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Editor: Daya Krishna

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Justice, Community and Selfhood*

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'Philosophers are not teachers of the nation. They can sometimes . . . be useful people. If they are, they may write books like that of Rawls, for instance.'[1]

JÜRGEN HABERMAS

John Rawls aims at reconstructing Kant's deontological ethics within an empirical framework, by severing it from its assumptions of transcendental idealism.[2] The latter is seen by Rawls as the source of the dilemmas facing Kantian deontology. Hence, Rawls aims at providing a viable deontological ethics by replacing Kant's noumenal agent with a situated moral subject.

The following paper attempts to evaluate the degree of Rawls's success in overcoming Kant's difficulties by his reformulation of proceduralism. It begins by spelling out the basic insights of procedural theory and detailing Rawls's critique of Kant. Next, Rawls's reformulation of Kantian ethics is presented and his success evaluated. Further, the communitarian alternative of overcoming justice and morality suggested by Michael Sandel is examined. Finally, the concluding section ponders over the prospects that are in store for procedural theory.

THE RAWLSIAN CRITIQUE OF KANT

Kant initiated the procedural approach to morality. This approach justifies norms through a process characterized by abstraction from given values and a commitment to freedom.[3] Kant's turn to proceduralism arose from a dissatisfaction with teleological theories of morality. The latter, which accorded normative priority to either metaphysical or empirical givens, had the basic dilemma of justifying the specific given selected.[4] In recommending to all individuals a specific

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given goal, out of a plurality of such goals, the standpoint of those who are committed to the specific goal is arbitrarily privileged. Proceduralism aims at avoiding this arbitrariness by not being committed to any given goal. Rather it is committed to the equal freedom of all persons in providing an impartial moral point of view that will allow for the maintenance of such a commitment.

Procedural theory offers a method, rather than recommend a specific goal.[5] This procedure allows moral agents to actively and freely arrive at their principles of conduct. It does this by not being committed to any values given antecedently to freedom. The procedure, hence, consists in a method of willing where the freedom of all can be exercised equally by taking into account the rights of all agents to such a freedom. The freedom provided by such a method of willing consists in the moral agent actively determining his/her goal. Negative freedom treats the moral agent as a passive subject to whom goals are given in a predetermined manner. Procedural theory, on the other hand, treats as positive freedom the capacity of moral agents to construct valid goals within the framework of the procedure.[6] The latter is meant to reflect the moral point of view, which is the source of all norms.

Kant's Categorical Imperative

Kant construes the moral point of view as the categorical imperative which is a rule of thought.[7] The thought-experimental procedure offered by Kant operates as follows. The agent mentally reflects upon whether or not a principle of conduct is compatible with the agent's own freedom and that of others. Thus, rather than any predetermined goal, the equal freedom of all is the basis of value. If it is congruous in this manner, the principle can be said to have a universal realm of application and is consequently valid.[8] Kant imposes a constraint on the moral agent in order to make this universality possible: The agent cannot have knowledge of his/her interests.[9] For this would tempt the agent in its favour, jettisoning the requisite impartial attitude for universality. By abstracting from all interests in this manner, the agent can only have the end of the intrinsic rationality of all human subjects.[10] Further, this abstraction from inclinations is conducive to the individual's autonomy, where it is not coerced by any externally given entity to arrive at valid norms.[11]

The Problems of Formalism and Idealism

Rawls is, however, critical of the Kantian formulation of proceduralism. According to Rawls, the thought-experiment prescribed by Kant can only be employed by a noumenal agent. The latter is divorced from the phenomenal world, in virtue of its abstraction from physiological interests. Consequently, Rawls argues that the Kantian categorical imperative is plagued by the problems of formalism and idealism.[12]

The problem of idealism consists in the impossibility of the empirical actualization of the procedure. It is a result of the noumenal subject of morality's detachment from the real structures of the world of interests. Actions that occur in the empirically real world have their motivations in the agent's physiological wants and desires. However, given Kant's restriction that all the reference to desires must be eschewed, they cannot motivate actions. The Kantian moral agent can only be motivated by a respect for the moral law. Consequently, the agent lacks the necessary basis for engaging in actions within the framework of the empirical world.[13]

The difficulty of formalism is the categorical imperative's inability to specify principles of conduct, which have relevant applicability in the phenomenal world. For its abstraction from interests makes the moral agent bereft of all content from the empirical world. This absence, in turn, makes the Kantian procedure a purely formal principle of universality that is indifferent to the validity of content and arbitrary in the phenomenal world.[14]

RAWLS'S REHABILITATION OF PROCEDURALISM

Rawls revamps Kantian procedural theory in an alternative thought-experiment whose goal is to meet the criticisms of idealism and formalism plaguing Kantian ethics without introducing given contents as teleological theories do. Rawls is sympathetic to the fundamental principles of Kantian proceduralism. These include the primacy of the right over the good and the free subject as the source of norms. Rawls' original position aims at maintaining these insights of procedural theory and in being rooted in certain assumptions regarding human nature and its milieu.[15] Further, the original position is committed to an empirical account of human freedom that is located within these assumptions. Rawls incorporates certain concrete circumstances into the original position to overcome the difficulties of the categorical imperative. Further, it is precisely the limits that these concrete circumstances pose to the moral agent's empirical freedom that the procedure of the original position becomes necessary.

Rawls's Account of Empirical Freedom

The basic problem with teleological ethical theories, according to Rawls, is that they hinder human freedom by recommending a specific goal as the object of choice. However, although Rawls, like Kant, places freedom at the centre of normativity, he does not entirely ignore the content of interests à la Kant. For it is precisely this indifference which catapults Kantian freedom onto an ideal plane and thereby makes the categorical imperative ineffective in actual practice. On the Rawlsian view of freedom each individual is entitled to pursue his or her object of choice. Rawls

initially defines freedom in negative terms, as the absence of restriction in the pursuit of goals.[16]

At first sight, Rawls' depiction of freedom seems to have echoes of the teleological strategy' characterization of freedom as a passive subject's apprehension of a given goal. However, there is a basic distinction between Rawls' construal of empirical freedom and the strategy of teleological ethics. For Rawls introduces the notion of positive freedom as primary in maintaining and enhancing such a pluralistic and negative freedom. The latter's concrete character confronts it with the limits imposed by its concrete circumstances. Hence a procedure specifying the moral point of view becomes necessary. Its necessity lies in making available to all agents the unhindered freedom to pursue goals within a prescribed framework that respects the right of all agents to such a freedom. Agents are free in a positive sense when they follow such a procedure of rational willing.[17]

The Factual Circumstances of Freedom: From the above discussion it follows that, according to Rawls, individuals are free to pursue their goals in keeping with their external and internal nature. Hence, Rawls provides a description of these empirical circumstances consisting of external and internal nature.[18]

External nature, according to Rawls, is characterized by a scarcity of resources that are conducive to individual wants.[19] Individuals, Rawls assumes, are psychologically so constituted as to only care for their self-interest. Consequently, they compete for the given resources that are the objects of their desires.[20] Here, Rawls assumes with Kant that human action is motivated by naturally given wants and desires. Consequently, individuals often hinder each other in their pursuit of freedom. Therefore, a procedure providing norms is necessary so that individuals are not left to the vagaries of their circumstances in maintaining their freedom. The procedure aims at giving all agents an equal chance to exercise their freedom by a fair distribution of these limited resources amongst them.

Rawls maintains that individuals should develop a capacity for rationality, in order to equitably acquire the limited resources for their benefits. Such a capacity consists in the pursuit of a set of primary goods.[21] Rawls defines primary goods as universally applicable resources that are instrumental in the pursuit of any private, individual goal.[22] Rawls specifies primary goods concretely as the right to basic liberties of thought, expression, the access to opportunities and powers, self-worth and the right to accumulate property.[23] These primary goods allow each individual to acquire his or her particular goods. The fair distribution of limited resources is guaranteed by the primary goods. Thus, the Rawlsian capacity for rationality aims at prudentially maintaining the self-interest of all agents upon which the pluralistic conception of

freedom is hinged. The norms which result from the original position are meant to give all agents their share of primary goods and the resultant freedom.

Rawls also prescribes certain parameters of reasonableness that that are required of normative principles. These include generality, universality, ordering, publicity and equality of the participants.[24] The above definition of reasonableness assumes the validity of primary goods provided by rationality. The conditions of reasonableness and rationality are necessary to allow all individuals to pursue the primary goods in an unhindered and prudential manner.

The principles of conduct embodying rationality and reasonableness ought not to be biased towards any specific goals of a particular person. Hence, the original position is offered by Rawls as a procedure embodying the moral point of view. It defines the fair terms for a cooperative pursuit of primary goods by means of the conditions of reasonableness.

Rawls's Thought-Experiment: The Original Position: The original position represents the moral point of view from which norms can be determined. It allows individuals to arrive at norms on the basis of a certain type of knowledge and the deprivation of a different type of knowledge.

Within the original position agents have knowledge of various general facts. These include the general sociological, psychological and economic conditions surrounding the primary goods delineated above.[25] Further, agents also have knowledge of formal conditions, that is, the criteria of 'reasonableness' delineated above that norms should possess. Such a general knowledge pertaining to the real world is meant to facilitate non-arbitrary moral legislation. However, agents should also arrive at impartial norms that do not capriciously privilege the standpoint of a particular person, or a group of people. To enable this, there is a 'veil of ignorance'[26] thrown over the legislating agent's particular interests, socio-economic position and psychological dimension. Such a deprivation of the particular facts pertaining to the moral agent would, according to Rawls, enable the agent to choose norms in a non-discriminatory manner.

Individuals who engage in the reflective exercise delineated above arrive at the two principles of justice.[27] These are:

(a) The right of all individuals to the maximum amount of freedom that is compatible with the like freedom of others.
(b) Any inequality in society should promote the interests of the worst off people in society.

The original position and the two principles of justice constitute the framework of 'justice as fairness',[28] which Rawls maintains is the basis of social institutions.

The Original Position's Divergence from the Categorical Imperative

The Rawlsian moral agent is autonomous, like the Kantian agent, in eschewing particular interests and pursuing the path of rationality prescribed by the procedure. Yet there are significant differences between the Kantian and Rawlsian versions of proceduralism.

Rawls places emphasis on the agent's general knowledge of a specific type of life structure so that determinate principles of conduct result from the original position. Rawls offers a weak sense of autonomy, which is not a complete absence of interests. As his critic Robert Paul Wolff points out, an autonomous agent's acts are guided by general interests rather than specific ones.[29] Given this Rawls' original position differs from Kant's categorical imperative in the following two ways: First, it is firmly ensconced in the empirical realm, where it purports to be a descriptive articulation of the basic convictions of a specific socio-historical community.[30] Second, it views moral subjects as physiological agents by its commitment to the empirical view of freedom as the pursuit of the concrete good.

The above differences are meant to prevent arbitrary outcomes from the adoption of the original position.[31] According to Rawls, the original position does not suffer from the Kantian problem of formalism. For in balancing competing claims to primary goods, it provides agents with the two principles of justice, which aim at an equitable distribution of primary goods. Further, in ensuring the prudential self-interest of all persons, it provides the requisite motivation for individuals to actualize it. Therefore, it does not face the difficulty of idealism, as Kant's categorical imperative does, of remaining on the noumenal level as a mere ought.

The following section examines whether the changes introduced by Rawls to overcome Kant's dilemmas are compatible with the goals of proceduralism initiated by Kant by discussing some of the problems facing the original position.

AN APPRAISAL

By virtue of incorporating concrete factual assumptions and general interests within a thought-experimental framework, the original position faces two sets of problems. The first set concerns the justifiability of Rawls' assumptions and the determinate set of general interests, neither of which are the products of the procedure's employment. Second, the thought-experimental formulation of the original position does not guarantee non-arbitrary consequences on its employment.

The Empirical Assumptions

In a Hobbesian vein, Rawls' pluralistic view of freedom treats all human beings as having a selfish disposition in a condition of scarcity of goods.[32] Consequently, in the competitive scramble for these goods, there is the danger of the strong few apportioning a large measure of the scarce resources for themselves. The original position with its stress on positive freedom enters in to resolve the chaos of a lawless negative freedom. Given this, the original position could be viewed as an embodiment of purposive rationality. It allows individuals to pursue private interests that are already given to them, without the mediation of common interests.[33] This is done by an equitable distribution of primary goods, which are defined by Rawls as general interests whose acquisition is a requisite condition for all agents' rational preservation of self-interest.

Rawls justifies his introduction of material assumptions into his procedure by referring to his critique of teleological ethics and the method of reflective equilibrium.[34] The teleological attempt to forward a given goal as the Archimedian principle of normativity is regarded by Rawls as a failure.[35] The Kantian formulation of procedural theory vainly aimed at an unconditional moral standpoint without any reference to the content of interests. From Kant's presumed failure, Rawls concludes that any attempt to specify a presuppositionless criterion of morality is bound to collapse.[36] Hence, Rawls attempts to provide an alternative route in moral theory. This consists in reconstructing and coherently clarifying the shared moral intuitions of the specific community of the moral theorist.[37] The original position purports to be such an articulation of western society to which Rawls belongs. The methodology of reflective equilibrium, with which Rawls arrives at the original position, validates philosophical concepts by balancing them with ordinary pre-philosophical class of judgements.[38] This balance, which is neither automatic nor absolute, is maintained by a constant change in the philosopher's assumptions. Rawls professes that his assumptions of individual freedom, primary goods and the circumstances of justice are normatively neutral, revealed merely through his reflections upon his culture.[39] However, despite Rawls's claims to the contrary, his normative commitment to the pluralistic conception of freedom is clear. The significance of the original position and the veil of ignorance, which bars all reference to particular goals, makes clear the antecedent normative status of the Rawlsian brand of individualistic freedom.[40]

Rawls faces an additional set of problems stemming from his relativist standpoint. He claims that his procedure offers *a* theory of justice, rather than *the* theory of justice.[41] However, an examination of the original position reveals that valid norms ought to have the features of generality, universality and publicity. Consequently, rather than being the products of the contingencies of one particular society, as Rawls seems to uphold, norms have cross-cultural applicability. Moreover, as some critics have argued, Rawls's assumptions reflect the lifestyle of possessive individualism that applies only to some sections of western society.[42]

However, given Rawls's tacit normative aspirations, this lifestyle is extended to the whole of western society. The basis of such an extension stands in need of justification. In the absence of such a justification given the diversity of human traits and conditions, Rawls cannot motivate individuals who do not have the human nature he specifies, to adopt the original position. As Jürgen Habermas observes, if a philosophical theory could do no more than report the intuitions of ordinary consciousness, without their critical evaluation, it cannot adopt a normative stance towards these intuitions.[43] If given intuitions are accorded normative worth, as Rawls's theory does albeit tacitly, then the criteria that underscores their legitimacy ought to be specified. Further, the relevant criteria would also have a more than parochial worth.

In addition to the above problems of justifying its substantive aspects, the original position is also plagued by problems resulting from its solitary application.

The Monological Framework of the Original Position

The original position is an imaginative exercise conducted in thought by individuals bereft of their particularities. Rawls requires all moral agents to exclude knowledge of their own social position, interests, etc., in employing the procedure. This transforms situated agents into solitary, detached, ideal subjects of thoughts under the 'veil of ignorance'. Like Kant, Rawls regards interests as incontrovertibly particular and, therefore, incapable of universalization. Thus, the demands of morality and physiological human nature are assumed to conflict. Consequently, in order to ensure the agent's autonomy and the impartiality of morality, all personal inclinations have to be suppressed. Further, all individuals are assumed to have identical structures that enables each to deliberate monologically in isolation from others.[44] Such solitary, self-sufficient agents are assumed to determine validity in congruity with one another because of their desire for primary goods. The latter ensures the pre-established harmony of the results of the various moral agents. Yet, as Rawls' own critique of Kant shows, any attempt by agents to singularly determine principles of conduct has the possibility of being vacuous. The assumptions of self-sufficiency and pre-established harmony of results are not warranted.[45] Hence, the Rawlsian agent could very well encounter the quandries of formalism and idealism afflicting Kantian ethics. For by disengaging itself from knowledge of its particular social location and interests, the Rawlsian agent is transformed into an unencumbered subject of thought. The latter fictitiously adopts the moral point of view in a solitary thought exercise. If moral agents are not assumed to be self-sufficient with a pre-established congruity of their deliberations, the original position cannot have an assured non-arbitrariness in its adoption. Its repeated employments by the same agent could produce conflicting results and so could its employment by

a variety of agents.[46] The solitary agent is not in a position to determine the accuracy of the original position's employment. Further, the Rawlsian moral agent could also involve itself in the perplexity of idealism. It could lack the necessary motivation to actualize its moral deliberation by virtue of being severed from the knowledge of the particular interests necessary for action on the empirical plane.

From the above discussion, one can conclude with Rawls' critics such as Wolff and Benhabib that the basic difficulty confronting Rawls is that his moral agents have to both know too much and too little.[47] On one hand, the Rawlsian agents are supposed to know everything that concerns their interests. This can be seen in Rawls introduction of the various material presuppositions into the original position. Yet, on the other hand, from the 'veil of ignorance' it is clear that these agents cannot know how these assumptions apply to their individual lives.[48] The Rawlsian moral agent then oscillates between the poles of situated submersion and transcendental jaunts.

A COMMUNITARIAN SOLUTION?

Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor argue that Rawls' predicaments can be overcome by supplanting his disembodied subject of thought with a communitarian subject. Subsequently, according to them, need for procedural theories of justice and morality will become redundant.[49] This suggestion is explored in what follows.

The Communitarian Subject

On the communitarian account, the moral subject's identity is constituted by its community.[50] The Rawlsian deontological self is individuated apart from its community. Consequently, it can detach itself from its community to revise and evaluate its aims. However, unlike this Rawlsian agent, the communitarian subject acquires its identity only within the context of the community. Hence, it cannot disengage itself from its community to engage in moral deliberation. Rather, the community to which it belongs defines its personhood and its character, which it cannot freely change.

Sandel distinguishes such a constitutive notion of the community from the instrumental and sentimental accounts of the community.[51] The former views social institutions as a liability that is necessary for agents to fulfil their personal goals. The Rawlsian sentimental view of the community treats social institutions as having intrinsic value. Here, individuals have a sentimental attachment to altruism and are not completely governed by their self-interest. Despite this, Sandel characterizes the sentimental account of the community as individualistic. For the Rawlsian subject is individuated prior to its involvement in its community. Consequently, Rawls' agent faces the

difficulty of legislating moral norms that have empirical applicability. Sandel sees the constitutive notion as non-individualistic, in that there is no subject given prior to the community. Such a subject, unlike the Rawlsian subject, can reflect upon its goals without arbitrary consequences. Its reflections are in coherence with its communitarian character. Although the latter is fixed, its contours are flexible enough to admit constant change in keeping with its community. Such a subject can distinguish between goals that are incidental and important on the basis of a vocabulary of socially accepted norms, which it inherits from its community.

Sandel and Taylor argue that the need for justice/morality becomes redundant for such a communitarian subject that can competently distinguish between significant and ordinary goals. According to Taylor, all attempts at morality are bound to collapse. This is because such attempts either postulate arbitrary goals as ideals a la utilitarianism, or formulate a single procedure that refers to the ideals of a disembodied subject.[52] The latter move is exemplified in the deontological decision procedures of Kant and Rawls. Such procedural theories, according to Sandel and Taylor, evade the complexities of the moral agent's historical engagement by offering a single scale procedure for measuring the diversity of goods. Thus, deontological ethics presupposes that it is possible for moral agents to distance themselves from their forms of life in order to contemplate the path of morality. Taylor and Sandel uphold the improbability of such a withdrawal. Further, even if such a disengagement were possible it would only result in findings that have no place in the social world. Thus, the communitarian recommendation consists in putting aside issues of justice, by turning to a situated subject and its socially accepted norms.[53] Taylor and Sandel view the situated agent's community as an intractable, harmonious whole, which provides human agency with a sense of belonging, identity, and a diverse set of goods to pursue.

It will be argued below that the watertight community and the unitary picture of subjective identity envisaged by Sandel and Taylor is not self-evident. Given this it is suggested that the notion of the subject's identity be treated as critical rather than communitarian. Consequently, justice is not dispensable, but crucial when a turn is made to the situated subject.

Critical Identity: A situated subject reveals a social environment with glaring interstices of race, caste, class and gender, rather than a harmonious community. The social milieu of the agent consists of diverse assemblages that are constituted by factors such as caste, gender, etc. These complex formations often share a pattern of unequal relations with one another. This pattern often reveals the dominant groups to be the centre and the subordinated groups at the periphery. Thus, for example, in a patriarchal society women are marginalized, while men

are at the centre. Although such a general pattern of inequality is evident, in a patriarchal society, there is no bi-polar opposition between two exclusively gendered collectivities. Such a division presupposes that men and women have fixed and eternal roles without any reference to the forces that interact with gender within history. To comprehend the structures of patriarchy, gender cannot be understood in such an ahistorical manner. Rather the interaction of gender with various factors like race, class, etc. has to be taken into account by historically locating gender. This entails taking into account the various social formations at the centre and at the periphery that depend on the way class, race and caste interact with gender. The oppressions faced by women are tied to the imbalances and inequalities between the dominant groups at the centre and the marginal groups at the periphery. Thus, the identity of the gendered subject is a complex one, where the intricacies of history and the myriad life forms that are generated by an assortment of factors other than gender have to be taken into consideration.[54] From this example it is clear that the formation of a subject's identity, whether gendered or any other, is a constant process. Sandel also recognizes this when he upholds that the subject's character is not fixed. An engaged subject could be located either at the centre or at the periphery. The description of the subject's location and the multifarious complex relations generated by this location, however, unlike Sandel's assumption, forms only a part of the subject's identity. To be socially located does not consist in inertly possessing a space, rather it involves the performance of activities. Since the latter are not done mechanically, subjects can be said to shape their selfhood and their environment through their practices. Given the prevailing structural inequalities (as the example of patriarchy shows) agents cannot continue their socially given practices in an unproblematic way, through their socially allocated roles. The activities of the situated agent could no doubt be in conformity with the demands of social location. On the other hand, agents could act in ways that critically evaluate their social locations and correct the existing imbalances of power. In the former case, agents identify with their social location and accept by conformity to it. On the other hand, critical agents do not accept their social locations, whether central or peripheral, as valid. Rather, they subject them to critical scrutiny. Hence in both cases, of conformism and critical evaluations, there is a normative point of view.[55] The conformist identity becomes problematic where there are coercions and obstacles to freedom faced by the marginalized groups. For it arbitrarily privileges the central, dominant point of view over all others as valid. Therefore, the critical identity which aims at correcting such arbitrary domination is preferable by virtue of its impartiality. Since the identity of the subject is tied with its social world, freedom in the latter becomes necessary for the agent's freedom. It is precisely due to this that there is a need for justice when a turn is made

to a socialized account of the subject. For justice and morality help in the selective rather than a blind renewal of practices.[56] Thus, for example, in a patriarchal society, subjects who have the descriptive identity of male, namely, the central location and women who descriptively have marginalized identities, could critically constitute themselves as subjects with a feminist identity. Unlike the Rawlsian subject, these subjects are not under a 'veil of ignorance' with respect to their particularities. They are very much aware of their gender and the way in which it interacts with the other factors of race, class and caste to give them the privileges they enjoy or to be the cause of their oppressions. Thus, in its critical moment of moral deliberation, the subject is not divorced from historical engagement. Rather this subject anchors the norms of freedom and equality within its life forms. It sees certain social relations as lacking in these norms. Consequently, with its dissent it aims at social change in order to incorporate these norms. The socially constituted agent is thereby enabled to pursue the bonds of solidarities, with which its identity is tied, without hinderances. Thus, Sandel's alternatives of either communitarian identity or an arbitrary moral point of view do not reflect the complete range of choices.[57] As the critical account of the subject's identity suggested above hints, morality can critically take community into account and can show new ways of forging social solidarities.

LESSONS FOR PROCEDURALISM

The above discussion has suggested that the notion of selfhood be construed critically, when the moral agent is socially situated. The communitarian resolution of Rawls' dilemmas is not satisfactory. For it does not heed to the normative dimension of selfhood that does not always conform to socially accepted norms. The compelling criticisms of Kant and Rawls against teleological ethics do not leave it open as a ready option in moral theory. A procedural theory of morality is more compatible than a teleological one with the critical identity of subjects. This is because of its commitment to impartiality and the equal freedom of all agents. Kant and Rawls help us in understanding the importance of this commitment. However, the specific articulation of procedural theory provided by Kant and Rawls remain troubling. Kant's transcendental idealism, Rawls' culture-specific assumptions and their thought-experimental models do not provide a procedural framework that can be employed by situated agents without hesitation. Hence, an alternate account of procedural ethics that is compatible with the critical identity of the situated subject is required. Given that the quandries faced by Kant and Rawls result from their abstraction of all interests, a refurbished procedural theory would have to allow as its

content particular interests and not dismiss them as individual preferences. However, the procedure in being impartial should not commit itself to particular interests or a determinate set of general interests like the Rawlsian primary goods. Rather, particular interests would enter the procedure, as content when it is employed by situated moral agents. Moral legislation would have to take the circumstances and the needs of the moral agent into account as Rawls rightly recognized. However, procedural theory cannot forward a specific set of duties, it can only provide a moral point of view. The participants who adopt the moral point of view would have to determine the concrete norms and relevant to them.

Moreover, since the procedure aims at arbitrating the immediate interests of agents among one another it cannot be confined to a mental framework. Indeed, such a framework does not allow moral agents to adopt the standpoint of the other. As Albrecht Wellmer points out merely to *think* from the standpoint of others does not guarantee that this may in fact occur.[58] For agents could very well be mistaken in determining what counts as the standpoints of others. Yet the procedural notion of the moral point of view, to which Kant and Rawls want to be faithful, aims at providing such an impartial perspective.

The critical theory of Jürgen Habermas is an attempt to linguistically reconstruct procedural theory. It aims at correcting the lacunae in Kant's and Rawls's versions of proceduralism by incorporating the content of interests in an intersubjective framework. Critical theory also wishes to retain the central insight of the Kantian and Rawlsian conception of normativity, namely, the impartiality of the moral point of view and the primacy of equal freedom of all agents. The extent of critical theory's success in this regard will have to be the subject of another discussion.[59]

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20. Ibid.

21. Rawls, *Theory*, pp. 90–95; Winfield, *Reason*, p. 109.

22. Rawls. *Theory*, pp. 62, 90–95; idem, 'Kantian Constructivism', pp. 25–26.

23. Ibid.

24. Rawls, *Theory*, pp. 116, 130–36; Chandran Kukathas, *Rawls*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1990, pp. 19–20, 24–25.

25. Ibid.

26. Rawls, 'Basic Structure', p. 161; idem, 'Kantian Constructivism', pp. 522–23.

27. Rawls, *Theory*, pp. 60–61.

28. Ibid., 3-4; idem, 'Basic Structure', pp. 160–61; idem, 'Kantian Constructivism', p. 520.

29. Such a weak sense of autonomy can be contrasted with the Kantian notion of strong autonomy that is possessed only by noumenal agents. See Robert Paul Wolff, *Understanding Rawls*, Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 113–16.

30. Andrew Levine, 'Rawls's Kantianism', *Social Theory and Practice* 3, 1974, pp. 47–63; Kukathas, p. 107.

31. Rawls, 'Basic Structure', pp. 164–65.

32. Rawls, *Theory*, p. 127.

33. Various commentators have argued as to how for Rawls the individual good is beyond arbitration. For a sample see: Robert Alexy, 'A Theory of Practical Discourse', in *The Communicative Ethics Controversy*, edited by Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990, p. 155; Charles Taylor, 'The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice', in *Philosophical Papers*, Vol.

2, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 292, 293; Winfield, *Reason*, 106; Wolff, pp. 113–16.

34. Rawls, *Theory*, pp. 20–21, 48–51; idem, *Kantian Constructivism*, 526–27, 534.

35. For Rawls's criticisms of utilitarianism and intuitionism, See Rawls, *Theory*, pp. 24–40.

36. Ibid., pp. 22–27.

37. Ibid., pp. 46–48; idem, 'Kantian Constructivism', p. 554.

38. Rawls, *Theory*, pp. 46–48, Charless Taylor, 'Atomism', in *Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 2, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1985, 190; Wolff, pp. 185–86.

39. Rawls, *Theory*, pp. 46–48; Kukathas, p. 126.

40. Various thinkers have questioned Rawls' professed value-free commitment to the assumptions in his theory. For example, see: Gerald Doppelt, 'Beyond Liberalism and Communatarianism: Towards a Critical Theory of Social Justice', *Philosophical Forum*, Winter, 1990, pp. 282–90; Benjamin Barber, 'Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Politics and Measurement in Rawls', in *Reading Rawls*, edited by Norman Daniels, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, pp. 292–318, Jürgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990, pp. 66–67; David Rasmussen, *Reading Habermas*, Blackwell, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990, pp. 62–63; Winfield, *Reason*, p. 108.

41. Rawls, 'Kantian Constructivism', p. 518.

42. Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1977, p. 198; Richard Miller, 'Rawls and Marxism', in *Reading Rawls*, edited by Norman Daniels, Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, pp. 206–29; Wolff, pp. 119–32.

43. Habermas, *Communication and Evolution*, p. 202.

44. Sandel, pp. 21, 54; Kukathas, pp. 106–8.

45. Any monological procedure would have to assume the self-sufficiency of the moral agents and the pre-established harmony of their results. For an explication of this thesis in connection with Kant, see Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978, p. 326. Also see, Kari-Otto Apel, *Towards a Transformation of Philosophy*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980, p. 329; Seyla Benhabib, 'In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: Communicative Ethics and Current Controversy in Practical Philosophy', *Philosophical Forum* 21, Fall-Winter 1989–90, p. I; Jürgen Habermas, 'Justice and Solidarity': On the discussion concerning 'Stage 6', *The Philosophical Forum* 21, Fall-Winter 1989–90, p. 35.

46. As Habermas argues the adoption of a rule presupposes an intersubjective context. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Vol. 2, *Life World and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1987, pp. 16, 17, 96-97, 115. According to Habermas, rule following requires rule competency that cannot be acquired by imitation. For competency involves recognizing the identity of the rule in a variety of contexts. This cannot be ascertained by memory, rather, it needs a public domain. Habermas acknowledges his indebtedness to Ludwig Wittgenstein for this insight. See, Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Macmillan, New York, 1958, pp. 20, 81.

47. Wolff, pp. 124–28; Benhabib, 'In the Shadow', p. 5.

48. Barber, pp. 294–95.

49. Sandel, pp. 175, 183; Taylor, 'Distributive Justice', pp. 308–17; idem, 'The Diversity of Good', in *Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 2, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 230–47.

50. Sandel, pp. 149–50; Taylor, 'Diversity', pp. 243–47.

51. Sandel, pp. 147–54; Taylor, 'Distributive Justice', p. 312.

52. Taylor, 'Diversity', pp. 245–46.

53. Sandel, pp. 181–83.
54. For a detailed discussion of this point and other related issues by a feminist philosopher, see Sandra Harding, *Whose Science? Whose knowledge?: Thinking from Women's Lives,* Open University Press, Buckingham,1991. If gender is viewed as a social relation rather than an entity, then according to Harding: 'Gender relations in any particular historical situation are always constructed by the entire array of hierarchical social relations in which 'woman' or 'man' participates', ibid., p. 14.
55. Sandra Harding has made an analogous distinction between Spontaneous consciousness and traitorous consciousness, See ibid., p. 295. Spontaneous consciousness is akin to what existentialists like Jean Paul Sartre have termed as facticity. It emerges involuntarily from the social location of the subject. Traitorous conciousness questions the positions of privilege that could be entailed in the spontaneous social location of the subject. Also see, Jürgen Habermas, 'The Limits of Neo-Historicism', interview by J.M. Ferry, in *Autonomy and Solidarity,* edited by Peter Dews, Verso, London, 1992, p. 239. Habermas has argued that both descriptive and normative ingredients are inseparable aspects of a subject's identity.
56. Habermas, 'Neo-Historicism', p. 243.
57. Richard Dien Winfield, *Overcoming Foundations,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1989, pp. 135–36.
58. Albrecht Wellmer, *The Persistence of Modernity,* MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1991, p. 141.
59. This issue has been examined in the author's doctoral dissertation, see, Kanchana Mahadevan, 'Habermas' Communicative Ethics: An Evaluation', PhD dissertation, University of Georgia, 1993.

The Concept of Justice in Liberalism

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This paper is essentially a critique of the concept of justice in philosophical liberalism. We are using the concepts of justice in the liberal thoughts of John Locke and John Rawls as case studies. Since political liberalism has its root in the philosophical liberalism, its import on African politics will be examined with citations from some works by African and Nigerian thinkers. Some of the salient features of philosophical liberalism are:

(a) It appealed to natural law to answer questions of obligation, right and morality;

(b) It stressed individualism and individual rights and sought to justify its position by an appeal to reason;

(c) Liberalism is marked by a distrust of government and a complete trust on man;

(d) Power and authority must be limited by the ends they serve, because they are but means to an end; and

(e) The concept of power and authority are to be judged by reference to their purpose as well as the regularities of the natural law that define mutual obligations and duties.

These are the basic propositions which the individual liberalists and liberalists of different western countries and epochs share. It is believed that liberalism is difficulty to define because some liberalists would uphold proposition 'b' and reject proposition 'c'.

In the history of western liberal traditions, we have the English liberalism, the French liberalism and the German liberalism.

JOHN LOCKE'S THEORY OF JUSTICE

It is often believed that John Locke is the founder of the Age of Reason. He was in the forefront of those who explicitly formulated the philosophy of modern, western, bourgeois industrial democracies. He lived between 1632 and 1704. He is a systematic philosopher who made profound to philosophy.

For the purpose of clarity let us look at the philosophical origin of Locke's concept of property right. A Dutch natural law writer, Hugo

Grotius contended that non-human nature belonged to all human beings in common and that individual men or women could come by agreement privately to own parts of it. Filmer could not see this argument sound because it is inconsistent for God to have created a community and at the same time prescribed private ownership. Firstly, Filmer could not see the historical plausibility in which human species as a whole coming together and agreeing unanimously to divide up ownership over all that they collectively possessed. 'If property is a matter of right and if all men originally owned everything, then no man could lose his right to everything without consciously choosing to abandon it'.[1] Secondly, he questioned whether the unanimous consent of all living human beings at a particular time could bind any subsequent human beings who had not themselves been a party to the agreement, or whether even such unanimous consent would necessarily bind any of the original contractor who had subsequently changed his mind about its merits. Filmer contended 'that property could only be practically secure and legally valid, if, like political authority itself, it were the direct expression of the will of God. Once it was seen as resting on human decision and commitment any right was open to indefinite revision'.[2] John Locke was largely in agreement with Filmer on this point. However, it prompted him to answer fully the main critical trust of Filmer's attack on Grotius, the question of how men can come to have a private right to any part of a common heritage. It is his answer to these questions which constitutes his theory of property.

According to Locke, 'Labour is what distinguishes what is privately owned from what is held in common; the labour of man's body and the works of his hands'.[3] He says that labour is creative activity that puts the difference of value of everything we enjoy in this world. He emphasizes the dependence of wealth on labour, and of labour on individual freedom. He says, 'if we will rightly consider things as they come to our use, and cast up what in them is purely owing to nature and what to labour, we shall find that in most of them ninety-nine hundredth are wholly to be put on account of labour'.[4] According to him, 'it is labour that puts the greatest part of the value on land, without which it would scarcely be worth anything'.[5] The logic or reasoning of Locke's argument is that labour is the criterion or yardstick of measuring who owns property. A man's labour, therefore is the foundation of individual property.

Locke's principles are at the bottom of the science of wealth. And it incidentally touches principles which are at the root of modern socialism. From Lockean analysis, it is observed that a man could not with his labour appropriate what is more than enough for him. Therefore, according to John Dunn, 'Right and convenience went together; for as a man had right to all he could employ his labour upon so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of'.[6] But,

according to John Locke, the invention of money increases the inequality of possessions made possible by the different degrees of industry which men display. 'It makes it possible for a man fairly to possess more than he can use the product of. Since he can hoard up, without injury to anyone, the value of the surplus which his property produces in the form of gold and silver'.[7] Although John Locke did seem to appreciate the effect of money on right to properties, his doctrine of rights and labour paradoxically lead to the greatest inequality in the modern capitalist world.

Locke's doctrine is the direct ancestor of the famous Bill of Rights in the American constitution. The Bill of Rights maintains 'that the government is powerless to abridge certain types of conduct of the citizenry; such as the freedom to speak, to worship as one pleases and so on'.[8] The main right which Locke emphasized, however, was the right to own private property. This is because, private property is, to a great extent the fruit of one's labour.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF JOHN LOCKE

It could be recalled that John Locke says that labour is the origin of property, and that it would be unjust to deny somebody the property he/she acquires through his labour. It could be recalled that Karl Marx used the concept of labour to illustrate the inhuman process in the capitalist economy. But the difference is that in Marx, everyone is to participate in the labour process without owners of labour while in John Locke's doctrine, there is ownership of labour and therein lies the root of capitalism. Critics have pointed out that if labour is the origin of property, then at least at its origin, entitlement and merit would be fused together and the consequences for mankind as a whole can leave little ground for anxiety. Those who possess more will be those who deserve to do so and they would have no reason to apologise to those who deserve and possess less. But it is a fact that there has been a lot of anxiety especially in the capitalist societies over wide disparities in income and properties among individuals. According to C.S. Momoh, Nigeria suffers from problems which are universal with capitalism. The most fundamental of those problems is the issue property wealth and riches and their acquisition and distribution. The other universal problem at capitalism is that of government control of big businesses. Any Nigerian government has a modicum of responsibility to its sovereignty and it is natural that it cannot just allow big business to operate with a blank cheque and on a *tabula rasa*'.[9]

If there is anything that dealt a serious blow on John Locke's doctrine, it is money. The invention and the introduction of money in the market has encouraged the primitive accumulation of wealth by the few to the detriment and resentment of many. According to John Dunn, 'Money

had introduced in full measure reasons for quarrelling about title, and doubts about largeness of possession.[10] Money encouraged and abaited the irrational traits of man to sublimate, thereby encouraging injustices which under rational circumstances should not have occurred. In Africa, before the introduction of western monetary system, man was relatively rational and had no need to unduly accumulate properties or agricultural assets and products. Indeed, it could be recalled that John Locke noted with misgiving the barter system which existed before the introduction of money in market. And according to him it was to safeguard agricultural products from perishing that the need for money or unperishable means of exchange arose. He says, 'And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent man would take in exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life'.[11] According to Locke, by the invention of money, men solved the basic economic problems of their original condition. The original condition here is the condition of waste and spoiling of agricultural produce which, according to him, had to be rectified by the introduction of money. John Locke used the invention of currency or durable material in exchange of the perishable products to justify inequalities of possession. To him it is natural. He says:

> 'it is plain that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth. They, having by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out a way how a man may fairly possess more than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus, gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to anyone, these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor.'[12]

Locke believed that the inequalities of possessions, necessitated by differentials in industry and expertise of men, would better the condition of the worst-off man. If John Locke had been alive today, he would definitely be disappointed over how his theory has been conveniently used to exploit the majority in the capitalist West. Man is a genus of irrationality and rationality. Sometimes, the irrationality overtakes and overshadows the rational aspect of man. So man should not be trusted because these are irrational traits in him. Some conditions, philosophies, ideologies, theories and so on can promote the irrational elements in man and this is what John Locke's theory on justice with regard to rights and properties did. Today, western capitalism and its influences in African countries like Nigeria is a testimony. Professor Claude Eke argues that it is difficult to escape the pitfalls of capitalism. 'Capitalism tendentially trivializes the problem of unemployment and though it uniquely produces it in its most tragic form. It is the capitalist mode of production which has produced the workless person. . . . The workless

person is the outcome of two related aspects of capitalism, the automization of precapitalist social structures and the emergence of market society, the society of individuals who relate to each other according to the calculus of self-interest'.[13] But for C.S. Momoh, the problem of capitalism though local, can be said to be general in the sense that they apply to countries that are also developing using the capitalistic mode of operation. Some of the problems are created in capitalistic mode of operation. Some of the problems are created in association. . . . To use a current example (1986) many Nigerians agreed with multinationals because the IMF did not give Nigeria a loan on a platter as generosity and philanthropy.[14]

Again it could be recalled that Locke's doctrine of rights is based on the idea of 'natural rights'. That is rights that men enjoyed in the state of nature before the emergence of organized society. Critics have observed that such a claim is incomprehensible since it is difficult to know how rights could exist before there existed a government and a system of law to grant them and to uphold them. Locke makes a prescriptive claim that men ought to have certain rights. Critics say this must cast some doubts on the validity of Locke's argument, which seems to be based on a belief that in a state of nature men do have these rights in some literal descriptive sense. He says:

> 'And reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions. . . . And being furnished with like faculties sharing all in one community of nature there cannot be supposed only such subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours.'[15]

So the dictate of the law of nature is not only descriptive but also different from Hobbes's state of nature which is a state of war. It seems that Hobbes's state of nature which was a state of peace was in the subsequent generations and the present day turned into a state of war and irrationality by Locke's doctrine of rights. Again, the rights we feel men ought to have may be incompatible with the notion of 'the public good'. Locke had held that the purpose of government is to preserve certain rights and at the same time work for the public good. But there may be cases where we cannot do both if we are the government. Take for example the Nigerian law that stipulates the killing of armed robbers by a firing squad. Should we say that the armed robbers should not be killed because man has a right to life? But it is not for public good that armed robbers should live to kill and terminate the lives of other people in the community. So I think it is just that the right to live of some killers or armed robbers should be taken away from them for public good. Democratic philosophers have agreed that men cannot

have absolute freedom against the state having absolute authority over man. A more moderate interpretation of rights is that 'rights are those areas which can only be infringed with majority consent or when the public welfare is genuinely at stake'.[16]

Another critical thrust of Locke's political theory is his notion of majority rule which critics have observed could degenerate into tyranny. Take for example a society where the majority are Moslems. It is ninety per cent certain that the Moslem will always support laws that are pro-Islamic. And a law that caters to the interest of the majority Moslems in a society of Moslems, Christians, Buddhists and African traditionalists will be unjust. It should be recalled that current forms of democracy are generally systems based on the majority principle of Locke or liberalism. Professor Wiredu draws a distinction between majoritarian democracy and consensual democracy to show that there is no necessary connection between democracy and the multi-party system which is peculiar to the western liberalism of John Locke. For him, democracies based on consensus may be called consensual democracies. 'The Ashanti (Ghana) system was a consensual democracy. It was a democracy because government was by the consent and subject to the control of the people as expressed through their representatives. It was consensual because, at least, as a rule, that consent was negotiated on the principle of consensus'.[17] African traditional politics, at least in some well-known instances, offered example of democracy without a multiparty mechanism. It argues that one of the most persistent causes of political instability in Africa derives from the fact that in so many contemporary African states certain ethnic groups have found themselves in the minority both numerically and politically. Under a system of majoritarian democracy this means that, even with all the safeguards, they will consistently find themselves outside the corridors of power.

JOHN RAWLS'S THEORY OF JUSTICE

I am certain that John Rawls's theory of justice is a prodigious attempt to reconstruct the liberal theory of justice and make them acceptable to the world where the gap between the rich and the poor is increasingly assuming an alarming dimension. He says, 'My guiding aim is to work out a theory of justice that is a viable alternative to these doctrines which have long dominated our philosophical traditions'.[18] He says that every person possesses an inalienable right founded on justice. For example, in a just society, the liberties of equal citizenship are secured by justice and not subjected to political bargaining or the calculus of social interests. According to him, the notions of 'an arbitrary distinction' and 'proper balance' are to be interpreted on the basis of his principles of justice.

THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE

'Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. (2) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a)   reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage and
(b)   attached to positions and offices open to all.'[19]

He says that the principle of justice is helpful in formulating restrictions as to how practises may define positions and offices, and assign these to powers and liabilities, rights and duties. By persons, he means either particular human beings or collective agencies, and by practises he means 'any form of activity specified by a system of rules which define offices and roles, rights and duties'.[20] These principles express justice as a complex of three ideas: liberty, equality and reward to services contributing to the common goal.

According to Rawls, justice and fairness are different concepts but they share a fundamental element in common, that is the concept of reciprocity. They represent this concept in two distinct cases: 'justice to a practise in which there is no option whether to engage in it or not and fairness to a practice in which there is such an option.'[21] Rawls's conception of justice as reciprocity when applied to the practise of slavery with its offices of slaveholder and slave, would not allow one to consider the advantages of the slaveholder in the first place. This is because that office is not in accordance with the principle which could be mutually acknowledged. Rawls argues that unless justice is founded upon 'the mutual acknowledgement of principle by fee and equal persons',[22] it becomes subject to the contingencies of force and circumstances. The principle of reciprocity requires of a practice that it satisfies those principles which the person who participates in it could reasonably propose for mutual acceptance under the circumstance and conditions of hypothetical account.

In his theory of justice, Rawls argued for the economic adequacy for worst-off man. Economic adequacy, a future of the special conception of justice, is attained when the search for food, shelter, and work has become routine rather than urgent. The economic condition for the priority of the basic liberties is sufficient wealth for basic liberties to be effectively exercised. This is economic adequacy which must extend to the citizens who are economically the worst off in a society in order for that society to meet this condition.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF JOHN RAWLS

Criticism of Rawls's theory of justice has taken different forms. Some have criticized him from the left, that is, from the vantage point of its underlying conception of self-respect and human dignity. Others have

pointed out some conceptual, philosophical and practical difficulties inherent in his theory.

A criticism of Rawls's system of justice from the left is concentrated on Rawls inadequate conception of the social reality of self-respect. Rawls says that liberty enjoys priority over economic benefits and that justice requires equal liberty but allows unequal economic benefits. According to the utilitarians there are so many more utilities (social goods) to be balanced against one another in a quantitative calculus designed to maximize overall human satisfaction. But Rawls says that the utilitarians obsfucates the central moral distinction between two irreducible different kinds of primary social goods; those whose distribution implicates human dignity and self-respect as against those whose distribution only effects persons' capacity to satisfy their desire. On Rawls's conception of the social basis of self-respect, basic civil liberties and political rights fall into the first category. Economic goods like income; wealth, institutional authority, economic power and social position fall into the second category. Rawls says equality of self-respect is perfectly compatible with unequal economic advantage; as realm of instrumental rationality economic life requires inequality to maximize the material prospects of all. Rawls's 'conception of self-respect identifies the social basis of self-respect with the position of equal citizenship within constitutional democracy, and detaches it from the position of individuals within socio-economic institutions.'[23] Critically speaking 'Rawls does not sufficiently separate his own theory of justice from utilitarian standpoint; he emancipates the constitutional state from a utilitarian standpoint which however continues to govern economic life.'[24] What Rawls is implying in his theory is that the individual as citizen and political agent is no utilitarian but actively engages in a free life with dignity and equality. However, as a socio-economic being he is a utilitarian concerned with maximization of his material benefits within the constraints of fairness. Rawls 'identifies the classical philosophical distinction between the higher realm of human freedom or dignity and the lower, of mere desire or satisfaction with the distinction between the state and the economic life in the society.'[25] According to Gerald Doppelt, this way of separating the state from the economy, stemming from his conception of self-respect as bourgeois democratic citizenship incorporates a structurally necessary, but morally pernicious feature of capitalism. Following empirical research concerning the social reality of self-respect within capitalist democracy, questions have been raised concerning the methodological status of Rawls's own conception of self-respect within capitalist democracy. In the post-colonial African literatures and journals, writers are prone to arguing that there is nothing like self-respect in capitalist democracy. This is always captured in the Marxian concept of alienation. For Kwame Nkruma, 'The evil of capitalism consist in its alienation of the fruit of labour from those who

with the toil of their body and the sweat of their brow produces this fruit. This aspect of capitalism makes it irreconcilable with those basic principles which animate the traditional African society. Capitalism is unjust; in our newly independent countries, it is not only too complicated to be workable, it is also alien.'[26]

It seems from the leftist point of view that Rawls's theory does not recognize any problems of social injustice arising from the unequal positions characteristic of a capitalist economy, other than whether they admit of equality of opportunity and maximize the income of the worst-off. According to Obafemi Awolowo, capitalism is an incurably exploitative and corruptive system. It helped to destroy feudalism and slavery and, as a result, the Seifs were released and the slaves became free. But it continues, under various subtle guises, to exploit the masses of the people in the same way as the feudal lords and the slave owners had done. He says that 'Capitalism is an incorrigibly planless system. What planning can there be in a community or state where the rule is that every person or group of persons should pursue their own self-interest in order more effectively to promote, the interests of others. . . as a result of plannlessness, the system is plagued with interminable crises.[27] There is good reason to believe that under capitalism inequalities of power positions surrounding the labour process and various sorts of inequalities connected with the way income and wealth are distributed both generate serious injuries to self-respect. Rawls's second principle, to the leftists, is reformist. It tolerates inequalities of power and income that better the condition of the worst-off. Rawls's way of distinguishing between the public and private sectors of society reflects an essential feature of capitalism. The injuries to self-respect in the labour process, according to Gerald Doppelt partly stems from the self-stultification implicit in its most powerless positions. Critics of Rawls's system do not dispute the importance of the classical democratic liberties and political participation for human dignity. However, they believe it is implausible to discount the central role which positions of individuals within productive life play in shaping and distributing social access to recognition and self-respect. Rawlsian reform, according to them, will continue to generate serious injuries to human dignity resulting from its characteristic division of economic power. 'It is not the case that in a Rawlsian social system, as opposed to a utilitarian one, ordinary individuals will experience rough equality in the social basis of self-respect and on this basis support its principles and institutions.'[28]

Researchers have traced alcoholism, crime, drug addiction, political cynicism, juvenile delinquency, and so on, to the injustice of self-respect in the labour process. Rawls's system in allowing unemployment, powerlessness on the job may have similar problems. For Julius Nyerere, defenders of capitalism claim that millionaires wealth is the just reward for his ability or enterprise. But this claim is not borne out by the facts.

The wealth of the millionaire depends as little on the enterprise or abilities of the millionaires himself as the power of feudal monarchs depended on his own efforts, enterprise or brain. Both are users, exploiters, of the abilities and enterprise of other people. He says that, 'even when we have an exceptionally intelligent and hardworking millionaire, the difference between his intelligence, his enterprise, his hardwork, and those of other members of society, cannot possibly be proportionate to the difference between their 'rewards'. There must be something wrong in a society where one man, however hardworking or clever he may be, can acquire as great a reward 'as a thousand of his fellows' can acquire between them.[29] Rawls's system appropriates the historical achievement of bourgeois democracy; the assumption that all individuals possess equal dignity, the demand that a just society must embody this equality of dignity, the equal liberties of bourgeois democratic citizenship and formal equality of opportunity, of self-respect is uncritically derived. Rawls's theory seems to incorporate capitalist democracy's own official assumptions concerning the basis of human dignity instead of developing an independent socio-empirical argument for or against the tenability of these assumptions. It uncritically incorporates a major structural limitation which capitalism places upon the extension of human dignity. This constitutes the negative ideological dimension of Rawls's thought.

From the Left, critics contend the derivation of the bourgeois democratic liberties because they excluded a kind of self-determination which has become increasingly important in the social dynamics of self-development and respect in modern society. This kind of self-determination calls for a system of democratic socialist liberties surrounding the labour process which goes well beyond the Rawlsian liberties of the first principle and which is incompatible with the kind of unequal economic rights and powers permitted by the second principle. According to Gerald Doppelt, Rawls's discussions do not yield a philosophical criterion of basic liberty. Therefore he has no argument from his Kantian conception of the person. And his social conception of bourgeois democratic liberties as the true content of self-determination and proper social basis of self-respect is ideological because it is uncritically derived from the structure and official self-understanding of capitalist democracy. Professor Claude Ake stresses the inapplicability of bourgeois democratic right in Africa. He says that 'the notion of human rights stresses rights which are not very interesting in the context of African realities. . . . They appeal to people with a full stomach who can now afford to pursue the more esoteric aspects of self-realization. The vast majority of our people are not in this position. . . . There is no freedom for hungry people, or those eternally oppressed by disease'.[30] There is no democracy where there is no equality for as inequality increases it reduces human relations to subordination and

domination. Theorists seem to agree that traditional African societies are structurally communalistic. But some have been careful enough to explain the difference between communalism and communism to ensure that the description does not imply a rejection of the capitalist form in favour of socialism.'[31] However the efforts of these theorists to formulate a new social and political formula that reflects the uniqueness of African society has been either a balanced synthesis at the two dominant world ideologies or a framework that leans on one of the ideologies.

Critics have also pointed out some areas of superiority of Marxian tradition over Rawlsian bourgeois-democratic liberties. 'Marxian paradigm postulates an essential link between human freedom and the division of labour within economic life: as such it marks a significant break with the bourgeois-democratic conception of freedom. For on this paradigm, the freedom and dignity of the individual requires in the first instance that they exercise control over their labouring activity.'[32] In Marxian tradition, 'the labour process involved human interests, activities and aspect of life sufficiently important to ground claims of basic liberties and rights for all. Free and equal rational beings will be concerned with the domain of labour or an area of life and activity in which their most essential human capacities as free and equal rational beings will either be nurtured or starved. The dignity of self-determination will require the practise of freedom not simply in personal and national political life but within the institutions of labour.'[33] Given this socialist paradigm, it is worthy of note that Rawls–Kantian conception of the person failed to appreciate that individuals in modern industrial society ought to identify the social basis of self-respect with their participation in the labour process.

CONCLUSION

Apart from the theoretical and practical difficulties we have observed in liberal conceptions of justice, it seems to me that the injustices inherent in liberal individualism are attributable to their metaphysical conceptions of the society. The nature of their theories seems to portray them as idealists. To the liberal idealists, the apartheid in South Africa was brought about by the 'ill will' or 'evil intention' of white people who don't wish to face up to reality while a materislist would attribute apartheid to the material system of capitalist exploitation which makes apartheid highly profitable for financial investors, factory owners and the giant farms.

Some believe that the injustices Africa and her people suffer were sowed and nurtured by western and Christian idealism, using their liberal democracy as an ideological front. It is against this background that some critics have advocated materialism as an epistemological and theoretical doctrine for the explanation of the society. Some of those

critics argued that materialism is the only philosophy today which can rationally explain the world of nature and society and thus enable people to control their own lives and rid mankind of injustices, inequalities and exploitations of capitalism.

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Oakeshott on Present, Future and Past

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INTRODUCTION

Michael Oakeshott in his essay 'Present, Future and Past' advances a theory of present, future and past, and then classifies and discusses the various modes of future and past, including the specifically historical mode of past.[1] This essay is part of a trilogy; the second and third essays are entitled 'Historical Events' and 'Historical Change' respectively.[2] There is a sharp divide between the discussion of present, future and past in the first essay and the content of the second and third essays. The discussion is philosophy of mind, because the various sorts of future and past are treated as different kinds of *awarenesses* of present, while the second and third essays are epistemological in orientation, being concerned with the structure of historical explanation, and how it differs from non-historical types of explanation.[3]

The present paper attempts a critique of Oakeshott's theory of present, future and past, using the tools of linguistic analysis. It is organized in three parts. The first part sets out Oakeshott's argument in detail, the second examines his theory of present, future and past and the third examines his discussion of the different types of past.

OAKESHOTT'S ARGUMENT

Oakeshott writes:

> The world upon which I open my eyes is unmistakably present. If I stand at the street corner and describe to myself what I perceive I speak to myself in the present tense. But even for me, a relatively unconcerned spectator, this present may be (and usually is) qualified by an awareness of future or of past or of both future and past.[4]

If I perceive a man standing on the kerb, the present is not significantly qualified but if what I perceive (owing to the way he stands, the expression on his face) is a man waiting to cross the street, present is qualified by awareness of future, and this awareness is evoked by attending exactly

to the present.[5] 'Future, then, is an understanding of present in terms of a change it may be perceived to intimate'.[6]

If I perceive a man with a wooden leg hobbling by, present is not significantly qualified but if what I perceive is a man who has lost a leg, present has been qualified by awareness of past, and this awareness is achieved in a reading of the present which evokes the past. 'Past, then, is an understanding of present in terms of a change it may be perceived to record or to conserve'.[7]

Both future and past therefore emerge only in a reading of the present.

There are a variety of modes of future and past. Each of these is related to a particular sort of present (is, in fact, a particular sort of present) and is to be distinguished in terms of the distinguishing conditions of that present, which include a procedure in which it is evoked. We begin in a present of objects and happenings and future and past are evoked from them. An object or happening is identified or recognized not only as something perceived, but in terms of some modal condition, for example, practical value, aesthetic value, historical significance. When we perceive an object or happening in terms of its practical value, we understand it in terms of its eligibility in satisfying our wants. But with every want, we evoke the future. Therefore whenever we recognize an object or happening in terms of its eligibility in satisfying our wants, we live in a future. We can call this present a present-future of practical engagement.

There is also a practical concern with the past which is 'our concern with present objects in relation to ourselves, to ascertain their worth to us and to use them for the satisfaction of our wants'.[8] This practical present-past is diverse. There is first an encapsulated past. The encapsulated (or assimilated) past is everything that has happened to us which gives us our present capacities and tendencies, for example, the past training which gives me my present musical skill, the past exposure which gives me my rheumatic shoulder. There is a remembered past. Then, there is a recollected or consulted past which is composed of two different sorts of things. It is composed partly of those of our experiences which we recollect for our guidance and those of others which are recollected by them when we approach them for guidance. What is significant is not the pastness of the experiences but their relevance to present circumstances. It is also composed of message-bearing survivals. These are partly references to historical events preserved in our practical vocabulary which we use to express our understandings of situations, for example, 'So and so has met his Waterloo'. It is composed as well of artefacts surviving from the past which we identify in terms of their practical value, for example, a gold Roman coin perceived as a commercial object, the Babri Masjid perceived as a political instrument by Hindu nationalists, who use this recently

demolished medieval mosque allegedly built on the site of a Hindu temple to mobilize Hindu support for themselves by holding out the prospect of building a temple on the site.

Then, there is a non-practical historical past. Historical understanding is concerned solely with the past. The objects of historical understanding are in the present but speak solely of the past. They are understood as survivals only and not as having messages or practical significance for us. These objects—utterances and artefacts—were once performances, *res gestae* (things done). They 'belong to a bygone present-future of practical engagment'[9] and it is the historian's task to evoke the antecedents of these objects from these objects.

OAKESHOTT'S THEORY OF PRESENT, FUTURE AND PAST

To begin with, Oakeshott talks continuously of 'present', 'future' and 'past' as if they were entities in their own right, things we can know or think about or experience by themselves. But 'present', 'future' and 'past' are relation-words like 'before', 'after', 'above' and 'below'. They do not denote anything independent of objects and happenings and capable of being known, or thought about, or experienced by themselves. They indicate the temporal order in which things and events appear cannot be known or thought about or experienced apart from those things or events. Oakeshott uses these concepts in a substantive and not an adjectival way. He writes as if he has never heard of Aristotle's distinction between the category of substances, which alone exist separately, and the other categories like temporality, which exist only as qualities of substances.

One can know or think about future and past objects and events but one cannot experience them. One can know or think about or experience (or perceive or attend to) present objects and events. But here one must enter a qualification. 'Present' is a word without sharp boundaries and can lead us into confusion. We can talk of the objects and events we experience being in the present provided our definition of present is sufficiently broad to allow for the time taken for the light from the man who is waiting to cross the street to reach my eyes, the airwaves created by a flash of lightning to reach my ears, so that I can hear the clap of thunder and so on. Oakeshott's 'The world upon which I open my eyes is unmistakably present' is not an unchallengeable statement.[10] This is an important point in astronomy; the galaxy I see is what it was millions of years ago and I would not say it is 'present'. But for the historian, this point is not of much importance. The Battle of Waterloo is 'past' and he cannot experience it, although he can know and think about it. The documents concerning the battle are 'present' and he can know or think about them or perceive them.

'Present' can give difficulty not just in regard to what we experience,

but in regard to experiencing itself. When we say we experience something, our use of the present tense requires the act of experiencing to be in the present. But, as Saint Augustine noted, whatever has duration is something that has gone into the past, even if the duration is for an infinitesimal fraction of a second. Therefore, we could take the view that we never experience anything; we are always in the position of being about to experience something or having already experienced it. Of course, this paradox can be avoided if our understanding of present is the conventional one, if it is sufficiently broad to cover what in certain moods we might be tempted to call the immediate past, if our understanding of present is not that of a point-instant with no extension at all.[11]

We come next to Oakeshott's use of 'aware'. Oakeshott relies very heavily on this word, both in the verb and noun forms. The word has two different meanings in everyday usage. It can mean 'know about' and it is invariably used in this way when it makes sense to say one is 'not aware'. (In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein makes the same point in regard to 'know').[12] For example, a lawyer may point out a difficulty in executing a legal document and I may say I am aware of it or not aware of it. The word is also used of experience, that is, of the deliverances of the senses. Here again, it is invariably used when it makes sense to say one is not aware. For example, if I am coming out of a coma, the doctor may want to know if I am aware, or not aware, of his presence in the room.[13]

According to Oakeshott, when I perceive that a man is waiting to cross the street or has lost a leg, present is qualified by awareness of future or past. It is unclear which use of 'aware' Oakeshott is thinking of. If the first use is intended, the use is a tautologous extension of the idea of perceiving that a man is waiting to cross the street or has lost a leg. 'Perceive' is a philosopher's word which connotes knowing something about a sense-datum. When I perceive that a man is waiting to cross the street or has lost a leg, I know, or am aware, that he is waiting to cross the street or has lost a leg. And if I know this, I also know, or am aware, that the crossing of the street will take place in the future and the loss of the leg happened in the past. Oakeshott's propositions are what Wittgenstein calls grammatical propositions—that is, analytic propositions whose truth is guaranteed by the meanings of words, which contain no additional information about the world. It makes no sense to deny them, one cannot imagine what it would be like for them to be untrue. They can be mistaken for empirical propositions, as may be happening in Oakeshott's case.[14]

If 'aware' is being used in the second sense, Oakeshott is making a false claim, because we do not experience the future crossing of the street, or the past loss of a leg.

In all probability, Oakeshott is unconsciously mingling the two uses and his repeated use of 'aware' in regard to 'future' and 'past' beguiles

the reader into thinking that future and past are somehow items in the flow of our experience. There is no state of awareness of future or past over and above my perceiving that the man will cross the street or has lost a leg. Oakeshott talks of becoming aware of 'future' and 'past' by 'attending exactly' to a present (that is, a present object or event). There is no act of attending to the present over and above my noticing that a man is going to cross the street or has lost a leg. Oakeshott's verbal structures involving 'aware' and 'attend' do not denote independent structures in the world of experience. One can apply these concepts of awareness of future and past, and attending to the present, only through the concepts of perceiving or noticing that a man in going to cross the street or has lost a leg. One cannot say anything about this awareness of or attending to a temporal mode in its own right, that is, independently of the perceiving or the noticing of the man.

Moreover, 'aware' is being used in an innovative way, of what is unmistakably there, of what will unmistakably happen or has unmistakably happened. It does not make sense to say that someone is not aware in these circumstances, unless that someone is an infant or a retarded person.

Oakeshott's terminology is innovative and idle, just as it would be innovative and idle to say, when I understand a sentence in the future or past tense, that the understanding 'evokes awareness of future or past' (In fact, Oakeshott does say at one point that the word 'lost' evokes past).[15] The expression would have no separate correlative in the world of experience. Understanding, like perception, connotes awareness (that is, knowledge) of something. The concept of 'evoking awareness of future or past' can be applied only through the concept of understanding a sentence in the future or past tense.

Again, Oakeshott's assertion that future and past 'emerge' only in a reading of present[16] encourages us to think that future or past have somehow become contemporaneous with us. But this use of 'emerge' makes sense only as a metaphorical way of saying that an object or event which suggests a future or past object or event to us, does so in the present, or that when we think of a future or past object or event, we do so in the present. Since a metaphor is a description or term that is only imaginatively and not literally applicable to the thing described or named,[17] one cannot think in metaphors in analytical work. The use of metaphors is a sign that the analysis is still in an infantile stage, that the analyst lacks familiarity with his real subject-matter.[18] Which meteorologist would want to say that the cloud pattern he is studying resembles a camel? And if he does so, how could he develop the idea? The literal meaning given here is true by definition. The use of the present tense ('suggests', 'think') requires the action to be in the present.

Future, according to Oakeshott, is an understanding of present in terms of a change it may be perceived to intimate, and past an understanding of present in terms of a change it may be perceived to conserve.[19] If I perceive a man standing on a kerb or hobbling by, there is no awareness of future or past, because no change is intimated or conserved. Oakeshott is guilty of a categorial confusion. Whether something is future or past depends on when it happens, not on what it is. Continuation, which is the opposite of change, may also be future or past. If I perceive a man who will go on standing on a kerb, or a man who has been hobbling along, I am aware (in Oakeshott's notation) of future and past, although these are cases of continuation, not change.

It is a subjectivist exaggeration to say, as Oakeshott does, that future and past are particular sorts of understandings of present. What happened in the past, or will happen in the future, had and will have a reality independent of any understanding of present objects or events. It is true—and this is what the formulation amounts to—that if I am aware of a future or past object or event, I am aware of it in the present, but this is an analytic truth; where else can I *be* aware of anything other than in the present?

Again, when Oakeshott talks of future and past as each a particular sort of 'understanding' or 'reading' of present (of present objects and events, that is),[20] 'understanding' and 'reading' are used in distorted ways. We talk of 'understanding' when what is understood is likely to be difficult for a competent person to discern, when there is a distinct possibility of his not understanding, when deliberation would be justifiable even if it does not happen. 'Reading' here is synonymous with 'interpretation'. What is read or interpreted is something that a competent person finds puzzling, which leads to deliberation which results in a reading or interpretation. But the man who is waiting to cross the street or who has lost a leg does not enter my life as an enigma but as something thoroughly familiar (he may be an enigma for a child or a retarded person).The effect of Oakeshott's terminology is to muddy the psychological waters, to make something 'given', a pre-inferential awareness, an everyday phenomenon, appear as inferential knowledge or recondite knowledge of some sort.

According to Oakeshott again, each time we experience a want, we 'evoke a future'.[21] It is a complete delusion to think that the words 'evoke a future' have, as a correlative in the world of experience, anything different from experiencing the want. The concept is parasitic upon that of experiencing the want. It can be applied only through it; we cannot say anything about it in its own right. 'Live in the future' which Oakeshott uses,[22] does not again denote anything different from experiencing the want. Both are metaphors improperly used in analytical writing.

Oakeshott uses the word 'evoke' very often.[23] The meaning of 'evoke' is specific. It refers to the stirring of the imagination by something, the arousing of certain sorts of feelings or thoughts (this is not the result of the stirring of the imagination, but what the stirring of the imagination amounts to). There is a dualism, there is something that evokes and something that is evoked. But in the case of the man who is waiting to cross the street or has lost a leg, there is a perception but no second thing which is evoked. Although Oakeshott says that future and past are forms of present, he tends to think about them in dualistic terms, as shown by his use of 'evoke'. Another example is when he talks of the practical present as a counterpart of the practical past.[24]

Oakeshott maintains that each of his modes is evoked from a present object or event by a particular procedure.[25] In most of these cases, there is, in fact, no procedure at all. A procedure is a preordained series of steps. When I perceive a man who will cross the street, or has lost a leg, there is no procedure which I use to get to know that he will cross the street or has lost a leg. The perception is not one thing and the knowledge another, which I get to know through a preordained series of steps; the knowledge is contained in the perception. The man who will cross the street or has lost a leg enters my life as a man who will cross the street or has lost a leg.

Oakeshott says that we always identify or recognize objects and events ('at least tacitly') in terms of some modal condition[26] such as practical value, aesthetic value or historical value. The words 'identify' and 'recognize' are used in a distorted way. These words are properly used in contexts where there is difficulty or likely difficulty in identifying or recognizing, where the phenomena in question are unfamiliar, when it would make sense not to be able to identify or recognize. It is not at all necessary, for the use of these words to be correct, that there should be an effort to identify or recognize although an effort would be understandable. But the man who will cross the street or has lost a leg is familiar, an everyday occurrence, so it does not make sense for me to talk of identifying or recognizing or of not identifying or not recognizing.

Moreover, Oakeshott's man who is waiting to cross the street or has lost the leg has no evident practical, aesthetic or historical significance. It is clear that objects can be neutral in this respect. The concept of 'tacit' identification or recognition poses problems. The word 'tacit' derives its meaning from the possibility of doing something publicly. One agrees tacitly, or acquiesces tacitly, instead of agreeing or acquiescing publicly. But mentalistic concepts like 'recognition' and 'identification' (Oakeshott uses the second word to mean a private process; he is not thinking of something public, like identification at a police line-up) are inherently private and it is unclear what it is to do such things publicly. Perhaps Oakeshott means that one is aware (that

is, one knows) that any object or event one perceives has the potential to acquire significance, but this is not tacit recognition.

Oakeshott's position leads us unavoidably into extravagances. If we are tempted to say, with Oakeshott, that the perception of a man waiting to cross the street evokes awareness of future, we could cure ourselves of the temptation by reflecting that by the same logic, the perception should evoke awareness of other categories as well—of substance twice over (man and street) and action twice over (waiting and crossing). Similarly, if the perception that a man has lost a leg evokes awareness of past, it must also evoke awareness of substance twice over (man and leg) and undergoing (losing). There is no way of avoiding such excesses once Oakeshott's position is granted. This position leads us into uncertainties as well. If I understand a sentence in a historical document, is the awareness of past evoked once or twice—first by the document and then by the sentence? If the sentence in question is in the present tense, is the present evoked as well? The heart of the matter, of course, is that the awareness is not a second thing which is different from the perception or the understanding, but simply a new and misleading label for the perception or understanding.

OAKESHOTT'S CLASSIFICATION SCHEME

Let us turn now to the various temporal modes. Oakeshott discusses in detail a present-future of practical engagement, a present-past of practical engagement, which is subdivided into an encapsulated present-past, a remembered present-past, a recollected or consulted present-past and finally a non-practical historical present-past. However, both logic and references elsewhere in the text make it clear that there must be other temporal modes. There is (1) a non-practical present unqualified by awareness of future and past (the man with the wooden leg hobbling by); (2) an aesthetic present, in which an object is enjoyed without any awareness of future or past; (3) a non-practical present-future (the man waiting to cross the street); and (4) a non-practical present-past (the man who has lost a leg).

Oakeshott's position is that each mode is a form of present, is a particular understanding or reading of a present object or happening and is evoked by means of a particular procedure from a present object and happening. We have criticized this position in detail in regard to the non-practical present-future (the man waiting to cross the street) and the non-practical present-past (the man who has lost a leg). We cannot speak of understanding, reading, of a procedure, etc. These criticisms generally hold for the other modes as well. Moreover, the classification scheme is open to a variety of other objections. It is proposed to confine the analysis to the various modes of past.

To take Oakeshott's encapsulated or assimilated past first. Oakeshott

does not seem to realize just how pervasive a role this past has in our lives. The encapsulated past enters into every one of our present perceptions[27] and into all our purposeful behaviour, and not just into such things as the exercise of our musical skills and our rheumatic pains. It is my previous experience which enables me to perceive a man standing on a kerb, whereas a newly-born baby would only see a flat surface of coloured patches. It is my previous experience which makes me reach for a pen and paper when I want to write. In fact, were it not for my previous experience, I would not want to write at all. A new-born baby does not want to write.

Oakeshott says that a particular sort of future or past is evoked from a present perception of an object or event by means of a particular procedure. But his encapsulated past cannot be fitted into this overarching conception because it refers to something entirely different—the assimilated experience which makes perception possible. Nor can this encapsulated past be considered a variety of the practical past. What is assimilated is usually beyond recall and cannot be understood in terms of its eligibility in satisfying a want or used for that purpose.

After talking briefly and obscurely about a remembered past, Oakeshott goes on to discuss a recollected or consulted past, which is supposed to be another variety of the practical past. This is, in part, a matter of 'joining a puzzling or intractable present with a known and unproblematic past to compose a less puzzling or more manageable practical present'.[28] We often have to make sense of a current situation by drawing on information we already have, and this information may become available to us without effort or after a mental search. However, is it right to call this recollection? We use the word 'recollection' in situations where information which it would make sense to say we do not recollect (owing to the lapse of time, the triviality of the item, etc.) is in fact available to us, either without effort, or after a mental search. But the information we draw upon to throw light on present problems need not be of the sort it would make sense to deny we recollect. What Oakeshott has in mind is a correlated past, and not a recollected past.[29]

Oakeshott next discusses another alleged variety of recollected past—one of message-bearing survivals. These are stories (perhaps mythical) of past human conduct, which are preserved in our practical vocabulary, and artefacts—testimonials, diplomas, historical monuments, etc. We use both for practical purposes—to express our understanding of situations, for example, by saying that so and so is inclined 'to cut the Gordian knot', or to promote a practical purpose, for example, by using the Babri Masjid as a political symbol and instrument.

But how are these cases of recollection? When I use an expression which is in my practical vocabulary—when, for example, I say that someone 'cut the Gordian knot'—what am I recollecting? Is it the

expression itself? If it is in my practical vocabulary, I must be familiar with it, and I cannot be said to be recollecting it. Or is it the historical incident to which the expression owes its existence? But this incident need not be present in my mind when I use the expression. When I say that someone is putting the cart before the horse, I am not recollecting the expression when I use it, nor am I recollecting a cart and a horse. Our familiar linguistic resources are not something we recollect when we use them and neither are the things they denote.

Moreover, all the words and expressions in our vocabulary are survivals which carry some message (in the sense that they have meanings) and it is artificial to have a category of expressions connected with historical events only.

The second category of message-bearing survivals is artefacts. What strikes us immediately is that these are 'survivals' in a totally different sense. While the first category, our entire vocabulary, in fact, can be said to exist only when we use it, artefacts are continuants. More importantly, when I use an artefact (the Babri Masjid) for a practical purpose (as an emotive issue for votes), I am not recollecting something. When I use a knife (another artefact, and, in a broad sense of the word, a survival) to carve up a chicken, I am not recollecting something. Instead, I have and I express an attitude towards the Babri Masjid and an attitude towards the knife.

What we have in the case of a man who is waiting to cross the street or has lost a leg is the circumstances of a perception, and it is these circumstances which are supposed to evoke future and past. But in the case of correlating some item of information, or of using a message-bearing expression, or of using an artefact for practical purposes, we are doing something categorially different from perceiving; we are correlating in the first case, operating with symbols in the second and having and expressing an attitude in the third. These cannot be fitted into Oakeshott's overarching conception of the various modes of future and past being evoked from particular perceptions.

Obviously, in none of these cases can we talk of 'consulting'—except in a metaphorical sense. Nor is there anything we could call evocation—except in a metaphorical sense. When we rack our brains for some fact, there is a process, but no procedure. In the case of using message-bearing expressions or artefacts, there is again no procedure; there is only a process. A process, which is a series of steps, cannot be equated with procedure, which is a preordained series of steps.

Finally, there is Oakeshott's historical present-past. In this present-past, we are concerned with survivals for their own sake, we are concerned to understand them solely in terms of the mediation of their emergence. Oakeshott is at his best when dealing with the historical past. But even here he makes mistakes. Historical enquiry is not the evoking of antecedent circumstances of survivals from those survivals. To evoke is

to cause images, thoughts and feelings to pass through a mind by the imaginative use of words or music. Historical enquiry is the inferring, through an extended critical enquiry (which is not evocation, but which could charitably be termed a procedure since it is guided by the broad rules of historical method) of the antecedent and also the attendant and subsequent circumstances of survivals and this is not done from just the survivals; the historian's previous life-experience (his encapsulated past) enters into the enquiry. However, Oakeshott's dualistic language does find its justification at last; the historian's picture of the past is a different thing from the *res gestae* he began with and could in a sense be said to be a counterpart of it. Talk of 'reading' and 'interpretation' would also be justified.

CONCLUSION

The list of concepts which Oakeshott uses in distorted ways is a formidable one—'present', 'future', 'past', 'aware', 'emerge', 'live', 'understanding', 'reading', 'evoke', 'recollect', 'consult', 'procedure'. Oakeshott, through these distorted uses, unconsciously builds up a philosophically astonishing edifice. The edifice ceases to be astonishing once we realize that he is expressing trivialities in misleading ways. Oakeshott's categorial scheme is open to grave objections as well.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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4. Oakeshott, 'Present, Future and Past', op. cit., p. 7.
5. Ibid., p. 8.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 14.
9. Ibid., pp. 30–31.
10. Ibid., p. 7.
11. For a discussion of problems arising from the indeterminateness of the concept of 'present', see J.N. Findlay, 'Time: A Treatment of Some Puzzles', in J.J.C.

Smart, *Problems of Space and Time,* Macmillan Company, New York, 1964, pp. 339-55.

12. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty,* Basil Blackwell, London, 1969, 10. Wittgenstein notes that when 'know' is used, doubt is intelligible.

13. For a more differentiated account of the uses of 'aware', see R.J. Hirst, *The Problems of Perception,* George Allen and Unwin, London, 1959, pp. 294–95.

14. For a discussion of this subject, see W.E. Kennick, 'Philosophy as Grammar and the Reality of Universals', *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Language,* Alice Ambrose and Morris Lazerowitz (eds.), George Allen and Unwin, London, 1972, pp. 140-52.

15. Oakeshott, op. cit., p. 8.

16. Ibid.

17. *Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary,* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 912.

18. Hedley Bull, 'Society and Anarchy in International Politics', *Diplomatic Investigations,* Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), George Allen and Unwin, London, 1966, p. 45.

19. Oakeshott, op. cit., p. 8.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 13.

22. Ibid., p. 14.

23. Ibid., p. 9, for example.

24. Ibid., p. 19.

25. Ibid., pp. 9, 10.

26. Ibid., p. 9.

27. 'What is perceived would not be perceived as anything unless the perceiver has prior concepts, knowledge and beliefs' (which of course, are due to his past experience). D.W. Hamlyn, *Perception, Learning and the Self,* Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1983, pp. 58–59.

28. Oakeshott, op. cit., p. 16.

29. Oakeshott talks of a 'present perception (the man who is waiting to cross the street) and the recollected experience with which it is informed (Ibid., p. 8). We talk of recollection when some item of information which it would not be surprising if we had forgotten is, in fact, available to us. It is my previous experience which enables me to perceive a man who is waiting to cross the street. As a new-born infant, I would only have seen a flat surface of coloured patches. Little by little, my experience grew until I could perceive what I perceived. But this experience is not available to me in the sense of being present before my consciousness, so it is not recollected. This is actually a case of encapsulated experience informing a perception.

Does Ayer's Verificationism Exonerate Him from Phenomenalism?

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1. THE DILEMMA ABOUT AYER'S PHENOMENALISM

Phenomenalism is said to be an 'iron-curtain' theory which never allows us to directly perceive physical objects.[1] Hence, it is widely believed to be non-realistic or anti-realistic for it never enlightens us about the nature of physical objects. Phenomenalism, therefore, never gets reconciled with realism. Such a reconciliation is forsworn by dint of the opposition, or even rivalry, between realism and anti-realism. In recent years, the opposition or rivalry becomes questionable, and the continuum between them is on the cards. More than anyone else, Dummett has contributed towards this in the context of phenomenalism. This is what is in broad focus here.

Within the evolution of Ayer's thought, it passes through many stages beginning with the classical formulation (an object is a configuration of sense-data), the linguistic (the statement of physical object is translatable into statements of sense-data), and finally, not the least, is what can be called a qualia phenomenalism, or constructivistic version of phenomenalism (the term qualia stands for properties of one's own experience). A staunch verificationist as he was, Ayer was never able to reconcile his verificationism with any one of the above varieties of phenomenalism. To have done so would have robbed him of his antimetaphysical stance which he maintained throughout. Recently, Dummett has argued that this need not necessarily be so understood and has put forward a proof of such a reconciliation. His verificationism (a sort of anti-realism) can go in tandem with his phenomenalism. In fact Dummett's view challenges at least one important study of Ayer's phenomenalism according to which if verificationism (evidence as well as content versions) has to get its (realistic) status, then phenomenalism would turn out to be false. In Foster's view, linguistic (statement) phenomenalism can only lead us to idealism, once it is agreed that his reductivism is a species of translation between statements.[2] That is what the statements to which they are translated show, since they can never show the original physical object statement.

What is missed here is the axiom that for any philosophy of perception to become viable, we need to retain both sides of the statement, and hence translation or its cognate notions such as synonymy, equivocation, or identity must be preserved. This is what is demonstrated by the way Dummett preserves this (Dummett identifies phenomenalism as sophisticated realism which speaks of one possible way of interpretation of both sides) and thereby retaining a continuum between realism and anti-realism. The question I am concerned with here is whether an equally viable case can be built for Ayer's later day qualia phenomenalism, once it is agreed that it is also modelled on the above. That is to say, if qualia phenomenalism is also shown to be linguistic, in a sense, then Dummett's challenge succeeds to reconcile it with realism as well. What we need for this is a certain verificationist reading of qualia, and the way this is also realistic. Ayer also has experimented with phenomenalism as a sophisticated realism. Dissatisfied as he was, he also has not dealt with qualia extensively, though writers agree that he was a votary for qualia.

Now, verificationist readings of qualia are indeed available, which provide the cue for the above continuum. Within cognitive science, a form of this appears in Daniel Dennett's attempt to quinise qualia (his famous article is titled as 'Quining Qualia') at least from one reading proposed by Don Ross.[3] A standard objection to such a view is that since Ayer himself has abandoned phenomenalism, why the fuss then about qualia phenomenalism which looks like an artifact. Dummett does not even care to mention such a stance in Ayer's last ditch effort to save phenomenalism.[4] If Dummett is right about his interpretation about the relation between verificationism and phenomenalism, then a viable case can be made out for the relation between qualia phenomenalism, and qualia verificationism within the framework of cognitive science and consequently the above continuum could be provably correct. There is another important objection here which is due to Hilary Putnam,[5] according to which it may not serve any strictly scientific purpose as the theory of qualia which backs up holistically the statements on one side may only be crude and not ideal; but even on Putnam's view, this does not deter one from naturalising realism. In what follows, we can show that Dummett's argument could be extended after all in this unique direction.

The exact point we need for formulating an argument for Ayer has starting point in what Dennett calls as quining qualia. Qualia are quinean posits. So, quining quinean qualia inevitably makes them fall under Quinean science (theory) and Quinean language (content). On Ross' reading, quining qualia need not necessarily eliminate qualia, but posits them within a theory. The mistake of functionalists like Paul Churchland is that they eliminate qualia for the simple reason that any attribution of an essential property (like privacy, ineffability, intrinsicality and directly apprehensible within consciousness) can never be reconciled with their account of functionalism. Quine's placebo here is that the posits could be accommodated within a Quinean theory of content within a broader framework of his account of theory. This is what he means when he remarks that Quine's razor (to be is to be the value of the variable in a scientific theory) makes short work of qualia without succumbing to the classical eliminativism.

Let me elaborate Ross's solution a little more. He envisages two types of solutions for qualia. Both seem to be essential in this context. The first type of solution is given in terms of a theory of mental content. The second type of solution is given in terms of a theory of ascription of content.[6] What exactly is the way in which both could be differentiated? One suggestion here is that though they are apparently related to each other, the relation involves a certain asymmetry. This indicates that one of them must assume a certain primacy, that is to say, the theory of ascription of mental content can accommodate the theory of mental content but not the other way round. This is what strongly supported by what Dennett introduces as a third-person (heterophenomenological) account. Now, a third person account demands that we ascribe content to others but it need not necessarily depend on a first person account of mental content. This not only denies a mentalistic (or boxological) account of mental content but it makes it impossible to separate it from an externalist theory of (broad) content. Assuming that Dummett has a similar account of ascription of content within his theory of meaning, and he is justified in attributing a similar motivation to Ayer, we can prove that this richly contributes towards a new way of understanding the reconciliation between verificationism and qualia phenomenalism as suggested by Dummett in his recent reading of verificationism and phenomenalism.

The upshot is to show that there is a verificationist case for saving qualia from the point of view of content. If Dummett is proved to have advanced a theory of ascription of content along the lines, then he will have demonstrated the verificationist case for qualia phenomenalism as well. No one has attributed such a theory to Dummett so far as I know. Towards the end, I develop such a theory and substantiate my claim that Ayer's qualia phenomenalism can be defended along the Dummettian lines against the attack by critics. Now what we have discovered is that the particular theory of content that a qualia phenomenalist needs need not be necessarily be internalist (it would meet the same fate as phenomenalism which results in a sort of first personal epistemology), but an externalist of the type Dennett advocates in his third personal epistemology. Ross' verficationist gloss is based on Dennett's externalist account of qualia and it is based on a linguistic premise: no quale is inaccessible to language and theory, in Quine's sense. Like Quine, Dennett also replaces qualia with 'complexes of mechanically accomplished dispositions to react' to stimuli. This is the

nerve centre of quinising qualia as his own 'drinking beer example'
amply attests to.

On Ross' reading there is a more interesting contrast between the
earlier attack on qualia and the more sophisticated mechanism that
informs his later critique in his book length study on Consciousness.[7] In
contrast to Dennett's earlier 'indirect' attack against the four putative
properties of qualia, namely ineffability, intrinsicalness, privacy, and
directly apprehended property in consciousness, the second attack was
'direct' in that it attacks the last-mentioned property as part of the
positive programme of explaining consciousness. There is no apparently
hard and fast distinction between a self-ascription and other ascription
of content within Dennett's theorization, as also the lack of clarity
about their relationship. But on Ross' reading, there is a definite
passage from the other ascription towards a self-ascription as this is
what is directly entailed by his heterophenomenological method.[8] The
earlier argument by intuition pump (though experiments in Dennett's
sense) is acknowledged to be a variant of Quine's indeterminacy of
translation.[9] If so what is actually critiqued is not the existence of qualia
but their indeterminacy within the context of a theory of content.
Dennett's aim is to block any theory of self-ascription by denying the
postulate concerning the content of introspective consciousness, leaving
only a third person ascription (heterophenomenological step) about
which there is no fact of the matter. Such a step ensures how one can
explain the behaviour of another by ascribing to him non-verbal beliefs,
verbal opinion and desires with a certain content. Sprigge,[10] for example,
gives a clue as to how this could happen in terms of a counterfactuals. It
consists in describing a world such that if he were living in it he would
be acting in a manner well calculated to bring about what he wants. We
can modify the above to read: if such and such made of verbal
signification works, then it would have been caused by such mental
content (thus reversing the nature of causal relation in psychological
explanation). The mental content like the one I used to have, but need
not necessarily be so (no cognitive analogy). If the above interpretation
is agreeable, then counterfactuals have heterophenomenological
antecedents.

So, quantify over real 'patterns'—a word Dennett uses to refer to
third-person description of qualia which have anti-individualistic
contents. The anti-individualistic externalist overtones of such a move
have considerable merit as something similar to this is under work in
the theory of understanding adopted by Dummett (infra).[11] In order to
see it clearly, let us first take Dummett's theory of understanding as
closely analogous to Davidson's theory, and in a sense for both Davidson
and Ross, attitudes are 'non-individuative' and extensional.[12] There is
no question about the consistency of this stance with what is expressed
by saying that while Churchland is an eliminativist about everything

except qualia, Dennett's functionalism is an eliminativism only about
qualia.[13] Ross is an externalist about qualia, where qualia-contents are
regarded as Quinean posits. This is what undergrids the claim about
quining qualia in Quine's way.

But Quinean posits are not neutral in Russell's sense, but neutral to
self and other ascriptions I think, it is here that Ross' interpretation
works an important solution to the Quinean posits. Ross does not
advocate the banishment of qualia as the benchmark of full-blown
Dennettism (anti-realism), but he underlines the synchronicity of public
(intersubjective) language and scientific language, calling attention to
the fact that 'what makes language public is roughly the same as that
which makes science objective'.[14] A major fallout of the above thesis is
that qualia cannot be classified as natural kinds. In Ross' development,
the verificationist argument depends on a thesis about the co-
evolutionary character of language and mind (when self is regarded as
the notational centre of narrative activity, that is, self spews out strings
or streams of narrative, thus constituting the semiotic or interpretative
materialism step), that is, it cannot develop unless there is both utility
and it is non-idiosyncratic (and hence they are not ineffable). Dennett's
argument, as presented in Ross' terms, amounts to the following: if it is
idiosyncratic, it is private and given the fact that we've not fully worked
out the theory of consciousness, no theory-ladenness, and hence no
sense can be made of private apprehension within one's own
consciousness. If the above argument is correct, then to say that the
content of Nolan Ryan's mental state q cannot be the way the ball feels
to Ryan, but it amounts to making a reference to some actual features of
the ball. Since, the naturalist route is thus blocked, it must be understood
as that in which no theory will bind a variable whose range of possible
value is a unique individual, but it can bind individualist's non-
individualistic content or qualia.

What I argue here, therefore, is that a verificationist case for qualia,
as explained in the above way, can sustain Ayer's verificationist case for
qualia phenomenalism. So, in an indirect sense, analytical
phenomenalism can imply qualia phenomenalism. Dummett correctly
reads Ayer as not being able to demonstrate that his verification principle
implies phenomenalism.[15] But that was not his fault. What prevented
Ayer from establishing that the 'logical connection' between
verificationism and phenomenalism as a 'valid transition' is that Ayer
wanted to maintain that his analysis of physical object statements in
terms of sense-data statements cannot be totally inconsistent with certain
ideal conditionals without which the physical object statements could
not be verified. This spelt doom for Ayer's project of phenomenalism as
a form of realism. Ayer cannot make this possible because he could not
understand the tight connection between meaning and verification.
Once verificationism takes on a Dummettian hue (we shall discuss and

contrast it with other options; for the present, we shall call Dummett's second option), he can prove that verificationism can imply phenomenalism.

Ayer's dilemma comes to this: if he allows the physical object statements to be equivalent to certain ideal conditionals, he should make it consistent with other statements about sense-data; on the other hand, if he could not include ideal conditionals, he could not secure his reductive programme in a successful way. His options are limited to two; to accept the ideal conditionals and work out an elaborate scheme in terms of 'primary' and 'secondary' systems so as to reconcile the two classes of statements with statements of physical objects. It is at this juncture that Ayer exercised Dummett's first option according to which he could agree with both sides of analysis (calling it as a species of descriptive analysis), and describing it as a sophisticated realism. Such a position was introduced first in his *Problem of Knowledge,* and later elaborated in his *Central Questions of Philosophy.*[16]

Ayer's second option is to reject the idea of reductionism altogether and pursue a line of thinking according to which qualia are quinean posits within the ambit of Quinean ontological theory. Later Ayer is said to move to qualia phenomenalism after renouncing phenomenalism itself. Qualia phenomenalism is anti-metaphysical and is bereft of any semantical support because they are hangovers from Ayer's early attempts. The anti-metaphysical streak throughout and semantic grounds are lost after he abandoned his statement account of phenomenalism. The fallout here is that he loses his ultimate grounds which bespeak about the tight connection between meaning and truth. A verificationist of the Dummettian hue (anti-realistic) must restore this to Ayer so as to bolster up a case for fostering a relation between verificationism and phenomenalism. Ayer in his 'Reply' agrees with Dummett's reformulation of verificationism, but his only objection is that it should not lead towards anti-realism. As far as phenomenalism is concerned, the question may be treatd as open.

If the foregoing account is correct, then Ayer commits two mistakes instead of one. In contrast to the above, Ayer's sophisticated realism is reductive as well as realistic, since it accepts both of the above classes of statements as true, bivalent together with the objectivist (referential) status. Besides it is metaphysical, but its metaphysical import is dubious. Hence Dummett expresses his own reservations about this particular version and so he suggests the second option which he calls a generalized verificationism. A generalized form of verificationism accepts the priority of verification over truth and its theory of meaning is composite in the sense that it is both truth—conditional and verificationist. Incidentally, it must be noted that this represents the most advanced form of verificationism which does not reject realism. If what he says is correct, then anti-realistic verificationism alone does not entail phenomenalism

except when it is associated with truth-conditional theory of meaning. The thesis which asserts that phenomenalism is a form of anti-realism must be automatically resisted.

On Dummett's diagnosis the supporting pillar for a generalized verificationism is found in the idea of indirect verification. To some extent, such a move is aimed to undermine direct verification. In no way does it mean that there should be sharp distinction between them. Nor is there any ground for believing that such a distinction could be conflated. Verificationist realists like Crispin Wright, for example, argues for such a conflation to sponsor a justification for a classical (atomic) version of the principle of verifiability (every sentence has impirical content on account of a direction of fit). May be verificationist realism according to Wright's plea, implies a sophisticated verificationism as mentioned above,[17] much in the same way a generalized verificationism must imply a sophisticated realism. But Dummett goes a little further than this. Nevertheless, the implications of the former are far from clear. *Contra* Wright, Dummettian indirect verificationism is holistic about theory as well as language. Its cognitive significance is fully brought out by the Dennett-type of verificationism as read through the spectacles of Ross. Dummett offers what he calls as *Argument A* in support of his reading so as to demonstrate that a generalized form of verificationism is still available for Ayer. If this argument succeeds, then we have a reconstruction of Ayer's verificationism as well as phenomenalism. Let us examine the steps of his *Argument A.*

2. DUMMETT'S ARGUMENT-A

The first three of the argument may be said to state the three different versions of verificationism, of which the first two are classical (positivistic) and the last one is Dummett's own which is recognized as the heir of the above. The steps of the argument are recounted as follows:

(1) The positivistic axiom: The meaning of a statement is its method of verification (first generation verification) is given fillip by Schlick's original formulation, and it is given as a meaning axiom for synthetic statements that occur within scientific theory.

(2) A statement is meaningful iff it is verifiable. (2) is given as a criterion of verifiability or criterion of meaningfulness of a statement given by Ayer. It represents the second-generation verificationism, now (2) is regarded as an evolute of (1).

(3) A statement is verifiable iff its meaning is understood. (3) is given as the third-generation verificationism. Dummett calls this as generalized verificationism for the specific reason the it is an alley of (1). Generalized verificationism poses a challenge to linguistic/ analytic versions of phenomenalism given in (4).

(4) M-statements are verifiable iff they are statements about sense-data.

What undergrids (4) is a principle of metaphysical necessity which states that our statements about the physical object say something metaphysical about sense-data (despite the arguments against sense-data). There appears to be no reason, therefore, to think that sense-data statements might be changed into qualia statement. As we shall see later, this need not be taken as true.

(4) is different from its linguistic counterpart given as the principle of linguistic necessity, which is very often stated as issuing in the following principle of analyticity (5):

(5)   A statement is analytic iff it is true by meaning alone.

Quinean counters to (4) and (5) draw the difference between these two principles in a rather different way. It is this which provides a strategy for Dummett to charge Ayer that the above distinction is drawn in the wrong way. A Quinean way of merging them invites us to restate analytical (statement) phenomenalism in a rather different way, as given in (6), which according to Dummett, is the most usual form of phenomenalism.

(6)   M-statements of physical objects are verifiable iff certain ideal conditionals are verifiable;

thus making the O-statements as ideal, and leaving the contingent part only as antecedent of those ideal conditionals. This accrues an advantage of making the antecedents as true while the consequent as false. The last clause is just to obviate the necessity of thinking of them as part of metaphysical necessity. What is rejected by (6) is that a phenomenalist cannot assert consistently certain counterfactuals along with other sense-datum statements. If this is agreed upon, then (6), on Dummett's showing, amounts to stating something about understanding the meaning of statements. Its verificationist character is to be seen in the way in which the antecedent states something about the one who cognizes its meaning while the consequent states the required sense-data. Both of them roughly correspond to the verificationist and truth-conditional theories of meaning respectively. In a sense, therefore, the two types of necessity roughly correspond to these two theories of meaning. (6) is said to be a weaker form of generalized form of verificationism for it does not entail (7) below:

(7)   Even if statement is true, then the appropriate sense-data would occur in favourable circumstances, thus entailing further (8) below:
(8)   Even if no sense data occurs, the statement might be true.

(8) in its strong form leads to (3), which becomes, therefore, the most appropriate form of (4). Now, the proper way to understand (3), therefore, is to see it as tightening the connection between meaning and understanding. A reformulation of this for qualia phenomenalism is all that we need to prove that qualia verificationism implies qualia

phenomenalism. It is only from such proviso, Dummett elsewhere deduces the dictum which holds that the theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. The point that needs further stress here is that whereas a theory of meaning is an internalist plea for self-ascription, a theory of understanding is an externalist map for other-ascription and both are not mutually exclusive to each other. If this were so, the entire point about Dummett's verificationist case goes through a premise about meaning in the above sense, which undoubtedly carries externalist implications.

Dummett's new thesis is thus poised to warrant a close link between verificationism and phenomenalism. This is offered as a corrective to Dummett's earlier interpretation of phenomenalism according to which the analysis of counterfactual statements leads towards a rejection of bivalence for those statements, and hence a thorough repudiation of realism.[18] However, the tendency of phenomenalists is to resist it along with lingering attachment to realism about material object statements. But now, Dummett thinks that a different analysis of counterfactual statements would sponsor a composite theory of meaning where it is seen that any direct opposition between realism and anti-realism is a red-herring. Earlier, the close link was to be described as one between sophisticated realism and phenomenalism. On Dummett's reading, this has two explicit disadvantages. On the one hand, it keeps a distance between verificationism and on the other hand, it only states a relation between two types of metaphysical schools of thinking. On Dummett's understanding, sophisticated realism cannot provide the real succour for an adequate defence of phenomenalism. And Ayer is right to waver. A thorough defence requires a verificationist standpoint such as the one formulated by Dummett himself. Thus, the conclusion becomes plausible which states that there is verificationist case for phenomenalism.

Dummett, I think, offers a corrective to his earlier stances where he makes a distinction between strongly reductionist (based on translatability between two classes of statements) and weakly reductionist (reductive) where the concern is about truth rather than about meaning. Now I think, Dummett is ready to abandon the above distinction. The strong and weak versions after all were oriented towards bringing out the semantic status of reductive programmes. More precisely, whereas the earlier one revolves around translation, meaning, and truth, the latter has no truck with translation (It is effective repudiation of Foster's reading of Ayer's phenomenalism mentioned at the beginning). So, abandoning the distinction might be said to restore the idea of translation into its original place. So long as we need translation, we preserve both sides of the identity symbol.

In my understanding, the later choice does not work and hence no stronger sense of reduction is viable without this. Given the Quinean strictures on translation, the weaker version also cannot be said to

escape its efficacy. On the other hand, the semantic status is now allowed to rely on a semantic thesis which offers primacy to meaning. The primacy thus offered makes realism as well as anti-realism as semantic theses. The sophistication that was earlier offered is the acceptance of both sides of the identity symbol (for their truth values); but now the sophistication is changed into something that is less concerned with the identity symbol, but it embodies only a dictum which says that meaning *implies* truth. Nevertheless, one need not look at this as one that totally excludes translation or synonymy altogether. Given a material object statement, there may be more than one set of equivalent statements, and hence no fact of the matter about translation. Thus, it must presuppose a *modus vivendi* between translation and meaning.[19] A verificationist (sophisticated irrealist/anti-realist) case is built on the opposition it gives to 'meaning = df. truth-conditions' by 'truth = meaning conditions' with a circumscribed reductionism as given in the above formula, (that is, meaning implies truth). It is possible to read the identity sign as one about mutual implication ($\rightarrow \leftarrow$) in order to preserve the theorem that meaning implies truth. A direct consequence is that it only denies truth implies meaning. An indirect consequence is that truth is nowhere denied and but it is given a status next to meaning. This is what is understood by saying that meaning implies truth. It is by no means claimed that these definitions should be symbiotic to realism and anti-realism.

3. FROM SOPHISTICATED REALISM TO QUALIA PHENOMENALISM

We can restate the three stages of Ayer's thinking on phenomenalism as follows:

(1) The classical version: physical objects are reducible to a class of sense-data.
(2) The analytical version: statements of physical objects are translatable to sentences about sense-data.
(3) The qualia version: statements of physical object can be translated into statements about sense-qualia.[20]

(3) is more appropriately characterized as a constructivistic variety of phenomenalism given as (4) below:

(4) Constructivistic version: statements about physical object are constructed, in part from qualia statements.

(I am indebted to Ted Honderich for the above formulation, especially the last two versions).[21] The partially constructive clause is ominous for it invites its complementary part found in the Humean account of imagination (such an interpretation cannot argued out of court and hence it is fully consistent with Ayer's own interpretation of Hume). It is

conceded by all hands that (3) and (4) do not represent a sense of logical construction.[22] There is no logical relation between the two types of statements like the one that obtains between the right hand side and left hand side of analytical version. Honderich terms it as a 'looser' relation and *a fortiori*, the class of qualia statements cannot be understood to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for physical object statements given above as (7). Nor is there reason to believe that it is a kind of logical construction as claimed in (4).

Now Ayer abandoned (1) and (2), but that is not a reason believe that it should convey that all efforts to reconstruct it are blocked. His 1947 essay is said to mark an official renouncement of phenomenalism. 'Traces' of it appear later in his *Problems of Knowledge* which focuses exclusively on the difficulties, along with an admission of sophisticated realism classifying it as a species of 'scientific philosophy'. As Ayer recounts, his main reason for abandonment of (2) is the infinite regress of 'unfulfilled' (ideal) conditionals, which according to Dummett, is the first step in the reductive programme of phenomenalism. In his *Central Questions of Philosophy*, Ayer pursues an alternative model which he calls the 'constructivist account of physical world on the basis of qualia'. It is also apparent that sophisticated realism has been elaborated leaving the impression that Ayer *en route* gives a last try to reconcile with phenomenalism. What can one draw from this? We cannot definitely say that he has totally abandoned, but what is clear is that he cannot reconcile it with qualia phenomenalism. Ayer's blunt assertion in the foreword to *Fact, Science, and Morality* that he has given up phenomenalism does not warrant a literary interpretation. Moreover, the reconciliation efforts to combine phenomenalism with sophisticated realism attest to the fact that serious efforts are made in a number of logical moves (some of which are reconstructed by Hemjith Balakrishnan with a modicum of coherence).[23] But the relation between analytical and qualia version is given up by saying that the former is not implied by the latter, thus warranting an independent version of qualia phenomenalism. Let us take the demand for independence as tantamount to the demand for empirical significance. Nevertheless, there is no reason to think that qualia and constructivist version cannot go together. The stumbling block in the above reconstruction is the critique of qualia. If we know how to meet some of the major criticisms, we can sustain the above programme, and then proceed to restate Dummett's second option with renewed vigour. The following two sections will reveal this.

4. AYER ON QUALIA

The term 'qualia' itself is so vulnerably placed within the matrix of Ayer's phenomenalism so much so that any criticisms against it *mutatis*

mutandis apply to qualia phenomenalism as well. There seems to be nothing wrong in treating sense qualia on par with sense data though their epistemological and ontological status seem to be different. Ayer thinks that sense-qualia is quite unlike sense data at least in one respect, namely that they are not private. Basically qualia are defined to be the properties attributed to one's own experience. Nevertheless, unlike sense-data, they are non-intentional, non-private, neutral universal stuff with which physical objects are constructed. They are particularized like sense-data while the actual construction takes place. In view of the above, one may hazard the following hypothesis: particularized sense-qualia are sense-data whereas universalized sense-data are sense-qualia. This enables us to strike down a complete separation between sense-qualia and sense-data. The most vulnerable part of Ayer's qualia is that is they are 'posits' and hence they are said to be 'capacious and vague'.[24] So, the only option is to quinise it within cognitive science.

Ted Honderich, a leading critic, wonders whether Ayer's positing is to be understood to involve logical inference and charges him by saying that since this does not get explained, the only alternative is that it should be non-inferential. This criticism could be silenced by holding that since they are posits, they are quinean posits and they are backed by the stratagem of quining qualia, within the matrix of theory. The second most important criticism is that it concedes too much to naive realism: if it is agreed then, it leads to naive realism and if it is not agreed, then it is useless (we shall omit any other major criticisms made outside of the context of Ayer). I think that there is a great deal to save Ayer's qualia within a context put forward by Putnam. However, Putnam has a stronger objection to theory.

The second dilemma about qualia is about their privileging: if they are privileged, it is private; if not, it is not amenable for explanation. It is here that the externalist accounts come in handy to sustain the Quinean strategy given in the form of Quine's razor: 'to be is to be the value of qualia as it is given in any scientific theory'.[25] Honderich has no worry about this verificationist thrust for he is not for saving qualia. Ross' reading of Dennett reinforces this verificationist gloss. Quining qualia for Ayer will lead to externalization of the qualia which is what Ayer needs. Following Tyler Burge, we can say that it carries anti-individuating tendencies backed up by an analysis of language. The last clause assures the interface between semantics and metaphysics.

The above viewpoint is also consistent with a viewpoint which Dummett has expressed, namely that Quine has not refuted verificationism. That is to say, verificationism is organic within a holistic pattern of theory. To some extent, Ayer has accepted holism. But his preference is for Poincare's type which implicitly accepts a distinction between empirical and analytical. It is only against this distinction Dummett's argument mounts an attack. Such a distinction, like the distinction between two

kinds of necessities, separates metaphysics from semantics. That is, as against the positivists, who held that all necessity is linguistic Dummett wants to argue that since both metaphysical and linguistic necessity are linguistic in origin because they both raise out of meanings, the necessity they posit must be transformed into 'contingence'. It is contingent in the sense that it distinguishes between something which is true and the effects by which we recognize it (the two necessities, of course, roughly correspond to epistemological and metaphysical necessity, as conceived by Kripke, but Dummett would deny any such watertight distinction). Ayer's counter seems to have been bypassed by Dummett for what it is worth.

Given the fact that Ayer's verificationism was a linguistic thesis and his realism a metaphysical thesis, there is no reason to believe that they are totally unrelated. It is only from some such premise that Dummett passes on to the observation that Ayer's verificationism has no other choice than to imply phenomenalism so much so that phenomenalism itself is the metaphysics of verificationism. This is true of Ayer as it is true for any other thinker. That is, it does not advocate that there is a unique way of describing the world. On Dummett's reading, Ayer's fault lies in that he does not pursue his phenomenalism to its logical conclusion.

Secondly, Ayer has not been able to explain the relation of 'reductionist' or 'reductive' programme to a species of realism. A 'reductionist' programme rests solely on a translation of physical object statements to statements of sense-data or sense-qualia, while a reductive programme has to do with the relationship between the truth of statements of a given class to the truth of a reductive class of statements. The former designs a specific type of relation that obtains between the meaning of both sides, and hence makes a stronger claim, while the reductivist programme talks in general of a relation, or more particularly the truth of statements and hence making a weaker claim. In fact there seems to be a certain basic opposition between them. The opposition lies in that while the stronger claim is said to adopt truth as definable in terms of meaning, the latter makes meaning in terms truth-conditions. If anything, it shows that it admits a *modus vivendi* at least in the case of former, that is between meaning and translation.[26] Quine, for example, is always understood to take translation as a necessary model or a dispositional analysis of speech. Dummett is not inclined to go the whole hog with this plea as he takes verificationist case as arising from the primacy of meaning. Hence the issue about the relation between the verificationism and externalism hardly arises for him.

However, it arises within the way Dummett theorises about the knowledge of meaning at different levels. The reason why a weaker claim is preferable is that translation model is vitiated by the following objections, some of which are to be discussed below (sec. 5). On

Dummett's view, Ayer need not shy away from his phenomenalistic stance, simply for the reason that they are open to anti-realistic invectives. Since neither a reductive nor a reductionist thesis is sufficient for a rejection of realism, Ayer need not be understood as an anti-realist at all.[27] Such a genuine option is open to him in his endeavour of sophisticating phenomenalism which accepts both its reductive character as well as its realistic import. As is too well-known, the major shortcoming of this is the analysis of counterfactuals. Hence it calls for a fresh interpretation of counterfactuals.

5. MORE LIGHT ON DUMMETT'S SECOND OPTION

Qualia-phenomenalism may be said to be as linguistic as the analytical version is. The only feature that distinguishes the former is that it is not implied by analytical phenomenalism or analytical methods in general according to Ted Honderich. This shows that Honderich is not open to the Dummettian option that arises mainly out of two considerations, which he terms as stronger reductionist (meaning-oriented) and weaker reductive (truth-oriented) programmes. The former is open to several objections, of which the first is that about the actual impossibility translation as revealed in the case of infinite reductive class; the second is the scepticism about translation as revealed in the case of statements which require proof, the third is the overlap of meaning and translation; and lastly, the Davidsonian type of non-identity as revealed in the way we have identity without psycho-physical laws. If the above Dummettian schema reveals anything, it squarely places its emphasis on the way we move from the left to the right hand side, while translating from one to the other. The point is not as much about the primacy of translation as about the relation between meaning and translation.[28] On Dummett's reading, sophisticated realism is to be classified as a full-fledged realism with no anti-realistic overtones because it enables us to move from the left to the right hand side (for example, centre-state materialism stipulated that there must be a one-to-one correspondence between the psychological statements and neurophysiological statements).[29] Such a position has the following three features:

(i)   we can give truth-conditional account of the given class;
(ii)   bivalence holds for the class; and
(iii) it is objectivist (that is, referential).

A fourth trait is that it is compatible with the reductive (meaning-oriented) thesis.

A reductive thesis may be either realistic (two types, namely the naive irreducible variety or sophisticated realist) or anti-realistic (reductivists or non-reductivist). Two points are noticeable: first is that the above supercedes any other previous classification; secondly, the compatibility

between realism and anti-realism depends much on compatibility of meaning and truth. This is what Dummett prefers to call the composite character of meaning which serves as a supporting pillar for the entire argument. I shall sketch this view in the following section.

6. THE COMPOSITE THEORY OF MEANING

A 'complete' theory of meaning is composite for the following levels:

(1)   meaning is compositional;
(2)   semantics as a theory of meaning states the condition under which the given sentence is true if it is true; and
(3)   the semantic theory which thrives on a distinction between a capacity version and conditional version.

The conditional version is associated with a speaker with whom it is credited what is known as the knowledge of meaning. It states the conditions under which a speaker knows the sentence as true, if it is true. The capacity version includes the condition for recognition, which is much more than what Dummett calls as the 'unmediated recognition' which characterizes the second level. Since it is much more than 'unmediated', it should be mediated in its aspect of recognition. It is mediated through a third-person point of view. Dummettian capacity is not merely Chomskyan ability *simpliciter*. This much is warranted by the above levels and not found a place on anyone's interpretation as far as I understand. A natural consequence of this is that it calls for such an externalist theory of meaning. The circumstances that call for an externalist theory involve the following simple argument. It starts with a Fregean premise (1):

(1)   A Fregean thought (other than a proposition) is true if it is true, and we can understand truth or falsity as it is applicable to it.
(2)   But we cannot recognize under what conditions we ascribe truth-values to them (equivalent to saying that we cannot know any fact with reference to which we can verify them to be true);
      (2) repudiates the following assumption (3):
(3)   There is a metaphysical plenum without any indeterminable gaps.

A simple way of understanding the above piece of argument is that verificationist character of meaning is logically *prior* to the realist notion of truth even while granting that there is no meaningful opposition between them. This is what underlies the composite theory of meaning which includes a theory of content ascription as well.

In the case of phenomenalism, the first step in the reductive programme has to do with counterfactuals or ideal conditionals. It is not easy to work out the truth of the conditionals unless we know the

meaning of these statements. The way these statements mean are not quite independent of the way certain empirical statements are deduced out of it. The truth of the latter follow from the former. The verification thus arrived at is called generalized verificationism, as opposed to Ayer's verificationism. Ayer defends it by saying that these counterfactuals are true in cases like:

> If I had jumped out of my window a moment ago, I should have been injured.

and hence he makes an implicit distinction between logical and empirical necessity. The reason for this is that there is a fact of the matter as to its affirmation and negation whereas in the instance such as the following:

> 'If I had taken a coin out of my pocket a moment ago, it would have emerged heads uppermost'

where there is none. Dummett's counter is that such a distinction is wrongly drawn because such statements are indeterminate.

Generalized verificationism is a somewhat developed form of organic verificationism.[30] While organic verificationism is purported to be a repudiation of atomistic formulations of verificationism, generalized verificationism is not. Quine's diagnosis of the ills of the analytic-synthetic distinction contains no refutation of the fundamental idea of the verificationist theory of meaning. It leaves us free to explore this possibility. So long as we admit a sufficiently generous conception of what in general may constitute verificationism.[31] The 'composite' is opposed to 'unitary'. Its self-application is limited by its lack of self-application (we cannot ask whether a composite theory is composite), and thus it has a counter-theoretical edge. This is so because it is more a theory of thought than a theory of language. On Dummett's reading the exact relation between them is only contingent.[32] In a sense, the language and thought are separable, but this is not exactly in the sense in which thought is *prior* to language, which implies events of a unique sequential order, but only with respect to their relationship.

There is, therefore, a certain agreement between a verificationist reading of qualia and the qualia version of phenomenalism, and this comes through in Dummett's reconstruction of Ayer's verificationism and his composite theory of meaning which backs up his theory of content ascription and the analysis of thought structures. To a great extent, Dummett's new way of understanding verificationism set at rest the distinction between direct and indirect verifiability with which Ayer struggles. It becomes preferable to any plausible-looking atomistic formulation attempted by Crispin Wright. Wright is a verificationist of the classical variety, with no reductionist commitments and contra-holistic as well as anti-Dennettian. Ironically, Wright never speaks about qualia nor about phenomenalism, and hence he is less metaphysical.[33]

Dummett's case can be extended to cover Ayer's qualia version without harming his analytical interests as attested to by Ross's reading of Dennett's verificationism. If the above reading is correct, then qualia-verificationism will imply qualia phenomenalism.[34]

[I owe this revised form to the extensive comments made by an anonymous referee of the Journal. I am indebted to the Editor for encouraging me to resubmit the article. I believe that he is convinced about the topicality of the above, as much as I am, against the criticism.]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The most important way of characterizing phenomenalism is by drawing a curtain to the externality of the world.
2. John Foster, *Ayer*, Arguments of the Philosophers Series, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1985; see especially Chapter 1, pp. 22, 48, and 50.
3. Dennett's attack on qualia occurs in his 'Quining Qualia' in *Consciousness in Contemporary Science*, edited by A. Marcel and E. Bisiach, Oxford, 1988, pp. 42–47. Don Ross provides a verificationist gloss in his 'Quining Qualia in Quine's Way' ('QQQ' hereafter) in *Dialogue*,1993 pp. 439–60 with which Dennett may not agree. Dennett is widely believed to be an anti-realist contrary to his claim that he is a realist in cognitive science.
4. See Ayer's 'Reply' to Michael Dummett's exegesis in his 'Metaphysics of Verificationism' in *The Philosophy of A.J. Ayer*, Library of Living Philosophers Series, Vol.XXI, edited by L.E. Hahn, Open Court, La Salle, 1992, pp. 149–56. Ayer is non-committal to Dummett's anti-realism, calling the conclusion as 'untenable', though he can agree with generalized verificationism, but not the metaphysics of phenomenalism (156). Neither makes much of qualia phenomenalism which provides the *raison d'etre* for this essay.
5. For Putnam, qualia 'renews' the metaphysics of perception in the direction of a second naive realism and *a fortiori*, it is post-functional. Putnam is prepared to use it almost synonymous with sense-data, and besides many similarities and dissimilarities, he also forges a sort of continuum. See his Dewey Lectures under the title 'Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Enquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind' in *Journal of Philosophy* (1994) pp. 445-517. The realist–anti-realist continuum is in focus in my attempt to survey, 'Wittgenstein's Challenge to Rules-as-Rails Platonism in Philosophy of Psychology' (Ms.) and the paper on 'H. Putnam's Post-Functionalistic Project' (to appear in the Proceedings of the 71st session of the *Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1996).
6. The theory of self-ascription requires a representation of the language in thought (*Mentalese*) whereas the theory of other-ascription starts with an interpretative strategy. The primacy for the latter should lead towards an asymmetry.
7. D. Dennett's *Consciousness Explained*, Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1991. Dennett both explains and explains away consciousness and thus provides yet another continuum. I am particularly interested the anti-realistic gloss put by Don Ross.
8. The passage from one to another should be a contingent one. Dennett perceives the primacy of other-ascriptions: 'Our interpretation . . . hinges on hypotheses we have about the intent of the author of any inscription etc.' (178), thus, in a sense, circumscribing the 'intentionalist fallacy'. Again, '. . . the inventor (of an artifact) is not the final arbiter of what an artifact is, or is for, the users decide that. The inventor is just another user, and only circumstantially and defeasibly privileged

in his knowledge of the function and uses of his device' (186). 'Turing and von Neumann might disavow the use of their computing machine as a word-processor, but so what?' (ibid.). See his 'The interpretation of Texts, People, and Other Artifacts' in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 1 (1990) pp. 177–94. Dennett's interpretative materialism disavows any hermeneutics-free interpretation.

9. Just as there is no fact of the matter for rival translations, there is no fact of the matter for rival interpretations. See Dennett's article quoted in f.n. 8 above, p. 180. See also his 'Real Patterns' in *Journal of Philosophy* 87 (1991) pp. 27-51 for the continuum.

10. T. Sprigge characterizes Dennett as a 'Dummettian anti-realist' (48). See his 'Is Dennett a Disillusioned Zimbo?' in *Inquiry* 36 (1993). In another context, Frank Jackson recalls a passage from his book (461) which supports an anti-realistic, case based on the idea of supervenience.

11. The exact relation between meaning and understanding is symbiotic to the theory of self- and other-ascriptions. In a sense, such a symbiosis tells us where the primacy should be taken to be lying. For Dennett also, the history of understanding is a larger theory which should accommodate the theory of meaning.

12. Donald Davidson's 'Three Varieties of Knowledge' in *A.J. Ayer Memorial Essays*, edited by P. Griffiths, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 153–66; see especially p. 158. For a generalized treatment of anti-individualism as it appears in Quine, Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty in my essay on 'Rorty's Counteranalytical Narrative' (Ms.).

13. Ross, 'QQQ' p. 450.

14. Ibid., p. 448.

15. I think the one way implication needs emphasis. Dummett's earlier attempts are found in his 1979 essay on 'Commonsense and Metaphysics' in G. McDonald (ed.,) *Perception and Identity* (McMillan, 1979) and his later attempt is found in his 'Realism' ('R' hereafter) in *Synthese* (1982) pp. 55-112; see especially pp. 66 and 76 ff. The reason why I attribute the theory of self-ascription is that it brings out a coherence with Dennett. From Dennett's point of view, the very idea of intentional stance, as he uses it, entails other-ascriptions, as the constraints on this stance invites a certain interpretivism. This is the essence of heterophenomenology.

16. See especially the section on 'Phenomenalism' in Ayer's *Central Questions of Philosophy*, London, 1973, and his book on *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, Unwin Paperbacks, 1982. Ayer's dealings with qualia in his later writings can be appreciated only from a cognitive point of view.

17. Wright reconstructs the principal of verifiability in his 'Scientific Realism, Observation, and the Verification Principle' ('SROVP' hereafter) calling it as embodying verificationist realism; see his article in *Fact, Science, and Morality: Essays on Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic*, edited by G. MacDonald and C. Wright, Blackwell, 1986, pp. 247-74.

18. Dummett improves his earlier four-fold classification of naive and sophisticated realism. His essay on Ayer is certainly updated still further.

19. Such a view receives endorsement in my 'Are Quine's Dogmas still Dogmas?' in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*,1993, pp. 195-213 assigning certain primacy to translation.

20. See p. 331.

21. Ted Honderich, 'Seeing Qualia and Positing the World' 'SQPW' hereafter) in *A.J.Ayer Memorial Essays*, edited by P. Griffiths, pp. 129–51.

22. Ibid., p. 131.

23. For a reconstruction of Ayer's reconciliation of phenomenalism and sophisticated realism, see his 'A.J. Ayer's Notion of Philosophical Analysis' in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Students' Supplement, pp. 11-20. A more detailed exegesis of Ayer's continuum is found in his doctoral thesis on 'A Critical Appraisal of A.J. Ayer's Phenomenalism as Form of Realism' (awarded in 1996).

24. Honderich, 'SQPW', p. 150.

25. Ross' formulation of Quine's Razor reads: 'To be is to be the value of the variable in our best scientific theory'; see also pp.445 and pp.450.

26. The continuum needs fuller treatment which at present is not available.

27. This line of thinking is pursued by Dummett. There is no hint of theory of ascription in Ayer as much as there is no hint for taking qualia phenomenalism as linguistic.

28. For a naturalistic development of semantics, see Michael Devitt's 'The Methodology of Naturalistic Semantics' in *Journal of Philosophy*, 1994, pp. 545-72. What he tries to establish is that there is a fact of the matter about meaning. But it does not follow that there is a fact about translation as well, given the *modus vivendi* about meaning and translation. Contrapositively, since there is no fact of the matter about translation, there is no fact of the matter about meaning. This in no way implies there is no possibility of translation, no possibility of meaning.

29. Dummett in 'R' p. 74.

30. Wright describes this as a challenge to realism as a semantic thesis held dear by Dummett.

31. See Dummett's 'the Significance of Quine's Indeterminacy Thesis', *Truth and Other Enigmas*, Duckworth, 1978, for the original inspiration of the idea about the primacy of translation.

32. Dummett's point about Quine's organic verificationism rests on two premisses: first, Quine has a theory of meaning; and second, holism is somewhat true. To say that meaning and truth are composite is tantamount to asserting that there is a continuum between realism and anti-realism.

33. As expected, for Dennett, the relation between natural language and the mentalese is a contingent one, pace Dummett, and both are fallouts of Quine's indeterminacy: Dennett openly admits that 'translating somebody's language of thought into, say English, would itself be an exercise in Quinean radical translation' in his 'Back from the Drawing Board', *Dennett and his Critics: Demystifying Mind*, Blackwell, 1993, p. 218.

34. For Wright ('SROVP'), Metaphysics can go as far as science can; this means that metaphysics is as much naturalistic as science is.

Textual Anonymity

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I

The anonymous does not amount to the unknown. It is made up of two components—one, a deed, an act or a product which is tangible, apprehensible and concrete; two, a point or source of origin, usually human, which is either unknown or amorphous.

The anonymous covers a very wide field—a painting, a musical composition, a temple or even a murder can be anonymous. But in this paper I shall concentrate upon anonymity only in the context of spoken and written texts.

A text is tangible and concrete—a given sequence of signs—a book, a memorized poem or a ballad. But a book or a poem does not write itself. It is bound to have a source—a human source. Let us call this point or source an *author*, not in the sense of *authority* with its legal implications, but in the sense of one who 'brings into being', the originator—the one who is assumed to be at the origin of an act or product. I prefer this word to *writer* since the one who writes may be a scribe. But more important, because in the Indian context, written texts came very late and in an oral tradition 'writer' is a meaningless word. Now if this point or source, which we call *author*, is not locatable or identifiable a text becomes anonymous. This is possible in various ways.

The name of the writer of a book may be lost in time. In the Buddhist tradition who wrote *Milindapañhā?* Who wrote *Beowulf* towards the end of the first millennia in Britain? The authors are unknown to us. But was this loss accidental or causal? In case of *Milindapañhā*, it was in all probabilities accidental since the Buddhists were keen about their authors' identities and a century later (second century AD) we have *Buddhacharita* authored by Aswagosha. But in case of *Beowulf* and most extant texts of that period in England, the anonymity that surrounds the works could be the result of an unawareness of the implications of an authorship. In other words, authorship of a text, in the then society, was not considered significant enough to be recorded. Perhaps man's memory was short about authors, poems like houses built for comfort and pleasure and thus, by the next generation, the author forgotten. On the other hand a text (for instance, a ballad) may be modified and

reworked by so many hands over decades and centuries that it cannot
be attributed to anyone. This kind of anonymity is very distinct in an
oral tradition where texts are written in memory. Interestingly, here,
the texts are not only anonymous, they are also very much *living* since they
perpetually change their forms until finally recorded in the written
form.

In modern times, a close parallel would be *jokes* which are not only
anonymous but also keep on changing their forms even after they are
printed. Perhaps, the reasons behind the changes and anonymity in
both cases are identical. It seems, such texts as these are considered
community property and yet not something which is sacred like a
religious text, and hence open to modifications according to one's
needs. The Buddhist *Jātakas*, interestingly, show a similar movement.
These moral tales about the previous births of the Buddha, recorded in
the Buddhist canonical writings were lifted from various sources
including folk tales, and modified to suit the purpose of the Buddhist
missionaries. In all probability, such tales were anonymous. But even if
and when they were not, they were codified in the canonical texts and
hence, here, became anonymous. In these cases authorship gets lost
and diffused in time. Both these can be called *temporal* anonymity since
time plays a significant role in causing it.

Anonymity can also occur due to diffusion in space. For instance, a
dictionary, though it has an editor, for all purposes is anonymous. This
is so because it has many collaborators. In other words, the *sources* of the
work are so many that an identification of an authorship (or authorships)
is not possible. This is an instance of *spatial* anonymity where authorship
is diffused in the same space as to become unidentifiable. The *Tripiṭakas*
or the canonical texts of the Buddhists, which were probably compiled
during the reign of Asoka, are early examples. Here, various Buddhist
scholars from different sects sat and debated for nine months before
the rules were laid down. But who authored them? No one. First, they
were essentially assumed to be the words of the Buddha or his teachings.
Secondly, hundreds participated. Voices got lost. But most important,
they were books of rules, a body of *unanimous* opinion that belonged to
all and not works of remarkable skill or brilliance that would need the
question, who did it? Besides, in religion ego always has a secondary
position, especially when such a text is canonical. And ego and the
acknowledgement of such an ego by others are necessary conditions of
authorship.

In these synchronic and diachronic losses of authorial identities a
most fundamental guiding principle that can be detected is *value*. Certain
ancient texts like the *Vedas*, the *Bible* or the *Quran*, for all practical
purposes are considered anonymous. Here, they are considered so
valuable that they cannot be attributed to a human source like a *ṛṣi*, a seer
or a prophet. On the other hand, a newspaper report may be anonymous

because no one considers it significant enough to identify its author.
Sometimes, an author may deem his work too insignificant and thus
forget to add his name to the work. Thus, anonymity can be the result of
too much or *too little* value.

Anonymity can also be the result of humility, fear or shame. An
author may consider himself too insignificant to be attached to his
work. This was often the case with ancient mystical writings. A writer
may be ashamed of his writing which in recent times has given rise to a
body of 'anonymous' pornographic writing. Fear can also be the cause
of a text whose father prefers to remain unknown. This can be the case
in writings that are too controversial or that threaten the very life of the
author.

Coming to the other side of the 'anonymous' we find that the
unknown in anonymous is only partially unknown. First, with or without
this unknown the text still exists—isolated from its author it can still
function. Secondly, the source is locatable in (a) human being. Hence
the unknown element does not amount to *what* or *how*, but only to *who*.
But a text, to function in isolation, must be deemed valuable enough to
be codified or it would be lost in time. In oral traditions, such texts
simply do not survive. But in a tradition of writing such texts may
undergo modifications in value if they are linked to an author. An
obscure poem may come into circulation if it is proved to have been
written by Shakespeare. But this is an area which has been explored by
Foucault and I will not probe further into it here.

To briefly sum up—a text becomes anonymous due to basically two
reasons.

(1) Practical difficulties in locating the author who is not known,
     does not want to be known or is too amorphous.
(2) The desire or decision to locate an author depending upon the
     value imposed upon the text.

II

The *valuable* always gathers around it a series of discourses consisting of
histories, anecdotes, stories and legends. Most of these deal with how it
originated, from whom, under what conditions. If it no longer exists,
then they are about how it ended and who brought about its end.

Man's primal obsession has been always with himself and his world.
Beyond himself, for him, the creation of the world is the most probing
question since it is his world and invaluable.

Here, a central question that comes up is who created it? The Old
Testament says: In the beginning God created the heaven and the
earth. (Genesis 1). In *The Questions of King Milinda*,[1] Milinda asks the
Buddhist monk, Nāgasena:

'What is the root, Nāgasena, of past time, and what of present and
what of future time?'
'Ignorance . . . .' (79)

The *Ṛg-Veda* (X, 129)[2] asks:

> . . . who is succeeded in finding out
> wherefrom the world has come, who has seen it?
>
>   *   *   *
>
> He who has created it or not created it
> He knows it or does not he too know?
>
> In Greece, Heraclitus concludes: The universe was not created by
> anyone . . . but it was ever.[3]

Whatever the answer to this question of *who*—be it God, ignorance,
Brahman or Fire the first principle—it clearly points to man's eternal
quest to find out the root, the origin, the cause, the author, the father
of what he considers valuable.

Once the question has been asked, the answer can basically be
three—either the world is self-created, or it has a supernatural or
human source. It is only with the human source of origin that anonymity
or authorship is linked.

But by merely saying that value determines the very possibility of
anonymity or authorship we will not make much progress. A palace is
valuable but one may not ask who built (I do not mean the king) it or
designed it.

In other words, the value should not be merely utilitarian or economic,
but one where elments of brilliance, skill, wonder or fear come in. Who
could make such a thing! In other words, a perceiver—an ego or
identity—must suddenly become aware of and be fascinated by the
who—the source—behind the work or text. When such an awareness
has caught a noticeable chunk of society or civilization the possibility of
anonymity or authorship emerges.

It is in this context that all the ancient revealed traditions pose an
interesting question. Why is it that they are anonymous? Is it accidental
or intentional? True, much of it must be accidentally lost in time. But
divinity is something which is imposed from outside upon these texts in
a tradition. In other words, man is replaced by God or a suprahuman
source and authorship is snatched away. Thus texts, such as the Vedas,
the *Bible* or the *Quran* become anonymous by convention.

Earlier, I had made a distinction between an author and a writer as
scribe. In revealed texts, the authors are bereft of their authorship and
are considered mere scribes. The Vedas are considered *apauraṣya,* that
is, not written by human agency. *Śruti,* the body of Vedic texts, is that
which is communicated from the beginning; sacred knowledge orally
transmitted by the Brahmins from generation to generation, wisdom

directly heard or revealed to the old sages. *The Bible* is the word of God.
In *The New Testament,* the four apostles are the four scribes. *The Quran* is
imparted to Muhammad and is later transcribed while in *Zend Avesta*
God speaks to Zoroaster.

Interestingly, in case of *Ṛg-Veda* we have an exhaustive list of names of
authors in *anukramāṇis* (which follows *Vedāṅgas*)—Viswāmitra, Atri, etc.
But for all that the Vedas are *apauraṣya*. This instance might be critical
for it could point to a juncture in history when the Vedas became
ordained divine texts.

In all these cases, why is authorship snatched away or wilfully
sublimated and anonymity imposed upon them? It is because they are
deemed too valuable to have been written by human beings. In two
words, *excess value*. But the other very significant reason is the very
nature of language.

Man is born into language. Surrounded by echoes he uses language
and language uses him. In the modern context, this free-play of language
and its echoes is considered purposeless like the random Brownian
movement of molecular particles. But for the ancients language was
sacred—an ephemeral, mystical physically graspable manifestation of
the Almighty.

The Bible says:

> In the beginning was the word (*New Testament*)

The *Ṛg-Veda* (X, 71,4) says:

> One man hath never seen *vāk* (speech) and yet he seeth; one man
> hath hearing but he never heard her/But to another hath she
> shown her beauty as a fond well-dressed woman to her husband.

It is perhaps these features of language—as an act, as memory, as
echo—that made it different from the builder's bricks or the artist's
paints and thus could lead to a distinctly different kind of anonymity
that was only possible with a text, not with a painting, a music score or
an architecture.

In other words, it could only be words—a text—that could be deemed
so immensely valuable as to lose their human authorship to divinity.

But here, if another significant concept is not mentioned, the
discussion will remain incomplete—the role and significance of
inspiration in the ancient texts.

Revelation of any kind is always intimately linked to inspiration.
According to Plato[4]:

> a poet is an airy thing, a winged and holy thing; and he cannot
> make poetry until he becomes inspired and goes out of his senses
> and no mind is left in him . . . the poets are nothing but God's
> interpreters. . . . (*Ion,* 18)

Naively put, all revelations are inspirations but all inspirations are
not revelations.

Revelations, in a civilization, are what are considered *absolute* truths to which nothing can be added and from which nothing can be taken. On the contrary, many wise sayings that are inspired may be considered only *relative* truths and hence cannot become anonymous even if their authors want them to. Two significant points strike us here. First, in the early days of civilization, all creative writing was considered inspired. Anything out of the ordinary was considered supernatural and stripped of its authorship. Over time, authorship was gradually restored to them. On the other hand, those writings which were considered *too valuable* were stripped of their authorship and incorporated into the revealed tradition.

Secondly, it is not the author who decides anonymity or authorship but a tradition. Many ancient writers, in their humility, considered their works too good to have been written by them. They attributed such texts to God or divinity. And yet after all this, authorship was still imposed upon them. On the other hand, it is possible (though we do not know for sure) than an author insisted that *he* had written a text and yet it passed into some revealed tradition. Thus, it is the *tradition* that decides the fate of many such texts. It was like the state deciding the fate of the son once he was born. Language was still very mysterious in its origin and inspiration was considered to come from outside. Authorship with all its legal implications came much later in civilization.

We have earlier mentioned that anonymity or authorship was something imposed from outside. The *Mahābhārata*, a huge body of literature written over at least six hundred years is an interesting example which is ascribed to Vyāsadeva. For all practical purposes it has an author (with his history, biography, legends and anecdotes) even though like ballads it underwent modifications, revisions and enlargement over centuries. This is so because *śruti* is what can be equated with revealed texts while the *Mahābhārata* does not fulfil those norms. Thus, here it is the degree of value that decides the nature of anonymity or authorship. Here, either an authorship is arbitrarily thrust upon them or they become anonymous in a more human way.

Authorship is generally external. I am not talking about the fact that there is one or more subjects inside the narrative network. I am not talking about the writer disappearing in the echoes of his words. But in fact, the author's name usually does not form a part of the text. In other words, it is *external* to the text. It is usually not to be found inside the space of the text which is what happens when a painter puts a signature on his painting. But in certain later Indian traditions, mostly oral, the author makes it a point to incorporate his name into the knitting of the text.

This could be a significant point in the story of Indian texts when the author no longer takes the risk of leaving his name to the memories of

other men. He makes it an integral part of the text so that it would not be lost in memory.

Speech, at its origin served a most utilitarian function as a counterpart to action. It elicited action or was response to it. For instance, a hunter used speech to tell where the deer were or got some information which would help him in locating his game. But with the growth of memory, strings of words could be remembered accurately and chanted, isolated from their immediate living. Whether they served some magical function or some aesthetic craving these ancient strings of remembered words in a particular sequence can be considered the first texts. It seems, though somebody made up these songs or someone modified them, they belonged to all the people of the tribe and hence were anonymous. Tribes usually had some kind of communism in which most things belonged to all. Early songs were like that. They belonged to all. It must have been difficult for them to privatize something like language which everyone shared.

Another thing common to ancient tribes was the fact that the individual was not deemed very valuable. In those primitive communisms a magic charm or a song could be a treasure, but no specific man could be considered significant enough to be linked to it. Perhaps such texts later became the property of a select few—the priests. But they were handed down and belonged to them as a piece of property, like a chair. The important question then, possibly, was not who made the chair but who possessed it.

But a text is more than property, and its author need not necessarily possess it. Shakespeare and other Elizabethan dramatists sold their plays. But the plays still belonged to them in a different sense. The author may not have any specific claim over his text but the society recognized and did not deny the umbilical bond between the two.

The emergence of legalized authorship, as Foucault points out, came pretty late in civilization and can be related to capitalism or individualism. Authorship was licensed and a text became a kind of wealth with money involved. This was possible through printing which gave the physical dimension of a text (namely, a book) a more concrete shape. A book was made to be sold, yielded money, and hence a text as property was graspable. The reason for pointing this out is two-fold. One, it is important to realize that a text also had a physical economically graspable dimension and indeed became a matter of business. But much more important, it points clearly to the fact that ownership, prior to this stage must have posed a strange problem. Property assumes that it is both unique and limited. It also implies that it is concrete and hence its ownership can be located. But a text is unique in the sense that it can be transmitted by memory and hence stolen. In this process half a community can manage to possess the text. This unique quality of the text, that it can be stolen from one by way of transmission makes it

impossible for one to assume that the one who possesses it owns it. Thus, inevitably, its relation to its author must have argued in favour of his rightful ownership. This could be another reason which determined the relation between text and author or anonymity.

III

A revealed text is not possible today. Its emergence is simply an impossibility. Even if one suddenly discovers a very antiquated and invaluable text, it can *never* be incorporated into a tradition of revelation. In other words, today, a text cannot ever become anonymous because of *immense value*.

Language is still enigmatic. But it has been stripped of its mysteries, of its magic. The immense value of words came from their link with truth—word is wisdom, word is God. It arose from the fact that *meaning* could never be separated from word. It evolved from the acknowledgement that words came as inspiration, voices spoke from within the space inside. Such miracles had to be preserved as they were, without the slightest change.

But today inspiration has been explained away by psychologists. The centre has also been abolished. It is no longer possible to believe that codified words or texts can say anything outside of or beyond themselves. But in the process language has regained its enigma in a more baffling way. It is unpredictable, its meanings innumerable, a jumble of echoes without an origin.

This state of affairs has come about in an interesting way. When Saussure defined language as a system—a vast repertoire at a given moment of time from which man used some—the possibility of language using man became more distinct. On the other hand, he pointed to the ephemeral quality of meaning. When meaning could no longer be considered independent of the word, language as a system could no longer be attached to an umbilical mother or Supreme being. In this background, the attack upon the author was perhaps a reaction to the excess of attention that he had received during the last two centuries. It was also because of the fact that the authors themselves showed a keen awareness of language using them rather than they using language. To name a few, Mallarme, Kafka, Brecht, Beckett. Barthes in 'The Death of the Author', says:

> Though the sway of the Author remains powerful . . . it goes without saying that certain writers have long since attempted to loosen it.[5]

He adds:

> Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile.[6]

What he tries to emphasize here is that the authors or writers do not perhaps try to say anything. It is as if language speaks through them—they only compile the echoes and combinations of words and cultures which move in the space of their minds.

Here, two kinds of anonymities are being indicated. One, a text has multiple identities. There are fictions within fictions, voices within voices. When we look at a book, we immediately link it to the name of its author written on its cover. But within a book, a voice speaks, a narrator narrates. Who is he? He may or may not be the author. In the novels of Kafka the narrator is without a name—anonymous. In Eliot's *Waste Land*, there are many voices, not only without names, but without identities, without sexes, without history. This can be called *internal* anonymity since this anonymity is within the text. But it does not affect the external relation of the text and its author. We still know what Kafka, Brecht or Beckett wrote.

But the other kind of attempted anonymity comes when the author attempts, in his text to show that he has not written it, but as Levi-Strauss phrases, it is written within the space called man. In other words, since the author denies having written it, we may as well say that the text writes itself in him. Ironically, this situation is similar to inspiration. But here language is assumed to be playing a game without any purpose, not directed at any meaning outside of itself. In other words, we cannot impart it any value.

In this manner, a text's very unity is threatened to be disrupted. Barthes tries to find an alternate unity in the reader into whom the text enters and who tries to give it his own meaning. But Foucault simply changes the line of inquiry to the organizational elements of a text rather than its intention or meaning.

In this scenario the possibilities of anonymity come in a haze, in a hallucinatory vision where there can be nothing called meaning, nothing can be pointed to and identified as this, where incoherence leads to a dissolution of identity.

On the other hand, in the post-modern culture everything is mass-produced, mass-designed in a desperate urgency, in a hurry, where there is no time. Recognition needs time, enough time to reflect, think at least twice about something. It also needs a space where a thing stands out, where it is slightly different from other things and where there is enough opportunity to recognize this slight difference. Where we do not have these there is anonymity. A text becomes a thing like an ice-cream to be consumed. And in the flurry of voices, echoes and memories floating around it becomes another echo in the brain's digestive space. Where, thus, a text's very identity is threatened, where there is not enough time, enough memory, anonymity is an imminent possibility.

But here we actually encounter two issues. As said earlier, it is a

culture that determines anonymity and authorship. It determines what is significant enough to have an author. In mass production each text is similar. They have a utilitarian purpose to serve. The author's attitude is also determined by the sociological conditions. In the texts he produces daily for a newspaper for his living, he may see no intimations of immortality. He may not find what he writes valuable enough to carry his name, the possibility of authorship or fame. On the other hand, there are many advertisement legends which are authored by the agency, namely Mudrā or Visiontek. Here, it is possible that many people collaborated. But it is more likely that the legend is bought. Authorship and the possibilities of immortality are sacrificed to money.

As mentioned earlier most pornographic confessions have been anonymous. But these days in much pulp fiction or pornographic journals actual names are replaced by fictitious names. This is interesting since here, as a token gesture to convention, a name is added like an appendage to the text. But it is a name without a history, without a responsibility, without a human being to attach itself to.

At the end of this paper I wish to discuss two issues which I consider most significant. What gave rise to this emphasis on the relation between text, authorship and anonymity? Can anonymity really claim texts in the present context as Barthes and Foucault have predicted?

The two issues, I strongly believe, are related. The possibility of anonymity or authorship arise only when one raises the question *who*. At some point of time, in the history of language, in various cultures this question was raised. Why? Because authorship in not only related to a text, but to *immortality* through the text. When man became aware of the durable nature of codified language, he must have tried to seek through it his sustenance. Kings built monuments to be remembered. So also with texts.

Foucault speaks of discourse, power and authority. Who wrote this order? The king. The text assumes power though its author. He also points to the fact that ancient scientific texts got their authority through their authors and their credence. But at the same time, a scientific discourse sustained its author and his immortality only as a codified text.

Due to these and various other reasons, a text was linked to a who, an originator, a father. And thus a text became also an extension of an ego, the outward articulation of a mind. It became a link between two egos, two selves, two identities—the one who authored and the one who received it or read it.

Barthes says:

> . . . the reader . . . is simply someone who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is constituted . . . . We know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the

myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the author.[7]

Foucault on the other hand predicts in 'What is an Author':

> We would no longer hear the questions that have been rehashed for so long: Who really spoke? Is it really he and not someone else? With what authenticity and originality? . . . . Instead, there would be other questions, like these: What are the modes of existence of this discourse . . . . [8]

But for such a thing to happen the first step is to remove the names of Foucault and Barthes from these quotations; to remove their names from their texts; to remove all names from all texts. Are we prepared to do so? For my part, I will stubbornly resist anyone removing my name from what I have written. For this, which I have written, I consider an extension of myself, however fragmented, neurotic and multi-dimensional that myself might be; because I still consider language significant enough to carry the memory of my voice, the hope of my immortality.

Unless I crack up and am sent to a madhouse or sublimate and dissolve into something larger I will hold on to my unstable 'I'. It is something instinctive to me, which sustains my very existence. Are we prepared for such a large self-denial? Is it possible to lose our curiosity about the author of a text which we find skilful, brilliant or fascinating, even if the author is an empty space in a mind where the words write themselves?

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(I) On Humanism, Secularism and Socialism*

PAULOS MAR GREGORIOS

I will begin by making a confession that to socialism, I have some
commitment, but to humanism and secularism, I have no commitment.
I am a fundamental critic of both humanism and secularism. And I tell
you why? Let us start with humanism. As you all know, all 'ism' words
with two or three exceptions are of nineteenth century origin. Before
that you would not find any 'ism'. Before the nineteenth century,
nobody talked about Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Mohammedanism
and all that. And the reason for that is in the nineteenth century,
thinkers wanted to classify everything in the world as systems or doctrines
or dogmas or ideologies—a set of interconnected ideas. That's what
'ism' really means—a set of ideas. However, it does not work everywhere
in the same way. Hinduism, for instance, is not simply a set of ideas, it is
a series of practice. We, in our classical languages, do not have a word
for 'ism'. We have schools, *darśanas, sampradāyas*, but 'ism' is not one of
our approaches. It is basically the peculiarity of our new enlightenment
culture that we want to know everything as an 'ism'. What is the idea
behind any 'ism'? For example, in Christianity somebody asked me,
'what do you orthodox believe which is different from Catholics and
Protestants?' Well, the assumption is that orthodoxy is a set of beliefs,
and Catholic and Protestant are schools. Orthodoxy is not a set of ideas
but a way of life, practice and all that. So 'ism' comes itself as a concept
which can distort reality.

About humanism which *Oxford Dictionary* defines as 'system of beliefs
that concentrate on common human needs and seeks rational rather
than divine ways of solving human problems'. Humanism is a system of
beliefs which mainly concentrates on human needs and a rational
solution to those needs. This is the essential feature of humanism. I
would say that humanism is the central product of the process which we
call European enlightenment. I tell you why. There are two kinds of
humanism—liberal humanism and Marxist humanism. These are two
different kinds of humanism and we have to look into how they came

into being. Humanism of the liberal variety has no consistent ideological structure. Liberal humanism simply says that none of the dogma should be accepted, everything should be opened, everything could be examined critically by reason. It is humanism in the sense that it makes human being its central concern. In Marxism also human being is the central concern. Liberal humanism has set arbitrary commitments usually to Justice and to the Freedom of man as its central commitments. But this commitment is not based on any consistent ideology. Whereas Marxism has a very highly developed sophisticated philosophical ideology, that ideology has one basic difference from Western liberalism. Marxism will not regard humanity and the world as two separate, disjunct realities. In liberal humanism, human being stands as the subject and the world as the object. Marxism does not like that. Marxism sees human beings themselves as the natural development of the process of evolution. It comes out of nature, not apart from nature, it is an extension of nature, it is an integral part of nature, it is dependent on nature for its very being. Engels said humanity is an 'exchange of material' and it means 'metabolism'. Human being becomes human being with his metabolism of interaction with material things, only by handling it, by touching it, feeling it, and also in the process of changing it becomes human being. You do not become human being without this metabolism with nature. In liberal humanism, human being is regarded as 'given' and nature is regarded as another 'given', and nature is something for you to 'use'. Our environmental problem comes out of the basic separation of humanity from nature. Marxism does not do that. In Marxism, humanity itself is an aspect of nature, integrally related to it and dependent on it for its very being. But in the European enlightenment, as you know, it was an ideological movement. The basic thing about European enlightenment is an attempt to totally undermine the feudal system and to give a rationale to new bourgeoisie, that is where the enlightenment begins. Bourgeoisie means 'city dwellers', 'Bour' means 'city'. Bourgeoisie was a new class of people comprising of artisans, craftsmen, traders and others, just coming out around the seventeenth century as a result of the economic and social developments. They wanted in the first place to overthrow feudalism and to establish a new philosophical justification for the new class. The class is the new bourgeoisie—the citizens. In doing so one thing became very clear as a historical fact. The old feudal system was so integrally related to the religion and it was very clear that as long as religion and feudal system work together, any attack on feudal system would not work. So in the European enlightenment, it was decided that religion as such should be put out. Even in the French revolution, there were some people who were 'deists' believing that God started the whole thing, then He went away and everything goes on in accordance with the natural laws, that is, deists. Even Voltaire was like that. But others were strongly convinced

that you cannot defeat feudalism unless you defeat the religion. The best example of that is Heinrich Heine—the great German poet and writer. He said that in France you are able to beat religion but in Germany we are not because religion is so deeply rooted and unless we defeat this religious entrenchment, we cannot begin our task. This was one side of it. Voltaire was also influenced by this idea that religion was a reactionary force. Nehru himself was partly of the same point of view that religion was an obstacle to progress. If you want progress, not only should you attack religion but also put it aside.

Until enlightenment, the integrating intellectual principle was the belief in God. It was in theology that all the human problems in experience were integrated. Now the enlightenment threw out that integrating principle—the religion as the matrix of thought process. In that place enlightenment put the human reason which could integrate everything. This was the basic change which European enlightenment brought. I myself do not subscribe to that theology as integrating element. But once you subscribe to enlightenment reason, you find that the integrating principle does not fully work. So you divide 'experience' into three compartments—science, ethics and art. In the new enlightenment thinking, technically it is human reason that reconciles the three. But that integration is very flimsy. It does not have adequate foundation. Immanuel Kant particularly was the one who was trying to distinguish between three kinds of reason—pure reason, practical reason and the judgment. In the one, you know the things (phenomena), in the other, you know how to act, in the third, you have to discern what is good. By making this separation, he held on the 'idea of reason' which was already divided in three compartments. European enlightenment has this problem that 'reason' as such is not able to fulfil the task of integrating everything. But the enlightenment was able to assert on the 'autonomy' and 'adulthood' (maturity). According to the evolutionary ideology which was going through that time, humanity has been developing into three phases; one is the religious stage, the second stage is metaphysics. These two stages are the stages of 'immaturity' of humanity. Humanity becomes 'mature' when its knowledge becomes 'scientific' which is the third stage. Science is the mature form of human dealing with reality. Both religion and metaphysics belong to the 'childhood' of humanity. Maturity means repudiating religion and metaphysics. The positive thing is that it affirms humanity. In the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant wrote 'What Is Enlightenment?' In that pamphlet he says, 'Enlightenment is the coming of the age of maturity throwing away all that belongs to childhood'. And why is humanity languished because, it does not have the 'courage' to trust its own 'reason', it is too dependent on religion and metaphysics. So the enlightenment means that human being has to have the 'courage', to think boldly, to overthrow childishness. It was

industrial revolution which was coming out of feudal relationship and was trying to affirm human autonomy. Individual's dignity, freedom and rights are affirmed in enlightenment reason. If reason has to be criticized, it has to be critisized by reason alone. That is what we mean by 'critical reason'.

Now interestingly enough, socialism is a reaction against enlightenment rationality, because socialism says that in the industrial revolution, since individual is central and his property is the source of his freedom. Immanuel Kant says that if you are, for example, a tutor at a rich man's house and if you share his table for breakfast, you are not free. You will be free if you have your own property or a job so that you are not dependent on any body for your livelihood. If you have no property, you cannot even vote. If you have private property, you will be law-maker and obeyer. And this is the thrust of enlightenment rationality. Propertied citizens have the rights to vote and to legislate. This principle ultimately led to individualism and acquisitive greed. This is what socialism reacts with.

Now I ask the question—what is socialism? The essential thing for socialism is not equality or social justice but to change the extreme individualist orientation of enlightenment. It is an attempt to create a social being who is not like the human beings of the commodity culture. Socialism believes that unless the total structure of society—economic, social, political and cultural—is transformed, the socialist kind of human being cannot emerge. Human being is not produced by preaching alone. Socialism believes that in the very process of 'socially organized labour', human beings get transformed. The essence of Marxist socialism lies in 'socially organized labour' in order to produce a new kind of human personality. If you say that you want to produce to have justice, it does not work. Socialism wants to change the human 'psyche', from an individual psyche to a social psyche. In capitalism, you work in order to get something for yourself. In socialism, you work in order that other people satisfy their needs. Labour is not the purpose of fulfilling your own needs. Labour is the purpose of making sure that all human beings can fulfil their needs. This is a different orientation to labour.

But the question is how do you go about finding out—what is man? There is no answer to it. There is no methodology on the basis of which you can make out the basic understanding of what a human being is. Phenomenologically, we can say this is what the human being is now. But 'what should a human being be' is a very difficult question. Now this is all that I have to say on humanism.

On secularism, let me say, there are three words with different meanings—secular, secularization and secularism. In India we confuse one with the other. India as a state is secular but as a nation, it is communal. At the time of partition, Mr Jinnah said that Pakistan would

be a religious country. In reaction to that, Jawaharlal Nehru said that India would be a secular state. Because there was no other word available that time as non-religious state or something. Therefore Nehru chose the word 'secular state'. I do not question that decision. That was a period of big crisis in which he had to take the decisions very quickly, and Nehru took over this word for his liberal education without understanding the history of this word.

The word 'secular' has a very old origin, 'secularization' originated during the sixteenth century and 'secularism' in the nineteenth century. The word secular as an adjective goes back to the Latin culture. It is a Latin word 'saecularis' and it comes as an adjective after the word 'saeculum' which in pre-Christian Latin meant 'a long period of time' almost something like our 'yugam' which means 'world structure' but not the world as 'basically conceived' but as 'time conceived'. [Likewise] 'a long period of time' is called saeculum. Then it came to be, saeculum meant 'century' or 'a hundred years'. Already in the time of Julius Caesar that is 44 BC, at the end of every century, they had saeculum games, once in a one hundred years, celebrating the century that is passing and welcoming the new century that is coming. It is a good time for us to do it now. But then saeculum meant 'belonging to the century'. After he beginning of the Christian church, the word secular takes on a new meaning. It is distinguished from saecularis and religious. What does it mean? Religious means 'monastic', attached to a monastry community under a given set of rules. This is the meaning of religious till the eighteenth century. Opposed to that was the word 'secular'.

Then the word 'secularization' (sixteenth century). The word was first used in the Treaty of West Falia in Germany which was signed by the European nations fighting for the Thirty Years War. The drafters of the treaty had used the word 'secularization'. What does it mean? When you take away the property that belonged to the Catholic Church and give it to public, it meant secularization. Then it meant that not only property but also institutions and ideas should be taken away from the control of the Church and be given to public openness. That is the way secularization came into being.

Secularism is a peculiar nineteenth century word like all other 'isms' and has a specific meaning. Around the beginning of nineteenth and twentieth century, a man called G.J. Holiock in England started a view called 'secularism'. It was very popular promoted by some of the highest scientists of the time. What he said was this: 'All the religions belonged to the immature past of humanity. Now we are at the stage of science and positive thought.' In the beginning, it was very popular in England and America. But it collapsed in the 30s. When Hitler came up, people said 'this is what secularism has produced'. There was a reaction against fascism and in that reaction secularism was also more or less abandoned by a large number of people. Indian secularism is a peculiar thing. It

moves away from the western model and makes certain basic principles. One of them is separation of religion and politics. But it does not really work. Religion is the heart of politics in India. The other principles are—state is not religious or anti-religious and that all religions are equal.

Now I shall talk about something which Marxist socialist has to take into account especially if he has learned a lesson from what happened in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s of which the Chinese just managed to survive. I would say that there are ten things which socialism has to re-think:

(1) It must rediscover its original purpose, namely transformation of human mind from an individual to social psyche. That has been lost very quickly after the achievement of socialism. The fundamental part is the human being and the transformation of the human being from individualistic, inquisited, property oriented to social being. Inside the Soviet Union, there is so much interest in private property and individual greed which Marxism was not able to stop.

(2) The notion that progress is automatic. That is to say the assumption that as means of production become stronger and better, the corresponding new relations of production will automatically emerge. And in a sense, science and technology is that which brings about this change. Science and technology improve the means of production so that human beings per capita or according to the number can produce more, and when they produce more, they cannot be organized as they were before. In feudalism, there was a particular kind of organization which was mostly agriculture, there were feudal lords, serfs and all that. When industrial culture came that feudal system of social relations became obsolete and you had wage labour emerging as a new phenomenon which required a new organization to accept it. The idea that as capitalism fades away, socialism comes into being, and that it is automatic, is questionable because it has not happened that way. Again and again capitalism develops techniques of survival. It was a dogmatic confidence that capitalism will fall down from its internal weight. You cannot say that automatically socialism will come when technology comes, organizations will change and socialism will emerge. We have to think of other factors than just the relations of production which are changes by the means of production.

(3) The inevitability of socialism out of historical necessity is too much a dogma. It has no adequate philosophical basis. In Marxism, history is a substitute for God because it is history that will accomplish the final fulfilment. Here is a dogma which is just the secularization of an earlier dogma. A Christian will say—God is going to bring justice. A Marxist will say—history is going to bring justice. I do not think there is any philosophical foundation to it.

(4) We have to re-examine the value theory developed by Marx

mainly as you see it in Capital. This is one of the most sophisticated theories in human history. It says value is created in human labour. But this is not true. In fact, human labour is one of the factors that creates value. There are other factors too depending on the market mechanism. The very word 'value' has been abandoned by the economists. Value was meant that which you desire to appropriate. Among post-Marxist economists there was tremendous discussion on it. Economists have abandoned the value theory and phenomenologists picked it up and made value-theory and so on. One of the things which classical Marxism has not taken into account is the sales-technique of capitalism like advertisement and with it mind-washing, making people buy things which they do not need. Not that it has got value in the ordinary sense but that is there as a commodity and you acquire it. This is a great power of capitalism because capitalism creates new desires and then creates the commodity which will fulfil that desire. Socialism could not take adequate account of it.

(5) That class-struggle is the only decisive principle for understanding everything that happens is one of the exaggerations of Marxism. There is no doubt about it that—class struggle is very powerful, but that is not the only means. We have in our Indian politics ethnic struggles which cut across class-struggle. When you come out of European societies, there are other struggles, religious struggles, community struggles. These too have been taken into account if you want to prepare an adequate socialism for the future.

(6) The role of the party in socialism has to be re-assessed. What happened is that you developed a theory that there is the proletariat and on behalf of the proletariat, the party will exercise its power. In practice, the proletariat was almost side-tracked and the party became the dictator of the society. The lack of democracy within the Party was the big problem in the whole of Central and Eastern European socialism. The Party must be accountable to the proletariat. Also you must forgive me for saying so. The Party members should not seek comfort, should not want privilege. They are the monks of the new era. A true communist does not seek anything for himself. Unfortunately this has not happened. I can say the same thing about Christianity. So long as Bishops and priests are seeking comfort, privilege and pleasure, the church will go down.

(7) Decentralization of property relationship. The idea that Party should own all means of production is a stupid idea. How can you do that? We must make a distinction between private property and personal property. If I have a flat in which I live, that is, my personal property. But if I have a flat which I rent out, that is my private property because I am making money out of that. Personal property is the basic necessity of life which everybody will like to have. But private property is a means of production including land, building and industry and so on. We

need to decentralize the private property. On personal property, there should be limits and controls, I agree with that. But private property as a means of production cannot be centrally owned by the Party. In fact, the Party is not competent, especially in a large country like Soviet Union, the party is not able to adequately control the private property.

(8) There must be international democracy within the Party of which I spoke at the Soviet Institute of Philosophy. There must be democracy among the communist parties of different countries along with CPSU. Even our communist party should not have just accepted whatever was given to them from Moscow. We must be bold enough to participate and say what we think about economy. There must also be cultural internationalism within the Party structure.

(9) Minimalization of unnecessary violence. At one time Marxism said that violence was necessary in some cases, and then it became a licence for all the time. Even in Kerala, it just goes on.

(10) Some of the ideological questions have to be reopened, though it is a very difficult task. The fundamental basis of Marxism is a kind of historical-dialectical materialism. It says that the only reality that exists is matter in the process of dialectical development. In 1980, Soviet thinkers made a small change in it and said that it is not matter alone but matter and energy that are developing dialectically. This is a very difficult issue. Matter, as we know, exists by itself, self-existent, uncaused. But in cosmic evolution, matter is something which has come out of energy.

Let me now conclude this lecture. I believe in the principle of a pluralistic society. I would even say a cosmopolitan society. For example, in south India where I come from, we have almost welcomed everybody who came from abroad. Jews came, Parsees came, Jains came, Buddhists came, all were welcome, because we are cosmopolitan. You have a right to follow your own religion and at the same time you can live with us. This is what we need today.

[The lecture was followed by a question-answer session].

Dr R.P. Singh: Father, what do you think—does socialism have a future? The classical Marxist foundation of socialism practised by Lenin has failed. Do you think by incorporating ten points that you have suggested, socialism could be revived?

Dr Gregorios: I think it is only socialism that has a future, capitalism does not have it. Capitalism survives on two factors; constant renewal of technology and availability of markets. But logically and philosophically there is definitely an end to it.

Dr Ranjan K. Ghosh: The present society is almost a global society. So what kind of relationship do we envisage between technology and human relationship?

Dr Gregorios: We cannot live without technology. The big problem with technology is that it has run away from human control. Technology is made into commodity which is sold in the market. It has become one way of exploiting the people. At the same time, without technology even science cannot develop.

(II) On Postmodernism

PAULOS MAR GREGORIOS

Today, we shall talk on 'postmodernism'. Unfortunately, everything is called an 'ism' these days. Normally, 'ism' means 'a clear set of ideas' and a programme based on it. If you ask any postmodernist to say what postmodernism is, he is lost. There in no way of defining it. It is a 'movement', it is an 'attitude' or a 'mood', but not a systematic thing where you can develop concepts and relationships, precisely what the postmodernists are against. Any attempt to oversystematize thought by being reduced to any kind of system is to reduce thinking as such. So postmodernism is basically a 'mood'. We must be careful of those people who include everything in postmodernism so that it becomes too all inclusive. Anything that happens after the modern period becomes postmodern. That's not true. Then there is opposite critique of postmodernism which largely came from the Left. It says that postmodernism is an expression of decadence of late capitalism. This is a negative kind of an approach towards postmodernism. I do not want to take that line. Of course, the Left thinks that postmodernism is a deviation, it stops you from taking a social action.

Postmodernism exists in different disciplines—in philosophy, in architecture, in music, in literature, in politics and so on—in different 'moods'. Each of these has certain qualities. The first question is—what is the relation of postmodernism to modernism? For that, we have to see what modernism is? Then to find out the relationship. No postmodernist will say that postmodernism is a denial of modernism. They say it is a reconstruction, reinterpretation, an attempt to give a new meaning to modernism. This is what the spokesman of postmodernism, Jean-Francois Lyotard says that 're-writing modernity is what is postmodernity' not postmodernism because 'ism' is very bad. For that we have to know what 'modernity' is? Modernity may be defined as 'quality of the new type'. The word came from *Modo* in Latin. *Modo* is the same as 'mode' or 'fashion'. What is in 'mode' now is 'modern'. So much so in English language 'our modern queen' means 'our present queen'.

Of course, there is no way of coming to terms with postmodernity (most post-modern writers are allergic to the term 'postmodernism' since they do not regard it as one of those 'isms' of the modern lingo;

they prefer postmodernity), we have to have some grasp of modernity, and the movement away from modernity in post-Nietzschian thought. We shall later have a look at these movements, mainly the post-Marxist or New Left, the post-structuralist or deconstructionist, post-linguist or post-positivist.

Max Weber characterized cultural modernity as the separation of 'substantive reason' expressed in religion and metaphysics into three autonomous regions: Science, Morality and Art. Peter Berger in his *Facing up to Modernity* (New York, 1977) suggested five phenomena characteristic of modernity:

(a) Abstraction
(b) Futurity
(c) Individualism
(d) Liberation
(e) Secularization

I prefer Max Weber's definition for a start, but would amend that slightly. For behind that separation of 'substantive reason' from the religious consciousness, and also from its basic unity, is the fundamental act of the Modern—the repudiation of the transcendent as the unifying principle, and its replacement by human rationality as sovereign and as the new unifying principle of all experience and all understanding. The central and fundamental thrust of the modern, seems to me, is the bold and unhesitating affirmation of the autonomy of the human individual and society, as not dependent on, or answerable to, any other reality. It is this affirmation that repudiates all external authority, outside of human reason, whether of religion or of tradition. From that repudiation of external authority and the affirmation of human autonomy and sovereignty have come the other trappings of the Modern—for example, Modern Science/Technology, Modern Urban-industrial civilization, Modern Philosophy and Literature, and so on.

The beginnings of the Modern can be traced to that intellectual fervour that spread in Europe from the middle of the eighteenth century. The French Revolution of 1789 was a high point in the spread of this intellectual-spiritual as well as political-economic-social ferment in western society. The process lasted from mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century, and is still spreading geographically, encompassing all cultures which adopt the urban-technological-industrial system, with its capitalist mode of production, Calvinist-individualist 'value-system', culture, medicine, communications system, educational system and political-economic institutions, all based on human sovereignty and autonomy. We 'modern educated people' are all today, in large measure, products of that ferment and process. In India, the process is pervasive, but has not yet conquered all the people, since all the people have not yet been educated:

What is the European Enlightenment? It was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), one of its earliest prophets, who asked that question and answered it in his article (in the *Berlinischer Monatsschrift*, December 1783 issue, entitled: *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklaerung?* or) 'Answer to the Question: What is the Enlightenment?'

His answer: 'Au*fklaerung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner Selbst-verschuldeten Unmuendigkeit*': Let me give his full answer:

> Enlightenment is the coming out of Man from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the incapacity to serve one's own understanding without direction (*Leitung*) from another. This immaturity is self-imposed; Reason languishes, not because it lacks understanding; what it lacks is resolution and courage; it is unwilling to serve itself without an external authority. 'Wise up! Wake up! Be bold! (*Sapere Aude! Habe Mut!*) Take courage to serve your own understanding'. This is therefore the Motto (*Walspruch*) of the Enlightenment.

Jean-Francois Lyotard's 'Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?' See Hassan I. and Hassan S., (eds.), *Innovation/ Renovation,* University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 1983, pp. 71–82, seems to be a take-off from the title of Kant's above-mentioned article on the Enlightenment.

The Modern, if not identical with that process, is certainly a consequence of that intellectual-spiritual ferment, which is sometimes referred to as the European Enlightenment, to distinguish it from other enlightenments like the Buddhist, to whom perhaps the term originally belongs. Enlightenment Liberalism with its twin children of modern Science/Technology and the Urban-industrial society, and its two outcomes, namely the Marxist attempt to construct the ideal society, and the Positivist-Linguistic/Discourse endeavour to capture the truth in words, all are based on the affirmation of the autonomy of the human individual and his/her capacity to know, shape and order the world. If these four constitute the hallmarks of the Modern, Postmodern is Post-Enlightenment, Post-Marxist/Freudian and Post-Discourse. We should give some attention to all three aspects, in order to come to terms with the inchoate and imprecise term 'postmodern'.

The first major post-Nietzschian systematic criticism of the European Enlightenment came in this century from the Frankfurt School of Social Research, at Frankfurt University in Germany. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno published their *Dialectics of the Enlightenment* in 1944, but the ideas were already brewing at the Frankfurt School during the Hitler years. 'Enlightenment is totalitarian', declared both Adorno and Horkheimer; the implication was that Nazi totalitarianism was a product of Enlightenment Liberalism, whose central thrust is to establish

human domination over everything, and to eliminate that which resists such domination.

('From now on, matter would at last be mastered without any illusion of ruling or inherent powers (in it), of hidden qualities. For the Enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the rule of computation and utility is suspect' (*Dialectics*, op. cit., p. 6).

Elsewhere in the same book they said: 'The fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant.' The Enlightenment's attempt was to capture Nature and keep it in the straitjacket of abstract reason, which it misinterpreted as scientific reason?

Adorno's *Against Epistemology* was an even more violent attack on the claim of scientific rationality to be resting on secure epistemic foundations. Adorno raised the question about the basic flaw in all epistemology, namely that no epistemology can itself be established by that Epistemology. Hegel had earlier raised that question apropos of Kant's epistemology of the categories. By what categories were these categories themselves established? That was Hegel's question, which had been formulated in India by our great genius Nāgārjuna in his *Vigrahavyavartini,* already 18 centuries before Hegel. 'If your *śastra* is based on certain *pramāṇas*, then may I ask by what *pramāṇas* were those *pramāṇas* themselves established?'

Post-modernism recognizes the difficulty in establishing any system of knowledge on an indubitable basis of certainty. Goedel's theorem had already in 1932 mathematically demonstrated that in any given system, there will be one or more elements not provable within the system, but are brought in from the outside by assumption. The modern was a quest for that indubitable certainty of knowledge as 'proven and objective', yielded by experience and logic. For a while science thought that it could state truth objectively and prove it. Now we know all proof is inductive, and therefore, tentative, and can be questioned by subsequent experience. We know also that there is no such thing as a non-subjective objectivity, that all perception involves subjectivity, that the perceiver is always part of the reality perceived. No scientific theory is handed down by the objective reality; it is the human subjectivity that formulates scientific hypotheses, and then tests their validity by experimentation. Science is neither non-subjectively objective, nor finally proven.

The Enlightenment, as a tyrannical-absolutist quest to master the world through human rationality—is a project that has failed—the attempt to unify all experience through the single dialectical logic of unaided human reason. Nietzsche in the last century had decried the Enlightenment as well as its emaciating and freedom-smothering rationality, scientism and historicism. Postmodernism is post-enlightenment, in a very Nietzschian sense, in fact in a Dionysian-Bacchanalian style of repudiation of all rules and conventions, a creativity

that springs from excess of energy, an excess that is sexual and orgiastic, which Nietzsche commended as the antidote to this insipid rulebound rationality of the Enlightenment. Hence Lyotard's intriguing title: Economic libidinale.

Jürgen Habermas, the last of the Frankfurt scholars, has sought to put some legitimacy to modernity by integrating it with a universal pragmatism. Habermas, in his *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (MIT Press, 1987), recognizes the fact that the whole western project of replacing religion with reason as the comprehensive uniting factor has simply exploded. Nietzsche doubted whether modernity can be redeemed at all; it cannot fashion out of itself the criteria for itself. 'For from ourselves we moderns have nothing at all' (*On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life,* Cambridge, 1980, p. 24, original *Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie fuer das Leben,* 1874). But Habermas has made an attempt, rather uncharacteristic of the Frankfurt School, to say that while proof is not possible, validation of propositions is possible, though the validation criteria may vary from discipline to discipline. The validation criteria appropriate for the physical sciences cannot be used for the social sciences, for example, as you go higher into art criticism or literary criticism, even the criteria of the social sciences will not fit; ideology formation requires another set of validation or legitimation criteria.

This attempt of Habermas fixes him in the modernist rather than the postmodernist camp. He is still talking about propositional truths and their legitimation, thus he is still in the positivist line.

In a sense, 1968 was a watershed year for Europe and America. In that year the students led by new Left thinkers like Herbert Marcuse, hit at the vitals of society in an effort to demolish it and reconstruct something fresh and new. It was the year of the student revolts of California and France, which mushroomed first to gigantic proportions, only to fizzle out very soon. Marcuse had convinced them that humanity was ready for a revolution, and that the students, who, unlike industrial labour, had no vested interests of their own to defend, should strike, wherever possible assisted by others. The edifice of society was so shaky that one little knock from the students would bring it down, and out of the ashes of the old the new would spontaneously spring up. In France Daniel Cohn-Bendit and others led the revolt and students took over the universities by force and began running them.

I remember very well the excitement of those days. The students captured the University in Sorbonne and Nanterre, and in that process captured the Word, la Parole. It was touted as the most important event in human history, more significant than the taking of the Bastille in the French Revolution. The Word was power and that was now in the hands of the young students. Everything was going to be all right, since the students wanted only the welfare of humanity.

Alas, how quickly that dream went sour even before two years had passed!

It was, however a major trauma for the European-American younger generation. They would never again, for a long time, try anything revolutionary. They lost faith in the Parole they had captured. The Word did not have the power they thought it had. Here was the beginning of Derrida's Deconstructionism, beginning in the wake of the tragic discomfiture of the student revolt. Cohn-Bendit minced no words. Liberalism had gone sour, and Marxism had gone senile. No good was to be expected from either of these sources.

It was the quest for an emancipatory cultural politics, the blending of aesthetics or art/literature with politics, that launched almost all the post-modern thinkers on the new path. Scholastic-philosophical or foundational modes of thinking had proved to be sterile and unproductive. You cannot always have a praxis fully conforming to theory. Theory has sometimes to be thrown to the winds, if you want to get some action. The Marxist ideology was also seen as shot through with totalitarianism and corruption. Something new had to be tried; the Apollonian or Rational-Harmonious had failed; only the Dionysian, which has no time for theoretical reflection, but operates from joyful abandon to libidinal energy, would do.

[After the presentation, the following questions were raised]

DR R.P. SINGH: Father, the postmodern reaction to the modern European philosophy is a story which is yet to be settled, for the story is far from over. I have a two-fold question. First, the postmodernists have questioned the basic premises of modern philosophy; such as, subjectivity, rationality, freedom, scientific knowledge, and so on. Do you think postmodernists could construct an alternative to those issues? Secondly, in Derrida's deconstruction, there is a doctrine of tetrapharmekon. Is this doctrine closer to Nāgārjuna's tetralema?

DR GREGORIOS: I entirely agree with you on both of your questions. Postmodernists in reaction to modernists could regard reality following diverse models, rich in conflicts. So far as Nāgārjuna's tetralema is concerned, it has to be seen within *Pratītyasamutpāda.*

Locke's Concept of Person

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'The besetting sin of philosophers', observes Hilary Putnam in his Dewey lectures, (March 1994, Columbia University) 'seems to be throwing the baby out with the bathwater.' 'From the beginning ', he continues, 'each "new wave" of philosophers has simply ignored the insights of the previous wave in the course of advancing its own. Today, we stand near the end of a century in which there have been many new insights in philosophy; but at the same time there has been an unprecedented forgetting of the insights of previous centuries and millennia.' What better example could one find of such a situation than Locke's whose views expressed in the four books which constitute his monumental *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* were, and still are, severely criticized—and in some cases abandoned—by, not only his immediate successors but, even contemporary philosophers today without acknowledging his basic insights. For instance, Ryle, while commenting that the historians of philosophy have 'written off' Locke not merely as an empiricist but as the founder of the school of English Empiricism, observes, 'It is not quite clear what an empiricist is, but it is quite clear that most of the doctrines which an empiricist should hold are strenuously denied by Locke. That the evidence of particular perceptions can never be a foundation for true knowledge, that true knowledge is both completely general and completely certain and is of the type of pure mathematics, that inductive generalizations from collected observations can never yield better than probable generalizations giving us opinion but not knowledge, are doctrines which Locke's whole 'essay' is intended to establish. He even goes so far with the rationalist metaphysician as to hold that the existence of God is demonstrable. and he is at one with the Cambridge Platonists in arguing the that principles of morality are demonstrable by the same methods and with the same certainty as any of the propositions of geometry.[1] Coming nearer home to the issue at hand, namely the concept of person and its identity (personal identity) Antony Flew claims to have shown in his paper, 'Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity' that Locke's 'central answer was wrong', and that 'the sources of his mistakes', he claims, 'are five'. He concludes by observing thus: 'We neither began

nor intended to begin to tackle the problem itself, it was a sufficient, and very Lockean, task to clear the ground of a few obstructions and to point out some of the dangers which beset the road.'[2] It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into considering what is the 'baby' and what is the 'bath-water' in Locke's 'Essay'. Its purpose is modest and its scope limited, to consider only the concept of person as explicated by Locke, in the light of modern philosophical thought, especially of David Wiggins and Hilary Putnam.

Locke defined a person as 'a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.'[3] It is generally accepted, on the basis of this definition, that according to Locke *continuity of consciousness* seems to be an integral part of what he means by a person. And to secure the continuing identity of a person, one experience must flow into the next experience in some stream of consciousness. Such a continuity of consicousness is then explained in terms of memory. In other words, a person, according to Locke's conception, is an 'object' (something) *essentially aware* of its progress and persistence through time, and peculiar among all other kinds of things by virtue of the fact that its present being is always under the cognitive and effective influence of its experiential memory of what it was in the past. In short, according to Locke, memory and reflection in terms of mental connectedness is part of the *concept* of person for they help to *constitute* the continuity of person. Continuity of consciousness is the condition of *identity* of person, that is, knowledge of being the *same person* and it is always instructive to avoid the serious confusion between *how* we know something and *what* it is for that thing to be so, or in other words, between an account of *what a thing* is and the elucidation of the *identity conditions* for members of its kind or, to follow David Wiggins, between *sameness* and *substance*. It is not this distinction, however important it is, between what a person *is* and what its *identity* conditions are and their intimate but complex relation that will occupy us in the rest of the paper but only the former, that is, what a person is and it needs to be acknowledged at this stage that I owe the subsequent discussion primarily, if not entirely, to David Wiggins' very interesting book *Sameness and Substance*,[4] where he considers arguments for and against Locke's position on these questions, that is, questions about *nature* and *identity* of person—in the background of modern philosophical thought suggesting in the end his own position regarding these questions.

What then *is* a person? Is it a body, an animal, a man (human being) or a disembodied being, transcending bodies?

It is almost universally believed that a person cannot be *equated* with the body on the ground that the lifeless corpse is not the person, and on the fact that there is something absurd in the proposition that people's bodies play chess, talk sense, know arithmetic, or even run or jump or

sit down. As Wiggins observes 'A person is material in the sense of being essentially constituted by matter; but in some strict and different sense of "material", namely, being definable or properly describable in terms of the concepts of the sciences of matter (physics, chemistry, and biology even) *person* is not a material concept.'[5] And in this sense, persons can be said to transcend bodies. However although person cannot be *equated* with a body, which is a material entity, it may be held that a person is a persisting material entity '*essentially*' endowed with the biological potentiality for the exercise of *all* the faculties and capacities '*conceptually constitutive*' of personhood—sentiment, desire, belief, motion, memory, and the various other elements which are involved in the particular mode of *activity* that marks the *extension of the concept of person*. This can be called *the naturalist view* of the concept of person as different from the *materalist physicalist view* of the concept of person considered earlier. What about equating *person* with *man*? Locke does make a distinction between a person and man. Locke's claim is that x is a person only if x has and exercises some sufficient capacity to *remember* or record sufficiently well from one time to the next enough of his immediately previous states or actions. Thus memory—actual and potential—is the necessary and sufficient condition for being a person, according to Locke. But there are situations like amnesia, sleep etc. which would disallow us to call x a person, but not disallow us to call x a man, since man is 'vitally united' to the organized body which persists. So man and person needs to be kept apart according to Locke. Against this view of Locke's Wiggins observes that however well one makes the distinctions *between the concepts man and person*, this can hardly show that nothing falls under both concepts and asks under which is John Locke? Instead, he tries to show that the concepts *man and person* are '*sortally concordant*' and determine for anything falling in the extension of both a '*unitary principle of persistence.*'[6] Wiggins thus finds both the naturalist and the materialist/physicalist/'scientific' view of persons unsatisfactory. His own suggestion *is what he calls animal attribute view.*

According to the animal attribute view *person* is a concept whose *defining marks* are to be given in terms of a *natural kind* determinable, say *animal*, plus what may be called a *functional* or, what Wiggins prefers to say, *systemic component* (that is, finite list of non-extension involving attributes) so x is a person if and only if x is an animal falling under the extension of a kind whose typical members perceive, feel, remember, imagine, desire, make projects, move themselves at will, speak, carry out projects, acquire a character as they age, are happy or miserable, are susceptible to concern for members of their own or like species . . . conceive of themselves as perceiving, feeling, remembering, imagining, desiring, making projects, speaking . . . , have and conceive of themselves as having, a part accessible *in* experience-memory and a future accessible in intention . . ., etc. 'On this account', observes Wiggins, '*person* is a non-

biological qualification of *animal* and further adds, 'according to this view, a person is any animal that is such by its kind as to have the capacity to enjoy fully the psychological attributes enumerated; biological whether or not a given animal kind qualifies is left to be a strictly and empirical matter.'[7] If we accept such a view of person then the extension of the concept *person* would include not only human beings but also such creatures as chimpanzees or dolphins. There would be no one real essence of person as such; but every person could still have the real essence of a certain kind of animal. This would be the real essence *in virtue of which* he was a person. The real essences of the various kinds of persons would be for empirical investigation on the levels of biology and neurophysiology and psychology, even of history, economics, literary art (not excluding descriptive philosophy), and psychoanalysis.[8]

It should be stressed at this stage that underlying such an animal attribute view of person is Wiggins' contention that the concept of person, though not *corresponding* to a single natural kind, might still be *akin* to a natural kind concept. What then is a natural kind and natural kind concept or term? It is generally held that Hilary Putnam popularized the notion of natural kind and natural kind concept. Whether or not a particular object is a *natural kind* will be determined according to *Putnam* by some *lawlike principles* that will collect together the actual *extension of the kind* around an *arbitrary good specimen* of it, that is, of its extension. Let us very briefly try to understand Putnam's view.

In his well-known paper 'Is semantics possible?' Putnam considers *one* kind of general names which are associated with *natural kinds*, that is, 'with classes of things that we regard as of explanatory importance; classes whose normal distinguishing characteristics are "held together" or even explained by deep-lying mechanisims.'[9] His contention is that the traditional theories of meaning 'radically falsify' the properties of such words. Quoting Austin he observes that what we have been given by philosophers, logicians, and 'semantic theories' alike, is a '*myth-eaten description*.'[10]

According to the traditional view, the meaning of, say 'lemon', is given by specifying a conjunction of *properties*. For each of these properties, the statement 'Lemons have the property P' is an analytic truth, and if $P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n$ are all the properties in the conjunction, then 'anything with all of the properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ is a lemon' is likewise an analytic truth. In other words, according to what Putnam calls the *traditional* view the term 'lemon' is definable by simply conjoining these 'defining characteristics', and this view Putnam contends is false because the 'most obvious' difficulty is that a natural kind may have '*abnormal members*'. For example, taking 'yellow peel' as one of the defining characteristics of 'lemon' a green lemon is still a lemon—even if, owing to some abnormality, it *never* turns yellow.

To meet this difficulty the following definition may be suggested: X is

a *lemon* = df. X belongs to a natural kind whose normal members have yellow peel, etc. Putnam focuses his analysis on two notions involved in this definition, the notions of *natural kind* and *normal member*, with an observation that 'Meta-science is today in its infancy and terms like "natural kind" and "normal member", are in the same boat as the more familiar meta-scientific terms "theory" and "explanation", as far as *resisting a speedy and definitive analysis* is concerned.'[11] However, Putnam adds that, that the proposed definition of 'lemon' use terms which themselves resist definition is 'not a fatal objection'. What is wrong with the definition according to Putnam is that if it is correct then the traditional idea of the '*force of general terms*' is badly mistaken.[12] To say that something is a lemon is, by the above definition, to say that it belongs to natural kind whose normal members have certain properties; but not to say that it *necessarily* has those properties itself. There are no *analytic* truths of the form *every lemon has P*. What has happened, contends Putnam, is this: the traditional theory has taken an account which is correct for the 'one-criterion' concepts (that is, for such concepts as 'bachelor'), and make it a general account of the meaning of general names. As he puts it: 'A theory which correctly describes the behaviour of perhaps three hundred words has been asserted to correctly describe the behaviour of ten of thousands of general names.'[13] Putnam concludes after a thorough analysis of the above definition that the above definition is *correct* to the extent that what is it says *isn't* analytic indeed isn't (for example, lemon has yellow peel), but it is *incorrect* in that what would be analytic if it were correct isn't (for example, every lemon has P).[14] and recommends the following analysis of natural kind words as 'lemon' and 'tiger':

There is somehow associated with the word 'tiger' a *theory*; not the actual theory we believe about tigers, which is very complex, but an oversimplified theory which describes a tiger *stereotype*. It describes a *normal member* of the natural kind. It is not necessary that we believe this theory, though in the case of 'tiger' we do. But it is necessary that we be aware that *this* theory is associated with the word: if our stereotype of a tiger ever changes, then the word 'tiger' would have changed its meaning. If lemons, for example, all turn blue, the word 'lemon' will not *immediately* change its meaning—but in time. To sum up, according to Putnam the are a few *core facts* about term 'lemon' or 'tiger' such that one can convey the use of 'lemon' or 'tiger' by simply conveying those facts, more precisely. One cannot convey the approximate use *unless* one gets the core facts across.[15] Thus in the case of a natural kind word, the core fats are that a *normal member* of the kind has certain characteristics, or that this idea is at least the *stereotype* associated with word. However, it is *not enough*, according to Putnam, that by the use of a natural kind word one conveys the associated *stereotype* (that is, the associated idea of the characteristics of the normal member of the kind); one must also

convey the *extension*, one must indicate *which* kind the stereotype is supposed to 'fit'.[16] Without entering into the problem as to whether giving extension is part of giving the meaning of a term let us turn from this necessary and useful digression to our main issue and note the moral of the above discussion for the concept of person.

We recall that Wiggins contended that the concept of person, though not corresponding can be akin to a natural kind concept. And relying on Putnam's view about natural kind and natural kind concept like 'lemon' we can say about person that there are a few core facts about 'person' such that one can convey the use of 'person' by simply conveying those facts. More precisely, one cannot convey the approximate use of 'person' *unless* one gets the core facts across. Thus, as in the case of natural kind word, the core facts about 'person' are that a *normal member* of the kind has certain characteristics or that a *stereotype* is associated with the word 'person'. Now whereas according to Wiggins the core facts about 'person' include 'animal' and 'psychological attributes' enumerated above, according to Locke as witnessed in his definition above, they are 'continuity of consciousness or memory'. Nevertheless we can rewrite 'Locke's famous definition given above as suggested by Wiggins by saying that a person is any *animal* the physical make-up of whose species constitutes the species' *typical members* thinking intelligent beings with reason and reflection, and *typically* enables them to consider themselves as themselves, the same thinking things, in different times and places.[17]

One interesting question can be asked, before we conclude: Are the '*core facts*' of person identical with the '*real essence*' of person? One is tempted to answer this question in the affirmative. But will not such an affirmative answer lead us—and Locke, if he would agree—to rationalistic metaphysics which Ryle refers and not to empiricism for which Locke is known in history? A way out might be to say that just as certain marks of birth, shape and appearance have to stand *proxy* for the real essence of man or the concept *man*, so being a man or being a human being is the only thing that we can make stand proxy for what it is to be a person. A human being is our only *stereotype* for *person*.

It must be noted and stressed finally that the concept of person in Locke, howsoever vague and open textured and opaque it may be, does not remain merely a formal or theoretical concept. It finds its applications in substantial political, social, moral and legal issues the consideration of which, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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3.   John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Essay II.xxvii.2.
4.   David Wiggins, *Sameness and Substance*, Oxford, London, 1980.
5.   Ibid., p. 164.
6.   Ibid., p. 161, fn. 16.
7.   Ibid., pp. 71–72.
8.   Ibid., p. 72.
9.   Hilary Putnam, *Mind, Language and Reality*, Vol. 2, p. 139.
10. Ibid., p. 139.
11. Ibid., p. 41.
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14. Ibid., p. 42.
15. Ibid., p. 148.
16. Ibid., p. 150.
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On the *Kroḍapatras:* A Brief Discussion of Some of the Issues Contained in this New Genre of Philosophical Writing in India

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Among the large numbers of works of Nyāya, written during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we come across two types of works which have made a unique contribution in the development of Nyāya school. They are *Vādas* and *Kroḍapatras*. Between the two, the *Vādas* are generally small treatises which aim at upholding a Nyāya view of a concept through a thorough discussion of the same. In fact, the genesis of these *Vāda* works can be traced during the eighteenth century itself. It seems that it is Raghunātha Śiromaṇi who started writing such *vādagranthas. Ākhyatavāda, Nañvāda, Kṛtisādhyatānumānavāda, Vājapeyavāda,* etc. are a few *Vādas* written by him. As their very title indicates they were written to discuss thoroughly certain topics. Later, Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācarya and others continued to write such treatises. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vyutpattivāda, Viṣayatavāda, Prāmāṇyavāda,* etc. are of that type. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries innumerable such *Vādas* were written. A list of these *Vādas,* based on the *Darśana-Mañjarī* of Śrī R. Taṅgaswāmī, is given separately here.

The *Kroḍapatras* are slightly different from the *Vādas.* They are not as lengthy as the *Vādas.* Though these *Kroḍapatras* are written to explain certain sentences that occur in the original text they cannot be considered as commentaries because they do not continue to explain each and every sentence of the text. They pick up only certain points made in the original text and discuss them thoroughly. Thus, they deserve to be treated as independent works of the author, because except at the starting point, the author nowhere explains or comments on any part of the text; he never takes the trouble of summarizing the points made in the text, which a commentator generally does. He keeps himself off the text and concentrates on a particular point. He starts by raising an objection on it. Further, he goes on rejecting any modification or clarification by pointing out the loopholes in it. When it thus reaches a certain stage beyond which no further objection is possible, he comes out with his own solution, normally by suggesting an *anugama,* a technical

device discovered by the Navya Naiyāyikās, by which the point under discussion is ultimately vindicated by plugging all the loopholes. The ingenuity with which the author of a *Kroḍapatra* imagines peculiar instances which nobody can ever think of and points out the untenability of the arguments defending the point under discussion, is indeed something remarkable. He can be compared to a very shrewd chess-player who while practicing the game, plays the role of two players, one strongly defending a position and the other savagely attacking the same.

The very title 'Kroḍapatra' suggests the purpose and scope of the small treatises that are called *Kroḍapatras*. 'Kroḍa' means 'Madhya' or middle. The term 'patra' which in common parlance means a letter, also means an article, analytical in nature. Thus, a *Kroḍapatra* is an article or a collection of articles with a critical perspective that aims at discussing a point which occurs in the middle of a topic being discussed in the original text. Another explanation given to the term is that *Kroḍapatra* is a paper kept in between the pages. While copying the manuscripts, sometimes the copyist may miss some sentences and in such cases, it becomes necessary to offer some explanation for that portion. Sometimes some scholar may write something to express his own views on a certain point discussed in the text. *Kroḍapatra*, as per this explanation is an article written with either of the intentions mentioned above and kept in the middle of the pages. But, as we see the *Kroḍapatras*, it is seldom found that the author is trying to fill in the gaps that were created by the person who copied the manuscript. As a matter of fact, generally the authors of the *Kroḍapatras* commence their discussion on the point which the original writer has stated as final. Here, I shall try to give an example to show the contribution of the *Kroḍapatras* for the development of the Navya–Nyāya tradition. The example that I have chosen is from the two *Kroḍapatras*—*Kāliśaṅkarīya* and *Candranārāyaṇīya* named after the authors Kālīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya and Candranārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭācārya who flourished during the eighteenth century AD. These two *Kroḍapatras* are held in high esteem in the Nyāya circle and even today they are studied as a part of the advanced study of Nyāya. These two *Kroḍapatras* are on the *Hetvābhāsasāmānyanirukti* of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, which in its turn is a commentary on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's *Didhiti* on the *Hetvābhāṣa* portion of *Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

Gaṅgeśa in the *Hetvābhāṣaprakaraṇa* of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* suggests, one after the other, three definitions of fallacies of reason. The second definition is:

॥ यद्विषयकत्वेन ज्ञानस्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वं तत्त्वम् ॥

It means that a fallacy of reason is that by comprehending which a cognition prevents an inferential cognition. *Vanhyabhāvavadhrada* is an instance of this definition. It is called the fallacy of *bādha*, while the inference is 'hrado vanhimān dhūmāt'. The definition is applicable here because, the cognition of this fallacy, which arises in the form 'hrado

Vanhyabhāvavān' prevents the inferential cognition 'hrado vanhimān'.

Commenting on this definition, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi suggests a slight modification by replacing *yadviṣayakatvena* into *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatvena*. Suppose this modification is not made, the definition would not be applicable to any fallacy. For, since 'mere hrada' is identical with the 'hrada qualified by vanhyabhāva' the cognition of 'mere hrada' also is the cognition *vanhyabhāvavadhrada*. But, the cognition of 'mere hrada' does not prevent the inferential cognition 'hrado vanhimān'. Therefore the cognition of *Vanhyabhāvavadhrada* cannot be said as preventive of the cognition of inferential cognition. Thus, the definition suffers from the defect of *asambhava*. If the term 'yadviṣayakatvena', is replaced by the term 'yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatvena', this defect can be avoided. Apparently, this modification suggested by Śiromaṇi is meaningless. For, since a qualified object is identical with the 'mere object', the *hrada* qualified with *vanhyabhāva*' is the same as the 'mere hrada and hence the cognition of 'mere hrada' is also the cognition of the *viśiṣṭa*—the *hrada* qualified with *vanhyabhāva*. But, as Gadādhara suggests here, the term 'Yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatvena', should be taken in the sense of 'Yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayakatvena'. Now the definition is:

यद्रूपावच्छिन्नविषयकत्वेन ज्ञानस्य अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वं तद्रूपावच्छिन्नत्वम् ।

It means a fallacy of reason is the possessing of that property, by comprehending the thing possessed of which property, a cognition prevents the inferential cognition'.

In case of the instance, 'hrado vanhimān dhūmāt' Gadādhara seems to hold the view that the property, the cognition of the thing possessed of which is the preventor of the above inference, is 'vanhyabhāvavadgṛdatva' or 'lakeness qualified with the absence of fire'. However, he does not specifically spell it out and moves to the next topic. From this point, the *Kroḍapatras* commence their analysis.

Kālīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya raises the question—*atha yadrūpapadena kim dhartavyam?*—What is signified by the term 'yadrūpa' (which property) in the definition? The ready answer would be 'vanhyabhāvavadhradatvam' in case of the fallacious inference—'hrado vanhimān dhūmāt'. But, Kālīśaṅkara continues to question—*vanhyabhāvavadhradatva* means the property called lakeness qualified with *vanhyabhāva* and what is this relation with which *hradatva* is said to be qualified with *vanhyabhāva*? Of course, the relation cannot be the relation of *svarūpa* by which an absence is normally expected to be present wherever its counterpositive does not exist. For, since fire, the counterpositive in the above case, can never even be imagined to exist in 'hradatva', its absence naturally always exists in it and the cognition 'the lake has lakeness that has no fire' cannot prevent the inferential cognition 'hrado vanhimān'. Therefore, the possible relation with *vanhyabhāva* here should be the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* or co-existence. It may be held that one, who knows *hradatva* and *vanhyabhāva*

existing together cannot have the cognition 'hrado vanhimān' and hence
the cognition that 'the lake has the property lakeness which is qualified
with vanhyabhāva by the relation of sāmānādhikaraṇya will definitely prevent
the inferential cognition—'hrado vanhimān'. Kālīśankara points out that
this view is not tenable, because there are some such cognitions which
cannot prevent the inferential cognition but comprehend a thing which
is possessed of the said property. For instance, the cognition—
'sāmānādhikaraṇyasambandhēna vanhyabhāvavadhradatvavān'. The
peculiarity of this cognition is that it has hrada as its qualificandum and
hradatva qualified with vanhyabhāva by the relation of sāmānādhikaraṇya
as its qualifier. But it does not comprehend any limitor of the
qualificandumness. For the same reason it cannot prevent the inferential
cognition 'hrado vanhimān', which has a limitor of qualificandumness,
namely, hradatva. Since these two cognitions mentioned above do not
have the same limitor of qualificandumness, they cannot be held as
pratibadhya—pratibandhaka. But, this cognition also comprehends hradatva
as qualified with vanhyabhāva by the relation of sāmānadhikaraṇya.
Therefore, 'sāmānādhikaraṇya sambandhena vanhyabhāvavadhradatva'
cannot be the property signified by the term 'yadrūpa' in the definition.

The other alternative is to hold that vanhyabhāva and hradatva—the two
properties as denoted by the term 'yadrūpa'. But, as in the case of the first
alternative, here also it can be shown that even a cognition, which is a
non-preventor of the inferential cognition 'hrado vanhimān', has as its
content the thing possessed of the two properties—vanhyabhāva and
hradatva. For instance, the cognition 'vanhyabhāvavadhradatvavān' which
comprehends both vanhyabhāva and hradatva together in hrada. As in the
earlier case, even this cognition does not have hradatva as the limitor of
the qualificandumness, and hence cannot be the preventor of the
inferential cognition 'hrado vanhimān' which has hradatva as the limitor
of the qualificandumness. Thus, Kālīśankara points out that it is not
possible to specifically state as to what could be the denotation of the
term 'yadrūpa'.

Kālīśankara Bhaṭṭācārya then refers to several attempts made to solve
the problem, including that of the 'Navyas' who could be his contemporary
Naiyāyikas. He finds fault in some of them. He also refers to the other
views without criticizing them, thereby indicating that they are acceptable.
Only with one view, he first, finds fault with it and on the suggestion of
an amendment, he gives his assent to it. I shall try to explain here only that
view which he concedes as admissible with an amendment. The following
are his words:

केचित्तु – वह्निधर्मितावच्छेदकतापन्नाभावत्वावच्छिन्नधर्मितावच्छेदकतापन्नह्रदत्वमेव
यद्रूपपदेन धर्तव्यमित्यपि वदन्ति। तन्न। तथासति वह्निधर्मितावच्छेदकतापन्नाभावत्वा-
वच्छिन्न-धर्मितावच्छेदकतापन्नपर्वतत्वमादाय भ्रमविषयेऽतिव्याप्तेः। यदि च तादृश-

धर्मितावच्छेदकतापन्नं यद् वह्न्यभाववद्ह्रदत्वादिकं तदेव यद्रूपपदनोच्यते तदा न दोष इति
ध्येयम्।

The solution suggested by kēcit (some) is this—in case of the fallacious
inference—'hrado vanhimān dhūmāt', the term yadrūpa denotes the
property hradatva which has the limitorness in respect to the
qualificandumness determined by an abhāva, the property—abhāvatva of
which has the limitorness in respect to the qualificandumness determined
by vanhi. The above solution will be easy to understand if we analyse the
structure of the cognition—'hrado vanhyabhāvavān'. Here abhāva is
comprehended as qualified with vanhi. Thus with reference to vanhi,
abhāva is the qualificandum and the abhāvatva, residing in it, is the limitor
of the qualificandumness that resides in the abhāva. Hence it can be said
that abhāvatva has the limitorness in respect to the qualificandumness
residing in the abhāva and this qualificandumness is determined by the
vanhi. Similarly with reference to the abhāva, hrada has the
qualificandumness and hradatva is its limitor.

In short, the term 'yadrūpa' in the definition, refers to that hradatva
which has the limitorness in respect to the qualificandumness determined
by the abhāva; abhāvatva, the property of which also has the limitorness
in respect to the qualificandumness determined by vanhi. Only by
comprehending a thing possessed of such a hrdatva, the cognition 'hrado
vanhyabhāvavān' could prevent the inferential cognition 'hrado vanhimān'.
Since the other cognitions such as 'sāmānadhikāraṇyasambandhena
vanhyabhāvavavaviśiṣṭahradatvavān', 'vanhyabhāvahradatvōbhayavān' etc., do
not comprehend such a hradatva, they cannot prevent the inferential
cognition hrado vanhimān.

The fault that Kālīśankara Bhaṭṭācārya finds with this second
explanation is that if such a property as shown above is denoted by the
term 'yadrūpa', then the definition of hētvābhāsa will become too wide.
For, the inference 'parvato vanhimān dhūmāt' which is a valid inference
can also be shown as having a fallacy. The point that is being made by him
is this—just as the cognition 'hrado vanhyabhāvavān' prevents the
inferential cognition 'hrado vanhimān', the cognition 'parvato
vanhyabhāvavān' also actually prevents the inferential cognition 'parvato
vanhyabhāvavān'. The only difference is that while the cognition 'hrado
vanhyabhāvavān' is a valid cognition, the cognition 'parvato
vanhyabhāvavān' is an erroneous one. Anyway, when it occurs, it prevents
the inferential cognition 'parvato vanhimān'. Now, just as the cognition
'hrado vanhyabhāvavān' comprehends that which is possessed of hradatva
which has dharmitāvacchhedakatā determined by the abhāva, abhāvatva the
property of which also has dharmitāvacchhedakatā determined by vanhi,
the cognition 'parvato vanhyabhāvavān' also comprehends that which is
possessed of parvatatva which has dharmitāvacchedakatā determined by
the adhāva, abhāvatva the property of which has dharmitāvacchhedakatā

determined by *vanhi*. Therefore, if the inference '*hrado vanhimān dhūmāt*' is fallacious, similarly, the inference, '*parvato vanhimān dhūmāt*' also will have to be considered as fallacious.

Kālīśaṅkara himself shows the way to overcome the above problem. He suggests that in addition to all that is said it must also be said that the *hradatva* qualified with *vanhyabhāva*, is denoted by the term '*yadrūpa*'. Since *hradatva* is naturally qualified with *vanhyabhāva* by the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* such a *hradatva* which also has *dharmitāvacchedakatā* as explained earlier, can be taken as the meaning of the term '*yadrūpa*'. But in the case of *parvatatva* it is not so. *Parvatatva* might be having *dharmitāvacchedakatā* as shown earlier. But, it is not qualified with *vanhyabhāva* as the smoky hill has no *vanhyabhāva*. In other words, since such a *parvatatva* does not exist, it cannot be the meaning of the term '*yadrūpa*' and it is also not possible to claim that the inference '*parvato vanhimān dhūmāt*' will have to be considered as fallacious.

This is the amendment that Kālīśaṅkara suggests here and he is of the view that with this modification the explanation of the meaning of the term '*yadrūpa*' given by '*kecit*' is acceptable. We do not know who are these '*kecit*' Naiyāyikās. There is also a custom among the *śāstric* writers to float their own views by the name of others. Kālīśaṅkara too might have followed that custom here.

Candranārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭācāryā's work, which also is a *Kroḍapatra* on the same text of *Gadādhara*, discusses more elaborately than the Kālīśaṅkariya does, the meaning of the term '*yadrūpa*'. In addition to the two possible alternatives that Kālīśaṅkara referred to in the begining of his analysis, Candranārāyaṇā refers to one more possible meaning of the term '*yadrūpa*' and thoroughly explains all the three alternatives. It is interesting to note that Candranārāyaṇā also, without offering his own solution to the problems, just criticizes the explanations offered by the others. While examining the third explanation of the term '*yadrūpa*' and also the explanation offered by some, what ultimately he points out is that if these explanations along with the amendments suggested are accepted, then certain *viśeṣaṇas* later included in the definition by Gadādhara would become redundant. Thus he is candid enough to show the inadequacies in the process of analyzing the things connected with the definition of *hetvābhāsa* by Gadādhara who first, blindly, introduced the term '*yadrūpa*' in the definition, without bothering to analyse its significance and later included some more *viśeṣaṇas* which would become redundant if the denotation of the term is properly analyzed.

Here I shall try to highlight briefly some of the interesting observations that Candranārāyaṇā makes while discussing the significance of the term '*yadrūpa*'.

The first possible explanation of the term '*yadrūpa*' that Candranārāyaṇa refers to is '*sāmānādhikaraṇyasambandhena vanhyabhāvaviśiṣṭahradatva*'. Kālīśaṅkara also refers to this explanation. The fault that Candranārāyaṇa

finds here is this that if this is the '*yadrūpa*' then it should have been comprehended by the cognition *hrado vanhyabhāvavān* which actually prevents the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*'. But it is obvious that the cognition '*hrado vanhyabhāvavān*' does not comprehend *vanhyabhāva* in *hradatva* by the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*. It may be argued that since, in the said cognition, *hradatva* is the limitor of the qualificandumness through the qualificandum that is *hrada*, *vanhyabhāva* is comprehended by the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* in *hradatva*. But, Candranārāyaṇa draws our attention to the subtle but significant point that though thus the cognition is comprehending *vanhyabhāva* in *hradatva* by the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* relation, it cannot be said that the cognition is comprehending *yadrūpāvacchinna*. To be more precise, what is meant by comprehending the *yadrūpāvacchinna*, is that the cognition must be the determinant of the qualificandumness which has the *yadrūpa* as its limitor (*yadrūpāvacchinnaviśeṣyatākatva*). But, while *vahnyabhāva* is, by an indirect relation *sāmānādhikaraṇya* grasped in *hradatva*, the objecthood that is the *viṣayatā* in *hradatva*, is not the limitorness determined by the qualificandumness (*viśeṣyatāvacchedakatā*). Hence the cognition *hrado vahnyabhāvavān* cannot be said as *yadrūpāvacchhinnaviṣayaka* in the sense of '*yadrūpaniṣṭhāvacchedakatākaviśeṣyatāka*'.

Candranārāyaṇa also rejects the second explanation according to which *vanhyabhāva* and *hradatva*—these two are meant by the term *yadrūpa*. In that case, the cognition '*hrado vahnyabhāvavān*' which prevents the inferential cognition '*hrado vahnyimān*', will have to be regarded as *yadrūpāvacchhinnaviṣayaka* which means *yadrūpa* has the limitorness (*avacchedakatā*) determined by the objecthood of the cognition. It further indicates that *yadrūpa*, that is, *vahnyabhāva-hradatva* together have a limitorness determined by the objecthood of the cognition. But, if we analyze the structure of the cognition '*hrado vahnyabhāvavān*' it becomes clear that it is not so. In this cognition, *vahnyabhāva* is the mode and its modeness is limited by the property *vahnyabhāvatva* and also by the relation called *viśeṣaṇatāviśeṣa*. But, though *hradatva* also is a content of this cognition it is not a mode. It is the limitor of the qualificandumness residing in the *hrada*. Thus the *hradatva* has the limitorness, which though is limited by the relation of *samavāya*, is not limited by any property. Hence it is clear that the objecthood residing in the *vahnyabhāva* is of the nature of modeness, whereas the objecthood residing in *hradatva* is of the nature of the limitorness and thus are absolutely different. This being the case, it is not correct to say that *vahnyabhāva* and *hradatva* are the *yadrūpa* and that both have the same limitorness determined by qualificandumness of the cognition '*hrado vahnyabhāvavān*'. Thus the second explanation also does not hold good.

As per the third explanation, mere '*vahnyabhāva*' with the relation of *viśeṣaṇatā* qualified with *hradatvāvacchinnānuyogitākatva* is the *yadrūpa*. This explanation and also the explanation offered by some according to

which *hradatva–vahnyabhāva*—these two only are the *yadrūpa,* are rejected by Candranārāyaṇa, pointing out that if these explanations with all the amendments that will be suggested are admitted, then the *viśeṣaṇas* which Gadādhara will include later in the definition would become redundant. I do not propose here to discuss these two explanations and Candranārāyaṇa's criticism thereon. I would only like to point out the frankness and the unbiased attitude of the authors of the *Kroḍapatras,* who after a thorough examination of a problem, are prepared even to reject the stand considered as final by the earlier Naiyāyikas.

Among the large number of *Kroḍapatras* that are known to us, only a few are published and are rarely studied. Some of them were secretly guarded by some scholars. *Tritalāvacchedakatāvāda* published by the Mithila Institute of Darbhanga is an example of it. It is said that for generations, this *Kroḍapatra* was secretly guarded by a tradition which would make use of the arguments and *pariṣkāras* contained in the *Kroḍapatra,* in the debates just to baffle the opponents. During the last century, and also the earlier part of this century, the *Naiyāyikas* got used to the study of the *Kroḍapatras* with much enthusiasm and consequently criticism and justification of the *Kroḍapatras* was also going on. Mysore Rāmā Śāstry's *Śatakoṭi Kroḍapatras* on the *satpratipakṣa* of Gadādhara is an example of it. This, which contains one hundred arguments, thoroughly examines the definition of the fallacy—satpratipakṣa, offered by Gadādhara. Two Naiyāyikas, namely Anantalvār and Kriṣṇatātācārya wrote *Kroḍapatras* called *śatakoṭikhandana* and attacked the arguments contained in the *śatakoṭi.* Later, another Naiyāyika authored a *Kroḍapatra* called *śatakoṭikhandanamandana* to justify Rāmā Śāstry's *Kroḍapatra.* Thus, till the earlier part of this century the *Kroḍapatra* tradition was a living force and now the tradition is no more alive.

This article on the *Kroḍapatras,* will be incomplete if the structure of *anugamas* which are frequently made use of in the *Kroḍapatras* is not explained. Hence, an attempt is made here to explain the technique of *anugama.*

The *anugamas* that are suggested as a final solution to a problem are of a wonderful structure. In the beginning they appear to be of a very simple nature. But, soon they will develop into a complex and complicated structure with the peculiar and the multiple relations involved. The structure of an *anugama* thus created is so complex that an ordinary student will find it impossible to penetrate into this fort containing innumerable inner circles.

Here an attempt is made to illustrate an *anugama* with its background:

ANUGAMA

While discussing the meaning of singular case suffix, (*ekavacanapratyaya*) the Naiyāyikas reject the contention that the number—being one, is the

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meaning of the suffix. For, such a number is universally present and hence even when there are several jars on the ground, the sentence '*atra ghaṭosti*'—'there is one jar on the ground'—will have to be considered as valid. Therefore, they define *ekatva*—the meaning of the singular suffix in a different manner. Accordingly, *ekatva* means '*sajātīyadvitīyarahitatva*' that is, being devoid of a second which is similar. Now, when several jars are on the ground, the sentence '*atra ghaṭosti*' becomes incorrect, because there is another jar similar to it. Here the similarity consists in possessing the attribute:

$$\text{स्वसमभिव्याहृतपदार्थसंसार्गितताविशिष्टप्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकधर्म}$$

that is the limitor of being the meaning of the nominal base (*prakṛtyarthatāvaccheddaka*) that co-exists with the relation of the locus conveyed by a word used in the same sentence. In the sentence—'*atra ghaṭosti*' the nominal base of the singular number is the word—'*ghaṭa*'. The limitor of being the meaning of this word, is jarness. This jarness, co-existing with the relation of the locus conveyed by the word '*atra*' used in the same sentence, is to be regarded here as the similarity and it is the absence of a similar object of that kind that is the *ekatva*—the meaning of a singular case suffix. When there are several jars on the ground, each jar has a jar similar to it. For, the other jar has not only the *prakṛtyarthatāvacchedaka* or jarness, but also 'the relation of the locus conveyed by the word *atra* of the sentence. That is why in a situation when there are several jars on the ground, the sentence—'*atra ghaṭosti*' becomes invalid.

Now an objection is raised against this explanation. Suppose there are two jars on the ground, one is black and the other is yellow—the sentence '*atra nilaghaṭosti*' cannot be said to be incorrect, because actually there is only one black jar on the ground. But, as per the above explanation of the meaning of the singular case suffix, even such sentences will have to be rejected as incorrect as in the given situation, the black jar has a similar jar with it. In other words, the yellow jar is similar to the black jar, because it has both the *prakṛtyarthatāvacchedaka*—jarness and also the 'relation of the locus' conveyed by the term '*atra*'. Thus, as the black jar has another similar jar with it, and, if the singular case suffix conveys the meaning as is described above, then the sentence when there is a *pītaghaṭa* also, will have to be rejected as incorrect.

The untenability of the explanation of the meaning of the singular case suffix, is shown by another instance also.

The sentence '*brāhmaṇo brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti*'—'one Brahmin gives away a cow to another Brahmin', conveys *ekatva* of two Brahmins, of whom one is the giver and other is the receiver. The singular case suffix added to the two 'brāhmaṇa' words here, conveys *ekatva* of both of them. But, if the meaning of the singular case suffix is as above then that cannot be explained in either case. For, as per the explanation, each of them,

should be *svasajātīyadvitīyarahita*, that is, must have been having the absence of the second similar to it. And the similarity as explained earlier consists in having the *prakṛtyarthatāvacchedaka* and also *samabhivyahṛta-samsarga*. Here the nominal base for the *ekavacana* is the word *'brāhmaṇa'* and hence 'Brahminhood' is the *prakṛtyarthatāvacchedaka*. This is present in both the giver and the receiver here. Again both of them possess *samabhivyahṛtasamsarga*—the relation of the object conveyed by a word used in the sentence. Here, such an object is the action 'giving away' or *'sampradānakriyā'* conveyed by the word *'dadāti'*. It is obvious that the relation of this object is present in both the giver and the receiver. Thus, both the Brahmins denoted by the two 'Brāhmaṇa' terms of the sentence have the *samabhivyāhṛtasamsarga*. Therefore each of the two Brāhmaṇas here, has a *sajātīya*, a second person similar to him. Hence none of them can be said as having the *ekatva* denoted by the singular case suffix here.

In order to aviod the above objections the following *anugama* is suggested:

एकवचनविशिष्टम् एकत्वम् एकवचनार्थ: ।

This simply means that a singular case suffix means the *ekatva*, that is, 'being one' which is related with an *ekavacana*—singular case suffix. Thus in the instance *'atra ghaṭosti'* the singular suffix that is added to the term *'ghaṭa'*, means the *ekatva* that is related with the *ekavacana* (the singular case suffix).

Now, naturally, the question arises as to what is the relation of *ekavacana* in *ekatva*. In reply, the following relation is suggested:

स्वप्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकवत्त्व-स्वविशिष्टसंसर्गतानिरूपकत्वोभयसंबन्धेन यत्स्वाधिकरणं तन्निष्ठभेदप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वम्

In the second relation mentioned above, certain *samsargatā* is to be related with the *ekavacana* which is referred to by the term *'sva'*. The following is the relation of *'sva'* in the *samsargatā*:

स्वप्रयोज्यशाब्दबोधविषयत्वसामानाधिकरण्य-स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रयोज्यशाब्द-बोधकिवषयतासामानाधिकरण्यान्यतरसंबन्धेन ।

The understanding of the above relations demands the familiarity with various technicalities, used by the Navya Nyāya school. I take it for granted that the reader is sufficiently familiar with those technicalities and will try to explain the above relations as simply as possible.

Let me take an instance and try to explain it. Let us suppose that there is only one jar on the ground. Only in such a situation the *ekatva*—'oneness' the number residing in the *ghaṭa* becomes related with the *ekavacana* that is added to the nominal base *'ghaṭa'*. This *ekatva* which is in the *ghaṭa* is related with the *ekavacana* by a relation which involves in it two relations

such as *svaprakṛtyarthatāvacchedakavatva* and *svaviśiṣṭasamsargatā-nirūpakatva*. Since this is the relation of *ekavacana*, here *'sva'* refers to the *ekavacana*. Its *prakṛti* (the nominal base), is the word *'ghaṭa'*. The *prakṛtyarthatāvacchedaka*, that is the limitor of 'being the meaning' of the *prakṛti* is *ghaṭatva*. As a matter of fact, this *ghaṭatva* is present even in a jar kept somewhere else. But, that jar does not have the second relation of the *ekavacana*, namely, *svaviśiṣṭasamsargatānirūpakatva*. Here the term *samsargatā* refers only to that *samsargatā* which resides in the *samsarga*—the relation between the ground and the jar that are before us. That relation is the *ādheyatā* residing in the jar before and is determined by the ground. At present, we have to assume that only this *samsargatā* is related with the *sva* and not any other *samsargatā*. This point will become clear when we try to analyze the relation of *sva* in the *samsargatā*. The relation is:

स्वप्रयोज्यशाब्दबोधविषयत्वसामानाधिकरण्य-
स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रत्ययप्रयोज्यतादृशविषयतासामानाधिकरण्य-एतदन्यतरसंबन्ध ।

The above relation, actually, contains two relations and the *samsargatā* is intended to be related with *sva* by either of the two relations. The two relations are:

1. स्वप्रयोज्यशाब्दबोधविषयत्वसामानाधिकरण्य   and
2. स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रत्ययप्रयोज्यतादृशविषयतासामानाधिकरण्य ।

In the case of the instance *'atra ghaṭaḥ asti'*, *'sva'*, as already said, refers to the *ekavacana* suffix added to the word *'ghaṭa'*. The *'ghaṭa'*, mentioned here in this sentence, is the *ghaṭa* which is on the ground before us (*atra*). That *ghaṭa* has the *samsarga*, namely *etaddeśanirūpitā ādhéyata*. This *ādhéyata* being a *samsarga* has *a samsargatā*. This *samsargitā* is *svaviśiṣṭa* is related with the *ekavacana* by the second relation of the two mentioned above. This can be explained as follows:

The relation is स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रत्ययप्रयोज्यशाब्दबोधविषयत्व

sva is the *ekavacana* that we hear after the word *'ghaṭa'*. *Sva-samānādhikaraṇapratyaya* means the suffix that co-exists with the *ekavacana*. In the sentence *'atra ghaṭaḥ asti'* both the *ekavacana* and the suffix *tral* which is a part of the word *atra*, are present. Hence the *tral* suffix can be said as *svasāmānādhikaraṇapratyaya*. The meaning of the *tral* is *ādheyatā*. By conveying that meaning the *tral* makes it possible for this *ādheyatva* to become an object of the verbal cognition produced by the sentence *'atra ghaṭaḥ asti'*. Therefore the *ādheyatā* has the objectness. This objectness, that is, *viṣayatā* resides here as *svasamānādhikaraṇapratyaya-prayojyaśabdabodhaviṣayatā*. Since this *viṣayatā* resides in the *samsarga* —*etaddeśanirūpitādheyatā*, it is now clear that the *samsargatā* of this *samsarga*, has the coexistence of the above *viṣayatā*. Thus the *samsargatā* which is in

the *ādhéyatā*, has *svasamānādhikaraṇa-pratyayaprayojya—śabdabodhaviṣyatā —sāmānādhikaranya*. In other words, the *samsargatā* is related with the *sva*, that is, *svaviśiṣta* by the above relation. Since this *samsargatā* is determined by the *ghaṭa* which actually has the *samsarga*, that is, *ādhéyatā*, it is now clear that *ghaṭa* is *svaviśiṣta-samsargatānirūpaka*. Thus, by the two relations, namely, *svaprakṛtyartha-tāvacchedakavatva* and *svaviśiṣta-samsargatānirūpakatva*, *sva* is related to the *ghaṭa* or, in other words by these two relations, the locus of the *sva* is the *ghaṭa* before us. The *ekatva* with which we are concerned now and which has to be shown by us as being related with the *ekavacana* of the word '*ghaṭaḥ*', also belongs to the same *ghaṭa*. The difference which may be said to be present in the *svādhikaraṇa ghaṭa*, is the difference of some other *ghaṭa*, and is never that of the same *ghaṭa*. Hence, the counterpositive (*pratiyogī*) of the difference is another jar and the *ekatva* residing in that *ghaṭa* can be said as being the limitor of the counterpositiveness. But the *ekatva* residing in the same *ghaṭa* cannot be the limitor of the counterpositiveness. Hence, when there is only one jar on the ground then only the sentence '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*' becomes valid. For, as already explained above, the jar which is there alone on the ground can be the possessor of the meaning of the singular case suffix, the meaning being '*ekavacanaviśiṣtam ekatvam*'.

Suppose there are two jars on the ground, then the sentence '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*' becomes incorrect, because none of the two jars, has the meaning of the singular case suffix. This can be briefly explained as follows:

The meaning of the singular case suffix is '*ekavacanaviśiṣtam ekatvam*'. The *vaiśiṣtya* or the relation of *ekavacana* in the *ekatva* is:

svaprakṛtyarthtāvacchedakavattva—svaviśiṣtasamsargatānirūpakatvobhaya sambandhena yat svādhikaraṇam tannisṭhabhedapratiyogitānavacchedakatva. Since both the jars are present on the same ground, both of them become *svādhikaraṇa*, that is the locus of *ekavacana* by the two relations, namely—*svaprakṛtyarthatāvacchedakavattva* and *svaviśiṣtasamsargatānirūpakatva*. Since the *ekatva* that is oneness of each jar can be the *pratiyogitvacchedaka* of the *bheda* residing in the other, none of the jars does possess the *ekatva* which is not the limitor of the counterpositiveness of the difference.

Similarly, when there are two jars on the ground—one being *nīla* and the other *pīta*—the sentence '*atra nīlaghaṭaḥ asti*' can be justified.

Here the singular case suffix, added to the word *ghaṭa*, can be said to be related with only the *nīla*-jar and not with the *pīta*-jar for the following reasons. Between the two relations, namely, *svaprakṛtyarthatāvacchedakavattva* and *svaviśiṣtasamsargatānirūpakatva*, the *pītaghaṭa*, as a matter of fact, is related with the *ekavacana* in the word '*ghaṭaḥ*' by the first relation, because the *prakṛtyarthatāvacchedaka*—the limitor of being the meaning of the nominal base '*ghaṭaḥ*', that is, *ghaṭatva*' is very much present in the *pītaghaṭa* also. But, the *pītaghaṭa* is not related with the singular case suffix, by the relation—*svaviśiṣtasamsargatānirūpakatva*, for, the

samsargatā which is *svaviśiṣta*, that is, related with the *ekavacana* here, is the *samsargatā* residing in the *ādhéyatā* that belongs to *nīlaghaṭa* alone. This is because that *samsargatā* alone has the relation of *sva*, namely *svasāmānādhikaraṇa-pratyayaprayojyaśābdabodhaviṣayatā-sāmānādhikaranya*. A brief explanation of this is as follows: *Sva* is the singular case suffix. The *pratyaya* co-existing with *sva*, is the *tral* in the word '*atra*'. The *viṣayatā*-objectness determined by the verbal cognition, resides in the *ādhéyatā* of *nīlaghaṭa* only. Since the *pītaghaṭa* is not an object of the verbal cognition produced by the sentence '*atra nīlaghaṭaḥ asti*', the question of its *ādhéyatā* having the objectness belonging to *pītaghaṭa* and that too being caused by the *tral*, does not arise. In short, the *pītaghaṭa* though exists on the same ground on which the *nīlaghaṭa* exists, is not related with the *ekavacana* by the second of the two relations. What actually is thus related with the *ekavacana* here, is *nīlaghaṭa*. Since *nīlaghaṭa* has the *bheda* of *pītaghaṭa*, the *ekatva* of *pītaghaṭa* becomes the *bhedapratiyogitāvacchedaka*. On the other hand, since *nīlaghaṭa*, cannot have the *bheda* of itself, the *ekatva* of it, becomes the *bhedapratiyogitānavacchedaka*. The meaning of the *ekavacana* suffix, as pointed out earlier, is the *ekavacanaviśiṣta-ekatva*. Such an *ekatva* is actually present in the *nīlaghaṭa*, in spite of the fact that *pītaghaṭa* also is present on the same ground. Thus, the sentence '*atra nīlaghaṭaḥ asti*'—when there are *nīlaghaṭa* and *pītaghaṭa* on the ground, can be justified.

The origin of this complicated structure of *ekatva* can be traced in the simple statement '*sajātīyadvitīyarahitatvam ekatvam*' made by Gadādhara in his *Vyutpattivāda*, while discussing the meaning of *ekavacana*. To make the concept more clear, Gadādhara himself elaborated it as *svasajātīyaniṣthabhedapratiyogiānavacchedakaikatva* and further clarified by stating the *sājātya*, that is, similarity, contained in it, as—*sājātyam ca svasamabhivyāhṛtapadarthasamsargitva—viśiṣtaprakṛtyarthatāvacchedaka-vatvarūpeṇa*. The above *anugama* suggested by Pt. Bacchā Jhā, is clear now that it is based only on these certain statements made by Gadādhara.

As a matter of fact, the *anugama* now shown is a simple one compared to the still complicated structure which Pt. Bacchā Jhā suggested later in order to avoid certain objections raised against the above *anugama*. I do not propose here either to discuss or elaborately explain the objections raised and the structure of *anugama* suggested to avoid the objections. But, just to show the mind-boggling complicatedness of it, which is the result of the various relations that are involved in it, I shall merely demonstrate the *anugama* with all the relations contained in it.

एकवचनविशिष्टं एकत्वम् एकवचनार्थः

This just means that the meaning of a singular case suffix is the *ekatva* which is related with the singular case suffix. Thus, in the sentence '*atra nīlaghaṭaḥ asti*', the singular case suffix added to the word '*nīlaghaṭa*' means the *ekatva* of *nīlaghaṭa*, denoted by the term '*nīlaghata*'. The following is

the relation of the singular case suffix in the *ekatva*:

स्वप्रकृतिप्रयोज्यविषयताविशिष्टनिरूपकताधिकरणतात्वावच्छिन्नानुयोगिताकपर्याप्तिक-.
संख्यावच्छिन्नवद्वृत्तिभेदप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वम् । (Here, '*sva*' refers to the
ekavacana.)

In the above relation, '*nirūpakatā*' is stated as related with
'*svaprakṛtiprayojyaviṣayatā*'. The relation of the *viṣayatā* in the *nirūpakatā*
is one of the following four relations:

निरूपकतायां वैशिष्ट्यं च –

१. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यविशेष्यतावत्त्व

२. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यप्रकारतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व

३. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यप्रकारतावत्त्व

४. स्वाभिन्नतादृशविशेष्यतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व-अन्यतरमसंबन्धेन ।

There are four possible, different instances in which a singular case
suffix can be found. They are:

1. Where the singular case suffix is added to a word that denotes the
main qualificandum (*mukhyaviśeṣya*) for example, '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*'. Here
the word '*ghaṭa*' denotes the main qualificandum. The singular case
suffix added to this is taken care of by the first of the above four relations.

2. The second type of singular case suffix is that which is added to the
word that denotes the 'limitor of the qualifierness' (*prakāratāvacchedaka*).
For example '*puruṣoyam rājñaḥ*'—'This is a king's servant'. Here the
ṣaṣṭhi—ekavacana added to the word '*rājan*' is being covered. In the
cognition produced by this sentence, 'servant' is the qualifier and the
king is the limitor of the qualifierness. To explain the meaning of this
ekavacana the second of the above four relations, is mentioned.

3. Among the above four relations, the third one, namely
'*svābhinnamukhyaprakāratāvatva*' is included to cover the instance
—'Rāmadārāḥ Jānakī'. Here the word 'Rāmadārā' denotes the
qualificandum and the word 'Jānakī' refers to the qualifier. Since the
word Rāmadāra is in plural number, that suffix cannot convey the *ekatva*
of 'Rāmadāra'—consort of Rāma. As a matter fact, the suffix is considered
here as meaningless, but added just for the sake of grammatical correctness
of the word. Hence the *ekatva* of Rāmadāra, will have to be conveyed by
the singular case suffix which we hear after the word 'Jānakī'. As told
above, this instance is covered by the third relation.

4. The fourth of the four relations being explained now, is
svābhinnamukhyaviśeṣyatā-vacchedakatāvattva. This is included here to
cover the instance '*rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ atrāsti*'. Here there are two terms ending
with a singular case suffix. One is the term '*rājñāḥ*' which is in
ṣaṣṭhi—ekavacana. Again, the main qualificandum of the cognition

produced by this sentence is '*puruṣa*'. The *ekatva* of him is conveyed by
the singular case affix added to the word '*puruṣa*'. But, if the *ekatva* of the
'*rājan*' also is intended in the given sentence, to cover it, this fourth
relation becomes necessary.

Before we continue further with this *anugama*, it will be helpful, if we
briefly repeat what we have explained so far:

The meaning of a singular case affix is:

स्वप्रकृतिप्रयोज्यविषयता
↓
विशिष्ट
↓
निरूपकताधिकरणतात्वावच्छिन्नानुयोगिताकपर्याप्तिकसंख्याच्छिन्नवद्वृत्तिभेद–
प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकमेकत्वम् ।

The *nirūpakatā* underlined above is related with one of the four
relations, mentioned below:

१. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यविशेष्यतावत्त्व ।

२. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यप्रकारतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व ।

३. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यप्रकारतावत्त्वं ।

४. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यविशेष्यतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व ।

In all the above four relations, '*sva*' refers to '*svaprakṛtiprayojyaviṣayatā*'
in which '*sva*' refers to the singular case suffix, the meaning of which is
being discussed now. It may be noticed here that each of the above
relations, involves relations. Thus the first relation involves relations of
svābhinnamukhyaviśeṣyatā in the *nirūpakatā*. The relations of the
mukhyaviśeṣyatā in the *nirūpakatā* is either of the following two relations:

१. स्वसाक्षान्निरूपकतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व,

२. स्वनिरूपितमुख्यप्रकारतावत्त्व ।

It is obvious that both the above relations which are the relations of
svābhinnamukhyaviśeṣyatā in *nirūpakatā*, involve relations. The relations
of *svasākṣānnirūpakatāvacchedakatāvatva* in the *nirūpakatā*, are four. They
are:

१. स्वसामानाधिकरण्य

२. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व

३. स्वावच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व

४. स्ववृत्तित्व

So far we have explained the first relation of *svābhinnamukhyaviśeṣyatā*. The second relation of *svābhinnamukhyaviśeṣyatā* in the *nirūpakatā* is *svanirūpitamukhyaprakāratā-vattva*. *mukhyaprakāratāvattva* means 'being replaced with the *mukhyaprakāratā*'. The relations of the *mukhyaprakāratā* in the *nirūpakatā*, are two. They are:

१. स्वावच्छेदकतात्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकपर्याप्त्यनुयोगितावच्छेदकरूपवृत्तित्व

२. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व ।

Here ends the chain of the relations with which *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviṣayatā* is connected with the first of the four relations, namely *svābhinna-mukhyaviśeṣyatāvatva*.

The second relation of *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviṣayatā* in the *nirūpakatā*, is *svābhinnamukhyaprakāratāvacchedakatāvattva*. Since this is a relation of *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviṣayatā*, as before, here also 'sva' refers to *sva-prakṛtiprayojyaviṣayatā*.

The relation *svābhinnamukhyaprakāratāvacchedakatāvattva* means 'being related with *svābhinnamukhyaprakāratāvacchedakatā*'. Now, we have to show as to how this *mukhyaprakāratāvacchedakatā* has the relation in *nirūpakatā*. Either of the following, is the relation of *mukhya-prakāratāvacchedakatā* in the *nirūpakatā*,

१. स्वविशिष्टावच्छेदकतावत्त्व

२. स्वाश्रयत्व ।

The first of the above two relations, viz., *svaviśiṣṭāvacchedakatāvattva* involves two relations. One is the relation of 'sva', that is, *svābhinna-mukhyaprakāratāvacchedakatā*, in a certain *avacchedakatā*. We call this as 'certain *avacchedakatā*' as we are not, at this stage, familiar with this *avacchedakatā* which is briefly stated as '*svaviśiṣṭāvacchedakatā*'. The other is the relation of this *avacchedakatā* in the *nirūpakatā*. The following two are the relations of *mukhyaprakāratāvacchedakatā* in the particular *avacchedakatā*:

१. स्वसाक्षात्रिरूपकता

२. स्वावच्छेद्यप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वानवच्छिन्नत्व

The relations of the particular *avacchedakatā* in the *nirūpakatā* are the following four:

१. स्वसामानाधिकरण्य

२. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व

३. स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व

४. स्ववृत्तित्व ।

So far we have explained the first chain of the relations of *mukhya-prakāratāvacchedakatā* with the *nirūpakatā*. Now, we have to explain the second relation, namely *svāśrayatva*. Here 'sva' is *mukhya-prakāratāvacchedakatā*. The *nirūpakatā* is said to be the locus of *mukhya-prakāratāvacchedakatā*. The *nirūpakatā* is said to be the locus of *mukhya-prakāratāvacchedakatā* with the three relations. They are:

१. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नसंबन्धित्वसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व

२. स्वावच्छेद्यप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्व

३. स्वविशिष्टविषयतात्वव्यापकत्व

The last of the above relations again involves two more relations. One is the relation of 'sva' in the *viṣayatā* and the other is the relation with which *vyāpakatva*, that is pervasiveness of the *nirūpakatā*, is limited. The relations of the 'sva' in the *viṣayatā*, are the following:

१. स्वावच्छेद्यविषयतानिरूपितविषयत्वावच्छिन्नत्व

२. स्वनिरूपितत्व

The *vyāpakatāvacchedakasambandha*, that is, the relation which is the limitor of *vyāpakatā* is:

स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकतावृत्तित्व

As per the above relation, the *nirūpakatā* is pervasive of *viṣayatātva* as it resides in all the instances of *viṣayatātva* by the relation of *svanirūpitāvacchedakatāvṛttitva*. This relation holds good when the *nirūpakatā* resides in the *svanirūpitāvacchedakatā*. The relation with which the *nirūpakatā* is required to be present in the *svanirūpitāvacchedakatā*, is actually not one, but two. They are:

१. स्वावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्व

२. स्वविशिष्टविशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारतावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व

In the second of the above relations, certain *viśeṣyatā* is required to be *svaviśiṣṭa*—related with *sva*. The relations of *sva* in the *viśeṣyatā*, are three. They are:

१. स्वाश्रयत्व

२. स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व

३. स्ववृत्तित्व

Of the above three, as per the first, *viśeṣyatā* is supposed to be the locus of *sva*. Here the relation is either of the following two:

१. स्वतादात्म्य

२. स्वावच्छेद्यत्व ।

So far, of the two relations with which *nirūpakatā* is required to be present in the *nirūpakatāvacchedakatva*, the second, namely *svaviśiṣṭaviśeṣyatānirupita*, etc. is explained. The other, that is, the first relation is *svāvacchédakāvacchinnatva*. This is described as *svābhāvavadavacchedakatvānirūpitatva*. Here, *svābhāva* means the absence of *sva*. the *pratiyogitāvacchedakasambandha* of this absence, that is the relation with which the *sva* is negated, is either of the following two:

१. स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकतावत्त्व

२. स्वावच्छेद्यप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतावत्त्व

Of the above two relations, the first one refers to the possession of *avacchedakatā* and the second one to the possession of *viśeṣyatā*. The following are the relations with which the possession of *avacchedakatā* and *viśeṣyatā*, is intended.

१. स्वसामानाधिकरण्य

२. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व

३. स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व

४. स्ववृत्तित्व

Here ends the chain of relations connected with the second relation referred to in the original definition of *ekatva*, that is, *svaprakṛti-prayojyaviṣayatāviśiṣṭanirūpakatākādhikaraṇatātvāvacchinna*, etc. The third relation with which *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviṣayatā* is related with the *nirūpakatā*, is—*svābhinnamukhyaprakāratāvattva*. The relation of *mukhyaprakāratā* in the *nirūpakatā*, is either of the following two:

१. स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकतावत्त्व

२. स्वाश्रयत्व ।

The second relation *svāśrayatva* means being the locus of *sva*, namely, the *mukhyaprakāratā*. The following two are the relations with which *nirūpakatā* is intended to be the locus of *mukhyaprakāratā*:

१. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नसंबन्धित्वसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व

२. स्वनिरूपितविशेष्यतावत्त्व

viśeṣyatāvattva in the second relation here means 'possessing *viśeṣyatā*'. Similarly, in the first relation of the two mentioned a bit earlier as the relations of *mukhyaprakāratā* in the *nirūpakatā*, *avacchedakatāvattva* is included. *avvacchedakatāvattva* means 'possessing the *avacchedakatā*'. The relations with which *nirūpakatā* is intended to be possessed of this *avacchedakatā* and also the relations of *viśeṣyatā* which is mentioned above, are:

१. स्वसामानाधिकरण्य,

२. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व

३. स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व

४. स्ववृत्तित्व

Here ends the chain of the relations of *mukhyaprakāratā* in the *nirūpakatā*. The fourth and the final relation of *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviṣayatā* in the *nirūpakatā* of the original definition of *ekatva*, is *svābhinna-mukhyaviśeṣyatāvacchedakatāvattva*. Either of the following is the relation of *mukhyaviśeṣyatāvacchedakatā* in *nirūpakatā*:

१. स्वविशिष्टावच्छेदकतावत्त्व

२. स्वाश्रयत्व

The first of the above two relations, involves the relation of *sva* in the *avacchedakatā* and also the relation of *avacchedakatā* in the *nirūpakatā*. Those relations are the following:

१. स्वसामानाधिकरण्य

२. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व

३. स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व

The second relation, *svāśrayatva*, means that the *nirūpakatā* is the locus of *viśeṣyatāvacchedakatā*. The following are the relations with which the *nirūpakatā* is intended to be the locus:

१. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नसंबन्धित्वसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व

२. स्वनिरूपितस्वावच्छेप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वावच्छेद्यविषयतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्व

३. स्वनिरूपितमुख्यप्रकारतावदवच्छेदकतावत्त्व

४. स्वविशिष्टविषयतात्वव्यापकत्व

The last relation here involves the relations of *sva* in a *viṣayatā* and also *vyāpakatva*, that is, pervasiveness. The relations of *sva* in the *viṣayatā* are the following:

१. स्वनिरूपितत्व

२. स्वावच्छेद्यविशेष्यतानिरूपितविषयताभिन्नत्व

३. स्वनिरूपितमुख्यप्रकारतावदन्यत्व

The *vyāpakatā* mentioned earlier, is intended with either of the following relations:

१. स्ववृत्तित्व

२. स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकतावृत्तित्व

Though this chain of relations can be developed further, we may stop here and can say that this explanation of *ekatva*, can cover all the instances of *ekatva*. For a layman, why, even for a scholar who is able to follow the Navya Nyāya terminology only up to an extent, all this exercise may seem to be absolutely meaningless. It is also impossible to convince a layman the necessity of conceiving innumerable relations, each of which involves many other relations and are mostly unintelligible. But when one notices the use of the singular case in different contexts, it becomes clear that a simple explanation cannot cover all the cases. For instance, take the sentene '*puruṣoyam rājñaḥ*'. Here singular case suffix is used more than once. The singular case that we hear after the term '*puruṣa*' denotes the *ekatva* that belongs to the qualificandum, whereas the singular case suffix heard after the word '*rājan*' denotes the *ekatva* that is related to the qualifier, because as per the Sanskrit linguistic rules—*puruṣa* is the qualificandum and *rājan* is the qualifier here. Any explanation of *ekatva* will have to cover all these instances. There are also some peculiar instances wherein the use of singular case affix poses a problem. Bacchā Jhā refers to many such instances. When a servant is carrying some money which actually belongs to two kings, the use of a sentence—*rājñaḥ dhanam gṛhītva jigamiṣati rājño dāsaḥ*—"The servant of the king desires to go, taking the money of the king' is not valid if the *ekatva* of the *rājan* is intended in both cases—'*rājñaḥ dhanam*' and '*rājñaḥ dāsaḥ*'. In one case, that is, '*rājñaḥ dāsaḥ*' the use of *ekavacana* is quite valid because the person is a servant of only one king, but the same cannot be said in the case of '*rājñaḥ dhanam*', because the money, actually does not belong to only one king. The various relations involved in this *anugama* take care of this instance also, the validity of which, otherwise cannot be established.

Similarly there are sentences like 'Rāmadārāh Jānakī'. Here, as per the desire of the speaker, either the term 'Rāmadārāh' can be taken as the term denoting the qualificandum (*viśeṣya*) or the term 'Jānakī'. In either case, the plural number used after the word Rāmadāra is not intended. Since the word *dāra*, as per the Sanskrit linguistic rules, for the sake of grammatical correctness has to be used in plural number, it is so used. But, the singular number after the word Jānakī, denotes the *ekatva*. Certain relations introduced in the *anugama* are intended to cover instances such as these also. Therefore, though it is very difficult even to make an attempt to explain the utility of the seemingly meaningless relations included in an *anugama*, it can only be said that an *anugama* is employed as a last weapon by the Naiyāyikās through which they can avoid many inconvenient questions and achieve precision to a maximum extent. The *anugama* mentioned above, which satisfactorily explains the *ekatva* that the singular case suffixes used in different situations denote, was designed by the great Naiyāyikas of this century, Bacchā Jhā, in his *Gūḍharthatattvaloka*, a commentary on the *Vyutpattivāda* of Gadādhara. Though Gadādhara discusses the meaning of singular case suffix in his

Vyutpattivāda and offers an explanation of *ekatva* which is, by and large, acceptable to all, Bacchā Jhā continues the discussion further, pointing out the problems that cannot be solved by the explanation of *ekatva* offered by Gadādhara. The objections that he raises and the solutions, including the above *anugama*, are entirely his own. This is only a small instance of the amazing ingenuity for which Bacchā Jhā is recognized as a legendary Naiyāyika of this century.

The Concept of *Antarvyāpti*: Sources, Development and Implications

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The earliest extant usage of the term *antarvyāpti*, meaning 'intrinsic inseparable connection' or 'intrinsic invariable concomitance' can be traced to the *Tarka-śāstra* of Vasubandhu (AD 410–490), an early Buddhist logician. Although the original Sanskrit work is no longer available now, it survives in the form of a Chinese version of this work called *Zu-shih-lun*, prepared by Paramartha of the Chan dynasty in AD 550. In the first chapter of this work, Vasubandhu treats of a proposition (*pratijñā*). a reason (*hetu*), an example (*udāharaṇa*), an application (*upanaya*), and a conclusion (*nigamana*), which constitute the five parts of a syllogism.[1]

Though, according to the *Tarka-śāstra*, a syllogism consisted of five parts, in the Ronki, quoted by Kwei-ke, Vasubandhu maintained that a thesis could be proved by two parts only, namely, a proposition and a reason, and that, therefore, the necessary terms in a syllogistic inference were only three, namely, the minor term (*pakṣa*), the major term (*sādhya*), and the middle term (*hetu*).[2]

Although neither the Ronki nor its Sanskrit original is available. Vasubandhu seems, however, to have used two forms of syllogism, namely, a syllogism of five parts at the time of a debate and a syllogism of two parts on an ordinary occasion. The two forms are exhibited below:

A syllogism of five parts
(1) Sound is non-eternal.
(2) Because it is a product.
(3) Products are non-eternal like a pot, which is a product and is non-eternal.
(4) Sound is an instance of a product.
(5) Therefore, sound is non-eternal.

A syllogism of two parts
(1) Sound is non-eternal.
(2) Because it is a product.[3]

The actual usage of the term *antarvyāpti* is found in the *Nyāyāvatāra* (NA) of Siddhasena Divākara, the Jaina logician, who flourished in AD 700. Siddhasena refers to the opinion of the celebrated logicians

(*nyāyavidaḥ*) in the verse 20, thus:

> *Antarvyāptyaiva sādhyasya siddher bahirudāhṛtiḥ/*
> *Vyarthā syāt tadasadbhāve' pyevaṁ nyāyavido viduḥ //20//*[4]

Here, he probably refers to the Buddhist logician Vasubandhu, when he says that, according to some logicians, *antarvyāpti* (internal inseparable connection) consisting of *pakṣa* or minor term, *sādhya* or major term and *hetu* or middle term, is quite enough in establishing a thesis, and that *dṛṣṭānta* or example if altogether useless.[5]

Being a type of *vyāpti* (inseparable concomitance), it is something intimately concerned with the relation between the major term and the middle term, and being concerned with such a relation, it is further concerned with the problem of the number of the members of a syllogism. This in its turn relates to the necessity or utility of inference as a means of knowledge, or real cognition.

Since all real cognition, that is, all cognition of reality, reduces to judgements, that is, to interpretation of sensations in concepts, and since cognition can be distinguished as a direct and indirect one, the judgement can also be divided in a direct and indirect one. The direct one is perception, the indirect one is inference. The direct one is a synthesia between a sensation and a conception, the indirect one is a synthesis between a sensation and two concepts. The direct one has two terms, the indirect one has three terms. The direct one reduces to the form 'this is blue' or 'this is smoke'. The indirect one can be reduced to the form 'this is smoke produced by fire', or 'there is some fire, because there is smoke'. The smoke is perceived, the judgement 'this is smoke' is perceptual and direct. The fire is hidden, the judgement 'there is here fire' is inferential and indirect. All things may be either perceived or unperceived. The cognition of an unperceived through a perceived is called inference. It is an indirect cognition, a cognition, so to speak, round the corner, a cognition of an object through its 'mark'. The hidden object has a mark, and this mark is, in its turn, the characteristic, or the mark of a point of reality. The cognition of a point of reality, as possessing the double mark, as possessing the mark of its mark, is inference.[6]

The inferential judgement will then become a judgement of concomitance (*vyāpti = sāhacarya = avinābhāva*). However, not every cognition containing three terms, of which one is a substratum for the two others, will be an inference. Only such a combination of them, where the two attributes are necessarily interrelated, the one deducible from the other, represents an inference. The judgement 'there is a fiery hill' contains three terms; however, they are not necessarily interrelated. But the judgement 'there is here a fire, because there is smoke', 'there is no smoke without a fire' are inferential, since smoke is represented as necessarily connected with its cause, the fire.[7]

The Science of Logic (*nyāya-śāstra*) developed in India out of a Science of Dialectics (*tarka-śāstra*). Inference appears in the latter as one of the methods of proof, but its part is insignificant; it is lost in a multitude of dialectical tricks resorted to in public debates. Its gradual rise in importance runs parallel with the gradual decrease in the importance of dialectics. The origin of the Indian doctrine of inference and syllogism is indigenous. Its whole conception as one of the 'sources of knowledge' (*pramāṇa*) gives it from the start an epistemological character. During the Hīnayāna period, the Buddhists seem to know nothing about either syllogism or inference.[8] In the oldest records of the Jains, the Āgamas, it appears that in the treatment of knowledge there existed from very early times a school of metaphysicians who divided knowledge into five varieties, namely, *mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥparyāya* and *kevala*, while the school of logicians would have divided it into *parokṣa* and *pratyakṣa*. They included, in *parokṣa*, it seems, the sources of valid knowledge, namely, *pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna* and *āgama*.[9] Among the Brahmins in the post-Vedic age, *Ātmā-vidyā*, was at a later stage called *Ānvīkṣikī*, the science of inquiry. It treated two subjects, namely, the soul and the theory of reasons. In so far as it was mainly concerned with the soul, *Ānvīkṣikī* was developed into a philosophy called *Darśana*; and in so far as it dealt largely with the theory of reasons it developed into a logic called pre-eminently the *Ānvīkṣiki* or *Hetu-vidyā* or *Hetu-śāstra*. It was also called *Tarka-vidyā*, the art of debate, or *Vāda-vidyā*, the art of discussion, inasmuch as it dealt with rules for carrying on disputes in learned assemblies called *pariṣad*.[10]

But with the advent of a new age, at a period of Indian philosophy when the teaching of the leading schools were put into systematic order and their fundamental treatises composed, inference appears in the majority of them as one of the chief sources of our knowledge, second in order and in importance to sense-perception. The orthodox Mīmāṁsakas deny inference as a source of real knowledge because neither sense-perception nor inference is a source of cognizing religious duty. The materialists, on the other side, deny it because direct sense-perception is for them the only source of knowledge. Between these two extremes we have the schools of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṁkhya which, in the period preceding Dignāga, framed their definitions of inference as the second source of our knowledge of the empirical world. With Vasubandhu the Buddhists enter into the movement and produce, in the *Vādavidhi*, their own first definition. All these definitions are mercilessly criticized and rejected by Dignāga.[11]

The Vaiśeṣikas, from among all non-Buddhist schools, come the nearest to the Buddhists, both in their definition of inference and in their classification of relations. They acknowledge four kinds of relations, namely, causality, coherence in a common substrate, conjunction (or simple concomitance) and opposition or negation. Dignāga records

that at his time (that is, during AD 450–520), the Vaiśeṣikas explained the generalizing step which the understanding makes when it moves from a particular case to a universal premise as supernatural intuition, evidently because it was unexplainable from experience. It seems from Praśastapāda, the author of the *Bhāṣya* on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* of Kaṇāda, that the idea of a fixed number of relations was nevertheless dropped by them in the sequel.[12]

Siddhasena Divākara, a Jaina logician who flourished in AD 480–550, referred to the opinion of Vasubandhu, maintains that perception and inference are of two varieties in accordance with the two kinds of valid knowledge, namely, for one's own sake (*svārtha*) and for the sake of others (*parārtha*). In *NA* verse 10 he says that both *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* disclose objects which are familiar (*prasiddha*) to us; and as both these kinds of knowledge are a means of communicating the same to others, they are knowledge for the sake of others (*parārtha*). *Parārthānumāna*, or inference for the sake of others, is defined as a statement expressive of the reason (*hetu, liṅga,* middle term) which is inseparably connected with *sādhya* or that which is to be proved. This statement should consist of *pakṣa*, or minor term, and four or nine other terms according to the form of syllogism chosen. Generally a syllogism of five parts is quite sufficient for an average man. Akṣapada Gautama (circa AD 150), the author of the *Nyāya-sūtra,* has propounded these five parts of syllogism as proposition (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*udāharaṇa* or *dṛṣṭānta*), application of the example (*upanaya*) and statement of the conclusion (*nigamana*).[13] Among the Jains, Bhadrabāhu (*circa* 473–357 BC), in his *Daśavaikālika-niryukti,*[14] elaborated a syllogism consisting of ten parts (*daśāvayava-vākya*), which contain, over and above, the four of the five enumerated above, six more, namely, limitation of the proposition (*pratijñā-vibhakti*), limitation of the reason (*hetu-vibhakti*), the counter-proposition (*vipakṣa*), opposition to the counter-proposition (*vipakṣa-pratiṣedha*), questioning the validity of the instance or example (*ākāṅṣā*), and the meeting of the question (*ākāṅṣā-pratiṣedha*); the order being pratijñā, *pratijñā-vibhakti, hetu, hetu-vibhakti, vipakṣa, vipakṣa-pratiṣedha, dṛṣṭānta, ākāṅṣā, ākāṅṣā-pratiṣedha,* and *nigamana;*[15] the *Upanaya* of Akṣapāda is broken up into the eighth and the ninth parts. Thus, both the Brahmanic and the Jaina tradition recognize the importance of five or ten members of a syllogism. And, Bhadrabāhu further categorizes the syllogism with ten parts as best (*utkṛṣṭa*), that with nine to two parts as mediocre (*madhyama*) and that with one part as worst (*jaghanya*).[16] This is the authentic and very ancient Jaina perspective.

The reason for such a perspective of having a syllogism of at least five members or, if possible, that of all the ten members is worth exploring. The difference between the inference, or *svārthānumāna*, and syllogism, or *parārthānumāna,* is a difference between that form of inferential judgement which has in the natural run of our thinking and acting

process, and another form which is most suitable in science and in public debate. In a public debate the universal proposition is rightly put forward as the foundation of the reasoning to which should follow the applying proposition, or the minor; whereas in the actual thought-process the universal judgement is never present to the mind in its necessity; it seems hidden in the depths of our consciousness, as though controlling the march of our thought from behind a screen. Our thought leaps from one particular case to another one, and a reason seems to suggest itself to the mind. Its universal and necessary connection with the predicate lies apparently dormant in the instinct and reveals only when duly attended to. In inference for the individual, the thought-process more closely corresponds to the natural process of transition from one particular case to another one. In syllogism, that is, the inference for others, it is very difficult to always distinguish between what belongs to inference as a thought-process and what to its expression in speech, since we cannot deal with the thought-process without expressing it in some way.[17]

When Dignāga started on his logical reform he was faced by the theory of a five-membered syllogism established in the school of the Naiyāyikas. This syllogism was supposed to represent five interrelated steps of an ascending and descending reasoning. It started by a thesis and ended in a conclusion. From these five members, Dignāga retained only two, the general rule including the examples, and the application including the conclusion. Indeed the main point in every syllogism, just as in every inference, is the fact of the necessary interrelation between two terms as it is expressed in the major premise. The second point consists in the application of the general rule to a particular case. This is the real aim of an inference, that is, the cognition of an object on the basis of the knowledge of its mark. When these two steps are made, the aim of the syllogism is attained, other members are superfluous. It thus consists of a general rule and its application to an individual case. But the syllogism of the Naiyāyikas contains much more details, resembling a mathematical demonstration; it begins by proclaiming the *probandum* and concludes by stating that its demonstration has been made. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti enlarge upon the definition of a correct thesis. Evidently this was a point at issue between the schools of their time. They maintain that a thesis in a public debate should be correctly formulated, but at the same time it is not at all an indispensible member of every deduction. It can be safely dropped even in a debate when in the course of debating it is clearly understood without special mention. Thus a series of rules were established to which an acceptable thesis must satisfy. But later on this chapter on a correctly formulated thesis gradually sunk into insignificance, since all the fallacies of a thesis became merged in the doctrine of false reasons. But, according to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, real members of a syllogism, the necessary members of the logical

process, are thus only two, the general rule and its application to an individual instance. The first establishes a necessary interdependence between two terms, the second applies this general rule to the point in question. The first is called inseparable connection (*avinābhāva = antarīyakatva = avyabhicāra = vyāpti*). The second is called qualification of the subject (*pakṣa-dharmatā*).[18]

Dharmottara testifies that Dignāga was the first to draw a hard and fast line between inference and syllogism. He envisaged inference as a process of cognition, one of the two 'sources' of our knowledge, and called it inference 'for one self', or 'in one self' (*svārthānumāna*); the second was regarded by him not as a source of knowledge at all, but as a method of correctly and convincingly expressing it in a series of propositions for the benefit of an audience. This doctrine is but a consequence of the theory of a difference in principle between the two sources of our knowledge. There are two, and only two, sources of knowledge, because there are two, and only two, kinds of cognized 'essences'. The senses apprehend the expreme concrete and particular only; inference apprehends the general alone. Inference and understanding are, thus, convertible terms. Such an inference must be separated from a series of propositions used for conveying a thesis to an audience. Such a separation is a direct outflow of the fundamental principle of his philosophy. We find in the works preceding the reform of Dignāga no mention of the inference 'for one self' and 'for others'. Neither Gotama, nor Kaṇāda, nor Vātsyāyana, nor, for ought we know, Vasubandhu refer to it. But almost every post-Dignāgan work on logic contains it. Praśastapāda, who most probably was a contemporary of Dignāga, was the first to introduce it in the logic of the Vaiśeṣika school.[19]

But the fate of Dignāga's innovation in the school of the Naiyāyikas was somewhat different. The original aphorisms of Akṣapāda Gotama already contain a distinction between inference as one of the 'sources' of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and the 'five membered syllogism' which is treated not under the head of the four 'sources' of cognition, but under the head of one of the sixteen topics of discourse (*padārtha*). It seems as though the innovation of Dignāga was simply borrowed, or extracted, out of these rules of Gotama. However, the five-membered syllogism is regarded, in the Nyāya school, not as an inference evoked in the head of the hearer, but as a faithful and adequate description of the gradual steps of our thought in a process of inference. These steps must be repeated when an inference is commu-nicated to somebody else. The five-membered syllogism is itself already an abbreviation of another, ten-membered, syllogism which was in vogue in that school previously to the establishment of the five-membered one.[20] It aimed at describing all the gradual steps of our inferential cognition, beginning with the first moment of inquisitiveness (*jijñasa*) and ending in an inferred

conclusion. The same psychological stand-point prevails in this school in regard of the five-membered syllogism.[21]

It is thus clear that it was in view of Dignāga's innovation that inference as *svārthānumāna* was separated from syllogism as *parāthānumāna*, in post-Dignāgan period of Indian logic. This was the influence of Buddhist Logic on Brahmanic Logic. This Buddhist influence worked on the Jaina logic too. We, thus, find Siddhasena Divākara separating the '*svārtha*' and the '*parārtha*' perception and inference in *NA*.[22] *Parārthānumāna*, or inference for the sake of others, is defined as a statement expressive of the reason (*hetu, liṅga*, middle term) which is inseparably connected with *sādhya* or that which is to be proved; it should consist of *pakṣa* and other terms.[23]

The normal form of syllogism, according to Siddhasena Divākara, is the well known five-membered one, namely *pratijñā, hetu, dṛṣṭānta, upanaya* and *nigamana*. *Pakṣa* or minor term is one which is admitted to be connected with *sādhya*, the major term; it should not be such as not to be opposed to perception, one's own assertion, inference and the worldly notions (*loka*). This *pakṣa* must be expressly stated in the syllogism to indicate the abode of the reason (*hetu*). Siddhasena Divākara illustrates his view by citing the instance of an archer who aims an arrow at the target without mentioning what that target is; his aim may be right, but the person who has come to see the archer's skill may regard it to be wrong. Similarly, if the disputant does not mention the minor term on which the existence of the major term is to be proved, his opponent may understand the minor term to be something else and thus misunderstand the argument of the disputant. The middle term, reason or *hetu*, in the syllogism can be used in two ways: (1) Presence or existence of the major term is inferred from the presence or existence of the middle term or *hetu*, as it can only then be accounted for (*upapateh*). (2) The presence or existence of the major term is inferred from the presence or existence of the middle term or *hetu*, as it cannot otherwise be accounted for (*anyathānupapatteh*). It is necessary to use the reason in both these ways as either way of expressing *hetu* is quite sufficient to make a valid reasoning. It is only the mode that differs and not the sense. The *dṛṣṭānta* or illustration is defined as one where inseparable connection between *sādhya* and *sādhana*, that is, the major term and the minor term, is well ascertained. It is of two kinds, namely *sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta* or homogeneous illustration, and *vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta* or heterogeneous illustration. The first is used only when the (causal) relationship, as for instance, between fire and smoke, is admitted. The second is one which shows that the absence of the major term leads to the absence of the middle term. The majority of logicians among the Brahmanists, the Buddhists and the Jainas advocate a syllogism of five parts, but some among them, obviously under the influence of Dignāga's innovation, think that *dṛṣṭānta* is not an essential part of a syllogism.[24]

Siddhasena Divākara has referred to this latter view in the verse 20 of his *NA*, as quoted and elaborated at the outset to explain the concept of *antarvyāpti*. Dr S.C. Vidyabhusana thinks that the opinion of Vasubandhu, the teacher of Dignāga is cited in this verse. Siddhasena Divākara here speaks of '*antarvyāpti*' and '*bahirvyapti*'. Siddharsi Gaṇi has explained the term '*antarvyāpti*' as one where the inseparable connection between the major term and the middle term is ascertained with reference to the minor term (*pakśa*) only,[25] the term '*bahirvyāpti*' is explained as the statement of the inseparable connection between the major term and the middle term in an illustration from outside, as in the kitchen in the stock example.[26] Thus, according to some logicians, an outside example is unnecessary, when the inseparable intrinsic connection is ascertained with reference to the minor term. Both Vasubandhu and Siddhasena Divākara seem to admit this alternative view, and further hold that the dṛṣṭānta is also useless if the inseparable intrinsic connection is not understood with reference to the minor term (*tad-asadbhāve 'pi*). Siddhasena Divākara does not combat this view, showing thereby that the view does not deserve special consideration. In his view, the form of syllogism depends on the capacity of the hearer; if he is clever enough, he may understand it even with two parts; for an average man the form with five parts would suit well, while for a dullard the form with ten parts should be used.[27] Dr S.C. Vidyabhusana has translated '*antarvyāpti*' as 'intrinsic inseparable connection', and '*bahirvyāpti*' as 'extrinsic inseparable connection'.[28]

Among the Jaina logicians who came after Siddhasena Divākara, the names of Jinabhadra Gaṇo Kṣamāśramaṇa, Siddhasena Gaṇi, Samantabhadra, Akalaṅkadeva, Vidyānanda and Māṇikya Nandī are notable. All these were Digambara Jainas. Among these Akalaṅka (about AD 750) was a famous logician, who has been called 'the crest gem of the circle of all logicians' (*sakala-tārkika-cakra-cūḍāmaṇi*).[29] In his *Laghīyastraya* (*LT*), he defines *anumāna* as the knowledge solely based on the concomitance (*avinābhava*) of the *liṅga* with the *sādhya*.[30] This *avinābhava* is the same as *anyathānupapatti*, and as *antarvyāpti*, according to his commentator Prabhācandra, the author of the *Nyāyakumudacandra* (*NKC*), a commentary on the *LT*.[31] Māṇikya Nandī (about AD 800), the author of the *Parikṣāmukha* (*PM*) has been said to have 'churned the nectar of the knowledge of Nyāya from the ocean of the words of Akalaṅka',[32] and culled all the subject matter from the works of Akalaṅka. Māṇikya Nandī has defined *anumāna* as the knowledge of the major term from the middle term, *hetu* as that which is fixed in concomitance with the major term, and has then declared that these two only are the limbs of *anumāna*, and not the *udāharaṇa*.[33] The universal concomitance (*avinābhāva*) is both the rule of co-existence and the existence of one following the other as in the case of cause and effect; it is exemplified by *sahabhāva* as can be seen in the form and colour in a fruit, and by

kramabhāva as exemplified in smoke following fire; this is ascertained by Tarka. The rule of co-existence is that which inheres in a relationship of *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka*.[34] Māṇikya Nandī has propounded the view here that only *pakṣa* and *hetu* are the two essential limbs of *Anumāna*. In his *Prameya-kamalamārttaṇḍa* (*PKM*), the commentary on the *PM*, Prabhācandra (about AD 825) while discussing the nature of *vyāpti* with reference to the definition of *hetu*, mentions three types of *vyāpti*, namely *bahirvyāpti*, *sākalyavyāpti* and *āntarvyapti*, and rules out all the three of them.[35]

Devasūri (AD 1086–1169), also called Vādidevasūri or the foremost of disputants, who belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect of Jainism, and well-known as the author of the important treatise entitled *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅjāra* (*PNT*) as also of the exhaustive auto-commentary called *Syādvāda-ratnākara* on it, has specifically adopted the post-Dignāga innovation regarding the essential members of a syllogism, by following in the footsteps of the Digambara Jain logicians from Siddhasena Divākara onwards.

He has mentioned that inference is of two kinds: *svārtha* or for one's ownself; and *parārtha* or for the sake of others.[36] He defines *svārtha* inference as that which consists in a knowledge of the proven, through the apprehension of the mark and a recollection of its inseparable relation to the *dharma*.[37] And, *parārtha* inference is defined as one consisting in a statement of the abode and the mark; it being granted the status of an inference only by transference of epithet, that is, metaphorically. To convince a cultured mind, a syllogism consisting of a statement of the abode (*pakṣa*) and the mark (*hetu*) is enough; for a highly cultured mind, however, the statement of the *Hetu* only is enough. A dull mind, on the contrary, requires a long chain of premises, namely example application, conclusion, to be convinced of a truth. It should be noted that the statements of the abode and of the mark, are after all propositions, consisting of words. Inference, however, is a mode of knowledge. So, when it is said that the statements of the *pakṣa* and the *hetu* constitute inference, it is to be understood only by transference of epithet, that is, metaphorically only. The position is this. An intelligent man makes an inference. This is *svārthānumāna* or inference-for-one's-own-self. When he communicates the matter of this inference to others he uses the statements of the *pakṣa* and the *hetu*. These statements or propositions are, on the one hand, the effects of this *svārthānumāna* or subjective inference and, on the other, the cause of the *parārthānumāna* or the inference-in-others. So, when it is stated that statements of the *pakṣa* and the *hetu* are the *parārthānumāna*, it is to be understood that the word *anumāna* is applied to either its cause or to its effect here.[38]

As regards the example, Devasūri says that in the matter of convincing others the premise stating the example is not potent; that is done through stating the abode and the reason. It has been already pointed

out by Devasūri above that the example-premise is unnecessary even in an inference-for-others. It is by the statement of the abode and the statement of the reason that one may be made to understand the truth of the matter (conclusion) of the inference. The statement of the example-premise is incompetent to convince one of the matter of the Inference.[39]

Then he proceeds to refer to the intrinsic inseparable connection, that is *antarvyāpti* and declares that since because of its 'internal inseparable connection' (pervasion) the mark is capable or incapable of establishing the Proven, because of its 'internal inseparable connection' (pervasion), the development of the 'external inseparable connection' is valueless.[40] Whether the mark is capable or not to prove the Proven is dependent on whether it is essentially connected (*antarvyāpti*) with it. An example shows the external, that is, superficial (*bahirvyāpti*) only; it does not prove the inseparable connection between the *sādhya* and the *sādhana*.[40] Ratnaprabhā, the author of the *Ratnāvatārikā (RA)* commentary on the *PNT*, explains this thus: 'This is the meaning. If the internal inseparable connection has the capacity to establish the proven, the description of the external inseparable connection is certainly useless.'That is my son, because such voice is not to be heard anywhere else'; here the mark leads to the proven, although there is no (example showing) external inseparable connection here. "He is green-black, because he is his (a given person's) son, like his other sons"; here, however, although there is the example, the mark does not establish the proven.'[41]

We have the internal inseparable connection where there is the 'pervasion' of the mark by the proven in the very object denoted as the abode; elsewhere, however, we have external connection. For instance, 'A thing has many aspects, because a substance is cognized to be so.' Here the inference is based on *antarvyāpti*. But in 'That place has fire, because it has smoke; whatever is such is such; as for example, the kitchen;' the inference is a case of *bahirvyāpti*.[42]

Devasūri further points out that in the matter of convincing others, application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) also are not potent; for, it is effected through the use of the abode and the reason. To convince others, supporting the mark is essential; without this, that is impossible though the example, etc., may be used.[43] Application and conclusion are the last two premises in the five-limbed nyāya syllogism. Devasūri says that these two like the example-premises, are useless, so far as arguments for convincing others are concerned. An intelligent man will understand a truth, (for example, 'This hill has fire.') and the mark (for example, 'Because it has smoke') are stated to him. The essential thing in the argument for-the-sake-of-convincing-others of a truth is to support and demonstrate the reason and for establishing it, the *hetu* must be verified, even though the 'example-premise' or the

other premises are used. If the reason is not well-established, it is impossible the proven in any way. Hence in an *anumāna*, it is the *hetu* alone which must be stated and verified. The premises of example, application and conclusion are superfluous.[44]

Finally, Devasūri points out to the utility of the ten-membered or the five-membered syllogism by stating that to convince the dull-minded persons, however, the premises of the example, the application and the conclusion etc. are to be used.[45] *Parārthānumana* or inference for others is two-limbed as Devasūri has been so long maintaining. Such a two-limbed argument, however, is meant for an intelligent pupil only. Where the pupil is a dull or uninformed person, a more elaborate process of argumentation is necessary. To teach such a person, not only are all the five premises of a Nyāya syllogism necessary, but Devasūri goes even further than this in his auto-commentary and conceives of a ten limbed syllogism for such a person. These ten premises are: (1) *pakṣa* premise or the proposition indicating the abode; (2) *pakṣa-śuddhi*-premise or the proposition verifying the abode; (3) *hetu*-premise or the proposition stating the reason; (4) *hetu-śiddhi*-premise or the proposition demonstrating the reason; (5) *dṛṣṭānta*-premise or the proposition stating the example; (6) *dṛṣṭānta*-śuddhi-premise or the proposition verifying the example; (7) *upanaya*-premise or the proposition describing the application; (8) *upanaya-śuddhi*-premise or the proposition verifying the application; (9) *nigamana*-premise or the proposition stating the conclusion; (10) *nigamana-śuddhi*-premise or the proposition verifying the conclusion.[46] On this, Ratnaprabhā adds in the *Ratnāvatārikā*: 'Of these the best (*utkṛṣṭa*) form of an inference-for-others is said to be ten-limbed. The mediocre (*madhyama*) form contains limbs from nine to two. The worst (*jaghanya*), however, consists in a statement of the mark only. These three forms of an 'inference-for-others' are meant for dull, intelligent and super-intelligent learners, respectively.[47]

Devasūri was a contemporary of Hemacandrasūri (AD 1088–1172) well-known as *Kalikāla-sarvajña*. About eighteen Jaina logicians are known to have been the authors of various treatises on Jaina logic. They are Candraprabhā, Nemicandra, Ānandasūri, Amaracandra, Haribhadra, Pārśvadeva, Śrīcandra, Devabhadra, Candrasena, Ratnaprabhā, Tilakācārya, Mallisena, Rājaśekhara, Jñānacandra, Gunaratna, Śrutasāgara, Dharmabhūṣaṇa and Vinayavijaya. But none of these seem to have even once referred to the term '*antarvyāpti*':

But, the last savant in the field of Jaina logic is Yaśovijaya Gaṇi (AD 1608–1688) of the Śvetāmbara sect and more famous as *Upādhyāya* and *Nyāya-viśārada*. In his famous work on Jaina logic, namely the *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā*, he has referred to the concept of *antarvyāpti*, in the first chapter called *Pramāṇa-pariccheda* in the course of his discussion about the nature of reason (*hetu*). Here Yaśovijaya poses a *prima facie* view by quoting

the sūtra 3.38 of the *PNT*, and rejects it as follows: As for the view that association of the subject with the probandum is felt by grasping the relationship of the probandum and the probane of the subject in the internal concomitance, as it is said that 'in the subject which is treated as thesis, the concomitance of the probane with the probandum is the internal concomitance, at other places it is external concomitance' (*PNT*. 3.38); it is not so. When, by the internal concomitance, the cause is 3.38); it is not so. When, by the internal concomitance, the cause is capable of giving the knowledge of the probandum, the external concomitance would have to be accepted as futile invention. The concomitance, being defined as innate without any exception, and the external concomitance being only an associate, the concomitance of universal nature can hardly be said to have any variety only on account of its subject. If it is not so, then only at the time of grasping an internal concomitance, there would be the experience of the relationship of the subject and the probandum and the inference would be futile without the knowledge 'The mountain has fire'; this should be thought upon by the scholars in accordance with the scriptures.[48]

Ratnākaraśānti (about AD 1040), called Kalikāla-sarvajña among the Buddhists and known to the Tibetans as Acarya Śānti or simply Santipa, was the author of the *Antarvyāpti* (in Tibetan, *Nan-gi-khyab-pa*, signifying 'internal insparable connection'. The Tibetan translation was prepared by the Indian sage Kumāra Kalasa and the interpreter-monk Śākya-hod. The work argues that the inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term can be conceived without the aid of an example in which the thing signified by the two terms co-abide, nay, without the aid even of the minor term in which we are to prove the co-presence of the things, for example, fiery because smoky.[49]

From the doctrine of ten-membered syllogism reduced to five-membered one in the *Nyāyaśāstra*, and still further reduced to two in the Buddhist logic, we can trace the history of the evolution of syllogism. Naturally, the psychological and logical factors were mixed in the doctrine of ten-membered syllogism. In the Naiyāyika's syllogism there has been a bold attempt to shake off the psychological incubus, but still the psychological influence did not cease to be at work. In the Buddhist syllogism as propounded by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti the psychological factors were carefully eliminated and the syllogism received a perfectly logical shape. But the survival of the example was a relic of the ancient sway of psychology and this was destined to be unceremoniously brushed aside by the onslaughts of Jaina logicians, who propounded the doctrine of internal concomitance (*antarvyapti*),[50] taking up the clue from Siddhasena Divākara. The incompatibility with the contradictory should be regarded as the only logical attribute of valid probans and the triple or quadruple character without this is powerless to prove the necessary connection. The Jaina logicians, and later on, Ratnākaraśānti, a Buddhist, call this fact 'internal concomitance (*antarvyāpti*) as opposed to the

Naiyāyikas who hold that universal concomitance is apprehended outside the subject of inference, for example, in a kitchen and not in the hill. This conception of universal concomitance is characterized as 'external concomitance' (*bahirvyāpti*). The Jainas emphasize that the relation of probans and probandum must be natural constitutional, appertaining to the inherent nature of the things and so wherever concomitance may be apprehended, the concomitance must be understood in respect of the probans and propandum *per se* without reference to the place of occurrence which is an accidental coincidence.[51]

We have seen that the doctrine of *antarvyāpti* (internal concomitance) is originally the creation of Vasubandhu, a Buddhist logician, which was adopted by Siddhasena Divākara, a Jaina logician of the Digambara sect, and was further developed as the exclusive doctrine of Jaina logic as a modification of the post-Dignāga innovation adopted by the Jaina logicians of both the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects. This doctrine has been supported by Jaina logicians from beginning to end, from Siddhasena Divākara of the sixth century AD down to Hemacandra Sūri of the twelfth century AD. Śāntirakṣita has made frantic attempts to refute this doctrine, and this was natural because the doctrine is antagonistic to the doctrine of triple probans and the fallacy of the uncommon inclusive reason propounded by Dignāga. Later on, Ratnakīrti, though not expressly advocating the claims of *antarvyāpti*, has adopted the exact principle on which it is based. He expressly declares that the concomitance of 'existing' (*sattva*) with momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) is not attested by perception in the familiar example, *ghaṭa* (earthen jar). The concomitance is proved by means of *prasaṅga* or *prasaṅga-viparyaya*, which are two cases of inference (*anumāna*). He also admits that the universal concomitance is capable of being comprehended in the subject of inference, provided the arguer has the energy to appeal to the evidence at every step. In this case, reference to an outside example is unnecessary and unprofitable.[52]

Ratnākaraśānti, a worthy disciple of Ratnakīrti, more fully than the latter, adopted this doctrine and incorporated it into the corpus of Buddhist logic, thus bringing the prodigal son of Vasubandhu back to home, and made bold and almost frantic efforts to reconcile this doctrine with the fundamental logical position of Dignāga and his followers. It is but a self-evident and indisputable fact that the world is much indebted to the Buddhists and Jainas, whose logical and philosophical contributions have distinctly extended the frontiers of human knowledge.[53]

And, now, we consider the implications of the concept of '*antarvyāpti*'. The problem of logic is pre-eminently the discovery of universal concomitance of the probans (*hetu*) and the probandum (*sādhya*), because this is the pivot and ground on which inference is based. We can infer the existence of fire from the existence of smoke in all places.

and times only if we can persuade ourselves by uninflinching logic that smoke cannot exist without fire. We cannot certainly arrive at this truth from perceptual observation, because all the individual cases of fire and smoke, present, past and future, near and distant, are not amenable to observation; even if it had been possible, it would have rendered all inference nugatory. Nor can this invariable concomitance be known with the help of inference, because inference is itself possible only if there is an invariable concomitance at its back, and for this, again, another inference would be in request and for that a third, and so on *ad infinitum*. The upshot will be that no inference would be possible. So the problem of problems that logic has to face and solve is to enquire into and discover the grounds of the universal concommitance.[54]

The Materialists of the Cārvāka school, and later on Bhartṛhari and Srīharṣa, emphatically denied the possibility of ascertaining this universal concomitance and consequently the validity of inference as a medium of authentic knowledge. Buddhists affirm that inference of the probandum is possible if the probans is ascertained to be endowed with triple characteristics, which can be easily established if the probans can be shown to stand in the relation of causality or essential identity to the probandum in question.[55] The relation of causality or of essential identity (*tādātmya*), on which the Buddhist logician bases the universal concomitance, has, by itself, no special virtue to commend itself in preference to repeated observation of co-presence (*sahacāra*), which the Naiyāyika claims to be guarantee of the validity of inferential knowledge.[56] Apart from the metaphysical doubts, which lay axe at the very root of all inference, the empirical validity of inference is not doubted even by the greatest sceptic. The importance of universal concomitance both in subjective inference (*svārthānumāna*) and syllogistic argument (parārthānumāna) was emphasized by Dignāga perhaps for the first time and ever since it has been recognized as an indispensable part of syllogistic argument. Though the Nyayasūtra does not contain any reference to this all-important factor of inference, there are indications that Vatsyāyana was conscious of the necessity of universal concomitance. Uddyotakara, however, interpreted the Nyāyasūtras (1.1.35–36:'*Tatha vaidharmyāt*' and '*sādhya-sādharmyāt taddharmabhavi dṛṣṭānta udāharaṇam*') in such a way that he brought it into line with the triple condition emphasized in Buddhist logic. Dignāga was perhaps the first logician to insist on the universal concomitance being stated in a syllogism and the violation of the rule was stated to give rise to two fallacies of the example, namely (1) non-statement of concomitance in agreement (*apradarśitānvaya*) and (2) non-statement of concomitance in difference (*apradarśitavyatireka*).[57] The Buddhist says that if the concomitance be based upon causality or essential identity, the relation cannot but be conceived to be invariable, as an effect cannot be conceived to be independent of a cause and hence the effect

is the proof of the cause; and as regards two things, whose nature is fundamentally identical, there can be no separation between the two, as that would be tantamount to forfeiture of their essential character, which is inconceivable. So long as the supposition of the contrary possibility is not ruled out of court by a *reductio ad absurdum*, the doubt as to their concomitance being a case of accidental coincidence will not be removed. And the *reductio ad absurdum* can come into operation only if the facts in question are known to be related as set forth above.[58]

The Jaina logicians contend that the triple characteristic and the fivefold characteristic of the probans, respectively maintained by the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas as the conditio *sine qua non* of valid inference, are absolutely inane and ineffectual, because the triple or the fivefold condition, if unbacked by knowledge of the impossibility of the contradictory supposition, cannot be a sufficient guarantee of universal concomitance. It is, therefore, perfectly reasonable to hold this 'logical incompatibility of the contradictory supposition' to be the only legitimate character of a valid probans, when the triple character is absolutely abortive in the absence of this condition and this condition alone is found to prove the thesis, though the triple character may be absent. The triple character of the Buddhist and the fivefold attribute of the Naiyāyika are only logical offshoots of this condition alone, namely the incompatibility of the probans with the contradictory and all their cogency and validity are derived from this factor alone.[59] So, universal concomitance can be understood only by ruling out the contradictory supposition, though the contradictory may be a fiction.[60] It follows, therefore, that incompatibility with the contradictory should be regarded as the only attribute of a valid probans and the triple or quantuple character without this is powerless to prove the necessary connection. The Jaina logicians and later on Ratnākaraśānti, a Buddhist, call this fact 'internal concomitance' (*antarvyāpti*) as opposed to the Naiyāyikas who hold that universal concomitance is apprehended outside the subject of inference, for example, in a kitchen and not in the hill. This conception of universal concomitance is characterized as 'external concomitance' (*bahirvyāpti*). The Jainas emphasize that the relation of probans and probandum must be a natural constitutional relation, appertaining to the inherent nature of things and so wherever concomitance may be apprehended, the concomitance must be understood in respect of the probans and the probandum *per se* without reference to the place of occurrence, which is an accidental coincidence.[61]

Though this doctrine of internal concomitance has been established by Ratnākaraśānti with ardour and emphasis, and he has left no stone unturned to reconcile this theory with the logical position of Dignāga, it is absolutely certain that the orthodox Buddhist logicians did not accept this theory for a long time to come. On the other hand, they

attacked this doctrine with all the emphasis at their command, because
the doctrine of internal concomitance is antagonistic to the doctrine of
the triple condition of the probans advocated by Dignāga and also the
fallacy of the inconclusive-reason-peculiar-to-the-subject. Thus,
Śāntarakṣita, a Buddhist, has attacked Pātrasvāmin, a Jaina, and tried to
uphold the position of Dignāga.[62]

In reply to the contentions of the advocate of *bahirvyāpti*, the adherent
of *antarvyāpti* observes that the order of syllogistic premises has nothing
to do with our subjective experience. Whatever be the customary
arrangement of propositions in a syllogism, we have nothing to quarrel
with, because, after all, it is a question of arrangement of words, and
words have no bearing on objective facts and much less on concomitance
and the like, which are relations of facts. Words are employed only to
indicate these factual relations and so the verbal order has no essential
relation with factual order of our ratiocinative process. Whatever be the
arrangement of premises, the knowledge of the probans subsisting in
the subject is the first step in the ratiocinative process and then the
universal concomitance is ascertained by a *reductio ad absurdum* of the
contradictory position. And this is exactly the psychological process
involved in all cases of inference irrespective of the order of propositions
in a syllogism. Moreover, the syllogistic order is not the same in all
schools of thought, and if the order of ratiocination is made contingent
upon verbal order, there will be no uniformity in inferential knowledge
as a psychological fact. The statement of the minor premise is, therefore,
not redundant in the theory of internal concommitance.[63]

It may be urged that mention of a concrete example is necessary for
bringing home the universal truth to a dull understanding. In that case,
the statement of example should be confined within a manual of logic
and should not be stated in a logical disputation, because only an
expert is eligible for debate. Besides, a debate or a logical disputation is
not the occasion for the instruction of pupils, as its objective is only to
score a victory by an effective refutation of the opponent's theses.[64]

According to Dignāga, such inference as 'word is impermanent,
because it is audible' is not valid, as the quality of audibility is the
exclusive property of word and its concomitance with impermanence is
not attested in a homologous instance. For the advocate of internal
concomitance, however, since the testimony of a homologous instance
is deemed unnecessary, this argument would be legitimate and valid.
But this is in express contravention of the position of Dignāga. Since
the Jaina logicians are not obliged to profess allegiance to Dignāga, this
discrepancy cannot be a case of disloyalty. But Ratnākaraśānti, who
tried to rejuvenate this theory of internal concomitance advocated by
the Jainas, perhaps in a bid to return to the position of Vasubandhu,
had to face this charge of treason against Dignāga, whose authority he
could not disown being a Buddhist by profession. Accordingly, he has

endeavoured to bring into line with Dignāga's conception of valid
probans; and he has succeeded in doing so only by explaining away
Dignāga's theory of triple character. The obvious implication is that it
should be ascertained wherever possible. In the case of inference such
as 'All that exists is momentary', the 'momentariness' is predicted of all
existents without exception and as such there is no homologue external
to and apart from the subject, where the agreemental aspect could be
verified. The agreement, therefore, must be admitted to be
comprehended in the subject on the strength of the absurdity of the
contrary possibility. Subsistence in a homologue in and by itself has no
cogency, unless it is ratified by the absurdity of the counter-issue. So the
fallacy of the uncommon inclusive probans is no fallacy in reality. It has
been formulated by the master only as a concession to persons of dull
intellect, who labour under the delusion that concomitance can be
ascertained only in an external example outside the scope of the
subject. But this is not really so, as concomitance is apprehended in a
universal reference.[65]

We have seen that concomitance is comprehended by means of
reductio ad absurdum of the contrary thesis and examples have no bearing
upon it. *Reductio ad absurdum* is a species of *tarka* (hypothetical reasoning)
and *tarka* is not regarded as an independent means of proof. There is a
vital difference between *tarka* and inference, as *tarka* has no reference
to the probans or its subsistence in the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*). But *tarka*
is not fettered like this. It may prove something regarding a particular
subject om the basis of an attribute found in the other, as for example
in a reasoning like this, 'certainly there are human beings here, because
we see that horses are used as beasts of burden.' Now, a horse as bearer
of burden is no attribute of human beings, but nevertheless it signifies
their existence. Thus, the tradition among the Naiyāyikas is uniformly
consistent with regard to the neutral character of *tarka* and about its lack
of probative value. We do not come across any speculation of *tarka* in any
Buddhist work. But Ratnākaraśānti always characterized it as *vipakṣa-
bādhaka-pramāṇa* (the proof refuting the contradictory), and Ratnakīrti
treated this proof of contradiction as a full-fledged syllogistic argument
in his *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*. The obvious implication is that it is regarded
as a proof and as a species of inference, according to the Buddhists. The
Jainas, however, regard *tarka* as a separate *pramāṇa*. It is the instrument
of knowledge of universal concomitance and perception and the like
do but give the occasion for it.[66]

<div style="text-align:center">NOTES AND REFERENCES</div>

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    Liṅgidhīr anumānaṁ tat-phalaṁ hānādi-buddhayaḥ//
31. *NKC*., Pt. II, p. 441 : *Antarvyāpti-lakṣaṇasya tathopapatti-rūpasya anvayasya sadbhāvād anyathānupapattirūpa-vyatirekavat/*
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Introduction, p. xxx, ftn.1 : *Akalaṅka-vacombhodher uddadhre yena dhīmatā/ Nyāya-vidyāmṛtaṁ tasmai namo māṇikyanandine//*
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34. *PM*., 3.16—*Saha-krama-bhāva-niyamo'vinābhavaḥ//16//*; 3.17—*Saha-cāriṇor vyāpya-vyāpakayos ca sahabhāvaḥ //17//*; 3.18—*Pūrvottara-cāriṇoḥ kārya-kāraṇayoś ca kramabhāvaḥ //18//*; 3.19—*Tarkāt tannirṇayaḥ//19//*
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39. Ibid., 3.33 : *Na dṛṣṭānta-vacanaṁ para-pratipattaye prabhavati, tasyāṁ pakṣa-hetu-vacanayor eva vyāpāropalabdheḥ //33//*; H.S. Bhattacharya, on *PNT*, 3.33, p. 216.
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    Antarvyāpteḥ sādhya-saṁsiddhi-śaktau
    Bāhyavyāpter varṇanam vyartham eva/
    Antarvyāpteḥ sādhya-saṁsiddhyaśaktau
    Bāhyavyāpter varṇanam vyartha eva//
    Mat-putro'yaṁ bahir vakti, evam-rupa-svarā'nupapateḥ, ityatra bahirvyāptyabhave'pi gamakatvasya, sa śyāmaḥ, tat-putratvāt, itaratat-putravat, ityatra tu tadbhāve'py agamakatvasyopalabdher iti/
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46. H.S. Bhattacharya, *PNT*, p. 222.
47. *RA* on *PNT*, 3.42 : *Tata utkṛṣṭam daśāvayavaṁ parārthānumānam ityuktaṁ bhavati / Madhyamaṁ tu navāvayavād ārabhya yāvat dvyavayavam / Jaghayaṁ punaḥ sādhanamātropanyāsasvarūpam / Pratipādyānāṁ mandāvyutpannā-tivyutpannatvat/*
48. *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā* (*JTB*) of Mahopādhyaya Yaśovijaya, edited with transtation and critical notes, by Dr Dayananda Bhargava, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1973, Sec. 36, pp. 12–13: *Yat tu antarvyāptyā pakṣīya-sādhya-sādhana-sambandh a-grahāt pakṣa-sādhya-saṁsarga-mānam, tad uktaṁ—'pakṣīkṛta eva viṣaye sādhanasya sādhyena vyāptir antarvyāptiḥ, anyatra tu bahirvyāptir' (Pra. Na. 3.38) iti; tan na; antarvyāptyā hetoḥ sādhya-pratyāyanaśaktau satyāṁ bahirvyapter udbhāvana-vyarthatva-pratipādanenanena tasyāḥ svarupaprayukta (ktā') vyabhicāra-lakṣanatvasya, bahirvyāptes ca sahacāra-mātratvasya lābhāt, sārvatrikyā vyāpter viṣaya-bheda-mātreṇa bhedasya*

durvacatvāt / Na ced evam tadā'ntarvyapti-grahakāla eṣa eva (kāla eva) pakṣa-sādhya-saṁsarga-bhānād anumāna-vaika-(ph)lyāpattiḥ vinā parvato vahnimān ityuddeśya-pratītim iti yathātantram bhāvanīyam sudhībhiḥ/

49. *HIL*, pp. 342–43.
50. Satkari Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* (BPUF), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1980, p. 364.
51. Ibid., p. 381.
52. Ibid., pp. 338–39; *Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhiḥ* of Ratnakīrti, published in *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts in Sanskrit*, edited by Mm. Haraprasad Shastri in *Bibliotheca Indica*, Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1910 (pp. 20–53).
53. Ibid., p. 399.
54. Ibid., p. 366.
55. Ibid., pp. 366–67.
56. Ibid., p. 368.
57. Ibid., p. 371.
58. Ibid., p. 372.
59. Ibid., p. 378.
60. Ibid., p. 380.
61. Ibid., p. 381.
62. Ibid., p. 382.
63. Ibid., pp. 387–88.
64. Ibid., pp. 391–92.
65. Ibid., pp. 393–94; *Antarvyāpti-samarthanam* of Ratnākaraśānti published in *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts in Sanskrit*, edited by Mm. Haraprasad Shastri, *Bibliotheca Indica*, Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1910 (pp. 102–13); pp. 112–13 :
    Asādhāraṇatāṁ hetudoṣaṁ mūdha-vyapekṣayā/
    Abravid agrahād vyāpter naivaṁ sarvopasaṁhrtau//
66. *BPUF*, pp. 395–98.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

On Excessive Politeness:
A Response to the Special Issue on Historiography of Civilizations

I am a social anthropologist, not a philosopher or historian, and therefore an outsider to the debates in the Special Issue on Historiography of Civilizations. Nonetheless, these debates do touch on questions that arise in my field, and in what follows my aim will be to indicate some links between points made in the Special Issue and important discussions that have taken place in anthropology. Let me add that although I was instructed by all the papers in the Special Issue, I do not intend to address them all separately or to consider all of the issues raised.

Actually, historians and anthropologists (and maybe even philosophers) have more in common than is commonly supposed. Both, after all, are students of culture, notwithstanding the tendency of anthropologists to think of the culture concept as their own special preserve. Historians can be seen as anthropologists who travel in time, students of cultural difference (among other things to be sure) as a product of recorded change.

Which brings us to our first issue. At the heart of the culture concept—indeed, at the heart of all so-called social science—is a quandary. In general terms, the issue is whether human conduct can or should be treated as if it were an object in nature, or whether it must be understood in some other manner. This problem arises in several of the papers in the Special Issue, albeit in different guises. For anthropologists it is an old debate centring on the epistemological status of culture itself. What is one actually describing when one renders an account of a culture? How does one come to know a cultural 'thing', if indeed one can speak in such terms at all?

One of the clearest formulations of this problem in anthropological writings—somewhat dated now, but still of interest—is the distinction between two somewhat arcane words, 'emic' and 'etic'. These terms, first used by the linguist Kenneth Clark and brought into more general anthropological discourse in a famous essay by Marvin Harris[1], derive from the linguistic distinction between phonetic and phonemic description and analysis. Briefly, a phonetic description of a language is a description of the sounds actually produced by the speakers of a language. By contrast, a phonemic description focuses on how speakers of a language discriminate the sounds they produce and hear. The

difference between these two approaches is the difference between two totally distinct ways of knowing. Because it is concerned with sounds, and not with the ways speakers distinguish sounds, a phonetic description can be done using categories meaningful only to outsiders to the language in question (in this case, linguists). Concepts like 'voiced', 'alveolar', or 'aspiration', will do all the work that needs to be done, and these are linguists' concepts, not the concepts of most speakers of a language. *But only a speaker of a language* knows whether, let us say, the aspiration of a bilabial stop does (as in Hindi) or does not (as in English) make an actual difference in the meaning of a word. To do a phonemic analysis of a language, in other words, one must at some level understand the world of sound as it is understood by a community of speakers; to do a phonetic analysis it is enough to be a member of the community of linguists.

Now, the derivative terms 'etic' and 'emic' are used to denote general approaches to the study of culture that are analogous to phonetic and phonemic descriptions in linguistics. Etic descriptions of culture are concerned with conduct as observed from the outside using outsiders' categories. Emic descriptions are concerned with conduct as it is understood by the actors themselves; in this mode it is the actors' categories that count, not the outside observers'. Such descriptions are not really Collingwoodian (or Diltheyian) 're-experiencings' (Ramachandra); they are more akin to acts of translation.

Is it then possible to have a social science (anthropological or historical) that is either entirely 'etic' or entirely 'emic'? In responding to this question, I think it is useful to look more closely at the phonetic/phonemic distinction in linguistics. Here we discover that, although they are different in principle, phonemic and phonetic descriptions are *both necessary* in any account of how a language conveys meaning through the medium of sound. Obviously, no human language can be described in any sense at all without taking into account its phonemic system. But this requires an understanding of phonetics. The phoneticist's domain is a physical context, one that exists for all languages, that makes language possible and limits the possibilities of what a language can be—the raw material, one might say, of all language. Moreover, and precisely because of this, phonetic categories provide a common ground that enables phonemic systems to be describable cross-linguistically. A phonemic description of a language must use universal phonetic categories in order to convey itself intelligibly to non-speakers of the language in question.

This same doubleness seems to be characteristic of human affairs in general. Human conduct exists in time and space, and can be described in the same manner as anything 'out there'. But human conduct (or much of it) is also meaningful to actors, and thus it has an inward dimension as well. The point surely is that our behaviour is both inward

and outward at the same time, and an adequate understanding of human life must take that into account.

How exactly these two sides of life interact with each other on the stage of social life is a mysterious matter, the social-scientific version (I suppose) of the mind-body problem. But we at least know that they do interact. The facts of, let us say, sexual attraction—the drifting pheromones, and maybe even the gestures and demeanours of men and women in such situations—are biological givens. Also, the hard realities of subsistence needs and limitations are a set of external (and universal) constraints that any assessment of the regulation of sexual activity in human societies (or any other aspect of human life) must consider. Still, the 'emic' webs of meanings in which such 'etic' basics become embedded, and the resulting patterns of behaviour, are very different in different cultures.

But although it seems obvious that anthropologists and historians should be concerned with both sides of the 'emic'/'etic' divide, there exists nonetheless a tendency in anthropology to privilege what is often called the 'hermeneutic' (that is, the emic) approach. That is, many anthropologists seem to have come to believe that an account of 'meaning' suffices as an account of the way of life of a given society. This same tendency seems to me to be echoed in at least some of the essays in the Special Issue. In particular, G.C. Pande, in a piece remarkable for its intelligence and clarity, suggests that the historian's craft, rightly understood, is to produce only 'particular studies, narrative and reflective, bearing on past experience so far as it has recorded itself' (p. 47). History thus becomes the recording of the world 'as it appeared to men in the past' (p. 42). This is precisely the emic approach, detached from its etic moorings.

While I have to agree with Pande's critique of knee-jerk scientism, the question remains, is this really the kind of history we want historians to write? And perhaps more fundamentally, is it even possible to write intelligible history this way? I certainly do not think this is the kind of anthropology we should encourage, and I believe the same holds true for history.

On the one hand, there is just no doubt that good historical (or ethnographic) writing strives to convey the inwardness of a society or civilization. This means that the historian or ethnographer must treat the culturally conditioned purposes and understandings of men and women who bear a culture as a partly autonomous domain: the web of meaning within which all human life is conducted. On the other hand, human understandings, purposes, and values also react against features of the human situation that might or might not be understood or even registered by actors. These, however, must be considered if sense is to be made of the things the people of a society do. And they must also be considered if any understanding is to be achieved of the cultural and

social change that it is the historian's office to record.

It is surely a thin sort of history (or anthropology) that makes no reference to universal human capacities, limitations, urges, and propensities. And how can an account be rendered of change that fails to consider the impact of such universal factors in the human situation as climate, soil, demography, and the facts of scarcity, competition, exploitation, and conflict. One could add to this list. These are enabling and limiting conditions of all societies and civilizations. I suppose it is the philosopher's task to argue about whether they belong to an 'independent reality', but independent of our perceptions or not, they certainly present hard surfaces to which human institutions and understandings must react and against which they are often sorely tested.

These considerations lead naturally to our next issue, which is the question of relativism that lurks, ghostlike, around many of the papers in the Special Issue. Certainly one has to agree with Shri Krishan's condemnation of western invidiousness, a theme echoed in many of the contributions to the Issue. And one can only agree, too, with Krause's rejection of the 'single right answer' fantasy. In our eagerness to avoid all appearance of ethnocentrism, however, we must take care that we avoid the trap of excessive relativism. It will be objected that there are no excessive relativists in the Issue. Perhaps not. But it must be remembered that few, if any, extreme relativists are prepared to confess their sins. Most are careful to state (as is Pande, on whom I pick precisely because of the exemplary lucidity of his writing) that they intend no 'radical incommensurability'.[2] And yet it seems to me that some of the papers flirt with precisely this.

Cultural relativism, as we now understand it, is a view of things that is largely traceable to the influence of anthropology and especially to the writings of the redoubtable Franz Boas and his students. Whatever its virtues or problems in anthropology, it has come to exercise enormous influence on the sensibility of most who study ways of life, including historians. In part its justifications are methodological, in part high-theoretical. But I fear that too often cultural relativism is actually rooted in a simple desire to be polite.

Many skirmishes and battles have been fought over the issue of relativism in anthropology, but it is probably fair to say that the classic debate, a debate that certainly defined the issues with superlative clarity, was a discussion that involved a philosopher. I refer of course to Peter Winch's famous critique[3] of E.E. Evans-Pritchard's *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande.*[4]

In this very influential book, Evans-Pritchard attempted to address a deceptively simple question. How, he asked, is it that the Azande believe in witches in view of the plain fact (or so he believed) that witches do not exist? His answer became a paradigm for anthropological

analysis of systems of thought; he said that, in the context of Zande culture, a belief in witchcraft is entirely reasonable. But more, if you were a Zande your thinking would be so deeply embedded in a dense network of Zande assumptions, beliefs, and values that it would be impossible *not* to believe in witches.

As many readers of this journal will know, Winch's objection was not to Evans-Pritchard's analysis as such, but to its premise, namely, that witches do not exist. What is the 'independent reality', he asked, against which this claim is to be tested? Is it the reality of scientific investigation? Fine, but scientific reality cannot be shown to be independent of the presuppositions of scientific investigation. Science is itself a 'culture' (though Winch did not put it quite this way) within which the Zande belief in witchcraft seems out of touch with reality. But from the Zande standpoint, the scientist's disbelief in witches likewise seems to be a kind of fantastic superstition. Who is to choose, and on what grounds, between these entirely separate conceptual worlds?

This is extreme relativism (of the conceptual as opposed to the ethical variety), although Winch himself denies that it is. And it illustrates well the limitations of extreme relativism. Winch's most serious difficulty is obviously the fact that the Azande seem to share some of the scientist's sense of reality. It is true that Zande divination techniques are different from the scientist's experimental method, and it is true too (as has been pointed out many times) that the predictions of Zande divination are protected from empirical disconfirmation (in ways that Evans-Pritchard describes in great detail). But when all is said and done, the Zande diviner *wishes his prediction to be vindicated by observable events* and believes that the *accuracy of his predictions is both empirically measurable and consequential for persons who depend on them.* This is conceptual common ground shared by Zande diviners, scientists, Evans-Pritchard, and I suspect most readers of this journal. Indeed, were this common ground not to exist, it is hard to see how Evans-Pritchard *or Peter Winch* could make statements about Zande life that would be both in some way truthful and intelligible to non-Zande readers.[5]

But what does this hairsplitting about Zande witchcraft have to do with the Special Issue? Only this, that Winch's challenge to Evans-Pritchard brings directly to the fore the question of how we should decide who 'really' is or is not a historian. This is the principal guise assumed by the problem of relativism in the Special Issue.

Let us dispose of one highly contentious matter right away. Is it the case that some societies lack historical consciousness? Obviously, it depends on what you mean by the term. At the very outset of the Special Issue, D.P. Chattopadhyaya reminds us that modern historiography—the 'reconstruction of human ideas and activities' on the basis of a 'reliable record' (p. 1)—is a product of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[6] If this is what one means by historical consciousness, then

clearly it is not universal. But the same author also suggests that every society recollects its past in some way, and that this recollection is related to a 'more or less distinct self-perception' (p. 28). This is historical consciousness in a legitimate, although extended, sense of the term (for the greatest extension, see Shekhawat).

Of course, it is sometimes claimed that even in this broader sense historical consciousness is absent in some societies. The indigenous inhabitants of Australia, with their celebrated and apparently ahistorical concept of 'dreamtime', are often cited as examples. And in fact it does seem possible that in the absence of written records, and in the absence also of social structures of the sort that register the passage of time, some simple hunting and gathering societies might have notions of the past that are radically flattened or foreshortened by comparison with literate civilizations. Even here, however, we must proceed with caution because the relevant ethnography could well be tendentious in ways we cannot fully know.

In most societies, however—and certainly in all complex societies and civilizations—the past is always present in the sense that it leaves traces, often in social structure itself, of which some sense must be made. And although the presence of written records obviously greatly increases the current saliency of the past, writing is not a necessary ingredient of historical consciousness (in our extended sense). For example, non-literate societies whose organization is based on descent have a vital interest in the past, an account of which is rendered in the form of genealogy. To the assertion that genealogy is merely a kind of reflex of social structure, the response is surely that (as Chattopadhyaya and others in the special issue stress) the historian's craft has never been exercised in a social vacuum. Much historical writing is, at least in part, a searching of the past in an effort to shed light on the present identity of groups and communities, an activity of which genealogy is the probable cultural-evolutionary precursor. In any case, it seems likely that for most of humanity the past is present whether people wish it to be or not, and that actual amnesia (Vinay Lal) is probably neither a cultural nor a social possibility.

But if we concede that almost all societies possess something like historical consciousness, does that mean that those 'traditional' specialists in recounting the past in such societies (the genealogists, chroniclers, hymnologists, etc.) are actually colleagues of modern historians? Grappling with this vexed question is an important subplot in the Special Issue.

The response of the non-relativist hard-liner to this issue is to dismiss the 'traditional historian' out of hand (I think it is fair to cite Vinay Lal as an example). These critics maintain (and often rightly in my view) that traditional specialists have no respect for evidence and no notion of systematic testing of findings against a 'reliable record'. Their

productions can be used by historians as evidence, but they themselves are not producing 'history'. Do you really believe—such a hard-liner might ask—that the writings of modern historians could possibly belong to the same category as such works as Hemacandra's *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacarita*? Whatever else might be said of this work, its historical content is simply fantasy by the standards of modern historians.

I suggest, however, that the use of such an egregious case, for this is sort of case the hard-liner usually cites, makes the line between history and what is dismissed as 'myth' seem easier to draw than it really is. To begin with, Daya Krishna's essay is an important reminder that the most cherished assumptions of modern historians may well turn out to be tomorrow's 'myth' (to use this term in an unanthropological sense). Moreover, the choices we face are not always between the most modern historiography and the most flagrant examples of (for want of a better term) historiographic unmodernity. For example, in the course of my own current research (dealing with the links between religion and concepts of group origin among trading communities) I found myself relying on such works as S.R. Bhandari's *Osvāl Jāti kā Itihās*.[7] This study—belonging to a large class of similar works—is based is based on massive research and certainly makes critical use of evidence, drawing sensible distinctions between more and less plausible versions of Osvāl origins. At the same time, the family histories of which the book mostly consists are, in their emphasis on the positive, much like the panegyrics of traditional genealogists. So is this book historical or is it not?

Of course, one can also approach this problem in the spirit of extreme relativism. Here we find a surprise. One might have thought that the relativist would be in some sense kinder than the non-relativist to the traditional specialist. But we find instead, and unexpectedly, that the road of cultural relativism leads to the worst kind of condescension.

To illustrate what I mean, I would like to return to Winch's critique of Evans-Pritchard. Here we encounter a parallel question, namely, whether the Zande diviner is a scientist's colleague or not. Winch's response (by implication) is that he is not. He deserves the same esteem as the scientist, for he does what he does well, but he is engaged in a project fundamentally different from that of science. The scientist is interested in predicting the behaviour of the world (and perhaps in controlling it). Zande divination, however, is less about predicting and controlling events in the world than it is about supplying meaning to misfortune, and integrating matters of destiny and the social experience of men and women. Does divination work? It depends on what you mean by 'work'. Yes, in its cultural context it does work. In other words, the diviner's craft and that of the scientist are simply incommensurate.

Now clearly this approach is designed in some sense to get the diviner off the hook. If the diviner seems less successful in predicting and controlling events than scientists are, then so be it. His successes

and failures must be judged by a different set of standards, standards internal to the culture and system of thought in which he operates. If we transpose this reasoning to the concerns of the Special Issue, then we would say that the question of whether the traditional historian passes muster by modern historiographic standards is inadmissible. It depends on what you mean by 'accurate'. Different cultures, different standards.

I think this kind of cultural relativism is actually a form of disdain masquerading as respect.[8] It reflects a type of cross-cultural embarrassment. Philosopher Winch wants to make the best of what he, in his heart, thinks is a bad job. If the Zande diviner is some kind of primitive scientist, then (or so I believe the unspoken thought to be) he will always lose out to the real scientist, who actually does know how to predict and control some natural events. Better, then, that the Zande diviner be playing a different game. Is the diviner attempting to predict and control? Maybe, but only 'symbolically'.

But with such friends, who needs enemies? This is killing with kindness. We must also ask if it is a view with which the Azande themselves would agree. I think it is not. By my reading of Evans-Pritchard's ethnography, the diviner does indeed wish to achieve prediction and control of events in the sensible world. Moreover, and crucially, when he fails to do so he recognizes it as a failure.[9] In other words, he holds himself to a standard to which many cultural relativists are unwilling to hold him. Furthermore, it is not a standard that he (or others like him) is necessarily unable to meet. The theory, for example, that social relationships gone sour can cause illness (a premise of some African beliefs about witchcraft) may indeed be borne out by studies of the impact of such mental states as depression on the body's immune system.

I do not think it is possible to transpose these considerations to the situation of historians in any exact way. Let me hasten to say also that I do not think any author in the Special Issue is guilty of the kind of misplaced charity that I have described. But I do believe that the issue has important implications for one's view of the potential colleagueship of 'traditional' historians. Certainly, these specialists do not see themselves as purveyors of 'myth', for (as Chattopadhyaya points out) in the cultural milieus in which they operate the concept denoted by that English term does not exist. Nor can the traditional specialists be explained away as traffickers in 'symbolic' forms of truth, for that idea has no place in the cultures (or at least many of the cultures) in question. Perhaps it is best simply to assume, extending the benefit of the doubt, that 'traditional' specialists are interested—as are 'modern' historians, albeit differently—in the socially significant past.

But then what exactly are they? And how are we to judge the things they say about the past? This is not just a matter of playing with words. Among other things, it bears on the question of how we should react to

Vinay Lal and others when they take some historians (including Romila Thapar) to task for trying to find historical consciousness in the *itihāsa-purāṇa* tradition. It also bears on the question of the level of seriousness with which we treat such works as Bhandari's history of the Osvāls (cited above).

Rigid formulas fail us. Still, if we believe that, despite cultural differences in the way we construe the world, we all live in the same world, then we have said that, whatever the cultural context, *some* common ground potentially exists between all efforts to understand the past and its effects on the present. Whether that common ground is actually occupied in particular cases has to be determined by careful looking and tested by discussion, and this should be discussion that takes careful (and non-invidious) account of the influence of culture on the way the past is interpreted. That conceded, then in some sense all students of the past (and this does indeed include the authors of the *Purāṇas*) must be considered potential colleagues. That does not mean that any particular text *has* to be read as history, for there are many other contexts—theological, cosmological, and more besides—within which such works should be read. But, of course, if they are read as history, then they should be read critically, as all history should be read critically, and let the chips fall where they may.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. 'Emics, Etics and the New Ethnography', in Marvin Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory*, Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 568–604.
2. It seems to me that Pande's approach is quite similar to P. Sundara Rajan's fourth perspective (p. 188) with its 'horrendous issues of relativism.'
3. Peter Winch, 'Understanding a Primitive Society', in Brian Wilson (ed.) *Rationality*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977, pp. 78–111.
4. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1937.
5. Winch himself recognizes this, for at the end of his analysis he suggests that notions of life, death, and sex are 'limiting concepts' of all societies. I believe he is motivated to do this by the uneasy feeling that without some common ground the notion of intercultural communication is unintelligible.
6. See Vinay Lal's note, pp. 129–30, for a excellent definition of history in this less extended sense of the term.
7. Oswal History Publishing House, Bhanpura (Indore), 1934.
8. What follows is inspired by Charles Taylor's very fine essay, 'Rationality', in Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, eds., *Rationality and Relativism*, The MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1982, pp. 87-105.
9. Although as is well known, he rationalizes the failure largely in terms of ritual omissions, mistakes, or counter magic.

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A Rejoinder to Daya Krishna*

Professor Daya Krishna's thought-'provoking' and scholarly approach to Indian philosophy is well-known.[1] Now in his recent article, 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD: The case study of a Retrospective Illusion Imposed by the Historiography of Indian Philosophy',[2] he has given scope for the Vedāntins to answer some of the issues raised by him. This rejoinder is an attempt to answer him.

No doubt, Daya's article is excellent and anyone who reads it with all seriousness would definitely appreciate him for his neat and systematic presentation. But it must also be admitted that the approach of Daya, unfortunately has not taken into account some of the important points. First of all, it is not clear whether his attack is on Bādarāyaṇa or on Śaṅkara. The first three pages are directed towards Bādarāyaṇa and to prove his claim, Daya takes support both from Vedic and non-Vedic systems and concludes, rather hastily, that there was no Vedānta in the first millennium AD. He could not stop himself with this. By his sarcastic remarks he concludes his paper by saying that in the 'idea of the presence of the Vedānta in the first millennium AD, there is a superimposition by the historiography of Indian philosophy due to its being dazzled by the picture in the second millennium AD.' (p. 207) This remark of Daya definitely disturbs the Vedāntin and let us see how a Vedāntin would react to Daya.

I

Daya Krishna's problem arises due to his approach to Indian philosophy from the standpoint of mere historical time. He approaches Indian philosophy in the chronological order and hence lands himself into trouble, thus making the distinction between the first and second millennium AD. Daya need not find fault with the Advaitins for this 'superimposition', because historical facts are always interpreted and theorised. This historical approach to Indian philosophy will not help anyone; especially it will not help a philosopher. It is because a philosopher is not merely interested in the succession of events which are accidentally connected; he is concerned with the ultimate cause of events. A philosopher disentangles the essential truths of history from the purely local and temporal accretions, and discerns the inner reality or the inwardness behind the outer expressions.[3] Thus, a philosopher is not merely interested in analyzing the data on the basis of chronological order. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri's remarks on this is very interesting.

In philosophy too there has been no consistent or steady advance. For the Advaitin, his own non-dualism stands for the high water-mark of philosophy and revelation alike. If we lost all records relating to Indian history from the fifth to the thirteenth century AD, and were left only with the three main varieties of Vedānta, an Advaitin reconstructing their order of development would, it has been said,[4] place Madhva's first, Rāmānuja's next and Śaṅkara's last; extreme pluralism would appear to him the attitude of naive common sense; a stress on identity without being able to give up difference in some form would appear to be the next stage; last would come the realization of pure identity as the absolute truth. The actual course of history has tended in just the reverse direction. Pluralism comes last instead of first. Can the Advaitin be blamed if he sees history as anything but a tale of progress.[5]

R.G. Collingwood's approach to the idea of history will help us here. For him,[6] there are two features of the idea of history: (i) the emphasis on thought, and (ii) the unimportance of time. 'Historical knowledge has for its proper object thought; not things thought about, but the act of thinking itself', says Collingwood.[7] The study of history has for its aim, self-knowledge and not the knowledge of objective events. Similarly, time is not *the* important factor in history. Hence the question of 'before' or 'after' is not very much important. If we accept Collingwood's idea of history according to which, time is not the important factor in history, it can be said that for the Advaitins for whom the reality itself is timeless, the distinction between the first and the second millennium AD is really insignificant.

Daya Krishna, following Bādarāyaṇa, acknowledges earlier thinkers like, Kārṣṇājini, Kāśakṛtsna, Ātreya, Auḍulomi, Āśamarthya, Bādari and Jaimini. From these thinkers one can understand the prevalence of Advaita prior to Bādarāyaṇa. T.M.P. Mahadevan mentions about the importance of Kāśakṛtsna, for whom, the immutable supreme Lord himself is the individual soul and the soul is not a product of the supreme and it is non-different from the supreme.[8] Śaṅkara expounds this view of Kāśakṛtsna in his commentary, on the *Brahmasūtras*. T.M.P. Mahadevan also mentions about another pre-Śaṅkara teacher of Advaita, namely, Draviḍācārya (or Dramiḍācārya), whom Daya also refers to. But what is important is that Draviḍācārya seems to have written a commentary on the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad-Vārtika*.[9] Daya states that *Brahmasūtras* have very little impact on the philosophical scene in India for a very long time and reference to it has been made only after five hundred years of its composition. But there is no reason for the Advaitins to worry over this remark of Daya because the Upaniṣads which form the crux of the *Brahmasūtras* emerged in the philosophical scene much before the origin of other schools of philosophy.

Quoting Haribhadra Sūri, Daya Krishna argues that in it there is no reference to Vedānta as a separate, distinctive school of philosophy. From here he takes a leap into Śaṅkara Digvijaya to make a claim that it may not be authentic. But a close study of important works like[10] Govindanātha's *Śaṅkarācārya-carita,* Cidvilāsa's *Śaṅkaravijaya-vilāsa,* Vyāsācala's *Śaṅkaravijaya* and Anantānandagiri's *Śaṅkaravijaya* would prove how Śaṅkara's thought was prominent over other schools. Anantānandagiri's work which is said to be the earliest and important one, gives a detailed account of the places and of the discussions Śaṅkara had with the different schools and cults of philosophy. Especially chapters, 4–5, 6–10, 12–13, 25–26, 29, 36, 40–41, 42, 49–51, etc., will go to show how Advaita was predominant over the other schools of thought.[11]

Daya Krishna approaches the question, namely, whether Vedānta was predominant in the first millennium AD, under two periods: (i) the period after the *Brahmasūtras* and before Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣyas* and (ii) the period of Śaṅkara. But very conveniently he has not taken into account the pre-Śaṅkara Advaita works and authors. Scholars have fixed the age of pre-Śaṅkara Advaita from the first century to the eighth century AD, that is, a period of 700 years at least. This was the period of the rise and fall of Buddhism and the debate between pre-Śaṅkara Advaita philosophy and Buddhism must have taken place. 'If Śrī Śaṅkarācārya is credited to have extirpated Buddhism from India, his success is largely due to the forces of pre-Śaṅkara Advaita that had strongly resisted Buddhism', says S.L. Pandey.[12] It is true that pre-Śaṅkara Advaita works and authors are little known but researches made by modern scholars like Kuppuswami Sastri, M. Hiriyanna, Gopinatha Kaviraja and others, have shown the importance and the role of pre-Śaṅkara Advaita.[13] For example, these scholars have collected the fragments of pre-Śaṅkara Advaita from later works of Śaṅkara and others. This means reconstructing pre-Śaṅkara Advaita authors and their works on the basis of their references and quotations in the later works.[14] The pre-Śaṅkara Advaita is sometimes called *Kārikā Advaita,* as most of pre-Śaṅkara Advaita thinkers have used *Kārikā* as their medium of expression.[15] A distinction between aphoristic Advaita Vedānta and pre-Śaṅkara Advaita is also maintained.[16] For example, Kāśakṛtsna and Bādarāyaṇa are the aphoristic Advaitins and others like, Upavarṣa, Sundarapāṇḍya, Brahmanandin, Draviḍācārya, Bhartṛprapañca, and Brahmadatta are prē-Śaṅkara Advaitins. The contributions of these pre-Śaṅkara Advaitins have really shaped the Advaitic thought. For example, that in Upavarṣa, one can see the epistemology of Advaita. The six means of valid knowledge and the concept of intrinsic validity of knowledge are said to be his contribution. Similarly, Brahmanandin's doctrine of *vivarta,* Draviḍācārya's argument for the existence of the soul, Bhartṛprapañca's doctrine of *bhedābheda* have really shaped the

Advaitic thought considerably.[17] Daya, undoubtedly, has not taken these points into consideration while discussing the predominance of Advaita in the first millennium AD. Since Advaita was dominant even in the first millennium AD, the question of its superimposition on any period of history does not arise at all.

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Some Remarks on
'Wittgenstein on Religious Belief and Superstition'

This discussion is devoted to the article entitled 'Wittgenstein on Religious Belief and Superstition' forwarded by the editor of *JICPR* for evaluation. There are various ways in which evaluation is done. We evaluate examination scripts. This is not a suitable way for evaluating philosophers. So I decided to discuss the philosophical dimension of the article. The following remarks have been made in the spirit of evaluation.

(1) Wittgenstein, as is well known, did not have a very high opinion about those who write articles for publication in philosophy journals. He was afraid of his views being misinterpreted. Therefore, those who write articles for philosophy journals should be very careful. And extraordinary care has to be taken by those who contemplate writing about Wittgenstein's views on religion, or his views on ethics (for him they coincide). For Wittgenstein 'Theology . . . wants to say something and does not know how to express it.'[1] Concerning ethics, he said, 'If a man could write a book on ethics . . . this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other books in the world'.[2] So religion belongs to a high sensitive zone, and one should be fully prepared to enter into this zone.

(2) Concerning the source-material for writing on Wittgenstein's later views on religion, the author of *WRBS* ('Wittgenstein on Religious Belief and Superstition') exhibits complete ignorance about 'Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazer's "Golden Bough"',[3] 'Lecture on Ethics'[4] and 'Drury's Conversations with Wittgenstein'[5]. The former two contain Wittgenstein's direct remarks, and the last one contains those remarks on religion which were recorded by Drury during his conversations with Wittgenstein. Even the stray remarks from *Investigations* [6], *Remarks on Colour*[7], etc., are quite helpful. Wittgenstein had the habit of making all kinds of remarks in all kinds of contexts.

(3) The writer of *WRBS* has restricted himself to the analysis of a few remarks from *Culture and Value* and *Lectures on Religious Belief*. One has to be careful while studying the latter work, because it contains notes taken by Wittgenstein's students. Consider Wittgenstein's reaction to those notes. Drury writes, 'During this lecture one of the students was rapidly writing notes. Wittgenstein told him not to do so. "If you write these spontaneous remarks down, some day someone may publish them as my considered opinions. I don't want that done. For I am talking now freely as my ideas come, but all this will need a lot more thought and better expression."'[8] Immediately after this Drury inserted his note '(This indeed was done later in the volume called *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief.*)'[9] Wittgenstein's *Lectures on Religious Belief* coupled with his *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough* produce better results, but the writer of *WRBS* is ignorant of the latter work.

(4) Consider the two respectable personalities, one a priest, Father O'Hara, and the other a social scientist, Sir James George Frazer. The views of the former are subjected to criticism in *Lectures on Religious Belief* and the latter becomes a target in Remarks on the *Golden Bough*. It is interesting to note that O'Hara speaks with the voice of Frazer, and Frazer with the voice of O'Hara (The distinction between science and religion is totally demolished). 'I would definitely call O'Hara unreasonable.

I would say, if this is religious belief, then it's all superstition.'[10] A

religious belief has become superstition in the hands of O'Hara because 'Father O'Hara is one of those people who make it a question of science.'[11] The position of Frazer is no better than that of O'Hara. Frazer converts the 'magical and religious views of mankind . . . look like *errors*.'[12] They are rooted in the 'faulty views about the physics of things.'[13] Do not Father O'Hara and Sir James Frazer exhibit the same attitude towards religious beliefs? Is Father O'Hara a social scientist? Is Frazer a modern theologian? Wittgenstein was led to remark 'Frazer cannot imagine a priest who is not basically a present-day English parson with the same stupidity and dullness.'[14]

(5) The writer of *WRBS* comments 'in Wittgenstein's treatment it is admissibility of empirical evidence that makes a religious belief superstitious.'[15] Yet the only remark of Wittgenstein in the whole of his *Lectures on Religious Belief* which would have given some support to his view has not been quoted by the writer. There is reference to 'superstition' in the context of scientific interpretation given by Father O'Hara, and this is perhaps the only reference. Perhaps the writer has the same attitude to Father O'Hara which a social scientist has to Sir James Frazer. Church Fathers should not be questioned as a *'Sir'* cannot be questioned.

(6) When Wittgenstein calls Father O'Hara 'unreasonable' and 'superstitious' he is *not* producing a *theory* about superstitions. To think that Wittgenstein has a *theory* about superstitions would be one of the greatest blunders. Wittgenstein says '"unreasonable" implies, with everyone, rebuke.'[16] So in calling O'Hara *unreasonable* and his interpretation *superstitious,* Wittgenstein is simply rebuking Father O'Hara. Suppose a person rebukes someone in an abusive tone—'You, son of a bitch'—would you say that this person had advanced a theory about the sons of bitches? Philosophers have a bad tendency to introduce theories where none is required. If at all Wittgenstein can be said to have a theory, he has a theory about religious belief, and superstition is only a by-product of this theory.

(7) Does Wittgenstein rebuke Father O'Hara simply because he has given a scientific interpretation to religious belief? Or, is it because he has attempted to make such belief *reasonable* ? Are scientific reasons the only kind of reasons? Wittgenstein says: 'What seems to me ludicrous about O'Hara is his making it appear *reasonable.*'[17] No kind of reasons, including the scientific ones, should be given in support of a religious belief. Then *why should one stare at scientific reasons alone?* Wittgenstein rejects Frazer's *scientific* explanation, because it is *explanation.* 'Every explanation is an hypothesis.'[18] No kind of explanation, including the scientific one, be given for religious beliefs and practices. These beliefs and practices speak for themselves. They do not require any external support.

(8) The writer of *WRBS* avoids Wittgenstein's reference to the

connection between a dream and the Last Judgement. 'Suppose someone dreamt of the Last Judgement, and said he now knew what it would be like.'[19] His dream cannot be a *scientific* basis for his belief in the Last Judgement. No inductive step has been taken in arguing like 'Well, I find this dream . . . therefore . . . Last Judgement.'[20] Does it mean that this belief is religious because scientific reasoning is absent? But the attitude of the believer may not be that of fear, terror and torment (The writer of *WRBS* knows the relation of *fear*, torment, etc., to a religious belief).'[21] Instead, he reacts by saying 'It will be in about 2000 years. It will be bad for so and so, etc.'[22] How can then what he holds be a religious belief? Would it be superstition if not a religious belief. But how can it be superstition when the scientific ground for the belief is missing? No terror and torment, therefore, no religious belief. No induction, therefore, there is no superstition. Then what is the status of such a belief? Either the writer of *WRBS* is wrong or Wittgenstein is wrong. May be both of them are right, only my understanding of them is wrong.

(9) 'Superstition' is a very muddled concept. Let us be clear about its grammar by studying *WRBS* from the beginning. The writer of *WRBS* begins his reflection by quoting the dictionary definition: 'The *Oxford English Dictionary* (1911) gives the meaning of "superstition" as "credulity regarding the supernatural, irrational fear of the unknown or mysterious, misdirected reverence and a religion or practice or particular opinion based on such tendencies." (p. 1375).'[23] There follows no comment on the dictionary definition. Then why was it introduced? Perhaps for beautification purposes.

(10) What immediately follows the dictionary definition of 'superstition' is the remark 'As ordinarily understood a belief is superstitious when not based on sufficient evidence, whereas a well grounded belief is not superstitious.'[24] What is meant by 'ordinary understanding' ? This is the kind of understanding, according to the writer, which can distinguish between sufficient and insufficient evidence for a belief, which can make a distinction between well-grounded and ill-grounded beliefs? Then how can such an understanding be ordinary? It is certainly an extraordinary understanding, the kind of understanding which philosophers and scientists are supposed to have. Of course, they too have this understanding in their rare moments. Some of the philosophers exhibit very poor understanding, poorer than the ordinary understanding. Sometimes they know not what they talk, perhaps thinking that it will add a philosophical dimension to their talk.

(11) Instead of clarifying the notion of 'superstition' as 'ordinarily understood', the succeeding remark makes things more difficult. 'A fear of or reverence for some supernatural beings is superstitious when sufficient evidence is not available for the existence or powers of these beings.'[25] What would count as 'sufficient evidence' for the existence of supernatural beings? Is it similar to the sufficient evidence for the

existence of natural beings? Are people afraid of supernatural beings, because they have 'sufficient evidence' for their existence? Then, are their fears rooted in superstitions? Search for 'sufficient' evidence for the existence of supernatural beings would make 'religious fears' impossible. All fears, all terrors, all torments, will be the result of superstition.

(12) While coming to the religious traditions the writer of *WRBS* remarks 'We find that most religious traditions declare certain beliefs and practices to be superstitious, specially those that do not fit in with the basic doctrines of these traditions. Thus practices relating to magic and witchraft are generally looked down as superstitious.'[26] So certain beliefs and practices are superstitious, not because of the *Oxford Dictionary* or 'ordinary understanding' but because they have been so declared by the religious traditions. Since there is multiplicity of religious tradition, it cannot be ruled out that the beliefs and practices of one religious tradition may be considered as superstitions in the other tradition. So 'superstition' is a kind of 'system dependent concept'. It is only in a system—in a tradition—that a belief is superstitious. And two different religious traditions may behave like two alternative systems of geometry, having certain beliefs and practices in common, in spite of their differences in other respects. However, all this cannot lead one to conclude that 'magic and witchcraft are generally looked down as superstition.' Perhaps the writer of *WRBS* does not know the logic of magic and witchcraft. A magical practice is not qualitatively different from a religious practice. But this is an independent issue which I would like to avoid. Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazer are quite helpful for understanding the logic of magic and witchcraft.

(13) According to the writer of *WRBS* Wittenstein's notion of superstition is different, not only from the *Oxford Dictionary*, 'ordinary understanding' or the so-called 'common parlance'[27], but also from the religious traditions. It is a novel notion. But how is that possible? Wittgenstein's notion of religious belief certainly belongs to a religious tradition. And if his notion of religious belief belongs to a religious tradition, then his notion of superstition too must belong to a religious tradition, and precisely to the same religious tradition to which his notion of religious belief belongs. For one's *mistakes* must be rooted in the same game in which one's *correct* moves are rooted. There is no such thing as a game played only with correct moves, and another only with false moves. A given game has correct moves because there is a possibility for it to have false moves.

(14) Wittgenstein has not only taken his birth in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, he has philosophized about this tradition. (Incidently, Wittgenstein had Jewish blood). While discussing the nature of religious belief he has picked up the concept of Last Judgement. Has not the Judaeo-Christian tradition handed over this concept to him? And what

is the substance of belief in the Last Judgement? 'No induction. Terror. That is, as it were, part of the substance of the belief.'[28] Therefore, the inductive path, the scientific path, to the Last Judgement will lead only to superstition. Father O'Hara is prescribing the inductive path, therefore he is converting religious belief into superstition. Terror, fear, torment characterize belief in the Last Judgement or any other judgement which is genuinely religious in the Christian sense.'The Christian religion is only for the man who needs infinite help, solely, that is, for the man who experiences infinite torment.'[29] His *Lectures on Religious Belief* make this absolutely clear. Consider his remark, 'If a man said to me after a dream that he believed in the Last Judgement, I'd try to find what impression it gave him. One attitude: "It will be in about 2000 years. It will be bad for so and so, etc." Or it may be one of terror.'[30] The latter attitude characterizes religious belief whereas the former characterizes only superstition. Having belief in the Last Judgement does not necessarily mean that one has a *religious* belief. One may have a superstitious attitude towards The Last Judgement.

(15) Wittgenstein did not stick to the position of the *Lectures on Religious Belief* for a long time. Later what was the *substance* of religious belief became the substance of superstition. A conversion has occurred. In 1948 he remarked 'Religious faith and superstition are quite different. One of them results from fear and is a sort of false science. The other is trusting.'[31] After reading this remark one realizes Wittgenstein's warning to his students who were taking down notes of his lectures on religion: Wittgenstein was against the publication of his lectures. Just after ten years of his lectures, what was a genuine religious belief became a superstition. What was a duck has now become a rabbit; a change in his view has occurred, he is viewing the same thing now differently. Of course, this is not against the Wittgensteinian thinking. Consider his remark 'What men consider reasonable and unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they find unreasonable and *vice versa*.'[32] Thus, fear, terror and torment which were the substance of religious belief have now become the substance of superstition. Of course, even with his revised position Wittgenstein does not wish that religion should be explained in terms of science. Religion must remain free from the impurities of science.

(16) To the admirers of Wittgenstein there has occurred no change in Wittgenstein's view. Their minds do not register significant changes. They try to introduce consistency and coherence where no such things are possible. For the sake of their stereotyped ideas, which lack all kinds of freshness, they do not hesitate in misrepresenting Wittgenstein. Like them Wittgenstein too should continue holding the same stereotyped views. The writer of *WRBS* is no exception. Reacting to the *Culture and Value* statement of 1948 quoted above he remarks 'This statement like LC identifies the source of superstition as confusion between uses of

"belief" in science and religion but it goes further in identifying the non-rational factors from which religious belief and superstition emanate. A genuine religious belief is based on trust, a trusting acceptance of what the authority says. A superstition on the other hand results (from) . . . fear.'[33] A CV statement has been identified with an LC statement. This is possible only when one has not seriously studied the position of Wittgenstein. And where is the question of 'finding out *mistake* in the uses of "belief" in science and religion'? Has Wittgenstein succeeded in fixing the boundary of belief in two spheres, religion and science? The boundaries are not fixed, he is only making effort to fix them. Does not the writer of *WRBS* think that both religious belief and superstition emanate from non-rational sources? *Fear* is a non-rational source, no one *reasons* in order to become frightened. Can the same be said about 'trusting authority'? Suppose 'religious faith' is like 'fear', a spontaneous blind occurrence without any rational calculation. So it requires no rational explanation, including the scientific one. But what about superstition? Superstition too is free from any kind of rational explanation, because it is rooted in fear.

In his *Lectures on Religious Belief,* Wittgenstein made *fear* as the ground for religious belief, because he wished to avoid a *rational* ground. Once a rational ground is introduced, rational explanation of religious belief cannot be avoided. He allowed superstition to have a rational ground. But in the *Culture and Value* remark of 1948 he has made *fear* as the ground of superstition. Then like religious belief, superstition too becomes free from any rational explanation. Of course, Wittgenstein is silent now about the question whether religious belief is based on a rational or non-rational ground. In saying 'Religious faith is trusting' ground of the religious faith has not been made explicit. Suppose the ground of the religious belief is also non-rational, then the distinction between religious belief and superstition disappears.

(17) There is a third alternative to rational and irrational grounds, beliefs may be 'groundless'. During the last years of his life Wittgenstein started developing the idea that certain beliefs must be accepted as groundless in order for other beliefs to have grounds. *On Certainty* is devoted to groundless beliefs, the beliefs which are basic to our world-pictures. Wittgenstein uses religious belief as a paradigm case of ground-less belief. A groundless non-religious belief is compared with a 'religious belief.'[34] Malcolm explains Wittgenstein's meaning 'What does he mean by belief "in the sense of religious belief"? He explicitly distinguishes it from *conjecture* (Vermutung). I think that this means that there is nothing tentative about it; it is not adopted as a hypothesis that might later be withdrawn in the light of new evidence. This also makes explicit an important feature of Wittgenstein's understanding of belief, in the sense of "religious belief," namely, that it does not rise or fall on the basis of evidence or grounds: It is "groundless".'[35] Thus a religious belief

belief is groundless. It is not grounded in *fear* or *submission to authority,* etc. Therefore, the conclusion about superstition is obvious. A superstition is a belief which has irrational or rational grounds. The writer of *WRBS* has not seen the progress of Wittgenstein's thought. In his *Lectures on Religious Belief* delivered in 1938 Wittgenstein thought that fear and torments, etc., are the grounds of religious belief. But a decade's time changed his views. He started thinking that the religious beliefs are groundless. What has grounds is superstition. But at no time Wittgenstein gave up the idea that religion cannot be justified through science.

(18) The writer of *WRBS* gets very disturbed when he comes to know through the papers of Winch and Philips that religion for Wittgenstein was a personal affair.[36] He thinks that 'Christianity as well as most of the monotheistic religions, as reflected in general practice, do not allow this kind of freedom where every believer can speak for himself.'[37] Wittgenstein was a Christian without rejecting other religions and having a personal attitude towards religion. He said:[38]

> The symbolism of Catholicism are wonderful beyond words. But any attempt to make it into a philosophical system is offensive.

> All religions are wonderful, even those of the most primitive tribes. The ways in which people express their religious feelings differ enormously.

> Make sure that your religion is a matter between you and God only.

The last refers to an advice given to Drury. These three statements have been presented as a body, a coherent body. What is incoherent about them? Cannot one praise Catholicism and praise other religions too? And how can religion prohibit one's personal equation with God? Different religions may not be very different from different geometrical systems, having common and uncommon elements.

(19) The writer of *WRBS* thinks that there cannot be any language game of religion if 'your religion is a matter between you and God only.' Consider his remark, 'The concept of language game revolves around two basic suppositions, one that the linguistic community use words in accordance with certain rules and two that their basic judgements agree. If uses of words and expressions in religious contexts constitute language games then it cannot be allowed that each believer is free to use words and sentences the way he/she likes.'[39] How does the advice of Wittgenstein to Drury—Make sure that your religion is a matter between you and God—would lead to the consequence that 'each believer is free to use words and sentences the way he/she likes'? Of course if each believer (that is, each member of the linguistic community) uses words and sentences the way he likes, then no language-community is possible. The genuine objection which can be raised game of religion is possible. The genuine objection which can be raised against Wittgenstein has not occurred to the writer of *WRBS*.

Wittgenstein's advice is operative only within the context of God-believers. Suppose, Drury is a Buddhist, then the advice is a non-starter. Thus the question can be raised whether 'belief in God' can be considered as a 'basic judgement of religion'. It may be a basic judgement (an axiom-like thing) in Christianity, Islam and some form of Hinduism. But it is not a basic judgement in Buddhism. The writer of *WRBS* is aware that the believers (that is, the members of linguistic community) must agree about their 'basic judgements'. But he does not throw any further light on this issue. He does not tell us what those basic judgements of religion are. If he would have made an attempt to enumerate the basic judgements of religion, he would have really helped the Wittgensteinian scholars. When one tries to pick holes in a wall, one must know the stuff out of which the wall is constituted (constructed). One should not prove a bad workman. There are so many problems connected with the language-game of religion, but they have not even been touched by the writer of *WRBS*.

(20) From p. 10 onwards the writer of *WRBS* speaks with the voice of Father O'Hara rather than that of a philosopher. Wittgenstein's views have been expounded only to be rejected. In rejecting Wittgenstein it appears as if one is serving the Church. Let me consider a few sample remarks: 'Granting that scientific criteria of reasonable belief are not to be imposed upon religious belief, it does not necessarily follow that reason has no application in religion.'[40] It seems that the writer has totally forgotten the remark of Wittgenstein which he himself quoted earlier, 'For every reason it offers there is a valid counter-reason.'[41] It is not the case that reasons have not been given in religion, but for all those reasons we can provide valid counter-reasons. It is this pitiable state of reason that led Wittgenstein to remark, which has also been quoted by the writer of *WRBS*, 'An honest religious thinker is like a tightrope walker. He almost looks as though he were walking on nothing but air. His support is the slenderest imaginable. And yet it really is possible to walk on it.'[42] 'Walking on nothing but air' means having no evidence, no support, no reasons. The reasons are so flimsy that having them is as good as not having them. So what would have gone against Wittgenstein is the production of such reasons for which no valid counter-reasons could be produced. But the writer of *WRBS* has not demonstrated his position by citing cases of reasons for which no counter-reasons could possibly be produced.

(21) Reacting on the option 'that the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable belief has no place in religion', the writer of *WRBS* writes, 'This . . . does not appear plausible since most religions reject certain beliefs and practices as superstitious and unreasonable.'[43] This treats as if Wittgenstein's views on religious belief and superstition are the result of an *empirical* survey of religions; Wittgenstein has produced false data.

The right kind of data is that most religions contain both sorts of beliefs, reasonable beliefs and unreasonable beliefs, the former are those which they accept and the latter are those which they reject. So reasonability of a belief consists in its being accepted by a religion (a system) and its unreasonability in its being rejected by a religion (a system). Then why add the adjectives 'reasonable' and 'ureasonable'? They become superfluous. 'Religious belief' simply means 'a belief accepted by a religious system' and 'superstition' means a belief rejected by a religious system.' But certainly it is a significant question to ask 'Why should a belief be accepted by a system?' It is possible that the belief is foundational, it is essential to the survival of the system. Take, for example, 'belief in God'. For Christianity this is a foundational belief. Perhaps 'belief in the Bible' is also a foundational belief. Without these beliefs Christianity cannot survive. If they are foundational, then Wittgenstein would call them 'groundless'. They function as grounds for other beliefs. If they are not groundless, then they will have other beliefs as their grounds, and they will lose their character as foundational beliefs. These groundless beliefs are neither rational nor non-rational; these characterizations do not apply to them.

If 'unreasonable' means 'having no reason' then superstition cannot be unreasonable. It is quite reasonable. Following Philips, the writer of *WRBS* describes the reasonable character of superstition when he says it is 'believing in a queer causal connection between sin and worldly punishment, thinking of the Last Judgement as a future event . . . and taking prayer to be a means to avoid certain consequences or make certain things happen.'[44] A superstitious belief is rejected by a religious system, not because it is unreasonable, but because it questions the very foundations of a religious system. If a religion is to be saved then certain beliefs must be considered as mere superstitions. This is a way of degrading the status of a belief.

(22) The writer of *WRBS* perhaps thinks that Wittgenstein is the first philosopher who has rejected scientific and philosophical interpretation to Christianity. Before Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard already did it. So also Kierkegaard explained religious beliefs in terms of passionate commitment rather than a matter of theoretical (logical) understanding. If one has read Kierkegaard's interpretation of Christianity, one may find only idiomatic departure of Wittgenstein from Kierkegaard. Perhaps the idea of foundational beliefs or groundless beliefs is Wittgenstein's own invention. Wittgenstein never claimed 'originality of the seed', he only claimed 'originality of the soil'.[45] So the seed of Kierkegaard has sprouted differently on the soil of Wittgenstein. Perhaps the writer of *WRBS* has not attempted to study Kierkegaard. If he had studied Kierkegaard he would not have made so many objections to Wittgenstein which he has made. Unfortunately Kierkegaard does not find his place in the Anglo-American study circles. We seem to forget that Wittgenstein

was basically a Continental thinker, he was not an English philosopher.

(23) Consider the remarks from *WRBS*, 'It is clear that Wittgenstein . . . wants to brush aside all questions of explanation and justification from the domain of religion . . . For him what matters in religion is how a belief affects a believer and regulates his thinking and life. This had led to an overemphasis upon affective commissive aspect of religious beliefs and ignoring of their conative aspect. His excessive emphasis upon belief in the last judgement as a typical case of religious belief may also be responsible for this factor.'[46] Has Wittgenstein 'brushed aside' and 'ignored' the questions of explanation and justification? What is meant by ignoring a question. A question is ignored when you bypass it, you do not give a serious thought to it. So also brushing aside means not giving a serious thought to it. Wittgenstein has given more serious thought to the questions of explanations and justification of religious beliefs than any other philosopher of our age except, perhaps, Kierkegaard. As a matter of fact, his work on religion is basically on the nature of explanation and justification. He came to reject them after serious contemplation. Rejecting a view is not the same thing as ignoring it. Why did Wittgenstein take up the Last Judgement? Perhaps for Christianity belief in the Last Judgement may be one of the foundational beliefs. Can Christianity give up this belief and retain its original character? Being foundational this belief cannot be grounded in any other set of beliefs. If belief in the Last Judgement is allowed to have explanation and justification, then it will lose its foundational character.

(24) Though the paper has more material for reflection I would like to end my discussion with the concluding remarks of *WRBS*. According to the writer Wittgenstein's 'obsession with affective and regulative function of religious beliefs has resulted in a lopsided view of religion where questions of explanation, justification and truth are relegated to the background, consequently the distinction between science and religion has been overemphasized and their links ignored.'[47] Wittgenstein has certainly not produced a 'lopsided view' of religious beliefs. It is not the case that the weight of 'affective and regulative function' is *more than* the weight of 'explanation and justification.' Explanation and justification are given no weight at all by Wittgenstein, therefore, the view is not *lopsided* but *one-sided*. Religion may have links with science, but the apologists like Father O'Hara are interested in those links which make possible scietific justification of religious beliefs. This would convert religion into one of the sciences. Wittgenstein is simply trying to stop the conversion of religion into one of the natural sciences.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Culture and Value*, p. 85.
2. *Philosophical Review*, 1965, p. 7.
3. This work was edited by Rush Rhees, 1979. It has also appeared in *Wittgenstein*:

Sources and Perspectives, edited by C.G. Luckhardt, translated by John Beversluis. Frazer's work was first read and discussed with M.C.O. Drury.

4. *Philosophical Review*, 1965.
5. Included in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections*, edited by Rush Rhees, 1981.
6. Cf. 373 'Grammar tells what kind of object anything is (Theology is grammar).
7. Cf. 317 'Theology fumbles around with words'.
8. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections*, edited by Rush Rhees, p. 155.
9. Ibid.
10. *Lectures on Religious Belief*, p. 59.
11. Ibid., p. 57.
12. *Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough'*, translated by John Beversluis, *Wittgenstein*, edited by C.G. Luckhardt, Harvester, p. 60.
13. Ibid., p. 67.
14. Ibid., p. 65.
15. *WRBS*, p. 3.
16. *Lectures on Religious Belief*, p. 58.
17. Ibid., p. 58.
18. Frazer, p. 63.
19. *Lectures*, p. 62.
20. Ibid.
21. *WRBS*, p. 6.
22. *Lectures*, p. 62.
23. *WRBS*, p. 2.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., pp. 2–3.
27. The writer of *WRBS* also talks about 'common parlance'. See p. 3. 'In common parlance it is lack of sufficient evidence . . .'
28. *Lectures*, p. 56.
29. *Culture and Value*, p. 46.
30. Cf. p. 56.
31. *Culture and Value*, p. 72.
32. *On Certainty*.
33. Cf. p. 8.
34. *On Certainty*, 459.
35. *'The Groundlessness of Belief'*, *Aesthetics, Ethics and Language*, edited by John V. Canfield, 1986, p. 204.
36. *WRBS*, pp. 12–13.
37. Ibid., p. 13.
38. 'Conversations with Wittgenstein', *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections*, edited by Rush Rhees, p. 117.
39. *WRBS*, p. 13.
40. Ibid., p. 14.
41. Ibid., p. 5.
42. Ibid., p. 18.
43. Ibid., pp. 14–15.
44. Ibid., p. 8.
45. *Culture and Value*, p. 36.
46. *WRBS*, p. 20.
47. Ibid., p. 21.

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Notes and Queries

Why Nyāya Remains Realist: Second Round

Let us assume that Navya Nyāya *cannot* make the distinction between sense and reference. Why should that entail (as Daya Krishna provocatively avers in the interrogative, vide May–August 1996 issue of *JICPR*) that it is idealistic *par exellence*?

Russell proudly failed to make that distinction, claiming in *On Denoting* that if you try to preserve the connection between sense and reference, as Frege would understand them, then you cannot stop them becoming the same. And this is not the voice of Russell during his idealistic adolescence. Indeed, it is pretty obvious that Russell thought that *drawing* the sense-reference distinction would go against that 'robust sense of reality' which he took to be the hallmark of a realist. If there are no senses of names like 'Pegasus' in zoology, then there are none such in reality, he would tell us.

So Daya Krishna's implicit premise: Whoever is a realist must draw the distinction between sense and reference is simply false. Where could he have got that from? A charitable attempt to speculate turns out to be very uncharitable on Daya Krishna. For, the following argument is a classic case of fallacious reasoning:

Frege was a realist.

Frege drew the sense-reference distinction.

Therefore, every realist must draw the sense-reference distinction.

And, of course, there is a sense in which Navya Nyāya does draw that distinction. What is known or understood when one hears the sentence 'Gadādhara is Saṅkhapaṇi' is surely different from what you know when you hear 'Gadādhara is Gadādhara' because, for one thing, according to Navya Nyāya, you do not know anything when you hear the latter sentence. Yet it is clear that both the sentences speak of the same referent, namely Viṣṇu. Apart from the *vacya*, therefore, Navya Nyāya includes the reason for application or the limitor of designatumhood (*pravṛttinimitta* or *vācyatāvacchedaka*) within the content of the awareness generated by the use of a word in the context of a sentence.

Whether this notion of a limitor of referentness—that in virtue of which, on a particular occasion, an object is picked out as the intended referent—is quite the same as Frege's notion of *sinn* is a matter of deep and difficult debate. Mohanty's discussion of this point in pp. 65–66 of his *Reason and Tradition* (Oxford, 1992) is the best record of the current state of that debate, apart from the relevant pages of *Saṃvāda*.

Navya Nyāya and the Russell of 1910 to 1919 (including the famous *Problems of Philosophy*) are very similar in this regard. Both are realist about external objects and universals and both give an account of error or false belief which eschews the positing of false propositions/Fregean thoughts or unobtaining complexes like that-Desdemona-loves-Cassio or that (=rope)-which-is-a-snake. The sophisticated 'multiple relation theory of belief' or *'anyathākhyāti* theory of error' was precisely an answer to the question: How can you be a realist about what is referred to by a false belief or the constituents of an erroneous perceptual judgement without giving ontological status to Fregean senses. The urge to avoid Fregean senses comes actually from a deep commitment to hard realism which fears that once we allow the veil of objective modes of presentation to come between our seeings or graspings from words and the objects and properties seen and grasped, we shall for ever be stuck in a rut of thought-contents. That, to succumb to an old pun, would be as sinful for a Naiyāyika as holding like a Buddhist that 'these words never touch real objects but only capture *vikalpas.*'

It is not clear at all what Daya Krishna is getting at when he links up the sense-reference distinction with accepting the idea that 'the same fact makes two different knowledges true.' If we mean by 'fact' what Frege explicitly meant by that word, that is, true thoughts, then 'Gadādhara saved me' and 'Sankhapani saved me' would express two different facts. Even Nyāya analysis of those two awarenesses would go *via* invoking different properties *'vācyopasthitiprakāra'*—the manner in which the referent was presented to the knower. And it is by showing sensitivity to this difference between what is meant, in other words, by showing the meaning-non-equivalence of the two formulations, that Navya Nyāya shows that it can do justice to the phenomenon that Frege needed the sense-reference distinction for, without actually drawing that distinction. As to how to honour the realistic intuition that, after all, the same objective circumstance (Viṣṇu saving the speaker) makes both of them true, Nyāya does that by the apparently innocent but extremely far-sighted doctrine that *a qualified entity is no distinct from that very entity in its unqualified state, (śuddha-padārtho viśiṣṭapadārthāt na atiricyate:* the man with the stick is no other than man). The real hallmarks of Nyāya realism are the following apparently distinct doctrines:

(1) The relation of inherence is mind-independently real.
(2) The object of very unlike kinds of knowing, for example, seeing and touching, perceiving and inferring, perceiving judgementally and perceiving indeterminately, can be exactly the same object or object complex.
(3) Awareness is not self-aware.
(4) Universals are mind-independently real and can be directly and indeterminately perceived.
(5) No awareness is self-certified to be true and false awarenesses do

not require any non-existent or intentional entities in order to be accounted for.
(6) Apart from a man with the stick, who is identical with the man, there is no fact or true thought that the man has a stick anywhere in any sector of reality.

How Frege could be a realist while dropping 2 and 6 is at most as interesting a question as how Prābhākara could be a realist while dropping 3 and 5. But just as you do not become an idealist if you believe that awarenesses are sometimes unwittingly false, you do not become an idealist if you do not draw the distinction between sense and reference in the way that Frege would.

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Is *'Tattvam Asi'* the same type of identity statement as the 'Evening star is the same as Morning star'?

Does the assertion of meaningful identity-statement necessarily involve a distinction between 'sense' and 'reference'? Frege's analysis seems to imply that this is so, while the advaitic analysis of the Upaniṣadic statement *prima facie* seems to deny this.

But, if there is no distinction whatsoever between the identity statement on the one hand and the belief-distinction, however mistaken, then how can the advaitic analysis make any sense at all?

Daya Krishna

* * *

What is the exact difference between *ūha, tarka, yukti* and *upapatti*?

Daya Krishna

'Is Udayana a Pracchnna Advaitin?': A Reply

Daya Krishna has raised the question[1] whether Udayana, the author of *Ātmatatvaviveka* and other works on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy is a disguised Advaitin. The grounds for raising such a question are, as stated by Daya Krishna, certain remarks made towards the end of *Ātmatatvaviveka* by Udayana. In these remarks Udayana seeks to highlight the distinction between the ultimate philosophical positions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita. Elsewhere in *Ātmatatvaviveka* and in *Nyāyakusumāñjali* as also in his commentaries Udayana has either criticised the Advaitic position or cast aspersions on it by making slightly disparaging remarks about it. In the aforementioned remarks, Udayana goes one step further in his denunciation of Advaita by maintaining that the quintessence of Advaita is to be found only in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the absolute self and not in the doctrine of self-conscious Brahman as upheld by the so-called Advaita of Śaṅkara. The ātman or self as understood by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika becomes totally devoid of all its special qualities, even including knowledge in the state of release. The Advaita of Śaṅkara, despite its claim to Advaitism, does not subscribe to such a view of absoluteness of self or Brahman which is nothing but pure consciousness. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view the knowledge that leads to the release of self from bondage is dissipated of itself in the state of release leaving the self by itself. In the Advaita of Śaṅkara however the last *vritti jñāna* which brings about self's release is, of course, dissipated in release but with this dissipation the conscious being of the self stands revealed. There is, thus, no real absolutism in the Advaita of Śaṅkara. The real absolutism or Advaitism is that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika only in Udayana's considered view.

Hanuman Nagar, Nagpur 　　　　　　　　　　　N.S. Dravid

Ślokārdhana pravakṣyāmi yad uktaṁ granthakotibhaḥ
Brahmasatyaṁ Jagganmithya Brahmajīvaiva Nāparāḥ

Who said this and in which book it is said?

Sanghamitra Dasgupta

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[1] *JICPR*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, p. 151.

Review Article

Understanding the 'Social' Through the 'Indian' Tradition: The Ideal and the Real

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The order of our social world is that of value-based norms arising ultimately from the idea of the person as the supreme value. The being or reality of person is in self-consciousness which contains within itself a tension between ideality and actuality. Correspondingly, the categories relevant to the comprehension of social reality can only be definitions of norms based upon value which itself is truly apprehended in terms of self-enlightenment.

G.C. Pande (1982)
The Nature of Social Categories

To confine oneself to the individual alone is to not do justice to the notion of *puruṣārtha*. The idea of *dharma* in traditional thought in India tries to consider the *puruṣārtha* of society, but the very fact that it does not know how to deal with law and polity on the one hand, and *mokṣa* on the other, shows that it was not able to deal with the problem effectively. In fact, it did not formulate the idea of a collective *puruṣārtha* without which the real problems of a plurality of *jīvas* who are aware of each other for the realization of their own *puruṣārthas* cannot even be formulated, let alone understood.

Daya Krishna (1996)
The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society and Polity', p. 149

An individual's capacity to make sense of the world . . . presupposes the existence of collective traditions; but individuals must be able to experiment with these collective traditions by being allowed to live at their limits.

Veena Das (1995)
Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India, p. 116.

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* Govind Chandra Pande, *Bhāratīya Samāj: Aitihāsik Aur Tattvik Vivecanā*, National Publishing House, Delhi, 1994.

Govind Chandra Pande has written enormously on many aspects of Indian traditions and has enriched our understanding of the wider questions of self, culture and spirituality. His *Meaning and Process of Culture as Philosophy of History* is a significant contribution to thinking about culture as a spiritual quest (Pande, 1989). In the present work, which consists of three lectures presented at the G.B. Pant Social Science Institute, Allahabad, as part of its annual Govind Ballav Pant Memorial Lecture, Pande discusses the problem of thinking of society from the point of view of classical Indian tradition.

In his first lecture entitled, '*abadhāraṇātmaka paripreksyā,*' Pande offers his critique of sociological reasoning. For him, there are two modes of social inquiry—the classical and the modern. While in all classical traditions, the knowledge of society is linked to philosophical and religious worldviews, in modernity this is part of science. The foundation of modern sociological knowledge is not '*śāstric*' text-based and transcendental but scientific. But Pande is quick to point out that modern sociology, claiming scientific status for itself, is not free from philosophical presuppositions. The foundational principle of modern science is the presupposition that unconscious matter is the foundation of the world. Such a philosophy is also at the root of modern sociological thinking where the dynamics of consciousness, particularly self-consciousness, has been banished from the sociological conceptualization of society as an objective reality. Pande strives to correct this lopsidedness by bringing the perspective of Indian tradition to bear on our thinking.

For Pande, sociology deals with human beings and the knowledge of human life is linked to their *ātmabodha*—self-knowledge—and, in fact, should be based on it. But self in Pande's thinking is not merely a societal being or even a 'reflective self'—a la Giddens (1991)—but a soul—a soul which is primarily transcendental and divine. It seems closer to the Heideggerian Dasein (cf. Dallmayr, 1993) and 'self' in Charles Taylor's (1989) recent formulation. Pande would like sociology to be a study of the work of soul in the field called society. For Pande, soul is not a mere object of knowledge; it is also its subject. Pande makes clear that in a deeper sense, while being the subject of knowledge it is also not totally subjective. Soul occupies an intermediary space between the subjective and objective dimension of the seeking of knowledge.

Pande argues that '*Atmānam Biddhi*'—know thyself—and '*Puruṣa Ebam Idam Sarvam*'—All this is *Purusha*, All this is God—are the foundational principles of the classical approach to sociology. Pande gives primary significance to the knowledge of the soul in the study of society. For him, the awakened conscience is the key to self-knowledge and self-knowledge is the educational foundation of society. Pande argues that in a society it is important for human happiness that the opportunity for self-realization

exists for individuals. Pande finds problems in modern sociology's reduction of self to external and physical determinants without paying attention to its inner dialectics.

Pande urges us to rethink the taken-for-granted belief in the virtue of social inquiry conducted on the model of science. Modern sociology, for him, is closer to science than religion on the ground that the claims of religions are contradictory, while those of science are not. But Pande argues that the existence of non-contradiction cannot be the starting point for any inquiry; if at all, it can be its ideal. 'In so far as contradictions between propositions of a philosophical system are concerned, they are characteristic of all philosophies. If for this reason, we keep the spiritual philosophies outside the foundations of our social inquiry then we would also have to leave the scientific ones. But it is not possible for man to leave all philosophical presuppositions and lead one's life only in accordance with the principles of science' (p. 17). To take religious presuppositions seriously in the conduct of our social inquiry may make us feel that it would take us to the Middle Ages but for Pande whether faith is more important than science is not a matter of fact alone; it is also a matter of value. It is a matter of what he calls *dṛṣṭimūlak mūlyāvibyakti* or perspectival value-expressiveness (p. 25).

Pande discusses the implication of taking the *ātmabodh* or sense of self of human beings seriously in the study of society. Once we turn to the inner world of persons, the evidence of the external world becomes less helpful. Here Pande builds upon the distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* in the Indian tradition and argues that the Being of the *puruṣa*—the soul of the person—is not governed by the objective and norm-governed *prakṛti*. It is governed by the autonomy of consciousness, a consciousness characterized by *swatantratā* (independence) and *ātmārthatā* (consciousness, conscious of its own significance) (p. 27). Pande admits that the study of society clearly means studying the observable action of individuals in the field of society but the transcendental worldviews which inspire human beings is not a matter of direct observation (p. 27).

For Pande, society is the world of human action; in his words, it is a *karmaloka*. But the analysis of *karma* takes one on the one hand to study the aspired world of *puruṣārthas* and on the other to study the nature of actors, what he calls *kartaka svarūpa*. For Pande, understanding the nature of actors is possible only through self-investigation or *ātmānusandhāna* which can be of two kinds. One is an inquiry into the pure self, a self which is not dependent upon externally attributed identifications. The other is an inquiry into the dialectic between self as pure self and several attributed identities of society which work as a marker of self. Thus Pande argues that sociology should be concerned with the study of the following four phenomena—self/soul, the attributes of self/soul, the world of action or *karma* and *puruṣārtha*.

II

In his second chapter entitled, 'Bharatiya Samaj; Sadhana Aur Bidhana,' Pande argues that society consists of two intertwining streams—one is the stream of *sādhanā*—creative quest—and the other is the stream of *bidhāna* or regulation. Modern sociology gives primacy to the world of social regulation epitomized by the Durkheimian principle that society consists of coercive social facts of which individuals are bonded/bound bearers. Pande here urges us to realize the significance of *sādhanā* in the constitution, functioning and transformation of societies. Recently social inquiry has reoriented itself from the emphasis on structure to a focus on practice (Ortner, 1984; Bourdieu, 1977). But *sādhanā* refers not merely to the logic of practice—a la Bourdieu; it refers to the world of ideal practice and a continued striving to realize this ideal in relationships. *Sādhanā* is the practice of individuals which is governed by an ideal vision of self and society. While transformation is outside the realm of modern sociological theory of practice, for example as it is in the case of the work of Bourdieu (see Fox, 1984), it is at the heart of *sādhanā*. Pande argues that Indian society should not only be studied through the prism of its world of regulations, say the caste system, but also through its *sādhanā* such as its spiritual movements. For Pande, the classical Indian culture is the foundation of Indian society and it is characterized by spirituality, tolerance and the influence of Sanskrit language (p. 39).

For Pande, taking *sādhanā* seriously in the study of society means that we would have to attend to the distinction between *śreya* and *preya* in human life. *Śreya* refers to the world of 'ought' while *preya* refers to the world of pleasure. While in modern sociology, *śreya* is the logical culmination of *preya*, in the traditional perspective, *śreya* has an autonomy of its own; it has a locus in the transcendental dimension of self, society and cosmos. Pande seems to suggest that *śreya* has a universal significance. But how do individuals perceive *śreya* in their lives? Is *śreya* the same for different people? How do people struggle with their *preyas* as they seek for the realization of *śreya* in their lives? Can a universal distinction be made between *śreya* and *preya*? Keeping in view the transformation in the discourse of desire at the contemporary juncture, can we also find preya in the *śreya* and *śreya* in the *preya*?[1]

Pande's writing suggests that dharma is a source of *śreya* in the life of individuals and society. Pande argues that *dharma* is not religion as it is conceived in the modern West. An Indian approach to study of society emphasizes the need to take a *dhārmic* view in our understanding of the 'social'. *Dharma* is a creative force in society; in fact, for Pande, it is a primary principle of creativity. *Dharma* is characterized by spiritual *sādhanā*, the work of the saints and prophets; it refers to their world and their examples which express highest human possibility. Pande realizes that there is a gap between *dharma* and society inasmuch as, at a given point

in history, the structure and functioning of an existent society does not embody the principle of *dharma*. Therefore, like *sādhanā*, *dharma* provides a continuous challenge to a society's existing arrangement and structure. But Pande's uncritical adoration of *dharma* and his failure to realize the distinction between *dharma* and *adhyātma*[2]—religion and spirituality—does not make it clear whether *dharma* is constitutive of society as an ideal or it permeates its real social arrangements. Speaking of Indian society Pande writes that in this *dharma* is both *rīti* and *bidhi*; *svabhāva* and *ādarsa*; *guṇa* and *kriyā*; system and justice. But if *dharma* is both the law of the social system and principle of justice, then is there no contradiction between these dual locations and meanings of dharma?[3] Pande's explorations do not help us understand the contradiction between these multiple roles of *dharma* in the life of individual and society.

In this context, it must be mentioned that *dharmasaṅkaṭa* is an important aspect of traditional Indian thinking about *dharma*. In other words, what characterizes the calling of dharma is not simply a set of clear principles whose significance is unambiguous and universal but *dharmasaṅkaṭa*. As Daya Krishna argues, '. . . the deepest *dharmasaṅkaṭa* is between the conflicting claims of self-consciousness, at every level, to be different from that one is and the claims of others which one's consciousness is aware of all the time' (Daya Krishna, 1996: 26). Following *dharma* means confronting a lot of dilemmas.[4] How does a society and an individual deal with such dilemmas? Is the option available at the level of self the same at the level of society? While at the societal level, we require reflexive structures which is the other name of institutions, to deal with the dilemmas arising out of the following of dharma at the individual level we also require a critical reflexivity. But can societies as they exist promote such a critical reflexivity? Can traditional Indian society foster such a critical sujectivity? What kind of institutions can we build upon from the perspectives of classical tradition to cope with the challenge of *dharmasaṅkaṭa*?

Pande himself writes that if the problem with modern sociology is to study self-consciousness in terms of reference of a lower self, then the problem with the classical/traditional perspective is to look at society through the idiom of rituals and not through the 'eternal sovereignty' of the Vedas.

Both the present chapter as well as the succeeding chapter on tradition and change makes some remarks about structure of Indian society which helps us to understand Pande. Pande argues that in classical Indian society, caste was conceived not primarily as a division of labour but as an expression of the distinction of *dharma*. Caste was supposedly a system for the exercise of *karmayoga* since for the conduct of *karmayoga* it is not important what *karma* has been determined for whom but the important thing is how one does it. But Pande himself writes that *karma* has been

determined in the caste system; it is not an object of self-determination. Then if the object of one's most important aspect of life, that is, *karma*, is not determined by self-consciousness then how does the free and pure self reconcile with such a system of determination? Inviting our attention to the Vedic times, Pande writes that even in the time of the Vedas, the Śūdras were debarred only from reading the Vedas but they were free to read other texts. But the very fact that Śūdras were debarred from reading the Vedas, which for Pande himself is the source of *dharma*, does it not pose any problem of incoherence to the seekers of *dharma*, what about the assault to the self-realization of the Śūdras because of their lack of access to the Vedas? Did the Śūdras have no soul in the Vedic times like the Jews lacking in the Heideggerian *Dasein* under the Nazis?

These chapters also bring to the fore Pande's dialogue with the ghost of Mandal. Pande resents the fact that castes today are the soldiers of political parties and argues: 'The economic condition of the so-called backward castes is not a product of the caste system rather a product of economic deprivation for which not caste but medieval feudalism and modern colonialism is responsible' (p. 61).

Pande also observes that the Ārya in the Indian tradition has not been a category of racial distinction but one of cultural distinction. In his words, 'The racial meaning of the Ārya is very new while its classical meaning refers to the one who is *śiṣṭa, sajjana* or *dhārmika*' (p. 73). Again for Pande, this certainly was the case in the Vedic Age. Pande sees the ideals of Indian society realized in the Vedic age. In the Vedic society, the Ṛṣis constituted the frame of reference of society. They were living in the forests and the culture of the forest was considered the highest. Pande writes that in the Vedic society, people had an affirmative attitude to life. They were not characterized by the suffering pathos of the later day renouncers. The fundamental mantra of their life was: '*Īśavaśayam Sarvam Idam*', that is, all this is Brahma, all this is God.

Pande argues that the role of woman in traditional Indian culture is that of a mother while in modern society it is that of worker. For Pande, the contemporary attempts to ameliorate the condition of women is in line with the perspective of tradition while the displacement of *dhārmic sraddhā* from the collective styles of life is a systematic annihilation of it.

III

Pande's arguments to make self-knowledge the foundation of sociological knowledge is exciting but raises a number of questions. How is self-knowledge going to be the foundation of sociological knowledge? Pande suggests that this should be in both a constitutive and an objective sense. In a constitutive sense, it means that the self-knowledge of the subject of inquiry is an important factor in the study of society. But what are the processes by which self-knowledge of the student of society becomes

sociological? Through a deeper knowledge of one's self—its transcendental dimension as well as interactive dimension—one can have illuminative knowledge about society. But knowledge of the transcendental universalism of self is not the same as that of its interactive universalism. Fields of social scientific inquiry such as anthropology and psychology have all along emphasized the significance of self-knowledge of the students of society and culture but have always invited us to understand the complexity of the problem and process of movement from one level to the other. Moreover, even in their critique of positivism, they have pointed to us the significance of evidence (see Obeyesekere, 1990). True in sociology, validity cannot be scientific and has to be interpretative but how do we establish the interpretative validity of our self-knowledge? How do we distinguish between self-knowledge and self-delusion?

In an objective sense, when sociological inquiry makes self-knowledge of human beings an important object of study then it certainly has a much more salutary significance. For instance, it can lead to a welcome emphasis on the narratives of the actors. And here Pande's insights are helpful. The *ātmabodha* of persons cannot be understood only through an objective, manifest consciousness. A sociologist has to go down or go up to the level of consciousness of the actors.[5] And in this journey an inquiry into the rational self-knowledge of actors is not enough.

The sense of self or self-knowledge of the actors is important for the sociological knowledge but what about their sense of the other? Studying the sense of the other or the other-regarding orientation of the actors is important since it is the capacity for otherness which constitutes society as a moral entity. As Swami Vivekananda tells us so forcefully: 'The watchword of all well-being, of all moral good is not "I" but "thou". Who cares whether there is a heaven or a hell, who cares if there is an unchangeable or not? Here is the world and it is full of misery. Go out into the world as Buddha did, and struggle to lessen it or die in the attempt' (1991: 353). But Pande's work on religion, spirituality, culture and society privileges self rather than other. But logically as well as contextually, there is no guarantee of one-to-one relationship between the two.

Of course, to be fair to Pande, it has to be noted that he does argue that the task of cultural realization is to overcome the distinction between the self and the non-self, *ātma* and the *anātma*, self and the other. But the dissolution of this distinction may not be a fact of life; in other words we may not encounter our given self this way. Therefore, we need to pay special attention to the reality of the other and attend to its multifarious moral demands on the self. In this context, what Daya Krishna argues is significant. For Daya Krishna, even the *Gītā* which widens the notion of action and sees it in a 'social and even political context' seems to have completely forgotten that 'action is, and ought to be, primarily concerned with others—their happiness, their freedom, their *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreaya*'.

(Daya Krishna, 1996: 58). Furthermore, once we begin to 'see the "other" as a subject in his or her own right and capable of being affected by one's actions one will begin to see the self as "responsible" to the "other" and not just be concerned with the state of one's own being. Yājñavalkya's *ātman*-centric analysis of the human situation and his contention that everything is dear for the sake of the self would, then, seem to result from a one-sided analysis' (Daya Krishna, 1996: 58).

Working on the question and practice of intersubjectivity can certainly help us mediate the relationship between the self and the other. But if the problem with modern sociology and even the critical theory of interlocutors such as Habermas is that it does not have a rich notion of intersubjectivity (cf. Giri, 1995), similar is also the case with scholars such as Pande. Pande argues that soul is neither objective nor subjective but does not describe its nature in this space of mediation. Nor does he discuss the sociological implication of such a perspective on soul.

In his critique of sociological knowledge, Pande builds upon the distinction between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* in the Indian tradition. *Puruṣa* is self-conscious while *Prakṛti* is not. But this is an outmoded view of reality as the narrative of quantum physics now attests. In quantum physics, an all-pervading consciousness permeates reality, physical and social, and this can have radical implications for our conceptions of society (cf. Zohar and Marshall, 1994). A quantum view of reality can help us break the hierarchic conceptions of society existing in the Indian tradition where the Brahmanas are all *Puruṣas* and *Śūdras* are all *Prakṛti*. Even contemporary social scientists seem to have gone a step ahead of the Advaita Vedāntins as they urge us to overcome the distinction between the human and the natural in our conceptualization of relationships (see, Gulbenkian Commission, 1995; Haraway, 1990; and Habermas, 1990).

Coming to the existing social relationship in the Indian tradition as presented by Pande one fails to see how one can defend the caste system in consideration of some esoteric notion of dharma or in the light of what supposedly existed in the Vedic times. Pande does not find it problematic that even in the Vedic times the Śūdras were debarred from the reading of the Vedas. *Varṇāśrama dharma*, for Pande, is the foundation of Indian society but as Daya Krishna argues: 'The so-called verṇāśrama dharma is a misnomer as every *varṇa* is not entitled to all the *āśramas*"' (Daya Krishna, 1996: 60). 'As is well-known, the *Śūdras* are not entitled to *sannyāsa* and *vānaprastha* and presumably not to *brahmacārya* if it is interpreted in the technical sense of going to the guru and living in the gurukula after the *upanayana* of the *yañgyopavita* ceremony"' (Daya Krishna, 1996: 61).

Puruṣārtha is another important concept in Indian tradition with which Pande works and it has a wider significance. But the four conventional *puruṣārthas* are drawn by the ideal of *mokṣa*—salvation. Usually, salvation has meant the salvation of the self and this does not

necessarily mean the salvation of the world. The predominant significance of *mokṣa* as a *puruṣārtha* has tended to obliterate the need for developing the capacity for otherness in other *puruṣārthas*. Daya Krishna (1996: 28) again helps us understand this: 'From the perspective of *mokṣa*, *dharma* is seen not as an other-oriented consciousness or even as the fulfilment of categorical imperatives, but rather in terms of the effects it has on one's consciousness. The consciousness-centric perspective of *mokṣa* thus turns the 'other-centric' perspective of *dharma* completely around the discussion of one's consciousness. Thus, instead of being concerned with the consciousness and self-consciousness of others . . . one begins to be concerned with the effects that actions have on one's own consciousness.'

Finally, Pande argues that tolerance has been an essential ingredient of Indian culture and Islam has been an integral part of it But Pande has maintained total silence over the demolition of the Babri Masjid which took place one year after the delivery of these lectures and two years before their publication. What would be the response of traditional faith to such fundamentalist onslaught on society which paradoxically uses some of the elements of the same vocabulary, for instance as that of *sanātana dharma*, as Pande does?

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The pursuit of pleasure and the seeking of *śreya* or a noble desire may not be altogether different processes. In fact, in the journey of our self-development, the seeking of *śreya* can be pleasure-giving.
2. In this context, it is important to recall the arguments of Sri Aurobindo (1962) that because of their proximity to the structure of power, history is replete with examples where systems of religions have annihilated spirituality.
3. For understanding the disjunction between systemic law and principles of justice which uphold human dignity, see Unger (1987), Das (1995) and Giri (1996).
4. The same is true about the predicament of ethics today which is characterized by the persistence of ethical dilemmas. See, Giri, 1994.
5. Such an approach is different from the interpretative approaches in contemporary anthropology, for instance, as in the work of Clifford Geertz. Geertz argues that 'understanding the form and pressure of . . . native's inner lives is more like grasping a proverb, catching an allusion, seeing a joke . . . than it is like achieving a communion' (quoted in Buraway, 1991: 4). But Pande would like to emphasize the communion that takes place between two souls in conversations and anthropological interactions.

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Book Reviews

R.N. NUGAYEV: *Reconstruction of Scientific Theory Change*, translated from the Russian, Kazam University Press, Kazam, 1989, pp. 200.

Originally published in Russian, the book has been translated into English specifically for the purpose of reviewing. Though the translation is quite poor and one often faces difficulty in grasping the correct purport of the author, the work is yet quite impressive displaying keen understanding of contemporary attempts at tackling the problem of theory-change in the cognitive enterprise that is modern science. The author critically examines major trends of thought in the area, namely the monotheoretic approach, Lakatosian approach, Kuhnian approach and the descriptive approach; shows their inadequacies and then, choosing the descriptive/normative approach as the most promising one, develops it further and succeeds in *explaining* various methodological events in actual history of modern science which have presumably remained unexplained so far by these earlier models. The model developed by the author is novel in certain respect as it employs novel concepts such as that of 'cross-coordination', or, that of 'resolution of contradiction', not employed so far by the philosophers of science as far as we know. Yet the model remains by and large simple and compact, not becoming very clumsy, which thus is an advantage often not accruing to complicated extended models that have emerged during the last decade or so.

The main thrust of the author seems to be this: Any adequate model of methodology of modern science ought to explain the process of theory-change and since the process involves situations of choice between 'empirically equivalent' theories, the model ought to provide *criteria* of theory choice that work *within* actual historical unfolding. Thus, according to the author, 'If an anomaly is caused by the cross of several fundamental theories contradicting each other, it cannot be eliminated by usual methods that consist in the modification of partial theoretical systems. Its real and effective elimination demands the resolution of the cross-contradiction. And the latter is possible only by the global theory construction that should contain the cross-theories as its partial ones.'

Borrowing some concepts from earlier works in Russian by Stjopin (1976), Bransky (1973), and Podgoretzky and Smorodinsky (1980), the author develops a normative model of theory-change and shows by instantiation of actual historical situations of theory change (such as electrodynamics, quantum theory and relativity theory) that change of any given fundamental theory is caused by clashes with anomalies connected with other fundamental theories existing in the field and contradicting the fundamental theory undergoing change. The anomalies

could be eliminated only by the resolution of the cross-contradictions between the several fundamental theories, that is, by the construction of a global theory. The global theory emerges by realization of reductionist or synthetic programmes. In the long run, that programme wins which can effectively eliminate the cross-contradiction. Thus, 'The link connecting the anomalies existence with the cross-contradiction constitutes one of the main distinctions of the model appearance constitutes one of the main distinctions of the model proposed here from Lakatos's methodology. The historical agents that take part in a scientific revolution can sometimes not realize that puzzling anomalies are connected with the cross-contradiction. Yet this contradiction will be resolved by them in any way. They will try to eliminate the anomalies until they find such a theory that can resolve the contradiction.'

Now the central concepts in this model are the 'crossbred objects', 'crossbred theory' and 'cross-contradiction'. Problem situations in science arise when two theories are simultaneously employed for explaining certain experimental data. This is achieved by constructing a system of derivative objects/concepts from the basic objects/concepts of the theories. Such derivative objects are the *cross-bred objects* of the model. The two theories that are employed jointly for explanation are called *cross-theories* and the set of statements describing the relations between cross-bred objects is called a *crossbred theory*. In the system of crossbred objects, the objects characterized by incompatible properties give rise to mutually contradicting statements in both cross-theories. Such appearance of incompatible statements when theories cross is called a *cross-contradiction* which thus is required to be resolved and is subsequently achieved by the synthetic/reductive activity of global theory construction.

The distinction between a cross-theory and a cross-bred theory requires further elaboration since it is quite crucial to the model. From the indications available in the text one may say that a cross-theory is one of the two or more theories that are jointly employed for explaining the puzzling facts or the problematic situation or the anomalies; whereas a crossbred theory is that which is constituted exclusively by the set of statements describing the relations between crossbred objects alone. The crossbred theory, then, may be visualized as a 'new offspring' with the *potential* of attaining a global status, it is a seedling which may *possibly* grow into a full blown global theory upon proper systematization and success in resolution of the cross-contradiction(s). The author has cited many instances from actual history for illustration of this point but the sort of *cognitive processes* that are taking place during this 'period of incubation' are required to be worked out more thoroughly.

The important role of historical agents in affecting a scientific revolution specifically and in cognitive pursuit generally was brought to notice, first of all, by Kuhn, and Nugayev has preserved this feature in

his model also. Since then the activity of historical agents in this regard has been described as puzzle solving activity or the activity of eliminating anomalies or the activity of resolving problems or that of explaining novel facts, etc., in the very wide sense of the terms. Nugayev now holds that it is essentially the activity of resolving the cross-contradictions in spite of the fact that the historical agents may themselves not realize that they are actually resolving some cross-contradiction(s). The concept of resolution of a cross-contradiction is certainly more precise, or, at least as precise as that of 'explaining novel facts'. What is more important however is that the historical agents seem to be moving forward in their cognitive pursuit without thorough understanding of the methodological significance of their activity. And yet, had the historical agents understood such significance, actual history would have been different. This, then, is the paradox of methodological models! The more the historical agents appreciate and understand the methodological significance of their cognitive activity, the more would be the need for reconstruction of history. Indeed, such situations have availed in the history of cognitive seeking of man. Indian seer-thinkers consciously sought proper methodology of cosmological theorizing as early as 600 bCE and worked out fundamental methodological principles of generation, construction and appraisal of rational knowledge systems on the one hand and of inner-seeing of the early origins of cosmos on the other hand (by the well-known methodology of *samādhi*). Such situations burden the task of methodologist for he has now to investigate how the increasing methodological awareness amongst historical agents affects the actual history of modern scientific seeking itself?

The idea of emergence of global theory resolving the cross-contradictions is also beset with difficulties and here, again, we may learn from the experience of cosmological theorizers in India. Firstly, the search for more and more global theories cannot be an endless pursuit and we expect *final* global or Grand Unified Theory/Theories (GUT) to emerge. The Final Global Theory (FGT) or GUT is bound to emerge because of the observational limit of historical agents beyond which further *deeper* facts cannot be unearthed by instruments or any other means whatsoever. Moreover several FGTs or GUTs are likely to emerge because alternative explanations of available fact are logically possible. Secondly, the process of theory globalization implies that as theories become more and more global, they become less and less refutable as has been well recognized. Thus, several such theories would come into existence each explaining a large mass of facts and each having its attendant anomalies—the theory-specific anomalies so to say. Since no more FGT or GUT would be possible in principle, a situation of theory choice would arise in a different way: each FGT/GUT has emerged after resolving some cross-contradictions and each has attendant anomalies and each explains a wide mass of facts. Which

FGT/GUT ought to be chosen in such a situation? Would it be a matter of personal preference of historical agents or can they evolve some criteria of choice different from, say, that of cross-contradiction resolution? Or, can the historical agents conclude that since no FGT/GUT entirely free from anomalies explaining *all* the accessible facts is possible, the idea of theorization itself is defunct and such pursuit ought to be given up once and for all? Needless to elaborate, numerous directions are possible in such a situation and this requires deeper thinking on the cognitive process of globalization of theories itself.

Thirdly, if at a certain stage, any FGT/GUT is not refutable in principle, what is its cognitive status? For instance, how does it differ from 'meta-physics' of scholastics or dogmatic rationalists such as Descartes and Leibniz? Finally, if no FGT/GUT entirely free from anomalies is possible, does it not point towards deeper limitations of historical agents (as theorisers) themselves, that is, towards the fundamental nature of man himself? Is the human mind by nature such that it can never exceed a certain limit to theoretical access to deepest available facts?

The seer-thinkers of India as theorizers of rational cosmologies, came to the conclusion as early as 600 bCE that certain cosmically universal, methodological principles such as the principle of cause-and-effect or the principle of regularity/uniformity of cosmos/nature are in principle irrefutable in the face of any number of evidences to the contrary. They claimed to 'know' such principles by innerseeing. However, the realization that grand cosmological theories are also not refutable in spite of their admitting some anomalies, came as late as 300 bCE or so. Such realization triggered the search for logics different from the ordinary two-valued logic—namely, the four-valued logic of the Buddhists and the seven-valued logic of the Jainas. A remarkable feature of all the diverse cosmological theories that emerged was that these first and foremost sought criteria for defining the logical-All so that the area of rational discourse may be marked out in advance demarcating that about which humans can speak/systematize/propound from that about which nothing can be said. Several alternative cosmological theories were systematically constructed rationally and attempts were made to *sharpen* them logically by criticism and defence,—realising that no such theory can ever be refuted conclusively. The idea of a well defined logical-All preliminary to detailed theorization itself rested on admittance of cognitive limits of human mind,—the limits were presumably reached by the methodology of inner-seeing, sophisticated instrumental observation not being available at the time.

* * *

The idea that any adequate model of modern scientific methodology ought to be sensitive to actual historical unfolding of cognitive events

has been very fruitful in enriching thinkers about historiographical methods although one can be easily skeptical about the actualization of such a programme in methodological models themselves. For one thing, there can be no unique series of event unfolding in history and historical agents can actualize the goals by several diverse series of event unfolding. For another, if the model concentrates on any such series of event unfolding, that, is on actual history, then the principles of methodology it is likely to discover would be too specific and are likely to prove inadequate when tested against some alternative series of event unfolding as historical agents of some future process actualize same or similar goal(s). For this reason, would it not be prudent to construct a model that provides only the central principles of practice/method providing guidelines only to the seekers. Moreover, since no methodological model, howsoever fine-tuned, can ever ensure success of the goal(s), what are such finer and finer models aiming at? If they are aiming at more and more thorough understanding of modern scientific enterprise itself, would not the central principles of practice/method as guidelines attended by actual practice suffice for a thorough understanding? Further, would not the study of history of event unfolding of modern scientific enterprise itself aid in such understanding? Indeed, historical agents participating in the cognitive process seem to pay greater attention to the history of the enterprise rather than to its methodology, for awareness of history itself enriches the mind regarding the underlying principles of practice/method in a general way.

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Study and review of the present work has afforded the opportunity to know the sort of intellectual activity going on in Russia in scientific methodological thought. Limitations of language prevent us from more thorough acquaintance with such activity and the present work is likely to be quite popular in intellectual circles here if it is translated into Hindi. Limitations of space in the present journal as also reviewer's anxiety to avoid technicalities have prevented him from presenting a more thorough and detailed review of the work which it certainly deserves. It is hoped that an improved English translation of the work will be published sooner or later.

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UDAYANĀCĀRYA: *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi*, edited by Anantalal Thakur, ICPR, New Delhi, 1976, XIV + 608 pp., Rs. 680.

This deluxe edition of the complete text of *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi* brought out by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research is sure to gladden the hearts of all ardent lovers and scholars of ancient Indian logic. It will be no exaggeration to say that no ancient Sanskrit treatise has so far been printed in such an impeccable and attractive form, except *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, which is the Council's own publication, as this. The credit for the beautiful get up, neat and tidy printing of the treatise goes to Sri Buddhadev Bhattacharya, the Executive Editor of the Council who is quite well known for his publication work in the field of Sanskrit philosophical literature for the past several decades. The editor of the text, Professor Anantalal Thakur, deserves high praise for his extraordinary zeal for pursuing his pet project which he had nicknamed as *Nyāyacaturgranthikā* (as it comprises the four major commentaries and sub-commentaries of Nyāya aphorisms. namely Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, Uddyotakara's commentary called *Nyāyavārttika* on the *Bhāṣya* besides the above-mentioned two treatises) for over forty years and bringing it to a successful end. Earlier, Professor Thakur himself had edited the first chapter of *Tātparyapariśuddhi* under the auspices of the Mithila Institute of Darbhanga in one volume consisting of the first chapter only of all the remaining three commentaries. Since that time Nyāya scholars—some of whom might have passed away by this time—have been eagerly waiting for the complete edition of *Tātparyapariśuddhi*. They would never have expected that their long-cherished desire would be so excellently fulfilled.

There is ample reason for feeling so euphoric about this publication. The published work is of extraordinary importance for the study of the older Nyāya school, more important than even the text *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* of which it is the commentary, because many logical issues in Nyāya arising from its opposition to Buddhist logical doctrines have been raised by Vācaspati Miśra, the author of *Tātparyaṭīkā* but insufficiently discussed by him. It is Udayana, the author of the present work, who has thoroughly thrashed out these issues by meeting squarely all arguments that have been and could be raised by the Buddhist and other critics of Nyāya. Udayana's ingenuity in elaborating and interpreting the text is simply marvellous. Right from the first prayer-verse of the text the interpretative originality of this great logician of ancient India manifests itself. In fact, every important logical or philosophical issue concerned with the older Nyāya and some basic issues of Navya Nyāya or the Neological School which came into existence long after Udayana, have been raised and discussed by him in this monumental commentary of his.

It is not surprising therefore that Udayana cherished reasonable pride of his vast learning and capacity of original thinking. A verse expressing his pride and composed by Udayana himself has come down to us from antiquity. The verse reads like this:

वदमिह पद्विद्यां तर्कमान्वीक्षिकीं वा ।
यदि पथि विपये वा वर्तयाम: सपेया: ।।
उद्यति दिशि यस्यां भानुमान्सैव पूर्वा ।
न हि तरणिरुदीते दिक् पराधीन वृत्ति: ।।

Udayana says in this verse that whichever way he handled the doctrines of logic, the science of grammar or any other school of thought, he must be regarded as justified. He is like the sun who by his rise marks a direction as eastern. It is not by ascertaining first the eastern direction that the sun rises there.

Many apocryphal stories about Udayana are widely current in Sanskrit literature. Udayana was a great devotee of Lord Śiva and his incarnations. At one time he even publicly challenged God to miraculously open the gates of a temple which were shut by his critics in his face. It is said that when even after a couple of days' waiting of Udayana the gates did not open Udayana warned the deity that nobody would care for it if it did not listen to his prayer. At this, the gates of the temple opened suddenly and Udayana's faith was vindicated.

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VĀCASPATI MIŚRA: *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, edited by Anantalal Thakur, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, pp. xii + 709, 1996 Rs. 800.

The Indian Council of Philosophical Research has done a great service to the philosophical community in general and to those interested in *Nyāyaśāstra* in particular, by presenting in beautiful print and attractive decor the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra edited by the authoritative learned professor of *Nyāyadarśana*—Sri Anantalal Thakur, providing, in addition, a compendium in a modern analytical way. Professor Thakur has already devoted more than fifty years to the editing of the fourfold Nyāya texts—*Nyāyabhāṣya, Nyāyavārttika, Nyāyatātparyaṭīkā* and *Nyāyatātparyapariśuddhi*. Whenever we look at this edition we feel happy.

Before this, *Nyāyatātparyaṭīkā* was earlier published two or three times. It was published from Vārāṇasi by Paṇḍit Rājarājeśwara Śāstri Dravida. Professor Tārānāth Tarkatīrtha and Professor Amarendra Mohan

Tarkatūrtha published it from Calcutta. But it did not contain the authoritative and absolutely correct text as one would desire. Hence, a thorough expert in the discipline was needed who could present it in the rectified form. Professor Thakur met the requirement, devoted a long time to the text and has succeeded in his undertaking. This can be stated with conviction. The reason for this is the success that the editor has attained in tracing other *mātṛkās* by hard work. Constantly reflecting on the text of those *mātṛkās*, the publication of Buddhist and Naiyāyika texts presenting positions and counterpositions and collection of and reflection on the corresponding and similar expressions. These fourfold texts have fulfilled the supportive need of presenting and leading the ancient Nyāya further, just as the exegetic texts of Vardhamāna Upādhyāya entitled *Prakāśa, Nyāyalnkāra* of the Jain Abhayatilakācārya and *Tippaṇaka* of Srikāṇṭhācārya do.

Both these texts were edited by Professor Thakur and have been brought out successively from Baroda and Calcutta. This is well known to the learned experts in the field.

Between Vācaspati and Udayanācārya, *Tātparyavivaraṇapañjikā* of Aniruddhacārya had taken care of the school. Though incomplete, yet being important from the point of view of research this text was edited by Sri Thākur and was published by the Mithilāsaṁskrita Vidyāpīth, Darbhaṅgā. The learned scholar has not merely been engaged in editing the unpublished texts of Nyāya, but he has also edited the works of *Jñānaśrimitra nibandhāvalī, Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*—the competitive texts—with great dedication. The authenticity and the integrity needed for preparing and editing ancient source texts are amply present in this scholar.

In the present work we have seen how the editing of the *mātṛkā* secured from Jaisalmer has proved greatly beneficial. For illustration an example is being presented here: There is an expression to be found in the *Tātparyaṭīkā* published from Vārāṇasi and Calcutta in its old editions—'*Kṛtsnāsadivādarabhūtadivā*'. The passage as given in the *mātṛkā* of Calcutta is—'*Kṛtṛrāsadivādara bhrāta*'. The passage from the personal *mātṛkā* of Viśuddhānand Saraswati reads as—'*Kṛtṛnāsadivādara bhūtdivā*'. But the *mātṛkā* from Jaisalmer provides us here the correct reading, '*Kṛ tṛ rā sa divādara bhūt divā*'. The correct version and authenticity of this reading gets corroborated by the reading quoted from *Nyāyālaṅkāra* of Abhayatilakācārya. Because here its meaning is correctly stated. Since the rest three steps are mentioned here the passage is clear in its complete form. In the *Ṭīkā*:

> *Kṛtṛrāsadivādarabhūtadivā' iti*
> *Śuarāṣṭadivaikarpūrṇdivā*
> *Yadi candragatiśca tithiśca samā*
> *Iti viṣṭigaṇam pravadanti budhāḥ*

These are the remaining three *pādas*. The meaning is thus: kṛ—in the *kṛṣṇapakṣa* (dark fortnight), tṛ—in *tṛtīyā* (third day of the fortnight), rā—*viṣṭi* in *rātri* (night) and sa—*viṣṭi* in *saptami divā* (seventh day or the fortnight), da—*daśmi* (tenth day of the fortnight) ra—*vīṣṭi* in *rātri*, *bhūta*—in *bhūtāṣṭmi* (eighth day of *bhūta* fortnight), in *caturdaśi* (fourteenth day of the fortnight) *viṣṭi*, and śu—*śucipakṣa* (clean fortnight), ca—*caturdaśi*, rā—in the *rātri*, aṣṭa—on the *aṣṭmi* day, ek—*ekādaśi* (eleventh day of the fortnight), ra—in the *rātri, pūrṇa—viṣṭi* in *pūrṇimā divā* (fifteenth day of the fortnight) (*Nyāyalaṅkāra*, pp. 778–79).

In this passage the well-known *viṣṭi*—indication according to Jyotiṣa śāstra has been established.* Having edited *Nyāyālaṅkāra* earlier, it was possible for Sri Thakur to have presented the related part in the Jaisalmer *mātṛkā* of *Tātparyaṭīkā* in a way in which one could be convinced of its correctness with little effort. Sri Thakur alone has thoroughly discussed the confusion prevalent in the earlier scholars, and the silence observed by the commentators of the Nyāya texts in respect of this passage in the preface to *Nyāyālaṅkāra*. This text has been published by the Oriental Institute of Baroda.

In the Calcutta edition, both the very learned editors, teachers of this edition, have mentioned in several places in *Tātparyaṭīkā*, their own reading in their comments which has been supported by the Jaisalmer *mātṛkā: Tātparyaṭīkā*. We bow with respect before these two teachers for such an evaluation, whose intelligence and thinking followed and open-minded approach while editing the text. These intellectuals are blessed and have done credit to our country, whose reflection resulted in the construction of the text of the same *Tātparyaṭīkā* which coincided with *mātṛkā* though they had not seen it. As *Tārānāth Nyāyatīrtha* comments in the *Tātparyaṭīkā* on p. 27, 'I believe that the correct reading would be *niṣedhan* in place of *niṣedhat*, and *dṛṣyāntarābhāvam* in place of *dṛṣyāntarbhāvam*.'

Besides on p. 31, only this reading—*tadbhāvapratiṣedhaḥ iṣōrbhāv* is right. Therefore, this needs the attention of the scholars.

Again on p. 63, only *parijñānārthameva kevalam*, this reading is right in our view. In the same way, this has been shown that the Jaisalmer *mātṛkā* gives this text antecedently as given here in the corrected form by the editor. The indicated reading in the comment there having the support of the *mātṛkā*, the published text in the comment is the same as that of the Calcutta edition.

We have found this after examining the matter and in order to back our statement have shown it here only to point the direction.

In the same way, reflecting on the hidden and missing text of the *Tātparyaṭīkā* before *mātṛkā*, the editor feels highly satisfied. We infer this

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*If the motion of moon and the date (*tithi*) coincide then the learned call it *viṣṭigaṇa*.

by noticing his partiality there. This is natural also. The great poet Harṣa has also said 'one is partial to the greats'. Here one finds three passages in the end of Chapter IV which have been taken from the Jaisalmer *mātṛkā*. They are not to be found in any (other) *mātṛkā* or edition.

For example:

> *Nivāritāneknibandhameghpaṅktīḥ*
> *		sphurannirmaladiguiśeṣā/*
> *Ṭīkeyamudyotakarprsaṅgamātanvatī'*
> *		bhāṇti śaraddvitīyā// 1//*
> *Parihṛtadūṣaṇa kaṇṭakamaphaṭkunibandha*
> *		Paṅksamparkam/*
> *Udyotakargavīnām mārgam*
> *		darśayati ṭikeyam// 2 //*
> *Ṭikāmimām vādamṛṇāladaṇḍām*
> *		jalpormimālām sarasīmvāpya/*
> *Adyāyamudyotakaraḥ samartho*
> *		vikāsitum sūrimanombujāni// 3//***

This has not escaped the notice of the learned scholar that these passages are meaningful, useful and relevant. The reading of the ancient texts is correct, authentic and rectified, so feel the learned. The reasons for this are: reflection of different experts, the investigation of the reading of the other *mātṛkā* which remains hidden, the availability of other passages having similarity with the one in question.

The discerning editor has used all these facts in that edition. This fact does not need overemphasis.

Therefore, in this respect, the editor and the publisher both are to be congratulated. We hope that soon Indian Council of Philosophical Research would publish the remaining parts of the fourfold texts —*Bhāṣyavārtika* and *Pariśuddhirūpa*, in the historical perspective with an extensive and authoritative introduction as edited by Sri Thākur himself.

Gaṅgānāth Jhā Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyāpīth,		KISHORE NATH JHA
Chandrashekhar Azād Park, Allahabad-211002

**This commentary is like a luminous flawless specific quarter which has dispelled several essays like cloud lines, having cool weather, spreading the splendour of the expanse of Uddyotakara like moon.

Getting rid of defects like thorns, distancing from the touch of ill-written essay like mire, this commentary indicates the path of the word of Uddyotakara.

Full of *jalpa* like waves, having *vāda* like lotus stems, having attained the pond like commentary, this Uddyotakara has succeeded in causing the heart like lotuses of learned to bloom.

R.C. PRADHAN: *Philosophy of Meaning and Representation*, Printworld Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1996, pp. 256, Rs. 275.

This is a neat little book which while 'surveying all the landmark developments in the recent philosophy of language' seeks to demonstrate that 'meaning arises only when the linguistic representation of the world take place. This is to say that language acquires meaning only by virtue of being about the world' (p. viii). In contrast to the anti-representationism of the late Wittgenstein and more recently of Richard Rorty, Dr Pradhan holds that 'linguistic representations say something about the world in their very structure' (p. ix).

The immediate and natural question is: what exactly does 'being about the world' entail, that is, what is at stake in the author's notion of representation which is so central to the book?

Dr Pradhan does tell us in numerous contexts and in many ways which are worth repeating here.

> The linguistic representations of the world reveal the fact that the world is what it is because of its being represented in language' (p. ix).

Again, 'language is involved in the world. This I call a representational relation between language and the world' (p.x). He suggests that the issue is not between representation and the notion of a game but 'whether we can think of language that is not about the world at all.' Nor is there a conflict between realism and anti-realism as far as the author's notion of representation goes. In the holistic framework that he argues for, objectivity and the human world are easily reconciled in meaning which let us recall, arises only when linguistic representations of the world take place. Much of the book examines the views of prominent philosophers of language in order to demonstrate that representationism is embedded in them.

Take the later Wittgenstein, Dr Pradhan has this to say about the transition from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations*:

> So a more radical turn was made to show that language games alone can be taken as the ways of world representation. The demand is no more that we describe the world in our language. Rather it is now necessary to throw open the world to language as it is, that is, to make it available in the natural language formations.(p. 58)

In explanation of his use of the term 'representation', the author says: 'To call language games the methods of representations is to say that in language alone there is talk of representation' (p. 57). 'This is the underlying principle of representation which we have taken for granted' (p. 58).

So far, so good though one might reasonably protest that Dr Pradhan

is stretching the notion of representation here. However, later in the book discussing 'Truth Reference and the World Order' (which last he claims is 'the foundation of modern semantics' (p. 126), Dr Pradhan says: '. . . it is the notion of the world which is the basis of all language and so language itself stands as surety of the world . . . '(p. 126)

Taken all together, these claims are rather perplexing and the crucial question that now arises is: what does such a principle of representation rule out as a possible relation between language and the world? The answer (as far as I could make out), is, very little, except perhaps the possibility of there being no world at all, since language at least is in the world. This then is the Achilles' heel of a book that otherwise does a commendable job of representing (*sic!*) the most well-known positions in current philosophy of language.

Although the title of the book mentions meaning and representation, the crucial intermediary between these, about which Dr Pradhan has much to say, is the notion of truth. It is truth that secures both meaning and representation and truth is inbuilt in the very notion of language. Indeed, it turns out to be indistinguishable from representation. Thus, in his discussion of Davidson's article on 'Truth and Meaning' the author easily concludes that since truth is a primitive concept, immanent to language, Davidson's position is that language is representational. Davidson himself in a noncommital statement (not quoted by Pradhan) says: 'We could take truth to be a property not of sentences but of utterances, or speech acts or ordered triples of sentences, times and persons but it is simplest just to view truth as a relation between a sentence, a person and a time (*The Philosophy of Language* edited by A.P. Martinich, p. 88). In fact the author himself notes that since Davidson has in any case given up the classical correspondence theory, it can be argued (as Rorty has done) that Davidson is a non-representationalist. How does he counter this reading? In his words:' . . . it is yet admissible that for Davidson truth is anticipating representations in language since without them there is no necessity of truth in language at all' (p. 70). It was perhaps necessary to deal with Davidson's theory of reference at this point rather than much later in the book, when without too much analysis the author simply dismisses this aspect of Davidson's theory because it 'does not conform to our intuitive understanding of language' (p.113).

In sum: truth is a necessary feature of language. Representation is a necessary condition of truth. Meaning is given in the act of representing. All these relations are treated as given *a priori*. But if (for instance) Dr Pradhan had looked at the literature in the philosophy of science, he would have perhaps been a little less confident than he is on the subject of language as a vehicle of truth. Certainly for theoretical languages the whole notion of truth and representation is far more problematic than is hinted at in this book.

The same somewhat cavalier attitude characterizes discussion on Dummett's constructionist theory of language. After a lucid presentation of the position we are told that 'from our point of view Dummett's theory of meaning is representational as it has not ruled out the possibility of truth being a representational concept' (p. 93). This despite an earlier observation that for Dummett 'both truth and meaning are subject to the decision of the people using language' (p. 92). And so on and on. Whether they are about Quine's principle of the inscrutability of reference about which the somewhat circular comment is: 'The very idea of alternative systems of interpretation of the reference of words is a semantic myth as it leads to extreme scepticism regarding reference' (p. 113) or about his epistemological naturalism that is dismissed because it leads to 'semantic undeterminacy of all kinds and ultimately . . . led to the loss of semantic facts' (p. 180), we are presented with too many conclusions reached by fiat. Dr Pradhan's greatest weapon appears to be a dogged insistence based on an unshakable faith that his premises cannot be controverted. All positions either conform or are served the *reductio ad absurdum* notice. This is unfortunate for the book based is on considerable scholarship and understanding. However, a major protagonist, Richard Rorty, is not discussed at all.

A few comments on the language, style and production values of the book. There are numerous printing errors that I am sure were avoidable. Some unusual locutions are used by the author: a conspicious example is his use of the word 'telling' which is a transitive verb but frequently employed as an intransitive verb by him. I reproduce one set of such occurrences.

'He has gone to the extent of telling that meaning is not possible in the classical sense. . . . It is a first philosophy in the sense that it is telling something about language . . . . Besides it is telling that there is no meaning' (p. 179). It must also be remarked here that although references are given to the writings of the philosophers discussed, the book is almost totally devoid of quotations from their works. In offering an interpretation of the views of others, some support from their actual writings is not just helpful—it is a necessary principle of argumentation —at least in this reviewer's view.

Finally, a general comment. That our young philosophers choosing to write books on truth, meaning and the philosophy of language generally, concern themselves exclusively with foreign authors is understandable if regrettable. But that they do not flinch at making reference to Bhartṛhari in a footnote (see note 7, p. 131) is nothing short of tragic.

New Delhi   MOHINI MULLICK

R. Thangaswami Sarma: *Mīmāṁsā Mañjarī*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1996, 298 pp., Rs. 375.

Professor Thangaswami Sarma has done a yeoman service, both for the layman and for the scholars and students of Mīmāṁsā by writing this monograph on Mīmāṁsā. He has culled information from more than 250 works of Mīmāṁsā starting from the *sūtras* of Jaimini and up to the recent works on the *śāstra* by modern scholars.

The ontological, etymological, epistemological and philosophical, not to mention the ritual details that he has gathered from these works are enormous and need a lot of elucidation, which is not possible to be compressed in a volume like this. That may spill over to several volumes. This volume gives a bird's eye view in as short a space as possible. For instance, he has described the philosophical tenets of this school, namely the reality of the world, the relation between the word and its meaning, the nature of the goal, etc. in just 18 pages in the first chapter. In the second chapter he has delineated the various epistemological aspects. In the third and following chapters, up to the fifth, the special rules of interpretation of this school are discussed succinctly. In the sixth chapter the ontological aspects are elucidated. The seventh chapter deals with the different sub-divisions of the Mīmāṁsā school, the eighth with the major works of different schools of Mīmāṁsā and the ninth consists of various indices.

It is a very useful work for research scholars and I am happy to see such a work as this and recommend to all the university and college libraries to make it available to their readers.

The Indian Council of Philosophical Research deserves kudos for coming forward to finance and publish such a work. But one word of regret will not be out of place; the book is full of printing and proof reading mistakes, which the publishers should strive to remove in the second edition.

Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi   Sampat Narayanan

Tribute

Sundara Rajan's Last Philosophical Testament*

[Professor R. Sundara Rajan passed away on 24 June 1997 at a particularly inopportune time as he was in the midst of giving a final shape to the philosophical thought which he had been developing for the last so many years. Fortunately, a few months back, I had requested him to write a brief account of what he regarded as his main contentions in the field of philosophy and he had kindly sent us the following which has now become the last formulation of his philosophical position.

Editor]

When I look upon some of my writings in the last eight to ten years, I seem to see a few basic issues being present in all of them, in the background as it were, although each one of these texts on the surface was preoccupied with a different problem. If I were to start naming these subliminal dispositions of thought, I would like to formulate them in the form of three basic questions.

1. *The Question of the Second Copernican turn*

In some of my recent work such as *The Humanization of Transcendental Philosophy* and *Beyond the Crisis of the European Sciences* I have explicitly formulated this movement from Cartesian presuppositions as the execution of the second Copernican turn, but the question, I now believe has been with me as early as my very first book *Structure and Change in Philosophy*. If the first Copernican movement is the Kantian regress from the world to self-consciousness as the condition of possibility of our knowledge of the world, the second is a return to the world, without however cancelling or negating the achievements of the first, it is to see the self as in the world and the world as the home of the self, as such it is the condition of the possibility of life. In my work, I have sought to follow some of the consequences of the two Copernican turns on the method as well as problems of philosophising.

2. *The transformation of transcendental philosophy*

The most visible effect of the two turns in my work is the question of new forms of transcendental inquiry. Pursuing this lead, I have, first, attempted to give a hermeneutical turn to the transcendental method (*Towards a*

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*Written just a few months before his passing away on 24 June 1997.

Critique of Cultural Reason). A second methodological issue has been the rethinking of the Critique (*The Concept of Critique* and *Critique and Imagination*) (IPQ). But the most extended discussion had been given to what I would like to call 'the linguistic turn' within transcendental philosophy (*Studies in Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and Deconstruction* and *Transformations of Transcendental Philosophy*.

3. *From Constitution to Participation*

The first problematics of the two Copernican turns has led to the second of my pre-occupations. Ever since Kant, we have come to realize that our experience and knowledge is no mere passive reflection of what is antecendentally given, but that we organise our experiences in the form of an objective world of meaningful order by means of a certain activity or spontaneity of the mind. This is the demand of the transcendental orientation that sees the world as the accomplishment of the subject. But there is another side to the story, namely that man has to find himself as sharing and participating in the world. The problem for philosophy is to understand this mystery of a constituting consciousness being also a participating one. This theme has been one of the guiding motivations of *Transformations of Transcendental Philosophy* while the ecological implications of the idea of participation was explained in my *Philosophy as Ges Philia*. But more recently the philosophy of participation has figured as one of the chief concerns of *Beyond the Crisis of the European Science*.

4. *The Humanization of Transcendental Philosophy*

The concern with participation finally took the form of an attempt to re-understand the transcendental subject as in some sense also the natural, embodied linguistic subject. It is the understanding of the paradoxical unity of the transcendental and the natural that is the theme of *The Humanization of Transcendental Philosophy* which is a study of the consequences of the discovery of the life world by Husserl, of the discovery of Dasein by Heidegger and of participation by Merleau Ponty.

Beyond the Crisis of the European Sciences

My current two-volume work in the philosophy of the human sciences is an attempt to study the implications for science in general and of the human sciences in particular of the above philosophical tendencies. At the same time, it also offers a critical perspective on contemporary western formulations of the problem of philosophy of sciences. In the first volume I study the epistemological transformations effected by the linguistic, the feminist and the ecological turns in general; the second volume proposes to study the changing relationship between philosophy and the sciences in the form of *a life cycle of science.*

1. Science as a possibility
2. Science as a fact
3. Science as a problem
4. Science as Hope

In the process, I attempt a detailed critique of Husserl's eurocentrism in *Transcendental Phenomenology* and *The Crisis of the European Sciences.*

Other Preoccupations

Besides the above concerns, I would like to mention a few other concerns which have motivated some of my work; as such, I would like to mention three themes:

1. *A transcendental understanding of the purusharthas* has been the pre-occupation of three articles (1) *Purusharthas understood in the light of Critical Theory (IPQ)*, (2) *The Theory of the Purusarthas (JICPR)*, (3) *Purusharthas of Life. (IIAS)*.
2. *The Hermeneutics of Political Theory* has been the basic issue in my *The Primacy of the Political.*
3. A phenomenological perspective on innovation and social change; the objective of my book *Innovative Competence and Social Change.*

Of contemporary thinkers, I have concentrated most on Husserl, Heidegger and Ricoeur. I would like to mention what perhaps may be called a certain individual or particular approach to these thinkers, though with regard to Husserl, I have concentrated heavily on the far reaching consequences of the life world. In this connection, perhaps the discussion I offer of Husserl on the ethnologist Levy Brohl in *The Humanisation of Transcendental Philosophy* may be somewhat novel. Similarly the discussion of Heidegger on Science in *The Humanisation of Transcendental Philosophy* and *Beyond the Crisis of the European Sciences*, Vol. II may be mentioned. And, finally in several of my articles on Paul Ricoeur, I have sought to formulate a principle of unity which may integrate a variety of his insights and further I have sought to develop some ideas on the human sciences based on his theory.

An Obituary

Richard V. De Smet, S.J. (1916–1997)

Richard De Smet was born in Charleroi, Belgium in 1916. Educated by Jesuits, he himself joined them in 1934. In the course of his Jesuit training he had the good fortune of being a student of Joseph Marechal, perhaps the most outstanding neo-Thomist philosopher. This was to have a permanent impact on the life and thought of the budding philosopher in De Smet. He arrived in India in 1946. For the next seven years he engaged himself in theological and Indological studies and completed his doctorate in 1953 from the Gregorian University, Rome. His thesis was *The Theological Method of Śaṅkara*. Upon his return to India in 1954 he became the Professor of Metaphysics, Natural Theology and Indian Philosophy in Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, Pune. Pune was to remain the base of his numerous activities till his last illness forced him to go to Belgium for treatment.

Philosophy, for him, was not an achievement of individual, Cartesian cogitations but the fruit of a dialogical encounter. Accordingly, he took an active part in the meetings of various philosophical forums. From his first year in Pune, he was a regular participant in the annual sessions of The Indian Philosophical Congress. He took an active part in the monthly meetings of the Pune University Philosophy Union and other similar associations. He went on lecture tours in Ahmedabad, Allahabad, Nagpur, Benaras and Visva-Bharati Universities and the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta. He was also associated with the Radhakrishnan Centre for Advanced Study directed by T.M.P. Mahadevan and Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla. His reputation took him overseas to attend the International Society for Metaphysics in Jerusalem and Nairobi, International Association of New Era in San Diego, Irish School of Economics (Dublin), Divinity School (Cambridge), Vrije Universitait (Amsterdam), Department of Philosophy, Louvain, Brussels and Bordeaux in Belgium, Warsaw and Lublin in Poland. His book, *Philosophical Activity in Pakistan* was occasioned by his participation in the Pakistan Philosophical Congress at Karachi.

His literary output is enormous. They include three books which he wrote or edited, and over 600 articles and book reviews. The books are: *The Theological Method of Śaṅkara, Philosophical Activity in Pakistan* and *Religious Hinduism*. He has contributed 68 articles to the *Marathi Encyclopedia of Philosophy* and about a hundred shorter ones to the *Portuguese-Brasilian Encyclopedia*, VERBO. His main themes are Indian Philosophy (prominently Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta, and History of

Indian Thought), Indian Religions, Inter-religious Dialogue, Ecumenism and General Philosophy.

One of his former students narrates this incident: 'In 1995, on my first visit to Kalady, the birthplace of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya in Kerala, I sent him a note to thank him for his lectures of infectious enthusiasm on the great thinker. He replied with a few lines from Kabir to the effect that the vow of the truth-seeker is harder than that of the warrior, for the warrior fights for a few hours, but the truth-seeker's battle goes on day and night ceaselessly, as long as life lasts.' That was Professor De Smet: a relentless truth-seeker. What impelled him on this life-long search was the conviction that 'Whatever is true, by whomsoever it is uttered, is from the Holy Spirit.' It must have been this conviction that led him to consider people of all cultures and religious traditions as 'converging brethren' marching together towards unity in faith and love. He called himself a 'hyphen-priest', hyphening between the Catholic Church and our converging brethren", whether Protestants, Orthodox, Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Muslims, atheists, and even some Russian and East German communists.

Philosophically, it was Śaṅkarācārya's Advaita Vedānta, together with the neo-Thomism of Marechal that were to remain his life-long love and inspiration. 'Thomism', according to him, 'offers the best Western parallel to Advaita'. He rejects the illusionistic interpretation of Advaita and argues that Śaṅkara and St. Thomas converge on a number of significant points. Both have a correct view of the Absolute which preserves the divine transcendence even when the world is accepted as real. Both make liberation the ultimate goal of their teaching and regard liberation as 'the blissful intellectual experience of the Godhead and the complete cessation of man's ignorance.' Both have the starting-point of their analogical method in divine revelation and according to De Smet, the three steps to divine transcendence of the *via affirmationis, via negationis,* and *via eminentiae* have their perfect correspondence in Śaṅkara's process of *lakṣaṇa* or analogy. His interpretation of Śaṅkara, although radically different from that of others, has gained the respect of many, not only because it provides an alternative and plausible interpretation but also because he studied the texts well and admired Śaṅkara and the Advaitic tradition. Eventually De Smet came to be regarded as one of the foremost Vedāntins in India. But it was not merely a matter of interpreting Vedānta at the academic level. His quest regarding the authentic meaning of Advaita finally led him to the realization. that the Christian faith as expounded by the early thinkers of the Church could be described as an authentic Advaita experience. Besides his interpretation of Advaita, his attempt to trace the history of the concept of person in Indian thought will be of lasting value.

His hyphening activity did not stop at the intellectual level. He was a welcome visitor to the Divine Life Society's Shivananda Ashram at Rishikesh, where he would be invited to address crowds of Indian and

foreign visitors for their evening *Satsang.* One year he gave an intensive six-week course on Indian Spirituality to such a group. He spoke about the 'striking similarities between Guru Nanak and Jesus' at Punjabi University, Patiala, at their international Sikh Seminar. To the Jains he spoke in Pune about the parallel significance of the nakedness of Mahāvīra and that of Jesus Christ (on the cross). Though no specialist in Islam, Professor De Smet was invited by the Jamia Millia team of 'Islam and the Modern Age' for seminars and to contribute articles. Indeed, he was a sage who could delve deep into any religious tradition and emerge with shining pearls.

Above all, Fr. Richard was a warm human being who could be at home not only with the learned and the intellectuals but also with the children and the poor. It was a common sight to find him playing with the children of the neighbourhood. And the time he spent in telling them stories, playing games and showing them tricks was as much a delight to him as it was to them. He was specially concerned about the welfare of the children of the workers: helping them in their studies and guiding them to choose suitable careers. This was another side of the man: a warm-hearted philanthropist with the simplicity of a child.

Fr. De Smet once said of his teacher Joseph Marechal that he 'was outstanding in those virtues which Socrates (in Plato's Gorgias 487, 2–7) defines as proper to a genuine partner in dialogue: 'learning (*episteme*), friendly feelings (*eunoia*) and frankness of speech (*parrhesia*)'. These very same words could as well have been a self-description, for Richard was all these; and that made him truly a man of dialogue.

De Nobili College, Pune   GEORGE KARUVELIL

ANNOUNCEMENT

The *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* plans to publish an issue dealing with implications of developments in modern logic for philosophy under the editorship of Prof. Anil Gupta and Dr Andre Chapuis, under the title "Circularity, Definition and Truth". Papers are invited for inclusion in this issue. Authors should send their manuscripts to the following address:

> Dr Andre Chapuis
> Department of Philosophy
> Indiana University
> Bloomington IN 47405
> USA

The deadline for the submission of manuscripts is 1 July 1998. It is expected that the issue will appear some time in the year 1999.

ANNOUNCEMENT

Some recent outstanding new publications of classsical texts in Indian Philosophy.

1. *Nyāyatattvāloka* by Vācaspati Miśra, II
   Kishor Nath Jha
   G.N. Jha Research Institute, Allahabad, 1992.
2. *Nyāyavarttikatātparyapariśuddhi* of Udayanācārya
   Anantalal Thakur
   ICPR, New Delhi, 1996.
3. *Nyāyāmṛatum* of Vyāsatīrtha along with

   (a) *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusudana Saraswati
   (b) *Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī* by Vyāsa Rāmācārya
   (c) *Nyāyāmṛtakantakodhara* by Anand Bhaṭṭāraka Pāndurangi
   (d) *Nyāyāmṛtaprakaśa* by Srīnivāsa Tīrtha

   edited in three volumes by Prof. K.T. Pandurangi
   Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Foundation, Bangalore, 1994.