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Applying Ethics: Modes, Motives, and Levels of Commitment*

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ETHICS AND THE WORLD

'Ethics does not treat', says Wittgenstein, 'of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic.'[1] He seems to suggest that ethics must be a condition of the world in the same sense in which logic must be. Logic must be a condition of the world, as I take him to mean, in the sense that it determines what the world may or may not contain: the world can contain only that which is logically possible and cannot contain anything which is not. This does not mean that it contains, or must contain, all that is logically possible. It means that any x it contains, or may contain, must be logically possible. X's logically possibility is a necessary condition of its being contained in the world.

But no sense can be given to the corresponding terms 'ethically possible' and 'ethically impossible'. Ethical principles do not determine the possibility or impossibility of anything they are relevant to; rather, they determine its desirability or undesirability. Of course, they are not relevant to anything and everything, but only to certain types of things, like individuals, their groups, their actions, motives, intentions, attitudes, plans and policies, projects and projections, etc. Let us then speak of ethically desirable and undesirable things, that is, things which are in accordance with, or violative of, ethical principles, and not of ethically possible and impossible things. But even then we cannot say that ethics must be a condition of the world in the sense that the world must have only ethically desirable things because it cannot have any ethically undesirable thing. To say that would be flying in the face of facts because the world does contain at least a few ethical evils, that is, ethically undesirable things. However, we definitely can say that the world should

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contain ethically desirable things. It is (almost) a logical truth that a desirable world, a world living in which would be worthwhile, must contain ethically desirable things. Negatively speaking, if a world does not contain any ethically desirable thing, or contains lesser number of ethically desirable than ethically undesirable things, it would not be a desirable world, or would at the most be only a marginally desirable world.

To make ethical desirability a condition of the desirability of a world does not imply that a world's being ethically desirable would make it on the whole desirable. For example, a miserable world in which poverty abounds, whose inmates lead by and large a moral life though eating only half a meal a day, would not be a desirable world even if it is an ethically desirable world. On the other hand, even if it is desirable in other, say, political, economic, etc., but not in ethical, respects, it would not be a desirable world. Ethical goodness is foundational to all other kinds of goodnesses in the sense that its presence in any one of them heightens the latter's natural or distinctive value, and its absence in the latter, or the latter's having been polluted with some ethical evil, does the contrary. It can also be asserted with a good amount of reasonable force that no non-ethical goodness can sustain itself, or its dignity, unless it is accompanied, or fortified, with some kind of ethical goodness. A necessary component of our ethical concern is a concern, or care, for the welfare of others. In a world, whose inhabitants completely lack this concern, any non-ethical goodness, like economic, political, etc., can have, if it can have at all, only an anaemic existence. No wonder that life in it would become 'nasty, short, and brutish.'

The things which a world may contain can be classified into the following types: things which it ought to have, things which it ought not to have, things which it may or may not have, and things whose absence in it would not make it ethically poorer but whose presence in it would add some lustre to its ethical value. Slightly stretching the use of a terminology meant to be applicable to human actions, when considered from the ethical (or even some non-ethical evaluative) point of view, we can call the above four types of things obligatory, forbidden, permissible, and recommended. In an ideal ethical world the number of the forbiddens would be nil, but all the other three types it can very well accommodate. In any actual world, all the four types of things exist. The normal way to improve its ethical quality is to minimize the number of forbiddens and increase that of the obligatory and the recommended. The permissibles are ethically indifferent, and therefore their status, that is, any plan or policy about encouraging or discouraging the existence of some one or ones of them, is determined, in any society by some other, non-ethical, consideration or considerations. For example, which direction a house should face is generally determined by considerations which may be climatic, spatial, situational, economic, etc. and seldom by some ethical consideration.

Anyway, a desirable world should have as few of the forbiddens as possible and definitely fewer than any one of the three others. This is only to assert that in a desirable world undesirables should be less than desirable, or even morally indifferent, ones. The obvious implication here is that it is empirically possible for an actual world to have all of the four types of things. This implication is true because it is a matter of fact that our world contains all of them. Here the analogy with logic breaks. No possible (therefore, actual) world can have what logic forbids or disallows, that is, what is logically impossible, and no world can miss or avoid to have what is logically obligatory for it to have, that is, what is logically necessary. Corresponding to the ethically permissible, we have the logically possible which may or may not be empirically possible. Nothing in logic corresponds to the ethically recommended. Logic allows, disallows, or requires, but does not do any of these things in a more or less manner. Therefore, there is no place in logic for anything which may be called the logically recommended, that is, something more logically possible than the merely logically possible and less logically required than the logically necessary. The concepts of logical possibility, impossibility and necessity do not admit of degrees. In the ethical context, on the contrary, we have the concept of being recommended which applies to a thing of which we cannot say that the desirable world ought to have, but only that it would be a good thing if it has it. Its importance becomes clearer if we contrast it with the permissible, the ethically neutral. It does not matter to the desirability of a world whether or not it has it, but it does matter to it if it has what it is recommended to have. Having it carries more credit than having the permissible, less credit than having the obligatory, and not having it carries no discredit, and definitely less discredit than not having the obligatory.

From granting to ethics the status of being a necessary condition of the desirable world, that is, of being necessary to its very structure or constitution, two very important lessons follow: One about the relation of ethical theory to the desirable world, which I would call the built-in applicability of the former to the latter, and the other about the relation of the ethically desirable to other kinds of desirables, which I would call the primacy of the ethical.

An ethical theory primarily aims at telling us what is ethically desirable and thereby what is ethically forbidden, permissible, or recommendable. If it tells us what is ethically desirable, or what makes a thing ethically desirable, by implication it tells us what is, or what makes a thing, ethically undesirable or forbidden, and obviously we can then determine what is permissible or recommendable. If something is neither ethically desirable nor undesirable, neither obligatory nor forbidden, it is permissible. The ethically desirable is basic or necessary to the very being of a desirable world. Therefore, the connection of ethical theory

with the desirable world must be very close. It must be true of the latter, of course, not in the sense of being accurately descriptive of it, because it 'does not treat of the world'. It should be true of the latter in the normative sense; it should tell us what is involved in being ethically desirable, or, what makes a thing ethically desirable and distinguishes it from the undesirable, the permissible, and the recommended.

A thing could be desirable from the ethical as well as from many other points of view, for example, economic, political, prudential, religious, strategic, etc. Since ethical desirability is the condition of a desirable world, it occupies the place of primacy in the sense that any world, to be desirable in any way whatsoever, must first be ethically desirable. That is, to be desirable economically, politically, etc., it must first be ethically desirable. This would perhaps look more persuasive if it is said negatively or contrapositively: If something is not ethically desirable, it is not desirable economically, politically, etc. The vice versa of it is obviously not true because no other kind of desirability, economic, political, etc. can be said to be a condition of ethical desirability.

Ethical reasons for considering something undesirable (or desirable) would thus override, or supersede in merit, other reasons for considering it desirable (or undesirable). Similarly, if ethical and non-ethical reasons point in the same direction, that is, both tend to show that something is desirable (or undesirable), the former would very greatly increase the normative force of the latter.

APPLICABILITY OF AN ETHICAL THEORY

Without prejudging anything about the nature or possibility of non-human ethics, like animal ethics, environmental ethics, etc., I shall limit myself in this essay to human ethics. The term 'ethical theory', therefore, would mean an ethical theory concerning the human things relevant to ethicising, that is, relevant to constructing an ethical theory. This is also, by and large, its traditional sense.

There is another clarification about the term's use that I need to make. A large number of philosophers have used it restrictively to stand only for a normative ethical theory and distinguish the latter from what they call a metaethical theory. I myself have done that in more than one writing of mine. But here I am using it in a liberal sense to include both normative ethical and metaethical theories. I am doing this because in claiming that an ethical theory has built into it its applicability I am claiming that that is true of both of them.

Some professional philosophers as well as non-philosophers complain: (i) that present-day ethical theorizing has become very technical and sophisticated and (ii) therefore cut off from the practical affairs of life, meaning thereby that it has become inapplicable to real life situations.

The first part of the complaint is true but there is no reason at all to

grieve over it. Becoming technical and sophisticated is a sign of advancement and growth. Even a folk song to be sung well has to be sung in a technical and sophisticated manner. De-sophisticating even a practice, and not only a theory, tends to make it inelegant. The attempts made by some Indian politicians of the post-Nehru period and more enthusiastically by some recent ones to de-sophisticate Indian political practice, in the name of bringing it nearer to the grassroots, have made a large part of it inelegant, uncouth, and crude. A sensitive and neutral observer may as well say that they have made it much more backward, or uncivilized, than what it was in the Gandhian period of pre-Independence, and even in the early years of post-Independence Nehru period.

The second part of the complaint is invalid because the technical sophistication of a theory does not make it inapplicable if it is not otherwise inapplicable. A general understanding of the broad aspects of an ethical theory is enough for applying it in normal situations. Only in a tricky situation one needs to take into account its technical, sophisticated, precizified, version. And, there may occur a problem in the case of which even an acknowledged possessor of ethical knowledge may fail to see how the relevant theory or theories are to be applied to yield a satisfactory solution. This would not necessarily imply that the theory or theories concerned are inapplicable. Rather, it may simply imply that the problem is unusually complicated and human intelligence finite on account of which the application of ethical knowledge has become so difficult. When Draupadī asks Bhīṣma to tell her whether Dharma allows Yudhiṣṭhira, even after his having lost his freedom and therefore his agency, to have the moral right to put her, who is not a thing but his wife, on the stakes, his saying that, because the meaning of Dharma is extremely subtle and deep, he does not know how to answer her question, very well illustrates this truth. It would, of course, mean assuming that the reason which Bhīṣma gives for not answering her question is his real reason.[2]

Comprehending properly the applicability of a sophisticated theory is itself a sophisticated job, and actually applying it to a concrete, difficult, or unusual, situation still more sophisticated. There need be no wonder, therefore, if the people, who complain against the alleged inapplicability of recent ethical theorizing, are generally those who have not cared to read seriously even a single technical work in the area.

But we are not always in a Bhīṣma-like situation. In the majority of cases we know how to apply the available ethical knowledge, or which part of it to apply. We do apply it and solve our ethical problems, which may sometimes require immediate action, and sometimes only taking a decision to act in a certain manner at some appropriate time in the immediate, or not too immediate, future. Solving an ethical problem either way involves applying an ethical principle, or a point of view, to

the situation concerned. More often than not the application takes place in a smooth, effortless, manner. Sometimes it is so smooth that we feel no pressure at all on our moral nerves. Had it not been the case, life would have become, if not impossible, definitely much more difficult than what we in fact find it to be.

A tenable theory of any sort has to be applicable to the field it is a theory about. A psychological theory of human learning, for example, has to be applicable to our learning behaviour in the sense that it should be able to explain how we learn and also in the other sense that it should be usable in making us better learners.These are two different types of traits or features which its applicability has. This sort of complexity, or one similar to it, is present in the applicability of any theory, though it may not be obvious in the case of a natural scientific, or a mathematical, theory. The physical theory, that heat expands and cold contracts a metallic body, not only enriches our understanding of the behaviour of the metallic bodies concerned but also enables us to expand or contract any one of them if we need to. Similar is the case with a mathematical theory. The geometrical theorem, that the straight-line drawn from the vertex to the base of an isosceles triangle, bisecting the base, also bisects the triangle, not only explains how an isosceles triangle can be divided into two equal parts, but also enables a father to equally divide among his two quarrrelling sons his isosceles triangular drawing room.

An ethical theory (of the normative variety) also has some sort of a built-in applicability, and that it has to have it is *not an ethical but a logical* requirement. It is a requirement for its being an ethical theory. An ethical theory is one about what is worth doing, achieving, or cultivating; that is, about what sorts of actions we should do, what sorts of experiences or things we should try to have, and what sorts of character traits we should have or cultivate. It tells us in a systematic, conceptually organized, way what could be a moral duty, a value, or a virtue, which, in fact, amounts to telling us what sort of life would be a good life from the moral point of view, a life we should live.

An ethical theory can be applied in more than one way, or on more than one level. I shall mention here only three such ways or levels: judgemental, decisional and persuasional. Take, for example, the consequentialist theory that an action is right if the majority of its consequences are more likely to be useful than harmful to personal and social well-being. We apply it in the judgemental way when we judge an action of an individual, or of a group, say, a political party or a university's syndicate, right or wrong on the basis of its actual or probable consequences. We call booth-capturing by a candidate or his party-men wrong on this ground. A theory is applied in the decisional way when an individual uses it to decide what he should do in a concrete situation. This he does when he is not sure which way he should go, and then

seeks to take help from the ethical theory or theories he is acquainted with, or has already accepted.

The use or application of a theory, as I have said, is not always made in a conscious, effortful, manner. One does that only when the alternative he should choose is not obvious, or when he finds more than one course of action claiming execution. Almost every normal individual possesses some ethical knowledge, partly inherited from his cultural heritage and partly acquired through his own reflection on certain situations he had been directly or indirectly involved in. This ethical knowledge stands by him in most of the cases in which he has to take a moral decision. Only occasionally does he need to make an effort to apply an ethical theory (or principle), or to explore which ethical theory can be relevantly applied, to the then situation. He may then even have to decide with how much rigour or stringency the relevant theory is to be applied in order to have a fit between the situation and the theory, without either sacrificing the spirit of the latter or ignoring the distinctive demands made by the former.

It does not mean, however, that one would always abide by the theory or principle he considers relevant to his decision-making. A decision to act, or one which is acted upon, can be taken on more than one ground, and not only on a moral ground. The application of an ethical theory would give him only a *moral* ground for doing, or forbear doing, something, which may or may not be sufficient to motivate him to do, or avoid doing, the action concerned. Some other motive or motives may overshadow the moral consideration. But this does not mean that the theory concerned has not been applied or is inapplicable. The fact of the matter is that it has been applied but not acted upon in spite of its having clearly shown what the agent should have done. After considering whether or not he should get a certain booth captured, a candidate may find it morally impermissible on account of its likely consequences, but he may still go ahead with his plan of capturing it if his moral will or determination is weak, or is overpowered by his strong desire to win the election by hook or by crook. This example does not show in any way that the consequentialist theory is inapplicable in decision-making. It is applicable because it is conceptually possible to have a good idea or assessment of the overall utilitarian value of a large number of the likely consequences of booth-capturing, of the good or bad effects of the move on social well-being, as well as on the future of the candidate and his party.

A theory is used in the persuasional way when it is used by an individual, who is himself convinced of its viability, to convince another individual (or a group of individuals) to accept it and make his (its) behaviour conform to it wherever it is relevant. Here again it is not necessary that he succeeds in convincing his subject, or his subject acts accordingly even though he has become convinced of the merits of the

theory. Jai Prakash Narayan was himself convinced of the theory that the electorate which elects a certain individual to represent it on a public body, a legislature or a panchayat, has the moral right to call him back, to de-elect him, even before his term has expired, if it finds that he has conspicuously failed in promoting the legitimate interests of the electorate which was his moral duty. He became a hyperactive moralist, in a laudatory sense, because, instead of limiting his moral conviction only to himself, he started a moral movement to convince the then Indian society of the moral necessity of de-electing some elected representatives: his was a moral move to change the then political and legal or constitutional ethos of Indian electoral practices or conventions. It is a pity that he failed and his movement failed. It is a greater pity that a moral (re-armament) movement was misconstrued as a political movement for destabilizing the social order and, therefore, was politically opposed and crushed, using all types of political and pseudo-legal might. Almost all of Gandhi's political movements had a moral component and largely on account of that he got domestic, as well as international, support. But because of the changed political and moral set-up of the country Jai Prakash could not have this advantage though his movement was as moral, or even more moral, than any of Gandhi's.

A normative ethical theory has to be, at least in principle, applicable in all the above three ways and only then it could be called one. Almost all of the available ethical theories satisfy this requirement, may be with more or less ease. It would be in the fitness of things to reject a proposed ethical theory by exhibiting that it is in principle inapplicable in any of the above three ways. One may say, for example, of the divine theory of ethics, that it is inapplicable and therefore not an ethical theory, or not a sound one. The theory says that an action is right if God approves of it. But there is no way to know in a definitive, conclusive, way whether or not God approves of a certain action, or what are the features which an action must have in order to be approved of by him. Therefore, we cannot apply this theory in judging whether or not what someone has done is right, or in deciding whether or not we should do something.

The three ways of being applicable are not completely independent of, or unrelated to, each other. The judgemental and decisional uses are almost identical, or very much the same. To judge that something should be done, as per the ethical theory one accepts, is to have a very good, or the best, reason for deciding to do it, or for doing it, if the judger is also the agent groping for the right decision. Similarly, and rather more obviously, to decide what to do, or not to do, in the light of the theory, is to judge that the theory approves, or disapproves, of doing it. The third one is also not unrelated to them. To try to persuade someone to x on the ground that x-ing is the moral thing he should do would be pointless, both logically and ethically,if the persuader

himself does not judge it to be the moral thing, and is not prepared to do it though it is also his moral duty as much as it is of the person or persons he is trying to persuade. Such a move would signify the persuader's ethical hypocrisy as well as metaethical insensitivity to the logic of the ethical concepts involved in the game. Being aware of all this, though, I have mentioned them as *three* ways only to make the modes of an ethical theory's applicability clearer.

To apply a theory, or a principle, to a given situation is, in effect, to apply a concept, and every theory has a concept, or a set of concepts, which may be called its root concept or concepts. For example, the root of concept of consequentialism is the concept of utility, or well-being, in terms of which it explicates other concepts. When, on consequentialist grounds, one judges that x-ing is right, or decides to x as the right thing to do, he applies the consequentialist notion of rightness to x-ing. This for him is the correct notion of rightness because he has accepted consequentialism. Similarly, to try to persuade someone to x on a moral ground is also to apply some moral concept to x-ing. It is obvious then that a theory can be applied if and only if it tells us clearly what are the conditions which x-ing should satisfy in order that a moral concept, say, that of rightness, can be applied to it, and its failing to do that would make the latter inapplicable to it.

Bhīṣma expresses his inability to answer Draupadī's question, already referred to, on the ground of Dharma's meaning being too subtle, and is not prepared even to openly condemn Duḥśāsana's attempt to de-robe her. This inability of his can be interpreted to mean that the then theory of Dharma does not, according to him, clearly specify the conditions whose satisfaction by an action would make it congruent with Dharma (धर्मानुकूल) and whose non-satisfaction by it would make it incongruent (धर्मविरुद्ध). On the other hand, for Vidura and Draupadī it does and therefore makes amply clear that an action like Duḥśāsana's to de-robe a woman like Draupadī is against Dharma. What all this means is that a theory would be inapplicable if it does not clearly state the conditions or criteria for applying its basic concept or concepts. And, even if it does, it would remain inapplicable for him who does not know what these conditions or criteria are, or believes that they do not exist, or questions their validity.

A theory would also become inapplicable if, though the criterion given by it is clear and precise, it is not possible to decide whether or not x-ing satisfies it. This seems to be the case with the divine command theory of, say, rightness. According to it one ought to x if and only if God has asked or commanded him to x. The notion of God's command is quite clear, or at least tolerably clear, but it seems impossible to know whether or not God has commanded one to x, whether or not x-ing satisfies the criterion laid down by the theory. When confronted with this difficulty, theological ethicists, by and large, appeal to some scripture

or scriptures which, they claim, have been revealed by God. The sum and substance of what they claim is that God has revealed his prescriptions and prohibitions in some scripture (or scriptures), for example, in the Vedas according to some Indian theologians. Apart from the problems of deciphering what exactly is the purport of a scriptural injunction, of two injunctions incongruous with each other, or of an injunction seemingly immoral, to say that one should always consult some scripture to ascertain what he should do when he has to make a decision concerning a matter to which scriptural consultation is relevant, has a derogatory implication for God himself, namely, that God stopped thinking after revealing his commands in the scripture(s). By demonstrating the failure of the scriptures in giving any help to experts in deciding a trivial-looking matter, namely, what sort of rites (*saṃskāras*) should be performed to dispose of the dead body of a brāhmin who, in his lifetime, led an un-brāhmaṇical life, Ananthamurthi's *Saṃskāra* very convincingly shows that God still needs to think.

There is also another factor which makes an ethical theory inapplicable, unattractive, or forbidding. An ethical theory may be formulated, and generally it is, by a highly gifted individual, a versatile thinker, a savant, or a man of extraordinarily noble and elevated character. But it is meant for normal people who have normal abilities to do moral things but are also liable to commit some immoralities. Therefore, if a moral theory keeps moral norms so high that they become unreachable for the common man, prescribes principles he cannot emulate, or recommends actions he cannot perform, it is bound to be dissuasive. The common man may not dare to try to follow it, or apply it, to solve his moral problems. Moral norms, principles, criteria of rightness, etc., do not have to be so easy and soft that no effort is ever needed to live up to them. But living up to them must be possible not only in the logical but also in the empirical sense. That is, the human nature being what it is and the human world being what it is, it must be possible for a normal human being to desire living a good moral life and to actually live it, may be with more or less of his own trying, or procuring direct or indirect assistance from education, social surrounding, cultural heritage, etc.

In brief, what an ethical theory presents as the desirable in the ethical sense, as the desireworthy, must also be desire-able, that is, capable of being desired in the psychological sense. If what it offers as desireworthy cannot be desired by the common man, it cannot function as a goal or norm of action for him. If it can be desired only by a set of extraordinarily gifted individuals, it can be used only by them in leading a good moral life. It would not then do what an ethical theory should. Ethical guidance, which it aims at giving, is needed more by ordinary than by extraordinary people. The latter may lead a good moral life

even without any guidance from a theory; they may not need to be told what they ought or ought not to do. A medicine which could be available to those who need it very rarely, and unavailable, or only rarely available, to those who need it most often, would not be worth manufacturing. It was the realization of this fact which inspired Buddha to present an ethical code he called *madhya mārga* (middle path). He realized that there was no point in laying out a road on which only the extremely sturdy could walk.

The human world and human nature are extremely complex and non-static. They keep raising, and therefore have to face, newer and newer ethical problems. These problems can be looked at in more than one way, and that is why different moral philosophers, looking at them from different points of view, have offered a number of theories and principles. But the theories and principles are not so different, or incongruous, as to make it impossible to decide which one to apply in which situation. Sometimes it may be difficult to make a choice of the relevant principle but the demands of life almost always show the way if one has the will. On the theoretical level it may not be possible to say with full confidence which theory is the best, or which principle the most comprehensive. But in practical life the situation is not so bad. The situation one is in quite often forces, which is also a way to help, him to select a principle of action. He may sometime later consider it to have been a wrong move, but that can happen with any move whatsoever. Still, this remains true that whichever a principle he selects and considers to be a moral principle, it will have for him an authority which no non-moral principle of action can have.

PRIMACY OF THE ETHICAL

That an ethical consideration has the primacy, or an overriding authority, is clear from the fact that no non-moral consideration can take away, or curtail, for example, the moral rightness of an action, if the latter is otherwise morally right. On the other hand, a contrary moral consideration can cancel, or very greatly reduce, the non-moral rightness of an action, that is, a rightness grounded in some non-moral consideration.

Rather, the moral rightness of an action can be a very good ground, or some would say, the best ground, for attributing to it some other kind of rightness, say, political rightness. But the vice versa is not, or need not be, true. All this is obvious from the common-sense fact that we consider it quite in order to call, for example, an action politically right, or prudentially right, because of its being morally right, but not the vice versa. This is true even of actions considered to be right on some religious consideration. It may be said that no action can, or should, be said to be right, even from the religious point of view, if it is

morally wrong. In fact, one of the methods quite frequently adopted by religious reformers to purify or improve the functioning of a religion is to suggest dropping or modifying those of its prescriptions or proscriptions which they consider morally wrong, unjustified, or insignificant. Religion, like politics, is also a social institution and therefore cannot be exempted from the requirements of morality. It cannot make a morally wrong action right because it is in accordance with one of its prescriptions and a morally right action wrong because it goes against the latter.

But despite its overridingness, a moral principle is itself sometimes superseded, or rather over-powered, and in more than one way. This should not make one raise his eyebrows because to say that it is overriding is only to say that it has the authority, or moral right, to supersede a non-moral principle, and not that it has the power to do that. I shall discuss below some of the ways in which, or occasions on which, such a thing may happen.

(a) Let us take the principle of truth-telling. One may be in a situation in which telling the required, or relevant, truth is very likely to get an innocent man killed. He may then not tell the truth and save the innocent man's life and justify his action on the ground that the principle of avoiding harm to an innocent man (*ahiṃsā*) is a higher-order moral principle than that of truth-telling (*satya*). Here the principle of truth-telling is superseded, overridden, by that of saving an innocent man's life. The latter is also a moral principle, rather one taken to be of a higher order, and therefore, this would not be a case of overriding a moral principle by a non-moral one.

Or, he may modify the principle of truth-telling, as the classical Indian tradition did, by incorporating in it the clause that malevolent truth ought not to be told. Even this modification or expansion would not offend the overriding character of the principle of truth-telling because it has been done in the moral direction, or on a moral ground. The reasoning behind the expansion very well could be that if a malevolent truth, because it is as much true as is a benevolent or neutral one, is made as tellable as the latter, the ethical practice, in which the principle of truth-telling operates, would tend to cause social ill-will or ill-being.

It is some such thinking which must have prompted the classical Indian thinkers to phrase the principle of truth-telling in the form 'The truth be told, the pleasant truth be told, but not the unpleasant truth, nor even the pleasant untruth.'[3]

This process of expanding a principle, making it more specific, declaring something (for example, a malevolent truth) to be an exception, a case to which it does not apply, is not unusual in the practice of applying it to a concrete situation. It is not that *any* exception to, or modification of, a principle would be as good as any other. For

example, when one tells an untruth to save an innocent man's life, he would not be considered guilty of violating the spirit of the principle of truth-telling, because saving an innocent man's life would be considered a good moral ground for telling the untruth. On the other hand, in such a situation, if he tells the truth and thereby helps the killer in killing the innocent man, we would say some such things as 'He followed the principle blindly', 'he is (in a bad sense) a moral fanatic', etc. What actually happens when we make a genuine exception is that we do not make an exception to the *morality* of the principle but to the *scope* of its application. This we do on the ground that granting to it unlimited scope may sometimes sanction a move which is obviously immoral. But when an exception to a principle is made on a non-moral ground, for example, prudential, political, religious, etc., it would hurt the morality of the principle. It is obviously valid to say of an action that it is desirable from the prudential, political, or religious, point of view, but it ought not to be done because it is undesirable from the moral point of view. But we cannot say the reverse of it.

It is in no way intended to suggest here that it is always so easy to solve, as the above example may suggest, the problem of choice when two different moral principles are relevant or applicable to a case. Sometimes the two principles may be so incompatible with each other that one finds it extremely difficult, or almost impossible, to modify any one in the light of the other, or even to decide which one to choose and which one to reject. But this is not the place to discuss the problems, practical or logical, which such dilemmas pose. I have mentioned the above example only to illustrate the case in which a relevant moral principle may give place to another, or be modified in the light of the latter, without letting the morality of the resulting action watered down.

(b) There is another type of case in which there is no doubt in the agent's mind about the relevance or applicability of a moral principle, but still he does not put it into practice because of the weakness of his (moral) will. He knows very well what he ought to do, but does not do it, or does something else which he knows he ought not to. He may do the immorality in a huff, or because he is so overpowered by the desire to do it that he is not able to pay adequate attention to the immorality of what he is doing. To put it metaphorically, he is not able to smell the stink the immorality of the act emits. Or, he may not be in a huff, or overpowered by a contrary desire, and may even try to think out whether or not he should do the immorality. He does the immorality because the motivating power of the desire to do it is stronger than that of his moral will. It is this kind of immorality which Yudhiṣṭhira commits by telling the celebrated untruth about Aśvathāmā's having been killed. He knows that he ought not to tell it, still he tells it, of course, on Kṛṣṇa's persuasion. But he tells it because he wants to win the battle. His wanting to win exercises a greater motivational pull than his moral will

to tell the truth, though his will to tell the truth does not become extinct as is evinced by the feeling of compunction, the prick of conscience, he experiences in performing the immoral feat.

Kṛṣṇa's argument can be put as follows:

(1) You, Yudhiṣṭhira, want to win the battle.
(2) You can win the battle only if Droṇa withdraws from the battle-field.
(3) Droṇa will withdraw only if he believes that his son, Aśvathāmā, has been killed.
(4) Droṇa will believe that only if you, Yudhiṣṭhira, announce that Aśvathāmā has been killed.
(5) ∴ You, Yudhiṣṭhira, ought to announce that Aśvathāmā has been killed.

Yudhiṣṭhira's moral will to tell the truth and only the truth is not strong enough to enable him to resist the argument, and to reply to Kṛṣṇa by saying that he would prefer loosing the battle to winning it by telling an untruth. Rather, it buckles down and he tells the untruth, though to console his conscience he adds in a subdued voice that the killed is the elephant, and not the man, named 'Aśvathāmā'. His subdued utterance of the added clause can be said to be an act of self-deception or bad faith.

An important feature of an immorality done by a morally weak-willed person is that the latter knows, or at least believes, that he has done something wrong. He may even repent a little later, or even in the very process of doing the wrong thing. And, when some suffering, or punishment, is inflicted on him on account of it, instead of grudging the infliction, he may feel relieved, or having atoned, because he would think that he deserved it. All this is true not only of a Yudhiṣṭhira but of a good number of ordinary mortals as well.

An immorality done by a weak-willed, akratic, agent is no doubt an immorality, and examples of it, involving minor as well as major lapses, can be very easily located in every society. But they need not make us feel pessimistic.The agent's awareness or acknowledgement that he has failed to act according to his own moral principle, his feeling of self-repentence, may be used, along with some other devices, to strengthen his moral will and thereby to minimize immoralities attributable to weak will. A very common way to motivate a man to stop committing an immorality he is prone to, adopted by moral reformers, even parents when dealing with a wayward child, is to generate in him a feeling of shame for it, or to intensify the feeling if it is already there though in a feeble form. I have my views about some of the ways in which the moral will may be strengthened but discussing them would take me beyond the scope of this essay.

(c) There is a third kind of infringement of a moral principle which

the agent commits neither in a huff, nor in a state of mind in which his moral will has lost completely, or almost completely, its power to determine the nature of his actions. Of an immorality committed in such a state of mind we may sometimes say that it was beyond him to have done something else. But this is not true of the kind of infringement I have in mind because the agent commits it with full self-control, with a will fully operative. He may even commit the infringement in accordance with a well thought-out plan. Take, for example, the case of a candidate in an election who gets the booths favourable to his opponent captured, or looted, and does never repent for what he has done; rather, he repents when he fails to get the booths either captured or looted. A friend once reported to me that a person, known to both of us, was very sorry when his muscle men could not capture his contestant's favourable booths because, on account of having taken too heavy a doze of *tawdi*, they overslept in the night in which the operation was to be carried out, whereas his contestant's muscle men succeeded in capturing his favourable booths because they had taken only a moderate doze of the liquor and therefore did not oversleep.

This kind of immorality can be described more accurately as an expression of a strong immoral will than as one of a weak moral will. Its agent does not feel in any way ashamed of having done it, and may even feel proud of the prowess in doing it. And, it does not matter whether he does the immorality to promote his, or his group's, or party's, interest.

An immorality of this type is not the result of the agent's failing to apply, or misapplying, a moral principle, nor of his inability to apply one because of his being confronted with a moral conflict or dilemma. It is the result of his having bad, perverted, moral principles. The principles which well-meaning citizens of his society cherish he does not cherish, and the ones he cherishes are considered by the former uncherishable, or unmaintainable. A perverted moral principle can be shown to be perverted by an argument and one may thereby hope to give a good reason to the holder of the former to stop acting in accordance with it and committing the immorality resulting thereform. But this can be done only if there is at least some point of moral agreement between him and the latter. Moral argumentation works successfully only when both the sides have a common stock of principles, however small the latter's number may be. Therefore, if the booth-capturer's principles are entirely different from mine, if he is morally thick-skinned, or completely insensitive to my principles, I cannot convince him of the immorality of booth-capturing by using any one of my principles as a premise howsoever sound a moral principle it may be. It is to handle such cases that we have the machinery of the legal enforcement of morals. If a moral principle is converted into a juridical law, then it can be enforced on an offender of it, no matter whether or

not he accepts it as a law. But if legal machinery itself becomes indolent, or corrupt, the situation becomes extremely frustrating for morally or legally sensitive citizens. It is not impossible then that they resort to the use of violence to stop immoralities. The latter may beget further violence. The result may then be complete social and moral chaos. That chaos leads to construction, or re-construction, may be a soothing belief, but the risk involved is too great to justify frequent use of violence. Once in a while it may yield some good results, and, therefore, individuals as well as societies do sometimes use it. But it cannot be adopted as a dependable, or safe, method of checking violations of moral principles either in private, or in public, life.

ETHICS AND METAETHICS

The view that a moral consideration has built into it an overriding authority over any non-moral consideration can be held as a metaethical and also as an ethical position. One may assert it on the basis of a logical analysis of a moral judgement, or of some specific moral concepts, such as those of moral obligation, moral rightness, moral reason for doing something, being morally commendable or preferable, etc. But equally cogently he can offer it as a substantive ethical thesis. For example, he may say that the human nature and the human world being what they are, human well-being, or a desirable and meaningful existence for all, or at least for the majority of, human beings can be ensured only if moral considerations are considered as having the authority to override all other considerations. The thesis of overridingness simply means, as already explained, that if any time there is a conflict between a moral and a non-moral consideration, the former has the authority to override, or supersede, the latter. Suppose a person is morally undesirable because of his proneness to take bribe from industrialists, but is politically useful because of his shrewdness in silencing some members of the opposition in the legislature who are extremely hostile to his party. Then, obviously, there is a strong moral reason against, but also a strong political reason in favour of, giving him a ministerial berth. What could be the response of one, who holds the thesis of overridingness, to this situation is obvious.

Call the overriding thesis ethical or metaethical, as it pleases you. Whichever way you go, you cannot deny its practical importance. There is something in the very logic of the word 'moral' that to have a moral reason for doing something is to have a conclusive, sufficient, reason for doing it, and this is not the case with other types of reasons. After admitting that there is a moral reason for x-ing one cannot ask for another reason for doing it, though even after admitting that there is some other kind of reason, say, prudential, political, or religious, for it, he very well can. With a moral reason against x-ing and a non-moral

reason for x-ing, if one chooses to x, he may be accused by the metaethicist of logical stupidity, meaning thereby that he is logically too dull to understand what is involved in the concept of moral reason, or too irrational to forbear doing that against doing which there exists a conclusive reason. The ethicist may, on the other hand, accuse him of moral stupidity which would mean that he is morally too insensitive to feel the pull of a moral reason, or too wicked to avoid doing what is morally wrong. Both of the accusations are serious, no matter whether or not they sting the stupid.

To accept the overriding thesis as a guiding principle of one's life is to become committed to lead a moral life. And, if it becomes an operative principle in the life of a society, it would not only ensure social harmony and prosperity, but will work as an Occam's razor to cut off some socially irksome, or apparently insoluble, problems. For example, the best way to soften the rough edges of religious fundamentalism, which erode social cohesiveness and peace, is to convince the fundamentalist that some of his doctrines go against moral common sense: Since it is morally right to treat men and women as equal, it is wrong to debar women from studying the Vedas, even if the Vedas say so; since all women, irrespective of their religious affiliation, are equal, it is morally wrong to debar some from some of their rights because they belong to this or that religion. Similarly, one can tell the political fundamentalist: Since it is morally wrong to prefer a less meritorious person to a more meritorious one, it is wrong to do that even if the two belong to two different castes or religions; when there is a moral reason to treat A and B alike, they ought to be treated alike even if there is a political reason to treat them differently. The Indian politician is not solving the classes of problems these cases exemplify because he is not willing to attach due weightage to moral considerations; rather, he prefers to act more on political than on moral considerations, and, whether he admits it or not, the political for him is amoral.

It is clear from the above discussion that even a metaethical view can have some practical applications. It is true that some early metaethicists were very forthright in claiming that a metaethical position has no normative implication. I myself once did that, but in a qualified manner. The early metaethicists were vocal on this issue because they were, of course falsely, accused by some unwary critics of having propounded metaethical views having some pernicious implications for moral life. What I have so far claimed in the present essay is that some metaethical views can also be used to yield some practical lessons. This is true even of some very technical ones. For example, when a metaethicist says that no set of factual assertions can entail a moral judgement, even though factual assertions are relevant to its acceptance or rejection, the obvious lesson is: Do not expect to give (or get) a rock-bottom argument for a moral judgement from a set consisting only of factual assertions. In the

same way, from the view that when a person judges that something is morally right it only means that he likes it, one can draw the lesson: Be prepared, if you hold this view, to admit that the same move may be both morally right and morally wrong (because you may like and I may dislike it).

It is a well-known fact of the history of ethics that the latter lesson has been used by the objectivist as a *reductio ad absurdum* argument against subjectivism and as a clear signal to the common man of the danger involved in accepting and using subjectivism as a guide in making his choices.

The above are, one may say, though connected with practice, mainly logical applications of some metaethical views. It may be true, but it cannot be an objection to what I have been trying to show. Moreover, I have not yet told the whole story. A metaethical view can also be used in a more earthly, substantive, manner to help one out of an agonizing situation.

Suppose B unncessarily keeps rebuking and humiliating his neighbour A. A then decides to become completely indifferent to B, thinking there is no way to have any friendly relation with him. But on the New Year's Day he picks up courage, goes to his house and wishes him a happy new year. Instead of being softened, B again rebukes him. Now, instead of reacting to him, A starts blaming himself for having wished him, knowing fully well the kind of person he is. He blames himself for having shown weakness of the will by acting against his own best judgement that it is impossible to befriend B, against his own determination to be completely indifferent to him, etc., etc. He thus suffers intensely from a feeling of self-repentence, a feeling of guilt for having himself been responsible for his own humiliation.

At this point he recollects the metaethical distinction between obligatory and recommended or supererogatory actions, and realizes that what he has done is a supererogatory action for which he deserves moral merit, or admiration. He argues with himself as follows: 'I have gone out of the way to wish a happy new year to a man who hates me, I have responded to hatred by love and thereby have shown greatness. Therefore, if I have shown weakness of the will, I have shown it in having done something good and great which should make me feel elevated and happy, and not guilty and repentent.' He thus backs himself up and becomes his normal self, and he does all this by making use of a metaethical distinction.

We make the distinction between metaethical and normative ethical ideas to enable us to comprehend better the phenomenology of moral life, its conceptual and contentual aspects. In actual moral practice we keep using ideas from both the stocks as and when we need them. Therefore, it should not at all be a matter of surprise that metaethical ideas or analyses are also sometimes used for practical purposes. It is

true, however, that when philosophers speak of applying an ethical theory, they generally have in mind a normative ethical theory. That is why 'applied ethics' has become (almost) synonymous with 'applied normative ethics'. Mainly to correct this imbalance I have given in the preceding few pages examples of applying some metaethical ideas.

APPLICATION AND MOTIVATION

Applying an ethical, or a metaethical, theory is a voluntary action. Like any voluntary action it can be done with any sort of motive, ethical or unethical. To illustrate what I mean let me turn to the example of the two neighbours, A and B, already given.

Suppose A asks C if he should go to B's house to wish him a happy new year. C, who knows the background very well, may do either one of the following:

(a) Himself believing in the ethical principle 'Love thy neighbour as thyself' and intending that A and B should also follow it, he may advise A to go to B and wish him a happy new year, his motivation being to get started the process of establishing the relation of good neighbourliness between the two. His motivation would then be ethical and, therefore, his application of the ethical principle, in his advice to A, would also be an ethical application of it.

(b) Suppose A returns rebuked and starts blaming himself for having gone to B and blaming C for having advised him to do so. C then may tell A that he has done nothing wrong. On the contrary, he has done something noble by returning love for hatred, by doing something supererogatory, something highly recommended, something he was not obligated to do. Therefore, neither is he blameable for having wished him a happy new year, nor is C himself for giving him the advice. C would now be using the metaethical notion of a supererogatory, or ethically recommendable, action, with an ethical motivation.

(c) But C could have advised A, with an unethical motive, to do what he did, for example, with the motive of getting him humiliated by B and thereby arousing in him intense hatred, which was so far nonexistent, for B, hoping that then each one would try to physically assault the other. And, C could have told A to go to B on the New Year's Day in the name of the same principle 'Love thy neighbour as thyself'. He may not himself then be believing in the principle. One *does not have to* believe in an ethical principle to apply it, and particularly when he makes an unethical use of it, as C would in this case be doing. But, it seems to me, one *may* even believe in a principle and still may apply it unethically. The way Vālmīki depicts Kaikeyī's pressurizing Daśaratha to keep his blanket promise of fulfilling two of her wishes, whatever they may be, gives a good ground to the reader to assume that she herself believes in the principle of promise-keeping. She uses this principle, a venerated

one of classical Indian ethics and of Raghukula (Daśaratha's ancestors), with blatantly unethical motives of getting her son, who was not the rightful claimant to the throne, enthroned and getting her step son, who was, exiled. Some of the Purāṇas depict Yudhiṣṭhira—and this can be supported by reading in between the lines of the *Mahābhārata's* account—as having used the ethical principle 'A mother's instruction ought to be obeyed by her children' unethically in getting Draupadī wedded to all the five brothers including himself. And, obviously, Yudhiṣṭhira believes in the ethical principle of children's respecting their mother's instructions.

(d) C may as well use the metaethical notion of the supererogatory to dissuade A from going to B with the unethical motive of keeping alive the existing hostility between A and B. He may tell A that his wishing B a happy new year would certainly be a good gesture. But it would be a supererogatory action, an action he is not obligated, or morally required,to do to a man so hostile to him. He would not, therefore, be doing anything wrong in not wishing him. And, why to do something morally not required, but only recommended, to a person like B?

All this is true of applying any theory whatsoever. One need not therefore think that applying ethics, or applied ethics, is congenitally infected with a dangerous virus when he is told of the possibility, particularly, of a (normative) ethical theory's being used, or applied, with an unethical motive, that is, unethically. To do anything, theoretical or practical, in an ethically upright manner one has to have an ethically upright motive, a good moral will to do what he thinks to be morally right. It may seem to a stickler of the orthodoxy of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy a plain and simple verbal truth. But it is not. One does not first apply ethical principles ethically and then becomes ethical. But he first has, develops, or cultivates, the ethical attitude, what I have called a concern for the welfare of others, which is another name, may be a non- or anti-Kantian name, for the moral goodwill, or simply, the ethical will. What are the conditions congenial to, or necessary for, having, or acquiring, it is an important topic, quite tricky and complex, like other important ones. It is a topic in the discussion of which the entire corpus of ethical studies, normative, metaethical, applied, and empirical, have to cooperate with and be assisted by one another.

APPLICATION AND LEVELS OF COMMITMENT

Our comprehension of the act of applying an ethical principle, whether with an ethical or unethical motive, would definitely become richer if it is imbued with a proper understanding of at least some of the important levels on which one's commitment to the ethical principle or principles he applies, or is required to apply, to a certain case, could be operative. Whenever he sincerely holds an ethical principle, he has a sense of

commitment to uphold the dignity of the principle in whichever way he thinks appropriate. This is not the occasion to dilate upon the nature of hyprocricy, though it is a very good topic for philosophical scrutiny. It would not, however, be amiss to say that it is his complete lack of commitment to the principle, or principles, he says he holds, which makes him a hypocrite. But a fair philosophical deal to him I may give at some other time.

Sense of commitment admits of levels or degrees. One who has no ethical principle at all, and therefore no sense of commitment to any, would be the hypothetical, completely amoral, person. I call him a hypothetical being because I do not think it is empirically possible for any human being to be completely amoral, that is, completely indifferent to all moral principles he is aware of. The hypocrite is not without any moral principle. His is the interesting case of a person whose real principles are different from those which he publicly declares to be his.

Assuming that every normal person has some ethical principle or principles and that to have one is to have a sense of commitment to it, I will discuss what seem to me the three important levels on which the latter may be operative. I shall call them (a) sub-committal, (b) committal and (c) hyper-committal.

(a) The sub-committal person has his principles and is committed to them like any other normal person. But in a certain case he has, for some reason or reasons, private or public, suspended, subdued, or made inoperative, his sense of commitment to the principle or principles which otherwise he, or any other applier, could relevantly have applied to it. His sub-committal attitude does not, however, make him morally neutral.

Moral neutrality is by and large an untenable notion. If to be morally neutral means to be neutral to both morality and immorality, that is, to take a neutral stand between two issues one of which is morally right and the other morally wrong, then it is not to be morally *neutral.* One cannot be neutral to immorality without himself becoming immoral. To be neutral, in the natural way, should mean to have no leaning towards either one of the two sides, to be unwilling to approve or disapprove of either one of them. But not to approve of the moral, as well as not to disapprove of the immoral, is to be immoral, and therefore to cease to be (morally) neutral. To be neutral between the moral and the immoral is like keeping one's mouth tight-lipped in a congregation one is attending and is supposed to participate in when a controversy is going on between two persons of whom one is pleading the cause of justice and the other opposing it tooth and nail. The tight-lipped neutral and the open-mouthed champion of injustice are, Manu rightly says, equally contemptible from the moral point of view.[5]

If on the other hand, the morally neutral is said to be one who, of two morally right issues, does not favour either one more, or less, than the

other, then he is not *morally* neutral. He is, in fact, one who approves of both the issues, and therefore is not really neutral, or indifferent, to either one of them. If we still want to call him neutral, we can do that in an attenuated sense, meaning thereby that he does not mind which one of the two issues is acted upon. For example, of the two proposals, one to found a free primary school for the children of the poor citizens of an area and the other to found a charitable hospital for the same people, one may say he is neutral to them, simply to indicate that he equally approves of both of them and not that he is equally indifferent to both them.

It is possible, on the other hand, to maintain some other sorts of neutrality, for example, religious neutrality or areligiosity. One may be neutral to all religions in the sense that he is neither in favour of, nor against, anyone's following, or not following, any one of them, and may himself not follow any one of them. This is so because it is possible to be completely non-religious or areligious, but not to be completely non-moral or amoral. I can very well say to a neighbour that I do not care whether he is a Hindu or a Christian, etc., or has no religion at all. But I cannot say that I do not care if he entices small children of his neighbourhood into smoking five cigarettes every morning. The latter is an immoral act and one cannot be indifferent or neutral towards one who does it.

The sub-committal individual may suspend his commitment to a moral principle for more than one reason. (i) For example, he may do that because he thinks its application to the present case conflicts with another principle to which also he feels committed. Gautama asks his son Cirakārī to kill his mother because he believes that she is guilty of having committed adultery with Indra. Cirakārī is committed to the principle 'To obey his father's commands is a son's sublime duty'. But he finds it difficult to implement it because its implementation would come into conflict with another principle, 'It is also a son's duty to protect his mother', to which also he is equally committed.[6] He suspends his commitment to the former and keeps thinking how to solve the dilemma. His dilemma is ultimately dissolved by his father who withdraws his order when he realizes that his wife is not really to blame because Indra, by appearing before her in the garb of Gautama himself, made her believe that he was her husband. She offered her body to him under the false impression that she was offering it to her husband.

(ii) One may also suspend his commitment to a principle, even though there is no conflict between it and another principle, if he is not sure of the case in hand being the right case for the principle to be applied to. Gautama would have suspended his commitment to the principle 'A woman ought to be beheaded if she commits adultery', had he been unsure of his wife's being a clear case of adulterous behaviour. As mentioned above, after realizing that it is not, he withdraws his order

to kill her, repents for having given it, pardons her, and thanks Chirakārī for having taken so much time, as was his wont, in thinking what to do.[7]

(iii) There is also a third way of being sub-committal. I shall call it the strategic way. To reply to a moral question, to suggest a solution to a moral problem, is to apply a moral principle. Its application in the proper way may yield a reply going against the self-interest of the replier, and its misapplication a reply going against his dignity as a morally respected person. When put in such a situation, if one suspends his commitment to the principle involved, or concerned, and becomes non-committal, saying that he cannot reply this way or that way, or that he does not know the reply, I will call him a strategic sub-committal person.

Bhīṣma's response to Draupadī may be described as strategic. He is a man committed to Dharma, to leading a Dhārmic life. Being well-versed in the Dharmaśāstras (sacred literature), he is expected to know what is, and what is not, in accordance with Dharma. That he knows all this and a lot more he himself owns and demonstrates when, lying down on his death-bed of arrows, he teaches to Yudhiṣṭhira, on his and Kṛṣṇa's request, all kinds of moralities, private, public, and political. Kṛṣṇa, who, as per the tradition, never errs, calls him the great knower (महाप्राज्ञ) and the great repository of Dharma (धर्ममयोनिधिः).[8] It is very unlikely that such a Bhīṣma really found the meaning of Dharma so subtle or deep that he could not use it to answer Draupadī's question. Therefore, it would not be unfair or incorrect to interpret his expression of inability to give the reply, which is the same thing as the suspension of his commitment to Dharma, as strategic. This needs some elaboration which I will give right now.

To say that the meaning of Dharma is too subtle that it is sometimes not clear whether or not something is in accordance with it is to make a metaethical claim. In modern terminology it means that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of Dharma are not definitively and exhaustively stateable. Therefore, there may be occasions when we cannot categorically say whether or not something is Dhārmic. But Draupadī's case is not an ordinary, humdrum, or trivial, one: A woman has been put on the stakes as if she were a chattel, and lost, by a husband who has already lost his free agency, and that woman is being derobed in public. If the existing concept of Dharma is not usable or applicable to this case, if it does not give to an expert applier of it like Bhīṣma, a good moral ground to condemn the act of derobing, it is an unviable, incompetent, concept. What is needed, therefore, is to make it usable by properly analyzing and precizifying it. It is such occasions which necessitate the analysis and precizification of concepts. Bhīṣma should have proceeded to do that because he is not only a scholar but also a repository of Dharma. But he does not do any such thing: He simply uses the metaethical claim about its extraordinary

subtlety as a reason for not replying to Draupadī's question whether or not, as per Dharma, she has been lost by Yudhiṣṭhira to the Kauravas.

One may say that he uses the metaethical claim as a device, or strategy, to circumvent his responsibility to reply. It is not implausible to call it his strategy because both the affirmative and the negative answers to the question are likely to be embarrassing for him: Suppose he says it is unDhārmic for Yudhiṣṭhira to have put her on the stakes because he has already lost his freedom, or because a wife is not her husband's chattel or property, or because Yudhiṣṭhira is not the sole owner of her, and therefore the attempt to derobe her is unDhārmic; or, that the derobing attempt is intrinsically so abominable that in itself it is unDhārmic, whatever may be Yudhiṣṭhira's own status, or claim on her. He knows he would then anger Duryodhana which he does not obviously want to. On the other hand, he also knows that, if he says that all this is Dhārmic, he would lose the respect people have for his moral stature. Therefore, he uses the metaethical defect of the concept of Dharma to justify his silence, which is very much similar to that of Manu's silent man in a court of justice where injustice is being manoeuvred by some vocal members of the court. Vidura minces no words in saying things which justify the appropriateness of this analogy.[9]

Some of the things which Bhīṣma actually says in this regard are really revealing. He not only reminds her of his earlier statement about the hyper-subtlety of the concept of Dharma and his consequential inability to answer her question, but even tries to pass the buck to Yudhiṣṭhira. He tells her that, being an expert in Dhārmic matters, Yudhiṣṭhira alone can give the correct answer.[10]

This is an ethical, and not a metaethical, device as is the earlier one, since it is an advice to refer the matter to a moral authority. But it is not as innocent or flawless as it may seem to be. According to the then acceptation the grandnephew (Yudhiṣṭhira) is not a higher moral authority than the granduncle (Bhīṣma), and this is not unknown to the latter. Even history supports it, as is testified by the former's taking, after the war is over, his final moral lessons from the latter. Moreover, it does not seem fair at all to ask the harassed lady to turn to Yudhiṣṭhira who, largely due to his own doing, has placed not only her but also himself in the tortuous situation they are in. These devices by Bhīṣma must have made morality wail more helplessly than even Draupadī herself. Kṛṣṇa does save Draupadī from being derobed, but not morality. Morality does get derobed, and that is the greatest tragedy, or at least one of the greatest tragedies, of the *Mahābhārata.*

(b) The committal attitude is the normal man's attitude towards his moral ideas, principles, or theories. If he holds a moral principle, for example, the principle of truth-telling, whenever telling the truth is relevant or required, he feels committed to follow or use it in one or more than one of the three modes, judgemental, decisional, and

persuasional, discussed earlier, as per the demand of the situation he is in. All this he may not, of course, do when he is afflicted with a conflict between this principle and some other principle, or some opposing desire, or with akrasia. When dealing with someone else, the committal person does try to persuade him to follow the principle he holds and considers it appropriate for him to follow. But what needs to be underlined is that he goes only upto a certain point, and then leaves the latter to decide according to his own judgement and moral common sense.

A very good example of the committal attitude is Vidura's. Whatever his own moral understanding convinces him to be right or wrong, he tries to abide by it, expresses his judgements fearlessly, frankly, and honestly, and tries to persuade the relevant persons to act according to the principles he thinks they ought to. This he does even with Duryodhana and Dhṛtarāṣṭra in whose moral integrity he does not have much faith. He is the only person who openly pleads for immediately stopping Duṣśāsana from trying to derobe Draupadī, as it is, according to him, an immoral act. But he too proceeds only upto the point of pleading, persuading, and arguing, and stops there even when his efforts are not met with success. He complains and cajoles, frets and fumes, but does nothing beyond that.

Vidura represents the ideal type of a normal committal, or moral, person. To say this does not mean or imply that every normal moral person always does, or would do, whatever Vidura does. Vidura is not a strategist like Bhīṣma. What the latter calls the hyper-subtlety of the notion of Dharma does not bother him, nor does it deter him from unambiguously declaring that the derobing attempt is immoral. It may even be said that the notion of Dharma is not for him so subtle, as it is for Bhīṣma on his own confession, that it becomes unusable in the present case. That is why he finds no hurdle, conceptual or normative, in calling the act unDhārmic. He categorically says, addressing all the great men assembled there, that because of their not answering Draupadī's question, who is crying like an unprotected woman, Dharma itself is being injured, that is, violated.[11] This means a lot, particularly in view of the admission by the tradition that his knowledge of Dharma is in no way inferior to anyone else's.

(c) The hyper-committal individual is a hyper-active moralist. His commitment to his moral principles, to his way of looking at what is and what is not morally desirable, that is, to his moral perspective, is so great that he is not merely satisfied with trying to convince, or even with convincing, someone of its worth, and leaving it to him to act according to his own best judgement which may or may not be congruent with his. His mode of thinking is something like this: I am convinced on irrefutable grounds that any A ought to x in any situation S. Since A is in S, he ought to x. Therefore, I ought to convince him that he ought to x and

see that he actually x-es. If I do not try to convince him that he ought to x and see that he does, I would be failing in my duty: Since x-ing ought to be done by A and I know that it ought to be, it is my duty to see that he does what he ought to. If I do not make him x, he would be failing in his duty, I in mine, and I would be doubly guilty because I would also, to some extent, be responsible for his failure. On the other hand, if I make him overcome his unwillingness to x and make him x, he would be doing his duty, I mine, and I would have the additional moral satisfaction or credit of having made, or helped, him perform his duty, of having guided him in leading a moral life.

The hyper-committal moralist does not make a distinction between persuading and pressurizing, between what W.D. Falk calls, guiding and goading. He does not see any conceptual gap between 'ought' and 'must'. He finds it not only natural but perfectly in order to glide down from 'ought' to 'must': Since I am convinced that A ought to x, I ought to see that A x-es; since I ought to see that he x-es, I must; since A ought to x, he must.

After giving his moral advice as to what one should do in a particular situation, or after expressing his moral opinion about what ought or ought not to be done in a certain case, the hyper-committal individual would not withdraw from the scene, as Vidura used to do. It is true that in the Kaurava household he did not have the status of one who could put any moral pressure on Duryodhana or Dhṛtarāṣtra. But he did not even take such steps as going on prolonged fast, in the Gandhian manner, as Gandhi sometimes did when he wanted to get his moral-political views accepted or implemented, or starting a public agitation in the Jai Prakashian manner. Nor did he go to the market-place to argue with the common people and the youth to create public opinion against Duryodhana, in the Socratic manner, though he had the Socratic skill, to mould their views in his favour by practicing midwifery on their natural, implicit, embryonic, moral-political ideas. This was so because all of the three, Socrates, Gandhi and Jai Prakash, were hyper-committal and therefore hyper-activists in applying their moral (or political) views. But Vidura was not: he remained only a good, flawless, normal, moralist, or what I have called a committal individual.

Many times when Gandhi wanted to get some of his moral-political views accepted or implemented, and felt that no other method was likely to persuade the dissenters to change their views, he went on fast which lasted for several days and was broken only after his objective was fulfilled as per his satisfaction. His adoption of the fasting method was a pressure technique. The Indian people, and even the people of some other countries, if they considered it a moral method, that was because they believed that Gandhi's motive behind the adoption of the fasting method was morally pure. Gandhi was a hyper-committal individual, and he applied his moral principles on many occasions in the manner

of a hyper-activist. His fasting method did exert some pressure on some of the people concerned and made them feel, of course, out of their love and respect for him, that their freedom was being curtailed and they were in a sense made, or forced, to take the steps he wanted them to take. This made some neutral observers of the then Indian scene doubt, and not without some good reason, the fully non-violent character of Gandhian fasts.

I may, as an aside, say that only a few years after Independence, when his pre-Independence disciples had got themselves well-seated in their ministerial chairs, Gandhi seems to have realized that his hyper-active moralism was not likely to yield the fruits it had yielded earlier. Perhaps it was on this account, or largely on this account, that he became a recluse, a *mahātma* in the traditional sense, contenting himself with addressing prayer meetings. The conversion of a hyper-committal, hyper-active, moralist into a peripatetic preacher is a pathetic comment on the too early commencement of the process of moral dehydration of Indian political practice.

The best example, however, of a hyper-committal, hyper-active moralist, in the Indian tradition, is found in Kṛṣṇa. I will mention only two episodes in his life to corroborate my claim.

(i) As already discussed, he himself is convinced that it is morally right for Yudhiṣṭhira to announce that Aśvathāmā has been killed even though it is untrue. He not only argues with and persuades him to do it but uses all the influence he has on him to remove his unwillingness and finally succeeds in making him do it. He does not leave it to his own moral discretion. He even sees to it that Yudhiṣṭhira's later part of the announcement 'It is the animal Aśvathāmā who has been killed', is uttered in such a low, subdued, voice that it is not heard by Droṇa, or any other person of his side who may inform him of the truth. Kṛṣṇa gets an untruth actually told by an otherwise truthful person and also believed by the person for whom it was meant. It is worth noting that this is the only untruth which Yudhiṣṭhira utters in his whole life and he utters it under Kṛṣṇa's influence (कृष्णावाक्य प्रचोदित:, Ibid., Vol. IV, 3692: 54).

(ii) The dialogue between Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa in the *Gītā* is another example, rather a more forceful one, of the latter's hyper-committal hyper-activism. He is himself, here again, fully convinced that Arjuna ought to fight the battle and tries his best to convince him that he ought to. To persuade him to fight he offers the theory of *niṣkāma karma* to the effect that no sin accrues from an action done only out of one's sense of duty, without any desire for anything resulting from it, though he gives no reason why this is so. He tries to refute Arjuna's arguments against fighting, and perhaps Arjuna thinks that he really refutes them. In fact, he does not succeed in refuting any one of them conclusively, but this is not the occasion to show that, since I am here concerned with his

hyper-activism and not with his good or bad logic. His hyper-active morality is visible all along in his conversation with Arjuna, but it becomes glaring when he shows to the latter his expansive, majestic, divine form which excites and terrifies Arjuna. He starts trembling (भयेन चप्रव्यथितं मनो मे) and dares not to raise any further doubt or question. Rather, he starts praying to him to re-assume his beautiful human form, tenders his apologies for having mistaken him to be an ordinary mortal, and seeks his protection as a child seeks from his father, etc., etc.[12]

Kṛṣṇa's may be the divine way to apply an ethical principle or theory to help an Arjuna out of a difficult moral situation, to assist him in making a right moral decision. But it is certainly not the human way. The human way of applying ethics is to make to the agent the relevant aspects of the problem clearer, to make available the relevant ethical principles, if they are not already available to him, to assess, with his cooperation, in a rationally coherent way, their strengths and weaknesses, etc. But to leave it ultimately to the agent himself to make his decision, without generating in him a fear to lose something important if he decides one way, or a hope to get something important if decides in another way. The heart of a moral decision lies in the agent's freedom. It must be *his* decision, and to be a moral decision it has to be taken on moral grounds. By applying an ethical theory, the applier can only prepare the ground for the agent's making a right decision; he is not to force or tempt him to take a particular decision. It is more than a mere truism to say that only the agent can take his moral decisions. Applied ethics, being a philosophical exercise, can be done well, in keeping with the human dignity of the moral agent, only if it is done with full awareness of this truth.

Notes and References

1. *Notebooks*: 1914–1916, p. 77e.
2. The *Mahābhārata*, Vol. I, *Dyūta Parva*, p. 898 (Gītā Press). For a little more detailed analysis of Bhīṣma's attitude to the derobing episode see section 'Application and Levels of Commitment', of this essay.
3. The *Manusmṛti*, 138, p. 65 (Vaidika Dharmaśāstra Prakāśana Saṃsthā, Delhi).
4. The *Mahābhārata*, Vol. IV, *Droṇabadha Parva*, pp. 3692–93 (Gītā Press). See section 'Application and Levels of Commitment', of this essay.
5. सभां वा न प्रवेष्टव्यं वक्तव्यं वा समंजसम्।
   अब्रुवन्वि ब्रुवन्वापि नरो भवति किल्विबी।। 13

   One should either not attend the congregation, or if he attends, he should speak what is congruent with justice. The silent, as well as the speaker against justice, deserves to be condemned.

   The *Manusmṛti*, p. 121, Vaidika Dharmaśāstra Prakāśana Saṃsthā, Delhi.

   See also The *Mahābhārata*, Vol. I, *Dyūta Parva*, p. 904, Gītā Press, for a similar remark by Viduṛa.

6. पितुराज्ञा परो धर्मः स्वधर्मो मातृरक्षणम्।
   अस्वतन्त्रं च पुत्रत्वं किं तु मां नानुपीडयेत्।। 11
   स्त्रियं हत्वा मातरं च को हि जातु सुखी भवेत्।
   पितरं चाप्यवज्ञाय कः प्रतिष्ठामवाप्नुयात्।। 12

   It is the son's highest duty to obey his father's order and to protect his mother. He is never independent, but always under the control of his parents. Therefore, what should I do to avoid the anguish resulting out of dutylessness? Which son can ever be happy after killing a woman, and that too his mother? Who can remain dignified even after flouting his father's order?

   The *Mahābhārata*, Vol. V, *Śānti Parva*, 11–12, p. 5107, Gītā Press.
7. Ibid., pp. 5109–11.
8. संहारश्चैव भूतानां धर्मस्य च फलोदयः।
   विदितस्ते महाप्राज्ञ त्वं हि धर्ममयो निधिः।। 19

   Ibid., Chapter 50, p. 4549.

   (Kṛṣṇa says to Bhīṣmaḥ:)

   The great savant, because you are the great repository of Dharma, you know all such things as when are living beings destroyed, what is the result of Dharma, when does that arise.

   See pp. 4548–4550 for Kṛṣṇa's high regards for Bhīṣma's erudition, purity of life, and moral wisdom, excelled by no one he knows of. The largest part of Volume V is devoted to recording Bhīṣma's replies to various types of Dhārmic questions asked by Yudhiṣṭhira.
9. यो हि प्रश्नं न विब्रूयाद् धर्मदर्शी सभागतः।
   अनृते चा फलावाप्तिस्तस्याः सोऽर्धं समश्नुते।। 63

   The knower of Dharma who goes to attend a congregation but does not answer the question asked, shares half of the (demeritorious) consequence of telling an untruth.

   The *Mahābhārata*, Vol. I, *Sabhā Parva*, p. 904, Gītā Press.
10. उक्तवानस्मि कल्याणि धर्मस्य परमा गतिः।
    लोके न शक्यते ज्ञातुमपि विज्ञैर्महात्मभिः।। 14

    न विवेक्तुं च ते प्रश्नमिमं शक्नोमि निश्चयात्।
    सूक्ष्मत्वाद् गहनत्वाच्च कार्यस्यास्य च गौरवात्।। 16

    युधिष्ठिरस्तु प्रश्नेऽस्मिन प्रमाणमिति मे मतिः।
    अजितां वा जितां वेति स्वयं व्याहर्तुमर्हति।। 21

    Blessed Draupadī, I have already told you that the way Dharma works is very subtle. Even expert saints in the world cannot accurately know it.

    I cannot give a definite and correct solution of this question of yours because of the nature of Dharma being extremely subtle and deep and the question of deciding what is and what is not Dhārmic being extremely important.

    In my opinion, Yudhiṣṭhira alone, whose knowledge of Dharma is perfect, is the most authoritative person to answer this question. He himself should say whether or not you have been lost in the game of dice.

    The *Mahābhārata*, Vol. I, *Sabhā Parva*, p. 907, Gītā Press.

11. द्रौपदी प्रश्नमुक्तैवं रोरवीति हत्यनाथवत्।
न च विब्रूत तं प्रश्नं सभ्या धर्मोऽन्त पीडत्यते।। 59

After putting her question to you Draupadī is crying like a woman who has none to support her. But you are not answering it. Therefore, Dharma suffers in this congregation.

The *Mahābhārata*, Vol. I, *Dyūta Parva*, pp. 904–906.

12. The *Gītā*, Chap. II: 9–16.

Habermas' Pragmatic Universals

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The study of *linguistic universals*, as we know, is associated with the famous Noam Chomsky. Hence, the talk of linguistic universals reminds us about the Chomskyan view which brought about a revolution in the study of language. For him, the languages that actually exist are the ones which children are predisposed to learn. If this theory is correct then a study of language should reveal things about the nature of the mind. Such *mentalism* of Chomsky asserts that the child is born with a perfect knowledge of *universal grammar*, that is, he is born with a fixed schematism that he uses in acquiring language. A grammar or competence, according to Chomsky, can be regarded as a set of rules in terms of which infinite sentences can be generated. The rules of a language which constitute the competence of a native speaker are mentally represented, since they are derived from some innately possessed organising principles.

However, philosophers are quite often found to search for adequacy conditions on which a theory should stand. Chomsky thought that a theory of linguistic competence can be adequate if innatism is embraced by the theory. But the danger is that such adequacy conditions are taken as a means for cancelling alternative theories. However, the fact is that there are some alternative theories of linguistic universals other than the Chomskyan one. We can have an idea of linguistic universals in a different mode, and one of the best alternative explanations of linguistic universals is proposed by J. Habermas, which caught the attention of everybody in the same way as had Chomsky's theory.

One can say that Habermas' theory is in one way better than the Chomskyan one, for he lays emphasis on the *communicative function of language*. With the help of the proposal of Habermas, we can show that an analysis of language is possible not by taking into account the mere syntactic system but by taking the communicative aspect as the basic medium. It is a fact that in speaking we not only make well-formed sentences, but relate our speech to others around us. Thus Habermas says:

> In order to participate in normal discourse, the speaker must have—in addition to his linguistic competence—basic qualifications

of speech and of symbolic interaction (role behaviour) at his disposal, which we may call communicative competence.[1]

Communicative interaction is an autonomous sphere in which cultural traditions are historically transmitted and social relations are institutionally organized. Language is dependent upon social processes which are not fully linguistic in nature—Habermas says, 'it is also a medium of domination and social force'.[2] However, Habermas like Chomsky talks about adequacy conditions upon which his theory of communication stands. He says:

(1) The speakers should be free from any constraints—internal or external.
(2) The speakers should be free to speak according to the dictate of reason.
(3) The speaker should mean what he says.

According to Habermas, communication between the speaker and the hearer will be successful if there are no external threats of power or any sort of internal constraints. In other words, communication must be one in which speaker–hearer are free to raise and challenge claims without fear of coercion, deceit, etc. and in which all have equal chances to speak, to make assertions, self-presentations, and normative claims and to challenge others. Communication is not hindered through internal constraints if and only if for all participants there is an equal distribution of chances to select and employ speech-acts. Communication, thus will become successful when both the speaker and the hearer will be on the same footing and will not have any difference between them by any kind of domination or ideology or by any other source. Habermas thinks that since we are rational beings we can be treated with equal dignity and honour. And since we are rational beings, no communication will be successful unless it is dependent on the principles of reason. According to Habermas, there should not be any emotional factors involved in the communication, one must only be rational and guided by the principles of reason. Hence Habermas speaks about *ideal communication* which is different from the communication that we understand normally.

Habermas talks about *action* and *discourse*. 'Action' refers to the everyday situation of social interaction, in which information is captured through sensory experience and exchanged through ordinary language. Whereas, 'discourse' refers to a realm of communication which is abstracted from the contexts of everyday life. In discourse, participants are there to search for arguments and justifications and not perform actions or to share experiences. However, the motive to search for arguments and justifications is 'a co-operative readiness' to arrive at an understanding.[3] According to Habermas, communication does not only mean understanding, but agreement of the hearer with the speaker.

Now for Habermas, when we are engaged in speech-acts, we are subject to the essential conditions of speech-acts, which consist in making four validity claims:

(1) intelligibility
(2) truth
(3) correctness
(4) sincerity[4]

The successful performance of a speech-act essentially requires that in issuing an utterance, the speaker implicitly claims that what is said is *intelligible*, that the propositional content is *true*, that the performative part is *correct* or legitimate, and that what is believed is expressed with *sincerity*. The hearer, in the same way, understands the utterance by generally assuming that the speaker is sincere, that he takes what is said to be true and so on. Hence these are the four validity claims stated above, and competent speakers must reciprocally maintain these with each of their speech-acts; this creates the background of normally functioning language-games. Thus the differentiation of the standard speech-act shows two levels that are involved in communication: (1) the level of intersubjectivity, upon which the speaker and the hearer communicate with one another, and (2) the level of objects, about which the speaker and the hearer come to an understanding. Any successful speech-act, according to Habermas, results in the establishment of a relation in which at least two subjects come to an understanding about a state of affairs.

Now according to Habermas, the ability to generate grammatical sentences in speech-acts, and also the ability to communicate, presuppose that all languages have a universal core or that native speakers have *pragmatic universals* or *dialogue-constitutive* universals. The universals are intersubjective linguistic elements which enable the speaker, while producing a speech-act, to reproduce the general structures of the speech situation. The universals are not merely a linguistic articulation of pre-existing conditions, rather they are the elements which establish these conditions. Without these universals, speech-act, interaction and communication are not possible among the speakers and hearers. Actually when we learn to speak language, we master these pragmatic universals and, thus, acquire communicative competence. Habermas refers to several categories of expressions which function as pragmatic universals and these are as follows:

(1) Personal pronouns like 'I' and 'You' secure the intersubjective validity of semantic rules.
(2) The deictic expressions of space and time which connect the intersubjective domain (the interaction between 'I' and 'You') with the domain of objects about which they talk.
(3) The performative verbs that are subdivided into four classes:

(i) *Communicatives* (to say, ask, etc.),
(ii) *Constatives* (to assert, to describe),
(iii) *Representatives* (to admit, to conceal),
(iv) *Regulatives* (to order, to prohibit).[5]

These performatives help the native speakers to express relations and to make certain distinctions which are very crucial for a speech situation.

According to Habermas, all these universals are the elements which establish the validity or essential conditions of language as communication. These are Habermas' pragmatic universals which communicatively competent speakers have at their disposal and these are the means for the construction of an ideal speech situation.

Now we will see that although Habermas' above explanation of pragmatic universals lie on a practical bed, still this kind of explanation of linguistic universals does not convey any hope of language-learning in an adequate way. Although Habermas' discontentment against Chomsky's linguistic competence 'as a monological capability . . . founded in the species specific equipment of the solitary human organism'[6] provokes an analysis of language not as a syntactic system but as the basic medium of communication, yet Habermas' theory is defective. It is defective for, on the one hand, it maintains certain universals (though pragmatic) and gives the explanation of language acquisition by the help of those universals. Thus his theory suffers from the same defects of the rationalistic bias; and on the other hand, many points in his theory are not sufficiently clear or explained. Specially Habermas' very programme for *universal pragmatics* must be held in doubt.

Habermas restricts his analysis to speech-acts in the 'standard form'. But the justification for restricting the analysis to speech-acts in the 'standard form' remains problematic. According to Habermas, there are certain distinctions for any speech situation, and that the ability to draw these distinctions presupposes the speaker's mastery of various kinds of speech-acts. Now the questions that arise here are: (1) Why should we take these very distinctions as fundamental to any speech situation? (2) To what extent does the ability to draw these distinctions presuppose that a man has mastery of the various kinds of speech-acts? As regards the first question, Habermas is not very clear about the nature of the distinctions and he is also not quite clear about the grounds for treating these distinctions as fundamental. Without a precise specification, it is not quite easy to judge whether those distinctions are genuinely universal. Again, as Habermas' notion of pragmatic universal converge with his analysis of speech-acts in the 'standard form', metaphors, poems, humour and so on, are given a completely secondary status in the functioning and comprehension of language.

Further, according to Habermas, in the process of communication a genuine agreement can occur at least between two subjects or people about a state of affairs, if it is prompted by *reason*. Reason can alone help to make a genuine agreement by the force of better argument. But there is no reason why people or subjects can be said genuinely to agree about something only when their agreement is prompted by reason and consequently by the force of better argument. Subjects may very well come to an agreement about a state of affairs guided by emotions and compassion and so there may be certain alternative ways in which a genuine agreement can be induced. In fact, a total man has both reason and emotion in his possession and hence reason singularly cannot always work. It seems, then, that Habermas' conception of the philosophy of man is incomplete. He takes man as an abstract entity that has no emotions.

Again, when Habermas says that by communication he means understanding/agreement then he is not very explicit about the exact connotation of the German word *Verstandigung*. But it seems that he lays emphasis on *agreement*.

When, according to Habermas, agreement between subjects is induced by the force of better argument, then this force of better argument prevails if and only if communication is not affected by external and internal constraints, and internal constraints are excluded if and only if for all participants there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech-acts. Is it not really clear what actually Habermas meant by 'a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech-acts'. Is it really possible to have a 'pure communication' devoid of any constraint in our complicated social life? I believe Habermas' argument for the presupposition of an ideal speech situation is in need of considerable attention. A great deal of everyday social interaction which is overtly strategic and covertly manipulative, does not fit Habermas's communicative model, which is *ideal*. The claimed universality of the structures which Habermas sketches cannot be established inductively, because one must notice that they are not characteristic of communication in all cultures and in all historical epochs. Different capabilities of man in social discourse, various interpersonal situation where man takes part, are nothing but empirical facts. We cannot reconstruct the universal structure of communication by starting from the 'pure' case of communicative action; for a reconstruction represents rules and structures that are actually operative in the domain under investigation. If all these be so, and if the structures of communicative action and discourse which Habermas singles out are to be found only in certain spheres of certain cultures at certain times, then certainly it is not possible to defend the view that these structures are universal-pragmatic features of communication as such.

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On Understanding: Standing Under Wittgenstein

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> Understanding arises, first of all, from the interests of practical life where people are dependent on communicating with each other. They must make themselves mutually understood. The one must know what the other wants. Thus, first of all, the elementary forms of understanding arise.
>
> [W. Dilthey, *Gessamelte Schriften*, p. 207, translated by H.P. Rickman, *Pattern and Meaning in History*, 1961/62, p. 119]

In this paper, I have a twofold purpose. At one level, I am trying to understand the writings of Wittgenstein and at another level, I am trying to understand the phenomenon called 'understanding'. The first level may be called the non-philosophical base on which a philosophical superstructure of the second level is to be erected. In this context, I shall be making use of a bit of Wittgenstein, a bit of my understanding of Wittgenstein of course. Consequently, what follows may not be the Wittgenstein of Wittgenstein. The ideas expressed below definitely are neither the Wittgenstein of the Wittgensteinians nor that of the Wittgensteinwallahs. I am neither interested in clarifying the thoughts of Wittgenstein nor defending him on any point. A thinker who is in need of a defense from other (doubtful) quarters is not worth considering. A writer who is in need of commentators or interpreters to reach out to others is not worth reading. My only (remote) intention is to contextualize what has been left behind by Wittgenstein and has been made public. I am only making an attempt to use the works of Wittgenstein for my purpose. If, by any chance, it is not marketable under the trade name of Wittgenstein industry or is not approved by the Wittgensteinwallahs, then I shall have the luxury of developing a cottage industry on my own. In order to facilitate matters, all references to the texts of Wittgenstein are given along with the quotations.

I have been told, time and again, that examples do not make any philosophically relevant point. Philosophy is too abstract while examples are usually concrete. The abstract philosophy should not be adulterated

with concrete examples. This is like adulterated food for thought. Nevertheless, let us consider an example, a sample of adulterated food for thought. Consider the expression:

C∀xCPxLx∀yCHy∀zCKPzByz∃uKLuByu

What do we understand? When a logician tells us that the above expression is a closed one, do we lose all our interest to peep through it? Do we start sympathizing with the expression, when someone tells us that it is an invalid one? So far we have not shown any sympathy towards invalid expressions by demanding reservation for them. That I have deliberately tried to adulterate the food for thought in order to make a point, may be philosophically pointless. I am trying to drive home the point that training is a pre-requisite for an understanding. The role of training in understanding has so far been allotted a backstage. Apprenticeship is usually boring, especially under an untrained instructor. Nevertheless, one has to undergo apprenticeship in order to be a professional. It is true that with the rise in technical advancements, the period of apprenticeship is getting elongated and patience is lacking. But in the absence of any training, understanding gets blocked. In fact, without any training, the idea of understanding cannot even take off. Hence, my emphasis on training, may be one of the most morbid and uninteresting points to emphasize. Obviously, the clue is from Wittgenstein.

> Understanding is effected by explanation;
> but also by training.
>
> [*Zettel*, 186; henceforth *Z*].

* * *

> God grant the philosophers insight into what lies
> in front of everyone's eyes.
>
> [*Culture and Value*, 1947, p. 63; henceforth *CV*]

The word 'understanding' is a name for the end product of a process designated by the transitive verb 'to understand'. In any use of the verb 'to understand', there is an agent who understands as well as there is a patient who is understood. Understanding is the name of a situation, where a sentence of the form 'x understands y' is true. In that case, it is quite legitimate to inquire into the nature of x's and y's, the possible agents and the possible patients, the actors and the acted upons. More bluntly, we may formulate two questions—(i) Who understands? and (ii) What is understood?

In order to come out with any plausible answer to these questions, we not only have to consider the various uses of the word 'understand' as such but also its use with appropriate prefixes and suffixes like 'do(es) not understand', 'misunderstands', etc. Let us consider the following sentences from ordinary English:

(a) Wittgenstein *understood* Russell.
(b) Carnap *did not understand* Heidegger.
(c) The table *misunderstands* everything that I write.
(d) My pet dog *does not misunderstand* me.

Out of the above four expressions, (c) appears to be odd or semantically incorrect. The oddity is due to the fact that the verb phrase 'misunderstand(s)' cannot take the noun phrase, 'The table', denoting an inanimate object, as its subject. The oddity associated with (c) however, may be diffused if we replace the verb 'misunderstands' by its negation. That is,

(c_1) The table *does not misunderstand* anything that I write—seems to be more acceptable than (c). This peculiarity in the use of 'understand' with prefixes displays a significant point.

If we consider the schema 'x understands y' in the Subject-Predicate format, the phrase 'understands y' occupies the predicate position. Let us designate the phrase 'understands y' by the predicate symbol '**U**'. Consequently, it can be applied to any subject either rightly or wrongly. That is, ∀x(**U**x v ~ **U**x) is a truth of logic, either x understands y or does not understand y, for any value of x. Similarly, we may consider the phrase 'misunderstands y' as the predicate and use the symbol **M** for designating the predicate phrase. Under this analysis, (c) is odd since it is untrue while the oddity fades significantly in (c_1) for its truth. The problem arises when we want to connect the two predicates **U** and **M** semantically, based on our normal intuition. For **M**x is not the same as ~**U**x. On the contrary, **U**x may be construed as an equivalent of v ~**U**x. Obviously, there is something wrong. The phrase, 'x does not misunderstand y' is neither a tautology nor trivial. We may have to look for some way to take us out of this triviality in order to understand misunderstandings. What seems to be the case is that an analysis of the schema 'x understands y' in the Subject-Predicate format easily leads us into the trap of triviality set by language. The extensional analysis of language is to be revised in order to accommodate misunderstandings, deliberate or otherwise. We may explore an intensional (modal) version of language to do the job.

Under an intensional version of language, the phrase, 'x understands y' may be symbolized as **U**y, where **U** is a modal operator which stands for the phrase 'x understands' or 'is understood'. Obviously, the **U** of **U**y is entirely different from the earlier use of **U** in **U**x. The operator **U**, under an intensional analysis, operates over y and not over x. That is, the transitiveness of the verb 'to understand' is to be taken seriously, the patient is focused while the agent is consumed under the operator. In that case, **U**y will mean 'x understands y' or 'y is understood'.

Consequently, we may use **My** to mean 'x misunderstands y' or 'y is misunderstood', which is equivalent to **U**~y. Obviously, ~**M**y is equivalent to ~**U**~y, neither a tautology nor a trivial expression.

These observations point to the fact that understanding, as used in our ordinary language, is an intentional state. Consequently, in order to characterize adequately the logic of understanding, we require an intensional language system. This further leads to the point that in the sentence schema,

x understands / misunderstands y, the variable x can be substituted by a name

denoting an entity capable of having intentional states. In short, it is the human beings or entities like human beings who try and often succeed in understanding. The expressions like (d) or (c_1) make sense only because we are quite habituated with anthropocentric projections onto non-anthropomorphic entities, like the computer *does* the editing for me or it obeys the commands faithfully.[1]

Once we have settled with 'Who understands?', we may turn our attention to 'What is understood?'. We have already seen that any attempt to characterize the case of understanding in terms of predication is riddled with trivialities. In order to overcome them, we have also seen that understanding is to be construed in terms of modality. Such modal operators operate over the objects of our understandings. That is, the entities which can be understood can also be bound by the modal operators **U** or **M**. In that case, the objects of our understandings are something like propositions. Even when we have sentences like (a) or (b), what we mean by the term in the object position is not the entity denoted by the term but the propositions supposed to have been generated by the entity. Wittgenstein understood Russell really means Wittgenstein understood the expressions generated by Russell. The ground for claiming this is the fact that the language of understanding closely resembles the languages for knowledge, belief, perception, doubt, etc. In other words, language of understanding demands some provision for the characterization of the intentional states. It can be argued that in order to characterize intentional states we require an intensional language. There is a close connection between intentional states and intensional languages. Wittgenstein, of course, had a wider connotation for expression in the sense that he would have included not only the spoken/written expressions but also the non-verbal ones. In this sense, every action is an expression. Verbal or linguistic expressions are only refinements, at the bottom of every expression there is some action:

> The origin and the primitive form of language-game is a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop. Language—I want to say—is a refinement.
>
> [*CV*, 1937, p. 31]

Actions are goal-oriented, intentional.[2] The intentions or the goals towards which the actions are directed, being unrealized (nonactual), must be in the form of images (pictures) in some language. Hence, actions are intricately related to the languages that are available to the actor. Wittgenstein's emphasis is on the primacy of actions over language. Even speech or written expressions (including hieroglyphics) is the result of some action.

> Words are deeds.
>
> [*Philosophical Investigations*, 546; henceforth *PI*]

Through an interesting move one can also argue that actions, when performed, take the form of speech.[3] In both the cases there is an attempt on the part of the actor/speaker to reach out to an other. That is, there is an attempt to make the intentions manifest.

The consideration of **U**y as an abbreviation for the phrase 'y is understood' leads to the obvious conclusion that 'an understanding of y' is not identical with 'y' (**U**y ≠ y); an understanding is something different from the object of understanding. The difference lies in the fact that y, as such, is an expression, available to anybody while there is an owner for **U**y (namely x, as considered above). The trap laid down by the language while making such an analysis commits us to the view that even if the x in 'x understands y' is accessible to us through our senses, x's understanding of y remains inaccessible to our ordinary perception. We need a kind of extraordinary (*alaukik*) perception to perceive the understanding of y by x. In other words, developing of understandings take place in the dark-room (of mind) impervious to the bright exposures from the curious glances of onlookers.[4]

Under such an interpretation, the phenomenon of understanding, like any other intentional phenomenon, is problematic. The problem lies precisely in the fact that there is a gulf between the speaker and the listener, the writer and the reader, the actor and the onlooker, and yet the gulf is usually bridged. There is no gulf. Though the developing takes place in a dark room, the finished photograph is immune to light. The process of developing is to be followed by a process of fixing. The result of an action[5] is an expression generated by an actor while the curious/indifferent onlookers (mis)understand/do not understand the expression. By doing something, by giving a voice, man discloses a condition, an attitude, an intention, a *bhāvanā*. These disclosures of human beings, through speech or action, essentially depend on the presupposition of a non-solipsistic universe, that there are others. If

there are no others, for whom then should I make my intentions manifest? Such attempts at externalizing the intentions also presuppose that there is a medium through which one can reach the other, and the other may also touch him/her. There is no room for untouchability in understanding, not even in a discourse on understanding. The cult of untouchability is a source of misunderstanding, nay non-understanding. Due to a perceived lack of 'interest in practical life', we often refuse to touch the other. Once we ignore the phenomenon of untouchability, we find that others not only can understand one's expressiveness but also the expressions. We disclose ourselves to others and others do (mis)understand us, our disclosures, our expressions. This brings us face to face with the problem—Can one(self) understand the other (non-self)? A negative answer amounts to skepticism. Any affirmative answer invites the question of method. It is a fact of life that we do understand one another. In that case, there should be a recipe, following which we can cook understanding in every kitchen. Here lies the crux of the problem for Wittgenstein. If we can give a recipe for all kinds of understandings, then the concept of understanding gets well-defined, amenable to one and only one interpretation. That is, understanding acquires an essence and anything short of that would be either misunderstanding or non-understanding. On the other hand, if we cannot give any recipe for all kinds of understandings, then the very possibility of understanding is on fire. We cannot understand 'What understanding is?' Understanding remains merely a fiction. This philosophical problem is centred around a Platonic-Cartesian understanding of Wittgenstein which not only overemphasizes the role of *wissen* but also puts the self at the centre of such *wissens*.[6]

The form of life which makes us believe that 'there is such a thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas' has to face the challenge of a trivial looking question—Is there only one such subject or are there many such subjects? If one sticks to the information-language-game and insists that there are subjects that think and entertain ideas, he is condemned to be in the Platonic-Cartesian philosophical cradle swinging between solipsism and skepticism.[7] In order to avoid one the other's invitation is automatically honoured. For example, if there are many subjects (non-solipsism), each with his own inwardness, then each such subject remains inaccessible to other such subjects (skepticism). On the other hand, if we want to claim universality of the accessibility to inwardness (non-skepticism) then we are left with only one such inwardness, my inwardness (solipsism). Neither the thesis of solipsism nor the thesis of skepticism is acceptable. The unacceptability of such theses can be proved only by showing either the ungrammaticality or meaninglessness of any formulation of such theses.

Once the thesis of solipsism is discarded on the basis of our experience (*ad homenium*) we are once again faced with the question—How can

one inwardness (self) understand other inwardnesses (non-self/other)? The challenge is really that of showing the ungrammaticality or meaninglessness of any formulation of skepticism. Within the Platonic-Cartesian tradition, it has been found that the ungrammaticality of the sentences expressing skepticism cannot be shown. All attempts to refute skepticism from within have failed. Hence attempts to refute skepticism are based on meaning and not on grammar, on semantics and not on syntax.

The meaning of an expression X in a language L is often given by another expression Y in L. That is X is equivalent to Y in L ($X \equiv_L Y$). This equivalence can be shown either through a set of rules, expressed in metalanguage, following which one can syntactically oscillate between X and Y without any semantic disturbance. Else, both the expressions must refer to something (fact, state of affairs, object) other than either X or Y. The latter conviction is stronger since we not only mean Y in L by X in L but also Y* in L* by X in L. That is, we do very often translate expressions of one language into another. In other words, it appears that the 'meaning of X' is something other than 'X', X is only a representation of the 'meaning of X'. We may have different representational structures to represent the 'meaning of X'. For example, 'An half empty bottle of wine' and 'A bottle half filled with wine' may be two different representations of the same structure. Meaning, under such analysis tends towards intentional states (structures) rather than physical structures. Further, a representation of a structure is never complete. A situation can never be represented fully. A map of a piece of land can never represent the piece of land fully [Lewis Carroll]. A representation is necessarily an abstraction of a concrete situation. All representations are, therefore, partial characterization of a situation. Here is a free port for the export-import of many crucial philosophical problems as to how an abstraction gets tied to something concrete, how language is hooked to reality!

It may well be the case that X is a representation of Z and Y is also a representation of Z but neither X is a representation of Y nor Y is a representation of X. Thus two different representations may have resemblance but need not have isomorphism. Resemblance being a non-transitive relation, may fade away with multiple application. What it amounts to is that, it may very well be the case that we may mean X by Z and also we may mean Y by Z and yet X may not mean Y. In other words, 'the meaning of Z' may be represented by X as well as by Y but X and Y themselves may not be representations of each other. How then can a representation of X in the mind of one be the same as in the mind of another? How can an intentional state of one coincide with that of another? In order to have an adequate answer to such questions, philosophers have often tended to manufacture a transcendental recipe for all kinds of understandings as well as a transcendental self

(inwardness). In other words, a refutation of skepticism relies heavily on the existence of a transcendental subject and a uniform recipe for all kinds of understandings. All empirical subjects are allegorically images of that transcendental subject. Moreover, it also depends on the assumption that there is something called THE UNDERSTANDING of y associated with every y, where y is an expression. All actual understandings of y are mere shadows of THE UNDERSTANDING of y. Such attempts not only advise us to look for an essence of understanding but also of the self. Accordingly, the ideal of all understandings is the self-understanding. All understandings are imitations of the self-understanding. An understanding of the other is an understanding so far as it can imitate self-understanding. This leads to a kind of paradoxical situation. We express ourselves only to be understood by others but others cannot understand us fully, as if we can understand ourselves fully!

In view of the actual practices, we act and speak in order to express ourselves. We are more often understood by others than not. However, we also understand other's actions and utterances with admirable ease provided we have the desire to understand, we have the interests of practical life. We also misunderstand perhaps with greater ease, when we rely too heavily on our self understanding as the sole guide for every understanding or we lack the interests of practical life or forget our dependency on communicating with each other. Obviously, there is less of paradoxicality in 'what lies in front of everyone's eyes'. The paradox itself is an expression of a disease whose germs lie in the Platonic-Cartesian myth of self-understanding as the highest form of understanding. Such a view is largely based on an individualistic, mechanistic form of life where life begins with an individualistic adult and never intends to look back at the painful childhood, even of his/her own.

It is a fact that we all begin our lives as infants and not as grown-ups which most philosophers tend to forget. As an infant, one is more a receiver than a giver, more a learner than a teacher. Interesting studies (post Wittgenstein, of course) have shown that an individual's role as a learner does not end with his/her infancy. On the contrary, reliance on others for an understanding of the external reality and even that of the self is inevitable throughout life. This becomes all the more obvious if we take serious note of our own crisis situations. Under crisis situations, we desperately look for advices from outside; all our understandings are shaken. The knowledge of selves, whether one's own or that of other's, is based on actions and interactions with a whole range of human environment. The human environment even determines (anticipates) what will eventually be found inside us, through introspection, the nature of our own inwardness. Once we grow up, we definitely make use of our self understanding in understanding and judging others. Perhaps, no one is totally free from this procedure of

projecting the self-image onto others. But if we judge the inwardness of others solely through the filter of our own readymade selves then the knowledge of other's inwardness is to be replaced by our own projection. Through such a (mis)adventure, we come to know what we already knew (Plato). Every knowledge is derived *a priori* (Descartes). The claim that by being adult we can judge other's inwardness merely by projecting our own inwardness (intentions) entails either unwillingness or incapacity on our part to learn further. One who is such an adult can hardly be a good companion unless, (s)he is at the centre of power. Nevertheless, in the process of reaching this finished adulthood, if there is any (though it seems to me that there are many as there is a lack of desire to learn further), one has to open her/his mind more often to understand the inwardness of other's expressions, especially the verbal ones accompanying actions. Otherwise, we would not have possessed our own inwardness on which we rely so much. The very idea of subjectivity is derived from outside, may not be from the idea of objectivity, but definitely through 'practical interests' relating to the outside world. What lies in front of everyone's eyes is not, in essence, a unity but a kind of diversity. Wittgenstein's insistence on non-essentialism is well known. It is a kind of resemblance that misleads us to think of unity or identity. There is no identity at the ontological level, two things are never the same. Identity is a conceptual construct, an aberration of resemblance. It is the resemblance that is in front of everyone's eyes. Identity is an outcome of developing overexposed resemblance in *wissen.*

* * *

> One of the most misleading representational techniques in our language is the use of the word 'I', particularly when it is used in representing immediate experience.
>
> [*Philosophical Remark*, VI–57, pp. 88; henceforth *PR*]

The occurrence of the expression 'I' in the information language-game produces a very distorted picture. Once we get used to this distorted picture, it is extremely difficult to visualize anything else. A kind of anthropocentricism pervades our thinking. Despite scientific progress and inflation of the information regarding the evolution of human species, we still tend to think of ourselves as at the centre. We quite easily forget that human beings are one of the youngest of the species on Earth. Our so called wisdom lies in the fact that we can be so easily ungrateful to the fellow species from whom we have learnt everything that is beautiful—from music to fashion designing. Understanding presupposes expressiveness which, in turn, presupposes a non-solipsistic universe, the existence of others. The most fundamental presupposition of expressing ourselves is that it is addressed to some other, who can come to an understanding of what is expressed. All

animals involved in sexual intercourse are expressive as they require another to keep the reproduction process going. Human beings are rather too eager to express him (her) self. We display ourselves readily since, among all the animal species, only human beings sell themselves. Consequently, we, for the interests of practical life, are in need of self-advertisement. It is true that through the ages, we have invented systems upon systems of constructed and manipulable expressions and symbols culminating in speech and imagery. Such constructed and manipulable devices have opened up entirely new dimensions of understanding and misunderstanding, openness and concealment, truth and falsity. Our ancient ancestors were very dimly aware of the bizarre surroundings in which we find ourselves today. Expressiveness among them was much too direct and straightforward as the present day complex artifacts were not available to them. Nevertheless, the overwhelming role of these artifacts must not conceal the fact that the role played by direct apprehension at the intuitive level forms the basis of all understandings. I look at a girl and she smiles. Something passes between us. Without such a transmission of signals, there could not have been any understanding. The smile obviously comes to me from without. Its locus is, first and always, another's face. Only by seeing the smiles of others I also learn to convey something through a smile or a grin. The point that emerges is that expressiveness presupposes an other while understanding generates the notion of a self. This selfing, bringing others into one's own 'fold' is an essential feature of any understanding while othering of the self makes expressiveness possible. There is a dual process in operation—objectifying the subject for expressiveness while subjectifying the object for understanding.[8]

Understanding, for Wittgenstein, comes through following a rule, by being able to decide 'how to go about', how to subjectify, to communalize the self. This is very close to the solution of establishing Transcendental Subjectivity, the rule following activity. Wittgenstein, though referred to Kant, was not content with merely a Kantian solution. He laid enough stress on learning along with rule following. Philosophers, in general, refuse to learn anything further, since they are under the impression that they have lost their childhood forever, they are the adults *par excellence*. Why is it that the philosophers quite carefully ignored the point of learning and overemphasized the point of following a rule? How can one follow a rule unless (s)he has learnt them? In the interest of practical life, the people of developed countries are much worried about rule following, the rules they have been brought up with, and understandably so. The people of developed countries have no place to go; they are condemned to be there. The choice for them is only downwards through the ladder of progress that they themselves have so meticulously built. Consequently, in order to be a good citizen, one must follow the rules. In contrast, for us, belonging to developing

countries, there is an open choice, choice is in both the directions, either to go up or down the ladder, built by others. Our priority may not be the priority of the developed countries. In the interest of our practical life, learning the rules is a pre-requisite for rule-following. Consequently, the concept of learning acquires greater significance. We have to set our priorities right. Without which, we may only be able to formulate and reformulate the ideas already laid down. Of course, we can reformulate Cartesian dualism in term of living a life (body) as different from doing philosophy (mind) and be happy to lead a schizophrenic life. For such philosophers, Wittgenstein's advice was not to treat common sense as umbrellas (especially in the English weather), that is, not to leave it outside when philosophizing in a room. [*Wittgenstein Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*, henceforth *WLFM*].

Our (mis)understanding of each other in everyday life is normally unproblematic. One thing among many others, that makes our everyday understanding unproblematic, in practice, is the existence of a large variety of shared background assumptions and conventions among the participants—an unconditional agreement over a large number of bedrock sentences. The sharing of background conditions, assumptions and conventions are mainly due to our schooling amidst a common cultural milieu, following a standard syllabus. We learn to speak the same language(s), we learn to adopt the same behavioural norms, we learn to relate ourselves to common myths, we inherit common cultural narratives and thereby we learn to interact with people in the expected manner. It is as though the culture-bound norms and myths provide the schema for both expressing ourselves and understanding others. Every human action, within a culture, is to be viewed as an attempt to exemplify the cultural norms and myths, enacting the cultural narratives. This is the mechanism through which the subjective intentions are externalized and objectified, the discourse is documented, particular expressions receive their meanings. As if there are standard rules in the archives for comparing every expression, every possible expression:

> The propositions describing this world picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game.
> [*On Certainty*, 95; henceforth *OC*]

In that case, understanding becomes merely culture bound. All our expressions and their understandings are attempts to locate their respective positions within the cultural narrative, within a fixed text. Any attempt to understand an expression belonging to some other culture is doomed to failure. It will be something like trying to locate a sentence from *The Holy Bible* in the *Mahābhārata*. This cultural relativity thesis has got currency in the developed countries, since they have hardly any *interest of practical life* in trying to understand other cultures. According to the philosophers belonging to the developed countries,

other, by definition is inferior. Therefore, there cannot be any *interest of practical life* for an understanding of the other. At the most, other cultures may have some documentary value for the libraries and museums, hence efforts may be made to preserve them. The school syllabi make it obvious. In Indian schools, we have to familiarize ourselves with a huge mass of European and American achievements. What about the school syllabi of the developed countries! Alas! what is a necessity for the western intellectuals is a fashion for us. There is a great enthusiasm in India with the cultural relativity thesis. In the process, we colonized intellectuals have only succeeded in forming our own small colonies, or even islands. Such an understanding of understanding, derived from the archives of Platonic-Cartesian myths, tends to confuse between exactitude and authority. A search for exactitude turns out to be a search for authority since the latter is a much easier task. Consequently, we have scores of Kripke's, Hacker & Baker's, Crispin Wright's, Peter Winch's understandings of Wittgenstein. But on Wittgenstein's authority there is no such point of final exactitude where one can rest.

> What I am opposed to is the concept of some ideal exactitude given us *a priori*, as it were. At different times we have different ideals of exactitude; and none of them is supreme.
>
> [*CV*, 1940, p. 37]

There is no reason to believe that Wittgenstein aspired for any transcendent, THE UNDERSTANDING, of any particular expression, apart from the expression itself. In order to comprehend or understand an expression, we usually focus our attention on an abstracted segment, stripped off from its concrete embodiment. But it would be wrong to say that our efforts towards an understanding of an expression is limited only to that cut out segment alone. It is true that we focus our attention on a particular expression while trying to understand but it is also equally true that we do not strip ourselves off from all the tacit dimensions of our cognition (awareness):

> Well 'understanding' is not a name of a single process accompanying reading or hearing, but more or less of interrelated processes against a background or in a context, of facts of a particular kind, namely, the actual use of a learnt language or languages.
>
> [*Philosophical Grammar*, II–35, p. 74; henceforth *PG*].

Understanding may also be viewed as a state of affairs, a concatenation of objects. Both Ux and Uy are abstractions. In the process of abstraction, some of the objects belonging to the concatenation are missed and some others are manufactured in order to fill the gap. What lies in front of everyone's eyes is a triad—(A, P, C), where A is an individual, P is a set of expressions and C is a set of background conditions. That is, A

understands P in the background of C is a more appropriate description of a fact. In a large variety of usual (normal) situations, the set of background conditions, C, is more or less stable. As a result C is often ignored in describing the state of affairs and only A and P are emphasized. Further, we have already seen that, under the Platonic-Cartesian tradition, there is a tendency to identify A with some kind of an autonomous inwardness (mind) of A. I think, I have tried sufficiently hard to explode this myth. But arguments are of no avail where myths are concerned. Even Wittgenstein failed to explode the myth:

> It is humiliating to have to appear like an empty tube which is simply inflated by mind.
>
> [*CV*, 1931, p. 11]

Once, we try to construe understanding as a triad, (A, P, C), we can very well say that understanding is a name of a whole class of such phenomena without indulging in a futile search for essence. Different understandings are related among themselves through a family resemblance. That is, given any two understandings, u_m and u_n, we need not assume that there is something common between them. All that is claimed is that if both u_m and u_n are understandings then, we can construct a sequence of understandings, $u_1, u_z, \ldots, u_k$, such that u_m resembles u_1, u_1 resembles u_z and so on until u_k resembles u_n. In other words, there need not be a standard of understanding with the help of which we can measure the amount of understanding in each case. This permits the possibility that (A_1, P_1, C_1) and (A_1, P_1, C_z) be two different understandings of P_1 by A_1. Different understandings need not be construed as wrong understandings. For example, my understanding of Wittgenstein has changed over the years. That does neither mean that my earlier understanding of Wittgenstein was all too wrong nor that my present understanding is the correct one. Understanding necessarily depends on training. Longer the apprenticeship, deeper the understanding is likely to be. However, anarchism in any field in not likely to yield any result. Two contradictory claims of understanding of one and the same object needs to be settled judiciously. That is, if (A, P, C) and (B, P, C) both have a claim over an understanding of P under the background C, while (A, P, C) and (B, P, C) are contradictory to or conflicting with one another, then the only way to settle the issue seems to be a consideration of compatibility. The way out of this impasse does not seem to be easy. If all the theoretical frameworks fail, we have our primitive intuitions to fall back upon, the pre-theoretical understanding on the basis of which we have been able to construct systems after systems of complex theoretical artifacts.

This kind of multifaceted understanding of '*understanding*' is easier to understand if we can somehow renounce the Platonic-Cartesian myth of essentialism. It is a sisyphusean task to look for an essence of

either the self or of understanding. I have already argued that the concept of a self need not be construed as a mind in the machine, a finished product. On the contrary, a human organism is a complex of many intricate as well as simple relationships, an object in different concatenations of objects. Consequently, a self is an unfinished process, constantly exploring its potentialities. The self has only existence, the essence is always in the making. A search for the final understanding, similarly presupposes *a priori*, that there is a final understanding—THE UNDERSTANDING, for each and every expression, apart from the expressions themselves. The myths of essentialism, scientism, modern temperament have led us to believe that everything can be ordered into a sequence like the sequence of numbers. Consequently, we are tempted to think that all the possible understandings of an expression can be linearly ordered between THE UNDERSTANDING and THE MISUNDERSTANDING. Moreover, there is a tendency to think that understanding is also a sequence of happenings—expression, perception, connecting with the myths, understanding. There is no such sequence of happenings in understanding:

> When I think in language, there aren't meanings going through my mind in addition to the verbal expression, the language is itself the vehicle of thought.
>
> [*PG*, VIII–112, p. 16]

The question is—how do you know that you yourself have understood an expression? [*WLFM*-II]. That is, how do I know that I have understood the work of Wittgenstein; how do I know whether the triad, (C, W, P), is an understanding where C stands for my name, W stands for the expression generated by Wittgenstein while P is the set of conditions available. Wittgenstein assumes that there seems to be two different sorts of criteria of understanding, namely understanding has to be *self-certifying* and/or it must be reflected in use [*WLFM*-II]. Only I can certify that the triad (C, W; P) is an understanding as well as the triad must be reflected in my behaviour. The trap lies in the unconditional use of *self-certification* for understanding and that of use. It can be shown quite easily that both the criteria of self-certification and use are quite consistent with a solipsistic universe. Self-certification becomes inconsistent with solipsism only if self-certification is dependent on learning how to certify oneself for which training is required. All the gossips about solipsism is a product of finished adulthood. A curious child knows, in the interest of his practical life, that he has to learn from others. The problem of solipsism that Wittgenstein seems to have solved is actually not a solution but a bed-rock sentence, for him. He, throughout his philosophical thinking accepted non-solipsism as a fact of life. Consequently, the question of rejecting solipsism does not arise. However, he occasionally gave the impression that he is making an

attempt to refute solipsism. If he has made any adventure in this direction then he has failed miserably, his model of numbers did, in fact, mislead him:

> When we teach someone how to go his first step, we thereby enable him to go any distance.
>
> [*PR*, p. 200]

This remark may work pretty well with numbers under the present understanding of number theory but it does not work at all if we try to work out a natural history of numbers. His insistence only on how to go about and complete indifference towards how to come back is the source of trouble. For even to teach the first step, the first step is to be repeated a number of times. How can the first step be repeated, unless we can come back to the starting point again? We can obviously, generate all the numbers through an operation of add and the number one—[1, x, x+1], once the first step is taken.

Once we introduce the idea of 'O', this simple mechanism does not work. That is, we require at least two numbers, 0 and 1, along with the operation, *add one*, to get [0, x, x+1], that is, to generate all the numbers. But Wittgenstein somehow thinks that a guarantee for non-emptiness will also guarantee non-solipsism. He uses the expression [0, x, x+1] in his earlier writings [*Tractatus*; henceforth *Tr*] but shifts to [1, x, x+1] later [*PG*]. This seems to be a very peculiar confusion, lack of clarity, on the part of Wittgenstein. Already [0, x, x+1] uses two symbols from the object language, 0 and 1. Whereas [1, x, x+1] needs only one single symbol, 1, from the object language. The formulation, [0, x, x+1] apparently tells us about a mechanism of getting 1 from 0, that is non-emptiness. But the schema already presupposes not only non-emptiness but also non-solipsism. There are two elements, 0 and 1 along with the operation 'add one'. However, the formulation [1, x, x+1] is solipsistic, there is only one element and the operation of *add*. It is to be noted that there is a difference between *add* and *add one*.

This somehow is related to the problem of one way traffic. The story of Abhimanyu may be cited as an illustration of the point. In the epic *Mahābhārata*, we find the story that Abhimanyu, the son of Arjun, learnt only how to enter in the *chakra vyuha* as he had heard so while he was in his mother's womb. Obviously, he could get in but could not come out. Did Abhimanyu understand *chakra vyuha*? Similarly, if we only learn to add we shall never be able to come back to smaller numbers. Consequently, it will be a non-understanding of the number system. But it is a fact of life that, given a number, n, we can reach the number from a smaller number by adding or we can also reach the number from a bigger number by a process of subtraction. It seems to be the case that the operations of adding and subtracting, going out and coming back, are complementary to each other. One cannot be

understood/learnt without the other. If Wittgenstein's insistence on teaching-learning is taken seriously, we immediately stumble on the number 2 and the trap of solipsism can be avoided. In any act of learning, the teacher is a pre-requisite. We cannot learn from nothing. Hence, rule following is to be clubbed with learning from someone else—how to go about. This learning does not involve learning the rules explicitly:

> The game can be learned purely practically without learning any explicit rules.
>
> [*OC*, 95]

At the same time, learning ensures that there are precedents, or examples. One who has learnt how to go about it is also aware of the fact that this is the way to go about, that is, he has seen others behaving in a particular way under particular circumstances:

> Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules have loopholes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.
>
> [*OC*, 139]

In whatever way we formulate a rule, it is open to different interpretations. The rule in the archives, by itself does not tell us which side of it should be compared for measuring one foot. Instructions of rules, to be effective, must be accompanied by examples, practice, demonstration. Only this can ensure non-solipsism. That is why, the number 2 is so crucial for metaphysical discourse. Once we can manage to reach 2, we can reach any number simply by repeating the same operation. In other words, if we want to talk about the natural history of numbers, we must start with three numbers, 0, 1, and 2. In fact, almost in all primitive societies, counting reached beyond 2. Further, I would like to point out that it is a peculiarity of human thinking that he thinks in terms of the opposites, the complementaries together make a whole:

> Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical.
>
> [*Tr*, 6.45]

Consequently, the operation of addition must be accompanied by an operation opposite to it—subtraction. The two operations together can generate the feeling of a limited whole. That is, even to generate the idea of an infinite, one has to start with the finite. By applying the idea of extending the whole repeatedly, one may get an idea of the infinite. Once we learn how to go about with addition and return back with respect to addition, we also have learnt how to go about and return back with respect to subtraction. This dual process of subtraction and addition together can generate an understanding of numbers and not

only addition. For both the operations to be operative one has to start from some non-zero quantity, and if one has to remain within the realm of the experience of counting while operating with subtraction, one has to have at least the number 2.

Related to the problem of solipsism is the problem of skepticism. Once non-solipsism is established or accepted, the problem of skepticism raises its head from the ruins of Platonic-Cartesian empire, of the finished adulthood. For a refusal to entertain the idea of skepticism, Wittgenstein seems to be much closer to common sense. He points to some of the obvious facets of our life:

> The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief.
>
> [*OC*, 160]

Both, the problem of solipsism as well as that of skepticism dissolve if we take Wittgenstein's notion of learning more seriously. The crux of many of the problems in Wittgenstein lies in ignoring the crucial concept of *learning*, in theory as well as in practice.[9]

It is always a problematic issue to judge the understanding of an expression (a set of expressions) made in the past, for the background conditions at the time of making the expressions have changed considerably. However, the set of conditions that were prevalent at the time of making the expression can only be created in terms of some pictures, from memory or some other expressions. That is, the past can only be represented partially. In that process, a lot of things are missed out. It is like watching an old movie in an old cinema hall of an Indian suburb. Many of the frames are missing or blacked out. But then quite a lot remains. That is why the question, whether I have understood Wittgenstein is bound to remain an enigma. However hard I may try to discover the conditions that made Wittgenstein, a complete detail is out of reach. Even if a complete representation were available, this can only be available on the background of present conditions. The fact that the sourcebook for the philosophical investigations carried out by Wittgenstein happened to be mathematics, is bound to receive scant attention from those who lack training in mathematics. Instead of learning mathematics, it is much easier to ignore those aspects and approach Wittgenstein through the filter of readymade adult self. But on the authority of Wittgenstein himself:

> With my full philosophical rucksack I can only climb slowly up the mountain of mathematics.
>
> [*CV*, 1929, p. 2]

Similarly, my total ignorance regarding the German language is a handicap. Also, Wittgenstein's passion for music remains at more than an arm's length from me due to my unfamiliarity with western classical

music. Consequently, even after making so much effort to understand the *one object seen from different angles*, all said and done, the Wittgensteinian question keeps peeping through:

> Is my understanding only blindness to my lack of understanding? It often seems to me so.
>
> [*OC*, 418]

One can enlarge the question through the magnifying instrument of his/her readymade self. In conclusion, therefore, I can only quote a *Rubai* of *Omar Khayyam*, the great mathematician, to elucidate my point:

> For IS and IS-NOT; though with Rule and Line
> And UP-AND-DOWN by Logic I define
> Of all that one should care to fathom, I
> Was never deep in anything but WINE.

I am thankful to Dr. Laxminarayan Lenka and Dr. R.C. Pradhan for their constant encouragement through their encouraging/critical remarks. It seems that there is some resemblance between the views expressed here and that of B. Bloor—*Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge*, Columbia University Press, 1983, which I discovered recently.

Notes and References

1. Often we also make mechanistic projections onto anthropomorphic entities. One of the consequences of such projections has been discussed in Goswami, C. 'On the Logical Form of Action Sentences', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, XIX, 3, 1992, pp. 187–198.
2. C. Goswami, 'Bringing About', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, XIII, 2, 1986, pp. 177–184.
3. C. Goswami, 'On understanding Human Actions', R. Jhanji, (Ed.)—*Knowledge, Culture, Action : Essays in Honour of Dharmendra Goel*, Ajanta, New Delhi, 1994, pp. 287–310.
4. Apart from understanding, many other expressions of ordinary language like knowing, believing, perceiving, doubting etc. need the privacy of a dark-room for their development. They are put in one basket called intention and the terms representing them are called intentional. In an interesting way Dr. Lenka argues that any interpretation of dualism permits the possibility of private language. L. Lenka, *Cartesian Privacy and Antarbhasa*, (unpublished, personal communication).
5. There is a difference between the *result* of an action and its *consequence*. The difference may be a relative one. In the phrase, 'By doing A he brought about B', A is the *result* while B is the *consequence*. For details see C. Goswami,—'Bringing About', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, XIX, 2, 1986, pp. 177–184.
6. In German there are two words, *wissen* and *kennen*. English translations of Wittgenstein seems to have blurred this distinction to a considerable extent by translating both the words as some variant of knowing. The sense of *wissen* is manipulative while *kennen* is contemplative. The word *kennen* is something personal, subjective, unfinished, involving the subject, interesting to the self. In contrast, *wissen* is objective, certain, binary. In other words, *wissen* gives manipulative power and consequently, it is a matter of skill, cunning, intrigue,

precision etc. However, through a personal communication, Prof. von Wright noted that 'the distinction is useful for stylistic purposes' only. It is very difficult to believe that Wittgenstein, so committed to clarity, had used two different words merely for stylistic variation. Also his remark, 'Unterschied Zwischen "knowing" und "being aware of"' (Z, 85) seems to be a remark regarding the inadequacy of English translation. In fact this very remark, the use of English words in the German text, made me suspicious regarding the confusion between *wissen* and *kennen*. In this context, the concluding lines of Descartes *Meditations-II*, is worth nothing:

> I readily discover that there is nothing more easily or clearly apprehended than my own mind.
>
> [Descartes—*Meditations*-II, Conclusion]

7. C. Goswami—'Solipsism', *Viswa Bharati Journal of Philosophy*, XXII, 2, 1986, pp. 120–122. I have tried to show that there is a close conceptual connection between solipsism and skepticism, metaphysical and epistemic counterpart. A rejection of Cartesian foundationalism alloyed with Cartesian dualism has to allow for skepticism. In that process, naturalized epistemologists make room for scientific skepticism. G. Sahu—'Epistemic Rules: Cartesian and Naturalized', presented in a seminar on Descartes in February 1996 (unpublished, personal communication).
8. The complexity of artifacts has not only opened new possibilities of understandings but also that of misunderstandings. L. Lenka—'Logic of Deliberate Misunderstanding', presented at ICPR, Lucknow in March, 1996 (unpublished, personal communication).
9. The use of the word 'learning' is in need of some clarification. To make the point clear, let us consider the two apparently diverse cases of learning languages often talked about by the linguists—(i) learning the mother-tongue and (ii) learning a second language. I can use the English language reasonably well without adopting the British ways of life. But of Wittgenstein, it seems that, second language learning is not learning at all; it lacks the intuitions of the native speaker (user) of the language. One is not really 'trained' unless (s)he acts automatically. 'I am using the word 'trained' in a way strictly analogous to that in which we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things.', *Blue and Brown Books*, p. 77. Here, the model of teaching-learning mathematics seems to have misled Wittgenstein. Though he admits that human life is complex but he fails to see that human learning has various degrees, especially where the social interactions are concerned. The rules for a mathematical form of life is rather homogeneous while in actual life an individual is a member of many forms of life simultaneously. Further, in mathematics, the acts are rather from the premises to the conclusion, from rules to following the rules. In actual life situations, mostly it is the act that is justified by connecting it with certain rules, from a conclusion, the premises are constructed. This apparent lack of objectivity, as Feyerabend puts it, 'does not mean less work; it means that scientists have to check all ingredients of their trade and not only those which philosophers and establishment scientists regard as characteristically scientific.', Verso, New York, 1977, p. 284.

Sentence Meaning, Intentionalism, and the Literary Text: An Interface

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In a recent paper[1], Searle discusses the problem concerning textual meaning in the context of some approaches made thereto in recent times. While doing so his main concern has been to point out and develop a few important distinctions which, according to him, being the mainstay of philosophy of language would help clear away some of the difficulties that are encountered by the literary theorist. One such distinction he refers to is that between sentence meaning and speaker meaning which he claims has a direct bearing on the issue of literary meaning. In this connection, he targets Steven Knapp and Walter Michaels as having eschewed this distinction in arriving at the position that the meaning of a literary text is to be identified with the intention of the author. Searle goes on to argue that such a position is quite untenable and that, by striking down the distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning Knapp and Michaels have developed their thesis which 'is simply false, because they are confusing sentence with utterances'.[2] By insisting on this distinction Searle tries to find a chink in the armour of intentionalism which has been built up over the years by Knapp and Michaels. Admittedly, Searle's distinction is a useful tool for the philosophy of language though what possibly may be questioned is its relevance to the practice of interpreting the literary text. In this paper, I shall argue that each side to the debate on this issue argues its case with a rigidity that hampers a clearer view of the other side. I shall also argue that a thorough-going intentionalistic thesis such as the one developed by Knapp and Michaels in the context of literary text would not be jeopardized even if one were to agree with Searle's distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning.

Let me begin with the main point of contention that Searle focuses on by considering an imaginary case of sighting 'on the beach a set of marks that looked exactly like'[3] the following lines from a poem by Wordsworth:

> A slumber did my spirit seal;
> I had no human fears:

She seemed a thing that could not feel
The touch of earthly years.

He goes on to suggest that even if these marks were produced by a natural accident (say, by the waves), and not by a conscious human agency, they constitute a sentence (or a group of sentences) in English and in virtue of their formal syntactical structure will have a meaning. This thought experiment is carried out by Searle in order to drive home the point that there is such a thing as sentence meaning regardless of whether the sentence has been produced by human agency or not. This is to say that even when a sentence is produced by accident (or non-human agency) it makes sense to us *because of* its syntactical structure. And if this be granted then, according to Searle, that should be enough to subvert the position maintained by Knapp and Michaels that in interpreting a text its meaning should be identified with the authorial intention. Searle's argument may assume the following form:

(p1) Knapp and Michaels hold the position that the meaning of a sentence is the *intended meaning*.
(p2) Even if a sentence is produced by non-human agency (and this can be imagined along the lines suggested by Searle) it *would* make sense to us in virtue of its conventional structure (syntactic).
(p3) Thus, p2 calls for a distinction to be made between sentence meaning and speaker (intended) meaning.
(p4) Therefore, p1 falls through.

Now, is this argument valid? Does Searle succeed in demolishing the position held by Knapp and Michaels? We may suspend our judgement for a while and turn to a question which is more fundamental in nature: What does it mean to say that a sentence produced by some non-human agency has meaning?

It must be admitted at the outset that the notion of a language being produced by accident (or, some non-human source) is an imaginary one though nothing prevents us from imagining it as has been suggested by Searle. But I think a radical difference would be made to such a situation if the accidental production of a language (linguistic expression, sentence, etc.) appeared *before* such a language had been conventionalized by its use in *human* communication.Would the 'language' in such an imaginary situation be regarded as a means of human communication? Turning to the specific case which Searle makes use of in his argument one might ask the following question: Suppose that the lines 'A slumber did my spirit seal' etc., had appeared on the sea beach *before* Wordsworth (or some other poet) had actually scribbled them down, would the lines still make sense to one who encountered them on the beach? What takes primacy in all such cases is one's familiarity and engagement with *human communication* which naturally envelops human *intentions*. Total *un*-familiarity with such a

process will not make it possible for us to understand a 'language' that has been produced by non-human means or accident. In the beach-marks example Searle assumes, even though implicitly, that the person who sees the marks is familiar with the English language and so is able to recognise the resemblance of these marks to the words in English which he can himself use by matching them with certain human intentions known to him. This way of looking at the matter will bring out the logical priority of intentions over what Searle terms as conventional meaning. In Searle's view, the conventional meaning has an independent status as it has nothing to do with the meaning intended by the speaker. According to him, in the beach-marks example there is no role for the speaker (intended) meaning to make its appearance, because sentence meaning is a product of the syntactical structure of the sentence. The point that I am suggesting is that even if we speak of the conventional meaning of a sentence it is parasitic upon the *notion* of intended meaning. Through familiarity with a language we begin to figure out the syntactical (conventional) meaning of sentences in that language and such an exercise is based on our past experience of matching words and sentences in that language with certain known human intentions. Searle, to my mind, is reversing the logical priority of human intentions over conventional sentence meanings. The oddity of his point is manifestly clear when Searle extends the sentence/speaker meaning distinction in the domain of *literary* text and its interpretation. An encounter with a literary text is a different kind of experience in which what one looks forward to is a 'disclosure' of author's felt experience and intention. Or else, how do we make a distinction between a *literary* text and one that is produced, say, by chance pressing of the computer keyboard?

At this stage, it would be quite useful to consider what Knapp and Michaels have to say on this matter. In their 'Reply to John Searle', they are quite categorical that 'the choice between literalism and intentionalism here is patently a choice between two separate practices, and in no sense a methodological choice within a single practice of interpretation. Even if Searle were right in claiming that sentence meanings exist independent of speakers' intentions, it still wouldn't make sense to recommend that interpreters choose one kind of meaning over another'.[4] The practice of interpretation has gained respectability in the context of literary text only because one is *interested* in finding out the intended meaning. But for one who believes in literalism, that is, that sentence meaning has nothing to do with the authorial intention, there should be no need for finding the author's intention. In other words, even if it is argued that there is a nominal sense in which every sentence has a literal meaning in virtue of its syntactical structure such a meaning would be of no interest to the interpreter of the *literary* text. The very act of regarding something as a literary text involves attributing

to the author the intention that the text be so regarded. The authorial intention is not an alternative to the literal meaning, rather it is the *only* meaning that can be identified with the literary text.

The interplay of choice between literalism and intentionalism is often invoked by those whose business it is to interpret legal documents. The example cited by Knapp and Michaels is that of interpreting the Constitution as the expert claims that the meaning of a certain rule or statute is based on the literal meaning of sentences which is independent of the intention of the framer of it. But even this can be shown to be a practice which is based on intentionalism though in a disguised form. What the legal experts 'really do is posit *ideal* authors whose imagined intentions they then read into the texts'[5] thereby interpreting the law in terms of the imaginary author's intention. The question one should ask here is: Can the interpretation of a law be made independently of the intention of the framer of the law? After all laws are made for certain specific purposes in a given context keeping in view certain *human* concerns. How can the laws be interpreted without having due regard for those human concerns and purposes? So even if the interpretation of the laws is purportedly made on the basis of their literal meaning some *human* agency (though imaginary) must *intend* the meaning for the sheer reason that these laws are designed to have a desired impact on human society. For that matter, the claim that the interpretations are independent of human intentions is no better or worse than to say that the laws just popped out of the computer by accidentally tapping on the keyboard. It would be a pathetic commentary on human affairs if the laws were to be made thus, unmindfully.

At this point, one might be curious to ask why the appeal to the literal meaning is made at all. One reason for this that seems ready at hand is to somehow link meaning (or interpretation) with what is *objectively* given. Intentionalism, on the other hand, makes room for multiple interpretations thereby leaving the question open as to which is *the* intended meaning. Thus literalism claims that the only evidence that is needed for arriving at the interpretation of a sentence is the syntactical structure in which the words occur which is a rule-governed operation to be followed by anyone for coming upon the *same* meaning. What is easily overlooked by the advocate of literalism is that even for the operation of the syntactical rules to be possible the *intending* consent of the language user is necessary. This argument has been developed by Knapp and Michaels in an interesting fashion for a better appreciation of which it would be worthwhile to quote the following crucial lines:

> Perhaps Searle would want to say that what gives the wave-poem its meaning is not the author's intention to follow some particular set of rules (since there is no author) and not the interpreter's ability to follow some rules (since the interpreter is not creating the meaning) but the fact that the *marks themselves* have followed the rules. But if they are rules that marks can follow, then they aren't rules at all—they're laws of nature.[6]

It is clear from the passage quoted above that, according to Knapp and Michaels, rule-following can be explained only in terms of the intention on the part of both author and interpreter. Now, this is not acceptable to Searle who in his follow-up rejoinder, 'Structure and Intention in Language: a Reply to Knapp and Michaels'[7] quotes the passage above by way of preparing the ground for his final assault. Searle argues that the intention (either of author or interpreter) is not crucial to our understanding of sentences (in a language) as this should not be confused with 'the intentionality of the system' which is 'such as to allow the existence of an infinite number of sentences, and this in turn implies that something can be a sentence without having been produced by any actually existing historical human intentions'.[8]

The main point of contention in this debate may be brought out in terms of the following question: Can there be a well-formed sentence (in any language) for the production of which no actual human intention is required? For Searle an affirmative reply to such a question is of strategic importance in order to hold out on the distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning. Now, what does Searle mean by 'the intentionality of the system' (of language) on which he draws heavily in order to make short shrift of the intentionalism of Knapp and Michaels? This may perhaps be explained in terms of the distinction he refers to earlier in the essay, namely, that between types and tokens. There he clarifies that this distinction 'is a consequence of the fact that language is rule-governed or conventional, because the notion of a rule or of a convention implies the possibility of repeated occurrences of the same phenomenon'[9]. And so, he argues that there can be an infinite number of token sentences of a linguistic *type*, and the production of any token sentence is independent of any historical human intention. For him it is quite imaginable that his pet cat's wandering over the computer keyboard may produce a perfect English sentence (for example, 'The chair is made of wood'). That this is a sentence in English can be claimed, we are told, on the basis of 'any of the standard criteria'[10]. Now, it is not that Knapp and Michaels do not agree with the view that language is a rule-governed activity and that, the same sentence in a language can be repeated at different points of time. But where they clearly disagree with Searle is whether this is ever possible without the participation of human intention. They deal with the matter by pointing back to the beach-marks example and asking the following question: Would it be sufficient for a set of marks to be a token of a sentence type in English if it merely resembles the latter? The argument that follows here considers some imaginary situations in which one may

observe resemblances by partial degrees. Given such a possibility, how can one be sure of the marks being a token of some sentence type without the input that they are *intended* to be a sentence token? So:

> it turns out, in fact, to be a necessary condition of any set of marks' being a sentence token of *any* sentence type in *any* language that it be intended by its producer to be a token of that type.[11]

It is interesting to see that Knapp and Michaels do not disagree with Searle's view that language is characterized by 'intentionality of the system' which is to say that it is necessary to have knowledge of the rules of grammar and syntax in order to be able to use the language. But from the standpoint of the interpreter what relevance will such knowledge of rules have for understanding the meaning of a sentence if the same rules have been applied in the production of the sentence (as in the beach-marks case of accidental production)? In other words, rule-following as a practice is not to be carried on *unilaterally* by the interpreter if the sentences (Knapp and Michaels would simply term them as 'marks') are themselves not the product of conscious rule-following. Marks produced by accident, even if they resemble well-formed sentences in a language, are not language at all because they do not satisfy the condition of being produced by human intention to follow the rules. However, the position is not acceptable to Searle who argues that so long as such marks '*satisfy* or *conform* to rules' it would be quite in order to speak of sentence meaning even if meeting of this condition is not dependent on any conscious rule-following. It must be noted that Searle is drawing here a subtle though relevant distinction between products of conscious rule-*following* (by a person) on one hand and products that result from the physical condition of certain sounds or marks *satisfying* the rules (even if by accident), on the other. Knapp and Michaels have all along taken the former alone as language while rejecting the latter out of hands. Searle seems to think that *both* the possibilities (that is, even the accidental production) are to be subsumed under the broad rubric of the term language. Knapp and Michaels have mainly remained confined to their concern with the exclusive domain of the *literary* text and its interpretation whereas Searle shows an overarching engagement with the philosophy of *language*. It is this which, to my mind, is responsible for making the issues that are involved in the debate somewhat out of focus and tendentious. The situation can be remedied by refocusing on the main issues in their relevant perspectives.

To turn to Searle, first: The main thrust of his argument seems to be (at least, in the essay under reference here) that what makes language or linguistic expressions and sentences possible is their *satisfying* the rules of grammar and syntax *even if this comes about by means other than human intention* (that is, say, by accident). In other words, not only the sentences that are produced by human intention (someone actually *intending* to

follow the rules) but even those that *somehow* satisfy the rules (by accident) are meaningful. Now, this must be viewed in the context of a broader perspective of language as an institution with its wide-ranging functions. From the general standpoint of the hearer, *any* sentence (in a language) which satisfies the rules of the language is meaningful notwithstanding *how* the condition is met. The examples Searle refers to are those of the beach-marks case ('wave-poem') and the cat fiddling with the computer keyboard. I think the first example is somewhat far-fetched in its description and also inappropriate for it makes use of a *poem*. One can easily sense here the objection that the criteria for determining what is a poem are not the same as for determining what is language (or sentence, etc.). The second example (that of catwalk on the computer keyboard) is again too chancy to be plausible. It may be perhaps a good idea to think up some other examples such as would be closer to life and our everyday experience. Take the case of my friend who had been deeply in love with a girl but the relationship broke off as the girl who belonged to a different caste had to marry a man her parents chose from the same caste. (Such cases are not too infrequent in Indian society.) A few years later, my friend also married another woman and settled down. The wife didn't know about the romantic affair of her husband. Now, my friend had the habit of talking in his sleep; and, as luck would have it through some utterances he made in sleep one night his wife came to know about his romantic attachment to the girl. When challenged by her husband she confronted him with the fact that the words spoken out by him in sleep gave him away. Now, here is a case (we need not go into the consequences of the matter) in which some words (or sounds) had been uttered in sleep without any *intention* of the utterer to do so, and yet since they satisfied the rules of grammar and syntax the hearer was able to figure out the meaning of the sentence(s) which gave her some vital information about her husband's past life. One can clearly distinguish here the sentence meaning (which the hearer gathered) which is *independent* of the utterer's intention. Not only did the utterer have *no* intention to speak out the words but he was not even *conscious* of what he was doing. To put the matter another way, the hearer can refer to the sentence meaning in this case which indeed was not intended by the utterer. It would be futile for the utterer to argue on the lines suggested by Knapp and Michaels that since such utterances were not intended by him they were not language at all! On the other hand, the hearer would be quite justified in arguing along the lines of Searle that since the sounds uttered in sleep satisfied the rules of grammar and syntax they surely have sentence meaning.

Another example that can be cited here is of a young student who was learning a foreign language by direct method. As part of this exercise, suppose that she is asked by the teacher to repeat after him a few sentences. Suppose further that just when the student begins to

utter the sentence aloud, let us say the English equivalent of which is 'This building is on fire!', a person who is well conversant with the foreign language steps into the room and after hearing the sentence spoken aloud panics. Now, neither the teacher nor the student ever intended to say what the sentence *means*. But for the chance hearer sentence meaning was at once operative though the teacher might explain later the point of the entire exercise as also that the meaning of the sentence had not been intended.

A third example is somewhat like this. Suppose that a person who knows and speaks only Hindi wins a lottery ticket for a short visit to the U.S.A. Before leaving for his destination he collects a small chart which lists out a few English sentences in Devanagari script along with their Hindi translations. The idea is that when he is in dire need of asking for food, water, hotel room, bus ticket, or some small help he should utter the relevant sentence in English to the desired effect. Suppose that this list contains a howler (may be mischievously contrived) in that instead of asking politely for food the sentence reads, 'You are my enemy; come and fight me'. He however believes that the sentence means something to the effect, 'Please serve me food; something hot and fresh'. Now, imagine the plight of this tourist when he utters the sentence off the chart to the waiter who comes to his table at the restaurant! If by sheer chance another person who knows both the languages intervenes in the ensuing scuffle and finds out from the Indian visitor everything about the chart he may try to pacify the restaurant staff by the following argument. What the visiting Indian intended was not what the sentence uttered by him means; his intention was to ask for food (hot and fresh, etc.) and he believed this to be the meaning of the sentence he had actually uttered. His fault lay in not being able to match his intention with sentence meaning through his ignorance of English. On the other hand, the waiter acted upon sentence meaning as he did not suspect the visitor of his ignorance of the language in use. This again is a case in which an utterance is made without the matching intention of the utterer though he believes that there is no gap between his intention and sentence meaning. In other words, the sentence meaning accrues independently of whatever might have been the speaker's intention.

Of the three examples that I have cited here the first two point to the possibility of language when utterances (sounds/marks) are made in the *absence* of any intention. For this matter, in these two cases the utterances could as well have been made imaginably by some *non*-human source or by accident. This precisely is the point which Searle is perhaps wanting to drive home. Our third example brings out how the existence of sentence meaning independent of human intention is possible. Sentence meaning in this case is not to be identified with speaker's meaning. Thus not only is Searle arguing (i) that a distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning is relevant but (ii) that language

(sentence meaning) is *possible* in the absence of any human intention which is also to say that it could have been produced by accident (or, non-human agency). The point at (ii) should not however be misconstrued to the effect that there *actually* exists any such language as the point of it is only to show a logical possibility in order to strengthen his claim at (i). It may be pointed out that even in response to our first two examples here one might argue that the utterances were regarded as language (linguistic expression/sentence) not merely because they satisfied the rules but rather for their resemblance to a lot of other similar sentence tokens which are produced by human intention. In other words, there might be a *derivative* sense in which marks produced by accident are language because they *resemble* the marks produced by human intention in the first place. But this would be quite besides the point when what is really at the centrestage is Searle's argument in support of (i). Knapp and Michaels seem to have missed the focus so far as this point is concerned. Their confusion in this respect is revealed if we attend to the following lines quoted from their 'Reply to Searle':

> In our view, then, the distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning is *real* but is not (as Searle calls it) a distinction between 'two kinds of meaning'; it is instead a distinction between two ways of meaning, by following the rules and by not following them, and these two ways are equally intentional.[12]

Notice that in this passage they first term the distinction as 'real' and then they issue a caveat. Now, how do they hope to find the meaning 'by not following' the rules in our first two examples cited earlier. The jealous wife could find out about her husband's past romantic attachment only from the utterances made by him which could neither be considered a case of following the rules nor that of not following them intentionally by the man in sleep. Similarly, in the case of the language-learning student repeating aloud the sentence after her teacher she was neither following nor not following the rules intentionally (though she might be said to be following a practice in the class). However, in both these cases what was crucial to the *hearer* was that the utterances satisfied the rules of grammar and syntax. After all, the question is not whether there *actually* is a language which is produced by accident (for, this perhaps is nobody's case) but whether in a given language (that is, *any* language) the distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning is valid. Take for instance all the corrections I have made in my script while writing this paper. What prompted me to do so was the consideration that the sentences typed out earlier did not fit the meaning I intended to convey through my writing. Not only that. At a later date I might still want to change or correct some sentence(s) should I find a gap between sentence meaning and what I intend to say. I believe this must be the case with any writer (and not necessarily of philosophical

essays). Interestingly, Knapp and Michaels themselves are no exception to this palpable practice. Turn to p. 673 ('Reply to Searle')[13] where they make the point that resemblance of a set of marks to a sentence token determine their sentence-hood though not 'intrinsically'. Now, on their own admission in their earlier writing ('Reply to George Wilson')[14] they had made the point while using the term 'intrinsically' which they now realize was 'misleading'. But how does the realization dawn upon them if not by considering the gap between sentence meaning (of the earlier writing) and what they intend to say? I would suggest here that what *intrinsically* determines whether a set of marks is a sentence token is the fulfilment of the requirement that it *satisfy* the rules of grammar and syntax though it is to be borne in mind that, according to Searle, the satisfiability criterion is to be delinked from actual rule-following. For Searle, to say that something conforms to or satisfies the rules is not to say that it is necessarily a case of actual rule-following by someone. He stresses this point only to hold on to the distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning. Knapp and Michaels, on the other hand, identify the rule-governed nature of language with *actual* rule-following by the language user and thereby claiming that the distinction made by Searle does not make room for two *kinds* of meaning; for, *intention* to follow the rules is the necessary condition for any language (sentence, expression) to have meaning.

At this stage, I think it necessary to focus attention on another aspect of the debate for which we may turn to the beach-marks example, once again. Significantly, the example is referred to as 'wave-poem' example by Knapp and Michaels while writing about it in their 'Reply to Searle'[15]. Why I call it 'significant' is because such description reflects the overriding concern of Knapp and Michaels with poems or the *literary* text, though they unsuspectingly get carried away by Searle's bait in the form of the question as to whether the marks on the beach can be considered *language*. Now, on behalf of Knapp and Michaels, one might ask the following question: Are the marks on the beach a *poem*? Would Searle say that it is a poem *because* the marks satisfy the rules of grammar and syntax? In other words, do we determine whether something is a poem or not by considering whether it follows the rules? And suppose that were the case then *anyone* could write a poem just by following the rules. In the present case the marks on the beach are readily *recognized* as a poem because one has familiarity with the genre of poetry (if not with the poems of Wordsworth). Whether something is a work of art (poem, etc.) cannot be determined by observing whether it *satisfies* certain rules of grammar and syntax even if we concede the point made by Searle that that is how we determine whether a set of marks is language. For, then, the criterion for the distinction between poems and the ordinary language (sentence tokens) would still remain open to question. Searle, in the essay under reference, has only argued about

the determining criterion for *sentence tokens* and not about poems. Thus the focus shifts from the literary text and its interpretation to sentence tokens and their determinability criterion. Unfortunately, the 'paradigm shift' is not taken note of by Knapp and Michaels and what consequently comes about is a confused amalgam of the two different issues.

The two issues should be set down distinguishably apart. Searle has been arguing that a set of marks would be language (sentence tokens) if only they conform to or satisfy the rules of grammar and syntax. By this way of putting the matter he succeeds in delinking the notion of conformability of the marks to the rules from the act of actual (intentional) rule-following by some historical person. Now by arguing that these two matters are only contingently related he presses ahead with the thesis that sentence meaning is independent of speaker meaning. One may take this to be the case for everyday language. But from this argument in respect of the determinability of language it does not follow that the *same* criteria would be applicable for determining whether something is a poem (that is, literary text). This raises a question of some fundamental importance: Are poems (literary works) products of mere chance? Or, can they ever be so. In a wider context, one might ask this sort of question about *any* work of art. But in a more specific sense, can a poem be possible without human intentions having to play any role in the matter? This way of asking the question is not to suggest that accidental elements do not enter at all into creative products. But for something to be *regarded* as a poem the human intention must have gone into making it so. In the beach-marks example the marks that appear after the receding waves may *look like* a poem though it cannot be regarded so if we are not sure that it was so *intended* by someone. The case in which a set of marks look like sentence tokens (in a language) must be distinguished from the one in which it is claimed to look like a *poem*. And so, the meaning or interpretation of the poem will have nothing to do with the former case, for unless it be regarded as a poem the talk about poetic meaning will make no sense. On the other hand, if it *is* a poem then the notion of a meaning of the poem is not independent of the notion of an *intending* act (that is, the poet's intention). Viewed against this perspective, Knapp and Michaels seem to be quite right in holding that the meaning of a poem is only to be identified with the intention of the poet and that even a reference to what Searle terms 'sentence meaning' would not make any sense in this context. What I am suggesting is that Searle's insistence on the distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning would seem quite pointless in the context of the *literary text*. The distinction is of relevance only when we take the everyday language as our paradigm. The intentionalistic thesis of Knapp and Michaels must be understood in light of such analysis though what is implicit here is the assumption that poetic language is distinguishable from our everyday language. If *this* distinction

is not accepted then Searle's point about sentence meaning being independent of speaker meaning would sweep over across the domain of creative literature. So what is at stake here is the autonomy of the literary text. The intending act of the creative writer *alone* intrinsically provides the criterion for regarding something as a literary work though whether it is among the successful of its kind would depend on other factors as well. Searle has argued that no actual intending act (or, rule-following) is necessary for a set of marks to be regarded as language. Knapp and Michaels need not join issue with him on this point. What they should and could stress is this: The case in which a set of marks is regarded as language is different from the case in which something is looked upon as, say, a poem. So even if the intending act is not integral to language production (in a purely theoretical sense) this will not warrant the extension of that argument to the making of poems or the literary text. Further, Searle must see the point that while he wants to dispense with the requirement of rule-following (as done intentionally) this does not help him to come to grips with the production of poems, etc. Poems cannot be produced by mere following of rules and much less the rules of grammar and syntax. For a process which is rule-governed (which language indeed is) one can point to the 'intentionality of the system' as Searle does to emphasize that conformability to the rules (of the marks) is what matters rather than any actual act of intending to follow the rules. But where departure from the rules (as in the case of poems, etc.) brings into existence a new range of meanings the intending act to do so is of the essence of any appreciation of the values so created.

An interesting point emerges. The main thrust of Searle's argument has been to focus on the condition of *satisfiability* of the rules as conceived independently of an intending act to be the determining criterion for a set of marks to be language. It follows that if the rules of grammar and syntax are not satisfied then the marks *alone*, even if they resemble the words in a language, cannot be regarded a language (sentence tokens, etc.). In other words, one can speak of sentence meaning of a sentence provided that the latter satisfies the grammatical and syntactical rules. Now, one can imagine that in a poem there might be a few lines which do not strictly adhere to the rules though such violation may sometimes heighten specific emotive elements. In Searle's view, these should not be regarded as sentence tokens, and therefore can claim to have no sentence meaning. But a sympathetic reader may at once see the intention of the poet as to the poetic significance of the lines in the total structure of meaning. What counts here as the *poetic meaning* is directly related to the intending act of creation which simply cannot be paraphrased in terms of the sum total of a set of grammatically well-formulated sentences. Knapp and Michaels are quite right in rejecting the dichotomy between sentence meaning and intended meaning if

the point of consideration relates to our understanding of poetic meaning. Where they really go wrong is in overstretching their point to cover the much larger domain of *all* meaningful utterances. In doing so they also tend to overlook the fact that they have shifted away from their central concern which is that of interpreting the *literary* text. I hasten to add that this in a way also shows the futility of applying a theory of language (or some aspect of it) to the problem of literary interpretation such as what has been attempted by Searle. While dealing with the interpretation of a poem what is crucial to such an exercise is to recognize that only an intentionalistic thesis can come to grips with metaphorical meanings, departures from conventional usages, etc. The position maintained by Knapp and Michaels, that all there is is the intended meaning, has to be seen only in the context of the literary text.

In conclusion, I have argued that the disagreement between Searle, on one hand, and Knapp and Michaels, on the other, on the point of distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning would seem to be of no great consequence if the ground on which each side builds up its case is clearly defined and demarcated. Searle's insistence on the distinction should be acceptable if one is looking at language *per se* from outside its domain as it were. For a set of marks to be meaningful as language (linguistic expression, sentence, etc.) it should suffice if the marks conform to the rules of grammar and syntax of that language. The fulfilment of such a condition can be held as logically independent of an actual act of intending to follow the rules. (Whether this in *actuality* is the case is besides the point of argument). In the context of our everyday language there are situations galore in which one could point to the possible dichotomy between sentence meaning and speaker meaning. As an *outsider* to a language (a foreign language, for example) one is trained to see whether a set of marks (words, etc.) conforms to the rules of that language; and in such cases one can surely refer to the *literal* meaning of the sentence regardless of whatever might have been intended. But the interpreter who deals with the poetic language occupies a position *vis-à-vis* that language as that of an *insider* who, because of his implicit knowledge of the rules, must recognize the *intention* of the poet in both following and not following (in some places) the relevant rules. Knapp and Michaels, in my view, are quite right in rejecting the notion of sentence meaning if they be taken to be arguing so in the context of the literary text *alone*.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. John R. Searle, 'Literary Theory and Its Discontents', *New Literary History*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Summer 1994; henceforth *LTID*.
2. Ibid., p. 650.
3. Ibid., p. 649.
4. S. Knapp and W. Michaels, 'Reply to John Searle', op. cit., p. 670.
5. Ibid., p. 672.
6. Ibid., p. 674.
7. John R. Searle, 'Structure and Intention in Language: A Reply to Knapp and Michaels', op.cit., pp. 677–81; henceforth *SIL*.
8. Ibid., p. 680.
9. John R. Searle, LTID, op.cit., p. 643.
10. John R. Searle, SIL, op. cit., p. 680.
11. S. Knapp and W. Michaels, op.cit., p. 673.
12. Ibid., p. 674 [my emphasis].
13. Ibid., p. 673.
14. S. Knapp and W. Michaels, 'Reply to George Wilson', *Critical Inquiry*, 19, Autumn 1992, p. 188.
15. 'Reply to John Searle', op.cit.

A Critique on Brahman-Realization

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INTRODUCTION

The philosophical pursuit in ancient India can broadly be categorized as follows:

(i) Pursuit based on the belief in the existence of self (*ātman*) or Reality;
(ii) Pursuit based on disbelief in the existence of self; and
(iii) Pursuit that disagrees with both belief and disbelief in the existence of self.

Almost all orthodox Indian philosophical systems and some of the heterodox systems share the view of the first category. However, each system disagrees with the other in defining self (*ātman*).[1] Among these systems, some (for instance the Cārvāka school) define the self as physical matter, some as vital breath (*prāṇa*), some as mind (*manas*), some as *buddhi* and some (for instance Advaita Vedānta) as Pure Consciousness. They also differ among themselves in the identification of the number of realities. For instance, Gotama in his *Nyāyasūtras* says that there are sixteen categories while Vyāsa in his *Brahmasūtras* maintains that there is only one Reality called Brahman.

Śri Śaṅkarācārya clearly defines Brahman as unqualified Pure Consciousness—the one and only non-dual Reality without a second. According to him, Brahman can be experienced. He reiterates that personal experience is the only valid means apart from verbal testimony (*śruti*) to realize the existence of Brahman. Hence an attempt is made in this paper to examine whether Brahman-realization is possible through personal experience or not.

ARE STATEMENTS RELATING TO BRAHMAN-ĀTMAN HYPOTHESES?

Most of the Upaniṣads begin with an inquiry into the Reality from the unknown Brahman to the known world, in order to establish the one and only non-dual Reality called Brahman. It is also stated in the Upaniṣads that Brahman-Ātman can be experienced.[2] Brahman-Ātman and statements related to the same may be considered in three ways in

Advaita Vedānta. They are: (i) as logical propositions, (ii) as objects of faith and (iii) as hypotheses. If 'Brahman-Ātman. . .' is a logical proposition, then the whole of Advaita Vedānta becomes a logical exercise to establish Brahman-Ātman. Logical establishment of Brahman-Ātman does not lead one to Brahman experience. Therefore, the logical method to establish Brahman-Ātman is not discussed in this paper.

If Brahman-Ātman is an object of faith and if it remains as an object of faith then one cannot have Brahman-experience because one requires to have faith only in such a thing which cannot be experienced. Thus, the only method left to establish Brahman-Ātman within the fold of human experience is to consider the statements related to Brahman-Ātman as hypotheses. Śaṅkara seems to accept Brahman-Ātman, that is, non-duality as hypothesis.[3] Vidyāraṇya also appears to hold the same view.[4] Thus, there is ground to consider Brahman-Ātman and its related statements as hypotheses.

Brahman, *Ātman* and the statement, namely, 'This *ātman* is Brahman', are basically conceived as hypotheses in Advaita Vedānta. These hypotheses are based on three important premises, namely:

(i) There is 'Brahman'[5] from which everything comes forth;
(ii) There is '*ātman*'[6] by which everything is known; and
(iii) This *ātman* is Brahman.[7]

Some of the hypotheses as set out in the Vedānta texts may be presented as follows: (i) 'In the beginning there was Brahman alone, one only, without a second';[8] (ii) 'All this is Brahman'.[9] Based on such hypotheses, Śaṅkara opines that, 'from the Realization of Brahman follows the highest human objective (namely, liberation). Therefore, one should undertake a deliberation on Brahman.'[10]

It may be stated that any hypothesis gains credibility if sufficient evidence is produced in its favour. For instance, one may not believe in the statement: 'There is a ghost in the room', even if it has been made by a genius or a pious person who hails from a great tradition until it is established with an experiential proof. Similarly, the hypothesis, 'There is Brahman from which everything comes forth', etc., needs to be established with practical realization. Thus one should examine whether such Brahman-Realization is possible or not.

The question 'Is Brahman-Realization possible?' arises in the following contexts:

(i) When one treats the statements related to Brahman as hypotheses;
(ii) When one questions the *Śruti* texts after a thorough investigation regarding the possibility of Brahman experience;
(iii) When one finds oneself in *Anubhavagata sandehaḥ* regarding Brahman after overcoming *Pramāṇagata sandehaḥ, Prameyagata sandehaḥ*, and *Viparītabhāvana* by attaining the eight-fold practices;[11] and
(iv) When one does not find experiential proof of Brahman.

In other words, if Brahman is to be Real, then one should experience the same.

THE STAND OF ADVAITA VEDĀNTA REGARDING BRAHMAN-REALIZATION

Śaṅkara holds that, since knowledge of Brahman culminates in experience and it relates to an existing entity, the Vedic texts, personal experience, etc., are taken as possible valid means for Brahman-knowledge.[12] He is also of the opinion that, 'the knowledge of Brahman must be determined by the thing (that is, Brahman) itself, since it is concerned with an existing reality.'[13] The *Śruti* text also states that 'Through mind alone the self is known'[14] and not by any other means. Brahman-knowledge is possible only through mind and personal experience is accepted as valid means to it. Therefore, one must trace the possibility of Brahman-Realization within the fold of Epistemological Analytic.[15]

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYTIC

According to Advaita Vedānta, human knowledge is broadly divided into two kinds, namely, *Nityajñāna* and *Vṛttijñāna. Nityajñāna* is *ātman.* It is Pure Consciousness. It is Bliss Infinite. It should be known through mind alone.[16] Since Advaitins argue that *Nityajñāna* is the basis for all varieties of knowledge, it is the objective of the hypothesis. If the existence of *Nityajñāna* is proved through *Vṛttijñāna,* then it becomes Real; otherwise, it is only an unproved presupposition. In order to examine whether realization of *Nityajñāna* is possible through *Vṛttijñāna,* one must analyse all kinds of *Vṛttijñāna* to find a suitable *vṛtti* for the revelation of *Nityajñāna.*

Analysis of Vṛttijñāna

Vṛttijñāna may be divided into two categories: (i) *Avidyā vṛttijñāna* and (ii) *Antaḥkaraṇa vṛttijñāna. Avidyā vṛttijñāna* is further subdivided into (i) *Avidyā khaṇḍākāra vṛttijñāna* and (ii) *Avidyā akhaṇḍākāra vṛttijñāna.* Examples for *Avidyā khaṇḍākāra vṛttijñāna* are knowledge of illusory objects such as snake on a rope and dream objects. Example for *Avidyā akhaṇḍākāra vṛttijñāna* is Bliss in Deep Sleep.[17] Since *Avidyā akhaṇḍākāra vṛttijñāna* has some relevance in the forthcoming arguments, it may be necessary to discuss the same in detail at this stage. The *Avidyā akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti* is formed in Deep Sleep because of the absence of objects of knowledge) known generally in Waking and

Dream).[18] The state of Deep Sleep is called *Ānandamaya,* that is, 'endowed with an abundance of Bliss', because at the time of Deep Sleep, the mind is free from the miseries of efforts made on account of the states of mind being involved in the relationship of subject and object. Advaitins believe that this is not Bliss by itself because it is not Bliss Infinite.[19]

Similarly, *Antaḥkaraṇa vṛttijñāna* is of two types: (i) *Antaḥkaraṇa khanḍākāra vṛttijñāna* and (ii) *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna.* Further, *Antaḥkaraṇa khanḍākāra vṛttijñāna* may be subdivided into (i) *Antaraṅga antaḥkaraṇa vṛttijñāna* and (ii) *Bahirgata antaḥkaraṇa vṛttijñāna.* Examples of *Antaraṅga antaḥkaraṇa vṛttijñāna* are happiness, etc., and of *Bahirgata antaḥkaraṇa vṛttijñāna* are table, chair, etc. Advaitins believe that *ātman* as such cannot be revealed in all the said varieties of *vṛtti* except in the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti.*[20] Since the subject matter of the present paper is confined to Brahman-Realization an examination of the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is attempted below.

According to the Advaitins, the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is *ātman* itself and it is presupposed as the only Reality. They also believe that *ātman* alone is real and the rest of the objects of any other *vṛtti* is unreal. For them, *ātman* is Bliss Infinite. In order to find an answer to the question, 'Is Brahman-Realization possible?', one should ask the Advaitins: How can one believe in only the reality of the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti,* while the other objects of all *vṛttis* are rejected as false? This question leads one to inquire into the arguments given by the Advaitins for the falsity of the objects of all other *vṛttis.* One needs to verify whether the same arguments are applicable in the case of the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti.* Since Advaitins believe that *ātman* is Bliss Infinite, one should also find out the reasons for the blissful nature of Deep Sleep in order to examine whether the same reasons are applicable in the case of the blissful nature of *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛittijñāna.*

ADVAITIN'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE FALSITY OF OBJECTS OF WAKING AND DREAM

(a) Śaṅkara holds that the objects in the states of Waking and Dream are 'perceived'. He argues that as the objects perceived to exist in Dream are illusory, so also are the objects perceived in the Waking state. Since the common feature of the objects of both Waking and Dream experience is 'being perceived', they are said to be illusory.[21]

(b) It is argued that the objects of both Waking and Dream experience are illusory because they are associated with the subject-object relationship.[22]

(c) It is said that all objects in Waking, as in Dream, are imagined. It is pointed out that the internal mental *vṛttis,* whether in Dream or in Waking, are thought to be unreal. Gauḍapāda in his *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* reiterates the unreality of the objects of Waking and Dream which the self merely imagines.[23]

EXPERIENCE OF ĀTMAN IS FALSE

(a) If 'being seen' is the common factor, based on which the objects of Waking and Dream are proved to be illusory, then the question that arises is: Is the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* 'seen' or not? If the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is 'seen', then the logic applied for the falsity of objects of both Waking and Dream also applies to the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* and consequently the *ātman* becomes illusory. If the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is 'not seen', then how can one determine that the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is *ātman*?

(b) One should realize that, since the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is seen, there exists a subject-object relationship between the seer and the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti.* If one argues that there is no subject-object relationship between the two, then the question arises: If the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* itself is the seer, then how can the seer see himself being separated in the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* by himself?In case it is argued that the seer is different from the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti,* then one cannot say that the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is *ātman,* which is supposed to be the basis of knowledge.
Since the subject-object relationship has to be accepted in the case of *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna,* the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti,* that is, *ātman,* becomes illusory on the basis of the argument given by the Advaitins to falsify the objects of Waking and Dream.

(c) It is said that all objects of mental *vṛttis* are imagined and, therefore, are illusory. Similarly, it can be argued that, since the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is also a mental *vṛtti,* the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* must be imagined. Therefore, the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is said to be illusory. Thus, it can be ascertained that the realization of the *ātman* is not possible.

BLISS IN DEEP SLEEP AND ANTAḤKARAṆA AKHANḌĀKĀRA VṚTTIJÑĀNA

It is said that the *akhanḍākāra vṛtti* in Deep Sleep is formed by *avidyā* whereas in the case of *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna,* the *akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is formed by the *antaḥkaraṇa* itself. The Bliss in Deep Sleep is the result of the absence of objects and for the same reason

Bliss can be experienced even in *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna.* It has to be reiterated that the Bliss in both cases is experienced by 'non-duality caused by the absence of the objects and not by the presence of the non-dual object'. Therefore, confirmation of the experience of *ātman* based on the experience of Bliss can be ruled out. Thus the reality of *ātman* still remains a doubtful proposition. The idea that the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is false may be supported by the following arguments.

THE METAPHYSICAL ANALYTIC

According to Advaita Vedānta, *avidyā* has two innate powers: (i) the concealing power and (ii) the projecting power. In other words, *avidyā* necessarily conceals reality at its causal level and when it comes to the effect level, that is, *antaḥkaraṇa* level, it not only conceals reality but also projects falsity. That means the specific characteristic of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is to project falsity after concealing reality. Now it can be argued that, if *ātman* is revealed in the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti,* then *ātman* becomes a false projection of the *antaḥkaraṇa,* because the *antaḥkaraṇa* necessarily conceals reality and projects unreality. In other words, the *antaḥkaraṇa* always projects false objects, and since *ātman* is revealed by the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti,* it is said that *ātman* also can be a false projection and, therefore, necessarily unreal. Advaita Vedānta does not offer any reason to accept the reality of the only projection of the *antaḥkaraṇa,* namely, *ātman* in the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti.* It may be a case of the 'logic of convenience' because when the Advaitins found non-duality in *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna,* they tried to account for the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* as *ātman,* that is, the objective of their proposed hypothesis. On the other hand, when the same logic is put forth in a different way, it can be said that Deep Sleep is conditioned by cause alone—a state of non-apprehension (*agrahaṇam*) of reality; and Waking and Dream states are conditioned by both cause and effect—states of mis-apprehension (*anyathāgrahaṇam*).[24] Deep Sleep is said to be the causal state—the state of *avidyā,* in which one does not know the reality. When *avidyā* gives rise to its effect called the *antaḥkaraṇa* in Waking and Dream states, these states become the states of both non-apprehension and mis-apprehension. Now it can be argued that, if Waking and Dream are called the states of both non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of reality because of the function of the *antaḥkaraṇa,* then for the same reason the state of *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna* also can equally be called the state of both non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of reality. Thus, the mis-apprehended object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti,* that is, *ātman,* becomes false.

THE EXPERIENTIAL ANALYTIC

The whole of human experience in Advaita Vedānta is divided into three states, namely, (i) Waking, (ii) Dream, and (iii) Deep Sleep. One should know the activity of the *antaḥkaraṇa* in the three states of experience in order to evaluate the reality of the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti.* The activity of the *antaḥkaraṇa* can be described as follows: The *antaḥkaraṇa* in Waking state functions externally through the senses; it conceals *turīya* and projects all duality. When it retires from Waking state and withdraws itself to the Dream state, it not only conceals *turīya* but also projects the duality of internal mental images. When it withdraws from this activity of projecting duality, it merges into its cause, that is, *avidyā* in Deep Sleep. There it withdraws all its dual projections but yet it conceals *turīya.* Similarly, it can be argued that when one introverts (*antarmukhatva*) one's *antaḥkaraṇa,* as its natural course the *antaḥkaraṇa* withdraws its projection of duality. When one forces the *antaḥkaraṇa* to surpass Deep Sleep to form the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti,* then it naturally projects non-duality due to the absence of objects. The only difference between the Deep Sleep state and the state of *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna* is that in Deep Sleep there is only concealment of *turīya* whereas in the state of *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna,* there is not only concealment of *turīya* but also false projection of non-duality.

The reasons for such non-dual projection in the state of *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna* are as follows: (i) It is natural for *avidyā* to project *akhanḍākāra vṛtti* in Deep Sleep due to the absence of objects. Any state beyond Deep Sleep cannot be of duality for the same reason, that is, absence of objects. (ii) Since the *antaḥkaraṇa* does not have any object in the introversion beyond Deep Sleep, it naturally projects non-duality, as its cause projects in Deep Sleep. The projection of non-duality in the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* should necessarily be a case of projection of falsity because of the natural characteristics of the *antaḥkaraṇa*—to conceal reality and project falsity.

If this argument is not acceptable to an Advaitin, then he should submit the reasons for the failure of the *antaḥkaraṇa* in projecting falsity only in the case of *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna.* Such reasons are not found in *Advaita Vedānta,* because any reason that applies for the reality of the object of the *antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* also applies for the reality of the objects of the other *antaḥkaraṇa vṛttis.* Consequently, any reason for the reality of the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* makes the whole world real. If this argument is acceptable, then the object revealed in the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti,* that is, *ātman,* becomes a false projection as the *antaḥkaraṇa* does in both Waking and Dream states. Alternatively, if the *ātman* is held to be a 'real' object revealed by the *antaḥkaraṇa,* then the

objects in Waking and Dream states were also to be regarded as real as such.

ANALYSIS OF KNOWER

The knower of Waking, Dream and *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna* is defined as follows:

(i) In the Waking state the knower is defined by Advaitins as 'Consciousness conditioned by the *antaḥkaraṇa*'.
(ii) In the Dream state the knower is 'Consciousness conditioned by the *antaḥkaraṇa*'.
(iii) In the state of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna* the knower is 'Consciousness conditioned by the *antaḥkaraṇa*'.

The above definitions reveal that the knower is the same for Waking, Dream and *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna*. Advaitins say that in the three states, namely, Waking, Dream and Deep Sleep, the one and the same object of experience appears in threefold form as the gross, the subtle and the blissful.[25] It is so because the experience of the three states is only different forms of thoughts or ideas and hence unreal. Similarly, the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* can also be called a mere *manaspandanaṃ* and hence unreal. As Bliss in Deep Sleep is equated with an unreal mental vibration, the Bliss in *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna* also can be equated with a mental vibration which is unreal. Since the objects of the knower of Dream and Waking are proved to be false, the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* can also be declared as unreal on the same grounds. Thus it may be argued that since the knower is the same for Waking, Dream and *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna*, the object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is also false.

EXPERIENCE OF ĀTMAN IS NOT POSSIBLE THROUGH JAHADAJAHALLAKṢAṆA

Position of Advaita Vedānta

The Advaitins claim that one attains the revelation of *ātman* through the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* by contemplating on the great Vedic sentences such as, 'That thou art.', etc. According to them, when one uses the method of *ubhayalakṣaṇa* to the words 'That' and 'Thou' in the great Vedic sentence, 'That thou art.', one attains *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛttijñāna*. The *antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* can destroy one's ignorance of Brahman-Ātman.

Critique

The object of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* cannot be accepted as

real when one thoroughly inquires into the process of *jahadajahallakṣaṇa*. When the *vācyārtha* of the word *'tat'* which is in the form of *āvaraṇa*, that is *Māyā*, the adjunct of *Īśvara* and the *vācyārtha* of the word *'tvam'*, which is in the form of *vikṣepa*, that is, the *antaḥkaraṇa*, the adjunct of *jīva*, are destroyed, then there remains only Pure Consciousness. The process of the application of *jahadajahallakṣaṇa* may be symbolically presented as in the following flow chart.[26]

1. $[C.A] \equiv a$
   $\sim A$
   $\therefore C \equiv a$
   $\therefore a \equiv I$

2. $[C.M] \equiv I$
   $\sim M$
   $\therefore C \equiv I$

$\therefore$ C = Pure Consciousness
A = *avidyā*
a = *ātman*
~ = annihilation of
M = *Māyā*
I = *Īśvara*
[.] = conditioned by

Now, one can raise the question, how, once all adjuncts are removed, how can the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti*, which is a product of the adjunct, come into existence? In other words, since the adjunct of *jīva*, that is, *antaḥkaraṇa* is removed, how can the destroyed *antaḥkaraṇa* again form the *akhanḍākāra vṛtti*? Thus, it is meaningless to say that there arises the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* after cessation of the *antaḥkaraṇa*.

Another argument may be given by questioning the purpose of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti*. One cannot say, as Advaitins do, that the purpose of the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is destruction of ignorance, because ignorance is destroyed already by the annihilation of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. According to Advaita Vedānta the destruction of ignorance and Realization of Brahman take place simultaneously. Then how can again the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti*, a product of ignorance, arise and destroy the ignorance of Brahman? It is not reasonable to say that ignorance is destroyed—once by *jahadajahallakṣaṇa*, once by *āvaraṇa nirākaraṇa* and again by the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti*. Thus, Śaṅkara clearly declares that the scriptures do not seek to establish Brahman as an entity referable objectively.[27] Even Rāmakṛṣṇādhvari, the author of the *Sikhāmaṇi Vyākhyā* on the *Advaita Vedānta Paribhāṣa* of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, is of the opinion that *siddhānta* cannot be established through the method of *jahadajahallakṣaṇa*.[28] Therefore, the revelation of *ātman* in the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhanḍākāra vṛtti* is not possible through *jahadajahallakṣaṇa*.

DECLARATION OF MADHUSŪDANA SARASVATI

In support of the arguments against objectivity of *ātman* in the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti*, Madhusūdana Sarasvati, in the first chapter of his *Advaitasiddhi* says that Brahman revealed in *vṛtti* is *sopādikam* and cannot be pure.[29] He reiterates that pure *ātman* cannot be the object of *vṛtti*.[30]

BRAHMAN-REALIZATION IS NOT POSSIBLE

Scriptural statements such as 'where mind cannot comprehend',[31] 'where speech returns with mind',[32] 'one will not return',[33] and *Smṛti* statements such as 'where one goes and never returns',[34] etc., reveal that Brahman-Realization is possible only after destruction of ignorance. In other words, Brahman-Realization is possible only when the *antaḥkaraṇa* is destroyed. Therefore, it can be argued that Brahman cannot be revealed in the *Antaḥkaraṇa akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti*. At the same time, it can also be argued that, since Brahman is realized after the annihilation of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, its validity purely depends on the *Śruti*, that is, on the proposed hypothesis and not on personal experience. It can be said so because the verification of Brahman-Realization is not possible since the *Śruti* text states that 'One will not return', etc., to explain the process of Brahman-Realization. Thus, it is clearly established that Advaita Vedānta begins with a hypothesis, and ends with the same unconfirmed.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

On the strength of the above arguments and analysis it is concluded that Brahman-Realization is not possible.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Śri Kākaraparti Krishna Śāstri, *Sadāmuktisudhārṇavamu*, translated into Telugu by Somanadha Sastri, Vavilla Ramaswami Sastrulu & Sons, Vavilla Press, Madras, 1935, pp. 41–66.
   According to K. Krishna Sastri, the *ātman* is defined by the Cārvāka school as physical matter, by the Lokāyata school as senses (*indriyas*), by the Hiraṇyagarbha school as vital breath (*prāṇa*), by the Nāradapañcarātra school as mind (*manas*), by the Yogācāra school as *buddhi* and by the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṁsa as sheet of Bliss (*Ānandamaya Kośa*).
2. *The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad with Gauḍapāda Kārikā and Śaṅkara's Commentary*, 1.7. *Sa ātmā sa vijñeyaḥ*, p. 46. Translated by Swami Nikhilananda, Sri Ramakrishna Ashram, Mysore, sixth edition, 1974.
3. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Śaṅkara Bhāṣya*, 2.1.20:
   Sarvāsu hy upaniṣatsu pūrvam ekatvam pratijñāya dṛṣṭāntair hetubhiśca paramātmano vikārāṁśāditvam jagataḥ pratipādya punar ekatvam upasaṁharati.

4. Vidyāraṇya, *Pañcadaśī*, XI. 25, p. 442. Translated by Swami Swahananda, R.K. Muth, Madras, third edition, 1980.
   While answering the objection: 'I do not admit non-duality but only accept it as a hypothesis to be refuted.'
   Nābhyupaimyahamadvaitam tadvaco 'nūdhya dūṣaṇam.
5. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 3.1: *Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante. Yena jātāni jīvanti. Yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti. Tadvijiñāsasva. Tadbrahmeti.*
   And *The Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya*, 1.1.2, pp. 17–18. Translated by Gambhirananda Swami, Advaita Ashram, Calcutta, fourth edition, 1983.
6. The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, I.2, pp. 10–11: *Ayamātmā.*
7. Ibid.: *Ayamātmā brahma.*
8. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.2.2: *Satveva somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam.*
9. The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, I.2, pp. 10–11: *Sarvam hyetadbrahma.*
10. The *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya*, 1.1.1., p. 9.
11. *Eight-fold practices:* (1) *Viveka*, (2) *Vairāgya*, (3) *Śamādi sampat*, (4) *Mumukṣatva*, (5) *Tattvam padārtha sodanam*, (6) *Śravaṇa*, (7) *Manana* and (8) *Nidhidyāsana.*
12. The *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya*, 1.1.2., p. 16.
13. Ibid., p. 17.
14. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.4.19.; *manasaivānudraṣṭavyam.* Also see *The Kaṭhopaniṣad*, 1.3.12. *Dṛśyate tvagryayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā sūkṣmadarśibhiḥ.*
15. The epistemological analytic describes an abridged analysis of the classification of the maximum possible varieties of knowledge in *Advaita Vedānta.*
16. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.4.19; *manasaivānudraṣṭavyam.* Also the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, 1.3.12. *Dṛśyate tvagryayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā sūkṣmadarśibhiḥ.*
17. Bellamkonda Rāmarāya Kavi, *Śrī Śaṅkarāśaṅkara Bhāṣyavimarśaḥ*, pp. 37–38. Published by Kavitha Venkatasubrahmanya Sastri, Śrī Rāmakavitā grantha mālāsampādakaḥ, Narasaravupeta, Gunturu District, Andhra Pradesh, India, 1953.
   nanu samādhau bhavatvevam Śabdādbrahmākārāṇtaḥkaraṇa vṛttiḥ; Katham Punassuṣuptau tadā'ntaḥkaraṇasyaivābhāvāditi cenmaivam . . . avidhyāyāssatvena tadā Brahmākāra avidhyā vṛttisattvānna nirvikalpaka jñānasya kāpi kṣatiḥ. . .
   Tasmāt suṣuptāvavidhyā vṛttibhissākṣyānandājñānānubhavasya jāyamānatvānna nirvikalpakajñānāsttvamiti.
18. The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, 1.5, p. 21.
19. Ibid.
20. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.4.19; The *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, I.3.12.
    According to the *Advaita* classification of knowledge, there is at least one among the three possible sources, for the revelation of *Nityajñāna*, namely, (i) *Nityajñāna* itself, (ii) in the fragmented modification of mind and *Avidyā* (*khaṇḍākara vṛtti*) and (iii) in the unfragmented mental modification (*antaḥkaraṇa akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti*). It can be argued: (i) Brahman-Ātman (*Nityajñāna*) as such is experienced only when the *antaḥkaraṇa* is destroyed and in turn its validity depends only on verbal testimony and not on personal experience. Therefore, realization of *Nityajñāna* requires some other means in order to be established through personal experience; (ii) Though *Nityajñāna* is presupposed as the basis for all kinds of *Vṛttijñāna*, it cannot be experienced in knowledge obtained through fragmented modifications of mind and *Avidyā*. It is said so because *Nityajñāna* is described as non-dual in *Advaita Vedānta* and it is not possible to realize non-duality while one is in duality; (iii) Therefore, it can be said that the unfragmented mental modification is the only source for the revelation of *Nityajñāna*. Thus an examination of the object of the *antaḥkaraṇa akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti* is conducted here.
21. The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, 2.4, p. 88.
22. Ibid., 2.5, p. 89.

23. Ibid., 2.9–15, pp. 95–103.
24. Ibid., 1.7 (11), p. 57.
25. Ibid., 1.6 (5) pp. 34–35.
26. (i) Consciousness conditioned by *Avidyā* is *ātman;* when *Avidyā* is annihilated Consciousness is *ātman.*
    (ii) Consciousness conditioned by *Māyā* is *Īśvara;* when *Māyā* is removed Consciousness is *Īśvara.*
    Therefore *ātman* is *Īśvara.*
    The inference here is that *ātman* gets identified with *Īśvara* only when *Avidyā* is destroyed. When *Avidyā* (cause) is destroyed completely then the existence of the *antaḥkaraṇa* with its modifications (effect) is not possible.
27. The *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya,* 1.1.4., p. 31.
28. Rāmakṛṣṇādhvari, *The Advaita Vedānta Paribhāṣa Sikhāmaṇi Vyākhyā,* 123.21. *Sidhānte Jahadajahallakṣanayā evāsiddheḥ.*
29. Madhusūdana Sarasvati, *Advaita Siddhi,* Chapter I, 239.2. *Śuddham hi Brahma na dṛśyaṁ 'yattadadreśya' miti śruteḥkimtu upahitameva. Tacca mithyaiva. Na hi vṛttidaśāyā manupahitam tadbhavati.*
30. Ibid., Chapter I, 242–4. *Vṛttikāle vṛttirūpeṇa dharmeṇa śudhdatvāsambhavāt. Śuddhasya vṛttiviṣayatvam na sambhavati.*
31. The *Kenopaniṣad,* 1.6. *Yanmanasā na manute yenāhurmano matam.*
32. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* 2.9.1. *Yatovāco nivartante. Aprāpya manasāsaḥ.*
33. The *Chāndogyopaniṣad,* 8.15.1. *Naca punarāvartate.*
34. The *Bhagavadgītā,* 15.6. *Yadgatvā na nivartante.*

Pramāṇa Saṁplava and *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā*

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I

The theory of *pramāṇa* is one of the major areas of philosophical controversies. It is not simply associated with the employment of *pramāṇa* but also with the philosophy of *pramāṇas* themselves. In Indian philosophical systems we come across two definitions of *pramāṇa* differing in nature and thereby representing two major philosophical traditions. Nyāya has defined *pramāṇa* as instrument of valid knowledge (*Pramā Karaṇaṃ Pramāṇam*) which is widely accepted by the orthodox schools. The Buddhist logicians have defined *pramāṇa* in their own fashion as the effect of object known (*Prameya Kāryaṃ hi Pramāṇam*).[1] It is in the process of conceptualizing *pramāṇa* that certain basic questions can be raised. How do we come to *pramāṇas* themselves and what is the evidence for them? If *pramāṇa* is made available we can settle all the disputes by making an appeal to suitable *pramāṇa.* If the dispute arises regarding *pramāṇas* themselves after their availability then how and to what extent can *pramāṇas* help us in this perplexed situation? How do we come to entertain the idea of *pramāṇa*? The perplexity cannot be resolved by appealing to *pramāṇas* themselves which tend to show that we are ultimately to fall back upon our intuitive grasp of *pramāṇas* and in this sense a *pramāṇa* is not empirical discovery or inductive generalization. It is only when we have criteria for determining valid knowledge, that *pramāṇas* can be inductively obtained. This criterion itself cannot be based on *pramāṇas* as in that case the argument will suffer from circularity. Therefore, we must have criteria independent of *pramāṇas* for deciding which knowledge is valid and which is not.

If it is said that valid knowledge is a correct representation of reality we are bound to know what reality is like. This must again be independent of *pramāṇa,* since we have not yet decided what is to be treated as *pramāṇa.* The train of logical thought would be in this fashion: If this is reality, this knowledge is valid; if this knowledge is valid, this particular means of obtaining is to be treated as *pramāṇa.* If the reality is believed

to be available only to mystic experience then the theory of *pramāṇa* will become irrelevant. The nature of reality cannot be empirically determined but it is a pre-given ontological assumption. The *pramāṇas* are then to be treated as a device to rationalize the whole procedure, yet they make false claim about their precedence. Therefore independent neutral status and role of *pramāṇas* can be safely doubted. This is revealed in the controversies regarding the *pramāṇas* in the history of ideas. Philosophers have agreed neither about the nature, nor the number of *pramāṇas*, nor about the object of the resultant knowledge generated by them.[2] When there is dispute about the nature of *pramāṇa*, we cannot offer those very *pramāṇas* as evidence without committing the fallacy of *petito principii*. Nor can we appeal to some other *pramāṇas*, since the latter would be exactly in the same predicament and it would itself require its justification. We cannot go on making an appeal to more and more basic *pramāṇa*, since there is no such thing as basic indisputable *pramāṇa*. So in the set of *pramāṇas* no *pramāṇa* as *pramāṇa* can claim precedence over another.

II

In the history of Indian philosophy the orthodox system takes the stand of *Mānādhīnā Meyasiddhiḥ*, that is, epistemology precedes ontology. If we probe deeper into the *pramāṇa–prameya* set-up of these orthodox systems the ontological determination of *pramāṇas* stares us in the face everywhere. Any philosophical system which accepts levels of reality is bound to make a distinction between *pramāṇas* in accordance with them. Advaita Vedānta[3] upholds the distinction of *vyavahāra* and *paramārtha* and for this they make the distinction of *tattvāvedaka* and *atattvāvedaka pramāṇa* which mutually exclude each other. Similarly, Mīmāṁsā makes the axiological distinction of *Vidhi* and *Vyavahāra* and therefore restricts the regions of *pramāṇas* to them. Further, *Śruti* occupies a central position in all orthodox systems. The basic ontological insights are achieved not as a result of any empirical investigation but are necessarily of non-empirical nature, and revelation or *Śabda* remains the only access to them. The *śabda pramāṇa* in their ontological application provides the theoretical basis and framework within which other *pramāṇas* such as perception, inference, etc. are allowed to function. It is curious to note that perception, which is supposed to be sacrosanct, is not bereft of ontological moorings. The immediate question arises: why is there disagreement regarding the object of perception? Advaita Vedānta accepts that *Brahman* is realized in direct and immediate perception (*Aparokṣānubhūti*), while Buddhist logicians accept *Svalakṣaṇa* as an object of perception. The note of disagreement is of no less importance in realistic schools regarding object of indeterminate perception. Kumārila[4] upholds that the object of indeterminate perception is an individual

(*vyakti*) which is the substratum of its generic and specific characters. Naiyāyikas[5] are of the view that the object of perception is universal and particular, though at the indeterminate stage it remains undifferentiated into universal and particular. In a similar fashion we find the germs of the ontological moorings in inference too. Gaṅgeśa,[6] the founder of Navya Nyāya, while considering the adequate definition of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), rejects several well-conceived definitions because they do not cover Kevalānvayī. The admission of Kevalānvayī Dharma makes a crucial difference in Nyāya theory of inference. They operate within a monolithical notion of *padārtha*, that every *padārtha* is of same status. It may also be mentioned that all *padārthas* share common characteristic—*jñeyatva* and *abhidheyatva*. The self is but one more object and it is not specially privileged and does not have an unique status. Everything is capable of being known in the objective way which can be justified only by Kevalānvayī inference. The Advaita Vedānta[7] however says that everything is knowable but there is at least one thing which is not knowable in the sense objects are known, the knower himself. The subject is an exception to the rule of universal knowability by something other than itself and therefore rejects the Kevalānvayī form of inference. Thus, we can safely conclude that our whole epistemological set-up is overloaded with ontological assumptions. It is not, however, useless; its value lies in the elucidation of the basic ontological standpoint which is a matter of our spiritual temperament.

III

The above critique clearly puts the model before us that epistemology is second level activity which has to follow certain types of ontology. In the history of Indian philosophy, Dignāga the great Buddhist logician, was the first person who drastically altered the previous orthodox epistemo-ontological structure and proposed the ontologico-epistemological model. Dignāga[8] while introducing this model puts forth the view that there are two kinds of reality–unique or particular and universal (*svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) and in accordance with this there are two kinds of pramāṇas as perception and inference (*pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*). Further the two kinds of reality are mutually exclusive which debars cooperative means of knowledge and restricts it to only two *pramāṇas*.[9] Hence, apart from these two *pramāṇas* other *pramāṇas* either do not fulfil the criterion of valid independent source of knowledge or they can be reduced to either perception or inference.[10]

The opponent can raise very serious objection against the ontologico-epistemological model that how Dignāga established the thesis that there are only two kinds of object (*prameya*)? Further it should be necessarily independent from the set of *pramāṇas*. It is for this reason that Buddhist logicians have put forth the very logical idea of

dvairāśyabheda; that we are subject to a sort of two mutually exclusive differentiation in all our common sense experience. The term *dvairāśyabheda* is not used by Buddhist logicians but the form of argumentation which is employed by them for establishing their thesis is akin to it. Dharmakīrti[11] provides four criteria according to which the world of experience can be divided into two exclusive domains:

(1) *The criterion of efficiency*—where things can be divided into the efficient and inefficient (*śakta-aśakta*). In this context the efficient is that which has the capacity to produce the direct knowledge, while inefficient is the product of human fancy.
(2) *The criterion of similarity*—where things can be divided into those which are distinct and universal (*asadṛśa* and *sadṛśa*) on the ground of relations. Whatever is distinct is efficient while universal is inefficient constructed on the basis of double negation (*atadvyāvṛtti*).
(3) *The criterion of communicability*—We find the dichotomy of non-communicability and communicability (*anabhilāpya* and *abhilāpya*) on linguistic grounds. Whatever is non-communicable by word is distinct while communicable by word is universal.
(4) *The criterion of intelligibility*—where object of knowledge can be divided into beyond intellectual apprehension and within intellectual apprehension (*dhīaviṣaya* and *dhīvisaya*). Whatever is beyond intellectual apprehension is non-communicable by word while that which is subject to intellectual apprehension is communicable by word.

It is on the basis of such comprehensive set of criteria that the Buddhist logicians propound that there are two exclusive kinds of reality which are termed as *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Whatever is efficient, distinct, non-communicable and beyond intellectual apprehension is *svalakṣaṇa* and the rest with diametrically opposed characteristics are *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. The purpose of the above set of criteria is to unearth and elaborate the ontological categories embedded in our common-sense experience. However, these criteria are independent to pramāṇas and they provide the foundation for a different type of epistemology and introduce the ontologico-epistemological model.

IV

The ontologico-epistemological model as propounded by Buddhist logicians against the orthodox epistemo-ontological model gave birth to very crucial problems known as *Pramāṇa Samplava* (cooperative means of knowledge) and *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* (Non-cooperative means of knowledge). The exponent of *Pramāṇa Samplavavāda* holds that the kind

of *pramāṇa* that is available generally depends not on the nature of object, but on the adventitious fact of its being immediate or not. The Pramāṇa Vyavasthāvādins are of the opinion that different kinds of *pramāṇa* are wedded to different kinds of object which are not only different but disparate. The history of this problem is not very clear because we do not find any reference and discussion in Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya and *Mīmāṁsā Sūtras*, though *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya* and *Mīmāṁsā Ślokavārttika* deals with the problem in a sketchy fashion. We do not come across the direct use of these terms in the Saṁskṛta texts of Buddhist logic. Vātsyāyana[12] is of the view that when more than one *pramāṇas* can be employed for knowing any particular object then it is to be treated as *Pramāṇa Samplava*, while non-employment of different pramāṇas for one and the same object is *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā*. In *Pramāṇa Samplavavāda* we find peaceful coexistence of *pramāṇas* in which one *pramāṇa* can be employed to know different objects and at the same time different *pramāṇas* can have access to one object, while in *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā*, *pramāṇas* enjoy the status of distinct individuality in which one pramāṇa is being confined to know only one object. The philosophers of orthodox systems in their critical temperament appear to be favouring *Pramāṇa Samplava* and dub the Buddhist logicians as Pramāṇa Vyavasthāvādī.

The problem of *Pramāṇa Samplava* and *Vyavasthā* is deeply associated with the employment of *pramāṇa*. It is further required to demarcate the area and object of *pramāṇa*, if we accept *pramāṇas* as more than one. In this connection certain fundamental questions can be raised: Can one *pramāṇa* be employed in the area and object of other *pramāṇas*? Can the object of one *pramāṇa* be known by another *pramāṇa* in a similar fashion? It is in the background of these basic questions that orthodox schools and Buddhist logicians are divided into two hostile camps. There is the possibility of cooperative employment of *pramāṇas* in the epistemological structure of orthodox systems, while it is negated in Buddhist epistemological set-up. The *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* is considered as preposterous to common-sense experience by orthodox philosophers, while for Buddhist logicians it is a necessarily required conception for the employment of *pramāṇas*.

V

In the conceptual set-up of Buddhist logicians the application of *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* is something unique not to the sense of being conceived by orthodox philosophers. The *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* is restricted not only to different *pramāṇas* but to *pramāṇa* itself as is clearly visible at surface and deeper levels respectively. They conceived that *svalakṣaṇa* is the object of perception while *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is that of inference at surface level. It is to be further noted that they make the distinction of immediate apprehension (*grāhyatā*) and definite cognition (*adhyavasāya* or

prāpakatā) at a deeper level. It is on account of momentariness that whatever is the object of immediate apprehension cannot be the object of definite cognition. The Buddhist logicians[13] uphold that the object of immediate apprehension *qua* perception is *svalakṣaṇa* and the object of definite congition qua perception is *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, while the object of immediate apprehension *qua* inference is *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and the object of definite cognition *qua* inference is *svalakṣaṇa*. Therefore it is the dichotomy of reality (*Prameya Dvaividhya*) which is reflected in epistemological set-up of Buddhist logicians as *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā*.

If we probe deeper into the conceptual set-up of Buddhist logicians then we find all the essential ingredients of a paradox inherent in *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā*. Prof. A.K. Chatterjee[14] remarks that any theory which claims to subsume all possible knowledge under either of two different categories has at the same time to make room for the theory itself. The theory of *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* cannot, however, itself be brought under either perception or inference as the Buddhist logicians understand them. It is a general theory and not an ultimate point instant (*svalakṣaṇa*) which could be perceived; even if, perception is impossible, it were to be perceived it would have to be excluded from the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and so could not inform us about the latter. At the same time it is not an inferable free floating universal, since it is also a theory about the particular and its mode of being known. How is then the theory itself known at all? It seems to transcend both the accepted modes of knowing and thus to constitute a third kind of knowledge, transcending perception and inference both, but this possibility is ruled out by the very formulation of the theory. *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* seems to be a metalogical discovery, not amenable to the usual *pramāṇas*. It can be only revealed, and that too, by somebody who somehow sees both *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* side by side, an impossible feet indeed.

Actually, the paradox hinges upon the question on how we come to know that there are two kinds of object which are mutually exclusive in their nature. This is to be answered first, only then can *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* be empirically discovered. It is not possible for empirical pramāṇas to give adequate reply because their spheres are mutually exclusive and do not overlap in their respective ranges. It has been previously discussed that ontological insights of two orders reality is not derived through *pramāṇas*; rather it is based on the logic of mutual exclusion (*dvairāśyabheda*). Even if we accept it, the query, why we restrict ourselves only to two pramāṇas for knowing two kinds of object, will remain. The Buddhist logicians would like to satisfy our query in this fashion:

(1) The classification of *pramāṇas* should be based only upon the object to be known because we find intentional directedness of *pramāṇas* towards object. Therefore, if there are only two kinds of object known then why to accept three *pramāṇas*.[15]

(2) It is on account of not accepting the cooperativeness of *pramāṇas* that the possibility of one or three *pramāṇas* for knowing two objects is ruled out.[16]
(3) All kinds of object which are known can be classified under direct and indirect. There cannot be the logical possibility of a third between two mutually exclusive objects. Therefore when there is no third category of object to be known then why accepts third *pramāṇa*.[17]
(4) Since the knowledge itself assumes two forms, appearance of object (*viṣayākāra*) and cognition of itself (*svākāra*), *pramāṇas* cannot be either one or three.[18]
(5) There is no justification for accepting another *pramāṇa* for *pramāṇa* itself as it is going to invite the fallacy of infinite regress. Every *pramāṇa* knows itself through self-cognition.[19]
(6) It is desirable to accept only two *pramāṇas* perception and inference as apart from these two, others can be reduced into them. Perception is immediate knowledge while other mediate knowledges being based upon some sort of necessary relation can be reduced to inference.[20]

Even if we accept two *pramāṇas* as followed by two *prameyas* yet another question crops up as to how we come to have substantial differentiation of immediate and mediate objects and since it is not known to us, the empirical formulation of *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* cannot be justified. Prajñākara Gupta himself has raised this pertinent question that substantial differentiation of two objects should be known either through perception, or inference or something else. Perception and inference cannot grasp the substantial differentiation of *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* because they are confined to their specific realms. The bare possibility of a third *pramāṇa* is ruled out outright in the conceptual scheme of Buddhist logicians.

Prajñākara Gupta[21] has tried to resolve the conflict by maintaining that dichotomy of object can be known by perception itself. It is because the similarity and dissimilarity, etc. which are the determining factor of the dichotomy of objects (Through the logic of mutual exclusion—*dvairāśyabheda*) are the qualifying attribute (*Dharma*) of knowledge. It can be apprehended by self-cognized perception (*svasaṁvedana pratyakṣa*) which contains both the self-awareness of knowledge of its qualifying attributes. If we don't accept this thesis then there cannot be any possibility of dialogue between plaintiff and defendant.

In this way Buddhist logicians have tried to come out of the paradoxical situation. But finally their attempt is vitiated by the fallacy of *petito principii*. Though it is possible to establish the dichotomy of object through the logic of mutual exclusion (*dvairāśyabheda*) and its knowledge procured

through self-cognized perception even then the dichotomy of object as *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* cannot be said to be ultimately real (*paramārthasat*) and mental construction (*saṁvṛttisat*) respectively. If self-cognized perception is interpreted in this way where dichotomy of reality can be revealed as ultimate reality and mental construction then this higher order of self-cognized perception cannot be brought under the categories of *pramāṇa* in which *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* is formulated. Hence the fundamental ontological insight of Buddhist logicians should be treated as given or revealed in some sense. It can be said to be a reconstruction of Buddha's proclamation of *paramārtha* and *samvṛtti*. However, the attempt of Buddhist logicians is commendable as it analyzes the common sense experience and provides *a priori* certainty to ontological presupposition by taking recourse in the logic of *dvairāśyabheda*.

Basically, the fundamentals of any philosophical system are not discovered empirically, but must be in some sense given or revealed. How can any ontologician know that there are seven *padārthas* or two *tattvas*, neither more nor less? But, in the case of Buddhist logicians, the situation worsens because of the complication introduced by *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā*. A knowledge somehow obtained from one source would not be applicable in another domain, forbidden to it, as it is possible for such philosophical systems which accept *Pramāṇa Samplavavāda*. However, the Pramāṇa Samplavavādins have their own difficulties too.

VI

The Naiyāyikas are the chief votary of *Pramāṇa Samplavavāda* which accept four sources of knowledge and more than two kinds of objects—the particular, the individual and the universal. The objects are all of the same order and are accessible to more than one *pramāṇa*. The sphere of perception and inference are not mutually exclusive. The sphere of perception according to Nyāya is rather extensive, for we can know by it not only particulars but also substance, quality, universal and inherence, etc. Similarly, the scope of inference is also extensive as it includes apart from universal, particular, etc., certain transcendental objects like Ātmā and Īśvara. Vātsyāyana[22] elucidates the cooperative means of knowledge in different steps—some tries to understand object firstly by verbal testimony and then confirming by inference and lastly through perception. It is after perception that all doubts and discrepancies are set aside.

The controversy of *Pramāṇa Samplava* and *Vyavasthā* is initially related to factors responsible for determining the nature of *pramāṇas*. For the Buddhist logicians perception is knowledge of reality shorn of all ideational element and so only *svalakṣaṇa* can really be the object of perception and nothing else. In Nyāya tradition, perception is knowledge

born out of the sense-object contact, and different kinds of such contacts (*sannikarṣa*) have been postulated to account for the perception of different kinds of objects specially for universal and particular non-existence. Similarly, there is a fundamental difference regarding the inferential structure in both the traditions. The inference of Buddhist logicians apprehends *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* as it is based on constructed substantive adjectival relation (*dharma-dharmī sambandha*) and invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*) is determined by causation, identity and negation. But according to Nyāya the object of inference is existence as such (*sattāsamavāya*) which inherently resides in the particulars. The relation of invariable concomitance (*sāhacarya*) is inductive generalisation based on repeated perceptual experience (*bhūyo-darśana*). However we may put the question that whether the difference of one *pramāṇa* from another lies in its constitution only or also in the nature of object revealed by it. The Naiyāyikas seem to think that differences regarding *pramāṇas* are solely due to their constitution while the Buddhist are inclined to the view that the very differences regarding the nature of *pramāṇa* indicate differences regarding its object.[23] In other words qualitative differences regarding the nature of reality necessitates qualitative differences regarding *pramāṇa* too. Therefore the differences in *pramāṇas* due to their constitution can lead to *Pramāṇa Samplava* while differences due to its object necessitates *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā*.

There is no disagreement that *Pramāṇa Samplava* can be supported on the basis of common-sense experiences. The table before me which is known by sight can be known by touch also and similarly the fire on the hill which is known by inference can be known by perception too. But can we really know by touch what is known by sight. The cooperative employment of senses as constituent of perception is very ambiguous. It is obvious that it is not the table which is known by the sight or touch, but only form and colour, softness and temperature. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa[24] accepts both *Pramāṇa Samplava* and *Vyavasthā* in the employment of sense organs. The perception of concrete objects is through sight and touch which is the example of cooperative employment of senses. The qualities as colour, taste, smell, touch and sound are respectively perceived by sight, tongue, nose, tactile and auditory sense organs and here we witness non-cooperative employment of senses.

Any philosophical system which maintains the distinction of substance and attributes has to accept *Pramāṇa Samplava* of sense organs in reference to substance while *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* in reference to attributes. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika upholds the relation of inherence between universal and particular which is cognized by all sense organs. They confer objective status to all the relations for the sake of defending their realism which also provides them strong basis in favour of *Pramāṇa Samplava*. But Buddhist logicians reject outrightly all sorts of relations and hold them as subjective. The *raison d'etre* for denial of relation is

through self-cognized perception even then the dichotomy of object as *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* cannot be said to be ultimately real (*paramārthasat*) and mental construction (*saṁvṛttisat*) respectively. If self-cognized perception is interpreted in this way where dichotomy of reality can be revealed as ultimate reality and mental construction then this higher order of self-cognized perception cannot be brought under the categories of *pramāṇa* in which *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* is formulated. Hence the fundamental ontological insight of Buddhist logicians should be treated as given or revealed in some sense. It can be said to be a reconstruction of Buddha's proclamation of *paramārtha* and *samvṛtti*. However, the attempt of Buddhist logicians is commendable as it analyzes the common sense experience and provides *a priori* certainty to ontological presupposition by taking recourse in the logic of *dvairāśyabheda*.

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The Naiyāyikas are the chief votary of *Pramāṇa Samplavavāda* which accept four sources of knowledge and more than two kinds of objects—the particular, the individual and the universal. The objects are all of the same order and are accessible to more than one *pramāṇa*. The sphere of perception and inference are not mutually exclusive. The sphere of perception according to Nyāya is rather extensive, for we can know by it not only particulars but also substance, quality, universal and inherence, etc. Similarly, the scope of inference is also extensive as it includes apart from universal, particular, etc., certain transcendental objects like Ātmā and Īśvara. Vātsyāyana[22] elucidates the cooperative means of knowledge in different steps—some tries to understand object firstly by verbal testimony and then confirming by inference and lastly through perception. It is after perception that all doubts and discrepancies are set aside.

The controversy of *Pramāṇa Samplava* and *Vyavasthā* is initially related to factors responsible for determining the nature of *pramāṇas*. For the Buddhist logicians perception is knowledge of reality shorn of all ideational element and so only *svalakṣaṇa* can really be the object of perception and nothing else. In Nyāya tradition, perception is knowledge

born out of the sense-object contact, and different kinds of such contacts (*sannikarṣa*) have been postulated to account for the perception of different kinds of objects specially for universal and particular non-existence. Similarly, there is a fundamental difference regarding the inferential structure in both the traditions. The inference of Buddhist logicians apprehends *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* as it is based on constructed substantive adjectival relation (*dharma-dharmī sambandha*) and invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*) is determined by causation, identity and negation. But according to Nyāya the object of inference is existence as such (*sattāsamavāya*) which inherently resides in the particulars. The relation of invariable concomitance (*sāhacarya*) is inductive generalisation based on repeated perceptual experience (*bhūyo-darśana*). However we may put the question that whether the difference of one *pramāṇa* from another lies in its constitution only or also in the nature of object revealed by it. The Naiyāyikas seem to think that differences regarding *pramāṇas* are solely due to their constitution while the Buddhist are inclined to the view that the very differences regarding the nature of *pramāṇa* indicate differences regarding its object.[23] In other words qualitative differences regarding the nature of reality necessitates qualitative differences regarding *pramāṇa* too. Therefore the differences in *pramāṇas* due to their constitution can lead to *Pramāṇa Samplava* while differences due to its object necessitates *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā*.

There is no disagreement that *Pramāṇa Samplava* can be supported on the basis of common-sense experiences. The table before me which is known by sight can be known by touch also and similarly the fire on the hill which is known by inference can be known by perception too. But can we really know by touch what is known by sight. The cooperative employment of senses as constituent of perception is very ambiguous. It is obvious that it is not the table which is known by the sight or touch, but only form and colour, softness and temperature. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa[24] accepts both *Pramāṇa Samplava* and *Vyavasthā* in the employment of sense organs. The perception of concrete objects is through sight and touch which is the example of cooperative employment of senses. The qualities as colour, taste, smell, touch and sound are respectively perceived by sight, tongue, nose, tactile and auditory sense organs and here we witness non-cooperative employment of senses.

Any philosophical system which maintains the distinction of substance and attributes has to accept *Pramāṇa Samplava* of sense organs in reference to substance while *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* in reference to attributes. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika upholds the relation of inherence between universal and particular which is cognized by all sense organs. They confer objective status to all the relations for the sake of defending their realism which also provides them strong basis in favour of *Pramāṇa Samplava*. But Buddhist logicians reject outrightly all sorts of relations and hold them as subjective. The *raison d'etre* for denial of relation is

that the relation between two relata suffers from the fallacy of third man argument (*anavasthā*).[25]

Now the cooperative employment of perception and inference on the ground of common-sense experience demands certain clarifications. It may serve our practical purpose, but it appears to be doubtful to epistemic analysis. Truly speaking, what exactly is known by perception is not known by inference. How does perception reveal fire as fire? It should be on the basis of either colour, temperature or smell. Is any of these things known by inference as we know fire in a general way? For example, we do not know the particular colour, form or temperature of fire by inference. If so, where is *Pramāṇa Samplava*? The cognitive experience of perception and inference differ widely. In a general way the object of the two seems to be the same but the sameness is here quite ambiguous and confusing. In fact, we can go further and say that inference does not give us existence of anything as perception does, it gives us mere possibility of existence.[26] The relation (*vyāpti*) on which inference is based is either contingent or necessary. If it is factual then it must be contingent and therefore it will be no doubt concerned with fact but can yield no necessary conclusion. And if it is formal then it will be necessary and the conclusion necessary too. But then it will have nothing to do with existence or facts. The so-called existential relations are frail in constitution. Hence cooperative employment of perception and other indirect means of knowledge including inference on empirical ground is not feasible.

In orthodox epistemological set-up non-cooperative employment of *śabda* and other *pramāṇas* is crystal clear. Any ontology which is committed to some kind of non-empirical suprasensuous reality will necessarily advocate *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā*. This is reflected in Advaita Vedānta as Brahman transcends all empirical modes of knowing. It is '*Śāstrayoni*', and can only be revealed while all other modes of knowing are confined to the empirical realm. The knowledge of the falsity of the world cannot be known by empirical modes of knowing too. Further, the world does not proclaim its own illusoriness. Sometimes we are shocked by being confronted with empirical illusion and that can put a question mark upon the reality of the world. But from this, ultimate falsity of the world cannot be maintained. In empirical matters we do not take recourse to '*śruti*' as we do not require '*śruti*' to tell us whether there is sugar in the tea. Therefore, Śaṅkara has to accept the possibility of *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* and elsewhere he has remarked[27] that every *Pramāṇa* should remain in accordance with its object. Similarly, Mīmāṁsā too, for the same reason, takes '*śruti*' as the sole *pramāṇa* for the revelation of imperative (*vidhi*). 'Ought' cannot be empirically discovered; no amount of alchemy would enable us to extract 'ought' out of 'what is' and to attempt this is to commit naturalistic fallacy. Śabara Swāmī clearly maintains that dharma is related to past, present and future while perception being sensuous is

confined to specific spatiotemporal realm. Hence the dichotomy of *vidhi* and *vyavahāra* in Mīmāṁsā cannot escape from being *Pramāṇa Vyavsthā*.

It is curious to note that non-cooperative employment of non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) and other source of knowledge can be technically demonstrated. Mīmāṁsaka (Kumārila) and *Advaita Vedānta* provide independent status of *pramāṇa* to *anupalabdhi* for cognizing absence of object (*abhāva*). Naiyāyikas have rejected anupalabdhi as an independent source of knowledge because *abhāva* being ontological category is the object of perception. But the cognition of the absence of object cannot be reduced to perception because there is no sense object contact. Even if we accept the Naiyāyikas stand, we are bound to accept *anupalabdhi* for cognizing non-availability of other *pramāṇas*. If we take the set of several *pramāṇas* in our epistemological discourse the absence of one *pramāṇa* in a specific spatio-temporal condition can be known through the availability of another. But where there is non-availability of all different *pramāṇas* taken in discourse, we have to take the shelter of Anupalabdhi for cognising it. In this way whatever is known by *anupalabdhi* cannot be known by others; hence *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā*.

In the light of the above discussion we may reach the conclusion that even if we accept that difference in *pramāṇas* is due to its constituents, the cooperative employment of *pramāṇas* cannot be fully supported in an orthodox epistemological set-up. In the three sets reviewed so far perception and others, verbal testimony and others, and non-apprehension and others, we witness non-cooperativeness of instrument (*karaṇa*) and uniqueness of object in different cases which make the claim of *Pramāṇas Samplava* weak.

Now we may further raise certain crucial questions regarding the number and cooperative employment of *pramāṇas* in an orthodox epistemological scheme. Why is it necessary to accept any *pramāṇa* other than perception and how the proposal of other *pramāṇas* is possible without the association of perception? One may answer that it is because we may actually find ourselves using different *pramāṇas*. There is no doubt that each and every *pramāṇa* has its own relevance and utility; even though inference and other indirect means of knowledge seem to be more useful in day-to-day activity and postulation of theories. But this answer gives rise to the further question of why we employ more than one *pramāṇa* for cognizing any particular object and if we do so then it is not than one *pramāṇa* makes other superfluous? Hence unless we assign a special field and uniqueness of object to every *pramāṇa* the problem of superfluousness will persist. Naiyāyikas[28] in order to escape from charge of superfluousness state that we do not know the same object in similar fashion by different *pramāṇas*. The aforesaid argument can be countered as Naiyāyikas[29] and Mīmāṁsakas[29A] and Vedāntins give more importance to perception as basic means of knowledge (*upajīvya*)

in comparison to other *pramāṇas*. Hence the cooperative employment of *pramāṇas* on the one hand and rendering greater stress to perception on the other will strengthen the charge of superfluousness to other *pramāṇas*. There is no question of privileged status for any pramāṇas if we accept *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā*.[30]

Even if we accept the Naiyāyikas standpoint that the difference of pramāṇas is not due to object but rather due to modes of knowing, the charge of superfluousness cannot be escaped. The *pramāṇas* as a different modes of knowing being free from existential status of object but the availability and application of different modes of knowing cannot be free from spatio-temporal condition of object given. The differential modes of knowing dependent upon spatio-temporal condition of particular object bring forth two alternative situations:

(1) If each mode of knowledge is restricted to specific spatio-temporal condition of particular object then due to differences in condition, the conditioned relative *Pramāṇas Vyavasthā* is guaranteed.
(2) If the different modes of knowing are applicable to the specific spatio-temporal condition of particular object then conditioned relative superfluousness of *Pramāṇa* persists.

The epistemological insight of Naiyāyikas is basically pragmatic and based on commonsense experiences even though the *Pramāṇa Samplavavāda* cannot be justified in practical import. Naiyāyikas[31] supposed to be the chief votary of *Pramāṇa Samplavavāda* have accepted the possibility of both *Pramāṇa Samplava* and *Vyavasthā*.

(1) The *Pramāṇa Samplava* can be cited from the following example—Ātman can be known by verbal testimony. It can also be inferred from the desire–aversion, pleasure–pain, motive–knowledge, etc. Ātmā can also be known by perception due to its contact with mind (*Ātmā Manaḥ Saṁyoga*). It can be known through yogic self-realization too.
(2) The *Pramāṇas Vyavasthā* can be cited from the following example—The Sacrificial performance for the attainment of heaven (*Svarga kāmoyajeta*) is verbal testimony. It cannot be known either by ordinary perception or inference. What we infer from the thundering of clouds cannot be known either through perception or testimony. The lotus on a palm which is known by direct perception needs no other *Pramāṇas*.

In this way, from acceptance of both, certain conclusions can be drawn. These two theories are not contradictory in orthodox systems and both can be embraced. The *Pramāṇas* as differential modes of knowing do not negate the possibility of *Pramāṇas Vyavasthā*.

It should not be understood from the above discussion that the

controversy of *Pramāṇas Samplava* and *Vyavasthā* is set aside or finally resolved. We can raise certain fundamental questions by turning the dimension of the problem. Generally it is considered that *pramāṇa* is the instrument of valid knowledge and the object of resultant knowledge is *prameya*. But in the realistic standpoint of Naiyāyikas *pramāṇa* can hold the status of *prameya* too. Gautama[32] has given analogy of a beam which can measure and be measured and in similar fashion what is the source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) in one instance can be the object of knowledge (*prameya*) in another. Therefore the problem of *Pramāṇa Samplava* and *Vyavasthā* is to be discussed not only with reference to *prameya* but also it should be considered with reference to *pramāṇas*. If it is so then immediately the question, arrises whether a particular *pramāṇa* can be known by itself or can be known by others. Naiyāyikas[33] cite the example of light of the lamp and consider that every *pramāṇa* knows itself and is the instrument for the knowledge of other *prameyas*. According to Vātsyāyana[34] when we know any particular object through perception, there is also an awareness that I am knowing it only through perception; which implies that perception grasps itself. The case is similar with other *pramāṇas* too. Hence the Naiyāyikas can be said to suffer from the fallacy of uncertain reason (A*naikāntika Doṣa*) because they restrict the analogy of 'light of lamp' to the *pramāṇa* and do not extend it to *prameya*. The solution offered by Vātsyāyana to escape from the charge of uncertain reason is that we can project different analogies for *pramāṇa* and *prameya* because the distinction of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* somehow persists. Even then the *pramāṇa* does not require any other *pramāṇa* for being known which keeps the *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* in reference to *pramāṇa* intact. This is widely accepted in entire Indian philosophical tradition and interpreted in different ways like *Anuvyavasāya, Svasaṁvedana* and *Svayaṁprakāśatā*, etc.

VII

In fact, the problem of *Pramāṇas Samplava* and *Vyavasthā* is inherently ontological in nature. Ontology decides not only the nature but also directs the employment of *pramāṇa*. Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṁsakas[35] are the representatives of *Nirākāra Jñānavāda* which is widely accepted in orthodox tradition. According to this, knowledge imports its form from the object and is formless in nature. It follows that differentiation in mode of knowledge does not create difference in the object known. Knowledge can receive the form of object through its various instruments and therefore we have *Pramāṇa Samplava*. The Buddhist logicians[36] are *Sākāra Jñānavādī* who believe that knowledge form is not borrowed from object but is the intrinsic nature of knowledge itself. It follows that if there is differentiation in knowledge then there must be differentiation

in the so-called objects. There is no possibility of differentiation of object over and above the differentiation of knowledge and therefore they have *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā.*

The ontological motive and controversy of *Pramāṇa Samplava* and *Vyavasthā* can be discussed in another way too. Any ontological system which accepts levels of reality, as Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta formulate it, presupposes some sort of *a priori* illusion or ignorance. Therefore the reality appears on empirical grounds as a mixture of the two or a confusion of the two, real and unreal. The realistic system does not accept anything as unreal and objects that a combination of the real with the unreal is impossible. It is for this reason that realistic philosophers as Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṁsakas take the stand of *Anyathākhyāti, Akhyāti* (Prabhākara) and *Viparītakhyāti* (Kumārila) for removing the element of subjectivity in the case of empirical illusions. The *Pramāṇas Samplava* seems to be helpful in explaining empirical illusion as a confusion between two real objects. For example, it is suggested in the case of *Anyathākhyāti* that the so-called illusory object is not false but an object known by *Jñānalakṣaṇā Pratyāsatti,* a kind of extraordinary perception.

The Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā viewpoint that there is nothing unreal may be consistent with realism, though it may well be contested. This conclusion that the real and unreal cannot mix together seems to ignore the nature of ignorance (*avidyā*). It is true that real and unreal cannot be mixed in a deliberate and conscious manner but it may be done in an unconscious way. Ignorance can create the false and mix it with the real. But the realistic philosopher may argue that *avidyā* is not dynamic or creative. In that case even *Anyathākhyāti* is not possible as it presupposes something dynamic which brings about the confusion. Akhyātivāda can consistently regard *avidyā* as static but not Anyathākhyātivāda. But Akhyātivāda has difficulties of its own. Hence the realistic schools of Indian philosophy miserably fail to explain the illusion because they do not accept any element of subjectivity in illusion. But if they allow subjectivity in the knowledge process then they are bound to accept levels of reality. The very moment they are forced to accept levels of reality then no option is left except to bring *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* in their epistemological discourse.

VIII

From the above elaborate discussion we may safely assert that the formulation of any epistemology is duly governed and regulated by its ontology. The various issues being raised among different epistemological set-ups ultimately point out the differentiation in ontological structure. The problem of *Pramāṇa Samplava* and *Vyavasthā* is no exception to it as it is epistemological issue with ontological moorings. It is really the liberal attitude of orthodox realistic ontologies that in spite of proposing

Pramāṇa Samplava they make room for *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* if the exigencies prevail. So far as in the case of Buddhist logicians there is constitutive ontological determination over epistemology which compels them to accept only *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* and nothing else. It is the destiny of *pramāṇa* to remain confined in their specific role and status in accordance with ontological determination. Hence every ontology has its own logic and epistemology. But from this it should not be construed that different epistemologies being ontologically determined dictate our common-sense experience. The task of epistemology is to analyse and interpret our common-sense experience and incorporate it with distinct ontological vision.

Notes and References

1. Dharmottara, *Nyāya Bindu Ṭīkā,* 2/48.
2. Durveka Miśra, *Dharmottara Pradīpa, Caturvidhā cātra vipratipattiḥ saṁkhyā, Lakṣaṇa, Gocara phala viṣayā.*
3. *Dharmarājādhvarindra, Vedānta Paribhāṣā,* edited and translated by Vidyānanda Jijñāsu, Delhi, 1967, p. 334, *Evaṃ Nirupitānāṃ Pramāṇānāṃ Prāmāṇyaṃ Dvividham, Vyāvahārika Tattvāvedaka pārmārthika tattvāvedakatvaṃ ceti.*
4. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *Śloka Vārttika,* 4/113.
5. Śrīdhara, *Nyāya Kandali,* quoted in D.N. Shastri's *Critique of Indian Realism,* p. 440, *Sāmānyaṃ Viśeṣaṇaṃ Cobhayamapi Gṛhnāti.*
6. Gaṅgeśa, *Vyāptipañcaka, Sādhyavadanyāvṛttittvaṃ vā Kevalānvayinyā Bhāvāt.*
7. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad,* 2/14, *Sarva Vijñānāti taṃ kena Vijāniyād vijñātāramakena Vijāniyāditi.*
8. Dignāga, *Pramāṇas Samuccaya,* restored and edited by H.R.R. Iyengar, Mysore University, 1930, p. 4, *Pratyakṣaṃ Anumānaṃ Ca pramāṇasṃ Hi Dvilakṣaṇam. Prameyaṃ Tat Prayogārthaṃ Na Pramāṇāntaraṃ Bhavet.*
9. Akalaṅka, *Pramāṇāntarbhāva,* The Asiatic Society, 1969, p. 1, *Pratyakṣaṁ cānumānaṃ ca pramāṇamidameva hi. Pramāṇas samplava ayogāt prameyadvaya saṁgateḥ.*
10. Ibid., *Śabdādikam pramāṇasṃ hi bhrāntimātraṃ tadanyathā. Pramāṇas lakṣaṇa ayogāt pramāṇbhaṃ bahihasthiteḥ.*
11. Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika,* chapter on Perception, verses 1–2.
12. Vātsyāyana, *Nyāya Bhāṣya,* 1-1-3, *Pramātuḥ pramātavye arthe pramāṇānāṃ Sambhavo abhisamplavaḥ asambhavo vyavastheti.*
13. Dharmottara, *Nyāya Bindu Ṭīkā,* 1/12.
14. *Ānvīkṣikī,* Volume VI, as 3 and 4, 1976, page 189, Advanced Study Centre, Department of Philosophy, Benaras Hindu University.
15. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Nyāya Mañjarī,* Chapter I, *Pramāṇa Pariccheda, Pramānadvaya siddhe Ca Viṣayadvaya Vedane. Vadakasyānurodhena Tritīya Mānamiṣyatām.*
16. Akalaṅka, *Pramāṇāntarbhāva,* 1, *Pramāṇa Samplava Ayogāt Prameyadvaya Saṁgateḥ.*
17. Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika,* 2/63, *Na Pratyakṣa Parokṣābhyāṃ Meyasyānyasya Sambhavaḥ. Tasmāt prameya dvitvena pramāṇadvitvamiṣyate.*
18. Prajñākara Gupta, *Pramāṇa Vārttikālaṅkārabhāṣya,* 2/63–63, *Svākāradvayasaṁvedane hi naikamiti yuktam.*
19. Ibid., *Pramāṇa svarupantu svasaṁvedanākārasiddheḥ.*
20. Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṁgraha,* Verses 1700–1707.
21. Prajñākara Gupta, *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkālaṅkārbhāṣya,* 2/17 and next,

Viṣayadvairidhyampratyakṣata eva siddham. Sadṛśāsadṛśa pratītirhi pratītireva dharmaḥ sa ca svasaṃvedana pratyakṣasiddhaḥ.

22. Vātsyāyana, *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, 1/1/3.
23. A.K. Rai, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 23–1–8, 1995, pp. 4–5.
24. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *Slokavārttika*, Chapter on perception, verse, 170.
25. Dharmakīrti, *Sambandha Parīkṣā*, 4, *Dvayorekābhisambandhāt sambando yadi tadvayoḥ. Kaḥ sambandho anavasthā ca na sambandha matistathā.*
26. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, page 8, quoted from *Bṛhadaraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (Śaṅkara Bhāṣya), *Sambhāvanāmātreṇa liṅgopanyāsaḥ na hi niścāyakatvena tadupanyasyate.*
27. Saṅkarācārya, *Bṛhādaraṇyaka Bhāṣya*, 2/1/20, *Svaviṣayānusārāni Hi Pramāṇāni.*
28. Uddyotakara, *Nyāya Vārttika*, 1/1/1, *Adhigatattvād Vaiyarthyamiti, Na Anyathā tadadhigateḥ.*
29. Vātsyāyana, *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, 1/1/3, *Sā Ceyaṃ Pramitiḥ Pratyakṣa Parā.*
29A. Uddyotakara, *Nyāya Vārttika*, 1/1/3, *Yatra pramāṇa vyavasthā tatra pradhāna guṇabhāvoḥ na cintyat.*
30. Vātsyāyana, *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, 1/1/3, *Kimpunaḥ pramāṇāni prameyaṃ abhisamplavante, atha prameyaṃ vyavatiṣṭhanta iti ubhayathā darśanam.*
31. Gautam, *Nyāya Sūtra*, 2/1/16, *Prameyatā ca tulā prāmāṇyavat.*
32. Ibid., 2/1/19, *Na pradīpa prakaśavat tat siddheḥ.*
33. Vātsyāyana, *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, 2/1/20, *Pratyakṣaṃ me jñānamānumānikaṃ me jñānamaupamānikaṁ me jñānamāgamikaṁ me jñānamiti.*
34. Sābara Bhāṣya, 1/1/2, *Nirākārā cano budhi akāravāna bahyoarthaḥ.*
35. Jñānaśrī Mitra, *Sākārasiddhi*, verse 1, In this verse Jñānasrī Mitra has beautifully elaborated the Buddhist tradition of *Sākāra Jñānavāda.*

The Ruptured Idiom: Of Dallmayr, Matilal and Ramanujan's 'Way of Thinking'

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A.K. Ramanujan's 'Is There an Indian Way of Thinking?' was first published in a special number of the journal, *Contributions to Indian Sociology*.[1] In 1990 the same piece reappeared twice in two different collections—thus becoming accessible to two constituencies. One was in an anthology entitled *India Through Hindu Categories*[2] and the other was in the literary periodical *The Book Review*.[3]

Before proceeding to attend to the arguments of Ramanujan's piece it is worth noting that the piece has also attracted the critical attention of two contemporary thinkers. Very recently the political theorist Fred Dallmayr commented on the essay.[4] And the Indian philosopher Bimal Matilal (who read a pre-published version of the essay) devoted one of the three Deusker lectures on the theme of Ramanujan's essay in 1987.[5] Although there are apparent differences between Dallmayr's and Matilal's responses—differences resulting from their intellectual allegiances (Dallmayr's continental philosophy and Matilal's apparently Madhyamika school, in this context) and methodological orientation (Dallmayr's comparatology and Matilal's ethical analysis)—on closer reading their accounts seem to be animated by a common interpretative basis. One part of the argument this paper tries to advance is that both readings operate essentially within the interpretative matrix sketched by Ramanujan's essay. Consequently, both readings leave the interpretative frame of Ramanujan's essay undisturbed or fail to provide us ways to stall the moves of the essay. The other part of the argument in my paper looks for other exits *in/from* Ramanujan's account.

DALLMAYR AND THE DECEPTIONS OF COMPARATOLOGY

As suggested earlier the starting point of Dallmayr's account is the conviction in the possibility of comparison—comparison between the 'two' traditions of 'thought' (that is, 'ideas ranging from philosophy to social theory and literature' [527]). It is this conviction that provides the method for Dallmayr's argument: 'I assume (without elaborate

demonstration [sic]) that the two modes of thought are distinct without being incommensurable—and thus permit fruitful comparison' (528). From what little clues Dallmayr provides in the paper one can recognize the possible direction such a demonstration might take. Dallmayr's comparatological approach fundamentally assumes the 'two' traditions ('Indian' and 'western') to be already fully formed entities, attributes them a prior significatory status; the entities to be compared appear to be phenomenally available wholes. Once such an assumption is made, it seems to me, the basis of critical task becomes less rigorous.

A predictable path of this argument, as can be seen from Dallmayr's account, is that it takes recourse to categorizations in terms of periods and schools that are already made available by the classical notion of history as phenomenalized events and objects of the past. Dallmayr provides us with lists of 'comparable' varieties of 'thought' and periods in 'Indian' and 'western' traditions—and refers to pertinent textbooks (529). Comparatology in this account simply boils down to matching schools of thought—for the purpose of identifying similarities and 'distinctions'. Thus, after translating the 'Indic' schools into 'western-style terminology', Dallmayr goes on to write that 'western empricism and *vaiśeṣika* teachings may be too closely related (perhaps even identical) to facilitate comparative assessment, the same may be true of *Nyāya* logic and Cartesian rationalism' (529). The schematic 'overview', however, through which Dallmayr suggests the possible translation is offered to counter any exclusivist (incommensurability) argument on the one hand, and question accounts about cultural non-distinctness on the other. Such argument 'frustrates comparison', Dallmayr argues. Yet this comparatological sweep seems sure about the identity and unity of the 'schools' which it invokes for its purpose of translation. And it is this certainty that makes the exercise of translation into a doubling activity—an activity which repeats the same in the name of the other. The gesture of befriending the other, by questioning stereotypical representations of the other (Dallmayr mentions four such commonplace accounts: rational West versus mystical India; material West versus spiritual India; analytical western approach to the past versus Indian reverence for the authority of the Vedas; and, the myth of *mokṣa*), manifests in grasping it in the received frames of the same in this account. For Dallmayr the comparable entities are already given significatory objects (with pre-existing meaning).

Within this essentially constituted comparatological project—constituted as the entities are presupposed—the 'translational' approach gets repeated when Dallmayr vindicates his theoretical credo, his loyalty to 'continental phenomenology'. His 'comparative framework', Dallmayr writes, derives from the phenomenological division between 'discourse' and 'life-world' or what he calls 'text' and 'context'—where the 'life-world' is the 'backdrop to rational-intentional

analysis' or discourse. Without entangling too deeply in the specific school ('continental phenomenology')—in the context of Dallmayr's mention/use of them (concerns pertaining to the notions of 'life-world', 'discourse' 'text' and 'context')—we can still ask: how is the relation between these two (pairs of) notions constituted? What is the status of 'life-world' with regard to 'discourse'/'text'?

The relation between text and context, discourse and life-world, is not an external one, but of 'reciprocal otherness and mutual entwinement', Dallmayr writes (532). But doesn't this thematic of 'reciprocality' and 'entwinement' presuppose an independent existence of the eventually reciprocating entities beforehand? Isn't this an unavoidable necessity as per the protocols of Dallmayr's interpretative frame? (It is as a result of the operation of this necessity that we find Dallmayr repeating the received period objects of philosophy in the name of schools and -isms). It seems to me that a warning against prioritization (of text over context, discourse over life-world—or to use another paradigmatic dualism of this type—signifier over signified) does not really change the matters—for even the putative reciprocality or dialogue will have to presuppose the phenomenal existence of the object (text/context)—to make the operation of reciprocality possible. Dallmayr does not seem to attend to this knot in the fabric of his argument. Consequently, the urge to represent remains irreducible in this translational exercise.

Dallmayr's commentary on Ramanujan's essay derives from the conceptual division—discourse/text and life-world/context. Dallmayr says that he is 'strongly attracted to Ramanujan's general line of argument'—which is a *rhetorical assertion* regarding Indian way of thinking. In accordance with his interpretative scheme Dallmayr proceeds to translate the two grammatical rules—which Ramanujan uses to buttress his rhetorical assertion (more about this later)—into his phenomenological idiom. Consequently, the former's linguistic norms of 'context-freedom' and 'context-sensitivity' are now interchanged with the latter's 'discourse' ('rational discourse'—universal validity claims'—characteristic of modern western thought) and 'life-world' ('the experiential underside of reason'), respectively (534).

Dallmayr celebrates Ramanujan's characterization of Indian thought as metonymically oriented, as context-sensitive. This mode of identification, he argues, is 'a splendid display of . . . "analogical imagination"'. Metonymic thought, Dallmayr elicits this from Ramanujan's essay, shows that human being is 'continuous with the context s/he is in' (533). In Peircean parlance, Dallmayr argues from Ramanujan's account, 'Indian thought accords primacy to indexical signs over symbolic devices—with indexes taken to be signs where signifiers and signified "belong in the same context", that is, where the signifier is not externally related to the signified but *is itself the carrier* of

signification' (533, emphasis added) Dallmayr goes on to make a parenthetical comment, to provide an example, an assertion which indicates the anthropologistic imports of his entire argument (isn't anthropologization another way of repeating the self-same, translating the other in the idiom of the same?): '(Thus, a figure of Śiva or Gaṇeśa does not so much symbolize something else, but rather "indicates" *its own meaning*' (533, emphasis mine). This is a peculiarity of *Indian* thought.

The locutions 'in itself' and 'its own meaning' sound rather quaint in a critical philosopher's idiom. Is it possible for any sign—even if it is labelled indexical—to confine itself in a determined context? Can there be a context that would absolutely control a sign in such a way as to guarantee and protect its continuity with, and self-exemplification only within, the given context? Doesn't this assertion about the unity of signifier and signified, their (alleged) continuity and belonging to 'the same context' accord priority to a context (a dissimulated thematic) in the proper name of 'India'? Does the semiotic elaboration advanced by Dallmayr here alert one to its categorizing and violent logic?

The possibility of a part at the same time inevitably implies the possibility of a 'whole'—whether the latter is explicitly indicated, referred to or not. One would not have made sense of, or gained access to, a single alphabet of a phonetic or hieroglyphic script without (implicitly or explicitly) assuming its location and function in the 'totality' of such a system. That is, the possibility of metonymy simultaneously underwrites the significatory (and interpretative) possibility in general—otherwise, the so-called metonymy cannot have been a sign of signification. Now, the division between metonymy and metaphor (part, totality, combinationality and their allies)[6] is rather a secondary division, a derivation, which (that is, each of which) cannot escape the general possibility (of significatory structure)—which gets reiterated in each of its (even when) exclusivist, prioritist, binaristic, manifestations. To operate with this dualism and to assert categorical divisions on its basis, is to confuse topological aspects of language (a significatory system) as referential certainties. Dallmayr's account perpetrates precisely this activity in asserting Indian identity by a figure of 'metonymy'. The representational urge is insistent in this activity.

'Comparison involves', Dallmayr writes in a remarkable passage, 'the interpretative creation of a new framework or frame of reference which transgresses the explicit self-understanding of each of the respective terms or configurations, thereby yielding insight into their (not immediately evident) correlation [sic]. . . comparative inquiry explores the explicit self-understanding of a given perspective in the direction of its non-thematized underpinnings or its covert 'otherness' (which is not simply its negation)' (531–32). Yet in the actual demonstration or working out of this critical insight we find representationalism overtaking the insight, we find this comparatological exploration ending up in a

classical gesture of objectifying precisely those 'non-thematized underpinnings', that 'otherness', of the entity (already) identified as 'India-n.'

In translating the grammatical rules which Ramanujan has used into his phenomenological idiom, Dallmayr's scheme assigns the identifying marks of Indian thought—context sensitivity, metonymic imagination—a place in a well-entrenched, received, notion of history: History as a progression from the context-sensitive, life-world and experience-oriented perception to a rational world of discourse: 'Seen from this vantage [sic], the process of modernization can be grasped as involving the progressive erosion of the life-world in favour of rational discourses, of amorphous experience in favour of rationally transparent 'systems' (of thought and action)' (534). Our earlier question regarding the relation between life-world and discourse, experience and reason, still remains valid and is still unanswered in the essay.

If life-world is believed to pre-exist discourse/reason and if it can exist without any kind of supplementation from the latter, our access to that world seems impossible except through the discourse of reason. If this is so, the alleged self-sufficiency of the life-world is by necessity dependent for its significance on the discourse of reason. What would only possibly be a theoretical fiction—'life-world'—is given a referential status in Dallmayr's scheme and is filiated to an historical epoch (of a West) and a geographical region (of a non-West). Although Ramanujan's 'general line of argument' (to which he is 'strongly attracted') is not at all free from this kind of theorization—Dallmayr somehow believes that he cannot agree with 'certain political or social-political accents manifest in the essay'. These 'accents' which Dallmayr finds in Ramanujan's treatment of 'the context-freedom of western thought [are] mainly in pejorative or derogatory terms' (534). Does Ramanujan's thinking appear nostalgic and reactionary to Dallmayr? (Indeed so: 'Sensitivity to context, in his [Ramanujan's] treatment, is sometimes in danger of lapsing into a nostalgic traditionalism' [534]). If this is the truth then how would one reckon Dallmayr's appraisal of Ramanujan's 'splendid display of . . . "analogical imagination"' in characterizing Indian thought, along with the dualist schema of the progressionist narrative to which Dallmayr is committed so resolutely? We will return to this loop in the schema soon.

Another objection Dallmayr raises against Ramanujan's account is that the latter pays insufficient attention to philosophical issues in supporting his arguments (earlier in the paper Ramanujan is described as the Indian philosopher). Ramanujan depends mostly on literature and semiotics. We will only remark in passing that the terms 'literature' and 'semiotics' are treated here as contents of a disciplinary frame, elements of a constituted body. Inadequate philosophical support, Dallmayr contends, causes logical inconsistencies in Ramanujan's

argument. If context-freedom is the dream of Indic tradition (as Ramanujan argued), Dallmayr reasons, this implies that traditional Indian thought was 'aspiring to a context-freemodel' and this 'would have to be seen as an instance of western modernity or as an anticipation of the goals of modernization' (535). Since Ramanujan's (and Dallmayr's own) attempt is to characterize 'Indic' thought, the former would not be asserting an identity between modern West and traditional India. Hence, the logical inconsistency in the argument for Dallmayr. This discovery of inconsistency, we must note here, however, is not likely to change the structural and thematic orientation of both the essays: to identify/fix an Indic signature.

It can be argued, as will be shown later, that Ramanujan's account asserts a prevalence of both elements (context-sensitivity and context-freedom) in the two cultures—but Dallmayr wishes to question the logical pertinence of this in Indic identity. One question that comes to mind in this context is: Is the so-called axiomatic of universality reducible to some period event called modernization (or even a historicizable occurrence as Dallmayr seems to indicate [537])? Isn't it possible that the articulation of context-freedom involved in Ramanujan's argument—in the context of 'Indic' idiom—is not a qualified emancipation from context-sensitivity, a release from primordial bondings which are said to get eroded in the process of modernization? That is, even when Ramanujan seeks a similarity between the notions of context-freedom associated with the two idioms—one could think (yet not objectify) of 'freedom' beyond all its calculated, constituted appropriations? Such a 'freedom' suggests the markings (and) limits of the life and death: it could be the cessation (or excess) of signification itself. This perhaps could also be the 'non-thematized' otherness lurking in Ramanujan's argument on Indic idiom. We will return to this enigma.

But Dallmayr goes on to invoke expert knowledge to objectify the other—and also to argue that Ramanujan lacks a proper grasp on Indian philosophical categories. For him categories like *mokṣa, samnyāsa* and *dharma,* etc. do not indicate any 'rupturing' of relationships, release from contexts as such but rather imply 'the discovery of a more genuine relation and attunement to the basic fabric of things . . . gaining a deeper bond with *dharma* and the web of being . . . a complete union with the divine. . . .' This is what Dallmayr offers as recontextualization of the Indic idiom (535–36). Two points can be made here:

(1) Primarily, Dallmayr's argument here brings forth only a polemical difference with Ramanujan's thesis. More substantially, Dallmayr's 'recontextualization' only goes on to reinforce Ramanujan's identification of the Indic idiom—its (alleged) attachment to contexts—what he calls now a 'deepened context-sensitivity' (536), 'a pervasive mode of context-sensitivity' (537). His argument only extends Ramanujan's thesis and almost gives it an ontological status.

(2) Dallmayr's expert knowledge operates entirely in accordance with the 'explicit self-understanding' (532–33), of the terms of the idiom invoked to identify the Indic signature (Dallmayr wished to go beyond it in the direction of the other). The received status of the terms remains undisturbed. Consequently, the primary postulates of the idiom, in Dallmayr's locutions, 'the basic fabric of things', 'the web of being', 'the higher power' (all of which could be, in the parameters of Dallmayr's argument, subsumed under the category of 'life-world')—operate essentially as received phenomena. How do these ontological (ontologized?) phenomena get constituted? What does it mean to state that a genuine relation, deeper bond and union with the primordial entities (mentioned above) is made possible in this 'recontextualization'? Aren't there any other possibilities of reading—a reading which would radically breach this 'self-understanding' of the tradition? Dallmayr's argument does not attend to these problems. On the contrary, he moves ahead with the expert insight on the nature of Indic notions.

What I am trying to argue here is that though Dallmayr is at pains to reduce the colloquial notion of context as contingent 'environment externally related to a given text or discourse'—it is difficult to see how his own argument can escape such a determination of his object—'India'. For all his categorizations circulate in the argument with the already given proper name 'India'—and are made available as Indic objects, thought, etc. If a 'reading' does not displace the given constellation, the received signification, then one wonders whether the reading has ever taken place at all. In effect, Dallmayr's argument, it seems to me, moves in a circle—that is, it invokes objects already received as Indic in order to characterize the putative identity of 'India'.

Even in this narrativization of Indian identity—despite his objection to Ramanujan's alleged prejudice against context-freedom—the thematic of the loss of innocence is difficult to ignore. The thematic is now recounted not without motifs of nostalgia and self-blame. For—to put it in simple words—the West (goes the argument) in its quest for conceptual formulations persistently transformed 'life-world' into 'discourse', foregrounded the elusive into conceptually accessible phenomena. Whereas the 'other' is now *identified* as still containing what the West has lost—that innocence which is yet to lose its enigma to an unveiling: 'Western thought . . . can indeed be described as marked by a tendency toward context-freedom or *de*-contextualization—that is, by an effort to render all background into a conceptually accessible presence or foreground (or life-world into discourse)' (537). Even if we do not wish to pause to inquire about the possibility of a conception of a pre-

conceptual 'background' (how do we access it?)—isn't this a rather familiar story of anthropological remorse? Indeed—remorse is not too far off: 'While the process of westernization is today 'undergone' by most non-western societies in painful and agonizing ways, western culture is not exposed to a reverse movement of similar magnitude and vehemence' (537). Can innocence proselytize and still claim its name? It looks as if the story of innocence/longing is a constitutive part of any anthropologistic discourse.

The paradox of Dallmayr's discourse is that it longs for something whose structural displacement and deferral is the very condition for the possibility of the discourse itself. One way of containing this discrepancy in the argument is by remorsefully giving the longed-for element a phenomenal/referential existence and project it on some cultural/geographical entity. Consequently, we get a kind of theorizing, through a categoristic mechanism (decontextualized West/recontextualized [yet deeply context-sensitive] India), a discursive production which is blind to the fact that its own assertions are derived from a categorizing impulse and yet yearns for another way of life, another performative.

In celebrating the conceptually elusive Indic notions Dallmayr's constitutive utterances, their theorizing impulse, do not recognize the fact that this admiring discovery is being achieved under the most sedimented conceptual frame: the conceptual West recognizing ('recontextualizing') once again the 'non-conceptual' potential of the non-West in a thoroughly saturated conceptual discourse.[7] (The Husserl quotation in footnote 19—which asserts the inevitability of the Europeanization of the earth and the impossibility of Europeans to Indianize themselves—is offered with no comment at all). The 'Indic' scene in this account provides a space for an epochal yearning. A commentary on Ramanujan ends up reiterating such a belonging and, in the process, reappropriating the other in the matrix of the same. The representational urge regulates the interpretative order in the essay.

BIMAL MATILAL AND THE RUSE OF RELATIVISM

Bimal Krishna Matilal's reading of Ramanujan's essay is occasioned by his critique of cultural-ethical relativism in a series of lectures. The confrontation of cultures takes place, Matilal's argument indicates, where two cultural entities are resolutely opposed to each other—where the chances of negotiation or communication between them seems impossible; a situation where translation and exchange appear to have no place. This precisely seems to be a situation where 'relativism' flourishes. 'Relativism' thrives on the premise of self-enclosed existence of cultural entities. Matilal questions the prevalence of relativistic thought in the discourses of cultural anthropology and ethics/philosophy. Another situation where relativism plays a role is one in which 'peaceful co-existence' of different communities prevails. Matilal offers westernized

Indian community in India as an example here—of a co-existence in the 'old traditional society' (2). Though the two communities might exist peacefully here, Matilal suggests, their commensurability, their internal crossings, is not warranted. They have only a relativized existence.

Perhaps we can use this very 'example' to suggest the larger issues involved here. Matilal's example of peaceful existence of westernized Indian community in the 'traditional society' is aimed at illustrating the operation of relativism; the example is preferred to vindicate the validity of a conception, a thesis. Yet the example itself indicates the fundamental possibility of citation, of translation or transferral, of avowedly context-bound, culture-specific elements across their 'original' home. That is, the 'example', projected to show the insularity of cultural frames, itself substantiates the point that the supposedly context-bound significatory entities cannot be once for all retained within the frame—that the so-called 'West' could be grafted—transferred onto another 'traditional' body called 'India'. But this other operation of the example is not thematized by Matilal here. The example (of the example) itself is not seen as a part of the problem. Rather it is sought to explicate another thematic (of confrontation—relativism). For the 'example' itself, in Matilal's argument, invoked by an 'Indian' philosopher, in a discussion on the strength of relativism, in the English language, across other philosophical idioms and historical epochs—at the same time indicates the other opening, that of something going against the thesis of relativism.

The question that can be raised in the case of the relativizing anthropologist of Matilal's argument is: how will the anthropologist account for his/her own activity of translating/citing all those (supposedly) culturally categorized material? Can one conceive the discourse of anthropology without the fundamental possibility of citation—incorporating other cultures in a coherent narrative, as in the case of Matilal's assessment of relativism—at work as the ground condition? Matilal, of course, is not unaware of the bind here.

'Cultural relativism', Matilal argues, 'is actually a recommended hypothetical construct, being in fact instrumental to *our* understanding of a culture from the *internalist's* viewpoint' (9, emphasis mine). Relativism can only be a theoretical fiction, and the reading that is at work in any context is irreducible (that is, significatory objects are always already caught in interpretative webs). The greatest difficulty, Matilal observes, in the philosophy of social sciences is the introduction of relativistic element: '*We have to posit* the existence of culturally distinct groups with different world-views and hold at the same time that *our access* to them is inescapably and non-trivially conditioned by *our own world-view*' (9–10, emphasis mine). This is obviously a formidable challenge to cultural/ethical relativism. The challenge also articulates the structural

necessity of reading subject/frame; it seems to deny the transparency or self-sufficiency of a cultural entity in itself. Finally, 'the culture-relativity of all moral norms is usually ill-conceived and generally indefensible' (11).

Two kinds of questions, *apparently* unrelated, emerge in this context. First, the rather predictable question: if Matilal's argument seems so resolute in its interrogation and undermining of the tenability of relativism—does this mean that his argument inclines toward some kind of abstract universalism of structures? Is there some kind of structuralism in Matilal's argument? This path of inquiry certainly finds light from Matilal's account.

Secondly, yet a more radical set of questions can be forged here—a set which would interrupt the earlier path of inquiry and bring its functioning to crisis: if the act(ivity) of reading is irreducible, if this denies transparency to other cultural entities—does not Matilal's argument suggest the principle of significatory possibility *in general*—rather than characterizing features of constituted regional fields such as cultural anthropology and ethical philosophy? That is, if meaning or signification in general is the effect of interpretative incursion or irruption of reading space—there can be no *a priori* significatory objects, events, contexts and identities (prior to such incursion). This, in consequence, would radically interrogate all avatars of meta-spaces and positions—all those 'vantage' locations from where 'objects' can be controlled and mastered. This possible opening from Matilal's argument would, eventually, challenge the desire to objectify, the very representational urge—it would unravel ethical/moral proclamations from vantage locations.

What are the consequences of these 'contradictory' pulls and heterogeneous impulses in the text of Matilal's argument? Which interpretative valence or reading act would prevail and claim Matilal's signature in the argument?

It is in this context that we should attend to what one could describe as the most contradictory moment in Matilal's argument: his remarks on Ramanujan's thesis. This appeal to Ramanujan's arguments after such a decisive interrogation of relativistic conceptions seems irreconcileable with the general force implied here. For Ramanujan's account, as will be shown later, can be read as a concerted attempt at particularism, relativism or context-sensivity. We should attend to the detail of the idiom in this 'contradictory' remarking.

In his final lecture critiquing relativism Matilal addresses Ramanujan's rhetorical assertion: 'Is there an Indian way of thinking?' Though Matilal indicates some differences with him—which are only marginal—he is essentially in agreement with Ramanujan's *assertion*. 'Traditionally', Matilal writes, 'universalism, at least in theory, was a western concept. . . . In India, on the other hand, strong context-

sensitivity was explicitly codified in the tradition, which invariably supported the practice' (26–27). This reiteration, like Ramanujan's and Dallmayr's, supposes that it is possible to categorize and fix the conceptual notions 'universality' and 'particularity' as clearly demarcatable and usable identitarian tools.

In the very first lecture we come across a use of this divided pair in a different guise when Matilal refers to the 'two faces of morality'. These two faces, Matilal argues, comprise of the 'rational side' and the 'less than rational side'. If the former is context-transcendent the latter is said to be historically and geographically conditioned. This is in fact a comparatological moment in Matilal's argument. For he goes on to argue that, Indian ethicists had an intuitive grasp of the 'two faces' (conceptually proposed by Europeans) when they championed 'group-relative *dharmas*'. These *dharmas* are surely identified as universalizing (*sādhārana dharma*) and particularizing (*viśeṣa dharma*) modes of understanding. Moving within a well-entrenched schema, Matilal classifies natural sciences in the universalizing mode and the social/human sciences in the particularizing mode of the understanding. If the 'rational' is identified with the 'universal'—the basic question as to how this rational is constituted could be asked. Yet, we shall ask the question only within the context of Matilal's idiom, his interpretative frame. We shall proceed and examine the destiny of this notion in this argument. We will be returning to this.

While moving with an analytic procedure which would fix identities by means of paired opposites, Matilal finds instances that would go counter to the identities thus fixed. Yet, it must be observed here that all the 'examples' which Matilal invokes are invariably either phenomenally available entities or historicized significatory objects. Thus, Matilal would 'take note of the two counter-movements in both traditions' to explain 'a lot of anomalies and paradoxes' (27). If Protestant Christianity and Judaisms espouse context-sensitivity in the western universalist tradition, Indic metaphysical concepts such as Soul and Brahman ('the universal soul and the Ultimate Reality') are offered as instances of context-transcending efforts in the particularistic tradition of India (27). 'The soteriology of *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* is decidedly a route to a state of freedom from all conditionalities (*saṁskṛta dharmas*) and contingencies; *sanyāsa* is a way to break all the barriers of caste, class, sex and birth'. Bhakti religiosity vindicates decontextualization, Matilal argues (27–28). In all this Matilal, like Dallmayr, is firmly with Ramanujan—and his account simply substantiates the latter's thesis. Matilal's reading does not disturb the received nature of the objects and their historicized significance.

In fact when Matilal appeals to the 'inner worth' of 'interpretive experiences' (which are said to have transcended temporality), his argument was ironically confirming this opponent's point. For the

western Indologist's (Matilal's *pūrvapakṣa* here) assertion that India's glory was in its past cannot be displaced by appealing only to the 'inner worth' of schools of thought which are now brought forth as identity markers. For the events that Matilal identifies as transcendental and universalist are mainly recognized as period occurrences, as eruptions in a continuum—where both the continuum and the (alleged) rupture are *retrospectively* conflated in a single identitarian frame: 'Indian culture'. 'I believe', Matilal writes, 'Indian culture has been sustained over the ages by this sort of internal critique, which has transcended contextualities *at different stages in history*' (28, emphasis mine). Identification of an event is like presupposing an object, assuming signification prior to reading. Yet, every such assumption—presupposing the self-sufficiency of the object, its 'inner worth'—results in, even if unwittingly or clandestinely, consolidating an identity, a signature, a nationality.

Any question of relativism (even a critique of it)—ethical one in particular—must examine its possibilities on the primary condition of language. That is, the possibility of significatory system is also the condition of any conception of ethics or norms, etc. If this is so, then the inquiry into ethical relativism must first examine the possibility of language in general. Otherwise, its inquiry will be confined to derived or constituted entities such as 'culture', and 'society', 'world-view' and 'ethical system'. Inquiry into relativism will remain a regional/school thought as long as it believes in the possibility of self-enclosed and self-sustaining frames of culture-thought system. Whereas a rigorous inquiry into the possibility of significatory system would show the limits of such regionality. Relativism, paradoxically, when rigorously attended is both untenable a*nd* (almost) impossible to avoid. Just as examples—which are both apparently self-sufficient and self-evident and at the same time are eminently re-citable (that, is usable elsewhere, against their provenance).

Matilal's account certainly shows the force of these contrary pulls (9). Yet in his attention to 'Indic' notions (*mokṣa, nirvāṇa, sanyāsa,* etc.) his account seems to weigh on one specific note. The Indic notions in Matilal's argument operate mainly as constituted entities, their received status remaining intact. Surely, their 'metaphysical' nature is acknowledged but it does not get interrogated. So, for all practical and argumentative (*thetic*) purposes the 'metaphysical' basis of these notions continues to forge an identity in this argument. The 'metaphysical' basis of these notions isn't affected as their constitutive/supplementary dependence on a significatory system is not examined. That is, the question of the relation between transcendental ('metaphysical') categories and the materiality of the significatory system remains unexplored.

Unlike Dallmayr, however, who faulted Ramanujan for treating the

'Indic' categories (*mokṣa, sanyāsa, dharma,* etc.) as equivalent with modern (that is, European) universalist notions (for Dallmayr the Indic ones can only be context-sensitive), Matilal implies an absolute transcendence for these categories from all kinds of *karmic* (that is, context-bound) instances. Their 'universality', Matilal suggests, is absolutely unrelated to any particularities. But on this reckoning, this figuration of universality cannot be filiated to the schema of universal/particular (which has been the governing dualism of the arguments we are unravelling). For Matilal, the universalism associated with modernity, modernization, and colonialism, etc., is inescapably context-bound: 'modern movements for universalism and decontextualization, for equality and justice, for liberty and freedom of choice unencumbered by group-relative, caste-relative loyalties and duties, would also be compatible with the old rigidity of the *karma* doctrine, the ethic of responsibility' (29). This would imply that the notions of *sanyāsa* and *niṣkāmakarma* cannot be reckoned within the received conceptual dualism. But Matilal wishes to do this as well.

Matilal's invocation of the 'Indic' notions (if one is not taken-in by popular sociology) as indicators of decontextuality in Indian culture have a paradoxical/ironic status in the scheme. These indicators of radical decontextuality, absolute transcendence, are brought-forth here to substantiate (an allegedly) unique signature, the singular trait of Indic identity. That which conflates all desire for universality with a rigid particularism (*niṣkāmakarma* is said to make assertions of 'modern movements', etc., another manifestation of *karma* doctrine) is, ironically, imprisoned here in the name of a cultural identity, a national signature.

Is it possible that a critique of relativism could be circumscribed by the pull of relativism itself? Is it inevitable for any inquiry devoted to trace signatures, articulations of the unique, to remain under the burden of relativism? Matilal's argument invites these questions. The orientation of the argument condemns relativism explicitly—but in the detail, in the very performance, of this argument one cannot fail to notice the rupture. As long as the argument takes recourse to historicized objects or substantialized events, phenomenalized entities, as long as there is no inquiry into the relation between the received object and significatory system—the efforts at tracing signatures get reduced to a regional activity of objectification. The representational urge dominates. Thus, when Matilal intends to counter, for instance, Sudhir Kakkar's representation of Indian identity as an underdeveloped ego—his interrogation moves only within the frame of received objects, inside a regional matrix.

'There is', arguing against Kakkar's assertions Matilal writes, 'no one preferred way of grasping reality'. But this suggestion of more than one possible way is fleshed by means of an empirical sociology. Matilal takes recourse to a populist argument that 'a fully developed ego may not

always be a thing of greater value. . . . For we have seen that rampant individualism . . . in modern western societies, has been counter-productive and has tended to destroy all other values' (29). Earlier in the argument Matilal questioned colonialist thought for its weak 'theoretical foundation' and dubious benevolence—but here too we see a slackening of critical rigour. For a more rigorous argument would unravel the basis of certainties on which arguments about the 'developed' ego rest. Whereas Matilal hastily moves from a theoretical engagement to empirical sociology to denounce a West. For his account in this process 'the Indian way of grasping reality' remains a specifiable, distinct mode. But this mode, as I have been arguing, is arrived at by means of a well-entrenched procedure of analysing through opposites. And assertions of relativism emerge essentially from this mode.

But the pull from the other 'face'—that of universality is privileged throughout in the argument. Moreover, this is done in the name of ethics. Beyond all the relativist interpretations Matilal believes the possibility of a commonality of human concerns. This commonality is what he indicated earlier in the figuration of the 'two faces of morality'. The commonality, Matilal writes, is not weighed down by the peculiarities of a national character. 'An ethical code determined by such ['cultural', 'national'] contingencies', is 'culture relative'. But transcending these underpinnings, Matilal argues, is the essence of 'basic values along with the value-experiences of the 'naked man' '. Obviously, this set of values and experiences is projected as cultural-neutral. But how is this notion of the naked man—stripped of 'all cultural underpinnings'—constituted? How would this stripping fare in the context of the absolute transcendentality of the 'Indic' notions which Matilal discussed earlier? It seems inevitable that all these originary questions will have to abide by the injunctions of simplicity and transparency: 'The common dispositions, constitutive of the concept of the 'naked man', may be recognized as numerous simple facts about needs, wants and desires, for example, removal of suffering, love of justice, courage in the face of injustice, pride, shame, love of children, delight, laughter, happiness' (30–31).

In the Indic parlance of 'universality' (of *niṣkāmakarma* and *sanyāsa*) that Matilal introduced earlier, the notion of the 'naked man' is undoubtedly weighed down by a *karmic* burden. He remains encrusted by the epochal motifs. This naked man by definition, constitutionally, is on the side of the most noble idealizations (without even having to choose) of 'culture'. He upholds the most celebrated notions coveted by ethicists and moralists, culturalists and ideologues as cherished virtues of humanity. How does the 'naked man' come to distinguish suffering from happiness, justice from injustice, courage from cowardice, love from hatred? What we are given, in Matilal's argument, is not how the 'naked man' is related to this classical system of binaries but a

hierarchized arrangement of the opposites of the system. In other words, we are given a thoroughly constituted subject in the name of the 'naked man' (allegedly) stripped of all contingencies. Further, this duality with a preference is not seen as an irreducible 'exterior', a supplemental other of the subject but as something natural, something inherent to it. That is, this preference for all the idealized elements of the system of opposites is seen as part of the instincts, desires of the person. This is where, it seems to me, the (conceptually) sedimented and the sensory (in the sense of the biological) are conflated and the thoroughly constituted biological (that is, value coded instincts) is non-rigorously incorporated and valorized. All protestations to the contrary, this argumentation operates from an essentializing foundation ('The suggested commonness of responses and emotions does not presuppose the essentialist dogma', Matilal claims [31]).

Once there is no critical rigour in examining the essentializing foundations ('metaphysical assumptions'), the attempted criticism of 'universalism', 'relativism', etc., becomes a regional, school, polemics. Matilal's arguments here operate within the historicized identitarian frames such as 'utilitarianism', 'contracturalism', etc., and totalizing unities such as the 'West' and 'India': 'The claim of the non-relativist is minimum: certain basic moral principles are neither agent-relative nor contingent upon any specific type of social order'. These principles, Matilal insists, represent a 'core of shared rationality'. The principle of reason, this proposition surmises, is at the same time a moral ideal. We have 'one world', Matilal argues, but this does not mean that we 'need one kind of man to share that world'. This convergence of principles into one world indicates for Matilal a 'moral singularism'. The concept of 'moral singularism', argues Matilal, at a 'basic level' 'does not encourage moral jingoism, or an attitude of 'holier-than-thou' towards an 'alien' culture' (32–33).

If the one world that is shared by more than 'one kind of man', then, one wonders, whether the desired unity of the *One*, the 'core of shared rationality, can ever be maintained. One wonders whether the basic principles of 'moral singularism' can be preserved as a universally/commonly shared unity. For our access to any such presumed unity will have to emerge with these radical singularities, these heterogeneous particularities. Here, once again, one sees the constituted nature of the object of inquiry, its received status, in this argument. One notices the absence of an originary inquiry which would not slide into a phenomenalistic or historicist material retrieval. For such an inquiry would show that, for instance, all languages are constitutively particularizing frames. They are, by definition, particularistic—one language differs (like each letter of the alphabet) from another in its shape and sound, dialect and register, idiom and history, range and reach. Yet, each of these with all its singular features, its unique attributes

fundamentally shares a common element with all forms of language (semiotic and linguistic): its function as a system of signification. And it is precisely this common role that divides the (almost) fundamentally singular, unique, attributes of each empirically recognizable language. It is this duplicity in constitution of the significatory system which both makes and unmakes the unique/universal in the same significatory context/element.

Bimal Matilal's arguments provide us a chance to see the operation of the contradictory pulls suggested above. Yet these impulses of difference cannot be conceived as exclusionary opposites—for in every instance each reiterates the force of the other. Whereas, Matilal's argument, very much in line with Ramanujan's, consciously inclines towards one exclusively conceived element of the binary. This privileged element is represented as transparent, natural and unified one. For in his account of the 'two faces of morality' Matilal presupposes the goodness and value of the 'core of shared rationality—the 'moral singularism'—of the non-relativist universality, of the 'One World'. This has a paradoxical consequence in Matilal's argument. In valorizing the uncritically received objects, in reiterating their constituted status, this account of universalism, on a closer reading, ends up being in foliation with the so-called relativism (the alleged *pūrvapakṣa* of the argument). For relativism is after all an assertion of a self-sufficient object (culture, ethics, values, etc.), independent of or prior to any act of reading. Matilal's performance through the received dualities and significatory phenomena betrays the non-relativist moves of his argument, and underwrites a representational urge at work.

Indeed the reliance on 'One World' in the ultimate analysis seems to be a voluntary move towards a 'return to relativism'. But can such '*returns*' escape the traps of dogma, of debt? We should now return what is due to A.K. Ramanujan.

A.K. RAMANUJAN AND THE BETRAYAL OF CITATION

If the substance of the past is related to us only through an interpretative frame, a procedure of reading, as we could see above, what is the relation between history and interpretation, heritage and debt, property and name? If this is not a genetic one, then, what is the force of 'history' or 'heritage'? Would the inheritance of a phenomenon called history (culture)—in the form of sedimented practices—be essential in order to *act*? Faced with such a 'system' (as our 'examples' indicate), is it necessary to have a deliberated account of these practices for whatever purpose that we wish to justify? Isn't historical or disciplinary knowledge entirely based on such an assumption: to *know* the 'given' as a starting point of activity? Hasn't such an assumption regulated the 'anthropologists' in their search for the objects of the past? Whatever

the status the past is given in these discourses (of history and anthropology), the past cannot escape from functioning as a series of examples.

The 'past' can only be a series of examples. Indeed couldn't one simply say that the colonial epochs (or capital flows) have after all instituted a set of examples—provided us with exemplary relations? Haven't they given us—in both epochs (colonial period and the era of decolonization)—an access to the 'empirical', to the 'exemplary'? The injunctions of 'history' (culture and the humanities) and 'science' (the social sciences and the science of language pedagogy) which this relationship exemplified and instituted—in the name of Europe—obligated the non-European to follow the exemplary, to remake themselves in terms of the exemplary—an enormous epochal pedagogical lesson indeed: to assume significatory certitudes through the new relationship to the empirical. The non-European remains adrift in these exemplary citations. But this being-adrift has paradoxical imports.

The problem of example is identical to that of citation. For citation indicates the possibility of being cited infinitely. That is, any event that has entered the network of signification can always be represented in diverse ways, and grafted onto diverse networks. What might appear to be a singular event, as seen earlier—because of its constitutive tendency to lend itself to other appropriations, paradoxically, the particularity, the uniqueness, of the event seems to harbour within itself a possibility of generality as well. Yet the effects of all appropriations are not equal. Also, the very pattern of appropriation, re-citation, may simply be a repetition, a conformation to an already existing law or injunction, an established exemplary relation. In such cases history (heritage) as repeating the available, the given, conformation to a law, a mimetology of reception (signification as capturing the original given, meaning as the grasping of the available), a doubling procedure occurs. This could also be a way of, or an effort at, arresting the drift of citation. Let us now turn to our much cited example, to our exemplary South Asianist: A.K. Ramanujan.[8]

In a fascinating and a rather playful piece, Ramanujan engages with the problematic of universality in 'Indian way of thinking' (18). The essay fascinates us, apart from the fact that it has received so much attention, for its structure of multiple narratives. These narratives are drawn from several sources across periods, histories, genres and discourses. The essay could be read as a play upon citations. Indeed the opening citation hints at robbing the reader of his convictions: 'Walter Benjamin once dreamed of hiding behind a phalanx of quotations which, like highway-men, would ambush the passing reader and rob him of his convictions' (18).

Yet as we follow the argument with care we notice that all the

citations are aimed at expressing the minimal essentials which would contribute to a cultural specificity. After a careful delineation of different systems of conception and exemplification associated with Europe and India, Ramanujan concentrates on two linguistic norms to suggest the dominant concerns of thought ascribed to the two cultural entities (Europe/India—or what have been represented as national idioms). Though the norms of context-freedom (or universality) and context-sensitivity (particularity) are to be found in both the cultural frames, the European is identified with the norm of universality and the Indian with particularity. If context-sensitivity persists in the 'under-belly' of universal culture, context-freedom remains the dream of the context-bound Indian (20–22).

The fact that over a century ago Max Müller (cited three times in the essay) developed an argument strikingly similar to the one we witness here need not deter us from our inquiry. Max Müller differentiated Europe and India in similar terms. For him Europe was theory-centred or was capable of generalization; whereas, India was particularistic.[9] Let us continue our reading. Also, we will not allow ourselves to dwell upon the problems involved in using literary motifs for propositional purposes (god, nature, inside/outside—*akam-puram*). For the habit of drawing certainties from figurative/metaphorical discourses has classical roots. This is precisely the procedure which Oxford orientalists adopted in their primary encounter with the corpus of Indic texts—which they classified as 'literary'. In fact this search for the certitudinal (identities) through the 'literary' is essentially related to the (sedimented, philosophical) conception of language itself: language as poetry mothering philosophical offspring, metaphor birthing concept.[10]

Yet, the argument in the essay makes a compelling reading. But the very lucidity of the case and the most crucial element of the structure-citation-demand our attention. While enabling the fortification of a conviction (about the cultural identities), citation itself in general and (and all the citations in the structure of the essay, as in Matilal's essay discussed earlier) seem to be prone to a radical drifting. Orchestration of various citations, anecdotes, stories, parables, legal codes and poetic passages in (for) the argument at the same time seems to reveal the radical possibility of citation moving across the context, the impossibility of any specific context absolutely guarding the citational, the impossibility of a context exhausting the implications (its possibility to drift) of citation. That is, every single quotation or borrowing Ramanujan brings forth to make his argument has already shown the possibility of its desertion of a 'home', its irreducible capacity to drift against or away from its provenance. It is only such a possibility, 'in the first place', enables Ramanujan to make his argument. The structure of the essay seems to defy the sentinel of contextual limits; whereas the argument seems to be an invocation of such a sentinel. More than mere irony is

involved in an argument which, aimed at identifying the nominalizing power of a context, is itself in turn gains its buttressing through citations drifting from various contexts. This could be described as a catachrestic moment when the vehicle of an argument goes against its tenor, when the container is in rupture with the contained; or, as in the cases discussed earlier, the performative goes against the constative. Citation seems to make and unmake arguments. An anthology of quotations will also work as an anthology of citations and deceive us.[11] It would be impossible to conceive of South Asian Studies and Americanization of European culture if the law of citation as drifting across contexts wasn't at work, if the transferral of objects coded and valued in identitarian terms across the contexts of their provenance into different significatory frames was not at work.

Citation works in a more profound way in the present case and complicates the argument which it ought to strengthen. We notice that all the crucial citations in the present argument are translations from Indic languages. But, can we find a more exemplary activity of citation than translation itself? Translation is citationality par-excellence. Translation enables the transferral of what is otherwise confined to a specific (linguistic, identitarian, ideational) context of idiom across its boundaries precisely through its citational force. Ramanujan is acutely aware of this force of citational transference.

Yet transcitational activity creates a paradox in Ramanujan's work which cannot be resolved within the frame of his (pre)conceptions. This paradox emerges in the context of his discursive and translational or transnational work. His discursive (constative) writings show a commitment toward the specificity, separateness, distinction of the 'native' idiom—which could be considered 'Indian' (Indian being a problematic term—even for Ramanujan). And the other work—the (performative) work of trancitation, persistently practicing the transferral of this 'unique', 'singular', material into another (transnational) frame where it becomes accessible and repeatable beyond the specificity of the 'national'/cultural, and period frames. This paradox (like the one between relativism and national idiom in Matilal's case earlier) itself seems unfocused, despite his unease with the term 'Indian', in his writings (in the sense that it is not thematized for examination). The point I am trying to make here is that the very fact that there is the translated object—and here Ramanujan's own wonderful translations from medieval Kannada and earlier Tamil traditions, and his collections of 'folk' tales—(each of these entities), indicates that any entity that once enters the significatory chain is destined to a drift without a destiny, without a finality of end.

Ramanujan's translational act(ivity) wrenches the 'object' from whatever the context in which it was once 'located' and displaces it into another context—the one which has no power to arrest the drift of the

object it seems to be in possession of. Whereas Ramanujan's discursive reflections on transcitationality are in the service of capturing a context, a meaning-giving frame existing *before* the translation, his endeavour seems to aim at arresting the drift. The question of history and interpretation seems to return even in this context. This is also, we realize, fundamentally a conflict between the trope of universality and nationality, the general and singular. When the translations are examined in his discursive frame, one finds the commitment to reinscribe the 'native', the context-sensitive, the unique, in the material itself. Indeed it was this kind of urge that we could see operating in the texts of Dallmayr and Matilal earlier.

But precisely this ideal of translatability structurally undermines the national or the singular character of the idiom. Yet for Ramanujan, in this piece which is playful but essentially committed to a thetic agenda, what disrupts the context-sensitivity of the national idiom is (the standard, determined conception of) the 'modern' society—its technology and capital. Modernization has seen the 'erosion of contexts, at least in principle' in India, Ramanujan argues (22). Ramanujan's further reflections on context here only reinforce an anthropologism which the institution (his own workplace—Chicago) in the decolonized space has nurtured over the years (22–23).

The problem we are facing here has much larger institutional dimensions. Institutions of knowledge are achieved largely through the fortification of boundaries in terms of nation/culture and through the ideals of universality. Institutions safeguard their unexamined interests by reinforcing these boundaries. They turn us into sentinels: 'What this institution [university] cannot bear is for anyone to tamper with language, meaning both the national language and, paradoxically, an ideal of translatability that neutralizes this national language. *Nationalism* and *universalism*. What this institution cannot bear is a transformation that leaves intact neither of these complimentary poles'.[12] Let us continue our tampering with the language we happen to come into.

Another important problematic one is faced within the contexts of texts we are dealing with is that of culture coding. Culture as a category of explanation, a meaning-making frame, is the most powerful machine for consolidating identities. Culture as a self-making apparatus gains its conceptual status and legitimacy through the process of Europeanization of the world. This process, in cartographing the world in terms of cultural–national frames consolidated the identity of the European subject. We note in passing that the term culture emerges from the same root in Latin from which the term colonization also emerged. It is, therefore, not by chance that culturalist models, as we have seen earlier, replicate the anthropologistic desire of an investigating subject involved in capturing the 'truth' of the object. Material or phenomenon (and its attributes) associated with the significatory object (entity with a meaning

intact before the investigating subject), now obliged to function as substances enter the identity making machine. Consequently, culture as a nominalizing category—a 'universal norm'—gets reinforced repeatedly even when our effort is to represent ourselves genuinely. The investigating subject becomes an unwitting accomplice in this making of Europe as the subject (Sudhir Kakkar's work, which Ramanujan cites approvingly, is a raving example of this politics). The investigating subject merely hopes to hold-up the mirror to celebrate the reflections of the cultures.

Mirrors are said to lead us through the windows into reality itself, in Ramanujan's work. Mirror and the eye: powerful, well-entrenched tropes. Yet we never get to know how the mirror gets the power to reflect, for the tain of the mirror (the irruption of the reading space) is never seen as the condition of this specularity; we never get to know how the eye can 'see', how the reality makes windows worthwhile, for their significatory status never gets problematized.

Specular tropes and diologic metalanguages (intertextuality and comparatology) may not tackle the problem we happen to face. They would only claim, as Bernard Cohn does, that 'both white rulers and indigenous peoples [in our context the dominant and its other] were constantly involved in representing to each other', as if there could be a two way communication between the self and the transparent other in itself—even after the epistemic violence.[13] They simply provide more citations for repeating the same perennially. We need to think the tain and implode into the structures of certainty that enframe and reflect 'us' in the law of the same. The pact must be broken and an irresponsibility must be assumed with regard to the injunctions of the principle of reason and debt.

Rage could be one form of responding to the violence of certain appropriations of the 'past', one's inheritance. But can such anxious assertions on the relevance of history, such expressions of consent, be free from filial anxieties? For history seems to function as another name-of-the-father, advancing a genetic relation with the object, the past, a certain relationship of heirdom. Invocation of history or assertion of one's fidelity to history in the name of 'ethics' and 'politics' is to reiterate faith in one's lineage, to repeat the past. For, 'history' and 'memory' have always functioned as the most privileged *pramāṇas* (sources of certainties) in the disciplines of thought.

But, this must be asserted at once, the attention to the interpretive is not in order to celebrate a certain presentism, glorify the present interpretation, to privilege the synchronic over the diachronic, signifier over the signified. Synchronistic discourses which set out to celebrate the system end up asserting the indispensability of a notion of genesis—which they assume unproblematically. This is evident in their notions of system or form as self-evident, auto-genetic, entity. The

problem here is not one of choosing one of the two—synchronic over the diachronic, structure over genesis, general over particular, etc. Precisely, it is this kind of privileging and calculating that has structured the arguments we have examined so far. What is needed, when we happen to be in a system of hierarchized binaries—is an engagement with both that moves beyond their hierarchical boundaries. Such an engagement cannot be presentist—for a presentism would only reinforce the synchronic with paradoxical implications.

The reduction of history suggested here cannot be conflated with a presentism—essentially for the risk of citation it affirms. That is, unlike a presentist argument where a specific interpretation of a period or context (such a secularist readings of religio-theological texts in an evolutionary order or retrospectively), the principle of citation exposes one's activities to the risk of disjunctures, the possibility of being displaced—and, of course, the unavailability of moral luck. The irreducible drift of this principle suggests how a specific organization of exemplary forces has brought forth the current constellation (the disciplines of thought) and the effects of such an organization. But history as capital flows has always attempted to reduce this drift, in the name of certitudes, of a principle of reason and national signatures and tried to programme destinies through calculations and claim a moral luck for itself.

Notes and References

1. *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, Vol. 23, No. 1, January–June 1989, pp. 41–58.
2. *India Through Hindu Categories*, edited by McKim Marriott, Sage, Delhi, 1990.
3. *The Book Review*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, January–February 1990, pp. 18–23.
4. Fred Dallmayr, 'Western Thought and Indian Thought: Comments on Ramanujan', *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 44, No. 3, July 1994, pp. 527–542.
5. Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Confrontation of Cultures*, K.P. Bagchi & Co., Calcutta, 1989.
6. Strictly speaking Dallmayr confuses synecdoche with metonomy. He translates metonomy as 'part for whole' (533), which is really coded as synecdoche. Whereas metonomy refers to the combinational, syntactical relations of language. In our context 'part for whole' actually suggests a metaphorical, substitutional rather than combinational or metonymical activity. For a well-known authoritative account of these terms, cf., Roman Jakobson's 'Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances', in his *Language and Rudy*, The Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987, pp. 95–114.
7. Dallmayr states in a footnote that the direction of his essay concurs with a 'trend' which is in search for a 'meta-philosophical stance. . .' (539).
8. Ramanujan's exemplarity is irreducible. Caught within the very networks of decolonization and capital flows he seems to have silently, but firmly, continued the larger battle within, what threateningly seems to get consolidated in the name of the 'Indic' tradition, on the one hand and the polarized schema of the Great and Little traditions which his workplace (Chicago) offered, on the other. From the earliest days his work explored other avenues, to articulate the heterogeneous under the proper name 'India'. The singularity of this difference can be noticed immediately when one contrasts his work with that cultural monolith which a whole generation of scholars were erecting in the name of 'Sanskrit'. One such glaring example is the *Report of the Sanskrit Commission 1956–57*, Ministry of Education, Delhi, 1958. This document, composed by the 'best' 'representatives' of 'authentic' 'Indic' tradition, is a capitalizing effort—in the name of the nation and culture. In contrast to such an effort, consciously setting himself against it, Ramanujan's work moved into the margins of this citadel and listened for the possible voices that could be there. But can the epistemic violence leave a 'good conscience' untouched? Can one escape the markings of capital flows? The rupture can be seen in Ramanujan's discursive and translational activities.

   Incidentally, it should be noted here that arguments such as Richard Fox's too quickly identify a 'national culture' with the recent political aspirations of a group. Such arguments remain misplaced when they ignore the operations of such a conception on other sites such as the Report mentioned earlier. Also, the ways in which 'capital flows' in decolonization have contributed to such consolidations must be examined. Here one needs to engage with the weaving which the Ford-Chicago-cultural exchanges wrought forth. See, Richard Fox, 'Hindu nationalism in the Making, or the Rise of the Hindus', in *Nationalist Ideologies and Production of National Cultures*, edited by Richard Fox, AAA, Washington, D.C., 1990.
9. Max Müller argued that the Greek thought developed philosophy and a capacity for generalization—and Indians were mainly fact-gatherers, particularistic; the former developed theories which would continue to invigorate one. Whereas Indian 'theories' of language are pedantic. Max Müller quoted in H.H. Wilson's *Essays—Analytical, Critical and Philosophical subjects connected with Sanskrit Literature*, Trubner, London, 1864.
10. Jacques Derrida, 'White Mythology', *Margins of Philosophy*, translated by Alan Bass, Harvester, Brighton, 1982, pp. 209–71.
11. Thoth is the Egyptian god of writing. Obviously, here I am using Derrida's meditations on writing and Thoth elaborated in *Dissemination*, translated by Barbara Johnson, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981.
12. Derrida, *The Ear of the Other*, translated by Peggy Kamuf, Schoken Books, New York, 1985.
13. Bernard S. Cohn, *Anthropologist Among Historians*, 1987, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1990, p. 44.

An Illusive Historiography of the View that the World is *Māyā*: Professor Daya Krishna on the Historiography of Vedānta

A common practitioner knows Vedānta, not through its intricate philosophical arguments concerning the identity of 'I' with 'Brahman' or through the subtleties of Brahman-consciousness, but through its view that all that appears to one's senses is *māyā*. And very few of these practitioners seem to know Śaṅkara. The Śaṅkara they know is not a historical figure; he is a mythological figure identified with Lord Śiva. However, their ignorance of historical Śaṅkara does not prohibit them for believing that the phenomenal world that appears to their senses is deprived of all reality; it is the product of *māyā*. *Māyā* is distinguished from an ordinary illusion. An illusory bread cannot satisfy the hunger of any practitioner, because it cannot be eaten. But the bread that is baked in the oven of *māyā* is not only eaten, it also satisfies one's hunger. Of course, one can stretch the word 'illusion' to such an extent that not only is the bread illusory, but also its eating and the consequent satisfaction of hunger. But the psychologists would not allow such a use of 'illusion'. *Māyā* may be illusion-like, but not technically an illusion. The responsibility for the generation of *māyā* is given to *avidyā* or 'ignorance'. It is the *avidyā*, or act of ignorance, that has led to the generation of such diverse objects as ducks and rabbits. Once knowledge dawns on us, the products of *avidyā* will be destroyed. There would then be no phenomenal world, the world that distinguishes and differentiates ducks from rabbits.

Concerning Vedānta, Professor Daya Krishna accepts that it is 'the most dominant and distinctive philosophy of India' of our days.[1] Its present impact and dominant position can be seen by the fact that some Indian scholars have converted even Wittgenstein into a kind of Māyāvādin—a 'grammatical Māyāvādin'. If Śaṅkara was a 'metaphysical Māyāvādin', Wittgenstein would appear as a 'grammatical Māyāvādin'. '*Avidyā*' creates the reality that is presented to our senses, the reality of ducks as distinguished from the reality of rabbits, says a Śaṅkarite. 'Grammar' creates the reality that is presented to our senses; it is the grammar that distinguishes ducks from the rabbits, says an Indian Wittgensteinian. It hardly matters that an Indian looks at Wittgenstein through some alien eyes. It is quite a difficult, if not an impossible, task to alienate oneself from one's roots. Wittgenstein's remarks on grammar

can easily be given a Māyāvādin interpretation. A Śaṅkarite finds '*avidya*' as the index of what happens in the world. Not very unlike him, an Indian Wittgensteinian is found remarking, 'The grammar of language is the index of what happens in the world, that is, 'Grammar tells what kind of object anything is' (*Investigations*, sect. 373).'[2] Remove *avidyā*, the phenomenal world would wax and wane as a whole, there would remain no more ducks to be distinguished from the rabbits, says a Vedāntin. Remove the grammar of language, the other one means, the world would wax and wane as a whole, there would remain no more ducks to be distinguished from the rabbits. 'Grammar' is a good substitute for '*avidyā*', their creative powers are the same.

Wittgenstein introduced the duck–rabbit picture to introduce us to the puzzles of perception.[3] Panneerselvam, an Indian Wittgensteinian, got the opportunity to compare Śaṅkara with Wittgenstein by extending the duck–rabbit imagery to the snake–rope imagery of Śaṅkara. What was a duck at one time later appears as a rabbit in Wittgenstein's picture. Snake appears as a rope in Śaṅkara. 'It is seen as snake first and later as rope.'[4] But it is also possible that one person sees the same picture as the picture of a duck which the other sees as the picture of a rabbit. Similarly, the snake for one is the rope for the other. Hanson presents this possibility by imagining Kepler and Tycho seeing the sun. Kepler saw the sun stationary, and earth moving round the sun. Tycho, on the other hand, saw the earth stationary and the sun moving round the earth.[5] Wittgenstein's own aspect-analysis is possible. A German may be looking at Wittgenstein in one way, an Indian in another. They have their own 'world-pictures'; they have taken their birth in two different cultures; all their traditions are different. Wittgenstein's notion of a 'world-picture', developed in *On Certainty*, is even more interesting than the duck–rabbit picture or Hanson's Kepler–Tycho pair. The world-picture that I have inherited 'is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there.'[6] And 'I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness.'[7] This is not the occasion for expounding Wittgenstein's notion of a world-picture. It has been done elsewhere.[8] What I wish to emphasize is that I have been thrown into a pre-established tradition. My thinking has taken its shape and form in this tradition. Of course, it is possible for me to change the world-picture that I have inherited, to jump out of my tradition. But then I have to look at the world quite differently; I have to create a different understanding of the world.

Daya Krishna may not appreciate my analogy of 'grammar' with '*avidyā*', that grammar has the same creative power as *avidyā*. For the simple, but good reason that he does not subscribe to the view that Vedānta is the most pervasive and persuasive philosophical thought of India. The propagandists of Vedānta, though few in number, have successfully misled the educated elite of India into thinking that Indian

philosophy means Vedānta philosophy. The truth, according to Daya Krishna, is that Vedānta philosophy plays a very minor role in the historical growth of Indian philosophy. To prove his point, Daya Krishna has not conducted any kind of survey of the practitioners of Vedānta, either from the cities or from the countryside. He is not concerned with the common or uncommon practitioners of the faith. His project is theoretical; he concentrates on the theoreticians of Vedānta. Those theoreticians who had the abilities wrote books, and the less able ones had to remain contended with writing commentaries on those books. Of course, some of these commentaries were thicker than the original works of which they were commentaries. Daya Krishna has restricted himself to certain texts and the commentaries on those texts.'

Daya Krishna wishes to isolate for study those classical texts in which Vedānta was expounded or preached or propagated in any fashion. The historical position of the text would also establish the historical position of Vedānta. So Daya Krishna has clearly avoided the pre-textual age, the age before the invention of two-dimensional script. Even during the age of script some people might have preferred oral delivery, as in our days some people continue talking without having any ability to write. However, these issues cannot and should not be raised. For Daya Krishna thinks that the historical origin of Vedānta can be established with conviction by studying the relevant classical texts. And these texts would also establish with conviction whether Vedānta ever had a powerful sway over the Indian philosophical thought. Quite interestingly he has taken up those classical texts which were handled by Śaṅkara himself. For Śaṅkara, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, the Upaniṣads and the *Brahmasūtras* were embodiment of all philosophical virtues, which for him were the same as Vedāntic virtues. Therefore, Śaṅkara wrote commentaries on these texts. According to him, as Daya Krishna points out, 'the source of Indian philosophy lies in these three texts.'[9] By Indian philosophy, as is obvious, Śaṅkara meant Vedānta. All else was nothing but playing cards. Daya Krishna wishes to prove Śaṅkara wrong.

Out of the three texts on which Śaṅkara commented, Daya Krishna gives his full attention to one, side glance to the other, and no thought given to the third. The text to which no attention has been paid is *Bhagavat Gītā*. May be because Daya Krishna fixes the First Millennium AD as the time when Vedānta, according to him, raised its head in the philosophical scene of India, but no precise date for *Bhagavad-gītā* has yet been fixed. So even if this text embodies Vedāntic thought we remain ignorant about its origin, therefore, perhaps Daya Krishna ignores it. Upaniṣads too have been brushed aside. They too have a fluid history. They 'continued to be composed till as late as the thirteenth century, that is, a long time after Śaṅkara wrote his commentaries on them.'[10] So only *Brahmasūtras* remain to be attended, two other important texts were given only first-aid and released. They were not serious cases.

Daya Krishna fixes AD 50 as the probable date for the birth of *Brahmasūtras*. If this date is reliable then Vedānta takes its birth when all the orthodox and heterodox systems were already in their youth. And this new-born babe was certainly not looked after properly by the philosophers for centuries to come. Whether a text has been looked after or not, depends on the fact whether it has been commented or not. For centuries to come *Brahmasūtras* remained uncommented upon. Daya Krishna gives no importance to certain commentators, who for him may be minor or slightly deviated from the ideal interpretation of Vedānta, namely, Bodhāyana (AD 350), Dramiḍācārya (AD 525), Bhartṛprapānca (AD 550), Viśwarūpadeva (AD 600), and Brahmadatta (AD 660). Therefore, he is surprised: '*Brahmasūtras* remained entirely unnoticed until the appearance of Śaṅkara who wrote his commentary on them.'[11] Being noticed by minor commentators was as good as not being noticed at all. Daya Krishna wishes to show that all the centuries from the time *Brahmasūtras* were composed till the arrival of Śaṅkara on the scene, the Indian academic world had no impact of Vedānta. No standard commentaries were written, so no impact is demonstrated. But what about the practioners of the Vedānta faith? Did they also require commentaries? Were they also removed from the scene because no commentaries on *Brahmasūtras* were coming to them? In the context of India, philosophy has been detached from its practitioners only from the time of the colonial invasion. But no philosophical system that has been discussed by Daya Krishna is the product of colonial subjugation. Too many commentaries do not necessarily imply that they would attract the practitioners. Too many cooks spoil the broth is a well-known saying. There is every possibility that too many commentators may confuse the practioners, and instead of conversion to the system they may run away from the system. Vedānta attracted its practitioners, not through its abstract logical argumentations but through its simple analogies, so simple that even a child could understand them. And in this direction Śaṅkara made things easier.

So far as the Vedānta academic world is concerned, it was dull not only between *Brahmasūtras* and Śaṅkara, according to Daya Krishna, the situation was no better during the post-Śaṅkara days. Even the days of Śaṅkara were not as rosy as were 'made out by his admirers and the author of the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*.'[12] Daya Krishna simply gives no importance to the so-called *Digvijaya* of Śaṅkara. According to him 'there is little evidence of the so-called *Digvijaya* as it is the philosophers of the other schools who continue to outnumber the Vedāntins in the centuries after Śaṅkara.'[13] According to the statistical analysis of Daya Krishna, the period in the first millennium AD that produced only 'eight Vedāntins' produced '117 Buddhist thinkers', '27 Jaina thinkers' and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, 13 (9+4)'.[14] Perhaps the situation of Vedānta had been little improved if Śaṅkara had conducted his *Digvijaya* in a slightly different

fashion. There is a story that Śaṅkara had to face a woman in discussion. Being a bachelor monk he had no experience of a family life. In order to defeat the woman in discussion he decided to have the required experiences. So he entered into the body of a prince, and lived the life of a married prince. He should have stayed in the body of the prince a little longer. He should have completed his *Digvijaya* as a prince. Then he had a chance to physically exterminate the Buddhists, the Jainas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who were trying to outnumber the Vedāntins. An academic war was no good. A political war would have brought better results. But this is a possibility which was quite risky. The bigger kings of the first millennium AD used to run over the territories of the smaller kings. But the defeat of these smaller kings was always short-lived. They faced only temporary humiliation. As soon as the big king returned to his capital, the smaller kings declared themselves free. Perhaps the political victories were more short-lived than the academic victories. In having an academic war against the opponents Śaṅkara decided the right course of action. The fact that the opponents of Vedānta outnumbered the Vedāntins 'in the centuries after Śaṅkara' cannot be produced as an evidence against Śaṅkara's *Digvijaya*. People change loyalties. 'Śaṅkara had a grand *Digvijaya*; he might have defeated all his opponents, including the Buddhists, the Jainas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. But the disciples of Śaṅkara failed to retain the academic empire of Śaṅkara. It was too big for them. And they did not have the abilities of Śaṅkara. So the empire might have collapsed.

The question that does not occur to Daya Krishna is to see whether there was any other scholar belonging to any other school who was as much academically competent as Śaṅkara. Was there any Buddhist or Jaina or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholar who could challenge Śaṅkara on his face? Of course many of them challenged him, and they were also defeated. But we are not to accept the words of the drum-beaters of Śaṅkara. Let us use our own faculty of judgement. Was there any other scholar of Śaṅkara's time whose work excelled that of Śaṅkara both in quality and quantity? Was there a Buddhist scholar who established his credentials in Buddhism as much as Śaṅkara established in Vedānta? Or, a Jaina who produced as much work on Jaina philosophy as Śaṅkara produced on Vedānta philosophy. If we see the quality and quantity of Śaṅkara's work, then no scholar of Śaṅkara's time, belonging to any other school of thought, produced a matching work. Daya Krishna has not cited the name of a single other scholar who was a match to Śaṅkara during his lifetime. Then why should he doubt *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*. Instead of bringing the big list of scholars belonging to different schools, Daya Krishna should have unearthed only one such scholar who did better academic work than Śaṅkara, then so far as we are concerned Śaṅkara's *Digvijaya* was only a fraud. So long as the name of such a scholar is not brought to our notice, for us *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* would remain genuine.

We simply have no reason to doubt Śaṅkara's credentials. Of course, Daya Krishna has succeeded in exposing Śaṅkara's disciples.

In order to win his case Daya Krishna has presented some 'post-Śaṅkara' philosophers as 'the contemporaries of Śaṅkara'. According to Daya Krishna, 'The first clear cut reference to Vedānta as a distinctive school of philosophy occurs in the work of Bhavya or *Bhāvaviveka* in AD 550, that is, more than five hundred years after the composition of the *Brahmasūtras* and about 150 years before Śaṅkara appears on the scene.'[15] So AD 700 is Śaṅkara's time. This is further confirmed when Daya Krishna divides 'the presence of Vedānta in the first millennium AD in two parts, the first relating to the period after the *Brahmasūtras* and before Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* in the early eighth century AD and the second after Śaṅkara, that is, roughly from AD 700–1000.'[16] So Śaṅkara's time is roughly AD 700. The time of Śaṅkara *Bhāṣya* is 'early eighth century'. Śaṅkara certainly did not survive beyond early eighth century. It is said that he died quite young, in his early 30s. By no stretch of imagination the year AD 750 can be described as 'early eighth century'. Daya Krishna refers to Buddhists and says 'even the Buddhists are ahead of the Vedāntins, both in quantity and quality, thus nullifying the myth that they were defeated by Śaṅkara.'[17] But Daya Krishna has not given the name of a single Buddhist scholar whose work excelled that of Śaṅkara in both quality and quantity, who challenged Śaṅkara on his face, except mentioning that the post-Śaṅkara period saw the emergence of '117 Buddhist thinkers'. None of those 117 Buddhist thinkers came to face Śaṅkara when he was on his war-path, the path of *Digvijaya*. So they were quite irrelevant even if they were several times more than the statistical figures of Daya Krishna.

The case is not very different when Daya Krishna refers to Jainas. He refers to Haribhadra Suri, the great Jaina thinker. But Daya Krishna himself accepts that this great Jaina thinker belonged to AD 750.[18] This date itself shows that Śaṅkara belonged to one age and Haribhadra Suri to another. Of course, the age of the latter immediately succeeded the age of the former. But there was no occsion for Śaṅkara to have challenged Haribhadra Sūrī, or for Haribhadra Sūrī to have faced Śaṅkara. So was the case of Śāṁtarakṣita and Kamalaśīla mentioned by Daya Krishna. Both of them belonged to the age of Haribhadra Sūrī, and not to the age of Śaṅkara, therefore, none of them created any kind of road-blocks when Śaṅkara was marching to complete his *Digvijaya*. How could any post-Śaṅkara philosopher be any kind of threat to Śaṅkara's supremacy in argumentation? They could be supreme only after Śaṅkara's death. Might be that the post-Śaṅkara Jaina thinkers defeated the post-Śaṅkara Vadāntin thinkers. But this would not be the defeat of Śaṅkara in the hands of Jainas, or any kind of argument against his *Digvijaya*.

Though in a subdued language, Daya Krishna has made the charge

of academic dishonesty against the author of *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*. Of course, academic dishonesty is not a phenomenon restricted to our own age; it is a universal phenomenon. Daya Krishna has drawn our attention to the fact that Haribhadra Sūrī 'did not even mention Vedānta' when on the other hand 'he mentions not only Buddhism but also Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṁkhya explicitly and even Lokāyata which certainly was not regarded as a major school of philosophy by anybody in India'.[19] Haribhadra Sūrī's handling (or mishandling) of Vedānta means a lot, because he appears on the scene immediately after Śaṅkara. Haribhadra's neglect of Vedānta has led Daya Krishna to infer that 'the influence of Śaṅkara and his disciples had not permeated the philosophical atmosphere as is usually alleged by those who regard *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* as an authentic work descriptive of his triumph over all other philosophical schools of India'.[20] The best way to reject a philosopher is to ignore him. But motives should not be imputed. However, we have to know that Śaṅkara was not the prime mover of Vedānta. That credit cannot be given even to Bādarāyaṇa. Haribhadra's work cannot be considered as the 'general survey' of the schools of philosophy existing at his time. It was simply a survey of the philosophical systems of his choice. His choice included Lokāyata that failed to produce any text of any repute, and produced only stray-remarks of doubtful origin, but excluded Vedānta that produced several well-commented texts from AD 50 to AD 750. If Haribhadra Sūrī cannot be blamed, Vedānta too cannot be blamed. Blame goes only to Haribhadra Sūrī's choice.

Daya Krishna's method of isolating Vedānta for attack is to refer to all those works that failed to refer to Vedānta. The works that praised Vedānta, or in any significant way referred to it, are not of much use to him. Thus Daya Krishna's critique of Vedānta rides on the shoulders of Buddhist and Jaina thinkers who ignore Vedānta. Thus the pre-Saṅkara Buddhist scholars Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu have been cited because they did not 'show any awareness of *Brahmasūtras*'.[21] If the Buddhist thinkers are used for pre-Śaṅkara period, Jaina thinkers have been used for the post-Śaṅkara period. The works of Haribhadra Sūrī, Śāṁtarakṣita and Kamalāśīla have ignored Vedānta, have shown no awareness of this system of philosophy. The progress of Buddhism and Jainism in the first millennium AD and their act of ignoring Vedānta have led Daya Krishna to the shocking conclsuion that there is 'practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD.'[22] The conclusion is shocking because throughout his writing Daya Krishna kept the balance of Vedānta quite high, but in the end he tilted against it. In his writing he wished to be faithful to history, but in the end he deserted it.

Consider why his conclusion is shocking. For the pre-Śaṅkara period he has brought out a set of five Buddhist thinkers who exhibited no

consciousness of *Brahmasūtras*. This set was balanced by the set of Vedāntin thinkers brought out with the help of Potter and Nakamura. This set has also five members. Of course, the set of Vedāntins is quite weak. That weakness is compensated by three big Vedāntins, namely, Bādarāyaṇa, Gauḍapāda and Bhartṛhari. So the pre-Śaṅkara periodhas fared quite well And the Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara period fares even better. Daya Krishna may have in his mind a big list of philosophers who ignored or opposed Śaṅkara during the post-Śaṅkara period. But in his paper he has mentioned only three names, those of the Jaina thinkers mentioned above. All these thinkers belonged to AD 750. We should rely on paper, and not on what is in Daya Krishna's mind. As against these three Jain thinkers, Daya Krishna has mentioned so many Vedāntin thinkers belonging to Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara period. Let us quote him in full. He points out 'Hastāmalaka, Troṭaka, Padmapāda and Sureśvara are the well known disciples of Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana Miśra, the author of *Brahmasiddhi* can be regarded as almost half his disciple. If we exclude these, then in the post-Śaṅkara period, we have, besides Bhāskara, who has written an independent Bhāṣya on the *Brahmasūtras*, Gopālāśrama (AD 780), Jñānaghana (AD 900), Jñānottama Bhaṭṭāraka (AD 930), Vīmuktātman, AD 960, Vācaspati Miśra (AD 960), Prakāśāmana (AD 975) and Jñānottama Miśra (AD 980).'[23] This shows that the Vedāntins were spread out in the whole of the first millennium AD, starting from the time of Śaṅkara till 980. Then how has Daya Krishna tilted the balance against Vedānta, how could he have come to the conclusion that 'there was practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD'. From the names he has mentioned in his paper it seems that there was hardly any opposition to Vedānta in the first millennium AD. Vedanta had a kind of walk-over as regards its opponents.

In order to show that there was practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD Daya Krishna is required to spell out the names of all the 117 Buddhist thinkers, 27 Jaina thinkers and 13 Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers to whom he refers. It is only when their names are written down that we can judge whether any of them was a match to Śaṅkara or even to Bhāskara or Vācaspati Miśra. Daya Krishna has not hesitated in mentioning the names of the Vedānta thinkers. Then why should he hesitate in mentioning the names of those thinkers who opposed Vedānta or overlooked it?

In providing the historiographical details of Vedānta Daya Krishna has not transcended the limits of the first millennium AD. But Vedānta as a thought might have originated much earlier in the past than the first century of the first millennium AD. Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtras* might have functioned as the occasion for the foundation of the Vedānta school of thought. But before the formation of the school, those thoughts were expressed by so many philosophers. Daya Krishna himself refers to the names mentioned in the *Brahmasūtras*. They are Kārṣṇājini,

Kāsakṛtana, Ātreya, Auḍulomi, Āśamarthya, Bāduri and Jaimini.[24] These names take us deeper into the past, before the birth of Christ. How long before Christ cannot be decided so easily. But it seems that the Vedāntic thought exactly in its *Māyāvāda* form was floating in the air when Alexander the Great invaded India. Daya Krishna gives the impression that the doctrines of '*avidyā* or *māyā*' were unique features of Śaṅkara's thought.[25] The expression *māyā* might have been a new invention. Once a school comes into existence so many new expressions are coined, which later become a part of the technical vocabulary of the school. But the coinage of these expressions pre-supposes a state of things behind it.

When Alexander invaded India he was accompanied by his court-philosopher Anaxarchus. Anaxarchus brought with him his pupil Pyrrho, who later became the leading philosopher of Greece. He became the father of Greek scepticism, called Pyrrhonism. 'For the Pyrrhonists', according to Brinda Dalmia, 'doubt is the *summum bonum* of our intellectual and ethical lives. The true sceptical method is of generating counter-arguments of equal strength to any and all claims which in turn, results in a suspension of judgement (epoché). This, it is claimed, is a state of ultimate peace (*atraxia*)'.[26] Doubt for Pyrrho was only a means for the suspension of judgement. If all our claims are open to counter-claims, then the futility of making claims is demonstrated. Silence or suspension of judgement is the result to which doubt leads, and this suspension of judgement would bring *atraxia*, a complete peace of mind. According to Nisha Rathore, Pyrrho comes very close to Buddhism. Buddha 'recommended the suspension of judgement on such metaphysical questions as "Is the universe destructible or indestructible? Is the soul same as the body? Is the universe finite or infinite?"'[27] Pyrrho extended the suspension of judgement to all kinds of situation. Pyrrho's *atraxia* comes very close to *nirvāṇa*. Pyrrho might have been influenced by Buddhism, but not his teacher Anaxarchus. Anaxarchus was influenced by the thought that was Vedāntic in spirit. He considered the physical world illusory and 'compared existing things to stage-painting and took them to be like experiences that occur in sleep or insanity'.[28] If this is not Māyāvāda then what is it? Not only were Buddhism and Jainism popular when Alexander invaded India, perhaps Vedānta was no less popular. Of course, for the Greeks all of them were 'naked philosophers'; all of them were 'gymnosophists'. But the philosophical views of these naked philosophers differed. From where did the Vedāntic thought emerge before Alexander invaded India? Among other sources, *Bhagavad Gīta* and Upaniṣads formed two major sources as Śaṅkara thought. Not all Upaniṣads were post-Śaṅkara, some of them might have been pre-Alexander. Incidentally, what would happen to a country if the practioners of Vedānta join hands with the practioners of Buddhism and Jainism?

Daya Krishna is aware of the fact that, at present, Vedānta is the most dominant philosophy of India. Its māyāvāda has influenced even the minds of those Indian philosophers who are working on alien philosophical systems. According to Daya Krishna's own acceptance 'innumerable writers on Indian philosophy' have given their time to Vedānta. What has brought into existence this mushroom growth of Vedāntins to the twentieth century AD of India? It seems that the Vedāntic thought has progressed in fits and starts. A period of intense activity was followed by a period of extreme depression. Vedānta might have passed through several rounds of progress in this fashion. Is this true only about Vedānta? Have the other systems of Indian philosophy progressed in a different fashion? Certainly not. It seems that all the systems of Indian philosophy have progressed in fits and starts. At present, Vedānta is the most dominant and distinctive philosophy of India, because the other systems of Indian philosophy are passing through their state of extreme depression. So there is a hope for India to have a bright future for those who are currently passing through a depression.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD : The Case-Study of a Retrospective Illusion Imposed by the Historiography of Indian Philosophy' in *JICPR*, Special Issue on Historiography of Civilizations, June 1996, p. 201.
2. R.C. Pradhan 'Seeing and Seeing *As* : A Response to Suresh Chandra', *JICPR*, May–August, 1995, p. 127.
3. See *Investigations*, II, ix.
4. S. Panneerselvam, 'Seeing and Seeing As: A Reply to Suresh Chandra', *JICPR*, May–August 1995, p. 136.
5. N.R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery*, Cambridge, 1958, p. 5.
6. *On Certainty*, 559.
7. Ibid., 94.
8. This refers to my paper on 'Wittgenstein on Religious Beliefs and World Pictures' in *Wittgenstein: New Perspectives*, an unpublished project submitted to ICPR. Wittgenstein's notion of a 'world-picture' is similar to the notion of a 'paradigm' later developed by T.S. Kuhn.
9. 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD', p. 202.
10. Ibid., p. 201.
11. Ibid., p. 202. One possibility is that Śaṅkara's interpretation was so unique that the earlier interpretations became unimpressive and out of the way.
12. Ibid., p. 203.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 204.
15. Ibid., p. 206.
16. Ibid., p. 205.
17. Ibid., p. 203.
18. Ibid., p. 206.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 205.

22. Ibid., p. 207.
23. Ibid., pp. 205–6.
24. Ibid., p. 203.
25. Ibid., p. 206.
26. Brinda Dalmia 'Benefit of Doubt', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* special number on René Descartes, Jan–Apr. 1996, p. 20.
27. Nisha Rathore 'Indian Philosophers and Greek Scepticism' *New Quest*, July–August 1995, p. 224.
28. Quoted by Nisha Rathore, p. 221. Anaxarchus remained an unknown figure in Greek philosophy. He is known because he was the teacher of Pyrrho.

Hyderabad SURESH CHANDRA

Does the Grammar of Seeing Aspects Imply a Kantian Concept?

One of the most interesting set of articles to be published in the JICPR are from three Wittgensteinians, namely Professors Suresh Chandra, Pradhan, and Panneerselvam, all having their focus on seeing aspects by Wittgenstein.[1] All of them miss something very crucial in their reading of Wittgenstein, namely Wittgenstein himself. They falter in their understanding of Wittgenstein. It is not my purpose here to show what a correct understanding of Wittgenstein consists in, but to discover the flaws in all the three interpretations on this particular issue of seeing aspects. I borrow this way of formulating the problem from Malcolm Budd.[2] So I owe to all of them for the stimuli to submit the following lines of criticism which in a way supplement what they say on the issue in question.

Briefly, Professor Suresh is right about perceptions with regard to the famous duck-rabbit figure, namely, seeing duck, seeing rabbit, and seeing duck as rabbit, all basically the same involving perception. He misses to hit the very target, for the problem here is not seeing duck or seeing rabbit, but seeing duck *as* rabbit, or more precisely the differentiation of seeing a rabbit from seeing a duck. *A fortiori*, it is not epistemic. Pradhan thinks that there is a conceptual aura in seeing duck as rabbit so much so that seeing aspects is a conceptual issue having a Kantian flavour. This fails to illuminate the very thing at issue. Panneerselvam argues that seeing duck as rabbit is an illusory perception on the scale of *māyā*, *contra* Suresh who thinks that it is a case of veridical perception. Neither of them is true. Consequently, Panneerselvam starts with a major premise which holds that all our veridical perceptions are conceptually coloured. Towards the end, he remarks that 'without concepts, visual experience is not possible' (136). This is very crucial for

maintaining that the world is seen as *māyā*. In contrast to Pradhan, who maintains that seeing as is only conceptually structured, for Panneerselvam, since seeing is conceptually structured, seeing as too is conceptually structured. It is very obvious that none of this will hold water as an interpretation of Wittgenstein. In what follows, I shall tell why I think this is so.

Professor Suresh takes exception to Pradhan's way of interpreting this in terms of a Kantian interpretation which seems to be the weakest part of the entire exchange. I am in sympathy with it though. Nevertheless, the very purpose of this anti-Kantian stance gets defeated when it refuses to move beyond a perfunctory level. The reason for this is to be sought in his own faltering interpretation of seeing aspects. His criticism is centred around the conceptual aura of of seeing as granted wholeheartedly by Pradhan. Suresh hits the bull's eye: 'Pradhan recognizes the distinction between seeing and seeing as'. And the rest of the criticism is to attack this differentiation. Consequent upon this denial, there comes the reduction of 'seeing as' to one about seeing. Granted that seeing rabbit is one aspect, but seeing it as a duck is a new aspect in my seeing *pace* Wittgenstein, but from this, Suresh Chandra wrongly concludes that it does not *alter* my seeing, though it might be a change in the *object seen*. If he is asked, then, 'what about the puzzle?', Suresh defeats the very purpose: 'the puzzle does not exist for me, it exists for others' (119). If it is for Wittgenstein who is thought to address himself to the question about (veridical) perception, what then is the purpose of the critique with which he is going to illuminate us? Does he want us to forego the problem of perception itself? Does he want to deny that there is a philosophical problem? That will land him in a contradiction since he has already admitted the change in the object seen.

Pradhan's view is simple in that he thinks that we attribute a property to an object because we possess a Kantian sort of concept so as to enable a rapport with the world which Wittgenstein calls the underlying structure of language in the *Tractatus* and grammar in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Thus, Wittgenstein supports a Kantian turn in philosophy. In other words, Wittgenstein's linguistic turn is the Kantian transcendental turn in disguise with which none of the Wittgensteinians can agree. For this purpose, Pradhan put to use the phrase 'critique of language' with which I have already expressed disagreement.[3] He includes into his outlook the synthetic *a priori* as well as idealistic elements which again stands on questionable grounds.[4] One can agree with Wittgenstein's anti-realism, but not his idealism. It seems that he still continues to maintain a similar position in the wake of mild tremors caused by Suresh in the context of his reading of seeing aspects in later Wittgenstein. Pradhan equivocates grammar with the highly ambiguous 'harmony between language and the world' given currency to by Baker,[5]

without realizing that he uses it as a counterthrust to the Tractarian metaphysical harmony and hence it carries a sense of *via negativa:* no harmony on account of the impossibility of purview.

With regard to the seeing aspects, Pradhan now maintains that it is more than mere seeing and hence merges with the Kantian conceptual elements. As said above, Professor Suresh vehemently denies this by pointing out that the above distinction is a miasma. To some extent, I agree with this criticism saying that there is absolutely no evidence at all for thinking that seeing and seeing as is to be distinguished by holding that seeing as is 'more than seeing' but that does not make me agree with Suresh Chandra in holding that seeing as is seeing *per se*. I cannot agree with him in saying, 'There is no special kind of seeing involved in seeing a rabbit, qualitatively different from the seeing which was involved when I earlier saw the duck' (119). This turns Wittgenstein upside down and is hence a non-starter.

By refusing to recognize the puzzle, Suresh Chandra completely misses the central thrust of Wittgenstein's discussion on the two uses of the word 'see' (*Philosophical Investigations*, 193ff.). At times, he seems to recognize the puzzle-picture of duck-rabbit, but misses the puzzle by hindsight. Ironically, he hurls the same charge against Panneerselvam. The puzzle concerns the multiple meaning of the word 'seen', a distinction Pradhan wants to highlight with his admission of change of language-games. Pradhan's distinction between seeing and seeing as comes through here. Like Suresh, he also denies that seeing as is deviant, but for him, it is more revealing in that the conceptual connections are internal. Can he maintain the same and still answer the question: what about seeing so as to keep up his Kantian posture? But that will sponsor only an inconsistency if he still harps on the view which holds that seeing as is more than seeing. Does it mean that seeing as is Kantian whereas seeing is less Kantian? If this is the only differentiation he wants to project, he is patently wrong. For Professor Suresh, Wittgenstein's quest about seeing is purely epistemic: can he show what Wittgenstein was concerned with here are truth-values of statements? He cannot show by any stretch of imagination. The colouration he lends to the problem makes it more monolithic than the occasion demands. The epistemic twist is appropriate only when he accepts that seeing aspects involves interpretation. Surprisingly, both Suresh Chandra and Pradhan deny this, despite Wittgenstein's acceptance of it. Does it involve concepts also? Pradhan's answer is yes. He conveniently forgets that it goes against Wittgenstein's denial of private language. He wants to clarify further by saying that Wittgenstein has no reason to accept interpretation. We do not force the concept but the concept is forced us; hence no interpretation (131).

Pradhan does not realize the reason why Wittgenstein in the quoted passage appears to deny interpretation. The reason is that it will make

the issue to be one that is exclusively epistemic. Wittgenstein's intention is clearly not to make it so. The following remark supports this reading. Let me quote: ' . . . it is easy to recognize cases in which we are *interpreting*. When we interpret, we form hypotheses which may prove false' (212). Wittgenstein further clarifies saying that this is possible only when seeing is a state. So if he denies interpretation, he denies the cognitive state that accompanies it. Wittgenstein must be understood to rule out the epistemic character of the concept precisely for the reason that our concepts are open-textured. This also proves the self-contradiction in Pradhan's whimsical reading of the passage (212), which squarely places its emphasis on mental state. In the illustration of a cube as a wire frame, Wittgenstein remarks: '. . . we see now as one thing and as another. So we interpret and *see* it as we *interpret* it' (193). What will be Pradhan's reaction to this remark? Suresh Chandra also contradicts when he refuses to recognize this while making it as epistemic. Suresh Chandra also turns a blind eye when he refuses to recognize that the issue of seeing as is tied up with a semantic issue about meaning change. He works in a semantic vacuum. Budd brings this out admirably well when he endorses Wittgenstein's view (*Philosophical Investigations*, 210).

It is easy to show that all the three Wittgensteinians got it wrong. Pradhan tries to Fregeanize Wittgenstein's use of concepts and says that this warrants a Kantian *a priorism*. There is no evidence to show that Wittgenstein is either Fregean or Kantian. With regard to the Fregean step, he is reproved by the text of Wittgenstein. Pradhan has been obviously misled by those passages in which either the locution 'concept' or its surrogates occur. If we try to enumerate all those passages in which they occur, we find that locutions such as 'concept of experience' (193) and the relation between concepts (208), the difference between concepts (197) all of which indicate that relations between concepts is more primary than concepts *per se* and clearly Wittgenstein is talking about the concept of experience rather than the experience of the concept. The locution 'concept of seeing' (200) conveys the idea that Wittgenstein was only dealing with a conceptual understanding of what seeing is and not what causes our seeing. Wittgenstein asserts that our problem is a conceptual one while denying that it is a causal one (203).

In the words of Budd, what Wittgenstein deals with here is the 'polymorphous character of the concept of seeing' (99). What is then the basis for Pradhan's importing into the text what is not found? Again, in *Philosophical Investigations*, 230 (xii), he explicitly denies that we are doing science or ours is an enquiry into the conceptual foundations of natural science, but his interest squarely lies in the way different concepts were formed and not how concepts *simpliciter* were formed innately in us as Pradhan seems to think. We can conclude that both the Fregean and Kantian moorings can be safely ignored. Pradhan's reading of Wittgenstein could be rejected *in toto*. Secondly, he is confused between the concept of seeing and the concept of the object seen and uses the latter as the proxy for the former. This follows from his refusal to believe that the analysis of the concept of seeing is a quest under a broader query about Wittgenstein's conceptual investigation into philosophy itself.

Panneerselvam makes a vain attempt to bring an analogy between seeing aspects and the celebrated seeing rope as a snake, that seeing one thing in another, where there is no analogy. He cannot 'explain' one in terms of another unless one of them provides the necessary *explanans*. He takes refuge under what he calls a parallel. But Panneerselvam's way of presenting it does not show any parallel. He denies, for example, along with Suresh, that duck-rabbit is ruled out by Śaṅkara's analysis. If so, seeing as is ruled out; if so, then what is the parallel he wants to bring about? His parallel is a non-starter, for Wittgenstein is not concerned with the epistemics of perception that is, seeing rope and seeing snake. The realization of one as false does not occur unless it warrants an epistemic situation. What then is Panneerselvam's interest in introducing this as interpretation. This requires him to introduce another premise saying that the previous perception is 'soaked with' concepts. This is *non-sequitur* because he can never show that all our epistemic revisions are sublations in Śaṅkara's way. Either Śaṅkara is wrong in a global sense about the epistemic revisions or Panneerselvam is in projecting the local to the global. Panneerselvam is also a Kantian in disguise. The premise about concept, therefore, is a premise about seeing rope as a snake. It is a premise about snake-rope which is now brought through the back door. What he shows utmost is that Śaṅkara's argument needs a Wittgenstein's premise about seeing as; does it mean this needs a solution of a similar type? The solution tells us that from Wittgenstein's point of view, seeing as cannot be modelled on seeing. That only proves that seeing a rope-snake or duck-rabbit is different from seeing a snake or seeing a rope. If it is agreed that it does not require a Wittgensteinean premise about snake-rope, it follows that there is no need for yet another premise about the dawning of a new aspect. This, together with the acceptance of the exclusive disjunction of seeing a rope and seeing a snake (Suresh Chandra calls this as an interesting feature of Śaṅkara and Panneerselvam accepts this), no parallel could be run along the lines. Wittgenstein's model serves no purpose for Śaṅkara.

Notes and References

1. The three articles, 'Seeing and Seeing As: Pradhan and Paneerselvam', 'Seeing and Seeing As: A Response to Suresh Chandra' and 'Seeing and Seeing As: A Reply to Suresh Chandra' in *JICPR*, 1995, pp. 111–39.

2. Malcolm Budd, *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology*, Routledge, London, 1989, see especially Chapter IV on 'Seeing Aspects' (pp. 77–99).
3. G. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, *Scepticism, Rules and Language*, Basil Blackwell, 1984, see sections 3 and 4 of chapter 3, pp. 115–31.
4. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, 1972. (The pagination in the brackets refer to the text.)
5. A. Kanthamani: 'Does Transcendental Subjectivity Meet Transcendental Grammar?' in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* (1993) pp.320–24.

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Nyāya Realism: Some Reflections

My aim in this essay is to examine, in some inevitable detail, Professor Daya Krishna's[1] objections to the general view which regards Nyāya as a 'realist' system in the sense that word is normally understood in the West. I also consider in this connection some of Professor Arindam Chakraborty's[2] response to Daya Krishna's poser, and for two reasons: one, that it does not head-on address certain issues focalized by Daya Krishna, and two, that in responding to the latter's queries, Chakraborty, even while upholding its basic realistic character, interprets Nyāya's position in a way that at certain points seems questionable.

I

Daya Krishna rightly notes that Nyāya is supposed to maintain that all that is real is knowable and nameable. But then he goes on to attribute to Nyāya the contention that 'to be real' *is* 'to be knowable' and concludes that if so, the Nyaya standpoint 'seems suspiciously close to the idealist [that is, Berkeleyan] contention that '*esse*' is '*percepi*' (p. 161) (my emphasis). Further, in order to be in a position to question the common practice of calling Nyāya realist, Daya Krishna tries to bring Nyāya and Berkeley closer by suggesting, obviously implying that there is no harm in doing so, that Berkeley's position can be reformulated in terms of 'the perceivable' (or 'knowable').

I will make two comments on this. In the first place, the Nyāya thesis that whatever is real is knowable does not as such assert the *kind* of equivalence that Daya Krishna attributes to Nyāya. Nyāya does not say that the meaning of 'being real' consists in 'being knowable'; that is Nyāya does not seek to define 'reality' in terms of either 'knowability' (or 'nameability'). Śrīdhara, the author of *Nyāya-kandalī*, when commenting upon Praśastapāda's enumeration of three common characteristics of the six *Padārthas* (categories or classes of reals)—'isness' (*astitva*), 'nameability' (*abhidheyatva*) and 'knowability' (*jñeyatva*)

—explains 'isness' (or reality: *astitva*) as the distinctive character or individuality of a thing: *astitvam svarūpavatvam . . . yasya vastuno yat svarūpam tad eva tasyā'stitvam.*[3] In other words, according to Śrīdhara the reality of a thing consists in its own distinctive 'isness', its self-identity so to say which is in each case unique to it and so also (in a way) serves to differentiate it from what it is not. In fact, unless the reals have their own-being or individuality they cannot partake of the universal 'existent-ness' (*sattā-sāmānya*)[4] which according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika inheres in the three categories of reals—substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), and motion (*karma*). (After all, for something to have a generic property—even if this property be *sattā-sāmānya*—it must first of all exist.) What Nyāya therefore means (even if it does not always say in so many words) is that its property of knowability or nameability a real thing possesses as a *further* characteristic, and in virtue of the fact that it is real. Reality of a thing cannot therefore be made parasitic upon or relative to its knowability, though it is true that it (that is, reality) becomes one of the necessary conditions for that knowability or even knownness. To put it a little differently, 'to be real' and 'to be knowable' do not in Nyāya *mean* the same thing, though it is the same thing which can be real and knowable at the same time. This proposition, as we know, has quite a few important implications, one of which is that an 'unreal' thing—like, for example, sky flower or square circle—cannot (according to Nyāya) be an object of knowledge. Jayanta, for instance, puts it thus: *yas tu deśāntare'pyartho nā'sti kālāntare'pi vā/na tasya grahaṇam dṛṣṭam gaganendīvarādivat.*[5] (Roughly: a thing which exists at no time—past, present or future—and in no space has never been found to be known. The example that Jayanta gives of such an unreal thing is of a sky-lotus.) There is a school of thought, specially in the West, which credits even contradictory things (and of course, imaginary things) such as a square circle with some sort of being or existence on the ground that they become objects of thought or philosophic discourse.[6] Nyāya would have nothing to do with such a view.

In this context someone may intervene and ask whether it is not true that we quite often talk and make judgements about the (so-called) unreal things and thus claim some knowledge about them even if some of these judgements assert nothing more than their unreality. Nyāya's reply would be that it all depends upon what your idea of knowledge is. If by knowledge we mean—and this is what Nyāya's own conception of knowledge, or better, awareness is—awareness of something *as* having certain characteristics, then it is inconceivable, according to Nyāya, that an unreal thing be said to be *known* and thus be (in the process) ascribed characteristics; for, on that logic, Nyāya would say, we might as well find it reasonable to talk and discuss about the kind of fragrance which a sky-lotus may be possessing. Mark, that to Nyāya—and, in my view, even otherwise—this doctrine is of cardinal importance. Indeed, its

remarkable relevance (by which I do not necessarily mean its truth) can be gauged when we contrast it with, for example, the Kantian doctrine about what that philosopher calls noumena or things-in-themselves. If Kant is to be believed, it is things-in-themselves alone which are real; and yet it is these which he brackets and puts (perhaps for that very reason) beyond the pale of knowledge. The pretensions of our cognitive capacities do not extend beyond the world (if it be a world) of appearances (or phenomena). And yet (be it noted) Kant *knows* or at least implicitly claims to know that the things-in-themselves are indeed real. To be real, to be known *as* real (and atemporal), and yet to remain unknowable (and not simply unknown)—can there be a greater paradox? And yet Kant asserts all these things of his noumena. And when he further adds that though not knowable as such, they are thinkable as to their existence, does not this whole proposition amount to admitting, however unwittingly, that some knowledge about them is a possibility after all, just as just asserting and without knowing any thing about it beyond that, that God exists, is to know, and know in a definite and non-trivial sense, something about him. The same, however, cannot, according to Nyāya, apply to things which we think to be unreal. For to deny reality to something is, in Nyāya's view, to affirm nothing about it, let alone say or know something about its nature or character. (It is to be remembered that *astitva* according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika means being something with regard to which an affirmative awareness [*vidhi-mukha-pratyaya-viṣayatva*] as for example Udayana calls it, is possible). That this view of Nyāya raises further problems in its wake is a different matter and beyond the muttons. (One of such problems is the one related to 'empty' terms—a problem which apart from being epistemological is also logical in nature.)

Professor Daya Krishna then comes out with an alternative suggestion which he thinks undermines the allegedly realistic character of the Nyāya metaphysics. (Recall that the first alternative of Daya Krishna's consisted in construing the Nyāya position—namely, that whatever is real, is knowable—in a certain way so as to bring it close to the Berkeleyan position.) Thus he supposes that a reformulation of Berkeley's thesis, 'To be, is to be *perceived*' as 'To be, is to be *perceivable*' would bring Berkeley's notion 'closer to the Nyāya formulation' (p. 161) so that once again in his view the hitherto common practice of thinking Nyāya to be a realistic system becomes gravely questionable. And so far as I can see there is no doubt that if Professor Krishna's construal of the Nyāya thesis and reformulation of the Berkeleyan position were to be allowed he has half won the battle. But I do not think that Daya Krishna comes anywhere near succeeding. I have already tried to show above how Prof. Krishna's representation of the Nyāya view of knowledge is open to objections of a fundamental kind. The same holds, I fear, for his reframing of the Berkeleyan view by substituting 'perceivable' for

philosophy means Vedānta philosophy. The truth, according to Daya Krishna, is that Vedānta philosophy plays a very minor role in the historical growth of Indian philosophy. To prove his point, Daya Krishna has not conducted any kind of survey of the practitioners of Vedānta, either from the cities or from the countryside. He is not concerned with the common or uncommon practitioners of the faith. His project is theoretical; he concentrates on the theoreticians of Vedānta. Those theoreticians who had the abilities wrote books, and the less able ones had to remain contended with writing commentaries on those books. Of course, some of these commentaries were thicker than the original works of which they were commentaries. Daya Krishna has restricted himself to certain texts and the commentaries on those texts.

Daya Krishna wishes to isolate for study those classical texts in which Vedānta was expounded or preached or propagated in any fashion. The historical position of the text would also establish the historical position of Vedānta. So Daya Krishna has clearly avoided the pre-textual age, the age before the invention of two-dimensional script. Even during the age of script some people might have preferred oral delivery, as in our days some people continue talking without having any ability to write. However, these issues cannot and should not be raised. For Daya Krishna thinks that the historical origin of Vedānta can be established with conviction by studying the relevant classical texts. And these texts would also establish with conviction whether Vedānta ever had a powerful sway over the Indian philosophical thought. Quite interestingly he has taken up those classical texts which were handled by Śaṅkara himself. For Śaṅkara, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, the Upaniṣads and the *Brahmasūtras* were embodiment of all philosophical virtues, which for him were the same as Vedāntic virtues. Therefore, Śaṅkara wrote commentaries on these texts. According to him, as Daya Krishna points out, 'the source of Indian philosophy lies in these three texts.'[9] By Indian philosophy, as is obvious, Śaṅkara meant Vedānta. All else was nothing but playing cards. Daya Krishna wishes to prove Śaṅkara wrong.

Out of the three texts on which Śaṅkara commented, Daya Krishna gives his full attention to one, side glance to the other, and no thought given to the third. The text to which no attention has been paid is *Bhagavat Gītā*. May be because Daya Krishna fixes the First Millennium AD as the time when Vedānta, according to him, raised its head in the philosophical scene of India, but no precise date for *Bhagavad-gītā* has yet been fixed. So even if this text embodies Vedāntic thought we remain ignorant about its origin, therefore, perhaps Daya Krishna ignores it. Upaniṣads too have been brushed aside. They too have a fluid history. They 'continued to be composed till as late as the thirteenth century, that is, a long time after Śaṅkara wrote his commentaries on them.'[10] So only *Brahmasūtras* remain to be attended, two other important texts were given only first-aid and released. They were not serious cases.

Daya Krishna fixes AD 50 as the probable date for the birth of *Brahmasūtras*. If this date is reliable then Vedānta takes its birth when all the orthodox and heterodox systems were already in their youth. And this new-born babe was certainly not looked after properly by the philosophers for centuries to come. Whether a text has been looked after or not, depends on the fact whether it has been commented or not. For centuries to come *Brahmasūtras* remained uncommented upon. Daya Krishna gives no importance to certain commentators, who for him may be minor or slightly deviated from the ideal interpretation of Vedānta, namely, Bodhāyana (AD 350), Dramiḍācārya (AD 525), Bhartṛprapānca (AD 550), Viśwarūpadeva (AD 600), and Brahmadatta (AD 660). Therefore, he is surprised: '*Brahmasūtras* remained entirely unnoticed until the appearance of Śaṅkara who wrote his commentary on them.'[11] Being noticed by minor commentators was as good as not being noticed at all. Daya Krishna wishes to show that all the centuries from the time *Brahmasūtras* were composed till the arrival of Śaṅkara on the scene, the Indian academic world had no impact of Vedānta. No standard commentaries were written, so no impact is demonstrated. But what about the practioners of the Vedānta faith? Did they also require commentaries? Were they also removed from the scene because no commentaries on *Brahmasūtras* were coming to them? In the context of India, philosophy has been detached from its practitioners only from the time of the colonial invasion. But no philosophical system that has been discussed by Daya Krishna is the product of colonial subjugation. Too many commentaries do not necessarily imply that they would attract the practitioners. Too many cooks spoil the broth is a well-known saying. There is every possibility that too many commentators may confuse the practioners, and instead of conversion to the system they may run away from the system. Vedānta attracted its practitioners, not through its abstract logical argumentations but through its simple analogies, so simple that even a child could understand them. And in this direction Śaṅkara made things easier.

So far as the Vedānta academic world is concerned, it was dull not only between *Brahmasūtras* and Śaṅkara, according to Daya Krishna, the situation was no better during the post-Śaṅkara days. Even the days of Śaṅkara were not as rosy as were 'made out by his admirers and the author of the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*.'[12] Daya Krishna simply gives no importance to the so-called *Digvijaya* of Śaṅkara. According to him 'there is little evidence of the so-called *Digvijaya* as it is the philosophers of the other schools who continue to outnumber the Vedāntins in the centuries after Śaṅkara.'[13] According to the statistical analysis of Daya Krishna, the period in the first millennium AD that produced only 'eight Vedāntins' produced '117 Buddhist thinkers', '27 Jaina thinkers' and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, 13 (9+4)'.[14] Perhaps the situation of Vedānta had been little improved if Śaṅkara had conducted his *Digvijaya* in a slightly different

fashion. There is a story that Śaṅkara had to face a woman in discussion. Being a bachelor monk he had no experience of a family life. In order to defeat the woman in discussion he decided to have the required experiences. So he entered into the body of a prince, and lived the life of a married prince. He should have stayed in the body of the prince a little longer. He should have completed his *Digvijaya* as a prince. Then he had a chance to physically exterminate the Buddhists, the Jainas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who were trying to outnumber the Vedāntins. An academic war was no good. A political war would have brought better results. But this is a possibility which was quite risky. The bigger kings of the first millennium AD used to run over the territories of the smaller kings. But the defeat of these smaller kings was always short-lived. They faced only temporary humiliation. As soon as the big king returned to his capital, the smaller kings declared themselves free. Perhaps the political victories were more short-lived than the academic victories. In having an academic war against the opponents Śaṅkara decided the right course of action. The fact that the opponents of Vedānta outnumbered the Vedāntins 'in the centuries after Śaṅkara' cannot be produced as an evidence against Śaṅkara's *Digvijaya*. People change loyalties. 'Śaṅkara had a grand *Digvijaya*; he might have defeated all his opponents, including the Buddhists, the Jainas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. But the disciples of Śaṅkara failed to retain the academic empire of Śaṅkara. It was too big for them. And they did not have the abilities of Śaṅkara. So the empire might have collapsed.

The question that does not occur to Daya Krishna is to see whether there was any other scholar belonging to any other school who was as much academically competent as Śaṅkara. Was there any Buddhist or Jaina or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholar who could challenge Śaṅkara on his face? Of course many of them challenged him, and they were also defeated. But we are not to accept the words of the drum-beaters of Śaṅkara. Let us use our own faculty of judgement. Was there any other scholar of Śaṅkara's time whose work excelled that of Śaṅkara both in quality and quantity? Was there a Buddhist scholar who established his credentials in Buddhism as much as Śaṅkara established in Vedānta? Or, a Jaina who produced as much work on Jaina philosophy as Śaṅkara produced on Vedānta philosophy. If we see the quality and quantity of Śaṅkara's work, then no scholar of Śaṅkara's time, belonging to any other school of thought, produced a matching work. Daya Krishna has not cited the name of a single other scholar who was a match to Śaṅkara during his lifetime. Then why should he doubt *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*. Instead of bringing the big list of scholars belonging to different schools, Daya Krishna should have unearthed only one such scholar who did better academic work than Śaṅkara, then so far as we are concerned Śaṅkara's *Digvijaya* was only a fraud. So long as the name of such a scholar is not brought to our notice, for us *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* would remain genuine.

We simply have no reason to doubt Śaṅkara's credentials. Of course, Daya Krishna has succeeded in exposing Śaṅkara's disciples.

In order to win his case Daya Krishna has presented some 'post-Śaṅkara' philosophers as 'the contemporaries of Śaṅkara'. According to Daya Krishna, 'The first clear cut reference to Vedānta as a distinctive school of philosophy occurs in the work of Bhavya or *Bhāvaviveka* in AD 550, that is, more than five hundred years after the composition of the *Brahmasūtras* and about 150 years before Śaṅkara appears on the scene.'[15] So AD 700 is Śaṅkara's time. This is further confirmed when Daya Krishna divides 'the presence of Vedānta in the first millennium AD in two parts, the first relating to the period after the *Brahmasūtras* and before Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* in the early eighth century AD and the second after Śaṅkara, that is, roughly from AD 700–1000.'[16] So Śaṅkara's time is roughly AD 700. The time of Śaṅkara *Bhāṣya* is 'early eighth century'. Śaṅkara certainly did not survive beyond early eighth century. It is said that he died quite young, in his early 30s. By no stretch of imagination the year AD 750 can be described as 'early eighth century'. Daya Krishna refers to Buddhists and says 'even the Buddhists are ahead of the Vedāntins, both in quantity and quality, thus nullifying the myth that they were defeated by Śaṅkara.'[17] But Daya Krishna has not given the name of a single Buddhist scholar whose work excelled that of Śaṅkara in both quality and quantity, who challenged Śaṅkara on his face, except mentioning that the post-Śaṅkara period saw the emergence of '117 Buddhist thinkers'. None of those 117 Buddhist thinkers came to face Śaṅkara when he was on his war-path, the path of *Digvijaya*. So they were quite irrelevant even if they were several times more than the statistical figures of Daya Krishna.

The case is not very different when Daya Krishna refers to Jainas. He refers to Haribhadra Suri, the great Jaina thinker. But Daya Krishna himself accepts that this great Jaina thinker belonged to AD 750.[18] This date itself shows that Śaṅkara belonged to one age and Haribhadra Suri to another. Of course, the age of the latter immediately succeeded the age of the former. But there was no occsion for Śaṅkara to have challenged Haribhadra Sūrī, or for Haribhadra Sūrī to have faced Śaṅkara. So was the case of Śāṁtarakṣita and Kamalaśīla mentioned by Daya Krishna. Both of them belonged to the age of Haribhadra Sūrī, and not to the age of Śaṅkara, therefore, none of them created any kind of road-blocks when Śaṅkara was marching to complete his *Digvijaya*. How could any post-Śaṅkara philosopher be any kind of threat to Śaṅkara's supremacy in argumentation? They could be supreme only after Śaṅkara's death. Might be that the post-Śaṅkara Jaina thinkers defeated the post-Śaṅkara Vadāntin thinkers. But this would not be the defeat of Śaṅkara in the hands of Jainas, or any kind of argument against his *Digvijaya*.

Though in a subdued language, Daya Krishna has made the charge

of academic dishonesty against the author of *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*. Of course, academic dishonesty is not a phenomenon restricted to our own age; it is a universal phenomenon. Daya Krishna has drawn our attention to the fact that Haribhadra Sūrī 'did not even mention Vedānta' when on the other hand 'he mentions not only Buddhism but also Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṁkhya explicitly and even Lokāyata which certainly was not regarded as a major school of philosophy by anybody in India'.[19] Haribhadra Sūrī's handling (or mishandling) of Vedānta means a lot, because he appears on the scene immediately after Śaṅkara. Haribhadra's neglect of Vedānta has led Daya Krishna to infer that 'the influence of Śaṅkara and his disciples had not permeated the philosophical atmosphere as is usually alleged by those who regard *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* as an authentic work descriptive of his triumph over all other philosophical schools of India'.[20] The best way to reject a philosopher is to ignore him. But motives should not be imputed. However, we have to know that Śaṅkara was not the prime mover of Vedānta. That credit cannot be given even to Bādarāyaṇa. Haribhadra's work cannot be considered as the 'general survey' of the schools of philosophy existing at his time. It was simply a survey of the philosophical systems of his choice. His choice included Lokāyata that failed to produce any text of any repute, and produced only stray-remarks of doubtful origin, but excluded Vedānta that produced several well-commented texts from AD 50 to AD 750. If Haribhadra Sūrī cannot be blamed, Vedānta too cannot be blamed. Blame goes only to Haribhadra Sūrī's choice.

Daya Krishna's method of isolating Vedānta for attack is to refer to all those works that failed to refer to Vedānta. The works that praised Vedānta, or in any significant way referred to it, are not of much use to him. Thus Daya Krishna's critique of Vedānta rides on the shoulders of Buddhist and Jaina thinkers who ignore Vedānta. Thus the pre-Saṅkara Buddhist scholars Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu have been cited because they did not 'show any awareness of *Brahmasūtras*'.[21] If the Buddhist thinkers are used for pre-Śaṅkara period, Jaina thinkers have been used for the post-Śaṅkara period. The works of Haribhadra Sūrī, Śāṁtarakṣita and Kamalāśīla have ignored Vedānta, have shown no awareness of this system of philosophy. The progress of Buddhism and Jainism in the first millennium AD and their act of ignoring Vedānta have led Daya Krishna to the shocking conclsuion that there is 'practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD.'[22] The conclusion is shocking because throughout his writing Daya Krishna kept the balance of Vedānta quite high, but in the end he tilted against it. In his writing he wished to be faithful to history, but in the end he deserted it.

Consider why his conclusion is shocking. For the pre-Śaṅkara period he has brought out a set of five Buddhist thinkers who exhibited no

consciousness of *Brahmasūtras*. This set was balanced by the set of Vedāntin thinkers brought out with the help of Potter and Nakamura. This set has also five members. Of course, the set of Vedāntins is quite weak. That weakness is compensated by three big Vedāntins, namely, Bādarāyaṇa, Gauḍapāda and Bhartṛhari. So the pre-Śaṅkara periodhas fared quite well And the Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara period fares even better. Daya Krishna may have in his mind a big list of philosophers who ignored or opposed Śaṅkara during the post-Śaṅkara period. But in his paper he has mentioned only three names, those of the Jaina thinkers mentioned above. All these thinkers belonged to AD 750. We should rely on paper, and not on what is in Daya Krishna's mind. As against these three Jain thinkers, Daya Krishna has mentioned so many Vedāntin thinkers belonging to Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara period. Let us quote him in full. He points out 'Hastāmalaka, Troṭaka, Padmapāda and Sureśvara are the well known disciples of Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana Miśra, the author of *Brahmasiddhi* can be regarded as almost half his disciple. If we exclude these, then in the post-Śaṅkara period, we have, besides Bhāskara, who has written an independent Bhāṣya on the *Brahmasūtras*, Gopālāśrama (AD 780), Jñānaghana (AD 900), Jñānottama Bhaṭṭāraka (AD 930), Vīmuktātman, AD 960, Vācaspati Miśra (AD 960), Prakāśāmana (AD 975) and Jñānottama Miśra (AD 980).'[23] This shows that the Vedāntins were spread out in the whole of the first millennium AD, starting from the time of Śaṅkara till 980. Then how has Daya Krishna tilted the balance against Vedānta, how could he have come to the conclusion that 'there was practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD'. From the names he has mentioned in his paper it seems that there was hardly any opposition to Vedānta in the first millennium AD. Vedanta had a kind of walk-over as regards its opponents.

In order to show that there was practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD Daya Krishna is required to spell out the names of all the 117 Buddhist thinkers, 27 Jaina thinkers and 13 Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers to whom he refers. It is only when their names are written down that we can judge whether any of them was a match to Śaṅkara or even to Bhāskara or Vācaspati Miśra. Daya Krishna has not hesitated in mentioning the names of the Vedānta thinkers. Then why should he hesitate in mentioning the names of those thinkers who opposed Vedānta or overlooked it?

In providing the historiographical details of Vedānta Daya Krishna has not transcended the limits of the first millennium AD. But Vedānta as a thought might have originated much earlier in the past than the first century of the first millennium AD. Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtras* might have functioned as the occasion for the foundation of the Vedānta school of thought. But before the formation of the school, those thoughts were expressed by so many philosophers. Daya Krishna himself refers to the names mentioned in the *Brahmasūtras*. They are Kārṣṇājini,

Kāsakṛtana, Ātreya, Auḍulomi, Āśamarthya, Bāduri and Jaimini.[24] These names take us deeper into the past, before the birth of Christ. How long before Christ cannot be decided so easily. But it seems that the Vedāntic thought exactly in its *Māyāvāda* form was floating in the air when Alexander the Great invaded India. Daya Krishna gives the impression that the doctrines of '*avidyā* or *māyā*' were unique features of Śaṅkara's thought.[25] The expression *māyā* might have been a new invention. Once a school comes into existence so many new expressions are coined, which later become a part of the technical vocabulary of the school. But the coinage of these expressions pre-supposes a state of things behind it.

When Alexander invaded India he was accompanied by his court-philosopher Anaxarchus. Anaxarchus brought with him his pupil Pyrrho, who later became the leading philosopher of Greece. He became the father of Greek scepticism, called Pyrrhonism. 'For the Pyrrhonists', according to Brinda Dalmia, 'doubt is the *summum bonum* of our intellectual and ethical lives. The true sceptical method is of generating counter-arguments of equal strength to any and all claims which in turn, results in a suspension of judgement (epoché). This, it is claimed, is a state of ultimate peace (*atraxia*)'.[26] Doubt for Pyrrho was only a means for the suspension of judgement. If all our claims are open to counter-claims, then the futility of making claims is demonstrated. Silence or suspension of judgement is the result to which doubt leads, and this suspension of judgement would bring *atraxia*, a complete peace of mind. According to Nisha Rathore, Pyrrho comes very close to Buddhism. Buddha 'recommended the suspension of judgement on such metaphysical questions as "Is the universe destructible or indestructible? Is the soul same as the body? Is the universe finite or infinite?"'[27] Pyrrho extended the suspension of judgement to all kinds of situation. Pyrrho's *atraxia* comes very close to *nirvāṇa*. Pyrrho might have been influenced by Buddhism, but not his teacher Anaxarchus. Anaxarchus was influenced by the thought that was Vedāntic in spirit. He considered the physical world illusory and 'compared existing things to stage-painting and took them to be like experiences that occur in sleep or insanity'.[28] If this is not Māyāvāda then what is it? Not only were Buddhism and Jainism popular when Alexander invaded India, perhaps Vedānta was no less popular. Of course, for the Greeks all of them were 'naked philosophers'; all of them were 'gymnosophists'. But the philosophical views of these naked philosophers differed. From where did the Vedāntic thought emerge before Alexander invaded India? Among other sources, *Bhagavad Gīta* and Upaniṣads formed two major sources as Śaṅkara thought. Not all Upaniṣads were post-Śaṅkara, some of them might have been pre-Alexander. Incidentally, what would happen to a country if the practioners of Vedānta join hands with the practioners of Buddhism and Jainism?

Daya Krishna is aware of the fact that, at present, Vedānta is the most dominant philosophy of India. Its māyāvāda has influenced even the minds of those Indian philosophers who are working on alien philosophical systems. According to Daya Krishna's own acceptance 'innumerable writers on Indian philosophy' have given their time to Vedānta. What has brought into existence this mushroom growth of Vedāntins to the twentieth century AD of India? It seems that the Vedāntic thought has progressed in fits and starts. A period of intense activity was followed by a period of extreme depression. Vedānta might have passed through several rounds of progress in this fashion. Is this true only about Vedānta? Have the other systems of Indian philosophy progressed in a different fashion? Certainly not. It seems that all the systems of Indian philosophy have progressed in fits and starts. At present, Vedānta is the most dominant and distinctive philosophy of India, because the other systems of Indian philosophy are passing through their state of extreme depression. So there is a hope for India to have a bright future for those who are currently passing through a depression.

Notes and References

1. 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD : The Case-Study of a Retrospective Illusion Imposed by the Historiography of Indian Philosophy' in *JICPR*, Special Issue on Historiography of Civilizations, June 1996, p. 201.
2. R.C. Pradhan 'Seeing and Seeing *As* : A Response to Suresh Chandra', *JICPR*, May–August, 1995, p. 127.
3. See *Investigations*, II, ix.
4. S. Panneerselvam, 'Seeing and Seeing As: A Reply to Suresh Chandra', *JICPR*, May–August 1995, p. 136.
5. N.R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery*, Cambridge, 1958, p. 5.
6. *On Certainty*, 559.
7. Ibid., 94.
8. This refers to my paper on 'Wittgenstein on Religious Beliefs and World Pictures' in *Wittgenstein: New Perspectives*, an unpublished project submitted to ICPR. Wittgenstein's notion of a 'world-picture' is similar to the notion of a 'paradigm' later developed by T.S. Kuhn.
9. 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD', p. 202.
10. Ibid., p. 201.
11. Ibid., p. 202. One possibility is that Śaṅkara's interpretation was so unique that the earlier interpretations became unimpressive and out of the way.
12. Ibid., p. 203.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 204.
15. Ibid., p. 206.
16. Ibid., p. 205.
17. Ibid., p. 203.
18. Ibid., p. 206.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 205.

22. Ibid., p. 207.
23. Ibid., pp. 205–6.
24. Ibid., p. 203.
25. Ibid., p. 206.
26. Brinda Dalmia 'Benefit of Doubt', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* special number on René Descartes, Jan–Apr. 1996, p. 20.
27. Nisha Rathore 'Indian Philosophers and Greek Scepticism' *New Quest*, July–August 1995, p. 224.
28. Quoted by Nisha Rathore, p. 221. Anaxarchus remained an unknown figure in Greek philosophy. He is known because he was the teacher of Pyrrho.

Hyderabad SURESH CHANDRA

Does the Grammar of Seeing Aspects Imply a Kantian Concept?

One of the most interesting set of articles to be published in the JICPR are from three Wittgensteinians, namely Professors Suresh Chandra, Pradhan, and Panneerselvam, all having their focus on seeing aspects by Wittgenstein.[1] All of them miss something very crucial in their reading of Wittgenstein, namely Wittgenstein himself. They falter in their understanding of Wittgenstein. It is not my purpose here to show what a correct understanding of Wittgenstein consists in, but to discover the flaws in all the three interpretations on this particular issue of seeing aspects. I borrow this way of formulating the problem from Malcolm Budd.[2] So I owe to all of them for the stimuli to submit the following lines of criticism which in a way supplement what they say on the issue in question.

Briefly, Professor Suresh is right about perceptions with regard to the famous duck-rabbit figure, namely, seeing duck, seeing rabbit, and seeing duck as rabbit, all basically the same involving perception. He misses to hit the very target, for the problem here is not seeing duck or seeing rabbit, but seeing duck *as* rabbit, or more precisely the differentiation of seeing a rabbit from seeing a duck. *A fortiori*, it is not epistemic. Pradhan thinks that there is a conceptual aura in seeing duck as rabbit so much so that seeing aspects is a conceptual issue having a Kantian flavour. This fails to illuminate the very thing at issue. Panneerselvam argues that seeing duck as rabbit is an illusory perception on the scale of *māyā*, *contra* Suresh who thinks that it is a case of veridical perception. Neither of them is true. Consequently, Panneerselvam starts with a major premise which holds that all our veridical perceptions are conceptually coloured. Towards the end, he remarks that 'without concepts, visual experience is not possible' (136). This is very crucial for

maintaining that the world is seen as *māyā*. In contrast to Pradhan, who maintains that seeing as is only conceptually structured, for Panneerselvam, since seeing is conceptually structured, seeing as too is conceptually structured. It is very obvious that none of this will hold water as an interpretation of Wittgenstein. In what follows, I shall tell why I think this is so.

Professor Suresh takes exception to Pradhan's way of interpreting this in terms of a Kantian interpretation which seems to be the weakest part of the entire exchange. I am in sympathy with it though. Nevertheless, the very purpose of this anti-Kantian stance gets defeated when it refuses to move beyond a perfunctory level. The reason for this is to be sought in his own faltering interpretation of seeing aspects. His criticism is centred around the conceptual aura of of seeing as granted wholeheartedly by Pradhan. Suresh hits the bull's eye: 'Pradhan recognizes the distinction between seeing and seeing as'. And the rest of the criticism is to attack this differentiation. Consequent upon this denial, there comes the reduction of 'seeing as' to one about seeing. Granted that seeing rabbit is one aspect, but seeing it as a duck is a new aspect in my seeing *pace* Wittgenstein, but from this, Suresh Chandra wrongly concludes that it does not *alter* my seeing, though it might be a change in the *object seen*. If he is asked, then, 'what about the puzzle?', Suresh defeats the very purpose: 'the puzzle does not exist for me, it exists for others' (119). If it is for Wittgenstein who is thought to address himself to the question about (veridical) perception, what then is the purpose of the critique with which he is going to illuminate us? Does he want us to forego the problem of perception itself? Does he want to deny that there is a philosophical problem? That will land him in a contradiction since he has already admitted the change in the object seen.

Pradhan's view is simple in that he thinks that we attribute a property to an object because we possess a Kantian sort of concept so as to enable a rapport with the world which Wittgenstein calls the underlying structure of language in the *Tractatus* and grammar in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Thus,Wittgenstein supports a Kantian turn in philosophy. In other words, Wittgenstein's linguistic turn is the Kantian transcendental turn in disguise with which none of the Wittgensteinians can agree. For this purpose, Pradhan put to use the phrase 'critique of language' with which I have already expressed disagreement.[3] He includes into his outlook the synthetic *a priori* as well as idealistic elements which again stands on questionable grounds.[4] One can agree with Wittgenstein's anti-realism, but not his idealism. It seems that he still continues to maintain a similar position in the wake of mild tremors caused by Suresh in the context of his reading of seeing aspects in later Wittgenstein. Pradhan equivocates grammar with the highly ambiguous 'harmony between language and the world' given currency to by Baker,[5]

without realizing that he uses it as a counterthrust to the Tractarian metaphysical harmony and hence it carries a sense of *via negativa:* no harmony on account of the impossibility of purview.

With regard to the seeing aspects, Pradhan now maintains that it is more than mere seeing and hence merges with the Kantian conceptual elements. As said above, Professor Suresh vehemently denies this by pointing out that the above distinction is a miasma. To some extent, I agree with this criticism saying that there is absolutely no evidence at all for thinking that seeing and seeing as is to be distinguished by holding that seeing as is 'more than seeing' but that does not make me agree with Suresh Chandra in holding that seeing as is seeing *per se*. I cannot agree with him in saying, 'There is no special kind of seeing involved in seeing a rabbit, qualitatively different from the seeing which was involved when I earlier saw the duck' (119). This turns Wittgenstein upside down and is hence a non-starter.

By refusing to recognize the puzzle, Suresh Chandra completely misses the central thrust of Wittgenstein's discussion on the two uses of the word 'see' (*Philosophical Investigations*, 193ff.). At times, he seems to recognize the puzzle-picture of duck-rabbit, but misses the puzzle by hindsight. Ironically, he hurls the same charge against Panneerselvam. The puzzle concerns the multiple meaning of the word 'seen', a distinction Pradhan wants to highlight with his admission of change of language-games. Pradhan's distinction between seeing and seeing as comes through here. Like Suresh, he also denies that seeing as is deviant, but for him, it is more revealing in that the conceptual connections are internal. Can he maintain the same and still answer the question: what about seeing so as to keep up his Kantian posture? But that will sponsor only an inconsistency if he still harps on the view which holds that seeing as is more than seeing. Does it mean that seeing as is Kantian whereas seeing is less Kantian? If this is the only differentiation he wants to project, he is patently wrong. For Professor Suresh, Wittgenstein's quest about seeing is purely epistemic: can he show what Wittgenstein was concerned with here are truth-values of statements? He cannot show by any stretch of imagination. The colouration he lends to the problem makes it more monolithic than the occasion demands. The epistemic twist is appropriate only when he accepts that seeing aspects involves interpretation. Surprisingly, both Suresh Chandra and Pradhan deny this, despite Wittgenstein's acceptance of it. Does it involve concepts also? Pradhan's answer is yes. He conveniently forgets that it goes against Wittgenstein's denial of private language. He wants to clarify further by saying that Wittgenstein has no reason to accept interpretation. We do not force the concept but the concept is forced us; hence no interpretation (131).

Pradhan does not realize the reason why Wittgenstein in the quoted passage appears to deny interpretation. The reason is that it will make

the issue to be one that is exclusively epistemic. Wittgenstein's intention is clearly not to make it so. The following remark supports this reading. Let me quote: ' . . . it is easy to recognize cases in which we are *interpreting*. When we interpret, we form hypotheses which may prove false' (212). Wittgenstein further clarifies saying that this is possible only when seeing is a state. So if he denies interpretation, he denies the cognitive state that accompanies it. Wittgenstein must be understood to rule out the epistemic character of the concept precisely for the reason that our concepts are open-textured. This also proves the self-contradiction in Pradhan's whimsical reading of the passage (212), which squarely places its emphasis on mental state. In the illustration of a cube as a wire frame, Wittgenstein remarks: '. . . we see now as one thing and as another. So we interpret and *see* it as we *interpret* it' (193). What will be Pradhan's reaction to this remark? Suresh Chandra also contradicts when he refuses to recognize this while making it as epistemic. Suresh Chandra also turns a blind eye when he refuses to recognize that the issue of seeing as is tied up with a semantic issue about meaning change. He works in a semantic vacuum. Budd brings this out admirably well when he endorses Wittgenstein's view (*Philosophical Investigations*, 210).

It is easy to show that all the three Wittgensteinians got it wrong. Pradhan tries to Fregeanize Wittgenstein's use of concepts and says that this warrants a Kantian *a priorism*. There is no evidence to show that Wittgenstein is either Fregean or Kantian. With regard to the Fregean step, he is reproved by the text of Wittgenstein. Pradhan has been obviously misled by those passages in which either the locution 'concept' or its surrogates occur. If we try to enumerate all those passages in which they occur, we find that locutions such as 'concept of experience' (193) and the relation between concepts (208), the difference between concepts (197) all of which indicate that relations between concepts is more primary than concepts *per se* and clearly Wittgenstein is talking about the concept of experience rather than the experience of the concept. The locution 'concept of seeing' (200) conveys the idea that Wittgenstein was only dealing with a conceptual understanding of what seeing is and not what causes our seeing. Wittgenstein asserts that our problem is a conceptual one while denying that it is a causal one (203).

In the words of Budd, what Wittgenstein deals with here is the 'polymorphous character of the concept of seeing' (99). What is then the basis for Pradhan's importing into the text what is not found? Again, in *Philosophical Investigations*, 230 (xii), he explicitly denies that we are doing science or ours is an enquiry into the conceptual foundations of natural science, but his interest squarely lies in the way different concepts were formed and not how concepts *simpliciter* were formed innately in us as Pradhan seems to think. We can conclude that both the Fregean and Kantian moorings can be safely ignored. Pradhan's

reading of Wittgenstein could be rejected *in toto*. Secondly, he is confused between the concept of seeing and the concept of the object seen and uses the latter as the proxy for the former. This follows from his refusal to believe that the analysis of the concept of seeing is a quest under a broader query about Wittgenstein's conceptual investigation into philosophy itself.

Panneerselvam makes a vain attempt to bring an analogy between seeing aspects and the celebrated seeing rope as a snake, that seeing one thing in another, where there is no analogy. He cannot 'explain' one in terms of another unless one of them provides the necessary *explanans*. He takes refuge under what he calls a parallel. But Panneerselvam's way of presenting it does not show any parallel. He denies, for example, along with Suresh, that duck-rabbit is ruled out by Śaṅkara's analysis. If so, seeing as is ruled out; if so, then what is the parallel he wants to bring about? His parallel is a non-starter, for Wittgenstein is not concerned with the epistemics of perception that is, seeing rope and seeing snake. The realization of one as false does not occur unless it warrants an epistemic situation. What then is Panneerselvam's interest in introducing this as interpretation. This requires him to introduce another premise saying that the previous perception is 'soaked with' concepts. This is *non-sequitur* because he can never show that all our epistemic revisions are sublations in Śaṅkara's way. Either Śaṅkara is wrong in a global sense about the epistemic revisions or Panneerselvam is in projecting the local to the global. Panneerselvam is also a Kantian in disguise. The premise about concept, therefore, is a premise about seeing rope as a snake. It is a premise about snake-rope which is now brought through the back door. What he shows utmost is that Śaṅkara's argument needs a Wittgenstein's premise about seeing as; does it mean this needs a solution of a similar type? The solution tells us that from Wittgenstein's point of view, seeing as cannot be modelled on seeing. That only proves that seeing a rope-snake or duck-rabbit is different from seeing a snake or seeing a rope. If it is agreed that it does not require a Wittgensteinean premise about snake-rope, it follows that there is no need for yet another premise about the dawning of a new aspect. This, together with the acceptance of the exclusive disjunction of seeing a rope and seeing a snake (Suresh Chandra calls this as an interesting feature of Śaṅkara and Panneerselvam accepts this), no parallel could be run along the lines. Wittgenstein's model serves no purpose for Śaṅkara.

Notes and References

1. The three articles, 'Seeing and Seeing As: Pradhan and Paneerselvam', 'Seeing and Seeing As: A Response to Suresh Chandra' and 'Seeing and Seeing As: A Reply to Suresh Chandra' in *JICPR*, 1995, pp. 111–39.

2. Malcolm Budd, *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology*, Routledge, London, 1989, see especially Chapter IV on 'Seeing Aspects' (pp. 77–99).
3. G. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, *Scepticism, Rules and Language*, Basil Blackwell, 1984, see sections 3 and 4 of chapter 3, pp. 115–31.
4. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, 1972. (The pagination in the brackets refer to the text.)
5. A. Kanthamani: 'Does Transcendental Subjectivity Meet Transcendental Grammar?' in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* (1993) pp.320–24.

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Nyāya Realism: Some Reflections

My aim in this essay is to examine, in some inevitable detail, Professor Daya Krishna's[1] objections to the general view which regards Nyāya as a 'realist' system in the sense that word is normally understood in the West. I also consider in this connection some of Professor Arindam Chakraborty's[2] response to Daya Krishna's poser, and for two reasons: one, that it does not head-on address certain issues focalized by Daya Krishna, and two, that in responding to the latter's queries, Chakraborty, even while upholding its basic realistic character, interprets Nyāya's position in a way that at certain points seems questionable.

I

Daya Krishna rightly notes that Nyāya is supposed to maintain that all that is real is knowable and nameable. But then he goes on to attribute to Nyāya the contention that 'to be real' *is* 'to be knowable' and concludes that if so, the Nyaya standpoint 'seems suspiciously close to the idealist [that is, Berkeleyan] contention that '*esse*' is '*percepi*' (p. 161) (my emphasis). Further, in order to be in a position to question the common practice of calling Nyāya realist, Daya Krishna tries to bring Nyāya and Berkeley closer by suggesting, obviously implying that there is no harm in doing so, that Berkeley's position can be reformulated in terms of 'the perceivable' (or 'knowable').

I will make two comments on this. In the first place, the Nyāya thesis that whatever is real is knowable does not as such assert the *kind* of equivalence that Daya Krishna attributes to Nyāya. Nyāya does not say that the meaning of 'being real' consists in 'being knowable'; that is Nyāya does not seek to define 'reality' in terms of either 'knowability' (or 'nameability'). Śrīdhara, the author of *Nyāya-kandalī*, when commenting upon Praśastapāda's enumeration of three common characteristics of the six *Padārthas* (categories or classes of reals)—'isness' (*astitva*), 'nameability' (*abhidheyatva*) and 'knowability' (*jñeyatva*)

—explains 'isness' (or reality: *astitva*) as the distinctive character or individuality of a thing: *astitvam svarūpavatvam . . . yasya vastuno yat svarūpam tad eva tasyā'stitvam.*[3] In other words, according to Śrīdhara the reality of a thing consists in its own distinctive 'isness', its self-identity so to say which is in each case unique to it and so also (in a way) serves to differentiate it from what it is not. In fact, unless the reals have their own-being or individuality they cannot partake of the universal 'existent-ness' (*sattā-sāmānya*)[4] which according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika inheres in the three categories of reals—substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), and motion (*karma*). (After all, for something to have a generic property—even if this property be *sattā-sāmānya*—it must first of all exist.) What Nyāya therefore means (even if it does not always say in so many words) is that its property of knowability or nameability a real thing possesses as a *further* characteristic, and in virtue of the fact that it is real. Reality of a thing cannot therefore be made parasitic upon or relative to its knowability, though it is true that it (that is, reality) becomes one of the necessary conditions for that knowability or even knownness. To put it a little differently, 'to be real' and 'to be knowable' do not in Nyāya *mean* the same thing, though it is the same thing which can be real and knowable at the same time. This proposition, as we know, has quite a few important implications, one of which is that an 'unreal' thing—like, for example, sky flower or square circle—cannot (according to Nyāya) be an object of knowledge. Jayanta, for instance, puts it thus: *yas tu deśāntare'pyartho nā'sti kālāntare'pi vā/na tasya grahaṇam dṛṣṭam gaganendīvarādivat.*[5] (Roughly: a thing which exists at no time—past, present or future—and in no space has never been found to be known. The example that Jayanta gives of such an unreal thing is of a sky-lotus.) There is a school of thought, specially in the West, which credits even contradictory things (and of course, imaginary things) such as a square circle with some sort of being or existence on the ground that they become objects of thought or philosophic discourse.[6] Nyāya would have nothing to do with such a view.

In this context someone may intervene and ask whether it is not true that we quite often talk and make judgements about the (so-called) unreal things and thus claim some knowledge about them even if some of these judgements assert nothing more than their unreality. Nyāya's reply would be that it all depends upon what your idea of knowledge is. If by knowledge we mean—and this is what Nyāya's own conception of knowledge, or better, awareness is—awareness of something *as* having certain characteristics, then it is inconceivable, according to Nyāya, that an unreal thing be said to be *known* and thus be (in the process) ascribed characteristics; for, on that logic, Nyāya would say, we might as well find it reasonable to talk and discuss about the kind of fragrance which a sky-lotus may be possessing. Mark, that to Nyāya—and, in my view, even otherwise—this doctrine is of cardinal importance. Indeed, its

remarkable relevance (by which I do not necessarily mean its truth) can be gauged when we contrast it with, for example, the Kantian doctrine about what that philosopher calls noumena or things-in-themselves. If Kant is to be believed, it is things-in-themselves alone which are real; and yet it is these which he brackets and puts (perhaps for that very reason) beyond the pale of knowledge. The pretensions of our cognitive capacities do not extend beyond the world (if it be a world) of appearances (or phenomena). And yet (be it noted) Kant *knows* or at least implicitly claims to know that the things-in-themselves are indeed real. To be real, to be known *as* real (and atemporal), and yet to remain unknowable (and not simply unknown)—can there be a greater paradox? And yet Kant asserts all these things of his noumena. And when he further adds that though not knowable as such, they are thinkable as to their existence, does not this whole proposition amount to admitting, however unwittingly, that some knowledge about them is a possibility after all, just as just asserting and without knowing any thing about it beyond that, that God exists, is to know, and know in a definite and non-trivial sense, something about him. The same, however, cannot, according to Nyāya, apply to things which we think to be unreal. For to deny reality to something is, in Nyāya's view, to affirm nothing about it, let alone say or know something about its nature or character. (It is to be remembered that *astitva* according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika means being something with regard to which an affirmative awareness [*vidhi-mukha-pratyaya-viṣayatva*] as for example Udayana calls it, is possible). That this view of Nyāya raises further problems in its wake is a different matter and beyond the muttons. (One of such problems is the one related to 'empty' terms—a problem which apart from being epistemological is also logical in nature.)

Professor Daya Krishna then comes out with an alternative suggestion which he thinks undermines the allegedly realistic character of the Nyāya metaphysics. (Recall that the first alternative of Daya Krishna's consisted in construing the Nyāya position—namely, that whatever is real, is knowable—in a certain way so as to bring it close to the Berkeleyan position.) Thus he supposes that a reformulation of Berkeley's thesis, 'To be, is to be *perceived*' as 'To be, is to be *perceivable*' would bring Berkeley's notion 'closer to the Nyāya formulation' (p. 161) so that once again in his view the hitherto common practice of thinking Nyāya to be a realistic system becomes gravely questionable. And so far as I can see there is no doubt that if Professor Krishna's construal of the Nyāya thesis and reformulation of the Berkeleyan position were to be allowed he has half won the battle. But I do not think that Daya Krishna comes anywhere near succeeding. I have already tried to show above how Prof. Krishna's representation of the Nyāya view of knowledge is open to objections of a fundamental kind. The same holds, I fear, for his reframing of the Berkeleyan view by substituting 'perceivable' for

'perceived'. Daya Krishna apparently feels that the difference between the two—'the perceived' and 'the perceivable'—though quite obvious, is not so considerable as to be impermissible and that if allowed, affects whatever seems pronouncedly idealistic in Berkeley's doctrine, and so this time brings Berkeley quite close to Nyāya.

Now what is remarkable about Daya Krishna's way of thinking on this issue is that on both the alternatives suggested by him it is Nyāya realism which in his view gets the knocking. That it does on the first alternative (—namely, that 'to be real' means 'to be perceivable'—), assuming for the sake of hypothesis that it is perfectly in order, is clear. But that it should do so even on the second suggestion passes comprehension, for this (that is, the second) alternative (in replacing 'perceived' by 'perceivable') instead of bringing Nyāya near to idealism, gives a clear realistic twist to what is essentially idealistic in Berkeley. In other words, it is Berkeley's idealism which here gets drastically compromized and not Nyāya's (so-called) realism, and consequently if Berkeley and Nyāya are to be thought to have been brought together on a common platform, this platform, I am afraid, is a realistic one rather than an idealistic one.

I have already shown that the first suggestion of Professor Krishna's cannot hold and have also given some reasons. As for his second suggestion referred to above, Daya Krishna apparently feels that while the difference between 'to be perceivable' and 'to be perceived' is only slight (for he does concede a little earlier that 'to be known' is different from 'to be knowable'), the consequence of it is quite considerable so as to bring Berkeley and Nyāya very close to each other. But this precisely is the crux of the matter; for while 'to be perceivable' in one clear sense represents a possible characteristic, 'to be perceived' represents a characteristic (or say ideal) already attained. The difference between the two is, in other words, the difference between possibility and actuality. And that in my view is what makes the whole difference to the issue at hand.

That the difference between the Nyāya position and the Berkeleyan position gets further narrowed if perception is taken, as Daya Krishna suggests, to mean *knowledge* (for perception as sense-perception would necessarily involve, in case of God's knowledge too, his having sense-organs and a body) is a point whose relevance I am not immediately in a position to estimate in so far as the question of Nyāya's view and Berkeley's view of reality is concerned.

Prof. Daya Krishna again betrays less than full appreciation of the Nyāya position when he says that the Naiyāyikas did not quite see the problems posed by the distinction between 'knowing' and 'knowability' or that the issue of the "independence" of the object of knowing from the 'act of knowing' was not 'focally raised' (p. 162) in the Nyāya (or perhaps the Indian!) tradition just because there was no Locke around to bring to the fore the issue of 'secondary qualities'. My submission,

without sounding apologetic at all, on this part of Daya Krishna's contention is that both the things—(a) the distinction between 'knowing' and 'knowability' and (b) the issue of the independence of the object of knowing from the 'act of knowing'—were not only very well understood by the Nyāya thinkers but also given a central place in their ontology and their doctrine of cognition, and that Locke's view about secondary qualities which in Daya Krishna's opinion triggered the concerned twin issues in the British empiricist tradition is something wholly contingent. In Nyāya these issues, I may add, arose in its attempted response to the Vedāntic and some Buddhist schools, specially the idealistic one. In philosophy, as indeed elsewhere, similar issues can arise and similar answers be attempted even if the historical contexts or the thought-traditions themselves happen to be different.

To continue with the question of reality and knowledge as they are conceived in Nyāya, one does not have to quote text after text to show that in Nyāya all that is real, apart from being regarded *for that reason* knowable and nameable, is considered not only as distinct from, but *also* as existing independently of the actual knowing and actual naming of it. Notice that we are here drawing, tentatively though, a distinction between 'being distinct' and 'being independent'. This is because while in Nyāya the reals—and this includes substances (or particulars or things), universals, relations, whether *saṃyoga* (contact) or *samavāya* (inherence), and a few other things besides—are both different from and independent of our knowledge (and verbalization) of them, in some schools, specially some of the Buddhistic ones, while an object (*viṣaya*) of knowledge is considered (at whatever level) *distinct* from the concerned act (or state) of knowledge, it is not considered *independent* of that act of knowledge. In other words, according to these schools 'distinctness' need not necessarily imply independence too. ('Independent existence' of course implies distinctness too.) The word '*bāhya-artha*' used in Nyāya for real objects connotes both distinctness and independence. (That is why, the Naiyāyikas are called by their opponents, *bāhyārtha-vādins*.) The English word 'externality' seems to me to capture both these connotations of *bāhyārtha*. It is important to note that in some of Buddhist idealist tradition (Yogācara-Vijñānavāda, for instance) while provision is made for an object's distinctness from the particular cognition of it, the object (*viṣaya*) is not considered as capable of existing independently of that cognition and hence is conceived as a *form* or *mode* of it (awareness). (Hence the name *sākāra-jñāna-vāda* for the doctrine.) To the extent the Buddhists entertain the subject-object talk at all they postulate the splitting of consciousness (or cognition) into, firstly, the appearance of itself [as subject] (*svabhāsa*) and secondly, the appearance of the object (*viṣayābhāsa*). Dignāga, for example, attempts to argue for this very thesis in his chapter on *Pratyakṣa* (Perception) in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.[7] And Dharmakīrti and others

follow suit. Before them there is Vasubandhu. It is no wonder then that the waking world is often thought of by some of these Buddhist philosophers as being essentially like a dream world where too the objects though perceived as being distinct from their perceptions are not found to exist independently of those perceptions. Of course the reasons why the Buddhist idealists look upon objects of cognition as nothing more than modes or forms of these cognitions are different and call for separate comment. But it would be erroneous to deny that the objects cognized are thought of as distinct from the act of cognizing to the extent cognition is regarded as *sākāra* (form-*ed*).

I now turn to Daya Krishna's contention that the Nyāya thesis of 'knowability' of 'reality' implies that the structure of 'knowing' and the structure of 'reality' are isomorphic 'in the sense that the *satta* must be of the nature of *dravya* which is related to *guṇa* and *karma* by *samavāya*' (p. 162). Frankly, I am not quite clear what Daya Krishna exactly means by isomorphism of structure here. (In fact, the words within quotes above seem completely dark.) I may however spell out one specific meaning of it which Nyāya seems to accept. This is that 'qualificative cognition' (*savikalpaka* or *viśiṣṭa jñāna*)—and this is the kind of cognition which for all practical purposes matters for Nyāya—consists of such constituent elements which all are, taken separately,—and in the case of true cognitions even in respect of their 'unity'—actual existents and therefore part of the real world. In other words, in Nyāya a cognition is thought capable of knowing an object in a variety of its aspects which are all considered independent existents. Be that as it may, Prof. Daya Krishna makes of the alleged structural isomorphism of knowledge and reality in Nyāya the basis of a further conclusion which he states thus: 'The "real", thus, has to be "rational", and as Nyāya does not accept the notion of an "unknowable thing-in-itself", there is no distinction between "phenomena" and "reality" or noumenon, as in Kant's case. If this is not out-and-out "idealism", what else is it?' (p. 162). This passage embodies quite a couple of theses which I shall briefly state and take up one by one. They are:

(1) To postulate (as and if Nyāya does) isomorphism of structure between reality and knowledge is to conceive the real as rational.
(2) To subscribe to the notion of an unknowable thing-in-itself—as Kant avowedly does and as Nyāya in Daya Krishna's view does not—is to draw a distinction, which Kant draws and which Nyāya does not, between phenomena (or appearances) and reality (or noumena).
(3) Nyāya implicitly subscribes, on a certain condition, to (1), explicitly rejects (2), and so ends up by being idealist.

To take up (1), I am not sure whether the isomorphism factor is sufficient in itself to prove the 'rational' nature of reality, as the two

terms—'real' and 'rational'—are conceived at least in Hegel's system with whom is associated what is also differently expressed (by him) as the idea of 'being-thought' identity when the two realms are considered holistically. There is no doubt that the eminent Hegelian equation of rationality and reality (or actuality) does presuppose some definite isomorphism between the two, but it should not be forgotten, and I can here do no more than touch upon the topic very cursorily, that the Hegelian conception of rationality goes beyond mere 'cognition' as it is understood in Nyāya (and in some other Indian schools) and involves human reason as the principal arbiter of truth in its inevitably universal and absolute aspect. In Hegel we find the attempt most assiduously carried out—though the process already begins with Descartes so far as modern western philosophy is concerned—to establish the closest possible relation (—and an internal relation at that—) between thought (or logic) and reality so that reason does not remain mere empty form (which it does to an extent even in Kant according to Hegel) and reality does not end up being taken as mere atomic fact or surd, depending upon whether you are on the side of logical analysis or existentialism. When Hegel conceives reality as 'rational' he finds in it an inalienable element of necessity—something which is best illustrated when we consider an apparently moral question. Hegel raises the very important question of whether the world is indeed as it ought to be, and comes to the above conclusion by treating this question as equivalent to the question: Is thought objectively actualized or embedded in the world? To a philosopher like Kant, as indeed to common sense, the two questions may seem to be about different things, the first about goodness, about whether human beings are morally good and happy in proportion to their desires and hopes, and the second about intelligibility, about the extent to which phenomena involve thoughts or categories, and about whether or not these thoughts or categories are applicable to things-in-themselves. And since he treats them both as one question, Hegel thinks their solution also to be one and the same. This equation as we come to learn is implicit in the famous Hegelian dictum 'What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational',[8] 'rationality' here meaning that the world as it is, in that it embodies or instantiates thought-determinations, is rationally intelligible *and* (so) *necessary*, and secondly, that the world is *reasonable* in the sense of being more or less as it ought to be, and so not really to be questioned as regards its ultimate goodness. In the *Encyclopaedia* the key-doctrine that thought is objectively realized in the actual world is construed as implying that it is none of our's or the philosopher's business to suggest that things ought to be different from what they are or to say how they ought to be, if this is viewed as different from the way they are. The point is that Hegel's whole endeavour in mapping the dialectic of reality taken in its widest sense is to establish the most intimate and most intrinsic connection between

existence and thought, between content and form, between fact and value, and thereby transcend the bifurcated or sundered world which becomes our inevitable fate when reason goes on holiday so far as its other equally important function of synthesis is concerned. Whether a philosophy like Nyāya, in its conception of reality and knowledge, admits between the two some such relation as envisioned by Hegel is a question which requires a more detailed comment than is possible within the limits of this essay. I will therefore remain content by just pointing out, pertinently in my view, that there is a basic difference between (rational) 'intelligibility' in the sense noted above and 'knowability' as it is normally understood in a system like Nyāya such that even a closest possible correspondence of structure between reality and knowledge, assuming that it is postulated therein, does not really entitle us to regard Nyāya metaphysics as 'rationalist' or 'idealist'. (I am, however, far from suggesting that 'realism' and 'idealism' are necessarily mutually exclusive categories in themselves.)

As for the thesis (2), it is extremely doubtful whether to draw a distinction between phenomena and reality *is* to subscribe to the doctrine of 'an unknowable thing-in-itself'. (That Kant does so is only a special feature of his philosophy.) Hegel or Advaita Vedānta or philosophers such as Bradley and McTaggart do draw a basic distinction between appearance and reality and yet do not hold (in fact Hegel's critique of the Kantian doctrine is well-known) that there are any such things as *unknowable* things-in-themselves. We find thus that Nyāya philosophy does not become idealistic either on (1) or on (2) or on a combination of them. I may here add, by way of a needed codicil, that though idealism too, like realism, has known many varieties, what is common to them all as a matter of historical fact is that reality is there conceived as being essentially of the nature of spirit. It is in this sense that philosophers, otherwise in many respects as diverse as the Advaita Vedāntins, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hegel, Bradley and McTaggart, are idealists.

To turn to the phrase '*avyapadeśyam*' in the *Nyāyasūtra* (1.1.4) definition of perception (*pratyakṣa*), which prompts Prof. Daya Krishna to make a couple of pertinent (if anxious) queries, it needs to be noted that the adjective does not mean that (knowledge) which cannot be named or verbalized but only, and significantly (as per the explanation given by none other than Vātsyāyana), *that* knowledge which does not owe its existence to any word or name which denotes (or happens to denote) it: *tasmādaśābdamarthajñānamindriyārthasannikarṣotpannam.* It is not that a name cannot produce knowledge of that for which it stands; only, the word naming the object plays *no* role in producing the *perceptual* knowledge of that object. A name only serves the purpose of communication: *tadevamarthajñānakāle sa na samākhyāśabdo vyāpriyate vyavahārakāle tu vyāpriyate.* In other words—as A. Chakraborty rightly points out by referring to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's explication of the phrase

'*avayapadeśyam*—perceptual knowledge is to be distinguished from the knowledge produced by verbal testimony. There is, therefore, no contradiction between the general thesis that everything real is verbalizable and the view expressed in the (above-mentioned) *Nyāyasūtra* that perceptual cognition is not word-generated (or linguistic) in origin. (In a way, Vātsyāyana's explication of this sūtra seems to put a big question mark on the propriety of postulating *nirvikalpaka* awareness as it came to be developed by the subsequent Nyāya philosophers from Vācaspati onwards.) Incidentally, this view of perception as 'non-verbal' has a different fall-out too, and it is that, on Nyāya's account, perceptual knowledge cannot be regarded as necessarily *propositional* knowledge as is commonly supposed in the West, notwithstanding the fact that being *abhidheya*, it can *acquire* a propositional structure (so to say) and so become an objective and public entity when expressed sententially. This point is important, if only because it is often missed in discussions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Prof. Daya Krishna then seeks to draw attention to some of the implications of the Nyāya (-Vaiśeṣika) attempt to make certain concepts relative to our conception or view of them, which 'fact' in his opinion compromises Nyāya's alleged realism in respect of at least those concepts.

Since the situation so warrants, I would respond to this suggestion at the basic level and as follows. The relevant aphorism (1.2.3) in Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* where the word '*buddhyapekṣa*' cited by Daya Krishna occurs is this: *sāmānyam viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam.* (Genericness and specificity are relative to [the nature of] the viewpoint.) Now the word *buddhyapekṣa*, if not carefully attended to and read along with the rest of the *sūtra*, can easily mislead one, as indeed it does Daya Krishna (if this is the *sūtra* which he has in mind) (and as indeed it has done some other writers), into believing that Kaṇāda here is propounding a conceptualist view of *sāmānya* (genericness) and thus reducing it to something that exists (or can exist) in thought alone and so cannot be credited with 'real' objective existence. This interpretation is, however, completely mistaken. What Kaṇāda actually seems to maintain here is that *jātis* or universals are eternal (*nitya*) entities which are (1) as much real as other realities, and so do not merely have (what is called) *logical* existence and which (2) serve *both* to produce as a generic character (*sāmānya*) a cognition of commonness among the members of the *same* class, and to distinguish, as a differentia (or specific character: *viśeṣa*), that class from *other* classes (or universals). Thus *dravyatva* (substancehood), for example, is a generic character or *sāmānya* when it is taken to unify all the existents which are substances, and is a specific character or *viśeṣa* when it is thought to differentiate the whole class of substances (*dravyas*) in which it inheres from such classes (of entities) as qualities (*guṇas*) or actions (*karma*) which are *not* substances. Likewise, the universal 'potness' (*ghaṭatva-sāmānya*) can be conceived as a synthetic

principle bringing under itself all individual pots, or as a differentiating principle which as belonging to pots alone distinguishes them from things which are not pots. Again, as serving the former purpose it ('substancehood' or 'potness' in our examples) is called *kevalasāmānya*, and as serving the latter purpose it is called *viśeṣātmaka-sāmānya.*[9] It is this *use* of a *jāti* or *sāmānya* which is dependent upon our viewpoint or understanding and not its *existence.* Our contention is supported by the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.2.5 (*dravyatvam guṇatvam karmatvam ca sāmānyāni viśeṣāś ca*) where it is further made clear that the universals—such as substancehood (*dravyatva*), qualityness (*guṇatva*) and action-ness (*karmatva*)—are also used to differentiate the respective classes they denote from *other* classes and are therefore called *viśeṣas.* It is clear therefore that '*viśeṣa*' here stands for a class-character conceived or understood as a differentia (and so ought to be distinguished from, as would be evident from the remarks that follow, *antya-viśeṣa* which stands for the altogether different category called 'particularity'.) Not only this, Kaṇāda's intention on the score becomes patently evident from the fact that in the following sūtra (1.2.6) *anyatrāntebhyo viśeṣebhyaḥ,* he uses the expression *antya-viśeṣa* (mark the adjective *antya* added here) to denote the different category (*padārtha*) called *viśeṣas* in order that they are not confused with *sāmānyas* or *jātis* when these latter are viewed as differentia (*viśeṣa*). The *antya-viśeṣas* are meant to represent those *ultimate,* unique, *self-differentiated* and eternal features which belong to every eternal substance (*nitya dravya*) which could not otherwise—that is, in terms of *guṇa, karma* or *sāmānya*—be distinguished from other similar eternal substances. In other words, while everywhere else it is *sāmānya* or *jāti* which assimilates all the members of a certain class under one identical mode of being and *also* further serves, depending upon our intention, as a means to distinguish that class from other classes, in the case of eternal substances which on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view are *all alike* so far as their *guṇa, karma and sāmānya* (or *jāti*) are concerned, it is the self-differentiating feature called *viśeṣa* which, on account of its being unique to every such substance (*nitya dravya*), acts as a differentia for that individual substance.

That we are not telling a fairy-tale as regards the two-fold purpose of *sāmānya* we have sought to emphasize by quoting the relevant *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra,* receives unambiguous support from Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.69—*sāmānya-prasavātmikā jātiḥ*—which is concerned with defining *jāti.* Vātsyāyana glosses: 'The class-essence [*jāti*] is that which produces the knowledge of commonness in different objects, *that is,* that by the presence of which the different objects are not mutually differentiated, that is, the entity which is the cause of the continuation of the same knowledge in different objects. That which points to similarity (of something) with some individuals and *at the same time* [my emphasis] differentiates (it) from other individuals is also a class-

essence, though of a *special* (*viśeṣa*) type.'[10] (*yā samānām buddhim prasūte bhinneṣu adhikaraṇeṣu, yayā bahūni itaretarato na vyāvartante, yo 'rtho 'nekatra pratyayānuvṛttinimittam tat sāmānyam yat ca keśāṃcid bhedam kutaścid bhedam karoti tat sāmānyaviśeṣo jātiriti.*) Notice the last but one phrase *sāmānya-viśeṣa* (in the Sanskrit text) which is comparable to the phrase *sāmānyam-viśeṣa* of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 1.2.3 cited above. To conclude (then) this part of the discussion, there is no real in Nyaya (Vaiśeṣika) which does not exist independently of our knowledge or conception of it. So the Nyāya realism remains unaffected so far as this particular aspect is concerned.

II

I turn now to some of the points contained in Prof. Arindam Chakraborty's response to Daya Krishna's Note.

(A) First, I do not understand the point Arindam wishes to make when, while rightly drawing our attention to Udayana's detailed refutation of the 'no external world' theory of the Buddhist idealists, he emphasizes that the self in Nyāya is not only not '*essentially* conscious', but also 'can exist independently of cognition' (p. 152), so that both self and object (*as* objects of knowledge) turn out to be entities existing outside (and so without dependence upon) awareness (*bāhyārtha*). My own view is that even if the Nyāya self were essentially conscious or of the nature of awareness that would not by itself compromise its independent existence. Advaita Vedānta, for example, takes this view of the self and yet regards it as objectively and independently existent (*vastu-sat*). And so does for that matter a system like that of Rāmānuja. Second, it is to be noted that whenever the self in Nyāya is *known* as existent it is always as *cognizing* and therefore as *conscious* self (or subject). As those conversant with Nyāya know, the self not being regarded as self-luminous (*sva-prakāśa*) in that philosophy can be known only in a second-order cognition (*anuvyavasāya* or introspective awareness) which makes the first-order or primary awareness (*vyavasāya*, which as such is always of one or another object) its intentional object, the seat or subject of which primary awareness is precisely the self. In other words, though the self can exist without consciousness it cannot be *known as existent unless it possesses consciousness of some object* (which, for example, it does in a primary cognition). It is this peculiar character of the self which distinguishes it from other entities—which also otherwise exist as independent knowable reals—and which in a way makes Nyāya regard consciousness (or awareness) as a *special* attribute (*sva-dharma*) of the self belonging to it by the relation of inherence. (The only other real which possesses consciousness is God who is called *paramātman* or the universal Self.) It is true that, as Chakraborty says, both self and object 'remain outside awareness' and so are not really dependent, as far as their

existence is concerned, upon consciousness. But his way of putting the whole proposition is a little awkward and misleading and fails to emphasize (what must be emphasized) that (in Nyāya) it is only a self which is inherently capable, given certain conditions, of being conscious or a knower. Thus, there is a basic difference between the object(s) of knowledge being independent of consciousness and the self being independent of consciousness. Other reals are only knowable and so can never have consciousness while the self, besides being a knowable, is *also* a knower and so is always capable of possessing consciousness. And if the self exists without any consciousness or awareness in the liberated state, this is not because there is no special (even if contingent) relationship between consciousness and the self, but because in that state the self is devoid of any bodily form encased in which alone can it become capable of knowing the outside world via the mind and the senses. My point here is not that the self in Nyāya is not a real independent of cognition, but that even if it were to have consciousness as its intrinsic quality its ontological status would not be affected at all. The same consideration incidentally applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to 'consciousness' or 'cognition'. In Nyāya consciousness too, being a quality (*guṇa*), is considered (like *saṃyoga*, etc.) among the objective reals and so independent of *its* consciousness (which consequently is called *anuvyavasāya* or introspection); and yet, is it not seen (by Nyāya) as possessing the property of being consciousness? Being 'devoid of' or being 'not made of' awareness cannot, therefore, by itself become a decisive criterion for affirming something's independent reality, as Chakraborty seems to think. The one necessary condition for independent existence is that the thing concerned should not be *dependent upon* or *relative to* awareness *of itself*. And this perfectly holds true in case of consciousness in Nyāya, for every cognitive act is there considered as an entity or state numerically different from the act (called *anuvyavasāya*) which cognizes it.

(B) Second, in his anxiety to affirm, rightly of course, that the Nyāya world is a totality of things, Arindam tends to be unfair to facts just because of (a) what he thinks to be the predominantly Tractarian association of the word 'fact' and (b) because of the fear that any admission of independently existing 'facts' would necessarily commit one to upholding either a fact-ontology or to regarding the world as a totality of facts rather than of things—which latter include, as Chakraborty emphasizes, the (real) relation of 'inherence' or *being-in*. Such a fear, however, seems to me unfounded. It is my view that one does not necessarily have to be a fact-ontologist (leaving aside the further question whether the Wittgenstein of *Tractatus* is one or not) as distinct from a thing-ontologist to entertain the idea of facts. It is possible, I think, to say in the same breath that the world consists of things and that these things have *facts* holding about them. What is a

fact, after all, (to confine ourselves to this elementary level), other than the possession by something of a property or the connection of something with something by a relation. (By 'something' we here mean both particulars and characteristics.) A fact then would exist *depending* on whether or not the thing(s) about which it is a fact exists. The blackness of the crow would then be a fact as distinct from my *cognition* of or belief about it (as black), which (cognition or belief) is an occurrent (attribute) in my self as a knowing agent. And such judgements can be commonly found in the Nyāya literature.[11] Besides, one does not have to be an upholder of the reality of propositions (which, for example, Wittgenstein is) to be an entertainer of facts. One can I think as legitimately talk of correspondence of structure between cognitions and objects (or facts) as between propositions and states of affairs (or facts).

(C) While endorsing the common scholarly opinion that Nyāya upholds metaphysical realism, Prof. Chakraborty cites two main reasons which in his view make the Nyāya system a realist one: first, that Nyāya subscribes to the doctrine of *Pramāṇa-saṃplava* (different means of knowledge grasping the same object) and, second, that Nyāya advocates the doctrine of *nirākāra-jñāna-vāda* (formlessness of awareness). Since Chakraborty leaves unclarified some of the meaning and implications of the two doctrines such that the possibility of misapprehension on this score always looms, I proceed to supplement what he has already said. To take up *nirākāra-jñāna-vāda* first, it must be remembered that this doctrine took the kind of shape (and, of course, the name) it did largely (though not exclusively) by way of a response to the *sākāra-jñāna-vāda* of some of the Buddhist schools, more especially the idealistic ones, who, since they totally denied the ontological reality of the external world (*bāhyārtha*) and since they yet felt impelled, either in the nature of things or by the opponents' attack, to account for the undeniable subject-object distinction as characterizing every cognition (even if in the final analysis this so-called distinction was for them nothing more than an illusion!), took shelter in and formulated the notorious (?) doctrine that every awareness has a form (*sākāra*) which bifurcates itself into two appearances—subject-appearance (*svābhāsa* or *grāhakākāra*) and object-appearance (*viṣayābhāsa* or *grāhyākāra*)—the latter one having then been supposed to represent the objective constituent of an awareness.

As against the *sākāra-jñāna-vādin* Buddhists, the Nyāya realists (as indeed some other Hindu realists and Vaibhāṣika Buddhists) propounded the doctrine of *nirākāra-jñāna* (formless cognition or consciousness) according to which the 'objective' constituent (*viṣaya* or *artha*) which serves and enables us to differentiate one state of awareness from another is not provided (as the Buddhist idealists 'mistakenly' thought) by awareness *itself* from *within* but from *outside* this consciousness

(which in itself is *nirākāra* or formless), that is, by the exterior world with which the conscious self comes into contact through the mind and the senses. It is always something belonging to the *real external* world which, in so far as it becomes an object of a cognition-episode, constitutes the objective component of a cognitive situation, cognition itself representing the subject-side (*viṣayi*) of that situation. Thus while both Nyāya and the Buddhists in question apparently (if unwittingly) agree that it is the object (or 'object-appearance') which distinguishes one awareness from another, this component, while it is in the case of the Buddhists supplied by consciousness internally (or from within and so in fact ultimately reduces to nothing more than an appearance) and thus necessarily renders the latter form-ed (*sākāra*), comes in the case of Nyāya from the actual world outside that cognition and thus underlines the inherently form-less (*nirākāra*) character of consciousness. This doctrine was pithily summed up by Udayana thus: *arthenaiva viśeṣo hi nirākāratayā dhiyām.*[12] (A cognition is distinguished by its object [*artha*] alone, for the cognitions themselves have *no* definite form by which to distinguish them from each other.) Now this particular formulation would seem to lead one to believe that in Nyāya's view consciousness is diaphanous. And in a significant sense it is. (One recalls here G.E. Moore's view of consciousness as enunciated in his essay 'Refutation of Idealism'.)[13] But though consciousness as thus conceived is diaphanous and formless, it is never contentless (*nirviṣayaka*) if only because of the fact that it always is directed towards one or another (real external) object which it grasps in at least some of its features. And as something with a content, and so a structure,—which incidentally is in Nyāya always in principle expressible in sentential form—it always lends itself to logical analysis. (Its structural content is however revealed only in an introspective or reflective act.)

But how can such an analysis become a possibility in the first instance unless we allow that a cognition must after all have a certain form and so be *sākāra.* Besides, whenever we need to distinguish one primary object-directed cognition from another such cognition we do it only in terms of the contents which have already become *internalized* and immanent (so to say) and so are accessible to introspective (or reflective) awareness whose *raison d'etre* consists precisely in making the primary cognition (*saviṣayaka vyavasāya*) its object of reflection. And it is common knowledge that Nyāya brings all such 'immanent' contents under the technical category called *viṣayatā* which is said to comprise three further sub-categories—*viśeṣyatā, prakāratā* and *saṃsargatā*—into which the constituent contents come to be arranged and their mutual connection analyzed. Indeed, to abstract a little, the sum and substance of the Buddhist idealist's contention is that if there is *no* such *immanent* content which characterizes every state of awareness, if awareness of blue and awareness of red, being therefore formless are wholly alike *internally*, their

difference being constituted by the difference between their respective objects existing out there in the world, how can (i) the first awareness be distinguished from the latter (in the so-called introspective awareness) when the objects to which they refer are no longer in sight or are otherwise past, and how can (ii) there exist a one-to-one determinate relation between an awareness and its object? What I am trying to drive at is that the meaning and connotations which we normally assign to the term *sākāra* or *nirākāra* when interpreting or pronouncing on the relative merits of the doctrines concerned is certainly not the whole story and the issues involved are much deeper and greater. I am not at all suggesting that Prof. Chakraborty's view of the doctrine of *nirākāra-jñāna* as one of the pillars of Nyāya realism is without substance. (In fact, I am in agreement with him here.) My only aim in doing the above unavoidably digressive exercise has been to put across to the common reader that the one specific meaning which the term *nirākāra jñāna* carries in the context of Nyāya (-Vaiśeṣika) is that the (immanent) content which characterizes every primary cognition and therefore makes it necessarily *sākāra* in the sense indicated above, derives its various determinations (in that system) *originally not from within* (hence the significance of the term *nirākāra*) but from the independently *existing* (object-complex in the) outside world. To put it all in one word, the (undeniable) internal content of a cognition is parasitic upon the real transcendent world and the nature or character of this transcendent world is established by *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇāyattā vastusthitiḥ* Jayanta).

(D) In the context of the knowability-talk (*jñeyatva*) in Nyāya, Prof. Chakraborty relies exclusively or mainly on the version given by *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* (in commentary on verse 13) and consequently interprets 'Everything that is, is knowable' as 'Everything that is, is actually known by God' (*jñeyatva* having been taken by *Muktāvalī* to mean: knowability is the property of being an object of knowledge: *jñānaviṣayatā*), proposing, surely after *Muktāvalī*, that this property of 'knowability' (*jñānaviṣayata*) exists everywhere, for everything whatever is *actually* the object of God's (or a *yogi's*)[14] knowledge. Now this proposition and its acceptance as *the* correct view entails certain consequences. The most important consequence is that if *jñeyata* is to be interpreted as '*actually*' known by God (my emphasis) then the concept *jñeyatva* becomes altogether redundant as a common property of six/seven Vaiśeṣika categories, for the concept of God already implies in Nyāya his omniscience—which property cannot but include knowledge of all that is, and perhaps even that is not. And the same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the property of nameability which too is said to belong commonly to all the six/seven categories. Briefly, what I wish to say is that if *jñeyatva* and *abhidheyatva* only mean that all that exists is *already* the object of God's knowledge and his 'naming' of it, then it would be unnecessary for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to enumerate them as additional common properties

of the existent. My point, in other words, is that their special mention makes sense only in the context of such thinking beings who, even while not actually possessing knowledge of all that *is*, are deemed inherently capable of acquiring such knowledge.

(E) Finally I turn to a special point made by Chakraborty in his response to some of Daya Krishna's queries. He writes, in obvious approval of a comment of Daya Krishna's: 'The canonical western characterization of realism as the thesis that objects exist mind-independently is *difficult* to apply to Nyāya' (p. 154) (my emphasis). The reason for this, according to Chakraborty, is that the notion of mind-independence involves the notion of *possibility:* 'An object of awareness is mind-independent if it *can* or *could* exist without awareness even if it actually is always the object of some awareness (for example, God's)' (p. 154). And Nyāya metaphysics, according to Chakraborty 'cannot make sense of this empty "can" or "could" because nowhere in Nyāya do we find any trace of the idea of possible worlds' (p. 154).

Now frankly I am not quite able to see how exactly is discussion of the question, if Nyāya can appropriately be called a realist philosophy, helped by Chakraborty's introduction of the notion of possibility? In fact, the puzzle only worsens because of Chakraborty's use of 'possibility' and 'possible worlds' as equivalents in the context concerned. What I mean is not that they can never be treated as equivalents, but only that care should be taken to indicate how exactly such equivalence is possible. It can surely not be accepted generally in the context of Nyāya. Thus (to illustrate), while (in Nyāya) it would make perfect sense to say that it may rain today, it is extremely doubtful whether Nyāya would entertain, without any qualification whatever, the notion of a possible *world* which for example, may be devoid of atoms (*paramāṇus*) as its constitutive cause. Again, in a different context, Nyāya would not hesitate to regard the illusorily perceived snake as a possible object precisely because both the 'snake' and its substrate, rope, are parts of the real world. And to come specifically to the context in which Chakraborty pointedly (if briefly) refers to the issue and goes on to dismiss summarily Nyāya's claim to the title 'realist', on the ground that it shuns any talk of 'possible worlds' which in his view realism as involving belief in mind-independent reality *necessarily* involves, I have only to submit that Chakraborty does nothing to show why 'possibility'—talk in the sense he cares to point out, is not permissible within Nyāya's metaphysical framework. Isn't it plainly the case that to the extent Nyāya regards the entities (or classes of them) which it postulates *as* real, it thinks them as *capable* of existing independently of being known, whether by finite minds or God's mind, to which latter incidentally they are presumed to be known perennially. If I happen to see a tree and if my perception is valid, isn't this tree (on Nyāya's account of substances) something which, in fact, exists independently of my knowledge of it? And if it so exists now, should not

such existence be taken to have been *possible*? Indeed, I would insist that when Nyāya calls an existent thing *jñeya*, it does not mean merely that it is possible to know that thing, but also, significantly, that it is a *potential* object of knowledge. And needless to say, this potentiality (as indeed also the possibility) the object derives from its mind-independent reality. Absence of 'possible worlds'-talk in Nyāya does not one bit change this situation and is besides, as remarked above, an issue standing on a different footing altogether. I have no wish to deny that the history of philosophy bears witness to many versions of realism, but what is common to them all is the thesis that there is a *mind*-independent real world. And I believe that this 'canonical' western characterization of realism does apply to the *essential* Nyāya (-Vaiśeṣika) standpoint on the nature of reality and knowledge (including God's knowledge). In fact, Chakraborty himself seems to concede this when he says: 'Things, even if all of them are actually known, are not of the nature of knowledge. They are distinct' (p. 154). However, his subsequent reduction of Nyāya realism to *just* the rejection of a certain Buddhist idealistic 'rule' (*—sahopalambhaniyamād abhedaḥ* [*nīla-taddhiyoḥ*—) appears to dilute, if not to undermine, not only what is independently and specially typical of Nyāya metaphysics but also its pronouncedly *realistic* character.

Notes and References

1. Daya Krishna, 'Is Nyāya Realist or Idealist?', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XII, No. 1, September–December 1994, pp. 161–63. References within parentheses in the first part of the main body of the article are to Daya Krishna's note.
2. Arindam Chakraborty, 'Is Nyāya Realist?' *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XII, No. 2, January-April, 1995, pp. 151–54. References within parentheses in the second part of the main body of the article are to Chakraborty's comment.
3. Śrīdhara, *Nyāya-kandalī* as published with *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (or *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*) of Praśastapāda, edited by Durgadhara Jha, Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1977, p. 41.
4. *'Na'ṗy astitvam anarthakam niḥsvarūpe sattāyāḥ samavāyābhāvāt'*, Śrīdhara, *Nyāya-kandalī*, op. cit., p. 42.
5. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Nyāya-mañjarī*, Part I, ed. by Gaurinatha Shastri, Varanasi, 1982, *Āhnika* 3, p. 261.
6. Among the moderns, Meinong and F.H. Bradley hold to this view, though the tradition can be traced as far back as Plato's *Theaetatus*.
7. See *Dignāga, on Perception*, trans. and annott. by Masaaki Hattori, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1968, Section 1.
8. See *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. with notes by T.M. Knox (1942: reprint, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1949), Preface (p. 10); cf. also Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*, Introduction.
9. See for example, Desika-Tirumalai Tatacarya, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra-vṛtti*, Ganganatha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Allahabad, 1979, p. 16 (on *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 1.2.3).

10. Gotama's *Nyāyasūtra* with Vātsyāyana's commentary (*Bhāṣya*), trans. by M.K. Gangopadhyaya, Indian Studies, Calcutta, 1972, p. 168.
11. I would not however be taken to mean that Nyāya does *explicitly* provide for 'facts' within its ontology. I am only suggesting that fact-talk would not strictly be an anathema to Nyāya.
12. Udayana, *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* with four commentaries, ed. with introduction by Mahaprabhulal Goswami, Mithila Research Institute, Darbhanga, 1972, Chapter 4, verse 4.
13. G.E. Moore, 'Refutation of Idealism', *Philosophical Studies*, 1922; reprint, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958.
14. Note that many translators of the text take '*adi*' in '*īsvarādijñāna-viṣayatāyāḥ kevalānvayitvāt*' to include (in addition to God) other knowing beings such as *yogis*.

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Notes and Queries

Different Forms of Advaitism; What Do They Mean?: A Reply

Under the above heading Professor Daya Krishna has asked for an explanation of the distinction amongst different forms of Advaitism like Advaita, Dvaitādvaita, Śaivism, etc., that are in vogue in Indian philosophy. Since each of these Advaitisms represents a full-fledged school of philosophy only a brief account of the basic tenets of each of these schools can be given in this note. It may be mentioned first that some of the schools listed by Daya Krishna like Kāśmīr Śaivism or Vīra Śaivism are not traditionally characterized as Advaitism although they have some of its distinctive features. We start the explanation with the 'Advaitism' of Śaṅkara which is in a sense the forerunner of all other Advaitisms which are of the nature of diverse philosophical reactions to the former and are propounded by the great ācāryas like Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Chaitanya, Jivagoswami, etc. It may be mentioned here that 'anubhavādvaita' referred to by Daya Krishna is not the name of any well-known school of Advaitic philosophy, although the word happens to be used by Udayana, and perhaps some other authors too, to describe the Vijñānavāda or the idealistic standpoint of the Yogācāra Buddhists. The word has been used in some contexts in other senses too. Such is also the case with Viśiṣṭaśaivasiddhānta, listed as a kind of Advaitism by Daya Krishna. According to Śaṅkara, the first propounder of Advaitism, reality is absolute, nondual, infinite and it excludes all differences there being nothing other than it which is similar or dissimilar to it. Even within it there are no differences of part and whole, qualified and qualifier, etc. All differences are mere appearances of the absolute and they are the projections of *māyā*, the cosmic illusion. The possibility of such a projection is illustrated by our dream reality experiences in which we, the dreamers, project our own selves as all kinds of things other than ourselves and experience them as such. The apparent and ad hoc reality of the dream-objects is not intrinsic to them as it is our own reality appearing as belonging to them. Even we ourselves are the projections of the basic absolute reality. This apparent reality is inexplicable as it is not absolutely affirmable or totally deniable. The realization of the absolute nature of the ultimate reality dissipates all this illusion leaving behind nothing but the absolute reality. So we can even say that the world is the illusory content of the dream being consciously dreamt by Brahman, this being the basic difference between our dreams and the dream of Brahman, which as absolute consciousness

may be likened to bright light containing all the different spectra of colours within it.

'Dvaitādvaita' is—as the very etymology of the word suggests—a kind of Advaitism which does not militate against Dvaitism. It admits their co-existence which in a way is supported by common experience. We commonly distinguish for example a thing and its qualities and yet we so often refer to them as identical with each other. We say that 'the clay-pot is a material object' and that 'red is the colour quality of this object'. This does not prevent us from expressing their identity by making a true statement like 'The clay-pot is red'. The pluralist philosophers take the word red, in its indirect sense, namely, 'That which has redness' instead of its literal sense. But there is no need to take recourse to such uncommonsensical interpretation of a common word only to maintain the nonexistent radical opposition between duality and non-duality. In a certain respect, two or more things can be identical and in some other respect can be different too from each other. So God, the self and the world are related with each other according to Dvaitādvaita both through identity and diversity. The various details concerning such a view—like God's powers of controlling, enjoying, etc. are not of much philosophical significance. In relation to Advaitism what needs to be noted is the basic principle that identity does not exclude diversity for Bhaṭṭa Bhaśkara and others who uphold the Dvaitādvaita doctrine.

The Acintyabhedābheda variety of Advaitism owes its origin to Jivagoswāmī's (of sixteenth century A.D.) writings has much affinity to Dvaītadvaita but the difference-cum-non-difference relation holding between God, the soul and the world is considered by this school as non-conceptualizable. These three basic entities being of quite different intrinsic natures, the relation between them cannot be adequately formulated. Unlike Rāmānuja who regards the sentient self and the insentient matter as the infinite attributes of God, the above school treats these latter as just manifestations of God's energy. The insentient matter or Prakṛti and the God-dependent self cannot actually characterize God's infinite and infinitely sentient being as this would delimit God's nature. Rāmānuja foreseeing this difficulty has invested even God's attributes with infinity. In this respect the qualified non-dualism of Rāmānuja comes very close to Spinoza's substance attribute philosophy, the only significant difference between these two being that according to Rāmānuja divine attributes are infinitely benevolent while Spinoza does not say anything like this about mind and matter which are the two infinite attributes of the infinite substance in his view.

Śaiva Siddhānta, a creed very popular mainly in South India and having followers and scholars devoted to its study almost all over the world to-day has not much in common with what is known as Kāśmīr Śaivism otherwise known as the Pratyabhiñā school. The main doctrines of this school are these: God Śiva, who is beginningless, omniscient and

omnipotent is the supreme reality. He is described as Saccidānanda which is taken to imply that He possesses the attributes of self-existence, essential purity, intrinsic wisdom, infinite intelligence, freedom from all bonds, infinite grace, and infinite bliss. Śiva, though possessing all these attributes, is not the sole creator of the world which is real and devoid of consciousness. Śiva with the cooperation of His Śakti creates the world. The principle of Karuṇā which determines the empirical and spiritual career of each self, is also the instrument of God's operation. Śakti is the link between Śiva, the pure consciousness and the unconscious world. About the nature of the relationship between God, the soul and the world, nothing very original has been said by Śaiva Siddhānta which the other Vedāntic schools have not said. It will be more appropriate to treat this school as theology, rather than philosophy.

Vīra Śaivism is out and out theology. Not much theorising of philosophical significance is traceable in the writings of this school. It may be called a kind of Advaitism only by courtesy (Śiva being the supreme reality according to it).

Kāśmīr Śaivism is, however, an important form of Advaitism. Śiva, the infinite consciousness which is absolutely unrestricted and independent, is the sole reality of the world. The world exists within the infinite consciousness as an *independent* existent. Unlike in other Advaitic schools, the existence of an instrumental cause like *māyā* or *prakṛti* for the creation of the world is not admitted by this school. God creates everything (absolutely everything) by the force of his will or energy, God makes the world which has its being within Him to appear as if it is outside Him and other than Him. By His own power God manifests Himself as the innumerable selves enjoying the world. It is obvious from this brief account that the God of this school is not much different from the Brahman of Advaita Vedānta, which maintains that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the world. But unlike in Advaita the energy of God is supposed to be endowed with aspects like intelligence, *ānanda* or bliss, will and *kriyā*.

The above is just a bare account of the various Advaitisms unsupported by any reason adduced by their respective advocates.

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Difference Between the Various Terms Which the Navya Nyāya Uses Frequently

Anuyogitā-Pratiyogitā

There is a lot of difference between these two terms. *Pratiyogitā* is counterpositiveness residing in the *pratiyogin*—the counterpositive. For instance, a jar is the counterpositive of the absence of it. The counterpositiveness resides in that jar. *Anuyogitā*, on the other hand, resides in the *anuyogin* which is not a counterpositive. *Anuyogin* is the correlate term of the term *pratiyogin*. Thus, when a jar is the *pratiyogin* of the absence, the absence itself is the *anuyogin*. So, in the instance of an absence of jar, the jar is the *pratiyogin* and has *pratiyogitā*, while the absence is the *anuyogin* having *anuyogitā*.

Sometimes, the locus of absence is also called *anuyogin*, for example, *bhūtalaṃ* is the *anuyogin* of *ghaṭābhāva*.

Viśeṣyatā and Prakāratā

Anything which is prominently comprehended by a cognition is *viśeṣya*. *Viśeṣyatā* is its property. For instance, the cognition 'The cow is black' comprehends 'The cow' prominently, which it comprehends 'black colour' as a qualifying attribute. Therefore, with reference to the above cognition 'The cow' is the *viśeṣya* and the property *viśeṣyatā* resides in it. The English equivalent for '*viśeṣya*' is qualificandum. So, *viśeṣyatā* is qualificandumness.

'*Prakāratā*,' on the other hand, is a property residing in *prakāra*—the qualifier. In the above cognition, 'black colour' is the qualifier and it has *prakāratā*.

Ādhāratā–Ādheyatā

Ādhāra is locus and *ādhāratā* is a property residing in it. For example, if there is a jar on the ground, the ground is *ādhāra* and it has *ādhāratā*.

The correlate term of *ādhāratā* is *ādheyatā*. *Ādheya* is that which resides. The jar, which resides on the ground, is *ādheya*. *Ādheyatā* or 'being *ādheya*' is its property. The relation between *ādheyatā* and *ādhāratā* is *nirūpya–nirūpakabhāva*, that is, the relation of determined and determinant.

Nirūpyatā–Nirūpakatā

Nirūpya is that which is determined. *Nirūpyatā* is a property residing in *nirūpya*. Similarly, *nirūpaka* is determinant and *nirūpakatā*, that is, determinanthood is a property of *nirūpaka*. For example, *Ādhāratā* and *ādheyatā* are related by this relation. We may be seeing the jar, the *ādheya*. But the *ādheyatā* of it can be known only by knowing the *ādhāratā* of the ground. Hence, the *ādheyatā* is *nirūpya* and the *ādhāratā* is *nirūpaka*. Sometimes *ādharatā* is *nirūpya* and *ādheyatā* is *nirūpaka*. The relation is mutual.

Vṛtti

Vṛtti means that which exists. It is also called *ādheya*. *Vṛttitva* and *ādheyatā* are the same. *Ādhāra* can be said as a correlate term of *vṛtti*.

Vyāpya–Vyāpaka

Vyāpya is pervaded, whereas *vyāpaka* is pervader. For instance, fire is *vyāpaka*, that is, pervader, because it pervades all the instances of smoke. Smoke is pervaded. Generally a pervader occupies a large number of instances, whereas the pervaded occupies a lesser number of instances.

Tādātmya—Abhinnatā

Tādātmya and *abhinnatā* are the same. Gadādhara defines *tādātmya* as *svavṛttyasādhāraṇa dharmaḥ*, that is, an uncommon property that resides in the self. For instance, in the proposition '*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*'—'The jar is black', the meaning of the term *nīla* is a thing that is qualified with *nīlatva*] blackness. The term *ghaṭa* means a thing possessed of jarness, that is, jar. Here the relation of *nīla* in the *ghaṭa* is *abhēda* or *tādātmya*. In other words, the jar is related with *nīla* by the relation of *svavṛttyasādhāraṇa dharmaḥ*. In all the relations '*sva*' which means 'self' refers to that, the relation of which is under consideration. In the above example the relation of *nīla* in *ghaṭa* is under consideration. Hence, '*sva*' refers to *nīla*. The *asādhāraṇa dharmaḥ* residing in it, is *nīlatva*. Since this *nīlatva* is in the *ghaṭa*] it is said as being related with *nīla* by the relation of *tādātmya*. *Tādātmyatā* is being *tādātmya*.

Svarūpa Sambandha

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School recognizes three relations as *Vṛtti-Niyāmakā*, that is, a relation by which a thing is cognized as residing in a particular locus. *Saṁyoga* (conjunction), *samavāya* (inherence) and *svarūpa* (self sameness)—these three are such relations. The term '*svarūpa sambandha*' which is generally translated into English as self-sameness is of two kinds—1. Spatial—*daiśikasvarūpasambandha*, and 2. Temporal —*kālikasvarūpasambandha*. The presence of an absence, in its locus, is by *daiśikasvarūpasambandha*. Similarly the presence of a thing in *kāla* is by the relation of *kālikasvarūpasambandha*. The *svarūpa* relation is also called as *viśeṣaṇatāsambandha*.

As per the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics the relation of conjunction holds good only among substances. The relation of *samavāya*, on the

other hand, holds between a whole and its parts, a substance and its qualities and actions, an individual and the generic attributes residing in it, eternal substances and the particularities called *viśeṣa*, residing in them. Since, either *saṁyoga* or *samavāya* does not hold good in many cases such as an absence its locus, *svarūpa sambandha* is envisaged as the relation, in such cases. The point to be noted here is that *svarūpa sambandha* is not a relation of identity as is understood by some.

Sva–Sāmānādhikaraṇatva

Sāmānādhikaraṇatva is co-existence. As stated earlier, *sva* refers to the thing, the relation of which is under consideration. For example, the colour of a mango fruit is related to the taste in the same fruit, by the relation of *sva–sāmānādhikaraṇatva*. Here, *sva* refers to the colour of the fruit. Since, the taste in the fruit co-exists with the colour, the taste is said to have been related with the colour by the relation of *sva–sāmānādhikaraṇatva*.

Sva–Vṛttitva

Vṛtti is that which resides or is located. So, *sva–vṛttitva* is being 'located in the *sva**. For instance, a jar residing on the ground is the *vṛtti* and is related with the ground by the relation of *sva–vṛttitva*. Here *sva* refers to the ground.

Sva-Aśrayatva

Āśraya is locus. Thus *sva–āśrayatva* is 'being the locus of the thing, that is, *sva*'. Ground is related with the jar residing in it, by this relation. '*Sva*' here refers to the jar.

Viṣayatā–Viṣayitā and Avacchedaka–Avacchinna

There is a radical difference between the terms mentioned above. *Viṣaya* is a content of a cognition and hence *viṣayatā* is the property residing in the content. For example, the jar, which is a content of a cognition, has the property *viṣayatā* and can also be related with the cognition by the relation *viṣayatā*, that is, contentness.

On the other hand, *viṣayin* is that which grasps a thing. Therefore, a cognition is *viṣayin* and has *viṣayitā*. Thus, the cognition of the jar, can be said as related with the content, that is, jar, with the relation of *viṣayitā*.

The difference between *avacchedaka* and *avacchinna* is obvious. *Avacchedaka* is limitor, whereas *avacchinna* is limited. For example, when a jar is considered as an effect, that is, *kārya*, *kāryatā* becomes a property of it. This *kāryatā* is limited by jarness. Therefore, the jarness is the limitor, whereas the *kāryatā* is limited.

Samavāyatā

Yes. There is a thing such as *samavāyatā*. It is a property of *samavāya*.

The last question is, indeed, interesting. It asks about the distinction between the universals such as *parvatatva* and the properties such as *avacchedakatva* which arise because of the machinery of Navya Nyāya analysis. My reply is that there is a radical distinction between *parvatatva*, etc. universals and the *avacchedakatva*, etc. properties. *Parvatatva* being a universal is perceived the moment *parvata*, the locus, is perceived. As a rule, a universal is grasped by the same sense organ by which the individual is grasped. But, *avacchedakatva*, etc. properties are not universals. They come to be known through inference or a sentence. Thus, when we consider a jar as an effect, that is, *kārya*, then by analysing the thing, we also come to know of the limitor of the *kāryata* which is the limited. The limitor here is *parvatatva* which is already perceived. But, its limitorness, that is, *avacchedakatva* is grasped later. The point is that jarness, etc. universals are perceived when the jar is perceived. But, the *avacchedakatva* of jarness is known when the *kāryata*, etc. properties are known through inference.

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Review Articles

Mind and Beyond Mind*

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What is the nature of consciousness? Is consciousness synonymous with mind? And how is it related to brain activity? Is consciousness nothing but, as someone has remarked, 'the intangible effluence of a material substance called cerebral cortex?' And how does mind interact with the body? These are some of the intractable questions that have eluded any satisfactory answers till this day. To quote Roger Walsh and Frances Vaughan, somehow consciousness seems to 'slip through scientific research and conceptual analysis like water through a net.'

From time to time modern science and philosophy have tried to express opinions about the possible nature of mind; yet, in spite of the imposing nature of their speculations, the riddle of mind and consciousness continues to defy any definitive solution. As Barbara B. Brown has pertinently remarked, 'Behind the cryptic façade of scientific and philosophic pronouncements on the essence of the human mind lies a chaotic jumble of fragmented and unexplored half-guesses about what may be the greatest power in this or any other universe.'

However, since the 1970s, a great amount of interest in what has been rather picturesquely termed 'consciousness research', has been evinced in the West. The transpersonal psychologists have taken up in right earnest and with an unbiased scientific interest the exploration of consciousness in its various manifestations. As a matter of fact, in the contemporary intellectual circles of the western world two opposite ontologies are engaged in a serious battle for supremacy. According to the first view consciousness is nothing but a function of brain activity and all its possible reaches and depths are ultimately fathomable through the researches of neuroscience. The second view contends, on the contrary, that consciousness is a primary principle of existence, pervading every reality and determining even the energy-matter of the physical world. Various journals are being devoted to the specific study of consciousness and books are coming out galore every year with such significant titles as '*States of Consciousness*', '*The Spectrum of Consciousness*',

* N.C. PANDA, *Mind and Supermind* (in 2 vols.), published by D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd., New Delhi, 1996, pp. xvi, 737, Coloured and b/w figures; glossary; bibliography; indices; hardback, Rs. 1000 (set).

'*Opening to Inner Light*', '*Awakening Intuition*', '*The Supermind: The Ultimate Energy*', etc.

Dr N.C. Panda's admirable book in two volumes, *Mind and Supermind*, has great relevance in this ambience of contemporary interest in consciousness research. As he himself has pointed out, a need has been felt that 'we clarify the concept of mind which takes cognizance of the recent developments in physical and biological sciences, neurophysiology, psychology, psychiatry, *yoga* science, computer science, etc.' (p. 380).

In this attempt at clarification the learned author has made a *tour de force* through the whole gamut of eastern and western psychologies and spiritual traditions. He has packed the two volumes of his book with an amazingly large array of ideas and information gleaned from a wide variety of fields of knowledge. He has, in the process, adequately discussed topics and subjects as diverse as Sāṁkhya and Yoga metaphysics and psychology, concept of mind in language analysis, the Serpent Power or Kundalini Yoga, computer architecture and artificial intelligence, karmavāda and rebirth, supernormal phenomena and psychic powers, the cognizability of Brahman, conscious control of the autonomic nervous system, and a host of other interesting themes. The author has also raised many intriguing questions such as: Can the computer think? Is the universe designed and fine-tuned? Is immediate experience possible? Is existence holistic? etc.

The scholarship of the author is wide and profound, both in the ancient Indian spiritual traditions and in the fields of contemporary western thought. The way he has treated the various topics bears ample testimony to the fact that Dr Panda has cogitated deep and long over the great wealth of materials forming the substance of his work. And he has succeeded with consummate skill in compressing to its essential core all that has been said about mind in the East as well as in the West.

The author has one central purpose behind the writing of this important treatise. It is to evolve an integrated perspective on mind and to synthesize ancient spiritual wisdom with the findings of contemporary sciences. To quote his own words:

> In the history of religion *versus* science, religion antagonized science and adhered to the so-called revealed truth. Then came a phase in which science antagonized religion through observed and carefully tested truths. We are at the threshold of a third phase in which empirical truths alone cannot explain all phenomena of Nature. Scientific discoveries of the twentieth century badly need the fusion of empirical science and spirituality which is not necessarily religion. (p. 520)

Dr Panda has thus sought in his book to present 'an integral picture of the mental world' through 'the synthesis of ancient Indian wisdom and modern science'. (p. xii) And he pertinently asks: 'Whether it has been successfully done is to be judged by the readers.' (ibid.). Now, it is a part of the unenviable task of a conscientious reviewer to point out what he honestly finds amiss in a book under review. It is in discharge of that responsibility that we feel constrained to remark that the laudable and heroic attempt at synthesis the author has made in his book has not been altogether successful. The comparative study the author has presented in his work with meticulous care is without doubt interesting and illuminating. But the bridge that he has sought to build between science and yoga may not, we fear, prove to be a bridge of synthesis at all to the discerning critics belonging to either of the two camps. They are sure to demur at the way the so-called integration and synthesis has been sought to be achieved. For there are many loopholes in the author's presentation of ideas and argumentation which, he avers, is bound to lead to the needed integration. It is very difficult for us to justify why we are saying so if we do not give at the same time illustrative excerpts from the book *Mind and Supermind*. But the limited space available to the reviewer does not allow him to do so. However, let us try our best to impart as clear a formulation as possible to the objections we have been alluding to. Here are some of the weak links in the author's argumentation:

(i) Dr Panda has at times just joined up in a facile way the yogic knowledge and the findings of science without offering much of a link of transition. (ii) At other times the author has put forward a scientific analogy to validate a spiritual finding before the scientific community. But analogical arguments, be it noted, can never be accepted as clinching proof. Besides, the attempt to apply scientific analogies to spiritual or yogic things leads more often to confusion than to anything else. (iii) A third point of criticism is that at many places in the book we come across emphatic assertions on the part of the author without any validating arguments to justify them. It is one form of the well-known fallacy '*argumentum ad verecundiam*'. Thus, expressions such as 'are bound to accept', 'we boldly assert', 'only inescapable inference', etc. are aplenty in the book under review. (iv) In order to validate to the scientific mind certain affirmations of the yogic knowledge, the author has at times adopted the fallacious argument: 'If P is true, then Q is true; and Q is true; therefore, P is true.' It goes without saying that this mode of reasoning in mixed hypothetical syllogism, termed in classical Logic '*ponendo ponens*' ('I affirm by affirming') is altogether invalid. The other *ponendo ponens*—'If P, then Q; and P; therefore, Q'—is, of course, valid. Dr Panda's *ponendo ponens* can at best lead to a provisional plausibility, never to a certainty.

There are some other glaring gaps in the author's argumentation which make his attempted synthesis somewhat suspect and unconvincing. But, be that as it may, Dr Panda's failure to integrate science and yoga

does not in any way detract from his otherwise highly creditable achievement. For before any proper and veritable synthesis can be made, it becomes essential that the authentic findings of empirical science and those of the yogic investigation be brought together in close proximity and studied with perspicacious discrimination. The erudite author of *Mind and Supermind* has done this with great expertise. After all, there need not be any essential contradiction between the results arrived at by science and those obtained by spirituality in their respective fields—if only one knows how to read and interpret them in a judicious manner. For, the Reality is one and unique everywhere and there must be systems of correspondence expressive of a common Truth underlying all the domains of manifestation.

The integration of science and spirituality is certainly called for. But the task of achieving this synthesis is a tricky one involving some apparently insuperable difficulties. But these difficulties can be successfully surmounted and the possibility of co-operation between science and spirituality in the pursuit after truth need not remain any longer a fond wish or pious hope. We shall come to this point once again at the end of our review. For the moment let us make some observations on a few issues discussed by the author in his book.

I. '*The Serpent Power' or Kundalini Yoga*: Dr Panda has devoted a very interesting and instructive chapter to the study of the Tāntric Yoga, otherwise known as the Kuṇḍālini Yoga. This chapter contains many pieces of precious information much of which is unknown to the general run of readers. Only a specialist in the study of Tāntric literature may hope to be familiar with these tenets and practices.

Incidentally, the learned author has elaborately discussed the symbology of the various *cakras* or centres in the subtle body and raised the moot question whether the distinguishing features of these *cakras*, as mentioned in the Tāntric texts, correspond to anything real or are simply elaborate symbols devised by imaginative minds. The book under review displays many multicoloured plates indicating visually these characteristic features which besides vary widely with the *cakras*. Each *cakra* is different as regards '(1) the number of petals, (2) the colour of petals, (3) the letters on the petals, (4) the colour of the pericarp, (5) the *yantra* or geometrical diagram inside the *cakra*, (6) the *bīja* (seed) *mantra*, (7) the animal symbol, (8) the divine symbol (a god and a goddess).' (pp. 224-25)

After an exhaustive discussion Dr Panda offers his conclusion in these words: 'In the opinion of this author, the symbols used for the *cakras* are not real, although the *cakras* themselves are subtle realities. . . . It may be more scientific to consider the symbols of the *cakras* as aids to psychological visualization and means for deep concentration, preparatory to transcendental meditation.' (pp. 242, 261)

The explanation, in our view, cannot be so simple as that. Even the

bijamantras or root sounds—*laṁ, vaṁ, raṁ, yaṁ, haṁ*, and *oṁ*—are not just meaningless phonemes: they possess deep significances. The symbology of the *cakras* and the meanings of the *bijamantras* have been profoundly treated in Alain Daniélou's *Hindu Polytheism* and in Pratyagatmananda's six-volume *Japasūtram*. A consultation of these two treatises would have immensely enriched Dr Panda's discussion of the 'Serpent Power'. (It may be of interest to point out in this connection that Swami Pratyagatmananda Saraswati, formerly known as Prof. Pramatha Nath Mukhopadhyaya, was a close associate of Sir John Woodroffe alias Arthus Avalon in the writing of the celebrated books on the Tantras.)

Dr Panda has devoted quite a few pages of his book to the *sādhana* procedure for the arousal of the Kuṇḍālini power. As is well known, in the traditional Tāntric yogic practice the *cakras* or the centres are opened and the Kuṇḍālini awakened through a specialized systematic process. The awakened 'Serpent Power' then rises upward starting from the lowest centre *Mūlādhāra*, passes through a few other centres, and finally reaches the *Sahasrāra* or the thousand-petalled lotus at the summit of the subtle body. Dr Panda has delineated the entire process in a masterly fashion. But we may be allowed to mention in this connection that in the Integral Yoga of Transformation, as propounded by Sri Aurobindo, another method is used. Kuṇḍālini need not be awakened through any willed systematic procedure nor need the Centres open invariably from down upward. The Kuṇḍālini may be awakened spontaneously through the opening and aspiration of the *sādhaka*'s consciousness. At other times, the awakening may come as a result of the descending pressure of the Higher Yoga-Śakti and the different Centres may open starting from up downward. For we should not forget that the Divine Force as Yoga-Śakti is not solely coiled up, involved, and asleep below but is at the same time awake, scient and potent above. It is there above our head waiting for manifestation and to this Force the aspirant in the Integral Yoga has to open himself.

The author of *Mind and Supermind* has referred to the experiences of the Kashmiri Pandit Gopi Krishna. We quote below, of course in part and in a mutilated form because of lack of space, an experience of the opening of the Centres from above downward, characteristic of the Integral Yoga of Sri Aurobindo:

> The Power that from her being's summit reigned,
> The Presence chambered in lotus secrecy,
> Came down and held the centre in her brow
> Where the mind's Lord in his control-room sites;
> There throned on concentration's native seat
> He opens that third mysterious eye in man,
> The Unseen's eye that looks at the unseen

* * *

It stirred in the lotus of her throat of song,
And in her speech throbbed the immortal Word

* * *

It glided into the lotus of her heart
And woke in it the Force that alters Fate.
It poured into a navel's lotus depth,
And made desire a pure celestial flame,
Broke into the cave where coiled World-energy sleeps
And smote the thousand-hooded Serpent Force
That blazing towered and clasped the World-Self above,
Joined Matter's dumbness to the Spirit hush
And filled earth's acts with the Spirit's silent power.

(Sri Aurobindo, *Savitri*, centenary edition, p. 665)

II. *Knowledge of Brahman:* Dr Panda has devoted some pages to the discussion of the problem of the cognizability of Brahman. He has remarked in that connection that although '*Brahman* cannot be known through our five organs of perception' (p. 29), '*Brahman* can be cognized through our mind.' (ibid.) The statement is rather puzzling because it apparently goes counter to what the sage Vaśiṣṭha in his *Yoga-Vaśiṣṭha*, and Vidyaraṇya Muni, the author of the Vedāntic treatise *Pancadaśī*, in his well-known book *Jīvanmukti-Viveka* have both prescribed as *manonāśa* or *manolaya* ('the annulment of mind') as the prerequisite to the realization of the ultimate Reality. We know of the famous spiritual saying: 'Mind is the greatest slayer; slay the slayer.'

Mind, purified and made silent, can reflect luminously great constructions of Truth, but it can never move in the domain where Truth is authentic, direct, sovereign and native. In fact, as the Upaniṣad says, a veil is constituted by the mind itself which hides the face of the supra-mental Truth. This veil may be altogether opaque, or smoky-luminous, or even golden depending on the level of the spiritual upliftment of the mind. But it remains a coverture all the same.

It is because of mind's intrinsic inability to possess the Infinite that, instead of being satisfied with the 'luminous shadow', golden lid, *hiraṇmayapātra*, if one would seek to realize the utter Real, one has perforce to get rid of mind altogether and enter into the absolute mindless *suṣupti*. It is for this reason that so many seekers of the past have recommended *manonāśa*, 'the cancellation of the mind', as the *via royal* to the supreme spiritual experience.

Thus we find Sri Ramakrishna declaring: 'The Knowledge of Brahman cannot be attained except through the annulment of Mind. A Guru told his disciple, "Give me your mind and I shall give you knowledge."' The Rājarṣi Janaka of old declared: 'Now I have awakened and discovered

the thief that is Mind; I must kill it, must scorch it to death. For Mind is the root of this world of Ignorance.'

According to Vaśiṣṭha Muni, a great good comes out of the destruction of Mind, *manonāśo mahodayaḥ*, and the Mind of the knower of the Truth verily gets annulled, *jñānino nāśamabhyeti*. The *Yoga-Śikhopaniṣad* too declares that mindlessness is the supreme status, *na manaḥ kevalaḥ paraḥ*.

Thus, almost on universal testimony, the ideal before the seeker after the Truth is to get to the state of mindlessness, *amanastā*, where the mind loses all its faculties, *yadā na manute manaḥ* and becomes non-mind so to say, *unmanībhūyat*.

Thus, if a *sādhaka* seeks to have an integrally full waking realization, not being satisfied with the realization in the 'seedless trance' state, he cannot hope to have it through the instrumentality of mind. But if mind fails, is there anything else to save the situation? Yes, there is; for mind is not the last possible rung of consciousness. We have to ascend beyond the highest heights of mind proper into the supra-mental Gnosis. But this is not the place to discuss that point.

III. *Immediate Experience*: One of the bones of contention between science and spirituality is the possibility or otherwise of the direct immediate experience on the part of a subject *vis-à-vis* an object of knowledge. The entire validity of an authentic spiritual realization depends upon *pratyakṣānubhūti* or direct experience. But science hotly contests this idea. Thus, Max Planck, the father-figure of modern Quantum Mechanics, asserts: 'This world cannot be disclosed by mere meditation and introspection; . . . the direct knowledge of the world claimed by the mystic. . . has no place in a scientific discussion.' Dr Panda himself has quoted a smilar view expressed by S. Katz in his book *Mysticism and Philosophy*: 'Thus Katz writes:

> There are no pure (that is, unmediated) experiences. Neither mystical experiences nor more ordinary forms of experience give any indication or any grounds for believing that they are unmediated. That is to say, all experience is processed through, organized by, and makes it available to us in extremely complex epistemological ways. The notion of unmediated experience seems, if not contradictory, at best empty.
>
> (*Mind and Supermind*, pp. 28–29)

Dr Panda has not pursued the topic very far. His discussion of this point leaves much to be desired. He could have pointed out that all our knowledge-process is made up of a fourfold order of knowledge: (1) a completely *separative* knowledge which relies on a machinery of *indirect* contact: a separative knowledge by acquisition; (2) a knowledge by separative *direct* contact; (3) a knowledge by *intimate direct* contact; and (4) a knowledge by *identity*.

The first one is the method of science while spirituality founds itself

on the fourth method. True and effective knowledge can come only through this process of identity. But we have no scope to elaborate the points further here.

IV. *Supernormal Phenomena and Psychic Powers*: Dr Panda has devoted a full chapter, the chapter 6, to the study and critical appraisal of the supernormal phenomena. He has mentioned in this connection the eight major *siddhis* or psychic powers and the twenty-six other minor *siddhis* claimed to be acquired by yogic practice. He has discussed in full the nature of these Tāntric *siddhis*, also the nature of the Rājayogic *vibhūtis* accruing from the successful practice of the Patañjal Yoga. The author has rightly pointed out that 'Really, there is nothing like a miracle; nothing is supernatural; every fact is natural and scientific.' (p. 293)

But in order to find a validity for these yogic *siddhis* Dr Panda has relied on the findings of parapsychological researches. He has alluded to many of the hypotheses advanced by contemporary western thinkers to account for these so-called 'supernatural' phenomena. But none of these hypotheses count for much and will not bear credibility before the skeptics. The author could have easily placed his explanation on a more assured and theoretically sound foundation if only he would have included in his discussion what Sri Aurobindo has to say on pages 538–39 and 1038–43 of his *magnum opus The Life Divine* on the subject of the inevitable emergence of new powers accompanying the development of consciousness brought about by the practice of *sādhanā*.

For consciousness being by its very nature *cit-śakti* or consciousness-force, new powers of consciousness are bound to be a very natural and inevitable consequence of an evolution of consciousness-force beyond mind to a superior cognitive and dynamic principle. There is nothing supernatural or miraculous in such an evolution of innate and latent but as yet unevolved powers of consciousness 'except in so far as it would be a supernature or superior nature to ours just as human nature is a supernature or superior nature to that of animal or plant or material objects.' (Sri Aurobindo)

Also, it is mostly the physical world-forces of which we have some knowledge at present, but it is an indubitable fact of yogic knowledge that we live constantly in the midst of a whirl of unseen mind-forces and life-forces of which we know nothing, we are not even aware of their existence. If a *sādhaka* can consciously develop his subliminal inner consciousness, he can open his awareness to all this unseen movement and action and dynamically act upon them. For, as Sri Aurobindo has so aptly remarked, occultism rightly understood 'means the use of the higher powers of our nature, soul, mind, life-force and the faculties of the subtle physical consciousness to bring about results on their own or on the material plane by some pressure of their own secret law and its potentialities, for manifestation and result in human or earthly mind and life and body or in objects and events in the world of matter.' (Sri Aurobindo, *The Supramental Manifestation and Other Writings*, p. 31)

Here at this point we feel like making a remark. Dr Panda seems to be rather shy of Sri Aurobindo. Otherwise how is one to account for the fact that he has not even for once mentioned Sri Aurobindo by name or given even a single extract from Sri Aurobindo's voluminous writings on human psychology, although the author has given in his 2-volume treatise *Mind and Supermind* almost one thousand excerpts from the wiritings of more than seven hundred writers? This has not harmed Sri Aurobindo in any way but, definitely, it has detracted from the value of the book under review. To compose a sumptuous work on the theme of mind and supermind and yet to leave completely out of account Sri Aurobindo's writings on the same theme is as if one wanted to stage the play *Hamlet* without assigning any role to the Prince of Denmark. We venture to add that a proper incorporation of Sri Aurobindo's thoughts and insights would have elevated the level of and imparted a profundity to the discussion of the following topics and subjects which Dr Panda has so laboriously treated in his book: (i) *Karmavāda*, (ii) rebirth, (iii) mind-body relationship, (iv) consciousness-matter interaction, (v) fate and free will and grace, (vi) the problem of personal identity, (vii) possibilities and limitations of mind, (viii) the nature of consciousness, etc.

We are constrained to make another point of criticism. Why has the author chosen to include 'Supermind' in the title of his book? It would have been better if he would have selected the term 'Cosmic Mind' instead. For the title *Mind and Supermind* in shining bold letters cannot but be confusing to anyone having even a nodding acquaintance with the writings of Sri Aurobindo. Be it noted that it is Sri Aurobindo who coined the word 'supermind' for the first time, and that too as far back as in the first decade of this century, to designate the Truth-Consciousness of Sachchidananda and he continued to employ this term consistently in this specific sense till 1950, the year he left his body. Even after that, hundreds of books have been written containing the word 'supermind' and having this technical sense attached to it. Now, so late in the day, to appropriate the term 'supermind' and to make it convey another sense different from what Sri Aurobindo and Aurobindonian writers mean by it will create confusion all around.

The confusion becomes still more puzzling when we come across, in Dr Panda's book, two different statements which on the face of it seem to contradict each other. Thus, on the back flap of the book we read: 'The "supermind" is *Brahman*. . .', while on p. 512 Dr Panda writes, 'it may be noted here that the concept "Supermind" does not refer to *Brahman*.' Let it rest at that. We need not add anything more.

The book under review is admirably comprehensive both in its content and in the way it has treated the subjects. But, as the title happens to be 'Mind' we would have liked to see two more chapters

included, one on the different levels of the mind consciousness and the other on the consciousness research conducted by the contemporary transpersonal psychologists.

For we should not ignore the fact that mind as mind does not signify a simple and unique entity. Under the generic designation of mind, exhibiting the same fundamental characteristic, there may be grouped many different and distinct ranges of mind. These ranges may be attained through a progressive development of consciousness. And, what is still more important to note, this development may occur along four distinct lines of exploration. Thus, apart from the subconscient studied by the so-called depth psychologists of the present day, we possess in the total constitution of our psychological being an intraconscient field, a circumconscient region and, of course, a superconscient domain. These last three fields of experience can be successfully reached and explored through the respective psycho-spiritual processes of deepening, widening and heightening of the consciousness. The deepening or inwardization of consciousness leads through the inner subliminal mind to the discovery of the inmost soul of our being. The widening of the consciousness makes us capable of *a direct communication* with the universal forces, movements and objects of the cosmos, *a direct feeling and opening* to them, *a direct action* on them and even an enlargement beyond the limits of the personal mind so that we feel ourselves more and more a universal being no longer limited by the existing walls of separation of our too narrow mental, vital and physical existence. This widening of consciousness can extend itself to a complete entry into the consciousness of cosmic Mind and unity with the universal Life.

The third movement, the heightening or the upward ascent of consciousness allows the seeker to pass through the spiritual mind planes. Thus the first ascent out of our normal mentality is into Higher Mind of automatic and spontaneous knowledge, where knowledge assumes the nature of truth-thought. Its most characteristic movement is a mass ideation, a system of totality of truth-seeing in a single view. Beyond this Higher Mind of truth-thought lies a mind which can be called the Illumined Mind of truth-sight. The characteristic power of this Illumined Mind is not thought but vision. Next in the order of ascension is the Intuitive Mind whose characteristic power is an intimate and exact truth-perception which is much more than conception and sight. Beyond the plane of this Intuitive Mind is a superconscient cosmic Mind which is a principle of global knowledge.

The upward journey of mind does not end even there. The Overmind, represents the line that parts and joins the lower and the upper hemispheres of our existence. The seeker can cross even this borderline and enter into the plenary realization of Sachchidananda on the

plane of gnostic Supermind. It goes without saying that this Supermind is not the same as what Dr Panda calls Supermind nor is it synonymous with what Barbara B. Brown has termed Supermind in her recently published book *Supermind: The Ultimate Energy*. As a matter of fact, Panda's Supermind is what we have called Cosmic Mind above and Barbara's Supermind is the inner Subliminal Mind in the topography of the mind that we have described in the preceding paragraphs.

It is because of the complexity of the whole affair that we would have welcomed the inclusion of a separate chapter in Panda's book, discussing all the possibilities that open up before the mind consciousness in its progressive ascension and inwardization.

Another lacuna in the book *Mind and Supermind* is that the author has completely overlooked the contributions of the transpersonal psychologists. Consciousness research and the systematic study of the full spectrum of psychic, mental and mystical phenomena, which is under way around the world in contemporary times finds absolutely no mention in the book. The author has devoted a full chapter to the elaboration of the concept of mind in psychology. In another sufficiently long chapter of his book the author has given an exhaustive treatment to parapsychological findings. We would request him to include in future editions of his scholarly work *Mind and Supermind* a full chapter detailing and discussing the researches of Roberto Assagioli, Michael Washburn, Ken Wilber, Alan W. Watts, Roger N. Walsh and other transpersonal psychologists in the fields of consciousness, mind and beyond mind.

The review article has extended itself to an inordinate length; it is time to cry a halt. A few words on why it becomes so difficult to bring about an effective synthesis of science and yogic wisdom, will conclude the essay.

One of the avowed objectives of Dr Panda in writing his book *Mind and Supermind* has been, as we have noted before, to synthesize the ancient and modern wisdoms (p. xii). And I have ventured the opinion that the attempt at this synthesis and integration has not been very successful. The fault for that does not lie with any lack of competence on the part of the learned author, for his knowledge is undoubtedly wide and deep and authentic. The difficulty of synthesis is inbuilt in the self-imposed restrictions science has imposed upon itself. In many places of his book Dr Panda has expressed the hope that with further development of sophisticated technology, physical science will be able to validate the findings of yogic knowledge. This hope is, we fear, ill-founded. For the basic assumptions and approaches of these two distinct fields of human activity are different, almost antithetical.

Thus science, as it is commonly understood, may be defined as a nomothetico-experimental procedure that studies the regularities

observed in *normal human sense-perceptions*, thereby excluding the abnormal and supranormal experiences as well as judgements of value that imply non-sensual premises (J.G. Bennette).

To exclude the abnormal or subnormal experiences may be permissible but science wants to exclude from the purview of its investigation all supra-normal experiences of man and therein lies the rub.

Science, or rather the scientists, have to recognise that the physical world and its laws represent only one of an indeterminable number of possible realities whose qualities can be apprehended only through the evolution of consciousness. There are different orders of reality; the objective and physical is only one order. Our subjective inner experiences are a domain of happenings as real and verifiable as any outward physical happenings. Even in the range of the objective itself the supraphysical object of consciousness has as much right to acceptance as the physical objectivity. To everything knowable in the universe —universe inner as well as outer—there are corresponding faculties of knowledge and all these faculties are latent in man. The means of knowledge need not and should not be limited to the normal sense-perceptions of man and the exercise of his normal faculty of reason. The now-unexplored latent faculties of knowledge can be brought into play through the practice of spiritual discipline. That mind is now dependent on the action of the brain is only a provisional arrangement; through the proper yogic practice mind can be liberated from the shackles of the physical body and made to function independently. For true consciousness is the primary reality and the brain activity is its vehicle of manifestation on the physical plane.

These are some of the propositions science has to accept before it can be integrated with spiritual knowledge. But for that the working scientists have to develop their consciousness and acquire access to the inner and higher domains of realities. Otherwise science will always try to see everything through its 'eye of flesh' ignoring the other two eyes, the 'eye of mind' and the 'eye of contemplation', and will seek to explain away all supernormal phenomena of consciousness in terms of the electro-chemical activity of the brain. A synthesis of this type of materialistic science and yogic spirituality will always remain a pipe-dream.

But a New Science is sure to rise in time today or tomorrow for as the very soul of science is the search for knowledge, knowledge more and still more, it will be unable to cry a halt. And, as Sri Aurobindo has justly pointed out, as Science 'reaches the barriers of sense-knowledge and of the reasoning from sense-knowledge, its very rush will carry it beyond and the rapidity and sureness with which it has embraced the visible universe is only an earnest of the energy and success which we may

hope to see repeated in the conquest of what lies beyond, once the stride is taken that crosses the barrier'. (*The Life Divine*, p. 13)

In the meantime let spiritual knowledge and scientific knowledge prosper in their respective fields and let not science in its misplaced haughtiness sit in judgement over the validity or otherwise of spiritual experiences. For, to quote the significant words of Huston Smith, 'in envisioning the way things are, there is no better place to begin than with modern science; equally, there is no worse place to end'. (*Forgotten Truth*, p. 1) And can we forget in this connection the memorable words of Fritjof Capra, the celebrated author of the *Tao of Physics*?:

> To paraphrase an old Chinese saying, mystics understand the roots of the Tao but not its branches; scientists understand its branches but not its roots. Science does not need mysticism and mysticism does not need science; but humans need both. Mystical experience is necessary to understand the deepest nature of things, and science is essential for modern life. What we need, therefore, is not a synthesis but a dynamic interplay between mystical intuition and scientific analysis.
>
> (*Paths beyond Ego*, edited by Roger Walsh and Frances Vaughan, p. 190)

And at the present moment when consciousness researches and transpersonal psychologies are being pursued with vigour by many a thinker, when East is meeting West in transcendental fashion, a powerful fermentation and enrichment is taking place before our eyes. And as an inevitable result 'the western emphasis on physical science, objectivity and outer space is blending with the eastern emphasis on spiritual science, subjectivity and inner space; the result is a proliferation of increasingly useful statements about the relationship between cosmos and consciousness'. (*What is Enlightenment?*, edited by John White, p. 201) .

And we have no hesitation in saying that Dr. Panda through his *Mind and Supermind* has made a rich contribution to the world-wide attempt at the elucidation of the problem. His book is a mine of very useful information amassed with meticulous care and arranged with laudable systematisation. The author says in his Prologue, 'It is hoped the book contains truth which is also beneficial.' (p. xv) The reviewer entirely concurs with his hope and recommends the reading of *Mind and Supermind* to all book-lovers who are interested in the wisdoms both of the West as well as of the East.

What adds to the value of the book is its simply excellent printing, paper, design and get-up.

A History of Indian Buddhism*

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The book is the first of a two-volume *History of Buddhism in India* covering the period from Śākyamuni Buddha to early Mahāyāna (just before Nāgārjuna). The book, originally written in Japanese, is translated into English by Paul Groner.

The book represents a most valuable phase of the ongoing process of writing the history of Indian Buddhism, that needs to be continuously reassessed and revised, as we gather more and more material on the subject. A person genuinely interested in the history of Indian Buddhism must not ignore this book. The book's treatment of the history is a marked improvement upon that of most histories written in English because of four principal reasons: (i) The book uses some unique primary source-materials; (ii) it consults some unique secondary research materials (which were not used before); (iii) it covers the history in a more comprehensive way, compared to previous coverages; (iv) it offers a new theory of the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Firstly, instead of relying solely on Sanskrit and Pāli primary source materials, Hirakawa Akira has used Chinese and Tibetan translations of Mahāyāna texts, as well as inscriptions discovered by archaeologists, to present a much fuller description of the origin, development and social setting of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Akira places his emphasis on Chinese translations of *Sarvāstivāda* material (rather than relying on only Pāli *Theravāda* material), and on scant source material of the *Mahāsaṅghika* school, in order to elucidate the role that these traditions played in the evolution of Indian Buddhism.

Secondly, Akira has made an extensive use of Japanese secondary scholarship on certain specific topics such as *Tathāgatagarbha* and Pure Land Buddhism. These topics have, possibly, played a more significant role in the development of Early Mahāyāna Buddhism than scholars writing in English have ever thought. With the help of the secondary scholarship Akira has traced these themes back to early sources, demonstrating the gradual evolution of many Mahāyāna doctrines.

Thirdly, Akira's history is more comprehensive compared to other English language histories. Instead of emphasizing on a limited number of topics such as Buddhist philosophy, or particular schools like *Theravāda* and *Yogācāra*, his history includes detailed studies of the following:

*Hirakawa Akira, *A Critical Notice: A History of Indian Buddhism, From Śākyamuni to Early Mahāyāna*, translated and edited by Paul Groner, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1992, pp. xix + 385, Rs 250.00.

(i) Historical development of different schools;
(ii) Bibliographical literature of different Buddhist traditions; [The bibliographical literature bears the characteristics of an encyclopaedic work. It will be most helpful for researchers.]
(iii) Analysis of the doctrines of both well-known and little-known traditions [for example, traditions such as the *Dharmaguptaka, Sammitīya, Pudgalavādins, Mahiśāsaka* and *Kāśyapīya* schools];
(iv) Religious practices and precepts;
(v) Organization of monastic orders;
(vi) Buddhist missionary activities.

Fourthly, one of the most important contributions of the present history lies in its suggestion that the cult of *stūpa* worship played an important role in the origin and development of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

The comparatively weaker part of this otherwise superbly conducted historical survey is its explication of the religio-philosophical doctrines of early Buddhism, *Nikāya* Buddhism (especially the doctrines of abhidharma literature) and early Mahāyāna Buddhism. The presentation of these doctrines suffers from a lack of precision, clarity and philosophical insight. I shall try to make my point clear when the occasion arises later, in the course of presenting a brief account of the contents of the book.

Indian Buddhism has been divided in this book into three periods: (i) early Buddhism, (ii) *Nikāya* or sectarian Buddhism and (iii) early Mahāyāna Buddhism.

I

The discussion of the first period is focused around (i) the Buddha's biography, (ii) early Buddhist doctrines, (iii) establishment and development of the early Buddhist order and (iv) the Buddhism propagated by Aśoka.

In elucidating the early Buddhist doctrines the author introduces the concepts of (i) the four noble truths, (ii) the middle path and unanswered questions and (iv) the '*dharma*', and the theory of dependent origination.

The discussion of the four noble truths is quite sketchy. For example, the author speaks of 'right actions', 'right effort' and 'right memory' (p. 41) without trying to spell out the reasons why they are considered 'right'. In the discussion of the second truth, the author speaks of desire and comments: 'It is sometimes identified with ignorance' (p. 40). Without further elaboration such a comment is not intelligible. (Ignorance is usually represented as the cause of the cause of desire.)

Akira discusses (in Chapter 3) the questions that the Buddha refrained from answering, such as: 'Does the *Tathāgata* exist after death?' He says that the Buddha 'did not answer questions concerning metaphysical

subjects about which a man could not have knowledge.' (p. 43) Such an agnostic interpretation of the Buddha's standpoint is quite off the mark. Almost all scholars are of the opinion that such questions are unanswerable because they themselves are defective. As the constituents of the individuality of the *Tathāgata*, namely, the *pañca-skandhas*, do not exist after his *parinirvāṇa*, the question, 'whether he survives?' is thus defective like the question, 'whether the present king of France is bald?' (as there is no individual corresponding to 'the present king of France').

Akira makes a brief survey of the cardinal Buddhist concept of *pratītya-samutpāda* (dependent origination) giving special emphasis on the concept of the *dvādaśāṅga-pratītya-samutpāda* (twelve-membered dependent origination). But the presentation suffers from certain shortcomings. Firstly, he wrongly interprets *pratītya-samutpāda* as standing for the relation of mutually dependent conditions (p. 48).

Secondly, Akira's presentation of *dvādaśāṅga-pratītya-samutpāda* lacks clarity on a number of occasions. He fails to elucidate how certain links in the chain of causation acts as the cause of the subsequent ones. For example, in elucidating the causal connection between the fourth link, 'mind and body' (*nāma-rūpa*) and the third link, 'consciousness' (*vijñāna*), he observes: 'The basis of a person's mind and body is said to be his consciousness. . . . If consciousness completely stops, the mind and body will soon cease to exist, because mind and body are dependent on consciousness for their coordination and unity' (p. 52). Now, inasmuch as 'mind' in Buddhist philosophy stands for consciousness in general, it is far from clear how consciousness (really mind) can be the cause of the coordination of mind and body.

In the context of the relationship between the sixth and the seventh links of the chain of causation it is remarked, 'When sensations are experienced, desires arise'. (p. 52) The remark would remain unclear unless it is specified that pleasant sensations give rise to desire and unpleasant ones to hatred.

The second link of the chain of causation, '*saṃskāra*' has been translated mostly as 'mental formation'. (pp. 51–54) This translation fails to explain why '*saṃskāra*' is the cause of *vijñāna* (the beginning of the rudimentary form of next life), unless it is specified that '*saṃskāra*' stands for volition or voluntary action (of the previous life).

In the context of discussing religious practices in the third chapter, the author quotes 'a list of thirty-seven practices that lead to enlightenment (*bodhi-pakṣa*)'. The author just mechanically mentions these practices like the four *smṛty-upasthānāni*, the four *samyak-prahāna*, the four *ṛddhipāda*, etc. (p. 57), without making the slightest effort to explain the contents of the list. This is rather disappointing.

In the fourth chapter of the book, a detailed account of the rules (*pārājika* and *saṅghaniddeśa*) guiding the monastic life, the different

types of monastic orders organised for different purposes, diverse monastic assemblies (for example, *uposatha*) and ceremonies are given.

The fifth chapter focuses on a very short description of the First Buddhist Council and the organisation of the extant Buddhist canon. The description includes the classification and compilation of the *Sūtra Piṭaka* and the *Vinaya Piṭaka* in Pāli, Sanskrit and Chinese.

The sixth chapter begins with a very informative account of the Second Buddhist Council and the first schism in the order which would lead later to diverse early Buddhist and Mahāyāna Buddhist sectarian divisions. The chapter also contains a discussion of the early Buddhist missionary activities initiated by famous Buddhist monks like *Madhyāntika* and *Dhammarakkhita*. This is followed by a discussion of the third Buddhist Council and disputes concerning the date of the Buddha.

The first part of the book ends with a brief survey of the propagation and preaching of the Dharma, and the support extended to the Buddhist order, by Emperor Aśoka.

II

The second part of the book (chapters 8–13) concentrates on '*Nikāya* Buddhism', that is, monastic Buddhism that developed after the initial schism into *Mahāsaṅghika* and *Sthaviravāda* schools. It contains a very helpful study of the chronological development of the different schools of *Sthaviravāda* and *Mahāsaṅghika* lineages as recorded in the Tibetan translation of Vasumitra's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* and in some *Theravāda* texts. It is interesting to note that the lists of the schools mentioned in the Tibetan and *Theravāda* traditions diverge a lot (pp. 112–13, 116). For example, the name of *Kaukuṭika* school which figures in the Tibetan list of *Mahāsaṅghika* lineage does not figure in the corresponding *Theravāda* list. Similarly, the names of *Gokulika, Rājagiriya* schools that figure in the *Theravāda* sources are not mentioned in the Tibetan sources.

Chapter 9 presents an excellent introduction to the *Abhidharma* literature of *Nikāya* Buddhism. After showing how the *Abhidharma Piṭaka* shaped out of the *abhidharma* (analysis of dharma) investigations (that developed after the compilation of the *Sūtra Piṭaka*), the materials of which were formerly placed in a 'mixed basket' called the *Kṣudraka Piṭaka*, the author goes on to give an account of the divisions of the *Abhidharma Piṭaka* of the *Theravādins* and the *Sarvāstivādins*. In the context of analysing the commentarial literature of the *Abhidharma Piṭaka*, the author goes on to show how the *Vaibhāṣika* school arose as commentators of a section (called *Jñāna-prasthāna*) of the *Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Piṭaka* (The commentary is popularly known as *Mahāvibhāsā Śāstra*).

A detailed classificatory analysis of different kinds of *saṃskṛta* (conditioned) and *asaṃskṛta* (unconditioned) dharmas enriches the

content of the tenth chapter. The *saṃskṛta* dharmas are meticulously analysed into: impure (*sāsrava*) and pure (*anāsrava*) *dharmas*; material (*rūpa*) and mental (*citta-samprayuktaka*) and neither mental nor non-mental (*cittaviprayuktaka saṃskāras*). The analysis of the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) *dharmas* and the impure (*sāsrava*) *dharmas* and the mental (*citta*) *dharmas* and concomitant mental faculties (*citta-samprayuktaka saṃskāras* is rather disappointing.

(a) In the *Sarvāstivāda* system Nirvāṇa is called *pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* (cessation of concomitant mental faculties). The difference between this *nirodha* and *apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* which is described as 'cessation that occurs because the necessary conditions for the production (of defilements and so forth) are not present and will not be present in the future' (p. 145) is not made clear enough. (b) The author mentions that in the *Sarvāstivāda abhidharma* literature impure dharmas are referred as both defilements (*kleśas*) and proclivities (*anuśayas*). Identical items like lust, hatred, delusion, wrong views and doubts figure as both defilements and proclivities (pp. 153–56). The difference between the two concepts is thus not clearly spelt out. (c) The mind, as the author observes, has been called in the *Sarvāstivāda abhidharma* as '*bhūmi*'—suggesting that 'the mind is viewed as the base upon which the mental faculties are manifested' (p. 157). Consequently, 'a ground or base where they' (defilements such as lust and anger) 'exist in a latent form, is thought to be present' (Ibid.). It is not clear from the above discussion whether the mind is treated here (in violation of the standard Buddhist theory of the non-substantiality of mind) as a mental substance which acts as an underlying substrate amidst changing mental faculties. (d) As for the *citta-viprayuktaka saṃskāras*, it is not clear why they are treated as 'neither mental nor material' (p. 166). At least some of the items listed therein as *asaṃjñi-samāpatti* (absorption without perception) and *nirodha-samāpatti* (absorption of cessation) (see p. 166), seem to bear the characteristics of being mental inasmuch as they refer to meditative stages. Curiously enough, the author remarks, that *citta viprayuktaka-saṃskāras* are 'nevertheless classified as part of the aggregate of mental formations'. (p. 165) Without further clarification the remark, in itself, remains unintelligible.

Besides discussing Buddhist cosmology (the *kāma, rūpa* and *ārūpya* realms and different heavens and hells), chapter 11 also gives an account of the relation of rebirth to *karma* through the principle of the *dvādaśaṅga-pratītya-samutpāda*. The Buddhist cosmology is not complete without a discussion of the different types of causes and effects. Certain incongruities, however, crop up in the account, given by the author, of the different types of causes, conditions and effects. On p. 181 it is remarked: 'since *pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* is an unconditioned dharma, it cannot be produced by conditioned dharmas. Yet, because Nirvāṇa is realised through practice, *pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* is categorised as an effect (without cause)'. The remark does not solve the puzzle as to how an unconditioned dharma can yet be an effect ('without cause').

The doctrine of *karma* plays a most significant role in early Buddhism and the *Nikāya* schools of Buddhism. In contrast to the teachings of many non-Buddhist religious groups that man's destiny is determined by the gods or fate, 'Buddhists, by interpreting *karma* through the teaching of Dependent Origination, affirmed free-will and the value of religious practice'. (p. 188) In the context of explaining two types of *karma*, namely, *vijñapti-karma* (manifested activity) and *avijñapti-karma* (unmanifested activity), the author makes it clear that by the term *avijñapti-karma, sarvāstivadins* mean both a potency of manifest actions to produce *karmic* effects, and a force created in a monk as a result of his being ordained with precepts (which helps him refrain from wrong doing).

Chapter 13, as the author points out, discusses the different ways suggested by the *Sarvāstivādins*, of eliminating the defilements and eventually attaining enlightenment through religious practices, including meditation. The chapter also gives a classification of different types of *kleśas* in accordance with the different ways of knowledge and meditation by which they can be eliminated (*darśana-heya* and *bhāvanā-heya kleśas*), and also in accordance with the different realms in which the *kleśas* dominate. The chapter also discusses the advanced stages of religious practice according to the *Sarvāstivāda* texts and compares it with the religious practices undertaken by the sages and the less spiritually advanced people as recorded in the *Theravāda* texts. The chapter ends with the account of the different levels of meditational practices adopted by the *sādhaka* of the *Sarvāstivāda* tradition.

III

The third part of the book, entitled, 'Early Mahāyāna Buddhism', begins with a historical account of the evolution of the Mahāyāna Buddhist order after Emperor Aśoka. The Mauryan empire rapidly declined after Aśoka and a number of Indian and non-Indian kings and royal dynasties ruled India. Most of these kings and dynasties played a major role in the development of the early Mahāyāna orders. Among Indian ruling dynasties, special mention may be made of the Śuṅga dynasty (who patronised the beautification of Bhārut and Sānchi stūpas), the Kānva dynasty and the Sātavāhana dynasty. Among foreign rulers special mention may be made of the Macedonian kings, the Śaka kings, the Kuṣāṇa dynasty and the Parthian kings. All these royal personages and dynasties are closely connected with the early Mahāyāna Buddhist orders. The Macedonian king Menandros patronised Buddhism to a great extent. His conversation with the Buddhist monk, Nāgasena, is compiled in the *Milindapañho*. This book records Buddhist doctrines in

a transitional period between the *Āgamas* and the development of the *Abhidharma* literature. Inscriptions found in the stūpas built during the rule of the Macedonian kings indicate that many officials in the Greek Court commissioned stūpas in India (p. 238). In addition, Buddhism was stimulated by Greco-Roman cultures to produce new forms of architecture, carving and sculpture known in history as the Gāndhāra art. It is to be noted that only 'with the emergence of Gāndhāra art was the Buddha portrayed in human form'. (p. 272) Referring to the Śaka rulers, the author mentions that one of the Śaka kings, Patika, who patronised Buddhism, 'built stūpas in areas where none had existed and installed the relics of Sākyamuni in them'. (p. 230) Referring to the Parthian kings the author points out they were converted to Buddhism, and that a number of Parthian monks played important roles in carrying Buddhism to China. An-Shih-Kao, the Parthian prince is famous in Buddhist history for translating into Chinese many works from *Āgamas* and *abhidharma* literature during the reign of the Emperor Huan (AD 146–67). (see p. 231)

The Kuṣāṇa dynasty is also famous in Buddhist history for patronising Buddhism. King Kaṇiṣka himself is credited with building the Kaṇiṣka-Vihāra stūpa. Kaṇiṣka is also credited with summoning the fourth Buddhist Council.

Commissioning of the stūpas, according to the author, is supposed to have played a significant role in the emergence of early Mahāyāna. That is the reason why elaborate description of the stūpas are given in the context of the evolution of the early Mahāyāna order, from archaeological findings. Description of the cave temples (of Ajantā, Bhājā, Nasik, Karli and Ellora) built in central-southern India by the Sātavāhana kings also find a place in this context, inasmuch as the caves contained stūpas, which were worshipped by the early Mahāyāna laymen. Information about the stūpas are culled also from travel diaries of Fa-hsien and Hsüan Tsang.

In chapter 15, 'Mahāyāna Texts composed during the Kuṣāṇa Dynasty' is discussed. It is maintained that Mahāyāna texts existed in northern India at the beginning of the Christian era. Attempt is made in this chapter to determine the dates of these texts through their dated Chinese translations.

Among the translators of Buddhist texts special mention is made here of Lou-chia-ch'an or Lokakṣema, a monk who translated, between AD 178–198, works like *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, Bhadrapāla-sūtra, Śuraṅgama-samādhisūtra, Drumakinnararājaparipṛcchā, Akṣobhyatathāgatasyavyūha* and *Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinodana.*

The *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* already assumed its final form by *Lokakṣema's* time. As Lokakṣema's translation of *Śuraṅgama-samādhisūtra* is not extant, its contents can be deduced from Kumārajīva's translation of it. Lokakṣema's translation of it indicates that it existed in the first

century AD. This *sūtra* concerns the power of an intense meditation that forms the basis of a bodhisattva's practices. This meditation helps a practitioner to make substantial progress in his cultivation of the six *pāramitās* or perfections. The concern with this progress suggests this *sūtra's* connection with the *Mahāyāna Daśabhūmikasūtra.* This *sūtra* reveals that the *bodhisattva* viewed his practice as distinct from that of a *Hīnayāna* practitioner (p. 249).

Bhadrapālasūtra concerns meditations leading to visualisation of the Buddha. These meditations were closely related to belief in the Buddha *Amitābha.* The translation of the *sūtra* indicates that beliefs concerning *Amitābha* Buddha were present in India during the rule of the Kuṣāṇa dynasty (p. 250).

The major theme of the *Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinodana* is that 'the basic nature of the mind is originally pure, a teaching that would develop into the *Tathāgatagarbha* doctrine' (p. 251) of Mahāyāna thought.

Chapter 16, 'The Origins of Mahāyāna, presents a well-documented account of the origin of Mahāyāna from three different sources: (i) Nikāya Buddhism, (ii) Buddhist biographical literature and (iii) the cult of *stūpa* worship.

Nikāya Buddhism and Mahāyāna

Vasumitra, the author of *Samayabhedoparacanacakra,* grouped together the doctrines of four schools (the Mahāsaṅghika, Lokottaravādin, Ekavyavahārika and Kaukuṭika) of Mahāsaṅghika lineage and noted that the four taught that, 'the Buddhas, the World-honoured Ones, are all supermundane. All the Tathāgatas are without impure (*sāsrva*) dharmas' (p. 262). The author points out that according to Vasumitra these four schools also uphold the doctrines that (i) 'the Buddha can expound all teachings with a single utterance' and that (ii) 'the *rūpa-kāya* of the Tathāgata is limitless' (p. 262). In the author's opinion these teachings foreshadow some typical Mahāyāna doctrines. Other doctrines maintained by the schools of Mahāsaṅghika lineage which possibly shaped Mahāyāna teachings are: (i) the concept that bodhisattvas can consciously choose where they will be born and (ii) the original nature of the mind is pure.

Biographical Literature

The author points out that the different biographies of the Buddha, such as the *Mahāvastu* (written by Lokottaravādins) and *Lalitavistara* (written by the Sarvāstivādins) contain some references to the spiritual progress through the ten *bhūmis* (stages) which the Buddha made, and a certain prediction (by Dīpaṃkara Buddha) about the success of the Śākyamuni's quest for Buddhahood, which represent rudimentary forms of teachings of later Mahāyāna Buddhism.

The Practice of Stūpa Worship

The author significantly points out that stūpa worship plays an important role in the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The Mahāyāna's unique concern with the Buddha as a saviour can be traced to the cult of worship of stūpas.

The author observes that Mahāyāna Buddhism was originally concerned with laymen. Doctrines relating to the lay bodhisattvas play a prominent part in the old Mahāyāna *sūtras.* Only later did Mahāyāna develop into a religion where monks could assume significant roles. Hence, beliefs in Buddhas Amitābha and Akṣobhya reflected the layman's desire to depend on someone greater than himself. Thus centres independent of monastic control must have existed in the latter phase of Buddhism, where people could practice and develop the teachings conçerning the saving power of the Buddha. Stūpas served as such centres. Music, dance, theatre, architecture and other arts conflicted with monastic standard of life which aimed at transcending worldly diversions. But, the author points out that, such music, architecture, sculpture, etc. did develop around the cult of stūpa veneration and were adopted by latter Mahāyānists and developed by them even further.

In spite of the fact that the chapter on the origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism is a well-documented one, it suffers from lack of clarity at some places. For example, in discussing the Mahāyāna conception of a bodhisattva's special quality of his concern to save others the author remarks: 'The Mahāyāna descriptions of religious practice as the six perfections (*pāramitā*) illustrate how a person could benefit himself only by helping others'. He adds: 'These doctrines reflected a view of the world based on the teachings of Dependent Origination'. (p. 258) However, the author makes no attempt to show how those doctrines reflected the teachings of Dependent Origination.

In the last two chapters (17 and 18) are contained a description of: (i) 'The Contents of Early Mahāyāna Scriptures' and (ii) 'Theory and Practice in Early Mahāyāna'.

The earliest known Mahāyāna works are the *Ṣaṭpāramitā, Bodhisattvapiṭaka* and *Triskandhakadharmaparyāya.* They are cited in some of the first Mahāyāna scriptures translated by Lokakṣema, such as *Kāśayaparivarta,* and by An Hsüan such as *Ugradattaparipṛcchā.* Their dates are guessed from Lokakṣema's translation of *Kāśyapaparivarta* in the first century of the Christian era. Perfection of Wisdom *sūtras* probably appeared after the *Ṣaṭpāramitā* were compiled.

Prajñāpāramitāsūtras

The largest of these texts is the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* translated into Chinese by Hsüan Tsang. The other *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* include the *Śatasāhasrikā* and the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* and the

Vajracchedikā. Among the smaller works are included the *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra.*

Although the author says that the '*prajñā*' specified in '*prajñāpāramitā*' is the 'wisdom of emptiness and non-substantiality', he makes no attempt to explain the significance of emptiness or *śūnyatā* which is the central Mahāyāna concept around which the other important Mahāyāna concepts revolve. In addition, the author mentions, at several places (pp. 250, 283, 285) the very important Mahāyāna concept of '*Upāyakauśalya*', without making any effort to explain it. These lapses on the part of the author makes this section rather weak.

In the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* a list of 108 concentrations is given starting with the *śuraṅgamasamādhi.* The latter *samādhi* which is obtained in the *dharmameghabhūmi,* helps the Mahāyāna practioner to have a vision of the Buddha.

The Avataṃsakasūtra

The full name of the text is *Buddhāvataṃsakamahāvaipulyasūtra.* 'The term '*vaipulya*' is a title given to a *sūtra* said to include profound doctrine'. (p. 279) The title of the *sūtra* indicates that all the virtues that the enlightened Buddha has accumulated are like a garland of flowers that adorns him.

The *Avataṃsakasūtra* was translated into Chinese by *Buddhabhadra* in 421 AD. The *sūtra* is, in the author's opinion, composed of a number of *sūtras* like the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra* and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (translated into Chinese in around AD 297).

The realm of enlightenment described in the *sūtra* is the world of *Vairocana,* the Buddha of Pervasive Light. In the *sūtra* it is remarked that 'The three realms are empty and false. They are simply the products of one mind'. (p. 281) The 'one-mind' mentioned here may be interpreted as the *Tathāgatagarbha,* the innately pure nature of the mind. If the original nature of the mind of even an ordinary person is pure, it follows, the author observes, that every one has the potential to realize Buddhahood. The Mahāyāna concept of potential Buddhahood of every one is linked to the one 'one-mind' concept.

The Saddharmapuṇḍarikasūtra

The '*Saddharma*' or 'true teaching' (of Buddhism) is compared to a white lotus which grows in mud, and yet not defiled. The *sūtra* aims at a syncretism of the different Mahāyāna and Hīnāyāna schools. According to this *sūtra,* although the followers of the three vehicles—*śrāvakayāna, pratyekabuddhayāna* (Hīnayāna) and *Bodhisattvayāna* (Mahāyāna) all perform different practices, they make equal progress on the path to Buddhahood. The author abruptly remarks: 'The appeal of such teachings was based on the popularity of the stūpa worship,' (p. 285), but makes no attempt to clarify his position.

Sukhāvatīvyūha

In the East Asia Pure Land tradition, the author informs us, following the *Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra* is particularly important.

The earliest extant Chinese translation of the 'Larger' *Sukhāvatīvyūha* dates back to sometime between AD 223 and 253.

According to the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* and its kindred literature, salvation is attained by submission to the Amitābha Buddha. 'Amitabha' is also referred to as '*Amitāyu*' (One with Infinite Life).

The last chapter of the book is devoted to discussing the following Mahāyāna doctrines and practices.

(a) The Mahāyāna practitioner's awareness that he is a bodhisattva.

(b) The cultivation of the ten *pāramitā* by the bodhisattva practitioner and the armour of vows to save others. The bodhisattva's taking the vow is compared to a warrior's wearing armour in the battlefield.

(c) Descriptions of the bodhisattva's using *ḍhāraṇi* (spoken formulae) and practising a variety of *samādhi* (concentration). [*Dhāraṇis* are practically useful in memorising teachings and have the power to preserve good and prevent evil.]

(d) Descriptions of the stages of a bodhisattva's progress in his path of spiritual progress. [The sketch of the stages of the bodhisattva's progress is lacking in organization and is unilluminative.] The author mentions that the stages described in terms unique to Mahāyāna are: the arising of the aspiration to attain enlightenment (*bodhicittotpāda*), the stage of non-retrogression (*avaivartika*), acquiescence to the truth that dharmas have no origination (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*), and the assurance of Buddhahood be the next life (*eka-jāti-pratibaddha*).

Although the end notes are not inadequate, they refer mainly to books and articles written in Japanese. As such, they are not of much help to readers who do not know Japanese. The book, however, ends with a very comprehensive secondary bibliographical literature written mainly in English.

Book Reviews

SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA and ASHOK VOHRA (eds.): *The Philosophy of K. Satchidananda Murty*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1995, Rs 350

There are few themes which have not figured within the ambit of K. Satchidananda Murty's philosophical writings. He has written on Indian Indian culture, Hinduism, Advaita Vedānta, peace, education, India's foreign policy, Far-Eastern philosophies, religious ideas, ethics, history, and international understanding. He is one of the highly respected philosophers in India today, and as this festschrift shows 19 scholars (14 Indian and 5 foreign) have contributed to it papers of magnanimous laudation for his observations and insights.

If it is the label—such as 'positivist', 'naturalist', 'analytical', 'phenomenological', 'ontological', that one looks for—for describing his philosophical position, no such label would exactly be fitting. Murty is at one and the same time an Advaitin, a Rāmānujite theist, an existentialist, a Nāgarjunite Buddhist, a transcendentalist and a universalist. But visibly he keeps himself away from epistemology and logic and philosophy of science. This seems to be intentional rather than accidental, because for Murty 'philosophy is the rational, critical and illuminating review of the contents of theology, economics, and political science, and also the right instrument and foundation of all action and duty, which helps one achieve intellectual balance and insight as well as linguistic clarity and behavioural competence *(Anvikṣiki)*'. Murty consistently adheres to this conception of philosophy and all his writings are in tune with this conception.

The view that philosophy need not be wholly preoccupied with problems in logic and epistemology but must embrace an area much larger has guided Murty's choice of topics of his works. This fact is very skilfully and comprehensively shown by the first four authors in the festschrift: R. Balasubramanian, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, J.S.R.L. Narayana Moorty and Stephen H. Phillips. These authors have gone deep into the questions *how* Murty does philosophy, *what* has propelled him to select his subjects, in what way philosophical thinking is for him a synthesizing exercise, in what sense he speaks of the greatness and transcendence of God, and how he reconciles between faith in God and the principle of reason which for him is the chief tool of philosophy.

By characterizing it as the philosophy of inclusiveness, Balasubramanian tries to encompass under it all the works and ideas of Murty. This philosophy, Balasubramanian points out, Murty has imbibed from his study of Advaita. There is no work by Murty, Balasubramanian further

shows, where we do not come across the impact of the Śaṅkara Vedānta, the Advaita transcendentalism. Whether it is *Metaphysics, Man and Freedom* or *The Indian Spirit* or *The Advaitic Notion*, Murty's books reflect his interpretation of Śaṅkara as a theist—even his understanding of history is grounded in his concept of the divine, that is, the divine as Brahman. Balasubramanian perceives Murty as an ardent theist holding that 'history which is temporal is grounded in God', that 'He creates the world and thereby launches history', that 'God is active in history', that there is a plan as well as a purpose in the creation of the universe 'though the entire creation has to be explained as the spontaneous expression of the Lord's timeless sport (*līlā*)'.

Sibajiban Bhattacharyya dwells on Murty's distinction between religion and philosophy, revelation and reason, his idea of freedom, his social–political–educational philosophy, and his doctrine of peace and international understanding. Then, apart from discussing his methodology, Bhattacharyya highlights Murty's references to *puja* (worship), *yajña* (sacrifice), *vrata* (correct performance), *avatāra* (incarnation), and such other ideas which may appear to be a matter for the sociology of religion. Bhattacharyya appears to be hesitant to accept Murty's theory of the world peace—the world peace, for Murty, would not be possible unless its pre-requisite in the form of 'a new level of organization transcending national, racial, religious and cultural boundaries' is achieved. Bhattacharyya remarks that since such a transcendence can never be absolute (because none can really elevate himself above the culture whose offspring he is) it is doubtful whether the world peace Murty writes about could be a reality.

J.S.R.L. Narayana Moorty is interested in surveying the transition that he thinks has taken place in Murty's conception of metaphysics over the years. Narayana Moorty argues that there was a time when metaphysics for Murty was 'interpretation of all that is known, an elucidation of existences as we know. . . .' It was 'concerned with not facts but the illumination of them . . . a discipline which rationally examines or systematizes upon the absolute presuppositions of science and commonsense.' For later Murty, Narayana Moorty remarks, metaphysics became almost 'faith', 'what we would normally understand as a religious interest'. And then there has been a further 'shift' in Murty's understanding of metaphysics, according to Narayana Moorty. It is a shift towards equating metaphysics to 'a deeper and more religious realization of reality, akin to what might occur when a person is *liberated*'. At this stage, Murty brings metaphysics close to the 'realization to the Buddha's awareness of the Unconditioned . . . the state of Nirvāṇa'.

Although one can easily appreciate Narayana Moorty's attempt to show the evolution of the idea of metaphysics Murty's works represent, we have to see this evolution in the light of what Murty thinks about the

very exercise of metaphysics. For Murty, there can be no 'universally acceptable' single metaphysics considered as the 'ultimate philosophy'. According to Murty, human beings can never reach a final metaphysics. This explains why Murty is not very eager to set clear-cut boundaries to metaphysics, philosophy and religion. He intermixes them, perhaps knowing fully well that they have to be constantly on the move in search of perfection, which they are not destined to reach.

Stephen H. Phillips perceives for philosophy in the future no way other than being 'global'. His wholly unarrested admiration for Murty is based on what he discovers as the latter's insistence on 'globality in the study of philosophy'. Phillips, however, feels that in Murty's writings 'there is outstanding the rootedness' in Indian culture and Indian spirituality which 'he promotes for Indian philosophers'. This advice by Murty, Phillips complains, 'tempers his globalism'. Phillips asks, 'why should philosophers of the Subcontinent be specially concerned with Classical Indian philosophies, in accord with one element in Murty's counsel?'

Sengaku Mayeda's and N. Isayeva's papers are a handsome tribute to Murty as a highly inspiring interpreter of the Śaṅkara Vedānta. To both these scholars, Murty's *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta* is his masterpiece and must be studied for its reconstruction, transformation, sympathetic explanation and deep understanding of the Advaita philosophy. Mayeda remarks that Murty is 'the first academic philosopher' to have shown that Advaita 'can be the foundation for an egalitarian society based on social justice and equality and peace'.

Rajendra Prasad writes on the concept of revelation, not necessarily as it appears in Murty's *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta* but as it forms the bedrock of all religious systems and metaphysics. Attributes used by religious thinkers for the description of the divine, the God-man relationship, Advaita metaphysics and theology, what Murty calls general revelation (GR) and special revelation (SR), the metaphor 'God's self-luminosity' are not Prasad's cup of tea. One wonders how Murty would react to Prasad's slashing remarks on his thesis that 'everybody believes in God, unconsciously if not consciously, because everybody is exposed to His self-disclosure. . .' One is left with an impression that Murty's thinking is on a wave-length that has no commonality with the wave-length of Prasad's thought.

Daya Krishna highlights what he calls 'deficiencies' in Murty's idea of 'betweenness'. Murty's *The Realm of Between* is a trip he undertakes across eastern and western philosophies and also across some of the literary figures, such as Dostoevsky and Sartre. Almost in one stroke Daya Krishna dismisses the spirit of the book thus: '. . . the dazzling brilliance of the book and its occasional penetrating, critical comments on what others have said, hide a deep yawning deficiency which, to my mind,

emanates from the brilliance itself and is its darker shadow which normally would not be noticed by any reader who is bound to be enchanted by the surface magic of the book'.

Murty's 'realm of between' is that grey area which is sandwiched by the transcendental parameter of our consciousness on the one side and the transient parameter on the other. The source of Murty's imagery is the contrast the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* conceived between 'this world' and the 'other world'. Daya Krishna takes the word 'between' semantically and argues that the realm of between can be posited even between man and God, between man and nature, between man and man, and even between man and his creation.

The anchorage of the papers by John Grimes, N.K. Devaraja and N.S.S. Raman is Murty's philosophy of religion. Grimes dwells on the well-known topic of religious language and the language of revelation. By raising the question 'religious language reveals what?' Grimes is not inclined to accept Murty's view that the references of religious language cannot be the same as those of ordinary language. He is critical of Murty's contention that 'God is known in the same way that one knows oneself and one's fellow-human beings, that is, through immediate awareness'. Devaraja is very appreciative of Murty's manysided observations in religion and philosophy which, according to him, bear great resemblance to those of S. Radhakrishnan. However, Devaraja does not accept Murty's belief in God and the connection the latter establishes between God and the moral and other values. He scoffs at Murty's reference to Being and accuses him of not having attempted 'either to elucidate the meaning and significance of the term Being or to tell his readers how and by which route the concept, if not the reality, of Being may be reached or made intelligible'. Raman eulogises Murty's 'abhorrence of narrow specialization and parochialism' and his readiness 'to allow light from different cultural directions to illuminate' him not only in religion and philosophy but also in literature and spirituality.

D.P. Chattopadhyaya analyzes threadbare Murty's approach to peace (*śānti*), as presented by him in his *The Quest for Peace*, and is in agreement with him on most of his observations both in the theoretical and practical or administrative spheres. However, what strikes Chattopadhyaya as 'intriguing' is that while discussing the 'Indian quest for peace' Murty does not seem to recognize 'the significant contribution' of the Islamic thought. Chattopadhyaya comments that since Islamic thought and its presence in India for a millennium are a basic component of the Indian culture Murty's omission of it is understandable.

A. Ramamurty develops the central theme of Murty's *The Indian Spirit*. This book is a capsule of Murty's thoughts on Indianness—the thoughts that 'Indian culture is something which is life itself', Indian culture 'cannot be determined in terms of any single concept or category', 'the unity of this culture can be emotionally experienced by anyone who has

soaked himself in his tradition, and appropriated it with empathy, and has travelled widely across this country'. Ramamurty emphasizes that by taking Indianness in this sense Murty has endorsed the views of the great representatives of Indian spirituality such as Swami Vivekananda, Radhakrishnan, Gandhi, Tagore and Aurobindo.

The main thrust of Ashok Vohra's paper also is Murty's ideas on the cultural regeneration of a nation in general and on the cultural identity of India in particular. Vohra encompasses Murty's perceptions on various facets of the culture phenomenon with great acumen. His complaint, however, is that nowhere in his writings does Murty ask the questions 'What is culture?' and 'What is Indian culture?' nor does he care to define 'fundamental values' which he associates with 'culture'.

Jaunts of an Indian philosopher into the study of Far-Eastern philosophies and religions are rare. Murty is widely known for having studied Chinese and Japanese philosophies with a certain amount of curiosity concerning the socio-cultural sediments in the Far East where these philosophies have originated and developed. Murty's work on Far-Eastern thoughts made the scholar like Nakamura remark that it is a 'great contribution to further progress of philosophical thinking in the global setting'. A.I. Kobzev's paper, 'Murty's *Far Eastern Philosophies*', gives us a survey of Murty's scholarship on the subject.

Like Ramamurty and Vohra, S.S. Barlingay makes Murty's concept of Indian spirit and the centripetal role this 'spirit' plays behind Indian culture and Indian civilization the key subject of his paper. For Barlingay, Indian spirit is continuous. He agrees with Murty that this "spirit" lies in the variety of lifestyles and thought processes Indians have adopted through centuries and behind the whole pluralistic structure Indian culture is famous for. Barlingay very suggestively calls this pluralistic structure the 'rainbow civilization of India'. Barlingay surveys the history of traditions, thought movements and political systems in India and endorses Murty's standpoint that 'culture is not like a bloodless mathematical system completely coherent and logical. . . (it is) like a great painting or music' and 'contains a blending of discordant elements fused together in a manner which defies description'.

Arindam Chakrabarti's extremely perceptive piece on what can be called the phenomenology of the Vedic *mahāvākya* has no visible connection with Murty's works, except perhaps with his attempt at re-setting some of the key Vedic sentences. Chakrabarti is sharp when he regards the 'ripening of the meditative tranquillity of mind', the method of reflection (*manana*), the 'yogic discipline of concentration or mind-arresting processes', the 'pre-linguistic pre-predicative perception' as all complementarily contributing to 'grasping the exact purported meanings' of the Vedic texts. Chakrabarti has several searching flashes on 'Brahman-consciousness'.

There are patches of iconoclasm in Murty's writings and these are

very closely knit by Bhuvan Chandel in her paper. Murty, for instance, has found out that Gotama the Buddha belonged to an agricultural community, that he did not teach the doctrine of *anātman* or non-self, that Jainism had never accepted the principle of equality and human brotherhood, that Jainism is not a philosophy, that there is neither philosophy nor an ethical theory in the Upaniṣads, that Śaṅkara was a non-dualist but not a monist, and so on.

Many scholars who are acquainted with Murty's works did not know that he had, when just sixteen, published a book on the *Bhagavadgītā* in impeccable Telugu. P. Sriramachandrudu must be congratulated on developing in his paper Murty's insights on the *Gītā*. Sriramachandrudu contends that though Murty is a Vaiṣṇava by birth he does not regard *bhakti* as the central tenor of the *Gītā*. Bhaktivedānta Swami Prabhupada's followers at the Krishna Consciousness movement who have made *bhakti* the principal running spirit of the *Bhagavadgītā* will find Murty's interpretation distorted.

A festschrift is an exotic form of literature. It is a bunch of articles written by a number of authors on one single thinker, and his works produced by him on various occasions and at different times of his intellectual growth. The authors of the articles are interpreters tied to their own ontological assumptions. The authors approach the thinker and his works from what Gadamer, the renowned hermeneutician of our time, would call certain 'prejudices'. This is precisely what makes the reading of a festschrift interesting. When one reads a festschrift one gets acquainted with the 'prejudices' of the contributors to it more than with the mind of the thinker around which the contributions are woven. The spectacle is amply evident in the present festschrift. It should invite a large readership.

I.I.T., Bombay RAMAKANT SINARI

TIRTHANATH BANDYOPADHYAY: *In Search of a Moral Criterion,* Papyrus, Calcutta, 1994, pp. 110, Rs 50.

Tirthanath Bandyopadhyay makes a sincere attempt in normative ethics to provide a criterion to derive morally right actions and their maxims in his book *In Search of a Moral Criterion.* He proposes the principle of universalizability as a moral criterion at the outset admitting in his preface that though the term has been borrowed from R.M. Hare and its formulation from Kant's Categorical Imperative, yet, he thinks he has taken an independent stance. So he has obtained as it were only the top dressing of what he has gone on to build up his philosophy. He wishes justice be done to his principle of universalizability (or PU as he

prefers to call it) by not treating it as either a defence or an attack on Kant.

The book is divided into seven chapters. In the first chapter he formulates PU and specifies its two versions, namely the maxim version and the will-version. The maxim version bases universalizability on the fact that a given maxim when practised by everyone does not defeat itself. And the requirement of the will version states that the alleged maxim can be consistently willed to be practised by everyone in their dealings with each other. His own preference is for the latter version of PU.

To combat the charges of formalism being levelled against him the author takes several precautionary measures during the course of the book. For instance, in the second chapter he relates universalizability of moral maxims and later on in Chapter VI he claims that PU helps us to recognize specific substantive moral maxims. He asserts that by recognizing universalizability as a necessary condition of morality it helps us not directly but obliquely to obtain morally right maxims. The author first works out the implications of treating PU as a sufficient condition of morality, and fears that if it be so, then any maxim which is universalizable *ipso facto* becomes moral and this becomes too wide a claim. Hence, in the following chapter he deals with PU as a necessary condition of morality and tries to establish a logical relationship between the two by trying to establish that a morally right maxim has to be universalizable and also that a given maxim is morally right if and only if its opposite is non-universalizable.

He analyzes and rejects various justifications of moral actions in the form of sincerity of commitment, rationally motivated consensus, radical choice of moral values, firm conviction and the like. Opposed to moral subjectivism and all teleological theories of ethics, the author is more in tune with deontic theory for he sees an intrinsic worth in moral pursuit.

The author considers PU as not being 'prescriptively vacuous'. At the same time he is aware of the limitation of this principle by admitting that this PU is most effective when some maxim of action is proposed for moral consideration. Rigorism and formalism charges levelled against Kant are not applicable on PU for the author has taken care to show that PU 'is professedly a this worldly moral criterion'.

Towards the end the philosophical argument about the PU is seen in the light of the working of our contemporary world. As he draws a realistic picture of globalization and consumerism, his genuine concern for re-affirmation of moral values becomes loud and clear. Earlier also in the course of the book he brushes aside amoral skepticism and throughout the book there is an explicit belief and faith in morality being an integral part of freedom and a panacea to present day crisis.

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BIJOYANANDA KAR: *Major Trends in Orissan Philosophy*, Grantha Mandir, Cuttack, 1989, pp. xii + 134

Major Trends in Orissan Philosophy is a collection of twelve essays written by Dr Bijoyananda Kar and aims at an exploration of the philosophical speculations found in Orissa from time to time. We find four essays on the cult of Jagannath and three essays on the *Gītā* by different exponents. Two essays are devoted to the discussion of Mahimā Dharma and one on Brahma Samaj along with one concluding essay on different religio-philosophical thinkers of Orissa. Moreover, the collection includes the discussion of an academic philospher of Orissa, late Prof. Ganeswar Mishra. The author himself has singled out the major trend of Orissa by saying, 'with a little effort one can be led to conclude that humanism in some form or other is the major trend in Orissan philosophy' (p. xii, Introduction).

Since Orissa has been identified with the land of Jagannath, let us discuss Kar's attempted enquiry of the philosophy and religion associated with Lord Jagannath. In his four essays on Lord Jagannath, Kar has not bothered to delineate the points where some conceptual enquiries may be undertaken like those of '*Purushottam*', '*Patitapabana*' and kindred concepts. Kar, however, has attempted enquiries into social philosophy and cultural tradition surrounding the Lord. In his words, Jagannath provides us with 'a unique cult where one finds the assimilation of the most primitive with the most modern' (p. 59). Kar claims that 'with the identification of *Daru* with *Purushottama* the anthropomorphic concept of Upaniṣadic puruṣa comes into prominence' (p. 60) but did not attempt to analyze it in detail. He, however, analyzes the mantra by which Jagannath is worshipped, that is, '*Oṁ klim Kṛṣṇaya Govindaya Gopijanavallabhaya Namaḥ*' (p. 61) and says 'by identifying Vedic *oṁ* and Tantric *klim* with Kṛṣṇa, Govinda, etc., attempts for co-ordinating the Vedic and Tāntric traditions with Purāṇic and Vaiṣṇavite traditions are clearly indicated' (p. 62). He cites the example of a unique system of interdining by different caste Hindus where all are served with '*Mahāprasād*', the food that is offered to the Lord. But Kar never hesitates to point out the black facet of the Cult of Jagannath (p. 81) when he finds 'a definite mark of separatism and factionalism at the level of practice' (p. 84) exemplified by the restricted entry inside the temple complex for the Hindus only. In the context of such a discriminatory pratice found inside the temple complex, Kar can hardly claim Jagannath to be a symbol of national integration when in his own words 'national integration seems to be nothing but accomplishing unity and harmony amidst all racial and communal diversities' (p.72). His interpretation of Jagannath Sanskruti as a 'sort of theistic humanism in which Jagannath as the symbol for equality, fraternity and progress of the whole mankind' (p. 68) becomes highly questionable.

The next discussion focuses on Mahima Dharma, which has a large following in Orissa. The philosophy behind this is nothing but a modification of Advaita philosophy. In the words of Kar, Mahimā which means 'the noble and the great' (p. 41) belongs to Brahman and is described: as attributeless (*nirguṇa*), formless (*nirākāra*), indescribable (*alekha*) and absolute (*nirañjan*)' (p. 41). Kar also refers to the unique characteristic of Mahimā philosophy in which 'the advice of the teacher (*Guru-ājñā*)' and the 'authentic scriptural sayings (*Apta-vākya*)' are 'even above the reasoning (*tarka*)' (p. 45). Jñāna has a subsidiary place in Mahimā philosophy and the absolute can be attained by devotion (*bhakti*). The followers of Mahimā Dharma do not believe in caste system and also in any form of idol worhsip and are practitioners of the Ahiṁsa principle. They advocate 'the worship of the Alekha Nirañjan not in temples in front of images of the Lord, but in the sacred shrine of the human soul' (p. 51). Kar, however, in his exposition of Mahima philosophy, could not reconcile his three simultaneous claims like, 'it may be said that Mahima eternally belongs to Brahman' (p. 57), 'it is because of Brahman's wonderful greatness (*Mahimā*), World is evolved' (p. 55) and 'Like Advaitins, the Mahimites too, describe their Mahimā as *Nirguṇa*' (p. 42).

Kar's book also discusses three essays on *Gītā* as interpreted by three exponents of Orissa like Bairagi Mishra, Sridhara Swami and more recently by Pandit Nilakantha Das. In Orissa we find a tradition of Vaisnavism which treats Jagannath as the Universal Lord (*Jagata Nātha*) who is also the ideal person (*Purusottama*). Here, we may say that Kar could have analyzed Sridhara or Jayadeva's, '*Jñāna-bhakti tattva*' or Bhim Bhoi's '*Śunya-bhakti tattva*' in the perspective '*prema-bhakti vāda*' of *Sri Caitanya*. In this context, Kar's exploration of a social self, as enunciated by Pandit Dash, deserves a special mention when he says, 'The social self is not to be construed as another external being. It is the same person who, by means of reason (*yukti*), keeps a balance or integration (*samanvaya*) between two trends of thinking, that is, individuality and sociality' (p. 9). However, Kar's inclusion of the essay 'Mohinimohan on Brahma Samaj' could have been avoided in a collection like the present one as it merely provides a direction to the reformative measures undertaken by the Brahma Samaj. If Kar has in mind the scientific and rationalistic temper of the Brahma Samaj, still such an inclusion in his collection may not be justifiable.

Kar finally refers to the technique adopted by late Prof. Ganeswar by which Mishra investigates into Advaita Vedānta with the eyes of modern analytic philosophers like Ayer, Wittgenstein, Ryle and Strawson. Prof. Mishra according to Kar holds 'Śaṅkara's philosophy as a descriptive metaphysics' (p. 109) and for such a claim Kar has not furnished any detail. Similarly, Kar's remark on Mishra's philosophy does not make much sense as to how analytic philosophy 'will help in bringing universal

brotherhood and international understanding' (p. 113). The trend-setters of analytic philosophy and linguistic analysis in the West have also found that analysis is not enough. Moreover, Kar's exposition of Mishra's philosophy does not provide us with the main tenets of Mishra's Rationalistic Humanism.

On final analysis, such a collection of essays may help us to enter into Orissan philosophy in a peripheral manner minus a provision for satisfactory response to our queries.

S.C.S. College, Puri RANJIT GHOSE

RAM SWARUP: *Hinduism vis-à-vis Christianity and Islam*, Voice of India, New Delhi, 1992 (third revised and enlarged edition; first published 1982) pp. 63.

The decade covered by the first and the last edition of the book (1982–1992) is a decade in which, one can now say with benefit of hindsight, shifts in the relationships among the religions of India were beginning to occur, whose fall-out on the political scene has caught so many by surprise. This book offers a valuable insight from a Hindu perspective in this respect.

The slim size of the book is deceptive; it is like a magazine of powder, and expresses forcefully the sources of Hindu resentment. It will be wise to take them into account even if one does not agree with them.

The basic thesis of the book is that the West has targeted Hindu India, however we understand the West as a *religious* West, comprising the traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam or as a secular West. In the first case, the source of resentment is the familiar one: 'Christianity and Islam have talked of "we" and "they". They divide mankind into two: believers and nonbelievers, they are not religions of "man" but of a particular *Umma, Millat* or church. Their rejection and hatred of others is written in capital letters in their doctrines and in the pages of their history' (p. 17). This charge of intolerance is found raised to the level of the God of western religions itself in S. Radhakrishnan: 'The intolerance of narrow monotheism is written in letters of blood across the history of man from the time when first the tribes of Israel burst into the lands of Canaan' (*The Hindu View of Life*, p. 405). However, although at one level the charge is similar, at another level there is a difference of nuance. While Radhakrishnan focused on Judaism and Christianity and spared Islam, Ramswarup's critique represents a spectral shift in which Judaism is spared and heavy fire is reserved for Christianity and Islam. Does the religious configuration in both the cases represent a political reality?

Radhakrishnan wrote during the course of the Independence struggle predicated on secularism which emphasized Hindu–Muslim unity and by implication rejected Zionism. Ramswarup is writing after Independence and Partition, when Israel elicits sympathy from the Hindu and the Muslim incurs his hostility, first for dividing India and then for continuing to exercise undue political clout through its minority swing vote. Christianity continues to draw heavy fire, despite its secularization for even if 'for itself the West has rejected Christianity . . . *it is still keeping it for export*' (p. 17, emphasis added).

The secular West does not fare any better. The author writes in the same vein: '. . . a feature of the triumph of religious tolerance in Europe was that the scene of religious excesses in Europe was shipped to other continents' (p. 2). This may be true for the Age of Imperialism but what about the situation now? Not much better. The liberal Christianity of Henry de Lubae, F.H. Hilard, Evelyn Underhill, Nicholas Berdyaev, Dr Jacques-Albert Cuttat, Fr J. Monchanin, Bede Griffiths are all weighed and found wanting. They all suffer from the 'original sin' of Christian evangelism; liberal Christianity is the same religious war waged by other means. As for communism as a product of a liberal West, its hostility to religion is undisguised.

The so-called benefits that followed in the wake of western colonization of India are acknowledged (p. 3) but their ugly underbelly is immediately exposed. Thus if the 'missionaries boast of giving pagan India their first printing press' what was the first thing they printed: '[T]he very first tracts Carey's printing press at Serampore published contained nothing but filthy attacks on Hindu scriptures' (p. 14). And this is the case with a West where 'people had to wage a grim battle against Christianity in order to liberate reason from its shackles. *The Islamic world is yet to fight this struggle and to free its mind*' (p. 12, emphasis added). And even in the secular West, 'In England the priests of the Anglican church, the national religion, are paid employees of the State. In Germany, the revenue of the country's religious denominations is collected along with taxes by the State and made over to them' (p. 19). Is this so?

The book is an eye-opener, not only in the facts it culls but the perspective it offers. We all, even the Hindus who live in the West, are so habituated to looking at India in terms of the West that we don't have a clue—apart from Radhakrishnan—as to how a Hindu intellectual might look at the West. Yet even Ramswarup, like Radhakrishnan, gives to Hinduism a western gloss. He aligns it with nationality and religious tolerance, which are essentially liberal values, and then attacks the West itself for falling short of its ideals. It is, of course, salutary to be caught denying the implications of one's own ideas and ideals whether at home or abroad for any culture. But this book signals the fact that the Hindu critique of the West is becoming not merely sophisticated but

also mature; and it is becoming not only sophisticated and mature but is also being sufficiently widely read to go into three editions.

McGill University, Canada ARVIND SHARMA

MOHAMMAD ABDUL SALAM KHAN: *Ibn-i-Arabi.*

Mustafa Khaja, a friend of mine approached me regarding a book on *Ibn-i-Arabi* by Mohammad Abdul Salam Khan, concerning mystico-religious experiences on which he bases an hypothesis, interpreting and explaining the genesis of the world, and the relationship of its material position with regard to the divine potential creativity.

Prima facie, I felt a tangible contradiction in the prefix of the author's name (Mohammad Abdul): should it not be either Mohammad Salam or Abdul Salam, rather than Mohammad Abdul Salam?

Keeping aside this contradiction in the prefix, I would like to say that from Socrates down to the modern philosophers every thinker has striven to give material interpretations of the divine workings and hidden designs, in terms of evolution and manifestations.

Socrates perceived *ideas* to be the essence of the world of *particulars*, establishing the passivity of matter. After him, this theory was developed by his pupil Plato, and in his scheme of things, the *idea* of God was thought to be co-existent with God. This implies that the idea of God is the manifestation of God or of His attributes emanating from God Himself. But this theory of ideas does not explain the material position of the genesis of the world.

After Plato, Aristotle modified this theory, perceiving that matter and form are co-existent, and in the absence of one, the other cannot possibly be perceived. He put forward the principle of causality. This theory of causation does not provide the wisdom and spirit to comprehend the potentiality of the world, nor the potential creativity of God. In the theory of ideas, it looked as if the idea of good infringes upon God, and ultimately matter is seen as being dissolved into a pure form, or formless form, termed to be God.

Hegel took this theory and explained causation in terms of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. It culminated into this: that the absolute idea is co-existant with God. In Hegelian philosophy a tinge of mysticism is introduced, namely that God Himself assumes matter and then returns into a transcendent reality, through the process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

This mystico-philosophical process engaged the attention of Descartes and led him to provide the ontological, cosmological and teleological proofs of the existence of God, standing for a material explanation of

the world. Descartes was a Christian, and he looked at the genesis of the world and at the aboriginal sin, from the biblical point of view, to take the religious position, to interpret matter in relation to God, Father, Eternal Word and the Holy Spirit.

Spinoza saw in a mystic way: God and the world as a union, being manifested in the form of modes and attributes. He holds that 'The infinite aspect of God, in which He exists perfectly and self-sufficiently, is His very essence, and is referred to as 'attributes'. The finite, dependent aspect of reality, which he calls 'modes', is the same as that which had been perceived and articulated by the aforementioned philosophers'.

We now turn to religious thinkers and philosophers. They focused on the spiritual domain of human existance, leaving aside the material position which is responsible for the spiritual sufferings, and they worked for the redemption from sins that had been committed.

After Moses, Christ came for the redemption of human sufferings and He saved human beings from aboriginal sin, sacrificing His own being.

The Bible regards God and the world as two distinct realities which are inter-related. The 'Word-made-flesh' (through an anthropological process) is Himself an emanation from God, the Father. The Holy Spirit of God made the Apostles to arise as 'divine forms' as new creations by grace, sharing the divine life, to liberate human beings from aboriginal sin, and to arouse divine consciousness and grace among the people.

The Bible promises the arrival of Christ and the Kingdom of God, while explaining the genesis of the world that 'in the beginning there was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God.' Using the metaphor of an 'echo', first, the Word was in Itself God; secondly, it reveals the Father, and thirdly, it communicates the Holy Spirit, one with God. This (anthropological) process will return again at the closure of the world.

This biblical mystification of matter in relation to God can be substantiated and comprehended, but the Islamic religious position in this regard is ambiguous and different.

Islam takes the material position of the genesis of our world with some historical variation about the advent of the Apostle, in contrast to the biblical narration of the fact of the genesis of the world and its Apostles. Islam is nothing but the total replica of the Bible enshrined in the holy Quran. According to the holy Quran, after God had created the world, He consulted His angels regarding His intention of creating Adam as the ruler on earth. The angels expressed their apprehensions about the freedom and creativity of Adam, on the earth. They felt that he would create problems. But God ignored their apprehensions and carried out His intention. He imparted to Adam a little knowledge about certain objects, and then called His angels to name the objects

given. The angels told God that they did not have any more knowledge than that which God had provided them with. Satan categorically cried out, declining to surrender himself before Adam who had the objective knowledge. Satan called this divine action a trick and a fraud. Consequently, he was exiled from the heavens. This divine knowledge is called the 'knowledge of absentia' (*Alimul Gāb*).

In the light of the Quran, the creation of the world is intentional, and this fact establishes, three independent realities (involved in the creation of the material world), namely, first, God; second, intention, and third, the matter intended to be converted into a particular shape and position. The Muslim philosopher could not have interpreted and explained the validity and permanency of God, intention and the matter, and could not have reconciled all the three into one reality. Here they sought to escape, and turned to mystico-religious positions. The holy Quran does not allow its believers to enter into hallucinations about experiences which they seek to have of the presence of God, through the physical eye.The holy Quran categorically says that human deeds will be evaluated and rewarded on Doom's Day. Islam has left no room for additional religious positions which hold that God is the light between heaven and earth. So, the experience of God as light, in the Quranic idiom, is not possible, because light itself illuminates.

Mysticism is an escape from the Quranic commandments, and it has no philosophical connotations. *Ibn-i-Arabi* has sought religious freedom of expression from the fixed and monotonous religious principles imposed upon human beings. This book on *Ibn-i-Arabi* by Mohammad Abdul Salam Khan does not assist human understanding to grasp the mystico-religious experiences in terms of God's essence and attributes. Actually, the human mind has ventured to attribute human qualifications to God, to know Him humanly. God is fact embodied by the Holy Spirit, spiritually.

However, this book contains a thought to be promoted and discussed at full length, though many ban this intellectual activity, advising to have blind faith.

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