes/things (a product of evolution must make a difference in the world—i.e. give some power to the creature which helps it to survive), and since mind is a product of evolution, it is causally efficacious, and hence as real as World1 objects (by [a]).
(c) According to identity theory, World2 and World3 phenomena are not causally efficacious—only World1 is so.
(d) But (c) contradicts (b).

It would seem on the face of it that Popper is right (if one is willing to accept his assumptions, especially [a]). If it is indeed the case that mind cannot be ontologically reduced to brain processes, then it is something over and above, ontologically, the brain. However, this still leaves open the possibility that the brain is the cause of the mind, and hence all apparent causal acts of mind can be explained in terms of neural activity. For example, my wishing to go to a doctor, and actually going (here my *wish*, one may think, was the cause of many changes in World1—my taking a bus, etc.) are explainable in terms of the brain processes which cause and sustain this wish if one holds that mind is causally reducible to brain. Popper would disagree at this point and say:

(a) All products of evolutions are causally efficacious.
(b) Mind (World3 and World2) is a product of evolution, and mind is more than brain.
(c) Hence mind is causally efficacious.
(d) Therefore, mind is real, in the full sense of the term, and is causally independent of brain (World1).

I am not quite sure if Popper's criticisms can be deflected by materialists. A good point of departure for a defence seems to be Popper's claim that something's being real entails that it have causal powers. Popper's attack unearths, I think, the fact that if the impossibility of ontological reduction of mind is granted, then causal reduction also becomes a difficult position to defend, because it then becomes a matter of metaphysical prejudice whether one wishes to read causal reduction from mind to matter (materialism), or from matter to mind (idealism), or whether one holds that both interact (dualism). I will treat this issue in the final section at greater depth.

FUNCTIONALISM

As we saw in the previous section, trying to identify a mental state with a strictly corresponding neural (physical) state seems untenable. An alternative is to announce that no *particular* neural activity is identical to a mental state, but rather there exists some neural activity (not necessarily of the same kind) which is always identical to the mental state. This, however, totters at the border between dualism and materialism because

nothing physical could account for how two persons' beliefs could be thought to be the same on materialist grounds.[49] For example, if Ram and Bhim both believe that Bombay is a dirty city, and it is entirely conceivable that there is no one kind of brain state with which those beliefs can be thought to be identical (i.e. in Ram the belief 'Bombay is a dirty city' is identical to one kind of neural firing, say 'j', and in Bhim to 'k' where k =/= j), then their beliefs are identical purely because of their being *beliefs*— their beliefs being the same kind of *mental* entity.

Functionalism could save this less strict sort of identity theory (called 'token-token identity' in contrast to 'type-type') by holding that two mental states are similar if the respective neurophysiological states with which they are claimed to be identical are functional, and also functionally similar.[50] Full-blown functionalism proceeds further—it is not even necessary that the corresponding physical state be neural, or even organic—what counts is the inner structure, or the very manner in which various parts of some physical system are causally connected. The manner of functioning of a physical system *is* a specific kind of mental state—the mental state *is* the functioning (causal interactivity) of a physical system organized in a certain fashion. Thus, 'what is important for mentality is not the matter of which the creature is made, but the structure of the internal activities which that matter sustains.'[51] This allows the functionalist to maintain, for instance, that a Martian, whose brain is materially different than ours, can also have the same sorts of experiences that we do, because both his brain and ours function similarly. Albeit different substances constitute his and our respective brains, both types of brains are organized and *operate* similarly—their causal structure, or causal form, is the same, and hence he and we can legitimately be said to feel sorrow, for example. This of course implies the possibility that a sophisticated enough silicon-based computer would be conscious if it were built such that its causal internal organization mimicked the causal functional structures of the human brain.

What needs to be emphasized here is that the mental state is defined solely in terms of the various causal *relations* that obtain within a system taken together with its responses to various inputs, and other mental states. Two physical systems are considered to be in similar mental states when they *function* along similar lines and it does not matter at all that the various parts of the system be of the same material or shape or anything else of this sort. Illustrating how a functionalist conceives of a mental state will be helpful. Let us take pain. Suppose that pain is caused by ' . . . pinpricks and causes worry and the emission of loud noises, and worry, in turn causes brow-wrinkling'[52] (this is obviously a ridiculous theory of pain, but it is being adopted for heuristic purposes). Now, according to the functionalist, one is said to be in pain when one has this state, i.e., when one has a state ' . . . that is caused by pinpricks and causes worry and the emission of loud noises, and worry, in turn

causes brow-wrinkling'.[53] The very *being* of someone in a state which displays the various causal relations constitutes pain. Pains are just like carburettors in so far as both characterize the operation of a system. Anything which ' . . . mixes gasoline and air and sends the mixture to the ignition chamber, which in turn . . .'[54] and so on can be thought to be a carburettor. Notice here that regardless of the physical design or type of material used, being a carburettor rests in a physical system which carries on the causally related activity of mixing petrol with air, sending the resultant mixture to the ignition chamber, etc., etc. A system is a carburettor not because it has such and such physical properties, but because it *does* such and such—*functioning* as a carburettor is what makes a carburettor a carburettor. Similarly, urges the functionalist, what makes pain a pain is pain's functioning as a pain.

Putnam admits, and I agree wholeheartedly, that the functionalist hypothesis is a bit opaque.[55] Functionalists seem to be philosophers who cannot make themselves become dualists (because of their materialist leanings) but at the same time who recognize the deficiencies of straightforward identity theory. The central problem with functionalism is that the definition of mental states purely in terms of causal relations cannot account for the qualitative feel of mental states.

It is possible to *conceive*, the story goes, that two people are in identical functional states when perceiving, say a banana, and yet one may actually be seeing the banana as being red, and the other person might be seeing it as being blue (spectrum inversion). Functionalism, then, fails to account for this possibility—indeed this possibility is inconceivable for functionalism. Thus, it seems to be false.[56]

The second objection is, I think, more convincing. Functionalism identifies mental states with certain causal relations, and with the properties of the components which make up the physical system. Block launches the following argument:[57] suppose, he says, that the billion and odd people of China were to be organized into interacting with one another so that they are functionally organized like a human brain, can we then say that this organization is capable of being a subject possessing consciousness? Surely not. Obviously, there seems to be something lacking in the functionalist account—mind. Let me now turn to materialism in the Indian tradition.

CARVAKAS

The Carvakas are ancient Indian materialists.[58] Much of their philosophical works have not survived, and we are forced to piece together their position from the writings of their philosophical opponents. There seems to be some controversy in the literature about whether or not the Carvakas (also called 'Lokayatas') were also sceptics who denied the necessary truth of inference (like Hume) in addition to

being thoroughgoing materialists. I am not interested in entering into this debate here, and I intend to focus on the nature of their materialism, and some of the objections raised against them by their opponents concerning their materialism.

Before proceeding to explicate the Carvaka doctrine, a note on the primary issue around which the Indian philosphical tradition revolves to a great extent seems necessary. The principal question addressed by many ancient Indian thinkers is: 'What is the nature of the self?' Philosophical systems are built on the various responses to questions like: 'Who am I?', 'What, or who is the referent of the term, "I"?'

The Carvakas' response to these queries is *prima facia* appealing: 'The self is the body!'[59] This, however, obliges them to explain how consciousness is caused by the body, for there are other positions which proclaim that the self is consciousness, and that consciousness is independent of body. Let us review Carvaka arguments for thinking that the self is body. The Carvaka wants to defend this definition: ' . . . such a body only which is a combined form or a totality of material elements has been called the self'.[60] The self is that which experiences, does, and sees, and the body satisfies all these conditions, according to the Caravakas. For instance, when one is sitting in the house, reading and writing, the only thing inside the house which can be seen to be performing the activity of reading and writing, claims the Carvaka, is the body. Hence, the body is the doer and experiencer in this case, and thus the body is the self. Similarly, the statement, 'Falling into this pit, I have suffered much pain' reveals that the self or 'I' is to be identified with body, for that which has fallen into the pit is the body, and nothing else. Therefore what has suffered pain is the body, thus the 'I' in 'I have suffered pain' must be referring to the body.[61] Furthermore, claims the Carvaka, because the self appears when the body appears, and does not appear where the body does not, the body is the substratum of the self.[62] The body is material, and for the Carvaka matter is divided into four and only four categories: earth, water, fire and air.[63] All material things are made up of some combination of these four types of matter.

The Carvaka does not deny that consciousness is real, but he denies that consciousness is not sustained by the body. Consciousness is not something over and above the living body. I would say that the Carvaka position is a brand of identity theory, however I do not think that anyone holds exactly this brand in contemporary western philosophy. But it does seem to me that there is some conceptual parallel between the Carvakas and Searle—more on this in the next section. Let me quote the Carvaka account of mind: 'Due to the combinaton of the forms of matter such as the earth, etc., as also due to transformation in the shape of a body, consciousness is produced in the body, just as the power of intoxication is produced from the ingredients of a spiritous drink.'[64] Clearly, 'power of intoxication' and 'spiritous drink' are here

being considered analogous to 'consciousness' and 'body' respectively. The idea seems to be that the body is a certain combination of matter which *becomes* so as to exhibit consciousness properties. Thus, mental stuff is nothing other than physical stuff (some combination of air, water, earth and fire). This follows because the power of intoxication does not exist apart from the spirited drink—indeed it is the spirited drink *being* in a certain combination which makes the spirited drink spirited/intoxicating. If mind has a material cause (in Aristotle's sense) then for the Carvaka that material cause is not mental 'stuff', rather it is material stuff organized/combined in such and such way.

The notion of combination is important because it supports the Carvaka's disbelief in reincarnation or the immortality of the soul, or views of this sort. If it is the case that there exists some material stuff which behaves exactly like consciousness stuff, then, one might be tempted to say, this material stuff is capable of entering into different bodies, and continuing on after the destruction of the specific body it inhabits. The Carvaka avoids this by saying that consciousness obtains only as long as the body is living—i.e. as long as the body exists in such and such combination (ultimately) of earth, fire, water and air—for consciousness is identical to this *combination of matter* (as opposed to being identical just to the matter, or just to the combination).

The Carvaka is contending that the *combination of x, y, z*, where x, y, z are certain kinds of material substances, can have an essence distinct from any of the individual essences of x, y, z. Therefore, the *combination of x, y, z* is ontologically distinct from x, y, or z; however, the combination of x, y, z is ontologically *dependent* on x, y, and z—in an important sense x, y, z cause and sustain their combine. The Carvaka shows that it is possible for the combination to be ontologically distinct from its constitutents by pointing to the spirited drink. The essence of spirited drink is the power of intoxication, but none of the ingredients of liquor have the power of intoxication as their respective essences.

It is now easy to see how the spirited drink-intoxication analogy rescues the Carvaka from the unsophisticated objection that because we do not observe any property of consciousness in a dead body, bodies do not have consciousness as their property.[65] Just as the alcoholic drink is intoxicating only so long as it remains in a particular combination, similarly the body is conscious only so long as it maintains a certain combination and mixture of earth, air, fire and water. The Carvaka reply to the above objection would say that a dead body has obviously lost this special combination, and consequently there is no more consciousness.

It is worthwhile to reiterate that for the Carvaka, consciousness *is* the *being* of matter which is in a certain combination. A pain, for example, would be some sort of disturbance of matter (for it is the body which falls into the pit and gets hurt, for instance). The after-image of orange

would literally be some subtle orangey matter in the eye—the Carvaka claims that the sense organs possess their respective kinds of knowledge.[66] Surely, no one in contemporary western philosophy holds that neural activity is coloured, or something like that. The Carvakas, however, did not have the advantages of modern physiology, and so their identity theory is not as sophisticated.

There are quite a number of objections advanced against the Carvakas by Indian philosophers of other schools. I shall consider two which seem decently potent. The second argument seems to be powerful enough to adversely affect present-day identity theories. Vacaspati Misra argues that since spirited drink is made up of component particles which are intoxicating to a lesser degree, it must also be the case that '. . . consciousness should be present, though in a very small degree, in each of the component parts of the body'.[67] Misra concludes that this would imply that there would be numerous consciousnesses present in a single body, each following its own intention and direction. As a result, the observed unity of consciousness is fatally compromised. Hence, the Carvaka view must be false.

The second objection (Sankara's) runs as follows:[68] we know that in general, for any element/material substance x, x cannot be its own object. Fire cannot burn itself (the set of objects which can be burned excludes fire), nor can an acrobat, regardless of extraordinary agility, climb on his own shoulders. Now if consciousness were material, then matter would become an object to itself, for matter is an object for consciousness—the body is grasped by consciousness. But this contradicts the principle that no physical process can have itself as an object of the process. The only way matter can be an object for consciousness is if consciousness is not identical with matter. I do not see why this principle of Sankara cannot be extended to attack all forms of identity theory. It is obvious that it is conceivable that I can observe my neural processes (imagine some device which will enable me to do this). Thus, my neural processes can become objects for themselves. This contradicts Sankara's principle that in the material world, a physical process cannot itself become an object of the process. (A modern example: magnetism cannot attract or repel itself—it cannot be its own object, so to speak.)

The alternative for the materialist is the position that there is something physical which cannot become an object of conciousness at all, because it itself is what is being consciousness. This would imply that this physical 'thing'—maybe it is some part of the brain (we would not be able to ever grasp it through consciousness of course)—would forever remain inaccessible to us. Some philosophers have suggested something like this, but it surely seems somewhat wierd to push it. If we cannot in principle fully[69] access this physical process which underlies mind, then we cannot describe the physical process using our knowledge of physiology or physics. So why subscribe to materialism at all?

SEARLE AND THE CARVAKAS

Ontological irreducibility of mind to brain processes, it seems to me, is a truth. However, Searle seems to think that mind is causally dependent on the brain.[70] Let me sketch Searle's position. According to him, mind and brain stand in the same relation as liquidity stands to water. Such a characterization, he claims, enables him to hold that though mind is ontologically irreducible to brain, nonetheless brain sustains and is the causal ground of consciousness.[71] Searle's intuition runs something like: water is H_2O, and there is nothing about H_2O which would make it liquid. However, when they are at a certain temperature, and when 'they are all put together', they exhibit liquidity—they behave 'liquidly'. If one looks closely at water one sees molecules, and liquidity is not an attribute of any of these particles. Liquidity is a phenomenon which is produced when the molecules are *being* in a certain complex, combined manner. And their being thus is ontologically distinct from any of the properties they enjoy individually. In other words, water, the *combination* of many H_2O molecules, is essentially liquid, while none of the individual H_2O molecules possess liquidity as a feature. Though the combination, water, is ontologically distinct from its constituents, H_2O molecules, water is still ontologically dependent on H_2O. This is what Searle means when he says that mind is ontologically irreducible to brain, and yet the former is causally dependent on the latter. Mind is a 'surface feature' of the complex inter-relations of brain *activity*, and this complex of activity is ontologically distinct from those which are sustaining the activity (neurons—brain matter *qua* matter); however this does not mean that the neurons firing off in the ways that they do, do not ontologically sustain mind. That Searle means 'ontolgoical dependence' by 'causal dependence' is seen in the following passage:

> Sometimes people resist my views because of a mistaken conception of the relations between causation and identity. U.T. Place (1988), for example, writes, 'According to Searle mental states are both identical with and causally dependent on the corresponding states of the brain. I say you can't have your cake and eat it. Either mental states are identical with brain states or one is causally dependent on the other. They can't be both.'
>
> Place is thinking of cases such as 'These footprints can be causally dependent on the shoes of the burglar, but they can't also be identical with those shoes.' But how about: 'The liquid state of this water can be causally dependent on the behaviour of the molecules, and can also be a feature of the *system* [my emphasis] made up of the moelcules?' It seems to me just obvious that my present state of consciousness is caused by neuronal behaviour in my brain and that very state just is a higher level feature of the brain. If that amounts to having your cake and eating it too, let's eat.[72]

It seems to me that Searle is saying that ontologically speaking, liquidity is distinct from the molecules themselves, or their behaviour (the behaviour is not liquid), and yet the molecular system taken as a whole sustains liquidity—the *system* is essentially liquid as a *system*, and none of the constituents of the system are liquid. This, I think, begins to look rather similar to the Carvaka view. Searle talks about consciousness being a feature of brain systems (the brain *system* is consciousness) and this is precisely the relation which obtains between power of intoxication and spirited drink respectively. This suggests that Searle is vulnerable to the objections raised against the Carvakas.

Misra's argument can be cast as: Since the system is identical to consciousness, and since the system has parts to it, this means that the parts must also sustain consciousness to a lower degree. But this undermines the unity of consciousness. Searle might retreat and say that we have not arrived at a detailed understanding of the nature of this system—it may not allow of being broken into parts in the way that Misra construes. However, Sankara's refutation seems potent, and we can throw in Popper for good measure, and I also fail to see how any brain process *qua* process/system can be coloured (this must be because the material cause—in Aristotle's sense—of conciousness is the brain process). And I absolutely insist that I can see colours in my mind, when I shut my eyes.

SOME REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

I very much wish to cast doubt on the strength of an argument for materialism (or some form of identity theory) which Churchland has summarized well (when he is arguing against dualism): 'If there really is a distinct entity in which reasoning, emotion, and consciousness take place, and if that entity is dependent on the brain for nothing more than sensory experiences as input and volitional executions as output, then one would expect reason, emotion, and consciousness to be relatively invulnerable to direct control or pathology by manipulation or damage to the brain.'[73] But we know that electrodes, drugs and the like affect mind adversely, and also, when one is knocked on the head one might lose consciousness. All this suggests that mind is brain function and not something apart from brain.

Prima facia this seems like a decisive piece of argument. But it is deceptive to think so. Churchland's argument works just fine when we know that two objects are connected, but not identical. Consider for example, a TV that is on, and working fine. If one fiddles with it, the broadcast is interrupted, and all sorts of malfunctions occur in the sound and the picture. But it is absurd to conclude from this (children have a tendency to, though) that the source of the picture and sound is the TV. Similarly, it is rash to conclude from the fact that 'messing with

the brain' affects the mind, that brain (TV) is the source of mental phenomena (picture, sound). I am not of course suggesting that the kind of relations that obtain between a TV and broadcast stations is the relation between brain and mind. Rather, I just want to point out that it is unthoughtful to suppose that just because poking the brain affects the mind, mind is brain. It is easy for dualism to defend against this type of attack because dualists are interactionists—as Popper would perhaps say, mind and body can causally affect each other because they are connected in such a way that if one pumps drugs into the brain, that would, via the causal link, inevitably produce changes in mind. If brain is smashed to bits, then for the Cartesian dualist the link is severed, and the soul/mind continues on.

The weakness of the dualist position is obviously the nature of this 'link', regardless of whether the type of dualism is Popperian or Cartesian. How this connection could be is conceptually mysterious. 'God' is as good an answer as any, I suppose. But if God provides the link, and God is of a totally different nature from mind or matter, how does He cause the world? One solution to the difficulty is itself a difficulty. This weakness of dualism is exploited to the full by materialists on the one side and idealists on the other. The materialist avoids the conceptual difficulty by trying to reduce mind to matter, and in this way he can eliminate the need for the 'link'. The idealist works in the other direction: he considers matter to be nothing more than mental stuff.

It astonishes me to read so many contemporary philosophers like Searle, Armstrong, Place, Smart, and many others, appealing to 'the world-view of physics' to justify their materialism. The results of physics are consistent with materialism or idealism—Kant, for example, has shown how physical laws can be conceived as the products of the synthetic powers of consciousness. The results of physics look consistent whichever of the three metaphysical frameworks are chosen. But why look to physics? The state of theoretical physics today seems entirely indecisive. Nobody seems to know what the physical world is really like—physicists do not seem to have reached a consensus on what seems to be the simplest question, 'what is an atom, really?', let alone about 'quarks' and 'mesons'. I am inclined to think that all the technological advances that have been attained are not because we have a great and decisive theoretical grasp of the physical universe, but because we have been able to, thanks to experimentation, discover certain mathematically describable relations that occur in the physical universe. We are far from being able to understand what those equations really mean—read the excellent book, *In Search of Schrodinger's Cat*, if this seems unbelievable. Some philosophers seem to be eager, by appealing to physics, to deny the existence of God, for instance, while physicists of the calibre of Einstein and Schrodinger, who know physics better than any philosopher, see nothing inconsistent in believing in mind and

God, or are humble enough to admit that advances in physics do not rule out such possibilities. So let us address the mind–body issue within philosophy, if at all possible, without dragging the imagined 'world-view of physics' into it.

The bad thing about materialism is that it leaves out mind, and the bad thing about idealism is it leaves out matter, and dualism cannot explain the link between matter and mind. Is there an alternative? I think so, and I will briefly sketch some of my thoughts here—I am not going to defend it in this paper though. First, let me say that the mind–body problem seems to be a conceptual problem—we are left with mind, and matter, and we do not quite know how to see the world so that these are seen in unity. As Schrodinger says, 'Subject and object are only one . . . The barrier between them cannot be said to have broken down . . . for this barrier does not exist.'[74] So how can we understand this unity which might allow us to say that mind and world permeate one another? If we do see them as fundamentally unified, then the question of how are they connected ceases to be an ontological puzzle. Such an ontological framework of unity is explicated in the *Mandukya Upanisad*, and the brilliant commentary of Gaudapada which accompanies it. Let us first sketchily explicate what the Upanisads are not.

The mind–body problem is arguably an instance of the general problem of reconciling difference and unity. Given any X and Y, where X and Y are ontologically different from one another, and also seem to be 'together', there seem to be three ways of conceiving their ontological relation:

   (a) X and Y are ontologically self-subsistent (each is the ontological ground or cause of itself, independently of the other).
   (b) X is ontologically dependent on Y—in other words, X is not ontologically self-sustaining, but is somehow critically ontologically dependent on Y. Hence, only Y is ontologically independent and self-sustaining.
   (c) Y is ontologically caused/dependent by/on X.

It should be obvious that if one substitutes mind for X, and matter for Y, (a), (b) and (c) are dualism, materialism and idealism respectively. The difficulties inherent to dualism, materialism and idealism can be seen as features of their respective forms, (a), (b) and (c). If (a) is right, then the fact that X and Y are different and self-existent raises the difficulty of how they could possibly be also interacting—the 'link' problem. The supposition of the truth of (b) or (c) is a conceptual strain because it is not easy to comprehend how one sort of being can be the ontological ground for a very different sort of being—and forcible reduction often fails to acknowledge the very existence of the essential properties of that which is being reduced. The greater weakness is that in principle, it

seems impossible to establish (a) or (b) because both are equally consistent frameworks.

One way of leaving this tangle is to deny that it is possible for X or Y to be ontologically self-existent/self-sustaining. If Z is any 'difference' whatsoever, then we deny that it is self-sustaining. The idea X or Y can self-exist is clearly a presupposition of (a), (b) and (c). In (a) X and Y are self-existing, in (b) Y is so, and in (c) X is supposed self-subsisting. Denying the notion of self-existence (ontological independence) precludes the very possibility of articulating (a), (b) and (c). For any Z, if there exists K such that Z is different from K, and K is different from Z, then Z is not ontologically self-existent is the concise statement of our 'exit' out of our conceptual difficulties (call this 'Alternative Approach'—'AP').

This may prevent us from putting forth dualism, materialism or idealism, but what then do we have? Is there an alternative ontology? How can we negotiate the world when we give up the principle of the possibility of self-existence of some distinct being? This is the challenge to which the Upanisads are a response—AP is the foundation of the Upanisads. It will be foolhardy of me to attempt to fully explicate the Upanisads here.[75] However, I will try a very rough account, to leave one with a flavour of the sort of thing that the Upanisads are driving toward (caveat: any interpretation of the Upanisads will be extremely controversial of course).

For the *Mandukya Upanisad*, the right ontological framework for the universe seems to be the ontological model of dream. Dream is not mind, nor is it brain state, but it is Existence Itself. Let us examine the nature of dream. There is a locus of awareness in dream—the perspective through which I perceive my dream body (if I have one), and also the various 'happenings' in the dream—people and things. I also think and feel, and the home of thoughts and feelings seems to be this locus of awareness. Now it seems obvious that the locus of awareness, and the dream body (if there is one) and the various dream objects and/or dream people are all nothing more than dream itself. This is brought out because one knows, after waking up (or sometimes while dreaming) that one is the entire dream—also we know dream merges into deep sleep, and deep sleep is without difference—it is uniform—it is pure potentiality one might say, and so possesses the capacity to let loose difference, but it does not admit any difference *qua* itself. And so we may hold that the dream encompasses everything in it—the dream is everything that there is in the dream, and though one is not necessarily aware of this while dreaming, one is identical with more than one's locus of awareness in the dream—because one *is* the dream, and because dream is all the objects/phenomena in the dream, one is all the objects and phenomena in the dream also. So the dream subject (the locus of awareness in dream—one's dream perspective) is identical with the

dream object because both are really dream itself. And yet the locus of awareness in dream is phenomenologically different from the various other objects in the dream. This is possible if we deny self-existence to the various phenomena in the dream, including the dream subject and the various objects (this strategy is the essence of AP). Every aspect in the dream is that aspect because some other aspect is not that aspect, and every aspect is that aspect not because that aspect is that aspect. The denial of self-existence to the various phenomena in the dream amounts to denying that they exist by virtue of themselves. This is the principle of co-arising. Now what is the dream itself? We cannot positively characterize dream within the confines of the dream. Because dream is everything in the dream, it cannot be positively characterized—it cannot even be characterized as that which cannot be positively characterized. It stands beyond language and concepts and at the same time permeates them. One cannot know the dream, but one is always identical to it. Dreaming is Existence Itself if we restrict ourselves to the dreaming sphere.

Now, if we extend this model to the waking universe, we will have the waking as that which is being the entire waking world. All phenomena in the waking universe are the waking, and my locus of awareness is identical to the waking, just as in the dream my locus of awareness is the dream. Thus the referent of 'I' when I say 'I' is the waking—the waking, I am alleging, is precisely that which one grasps when one intuits, 'I am.' That primordial sense of *being* is the waking. I am not just a part of the waking, I am the waking, and the waking is me. Thus matter and mind, in so far as they are different, are different not by virtue of themselves, but because they are not each other.

Now, Existence Itself is that which is the waking, the dream, and the deep sleep. Existence Itself is different in Its unity and changing in Its motionlessness. It Is It, and all Is It and It is everything. Just as the waking is identical to the various phenomena in it, and just as dream is identical to everything in it, so Existence Itself is identical to deep sleep, waking and dream—indeed it is Everything Itself which is being deep sleep, dreaming and waking. It is everyone and everything. It is fully every part of Itself—It is universal in Its particularity, and particular in Its universality.

I am saying that the referent of the 'I' of every one of us is Existence Itself. One may call this 'Consciousness' with a big 'C' as opposed to consciousness—the latter is just mind, not the ground of mind. Consciousnesss is, and is all-pervasive. That It is every one of us is suggested by the fact that there are not numerous Consciousnesses. Schrodinger argues:

> . . . one thing can be claimed in favour of the mystical teaching of the 'identity' of all minds with each other and with the supreme mind—as against the fearful monadology of Leibnitz. The doctrine

of identity can claim that it is clinched by the empirical fact that consciousness is never experienced in the plural, only in the singular. Not only has none of us ever experienced more than one consciousness, but there is also no trace of circumstantial evidence of this ever happening anywhere in the world.[76] [Existence Itself is here equivalent to 'mind', 'supreme mind', 'consciousness'.]

I claim that if Existence Itself/Consciousness is granted, then we have an ontological framework where we can say that mind and body are co-extensive. There is no longer an ontological problem of mind–body because this very distinction collapses ontologically. Indeed all that there is, is Existence Itself. AP gives one a radically different perspective, and the old mode of understanding within which the mind–body problems nags one is left behind.

The scientist is free to concentrate on the intricacies of brain or whatever else. *Of course*, fiddling with the brain affects mind, and of course, mind affects the world—everything is so ontologically connected that everything affects everything else—ontologically, everything *is* everything else, and yet phenomenologically, there is difference too. But this difference does not destroy unity, nor does unity destroy difference—Existence Itself is difference and unity.

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Body-Subjectivity in Psychiatry: The Initial Argument*

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The objective of this brief paper is to propose the initial argument which shall allow the body to be understood as being central to the subjectivity of a mentally distressed person. This is sought to be done by reading the thought of Michel Foucault as a revision of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's position on body-intentionality, as it is shown to operate within the domains of temporality, protosociality and social structure.

This may contribute towards the generation of a more viable alternative to the medical psychiatric understanding of human subjectivity in terms of the body, which, in turn, can be incorporated by mental health care strategies seeking ways out other than that offered by medical psychopathology.

THE BODY-SUBJECTIVITY PROBLEM WITHIN MEDICAL PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN THE WEST

One of the dominant and pervasive forms of nineteenth- and twentieth-century mental health care in the West has been that of medicine. According to medical psychopathology,[1] problems largely arise when malfunctioning in neural, metabolic and biochemical forces produce certain aberrant cognitive, perceptual, motor and emotional states, leading to some typical symptoms of mental distress. These disturbed states are apparently disease states in much the same way as physical diseases and they follow a certain establishable pattern.[2] The resultant therapy is, thus, overly medical.

However, a continuing deep-rooted dissatisfaction with this medical appropriation of mental health care and its narrative of humanitarian progressivism in the West has led to the evolution of a number of alternative strategies, almost all of which result in some qualification of

the claims of medical psychiatry. Some such alternatives are counselling and psychotherapies[3] (viz. existential psychotherapy, gestalt therapy, psychoanalytic therapy and cognitive behaviour therapy); socio-political therapeutic movements (viz. anti-psychiatry[4] and democratic psychiatry[5]); and, community care (viz. community mental health[6]). Through an enormous amount of effort down the ages, these alternatives—inspite of the many variations within each of them, and not a few difficulties[7]—have today attained a certain degree of maturity. Despite the continuing predomination of medical psychiatry, these strategies constitute a significant challenge to the thought and practice of medical psychiatry.

The general complaint against medical psychiatry is, of course, that it prevents mentally distressed persons[8] from 'coming to terms with crises that reflect underlying interpersonal or social or economic problems'.[9] Furthermore, there is a persistent illogical refusal to recognize the similarities between what is taken to be the normal modern western consciousness and what is taken to be the distorted consciousness of mentally distressed persons.[10] One of the fundamental problems with medical psychiatry, however, is its understanding of the human body, and its relationship with selfhood and identity.

Medical psychiatry is composed of elements of several positions on the relationship of the mind and body to human subjectivity, ranging between the poles of what has often been called 'psychophysical dualism' and 'psychophysical monism'. However, there seem to be two dominant positions. First, there is a psychopathology and therapy which is based on a form of monism in which the neural functions of the person gather together into activities which define his[11] subjectivity. Although the brain becomes the centre of its explanation, this position claims to overcome the mind-body dualism (and its associated difficulties) by emphasizing on the holistic bodily and brain neural mechanisms.[12] In so far as the neural brain is often seen to operate on representational or information processing principles this position suffers from the dualism of 'internal' and 'external' realities.[13] Moreover, such an understanding remains essentially asocial.

On the other hand, there is the popular position which practices a form of psychophysical and psychosocial dualism. Accordingly, there are two interactions: (i) the mind and the body are considered to be separate and interactive, and (ii) this dual mind-body complex is considered to be separate from and interactive with the social environment. Hence, psychopathology and therapy are based on a complex of physiological, psychological and sociological constructs.[14, 15, 16, 17] However, this approach has been found in actual day-to-day practice to emphasize its preference for a biomedical conceptualization and treatment, thereby rendering itself vulnerable to problems related to

dualism; to a prioritizing of the mind over the body and of the sensory over the nonsensory; and, to asociality.[18]

In addition, this approach, along with that of neural monism, disempowers the subject. It is only the medical and paramedical professionals who have some semblance of understanding of and manipulative control over these forces of mental distress. This fundamental assumption leads to a marked tendency towards the transfer of interventional power from the layman to the professional, which gets further bulwarked and amplified by economic and socio-political forces.[19, 20]

All this is not to say that medical psychiatry has no role. One cannot ignore its advantages in emergency and symptomatic relief, but it is being contended that it is limited in its claims, scope and efficacy.

Having taken this position against the objectivity-derived difficulties of medical psychiatry, it is also of concern that the search for an alternative body-subjectivity should not lead to dependence on the other side of the subject-object dichotomy, which is pure subjectivity. The phenomenological position on pure subjectivity, for instance, brackets out all external objectivity, 'We must regard nothing as veridical except the pure immediacy and givenness in the field of the *ego cogito* which the epoché has opened to us'.[21]

An over-emphasis on pure subjective mental heath care has its own difficulties which arise from the problems of the specific form of Cartesianism inhering in phenomenological subjectivity, in which the position of the knowing subject is also one of a disengaged observer (who is socially uninvolved), and in which the world becomes an object for consciousness.[22]

These difficulties call for a more fundamental and sociological understanding of subjectivity in terms of the body. The body presents the most immediate aspect of our daily existence and is fundamental to our view of ourselves as human objects. It is almost impossible to conceive of the subject as a social agent without the body, that is, the very selfhood and identity of the subject cannot be unproblematically delinked from his embodiment within the everyday interactional situation.[23] Recent sociological research[24, 25] recognizes the importance of the body for comprehending subjectivity in such diverse areas as feminism,[26] sexuality, life and death,[27] art,[28] leisure,[29] and political activism.[30] These findings indicate the lacuna in tradition western thought of conceptualizing the mind, knowledge and subjectivity as superior to and transcending bodily experiences. As Johnson[31] has attempted to show, even in imagination—which, despite its centrality to subjectivity, has been subjugated to the processes of the non-imaginative mind and rationality—human embodiment is vital to its functioning.

PERSISTENCE OF THE BODY-SUBJECTIVITY PROBLEM
WITHIN A DOMINANT MEDICAL PSYCHIATRY: THE CASE OF
MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN INDIA

The mental health scenario in contemporary India can be broadly divided into two sectors. First, there is medical psychiatry in the institutional (*governmental* and *private*, such as state mental hospitals, research-cum-treatment facilities, private clinics) and public health (viz. The National Mental Health Programme for India/NMHP) spheres. This sector is almost entirely composed of western medical thought and practices.

Second, there is the indigenous sector comprising (what have been called) the popular (i.e. based on the individual, family, social nexus and community), folk (non-professional healing specialists), and professional (limited to the indigenous professionals) spheres.[32] It is better to note here that at the microsocial level there is a complex interaction between different components of the medical and indigenous sectors.

Of these two sectors, it is medical psychiatry[33] which dominates the field in terms of organizational infrastructure, financial resources and political clout. Compared to this, the indigenous sector has a weak organizational set-up, little voice in the corridors of bureaucratic and political power, and no substantial earmarked budget. The medical psychiatric sector is also dominant as a knowledge-base because the greatest state resources and international aid are poured into medical psychiatric education and dissemination.

All this helps in its gaining prestige and influence. It tends to display the features of elite professional intellectualization.[34] This professional dominance can be read as being a part of the larger complex hegemony of capitalistic westernization emanating from the colonial and post-colonial legacy of the Indian nation.[35] Such hegemony becomes further entrenched because of its intricate weaving with the dynamics of selfhood and identity.[36]

Leaving aside the question of the quality of the service provided by such medical psychiatry there are admittedly some doubts regarding the totality of legitimation which it has amongst the masses and the extent of 'westernism' in western medical psychiatry in India. Any claim to hegemonical totality is likely to be qualified by such factors as the still widespread prevalence of indigenous practices and the lack of community participation in certain medical psychiatric programmes, viz. the NMHP.[37]

Moreover, how 'western' is western medical psychiatry in India? The process by which an Indian gets educated and trained in western medical psychiatry in an Indian milieu by Indian professionals is an extremely complex cognitive and social process. It remains to be studied as to how far the methodology, meanings and implications of this medical psychiatric knowledge are accurately transferred from teacher

to learner and the extent to which they are internalized by the learner. Again, the 'faithfulness' to medical psychiatry and its meanings effected by the Indian psychiatrists whilst applying their knowledge in practice-situations needs to be studied. Do not Indian world-views permeate, change and revise the learning and application of western medical psychiatry in India?

These are valid questions which must be addressed. Nevertheless, one would not be off the mark if one responds that western medical psychiatry dominates in India, when by 'western' medical psychiatry one refers to the economic and socio-political dominance of a contemporary (i.e. in post-colonial India) approach to mental health care which is basically dualistic, asocial and disempowering. The theory of body-subjectivity in medical psychiatry in contemporary India continues on the model of western medical psychiatry, especially the interactionist one. The body is separated from the brain/mind and both are considered as representational and sensory asocial processes.

No sustained effort is made to consider the more comprehensive models of the body found in the orthodox and heterodox Indian philosophical practices. The body here is related to the larger notion of personhood, wherein the mind-body problem is related to questions addressed to the location of consciousness in the body which is general and specific at the same time.[38] Several problems of the Cartesian mind-body dilemma can be tackled by not drawing a distinction between mind and matter but between matter and consciousness, wherein mind is given a material content.[39] Whereas the Cartesian position would deny any consciousness to the subject if the mind is taken to be material, the Indian position would allow both materiality and consciousness to the subject.

BODY-SUBJECTIVITY IN MERLEAU-PONTY AND FOUCAULT

Against the above 'Indo-western' context, the paper seeks to make a contribution by arguing for a theory of body-subjectivity (which can be incorporated by alternative mental health care strategies) in which a person's body is considered to be basic to his subjectivity, such that the body-subject's sociality is recognized.[40]

In this attempt, the claims are better made through an internal critique, that is, efforts shall be made to remain within the confines of western thought. This is not only because medical psychiatry in India is originally and essentially western but also because of a basic difficulty of the comparative method arising from the hesitation of western thought to acknowledge Indian thought as having sufficient maturity and complexity.

Traditionally, western thought (i.e. classical, theological and philosophical) has postponed a genuine comparative methodology by

disqualifying Indian thought for a host of lacunae such as the lack of separation of philosophy from religion, the loss of an understanding of the true origins of indigenous thought, the lack of dialectical mediation, and the submergence of subjective freedom (personhood) under general essences.[41]

It is only recently that a recognition of the sociology of this exclusion—that is, of the facts that much of this western response has been based on inadequate information and has been carried out within a colonizing and subordinating framework—has led to attempts to generate a positive comparative methodology which seeks to remain 'factually careful and analytically close'.[42] Nevertheless, doubts about a sufficient and comprehensive mutual understanding of western and Indian thought persist so that a comparative methodology still remains a somewhat perilous venture. Hence, the adherence to western theoretical boundaries.

In the West, one of the main social theorists who can be taken as a beginning point in the development of a founding, non-dualist and social understanding of body-subjectivity through a definite approach to psychology and psychopathology is Merleau-Ponty (1908–61). According to him, the body

> does not appear to me as an object, a set of qualities and characteristics to be linked up with one another and thus understood. My relation to it is not that of the *cogito* to the *cogitatum*, the 'epistemological subject' to the object. I and it form a common cause, and in a sense I *am* my body. Between it and me there cannot properly be said to be a relation, since this term designates the behaviour of one object in reference to another. Here it is more a question of presence, adherence, and intimacy.[43]

Merleau-Ponty's involvement with psychopathology is fundamental in at least two senses. First, Merleau-Ponty can be read as conducting an existential phenomenological reformulation of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis.[44] After having jettisoned the causality of Freudian psychopathology, Merleau-Ponty links existential phenomenology with psychoanalysis by stating that the former brings to the latter certain methodological tools which enable the latter to complete the dynamic of its own thought, whereas psychoanalysis helps existential phenomenology by confirming consciousness as investment and not representation.[45]

Merleau-Ponty's account of psychopathology can be seen as a 'breadth psychology' which is a qualification of the 'depth psychology' of Freudian psychopathology.[46, 47] Merleau-Ponty claims that mental distress occurs when a person forgets the context within which an object is situated and goes on to make his response to such an object as the basis or context for his responses to all objects. This de-contextualization and

generalization creates a statis in the mentally distressed person's temporality and sociality so that most of the possibilities of life are lost. Therefore, mental distress distorts what would have been seen by the person as a specific response to an object within the primordial background ('clearing') of Being, into the main dimension of the clearing itself. Inasmuch as this clearing is corporeal, mental distress warps the person's body-subjectivity.

This de-contextualized body-subjectivity gives rise to a veritable stylistic of selfhood which calls into question the representational positions of cognitive psychology and Freudian psychopathology. Incarnate subjectivity overcomes the difficulties of cognitive psychology because 'As a perceiving body, I am a viewpoint on the situation rather than merely another object in it'.[48] If, like Freud, one were to contend that the generalization effected by the subject were the result of a mental schema (e.g. belief or desire), then one would be hard put to explain the consistency with which the subject allows the de-contextualized response or mood to prevail. That is, whereas the 'representational-subject' may fail to apply his belief in many situations in life which are ambiguous and unclear, the body-subject will have little difficulty in providing a generalized response in such situations precisely because this generalization has become an embodied style of living for him.

This stylistic of behaviour leads to a further qualification of Freud. Whereas the latter would contend that as mental distress is located in desire, it incorporates human agency, Merleau-Ponty would contend that once the generalizing distortion is effected, human agency is not required to further the mental distress because the de-contextualized stylistics are pervasive and self-perpetuating.

Furthermore, this Merleau-Pontian reformulation empowers the subject because, instead of imposing a specific interpretive therapeutic frame (e.g. the oedipal or anal complex), one attempts to show the subject how he has managed to convert a specific contextualized frame into *the* frame.

Merleau-Ponty's unhappiness with the therapeutic dis-empowerment inbuilt into Freudian psychopathology leads him to suspect that such a philosophy also denies the power of consciousness through its formulation of the hidden unconscious. In stating that the unconscious is our 'primordial institution' constituting an ensemble of organized defences, Merleau-Ponty agrees with Freud. But in holding that such an unconscious is not radically unknown to the subject, Merleau-Ponty disagrees with Freud:

> Merleau-Ponty saw that symbolic power, which Freud localized under the name of the unconscious in a *separate* domain, just as he also thought the unconscious as being shut off from the consciousness of his patients, as being at work as the *other side* (Husserl) and not as the *other scene* (Freud) of our existence.[49]

Such an unconscious is different from the unconscious whose significance is substituted by significations of intentionality, thereby severing significance and signification from each other. This reformulation of the unconscious may be seen as Merleau-Ponty's effort to resolve the relationship between structure and signification.

This unconscious, which is the other side of our existence, is not an event of knowledge but one of undistorted (i.e. unplagued by doubt) communication.[50] It contests the claim that all knowledge is undistorted communication and that intentional consciousness is the fount of all such knowledge and communication. Moreover, it states that its medium of expression is body-flesh.

It is Merleau-Ponty's conversion of the 'body of consciousness' to the 'body of flesh' which enables him to cover some of the loopholes of the Freudian dictum that every act of the body has psychological meaning *via* the mechanism of the unconscious.[51] The concept of flesh can be seen as an 'attempt to think that in consciousness of which consciousness itself is blind—its rootedness in Being [which is, of course, not Sartreian or Heiddegerian]'.[52] Flesh, being the ambiguous passive-active nature of the lived body, enables an understanding of the unconscious as a disarticulation of perceptual faith and not as a cause of behaviour. Consciousness and the unconscious are not separate domains. Rather, the space between them can be seen as a matter of the degree of separation from the 'body of flesh'.

These then are the rough details of Merleau-Ponty's Freudianism. However, such an effort is not a totally different and self-sufficient alternative to Freudian psychopathology but a supplementary reformulation of it. For instance, whereas Merleau-Pontian psychopathology best describes character pathology, Freudian psychopathology explains symptomatology better.[53]

In the above reformulation of Freudian psychopathology, the broad outlines of a new ontology are drawn and body-subjectivity is indicated as the explanatory key. However, what specific configurations the body-subject undergoes within this re-worked psychoanalysis needs to be further spelt out and studied in detail.

The second sense in which Merleau-Ponty is involved with psychopathology is through his linguistic analysis wherein mental distress is seen to possibly lie at the heart of 'normality' as an intrinsic part of it. As he says in *The Prose of the World:*

> Whatever one thinks of the relationship of the patient to the healthy man, it indeed must be that, in its normal exercise, speech is of such a nature that our sick variations are and remain possible. It must be that it has at its center something which makes it susceptible to these alienations . . .[54]

This linguistic engagement with psychopathology can be seen to illuminate the operations of the lived body in its spatio-temporal, intersubjective and socio-cultural manifestations.

Now, the purpose is not to work out a body-subjectivity specific to any of the above two sectors of Merleau-Ponty's understanding of psychopathology. In both the sectors, Merleau-Ponty's body-subjectivity remains nondualist and social, and it is these elements of theorizing which shall be picked up.

Merleau-Ponty's understanding of a grounding context of his body-subjectivity should be seen against the backdrop of his existential phenomenological roots which claim,

> to have discovered . . . the core phenomenon of philosophy as such: *la condition humaine,* human subjectivity, or perhaps best expressed, man's *being-in-reality.* The concrete analysis of the body-proper, in other words, opens up the possibility of investigating human being as such . . . and thus makes it possible to comprehend the human condition in its actual concreteness and existential complexity.[55]

Basic to the centrality of the body is a nondualist and social subjectivity. The individual

> . . . is neither a mere thing like other things in the universe nor self-sufficient subjectivity which maintains itself in splendid isolation from the world. He is not locked up within himself as mere thought and worldless self-presence. Instead he is always already outside himself and in the world, he involves himself continuously in the density of reality in and around him: he is a dialogue with things and processes in his own organism and in his surroundings. At the same time, he remains a subject in the world and *lets the world be for him* by steadily uncovering its manifold meanings.
>
> In short, [the subject experiences himself] as a being-in-the-world, an ex-sistence, a presence, an encounter, and an involvement.[56]

Deriving sustenance from such an existential phenomenological tradition, Merleau-Ponty develops a general understanding of body-subjectivity which has a few important implications for the theories of body-subjectivity in medical psychiatry or, for that matter, in any dualist psychopathology. Merleau-Ponty tries to show that it is the body and flesh which is the main context of comprehending selfhood. For him, the body-flesh is the space where the primordiality of existence of Being can attain various configurations.

Secondly, such a body-subjectivity repudiates any notions of subject-object dichotomy. His alternative—lived body-flesh—forms the context

for a subjectivity which is both immanence and transcendence. Such body-subjectivity becomes capable of both conscious reflexivity (i.e. body-as-subject) and corporeal reflex (i.e. body-as-object).

Third, such a body-subjectivity is defined through an essentially social plane constituted by temporality, protosociality/intersubjectivity and socio-cultural rootedness. Man is, as it were, 'continuously engaged in a dialogue of being and nothing'.[57]

Therefore, Merleau-Ponty's theory of body-subjectivity can be read as claiming to provide an alternative to the theory of body-subjectivity in medical psychiatry and other dualist psychopathologies, through its theses of the centrality of the body, nondualism and sociality.

However, it is crucial to note that such a founding body-subjectivity is not totally *fundamental* or *foundational* because it remains essentially ambiguous. That is, although the body-subject is the main context for understanding existence, human beings and society, it is not possible to know it completely because it is forever intrinsically unclear, intitutive and incomplete.

Now, although the above notion of body-subjectivity is a bold innovation it has been criticized on many grounds. For instance, it is contended[58] that it creates problems by being undecided with regard to the space between phenomenological reflection and its necessary 'engagement' in daily existence. Moreover, although this body-subjectivity attacks causality it does not mean that all forms of causality are *a priori* null and void. Again, although this body-subjectivity is developed out of the spring of psychology and psychopathology, it (like existentialism in general) gives little indication of having drawn examples from non-pathological phenomena.[59] These criticisms, along with others, call for attention of course. The greater interest, however, lies in a positive critique. That is, the aim is to *retain* Merleau-Ponty's original insights after *revising* them with the help of a constructive critique.

It is the thought of one of Merleau-Ponty's students—Foucault (1926–84)—which represents one of the most relevant and constructive critique of existential phenomenology. This critique is mainly developed through an attack on subjectivism, which recognizes the social practices on account of which the individual becomes subject to power.[60] For Foucault, too, the role of the body is central. According to him, it is impossible to understand selfhood and identity in the West without developing empirical and theoretical positions on the body. Empirically, the body becomes the site of epic power struggles which seek to define subjectivity. Moreover, the 'body is also a general problem in so far as it is the site of death which is the ultimate limit on knowledge'.[61] However, as shall be seen below, Foucault's position is different in some important ways from that of Merleau-Ponty's.

Nonetheless, Foucault could be read more as qualifying, revising and re-working many of the radical claims of Merleau-Ponty and less as

making a frontal attack on him and throwing him overboard. As Gilles Deleuze says, it is as if 'Foucault was reproaching Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty for going too quickly'.[62]

FOUCAULT'S RE-WORKING OF MERLEAU-PONTY

Broadly, the stage for a confrontation between Merleau-Ponty and Foucault is set by Merleau-Ponty's version of Edmund Husserl's concept of intentionality. Intentionality is a fundamental structure of the subject which underlies his consciousness and his entire relations with the world. In other words, the conscious subject is intentional not only because intentionality is a property of consciousness but because the intentiveness of the subject is a mode of being, that is, it designates the being of consciousness. Such an intentionality is a non-thetic consciousness which is, furthermore, embodied. The unity of body and objects which is experienced in perception is brought about by the autochthonous organization of the intentionality of the body itself. It is Merleau-Ponty's broad claim that being folds into Being in order to refound intentionality, which Foucault contests and re-works by showing how such a phenomenon has yet to come into existence.[63]

This basic re-working of Merleau-Ponty by Foucault can be seen to operate through their respective positions on body-intentionality as it operates nondualistically in time, protosociality/intersubjectivity, and social structure and culture. Merleau-Ponty conducts his entire analysis of body-intentionality against the background of a critique of any form of dualism, an effort which is a *sine qua non* for Foucault.

Again, both Merleau-Ponty and Foucault stress on the sociality of body-intentionality[64] through the axes of temporality, protosociality/intersubjectivity, and social structure. In Merleau-Ponty, body-intentionality is inherently and internally historicalized and temporalized. The intentional subject is not *in* time but permeated with time because he assumes and lives time, and is continuously 'engaged' in it. Foucault's body-subject, too, cannot be before or behind time, but this temporality is more social than psychosocial in nature.

For Merleau-Ponty, the temporality of the body-subject is complemented by a certain protosociality. The child's body, for instance, is already organized into an 'intercorporeal schema' before any socialization process takes place. It is on account of the flesh that we are inherently gathered together as a corporeal community which forms the ground for our normative engagement of socio-political practices. Foucault, too, indicates his version of protosociality when he talks of the subject as already involved in and moulded by social practices. He also insists that the body is 'marked' by power relations. These power relations and social practices are intertwined in such a way as to develop certain 'technologies':

(1) technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform or manipulate things;

(2) technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification;

(3) technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject;

(4) technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.[65]

This thesis of protosocial embodiment leads to Merleau-Ponty's explanation of intersubjectivity. In contrast to Cartesianism and transcendental phenomenology which cannot talk of true intersubjectivity (because, for them, it is impossible for the subject to know another person as a thinking being), in Merleau-Ponty it is the lived body and expression (or language) which makes intersubjectivity certainly possible. Body-subjectivity is visible and public so that it is possible for the subject to know another and *vice-versa*. This intersubjectivity is also allowed for by the reversibility of expression. Foucault grants the essential social nature of body-subjectivity through its intersubjectivity, but qualifies it by holding that intersubjectivity is not the alterity of the subjective ego but the realm of the unthought other which is populated by social practices.

Furthermore, social structures and culture are not overdetermining in Merleau-Ponty, but they are nevertheless important because they impart meaning to human lives and generate within the body-subject the openness of possibilities. Every human subject incorporates his culture, subculture and even familial traditions. Along with this the subject incorporates an embodied understanding of reality which is not privatized but is a variation of the shared public world. In Foucault, too, these social forces are not formalized powers but practices which are the result of tactical strategies and struggles which are not meaningful.

Such a Foucauldian[66] re-working of a Merleau-Pontian body-intentionality, therefore, offers a general understanding of the body-subject which promises to overcome the difficulties of the theory of body-subjectivity in medical psychiatry and in other similar sciences. Such a founding, yet social, body-subject is more true to worldly experience. In this sense, the body-subject is more realistic, capable and self-controlled. Such a position, then, on subjectivity in terms of the body can be incorporated with profit by mental health care strategies seeking alternatives to the dominant medical psychiatry.[67]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Although the more encompassing definitions of 'psychopathology' include both the theory and practice of care for the mentally distressed (See T. Millon, *Modern Psychopathology*, Saunders, Philadelphia, 1969), the standard sense in which 'psychopathology' is used is to define it as being concerned more with the theory of understanding of mental distress than with its diagnostical and therapeutic aspects (See Brendan A. Maher, *Principles of Psychopathology: An Experimental Approach*, McGraw Hill, New York, 1966, p. 1). Therapy (both personalistic and socio-political) and psychopathology are together considered under the rubric 'mental health care'. Moreover, a distance is maintained from the stigmatizing usage to which 'psychopathology' sometimes lends itself.

   Terms such as 'psychopathology' and 'mental health care' do smack of medicalism, mentalism and dualism. But there is, as yet, no exact terminology which deal with similar problems and at the same time avoid the traditional traps. Such is our historical burden. However, this paper is precisely an attempt to work through these terms in order to give them meanings other than what they hold today.

2. Shulamit Ramon, *Psychiatry in Britain: Meaning and Policy*, Croom Helm, Beckenham, 1985, pp. 9–10.

3. C.H. Patterson, *Theories of Counseling and Psychotherapy*, Harper and Row, New York, 1986.

4. David Cooper, *Anti-Psychiatry*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1967.

5. Nancy Scherper-Hughes and Anne M. Lovell (editors), *Psychiatry Inside Out: Selected Writings of Franco Basaglia*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1987.

6. Loren R. Mosher and Lorenzo Burti, *Community Mental Health: Principles and Practice*, W.W. Norton, New York, 1989.

7. It is pointed out that the general difficulty with these alternatives is not only that they get co-opted into the traditional psychiatric network or system, but that they positively reinforce some of the traditional 'evils' (e.g. coercive social control and profiteering). What is worse, some alternatives generate difficulties of their own (e.g. denial of psychopathological conditions and ruthless professionalization). See David Ingelby, 'Understanding Mental Illness', *Critical Psychiatry: The Politics of Mental Health*, edited by David Ingleby, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1981, pp. 23–41; and David Ingleby, 'Mental Health and Social Order', Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative Essays, edited by Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985, pp. 141–88. Also see Diana Ralph, *Work and Madness: The Rise of Community Psychiatry*, Black Rose, Montreal, 1983; Andrew Scull, *Decarceration: Community Treatment and the Deviant—A Radical View*, Prentice-Hall, Engelwood Cliffs, 1977; and Peter Sedgwick, *Psychopolitics*, Pluto, London, 1987.

   Interestingly, the resilience of these difficulties is exemplified by the fact that they develop roots even when forms of traditional psychiatry are transplanted in very different societies. Coercive social control and profiteering were evident, for instance, in the mental asylums and hospitals of colonial India (See Waltraud Ernst, 'Asylums in Alien Places: The Treatment of the European Insane in British India', *The Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the History of Psychiatry, Vol. 3: The Asylum and its Psychiatry*, edited by W. F. Bynum et al, Routledge, London, 1988, pp. 48–70). Again, that the danger of mass-scale short-cut drugging of the rural and urban (mostly poor) populations of India is a possibility within the NMHP is evident. See, for instance, the manuals of instruction to the primary health care doctors and basic health workers under the NMHP (reprinted in *Collaborative Study on Severe Mental Morbidity: Report of the ICMR–DST Multi-Centre Project 1976–83*,

Department of Psychiatry, National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro-Sciences, Bangalore, 1986).

8. 'Person' and 'subject' (according to the demands of the context) shall be used to denote the/a human being. However, this generic and specific usage of 'person' does not make the distinction (as in liberal discourse) between man (as the universal human being) and person (as the particular human being), wherein only the (particular) person and not the (universal) man, incorporates juridical rights and is capable of reasoning in the determination of her actions (See James Tully, *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 104–66). In this paper, it is being assumed that all human beings—'normal' and 'pathological'—have 'human rights' and are capable of reasoning in action. Moreover, this generic-specific 'person' is also not an 'individual' (i.e. a separate, unique and indivisible entity). For an elaborate interdisciplinary discussion (albeit not in phenomenological or existential terms) of the concept of the person, see Michael Carrithers et al (editors), *The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.

9. Geoff Baruch and Andrew Treacher, *Psychiatry Observed*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978, p. 56.

10. Louis A. Sass, 'Civilized Madness: Schizophrenia, Self-Consciousness and the Modern Mind', *History of the Human Sciences*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1994.

11. The male gender term ('he') here and elsewhere in the study does not incorporate any sexist bias. It is used interchangeably with its female counterpart. Although an effort is made to use a suitable neutral term, the human subject is clearly not an 'it'; 'he' or 'she' is preferable to 'it'. However, 'he' shall be used more frequently in the discussion of Merleau-Ponty's and Foucault's works which—despite their emphasis on contextuality—lack gender contextualization.

12. Mario Bunge, *The Mind-Body Problem: A Psychobiological Approach*, Pergamon, Oxford, 1980.

13. Theories of mental representation are usually split into those focusing on thought and those focusing on experience. Psychiatry—being empirical in orientation—has emphasized on the theory of representation in experience but have been unable to overcome the problems of empiricism associated with such a position. It has not even taken cognizance of new developments in the theory of representation in experience which are not empiricist and (yet) which would be supportive of medical psychiatry in general. See Adrian Cussins, 'Content, Embodiment and Objectivity: The Theory of Cognitive Trails', *Mind*, Vol. 101, No. 404, 1992.

14. Peter Storey, *Psychological Medicine: An Introduction to Psychiatry*, Churchill Livingstone, Edinburgh, 1986.

15. Peter Hill et al (editors), *Essentials of Postgraduate Psychiatry*, Grune and Stratton, London, 1986.

16. Michael Gelder et al, *Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986.

17. Alfred Freedman et al, *Modern Synopsis of Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry*, Second edition, The Williams and Wilkins Co., Baltimore, 1978.

18. This attempt to de-socialize mental distress becomes all the more specious because 'The clinical positivists are so involved in uncovering the factual, objective basis of psychotherapy that they have forgotten the subjective valuations which impregnate their whole enterprise' (See Peter Sedgwick, *Psychopolitics*, Pluto, London, 1987, p. 26). These subjective aspects (i.e. cultural and socio-political biases) have been repeatedly pointed out (See David Ingelby, 'The Social Construction of Mental Illness', The Problem of Medical Knowledge. Examining the Social Construction of Medicine, edited by P. Wright and A. Treacher, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1984, pp. 123–43; Thomas J. Scheff, 'On

Reason and Sanity: Some Political Implications of Psychiatric Thought', *Recent Sociology No. 3: The Social Organization of Health*, edited by Hans P. Dreitzel, Macmillan, New York, 1971 and (editor) *Labelling Madness*, Prentice-Hall, Engelwood Cliffs, 1975. Also see Ragnhild Banton et al, *The Politics of Mental Health*, Macmillan, London, 1985; Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (editors), *The Power of Psychiatry*, Polity, Oxford, 1986; Suman Fernando, *Race and Culture in Psychiatry*, Croom Helm, London, 1988.

19. Joan Busfield, *Managing Madness: Changing Ideas and Practice*, Unwin Hyman, London, 1986, pp. 115–45.

20. Robert Castel et al (editors), *The Psychiatric Society*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982.

21. Edmund Husserl, *The Paris Lectures*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hagne, 1985, p. 9.

22. M.C. Dillon, *Merleau-Ponty's Ontology*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1988, p. 33.

23. Bryan S. Turner, 'An Introduction to the Sociology of the Body', *Health, Fitness and the Postmodern Body*, edited by Bryan S. Turner, Deakin University Press, Gelong, 1991, p. 9.

24. Arthur Frank, 'Bringing Bodies Back In: A Decade Review', *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990.

25. Arthur Frank, 'For a Sociology of the Body: An Analytical Review', *The Body, Social Process and Cultural Theory*, edited by Mike Featherstone, Sage, London, 1991.

26. S.R. Suleiman (editor), *The Female Body in Western Culture: Contemporary Perspectives*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986.

27. Douglas Kellner, *Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond*, Polity, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 99–108.

28. Roy Boyne, 'The Art of the Body in the Discourse of Postmodernity', *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 5, 1988.

29. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1984.

30. Gabriele Dietrich, 'Our Bodies, Ourselves: Organising Women on Health Issues', *Socialist Health Review*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1986.

31. Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987.

32. Arthur Kleinman, 'Concepts and a Model for the Comparison of Medical Systems', *Concepts of Health, Illness and Disease: A Comparative Perspective*, edited by Caroline Currer and Meg Stacey, Berg, Leamington Spa, 1986.

33. It is necessary to note that indigenous mental health care also has somatic methods such as *Ayurveda* and *Unani*. However, as their principles are different from those of western somatic methods, in this paper 'medical psychiatry' shall refer to non-indigenous western medical psychiatry.

34. According to Antonio Gramsci, one of the crucial forces within any hegemonic attempt is the social group of intellectuals:

The intellectuals are the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government. These comprise:

1. The 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on the social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.

2. The apparatus of state coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent

has weakened (See Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971).

In the paper, the medical psychiatric professionals are understood more in the Gramscian sense of intellectuals rather than the traditional sense of the 'westernized middle class'.

35. For a discussion of hegemony in colonial India, see Sudipta Kaviraj, *On the Construction of Colonial Power: Structure, Discourse, Hegemony*, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, London, 1989 (mimeo). For hegemony in the nationalist context, see Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*, Zed, London, 1984. Western hegemony in contemporary India is evident from the continued development of capitalism (See Ranjit K. Sau, *Economy, Class, Society*, Sangam, London, 1986; A.R. Desai, *India's Path of Development: A Marxist Analysis*, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1984), which has progressively ingrained itself in the social forces specific to India. For an analysis of such localized hegemony in the health field, see Debacbar Banerji, *Poverty, Class and Health Culture in India*, Vol. 1, Prachi Prakashan, New Delhi, 1982.

36. Alan Roland, *In Search of Self in India and Japan: Towards a Cross-Cultural Psychology*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988.

37. *NMHP: Progress Report 1982–88*, Directorate General of Health Services, Government of India, New Delhi, 1989, p. 29.

38. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, 'Some Indian Theories of the Body', *Freedom, Transcendence and Identity: Essays in Memory of Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya*, edited by Pradip Kumar Sengupta, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1988.

39. Paul Schweizer, 'Mind/Consciousness Dualism in Sāṃkhya–Yoga Philosophy', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 53, No. 4, 1993.

40. This is not to repeat the mistake of anti-psychiatry, which was to develop a critique which over-focused on nineteenth century psychiatry at the cost of ignoring the novel features of the (by then) present twentieth century psychiatry. That is, it is not being said that a revision of only medical psychiatry (and that too, of body-subjectivity in medical psychiatry) is sufficient to change mental health care in India. Certainly, a comprehensive reform must aim to channel an equal amount of effort into recognizing and refining (i) the elements in medical psychiatry other than that of body-subjectivity, and (ii) the other forms of care and their elements, which are aspects of indigenous and twentieth-century psychiatry. However, nineteenth-century psychiatry today is alive and well. This means that the one form of nineteenth-century psychiatry—the somatic perspective—is hale and hearty and dominant, requiring a critical attention of its fundamental difficulties.

41. Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1988.

42. Ben-Ami Scharfstein et al, 'Introduction', *Philosophy East/Philosophy West: A Critical Comparison of Indian, Chinese, Islamic and European Philosophy*, edited by Ben-Ami Scharfstein et al, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978, p. 4.

43. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 'Being and Having', *Texts and Dialogues*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, series edited by Hugh J. Silverman and James Barry Jr, Humanities, New Jersey, 1992, p. 102.

44. Here, 'Freudian psychoanalysis' refers to psychoanalytic thought close to Freud's thought itself and not to the major psychoanalytical revisions of Freud.

45. Maurice-Merleau Ponty, 'Preface to Hesnard's "*L'Oeuvre de Freud*"', *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, Vol. 18, Nos. 1, 2 and 3, 1982–83, p. 67.

46. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Jerome Wakefield, 'From Depth Psychology to Breadth Psychology: A Phenomenological Approach to Psychopathology', *Hermeneutics and Psychological Theory: Interpretive Perspectives on Personality, Psychotherapy and Psychopathology*, edited by Stanley B. Messer et al, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1988, pp. 272–88.

47. Ibid., pp. 295–97.

48. Frederick J. Wertz, 'Merleau-Ponty and the Cognitive Psychology and Perception', *Critical and Dialectical Phenomenology*, edited by Dawn Wetton and Hugh J. Silverman, SUNY Press, Albany, 1987, p. 274.

49. J.B. Pontalis, 'The Problem of the Unconscious in Merleau-Ponty's Thought', *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, Vol. 18, Nos. 1, 2 and 3, 1968, pp. 93–94.

50. Tony O'Connor, 'Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of the Unconscious', *Merleau-Ponty: Perception, Structure, Language—A Collection of Essays*, edited by John Sallis, Humanities, Atlantic Highlands, 1981, p. 86.

51. Dorothea A. Olkowzki, 'Merleau-Ponty's Freudianism: From the Body of Consciousness to the Body of Flesh', *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, Vol. 18, Nos. 1, 2 and 3, 1982–83, pp. 97–116.

52. R. Sundara Rajan, *Transformations of Transcendental Philosophy*, Pragati, Delhi, 1994, p. 208.

53. Hubert L. Dreyfus, 'Alternative Philosophical Conceptualizations of Psychopathology', *Phenomenology and Beyond: The Self and Its Language*, edited by Harold A. Durfee and F.T. Rodier, Kluwer Academic, Dordrechst, 1983, 1989, p. 43.

54. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973, pp. 26–27.

55. Richard M. Zaner, *The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of the Body*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964, p. 241.

56. Adrian van Kaam, *Existential Foundations of Psychology*, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1966, pp. 6–7.

57. S.P. Banerjee, 'Phenomenology of Human Relations: Some Reflections', *Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy*, edited by D.P. Chattopadhyaya et al, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1992, pp. 260–61.

58. Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982, pp. 573–74.

59. Alisdair MacIntyre, 'Existentialism', *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 3, edited by Paul Edwards, Macmillan, New York, 1962, pp. 149 and 153.

60. Tony O'Connor, 'Foucault and the Transgression of Limits', *Continental Philosophy 1: Philosophy and Non-Philosophy Since Merleau-Ponty*, edited by Hugh J. Silverman, Routledge, New York, 1988, pp. 136–51.

61. Charles C. Lemert and Garth Gillian, *Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982, pp. 128–29.

62. Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, Athlone, London, 1988, p. 112.

63. Ibid., pp. 108–12.

64. It is not only in this debate on sociality, but in the entire corpus of their works that both Merleau-Ponty and Foucault may be seen as developing a new sociology of body-subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty is well-known for having insisted on the interdependence of philosophy and sociology. According to him, philosophy is sociological because it is always a discourse about something (viz. objects, persons and community). Conversely, sociology is philosophy because in order for sociology to impart meaning to its causal analysis, it incorporates an acausal mode of analysis, which is philosophy.

Within this context, Merleau-Ponty rejects much of traditional sociology. In addition to his general anti-dualist stance, there are certain specific aspects to his new sociology (John W. Murphy, 'Merleau-Ponty as Sociologist', *Philosophy Today*, No. 24, 1980). Methodologically, he rejects the lack of qualifications in the *a priori* assumptions inherent in the sociology of Emile Durkheim and anthropology

of Lucien Levy-Bruhl. Like Max Weber, he historicizes social research methodology. Second, Merleau-Ponty contends that it is not possible to accept social roles or structures as ontological facts of subjectivity (as does social interactionism or structuralism), because the subject is contingent on the exploitation of his potentialities rather than on the exigencies of social roles or structures. Third, in contrast to Talcott Parson's sociology where culture is a different entity from social structure, which legitimizes the latter without the force of agency, Merleau-Ponty contends that it is impossible to separate culture from social structure and from human agency.

If Merleau-Ponty, thereby, formulates a radical *logos* of the social, then Foucault's re-workings can be read as an attempt to make this sociological radicality more resilient. For Foucault, too, develops a sociology which claims to steer clear of Durkheim's individual-society dualism. It is social practices which in the complex network of interpersonal, economic, socio-political and cultural processes, form the base of the Foucauldian social. Moreover, the social practices are privileged over other personal and social constructs.

65. Michel Foucault, 'Technologies of the Self', *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, edited by Luther H. Martin et al, Tavistock, London, 1988, p. 18.

66. However, it should be noted that Foucault's position on the body itself has been criticized on many grounds. Deriving from the general criticism that Foucault hardly leaves any space for human agency (See Bryan S. Turner, *The Body and Society*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, p. 250), it has been held that there is a lack of conceiving embodiment as a positive and 'libidinal' force, which implies that the body becomes passive and incapable of resistances (See Scott Lash, *Imagining: A Phenomenological Study*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1984, pp. 259–260). Moreover, Foucault's understanding supposedly belies a problematic ontological priority to the body, which conceives of the body, at the same time, as a 'given substratum of change and an unthought common point of reference', and as a 'particular object of particular bodies of knowledge' (Jeffrey Minson, 'Genealogy and the Body: Foucault/Deleuze/Nietzsche', *The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory*, edited by Mike Feathustone et al, Sage, London, 1991, p. 92). These are serious charges amongst many others and so they need to be taken into account.

67. Whilst conducting such an exercise, it is necessary, as a logistical guide, to briefly chart the epistemological phases of Merleau-Ponty's works and note their correspondence with Foucault's phases. It is generally accepted that Merleau-Ponty's works—with reference to an understanding of subjectivity in terms of the intentional body—can be roughly divided into two periods: the early period defined by an implicit ontology of the body and perception [through such works as *The Structure of Behavior (1942)*, *Phenomenology of Perception (1945)*, and *Sense and Non-Sense (1984)*], and the later period marked by an explicit ontology of flesh and perceptual faith [through such works as *The Primacy of Perception (1964)*, and *The Visible and the Invisible (1964)*] (See M.C. Dillon, *Merleau-Ponty's Ontology*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1988). In the early period, he still retains a whiff of dualism because, as he himself admits, he starts therein 'from the consciousness—"object" distinction' (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968, p. 200). In the later period, he deliberately tries to overcome this distinction.

Foucault's thought can be divided into four broad sections. In the first section there is Foucault's sympathetic appraisal of existential phenomenology through such works as, *Dream, Imagination, and Existence, (1954)*, and *Mental Illness and Psychology (Part One) (1954)*. In the second section he could be seen as breaking with and moving beyond existential phenomenology through such works as *Madness and Civilization (1961)*, *Mental Illness and Psychology (Part Two) (1962)*, *The Order of Things (1966)*, and *The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969)*. In the third section

[where he is clearly influenced by 'genealogy', mainly of Friedrich Nietzsche, and consisting of such works as *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975)*] and, in the fourth section [where he is perhaps influenced by game theory/problem-solving theory, and consisting of such works as *The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality*, Vol. 2 *(1984)* and *The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom' 1984*], Foucault's debate with existential phenomenology is hardly visible although it is possible to take these two sections as implicitly continuing the debate.

Now, it is only the early Merleau-Ponty which were available to the Foucault of the first section. Foucault's second section straddles both the early and late Merleau-Ponty, whilst in Foucault's third and fourth sections all of Merleau-Ponty's works were available. Of course, these broad correlations are contingent upon further exploration of two factors: (i) the content of Merleau-Ponty's lectures at the College de France (1952–60), some of which Foucault might have attended, and (ii) the degree of access which Foucault had in each section of Merleau-Ponty's unpublished writings.

The Intentionality of Mental Reference

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Philosophy of language is an attempt to understand the relations existing among elements of a triangle—the triangle of the mind which knows, the world which is known by the mind, and language which expresses what the mind knows about the world. The relation among these elements are three:

(1) the relation between the mind and the world, which is the 'intentionality of the mind';
(2) the relation between language and the world, which is the 'intentionality of language'; and
(3) the relation between mind and language.

Both mental states and language are intentional or have intentionality. But there is no intentionality which characterizes the world in the sense that the world is not about anything.

According to some philosophers, the relation between the mind and language is merely contingent. Language is a vehicle through which what is mental gets expressed. It is simply a powerful tool of communication between the mind and the world. In other words, although most, if not all, of our thoughts are expressed in language, there is no necessary connection between the two. This is amply supported by the fact that animals and infants who have no language have desires, fears and, perhaps, thoughts and beliefs too. If the relation between the mind and language is merely contingent, then it is of somewhat less philosophic interest than the relation between the intentionality of the mind and the intentionality of language. What is interesting here is the question—which is prior to which? That is, is the intentionality of language *due* to the intentionality of the mind or *vice versa*? Some philosophers, including Searle,[1] maintain that the intentionality of language is *derived* from the non-linguistic and *intrinsic* intentionality of the mind. So, what is most important to these philosophers is to understand the intentionality of the mind. How does the mind relate to the world? According to Searle, we can understand the intentionality of the mind in terms of the intentionality of language. But, he adds that this move from language to the mind is merely pedagogical. The intentionality of the mind unlike that of language

is primitive, intrinsic, and not derived from any external source. The intentionality of language, on the contrary, is derived from the intentionality of the mind.

In this paper, I wish to examine Searle's claim regarding the intentionality of the mental in a very specific context: the context of reference. Searle claims that linguistic reference depends on mental reference which is in virtue of 'intentional content' which is totally mental and non-linguistic. Thus, so far as reference is concerned, the intentionality of linguistic reference is *derived* from the intentionality of mental reference which is not derived from anything non-mental and as such is *primitive*. Unlike the notion of linguistic reference (speech act reference), the notion of mental reference is rather controversial. Hence, in the first part of the paper, I will try to make a case in favour of mental reference and then in the second part I propose to show that mental reference like speech act reference is an 'essentially linguistic act'. The implications of this claim will be discussed in the concluding part of the paper.

NATURE OF MENTAL REFERENCE

If referring is understood as the act of identifying an object/individual to an audience who then knows which thing is being talked about, then, to talk about 'mental reference' is rather strange if not totally ridiculous for we know that a thought context is never a speaker–hearer context. But the question is, is this understanding of reference correct? Are there good reasons to understand reference in a way which precludes the possibility of 'mental reference'? To a certain extent this is a matter of terminology only. We may not choose to call 'mental reference' reference. But there is no doubt that in thinking about an object we are in a certain relation with the object.

An argument supporting the view that some mental phenomena which are propositional in form do involve mental reference is the argument from the 'specificity of mental phenomena'. Mental phenomena like beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc., are always about something. Thus, the belief that wars are destructive is about wars. The desire for a hot cup of coffee is about coffee and the fear of ghosts is about ghosts. Not every mental phenomenon which is about something about something specific. Thus, the belief about wars, or the other, is about something specific. Thus, the belief about wars, the desire for a hot cup of coffee and the fear of ghosts is not about any specific war, cup of coffee or ghost respectively. They do not involve reference to any specific thing. They are examples of mental phenomena about things in general. As opposed to these, my belief that the next manned space flight will be a success is an example of a mental phenomenon about a specific thing. In entertaining this belief, I am referring to a specific event in the sense of singling it out and predicating something of it. My belief is specific because it is concerned with a

specific event. Thus, the specificity of some of our mental phenomena shows that they have a referential feature.

Kent Bach has questioned the notion of mental reference. According to Bach, 'In thinking of something . . . one is not "referring" an audience to it, nor, for that matter, is one referring oneself to it'.[2] He is of the opinion that the term 'mental reference' is a misnomer which tends to provoke an important question, viz., what is the connection between a speaker's thinking of something and referring to it. But, one can think of an object, without being able to identify the object one is thinking about. To be able to identify the object is, strictly speaking, a condition of successful reference and is not a necessary precondition of having a thought about the object. After all, identification is possible only under some description or the other, but in having a thought about an object one is related to it directly, i.e. non-descriptively. According to Bach, the object is 'in the mind', so to speak, or as some philosophers have said, in 'cognitive contact'[3] or 'epistemically intimate with it'.[4] Regarding the act of referring Bach says, '. . . referring to an object just is a component of the communicative act of expressing an attitude about something one is thinking of . . . Since thinking of something is necessary for referring to that thing, we cannot expect to understand it on the model of referring'.[5] As mentioned earlier, we may choose not to call the relation obtaining between a person thinking of an object and the object thought of, referring. But that there obtains a relation like referring cannot be easily denied. Bach's view expresses a two-tier theory where first one has a non-linguistic *de re* belief in which one knows the object directly and then expresses the same belief to an audience by making an assertion which contains an explicit reference to the object of belief. There is, however, no empirical evidence for such a two-tier theory. Empirical evidence aside, there are arguments which establish that the difference between a thought about an object and the corresponding assertion lies not in their semantic features but rather in the use of linguistic expressions. If an assertion is a sincere expression of a thought, they must share their semantic features. Not only do our thoughts about objects reflect a referential component, they also reflect a predicative component which can appropriately be called 'mental predication'.

Bach further says that if all thought about an object was under some description or other, i.e. if the object of thought was so only because it satisfied some description, then our thought about the world would be restricted to mere qualitative description of it. As he puts it, 'we could think and speak only of its character, of what it is like, but we could not think or speak of anything in particular'.[6] But, 'when we think and speak about the world around us, we commonly form and express thoughts about particular items in it'.[7] We have what Bach calls '*de re*' thoughts about particular objects in contrast to 'descriptive' thought where the

object of thought is known merely by description. Bach contends that in having a thought about an object we know the object as such not as in 'being such and such'. Thus, we know the object of our thought without 'being such and such'. Thus, we know the object in the sense in which these phrases 'knowing who' or 'knowing which' in the sense in which these phrases imply being able to identify the object amongst other similar and dissimilar objects. There is no connection between thinking of an object and referring to it in the sense of identifying it. Bach argues that the identity of the object of a *de re* thought does not depend on one's belief about its identity. He compares his view with that of Evans who holds that knowing the identity of the object thought of is an essential part of having the thought.[8] In holding this position Evans is endorsing the 'Russellian principle' which is that a subject cannot make a judgement about something unless he knows which object his judgement is about. Here to 'know which object his judgement is about' is to have a capacity to distinguish the object of his judgement from all other things. Bach does not think that the principle is correct and cites many counter-examples to show that. It is difficult to comprehend how one can be in some kind of a direct relation with the object of thought without at the same time knowing any identifying fact about the object.

One of the main reasons why it is necessary to adhere to the 'Russellian principle' in some form or the other is that it makes it easier to explain the phenomenon of re-identification. If one can have a thought about an object without knowing some identifying description about it, how can one recollect and re-identify the object the thought was about at some point in time in the future? Future re-identification aside, it will not be possible to distinguish that thought from other thoughts which one might have at that very moment. Thus, on this ground, we need to admit 'Russell's principle'.

The presupposition working behind Bach's thesis that there is nothing like 'mental reference' is the notion that reference, or rather referring, is essentially a speaker–hearer context and that the act of referring is 'complete' or 'successful' if the hearer is able to know which object the speaker is referring to, and for this, it is essential that the speaker makes an identifying reference to the object referred to. However, there is no reason why one should attach this restrictive precondition to the notion of reference and thereby separate the issues of thought and reference, more specifically, singular thought and singular reference. If the expression of our thought involves a referential component, and if our assertions are sincere expressions of our thoughts, then, the latter must also involve a referential component. And, what is a better term to use than 'mental reference'? The fact that some instances of the expression of our thought are in a 'speaker–hearer' context should not affect the semantic structure of either thought or its expression. Bach takes referring to be a four-term relation involving speaker, expression, object and hearer. I think to include the hearer as one of the terms of the

relation is to unduly restrict the notion of referring. Referring, in my opinion, is a three-term relation involving speaker/thinker, expression and object.

The notion of reference that I have been trying to defend is made clearer with the phrase, 'singling out'. It is not as if the person needs to 'identify' the object of thought to himself, but in having the thought, the person is 'singling out' a certain object from other objects and it is in this sense of 'singling out' that we can understand 'mental reference'. Our thoughts can be about a present object in which case it is known by perception, or they can be about an absent object in which case it is known through memory or communication.

It is not so obvious that cases of mental referring where the object is present (let us call them mental referring 1) involve the use of a referring expression having some kind of descriptive content. Suppose an object is present and the referring subject is simply aware of it. He could notice the object and attribute some property to it. Whether we should count noticing as a case of referring is to some extent a matter of an arbitrary choice. But suppose we decide to count this as referring. In that case, it is not immediately clear that the reference is in virtue of some descriptive content or that the subject is using a referring expression to refer. Where the object of thought is not present in front of the person having the thought, it (the object) is mentally referred to/identified (let us call such cases mental referring 2) *via* some description. Thus the object which is thought of through memory or communication is always referred to *via* some description. When we form a thought of something, we have a certain description in mind which enables us to identify the object we are thinking of. We further want to attribute some quality or characteristic (predicating quality) to the object thus identified. If the object of thought fails to satisfy the description the thinker has in mind, i.e. the identifying description corresponding to the identifying quality (not the predicating description), the thinker will not be in a position to tell which object he is thinking about even if the object is the cause of his perceptual belief. It is not that we require to identify the object of thought to an audience or to oneself but, in order to be able to know/tell which object the thought is about, the object must be known or 'singled out' under some description or the other. Thus, the 'Russellian principle' does have a fundamental intuitive appeal and cannot easily be ignored. The object stripped of all or any description, the Kantian 'Thing-in-itself', cannot really be known or thought about. In having the thought, the thinker does not seek to identify the object to any hearer or the thinker himself, and in noting this point, Bach is right. The thought is directed at some object which is 'singled out' under a certain description. Thus, referring in singular belief/thought is not so much a matter of identifying an object to someone; it is drawing the mind from other things to single

out one thing about which something is thought or believed. When the same thought is expressed in the form of an assertion then, in order to fulfil the purpose of making the hearer know which object is being talked about, the speaker refers the audience to the object *via* some description which he believes the object satisfies. So here the speaker is clearly performing the speech act of referring. In thought mental reference is tacit whereas in the corresponding assertion (made in a speaker–hearer context) the reference is explicit/clear.

Bach says that 'to think of something by description is just to think of whatever happens to have the properties expressed by the description'.[9] But which object actually fits the description need not be known. So, the thinker need not have any relation with any object whatsoever and the thought is not *de re* or a singular thought. I think that in some cases a thought whose object is identified by a description can count as *de re*. In these cases the description which is in the mind of the person and which serves to identify the object is used, to borrow Donnellan's terminology, 'referentially' and not 'attributively'.[10] The identifying descriptions are not essentially involved in the thought. Just as in Donnellan's example of Smith's murderer, the person in the dock can be said to be insane even though he does not satisfy the identifying description 'the murderer of Smith', so, in the case of a singular thought, the object of thought may satisfy the predicating description without in fact satisfying the identifying description. If in a singular thought the identifying description is used only referentially, there is no reason why we cannot say that the thinker is not in some sort of a direct relation to the object of thought and that thought is *de re*.

ESSENTIALLY LINGUISTIC ACTS AND FULLY LINGUISTIC ACTS

Having established that there is something like mental reference present in singular thought I will now try to show how both speech act reference and mental reference are essentially linguistic acts in the sense of involving concepts which are linguistic in nature.

The notion of an essentially linguistic act is central to the theory about the relation of certain acts (speech acts and other acts) to language. An essentially linguistic act should be distinguished from a fully linguistic act. A fully linguistic act is a representing act which satisfies the following two conditions:

(1) it involves the production and use of linguistic expressions;
(2) it owes its meaning to its relations to expressions in a language.

Two kinds of fully linguistic acts can be distinguished. One, where the act involves an overt use of language, e.g., speech acts where words are spoken aloud or written down. Two, where the words are produced and used only mentally. It is not uncommon for people to think in the words of the language they speak and these words form sentences

which are in relevant respects the same as the sentences which are uttered aloud or written or otherwise publicly produced. Such a use of words or linguistic expressions is an explicit use although it is not an overt use. We may call it a 'covert' use of language. An example of the case in point is a belief about an absent object. When we have a belief or a thought about an object which is not present in front of us, we think about that object by 'using' a referring expression 'mentally'. Such a mental use of referring expressions is not an overt use although it is an explicit use. I think that this is true even when one is thinking about an object which is present before the speaker. So, the overt use of a word is an explicit use of the word, but some explicit uses are not overt.

An essentially linguistic act is a representing act which satisfies only the second of the two conditions of a fully linguistic act. It is a representing act which owes its meaning to its relation to expressions in a language. Every act which is fully linguistic is also essentially linguistic. The converse, however, is not necessarily true. Acts which are essentially linguistic but not fully linguistic do not involve any use of language. It is possible to recognize that an object falls under a (linguistic) concept even though I do not speak or think that word. Such acts are linguistic even though they do not involve the production and use of words. Beliefs about present objects are of this nature. The relations which link an act of using a linguistic expression to other expressions or other acts of using linguistic expressions, are logical or semantic relations. Thus, an act of using a sentence can be entailed by some acts and can entail still other acts of using sentences. It can be incompatible with some acts and compatible with some other acts. In the case of a noun, the relation between an act of using it and acts of using other nouns can be inclusion or exclusion. These relations do not link acts that do not make any use of language. In such cases, the relations linking the act to words in a language are analogous to relations which link acts making (overt or explicit) use of language to words. We can call them quasi-logical or quasi-semantic relations.

Referring: An Essentially Linguistic Act

That speech act referring is a fully linguistic act so far as fulfilling the first condition goes is quite obvious. Every case of speech act referring involves the overt use of a linguistic expression—the referring expression. What needs explaining is how it fulfils the second condition. That is, how its meaning or significance depends on its relations to expressions in a language. This also needs to be explained in the case of mental reference, for mental reference also owes its meaning or significance to its relations to expressions in a language.

The significance or meaning of a referring act is to pick out or identify a specific individual about which the speaker goes on to say something (case of speech act referring) or the thinker goes on to

believe something (case of mental referring).[11] The individual which is uniquely identified by the subject for the purpose of predicating something of it is the object of reference. One of the factors determining the object of speech act reference is the descriptive content the subject associates with the referring expression.[12] By 'descriptive content' I mean the pieces of information which form the content of or which are associated with that which is used as a referring device. Thus, if the referring device is a definite description, the descriptive content is the linguistic meaning of the definite description. The descriptive content of a proper name is the descriptive content of definite descriptions associated with the proper name. The descriptive content the speaker associates with a referring expression results from using empirical concepts to identify a specific individual. When somebody says, 'The red book on the table is a copy of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*', he is referring to the red book on the table. This book satisfies the descriptive content of the descriptive phrase used. In using the descriptive phrase to identify the red book on the table, the speaker is using the concepts of 'redness', 'being a table', 'being a book', and the relation of 'one object being on top of the other'. It is the use of concepts to identify a thing which makes the referring act a linguistic act. But what is it about the use of concepts which makes the referring act linguistic? Are concepts themselves linguistic entities? Are concepts to be identified with concept words in a certain language? What then is the nature of concepts and how are concepts used in the act of referring?

Having a Concept

If we consider the different theories regarding the nature of concepts and conceptual thinking, there seem to be two ways of understanding the expression 'having a concept'. The first understanding draws from traditional theories of the nature of concepts, viz., Realism and Conceptualism. On this understanding, to have a concept is to be in a certain relation to an entity of a special kind. According to some versions of Realism, particularly the Platonic form, a concept is an objective, abstract entity which subsists in a third world different from the mental and the physical world. It (a concept) is the common property belonging to particular objects of a kind, e.g., all red objects possess the property redness. This common property or the concept is called a Form. These Forms have an ontological status in the third world and to know these Forms or, in our terminology, to have a concept, is to stand in the relation of immediate awareness to them. On this view, concept words are names of the corresponding concept or Form. Thus, Platonism favours the entitative understanding of concepts. So does Conceptualism, except that, according to the latter, concepts are mental entities. They are abstract ideas in the mind and are completely mind dependent. They are, as Aaron puts it, 'internal

accusatives' of the act of conceiving, and unlike Plato's Forms are subjective in nature.[13] To have a concept on this view is to be immediately aware of these 'internal accusatives' in introspection. Here too, the general word or the concept word is a name of the corresponding concept. Like Platonism, Conceptualism favours an entitative explanation of concepts. The view that concepts are mental objects—mental ideas or mental images—was quite widespread and influential until Wittgenstein revolted against it in his *Philosophical Investigations*.[14] Criticizing the entitative understanding of concepts Wittgenstein pointed out that the more sensible question regarding concepts is not, 'What is a concept?', but 'What is it to have a concept?'. Wittgenstein's view does not state what a concept is but rather what it is to have a concept.

According to Wittgenstein and the post-Wittgensteinian philosophers like Ryle, Geach, Price and others, to have a concept is to have a capacity to do something or a disposition towards doing something. This is the second understanding of the expression 'having a concept'. In Wittgenstein's view, to have a concept is to know the use of the corresponding word in some natural language. He says, 'We are not analysing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. that of thinking), and therefore the use of a word . . . '.[15] Wittgenstein, thus, emphasizes the linguistic way in which a concept is manifested. P.T. Geach also seems to want to restrict concepts to language users or at least to those who have acquired the use of language, whether or not they have subsequently lost it.[16] Although Geach admits that the possession of linguistic skills is not the necessary condition for possessing concepts, yet he is not willing to attribute concepts to animals. His reluctance to attribute even minimal concepts to animals indicates that like Wittgenstein, he too wants to link the possession of concepts with the ability to use language. Unlike Geach, Price maintains that the possession of a concept is equally manifested through linguistic and non-linguistic means. Criticizing the linguistic view regarding concept possession he says,

> To possess the concept of Ø, it is thought, consists simply in the capacity to use the *word* 'Ø' with understanding, both publicly and privately, both in the presence of instances of Ø and in their absence. Throughout this book I have been protesting against such narrow views of conceptual cognition. The production and understanding of non-instantiative symbols, and *a fortiori* the production and understanding of verbal symbols is only one of the many different ways in which our concepts are occurrently manifested. They are manifested also by the recognition of instances; by the production of quasi-instantive particulars, whether images or physical replicas; by the production (sometimes) of real life instances; by sign-cognition in its various forms including

secondary recognition; by intelligent action of all kinds, both at the sign cognitive level and above it.[17]

I think that Price's view is basically correct. However, I would like to add that the different ways in which a concept can manifest itself are indices of the extent or degree to which the concept has been completely acquired. To acquire a concept completely is to know the correct use of the corresponding concept expression. Correct usage, however, is not to be identified with mere linguistic skill, the ability to simply utter linguistic expressions or sequences of such expressions according to the rules of grammar. To possess a concept completely is to know the correct use of the concept expression in a language, and to know the correct use of a concept word in a language is to know its meaning in that language. Thus, to know a concept completely is to understand the meaning of the corresponding concept word. To understand the meaning of a concept word is to know what it stands for, if there is anything in the world that it stands for, and to know the various logical relations the concept word bears to other concept words in the language. For instance, to have the concept of a cat is to know what the word 'cat' stands for and to know the relations which obtain between it and other concept words. It is to know, e.g., that the concept word 'cat' is included in the concept word, 'animal'. With some concept words, however, it is difficult to say what they stand for. That is to say, there is nothing in the world which can be said to be named by them. In such cases to know the meaning of the concept word is to simply know the logical relations the concept word bears to other concept words in the language. It is to be noted that a concept can be known completely even if all the logical relations which the concept word bears to other concept words in the language are not known. It is enough if some at least are known. It is important to realize that one does not acquire concepts in isolation. We do not have a plurality of isolated concepts. Rather, we have a unified conceptual framework or a unified conceptual scheme. When a person acquires a concept completely he acquires the capacity to use the concept word grammatically and meaningfully. In fact, these two capacities are acquired simultaneously. Nevertheless, one may learn the grammatical use of a word and yet not learn its meaning completely. In such a case, which is quite common with most of us, we have acquired a linguistic skill but not the complete concept.

It is clear that acquiring a concept completely is essentially linked with expressions in a language. For, to know a concept completely is to know the meaning of the corresponding concept word which belongs to some language, not necessarily a natural language. Hence, to know a concept completely is to know it, let us say, linguistically. Or, to possess a concept completely is to possess the linguistic version of a concept. From now onwards, I will use the word 'linguistic concept' to denote concepts acquired completely.

Using Concepts in Referring

An act in which the having and using of concepts is manifested in the fullest sense is the act of referring, whether it is speech act referring or mental referring 2. When a subject intends to refer to something, he/she intends to identify that thing. The subject needs to identify that thing while at the same time distinguishing it from other similar and dissimilar things. And, this he/she is able to do only by using linguistic concepts. For example, when I want to refer to a certain red book on the table, I use different concepts, the concepts of red, book, table and the relation of one object being on the top of another. My use of these concepts to refer is not simply my being able to recognize the object as being red, a book, and being on the table. Simple recognition of an object for what it is, does not constitute referring to it. For, simply recognizing an object does not identify it in the sense of distinguishing it from other similar and dissimilar objects. And, referring involves identifying an object in this sense. For similar reasons, a picture will not do. A picture cannot succeed in uniquely identifying a thing because a picture can resemble any number of objects. I can only distinguish a thing from other similar and dissimilar things, i.e. uniquely identify it, by using linguistic concepts. I can only distinguish the red book I want to refer to from other red books beneath the table by recognizing that it is on the table. And this recognition is expressed in my use of the phrase 'on the table'. Again, I can distinguish the book on the table from other things on the table by using the word 'book'. Similarly, I can distinguish the red book I want to refer to from other black books on the table by using the word 'red'. Hence, the use of words is necessary to distinguish the object one intends to refer to from other similar and dissimilar objects. In speech act referring, the use of words is overt. It is also necessary to understand the logical relations which obtain between the words used and other concept words. If I did not understand that colour can be attributed to physical objects only, I would not (except perhaps accidentally) use the colour word 'red' to qualify the book in order to distinguish it from the black books. Similarly, if I did not understand that only physical objects can stand in the relation of on top of, I would not have used the expression 'on top of the —' to distinguish the book on top of the table from others which are beneath it. It follows then that one can refer to a thing only by using concepts which he/she has acquired completely. In other words, in order to refer to something it is necessary to exercise the capacity to use words and the capacity to understand the logical relations among the different words. The use of both these capacities helps in identifying the thing one intends to refer to. As these capacities relate to words, i.e. to their use and their logical relations, and as words are linguistic entities, it follows that the act of referring in which these capacities are exercised is essentially a linguistic act. We can consider referring from a new perspective and develop

another argument in favour of the view that referring is an essentially linguistic act.

For someone to perform an act of referring, that person must intend to pick out a unique object. He must understand that the object is identical with itself and that he can refer to it more than once, that it is different from some objects and similar to some other objects. In other words, the person must understand identity, similarity and difference even if he does not know words for them. But identity, similarity and difference can only be understood in connection with language. For we cannot see identity. We cannot see that some object is the same as itself. Nor can we see that it is different from some objects and similar to some other objects. We can see different objects and objects which are similar to one another. But we cannot see with our eyes that they are similar. We can only judge that they are similar or different on the basis of what we see with our eyes. To recognize or judge that an object is the same as itself or similar to other objects or different from some other objects is to perform an essentially linguistic act. I recognize or understand that an object is the same as itself by pinning down its identity by using a singular term to refer to it. In the learning process when a child learns to recognize a *single* individual he also acquires the skill of using a singular referring expression to refer to that individual. The recognition of identity and the skill of using a singular referring expression are one and the same thing. In fact, the ability to use singular referring expressions shows that the person using those referring expressions has the concept of identity. Conversely, to have the concept of identity is to be able to use singular referring expressions.

The function of referring expressions is not only to identify some object about which something is said but also to re-identify the object to which the referring expression applies, when the object is not present in front of the speaker. Imagine a speech act context where two friends are talking about their mutual friend who is not present then. The speaker is using a referring expression to refer to the absent friend. In using the referring expression, the speaker is not only identifying him in the sense of picking him out from other individuals but also re-identifying him. By using the one and the same referring expression, the speaker intends to inform the hearer that it is the same identical individual (their friend) that he wants to refer to. The understanding of similarity and difference is also linked to the use of referring expressions. When I refer to the red book on the table, my use of the word 'book' shows that I understand that the object I am referring to is different from, say, a picture, and similar to other things I have called books in the past. We may not know the words for identity, similarity and difference, but in order to refer to something we need to understand the concepts of identity, similarity and difference. And, our understanding of these concepts is necessarily linked with the use of

singular referring expressions. Thus, all referring acts are essentially linguistic acts. The significance of the act of referring consists in uniquely identifying a single individual. This significance is realized with the help of concepts which tie the act of referring to expressions in a language, thus, making the referring act essentially linguistic. From the above discussion it follows that so far as referring is concerned, the use of language is not only the sufficient condition, but also the necessary condition for having and using concepts to identify the referent.

In the course of our discussion we noted that mental reference 1, i.e. where we refer to an object present in front of us, as in the case of a perceptual thought, does not involve the use of referring expressions, not even the 'mental use' of referring expressions which we said was involved in our thought about an object which was not present in front of us. However, I believe that such mental reference is also essentially linguistic in fulfilling only the second of the two conditions of a fully linguistic act. That is to say, even here, the significance of the referring act is determined by its relations to expressions in a language. I believe that the connection that holds between a person and an object when he is thinking of the object, or when he intends to speak of it, is similar in the relevant respects to the connection that holds when the person has specified or referred to the object by using language. Here I agree with Charles Chaistain who says,

> a theory of linguistic reference will have to be combined with a systematic account of certain internal states of the speaker, his thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, memories, and so on, which are, so to speak, the intermediate links connecting the singular terms he utters with their referents out in the world. These intermediaries can themselves be understood only if we treat them as being quasi-linguistic in structure and content . . . and as containing elements analogous to singular terms which can be referentially connected with things in the world outside the speaker's skin.[18]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper, I have tried to establish that mental reference is an 'essentially linguistic act' in the sense explained. I believe that along similar lines it can be argued that mental predication is also an 'essentially linguistic act'. However, I will not attempt to do that here. In any case, if mental reference and mental predication are essentially linguistic acts then our thoughts wherein they occur must also be essentially linguistic. Mental reference and mental predication are linked to beliefs in ways which are similar to those which link speech act reference and speech act predication to the illocutionary act of assertion. If in this sense our beliefs/thoughts are essentially linguistic in nature then Searle's claim regarding the intentionality of mind vis-à-vis the intentionality of

language makes little sense. For, if the intentionality of both thought and language (as used in a speech act) is essentially linguistic then there is no difference between the intentionality of the two. The fact that the intentionality of the mental is linked with a covert (but explicit) use of language, whereas the intentionality of a speech act is linked with an overt use of language does not affect the intrinsic nature of their intentionality. In my view, if intentionality is taken in its original sense (as we find it in Brentano's works) as simply 'being about something', then the intentionality of any intentional phenomenon is *intrinsic* to it.[19] Just as a belief cannot but be about something/some state of affairs, so the assertion expressing that belief cannot but be about something/some state of affairs. Thus, the intentionality of both thought and language (as used in the expression of thought) is *intrinsic* to each and not derived from any external source.

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Theory-ladenness of Observation and Evidence

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In this paper, I argue for theory-ladenness of observation. Several arguments have traditionally been employed by philosophers to establish theory-ladenness of observation. These include the Voluntary Reversal of Perception Argument (VRPA), and the Penetrability of the Visual System Argument (also known as the Conceptual Penetration Argument) (PVSA). The epistemological lesson drawn from these arguments is set out in terms of rational theory resolution. Next, I consider an objection, motivated by Michael Bishop's work.[1] Bishop attempts to show that most theory-ladenness of perception arguments fail to show that observation is in a strong sense theory-laden. The problem is raised in the context of theory resolution. I first summarize Bishop's analyses of two arguments: the Penetrability of the Visual System Argument (or the Conceptual Penetration Argument), and the Voluntary Reversal of Perception Argument. I also consider some preliminary objections that can be dealt with successfully by this analysis. I then go on to elaborate the epistemic situation which involves rational resolution of theory. I point out that this involves introducing a notion of evidence or evidential bearing of observation. I argue that the strength of the Voluntary Reversal of Perception Argument and of its subsequent support to the Penetrability of the Visual System Argument (or the Conceptual Penetration Argument) are dependent upon this notion of evidence or evidential bearing of observation. Once the notion of evidence is emphasized, theory-ladenness of observation or evidence becomes more transparent. In conclusion, I point out that an analysis similar to that of Bishop's is relevant for observation and not for evidence.

TWO ARGUMENTS FOR THEORY-LADENNESS OF OBSERVATION

In this section, I first briefly set out the general problem which raises very acutely the problem of theory-ladenness of observation. This is the problem of theory resolution. In science, the practitioners of science often are confronted with a situation where they have to choose one theory over

another, or one explanation over another, given a certain set of observations. In normal science, more often than not, theory resolution involves no major overthrow of the conceptual schema. However, there are examples in history of science where we see a major break with the past world-view. These breaks are called, in philosophy of science, scientific revolutions. Some of the well-known examples are the Copernican Revolution, the Newtonian Revolution, the Chemical Revolution, the Darwinian Theory of Evolution, and, in the twentieth century, revolutions in physics involving Quantum Mechanics and Theory of Relativity. One of the important questions which philosophers of science have asked is: what goes on in theory resolution in science? The problem can be made explicit in the following way. Scientists are faced with the problem of resolving, given a set of observations, which of the two contending theories is more likely or acceptable. There are various philosophical accounts as to what happens or ought to happen in such situations. But we will not worry about them here. Our problem is to ask whether the set of observations that various scientists engaged in the act of theory resolution employ, is a set which is theory-neutral. After all, if the scientists with allegiance to two contrary theories are appealing to observations which are theory-specific, then theory resolution is almost an impossible task. More correctly, rational theory resolution will be almost an impossible task. Viewed in this way the problem of theory-ladenness of observation assumes importance. Theory-ladenness of observation implies that what we observe, or more accurately the description of our observation, is theory-infected. There are several arguments to show that observation is theory-laden, that our visual system is penetrated by the conceptual resources we possess. We now briefly look at two of these arguments below.

Voluntary Reversal of Perception Argument

Proponents of theory-ladenness of observation employ certain kinds of psychological evidence to argue for theory-ladenness of observation. Some of the more effective evidence are, allegedly, perceptual reversal of ambiguous figures. Some of the well-known examples include the necker cube (ambiguous three-dimensional figure), the old woman/young woman (see Figure 1a) and the duck/rabbit (ambiguous forms), and the face/vase (figure-ground ambiguity) (see Figure 1b). The visual system can readily interpret these figures in two ways. Thus, the face/vase figure can be interpreted as either a pair of faces or a vase. At the least, this evidence is suggestive. The fact that we can interpret the figure in more than one way seems to suggest that we impose a certain set of conceptual apparatus to interpret the pre-theoretic observation. The observation and the conclusion that it is a figure of a face, at a particular time, is clearly concept (of face in this case) infected. By parity of reasoning, the observation that it is a figure of a vase is also

Figure 1a

Figure 1b

Figure 1c

concept-infected. In such a case, no rational resolution, as to what this figure is actually of, is possible. This is because, the argument goes, there is no theory-neutral observation we can appeal to. Analogically, this perceptual reversal argument supposedly underscores that if our visual systems are implicated in an episode of theory resolution, it would result in no theory-neutral observations being employed. The different hypotheses about the ambiguous figures are supposed to be analogous to the competing theories in theory resolution.

Penetrability of Visual Systems Argument

Proponents of the theory-ladenness of observation also adduce cases of expert–novice differences in observation. Suppose the expert, say in particle physics, and a novice, say a new graduate student, view a track on the screen. Although this viewing is unproblematic, what they actually see are quite different. While the expert sees a proton trace, the novice

merely sees a track. Thus, what they observe are quite different. Of course, the graduate student, after sufficient training, does see that such a track is of a proton trace. Paul Churchland dramatizes this point by way of an imaginary experiment. Imagine a group of people, Churchland says, who have expanded their 'perceptual consciousness' by mastering at a young age most sophisticated scientific theories.

> They do not observe the western sky redden as the Sun sets. They observe the wavelength distribution of incoming solar radiation shift towards the longer wavelengths . . . as the shorter are increasingly scattered away from the lengthening atmospheric path they must take as terrestrial rotation turns us slowly away from their source.[2]

The argument suggests the following scenario. Suppose a pair of individuals have mastered competing theories. As a result, the conceptual resources of their visual systems will have changed in such a way that the observations they make cannot be neutral between those theories. To use Churchland's example, when individuals master completely contemporary optical theory, it is possible that they will no longer observe a red sky, but a sky that is reflecting solar radiation whose wavelength is between 650 and 700 nanometres.

The phenomenon of voluntary perceptual reversal is also employed to argue for conceptual penetration. The phenomenon shows that it is possible that different individuals or the same individual at different times can perceive different things when their perceptual mechanisms are pointed in the same direction.[3]

A Historical Episode

I shall end this section with an example from history of chemistry. I will emphasize that scientists in the eighteenth century did recognize that observations (as a relevant evidence for theory) are theory-infected. For example, Joseph Priestley, a leading eighteenth-century chemist, argued that descriptions of contents in a beaker or vessel descriptions or phenomenological descriptions of the colour and smell, etc., of substances do not constitute evidence for whether some experiments in chemistry are the same or not. Priestley was responding to a charge that he had plagiarized someone's work. His reply was to point out that mere sameness of observation reports do not constitute the basis of sameness of experiments in chemistry. Thus, he said,

> Now this I take to have been the difference between Dr H——s's experiments and mine, and I hope that the next time you shall see a man standing by a tub of water, or a bason of quicksilver, with jars and phials, & c. before him, filled partly with air, and partly with water, with a lighted candle, and a variety of little implements at

hand, and transferring his different kinds of airs, with the same degree of dexterity, from one vessel to another, a red colour appearing here, and a white one appearing there, you will not be ready to affirm that the operation was instituting the very same experiments that you saw at Shelburne home.[4]

Priestley's point here is this. Suppose we see an experiment is being performed. For the sake of simplicity, let us say, we take a white powder in a beaker. Pour a transparent liquid on the powder. We see effervescence in the beaker. Now, we invert an empty phial on the top of the beaker. We see some red fume being collected in the phial. We may 'see' the 'same' experiment again later. The experiments are the 'same' in the sense that the description of the later experiment may be in no way different from the description of the experiment given above. But that similarity in descriptions does not constitute the 'sameness' of the experiment in the 'sense' that both involved the same constituents, or the same chemical experiments with the same constituents. One of them might have been done as a control experiment to establish that light does not play any causal role on the chemical reaction under investigation. Or the constituents involved might be quite different although they look the same.

The moral that I want to draw from the above arguments and the historical example is following. Observation, in order for it to be (evidentially) relevant for a theory, is theory-infected. Although one could legitimately hold that there are observations which are not theory infected, I will argue later on that such observations cannot be employed for theory resolution.

SUMMARY OF MICHAEL BISHOP'S ARGUMENTS

Michael Bishop in his paper 'Theory-ladenness of Perception Arguments' raises some important objections against the theory-ladenness of perception arguments. In order to explain his objections I shall first explain some of the key terms he employs in presenting his argument. I shall also highlight his presentation of the general structure of the two arguments discussed in the last section, and subsequently consider his objections to each.

The Structure of Empirical Arguments

Bishop recognizes that empirical theory-ladenness arguments 'typically employ some psychological phenomena to show that observations are in some sense "theory-laden".'[5] A somewhat trivial argument is that observations are inevitably made (or at least expressed) in terms of some conceptual framework (terms) or other. A more interesting argument is that theory-ladenness implies that 'all observations are *in principle* defeasible since the conceptual apparatus they employ might

turn out to be faulty.'[6] An example of a defeasible observation is that of the sun rising in the morning. The sun, of course, does not rise, according to the heliocentric theory. The earth by virtue of its rotation around its axis gives rise to that defeasible observation. It is the intent of this version of the argument that I shall be interested in discussing in this paper.

Bishop next proposes the following general theory-ladenness thesis which may give rise to several particular theses.

> (T) Given a case of rational theory resolution, the psychological evidence *A* the set of observations S employs in deciding between *B* significantly different and competing theories consists of *C* theory-neutral observations.
>
> A: shows that inevitably, suggests that possibly
> B: all possible, all actual, most actual, some actual
> C: no, only some, primarily, only
> The most radical theory-ladenness thesis, call it T_1, will be:
>
> (T_1) Given a case of rational theory resolution, the psychological evidence *shows that inevitably* the set of observations S employs in deciding between *all possible* significantly different and competing theories consists of *no* theory-neutral observations.
> The most conservative theory-ladenness thesis, T_{32}, is:
>
> (T_{32}) Given a case of rational theory resolution, the psychological evidence *shows that inevitably* the set of observations S employs in deciding between *all possible* significantly different and competing theories consists of *only* theory-neutral observations.

Bishop then gives us a notion of theory-neutrality of concepts. He proceeds, following B. Russell, Ramsey, and D. Lewis, by first conjoining the sentences in a theory that contain C, then quantifying existentially (first or second order) over C, and lastly by replacing the existential quantifier with a definite description operator and by defining as C what satisfies the entire definite description. Although this may be difficult to manage, it is possible to define the terms using less than all the descriptions believed true of it. He next defines a theory-neutral concept as follows.

(NC) Term T expresses concept C which is theory-neutral between theories T_1 and T_2 just in case term T is defined by descriptions that are not incompatible with either T_1 or T_2.

(NO) An observation is neutral between competing theories T_1 and T_2 just in case its representational content is given only by concepts that are theory-neutral between T_1 and T_2. An observation is theory-laden just in case it is not theory-neutral. This definition makes an observation theory-neutral or theory-laden only relative to a set of theories. Thus, although an observation can be trivially theory-laden, yet it can be used

for theory resolution because contending theories are sharing a certain subset of concepts which can be employed to describe the representational content of that observation.

The representational content (RC) of an observation, O, is described by employing concepts which the observer has at his/her command. Thus, trivially any observation is theory-infected. Now, different theories can and do employ different, and at times, contrary conceptual schemes. Hence, the description of the representational content of an observation will be dependent upon what conceptual resources (CR) of a particular theory are being employed.

Bishop then considers what some piece of evidence would have to exhibit in order to support something close to T_1. Although he acknowledges that psychological evidence seems to show that our visual systems are malleable, he thinks that what one needs to show is that our visual 'systems are *capable of changing in such a way that lends support to his conclusion.*'[7] 'Ideally, the evidence would illustrate the following features:

(a) Subject adopts a new theory, *T*.

(b) Subject's visual system adapts to *T*.

(c) As a result of the adaptation, Subject sees the world differently, in the sense that it is now *more difficult* for Subject to resolve disputes on the basis of theory-neutral observations with those who have not adopted *T*.'[8]

Bishop argues that neither of the two arguments (VRPA or PVSA) successfully does that.

The Conceptual Penetration Argument

The conceptual penetration argument suggests that the conceptual resources of the visual systems of a pair of individuals, who have mastered competing theories, T_1 and T_2, change in such a way that they do not or cannot make observations which are neutral between T_1 and T_2.

In order for the conceptual penetration argument to succeed, the following three views must be defended.

'(1) *A theory of representational content that allows for the possibility that the proponents of substantially different scientific theories can employ very different observational concepts.*

(2) *A psychological account of visual perception that allows for the possibility that after the appropriate sort of training, the proponent of a novel theory can visually perceive the world in terms of the theory's observational concepts.*

(3) *The thesis that proponents of substantially different competing theories will often (or perhaps inevitably) employ very different concepts in historical episodes of theory-choice.*'[9]

Bishop then points out that (1) may be granted because (1) is compatible with 'our expressions of various concepts like light, heat, or gene, that is agnostic about what constitutes those things. Such concepts seem to be neutral between a number of different theories about the

structure of light, or heat, or gene.'[10] He also grants (2) because 'there are good reasons to believe that experience and training can alter our visual systems'.[11] Thus, after a lot of contacts with proton traces, the scientist's visual system could expand to include such representations. Yet 'the historical evidence will not show that in all actual cases of theory-resolution, only non-neutral categories were employed.'[12] Bishop now argues that the conclusion to draw from the penetration evidence will be:

(T) Given a case of rational theory resolution, the psychological evidence *suggests that possibly* the set of observations S employs in deciding between *B* significantly different and competing theories consists of *C* theory-neutral observations.

B: most actual, some actual

C: no, only some, primarily, only.

Thus, 'even if the defenders of the conceptual penetration argument win the semantic and psychological debates, they can, at best, establish some reasonably moderate version of the theory-ladenness thesis.'[13]

Perceptual Reversal of Ambiguous Figures

Bishop argues that 'by itself the phenomenon of perceptual reversal implies nothing about how scientific controversies are resolved and so does not directly support any version of the theory-ladenness thesis.'[14] This is because the subject does not adopt a new theory. It also does not show that 'the subject's visual system is capable of adapting to a new theory'.[15] This evidence seems to exhibit features of our visual systems that if implicated in an episode of theory resolution would result in no (or only a few) theory-neutral observations being employed.

The Voluntary Reversal of Perception phenomenon shows that 'different individuals or the same individual at different times, can perceive different things when their perceptual mechanisms are pointed in the same direction'.[16] The disanalogy between this phenomenon and an episode of theory resolution lies in the fact that this phenomenon does not show that the visual system's representational resources are changing appreciably in the case of Voluntary Reversal of Perception, as is required in theory resolution. Similarly, unlike in an episode of theory resolution, the visual system's conceptual resources do not increase or change in the case of the ambiguous old woman/young woman figure. All that the phenomenon of voluntary perceptual reversal suggests is that individuals are capable of deciding which observational representations to employ in any given situation. Bishop points out that a complete hypothesis-neutral description of the old woman/young woman (expressed in geometrical terms), does not make it possible to determine whether it is a figure of an old or a young woman. Bishop grants the possibility of there being analogous cases in episodes of theory resolution in which scientists are incapable of rationally deciding

between hypotheses on the basis of theory-neutral observations alone. However, for Bishop, 'the real issue is whether non-neutral observations *must* play a role in theory adjudication'.[17] Voluntary perceptual reversal does not show that 'non-neutral observations are necessary in order to make rational theory choices'.[18] It merely shows that it is not possible to rationally decide whether the old woman/young woman figure really represents an old woman or a young woman because of lack of enough information provided by the figure. 'What voluntary perceptual reversal does not show, and needs to, is that in cases in which there is enough information available to decide rationally between a pair of theories, non-neutral observations must be part of that information.'[19]

To summarize, the two arguments from conceptual penetration of the visual system and perceptual reversal of ambiguous figures do not substantiate a radical theory-ladenness thesis. Both arguments grant that there are observations which are theory-laden and that historically in some cases of rational theory adjudication there might have been non-theory-neutral observations as well, which were employed.

Replies to Some Objections

Theory resolution implies that an agent, S, assesses a theory T_1 on the basis of an evidence set $\{E_1\}$; the agent also assesses a theory T_2 on the basis of another evidence set $\{E_2\}$; and finally comes to the decision, say, that T_1 is acceptable compared to T_2. Given this view, it follows that the agent can go back and forth between T_1 and T_2. This satisfies the requirement that Bishop imposes for S to be able to rationally decide between theories. The question, however, remains whether (some of) these observations/evidence (in $\{E_1\}$ or $\{E_2\}$) are not theory-neutral. I shall emphasize later that the notion of evidence or evidential role of observation is crucial to our understanding of the problem at hand.

The definition of theory-neutral concept needs to be understood/ elaborated in the following way. A term, T, which expresses a theory-neutral (between two theories T_1 and T_2) concept, C, is defined by descriptions that are not incompatible with either T_1 or T_2. One way this non-incompatibility is achieved is when these descriptions are used by both T_1 and T_2. Another way this is achieved is when neither T_1 nor T_2 employs these descriptions. However, in that case, the representational content of an observation cannot be described by any term, and hence will have no evidential bearing on either T_1 or T_2. Another interesting example of non-incompatibility will be when T_1 (or T_2) employs descriptions which are not employed by T_2 (or T_1) but the term has no evidential bearing on T_2 (or T_1). Here only the first kind of non-incompatibility is relevant for our purposes, because we are interested in investigating whether there is a set of theory-neutral observations which can play an evidential role and subsequently help in theory adjudication. The question is whether these theory-neutral (understood

following Bishop's account) observations can play the relevant evidential role required of them to help in theory adjudication. I turn to that question next.

Suppose there is a particular theory-neutral observation, O. The representational content (RC) of O is expressed by theory-neutral terms and hence theory-neutral concepts. The linguistic expression of O will be one of the following: X is Y, or X = g(Y). X and Y are terms which express corresponding concepts, C(X), and C(Y), which are theory-neutral. Thus, X is Y, for example, is an observation which can be employed to determine whether T_1 or T_2 is supported by it. The observation, X is Y, will be compatible with one, say T_1, and will be incompatible with the other, say T_2. Thus, although X is Y is theory-laden because it employs some concepts, it can still be employed for theory adjudication of this kind.

However, apparently there are some serious problems when we consider the situation carefully. Suppose there are two competing theories T_1 and T_2. These employ very different conceptual resources, say $\{CR_1\}$ and $\{CR_2\}$ respectively. Thus, the language (L_{T1}) employed to describe T_1, and the language (L_{T2}) employed to describe T_2 are very different. The observation language (L_{O1}) for T_1 is different from the observation language (L_{O2}) for T_2. Suppose, following Bishop, there could be a set of theory-neutral observations, $\{O\}$. Therefore, $\{O\}$ must belong to the intersection of the set $\{O_1\}$ and the set $\{O_2\}$. The conceptual resources $\{CR\}$ employed to describe $\{O\}$ must be common to both L_{O1} and L_{O2}. In fact, $\{CR\}$ will be the intersection of the sets $\{CR_1\}$ and $\{CR_2\}$. Since $\{O\}$ has evidential bearing on both T_1 and T_2, $\{O\}$ must be re-expressed in such a way that the evidential relation becomes explicit. (I shall argue in the next section that the evidential potential for $\{O\}$ needs to be understood differently from the way it will be discussed in the rest of this section.) The way T_1 and an element of $\{O\}$ is going to be related is either by a correspondence rule or a bridge law or through a subset of is the set of some relations, $\{B_1\}$. The details of these are not important here. This will allow the terms in L_{T1} (associated with $\{CR_1\}$) to be connected to $\{O\}$. Similarly, through a subset of the set of relations, $\{B_2\}$, the terms in L_{T2} (associated with $\{CR_2\}$) are going to be connected to $\{O\}$. Suppose, O', an element of thee set $\{O\}$, is a theory-neutral observation. We want to determine its evidential relation with T_1 and with T_2. Let the two relations be L_1 and L_2. It follows that $T_1 L_1 O'$ as well as $T_2 L_2 O'$ both hold. If these relations are conceptual, then T_1 and T_2 are conceptually connected. But they are at least contrary. So, the relations cannot be conceptual. Also, they employ very different conceptual resources. Therefore, these relations must be empirical and must be established independently. There are four possible kinds of situations which may arise. These are as follows.

(a) The relation between T_1 and O' is of the kind, All O' are A and the relation between T_2 and $Ó$ is of the kind, All O' are U. In that case either T_1 entails T_2 or T_2 entails T_1, or they entail each other in part, and O' is relevant for the part which reflects the intersection of the two. This does not lead to theory resolution.

(b) Some O' are A and Some O' are U. In this case also, no theory resolution is possible.

(c) All O' are A, and No O' are U. In this case, theory resolution is possible.

(d) However, most cases deal with the following kind of situations. Most O' are A and most O' are not U. This allows theory resolution through an inductive argument.

There are other apparent problems. Rational theory resolution demands that the agent comes to the conclusion that, say, T_1 is more likely than T_2 given all the evidence. Let us assume that there is a set of theory-neutral evidence to which both theories appeal. In order for this set to be of any use in theory adjudication, it must help increase the probability of one of the theories. But how will we calculate such probabilities? If these are objective probabilities, then the observation sentence couched in the observation language must be translated into the theoretical language through a correspondence principle such that a Carnapian kind of programme succeeds. But that observation sentence is now no more a theory-neutral sentence in order for it to have any bearing on the theory. Even if these probabilities are subjective, the situation does not change. However, the reply will be that since both theories appeal to the same observations, and these are theory-neutral, their translations into theoretical language, through theory-neutral terms, will be identical. Now, one has to determine how much this evidence sentence makes one of them probable as against the other. But it can make one more probable than the other provided it expresses a relation which follows from or entails one part of one of the theories and no such relation exists between the evidence sentence and the other theory. Since T_1 and T_2 are at least contrary to each other, the observation must favour one over the other at least probabilistically. Then, theory adjudication is possible.

In spite of the apparent success of Bishop's argument there are some problems. I will mention a few in this section, before I consider a reply to his criticism of the Voluntary Reversal of Perception Argument in the next section. Although it may be held that we have concept of light, heat, or genes, which are theory independent in the sense we are not sure what the correct theory about any of them is, yet it should be apparent that scientists cannot make use of these terms to generate and/or use observations unless these have *evidential bearing* on the competing theories. This implies that scientists with competing theories may not be able to use these allegedly theory-neutral terms for theory adjudication.

Also, although experience and training can help alter scientists' visual systems so that they are capable of recognizing new things, and hence can learn by a lot of contact with proton traces, e.g., what they are like, so can the technicians. But learning that a particular picture is of a proton trace is only the first step towards generating a piece of evidence.

VOLUNTARY REVERSAL OF PERCEPTION
ARGUMENT—LESSON TO BE DRAWN

Voluntary reversal of perception, Bishop argues, does not show that the visual system's representational resources are changing appreciably. This may be true. The same conceptual/representational resources lead to perception of different things. Perhaps it is one subset of these resources which leads to one perception, while the other subset leads to the other. These subsets are conflicting in the sense that these together cannot lead to the perception of two different things at the same time, nor can they together lead to perception of anything except some lines. Here, we start with a theory-neutral observation: a set of lines with some pattern but not an identifiable one. The representational content of the observation is the same for both final hypotheses (the figure is that of an old woman or that of a young woman). However, even when the two hypotheses share the representational content of the observation, because they are contrary by virtue of the subsets of conceptual resources being conflicting, one can and does reach only one of the hypotheses at one time.

In the case of theory choice, the two theories share the conceptual resources to a lesser extent. In that case a particular observation, relevant for theory adjudication is theory-neutral, provided the conceptual resources of both theories are shared to the extent that the reperesentational content of that observation can be adequately expressed by the shared conceptual resources such that the observation can now play its required evidential role. In order to assess the evidential bearing of that observation, one must not *need any increase* in the visual system's conceptual resources. Because if we do, then we need it while assessing at least one or both theories. This will imply either that the theory-neutral observation employed is not a sufficient condition for assessing the evidential bearing of that particular observation or it implies that such observation is retranslated into a more theoretical description by the respective enhanced theoretical conceptual resources. If the former is true, then we need an account of what else is required to establish the evidential bearing. If the latter is true, then theory-neutrality of observation can be granted but no epistemological gain in terms of the possibility of rational theory choice by appealing to theory-neutral observations is *prima facie* possible. The argument for such a gain has to be separately provided.

THEORY–LADENNESS OF OBSERVATION

In this section, I argue for the ineliminable theory-ladenness of observation by showing that Bishop's analysis of the Voluntary Reversal of Perception Argument is inadequate because of his lack of recognition of the evidential bearing any observation has on theories. I conclude by considering some objections to my argument.

Theory-ladenness of Observation and Evidential Bearing

Although the example of the figure employed in the Voluntary Reversal of Perception Argument is not unambiguous, in the sense that it does not provide enough information to decide whether it really represents an old woman or a young woman, it allows us to draw one lesson. In the case of theory resolution also we are faced with a similar problem, in that we do not have enough information to decide which one is really true. Suppose we have two theories, T_1 and T_2. Both T_1 and T_2 are underdetermined by the observation/information. Suppose the claim is that it is rational to accept T_1. This must be because of the evidential bearing of a set of observations, $\{O\}$. Suppose, I, a subset of $\{O\}$, is a set of neutral observations. Rational decision procedure will need an account of bearing of I on T_1 vis-à-vis that of I on T_2. But such bearing can be determined when and only when I and T_1 employ the same/translatable language. Let me explain what I imply by all these.

The Voluntary Reversal of Perception in the case of the figure (old woman/young woman) shows the following. We have a set of observations, $\{O\}$. The set consists of certain lines arranged in some pattern. This description (of the representational content) of $\{O\}$ is theory-neutral or perhaps hypothesis-neutral. This description employs concepts shared by both hypotheses. The hypotheses in this case being: H_1—The figure is that of an old woman, and H_2—The figure is that of a young woman. The transformation of $\{O\}$ into a piece of evidence for H_1 or H_2 requires, however, employment of contrary conceptual resources. It is true that both hypotheses have at their disposal the same conceptual resource $\{CR\}$ which includes concepts like old, woman, young etc. But $\{O\}$ is transformed to a piece of evidence for H_1 by applying the concept old, while $\{O\}$ is transformed to a piece of evidence for H_2 by applying the concept young (which is contrary to old). Thus, two contrary subsets, $\{CR_1\}$ and $\{CR_2\}$ respectively, of the set of conceptual resources $\{CR\}$ were employed to arrive at two different pieces of evidence from the same hypothesis-neutral observation. These pieces of evidence now have bearing for their respective hypotheses. Each entails one hypothesis and refutes the other. These two evidence sentences are laden by (contrary) theoretical concepts. Viewed this way, the Voluntary Reversal of Perception can now provide a stronger argument for theory-ladenness. Before I show how, one more important point needs to be discussed. It may be granted that if we have more information in this case, we could

unambiguously determine whether the figure is of an old woman or of a young woman. This implies that the set of observations $\{O\}$ is now enlarged to $\{O'\}$, and $\{O'\}$ is described using hypothesis-neutral concepts understood as above. The enlarged set $\{O'\}$ can lead to evidence which could help decide unambiguously whether the figure is of an old woman or of a young woman. Thus, its evidential potential can be brought to the fore by its transformation to the relevant piece of evidence by $\{CR_1\}$ or $\{CR_2\}$, as the situation may be. But this only shows that we have a situation which is not ambiguous. It does not show that observations are not hypothesis-laden. The transformation of observations into evidence is required before any decision can be taken whether one hypothesis is more likely than the other. These transformations require employment of conceptual resources of the hypothesis or theory which is to be evaluated.

Similar arguments apply in the case of theory adjudication. Suppose we have two theories, T_1 and T_2. Suppose, also, that the conceptual resources each employs are characterized by $\{CR_1\}$ and $\{CR_2\}$ respectively. We also grant that these theories share some conceptual resources $\{CR\}$. Thus, $\{CR_1\}$ is a combination of $\{CR^1\}$ and $\{CR\}$, while $\{CR_2\}$ is a combination of $\{CR^2\}$ and $\{CR\}$. Suppose now, we have theory-neutral observation set $\{O\}$. This implies that $\{O\}$ along with $\{CR\}$ will lead to evidence set $\{E\}$. In theory adjudication, evidential bearing of $\{E\}$ on T_1 as well as on T_2 have to be assessed. Generally, three kinds of situations arise.

(a) T_1 and T_2 differ with respect to their relations with $\{E\}$ which is generated using $\{O\}$ and $\{CR\}$. This case is somewhat similar to the augmented Voluntary Reversal of Perception case discussed above. Thus, the difference between T_1 and T_2 is centred around relations involving terms (concepts) in $\{CR\}$ and can be resolved by $\{E\}$.

(b) T_1 and T_2 differ and the nature of the difference is based on unshared $\{CR^1\}$ and $\{CR^2\}$. This cannot be resolved by $\{E\}$. I shall explain why.

(c) T_1 and T_2 differ and the ground for the difference includes both reasons (a) and (b). This cannot be resolved because of the same problem as in (b).

The resolution in case (b) or (c) is not possible because of the following reason. $\{CR^1\}$ and $\{CR^2\}$ employ contrary concepts. Therefore, $\{CR_1\}$ and $\{CR_2\}$ employ contrary concepts. E has an evidential bearing on T_1 provided E can be expressed in terms of $\{CR^1\}$ or $\{CR_1\}$. If the former, then E has no evidential bearing on T_2. If the latter, only that part of E has an evidential bearing on T_2, which involves $\{CR\}$. Parity of reasoning holds if E has an evidential bearing on T_2. Therefore, E has either an evidential bearing on T_1 (and perhaps only a partial bearing on T_2) or has an evidential bearing on T_2 (and perhaps only a partial bearing on T_1). The upshot of this is that the apparent theory-neutrality

of $\{O\}$ can perhaps be established but its evidential potential is rather limited if it cannot be expressed in evidence sentences which are expressed in the language of the theory. Hence, for rational decision-making, availability of a set of theory-neutral observations $\{O\}$ *per se* does not help. The evidential potential of $\{O\}$ is of importance. But transformation of $\{O\}$ to evidence is theory-laden and the particular transformed evidence, thus being theory-laden, cannot be appealed to by both the theories.

Replies to Some Objections

The objection that might be raised against the analysis of voluntary reversal of perception is that there is insufficiency of neutral observations in determining whether the figure is of an old woman or of a young woman. If there were sufficient neutral observations it would be possible in principle to determine without ambiguity what the figure is about. It seems that this objection, as discussed before, misses the point. The observations as observations do not play any role in determining what the figure is about. The transformation of the observation is a necessary step to bring out its evidential bearing in the particular situation at hand. This transformation is theory-laden. In this particular case, if there were sufficient observations, these will be expressed in theory-neutral terms, because the contrary hypotheses do not share contrary conceptual resources. In fact, it is somewhat of a misnomer to call these observations theory-neutral, as defined by Bishop. These are, in one sense trivially theory-neutral, and in another sense trivially theory-laden. However, the evidential potential of these observations are to be understood only when these are transformed (in this case trivially) into evidence sentences by the theoretical concepts. The more important objection is that it has not been established that non-neutral observations *must* play a role in theory adjudication. Since observations must be transformed to evidence by theoretical concepts, they are theory-infected. But that does not show that neutral observations, following Bishop, are not enough for theory adjudication. In one class of cases theory adjudication is possible without appealing to non-trivial theory-laden observations. This is the case where within a given theory, the controversy is whether a particular relation obtains between two concepts or not. Here, with enough information, one can perhaps decide whether the relation obtains or not. The observations are transformed into evidence but the conceptual resources of the competing hypotheses belong to the conceptual resource of the general theory. In any other significant case, where the competing theories do not share conceptual resources, the apparently theory-neutral observations will be transformed to very different evidence by the different conceptual resources of these theories. Hence, a rational theory resolution will be difficult. It will be difficult because the evidential worth of the observation on independent theories

will not be comparable if such worth is calculated in terms of (increase or decrease of) probability of the theory by the observation.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. M. Bishop, 'Theory-ladenness of Perception Arguments', paper presented at Iowa Philosophical Society Annual Meeting, 1992. A copy of the paper was made available to me by the author. Subsequently published in *PSA*, Vol. 1, 1992, pp. 287–300. References are from the published paper. I think that Bishop's objections and arguments need to be seriously considered and replied to. To that extent, his worries could have been raised by any sensitive philosopher and my exposition of these worries and my replies to them are to be seen from that perspective.
2. P. Churchland, *Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, p. 29.
3. The example of dent (see Figure 1c) seems to suggest that. In fact it is a stronger argument. The reason for perceiving something as raised is the belief that light generally falls from above. In that circumstance, a raised object will have its shadow falling down. A dent on the other hand will have its bottom illuminated and the side will be dark. It should be apparent that our theoretical belief regarding how light works is employed in our interpretation of the observation.
4. J. Priestley, *Philosophical Empiricism*, J. Johnson, London, 1774, pp. 77–78.
5. Bishop, 'Theory-ladenness of Perception Arguments', p. 287.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 289.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 291.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 292.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 293.
17. Ibid., p. 294.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

Buddhist Critique of Relation with Special Reference to *Samavāya*

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I

The concept of relation constitutes a basic plank of a realistic system. Advocacy of reality of relations is as essential for realism as its denial is essential to idealism. An idealist has to do away with relations in the ultimate analysis but for a realist its maintenance is a dire necessity all through. Relations play a significant role in epistemology, logic, ontology, linguistic analysis and in all areas of philosophizing.

The concept of relation is essentially non-monistic in its connotation and therefore it necessarily presupposes a dualistic (or pluralistic) conceptual framework.[1] A relation can no doubt be construed as internal (*svagata*) within one and the same entity as it is conceived in the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta in the form of *apṛthaksiddhi sambandha*, but it needs to be pondered if it would not amount to *rūpahāni* (loss of nature), as acceptance of relata within a unity would jeopardize its unitary character. All relations should legitimately be regarded as external obtaining between two or more distinct relata, one being the adjunct (*anuyogi*) and the other subjunct (*pratiyogi*).

In a pluralistic framework a distinction can be drawn between intra-categorial (*padārthagata*) and inter-categorial (*padārthāntara*) relation. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system *samyoga* (conjunction) is of the former type in so far as it is between two substances only, whereas *samavāya* (inherence) is mostly of the latter type.

Samyoga obtains between two independently existing relata such that they could be in and out of relation without their essential nature being in any way affected. It is a relation of separability which is terminable and repeatable. It could be of the nature of locus-locatedness (*vṛtti niyāmaka*) or having no locus-locatedness (*vṛttyaniyāmaka*). Within locus-locatedness again it can be pervasive occurrence (*vyāpya vṛtti*) or non-pervasive occurrence (*avyāpya vṛtti*).

Samavāya, as distinct from *samyoga*, obtains between two or more inseparably existing objects such that one of them has to be a locus (*āśraya*) and the other located. It is a relation of 'being in' or 'inhering

in' like the cloth inhering in the threads, or colour in the threads. So it is necessarily of the nature of locus-locatedness.[2]

The relation of *samavāya* (comparable to the relation of *paratantratā*, that is, dependence, in the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā) is peculiar to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system introduced in the context of the difficulties given rise to by its analysis of causation, etc.[3] The notion of inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇa*) gives rise to a predicament of the causal substance coexisting with the effect substance such that even though they occupy the same space they appear distinct.[4] The relation of *samavāya* is employed as a device to meet such a situation.

The relation of *samavāya* is not only necessitated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika continuity model of causation, it also has to account for the distinction between substance and qualities, substance and motion, universal and its individual manifestations, ultimate individuals and their differential characters, whole and its parts, etc. Further, being a realistic system it has also to maintain the objective reality of all these relata. So if one denies objectivity to all these relata as some of the systems of Indian thought do, there remains no need to postulate *samavāya*. This apart, with the introduction of the relation of *svarūpa sambandha* its acceptance gets thinned down.

II

In the Buddhist system all relations are regarded as mental construction having no objective existence. They are only hypostatized as external and superimposed upon the reals which are impermanent or momentary particulars. They are discrete and unrelated. All relations are superimpositions (*upādhi*). Relation, therefore, is an interpretation of reality rather than reality itself, as Stcherbatsky has put it.[5] It indeed pretends to acquire perceptiveness and objectivity but it possesses no independent reality of its own. The general Buddhist approach to relation is succinctly put forth by Śankarānanda in the invocatory verse of *Sambandha parīkṣānusāra* as follows:

> By whom all relations with the world have been renounced, in whom there is no 'I' and 'mine', who is free from all concerns, to that omniscient one I bow down.[6]

Buddha was above all relations in socio-personal life. He pointed out the perils of accepting objective reality of relations leading to attachment and infatuation and consequent suffering. All relations are binding in nature and if we have to rise above bondage we have to transcend all relations. A proper understanding (*prajñā*) of the nature of reality (*tattva*) leads to cessation of bondage and suffering (*nirvāṇa*).

From the empirical point of view, however, twenty-four types of relation are enumerated, explained and illustrated in the *paṭṭhāna*

prakaraṇa of the *khuddaka nikāya*, the seventh book of the *Abhidhamma piṭaka*. In fact these are all analytical deductions or explications of the relation of *pratītya samutpāda* (dependent origination) to account for the interconnections which obtain among psycho-physical objects of the empirical world.

From the logical point of view the concept of relation stands for the idea of necessary dependence in the overall context of time. Hence there can be two and only two types of such dependence, i.e. in terms of simultaneity and succession. There are two and only two ways in which one fact can be dependent upon another fact. It is either a part of the latter or it is its effect. There is no third possibility. In the former case they both refer to the same fact like rose and flower. They are related through an identical objective reference. As Dharmakīrti puts it,[7] 'Identity is a reason for deducing a predicate when the subject alone is by itself sufficient for that deduction', i.e. when predicate is part of the subject. The other type of dependence is causal. Cause and effect are not related by identity as their objective references are different. They refer to two different though necessarily interdependent points of reality.

The logico-empirical understanding of relation in Buddhism makes a very interesting study in so far as having accepted it at the logical and empirical planes and having made a ladder-like use of it, paradoxically it has been rejected in the final analysis at the metaphysical plane. In this dialectical understanding all relations, including that of dependent origination, have been accepted only from the logico-empirical point of view having no concern with the objective reals. All relations are vitiated with essencelessness (*svabhāva śūnyatā*) as Nāgārjuna would put it. All mental constructions (*prapañca*) including that of relations are self-stultifying, beset with self-contradictions and hence need to be transcended. Even the principle of dependent origination is also to be used for abnegating the mental constructions (*prapañcopaśama*) and to be transcended.

Inspired by Nāgārjuna and with a view to provide a solid foundation to Buddhist idealism, Dignāga[8] offers a strong critique of relations. The main thrust of his argument is as follows. What indeed is relation to things related? Is it something or is it nothing? If it is something it must represent a third entity. If it is nothing, the two entities remain unrelated. There will then be no relation between them. In the *Sambandha parīkṣā* Dharmakīrti puts forth a scathing examination of the concept of relation. He defines relation as that which exists in two things.[9] He argues that there are four possible ways in which relation can be understood and in all the four possibilities it does not hold good.[10]

(i) If relation is understood as dependency (*pāratantrya*) then it has to be proved that one object depends on another. Now there are two alternatives available. The two relata may have relation either before

their production (*aniṣpanna*) or after their production (*niṣpanna*). It is absurd to say that the two relata are related prior to their production. And it is superfluous to say that the two relata have relation after they are already produced. *Samavāya* is a relation of dependency and there is no logical basis for its acceptance.[11]

(ii) If relation is taken to be intermixure of essences (*rūpaśleṣa*) then it requires two relata and the question that arises here is, whether such a relation is a total amalgamation of one with the other or not. If it is, then the two will become one and no longer remain two. If it is not, then the further question would be whether the two parts of the two relata which are in contact are themselves in total contact or in partial contact. If total, then no part is left with which contact is possible and if partial, then again the chain of questions will arise leading to infinite regress. Therefore contact cannot be a relation in reality.[12]

(iii) If expectancy of one for another is a relation then in case it is not in existence how can such a non-existent have expectancy? If it is already in existence then there is no need or scope for expectancy as it is free from such requirement.[13] Relation cannot be thought of apart from the relata and the relata also cannot be thought of without a common relation (*ekābhisambandha*) but the problem of the relation of the relation with its relata leads to infinite regress.[14] Dharmakīrti points out that in fact the two relata and the relation which is different from the two all exist in their own form distinctly and only our mental faculty (*kalpanā*) makes them appear related.[15]

(iv) Finally, relation cannot even be understood in causal terms because cause and effect do not co-exist on account of their succession and if they do not co-exist how can it be called a relation because a relation has to exist in two relata and not in one (*sambandho naika vṛttimān*).[16] Stcherbatsky has given a free rendering of a verse in a beautiful form as follows:

Since cause and its effect
Do not co-exist at once
How can then their relation be existent?
If it exists in both how is it real?
If it does not exist in both, how is it a relation?[17]

In other words, causal relation is not really possible because cause and effect do not exist together. If it is argued that relation may exist in cause and in effect in succession and not simultaneously, then how can it be called a relation? It would then mean that relation can exist without any one relatum but this is not a mark of relation.[18]

Further, relation 'R' is expected to produce some effect or change in the relata, say x and y. But if R is in x and y does not exist or R is in y and x does not exist then how can R produce any effect in y or x? R can be

present only if both x and y are present. If either x or y is absent R cannot be present and if it is not present how can it bring about any effect in x or y?[19]

Dharmkīrti has thus undertaken an elaborate examination of causal relation. The basic thrust of his objection is that if cause and effect are different from each other they cannot be related and if they are non-different they cannot be differentiated.[20]

Śāntarakṣita in the *Tattva Samgraha* puts forth a critique of *samavāya* relation in a very subtle and logical way and on different grounds than those of Śankara, etc. Instead of examining the concept of relation in general he pays exclusive attention to *samavāya* and attacks the very ground on the basis of which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system accepts *samavāya*. The basic plank of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system to accept *samavāya* is the cognition of 'this subsisting in that' or 'this being in that' (*iha mati* or *iha buddhi*). Kamalaśīla in his commentary summarizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *pūrvapakṣa* as follows.[21] 'In regard to things that are inseparable and things where one is the container and the other contained, there is the notion of "this subsisting in that"; and the relation upon which this notion is based is *samavāya*'. Śāntarakṣita[22] argues that the idea of subsisting in this is due to Vaiśeṣika's infatuation with his doctrine (of realistic pluralism). It is never met with in ordinary experience. For this purpose he undertakes an analysis of ordinary experience and points out that in fact the idea that does appear in our common experience is just the opposite. It is in the form that 'There are branches in the tree' rather than 'There is tree in the branches', or, 'There are threads in the cloth' rather than 'There is cloth in the threads', and this cognition is not due to *samavāya* but because of our experience of close contact of one part with the other part. But it is all explainable as a conglomeration of different elements. The Vaiśeṣikas may insist that the relation between container and contained is explainable only in terms of *samavāya* but to this Śāntarakṣita replies that we have the cognition of container and contained only in case of fruits and basket where both are different and not in the case of cloth and threads which are not different in reality.[23]

Further, when we have the notion like colour in the jar all it means is the identity in the sense that the colour forms the nature of the jar. However, this is not to be understood as colour being the same as jar. The term 'colour' also connotes colour in general in all sorts of conditions; just as colour in jar is spoken of as colour, so also colour in the cloth is spoken of as colour. Hence the term 'colour' by itself does not connote anything in particular, or which particular colour is meant. When, however, the expression used is the colour in the jar, the colour connoted is the particular one which is in the jar as distinguished from the colour in the cloth and other things. But all this is not due to *samavāya*.[24]

Śāntarakṣita passes on to an examination of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view
that *samavāya* is one. According to this system *samavāya* has to be
regarded as *one* because acceptance of its multiplicity amounts to
multiplication of assumptions (*kalpanā gaurava*).[25] But in accepting it
as one there are many difficulties. Praśastapāda himself is aware of
some such difficulties and Śāntarakṣita refers to him and his view in the
form of *pūrvapakṣa*.[26] Referring to the objections Praśastapāda writes,
'If *samavāya* is one the universal of substance and that of quality and
action being the same the. universal of substance will reside in the
qualities and actions also and likewise the universal of quality and
action will reside in substance also and this will give rise to confusion of
objects.'[27] Elaborating this Śāntarakṣita writes, 'If there were one and
the same *samavāya* in all things, then the notion of cloth etc. should
appear in pot etc. It would also follow that the universal of cow subsists
in the elephant as well, so that the elephant should also have the form
of the cow just like the variegated cow. Further, it is said that cloth
subsists in thread by *samavāya*, then *samavāya* being one, and the same
samavāya subsists in pot, cloth should also subsist in pot. But why is it
that there is no such notion.'[28] To this Praśastapāda's reply is: 'Although
the universal of substance etc. have the same *samavāya* there is the differ-
ence of potentiality of manifestation on account of which there will be a
restriction in the relation of the container and the contained.'[29] Śān-
tarakṣita elaborates his argument in the form of *pūrvapakṣa* as follows.[30]
'Even though *samavāya* is one the restriction of container and contained
is always there by virtue of which the universal of substance is present in
substances only and the universal of action is present in actions only.
From the cognition of the fact that the notion of subsisting in this which
arises due to *samavāya* is common in all cases, it is to be concluded that
samavāya is one only.' Commenting on this Kamalaśīla writes, 'Praśasta-
mati has argued as follows: "Though inherence is one, yet there is no
likelihood of an admixture among the five categories; because there is
always a restriction as to what is contained in what. That is to say, the
universal substance is contained in substances only, the universal 'quality'
is contained in quality only, the universal action is contained in action
only, and so on. The notion of universal 'substance' and the rest appear
as restricted to a particular substratum only."' Having stated the
pūrvapakṣa Śāntarakṣita refutes it by saying, 'If *samavāya* is one only then
any restriction regarding the container and contained is impossible.
The universal substance is held to subsist in substance only. How could
that be due to *samavāya*? This same *samavāya* of substance is present in
quality, etc. also. This inevitably results in admixture and confusion.'[31]
Finally, Śāntarakṣita argues that this restriction cannot be accounted
for in terms of the capacity to manifest and to be manifested. The
substance being the manifestator of substance-ness his objection is that
this also presupposes *samavāya* and leads to absurdities.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition *samavāya* is eternal because
no cause of it is experienced. Śāntarakṣita examines this position and
argues that if *samavāya* is eternal then all relata become eternal. *Samavāya*
being eternal, pot, etc. also will have to be regarded as eternal as they
exist in their substratum by *samavāya*. In fact it is on the ground of
samavāya that these things are held to subsist in their substratum and if
samavāya is eternal why should then these things not persist for ever. To
this the Vaiśeṣika thinkers may reply that things become destroyed
either through the disruption or destruction of their component parts
but this does not affect *samavāya*. To this Śāntarakṣita's rejoinder is that
this cannot be so. Since *samavāya* lies in these components there can
not be their destruction and if they can be destroyed *samavāya* is also
liable to be destroyed. This is because when the relata have ceased to
exist, it is impossible for the relation to exist. The Vaiśeṣika thinkers
may further argue that even on the destruction of one relatum *samavāya*
continues to exist because the other relatum is still there. Then the
question arises whether it remains the same *samavāya* or becomes
different. It cannot be the same, otherwise both the relata must continue
to exist. If the relata are not there the *samavāya* also cannot be there,
otherwise it might be in mere name. If *samavāya* is not the same it cannot
be eternal. If mere existence of *samavāya* is postulated as something
independent of all things, and not benefiting or affecting the relata,
then it would be something in name only and there will be no
corresponding reality. Under such circumstance to assert that *samavāya*
constitutes a part of existence of things would be mere verbiage.

The upshot of the above discussion is that the problem of relation is
very baffling and more so is the case with the relation of *samavāya*
accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. The acceptance of *samavāya*
has been criticized by many thinkers belonging to other schools. Among
these the Buddhist thinkers have been the most severe in their criticism.
This is because they maintain a purely subjectivistic view of relation.
The reals being momentary, isolated and discrete, there is no room for
their being related with each other in any form. So, for the Buddhists
relation is only a conceptual fiction fabricated by our mind and it has
no objective existence at all. In other words, unless the Buddhists
accept an abiding character of reals which should persist at least for two
moments, they cannot admit reality of relation.

The Buddhist critique of *samavāya*, though initiated by Dharmakīrti,
has been mainly spearheaded by Śāntarakṣita. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
thinkers have struggled hard to defend and justify the relation of
samavāya. As a consequence they had to invent another relation of
svarūpa. Further, on the question of *samavāya* being one and eternal,
they got divided into two camps. Raghunātha maintains that it is many
and non-eternal whereas Viśvanātha sticks to the older view without
caring for the absurdity involved in it.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Dviṣṭho hi kaścid sambandhaḥ, Sambandha parīkṣā,* verse 11.
2. (i) Praśastapāda defines *samavāya* as 'that relation which obtains betwen such inseparables as are in the relation of the container and the contained, and cause the notion of the latter subsisting in the former.' '*Ayuta siddhānāmādhāryādhāra bhūtānām yaḥ sambandha iha pratyaya hetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ.*'
   (ii) The objective of the present paper is not to give an exposition or analysis of *samavāya* but to put forth its Buddhist critique. In the English rendering of verses of *Sambandha parīkṣā* I have followed V.N. Jha. For *Tattva Saṁgraha* I have followed G.N. Jha.
3. *Ihedamiti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāya, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra,* VII. 2.26.
4. *Pratītibhedāt bhedo' sti deśabhedastuneṣyate, Nyāya-mañjari* of Jayanta.
5. *Buddhist Logic,* Vol. I, p. 245.
6. Quoted from S.C. Vidyabhusava's *History of Indian Logic,* p. 345.
7. *Svabhāvaḥ svasattāmātra bhāvini Sādhyadharme hetuḥ, Nyāya-bindu,* chapter II.
8. *Anumāna-pariccheda, Pramāṇa samuccaya.*
9. *Dviṣṭho hi kaścid sambandhaḥ nāto' nyattasya lakṣaṇam, Sambandha parīkṣā,* verse 11.
10. This exposition is based on Prabhāchandra's commentary as edited by V.N. Jha.
11. *Sambandha parīkṣā,* verse 1.
12. Ibid., verse 2.
13. Ibid., verse 3.
14. Ibid., verse 4.
15. Ibid., verse 5.
16. Ibid., verse 7.
17. *Buddhist Logic,* Vol. I, p. 245.
18. *Sambandha parīkṣā,* verse 8.
19. Ibid., verse 9.
20. Ibid., verse 18.
21. *Ṭīkā* on verse 822.
22. Ibid., verse 826.
23. Ibid., verses 827–30.
24. Ibid., verses 831–33.
25. However, later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers like Raghunātha have disagreed on this and have accepted multiplicity of *samavāyas.*
26. *Tattva Saṁgraha,* verses 840–44.
27. Ibid., verse 840.
28. Ibid., verses 834–39.
29. Ibid., verses 843–44.
30. Ibid., verses 845–53.
31. Ibid., verses 854–65.

Two Biblical Myths of Creation: An Exploration in Ecological Philosophy

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Ecologists, especially in the West, faced with the colossal ecological destruction brought about by man, have been beginning to believe that Christianity has failed us dismally in the search for sustainable development. On account of its anthropocentrism, Christian doctrine has precipitated our current ecological crisis. Through the myths and metaphors of the Bible, it has perpetrated the dominion of man over nature, and nature has started to speak back to man of his abuses and depredations. At the core of these myths and metaphors is the biblical myth of creation. In this article, I would like to closely analyse the biblical myth of creation to examine the charge that the story of creation in the biblical tradition has been ecologically damaging. For my purpose, I shall identify two narratives of creation, compare and contrast them to suggest that the charge has a grain of truth, since the first narrative came to represent *the* view of the Bible at the cost of that of the second. But the time has come to highlight the importance of the second narrative for the sake of exploring similar ecologically friendly narratives within the same biblical tradition, instead of rejecting it altogether. In the first part, the ecological problem is briefly stated. In the second part, I shall give a description of the modern scholarship on the JEDP Source Theory to identify the two myths of creation. In the third part, I shall compare and contrast the two narratives, especially to highlight the emergent picture of man and his place in nature. Finally, I shall briefly dwell upon the merit of drawing upon ecologically friendly biblical myths, by way of an exemplification in the myth of *Job.*

THE ECOLOGICAL PROBLEM

Man has been indubitably indulging in large-scale destruction of his natural habitat, the earth. By his reckless activity, he has polluted earth, air and water, whose purity is an essential condition for sustaining every form of life. Life, as we know, subsists only on the epidermis of the earth, but the latter is subjected to man's predatory violence. The soil is impoverished, the air fouled and the water poisoned through gigantic

industrial activities. The growing population has increasingly encroached upon the natural environment of flora and fauna. To feed, clothe and shelter it, large tracts of forests are indiscriminately cleared. Many of these are tropical forests, which account for not merely the local weather patterns, but the global climate. There is a delicate balance between the greenbelt of the earth and the absorption of the carbon dioxide (CO_2) emitted by our living systems and industries. There is now no sink for the man-made CO_2, which is alarmingly on the increase. With the felling down of the trees, earth can grow only grass. Cattle grazing on it can digest the cellulose due to anaerobic bacteria in their intestines. But this bacteria gives out methane, more dangerous than CO_2, that traps more heat and brings about the greenhouse effect. It is today indisputably admitted that the large-scale denudation of forests, the increasing emission of CO_2, both by living systems and industries, have torn open here and there the ozone layer of the earth's atmosphere, exposing all forms of life to a higher level of radiation. We do not readily admit that the increasing number of cancer and AIDS cases with us has anything to do with the rupture of our stratosphere.

Yet another direct result of the rupture of the stratosphere is global warming. If it is to continue at the present rate, it will bring about the melting of the polar caps, resulting in the submergence of the vast coastal areas. This area, we all know, have been the centres of human civilization. There is no doubt that much of our human civilization may be wiped out, beginning with the small island masses. The periodic, but persistent, cyclonic storms in select vulnerable regions in the world are ominous signs of the catastrophe that is impending on us. Tropical forests are also the habitat of innumerable species of plants and animals, which, in their own invisible ways, guard and preserve the precarious symbiosis of all living forms. With their destruction, a large number of these species have already written off their last signatures in geological records. Paleontologists and geologists tell us that the destruction initiated by man in recent years has no parallel in the history of the earth's strata. The pace of this destruction is so furious that even modest estimates have it to be the annihilation of at least ten species per day. These species of plants and animals are the sources of many valuable medicines, nitrogen fixers, soil enrichers, and so on. Man's indiscriminate destruction, therefore, has been, if anything, suicidal. For it has been the furious march ahead of the mortality of the human species itself.

The industrial revolution has been catering to the narrow and lopsided ideal of never-ending consumerism. This has brought about the fast depletion of the non-renewable resources of the world both of the mineral kingdom and of fossil fuels like coal and petroleum. Mining everywhere has left deep scars on the body of the mother earth, besides poisoning our atmosphere as well as water sources. Nuclear wastes, in

particular, is a singular threat that stares into our faces with unimaginable consequences. When one begins to think that, irrespective of the mode of disposal of these wastes, its effect is to last for tens of thousands of years, one is made to realize the 'plague' that one is injecting into the environment. The picture is dismal, horrifying and insane.

What we are witnessing today, in respect of our ecological crisis, is the product of a conceptual legacy. The conceptual baggage that we have inherited, in particular, in the West (and the East is not far behind in 'aping' the West), has pushed us to the brink of a colossal disaster. That our conceptual baggage has its immediate impact on our enterprise may be readily admitted. What we do is largely determined by what we think; and, what we think is likewise determined by what we think we are.

It may be argued that the western conceptual heritage can be traced to two closely related legacies, the one proximate and the other remote. The proximate legacy is that of the enlightenment, which triumphantly heralded the age of reason. The age of reason proclaimed that man at last had acquired the intellectual maturity, evolving through the several imperfect stages of human development through magic, religion and metaphysics to science. Hence, the age of reason is the glorious stage of science and scientific rationality. Darwin's biological evolution, with its movement from simple to complex states of organism, became a model to explain every sector of human existence, economic and political, social and psychological, artistic and literary, and even ethical and religious. In short, the spirit of enlightenment inaugurated the reign of scientism and positivism. Implicit in the reign is an unbounded faith in the perfectibility of man and the undaunted autonomy of the human spirit. A belief in unlimited scientific progress and economic development is a corollary of the faith concerned. Human enterprise itself becomes now an autonomous value, dissociated largely from all other values. Man thus comes to occupy the centre of the world that he reorganizes. Indeed there is no world which man has not reorganized. The world is essentially his and, if there be anything that claims to remain outside his purview, his adventure is to bring it within the ambit of his enterprise.

The proximate legacy of the enlightenment may be traced back to the indomitable Greek spirit within western culture. But it may be said to be deeply rooted in, besides being sanctified by, the biblical legacy: Man is the image of God. The biblical legacy is then the remote, but the deeper, legacy. In the order of creation, man represents the best of God's creation. Thus the legacy seems to be the depth-determinant of the western conceptual baggage. Think of the entire value systems of the enlightenment: rationality, freedom, autonomy, equality, liberty, fraternity, progress, growth and so on—they are all rooted in the biblical concept of man as the image of God. It is in virtue of his being

the image of God that man is privileged 'to name' everything in creation; that he 'is made a little less than the angels'; that he is placed in 'the centre of the garden of Eden'; that he is 'to rule over all that is created'. In short, man is a co-creator with God, with the rare power of imagination, ratiocination, volition and action to shape his environment to suit his needs.

It is precisely here that some environmentalists hold that man, equipped with the biblical conceptual baggage, has wreaked havoc on nature. Under its impact man has absolutized his 'creative' value, and thereupon the human enterprise itself. He has either forgotten or deliberately ignored the fundamental truth that he has a symbiotic relation with everything in nature; that his survival on the earth as a species is intricately associated with all the rest of nature, living and non-living. This is essentially because he has been fed on the biblical myths of creation.

MODERN BIBLICAL SCHOLARSHIP

JEDP Source Theory

Ideas of creation are interspersed throughout the Bible. However, as the name suggests, *Genesis*, the first book within its collection, may be fruitfully scanned for the myths of creation. To be sure, *Genesis* begins with two distinct narratives of creation (1–2:4 and 2:5–25). Biblical scholars have identified the two myths to belong to the P and J traditions respectively, in the wider context of the classical JEDP Source Theory, also known as the 'Wellhausen hypothesis'.[1] For my present purposes, I shall focus my attention on the distinctive features of only the P and J traditions, for the sake of analysing the two myths identified here. For this I need first of all to look into the composition of the Penteteuch in terms of the material that enter into it.

The Old Testament in general and the Penteteuch in particular, represent an interpretative history of Israel as a theocratic people. The material for the earliest history of Israel comes from such literary genres as legends, primitive songs, independent stories, cult narratives and etymological explanations. We can suppose that, before some of the material came to be written down, it was orally transmitted, possibly in poetic form, as far back as the period of the *Judges*, since later histories suggest their dependence on some common source. The material, after being committed to writing, may have been deposited in the sanctuaries of Israel.

Modern biblical scholarship on the composition of the Penteteuch is about two hundred years old. It has traced its materials to four primary traditions: Yahwist (J, after the German spelling, Jahweh), Elohist (E), Deuteronomic (D) and Priestly (P). J is the earliest tradition, and is easily identifiable by its anachronistic use of the term 'Yahweh' for God.

It belongs to the southern kingdom of Judah, and is generally characterized by, besides its archaic vocabulary, an elegant style for the colourful presentation of scenes and dialogues, deep psychological and theological insights and also an unabashed use of anthropomorphism. Its period was considerably influential in the process of selection, arrangement and redaction of material, without however ruling out other editorial works. Its range of history is sweeping. There is a certain euphoria about the material presented, because the authors look forward and backward in history from the vantage-point of the destiny of the tribe of Judah in the establishment of a Judaic kingdom under David and Solomon. There is in it an unbounded optimism, tinged with a profound sense of divine magnificence, that can turn even defeat into victory. When it looks back at the relevance of the creation of man, an item in proto-history, and the election of the patriarchs and the event of the Exodus, items in history, all history is interpreted by it as serving God's specific plan for man through the chosen people. This plan is central to otherwise disparate material. Human realities, be it the ascendency of Isaac over Esau, Judah over other tribes, or David over Saul, are illumined by God's choice. There is a certain exuberance in its narratives, characterizing the type of communion that takes place between man and God. Hence, the Yahwist authors do not fight shy of anthropomorphism.

The P source, on the other hand, is of considerably recent origin, in so far as it is clearly post-exilic in tone and content. It is attributed to the priests of Jerusalem, hence its concern is largely liturgical; its themes centre around the cultic life of Israel. Its style is remote and abstract, but learned, more often pedantic and redundant. It is fond of genealogies, chronological precisions and minute descriptions of ritual elements. It is also careful to avoid the anthropomorphisms of the J source. Since the faith of Israel was in a crisis during the Exile, the tone of P is exhortationary: Israel must remain holy, like Yahweh himself is, and the royal road for it is a moral and cultic life. Hence there are a host of prescriptions for ritual and legal cleanliness. The goal envisaged is one of going back to the celebration of ritual sacrifice in the temple of Jerusalem. Even the creation narratives have liturgical allusions and applications. The reckoning of days and dates is with reference to the liturgical calendar of feasts. The Exodus march is a liturgical procession. P divides Israelitic history into four periods, each of which is punctuated by a covenant with God, calling at once for a special worship of God, since people, to its priestly perspectives, become holy only through the celebration of liturgy. It is a hopeful ideal held out for a people in exile, or immediately coming out of it for a reconstruction of their community life. In short, the accounts in the P source are more hieratic than poetic, more deliberative than spontaneous, more abstract than emotive.

The two hundred years of scholarship on the formation of the

Penteteuch passed through a 'documentary' theory to a 'fragmentary' theory to a 'supplementary' theory, before it could finally congeal into the classical Wellhausen hypothesis.[2] While analysing our myths of creation, we may have to constantly refer to the spirit of the sources to which they belong.

Two Myths of Creation

The two myths are as under.[3]

P-Myth (Genesis, 1–2:4)

In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. Now the earth was a formless void, there was darkness over the deep, and God's spirit hovered over the water.

God said, 'Let there be light', and there was light. God saw that light was good, and God divided light from darkness. God called light 'day', and darkness, he called 'night'. Evening came and morning came: the first day . . .

The earth produced vegetation: plants bearing seed in their several kinds, and trees bearing fruit with their seed inside in their several kinds . . .

God said, 'Let there be lights in the vault of heaven to divide day from night, and let them indicate festivals, days and years' . . .

God said, 'Let the waters teem with living creatures, and let birds fly above the earth within the vault of heaven'. . .

God blessed them, saying, 'Be fruitful, multiply, and fill the waters of the seas; and let the birds multiply upon the earth'. . .

God said, 'Let the earth produce every kind of living creature: cattle, reptiles and every kind of wild beasts.' And so it was . . .

God said, 'Let us make man in our own image, in the likeness of ourselves, and let them be masters of the fish of the sea, the birds of heaven, the cattle, all the wild beasts and all the reptiles that crawl upon the earth.'

God created man in the image of himself, in the image of God he created him, male and female he created them.

God blessed them, saying to them, 'Be fruitful, multiply, fill the earth and conquer it. Be masters of the fish of the sea, the birds of heaven and all living animals on the earth.' God said, 'See, I give you all these seed-bearing fruit: this shall be your food. To all wild beasts, all birds of heaven and all living reptiles on the earth I give all the foliage of plants for food'. . .

Thus heaven and earth were completed with all their array. On the seventh day God completed the work he had been doing. He rested on the seventh day after all the work he had been doing. God blessed the seventh day and made it holy, because on that day he had rested after all

his work of creating. Such were the origins of heaven and earth when they were created.

J-Myth (Genesis, 2:5–25)

At the time when Yahweh God made earth and heaven there was as yet no wild bush on the earth, nor was there any man to till the soil. However, a flood was rising from the earth and watering all the surface of the soil. Yahweh God fashioned man of dust from the soil. Then he breathed into his nostrils a breath of life, and thus man became a living being.

Yahweh God planted a garden in Eden . . .

Yahweh God caused to spring up from the soil every kind of tree . . .

A river flowed from Eden to water the garden, and from there it divided to make four streams. The first is named Pishon, and this encircles the whole land of Havilah where there is gold. The gold of this land is pure; bdellium and onyx stone are found there . . .

Yahweh God took the man and settled him in the garden of Eden to cultivate and take care of it . . .

Yahweh God said, 'It is not good that the man should be alone. I will make him a helpmate.' So from the soil Yahweh God fashioned all the wild beasts and all the birds of heaven. These he brought to the man to see what he would call them; each one was to bear the name the man would give it. The man gave names to all the cattle, all the birds of heaven and all the wild beasts. But no helpmate suitable for man was found for him. So Yahweh God made the man fall into a deep sleep. And while he slept, he took one of his ribs and enclosed it in flesh. Yahweh God built the rib he had taken from the man into a woman, and brought her to the man . . .

EMERGENT PICTURE OF MAN IN NATURE

First of all, we need to know the picture of man emerging out of the myths, and the relation of man to nature in them. The picture obviously is determined by the sources to which the myths belong, and it need not be the same in them. Human nature, even generally considered, is simple, yet limited.[4] But the simplicity and limitation are diversely grasped by the J and P sources. J dwells upon the limited nature of man, because it recognizes that man too belongs to the created order. It has a profound sense of man's finitude and God's infinitude. There is a sort of a 'metaphysical monism' that pervades its myth of creation, especially if we are to adopt its agricultural viewpoint. In the Semitic context, however, it does not believe in any monism; nonetheless, a sense of poetic wonderment at creation is palpably felt. Being the earliest source, the sense may be said to affect even the P, although P has a distinctive perspective from that of J. Hence, the P-myth appears like an adaptation

of the J-myth, however with its distinctive perspective. This at once suggests that it is not unlikely that J's perspective is overshadowed, nay, greatly obliterated, by that of P. How could this have happened?

Simply by way of an editorial sleight-of-hand. The P-myth, obviously of later origin, was placed right at the beginning of the entire biblical narrative. *Genesis*, we know, is only a proto-history, intended by the priestly editors to link the historical Abraham to a mythical first man, Adam, and likewise to link the tribal history of Abraham to a mythical account of creation. Hence the narratives that suited the priestly objectives, e.g., the P-myth of creation, found precedence over other similar narratives with Yahwist perspectives. Thus our J-myth came under the penumbra of the P-myth. Any literary critic without adequate training in the biblical scholarship is likely to read the *Genesis* and go confidently with the P-myth in his literary kit as representative of the Semitic view of creation, caring little, even if he has read the J-myth, to stop for a while and wonder if the perspectives of the two myths are not different. P has succeeded in drawing a line to the creation account with the Sabbath, enabling us to proceed on weekend from our scholarly pursuits. If there is a J-myth, it could be safely ignored, since it is a mere repetition—after all, are there not many repetitions in the Bible? Philosophers, ecologists and scientists alike tend to amalgamate both the accounts without caring for the perspectives that clearly have given rise to the two distinct myths. They have easily borrowed P's goggles to look through J's narrative. It is now only a short step to perpetuate the thesis, as is actually done in contemporary ecological debates on the Semitic world-view, that man is to be the 'masters of fish . . . birds . . . and all living animals on the earth', thus resulting in our ecological crisis.

Yet, the above vision of mastery over the creatures on the part of man does not correspond with the Yahwist vision of man. What is more, it is not even the characteristic feature of the biblical mentality. The viewpoints of P and J are then two separate, powerful and distinctive approaches to be taken note of in the current ecological debates. The J-myth needs to be redeemed, to say the least, if we are to fully appreciate the total biblical world-view, from the colouring that P has superimposed on it.

Whereas a gnawing sense of the limits of human nature is central to the J-myth, for the P-myth, human nature is triumphal and glorious, because it bears the image of God. Man alone, in the entire order of creation, has this privileged position. Sharing the divine image, and therefore the divine role, he has become now 'like unto God', a (co) creator.[5] He is, of course, below God, but above all creatures. 'You have made them a little less than the angels' (*Psalm* 8)—is a direct echo of P's perspective. But the J-myth is different here: man has a *derived* existence, for he is derived from the earth; he is fashioned 'of dust from the soil'. All forms of life, vegetative and animal, man included, are brought into

existence from the humus of the soil. That the *human* form of life too is from the 'humus' needs be reiterated. Human nature then is 'earthly earthy'. Man bears an inextricable relationship to the soil, as encapsulated in the name, 'Adam', from the Hebrew *adama*, given to the first man. Implicit in the perspective of the P- and J-myths are two diverse pictures of humanity itself, viz. the 'hieratic' and the 'hortic'. Man is either a priest, who creates and rules over an order, sanctified by his ritual actions, or a gardener who tends and takes care of the order of nature that sustains him, by his physical exertions. If he is a priest, he represents God, overlording the earth. But, if he is a gardener and farmer, being made of the humũs, he must tend and cultivate the earth for his own survival.

Secondly, what is the picture of the relation, obtaining between man and the rest of the animal and vegetative kingdom in the two myths? In the P-myth, the relation is hierarchical, in the sense that it is clearly a graded one: man is higher, the animal and vegetative kingdoms are lower. This gradation is determined not only by the image of God that man bears, in contradistinction to the vestige of God in the rest of creation, but also by the fact that man is created at the very end of creation, as if he were the crown of creation. Does not the artist display his masterpiece at the very end in a show? The P-myth prefaces the creation of man with the proud comments, 'Let us make man in our own imàge, in the likeness of ourselves', and concludes with the refrain, 'God created man in the image of himself. . . .' This observation is on the mark, since man is then entrusted with the task of ruling over (*rada*), or having *dominion* over, the entire animate form of life. The Hebrew *rada* stands for rule, either benevolent or dictatorial, but in either case it is the function of power, control and coercion—generally associated with kings and priests.[6]

On the contrary, the J-myth conceives of the relation in a communitarian manner. Man forms a community of the living with the entire animate world of plants and animals. It is not only man who is Adam, everything is, in a sense, 'adam', being made of the *adama* of the earth. Man only represents the community of the living. There is no special ontological status accorded to man, hence no privileged position ascribed to him. The animate world constitutes an order of living beings (*nephesh khayya*). It may be asked, however, what of the 'breath of life' breathed into man, which is made much of in our anthropocentric theologies. Yahwist is clear. Breath of life is what sustains man's physical life, for by it 'man becomes a living being'. There is then nothing more, nothing less to it. Further, J's perspective is communal, because man and animals possess 'speech and knowledge': it is not only man but also the serpent who possesses them. Again, man being essentially a farmer, animals are his helpmates in the common task of procuring food and fodder to man and animals alike. They are, the J-myth asserts,

'companions to man'. The hierarchical and the hieratical order, sanctioned by the P-myth, is nowhere to be seen in the J-myth. Biblical scholars have made much of the act of naming, it appears, under the impact of the P-myth. Far from suggesting any dominion over animals by man, for the J-myth, man and animals share a common concern, viz. the growing of food for themselves.[7]

To be sure, in the history of civilization, foraging and hunting were the initial modes of procurement of food. They were gradually replaced by a large-scale grain-based agriculture. The latter mode of food procurement marks for man a relatively sedentary, as distinct from nomadic, life-style, centred around not only the cultivation of grains for immediate need, but also its storage in barns to meet his needs in the lean seasons. The P source, even when compelled to acknowledge the fact of man being an agriculturist, injects its own perspective into the agricultural activity. The activity is geared to the *subduing* of the earth (*kavash*) to wrest from it man's sustenance. The Hebrew *kavash* is a word packed with a host of nuances, but all of them shaded by harsh control and coercion (*rada*). It has the nuance of subjugation of one human being to another, implicit in bonded labour or slavery. It has often a reference to the overpowering of an enemy in the battle. It also has a shade of meaning homologous with being rapacious to gain control over what does not belong to one; and even with raping women.[8] In the perspective of the P-myth, one can read all these implications. Land is to be subjugated, overpowered, or 'raped', by man to snatch away what does not strictly belong to him. Such an attitude to land has given rise to the contrast between 'nature' and 'culture', 'the raw' and 'the cooked', 'the given' and 'the artefact'. At the level of nature, man is raw, callow, uncultured and uncivilized—in short, a brute animal. It is only by uprooting himself from the soil that he transcends the natural order and attains the glory of the human being, created after God's image. Man is specifically human in the achievements of culture, science, technology and art. Hence, in his relation to the land, he is the lord; on the contrary, the land is to yield like a slave. Land is like a hostile enemy to be overcome by man's furious physical exertion. Finally, land is the virgin that has to yield to the rapacious gred and lust of man. Man is not so much a farmer as *husband*-man, however softened the imagery may be to well-meaning male chauvinists.

By contrast, the J-myth views agriculture, and the production and storage of food, as a service to the land (*avad*). It is the sense of service, built into a communal life, that may be said to run as a continuous thread in the entire narrative. It is land, and not man, that is superior. For *avad* is substantially the service rendered by man to the 'sovereignty' of earth. Humanity and the earth are to be in a symbiotic relation with each other, if for no other reason than that the former is derived from the latter, and also is dependent on it for its survival. This is the vision of

the J-myth. They are at loggerheads, however, in the vision of the P-myth. Hence, land is the servant for P, but the master for J; conversely, man is the master for P, but the servant for J.

Closely associated with the problem of the fertility of the earth is the problem of the fertility of humanity itself. We are today painfully aware of the fact that development in the agricultural sector has not kept pace with the growth in population in most parts of the earth. The solution does not seem to consist in ever greater expansion of agriculture. For the prevalent growth itself is achieved at unimaginable violence to the earth, both by way of poisoning its bowels through petro-chemicals and by putting a no longer sustainable demand on the available arable land to feed, clothe and shelter a weed-species of man at the cost of all other forms of life. Do our myths throw some light on this vexed problem, which ecologists are acutely conscious of?

For the P-myth, human reproduction, it appears, is a primary obligation that knows neither curtailment nor restriction. The first sermon of God for humanity in the myth reads, 'Be fruitful, multiply, fill the earth and conquer it.' Even the first 'divine blessing' seems to have been linked with this fertility of humanity at the cost of the fertility of the earth. Both in intent and content the sermon is nothing less than imperialistic, and it has eminently suited the self-aggrandizement of man over nature. In contradistinction to the P-myth, the J-myth views human reproduction as a complex process. J clearly acknowledges that, while a child is a divine blessing, childbirth has within itself all the risks of reproduction at its every stage of conception, pregnancy, pain, giving birth, parturition and education. It combines a sense of mystery, therefore a profound sense of awe and responsibility, with the growth and nurture of all life in nature, human life included. By implication it suggests the inextricable symbiosis between the origin of human and non-human forms of life. Thus, while P views reproduction of the human species as an obligation that knows no control, J sees it within the divine scheme as risky, precarious, hence characterized by mysterious uncertainties, but above all as a process within nature. J especially contemplates on the mystery of life itself.

Thirdly, for the P-myth, humanity is at the centre of creation. Creation itself is seen as a sort of a great sacrifice.[9] Erection of altars for sacrifices at the heart of the cultic life among the Israelites provides us with a further contrast in respect of the two perspectives in the biblical tradition. The altar at Mt Sinai is a priestly altar: it is constructed according to the minute details communicated to Moses. It is an exemplification of the artistic and architectural skills (*Exodus*, 27:1–8; 38:1–7) that are at the disposal of the priest-administrators. The details do not fall short of an elaborate blueprint drawn by any contemporary architectural firm: The length, breadth and shape of the altar are clearly specified. It is to be constructed of pure acacia wood with bronze sheets to cover it. It is to

have sacrificial vessels and accessories made of bronze, all to be used at the time of sacrifice. Whatever skill in carpentry and metallurgy, that is available among them, is to be fully made use of. The sacrifice of burnt-offering is to be offered to God on the altar built with all the available human ingenuity in the areas of art, architecture and metallurgy of the times. Wood and bronze, here, only represent the natural material that human skill has already mastered to shape for its own use.

On the contrary, it is altogether a different story with the Yahwist altar. The perspective marks a radical departure (*Exodus*, 20:24). The altar is built on earth, especially the fertile humus (*adama*), as provided by nature. This indeed may be said to represent the Israelites' agricultural economy. If stones are used, they are not to be chiselled and dressed by the masons. The use of artefacts, to say nothing of tools made by man to carry out his artistic and technological innovations, must not even touch the altar; it would be tantamount to its profanation. The altar must be pristine and natural; human technology must not be employed to 'refine' it. The altar is not to be so much a product of the achievements of man, shaping the natural material to suit his own goals, as the material nature itself that sustains a people. Man is to be aware of the creation of the original materials of the earth more than what artists, architects, scientists and technologists would recreate out of them. The initial materials have a timeless purpose in the divine scheme. Man is not to arrogate to himself indiscriminately the powers of the creator. If he does so, then he can only be a demonic creator, who indulges in inflicting on them the demonic scars of human brutality. Hence we are to assume a more modest approach to our own achievements of civilization lest nature speak back to us of the abuses that we heap upon it; for that would be really suicidal to mankind.

So much for our interpretation of the two myths that indisputably place before us the two perspectives, one ecologically hostile and the other friendly. This goes a long way to suggest that there are narratives of the latter type in the Bible which have escaped our attention, due to other aggressive types of orientation. The Sapiential literature is replete with them. Let me end this article with the myth of *Job* as an exemplification.

ALTERNATIVE MODELS: AN EXAMPLE

Born and brought up within a covenantal exceptionalism, Job is perfectly orthodox.[10] His orthodoxy consists in the belief in the integrity of the morally upright man, therefore in the belief that righteousness ensures prosperity to the good man; conversely, misery is an expression of God's punishment for moral lapse. Needless to say, it is an anthropocentric orthodoxy. But God subjects it to a radical questioning. When the tragedy befalls Job, he protests; his friends understand the

language of his protests. Their final advice to Job is: 'Curse God, and die!'. Job is pushed to the brink of his personal faith. There seems to be no moral basis for the natural processes. But Job, unlike his friends, in the very act of seeking reasons from God, also pleads for mercy—the first move from within towards breaking out of the anthropocentric orthodoxy. God would now visit him with His salvation.

But what is the nature of this salvation? Firstly, it is a confrontation with Job with a series of rhetorical, but cosmic, questions, as if adding insult to injury. Who is this foolish man, darkening God's counsel and designs with ignorant words? Where were you, when I laid the foundations of the earth? Similar questions follow with such rapidity that Job is taken breathless on a kaleidoscopic 'universe-tour', as it were. The tone is satirical. God does not seem to be concerned at all at the personal tragedies and distress of Job. It is a radical confrontation. Job is suddenly reduced to insignificance before the majesty of God's creation. Wisdom begins to dawn on him gradually, when he is ground to 'dust and ashes' before the unrelenting questions of God. He sees the creative genius of the creator, the richness of creation, and the glory and majesty of God in nature.

Secondly, the sarcastic questions are to be situated within the setting of creation. Feeling utterly insignificant at the end of his 'tour', Job discovers for the first time his own place in the marvellous creation of God. He is now reborn to a new wonder, a new consciousness of creation and his God as the creator-lord. Creation is God's, not man's. He humbly confesses that he had uttered what he did not know; that creation is too wonderful for him to understand; that it is God, and not man, who is in control of it. He also realizes that, if he ever tried to control it, self-destruction is sure to follow.

Thirdly, it now dawns upon Job that creation is perfectly compatible without the presence of man on the face of the earth. The Big Bang of Job's anthropocentric orthodoxy! When God takes Job on the 'world-tour', he sees an earth *without* the human species on it. Creation them can have meaning to God without man in it. The creation accounts, especially the J-myth, speak of the range of creation, before man makes his appearance, on a scale that baffles the human mind. Man is not a necessity in God's creation. He 'waters the desolate land', and 'makes wilderness to bloom'. The rain that he pours forth is not for the exclusive benefit of man, but for all the living beings. Anthropocentrism is then a lie perpetuated by his orthodoxy. Man then is essentially a part, an infinitesimally small one at that, of the total order of creation. Job experiences his Copernican Revolution—we are not the centre, rather we revolve around a centre. In short, God is intent on teaching Job not a moral, but an ecological, justice.

What is the application of the narrative of Job to modern man? Job had his orthodoxy, engendered by the covenantal exceptionalism, and

the modern man too has his, engendered equally by the confessional exceptionalism. The latter consists in unmitigated consumerism as a confessed ideology: maximize comforts by producing ever more consumer goods. Implicit in the ideology is the belief in unlimited economic growth in a limited world—a lie that has systematically destroyed God's creation; creation is groaning under man's oppression. Job's is a moral anthropocentrism, ours is an economic anthropocentrism, that has ill-augured to the survival of every form of life on earth. It may not be wrong to state that the modern western economic anthropocentrism, rooted in a part of the biblical tradition, which is equally ours today by way of appropriation via enlightenment philosophies and technoscientisms, is fed on the ecologically unfriendly perspectives of these religions. Justice was viewed by Job and his friends as moral on a human scale. We are today equally guilty of viewing justice as narrowly economic, for our social justice, enshrined in our political systems, turns out to be species-bound justice. The scale once again is anthropocentric. Everything around us is to be used for our comforts. The 'use-confessional exceptionalism' unfortunately percolates every activity of ours, economic, social, political and even religious. In it there is no scope for justice to our environment. It is time that we wake up, as Job was forced to, to the demands of ecological justice.

The demand has to be taken seriously, because nature has been speaking back to us of our abuse. While man's life is symbiotic with the rest of nature, his hubris however has fed on the biblical sanction for consolidating his anthropocentrism. God, who saw his 'creation to be good', does not intend its wanton destruction at the hands of man. Too long man has attempted to destroy divine design, but it can be done so only with the severest penalty to his own life. Anthropocentrism, it may be pointed out, is not a legacy of only biblical religions. It is a heritage of world's cultures and religions alike. Once human greed takes over, man easily becomes oblivious of ecological justice to nature. If we are to be truly civilized, it is not sufficient that we banish wars among us; we need to banish also our relentless war against nature.

In conclusion, a close look at the two myths of creation, far from suggesting the outright rejection of biblical religions, makes us aware of the alternative models in the same tradition, that teach us salutary lessons in ecological justice. The availability of a J source, reflected in the creation myths, erection of sacrificial altars and the story of Job, suggests such alternative models. Even so, Noah may be treated as a radical conservationist, and his ark a prototype of a wild-life sanctuary. *Psalm* 104, which is known to be the best of creation hymns, vividly depicts how God cares for the nurture of the earth, to provide all living beings with their daily bread. In the divine scheme of creation, waters, springs, wild beasts, birds of the air, trees, hills and valleys—all have their respective place. We only need to keep our hearts and minds open

to identify such narratives as have a bearing on the themes of judgement, apocalypse, holism, renovation of the earth, and so on. 'Dust thou art and unto dust thou returnest' has been too long interpreted to mean human mortality. It is time now that it served as the axiom for a new biblical ecological philosophy.

Notes and References

1. Wellhausen is credited to have provided us with a framework for identifying the diverse sources for biblical material, especially of the Penteteuch. The theory is based on the relative chronology of the sources: D source, dating definitely back to 622 BC, is ascribed to a Judean author. Using it as a point of reference, J source is placed in the ninth century BC, and it is said to be a Judean document. E source goes back to the eighth century BC, and it is a northern document. J and E are the oldest sources that speak of the plurality of the cultic places, which are opposed by the D source. P source is the post-exilic work of the priests of Jerusalem, and is of considerably later times.
2. The initial assumption was that a foundational *document* preceded the composition of the Penteteuch. This was soon rejected, and the existence of independent and disparate *fragments* of narratives was supposed. At a third stage, a combination of both theories was posited under the supposition that a rudimentary document was *supplemented* by fragments of narratives. All these paved the way for the final settlement of the classical JEDP Source Hypothesis.
3. The reader is advised to read the texts at length. I quote here only the passages relevant to my purpose.
4. William F. Lynch, *Christ and Apollo: The Dimensions of the Literary Imagination*, University of Notre Dame, 1975. For this comparison, see Theodore Hiebert, *The Yahwist's Landscape: Nature and Religion in Early Israel*, to be published shortly by Oxford University Press.
5. Is it possible to interpret 'image of God' to mean not so much an ontological privilege as 'a functional designation conferring representational power'? See Phyllis Bird in *Harvard Theological Review*, 74, 1981, pp. 129–59.
6. The term occurs in *Nrs.*, 32:22, 29; *II Samuel*, 8:11; *II Chronicles*, 28:11; *Nehemiah*, 5:5; *Esther*, 7:8.
7. J. Baird Callicott, 'Genesis and John Muir', in *Covenant for a New Creation: Ethics, Religion and Public Policy*, edited by Carol S. Robb and Carl J. Casebolt, Orbis, Maryknoll, N.Y., 1991, pp. 119–21. Accusing that the western theology has subjugated too long to utilitarian philosophies, he suggests an alternative environmental theology.
8. See f.n. 6.
9. This is a common conception among the world's hieratic traditions, especially among the oriental mythologies and philosophies. I feel the need to reiterate it for the simple reason that some anthropologists have entertained an unhealthy romanticism that the oriental philosophies have been ecologically friendly, while the occidental philosophies have been hostile. These are facile generalizations.
10. Bill McKibban, 'The Comforting Whirlwind: God, Job and the Scale of Creation', in *Harvard Divinity Bulletin*, 2:2, 1994. See also his *The End of Nature* and *The Age of Missing Information*, both published by William B. Erdmans Publishing Company. Also Timothy Weiskel, 'In Dust and Ashes: The Environmental Crisis in Religious Perspective', in *Harvard Divinity Bulletin*, 21:3, 1992.

Indian Philosophy in the
First Millennium AD: Fact and Fiction

DAYA KRISHNA

Histories of Indian philosophy are usually centred around the so-called six schools of Indian philosophy designated as 'orthodox' and the three schools designated as 'unorthodox'. This seems to be the standard practice and, as far as I know, there is hardly any exception to it. The very acceptance of the designations 'orthodox' and 'unorthodox', which are supposed to be translations of the terms '*āstika*' and '*nāstika*' generally used by Indians to describe these systems, underwrites the perspective in which Indian philosophy is to be viewed and treats it by this very strategy, as a natural objective or given classification. However, it is little realized that such a way of viewing philosophy in India is merely to accept uncritically the way the philosophical scene in India was perceived by a particular set of thinkers belonging to a certain tradition of philosophizing which they thought was derived from the Vedas. Such a move treated the Vedas as central to the philosophical enterprise and gave primacy to those traditions which accepted in some sense or other the so-called authority of the Vedas at the expense of those which explicitly denied it or refused to accept it.

The implicit presuppositions of such a way of looking at the history of Indian philosophy would perhaps become clearer if we try to see it from the viewpoint of the Buddhists or the Jains. The Buddhists, for example, characterized all non-Buddhist thought as 'heretic' as for them the world of philosophy was divided into that of the Buddhists and of the non-Buddhists. On the other hand, the Jains always describe the other schools of philosophy as propounding partial perspectives of the total truth which they alone have captured in their view of reality as being essentially *anekāntic* (multifaceted) in character. The others are therefore all *ekāntic* (one-faceted) according to the Jain perspective and they criticize them basically on this ground.

It may of course be said that as the Vedas are prior to both the Buddhists and the Jains, the treatment of them as the basic term of reference for defining the centrality of the Indian philosophical tradition is justified and that those who, like the Buddhists and the Jains, treat themselves as central do so only for sectarian reasons. But, though this argument may have some force, ultimately it will be the quantity and the

quality of the philosophical achievement derived from these various perspectives that should be taken as determining more appropriately the characterization of a philosophical period in Indian philosophy in its own terms. In any case it would be best to be aware of the presuppositions involved and to try to see the picture of Indian philosophy as it developed over a period of time from alternative points of view so that no specific centrality is imposed on the material without one being aware of what is being done. For, even if we accept that large parts of the Vedic corpus, including the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas and some of the older Upaniṣads, were prior to the times when the Buddha and the Mahāvīra emerged on the Indian scene, there can be little doubt that traditions of non-Vedic thought had already emerged which are referred to in the Vedic literature itself. The distinction between the *ṛṣi* and the *muni* is drawn in the Vedic literature and the reference to Ṛṣabhadeva, the first Jain tīrthaṅkara, is supposed to be found in the *Ṛg Veda* itself, at least according to the *Śrīmad Bhāgvat*. Also, Sāṁkhyan thought, which by common consent is supposed to be non-Vedic, is found earlier to the period of the Buddha and the Mahāvīra, if we accept that Sāṁkhya or what Larson has called 'proto-Sāṁkhya thought' is found in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad.* Besides these it is significant that all the other contemporaries of the Buddha and the Mahāvīra who are referred to in the Buddhist and the Jain texts hardly hold views which can be described as deriving from the Vedic texts in any significant manner. Makkalī Ghoṣāla or Gośālaka, who played a significant role in the early accounts of the Mahāvīra and the Buddha, for example, cannot be considered to hold views which can be regarded as deriving from the Vedic tradition by any stretch of the imagination. Similarly, the views of others such as Puraṇa Kassapa, Ajita Keśa Kambalī, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Sañjaya Velaṭṭhiputta, have little to do with the thought found in the texts deriving from the Vedic tradition. This points to the fact that the contemporary climate of philosophical opinion in the sixth century BC was hardly dominated by the thought derived from the Vedic tradition and that the reflections on the *yajña* in the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas and the debates and discussions on various subjects in the Upaniṣads formed only one stream in the philosophical picture of these times and were scarcely the dominant ones as has been projected by those who have written on the history of philosophy in India until now.

The point may become clearer if we reflect on the developments in the philosophical traditions of India after the appearance of the Buddha and the Mahāvīra and the self-conscious writings of their disciples who treated themselves as representing a tradition radically distinct, even if not completely opposed, to that deriving from the Vedas. In fact, the term 'Veda-Vādina' is used by them for their opponents to indicate those who held the doctrines propounded in the Veda. It is perhaps ironic

that the Gītā which later came to occupy such a prestigious position amongst the so-called orthodox texts of the Indian tradition also described the '*Veda-Vādina*' as '*Vedavāda ratāḥ*' and characterized them as '*Nānyadātītivādinaḥ*', that is, those who say that nothing else is to be believed except what they say.[1] 'The Veda-Vādins themselves of course emphasized either the *yajña*-centric interpretation of the Vedic texts epitomized in the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtras* erroneously ascribed to Jaimini or the Brahman-centric interpretation deriving mainly from that part of the Vedic corpus usually designated as the Upaniṣads and epitomized in the *Brahma-Sūtras* ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa.'[2] There were earlier attempts to interpret the Upaniṣadic texts, some of which are referred to by the author of the *Brahma-Sūtras*, but their authority seems to have been superseded by the appearance of Bādarāyaṇa's text on the subject. It is of course true that the texts designated as the Upaniṣads breathe a common philosophical atmosphere and are witnesses to a common enquiry and discourse which seems substantially different from the one that is found in the Āgamic literature of the Buddhists and the Jains. In fact, if we confine ourselves to the Upaniṣadic texts alone we might get a wrong picture of the philosophical activity during that period. Such a picture can only be corrected if one moves to the Buddhist and Jain texts, and such works as the *Kathāvatthu* and the *Milindapāñha*. It is not that the questions do not concern the ultimate aim of life and its meaning in this world governed by space, time and causality, but that the modes of analysis and the terms of discourse appear to be distinctively different and it would be difficult to say that the Upaniṣadic perspective prevails and dominates the philosophical scene as revealed in those texts in the India of those times. Ultimately, it was but one of the many strands in the philosophical activity that was emerging in what may be regarded as different sectors of Indian civilization at that time, and if one chooses to designate the thought contained in the texts known as the Upaniṣads as Vedānta, however mistaken such a description may be, it is clear that it did not occupy any privileged or pre-eminent place amongst the thinkers of those times. This fact, however unpalatable it may be to the Vedāntins of modern times, is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the compilation of the *Brahma-Sūtras* did not seem to have had much effect on the philosophical scene of India as it not only failed to make any impact on any of the dominant philosophical schools of that time but itself remained uncommented upon till about Śaṁkara's time, seven hundred years later.

The situation however is not confined to Vedānta alone or to the *Brahma-Sūtras* which are supposed to epitomize it, but extends to all the other so-called schools of Indian philosophy which arise from the various Sūtras which are generally supposed to be their foundational texts and on which not only a large number of commentaries have been written, time and again, but which have also been the source of

continuous inspiration for those who have believed in the tenets of that
school. But there appears to be a radical difference between the *Brahma-Sūtras* and all the other Sūtras which are supposed to be the foundational
texts of other traditions of Indian philosophy. The *Brahma-Sūtras* do not
supersede in any way the authority of the Upaniṣads whose diverse views
they present in an organized, coherent and harmonious form. Rather,
they seem to have continued to enjoy a superior and independent
status as is evidenced by the fact that many of those who wrote a
commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* felt it necessary to write independent
commentaries on the Upaniṣads also. Not only this, many a time,
thinkers have written commentaries on the Upaniṣads without being
concerned with what the author of the *Brahma-Sūtras* had said about
them. This fact assumes a radical significance if it is remembered that
the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtras* which try to do the same thing for the pre-Upāniṣadic
part of the Vedic corpus which the *Brahma-Sūtra* attempts to do for the
Upaniṣadic texts written before their composition, replaced completely
for all future times the authority of the texts which they had tried to
coherently summarize. There is, as far as I know, no independent
commentary on those portions of the Brāhmaṇa texts which deal with
the issues treated by the author of the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtras* in his text devoted
to those subjects.

The case of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* and the *Nyāya Sūtras* is of course well-known, as in their case one does not even know what were the pre-existent texts or traditions which they attempt to present in a coherent,
systematic manner. This itself should be sufficient to indicate that the
traditions they represent have only a very tenuous link with the Vedic
corpus which they do not directly disown. Indirectly, of course, the
Nyāya Sūtras question the eternity of sound and the so-called
apauruṣeyatva of the *śruti*, and the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* not only propound a
radically different analysis of *dharma* than the one given in the *Mīmāṁsā
Sūtras*, but also, at least according to Nakamura, question the so-called
Upaniṣadic doctrines in Sūtras 7.2.3, 7.2.4, 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.3.4.[3] As for
Sāṁkhya, it is a matter of common knowledge that, while there are no
specific Sāṁkhya texts before *Saṣṭitantra* which is ascribed by Larson to
100 BC and which Potter in the third edition of his *Bibliography* has
assigned to AD 100, there are ample references to Sāmkhyan thought
scattered in almost all the texts that are dated prior to that period. The
first important Sāṁkhyan text after *Saṣṭitantra* is supposed to be *Sāṁkhya
Kārikā* which is ascribed to around AD 350. However, there seems to be a
peculiarity in the case of Sāṁkhya in that though the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*
did enjoy some sort of a pre-eminence after it was written, independent
works differing from it continued to be composed and it never occupied
the status which the Sūtras of other schools of philosophy normally did
in the Indian philosophical tradition. The *Sāṁkhya Sūtras*, as is well

known, are a later work and never enjoyed the authority which the
foundational Sūtras of other philosophical traditions enjoyed.

The *Yoga Sūtras* composed around AD 400 are a compendium of the
yogic practices prevalent in India from primordial times and have little
philosophical interest, except for the fact that they provide a common
background for the existential realization of the various truths
propounded in the diverse philosophical traditions of India. Hardly
anybody has raised the question as to how almost the same meditational
practices would lead to the realization of different existential truths so
elaborately argued and defended by the protagonists of the conflicting
schools of philosophy which show a tradition of extreme polemical
intolerance verging sometimes on unbelievable abuses against one
another.[4]

The story of the crystallization of the diverse schools of Indian
philosophy around the first century AD is well known and their subsequent
development during the first millennium AD is fairly well documented
in the texts devoted to that subject. However, by and large, the story of
the development of these schools is treated in relative isolation as if
they had nothing to do with one another and had no influence or
impact or interaction resulting in a modification of their positions
under the influence of the criticisms they received from others. This, of
course, is generally true only of the so-called 'orthodox' schools of
Indian philosophy which are supposed to be derived from the Vedic
tradition, for Buddhism is generally treated as the adversary whose
critical responses led to significant developments primarily in Nyāya
and secondarily in some other schools of Indian philosophy. In fact,
Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* is supposed to have been profoundly
influenced by Buddhism, while Śaṁkara's thought is regarded as having
assimilated significant insights of Buddhism in his reconstruction of
Advaitic thought on the basis of the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*.

But in whatever way the story is told, the chief protagonists on the
philosophical scene of India during the first millennium AD are the so-called 'orthodox' schools of Indian philosophy, that is, the Mīmāṁsā,
the Vedānta, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Yoga, without anyone
ever realizing that the total number of works produced by all these
schools together bear hardly any comparison with those which have
been produced by the Buddhists or even the Jains both in quantity and
quality during this period. The Buddhist thinking continued unabated
from Nāgārjuna onwards, that is, from around AD 150 till about AD 1200,
when it suddenly stopped in India due to the destruction of Nālandā by
Bakhtiyar Khilji in that year. Nāgārjuna not only shows as much
sophistication in his argumentation as any of the thinkers who are
supposed to have been the authors of the foundational texts relating to
the 'orthodox' schools of Indian philosophy, but his radical critique of

all the *pramāṇas* regarding their capacity to grasp the nature of ultimate reality appears to have centrally grasped and formulated the issue between intellectual ratiocination and spiritual realization which has hardly caught the serious attention of any other thinker in the Indian tradition including Saṁkara. The problem seems to have been evaded or camouflaged by raising the issue of the relation between *śruti* and *yukti* or *tarka* in its non-technical sense, as the *śruti* was supposed to proclaim the ultimate truth.

Strangely, neither for Nāgārjuna, nor for any of the subsequent thinkers in the Buddhist tradition, do Buddha's discourses, as handed down and accepted in the Buddhist tradition, play a similar role as the Vedic corpus seems to have done in the case of those who try to align themselves with it. There appears to have been an obsession with the original texts amongst those who belonged to the Vedic tradition, whether directly or indirectly. And, perhaps it is for this reason that the foundational Sūtras of the various schools of Indian philosophy are accorded almost the same status as the one given to the *śruti* in the Vedic tradition. On the other hand, neither had the work of Nāgārjuna nor that of any of his successors ever acquired the same authority as the works produced by the thinkers belonging to the so-called 'orthodox' schools of Indian philosophy. It is of course not the case that commentaries were not written on the works of the Buddhist masters, but somehow they never achieved the kind of status that those in the non-*śramaṇic* schools of philosophy did.

The Buddhist philosophical position is generally divided into four schools which are known as Śūnyavāda, Vijñānavāda, Vaibhāṣikas, and Srautāntrikas. However, while there are outstanding thinkers belonging to all these schools of Buddhist philosophy, there seems to be no one who is given the same status as, say, Gotama or Jaimini or Kaṇāda or Bādarāyaṇa. This itself is a significant difference which has seldom been noted as the Buddhist thinkers appear to have a more individual stamp of their own and are known for their outstanding contribution to philosophical thought rather than as exemplars of some primordial schools of philosophical thought arising from a foundational text which not only has an over-riding authority but also a finality in the formulation of the school's philosophical position. A Nāgārjuna, an Asaṅga or a Vasubandhu do not obviously have the same status; nor for that matter, do a Dignāga or a Dharmakīrti. These appear to be thinkers on their own and are not just carriers or explicators of a prior tradition of philosophizing to which their own philosophies are subservient.

The story of the Buddhist traditions of philosophizing in the first millennium AD has to be written differently and not seen merely in the context of the debate with the non-*śramaṇic* traditions as has been done up till now. The need for this will be realized even more if we try to see the presence of Buddhist philosophers and their works in the first

millennium AD and compare them with the works of all other schools of philosophy in that period. If we take the third edition of Potter's *Bibliography* in his well-known *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* as our source of information, we find that in the first millennium AD there are more than 400 entries relating to Buddhist works and thinkers as against 83 entries relating to all others, including even Kāśmīra Śaivism and Śaiva Siddhānta.[5] If we include Jain works the situation does not change very much as the total number of Jain entries add up only to 39. Thus, even if we include the Jain thinkers the situation does not change substantially as the number of all non-Buddhist thinkers and works will not be more than 122. The Buddhist works are in a ratio of 4 to 1, thus clearly indicating their dominance on the philosophical scene of India during the first millennium AD, a picture which one would hardly get from any of the histories of Indian philosophy that have been written till now. It is surprising that this fact which should have been so obvious to anyone who had looked into the extant material of philosophical texts in India should not have been noticed. The only reason one can think of is the overwhelming obsession with the picture of Indian philosophy as it obtained in the second millennium AD when Buddhism had practically disappeared from the Indian scene after the destruction of Nālandā in AD 1200 and the rise of non-Advaitic schools of Vedānta, starting from Rāmānuja (AD 1120), and their debate with the Advaitins who swept the philosophical scene in India by their radical advocacy of the denial of all difference, both in terms of ontology and epistemology. The radicalism of Buddhism was replaced by the radicalism of Advaita Vedānta which thus became the main centre of controversy in the second millennium AD. Along with this, there was the dramatic rise of Nyāya whose total number of thinkers matches those of Advaita Vedānta and even outnumbers them.

It appears therefore that the philosophical perception of the historians of Indian philosophy has been profoundly shaped by the situation as it obtained in the second millennium AD which has made them see Indian philosophy right from the beginning in a certain way, disregarding the facts as they actually occurred. This seems to have been facilitated further by the emergence of neo-Vedāntism in India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through works written mostly in the English language which re-interpreted India's cultural past in a certain light to make it acceptable to the modern mind, primarily shaped by western influences which became increasingly dominant from the middle of the nineteenth century in this country. In fact, even the domination of Nyāya was underplayed by these thinkers who practically dismissed it as unnecessary hair-splitting. Not only this, they even ignored the dominant Jain presence in the second millennium AD which has about 180 thinkers in this period and which had already outnumbered the Vedāntins and the Naiyāyikas even in the first

millennium AD. In fact, the Jains are only second to the Buddhists in the first millennium and the total number of thinkers in each of the schools of Indian philosophy is substantially less than theirs in this period. The historians of Indian philosophy, then, seem to have been not only greatly biased but almost blind to the reality which stared them in the face.

The fiction that goes in the name of the history of Indian philosophy has thus to be recognized for what it is and needs to be replaced by a more authentic, objective and balanced picture of the way philosophy in India developed over the last two-and-a-half millennia, doing justice to each and every school of Indian thought as it has developed over a period of time in interaction and inter-relation with other schools of thought in this country.

The trans-civilizational linkages of India's philosophical thought have also to be kept in mind, as the history of Buddhism in the first 750 years of the first millennium AD is a story of its spreading in West Asia, Central Asia, China and Tibet and it is unlikely that it would have been a one-way affair only. Buddhism itself must have been influenced by this international expansion. In fact, if Nālandā was an international centre for over 500 years where students from all over Asia came to study, it is unlikely that they would not have influenced the development of Buddhist thought to some extent. The untold story of Buddhism in the first millennium AD has thus still to be written and its influence on the other schools of philosophy has to be seen in a different way than it has been seen until now. It is not just that it makes a marginal impact on Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta by its criticism, but that it plays a central role in terms of which the other schools of Indian philosophy are developing and defining their position with respect to it. The story is, however, far more complex as the inter-relationships between the other schools of Indian philosophy are far more variegated than it has been thought until now. All in all, we need a new history of Indian philosophy and not the fiction that goes under its name.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The literal translation of the phrase used in the *Gītā* would be 'those who say that nothing else exists'.
2. On the question of the authorship of the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtras* and the *Brahma Sūtras*, see Nakamura, *History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*.
3. Ibid., p. 330.
4. Sādhu Śāntinātha is perhaps the only exception to this statement. His book entitled *Sādhanā* tries to explain and explore this phenomenon. However, nobody seems to have taken it seriously, perhaps because of his negative conclusion that the very structure of meditational practices ensures that whatever the theoretical truth with which one starts it is bound to be realized as existentially true because of the very nature of the meditative practices through which its truth is sought to

be actualized and realized in consciousness. The positive counterpart of this contention is perhaps more explicitly exemplified in the life of Shri Ramakrishna which has attracted more attention and appreciation without any attempt at its epistemological analysis or comparison with Sādhu Śāntinātha's negative conclusions.

5. It may be said that the predominance of the Buddhist texts during the first millennium AD may be due to the availability of Buddhist texts outside India where they were better preserved. But this can hardly explain the overwhelming discrepancies in the proportion of the texts or the fact that even the Jain texts during this period outnumber those of the Vedānta, the Nyāya, the Mīmāṁsā, the Sāṁkhya, etc. The Jains, of course, were confined to India alone and hence the question of their texts being preserved outside India does not arise.

CLARIFICATION

It has been brought to our notice that the article entitled 'Fallibilism and Putnam' by Professor Tirthanath Bandopadhyaya published in the *JICPR* Vol. XII No. 1, has also been published in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* Vol. 4, 1995. The incident is unfortunate and the author of the article has sent the following clarification explaining how such a thing has occurred.—*Editor*

'I did send the article entitled "Fallibilism and Putnam" to *IPQ*, but then subsequently I had totally forgotten the matter. As no letter of acceptance from *IPQ* did really reach me (perhaps because of postal fault), the whole thing remained absent from my memory. I don't know whether you would trust me or not. Anyway, the responsibility lies entirely with me. The only thing I can say is that this will never happen in future. I do sincerely apologise to you.'

Do Wittgenstein's Forms of Life Inaugurate a Kantian Project of Transcendental Idealism?

Many of R.C. Pradhan's claims[1] in 'Transcendental Perspective' are exaggerated and hence the transcendental framework he supplies meets the same fate as his previous transcendental interface between subjectivity and grammar.[2] His claims are exaggerated because he wants to make forms of life the centre around which everything else in Wittgenstein's later philosophy revolves. At the most, the notion is 'notorious' and it occurs at the most half-a-dozen times in *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) (Parts I and II).[3] This is not to rule out the links between forms of life and language-games (for Pradhan, they are the two sides of the same coin), but the link is only tenuous, especially when 'language', as it is used by Pradhan, slants in the direction of 'given', and *a fortiori*, it is necessary. Similarly, the links between forms of life and transcendental solipsism on the one hand and private language hypothesis on the other, is much more tenuous. It is while working (reworking) on this, that Baker was forced to reconsider his earlier Kantian themes of the philosophy of Wittgenstein.[4] The consequent argument form which claims that there is no metaphysical self and hence there is transcendental self, is a clear case of *ignoratio elenchi*.[5] *Contra* Hunter, Pradhan wants to recover a non-naturalistic, non-realistic interpretation (i.e. transcendental in his sense). This does not do well especially when he concedes much to his opponent and hence nothing goes counter to it. Again, Pradhan's Kantian transcendental claims have already been found to be a misfit: one has only to consult Baker's 'Note on Wittgenstein and Kant' in this regard and his open disavowal of it.[6] The reason why I say this is that Pradhan's staple cheese (the term 'metaphysics of experience') has already been disowned by his mentor (Pradhan makes a reference to Chapter VI of the earlier edition).[7] The major reason why Baker abandoned the neo-Kantian interpretation is that even a watered-down version of Strawson's version of transcendental argument runs counter to the spirit of the later Wittgenstein's repudiation of the private language argument. So, one can tolerate it if transcendence is taken as open-textured, whether Kantian or not. But Pradhan chooses a wrong tack that is strongly Kantian in its import so as to derive the conclusion that forms are *a priori* and transcendental. No wonder, at crucial places, his claims border on absurdity, for example, when he claims that the transcendent-we is a descendant of the transcendent-I (p. 71), or when he wants to pursue an integrated

project of mind (self), language and reality. Pradhan should realize that there is hardly anything Kantian about it.

As a specimen, just look at Pradhan's version of the transcendental argument which deduces the 'transcendental-we from the denial of the 'metaphysical-I', *via* a premise about the limit-self. Or the version which moves from the denial of empirical self, to the identity of limit-self and transcendental self. Which premises support this? How does one make sense of the conclusion: Transcendental-we is non-anthropological, non-contingent. and non-arbitrary. Notwithstanding the colouration given to it from a reading of Lear, this leads us nowhere. No doubt, the authorities he quotes: for example, Mohanty (his context is transcendental turn of Husserl's phenomenology), Hintikka (his proof of the phenomenality of language use), or Lear's, in support of anthropological reading, all touch upon this, but nowhere are the links fully worked out by Pradhan. So, the vulnerability of his position is evidenced more in the locutions he uses, such as 'transcendental self', 'transcendental *Ubersicht*' (I think, there is no such thing as this in Wittgenstein for the simple reason that no one has shown how surveyability is a transcendental notion), transcendental logic, etc. I think Pradhan has been misled by the dictum, '"essence" is expressed by grammar' (PI, 371) overlooking the scare quote, and thereby overlooks the inherent 'opposition' (scare quote again) between metaphysics and grammar. Wittgenstein's view is that metaphysics is no substitute for grammar. Or more crudely, metaphysics violates grammar (cf. Baker, pp. 193, 197). Pradhan's fascination for metaphysics, in the *Tractatus* as well as *Philosophical Investigations* is understandable. But what is Kantian in the sense as he makes it out to be? However, his negligence of metaphysically-oriented readings by other interpreters only evokes sympathy. They may or may not use Kantian outfits. He is well advised either to abandon or look for support in sources elsewhere.[8] No doubt, Wittgenstein says that logic or ethics is transcendental. It does not follow that transcendental logic and transcendental ethics are the underlying Kantian themes in the later Wittgenstein.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See Pradhan's 'Wittgenstein on Forms of Life: Towards a Transcendental Perspective', in *JICPR*, May-August 1994, pp. 63–80.
2. Pradhan's 'The Availability of Later Wittgenstein's Philosophy' appears in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, (July 1992); his views were challenged in my 'Does Transcendental Subjectivity meet Transcendental Grammar?' in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* (July 1993). Pradhan's way of meeting my criticisms stops short of attributing positive motives to me. My intention was only to challenge the relation as no one has succeeded to explain the relation.
3. G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, *An Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's*

Philosophical Investigations: Understanding and Meaning, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, see 19:1.1, p. 47.
4. G.P. Baker, in his *Insight and Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience* (Oxford, 1972) concedes as much as to call it as a term of art, which forms the title of Pradhan's doctoral thesis. Baker's observation is that this term directly gave rise to the dichotomy of realism and anti-realism, which is repugnant to him. The two terms unnecessarily signify two versions of semantics. If Wittgenstein were a Kantian, then he would be regarded as a realist of a sort during his early period. If he were not a realist, he would not be a Kantian transcendentalist either. From this, Baker concludes that the term is to be 'expunged' as it was 'misleading'. Further, according to Baker a transcendentalist cannot show that the two paradigm theories of meaning are compatible, unless it is assumed that there is a compatibility between the 'transcendental solipsists' of the *Tractatus* and the methodological solipsist of the PI. He cannot show this because Wittgenstein's transit is to a propositional system (satzsystem account) of verification after abandoning the transcendental solipsist position. It is not a real shift but only bridged by verificationism. So the categorization of 'early' and 'later' is also a mistake, and *a fortiori*, the transcendentalist plea is a mistake. Similar reasoning applies to the form of transcendental argument that underlies Wittgenstein's repudiation of the private language argument. This summarizes Baker's views as found in my (m.s.) 'Wittgenstein's Grammar(s)'.
5. A ramified variety of Pradhan's argument is discussed in the following paragraph.
6. See Section 4 of Chapter VII in Baker (1986), revised edition of *Insight and Illusion*.
7. Pradhan, f.n. 39, p. 79.
8. Michael Hodges maintains a thesis which holds that the Tractarian notion of transcendence is a 'failure' since that requires a shift from a transcendental subject to a community of language-users in *Philosophical Investigations*. His argument endorses the ambiguity of the 'I' and holds that this ambiguity discloses in the necessity of rejecting the transcendental subject. This is consistent with the possibility of reducing the world to the totality of facts. The *de facto* limits carry no *a priori* (*de jure*) implications, as Pradhan maintains. If we pursue a similar line of thinking, we can show that the term 'transcendental *ubersicht*' is self-contradictory for it allows no vantage-point. See Hodges, *Transcendence and Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1990.

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Response to Kanthamani's Comment

The paper by Kanthamani is a critical response to my paper, 'Wittgenstein on Forms of Life: Towards a Transcendental Perspective' (*JICPR*, May–August 1994, pp. 63–80). Kanthamani's main contention is that my claims about the 'transcendental perspective' are 'exaggerated' and that they 'border on absurdity', because there is, according to him, no scope for a Kantian interpretation of Wittgenstein's concept of forms of life. In this response I will confine myself to meeting the points raised

by Kanthamani rather than restate what I have already defended in my paper.

TRANSCENDENTAL AND NOT TRANSCENDENT

The 'transcendental perspective' I have talked about is not a mere euphemism for anything metaphysical or short-hand for anything transcendent in the classical sense of the term. It is a methodological perspective—a way 'we look at things', as Wittgenstein would say (*Philosophical Investigations*, 122). No doubt the term is Kantian in origin and is used here to present a perspective about Wittgenstein's 'forms of life'.

Kanthamani's first objection is that the concept of form of life is 'notorious' and it occurs only 'half a dozen times' in *Philosophical Investigations* (PI), and so cannot be claimed to be the 'centre' of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Kanthamani has not shown why it is notorious and has not argued why it cannot be the central notion in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It is, however, true that the concept of form of life does not occur as frequently as the concept of language-game in Wittgenstein's later writings. But that does not mean that the concept is notorious even in the sense that it is ambiguous. Had it been that, Hunter[1] would not have chosen to comment on it, quoting passages after passages from Wittgenstein's writings. A naturalistic interpretation, let alone a transcendental one, is not possible if the concept of form of life is itself imprecise and without substance.

Kanthamani concedes that there is a link between language-games and forms of life, but he finds that the link is 'tenuous'. If the relation between language and forms of life is tenuous, it would be difficult to situate a form of life and thus it would make the forms of life accidental and arbitrary. Keeping this in view, I have argued that there is a necessary and straightforward relation between language-games and forms of life.

Kanthamani's second objection is that there is nothing called a 'transcendental *Übersichtliche Darstellung*' in Wittgenstein's later philosophy as 'no one has shown how surveyability is a transcendental notion'. Whether anyone has actually shown it to be so is immaterial in this context as we are interested in whether it can be shown to be transcendental at all. My argument is that at least in one sense in which philosophy is concerned with the 'possibilities of phenomena', we can call the 'perspicuous representation' of these possibilities transcendental. Wittgenstein called these representations 'grammatical' (PI, 90), for philosophy examines the 'kind of statement that we make about the phenomena' (PI, 90). There is reason to believe that these grammatical representations are *a priori* and necessary because without being so they cannot claim to show how the phenomena themselves are possible. It is

thus not claimed that forms of life themselves are transcendental but that the perspicuous representations of them are transcendental.

TRANSCENDENTAL SELF

A related question that worries Kanthamani is whether there is anything as transcendental self surviving in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. He seems to argue that the idea of transcendental self as the limit-self is buried along with the *Tractatus* and so there is no trace of it in his later philosophy. His objection is that I have resurrected a transcendental 'we' out of the transcendental 'I' on the basis of the denial of empirical self and the identification of the transcendental self with the limit-self. This move from the denial of the empirical self to the transcendental self is self-evident and does not demand any other premise as claimed by Kanthamani. Wittgenstein's denial of empirical and psychological self is the common theme of the *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations*. Both assume that there is a transcendental self as the one that is the necessary presupposition of language and the world. It is Williams[2] who has claimed that the transcendental 'we' of the PI is a descendant of the transcendental 'I' of the *Tractatus*.

It is, however, immaterial whether we call the transcendental self the 'we' or the 'I' because what is transcendental is not tied down to a particular type of description, namely, the social and anthropological one that takes the self as an anthropological category. I have therefore argued that there is a limit to anthropologism in Wittgenstein's account of the self. The self that is important for him is the transcendental one that is 'non-anthropological, non-contingent and non-arbitrary'. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the above description of the self is a mere 'colouration' and that it 'leads us nowhere'. It leads definitely to the fact that there is a non-anthropological way of talking about the self. This itself provides the clue as to why there is a non-anthropological way of representing the forms of life.

KANTIANISM

Kanthamani's worry is whether there is any Kantian line of thinking in Wittgenstein at all. In fact he seems to believe that anything that is transcendental is necessarily Kantian. That is why he says that I have chosen 'a wrong tack that is strongly Kantian in import'. On his own admission, however, even Husserl's phenomenology is a transcendental philosophy though Husserl is not strictly a Kantian thinker. What is important here is not whether Wittgenstein is a Kantian or not but whether we can discern a transcendental perspective in his philosophy, be it strictly Kantian or not.

It is wrong to say that 'my staple cheese' is 'Baker's metaphysics of

experience'. It is a factual error to say that Baker wrote *Insight and Illusion.* P.M.S. Hacker is the author of this title, the subtitle of which contains the term the 'metaphysics of experience'.[3] Hacker is not my 'mentor' as Kanthamani believes. No doubt Hacker saw the parallel between the *Tractatus* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason.*[4] But there are others who equally saw strong affinity between Kant and Wittgenstein, foremost amongst them being Stenius, Pears, Williams and Hintikka. I have acknowledged these sources in my published writings. But none of them can be identified as my mentor. Besides, if Hacker or anybody holds them or how many hold them. Kanthamani must recognize that become wrong. Philosophical arguments do not depend upon who changes his views on this, the transcendental interpretation does not philosophical views are not mere fads or fancies such that we always require a mentor for supporting them.

This also should prove hollow his advice that I seek 'support in sources elsewhere'. Kanthamani is selling Michael Hodges as that invaluable 'source' or the new 'mentor'. But that is not a philosophical point, so it deserves no consideration.

METAPHYSICS

The transcendental perspective is not a promoter of metaphysics in the sense the latter studies essences in the Platonic sense. Wittgenstein is well aware that there cannot be a non-grammatical way of introducing the essence, hence the importance of the dictum: 'Essence is expressed by grammar' (PI, 371). In this sense metaphysics and grammar do not come into conflict as grammar itself represents the so-called metaphysical essences.

There is of course nothing Kantian about this derivation of metaphysics from grammar as grammar does not derive the essences from a still more primordial source than language. Grammar only *expresses* them and so they are already embedded in the structure of language. However, that qualifies the essences to be *a priori* and non-contingent. They make us see how they constitute the grounds of the 'possibilities of phenomena'. This is the crux of the transcendental perspective that I am arguing for. Certain Kantian themes do appear in any transcendental perspective but that is no reason to identify the Kantian with the transcendental.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. J.F.M. Hunter, '"Forms of Life" in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*', in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, Vol. 2, edited by Stuart Shanker, Croomhelm, London, 1986.
2. See Bernard Williams, 'Wittgenstein and Idealism', in *Understanding Wittgenstein,*

Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 7, 1972–73, Macmillan, London, 1974.
3. P.M.S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience,* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972.
4. Ibid., Chapter I.

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Notes towards Understanding the Art/Life Divide

In a recent paper, 'Can Art Ever Be Just About Itself?'[1] Nick McAdoo has raised some seminal issues concerning the self-referentiality thesis about art. His own answer to this self-formulated question is in the negative as he seems opposed to the idea that art represents an exclusive realm of the aesthetic which comes under focus as we confront a work of art. In this brief note we shall consider this position and argue that the grounds advanced by McAdoo in support of his view do not warrant the conclusion that he seeks to draw from them. In the end, we shall also make some brief comments on the art/life relationship.

Let us begin by elaborating McAdoo's *own* viewpoint. According to him, one cannot *describe* art without the use of everyday language. We can and do understand when someone says about music that 'it is sad' or 'it is profound', because we know what sadness or profundity is like in everyday life. Unless that were the case why would we use terms such as 'sad', 'profound', etc. for music? In other words, we understand such terms, on McAdoo's view, in the context of our life-experiences and extend their use in aesthetic realms. In a work of art, we are told, the aesthetic and the extra-aesthetic are so intermingled that a proper understanding of the aesthetic import would require *knowledge* about the world and everyday life.

The main contention that McAdoo develops is that there is no 'rigid [,] either/or distinction between aesthetic purity and worldly significance'[2] since attributions to a work of art are made *both* by the use of 'aesthetic' as well as 'non-aesthetic' words. McAdoo's argument in support of his view may be outlined as follows. Our talk about a work of art comprises words which are commonly used in referring to life-situations; for example, words like 'sad' and 'profound' are used as much in the context of workaday life-experiences as for, say, musical compositions, paintings, etc. On the other hand, the supposedly aesthetical terms, say, 'graceful' which are used for aesthetic situations like movement in dance, are such that their 'use is inextricably linked to everyday instances in the world'.[3] From this McAdoo would have us

conclude that there is no special class of attributions such as would be applicable to art *alone*. Now, would it follow from this that there is nothing *purely* aesthetic? Yes, for McAdoo it very much *would*. However, an important strain that is added here to the whole argument is the burden of acceptance of the 'tension between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic in art'[4] which must be resolved for our understanding of the relationship between art and life. According to McAdoo, this tension can be resolved only by giving up the purist position. In order to bring about such a resolution McAdoo considers the use of words such as 'graceful', 'elegant', and 'discordant', which find their use only in aesthetic discourse and to ask

> whether such words can be fully understood without evoking extra-aesthetic associations, especially in so far as, to state the obvious, such qualities do not exist per se, but only in their perceptual instantiations, which are to be found just as much in the real world as in works of art.[5]

And so, he concludes that whatever attributions may be made for a work of art, 'we invariably fall back on our "everyday" vocabulary once more'.[6] In essence, for McAdoo art and life do not represent two different domains and whatever is allegedly aesthetic is not discontinuous with life as our everyday language is adequate for describing either.

We may now turn to a critical assessment of some of the points brought out in the foregoing account. To begin, we must view art as discontinuous with life, at least up to a point, if we are to respond to certain kinds of objects or situations aesthetically. In holding out these objects, events or situations as claimants to the special status of art we implicitly draw a dividing line between art and life. Admittedly, such artistic creations are often a source of aesthetic delight, though such enjoyment results in a contemplative mode. What it means to say is that such objects *qua* art are not used or put to any utilitarian end as most other objects are in daily life. This is, however, not to say that some of the commonplace objects can never be viewed aesthetically. As to how this may happen, I have argued elsewhere.[7] It has been suggested there that things when lifted out of their usual and familiar context acquire a significance of the *aesthetic* kind. Dada art exemplifies this point with telling effect. Now, the point is that when a thing is viewed aesthetically it ceases for that moment to participate in its familiar utilitarian framework. An object of aesthetic contemplation cannot *at the same time* be seen as behaving as an object of utility. It is viewed as *either* of one kind *or* the other. The ontological status of the aesthetic object precludes it from being anything other than what it is at that moment—an object of pure contemplation. How can a beautiful bronze figurine as an object of aesthetic appreciation be at the same moment be considered as a possible paperweight? In the former mode some *pure* aesthetic aspects

may only attract our attention though there remains the possibility that in *another* context its utilitarian aspects may engage our attention. Consider, for example, a novel. Some of the events, situations and characters in it may quite possibly bear a close resemblance to life. Here, what we appreciate aesthetically are not the events and characters *as such* but the way these are put together in a significant configuration. This (pure form) may or may not be aesthetically appealing, but it has nothing to do with whether or not the resemblance it bears to life is close or otherwise. There is thus a sense in distinguishing aspects that may be categorized as *purely aesthetic* and those that are *non*-aesthetic. McAdoo's emphatic assertion that 'the work's aesthetic form *must* presuppose extra-aesthetic knowledge'[8] seems misplaced, for while it is true that all *perception* including that of a work of art involves an act of interpretation, *appreciation* of the 'aesthetic form' is not *qualitatively* guided or determined by our ability to perceive life-elements in the work of art. We would draw support for this point from Clive Bell who says that 'to *appreciate* a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life . . . nothing but a sense of form and colour and a knowledge of three-dimensional space.'[9] Interestingly, these lines have been quoted by McAdoo as well, though he fails to see the underlying point. What is important here to see is that appreciating a work of art does not have anything to do with finding life-elements or resemblance thereto in the work. This point may be brought out by putting the matter obliquely in terms of the following question: Does our appreciation of a work (of whatever art form) depend on the detection of life-elements in it? One may imagine here a work (say, an abstract painting) which bears no resemblance, in the ordinary sense of that term, to life or world and yet may be aesthetically satisfying. Jackson Pollock's drip-paintings would readily come to one's mind. On the other hand, a poor (aesthetically) landscape painting may well contain elements of resemblance to our surroundings.

The point we are suggesting merits critical attention. What we are saying is that the purist has no quarrel with the representational elements in a work of art; he does not denigrate such elements but only *delinks* them from the grounds for appreciating the work. Thus, on the plane of aesthetic appreciation the non-representational painting does not run a handicapped race just because life-elements are not recognizable in it. The act of appreciation is not to be confused with that of recognizing representational features in the work. If pure aesthetic aspects are not appealed to, on what grounds does one distinguish between a piece of creative writing and a mere newspaper report on some interesting incident? Again, if perceiving life-elements in a work of art were enough, what would count for the criteria on which to distinguish good art from bad or mediocre art?

McAdoo does seem nearly to have anticipated some of the possible

objections to his standpoint as outlined above when taking into account
Van Gogh's chair, Hokusai's wave and quotes Mikel Dufrenne as to 'the
object [that] exerts a kind of magic so that perception can relegate to
the background that which ordinary perception places in the
foreground'.[10] Nor do the purist's 'most favoured cases' such as those
of 'abstract' painting, 'pure' instrumental music, escape McAdoo's
attention. So he paves the way for a different strategy though not
without admitting that 'even while seeing the work as pure "presence"
we have also to judge its extra-aesthetic content quite differently, i.e. as
a more or less successful attempt to portray an *instance* of something in
the world and therefore subject to determinate truth-conditions.'[11]
And, how do we judge the 'extra-aesthetic content'? For Picasso's
Guernica, the suggestion is that we should 'reflect upon the truthfulness
with which this painting presents the agony of war'.[12] One really wonders
what McAdoo would have to suggest for a painting like *Monalisa*? Further,
how does one go about reflecting upon 'truthfulness' in non-
representational works of art, or for that matter pure musical
compositions? Quite understandably, McAdoo does not seem inclined
to raise such inconvenient questions.

Another line of approach that McAdoo takes in support of his view is
based on the consideration of the general ways in which we describe
certain features or aspects of a work of art. He begins by distinguishing
two different kinds of words which come in for use in such descriptive
language or talk. First, there are those like 'graceful', 'elegant',
'harmonious', and so on, which 'appear to have no *non-aesthetic*
meaning'.[13] Second, there are those that are primarily used in relation
to the non-aesthetic world, for example, 'bursting with energy',
'meandering', 'sad', 'profound', etc. Now, McAdoo gives a 'linguistic
turn' to the issue concerning the aesthetic/non-aesthetic dichotomy.
This he does by arguing that appraisal words of either kind have their
basis in everyday language and experience, and that the idea of a 'pure'
aesthetic form or property is not tenable. He begins, first, by taking on
words like 'sad', 'profound', etc., which have their 'primary home in
the everyday, non-aesthetic world'.[14] He proceeds by arguing, following
closely in the footsteps of Roger Scruton, that non-aesthetic words like
'sad' can be used for the aesthetic form only because the non-aesthetic
qualities are to be found given inseparably with the aesthetic qualities.
And so 'to understand expressions like "the music is sad", we certainly
don't need to posit a new meaning for "sad"'.[15] He quotes the following
words of Scruton in order to muster support for his view:

> The use [of 'sad'] to refer to an emotional state is primary, and
> anyone who did not understand *this* use of the term 'sad'—did not
> understand what the emotion of sadness was—would not know
> what he was talking about in attributing sadness to a work of art.[16]

However, McAdoo hastens to add that the use of such terms is made
in the 'extended' sense as 'the sad aspect is linked to a feeling of
contemplative aesthetic pleasure rather than a stimulus to action'.[17]
Now, we would aver that McAdoo does not attend to the full implication
of the 'extended' sense in which a term like 'sad' may be used for some
kinds of music. He rightly admits that the sadness of music is to be felt
only in the contemplative mode and not as we do in the everyday life-
situation. But he stops short of driving the point to its logical conclusion.
Why does he not see the point that only such aspects as are given in the
aesthetic mode qualify as aesthetic aspects and stand distinguishably
apart from the non-aesthetic aspects? Instead, a little while later he
readily sees the 'collapse [of] the notion of a "pure" aesthetic emotion
or attitude'.[18] But more about it a little later.

Let us now turn to words like 'beautiful', 'graceful', etc., and what
McAdoo has to say about them while acknowledging that these words
find their use mainly in aesthetic discourse. His argument runs somewhat
in the following manner. One learns the use of such words in early
childhood through experiences in everyday life, e.g. by watching the
gracefulness of a cat playing or the prettiness of a face. In other words,
our understanding and use of these words in the aesthetic context
depend on our knowledge about and familiarity with non-aesthetic
situations. From this he concludes that both 'aesthetic form and worldly
significance would seem to be ultimately inseparable'.[19] He joins issue
with Peter Kivy who holds the view that 'the expressive properties of
music alone are purely musical properties, understandable in purely
musical terms'.[20] For McAdoo there are no such properties. The presence
of such properties must be matched with appraisal terms which would
mean nothing in the context of our everyday world.

Now, on what grounds does McAdoo draw the distinction between
aesthetic appraisal terms like 'harmonious' and non-aesthetic terms
like 'sad'? He does begin by saying that the term 'harmonious' and such
others 'appear to have non-aesthetic meaning' whereas a word like 'sad'
has its primary home in the 'everyday, non-aesthetic world.'[21] There is
thus a tacit acknowledgement that there are two different *kinds* of worlds,
the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic. But on closer consideration McAdoo
seeks to build up the case that even the use of aesthetic terms is learnt
through their use in the context of the everyday world. Now, in what
way does this become responsible for the 'collapse' of the two worlds?
Do they coalesce into one, namely, the everyday world? McAdoo seems
to have no satisfactory explanation for this.

Let us now turn to another consideration. If we look to the world of
art we do find, broadly speaking, two opposing tendencies: one that is
marked by an apparent closeness to the everyday world; and, the other,
heightened by its removedness from it. Let us coin two terms for such
tendencies: for the former, closeness-ism, and for the latter, far-

removedness-ism. Cases of abstract or non-representational paintings, pure musical harmony, etc., would fall in the latter category. On the other hand, underlying closeness-ism would be the assumption that art holds a mirror to the world or society. It would be quite understandable if one were to argue about the presence of life/world elements in a representational painting. What needs, however, to be stressed here is that we commend a work of art, of whatever kind, not for what it refers to outside of the work but rather for what it is in *itself.* Even when the work is based on closeness-ism attention is attracted by the fact of mere closeness or resemblance to whatever is outside of it since the focus of our attention is always the work itself.

And now, if we go back to the formalist's position, it should be noted that Bell does speak of 'knowledge of three-dimensional space' or 'a sense of form and colour' as relevant to our appreciation of a work of art. But then, how may one be expected to have such knowledge or sense if not through direct experience of life and world? In other words, it is not as if one would assume that a person who responds to a creative work need have had no contact with the everyday world. The contention is that for such response no *special* kind of knowledge about the world is presupposed. On the other hand, our response to a work of art would be facilitated if we have an intimate knowledge of the medium in which the work has been executed. Even if the work is about some special aspect of life-experience what comes for aesthetic *appreciation* is the way in which such experience is depicted. A Ray film like *Pather Panchali* which is set in the background of rural Bengal received ready universal acclaim because of its cinematic (formal) qualities, though this is not to suggest that our *general* acquaintance with the various human emotions does not help us to understand the complexities of human character into which the film so ably provides an insight. Here, what we appreciate is the *aesthetic form* of the film which subsumes under it the story, the individual characters, etc. Thus, it would be quite in order to distinguish between two kinds of knowledge: knowledge about specific aspects of the world or life-situations, on the one hand and the *general* awareness of the world through our constant contact with it, on the other. For the purist, the former kind is of no relevance to our response to art. But the sense we develop about colour and form or three-dimensional space is implicitly given in our general awareness of the world. Thus even the purist would not envisage a situation where the person who is said to have aesthetic delight would be taken to be totally ignorant about or cut off from this world. A fair assessment of the formalist's position must guard against any such distorted view.

Finally, a remark about the nature of the relationship between art and life. The art/life divide is to be pressed hard by anyone who seeks to have aesthetic delight from certain special kinds of objects and events. But our repeated contact with objects of art leaves an impact on our

attitude through which life is viewed as though it were part of the created realm. In other words, the distinction we are referring to works only up to a point whereafter it begins to thin out for a mind which is fully attuned to the world of creation so that even things and events of humdrum life assume importance. In a way, close interaction with artistic works guides us to have a view of life in a new perspective which may appear more meaningful. When the sharp line of distinction between art and life begins to blur the perceptive mind oscillates between two realms—the factual and the created.

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Comment on
'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD:
Illusion or Reality?'*

If Vedānta is the philosophy expounded in the Upaniṣads, it came into existence in pre-Buddhist period.[1] Some Upaniṣads are contemporaneous with Buddha and some later.

Various authors mentioned in the *Brahma-Sūtra* expounded aupaniṣadic philosophy; whether they wrote books in a systematic way is not known now. Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma-Sūtra* is the earliest work available to us now, which systematically expounds aupaniṣadic philosophy.

If Vedānta is identified with the systematic philosophy expounded in the *Brahma-Sūtras*, it did not exist prior to them.

From evidence Daya Krishna gathered, it is clear, that the *Brahma-Sūtra* was not much in vogue till Śaṅkarācārya wrote a commentary on it. But aupaniṣadic philosophy and followers of it did exist. They may not have accepted the *Brahma-Sūtra*'s systematization.

There is not enough evidence to say whether aupaniṣadic philosophy or Sāṃkhya was more popular. If Itihāsa-Purāṇas are taken into consideration, an amalgam of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta seems to have been Hindu popular philosophy. Buddhist philosophy was undoubtedly popular in the first millennium. But we cannot say whether its popularity was greater or lesser than Hindu philosophy.

When the number of philosophical systems came to be commonly fixed as six is not known. In some of the books dealing with systems of philosophy Vedānta is not dealt with. Not only Haribhadra's work but even the general recension of Mādhava's *Sarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha* does not include Vedānta. Cowell and Gough edition does not have it.

Far more systematic, Buddhist philosophy was done than systematic Vedānta before Śaṅkarācārya. In fact the latter is negligible. As F.W. Thomas said long ago, 'The Vedānta, as we have seen, was practically ignored during the whole of the Classical period.' (*Indianism and its Expansion*, University of Calcutta, 1942). Only Bāṇa and Kumārila refer to Vedānta.

The post-Śaṅkara period till the twelfth century AD is the Vedānta period according to F.W. Thomas. Later Navya-Nyāya became a rival to Vedānta. 'Vedānta domination arose at a time of South Indian prosperity and prestige.' (Ibid.)

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* This is a response to Professor Daya Krishna's article published in the Special Issue on 'Historiography of Civilizations', *JICPR*, June, 1996.

[1] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya*, etc. are pre-Buddhistic.

Notes and Queries

Can Navya Nyāya Analysis Make a Distinction between Sense and Reference?

Can Navya Nyāya analysis make a distinction between sense and reference? If it cannot, should it not be regarded as idealistic *par excellence*. On the other hand, if it can, how will it do so, particularly when it does not accept the idea of an identical propositional meaning conveyed by different linguistic formulations even when the same 'fact' is supposed to render the two different 'knowledges', 'true'? Or, in other words, can Navya Nyāya analysis ever accept the 'meaning equivalence' of two *differently* formulated linguistic expressions, or in which the *anuyogī* and the *pratiyogī* are different?

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Is Udayana a *pracchanna advaitin*?

Udayana, by common consent, is usually regarded as the last of the Naiyāyikas of the old school before Gaṅgeśa started what is called the Navya Nyāya or the new school of Nyāya which replaced older Nyāya completely. Yet, Udayana, in his *Ātmatattvaviveka*, gives six stages of realisation of the self in ascending order out of which the third and the fifth are described by him as advaitic positions and the fifth is considered only one step lower than that of the Nyāya which occupies the highest position in his system. As the difference between the two is only marginal, that is, whether the self when completely established in itself without any relation to any object whatsoever can still be regarded as conscious in any relevant sense of the term. Not only this, he closes the book with the recommendation to meditate on the self and suggests the gradual stages of realisation which would occur during the course of meditation. In the light of all this, would it not be more proper to treat him as almost an advaitin who is concerned with the realisation of the self and believes that it can only be so realised through the usual meditational practices associated with the advaita Vedāntins who deny the awareness of any object including the self in such a realisation? Where is the Naiyāyika in all this? And, should not we, therefore, call him almost an advaitin, a *pracchanna advaitin*?

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Review Articles

The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson

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The book* under review is a collection of sixteen essays by eminent philosophers of India, Britain and the USA on the philosophy of P.F. Strawson. It is a fitting tribute to a great philosopher of our times who not only represents the best in the contemporary western philosophical tradition but also has a fine sense of appreciating the Indian philosophical scholarship. This volume, edited by two eminent philosophers of India, represents the best in Strawson's philosophy.

The essays cover all aspects of Strawson's philosophy, viz. metaphysics, philosophical logic, epistemology, morality and interpretation of Kant. In each of these areas Strawson has original contributions. Each essay of this volume has highlighted his contributions in the most analytic and critical spirit. Strawson's own 'My Philosophy' and 'Replies' have added to the lively character of the book. It also has a complete Bibliography of Strawson's writings and an index.

My task in this review article is to highlight the main themes of the volume and present a perspective for approaching the book.

THE QUEST FOR A DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS

Strawson's philosophy can be best characterized as a quest for a descriptive metaphysics. It is in founding such a metaphysics that Strawson's lasting contribution lies. From *Individuals* (1959) to *Analysis and Metaphysics* (1993), there has been a continuous effort to outline the broad features of descriptive metaphysics. For Strawson, a systematic and connective model of philosophical analysis is synonymous with descriptive metaphysics. Its aim is to lay bare 'the actual structure of our thought about the world' (*Individuals*, p. 9). The further assumption is that 'there is a massive central core of human thinking which has no history' (ibid., p. 10).

Descriptive metaphysics has little in common with revisionary metaphysics that remodels and revises our existing conceptual scheme. It is the latter that has dominated the philosophical scene for long except, of course, the philosophy of Aristotle and Kant who, according

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The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson, edited by P.K. Sen and R.R. Verma, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1995.

to Strawson, are the harbingers of descriptive metaphysics. Be it as it may, descriptive metaphysics seeks to replace revisionary metaphysics by showing that metaphysics can very well be content to describe the actual structure of our thought and language in a systematic fashion. As Strawson has shown, descriptive metaphysics consists in showing that our world consists of particulars and universals in the most liberal way.

Descriptive metaphysics thus has an inner structure and a well-designed method of analysis of language and conceptual structure. Even then it is bound to suffer from inner tensions because of its ambitious project of delineating the global structure of our conceptual scheme. First of all, it is too general a project because the concepts to be described are too many and too diverse. That is why the task of the descriptive metaphysician is very complex and enormous. D.P. Chattopadhyaya in his paper 'Categorial Frameworks: Some Problems', has drawn attention to some of the inner tensions in descriptive metaphysics. His first basic question is whether there is only one conceptual scheme or there are many. Either way there is no straightforward answer to that question because if there is only one conceptual scheme, then the possibility of different systems of descriptive metaphysics does not arise. All systems must converge on the single all-comprehensive system of descriptive metaphysics. On the contrary, if there are many conceptual systems, then the very idea of descriptive metaphysics is threatened as it cannot allow multiple and sometimes conflicting systems of descriptive metaphysics to co-exist. If there are many such metaphysical systems the distinction between 'descriptive' and 'revisionary' metaphysics is blurred. Besides, Chattopadhyaya argues that the idea of an unchanging conceptual core causes problems as to how there can be unchanging concepts when language goes on changing (p. 120). Further, he says, 'Given Strawson's notion of descriptive metaphysics the very concept of a "history of descriptive metaphysics" seems to be incoherent' (p. 118).

However, the idea of descriptive metaphysics survives even if the question whether there is one and only one metaphysical system is not answered. There can always be different ways of describing the same conceptual core and the conceptual core can remain changeless even if the idioms of description change. Strawson is not foreclosing the possibility of future metaphysical systems as he is allowing for the possibility that as we go on in our philosophical quest the basic roots of our thought will continue to be the same. It is those roots that matter and it is the task of philosophy to locate that core in our ever-widening conceptual scheme.

Strawson is well aware of the problem of the legitimacy of the descriptive enterprise itself. That is why he has offered the model of connective analysis as the acceptable alternative to the revisionary attempts to revise our language and the conceptual scheme. He is

rather with Aristotle and Kant in not disturbing our ordinary and yet most rooted systems of beliefs and thought-patterns. He cannot, of course, accept the explicitly transcendental argument like Kant's but that does not mean that he has no sympathy for it. The presence of transcendental arguments in Strawson's theory is demonstrated by Michael Luntley in his paper 'Thinking of Individuals: A Prolegomenon to any Future Theory of Thought'. Luntley analyses the structure of the object-directed singular thought as propounded in *Individuals* and comes out with the thesis that there are 'transcendental conditions' (p. 180) which are at the foundation of all object-directed thoughts. These conditions are neither causal nor psychological but are basically the normative conditions making the thoughts possible. The thoughts are about individuals which themselves are presented in a spatio-temporal framework. Thus, at the basis of all thoughts the logical structure of the individuals is internally given. This opens the transcendental route to the descriptive metaphysics of individuals.

NATURALISM AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT

Strawson's descriptive metaphysics combines soft naturalism with soft transcendentalism, if by the latter is meant keeping room for a logically purified domain of concepts. While the early Strawson is a logician and a metaphysician, the later Strawson is a naturalist and a liberal realist. However, there is no conflict between the two, as is shown by P.K. Sen in his paper 'On a Gentle Naturalist's Response to Scepticism'. Sen is not interested in transcendental arguments as much as he is interested in showing that Strawson's gentle naturalism is too gentle to defeat the sceptic who deserves a hard knock.

Sen's argument is that though soft naturalism is powerful as a persuasive force in comparison to reductive naturalism, yet there is a serious lacuna in it as it does not face the sceptical challenge and simply avoids it. The sceptic can be defeated by arguments and not by a refusal to argue at all. Sen has reasons to be dissatisfied with gentle naturalism because the latter simply tells that there are foundational beliefs of ours which can be little displaced by the sceptic. But the fact remains that the sceptic does throw away all beliefs along with the foundational ones which are supposed to be our natural and inescapable beliefs *á la* Hume and Wittgenstein. There is in fact an argument to show that the sceptic is not only wrong but also inconsistent in throwing away all our beliefs. Sen rightly says, 'So if the arguments offered by different philosophers have established interconnections of beliefs and concepts relating to the external world, they have also at least tended to show that these beliefs are true, and to the extent they have done this they have tended to show that the sceptic is wrong' (p. 303). Strawson's descriptive

metaphysics itself has shown the interconnections of the concepts and to that extent can claim to be an argument against the sceptic.

The effectiveness of transcendental arguments against the sceptic can always be emphasized in spite of Stroud's warnings to the contrary. The transcendental arguments have always been emphatic about the interconnections of concepts, and Kant especially held conceptual connections to be primary. That is why there is the emphasis on the *a priori* validity of concepts. Strawson himself acknowledges this when he says', 'even if they [the transcendental arguments] do not succeed in establishing such tight or rigid connections as they initially promise, they do at least indicate or bring out conceptual connections, even if only of a looser kind' (*Scepticism and Naturalism*, p. 23). This is enough of a recognition of the fact that transcendental arguments are legitimate and are worth considering for the purpose.

REALISM, REFERENCE AND IDENTIFICATION

Strawson's catholic naturalism goes hand-in-hand with his catholic realism. If his *Individuals* stands as an embodiment of realism, his *Scepticism and Naturalism* stands as a transition to naturalism. There is a natural tendency in this development for a more comprehensive system of thought. His realism does not clash with naturalism as he makes room for a variety of entities all naturally secured in our experience. Arindam Chakrabarti's paper 'Non-Particular Individuals' makes a strong plea for Strawson's catholic realism.

Chakrabrati has argued that metaphysical realism is the natural corollary of Strawson's descriptive metaphysics as there is an inherent logic, as in Nyāya, to postulate as many as entities as language requires. If language and experience are the guide, then our ontology is bound to be elastic to accommodate not only the particular individuals but the non-particular individuals as well. The universals, concepts, properties and relations have legitimate claims to be within the ontology.

However, it cannot be forgotten that an indiscriminate realism threatens its own cogency as it cannot afford to have a concept of reality at all. Therefore it is to be noted that there is experiential constraint on the admissible entities even in Strawson's realism. But it has not been shown by Chakrabarti whether metaphysical realism even in its catholic way can maintain a check on the proliferation of the ontic entities. He rightly claims that, for Strawson, there is only an internal check as the conceptual system alone has its in-built checks against unlimited or extravagant realism. Therefore, he characterizes Strawson as an 'internal realist' (p. 133) in Putnam's sense. In Strawson, of course, there is a collapse of internal realism into metaphysical realism.

B.K. Matilal's paper, 'A Realist View of Perception', is a defence of metaphysical realism against the attacks of the internal realism of

Putnam and the anti-realism of Dummett. He bases his attack on internal realism on the fact that common sense as well as experience vouchsafes for the reality of the world along with all the entities postulated by language and knowledge. The entities in the world are not our creations as they are independent of our language and knowledge. Matilal advocates a direct relation between language and the world. He says, 'Realism will be saved if we admit that there are objects in the world that are "self-identifying" in this sense, even without our fully succeeding to tell what they are and how many kinds there are' (p. 324). It is, however, to be noted that Putnam's 'brain-in-the-vat' argument is precisely against this kind of metaphysical realism that holds that there are things independently of our language. Matilal's defence of the possibility of the vat-world goes against the reality of the actual world and so he cannot be a defender of both the vat-world and the real world at the same time.

R.R. Verma's defence of realism is more acceptable as she argues in her paper, 'A Point about Reference', for two conditions for the success of reference, namely, the reference-reality condition and the reference-transparency condition. Unless there is a prior ontic commitment to the objects in the world there cannot be reference at all. This is all the more true in the case of history-relative reference. Besides, the transparency of the reference-relation is necessary as in it lies the success of the reference. Otherwise, there will arise puzzling cases in identification. Thus, the 'ontic framework determined by his narrative' (p. 62) is the best guarantee of the speaker's reference. Here, of course, it is to be noted that the ontic pinning down of the reference must be done by language, that is, the narrative and not by the free-floating ontic beliefs of the speaker.

Concern for the proper identification of particulars is the main issue in Strawson's theory of reference. For this he has gone back to the language in which reference takes place. The identifying references are so peculiarly situated that they succeed more often than not in identifying the referents in the world. Nirmalangshu Mukherjee in his paper 'Identification' rightly tells us that our ordinary linguistic intuitions are enough for the purpose and therefore the Russellian paradigm of logical proper names is unwarranted. It is primarily a Strawsonian insight that reference is the business of speech performance and not of logical calculus.

It is, of course, not the case that reference has no logic of its own. Strawson has provided a logical framework for reference and predication. According to him, the subject-predicate logic traditionally defended provides the much needed logical framework for the purpose. This point has been highlighted by Sibajiban Bhattacharyya in his paper 'Strawson on Subject and Predicate'. Bhattacharyya has claimed that the logical plan provided by Strawson is valid in that it provides a logical

criterion for distinguishing expressions as subject and predicate. But it must be noted that the logical criterion is supported by an ontological criterion that presupposes that there are not only particulars in the world but also universals to match the criterial distinction. Strawson's logic is part of his overall metaphysics and there cannot be any understanding of the logic without investigating the broad features of the metaphysics.

FOUNDATIONALISM, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE

From the logic of particulars to knowledge of the particulars is only short step. This step is taken by Strawson in his theory that particulars are given in experience, that is, in perception. This theory is largely an empiricist theory but without the defects of empiricism. Strawson disowns the sense-datum theory as well as the theory called foundationalism according to which there are basic perceptual statements at the basis of all empirical knowledge. He accepts the coherentist theory of knowledge which holds that there is a system of knowledge of particulars in the space-time world. It is the system that matters and not the so-called foundational beliefs. However, Sandhya Basu in her paper 'Strawson and Foundationalism' has argued that foundationalism is still valid because in whatever way we may try we cannot avoid the fact that there are some basic beliefs which are true directly without waiting upon our validation. Such beliefs are the building blocks of our knowledge-system. But there are many beliefs which constitute the very framework of knowledge and as such need no proof or justification. But this does not commit one to foundationalism because the latter is still a revisionary thesis and is still working within the empiricist theory. Strawson can very well sail with Wittgenstein.

Strawson's epistemology does not inherit the transcendental load of the Kantians or the linguisticism of the Wittgensteinians. It steers a middle course between the Kantian concern for epistemic rationality and the Wittgensteinian concern for plain facts such as rule-following. That is why Strawson rejects the necessity of a transcendental subject as the source of knowledge. Quassim Cassam in his paper 'Transcendental Self-consciousness' has argued that Strawson is right in rejecting the transcendental self-consciousness in knowledge because that is only a derivative notion as the primary notion is that of personal self-consciousness. The latter is enough to explain knowledge as the objectivity argument demands. This, however, does not solve the issue finally because what is called transcendental self-consciousness need not be a derivative notion at all. In a different context it can be seen to be a fundamental notion though without the Kantian metaphysical load.

Such a context is provided by Akeel Bilgrami in his paper 'Self-

knowledge and Resentment'; according to him self-knowledge is not a matter of direct knowledge of oneself in the Cartesian fashion. Rather, it is a matter of our moral reactions and attitudes such as resentment, praise, blame, etc. The reactive attitudes do suggest that moral persons not only have knowledge about themselves but also about others. That is to say, in having moral attitudes we have already presupposed self-knowledge as a primary notion. This is the surest way to self-knowledge as it is no more a matter of direct introspection but of a transcendental presupposition. The self talked of here is the moral self and that is akin to Kant's transcendental self. Though Bilgrami is cautious enough not to introduce the transcendental moral self there is reason to believe that the moral self here in focus is very akin to the transcendental self.

MORALITY, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM

The problem of morality is very important in Strawson's philosophy. Hence his concern for the concept of freedom, moral will and responsibility. But as a catholic naturalist and not a rationalist he is not searching for the rational foundations for morality but is satisfied with a descriptive metaphysics of morals. This point has been sufficiently highlighted by Mark Platt's in his paper 'The Metaphysics of Morals'. He has shown that Strawson has not been enamoured of rational justification of morality as there is no such justification and besides there are only moral sentiments and attitudes and nothing like categorical imperatives in ethics. It is the total natural man who is engaged in the moral life and there is enough room for talking of moral rules and ideals provided we see them in the moral perspective. Beyond these there are no transcendental grounds of morality. Strawson is against revisionary ethics as he is against revisionary metaphysics.

Bijoy Boruah in his paper 'The Non-Moral Foundation of the Moral Reality' has probed further into the naturalist defence of morality given by Strawson. He argues that Strawson's distinction between the points of the objective and the non-objective points of view does suggest that morality and freedom are possible from the non-objective and non-scientific point of view and that in the relative context of the non-objective view our moral reactions can be embedded. This distinction, according to Boruah, is the source of tension and inconsistency as the same action is seen as moral and free from one point of view but not so from another point of view. He therefore says that Strawson's relativizing move will not do as both points of view may collapse into the 'view from nowhere'. In that case freedom and morality will be illusory. But it must be noted that Strawson does not see that there can be collapse of the two points of view as long as we remain confined to the point of view we adopt. Besides, it is not a matter of choice that we occupy a moral point of view. It is very natural with man.

Rajendra Prasad's paper 'Reactive Attitudes, Rationality and Determinism' goes to prove that ethics is still a matter of rational way of life and there is still scope for rational considerations in ethics. Prasad does not agree that morality can take care of itself like our natural beliefs. For example, the falsity of determinism is a presupposition of morality and so we cannot say that both determinism and morality are true. Moral attitudes are possible because there is a moral point of view as distinguished from a non-moral point of view. He thus endorses Strawson's main contention that the moral point of view is natural to man. He only adds that we cannot just leave moral scepticism as it is. A rational defence of morality is always a distinct option.

THE KANTIAN TRADITION AND THE SEMANTICS OF SENSE

Strawson's rejection of rational defence of morality need not be his total opposition to the Kantian tradition itself. He has many points in common with Kant especially his idea that descriptive metaphysics is possible. Kant is accepted by him as a descriptive metaphysician. The central thesis of the Kantian tradition which Strawson inherits is that there is a way to the determination of the bounds of sense. This also implies a method of determining the nature of necessity. These and other related issues are discussed by Hilary Putnam in his paper 'Logical Positivism, the Kantian Tradition and the Bounds of Sense'.

According to Putnam, the validity of the Kantian legacy is now a matter of common acceptance since it is a mistake to reject Kant as has been done by the logical positivists. The latter rejected all presuppositions of knowledge including our postulation of a standard of truth and falsity which is not a matter of verification but is presupposed by it. Putnam rightly tells us that positivism could not explain how the rationality of our scientific discourse can be explained at all. Here Kant comes to our mind as he gave the right direction as to how the idea of the normativity of sense could be explained at all.

Putnam, however, thinks that the normativity of sense cannot be explained either by straightforward rationalism or by the conventionalism of the positivists. There must be a middle course which will steer clear of the excesses of conventionalism and of Kantian transcendentalism. That is why he says that there is 'a space of necessities which do not have the kinds of guarantees that either linguistic philosophy or Kantian philosophy has tried to provide for them' (p. 158). This space is open to all sorts of human factors such as those of our nature and our experience. Putnam acknowledges that Strawson has clearly shown a method of determining the bounds of sense in his descriptive metaphysics.

Strawson's philosophy of language and meaning is an effort towards fixing the bounds of sense within the domain of language. He has

shown that sense is not a matter of habits of mind nor of conventions. Sense is situated in human nature itself so far as the latter is the broad framework of human understanding and language. Michael Dummett in his paper 'Force and Conventions' has gone into the details of the theory of sense found in Strawson's theory of language. He has shown that sense itself is not a conventional entity but is bound by the conventions which language itself brings into existence. Though Dummett himself cannot go all the way with Strawson in fixing the bounds of sense in a metaphysical way, yet he can acknowledge that there is no sense in the arbitrary conventions found in language and so it must be located in the necessary structure of language. Therefore, there is always a solid semantic foundation of sense in the structure of language. Here Strawson, Dummett and Putnam agree on the Kantian legacy of fixing sense in the necessary structure of language and thought.

To conclude: the key to an understanding of the philosophy of Strawson lies in the idea of descriptive metaphysics which explains how logic, ontology, epistemology and morals are all integrated into the study of the inner structure of the human conceptual scheme. It is a major achievement of the book under review that it has successfully brought into focus an integrated picture of Strawson's philosophy. The book is a must for every student of philosophy interested in the mainstream of contemporary analytic philosophy.

Potter's New Bibliography of Indian Philosophy:
One Step Forward and Three Steps Backwards

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Karl H. Potter's *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies** has by now become a standard reference work in the field of Indian philosophy and its first volume devoted to the *Bibliography* of the subject is the most exhaustive reference tool on what has till now been published in the field of Indian philosophy or even referred to in catalogues of manuscripts, or even in important articles on the subject. The *Bibliography* was first published in 1970 and the second revised edition was published in 1983. The present *Bibliography* in two parts is the third revised edition and thus contains the most up-to-date information regarding both primary and secondary materials relating to Indian philosophy in the English language. One would normally have expected that the editor himself would have highlighted the points in which his third revised edition differs from the earlier ones and what improvements have been made in it, but, nothing of the kind is provided by the editor and the reader is left to his or her own devices to find what exactly has been done in the new edition of the *Bibliography* to make it more serviceable to the research-oriented student of the subject.

The first change which strikes one is the division of the *Bibliography* into two parts, the first part containing only the original works in Indian philosophy while the second part consists of secondary material such as articles, etc. on various schools of Indian philosophy or subjects dealt with therein. This is a welcome change as the primary and the secondary material have been separated, though it appears that the editor has not been able to observe the principle of separation completely as he has referred to articles even in the first part which primarily contains the original works only. At places, the inclusion of an article was perhaps justified because the original author is only known through reference and discussion in the article concerned. But this is not always the case.

The second obvious difference is the numbering of the entries which was totally absent in the second revised edition where, if one had to find the total number of entries, one had to count them onself. As against this, for some reason, the editor has chosen to eliminate the indication of the date of the authors in the upper margin of each page to help one find the period to which the authors mentioned on the page belonged. One now has to search for the dates against the name of the author

* *The Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies: Bibliography* (third edition), compiled by Karl H. Potter, published by Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi, Vol. I, parts 1 and 2, pp. 1–1606, Rs 800.

which is certainly a little more cumbersome than the earlier practice. It would have been far better if the earlier practice had been retained where the dates were given both in the top margin as well as against the author concerned. In fact, the new edition makes it very difficult to locate either by chronology or by names of schools as nothing is indicated at the top of the page to help the serious enquirer. As for the index, there seem to be so many mistakes in it, that one has difficulty in finding works in the main *Bibliography* which is divided into two parts, the index being at the end of the second part only, thus making one rush from one part of the volume to the other to find what one is looking for.

As the dating of the authors or the works is an important information to be provided by the *Bibliography*, it would have been helpful if the basis of the dating would have been clearly indicated. However, this is not the case and one is left to guess the grounds of the dating which the editor had in his mind, particularly when the dates given are too precise as has been done in the *Bibliography*. The situation in fact is even more complicated, for if one compares the dates in the old edition with those in the new, one finds that the changes in certain cases are so marginal that one wonders what could possibly be the ground for the change, specially when it spans only a few years (Appendix I). Surely, such a precise dating for most of the works and authors in Indian philosophy is not there, and if the grounds for it were available to the editor, he should certainly have shared them with the user of the *Bibliography*. What is even more disturbing is the unbelievably large shifting in the dates of many authors, some of whom are extremely important in the history of the development of Indian philosophy, without any inkling being given of the reasons for such a change or the grounds on which it has been made (Appendix II). As this is not an isolated occurrence in the *Bibliography* but is a fairly widespread phenomenon we will try to highlight it and make it a subject of discussion amongst concerned scholars so that it does not escape the attention of the scholarly community.

What is, however, even more surprising is the fact that not only the third edition of the *Bibliography* makes minor changes of a few decades in the case of many authors, it also eliminates some of those who were mentioned in the second edition (see Appendixes III and IV). This is absolutely incomprehensible, for if the authors did exist and their works published, then how could they disappear from the revised *Bibliography*? Equally baffling are the instances where the works whose dating is shown as known in the second edition become of unknown date in the revised edition. In case there were substantial grounds for doing so, they should have been pointed out in the Introduction to the third edition. But nothing of the kind has been done. In fact, the unwary reader may not even be aware that such an elimination or change has been done in the third edition of the *Bibliography*.

But this is not the only anomaly one finds in the third edition of the

Bibliography. What is even more surprising is that many of the names mentioned in the index are not to be found in the *Bibliography*, and one wonders how, if they are in the index, which obviously is prepared only after the main text is ready, they have disappeared from the *Bibliography* (see Appendix V).

The third edition lists 1962 entries, 518 more than the entries in the second edition. The present edition lists authors and works up to 1991 while the earlier edition listed only up to 1976, and this obviously could be one of the reasons for the increase in the number of entries in the later edition. But as there are only 23 new entries from 1976 to 1991, this fact alone cannot account for the substantial increase in the number of the entries in the third edition of the *Bibliography*. On the other hand, this fact points to a decline of publications in the field of philosophy in Sanskrit during the later half of the twentieth century as normally the *Bibliography* seems to include everything published in the field of philosophy in India, whatever be its nature and quality.

The present *Bibliography* contains 518 more entries than those which were there in the second edition. If one breaks it centurywise, one finds:

Century	More	Less
300–200 BC	9	
200–100 BC	1	7
100–000 BC	1	
AD 0–100		10
AD 100–200	29	
AD 200–300	51	
AD 300–400	54	
AD 400–500	35	
AD 500–600	38	
AD 600–700	34	
AD 700–800	33	
AD 800–900	7	
AD 900–1000	59	
AD 1000–1100	1	
AD 1100–1200	5	
AD 1200–1300	1	
AD 1300–1400		4
AD 1400–1500	14	
AD 1500–1600	33	
AD 1600–1700	8	
AD 1700–1800	27	
AD 1800–1900	19	
AD 1900–1991	81	
	539	21

The above centurywise breakup of additions in the new *Bibliography* is interesting in many respects and raises new questions which need to be investigated. The largest number of new additions occur in the period AD 900 to AD 1000 (59) followed by the one from AD 1900 to AD 1991 (58), if we subtract those which have been added only because the period covered has been extended from 1976 to 1991, the next largest number occurs in the period AD 300–400 (54) and AD 200–300 (51). In fact the period AD 200–400 witnesses 105 new entries. The next largest addition occurs between AD 500–600 (38) followed by AD 400–500 (35), AD 600–700 (34), AD 700–800 (33), AD 1500–1600 (33) and AD 100–200 (29).

The period from AD 100–1000 thus sees an addition of 340 new entries. The only strange thing in this period is that there are very few new entries in the period between AD 800–900 (07). The period from 300–100 BC sees only 2 new additions while from BC 100 to AD 100 there are 09 less entries, presumably because the authors/works earlier listed during this period have been shifted elsewhere or omitted altogether. The second millennium AD that is, from 1000 onwards sees a total of (189–23), that is 166 new entries in the *Bibliography*. During the second millennium we have only 4 less in the period AD 1300–1400, most probably due to the same reasons as were mentioned earlier.

Thus, if in the first millennium AD we include entries from BC 300 to AD 1000 we have a total number of 333 additions out of which we find that 307 happen to be Buddhist, the rest, 26 in number, being distributed amongst the other schools of Indian philosophy, namely, Jain, Nyāya, Vedānta, etc., including those which have been placed in the category of 'general' in the *Bibliography*. As for the second millennium AD, one of the interesting features seems to be the increase in the discovery of works belonging to the less well-known schools of Indian thought.

Viśiṣṭādvaita	21
Dvaitādvaita	10
Śaiva Siddhānta	11
Kāśmīra Śaivism	4
Vīra Śaiva	16
Acintyabhedābheda	21

Besides these unbelievable omissions and commissions, one would have normally expected that the mistakes committed in the second edition of the *Bibliography* would have been rectified in the later edition, but it is surprising to find the same mistakes being repeated, including the ones that would be normally expected to have come to the attention of the editor in the course of getting the scholarly information on the subjects concerned. To give a few examples, Vācaspati Miśra II's *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* was mentioned as being partly in MS according to Dinesh Bhattacharya, (*History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithila*, Darbhanga 1959, p. 147. Cf. also Umesh Mishra, *History of Indian Philosophy*, volume two,

1970, p. 292. [Potter, p. 530 of Vol. I, Section I]) even thought it was published as early as 1896 by Pandita Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailang as a text of the Nyāya Sūtra with Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* in the Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series,Vol. IX.This, in fact, was pointed out in my article entitled. 'The Text of the Nyāya Sūtras—Some Problems' published in *JICPR* (Vol. VII, No. 2, Jan.–Apr. 1990). But the mistake has been repeated in the third edition. Similarly, for example, it was mentioned in the second edition that Karuna Bhattacharya has written an article in French (p. 395, Karuna Bhattacharya) which, on enquiry, was found to be wrong as it was not she who had written the article but someone else in Calcutta. However, in the new edition she is again credited with having written an article in French which is unlikely as she has no knowledge of the language.

There are also many printing errors and one wonders if anyone has taken serious care to see that the volume is as free of errors as it could be. All in all, it seems to be a job carelessly done and perfunctorily performed without any regard for the convenience of its users. However, as it is the only *Bibliography* in the field, apart from Thangaswami Sarma's three volumes in Sanskrit on *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Advaita Vedānta* and *Mīmāṃsā*, one is thankful that there is at least such a *Bibliography*, for anyone who is seriously interested in information about the works in Indian philosophy till today cannot but rush to it for information as there is practically nothing else in the field up till now.

APPENDIX I

Some Representative Examples of the Changes in Dates in the Third Edition of Potter's *Bibliography*

	Third Edition		Second Edition	
Guṇamati	AD	500	AD	480
Dignāga	AD	510	AD	480
Ārya Vimuktisena	AD	560	AD	555
(Bhaṭṭa) Kallatta	AD	850	AD	854
Murārī Bhaṭṭa	AD	1645	AD	1670
Śaṃkara Bhaṭṭa	AD	1593	AD	1600
Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana	AD	1620	AD	1630
Gauḍa Brahmānanda Saraswatī	AD	1700	AD	1680
Rāmarudra Tarkavagīśa Bhaṭṭācārya	AD	1670	AD	1680

APPENDIX II

Some Representative Examples of the Changes in Dates in the Third Edition of Potter's *Bibliography*

	Third Edition		Second Edition	
Kambala	AD	500	AD	750
Ānanda	AD	570	AD	800

Gurudeva (Viraśaiva)	AD	1600	AD	1905
Sampādaneya Siddhavīra	AD	1600	AD	1905
Annayacārya	AD	1673	AD	1785
Devarāja	AD	1800	AD	1600

APPENDIX III

Some Examples of Authors Mentioned in the Second Edition of the *Bibliography* Missing in the Third Edition

1. Cūlabhayā
2. Nāga or Nāgabodhi, author of *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśāsāstra* (another Nāgabodhi listed as DU 443 in new *Bibliography* is not the author of this work)
3. Upaśānta—Abhidharmahṛdayasūtra
4. Dharmaghoṣa Sūri
5. Ānandasvarūpa Bhaṭṭāraka
6. Meghānanda
7. Abhayaprada
8. Senanātha
9. Rādhā Mohan Gosvamin
10. Sundarajāmātṛ
11. Mahādeva Punataṃkara
12. Laksminṛsiṃha Śāstrin
13. Brahmadeva Pandita
14. Ratnanātha Śukla
15. Kedāra Nātha Bhaktivinoda Thakkura
16. Srīdhara Pāthaka Svāmin
17. K.S. Varadācārya

APPENDIX IV

Some Examples of Works of Unknown Authors Mentioned in the Second Edition of the *Bibliography* but Missing from the Third Edition

1. Mahaprajñāpāramitāsūtra
2. Samdhinirmocanasūtra
3. Avataṃśaka Sūtra
4. Prajñāpārmitahṛdayasūtra
5. Vṛtti on Iśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāmkhyakārikā
6. Ārya—Pañcaviṃśatīsāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra

APPENDIX V

Some Examples of Wrong Entries or Missing Entries in Potter's New *Bibliography*

1. Entry 16 followed by entry 18.1.10. Entries 17 and 18 missing on pp. 50–51.
2. Mahākātyāyana (150 BC) listed in Index missing from *Bibliography*.
3. Vasumitra is listed in Index as 27, but entry 27 is missing in *Bibliography* p. 73–74.
4. (Sri) Kumāradeva is listed in Index as 609, in the *Bibliography* 609 is Bhajadeva.
5. Vasunandin Saiddhāntika is listed in Index as 665 but in *Bibliography* 665 is Bodhanidhi.

6. Vādhūla Vīrarāghavācārya is listed in Index as 702 but in *Bibliography* entry 702 is missing (p. 441).
7. Vijñānātman is listed in Index as 770 but in *Bibliography* 770 is Jinasena.
8. Narendrapuri is listed in Index as 778 but in *Bibliography* this entry is missing (p. 483).
9. In Index 810 is Devendra Sūri but in *Bibliography* it is Vaṭeśvara.
10. In Index 727A is Varavaramuni. This entry is missing from *Bibliography* (p. 449). However there is another Varavaramuni listed as entry 1436 but in *Bibliography* 1436 is Kṛṣṇa Dhūrjaṭi Dīksita in *Bibliography*.
11. Viśveśvara Pāndeya is listed in Index as 1164 but in *Bibliography* it is Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa.
12. Annayacārya is listed in Index as 1454 but in *Bibliography* it is Nityamukta Narahari. 1454 is missing.
13. Ananta Bhaṭṭa is listed in Index as 1138 but in *Bibliography* it is Purṇānandaśramin. One Ananta Bhaṭṭa is no. 1139 of *Bibliography*.
14. Gopīnātha Maunin is listed as 1365 in Index but this entry is missing from *Bibliography* (p. 706).
15. Kākārāma is listed in Index as 1535 but in the *Bibliography* 1535 is Kiriti Veṅkaṭācārya.
16. Entry 1365 is missing.

The data in the Appendices has been prepared by Dr Rashmi Patni, Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur.

Book Reviews

N.K. DEVARAJA, *The Limits of Disagreement: An Essay on Reasoning in Humanistic Disciplines*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1993, x+221 pages, Rs 200.

The proper role and strength of reasoning in humanistic disciplines has yet to achieve its full significance. Covering a wide range of contemporary philosophical issues, the author reaffirms his faith in creative humanism. The genesis of the thesis of creative humanism could be traced back to his D.Litt. dissertation submitted at Lucknow University in the year 1958, the revised and reduced version of which has been published as *The Philosophy of Culture: An Introduction to Creative Humanism* (1993). In this book, he has addressed two problems—how to restore the modern man's faith in the objectivity and universality of values and how to achieve a connected consciousness of the different kinds of values with the pursuit of which civilized human beings have been and ought to be concerned.

The author says that no justice can be done to the present book by any reviewer unless he or she studies his favourite book: *Freedom, Creativity and Value* (1988). In this book, he says that the specific essence of man consists in his urge towards creative pursuit of values. Having secured the means of subsistence, man finds it possible to withdraw this attention, though temporarily, from the utilitarian aspects of life and the world and to occupy himself with only those phases of them which generate intrinsically significant forms of consciousness. This process may be called 'the process of evaluative abstraction' which man practises in the moment of leisure.

The 'Introduction' to the book deals with the conceptual framework of the entire presentation. The new wave of relativism and historicism flourishing under the twin wings of 'hermeneutics' and 'sociology of knowledge' that seem to have invaded the cultural and the physical sciences alike come for extensive treatment and discussion. Logic is not the only form of rationality and scientific knowledge is not the only form of knowledge. There can be n-number of dimensions to rationality and 'knowledge'. Here the author examines the views of Giambattista Vico, the writer of *New Science* (1974), as interpreted by Wilhelm Dilthey on the one side and Hans-Georg Gadamer on the other. We can have a true understanding 'only of the world of history' (and not of nature) because in history we can comprehend what man has made himself. Only here, according to Vico, do truth and fact (*verum et factum*) coincide. Thus understanding happens to be the most perfect knowledge that is attainable for us human beings. According to the author, this understanding is the mode of knowing characteristic of human studies, viz. the human sciences

and the humanities. The true object of understanding and knowledge are the various orders of meanings that ultimately derive from our varied primary needs and culturally induced interests. Even the so-called physical scientific knowledge is no exception to this general position, for the sensory phenomena taken in themselves are not susceptible either to expression or to connected understanding in the medium of public symbols. These operations are possible only in respect of the meanings dictated by our various needs and interests.

In the first chapter entitled 'Contemporary Crisis in Human Sciences: Its Background and Character', the author rightly stands for maintaining a delicate balance between the extremes of dogmatic certainty in human thought on the one hand and sceptical doubt in human thought on the other. The author presents a brief survey of the views of Descartes, Laplace, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard, Spencer, Vico, Montesquieu and Rousseau, and proves that the concept of 'subjective meaning' and 'interpretive element' in social explanation demarcate the social sciences from their physical counterpart. The author is very correct when he says—'human behaviour is comprehended by or made intelligible to himself by observer, as a more or less *unique particular* [italics mine] rather than as instance of a general law.' All the same, man is a social animal. He or she is bound to interact socially with fellow human beings. Societies could be held together in a coherent unity only by common beliefs and sentiments.

The author very elegantly sums up when he says—while the European mind suffered progressive erosion of its religious beliefs from the seventeenth century onwards under the impact of the triumphant march of the sciences of astronomy, physics and biology, it's faith in science and scientific method continued unshaken and even kept flourishing, up to about the end of the 1870s. Now science can no longer be taken as the paradigm of knowledge. It is noteworthy that neither J.S. Mill, an important representative of positivist thought, nor Marx and Engels laid stress on the limitations of human knowledge. Both these currents of thought lent support to scientific naturalism. This world-view or philosophy which set itself in conscious opposition to the theological or religious outlook on life was embraced and propagated by such spokesmen of science and the scientific spirit as T.H. Huxley, John Tyndnall, Francis Galton, Frederic Harrison, G.B. Lewes, John Merley and others. The crisis posed by these thinkers consists in their conviction that scientific knowledge is the only kind of reliable knowledge and the method of science is the only method of achieving that knowledge. The author does not believe in scientific naturalism; however, he agrees with the current trend of thought in philosophical reflections on the sciences, human and natural which is anti-foundational in character. This anti-foundational bias is the distinctive feature of modern social philosophic thought represented by such

sociologists of knowledge as Karl Mannhein and the Wittgensteinians, hermeneuticists like Gadamer and structuralists and post-structuralists such as Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. We can also add the names of P.K. Feyerabend and Richard Rorty in the latter group.

In the second chapter entitled 'Pattern of Disagreement', the author outlines the phenomenon of disagreement. The phenomenon of disagreement belongs to the realm or realms of thought, and not to the realms of things. Disagreement may also pertain as much to the world of things as to that of concepts and ideas. It happens that diverse kinds of scientific inquiry and types of discourse adopt different sorts of methods for resolving their internal differences. The methods may comprise appeal to observations of observed phenomena or to facts encountered in experiments and to consistency with accepted beliefs, cognitive and practical. The author suggests that disagreements within a discipline could be dealt with more satisfactorily if the practitioners of the discipline concerned work in conjunction with philosophers. He very correctly suggests that philosophers must be called upon to do something more than occupy themselves with the methodology of one or the other science. They have to reflect over the disagreements among inquiries in different disciplines in a more generalized fashion, taking into consideration man's total cognitive concern on the one side and his solicitude for values including not only truth, but also beauty, goodness and holiness on the other side. Factual data, particularly in the human sciences, are not unaffected by the valuational prejudices of the investigating subjects. There is no *a priori* reason why the evaluative pronouncements of men and women should not be taken to be devoid of cognitive significance. Even in the field of the physical sciences, the selection of factual data is not wholly free from interference by the valuational attitudes and prejudices of the inquiries concerned.

The author does not subscribe to the creed of idealism, subjective, objective or absolute. Still, he feels inclined to favour Herbst and P.F. Strawson's opinion as far as the nature of facts is concerned. The same event, object or fact may bear different appearances and convey different meanings to investigators belonging to different ages and cultures. The author very effectively presents his case—how hermeneutics or the theory of interpretation had originally been the concern of protestant reformers seeking to understand the Bible and later on of the philologists, who were interested in knowing how the objective understanding of the texts and utterances of any kind might be achieved, how 'meanings' could be comprehended or what were the methods that would permit an objective reading of symbolic structures of any kind, including action, social practices, norms and values. The author should have elaborated his agreement with Dilthey in a more detailed manner when he says that various disciplines of knowledge should be grouped by subject matter and not so much by method because the

general belief on the subject is that sciences are united by method and divided by subject matter.

In the third and fourth chapters, the author proceeds to highlight the role of presuppositions, postulates and assumptions in the construction of philosophical arguments and systems with illustrations drawn mainly from ancient Indian and modern as also recent thought. The author talks about the two most important criteria for judging the validity of a system, viz. the adequacy of the proposed scheme of concepts or ideas as defined in a system and their coherence or consistency. It is noteworthy that Bradley also lays down these criteria for ascertaining or judging the degree of reality that is enjoyed by an appearance. Other criteria are the simplicity and elegance of the scheme in question, as also economy (*kalpana-laghava*) in the making of postulates or assumptions. By adequacy of a system of concepts, postulates or principles accepted by a philosophical scheme is meant its power to give an illuminating explanatory account of data regarded as important in an age or tradition. These data include the presuppositions of the age or tradition concerned. The wider the vision of a philosopher, the larger the variety and range of data to be explained by his system. For instance, the systems of Aristotle and Hegel cover much more extensive ground than, say, the philosophies of Descartes and Hume.

In the fifth chapter entitled 'Language, Logic and Reality', the author tries to understand the relationship that obtains between the symbols or symbolic structures constituting language on the one side and the world of objects or objective reals or realities on the other side. A proper understanding of this relationship is necessary for a critical appraisal of some of the famous paradoxical views and dialectical arguments. Here he discusses Russell, Naiyāyika and Karl Popper's views in great detail. He agrees with the views of Max Planck who once said that we have no right to assume that any physical laws exist. There cannot be any mathematical description of nature, since the logical mind seeks to comprehend reality *per se* without reference to any interest or purpose; therefore, it fails in its aim to describe that reality. The author introduces the word 'meaning' as a concept relevant for a particular interest or purpose motivating conceptual acts. Hence we can say, in tune with the author—what is real is nothing but the bearer of some meaning to us. From this standpoint biography, history and fiction, etc., are nothing but bearers or vehicles of *meanings* relevant in terms of the interests of the actors, viewed as individuals or representatives of groups involved in the events in question. I agree with the author when he writes—viewed in this light the entire panorama of the physical world would appear to be a network of the media serving as the bearers of vehicles of the meanings or values relevant to varied human interests. From this account of the relationship between language and reality there emerges a concept of man as a consciously creative being continually engaged in the

contemplation, production and enjoyment of values. The 'signifier' is more important than the 'signified'. Writing is more important than speech. This account has a good deal of agreement with one of the trends in linguistics which originated in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and a few other structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers like Claude Levi-strauss, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida.

In the penultimate chapter entitled 'Limits of Disagreement: Fact, Value and Theories', the author has declared in tune with Sartre that 'man is condemned to disagree with one another'. 'Let us agree to disagree' seems to be the ultimate limit on reasoning in humanistic disciplines. The tragi-comic side of the situation is that no person, however cautious and conscientious, sophisticated and demanding in his intellectual orientation and make-up, can help believing in the reality of his physical environment and the pressing actualities of his day-to-day existence in nature and society. This cannot be denied strictly speaking even by sceptics, cultural and historical relativists, hermeneuticists, sociologists, relativists and objectivists and highlights the 'constructed' character of the world of appearances. The author maintains that as against conjectural knowledge subject to repeated revisions available in physical science, the knowledge and understanding attained by the humanistic disciplines is truly cumulative.

According to the author the perception of facts involves interpretation. Interpretation involves employment of categories. These categories, in the last analysis, are derived from primary and universally sharable interest on the one side and interests induced by culture in its varied forms on the other side. He sees the community of needs and interests to be the cornerstone of shared perception and knowledge. This leads him to postulate gradations of objectivity in both factual and valuational knowledge. The author further examines the Habermas doctrine of 'communative action' and ideal speech situation and the latter's optimistic view of the efficacy of successful communication resulting in genuine understanding and agreement. He rightly agrees with Roderick against Habermas when the former builds up his case as follows—the fact that it makes sense to say, 'I understand you but I don't agree with you shows there is a difference between the two', I can understand what you say at the grammatical level, at the semantical level and at the pragmatic level without agreeing with you.

In the last chapter entitled 'Concluding Observations', the author tries to move his heartfelt postulates concerning his main thesis of creative humanism. He accepts the Kantian thesis of an active recipient or experience of sense-data as a postulate in a modified from. The organizing categories used by the experiential subject in his attempted articulation of his experiential material are in the last analysis derived from his needs and interests. Such interests may be primary and acquired

commonly among his or her fellow-beings. On the basis of similar needs, or like tastes and comparable temperaments, we make for cooperation and agreement on various levels; on the basis of conflicting needs and divergent tastes, we make for conflict and disagreement. Most of the differences and diaagreements among men are due to plurality of impulses. Similarly, the author talks of the other postulate of creative humanism which deals with creativity and freedom of man as correlated with the quest for values. Briefly speaking, creativity may be described as the capacity of man for purposive and meaningful variation in response to and in the manipulation of environmental factors and forces. This capacity also entails man's proclivity to have preferences partly intuitive and partly the result of his acculturation and education.

To my mind the author has made three important contributions to philosophy through his mature writings as presented in the present work. He has set forth:

(i)   The job of a philosopher both in thought and action;
(ii) the concept of pre-theoretic consciousness;
(iii) the doctrine of relativism and disagreement in ethics.

The author eulogizes the role of Plato's philosopher-king as spectator of all time and existence and real knower and practitioner of 'good' and 'justice'. Theoretically speaking, such ideals of 'ascetic ruler' or '*dharmik cakravarti*' as propounded in the ancient thought of both the West and the East are fascinating and attractive but practically very difficult to realize if not impossible. One who wishes to control others must first control oneself. In any case the thinker's first and foremost task is to tackle the problems and issues bothering his own age and society while not ignoring the historical dimensions of either the problems or the factual realities claiming his attention and consideration. In this regard the philosopher's burden or responsibility is obviously greater than that of the representative or spokesman of one or other single department of knowledge and inquiry. Therefore, a philosopher has to be a bridge-builder and he has to put a limit on disagreements among various disciplines of human studies. He has to present a sound, integral view or philosophy of life which should be able to guide a person to make wise decisions and viable choices in conformity with his potentialities, powers and proclivities, determining the strengths of his various needs and interests as also of the driving force of impulses towards their inte-grated satisfaction in a fulfilled life. A philosopher is the regulator of the 'collective wisdom' of the society, he must hold the pulse of the age.

Secondly, the author introduces a new concept of pre-theoretic consciousness relating both to facts and to values. It is not pre-linguistic. As far as pre-theoretic value consciousness is concerned, it expresses itself in the perceived or felt preferability of one object or situation to

another. This consciousness grows and develops with evolving culture. In other words, the author rightly believes in the ideal of moral progress. Any attempt to conceptualize reality without reference to interests gives rise to paradoxes like those of Zeno. The categories informing pretheoretic consciousness are better described as classes of meanings constituting objects of diverse interests ranging from satisfaction of organic needs to aesthetic experiences. The meanings interwoven with varieties of pre-theoretic consciousness are to be sharply differentiated from such theory-laden concepts as 'duty', 'obligation', 'alienation', 'exploitation', etc.

Lastly, as far as the author's treatment of the doctrine of 'relativism and disagreement in ethics' is concerned, he concentrates on the problem of justice and fairness, duty and obligation. He very correctly suggests that wrong-doers of all sorts may not and should not be treated alike. While judging the conduct and character of a person, we should, in fairness, take into consideration at least some of the circumstantial factors that have been instrumental in the growth and development of his mind and dispositional qualities. Each case should be judged on its own merit. The author seems to believe both in individual justice as well as social justice. He offers two important considerations to a sane and adult human being who is going to make a moral judgement over a particular voluntary action performed in a moral situation. The first consideration is the feedback from a psychologist, particularly one with psychiatric leanings, and the second consideration is the feedback from an environmentalist holding a Marxist or otherwise deterministic view of human affairs. The evaluator's preference is the key-factor while judging the action of a moral agent. Such judgements cannot be absolute because philosophy is usually, if not invariably, partly, if not wholly, tied to or conditioned by a system of beliefs, particularly the religio-metaphysical beliefs propagated by the society's leading thinkers.

The book is worth reading. Every sincere student of philosophy must have it. Last not the least, I would like to observe that the quality of printing of the book is excellent; however, the readers would have been happier had the proof-readers been more alert.

University of Allahabad   MANENDRA PRATAP SINGH

N.K. DEVARAJA, *The Limits of Disagreement: An Essay on Reasoning in Humanistic Disciplines* (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1993, pp. 221, Rs. 200.00)

In all inter-personal and inter-societal relations the journey from disagreement to agreement, from discord to concord, from dissent to assent is most arduous. It has always been so in human history and

perhaps will remain so as long as individuals and societies remain fundamentally self-centred islands. Undoubtedly, the most interesting human phenomenon has been that despite disagreements and being at times at loggerheads, persons and groups and communities have lived together, and there has been invariably some amount of tolerance and understanding among them from one towards the other. Only if one were an utter pessimist or a misanthrope would one believe that disagreement among human beings could some day become so perilous that it could transform them into vultures devouring one another, and eventually cause the extinction of the entire human race.

For a philosopher, disagreement (and its opposite, agreement) is an epistemological problem. Although the fringe of either of them cannot exactly be determined, the philosophical task would be to go to the roots of both of them and to find out whether disagreement or agreement, discord or concord, disharmony or harmony, is basic to human nature. It does appear that through the whole course of human history there has been some kind of inertia, a binding force, holding individuals and communities together. Had this not been there—the centripetal agency arresting the centrifugal one—the failure of agreement would have thrown societies into total chaos and probably brought about their end already.

In *The Limits of Disagreement: An Essay on Reasoning in Humanistic Disciplines*, N.K. Devaraja grapples with the unique problem of locating the primordial basis from which disagreement situations arise. His principal concern is to study disagreement rather than agreement. ' . . why so much bother and worry about the patent fact of disagreement? Why can't we, in a spirit of sober realism, accept it as a fact of life?', he asks. Disagreement is a part of all inter-personal relations, he concedes. However, he points out that what gives priority to the study of disagreement is that it is potent with dangers and that it is presumed that 'both individuals and societies have to live together, with some sort of understanding and adjustment with respect to other individuals and societies'.

Devaraja is not satisfied with just a scraping of the phenomenon of disagreement on the surface. After analysing with a lot of rigour 'clashes of ideas and ideologies, ideas and values' mankind is known for, he comes to what he calls the 'intuited preferability,' 'preferability of a particular perceived or visualized state of affairs over another' as the ground of disagreements. To supplement the concept of preferability, which operates largely at the cognitive level, he brings in the idea of 'pre-theoretic consciousness' and asserts that this consciousness 'is directed on *meanings* perceived as inhering in the new factual set-up or situation that keeps changing with the progress of man's technical knowledge on the one side and his changing self-image, hopes and expectations on the other side'. Devaraja is equally aware of the fact that 'the diversity of interests' and 'deep-rooted instincts or drives'

determine the direction of a person's life embracing the drift and tenor of his more conscious pursuits'.

Devaraja is not a determinist. On the contrary, he has immense faith in man's rationality, man's capacity for purposive and meaningful alterations of environmental, socio-cultural, moral and other factors. It would be wrong to say therefore that he would look upon disagreement situations—however strong may be their anchorage in individuals' preferences, interests, or even in their pre-theoretic awareness—as unsurmountable. For Devaraja, man's 'power of imagination,' his concern for 'non-utilitarian goods and values such as truth, justice, aesthetic enjoyment and excellence in artistic creation and understanding' could act as devices for generating a society free from encumbrances and rivalries. Since it is the individual who is the origin of the thought and expression of disagreement, Devaraja's hope is that 'the more informed and cultivated a person, the more likely he is to make acceptable judgements'. It is this sort of person that is celebrated in the Indian tradition. Such a person, Devaraja says, is 'a man of detachment, a *rishi* or a saintly personage, who could be expected to be impartial as between incompatible and discordant interests of individuals, groups or classes involved in a conflict situation.'

In the global scenario of ideas today—whether they are political, economic, religious, philosophical—the zones of concord are persistently threatened by the feelings and voices of discord. Then there are the spokesmen of the new generation posed against the old generation, feminists against non-feminists, fundamentalists against secularists, authoritarians against democrats and liberals, positivists against existentialists, Vedantins against materialists. The thought and value system of each of them displays a logic visibly irreconcilable with the logic of the other. There are notorious quarrels, many a time violent, among subscribers to opposite beliefs, faiths, ideologies, or paradigms, so to say. It appears that the postulates of every single style of thinking and living bear an ontological commitment, a kind of singular conglomeration of basic elements (biological, chemical, psychological, cultural, etc.), and beyond a certain point no accord between these postulates and the ones behind the other style can be attained.

To Devaraja, however, the fact of disagreement among humans must not be taken to an extreme stage. He does admit that 'each person's life, consisting of varied perceptions, relevant beliefs and aspirations constitutes a world of its own, a world within the world'. Yet, he says, individuals, communities and nations reach different degrees of mutual understanding 'for limited purposes in the fields of political and commercial interaction'.

But Devaraja must not forget that what he lauds as the human capacity 'to understand each other's position' has not, despite the amazing scientific and technological feats we have achieved, led us

close to a harmonious community, a state guided by the spirit of co-existence and cooperation, a world free from insecurity and terror. Socrates' trust that 'knowledge' born out of deep insight into what is ultimately good for man would necessarily produce 'virtue', Habermas' theory concerning communities' and nations' potential shareability of interests and values, and the Vedantin's somewhat utopian confidence in a human being's capacity to develop into a selfless, compassionate and immaculately benevolent saint (*rishi*), are belied by, more than any other time, the twentieth century.

Modern studies of 'Will' and 'Power', or, as Nietzsche put it, 'Will to Power', have shown that human consciousness is not so transparent as rationalists take it to be. There are extremely sadistic tendencies in the individual (these could be attributed to the collections of individuals as well) which endanger all declarations of agreement and keep them unstable. Had Devaraja tried to arch the concepts of 'preferability', 'interests', 'needs' and 'values' on the one hand and the concepts of 'power' and 'authority' on the other, he would have supplied a new dimension to his analysis of disagreement. As Sartre succinctly remarks, human subjectivity is freedom and we do not know under which circumstances an individual might experience his freedom. The exercise of his freedom makes the individual, whatever the sphere of his operation, a centre of power before which every 'Other' is secondary, an 'object', an instrument. Agreements could thus be matters of convenience, superficial arrangements under which would lie hidden individual centres of power, self-promoters, self-glorifiers.

All this that is said must not cloud the merit of Devaraja's long essay in which the anatomy of disagreement is analysed threadbare. There are short jaunts here into disagreement situations in the natural sciences and social sciences, the works of Dilthey, Max Weber, Habermas and Gadamer. The concluding note of the book is idealistic and optimistic where Devaraja unhesitatingly suggests that although disagreement is an unavoidable fact of human life, the areas of agreement could be so enlarged that a peaceful and harmonious society could be built. The reading of the book is a must to scholars in philosophy and the social sciences.

Bombay   RAMAKANT SINARI

R.K. GUPTA, *Towards Purity of Morals*, Pragati Publications, Delhi, 1981 and 1993, 155 pages.

The book is a collection of seven articles by R.K. Gupta, discussed earlier in the Philosophical Society of St Stephen's College, Delhi and published in various academic journals between 1971 and 1991.

Of special interest in the broad spectrum of ethical themes in this volume are Kant's categorical imperative (ought) as the criterion of actions enjoined upon by duties and Moore's notion of the good or goodness as the fundamental philosophical category which ought to determine ethical and all other worthwhile human activities. Apart from Kant and Moore, Hume, Hegel, Spencer, Ayer, Hare and Toulmin are referred to by the author in his detailed discussion on moral issues. Then there is in this collection a wide variety of interesting and thought-provoking ethical questions and the author's own approaches to their solutions.

This volume is a significant addition to numerous writings on the philosophical theories of morality and will certainly provide a valuable survey of ongoing dialogues and debates on moral problems.

Finally, the article-wise notes and index of proper names and topics are useful and discriminating, and will considerably facilitate the work of the reader to construct connections among topics, persons and works.

KAUSHAL KISHORE SHARMA

PUSHRAJ, *Sanātan Dharma aur Mahatma Gandhi*, Sri Vināyak Prakashan, Delhi, 1994, 260 pages, Rs 200.

I take pleasure in recommending this book (in Hindi) to all those who are interested in Gandhi's concern with religion. It is doubtless an interesting work, and instructive too at places. Both these qualities, however, arise (in the main) from quotations from Gandhiji's own writings in which the book abounds, and not from any hermeneutic acumen of the author. But he surely deserves credit for selecting the extracts judiciously.

The author has also been able to prove his basic thesis that though Gandhi is never slow to acknowledge his indebtedness to western scholars in some respects, the mainspring of his attitude to life and religion is the hoary Indian cultural tradition (p. 248), *Sanātan Dharma*, which may fairly be taken to mean the wisdom embodied in the Vedas, Upaniṣads, Gītā, Mahābhārata, Yoga Sūtras, and Rāmāyaṇa, and which (according to Gandhi), covers the basic disciplines of the Jaina, Buddhist, Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva, Śākta, Sikh, Arya Samāj and Brahma Samāj religious traditions (p. 63); and that Gandhi is not the innovator of any new religion, but only a discriminating and level-headed rejuvenator of India's traditional values. Pushraj must also be complimented for providing, as an appendix, a very impressive list of books read by Gandhi in Yervada prison. We are also told that Gandhi had not only read all the available commentaries on the Gītā, but had written variously on the import and teachings of this compact repository of our ethico-religious wisdom (pp. 136–38).

All this information should open the eyes of those who believe that the Father of the Nation was only a man of action.

But I may also add that the list of book consulted with which the work under review ends (pp. 259–60) is not duly comprehensive. Such important works have been left out as Pyarelal's *The Last Phase*, Ācārya Kripalāni's *Gandhi: His Life and Thought*, Louis Fisher's *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi*, and D.G. Iendulkãr's *Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi* in eight volumes. I feel constrained to point out this defect even though I am mindful that a study of Gandhiji's *Collected Works*, brought out by the Publications Division of the Government of India, must itself have made pretty heavy demands on the author's time and energy.

What, however, I cannot help complaining about, unreservedly, is that this (on the whole) commendable work is sullied with some defects that could have been easily avoided with one or two careful revisions. Here are two of the more offensive errors: *Thoreau's* 'Unto This Last' (p. 11), and Westward *Home* (p. 257). 'Unto This Last' (1862) is one of *Ruskin's* better known works, and Thoreau's essay which influenced Gandhi is *Civil Disobedience* (1849). *Westward Ho* (not *Home*) is one of Charles Kingsley's historical romances (1855). Again, the word शक्य on p. 13 should be, अशक्य; and, अशक्य on pp. 39 and 147, शक्य. Further, the following sentence on p. 121: 'ईश्वर भजन का अर्थ . . . स्वीकृति' has been repeated verbatim on p. 128. On p. 121, a sentence which is likely to disturb the reader as a specimen of anaemic writing runs thus:

गांधी जी के अनुसार विद्धता हमें जीवन की भूल-भुलैया में अनेक स्थानों से निकालकर ले जाती है और संकट और प्रलोभन की घड़ी में वह हमें कोई सहारा नही दे पाती।

Here, the author would have done well to put तो before निकालकर and पर or परन्तु before संकट in place of और. Fuzzy writing is unfortunately recurrent in the book; and at quite a few places the author merely states (his own interpretation of) Gandhi's views without making any attempt to explain them properly. Thus, see the following:

कर्म देह है. . . कर्म का अर्थ हिंसा भी है (p. 157)
उतावली हिंसा है, द्वेष हिंसा है. . . (p. 181)
गुणा भी आकार है।

Here, the following correctives or explanations are clearly required: देह is not the same thing as कर्म. Some *karma* may well be inseparable from bodily existence, but inseparableness is not identity; and therefore it is wrong to say: कर्म देह है. Again, *himsā* is not the *artha* or meaning of *karma*; but perhaps in the simplest of *karma*, such as sneezing, some *himsā* is involved, say, in passing the infection to others. Similarly, उतावली and द्वेष are *not the same as* हिंसा; but, in so far as both these attitudes facilitate the incidence of anger, which is the mainspring of *himsā*—and because one who wishes to avoid *himsā in practice*, and is not content with merely distinguishing the verbal meaning of 'impatience' and 'jealousy' from

that of *himsā*—the former two (उतावली and द्वेष) are to be taken *as quite as rejectable*, though, I repeat, not the same as *himsā*. Finally, *guna* may be said to be *ākāra* in the sense that they both imply determinateness or some limitation.

But the *commendable* features of the book clearly outnumber the objectionable ones, and I now turn happily to strike some laudatory notes. I like the work because it provides the following information about, or the author's own comments on, Gandhiji's life and thinking.

How exactly the attribute *Sanātan Dharmi* may be applied to Gandhi (p. 79); the true marks of a *Sanātani Hindu* (p. 87); Gandhi's emphasis on and interpretation of the *first mantra* of the *Iśopaniṣad* (pp. 91–94); his reasonable, even elevating interpretation of the various *ślokas* that made the content of his regular prayers (pp. 114–16)—especially of the Saraswati *vandanā*, '*ya kundendu tushār*. . . ', with which our Kathaks freely open their dance recitals without realizing that, as Gandhi explains, the entire invocation emphasizes purity as an integral constituent of learning or wisdom; again, his sensible and balanced interpretation and defence of Hindu gods and goddesses, and of idol-worship (pp. 116–18); the proper use and real benefits of holding on to the *Rāmanāma* (pp. 122–24); and a fair formulation of the qualifications of a truly eligible interpreter of the *śāstras*. The author's own attempt to trace the influence of the Gītā on Buddhist and Jaina scriptures (p. 131) also makes sense. Further, I value the work because it provides a fairly comprehensive list of commentaries on the Gītā (p. 133); an equally good inventory of Rāmāyaṇas in different languages (p. 230); and Gandhi's own interpretation of *Rāmarājya* as *divya rājya* rather than as Hindu *rājya* (p. 234).

Above all, the author does well to highlight Gandhi's emphasis that the western ways of living are ruinous and quite unsuitable for India (p. 239). By and large, this is a very relevant warning to those who seem to vie with one another in aping the West today, say, by promoting consumerism and unbridled freedom in matters of sex.

I must also, in the end, acknowledge that the book is quite neatly produced and reasonably priced. It deserves a place in every library, and the author, our gratitude.

Delhi   S.K. SAXENA

G. SRINIVASAN, *Insights into Inward Consciousness*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1994, xv+120, Rs 125.

Professor G. Srinivasan's *Insights into Inward Consciousness* is an important addition to the publication programme of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (ICPR), New Delhi. The primary objective of

the treatise, as suggested from the very title itself, is to analyse the structure of consciousness from 'within'. This method of viewing consciousness from 'within', or the 'inward' approach, turns back on itself and comports itself towards its own understanding. It may be said that this method of reflecting on consciousness from 'within' is neither new nor uncommon, for all those thinkers who wanted to emphasize the separate existence of consciousness from body, have already suggested this method. Nonetheless, perusal of this method, even in this present technological age, is neither unnecessary nor insignificant; rather, such an approach is especially significant in the period when we notice the growing popularity of such trends as cognitive psychology, which seek to explain conscious behaviours from a thoroughly different perspective.

In *Insights into Inward Consciousness* Professor Srinivasan offers a comprehensive and scholarly account of the nature and function of consciousness. Though his primary interest is to view consciousness from 'within', yet he has paid much attention to the relationship of consciousness and objects, to consciousness and body. Besides, the author also discusses here the inalienable connection of consciousness with temporality, freedom and value. Such experiences of death and dread have not been ignored too.

This 'inward approach' to consciousness undoubtedly has close affinity with the phenomenological method and the author admits, in the Preface, to have 'assimilated' the views of different contemporary thinkers like Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty among others, within the 'inward approach'. The author is not only impressed by the intentional nature of consciousness but he also seeks to develop the various implications of such intentionality. Like phenomenology, this 'inward approach' has some metaphysical orientation as Professor Srinivasan holds that the 'encounter with being in the poise of pure consciousness' is the result of the gradual inwardization of consciousness.

In his exposition of the nature of consciousness, Professor Srinivasan has often referred to the views offered by the Indian thinkers and that has opened a new dimension for the treatise. It is often necessary and relevant to remember the contribution of the Indian thinkers and the readers would be grateful to the author for such parallel accounts of some perennial problems from eastern and western perspectives. For example, in his discussion of the pure consciousness as 'transcendence in immanence', the author avoids the extreme views of Buddhism on the one hand and that of Vedānta on the other, and prefers to follow a middle course instead.

In spite of admitting such commendable contributions of the author, it may be pointed out that the references to Indian counterparts is not always exhaustive or adequate. In some cases the author has brought in such discussions from the Indian perspective while in other cases (for

example, in his discussion on freedom, death and dread) such references would have been more interesting and thought-provoking.

As mentioned earlier, this book seeks to appropriate and assimilate the views of some continental thinkers in a scholarly yet lucid. way. Those who are conversant with continental philosophy would hardly have any difficulty in recognizing these views and they may think such discussion a bit repetitive, yet those who are not so familiar with continental ideas would find these discussions illuminating and interesting.

In conclusion, I would like to mention that the author deserves our gratitude for bringing to light some intricacies regarding the nature of consciousness and directing our attention to this very significant approach of viewing consciousness from 'within'. Professor Balasubramaniam's Foreword is an important addition to this volume.

Jadavpur University   KRISHNA ROY

E. RUDOLPH and I.O. STAMATESCU (editors), *Philosophy, Mathematics and Modern Physics: A Dialogue*, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, 1994, 242 pages.

What does modern physics, using its language of mathematics, say about the world (either including or excluding the subject)? How are the traditional questions of philosophy in epistemology, metaphysics, ontology, questions of space, time, world-view, consciousness, etc. affected by the advances in theoretical physics and astronomy? These questions engage laymen and experts alike. While admiring the practical achievements and precise predictions of science, on deeper thought one fails to get at the bottom of the basic questions. Most of the difficulties arise when dealing with the unobservable micro-world or with the universe as a whole in space and time (cosmology). Physics as an empirical science stops short of answering the last questions. It is metaphysics or philosophy of science that takes over where physics ends, with a large area of overlap. This area of overlap is the subject matter of the book under review.

The book is a collection of seventeen scholarly papers representing a dialogue between philosophy and modern physics as seen by the individual authors. The papers are the result of a three-year project in Heidelberg which was inspired by the well-known scientist–philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weisszäcker. The interdisciplinary communication between philosophers, mathematicians and physicists are given a new impetus by the thoughtful and wide-ranging contributions to this book.

The two introductory papers by the editors entitled. 'On the Dialogue between Physics and Philosophy', and 'Questions Concerning Theory and Experience and the Role of Mathematics in Physical Science', set the tone of the book. They describe the 'Philosophy and Physics

Workshops' organized by the Protestant Institute for Interdisciplinary Research (FEST), Heidelberg. Contributions to them comprise the main part of the book under review. Some of the themes covered in these workshops (and in this book) are: foundational problems in modern physics, the question of reality in quantum mechanics, and objectivity and natural law. A number of theories, understood as generally valid theoretical schemes, may be added to the above list, according to Stamatescu and Rudolph: mechanics, electrodynamics, statistical mechanics, quantum mechanics, thermodynamics.

What is nature? Are we concerned with the nature of things, or only with our knowledge of it? What are the roles of models and theories in physics? Does the universe have a finite age and extension? Was time itself created together with the universe? Is there a reality behind the quantum state (wave function)? How is the concept of an object defined in philosophy (Kant, Leibniz, Hume, Cassirer) and in quantum mechanics? These are some of the questions which the participants in the Heidelberg project had to deal with.

The articles in the present volume are grouped into two parts. The first part, *Space and Time, Cosmology and Quantum Theory*, opens with the question of the very possibility of founding our notions of space and time on conscious events. (R. Penrose: 'Is consciousness consistent with space-time descriptions?') There follows (F. Luçrat) a discussion of the problems encountered in relating the intuitive and the abstract, physical concepts of space and time. The third article (I.O. Stamatescu: 'On Renormalization in Quantum Field Theory and the Structure of Space-Time') discusses the change in the physical concept of space-time continuum, from a description basis toward a dynamical element of the theory, a tendency for unification of space-time and dynamics. There follows (E. Squires) an argument arising from the well-known discussion about the reality problem in quantum mechanics toward an absolute consciousness. The conceptual necessity of putting the problem of quantum gravity in connection both with quantum theory and with the theory of space and time is discussed in the next article (C. Kiefer). An illustration of the application of Leibnizian optimization arguments, here understood as maximization of complexity, is described in the following article (J.B. Barbour). The standard model of cosmology is subjected to a critical examination in the next contribution (H. Arp) and the possibility of alternative pictures is presented. The last article of this part discusses the general problems of an 'extrapolation science' such as cosmology and the basis of the standard cosmological model (H.F. Goenner).

The second part, *Philosophical Concepts and the Mathematics of Physics*, opens with an article dealing directly with the problem of reference, in the frame of an argument about concept formation and the role of aprioricity (F. Müllhölzer). The next article (E. Scheibe) introduces a

fundamental question concerning the epistemological role of mathematics in physical science: the problem of grasping the knowledge-building function of the mathematical structures in theoretical physics. The third article (K. Fredenhagen) contains a presentation of the mathematical setting of our fundamental theories and its role in providing new connections and points of view. The next article (G. Münster) introduces and discusses the mathematical aspects of modern physical theories, their epistemological implications and their significance in the process of frontier research. One of these aspects is taken over for a general consideration in the following article (E. Scheibe). The next contribution (G. Prauss) is an analysis in the frame of the Kantian conception of geometry. The volume closes with a discussion about the possibility of founding the concept of function (as it had been developed in philosophy, especially by Ernst Cassirer) in the Leibnizian thinking (E. Rudolph).

The above sketch gives an idea of the breadth of subjects covered and also shows that the book is meant for a serious student of physics and philosophy rather than for a reader who does not venture beyond popular science. However, a general reader, in our opinion, will also gain from portions of the book dealing with topics with which he or she has had a previous contact. Here the reader can expect to find an authentic, scholarly and up-to-date treatment of many problems which appeal to an interested layman. Even if all the articles are not equally interesting or intelligible to all readers, an overwhelming majority of them, in our opinion, will benefit from this slim volume and gain insights into some of the most important problems of philosophy of modern physics.

In conclusion, I might add a few personal comments. Although admiring German philosophy for its depth, thoroughness and exactitude, I find it a daunting enterprise to read German texts in the original because of their heavy style and, of course, because of my insufficient command of the language. It was, therefore, an excellent opportunity for me to read in English on the views of Kant, Leibniz, Husserl, Heidegger, Cassirer from the pens of German scholars. Similarly, the no-nonsense *Wissenschaftstheorie* (philosophy of science) is also admirably presented in English by able German writers who are at the same time familiar with current work in the Anglo-Saxon world. I did not notice any serious deterioration in style due to translation, in some of the papers, from German into English. Thus, personally, I derived from the book the benefit of savouring deep German philosophy in a comprehensible (to me) style. For the readership at large, I repeat, the book will be an excellent read even if parts of it remain, as in my case, unclear at the first reading.

Vienna   SAURABH SANATANI

JOHANNES BRONKHORST, *The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India,* Motilal Banarsidass, 1993, 150 pages, Rs. 150.

This work is an example of philological and hermeneutic scholarship at its best. The author presents his theory as one possible theory, and from the outset is open-minded about constructive criticism. He also recognizes the limitations of hermeneutics and, therefore, the scope of this particular book. However, within the extent of its scope, the author has made a meticulous and systematic study of the early Buddhist texts.

The aim of the work is to explore the nature of Buddhist meditation, and to discover the 'authentic' aspects of these practices, uninfluenced by other traditions of meditation. The method employed is both simple and unique. The non-essential or in-authentic aspects of Buddhist meditation are discovered by identifying those elements which are '(i) rejected at some places in the Buddhist texts, (ii) accepted at others, and (iii) known to fit at least some non-Buddhist religious movements of the time.' (p. ix). Such elements are taken to be foreign intrusions into the Buddhist tradition. When the non-Buddhist elements present in the early Buddhist texts are thus eliminated, the nature of authentic Buddhist meditation is revealed. The author argues further that these essentially Buddhist elements were not present prior to the historical Buddha, but were discovered and introduced by him, and later these elements influenced the other 'mainstream' traditions of meditation.

The author distinguishes between the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist traditions of meditation. All the non-Buddhist traditions—specifically mentioned are the Jaina and the Hindu traditions—are grouped together as the 'mainstream' traditions. These two, that is, the mainstream and the Buddhist, are the 'two traditions of meditation in ancient India' mentioned in the title of the book.

Five elements are identified by the author as foreign intrusions into the Buddhist texts:

(1) the practice of meditation without breath;
(2) the practice of reduced intake of food;
(3) the importance of the non-performance of new actions (this is specifically associated with the practice of holding the body motionless);
(4) the practice of asceticism to bring about the annihilation of former actions (this is done supposedly through the suffering endured by holding the body motionless, etc.);
(5) the practice, or ability, of cultivating the senses such that their normal functioning is halted.

In addition, the author claims that the 'mainstream' concept of liberation implied liberation after death. And it was only in the cases where a special 'liberating insight' was achieved that liberation during

the lifetime could occur. This concept influenced the Buddhist tradition which originally believed in liberation during the lifetime, as exemplified by the case of Buddha himself.

An example of reverse influence, that is, the influence of Buddhist meditational traditions on the mainstream traditions is the concept of bliss. According to the author, the meditational practices of the mainstream traditions were painful and typically involving suffering, while the Buddhist meditation was characterized by an accompanying bliss. The presence of bliss, in later non-Buddhist meditation, is claimed to be due to the influence of the Buddhist tradition.

The author has conducted painstaking labour, using both linguistic and historical records to place the texts and establish his theory. It is difficult to construct a method which would be substantially superior to the one used here for discovering the original form of meditation in the Buddhist tradition. However, the author appears to have greater scholarship in the Buddhist traditions than in the non-Buddhist traditions. The organization of meditational practices into two distinct traditions is a case in point. Some differences between various meditational practices do, of course, exist. Nevertheless, the very nature of meditation itself should result in many similarities between different traditions. In any case, if Buddhist meditation is considered to be different from other forms of meditation, it is hard to see why the Jaina and the Hindu meditation practices are also not viewed as distinct from each other.

These conclusions reached by the author are plausible if one starts with the presupposition that various forms of meditation are radically different and that the meaning of the practice is ascertained by looking into the linguistic corpus of the presentation alone. But this is only a presupposition, and not necessarily the truth. It is also possible that the changes in the Buddhist meditational tradition arose, not due to outside influence, but out of the inner dynamism and growth of the practice itself.

However, these comments are more a reflection on the kinds of methods employed to study the texts. The method used by the author has, as he himself admits, limitations. It concentrates on the form of the text more than on the content. Therefore, it has a limited value. This method is also typical of the way in which many western scholars tend to study the eastern texts. Unable perhaps to penetrate the deeper significance of the cryptic statements, they pay more attention to the superficial meanings and the syntax of the texts.

This author has, however, made an open-minded beginning in the right direction. He also promises to work on the subject from a different approach in order to go beyond philological limitations. If the rigorous and scientific scholarship of this work could be combined with a more sensitive understanding of the texts, much more would be achieved.

One hopes that such an effort from this author will soon be forthcoming.

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