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JICPR

Editor DAYA KRISHNA

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Note to Contributors

JICPR welcomes contributions in all fields of Philosophy. However, it would like its contributors to focus on what they consider to be significantly new and important in what they have to say and to consider the counter arguments to what they are saying. This is to ensure that others may judge that what they are saying is on the whole more reasonable than the views opposed to their own. The historical preliminaries may be avoided unless they are absolutely necessary to the development of the argument, as it may be assumed that most of the readers of the *Journal* are already familiar with them. Reference and quotations are generally to be avoided except in an article that is specifically exegetical. Even in such cases the author is expected to give substantive reasons as to why he differs from the accepted interpretations. The article should, as far as possible, avoid jargon and the author's contention should be stated in as simple a language as possible.

The articles which use Sanskrit terms should use the standard diacritical marks, a specimen list of which is given at the end of the *Journal*.

Editorial correspondence, including manuscripts for submission should be sent to Prof. Daya Krishna, Editor, *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, B/189 A, University Marg, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur - 302 015, or to the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Rajendra Bhavan, IVth Floor, 210, Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Marg, New Delhi, 110 002. Articles should be between 3000 to 6000 words, two copies of which should be submitted. They should be typed on one side of the paper, double spaced with ample margins, and contain author(s)/ contributor's name and his/her institutional affiliation along with the complete mailing address. An abstract of 150–200 words should be included. Notes and references should appear at the end of the articles as *Notes*.

Only papers which have not been published elsewhere will be considered.

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For the papers written in English, words from Sanskrit, Ardhamāgadhī and other Prakrits including the Apabhraṁśa etc., will be diacriticised if rendered in Roman script. (Quotations can also be in Nāgarī script.) (Here we suggest those for the Sanskrit (classical), the Prakrit, the Apabhraṁśa, and the Dravidic languages. For other languages, namely Arabic, Persian and the modern European languages, the current international conventions for transliteration for their rendering may be followed.)

Continued on back cover

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DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

From the Editor's Desk

Dear Readers,

The *JICPR* is entering its fifteenth year and we thought it is time to look back and see if what we had promised four years ago when I last addressed you in the pages of this *Journal* has been fulfilled. Also, we think it is time to look ahead and think afresh and plan for something new, something different.

When we look back, we find that our idea of having a dialogue between western Indologists and traditional scholars did not make much headway, mainly because we discovered to our surprise that the former were not willing to enter into a real dialogue on equal terms on the subject. In fact, many of them did not even care to respond to our repeated invitations to do so. The idea of a global community of intellect is perhaps only a distant dream to be realized only when greater 'equality' prevails in other realms which, incidentally, have nothing to do with matters that pertain to intellect or reason.

In any case, the last such attempt was made in the context of Professor J.C. Heesterman's contention regarding the radical distinction between the *Śukla* and the *Kṛṣna Yajurveda* and the presence of the renunciatory tradition in the latter, as reported in the *JICPR* Vol. XII, No. 1 and then given up altogether.

More successful was the attempt in the 'Notes and Queries' section where a number of issues were raised which met with immediate response from the philosophical community in India. Starting from Vol. XI, No. 2, a number of queries were raised such as 'Does Mīmāṁsā treat the theory of *karma* as *pūrva pakṣa*?' (XI, 2), 'Kant's Doctrine of Categories: Some Problems' (XI, 3), 'What Exactly is Meant when We Talk of Different types of Philosophical Texts in the Indian Tradition?' (XI, 3), 'Is Nyāya Realist or Idealist?' (XII, 1), 'Different Forms of Advaita : What Do they Mean?' (XII, 3), 'The Concept of *Āhārya-jñāna*: Some Queries' (XIII, 1), 'Can Navya Nyāya analysis make a distinction between sense and reference?' (XIII, 3), 'Is Udayana a *pracchanna* advaitin?' (XIII, 3).

These queries evoked a number of responses from various persons and provided some clarification regarding the issues that were raised. However, they themselves brought to light not only deep differences in the understanding of what was sought to be clarified, but also raised new issues which have not yet been highlighted or become the focus of further discussion.

One of the disturbing features of the responses has been that most of those who have chosen to comment and clarify have seen the questions as aimed at unsettling the settled orthodoxies which appear to provide a safe haven for the conventional understanding of the issues concerned.

This seems even truer of the queries that were raised regarding the issues in Indian philosophy. Instead of treating the questions as opening horizons for further thinking on the subject, almost everyone appears to have taken it as an attack on the traditionally built citadels of their *sampradāyas* and rushed to defend them as if something disastrous would happen if the walls were breached and fresh air or waters allowed to flow in.

This has also seemed to be the case with those who have responded to articles questioning the positions considered sacrosanct by almost all those who have written on traditional Indian philosophy till now. The responses to the article 'Vedānta in the first millennium AD—A Case Study of a Retrospective Illusion Imposed by the Historiography of Indian Philosophy' illustrates it in a more focal manner. It is heartening to find that scholars such as R. Balasubramanian and Suresh Chandra have cared to respond to the issue raised, just as the issues with respect to Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā were responded to by Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, N.S. Dravid, J.N. Mohanty, Arindam Chakravarthy, Ramesh Kumar Sharma (Nyāya) and Sampat Narayan, Sri Ram Sharma, N.S.R. Tatacharyaswami, Surya Prakash Shastri, E.S. Varadacharya, Laxminarayana Murti Sharma and N.K. Ramanujatatacharya (Mīmāṁsā). Surprisingly, however, no one has seen the important discrepancies in the replies that have been given by these scholars, nor has any one of them tried to respond to what the others have said on the issue.

The same is the case with the discussion on Kant's categories where well-known students of Kant such as Herbert Herring, Kaushal Kishore Sharma and Rajendra Gupta have tried to clarify the issues raised without seeing the fundamental nature of the questions and their far-reaching implications for Kant's whole system as it is usually understood by scholars until now. Still, there can be little doubt that we have had a good beginning, particularly as, besides these, we have also had comments on the articles published in the *Journal* and sometimes even on a whole issue such as the one devoted to 'Issues in the Historiography of Civilizations', which has attracted responses from Professor R.K. Kaul (XIV, 1) and Professor Lawrence A. Babb (XIV, 3).

Yet, however satisfying these may be, a lot still remains to be done. Our promise to publish articles on Indian thinkers of the recent past has hardly been fulfilled. We have, of course, published two articles on Professor Rasvihary Das in Vol. XIII, No.2 and have been indirectly responsible for the publication of a full length volume on the work of G.R. Malkani by Sharad Deshpande, published recently by the ICPR (1997). There has also been an article on Basant Kumar Malik in Vol. XIV, No. 1 and some discussion on the work of recent philosophers such as B.K. Matilal and Sundara Rajan in Vols. XI, 3, XII, 1, XIII, 1. However, there remain a large number of eminent thinkers of the recent past whose contributions still await articulation and critical evaluation.

Similar seems to have been the case of our promise to publish survey articles on recent developments in various fields of philosophy. We were able to publish only one survey article, that is, 'The Deflationary View of Truth' by Jerry Kapus in Vol. XII, No. 2. But, however little, these isolated examples reveal that the 'promises' made were still in our mind and that we tried to fulfil them at least to some extent.

There have been other shortcomings which we have not been able to overcome even partially. There is the inordinate delay in conveying to the authors the decision about the publication of their article in the *Journal*. This primarily emanates not only from the fact that our evaluators sometimes take a long time to convey their opinion, but also because we first write to them to ask if they would be willing to evaluate the article. This itself takes quite some time as the scholars do not reply immediately to our request. Also, in many fields, the concerned specialists who are both able and willing to evaluate the articles received by us are too few and we do not like to overburden them with too many requests of this kind. In order to remedy this, we have enlarged the Editorial Board of the *Journal* and have formally included many scholars who had been helping us with such work during the past few years. We have also decided that we will not ask members of the Editorial Board if they would be willing to evaluate the articles as we had been doing until now. This, hopefully, would cut short the period of decision-making, at least to some extent.

The same has been true of reviews; but little can be done in this regard unless the philosophical community in India feels that it is a part of their responsibility to critically evaluate the work of their peers. People take years even after formally agreeing to undertake the review of a book and even then do not do so or care to reply to our letters or acknowledge them. This has happened with some of the best persons in the country. But then, it cannot be helped. Still, we can derive some satisfaction from the fact that our reviews, particularly review articles, have been consistently of high quality and scholars have taken seriously their responsibility of critically evaluating the book they were asked to review.

As for special issues of the *Journal* devoted to a particular topic, we have been able to bring out only the one concerned with issues in the Historiography of Civilizations. We propose, in the near future, as announced in Vol. XIV, No. 3, a special issue devoted to developments in philosophical logic entitled 'Circularity, Definition and Truth'. We are also thinking of bringing out issues on 'Modernity and Post Modernism: a critical evaluation' and 'Issues in Philosophy of the Social Sciences'. In case our readers would like to make any suggestions regarding these or any other subject which they would like to see specially discussed in the pages of this *Journal*, we will welcome them.

We are introducing two new sections with this issue of the *JICPR* entitled 'Focus' and 'Agenda for Research'. We hope our readers will

find both interesting. Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, the founder editor of the *JICPR* and a member of our Editorial Board has warned us that, like the 'Notes and Queries' section, we might have to 'fill in' these sections on our own as we may not find many persons who would be willing to write for them. We hope the community of readers of the *JICPR* will prove him wrong.

With all these modifications and additions, there is still the problem of time-lag as our *Journal* is published only three times a year. We have been thinking of overcoming this limitation by opening a network of communication between those readers of the *Journal* who would like to interact and be informed of the answers to the queries or the discussion, comments and responses on the articles published in the *Journal*. However, this would be possible only if a significant number of our readers write to us in this regard so that we can initiate steps in this direction. Many of our younger contributors have complained of 'academic loneliness' as they find few persons to interact with. This might take care of their problem at least partially.

There is only one thing more that I would like to bring to your notice. The quality of production that the *JICPR* has maintained over the last fourteen years of its publication has been mainly due to the efforts, commitment and dedication of Shri Buddhadev Bhattacharya who, unfortunately, has had to leave his formal association with the *Journal*. The loss is almost irreparable, but we hope that the standards he had set will continue to be maintained by those who succeed him.

DAYA KRISHNA

The Issue of Autonomy of Professional Ethics

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As human society grows more and more complex, its problems also grow in the same proportion. Science and technology extend a helping hand to solve many of the problems of modern society, but add a few of their own. As knowledge grows, the need for specialization grows. This results in certain gifted individuals with high intelligence and the right aptitude taking special interest in acquiring greater skills and specialized knowledge. When the society recognizes the services of such specialists, it allows organizations and institutions to come up and organize themselves better so that they can serve the society efficiently apart from taking the initiative for the welfare of the professionals themselves. The legal, medical and military professions are traditionally recognized professions, but we have felt the need for skilled personnel for designing, producing, advertising and marketing after the society has gone through industrialization. We have also felt the need to revitalize and modernize the older professions with the aid of modern science and technology. We would like to be better prepared to face the ferocity of nature manifested in the form of famines, floods, fire and earthquakes. We would like to minimize evils perpetrated by humans, such as terrorism, war, death and suffering due to environmental pollution, radiation and various accidents of dangerous dimensions with the help of professionals equipped with sophisticated instruments developed by modern science and technology.

Not everyone is in a position to competently handle modern technological instruments. A person who is competent to handle these instruments must have adequate knowledge of both the instruments and the professions they relate to. It is not easy to acquire this training and specialized knowledge; and the opportunity and costs involved, apart from the motivational aspect, are significant. Thus, the modern professional, a heart specialist for instance, in addition to his professional knowledge and skills should know how to use a computer-controlled, sophisticated scientific instrument to monitor a heart surgery. Modern society felt the need to formulate codes of conduct for professionals. Most of us are aware of the existence of different codes of conduct for professionals such as the Hippocratic Oath and the Indian Medical Codes-1956. Time and again some of these codes have been examined by

experts and competent authorities, who have introduced modifications wherever necessary. On the basis of the existence of such professional ethical codes and the continued interest in evaluating and modifying them, one might think that the relation between a professional code and the general code of ethics has become definitive. Unfortunately, despite the best efforts, confusion exists in this regard.

Philosophical treatises on professional ethics and applied ethics were written mainly in the eighties. This can be considered to be the first phase of the development of professional ethics, where the authors are moved by the urgency of the issues that confronted the professionals while working and the common man by the behaviour of the professionals. This first stage is, therefore, the stage of identifying the ethical dimension of professions. The second stage is where integration of professional morality with general morality is attempted in one way or the other, without much success. Three extreme positions are held. One, by the group of philosophers who believe in universal ethics. Those who believe that all men are equal have the view that ethics can only be one whether the person is a professional or a non-professional. These philosophers are normally absolutists. Two, by philosophers who believe in ethical relativism. These philosophers want to contextualize ethics and believe that the same moral norms are applicable even in the professional conditions. Some would argue for the identity of moral norms operative both in the general context and the professional context with the sole difference of the criterion of their applicability. Some others would take this to be the extension of the same moral principle and yet others believe it to be the concretization of the same norm. Gewirth, who believes in universal ethics, makes room for professional ethics by making certain exceptions to general ethical norms. His approach is one of infringement rather than overruling of rights of non-professionals when there is a genuine conflict. Three, by a group of philosophers who believe in the complete autonomy of professional ethics. Views are again further divided within this group. Some believe in the total autonomy in the sense that the source of the professional ethics is the same as that of general ethics. Freedman, for instance, believes that professional ethics is branching off from the general ethics making use of the norm of the general ethics. He believes that professional ethics is a form of acquired obligation which, of course, is in the form of an implicit contract. Goldman's view of professional ethics would differ from this. He would believe in strongly differentiated roles of professionals where he believes that rights of professionals are more weighed in comparison to the rights of non-professionals.

We shall not speak much about the position of the universal ethics here. The position of this group of philosophers is too well known to be discussed. Kantian philosophy, for instance, would not be in a position to make room for a separate code of conduct for professionals. Even

others who believe in rational ethics with universal applicability cannot agree for a separate code of conduct. If there is any moral conflict between a professional and the moral interest of a non-professional, the issue would be treated at par with other ethical conflicts; and the method to resolve the conflict would be similar to the methods that we adopt to resolve the conflicts in general ethics.

We may thus begin with the views of the second group of philosophers. These group of philosophers holding the position of ethical relativism treat the issue of professional ethics as a special case of general ethics or general ethics made more concrete. Professional code of conduct would be nothing but the re-enforcement of the general ethical code of conduct in the professional context. Professional ethical norms are identical to the ethical norms practiced by the ordinary people. However, the professional situations are such that an ordinary person is not in a position to know because of the lack of the knowledge of the specialized field and context. What a professional does is to apply the same moral norms such as do not kill others, be truthful, be helpful, be kind to others, etc., in the professional context. For instance, an ordinary person may not know what the physician knows. One may tend to think that a certain type of extra growth on certain part of the body is harmless as it does not interfere with day-to-day activities, but it is the physician who will be able to judge whether the growth may turn malignant if not removed. It may not be possible for a non-expert to decide whether the extra growth should be operated upon or should be left as it is without interfering with the bodily mechanism. Similarly, it may be difficult for a non-expert to judge whether a person is a thief or whether the person in question is suffering from a certain form of psychological disease.

The general thrust of this view is that ethical norms are very general, and hence they can provide only general guidelines. All delicate contexts of modern industrialized society cannot be so clearly handled by the traditional general ethical principles. This may be due to the fact that principles of general ethics are too general to be of any help to us in certain professional situations or the professional context itself is so complex that a non-professional is not able to visualize how the norms are to be applied. This eventually results in the formulation of separate codes of conduct for different groups of specialized individuals belonging to different professions. There were always, professional ethics in practice whether they were made explicit or not. But such professional codes were changed often to suit the needs of the society as society and culture have changed. Though professional codes of conduct derive their validity from one or more basic principles of general ethics, once formulated in order to enhance the goal set by the said norm(s), they gain a certain amount of operational autonomy within a certain social environment.

The philosophical position that moral principles being quite general, and the professional codes of conduct are quite specific in order to cater

to the need of limited professional contexts, need not acknowledge any possibility of conflict of a fundamental nature between professional ethics on the one hand, and general ethics on the other. Both professional ethics and general ethics would be complementary to one another according to this view. If there is any conflict of a superficial kind, professional ethics would infringe on the rights of general ethics only as exceptions. This is because anything that is backed by a professional code of ethics is also backed by a general code of ethics. For instance, confidentiality is a form of institutionalized promise for a professional. A client may reveal in confidence certain things to his lawyer, but as a professional, the lawyer may not want to divulge everything that he knows about his client to the judge even if he is expected to tell the truth by the norms of general ethics.[1] The manner in which the behaviour of a professional is upheld as against the behaviour of a non-professional is the following: The professional, in addition to professional norms, is also governed by some basic norms of general ethics. For instance, that a professional should keep confidentiality is pitched against the norm that one should keep one's promise of general ethics. Gewirth believes that the professional has professional obligations as well as general obligations. But when there is a conflict between professional obligation and general obligation, especially in the professional context, the professional is obliged to meet his professional obligation first even if it comes in conflicts with the general norm.

A professional is said to have double commitment for the following reason: first, when he joined the profession he acquired professional obligations, for example, of healing the patient as a doctor, and second, his normal moral commitment as a member of the society. If there is any conflict that concerns non-professionals, it would normally be between one moral norm and another of general ethics. We can visualize the following possibilities: (1) A professional norm comes in conflict with another professional norm. For instance, the interests of a lawyer conflict with the interests of another lawyer. (2) A professional norm comes in conflict with a general norm. The interests of workers in an essential service sector come in conflict with the general interest of the masses. For instance, the workers in the energy sector cannot go on strike because that would affect the essential services of the society. (3) A general norm comes in conflict with another general norm. Something uttered in confidence may have to be breached for saving someone's life. For instance, if a friend informs in confidence that he plans to murder someone, the promise might have to be breached to save the life of the person in question.

When a professional norm comes in conflict with another professional norm, then the professional bodies look into the matter and modify one of the professional norms at least. All the conflicts of this type get settled within the professional context itself. The second type of conflict,

namely, a professional norm comes in conflict with the general norm, is not visualizable according to this group of philosophers. After adequate understanding, it is believed that the problem gets re-classified as the third alternative. All the cases of professional norms coming in conflict with general norms are the cases of general norms coming in conflict with other general norms if professional norms are based on general norms. The second type of conflict slips itself into the third kind, that is, a general norm comes in conflict with another general norm. Thus, a conflict between a professional norm and the general norm would always be nothing but the conflict between two general norms.

A professional should act as a professional rather than like a non-professional. For instance, an advocate should not give valuable information to his opponent for double reasons: as a professional, he is obliged to keep certain valuable documents of his client as confidential and in addition to that he is expected to keep his promise as the member of this society. But there can be only one obligation to others, that is, he should speak the truth. This is the reason why a professional obligation outweighs the general obligation of a professional according to this line of thinking.

The third group of philosophers who subscribe to the view that professional ethics is autonomous believe that one is not dependent on the other. Freedman, for instance, believes that professional ethics is acquired. He makes the distinction between acquired obligations and non-acquired obligations. He explains that by making a contract, one has bound oneself morally to perform the terms of the contract. He calls this additional obligation that one has acquired by making a contract the acquired obligation, while the obligation to keep one's promise is the non-acquired requirement of morality.[2] According to Freedman, professional morality is an acquired morality and is based on the tacit promise that a professional makes by joining that profession. Professions are social institutions of society rendering certain crucial services. There are normal expectations from these professional bodies; we expect physicians to promote health, judiciary to promote justice, police and military to provide basic protection to civilians and so on. Thus an agent, in adopting the role he has chosen, has obligated himself through a tacit promise to follow professional morality.

But Freedman feels that this is inadequate to justify the professional morality. He feels that not keeping the promise in certain circumstances is not a breach of promise from the moral point of view. For instance, if one promises to do evil, that promise is not binding on a moral agent. Whenever and wherever professional ethics is in conflict with ordinary ethics, by promising to obey professional morality one has promised to disobey the general morality. But this cannot be binding on the professionals as moral agents, because promise to do anything contrary

to ordinary morality is to promise to do evil and such a promise is not binding on the agent at all.[3]

Speaking of confidentiality in medicine as an example, Freedman holds that this does not originate with the medical, or any other, profession, however far back we may trace professional confidentiality, but, rather, in ordinary human interaction.[4] But ordinary confidentiality differs from professional confidentiality in important respects. Medical confidentiality, for instance is based on the tacit promise made by the physician to his patient by joining the profession and confidentiality in the ordinary context has to be extracted in the form of a promise in ordinary discourse. Medical confidentiality is more binding than ordinary confidentiality, and finally, medical confidentiality is more stringent than ordinary confidentiality. Because of these said reasons Freedman believes that a professional has the right to infringe on the rights of the ordinary person. A genuine test of autonomy would be the one where it is morally right for the professional to act in a certain way, whereas it is immoral for a non-professional to act in that particular fashion. For instance, the surgery conducted by a physician is moral and if it is conducted by a non-professional, then it is immoral. Thus, professional morality is autonomous according to Freedman because it has the right to infringe.[5]

Goldman, another thinker, who believes that there is autonomy to professional ethics holds a partially different view. He distinguishes between *strongly differentiated roles* and *weakly differentiated roles*. He calls a professional role strongly differentiated if its norms are to be weighed more heavily than they would be against other principles in other contexts. And if the professional roles involve relations with unique morally relevant features, and if these features can be evaluated by applying in the usual way the moral principles then he would call the role with such institutional relations and obligations weakly differentiated.[6] He explains his concept of *strongly differentiated roles* by giving the example of family. Parents have authority to make crucial decisions for their children and responsibility to provide for their welfare. Children owe duties of obedience. Thus preference for family may extend even to violation of claims that would normally constitute moral rights of others. Clearly special norms are in operation here.[7] The justification for *strong role differentiation* requires that the institution in question serves a vital moral function in society. And if the function is so central to society, then the elevation of the norm central to that institution, whether it is legal advocacy, health or profits must be necessary to the fulfilment of that function claims Goldman.[8]

Professional ethics could be said to be autonomous only when an action of a professional is upheld even when the action in question is normally considered wrong going by the standards of ordinary morality. A decisive situation would be one where rights of at least two individuals are involved and one deriving rights from general ethics and the other

deriving his rights from professional roles. Goldman uses the example of judges to argue his case. The moral position of judges is different from that of citizens for: (1) The law should be consistent and predictable and therefore judges ought to be consistent and predictable. The consistency and inconsistency in the behaviour of ordinary people does not matter to law. (2) Judges need not consider each case on the basis of moral merits alone. An ordinary man can behave in one way with his friend and in another way with a stranger, but a judge cannot do this, he should apply the law in exactly the same way to both his friend as well as to the stranger. (3) Citizens and private corporations can be given sanctions for their slant decisions, while we cannot demand punishment of judges for every legally incorrect decision because (a) in many cases correct decision is a matter of controversy, (b) no one would be willing to seek careers on the bench under such threats.

For the above stated reasons, Goldman recognizes only enforcement officials as proper examples of strong role differentiation. He opines that law enforcement officials, including judges, prosecutors and police, have special obligations to law that private citizens lack, and that these officials have a moral duty to accept these institutional obligations even at the expense of more important moral rights of others, and hence he concludes that the roles of these officials have an obligation to obey the law as such, independent of normal consequential calculations. Only this special obligation to obey the law as such makes the role of enforcement officials strongly differentiated.[9]

In the same line as was argued by Freedman and Gewirth, Goldman argues that the contractual obligations are acquired by the professionals by joining their professions. However, Goldman would not agree with Freedman that such an obligation would have higher weightage in comparison to our obligations to others in the normal circumstances.[10] But he believes that strongly differentiated roles that the enforcement officials have to perform necessitates infringement of rights of non-professionals as noted above.

So far, we have examined the three different views on the relation between professional ethics and general ethics. The expectation does not seem to be unreasonable if one expects that general ethical principles would change in order to cope with the needs of the time. Contrary to one's normal expectations, there arise new sets of professional codes of ethics for different professions, and they are modified time and again to suit the needs of the day. In the context of language, for instance, we expect the grammar of a language to be flexible and accommodative; it would absorb the changes that emerge over the years. If general ethical norms were flexible, then there would have been no need of formulation of different sets of professional codes of conduct for different professions. The fact that the basic moral norms have never changed makes one wonder whether they have the ability to adopt at all.

Ethics and ethical norms do not seem to change. To be very sure, one may point out that an act of stealing has remained an immoral act and it would remain so, even though, we have newly emerging sciences like criminology and psychiatry which have made our job of identifying criminals and psychological patients simpler and indisputable. An immoral act can never be re-named as moral and the reverse is almost true *a priori*. Under no circumstance, a morally neutral activity can become moral or immoral if it is not so already. Therefore, no amount of details of knowledge on the matter could turn such a morally neutral act into a different one. However, developments in psychology have helped us to sharpen our criteria of application of moral principles to the actual situations, especially in the context of modern industrialized society where the cases of psychiatry are numerically growing.

If ethics does not recognize these developments in the allied disciplines, it would not be able to live up to the level of expectations of people and would naturally become ineffective and out-dated. Those who are interested in making ethics more relevant to the modern context, would note the developments in sciences and allied branches with a view to incorporate the useful findings into the fold of ethics. The findings are normally used to sharpen the criteria of applicability of certain judgements to certain social situations.

It is only the criterion that is being changed, and not the general norm. The contexts are specialized and we need different criteria to measure the norms that are applicable. The situation is one like the following: we measure the distance between any two points on earth in terms of metres, but when it is the matter of the distance between earth and stars we measure the distance in terms of light years, yet distance remains the same. There is no ground to believe that since the criterion for measuring the norm has been changed the norm itself has been changed. R.M. Hare for instance, has held the view that change in criterion does not necessarily lead to the change in meaning.[11] This may not be true in all cases. For instance, change in the criterion of deciding who is below the poverty line if changed would necessarily change the meaning of the term 'poor'. What is meant by poor largely depends on the criterion we adopt to classify people on the basis of economic parameters. Similarly, by changing the criterion of human rights, we certainly change the norm.

Whether or not we consider professional norms to be an extension of the general norms, or a concretization or specification, the issue remains the same. The issue at hand is: would the change in the criterion in the professional context change the norm? For instance, what we expect from a bus driver, cannot be expected of a motorman of a train, and what can be expected of these two cannot be expected of a pilot of a jet plane. This is because, the speeds of the vehicle that they drive are different whereas the speed at which human beings react to any obstacle remains the same in all three contexts. We cannot expect a pilot of a jet plane to

notice a flying bird and avoid collision, whereas we expect the motorman to notice danger from a distance, and we certainly expect the bus drivers to be careful about the pedestrians.

The society permits professionals to emerge because, given the complexity of the society, there is no way one can keep pace with knowledge and skill required for a dignified living in the society. Therefore, division of labour is the only method that a society can invoke. Demand and supply principle would prevail if we allow professionals to compete with one another, and competition would normally lead to professionalization of the services.

Freedman, Goldman and Gewirth base professional morality on one version or the other of institutionalized contract. Since promise keeping, confidentiality, etc. are part of general norm, philosophers have tried to build professional morality on the basis of these general norms. After listing the difference between a professional and his context on the one hand, and a non-professional on the other, these philosophers have jumped to the conclusion that they deserve a separate ethical treatment. If morality has universal application, then there cannot be competing moral systems, one for non-professionals and another for professionals.

We often say 'ought' cannot be derived from 'is' and here we seem to be doing exactly what we claim to be impossible. From the fact that there are professional institutions, we argue that professionals have made a tacit contract by joining those institutions, and as a consequence they are obliged to do some favours to their clients. If joining a profession is the basic cause of acquired obligation it would not be fair not to meet the obligations; but society can discourage its members from repeating this mistake if it is a mistake. Freedman fails to meet his own argument when he pleads for a separate code of conduct on the basis of the difference between a professional and a non-professional. From the fact that there are professional institutions, one cannot judge the desirability of their existence. Therefore, the argument based on acquired obligation by making tacit contract by joining a profession, if not invalid, is misplaced.

Let us make a fresh attempt to justify the autonomy of professional ethics. As a first step towards it, let us first clear some of the hurdles that fog the issue. These issues are: (1) the norms and their applicability and (2) ethicality of professional codes.

In order to understand the issue of applicability of moral norms, let us draw some insight into the issue from the debate between Malcolm on the one hand and Baker and Hacker on the other.[12] According to Malcolm, Baker and Hacker are quite mistaken in holding the thesis that meaning determines extension. Malcolm is of the opinion that it is not enough that we know the rules, we must have the knowledge of where to apply the rules. But there seems to be a fundamental problem here. If rules do not give us the knowledge and ability to apply them, then nothing can help us. One cannot invoke a rule for application of a rule, because if we do

not know how to apply a rule, the problem is multiplied when we make another rule. And if one speaks of decisions in the context of applying a rule every time, then rules are made redundant and irrelevant. Despite the rules of income tax, if the tax officials have to look into every file and judge on the merit of the case without being guided by the rules so to speak, then income tax laws are made redundant and useless. Therefore, how far do the rules help us to apply them to a context is a matter of serious debate.

The parallel question, in the context of professional norms and the general codes of conduct, is: Are professional norms identical to, application of, an extension of, general norms? If general norms are the ones that are re-enforced in the form of professional codes, why were professional codes needed in addition to general codes? And if professional codes achieve something which the general codes could never achieve, then professional codes are different from the general codes and the question now would arise whether all of them are moral at all, at least in those cases where there are genuine conflicts between the professional codes and the general codes.

One case of truth telling is not in any way pure or corrupt as a case of truth telling in comparison to another like a triangle is neither less nor more of a triangle with respect to triangularity. We cannot speak of degree of applicability or non-applicability of a moral norm. Either the norm applies or does not apply. If it applies, it applies fully or it does not apply at all. This is the spirit of the universal ethics.

Our second issue is regarding the nature of professional codes themselves. Why call professional codes ethical if they are autonomous? This does not seem to be a historical accident that we use the term 'ethics' to refer to two value systems, professional and general. If professional codes have the power to override general moral codes, they are in some way independent and more powerful. Do the professional codes derive their overriding power from society because the society cannot afford to lose the service of professionals? If this is so, what makes us admit this exertion of power on non-professionals, ethical and not unethical as is the case with certain form of pricing of commodities by industries having monopoly in the market? There is an element of doubt whether this superiority is due to the power that professionals possess to bargain or whether there are any stronger moral grounds. And if this superiority is managed by exploiting the weakness of the psychology of people, then is there any case for calling professional codes ethical?

To acknowledge that professionals have special knowledge and skill is one thing, and to hold that they deserve a set of separate moral codes is another. The plea for separate moral codes could be entertained if and only if one would be able to show that injustice is being done to professionals or to the common man or to both in the absence of such special moral codes.

No other argument can really make room for a separate set of codes for professionals. Factors like additional investment of time, effort and money by professionals to acquire certain training, skill, knowledge, etc., can at best make room for plea for better return either in terms of money or recognition, but not in the realm of ethics. These are not the ones that distinguish human beings essentially from one another for differential treatment. Universal ethics does not find this argument convincing enough for the separatists' thesis. If such difference, like training, skill, etc., should make a difference to ethics, then certainly one should speak of children ethics, old-age ethics, women ethics, etc., because there is significant difference between an adult male on the one hand and children, the aged and women in terms of knowledge, skill, ability and the resources on the other.

What one needs to show is that the essential services rendered by different professions are necessary to have a morally just and fair society. This cannot be shown unless we show how injustice would be done to a non-professional if he cannot avail of the services of professionals. This is the reason why professionals with extra training, knowledge and skill are there to serve the needy. If there are no physicians, individuals suffer from diseases and eventually die. And if there are no lawyers, the justice to individuals would be denied as each and every individual would not be in a position to present one's own case competently and so on.

Certain new professions have come into being only in the recent past, and therefore the issue of injustice to the professionals has only arisen lately. When they became pressing issues they were attended promptly by formulating appropriate professional codes of conduct for different professions in the past. Professional codes of ethics had to be spelled out in detail in order to do justice to both non-professionals and professionals.

The common man may wish that professionals have a separate code of conduct for genuine reasons. For instance, if confidentiality is not a code of conduct for professionals, then all the clients of doctors, lawyers and priests, journalists would suffer. They would not find enough safeguard to reveal certain information to their professionals and take advantage of the knowledge and skill of the professionals if the professionals have no way to keep the information confidential with moral justification. Speaking from this perspective, professionals having their own code of conduct different from the general norms may be more desirable for the common man rather than the professionals themselves. In addition to this, since there would be some fee charged by the professionals for rendering their service, the clients have the right to seek justice in a consumer court in case the professional does not behave according to the codes of conduct. This would not be possible in the absence of codes of conduct, for not always are immoral acts recognized as illegal acts. Legality does not all the time match with morality.[13]

As is obvious to everyone, a professional has invested more in

comparison to others in quality and quantity of labour and money in order to acquire professional knowledge, skill and expertise. That is to say, from a certain point of view, he has sacrificed a certain amount of freedom to do many other things that he would have chosen and enjoyed otherwise. Here, we have assumed that psychological hedonism is necessarily false. A professional being different from an ordinary man, should be treated differently at least in the professional situations where this difference is important. And if the society fails to treat him differently, one may call the society unjust, for it is not enough to 'treat similar things similarly' to be just, it is also necessary to 'treat different things differently' to obtain justice. Professionals would argue that they are different from the rest of the masses, and therefore deserve different treatment.

There could be many reasons among which the lack of proper legal protection may be a prominent reason for which professionals feel that they are harassed sometimes. If the injustice is due to the very secondary treatment that the professionals get in the hands of people, that is, 'use them whenever necessary and leave them to their fate' attitude of people which causes a certain sense of feeling of insecurity and neglect in the minds of professionals, professional codes of ethics can help much to improve the situation.

The question may be raised if we show that injustice would be done if there is no separate code of conduct, we are repeating the mistakes that Gewirth, Freedman and Goldman have committed of basing professional morality on certain norms of general morality. Certainly not in the manner in which the thinkers we have examined have done it. Of course, we would not have called professional codes of conduct ethical if there were no point of comparison. In fact, there ought to be basic ethical values common to these two systems in order to recognize them to be ethical as is the case with any two languages that they share certain features to be recognized as languages. However, there is a significant difference in our approach and the approaches of the others surveyed. We have based our professional ethics on the notion of justice that is the most basic value of general ethics as well as professional ethics. And more importantly, professional ethics cannot be treated as an extension, or an application of general ethics. The need to formulate professional ethics arose because the general norms of ethics could not meet the ethical requirement of justice.

What follows is that professionals ought to obey their professional codes rather than follow the general ethical norms while acting professionally. This is because, if it is true that the same action is performed by a professional it is moral and if performed by a non-professional, it is immoral, then a professional should not attempt to act in a professional context on the norms of general ethics. If he uses his general norms to act professionally, then if not in all cases, at least in some cases, he would be immoral as is the case with a non-professional.

The philosophical position that has been upheld in this paper has all the advantages of the views that we have examined. We admit, that the institutional obligation is inevitable if we join a profession. However, as is felt by both Gewirth and Freedman, that would not be enough to show that professionals need a separate code of conduct. We have tried to add an argument from justice to strengthen the separatist thesis.

Notes and References

1. Alan Gewirth, 'Professional Ethics: The Separatist Thesis', *Ethics*, Vol. 96, No. 2, 1986, p. 282.
2. Benjamin Freedman, 'A Meta-Ethics for Professional Morality' *Ethics*, Vol. 89, No. 1, 1978, p. 5.
3. Freedman, op.cit., pp. 12ff. Also see B. Freedman, 'What Really Makes Professional Morality Different: Response to Martin', *Ethics*, Vol. 91, p. 628.
4. Freedman, op.cit., p. 5.
5. Gewirth also agrees with Freedman on this point. He writes: 'No one denies that professionals may perform actions and require prerogatives that go beyond what is permitted to non-professionals. For example, a physician may inspect the naked body of his patient, and a lawyer may likewise demand that her client bare his soul in the more metaphorical sense of making full disclosure to his lawyer of certain intensely personal and embarrassing or even incriminating facts about the client's own conduct.' pp. 282–83.
6. Alan H. Goldman, *The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics*, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, N.J., 1980, pp. 2–3.
7. Goldman, op.cit., p. 5.
8. Goldman, op.cit., p. 7.
9. Goldman, op.cit., pp. 34, 41–42.
10. Goldman, op.cit., p. 3.
11. See especially R.M. Hare's discussion on 'good', 'meaning' and 'criteria' in *The Language of Morals*, Clarendon Press, 1952; *Freedom and Reason*, Oxford University Press, 1963, and *Moral Thinking*, Clarendon Press, 1981. In the context of professional ethics, we may say that meaning remains the same, but the criteria change.
12. N. Malcolm, 'Wittgenstein on Language and Rules', *Philosophy*, Vol. 64, 1989, pp. 5–28. Also see G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, 'Malcolm on Language and Rules', *Philosophy*, Vol. 65, 1990, pp. 167–79.
13. In fact, Goldman believes that enforcement officials are obliged to obey laws, and the specific duty in their case is to enforce and apply the law itself, not on the moral merits alone, but to apply the law when possible in their decisions, Goldman, op.cit., pp. 36–37.

The Causal Theory of Perception: Ayer and Beyond

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In science explanation of perception of a medium-sized physical object is ordinarily given in terms of unobservable physical cause. What we perceive here and now is connectable to a causal chain arising out of what is there and then. The causal impetus transmitted by initial thrust is received along a continuous causal chain, leading from the real cause to the percipient's body. When we look closely into this formulation of the causal theory of perception, we find that the following components underlie the theory.

(i) The effect felt through in my body is here but the cause of the effect lies elsewhere, and somehow that initial impetus or thrust is sustained along the causal chain.
(ii) The percipient's body and the original source of perception are causally linked and, what is more important to note, this relation is a sort of continuum.
(iii) The unobservable cause is inferred from that which is immediately perceived.

In short, a chain of events like transmission of light from the physical cause, its perception by the visual organ and the resulting neuro-physiological change sustain our perceptions.

Ayer seems to be notably responsive to the causal theory of perception. The treatment of the problem in his later works shows the movement of his thought from the early phase of phenomenalism to what he calls sophisticated realism. In a sense he purports to defend physical causation and show its compatibility with naive realism. In this respect he differs from Russell and Locke and claims to be nearer to Mackie.

In the sections that follow I take 'The Causal Theory of Perception'[1] of Ayer as my basic text and largely concentrate on his later work, *The Central Questions of Philosophy*.[2] First, I shall try to spell out his attempts to reconcile naive realism with his causal account of perception. Thereafter, I shall suggest a reconstruction of Ayer's pro-phenomenalist and realist theory of perception *vis-à-vis* the modern theory of quantum mechanics.

COMMONSENSE AND SCIENCE

Do we perceive physical objects as they really are? If this question is put to an ordinary adult, his answer will be in the affirmative and kindred to naive realism. On Ayer's view, '. . . the ordinary man in our culture is surely a naive realist . . . ' who believes that objects '. . . retain their colour in a literal sense which cannot simply be equated with their power to produce sensations of colour in us.'[3] Contrary to naive realism, the physicist deploys a rather sharp distinction between real things having certain properties in themselves and things as they appear to us. Following the scientific mode of understanding, many philosophers, Russell among others, make a distinction between directly perceived percepts and the real thing which is supposed to be the cause of perception. A percept which occupies a position in the perceptual space is distinct from its unobservable cause lying in physical space. The confused view of commonsense is largely due to its failure to distinguish between the perceptual space and the physical space consisting of imperceptible relations between the unobservable entities. Science as Russell understands it, has developed from the naive realist attitude of commonsense but the latter has failed to keep up with science. Grass is perceived as green, snow as cold and stone as hard and it is a common belief that the said objects really possess these properties. But the physicist thinks that there is no good enough reason to endorse the commonsense view that the perceived effect and the supposed cause are identical entities in unified space. Russell writes: 'Naive realism leads to physics and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false. Therefore, naive realism, if true, is falsé, therefore it is false.'[4]

Western science since the Galilean revolution finds it important to distinguish between properties which are expressible in mathematical terms, and properties which are not so expressible, for instance, colour. This distinction is sharpened by the realist interpretation of causal entities given by Locke. Being committed as he was to Euclidian geometry and Newtonian physics, Locke finds that only primary qualities really exist in things-in-themselves. Ideas of secondary qualities have a sort of 'mental status' and correspond to nothing extra-mental. But *as such*, secondary qualities can be realistically construed. This is indicated by Locke himself: 'Secondary qualities in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but *powers* to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, that is, by the bulk of figure, texture and motion of their insensible parts, *as* colours, sounds, tastes, etc.'[5]

In a sense, secondary quality-related experiences are rooted in the 'power' of real things. Without any realistic root, Locke fears, the world of ordinary objects will be reduced to phenomenal experiences which is incompatible with the reality of Newtonian physics and Euclidian geometry.

In the physical world-picture of Russell and Locke, causes do exist and are credited with causal efficacy or power. Terms like 'force', 'field of force', 'gravity', or whatever physics concocts are permissible in the theory of physical causation. The view that cause is a category is rejected both by Russell and Locke, though they often concede that the concept of cause is an inductively derived empirical concept. Ayer agrees that causal entities have ontic status. About the epistemological basis of causality, he asserts that our belief in causality is based on sensory experience. We need not metaphysically presuppose the reality of cause and assume, like Russell and Locke, a gap between the perceptual world of commonsense populated with medium-sized objects and the scientific world of causal entities. This reminds us of Hume who rejects the rationality of the metaphysical notion of cause, tries to trace its root in experience and finds its justification in practice. Though a follower of Hume, Ayer takes a serious note of Kant's epistemological reconstruction of Newton's paradigm. But debunking Kant, in his defence of the notion of causality as a process he sought to bridge the gap by tracing the continuity between the thing-in-itself and the content of a particular percipient's sense-field, that is, percepts.

To the sensible qualities of the sense-field for which C.I. Lewis and Nelson Goodman use the term 'qualia', Ayer adds the qualia of a set of patterns. Certain terms like 'chair-pattern', leaf-pattern', etc., describe these qualia. Though the terms are borrowed from the names of ordinary middle-sized physical objects, Ayer is careful enough to point out that such terms do not have usual reference. To apply the term 'cat-pattern' in a sense-field is not to assert that there are cats. The terms are used phenomenally and refer to experiencible qualities. Percepts as conceived by Ayer are the particularized contents of one's sense-field which can be identified demonstratively and here Ayer differs from Russell. In fact Russell and Ayer owe their insight to Peirce and James who use the term percept as a complex of qualities. As contents of sense-field, percepts change with the changing perspectives of different observers and also of the same observer. Nonetheless, they largely overlap. By the aid of his memory one is able to trace the continuity between percepts.[6] The traceable continuity of successive percepts is indicative of their objective character and we are able to conceive of a stable, spatially extended world of physical objects. In other words, percepts are not objects but registering them facilitates projection of objects. Very often changes in the sense-field in respect of their respective contexts do not lead to any perceptible difference. The seeming continuity often leads to the *belief* that the world is inhabited by stable objects.

In principle, Ayer argues, there is no conflict between science and commonsense. That astronomers have good reason to believe in the existence of the planet Neptune prior to its actual observation which Ayer asserts, is indicative of his support for causalism. But, if perception

is linked with cause from the outset then the object of perception will be converted to 'unobservable object of an unobservable space'. The existence of space itself in which physical objects are situated can only be inferred. But Ayer thinks that our belief in physical causes as inferred entities of physical space, though 'inaccessible to our observation', '... allows for some latitude in the interpretation that we put upon them; we may, for example, be able to construe them as relating to perceptual data'.[7] He suggests that we have to assume a primitive notion of physical object and introduce the notion of causal entities at a later stage in the explanatory hypothesis of perception. All this implies that the causal hypothesis of perception is justified by its connectability to the commonsense account of perception. This conclusion of Ayer is a hangover of the principle of verificationism as expressed in his earlier work, for example, *Language, Truth and Logic*.[8]

Perceptual judgements of the common man, as said earlier, are embedded in a naive realist theory about the physical world. When a common man by raising his hand says that he looks at his 'own hand' and his 'own hand' is causally responsible for his perception, his judgement is based on his commitment to an already accepted theory that there is just one object to which his 'own hand' refers. Acceptance of naive realism about 'what there is', Ayer claims, is empirically justified. This does not mean denial of the fact that the cause of perception, being imperceptible, is largely unknown. Ayer's objection is directed against the 'iron curtain theory' that there is an unbridgeable gap between a percept and its cause The distinction between physical space and perceptual space is unacceptable to him. If cause is in physical space then its sensory address cannot be located and it remains empirically unaccountable. Perceived effect and supposed cause both exist in measurable space and the distance between them is measurable. We may be mistaken in measuring the distance but corrigibility proves that there is a measurable gap between the domains of perceived object and the unperceived cause thereof, which makes causal explanations empirically significant. If cause is imperceptible in principle then one cannot meaningfully speak of their causal role in the production of empirical events. We cannot suppose that the perceived effect and the physical cause are linked unless we assume that the causal chain is a continuum and this assumption is justified by a further supposition that physical space and visual space themselves form a continuum. It is true that sometimes we do distinguish between the place where an object is physically present and where it *appears* to be. But this does not disprove the fact that space is a continuum. Verifiable results can be obtained by calculations on the assumption that percepts, physical objects around us, and supposed cause exist in one unified space. To account for the ontological warrant of cause Ayer is obliged to refute both the sceptical realism of Hume and the transcendental idealism of Kant. He is emphatic

on the question of the physical world. There is a distinction between cause which induces our belief in the existence of an object external to perceiving mind and the perceived object. But the causal efficacy of what may lead us to believe in the existence of external bodies makes no sense unless we believe that it is connectable to the object of perception. On the basis of this point some philosophers like Davidson argue that there is no gulf between belief and non-belief, or what causes belief, and that cause *of* belief lies *within* belief itself.

Ayer seems to draw our attention to the fact that causal hypothesis is a generalization from experiential statements about what we directly perceive. But neither the statements about physical objects nor about the causes of their perceptions are completely reducible to the statements about percepts.[9] Ayer's thrust here is on the point that the notions of medium-sized objects and imperceptible causal entities are *projections* from what sentient beings perceive directly. In effect, he is arguing for a weaker form of phenomenalism. The causal theory of perception is erected on the basis of 'primitive experiential propositions' about percepts. Given the primacy of theory, the existence of causal entities becomes an 'objective fact'. It indicates the limit of phenomenalism, leaving room for what he calls sophisticated realism.

To round off this part of my discussion: Ayer seems to reject strict phenomenalism which implies that to ensure the truth of a material object statement, the latter should be in principle, reducible to an infinite set of statements about actual and possible percepts. In that case, a true material object statement would be a subjunctive conditional statement formulable in if–then form. But infinite conjunctions cannot be formed by available logical apparatus. So, in principle, it is not possible to realize the conditions in their totality and exhaustively, and the statement remains irreducible in principle, that is, not adequately translatable to the phenomenalist language. Ayer finds it reasonable to be a modest phenomenalist and to reject the strong thesis of reductionism. His claim of being a sophisticated realist is based on the strength of his rejection of phenomenalism in its strong sense. It appears that Ayer's realist claim is based on the irreducibility of the statements of what Ramsay calls secondary system, to statements about the factual content of those statements which constitute the primary system. Within the unified field of visual space there lies the domain of theoretical entities along with the observable qualia.

The special feature of the causal theory of perception, as Ayer understands it, is that epistemologically the theory is rooted in the occurrence of some sense experience, but later it is 'cut loose from its moorings'. Interestingly enough, the elements which provide the epistemological basis of causal theory are later interpreted in terms of theory, and objects or entities which are developed out of them are held to be causally responsible for the occurrence of perceptual experience.

Due to this process of projection of causal entities from the perceptual content, Ayer characterizes his realism as sophisticated. However, Dummett argues that unless one strictly adheres to the reductionist thesis and makes the given class of statements, in Ayer's case the class of statements about causes of perception, determinately either true or false in virtue of what he calls the statements of 'reductive class', one cannot claim to be a realist, not even in a sophisticated sense. Realism without reductionism is simply a naive form of realism. Not being a realist in the literal sense, Ayer can at most be a naive realist.[10] In a sense Dummett is justified because the principle of bivalence is the central plank of today's realism. In fact, when Ayer talks of realism he is more an *entity realist* than a *truth realist*, and also a reductionist in a weaker sense, the causal statements being connectable with perceptual ones.

Ayer purports to bridge the gap between the content of perception and medium-sized objects in the Humean way. What enables us to believe in continued existence of physical objects is our *imagination*. It is pointed out by Hume that impressions which are received from the senses cannot suggest existence of an 'independent', 'distinct' object. Nor can we consistently suppose that interrupted and fleeting perceptions on their own have continued existence. For, impressions not being sensed, cannot exist. However, by the power of imagination we can 'conceive them as existent'. The ground of this conception is the 'constancy and coherence' exhibited by impressions. The latter makes it natural for us to believe in the continued existence of physical object, but the said belief though natural is not justified, and here Ayer differs from Hume. The seeming persistence of percepts, on Ayer's view, exhibits a means for 'justifying' commonsense theory that things exist independent of our perceiving them.

Hume's contention that scientific knowledge has its origin in sense impressions in a way is due consideration to common man's natural belief. As a neo-Humean thinker Ayer insistently points out that unless we recognize the world of commonsense the question of causal efficacy makes hardly any sense. It is because we, as philosophers, take the commonsense world in its unbracketed sense seriously that extrapolation of cause by the use of our speculative propensity is quite pertinent. The supposed cause of perception is born of experience; it is imaginatively developed under the constraint of perceptual content. Though a radical empiricist, Hume does not think that our knowledge is confined within the realm of sensible entities. Non-sensible object is accepted by Hume on practical considerations. In a somewhat different way, without invoking the notion of practice Ayer purports to show that there is no real paradox in our acceptance of the commonsense view of things and the physicist's view of the same if we keep in mind that though we move beyond experience our knowledge in principle is traceable to sense experience.

PHENOMENALISTIC ROUTE TO REALISM

Modern science explains perception as the effect of causal action of atomic and sub-atomic particles upon the percipient and the particles are supposed to be unobservable 'occupants of unobservable space'. Realism about imperceptible entities is indeed a defensible hypothesis for the scientific realist against the phenomenalist alternative. In a way it fills the gaps between successive appearances and purports to justify our belief that objects of perception have continued existence. Due to this special sort of simplicity and explanatory power, scientific realism rather than its phenomenalist alternative is preferred by Mackie. But he feels that if causal entities are in principle imperceptible then causal hypothesis cannot be justified. Justification of causal inference rests on empirical confirmation of the causal law. But causal entities being imperceptible and distinct from perceived effects, the event of observing the occurrence of cause being followed by effect cannot even be conceived. Interestingly enough, Mackie does not renounce physical causation altogether and on this point his position is comparable to that of Ayer's.

Commitment to empiricism makes it difficult for Mackie to conceive cause in a strict realist way. He denies a rather sharp distinction between the perceived object and thing-in-itself and suggests a modification within the framework of realism itself. Referring to the perceived object as 'appearance', he insists that it is not a 'special kind of entity', '. . . to speak' of appearance is just to speak generally of such matters as how-it (object)-looks or how-it-feels'.[11] Repeated occurrence of a certain sensation in the presence of the object, referred to as appearance, and its non-occurrence in the absence of it is taken to be the evidence of the fact that sensation has a real cause. As a causal relation obtains between sensation and appearance, Mackie feels that there is '. . . no difficulty in checking that things cause our sensations'. The causal law in a sense is empirically confirmable. Conception of appearance as how things look also serves to justify our belief that the causal chain is extendable from appearance to reality. It is instructive to quote Mackie at this point.[12]

> . . . what I seem to be presented with is just that when a feelable cup-shaped object comes to be before my eyes, I begin to have a certain visual sensation and when the object is removed I cease to have it, the whole set of observations being repeatable in just the ways needed to confirm a causal relationship. I seem to be getting evidence of a real solid object causing sensations. . . . If to speak of an appearance is just to speak of how it looks, then . . . appearances can be its looking as if there were a causal relation between a real thing and, . . . my having a certain sensation.

Mackie seems to give the impression that unless some minute causes are postulated the sort of gaps and discontinuities found in the secondary quality-related experiences cannot be accounted for. This seems to be

unacceptable to Ayer because of his pro-phenomenalist orientation. Following Hume, he suggests that the role of postulating entities may be ascribed to imagination so that the alleged problems of discontinuity, inconsistency and other related problems do not arise. With the resulting modification of Mackie's position, Ayer does not find much difference between his position and Mackie's. For example, a cup is not 'feelable' unless it is there as an object and also sending sensible signals to the percipient. A causal entity cannot be a substratum, sending experiential signals but separable from the same. The theory of physical causation as a realist thesis can be upheld without entertaining Mackie's distinction between the cup-shaped object (appearance) and the cup itself (reality). Perceived object need not be claimed as a duplication of whatever the object is like. The ground of causal perception and perception itself need not have point-to-point correspondence. This does not prevent Ayer from maintaining that what is perceived is really there. The gap in perception may well be compensated, if that is what is needed, by imagnative projection of perception itself. Like Hume, he sought to dispense with the 'essentialism' of primary qualities and yet to retain the advantages of realism. He seems to maintain that while the perception of colour need not be caused exclusively by objects which are themselves coloured, for logical reasons we are required to believe that the colour-generating properties are in the real objects or in the field in which the objects are moving and interacting. The quality of colour cannot be attributed to the object if it, in any way, is not related to the colour-generating property of the object. The point, '. . . . (I)s it entirely obvious that colour is a relational property?'[13] which Ayer raises in the relevant context is suggestive of the above line of argument. In the same context he maintains that the primary qualities are required to be relational. Ascription of properties like 'mass' or 'electric charge' to a physical object is not significant if we cannot consider the ways in which other things are affected by it. The strength of the theoretical statements of science is guaranteed by their *connectability* with statements about observable states of affairs. If the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is not conceived in this way then the vestiges of a Lockean variety of essentialism would vitiate the causal account of perception.

Realism does not require primary qualities to be intrinsic to an object in a literal sense. The theory, the Lockean one for instance, which demands this sort of intrinsic properties cannot tell us what are the conditions under which a causal statement can be true. As these conditions are the occurrence of directly observable states of affairs, and cause being in principle not connectable to observable states of affairs, we cannot even understand the statement in which terms of primary qualities in the Lockean sense figure. Ayer tries to indicate the plausibility of non-essentialist realism with accent on what we perceive at the percipient's

end, and argues for an acceptable theory of property. An object can be said to be coloured, red or brown, if all the persons with similar sense capacity and opportunity situated *vis-à-vis* the object can perceive it as red or brown and this strategy is extended to the geometrical properties ascribed to the object. The key concept here is the 'possible perception' of the object by normal persons. That ensures two things: (i) no property is intrinsic to the nature of object; (ii) objectivity is ensured in terms of similarity of the perceived content of different percipients. It purports to be realism without essentialist stigma.

Ayer's account rests much on what may be called idealized description. It is descriptive because it relies substantially on the observed properties of the objects under considerations. It is also idealized in the sense that the descriptive content is not exhaustively reducible to the observable entities, but the unobservables attended to, need not be postulated as essentialist entities. They are distinguishable from the observables in terms of the latter themselves. To argue back to the theoretical 'bottom' or 'essence' of the observables, we have to use a suitable empirical criterion. For example, one and the same observable object, in fact, is observed differently from different standpoints or under different circumstances. From this *seeming* difference between different 'appearance' of the same object, one is not logically obliged to postulate that there is a real and unique object underneath the said appearance.

Ayer's account of the real existence of objects is not contingent upon Berkeleyan principle, like *esse est percepii*. The 'minute' objects of Locke or light 'corpuscles' of Newton, for example, are not themselves visible under normal circumstances. Yet their admissibility into a plausible account of colour perception is not rejected outright by Ayer. For, he holds, the Lockean 'minutes' and Newtonian 'corpuscles' are correlatable to what is perceptible and therefore need not be accepted as 'essentialist' presuppositions. But, as indicated earlier, he insists on the distinction between the 'minutes' and 'corpuscles' on the one hand, and their ascertainability on the other. The presupposition need not be essentialist but this does not mean that Ayer's defence of process causality is a presupposition-free exercise. In fairness to Ayer we can say that he purports to vindicate a modest form of realism, and true to his aim, presupposes structural minutes whose imperceptibility is due to the empirically contingent fact of their being minute. His causal account of perception, consistently with his modest version of realism, is not very robust.

It is worth noting the point that with the advent of Newtonian mechanics, there have been liberal uses of ideal objects in science. Ayer finds nothing objectionable to the postulation of unobservable entities in causal theories so far as they have empirical consequences. When one perceives an object like an apple, what is directly perceived is much less than the real apple. But this does not entail the denial of the commonsense

belief that a solid, opaque, medium-sized object exists independent of our perception. Ayer writes:[14]

> . . . my judgement that this is a table embodies an inference . . . in the sense that it affirms more than can logically be entailed by any strict account of the experience on which it is based. What I mean here by a strict account is one that is tailored to the experience in that it describes the quality of what is sensibly presented, without carrying any further implication of any sort.

All perceptual judgements 'go beyond' sensory experience. This provides Ayer with good enough reason to distinguish between that which is immediately perceived and the projections to which it leads. Objects are developed by transmuting percepts. Transmutations of percepts enable one to posit objects which are also credited with causal powers. This is indeed an attempt to defend realism in a modest way, arbitrary idealization being prevented by the constraint that a scientific hypothesis must have empirically testable consequences.

Indeed Ayer neither lends support to experience transcendent sense of the notion of 'exist' nor accepts the direct access thesis of the naive realist. Experiencing subject backed by imagination posits physical objects. The gap between percept and object is overcome by imagination. The idea of causal power suggests a line of defence of the causal theory of perception but the resulting thesis of Ayer is not a duplicate of the theory of physical causation of causal realists.

The whole endeavour of Ayer to develop a pro-phenomenalist–realist account of perception aims at the elimination of the supposed incompatibility between science and commonsense. If percepts are linked with cause from the beginning then the object, as indicated before, will be converted into 'unobservable occupant of unobservable space', which Ayer cannot accept due to his pro-phenomenalist–empiricist orientation. At the outset, a primitive notion of object as medium-sized entity has to be assumed and then at a secondary stage where one intends to offer an explanatory account of perception its connection with cause can be traced. But the problem is with the supposed primitive notion of object. It is difficult to fix the objective standard for 'normal individuals' and 'normal conditions of perception' in view of spatial–geometrical and temporal–durational limitations. In the face of these difficulties, Ayer's attempt to express the primitive notion of object as one which is perceived by normal individuals under normal conditions seems to be spurious. He remarks that our perceptual judgements embody a realistic theory about objects. If perceptual judgements of commonsense are theory-loaded then there is no good reason to suppose that the commonsense notion of object is primitive.

From what I have just said it follows that the realist theory of physical objects, which is by and large acceptable, has the status of a theory with

respect to the immediate data of perception. But it is difficult to provide a strict account of experience in relation to which the realist view of objects would be a theory. The puzzle is that it is not possible to describe faithfully the sensible experience without presupposing the realist view of the world. Anticipating this objection, Ayer makes a distinction between experiential statements about immediate data of perception and perceptual statements about ordinary objects. He is cautious enough to point out that for identifying immediate data of perception concepts are used in a theory-neutral way, and he discusses at length how the realist view which is also the commonsense view evolved from perceptual data. That a physicist cannot disown his affiliation to the commonsense view of the world is a more reasonable conclusion for Ayer. The physicist's mode of description is indeed *different* from that of commonsense, but it is not *distinct* from the latter. The common man describes in observational terms what he ordinarily perceives from a certain perspective. The physicist explains the ways in which perceptions of solid, opaque, medium-sized objects takes place. Science starts with commonsense and also sustains it.

Through phenomenalist realism Ayer tries to show the compatibility between two world-views, commonsensical and scientific, one based on perceptually available data, the other though not founded on perception, relatable to the latter. The two world-views are almost concordant or consistent. I use the word 'almost' because due to his empiricism Ayer cannot claim that the causal mode of understanding is definitive or ultimate. For, in the context of the empiricist account of causation, the questions of empirical identifiability, neither of the effect which is to be explained nor of the cause by which the former is sought to be explained, in a clear-cut manner, makes sense. The durable events of the world may be construed as a *plenum*. In the *plenum* of events in the world there is no dividing line between events which have identifying marks of cause and events which have identifying marks of effect.

Similarly, in the continuum of events where a particular event which is a cause ends and a particular event which is an effect starts are not clearly indicated. In the absence of this indication, the beginning and the end-points of the causal chain cannot be continuously traced.[15] This is a point which Hume tries to highlight in his argument that causal power is not a perceptible quality but projected habitually to the external body from repeated experience of the union of perceived impressions. 'Fire is the cause of burning': this casual statement does not imply the reality of causal power intrinsic to fire. Due to his strong disavowal of essentialism of the Lockean variety and his affiliation to comprehensive empiricism, Hume rejects the notion of causal power. The said statement, as Hume suggests, means, 'the event, like fire is always followed by the event, like burning'. But this conclusion is not acceptable to Ayer. The transcendental cause is admissible in Ayer's schema of thought if it is empirically

accountable. Throughout Ayer's account of causation there is a trace of dualism between the ontology of physical objects and the phenomenalist ontology of what he calls percepts. He is not committed to the reductive thesis of the phenomenalist and Dummett doubts whether his claim of being a sophisticated realist is actually justified. It seems due to his legacy to Humean empiricism that Ayer prefers to be a phenomenalist in the weaker sense rather than subscribing to a purely physicalist ontology leading to one kind of monism. Sense-impressions, to use Hume's expression, are passively received by the perceiving mind and physical objects, medium or minute, are products drawn by means of imagination under the constraint of perceptual experience. Testable consequences of statements about physical objects lead to realism in a sophisticated way.

Why does Ayer posit the ontology of physical objects when he is unable to cut off his moorings in phenomenalist empiricism? He posits habit-transcendent physical objects but fails to disown the phenomenalist way of conceiving the connectability of physical objects even of the Lockean minutes to the elements of sensory experience. To the metaphysical question of 'what there is?' Ayer's response is extremely ambiguous. His ambivalence leads to an unstable view of ontology. But Ayer is unambiguous regarding one basic point, that our perceptual experience has a non-mental cause. However minute it might be, the cause is in principle perceptible. The ground of this belief is the assumption that the physical position of external things, distal or proximal, and that of standardized percepts are traceable to a unified spatial field. Postulation of unobservable entities can lead to verifiable results because the perceiving subjects, percepts and posited entities are located in a spatial system which fundamentally consists of the spatial relations that obtain between observable objects. It is abundantly clear that subjective sensory elements with total exclusion of physical objects cannot suffice for an explanatory account of perception in causal terms. It has been suggested by Mackie, for example, that postulation of minute substratum is necessary for mitigating the gap between appearance and reality. The look of the thing is the look of the thing-in-itself. Mackie admits that if appearances are completely cut off from reality then either one has to deny causal process or move in ambivalence. Committing to the thing-in-itself in a non-Kantian way, he insists that appearances are not special kinds of entities. His approach to the causal theory of perception therefore differs both from Locke's resemblance theory and Ayer's pro-phenomenalistic causality, although Ayer claims to be close to Mackie. The bridge concept for Mackie is that of 'appearance' which allows him to postulate unobservable cause and defend process causality. Ayer's ambivalence is indeed due to his inability to find a reasonable alternative to Humean empiricism by suggesting a modification within the framework of empiricism itself.

When I make the above comment I have in mind the view of some philosophers of recent decades, Quine among others, who regard the question of the epistemological basis of causal relation as misconceived. Unlike Hume and Ayer, Quine's sole concern is with the nature of the ontology of causal relation. Causal relation holds between events and all events are effects of physical force upon particles. This implies that all events of nature, mental or physical, belong to the single category of matter. Taking the notion of energy as basic, Quine says that our perceptual experiences can be explained as the 'flow of energy' from the surrounding body to the body or body–mind complex of the individual. Conceding to the difficulties of projecting physical objects from sensory evidence (internally available to the cognitive mind), but not giving up the conviction '. . . that whatever evidence there is for science is sensory evidence'.[16] Quine has suggested the possibility of new empiricism. He agrees that it is difficult to justify the ontology of physical objects if objects are posited phenomenalistically from the internal domain of qualia. Consideration of memory, what we actually notice, led Quine to believe that physicalism provides us with an adequate conceptual scheme for systematic organization of experience. Imagination, which plays a significant role in Ayer's pro-phenomenalist–realist scheme, connects present experience with our memory of experiences of the past. But recollected experience is usually the memory of physical things and events, the sensory aspects being very feeble or almost forgotten. It is only with reference to physical objects that our experiences are held together. When an empiricist like Ayer is emphatic on the role of imagination in talking about the cause of perception he actually means projection of cause from the physical content of past experience. What Quine intends to point out is that we can perceive external objects because of '. . . the impact of molecules and light rays on our sensory receptors', and this again is facilitated by our prior knowledge of physical objects. Without subscribing to the internal–external distinction of the traditional empiricists, Quine regards the body–mind complex of the human subject as one body among other physical bodies. Perceptual experiences have the physical force of energy as cause. All effects are 'actions of physical force'. It is by the 'thermodynamical' notion of cause that Quine sought to overcome the dualism between the physical and the mental. The effect of the new naturalized empiricism of Quine is the 'reduction' of the supposed Lockean essence or, in Ayer's terminology, 'minutes', to neural intake so far as perception of physical objects is concerned. Nothing in addition to physical object is needed to account for our perceptual experience. Neural intake, medium-sized objects and inferred entities are homogeneous and continuous and we need not postulate a distinct ontology of causal entitities. The causal world and the perceptual content are not only connectable but connected. Realizing that phenomenalism cannot account for the continuity that underlies the

causal theory of perception, Quine suggests:[17] 'Causality is a relation of events and all events . . . are a matter ultimately of the action of physical forces upon particles.' Indicating his difference from Hume, Quine writes:[18] 'My concern . . . is different from Hume's, his was with the epistemological basis for a causal relation, while mine is with the ontological nature of the causal relation as an object of scientific theory.'

In a sense, what Quine purports to achieve is a reconciliation between a liberal form of realism and empiricism and in this context his reductionist programme is comparable to that of Ayer's. Unlike Moore, neither Ayer nor Quine proposes to prove the existence of the world of real things. Both of them try to vindicate the posited ontology of physical objects. While Ayer's sophisticated route to realism is through phenomenalism, Quine's liberal route is through physicalism. The underlying monism of Quine's doctrine of physicalism enables him to arrive at an ontologically coherent view. Both object-energy or thing-particles and brain-energy or in-taking neural particles are subject to the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics. That explains the non-rigid and liberal character of Quine's causal physicalism. It might be interpreted as a purported attempt to overcome the ambivalence between empiricism and realism so profound in the pro-phenomenalist, realist conceptual scheme of Ayer.

In the Indian context the classical Buddhist thought is a comparable view. On Nāgārjuna's account, the causal theory of perception is rejected for the following reasons: (i) momentariness (*kṣṇa*) and (ii) dependent origination (*pratitya*). The past is not in the present, nor is the future in the present. Present as present is not available either. It is either imaginary past or expected future. Neither past, nor present, nor future as such is a definite link in a chain. But all these so-called segments of time and what happens 'in' them are inter-dependent, not independent, not discrete. They are like a continuum, yet the continuity is not perceivable. It is imaginary (*kalpanā*) and the contents of imagination may be, in fact are, alternatively organized and presented, rather presentable. Therefore, the supposed causal link from the object to the percipient is imaginary. What is more important to note is that the content of this imagination is not unique or definite. From this analysis the causal theory of perception as it is often defended, is untenable, if not collapsable.[19]

However, it may be argued in defence of Nāgārjuna, that the causal world which is imaginable in alternative ways is not so unstructured as to permit every sort of alteration, every kind of alternative. After all, the account of the empirical world, *Saṁsāra*, given by the Buddhist is not fictitious or arbitrary in the bad sense, because, it is pointed out, the so-called imaginary or empirically constructed world, due to *kalpanā* in spite of its alternative (*vikalpa*) and changing representations, is sustained by what is *śūnya* or *nirvāṇa*. Otherwise the Buddhist account fails to be in accord not only with the science of the time but also with the commonsense

of all times. It is not at all surprising that Nāgārjuna says *Nirvāṇa* is *Saṁsāra* or *Saṁsāra* is *Nirvāṇa*. In modern times one may put the solution in this way: The empirical is transcendental and the transcendental is empirical.

It seems that the above view of Nāgārjuna can satisfy at least partially Ayer's demand that the transcendental 'cause' is admissible in his schema of thought if it is empirically accountable. The notion of essence is denied by the Buddhist.[20] 'Firehood' has nothing to do with 'burning'. All that matters when the event 'burning of fire' takes place is the *arthakriyāsāmarthya* (causal efficacy) of the object 'fire'. Empirical accountability of 'cause' in terms of practice which Hume speaks of or verifiability as Ayer contends was anticipated by the Buddhist notion of fulfilment of purpose (*artha*) of humans. One might say that Śaṅkara's view of the empirical world on the locus of Brahman and Berkeley's god based account of the scientific world, both perceptible and non-perceptible, are, given suitable elucidations, not incompatible with the broad scheme of Nāgārjuna.

AYER AND QUANTUM MECHANICS

From the scientific point of view causal account of perception is often associated with the conceptual framework of deterministic mechanics. Till quantum mechanics made its appearance in the early part of this century, it was assumed that all physical bodies are reducible to few kinds of elements or few kinds of elements *and* few kinds of fields. The view regarding the nature of basic elements changed over time. To the classical determinists individual atoms were the fundamental elements. It was discovered later that atoms were composed of electrons, protons, neutrons, etc. in motion. With the discovery of these fundamental subatomic elements it is supposed that physics has 'touched' the ontic essence. There persists now a belief that quantum mechanics is a 'never-to-be surpassed revolution in physics'.

But problem was felt when experimental explorations started showing that subatomic elements have a peculiar combination of wave-and-particle-like properties. For this 'puzzling' feature the position and momentum of subatomic elements cannot be simultaneously measured. So against the Newtonian and the post-Newtonian determinists, quantum, mechanists maintain that *strict* causal account of the physical reality cannot possibly be given. Under this revolutionary perspective of science, the mechanistic assumption that all events at various levels can be explained as effects of some permanently fixed fundamental elements of physical reality proves seriously problematic.

Ayer's response to this new perspective of science is very general. On his view, terms and postulates of quantum mechanics are only indirectly connectable with the observable objects. The general tendency of adopting highly general laws and principles in advanced scientific theories is

indicative of an idealized world that appears to be incompatible, at least in some respects, with the world which we ordinarily experience. Ayer optimistically concludes that, compared to Newton and post-Newtonian determinism, quantum mechanics exploits the strategy of idealization in much higher degree no doubt but in principle it is also connectable to the range of available states of affairs.[21]

> There is only a remote and devious connection between the terms of contemporary quantum theory and any observable event.

But this general observation of Ayer would be unacceptable to those who subscribe to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics given by Bohr and Heisenberg.

According to Bohr, one cannot meaningfully state that a causal system passes through a continuous series of intermediate states of physical bodies, similar to initial and final states. This limitation is the result of indivisibility of quantum of action. It seems that Bohr equates the notion of causality with that of interaction between bodies which involve transference of energy from one body to another.[22]

Search for the connection of quantum elements with experimental evidence may not be a totally hopeless enterprise. But there are certain practical and theoretical (or philosophical) difficulties. To show the said connection, a highly 'complex theory on the basis of very little experimental evidence' has to be developed. This would require '. . . solution of some as yet unsolved mathematical problems of the highest order of difficulty, that is of the properties of the solutions of non-linear equations'.[23] Theoretical (or philosophical) reason for renunciation of causality in connection with the domain of quantum elements is due to our 'subjective' limitations to know precisely the nature of the elements. For in the quantum nature of the interaction between the observer (measuring apparatus together with the discrete quanta of light which is used in microscope) and the observed (subatomic elements), indeterminacy is at work. The subject's or the knower's psychosomatic conditions themselves obey the principle of indeterminacy. 'The philosophical reasons' attending the conditions of ascertaining cause-effect connection, Bohr writes, '(are) based on the famous indeterminacy principle of Heisenberg'.[24] In view of these practical and theoretical considerations one might conclude: connectability of quantum elements with experimental–experiental evidence which Ayer speaks of is not even remotely possible.

I don't think Ayer has paid much attention to the problem of indeterminacy due to quantum mechanics in the perceptual or, more generally speaking, epistemological context. What I think is that his main preoccupation is with the problem of perception or, to be more precise, the cause of perception. This interest is not elaborately extended to the area of quantum mechanics. As we know, according to Einstein, Podolsky

and Rosen, among others, even in quantum area there is the substratum where lies the cause of everything that happens in physical reality. Now the main difficulty of Einsteinian interpretation of quantum behaviour lies in the speculation of unified causal field. In fact scientific investigation does involve speculation. Without the adventure of informed speculation scientific enquiry becomes positivist, less explorative, almost restrictive. In the form of thought experiment speculation often leads to new developments in science. Hypothesis based on speculation is entertained so far as it is open to appropriate experimental tests under favourable conditions. Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen write:[25]

> If without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.

The above statement is criticized on the ground that it wrongly assumes that quantum-theoretic system is free from disturbance. The system is construed in the framework of classical mechanics. But Bohr points out that the quantum-theoretic system by its very nature cannot be free from disturbance. The conditions required for prediction cannot obtain in the domain of quantum mechanics.

Bohr, Heisenberg and their followers, Dirac among others, think that the concept which helps in understanding the behaviour of quantum phenomena is probability and not causality. The concept of probability on this interpretation is a 'subjective' concept. It is connected with the incomplete information which we possess in respect of certain events. Probabilistic considerations enter in physics only because we cannot possibly know the precise measurements of relevant elements. Though Heisenberg finds physical reality by its very nature indeterminate, his thrust is on the point that probabilities represent 'our lack of knowledge'. Primacy of the role of subjective uncertainty in the Bohr–Heisenberg interpretation of probability leads to the renunciation of causality together with the rejection, at least to a certain extent, of realism in physics.

The whole situation takes a different turn when one tries to understand quantum mechanics in terms of objective probability or what thinkers like Popper calls propensity interpretation of probability. There are real physical *tendencies* or *propensities* or *dispositions* to realize the possible states of affairs. Probability is the measure of the propensity to realize the possibility.[26] The relative strength of tendencies or propensities to realize the possibilities expresses itself in terms of the relative frequency of success in realizing the possibilities. Frequency or statistical probability is the test of such realizations.

In view of the limited context of the present paper I need not enter into the details of subjective and objective probabilities. But it may be pointed out that from the point of view of objective probability, a physical

system may be realistic even if it employs the concept of probability. Rather it has to be thought of as a description of the possibilities or potentialities within the physical situation. Quantum theory is an explanation of actualization of propensities of basic elements of physical reality in probabilistic terms. It provides us with the statistical laws of the physical system to predict the probability measure of the actualization of propensities of subatomic elements. So it is said, the subjectivism of Bohr and Heisenberg is to be taken with circumspection. Given the propensity interpretation of probability, the role of probability in physics receives a different interpretation. As Popper writes:[27]'. . . quantum physics . . . is regarded as objectively indeterministic, and probability as something objective . . .'

What I want to point out is that Ayer has not discussed in detail the problem of probability in connection with quantum mechanics. But if we go carefully through his writings and stray references made by him to both theory of relativity and quantum mechanics then we can reconstruct his view therefrom.

Broadly speaking, scientific theories are open at least to two different approaches. One is that a scientific theory must be answerable at least in principle to observable phenomena. This is an old empiricist view but in the modern time this view is repeatedly ascribed to Hume. Though scientifically speaking Hume is a Newtonian, there is a dilemma between his philosophical commitment to the Newtonian paradigm and his commitment to commonsense. Commonsense requires him to maintain that scientific theories must be answerable to sense experience somehow or other. But there is another view that we call primacy of theory which is often ascribed to Kant and neo-Kantians who maintain even observation is theory loaded. Now, in this connection we can recall the noted phenomenologist, particularly, Merleau-Ponty who is fond of saying that knowledge is distorted in two ways.[28] There is an ultra-theoretic distortion from above by those who believe in primacy of theory. Another way of distorting knowledge is from below by the perceptualist or sensationalist who thinks that unless theoretical knowledge is accountable, or more preferably, reducible to sense impressions, sensory evidence, they are not scientific in a strict sense. Empiricists from Hume to Quine uphold this view of theoretical knowledge though the concept of 'sensory evidence' has changed over time and Merleau-Ponty would say that they distort knowledge from below. In this spectrum of primacy of theory at one end and primacy of sense impressions/sensory evidence on the other, where does Ayer stand? Certainly early Ayer is a phenomenalist and therefore closer to 'distortion from below'. But with the passage of time one finds that Ayer's theory becomes a little less phenomenalist, a little less sensationalist and a little more realist.

Now let us see how Ayer's commitment to realism influences our reconstruction of his theory of perception *vis-à-vis* quantum theory.

Quantum phenomena like distant astrophysical or galactic phenomena are not visible to the naked eye. Quantum behaviour is understandable to us and also to the professional scientists themselves, mainly in terms of certain theories. Only incidentally in some cases, when smashers of physical particles are used, we can see the visible effect of quantum behaviour but what we see is only a subsidiary part, only a part. Quantum mechanics, to us, to quantum mechanists themselves and also to philosophers of quantum mechanics is more a theoretical affair than a perceptual one. So realism of Ayer obliges him, somewhat as a follower of Einstein to maintain that seemingly non-causal and non-realist behaviour of the quantum phenomena is the surface structure of the physical phenomena called quanta. By implication he wants to maintain that underneath these quanta behaviours there is a sort of causal field connectable with observable phenomena. One has to be very careful of the distinction between connectable and connected. When Ayer is saying 'connectable' his claim is weaker: his perceptualist claim, his realist claim have been put across in a sober modest way. Though quantum mechanists maintain that the quanta phenomena are discrete and have to be understood probabilistically, he continues to maintain that they can be understood perceptually, and here comes our last point.

Perception and causal perception should not be lumped together. The famous critique of causality offered by Hume needs to be borne in mind. Cause-effect relationship is undeniable but observability of the things or events between which such relation obtains is extremely important. Therefore, in a way, says Ayer, cause-effect relationship is observable only in an indirect way, that is at least in principle they are observationally connectable. If this connectability requirement is in principle conceded to, then one is obliged to fall back upon a sort of metaphysical realism, a sort of transcendentalism which is not to the taste of Ayer, not even of later Ayer. That is why, if we closely scrutiny his later works then we find that he wants to make a sort of compromise between his realism, fidelity to commonsense on the one hand and theory-ladenness of quantum mechanics on the other.

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Telling a Lie

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I

Telling a lie may be defined as a person's stating the facts to be other than what they actually are, knowing that he is stating the facts to be other than what they actually are; or, as a person's stating something to be the case, knowing that what he is stating to be the case is other than what is actually the case.

A person may tell a lie in so many words, or not in so many words. Thus, for example, the persons A and B are involved in doing something conjointly. However, the people somehow believe that A alone is involved in doing it, and therefore they blame him alone for something that may have gone wrong with it. B does not say anything in the matter. Now, it seems to me that B's not saying anything in the matter is as good as his saying that he is not involved in doing it, knowing that he is involved in doing it, and thus it is as good as his telling a lie. It will be seen that in not saying anything in the matter and consequently telling a lie, B is also disowning collective responsibility and as a result betraying A's trust.

Telling a lie may be distinguished from the following: (1) saying what is false; (2) making a mistake; (3) misrepresenting something or somebody; (4) deceiving somebody else (in one sense); (5) being crooked; (6) concealing, or avoiding telling, the truth; (7) exaggerating; (8) being just so much story-telling; (9) telling a half-truth; (10) avoiding giving an answer; (11) rumouring; (12) saying something which is not warranted by the facts of the case; (13) giving an answer which is no answer; and (14) boasting.

(1) Saying what is false is a person's saying what is not the case. This is not done knowingly, but, say, on the basis of misperception, or fallacious reasoning, or hearsay, or unpreparedness or unwillingness to find out.

(2) Making a mistake is a person's doing something which he should not have done, or his not doing something which he should have done, as a result of a failure of proper understanding on his part.

(3) Misrepresenting something or somebody is a person's saying something about something or somebody which is not the case, or which he knows not to be the case; or misrepresenting something or somebody

is a person's saying something about something or somebody which is false, or which is a lie.

(4) Deceiving somebody else (in one sense) is (a) a person's making somebody else believe what is not the case, or (b) a person's making somebody else not believe what is the case.

A person may deceive somebody else in a variety of ways, say, by talking ambiguously, or through telling a lie, or through telling a lie repeatedly, or by means of propaganda, or by concealing the truth.

Let me mention here an example of a person's deceiving somebody else by talking ambiguously. In the *Mahabharata*, Drona asks Yudhishthira, whom he trusted because of his righteousness, whether his (Drona's) son, Aswatthama, had really been killed in the battle. Yudhishthira tells Drona that Aswatthama had been killed; and then he goes on to add in a voice hardly audible that the elephant Aswatthama had been killed. It has been said that this was the only lie which Yudhishthira ever spoke. However, I find that here Yudhishthira did not tell a lie. He spoke the truth; Aswatthama, although the elephant Aswatthama, had indeed been killed. What he did was to deceive Drona into believing that his son had been killed, by talking ambiguously about Aswatthama. It is true that Yudhishthira tried to remove this ambiguity by saying that the elephant Aswatthama had been killed, but in a voice which was hardly audible. This was plainly a case of being crooked. One would have already noticed that, in not speaking in clear terms, Yudhishthira also betrayed Drona's trust in him. Thus, what we have in the course of Yudhishthira's short speech is (a) his trying to deceive Drona by talking ambiguously; and, in addition, (b) his being crooked, and (c) his betrayal of Drona's trust in him.

(5) Being crooked is a person's being dishonest.

I have already mentioned an example of being crooked under the above-mentioned head 'Deceiving somebody else (in one sense).' I have said that Yudhishthira was being crooked in telling Drona that it was the elephant Aswatthama which had been killed, but telling him this in a voice which was hardly audible.

(6) Concealing, or avoiding telling, the truth is as good as a person's telling a lie, although not in so many words; that is, it is as good as a person's (knowingly) saying that nothing is the matter when something is the matter, although not in so many words.

(7) Exaggerating is a person's more or less wittingly or unwittingly, overlooking the facts of the case, and presenting something as being in some sense more than it actually is. To the extent one overlooks the facts of the case, and presents something as being in some sense more than it actually is, wittingly, exaggerating is a case of telling a lie.

(8) Being just so much story-telling is a person's knowingly or unknowingly talking imaginarily or fictitiously or about things which may have no relation with reality.

(9) Telling a half- truth is a person's telling a part of the truth, but not telling some other part of the truth which is of vital importance.

Somebody who does not know the whole truth, would evidently have a highly mistaken notion of the whole truth, if he is told only a half-truth.

One may tell a half-truth deliberately or undeliberately. When one tells a half-truth deliberately, then one is telling a lie about that part of the truth which is of vital importance, although not in so many words. Telling a half-truth deliberately is the same thing as concealing, or avoiding telling, that part of the truth which is of vital importance. (See '(6)' above, 'Concealing, or avoiding telling, the truth.')

(10) Avoiding giving an answer is this: in response to a question, a person's neither speaking the truth nor telling a lie, but, say, keeping quiet or attempting diversions aimed at showing that he was not interested in answering that question.

(11) Rumouring is a person's spreading report without checking the truth of that report.

It is astonishing how many people find rumouring titillating, and also how many of them find it titillating to be the recipients of rumouring. In fact, the area of rumouring would be a rather rich area of investigation.

(12) Saying something which is not warranted by the facts of the case is, to say it in only slightly different words, a person's saying something which the facts of the case do not support.

Saying something which is not warranted by the facts of the case, that is, saying something which the facts of the case do not support, is saying something which is not the case, and this means that it is saying something which is false.

One says something which is not warranted by the facts of the case, that is, one says something which is false, say, on the basis of misperception, or fallacious reasoning, or hearsay, or unpreparedness or unwillingness to find out. (See '(1)' above, 'What is false.')

Saying something which is not warranted by the facts of the case, knowing that one is saying something which is not warranted by the facts of the case, is a case of telling a lie. (See the definition of telling a lie above.)

(13) Giving an answer which is no answer is this: in response to a question, a person's saying something which is no answer to that question, but is of the nature of sidetracking.

In giving an answer which is no answer, one does not deny that something is the case. One simply refuses to take cognisance of something being or not being the case.

(14) Boasting is a person's speaking in praise of himself for one thing or another: say, for something which he has done, or even for something which he has not done but which he would like it to be known that he has done it; or for something which he has, or even for something which he does not have but which he would like it to be known that he has it; or for

his knowing such and such people, or even for his not knowing such and such people but he would like it to be known that he knows such and such people (for example, name-dropping).

One may boast in so many words or not in so many words. Boasting is a case of telling a lie, whatever else it may be, when one boasts for something being the case which is not the case, knowing that he is boasting for something being the case which is not the case.

II

Generally speaking, the notion of telling a lie is said to belong to the moral realm. Here two things are said about it. Firstly, there is the view that there is the moral law that one should not tell a lie. Kant is a well-known representative of this view. Secondly, there is the view that there are exceptions to the moral law that one should not tell a lie, just as there are exceptions to many other moral laws. This view is commonly held. I will mention examples in respect of both these views. In doing so I will be moving within a familiar territory.

I will begin with mentioning some examples in respect of the first view, that is, examples where, following the first view, in telling a lie one would be doing something which one ought not to do from the moral point of view, or which it is immoral to do.

(1) The first example which I am going to mention here is an extended and slightly modified version of the example which I have mentioned at the beginning of this paper. The persons A and B are involved in doing something conjointly, say, in producing a report on the state of the institution of which they are members. The report contains a certain amount of criticism of those in authority, and as a result it arouses hostility of these people. In order that he is not affected adversely, B tells a lie. He says that, although he was a member of the team which was to produce that report, he was not actually involved in producing it; A alone was responsible for doing so.

(2) In a certain society, those of its classes of people which have somehow suffered great deprivation over a long period of time are provided with special benefits in order to ameliorate their lot. Thus there is a reservation of seats for them in educational institutions, and they receive a considerable amount of material help while they are there. There is a reservation of seats for them in matters of appointment. There is free or highly subsidized medical aid for them in public hospitals. Now, various people who do not belong to the classes just-mentioned but who would like to take advantage of the special benefits given to these classes tell a lie. They adopt all kinds of dubious ways towards showing that they also belong to these classes.

(3) Somebody has had, say, a cataract operation. However, there are certain complications. Thus there is swelling in the eye which has been

operated upon and this swelling refuses to subside; there is the dislocation of the lens which has been put in the eye; and, more seriously, the vision in the eye is becoming weaker with passage of time. But the doctor, in order to protect himself against something that may have gone wrong with the operation, tells a lie. He says to the patient that everything is all right; and that he (the patient) is simply being misled into believing all sorts of things and is a victim of his own psychology.

(4) Some article is selling well in the market. It has been produced by a well-known firm. Now, a trader, in order to make much and easy money, tells a lie. He produces an article apparently similar to the one which is selling well and which has been produced by that well-known firm, and tells the customers that the article which he has himself produced has been produced by that well-known firm. He may do so by putting the mark of that well-known firm on his own article.

I will now mention some examples in respect of the above-mentioned second view (the view that there are exceptions to the moral law that one should not tell a lie); that is, examples where, following the second view, in telling a lie one would not be doing something which one ought not do or which it is immoral to do. There are two kinds of cases here. Firstly, there are cases in which in telling a lie one would be doing something which is of a moral nature. And, secondly, there are cases in which in telling a lie one would be doing something which is not of an immoral nature. The first three examples which I am going to mention relate to the first kind of cases; and the other three examples which I am going to mention relate to the second kind of cases.

(i) The persons A and B are very close to one another. A is B's dear teacher, and B is A's dear pupil. After several years, A, who is now old and weak, along with his wife is going to visit for some reason the place where B lives. He would very much like B to meet him and his wife on their arrival in that place. B has every intention of doing so, and is in fact keenly looking forward to doing so. But when the time comes, he quite inexplicably completely forgets the whole thing. Now, he could go to A, explain everything and apologise. However, A is an exceptionally sensitive person, and B knows that he would be shocked to hear that B was not there because he had forgotten to do so. As a result, B finds himself left with no alternative except to tell a lie. He says to A, when he meets him, that he is sorry that he could not make it, because he had to be away from the place on some pressing business and at a very short notice.

(ii) The person C is looking after his children, who have lost their mother. He is himself suffering from some painful and possibly incurable ailment. But he would not like his children, who have already lost their mother when they were still relatively young, to have an inkling of it. On occasions when the children see signs of their father not feeling quite well, they ask him how he is, and he tells them a lie. He says to them that he is all right. He would like, while he is there, that his children are happy

as far as possible, and he is able to provide for their future as much as possible.

(iii) The person D has gone far, far away from home on some rather important work. However, in his absence, there is a tragedy in the family. He makes his usual enquiry from home, from wherever he is, whether everything was all right. Now, in order not to disturb him in the important work in which he is engaged so far away from home, the people in the family tell him a lie. They say to him that everything was all right, except, of course, those minor irritants which are taking place in a family all the time, but which are not worth bothering about.

(iv) The person E is an insistent, and not always a welcome, visitor. He would come and stay on, even if the family have some other plans of their own or have visitors with whom they would like to be by themselves. On some occasion, when they are settling down to doing something by themselves, they see this visitor making his way to them. And then they find that they simply have to tell him a lie. They tell him that they have to be going somewhere, and as a result they are rather busy preparing for it.

(v) The person F goes to attend a party. Going by his past experience, he expects this party to be in no way very different from the other of these parties. There would be a good deal of talking; the children would be playing among themselves, of course, making a certain amount of noise; there would be feasting; and so on. But when F arrives there, he is met with deafening noise. There is a band playing, and it is left to them to make as much noise as they like; in fact, the louder, the more welcome. And the people are themselves shouting, trying their best to keep pace with the band. F finds the whole scene unexpectedly unpleasant and nerve-shattering. And so he decides to tell a lie. He tells the host that he is sorry that he has to leave early, because he has to attend a couple of other parties as well.

(vi) The person G is an ambitious person, and as a result, irrespective of his level of competence, he would like to do one thing or another to acquire public recognition. He approaches the person H, whom he considers as his friend but who himself sees no such relationship between them, in whatever place the latter may be living, and suggests to him the various things which he would like him to do in that place to bring him (G) into prominence there. H does not respond to G's request. And when they happen to meet, he tells him a lie. He tells him that he is sorry that he cannot do anything in the matter because he is caught up in his own rather serious problems.

III

In the preceding section of this paper, I have been concerned with the thesis of the moral role or function of the notion of telling a lie in our life. According to this thesis, the moral role is the major role which the notion

of telling a lie plays in our life; by and large, to talk of the notion of telling a lie is to have before one's mind its moral role. However, we find that the moral role is not the only major, let alone the only, role, which the notion of telling a lie plays in our life; it plays many other roles as well. I am going to mention only some of them. (1) A role, which may not be very far behind the moral role, which the notion of telling a lie plays in our life is its role in our life of politeness. (2) There are occasions when telling a lie is a folly; and there are occasions when not telling a lie is a folly. (3) There are occasions when telling a lie is just a matter of joke. (4) There are occasions when telling a lie is an expression of our concern and affection for somebody. We find that these other roles, at least collectively, which the notion of telling a lie plays in our life, may be as prominent as the moral role. We also find that, in virtue of some of these other roles, the notion of telling a lie has additional respectability, that is, in addition to the respectability which it has in virtue of there being times when telling a lie is not of an immoral nature. Telling a lie is not always an object of condemnation; often enough it is also an object of appreciation. In the following part of this section, I would mention examples in respect of the above-mentioned four roles which the notion of telling a lie plays in our life; and I would mention these examples in respect of these four roles in the order in which these roles are given above.

(1) It will be noted that a good deal of our life of politeness takes place through our telling a lie. It will also be noted that telling a lie in the life of politeness is not really telling a lie; it is a polite way of doing something or saying something else. (The role of telling a lie in our life of politeness could be a theme of enquiry by itself.) Let me now mention a few examples.

(i) The person I is invited to attend some function. But I is not inclined to go. And so he informs the people concerned that, although he would very much like to come, he is not able to do so on account of some preoccupation. Here telling a lie is a polite way of saying that one does not want to come or is not interested in coming. The people who have some experience of I in the matter would also interpret it in that way.

(ii) The person J has something, which the person K would like to borrow from him. But J would not like to lend it to K (or to anybody else for that matter). And so he tells K that he is sorry that he cannot lend it to him, because he is needing it himself all the time. Here telling a lie is a polite way of saying that one does not want to lend something which he has.

(iii) The person L would like to give something as a present to the person M. But M is not at all keen to have it for whatever reason. But he knows that L would be hurt if he did not accept it, and he would be happy if he accepted it. And so M accepts L's present and says to him that he is so very happy to have it. Here telling a lie is a polite way of going along for one reason or another.

(iv) The person N writes to the publishers of a book to allow him to publish a translation of that book. After some hesitation, the publishers give him the permission. However, in the course of time, in a state of sheer negligence or what can only be called a state of madness, he destroys the permission. And then he writes to the publishers once more for the permission. He says to them that he has misplaced the permission which they had kindly given him and is not able to trace it anywhere, and, therefore, he would be grateful to them if they give him another permission. Here telling a lie is a polite way of saying that something has gone wrong.

(v) The person O visits a place after a long time; and, while he is there, he makes it a point to meet several of his friends. Later on, the friend P comes to know of O having been there, and he is annoyed that O did not meet him, and complains to him about it. And then O tells P a lie. He says to him that he is sorry that he did not meet him, but, knowing that P was a rather busy person, he did not want to disturb him. Here telling a lie is a polite way of saying or confessing that things had gone wrong.

(2) I am going to mention two examples here; the first example is about telling a lie being a folly; and the second example is about not telling a lie being a folly.

(i) A person has developed some extremely serious, and possibly some terminal, malady. The members of the family, out of concern for him, tell him a lie about it. They tell him, even invoking the name of a doctor, that there is nothing very serious with him, and he should be all right soon. However, there is, or is emerging, a view, according to which, telling this person a lie is a folly. According to this view, this person should know exactly what the matter with him is, so that he knows exactly what all he is required or expected to do to get well or face the worst.

(ii) The person Q borrows things from just anybody, but never returns them. This is well-known. On some occasion, he asks the person R to lend something to him. Now, knowing things, R considers it a folly to lend it to him; unless, of course, he is prepared to forgo what he lends, and this he is not prepared to do. And as a result, he considers it a folly not to tell a lie, if by doing so one can escape lending the thing to him. And so he tells R a lie. He says to him, say, that he does not have the thing which he has asked him to lend.

(3) I will mention here two examples of telling a lie as a matter of joke.

(i) The person S is infatuated with the person T, without the latter having the slightest inkling of the former's condition, or even without her having the least awareness of his existence. Some friends of S decide to have some fun at his expense. They write a letter to him, as if it has been written by T herself. In this letter they represent T as saying to S something to the following effect: 'I am deeply in love with you. Now and again I have tried to give you an indication in that direction, but you have not taken any notice. Kindly do something in the matter, so that my

anxiety can be set at rest.' It is not for us to worry here about what happens to S after he receives this letter. I only wish to say at present that in the given case telling a lie is just a matter of joke.

(ii) The person U is fond of children and is easily able to establish a rapport with them. He is playing with the child V. He tells her, in fun, that there is a cat behind her. V, in a state of something of a panic, looks behind her, finds that there is nothing, and is a little embarrassed. U tells V that he was only trying to make an 'April fool' of her. U repeats the game at some other time, but this time V is already wiser.

(4) I will mention here just one example of telling a lie as an expression of one's concern and affection for somebody.

The persons W and X are lovers. Each of them would like to do something for the other. They sit down to a meal. Both of them are excessively fond of some item in the meal. But W says to X that she is not feeling like eating that item; she would be happy if X could take it, otherwise it would be wasted. X says to W that he was himself going to say exactly the same thing to her. It is not for us to worry here about how they work out things. What I wish to say is that their telling a lie is an expression of their concern and affection for one another.

While talking of telling a lie in our life of politeness, I have said that there telling a lie is not really telling a lie, but a polite way of doing something or saying something else. We now find that, in telling a lie as a matter of joke, once again, telling a lie is not really telling a lie; it is a way of having fun. And, likewise, in telling a lie as an expression of one's concern and affection for somebody, telling a lie is not really telling a lie; it is a way of caring for somebody or saying that one cares for somebody.

IV

In this section, I wish to deal with a problem which is not directly connected with the notion of telling a lie. But I find that the notion of telling a lie enables us to discuss this problem rather well. This problem relates to moral knowledge. It is about how we know a moral law, like 'Do not tell a lie' or 'Do not tell a lie except under conditions x.' I find that, in our moral deliberations, the problem of moral knowledge is no less important than the problem of the foundation of morality. However, somehow for sometime these problems have received very little attention in philosophy.

Take the following two cases:

(i) The chief of a state is charged with monumental corruption. There is more than a *prima facie* case against him in this connection. Now, in his anxiety to clear his name and believing that the people would be taken in, he declares to them, on oath, that he is completely innocent and is not at all involved in any corrupt practices. He goes on to say, showing how hurt he is, that it is his enemies who are responsible for dragging him into

the whole affair. However, in the course of time, the charges against him are found to be conclusively established.

(ii) There is communal violence in some area. Members of community C1 are after members of community C2, for the simple reason that they are members of C2. It does not matter to them whether members of C2 whom they are after have harmed members of C1 or are innocent. It is enough that they are members of C2. The person Y, who is a member of C2 and is innocent, has found shelter with his friend Z, who is a member of C1. Members of C1, with some suspicion in their mind, come to Z and ask him whether Y was staying with him. Z answers in the negative. We need not worry at the moment about what follows.

Now, being confronted with the above-mentioned first case, that is, with the case of the chief of a state, who has been charged with monumental corruption and who is also later on found to be guilty of that charge, telling a lie that he is not involved in corrupt practices; we find that we are simply morally shocked at that. We say how, for heaven's sake, he could tell that blatant lie. (We find that we are also morally shocked at that chief of a state being involved in that corruption. But for the time being I am only taking the case of our being morally shocked at his telling that lie.) Likewise, being confronted with the above-mentioned second case, that is, with the case of Z's telling a lie in order to protect the life of innocent Y; we find that we simply morally approve of Z's telling that lie. We say that Z has acted in a morally right manner in telling that lie. We find that we are morally shocked at the first case, and we morally approve of the second case; and I do not how to deny this.

At least on the face of it, there is a similarity between these cases, and, say, the cases in which we are confronted with certain objects and then characterize them as red, or hot, or loud. The similarity is this: in all these cases we are confronted with such and such objects, and then apparently as a result of this confrontation, and not as a result of something else, we characterize them in such and such ways (as morally shocking, or morally approvable, or red, or hot, or loud). Thus we do not characterize them in such and such ways because we want to characterize them in those ways. There is no urge on our part to tell a story. Here it does not matter that in one case there are physical objects, and in the other case there are what may be called moral objects. Here it does not also matter that in relation to physical objects there are sense-organs, but in relation to moral objects there are no what may be called moral organs.

A word of explanation here. I have said that we are confronted with such and such objects, and then we characterize them in such and such ways. It may be asked in this place: what does 'we' in this statement stand for? It does not stand for a group of people, large or small. It does not also stand for a number of people, large or small. It stands for any number of people, from one to all. The important thing is that whatever 'we' in the given statement stands for, whether for one or more than one person,

that by itself has no significance whatsoever for the truth of our characterization.

Now, I have said that we are confronted with such and such objects, and then apparently as a result of this confrontation, and not as a result of something else, we characterize them in such and such ways. The question arises: how do we know that when we characterize these objects in these ways, we are doing so purely and simply as a result of this confrontation, and not as a result of something else, not even partly in that way? That something else because of which we characterize these objects in these ways may not be that we want to characterize them in these ways, that we want to tell a story. It may be something other than this. How do we know that it is nothing else whatsoever?

Now, I have not tried to find out what all can be imagined to fall under that something else, on account of which, and not purely and simply out of confrontation, we may characterize such and such objects in such and such ways. But there is one thing which we can well imagine, which in fact we even know well, to fall under that something else. This thing is of the subjective kind. Thus we can say that when we characterize such and such objects in such and such ways, we may do so for subjective reasons. There are numerous things which come under or are of the subjective kind. Let me mention some of them. (i) Human beings have this as a necessary constitution of their nature that when, for example, they are confronted with the case of that chief of a state telling that lie, they are bound to characterize it as morally shocking. (ii) Human beings, collectively or individually, have had this become a part of their unconscious nature in such a way that when they are confronted with that case, they irremediably characterize it as morally shocking. (iii) Human beings are so made by nature that when they are confronted with that case, they characterize it as morally shocking. (iv) Human beings, in this number or that, are so socially conditioned that when they are confronted with that case, they characterize it as morally shocking. (v) Human beings have their personal likes and dislikes. It belongs to their personal dislike that when they are confronted with that case they characterize it as morally shocking.

I have mentioned above five of the numerous sorts of things which are of the subjective kind. There should be no difficulty in seeing that the first two sorts of things are of the unavoidable variety. That is, they are such that, in case they are there, in being confronted with such and such objects, we cannot but characterize them in a subjective way. And thus, in case they are there, in being confronted with such and such objects, there is just no possibility of our characterizing them purely and simply on the basis of confrontation. Further, there should be no difficulty in seeing that the other three sorts of things are of the avoidable variety. That is, they are such that we can supersede them, although it would by no means be an easy thing to do. And, as a result, in being confronted with such and such objects, these three sorts of things need not stand in

the way of our characterizing them purely and simply on the basis of confrontation.

I have mentioned above one kind of thing, that of the subjective kind, which falls under that something else, on account of which, and not on account purely and simply of confrontation, we may characterize such and such things in such and such ways. And I have mentioned above various sorts of things which are of the subjective kind; and I have said that some of them are of the unavoidable variety, and some of them avoidable. Now, we can go on to say that, whatever may fall under that something else, it would also be of the unavoidable or avoidable variety. And then we can go on to say about it, just as in respect of things of the subjective kind, the following: (1) if it is of the unavoidable variety, then, in case it is there, in our being confronted with such and such objects, we cannot but characterize them as mediated through it; and consequently we can never characterize them purely and simply as a result of confrontation; and (2) if it is of the avoidable variety, then we can supersede it, although possibly by no means in an easy manner; and consequently, in our being confronted with such and such objects, it need not stand in the way of our characterizing it purely and simply as a result of confrontation.

In the preceding text I have raised the question: how do we know that, in being confronted with such and such objects, we are characterizing them in such and such ways, purely and simply on the basis of confrontation and not on the basis of something else? I have already answered this question above. In brief, the answer is this: (1) if that something else, whether of the subjective or some other kind, is of the unavoidable variety, then there is absolutely no possibility of our being able to characterize such and such objects in such and such ways purely and simply on the basis of confrontation; but (2) if it is of the avoidable variety, then we can supersede it, and consequently characterize such and such objects in such and such ways purely and simply on the basis of confrontation. Here I do not wish to deal with what all is required, what all the intellectual and moral work we need to put in, for this supersession.

V

Here let me state in short what I have tried to say in this paper. (1) I have defined the notion of telling a lie, and distinguished it from several other notions (Section I). (2) I have said that, generally speaking, the notion of telling a lie is taken to belong to the moral realm. In this connection two things are said about it. Firstly, it is said that there is the moral law that one should not tell a lie. Secondly, it is said that there are exceptions to this law, just as there are exceptions to many other moral laws. I have profusely illustrated both these theses (Section II). (3) I have said that the moral role is not the only role which the notion of telling a lie plays

in our life. It plays various other roles as well. I have mentioned some of them, and sufficiently illustrated them. I have said that a few of them give to the notion of telling a lie an additional respectability, that is, in addition to the respectability which it has by virtue of there being times when telling a lie is not of an immoral nature (Section III). (4) I have dealt with a problem which is not directly related to the notion of telling a lie, but which this notion enables us to discuss rather well. This problem is about how we know a moral law, say, the moral law, 'One should not tell a lie,' or the moral law, 'One should not tell a lie, except under conditions x.' I have maintained that although, being confronted with such and such cases, we call them moral or immoral (just as, being confronted with such and such cases, we call them red, or hot, or loud), we cannot always be sure that we are calling them so, purely and simply on the basis of confrontation; but there are times when we can be (Section IV).

Normativities—Naturalized and Not

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Traditionalists in epistemology hold up the normativity of their discipline as sacrosanct. Like the Cartesian apple-sorter with his pile of apples[1], epistemologists are typically seen as engaged in evaluating our beliefs and cognitive practices—and evaluation brings in ideals, values, *norms*. In the light of this, it is hardly surprising that 'descriptivists' or 'naturalists' either rejoice in the *withering away* of epistemology (conceived as essentially a normative discipline) or succumb to the pressure of *normatizing* their theories in order to make them bona fide 'epistemologies'. Caught in this cross-fire between the pure naturalists and the traditional epistemologist, it is necessary I think, to raise a rather simple-minded question: *What does it mean to say that epistemology is, or should be, normative?*

Interestingly, there is no straightforward answer to this question even within the traditionalist camp: Since the notion of justification bears the normative burden in a theory of knowledge, conflicting theories of justification—internalism vs. externalism, deontic vs. non-deontic—can easily be seen as in-house debates about the very nature of epistemic normativity. Such potential ambiguity has far reaching consequences. If normativity does not comprise of just one feature or if there is no consensus on the set of normative-making features, then it is possible for normative epistemological systems to *differ* significantly from one another. Also, it becomes possible for a naturalism to *fail* to be normative in some sense without committing the epistemological sin of being *non*-normative altogether. The important question is thus no longer whether a system—naturalist or otherwise—is normative, but whether it is *adequately* so to be deemed an 'epistemology'.

My main aim here is to establish the different ways in which epistemic normativity can infuse a theory of knowledge (Section I). To illustrate the importance of such a fine-grained approach *vis-à-vis* the debate between naturalism and non-naturalism, I undertake (in Section III) a critical analysis of Larry Laudan's 'normative naturalism'[2] after an outlining of his general strategy (in Section II).

SECTION I: WHAT IS NORMATIVITY?

The 'normative' and the 'descriptive' are primarily ways of classifying judgements. But to claim that epistemology is normative is to apply the adjective to a *project* or inquiry. One could begin by saying that a project is normative if it culminates in statements that are normative. But even so, it can (and must) include a host of descriptive statements. An epistemology is thus not labeled 'naturalized' simply because it contains some or even many, descriptive sentences. Now a theory of knowledge culminates in statements like 'S has knowledge that p'. The problem, however, is that there are no *structural* features to mark these sentences as being normative rather than descriptive. Classically, a normative statement is one that evaluates rather than simply describes the world. So 'Truth telling is good' is normative and 'Mary is tall' is descriptive. One might feel inclined to say that normativity is determined by peculiar normative predicates. But even though, 'good' is paradigmatically evaluative, apparently descriptive predicates like "tall" can also function as normative in certain contexts: the statement 'Ram is tall' could well be evaluative in the context of considering Ram for the basketball team. Grammatical form is also not a fool-proof clue: While some imperatives are normative ('Speak the truth'), all imperatives are not so ('Bring me the book'). Thus, a Quine could easily endorse 'S has knowledge that p' along with a Chisholm but whereas, for the former, the sentence is intended merely as a description of the psychologico-neutral process through which S comes to believe that p; for the latter, the statement embodies not just a causal history but a cognitive value.

However, even statements of value may be put to a multiplicity of uses because norms may function in many different ways. Let us call this multiplicity resulting from different functions of value-statements in a theory of knowledge, the *dimensions* of epistemic normativity. What follows is their enumeration.

The Dimensions of Epistemic Normativity

1. *Classificatory*: Going back to the analogy used by Descartes, epistemology is like the process of sorting a pile of apples into the good and the rotten. The epistemologist approaches our doxastic system with the aim of ascertaining which items in it are 'knowledge' or 'justified' as opposed to lucky guesses, dogmas or superstitious beliefs. At the very least then, epistemology classifies the set of our beliefs into different sorts—'knowledge' or 'not-knowledge', 'justified' and 'non-justified', and maybe even finer-grained classes ranging from the 'less' to 'more-justified' beliefs. The normativity of epistemology in a minimal sense includes this *sorting enterprise*—its key terms are used to pick out a proper subset of our beliefs.[3]

It may be argued that though the normative *implies* a classification, it is perverse to regard a mere sorting as being 'normative'. The use of predicates in a descriptive enterprise, for example, classifies but it would be far-fetched to call (say) the pre-school exercise of sorting blocks into 'red', 'blue' and 'green' a normative exercise in any sense.

Two kinds of response are possible here. First, the original claim was that classification is the necessary (or the minimal) condition of normativity. And this is not refuted by a counter-example of non-normative classification. Second, whether the given counter-example is genuinely non-normative is also suspect. There is an axiology embedded in the very choice of descriptive terms adopted by a theory. In our example, the classification of blocks by the pre-schooler is normative to the extent that it occurs within the context of a *lesson* that prescribes certain parameters ('red', 'blue' and 'green' but not 'square' and 'heavy') to be used in classification. In other words, it is permissible to overlook the distinction between square and heavy in our sorting but not that between red and blue. And this is because some sort of value is attached to the latter distinction and not to the former. My point here is that even a purely descriptive project has a minimal normativity that trickles down from the aims of the theory. In carving out a domain to be described and systematized, a set of choices determined by our interests is also made concerning what are the appropriate or preferred parameters of systematization. Any classification of doxastic items therefore, to the extent that it is done *within a theory of knowledge*, has this base-level normativity. If it is not a preference for a certain *sort* that is involved in our classification, it is at least a preference for a certain kind of *sorting*.

2. *Evaluative*: The notion of 'being preferred' inherent in our theoretical classifications generates another aspect of normativity. The apples in the Cartesian analogy needed to be sorted, neither into the red and green nor into Granny Smiths and Golden Delicious but into the frankly evaluative categories of the good and the rotten. A distinguishing feature of these predicates is their 'commendatory force'. The classes of beliefs chosen by the epistemologist is what she deems 'good'. They indicate which kind of belief is 'better' from the epistemic point of view. In this sense, then, the classifications of epistemology are hierarchical rather than simply horizontal; they express norms or values in the sense of a *desideratum*.

3. *Systematic*: The classificatory-cum-evaluative activity of epistemology is not random grouping but is governed by principles. A belief is put into a certain class because of a property it has—for example, 'being related to the subject's doxastic system in a specific manner', 'being produced by a reliable source', 'being foundational', etc.—just as apples are classified as good or rotten on the basis of their possessing some other properties like (for example) a specific colour or texture. This point is sometimes made in terms of *supervenience* of epistemic evaluations on natural

properties. Two beliefs that are exactly alike in their non-epistemic properties cannot differ in their epistemic status and the former serve as criteria for the latter. Epistemology as the project of doxastic evaluation therefore, crucially involves, formulation of criteria or general principles of classification. Here we have the notion of norms as *standards.*

4. *Prescriptive.* Evaluations may embody not just a preference but a '*requirement* to prefer'.[4] The difference of such prescriptivity from the simply evaluative can be brought out in many ways. The claim 'cigarette smoking is injurious to health' clearly embodies an evaluation but it would be ridiculous to say that the advertisement in which it occurs *prescribes* our giving up smoking or implies that it is our *duty* not to smoke. James Maffie[5] gives the example of a quiche-competition judge who does not eat quiche. The evaluative norms of good quiches, for such a judge, never become prescriptions or an inducement to choose.

In the light of this, the formulation of principles of justification can be done with the explicit aim of *improving* our doxastic situation. Recall Descartes' explicit agenda 'to direct the mind with a view to forming true and sound judgements about whatever comes before it'[6] and in more contemporary times, of Goldman's search for 'doxastic decision procedures'.[7] From the classificatory-evaluative statement 'belief in p is justified' now follows the imperative 'you *ought,* in similar circumstances, to believe p'. Epistemology, in this sense, involves norms understood as categorical reasons for epistemic action (that is, believing, denying or withholding assent from a proposition).[8]

5. *Meta-Theoretic.* In order to be effectively normative in the classificatory, evaluative and prescriptive senses, a theory of knowledge must raise questions about the status of the principles being used to classify, evaluate and prescribe. In other words, norms as standards of and guides for epistemic conduct must themselves be evaluated before they can non-arbitrarily function as classificatory or prescriptive norms for first-order beliefs. We need norms to sort and check our justificatory principles just as much as we need the latter to sort and check beliefs.

It might be contended that this is paradoxical. On the one hand, it is odd to claim that beliefs are epistemically justified by methods that are not themselves susceptible to proof. But on the other hand, since these methods are the very basis of epistemic justification, they cannot, on pain of circularity or regress be epistemically justified themselves. The way out of this conundrum is not to abandon the meta-theoretic project but to appreciate once again, the difference in the ways in which norms can function. We may have kinds of epistemic 'assessment' or 'evaluation' that do not count strictly as 'epistemic *justification*'. To see what I mean, let us look at the following lines from Lycan:[9]

> Basic epistemic norms, like moral norms (and logical norms), are justified not by being deduced from more fundamental norms (an *obvious* impossibility), but by their ability to sort specific individual normative intuitions and other relevant data into the right barrels in an economic and illuminating way.

Lycan takes this as indicative of the impossibility of the meta-theoretic project. But note that even he does not advocate an 'anything goes' policy *vis-à-vis* first order epistemic norms. Rather they are assessed by 'their ability to sort specific individual normative intuitions . . . into the right barrels'. There is an *assessment*—even though you might not want to call it 'justification' narrowly defined as 'deducibility from more fundamental (epistemic) norms'. The former assessment, however, does involve norms even though not referring to epistemic principles. It is an evaluation of whether data are sorted into the '*right* barrels'. The sense in which norms are implicated in this idea of getting things epistemically 'right' is that of epistemic values or ideals being realized. The normative as *axiology* is thus brought in. We have here a teleological notion of norms.

The meta-theoretic level then, deals with 'foundational questions' arising out of the attempt to validate classificatory and prescriptive principles in terms of the nature and content of epistemic ends. These ends include the goals of *cognitive* enterprise and also the goals of *epistemology* itself. Thus the question: What are the constraints on norms as principles/standards so that they can function as normative principles of cognitive behaviour?, can be answered only after determining (a) the ideals of cognitive behaviour and (b) the function of normative principles themselves. We need methodological standards in our search for 'adequate' principles of justification. But 'adequacy' here is defined with reference to what functions these principles—systematic classification, evaluation or prescription—are expected to perform. The debate between internalism and externalism—which now emerges as a metatheoretic debate, illustrates this point. For example, if principles of justification are required to function *prescriptively,* then it is necessary that a subject be able to tell from within her first-person point-of-view whether a particular belief satisfies that condition or not—and this would rule out as 'inadequate' (for example) a causal principle of justification. But this 'internalist' constraint is not really required if our canons are intended merely in the evaluative sense of distinguishing warranted from unwarranted doxastic states and not as regulating epistemic behaviour.

6. *Cognitive.* The adequacy of epistemic principles is also determined by the extent to which they serve cognitive goals. An important meta-theoretic activity—important enough to be listed separately—is the identification and explanation of *cognitive* ends. So far we have been discussing normativity in general terms. But there can be evaluation, classification, and prescription from many standpoints—the standpoint

of etiquette, morality, prudence and aesthetics. There must be something unique about epistemic normativity and justification that identifies it as *epistemic* rather than any of these. This is usually thought to be a distinctly *epistemic ideal* or goal—and so we get the idea of a norm as Ultimate Value. Even though there is not much consensus on what the distinctively cognitive ideal is, the difference between conventional, moral, prudential, aesthetic and epistemological justifiedness is constituted by differences in their respective goals. The basic evaluative dimension of epistemological normativity is clearly parasitic on this ultimate goal of cognitive inquiry. In fact, the normativity of the epistemic ideal filters down and accounts for specific beliefs being commended or valued. Thus, if epistemic justification is defined in terms of Truth, then a particular belief is classed as valuable if it is truth-conducive.[10]

Normativity in a Theory of Knowledge

Let us now turn to how these different dimensions of normativity figure in a theory of knowledge. The latter is a three-tier enterprise. On the *first level*, it is the minimalist project of sorting our beliefs and identifying a subset K, as acceptable. The class K is the class of beliefs identified as 'knowledge', 'justified' or some other form of epistemic appraisal. On the *second level*, we ask: Why are, all and only, members of the set K instances of acceptable belief? The answer can be schematically represented as 'Because they share feature F'. F can be a property like 'being foundational', 'being deducible from a foundational belief', 'being produced by a reliable source', etc. Level two generates epistemic criteria of the form 'Beliefs with feature F are epistemically acceptable'. Our questions do not end here. On *level three* we ask: Why is feature F (rather than feature G or H) a mark of being an epistemically acceptable belief? The schematic answer 'Because feature F ensures ϕ' generates a meta-epistemic criterion for justifying and explaining our epistemic criteria on level two. This clearly involves discussion of what it *means* to be epistemically acceptable (or justified) and why feature F is held as ensuring it. Structurally then, a complete theory of knowledge can be seen as involving:

E1. Sorting of beliefs into acceptable and unacceptable. (*What do we know?*)
E2. Rules and Methods for sorting beliefs.
(*What are the principles of justification or of acceptability? What makes these beliefs acceptable?*)
ME. Rules and methods for validating principles of justification or E2, that is, meta-epistemic criteria and considerations.
(*Why are those very principles (in E2) adequate as principles of justification?*)

Now, norms functioning in different ways pervade all three strata of a complete theory of knowledge. We find normativity as:

Classificatory and *Evaluative*. . . . at E1.
Systematic and *Prescriptive*. . . . at E2.
Meta-theoretic and *Cognitive*. . . . at ME.

To summarize the general conclusions emerging from the foregoing discussion: (a) The claim that epistemology is normative is complex because norms have multiple dimensions. (b) Traditional epistemologists may disagree on whether to incorporate and how to emphasize these different dimensions. Consequently, the term 'normative' might come to signify different things. (c) It is not enough for the traditionalists to simply reject the naturalist programme as 'non-normative'. This charge must be accompanied by a sensitivity to which dimensions of normativity are considered crucial and are thought to be missed or misunderstood by naturalism: For it is possible for naturalisms to unabashedly retain norms at some levels and in some senses, while rejecting it at others. (d) Clearly different naturalisms can commit the sin of being non-normative in different ways and in varying degrees.

In the light of this, when confronted with a professed 'normative naturalism' as Laudan's, we must ask: On which level of a theory of knowledge does his naturalism set in and what dimensions of normativity are being naturalized? An interesting possibility now opens up: A theory can be both 'normative' (at one level) and 'naturalized' (at another) *without* strictly speaking, involving 'naturalized norms' (at any level). This possibility is clearly illustrated by the following critique of Laudan's theory.

SECTION II: LAUDAN'S PROGRAMME FOR A NORMATIVE NATURALISM

According to Laudan, science is the paradigm of knowledge: An epistemic principle thus becomes a methodology for classifying scientific theories and conducting scientific research. With this as background, 'epistemic naturalism', says Laudan, 'is not so much an epistemology *per se* as it is a theory *about philosophical knowledge*'[11] (emphasis mine). If 'philosophical knowledge' refers here to epistemological principles, Laudan's naturalism becomes a pronouncement made from the meta-epistemic level ME ('epistemological naturalism is a meta-epistemological thesis'[12]) about epistemic criteria ('methodological principles') on E2. More specifically, it is a thesis propounding a continuity between epistemology and science. This amounts to *explaining epistemic criteria in 'natural' terms* which, in turn, means subjecting them to precisely the same strategies of adjudication that we bring to bear on the assessment of theories within science or commonsense. Since the acceptability of scientific theories is determined by experiments showing that they 'fit the facts well' (of course, in effect,

there are often other supplementary considerations also) such 'fact sensitivity' becomes the criterion for judging the acceptability of epistemological principles also. Laudan's naturalism as a meta-methodology, therefore, is in direct opposition to (a) the *historicists* among philosophers of science, according to whom acceptable epistemological principles must exhibit past science as rational and (b) the *a priorists* among epistemologists, according to whom meta-methodology is *sui generis*. The Laudanian programme works in the following, say:

(1) Begin with an epistemic rule or method—the schema for which would be something like: *Theories (doxastic items) that have feature F are acceptable.*
(2) Derive from this the traditional form of a prescription. This is the imperative: *You ought to choose theories that have feature F.*
(3) *Recast* the above imperative as a hypothetical imperative, by introducing as antecedent the actual aim being sought by the author or recipient of the original imperative. Thus we get: *If you want to achieve aim A, you ought to choose theories with feature F.*

Now, note that a hypothetical conditional like (3) above, presupposes a relation between means and ends. Its acceptance is 'fact-sensitive' because its viability is dependent on the *empirical generalization* that adoption of theories with feature F, more often than not, lead to the attainment of goal A. Epistemic rules recast in this way, therefore, derive their warrant from the truth of statements stating the specific ends—means relations, and consequently, their prescriptivity is defeasible as that of any other empirical generalization. This reformulation of epistemic rules, therefore, amounts to *naturalizing* them.

Such 'Laudan-naturalization' suggests a 'reticulated' instead of a 'hierarchical' model of the justificatory inter-relation between epistemic rules and scientific theories. Neither theories nor rules are prior to the other. To the extent that particular theories can be picked out by viable rules (remember that the latter are hypothetical conditionals of the form (3) above), their success is accounted for, that is, they are instances of rules that have worked well. The viability of the rules themselves, however, is explained (as already pointed out) by empirical generalizations that is, scientific theories concerning ends—means relations. The threat of circularity is countered, Laudan thinks, by appeal to a certain base-level, uncontroversial, inductive procedure. The following rule is supposedly an example:

> (R1) If actions of a particular sort, m, have consistently promoted certain cognitive ends, e, in the past, and rival actions, n, have failed to do so, then assume that future actions following the rule 'if your aim is e, you ought to do m' are more likely to promote those ends than actions based on the rule 'if your aim is e, you ought to do n'.[13]

The meta-methodological programme of Laudan-naturalization can be summarized now in the following way: (A) Acceptance of something like (R1); (B) Recasting epistemic principles as hypothetical imperatives; (C) Looking at empirical evidence to determine if there is the kind of co-variance postulated by R1. If there is, then alone would our epistemic principle be acceptable.

SECTION III: THE WEDGE BETWEEN NORMATIVITY AND NATURALIZATION

The above programme along with the fracturing (as in Section I) of a monolithic normativity illustrates possible slippages between notions of naturalization and normativity. The incorporation in Laudan's project, of some dimensions of norms is pretty straightforward. To start with, Laudan conceives of his project in terms of *meta-theoretic* normativity—of justifying methodological principles scientifically and acknowledges that without this dimension, the epistemological agenda of sorting scientific theories by methodological rules itself, is called into question. Furthermore, the presence of *classificatory* and *systematic* normativity is also clear. Laudan admits that we have criteria for classifying and criticizing theories—all that his naturalization does is to indicate that these principles are empirically based rather than *a priori*. Finally, on his analysis, an epistemic principle remains a methodological rule for guiding inquiry and thus *prescriptive* normativity is also retained. Laudan is vociferous against philosophers like Feyerbend, Kuhn, Popper, Quine and Rorty who (for different reasons) reject such prescriptivity. His naturalization recasts the traditional epistemic imperative from the categorical to the hypothetical form but they remain commands nonetheless.[14]

There is an interesting ambiguity in the prescriptivity of conditional imperatives. Take the Laudan-conditional 'If you want to achieve aim A, you ought to choose theories with feature F'. What we are directly prescribed to do is really the consequent (of course only under certain circumstances). Now (i) 'wanting A' may be genuinely optional, that is, no prescriptivity accrues to the antecedent of the conditional. On the other hand, (ii) 'wanting A' may, in fact, be the case—something that obtains and over which we have no choice. In such instances, once again there is no prescriptive force attached to the antecedent. However, (iii) 'wanting A' may not only be contingent but there might be prescriptivity attached to it as well, that is, we might be *required* to want A and thereby also to choose theories with feature F. It is not quite clear which of these formulations Laudan would adopt and this unclarity, as we shall see, becomes important later.

Naturalization without Normativity

It is more difficult to make sense of *evaluative* normativity in Laudan's

programme. Why are beliefs (or theories) identified by his epistemological principles *preferred* or laudable? The answer in traditional epistemology goes back to an ultimate Ideal inherent in cognitive activity. Epistemic locutions capture the idea of 'being reasonable' the nature of which, along with epistemic aims, follows *a priori* from an analysis of cognition. So, beliefs picked out on their basis are commended by a cognizing subject *given the nature of cognition.* 'Being reasonable' is thus an intrinsic virtue for a rational cognisor who, by definition, is one pursuing those ends.

Laudan loses this answer by conditionalizing principles to a multiplicity of alternative aims (which multiplicity, by the way, is necessary to distinguish, as Laudan does, between 'epistemology' and 'theory of rationality'). The problem now is of establishing the aim chosen as *desirable.* Note him saying: 'Methodological rules or maxims are propounded for a particular reason, specifically because it is believed that following the rule in question will *promote certain cognitive ends which one holds dear*'[15] (emphasis mine). Thus, *because* there is an aim which is 'held to be dear', the instrumental rule for realizing it is preferred and commended. But this strategy pushes the issue of preferring certain epistemic rules/criteria back to that of preferring their antecedent aims.

However, preference can be a simple description or record of an agent's psychological state. On one level, just because an aim is *chosen* it is 'held dear'. But preference in this sense can hardly generate evaluations. Can Laudan answer why his preferred/chosen aims (and thereby, some methodologies) are of *value*? Note that everything *in fact* preferred by people—even by clever people—need not be a value. Epistemic locutions come to mean not 'being reasonable' simpliciter but 'being reasonable from the standpoint of a particular aim A' and whether *that* is a value, is an open question till the desirability of the aim A itself, is established. Consider the hypothetical imperative, 'If you aim at maintaining peace of mind, adopt the principle of sticking to the belief system of the society you are born in'. Even if the aim here is actually chosen, it can hardly form the basis of an epistemically laudable principle. Values becomes 'aims' by being chosen but sometimes it is possible to choose aims that are not of value.

It should be noted that Laudan does try to 'naturalize' axiology or the choice of aims.[16] But it is one thing to make the choice of aims fact-sensitive, that is, to choose aims on empirical grounds and quite another thing to show that they are desirable as opposed to being simply desired. Our choice of aims may be governed by empirical considerations like realizability and testability (both mentioned by Laudan), but these are neither sufficient nor necessary to capture *valuableness* of an aim. Many empirically chosen goals are not of value and many values remain valuable as 'regulative ideals' even though they are not empirically realizable.

It may well be argued that we are missing the point here. Sensitizing aims to empirical realizability and testability *is* to establish chosen aims as desirable because *naturalization itself* is a value. The move here can be understood in terms of the ambiguity of conditional imperatives already noted. Thus if our imperative is of the form 'If you choose A, then do X', then to begin with interpretation (i) A could be purely optional with the imperative force accruing to only the consequent. This is when A is simply chosen and hence 'doing X' is prescribed. However, I have been arguing that this view of the conditional imperative fails to capture the fact that epistemic principles lead to *evaluations.* To ensure the latter, we are led to interpretation (iii) according to which, the choice of the antecendent itself (along with the consequent) is prescribed. Laudan's naturalization of axiology that allows the possibility of alternative but all empirically sensitive aims, may tend towards this interpretation if naturalization itself is prescribed as a value. But the problem with this very plausible move arises from within Laudan's programme itself and will be touched upon at the very end. To anticipate the desirability of our naturalized aims is parasitic on the desirability of naturalization itself. And we will question whether Laudan can consistently speak of the latter.

For the time being, to the extent that Laudan's process of translating epistemic criteria into empirically testable ends-means relations fails to ensure that only (epistemically) *valuable* ends are actually sought, the evaluative dimension of normativity is left un-naturalized. So, in an important instance, Laudan's strategy is a naturalization but not a 'naturalized *normativity*'.

Normativity without Naturalization

Let us turn to meta-theoretic normativity once again. In Laudan's own words, the important meta-methodological question when justifying methodological rules is '. . . do we have—or can we find—evidence that the means proposed in the rule promotes its associated cognitive end better than its extant rivals?'[17] which is really a general form of the meta-epistemic rule (R1): 'If actions of a particular sort, m, have consistently promoted certain cognitive ends, e, in the past, and rival actions, n, have failed to do so, then assume, that future actions following the rule 'if your aim is e, you ought to do m' are more likely to promote those ends than actions based on the rule 'if your aim is, e, you ought to do n.'

With this we are in an interesting predicament. Such meta-methodology effects naturalization of epistemic criteria all right, but is it *itself* naturalized? The fact-sensitivity of methodological rules (E2 imperatives) was achieved only by recasting them as hypothetical imperatives asserting means-ends relationships. But note that (R1) is in the form of a *categorical imperative* which we are required to follow. (It looks like a conditional but it is *not* conditional upon the pursuit of a particular end). To the extent that Laudan's meta-theoretic prescriptions are categorical, they remain *non-*

naturalized. Laudan, therefore, naturalizes epistemology at E2 but such a naturalization strategy is not *thereby,* naturalized itself. Naturalization as a method is as basic an intuition as the categorical imperatives of traditional *a priori* epistemology. We clearly have here a full-fledged non-naturalized normativity.

It might be retorted that Laudan does not need to naturalize meta-criteria, for after all, his project was to naturalize *epistemology.* Such a response draws an artificial line between our levels E1 and E2 on the one hand and ME on the other. Besides, it is a way out not open to Laudan for whom, meta-epistemic criteria are *epistemic* criteria. But epistemic criteria, when Laudan-naturalized are shown to be nothing but empirically based theories. Such theories are sets of very large beliefs. Whatever sorts such theories therefore, sorts beliefs and counts as an epistemology. Consequently, meta-epistemic criteria need to be naturalized as well.

Since we cannot wriggle out of the commitment to naturalize meta-epistemology, we could try and complete the project. The first step would involve recasting meta-epistemic principles as hypothetical imperatives. But what is our antecedent *aim* when we use scientific methods (or the general rule of inductive support like (R1))? We could come up with a conditional like—

> If you want to *survive,* then you ought to use scientific methods to choose between epistemic criteria.

With 'will to survive', we avoid the problem of having to justify the choice of the antecedent aim. Human beings generally do and have chosen, survival as an aim no matter how pitiable our chosen means for it might be. In fact, conditionalization in this way yields (to invoke a Kantian distinction) an *assertoric* rather than a pure *hypothetical* imperative because its antecedent signifies what *in fact* is chosen by us. Note that with this move we shift to interpretation (ii) of conditional imperatives and mean that the antecedent aim is automatically chosen and hence is outside the scope of its prescriptive force. But since 'survival' is hardly an 'option' in the ordinary sense, can it form the basis for a genuinely 'evaluative', commendatory and prescriptive normativity as Laudan demands? If prescriptivity of methodological criteria are parasitic on their antecedent aims and if the aim is something that human organisms automatically pursue, does it make sense to infuse them with commendatory force?[18]

In his *Pursuit of Truth*[19], Quine seems to come to a similar conclusion. Naturalized epistemology, he says, takes the form of *empiricism* stating that information about the world is derived and tested by sensory inputs. Now this principal tenet has a normative fallout: It warns against telepaths and soothsayers and prescribes a heuristics for framing hypotheses that emphasises 'virtues' of conservatism, generality, simplicity, refutability and modesty. He is willing to envisage (per impossibile?) the possibility

of having to abandon empiricism by the infiltration of telepathy and clairvoyance as evidence. But 'science after such a convulsion would still be science'[20] —a venture still proceeding on the basis of 'predicted sensation' as evidence even though, the inputs allowed as evidence is broadened. Importantly for our purposes, Quine's conclusion from this is that, 'when I cite predictions as the checkpoints of science, *I do not see that as normative.* I see it as defining a particular language game, in Wittgenstein's phrase: the game of science, in contrast to other good language games such as fiction and poetry'[21] (emphasis mine). So even when science dictates certain 'norms', that is, principles and prescriptions on level E2, *its own* adoption on the meta-epistemic level ME is not itself normative. It is not a 'preferred' or 'prescribed' option—maybe because there is *no other* option for a Quinean knower.

It is interesting to note that the Quinean attitude to the adoption of scientific procedures at ME claims *naturalization* but not normativity: while what we have been attributing to Laudan's adoption of science at ME is a *normativity* but not naturalization. This asymmetry is due to an ambiguity in both the terms 'normativity' and 'naturalization'. For Quine, normative functions seem restricted to the systematic and the prescriptive. On this understanding 'adoption of the naturalistic standpoint' itself, is not normative because, being something which we, in fact and inevitably follow, it is meaningless to infuse its adoption with a systematic or prescriptive force. But according to the expanded range of the normative suggested in Section I, the adoption of scientific method on ME is a crucial constituent of the normativity of epistemology. But if 'naturalization' entails (as it does for Laudan) hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical ones, then scientific method as a meta-method though normative in a sense, is not *naturalized.*[22] So what we have here is an instance of normativity without naturalization.

Naturalization without Normativity, Again

Any and every normative project is not epistemology. Section I argued for the peculiar character of *epistemic* normativity in terms of certain meta-theoretic postures—more specifically, in terms of distinctive Ideals or cognitive values. Most commonly, this is said to be Truth. Laudan, however, is unequivocal in rejecting Truth as an appropriate aim of science[23] because of an alleged 'fact-*in*sensitivity' of the notion. Aims, he says, have to be 'realizable' and 'testable' in a way that Truth is not.

This criticism seems to be based on a misunderstanding of the role, in a theory of knowledge, of norms as Ideals. Once again, making the distinction between a 'value' (in the sense of an *Ideal*) and an 'aim' (in the sense of what is *chosen*), it could be argued that even in traditional epistemology, the cognitive *aim* is not Truth. According to the traditionalist's story, conclusions on E1 assert that a specific belief, for example belief that p is justified. E2 indicates epistemic principles to the

effect that only beliefs with feature F are justified and our belief that p has feature F. This translates into the epistemological imperative 'You ought to believe p rather than not-p' because p rather than not-p is justified. In an important sense then, *justification* is what we look for and aim at. If justification is the basic idea of 'being more reasonable than' then *this* is our proximate *cognitive aim*. But now the question on the meta-level ME is: Why are beliefs with feature F more justified? The answer *now* is in terms or Truth and Truth-conduciveness—believing p rather than q, is more reasonable because beliefs having the feature F are more likely to be true.

Now note here that what cognizers *aim* at is 'reasonableness' which is explained and defined on the meta-level, in terms of Truth-conduciveness. *But this does not mean that Truth is what we actually aim at or choose in the cognitive enterprise.* The argument, S wants ϕ, ϕ is defined in terms of φ and so S wants φ, is clearly invalid. Thus, in inquiry we *aim* at 'reasonableness' no matter how 'being reasonable' is accounted for and defined at ME. Even when it is explained in terms of survival, the latter is *not* what we *aim* at in inquiry. But the nature of the account we give of reasonableness does become important if our inquiry is to be a *cognitive* inquiry and our aim to be *epistemically* reasonable. It is Ideals in terms of which our meta-theories work that infuse our aims with a cognitive flavour. A traditional theory of knowledge is a cognitive enterprise because the aim 'being reasonable' is explained in terms of the *epistemically distinct* Ideal of Truth.

Substitution of Truth by 'survival' or any other evolutionary aim would make the principles of justification maxims of *prudence*. There is nothing distinctively *cognitive* in such a system. The internal tension in Laudan's theory comes out clearly in his own summary of his project. He claims to argue both that:

> . . . the soundness of such *prudential* imperatives depends on certain empirical claims about the connections between means and ends (emphasis mine)[24]

and then says:

> . . . accordingly, empirical information about the relative frequencies with which various epistemic means are likely to promote sundry *epistemic ends* is a crucial desideratum for deciding on the correctness of epistemic rules (emphasis mine)[25]

The slide from the prudential to the epistemic is telling here.

One may bite the bullet at this point and argue that the core of naturalization *is* to reduce the epistemic to the prudential.[26] But if so, then Laudan's theory, qua naturalism, is not an *epistemology* at all in an important sense. We begin to hear comforting echoes of the original naturalistic programme of Quine's 'replacement thesis' which is not what Laudan began with. Thus to the extent that capturing the peculiarly cognitive nature through a distinctively cognitive ideal is part of the meta-

theoretic activity of traditional theory of knowledge, Laudan's system is a naturalization that fails to capture this crucial dimension of epistemic norms. Science and scientific procedures could be intrinsically valuable, but this would be either because it is seen as constitutive of cognition—the *a priorist* move that Laudan wants to reject; or because it is constitutive of our empirically based evolutionary predicament—a move that amounts to the 'replacement' of epistemic norms which also, Laudan is not happy with.

Notes and References

1. Descartes, 'Replies to Objections by Pierre Bourdin', *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* Vol. II, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, p. 324.
2. Larry Laudan, 'Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for a Normative Naturalism' *American Philosophical Quarterly* 24, January, 1987, and 'Normative naturalism' *Philosophy of Science* 57, March, 1990.
3. Note that on this conception it becomes problematic to speak of an 'epistemology' for a community of omniscient Gods whose beliefs are knowledge (unless we are willing to bring in our mortal beliefs to from the contrastive class).
4. Roderick Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, third edition, Prentice Hall, USA, 1989, p. 59.
5. James Maffie, 'Naturalism and the Normativity of Epistemology' *Philosophical Studies*, 59, 1990; pp. 339–40.
6. Descartes, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, translated by D. Murdoch in *Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 9.
7. Alvin Goldman, 'The Internalist Conception of Justification' P.A. French, T.E. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, (eds) *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1980.
8. An objection against such epistemic prescriptivity might be that beliefs are *not* like actions in that it makes little sense to order or require of a person that he or she believe something. Even though wanting to, I cannot, for example, comply with your prescription right now to believe that the United Front Government in India will be stable: For the most part, beliefs unlike actions, cannot be chosen. However, even given such involuntarism there are different types of prescriptions. Chisholm, for example, speaks of epistemic requirements as 'negative requirements' where to be epistemically required to prefer A to B is 'to be required not to choose between A and B without choosing A' (Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, third edition, p. 59). This spells out a kind of compatibilism where it makes sense to abide by prescriptions even though beliefs are beyond our control.
9. William G. Lycan, 'Epistemic Virtue' *Synthese* 64, 1985, p. 143.
10. In the Chisholmian scheme, where a *sui generis* epistemic locution is our ultimate epistemological aim, the epistemic quality of particular beliefs (evident, probable, certain, etc.) are understood in terms of this undefined concept.
11. Laudan; 'Normative Naturalism', p.1.
12. Laudan, 'Normative Naturalism', p. 1.
13. Laudan, 'Progress or Rationality?' p. 25.
14. A note of caution should be sounded regarding the relation between methodological imperatives and the body of empirical facts. 'Methodological rules *are* thus statements about instrumentalities, about effective means for realizing cherished ends. It is clear that such rules, even if they do not yet appear to be truth-value bearing

statements themselves, nonetheless *depend for their warrant* on the truth of such statements' ('Progress or Rationality?' p. 24, emphasis mine). The slide from identification to the dependence idiom is damning here. If epistemic criteria are simply *reduced* to empirical generalizations, it becomes difficult to see how they can have any prescriptivity. But Laudan is generally careful to avoid the reductive formulation. He speaks more in terms of maxims as 'resting' or being 'parasitic' on claims about the empirical world.

15. Laudan, 'Progress or Rationality?' p. 24.
16. Laudan, 'Normative Naturalism', pp. 3–6.
17. Laudan, 'Progress or Rationality?', p. 26.
18. An objector may take recourse to the difference between the prescriptiveand the evaluative and argue that an aim can be a *value* even though it is not meaningfully prescribed. The difficulty of treating 'survival' as such a value for our purposes will be discussed at the end.
19. W.V.O. Quine, *Pursuit of Truth*, Harvard University Press, 1990.
20. Quine, *The Pursuit of Truth*, p. 21.
21. Quine, *The Pursuit of Truth*, p. 21.
22. One may feel that we are being too literal here. Use of scientific method *is* the essence of naturalization and though such relativisation to aims is needed to bring *other* methodological principles within the purview of science, this is not needed in the case of scientific methodology itself. Scientific method is *self-sanctioning* and constitutes the very definition of naturalization.

    In spite of the plausibility of this line of argument, our basic point hinges on the *rationale* for adopting scientific method. If the answer is that it is a categorical imperative to follow science and that is the way in which we, as rational cognisors are constituted, then the meta-method (though different in content) remains as *a priori* as in traditional epistemology.
23. Larry Laudan, *Science and Values*, University of California Press, 1984.
24. Laudan, 'Normative Naturalisation', p. 2.
25. Laudan, 'Normative Naturalism', p. 2.
26. In another brand of naturalism, the normative force of epistemic terms is traced to value notions in 'design-stance psychology'. Thus, as *well-designed* systems, we are hard-wired to use scientific methodology and the notion of being 'well-designed' can be cashed out in terms of teliology. But even this, would ultimately reduce to instrumental value and 'efficiency'.

The Mission of the Original Vedānta

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THE BRĀHMAṆAS AND THE PARIVRĀJAKAS*

Many in India as well as in other parts of the world know that the Vedānta is the final and finished product of a prehistoric civilization dating back to 1500 B.C., a date upon which all scholars in the field of Vedic studies are agreed.

Thanks to the great work of Swami Vivekananda and others who followed in his footsteps the Vedānta is seen not as a symbol of past achievement but as a living force relevant to all in the contemporary world. But it is taken to be a gospel of asceticism which preaches world-disgust and world-negation, the value of personal good and personal liberation. Though there is an element of truth in so viewing the Vedānta, it is certainly wrong to exaggerate this element and exclude all the positivist elements inherited by the Upaniṣads from the Vedic ṛṣis.

In the hymns of the *Ṛgveda* one cannot find asceticism. The Vedic sages lived within the framework of family and conquered the worlds of the upper hemisphere, *parārdha*. To them life was the field of works, more eminently the field of world-conquest. They were naturally masters and not renouncers of life. As is rightly affirmed by the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, they are doers of works, *kriyāvantaḥ*, and at the same time delight in Brahman, *ātmaratāḥ*. Their works are divine and free from the fault of egoism, *sukarmāṇaḥ* (*Ṛgveda*, 4–2–17).

The one thing that survived when the Ṛgvedic age came to a close, was the composition of the Vedic poets, the hymns of the *Ṛgveda*. This is the source from which all subsequent forms of Vedic revivals originated. The first attempt at reviving the Vedic way of life was by the Brāhmaṇas. They brought into existence an elaborate system of sacrifices (*yajñās*) and worship of the gods (*devas*).

The Brāhmaṇa teaches that if we perform sacrifices in the prescribed manner and learn to live in harmony with the gods of the world, they will readily fulfil our desires and bring us both enjoyment and lordship in the world, *bhogaiśvarya*. Not only that, they also allow us to reach their world and partake of their glory, *devatānāṃ salokatāṃ sāriṣṭitāṃ sāyujyam gacchati* (*Chāndogya*, 2–20–2). Thus we attain the highest and best in this world and a similar state of eminence in the world of the gods.

The ideal of the Brāhmaṇa certainly comes closer to the Vedic positivism in that it does not neglect the world. It helps man to attain greatness here and god-form in heaven. But it is too superficial to be a faithful advocate of the original positivism of the Veda. Man's entire life, from beginning to end, is shaped through sacrifices, *puruṣo vāva yajñaḥ* (*Chāndogya*, 3–16–1). But with them he cannot attain the Highest (*śreṣṭham*) which is beyond the gods or develop into a doer of faultless works untouched by egoism. The works of the Brāhmaṇa are said to be good (*sukarma*) because they are devoid of the ego that fails to see the gods. But they too are not free from the fault of egoism because they are supported by the ego that fails to see the Highest beyond the gods. In this respect the Brāhmaṇa is un-Vedic, a way of life conducive neither to the Highest nor to the perfect works.

Some Upaniṣads like the *Īśāvāsya* clearly suggest that there was a movement of ascetics whose aim was to reject works and physical life in the world. They were wandering monks, *parivrājakas*, who opposed the religion of the Brāhmaṇas. All later Upaniṣads preaching asceticism have their origin in the above movement. The ascetics believe that the Highest is absolutely aloof, not dependent on anything. Hence they take absolute aloofness as the means of realising the Highest. Since the Brāhmaṇas make man a dependent being—dependent on the Gods, sacrifices and family institution, the ascetics reject them all and go beyond the whole system—beyond *grahastha āśrama*, beyond *yajñas*, and beyond *devas*—in order to reach the Highest. In extreme cases aloofness is taken to its logical end and considered as being aloof from physical existence itself. In later Upaniṣads it is referred to as body-renunciation, *dehatyāgam* (*Jābāla*, 6). Undoubtedly, the merit of asceticism lies in recovering the essential truth of the Veda, namely, the Highest, but in doing so it has neglected the truth that a seeker of the Highest is not necessarily a renouncer of world-existence, *parivrājaka*. For the poets of the Veda constantly pray for a long-extended life in the world, *dīrghāyu* (*Ṛgveda*, 5–18–3). Like the Brāhmaṇas, the *Parivrājaka* asceticism is un-Vedic, for it makes the Highest completely unrelated to the world.

In many of the principal Upaniṣads we find that an attempt is frequently made to reestablish the original ideal of the Veda by rejecting the ideas of both the Brāhmaṇas and the *Parivrājakas*. In fact, their aim is to show that the nature of the Veda, *vedānta*, true and original, is rightly known only when these ideas are dismissed as un-Vedic.

THE REJECTION OF RITUALISM

The *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* speaks of two worlds of Brahman, one attained through good works (1–2–6) and another through the yoga of renunciation (3–2–6), one by the unenlightened, *mūdhāḥ*, and another by the sages, *yatayaḥ*. To distinguish one from the other, the first may be

called the lower world and the second the higher world.

Here it does not mean that the higher world is attained through renunciation of works, *karma sannyāsa*. The Upaniṣad simply says that the sages, who possess their pure being through the yoga of renunciation, reach the higher world, *sannyāsayogād yatayaḥ suddhasattvāḥ* (3–2–6). The pure being is possessed not necessarily through renunciation of works. It can be also possessed through renunciation of desires which express themselves in works. Often the words *nāsty akṛtaḥ kṛtena* (1–2–12) are cited in support of the view that as long as works persist the higher world (*akṛtaḥ*) cannot be reached. Rightly understood, the words merely exclude a particular class of works, not all works. If we look into the context, it is fair to take *kṛtena* in a qualified sense to mean *sukṛtena*, that is, works done out of attachment for good things. Therefore, works done without the sense of ego can be a means of reaching the higher world. The sages, *brahmaniṣṭhāḥ*, are devoid of ego and desire, *akāmāḥ*. So their works are faultless and serve as the means of possessing the pure being and eventually attaining the supreme abode of Brahman, *akṛta*. Faultless works are divine in nature and hence a knower of Brahman is declared to be a doer of works, *ātmakrīḍa ātmaratiḥ kriyāvān* (3–1–4). In the Veda the sages are called the doers of divine works, *sukarmāṇaḥ* (*Ṛgveda*, 4–2–17).

The works of the unenlightened are inferior, *avaram karma*, for two reasons: (i) they are done out of passion and attachment; (ii) they lead to the lower world of Brahman. Men who go to this world cannot enjoy permanent habitation there and are forced to return to the mortal world from which they have ascended. Sometimes they fall into a world much inferior to the mortal world. On account of this the Vedāntins ask the seekers to be indifferent to the lower world and approach a great sage established in Brahman, *brahmaniṣṭham* (1–2–12), one who is a doer of faultless works and delights in Brahman, *ātmaratiḥ kriyāvān* (3–1–4). A Brahmaniṣṭha is one who has gone beyond death, *parāmṛtaḥ* (3–2–6), and is, therefore, competent to help others to cross beyond *mṛtyu* and reach the higher world of Brahman.

Thus, by rejecting the lower world of Brahman the Vedāntins reject the ideal of the Brāhmaṇas. Likewise, by affirming the higher world of Brahman they affirm the original Vedic ideal.

The Brāhmaṇa is subjected to a severe criticism though the word Brāhmaṇa is not used. The criticism is directed at all who institute (*yajamānas*) and perform (*ṛtvijas*) sacrifices. The *Muṇḍaka* speaks of the blind (the enjoyers of the fruits of sacrifices) led by the blind (the performers of sacrifices)—*andhenaiva nīyamānā yathāndhāḥ* (1–2–8). The performers of sacrifices are even more bitterly condemned by the Vedāntin—men living in the depths of ignorance (1–2–8), the deluded men (1–2–10), the unformed and immature men (1–2–9), for without them the ideals of the Brāhmaṇa cannot thrive among common people.

The attack of the Vedāntin extends even to the gods of the Brāhmaṇa.

The gods occupy a prominent position in the system of sacrifices and their influence upon the world is considered to be decisive. The *Kena* denies this un-Vedic view by showing that the strength the gods possess is really derived from the eternal Brahman who is superior to them and achieves all for their sake, *brahma ha devebhyo vijigye* (3–1). It also shows that they who are supposed to guide and help men in their progress are ignorant without the knowledge of Brahman, *na vyajānata* (3–2). The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* goes further in exposing the un-Vedic character of gods. It says that they are not divine companions who help in his struggle but divine masters who use him in the same way as a human master uses an animal, *paśuḥ* (1–4–10), for his own purposes and does not want it to be taken away from him. If we exclude the *Chāndogya* text on the *udgītha* of the dogs (1–12–1), a more devastating attack upon the Brāhmaṇas cannot be found in the Upaniṣads.

THE REJECTION OF ASCETICISM

The ascetics take an exclusive view of the Highest and conclude that since it is absolutely aloof from the world, it is not extended in names, forms and works. They push their conclusion to its logical end and say that since the world is not a self-projection of the Highest it must be dismissed as *asat*. They trace all miseries of life to the world which is of the nature of *asat*—fear and death, injury and pain. This is contrary to the view of the Vedic sages. The Vedic sages do aspire for the Highest and Imperishable, but their constant prayer is that they may be blessed with delight and strength and a physical life of a hundred winters here (*Ṛgveda*, 6–13–6).

In the Upaniṣads the word *asat* signifies merely death and darkness (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 1–3–28). Occasionally the word is also used in the sense of the unmanifest Brahman (*Taittirīya*, 2–7–1). But nowhere is it used in the sense of the world. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* clearly says that the world is a becoming of That, *tat sarvam abhavat* (1–4–10). This implies that not only the world has arisen from Brahman but even the material of the world is Brahman. Hence the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* declares that this world is Brahman itself, *brahmaiva idam viśvam* (2–2–12). The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* also views the world in the same manner when it says *svabhāvam pacati viśvayoniḥ* (5–5). Since the world is a becoming of That, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* declares that it is not *asat*, but a *sat* of the supreme *Sat*, *satyasya satyam* (2–1–20). All these and many other texts of this kind in the Upaniṣads must be construed as remarkable affirmations of the original view of the Veda on the one hand and determined attempts at denying the position of the ascetics on the other hand.

Further, the *Madhu Vidyā* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is a sustained attempt at disproving the conclusion of the ascetics. If we view the whole section on this *vidyā* in this light, its teachings acquire a profound significance. If all here are the becomings of *Ātmā* (2–2–14), then there is no reason

why the world should be a place of misery, a dwelling subject to the inexorable laws of pain and death. This world (*idam satyam*), the Upaniṣad says, is honey, that is, a place of delight, for all beings, *sarveṣām bhūtānām*. For the Self (*idam satyam*), it again says, all beings are honey, that is, delightful becomings in Form and Name (2–5–12). With minor variations this teaching is repeatedly affirmed in the *Madhu Vidyā*.

But then why is the world full of faults? It is true they are there, but they are not inherent properties that exist independently of the perceiver. We have forgotten our essential oneness in law with the Lord of the world and become a non-lord, *anīśa*. We see and enjoy not like Him but as a non-lord, as a slave of nature without strength and mastery. This is the cause of our miseries. Owing to the fault of having forgotten our true nature as the Lord of the world, *anīśayā* (*Muṇḍaka*, 3–1–2), we see the world to be full of faults. Therefore, the faults are relative and stay in the world as long as the fault of being *anīśa* persists in us. If we realize our essential nature and remove the fault in us, we will find the world to be a place of immense delight and sweetness and all inexorable laws to be multiple formulas of delightful becomings of the Lord. This brings us freedom from misery. Freed from fear and death, we become an eater of honey like the Lord, *madhvadam* (*Kaṭha*, 2–1–5). In the language of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* it is attaining absolute likeness to the Lord, *paramaṃ sāmyam upaiti* (3–1–3). This is the significance of the teaching of *Madhu Vidyā*.

The repudiation of the un-Vedic asceticism is very marked in the *Kena Upaniṣad*. It is found in its account of Brahman. The Upaniṣad teaches that Brahman is threefold: (i) the known; (ii) the unknown; and (iii) the supreme. First of all, there is a Brahman by which the word is expressed, the mind is thought, one sees the eye's seeings, the ear's hearing is heard and the life-breath is led forward. Secondly, there is another Brahman which is not expressed by the word, not thought by the mind, not seen with the eye, not heard with the ear and does not breathe with the breath. Thirdly, there is a supreme Brahman which goes beyond the known and the unknown. It is other than the known, *anyadeva tadvididāt* (1–4),—It is Hearing of our hearing, Mind of our mind, Speech of our speech, Life of our life-breath and Sight of our sight. In like manner, It is above the unknown, *aviditādadhi* (1–4),—there sight travels not, nor speech nor mind; we know It not; nor can we distinguish how one should teach of It, *na vijānīmo yathaitad anuśiṣyāt* (1–3). Though the supreme Brahman exceeds the known and the unknown, It is not external to them, for It holds them together in its bosom: It is at once the unexpressed and the expressed, *vācānabhyuditam, vāgabhyudyate* (1–5); at once thought not by the mind and thought by the mind, *manasā na manute, mano matam* (1–6); at once sees not with the eye and sees the eye's seeings, *cakṣūṣā na paśyati, cakṣūṃṣi paśyati* (1–7); at once hears not with the ear and hears the ear's hearing, *śrotreṇa na śṛṇoti, śrotram idam śrutam* (1–8); at once breathes not

with breath and leads forward the life-breath, *prāṇena na prāṇiti, prāṇaḥ praṇīyate* (1–9). In this supreme aspect is revealed the true form of Brahman; and it is this Brahman that we should know. This is the teaching of the ancient sages, *pūrveṣāṃ*.

Since the ascetics take the Highest to be the utterly Aloof which does not express itself in name and form, they worship That as the unknown Brahman, *aviditād*. In real fact, what they worship is not the whole form of Brahman, *brahmaṇo rūpam*. What they know of It is very little, *daharameva*. As the aim of the *Kena Upaniṣad* is to reestablish the original view of Vedic sages (*pūrveṣām*) and reject the one favoured by the ascetics, it deliberately employs a powerful refrain in as many as five verses from 1–4 to 1–8 —know That (the supreme Brahman of the ancients which contains both the unknown and the known) alone to be Brahman, *tadeva brahma tvaṃ viddhi* (1–5), and not this, this Brahman (the unknown) which they (the ascetics) currently worship; *na idaṃ yad idaṃ upāsate* (1–5). If the refrain is not for the affirmation of the old Vedic worship as against the current ascetic worship of Brahman, it loses its whole significance.

As if to emphasize again this important point, the *Kena Upaniṣad* closes with these highly significant words—*tadvanam iti upāsitavyaṃ* (4–6). It says that the name of Brahman is That-Abode, *tadvanaṃ* (4–6). In other words, Brahman must be known as that place of dwelling chosen by the Vedic sages. Their place of dwelling was the supreme Brahman and nothing short of that. Therefore, Brahman must be known as the supreme Brahman chosen by the Vedic sages as the abode of their consciousness. This is the implied sense of *taddha tadvanaṃ nāma* (4–6). Then it tells us categorically that Brahman should be worshipped as the supreme Brahman of the ancient sages and not as the unknown Brahman currently expounded by the ascetics, *tadvanam iti upāsitavyaṃ*. This seems to be the natural sense of the Upaniṣad's categorical imperative.

Not only does the *Kena* reject the un-Vedic view of the ascetics but it gives a very clear view of Brahman as understood by the ancient sages.

THE TWO-FOLD TASK OF THE *ĪŚĀVĀSYA UPANIṢAD*

The *Īśāvāsya* belongs to the *saṁhitā* portion of the *Śuklayajurveda*, a merit which no other Upaniṣad possesses. It consists of eighteen mantras. They fall into two major groups, the first having the first three mantras and the second having the rest. Mantras 1, 2 and 3 are aphoristic in nature, *sūtrabhūta mantraḥ*, and state the central teaching of the Upaniṣad in words at once concise and profound. The other mantras, 4 to 18, are elucidatory, *vṛttibhūta mantraḥ*, and develop the ideas of the first three in a highly orderly manner. As a matter of fact, among the three the first is the supreme mantra, *parama sūtrabhūta mantraḥ*.

In verses 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 16 and 18 there are many expressions which, when taken together, give us a detailed account of the Lord. In the same way, verses 6, 7, 11 and 14 to 18 deal with the various results that accrue to a supreme knower of the Lord, *vijānataḥ*. But these two aspects, one concerning the Lord and the other concerning the knower of the Lord, go back to two key words in the first mantra and get condensed into them—*Īśa* and *Dhanam*. In other words, the Upaniṣad in other verses does not add anything substantial to itself which is not already stated in the first verse; or it would not lose anything essential if it were to retain only the first and wipe out the other verses. Sri Aurobindo, a great exponent of Vedānta, comes to the same conclusion. He writes about the first couplet of the *Īśāvāsya*:

> The first line of the Seer's first couplet has given us very briefly and suggestively the base and starting point of the whole thought of the Upanishad; the second line of the same couplet opens to us, with equal brevity, with equal suggestiveness the consummation of the whole thought of the Upanishad. The rest of the eighteen *ślokas* fill out, complete, play variations; . . . but all the practical need of man and the central gist of the Seer's thought about human life is compressed into these two lines with their few brief words and their thousand echoes. (*The Life Divine: A Commentary on the Isha Upanishad*, 1981, p. 21).

In barely six lines of the Upaniṣad (verses 1 to 3) we see two monumental ideas confronting each other, two important teachings stated in carefully chosen words and at the same time very skilfully designed to enrich each other and attain the highest eloquence through mutual enrichment—one favouring the Vedic ideal of fulfilment and the other opposing the ascetic ideal of annulment.

(i) The Lord of the world, absolutely free and unbounded, is limited neither by the world nor by that which transcends the world and therefore seated in the world as its Inhabitant. Though He is greater than the world, He does not deny but elevates all and fulfils all in divine terms. He is the proximate *Jīva* and enjoyer of sweetness in the world, *madvadam . . . jīvamantikāt* (*Kaṭha*, 2–1–5). As the Lord is without ego and desire, He lives in all and enjoys all without bondage, nourishes and uplifts all without disgust or attachment.

The Lord is the perfect perfection of all we find here, *sarvaṃ idaṃ*. The world has three aspects— form, name and work, and in all these it rises to divine perfection through knowledge founded upon the similitude between the Lord and His creatures, *pratibodha*. The wise who pass beyond the ego, which alone prevents men from rising to divine perfection through *pratibodha*, become immortal here, *dhīrāḥ pretyāsmāllokādmṛtā bhavanti* (*Kena*, 1–2). Their form is no longer a dwelling of the ego, their name is no longer to be found in the category of ego-bound individuals; and their works are no longer done for the satisfaction of the ego. Immortality consists in removing all ego and attaining perfect likeness to

the Lord. It is so we have heard from the ancient sages of the Veda, *iti śuśruma pūrveṣāṃ* (*Kena*, 1–3), from those who have founded the ideal of fulfilment.

(ii) Anything less than the Vedic ideal is unauthentic and has no value for the Vedāntins. The first three verses are obviously spoken to a seeker of Brahman who has been influenced by the current teaching of the ascetics.

First of all, the ascetics take Brahman to be absolute aloofness and not related to anything we have known in the world. Not related to the known, It is aptly worshipped as the unknown, *aviditād*. This Brahman is replaced by the all-inclusive *Īśvara* of the Vedāntins who is extended in both the unknown and the known, *saparyagāt* (verse 8).

Secondly, the ascetics believe that even though the unknown Brahman is not expressed in the forms of the world, we are not free to sever our connections with them and attain the Unknown because we are bound to them by the desire for world-enjoyment. Hence they insist on withdrawing from the world through disgust and non-enjoyment of the forms. But this is not the view of the Vedānta. It teaches that as we are one in essence of being and consciousness with the Lord of the world, we can realize our true Self by accepting His law, *Satyadharma* (verse 15), which we have abandoned out of ignorance, and enjoy the world, like Him, without desire and attachment, *tena tyaktena bhunjīthā māgṛdhaḥ* (verse 1). For He enjoys the world without disgust or desire. Our ideal is therefore not abandonment but fulfilment by God's Law.

Thirdly, the ascetics think that man is bound by his birth and works, the two factors that make desires ineradicable from human nature. Hence they insist on renouncing both. But this is not the Vedic way. So the Vedāntin says that one should desire to live a hundred years and perform works in the world, otherwise God's work cannot be done. Works bind if they are done for the satisfaction of the ego; body binds if it is a dwelling of the ego. If they are used for the purpose of fulfilling God in oneself and others, they become instruments of freedom and immortality. In man who has accepted the world for God's sake, both life and works are necessary, *evam tvayi* (verse 3). For him there is no other alternative, *nānyatheto'sti* (verse 3). The question of karmic effect does not arise, for there is no bondage for God's worker, *na karma lipyate nare* (verse 3).

Fourthly, the ascetics are known to be body-renouncers, *ātmahanaḥ* (verse 3). For they use destruction of the body as the final means of liberation. They say that they enter the worlds of Brahman through self-annulment, *dehatyāgam* (Cf. *Jābāla*, 6; *Manu*, 6–32). Brahman-worlds, according to the Vedānta, are of different types. For instance, we may speak of two broad types of these worlds, shadow-worlds and bright worlds (Cf. *Kaṭha*, 2–3–5; in the world of Brahman the abode looks like shade and light, *chāyātapayoriva brahmaloke*). The wise men are worshippers

of the Lord of whom the unknown and the known are two aspects. They are neither blind nor ignorant with regard to their object of worship. Hence they go to the bright worlds of Brahman, *tapomaya lokāḥ*. To these worlds the ascetics cannot go, for they are blind and ignorant, *andhenatamasāvṛtāḥ* (verse 3). They are blind because they do not see the Lord who is the supreme Brahman; they are ignorant because they wrongly worship the unknown as the supreme Brahman. As a result of these twin deficiencies, they go to the lesser worlds, namely, the shadow-worlds of Brahman, *chāyāmaya lokāḥ*. In the Upaniṣad these worlds are spoken of as *asūryā nāma te lokāḥ* (verse 3). The words *asūryā lokāḥ* suggest that the worlds of the ascetics are un-Vedic, that is, not sought after by the sages of Veda. For the Sun is a Vedic symbol of perfection and fulfilment in the Highest. The word *nāma* is intended to tell us that the worlds of the ascetics are well-known among the Vedāntins as the abodes of un-Vedic seekers of the supreme God.

To conclude, this is the mission of the original Vedānta—to reaffirm the Vedic ideal and reject all that are contrary to it. If the rejection of asceticism is clearly pronounced in the *Kena*, the pronouncement is made in unmistakable terms in the *Īśāvāsya*. Such is the intimate connection between the two Upaniṣads.

[* In ancient India there were many schools of Vedic interpretation. My view of the Parivrajaka asceticism goes back to one of those schools associated with *parivrājakāḥ* about which Yaksha speaks in his Nirukta (2–8).]

Where Are the Vedas in the First Millennium A.D.?*

DAYA KRISHNA

I

The Vedas are supposed to be the most authoritative source both for rituals and knowledge in the non-Śramanic and non-Āgamic traditions of India. In fact, many people in contemporary India believe that they contain all knowledge including that of modern science if one has the capacity and insight to find it there. Many others, like Sri Aurobindo and those who have followed him in the understanding and the interpretation of the Vedas, feel that they are the store-house of all mystical knowledge that man might possibly possess. Yet, their exact place in the Indian tradition has never been clearly stated. Nor do we have a clear history of the attempts at the understanding of the Vedas in the long Indian tradition since they were composed. In fact, one does not even know as to what exactly is to be understood by the term 'Veda', that is, what to include and what to exclude from it. Normally, one is told that the term 'Veda' includes the *mantras*, the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Nāmadheya* in it. But this is a Mīmāṁsā contention and obviously excludes the *Āraṇyakas* and the Upaniṣads which are generally held to be an integral part of the Vedic corpus. Even, with respect to the texts known as the *mantras* and the *Brāhmaṇas,* it does not clearly articulate the fact that the texts known by these names differ in the different *śākhās,* and that any meaningful talk about the texts known as the Vedas has first to indicate the *śākhā* to which one is referring.

These are well-known facts and yet they are generally ignored in any discussion of the Vedas. The problems are glossed over by saying that the difference between the *śākhās* is not very great and that the term '*Brāhmaṇa*' in the Mīmāṁsā definition includes the *Āraṇyakas* and the Upaniṣads also. No one, of course, pays any attention to the implications of the use of the word '*saṁhitā*' in connection with the *mantra* portion of this Veda, nor to the fact that there are repetitions of the *mantras* of the Ṛgveda not only in the other *saṁhitā* but also in the Ṛgveda itself.

The term '*saṁhitā*' is generally taken to mean a collection or an edition

* This article is dedicated to Prof. R.N. Dandekar, one of the most outstanding Vedic scholars in the world today, whose paper entitled 'Commentators of the *Ṛgveda*: A Recapitulation' has provided much of the substantive evidence referred to in it.

implying that someone had collected and arranged the texts in the order that we have them; but a 'collection' means a selection, that is, that certain portions have been omitted which the editor did not consider important enough to be included. On the other hand, even if one concedes the possibility that the editor only arranged and organized the material without excluding anything, the principle of organization would itself impose a pattern on the material that was earlier present in an unorganized, scattered form. The arrangement of the Ṛgveda in different *maṇḍalas*, each having its own *ṛṣi* and *devatā*, suggests this. But, if we take the idea of the *śākhā* seriously, then we will have to accept the fact that each of the *saṁhitās* belonging to each of the *śākhās* was edited by a different person belonging to that *śākhā* and that he made the selection according to his own judgement and the tradition of the *śākhā* to which he belonged.

The first task in respect to the Vedic texts, then, should be to find out the difference between the *saṁhitā* texts of the different *śākhās* and to find what has been rejected or added to the central corpus of the *mantras* which perhaps was the common property of the Vedic seers of those times. Next, will come the task of seeing as to what portions of the Ṛgveda have been repeated in the other *saṁhitās*. It is, of course, well known that the Sāmaveda is not an independent Veda but consists mostly of the *mantras* taken from the Ṛgveda. Was this selection made on the basis of their suitability of being sung in the Vedic ritual, as the *mantras* in the Sāmaveda are supposed to be sung? In case this is so, it would have to be found as to whether there is any essential difference between the *mantras* in the Sāmaveda and the other *mantras* in the Ṛgveda, and if the former were considered more suitable for singing rather than the latter. Moreover, as a distinction has been made in the *mantras* of the Sāmaveda between those which are supposed to be sung in the forests and those which are supposed to be sung in the villages, it will have to be found whether there is any distinction between these. The distinctive names for them, as given in the Sāmaveda are '*āraṇya gāna*' and '*grāma geyagāna*'. Furthermore, the distinction suggests that all of these *mantras* included in the Sāmaveda were not meant exclusively for being sung at the Vedic sacrifices, and that they would be sung on other occasions for other purposes as well.

However, once the distinction between the *śākhās* is made central to all the texts, the question of what is included in the other *saṁhitās* from the Ṛgveda would have to be seen in the context of the *saṁhitās* belonging to that *śākhā* alone. It is only after this is done that a comparative study could be made of the texts belonging to the various *śākhās* and the repetitions in them. The context in which the repetition is made and the probable purpose for which it might have been made are other questions which may have to be taken into account after initial work has been done. There is of course the question of repetitions in the Ṛgveda itself, but as Bloomfield pointed out long ago, this cannot be completely determined

unless a reverse concordance is made. But, as far as I know, it has not been attempted until now and one has to totally depend upon Bloomfield's concordance on the basis of which he had found the repetitions mentioned in his well-known work on the subject. Yet, if one accepts the primary distinction between the *śākhās*, then one would have to distinguish between the text of the Ṛgveda itself as belonging to one *śākhā* or the other, and the repetitions would have to be found within them and across them. The same distinction would also have to be made in respect to the *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Āraṇyakas* and the Upaniṣads, except that the assignment of many of these to the Atharvaveda has generally been done in a residual manner and hence a radical distinction may be made between those belonging to the first three *saṁhitās* and the Atharvaveda. The question as to whether the text of the Atharvaveda itself varies depending upon the *śākhā* to which it belongs needs to be examined as well as the question as to why some scholars assign it to a period even earlier than that of the Ṛgveda.

II

These, of course, are preliminary questions which should have been decided and settled long ago. It is surprising that they have to be raised, even though the Vedas are supposed to be not only the oldest but the most 'authoritative' texts in the Indian tradition. Normally, one would have expected a better treatment of the texts considered so fundamental to the whole tradition and also a continuous serious concern with the explication and understanding of their meaning. Yet, the moment one looks at the history of this 'concern' with the Vedic texts, one is surprised to find that though there was certainly a sustained attempt at the preservation of the *mantra* portion of the texts, there was little attempt at understanding what they meant. The first serious evidence of such a concern with the elucidation of the meaning of the Vedic text occurs, as is well known, in the *Nighaṇṭu* and the *Nirukta* ascribed to Yaska and placed some time around the fifth century BC. The first only gives the synonyms and homonyms of the words which occur in the Vedas and which, according to the author, need to be taken into account to understand the meaning of the Veda. The ambiguity involved in such an exercise can easily be understood if one considers that, according to the author of the *Nighaṇṭu*, the same word may stand for many different things and many different words may stand for the same thing. The *Nirukta*, which is the second work in this connection, considers many of the issues that had been raised in connection with the Vedic interpretation and is clearly aware of the difficulties in any such attempt. It says at the end that the older *ṛṣis* have disappeared and now it is only with our own intellect and reason that we may hope to explicate and understand the meaning of the Veda.[1] However, it should be remembered that the *Nirukta* is not a *bhāṣya* on the *mantras* of the *Saṁhitās*. There is no such thing as a *mantra* by *mantra*

commentary to explicate what it means or even to give possible alternative meanings as held by different interpreters of the text. The *Nirukta*, of course, is the first work to deal with the problem of the interpretation of the Vedas but it does not do what one would have expected it to do, that is, to seriously take the text word by word, line by line and *mantra* by *mantra* explaining it and relating it to the meanings of the other *mantras* and thus build a complete, coherent body of meanings embedded in the text. Surprisingly, not only Yāska does not do this but no one else seems to have done it after him.

The period between Yāska and Skandasvāmin lasts almost a thousand years, if not more, and during this whole period there is no evidence of any serious attempt to understand the *mantra* portion of the Vedic texts. In fact, there seems to have emerged a powerful school which roundly declared that the Vedic texts were meaningless and that their efficacy and purport consisted totally in their being recited in the proper manner and in the proper order. This was the idea of Svarānukramaṇī, Varṇānukramanī and Śabdānukramaṇī. Thus, even the type of understanding exemplified by the Nirukta was not followed for almost a thousand years, if not more, let alone was there any attempt at an understanding of the Saṁhitā texts, *mantra* by *mantra*, as would normally have been expected in the tradition. This certainly requires an explanation even though it has hardly struck anyone as requiring one. Professor Dandekar is, of course, an exception and we shall refer to him later.

Perhaps, this stunning absence of any attempt at understanding basic Vedic texts derived from the fact that the Vedic corpus itself underwent a radical transformation as the texts known as the Upaniṣads developed out of it. These texts, though generally regarded as an integral part of the Veda display an attitude which is indicative of a self-conscious attempt on their part to distance themselves from it. Narada, in the well-known story that occurs in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* mentions the four Vedas as included in all the branches of knowledge that he had mastered and had yet remained dissatisfied with all that was contained in it. The Upaniṣads thus replaced the *mantra* texts of the *Saṃhitās* for those who wanted to understand their meaning. This is clearly evidenced in the *Brahma Sūtras* which concentrate exclusively on the Upaniṣads in an attempt at discovering a unified meaning in them. On the other hand, for those who were interested in the performance of the sacrifices enjoined in the Vedas, the *Śrauta Sūtras* and the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtras* replaced the *mantra* texts exclusively and, to a large extent, even those portions of the texts known as the *Brāhmaṇas* which dealt with the performance of the ritual. Thus the *mantra* portion which constituted the *Saṁhitās* became totally irrelevant for both the votaries of the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtras* and the *Brahma Sūtras*, except for the fact that they were to be preserved in their purity to the utmost possible extent. The so-called *Āraṇyaka* portion of the Vedic corpus got assimilated into the portion known as the Upaniṣads, just as the *Brāhmaṇa* portion was assimilated into the *mantra* portion which was supposed to be required only for the performance of the Vedic sacrifices, the procedure for performance of which was detailed in the *Brāhmaṇa* texts.

This, perhaps, is the possible explanation for the unbelievable absence for such a long time at any attempt at understanding the Vedic texts even though the tradition of writing both the *bhāṣya* and the *vārtika* had already been developed on all the major texts of the tradition right from the time when Kātyāyana wrote his *vārtika* on the *sūtras* of Pāṇini. But then the question arises as to why the *mantra* portion of the Vedic texts suddenly became the subject of interpretation from the seventh century onwards. Something must have happened to trigger this activity which has been regarded as totally unnecessary for almost a millennium until Sāyaṇa in the fourteenth century. His is the only available fully published commentary on the Vedic *Saṁhitās* that we have with us today, according to Prof. Dandekar, the most outstanding authority on the Veda of our time. He writes that it is 'the only completely published commentary on the *Ṛgveda*'. It should be remembered in this connection that this was a collective enterprise of the Vijaynagar Empire undertaken by a number of scholars under the leadership of Sāyaṇa, who was perhaps the Prime Minister of the state, and his brother Mādhava. Only then can its significance be understood as a self-conscious attempt to revive the Vedas and to make them relevant to the political and cultural conditions of those times.

It is an amazing phenomenon, that after a neglect of more than a millennium and a half, there occurs a sustained, self-conscious, collective attempt at an understanding of the Vedic texts *mantra* by *mantra*. The earliest of such attempts seems to date from the early seventh century AD. when a group of scholars attempted to write commentaries on the Veda, though they are only partially available now. Most of these commentators were concentrated at Valabhi in Gujarat which was then the centre of a powerful Jain revival where the compilation of the authoritative texts of the Jain tradition was going on. The leader of this group was Skandasvāmin, followed by Nārāyaṇa, Udgita and Mādhava. The first three appear to have collectively written a commentary or *Bhāṣya* on the Ṛgveda while the fourth, that is Mādhava, wrote on the *Sāmaveda*. It is not known whether this activity was undertaken at the royal behest, or whether it could be seen as a response to the Jain revival in the same region.

The Valabhi enterprise seems to have had little impact as there is hardly any evidence of any renewed interest in Vedic exegetics after it until almost 300 years later, that is around the tenth century, we have Venkatamādhava who wrote a detailed commentary on the Ṛgveda entitled the *Ṛgarthadīpikā* of which only portions are available. After him we have Ṣadguruśiṣya in the twelfth century who is supposed to have written a work entitled *Vedārthadīpikā*. It is however not clear whether it is a detailed commentary on the Vedic texts or merely a general elucidation

of its meaning. There is a difference of opinion about its date.[2] After Ṣadguruśiṣya, we have, according to Nilakantha Sastri, Bharatasvamin who wrote a commentary on the Sāmaveda and lived during the period of Hoysala Ramnath (twelfth century). After Bharatasvamin, according to 'Dandekar, there occurred Bhatta Govinda who wrote a full commentary on the Ṛgveda called *Śrutivikāsa* around 1311 AD.: though at present, we have only the commentary on the last eight *adhyāyas* available to us.

Thus, before Sāyaṇa who wrote a full length commentary on the *mantra* texts, we have only eight or nine commentators if we include Uvaṭa, who according to Gonda is mentioned by Skandasvāmin as a predecessor (reference to be given). The total number of these does not even add up to a dozen, and most of these occur only after the tenth century and that too in the south. If we compare this with the commentaries on the *sūtra* literature that we find during this period, the neglect of the Vedas which were supposed to be the foundation of the whole tradition would appear even more surprising.

Even after the tenth century, the situation does not seem to improve very much as we have only six commentators up to Sāyaṇa, even if we include Mudgala whose *vṛtti* is sometimes mentioned after Sāyaṇa.

The situation after the tenth century may show a slight improvement if we include all those persons who had written on the individual *mantras* of the Ṛgveda, namely, Haradatta (ninth century AD), Gunavisnu (end of the eleventh century), Halāyudha (AD 1171–1201), Śatrughna (AD 1528), Ramnath Vidyāvacaspati (seventeenth century). Besides these we also find mention of Atmānanda (thirteenth century), Rāvaṇa (early fifteenth century), Dinakara Bhatta (1575–1640) and Bhattoji Devasvamin, Hastāmalaka (eighth century), Bhatta Bhaskara (eleventh century), Lakṣmaṇa (eleventh century), Dhatuskayajvan (twelfth century), Varadaraja (1600–1650). If we include all these five persons in the list of those who are said to have commented on the Ṛgveda in the first millennium AD, we then have a total of twelve persons most of them occurring from the seventh century onwards, while in the second millennium AD. we have eighteen up to the seventeenth century. Thus there is, *prima facie*, a significant increase in the number of those who have either fully or partly commented upon the Vedic texts or who are referred to as having done so. The situation dramatically changes from the nineteenth century onwards when there is a renewed interest in Vedic exegetics starting from Dayanand Saraswati in the first half of the nineteenth century followed by others such as Sri Aurobindo and those influenced by him, such as Kapali Sastri and Anirvanaji. On the other hand we have Madhusudana Ojha who seems to have given his interpretation against the one given by Dayanand. The same is probably true of Swami Karpatriji. It is interesting to note that all these interpretations ignore the ritualistic *yajña*-centric interpretation of the Veda and emphasize its non-ritualistic, mystical meaning. The work of

Sāyaṇa and his collaborators remains the pivotal point in the second millennium AD which summarizes to a large extent the work of earlier interpreters and provides the point of controversy for all subsequent commentators. It is surprising to note however, that there does not seem to be a pro-Sāyaṇa school of interpretation defending him against the new interpretation of the Veda. This is in contrast with the continuous debate that we find between the Advaitic and the non-Advaitic interpretation of the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma Sūtra*.

III

The long gap between the *Nirukta* of Yāska in the fifth century BC and Uvaṭa or Skandasvamin in seventh century AD, however, remains an enigma which defies any explanation of the normal understanding of the picture of Indian civilization during this period which was drawn by putting the Vedic tradition and the tradition deriving directly or indirectly from it at its centre. In fact, the disappearance of the original Vedic texts from the centre of sustained attention and interest during this long period has hardly been noticed. Prof. Dandekar is perhaps the only person who has highlighted this fact and also tried to account for it by suggesting possible reasons which might have led to this situation. He asks, for example, in his article entitled 'Commentators of the *Ṛgveda*: A Recapitulation', why there should have occurred a break of nearly 1100–1200 years between the second and the third stages of the '*Ṛgvedic* Exegetical tradition'. He suggests the following possible hypothesis: (1) During this period somehow, no great urgency or ardour may have been felt in regard to the understanding of the purport of the Veda or in producing the necessary literature for that purpose. (2) Conscious efforts towards the popular propagation of the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda and averting its secularization. (3) Only the oral tradition of Vedic exegesis was sponsored during that period. Consequently, no written commentaries were produced and a few which might have been produced were presumably lost. But, this is not an isolated phenomenon. It is not as if the Vedic texts alone did not get the attention they deserved if they were regarded as the source of the so-called 'orthodox' tradition during this long period. The situation was practically the same in respect to the *Brahma Sūtras* which had summarized the Upaniṣadic tradition centring on the knowledge of the Brāhmaṇa as we pointed out in our article 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD.' Not only this, the situation is similar with marginal differences in respect to the whole tradition which, directly or indirectly, considered itself as deriving its authority and inspiration from the Vedas. We have already pointed out this fact in our article 'Indian Philosophy in the First Millennium AD.'

If we take all of these facts together, a clear picture emerges which questions at its foundations the total picture that has been built of India's

philosophical tradition in the first millennium AD, stretching back to the period from the appearance of the Buddha. This whole period of a millenium-and-a-half is dominated by the intellectual and spiritual presence of Buddhism which has either been ignored or presented as a minor motif in the usual pictures that have been painted until now. The story has to be changed and drawn in the light of inconvertible factual evidence that we had amassed in the two earlier articles and in the present one. The *nihsaṅga buddhi* should have also no preferences and no special attachment either to one point of view or the other. It should only consider the facts as dispassionately and objectively as possible and try to build a picture based on them. The history and philosophy of India from 500 BC to 1000 AD has to be totally rewritten placing Buddhism in the centre and treating it as a chief protagonist as it not only outnumbered all other schools of philosophy both in quantity and quality but set the agenda for them by radically refuting the necessity for postulating the reality of any substance universals or wholes for understanding experience, thus reducing all knowledge to a mental construction behind which there was only a succession of discreet disparate self-identical momentary reals (*svalakṣaṇas*) or only a void (*śūnya*) indescribable and uncharacterizable in principle.

Notes and References

1 मनुष्या वा ऋषिभूत्कामत्सु देवानब्रुवन् । को न ऋषिर्भविष्यतीति । तेभ्य एतं तर्कमृषिं प्रायच्छन्मन्त्रार्थचिन्ताभ्यूहमभ्यूळ्हम् । तस्माद्यदेव किंचानूचानोऽभ्यूहत्यार्षं तदवति ।। १२ ।।
"हृदा तष्टेषु मनसो जवेषु यद्ब्राह्मणाः संयजन्ते सखायः ।
अत्राह त्वं वि जहुर्वेद्याभिरोहब्राह्माणे वि चरन्त्यु त्वे ।।१३ ।।
(ऋवु॰ सं॰ १०-७१-८)
हृदा तष्टेषु मनसां प्रजवेषु यद्ब्राह्मणाः संयजन्ते समानाख्याना ऋत्विजः । अत्राह त्वं विजहुर्वेद्याभिर्वैरितव्याभिः प्रवृत्तिभिः । ओहब्रह्माण ऊहब्रह्माणः ऊह एषां ब्रह्मेति वा ।।
निरुक्ते-त्रयोदशाध्यायः (परिशिष्ट) section ९२-९३

2. There appears to be an inconsistency with regard to the date of Sadgurusisya. While Gonda places him in the twelfth century, Nilakantha Sastri places him in the middle of the thirteenth century. Also, while the former refers to his work entitled *Vedārthadīpikā* the latter does not mention this work at all but mentions that he commented on the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* and *Āraṇyaka*, and Kātyāyaṇa's *Sarvānukramanī*. The works on the Mīmāṁsā number around 12 while those on Nyāya add up to 15, Vaiśeśika 10, Sāṁkhya 11, Vedānta 8, Advaita 14, Jainism 39. It becomes even more remarkable if we remember that the commentaries on the *sūtra* literature begin only from around 100 AD; the *Nirukta* dates back to around the fifth century BC.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness?

Since I have not studied phenomenology, I do not know what exactly is meant by the expression 'the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness and the fact that self-consciousness may be affected by the way consciousness perceives and apprehends events in the present'.

From the analytical point of view, the picture is quite clear. The word 'consciousness' had two uses in everyday life. Firstly, we say a person is conscious when he uses his sense-organs or thinks or is able to do so, but we say this in special contexts only, for example, when he is coming out of a faint, or is on the verge of death. Consciousness is not something present in perception and yet different from it, or a causal condition for perception, or a subject which perceives. Consciousness is what we call perceiving in certain contexts. To say that 'consciousness perceives events in the present' seems to be equivalent to saying that 'perception perceives events in the present'. Moreover, the words 'in the present' would appear to be an unnecessary specification, since the verb is in the present tense.

Apart from this sense of experience, consciousness can also mean knowledge ('Consciousness' and 'awareness' are synonymous terms and 'awareness' too has both these meanings). For example, a person could be said to be 'conscious of his superiority'. Consciousness in this sense is a disposition, not an experience.

Although consciousness, in its first sense, is used synonymously with experience, the experience or consciousness is always of something and it is that something which one experiences or is conscious of. This is a grammatical or logical truth, which tells us a rule about the use of the words 'experience' and 'consciousness'. When we see an apple, the seeing, or consciousness or experience is of the apple; the seeing or consciousness or experience is not a separate something in the mind, some primordial mental stuff; there is no such stuff. There is no such thing as 'consciousness of consciousness', that is, experience of experience. It is risky to venture into Sartrean exegesis without a careful study of his work, but Sartre's talk of 'consciousness of consciousness' surely arises from just such an idle hypostatization, from the mistaken notion that consciousness is itself a separate mental entity, perhaps on the model of some inner searchlight (instead of being just a word with functions in our language which does not denote a thing).[1] If it is such a thing, it would certainly be something of which we are conscious. Consciousness is

always of something and a mental entity is always something of which we are conscious and both are grammatical and not empirical remarks. If they were empirical propositions, we could imagine situations in which they are wrong, but we cannot, just as we cannot imagine a situation in which there are less than three feet to a yard.

As for self-consciousness, it has of course, an everyday use which we all know. The philosophic use involves consciousness in the first sense. Self-consciousness is supposed to be an experiencing of one's self. Here again, certain words like 'self' (*'myself','yourself'*). 'I' and 'my', which perform certain functions in our language, make us look about for a separate entity which corresponds to them, some subject or owner or something but this is a case of transferring syntactical elements to the world. In fact, it is possible to have a subjectless language; for example, one could say 'There are feelings' instead of 'I feel'. If one 'introspects', one may convince oneself that one is conscious of one's self but what apparently happens in such cases is that one is mistaking some unfamiliar sensation or imagining for one's self. Hence, William James' 'discovery' cited by Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations* that the self consists mainly of 'peculiar motions in the head and between the head and throat'.[2]

In fact, the concept of 'introspection' which is supposed to be the means of acquainting oneself with one's self, warrants a closer look. In everyday usage, it is the adjective 'introspective' which is used, not the noun. It is applied to a person (for example, C.S. Forester's fictional hero, Horatio Hornblower) who worries too much about his behaviour and motives and about the impression he makes on others, that is, to a person who relates to situations in a particular way. The philosophic use of the noun 'introspection' is utterly different. It means making an inventory of the contents 'of one's mind' and it is used in contrast to perception. We are supposed to perceive things in the outer world through the senses and things in the inner world, that is mental entities and events, by means of introspection. But any attempt to apply the concept involves us at once in problems.

Most philosophers would regard Hume's famous exercise, in which he (unlike James) fails to discover a self, as an introspective exercise. But what Hume says is that he cannot catch himself but keeps stumbling 'on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure'.[3] (Hume is using 'perception' in a non-technical way, synonymously with 'awareness' and not with seeing), When Hume perceives 'heat or cold, light or shade' he is obviously using his senses. As for 'love or hatred, pain or pleasure', it is things in the world (individuals, objects, situations) that are lovable or hateful, painful or pleasant. Emotion nouns (love, hatred, etc.) and feeling nouns (pain, pleasure, etc.) have a role in our language but they do not designate mental things, modifications of some primordial mental stuff. Wittgenstein

observes in *Zettel*: 'But "Joy" surely designates some inward thing. No. "Joy" designates nothing at all. Neither any inward nor any outward thing'.[4] In other words a person may hear some delightful news and may react with joy-behaviour but nothing comes into his mind or anywhere else which the word 'joy' could designate; this is a mythical third element in the situation. Hume may, of course, be referring to painful or pleasant sensations—a toothache, a tasty morsel of food—in which case he is again using his senses. As for images, Hume does not mention them but since they are imagined, they are not entities, nor do we observe them. The 'inner world', 'introspection' and 'mental entities' (in the sense of things made up of some special 'mental stuff', as opposed to an apple one sees or a pain one has) are all mirages.

This raises an important question. What is the nature of the self that one is supposed to be conscious of? An imagined self would not answer anyone's purpose. A self that is sensation, something bodily, would satisfy few philosophers; William James would appear to be a rare exception. In that case, what is there left to constitute the self?

Notes and References

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, translated by Hazel E. Barnes, Washington Square Press, New York, 1992, pp. 10–17.
2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1972, pp. 124–25.
3. Cited in Sydney Shoemaker, 'Introspection and the Self', in Quassim Cassam, (ed.), *Self-Knowledge*, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 118.
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, p. 86.

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Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness? A Response

(1) The paper, ' Is there such a thing as Self-consciousness' makes two moves to deny self-consciousness as a phenomenon: (i) the linguistic move that denies the autonomy of the use of the word 'self-consciousness'; (ii) the ontological move that denies the reality of self-consciousness as a phenomenon. Both moves ultimately coincide, since on either move, self-consciousness stands condemned. The author says:

When we see an apple, the seeing, or consciousness or experience is of an apple; the seeing or consciousness or experience is not a separate something in the mind, some primordial mental stuff; there is no such

stuff. There is no such thing as 'consciousness of consciousness', that is, experience of experience (p.1).

The ontological move made in this passage is juxtaposed with the linguistic move as mentioned in the following passage:

Although consciousness, in its first sense, is synonymous with experience, the experience or consciousness is always of something and it is that something which one experiences or is conscious of. This is a grammatical or logical truth, which tells us about a rule about the use of words 'experience' and 'consciousness' (p. 1).

(2) Both these moves are based on two sorts of argument now well-known to students of philosophy: the ontological move is more or less a Humean one which has its echo in Russell and James, while the linguistic move is based on Wittgenstein's, and also Ryle's, argument that self-consciousness is not a metaphysical reality as it is ultimately a grammatical fact that we are self-conscious. The author therefore has restated something familiar, though it is very apt that there is something convincing in the restatement.

(3) The Humean argument in refuting self-consciousness is rather hackneyed for the reason that Hume's bundle theory of self is inconsistent, and there is already a presupposed unity of self-consciousness even for the construction of the self proposed by the Humeans. One must accept that there is nothing like constructing the self, since it is the self which attempts to construct itself, and so it already takes for granted that there is the self that cannot be constructed. Therefore even to say that the self is a chimera one has to presuppose the self and hence one must give up the pseudo-talk of denying the self.

Self is a primitive, pre-theoretical concept that is already underlying our sophisticated logical as well as ontological thought. Hence it is almost impossible to deny that there is self-consciousness. Every bit of consciousness is logically associated with self-consciousness. Of course, consciousness and self-consciousness cannot be mysterious ontological entities to be discovered through introspection. It is enough that we are aware of the fact that we are conscious of the world. This consciousness of the consciousness is a fact of the matter that cannot be denied without self-inconsistency.

(4) The grammatical argument propounded by Wittgenstein does not have a Humean ring precisely for the reason that it aims at demystifying self-consciousness rather than at denying it. Wittgenstein writes:

Is my being conscious a fact of experience?—But doesn't one say that human being have consciousness and that trees, or stones do not?—What could it be if it were otherwise—Would human beings all be unconscious?—No. Not in the ordinary sense of the word. But, I , for instance, should not have consciousness—as I now in fact have it (*Philosophical Investigations, sec.* 418).

Further he says:

Say to yourself, for example, 'The children over there are mere automata; all their loveliness is mere automatism'. And you will either find these words become meaningless; or you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort (*Ibid.* sec. 429).

These passages are sufficient to show that the grammatical argument has nothing in it to suggest that self-consciousness is a chimera. If there were in fact no self-consciousness, it would be impossible to understand human beings.

To say that there is no self-conscious human being is to say the absurd because it is ungrammatical to say that 'I am unconscious'. I can make none of the statements like 'I doubt if I am conscious' or 'I can infer that I have a self'. These statements are ungrammatical because they deny the obvious, that is, because they deny the necessary facts of life.

(5) It is not the case that the idea of 'consciousness of consciousness' is an idle hypostatization as claimed by the author for the reason that, logically speaking, if there is consciousness, then there must be consciousness of consciousness. There is second-order consciousness for every first-order consciousness. Consciousness is not a mysterious stuff in the mind; it is the very form of human life. Therefore it is not a 'mistaken notion' (p. 2) that we have consciousness; rather it is impossible to imagine what human life could have been without consciousness.

Now the question whether consciousness is a 'separate mental entity' (p. 2) or not raises a fundamental issue. It cannot be denied that consciousness is logically distinct from anything that is not conscious. Thus consciousness is an autonomous reality so far as its logical conceivability is concerned. Its ontological locus in the human body does not deny that it is something different from the body. As long as we do not identify the body with the mind or consciousness, it remains an open question whether consciousness is a separate mental entity or not.

The author has a point in saying that such statements as 'Consciousness is of something' and 'A mental entity is always something of which we are conscious' are grammatical and not empirical remarks (p. 2). But from this it does not follow that consciousness is not ontologically real or that it is a 'case of transferring the syntactical elements to the world' (p. 2). The syntactical way of representing consciousness does not rule out the ontological reality of consciousness, unless one retains a rigid distinction between language and reality. The question of transfer of consciousness from language to the world does not arise since the consciousness manifested in language is the stuff belonging to reality, that is, to the self.

(6) The idea of the subject is vital for understanding the ontological reality of consciousness. It is the subject that is the locus of consciousness and not any material body. Therefore the human subject is capable of developing a language that represents thoughts and feelings. If this is a matter of common acceptance, then it is an unnecessary and idle metaphysical speculation that there is a 'subjectless language'. It is

meaningless to say that there is thinking but there is no thinker or the 'I'. Similarly, it is absurd to say that there are feelings but there is nobody who has them, thus implying that they are as it were hanging in the air. What is troublesome is not the word 'I' in language, but the unwarranted metaphysical speculations growing around it. If the analytic thinkers have sometimes talked about the subjectless language and knowledge, it is not because they do not accept the grammatical use of 'I', but because they are wary of the possible and actual metaphysical implications following therefrom. There is nothing, however, to suggest that the subject as an ontological category is abolished. The logical subject or the self cannot be treated on a par with the things we talk about in the world. There is ontologically something very distinct about the subject (Cf. *Philosophical Investigations*, sec. 398).

(7) The author has done well to bring into focus the logical or grammatical nature of the subject or self, but has failed to see that the grammatical position of the self is not independent of its ontological reality. He has presupposed that what is only grammatically true must be ontologically false. That drives him to suggest that consciousness and self-consciousness are illusory as phenomena, though they have a grammatical sanction in language. But what can a grammatical sanction amount to if it does not have an ontological backing? That is why I argue that consciousness is not a mere grammatical phenomenon but a reality as such.

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The Concept of *Āhāryajñāna* in Navya-Nyāya: Some Reflections

A few interesting philosophical problems have been raised by Professor Lath in connection with the concept of *āhāryajñāna* in Navya Nyāya (*JICPR*, Vol. XIII, No. 1). As the problems are very much cogent, interesting and thought-provoking, an effort has been made to illuminate these logically from the purview of Navya Nyāya.

A problem of how one can think of 'knowledge produced through desire' (*icchājanyajñāna*) has been raised (p. 174). A solution to this problem may be offered in the following way. Let us look towards the exact nature of *āhāryajñāna*. The knowledge which is produced out of one's own desire at the time when there is the contradictory knowledge is called *āhāryajñāna*. (*Virodhijñāna-kālīnecchāprayojyajñānatvaṃ āhāryajñānatvam* or '*Vādhakālinecchājanyaṃ jñānam*).[1] The word '*āhārya*'

means 'artificial', which is found in the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* where the ladies are described as *āhāryaśobhārahitairamāyaiḥ*[2] (that is, free from artificial beauty). From this, it follows that the word *anāhārya* means 'natural' which is expressed by the term '*amāyaiḥ*'. When we talk of *āhārya*-knowledge, it has to be taken as an artificial knowledge on account of the fact that between two objects an object is *deliberately* thought as otherwise in spite of knowing the distinct character or real nature of these two objects. In these cases one's desire of thinking an object as otherwise acts as an instrument (*icchājanya*). It is to be borne in mind that the Navya Naiyāyikas have given much importance on *vivakṣā* (that is, will to say). Let us put forth some cases where we find a knowledge produced through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanyajñāna*). One is allowed to say *sthālī pacati* (he cooks with clay-pot) with the nominative case-ending to the pot instead of the correct expression '*sthālyā pacati*', with the instrumental case-ending with the word *sthālī* if one so desires.

Apart from these there are a few cases where we find knowledge attained through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*) as in the case of *pakṣatā*. If someone bears a strong desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*), he can infer in spite of having *siddhi*. ('*siṣādhayiṣāsattve numitirbhavatyeva*'[3]). It is permissible as the Naiyāyikas believe in the theory of *pramāṇasamplava* (that is, capability of applying various *pramāṇas*) to ascertain an object. According to this theory, 'fire' which is perceived can be inferred if someone so desires. That a cloth is completely different from a jar is completely known from the perception and hence there is not at all any necessity to infer a cloth as distinct from a jar. In spite of this one is found to infer: 'It (that is, a cloth) is endowed with the mutual absence of a jar, as it has got clothness' (*ghaṭānyonyābhāvavān paṭatvāt*). All these cases are supportable as an individual desires to do so and hence the role of *icchājanyatva* in the attainment of knowledge cannot be denied. But it should be clearly borne in mind that all *icchājanya*—inferences or knowledges—are not *āhārya*. The *icchājanya-jñāna* as found in the case of *rūpaka* and *tarka* are the instances of *āhāryajñāna*. From the abovementioned cases it is proved that desire may act as the instrument of knowledge which is called *icchājanyajñāna*.

Another problem has been raised how the concept of *āhāryajñāna* can be accommodated in *Nyāya* as the sentence conveying such cognition has no *yogyatā* (p. 176). It may seem strange to us as to why such artificial nature of knowledge is at all essential in the context of *nyāya*. Though there is no direct result of the deliberation of such artificial knowledge due to not having semantic competency (*yogyatā*), it plays a great role in pointing out the exact nature of an object *indirectly*.

The importance of accepting *āhāryajñāna* can be realized easily if we ponder over the importance of *tarka* as a philosophical method. *Tarka* is nothing but an *āhāryajñāna*, which is evidenced from the definition given in the *Nīlakaṇṭhaprakāśikā* on *Dīpikā* '*Āhāryavyāpyavattābhramajanya*

āhāryavyāpakavattābhramastarkaḥ'[4]. That is, *tarka* is an imposed (*āhārya*) erroneous cognition of the existence of a pervader (*vyāpaka*) which is produced by another imposed erroneous cognition of the existence of a *vyāpya*. If the knowledge in the form—'There is fire in the lake' (*hrado vahnimān*) is produced out of one's desire at the time where there is the awareness of the contradictory knowledge in the form—'there is the absence of fire in the lake' (*hrado vahnyabhāvavān*), it is called *āhārya*. In this case erroneous cognition is deliberate which is not found in ordinary illusion.

The main purpose of accepting *āhāryajñāna* is to ascertain the true nature of an object (*viṣayapariśodhaka*) and to remove the doubt of deviation (*vyabhicāraśaṁkānivartaka*). The *āhāryajñāna* existing in the former type—'If it has no fire, it has no smoke' (*Yadyaṁ vahnimān na syāt tadā dhūmavān na syāt*) ascertains the existence of fire in a particular locus. In the same way, the Navya Naiyāyikas have accepted another form of *tarka* which is also *āhārya* in order to eliminate one's doubt of deviation (*vyabhicāraśaṁkā*). If someone bears a doubt whether smoke and fire have an invariable relation or not, this doubt of deviation (*vyabhicāraśaṁkā*) can be dispelled by demonstrating the *āhārya*-knowledge in the form: 'If smoke be deviated from fire, it will not be caused by fire'. (*dhūmo yadi vahnivyabhicārī syāt tarhi vahnijanyo na syāt*). From this it is indirectly proved that as smoke is caused by fire, it will not be deviated from fire.[5]

By virtue of being *āhārya* both the parts—the ground (*āpādaka*) and consequent (*āpādya*) are imaginary or hypothetical. If the first part is true, the second part would become automatically true. But it is a well-known fact that the second part is not true in so far as we do not get any smoke which is not caused by fire. So, the doubt as to the deviation of fire with smoke can be removed by applying the *tarka* in the form of *āhārya*. It, being a kind of mental construction, is useful for removing doubt and hence it becomes promoter to *pramāṇas*. This *āhārya* cognition is otherwise called *aniṣṭāpatti* or *aniṣṭaprasaṅga*, that is, introduction of the undesired through which the desired one is established. This imposition of the undesired is of two types: the rejection of the established fact and the acceptance of the non-established object (*Syādaniṣṭam dvividham smṛtam prāmāṇikaparityāgastathetaraparigrahaḥ*). If there is an *āhāryajñāna* in the form—'water cannot quench thirst', there would arise an objection—'If it is so, no thirsty people should drink water'. It is known from our experience that water is capable of quenching thirst, which is denied here and hence it comes under the first type of *aniṣṭa*.

If it is said that water causes burning, there would arise objection in the form—'If it is so, the drinking of water would cause a burning sensation.' The burning sensation from water is not an established fact, which is admitted here and hence it belongs to the second type of *aniṣṭa*. We often take recourse to *āhāryajñāna* even in our day-to-day debate. If an opponent says to a Naiyāyika that self is non-eternal (*anitya*), he may first agree with

what the opponent says in the following manner—'O.K., initially I agree with you that self is non-eternal'. This agreement for the time being is *āhārya* and the next step in the form—'If self were non-eternal in nature, there would not have been the enjoyment of *karma*, rebirth or liberation due to the destruction of the self' is also *āhārya* which indirectly points to the eternality of self. In the same way, various expressions like 'If I were a bird, I would have flown from one place to another', 'If you were a firmament, I would have stretched my wings like a crane' (which reminds me of a Bengali song—*Tumi ākāś yadi hate āmi balākār mato pākhā meltām*) can be included under *āhāryajñāna*.

The accommodation of *āhāryajñāna* in Navya Nyāya is primarily to promote an indirect method through which truth is ascertained. In the indirect proof in symbolic logic the negation of the conclusion is deliberately taken which is also an *āhārya* and from this it is shown that, if this is taken as a conclusion, it will lead to some contradiction or absurdity. If the negation of P which is originally a conclusion is taken as a conclusion of *āhārya*-type and proved it as contradictory or absurd, it will automatically follow that the original conclusion, that is, P (*anāhārya*) is true. This method is also called the method of proof by *reductio ad absurdum*.[6]

In metaphorical expressions such *āhāryajñāna* bears a completely different import. *Rūpaka* remains in the representation of the subject of description which is not concealed, as identified with another well known standard (*rūpakam rūpitāropād viṣaye nirapahnave*).[7] In the famous case of *rūpaka—mukhacandra* the *upameya* is 'face' which is identified with 'moon'. In this case, the distinction between these is not concealed in spite of having excessive similarity. Though the difference between them is not concealed yet there is the ascription of the identification between two objects (*atisāmyāt anapahnutabhedayoḥ upamānopameyayoḥ abhedāropaḥ*). In spite of knowing the distinction between *upamāna* and *upameya*, there is the hypothetical ascription of identity deliberately which is also an *āhārya*.[8]

From the above discussions, it is known to us that the accommodation of the *āhāryajñāna* presupposes some intention of an individual. In the case of metaphor, *āhāryatva* is taken recourse to in order to show the extreme similarities between two objects. In the same way, *āhāryajñāna* is accepted by the logicians to ascertain the real nature of an object indirectly. Hence *āhāryajñāna* can be utilized as an accessory to a *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇānugrāhakarūpeṇa*). Though the semantic competency (*yogyatā*), the criterion of the meaningfulness of a sentence, is not found in the sentences conveying *āhāryajñāna*, meaning of such sentences is easily understood by others. Had these been not understood at all, the absence of *yogyatā* cannot also be known. Moreover, as there is semantic incompetency, a search for other indirect or secondary meaning is permissible. As there is the absence of *yogyatā* in the expressions like

mukhacandra and 'If I were a bird, I would have flown', etc., a thorough search for indirect meanings like extreme similarity (*atisāmya*) between face and moon, the absurdity of describing a man as bird, etc. have to be ascertained. It is to be kept in mind that the semantic competency is essential only in the case of direct meaning (*śakyārtha*) but not in implicative or suggestive meaning (*lakṣyārtha or vyaṅgyārtha*). In fact, an implicative or suggestive meaning is looked for if there is the incompetency among the words (*mukhyārthavādhe*). Hence the semantic incompetency paves way to the indirect meaning as found in the expressions like 'I am building castles in the air', etc. Following the same line it can be said that *āhāryajñāna* can communicate something to us indirectly in spite of not having the said competency.

Professor Lath further adds: can we speak of *āhāryajñāna* existing in the pure music of *rāgas*, pure dance or abstract paintings that are new worlds created through imagination? In response to this, the following suggestions can be made. Though *āhāryajñāna* is a product of imagination, all imaginations cannot be taken as *āhāryajñāna*. The imaginary ideas as found in the fanciful stories or fairy tales, etc., are not *āhārya*. Some imagination is created out of one's own will (*icchāprayojya*) at the time when one is conscious of the contradictory knowledge (*virodhijñānakālīna*). In spite of being conscious of the fact that fire cannot stay in the lake, we imagine that the lake has fire out of our strong will. It is the case of *āhārya* as already mentioned. In the case of pure music, dance and abstract paintings, we are not aware of the contradictory knowledge (*virodhijñāna*) through which the imaginary states are sublated (*vādhita*). Though these are the cases of imagination having the characteristic of *icchāprayojyatva*, or *icchājanyatva*, they are not *āhāryajñāna* due to the lack of the other characteristic, that is, *virodhijñānakalīnatva* or *vādhakālīnatva*. In the case of *āhāryajñāna* both the characteristic should be taken as adjuncts of imaginations. An imaginary cognition associated with *icchāprayojyatva* or *icchājanyatva* and *virodhijñānakālīnatva* is called *āhārya*. Due to the absence of the second characteristic the charge of *avyāpti* of the definition of *āhāryajñāna* to the pure music, etc., does not stand on logic.

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2. *Bhaṭṭikāvya* 2/14.
3. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse no. 70.

4. *Nīlakaṇṭhaprakāśikā* on *Dīpikā* on *Tarkasaṁgraha*, p. 376, edited by Satkari Sharma Bangiya, with seven commentaries, Chowkhamba, 1976.
5. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (Anumānakhaṇḍa), Gaṇgeśa, Vyāptigrahopāyaḥ chapter.
6. *Symbolic Logic* (4th ed.), Irving M. Copi, Macmillan, London, 1973, p. 53.
7. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Chapter X, edited by Haridās Siddhāntavagīśa, p. 620, 1875(B.5).
8. *Kusumapratimā* on *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Chapter X, edited by Haridās Siddhāntavagīśa, 1875(B.S.), p. 621.

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The Intentionality of the Mental Reference

In the paper, 'The Intentionality of the Mental Reference',[1] Shashi Motilal argues against the specificity of the mental reference and emphasizes the linguistic reference. The author feels that the process of identifying the referent in the case of mental reference through the intentional content is controversial. However, according to the author, the whole process that is involved in identifying referent is essentially linguistic activity. In this way, the main contention of the paper is as follows:

(1) There is a necessary relation between thought and language without any structural gap.

(2) Intentionality does not have any role in singling out the referent so far as its intrinsic relationship with mental states is concerned. Rather, its basic feature reveals only through linguistic expression or speech-act. And, it is through the 'descriptive content' that the particular referent can be singled out.

(3) 'Linguistic concepts' are the primary ingredients for both the referentiality of the expression and understanding of the phenomena. Building up of the linguistic concept is mainly an 'essentially linguistic act.'[2] And the developed *concept* is acquired through the use of language. They are logically correlated and function within the unified framework.[3] And the complete unification of these concepts builds up a 'conceptual scheme'.

Taking all these points into account, Motilal refutes those who advocate the primacy of intentionality, and especially Searle, who strongly holds the view that the intentionality of the linguistic representation of intentional states is derived from intentional states in the mind.

My response is basically to defend Searle's position and to point out how Motilal has arrived at the conclusion without considering the core aspects of the Searlean thesis. It is difficult to play down the importance of the Searlean concept of *intentionality* as the basic feature of the mental. Intentionality, for Searle, not only helps to explain the structure of the

mental states but also discloses the triangular relationship between mind, language and the world. At the same time, I would like to focus on the Searlean conception of *directedness* of mind to the world and vice versa. Mind is basically directed towards the world as man lives in the world. However, it is not the case that the dynamic and multifarious participation of the agent puts less emphasis on the language. Rather, the entire notion of *representation* of mental states or intentional states reveals that the agent is necessarily a 'language-centric conscious being'.[4] Searle, moreover, talks about the various intrinsic features of the mental including intentionality, that is, the features which distinguish the mental from the non-mental. For Searle, the mental and the physical are nonetheless intimately related. There is thus an intimate relationship between neurobiology and semantics. Hence, his programme is to highlight particularly the illoccutionary aspects of assertions and what goes on behind them.[5]

Now it is our primary concern to understand the realm of the ontology of the mental we are talking about in our linguistic analysis. It is true that the whole enterprise of representation and communication not only takes place through language but also presupposes *thoughts*. The representation basically reveals the structural relationship between language and thought. As Wittgenstein rightly says, 'The thought is already complete at the beginning of the sentence. How can we know that?—But the *intention* of uttering the thought may already exist before the word has been said. For if you ask someone: 'Do you know what you mean to say? He will often say yes'.[6] That is to say the structure of thought contains all the essential ingredients, such as the syntactical and the semantical features. It can be asked whether *thoughts* include the whole domain of the mental phenomena or thought would be considered as one of the mental phenomena. Furthermore, it is necessary to make the distinction between *states, events* and *processes* in the realm of the mental. A 'state' is either a completed process or not a process at all. Whereas a 'process' includes some state or states. So a process can be termed as state-in-action. But one can very well make out a singular thought as distinguished from a complex thought. A piece of thought need not always be in the process. In that sense, it may not be called action. It is a state of mind having desire, belief, intention, etc. It is not necessarily the case that desire and intention will always co-exist in a state of mind. But so far as the representation of intentional states or mental states is concerned, Searle will not go against the representation of thought. More precisely, those who advocate that *linguistic representation* is the representation of thought, mainly emphasize the feature of directedness or *aboutness* which belongs to the language as well as thought.[7] Searle's characterization of 'representation' is certainly different from Fodor's and Dennett's who advocate that intentional states or mental states can be syntactically represented. Quite opposite to this, Searle advocates the

primacy of mental representation by showing that each intentional state will have 'propositional content' and 'psychological mode'. And in both the cases it refers to the direction of fit and the condition of satisfaction respectively.[8] Thus the legitimacy of mental states cannot be questioned both within the gamut of thoughts and linguistic concepts.

Let me be very specific about the issues to be raised in this discussion now. I would like to discuss four important points in this regard in order to show intentionality is deeply rooted in the study of mental phenomena. They are (i) linguistic parallelism between the intentional states and its representations; (ii) the two aspects of representations; (iii) knowability of objects; linguistic concepts vs. linguistic categories; (iv) the autonomy of mental states and the connective principle.

LINGUISTIC PARALLELISM

By linguistic parallelism we mean the structural sameness of both thought and its expression which includes syntactical and semantical aspects. If thoughts and intentional states are considered as the prior forms of the expression and representation respectively, then *directedness* is salient to mental in mental reference as advocated by Motilal. Searle himself has advocated this parallelism between mental and linguistic reference to illustrate this point. If I say that, 'My son is arriving today'; this expression definitely contains various mental states such as,'I *believe* that my son will reach today', 'I *desire* that he should reach here safely' and so on. If that is the case, then am I not *referring to* my son in thinking about him. And Motilal also agrees on this point that, 'thinking about an object we are in certain relation with the object.'[9] I think Motilal also shares the similar view with Searle that there is *intentionality* involved in mental reference. And we do make the difference between *thinking of* something and *expressing* it in language, because thinking and speaking are not the same.

THE TWO ASPECTS OF REPRESENTATION

As we have already mentioned, the very act of representation of an intentional state, according to Searle, includes two essential features. They are, propositional content and psychological mode. The propositional content refers to the object whereas the psychological mode deals with the *condition of satisfaction*. The whole endeavour of Searle in his later works is to provide an internal logical structure for performatives. In the speech-acts representation it is essential for the agent to recognize the psychological mode because the very act of formulating an intentional state and representing it results in the conditions of satisfaction. It is in this connection that *directedness* is from world-to-mind. For instance, as a management trainee one is taught how

to motivate and deal professionally with costumers. But learning *how to do* a thing is different from developing one's own *skill.* Can we tell now acquiring such a *skill* is a 'linguistic concept'? Then the question arises what sort of linguistic content is it? However, it is clear that the whole conception of *designing* or *formulating* the intentional states and representing them presupposes intentionality.

KNOWABILITY OF OBJECTS: LINGUISTIC CONCEPTS VS LINGUISTIC CATEGORIES

Motilal strongly argues for the legitimacy of acquiring the *linguistic concept* as the capacity to know an object is 'essentially a linguistic act'. To quote, 'To possess a concept completely is to know the correct use of the concept expression in a language, and to know the correct use of a concept word in a language is to know its meaning in that language. Thus, to know a concept completely is to understand the meaning of the corresponding concept word. To understand the meaning of a concept word is to know what it stands for, and to know the various logical relations the concept of the words bears to the other concept words in the language,'[10] whereas for Searle, the *linguistic categories* for the experience of the world,[11] are involved in consciousness. Moreover, there are certain other features which enable us to know the objects. They are, structuredness, perception as, the aspectual shape of intentionality, categories, and the aspect of familiarity, etc.[12] But in the case of Motilal, it is certainly difficult to understand how much *linguistic* the *concepts* are. It is precisely because, as the author says, 'It is possible to recognize an object fall under (linguistic) concept even though I do not speak or think that. Such acts are linguistic even though they do not involve the production and use of words.'[13]

Searle's notion of 'linguistic categories' are unproblematic in the sense that they function within the framework of the network of intentional states. And intentional states are essentially linguistic.

THE AUTONOMY OF INTENTIONAL STATES AND CONNECTIVE PRINCIPLE

I thing that the major problem according to Motilal, lies in this point: 'can there be a contingent relation between mind and language?' And, language being an essential element of understanding and expression cannot be derived from the intentionality of the mental states, as a result of which it creates a less philosophical interest for Motilal.[14] This answer needs to focus on the distinction and the interconnection between the autonomy of intentional states and the connective principle of the background in Searle's programme. Hence, it is important to understand the nature and function of the background thoroughly. Moreover, it can be said that the nature of the background is such that it is non-representational and non-intentional.[15] The capacity of *representation* is partly biological and partly social or 'linguistic'. It is the biological aspect

of the background which is responsible much for the emergence of the mental states and for making the mental states into intentional states. The notion of representation and conditions of satisfaction arise at the level of the network of intentional states. If one says language is *derived from* intentional states, what is wrong in it? Because the intentional states contain both syntactic and semantic contents. Hence, there is a necessary relation between the 'linguistic representations' and intentional states. However, Searle also maintains the view that, '. . . all representations whether in language, thought or experience only *succeed in* given set of non-representational capacities that are not themselves intentional.'[16] As far as the interrelationship and the transformation of mental states to intentional states are concerned, Searle emphasizes the structural features of neurobiology of the brain process. This causal relationship is intrinsic and potentially present in the brain process which serves as the connective principle between the unconscious mental states and conscious intentional states.[17] Moreover, Searle suggests that learning a rule or 'concept word' (that Motilal is talking about) and its use is an intentional process or intention-in-action. Though it seems to us that we follow a rule unconsciously, the whole explanation of rule in case of describing our behaviour is nothing but giving a 'intentional-causal' explanation. Searle clearly makes the distinction between how a person is *rule-guided* or *rule-governed* and how the rule is being *described.*[18]

Thus, I strongly feel that the notion of intentionality of the mental states can neither be simply denied nor can it be lightly taken into consideration. Rather, it is deeply rooted as the intrinsic feature of consciousness and helps us in revealing the internal structure of the mental states. Searl's theorization of Intentionality is a novel contribution to both philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Shashi Motilal, 'The Intentionality of Mental Reference', *JICPR*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, May–Aug. 1996.
2. See Motilal makes the distinction between a fully linguistic act and an essentially linguistic act. 'Acts which are essentially linguistic but not fully linguistic do not involve any use of language. It is possible to recognize that an object falls under a (linguistic) concept even though it does not involve the production and use of words.' (p. 79). The author also says the whole exercise of *capacity of using* words and finding out the logical correlations among the different words, and *capacity of* understanding the object intended in the expression is essentially linguistic (p. 83).
3. See Motilal, 'Intentionality of Mental Reference', p. 82.
4. See R.C. Pradhan, 'Wittgenstein on Forms of Life: Towards a Transcendental Perspective', *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 3, May–Aug, 1994, p.74.
5. See, Bryan Magee's interview with Searle, *Men of Ideas,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978. p. 170.
6. See Wittgenstein's *Zettel,* Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, section 1.
7. R.C. Pradhan advocates that the 'representationality' or *aboutness* is an essential

feature of *linguistic representation*. According to him, 'representationality' is embedded in whole exercise of 'meaning' starting from both classical theory of semantics to post-Wittgensteinian theory of semantics. And the 'linguistic representation' never denies the ontology of thought. See, R.C. Pradhan, *Philosophy of Meaning and Representation*, D.K. Printworld (p) Ltd., New Delhi, 1996.

8. See, Searle's *Intentionality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. p. 12.
9. See Motilal, 'Intentionality of Mental Reference', p. 74.
10. Ibid., p. 82.
11. See, Searle's reply to Bryan Magee in *Mind of Ideas*, p. 156.
12. See Searle's *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, MIT Press, Mass., 1993, p. 136.
13. See, Motilal, 'Intentionality of Mental Reference', p. 79.
14. Ibid., p. 73
15. See, J.R. Searle, *Intentionality*, Chapter 5 pp. 141–59. In *The Rediscovery of Mind*, Searle discusses the interrelationship of the background with intentionality and consciouness. See chapter 8, pp. 175–96.
16. See, Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, pp. 175–76.
17. Searle clarifies this while replying to J. Fodor and E. Lepore in his paper, 'The Connective Principle and the Ontology of the Unconscious: A Reply to Fodor and Lepore, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. LIV, No. 4, Dec. 1994.
18. Cf. Ibid., and also see the example that is cited in p. 6 of this paper.

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Two Dogmas of the Bhagavadgītā

The purpose of this paper is to present a critical analysis of the following two dogmas of the *Bhagavadgītā* and to show that the *Bhagavadgītā* does not, and cannot, maintain both the dogmas consistently within its own framework of philosophy.

Dogma 1
A desireful action, an action done with or prompted by desire for the fruit of action, causes bondage.[1]

Dogma 2
A desireless action, an action done without or not prompted by any desire for the fruit of action, causes freedom.[2]

It is quite obvious from the dogma of bondage, that is, the dogma 1 that the *Bhagavadgītā* does not logically rest its notion of bondage on the notion of desireless action. It rests its notion of bondage on the notion of desireful action, an action which is done with desire for the fruit of action. It is also quite obvious from the dogma of freedom, that is, the dogma 2 that the *Bhagavadgītā* does not logically rest its notion of freedom on the notion of desireful action. It rests its notion of freedom on the notion of desireless action, an action which is done without any desire for the fruit of action, and the notion of desireless action is conceptually different from the notion of desireful action. Not only this, it is also quite obvious from the assertions of the dogmas 1 and 2 that the *Bhagavadgītā* does not logically rest its dichotomy of bondage and freedom on the

dichotomy of action and inaction or non-action. It rests its dichotomy of bondage and freedom on the dichotomy of desireful and desireless action; and the dichotomy of desireful and desireless action logically rests on the dichotomy of presence and absence of an element of desire for the fruit of action. The notion of desireful action conceptually involves in its meaning the notion of attachment for the fruit of action. To do an action in a desireful manner means to have an attachment for what the action is going to produce. While the notion of desireless action conceptually involves in its meaning the notion of non-attachment for the fruit of action, to do an action in desireless manner means to have no attachment for what the action is going to produce. The notion of non-attachment involves in its meaning the notion of indifference or neutrality about the possible consequences which the doer of action thinks the action would be bringing about if it is done. And to say this is not to say that the notion of non-attachment action involves in its meaning the renunciation of action. The notion of renunciation of action consists in the abandonment or giving up of action which is equivalent to inaction (*naiskarmya*) which the *Bhagavadgītā* does not advocate. The *Bhagavadgītā* advocates the philosophy of action. If it were the case, the Lord Kṛṣṇa would not have taught Arjuna the philosophy of *karmayoga* because the philosophy of *karmayoga* consists in the practice of the philosophy of non-attachment (*niṣkāma karma*); he would have taught him to follow the path of non-action (*akarma*) or renunciation of action which he did not do. Instead of this he taught him to follow the philosophy of renunciation in action which is conceptually quite different from the philosophy of renunciation of action. It is for this reason I say that the *Bhagavadgītā* does not rest its dichotomy of bondage and freedom on the dichotomy of action and non-action or inaction. It rests its dichotomy of bondage and freedom on the dichotomy of desireful and desireless actions in the explained sense of the term. And to say this does not amount to saying that the *Bhagavadgītā* rests its dichotomy of bondage and freedom on the notion of action. Because the notion of action is conceptually different from the notions of desireful and desireless action. Desireful and desireless actions are two different sub-classes of a class of actions and the notion of sub-class of a class of actions is conceptually different from the notion of a class of actions. But to say this, however, does not mean that they are not logically connected. They are logically well connected in a significant way. Their relation is a relation of genus and species. And this is perfectly quite possible because relatedness is not opposed to distinctness. That is the reason why any two concepts which are conceptually distinct can also be related to each other in a significant way and yet what holds in one case may not hold in another case. Since desireful and desireless actions are two distinct sub-classes of a class of actions, to identify desireful action with either desireless action or action is to commit a self-contradictory mistake. Here one might say that the distinction which I have drawn

between action on the one hand, and between desireless and desireful action on the other, is not justified because I have already assumed, for action in order to be voluntary human action has to be either of these two kinds and these two kinds alone. If something is an action, then it has to be either one of these, just as if something is coloured, it has to be either blue or green or yellow or. . . . There is no doubt in it that if something is an action, then from this it does follow that it has to be either desireful action or desireless action, just as if something is coloured, it has to be either blue or green or yellow or. . . . But this does not prove the thesis that there is no significant distinction between action on the one hand, and between desireless and desireful action on the other. What it proves is this that they are logically well connected. Their relation is a relation of entailment. And to say this is not to say that there is no significant distinction between them. So to say that one concept entails another is not to say that they are not distinct from each other. It only means that they are logically well connected. If this view of mine is correct, which I think it is, then to say that the *Bhagavadgītā* rests its dichotomy of bondage and freedom on the dichotomy of desireful and desireless action is not to say that the *Bhagavadgītā* rests its dichotomy of bondage and freedom on the notion of action. But when I say this it does not mean that there is no significant conceptual connection between them. There is a conceptual connection between them because without action neither bondage nor freedom on the account of the *Bhagavadgītā* is possible. For the *Bhagavadgītā* doing of action is a necessary condition for the occurrences of bondage and freedom. But it is not a sufficient condition because it does not guarantee for the occurrences of bondage and freedom. Action for the *Bhagavadgītā* causes bondage only when we do it with desire for the fruit of action. But when we do it without any desire for the fruit of action, the *Bhagavadgītā* says, it does not cause bondage. If at all it were the cause, the *Bhagavadgītā* would not have propounded as it propounds the dogma of 1 and 2 because it goes against them. The dogma 1 of the *Bhagavadgītā* does not assert that doing of action by itself causes bondage. It only asserts that doing of action causes bondage when we do it with desire for the fruit of action. And to say this is not equivalent to saying that it asserts doing of action by itself causes bondage. What is true of the dogma 1 is also true of the dogma 2 because the dogma 2 also does not assert that doing of action by itself causes freedom. It only asserts that doing of action causes freedom when we do it in a detached manner, that is, without any desire for the fruit of action. And to say this is not to say that it asserts doing of action by itself causes freedom. It would cause freedom only if we do not maintain the distinction between action and desireless action and treat them as identical. But to do this would amount to committing a self-contradictory mistake. Not only this, if we do not maintain the distinction between action on the one hand and between desireless and desireful action on the other, then we will have to admit

that one and the same action can cause both bondage and freedom which the *Bhagavadgītā* does not advocate. But nonetheless it follows if we ignore the distinction between them and identify one concept with another. Above all, the notions of bondage and freedom of the *Bhagavadgītā* are two mutually incompatible notions. And being mutually incompatible notions, their distinction cannot logically rest on one and the same ground, that is, action. But to say this is not to say that they are not related to each other in a significant way. The notions of bondage and freedom no doubt are significantly connected with the notion of action. But to say this is in no way to say that their distinction logically rests on the notion of action. If we think so, we would be committing a logical mistake. But in spite of this, if it is said that doing of action on the account of the *Bhagavadgītā* does by itself cause bondage, then it causes bondage no matter in what manner we do it whether we do it with or without any desire for the fruit of action. Because the ground of bondage does not change in both the cases. It remains the same. So we cannot say to avoid the problem that doing of a desireless action cannot cause bondage. We will have to admit it. If we do not admit it, we are bound to commit a self-contradictory mistake. Because a desireless action is also done and what is done is said to cause bondage which the *Bhagavadgītā* does not advocate. The *Bhagavadgītā* nowhere advocated this view that mere doing of action causes bondage. What it advocates is this that doing of action causes bondage only when we do it with desire for the fruit of action and to say this is not to say that doing of action by itself causes bondage. In fact, the dogma 1 of the *Bhagavadgītā* does not rest the notion of bondage on the notion of action at all. It rests the notion of bondage on the notion of desireful action and the notion of desireful action is not only conceptually different from the notion of desireless action but also is conceptually different from the notion of action. But to say this is not to say that they themselves are not conceptually connected. They are conceptually connected and yet there is a significant distinction between them and what holds in one case does not hold in another case. We cannot say this that the *Bhagavadgītā's* notion of desire for the fruit of action is causally dependent upon the notion of action. Because the notion of desire for the fruit of action always comes logically prior to the notion of action and what comes logically prior to cannot be said to be grounded on that which comes logically after it. This is analytically true.

Whatever I have said so far against that one might say that all the arguments put forward do not hold good because the *Bhagavadgītā* does not close its discussion of action only these two alternatives which the dogmas 1 and 2 assert. It also suggests at the end of its discussion of action another alternative, that is, to give up the fruits of all actions to the Lord. But this line of argument to my mind does not go against the view put forward. Because the notion of giving up the fruits of all actions to the Lord does not fall out the domain of non-attachment action in terms of

which the notion of desireless action the *Bhagavadgītā* explicates. The notion of non-attachment action conceptually involves in its meaning the notion of renunciation of the fruit of action and to renounce the fruit of action means to give up the fruit of action. It does not matter whether we give up the fruits of action to the Lord or not. What matters in this regard is giving up the fruits of action. If this be the case, then we cannot say that the *Bhagavadgītā's* discussion of action does not close with these two alternatives alone which the dogmas 1 and 2 assert. So all the arguments put forward remains intact. They stand invalidated only when we interpret the *Bhagavadgītā's* notion of non-attachment action in terms of the renunciation of action, but not otherwise. But if we interpret the *Bhagavadgītā's* notion of non-attachment action in terms of the renunciation of action, it would amount to going against its fundamental thesis of the philosophy of action. So to avoid the problem it is better to admit that the dichotomy of bondage and freedom of the *Bhagavadgītā* logically rests on the dichotomy of desireful and desireless action and the dichotomy of desireful and desireless action rests on the dichotomy of presence and absence of an element of desire for the fruit of action and not on the action even though they are conceptually connected to each other.

But then the question arises, why does the *Bhagavadgītā* say a desireful, but not a desireless, action bind? Let us try to find out an answer to this question through the analysis of the *Bhagavadgītā's* notion of desire for the fruit of action itself. When we analyze the *Bhagavadgīta's* notion of desire for the fruit of action, we find that there are three elements involved in it. They are the act of desiring, the desired fruit of action and the relation of desiring and desired fruit of action. There is no doubt in it that all these three elements are conceptually distinct from one another. The act of desiring is conceptually different from the desired fruit of action and the desired fruit of action is conceptually different from the relation of desiring and desired fruit of action. Since the act of desiring is conceptually different from the desired fruit of action and the desired fruit of action is conceptually different from the relation of desiring and desired fruit of action, therefore to identify any one of the elements with either of them is to commit a mistake. But to say this, however, does not mean that there is no conceptual connection between them. They are conceptually well connected. But their connectedness is not opposed to their distinctness, because any two concepts which are conceptually different can also be related to each other. This is perfectly quite possible. Let us consider the first alternative. If the *Bhagavadgītā* says that it is the act of desiring involved in the notion of desire for the fruit of action which causes bondage, then it causes bondage no matter what the fruit of action we desire whether we desire our own interest or the interest of others. This the *Bhagavadgītā* cannot say that the act of desiring causes bondage only when we desire our own interest but does not cause bondage when we desire the interest of others. Because in both

the cases we perform the act of desiring and the act of desiring is said to cause bondage. So if the act of desiring constitutes a good reason for the *Bhagavadgītā* to say that it causes bondage when we desire our own interest, then it also constitutes a good reason at the same time for the *Bhagavadgītā* to admit that it causes bondage when we desire the interest of others. If there is some grain of truth in what I have said, then from this it is also quite clear that the *Bhagavadgītā* cannot say in the same breath that the act of desiring causes bondage only when we desire for the fruit of action but does not cause bondage when we desire for action for the sake of action. Because the ground of bondage in both the cases remains the same. If the act of desiring causes bondage, then it causes bondage no matter in what manner we desire whether we desire for the fruit of action or we desire action for the sake of action. It holds good in both the ways. This the *Bhagavadgītā* cannot say that the act of desiring causes bondage only when our action originates from our desire for the fruit of action, but does not cause bondage when our action originates from a sense of duty. Because doing of the action from a sense of duty is also a kind of motive and it does not fall out the domain of desire and desire is said to be the cause of bondage. But this line of argument goes against the *Bhagavadgītā's* view because the *Bhagavadgītā* says that when we perform actions for the sake of *yajña*,[3] *mokṣa*[4] and *loksaṅgrah*,[5] our actions do not bind us. Instead of binding they liberate us from all sorts of sufferings which the *Bhagavadgītā* cannot say without discarding this thesis that it is the act of desiring which causes bondage. Because if the act of desiring causes bondage, then it causes bondage no matter what we desire whether use desire *yajña* or *mokṣa* or *loksaṅgrah* or anything else. The objects of our desire become totally irrelevant in this matter.

Let us consider the second alternative. If the *Bhagavadgītā* says that the binding force of action does not spring from our act of desiring but springs from our desired fruit of action, then the question arises, why is it so? Why does it spring from some, but not all, types of the desired fruits of actions. This question the *Bhagavadgītā* cannot answer by referring to the actual fruit of action because the notion of the actual fruit of action is conceptually different from the desired fruit of action. The desired fruit of action is an intended fruit of action which the doer of action always conceives before doing the action and thinks that the action would be bringing about if it is done. And the intended fruit of action may or may not coincide with the actual fruit of that action. But when the coincidence between the two exists, it exists not because of the matter of logic or causality, but because of the matter of fact. Moreover, the desired fruit of action is the characteristic feature of the mind. It exists only in the mind of the desirer. It is not the characteristic feature of the act. While the actual fruit of action is the characteristic feature of the act because it is the causal nature of the act which brings it into effect. And the relation which exists between the desired and the actual fruit of action is neither

a relation of causality nor a relation of logic. It is purely a contingent relation. Since the desired fruit of action always depends upon our act of desiring and the act of desiring is a characteristic feature of our mind, so it is perfectly possible for us to control the desired fruit of action by controlling our mind through the practice of *yoga* which is not possible in the case of the actual fruit of action. We cannot control the actual fruit of action by controlling our action because our action may produce several kinds of effects which may or may not coincide with that what we desire to produce through our action. What at the best we can control is our action which we may or may not do. But once we have done the action, we have no control over the result of that action. But whenever we control the result of action by controlling our action, we control its intended but not the actual result of action; and what we intend to achieve, that we may or may not get it. This is not only logically but also practically quite possible. So when I say that the intended or the desired fruit of action is conceptually different from its actual fruit, I do not mean to say that what is intended cannot be the actual fruit of action. What is intended can also be the actual fruit of action. But the relation which exists between them is neither a relation of causality nor a relation of logic. It is a purely empirical relation which may or may not coincide. Since the very fact that there always remains a logical gap between the desired and the actual fruit of action, we cannot validly answer this question, why does the binding force of action spring from some, but not all, types of the desired fruits of actions? On the basis of the actual fruits of actions. If someone argues on this ground that the desired fruit of action causes bondage because of being an object of desire, then it causes bondage no matter what the object we desire whether we desire our own interest or the interest of others which the *Bhagavadgītā* to my mind does not advocate. It rather advocates the view that the objects of our desire do cause bondage when they are the objects of our own interest. But when the objects of our desire are not the objects of our own interest and are the objects of the interest of others, they do not cause bondage. They cause freedom and freedom is opposed to bondage. But here one might ask this question, why does the *Bhagavadgītā* say that the objects of our desire do cause bondage when they are the objects of our own interest? Unfortunately, the *Bhagavadgīta* does not have any answer to this question. The *Bhagavadgītā* cannot say even if it wishes to say that the desire for self-interest by itself causes bondage. If the *Bhagavadgītā* says that the desire for self-interest by itself causes bondage, then it causes bondage the moment when we desire for it even before performing of our action. And if this be the case, then the notion of bondage is purely a matter of attitude which the *Bhagavadgītā* cannot say because it goes against its dictum of the dogma 1. The dogma 1 of the *Bhagavadgītā* asserts that the desired fruit of action causes bondage only when the action is done with desire for it. And to say this is not to say on the account of the *Bhagavadgītā*

that the desired fruit of action by itself causes bondage even without performing of the action. If the *Bhagavadgītā* says to avoid the problem is the actual but not the desired fruit of action which causes bondage when the action is done, then it causes bondage not because of the fact of our desiring or the desired fruit of action but because of the fact of our doing of the action. If this is so, then desireless actions also cause bondage because they are done and what is done is said to cause bondage. But this the *Bhagavadgītā* cannot admit because it goes against its dogma of bondage and freedom. The dogma of bondage asserts that our action causes bondage only when we do it with desire for the fruit of action and doing of action with desire for the fruit of action is conceptually different from that of mere doing of the action. The dogma of freedom asserts that our action causes freedom only when we do it without any desire for the fruit of action. And to say this is not equivalent to saying that it is the actual fruit of action which causes freedom. If at all it is true that the actual fruit of action causes bondage, then it causes bondage no matter in what manner we do it whether we do it with or without any desire for the fruit of action. It causes bondage in both the ways which the *Bhagavadgītā* does not advocate. This also cannot be said that it is the actual fruit of action which on the account of the *Bhagavadgītā* causes our desired fruit of action. Because the desired fruit of action always comes logically prior to the actual fruit of action and what comes logically prior to it cannot be said to be grounded on that what comes logically after it. Moreover, the relation which exists between them is not a relation of causality. In fact, when we desire for the fruit of action, we do not desire the actual fruit of action. Even if we wish, we cannot do it before its origination. What we desire when we desire is the intended fruit of action which we conceive before doing of the action and think that our action would be bringing about if we do it; and the intended fruit of action is conceptually different from the actual fruit of action.

All the arguments put forward may be refuted by saying that the *Bhagavadgītā* never advocates this view that it is the act of desiring which causes bondage, nor does it advocate this view that it is the desired fruit of action which causes bondage. What the *Bhagavadgītā* advocates is this that it is the desire for the fruit of action which causes bondage. And to say this is not to say that it is the act of desiring which causes bondage; nor does it mean to say that it is the desired fruit of action which causes bondage. The notion of desire for the fruit of action conceptually involves in its meaning a relation of desiring and desired fruit of action; and the relation of desiring and desired fruit of action is conceptually different not only from that of the relation of means and end, but also from that of the relation of cause and effect. The relation of desiring and desired fruit of action is conceptually different from the relation of means and end in this sense that because when we desire for the fruit of action, we do not use our desire as a means to achieve the desired fruit

of action. But to say this, however, does not mean that our desire for the fruit of action cannot move us towards the realization of the desired fruit of action. Our desire for the fruit of action no doubt does move us towards the realization of the desired fruit of action. But whenever we desire for the fruit of action, we do not use our desire as a means to realize the desired fruit of action. The relation of desiring and desired fruit of action is also conceptually different from that of the relation of cause and effect in this sense that because when we desire for the fruit of action, we do not use our desire as a cause to produce the desired fruit of action. If at all our desire causes something, it causes the actual fruit of action and the actual fruit of action is conceptually different from that of our desired fruit of action. Since the notion of desiring is conceptually different from that of the notion of the desired action, we cannot argue on the basis of the desired action that when we use it as a means to achieve the desired end, we use our desire as a means to achieve the desired end. There is no doubt in it that the relation which exists between action and the desired fruit of action is a relation of means and end when we use the action to achieve it. But the relation which exists between action and the actual fruit of action is not a relation of means and end. It is a relation of cause and effect and the relation of cause and effect is conceptually different from that of the relation of means and end. Above all, the notions of means and end are conceptually connected with the notion of an agency because it is the agent's intention which gives the status of something as a means when we use it to bring about the desired end and the desired end is that which the agent intends to achieve. While the notions of cause and effect are not conceptually connected with the notions of any agency who could be said to be giving the status of something as a cause when we use it to produce something. When something becomes a cause, it becomes a cause on the account of its own causal efficacy and not on the account of our using it. But to say all this, however, does not mean that a cause cannot be a means; nor does it mean to say that an effect of something cannot be desired as an end. A cause can be used as a means to achieve the desired end and effect of an action can be sought as an end. All this is perfectly possible because the notions of means and end do not conflict with the notions of cause and effect. They are all mutually quite compatible. But so far as the view of the *Bhagavadgītā* on this matter is concerned, we find that the *Bhagavadgītā* does not maintain any sharp distinction between them. But nonetheless the fact remains that we cannot say that the relation of desiring and desired is identical with the relation of means and end; nor can we say that it is identical with the relation of cause and effect.

Let us consider the third alternative. If the *Bhagavadgītā* says that it is the relation of desiring and desired fruit of action which causes bondage, then it causes bondage no matter what the fruit of action we desire whether we desire our own interest or the interest of others. Not only this,

if it is true that it is the relation of desiring and desired fruit of action which causes bondage, then it causes bondage whether we do action with desire for the fruit of action or we do it with desire for doing the action for the sake of action. Because the notion of desire for doing the action for the sake of action also conceptually involves in its meaning the relation of desiring and desired; and the relation of desiring and desired is said to cause bondage. Even if the *Bhagavadgītā* wishes to argue, it cannot argue on this ground that the notion of desire for doing the action for the sake of action does not involve in its meaning the relation of desiring and desired because in it the desired object is not the fruit of action. Because the relation of desiring and desired does not logically depend upon the nature of the desired object. It depends upon the nature of the mind of the desirer. So the relation of desiring and desired does not change no matter what the object we desire whether we desire action or the fruit of action of some specific kind. It remains the same in both the cases. But this line of argument surely the *Bhagavadgītā* cannot accept without discarding the dogma 2 because the dogma 2 asserts that an action does not cause bondage when it is done with desire for doing the action for the sake of action. We cannot reconcile both these theses by saying that the *Bhagavadgītā's* assertion of the dogma 2 does not conceptually involve in its meaning an element of desire. Because the notion of desireless action (*niṣkāma karma*) of the *Bhagavadgītā* does not exclude from its meaning, to my mind, the desire for doing the action for the sake of action. What it excludes from its meaning is the desire for doing the action for the sake of the fruit of action. And to say this is not tantamount to saying that it excludes from its meaning the desire for doing the action for the sake of action. In fact, instead of excluding it the doctrine of *niṣkāma karma* of the *Bhagavadgītā* advocates it. Moreover, the relation of desiring and desired fruit of action is a purely mental relation which exists only the mind of the desirer and not outside of his mind. If it is true that it is the relation of desiring and desired fruit of action of some specific kind which causes bondage when we do the action from that point of view, then by controlling our desire for the fruit of action we should be able to control our bondage which arises out of it. And this is possible only when we assume that the fruit of action is inseparably connected without desire and action, otherwise not. But if we assume that the fruit of action is inseparably connected with our desire and action, then to say that one should perform action would amount to saying, by way of implication, that one should entertain the hope for the fruit of action. And this is equivalent to saying that one should perform action with desire for the fruit of action which the *Bhagavadgītā* does not prescribe. Not only this, if the fruit of action is inseparably connected with action, then no matter whether we desire for it or not, it is bound to occur once the action is done. But if we say that the fruit of action is not inseparately connected with our desire and action, then no action can give guarantee

for its fruit no matter what it is and in what manner we do it whether we do it with or without any desire for the fruit of action. If this be the case; then no one can be said to be obligated by the consequences of his action. But if we are not obligated by the consequences of our action, then the *Bhagavadgītā* cannot say that action when it is done with desire for the fruit of action necessarily binds the doer of action to reap the consequences of his action. This the *Bhagavadgītā* cannot say that only in the case of the desired fruit of action the consequences of action necessarily follows from the action because it goes against its dictum of the dogma 2. The dogma 2 of the *Bhagavadgītā* asserts that anyone who performs action without any desire for the fruit of action is necessarily bound to attain freedom from the bondage of *action* which the *Bhagavadgītā* cannot say with consistency without assuming it that the consequence of action is inseparably connected with action and every action has its fitting result. The *Bhagavadgītā* cannot argue on this ground even if it wishes to argue that doing of desireless action does not cause bondage because in it the absence of an element of desire for the fruit of action makes the causal power of action totally ineffective. If the *Bhagavadgītā* argues, then the *Bhagavadgītā* cannot say as it claims that the doing of desireless action causes freedom because even for causing freedom a desireless action must have a causal power. But if the *Bhagavadgītā* says that a desireless action does have a causal power to cause freedom, then it cannot say that the absence of an element of desire for the fruit of action makes the causal power of action totally ineffective. What at the best the *Bhagavadgītā* can say is this that the absence of an element of desire for the fruit of action makes the binding causal power of action totally ineffective. And to say this is not to say that the absence of an element of desire for the fruit of action makes the causal power of action totally ineffective. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the *Bhagavadgītā's* notion of freedom consists only in the absence of bondage and the absence of bondage causally follows from the ineffectiveness of action, it does not validate the thesis that the *Bhagavadgītā's* notion of freedom is not causally connected with the notion of a desireless action.

In the view of the above discussions, thus, we can say that the *Bhagavadgītā* does not maintain nor can it maintain both the dogmas 1 and 2 consistently which it prescribes within its own conceptual framework of philosophy.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The *Bhagavadgītā*, Chap. V, 12.
2. Ibid., Chap. III, 19, Chap. V, 12.
3. Ibid., Chap. III, 9, Chap. IV, 23.
4. Ibid., Chap. XVIII, 66.
5. Ibid., Chap. III, 20.

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Clouds and Clocks and Red Herrings*

Sir Karl Popper, claimed by many as this century's greatest and most versatile philosopher, a 'thinker', according to Bernard Levin, 'whose influence it is impossible to overestimate', died towards the end of 1994. It seems fitting now to re-evaluate his philosophy. I have chosen to do my little bit towards this end by a critical analysis of an essay called 'Of Clouds and Clocks', which, I believe, is fairly representative of one strand of his general philosophical position. It is the longest essay in a collection entitled *Objective Knowledge* which he published in 1972.[1]

Clouds represent 'physical systems' which are 'highly irregular, disorderly, and more or less unpredictable'. Clocks represent regular, orderly and predictable physical systems. If we put clouds on the left and clocks on the right, many other systems will occupy different places in the space between; animals will go to the left and plants to the right; a Rolls Royce will go very much to the right, a Maruti will go on the left. The solar system will go very far right. (pp. 207–08)

Popper suggests a cluster of gnats as an example of a cloudy system. Individual gnats move 'in an astonishingly irregular way', almost impossible to follow or predict, but each keeps returning towards the centre of the cluster. Similarly, the molecules in a gas cloud keep together by gravitational forces.

At the extreme right is the Newtonian system. It was thought to have established that everything that happens in the physical universe is determined to the last detail by strict laws. Nothing, absolutely nothing, is undetermined. According to physical determinism, 'all clouds are clocks', and if they don't seem to be so, it is only due to our ignorance 'about the *detailed* interaction' of the parts that form the whole. The immense success of the Newtonian theory, says Popper, 'turned the physicists' heads' and 'anybody who did not embrace this new faith was held to be an obscurantist'. (pp. 210–12)

The dissenting view was declared by people like Charles Peirce. Though he believed, writes Popper, 'that the world was a clock that worked according to Newtonian laws, he rejected the belief that this clock, or any other, was *perfect*, down to the smallest detail', and he held that 'we could not possibly claim to know, from experience, anything . . . even faintly approaching that perfection which physical determinists assumed', that 'we were free to conjecture that there was a certain looseness or imperfection in all clocks', that this 'allowed an *element of chance* to enter' and that 'the world was not only ruled by *strict Newtonian laws*, but that it was also . . . ruled by *laws of chance*, or randomness, or disorder'. The world is 'an interlocking system of clouds and clocks' where

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every object 'would, *in its molecular structure*, show some degree of cloudiness'. In short, '*all* clocks are clouds'. 'With the downfall of classical physics', writes Popper, 'physicists were prepared to abandon physical determinism', and indeterminism 'became the ruling fashion'. (pp. 212–14)

'I am an indeterminist', Popper proudly announces, putting himself in the company of 'Peirce, Compton, and most other contemporary physicists' (p. 215).

Let us see whether we understand all this about clouds and clocks. Red herrings will come by and by. By cloudiness Popper seems to want to mean pure chance or uncaused occurrences, but his examples do not bear this out. The movements of gnats may be, in some sense, random or disorderly, but are they uncaused or purposeless? I do not know the psychology of gnats, but to say they are is to beg the question. Whether, in microphysics, the quantum jump is really uncaused or whether we simply cannot know its cause is still, I believe, a debatable question of interpretation. Max Planck, Schrodinger and Einstein 'hesitated to abandon determinism', says Popper, but adds that they 'were considered old fogies' and were 'mistaken' (pp. 214–15). I am, of course, not competent to opine on this matter, but if chance means a quantum jump, then to say 'all clocks are clouds' is false, because clocks, motor cars or the solar system do not make quantum jumps in their functioning.

The references to Peirce seem to suggest that for Peirce, and for Popper himself, cloudiness simply means inaccuracy or some kind of imperfection. Even machines which are far more accurate than pendulum clocks can never be, let us grant, a hundred per cent accurate and, since no law, however well propounded to cover deviations, could possibly allow for all of them there would always be room for 'chance'. But 'chance', in this sense, does not establish indeterminism, for it simply means deviation from the desired norm and the norm is set by us. It is we who decide, for example, what a perfect motor car should be like (I do not know if we can even do that). A clock that loses one minute in a day is more chancy than one which loses ten seconds. 'We know', says Popper, 'that even the most reliable clocks are not really perfect', but adds—significantly—'this is largely due to factors such as friction' or 'chance effects' (p. 229). This is precisely what the determinist maintains, namely, that when things are said to be imperfect or appear to function in a disorderly manner, this is really due to certain factors or causes which, even if practically never possible to identify or observe, must be there. In other words, everything that happens—at least everything in the macro-universe—has a cause why it happens the way it does and not otherwise. He would say that Popper's 'chance effects' is a contradiction in terms.

The Law of Universal Causation declares what Popper calls philosophical determinism. It says, 'Every event has a cause'. He dismisses

it summarily by saying that 'the terms 'event' and 'cause' are vague enough to make the doctrine . . . compatible with physical indeterminism', for 'no measurement can be infinitely precise' (p. 220). But a lack of precision in our observations (or, for that matter, a lack of knowledge of details) is not denied by determinism. Popper sums up his position (so far) in the following words:

> While physical determinism demands complete and infinitely precise physical predetermination and the absence of *any* exception whatever, physical indeterminism asserts no more than that there are *at least some* exceptions, here and there, to precise predetermination (p. 220).

Which really comes to saying that *some* clocks are clouds, not all. Earlier he had interpreted physical indeterminism to mean that *all* clocks are clouds. (It may be noted that he has surreptitiously pushed in a 'pre' as a prefix to 'determinism'. This would require further analysis, but let it pass. Besides, 'here and there' is no less vague than 'event' and 'cause', if, that is, they are so.)

It must be emphasized that Popper speaks throughout of *physical* determinism. He makes a further two-pronged attack on it.

(1) 'A deterministic physical clockwork mechanism is', he writes, 'completely self-contained', with 'no room for outside intervention', where everything that happens is 'physically predetermined, including all our movements', where our thoughts, feelings, and efforts can have no practical influence upon what happens in the physical world' and are 'mere illusions' or 'epiphenomena' of physical events (p. 217). In his book, *The Freedom of Man*, A.H. Compton, a famous quantum physicist, asked, if 'the atoms of our bodies follow physical laws as immutable as the motions of the planets', is 'man a free agent?' Compton posed a dilemma: either 'the feeling of freedom is illusory' or 'the laws of physics were. . . unreliable'. According to Popper, quantum theory rescued Compton from what Popper calls the 'nightmare of the physical determinist'. This theory not only solved problems in physics for Compton, but also, says Popper, philosophical ones, especially those 'connected with ethics'. (pp. 217–18)

(2) The second prong of Popper's attack on physical determinism is that it does not explain what he calls 'third-world' entities and 'third-world' activity. The 'third world' or what he also calls 'the universe of abstract meanings' comprises

> such diverse things as promises, aims, and various kinds of rules, such as rules of grammar, . . . or of logic, or of chess; . . . such things as scientific publications, . . . artistic appreciation; and so on, almost *ad infinitum* (p. 231).

Theories and arguments also belong to the 'third world'.

Physical determinism, says Popper, destroys 'the idea of creativity'. It

asserts 'that the whole world . . . is a huge automaton, and that we are nothing but little cog-wheels . . . within it'. 'It reduces to a complete illusion the idea' that the preparation, say, of this essay of his had anything more in it than that certain parts of his body put black marks on paper. If physical determinism is right, says Popper, any physicist could, by studying the bodies of Mozart or Beethoven, not only write works such as they had written but even those they would have written 'had certain external circumstances of their lives been different: if they had eaten lamb, say, instead of chicken, or drunk tea instead of coffee'. (pp. 222–23) 'I believe that all this is absurd', says Popper, because

> Physical determinism is a theory which, if it is true, is not arguable, since it must explain all reactions, including what appear to us as beliefs based on arguments, as due to *purely physical conditions*. . . . But this means that if we believe that we have accepted a theory like determinism because we were swayed by the logical force of certain arguments, then we are deceiving ourselves (p. 224).

This cogent argument against a physical determinism like behaviourism is directed by Popper against those biologists, physicists and philosophers who hold that 'man is a computer'. 'I do not believe that we are mere computing machines', he writes, 'I am a *physical indeterminist*. . . .We have to be indeterminists; yet . . .' This brings him to what he calls 'the very heart' of his problem which is that if 'Peirce's or Heisenberg's or some other form of indeterminism is true, then sheer *chance* plays a major role in our physical world'. Having so far extolled the virtues of cloudiness and indeterminism, with their consequent emphasis on chance, and the quantum jump which rescued Compton from his mental discomfort, Popper suddenly asks (all in italics) '*But is chance really more satisfactory than determinism?*' (p. 226). He writes,

> To say that the black marks made on white paper which I produced in preparation for this lecture were just the result of *chance* is hardly more satisfactory than to say that they were physically determined. . . . Hardly anybody will believe that what I am reading to you is . . . just a random sample of English words, or perhaps letters, put together without any purpose, deliberation, plan, or intention (p. 227).

He points out that for thinkers like Hume and Schlick 'the only alternative to determinism is just sheer chance', that this 'holds good for quantum-theoretical models which have been designed to explain, or at least illustrate, the possibility of human freedom', and concludes that 'these models are so very unsatisfactory'. He even quotes Schlick himself as saying that 'a higher degree of randomness' means 'a higher degree of irresponsibility', and that 'freedom of action' and 'responsibility' must 'stop where chance begins'. (pp. 226–27)

In other words, the several pages that were spent on expounding and commending physical indeterminism, cloudiness, quantum jumps and chance were all beside the point and unnecessary. 'Physical indeterminism, I believe, is a necessary prerequisite for any solution of our problem' says Popper on p. 226, but adds that 'indeterminism is not enough'. But by p. 227 it turns out that it is irrelevant, if his problem is the problem of human freedom (as it is), and so unnecessary.

After his disenchantment with physical indeterminism, Popper turns to another sphere of discourse. He begins to talk of 'purpose, deliberation, plan'. These are not physical entities. He considers Compton's use of 'quantum indeterminacy, and the unpredictability of a quantum jump, as a model of human decision'. 'But in my opinion', he says, 'the model has no similarity to any *rational decision*'[2] and 'I do not think that we shall get much further with quantum jumps'. (p. 227, n. 8)

At this point Popper should have realized that the problem of human freedom or freedom of choice or freedom of the will arises, not in connection with *physical* determinism (about which he has been exclusively talking), but with *psychological* determinism: if the Law of Causation operates in the psychological sphere, then are our purposes, deliberations, plans and decisions not the effects of what we are (our nature or character) and the circumstances that obtain at the time? Our circumstances are not made by us, nor is our nature, or, if it is to some extent so made, this itself is the result of previous decisions. If that is so, how can we ever decide otherwise than the way we do decide? How can we ever decide on the merits of the case? Because what appears to us to be meritorious or otherwise will depend on our nature and the circumstances. A further problem is: assuming that somehow we can make decisions freely, how can our decisions cut into the closed system of the physical universe and alter its course?

Instead of attacking the first of these two immensely difficult and important problems, Popper says, 'What we need for understanding rational human behaviour is something *intermediate* between perfect chance and perfect determinism', something 'between perfect clouds and perfect clocks' (p. 228). (In passing we may note that, as we have already seen, there is really no exact correspondence between determinism and indeterminism on the one hand and clocks and clouds on the other; cloudiness is not chanciness but only irregularity, disorder and unpredictability. Further, Popper has himself said there is a whole range of items that fall between clouds and clocks. However, none of them could possibly solve the problem of freedom that we are facing now.)

Hume and Schlick deny, according to Popper, that there is anything between chance and determinism. He condemns this view as 'highly dogmatic' and 'clearly absurd'.

However, instead of looking for this intermediate something, Popper raises the second of those two problems I just mentioned. He calls it 'our

main question', though, of course, our main question, at least the question we had started with, was the problem of human freedom in the face of (physical) determinism. Anyway, he now wants 'to understand how such non-physical things as *purposes, deliberations, plans, decisions, theories, intentions,* and *values,* can play a part in bringing about physical changes in the physical world' (p. 229).

It should be noted that Popper here and elsewhere lumps together two different kinds of entities. There is (in his own words) 'the world of mental states'. of 'subjective or personal experiences', and he calls this the 'second world'. The 'first world' is the world of physical things. The 'third world' is the 'objective world' which includes 'the logical content' of theories, conjectures, propositions, statements and other linguistic entities (pp. 74, 157). When, in raising what he calls his 'main question', he talks of purposes, deliberations etc., it is not clear whether he means the logical content of these items or he means the psychological acts of entertaining purposes, deliberating, etc. That is, is he talking of 'third world' entities or 'second world' entities, respectively?

Assuming that we can decide, deliberate or plan freely, how can these 'second world' occurrences cut into the closed world ('first world') of physical causes and effects? When it seemed that he was going to tackle this problem, he steers away from it and proceeds to deal with the 'third world' items, which are not occurrences. This is clear from the following:

> There are such things as . . . publicly declared aims and purposes; general moral rules. Each of these . . . has a certain content, or meaning, which remains invariant if we translate it, or reformulate it. Thus *this content or meaning is something quite abstract.* Yet it can control . . . the physical movements of a man. . . . How can that be? (p. 230)

Popper calls this Compton's problem.

There is some confusion here. The 'control' which the 'universe of abstract meanings' has on our behaviour is a different kind of control from the control which, according to determinism, our nature and our circumstances are supposed to have on our behaviour. Abstract meanings, the logical content of theories, rules, decisions, plans or deliberations control us only in the sense that, understanding them grasping them and assessing them, we decide to act in a certain way or not to act. In an earlier essay in the same book, Popper himself makes this point:

> It is one of the main functions of the second world to grasp the objects of the third world. This is something we all do: it is an essential part of being human . . . to learn to grasp *objective thought contents* (p. 156).

and suggests that we should look at the human mind 'as an organ for interacting with the objects of the third world' (p. 156). However,

whether we can do all this freely or not is a problem that still haunts us. But as soon as Popper comes to speak of 'control' he mixes up two different lines of thought. He says that an '*acceptable* solution' of Compton's problem 'must explain how freedom is not just chance, but, rather, the result of a subtle interplay between *something almost random or haphazard,* and something *like a restrictive or selective control*—such as an aim or a standard—though certainly not a cast-iron control' but one which allows the 'freedom to choose' between one course of action and another. Such a control he calls a 'plastic control' (p. 232). But the control that the logical content of a theory or plan or decision exerts on us is quite a different kind of control from the control exerted on us, according to determinism, by our nature and our circumstances.[3]

At this point Popper begins to tackle what he calls Descartes's problem—the mind-body problem: 'how can it be that such things as states of mind—volitions, feelings, expectations—influence or control the physical movements of our limbs?' and that 'the physical states of the organism may influence its mental states?' (p. 231)

Just as he had considered the question of determinism and chance within the physical system, he now considers these with respect to the physical-mental system. He says that 'existing deterministic theories are unsatisfactory' and refers to them as 'master-switch models of control'. He describes this model at length, but in essence these theories hold 'that our body is a kind of machine which can be regulated by a . . . switch from one or more *central control points.* . . . Our minds work upon our bodies by . . . selecting some quantum jumps', which 'operate a cascade of . . . master switches and ultimately effect muscular contractions'. While Descartes located the point of connection between body and mind in the pineal gland, the master-switch theories locate it in a quantum jump. (pp. 232–33) Popper rejects the solution of both Descartes and the master-switch theorists by calling them 'tiny baby theories': just as the mother of her illegitimate child pleaded, 'But it is such a very tiny baby;', so, says Popper, Descartes would have said, 'The pineal gland is such a tiny gland', and the master-switch theorists would say, 'It is such a tiny jump'. 'But I still do not love the baby', writes Popper. The master-switch model, he goes on, 'strongly suggests that all decisions are . . . snap decisions', 'almost like reflexes', whereas our decisions, at least those which conform to the postulate of freedom, are not like reflexes or the results of quantum jumps; they are 'reached almost imperceptibly through lengthy deliberation', a 'kind of *maturing* process which is not well represented by the master-switch model'. (pp. 233–34)

After this diversion, we are back at our old twin problems: are our decisions or deliberations free and, if so, how? and how do they influence behaviour? Instead, however, of applying himself to these two problems, Popper proceeds to describe how deliberation *works.* It works, he says, by 'the method of trial and of error-elimination'. This requires a special

kind of 'mechanism', which, in turn, requires him to put forward a new evolutionary theory. And this leads him, at once, to the evolution of language. (pp. 234–35)

The sum and substance of the next four pages (pp. 235–38) is as follows.

Animal and human language have this in common that (1) they express 'the state of the organism which makes the linguistic signs' ('the expressive function') [this is debatable] and (2) there must be a 'sign-making organism' (the 'sender') and also a receiving one (the 'receiver') (the 'signalling function'). These two functions 'always occur together'.

Human language, which is 'very much richer', includes these two lower functions, but has, in addition, (3) the 'descriptive function' and (4) the 'argumentative function'. We see this last 'at work, in its highest form of development, in a well-disciplined *critical discussion*'. 'It is perhaps the most powerful tool for biological adaptation'. Along with these two higher functions, two 'regulative ideas'. or 'ideal standards of control' have evolved; they are '*truth*' and '*validity*', respectively. Many behaviourists and philosophers, Popper reminds us, have overlooked these higher functions.

So much for the evolution of language. It is all very interesting though hardly very new, but where, at the end of it, are we? We are about to see the relation between the theory of language and the new theory of evolution. But, first, Popper explains the relation between the lower and higher functions of language. He writes,

> Take, for example, a discussion at a scientific conference. It may be exciting and enjoyable, and give rise to expressions and symptoms of its being so; and these expressions in their turn may release similar symptoms in other participants. Yet . . . upto a point these symptoms and releasing signals will be due to, and controlled by, the scientific *content* of the discussion; and since this will be *of a descriptive and of an argumantative nature*, the lower functions will be controlled by the higher ones. . . . Our discussion is controlled, though plastically, by the regulative ideas of truth and of validity. (p. 239)

Thus, while earlier a 'plastic control' was defined as the freedom to choose between one course of action and another by a selective control according to a standard, it has now become the control of the higher language functions over the lower ones—'a control with a feedback' (p. 239).

Popper has a disarming way of suggesting or even claiming that he has, for the first time, discovered something which, actually, we have known for a long time. The method of problem-solving described by him is the method of hypothesis that has been part of the staple diet of logic students. He also believes that while 'the higher levels of language have evolved under pressure of a need for the *better control* of . . . our adaptation

to our environment' (p. 240), once he has hit upon the concept of plastic control, there is no stopping him. He believes that plastic control is in evidence not only throughout animate nature but also in inanimate nature.

He states his new general theory of evolution in twelve propositions (pp. 242–44), of which I pick up the most important. 'All organisms are constantly . . . engaged in *problem-solving*'; 'problem-solving always proceeds by the method of trial and error: new reactions, new forms, new organs, new modes of behaviour, new hypotheses, are tentatively put forward and controlled by error-elimination'. By now he is riding his favourite hobby-horse. 'The fundamental evolutionary sequence of events' is summarized in the formula

$$'P_1 - TS - EE - P_2'$$

which means that a certain problem (P_1) leads to a tentative solution (TS), which leads to error-elimination (EE) and raises a further problem (P_2); and so it goes on from problem to problem. (This formula appears at least ten times at different places in this very book.) Evolution, says Popper, is 'a growing heirarchical system of plastic controls' (p. 242), and even 'each organism can be regarded as a heirarchical system of *plastic controls*', a 'system of clouds controlled by clouds' (p. 245). By now the atmosphere has become extremely cloudy, but one thing stands out—the concept of plastic control. It controls everything. It is visible even in inanimate nature. A 'soap-bubble consists of two subsystems which . . . control each other': the soapy film and the air control each other', and this control 'is mutual; it is plastic, and of a feed-back character'. The planetary system, too, he says, is a cloud (p. 249), and I believe he would agree that a planet's orbit is one also, because the gravitational pull and the centrifugal force control each other.

One might ask, is there anything where there is no plastic control? The whole of evolution is a process of plastic controls because it is a process of problems-solving (for example, the evolution of the eye solves the problem of giving a moving animal a timely warning' (p. 246)), language exhibits plastic control, and the scientific method, which involves, principally, the argumentative function, is a matter of plastic control. 'From the amoeba to Einstein is just one jump' (though not a quantum jump). Why just the amoeba? we might ask; why not the Big Bang itself?

'I admit that there is a difference', reflects Popper, for even though the amoeba's and Einstein's methods of solving their respective problems 'are fundamentally not very different'—both involve the use of 'almost random and cloud-like trial and error movements'—yet, he goes on, 'Einstein, unlike the amoeba, consciously tried his best, whenever a new solution occurred to him, to fault it and detect an error in it: he approached his own solutions *critically*', and hence he could 'reject, quickly, hundreds of hypotheses' before examining one or two 'more carefully'.

(p. 247) The amoeba, on the other hand, does not have the 'critical attitude'; it simply makes a fresh attempt when an earlier one fails. The soap bubble, too, I suppose lacks a critical attitude. And so it often happens, according to Popper, that 'natural selection', unlike Einstein's procedure of trying out hypotheses, sometimes eliminates the organism itself (pp. 247–48). This quick 'disposal of unwanted, unfruitful hypotheses', says he, 'is the highest form . . . of the rational attitude, or of rationality' itself.

Popper seems not to realize that this difference between the amoeba and Einstein is crucial; here, if anywhere, is a quantum jump or, at least, a jump that remains unexplained. Certainly Popper's new evolutionary theory does not explain it. There is a great gulf between 'mutations' which he himself interprets as 'more or less accidental trial-and-error gambits' (p. 242) and the conscious use of the method of hypothesis. By lumping them together things are made more cloudy than they need be. The so-called new theory is just hot air and throws no light on the problems at hand. Popper could have omitted it and saved over seven pages, and got on to describing the method of hypothesis—his loyal warhorse, 'P_1–TS–EE–P_2'—without the new theory. Indeed, he himself writes,

> I offer my general theory with many apologies. It has taken me a long time to think it out fully. . . . Nevertheless, I still feel far from satisfied with it. . . It is an *evolutionary* theory, and one which adds only a little, I fear, to existing evolutionary theories, except perhaps a new emphasis (p. 241).

However, he still goes on to say that his evolutionary theory 'yields an immediate solution' to Descartes's mind-body problem (p. 250). Unlike the blind trial-and-error processes in non-human nature, we humans 'deliberate'; our 'conscious states . . . anticipate our behaviour, working out, by trial and error, its likely consequences; thus they not only control but they try out, *deliberate*'. Consciousness, according to Popper, 'appears as just one of many interacting kinds of control', and not the highest, for there are others like books, theories and suchlike which constitute the 'universe of meanings'. (p. 251) But, surely, these can do so only through our consciousness; it is consciousness that grasps these meanings and acts accordingly. However, to Compton's problem—'the controlling power of meanings'—Popper answers, 'Their power of influencing us is part and parcel of these . . . meanings', it is a part of their function (p. 240). It is like saying that eyes can see because it is their function to see. It is a plastic control, he tells us, and, because 'we are not forced to submit ourselves' to this control (that is, we can discuss them and reject them), 'if we submit, ... then we do so freely, after deliberation' (pp. 240–41). Thus, the old problem with which we started is evaded; that we do have the freedom to discuss, deliberate and reject is simply postulated, not established or explained.

And how does the new theory answer Descartes's problem? Popper answers, 'It does so (without saying *what* ' mind' or 'consciousness' is) by saying something about . . . the functions of mind or consciousness' (p. 250). Consciousness, growing from 'a vague feeling of irritation experienced when the organism has a problem to solve, . . . begins to *anticipate* possible ways of reacting, possible trial-and-error movements' (pp. 250–51). So, evading the issue again, Popper writes,

> We now see that this theory offers . . . an almost trivial answer to Descartes's problem. Without saying *what* 'the mind' is, it leads immediately to the conclusion that our mental states control . . . our physical movements (251).

Once again we are told that the control is 'of the 'plastic' kind', because there is 'some give-and-take, some feedback'; and, 'because the body does not always do what we want it to do', 'we have to learn how to modify our aims'. Hence, 'though we are free, to some considerable extent, there are always conditions' and constraints (p. 252).

Repeatedly Popper talks of how 'different aims may compete, and new aims may be invented and controlled by the method of trial and error elimination' (p. 253). All this is familiar to us as the hypothetico-deductive method of science. But with all this, which is old hat, Popper has not answered either the original problem of free choice or the twin problems he calls Compton's problem and Descartes's problem. He himself says, 'I am far from suggesting that my proposed solution is what philosophers have been looking for' (p. 251).

Notes and References

1. *Objective Knowledge—an Evolutionary Approach* (Oxford, 1972) (Reprint, 1974) Page references given in brackets in the text of my paper are to this edition.
2. Compton's model is, says Popper, 'a model of a kind of decision-making where people who cannot make up their minds say 'Let us toss a penny' . 'Some of our decisions are like that', he says, 'snap decisions, taken without deliberation' because we have no time to deliberate. As an example he mentions the case of a pilot:' if he is well trained, or just lucky, the result may be satisfactory' (p. 228). I hardly think that a pilot's decision can ever be like a penny toss and is certainly not a quantum jump. At most, it may be like a conditioned reflex as a result of training, practice and habit.
3. Popper says, 'It is difficult to understand how the physical universe could produce abstract entities such as rules, and then could come under the influence of these rules' (p. 225), like a Frankenstein monster that dominates its creator. It is not clear whether Popper here is denying the possibility of the physical universe producing abstract entities (in other words, whether this is an argument against determinism) or he is putting it forward as a real, serious problem.

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Reply to Daya Krishna's Review of *Bibliography of Indian Philosophies* (Third Edition)

Professor Daya Krishna has done me the honour of reviewing the Third Edition of the *Bibliography of Indian Philosophies* (in two sections; Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1995).[1] I note appreciatively (despite the derogatory heading to the review) that he is 'thankful that there is at least such a *Bibliography*, for anyone who is seriously interested in information about the works in Indian philosophy till today cannot but rush to it for information as there is practically nothing else in the field up till now.'

The *Bibliography* has now grown to a size that Daya unsurprisingly finds difficult to work with, and there are many shortcomings in it that I should be the first to point out. The job of preparing and producing such a work properly requires a team of scholars capable of reading many languages, of checking and rechecking references, along with many other editorial and secretarial tasks. I have had no help available to me in preparing the text; the work is entirely my own. It suffers from many problems of the sort that Daya mentions, though not all of the specific faults that he claims to unearth.

1. Given the size to which the *Bibliography* has grown, publication in two volumes was unavoidable for this third edition. I realize this makes use of the work more difficult, the reader having to move back and forth between, for example, the indices in the second volume and some of the primary entries in the first. Because of the unwieldy size I have decided not to try to publish any more such editions, but rather to keep the work up-to-date by making it available through computer references to new materials being published as they appear. Those interested in accessing these supplements can do so by consulting the following URL code:

http://weber.u.washington.edu/~kpotter/

2. It was hardly possible to provide the basis for the dating of authors, as well as the basis for many other editorial decisions. Daya complains about the undue precision in the dating. Given the plan of attack in the relevant portion, where authors are arranged in relative chronological order, what was attempted was to find a date which corresponded to what scholarly estimates suggest might be approximately the fiftieth year in the life of an author. Obviously this estimating is open to disagreement, and in several cases dating has been the occasion for a good deal of printed scholarly discussion. All I have done is to try to make, on the basis of literature available to me, a reasonable guess at a date which is said there to constitute some year, hopefully nearer the fiftieth, in an author's life. In some cases this was well beyond the range of feasibility, there being no literature to appeal to, and I merely depended on an estimate as to an appropriate century and put the author at its midpoint. And of course in some cases even that was impossible; hence the sections on 'Dates Unknown'. As for changes from previous editions, all that signifies is that I revised my estimate of a date on the basis, usually, of published scholarship that had come to my attention before the publication of the third edition but after that of the second.

3. Daya thinks there are authors and works which are found in previous editions but are lacking in this one, and has had the assistance of a colleague of his, Prof. Rashmi Patni, in locating some apparent instances. In many cases, however, what has happened is that an author's name or the title of a work is entered in a different way than Prof. Patni was able to locate (see the appendices below for location of some of these). For example, authors who bear the title of 'Śāstri(n)' are, I fear, sometimes entered in the Index under 'S' and sometimes under the proper surname. Again, since Indian names are sometimes found in one order and sometimes in another, it would take a lot of space to indicate where among all the possible places the author's name is in fact to be found. The reader is warned of this at the outset of the relevant Index (see p. 1322, lines 4–6), but of course that hardly eliminates such difficulties, as the ways of spelling and arranging Indian names is endless.

4. Daya spends several paragraphs counting and classifying the centuries in which titles newly added to the third edition have been dated there. I have not made such a count myself, but I can well believe his are more or less correct. I do not find them especially puzzling, as he apparently does, and find no basis provided for his reference to 'unbelievable omissions and commissions.' He cites one or two specific mistakes known to him. I am certain there are more, known to other users, but given the size and nature of the task and of the team (of one) attending to it, perhaps this is not so surprising.

5. Missing entries. It has not proved entirely easy to find a way to number entries in a way that will allow for the organization now in place to accommodate future entries as they are published. In preparing the third edition for publication I found a number of reduplications in the already definitively-numbered manuscript. Since the numbering is not consecutive overall, but is designed to order chronologically the published material which primarily concerns each text or author or school, when these reduplications were discovered it seemed best merely to eliminate them. This, of course, created holes in the numbering, which Daya suspects of demonstrating confusion. While I am no doubt confused on a number of points about the history of Indian philosophy, this skipping of numbers does not necessarily demonstrate it.

6. Finally, he feels mine is a 'job carelessly done and perfunctorily performed without any regard for the convenience of its users'. I am sorry he feels this way, and hope that his is not a widespread opinion. Despite my inability to command the languages needed to do the job that would certainly be preferable, I can assure him I have given a vast proportion

of my time over the years to collecting the references he finds in these volumes and that I have given considerable thought to making them convenient to use. I'm quite sure the job could be done better given more staff. Taking more care would require additional time, however, the new system now initiated has the merit of making it possible to keep up-to-date with the literature fairly quickly for those with access to a computer.

Note

1. See Daya Krishna's review article, JICPR Volume XIII, No. 3, pp. 162–67.

Appendix I

Some examples of authors mentioned by Daya as missing from the third edition that are not:

2. Nāga, author of *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśasūtra.* See entry no. 200, p. 185.
4. Dharmaghoṣa Sūri. See no. 898, p. 534.
6. Meghānandana. See no. 1007, p. 571.
9. Rādhā Mohan Vidyavacaspati Gosvāmin. See no. 1624, pp. 762–63.
11. Mahādeva Punataṁha. See no. 1288. pp. 678–79.
12. Lakṣmīnṛsiṃha Śāstrin. See no. 1269, p. 675.
13. Brahmadeva Paṇḍita = Kṛṣṇadeva Paṇḍita, no. 1598, p. 757.
14. Ratnanātha Śukla. See no. 1889, p. 803.
15. Kedāra Nātha Datta Bhaktivinoda Ṭhakkura. See no. 1766, pp. 784–85.
16. Śrīdhara Trayambaka Pāthaka Svāmin. See no. 1757, p. 783.
17. K.S. Varadācārya. See no. 1893, p. 804.

Appendix II

Works of unknown authors alleged by Daya to be missing from the third edition but which are not:

1. *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra.* See no. 200.1, p. 185.
2. *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra.* See no. 1351.1, pp. 142–43.
3. *Avataṁśaka Sūtra.* This is a collection, not a single work.
4. *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra.* See no. 160.1, pp. 148–51.
5. *Vṛtti* on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṁkhyakārikās.* There are several. See nos. 244.1, 423.1, 1467.3, 1476.1.
6. *Ārya-Pañcaviṁśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra.* See no. 53.1, p. 111.

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Potter's Clarification—Does it Change the Situation?

Professor Potter's observations on our comments in our review article entitled 'Potter's *New Bibliography of Indian Philosophy*: One Step Forward and Three Steps Backwards', (*JICPR*, Vol. III, 3, pp. 162–68) are based on a fundamental misconception, namely that our comments were concerned with his *Bibliography. It was not so.* Instead they were concerned with a comparative estimate of the merits and demerits of the third edition of the *Bibliography* over the second edition which had appeared in 1983 and which had provided a standard basis for all information pertaining to publications on Indian philosophy.

Secondly, Professor Potter has forgotten that a standard work of reference, which his *Bibliography* claims to be, is almost like a *śruti* and hence if any changes are made in it, then it is the duty of the editor, that is, his *dharma,* to bring them to the notice of his readers and give the grounds on which the changes have been made. Not to have done so is a major omission the reasons for which can only be known to Professor Potter himself.

Thirdly, if these two points are kept in mind, then it is obvious that besides the additions to the *Bibliography* which have been necessitated for various reasons, the alterations from the earlier edition should have been minimal in character and explained wherever they occurred.

The changes in the dates of the authors given in the second edition is an important matter as those who had worked on their basis would have drawn their conclusions on the basis of the information provided therein. Any drastic revision in these dates thus had to be brought to their notice. Yet, even when the discrepancy in the new dates given in the third edition spans a few centuries, this has not been explicitly mentioned anywhere by Professor Potter and has to be discovered by the readers through researches on their own. Not only this, the user of the *Bibliography* has been kept completely in the dark regarding the reasons for such a drastic revision. As for the smaller changes of a few years, Professor Potter has enlightened us: 'What was attempted was to find a date which corresponded to what scholarly estimates suggest might be approximately the fiftieth year in the life of the author'. However, it is difficult to believe that any new information could have arisen regarding many of the past authors which could have necessitated a revision of their date by a *few* years to fulfil Professor Potter's calculation in this context.

The same appears to be the case with the confusing order in which Professor Potter finds Indian names to be written. However 'confusing' the order might be, there seems no reason why the order followed in the second edition should have been changed in the third edition, unless it was meant to confuse the unwary reader. In fact, Professor Potter himself seems to have been in two minds. He writes, for example, the authors who

bear the title of 'Sastri(n)' are, I fear, *sometimes* (italics mine) entered in the Index under 'S' and *sometimes* under the proper surname'.

It was initially comforting to read in Professor Potter's reply that authors that we had found missing in the third edition were indeed there. But on closer examination we found that, in most cases, even in Professor Potter's clarification, 'confusion' and 'error' continue to prevail. For example, it is true that *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśastra* figures in the third edition as entry no. 200 on p. 185 as indicated in his reply, but it is attributed to an unknown author. The author Nāga or Nāgabodhi to whom it was attributed earlier in the second edition and whose date was given as 180 AD is just not there in that part of the *Bibliography* which lists authors whose dates are known though Nāgabodhi (not the author of the above mentioned work) is to be found in the list of authors whose dates are unknown.

Similar is the case with Dharmaghoṣa Sūri . . . who is also known as Dharmakīrti Sūri in the second edition and whose date is given as 1290 AD. The index of the second edition lists the author under both these names. When, we turn to no. 898, p. 534 of the third edition, as Professor Potter suggests in his reply, we find there not Dharmaghoṣa Sūri but only Dharmaghoṣa (who seems now to have appropriated at least one of the works attributed to Dharmaghoṣa Sūri, that is, *Sākārdīpikā*) who corresponds with another Dharmaghoṣa mentioned in the second edition whose date is given as 1490. One wonders what has happened to Dharmaghoṣa Sūri who was explicitly mentioned in the second edition and whose date was given as 1290.

Similarly, the Meghānanda that we found missing in the text is not to be confused with the Meghananda indicated by Professor Potter in his reply (Appendix 1, No. 6) as entry no. 1007, p. 57 which corresponds to one Meghānandana whose name has been mis-spelt in the index of the third edition. We were referring to Meghānanda or Meghanādri Sūri (1350 AD), author of a work on *Viśiṣṭadvaita*. This author is simply not there in the index of the third edition under either the first or the second name and one of his works. *Nayadyumaṇi*, is ascribed to one Śrīnivāsācārya (1755 AD) while his other work is not even mentioned in the index of the third edition.

The same is the case with Rādhā Mohan Goswami (See Potter's reply, Appendix I, No. 9). If we turn to entry no. 1624, pp. 762–63 of the third edition we find there one Rādhāmohana Vidyāvācaspati Gosvāmin Bhaṭṭāchārya whose date is given as 1890 AD and who corresponds with an entry by the same name on p. 499 of the second edition. We were referring to a Rādhā Mohan Goswāmin (1565 A.D.) on p. 368 of the second edition who was attributed three works on *Acintyabhedābheda*, which the third edition now lists under the later Rādhāmohana Vidyāvācaspati Gosvāmin Bhaṭṭāchārya, under whom the second edition had earlier listed only one work, a *Vivaraṇa* on Gautama's *Nyāyasūtras*.

As for Mahādeva Punātmakara, he is not listed in the index either under his first or his last name though as Potter indicates, he is present in the third edition, entry no. 1288, pp. 678–79 with a slight change in his date.

The case of Brahmadeva Pandita is even more confusing. The second edition lists the author under this name and the third under another name, that is, Kṛṣṇadeva Pandita. How is the reader to know that they are identical?

We need not continue examining the details any further, except for pointing out that, out of the seventeen examples that we had given, Professor Potter himself has chosen not to question at least six which, by implication, he concedes to being authentic mistakes of non-inclusion in the third edition of those authors who were there in the second edition.

There is, however, one mistake in our review article which we would like to admit and apologize for, for the puzzling conclusion it has created. This refers to the last paragraph on page 165 of our Review article which should have followed after '. . . (See Appendix V)' in the first paragraph on p. 164, as it makes no sense where it occurs in the review.

In conclusion, I would like to repeat once more, that there can be no two opinions about the immense usefulness of Professor Potter's *Bibliography* as a research tool for any one who is interested in Indian philosophy. The basic point is whether the third edition of the *Bibliography* is an improvement on the second. It is for the users of the *Bibliography* to decide the issue. I, for one, still prefer to use the second edition except where it is necessary for supplementation and sometimes correction.

DAYA KRISHNA

Must Self-Consciousness be Non-Referential?*

To be conscious is ordinarily to be conscious of something. We do sometimes say A is conscious without implying that he is conscious of some identifiable thing. For example, if a man has met with a brain-injury and is lying still, making no movement, the attending doctor may say to his crying wife that he is conscious. Neither he, nor the sad wife, would think of any object he is conscious of, but both would very well understand the meaning of 'He is conscious'. And, even an intentionalist philosopher would concede that the question 'But what is he conscious of?' would be a completely odd thing to ask. But taking this case to be a little non-

* A response to Prof. G.P. Ramachandra's query, 'Is There Such a Thing as Self-consciousness?', pp. 83–85 of this issue of *JICPR*.

ordinary, or non-standard, it is correct to say that normally, ordinarily, or generally, to be conscious is to be conscious of something. This is a truth about the ordinary use of 'conscious', or of 'consciousness', and not an empirical, or ontological one about being conscious or about consciousness. Therefore, G.P. Ramachandra is right in saying in his note 'Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness?' that (a) 'Consciousness is always of something' (pp. 83–84).

But the above quoted expression, (a), is only the first conjunct of a conjunctive statemment with two others. The second conjunct is (b) 'a mental entity is always something of which we are conscious' and the third (c) 'both are grammatical and not empirical remarks' (p. 84). 'Both' in (c) refers to (a) and (b). As I have already admitted, (a) is a grammatical remark, and therefore (c) is true of (a). But it would be wholly true only if it is also true of (b). In case it is not true of (b), then it would not be wholly true, that is, it would be partly true, and partly false. It asserts that both (a) and (b) are grammatical. Therefore, if one has a friendly attitude towards Ramachandra as I have, he would take the above position. But if his is the attitude of a strict formal logician—and that certainly would not be for that reason an unfriendly attitude—he would say that (c) is false because a conjunction is false when even a single conjunct of it is false. Let us see what exactly is stored in the logical luck of (b) and (c), because the fate of (c) depends on that of (b).

(b), to repeat, is 'a mental entity is always something of which we are conscious'. It obviously means, or implies, that there are several mental entities of which we are always conscious, and therefore that there are mental entities. (b) is not, even on the face of it, an innocent remark, and therefore it merits a close examination.

(i) The occurrence of (b), after (a), in the three-membered conjunction, very strongly suggests that Ramachandra holds not only (b1) that we are always conscious of mental entities but also (b2) that we are conscious of only mental entities. Taking up (b2) first, then, a mood, say, of boredom caused by a lecture, a feeling, say, of being irked by a comment, a disposition, say, to look at the hair-style of the lady sitting in the back row, a desire, say, to supersede a colleague, etc., of which we are conscious, are all mental entities. This would mean that though there may not be an entity called mind, there are innumerable mental entities, inhabiting the inner, mental, world, simply because they cannot inhabit the outer world. And, this Ramachandra would have to admit while declaring that the 'inner world', 'introspection' and 'mental entities' are all mirages (pp. 83–84): a glaring self-contradiction indeed.

(ii) To say that we are always conscious of mental entities and nothing else, and that mental entities are images entail that we are always conscious of mirages, and mirages alone. But the entailed statement is a logical impossibility. One who is conscious of mirages and only mirages cannot, in point of logic, say that he is conscious of mirages and only

mirages. One must have seen sometime in his life real water in order to have the logical right to say that what he sees now is a mirage, and not real water. Secondly, it is not clear why Ramachandra calls introspection a mirage. We do introspect. If our introspection does not reveal a substantive self, but only mental states, or occurrences, it does not mean that to introspect is to have a mirage. If we sometimes commit a mistake in indentifying, or recognizing, what we introspect, we do that even in seeing things. To take a mirage for a real collection of water is a visual lapse, but that does not make visual perception, or seeing itself a mirage. Moreover, on what basis does Ramachandra say that what we are always conscious of arc mental entities? It seems to me that he does that only on the basis of a (wrong) introspection, or, more precisely, on the basis of wrongly interpreting the results of introspection. Had he properly used, or correctly interpreted the results of introspection, he would not have called everything we are conscious of a mental entity, and certainly not the examples I have already given of some of the things we are conscious of, that is, moods, feelings, dispositions, desirings, etc.

Referring to (b1), if we are always conscious of mental entities, then Ramachandra would have either to deny that there is any unconscious motive, desire, disposition, etc., or to admit that the latter are not mental entities, though mental. That is, he would have to admit a class of mental things which are of some non-entitative type or category. It is difficult to form an idea of what kind of being these creatures would have. But it is obvious that Ramachandra would now be multiplying kinds of mental things in spite of himself.

I think his troubles are largely due to his not saying what he means by a mental entity. All that he says of it is that we are conscious of it and that it is not made up of some special mental stuff (p. 83). If not of some special mental stuff, is it made up of some general mental stuff? How to distinguish between special and general mental stuff? It cannot be made up of any non-mental stuff. Here, again unnecessary metaphysical problems are created.

He proceeds to build up his argument against the possibility of self-consciousness by emphasizing the common-sense truth that we are always conscious of something. But he seems not to be very clear about what he means by self-consciousness, and the way he proceeds gives the impression that he means by it the consciousness of a substance-like self, of which, he concludes, a la Hume, that it does not exist. If there is no substance called self, his argument is that there cannot be a self-consciousness, meaning a consciousness of self-substance. But from this it would not follow that there is no consciousness of non-substantial self if the self is non-substantial, say, a stream of consciousness, or a series of conscious states. There won't be, one may say, a consciousness of self only if there is no self, neither substantial, nor non-substantial. But this can be said only if it is proven, or assumed, that there cannot be a consciousness

of something which is not there, that is, which does not exist. But then some common experiences would pose a problem. When a shaking or hanging tooth has been taken away, sometimes the patient feels that the tooth is still there, sticking loosely, or half-sticking, into the gum. This may be taken to be a case of being conscious of something which is not there. Such cases can be explained, or explained away, only by ascertaining what exactly it is to be conscious of something. Only then one may say that the patient's feeling that the tooth is still there is not really a case of being conscious of, if his prior analysis of consciousness implies it Ramachandra does not attempt this analysis, but I do not blame him for it because, in spite of the fact that a lot has been written on consciousness, still it is not easy to give a neat, handy, analysis of it, profitably usable in a short note like his.

There is another, and I think a more common, understanding of the concept of self-consciousness which means consciousness of consciousness, and not consciousness of self of any sort. In this sense, for example, if in percieving a paper-weight on my desk I am also meta-conscious, that is, conscious of the fact that I am percieving the paper-weight, I am self-conscious. This sort of meta-consciousness cannot be proved unmaintainable, or wished away, by saying that consciousness is always consciousness of something. This sort of self-consciousness is consciousness of something and that something is consciousness itself. To prove its unmaintainability what needs to be proved is that consciousness is always consciousness of x and that x is always something other than consciousness. To prove it either as an empirical, or as a logical, truth is an equally hard job. Had Ramachandra attempted it in a serious manner, even if he had not succeeded in accomplishing it, he would have, in all likelihood, done a worthwhile philosophical exercise.

I would conclude by making the matter a little more complicated, or uncertain. What would be Ramachandra's, or anyone else's, who denies the possibility of self-conciousness, response to the metaphysician who holds that by nature, in its natural, uncorrupted, pure, condition, consciousness is self-consciousness, and only in its corrupted, impure, or vulgarized, condition, it is consciousness of something other than itself? It would be too cavalier to call this question illegitimate by invoking the thesis of the meaninglessness of the metaphysical enterprize.

Even a milder metaphysical move would pose a challenge to Ramachandra. Suppose a metaphysician claims, not that consciousness is really self-consciousness, but that it is just consciousness and not the consciousness of anything. And, there are metaphysicians who say it. Even this claim, if found maintainable, would topple down Ramachandra's apple-cart. He seems to assume that those who admit the possibility of self-consciousness do not know the fact about the ordinary use of 'consciousness' that consciousness is always of something. Facts about the ordinary use of expressions are known not only to ordinary language

philosophers, but also to others, including metaphysicians. This I am saying while having a much closer affiliation with the ordinary language group than with any other brand of philosophers, and having no secret pact with any abstruse metaphysicians, as already confessed. But still Ramachandra's or anyone else's, assumption that the metaphysician who holds that consciousness is naturally self-consciousness, or that it is naturally objectless, is not aware of the ordinary use of 'consciousness' and therefore holds the view he holds, would seem to me a little too naive, and not just simplistic. Moreover, it would do a lot of philosophical, or logical, good, to an ordinary language philosopher if he respects the ordinary truth that even some non-ordinary language philosophers have a knowledgeable awareness and understanding of the ordinary use of the expressions they talk about.

I do not have much sympathy for esoteric metaphysics. I have mentioned some metaphysical strategies because reflection on them is very likely to take us further, and hopefully in some newer direction, in the discussion of the problem, or, nature, of consciousness, and of self-consciousness. In fact, this is the primary purpose of my response, and if I have been critical, I have been because I sincerely believe that criticism, if not taken amiss, can really further a discussion.

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Comments on G.P. Ramachandra's note 'Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness?'

Maybe we should have a detour from directly asking the question 'Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness?' and ask 'What would it be like to be non-conscious or comatose or dead, or like not being there at all?' I think phenomenologists (Brentano, Husserl and Heidegger, for instance) did not overtly pose this question, but stuck to their presupposition that to be 'human,' 'mental' or 'conscious' is to be 'intentional'—intentionality for them being that primordial meaning-seeing act which constitutes the fact of one's being 'conscious,' 'aware,' 'alive.' The transition therefore from 'not being there' to 'being there' is one from 'not being present' to 'being present,' that is, from being 'nothing' to being the 'meaning-seer.' And since 'being conscious' is an experience one possesses solely in or for oneself it would smack of solipsism, which for all that I know may not be incongruous with the present time of postmodernism we are passing through.

Professor Ramachandra's well-meaning reference to the analytical view of consciousness does not bring us close to any answer to the

question 'What is consciousness?' Indeed, there are various uses of the word 'conscious': we may say that someone is clothes-conscious, fame-conscious, women-conscious, as someone else may be totally unaware of these things. We may also say about a person who has come out of a faint that he is now conscious. Yet consciousness is not just a mark of designation to be given to one who can use his sense-organs, or a tag for identifying a certain disposition, although there is no harm if one deploys that word to carry out such functions. We can go with Ramachandra when he says that the words 'experience' and 'consciousness' do not denote different phenomena, that is, 'to be experiencing' and 'to be conscious' are not two distinct acts, but Metzinger (see Thomas Metzinger, ed., *Conscious Experience,* 1995) appears to be more convincing when he writes that for referring to what happens to the 'inside' of a human, unlike that of a plant or an animal or an AI gadget, it would be more appropriate to use the expression 'conscious experience'.

The term 'conscious experience' signifies, hermeneutically if you like, several dimensions of our consciousness. Ramachandran is not correct when he writes that 'there is no such thing as "consciousness of consciousness", that is, 'experience of experience'. That expressions like these end up in the fallacy of *ad infinitum* is an old adage—one's reasoning need not be guided by it. Just because the words 'consciousness' and 'self-consciousness' are nouns, they should not be taken as standing for some substance or essence. This fact is emphasized by phenomenologists and existentialists (Husserl, in particular) when they term consciousness or self-consciousness as an act, a field, an openness, a bottomless pit, a fluvial constructor and de-constructor of itself or its own image, a transcendence, a kind of absolute freedom without any rigid core, a self-maker and self-definer.

I wish to use the concept of 'intentional arc,' extremely suggestively put forth by Merleau-Ponty, to convey what happens to or in each one of us when we sort of feel our being-in-the-world. Look at what I would call Ramachandra's self-consciousness as he has gone about writing 'Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness?' He must have one day got the idea of writing this piece; as he was writing it, he was on and off journeying across his own 'inner space' to buttress his pre-set notion that there is no such thing as self-consciousness; he had to 'bracket' the ideas and views that he might have found to oppose or weaken his own pre-set notion; he operated on a canvas of meanings, expressions, effective and non-effective constructions; he must have at every step of his thought and its verbal 'delivery' intended a certain effect on the readers and gauged it again and again; possibly, he did not believe in what he said in the article but wanted to say what he said in order to produce a certain stir in his readers; finally, he must have re-read what he had written and must have been satisfied, amazed or dismayed at what there was as his composition. All these, and several other dimensions of Ramachandra's reflective,

introspective, self-reading, verbalizing mind or consciousness, all of which he himself would not be able to compass, fall within his intentional arc. This intentional arc is Professor Ramachandra himself, having had a certain 'lived past,' a certain subjectivity, a certain self-constituting position *vis-à-vis* the world. What this intentional arc arcs is the multiple dimensions of consciousness including the body-dimension and has a locus within whose loose boundaries 'I am I' stays as the ground. This 'I am I' is not inferred: self-identity (it is another expression for self-consciousness) is not inferred, however emphatic Descartes might have been about ego's being inferred from *cogito.* One of the greatest geniuses of many eastern and western metaphysicians has been to invent the metaphor of light (luminosity, radiance, *swayamprakasha*) for describing the self-evident existence of self-conscious: ess.

It is difficult to understand for what purpose Ramachandra states that 'it is possible to have a subjectless language' and that 'one could say 'There are feelings' instead of 'I feel'.' Surely one would not be able to interpret or understand the statement 'There are feelings' unless one refers it to a subject, that is, to someone who experiences the feelings. Similarly, introspection is a strictly personal affair. When I introspect, it is *my* consciousness that probes itself and, if let-go unrestrainedly, would not leave anything even in the realm of the unconscious, outside its beam so to say. Introspection confirms the 'act' of self-consciousness—it is what the ancient Indian philosophers portrayed as the *saksin-satta* (the witnessing consciousness) having a surveillance over its own 'inside' and 'outside.' As a witnessing consciousness, self-consciousness perpetually steps behind the world of senses, the everyday world, and encompasses itself and *its* world in the form of an ensemble. The ever moving nature of self-consciousness would not allow it to develop any rigid view of itself or of the world. This is why people who have been autobiographical in their speech or written works have constantly been hermeneutical and creative and inconstant in their explication of what they might have already said. This is unavoidable since self-knowledge can never give one a total access to oneself. One's knowledge of oneself, like one's consciousness of one's own self, remains ever incomplete and is never free from a 'lack.'

In his attempt to look for a possible answer to the question 'Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness?' Professor Ramachandra has been too much of an objectivist. The question he handles is not like the questions 'Is there such a thing as magnetic power, or electricity, or electron, or black hole, or energy?' The strictly personal experience we refer to as 'self-consciousness,' like the experiences we refer to as 'having a mind,' 'having an *inside*', 'feeling time as duration', 'having a body with several drives woven in it', has a texture that would warrant for its expression or verbalization what Heidegger would call a *Dasein* language. This language is a blend of poetry, metaphoricity, often highly loaded

symbolism and equivocation, and *koan*-like parables. Without meaning any offence, what sort of answer does Ramachandra anticipate to the question he has asked? Is his problem solved if one answers his question by a 'No, there is no such thing as self-consciousness'? I may be wrong, but it appears that Ramachandra is inclined to favour such an answer. But then *who* has done the whole exercise of raising the question and undertaken the 'travail' of finding a solution to it? Has not Ramachandran as a self-conscious subject, an 'intentional arc,' as the 'owner' of his own typical thinking, meaning and saying, and certainly as the self-prober and the breaker of the wall between his 'intention to say' and his 'verbalizing,' said to himself, before he put the pen to paper, 'let me find out whether there is in *me* self-consciousness'? The very exploration of this kind confirms the reality of Ramachandra's self-consciousness, or, for that matter, of anybody who does a similar exploration. Self-consciousness as consciousness' intentionality directed toward itself is basic to our existence, to our being present in the world—it is that hermeneutical or interpretative consciousness each of us cannot help being while we live as psychophysical entities hurled (God knows how and why!) into time and space.

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Agenda for Research

(1) Agendas for research even in the field of philosophy are being increasingly set by international agencies which look at the world from primarily the western point of view though they speak in the name of the whole of humanity. One such example is the plea for research on 'Development ethics' by the International Development Ethics Association and its possible adoption at the World Philosophers' Conference at Boston, USA, for being included in the philosophical curricula of all the developing countries. I think it is time that the philosophers of the non-western world present a counter-agenda for study and research of ethical issues relating to the developed countries. The following are suggested as possible areas which may be investigated by concerned philosophers in both the 'developing' and the 'developed' countries.

(a) The ethics of nuclear monopoly or nuclear oligopoly versus the ethics of nuclear proliferation.
(b) The ethics of armament manufacture and their sale by the 'developed' countries of the world to the developing and under developed countries.
(c) The ethical basis of the terms of trade between the 'developed' and 'non-developed' world.

These are only given as examples and the readers of the *JICPR* are invited to suggest others which would focus attention upon the ethical issues resulting from a basic asymmetry in power relations between the developed and non-developed world in the contemporary global situation.

(2) The Indian Council of Philosophical Research has published a subject and author index of the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly, The Journal of the Indian Academy of Philosophy, The Philosophical Annual* and the *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research.*

These give relevant information about what has been written on various philosophical topics during the last thirty or forty years and thus provide a rich area for research in what has been thought in these various fields by Indian thinkers for scholars/students in this country.

Focus

(1) John R. Searle has written an interesting review of *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory* by David J. Chalmers in the *New York Review of Books*, Vol. XLI, No. 4, March 6, 1997, pp. 43–44 under the title 'Consciousness and the Philosophers'. The article is a comprehensive, fair, objective and balanced review of the current position concerning the feasibility of understanding 'consciousness' in terms which, without any residuum, do not refer to consciousness at all. Interested readers may also see David J. Chalmers' reply to Searle in the *New York Review of Books*, Vol. XLIV, No. 8, May 15, 1997, p. 60.

(2) Uddyotakara in his *Vārttika* on *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.1 has said that each *vidyā* has its own *tattvajñāna* which leads to that *nihśreyasa* which pertains specifically to its own domain. He gives examples of *Mīmāṁsā*, *Vārtā* and *Dandanīti* whose specific *nihśreyasa* he mentions respectively. It is only in the case of *ātmavidyā* that the *nihśreyasa* is supposed to be *mokṣa*. However, for some reason, this meaning of *tattvajñāna* and *nihśreyasa* seems to have been completely lost sight of in the tradition. The lost insight of Uddyotakara is important as it may lead us to ask about the *nihśreyasa* of each field of knowledge that we may pursue.

Notes and Queries

1. Can *pramā* of the Nyāya school be treated as 'justified true belief'?
2. Can *pramā* of the Nyāya school be treated as a piece of knowledge which is 'justified, true and nondubious'?
3. Is there any substitute word in Saṁskṛta of the word '*belief*' as it is used by the epistemologists in the West?

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D.K. MOHANTA

* * *

What shall be the Navya Nyāya analysis of the following sentence?

"This is the same bright, red rose whose sweet and subtle fragrance so deeply affected the beautiful princess when she came for an early morning stroll in the private royal garden a few days back that she still talks about it to her friends and says that she would remember the fragrance all her life."

This is a rather long sentence but the Navya Nyāya analysis, as Prof. Prahladachar's article on the *Kroḍapatrās* (*JICPR* Vol. XIV, No. 3) showed generally concentrates on such simple sentences as '*atra ghataḥ asti*', that I felt tempted to construct a complex sentence.

The sentence is deliberately constructed to test as to how a neo-Naiyāyika would analyse such a phrase as 'bright, red rose' or 'sweet and subtle fragrance' without questioning the generally accepted presuppositions of Navya Nyāya analysis. Also, the sentence challenges one to find what is the '*mukhya viśeṣyata*' which is so often talked about in Navya Nyāya analysis. Basically it is an invitation to *do* Nyāya rather than to talk about it, as most of our Naiyāyikas do.

* * *

What exactly is meant by the terms 'Logos' and 'Nous' in Greek philosophy? What is the difference between them? Are they opposed to each other? Or, are they complementary to each other?

* * *

What exactly is meant by the terms '*anuyogi*' and '*pratiyogi*' in the Navya Nyāya mode of analysis of sentences or in the knowledge produced by

them? What is their *vyāvartaka lakṣaṇa,* to use Nyāya terminology? What, for example, would be the *anuyogi* and the *pratiyogi* in the following sentences?

1. *Bhūtale ghaṭābhāvaḥ*
2. *Bhūtale ghatābhāvasya abhāvaḥ*
3. *Kaliyuge dharmābhāvaḥ*
4. *Ākāśe sarva-sattayāḥ bhāvarūpa padārthānāṁ abhāvaḥ*
5. *Satyaṁ vada*
6. *Satyaṁ vada priyaṁ vada*
7. *Satyaṁ vada dharmaṁ cara*

तदिदं तत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसाधिगमश्च यथाविद्यं वेदितव्यम्। सर्वासु विद्यासु तत्त्वज्ञानमस्ति निःश्रेयसाधिगमश्चेति। त्रय्यां तावत् किं तत्त्वज्ञानं कश्च निःश्रेयसाधिगम इति? तत्त्वज्ञानं तावदग्निहोत्रादिसाधनानां स्वागतादिपरिज्ञानमनुपहतादिपरिज्ञानं च। निःश्रेयसाधिगमोऽपि स्वर्गप्राप्तिः। तथा ह्यत्र स्वर्गः फलं श्रूयत इति। अथ वार्तायां किं तत्त्वज्ञानं को वा निःश्रेयसाधिगम इति? भूम्यादिपरिज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानम्। भूमिः कण्टकाद्यनुपहतेत्येतत् तत्त्वज्ञानम्। निःश्रेयसं सस्याधिगमस्तत्फलम्। दण्डनीत्यां किं तत्त्वज्ञानं को वा निःश्रेयसाधिगम इति? सामदानभेददण्डानां यथाकालं यथादेशं यथाशक्ति विनियोगस्तत्त्वज्ञानम्। निःश्रेयसमपि पृथिवीविजय इति। इह त्वध्यात्मविद्यायामात्मादिज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानम्, निःश्रेयसाधिगमोऽपवर्गप्राप्तिरिति।

Book Reviews

ALBERT W.J. HARPER: *Discussion and Commentary on Kant's Critiques*, The Edwin Mellen Press, Box 450, Lewiston, New York, USA, 14092–0450, 1996.

After a brief introduction (pp. 1–6), there follow four essays entitled (1) Representations (pp. 8–41), (2) First Analogy (pp. 42–98), (3) Morals (pp. 99–164) and (4) Commentary (pp. 170–199).

The first essay explores the relationship between representations and sensibility, the self, the intelligible object and the noumenon. But in the Kantian usage the term representations is so overburdened with meanings that there is nothing surprising if the author reaches the conclusion: 'In our analysis of representations, therefore, we are left with the inevitable question: what is related? To answer in either case that it must simply be the 'relata' that are related (or represented) would scarcely resolve the problem to our complete satisfaction, but would only raise further and deeper questions.'

The second essay deals with the First Analogy based on the principle of permanence of substance formulated by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason (A 182–B 224) along the following lines:

In 'A': All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the transitory as its mere determination, that is, as a way in which the object exists.

In 'B': In all changes of appearances substance is permanent: its quantum in nature is neither increased nor decreased.

On the metaphysical principle of permanency of substance in 'A' is built the concept of permanency of substance (physical substance) in the phenomenal world in 'B', with the implication that the quantum of substance or matter in the sensible world of appearance cannot admit of increase or diminution.

As we slowly go through the essay, we cannot but admire the author's undertaking of the critical investigations into Kant's concepts of substance in 'A' and 'B', but there is a point where one might say that his keen eye overlooked to see that there seems to be an incompatibility between the principle of permanency or changelessness of physical substance or matter in nature and Kant's critical theory of synthesis or synthetic activity of human mind, requiring that the quantum of substance which we call *real matter* in the natural world be related to the range of the synthetic activity of understanding. That is to say, the quantum of matter in nature will increase or decrease to the extent of sense data provided by the faculty of sensibility to the faculty of understanding for synthesis.

This issue merits response if we seek metaphysical foundation of scientific theories about matter, energy and the allied concepts in the context of transcendental philosophy.

The widely discussed problem of the justification of the application of Kant's moral law (the categorical imperative) to concrete situations in which man finds himself in the phenomenal world is the subject of the third essay. What can be gathered from reading this essay is that the functionality of Kant's moral law is purely formal and therefore, by all means, disappointing. However, this essay furnishes a useful survey of the current state of the Kant debate in the philosophical world.

We must congratulate the author for introducing us to modern Kant scholars. Roger Scruton (1982), Ernst Cassirer (1981), Rudolf Makkreel (1980) and others, with their views on some of Kant's epistemological and moral issues in the last essay entitled 'Commentary'. However, it is a matter of deep regret that Kant's third Critique (The Critique of Judgement), a neglected work in contemporary philosophical debate, receives a scant treatment in mere outlines in section IV of the commentary.

This volume contains a wealth of ideas in the area of Kantian scholarship and should command the respect of all Kant scholars and readers. It is pleasantly printed and clear to read. Notes and Index add to its richness.

1879 Kucha Khayaliram, Bazar Sitaram, Delhi KAUSHAL KISHORE SHARMA

RICHARD FELDMAN: *Reason and Argument*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 07632, 1993, pp. xiii+432

The goodness of the book encouraged me to bring it to the notice of the students as well as the teachers of philosophy. The value of the book is not restricted to its usefulness to a special group of people that is the students and the teachers of philosophy. A general reader with a reflective attitude will find the book interesting and illuminating because the book teaches on how to reason well and find good justifications for the beliefs one holds.

The language is simple. The sentences are not complex. The book does not contain any jargon. The book is intended to help one think clearly. This purpose is very conspicuous from the beginning to the end of the book. This book is not an impediment to a reader for whom English is a second language.

I would make a strong recommendation of the book for a foundational course on epistemology and rational thinking. What is good about this book is that it introduces the important concepts in epistemology and logic in a lucid way. It steadily brings a reader to the level of thinking and

reflecting on those concepts and the relations thereof. At the end of the course, a student will not only be acquainted with relevant concepts he will also be confident enough to dig out the arguments from a passage that contains those arguments hidden and evaluate them successfully. That this book, *Reason and Argument*, is full of worth will be obvious, if one browses through the contents of the book.

The first chapter introduces the notion of an argument. It distinguishes between reason and rhetoric. Further, it makes a good description of the impediments to good reasoning. The main goal of this chapter is to introduce the students to the method of argument analysis and to distinguish argumentative writing from other kinds of writing.

The second chapter is about the objective theory of truth. It brings down the truth to the students that truth is objective in an unambiguous way. Statements are distinguished from sentences and problematic sentences are spotted out which are unsuitable for making statements that have truth value. According to the objective theory of truth, truth (falsity) is an objective property of a statement. Moral statements are no exception to the theory.

The third chapter elucidates the connection between rationality and beliefs and the connection between rationality and evidence. That rationality is the following the evidence for believing a statement is well spelled out. The chapter provides a basic understanding of the notion of rationality, a prerequisite for understanding a good argument.

Chapters four and five introduce basic concepts of argument analysis. The forms of argument, well formed arguments, validity, cogency, soundness and strength of an argument are the topics of the two chapters. Cogency is a fairly unfamiliar notion not found in the textbooks of logic. But the book makes a good discussion of it. The strength of the connection between the premises and their conclusion determines whether the argument is cogent. An argument is cogent if the premises of the argument are good reasons for the conclusion. However, it remains unexplained as to what those reasons are, they are left to be grasped intuitively.

Part two of the book contains three chapters. These chapters concentrate on the details of argument reconstruction and evaluation of arguments. A student learns the skill of finding implicit premises of an argument and gets familiar with common problems in reconstructing the argument such as improper wording, missing premises and unnecessary premises. Needless to mention that the ways to avoid these problems are discussed too. Digging out arguments and evaluating them properly are significant aspects of reflecting thinking. These chapters are well designed to develop those skills in a student.

Part three consists of five chapters. It devotes on the application of the method of argument analysis. The analysis is applied to testimonial, statistical, causal and moral arguments.

The last chapter takes up two debatable issues—abortion and mathematical reasoning ability in boys and girls. Here a student comprehends the application of previously learned ideas and techniques.

There are four appendices which summarize the important ideas and principles discussed in the book. Appendix C contains answers to selected exercises. Appendix D contains a glossary. The book also contains an index. What makes the book so special is that the concepts and principles are introduced in a systematic way with several improvized definitions, finally reaching at an acceptable definition. This procedure makes a student grasp the complexity of a principle gradually and help him discard the initial view he holds of a particular issue. In addition to that, the book contains numerous examples and exercises to sharpen his understanding of the subject and the skill for argument analysis.

The book is supplemented with an instructor's manual. The manual discusses teaching ideas and contains solutions to some difficult exercises.

It is not unusual for a student to be interested in a more detailed study of some of the concepts and the problem introduced in the book. A small bibliography for each relevant chapter would have added to the richness of the book for that reason. Nevertheless, the book is undoubtedly resourceful for the students as well as for the teachers.

Gandhi Mahavidyalaya, Deogaon, Rourkela RAM C. MAJHI

KARL H. POTTER, et al. (eds.): *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. VII, *Abhidharma Buddhism to AD 150*, Motilal Banarsidass Private Limited, Delhi, 1996, pp. 636, Rs 600.00.

The study of Asian cultures and religions by European scholars in the nineteenth century was largely part of an imperialistic and missionary agenda. The European scholars appealing to history and rational criticism sought to represent the traditional faiths of the Asian peoples in a way that it could satisfy the sense of Western and Christian superiority and confirm the mythical and superstitious irrationality of the colonial people. This Western understanding of Asia tended to be universally accepted at that time. The gradual decline and transformation of this scholarship in the post-colonial era into an isolated and exotic area of Western learning is a historic phenomenon. In this context, Potter's projected *Encyclopedia* seeking to move away from old stereotypes and build a bridge between textual and traditional scholarship, on the one hand, and general philosophical interest in the West, on the other, is a most welcome enterprise.

The present volume, however, seems to depart from earlier volumes as it seems to be confined in the main to the current state of Buddhist

scholarship in American University Departments of Languages and Religious Studies. It seems to be addressed to those who would like to know the contents of *Abhidharmic* works in a general manner. Whether the general philosophical reader would find it sufficiently intelligible, remains to be seen.

This doubt arises partly owing to the fact that the volume attempts to provide brief summaries of complicated and voluminous works like the *Paṭṭhāna* or the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, partly because of the employment of a peculiar 'translation language' which would hardly be intelligible to an English reader who is not already familiar with the original texts. It is not clear why the language of the summary should seek to approximate to the language of a literal translation of the texts. Here is an example, 'Good awarenesses relating to the sensuous universe which are accompanied by contentedness, connected with knowledge and have as their supporting object something visual (that is, material) or auditory or olfactory or gustatory or tactual or a *dharma* are accompanied or followed by. . .' It is obvious that this is not a summary in current language based on the comprehension of the text but a translated text fragment. Most of the summaries are in fact lists of contents or text fragments.

This is not to deny the substantial achievement of the present volume which is to bring the realm of *Abhidharma* within the ken of the English reading student of philosophy who would find the volume a useful supplement to the study of the history of Buddhist literature and philosophy. Karl Potter has ambitiously and painstakingly sought to put together information about *Abhidharma* texts scattered in diverse languages. The order of the texts in the volume, however, creates some difficulty owing to its attempt to treat Buddhist philosophy chronologically and deal with *Abhidharma* and *Mahayana* writings side by side. Such a treatment could have a point in a history of Buddhist philosophy which could justify its own chronological decisions but hardly in an encyclopedia where the systems could be brought out more clearly in terms of their own traditional arrangement.

About one-fourth of the volume is taken up by the introduction of which the third section entitled 'Development of Abhidharma Philosophy' alone is strictly relevant. It is also the most commendable part of the introduction since it succeeds in presenting a clear summary of the best known facts relating to the theme. The first and the longest section of the introduction entitled 'The Historical Buddha and his Teachings' covers an immense ground ranging from remote historical origins of Buddhism, the life of Buddha, the original teaching of the historical Buddha, the development of early Buddhism, the councils and the division into sects and the origin of *Mahayana* to such philosophical questions as the nature of the *Catus-koti*, the problem of reconciling transmigration with the doctrine of No-self, the meaning of terms like *nāma* and *rūpa*, and moral and meditative teachings of the Buddha. However, while it commendably

seeks to connect the origins of Buddhism with proto-history, it could have profited by considering the historical links provided by the ancient *śramanic* traditions. Its treatment of the origins of *Mahāyāna* is similarly on sound lines but should have given due weight to earlier or recent researches. Although the crucial importance of the Middle Path for the understanding of Buddhist philosophy is rightly emphasized, the treatment of the *Catus-koti* comes perilously near to an attempt to justify contradictions. Excessive reliance on Bareau has the unfortunate effect of preventing any effort to discover the dialectic of *Nikāya-bheda* as has been suggested by some Indian researchers. Thus, although Dr Reat presents a fresh survey of early Buddhist history raising and discussing important questions and following some sound hypotheses, his account shows a curious unawareness of much important writing on the subject, which gives to his own essay, despite its virtues, the appearance of being simplistic.

Of the summaries the most readable are those of the *Kathāvathu, Vijñānakāya, Milindpañho* and *Mahāvibhāṣā.* The summary of the *Mahāvibhāsā* will be generally welcomed. The presentation of *Paṭṭhāna* which constitutes the heart of Theravāda *Abhidharma* leaves much to be desired.

11, Balrampur House, Allahabad G.C. PANDE

C. MABEL RICKMERS (trans. from the German translation by WILHELM GEIGER): *Cūlavaṁsa,* Motilal Banarsidass, First Indian Edition, 1996 (Two volumes in one), pp. 365, Rs 425.00.

Although not so well known as *Dīpavaṁsa* and *Mahāvaṁsa,* the *Cūlavaṁsa* is actually the more recent part added to the original and ancient *Mahāvaṁsa.* It is an important Pāli chronicle relating to the history of Sri Lanka. Geiger's work on the Ceylonese chronicle *Mahāvaṁsa* with its supplement *Cūlavaṁsa* enjoys the secure status of a classic. It has been constantly used and discussed for well over half a century. Indeed, the recent Göttingen conference on the date of the Buddha saw Geiger discussed yet once again.

The present work under review is a reprint of the English translation of the original work written in 1928. As the work has been long out of print, Motilal Banarsidass have done a great service to the world of scholarship by bringing out this Indian edition which is not only well printed but has an attractive cover and get-up.

11, Balrampur House, Allahabad G.C. PANDE

ARVIND SHARMA: *Hinduism For Our Times,* Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1996, Rs 225.00.

Hinduism For Our Times is not a book on philosophy, unless, of course, philosophy is taken very liberally. Lately, in the West, there is a spurt in the pursuit of philosophy of religion in the full-blooded spirit of hard-core philosophizing, with the application of the tools of analytical philosophy to the concepts of religion. The writings of Alvin Plantinga in general and the latest writings of William Alston are cases in point. The main focus of their philosophizing, however, centres around Christianity, or at most, Judeo-Christianity. It is but expected that further philosophizing in the area incorporating the perspectives from the other faiths, specially Hinduism, which encompasses a wide variety of religious angles of both the theistic and the non-theistic kinds, will add to the strength and richness of the enterprise in philosophy of religion as such. To be fair, the tolerance inherent in Hinduism toward other religions, that Sharma deals with at length in his book, should not act as an example to be followed for possible sociological benefits only in today's world. The tolerance, we must keep in mind, is not secular but spiritual in nature. As such, it is expected to engender a broader understanding of spirituality itself, which, to my mind, seems to be of special relevance to philosophy of religion. In this light, *Hinduism For Our Times* may be taken not only as suggesting the needs for adaptation of the age-old practices of the faith to the demands of the modern world, but also as implying the relevance of the faith to today's world at large in its search for the unifying bond of the various faiths through a common spiritual quest of humanity, which Tagore calls 'the religion of man.' The Hindu custom of the caste system which has often degenerated into an hierarchical form of institutionalized discrimination adapted at times even to torture and violence should, no doubt, adjust itself to the needs of the time. The scholars, however, must keep in mind the role of the custom in earlier times in the path of the spiritual journey of mankind, and reinterpretation of it in the *Mahābhārata,* as Sharma specifies, against possible and actual stereotyping of it even in ancient times. In his treatment of the issues the author has extensively quoted from the writings and speeches of Mahatma Gandhi and Swami Vivekananda. It would have been beneficial for us if he would have drawn on the ideas of Sri Aurobindo and Tagore, too, in so far as they relate very meaningfully to the issues discussed.

Department of Philosophy and Religion, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan SITANSU S. CHAKRAVARTI

ANNOUNCEMENT

The *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* plans to publish an issue dealing with implications of developments in modern logic for philosophy under the editorship of Prof. Anil Gupta and Dr Andre Chapuis, under the title "Circularity, Definition and Truth". Papers are invited for inclusion in this issue. Authors should send their manuscripts to the following address:

Dr Andre Chapuis
Department of Philosophy
Indiana University
Bloomington IN 47405
USA

The deadline for the submission of manuscripts is 1 July 1998. It is expected that the issue will appear some time in the year 1999.

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

Editor: DAYA KRISHNA

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Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए ऄ ē (long)
ओ ō (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ r and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as r̄)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā*, *jñāna* and not *djñāna*, *Kṛṣṇa* and not *Krishṇa*, *sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and specific) characters

ൽ ḷ
ഴ ḻ
ൺ ṇ
ർ ṛ

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa), Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaî* and not jāṇai
Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the conventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dāgaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *véve* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script. (The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for *laghu-guru* of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḻevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is