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*Continued on back cover*

# JOURNAL OF INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH

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ERRATUM

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*For* Sun Keun Kim, Department of Philosophy, Arsandey, P.O. Boreya, 834007, Ranchi, Bihar

*Read* Sun Keun Kim, Professor, Department of Philosophy, Dongguk University, Seoul, Korea

# Putting into Practice What One Professes

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I

1. Four of Plato's Dialogues, *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito* and *Phaedo*, are concerned with the trial and death of Socrates.

In *Euthyphro*, Socrates meets Euthyphro in the Porch of King Archon and tells him that he has been charged by a young man called Meletus, whom he hardly knows and who 'has a beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is ill grown',[1] with corrupting youth by denying old gods and inventing new ones. Euthyphro tells Socrates that he has himself been charged with impiety for prosecuting his father, who, as he says, has committed an unjust murder. This leads Socrates to engage Euthyphro in a discussion on the nature of piety. Euthyphro is made to advance one definition after another of piety, each of which in turn Socrates has no difficulty in showing as unsatisfactory. Euthyphro calls Socrates Daedalus who sets arguments in motion, makes them move and go round.

In *Apology*, Socrates is at his trial. He says that there are old charges against him, and there are new ones which Meletus has brought. He contends that hostility is the cause of these accusations. And, according to him, there are two causes of this hostility.

The first cause is this: Socrates narrates that Chaerephon, a one-time friend of his, once asked the oracle of Delphi whether there was anyone wiser than Socrates. And the oracle said that there was none. Socrates wondered at this, because he himself had no wisdom, great or small. He decided to meet men who were reputed to be wise, amongst politicians, poets and artisans, in order to verify the truth of what the oracle had said. And he found that they were not wise, although they thought that they were so. And he found that in this respect he was better off than they, because while, like them, he had no wisdom, unlike them, he did not think that he had wisdom. This exposure aroused hostility. But, Socrates says, 'I go about the world, obedient to the god, and search and make enquiry into the wisdom of anyone, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give to any public matter of interest or to any concern

of mine, but I am in utter poverty by reason of devotion to the god'.[2]

The second cause of hostility is this: following the example of Socrates, many young men who came to him also started exposing men reputed to be wise. And this again aroused hostility against Socrates. '... Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord; they like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to examine others; there are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me: This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth!'[3]

Socrates observes that, not accusation, but envy and detraction would be the cause of his possible destruction, as they have been and would be the cause of destruction of many good men. However, he goes on to say that, with his reputation for wisdom, he was not going to demean himself and ask for mercy. He was also not going to ask for mercy, because it would be wrong to do so. In pursuance of his oath, the function of a judge is not to yield to entreaties, but to give judgement in accordance with the laws. If he did not do so, he would be guilty of perjury. Socrates would be doing something wrong in being a party to this situation.

Socrates is sentenced to death.

In *Crito*, Crito visits Socrates in prison. He tells him that he had been allowed in at that early hour, because he knew the jailor and also had done him some kindness, and that he did not disturb him (Socrates) and waited, because, despite his impending death, he found him peacefully asleep. 'I have always thought you to be of a happy disposition; but never did I see anything like the easy, tranquil manner in which you bear the calamity.'[4]

Crito tells Socrates that he had come there to help him to escape. He tells him that he and the other friends of Socrates had enough money to arrange for his escape. He also mentions various reasons why he should escape. He says that, if he did not escape, (i) he would be playing into the hands of his enemies who wanted his destruction, (ii) he would be abdicating his responsibility towards his children, and (iii) he would be giving the people a chance to call his friends cowardly who did not help him to escape.

Socrates tells Crito that he would be guided by reason and reason alone, whatever the consequences. 'For I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which on reflection appears to me to be the best; and now that the chance has befallen me, I cannot repudiate my own words: the principle which I have hitherto honoured and revered I still honour, and unless we can find other and better principles, I am certain not to agree with you; no, not even if the power of the multitude could inflict many more



imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening us like children with hobgobling terrors.'[5]

Socrates mentions various things in reply to Crito's reasons for escaping. (i) In matters of body, the opinion of the one who knows and not of the many who do not know is to be followed; so also in matters of soul, in matters of justice and injustice. 'Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many of us say; but what he, the one who has understanding of just, will say, and what the truth will say.'[6] (ii) One should never do evil, even as an act of retaliation. '...neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever right.'[7] (iii) If he escaped, he would be violating the laws which brought him into existence and nurtured and educated him and gave him a share in every good which they could provide. But, knowing what they were, if he still remained there, then he had entered into an implied contract with them that he would do what they said. And of all people, he had entered into an implied contract with them, because he had been the most constant resident of the city. '... the halt, the blind, the maimed were not more stationary...'[8] (iv) If he escaped, he would also be doing varied harm to his children, friends and himself.

Socrates refuses to escape.

'This, dear Crito, is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that anything more which you say will be vain. Yet speak, if you have anything to say.

*Crito.* I have nothing to say, Socrates.

*Socrates.* Leave me then, Crito, to fulfil the will of God, and to follow whither he leads.'[9]

In *Phaedo*, Phaedo describes to Echecrates the last hours of Socrates' death. He tells him who were the people present, besides himself, at the time. He tells him that philosophy was discussed on the occasion, as it had been on the previous days also when they had met Socrates in prison. He reports to him on the various problems discussed. He mentions to him Socrates' argument why a philosopher is always willing to die. The argument is this: (1) death is the separation of soul and body; (2) philosopher aims at true knowledge, knowledge of true being, the essence of each thing, absolute justice, absolute good, absolute beauty, and so on; (3) this knowledge is possible only through thought or soul, unimpeded by body; (4) thus a philosopher is always willing to be with soul alone away from the body; and (5) thus a philosopher is always willing to die. Socrates goes on to say that it would be a ridiculous contradiction if philosophers were always willing to die and yet repining when death came. '... if they have been in every way the enemies of the body, and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when their desire is granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined, instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when they

arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired—and this was wisdom—and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy.'[10]

Socrates dies by taking the cup of poison which is given to him.

I have given above a brief account of Plato's *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito* and *Phaedo*. I would like to abstract from it three of the things which Socrates professes there and which he also puts into practice. These are as follows: (1) on the basis of the reasons which he mentions, one should not ask for mercy; (2) on the basis of the various things which he mentions in reply to Crito's reasons for escaping, one should not escape; and (3) on the basis of the reasons which he mentions, a philosopher should be willing to die.

2. Now, suppose, after saying all that he does in favour of not asking for mercy, not escaping and a philosopher being willing to die, Socrates agrees to ask for mercy, agrees to escape and is unwilling to die. Then there is obviously an inconsistency between what he says and what he does, between his profession and his practice. As a result, that is, as a result of this inconsistency between what he says and what he does, we find that he becomes an object of our moral condemnation, we say that he has done something which he should not have done or has done something immoral. We morally expect or require that if he says what he does, then he will also act up to it. And if he does not do so, if he deviates from his profession, then we morally condemn him. If we were to formulate the moral law underlying this attitude on our part, it would be 'One should put into practice what one professes'. This moral law is a (moral) way of bridging the gulf between what one professes and one's practice of it.

Now, take the following cases:

(1) Socrates does not put into practice what he professes, because in the course of time he finds himself lacking in those moral qualities which he needs in order to do so.
(2) Socrates does not put into practice what he professes, because in the meanwhile he finds better reasons for making some other professions which he then goes on to put into practice.
(3) Socrates professes whatever he professes. Consciously or unconsciously he may do so in order to present himself in a favourable light. But, of course, this does not mean that, while making his profession, he is not sure that he will put it into practice also. However, when the time comes, he is swayed by considerations of some personal gain and then he does not put it into practice. Socrates may go on to hide, if he can, that he has not put it into practice, or to rationalize his not doing so, or to become aggressive as a defence-mechanism about this.



In brief, Socrates does not put into practice what he professes, because he is swayed from doing so by considerations of some personal gain.

Let me go back to the second case first. It is not that Socrates does not put into practice what he professes. It is that he now finds better reasons to make a new profession in place of the old one which he then goes on to put into practice. As a result, in not putting into practice his earlier profession which he does not make any more, he is not an object of our moral condemnation. What may happen is that some people may consider his change of profession on the face of it a little intriguing or even suspect.

Let me go back to the first case next. Socrates, for example, advances a certain argument about why a philosopher should be willing to die. But, suppose that, as the time of death draws near, he is overtaken by what one may call the natural fear of death, which he is not able to conquer; and consequently in one way or another he would like to avoid being killed. We find that only an exceptional person is able to conquer this fear (and, we know, Plato does present Socrates as such an exceptional person). But suppose he is not able to conquer this fear. Then it seems to me that, while we may ridicule Socrates for his faith in the efficacy of his theory, we will find his conduct morally understandable or excusable, not morally condemnable.

Let me introduce a variation in the just-mentioned situation. Suppose that, as the time of his death draws near, Socrates is tempted to be able to continue to visit his usual haunts and engage with people in his familiar conversations, which (temptation) he is not able to resist; and consequently in one way or another he would like to avoid being killed. We find that people could normally be expected to resist this temptation, although indeed not without some difficulty. As a result, it seems to me that Socrates' conduct in the modified situation would be quite close to being morally condemnable.

Generally speaking, as far as the first case is concerned, we can say that a person's not putting into practice what he professes is sometimes morally condemnable and sometimes not. It is morally condemnable when he does not have the required moral qualities which people could normally be expected to have, although at times not without considerable difficulty. It is not morally condemnable when he does not have the required moral qualities which only an exceptional person could have. In this latter case his not putting into practice what he professes would be morally excusable.

Let me now go back to the third case. I find that, as in the first case, in the third case also, a person's not putting into practice what he professes is sometimes morally condemnable and sometimes not. It is morally condemnable when he is not able to resist his desire for personal gain which people could normally be expected to resist, although at times not without considerable difficulty, like the desire which Socrates may have

to see his children settled before he dies. It is not morally condemnable when he is not able to resist his desire for personal gain which only an exceptional person could resist, like the desire which Socrates may have to see that his wife and children were not subjected to a fatal harm which he had good reasons to apprehend to take place when he was no more there. In this latter case a person's not putting into practice what he professes would be morally excusable, not morally condemnable.

I have mentioned above the moral law 'One should put into practice what one professes'. I have also mentioned above that a person's not putting into practice what he professes is morally excusable under certain specifiable circumstances. This makes us qualify or amend the given moral law in a certain way. The moral law would now be 'One should put into practice what one professes, it being morally excusable not to do so under certain specifiable circumstances.'

I would like to ask here: are there circumstances under which a person's not putting into practice what he professes is not just morally excusable but morally justified? For example, are there circumstances under which, although he professes that a philosopher should be willing to die, Socrates is morally justified in avoiding death?

Suppose a person has been falsely charged with some serious criminal offence, which also carries with it a grave penalty. And suppose that Socrates, and he alone, has in his possession evidence to the effect that this person has been falsely implicated. Then, it seems to me that, in case he cannot make this evidence available in some other way, Socrates would be morally justified in avoiding death for the required duration in order to save that person.

Somewhat generally speaking, we can say that Socrates is morally justified in avoiding death, in case a moral value or a higher moral value is at stake.

More generally speaking, we can say that a person is morally justified in not putting into practice what he professes, in case a moral value or a higher moral value is at stake.

This preceding consideration makes us further qualify or amend the moral law 'One should put into practice what one professes'. The moral law would now be 'One should put into practice what one professes, it being morally excusable or morally justified not to do so under certain specifiable circumstances'.

I may put together in this place some definitions.

(1) A person's not putting into practice what he professes is morally condemnatory, (i) if, in not doing so, no moral value or no higher moral value is at stake, or (ii) if, in doing so, no exceptional qualities, say, exceptional moral qualities, are required.
(2) A person's not putting into practice what he professes is morally excusable, if, in doing so, some exceptional qualities, say, exceptional moral qualities, are required.



(3) A person's not putting into practice what he professes is morally justified, if, in doing so, some moral value or some higher moral value is sought to be realized.
(4) A person's putting into practice what he professes is morally heroic, if, in doing so, some exceptional qualities, say, exceptional moral qualities, are required.

3. (1) Suppose, instead of professing any of the above-mentioned three things, Socrates professes 'One should escape and take revenge against people who have falsely charged him' or 'One should treat all non-Greeks as barbarians or uncivilized people'. Would one find his not putting into practice any of these two new professions also morally condemnatory, just as one finds his not putting into practice any of his other three professions morally condemnatory? Would one rather not have a sense of what I may call moral relief at his not putting them into practice as things which are morally wrong?

I have said above that a person's not putting into practice what he professes is not morally condemnatory but morally justified, if, in not doing so, some moral value or some higher moral value is sought to be realized. I take it as a negative part of this thesis that a person's not putting into practice what he professes is not morally condemnatory but morally justified, if, in not doing so, the realization of some negative moral value is sought to be avoided. As a result, Socrates' not putting into practice any of his two new professions is not morally condemnatory but morally justified, if they have a negative moral value. And we may say that we have a sense of moral relief at Socrates' not putting them into practice, if they have a negative moral value.

It may be noted here that it is not a part of my purpose in this place to contend whether or not any of Socrates' new professions really have a negative moral value, just as it was not a part of my purpose earlier to contend whether or not any of Socrates' other professions really had a positive moral value. A part of what I have done earlier is to mention various circumstances which make us qualify or amend the moral law 'One should put into practice what one professes'. One set of these circumstances are those under which a person's not putting into practice what he professes is not morally condemnatory but morally justified. I have now maintained that Socrates' not putting into practice any of his new professions, if they have a negative moral value, is a negative part of this thesis, that is, the thesis immediately preceding.

I have made use here of the notion of moral relief. For the time being, I understand this notion to be that of relief which one may have at a person's not putting into practice his profession which has a negative moral value. In contrast to this, I make use of the notion of immoral glee. And, for the time being again, I understand this notion to be that of glee which one may have at a person's putting into practice his profession

which has a negative moral value.

(2) Plato presents Socrates as a man of wisdom, although his Socrates also never tires of saying that he has no wisdom. Now, suppose that Socrates, whom Plato presents as a man of wisdom, professes that one should not escape. And then, suppose that somebody else who does not have wisdom in that sense, say, Crito, an ordinary human being like a large many of us, professes that one should not escape. I would like to ask here the question: why is it that we expect more, as, it seems to me, we do, from the former putting into practice what he professes than we do from the latter? And, in the negative case, why is it that we morally condemn more, as again, it seems to me, we do, the former not putting into practice what he professes than we do the latter?

We may take yet another example. Suppose that a man of wisdom professes that one should practise temperance. And then, suppose that somebody else who is not a man of wisdom in that sense professes the same thing. We may ask about this example the same questions as we have done about the other example.

I find that there are two reasons for our expecting more from a man of wisdom putting into practice what he professes than from somebody else. Firstly, we expect that a man of wisdom has given enough thought to what exactly he professes and to the implications of putting it into practice. Secondly, we expect somehow that he has the qualities, say, the moral qualities, to put into practice what he professes. Let me go back to my two examples. We expect that a man of wisdom has given enough thought to what exactly it means not to escape and to practise temperance, and to the fact that, possibly among other things, not escaping implies any amount of suffering for himself and very likely also for his kith and kin; and, again, possibly among other things, practising temperance implies an arduous task of resisting temptations. Further, we expect somehow that a man of wisdom, possibly among other things, is ready to put up with suffering for himself and for his kith and kin, and again possibly among other things, has it in him to resist temptations.

I have said that we expect more from a man of wisdom putting into practice what he professes than from somebody else. It is indeed a separate question whether he does indeed do so. And I am not going into it at present.

(3) Take the following cases:

(i) Suppose a person, who is a member of an institution, is deeply annoyed with some of the things which the authorities in that institution have been doing. And then, in a state of anger, he professes that one should not belong to such an institution.

(ii) Suppose a person wants something done at a public office. He finds that the man who is responsible for doing it does not pay any attention and continues to be busy with something else. The person concerned loses his temper and then there is a verbal encounter between the two sides, the work which was to be done remaining undone. After some time the person returns home and, in boastfulness, professes that one should teach such a man a lesson.

(iii) Suppose there is a set of people idling away and chatting and cursing other people. And then, while in that light-hearted mood, they profess that one should make a nuisance of oneself to such and such people.



Now, as regards the first case, we are inclined to say that the person has professed something in a state of anger; let one wait for a little while for things to cool down, and then he may take a different view of the matter. As regards the second case, especially if the person is a habitual boaster, we are inclined to say that he has professed something in boastfulness, and therefore he is not to be taken seriously. As regards the third case, we are inclined to say that the people have professed something in a mood of lightheartedness, and therefore, again, they are not to be taken seriously. That means to say that, in all these three cases (as also in many other cases), we are inclined to say that the people profess something only apparently, but not really. That is to say, they do not profess anything; they simply utter words to that effect.

We profess something when we do so after due thought. It is possible that, even while we are giving what we claim to be due thought, extraneous factors enter into our profession. When that happens, it is evidently essential to take note of them as soon as they are discovered, and say that we do not yet have a real profession. It is, of course, possible once more that, whether we profess something only apparently or really, there would be people who morally condemn us for not putting into practice what we profess.

4. I have mentioned above several examples in which we profess something in so many words. We may call this form of professing professing explicitly. However, there is another form of professing also. In this form we profess something by living in a certain way. We may call this form of professing 'professing implicitly'. And then, *mutatis mutandis*, we may go on to say about the latter various things which I have said about the former.

(i) The moral law: we should continue to live in the way in which we profess something by living in that way.

(ii) A person's not continuing to live in the way in which he professes something by living in that way is morally condemnatory, (a) if, in not continuing to live in that way, no moral value or no higher moral value is at stake, or (b) if, in continuing to live in that way, no exceptional qualities, say, exceptional moral qualities, are required.

(iii) A person's not continuing to live in the way in which he professes something by living in that way is morally excusable, if, in continuing to live in that way, some exceptional qualities, say, exceptional moral qualities, are required.

(iv) A person's not continuing to live in the way in which he professes something by living in that way is morally justified, if, in not continuing to live in that way, some moral value or some higher moral value is sought to be realized, or negatively, the realization of some negative moral value is sought to be avoided.

(v) A person's continuing to live in the way in which he professes something by living in that way is morally excusable, if, in continuing to live in that way some exceptional qualities, say, exceptional moral qualities, are required.

(vi) As I understand that term for the time being, moral relief is a relief which one may have at a person's not continuing to live in the way in which one professes something by living in that way which has a negative moral value.

(vii) Again, as I understand that term for the time being, immoral glee is glee which one may have at a person's continuing to live in the way in which he professes something by continuing to live in that way which has a negative moral value.

5. Let me state briefly what I have tried to say in part 1 of this paper.

(1) I have said that we morally condemn a person for not putting into practice what he professes. And I have mentioned the moral law 'One should put into practice what one professes'. And then, I have mentioned the circumstances when a person's not putting into practice what he professes is not morally condemnatory, but morally excusable or morally justified.

(2) I have argued that we morally expect more from a man of wisdom putting into practice what he professes than from somebody else. And, likewise, we morally condemn more a man of wisdom not putting into practice what he professes than somebody else.

(3) I have mentioned several cases where a person does not really profess; he only uses words to that effect. And I have mentioned when it is that a person does really profess.

(4) I have distinguished between professing explicitly and professing implicitly.

(5) In the course of these various deliberations, I have defined the expressions: (i) morally condemnatory, (ii) morally excusable, (iii) morally justified, (iv) morally heroic, (v) moral relief, and (vi) immoral glee.



II

1. There is a continuing and widely prevalent belief that when one puts into practice what one professes, what it means is that, for example, Socrates professes that one should not ask for mercy in his situation and he does not do so, one should not escape in his situation and he does not do so, and a philosopher should be willing to die and he is willing to do so. In other words, when one puts into practice what one professes, what it means is that there is a straightforward conformity between what one professes and one's putting it into practice.

I would like to ask here the following two questions:

(1) Is it the case that when one puts into practice what one professes there need not always be a straightforward conformity between what one professes and one's putting it into practice, but this does not mean that there is no conformity between them? Differently expressed, is it the case that when one puts into practice what one professes, there need not always be a conformity in word between what one professes and one's putting it into practice, but this does not mean that there is no conformity in spirit between them?

(2) Is it the case that when one puts into practice what one professes, there is sometimes conformity in word between what one professes and one's putting it into practice, but there is no conformity in spirit between them?

2. In the preceding section I have used: (1) the notion of straightforward conformity or conformity *in word* between what one professes and one's putting it into practice; and (2) the notion of conformity *in spirit* between what one professes and one's putting it into practice. I would now like to determine the nature of these two notions.

Firstly, let me determine the nature of the former notion. This is done relatively easily. I have already mentioned above some examples of this notion. On the basis of these examples, we can say that we have conformity in word when what we put into practice is a mirror-image or replica, so to say, of what we profess. We profess something and then it is reproduced, so to say, in practice. I may mention here a couple of other examples of this notion: one professes that, in keeping with the Hindu system of organization of life into different stages, one should renounce the world at such and such age, and one renounces the world at such and such age; and one professes that, in keeping with the Gandhian scheme of basic education, one should send one's children to a basic education school, and one sends one's children to a basic education school.

This brings me to determine the nature of conformity in spirit.

Suppose one professes that the people should try to resolve conflicts of opinion among themselves through discussion.

Let me take the following cases in this connection:

(1) The persons A and B are engaged in discussion about whether all human beings should have certain basic rights. A is of the view that they should. According to him, their possession of these basic rights will enable them to develop in their own peculiar way, thus contributing enormously to the richness of humanity; and it will also protect them against exploitation. On the other hand, B is of the view that their possession of these basic rights will make them selfish; and even when they co-exist, they will be doing so for selfish reasons. He suggests that, instead of certain basic rights, all human beings should have certain basic concerns (for others), like some physical and mental care of other people. According to him, their possession of these basic concerns, needless to say, will contribute enormously to general human welfare; and, concerns as these are for others, there will also be no question of exploitation. A and B go on to argue in this way, until A is able to convince B, or *vice versa*, or both agree to disagree at least for the time being.

(2) The persons A and B are engaged in discussion about whether women constitute a specially suppressed class of people. A is of the view that they do. On the other hand, B is of the view that there are suppressed people among men, and there are suppressed people among women. And if we are looking for a specially suppressed class (or classes) of people, then we will not find it to consist of men merely or of women merely, but of both. And in relation to this specially suppressed class of people, we will find the suppressors among both men and women. A may continue to hold the view that women do constitute a specially suppressed class of people (while not denying that there may be other specially suppressed classes of people). And he may go on to support his contention by mentioning how throughout the ages and throughout the world, by virtue of being the weaker sex, they have been singled out for specially harsh treatment. A may go on and on in this way, giving B no further chance even to get a word in edgeways. B keeps listening to what A has been saying, trying to draw from it its quintessence, and deciding to consider it on his own most carefully.

(3) The persons A and B are engaged in discussion about whether young men and women in an educational institution should have complete freedom in respect of the sexual life which they would like to lead. A is of the view that they should. According to him, they should have complete freedom to do with their own lives what they want. On the other hand, B is of the view that if these young men and women are members of a relatively conservative society, then their having the complete freedom under consideration, at least at one go, would be a cause of a great turmoil in that society. And, further, even in a society which is rather liberal, one should not be entirely neglectful of the various consequences of this freedom. A is furious at B's argumentation, and



charges him with being an obscurantist, an enemy of liberalism. B chooses to be silent at A's outburst.

(4) The persons A and B together are involved in a controversy over something with the authorities with or under whom they work. The authorities are of the view that the controversy can only be resolved in manner m. A and B are of the view that this controversy can only be resolved in manner n. Now, as the deliberations proceed, B finds himself in a position to suggest that the controversy could perhaps also be resolved in manner o, o being some kind of a compromise position between m and n. While the authorities, after some hesitation, accept this new way of resolving the controversy, A feels let down by B for not having stuck to n in their joint opposition to the authorities. B may want to discuss with A whether he was justified in suggesting o as a means of resolving the controversy between them and the authorities, but the sense of hurt of A prevents him from reciprocating B's desire. Every move which B may make in the direction of discussion may indeed be met with a look of cold contempt by A. Now, in relation to A's attitude of not being prepared to discuss out of anger, B decides to wait, hoping that in the course of time A will eventually cool down and come round.

Now, take these four cases which I have mentioned in connection with the profession that people should try to resolve conflicts of opinion among themselves through discussion. In the first case, the discussion has the form which it would have if it conformed to its form in word. This does not, however, mean that it may not conform to this form in spirit as well. In the second case, one comes to a point where one adopts the attitude of listening to what is being said, and then considering it on one's own most carefully. In the third case, again, one comes to a point where one adopts the attitude of being silent. In the fourth case, once again, one comes to a point where one adopts the attitude of waiting and hoping that things will turn out all right in the course of time. Here it is evident that, in the latter three cases, the discussion does not have the form which it would have if it conformed to its form in word. But I take it that, in all these cases, it still does have some or the other form which it could have under the circumstances, the form of ultimately listening to what is being said and considering it on one's own most carefully, the form of ultimately being silent, and the form of ultimately waiting and hoping that things will turn out all right in the course of time.

We could say that our putting into practice what we profess would conform to what we profess in spirit, if it involves, firstly, our looking for the (inner) meaning of what we profess, secondly, our seeing what (outer) form it could take under the circumstances keeping in view its (inner) meaning, and, thirdly, our giving it that form. It could have, as in the above-mentioned first case, the form which it would have if it conformed to its form in word; or it could have, as in the other three above-mentioned cases, some other form. Evidently, in the former case,

its form in spirit would coincide with its form in word; in the latter three cases, its form in spirit would be different from its form in word.

3. Let me now return to the two questions which I have asked in section one of this part of the paper. These questions, somewhat differently and in the case of the first question somewhat briefly stated, are: (1) may it not happen that our putting into practice what we profess does not sometimes conform to what we profess in word, but it does so in spirit? and (2) may it not happen that our putting into practice what we profess sometimes conforms to what we profess in word, but it does not do so in spirit?

In section two of this part of the paper, I have tried to determine the nature of the notion of our putting into practice what we profess in word, and that of the notion of our putting into practice what we profess in spirit. And in connection with our doing the latter, I have talked of the possibility of our putting into practice what we profess in spirit coinciding with our putting into practice what we profess in word, and the possibility of our putting into practice what we profess in spirit not coinciding with our putting into practice what we profess in word.

In all, in connection with our putting into practice what we profess, there is the question concerning four possibilities:

(i) concerning the possibility of our putting into practice what we profess in word being there, and our putting into practice what we profess in spirit also being there;
(ii) concerning the possibility of our putting into practice what we profess in word being there, but our putting into practice what we profess in spirit not being there;
(iii) concerning the possibility of our putting into practice what we profess in spirit being there, but our putting into practice what we profess in word not being there; and
(iv) concerning the possibility of neither our putting into practice what we profess in word being there nor our putting into practice what we profess in spirit being there.

Now, in order to deal with the question concerning these four possibilities, let me revert to the profession that people should try to resolve conflicts of opinion among themselves through discussion. And let me suppose that the (inner) meaning of this profession is that people should try to resolve conflicts of opinion among themselves through an interchange of ideas with a view to attaining truth. Then it is possible that all this happens, and there is also the form which there would be if there was conformity in word, that is to say that it is possible that our putting into practice what we profess conforms to what we profess in spirit as well as in word. This would be our answer to the question concerning the above-mentioned first possibility. Further, it is possible that, in people's trying to resolve conflicts of opinion among themselves, there is a certain



interchange of ideas with a view to attaining truth, or there is an attempt at such an interchange; but, on account of the circumstances which are there, there is not the form which there would be if there was conformity in word, but there is some other form instead. That is to say that our putting into practice what we profess, in some way conforms to what we profess in spirit but not in word. This would be our answer to the question concerning the above-mentioned third possibility.

It may have been noted that both these possibilities have already been indicated above, the former possibility in respect of the first case mentioned in section two of this part of the paper and the latter possibility in respect of the other three cases mentioned there.

Still further, we find there to be the following two things: (a) there are occasions when, out of fatigue or boredom or lack of real interest or desire to keep up appearances, in trying to resolve conflicts of opinion among themselves, people go through all the motions of a discussion, there are questions and answers, there is the form which there would be if there was conformity in word. But, as far as one can see, there is no interchange of ideas with a view to attaining truth. That is to say that there are occasions when our putting into practice what we profess conforms to what we profess in word but not in spirit. (b) Likewise, there are occasions when, again for the same reasons as those just-mentioned, in trying to resolve conflicts of opinion among themselves, people go through all the motions of a discussion which they might do under some special circumstances, claiming to listen and consider on one's own later on or claiming to be silent or claiming to wait and hope for things to turn out all right. But once more, as far as one can see, there is no interchange of ideas or there is no attempt at such an interchange, with a view to attaining truth. That is to say that there are occasions when our putting into practice what we profess does not conform to what we profess either in word or in spirit. These two things are our answers to the question concerning the above-mentioned second and fourth possibility, respectively.

The answers which I have given here to the question concerning the four possibilities mentioned above, contain the answers to the two questions which I have mentioned in section one of this part of the paper and which I have repeated in the beginning of the present section. The answers are that our putting into practice what we profess may conform to what we profess in spirit but not in word, or it may conform to it in word but not in spirit. This shows that the continuing and widely prevalent belief that I have mentioned in the beginning of the first section, namely the view that our putting into practice what we profess means straightforward conformity to what we profess or conformity to what we profess in word, this view is not justified.

Let me state in brief what I have tried to say in part II of this paper.

(1) I have mentioned the continuing and widely prevalent belief that our putting into practice what we profess means its straightforward conformity to what we profess or its conformity to what we profess in word.
(2) I have posed two questions concerning this belief, namely the question concerning the possibility of our putting into practice what we profess conforming to what we profess in spirit but not in word, and that of the possibility of its conforming to it in word but not in spirit.
(3) I have tried to determine the nature of the notion of our putting into practice what we profess conforming to what we profess in word and that of conforming to it in spirit.
(4) As a part of showing various possibilities concerning our putting into practice what we profess conforming to what we profess in word or its conforming to it in spirit, I have tried to show that it is possible for it to conform to it in spirit but not in word, or to conform to it in word but not in spirit. And that means that the above-mentioned continuing and widely prevalent belief is not justified.

## Notes and References

1. *The Dialogues of Plato*, translated by B. Jowett, Random House, Vol. I, p. 383.
2. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 406.
3. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 406.
4. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 427
5. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 430.
6. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 431.
7. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 433.
8. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 436.
9. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 438.
10. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 451.

# Persons as Minded Beings: Towards a Metaphysics of Persons

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What I intend to do here is to argue for a metaphysical view of persons, that is, the view that persons are substances of some sort. Persons, according to this view, are minded beings, that is, they are beings who can be described as having a mental life as their constitutive feature. Thus viewed, persons can be characterized as the person-substances as distinguished from the substances in general that include material bodies. In this context, the concept of substance has to be taken broadly as standing for entities that continue to exist in space and time for a tangible period. In the minimal sense, a substance is an enduring object in the spatio-temporal world.

I shall argue that persons are not only enduring beings in space and time, but also are minded beings. In section I, I shall argue that persons persist in the spatio-temporal world as continuant beings. In section II, I shall show that persons have their metaphysical essence in being minded or self-conscious beings. In section III, I shall argue that persons transcend their bodies. In section IV, I shall defend a non-Parfitian view of persons.

## I. METAPHYSICS OF PERSONS: PERSONS AS ENDURING BEINGS

Persons belong to the spatio-temporally continuous world as much as the material bodies and other organisms do. In this respect, there is no distinction between the persons and the material bodies: both are enduring substances in space and time. The continuity in space and time is the minimal condition of a person being a continuing being.[1] That is because the person has a continuous history which can be told by himself or herself as well as by others. The biography of a person presupposes that the person has a continuous history such that it can be told and retold at different times. Besides, the biography itself is a connected story of a person's life such that one of the conditions of its being possible is that the person has continued to live over a large segment of time. If the time-segment is very small, then the biography itself will be small. But it cannot be so small that it cannot be recorded at all. If the time-segment is of one

second, then a biography will not be possible and so no person can be conceived at all. Let us imagine a one-second universe[2] in which there is time of only one second. In this universe, we cannot posit a person who can be having a biography and also who can have any memory of his past life because here the present and past lives collapse into one moment, that is, the present moment. Such a universe, though possible, cannot have persons in it, unless persons are so defined that they are beings of the single moment. Persons as continuant beings require a larger segment of time in order to be born, to live and to die. In this context, it must be taken as a condition of there being persons that there must be other continuant entities in the universe.

Persons claim substancehood precisely for the reason that they have to be individuated across a period of time. To talk, for example, about the person P, we need such individuative characteristics as uniquely identify P. That is, we must be able to tell where P is, when P was born, etc. The person P thus must be located in time and space such that he or she is described individuatively within a certain history of the world. Besides the temporal history of the person, we must provide for him or her a sortal space which can situate him or her in the range of other persons such as $P_1, P_2, P_3 \ldots P_n$. That is, a sortal identity[3] is needed for the person P to be identified and distinguished from the rest of the entities. Persons constitute a class because in the class alone we have a sortal identity of the person. Here the ontological individuality of the person perfectly matches with the requirement of sortal identity. Persons therefore ontologically belong to a natural kind[4] and thus are able to fulfil the conditions of sortal identity.

Now we can say that persons, ontologically being of a natural kind, are substances of a very unique sort in that they are living natural beings at one level and are self-conscious and minded beings at another. The person-substance claims existence as a continuant being and at the same time is capable of self-description of himself or herself. The self-description includes his or her awareness that he or she is a solid, continuing being in the world. Thus, spatio-temporal continuity must be recognized as a minimum logical condition of being a person.

The person-substances are, however, not merely a set of properties, physical or mental, because they are not fully exhausted in their descriptions. The descriptions of the persons as having such and such properties, however complete, still presuppose that there are persons who are in themselves substances having those properties. Among the properties of the persons, the most important are their physical and psychological properties such as 'being at such and such time and place', 'having such and such colour and weight', 'being in the state of anger', 'being in the state of joy', etc. These properties are the Strawsonian M-predicates and P-predicates, respectively. What is significant about them, as Strawson[5] has pointed out, is their co-applicability to the same person-



substance such that in this case alone they are jointly ascribable to the same subject. Independently, the M-predicates have a logic of their own that prohibits them from being ascribable to the conscious beings, and so is the case with the P-predicates that cannot be ascribed to the material bodies at all. Even then the person is the subject of both because the person is a unique substance of its kind such that it can be having the apparently conflicting predicates. Persons thus constitute a unique kind of substance that has both physical as well as mental properties without being reducible to either of them. Their personhood is of the type of living organisms that have the higher order phenomena such as being minded, that is, being self-conscious. There is no conflict between the lower order property of being an animal organism and the higher order property of being a minded being. That is the reason why the person-substance is not exhausted by the properties, since it keeps room for an unlimited way of being described which includes what Nozick[6] calls the acts of self-synthesizing and reflexive self-referring. The most important way of describing a person is the self-description which has the components of self-reflective descriptions and references such as 'I am RCP', 'I am born to parents of humble means', etc. These self-reflective and indexical acts of talking about oneself bring in the important concept of self or person which is not one of the properties ascribed to the self. Self or the person is irreducible to properties in this sense.

## II. METAPHYSICS OF PERSONS: PERSONS AS SELF-CONSCIOUS BEINGS

The being of a person lies in one's own reference to oneself as an 'I', that is, in being oneself a self-referring person. This paves the way for the fact that persons are beings of such a sort that they can recognize themselves as persons and can be conscious of themselves as beings that can describe themselves in certain ways. The person is aware that he or she has a body, that the body is a gift of the parents and that it is a part of Nature and so on. This description takes into account the body of the person. But that is not enough; there are other features of the person that need description such as their having a mind and their having mental states such as pain, suffering, joy, etc. The description of a person as a soul[7] seems appropriate in the sense that the persons are conscious of themselves as selves and are the self-conscious agents of actions without being aware of the fact that they have also physical bodies. This distancing from the body is a part of the person's being a self-conscious agent. The description of a person as a soul is not rare and is not impossible either, because it shows the way a person can be described without reference to his or her body. The possibility of this description, however, does not have the ontological commitment that persons are spiritual substances without bodies.

Persons are persons and that is the basic ontological reality. The body and soul or mind are the ways the persons are described and so, to say that

persons have bodies and minds is not to open up the possibility of the Cartesian dualism. It is because if persons are substances, then the body and the mind cannot be substances and so must have only attributive status. This is the kind of thesis which has the sanction of metaphysics in not allowing the body-mind dualism and the consequent incoherence in the concept of a person. As it has been noted by the anti-Cartesian and the anti-Lockean philosophers, the human persons are not accidental entities in the world of material and spiritual substances. If persons are the Lockean conscious beings, then persons in a sense will be accidental beings in that they would hardly be distinguishable from parrots and other machines that could be conscious by accident. Similarly, if they are the Cartesian souls or the mental substances, they would not be very different from the thinking trees or the talking pots in the fictions. Therefore the persons cannot be souls or conscious substances as such; they have no doubt souls or minds, or at best can be characterized as mental or minded beings. The attribute of being minded shows that there is a definite way in which persons can necessarily be described as minded beings.

Being minded is to have the mind or to have the capacity of doing the mental activities. Such activities include thinking, willing, feeling, understanding, speaking, communicating and, above all, remembering the past. These activities include all that human beings have in general the capacity for. Mental activities are such that they presuppose that there is a thinker who is capable of these activities. There is, besides, the brain that is the seat of all these activities. Remembering is as much dependent on the brain as thinking is and so there is a physical location for these activities in the brain.[8] Without the physical basis, the mental activities cannot be realized. But this does not suggest that the mental activities are nothing other than the brain activities as the identity theorists would say. Mental activities are descriptionally self-sufficient, though they are causally supervenient on the brain and the body as such. There is autonomy[9] of the mind in relation to the body though the latter is causally subvenient to the mind. It is because we cannot think of a mind without a body. The autonomy granted to the mind is only partial because mind is not causally self-sufficient, though descriptionally it is. That is, when we describe the person as a minded being, we are not constrained to say that it is a material body associated with mental attributes. What we are constrained to say is that persons are minded substances such that we are giving a self-complete description of the persons in saying that they are minded beings. No such completeness is available in describing the persons as embodied material beings.

To be a person therefore is not to be a body of some kind, not even a body of the complex kind.[10] It is because persons are more than their bodies and that they are not reducible to any kind of body, gross or subtle. The person-substances as described above are not taken to exclude the



material properties as such. They only exclude the fact that persons are material bodies and nothing else. Persons are autonomous so far as their description in terms of bodies and minds is concerned. But it is not that no reference to body and mind is to be retained at all. Person-descriptions have the attributive reference to body and mind. After all, persons are minimally described as continuing conscious entities in space and time. But that is no constraint on the fact that person-substances are not bodies as such or minds as such.[11]

The fact underlying the idea of a person is the possible recognition of oneself as a subject or a self that can make self-ascription of predicates such as thinking, remembering, choosing, etc. These predicates are as much self-ascribable as other-ascribable, but there is a distinct logical compulsion for self-ascription in the case of one's realization that one is a person. There is therefore a distinct logical autonomy for the self-description of persons as subjects. This subjective point of view cannot be replaced by a purely objective point of view[12] as in the subjective view lies the clue as to how one can be a self or a person as such.

### III. THE FIRST PERSON AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL SELF

It is the capacity to become the first-person—the 'I'—which makes someone a person. The person is primarily a first-person who can call himself or herself a unique self, an 'I' distinguishable from others. The 'I' is not the name of someone, as Wittgenstein[13] points out; it is myself. Whereas RCP is the name of a human being, the 'I' stands for myself. Thus the 'I' cannot be substituted by 'RCP'. The first-person is therefore not the description of any human being; it refers to the person himself or herself. Here also it can be mentioned that whereas the human being can be traced out physically as a body, or as an animal organism, the 'I' cannot be so traced, though the locus of the 'I' is my body itself.

The person-substance as a minded being tends to be the 'I' or the self in the sense that, though it is a continuant being in the spatio-temporal world, yet it does not belong to the world[14] in the way the human being belongs. For example, RCP as a human being is very much a part of the world, but the 'I' or the self is not an entity in the world at all. Among the items constituting the world, the self is not included. The person as self cannot enter the world so to say.[15] The fact is that the self is not a physical body to be counted in the world. Hence there is a sense of transcendence underlying the concept of self, though it does not mean that selves or persons for that matter are mysterious entities.

Now the problem arises, if the person is a continuant being as a substance, how can he or she not belong to the world? That is, persons as substances are bound up with the world. So, it may be argued, the self or the person must be either a material body or a soul-substance belonging to the world. But this need not be the case. First of all, the

person as a continuant being does not have to be only a material body, though it will have the bodily organism. Secondly, in order to be a self, it need not be a soul-substance; all that is needed is the person's capacity to distance himself or herself from the body. The person as a self is a transcendent being in this limited sense. Thus the person combines in himself or herself the capacity to exist in the world as a spatio-temporal being and at the same time has the capacity to transcend the body. That is why, though the 'I' cannot exist without a physical locus, it cannot be the physical locus itself. Persons therefore cannot be reduced to their bodies or the organisms which are their loci.

The concept of a person is a metaphysical concept like the concept of self, and therefore is not merely a social or a forensic concept.[16] It is metaphysical precisely because it shows how it can be used to describe the minded being as the unique substance which is not identical with the body, though it is necessarily linked with the body. That is to say that persons have material bodies and yet are not on the same level as the physical bodies or organisms. On one level, the persons are human beings and have the history of an organism belonging to a natural kind, and on another, they are not physical beings at all and they transcend their physical existence. Thus there are two perspectives of a person, the subjective and the objective, as Nagel points out, both harmoniously co-existing.[17] However, it is not the case that the subjective being of the self is a mere coincidence but it is the hard metaphysical fact that the person or the self is a substance or solid being.

The argument for the metaphysical being of the person is that a person cannot be a mere a social construction, or a forensic reality. The persons are metaphysical beings who could be all these and yet must claim an ontological reality in the sense that they could not be what they are without a metaphysical essence. Two features of the persons must be noted here: one is their metaphysical essence that lies in their being minded beings, that is, in their being conscious, and the other is their unity or solidity which lies in their being not open to dissolution or dissipation in the non-physical sense. Purely physical bodies of course get dissolved, but can this happen to the persons themselves?

## IV. MYSELF AND MY PARFITIAN SURVIVORS

Persons being substances that occupy space and time, it is inevitable that they come into being and also go out of existence. This necessarily happens to natural beings in so far as they are spatio-temporal continuants. Persons are also natural beings in the minimum and therefore the fact of their being subject to annihilation is beyond doubt. But this does not entail that the persons meet the same fate as their bodies. Bodies are annihilated, but persons die. Even the dead persons outlive their bodies since in death also people live in the socio-cultural sense. That is to say



that persons live even when they are physically no more. This may be called social immortality of persons which is secured because of interpersonal relationships.

Now the question arises: can persons survive beyond their body in a metaphysical sense? This question cannot have a straightforward answer. There have been many thought-experiments regarding the possibility of disembodied survival and also about the survival of a person in another body and so on. But all such cases of body-switch, brain-fission and disembodied existence have the same presupposition that persons are different from their bodies and so they can survive in varying degrees without a body. There is no doubt that it is logically possible that persons can survive without bodies but it is not actually the case that persons exist without bodies. As we have already argued, the physical body is the necessary causal locus of a person and therefore it cannot be denied that actual persons are embodied beings in the world.

Since, however, we have made a metaphysical distinction between the person and the bodily organism, we have to admit that the person's continuity is not the same as the continuity of a body. The personal continuity is a matter of the continuity of the personality, memory and other aspects of the mental life. Given this mental continuity, it is reasonable to suppose that persons can survive as long as their mental life continues to exist. Parfit[18] has argued that persons survive on the basis of psychological continuity and not because of identity, including the psychological identity. According to him, there are different degrees in which selves can be continuous with one another; for example, we can imagine a series of selves $S_1$, $S_2$, $S_a$ . . . $S_n$ which are psychologically continuous. In this case, the selves are not identical at all, but have some memory-links that bind them together as the person-stages of the same self S. Here we find the survivors of S which, without being identical, are yet linked with one another so much so that $S_n$ is an incarnation of S. Thus, according to Parfit, identity does not matter in survival.[19]

The Parfitian survivors, however, are not actual, though they are perfectly possible. It is conceptually difficult to imagine the self that is remotely related to me in some future time. Even if such a self is possible, it is not necessary that it has anything to do with me. I cannot be held responsible for what the remote future self does. Besides, it cannot entertain the same substancehood that I enjoy in the neighbourhood of other persons. My solidity as a being gets absolutely thin in the case of my future Parfitian survivor. The survivor-self may not have the same moral and mental life like mine and so there is no ground on which I can say that that self in future is me.

The brain-fission cases are no less unusual and so factually impossible. The brain may get diversified into many brain-parts each living as an island of consciousness, but it cannot be that each is a survivor of the original person having the brain. First of all, the brain or the brain-part

is not a person, and secondly, even if each brain is the locus of the memory of a person, it cannot be the case that the brain-part carries the entire memory of the original person. The so-called islands of consciousness cannot be the reincarnations of the original self. Thus the brain-fission cases do not carry conviction in upholding the possibility of survival of persons.

The substance theory of person does not commit itself to the fact that there is survival of all bizarre kinds such as the disembodied souls,[20] the Parfitian survivors, etc. Nonetheless, it holds that persons are not material bodies and that persons outlive their bodies. It is arguable that persons, being metaphysical beings, are imaginable apart from their bodies, but they cannot exist without their bodies. This prohibits them from existing in any body other than one's own. That is, the body-switch cases also fail to tell how I can exist in the body of another when my personhood is so much causally, if not metaphysically, dependent on my body. As Wittgenstein has said, 'the human body is the best picture of the human soul'[21] and in that sense my body is the best picture of my soul. So it is not the case that I can be the same person in another body notwithstanding the fact that it is imaginable that I can occupy another body.

Even my closest continuers in Nozick's sense[22] do not qualify to make me the same person. They are after all not the same continuants as me and are not the same substances as me. Between me and my closest continuer, there is a metaphysical gap: I am a different substance from that of the closest continuer. So the uniqueness of mine denies that I can be a person in another body, or that my memory alone will suffice to make me the same person as the closest continuer of mine. There is a metaphysical absoluteness about the persons as substances.

## Notes and References

1. See David Wiggins, *Sameness and Substance,* Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, Chapter 6. The concept of substance need not be synonymous with 'spiritual substance', 'subject' 'Pure ego', etc., as Shoemaker mentions in his *Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity.* Allied Publishers, Bombay, New Delhi, 1971, Chapter 2, especially pp. 41–48.
2. Cf. Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics,* translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, for a similar conception of a two-minute man doing mathematics in a two-minute world.
3. Wiggins, op. cit., Chapter 3.
4. Cf. Putnam, 'The Meaning of "Meaning"' in *Mind, Language and Reality,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975.
5. P.F. Strawson, *Individuals: an Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics,* Methuen, London, 1959, Chapter 3.
6. Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations,* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981, pp. 71–114.
7. See Quinton, 'The Soul', *Journal of Philosophy,* LIX, 15 (1962) for a non-materialist conception of a person.
8. Wiggins, *Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity,* Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971, p. 51.



9. See Davidson, 'The Mental Events' in *Essays on Actions and Events,* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, pp. 207–27.
10. See Bernard Williams, 'Are Person Bodies?' in *Problems of Self,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973. See also Mrinal Miri, *What Is a Person,* Shree Publishing House, Delhi, 1980, Chapter I.
11. Cf. J. Shaffer, 'Persons and Their Bodies', *Philosophical Review,* LXXV, I, 1966, pp. 59–77.
12. See T. Nagel, *The View from Nowhere,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, Chapter IV.
13. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953, sect. 410.
14. See Nagel, op. cit. See also Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961, 5,632 and *Philosophical Investigations,* sect. 398.
16. See Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* J. Yolton, (ed.) Dent, 1961, for the view that 'person' is a forensic concept.
17. Nagel, op. cit.
18. See Derek Parfit, 'Personal Identity', *Philosophical Review,* LXXX, 1971, pp. 3–24. See also his *Reasons and Persons,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 1986, Chapter 13.
19. Ibid.
20. See P.K. Mohapatra, *Personal Identity,* Santosh Publications, Cuttack, 1983, for further discussion on disembodied persons.
21. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* Part II, iv, p. 178.
22. See Nozick, op. cit. Also see Harold W. Noonan, *Personal Identity,* Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and New York, 1989, for further discussion on the closest continuer theory.

# The Rationale of Reactive Attitudes

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Reactivity, the very mark of our interpersonal life, it is felt, needs to be provided with some rationale in order to counter the attack from the scientistic philosophers who try to label the former as 'irrational'—the 'rational', in this view, being the suspension of it, and treating everything, including human activity, as destined and, for that reason, unworthy to be praised or blamed. This need is felt because the entire edifice of our interpersonal and moral life would be in peril if the said attack is not properly met. And we suppose our moral life is worth that name, that is, moral evaluation in praise-blame language is not ordinarily thought to be without grounds. The upholders of the deterministic thesis maintain that since everything is determined there is no point in our reacting to somebody else's activities which in this or that way affect our interests. A person P does X, and it affects another person $P_1$'s interest in a way *w*; $P_1$ reacts to P in *r*—this is an ordinary affair. But if $P_1$ knows that P could not have acted otherwise than doing X, then $P_1$ does not react in *r*. Or if he so reacts his reacting would be 'irrational'. Thus runs the argument of the determinist. But P.F. Strawson goes to establish in his celebrated essay 'Freedom and Resentment'[1] that people do react to each other without caring for the truth or falsity of the thesis of determinism, hence the latter, even if true, cannot deter them from reacting in the way they do.

Throughout the essay, Strawson tries to strengthen the logic of the 'optimists'. He holds that the concepts of moral responsibility and obligation are associated with, are manifested in, the reactive attitudes we show towards others or towards ourselves. These reactive attitudes are distinguished as personal, moral and self-reactive attitudes. The point he emphasizes is that holding of these reactive attitudes is the very mark of our leading a participatory life, and the zeal to lead such a life is built into the very nature of our being. So it happens to be an accepted truth of life that we often react with resentment and gratitude, moral approval and condemnation, pride and remorse—corresponding to the three different types of reactive attitudes mentioned above. Reacting in these ways, in most cases, was not proved pointless. Hence the thesis of determinism, whatever it might mean, whether true or false, cannot have any bearing upon our holding of different reactive attitudes.

True, under some particular conditions we suspend these reactive attitudes because it would 'not seem natural or reasonable or appropriate'.[2] But this suspension is not because of the truth of a general theory of determinism.

In his ingenious essay 'Reactive attitudes, Rationality and Determinism' Professor Rajendra Prasad makes an attempt to show that determinism can be given a meaning in which to accept it would be to deny the concept of responsibility. This is just the contrary of what Strawson has held in 'Freedom and Resentment', namely, that the thesis of determinism, whether true or false, has no bearing upon our holding of reactive attitudes including moral ones and, hence, upon the concept of responsibility. The sense of determinism which Prasad has in mind when he speaks of its giving a form so as to make reactive attitudes as well as moral evaluation pointless is the one as it is 'ordinarily understood'—

> a general theory about the world, or about human action, according to which when an agent does something, it is not possible for him to have avoided doing it, or to have done something else.[3]

As he says, Prasad begins with a standpoint which is similar to that of Strawson. He claims himself to belong to the same group as Strawson, the members of which do not 'know' what the thesis of determinism is. But he finds that from an analysis of the reactive attitudes one cannot come to a Strawsonian conclusion to the effect of otioseness of determinism in our moral as well as inter-personal life. What makes him unhappy with what Strawson has so boldly asserted is his exploration of the logic of reactive attitudes.

According to Prasad, it is logically meaningful to hold reactive attitudes only when we can associate with them a hope that the agent towards whom, or towards whose action, we hold such an attitude is likely to be influenced in his behaviour by our so reacting.

But the providing of such a rationale to Strawson's reactive attitudes makes Prasad a moral pressurist—a utilitarian of the Schlickian camp. In so rationalizing the irrationalizable Prasad seems to rule out any point in evaluating the moral worth (a reactive attitude) of anything incorrigible. So, 'gratitude to a now-dead benefactor, anger at a still unidentified thief, resentment towards an oppressor whom one hopes never to see again'[4] all become irrational on this view.

What Prasad is concerned with throughout his paper is to find out the rationale for our holding of reactive attitudes in the case of determinism's being a true theory. And, in his analysis, he has come to meet with a failure to find any. Consequently he concludes:

> We may then think that human nature is infected with logical depravity because it is committed to have attitudes which in point of logic, it ought not to have. . . It (the human nature) would now appear to be eternally condemned to be incurably irrational.[5]



In order to rationalize it, he maintains, Strawson has either to reject determinism like a libertarian or to find out a way through it like a compatibilist determinist. He has to spell out in detail the nature of determinism and cannot simply ignore it as irrelevant by appealing to facts.

It appears that Strawson's thesis cannot be provided with a rational justification. The only justification we have for it is an empirical one. Can we not also call it an ethical justification? Yes, but Prasad would say that ethics has been, or can be, robbed of its foundation by the logic of determinism. And it appears to be a serious threat to our moral life as well as to moral personhood.

But is the threat as serious as it appears to be? To be sure, Prasad puts a theoretical question which he wants to be answered without appealing to facts. But this demand for an *a priori* answer is not justified since at least one of the concepts he makes use of in framing the problem (namely, reactive attitudes) is not an *a priori* concept. It is a matter of fact concept which requires some empirical verification. Prasad cannot, for example, say, 'If determinism (a theory) in its specified sense is, or is supposed to be, true then our reactive attitudes—*no matter what we mean thereby*—will be affected.' He has exactly the same things in his mind as Strawson when he speaks of reactive attitudes. They are facts of our life. That means he himself uses an empirical concept. Hence he cannot deny Strawson that privilege to refer to empirical facts. And if, reluctantly though it may be, he grants that privilege, a conclusion as to the falsity of determinism may be drawn in the following way:

*Argument 1:* If determinism (in the specified form) is, or is supposed to be, true, then our reactive attitudes will be affected (Prasad).
Our reactive attitudes are not affected (empirical fact).
Therefore, determinism (in the specified form) is not true.

However, Prasad will not be satisfied with this argument since he has never held the contrary of the conclusion we have arrived at. He insists on the logical possibility of its being true; and if true it is not irrelevant, as Strawson supposes it to be, to our holding of reactive attitudes. But can we ask him to derive a further conclusion therefrom—that is, if determinism in the specified form is not irrelevant to our holding of reactive attitudes then what *observable facts* would follow? If he refuses to give any answer on the plea that he is only raising a theoretical question and he has no business with observable facts then we may reject his hypothesis as idle—being incapable of deductive development. It remains unverifiable, and for that reason unestablished. If this persuasion makes him answer, obviously reluctantly, in the way we desire it to be, namely, 'then our reactive attitudes will be affected', then we get his hypothesis falsified by connecting this with the same empirical fact-statement used in the Argument 1.

*Argument 2:* If determinism in its specified form is not irrelevant to our holding of reactive attitudes, then if determinism is true, our reactive attitudes will be affected.
Our reactive attitudes are not affected.
Therefore, determinism in its specified form, if true, is irrelevant to our holding of reactive attitudes.

The validity of this argument can be seen by symbolizing it as:

$$P \supset (q \supset r)$$
$$\sim r$$
$$\therefore q \supset \sim p$$

Howsoever strong or weak this may count to be, still it may serve as a defence of Strawson from Prasad's attack, and we may happily hope to remain not irrational in reacting.

However, Strawson in his present position has accepted that 'the surrender of reactive attitudes would leave us more exclusively *ratiocinative* creatures than before'.[6] It would 'impoverish' our ordinary participatory life.

> We cannot be obliged to give up something whose loss would gravely worsen the human condition, and so reactive feelings cannot be made impermissible by any facts, for example, the fact that men are natural objects.[7]

Prasad's objection is that we undoubtedly do react to others, and also to ourselves. But this reacting is made 'irrational' by the possibility of determinism's being true. Here, it appears, a distinction may be drawn between 'irrational' and 'non-rational' to protect the position of P.F. Strawson. 'Irrational' here would mean 'against reason' and 'non-rational' would mean that which does not fall within the purview of reason. Our affective elements which are the sources of our reactive attitudes are not 'irrational' but 'non-rational'. Hence Prasad need not be in any 'intellectual discomfort', to borrow a terminology from Ayer[8] for having been 'condemned to be incurably irrational' to use another phraseology of Prasad. For those non-rational elements do not come into conflict with what appears to him quite rational. They can be very well accommodated in our rational life. From this point of view Strawson's thesis may be re-emphasized: whatever the *rational* thesis of determinism may mean, our *non-rational* reactive attitudes may still be held.

But how far are we justified here in accompanying Prasad in maintaining that the thesis of determinism, understood in the sense in which it would leave no room for agential freedom, would make our participatory reactions (all morally overtoned) irrational or even non-rational? An obvious implication of accepting this is that to be rational, we have to suspend our reactive attitudes once and for all and accept the life as destined. To borrow an example from Prasad: If I throw a doll from the



fifth floor of a building, then by virtue of the law of gravity, it will of necessity touch the ground. Now the kind of determinism in question determines not only the doll's touching the ground, but also my engaging in the activity of throwing it. Here I am left with no option than to throw the doll from the fifth floor of the building. And this logically rules out any possibility of my being held responsible. Human beings are no more viewed as free agents, but as programmed computers. But if we are programmed to act in the way we do, we are also programmed to have reactive feelings and attitudes, again as we do. They are not irrationalized by the thesis of determinism. This is a 'category-mistake' of the Rylean kind, employed in a different sense, into which Prasad lapses by viewing determinism as an all-embracing thesis and reactive attitudes as not falling within it. Or rather it should be seen as a logical inconsistency in allowing determinism to leave no room for agential freedom and at the same time to think of reactive attitudes as springing out of our free will. Everything being determined, the so-called free will is also determined. In other words, we are free within the boundaries of determinism. Hence we hold reactive attitudes, ascribe responsibility, praise and blame people for their action—all in the full spirit of freedom. All these may be determined in a broad sense—but that need not concern us. There cannot, *ex-hypothesi*, remain any one unaffected by this universal determinism in order to judge our participatory life as irrational. Once more, determinism, even if proved to be a true theory, is not relevant to our holding of reactive attitudes.

Destined to be persons as we are we cannot help reacting as we do. The reacting pre-supposes responsibility on the part of the agent, which in its turn implies freedom of the agent to do what he chooses. Hence we are left with no alternative but to accept freedom as a fact of nature. The reactive nature is built into the very ontology of person. This is not a 'pragmatic commitment' as Professor Prasad holds. Viewing it as pragmatic, and not ontological, is the result of the failure to see ourselves and our fellow beings as persons. This is however not to accept the position of a libertarian who denies the thesis of determinism. This is also not to accept the compatibilistic position and to find a way for freedom through determinism. Rather this is to admit the reality of both—freedom and determinism, in a way that the acceptance of one does not necessitate the denial of the other. From one point of view, that is, as parts of nature, our actions are determined or caused; from another, that is, as persons, or responsible moral agents, they are free in so far as they are caused by our desires and intentions. Borrowing the terminology of Ryle, freedom and determinism may be said to belong to two 'different categories'. Hence any solution to the problem in terms of preferring one to the other is bound to fail. The question of rationality or non-rationality of our reactive nature does arise from such an attempt to prefer determinism to freedom.

So, we conclude with Strawson that we are not programmed automata but persons. And as persons we are *determined to be free* even though it seems to involve a contradiction in terms. Any further enquiry from this stand-point would lead us to the question: 'why should there be a concept of person?' and this seems to be tantamount to asking 'why am I what I am?' For these questions we do not seem to have any answer at hand.

[This article was sent to P.F. Strawson, before it was given the final shape, for comment and reply. While appreciating the spirit of my article he writes in a letter addressed to me:

> It is indeed possible to see us, at one level, as physical objects whose physical movements are subject to natural law; but this should not exclude recognizing that we are also, and equally naturally, autonomous agents capable of intentional action and as such the natural objects, and subjects, of the reactive attitudes. However, I would add that the 'compatibilism' about freedom outlined by me in the longest paragraph on p. 431 of the ICPR volume (in my reply to Prof. Prasad) seems to me a legitimate fallback position for anyone disinclined to accept the stronger view of the total irrelevance of the determinist thesis. Finally, I do not myself think it a matter of great moment to make decisions about the limits of the extension of the concept person. As far as we terrestrials are concerned we can safely treat it as equivalent to human being.]

## Notes and References


1. P.F. Strawson, *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays*, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1974.
2. Ibid., p. 6.
3. R. Prasad, 'Reactive Attitudes, Rationality and Determinism' in *The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson*, P.K. Sen and R.R. Verma, (eds.) ICPR, New Delhi, 1995, p. 350.
4. J. Bennett, 'Accountability' in Z. Van Straaten, (ed.) *Philosophical Subjects*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, p. 45.
5. R. Prasad, op. cit., p. 373.
6. Strawson's reply to Ayer, *Philosophical Subjects*, p. 261 (adapted).
7. J. Bennett, op. cit., p. 29.
8. A.J. Ayer, 'Free Will and Rationality' in Z. Van Straaten (ed.), *Philosophical Subjects*.


# Theory of *Yukti* or Argument-Unit

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Informed and educated by *pramāṇa* as '*natural*' process of human cognition providing natural universal principles true for all humans without exception, such as the principle of *utsargakaraṇa/anugamana-karaṇa, anumānakaraṇa* and *upamānakaraṇa*, we seek to make our *samvāda vyākrta-samvāda*.[1] This we achieve by taking *utsargakaraṇa, anumānakaraṇa* and *upamānakaraṇa* as *analogues* for reasoning so as to model a structure, called *yukti*, accordingly. *Yukti* therefore is a piece of reasoning or an argument-unit which helps us *prove* propositions already known by *sakṣāta* or measurement or (experimental) observation to be true, or, it helps us uncover/derive *new* universal propositions that are increasingly more and more general or cosmically universal on grounds of the ones already known or established. Since propositions or *vākyas*[2] are presumably constituents of a *yukti* which must have a clear-cut division between *sādhana* and *sādhya*, we may ask how a *vākya-rāśi* differs from *yukti*. Although a *vākyarāśi* is compounded of *vākyas*, it differs from *yukti* in several ways. Firstly, in *yukti* the order of *vākyas* is a central feature so that *sādhana vākyas* come first and *sādhya vākya* follows later. Such order, which is determined by the connectives that occur in it, however, is not a matter of rule in a *vākyarāśi*. Secondly, *yukti* possesses the property of *transitivity*, that is, a property by virtue of which *sādhya* follows of necessity from *sādhana* giving rise to a definite situation of acceptance or *swikārya saṁsthiti* which property is never shown by a *vākyarāśi*. Thirdly, in the *yukti* the *sādhana vākyas* themselves have an order so that the *hetu-vākya* is stated first and *udāharaṇa vākya* afterwards. We may say a *yukti* is essentially one that begins with a *hetu-vākya* and ends with a *nigamana-vākya* whatever the intervening *vākyas* may be. Fourthly, a *yukti* differs from *anumāna* also in that the *hetu* and *nigamana* propositions in *anumāna* are by and large of the present, or past, or future, whereas in the *yukti*, all propositions are by and large tritemporal or *traikālika*. Thus, following the model of *derivation* in *pratīkabhāṣā samvāda* or *gaṇita* we agree that *yukti* is not a proposition-*rāśi* but a *schema*. In a schema we do not insist on complete proof including *pratijñā vākya* as well as *upanaya vākya* but mention only *hetu vākya* and *udāharaṇa vākya* as premises and *nigamana vākya* as conclusion. The proof, however, can always be constructed on demand.[3] Thus, although in a schema we are kept in suspense about the conclusion till it is stated, we

are nevertheless certain that the result will follow when rules of derivation/inference are *correctly* applied—only, we are blind about it till these are applied and the process of derivation completed. Moreover, following the model of *vāgbhāṣā saṁvāda*, we accept the natural principle of *transitivity* as in *utsargakaraṇa/anugamanakaraṇa, anumānakaraṇa* and *upamānakaraṇa*—as a universal principle true for all humans without exception. Thus, in our effort at *vyākṛti* of *vāgbhāṣā samvāda*, we conceive of *yukti* as that in which transitivity is ensured by means of a mediating *udāharaṇa vākya* or ever true/well-established *siddhānta*.[4] Thus, as a schema, *yukti* is the instance of *vyākṛta-saṁvāda-gaṇita* or *vyākṛta saṁvāda* in *pratīkabhāṣā*. Finally, a *vākya* is that which has the property of being true–false or *satyāsatya* whereas a *yukti* is that which is valid–invalid or *siddhāsiddha*. A *yukti* is thus an encaptulated *model* of *rationality* and *truth*. A theory or *siddhāntatantra* is a garland in which *yuktis* are threaded *(sūtraṇa)* and a garland is always a closed whole in which each 'pearl' has a definite place. Generally, a *yukti*, when unfolded, will be found to have more than two *sādhana vākyas* (at least implicitly) and this is quite in line with *gaṇita* model of derivation for in derivations there can be no restriction to the number of *sādhana vākyas* that lead to *phala*.

*Yukti* becomes possible because informed of *pramāṇa siddhi* and *transitivity* and the consequent natural principles of validation that work in the human mind/perceptual experience, we proceed to deploy/apply them *consciously* in our *saṁvāda* or reasoning so as to generate more of genuine knowledge which is true and to achieve not only more numerous universal propositions but also the ones having increasingly higher and higher universality. In other words, we consciously pursue *vyākṛta saṁvāda* that is now governed by disclosed universal principles of human nature and in this we are guided by the model of *pramāṇa siddhi* itself. That alone can be the justification for the transitivity we allow and the *siddhi* we claim to achieve of the conclusions or *nigamana-vākya*. *Yukti* may therefore be said to be the expression of *vyākṛta saṁvāda* upon discovery of underlying universal principles of *saṁvāda* by study of *prākṛta saṁvāda* itself.

It is presupposed in a *yukti* that its terms are *sārthaka* and its *vākyas satya*, for then only can it be *siddha*. It is clear that both grammar/*vyākaraṇa* and epistemology/*pramāṇa* are presupposed in *yukti* for the former alone can provide criteria for terms being *sārthaka* and the latter alone can provide the criteria of *vākyas* being *satya*. A term is *sārthaka* when it presents the *artha* as it is otherwise *anarthaka*. (*Anarthaka* is not the same as *nirarthaka* for while the former falsely utters absence or presence of *specific artha*, the latter utters of no *artha* whatever and we must ensure that the later situation also does not arise in *vyākṛta saṁvāda*).

Now, *yukti* differs from *vyākhyā* or explanation in a fundamental sense in that the order of *hetu* and *nigamana* is just reversed in the latter. Thus, if the *yukti* is that *Dukha hotā hai/ ∴ Saṁyoga hotā hai*, then the *vyākhyā* (of *dukha*) will be: *Saṁyoga hotā hai/∴ Dukha hotā hai*. This means that in a



*yukti*, we discover the cause, while in *vyākhyā* we employ this discovery for explaining the phenomenon itself which served as evidence for discovery of the cause. The insistence of ancient seer-thinkers for putting forth *pratijñā* before the *hetu* itself and for giving a complete proof for establishing the *pratijñā* suggests that they were employing it primarily for discovery of causes and were cautious only about the form of proof (*siddha rūpa*) not of *avayavas* of the proof.

Thus, the concept of *yukti* is far more flexible (a flexibility similar to that allowed by *Vyākaraṇaśāstra* in *vāgbhāṣā*) than that of Aristotle's syllogism who went too far to impose a *form* on it which cannot be justified in the light of flexibility allowed by grammar in linguistic usage. Insistence that propositions have *one* definite form may only serve to distort the structure of propositions that flexible expressibility demands.

It may be instructive to inquire about the structure of *lakṣaṇa vākya* or a definition and compare it with that of *yukti*. Now, in a *lakṣaṇa vākya* we present essential characteristics or *lakṣaṇa* of some *lakṣya* so that the *artha* of the *lakṣya* becomes clear/*spaṣṭa*. Thus, a definition is purported to achieve *arthaspaṣṭikaraṇa* by employing terms/*lakṣāṇas* that are clear/ordinarily grasped. A *lakṣaṇa-vākya* is not said to be true–false but correct-incorrect or *spaṣṭāspaṣṭa*. Thus, for example, in the *lakṣaṇavākya 'prakṛti sakriya aur eka hotī hai'*, the meaning of the *lakṣya*, namely *prakṛti*, is made clear by means of the terms *sakriya* and *eka* which are expected to be clear ordinarily. We may ask what sort of relation obtains between the *lakṣya* and the *lakṣaṇa(s)* in a definition? The relation is generally said to be *swarūpa sambandha* which may be symbolized as ϶ so that the above definition may be symbolized as (x) ($p_x$ ϶ $s_x$, $e_x$). Following this model of definition, we may say that in a *yukti* also the relation between *sādhana* and *sādhya* is *swarūpa* relation so that, for example, *'kṛtavastuon kā bhoktā hotā hai, jaise ghaṭa kā, ataḥ deha kā bhoktā hotā hai'* has a *swarūpa* which is defined by a *swarūpa*-relation between its *sādhana* and *sādhya*. Thus if the *sādhana* are $H_x$ and $U_x$ and *sādhya* $N_x$ then (x) [(Hx, Ux) ϶Nx].

Though definition is certainly not *yukti*, what is important is that the two have a certain similarity of structure: in the *former swarūpa* relation obtains between *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa* (which are terms) whereas in the latter it obtains between propositions. Thus propositions are not always connected by *connectives* but in different kinds of *yuktis* these are related by a far more durable relation of *swarūpa* (which is something close to *samavāya*). In this sense *yuktikaraṇa* can be interpreted on the model of *lakṣaṇakaraṇa*,—that is, in it, *nigamana* gets 'defined' or 'explained' or 'clarified' by *hetu* and *udāharaṇa/siddhānta*. Under this interpretation, then, in a *yukti* or argument-unit, the *nigamana vākya* or *sādhya* is the *lakṣya* and the *sādhana* are the *lakṣaṇa*, the relation between them being the *swarūpa* relation. This amounts to redefining the property of *transitivity* itself that characterizes a *yukti*. Just as a definition is said to be correct/incorrect, not true/false, a *yukti* is said to be valid/invalid.

II

What is the justification of having a *hetuvākya* (instead of *liṅgavākya* such as in *anumāna*) as first *sādhana*/premiss and an *udāharaṇavākya* (instead of *dṛṣṭāntavākya* as in *anumāna*) as second *sādhana* and *nigamanavākya* (instead of *liṅgīvākya* as in *anumāna*) as *sādhya*/conclusion? And how can it be claimed that such widespread changes will still preserve the property of transitivity in the new structure just like the old structure of *anumāna* preserves? Further, it will be recalled that transitivity was supposed to be a *natural* property of structure of *anumāna* by virtue of universal natural law working in and through human mind; but if *yukti* is devised/artificial, not natural, how can it be justified that it still preserves the property?

In order to settle these issues, we have to remember that the property of transitivity *arises* in the structure of *anumāna* by virtue of *relevance* of *dṛṣṭānta* to the perceived *liṅga* or signature, that is a *perfectly relevant dṛṣṭānta naturally occurs* instantly and one is led to the conclusion naturally. It is clear that if the distinction of relevance is fulfilled consciously in structuring the *yukti*, it will also possess the property of transitivity as the universal law demands. In fact, if we disallow such property of *yukti* when the condition of relevance is fulfilled, we would be violating a universal natural law. We thus demand that *udāharaṇvākya* be perfectly relevant to *hetuvākya* and that the *yukti* would be *fallacious* if such condition is not fulfilled to fullest satisfaction.

We may now examine all the three components of *yukti* one by one and see what features these have. Thus, *hetu-vākya* is presumably similar to or has resemblance with *liṅga-vākya* of *anumāna*. Now, *liṅgavākya* depicts the *liṅga* which is a *perceived signature* of something deep/unperceived/unknown. The perception of signature is a perceptual evidence and is crucial for only when this is clearly perceived/known genuinely, can it spur the occurrence of relevant *dṛṣṭānta* in the mind. On this basis, we demand of the *hetuvākya* that although it may not depict a perceptual evidence, yet it may be a clear depiction of some fact or be presentation of errorless-genuine-knowledge acquired only by *pramāṇa*. *Hetuvākya* is thus the embodiment of *pramāṇa* and it is for this reason that *hetu parīkṣā* has significance in *yuktikaraṇa*. But *yukti* differs from *anumāna* in a very important respect: While in *anumāna* we *always* discover an *unknown* fact—*liṅgī vākya*—from a known fact, in *yukti* we work both ways as the situation demands. Thus, we may deploy it for making *explicit* an unknown result or we may deploy it for *proving* a known fact or law such as the observed regularity of seasons (or in some experiment). Or, as in geometry, we may know already by measurement that, say, the sum of angles of numerous triangles is always two right-angles and then seek to prove it by *yukti* so as to *establish* it as a universal law. Or, as in Sāṁkhya Siddhānta, we may know already by *sākṣāt* that *puruṣa* exists and is eternal and then seek to prove it by *yukti* as a universal/cosmic law. In whichever way we work, we are bound to stick to the general rules of inference which



apply to all specific *yuktis* of different structures. Therefore, *hetuvākya*, though not generally a particular perceptual evidence, is as certain as *liṅgavākya* since it has to be an already proved/*siddha vākya*, therefore true. What is common to both *liṅgavākya* and *hetu-vākya* is that both have to be definitely true and thus only this truth condition for the first *sādhana* is required to be preserved/fulfilled in a *yukti*. That is to say, although *liṅgavākya is always* a particular proposition, we drop all these additional conditions for *hetuvākya* and require it only to be a definitely true proposition fulfilling the condition of truth.

Consider now the *udāharaṇavākya* which is an analogue of *dṛṣṭāntavākya* of *anumāna*. Now, *dṛṣṭāntavākya* is, firstly, an *ordinary* proposition for only when it is ordinary, can it be said to occur universally in all humans without exception. Secondly, it is empirico-practically self-evident therefore evertrue, that is, by virtue of day-to-day experience and practice in ordinary life. Thirdly, it is relevant to *liṅgavākya* and occurs only by virtue of such relevance. Now, we drop all these additional conditions also for *udāharaṇavākya* and require it to satisfy, firstly, the truth-condition for evertrue is true as well, and, secondly, the relevance condition for without this condition the property of transitivity in the structure cannot be retained, that is, a transition to conclusion would not be possible. The transition cannot be made to just any conclusion but must generate a situation of acceptance or *swīkārya saṁsthiti* which only a legitimate transition can generate. Now, *swīkārya saṁsthiti* is superior or *śreṣṭha* when it is numerally and temporally universal as far as possible. That is to say, when the *udāharaṇa* is relevant and true, the correct conclusion follows compulsively, by virtue of its own inner logic. And when this happens, the property of transitivity can be said to have been preserved. It is clear that of all the three constituents of *yukti* structure, it is the *udāharaṇa vākya* that is most crucial and it can be *relevant* to *hetuvākya* only when the relation between its terms is the same as that obtaining in the terms of *hetuvākya*.

The fourth important characteristic of *dṛṣṭānta vākya*, is that it is always a just-universal proposition, that is, it has some claim to universality but does not make such claim explicitly. Thus we require of *udāharaṇavākya* not to make an *explicit* claim to universality such as made by a 'crucial experiment' in modern science. The insistence on relevance, truth and just universality conditions to be satisfied by *udāharaṇavākya* is sufficient to ensure the property of transitivity to the structure of *yukti*. We cannot and must never insist on ordinariness of *udāharaṇavākya* for it would be impossible for us to rise above the ordinary or to penetrate deeper which is precisely what we want to achieve by means of *yauktika saṁvāda*. Therefore, if you utter a true *hetuvākya*, I would have no idea about what it is directed at but as soon as you utter a relevant just universal and true *udāharaṇa vākya*, the conclusion will already be in sight even before you say it. And that would be an evidence that the property of transitivity has been preserved therefore *swīkārya saṁsthiti* generated.

The *nigamanavākya* of the *yukti* is an analogue of *liṅgīvākya* of *anumāna*. Since there presumably exists a definite *relation between liṅga* and *liṅgī*, one is assured thereby that when the *liṅga* is definitively perceived the *liṅgī must* also be present. That is why the sheer occurrence of *dṛṣṭānta* in the mind ensures that a compulsive transition is inevitably made to *liṅgivākya*. Thus, not only does the *dṛṣṭānta* ensure transitivity but also some presumably 'necessary' relation between the *liṅga* and the *liṅgī*. Does a similar situation obtain in a *yukti*? Of course, the *same* sort of situation does not obtain in a *yukti*, namely, that of some necessary relation, but a *similar* compensating situation always obtains in it. Thus, either by clear-cut *analogy* or by *utsargakaraṇa* or by class-inclusion, the *udāharaṇavākya* itself points to/directs towards the *nigamanavākya*. For example, in the *yukti 'Puruṣa akṛta hotā hai, jaise ākāśa akṛta hotā hai, atah puruṣa nitya hotā hai'*, the *udāharaṇavākya* clearly suggests an analogy and thereby leads to the *nigamanavākya* which provides the knowledge not contained in any of the premises. The analogy with *ākāśa* at once leads to the knowledge that *puruśa* belongs to the class of *nitya* objects like *ākāśa* which is there for everyone to experience as *nitya*. Similarly, in the *yukti 'Upādānagrahaṇa se vastuen hotī hain, jaise ghaṭapaṭādi,* ataḥ *upādān (kāraṇa) se vastuen hotī hain'*, the *udāharaṇavākya* suggests *utsargakaraṇa* principle as operative and leads to a cosmically universal *nigamanavākya*.

The situation in *yukti* by class inclusion is, however, slightly different and that is because *tādātmyānumāna* works as analogue there. In *tādātmyānumāna* the *dṛṣṭāntavākya* has a different structure, namely it depicts a *tādātmya* relation between two classes the occurrence of which spurs/triggers towards the *nigaman*. Does a *liṅga-liṅgī* relation obtain here and are we moving from a *liṅgavākya* to a *liṅgīvākya*? Though it is not clear from the examples of such *anumāna* usually given, namely that of *sinśipā*, yet unless some such relation can be shown to exist, the *anumāna* will certainly be a *petitio principii*. Thus, imagine that *sinśipā* is yet a small plant so that when it is being identified as such, the *dṛṣṭānta* (*sinśipā vṛkṣa hote hain*) would definitely be providing or leading to new knowledge since the *sinśipā* in question is at the moment only a plant therefore only a *liṅga* and it is being claimed that it is bound to grow as a *sinśipā* tree. This analogue when adopted in a *yukti* such as '*yogī-mānava hote hain, mānava prāṇī hote hain, atah yogī prānī hote hain*' allows the *yukti* to retain the feature of *tādātmya saṁbandh* or class inclusion, but seems to produce the fallacy of *siddhasādhya* or *petitio principii*. However, a more instructive *yukti* is: '*Puruṣa asakriya hotā hai, jo asakriya hotā hai vah saṁyukta nahīn ho sakatā, ataḥ puruṣa saṁyukta nahīn ho sakatā*'. The *yukti* suggests a paradox within Sāmkhya cosmology therefore has significance. The *nigamanavākya* in this *yukti* also is obtained by virtue of *tādātmya* relation which thereby safeguards the property of transitivity.

The paradox of this sort of *yuktikaraṇa* is that if the *sādhya* is kept *implicit*, the reasoning remains somewhat *unclear*, but if made *explicit*, it becomes



a *petitio principii*! We may say that the *udāharaṇavākya* makes the relation evident or spurs towards the *sādhya* without explicitly mentioning the *relation*, that is, without depicting it. Now, while in *anumānakaraṇa* an analogue/relevant *dṛṣṭānta* occurs *naturally* without deliberation, *yukti* generates an analogue by conceiving of an *udāharaṇa* that *suggests* an analogy with the situation/state of affairs in *hetuvākya*,—that is without bringing in *sādṛśya saṁbandh* at all and this being persuasive, generates *swīkārya saṁsthiti*. If we have to generate an analogue of *dṛṣṭānta*, it would be prudent to make the *sādhya-term/liṅgī explicit* as different from its being implicit in *dṛṣṭānta*. This will be particularly efficacious in proof if not in solution.

Now, most of the ancient seer-thinkers do not seem to have made this distinction between proof and solution so that some saw the *yukti* as proof only and insisted on one schema while others saw it as solution also/only and insisted on another schema. As already indicated, the movement in *anumānakāraṇa* is always in one direction: There is the perception of *liṅga*, then occurrence of *dṛṣṭānta*, and finally the arising of explicit knowledge of *liṅgī*. But in *yukti* we allow a both-way movement, that is, we may seek to *prove* an already known *nigamana*, or, we may seek to find an *unknown nigamana* on grounds of known premises as a solution or *phala*. In the former case, the problem is 'Prove that . . .' in the latter the problem is 'Given the *hetu* find the *nigamana*'. Now, in discovery, exploration, knowledge-systematization etc. the movement keeps on occurring now in one direction now in another. And recognition of this is the precise significance of *yukti*. Thus although modelled largely on *anumāna*, it allows greater flexibility in the movement of *samvāda*. Thus, for example,

A. To prove : *Puruṣa nitya hotā hai.*

Proof : *Puruṣa akṛta hotā hai.* (true)
Jaise *ākāśa akṛta hotā hai.* (true)
Ataḥ, *Puruṣa nitya hotā hai.* (true)

Here we *think up* a *hetu-vākya* and an adequate *udāharaṇavākya* so as to prove the given *vākya*.

B. Problem : Given the true *hetuvākya 'Kāryon men upādānagrahaṇa hotā hai'*, think of an *udāharaṇavākya* and find the *nigamanavākya*.

Solution : Given '*kāryon men upādānagrahaṇa hotā hai*'.

The instances are : *mṛtikā* is *upādāna* in *ghaṭa, bīja* is *upādāna* in *vṛkṣa* etc. Therefore,

*Kāryon men upādānagrahaṇa hotā hai.* (T)
*Jaise ghaṭa, vṛkśādimen upādāna hotā hai.* (T)

Therefore, *kāryon ke upādāna (kāraṇa) hote hain.* (T)

Since the *udāharaṇavākya* is true and valid rule of inference has been applied, the *yukti* is valid. Therefore,

Solution : *'kāryon ke upādāna (kāraṇa) hote hain'.*

Clearly, the fundamental idea that the concept of *yukti* stresses is that it is not important if some fallacies or anomalies or violations of what has been validly inferred are noticed here and there under certain conditions, rather what is important is that some regularity or the *case* of a universal *law* is discovered,—that is a *siddhānta.* Thus, if in a *yukti* a proposition has found entry that is actually false and is yet being treated as true, we must examine the *pramāṇa*-system as to how it allowed such a proposition to pass as true? Strictly speaking, therefore, in logic we are not interested in investigating how certain conditions affect truth/falsity of facts (that being the concern of epistemology), our interest lies in providing foolproof *methods* of validity of *yuktis,* that is *methods of siddhi* such as worked out first in *utsargakaraṇa, anumānakaraṇa* and *upamānakaraṇa* and later in *yuktikaraṇa.* Moreover, above considerations make it abundantly clear that indigenous logic allows far more diversity in reasoning than, say, Aristotelian Logic, or, even, contemporary formal logic does. In indigenous Logic, the structure of argument-units was historically investigated after the analysis of *pramāṇa* which therefore provided a guiding *model* for structuralization of systematic reasoning or *vyākṛta saṁvāda.* Thus, norms of reasoning and rules of valid inference were developed without any recourse whatsoever to the notion of *form* of proposition or of argument-unit which puts far more restrictions than are desired in smooth and *vyākṛta saṁvāda.* The idea of *form* was also not welcome because of deep commitment to Vyākaraṇa Śāstra which was historically very influential and which provided norms for correct linguistic usage. Thus any criteria, such as of form, over and above these norms would put severe limitations on *vyākṛta vāgbhāṣā* itself distorting it beyond allowed limits implying distortion of the expressed meaning itself when being employed in the construction of schemas.

## III

Not that *anumāna* alone provided a model for *yukti: utsarga* and *upamāna* were equally efficaciously employed as models for *yukti* by Sāmkhya Siddhānta. Thus, for example, in simple *utsargakaraṇa,* we generate true particular propositions from singular statements/elementary propositions and true universal propositions from particular statements. Now, in a *yukti* modelled on *utsargakaraṇa,* we obtain a true universal proposition



from true universal propositions as *Sādhana* but the *terms* of *nigamana*-proposition are themselves of higher generality than those of the premisses. For example,

*<Ghaṭa men mṛtikāgrahaṇa hotā hai.>*
*<Paṭa men tantugrahaṇa hotā hai.>*
.....
.....

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*∴ <Kṛtavastuon men upādānagrahaṇa hotā hai.>*

Here the *uddeśya* terms in the premises are *ghaṭa, paṭa* etc. and the *vidheya* terms are *mṛtikā, tantu* etc. which lead to the *uddeśya* term *kṛtavastu* and *vidheya* term *upādāna* in the *nigamana*/proposition. This procedure allows us to reach higher and higher universal propositions employing terms of higher and higher generality. How far is this procedure justified? Well, if we are justified in saying that *'sabhī sinśipā vṛkṣa hote hain'* from statements about singular *sinśipās* as premises, then we are also justified in bringing *sinśipās, neems, peepals,* etc. under a single class, namely *trees.* Sāṁkhya cosmology thus reached step by step to propositions of higher/cosmic generality by this procedure of *yuktikaraṇa.* [It will be evident that concepts of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are already implicit in such *yuktis* modelled on *utsargakaraṇa* and it took little ingenuity for Vaiśeṣika cosmologists to posit them as realities constituting the cosmos itself.]

In the special kind of *yukti,* the *udāharaṇa-vākya* is replaced by an evertrue *siddhānta* rest of the structure remaining the same. That is to say, while in the *yukti* as analogue of *anumāna,* we replaced evertrue *dṛṣṭāntavākya* by a maximally universal, true *udāharaṇavākya,* in such *yukti* we replace it by a (cosmically) universal evertrue *siddhānta.* Not that all *siddhāntas* are evertrue, but some are established by *yukti* as propositions that hold in all systems of knowledge so that these become valuable devices for knowledge systematization. In such *yukti* also the property of transitivity is preserved by recourse to analogy and/or *utsarga* and/or *tādātmya* in combination with the intermediary evertrue *siddhānta.* A *yukti* of this kind, called *tarka,* can be distinguished as twofold: the one aiming at *discovery* of causes and the other at their *identification.* It is only the former which is modelled on *anumāna* and employs evertrue *siddhānta* as a second premiss, the latter being modelled on *pratyakṣa* or *utsarga/anugamana.* Even the structure of *tarka-I* has a peculiar property,—in it the structure of *hetuvākya* is relationally different from the structure of *siddhāntavākya.* Thus, for example, in the *tarka, 'vyādhi kārya hotī hai, hara kārya kā kāraṇa hotā hai, ataḥ vyādhi kā kāraṇa hotā hai'*, the *hetuvākya* depicts *tādātmya* relation between its terms whereas the *siddhānta* depicts *samavāya* relation between its terms. And it is remarkable that in spite of relational difference between the two premises, the property of transitivity of the structure remains intact. This is because the *siddhāntvākya* maintains its

*relevance* with the *hetuvākya*. Now, the *nigamanavākya* that results has the same relational structure as that of *siddhāntavākya* so that it *may turn out* to be a general rule for the *yukti*: that if the two premises have different relational structure, the relational structure of second premise is preserved in the conclusion. The structure of *tarka-II* on the other hand is just the *utsargakaraṇa* or obtaining of a universal conclusion on grounds of numerous particular premises which, again, occurs in two steps. In one case the premises depict implication relation and the conclusion depicts *samavāya* relation by virtue of *utsargakaraṇa*, both the premises and the conclusion being particular propositions; whereas in the second step the premises are particular propositions depicting *samavāya* relation while the conclusion is a universal proposition depicting the same relation. This suggests the second rule: that in *utsargakaraṇa/anugamana* wherever a maximally universal proposition is derived on the basis of numerous particular propositions as premises, the relational structure of premises is preserved in the conclusion.

## IV.

The above considerations make it clear that Indian theorizers pursued *samvāda śāstra* in close intimacy with cosmological systematization of knowledge. This required investigations in *all* the conditions requisite for successful completion of cosmological system of knowledge. Thus, *pramāṇakaraṇa*, then *yuktikaraṇa* and then *tarkakaraṇa*, this last being the joint deployment of the methods of *pramāṇa* and *yukti*. *Pramāṇakaraṇa* is quite difficult to formalize, *yukti-karaṇa* lends easily to it but *tarkakaraṇa* is midway. *Pramāṇakaraṇa* is difficult because to lay down *formal* conditions under which true propositions *alone* are generated is difficult if not impossible. *Yuktikaraṇa* is easy to formalize because it only requires that propositions be *true* and seeks criteria of *valid* derivations if true propositions be given.

Now, historically, *yukti* was a discovery of *siddhānta* seekers as different from orthodox *vedānta* seekers of the *upaniṣadik* fold. The *siddhānta* theorizers seem to have faced strong resistance from the latter but as their efforts fructified in Sāṁkhya cosmology as a system of knowledge, the ideas of *siddhānta* and *siddhāntatantra* gradually gained footing. It is in this context that *Hetu Vidyā* or *Vāda Vidyā* gradually arose. Thus, Gotama in his *Ānvīkṣikī* took Sāṁkhya Siddhānta as paradigm of *yuktikaraṇa* as is evidenced from *Carak Saṁhita* version of *Ānvīkṣikī*.[5] Later, as alternative cosmological systems of knowledge started to emerge, the science grew gradually into Nyāya/Samvāda Śāstra which leaned more and more towards Vaiśeṣika Siddhānta as a paradigm of *samvāda*. We must not understand Samvāda Śāstra as concerned exclusively with Vaiśeṣika cosmology but as general science of generating, presenting and appraising any cosmological system. Thus it forms one component of not only



Darśana Śāstra as a complex of Yoga-Sāṁkhya-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Sūtras but also forms a common factor in alternative Darśana Śāstras such as by Bauddha and Jaina trends. *Yukti* is thus *intersystemic*,—once discovered, it becomes an instrument for systematization in general. However, it seems that Indian logicians posterior to Nyāya Sūtra failed to stress clearly the fundamental and significant distinction between *anumāna* and *avayava*, —this latter referred both to structure of *anumāna* as well as *yukti*. The term *avayava* has two meanings: that it is part of a system of knowledge as a whole, and that, it itself has parts. Yet we find remarkable growth of logical thinking which was generally led by Bauddha and Jaina logicians after Vātsyāyan and numerous forms of *yukti* were conceived (as different from single Aristotelian syllogistic form in Greece). Such diversity in forms of *yukti* could be discovered because the *samvāda* made cosmology itself its field of discourse and at least four major cosmologies were systematized in Ārṣa trend itself. The two *alternative cosmologies*, namely Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika, were retained in Ārṣa Darśana Śāstra signifying the possibility of *alternative conceptions* of the *same* cosmos and exemplifying that truth and validity can acquire variant *structures/schematizations* in the form of *siddhāntantras* as valid *yuktis* are threaded in a single whole.

In the cosmology as presented in Ārṣa Siddhāntas, we do not find mere presentation of *yuktis* but also are considered the negations/objections and doubts along with them. In its widemost setting then a *yukti* would consist of objections/refutations of *hetu* and the rejoinders, as also doubts about *udāharaṇa* and their clarifications. When, therefore, a *yukti* is presented as affirmative *hetu*-proposition and affirmative *nigamana* proposition, its refutation would involve an affirmative counter—*hetuvākya* and affirmative counter—*nigamanavākya*. A counter-refutation may follow in which the fallacies of counter—*hetuvākya* or of counter-*udāharaṇavākya* may be pointed out or a situation of scepsis (*samsaya*) may be admitted whereupon the dialectical process may not lead to any definite decision. If, however, a situation of scepsis does not arise and all the counter-*yuktis* are validly refuted, then the affirmative *nigamanavākya* becomes a *siddhānta*. The stress on such a process (*prakriyā siddhi*) for clear presentation of system of knowledge (generally in *vāgbhāṣā*) was perhaps an important obstruction to any propensity of formalization of *saṁvāda*. For, what would a system of knowledge be worth if it did not consider the objections and doubts and responded to these satisfactorily? It is here that the concepts of *sthāpanā* and *pratisthāpanā* become significant: *sthāpanā* involves affirmative propositions only and *pratisthāpanā* involves counter-affirmative propositions *only*. A counter-affirmative *nigamana* proposition can *never* be a *siddhānta* so that if those who are refuting, seek to discover some *siddhānta*, they shall have to begin by establishing an affirmative *nigamana* proposition, face criticism, and refute it successfully. [This distinction between *sthāpanā* and *pratisthāpanā* and their role in yielding a *siddhānta* is often missed by contemporary interpreters

and students of indigenous logic—perhaps because it is more or less entirely absent in Greco-European logic whether formal or informal.] Now, why do only counter-affirmative propositions suffice in *pratisthāpanā* although these are *never decisive* falsifiers? This is because it suffices to show that the said *vidheya does not* obtain for the said *uddeśya* whatever other *vidheya* may obtain. A *decisive* falsification of the *yukti* is however made when some *alternative yukti* with affirmative *hetuvākya* and *nigamanavākya* is presented with an alternative *udāharaṇavākya*. This is precisely the sort of activity that is going on in modern science (of Greco-European origin) where a counter-*hetuvākya* (anomalous fact) and a counter-*udāharaṇavākya* (new experimental demonstration) refute the affirmative *nigamanavākya* giving rise to *uttrottara prasaṅga* due to scepsis (Copenhagen interpretation) or to developments of novel *siddhāntas* by means of novel affirmative *hetuvākyas* and novel affirmative *udāharaṇavākyas* (new experiments supporting the theory).

## V

If we examine the structure of proof or complete argument unit which is an evidence of profound logical thinking and commitment to clarity of Indian seer-thinkers and of which the *yukti* is a concise form, we may note that *pratijñā vākya* itself is indispensable for triggering the logical process in mind and which plays a decisive role in the *transitions* towards the *nigamanavākya via hetu-udharaṇa-upamāna-vākyas*. This becomes more explicit in the formal structure of proof which is:

$$]Py : \{Px.Qx.\ (Pxy \equiv Oxy)\} \vdash Py.$$

Thus, if Py were not given, a Px could not be generated, that is, an affirmative proposition with the same *uddeśya* as that of *pratijñā vākya* but having a different, pertinent *vidheya*. The same proof in the symbolization presented in 'Theory of Vākya'[6] for a *siddharūpa* such as: '*Puruṣa nitya hotā hai, kyonki puruṣa akṛtaka hotā hai, jaise ākāśa akṛtaka hotā hai, jaisā ākāśa akṛtaka va nitya hotā hai vaisā puruṣa akṛtaka va nitya hotā hai, ataḥ puruṣa nitya hotā hai*', will have the symbolic form:

$$]\ (y)\langle p \supset n\rangle_y : \{(y)\langle p \supset \bar{k}\rangle_y .\ U^* \langle s \supset \bar{k}\rangle .\ U^* \{(s \supset \bar{k}, n) \equiv \langle p \supset \bar{k}, n\rangle)\} \vdash \langle (y)\langle p \supset n\rangle_y$$[7]

where p symbolizes '*puruṣa*', n symbolizes '*nitya*', k symbolizes '*akṛtaka*' and symbolizes '*ākāśa*'. Here again, if $\langle p \supset n\rangle_y$ were already not 'given', a new k in the *hetuvākya* preserving p could not be generated, and if a new k could not be generated, a new s in U* preserving the k could not be generated. We have to note here that precisely the same relation in *udāharaṇa vākya* obtains here which obtained in the *hetuvākya*. The fundamental question that arises here is whether this *order* of *vākyas* must *always* be preserved in the proof (as also in the *yukti*)? If the order were



to be preserved always, then it is obvious that the connective 'and' will not serve our purpose for it is known to be commutative. However, since the validity of proof cannot be affected even if the order were subsequently disturbed, after the construction of proof so to say, we may require that the proof be presented strictly in this order but while applying the *yuktis* as rules of inference, the order may be disregarded if necessary. Further, how far the employment of connective 'iff' is justifiable in the *upanaya vākya*? Is 'if and only if' the same as '*jaisā, vaisā*'? Since, in our system of logic, the entrance of any false proposition is impossible due to the filter of *pramāṇa*, the propositions '*ākāśa akṛtaka va nitya hotā hai*' and '*puruṣa akṛtaka va nitya hotā hai*' must both be true and since T and T is true in modern symbolic logic, similarity is logically the same as *equivalence* here and therefore the employment of this connective is not unjustified.

Since in a *yukti* we present only the *hetuvākya*, the *udāharaṇavākya* and the *nigamanavākya*, its form will be:

$$\{(y)\langle p \supset \bar{k}\rangle_y .\ U^* \langle s \supset \bar{k}\rangle\} \vdash (y)\ (p \supset n)_y$$[8]

which shows that a *new* n entirely absent in the premises has appeared in the conclusion so that the conclusion says something *more* than the premises say. This aspect of the *yukti* brings out clearly the significance of *yukti* which is as a *rule* valid if and only if the premises as well as the conclusion are *true*. Since the business of logic is only to delineate the conditions of validity of *yukti* and not of conditions of truth of propositions, the latter conditions are to be ensured by empirical sciences (such as psychology, sciences of life, sciences of lifeless etc.) by means of observation of facts and experimental testing of conclusions. In a sense, then, *yukti* encapsulates the sum and substance of both logic as well as scientific method, the former in respect of condition of validity and of the latter in respect of conditions of truth by means of *pramāṇa* and *udāharaṇa*.

Since a *siddhānta* is obtained after proper refutations and counter-refutations, a system of knowledge under this conception of knowledge systematization will therefore have the following general logical structure:

$$[\{(x)\ (y)\ p_f \rangle x.y.\ (x)\ (y)\ p_f^* \rangle x.y\} \vdash (x)\ (y)\ p_g \rangle x.y]\ (.)$$
$$[\{(x)\ (y)\ q_g \rangle x,y.\ (x)\ (y)\ q_g^* \rangle x,y\} \vdash (x)\ (y)\ q_h \rangle x,y]\ (.)$$
$$[\{(x)\ (y)\ r_h \rangle x,y.\ (x)\ (y)\ q^*_h \rangle x.y\} \vdash (x)\ (y) r_j \rangle x,y] \ldots,$$

where star is indicative of the fact that a certain conclusion has been established as a *siddhānta* after proper refutations and counter-refutations. This is precisely the sense in which a *siddhānta tantra* is claimed to be a *sūtraṇa* of well established *siddhāntas*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See V. Shekhawat, 'Problems of Formalisation in Saṁvāda Śāstra', *JICPR*, Vol. No. XII, 2, 1996.
2. V. Shekhawat, 'Theory of *Vākya* or Proposition', *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 2, 1998.
3. V. Shekhawat, 'Problems. . .' *op.cit.*
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. The general form of proof can now be written as:
   ] (x) (y) $p_n$>xy: {(x) (y) $p_k$>xy. $q^*_k$ ($q_{k,n} \equiv P_{k,n}$)}
   ⊦ (x) (y) $p_n$>xy;
   where any one of the four relations obtains between the base and the suffix.
8. The general form of *yukti* can be written as:
   {(x) (y) $P_f$>x.y. $q^*$f} | (x) (y)$P_g$>x.y,
   where any one of the four kinds of relation obtains between the base and suffix other conditions being the same as mentioned.

# Possibility of Disinterested Knowledge— A Bhartṛhārian Approach

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## I

'All our knowledge is interested knowledge' says Jurgen Habermas.[1] N.K. Devaraja,[2] an outstanding humanistic thinker in contemporary India in a scholarly discussion in his recent book entitled *The Limits of Disagreement* has very fittingly showed that all human knowledge for humanistic disciplines is interested knowledge and that for the accomplishment of the disinterested knowledge one is required to be free from selfish motives, ambitions, passions and other cultural allegiances. Similarly, most of the religious and moral philosophers are of the opinion that for the accomplishment of disinterested knowledge one has to get freedom from one's personal motives, etc. and that one cannot get rid of them if one does not realize one's religious-end or the moral well-being.

In regard with knowledge, theories of epistemology whether subjective or objective, idealistic or realistic, as Karl Popper[3] evaluates them in his noted work entitled '*Objective Knowledge*', suffer from psychologism. I shall not discuss his arguments against theories interested in our subjective beliefs or suffering from psychologism due to lack of space. What I want to say presently is that Popper's own theory of objective or scientific knowledge which he prefers to call conjectural knowledge does not view knowledge as free from belief of searching the absence of negative instances to gain confidence in truth of knowledge which as he conceives is derived by induction and is not the natural character of knowledge.

Most of the analytic philosophers of language, for whom language is token standing by proxy for the things (external things or mental entities), take knowledge as impregnated with the alleged data. John Wisdom, a Wittgensteinian observes that no one has any knowledge at all apart from knowledge as to his own sensations of the moment.[4] The philosophical reflexions of historical and cultural relativism or *structuralism* [centred on the ground of its claims that: (1) It is through language that we make sense of external world or that our knowledge is primarily an attempt to take the events from real world and capture them in symbols,

and that (2) Meaning and cognition arise from action or the interaction between the intentionality of the self and a concrete world of cultural-historical setting], are based on a misguided attempt of understanding a trans-communicable non-linguistic physical world of entities through linguistic units. *Post-structuralistic* philosophy of cognition in its attempt to provide objective knowledge deconstructs the foundationality of knowledge. The thesis of knowledge as abstraction based on the anti-foundational theory of knowledge stands as a problem not only before *structuralists* but before *post-structuralists* also who take knowledge as abstraction. Object of knowledge, in our philosophy, is a flash or understanding not caused by any transcendental, logical or ontological structures but revealed non-differently in the mind by language. Object of knowledge isolated from language is not acceptable to us because the cognoscible and communicable character of it is not possible if it is taken as separate from language from which it is revealed non-differently. Such a claim regarding the object abstracted cannot be made. There is cognitive difficulty in accepting abstraction without language either as knowledge or as the object of knowledge because abstraction in popular term of its use is taken as that in which properties of an entity or connection between its properties from others is isolated on one hand and is accepted as independent of what is revealed directly by language in the mind on the other hand. It, in our scheme, is taken as a means or instrumental (like those of other instruments, namely, verbal noises, sense-data, gestures and other tokens) in the manifestation of inner, indivisible and given meaning-revealing-language, that is, *sphoṭa* (*śabda*). Manifested by them, the *śabda* reveals its own nature as *vācaka* from which objects of cognition (that is, meanings) are revealed non-differently in the mind and independently of physical or mental entities which are taken by abstractionists as the entities to be abstracted. Abstraction as an object of cognition is not free from the allegiances of mind which abstracts and also from the entities abstracted. Nonetheless, there is no getting rid of its being private because no claim of objectivity of an abstracted entity by different minds can be justified cognitively. The major cognitive difference between the abstraction taken as knowledge and the cognition taken as revealed by language lies in their different characters of non-foundationality and foundationality respectively. Abstraction is relational to the mind and to the thing abstracted but cognition as such is foundational; it is the awareness of itself—the expressor (*vācaka*) and of the objects—the expressed (*vācya*) as well. How can that which is itself abstracted be the awareness of itself and the objects?

Abstraction, as abstractionists accept, is universal, and, thus, it cannot be taken as knowledge because universal, for us, is the object of knowledge and knowledge, though it is the knowledge of the object, is not an object in that knowledge. If knowledge is taken as universal it will be an object



and, hence, relational because no object independently of language can be cognized distinctly. Knowledge on the other hand is not a being but awareness of being and hence not a universal. The objects known, that is, the being of language and of the meaning revealed by the language are objects of cognition and are universal but the knowledge itself is not an object in the cognition and, hence, not universal. We will discuss universality in due course. Since abstraction is isolated or divorced from its intermediary connections and from its subsequent history and language, the discriminative character of knowledge if taken as abstraction will not be possible because discrimination is possible only if cognition is taken as revealed by and as shot through and through by language. Abstraction itself implies the foundationality of knowledge as its cognitive base. The difference between abstraction and foundationality will be discussed after a few steps.

The views of knowledge as interested and knowledge as abstraction as mentioned above are not free from privatism. Conclusively, it can be said that philosophers not only *humanists* but *epistemologists* also have found themselves incapable of philosophizing knowledge as free from our allegiances with physical and mental entities, mental state of the knower and other cultural allegiances, and, that is why a modern critique of epistemology finds no disinterested basis of the empirical evidences and epistemic-justifications for the certainty and belief in the knowledge, and hence, 'The Recent Obituaries of Epistemology.'[5]

## II

By the term 'disinterested knowledge' we negatively, mean the impartial knowledge, knowledge free from our allegiances with physical and mental entities, or the knowledge free from our private motives and psychological beliefs. Apart from these negative senses, the term positively means the foundationality of knowledge or the knowledge revealed independently of our private motives, allegiances and irrespective of ontological, physiological or mental entities and our allegiances to them. Is such a knowledge possible to a state of ordinary person? Is it necessary to become a *Siddha* or *Sākṣi* (perfected spirit) for the accomplishment of such a knowledge as disinterested? Or above all, is there any genuine ground to deny the disinterested character of our knowledge accomplished in communication or accomplishing communications? are the central questions that need fresh light for removing most of our indeterminations and confusions regarding the nature of knowledge. It, I think, may also help to find out the cause for misapprehending and misinterpreting the true nature of knowledge consequently misleading philosophical conclusions regarding it.

Different solutions of the problem of the possibility of disinterested knowledge may be given differently by different philosophers. Here, I

shall keep all of them into three chief categories for the present discussion on the problem.

(1) All our knowledge, except mathematical and logical calculations and demonstrations, is interested knowledge and that there is no possibility of disinterested knowledge to the stage of a person not attaining the perfection of a *Siddha* or *Sākṣi* because otherwise there is no escape from the intrusion of our purpose and allegiances in the accomplishment of knowledge.
(2) Knowledge may be interested or disinterested but its being so is known by afterward efforts, that is, through empirical-evidences and epistemic-justifications.
(3) Knowledge accomplished in communications is itself disinterested. Disinterestedness, for this view, is not derived by afterward efforts and that to attain a *Siddha* or *Sāksi* stage is not necessary for the accomplishment of it. However, this theory does not overlook the differences between the disinterested knowledge accomplished in communications and the vision of perfected *Sāksi* incommunicable on the ordinary plane.

Our discussion in this paper is confined to the third of the alternatives. The wonder that was Bhartṛhari, a fifth century Indian grammarian philosopher who for the first time in the history of philosophy took the task of philosophizing the accomplishment of disinterested knowledge as the aim of his philosophy of *Vākyapadīyam*.[6] All knowledge as such is disinterested knowledge. For him, knowledge means illumination and this illumination is not through medium but direct. The term 'direct knowledge' should not be confused as suprarational intuitions in contrast with the knowledge through mediums, that is, perceptual, inferential, etc. as epistemological theories generally assume. By 'direct knowledge' we mean the knowledge non-differently and directly revealed by language which is inner, indivisible, ubiquitously given as meaning-revealing unit, that is, *sphoṭa*. The *sphoṭa* by nature is expressive and it expresses itself and its meaning independently of our allegiances and purposes.

## III

As our discussion in this paper is based on Bhartṛhāri's (henceforth B) philosophy of *Vākyapadīyam*, we feel it necessary to give a very brief account of his outlook on knowledge for a clear understanding of it.

B is quite clear in saying that things-in-themselves are not the object of our cognition. They are untouched by the language. They may be known to the vision of sages and seers but as B says 'the vision of them which is based on reality (as they are realizers of the reality) cannot be put to ordinary use and, hence, their vision is incommunicable and inconceivable to ordinary state of mind. On the other hand, the comprehension and



report of the people who have not seen the truth are defective, unreliable and perceptually inconsistent.[7] Our perception, etc. are also interested and open to errors, and, hence, a wise man should see even a thing which he perceives with the eyes through the logic based on communication. B suggests 'let us not determine a thing on the evidence of perception of physical things.'[8] Perceptual vision of a thing of different persons, that is, a sage and an ordinary man, differs and nothing can absolutely be claimed to be cognized about a physical thing. When an ordinary person gives a pragmatic description of a thing whose essential nature is beyond the grasp of language, the wise man should not take them as a statement of reality[9] because they are based on mere habitual or stereotyped perception which does not pertain exactly to the field of the function of language.[10] Language for B is the foundational being which illuminates itself and its meaning as well (*grāhakagrāhya*).[11] He conceives cognition as the cognition shot through and through by language.[12] Language is the only revealer which reveals itself and the meaning is revealed non-differently in the mind by it.

By language we do not mean the language-token we speak, read or write as they are only instrumental in the manifestation of inner, indivisible and meaning-revealing language (*sphoṭa*). Manifested by tokens, the *sphoṭa* reveals itself first as *vācaka* (expressor) and then meaning is revealed non-differently by it in the mind as a *vācya* (expressed). How can meaning (*vācya*) be revealed if language as *Vācaka* is not revealed first? Is a *vācya* without a *vācaka* possible?

No cognition is possible if isolated from language. Cognition ceases to be cognition if separated from language. Perceptual, inferential and others (even the cognition in dream or of deep-sleep) are also known as as they are intertwined with language.[13] Not only determinate but indeterminate cognitions as B says[14] are also intertwined with language. Infusion of language or otherwise is not the ground of distinction of determinate and indeterminate cognition because all cognition and hence undetermined cognition is also infused with language. Showing the cause of their difference B says—in case of determinate cognition language as *vācaka* is revealed in its exactness and its meaning is distinctively revealed non-differently by the *vācaka* in the mind while in the case of indeterminate cognition, the language as *vācaka* is not revealed in its exactness and in the state of non-apprehension of the exact *vācaka*, the *vācya* (meaning) is not revealed in its clarity with all its distinctive characteristics. Knowledge for B is not the knowledge in isolation and hence not without illumination. This illuminating nature of cognition is not possible if taken as separate from language. How can cognition without language be thought, known or expressed as cognition? B is of the view that our cognition, communication and reflection are not only concerned with but are confined to the objects figures in the mind by language also. By objects we mean thought-objects figured non-differently

by language in the mind, that is, the language and its meaning and they, as such, are only cognoscible and communicable units.

Being and non-being either of accomplished or of non-accomplished character are cognized as are revealed so by language in the mind. The language and the meaning revealed in the mind non-differently by language are only objects of our cognition. The language is eternally fit to reveal them and that is why the relation between language and meaning is accepted by B as eternal-fitness (*yogyatā*). The language is eternally fit to reveal all meanings and it is convention which restrains natural-fitness of the language on account of which fixed meaning is revealed by fixed words or sentences.[15] It is the eternal-fitness of language that meaning inevitably figures by it in the mind and, thus, meaning is not a discrete being as a Wittgensteinian would say. The meaning is revealed by language independently of external things, of mental entities, motives and of our allegiances with them. It is not mental construction or abstraction of mind from the external things but that which is revealed non-differently in the mind by language as a flash which as such is a self-restrained being (*pratibhā*).

## IV

The cognition of meaning revealed by language in the mind is a veridical cognition.[16] If the meaning revealed even by the word 'non-veridical' is not taken as veridical how could it be known so. It is known so and that is why the cognition is taken by B as a veridical cognition.

By the term 'veridical-cognition' we mean the cognition revealed or figured in the mind by language and that which by itself functions for an incentive to an action. B does not reject the importance of further examination of the veridical cognition (revealed directly by language) through reasoning and experience for men who seek verification, confirmation, etc. for believing in it. In our theory, the testability of meaning based on the comparison of it with referable entities is of no use and of no significance so far as the accomplishment of communication by *śabda* (language) is concerned.

Cognitively, verity is the very character of the cognition accomplishing communication. As cognition by language is accepted by B as a revealed truth, it is always veridical (*prakāśita*).[17] Communication cannot be accomplished if cognition by language is not taken as veridical and cognition cannot be taken as veridical if it is not taken as revealed. As language is luminous and illuminating principle of cognition and as cognition is revealed and is shot through and through by language, the cognition revealed by it is taken as veridical on one hand and as foundational on the other hand. In this regard it is important to note that presentational and representational theory of cognition of *Prabhākara Mīmāṁsakas* for which to experience is always to 'experience validity' is



quite different from our theory. Cognition as experience with the things is relational and as such cannot be taken as free from the allegiances of the mental and physical entities, and if it is not free from our allegiances with them how can it be said with certainty that cognition is valid *per se*. Opposite to them, cognition in our theory is directly revealed in the mind by language and the objects of cognition are also thought-objects revealed non-differently by language independently of our allegiances with physical and mental entities. However, we are not involved in the deep analysis of the differences between the two and would like to concentrate on the possibility of disinterestedness of our cognition accomplished in communication.

## V

The whole world, as B says, looks upon communication as authority for what to do and not to do.[18] Even in animals, the knowledge of the beginning of behaviour is drawn by virtue of it.[19] He again writes 'in the matter of knowledge of what to do or not to do none can transgress the cognition as revealed by language in communication. Even the saints like children and ignorants also follow it in the matters of communication.[20] A scholar or a saint should not change the meaning arbitrarily as that may obscure and may make communication impossible.[21]

B does not support transcendence of the world of communication for showing the possibility of disinterestedness of the knowledge and philosophizes that our cognition accomplishing communication is itself disinterested.

There is nothing in the whole universe, except language and the meaning non-differently revealed by it, which is communicable by nature. These communicable and cognoscible units are only objects of our cognition which is shot through and through by language. These units according to us are ubiquitous and are given non-differently in mind as *sphoṭa* and are revealed when manifested by tokens or symbols, namely, utterances, gestures or written symbols having conventional value. That which is communicable by nature and is given ubiquitously is not a private property of any person. If they are taken as private entities no communication by language will be possible. Rajendra Prasad, a noted analytic thinker of contemporary India, rightly observes 'linguistic behaviour is social behaviour, behaviour necessary for enabling man to live his social life. As a social being he is committed to using language and using it in such a manner that can successfully communicate with, or enter in communication with his fellow being.'[22] Cognition cannot be just a matter of private affair as it is intertwined with and is revealed by language which is communicable by nature. No communication can take place if cognition revealed by language is taken as private because in that case it will be different to different persons. Communication means the

accomplishment of cognition by language and, thus, the inter-social and socio-historical nature of language and the accomplishment of cognition by the audience inevitably by language are cognitively evidential in the disinterestedness of cognition. To take it as private is to negate the essential character of its being revealed by language. Communication cannot be accomplished if cognition by language is different to different persons. On the contrary, it is accomplished by language equally to all. To take the indivisible cognition and the indivisible object of cognition revealed non-differently by language in the mind of the audience as private or interested is contradiction in term.

It can be asked: how can communication be accomplished without convention? As the convention may differ from person to person that is, from the person of a community to the person of another community, how can the knowledge revealed by language be free from its conventional allegiances? In reply to the objection a two-fold solution from the side of grammarians can be given as follows:

(1) Convention is defined by B as the observation of the use of language by the elders of the society. It has not a subjective but inter-social foundation and as such not a private matter of fact.

(2) Convention for B is not the relation between language and meaning. The relation as such is given as the eternal-fitness of language which is naturally fit to illuminate all meanings and it is convention which restrains the natural-fitness to a popularly fixed meaning on the basis of which a fixed meaning is known to the audience by a fixed word (language).[23] Thus the fact of convention does not go against our favoured theory, rather, it also affirms the disinterestedness of cognition revealed non-differently by language. As cognition is revealed by language in audience, irrespective of their separate or individual existences, it cannot be taken as impregnated by their selfish motives.

## VI

As the realization of the sages and seers cannot be put to ordinary use, they are not the subject proper of philosophical analysis, and, hence, for investigating into the possibility of disinterested knowledge we confine the present discussion to the cognition accomplished by language in communication. A brief account of our chief arguments in favour of disinterestedness of cognition accomplished in communication may be given as follows:

1. 'Knowing' is an act and is taken as 'doing' to be performed by the agent with the requisite instruments for the accomplishment of some effect. Though knowing is an act, it is, philosophically, a different kind of act—different from 'doing' in which the agent, the means and the effects



all are externals. Different from doing, the agent, the object or means and the effect that is, cognition by the act of knowing are not external but inner. The cognition is revealed by language which is inner, indivisible unit of communication and the meaning revealed non-differently by it in the mind is also inner-being revealed by language independently of mental and physical entities and our allegiances to them as well. The cognition which is taken as the effect of the act of knowing, is really not an object (physical or mental) or another in that cognition. It is the illumination, the foundation of all beings revealed in the mind. The difference between cognition as such and as the objects of cognition cannot be overlooked because any such attempt may mislead one's conclusion regarding the true nature of cognition.

2. Perception, verbal-utterances and other tokens, that is, gestures, etc. are only instrumental in the manifestation of inner meaning-revealing language and as the meaning or object of knowledge for us is what is revealed non-differently by language independently of our allegiances to physical and mental entities, there is no ground to accept the cognition as such as alleged by them. Knowledge is not the disposition of mind as some of the idealists understand. Out of the tripartite of the knower, knowable and known, the idealistic epistemology assumes the primacy of the knower (mind) and take knowledge as its dispositions (*vṛttiyān*), but in our theory, knowledge is not disposition. There is a difference between knowledge and disposition. Dispositions are psychological entities subject to be known as the object of cognition but the cognition itself is not an object or another in a cognition, it cannot be confused as psychological entities at all. The realist's epistemology of the mind and matter has no ground to interpret knowledge as free from alleged data acquired by theory impregnated senses which are not free from errors. Data and sense-perception, other experiences and feelings, etc. are mere tools for manifesting inner-language and the cognition is revealed directly by the language itself and hence there is no ground to think the cognition as such as interested by theory impregnated senses and the alleged sense-data.

3. If cognition is taken in terms of alleged data acquired by theory impregnated senses there will be no escape from its being interested by physical and mental entities and then no empirical evidences and epistemic justifications will be capable of showing it as disinterested except leading to their own suicide. To identify language tokens as real and meaning revealing units and to take them to stand for the things (external things meant) and, finally, to take that it is sensations from things which are communicated by language are to our opinion the basic reason for the misunderstanding of cognition by epistemological theories as alleged or interested. In our system knowing the object and doing with the object, are different types of phenomena. In knowing the object is

mental-being revealed by inner language that is, it is what figures by language in the mind, while in doing the object is external-thing, that is, cognitively transcendental being. 'I know the pot kept on this table' and 'I do with it' are true state of affairs, but, so far as cognition is concerned we know only the meaning as revealed or as presented by these statements in the mind, and that the language is not what I have written on this paper or what I uttered but the inner-meaning revealing unit in the manifestation of which these letters/words or sentence tokens (written or spoken) function only as means. Manifested by these tokens the *sphoṭa* reveals itself and its meaning as well and the token are separated after performing their own vocation of manifesting while the *sphoṭa* infuses cognition.

4. The true nature of knowledge cannot be estimated properly if the nature of its objects and its differences with them are not distinguished. In epistemological theories external-things or the data acquired on their basis or the mental dispositions are generally taken as the object of knowledge and in each case the knowledge is considered in relation to them. This misleads epistemologists from estimating the true nature of cognition which as such is revealed by language independently of them. Knowledge for us is not data-impregnated but revealed directly by language.

It is trivial to take external-existents as the objects of cognition because they are cognitively transcendental things untouched by language and, hence, incognoscibles and incommunicables. We have already clarified that the sense-data acquired by sense-object contact are also not the object proper of knowledge as they, for a Bhartṛhārian, are only instrumental in manifesting the inner-language by which meaning is revealed non-differently in the mind. It is not mental construction or psychological entities because objects of cognition for us are those revealed directly by language, and, hence, they are self-restrained cognitive beings. By the term 'self-restrained' we mean that they are non-different from the foundational being, that is, language which reveals them, and that, they are not mental construction, imagination or abstraction from external things but are revealed units or units of awareness.

5. Now, we are in a position to observe that knowledge as such is free from the allegiances of physical and mental entities as the object of cognition. But this does not mean that our theory denies the contents of knowledge. It is notable that the contents of knowledge, for our theory is mental beings, that is, thought-objects which are not mental construction or abstraction but those revealed or figured non-differently by language in the mind. Nonetheless, knowledge as such as B conceives[24] is not a content or an object in a knowledge, though it is contents or objects, that is, the objects of the knowledge figured in the mind by *sphoṭa* on the basis of which different apprehensions are distinguished in communication.

It is the very nature of knowledge that it is not an object or another in



that knowledge. 'Otherness' is the characteristic of the objects and not of the indivisible cognition which is self-illumination. B says as a lamp does not need another lamp in order to be illuminated, the knowledge need not be known as object or another in that knowledge.[25] It, for us, is not relational but foundational and as such free from private feelings and other allegiances.[26]

6. Even if we take the object of cognition into consideration, the disinterestedness of cognition can well be explained in our theory. The object of cognition revealed non-differently by language in the mind for B is universal[27] because identical cognition in different occurrences and instances is revealed. As objects of cognition are universal in character, there is no case of being the cognition interested by the particulars—individual, colour, shape and other qualities of the thing. The universal independently of individuals is revealed by language in communication, and, hence the cognition of the object is disinterested from the external things or individuals, qualities and our private feelings. It is to remind here that we do not reject individual existences. There is no philosophical need to even reject them. We neither reject them nor do we accept them as the proper denotation of language. In our philosophy, they are accepted as entities known by implication as the substratum of the universal revealed directly in the mind by language. Implication may be interested for its object is not free from our personal motives and cultural allegiance involved in implicating; its objects are relational to the knower and to the known. In our view, the objects of implication, inference, etc. may be mental or physical entities which are taken to function as the substratum of the cognition revealed directly by language. The object of implication is not revealed but alleged objects or entities (physical or mental) while the knowledge is the awareness. The knowledge revealed by language is free from their allegiances but when it is alleged on them differently by different persons it is taken as different. The secondary and tertiary meanings, for us, result only by imposition of the primary-meaning of the language by similarly, etc., on other meanings and by the nearness of the primary meaning respectively.

## VII

The meaning revealed non-differently in the mind of the audience by the sentence 'The Sun sets' is quite clear to all of us and as such the cognition by it is disinterested as it is revealed by the sentence itself independently of our allegiance and motives. It is due to imposition of it on our different allegiances and interests that the meaning by the statement is taken differently by different persons.[28] For example, it, for some, may mean that 'a glorious man has died', to a student it may meant that 'it is high time to close up the studies', to a herdman it may mean 'it is time to drive

cattle home,' and the likewise. Keeping this matter of fact in view B writes it is true that different persons with their different cultural allegiances pertaining to the impressions of their past-lives (*Prāgjanamīya Vāsanā* with the things and theories) take different meaning by the same word.[29] For example, one who is trained in Bauddha or Jain religion takes the word 'pot' to mean the association of atoms, a Sāṁkhyaita takes it to mean the association of *traiguṇa* (all the three qualities in a particular proportion) and a *Vaiśeṣika* takes *Avayavīmātra* (the pot as a whole, that is, the aggregate of individual, universal and form) to be known by the word 'pot'. It implies that persons as per their allegiance or impressions regarding external things inherent in their minds take differences of cognition by the same language,[30] but this should not be taken as the real nature of cognition revealed in the mind in communication. Actually, the language reveals inner-being, that is, idea or meaning, whether there is any referent of it outside or not, is known by implication consequently after the cognition revealed non-differently by language. He elucidates that 'the language reveals meaning (inner-being) independently of not only external and mental entities but also independently of their being referentially illusion or truth and that is why the veridical cognition even by the expressions like hairs-horns, baron's son, non-existence, etc. is also revealed inevitably by these words in the mind.[31] B does not find any reason to accept the knowledge as sound if it doesn't have a communicative base or if it contradicts or overlooks communication.[32] By communication we mean the accomplishment of cognition by language. Communication is the exact world of cognition by language, and, no other experiences—either perception, etc. based on defectiveness of senses, etc. or trans-communicative vision of reality are worth accomplishing communication as they themselves need to be revealed by language in the mind. One may claim to know them only as they are presented in the mind by language and they in themselves are incognoscible and incommunicable entities.[33]

By taking the object of knowledge as revealed non-differently in the mind by language which reveals knowledge independently of physical and mental entities, mental state of the knower and his other allegiances, we explain knowledge as free from them. In our scheme, these entities, considered as of primary object of knowledge by epistemologists, are imparted merely secondary or instrumental value. No object independently of what is revealed by language or separate from the object as figured in the mind by language is acceptable to us. Verbal noises, perception of the objects, sense-data or so-called ideas abstracted from these entities are only instrumental in the manifestation of the inner meaning-revealing language (*sphoṭa*). Manifested by these tokens or instruments, the language reveals itself as *Vācaka* (expression) first and then meaning (*Vācya*) is revealed non-differently in the mind by it. A *Vācya* is called so because it is revealed by the *Vācaka* and hence the two



are cognitively and essentially non-different. Our cognition, communication and philosophical reflexions are confined to the language and to what it reveals non-differently in the mind.

Physical and mental entities on the basis of which sense-data is acquired, are presumed or inferred as the ontological opposition of the objects of cognition (*Upacāra-sattā*) revealed by language in the mind. Mind itself is presumed as ontological substratum of the cognition (*bodha*) revealed by language. The differences of cognition, objects revealed by language and the entities presumed on their basis must be kept in mind while discussing the issue of the nature of cognition; if otherwise, our investigation will be misleading and non-philosophical.

Conclusively, it can be said that there is no proper ground to deny or even to doubt the disinterestedness of knowledge revealed by language in the mind because communication is accomplished by it. Communication is the ground of empirical evidences and epistemic-justifications and up to an extent of beliefs also. If there is any criteria of disinterestedness of knowledge (other than accomplishment of communication by it) and if the criteria are not based on communicative ground, it will not be acceptable to the position of human cognition because no criteria of knowledge can be taken as foundational if it contradicts or goes beyond communication. We can say that if there is so-called an interested knowledge but if communication is accomplished by it or if it has a communicative character, it will then, be interested no more but disinterested because in that case the word will be the expressor of that very meaning. Knowledge is knowledge revealed by language and the knowledge revealed by language is a veridical knowledge. The knowledge revealed even by the statement 'knowledge is interested knowledge' is disinterested because it is cognized so equally by all of us as revealed by the statement and if otherwise nobody will claim to know it so even by the statement. As all knowledge is revealed by and is shot through and through by language and as language and the meaning in their conceptual form are universal and as communication is accomplished by it, the cognition revealed by it is itself disinterested knowledge. It is by taking the knowledge in terms of knowledge of the objects and objects in terms of entities (physical or mental things) that the object directly revealed by language is alleged on them and also by taking the knowledge as relational to the knower's interest that it is considered as interested but, for us, knowledge as such is foundationally awareness revealed by language but it is not an object or another in that knowledge. In brief, no claim of 'knowledge is interested' can cognitively and communicatively be made if disinterested knowledge by the statement is ignored.

VIII

Prof. Daya Krishna, a distinguished living philosopher of India has been kind enough to forward his remarks on an earlier draft of this paper. He has raised some queries, a response to which is very significant in the context of removing most of the confusions regarding a clear understanding of the language philosophy of the Pāṇinian grammar in general and that of *Bhartṛhari's* in particular. We are putting his queries here below in his own words first.

> "I feel, the basic issues relating to language are two-fold: Whether there is language or languages. As the empirical fact is that there are only languages, the idea that there is some one universal language can only be a theoretical construct about which not much can be significantly said. There is the second question, specially with respect to Bhartṛhari's discussion of language, and this relates to the question whether there can be any such thing as an undeciphered language or a language which is unintelligible. In Bhartṛhari's framework, this seems an impossibility but empirically everyone knows that one does not understand a language which one had not learnt or in which one has not grown. There is the problem of the translation from one language to another. This relates to the intrinsic and inalienable relation which Bhartṛhari posits between language and meaning. Can different languages convey identical meaning?
>
> As for the issue of the disinterestedness of knowledge, little is gained if you analyze the whole situation in such a way that 'interested' knowledge becomes impossible by definition. In your own framework, the manifestation of language by physiological and psychological condition can obviously result in intrusion of interest into language or body and mind can certainly infect it in their own interests and purposes. In any case, the concept of unmanifest language raises enormous difficulties, for it will have to be constructed on the basis of what is manifest and, thus, will have to have theoretically postulated multiple, unmanifest languages on the other hand, if there is only one unmanifest language, one will have to explain how it is different from universal reason or thought."

Philosophical reflexions on language, herein our paper, is not concerned with one language or with many languages but with the language as it figures in the mind and that which figures in the mind is a unit of awareness. As it reveals inself (its own nature) first and then its meaning is revealed non-differently by it in the mind, we name it as *sphoṭa* (language—henceforth). Taking *sphoṭa* as the object of philosophical reflections and investigations that our activity, as a philosopher, different from sociological, anthropological or linguistic studies of language or



languages, may be claimed as cognitive par excellence. Prof. Daya Krishna[34] himself will not deny to support the view that philosophization relating to concepts is a cognitive activity and is not blind. It essentially requires an analysis and explanation of the concepts on the basis of cognition as accomplished in the mind. Language and knowledge in B's cognitio-holistic philosophy are non-different and it is the non-difference of language and cognition on which his philosophy is based. All cognition, for B, is the cognition through language and is shot through and through with language. Language infuses cognition and the cognition of language is also infused with language.[35] The language infusing cognition is a unit of awareness and should not be confined to language or languages (language-tokens henceforth) we speak and write (*dhvaniyān* and *lipiyān*) which for B are only instrumental in the manifestation of language and are separated when the language in the mind is manifested. Language is eternal and is ubiquitously given in the mind as the unit of awareness which reveals itself as expressor (*vācaka*) (when manifested by language tokens) and its meaning (*vācya*) is revealed non-differently in the mind by it only when it is revealed first. No meaning, no cognition is possible if not revealed by language. It is the beings (that is, the language itself and its meaning) revealed in the mind to which our philosophical reflexions, investigations, cognition and communications are confined. The distinction between the revealed-language (which is manifested by language-tokens) and the manifesting language (that is, language-token) which manifests the former must be kept in the mind for a clear standing of our position. Manifestation of the language is also instrumental in the revelation of language. On manifestation and its implications we will discuss after few paragraphs.

Taking even Daya Krishna's definition of philosophy as concerned with 'the conceptuality of the concepts'[36] in view, we are here in a position to say that the differences of language-token, involved in speaking and writing differently, play no such role in an activity taken as philosophical by him as they play in sociological or linguistic studies of languages. The thought of the construction of the tokens may not be a construction itself. If it is not so, the situation may lead to an infinite regress. This does not mean that we deny the empirical fact of many languages, that is, language tokens. We just make a submission as to how can cognition or identical conception by an expression expressed differently in different language-tokens totally different in uttering, writing, size, shape, form, tone, anointing, etc., be taken to be accomplished without unity of cognition, that is, *sphoṭa* underlying all the changing occurrences of them by different language communities. In such a case, communication will be an impossibility. In spite of the differences involved in uttering and writing (*dhvaniyān* and *lipiyān*) of the same expression, identical cognition is revealed in the mind of the person versed in observing their uses by the elders of the language community. Not only that but the

moment the cognition is accomplished, the language-token is separated from the cognition and the knowledge is revealed by the language itself. It is only on the basis of language, that is, *sphoṭa* infusing cognition, that cognition and communication is accomplished. Cognition ceases to be cognition if isolated from the language.

For us, that which figures or presented by language in the mind is also a being, that is, thought – object = idea and the language also figures in the mind when it is manifested by language-tokens and, thus, it is a being. As it reveals itself and the meaning as well, it is a foundational being for the grammarian philosopher like Bhartṛhari. It is on the basis of illumined and illuminating character of the language that the analysis of language is possible and is conceived as the analysis of thought and *vice versa*. Such a conception is not possible if we confine ourselves only to different sets of transitory language-tokens. Nonetheless, the differences of tokens will then imply the differences of meanings and cognition but this is not so. Identical cognition by the same expression of the different sets of language-tokens is accomplished and it is on this basis only that the translation of one language-token in other totally different language-tokens is made possible.[37]

Can token-sounds, letters, etc. be translated in different sets of them, that is, in English, French, Japanese, etc. without the awareness of the expressor involved in them? Can meaning be revealed without figuring of the expressor in the mind through different sets of tokens? As cognition is cognition revealed and infused by language, it can be asked as to how can the cognition be accomplished without the revelation of language in the mind. It is the language on the basis of which identical cognition by different sets of tokens is accomplished. Without the prior revelation of the inner *sphoṭa* given in the mind and the *pratibhā* (meaning) revealed non-differently by it, there is no possibility of any cognition, translation and the accomplishment of communication through different sets of tokens.

*Sphoṭa* is given ubiquitously in the minds as awareness in character and that is why it is defined by B as *grāhyagrāhaka*. But only its givenness does not mean accomplishment of cognition. It requires to be revealed and, in ordinary plane, it cannot reveal itself without being manifested by language-tokens learnt by the observation of their uses by the elders of the language—society or community in which one is born and grown. Convention does not mean construction of *sphoṭa*. It is observed only with language tokens. It only delimits the specific use of the language (*sphoṭa*) which is foundational even in learning the language-tokens, symbols, gestures, etc. The beginner born in a language community with which the issue of empirical fact of one or many languages is concerned, observes the uses—tones, modes sequence, diction writings, referents, etc., as used by the elders of that society and uses them accordingly for communicating. But the learning of uses in no way mean construction of



the *sphoṭa* which is foundationally given as the awareness and as incentive to learning them also. It helps only to understand the specific use that manifests the specific *sphoṭa*; it helps delimiting and restraining the power of *sphoṭa* which by nature is expressive of all meanings (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*). The *sphoṭa* is naturally fit to express meanings. This natural fitness of it is defined by B as the natural relation between a *vācaka* and a *vācya*[38] unlike what Prof. Daya Krishna suggests, the *sphoṭa*, in B's philosophy, in no way be construed as a construct or an abstracted construct out of language-tokens, verbal noises, utterances and writings (*dhvaniyān* and *lipiyān*). The two—language and the language-tokens—are too different in nature that the former cannot be taken as a construct of the latter, rather, the former serves as the foundational being in the construction of the latter according to the rules of manifestation, association, sequence, perception, inference memory, observation, etc. We do not deny the construction of the language-token irrespective of the fact that this construction is not through abstraction but the outer manifestation of *sphoṭa* through organs of speech.

In B's scheme of analysis of three levels of speech-element, that is, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*, the *sphoṭa* at the level of *paśyantī* is taken as a metaphysical entity which is unintelligible but is presumed only as the apposition of the cognition revealed by the *sphoṭa* at the *madhyamā* level which is intelligible by nature. *Sphoṭa* at *madhyamā* level is a revealed being—it is revealed in the mind when it is manifested by it at *vaikharī* level (the manifestation of *sphoṭa* at *madhyamā* level through organs of speech) which, for our philosophy, is only instrumental in the manifestation of *sphoṭa* at *madhyamā* level which is a cognitive unit for B. It is *sphoṭa* as cognitive being which is properly concerned here with our discussion in this paper. It is the real language as it is a revealed being and it reveals meaning independently of tokens, metaphysical entities and our allegiances to them. It is the real language in the sense that it manifests itself in the form of *vaikharī* when one intends to communicate and the language at *vaikharī* level is taken habitually by proxy as language. If the *sphoṭa* as thought is not accepted, there will be no possibility of identical cognition of *vaikharī*. Even if we imagine a stage prior to the existence of *vaikharī* and if there was life on the earth, the beginninglessness of communication cannot be denied. The accomplishment of communication by ignorants and newly born babies, who do not know and use the language or languages we speak and write, cannot be explained so if the *sphoṭa* given in them is denied.

As consciousness is foundational in experiences—perception, etc. though it—itself is not perceived by senses, the *sphoṭa* as a cognitive being though imperceptible cannot be called unintelligible. It is the human limitation that he cannot perceive the inner units of awareness and also that he can understand, speak or write the indivisible unit only through

outer piecemeal manifestations and not the whole unit. He understands it through the association of individual letters spoken or written in a sequence but for that limitation the unit revealed in the mind cannot be called unintelligible. Intelligibility does not mean perception or experience but revelation of beings in the mind by language and the language itself is a being revealed in the mind. Even perception, etc. are also known thus as they are revealed so by language in the mind.

Prof. Daya Krishna's query that 'the idea that there is some one universal language can only be a theoretical construct' is based on a *prima facie* of universal as a theoretical construct and may not be acceptable to a theory which assumes universal as an eternally given and indivisible flash or understanding revealed in the mind by language.

However, we are trying to satisfy the question regarding the universal as a theoretical construct by putting a comparative account of our view of universality of language with that of proposition which is generally taken by western thinkers as a theoretical construct out of several occurrences and instances of sentence-token. Although the two in respective traditions are accepted as thought-object, the difference between the two is quite fundamental. A proposition is an abstracted construct but the *sphoṭa* is an indivisible and given unit of awareness. It can be taken neither as sentence-token nor as an abstracted construct out of such tokens but a foundational being of illumined and illuminating nature and hence self-restrained being. The idea of abstraction leads to unnecessary assumptions of metaphysical entities, that is, things-in-themselves abstracted and the mind which abstracts but the *sphoṭa* in B's *cognitio-holistic philosophy*[39] is independently an expressor—expressor of itself and the meaning non-differently revealed by it in the mind. It is on the basis of the expressive nature of *sphoṭa* that we analyze and explain cognition even without an intrusion of or independently of metaphysical entities and of our allegiances to them. Not only that but we can say even this much that even the abstracted construct—may be sense-data or mental state of affairs or proposition—pre-requisitedly requires *sphoṭa* in order to be revealed and know so. The same logic is not applied with *sphoṭa* as it is called so by its revealed and revealing character and only in this sense it may be taken as universal reason and not otherwise.

All words/sentences for B are thoughts and all thoughts are concepts—universal in character. It is universal not because of it as an abstracted construct but as it remains unchanging even though manifested by changing and transient sounds and letters, not because of its beings a constructed unit but because of it as an indivisible unit on the basis of which identical cognition/conception is accomplished in communication. It is called universal also in the sense that it is manifested by individual letters/utterance. The unit which is awareness in character can hardly be construed as a construct or an abstracted construct. There is no philosophical need even to construe it so if it is a self-restrained being of



awareness in character.

The way Prof. Daya Krishna has raised the question regarding interested knowledge apparently suggests that there is every possibility of intrusion of interests in the knowledge. Prof. Daya Krishna may be right if knowledge is taken as experience acquired by senses which are not free from defects of privatism but experiences in our trend of thinking are only instrumental in manifesting the *sphoṭa* which independently expresses itself and its meaning in the mind. Experience isolated from language cannot be claimed as knowledge.

So far as our position is concerned, we neither accept the existence of only disinterested knowledge nor do we deny the interested knowledge. It has not been the intention of the masters too. Their intention is to elucidate the difference between the two by analyzing the knowledge on the basis of cognition as accomplished by language, for, they think, only this way the disinterested knowledge may be accomplished (*Prajñāvivekam labhate bhinnairāgam darśanaiḥ. Kiyadvā śakyammunnetum svatarkam anudhāvatā.*[40] This *vivekam* (discriminating knowledge) distinguishes itself from that of interested language. Philosophical reflections for this *prajñā* (wisdom) is limited to the beings revealed in the mind by language. The language reveals itself and is a being expressive of by nature. It reveals meaning independently of ontological, physiological and psychological entities and our allegiances to them. It is not the mind but the language that reveals and it reveals meaning in the mind independently of mental allegiances, modes of minds, etc. and in this sense all knowledge as such is knowledge revealed by language and hence disinterested but it is the limitation of ordinary persons that they understand the knowledge revealed by language in terms of their feelings and experiences with the things. They conceive the knowledge revealed directly by language by imposing it on their allegiances and experiences with the things lying very deep into the structure of their mind. It is by habit and practice of understanding knowledge by the intrusion of motives and purposes that one does not mind the disinterestedness of it and conceives all knowledge as interested. The knowledge varying from persons to persons may not serve the purpose of accomplishing communication and hence involves conflicts and controversies. Even convention varying from community to community will also be of little help in this regard. If the knowledge revealed as such by language is denied, there will be nothing to serve as foundational to the intrusion of our interests and allegiances and then there will be no possibility of even interested knowledge also. The knowledge revealed as such by language in the mind is a disinterested knowledge. Daya Krishna[41] himself writes 'the reason why philosophical writings are generally interspersed with non-philosophical matters lies not merely in the fact that the philosopher is not only a philosopher but a man with other interests as well, but also in the misconceived notion that the philosopher has of his own function.

## Notes and References

1. See, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, J. Habermas, English translation published in London, 1972.
2. *Limits of Disagreements*, N.K. Devaraja, IIAS, Shimla, 1993, pp. 157–97.
3. For details, see *Objective Knowledge*, Karl Popper, Oxford University Press, 1979.
4. 'Other minds', John Wisdom, *Mind*, 1943.
5. See, Susan Haak, 'Recent Obituaries of Epistemology', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 27, No. 3, July, 1990.
6. *Prajñā vivekam labhate bhinnairāgama darśanaiḥ. Kiyadvā śakyamunnetum svatarkam anudhāvatā*, VP. 2/496.
7. VP. 2/138–139.
8. Ibid., 2/142.
9. Ibid., 2/142.
10. Ibid., 2/120.
11. Ibid., 1/55.
12. *Na so'sti pratyayoloke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte. Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate*, Ibid, 1/123.
13. *Harivṛtti* on VP. 1/121, 123 & 127.
14. *Yathāsya sanhatarūpā śabdābhāva tathā jñeyesvarthenaṣtpannenāp yavikalpaken kāryam na kriyate-Harivṛtti* on VP. 1/123.
15. For a detailed account of relation between language and meaning, see, 'Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Relation between word and meaning,' D.N. Tiwari, *JICPR* Vol. XI, No. 2, 1994 and Chapter 8 of the project entitled Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Language' completed under fellowship of ICPR, 1995.
16. A research paper entitled 'Cognition, Being and the possibility of expressions' by D.N. Tiwari discusses the issue in detail, *JICPR*, Vol. XIV No. 1, pp. 65–93.
17. *Yathā ghatādinām dīpaḥ Prakāśakaḥ Svaprakāśe dīpāntaram napekṣata tathā'rthasya Prakāśakam Jñānamātmaprakāśanāya Prakāśantarānapekṣmiti Svaprakāśakam Siddham. Jaḍavailakṣaṇyam hi prakāśakatvamiti tasyāpi Prakāśyatve Jaḍatāpattiḥ. Artha prakāśakāle ca prakāśakasyā prakāśerthasamvedanameva na syāt. prakāśsasacetane tallagnārtha-sancetanāsiddhe.* HR on VP. 3/1/104.
18. VP. 1/121.
19. VP. 2/147.
20. Ibid., 3/355.
21. Ibid., 2/139.
22. *Essays in Philosophical Analysis: Rajendra Prasad*, pp. 51, *IPQ*, Poona, 1989.
23. See *Sambandha—Samuddesaḥ* VP. 3/3 and also Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Relation between word and meaning, D.N. Tiwari, *JICPR*, Vol. XI, number 2, edited by Daya Krishna.
24. Helārāja on VP. 3/1/103–106.
25. VP, 3/1/104.
26. Ibid., 3/1/105.
27. Ibid., 3/1/94–102.
28. *Gantavyam Dṛ'syatām Sūryamiti Kālsya Lakṣaṇe. Jñāyatām Kāla Ityetatsopāyamabhidhīyate*, VP. 2/310.
29. VP. 2/134.
30. Ibid., and Puṇyarāja's commentary on it.



31. *Puṇyarāja* on VP. 2/134.
32. *Asamākhyeyatattvānāmarthāṇām laukikairyathā. Vyavahāre sāmākhyānam tatprājño na vikalpayet.* VP. 2/142.
33. *Yaccopaghātajam jñānam yacca jñānamalaukikam. Na tābhyām vyavahāro'sti śabdā lokanibandhanāḥ.* Ibid., 2/297.
34. *The Nature of Philosophy, Daya Krishna*, 1955, p. 215.
35. VP. 1/123.
36. *The Philosophy of Daya Krishna*, edited by Bhuvan Chandel and K.K. Sharma, ICPR. New Delhi, 1996, pp. 301.
37. The issue is discussed in detail in my project entitled 'Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Language' completed under Fellowship of ICPR. New Delhi. See Chapters II and III.
38. 'Philosophy of Relation between word and meaning', D.N. Tiwari, *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 2, pp. 43–54.
39. See, Cognition Being and the Possibility of Expressions: A Bhartṛharian approach. D.N. Tiwari, *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 1.
40. VP. 2/484.
41. *The Nature of Philosophy*, Daya Krishna, 1955, p. 226.

# Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on Yogic Perception

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## THE CONTEXT

Śabara, while discussing the definition of perceptual cognition given by Jaimini (*Jaiminisūtra* (*JS*) I.1.4), never spoke about the supernatural type of perception but only elaborated the definition on the line of the intention of Jaimini. The context in which Jaimini has given the definition of perception is that of the question of what could be the means to know *dharma* which is the sole meaning of the Veda. To answer this question Jaimini defined perception and straightaway denied its scope so far as the knowledge of *dharma* was concerned. The definition runs as: *Satsamprayoge puruṣasya indriyāṇām buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam animittam vidyamānopalambhanatvāt* (*JS*, I.1.4). Which means: perception which is the origination of knowledge when the human sense organs come in contact with (something which is) present (in the reach of the same), is not the means (of knowing *dharma*) because it lets one know of (the things which are) present (before him).

While discussing this definition, Śabara though discusses various issues like reality of external world etc. does not at all pay any heed to the other type of perception, namely the supernatural or *a-laukika* one which is accepted as the means of cognition by almost all the systems of Indian philosophy excepting the Cārvākas. It is also clear that the context specifies that he is talking about the cognition of the things which are present, that is, which are there in the reach of human sense organs and the emphasis is on its not being the means of valid knowledge of *dharma*.

While commenting upon this, Kumārila, in his *Ślokavārtika* (*ŚV*), however has raised the issue of the possibility of a type of perception which is called yogic perception and has refuted any such possibility in no ambiguous words.

This paper aims at knowing the arguments of Kumārila on the basis of which he has refuted yogic perception and also at evaluating the same with the help of some Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā texts.

## YOGIC PERCEPTION

Yogic perception is perception of a *yogin* wherein he perceives things belonging to all the three times and also those things that are beyond the

reach of ordinary sense organs with the help of mind associated with the contact in the form of the merit that is produced by his yogic practice, for example, he perceives even infinitesimal things like atoms (*paramāṇus*).

Praśastapāda in his *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* (*PDS*) observes:

> अस्मद्विशिष्टानां तु योगिनां युक्तानां योगजधर्मानुगृहीतेन मनसा स्वात्मान्तराकाशदिक्कालपरमाणुमनस्सु तत्समवेतगुणकर्म-सामान्यविशेषेषु समवाये चावितथं स्वरूपदर्शनमुत्पद्यते।
>
> (*PDS*, para 241 p. 189)

And further states:

> वियुक्तानां पुनश्चतुष्टयसन्निकर्षाद्योगज-धर्मानुग्रहसामर्थ्यात् सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टेषु प्रत्यक्षम् उत्पद्यते।
>
> (*Ibid.*, para 242 p. 190)

## KUMĀRILA'S REFUTATION

This view, which is so described in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system is not acceptable to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and he has clearly refuted it in the following:

> अतीतानागतेऽप्यर्थे सूक्ष्मे व्यवहितेऽपि च।
> प्रत्यक्षं योगिनामिष्टं कैश्चिन्मुक्तात्मनामपि।।
> विद्यमानोपलम्भत्वमसिद्धं तत्र तान्प्रति।
> भविष्यत्त्वस्य वा हेतोस्तद्ग्राहयैर्व्यभिचारिता।।
> मा भूतामिति तेनाह लोक सिद्धं सदित्ययम्।
> न लोकव्यतिरिक्तं हि प्रत्यक्षं योगिनामपि।।
> प्रत्यक्षत्वेन तस्यापि विद्यमानोपलम्भनम्।
> सत्सम्प्रयोगजत्वं वाप्यस्मत्प्रत्यक्षवद्भवेत्।।
>
> (*ŚV* 4.26–29)

It is clear from this that Kumārila does not favour the view that yogins perceive past, future minute and also things beyond the reach of ordinary external sense-organs. The reason that he has put forth is very much in keeping with Jaimini's definition. By definition perception is that cognition the object of which is present in the reach of the sense-organs. Hence perceptual cognition is capable of illumining only those objects which are within the reach of the sense organs. And hence he says if the yogins perceive something which is past or yet to occur then that knowledge cannot be called perception.

> तेषामवर्तमानेऽर्थे या नामोत्पद्यते मतिः।
> प्रत्यक्षं सा ततस्त्वेव नाभिलाषस्मृतादिवत्।।
>
> (*ŚV* 4.30)

Whatever is called *pratyakṣa*, all that cognition illuminates only those objects which are actually present. So even if it is the case of a perception of a *yogin* still if it is a perceptual cognition then the object of it cannot



be the past or future but it has to be present. This implies that even *yogins* cannot perceive the things belonging to past or future times.

If we think of the reason why Kumārila is so emphatic on the point that perception always is a cognition which is of something that is present, it becomes obvious that the context in which he is talking about it and the basic tenets of his system have prompted him not to accept any such thing called yogic perception which has past and future things as its objects. The context is that of the question of what could be the means of knowing *dharma*. And the basic assumption of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* is, *dharma* is the meaning of the Veda and it can be known only through the Veda and not by any other means. Why? Because Dharma is something which is yet to occur or if it has already occurred it is the 'means of something that is desired' (*iṣṭasādhana*) by the person who performs it—and hence it is never present—nor accessible to anyone else than the Veda.

> प्रत्यक्षः प्रागनुष्ठानान्न धर्मोऽनुष्ठितोऽपि वा।
> फलसाधनरूपेण तदानीं येन नास्त्यसौ।।
>
> (*ŚV*, 4.34)

As it is never present it cannot be perceived because the scope of perception is already determined and that delimits it to the things that are present before the perceiver within the reach of his sense organs. Thus, *dharma* cannot be the object of perception and it can also never be the object of any other means of knowing because of this reason only as all the other means of knowing are ultimately dependent on perception. And so Veda is the only means to know Dharma—and it cannot be the object of perception.

Thus, it leads us to the point that if one accepts that *yogins* perceive past as well as future things then one is forced to accept that *yogin* can perceive Dharma as Dharma is something which is future (or past). This again would mean that Vedic injunction is not the only source to know Dharma, but it can also be an object of yogic perception. It in turn would hamper two basic assumptions of the system, namely, (1) *Pratyakṣa* or perception always is the cognition of something present and (2) Dharma can be known only through Vedic injunction. This has been stated by Kumārila in so many words. He says:

> अविद्यमानसंयोगात् स्याच्चेत् प्रत्यक्षधीः क्वचित्।
> भविष्यत्यपि धर्मे स्याच्छक्तेत्याह सदित्ययम्।।
>
> (*ŚV*, IV. 33)

## KUMĀRILA REFUTES PRATIBHĀ

Not only this but Kumārila has refuted even *Prātibhajñāna*. *Prātibhajñāna* or *pratibhā* is intuition which is sometimes produced even in ordinary people. Vaiśeṣikas have accepted it particularly in case of the sages to know dharma and adharma. They have divided *pratibhā* into two categories

namely: *ārṣa* and *laukikī*. Praśastapāda in his *PDS* observes:

> आम्नायविधाततृणामृषीणामतीतानागतवर्तमानेष्ववतीन्द्रियेषु धर्मादिषु ग्रन्थोपनिबद्धेष्वनुपनिबद्धेषु चात्ममनसोः संयोगाद्धर्मविशेषाच्च यत्प्रातिभं यथात्मनिवेदनं ज्ञानम् उत्पद्यते तदार्षमित्याचक्षते। तत्तु प्रस्तारेण देवर्षीणाम्, कदाचिदेव लौकिकानां यथा कन्यका ब्रवीति, 'श्वो मे भ्राता आगन्तेति हृदयं मे कथयती'ति।
>
> (*PDS*, para 288, p. 245)

Kumārila refutes this on the ground that as the *laukikī pratībhā* is not alone sufficient to determine the object without the help of other means of knowing such as perception, etc., the same is the case of the *pratibhā* of *yogins*. He says:

> लौकिकी प्रतिभा यद्वत्प्रत्यक्षाद्यनपेक्षिणी।
> न निश्चयाय पर्याप्ता तथा स्याद्योगिनामपि।।
>
> (*ŚV*, 4.32)

Kumārila has taken the stand that as the *pratibhā* or intuition of ordinary people is not valid in itself, that is, without the help of other confirming factors so also is the case of *yogins*. In other words, Kumārila is not of the opinion that *yogins* is a different category of human beings possessing a different category of knowledge. We have already seen why.

## FOLLOWERS OF KUMĀRILA

It is interesting to note that Pārthasārathi Miśra, who has elaborately commented upon Kumārila's *ŚV*, is silent on the issue in his own treatise, namely the *Śāstradīpikā*. The reasoning about why Kumārila is refuting the category of knowledge accepted by all is confirmed by the statements of Pārthasārthi Miśra. He clearly says that *Pratyakṣa* being a cognition, the object of which is present within the reach of the sense organs is not the means to know the future *dharma*. He further states that this definition is objected to by the Nyāya system by arguing that this is not a definition of perception at all as it is applicable in the illusory cases also; and clarifies that this objection is not well taken because *JS* I.1.4. is not a definition of perception at all. Jaimini, in this *sūtra*, aims simply at stating that *pratyakṣa* is not the means of knowing *dharma*.

> न हीदं लक्षणं प्रत्यक्षस्य, किं त्वनिमित्तत्वकथनमात्रम्। तत्र हेतुः विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वं तत्साधनं च सत्सम्प्रयोगजत्वम्। न हि सत्सम्प्रयोगजमविद्यमानोपलम्भनं सम्भवति।
>
> (*Śāstradīpikā* of Pārthasārthi Miśra on *JS* I.1.4)..

Thus, Pārthasārthi only defends the *sūtra* of Jaimini but in this context does not take up the issue of yogic perception.

It is Gāgābhaṭṭa, who after Kumārila refutes yogic perception while accepting the other two categories of extraordinary perception (*alaukikapratyakṣa*). He states:



> तच्च सविकल्पकं द्विविधं लौकिकमलौकिकञ्च। उक्तसन्निकर्षजमाद्यम्।

(that is, he has already discussed the ordinary sense-perception.)

> सामान्यलक्षणाज्ञानलक्षणाजन्यं द्वितीयम्।

(Vide: भाट्टचिन्तामणि of Gāgābhaṭṭa; तर्कपाद, p. 21) After explaining the necessity of accepting the two above-mentioned types of extraordinary perception, he proceeds:

> न्यायविदस्तु योगजधर्मप्रत्यासत्तिं तृतीयामाहुः। तद्योगिषु मानाभावेनासुन्दरम्। न चेतिहासपुराणादि मानम्। तस्यान्यतात्पर्यकत्वादिति दिक्।
>
> (Ibid., p. 23)

In the *Mānameyodaya* of Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa also we find a passing reference towards non-acceptance of the yogic perception:

> यत्पुनर्भूतभविष्यदादिविषयं योगिज्ञानमीश्वरज्ञानं च इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षजत्वाभावेऽपि अपरोक्षमस्तीति तत्सङ्ग्रहणाय अपरोक्षप्रमाव्याप्तं प्रत्यक्षमिति लक्षयितव्यमिति तार्किकैरुक्तं तदप्ययुक्तम्। प्रत्यक्षस्यं विद्यमानोपलम्भनियमात्, भूतादीनां प्रत्यक्षत्वस्यानुपपत्तेः।
> (मानमेयोदय of नारायणभट्ट, p. 24, para 28.)

Thus, we have seen so far how Kumārila has refuted yogic perception and also why he has done so. It is obvious from the above discussion that many of his followers have also supported his stand.

The same point is discussed in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (*NM*) of Jayantabhaṭṭa where Kumārila's arguments have been categorically refuted and yogic perception is firmly established by Jayanta. He also has established specifically that yogic perception has an access to *dharma*. It would not be out of place if we look into the *NM* in a brief manner.

## JAYANTA REFUTES KUMĀRILA'S STAND

Jayanta opens the discussion with the opponent's question: What is the proof to accept yogic perception? His answer is: the excellence in the understanding capacity of various beings is the only proof:

> दर्शनातिशय एव प्रमाणम्। तथा ह्यस्मदादिरपेक्षितालोको ऽवलोकयति निकटस्थितमर्थवृन्दम्। उन्दुरुवैरिणस्तु सान्द्रतमतमःपङ्कपटलविलिप्तदेशपतितमपि सम्पश्यन्ति।• • • सोऽयं दर्शनातिशय शुक्लादिगुणातिशय इव तारतम्य-समन्वित इति गमयति परमपि निरतिशयमतिशयम्। अतश्च यत्रास्य परः प्रकर्षः ते यगिनो गीयन्ते। दर्शनस्य च परोऽतिशयः सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टभूत-भविष्यदादिविषयत्वम्।
>
> (*NM*, 2nd chapter)

He explains that the proof to accept yogic perception is nothing else than the excellence in the vision of *yogins*. It is our experience that we, ordinary people require sufficient light to perceive things which are even close to us but cats see in the dense darkness and this proves that there are degrees in the excellence of vision. Where it is at par excellence that

are the cases of *yogins*. And what is vision par excellence? It is nothing but visualizing the objects which are minute, hindered, distant, past and future: And thus, *yogins* perceive all these objects.

Here, the opponent argues, it is really a daring statement to say that *dharma*, which is beyond the reach of all the three times, as its nature is that of duty, is the object of eyes! Jayanta answers:

सत्यं साहसमेतत्ते मम वा चर्मचक्षुषः।
न त्वेष दुर्गमः पन्था योगिनां सर्वदर्शिनाम्।।

(*NM*, 2. 128)

And further with the simile of, 'gold gradually shining more and more due to heat' confirms that the yogic perception is capable of perceiving all the knowables.

यथा वा पुटपाकेन शोध्यमानं शनैश्शनैः।
हेम निष्प्रतिकाशं तद्याति कल्याणतां पराम्।।
तथैव भावनाभ्यासात् योगिनामपि मानसम्।
ज्ञानं सकलविज्ञेयसाक्षात्कारक्षमं भवेत्।।

(*NM*, 2. 136–37)

He also comments further that even we ordinary people have knowledge of future sometimes and gives the same example of a sister having intuitive cognition that her brother is visiting her the next day. (vide *NM*, 2. 142–45)

He says we must accept it as valid, as the brother actually arrives the next day. (Ibid.)

And then after establishing its validity, its inclusion in the domain of perception and after some more arguments pertaining to the issue concludes the discussion as follows:

The intension of Jaimini's *Sūtra* I. 1.4. and that of Kumārila's *ŚV* there, on is to establish that *codanā*, that is, vedic injunction alone is the means to know *dharma*. But this stand cannot be accepted because, if the *yogins* even after the knowledge of *dharma* obtained through the Veda can perceive the future *dharma* then, 'the Veda alone is the means of knowing *dharma*' is automatically refuted. Moreover, God's knowledge of *dharma* which is eternal is the cause of the Veda and hence again the proposition that the Veda alone is the source of *dharma* loses its force.

Jayanta's conclusion is:

तस्मात्, 'न धर्मग्राहकं योगिप्रत्यक्षं विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वात्, सत्सम्प्रयोगजत्वात्' इत्यादिसाधनम् अप्रयोजकम्।

प्रत्यक्षः कस्यचिद्धर्मः प्रमेयत्वात् घटादिवत्।
इत्यादयश्च सुलभाः सन्त्येव प्रतिहेतवः।।

(Vide *NM*, 2.148)

Udayana who is more or less a contemporary of Jayanta, while commenting on the *PDS* of Praśastapāda states:



योगाच्च धर्मो जायत इत्यत्र योगविधय एव प्रमाणम्। तेषां कर्मविधितुल्ययोगक्षेमत्वात्।

(vide *Kiraṇāvali* on *PDS*, p. 190)

He also offers inference as the proof to accept the yogic perception.

प्रमाणं तु योगिप्रत्यक्षे, 'स्वर्गापूर्वदेवतादयः कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाः प्रमेयत्ववस्तुत्वसत्त्वादिभ्यः पटवदिति'। विपक्षे बाधकश्च तदर्थविधिवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गः।

(Ibid., p. 190)

Thus, it is clear from the above references that the proofs to accept yogic perception as described in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems are threefold: perception or direct experience; inference and the authority of the *yogavidhis*.

## OBSERVATIONS

So far we have seen both the sides of the coin, namely: the source of *dharma* is the Veda alone and that the *yogins* also have an access to *dharma* because of their extraordinary powers.

One may look at it this way: To establish and maintain the authority of the Vedas is the basic task of all the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy, for which they had adopted different stands for which again they offered their own different arguments. The basic stand that the Mīmāṁsā system upheld was that there is no human association so far as the Vedas are concerned, and this is the reason why they are all time valid. Because invalidity creeps in only because of human association which has its own drawbacks and limitations. Once this is so accepted it becomes necessary to hold that the Veda is the whole and sole authority so far as *dharma*—the meaning of the Veda—is concerned. There is no other source to know it. And therefore, there is nobody to have an access to *dharma* without the Veda, hence not even the yogins. On the other hand the Naiyāyikas have granted the authorship of the Veda to Īśvara who is the creator of the Universe. He being the Omniscient Being is beyond all invalidity and therefore the Veda is valid.

It is direct ordinary experience of अतिशय, that is, excellence in intelligence and the authority of the योगविधिऽ that led the Naiyāyikas to accept yogic perception and it is the basic stand of the Mīmāṁsā system that the Veda is the only source to know *dharma* that prompted Kumārila and other mīmāṁsakas to deny the yogic perception. Because, if he accepts it then there is nothing which would stop it from perceiving *dharma* and then the framework of the system would collapse.

It is further interesting to note that for the sake of defending the fundamentals of his system Kumārila has gone to the extent of denying the direct experience of ours of the varying degrees of excellence in the understanding capacities and also the authority of the *Yogasūtra* which establishes the existence of *yogins*.

And Jayanta, on the other hand, while refuting the stand of Jaimini and Kumārila even after accepting that even the *yogins* basically acquire the knowledge of *dharma* from the Veda itself insists on his point that though it is so, after they acquire it, they know even the future *dharma*. (Vide *NM*, 2.146 and the following lines)

Thus, we notice the weaker points in the arguments of both the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas who are necessarily bound by the delimitations of the tenets of their own systems. But even if we notice them after discussing all the points raised by them, one question remains in our mind and that is, is it proper to deny the facts which are directly perceivable by all human beings be it for the sake of the defence of one's own system? And further, could there be any other way to reconcile between the two streams of arguments keeping the framework of the system intact without dismissing the authority of the *yogasūtras* outright? (Vide *Yogasūtras*: 3.25; 33; 36)

These questions linger in our mind because the solution that Kumārila has given to the problem is apparently not very convincing and Jayanta, though sounds convincing, had to bring Īśvara as the source to know Dharma over and above the Veda. And we keep on thinking whether these two weaker arguments can be joined in the reconciliation in such a way that the authority of all the systems remains intact.

We find, to our satisfaction, Vāsudeva Dīkṣita, belonging to the eighteenth century (AD) has also thought on the same line in his work *Adhvaramīmāṁsākutūhalavṛtti* (*AMKV*). This book is a commentary on the *Jaiminisūtras (JS)*.

The author, while commenting upon the *JS*, I.1.4, argues:

> अलौकिक-श्रेयः साधनताकत्वमेव हि धर्मस्वरूपम्। न च योगिप्रत्यक्षमेव तत्र प्रमाणमिति वाच्यम्। योगिनां हि तत्सामर्थ्यं नाकस्मिकं किन्तु धर्मानुष्ठानादेव भवति। तच्च न धर्मज्ञानं विना भवितुमर्हति। अथ तेषां धर्मज्ञानं योग्यन्तरादिति चेत्, न, अनवस्थापत्तेः। तस्माच्चोदनैव शरणम्।
>
> (*AMKV* on *JS* I.1.4)

Here, he defines the nature of *dharma* as being the instrument of extraordinary bliss and then raises the doubt such as: whether the yogic perception can be the means to know such a *dharma*. And denying the possibility of it clarifies further: the said capacity of the *yogins* is not without any cause. In other words the capacity of the *yogins* is not an eternal one but it is caused by certain activities such as the performance of *dharma*, which is not possible without its knowledge. This amounts to saying that even *yogins* after learning the Veda and acquiring the knowledge of its meaning through the same and after performing *dharma* alone obtain the yogic power through which they can have extraordinary knowledge of all the things. Hence, knowledge of *dharma*, the meaning of the Veda can be gained only through the Vedas even by the *yogins*. One should not further ask that one *yogin* may have knowledge of *dharma* through another



*yogin*, because this argument would lead to infinite regress. Thus, it is established that Vedic injunction is the only means to know *dharma* and there is no other way to know it.

Thus, Vāsudeva Dīkṣita must be given due credit for providing a solution to the problem so as to keep the authority of the *Yogasūtras* as well as the validity of our direct experience intact and also not to disturb the basic tenets of the system. As per his argument, he has also accepted the category of *yogins* on one hand and has held that the source of even their knowledge is the Veda and therefore the Veda is the only means to know *dharma* on the other.

Even on this one may raise a doubt as whether all *yogins* perform various *dharma* activities and then alone obtain various yogic powers as stated by Vāsudeva Dīkṣita. But, to me, this is not a well-founded doubt. Because one may answer this question this way: the argument of Vāsudeva Dīkṣita not only keeps the framework of the system intact but also rules out the contingency of discarding the validity of the *Yogasūtras*. Thus, what he means is only this: yogic power is neither innate nor eternal but it is produced out of some causal complex. [This is acceptable to the Nyāya system also. In fact this is the very ground that differentiates a *yogin* from *Īśvara*. (Vide *NM*, chapter II).] And that causal complex is provided primarily by the Veda and then by the *Yogasūtras* which are as orthodox as the Mīmāṁsā system itself is and the very basis of which is again the authority of the Veda just like the Mīmāṁsā system.

If the intention of the *AMKV* is understood in this line that should answer the above doubt at least for the harmonizing reconciliation between Mīmāṁsā and the yoga system in particular whose authority a Mīmāṁsaka need not deny any longer and with all other systems in general.

This issue may be taken as a good example of developing one's own system by modifying it in the light of the arguments in other systems and accommodating new thoughts in one's system to give up the disharmonizing elements and to lead to certain solutions in a more amicable way.

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11. *Mānameyodaya* of Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa edited by C.K. Raja and S.S.S Sastri, Madras, 1933.
12. *Adhvaramīāṁsākutūhalavṛtti* of Vāsudeva Dīkṣita, edited by Pattabhirama Shastri, Delhi, 1968–69.
13. *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrvamīmāṁsā* by Govardhan Bhatt, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Studies Vol. XVII, Varanasi, 1962.

# The Concept of *Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa* in Mīmāṁsa System

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## I

The theory of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* or non-qualificative perception is one of the most vexed problems of Indian philosophy, and the different systems of Indian philosophy propound diverse theories of non-qualificative cognition which appear to be incompatible with others. As a result of which a student of Indian philosophy may be perplexed by the bewildering variety of views. A study of the compatibility of the theories of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* enunciated by the two schools of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, namely the Bhāṭṭa and the Prabhākara schools will come up for present discussion.

Kumārila Bhāṭṭa, the propounder of the Bhāṭṭa school, begins his exposition of the definition of perception with a consideration of the definition of *pratyakṣa* as given by Jaimini, the author of the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* and as interpreted by Śabarasvāmin, the commentator of the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*.[1] Perception, as Śabarasvāmin holds, is the knowledge which is the result of right functioning of the sense-organs with reference to their objects.[2] Sense perception is not the means of knowing dharma, inasmuch as, it comprehends only such objects as existing at the present time and functions over object in contact with the sense. Jaimini proposes that dharma can be ascertained by the scriptural texts alone. He rejects perception for the purpose on the obvious ground that it apprehends only those objects which exist at present, while dharma, as Śabarasvāmin interprets, is yet to be (*bhaviṣyat*).[3]

The later commentators of the Bhāṭṭa school do not agree with each other in giving the definition of perception. While the definition as given by Bhāvadāsa has been strongly criticized by the later commentators, Pārthasārathi Miśra favours the definition of perception as offered by *vṛttikara* that perception comes into being from the contact of the sense organs with the object alone. But Pārthasārathi holds the opinion that directness is the essential nature of perception,[4] and its sensuous origin is only a matter of inference. While commenting on *Ślokavārttika* Sucharita Misra announces that an attempt to define perception in terms of sense-

contact simply indicates the cause of direct consciousness. It does not signify that sense-contact is the essential form of perception. But Kumārila holds that a cognition which follows from sense-contact is commonly known by people as perception even without its elaborate definition.[5]

Śabarasvāmin expresses the opinion that perception is a real cognition—it can never be a wrong cognition. When the sense-organs, he argues, come in touch with the actually perceived of the resultant cognition of the person, cognition produced is a real perception. Following the path left by Śabara the author of *Vṛtti* interprets the *Pratyakṣasūtra* in such a manner so as to avoid illusion and doubt which come into being on account of the contact with different objects. Kumārila also asserts that perception should be a real cognition. He interprets the prefix '*sam*' in the word '*samprayoge*' occurring in the sūtra in the sense of 'right'. By '*prayoge*' he means the functioning of the sense with reference to their objects (*sat*).[6] Actually speaking, the definition of perception as interpreted by Kumārila is the same as that of *vṛttikāra*. Still Kumārila is of opinion that the *sūtra* may be taken as the mere definition of sense perception.[7]

Kumārila in his *Ślokavārttika* makes a sharp distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* forms of *pratyakṣa*, and explains them as two successive stages of direct cognition. While *nirvikalpaka* is a pre-linguistic and non-reflective perception, *savikalpaka* is a propositional perceptive judgement. In the latter type of perception the concepts and language play a role. It is a fact that the comprehender apprehends the particular in perception, and a particular is the substratum of the universal. Each object, as Kumārila proposes, possesses two aspects—a specific individuality and a generality,—a particular form and a general form. The sense-object-contact leads the cognizer first to grasp the object as a whole by sense perception—the whole that is inclusive of the particular aspect, and later on the cognizer may have another awareness which ascertains the object qualified by universal or some other attributes. The second awareness is judgemental or propositional and at the same time infected with words. Kumārila recognizes this second awareness as *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*.[8]

The mere apprehension or the *ālocanajñāna*, Kumārila announces, is comparable to that of a baby or of a mute person.[9] It is born out of pure object (*śuddhavastu*). The pure object or *śuddhavastu* is, for Kumārila, the individual which is the substratum of the specific and the generic character as well. But at the first stage of sensory awareness neither the specific nor the generic characters are perceived, but only the pure individual is cognized.[10] Kumārila thinks that the object of abstract cognition (*nirvikalpaka*) has a two-fold aspect. What is comprehended by the cognizer is the object,—pure and simple without having any qualification. In the sensory awareness the object is not cognized as anything particular, inasmuch as this simple awareness does not serve to



exclude other objects. In the first stage of perception object is not cognized as general, simply because there is no exclusion of other objects in such a cognition. An object is capable of being cognized as having common character through the process of assimilation. It is distinguished from other objects through the process of discrimination. These two processes involve a memory of other objects and a comparison of the cognized object with them. When memory and comparison do not come into existence the object is cognized as an individual whole, in which the specific and the generic characters remain uncognized.[11] By mentioning the word 'two-fold aspect of the object' Kumārila merely states the characters of the objects. But he declares that in a sensory awareness the object is perceived by the comprehender in its pure unqualified form only.

Thus, it appears that in the Bhaṭṭa scheme the first awareness, which is designated by Kumārila as *nirvikalpaka* or *ālocanajñāna*, is non-propositional, non-relational and non-analytic. The second awareness is propositional which is based on the first awareness. In *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* the comprehender grasps the whole, and in *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* he discriminates what he has grasped first and pays attention to its structure and apprehends the general and the special aspect of the object. This discriminating or comparative activity is not part of the pure sensory awareness. *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is a prelinguistic awareness, inasmuch as it is not generated by the analytic process of thought. So the apprehender is not in a position to express his cognition by language.

## II

Like the advocates of the Bhāṭṭā school of Mīmāṁsa philosophy the upholders of the Prabhākara school also recognize *pratyakṣa* as a direct apprehension.[12] This school maintains that in each act of perception the apprehended object, the apprehended person and the apprehension itself enter as constituent factors. Direct apprehension, as the Prabhākara holds, simultaneously apprehends the apprehender, the apprehended object and the apprehension. This distinctive view of the Prabhākara school has been designated as *triputipratyakṣavāda*—the doctrine of tripartite perception.[13] While the object is being apprehended as *saṁvedya*, the apprehender and the apprehension itself are being cognized as *saṁvettā* and *saṁvit* respectively, but not as *saṁvedya*.

Direct perception pertaining to apprehended object proceeds directly from sense-contact.[14] It is a recognized fact that every event has two types of causes—the material cause and the immaterial cause. In the case of *pratyakṣā ātmā* or cognizing soul is the material cause (*samavāyī kāraṇa*) and the contact is immaterial cause (*asamavāyī kāraṇa*). The perceptive cognition is a specific quality of the cognizing soul. Since quality belongs to an external substance the immaterial cause of perception must be in

the form of contact with some other substances. No contact with an all-embracing substance is possible.[15] An all-embracing substance is in permanent contact with all things. So it cannot be said to come or be brought in contact into anything. The external contact with all-pervading substance cannot be considered to be the cause of anything. External contact can produce only external effect which is a contradiction in terms. Considering all these things to the Prabhākara school declares that the contact which is the immaterial cause of *pratyakṣa* must subsist in the atomic substance.[16] And, again, the atomic substance resides in the body. The action of the atomic substance in the body is due to its coming into contact with the soul which puts forth an effort towards the act of cognition. The only atomic substance which fulfils the conditions is *manas* or the internal organ. Contact of the mind, as the Prabhākara school contends, is a necessary factor in the process of perception. The sense fails to apprehend an object when it is not in contact with the mind in spite of its contact with the object to be cognized. Thus, the Prabhākara school asserts that four distinct contacts—contact of the object with the sense, that of the distinctive quality of the object with the sense, that of the sense with the mind and that of the mind with the soul—are necessary in the genesis of all perceptive cognition.[17]

The Prabhākara Mīmāṁsā admits two forms of perception—*nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*.[18] Śālikanātha, a student and faithful follower of the great Prabhākara Miśra, takes a great pain to make a sharp distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*. While Kumārila refers to *nirvikalpaka* form of perception by the word *ālocana*, Śālikanātha prefers to refer it by the word *avikalpaka*. *Nirvikalpaka* is a cognition which is free from all determinations or characterizations. The word *avikalpaka* has been employed by Śālikanātha to denote the same sense. *Nirvikalpaka* or *avikalpaka pratyakṣa* is, as Śālikanātha contends, a formal experience (*āpātajñāna*) of the mere existence of an object is in touch with the sense concerned. It is designated as *āpātajñāna* since it is the first of the two successive stage in a perception.[19] The Prabhākara school maintains that *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* apprehends both the class (*sāmānya*) and the individual (*viśeṣa*). But in a non-relational cognition the generic character and the specific individuality are not apprehended inasmuch as, no other objects still enter into the comprehension.[20] In a *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*, Śālikanātha claims, a particular is not comprehended as actually being an individual belonging to a definite class. A thing can be apprehended as an individual only in comparison with other things from which it differs. A particular thing can be cognized 'as belonging to a class' only when it is found to possess some characteristic features that are common to other things. As no other things enter into the non-qualificative cognition the generic character and the specific individuality are cognized here as their own natures, not as *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, in which apprehension of assimilation and dissimulation are respectively cognized.[21]



Śālikanātha points out that *avikalpaka pratyakṣa* pertains to substance, generic character and qualities.[22] A mere *sāmānya* or generic character cannot be the content of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* since an experiencer experiences '*bheda*' or difference at the very first moment of perception. But Śālikanātha employs the word '*bheda*' in the sense of svarūpa.[23] The Prabhākara Mīmāṁsaka does not recognize '*bheda*' as a dharma as admitted by the logicians, inasmuch as, if *bheda* or difference were an attribute or dharma then one should have to assume that difference or *bheda* is different from essential nature or *svarūpa*, for otherwise it would be the same as the latter. And, again, this latter difference would have to be viewed as an attribute of the difference, and this would lead one to a third difference and so on *ad infinitum*. To avoid these difficulties Śālikanātha recognizes *bheda* as *svarūpa*. Thus, the author of *Prakaraṇapañcikā* asserts that in *avikalpaka* or non-reflective perception both generic character and specific individuality are cognized in their own natures, but not as *sāmānya and viśeṣa*, the concepts of which rest on assimilation and dissimilation.[24] Assimilation, or *anuvṛtti* and differentiation (*vyavṛtti*), as the Prabhākara school holds, enter into the qualificative perceptual cognition later on.

## III

So far we have endeavoured to dive deep into the concept of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* as projected by the Bhāṭṭa and the Prabhākara schools of the Mīmāṁsā system to show that they do not always agree with each other in expounding the concept of non-qualificative cognition. The Bhāṭṭa School proposes that a word denotes the universal by the power of expressiveness or *śakti*, while individual is indicated by the power of indication or *lakṣaṇā*. As an individual is not capable of being expressed by a word it should be cognized in a pre-linguistic cognition. In view of this, the Bhāṭṭa philosophers declare that in a *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* the cognizer cognizes the individual alone which is the substrate of the universal.

The Prabhākara concept of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* also appears to be compatible with his scheme. The Prabhākara Mīmāṁsaka supports the class theory and announces that a word expresses the universal by the power of denotation, and the particular being a substrate of the universal is comprehended by the same comprehension (*ekavittivedya*). So this school feels it necessary that in a pre-linguistic cognition both the particular and the universal should be cognized as such and they should be known as related by a relation in the qualificative cognition in which language plays a vital role.

## Notes and References

1. *Satsaṁprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇaṁ buddhijanna tat pratyakṣam animittaṁ vidyamānopalambhanatvād.*
   *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* 1.1.4; See *Bhāṣya* of Śabarsvāmin thereon.
2. *Sati indriyārthasambandhe ya puruṣasya budhir jāyate tat pratyakṣam.*
   *Śarbarabhāṣya* on *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* 1.1.4; Part I, p. 19, lines 5–6, published by Yudhisthir Mīmāṁsaka, Bahalgarh, 1987.
3. *bhaviṣyaṁsca eso'rtho na jñānakali'sti'tī. sataś caitad upalambhanam, nāsataḥ. ataḥ pratyakṣam animittam—Ibid; yato'sti tatra dharmo'yaṁ vidyamānapalalambhanam / tasmāt tena prasiddhena gamyatām animittatā//*
   *Ślokavārttika* on Pratyakṣasūtra, Verse 20, p. 100, Tara Publication, Varanasi, 1978.
4. *na hīha yathākathaneitsaṁprayogajanyatvaṁ lakṣaṇam, kintu sāksāttajjanyatvam—Śāstradīpikā*, p. 166, lines 5–6, Vidya Vilas Press edition, Kashi, Vikramabda, 1964.
5. *pratyakṣatvena tasyāpi vidyamānopalambham / satsaṁprayogajatvaṁ vāpy asmatpratyakṣavadbhavet / /*
   *Ślokavārttika*, Chapter on Pratyakṣa, verse 29, Tara Publication, Varanasi, 1978.
6. *samyagarthe ca samśabdo dusprayoganivāraṇaḥ / prayoga indriyāṇaṁ ca vyāpāro'rtheṣu kathyate / /*
   Ibid., verse 38.
7. *evaṁ satyo anuvādatvaṁ lakṣanasyāpi sambhavet / /*
   Ibid, verse 39.[b]
8. *yathā tvābhāsamātreṇa pūrvaṁ jñātvā svarūpataḥ / paścāt tatrā'vabudhyānte tathā jātyādidharmataḥ / /*
   Ibid., verse 127.
9. *asti hy ālocanaṁ jñānaṁ prathamaṁ nirvikalpakam bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṁ śuddhavastujam / /*
   Ibid., verse 112.
10. *na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṁ tadānīm anubhūyate / tayor ādhārabhūtā tu, vyaktir evā'vasīyate / /*
    Ibid., verse 113.
11. *na hī'dānīṁ apy anuvṛttivyāvṛtyor grahaṇam ucyate, ... sāmānyaviśeṣātmakam tad vastviti; jñātra punaḥ śiddham evānuvṛttivyāvṛttirahitaṁ grhyate, na tvasādharanatvena, parebhyo vyaktantarebhyo vyāvṛtter akalpanāt.*
    *Ślokavārttika*, Chapter on *Pratyakṣa*, verse 119, *Nyāyaratṇakar*, p. 124, lines 8–11, Tara Publication, Varanasi, 1978.
12. *Sākṣat pratītiḥ pratyakṣaṁ meyamātṛ pramāsu sā /*
    *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, Chapter 5, verse 5a, p. 104, edited by T.R.V. Murti, Banaras Hindu University Darshan Series No. 4, Varanasi, 1961.
13. *Yā kā cit grahaṇasamaraṇarūpā'rthapratitiḥ, tatra sākṣād ātmā bhāti. na hyarthāvabhāsinyātmanyanavabhāsamāne viṣayābhāsante. sarvā hi pratītir evam upajāyate'ham idam jānāmi'ti, na punar jānātī'tyevaṁ kācid budhir asti.*
    Ibid., p. 168, lines 1–3, ibid.
14. *pratyakṣā pratītiḥ meyeṣv indriyasaṁyogena, tatsaṁyuktasamavāyena, samavāyena ca jāyate.*
    Ibid., p. 147, lines 5–6.
15. *tatra tāvad ātmans nityatvāt tatkāraṇasamavetam asamavāyikāraṇam na bhavati'ty ātmasamavetam eva guṇāntaram asamavāyikāraṇam āśrāyanīyam. tatra nityadravyasamavāyino vaiśiṣkaguṇasya dravyāntrasaṁyoga evāsamavāyikaraṇatvenāvadhāritaḥ.*
    Ibid., p. 148, lines 5–8.
16. *na ca paramamahataḥ, sākṣātsaṁyogobhavati, na vā'numātuṁ śakyata iti pāriśeṣyād aṇutvam eva tasya dravyāśyasriyate.*
    Ibid., p. 149, lines 2–4.



17. *bāhyarūpadigrahaṇe ca sannikarṣacatuṣtayakam kāraṇam ātmamanassannikarṣaḥ, manaindriyasannikarṣaḥ, dravyendriyasannikarṣaḥ rūpendriyasannikarṣasca.*
    Ibid., pp. 153–54.
18. *savikalpakā'vikalpā ca pratyakṣa buddhir iṣyate.*
    Ibid., Chapter 5, verse 5, p. 104.
19. *prathamaṁ hi svarūpamātragrahaṇaṁ dravyajāti—guṇeṣūpapadyate. tac ca svānubhavasiddham.*
    Ibid., p. 161, lines 3–4.
20. *tasmāt sāmānyaviśeṣuau dve vastunī pratipadyamānaṁ pratyakṣaṁ prathamam upadadyate.*
    Ibid., p. 163, lines 5–6.
21. *kintu vastvantarānusandhānasūnyataya sāmānyaviśeṣatayā na pratīyate. anugataṁ hi sāmānyam ucyate, vyāvṛttis ca viśeṣaḥ na ca vastvantāranusandhānam antareṇā' nugativyāvṛtti pratyetuṁ śakyete.*
    Ibid., pp. 163–64.
22. *sā indriyasaṁyogothā pratītiḥ dravyajātiguṇeṣu bhavati.*
    Ibid., p. 154, lines 3–4.
23. *bhedaśabdena padārthasvarūpam ycyate.*
    Ibid., Nyāyasiddhi, p. 163, lines 18.
24. *apratipadyamāno'pi ca te, śaknoty eva svarūpam tayoḥ pratipattum iti, nirvikalpakam asāmānyaviśeṣaviṣayam.*
    Prakaraṇapañcika, p. 164, lines 3–4, T.R.V. Murti (ed.), Banaras Hindu University, Darshan Series No. 4, Varanasi, 1961.

# The Emotions: Some Preliminaries

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## 1. WHAT ARE EMOTIONS?

I believe that emotions, standardly, are complexes consisting of two components: (i) an affective element, consisting of affects or feelings; as well as (ii) a cognitive element, consisting typically of evaluative beliefs, thoughts, judgements, imaginings, and the like.[1] In virtue of the cognitive element, emotions have intentionality, i.e. they are directed upon things like states of affairs, actions, events, people, physical objects, and so on. Furthermore, it is claimed that desires, which are distinct from emotions, may often accompany, or even constitute, emotions; though this need not be the case.[2]

### I

At this stage, let us specify what the elements of the above account of the emotions amount to. It is difficult to give a very precise account of affects, but very roughly one may say that affects are the non-cognitive, non-intentional part of emotions, and they involve a what-it-feels-like, or a phenomenological, aspect. They involve (a) 'raw feels', or inner 'psychological' affects, of pleasure or of pain; and they may also involve (b) physical or bodily affects.[3]

It is easier to give an account of physical than psychological affects, though an adequate theory of the emotions must account for both—instead of denying the latter, or else reducing them to the former, as may seem tempting. Physical affects involve bodily reactions like hearts pounding faster, pulse-rates quickening, hair standing on ends, breathing getting faster, etc. Such affects may be found, for example, when we have feelings of excitement or fear; though, one general worry may be that these 'physical affects' are just external, behavioural manifestations of inner, psychological affects, not affects themselves. To dispose of this worry, consider a strong feeling of drowsiness.[4] Now, such a feeling need not involve any psychological affects of pleasure or pain, even as accompaniments, but may only involve physical affects like yawning and a general lethargy.

Psychological affects,[5] on the other hand, are best seen in cases of intense emotions. Suppose X's mother, whom she is very attached to, dies, and X feels an emotion of intense grief. Such grief involves not only assent to evaluative beliefs about her mother's death having occurred and her death being bad, but also an inner psychological feeling or affect of pain (or distress) that may (or may not be) behaviourally or physically manifested through crying, dejection and the like. Psychological affects of pleasure, as opposed to pain,[6] can be seen in aesthetic experiences of great works of art, or of beauty in nature, as the inner psychological affect of intense pleasure (or joy) that I feel when I admire Michelangelo's *David*, for instance,[7] or when I admire the beauty of a stunning landscape in the Himalayas.

Let us turn now to the cognitive element in emotions. As seen in the above example of intense grief felt by X upon her mother's death, the cognitive element of emotions involves an evaluative belief that a certain judgement is true, or at least justified by present evidence, and that it is good or bad: X believes that it is true that her mother is dead, and that it is bad that this is the case; this evaluative belief causes the emotion of sadness, and its constituent psychological affect, in her.[8] Sometimes, though, the cognitive element involved in emotions is weaker than strict beliefs, and may involve thoughts or imaginings, as, for example, is the case when I fear house lizards, knowing fully well that they are harmless.

It should be clarified that we may not always be consciously aware of the cognitive element in emotions. Nevertheless, while having emotions, we do judge evaluatively below the level of our consciousness, though we are not aware of making such evaluative judgements. Such evaluative judgements *cause* and are indeed *part* of the emotion; it is not valid to argue that evaluative judgements are parts of emotions *because* they are causes of emotions, and I make no such claim. Moreover, while emotions are often caused by cognitions, sometimes they may cause cognitions: for example, fear at seeing a deadly snake may lead me to cognize that I should flee.[9]

As indicated earlier, in virtue of their cognitive elements, emotions have intentionality, that is, they are about something, or are directed or focused upon some object. Thus, X's grief is about her mother's death, and my fear above is directed upon lizards; it is a fear *of* something, namely, lizards in this case. Emotions acquire intentionality because their constitutive cognitive elements (whether beliefs, judgements, thoughts or imaginings) have intentionality—a thought, for instance, must be a thought *about* something; it must be directed upon an object (including not just physical objects, but also states of affairs, actions, events, persons, and the like).



III

It is sometimes held that emotions also involve a volitional element consisting of desires for action, or strivings, in addition to the affective and cognitive elements specified above.[10] I believe that such accounts of emotions are mistaken in making desires *constitutive* elements of *all* emotions; though desires may partly constitute some emotions like love, which typically involves a desire, or a yearning, to be with the object of one's love.

To begin with, I think we must distinguish clearly between the concepts of emotions, desires and beliefs. Desires as well as beliefs usually involve the idea of a *unidirectional* fit (or agreement, if you like) with the world, though the direction of fit involved differs in the two cases. In contrast, when emotions involve the idea of a fit with the world, this is true in a *bidirectional* way.[11]

To illustrate, my desire to listen to, say, Beethoven's Seventh Symphony involves the striving that the world should come to match my desire so that somewhere in my vicinity there is a recorded or a live performance of this musical work. In contrast, we typically want our beliefs to be true, that is, we want that our beliefs should match the world, not *vice versa*, and that we give up false beliefs which do not match the world. So, for instance, when we realize that the belief that the earth is flat is false, we want to give it up and hold instead the true belief that the earth is round.

Emotions which do involve the idea of a fit with the world typically involve the direction of fit going from the world to the emotion, and also sometimes the other way round. Thus the fit between emotions and the world may be *bidirectional*. Many emotions involve the idea that the world should come to fit the *desire* that is involved in, or constitutes, the emotion. There is, however, a sense in which the direction of fit may go from the emotions to the world. The idea here is *not* that some emotions are true, as beliefs that fit the world are, but rather that some emotions may be *appropriate* given the way the world is,[12] for example, moderate fear of a deadly snake may be an appropriate emotion that fits the world. Such fitting emotions would involve assent to the true beliefs that constitute them.[13]

Now, emotions are often constituted by desires. For instance, the emotion of love for someone is standardly constituted by, or involves, a desire to be with the loved one, and in this sense involves the idea that the world should come to fit this desire. Similarly, the emotion of being angry with someone may involve a desire for revenge,[14] and in this sense may involve the idea that the world should fit this desire.

But there are other emotions where it is not clear that they are *constituted* by desires. For instance, suppose a graduate student gets a straight 'A' grade on a philosophy term-paper. The ensuing emotion of happiness is certainly *caused* by satisfaction of the desire to fare well,[15] and

certainly the emotion involves, as its constituents, affects of pleasure as well as assent to the true evaluative belief that the student has obtained a straight 'A', and that is good. But it is not clear that this emotion itself is constituted by the satisfied desire to fare well, nor is it clear that this emotion is constituted by, or necessarily involves, a desire for action of the sort often found in anger or love. Of course, the student may have a desire, later in time, to continue to fare well, but it is not clear that this later desire constitutes the very emotion of happiness that she feels when she is happy at her grade upon *first* coming to know of it. And she may also have a desire, later in time, to tell near and dear ones about her grade, but again it is not clear that this later desire *constitutes* the very emotion of happiness that she feels when she is happy at her grade upon *first* coming to know of it. In this example, the first rushes of happiness, I contend, consist *only* of affects and evaluative belief, yet there *is* a full-fledged emotion of happiness.[16]

Oakley claims that one problem for accounts of emotions which do not include desires as constituents of emotions is that they may fail to distinguish between some emotions, like fear (involving the desire to flee) felt by me upon seeing a snake, and interest (involving the desire to stay and examine) felt by a naturalist upon seeing the same snake.[17] He thinks that only desires can distinguish fear from interest in this case. However, it seems that Oakley is mistaken here, for clearly there are different affects involved in this example given by Oakley, an affect of pain (or distress, more properly) in the case of fear, and an affect of pleasure (or excitement, more properly) in the case of interest.[18] Moreover, there are also different cognitions involved in the two cases: I cognize that the snake is deadly, while the naturalist cognizes that the same snake is harmless but rare.[19] These differences in affects as well as cognitions may serve to distinguish fear and interest, without having to bring in desires, contrary to what Oakley thinks. Oakley is, however, right to say that acting out of emotion involves being motivated by desires; but acting out of emotion is not requisite for *having* emotion. For example, acting out of compassion involves being motivated by the desire to help the needy. In such cases, desires explain the motivational power of emotions.

## IV

Enough of desires and their distinctions from emotions. The distinction between emotions and affects or feelings should be clear from what has gone before: affects are necessary but not sufficient for emotions, for they lack the cognitiveness and intentionality involved in emotions. I believe it is important to make clearer, briefly, two further distinctions: (a) that between emotions and beliefs or judgements; and (b) that between emotions and moods.[20]



We have already seen part of the distinction between emotions and beliefs in terms of the idea of a fit with the world: we want our beliefs to fit the world, but this idea of a fit with the world, when it does apply to emotions, can do so in both directions: typically, with the world fitting the emotions, and also sometimes with emotions fitting the world.

But there is more to the distinction between emotions and beliefs. Beliefs, like emotions and desires, are cognitive and intentional. Beliefs may also sometimes be necessary for some emotions like grief; though some emotions may involve not beliefs but, instead, thoughts or imaginings, as seen earlier. Beliefs may, thus, at best be necessary components for some, but not all, emotions. But the important point I wish to make here is that beliefs alone cannot, in general, be sufficient for emotions, for beliefs lack the affective component of emotions, a component which is so essential and distinctive to emotions.[21] For example, my belief that 'Schnee ist weiss' is true if and only if snow is white does not involve an affective component; nor need it be accompanied by any affects. Of course, it may be true that some beliefs may be accompanied by affects, or else may cause affects, or else may be necessary for affects, but none of these shows that beliefs are constituted by affects; just as the fact that (the satisfaction or frustration of) some desires may cause some emotions, or may be necessary for some emotions, does not show that desires are constituents of even these emotions, leave alone all emotions, as argued before. For instance, my assent to the belief that the snake I see is harmful may cause, or be necessary for, or be accompanied by, an affect of distress that is part of the emotion of fear that I feel. But in no way is the belief, which is cognitive and intentional, constituted by the affect of distress, which is non-cognitive and non-intentional.

Very briefly, let us now turn to the distinction between emotions and moods.[22] We have seen already what emotions are. Now firstly, moods, unlike emotions, are non-intentional, that is, they are not directed upon any particular object, though they may be set off or caused by particular events or things. For example, someone's depression may be triggered off or caused by her mother's death—and thus she may be depressed 'about' her mother's death in a causal, non-intentional sense of aboutness, so to speak—but when she is depressed, her mind need not always be *directed* or focused upon her mother's death (unlike say an emotion of grief about the same event); though, from time to time, her thoughts may wander back to her mother's death, thus being directed upon that event (only) in those moments. Nor is her depression directed or focused upon anything else in particular, unlike her emotions, beliefs and desires. Secondly, moods are pervasive, affecting or colouring all other conscious mental events (like thoughts, desires, etc.) in their wake, whereas this need not be true of emotions. Thus, for example, our agent's depression may 'negatively' affect her thoughts, her disposition towards the world, her desires, and so on, while this need not be true of

an emotion of grief, unless of course it turns into depression. We find thus that moods are non-intentional, and involve pervasive affects, and very roughly one may thus say that moods are pervasive, objectless 'emotions'.[23]

## Notes and References

1. Compare Greenspan (Patricia Greenspan, *Emotions and Reasons*, Routledge, New York, 1988) pp. 3–14. It should be noted that the above is not intended as a definition of emotions; I am not trying to compare the essence of emotions, nor giving a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for them, nor trying to specify genus-species-differentia for emotions, nor trying to cover all and only emotions. My analysis may cover many, even most, emotions, and I invite the reader to look for cases that fall outside my analysis, given that the class of emotions and mental phenomena in general is diverse.
2. Desires will probably constitute some emotions, like love and sometimes anger, but not all of them. Moreover, emotions may often be *caused* by (actual or imminent or possible) satisfaction, or frustration, of desires, but desires need not be *constituents* of these emotions. Desires and their satisfaction (or frustration) may often be *necessary* for some emotions, but this does not show that desires must be constituents of these emotions. In maintaining this, I will later distinguish between emotions and desires, and also argue against Oakley (Justin Oakley, *Morality and the Emotions*, Routledge, New York, 1992) pp. 6–37.
3. Compare Oakley (op. cit, 1992) pp. 9–14. Oakley also rightly points out that we may have affects without really noticing (or feeling, as he puts it) that we have these.
4. This feeling of drowsiness may be so strong that it may induce us to go to sleep before we realize that we are drowsy; or else it may take a little while before we realize that we are drowsy. Thus, this feeling of drowsiness is non-cognitive in so far as, at least for a little while, it does not involve a belief or a thought or a judgement; and it is also non-intentional in so far as it is not about, or directed towards, anything. Moreover, we have here a feeling or affect of drowsiness, but not an emotion. All of this goes to illustrate my claim above that feelings or affects are non-cognitive, non-intentional parts of emotions. And it also serves to illuminate the distinction between emotions and feelings/affects.
5. Affects of pain can be both physical as well as psychological, but while physical pain is usually localized to some part of the body that is in pain, psychological pain is not so localized, for example, the physical pain of being pinched or hit is restricted to, and felt in, the concerned part of the body, whereas the psychological pain felt upon the death of one's mother is not localized to any particular part of the body, though it is not located outside the body either. Similarly, affects of pleasure can be both physical as well as psychological, but while physical pleasure is usually localized to some part of the body, the same need not be true of psychological pleasure, for example, the physical pleasure of being tickled is localized to the part of the body that is being tickled, whereas the psychological pleasure of aesthetic experience is not so localized—I don't feel the pleasure of seeing a beautiful landscape in my eyes, for instance, even if seeing the landscape is soothing to my eyes. Moreover, psychological affects of pleasure (or comfort) are, roughly, the 'feel good' aspects common to all positive emotions (joy, elation, contentment, etc.), while psychological affects of pain (or discomfort) are, roughly, the 'feel bad' aspects common to all negative emotions (anger, hatred, sorrow, despair, anguish, etc.). I am grateful to Dr K.P. Shanker for some discussion on this point; though he is unlikely to agree with all I say about psychological affects.



6. One might wonder if there is a third genus of psychological affect/feeling, apart from those that involve pain (and are typically found in so-called negative emotions like anger, hatred, despair, sorrow, anguish, etc.) and pleasure (and are typically found in so-called positive emotions like joy, elation, contentment, etc.), namely, a genus of psychological affects that neither involve pain nor pleasure, for example, it might be thought that there is a psychological affect associated with the physical affect/feeling of drowsiness, a psychological affect that is neither pleasurable nor painful. On a very different note, Jerrold Levinson has suggested (in personal discussions) that there may be a distinct psychological feeling involved in many emotions, a psychological feeling that may be unique to the emotion in question: for example, anger may involve not merely a painful psychological feeling, but a 'burning' feeling; similarly, sorrow may involve a 'sinking' feeling, and not just a painful psychological feeling. I am not sure what to make of this suggestion, though it may well be right; in which case, the distinct psychological feelings involved in some emotions would all be species belonging to one or the other of the three genuses of psychological feelings. At any rate, it still remains to be clarified what exactly psychological affects are, and what they involve.
7. Aesthetic experiences may also involve psychological affects of pain, despite the overall aesthetic pleasure felt. This may happen when, for instance, we listen to sad music, like, say, the funeral march from Beethoven's *Eroica* Symphony. For an excellent account of the rewards we may get from listening to such music, see Jerrold Levinson, 'Music and Negative Emotion', in his *Music, Art and Metaphysics*, Cornell, Ithaca, 1990.
8. Compare the causal-evaluative account of the emotions defended in Lyons (William Lyons, *Emotion*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980), especially Chapters 2–4.
9. Michael Slote has suggested (in personal discussions) that beliefs may have affects as parts; for example, the relevant affect may be a part of the belief that X is disgusting. Against this, I maintain that affects may accompany beliefs but are not parts of them; indeed affects need not even accompany beliefs such as the one above, for example, I can believe that, say, picking one's nose is disgusting without actually being disgusted by an instance of it—indeed, on occasion, I may even find it amusing that a well-known figure does so in public.
10. This, for instance, seems to be the account of emotions found in Oakley (op. cit, 1992) and perhaps also in Sherman (Nancy Sherman, 'Emotions', in *Encyclopaedia of Bioethics*, edited by Warren Reich, Macmillan, 1994).
11. Perhaps a better way of expressing this contrast is to say that the idea of a unidirectional fit with the world, with different directions of fit, *applies* standardly to beliefs and desires, but need not apply in the same way (if it applies at all) to emotions, where the fit with the world is bidirectional. See Dancy (Jonathan Dancy, *Moral Reasons*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993: Chapter 1, and especially pp. 27–30) for a distinction between beliefs and desires in terms of direction of fit with the world. In believing that emotions can fit the world bidirectionally, I am, however, opposed Dancy who thinks we want a unidirectional fit of the world with emotions, à la desires and intentions. It should be noted that though beliefs and desires usually fit the world unidirectionally, there is a sense in which they may fit the world bidirectionally: apart from true beliefs fitting the world, some beliefs (for example, beliefs about the future like 'It will rain tomorrow', and beliefs involving 'ought' like 'Apartheid ought to be abolished') may involve the idea that the world comes to fit them; and apart from desires usually being such that the world comes to fit them, some desires (for example, appropriate desires like the desire to save for a rainy day) may be such that they fit the world in being suitable or befitting.
12. Thus, when emotions fit the world in the same direction in which beliefs do, the senses of fit involved are different: while true beliefs fit the world in a

representationally faithful sense—they 'mirror' or 'picture' the world, if you like—appropriate emotions fit the world in the non-representational sense of being befitting or suitable. I am grateful to Professor Arindam Chakrabarti for some discussion on this and some other issues in this paper.

13. Another interesting question to ponder upon is whether one and the same emotion can fit the world bidirectionally, for so far what I have said is that some emotions may fit the world whereas the world may fit some other emotions. A possible example here may be appropriate emotions that involve desires: for example, if love for one's spouse is an appropriate emotion, given suitable circumstances, then the constituent desire to be with one's spouse may be one that involves that the world fit the desire, while the appropriate emotion of love for one's spouse involves the idea that one's emotion fits the circumstances in the world.
14. It is not clear, contrary to Oakley's (and perhaps also Aristotle's) view, that every instance of anger involves a desire for revenge. For instance, I may be angry with myself for having done something extremely careless and foolish recently, but it is not clear that such anger involves a desire for revenge against myself, or even against my past self. Moreover, such anger may last for a significant period of time, differentiating it thus from mere irritation or annoyance. It may be urged, against me, that such an emotion is not one of anger but merely one of deep-rooted disappointment, for it does not involve a desire for revenge. But this claim begs the question, making the issue merely verbal.
15. And thus it may be true to say that satisfaction of the desire, and having the desire in the first place, are *necessary* for having the emotion of happiness in this case. But that does not show that the desire *constitutes* the very emotion of happiness involved here. An analogy may make the point clearer. Hunger (that is, the appetitive desire for food) and its satisfaction may sometimes be necessary for having the objectless 'emotion' (or mood, as I will argue presently) of contentment after having had a hearty meal, but it would be absurd to claim that hunger is constitutive of (that is, that it is an element of, or a component of) contentment. Moreover, the satisfaction of hunger may sometimes *cause* such contentment, but it would be absurd to claim that hunger is constitutive of this contentment; for in general, causes need not be constitutive of their effects.
16. Moreover, I claim that even if she never has a desire to tell anyone about her grade, the student can still have the emotion of happiness so long as there occur (a) the appropriate evaluative belief and (b) the relevant pleasurable psychological affect.
17. See Oakley, op. cit, pp. 22–28.
18. One may also question Oakley whether interest is an emotion or a mode of belief, though for argument's sake let us grant Oakley that it is an emotion.
19. Alternatively, if the snake is indeed deadly, then the naturalist may cognize that it is deadly but rare, and his affects may be both of pleasure (or excitement, more properly, given his interest in the snake) and pain (or distress, more properly, given his fear of the deadly snake). Even so, the cognitions and affects involved in the naturalist's emotion, which is a mix of interest and fear, will be different from the cognitions and affects involved in my emotion of fear; consequently, there is no need, contrary to what Oakley thinks, to posit desire as a constituent of the respective emotions in this case so as to be able to distinguish them.
20. It might be asked what whims are, and how they are different from emotions. I suggest that whims are more like impulses, they are more transient than emotions and are more like transient desires than like emotions, and they are not fully thought out.
21. That beliefs alone do not suffice for emotions, without the addition of affects at least, can also be shown by the fact that one can assent to the requisite belief without having the emotion in question. See Oakley, op. cit, pp. 28–31. Another problem with excluding affects from an account of emotions may be, as Oakley points out, that some emotions, for example, certain kinds of admiration and envy, can only be distinguished by affects. Oakley's example is that of my feeling admiration towards a courageous mountaineer, and my being envious of him. Here, the belief involved is the same: that X is a courageous mountaineer and I am not. The desires involved, if any, may also be the same, that is, the desire to be like X; note here that unlike jealousy, envy need not involve a desire that the person who is envied not have whatever attribute it is that we envy him for. The only thing that may distinguish admiration and envy here may be affects, that is, while admiration involves an affect of pleasure without an affect of pain at my lacking the mountaineer's courage, envy may involve an affect of pain at not having the mountaineer's courage.



22. In making this distinction, I draw upon Searle (John Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992, pp. 140–41) who thinks that whilst conscious, we are always in some mood or the other.
23. Compare Sherman (Nancy Sherman, 'Emotions', *Encyclopaedia of Bioethics*, edited by Warren Reich, Macmillan, 1994, pp. 9–11). In addition to those acknowledged above, I am also grateful to Patricia Greenspan, Amresh Kumar, Dr Nirmalangshu Mukherji, Nancy Sherman, and the members of the Philosophical Society at St. Stephen's College, Delhi for discussions on earlier versions of this paper.

# Not Just 'Staying Alive'

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## INTRODUCTION

The basic tenet of ecofeminism is fairly straightforward: exploitation of women and exploitation of nature are linked and consequently, the liberation of both go together. We cannot be true environmentalists while ignoring oppression of women, just as women cannot be liberated from patriarchy while ecological destruction continues. This stance is what distinguishes ecofeminism from mere 'feminism' which has often been content to ignore exploitation of nature as being peripheral to its concerns. The methodological constraint implicit in ecofeminism being a *feminism* is that women's voices be echoed in the theoretical constructs offered or that the analysis of an 'integrated oppression perspective' crucially incorporate gender rather than 'neutralize' it.[1] Of course, there is no consensus on the shape that such attention to gender should take, but acknowledging its necessity in some form makes ecofeminism different from versions of radical environmentalism or 'deep ecology' that critique anthropocentrism yet remain insensitive to gender in a typically masculinist fashion. The *ethico-political* stance of extending the moral domain to include *both* women and nature involved in the explicit self-definition of ecofeminism when combined with such a methodological constraint invokes far-reaching changes in *epistemology* which reverberate into a *metaphysics*. Ecofeminism, therefore, is a deeply philosophical theory. It is surprising then, that even though social scientists have taken cognizance of Vandana Shiva's *Staying Alive*[2] as a contribution to the alternative development debate, *philosophers* in India have tended to ignore this internationally acclaimed 'Indian' version of ecofeminism. What I intend to do in this paper is engage with some of the criticisms of that text from the point of view of environmental philosophy. Needless to say, the interpretations and extensions of Shiva's theory envisaged here may not be something that she herself would endorse.

That Shiva's work can be situated squarely within the ecofeminist camp (given the definition of ecofeminism above) is clear from the following:

> *Feminism as ecology, and ecology as the revival of Prakṛti,*[3] the source of life, become the decentred powers of political and economic

transformation (p. 7) (Emphasis mine).

> The *recovery of the feminine principle* allows a transcendence and transformation of these patriarchal foundations of maldevelopment. It allows a redefinition of growth and productivity as categories linked to the production, not the destruction, of life. It is thus *simultaneously an ecological and a feminist political project*. . . . (p. 13) (Emphasis mine)

This 'Indian' example of the 'integrated oppression perspective' of ecofeminism is significant not just as a token from a particular geographical region; rather it is important as a substantial enrichment and extension of a general ecofeminist perspective itself. I shall concentrate on arguing this claim.

*Staying Alive* has two main parts. It first traces the oppression of women and nature to the post-colonial project of 'development' (called 'maldevelopment') and then goes on to reclaim the 'feminine principle' of *Prakṛti* as a solution to the oppression. On my reading, it is important to stress *both* these aspects for a philosophically interesting variant of ecofeminism. To say, along with Ariel Salleh, that

> 'empirical knowledge conceived in daily labour sustains the ecofeminist voice that Shiva translates for us . . . Prakriti might just as well have been left to sleep in a footnote'.[4]

misses the punch of the theory. By the introduction of Prakṛti, we not only have an intriguing blend of the 'cultural' and 'material' streams within ecofeminism but by leaving Prakṛti out, we run the risk of throwing the philosophical baby out with the bath water. Before arguing for the ecofeminist potential of this particular use of the concept of Prakṛti, however, it is necessary to understand Shiva's negative thesis—her analysis of the *cause* of oppression.

## THE WOMAN–NATURE LINK

Underlying the claim that exploitations of women and of nature are intertwined is an assertion of an implicit link between women and nature. It is probably because 'western' environmental movements are generally 'full stomach phenomena' that this crucial women-nature connection has usually been articulated by American ecofeminists in symbolic or ideological terms. What is stressed is the *construction* of women in terms of repressive dualisms. Thus women are *thought of* as being closer to nature because of their reproductive functions. Nature is *conceived as* being inferior to 'culture' which in turn, is *conceived of* as being the domain of men. This generates the *ideological* equation: women = child bearers = nature = the less valuable, which is said to underlie the parallel oppressions of both. For example, both women and nature can be 'owned'; they need to be 'controlled' by a transcendent male figure; women (as embodiments of



sexuality and emotion) and nature (as material) are both 'traps for the soul or reason'; the maintenance or life-sustaining activities of women and nature is of 'less or no worth' and so on. While noting some Black and native American voices as exceptions, it would not be too far off the mark to say that the general trend of ecofeminism in USA has been to articulate the women–nature link and consequently their twin oppressions in such conceptual terms.

In contrast to this, Shiva's ecofeminism rooted as it is, in the rural context of India, takes the woman–nature link beyond the symbolic. The exploitation of women and nature are now connected not simply because 'woman' and 'nature' are culturally linked but because *nature provides the material conditions for rural woman to 'stay alive'*. The survival of women in the villages is intricately bound to the environment. The depletion of natural resources resulting from exploitation of nature negatively affects the quality of their lives in a direct way. The woman–nature link is thus enriched to include the *material* of the *empirical*: women are 'closer' to nature not just in the conceptual space of master discourse but because their very existence is immediately affected by natural resources.

It is interesting, however, to note that Indian critics of Shiva (who are mainly social scientists) take her to task for *not* emphasising the material and economic conditions of exploitation. Take for instance, Bina Agarwal's 'feminist environmentalism'[5] that starkly distances itself from Shiva's ecofeminism because of the following principal objections. Shiva is said to have (a) *essentialised* woman by lumping together not only all 'Indian women' but also all 'Third World women' as being closer to nature. She is also accused of (b) *ignoring the class, caste differentials* in access to resources and in their production and distribution. According to Agarwal, the empirical link between environmental degradation and the quality of life of women varies according to specific social locations of women so that no generalizations can be made about the 'distance' of women *qua women* from nature. She gives a finely textured articulation of the effect of environmental changes in a woman's life along dimensions of time, income, nutrition, health, depletion of social survival networks and indigenous knowledge while fine-tuning the nature–woman link as mediated by factors like statization, privatization, erosion of community resource management, population growth and pre-existing gendered division of labour and gendered inequalities in distribution of subsistence and productive resources.

Now certainly there are differences between Shiva and Agarwal. But I would like to maintain that if we read Shiva as giving us a philosophical blueprint of ecofeminism then Agarwal misconstrues and overstates this difference. Let us get into the details of Shiva's theory a little more in order to understand this. According to her, the economic category of 'development'—based as it is on ideas of 'growth' modelled on a market economy, commodity production, capital accumulation,

commercialization of resources and technology—is the root of our twin oppressions. The basic argument goes as follows: Intrinsic to development is the constant supply of raw materials which leads to violence on nature. Women depend on nature for sustenance and hence the depletion of nature through development, leads to a violence against women. 'Developmental' projects thus become a modern form of '*colonization*'. Now the logic of colonization is the logic of 'dualism'[6] or polarization where one sector *feeds off* or gains at the cost of another. It is an exploitative linkage between two parties where the drain on and needs of the exploited party is rendered invisible because it is regarded as dispensable and valueless. Developmental projects create 'internal colonies' sustained by a dualism between the national elite on the one hand and the rural poor and nature on the other and hence, become sites of '*mal*development'.

A quick look at some aspects of social forestry in India illustrates this phenomenon of developmental activity *creating* poverty. Forests provide a diverse biomass over time which is crucial for the livelihood and survival of rural populations not just in terms of providing fuel, fodder, nutrition but also in preserving water and soil. 'Scientific forestry' in India involves (among other things) 'wasteland development' which includes their privatization and programmes of afforestation. However, vast tracts of the commons described as '*wasteland*' are really a *resource base* for a non-cash, non-market economy. They are crucial for the village poor in providing free grazing, increasing animal waste inputs in agriculture and as a source of fuel and food. Many landless peasants can own livestock simply because of such commons. Turning such 'waste' into 'wealth' through governmental projects seriously curtails livelihood options of the poorest sections of society. Further, the nature of afforestation programmes largely through the planting of eucalyptus trees and other cash crops, affects local food needs and ecological cycles. A forest becomes a resource for the pulp-industry rather than a resource base for subsistence needs. In this switch, it is the lives of women in the poorest groups which are adversely affected because of their involvement and work in the 'sustenance economy'. The forest is transformed by development into a means of generating income for the urban elite and consequently, rural women have to spend more time and energy for lesser returns of fuel, food, water and fodder in an environment which they can no longer manage and which is sometimes so vastly changed that it can no longer serve local needs.

How is the theory of exploitation sketched above guilty of the two principal criticisms made by Agarwal? Is Shiva unaware of the importance of social location and has she 'essentialized' woman in speaking of their empirical connection to Nature? It is true that Shiva more often than not writes 'woman' without specific markers for context as for instance:



> It is no accident that the modern, efficient and productive technologies created within the context of growth in market economic terms are associated with heavy ecological costs, borne largely by *women*. (p. 7, emphasis mine)
>
> [And] while *Third World women* have privileged access to survival expertise, their knowledge is inclusive and not exclusive. (p. 224, emphasis mine)
>
> *Women in India* are an intimate part of nature, both in imagination and in practice. (p. 38, emphasis mine)

In these examples there does seem to be a progressive lumping together of all 'women in India' to all 'Third World women' to all 'women'. But in spite of this, it is clear from the context that Shiva is speaking of *rural* women in India and that this *positioning* of the female subjects is crucial for her analysis. The distinction between the 'national elites' and the 'poor' is important for her theory and her examples of interconnections between nature and women, 'Women in the Forest', 'Women in the Food Chain' and 'Women and the Vanishing Waters'—all chapter headings—speak of peasant societies—of women gathering fuel, fodder and water and engaged in agricultural practices. Thus, the 'women' she is talking about are poor, rural women. The positive part of her theory goes on to cast *these* women not just as victims but also as primary actors in creating solutions. The 'feminine principle' is reclaimed by noticing practices of 'Third World women, whose minds have not yet been dispossessed or colonized' (p. 46). So in spite of her language, Shiva is clearly concerned with only a certain class of women. Note her saying:

> All ecological societies of forest-dwellers and peasants, whose life is organized on the principle of sustainability and the reproduction of life in all its richness, also embody the feminine principle. Historically, however, when such societies have been colonized and broken up the men have usually started to participate in life-destroying activities or have had to migrate; the women meanwhile, usually continue to be linked to life and nature through their roles as providers of sustenance, food and water. The privileged access of women to the sustaining principle thus has a historical and cultural, and not merely a biological basis. (p. 42)

Shiva very self-consciously moves away from the centre to the margins in a couple of steps—first to the peripheral *Third World vis-à-vis* the West, then to the peripheral *rural poor vis-à-vis* the urban elite in the Third World and finally, to the peripheral *women vis-à-vis* the male population within the rural poor of the Third World. Her claim seems to be that conditions of survival at these margins is such that it is more directly affected by the conditions of the environment than life at their (comparative) centres.

Of course, it may be argued that 'rural woman in India' is still too

broad a category and particular women are affected differently according to their caste/class distinctions within a village. This is certainly correct but I do not see how Shiva could object to it given her own commitment to contextualization. As we shall see, her main critique of development is its implicit transformation of economic and scientific categories developed *within the context of industrialization in a colonial power* to *universal* values and their consequent application in widely diverse situations of present day Third World countries.

Shiva's work thus should be read as establishing the broad claim that when we look at rural economies in the Third World, the woman–nature link becomes more imminent than the hitherto emphasized symbolic connections. What Agarwal gives us is a more detailed analysis of these material and empirical connections. It is true that Shiva does ignore class/caste differentials within rural women but not because she thinks that these are irrelevant. Rather her point *is* to underscore the importance of material conditions and locations when doing conceptual cartography. And this she does by showing how material differences in the lives of rural and elite populations in a Third World country result in their very different relationships to the environment affected by development projects. To show that rural populations are *further* fractured by caste/class locations is an extension (and an important extension) of the same basic point. So I take Shiva's claims regarding rural women in India as *illustrations* or *examples*. And the function of an example is to point to a more general thesis the scope of which is *not* exhausted by that example. The content of Shiva's thesis on this reading is not restricted to what she says about rural women as contrasted with urban and urbanized women but in fact, can accommodate and welcome the kind of further positional shifts along the lines of class and caste that Agarwal speaks of.

A quick word on the bogey of 'essentialism' in feminist philosophy would help us here. Feminists have rightly been wary of 'essences'—transhistorical, Platonic archetypes that encapsulate the 'true' nature of things—in this case, of what it is to be 'woman'. Such a realism about 'nature' or 'kinds' is an essentialism that brings with it a rationalistic tendency to universalism that straightjackets individual differences between women. Now while it is important to note the significance of particularities, it is also important to remember that any use of predicates involves universals or a grouping into kinds according to common characteristics. But any *theorizing* about oppression and any attempt to specify its causes, involves not only the use of predicates and hence of universals but also a commitment to their reality. *Some* unreal universals (for example, racist stereotypes) may be foisted on diverse groups by oppressors through mere propaganda. But some *other* real universals (for example, racism) that need to be recognized for political action to be possible may be wished away as 'mere' propaganda. We must be at least as suspicious of a flat denouncement of all objective predicates



as we are of essentialism. The worry about 'essentialism' in Shiva's work thus needs to be stated with care. Shiva explicitly rejects essentialism in the form of a biologically rooted immutable 'nature' that all women *qua* women have as being a 'narrow' and 'gendered response' to patriarchy. However, she does speak of 'rural women in India'—that is the group or kind (as against 'women in the West' and 'women of the urban elite in India') with reference to which she formulates both her negative theory about the cause of oppression and her positive solution for bootstrapping out of it. One could argue that 'rural women in India' is too *broad* a predicate and that a theory of oppression should be given for, say, 'rural women of a specific class/caste in India' instead. But it should be remembered that even *this*—the group of 'rural women belonging to a specific caste/class'—is a collecting of individual women under a particular predicate that ignores some of their differences (their age, for example). To imply that the latter predicate *is* sensitive to individual differences whereas the wider predicate 'rural women in India' is not, is an exaggeration. At best, the latter unlike the former, may be thought to ignore differences that are important. So the point is that neither a theory in terms of 'rural' women nor one in terms of 'caste/class' *essentialises* women in the sense of introducing rationalistic or Platonic 'essences'. Both generalize (as all theories must) and they do so in terms of predicates that have reference to socio-economic conditions. Where they differ is on the *specific* socio-economic factors used to group individuals (women) into kinds. If this is the charge of 'essentialism', then it might be best to speak with Diana Fuss of 'deploying' or 'activating' essentialism rather than of 'lapsing' into it[7] and then go on to rate theories from the point of view of the most effective strategies of such deployment.

Similarly, Agarwal's battery of 'causes' of exploitation seems a more fine-tuned analysis of Shiva's notion of 'maldevelopment'. What Shiva identifies for us is an over-arching nexus of ideas about poverty, growth and knowledge that constitute what may be called a 'colonizing identity'.[8] But this is just a *determinable*. A colonizing identity can get played out in varying acts. The parameters introduced by Agarwal—statization, privatization, destruction of indigenous knowledge systems, etc.—may be seen as *determinates* of this general attitude based on dualism promoting the notion that women and nature are in abject 'poverty' and need to be 'helped to grow' by the powerful nexus of the State, the elite and the First World. See how close Shiva comes to Agarwal's thesis in:

> The privatization of land for revenue generation displaced women more critically, eroding their traditional land use rights. The expansion of cash crops undermined food production, and women were often left with meagre resources to feed and care for children, the aged and the infirm, when men migrated or were conscripted into forced labour by the colonizers . . . (continuing with a quotation from DAWN) . . . with a few exceptions, women's relative access to

> economic resources, incomes and employment has worsened, their burden of work has increased, and their relative and even absolute health, nutritional and educational status has declined. (p. 3)

So once again, there is no clear *contradiction* between the two thinkers here. Shiva speaks of logico-structural features whereas Agarwal of how these are instantiated in various institutions and practices.

In order to reinforce the above interpretation, it is instructive at this point to read Shiva's 'colonizing identity' along the lines of Val Plumwood's *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*. Plumwood traces oppression to the notion of a 'master subject'. This is a kind of self-identity that relates to 'others' according to what she calls 'dualism' (to be distinguished from mere 'duality'). Dualism is based on the truth-functional notion of negation where the 'other' or what is not-self, is 'backgrounded', 'hyper-separated', 'incorporated', 'objectified' and 'homogenized'. Each of these mechanisms[9] is a process of constructing the other only in terms of the projects and interests of the 'master'. According to Plumwood, such 'master-identity' plays itself out differently in various historical contexts. What is interesting about this analysis is that very different kinds of oppressions are seen as having a common logico-conceptual core in the 'logic of dualism' and what we get is a network of mutually re-enforcing oppressions rather than any one of these designated as primary.

Now Shiva's work could also be construed as giving us a picture of such an inter-locking system of oppressions. For her, the empirical cause of the exploitation of women and nature is (*mal*) development. But she goes on to clarify that the grip of this model on the Third World is partly due to the alleged superiority of 'modern science'. Her critique of such science is that it is 'reductionist'. This is what she says in explanation of this term:

> The basic ontological and epistemological assumptions of reductionism are based on homogeneity. It sees all systems as made up of the same basic constituents, discrete, unrelated and atomistic. ... The epistemological assumptions of reductionism are related to its ontological assumptions: uniformity allows the knowledge of parts of a system to be taken as knowledge of the whole. Separability allows context-free abstraction of knowledge and creates criteria of validity based on alienation and non-participation, then projected as 'objectivity'. (p. 22)

The above 'philosophical' view is said to be part of the 'same process' as that of the industrial revolution and capitalism. Consequently, the ontological (uniformity and separability) and epistemological (decontextualized and 'objective' knowledge) components of reductionism lead to an ideology—they involve fragmentation and concentration on the interests of just one unit (state or privately owned firms) to the exclusion of all other units—social and ecological.



My claim is that Shiva's notion of 'reductionism' is a blue-print for the construction of a certain kind of autonomous and insular self-identity and of a certain kind of self-other relationship which comes very close to Plumwood's 'logic of dualism'. Shiva discovers these tropes not in classical truth-functional logic (as does Plumwood) but in the attitude and history underlying modern science. If, as she says:

> at a deeper level, scientific knowledge, in which the development process is based, is itself a source of violence. (p. 14)

and, if 'scientific knowledge' is at a yet deeper level, 'reductionist', then the ultimate root of violence can be traced to such a nexus of ontological, epistemological and ethical attitudes. A self that has adopted these reductionist attitudes is a 'colonizing subject' and parallel to Plumwood's 'master subject', it can express itself in many different ways. Shiva mainly speaks of its expression in the adoption of (mal) *development* projects, but the move towards privatization, statization, destruction of indigenous knowledge systems, etc. are all specific instances of a self defining and demarcating itself from others in such reductionist ways. On this reading then, it becomes simplistic to charge Shiva with pinning all the blame for exploitation on the encounter of the Third World with the West. Her focus is certainly on this (and we shall have occasion to see why at the end of the paper) but her theoretical apparatus is really rich enough to allow different kinds of patriarchal oppressions. Her concentration on science and development is because, given her context, they appear to be the 'most brutal expression of a patriarchal ideology' and is not meant to imply a denial of its other forms.

## PRAKṚTI AND THE 'FEMININE PRINCIPLE'

Shiva's positive agenda consists in reclaiming the 'feminine principle of Prakṛti. Since Prakṛti is a metaphysical/spiritual concept, it introduces a 'culturalist' stream into Shiva's analysis with all its attendant difficulties. The general worries here, firstly, concern questions of how a *metaphysics* can function as an antidote for social dysfunctions and secondly, even if it can, how the specific Prakṛti-metaphysics, can serve ecofeminist rather than 'deep ecological' purposes. But, besides these concerns (which I address in the final section), the unclarities of Shiva's own exposition of the concept of Prakṛti create many more specific misunderstandings that need to be clarified first. I do this in this section under the three heads (a) What is Prakṛti? (b) The relation between Prakṛti and nature, and (c) The relation between Prakṛti and the 'feminine'. The important and final transition from Prakṛti as a 'feminine principle' to Prakṛti as a *feminist* one, shall be dealt with in the last section of the paper along with the more general worries of using a metaphysical/spiritual framework for ecofeminist purposes.

*What is Prakṛti?*

India is not only a land of religious diversity but of rich philosophical pluralities. So to the extent that Shiva's language conveys the idea that Prakṛti is 'the' principle of Indian philosophy or spirituality embedded in rural life, she is clearly wrong. Focusing on Prakṛti is a *choice* from many other possible Indian world-views. Moreover, fundamentally distinct concepts of Prakṛti are used by the *Bhagavadgitā*, the Sāṁkhya and the Tāntric philosophical schools. So the first question is, '*Which* Prakṛti?' are we to concentrate on for a viable ecofeminist solution.

The *Sāṁkhya* system is clearly dualistic with Puruṣa and Prakṛti as the fundamental ontological categories. Puruṣa is consciousness and motionless, while Prakṛti is blind but dynamic. Further, Prakṛti is often represented as female—the dancing girls performing in the 'gaze' of an ever-watchful Puruṣa. Evolution of multiplicity is a co-operative project of both Puruṣa and Prakṛti, a result of this dance of Prakṛti in front of Puruṣa. Now, clearly *such* a Prakṛti cannot serve any feminist purposes. A Sāṁkhya dualism has the potential of fueling an ideology of repression just as much as the mechanistic world-view of 'modern' science. Even though the Sāṁkhya Prakṛti is a principle of dynamism rather than of passivity, it remains too close to patriarchal constructions of 'blind matter'. However, given her explicit references to *Kulacudāmaṇi Nigama*[10] and *The Serpent Power*[11], Shiva speaks of Prakṛti in the completely different (and non-orthodox) tradition of *Tantra* philosophy.[12] Here Prakṛti alone is the primordial power. It is the source and substance of all that is. It is *One*—requiring nothing other than itself in order to create. It is vibrantly *conscious*—its *will* to become many is sufficient for the evolutionary process to begin and it is *dynamic*—an inherently productive, creative force. Given such explicit monism, it is unfortunate that Shiva very often resorts to the language of complementarity more in line with the Sāṁkhya, as for instance, in

> Nature is thus an expression of Shakti, the feminine and creative principle of the cosmos; in conjunction with the masculine principle (Purusha), Prakriti creates the world. (p. 38)

It should be made clear that the metaphysical system Shiva intends to appropriate is *monistic* and references to the masculine principle (Śiva or Puruṣa) need to be understood within this monistic context. The primordial stage of Prakṛti is a state of neither creation nor destruction. In the next state, Prakṛti becomes desirous of creation and differentiates Herself into the principles of Śiva and Śakti. Subsequently, it is through the joyous union of these two differentiated aspects of the primordial Prakṛti that the rest of creation follows. Thus Prakṛti is the '*Father* and Mother of all', She addresses Śiva as 'Listen, *My child*' and the union of Śiva with Śakti at the 'beginning' of creation is a picture of Śiva 'maddened as He was with the joy of the embrace of (Thee Who art) *His own self*'.[13]



So ultimately, Śiva and Śakti or Puruṣa and Prakṛti are one and the same. Such Prakṛti—the ultimate source and primal power—is obviously also fit for veneration. On a spiritual plane thus, this metaphysical principle is translated into the 'sacred' and becomes an object of (non-dualistic) worship.

Two other questions remain even after this delineation of Shiva's metaphysical framework: Why and in what sense is such a Prakṛti the '*feminine* principle of the cosmos'? and why is it called *nature*? Let us begin with the latter first.

*Prakṛti and 'nature'*

The word for nature in some of the vernaculars is 'prakṛti'.[14] The link between Prakṛti, the ontological principle and prakṛti (nature) is interesting. If nature is 'all that there is'—living and non-living, organic and non-organic—then it is nothing but an expression of Prakṛti, the one dynamic principle underlying creation. Thus nature, thought of as either the class of all created things or as any one object—a particular tree or a stone—in that class, is *representative* of the metaphysical Prakṛti. It is itself nothing but Prakṛti though Prakṛti clearly transcends any particular manifestation of itself (in prakṛti). The relation here is very like the relation between Spinoza's *Natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. This pan-entheistic 'identification' of ordinary nature with the primordial source of existence infuses the former with all the mystery and sacredness of the latter. 'The tulsi is sacred not merely as a plant with beneficial properties but as Brindavan, the Symbol of the cosmos' (p. 40). *Each* tree in the world is sacred, *any* tree can be worshipped as a stand-in for the Ultimate just as much as 'nature as a whole'. Also, from the point of view of representations of Prakṛti, *each and every* manifestation of it has equal claim: rational humans, sentient animals or the grand old oak tree are not 'more' Prakṛti than say the weeds and the pebbles.[15]

From the perspective of an environmental ethic, this deification of nature and of everything in it, is a move towards expanding the moral domain. To conceptualize the natural order as 'sacred' rather than a 'resource', is to take away the sanction to use nature indiscriminately. Recollect Shiva's main ecofeminist argument in the previous section: Development implies exploitation of Nature as a resource. Exploitation of nature affects lives of (rural) women. So development results in a violence on *both* nature and women. What we now get is an ethical rebuttal of the first premise. Thinking of nature as the sacred Prakṛti generates prescriptions and sanctions *against* treating it as a resource for raw materials. And so, we have an ethical block to 'development'—the main cause of oppression. To what extent is such a simple *change in our thinking about nature* effective for changing exploitative social institutions and to what extent Shiva actually makes that claim is questionable and we will have occasion to return to it. But for the time being, it is sufficient to

note that she does point to *moral* prescriptions implicit in such a reconceptualization. This is clear from her quoting from (respectively) Chief Smohalla and Carolyn Merchant:

> You ask me to plough to ground: shall I take a knife and tear my mother's bosom? You ask me to cut grass and make hay and sell it and be rich like white men; but how dare I cut off my mother's hair? (p. 19)
>
> One does not readily slay a mother, dig her entrails or mutilate her body. (p. 18)

Even though we have not spoken of Prakṛti as a 'mother' so far, it is not hard to generate parallel ethical sanctions for nature conceived simply as divine: Do we unthinkingly and randomly mutilate our Gods?

*Prakṛti and the 'feminine principle'*

The slide from the deification of Prakṛti/nature to its 'maternalization', however, is a tricky issue important for our purposes. Why, upon this (broadly Tāntric) conception, is Prakṛti a *feminine* principle? Note that given the methodological constraint on ecofeminism articulated in an earlier section, this step is important. Yet, even while calling Prakṛti a 'feminine principle', Shiva clearly emphasizes that it is '*trans-gendered*'. What does such a juxtaposition amount to?

The 'feminization' of Prakṛti is very evident in the Tāntric tradition itself. In a predominant form of Tantra spirituality, the ontological principle is envisaged as the Goddess Kāli—a female figure. Also, the assimilation of the primordial *source* of creation as the primal *mother* is pretty straightforward. Now, Shiva does play around these ideas (she does not mention Prakṛti-as-Kāli but does speak in terms of Mother Goddesses). And consequently, she has invited upon herself the wrath of feminists who find motherhood politically problematic. However, it is important to note that Shiva cannot be speaking of simple biological motherhood seen through the lens of patriarchy. Prakṛti cannot be a 'mother' ordinarily understood. Unlike usual constructions of mothers as those who merely lend a womb, Prakṛti is designated as the *active* and *generative* principle. She is the sole creator of the universe—she is *not in need of impregnation* by a male and in fact is prior to any 'male principle'. (Thus as noted earlier, her language of complementarity more akin to the Sāṁkhya metaphysics actually weakens her position and shows an insensitivity to the complexity of her chosen version of Prakṛti). In Shiva's text what is emphasized is not so much the process of birthing but the *labour of sustaining*. So if we have an Earth Mother at all, it is not just from the point of view of *reproduction* but from the perspective of 'mothering'—the activities of nurturing, caring and serving sustenance-needs. Nature is feminine like a mother because, like women in rural



society, it nurtures and sustains life. Now, once we move away from biological motherhood, Prakṛti becomes 'trans-gendered' because the *activity* of serving life-needs can be performed both by women and men. The ability to act in order to sustain life rather than accumulate profit, is not *inherently* linked to females nor is it *impossible* for males. Nurturing or caring is an aspect historically associated with females which males can and would do well to emulate with no biological handicap whatever.

However, the critic[16] here may note (quite rightly) that though Prakṛti so understood may be in *principle* trans-gendered, it is the *women* who end up doing most of the sustenance work given the pre-existing gendered division of labour in society. It is thus not just biological motherhood which is the site of exploitation but *caretaking* stereotypes as well. Such criticisms require another twist to the commitment of Prakṛti being a 'feminine principle'. But instead of answering this directly, it would be helpful to look at a slightly different problem first.

It is clear that *Staying Alive* is not just a story of women as victims. Parallel to the analysis of their exploitation in terms of what has been termed the 'colonizing identity' is a theory of their political redemption through the Prakṛti-principle. But how can 'victims' access this principle in order to turn into principal actors? Agarwal notes that as a principle of high philosophy codified in Sanskrit texts, Prakṛti and its interpretations remain in the domain of the elite. The teachings of the *Kulacudāmaṇi*, says John Woodroffe, was 'never meant for the ordinary man of the world', leave alone ordinary women! Cecile Jackson makes a similar point in the slightly different context of commenting on the anthropologists Banuri and Apffel Marglin's approach to a tribal group in Orissa. Even though the *anthropologist*, Jackson says, may see a link between local knowledge systems concerning agriculture and female physiology, the point is really whether the *local population* itself articulates this link in the same way.[17] Parallelly, it is hardly likely that Shiva's subjects—women in the fringes—would know about Prakṛti or articulate their life-styles in terms of it.

Faced with the above Agarwal/Jackson worry, Shiva could say that her women do not participate in the highly Sanskritized and theoretical culture of the elite and *that they do not need to*. Through their ordinary agricultural practices and labour—in their choice of the trees to plant, in their skill in lopping to collect firewood, in their technique of preserving seeds, women exhibit *a* knowledge of Prakṛti. Now what kind of knowledge is this? Prakṛti in the *Kulacudāmaṇi* is an ontological principle grasped by a chosen few. *This* is obviously not something which the village women know. However, given a Prakṛti-ontology what follows is the organic unity of humankind with all that there is. If everything is a manifestation of Prakṛti, then we not only have diversity but also inter-relatedness in the world around us. The agricultural practices of local women underscore and are based on these principles of creativity,

diversity and unity in nature—they display a grasp of these ontological principles. Hence rural women are not here ascribed a *textual knowledge* of philosophy but a *knowing how*. Of course a part of the content of this knowledge how is codified in *propositional* form in texts and since *we*, Shiva's readers, do not participate in the practices of these rural women, *we* can only hope for a theoretical grasp in the form of *knowlege that* of Prakṛti as a philosophical principle. However, peasant (mostly) women exhibit a grasp of Prakṛti in their way of life and the *work* they do. Thus, Prakṛti is a 'feminine principle' now because (in contemporary society) it is *known* by women or *reclaimed* by taking their work seriously. It remains 'transgendered' because both men and women can, in effect, participate in that kind of work. The *content* of what is grasped is not gendered even though in contemporary society, the *knowing* of it is—and this also, not because of some inherently and biologically rooted 'female essence' but because of the kind of *work* that women historically do and are traditionally made to do.

What we get thus, is an *epistemological* thesis. It is the material conditions of women that give them a 'privileged (?) access' to a perspective different from the perspective dictated by a 'colonizing identity'. If demolishing such identity is the key to redemption, then these marginalized women are *cognitive experts* rather than scholars of philosophy or scientists in laboratories who are products of the system. Development spells the disaster that it does because indigenous and localized knowledge-systems are destroyed in favour of highly technologized and universalized systems. Thus, in a brilliant move, Shiva links ecological violence to *epistemological* violence and what we get is a fascinating extension of the ecofeminist thesis. The same forces that deplete nature and push women to the economic fringes also marginalize as a consequence, certain kinds of knowing like 'knowing how' or 'experiential knowledge'.[18] Along with this marginalization of *ways of knowing*, certain sectors of the *known* (or 'facts')—that is, the inherent diversity, inter-relatedness and self-renewability of nature embodied in these practices—are also lost. Prakṛti is 'feminine' because it is a codification of that which survives in these practices at the fringes of society—which, as a matter of fact, happens to be the domain of women. So Shiva says:

> In contemporary times, Third World women, whose minds have not been dispossessed or colonized, are in a privileged position to make visible the invisible, the oppositional categories (presumably what is meant here are, the categories that oppose maldevelopment) that they are the custodians of. It is not only as victims, but also as leaders in creating new intellectual ecological paradigms, that women are central to arresting and overcoming ecological crises. Just as ecological recovery begins from the centres of natural diversity which are gene pools, Third World women, and those tribals and peasants who have been left out of the processes of maldevelopment, are today acting as the intellectual gene pools of ecological categories of thought. (p. 46)



Political redemption is now not just the liberation of nature and women together, nor is it merely liberation of nature led by women but is also the breaking down of the entrenched superiority of *propositional* and textual knowing. It is also a liberation of hitherto ignored forms of knowing:

> The political struggle for the feminist and ecology movements involves an epistemological shift in the criteria of assessment of the rationality of knowledge. (p. 28)

Through this move, Shiva avoids falling into the typical orientalistic dualism of 'subjective, embedded, caring' of the East as against the 'objective, detached, intellectualism' of the West. Even while emphasizing the embeddedness in Nature of rural women and their nurturing practices, Shiva does not deprive them of 'minds': Their caring practices involving nature are forms of *knowing* nature. As in the Purāṇic–Tāntric story—you need a thousand-*handed* Goddess to destroy the thousand-*headed* demon of mal-development. In the process the knowing *hands* reclaim their epistemic status hitherto usurped by the talking *heads*!

## CORRECTING 'MALDEVELOPMENT' WITH PRAKṚTI

This last section shows how the negative and positive aspects of Shiva's theory hang together to constitute a coherent and powerful ecofeminism. From what has been said so far, this is yet to emerge. Note that the *cause of oppression*, maldevelopment, is very squarely an economic category whereas its *solution* is in terms of a metaphysical/spiritual category. How do the two come together? Is the coalition of the 'empirical' and 'cultural' streams that Shiva envisages within ecofeminism really coherent? Misunderstandings of the way in which these two currents enrich one another, leaves the theory open to a couple of devastating criticisms. Besides the point that Prakṛti-vision appears to give us a 'deep ecology' rather than an ecofeminism, the theory is vulnerable to the charge that if colonial projects of development are responsible for violence, then indigenous pre-colonial Indian society should be egalitarian. But this obviously turns a blind eye to partriarchal violence in very traditional Indian families and rural communities.

In order to understand what is going on here, it is necessary to get clear on what is being opposed to what—on the precise terms constituting, what Shiva likes to call, the 'oppositional categories'. Counterpoising a metaphysical vision directly with an economic structure seems to involve a levels confusion at best. So we need to dig deeper.

True, the direct and material causes of oppression are developmental projects but as has already been shown in Section I, this causal line can be taken further. To recapitulate briefly, the popularity of the prevalent

form of development in the Third World is traced to international power relations but also to *conceptual* schemes embedded in Baconian 'modern' science. So there is a conceptual paradigm that can be discerned at the heart of development. Shiva calls this paradigm 'reductionism' which is a kind of tunnel vision that erases diversity at all levels to serve the interests of a 'colonizer'. Thus, profit becomes the only 'value', commodity production becomes the only 'production', scientific knowledge produced by research methodologies in laboratories and published in refereed journals becomes the only 'knowledge', scientists become the only 'experts', to supply raw material for industry becomes the only 'use' that nature has. Underlying all this is an anthropocentrism of the privileged—that the rich elite are the only 'humans' that count. Consequently, a hierarchical dualism is generated between their needs and everything else—which, in turn, serves as a sanction for the exploitation of the latter through 'development'.

Now the metaphysical thesis of Prakṛti strikes at the heart of such hierarchy and dualism for it embodies a conceptual cartography that is diametrically opposed to the one implicit in 'modern science'. Thus Prakṛti undermines development by undermining its *conceptual roots*. What is this alternative vision? If *everything* is the result of Prakṛti, *everything* shares in Goddesshood equally. As hunger, shame, trust, memory, motherliness and prosperity—the goddess is in every living being. There is no justified claim that any *one* evolute, as opposed to the others is any 'higher' and consequently, the crippling dualisms of contemporary life are washed away. More positively, it becomes a celebration of the interconnectedness and diversity of life and nature.[19]

Of course, *just this much* is reminiscent of the classic deep ecological move of negating anthropocentrism—humans are no longer seen to be special and all species have an equal moral standing. This message is couched in terms of an Eastern philosophical/spiritual vision (Prakṛti)—also a classic ploy of deep ecology! But Shiva's theory is significantly different in two ways. Firstly, the incorporation of empirical and social issues of power in her analysis of oppression, is *more* than the deep ecological denial of anthropocentrism. Humans are not privileged but some humans have tried to keep others underprivileged and the model of counter-development through Prakṛti proposes to remedy that. Secondly, the use she makes of Prakṛti is distinctively gendered. Remember that Prakṛti for her is a 'feminine' principle and according to our analysis, this is cashed out in a *gendered epistemological* way even though the content (or what is known) is trans-gender. So Shiva cannot be accused at least of the androcentrism (in the name of genderlessness) that feminists see in 'deep ecology'.

Does such a recourse to Prakṛti mean that Shiva ends up saying that we can set things right simply by changing the way we think and by focusing on the 'right' philosophy? Does the 'cultural' strand in her system



triumph after all? But if so, pre-colonial societies fueled by the Prakṛti-ideal should have been free of violence against women and nature—which they were obviously not. What then is the precise link between reclaiming the conceptual scheme associated with Prakṛti and fighting exploitation? How, in other words, does the 'feminine principle' become not only a non-violent way of *conceiving* the world but also of '*acting in it* to sustain all life by maintaining the interconnectedness and diversity of nature'? (p. 14; My emphasis)

Once again, to answer the above objection often raised against Shiva's work, it is important to read the text as philosophy that is not interested in making *historical* claims about any particular Indian society being egalitarian nor as entailing any such historical fact. What we have here is a *normative* thesis—that the philosophical idea of Prakṛti *could be used* or *ought to be appropriated* for ecofeminist purposes. The fact that it has not happened in the past is no argument for the claim that it cannot be done. But with this kind of a defense, we might be left pretty confused about the purpose of Shiva's sharp polarization of the West and the Third World, of the world view of 'modern' science and the world view of Prakṛti. If the second terms in the two dichotomies—that is, 'Third World' and 'world view of Prakṛti'—are equally susceptible to patriarchal exploitation, is there any sense to her analysis of either the *cause* of exploitation being a 'Western' notion or its *solution* lying in a 'Third World' philosophical perspective? This is where a reading of *Staying Alive* parallel to Plumwood's *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature* (as suggested in the section II above) helps again.

It is best to untangle ourselves in the following way. I do not think Shiva is (or need be) unaware of indigenous forms of patriarchy in traditional societies. Yet she concentrates (maybe for political reasons, maybe because of her own location) on *one glaring form* of patriarchy—the economic colonization of India by the West. An analysis of this leads her to unearth the structure of a 'colonizing identity'—a construction of 'self' based on exploitative self-other dualisms. Now so long as *self-construction* follows this model, there is bound to be violence and exploitation. Thus the point of dramatizing and focusing on patriarchal hierarchies of the colonial moment is not necessarily to deny the forms that patriarchy takes in other moments. Rather, it is to make perspicuous the over-arching logico-conceptual structures underlying patriarchy in all its different forms. What the metaphysics of Prakṛti offers us is a blueprint for constructing ourselves differently and interactively. Rather than a dualistic, autonomous self we are shown the *possibility of a 'relational' self*. It is a strength rather than a weakness of Shiva's theory that the mere existence of such a blueprint is not construed as automatically leading to non-exploitative social conditions. The key is whether self-identity and self-other relationships are *actually* constructed according to this blueprint. Traditional societies can be internally as exploitative as the First

World–Third World relationship under capitalism. These would be societies where the metaphysics of self and of a community of selves is structured 'dualistically'—though the hierarchical dualisms would play out in terms other than the divisions of urban–rural, west–east, profit–life. So by reading against the grain, maybe we do have in *Staying Alive* at least the beginnings of what Ariel Salleh wants from her Third World sisters—'a close attention to the interplay of western and other patriarchal systems'.[20] A 'colonizing identity' (diametrically opposed to self-other interactions modelled on a Prakṛti-vision) is the common nexus between the diverse forms that patriarchy takes across cultures and times. Moreover, a mere theoretical grasp of the Prakṛti blueprint is also not sufficient for a solution. The kind of knowledge in question is not the grasp of a propositional system but a 'know how'—a dialectic of understanding and doing. Maybe the fact that pre-colonial Indian societies remained patriarchal in spite of their philosophical traditions of Prakṛti is because they did not *do* enough. Medieval Sanskrit casuistry did warn 'even reading the Great Books people remain great fools. Those who work, they alone are learned'; but this wisdom itself may have remained largely confined to bookish learning! The dualism of thought and action, of those who 'know' and those who 'do' remains a dualism generated by a 'colonizing identity'.

To take this argument further, in a certain sense Shiva has no option but to take *economic patriarchy* as fundamental or as the key exemplar of what has gone wrong. Given her *epistemological* commitments (of not conceiving women as simple victims but as cognitive 'experts' with a solution), a vision of the solution and of what is 'right' cannot be grasped just by theoretical analysis. Rather, it must be embodied in a form of 'knowing how' that still survives in the practices of women on the fringes of society. But these practices (and this is the central point)—be it sustenance sylviculture or spontaneous pro-environment protests—happen to be counters to economic patriarchy that have retained their roots in traditional conceptual schemes in spite of depletion of material conditions due to development projects. Thus Shiva's ecofeminist solutions arise from within contexts of post-colonial economic depravity. Even her own theorizing arises out of her 'involvement with women's struggles for survival in India'. It is not a theoretical structure *independent* of labour and practice but embedded in it. Thus, the 'culturalist' stream of her thought remains grounded in material conditions. To 'reclaim' the conceptual core encapsulated and codified as Prakṛti, it is not enough just to read it as philosophy. One needs to *participate in* the life-affirming practices of the peasants.

Thus, concentrating on the material conditions and actions of rural women to stay alive, gives us much more than just ethical constraints necessary for their 'staying alive'—it generates a new and dramatic *epistemology* and *metaphysics* as well. Ecofeminism now need not fear being



caught in the false dilemma of being either ineffective and idle on the one hand or being untheoretical and blind on the other. It can at once be both politically busy and sighted—just like the self-generating, active Prakṛti-consciousness which is the source and sustainer of us all.

## Notes and References

1. See for example Janis Birkeland, 'Neutralizing Gender', *Environmental Ethics*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1995.
2. Vandana Shiva, *Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development*, Kali for Women, New Delhi, 1989. All references and page numbers are to this text unless otherwise specified.
3. Shiva does not use diacritical marks in her text. I have done so, except when I quote her work.
4. Ariel Salleh's review of *Staying alive* in *Hypatia*, vol. 6, no. 1, Spring, 1991.
5. Bina Agarwal, 'Engendering the Environment Debate: Lessons from the Indian Subcontinent', *Feminist Studies* 18, No. 1, Spring, 1992.
6. See the development of this idea in Plumwood's *Feminism and Mastery Over Nature*, Routledge, New York and London, 1993, Chap. 2. I shall have occasion to say more about this later.
7. Diana, Fuss, *Essentially Speaking*, Routledge, New York, 1989. Fuss mentions Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's reading of Subaltern Studies in *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics*, Methuen, New York and London, 1987, in this connection. Fuss' own stand here is that 'Historicism is not always an effective counter to essentialism if it succeeds only in fragmenting the subject into multiple identities, each with its own self-contained, self-referential essence. The constructionist impulse to specify, rather than definitively counteracting essentialism, often simply redeploys it through the very strategy of historicization, re-routing and dispersing it through a number of micro-political units or sub-categorical classifications, each presupposing its own unique interior composition or metaphysical core', p. 20.
8. This is a term from the later book *Ecofeminism* by Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, Kali for Women, New Delhi, 1993, but is apt to characterize her ideas here as well.
9. Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, Chap. 2.
10. There is an unfortunate and unpardonable typographical error in the name of the text here. Shiva refers to the *Kulacudāmaṇi Nigama*, See *Tantric Texts*, Vol. IV, edited by Arthur Avalon, Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi, 1987.
11. Sir John Woodroffe, *The Serpent Power*, Ganesh and Co., Madras, 1931.
12. Once again, there are differences even within what can be broadly called the Tantra school.
13. All in the *Kulacudāmaṇi Nigama*.
14. In Sanskrit, 'nature' is '*nisarga*'. 'Prakṛiti' means one of the following: People or subjects of a kingdom, root of a verb or word, original state, character of a person, cause, or woman.
15. At first blush, this appropriation of Prakṛti-metaphysics for environmental purposes may seem very much like a deep ecological move. As some critics have pointed out, this is a position which Shiva does not seem to be aware of or at least does not consciously distinguish her theory from. I will argue later how it is very different from deep ecology.
16. See for example, Ariel Salleh's review in *Hypatia*.
17. Cecile Jackson, 'Radical Environmental Myths: A Gender Perspective' in *The New Left Review*, No. 210, March/April, 1995.

18. These categories have been further developed in 'Are Old Wives' Tales Justified?' by Vrinda Dalmiya and Linda Alcoff, *Feminist Epistemologies*, edited by Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, Routledge, New York, 1993.
19. For an example of 'Indian science' based on a Prakṛti ideal (though the conception of Prakṛti here is not as specific as the one Shiva uses) see the work of Jagadis Chandra Bose on the similarities between living and non-living realms. Ashis Nandy in his psycho-social biography of Bose reads him as attempting to formulate a peculiarly 'Indian' scientific ideology—based on redefined notions of scholarliness, of learning and of the social obligation of a scientist rooted in an Indian metaphysical framework of abstract monism. Ashis Nandy, *Alternative Sciences: Creativity and Authenticity in Two Indian Scientists*, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1980.
20. Salleh, *Hypatia*, p. 214.



# Documenting Difference: A Note on Historiography of Civilization (A Comment on the Special Issue Devoted to the Historiography of Civilizations, June 1996)

In the September–December 1996 issue of *JICPR*, there has been published a review of *JICPR 'Special Issue on Historiography of Civilization'* (June 1996) by R.K. Kaul. Considering the serious philosophical discourses in the original issue of the the *JICPR*, the review seems to skim the surface even while it injects its own brand of bias. Thus D.P. Chattopadhyaya's attempt to establish a conceptual difference between Itihas and history is viewed as a distant curiosity, G.C. Pande's analysis of ethnocentricism in the western historiography of civilizations, is dismissed as common quibbling, Suresh Chandra's article is rejected with similar disdain. The reviewer shows no awareness of the substantive issues underlying these articles.

Another review of same issue (Lawrence A. Babb, 'On Excessive Politeness: A response to special issue on Historiography of Civilization' in *JICPR* Vol. IV, Number 3) has made a commendable attempt to underline the issues lying in the discourses of the volume. While centring his discussion on 'emic' and 'etic' paradigms to know the cultures, he points out the theoretical mode of particular studies and narrative of knowing and writing culture which emerge from G.C. Pande's discourse on the historiography of civilization.

The construction of 'particularity' in one sense, is the way of deconstruction of 'Master- or Meta-narrative' which is dominant in understanding and writing about civilizations. Master-narrative meant for describing stories which seem to assimilate different cultures into a single course of history dominated by the West. Kerwin Lee Kelin (1995), rightly opined that the Meta-narrative is institutionalized, canonical and legitimizing. It is in a position of intellectual mastery. It ignores the obvious pagan truism, that stories refer to other stories.[1] Master-narratives were those which occupied positions of dominance. This great story of history has its end in the extinction of particularism. So the post-modern condition is the condition of incredulity towards master narratives (Lyotard, 1984). That is, we have anthropology and history in transition from a state of uncontested authority to contesting domain.[2] This is the way to be free from Hegelian hubris and create new forms for narrating post-colonial histories of civilizations.

This original volume is welcome because there is reflected in it, an attempt of reconstructing historiography of civilization in the post-

colonial paradigm. The importance of this volume is further acceler-ated in the backdrop of the new wave of searching the post-colonial historiographic model, independent of colonial dictates in those countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America which have, after a prolonged struggle, started searching their own historical identities. In these continents the effort is being made to construct the post-colonial condition after a break- away from colonial dependence. In this context, special mention may be made of the efforts of scholars like Edward W. Said, Talal Asad and subsequently a new generation of post-colonial theorists who are involved in the construction of a post-colonial and non-western context of civilizational discourse. The contributions in this volume are in a way, a bold attempt to free the historiography of Indian civilization from colonial and oppressive western hangover and develop an agenda for the writing of post-colonial historiography of Indian civilization. This is an important lead in my opinion. The articles of D.P. Chattopadhyaya, G.C. Pande, and Suresh Chandra in this volume are worth mentioning here in this reference.

D.P. Chattopadhyaya establishes the fact that in many societies, there are multiple and plural ways of recollecting and representing their past. One should not homogenize them only because they do not fit the parameters of history developed in the nineteenth century, or exclude them from discourses of the historiography of civilization. Pauranic societies had even, their own ways to preserve history. Why should it be a ground of disparagement that meanings of history and Itihas have different echoes? Historiography based on the *aufklärung* and the aftermath of Sturm and Drang came in the focus during the period from the mid-eighteenth century to mid-nineteenth century. In the Indian context, an attempt to search the 'meaning of Itihas' different from 'history', would be an expansion of the boundary of the past constructed till now, and also an attempt at searching many sources rejected and oppressed by official historiography, under the impact of positivism. In fact it can be perceived as a protest against the colonial construction of the past and an important stage in the process of the search for Indian identity. D.P. Chattopadhyaya very properly exposes the pitfalls lying in the meaning of terms as western discourses become dominant. In this process he exposes the politics of knowledge and definitions developed by western hegemonic efforts.

G.C. Pande has tried to present the approaches and attitudes towards Indian civilization, which emerge from the history of civilization written by western academia. The fact which emerges from these approaches is that what we have is a history of shadows and negativities, a modern western judgement on Indian civilization is thus essentially ethnocentric, whether it deals with the history of the West, the history of the world, or the history of the different non-western civilization. Edward Said (1978) also drew a similar inference about western imperial approach towards



Arabs that 'by constructing a passive and backward or even decadent Orient, generated' what he calls a will to govern over it, justified as a 'civilizing' project by which the Orient can be brought into the modern world.[3] In fact 'this is the way by which the West has treated the globe and its people as both play-thing and object to be exploited, ruled and studied.'[4] Really, a type of colonialism is prevalent in the historiography of civilization. So in G.C. Pande's article a philosophical basis for writing an Indian history of civilization instead of a western history of civilization seems to be developing. He always attempts to recover the nation (Desh) which is lost in western historiography. G.C. Pande has raised right questions at the right time. This is the right time to raise the question about proper justice to our civilizational identity in the texts of western judgement on civilizations. After the collapse of communism the questions of cultural/civilizational identity are very much evident in spite of all efforts putforth towards globalization as a new civilization. In fact, the western construction of our mind has brought a schism in our soul. Because of long colonial experience, we are in the trap of collective amnesia due to which what is ours does not seem so! What is not ours seems to be ours. In his article, he exposes some myths dominant in contemporary history of civilization. He de-establishes hegemony of western concepts established during the period from mid-eighteenth century to early nineteenth century and also removes fallacies emerging from positivism and others.

G.C. Pande denounces the concept of master story, grand narrative in the historiography of civilization. He stands for particular studies, narratives and reflections, bearing on past human experience in so far as it has recorded itself. Such a historiography in his words 'despite its fragmentary character, would have an intrinsic, humanistic, moral and spiritual significance.' He proceeds in his method of analysis towards the post-colonial ways of difference. As we know, western colonial logic of universalist assimilation has given way to the non-western post-colonial logic of difference. Without deconstructing the colonial and western hegemonic concept one could not provide any non-West construction in the arena of knowledge in the colonies.[5] G.C. Pande has attempted to do the same thing in this article. He has tried to give a post-colonial answer to the colonial questions about the historiography of civilization.

He is of the view that there are three artificial impositions in the current historiography of civilization.

(1) The idea of a single civilizational evolution which is not so much the product of historical enquiry but based on the recent historical experience of the modern West.
(2) The notion of the division of history which was started by the revelatory Semitic religions.
(3) The contrast of the old and new, which was brought out by the renaissance and reformation.

He gives many valuable examples from the history of traditions, civilizations and scientific development all over the world, in support of his logic.

These western myths create far-reaching problems in our civilizational discourse. When we proceed to reconstruct the Indian history of civilization these myths serve as a basis of our knowledge and introduce dislocations in our vision. For example there is the fallacy underlying the ideological construction on the assumption that the substance of civilization lies in the quest for rational power and satisfaction to be attained by adopting the White Man's magic: Such a notion erodes, the human substance of culture.

While discussing the Historiography of Indian Civilization, Suresh Chandra presents in a very argumentative way, the process of the distortion of knowledge about the Indian past brought out by the academic industry of the West which is the foundation of our further reconstruction of the history of Indian civilization.

Nisha Rathore exposes Ranjit Guha's approaches to historiography as axiomatic, not empirical. In fact, this very review of subaltern historiography is itself compelled by axiomatic approach. It presents Guha's approach to history in mathematical sense to negate many complexities of subaltern historiography. Nisha Rathore supposes Guha's division of elite and subaltern to be very rigid, while Guha, even after establishing this division, explains the process of overlap and interaction between them, and himself analyses the process of reconstruction of their rigidity in the dialectics of social discourse. There is no contradiction in it, but the social interaction mentioned is only the depiction of continuous process involving construction and deconstruction. Guha clarifies in his writings again and again that two domains (elite and subaltern) have not been sealed off from each other, but often overlap mainly because the elite dominance always tried to mobilize and interrogate them but primarily to fight for elite objectivities.[6]

Daya Krishna has presented a very insightful paper on the historical development of philosophy. He has attempted to situate the evolution of Vedānta in the course of history. He argues that the expansion of the influence of Vedānta was based on the loss and defeat of the other streams of knowledge, for example, Buddhism, Jainism, etc. The entire issue provides a new programme of research for reflecting our civilizational self.

It would be in the fitness of things if one could burn the long fossilized occidental versus oriental controversy of the age of Macaulay and realize that we are now in the post-colonial and post-modernist context of historiographic reflection.

### Notes and References

1. Kerwin Lee Klein, 1995, 'In search of narrative mastery, Post-modernism to People without History', *History and Theory*, Vol. 34, Wesley University.
2. Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Post-modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, translated by Geoff Bennigton and Brian, Massachusetts University, Minneapolis, 1984.
3. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, Pantheon, New York, 1978.
4. Joels Kahn, *Culture, Multiculture, Post-Culture*, Sage, London, 1995.
5. Nugugi W.A. Thyongo, *Bhasha, Sanskriti Aur Rashtriya Asmita*, Saransh, Delhi, 1995.
6. D. N. Dhanagre, 'Subaltern Consciousness and Populism: Two approaches in the study of Social Movement in India', *Social Scientist*, Vol. 16, Number 11, Delhi, 1998.

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[According to Professor V.N. Jha, the well-known scholar of Nyāya to whom these comments were sent to find if there was anything wrong with them, 'They are far from the tradition. It appears that nobody has made the fundamentals of Navya Nyāya clear to you. Naturally your comments are without foundation.' However, as he has not indicated as to what exactly is the misunderstanding, I am still tempted to publish them so the misunderstandings if any, may be clarified and we may move nearer to understanding what exactly the neo-Naiyāyika is doing and whether he has really achieved the precision which is usually ascribed to him. Professor V.N. Jha had said that 'It is not possible for me and also it is not a rewarding exercise to write my own comments on each and every comment of yours, because that will take double the pages you have used for your comments.' However, I hope that he, as well as other Naiyāyikas would point out the 'misunderstandings' so that the issue may be clarified to the extent it is possible. Navya Nyāya ultimately is a mode of analysis and I see no reason why it cannot be used by anyone for purposes other than the traditional ones for which the neo-Naiyāyikas have used them in the past. I am also giving at the end the response that Professor D. Prahalada Char had made on my comments so that the reader may see the difference between the two responses, one by Professor V.N. Jha and the other by Professor Prahalada Char.]

## Have the Neo-Naiyāyikas been Leading Us Up the Garden Path? A Comment on the *Kroḍapatras* by D. Prahlada Char

Professor Prahlada Char's article on the *kroḍapatras* published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, is perhaps the first detailed study of this new genre of philosophical writing which occurred in India some time in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The *kroḍapatras* are supposed to be different from the *Vādagranthas* and are primarily written to explain certain sentences which occur in the classical texts and which have some difficulty with respect to their formulation. The *kroḍapatras* that he considers for detailed examination are those by Kālīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya (AD 1810) and Candranārāyana Bhaṭṭāchārya (AD 1790). These two *kroḍapatras* are supposed to be concerned with the *hetvābhāsa sāmānyanirukti* of Gadādhara which treats the issue of fallacies and which itself is a commentary on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's treatment of fallacies as given by Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Gaṅgeśa's definition runs somewhat as follows, 'The fallacy of reason is that by comprehending

which a cognition prevents an inferential cognition'. What perhaps is meant is that the moment one recognizes something as a fallacy one feels constrained to forego the deduction of a conclusion from premises from which earlier one had supposed it to follow. However, Gaṅgeśa's definition, though obviously plausible, does not take into account the distinction between the one who gives the argument and the one who only receives it or hears it or learns about it in any other way. The distinction is important for the awareness of a fallacy normally would function differently in the two contexts. The person who is actively thinking and arguing, after becoming aware that there is a fallacy involved in the argument would normally think of finding some other premises or grounds from which the conclusion can be derived without involving the fallacy concerned as he is convinced that the conclusion itself is valid and hence needs to be established on non-fallacious grounds. Basically, the point is that the attitude of the thinker to the awareness of a fallacy in his argument is not 'passive', particularly as there are very few conclusions which follow only from one set of premises and from no others. Normally, we do not have 'Q', if and only, if 'P'. In other words, the 'active' mind searches for alternative premises from which to derive the conclusion concerned in the face of its awareness that there is a fallacy involved in the argument that one has given. On the other hand, the passive recipient of the argument or the one who purely contemplates it as an object, feels only that as there is a fallacy, the conclusion does not follow from the premises that have been provided for it. Gaṅgeśa's definition therefore while essentially correct, is inadequate as it does not take into account the distinction between *swārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* which the Nyāya thinker generally accepts. It is of course true that this distinction is not normally drawn in the way we are trying to understand it, but if the whole context of an argument which is usually designated as '*prayojana*' and which is so heavily emphasized by the Nyāya thinker is kept in mind, then one will see the relevance of the point that we are trying to make.

The *kroḍapatras*, however, are not concerned with this issue but rather with something else. They are concerned rather with the modification that Raghunātha Śiromaṇi suggested in the definition of Gaṅgeśa. However, it does not discuss the generalized issue at all, thus pointing to a strange limitation of the traditional format of the discussion on the subject. Somehow, the tradition seems to accept that the inference 'there is fire on the mountain, because there is smoke' as valid while 'there is fire on the lake because there is smoke' is invalid, without critically examining why the first is valid and the second invalid. In fact, the Sanskrit formulations are ambiguous in the extreme, for the Sanskrit phrase '*parvato vanhimān dhūmāt*' means the mountain is fiery or to make it closer to English usage that the mountain is characterized by the presence of fire because there is smoke. The term '*dhūmāt*' only means



that the ground of this inference is the perception of smoke but not directly the perception of the fire itself. The hidden ground for this inference is the adage 'where there is smoke, there is fire'. But even this formulation of the ground is faulty, for the terms 'where' and 'there' are ambiguous. One obviously does not mean that the fire is exactly at the same place where there is smoke but only that in case smoke is perceived, or even smelt, it is a sign that there is fire somewhere. Where exactly the fire is, the smoke can never tell. On the other hand, the counter-example on which the whole discussion in the *kroḍapatra* is based which alleges that the second definition of fallacious reasoning given by Gaṅgeśa would not be able to distinguish between the statement 'the mountain is fiery because there is smoke' and the statement 'the lake is fiery because there is smoke' even though the latter is obviously fallacious while the former is not. The reason why the second is supposed to be fallacious is because there seems to be *a priori* knowledge that water, by its very nature, cannot have the characteristic of having fire in it. But it is never discussed in the tradition as to how one obtains this knowledge and how one is 'certain' about it. For, in a sense, even a mountain can never have a fire on it unless there is a forest cover on it to catch the fire. A mountain totally bereft of a forest cover, that is, which does not have any dry grass or trees can obviously never be characterized as fiery, as stones normally are not supposed to catch fire. They can of course become very hot, but so can water. Water cannot only get very hot but also boil and burn and if heat is the chief characteristic of fire then surely it can have an element of fire in it and obviously it cannot be held that its intrinsic nature is such as not to allow any element of heat within it. Of course, we pour it on fire to extinguish it but there are some kinds of fire in which water is not supposed to be used to extinguish them. Also, in the tradition itself, there is supposed to be a fire which is held to be intrinsic to water itself and this has been called '*baḍavānala*'. In fact, if one believes in the usual mythology, then Rama is supposed to have burnt the ocean or threatened to burn it, if it refused to hear his request to provide access for his troops to cross over to Laṅkā. If water could never burn, then surely Rāma would not even have threatened to do so, and if this was as impossible as the Nyāya logicians treat it, then the author of the Rāmāyaṇa would never have written it.

The issue is not of mythology or of what people believe in. It relates to a question of empirical fact and hence the objection to a definition should not normally be entertained where the example given is itself subject to doubt. In fact, the traditional Nyāya logician seems never to have carefully distinguished between the logical and the empirical and this perhaps is the reason why he is continuously faced with problems arising from the absence of such a distinction. Of course, the distinction raises problems of its own as has been pointed out by Quine in his famous article entitled 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'. But the Indian logician

does not seem to have even faced the problem of the essential contingency of most empirical statements as they are always based on limited experience which future experience may subvert.

In any case, it appears that Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in his commentary on Gaṅgeśa found a slight defect in the formulation of the definition and added the word '*viśiṣṭa*' in order to obviate this defect. Perhaps, by adding this term he wanted to restrict the definition of fallacious reasoning given by Gaṅgeśa to the specific nature of the objects in which the relation of *vyāpti* was supposed to be the ground of inference. The correction by Raghunātha however seems to have given rise to further difficulties as the term '*viśiṣṭa*' which he added does not seem to have conveyed precisely the nature of the property in the cognition of fallacious reasoning which prevents the inferential process from taking place. Gadādhara made a further addition in the modification suggested by Raghunātha to the definition given by Gaṅgeśa, creating further problems for subsequent thinkers, though the writers of the *kroḍapatras* seem to have dealt with them.

It appears that Gadādhara added the word '*yadrūpa*' to specify what exactly the word '*viśiṣṭa*' meant when Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's used this term to convey the specificity of the property conceived. But it seems that the added precision was not precise enough for subsequent Nyāya thinkers and Kālīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya starts his *kroḍapatras* by asking what exactly was meant by '*yadrūpa*', which Gadādhara had added to the modification already proposed by Raghunātha, or in other words, what exactly was the property whose apprehension obstructed the process of inferring the conclusion from the premises. The obvious answer in the context of the Nyāya example is that it should be the absence of the *vyāpti* relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*. However, instead of discussing at this general level, which perhaps would have been more rational, the Nyāya discussion, as developed by the authors of the *kroḍapatras*, takes a different turn and confines itself only to the specific example of the fallacious inference that the lake is on fire because there is smoke. This suggests that the apprehension of the property which obstructs the inference is obviously the fact that the lake which is full of water cannot be on fire as water is characterized by the absence of fire. Or, to put the same thing in Nyāya terminology, as water itself is characterized by 'waterness' and fire by 'fireness', it is the absence of the 'fireness' in 'waterness' which obstructs the process of inference. The Nyāyāyika however does not raise the question as to how one accounts for this absence or how one validates such an assertion. Kālīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya, on the other hand, in his *kroḍapatras* raises the question as to the exact nature of the relation between the absence of 'fireness' in the 'waterness' which is supposed to be an essential characteristic of something being a lake. Kālīśaṅkara forgets that there can be such a thing as a 'dry lake' and that such a lake where there is no water is not a contradiction-in-terms,



that is, it is not like *vandhyāpautra*. However, forgetting this objection for the moment and attending only to the turn that Kālīśaṅkara's thought takes in the discussion of the subject, the issue that he raises is that the relation between the absence of 'fireness' in what he calls 'lakeness' cannot be a *swarūpa saṁbandha* as, in the case of the absence of a pot on the ground and the ground itself, which is related by what the Nyāya calls a *swarūpa saṁbandha*. The relation of the absence will have to be more positive in character. Perhaps, what is meant is that the relation of 'fireness' in the 'lakeness' will have to be more positive in order to obstruct the inference. Kālīśaṅkara's move to provide this positive character to the presence of the negation is to suggest that the relation should be conceived as *samānādhikaraṇya*, that is, as 'co-present' in the same locus and not as *swarūpa*. This however is no solution at all as the basic question is whether the co-presence of absence is accidental or necessary, an issue to which Kālīśaṅkara does not address himself for the simple reason that Nyāya thought does not come to grips with the problem. But basically Kālīśaṅkara is not very serious about this suggestion as he himself rejects it. Yet, the very fact that he does entertain the possibility shows, firstly, that the distinction between necessary and accidental qualities has not been given much attention in Nyāya and, secondly, the very notion of *samānādhikaraṇya* and what it implies has not been analysed as it is not clear what exactly is meant by saying that the same object is the locus of different properties or, putting it differently, the same subject can be characterized by different predicates. This obviously presupposes the notion of a substance or a thing which endures in time and hence may even have incompatible properties in case they occur at different moments of time. However, even if one accepts the notion of *samānādhikaraṇa*, one will have to further discuss the criteria on the basis of which some properties or certain kinds of properties cannot in principle have the same *samānādhikaraṇa*. Nyāya thinkers have not discussed this question. The objection of Kālīśaṅkara to the acceptance of the *samānādhikaraṇa* of 'lakeness' and the 'absence of fire' seems to be on the ground that sufficient precision has not been articulated with respect to the 'absence of fire in the lake' as one has to realize that the lake is characterized by 'lakeness' and fire by 'fireness' and that 'absence' is itself characterized both by what may be called 'absenceness' on the one hand and that it is the 'absence of fire', and hence an 'absenceness' qualified by fire, which itself is qualified by 'fireness' and which characterizes the 'lakeness' which is characterizing the lake. Thus, to put this simple thing in a very complicated way, the lake is characterized by 'lakeness' which itself is characterized by the 'absence of fire' which in turn is characterized by 'absenceness' and 'fireness' which together are further characterized by an 'absenceness of fireness'. This 'absenceness characterized by fireness' itself characterizes 'lakeness' which characterizes the lake. This complicated analysis seems to be a roundabout way to the

assertion which, in the western philosophical tradition, has been described in terms of the necessary exclusion of one set of qualities from another set of qualities on one set of predicates from another set. As a predicate is always analysed as a particular characterized by a universal and as the exclusion is supposed to be necessary because of the very nature of the predicate, the awareness of such an exclusion prevents or forbids such an inference from occurring. However, the Western tradition of philosophizing has never been able to completely explicate as to what exactly is meant by a 'necessary' exclusion just as the Indian analysis does not seem to come to grips with the question as to the grounds on which such exclusion is justified. The situation is however further complicated by the fact that Nyāya does not treat sentences as conveying some specific state of affairs or 'facts', but rather as producing states of 'knowing' in the person who reads or hears them and hence treats sentences which convey the same fact as essentially different depending on the way it is expressed in a sentence, or through a sentential construction. Thus a sentence like 'Daśaratha is the father of Rāma' will be treated as essentially different from the sentence 'Rāma is the son of Daśaratha' even though they may denote the same fact, especially for a person who is familiar with Indian mythology and hence knows that the name 'Rāma' denotes a male person. The western analysis of such sentences postulates either the notion of a proposition or a fact which is conveyed by seemingly diverse kinds of sentences which, for all cognitive purposes, are supposed to say the same thing. As Nyāya does not accept this position, it is not quite clear how it will tackle the question of the translatability of one set of sentences into another while preserving the identity of meaning. It is not quite clear whether the prolonged discussion of *śābdabodha* or linguistic meaning in the Indian tradition has addressed itself to this issue. In the recent western discussion on the subject Professor Quine has questioned the notion of translatability in terms of the preservation of the sameness of meaning understood in terms of *salva veritate*, but one does not know whether there is a comparable Indian discussion on the subject and if it has taken the Quinean turn or some other direction.

Kālīsaṅkara, however, seems to raise an objection even to this complicated formulation mentioned above. His objection appears to suggest that the formulation would also prohibit the inference of the presence of fire in the mountain if for some reason someone were to think that the absence of fire was as much a characteristic of a mountain as it is of a lake. It is strange to find Kālīśaṅkara raising such an objection as the crux of the matter was that there is a radical difference between lake and mountain in this regard and while the first can never be characterized by the presence of fire the other possibly could and there is nothing in the nature of things which prevents a mountain being characterized by the presence of fire even though a mountain can certainly have a lake within it. But normally one would not deny the possibility of a mountain catching fire on the ground that there was a lake there. Kālīśaṅkara may have been grouping for a purely formal notion of inferential validity/invalidity which does not clearly exist in the Nyāya framework. It is of course true that in case one 'accepts' the premise that wherever there is 'mountainness' there is absence of 'fireness', then one cannot infer that there is fire on the mountain, just as if one 'accepts' that wherever there is 'lakeness' there is an absence of 'fireness', one cannot infer that there is fire in the lake. All of this, of course, is correct as it depends on the acceptance of the premise preceded by it and Kālīśaṅkara's understandable confusion arises simply from the fact that he has not grasped the notion of the formal validity of an inference as distinct from its empirical truth.



As Kālīśaṅkara wrote in 1810 or so, it is quite possible that he had not had any interaction with the western tradition of philosophizing. As both the Sanskrit College and Hindu College were established by the British in Calcutta in 1823 and 1828, respectively, it would be interesting to know in this regard if persons writing later showed any awareness of this commonplace distinction in the western tradition.

Kālīśaṅkara's further explanation as to why the term '*yadrūpa*' in Gadādhara cannot apply to 'mountainness' when it can apply to 'lakeness' is as unsatisfactory as his earlier discussion because he does not seem to have grasped the essential point of the discussion. Surely a mountain can be characterized by the absence of fire as there is nothing in the nature of a mountain to make it impossible for fire to be absent there. On the other hand, the very nature of water as such seems to exclude the possible presence of fire in it and hence the absence of fire is not contingent or accidental as in the case of a mountain but necessary as the very nature of water is supposed to require that it is such. The absence of fire in the mountain and the absence of fire in the water in the lake are thus of two different orders and unless this is realized, no satisfactory analysis of the term '*yadrūpa*' as given by Gadādhara can be done.

The discussion on what exactly is meant by the term '*yadrūpa*' in Gadādhara is carried forward in another *kroḍapatra* by Candranārāyana Bhaṭṭācārya who makes an interesting point that the bringing in of the notion of *samānādhikaraṇya* does not explain the 'fireness' in the 'lakeness' as the relation between two such universals cannot be said to have any *samānādhikaraṇya* which the 'absence of fire' and the lake may be supposed to have. The issue in fact is a larger one and it is doubtful if Candranārāyana has seen it in this manner, even if what he has written appears to imply that he did. The issue might be formulated in the form of a question. Can universals in their universality have *sāmānādhikaraṇya* which only particular properties are supposed to have when they characterize the same object?

There is a subtle point raised by Candranārāyana as to why the indirect *samānādhikaraṇatva* of absence of fire in the lake, cannot be regarded as

sufficient ground for the acceptance of the absence of 'fireness' in 'lakeness'. According to him it cannot be the meaning of the term '*yadrūpa*' in Gadādhara which would prevent the inferential cognition as required by Gaṅgeśa's definition.

Candranārāyana raises another interesting issue in his discussion as to why the term '*yadrūpa*' cannot be understood as lake characterized by the absence of fire. The main point of his objection seems to be that the term 'lake' and the complex term characterized by the 'absence of fire' have two totally different modalities and hence cannot jointly be combined as being referred to by the term '*yadrūpa*', for the property of 'being characterized by the absence of fire', according to him, does not have the same *avacchedaka* which the term 'lake' has. The lake obviously has the *avacchedaka* 'lakeness' which resides in it according to Nyāya analysis by the relation of *samavāya*. On the other hand, 'characterized by the absence of fire' as an *avacchedaka*, namely the 'absence of fireness' which is related to the lake by the relation of *viśeṣaṇata* or what may be called an adjectival relation. Even if one accepts Candranārāyana's analysis it does not follow as to why the term '*yadrūpa*' would not convey a complex awareness whose different parts or elements are characterized by different *avacchedakas* and even different relations. He seems to be assuming that the term '*yadrūpa*' can only refer to a unitary awareness of a simple kind, or at least the different elements of which have the same *avacchedakas*. But he has given no reasons to justify this assumption.

One reason that Candranārāyana gives as to why the absence of fire cannot be regarded as an adjective of the lake and the whole considered as the meaning of the term '*yadrūpa*' used by Gadādhara is that if this were to be accepted, then many of the adjectives later on used by Gadādhara himself would be inapplicable and that the two set of adjectives would contradict each other.

The discussion about a faultless definition of fallacy seems to have been a favourite topic of the authors of the *kroḍapatras* as we hear of one *kroḍapatra* written by Mysore Rāma Śastrī (1850) entitled '*Śatakoti Kroḍapatra*' which seems to get its name from the hundred arguments against the definition given by Gadādhara in his work *Satpratipakṣa*. The work of Rāma Śastrī had aroused great controversy as it was replied to by Anantalvas and Kṛṣṇatātācārya who wrote a *kroḍapatra* entitled *Śatakoṭi Khaṇḍana*. Another Naiyayika seems to have come to the defence of Rāma Śastrī by writing a work entitled *Śatkoṭi Khaṇḍana Maṇḍana*. In any case, as no one seems to have examined the arguments and counter-arguments, one is not in a position to assess it for the quality of arguments or their validity. But it certainly is evidence of the lively philosophical debate through the medium of the *kroḍapatras* which occurred until the beginning of the twentieth century, after which for some reason the interest in writing *kroḍapatras* declined and ultimately ceased altogether.



II

Leaving the issue relating to the adequate definition of fallacy as discussed in the *kroḍapatras*, Professor Prahlada Char attempts to explicate the notion of an *anugama* which however is not very clear. Perhaps the idea of an *anugama* is to show that a seemingly simple situation is full of infinite complexity and appears to be simple only because it has not been adequately analysed. He takes the example relating to the issue as to how the singularity of an object is denoted and shows why the simple answer that it is easily conveyed by the singular number of the *vibhakti* concerned, cannot be accepted. The Sanskrit language, as is well known, has singular, dual and plural numbers and thus conveys by the grammatical suffix whether one is talking of a single object, two objects or many objects. Professor Prahlada Char tries to show that such an easy explanation will not do and takes the example of a simple sentence: '*Atra ghaṭah asti*' (Here there is a jar). Such a statement, according to him, would be mistaken if supposing there were more than one jar at the place concerned and hence either the suffix pointing to the singleness of the object would be wrong or the singularity would have to be conveyed in some other way. The analysis seems to have been vitiated from the very beginning by paying too much attention to how language conveys singularities. The problem obviously is not with '*ghaṭa*', but with '*atra*'. What exactly is meant by '*atra*'? Normally we tend to assume that one object can only occupy one space or that, conversely, the same space cannot be occupied by more than one object. This however is not quite clear for one can show that the same space, for example the space enclosed by the four walls of a room, is occupied by a plurality or multiplicity of objects. Yet, this counter-example would be held by most people to be mistaken as it would be said that the space occupied by each object in the room is different from that occupied by other objects in the room. On the other hand if one gave the example of Chinese boxes where each box is inside the other, it could be objected that, after all, the space occupied by one box is not the same as the space occupied by the other boxes. But if one asks the question as to what is meant by the 'same space' or by something occupying 'that space' then it will be clear that ultimately the idea of space and something occupying that space are being treated in such a way that they are completely identical and that the singularity of the object is the same as the singularity of the space and that one does not quite know what exactly is meant by either the singularity of the object or the singularity of the space, for if the space was infinitely divisible there would be no singularity of space and as for the singularity of objects, none of the objects that we commonly talk of would be regarded as singular under this mode of analysis.

The problem has been discussed in contemporary philosophy in the context of what has come to be known as the theory of definite description, but it is interesting to see how the same issue has been discussed by Indian

thinkers in a totally different way in a different context where the uniqueness of reference seems to have been approached and caught in a different way.

The problem posed by the Indian analyst appears to arise from an imagined situation where there are a number of jars on the ground and where someone uses the sentence 'here there is a jar', the 'is' of the English language conveying the oneness or singularity of the object referred to by the sentence. The question is whether the use of such a sentence as 'here is a jar' is correct and whether it really refers to the oneness of the object that is being referred to. One of the suggested modifications in the condition of the reference of a singular suffix ending for purposes of ensuring singularity of reference, namely that there should be no other object of the same kind in order that the singularity of references is unambiguously indicated does not obtain in this case as there is another jar which obviously is of the same kind. There is thus an obvious necessity of formulating the conditions of singular reference in such a way that this kind of situation is adequately taken care of along with many others which the ingenious mind of the Naiyāyika can imagine.

Unfortunately, the Nyāya discussion on the subject does not seem to distinguish between '*ekatva*' and '*viśiṣṭatva*', that is, between the numerical oneness of the object conveyed by the suffix in the Sanskrit language and the uniqueness of the object which is the subject of the second discussion around the notion of definite descriptions and proper names in the western tradition primarily associated with the names of Russell, Quine and Davidson.

The example of the two jars on the ground which seems to invalidate the condition that there should be nothing else of the same kind is further complicated by the assumption that the two jars are of different colours—one, yellow and the other, blue. In such a situation, the addition of the word relating to colour would provide the distinguishing reference, even though another object of the same kind still continues to be there. There has therefore to be some further condition to the absence of another thing of the same kind to ensure the correctness of 'oneness' of reference by the suffix in the Sanskrit language. In fact, the discussion brings in another notion regarding the natural meaning of a word or '*prakṛtyārtha*' which itself needs further clarification. The example of two jars with different colours can be taken care of by specifying the colour of the jar that is referred to, ensuring its '*ekatva*' being correctly conveyed by the suffix in '*atra neelghaṭaḥ asti*'. However the Nyāya imagination conceives of another instance where the sentence refers to a situation where one brāhmaṇa gives a cow to another brāhmaṇa. Here both are brāhmaṇas and belong to the same caste and yet each of them is referred to by a suffix which conveys the '*ekatva*' of each and does not group them together to convey that they are two of a kind. The sentence



seems correct and yet if the condition were to be accepted, the reference of '*ekatva*' will be wrong. The analysis does not seem to take into account the fact that the distinction between the two brāhmaṇas is not in their brāhmaṇhood but that they are related by a relation in which one is a receiver and the other a giver. The western tradition would have treated this as an asymmetrical or non-symmetrical relation and perhaps chosen a clearer example such as 'A is greater than B'. However, in the context in which it is given, it is interesting as the suffix indicating both the brāhmaṇas ensures their 'oneness' even though they are both present together at the same place and time and hence violate the condition of the absence of another of one's kind which was given to ensure the oneness of reference by the Sanskrit suffix.

The solution suggested to these difficulties is to completely drop the condition of the absence of another of the same kind and just hold that the oneness or '*ekatva*' of the object concerned is denoted by the singular case ending of the suffix. But this is to go back to the earlier definition and is almost a tautology for that is what the *eka vacana* singular suffix is supposed to denote. The apparently simple situation is complicated by the raising of the question as to what exactly is the relation between the *eka vacana* suffix of the language and the *ekatva* or the numerical oneness denoted by it, a question which no one would ordinarily think of asking at all as it is the function of language to denote or to refer. Moreover, it is not clear as to whether the question refers only to the specificity of the relation between '*eka vacana*' and the '*ekatva*' or the generalized question regarding the relation of language to reality or of language to that which it refers, or even to what it means. The trouble with much of the Nyāya discussion in the *kroḍapatras* seems to be that it is too tied to the particular instances it is discussing and does not deal with the general issues which are involved in it and of which, at least on a *prima facie* view, it appears to be only an instance. The Nyāya explication of the relation between the *ekavacana* of the suffix in the Sanskrit language and the *ekatva* or numerical oneness of the object referred to is that there are at least two relations involved here, the first being the relation of natural meaningfulness which inheres in the *ekavacana* in the language and by which it is essentially characterized or limited. The second relation, on the other hand, is being characterized by '*saṁsargatā*' which is specifically peculiar to it, 'it' referring to the suffix itself. The suffix then is supposed to be characterized by two relations, the one being its natural meaning and the second being that *viśiṣta saṁsargatā* by which it characterizes the object to which the suffix is added. The second relation probably refers to the relation which the suffix has to the term to which it is added. After all, the suffix denoting *ekavacana* can be added to anything such as a jar or a brāhmaṇa. The *ekavacananess* of the suffix remains the same, but as the suffix can never be used by itself and will have to be added to some term or the other, this term to which the suffix is added will have *svaviśiṣtasaṁsarga-tānirūpakatva*.

However, as this term is a word and hence will produce knowledge, that is, *śābdabodha* and as the word will always be used by someone to produce this *śābdabodha*, a number of other relations also enter into the situation besides *svaprakṛtyārtha avacchedakatva* and *svaviśiṣṭa saṁsargatā nirūpakatva*.

However, Professor Prahlada Char's presentation of the analysis turns the discussion in another direction. It focuses on the term '*atra*' in the sentence '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*', that is, 'Here there is a jar'. The term 'here' according to him, denotes the numerical singularity of the space which is being occupied by the jar and hence which is functioning as a support or '*ādhāra*' of the jar which is related to it by the relation, known in Nyāya as '*ādhāra ādheya*'. Hence, the jar has the *ādheyatā* and the space has the *ādhāratā* in it and the *ekavacana* of the *ghaṭaḥ* refers both to the *ekatva* of the jar and also indirectly to the *ekatva* of the space in which the jar exists and which is being denoted by the term '*atra*'. This double relation of the suffix denoting the *ekavacana* in the term *ghaṭa*, both in the jar and the space in which the jar exists is being described by saying that the '*sva*', that is, the suffix is a joint locus or *samānādhikaraṇa* of the *ekatva* residing both in the jar and the space in which the jar exists and which is conveyed as a *viṣaya* by the cognition of the two words, '*atra*' and '*ghaṭa*' in the sentence '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*'. It is not quite clear what exactly is the difference between *pratyaya* and *śābdabodha* used by Professor Prahlada Char in his description of the analysis given in the *anugama* on this issue. The discussion in fact is vitiated by the lack of a distinction between the *ekatva* which is denoted by the *ekadeśīyatā* of the '*atra*' and the *ekatva* of the jar which is conveyed by the suffix which is added to the word *ghaṭa* in the Sanskrit language. The former, interestingly, is immediately transmitted to the jar which occupies the space and thus the *ādheyatā* relation with it. The two 'onenesses' derive from two radically different considerations some of which have been pointed out earlier. It is only material objects whose essential characteristic is supposed to be their spatiality or their extentionality or the fact that they occupy space which leads to this dual characterization of 'oneness', one of which derives from the oneness which is intrinsic to them and the other because of the fact that one object can occupy only one space at a time. This duality of derivation of the characteristic of oneness on their part becomes clear in the case of those objects which do not occupy space and yet are regarded as numerically one as distinguished from others of their own kind.

Much of the discussion on this issue seems also to be further limited by the fact that the thinkers who have engaged in it seem to be unaware that it is only the peculiarity of the Sanskrit language where numerical oneness is to be conveyed by addition of a suffix which has created the problem. In English, for example, this is not the case and no suffix is to be added to convey that we are talking of one object and only one. It is only when more than one object is under consideration that suffixes are added.



The situation of linguistic analysis in Sanskrit, particularly in the Nyāya perspective, is further complicated by the fact that for Nyāya, a specific property called '*viṣayatā*', arises in the object when it is cognized, that is, the epistemological status of being an object which is conferred on it by the fact of its being known and hence every object of knowledge gains this additional property which it did not have before it was known. Furthermore, if this cognition happens to be linguistic in character, then the linguistic meaning apprehended by consciousness gains what may be called '*Śābdabodha viṣayatā*' or the objectness generated by the cognition of a linguistic element in the meaning itself. The numerical oneness conveyed by a suffix because of its *prakṛtyārthā* or natural meaning and the relationship of '*saṁsargatā*' that it has with the specific object to which it is related by the relation of *saṁsargata* is complicated by the other *saṁsargatā* relations which also obtain, according to Navya Nyāya analysis, in this situation. There is, for example, the *saṁsargatā* relation introduced by the *ekadeśīyatā* denoted by '*atra*' which, in turn, transmits this to the jar which is related to it by *ādheyatā*. This relation of *ādheyatā* which the jar gets because it is located in the space which is denoted by the term *atra* is supposed to be related to it by the relation of *samvāya*. This however does not close the story as the whole cognition is further characterized by the relation of *viṣayatā* or epistemological objectness which arises because of the multiple *saṁsargatā* relations between the words denoting all these together in the sentence '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*'.

It is not quite clear how many *viṣayatās* Nyāya will have to postulate and how many *saṁsargatās* in the complex act of linguistic cognition, and in case it has to postulate more than one, how it will establish the interrelationship between them. The recourse to *samānādhikaraṇa* will not help, as while in the case of an objective situation *samānādhikaraṇa* may help, in the case of *śabdabodha* it will not do so, particularly when a very large number of sentences convey a unified meaning. Even in the case of complex situations there may arise the same problem as, for example, in the case of large-scale historical events. There is the added question as to whether Nyāya postulates different kinds of *viṣayatās* for different kinds of cognition. Perceptual knowledge, for instance, is supposed to be non-linguistic and its *viṣayatā* will have to be different from the *viṣayatā* of linguistic cognition. On the other hand, even when *śabdabodha* is necessarily involved as, say, in *anumāna* one will have to distinguish between the '*viṣayatā*' of the inferential cognition and that of linguistic meaning in which it is embedded. In any case, the complications brought into the analysis by its introduction of *viṣayatā* as an emergent property both in the object and the linguistic meaning seems fairly clear. But, Professor Prahlada Char's discussion seems to restrict itself only to the *viṣayatā* of the *ādheyatā* of the jar on the ground denoted by the term '*atra*' and does not extend to the *viṣayatā* of the *saṁsargatā* between the suffix and the word '*ghaṭa*'. There seems no reason why he should have

restricted himself only to one type of *viṣayatā* and not considered the others involved in the cognition resulting from the sentence '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*'.

However, it seems that none of these strategies takes care of the situation where there is more than one jar on the ground unless the so-called *ādheyatā* itself is related as qualified by the space to which the jar has that relation and thus treated as a *viśiṣṭādheyatā* which occurs only in the first jar and not in the second jar. In other words, the numerical singularity at least of an object occupying space will have to be determined by the space it occupies.

Professor Prahlada Char's analysis does not seem to take this direction for solving the problem. On the other hand, he complicates the example by postulating jars of two different colours forgetting that the singularity in such a situation will not be denoted so much by the *ekavacana* suffix as by the distinguishing attribute which will separate one jar from the other. The trouble with the discussion seems to be that it does not address itself directly to the question as to what makes an object 'one' and how this 'oneness' is unambiguously referred to by language. There is of course the larger problem of how language tries to mitigate or avoid the intrinsic ambiguity which is involved in it and which is concerned not only with the numerical singularity of the object but with the specificity of all reference whatever where one wants to distinguish clearly what one wants to refer to from everything else.

The discussion on pages 17–18 with respect to the '*neelghaṭa*' and its presumed distinction from the '*pītaghaṭa*' seems to be vitiated by the fact that Professor Prahlada Char is assuming that the *ādheyatā* of the *neelghaṭa* is distinct from that of the *pītaghaṭa* because of the fact that one is blue and the other is yellow. That is not the case because the *ādheyatā* has nothing to do with the colour but relates rather to the space which the jar occupies. And hence the *viśiṣṭādheyatā* of the *neelghaṭa* has nothing to do with its blueness and would be there even if the jars were of the same colour. It is of course true that the *viṣayatā* produced by the *śābdabodha* in the sentence which has *neelghaṭa* is different from that which is produced by the sentence which has *pītaghaṭa* in it but this distinction in the *viṣayatā* in the *śābdabodha* has nothing to do with the *ādheyatā* of the two jars unless the *ādheyatā* of the jar is itself considered to be related to their colour. But normally the colour is supposed to be related to the jar by *samavāya saṁbandha*, and I am not sure if the *ādhāra-ādheya saṁbandha* can be discussed relevantly in this context. It is also not clear whether the *viṣayatā* of the *śābdabodha* can itself be considered in terms of the *ādharā ādheya* relation where the *śābdabodha* is the *ādharā* of the *viṣayatā* which then is treated as *adheya*. However, whatever the twists and turns that the Nyāya analysis may take, it cannot get rid of the fundamental fact that the distinction between the two jars is because of reference to their colours and not to the space to which they are related by *ādheyatā* because of the



simple reason that the term *atra* occurs in both the sentences with no sign that it is being used to denote two different spaces in the sentences concerned.

The complications further introduced by Baccā Jhā in his attempt at clarification through a detailed specification of all the relations involved in the simple statement derived from the Navya Nyāya analysis of the *śābdabodha* conveyed by the sentence '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*' are discussed by Professor Prahlada Char. But in order to understand what Baccā Jhā is doing we ourselves have to understand the conceptual apparatus involved in Nyāya analysis of the act of cognition. The first thing to understand is that for Nyāya a knowledge is always a relation, and therefore the analysis has to state the technical names of the terms between which the relation is supposed to hold along with the name of the relation itself. The names of the terms are *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī*. However as the Naiyāyikas are fond of making a property out of everything as well as the universal of which the property is an instance, the *anuyogī* and the *pratiyogī* will have to have the property of *anuyogitā* and *pratiyogitā* in them. This however will not suffice as the property of *anuyogitā* is merely an instance of the universal characteristic of being *anuyogitā* and hence is supposed to possess *anuyogitātva* or *anuyogīness*. The same of course will be true of *pratiyogitā* which will be seen as an instance of *pratiyogitātva*. The story cannot end here, for it is the specific terms of the relation that have these properties. If it is a 'jar', for example, which has the property 'red', then it will be the 'jar' and the 'red' which have these properties of *anuyogitā* and *pratiyogitā* which themselves are characterized by *anuyogitātva* and *pratiyogitātva*. Thus the Nyāya analyst has to state further that in the statement 'the jar is red' the *anuyogitā* relation is confined to 'jar' only and not to anything else. In the same way, the *pratiyogitā* is confined to red alone in the sentence. Thus the Nyāya analyst has to use another technical term to indicate this specific restriction and he uses the word *avacchedaka* to indicate it. The jar has to be characterized by *anuyogitā* which is treated as the *avacchedaka* to denote that only the jar is the *anuyogī* in the relation and nothing else. The same of course has to be done with respect to the term 'red' whose being a *pratiyogī* is limited to it alone. However, as everything particular has to have a universal, one will have to have *avacchedakatā* which is a property and *avacchedakatva*, which is a universal. Now in Nyāya analysis a universal has to be related to a particular by a relation and this relation is called *samavāya*. Thus we have to have not only *anuyogitatva*, *pratiyogitatva* and *avacchedakatva* but each of these relations related to the property of *anuyogitā*, *pratiyogitā* and *avacchedaktā* respectively, which in turn belong to *anuyogī*, *pratiyogī* and *avacchedaka* which in their own turn will characterize the specific objects in the sentence concerned. Further, each of these universals will have to be related to their property by a *samavāya saṁbandha* which itself will have to be related to the object by another *samavāya saṁbandha*. On the other hand, as the concept of the

*avacchedaka* is brought in to clearly denote the specific limitation under which properties and relations are functioning, it will have to be mentioned all the time and if one is particular, one will have to talk of an *avacchedaka* characterizing *avacchedakatva* of the *avacchedaktā* of the property or the relation separately each time. All this may sound very complicated but in fact it is really very simple. To give an example, take such a sentence as 'the rose is red'. In the Nyāya analysis 'rose' is the *anuyogi* and 'red' is the *pratiyogī*. And the relation is that of inherence between the red and the rose. But the rose has 'roseness' and red has 'redness' and the 'roseness' belongs to the rose by a relation of *samavāya* and 'redness' belongs to red by the relation of *samavāya*. But though there are three relations of *samavāya*, one being the relation of 'roseness' and the 'rose', the second being the relation between the 'redness' and the 'red' and the third between the red and the rose, one will have to have the relevant *avacchedakas* to capture the distinction between the three *samavāyas*. Besides these, as the rose is the *anuyogī* and the red is the *pratiyogī* in the relation of the red to the rose, this will further lead to the specification of the property of *anuyogitā* in the rose and of *pratigyogitā* in the red. Thus rose does not have only the property red in it but also the property of *anuyogitā*, and similarly red has not merely redness in it but also the property of *pratiyogitā*, and as the Naiyāyika wants no confusion at all, that is, no misunderstanding that the rose is a *pratiyogī* and red is an *anuyogī*, he has to use an *avacchedaka* to characterize the *anuyogitā* of the rose and the *pratiyogitā* of the red. However, this *avacchedaktā* will have to be distinguished from the three *avacchedaktās* which were brought in to distinguish the *samavāya saṁbandhas* mentioned earlier. Another *avacchedaka* will have to be added, for it should be remembered that the *anuyogitā* of the rose is related to it by the *samavāya saṁbandha*, just as the *pratiyogitā* of the red is related to it by a *samavāya saṁbandha*. The story will have to go on, for one has also to remember that *anuyogitā* has its *anuyogitātva* and the *pratiyogitā* has its *pratiyogitātva* which are related to them by a *samavāya saṁbandha* respectively, just as the *pratiyogitā* is related to *anuyogitā* by another *samavāya saṁbandha*.

All these relations have to be related to the rose on the one hand and the red on the other. So Nyāya has to postulate the notion of a *samānādhikaraṇa* which gives unity to all these diverse relations by being the common locus of all of them. The *samānādhikaraṇa*, it should be noted, will have to be threefold in this specific instance; the first in the rose and the second in the red, and the third one also in the rose as it will also have the red within it, being the *samānādhikaraṇa* of all the relations which the property red has in it. The rose, then, is a *samānādhikaraṇa* of all the properties and relations which belong to it by virtue of its being a rose as well as those which belong to red by virtue of its being red along with the special property which it gets as an *anuyogī* because of having this relationship with red, though excluding the property of *pratiyogī* which



the red has because of its relation to the rose. The strange world of Nyāya does not end with this as one might think, for the knowledge that the rose is red has a property called *viṣayatā* which arises in it when it becomes an object of cognition. This property is independent of all the properties that we have talked about until now, and belongs to the complex object of cognition that the rose is red and if one is to be faithful to the Nyāya mode of analysis this will in turn have *viṣayatātva* to which *viṣayatā* would have to be related by *samavāya saṁbandha* and which will belong to the object of cognition and yet which itself will have to be distinguished from the *viṣayatā* of all other objects of cognition by bringing in a new *avacchedaka* specifying this. In fact, as *viṣayatā* is itself a correlate of *viṣayitā*, that is, the subject to which the object is an object, the relation between *viṣayitā* and *viṣayatā* will again have to be analysed in terms of *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī* and all the other attendant *avacchedakas* which have already been pointed out.

This is, however, a direction which fortunately for the reader, Baccā Jhā, does not take, but which he should have taken if he were to be true to the spirit of the Nyāya mode of analysis. He, in fact, takes another turn and emphasizes two notions of Nyāya analysis to which we have paid no attention until now, *viśeṣyatā* and *prakāratā*, that is, that which is qualified, and of which the property is said to be a property. *Prakāratā*, on the other hand, is that which qualifies or which is a property. He makes a further distinction between the *mukhya viśeṣyatā* and the *mukhya prakāratā*, particularly in the context of complex sentences where there are a number of *viśeṣyatās* and *prakāratās*. And as each one of them can be treated as a universal, the same process will have to be repeated regarding their specific characterization along with their proper relation and the *avacchedaka* involved. Baccā Jhā's complications thus can easily be understood once one understands the principle behind them. For example, in the first formulation that he gives, the *anuyogitā* is given as *anuyogitātva* and the *pratiyogitā* is given as *pratiyogitātva*.

Analyzing these further, Professor Prahlada Char tries to clarify the possible ways in which the *viśiṣṭa nirūpaktā* is related. It is not quite clear whether *nirupkta* is only another name of *prakāratā* or it is something different from it. As all these relations have to be in a common locus, the first thing that has to be mentioned is *sva-samānādhikaraṇa*. Also as everything has to be related, ultimately to one object, there has to be a *sva-avacchedaka saṁbandha-vacchinatva*, what Professor Prahlada Char calls *sva-vṛttitva*. However, the number 3 that he has given on page 113 is not quite intelligible as it seems to be just the opposite of number 2. However, as the opposite correlation of the *nirūpaktā* is *nirūpyatā* which obviously would be the *viśeṣyatā*, the same analysis would have to be done in respect to the *nirūpyatā*, that is, the *viśeṣyatā*. The relations of the *mukhya prakāratā* in the *nirūpaktā* are again given on page 114. However, the interesting point here seems to be that as every relation will have to have

an *anuyogī* and a *pratiyogī* and if *prakaratā* which is itself a *pratiyogī* has to have a relation, then it will have to be treated as an *anuyogī* in that context. The point perhaps is that those two terms are relative to each other and if the *pratiyogī* itself becomes the subject of a relation, then it will have to become an *anuyogī* with respect to that relation; in case it becomes an *anuyogī* to that relation, its *pratiyogī* will have to be specified further. However, it is not clear as to why when an *anuyogī* is itself related to something else by some other relation, it should not be treated as a *pratiyogī* to that relation. Some of the subtleties introduced by Baccā Jhā derive from the fact that the Sanskrit language has some peculiarities of its own which have to be accommodated to explain how numerical singularity is conveyed through the language. The two examples discussed by Professor Prahlada Char which have to be accommodated in the definition are '*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*' and '*rāmadārā Jānakī*'. The former necessitates the distinction between *mukhya viśeṣyatā* and that which is not so. The second, on the other hand, addresses the problem that even though ostensibly the linguistic indication is that of a plural number, as the word '*dārā*' in Sanskrit can only be used in the plural, it nevertheless conveys a numerical singularity as here it qualifies *Jānakī* who herself is numerically one rather than many. It is not quite clear whether the plurality of '*dārā*' in Sanskrit is rendered singular by the fact that Rāma had only one wife or by the fact that it is qualifying Sītā who happens to be 'one'. The point is important because if it is the latter which is the singularity of reference, then the term '*dārā*' in Sanskrit would always qualify a singular object unless the plurality itself is indicated by a specific mention of the names of most of the wives that one has.

If one closely analyzes the analysis given on page 114, one finds that the terms *viśeṣyatva, nirūpita, prakāratā* and *avacchedaka* are used both before *prakāratā* and after *viśeṣyatva*. Thus we have two *avacchedaks* in the situation and *viśeṣyatā* itself turns into a universal by making it *viśeṣyatva*. The further analysis that Professor Prahlada Char gives to explain the *avacchedakatā* in the *nirūpakatā* are *sva-sāmānyadhikaraṇya*, meaning thereby that all the relations are located in the same locus including one's relation to oneself. The second relation is supposed to be that this self-relatedness has itself to be seen as of a very specific kind and hence seen as a limitor or as an *avacchedaka* of itself. However, it is not quite clear what exactly is gained by this point. The third relation mentioned is again not quite clear as it is the exact opposite of what has been said for the second relation, unless it is a negative way of saying what has been said earlier as it uses a double negation with respect to *avacchedaka*. The fourth relation mentioned again seems to relate a thing to itself and it is not quite clear how it is different from one and two though the word *vṛtti* seems to suggest something different from what was mentioned in one and two. However, a universal is again made of *vṛtti* and it is mentioned as *vṛttitva*. These four relations are supposed to explicate the *avacchedakatā* relating to the *mukhya*



*prakāratā* and its relation to *nirūpakatā*. The second explanation which is being given is supposed to be of the relation of being the '*āśraya*' or the support of oneself, or being one's own *ādhāra*, that is, the unity of the relation of *ādhāra* and *ādheya* in one's own self. It is not quite clear how this is different from the relation of either *sva-vṛttitva* or *sva-samānādhikaraṇtā*.

In any case, the explications of how *nirūpakatā* is the locus of *mukhya prakāratā avacchedakatā* through the three relations mentioned do not seem to help to see matters clearly. Take for example, the first relation. It seems to talk about the relation of *avacchedakā* itself and tries to show how the relationship of *avacchedakatā* is itself related to the objects concerned. Firstly, *saṁbandha* or relation itself has been universalized and the term used is '*saṁbandhitva*' and to talk of being *avacchina* or limited by the *saṁbandhitva* and to talk of being *avacchina* or limited by the *saṁbandhitva saṁbandha* or the relation of relatedness only illustrates the tendency of the Nyāya analyst to make a universal of everything and then relate that which is a universal to that from which the universal was generated by a generalization and then to mention it again in terms of an *avacchedakatā*, in terms of which the game can be repeated again as the *avacchedaka* itself has a universal. However as *avacchedakatava* is a universal, it will itself have to be specified further by being limited to that to which it is being applied. It is surprising why Baccā Jhā or Professor Prahlada Char has not mentioned the specific relation of *saṁbandhitva saṁbandha* and the *avacchedaka*.

Similarly, the second relation only specifies further the *prakāratā nirūpitā viśeṣyatā* along with the *avacchedakas* concerned. The third brings in the notion of *viṣayatā* and interestingly again makes a universal of it by writing *viṣayatātva* and brings in another notion of *vyāpaka* and *vyāpyatva*. However, it is not quite clear as to why Baccā Jhā only mentions *vyāpakatva* without mentioning *vyāpyatva*. Still, it is to be noted that here the *viṣaytātva* is itself being related to *vyāpakatva* without mentioning the relation between them. Professor Prahlada Char of course admits that the third relation has another two relations in it, one being of '*sva*' to '*viṣayatā*' and the second between '*vyāpakatva*' *and* '*nirūpakatā*'. But besides these there has to be a relation of *viśiṣṭa* to *viṣayatā*, though perhaps that is included in the relation '*sva*' to *viṣayatā* and the relation between *viṣayatātva* and *vyāpakatva*. The two relations are further explicated on page 113. However it is not clear how the second relation of *sva nirūpitātva* is different from what was earlier been called *svavṛttitva*. He tries to explicate further the relation which is the limitor of *vyāpakata* and again brings the notion of *avacchedakatā vrttitva*, suggesting thereby that *vṛittitva* can be added to anything. However, he does not clarify what the distinction is between *avacchedakatva* and *avacchedakatā vṛttitva*. Once the notion of *vyāpakatā* is brought in then obviously it will have to be mentioned in all analyses, for all relations in Nyāya analysis have a

*vyāpya–vyāpaka saṁbandha* and it will have to be explained as to why, in the earlier analysis, it was not used.

Interestingly, Professor Prahlada Char brings another notion into his analysis on page 115 and that is the notion of *tādātmya*. He suggests that as *viśeṣyatā* is supposed to be the locus of *sva*, this has to be by the relation of *tādātmya* and also *avacchedyatva*. It is not quite clear whether this *avacchedyatva* is the same as *avacchedakatva* or different from it. In any case, if these are to be considered as distinct relations different from all others mentioned until now, then they will have to be inevitably mentioned in the context of all other relations for we have to state whether the relation is related by *tādātmya* and *avacchedyatva* or not. In fact, the story of the proliferation of relations appears to go on unendingly as on the same page he raises the question as to how *nirūpakatā* is related to or present in *nirūpakatā avacchedakatva*. And as this *nirūpakatā* is supposed to belong to *viśeṣyatā* which itself is *viśiṣṭa* and which is related to *sva*, we can understand the complications that this search for relations introduces in Nyāya analysis. If *avacchinayatva* has also to be related to *avacchedaka* and if the latter has to be related to *sva*, one can see how one can indefinitely multiply relations in this manner. In fact, if one brings the notion of *abhāva* into the picture, as he does at the end of page 115, and if one also sees that one may, in the Nyāya analysis, also mention that there is an *abhāva* of *abhāva;* in case there is no *abhāva*, one can imagine the further complications that one can introduce into one's analysis which is in search of a complete precision of statement.

In fact, if *avacchedakatā* itself has to be related to every other thing in the analysis and if *avacchedakatā* also has a universal, that is *avacchedakatva* and if the term *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī* are also to be brought into this relation, and if each of these is also to be seen in terms of its *viṣayatā* which is related to *viṣayitā*, then one can imagine the infinite complexity. Baccā Jhā can introduce in the name of the search for seeking precision and unambiguity in Navya Nyāya analysis of the simplest of statements, such as, say '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*'. In the further analysis on page 116 and 117, while there is generally a repetition of the points made earlier, a new relation is mentioned there on page 117 called '*abhinnatva*'. It is not quite clear if this is different from *tādātmya*. In case this is so, then we will have to mention it also. Similarly, there is the relation of *āśrayatva* mentioned on the same page, but is *āśrayatva* different from *samānādhikaraṇa* mentioned earlier? In case this is so, one will have to mention *sva-samānādhikaraṇa, sva-āśrayatva, sva-tādātmya, sva-abhinnatva*. In fact we further have the mention of such a relation as *svanīrupitatva* and in case this is different from *sva-vṛttitva*, it will have to be mentioned all the time also. Professor Prahlada Char has of course mentioned on page 118 that this chain of relations could be developed further but that he would stop there.

The basic issues are two. What is the principle behind the development of this unending chain of relations and whether it can be ever stopped and if so what shall be the possible ground for believing that no further relation can be generated by the inherent logic of the generation of relations in the Nyāya perspective? Secondly, why should one generate this chain of relations and what does one get out of it? Thirdly, the problem of the infinite generation of relations or of classes has been encountered in other philosophical traditions and some *ad hoc* principle has been adopted to stop this chain as, say, in Russell's theory of types. Has any such principle ever been formulated by Nyāya theorists?

*Jaipur* DAYA KRISHNA



## Reply to Daya Krishna's Comment on the *Kroḍapatras* by D. Prahlada Char

My article on 'Kroḍapatras' aims at giving a picture of the Kroḍapatras as to what they are and highlighting their contribution to the development of Navya Nyāya tradition. For this purpose, I have selected a few points that are discussed in some of the Kroḍapatras and have tried to explain them. I do not know how far I have been successful in my endeavour. Your commentary, though makes an honest attempt to evaluate the contribution made by the Kroḍapatras, on the basis of the discussion of some of the highly technical points which I have selected from the Kroḍapatras as examples, I am afraid, the observations made, miss to recognise the philosophical points that emerge from the discussion and to evaluate them. This, I feel, is quite natural. For, the issues that are chosen to be explained in the article are highly technical involving a very complicated Navya Nyāya terminology. Regarding some of the comments you have made about the factual correctness of some of the instances like 'mountain is fiery, because of smoke', and 'the lake is fiery', etc. that are frequently made use of, by the Naiyāyikas, I would only wish to point out that Naiyāyikas, like any of their counterparts in the East or the West, are purely philosophical in their approach and not much bothered about the factuality of the contents of the instance. Therefore, I feel these observations do not help much to assess the merit of the discussion made in the Kroḍapatras. But, the questions you have raised at the end of the commentary are very much relevant and they should be answered.

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# Focus

[Students of philosophy and literature may find it profitable to read the book entitled *Scepticism and Poetry—An Essay on Poetic Imagination* by D.G. James (George Allen and Unwin, London, first published in 1937, second impression, 1960).

We publish below a brief statement about the book received from V.Y. Kantak, the well-known scholar of English literature who was formerly Professor in the Department of English Literature, Baroda University, Baroda.]

## Scepticism and Poetry: A Note

The first part has several stimulating leads: There is first of all, Coleridge's formulations regarding the functioning of the primary and the secondary imaginations, side by side with an elaboration of the seminal contribution of Kant on the synthetic activity of the mind cited in its support. Then there is the problem of the nature and influence of the scientific method and its claims in the present context. I.A. Richards' prestigious aesthetics, psychologizing the entire artistic process receives some sharp critical attention; so also the inroads of associationism of the Hartley-Condillac type... And Richards' rhetorical query: 'What *facts* verified by science are relevant to a reading of *King Lear*?' with his own answer: 'None whatever.' comes into focus. Similarly, that old question of the imaginative use of language—analogy, metaphor and so on, and the enigma of their mysterious power born of 'the torture of mind by identity and contrast in one' gets addressed. So also the problem posed by the limitations and dangers of the moralistic and ethical attitude to life when the aid of the transcendent activity of the imagination is not available is investigated.

However, I thought that the second part of the book has the real *piece de resistance*, namely James' brilliant consideration of the three prime poets (Wordsworth, Keats, and Shakespeare) experiencing the compulsive need to evolve a mythological mode adequate for their own distinctive purposes, and their failure to do so. Wordsworth took refuge in the Christian doctrine and mythology though that seems to have turned off the original sources of his poetic vitality. Keats tried to make do with Greek mythology but left his *Endymion* and *Hyperion* more of a disaster than a dubious success! And the imperative surge to evolve a mythology that could prove adequate for the projection of 'unknown modes of being' seems to have driven Shakespeare to try out, in his last phase, a loose dramatic structure—with little in it of the Shakespearean dramatic verve and much more of the quality of its provenance—the Narrative Romance. True, after the rather clumsy effects of the three earlier plays of the last phase he achieved a notable success with the semi-human,

semi-divine *Magus* figure of Prospero. Even that proved to be only a partial success.

In and through all this, James is concerned with the allied and more fundamental question of poetic imagination and its relation to religious experience—its status as a purveyor of the truth of things . . . the ultimate reality.

While recognizing the supreme achievements of the poetic imagination he draws attention to the 'bafflement' it knows in the pursuit of what is beyond its reach. Which leaves one wistful about the implications of Keats's observation: 'Poetry is not so fine a thing as philosophy—for the same reason that an eagle is not so fine a thing as a truth.'

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## Advaita Before Śaṁkara: A Discussion by Samantabhadra

Generally, the doctrine of Advaita is ascribed to Śaṁkara and the discussion regarding it is supposed to have occurred after him. However, as the following quotations from Samantabhadra (AD 650, Potter) and Akalanka (AD 680, Potter) two eminent Jain philosophers, conclusively prove both the doctrine and the discussion regarding it were prevalent long before Śaṁkara appeared on the scene. The attention of the readers of the *JICPR* is drawn to the following quotation from Hajime Nakamura's *A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy* (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1983, pp. 284–85).

Verse 26:

> 'If the principle of Advaita should be established by means of reason (*hetu*), there must exist a duality (*dvaita*) between reason and what is to be proved (*sādhya*). If (the principle of Advaita) should be established without reason, why should not dualism too be established from mere words alone?'

[*Aṣṭaśatī*] What is not established (in any way) should not be adopted by those who wish to gain profit and to discard disadvantage. For example, 'the one-sided view of emptiness' (*śūnyaikānta*) (the theory of the Mādhyamika school) should not be adopted. Therefore, non-dualism, that is, which cannot be established, (should not be adopted) . . . In this case (the fact that non-dualism cannot be established) will not become a non-established reason (*asiddha hetu*). (Reason for that will be explained.) (1) If the establishment of the principle of non-duality be based upon the reason (*sādhana*), then there would exist the duality of



that which is to be established and its reason. Or, in the same way as the principle of non-duality (*advaita*) is established, how is duality not established? (2) If (although the reason does not exist) one accomplishes one's objective by merely saying it, everything would be established for all. (Accordingly, the theory of non-dualism cannot be established).

Verse 27:

> Without dualism (*dvaita*), *advaita* cannot be established, just in the same way unless reason (*hetu*) exists, fallacious reason (*ahetu*) cannot exist. Negation of anything which has a name cannot exist without (the existence of) that which should be negated.

[*Aṣṭaśatī*] The word 'non-dualism' (*advaita*) points to the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) which contradicts that which one thinks in his heart, for it is a single word to which a negative prefix is attached. It is the same case with the expression 'non-cause' (*ahetu*). In this case the range of applicability (for the negative prefix) is not too broad. (That is, if the prefix 'a' of *advaita* is a negative affix one must not assert that the range of application of the negative affix is too broad). For, the negative affix is related to the negation of a thing as something of such a nature. (Now) it must be thought that in all cases, if there is nothing to be negated, the negation of anything which has the name is not possible. (Therefore, the negation of duality must admit the existence of duality).

DAYA KRISHNA

Vācaspati Miśra I who is supposed to have flourished around AD 960 was perhaps the first person to write authoritatively on Nyāya, Advaita and Sāṁkhya and to give new directions of interpretations of those schools for later times. He also wrote on Mīmāṁsā and Yoga. However, most of these schools held diametrically opposite positions on many issues and used arguments to refute the objections that were raised against their position by the opponents. It is unlikely that Vācaspati Miśra I in his exposition of the doctrines of these various schools did not give arguments for controverting the various *pūrvapakṣas* against them. But how could he have done so without contradicting what he himself had said in the exposition of rival schools on which he also wrote with authority? A comparative study of these three major works and the arguments given in them is thus a desideratum for exploring how he could have achieved the important feat of being the originator of new interpretations in the field of Nyāya, Advaita Vedānta and Sāṁkhya, respectively.

It would also be interesting to learn how his interpretation of Śaṁkara's position differs from that of Padmapāda and Sureśvara who were the immediate disciples of Śaṁkara and may be regarded as having known his position more intimately.

The differences between Padmapāda and Sureśvara may also be a subject of intensive investigation and it may be asked as to why the issue of their different interpretations of the master's views has not been the focus of attention in the subsequent Advaitic tradition.

# Notes and Queries

I. Kant, in his *Critique of Practical Reason* (Liberal Arts Press, 1956, pp. 68-69), has given the following as categories of freedom:

(1) Categories of Quantity
Subjective, according to maxims (intentions of the individual's will)
Objective, according to principles (precepts)
A priori principles of freedom, both subjective and objective (laws)

(2) Categories of Quality
Practical rules of commission (*praeceptivae*)
Practical rules of omission (*prohibitivae*)
Practical rules of exceptions (*exceptivae*)

(3) Categories of Relation
Relation to personality
Relation to the condition of the person
Reciprocally, relation of one person to the condition of another

(4) Categories of Modality
The permitted and the forbidden
Duty and that which is contrary to duty
Perfect and imperfect duty

These categories are in a sense parallel to those mentioned in the *Critique of Pure Reason* under the categories of understanding as here also they are divided into four general headings: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality with three sub-sets under each of them. The total number of categories thus, is twelve here as in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and raises the same issues as were raised in the 'Notes and Queries' section of the *JICPR* in Volume XI, No. 3, May–August, 1994, by us even though the specific titles of the categories under each of the headings are different.

What does Kant man by 'Categories of Freedom'? Can the idea of categories be applied to 'freedom'? Or, in other words, can 'freedom' have transcendental forms in which it has necessarily to function? Does it then mean that there are transcendental forms of willing which all willing has necessarily to conform to?

* * *

II. What was the Mīmāṁsaka's reply to Śaṁkara's contention in his commentary on the *Īśopaniṣad* that, though it forms an integral part of the *Śukla Yajurveda*, it does not prescribe any ritual or procedure for the performance of any *yajña*?

*Jaipur* DAYA KRISHNA

## *Mahājana*—What Does it Mean?

Arvind Sharma, in his book *Hinduism for Our Times* (OUP, 1996), interprets the term *mahājana* in Yudhishthira's answer to Yaksha, namely *mahājana yena gata sa pantha* in two ways. It may, according to him, mean (1) a great person (2) a great number of persons. Even though he agrees that 'the first sense is the obvious one' he considers the second sense to be 'surprisingly logical' and avers that 'tradition, in this context, favours it.' His contention that the first sense is obvious is apparently based on the etymology of the word *mahājana* itself. The term *mahājana* is derived from a combination of *mahā* +*jana* which means great+man, that is, great man. But for the second which he considers to be 'though *less* obvious' but '*more* plausible' one, he has advance an argument. His argument is as follows:

> Before saying *mahājana yena gata sa pantha,* in the first part of the answer Yudhishthira asserts that (1) The Śrutis differ among themselves (2) The Smṛtis differ among themselves (3) The sages differ among themselves (4) The essence of Dharma is concealed in a cave. These sages are 'presumably great persons'. 'And if it has already been asserted that the sages who were great persons differ among themselves, then how does the great man/men, the *mahājanas* help us overcome the dilemma?' Therefore, he concludes that 'the sense of a "great number of persons" must be favoured.

In order to support his contention Arvind Sharma has quoted P.V. Kane's translation of the same verse, in his *History of Dharmāśāstras,* Vol. V, part, 4, pp. 1271, which goes as follows:

> Rationalization is unstable, Vedas are in conflict with each other, there is no single sage whose opinion is held to be authoritative (by all), the truth about Dharma is enveloped in cave, (that is, it cannot be clearly discerned) and that therefore the path (to be followed) is the one followed by the great mass of people.

According to Arvind Sharma, 'Nilakantha, in the Sixteenth century, in his commentary on the verse (*Brahmasūtra* IV. 2.7) takes it clearly in this sense: for he glosses it as *bahujanasammatamityarthaḥ*. I have found that even in *Satyānandi-dīpika,* the commentary on the above *sūtra* the term



*mahājana* in *evamiyampyutkrantirmahajangataivanukirtyate,* is used in the sense of *Janasadharanagata,* that is, which is found in common people. V.S. Apte in *The Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary* describes महा as the substitute of महत् at the beginning of *Karmadharaya* and *Bahuvṛthi* compounds, and also at the beginning of some other irregular words. He defines महाजन: as '(1) a multitude of men, a great many beings; the general populace or public; (2) the populace, mob; (3) a great man, a distinguished or eminent man (4) the chief of caste or trade; (5) a merchant tradesman. Monier William in his *Dictionary from Sanskrit to English* after saying that महाजन: is 'always used in the singular and rarely used in the plural', defines it as '(1) a great multitude of men (2) the populace; (3) a great or eminent man, great persons; (4) the chief or a head of a trade or caste; (5) a merchant. Further he also says that it means '(a house) occupied by a great number of men'.

A clarification of the term *mahājana* is of great importance for understanding the concept of *dharma,* for if it means 'great man' then the path is one which is shown by the great man or may be class of great men. And the question about *dharma*/path boils down to who is a great man? Which itself is a problematique. By accepting this definition we concede that the sages, that is, *ṛṣis* cannot be regarded as great men as we have already rejected them to be the source of the path because they differ among themselves and there is no consensus among them regarding the nature of the path.

On the other hand, if we accept the definition of *mahājana* as 'great mass of people' then the notion of *dharma* as a categorial imperative loses sense. For then the path is that which is followed by the great mass of people. On this view, therefore, the path shall be determined by the majority of the people. It shall lead to egalitarianism. If the great mass of people is dishonest, then dishonesty shall be the *dharma.* If a greater number of persons, at a given time and in a given state are corrupt then corruption shall be the norm, the *dharma.* But *dharma* cannot be so shifty. One continues to believe in honesty as one's *dharma* even if a large section, nay even all, the people become dishonest. Such is the force of *dharma.* So, path cannot be determined by the masses but is determined by the classes. In fact, if we look at the history of mankind we find that in all ages the path is shown by an enlightened individual who has either gained it from the study, meditation, experience, insight or intuition of it. Masses just follow the path shown to them by him. Rama, Krishna, Śankara, Buddha, Mahavira, and in our own times Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, Ramana Maharishi, Sri Aurobindo and Mahatma Gandhi are clear exemplars. Mankind has always looked to this enlightened individual for guidance in case of doubt and for the resolution of all kinds of conflicts confronted by them. It is the *śista vyavahāra* and not the *loka vyavahāra* which determines the path. This view is supported by *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* (I.11.4) which says:

अथ यदि ते कर्मविचिकित्सा वा वृत्तविचिकित्सा वा स्यात्।
ये तत्र ब्राह्मणाः सम्मर्शिनः। युक्ता आयुक्ताः। अलूक्षा धर्मकामाः
स्युः। यथा ते तत्र वर्तेरन्। तथा तत्र वर्तेथाः। अथाभ्याख्यातेषु।
ये तत्र ब्राह्मणाः सम्मर्शिनः। युक्ता आयुक्ताः। अलूक्षा धर्मकामाः
स्युः। यथा ते तेषु वर्तेरन्। तथा तेषु वर्तेथाः। एष आदेशः।
एष उपदेशः। एषा वेदोपनिषत्। एतदनुशासनम्। एवमुपासितव्यम्। एवमु चैतदुपास्यम्।

Accordingly, one has to follow the path shown not even by an ordinary Brāhamaṇa but only by the Brāhamaṇa who has high ideals, who has the expertise, who is devoted to good deeds, who loves everyone, who acts out of a sense of duty, and who does not act out of avarice, hatred or ill-will. He has to be one who has attained equanimity and has goodwill for all. He has to be one whose words and deeds do not differ. In short, he is the one who is virtuous.

This is quite close to Mill's 'competent judges', from whose decree 'there can be no appeal'. Of them he says: 'On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures. . . the judgement of those who are qualified by knowledge of both or if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final.'

How is this dilemma about the meaning of the term *mahājana* to be resolved?

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## Reply to the query raised by Sanghmitra Dasgupta in the *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 3

The off-quoted verse, attributed to Ādi Śaṁkara, occurs in *Brahma Jñānāvalīmālā*, verse 20. Professor S. Sankaranarayanan quotes a part of this verse in his *Śri Śaṁkara* (The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1955), p. 156. Another reading of this verse is:

*Brahma satyam jaganmithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ* I
*anena vedyaṁ sacchāstram iti vedāntaḍiṇḍimaḥ* II

See 'Brahmajñānāvalīmāla', V. 20, *Vedānta-sandarbha* (*Advaita Grantha Ratna Manjusha-32*, Mahesh Research Institute, Varanasi, 1989), p. 378. Yet another reading of this verse occurs in Vedāntaḍiṇḍimaḥ V. 66 in *Vedānta-sandarbha*. It is as follows:

*Brahma satyam jaganmithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparah* I
*jīvanmuktastu tadvidvān iti vedāntaḍiṇḍimaḥ* II

*Madras* — R. Balasubramanian

# Book Reviews

Anantalal Thakur (ed.): *Nyāyavārtikatātparyapariśuddhi*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, pp. 14+608, Rs. 680.00

The internationally renowned Indologist Professor Anant Lal Thakur, having been engaged for more than fifty years in the fourfold Nyāya text—*Nyāya Bhāṣya Vārtika Tātparya Tīka Parisūddhi*, has edited Udayana's extremely important *Nyāyavārtikatātparyapariśuddhi* in the manner of modern analysis. Its publication by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, is appealing to the experts and pleasing to the eye.

It is a blessing for those interested in Nyāya śāstra and are engaged in the study of ancient Nyāya. It is worthy of our admiration, and those rich in intellect would be gladdened viewing this treatise in its published form.

Thirty years ago in 1967 only the first chapter of this fourfold text was brought out from the Mithila Research Centre, Darbhanga, and was edited by this very learned expert Professor Thakur, and was greatly respected by the scholars.

Even before that, the *Bibliothica Indica* from Calcutta published the *Pariśuddhi* in one volume, in which edition the commentary entitled *Prakāśa* of Vardhamāna Upādhyaya was also appended. The learned Mahāmahopadhyāya Laxman Sāstri Dravida and Vindhyaswāmi Prasad Dwivedi were its editors. It was at that time that the *tīkā* of the portion from first to fourth sūtras came to light. How the later part remained unpublished is not known. Need for the rectified form of the entire text had been felt for long which has been fulfilled by this publication.

On the occasion of its editing the critical assessment of the four *mātṛkās*, collected from the different states was done by the farsighted editor. These *mātṛkās* were also assigned proper names. Therefore, no one feels any doubt about the flawlessness of the edited text. Various readings called on the basis of JATM symbols obtained from Jaisalmer, Ahmedabad, Tanjore and the Adyar Library, Madras, are referred to in the footnotes here. B signifies publications of *Bibliothica*, and *B–1* signifies *mātṛka* text from Baroda. Here, the *mātṛkā* obtained from Baroda is referred to in the footnotes. It consists of the fifth chapter only. So, we do not find any fault of carelessness or of any other sort in this *Pariśuddhi*. This becomes perfectly certain when you see through the treatise.

Although another commentary by Udayanācārya on the last chapter of *Nyāyadarśana* named variously as *Nyāyapariśiṣta, Prabōdhsiddhi, Bodhsiddhi*, etc., is available in published form, the author illuminates the meaning of the text basing on sūtras as in the form of *vṛtti*. In it the import

of *Tātparyatīkā* has been revealed, therefore, the breadth and seriousness of thought are natural. In both, the difference of themes is a subject for thought.

Although there had been several commentators of this *Pariśuddhi*, such as Darpankāra, Bateśwarūpādhyāya—the writer of *Prakāśa* Vardhmāna Upādhyāya, Śaṁkara Miśra, Kriṣnānanda, Vidyāvīranci, Diwākar Upādhyāya, Prabhākar Upādhyāya, Jānkināth Bhaṭṭācārya and Cūḍamaṇi, yet their works are not easily available.

Besides, it is neither handy nor possible to have a rectified text of all the commentaries, so if the present editor chose not to include them, it has not resulted in any damage to quality.

The publication of this treatise would change the view of the historian of a Nyāya discipline, since the theory of Gaudnayāyika Śrivatsācārya is presented as antithesis or eliminated by quoting and questioning. Before its publication, in the book named the *History of Navyanyāya* in Mithila, Professor Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya had considered Śrivatsa as the teacher of Udayanācārya.

The sentences of the *Pariśuddhi* clearly state the antithesis of Udayanācārya in relation to Śrivatsa. In this *Pariśuddhi* five quotations from Śrivatsa are given. All the quotations are in the form of the views to be refuted and not in support of the thesis. Thus, Śrivatsa could not have been Udayanācārya's teacher.

> Just as in a desert well, after removal of earth, water becomes visible, similarly, when a profound text is rectified, its essence or meaning becomes apparent. Our effort to explain the meaning of the same has been possible because of the love of Śrivatsa. [Originally in the form of a couplet.]

In this initial couplet of the second chapter the term 'vatsaltā' (love between parents and offsprings.) is in the opposite sense and expresses its meaning as Jahatswārtha lakṣaṇa.

In this respect it should be noted that competing with Buddhist thinkers the ancient Nyāya stream had attained an extremely high position in the times of Udyotkara—the Vārtika writer. That is why, Udayanācārya says in the *Pariśuddhi*, 'Udyotkara school was in its youth which had declined with times, as if. Then, is it here the teachings of Trilochana Guru, as a tonic, which is being given for its renewal? It seems to be right.' (*Pariśuddhi*, p. 3)

Buddhist thinkers such as Dharmakīrti etc. raised objections against Nyāya view with strong arguments. Removing those objections in his *Tātparyatīka*, Vācaspati Miśra presents Nyāya view and expands it, whereas the teachings of Trilocanaguru support Vācaspati. Thus, Tātparyacārya states in the conclusive portion of *Tātparyatīka*, 'Do not destroy the river of fame of others'.



But in the times of Udayanacārya the Nyāya stream had flown fast and the objections of Buddhist thinkers such as Jñānaśriratnakīrti were thoroughly met, etc., yet the stream became slow with the disappearance of competitive Buddhist thinkers for some unspecified reason.

Only Varadarāja preserving the logical point of view respectfully followed Udayana. Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, propagated the new stream of Nyāya, the Navya Nyāya, which was given due respect in other disciplines also. So, in our view, in the times of Udayanācārya ancient Nyāya was on the decline while Navya Nyāya had begun to gain popularity. Being a time of transition, we can thus call it a limit point.

Although he, as an *avant garde* expert, had edited the commentary on *Pariśuddhi* by Śrikanthācārya and the *Nyāyalakṁāra* of Abhaytilakācārya and published them from Calcutta and Baroda, yet with the academics Navya Nyāya remained reigning.

In Navya Nyāya, in the place of Buddhist thinkers one notices the competitive spirit of Prabhākar Mīmāṁsā much more, which was embedded in all the works of Udayanācārya generally and particularly in his *Kusumāñjali*.

For the students of ancient Nyāya, this treatise *par excellence*, is a must and ought to be possessed.

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CROSBIE SMITH and M. NORTON WISE: *Energy and Empire: A Biographical Study of Lord Kelvin*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 866

Biographies of eminent figures of history may make interesting reading. But difference of opinion on their place in history can render the honorific of 'eminent' subjective. On the other hand, there is less room for controversy about eminent persons of science, like Lord Kelvin, especially if we have had a century or more to look back on their work. Even Marxist historians would hesitate to analyse the activities of scientists exclusively in terms of social conditions; still, it must be admitted that scientific thought can be influenced by these. In this sense, Kelvin is indeed an excellent subject. As the title suggests, he was influential and was influenced by the needs of his times.

William Thomson was born in Northern Ireland in 1824. A brilliant career as a student brought him early recognition and he became Professor of Natural Philosophy in Glasgow College at the young age of twenty-two and he served there until he retired in 1899. In 1892, he became the first 'scientific' peer, Baron Kelvin of Largs. He died in 1907.

These dates are significant in the context of the contemporary scene in the various fields in which Kelvin made his contribution.

From his father Dr James Thomson, Professor of Mathematics at Glasgow, he imbibed strong values of economy and social responsibility. For Kelvin, these traits meant that public service and profitability were restraints on speculative theorizing: to the degree that theories lost direct contact with reality, they became methodologically and morally wrong.

Kelvin's early love affair was with mathematical physics, particularly the style of Fourier. The use of mathematical analogies in physical theories was to be a feature of his work. At the same time, he developed into a great experimentalist as a researcher and as an inventor. He turned an old coal cellar, at Glasgow, into a fine teaching and research laboratory, in which precision measurements were to be tools to test theories.

From this voluminous work, I shall select three topics in which Kelvin's work is discussed in detail, namely thermodynamics, the age of the earth (and the sun) and the laying of the transatlantic cable for telegraphy. I think they will convey the spirit of the book.

Kelvin's interest in thermodynamics was stimulated by the requirements of marine engineering when shipbuilders were making an economic reality of ocean steam navigation. His elder brother, James Thomson, a scholarly engineer, was interested in the mechanical effect of heat and the brothers were in continuous discussion of the general problem. They were familiar with the epochal work of Sadi Carnot, 'The Motive Power of Heat' (1824), in which the crucial ideas that the motive power is most efficiently generated in a reversible engine without transport of heat through finite temperature differences) and that the efficiency depended only on the temperature of what we now call the source and the sink and not on the agent (that is, working substance) used, had been expressed. Curiously, Carnot's work was based on the old caloric theory of heat flowing from a hotter to a colder body. In his early career Kelvin was impressed by the analogy between the flow of heat and of electricity with the flow of water, familiar as he was in the use of water power in the Clydeside. Now the total work in the fall of a column of mass M is:

$$W \propto \int_0^M m \, d \, m \propto M^2$$

and likewise, argued Kelvin, the work done in raising the temperature of a body would be:

$$W \propto \int_0^Q T \, d \, Q \propto Q^2$$

where T is the temperature and Q, the heat.

By now, Kelvin was aware of the argument of James Joule on the inter-conversion of heat and mechanical work. But he had difficulty in appreciating its significance. The contradiction between the two ideas was to puzzle him—that heat was a form of motion and not a conserved fluid and yet it is the 'fall' of heat from a higher to a lower temperature



that enabled it to perform work. It was to be some three years of vigorous interaction with Joule and others before Kelvin arrived at the modern view. He was then quick to appreciate the distinction between the two directions of the inter-conversion. Indeed this temporal directionality was soon couched in theological terms: God alone could create and annihilate energy (I law) and God alone could restore the original arrangement of energy (II law). Fortunately, the subsequent progress of the subject did not need theological dicta and the eminent founders of thermodynamics did not seem fettered by thoughts of divine intervention!

The idea that the sun and other astronomical bodies have a finite life was not new. (The Greek poet Lucretius, among others, had suggested it some two thousand years ago). For Kelvin, his now firm belief in irreversibility of natural processes led him to a 'progressionist' cosmology. The conversion of the sun's energy into radiant heat was an irreversible process and the life of the sun and the earth were finite. Kelvin's command of Fourier's methods led him to estimates of the rate of cooling of the earth, using such data as conductivities of rock. Uncertainties in the various thermal properties of rocks at different depths, as also of the constitution of the interior, meant that Kelvin often had to revise his estimates but he was firm in his upper limit of some 400 million years for the age of the earth. This was well short of the estimates of geologists whose study of fossils in rocks and sequence of rock formations suggested that it could hardly have been that small. The ensuing debate was long and often acerbic, with Kelvin and his supporters scarcely concealing their lack of faith in the less established sciences like geology. By the early 1900s, the new phenomenon of radioactivity impinged upon the whole issue of energy generation in the sun although it was to be years before a proper understanding of the nuclear processes was to emerge. In 1904, Frederick Soddy argued that the hitherto unsuspected source of energy (radioactivity) would challenge Kelvin's assumption about the cooling of the earth. Kelvin's response was unenthusiastic; he dismissed the role of radioactivity as negligible.

Kelvin's work on telegraphy, particularly the laying of the transatlantic cables, was to bring him fame in commercial circles and a peerage for his 'service to science and progress'. The first transatlantic cable, completed in 1858, had failed within weeks and the directors of the company relied increasingly on the advice of Kelvin, who had decided views on the harmony of theory and practice. His contribution was crucial. He ensured that the materials for the cable were up to engineering standards that he deemed necessary and he also invented a very sensitive detecting instrument for recording signals.

For all that, Kelvin's understanding of the basic process of propagation of electrical signals along the cable was, to put it mildly, different from that of Faraday and Maxwell. George Stokes, expounding essentially the modern version of the transmission line, consistently regarded the

dielectric between the central copper wire and the outer iron sheath ('gutta percha', a commonly used insulation) as an essential component of the circuit. For Kelvin, electricity flowed linearly along the central wire, like water, in longitudinal motion within it. The problem here was fundamental. Kelvin could not accept Maxwell's displacement current. No electric displacement, he argued, could complete a circuit of electrical quantities! In remonstrance, G.F. Fitzgerald (more famous for his relativistic—contraction hypothesis) wrote to *Nature* pointing out that 'the inertia of water is a very bad analogue to electromagnetic induction'.

These examples heighten, for me, a sense of wonderment at the strange ways of progress of scientific knowledge, different from the pedagogic version dressed up for classroom instruction. The essence of the secoond law of thermodynamics was anticipated by Carnot before the nature of heat, the first law, was understood. The remarkable venture of the submarine cable, richly successful, was based on confused understanding of its working. And, although the logic and methods of Kelvin were sound in his estimates of the age of the earth, it was based, as it turned out, on inadequate data and insufficient attention to information available from other sciences.

Kelvin's achievements were many and the book has meticulously recorded them. His method of images for solving electrostatic problems, the large number of instruments that he invented, the formulation of the second law of thermodynamics and the idea of the absolute (Kelvin) scale of temperature and his success in commercial ventures with his patented instruments like the magnetic compass and the sounding machine for shipping fleet, richly deserve the tribute that is succinctly phrased in the last sentence of the text of this book: 'A very great name in British science had passed into history.' I recommend this scholarly work to all those interested in the history and philosophy of science.

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## ANNOUNCEMENT

The *JICPR* is seriously thinking of forming a Network Group consisting of those of its readers who would like to receive the contents of its special features such as 'Focus', 'Agenda for Research' and 'Notes and Queries' before their publication so that they may become aware of them as soon as they are received and may respond to them in case they would like to do so.

The *JICPR* is at present published three times a year and thus it takes a long time for items under these sections to be published and brought to the attention of our readers. In order to avoid the delay, it is proposed that those who would like to be actively involved in the on-going discussions may write to us expressing their desire to become members of the *JICPR* Network Group so that they may be sent the material immediately as soon as it is received by us. Those interested may kindly write to the Editor.

EDITOR

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## ANNOUNCEMENT

A reasonably settled chronology is essential for any reconstruction of the history of Indian Philosophy. The problem of chronology and its consequent uncertainty have vitiated not only an authentic historical construction of Indian Philosophy but has also made it difficult to have an authoritative history of Indian culture which is closely allied with Indian Philosophy. Of late, a lot of work has been done to clarify the issues relating to the subject. As a result, perspectives determined by personal or cultural prejudices are gradually receding to the background and a new outlook is emerging.

The *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* (*JICPR*) proposes to bring out a special Issue on 'Chronology and Indian Philosophy', under the editorship of Professor G.C. Pande, the well-known scholar of Ancient Indian History and Culture and a member of the Editorial Board of the *JICPR*.

The issue is planned to appear some time in early 1999 and papers on various aspects of the theme may be sent directly to:

Professor G.C. Pande
11 Balrampur House
Allahabad - 211 002
U.P.
India

## ANNOUNCEMENT

The *JICPR* proposes to discuss the following topics in the forthcoming issues of the *Journal* and would like to invite papers dealing with them from scholars interested in the areas mentioned:

1. Modernity and Post-modernism: A Critical Evaluation
2. Philosophy and the Social Sciences
3. Philosophy and Literature

The *JICPR* would also like to invite its readers to suggest topics that they would especially like to see discussed in the pages of the *JICPR*. Those interested may write to the Editor in this connection.

EDITOR

## ANNOUNCEMENT

The *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* plans to publish an issue dealing with implications of developments in modern logic for philosophy under the editorship of Prof. Anil Gupta and Dr Andre Chapuis, under the title "Circularity, Definition and Truth". Papers are invited for inclusion in this issue. Authors should send their manuscripts to the following address:

Dr Andre Chapuis
Department of Philosophy
Indiana University
Bloomington IN 47405
USA

The deadline for the submission of manuscripts is 1 July 1998. It is expected that the issue will appear some time in the year 1999.

# *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*

EDITOR: DAYA KRISHNA

**Volume XVI Number 1 September–December 1998**

# Journal of Indian Philosophy

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The *Journal of Indian Philosophy* encourages creative activities among orientalists and philosophers along with the various combinations that the two classes can form. Contributions to the journal are bounded by the limits of rational enquiry and avoid questions that lie in the fields of speculative sociology and parapsychology. In a very general sense, the method is analytical and comparative, aiming at a rigorous precision in the translation of terms and statements. Space is devoted to the work of philosophers of the past as well as to the creative researches of contemporary scholars on such philosophic problems as were addressed by past philosophers.

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## Diacritical Marks

*Vowels*

| | |
|---|---|
| आ | ā |
| ई | ī |
| ऊ | ū |
| ए,ऐ | ē } (long) |
| ओ | ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.) |
| ऋ | ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ) |

*Nasals*

*Anusvāra*

| | |
|---|---|
| (ं) | ṁ and not ṃ |

*anunāsikas*

| | |
|---|---|
| ङ् | ṅ |
| ञ् | ñ |
| ण् | ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be) |

*Hard aspirate*

*Visarga*

| | |
|---|---|
| (ः) | ḥ |

*Consonants*

*Palatals*

| | |
|---|---|
| च | ca and not cha |
| छ | cha and not chha |

*Linguals*

| | |
|---|---|
| ट | ṭa |
| ठ | ṭha |
| ड | ḍa |
| ढ | ḍha and not ḷha |

*Sibilants*

| | |
|---|---|
| श | śa |
| ष | ṣa |
| स | sa |

*Unclassified*

| | |
|---|---|
| ळ | ḷa |
| क्ष | kṣa and not ksha |
| ज्ञ | jña and not djña |
| ऌ | ḷṛ and not ḷri |

General Examples

*kṣamā* and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Krishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha,* (except in Hindi)

*Dravidic (conjuncts* and *specific) characters*

| | |
|---|---|
| ൽ | ḷ |
| ൾ | ḷ. |
| ൺ | ṇ |
| ർ | r. |

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Chola), Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

## Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dāgaba* and not *dagaba*
*veve* or *vēve* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script. (The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for *laghu-guru* of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

## Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

## Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

*References to published works*

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
*Title of Book,* Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.