Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

JICPR

Editor DAYA KRISHNA

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

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STYLE SHEET

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For the papers written in English, words from Sanskrit, Ardhamāgadhī and other Prakrits including the Apabhraṁśa etc., will be diacriticised if rendered in Roman script. (Quotations can also be in Nāgarī script.) (Here we suggest those for the Sanskrit (classical), the Prakrit, the Apabhraṁśa, and the Dravidic languages. For other languages, namely Arabic, Persian and the modern European languages, the current international conventions for transliteration for their rendering may be followed.)

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What is Wrong with Davidson's Anomalous Monism?

R.C. PRADHAN
Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad

This paper seeks to examine Davidson's theory of anomalous monism in his philosophy of mind. This theory is famously known for its denial of psychophysical laws relating the mental with the physical. This has justly become the subject matter of an intense debate[1] in recent philosophy of mind. It has increasingly been felt that Davidson has defended the autonomy of the mental without making sufficient room for the mind in the world of nature. It is alleged that for him the mental is causally inefficacious or inert[2] so that there is nothing that can make mind autonomous.

The aim of this paper is to defend Davidson's autonomy thesis even if such a defense may entail rejecting his thesis of identity of the mental with the physical. My contention is that mind is autonomous in an ontological sense for which we have to provide a more non-reductivist framework than is available in Davidson's theory.

I. THE MENTAL IS THE PHYSICAL: DAVIDSON'S MONISTIC FRAMEWORK

There is a definite monistic metaphysics unmistakably present in Davidson's philosophy of mind. It is manifested in his ontological thesis that the mental is the physical, i.e. mind is ultimately non-different from the physical system in which it is embedded. The picture of the world thus presented contains mental events which are ontologically the same as the physical events.

In this picture of the world the mental events are not abolished altogether but are introduced in the mechanism of the description of the mental. The mental therefore has its locus in the descriptive system of beliefs, intentions, etc., which is differentiated from the descriptive system of the physical. Thus at the ontological level the mental events are the same as the physical events, though they differ in their respective vocabularies. Thus here is a mixed picture of the world allowing for a physicalist or minimal materialist[3] ontology along

with a conceptual dualism making room for a full-fledged system of the mental.

The following theses broadly characterize Davidson's philosophy of mind:

D1: There is token-identity of the mental with the physical. That is, a particular mental event, in spite of its descriptional differences, is the same as the physical event with which it is correlated.

D2: The mental is causally supervenient on the physical such that the mental characteristics are dependent on the physical characteristics.

D3: The mental is irreducible to the physical and thus is autonomous. It is free of the deterministic laws of the physical.

While D1 and D2 define Davidson's monistic metaphysics of the world, D3 ushers in the anomaly of the mental in relation to the physical. Davidson's philosophy of the mind is thus justly called anomalous monism.[4]

There are three basic principles[5] P1-P3 which function as the basic postulates or the premises of Davidson's anomalous monism. They are as follows:

P1: Mental events cause physical events and vice versa as they are in some kind of a casual interaction (The Principle of Causal Interaction).

P2: The causal relation is nomologically closed, that is, is strictly determined by laws (The Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality).

P3: There are no strict laws by which the mental events can be predicted and explained (The Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental).

P1-P3 lay down the basic presuppositions of the theory of anomalous monism as a theory of the mind. According to this theory, mind and the world make the reality without the mind being ontologically different from the physical world. Mind is as real as the physical world and yet there is no ontological difference between them. The only difference that makes the mental autonomous is that it cannot be reduced to the physical world.

Davidson's philosophy of anomalous monism as contained in D1-D3 tacitly presupposes the above mentioned principles or postulates such that the former follows logically from the latter. D1 is the direct result of P1 insofar as the latter makes the interaction of the mental with the physical possible. If mind and brain are in constant causal interaction, it is inevitable that the particular mental events cannot

but be physical. That is, the particular token mental events are identical with the particular token physical events (token-token identity)[6]. D2 makes the further claim based on P1 that the mental events are supervenient on the physical, that is, the mental events are dependent on the physical events so far as their respective characteristics are concerned. Thus both the identity and the supervenience theses are grafted on the Principle of the Causal Interaction (P1) because it is held that the identity and supervenience relations are derived from the relation of causal interaction. If mind and brain influence each other causally, there is reason to believe that the mental events such as thinking, perceiving, judging, etc. are not only identical with the correlated brain-processes, but are also dependent on them.

II. THE TWO LEVELS: ONTOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL

The anomalous character of the mental contained in D3 follows from the fact that no strict causal laws are available to relate the mental with the physical. That is, as Davidson puts it, 'there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained'.[7] This further suggests that the mental events are type-different from the physical events and so do not come under the strict causal laws of the physical world. The supervenience of the mental on the physical and the token-identity of the mental with the physical do not amount to a strict causal determination of the mental. The mental events remain outside the pale of deterministic laws for the very fact that they are mental as type-distinct from the physical.

The failure of the P2, that is, the Principle of Nomological Character of Causality in the realm of the mental events shows that anomalous monism is inevitable and that it is true. It is inevitable because the mental is type-distinct from the physical and it is true because it is the case that the mind has many functions which cannot simply be ascribed to the brain. Thus anomalism of the mental remains an unchallengable thesis.

It is, however, the monistic hypothesis which is subject to doubt as it does not fit in with anomalism of the mental. This is at least what we can make out of the serious inconsistency allegedly involved in Davidson's three principles. P1 and P2 stand for physicalism of some sort while P3 stands for anomalism of the mental. The latter speaks for the autonomy of the mental while the former speaks for the determinism of the physical and the identity of the mental with the

physical. Thus there is an inconsistency[8] between P1 and P2 on the one hand and P3 on the other. The locus of the inconsistency of the monism with the anomalism lies in the confusion between the two levels of understanding which it implicitly presupposes, namely the ontological and the conceptual, that is between the realm of the individual events and the realm of the descriptions of these events.

The two levels are like this: the individual events are the stuff of the world such that the world could be said to be containing such events. This ontological domain, for Davidson, contains the individuals of the physical type such that the mental events are identical with them. Thus the mental events are token-identical with the physical ones and so monism follows as a matter of fact. Besides the ontological level, there is the level of descriptions of the ontological particulars. The descriptions of the mental and those of the physical are type-distinct because what the former ascribe to the individual events the latter do not. That is, while the mental is ascribed such properties as intentionality and subjectivity, the physical realm has very different properties. Thus there is type-difference between the language of the mind and the language of the physical events and processes.

Davidson seems to advocate strict monism at the ontological level where the world is physically constituted. He is well aware of the fact that the so-called mental events have no non-physical existence. But that is not the whole story. The mental events enjoy autonomy at another level: they are non-reducibly present alongside the physical events. This level is the level of conceptual organization and the description of the ontological particulars. Here manifold discriminations and distinctions are made. The physical stands apart from the mental and the mental is autonomous in its activities. The deterministic laws of the physical world do not affect the mental world.

Now the question is: How can these two levels be reconciled? Can the apparent inconsistency be removed? Davidson has a Kantian[9] solution to the problem. He agrees with Kant that natural necessity and autonomy of the mind can go together, that is, the anomaly or freedom of the mind and the causal determinism and the monism of the physical can be reconciled. Physicalist monism and the autonomy of the mind can co-exist.

III. COMPATIBILITY AND THE AUTONOMY OF THE MENTAL

Davidson's Kantian option for compatibilism has the following rationale: it makes room for both physicalist monism and the mental

anomalism. Freedom of the mental runs parallel with the determinism of the physical world. Nomological necessity for the physical world does not cancel the lawlessness of the mental. Davidson writes:

> Mental events as a class cannot be explained by physical science; particular mental can when we know particular identities. But the explanations of the mental events in which we are typically interested relate them to other mental events and conditions. We explain a man's free actions, for example, by appeal to his desires, habits, knowledge and perceptions. Such accounts of intentional behavior operate in a conceptual framework removed from the direct reach of physical law by describing both cause and effect, reason and action, as aspects of a portrait of a human agent.[10]

It is thus the 'class' of the mental events which need to be placed alongside the physical events without being reduced to the latter. They are autonomous being free from the physical necessity which characterizes the events in the physical world. The physical events have no other identity than their nomological behaviour which can be mapped into the strict laws of the physical world.

Now the idea of the autonomy of the mental follows just from the fact that conscious states of the mind cannot be mapped into the strict laws of the psychophysical variety. The latter especially are not available since consciousness cannot be explained in terms of the physical laws. The conscious mind is an autonomous reality that needs no nomological explanation. Davidson puts this as follows: .

> Even if someone knew the entire physical history of the world, and every mental event were identical with the physical, it would not follow that he could predict or explain a single mental event (so described, of course).[11]

That is to say that the mental events as such remain beyond the physical laws and their power to explain the physical events. The physical laws are entirely inappropriate so far as the mental realm is concerned.

The best way of guaranteeing the autonomy of the mental is to harp on the fact that there is anomalousness about the mental. Davidson therefore argues that there are no psychophysical laws to correlate the mental with the physical. The so-called 'bridge laws' between the mental and the physical are not available so that we cannot explain how the mental events arise out of a physical

background. Anomalousness of the mind arises precisely where the bridge laws fail and this is evident in the fact that the mental events remain beyond the orbit of all strict causal laws. Davidson remarks: 'The anomalism of the mental is thus a necessary condition for viewing action as autonomous.'[12] And further says: 'We must conclude, I think that nomological slack between the mental and the physical is essential as long as we conceive of man as a 'rational animal'.[13]

This makes it clear that the mental is autonomous to the extent it maintains the slack between itself and the physical. The slack is the gap between the two realms, namely the anomalous mental and nomological physical.

This further brings out the issue of reductionism in philosophy of mind. The autonomy thesis is dependent on the fact that the reduction of the mental into physical is not possible.[14] Davidson defends the irreducibility of the mental on the ground that the mental shows the remarkable features of intentionality which cannot be ascribed to the physical. The mental can be described in the language of the propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, etc. This is not available for the physical events, so mental activities remain irreducible to the physical.

The autonomy thesis, however, does not deny that there is a physical background[15] for the mental events or that there is a physical realization[16] of the same. The mental is indifferent to the fact that the physical world provides the backdrop for the emergence of the mental.

Davidson argues for the co-existence of the mental and the physical and therefore for their reconciliation within his holistic framework. His effort is to see that there is a perfect harmony between the physical world and the mind. The mind is actively engaged in the weaving of the mental world in constant interaction with the physical world without losing its autonomy. Davidson is thus, like Kant, a soft determinist so far as the relation of the mental with the physical is concerned. His defense of weak or soft supervenience of the mental on the physical is a standing testimony to that.

IV. STRONG VS WEAK SUPERVENIENCE

Davidson's theory of weak supervenience is consistent with his autonomy thesis on the ground that the mental must remain causally linked with the physical even if in a very weak sense. The mental is dependent on the physical in the sense that it arises in the background of the physical. This dependence is known as the supervenience of

the mental on the physical.

Weak supervenience as distinguished from strong supervenience makes room for rough correlation between the mental and the physical. It shows that though there are no strict psychophysical laws to link the mental with the physical, nevertheless there are weak correlation laws to establish the link between the two. Supervenience is one-directional because it only shows that the mental is dependent on the physical; it remains indifferent to the question whether the physical is dependent on the mental. Even then there is no guarantee that the mental is rigidly dependent on the physical. Davidson writes:

Although the position I describe denies there are psychophysical laws, it is consistent with the view that mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical aspects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect. Dependence or supervenience of this kind does not entail reducibility through law or definition. . . .[17]

That is to say, the mental properties are dependent on the physical properties and so whatever happens in the mental world has its causal basis in the physical world. Mental properties are directly correlated with physical properties.

The strong supervenience as advocated by Kim[18] clashes with Davidson's for the reason that the former admits reductionism which Davidson rejects. Kim argues for the fact that the mental events are strongly correlated with the physical events in the sense that there are psychophysical laws correlating them. This makes room for nomological relations between the mental processes and the physical processes in the brain. This leads to the rejection of Davidson's P3. It is not surprising therefore that Kim thoroughly rejects Davidson's anomalous monism. Kim writes in a revealing passage:

The fact is that under Davidson's monism, mentality does no causal work. Remember: on anomalous monism, events are causes only as they instantiate physical laws, and this means that an event's mental properties make no causal difference. And to suppose that altering an event's mental properties would also alter its physical properties and thereby affect its causal relations is to suppose that psychophysical anomalism, a cardinal tenet of anomalous monism, is false.[19]

That is, if Kim is right, Davidson's anomalous monism makes mind inert and so inefficacious. In that case, the mental is as good as reduced to the physical.

This is, of course, not the case as far as Davidson's theory is concerned. In fact Davidson is concerned with the autonomy of the mental, and so he does not deny its reality or active presence. How can an autonomous reality like the mind remain ineffective or inert vis-à-vis the physical world? Davidson's P1 asserts, to the contrary, that the mind is in interaction with the physical world. Kim has mis-understood Davidson's view that mind is dependent on the physical body by taking it in the strong sense. The dependence is not strictly nomological. There is a slack between the two. If we abolish that slack, then Kim's point is well placed.

Besides, Davidson's identity thesis (D1) does not amount to reductionism. It is a token-token identity which shows that at the ontological level identifying a mental event coincides with the identification of the physical event. This is constrained by the fact that at the conceptual level there is type-difference between the mental and the physical. The token-identity thesis as such cannot subvert the thesis of anomalism of the mental. It is nevertheless a deep inconsistency in Davidson's theory that there is mental-physical identity at all.

V. THE INCONSISTENCY OF AM + P + S

The inconsistency arises between Davidson's anomalous monism (AM) and his principles (P) along with the thesis of supervenience (S) as pointed out by Kim[20] because if the principles are accepted, then anomalousness of the mental does not follow. Anomalousness of the mental denies that there are psychophysical laws at all, where-as P1 and P2 demand that there be nomological causal laws covering all mental and physical events as they are one and the same. If the principle of identity and the principles of nomologicality are allowed, then the idea of there being no psychophysical laws does not follow.

We have already seen that supervenience in the weak sense can be consistent with anomalism of the mental but supervenience with identity cannot be consistent with anomalism. Identity in its strongest sense means that the mental and physical events have all the properties in common according to the Leibniz's Law. Therefore under all circumstances the mental and the physical will coincide in all respects as long as the events are properly individuated. Thus all mental events

collapse into the physical events. This is how the identity theorists[21] have conceived the identity relation to be. This type-type identity[22] theory advocated by Place and Smart does demand that the mental processes and the brain-processes are factually identical in view of the fact that in the actual world there are no two processes going on: there is one and one type of process taking place in the brain. These also are called mental as there are no extra-physical processes at all. According to this view, there is no logical identity between the mental processes and the brain-processes because there is no question of identity of meaning between the 'mental' and the 'physical'.

Davidson has done well to have rejected type-type identity because it spells disaster for his anomalous monism in the sense that if the mental and the physical are type-identical, then there is no ground for taking the mental as autonomous in relation to the physical. Even the factual identity between the mental and the physical cannot be allowed as type-identity will lead to the collapse of the anomalism of the mental. Hence Davidson has opted for the token-token identity of the mental and the physical. According to this view, only particular mental events are identical with particular physical events. And this happens as a matter of fact because our mental history is in reality the history of the physical world. The types are not identical because in that case they would demand psychophysical laws which, according to Davidson, are not available at all. There are only physical laws available. Type-identity would assimilate the mental events under the covering laws of the physical. Tokens are, however, identical not because of their type-description but because of their real stuff involved. That is, there is an ontological demand that there can be only physical stuff in the world.

But we can very well see that token-identity also makes anomalous-ness of the mental impossible. It is because if the mental is token-identical with the physical, they must have all their properties in common and so they must obey Leibniz's Law. That is, the tokens will depend on their types for their individuation. The properties especially depend on the types or kinds for their individuation.

The ontological-conceptual distinction does not ultimately help resolve the inconsistency because token-identity leads to type-identity and thus the so-called ontological level is not innocent of the conceptual level. The ontological identity cannot easily mesh up with the conceptual difference between the mental and the physical. If conceptual difference is all that matters for anomalousness, then the ontological monism cannot be espoused along with anomalism. The

monism of the physicalist theory which results from the identity thesis must be discarded if the autonomy of the mind can be accepted.

Davidson's monism is the most troublesome thesis in view of the fact that it allows for physicalism or materialism at the ontological level. It has reduced ontologically, if not conceptually, the mental world to the physical world. This is the source of inconsistency in Davidson's system. If physicalist monism is the end result of metaphysical inquiry into the structure of the world, then mind is found ontologically a superfluous phenomenon. Mind is already made into a useless appendix of the world. If the mental life loses autonomy at the ontological level, what is left for it to be restored at the conceptual level? In fact the concession of autonomy at the conceptual level is only an empty concession.

The autonomy principle demands that the mental life has its own reality and that it is not derivatively real in any sense. In that sense it must be independent of the physical world not only ontologically but also conceptually. For that it needs to be placed alongside the physical world at both the levels without being reduced to the latter. It is not denied here that mind is dependent on the physical world for its biological origin[23] and therefore a weak form of supervenience could be accommodated. But this does not amount to a kind of identity even in the sense of token-identity. All that matters is that the mental is autonomous in the way spelt out by Davidson without being ontologically identical with the physical.

VI. ANOMALOUS DUALISM WITHOUT CARTESIANISM: THE ONTOLOGY OF 'THINKING CAUSES'

Davidson defends an ontology of 'thinking causes'[24] that are in active interaction with the physical world. This amounts to accepting the mental events which cause physical events, that is, which bring about causal changes in the world. If therefore the mental events are causally efficacious and active, they cannot simply remain inert or powerless. Thus Davidson is right in refuting the charge that his anomalous monism does render the mental events causally inert.[25]

But the question now is: How can the mental causes, which are otherwise active, be identical with the physical events that accompany them? Davidson's argument is that they are active as the individual events and are themselves physical events in the sense that there is nothing to distinguish between them and the physical events. The identity thesis is made mandatory for the thesis that the mental events

are causally efficacious. But the fact remains that the mental events are active only as physical events; so the problem remains as to whether the mental events are active at all *qua* mental events.[26]

Davidson must accept that the mental events are not just a matter of description, though admittedly, according to him, the mental events are introduced only on the level of description.[27] If mental events are only descriptionally available, then they lose their autonomy because there is no ontological backing for their autonomy. Davidson's main argument is for autonomy and the anomaly of the mental. But the argument is at stake if we accept the monistic hypothesis that the mental and the physical are identical.

Davidson has accepted ontological reduction while rejecting conceptual reduction. This itself is a major source of inconsistency in the system. If the mental events are ontologically identical with the physical events, can they remain conceptually different from the latter? The thin difference between the two levels is that the conceptual level introduces the mental predicates which obey no strict laws either of the mental or the pschophysical type. By implication, it follows that the ontological realm is fully under the strict causal laws. Thus the mental events are causally determined at one level but are causally not so determined at another level. Unless the two levels are substantially different, the monism of one level can collapse into the monism of another level.

Davidson accepts ontological monism with conceptual dualism. The latter goes with the irreducibility of the mental and is the only safeguard for the autonomy of the mental. Thus there is sufficient ground for maintaining dualism between the mental and the physical in Davidson's theory. This can very well be called anomalous dualism though it is not identical with Cartesianism. For two reasons it is not Cartesianism: first, it does not allow for substance-dualism in the way Descartes does; second, the ontological monism is still intact. Davidson cannot, for obvious reasons, accept dualism at the ontological level because that is Cartesianism of some sort. Therefore the only option for him is to accept monism at a great price.

But one can see that one need not be a Cartesian in order to be a dualist even at the ontological level. Let us admit that there are mental events which are causally efficacious. Besides, they are conceptually different from the physical events and so are not under the deterministic laws of the physical world. Now after admitting all these, can we say that the mental and the physical are identical? We can admit the two sorts of events ontologically, one sort belonging to the mental

realm and the other sort belonging to physical world. We need not for this admit, like Descartes, two substances, but we can admit two different realms of reality like Searle who says that the 'ontology of the mental is an irreducibly first-person ontology'.[28] The dualism of the substance is hard to sustain in the absence of a clear-cut definition of a mental substance or soul, but it is arguably easy to sustain the dualism of the mental and the physical realms. The latter is what is argued for by the theorists of mental reality as an autonomous reality in the world.

The idea of monism is as problematic as the idea of dualism as Searle has argued because both are allegedly labouring under certain presuppositions which are detrimental to a proper study of the mind.[30] But it cannot be gainsaid that if we demarcate the reality as mental and physical, we are bound to recognize that the mental is different from the physical. Therefore it is dualism which is more commonsensical than monism. Monism is a more laboured doctrine than dualism and so it suffers from all the deficiencies of the reductionist dogma.

VII. Concluding Remarks

Davidson's anomalous monism finds itself in a paradoxical position because of its denial of the mental as an ontological category. It fails to locate the mind and consciousness in the physical world as fully-fledged realities. It, however, retrieves the ground only partially by conceding that conceptually the mental is real and is autonomous.

This paper has suggested that the anomalous character of the mind can be better safeguarded in a dualist and mentalist framework. Davidson's minimal mentalism can be emphasized to the exclusion of his minimal physicalism or materialism[31] such that there could be a genuine effort like Kant's to place the mental world alongside the physical world. Davidson's real Kantian intentions could be better served in keeping the mind forcefully alongside the domain of the natural world.[32]

Notes and References

1. See *Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events*, Bruce Vermazen and Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985. See also *Mental Causation*, John Heil and Alfred Mele (eds.), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.

2. See Davidson, 'Thinking Causes' in *Mental Causation*, op. cit., pp. 3-17 for the nature of the allegation and his response.
3. The notion of minimal materialism is due to J.J.C. Smart. See his 'Davidson's Minimal Materialism' in *Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events*, op. cit., pp. 173-82.
4. See Davidson, 'Mental Events' in *Essays on Actions and Events*, Clarendon Press, Oxford,1980, pp. 207-27. See also in the same volume his 'Psychology as Philosophy', pp. 229-44 and 'The Material Mind', pp. 245-59.
5. See Davidson, 'Mental Events', op.cit., pp. 207-9.
6. For a full discussion on token-token identity see Cynthia Macdonald, *Mind-Body Identity Theories*, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, Ch. II.
7. Davidson, 'Mental Events' op.cit., p. 208. This is Davidson's third principle (P3).
8. Cf. Jaegwon Kim, 'Can Supervenience and "Non-Strict Laws" Save Anomalous Monism?' in *Mental Causation*, op.cit.. pp. 19-26.
9. See Davidson, 'Mental Events' for the expression of the Kantian intentions.
10. Davidson, 'Mental Events', op.cit., p. 225.
11. Ibid., p. 224.
12. Ibid., p. 225.
13. Ibid., p. 223.
14. Cf. John R. Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1994, Chs. 5 & 6.
15. Ibid., Ch. 6.
16. See Hilary Putnam, 'Philosophy and Our Mental Life' in *Mind, Language and Reality* (Philosophical Papers Vol. 2), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, pp. 291-303.
17. Davidson, 'Mental Events', op.cit., p. 214.
18. Cf. Kim, 'Concepts of Supervenience', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (1984), 153-76.
19. Quoted by Davidson in his paper 'Thinking Causes', op. cit., pp. 5-6.
20. Cf. Kim, 'Can Supervenience and "Non-Strict Laws" Save Anomalous Monism?', op.cit., pp. 19-26.
21. See U.T. Place, 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?' in *Modern Materialism: Readings on Mind-Body Identity*, John O'Connor (ed.), Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New York, 1969, pp. 21-31. See also in the same volume J.J.C. Smart, 'Sensations and Brain Processes', pp. 32-47.
22. Ibid.
23. See Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, op.cit., and also his *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, for the position called 'biological naturalism'.
24. See Davidson, 'Thinking Causes', op.cit.
25. Ibid.
26. See Kim, 'The Non-Reductivist's Troubles with Mental Causation' in *Mental Causation*, op.cit., pp. 189-210. See also his 'Can Supervenience and "Non-Strict Laws" Save Anomalous Monism?' op.cit., and E. Sosa 'Davidson's Thinking Causes' in the same volume, pp. 41-50.
27. Davidson, 'Thinking Causes', op.cit., p. 8.
28. Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, p. 95.

29. See Putnam, op.cit., and Searle, op.cit.

30. Searle, op.cit., p. 26.

31. Smart, 'Davidson's Minimal Materialism', op.cit., pp. 173-82. For a refutation of materialism see Tyler Burge, 'Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice' in *Mental Causation*, op. cit., pp. 97-120.

32. An earlier version of the paper was presented at a National Seminar on 'The Concept of Mind' organized by Vismad Nad, Ludhiana in 1997. I am grateful to all those who had commented on the paper.

Do Feeling-Nouns Designate Anything?

G. P. RAMACHANDRA
Professor and Director, School of International Relations
Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam–686560, Kerala

At the outset, it is necessary to define the word 'feeling' as it is used here. The word can, of course, refer to sensations like heat or cold or pain, but it is not used here in that way. It refers to occurrences like joy, fear, rage and enjoyment. The word 'emotion' is not used, because 'feeling' has a wider range than 'emotion', for example, enjoyment is not an emotion but it is a feeling. It is true that it seems more correct to refer to such states as love and patriotism as emotions rather than as feelings but the present paper is concerned with occurrences, not with dispositions like love or patriotism, which are manifested in the occurrences. When discussing William James' theory, however, his use of the word 'emotions' for feelings in our sense will be retained. The paper will refer to feelings as entities, not occurrences, because the word 'occurrence', in this context at least, would appear to signify the appearance of an entity.

No subject is of greater importance to human beings than feelings, yet it has been relatively neglected in the recent times by the great philosophers. The outstanding exceptions are William James and Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein made a contribution to the subject in his later years which is of the greatest importance to philosophers and laymen alike. The present paper attempts to tackle the question of what is a feeling from a Wittgensteinian perspective. It will also examine William James' ideas on the subject from the same perspective.

What is a feeling? What do feeling-nouns designate? Do they designate anything at all? One talks of present, future and past objects and events evoking feelings, e.g. a snake one encounters arouses fear, one's impending promotion fills one with joy, one's impending bankruptcy causes depression. Equally, there are characteristic bodily manifestation of fear, joy and other feelings. The sight of a snake evokes fear in a person and this causes him to turn pale and his heart to beat faster and makes him turn and run away. A taunt from someone

fills a man with rage, which causes him to go red in the face, and makes him strike the man who insulted him. The news of a promotion fills a person with joy, which causes him to smile, to find the people and situations around him pleasant, to be friendly and enthusiastic, to cease to be troubled by matters that troubled him before. And since it makes little sense to locate the feelings in the body, and none whatever to locate them outside, one tends to think of them as occupying some 'inner' but non-spatial realm.

This is precisely the view which Wittgenstein attacks in *Zettel*: 'But "Joy" surely designates some inward thing. No. "Joy" designates nothing at all. Neither any outward nor any inward thing.'[1]

Elsewhere, in the *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein says that one of the great sources of confusion in philosophy is the case of a substantive making one look for something corresponding to it. On this view, which is the one adopted here, feelings are not entities, and feeling-nouns do not designate anything but have a role in our language.[2] This view dispenses with the feeling as the mediating inner element in the situation. Instead of looking for psychic counterparts for feeling-nouns, it looks at the context in which these words are used. It is a situation or thought, which, by entering one's life in a particular way, causes the changes. Gilbert Ryle has given the famous example of the man who is enjoying the digging that he is doing.[3] The enjoyment is not an 'inner' parallel process accompanying the digging; it is simply the digging entering one's life as something enjoyable.

It is significant that in everyday life, the bodily manifestations of feelings are always explained in terms of situations and thoughts and that such explanations are always found to be satisfactory. When a person is asked why he is weeping, he mentions a situation or thought, and an explanation of this sort is never regarded as incomplete. Nobody answers : 'Because I feel sad "and if somebody does so", the answer will strike the questioner as tautological'. If someone mentions an event and then says 'Therefore I feel sad', these words will be regarded as redundant. The average man does believe in feeling-entities but this is because the existence of feeling-nouns makes him think of counterparts. The total irrelevance of such entities in his everyday explanations marks a contradiction in his position.

The view that feeling-nouns designate entities leads one to ask questions to which no answers can be given. If a feeling is an entity, what is it composed of? To say that it is made up of psychic or mental stuff is to beg the further question as to what psychic or mental stuff is. One can give no answer to this question, so one has no distinct

conception of what a feeling is. One finds oneself talking in tautologies, in terms of one's own definitions, in terms of the descriptions and sub-discriminations made by language, instead of saying something about feelings in their own right.

The stuff of which feelings are constituted must contrast in some way with matter; certainly, if it is not itself material. But if feelings are different from other mental entities, like thoughts, images and volitions, they must contrast in some way with the stuff of which these entities are made. And if there are different feeling—entities corresponding to different feeling—nouns, their psychic stuff must contrast with one another in some way. And if 'mental entities' stands for a distinct kind of entity, it necessarily follows that mental entities—thoughts, images, volitions, feelings—while contrasting with one another (on the above definition) must also have something in common. And if feelings are a distinct category of mental entity, they must while contrasting with one another (if there is a distinct counterpart of each feeling-noun) also have something in common.

Similar complications arise in regard to particular feelings. Hitherto, the assumption has been that each feeling-noun has a distinct psychic entity as a counterpart. But why cannot such a noun have more than one counterpart? Take the case of enjoyment. Ryle's example of the man who is enjoying his digging has been mentioned. Someone else may be enjoying a glass of wine, another a glass of water after a hot walk, a third a plate of Beef Stroganoff, a fourth a composition of Tchaikovsky's, a fifth the view of a snow-covered mountain, a sixth a cricket game, a seventh a reading of Proust's *Un Amour de Swann*, an eighth a reading of an Agatha Christie novel, a ninth a reading of a P.G. Wodehouse novel. We can and do talk of enjoyment in each case. But is the same psychic entity brought into being in each case or are the entities different in each case? Or is there a common element in each case, since they are all cases of enjoyment, together with differences reflecting in some way the differences in the kind of enjoyment? Are there sub-categories of entities? Is there something common in the two cases of gastronomic pleasure (drinking wine and eating Beef Stroganoff)? Or in the three cases in which something is ingested? Or in the two cases of aesthetic pleasure (listening to Tchaikovsky, reading Proust)? Or in the three cases of reading (Proust, Agatha Christie, P.G. Wodehouse)? And if there is a common element corresponding to a sub-category, are there disparate elements corresponding to the differences within the sub-category (for example, the different novels used in the cases of reading

Proust, Agatha Christie, P.G. Wodehouse)?

The fact is that there are an indefinite number of ways in which the cases of 'enjoyment' can be sub-divided and one can ask if there is a common element corresponding to each sub-heading, and within each sub-category, one can ask if there are differences corresponding to the differences between the individual members of the category. However, since one has no clear conception of what a feeling is, one has no means of answering these questions.

More puzzles suggest themselves. The enjoyment element which is produced say, by one's reading of *Un Amour de Swann*—does it come into existence as soon as one finds the book enjoyable or immediately afterwards? If afterwards, how soon afterwards? Does it cease when one interrupts one's reading or does it linger on? Do we not talk sometimes of enjoyment leaving an afterglow?

There are different kinds of unhappiness, just as there are different kinds of enjoyment. Remorse, guilt, shame, nostalgia and homesickness are all unhappy feelings but with differences which are much greater in some cases than in others. For example, remorse and homesickness are far more apart than remorse and shame. The same kind of problem arises as to whether there is only one kind of feeling-element corresponding to each one of these feeling-nouns, or whether there is a common element in these cases together with other elements which somehow correspond to the differences between them and whether these correspondences reflect in some way the variation in the degree of difference between these feelings.

Not only are there different kinds of feelings but feelings can differ in their degree of intensity. 'Delight', for example, does not stand for a distinct kind of feeling, but for a difference in the intensity of enjoyment. Something may be fairly enjoyable, enjoyable or very enjoyable or delightful. One can say 'fairly enjoyable' but not 'fairly delightful'; delight does not admit of a low degree of intensity. If feelings are separate entities, are differences in intensity reflected in the entities in some way? Is the fact that a person finds Tchaikovsky fairly enjoyable, Beethoven enjoyable and Mozart delightful reflected in some way in the feeling-element brought into being when he listens to their music?

Is it not becoming obvious that one is allowing one's vocabulary to call the shots, that the discriminations and the sub-discriminations made by one's language are spawning spurious parallel structures, that the feeling element is simply a shadow cast by language? But language casts more than one shadow and one does not know which

one to adopt. And a hypothesis which encourages one to posit psychic entities for every discrimination and sub-discrimination of one's language is certainly a most uneconomical one.

There is a temptation to refer to feelings as 'fragments of consciousness' but this does not throw light on what they are; one has simply moved from 'psychic stuff' or 'mental stuff' to 'fragments of consciousness'; one has not said anything about feelings in their own right. In any case, this use of 'consciousness' shows confusion about the concept, for the word does not refer to an inner entity at all and one realizes this when one looks into its grammar. One says that a person is 'conscious' when he is able to perceive and think, but in special situations only, for example, when he is coming out of a faint, or is on the point of death, in other words, when it is reasonable to say he cannot perceive and think. 'Consciousness' is simply the abstract noun corresponding to the adjective 'conscious' and it is always used in everyday life with the verbs 'gain', 'regain' and 'lose', showing the very restricted range of situations to which its use is confined. It is never used, as in philosophy, independently of these verbs, and as the subject of a sentence. (We are not concerned here with its use in the social sciences synonymously with attitude of mind, e.g. 'proletarian consciousness' and its rather infrequent ordinary use synonymously with knowledge, e.g. 'his consciousness of differences between the two policies').

The conventional view that the feeling causes the bodily reactions runs into the insoluble problem of how psychic entities, which are necessarily non-material, can affect material ones. For example, how can joy, a psychic entity, operate on one's facial muscles, causing one to smile? How can sorrow, a psychic entity, operate on one's lacrimal ducts, causing tears to flow?

The conventional view is that the feeling causes the bodily changes appropriate to it and talk of a smile as an expression or manifestation of joy, of crying as an expression or manifestation of sorrow, encourages one to look at the matter in this way. But the bodily changes are not caused by psychic entities and cannot be. Nor are they symptoms which permit one to infer the existence of a separate entity, the feeling. Nor do they constitute the feeling, as William James thought, a point of view which will be examined later. Instead, they are among the criteria permitting one to use the appropriate feeling—word. The word itself has no content or correlative. An example given by Anthony Kenny will make the matter clearer.[4] A cloudless sky, sunshine and so on are criteria for talking about good weather. They

are not caused by good weather and they are not symptoms permitting one to infer the existence of good weather. If they are effects or symptoms, good weather would be something over and above these conditions. This truth holds for most psychological words. Take courage. When a soldier fights to the death rather than surrender, one says he had courage. Courage is not an extra entity inspiring his behaviour or an extra entity which we infer from it.

The conventional view assimilates feelings to the category of a sensation like pain. A blade cuts one's flesh, it causes pain and the pain causes the pain-behaviour like moaning. The pain is a distinct occurrence, separate both from the blade which cuts and the pain-behaviour and without which there would be no pain-behaviour. This schema is taken wrongly for a schema for feelings.

The real affinity is with a different kind of sensation-word, 'sight'. 'Sight' unlike pain, does not denote a separate occurrence; it has no content. When one sees a pen, there is no separate act of seeing of which one is aware, unlike for example, the act of picking up the pen. When one sees a patch of colour, the patch is not one thing and the seeing another; one's experience is of the patch of colour only. Sight itself is not something of which one can have an experience. Like 'joy' and 'courage', 'sight' is a mere abstraction, which, however, has functions in one's language.

Saying that 'joy' does not designate anything does not, of course, entail the conclusion that one is not really glad when one feels glad, that the gladness is somehow chimerical. However, one may find oneself confronted by this paradox when one considers the view that feeling-nouns do not designate anything.

The point is that the grammar of the word 'joy' is like that of 'sight', not 'pain'. It is true that if there were no separate occurrence such as pain, one could not have an experience of pain, one could not be in pain. But although sight is not a separate occurrence, one does see; there is an experience of things, not of sight. One perceives and thinks about many things and some of these things can affect one and can evoke bodily reactions in one. The word 'joy' does not designate anything, it has no content, but it does not follow that the news that one's job application has been successful is not delightful news, that it does not make one smile and talk enthusiastically, find the people around one likeable and cease to be troubled by things that troubled one before. And, of course, joy is not the good news, nor is it the smile, nor the enthusiastic talk nor seeing people and things in a changed way. But the occasion and behaviour are the

criteria for talking about joy.

It is possible to employ a notation which dispenses with the concept of sight. Instead of saying 'I see X', one could say 'Over there appears X' and instead of 'the sight of X' one could say 'the appearance of X'. Similarly, one could employ a notation that dispenses with the concept of feelings as mental states. Instead of saying 'He is in a rage', one could say 'There is an enraging occasion which makes him rage-behave'.[5] But one cannot substitute 'pain-behave' for 'be in pain'.

Speaking metaphorically, one might say that a feeling is grounded in a situation or that it colours a thought[6] but it does not follow that it is a separate item, in the way, for example, that the red powder that colours a glass of water is something separate from the water. In this regard, William P. Alston's talk of a feeling involving an evaluation has its dangers.[7] Does not talk of evaluation imply that what is cognized or perceived is raw data, that it has a nature independent of the evaluation, that the evaluation is a process done after the cognition, in the way that the evidence for a crime is raw data, which has a nature independent of the evaluation the policeman places upon it after studying it? But one does not first cognize a face and then evaluate it as angry; an angry face enters one's life as an angry face. One could speak metaphorically of anger being grounded in the face, but it is not something that is somehow added to the face; an angry face enters one's life as an integral whole. Similarly, a thought, that is, a memory of something that happened, an anticipation of something that may happen, a consideration of some present situation, may affect one, may give one pleasure or pain, but the pleasure or pain is not something that accompanies the thought or its effect; speaking metaphorically, one could say that it colours the thought. And if the thought is pleasant or painful, this is because it is a thought of a situation that is pleasant or painful.

In spite of everything that has been said, the impression that a feeling is a gaseous mental entity of some kind is likely to persist, requiring prolonged therapy, as it were, before it disappears. One probably still feels inclined to say, 'I do feel glad, and surely this gladness must be something'. There is a delightful occasion and there is joy-behaviour; why should there be something more corresponding to 'gladness'? Is there anything corresponding to 'sight'? Do not all mentalistic words, barring sensation-words, lack correlatives-words such as intention, volition and desiring? (Images, of course, are not true correlatives, because they do not exist). Even someone who insists

that there must be feeling-entities will surely agree that they are apparently evanescent; that he could not find them if he looks for them, that he never actually finds a feeling.[8] Compare this with pain. The question of looking for a pain does not even arise.

The discussion so far has been about feelings which are connected with particular situations. Moods like depression and cheerfulness are different in that they are generalized feelings. For a depressed person, nothing gives pleasure, all sorts of things become a source of misery and anger. A cheerful person finds all sorts of things agreeable. In such cases, there are situations which enter one's life in a particular way and an appropriate feeling-behaviour. However, when one says that someone is in a cheerful mood, one does not feel there is anything disproportionate between his responses to situations and the situations themselves. In the case of depression, one does feel that there is a lack of proportion. Moreover, when all sorts of things become depressing or cheering, one feels disinclined to refer to situations as the cause of the feeling-behaviour; instead, one is inclined to speak of them as the target of the feeling-behaviour.

Depression can, of course, be produced by drugs. One is not inclined to say that cheerfulness can be produced by drugs; cheerfulness connotes sanity and good mental health. But one could say that drugs can make one elated. In the case of drugs, the temptation to talk of the situation as the target of the feeling-behaviour is even stronger; one wants to reserve the use of 'cause' for the drug.

The pathological phenomenon called objectless dread might appear to suggest that feelings can exist in isolation, that is, without a connection with a situation. In such cases, a person is seized by extreme terror, accompanied by violent bodily reactions, but is not terrified of anything in particular. These cases might even appear to argue for the existence of feelings as psychic constituents. Someone is terrified, but since he is not terrified of anything in particular and the bodily reactions by themselves are not terrifying (as opposed, say, to the thought that if they are so violent, they might kill one) there seems to be nothing left to give the feeling of terror its identi-fying quality except a psychic constituent. But one has only to lift the curtain of language for the problem to disappear. Someone who is in terror is someone who thinks that something appalling will happen to him, even if he does not know what this is. This thought of an undefined something is an object.

Finally, William James' theory of the emotions will be examined (James, when he talks about the emotions, is referring to feelings

as the term is used here, not to dispositions but his usage will be retained). James' theory probably originated in a realization on his part that there was no mediating psychic entity. He himself points out that when we abstract the bodily reactions, there is no 'psychic stuff' left behind, out of which the emotion can be constituted.[9] But the existence of nouns like fear, hate and joy seems to have misled him into looking for counterparts. He thought he found them but he says contradictory things about what, in his view, they are. He begins with what he calls the coarser emotions—such as hate, anger and fear. He writes:

> Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state for mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that *the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.* Commonsense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended is that this order of sequence is incorrect; that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be inter-posed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike or tremble, because we are sorry, angry or fearful, as the case may be.[10]

James here identifies an emotion not with the bodily changes, but with our feeling of them, that is, our awareness or consciousness of them. *Our feeling of the changes as they occur IS the emotion.* He also says that the emotion is a mental state which cannot arise unless the bodily changes first occur, thus clearly distinguishing between the two.

However, elsewhere, James identifies an emotion, equally explicitly, with the bodily changes.

> Whatever moods, affections and passion I have are in very truth constituted by, and made up of, those bodily changes which we ordinarily call their expression or consequence.[11]

The use of 'constituted by' and 'made up of' leaves no doubt about his meaning. What James says about feeling sorry because we cry and so forth can accommodate both theories; on the feeling

theory, the bodily reaction would be a cause in a generative sense and on the second a cause in a material or constitutive sense.

To take the feeling theory first: James is using 'feeling' synony-mously with 'awareness' or 'consciousness'. But James dealt very destructively elsewhere with the idea of 'consciousness' as a distinct mental entity; the word does not denote such a thing.[12] How then could he fail to see that same is true of 'feeling'? One's 'feeling of the changes as they occur' is simply the bodily changes entering one's life. The feeling is not a separate occurrence, a second thing, an effect; the presence of the sensation constitutes the feeling of the sensation; there is no sensation, however faint, that one does not feel or sense, and that is a logical or grammatical remark.

James' theory, of course, has to explain how bodily states can give rise to psychic ones, whereas the conventional view of feelings has to explain how psychic states can give rise to bodily ones.

Effectively the awareness theory reduces to the bodily reactions view, and this has been demolished by Wittgenstein. On this view, if one experiences a dreadful fright, it is the sensations which occur which are dreadful. Wittgenstein points out that a sensation of pain is dreadful but asks if the sensations occurring when one experiences a dreadful fright are dreadful.

> It is the sensation of pain that is dreadful—but is it the sensation of fright? When someone falls headlong in my presence—is that merely the cause of an extremely unpleasant sensation in *me*? And how can the question get answered? Does someone who reports the frightful incident complain of the sensations, the catching of the breath etc.? If one wants to help someone get over the fright, does one treat the body? Doesn't one much more soothe him above the event, the occasion?[13]

Wittgenstein suggests that when one is really sad, or is following a sorrowful scene in a film, one is not even conscious of one's face.[14] He thinks it is important that there is no gesture of pointing to a place where one is depressed and that one does not say, when one weeps, that one feels sad in one's eyes.[15]

James writes:

> Can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action, but in their stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face? The present writer, for one, certainly cannot. The rage is as completely

evaporated as the sensation of its so-called manifestations, and the only thing that can possibly be supposed to take its place is some cold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, confined entirely to the intellectual realm, to the effect that a certain person or persons merit chastisement for their sins.[16]

It is admittedly impossible to image a person who does not exhibit some at least of these reactions being in a rage. But this does not prove that the rage *is* the reactions. What James has unwittingly done is to give the criteria for one's saying that a man is in a rage and the impossibility in question is a logical impossibility.

James deals next with what he calls the subtler emotions—'the moral, intellectual and aesthetic feelings'.[17] As before, he repudiates psychic entities, but he feels compelled all the same to look for correlatives. In the process, he involves himself in major contra-dictions. He writes:

> Concords of sounds, of colours, of lines, logical consistencies, teleological fitnesses, affect us with a pleasure that seems ingrained in the very form of the representation itself, and to borrow nothing from any reverberation surging up from the parts below the brain.[18]

James imagines an objector saying that if musical experiences, logical ideas and so forth can immediately arouse a form of emotional feeling (thus implying that the emotion is distinct from the cause, is its effect) why cannot the same be true of the coarser emotions such as hate and fear? Why cannot one's perception of the bear be what arouses the emotion of fear, and the bodily reaction appear afterwards?

When replying, James separates aesthetic emotion from intellec-tual and moral pleasure. He then denies that aesthetic emotion is anything different from the sensation; this idea, in fact, is beautifully evoked by the words of his formulation ('seems ingrained in the very form of the representation itself'). Aesthetic emotion

> is an absolutely sensational experience, an optical or auricular feeling (note the identifying 'is', as opposed to his talk elsewhere of a feeling of a sensation) that is primary, and not due to the repercussion backwards of other sensations elsewhere consecutively aroused'.[19]

Elsewhere he talks about the emotion as 'a pure incoming sensible quality'.[20] He concedes that emotions 'for the most past constituted

(note the use of "constituted") of other incoming sensations'[21] do arise, but insists that these are secondary and are grafted upon the primary sensation.

James regards these sensations—a 'glow, a pang in the breast, a shudder, a fullness of the breathing, a flutter of the heart, a shiver down the back, a moistening of the eyes, a stirring in the hypogastrium'[22]—as aesthetic, and maintains that for the romantic sensibility, these are the important aesthetic emotions. Of course there is nothing aesthetic about the stirring of hypogastrium and so on; James' list amounts to a *reductio ad absurdum* of his case. Moreover, an objector could ask why, if incoming sensations can constitute the primary aesthetic emotion, this cannot be true of the coarser emotions as well. For most people, the impressions in the second category are much more powerful.

Both James and the objector are, in fact, guilty of bad grammar. An emotion belongs out of grammatical necessity to a person and cannot be located in sounds or in a picture or in a bear. But a musical composition or a picture can be pleasant and a bear can be frightful.

When it comes to intellectual and moral raptures, James involves himself in yet another contradiction. He writes:

> In all cases of intellectual or moral rapture we find that, unless there be coupled a bodily reverberation of some kind with the mere thought of the object and cognition of its quality; unless we actually laugh at the neatness of the demonstration or witticism; unless we thrill at the case of justice, or tingle at the act of magnanimity; our state of mind can hardly be called an emotion at all.[23]

The following points may be noted. James is gratuitously putting intellectual and moral rapture in the same category as the coarser emotions, in that they are said to be constituted of bodily sensations, but why should this be so? Why cannot intellectual and moral rapture be, like aesthetic emotion, a sensational experience, as implied by James' own wording elsewhere ('ingrained in the very form of the representation itself')? Secondly, if one is experiencing intellectual or moral rapture—and a brilliant argument or an ennobling action can enter one's life as something captivating—it is contradictory to talk of the 'mere thought of the object and cognition of its quality'; if rapture is present, such a possibility is logically excluded. Finally, there is nothing intellectually or morally rapturous about laughs, thrills and tingles. If one thinks that one's state of mind cannot be called

emotional without them, it means that one is using 'emotion' to refer, not to intellectual or moral rapture, but to emotionalism, a mere agitation, which would distract one's attention from the intellectual or moral rapture. The bodily reactions mentioned by James in connection with aesthetic, intellectual and moral emotion do not even appear for the most part to be criteria for talking about it; the criteria would appear to be a suitable occasion, an appropriate facial expression and except the case of witticisms, a stillness of the body.

To conclude: the view that feelings are distinct constituents is untenable and any attempt to identify them with the bodily manifestations is equally untenable. Like most psychological words, feeling-nouns do not designate phenomena.

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Post-Genocidal Spirituality

TYSON ANDERSON

Professor of Philosophy, Saint Leo College, Saint Leo, FL

The various genocides of modern times are a call for unsettling reflection.[1] The details are familiar and hardly anyone escapes with his or her innocence intact: Americans devastated native populations, Nazis and others annihilated Jews, the Swiss were bankers for the Nazis, Yugoslavian bloodshed is terrifying and possibly unfinished, and Rwanda is the scene of incredible massacres perpetrated with no effective effort to stop them being made by any other powers.[2] After pondering these genocidal events—which surely give a 'Waste Land' quality to our times beyond what Eliot would have originally imagined—it is difficult to avoid a considerable feeling of alarm and a sense that there is something radically wrong with the way that we have been going about things. Christopher Browning concludes his study of 'ordinary men' in the Order Police with its 'deeply disturbing implications' by asking: 'If the men of the Reserve Police Battalion 101 could become killers under such circumstances, what group of men cannot?[3] One begins to wonder if a new spirituality is called for, a new way of being religious that avoids the contributions—and lack of contributions—that religions have made to these horrors. Simone Weil says: 'We are living in times that have no precedent, and in our present situation universality, which could formerly be implicit, has to be fully explicit. It has to permeate our language and the whole of our way of life.'[4] Gilbert Ryle has noted the difference in kinds of changes that we may undergo: 'If I have ceased to enjoy bridge, or come to admire Picasso, then *I* have changed. But, if I have forgotten a date or become rusty in my Latin, I do not think of this as a change in *me*, but rather as a diminution of my equipment.'[5] In a similar vein, Wittgenstein remarked: 'A man can see what he has but not what he is. What he is can be compared to his height above sea level, which you cannot for the most part judge without more ado.'[6] The kind of change being contemplated here is an extreme example of the first kind: the possibility of our becoming a different kind of human being, which would be, in an older way of speaking, a

conversion.[7] The question in particular is this: can we change our whole way of thinking—not just our way of thinking *about* certain matters but our *way of thinking* itself? And if we can, what consequences would follow from this for our spiritual life and religion? I suggest that the two very different examples of a German theologian who was executed by the Nazis (Dietrich Bonhoeffer) and a Dutch Jew who died in Auschwitz (Etty Hillesum) show us a way of our current predicament into a post-genocidal, universal way of thinking and, perhaps, a new 'form of life'.[8]

I want to begin by drawing attention to the familiar fact that there are different ways of thinking. We think differently when we are doing biology, listening to music, or reading poetry. There are also more healthy and less healthy ways of thinking, i.e. there can be a pathology of thinking. Such pathology is not only encountered in psychological disturbances but in normal thinking itself. For instance, Wittgenstein said that philosophical thinking may be compared to 'the treatment of an illness',[9] and that in philosophy there are 'different methods, like different therapies'.[10] An unhealthy way of thinking actually can bind us: 'A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably'.[11] The effect of this kind of 'picture' on the thinker is to produce a blind spot. And the effect is the same in regard to our ordinary, everyday thinking as we live and act in the world. Such a psychological blind spot in ordinary life has been labelled a 'scotoma' by Bernard Lonergan in his discussion of various biases in thinking.[12] I am suggesting that even normal thinking is unhealthy in a spiritual sense, that we have some kind of fundamental scotoma regarding who we and others are that opens the way for us to engage in genocide. When we are in the grip of genocidal thinking we are locked in; there is a way out, but we cannot see it. Something in us blinds us to the human route. Our whole way of thinking is askew. Presumably it is thinking which could aid in our escape. But if our thinking itself is completely unhealthy, then we could seem to be blocked on all sides. 'If then the light in you is darkness, how great is the darkness.'[13] There is, however, some hope to be found in the realization that a degree of healthy thinking may remain. After all, the realization that genocidal thinking is a real problem at least suggests the possibility of post-genocidal thinking, and that very act of realizing itself would seem to indicate that not all is darkness.

Can we say more about the nature of this genocidal thinking? Genocide has a certain 'voice'. There is inevitably a very specific kind

of 'we' and 'they' thinking that is operating in genocide, a kind of thinking that in principle pays no or virtually no attention to the value of individual persons but rather to the group or category to which the persons belong. Civilized and savage, Aryan and Jew, Serb and Muslim, Tutsi and Hutu, all of these terms carry an evaluation, a 'sign' that separates the two kinds. Merisha was seventeen years old and living in Resnik.

> Yes, I knew that five of my school colleagues were raped and killed afterwards. I saw them lying in a ditch. . . . I saw knife wounds on their breasts, on their stomachs. . . . Then one afternoon . . . we saw that armed Serb Chetniks were waiting for us. . . . They stopped us and chose two women. Then about ten Chetniks raped them in front of us. We were forced to stand and watch.[14]

Perpetue was twenty years old when the violence in Rwanda began.

> On April 9, 1994, they found me. I was taken to the Nyaborongo River by a group of Interahamwe [civilian militiamen]. When I go there, one Interahamwe said to me that he knew the best method to check that Tutsi women were like Hutu women. For two days, myself and eight other young women were held and raped by Interahamwe, one after another. Perhaps as many as twenty of them. I knew three of them.[15]

Even people of the same ethnic group are not safe from further odious subdivisions: Orthodox Israelis recently assailed Conservative and Reform Jewish men and women who were praying at the Wailing Wall, calling them Nazis, Christians, whores and goyim and throwing human excrement on them.[16] Genocidal thinking, then, attends to the person's *group* or category before it attends to the person and his or her characteristics. The genocidal voice, moreover, evaluates one group as being somehow less than worthy of dignified treatment, sometimes even labeling, members of the group as animals, vermin, insects. There is an impurity, an uncleanness, a despicableness about the denigrated group.

> The Jews remain united only if forced by a common danger or attracted by a common booty; if both reasons are no longer evident, then the qualities of the crassest egoism come into their own, and, in a moment, the united people becomes a horde of rats, fighting bloodily among themselves.
>
> If Jews were alone in this world, they would suffocate as much in dirt and filth, as they would carry on a detestable struggle to

cheat and ruin each other, although the complete lack of the will to sacrifice, expressed in their cowardice, would also in this instance make the fight a comedy.[17]

The specific negative characteristics vary from group to group, and the groups may be virtually indistinguishable to both outsiders and insiders. Most people cannot tell Aryans from Jews, Serbs from Muslims, or Tutsis from Hutus. As if to underscore this point, during colonial days European administrators in Rwanda issued identification cards to Tutsis and Hutus and adults were required to carry them; the practice was continued after independence.[18]

It would appear that we have in us a readiness for genocide, and that only the particulars need to be supplied by the culture—as if we were born with 'genocide receptors', so to say, ready and waiting for requisite activating ideology specific to our historical circumstances. It is clear that one aspect of the solution for avoiding some of the consequences of this phenomenon would be political, that is, avoiding a Hobbesian world by creating societies which are practically—in the actions of their courts and police force—dedicated to the protection of the liberty of all their citizens, where 'citizens' denoted a human being and not a member of a particular race, ethnic group, or gender.[19] The political answer does remove the legal means for genocide to operate. But this answer, as necessary as it is, would leave the psychological mechanism of genocide untouched and the spiritual problem would still remain. The law is only as good as the people who conceive and live by it. The political solution does not eliminate the plethora of real and significant differences between people and between groups of people. Differences are not only inevitable, they are a good thing. As Michael Ignatieff says: 'It's good to have a collective identity, to take pride and to find belonging in something larger than your career, your family, yourself.'[20] The problem of genocide is a matter of taking these differences in a way that makes some people less than human.

One explanation of the phenomenon for genocidal thinking would be the 'narcissism of minor differences' discussed by Freud and favoured in some form by many, including Ignatieff.[21] Vamik Volkan relates narcissism to the concept of 'enemy' as this idea develops in childhood.[22] As helpful as this viewpoint may be, even if human beings were all psychoanalytically aware, it seems clear that there would remain a way of thinking that underlies all of our normal dealings and which will not go away, or even be weakened, until it is directly addressed. Ignatieff says: 'The problem is the systematic over-

valuation of the self that goes with narcissism, and the mythic distortion of others that goes with it.'[23] This 'over-valuation' requires further examination. What is it, exactly? 'Over' implies a right evaluation, and someone has gone 'over' that. What would the right self-evaluation be?

Ignatieff doesn't say, but it probably amounts to an ethic of liberty, where one affirms the liberty of oneself and others. But this is an ethical position which is of a different order than the phenomenon of narcissism which he has in mind. Over-evaluation can in fact remain firmly in place while one espouses and actually follows an ethics of liberty. Plenty of citizens of democracies are quite capable of genuinely believing in liberty while also being narcissistic.

Perhaps self-esteem is what is meant. Self-esteem is one kind of evaluation; it is related essentially to others—what they think of you or your group. Self-esteem is said by some to be a good thing and having low self-esteem a bad thing. It is true enough, of course, that it makes a great deal of difference, practically speaking, what others think of us and what we think of them. That having been said, it is not clear that self-esteem has any really positive function whatsoever. People-esteem, perhaps, but self-esteem? Admittedly, low self-esteem is bad, but of what good is *any* self-esteem, ideally speaking? It has been said that we should love our neighbours as ourselves, but surely this has nothing to do with self-esteem. Concerns for 'self-esteem' ('How will I or my group 'rate' as a result of this action?') would seem to add nothing but distraction to the challenge of living in a loving manner. On this understanding, self-esteem itself is an obstacle to be overcome, and thus there could be here no 'right', properly modulated and desirable self-evaluation.

This suggests that normal consciousness has something 'in the way', something having to do with self-evaluation that hinders and can actually prohibit acting from love. Ignatieff wonders why our 'common humanity' is of such little consequence. . . . Why is human identity so much less important than Croatian and Serbian identity?[24] Perhaps the 'picture' that holds us captive can be located here somewhere. I propose that it is the picture of ourselves, of our common humanity or the 'self' as normally conceived that is the obstacle, and that consequently we do not in fact normally live as if being *human* were more important than being a particular group *version* of a human being. As things usually are understood, our common humanity is no great thing; it is a sort of a lowest common denominator, and what really counts—what is really valuable—is the

difference that we have, which differences may be divided into group and then later individual differences. And we are not just anybody but rather Aryans, Croats, or Tutsis, and after that individuals with certain characteristics peculiar to ourselves. Here then is the first part of our picture of ourselves: a self-evaluation emphasizing our worth as members of certain groups and individuals. Notice how this particular way of proceeding is both doomed to failure and is potentially violent: this comparative evaluation demands that there be some others that are less valuable than we are, otherwise there is no real point to the evaluation. The vagaries of history are unkind to such pieces of narcissism, and so to improve on reality we are tempted to use force to establish our preeminence. The resentment can be especially high if there is some truth to the distinctions and our group is lacking in some significant respects. Then the 'we'll show you who is "better" kind of thinking becomes engaged. As a Serbian militiaman told Michael Ignatieff: 'Look, here is how it is. Those Croats, they think they're better than us. Think they're fancy Europeans and everything. I'll tell you something. We're all just Balkan rubbish.'[25] The glory of the nation, the tribe, the religion, the race, and so on *ad nauseam* are all variations on this one self-congratulatory theme. It has been noted that people can use certain events as symbols for other concerns, as Slobodan Milosevic and others turned the Kosovo complaints 'into a metonym for the resistance of Serbs to foreign domination, melding history, myth, and the grievances of Serbian minorities elsewhere in Yugoslavia'.[26] But this kind of group identification *as such* is metonymical,[27] for here the particular group is taken for the whole and as its welfare goes, so goes the welfare of the humanity. Normal consciousness is in fact metonymical or, in traditional terms, idolatrous: its delusion is to take a partial truth for the whole truth and then to give it allegiance, service, *latreia.*

Thus far then, genocidal thinking is based on a picture of ourselves, an 'over-valuation', as Ignatieff says, which is metonymical, delusional, and idolatrous. As a way of thinking, genocidal thinking is inherently violent and also irrational in the sense that it cannot be successfully thought through. It is opaque and resistant to healthy thinking since its continuance depends on acceptance and the silence of any opposing voices. The voice of genocide is not the dialogue of fallible people engaged in a search for truth but monologue and even harangue. It is dogmatic in quality. Hitler asserted that the Nazi view of life 'demands dictatorially that it be acknowledged exclusively and completely and that the entire public life be completely readjusted

according to its own views.[28] Understandably, Hitler spoke admiringly of Christianity's historical intolerance:

> Christianity could also not content itself with building up its own altar, it was compelled to proceed to destroying the heathen altars. Only out of this fanatical intolerance could an apodictic creed form itself, and his intolerance is even its absolute presupposition.[29]

Hitler found out that his passionate addresses were much more effective in the evening than in the morning. This was especially important to him, for ironically one of Hitler's main concerns was:

> with overcoming the prejudice of people. Wrong conceptions and inferior knowledge can be abolished by instruction, but never obstacles of sentiment. Here solely an appeal to these mysterious forces can be effective. . .
>
> It seems that in the morning and even during the day men's will power revolts with highest energy against an attempt at being forced under another's will and opinion. In the evening, however, they succumb more easily to the dominating force of a stronger will.[30]

The picturing of ourselves is also a picturing of the world—we picture ourselves as living in a certain kind of world—and this can be thought of as a kind of *reading* of others and the world. Reading itself can be seen as a kind of imaginative perception which goes beyond the mere sensory aspects of the world to the meaning that is being presented,[31] and this then implies that there is a distinctly genocidal way of reading the world. As a way of perceiving, genocidal readings would be nondeliberative: they would seem to happen of themselves; the meanings would seem to the perceiver to be natural, given, the simple truth about matters. This man is a Jew, that one a Serb, the other a Tutsi; once this is perceived, we immediately read a whole fabric of ideas, feelings, and actions into the situation—a whole narrative springs into play, replete with roles, histories, values, and actions. The genocidal 'language-game' is ready and only awaits the discovery of an appropriate 'text', whereupon the reader knows his role and what actions must follow.

How old is this genocidal 'form of life'? Probably as old as our understanding of ourselves and our world. In learning about ourselves we also are learning about the world. We do not just learn a single preposition but a whole host of them which form our world picture.[32]

In the development of our world-picture, there is no indication that the younger we get the more innocent we are in terms of any problem of over self-evaluation; narcissism, if not the earliest part of our personality, is certainly very old indeed.[33] If genocidal thinking is not limited to any particular culture and, we may safely suppose, no culture is exempt from its temptations, is it possible to discover an aspect of such thinking that is common to children and adults and which would still remain even after narcissistic issues become less controlling? That is, could we isolate the basis for, the presupposition of, a kind of egoism—to the point of a social 'austism', as Ignatieff says[34]—which is not a matter of childhood development yet which is open to genocide? I believe that this basis can be found in the very process of identification that underlines normal consciousness. As Ignatieff says: 'Violence must be done to the self before it can be done to the others.'[35]

'The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology.'[36] Wittgenstein made this remark in the context of discussing Moore's certainties—e.g., that he had spent his whole life in close proximity to the earth—and such certainties ground our identity. What my name is, who my parents were, that I and others have ancestors, all of this is a part of my identity and my world-picture: if elements of this mythology change, then, as Ryle observed, *I* have changed. Now it is a part of our normal mythology today that we are merely finite psychophysical beings, that is, the kind of beings have ancestors and who are born into a certain group (gender, race, nation, etc.) and can join certain groups (political parties, militias, religions, etc.). As material beings we suffer and die and as beings who can think we are not infrequently led to question the worth of ourselves and those whom we love because of the suffering and transience of life. Fear and anxiety are natural parts of this identification process, so much a part that it would be difficult to imagine our lives as not being subject to debilitating anxiety, depression and a sense of meaninglessness—even if we ourselves are not directly attacked. A Hutu woman who lost her husband said: 'We are living as if we are dead. When they kill your husband and children and then leave you, it is like killing you. They left us to die slowly. I wish everyday that I was dead.'[37]

Can there be an identification process where it is understood that these kinds of identities are of secondary importance and that what is of primary importance is our identity as human beings—so that these other identities have no other point than their serving

human life? Should it turn out that a group had some particular virtues—should the British, e.g., have an especially strong sense of possibilities of liberty for mankind—this would simply be a way in which the group could contribute something special to humanity and in no way an excuse for inflicting suffering on others. If a sense of universal humanity were cultivated, this would revitalize the other identities, and those identities which served universal values would be retained while those that did not would be dropped. For instance, if there is Tutsi pride which helps non-Tutsi human beings and if there is a Hutu pride which helps non-Hutu human beings, than these would be good things; but if such examples in fact promote group priority over human value, then they reinforce prejudice, fuel the desire for ethnic cleansing, and are nothing more that genocidal thinking in disguise.

There does not appear to be much difficulty in imagining post-genocidal thinking from afar, but the actual living of it—the *conversion* to such a life—is another matter entirely. Is there in fact a way out—a way from conception to living? I believe that Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Etty Hillesum can give us at least glimpses of the way out. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, executed at Follenburg death camp on 9th April 1945, is a stark witness to spiritual freedom and the dignity of the individual in the face of the Nazi oppression. His prison term gave him time to develop at least the outlines of a radical reinterpretation of Christian doctrines. On 21 July 1944, the day after the failure of the attempt on Hitler's life, Bonheoffer wrote to Eberhard Bethge that a Christian is 'not a *homo religious*, but simply a man', who has a 'profound this-worldliness, characterized by discipline and the constant knowledge of death and resurrection.'[38] Going beyond even Simone Weil's call for 'a new saintliness, itself . . . without precedent',[39] Bonhoeffer counsels: 'One must completely abandon any attempt to make some-thing of oneself whether it be a saint, or a converted sinner, or a churchman (a so-called "priestly" type!).' To make being 'religious' a condition for salvation is like making circumcision a condition of salvation. 'Freedom from *peritome* is also freedom from religion'[40] In August he sent Bethge the outline of a book which gives his further thoughts on being a Christian and being a man. He thought the time for 'religion' in the general sense of a pious other-worldliness was over. He had been contemplating a nonreligious, 'secular interpreta-tion' of Christian doctrines.[41] Although the meaning of religion for Bonhoeffer is somewhat undetermined, it is very clear what he wanted to exclude: a concern for salvation as a kind of liberation from the

world together with a love for a ritualistic and ecclesiastical niceties when the really pressing issue has to do with being a human being and being able, therefore, to live decently—nongenocidally, I would say—with others. Thus the German churches all had their many doctrines ('a heavy incubus of difficult traditional ideas'[42]), sophisticated theologies, and inspiring liturgies, yet none for this prevented people raised in this culture from committing and aiding this genocide.[43] The apparently simple task of being *human* (not being German, Aryan, Protestant or Catholic) eluded them. For Bonhoeffer then, the term 'Christian' should not indicate a person belonging to a particular group—the saved or the saints, for instance—which, in the traditional sense, has the correct dogmas. This is somewhat analogous to being a citizen of a state devoted to liberty. If such a state is founded on regard for human liberty, then it is not a 'nation' in the historical sense: nationality—like gender, race, etc.—is, ideally, irrelevant.[44] Of course, the spiritual dimension is crucial for Bonhoeffer: indeed, 'a constant knowledge for death and resurrection' is the basis of the 'this-worldliness' which he has in mind, which means 'living unreservedly in life's duties, problems, successes and failures, experiences and perplexities',[45] and which is summed up as 'prayer and action'.[46] Faith (or conversion) here is not a 'religious act' but 'but something whole, involving the whole of one's life. Jesus calls men not to a new religion, but to life'.[47] As a significant contrast to this, compare the following statement by Bernard Lonergan: Religious conversion 'is other-worldly falling in love'.[48] Bonhoeffer is opposing such an orientation. For him, if spirituality is not oriented towards the world—towards preventing genocide in the world—then it is 'religious' in the pejorative, 'other-worldly' sense. This leads Bonhoeffer to redefine transcendence in terms of 'being for others'. Jesus; '"being there for the others" is the experience for transcendence'.[49] 'The beyond is not what is infinitely remote, but what is nearest at hand', and the 'transcendence is not infinite and unattainable tasks, but the neighbor who is within reach in any given situation'.[50] 'God is beyond in the midst of our life'.[51] What is nearest at hand might be a Jew, Serb, or Tutsi, for instance, and simply to list these is at once to see the striking simplicity and difficulty of the spiritual life which Bonhoeffer is describing. He himself specifically said to his seminarians that the Christians' closest brothers and sisters in suffering were not Christians but Jews and 'the test of one's Christian faith soon became whether one would speak up on behalf of these victims of Nazi racism'.[52] Rich liturgies and complicated theologies

are manageable, but not killing our neighbor is, well, supernaturally challenging!

For Bonhoeffer, it follows from these considerations that the traditional distinctions between denominations are anachronisms. Taking refuge in 'the faith of the church' is an evasion of responsibility for our own spiritual life. 'We cannot, like the Roman Catholics, simply identify with the church'.[53] Since Catholics nowadays—following *Dignitatis Humanae Personae*'s founding of religious life in human liberty and free inquiry[54]—cannot simply identify with the church either, one imagines that the distinction between Protestant and Catholic is fundamentally unreal also. Marian devotion is often seen as a divisive point for Catholics and Protestants, yet 'La Morenita'— the multiracial Virgin of Guadalupe who, according to the story, appeared to Juan Diego, a layman—was from the beginning strongly opposed to the hierarchy, and even today her cult is paraliturgical and depends primarily on the devotion of the people and not hierarchical promotion. Madre Guadalupe, depicted as pregnant, is easily understood to be both an emphatically nongenocidal symbol of 'being for others' as well as a blessing on our multiracial future.[55] Virgil Elizondo says: 'She is neither an Indian goddess nor an European madonna; she is something new. She . . . 'unites what others strive to divide. She is the first truly American person and as such the mother of the new generations to come'.[56] Guadalupe's 'uniting what others strive to divide' is reminiscent of the spirit of the Jesus movement and Jesus' replacing 'the central ordering principle of the Jewish social world: the division between purity and impurity, holy and not-holy, righteous and wicked'[57] with a principle of love and compassion. The image of Guadalupe indicates that she is the sign of a new age, the sixth Aztec Age (the fifth coming to an end around 1517 to 1519),[58] which we might think of as an age which is post-genocidal and universal—truly 'catholic', one might say, if that word did not carry such strong parochial and even inquisitional connotations.[59]

If the division between Protestant and Catholic is an anachronism—in principle, at least—one wonders if much the same observation could also be made about the distinctions between Christian and non-Christian religions. That is, if spiritual reality is the foundation of a life lived wholeheartedly in the world 'for others', and if the goal of the spiritual life is to be a human being, then other religions, insofar as they advance this goal, would be sharing the same this-worldly spirituality. If, to take an example of beliefs found in Hinduism and Buddhism, the doctrines of *karma* and rebirth were to

be interpreted in an evolutionary way—somewhat in the manner of Sri Aurobindo[60]—as fundamentally building over time a community of persons who 'exist for others' regardless of gender, race, and ethnic group, then these doctrines would be supporting a post-genocidal, universal spirituality. Again, a political analogy may be useful. If different countries—say Britain and the United States—are devoted to protecting liberty of human rights, then the individual differences between the countries would retain a certain historical and traditional justification but they would both share the most important thing, namely, a desire to promote liberty. Although, their styles differ, their most important ideals would be the same. Likewise if different religions are fundamentally dedicated to being human and therefore 'being for others' in the sense that it is understood here, then the differences—while important and necessary since we are all human in a specific biological and historical way and our various traditions contain valuable insights—are of secondary importance. Otherwise, to make being a Christian a condition of salvation ('being for others') would simply be another, more modern version of the circumcision issue. To be of secondary importance is not, however, the same thing as being of no importance, and there is no requirement here that traditional Christologies be abandoned. Theoretically, for example, Christians should be able to explain in detail how a post-genocidal christology could contribute to universal spirituality. Thus the Logos could be considered to be an inspiring, graceful force in any human life whatsoever, while at the same time the incarnation is also thought to be unique and nonrepeatable event in the cosmic history.[61]

A picture of ourselves and our world holds us captive. In the normal identification process which forms this picture, our view of humanity is limited, thus doing violence to the self; and this process has potentially genocidal implications. One way to fight this result is to oppose it with universalistic ideals that counter-balance traditional separations—race, gender, ethnicity, religion—where genocide can find a point of entry. Bonhoeffer has given us, some direction in how we might go about this. Nevertheless, although the self here is under-stood more in the universal human sense, the normal identification process remains, and, as Aurobindo noted, unless individuals change profoundly, 'the relations formed are constantly marred by imperfect sympathy . . ., gross misunderstandings. . . . [And b]etween community and community there is . . . constant recurrence of strife of collective ego with collective ego'.[62] It is possible to take all of this a step further and eliminate entirely—at least in principle—any support for

genocide? That is, can the normal identification process itself be left behind? And if so, what would take its place? What would be the 'glue' that holds the personality together?

The normal identification process depends on our thinking, and a clue to the fundamental problem with our thinking is given by Rudolf Steiner: 'It is characteristic of thinking that the thinker forgets thinking while doing it. What occupies his attention is not his thinking, but the object he is observing. The first thing we notice about thinking is that it is the unobserved element in our ordinary life of thought.'[63] At the first glance, this seems to be an innocent enough observation. How could any violence at all would be lurking here, much less genocide? But the result of this process is that the human being identifies not with the unobserved activity of thinking but with the *results* of thinking, namely, thoughts. These thoughts constitute the picture that holds us captive. That picture is one of a thought-being in a thought-world. All of this is unrecognized, of course, for generally we think of ourselves as thinking beings; but in reality this thinking is not experienced, instead the thoughts are, and in fact we, whether we call it so or not, identify ourselves as thought- beings.[64] Another way of putting this is to say that human beings are deluded about their nature from the beginning of their thinking. Here Steiner has, I believe, discovered the basic process underlying *avidyā* and sin, thus uniting East and West should he be correct. Aurobindo has said this about *avidyā*:

> [T]here has been an involution of this unity into the dividing Mind, a plunge into self-oblivion by which the ever present sense of the complete oneness is lost, and the play of separative difference . . . comes into the forefront as the dominant reality.[65]

In Aurobindo's terms, the problem is not with the individuality but with 'separative difference', and this what is established when we identify with our thoughts and not our thinking. If our way of thinking is deluded on this most basic level, then it should come as no surprise that the later, more intellectually complex elaborations are also, at least partly, exercises in delusion issuing from an original forgetful-ness. Normal consciousness and normal identification process are metonymous: a part, thought, is taken for the whole, which includes in the first place, thinking and in the second place, thought. The self and the world are then read in this metonymous fashion, and in turn this reading, this picturing of ourselves and the world, opens the way for genocide when our partial and incomplete thought-selves prepare

to extend their hegemony (*jihad*/crusade) over the partial thought-selves or to defend it from insiders who might threaten it (inquisition)—and this partial world is full of threats; indeed, being threatened is a general characteristic of partial existence. Thus, as Ignatieff said, a kind of violence—the original circumcision, the primal wound to the Grail King— is done to the self as human beings identify themselves as thought-beings of various kinds: Aryan, Jew, Serb, Croat, Tutsi, Hutu, etc. These identifications are all importantly unreal in their narrowness. It could conceivably be, of course, that as human beings develop and reach young maturity they readily and easily identify themselves in the first place as *thinking* beings—not in Descartes' sense of *res cogitans*, which is very much still within the realm of thought and not thinking—that is, as beings who engage in a living, warm, luminous, loving activity which we all share in some measure, which is creative of the world as we experience it, and which constitutes the core of our true identity.[66] But in fact it is otherwise with us, and we instead engage in the normal, limiting identification process. The thinking activity under consideration here has *in itself* no narcissism, no egoism, no self-centeredness, and no 'over-evaluation'. Ironically, the evaluations of the thought-selves are, from this higher—'supernatural'—point of view, *under*-evaluations, and thus it comes about the genocide is rooted in systematic, unconscious and asymmetrical (hierarchical, bipolar) *under*-evaluations. Thinking is *the* 'supernatural' reality, in the sense that the experience of it lies beyond normal, bipolar consciousness and constitutes a crucial element in the *metanoia* that would eventually lead us beyond genocide, as it reorganizes our ways of thinking, feeling and acting.

Can we find an example of post-genocidal spirituality in which identification with the thought-being has either disappeared or has substantially retired? Ideally, such a person would be a person who can be seen to struggle, like ourselves, to overcome her own partial identifications,[67] who is not caught up in Aurobindo's 'separative difference', who does not simply identify herself with any given tradition but who instead is devoted to seeing clearly for herself what the truth is and what is to be done, and who wholeheartedly acts in an extraordinarily loving and compassionate manner in the world—i.e., in a 'secular' manner, to use Bonhoeffer's term. I believe we have such an example in Etty Hillesum.

Etty was a young Dutch Jew living at Amsterdam during World War II. When she began writing her diary on 9 March 1941, she had earned a law degree, was pursuing graduate studies in Russian, and

had taken up the study of psychology. She earned a little money as a Russian tutor. She had several lovers, foremost amongst them being Julius Spier who had trained under Carl Jung and was practising 'psychochirology', which Jung had encouraged. Etty became Speir's assistant and close intellectual companion. In July 1942 she became a typist for a Jewish Council, but in August, not wanting to escape the fate of her people, she voluntarily went to Westerbork, the deportation camp which was the last stop before Auschwitz. She remained there till September 1943. She died in Auschwitz on 30 November 1943 at the age of twenty-nine.

Etty did intense psychological work with Spier before she began the spiritual transformation that is recorded in her diary. She had been plagued by depression and violent headaches, sometimes sleeping for hours during the day, but after only a week with Spier there was substantial improvement. Stimulated by her meetings with Spier, she begins her diary looking for what is 'essential' but notes that while she feels intellectually adequate to the task, spiritually 'deep down something like a tightly wound ball of twine binds me relentlessly'.[68] It is clear from her account that the author is a woman and that she is socially active: she menstruates, can't tear herself away from her 'likeness', has a 'far ranging sexual curiosity', several lovers and abortions.[69] She develops a spiritual practice by setting aside half hour each morning for listening to her inner voice. She discovers that her psyche is filled with 'unimportant inner litter' and, therefore, the aim for her meditation is 'to turn one's own being into a vast empty plain, with none of that treacherous undergrowth to impede the view'.[70] She says: 'We have to become as simple and as wordless as the growing corn or the falling rain'.[71] Etty is aware that there is an eastern aspect to her practice: 'I am left alone in my still corner, squatting like Buddha and smiling like one as well, deep within, that is.'[72] It is clear that Etty has chosen to develop her *voluntary attention*, the one key element in the spiritual life according to many authors, both eastern as well as western.[73] This kind of silent attending allows one to begin to perceive the difference between thoughts and the attending/thinking that is aware of them, and this awareness is itself strangely limitless in quality—or formless, in Ch'an terms. In the *Treatise on No-Mind*, traditionally attributed to Bodhidharma, the master advises that the practice is '[j]ust to be totally aware in all affairs!'[74] On hearing this advice, the disciple became enlightened and composed a verse, which in part reads: 'Mind is marvelous tranquil;/ It has no color or form'.[75] This formless awareness also

does not know the 'separative difference' that Aurobindo considered to be a hallmark of *avidyā*, which means that awareness in itself is nongenocidal and can serve as the basis for a truly universal spirituality—provided, however, living thinking is able to work itself thoroughly down through our lives with all their prejudices, habits and contradictions of thought, and conflicted feelings.[76] Otherwise, our same psychological and social systems reassert themselves and continue running us as before, and nothing has really changed where it counts in terms of life and death, namely, in being for others, in a 'beyond' that is 'in the midst for our life', as Bonhoeffer urged.

Etty gradually was able to bring this strengthened attention into her daily life until her very being began to alter. '[A]n organic process at work', she says. 'Something in me is growing and every time I look inside something fresh has appeared and all I have to do is accept it, to take it upon myself, to bear it forward and let it flourish.'[77] This metamorphosis involved the removal of blockages and seeing through stereotyped ideas: 'We have to rid ourselves of all pre-conceptions, of all slogans, of all sense for security, find the courage to let go every standard of every conventional bulwark.'[78] This work of seeing directly must include ourselves and a questioning of even the most justified emotions: '[G]enuine moral indignation must run deep and not be petty personal hatred.'[79] This is a practice of meditative learning—thinking/attention—that is very different from an abstract thinking *about* things. I must, she says, 'listen to what is going on inside me. Thinking gets you nowhere. It may be a fine and noble aid in academic studies, but you can't think your way out of emotional difficulties. . . .'You have to make yourself passive then and just listen'.[80] One result of her metamorphosis was a remarkable equanimity, for shortly after she has determined that the Germans are out to destroy the Jews completely, she says this:

Had all this happened to me only a year ago, I should certainly have collapsed within three days, committed suicide or pretended to a false kind of cheerfulness. But now I am filled with such equanimity, endurance and calmness that I can now see things clearly and have an inkling of how they fit together.[81]

Her deep experience of meditative awareness began to dissolve the false (genocidal) boundaries between her and others. Meditating on the New Testament, particularly *Matthew*, there emerged such a noticeably different spiritual quality in her that a friend remarked: 'There is something of the Early Christian in you. If you believed in

reincarnation I would tell you that you lived at the time of the Apostles.'[82] Correcting a communist acquaintance, she says that we can't get anywhere with hatred because 'we have so much work to do on ourselves that we shouldn't even be thinking of hating our so-called enemies. . . . I see no alternative, each of us must turn inwards and destroy in himself all that he thinks he ought to destroy in others'.[83] When the communist replied that this was nothing but Christianity, she replied: 'Yes, Christianity, why ever not?'[84]

Etty's spiritual practice allowed a great love to grow in her. At one point she voluntarily left her beloved Spier in order to be with the first group of Jews being deported to Westerbork. Not long after this, Spier suddenly died and Etty returned to Amsterdam for over a month. She had become ill and a physician flirted with her, telling her she was too cerebral and didn't live in the real world.

The real world! All over the real world men and women are being kept apart. In camps. In prison. . . . That is the real world. And you have to come to terms with that. . . . Why not turn the love that cannot be bestowed on another . . . into a force that benefits the whole community and that might still be love? And if we attempt that transformation, are we not standing on the solid ground of the real world?[85]

Such love changes our picture of the world—the picture that had held us captive. In *Brothers Karamazov* Father Zozima says: 'If you love everything, you will perceive the divine mystery in things. . . . And you will come at last to love the whole world with an all-embracing love.'[86] This is the direction in which Etty was moving, extending her love from her family, friends, and especially Spier to total strangers in desperate conditions. 'I want to be sent to all the camps that lie scattered over Europe, I want to be at every front, I don't ever want to be what they call "safe".'[87] Finally, her love took on an eucharistic aspect: 'I have broken my body like bread and shared it out among men. And why not, they were hungry and had gone without for so long.'[88]

Earlier I mentioned the voice of genocide. Surely in Etty Hillesum —'the thinking heart of the barracks', as she called herself[89]—we hear a quite different voice, speaking out for a very different, post-genocidal and universal picture for herself and the world. Her meditative spiritual style unites many of the strengths of western and eastern spiritualities. Her life is utterly secular and this-worldly, and yet she is not caught up in the genocidal way the world thinks since

she is able to bring meditative awareness into daily life. Out of her superior awareness there emerges a universal love that is not confined by the normal groupings which can drive us to murder. Henri Bergson thought that active mystics who undergo a 'metamorphosis' of love represent an evolutionary, creative energy that can transform humanity.[90] In Etty Hillesum I think there lived this creative force of the future which is a new way of being human and a new form of life.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. 'By "genocide" we mean the destruction for a nation or of an ethnic group.' Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1944, p. 79. Lemkin notes that he could have proposed 'ethnocide' just as well. Ibid. n. 1. As I use the term, mass killing is involved, and therefore slavery is not an example of genocide even though the culture of a people is destroyed. See also Kurt Jonassohn, 'What is Genocide?' in *Genocide Watch*, Helen Fein (ed.), Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992.

2. The former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, contrary to many accounts, were very different cases. For Yugoslavia, see Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging*, Noonday Press, New York, 1993. On Rwanda, Catherine Newbury, 'Background to Genocide in Rwanda,' *Issue*, 23:2, October 1995, 12-17. According to Newbury, '[f]ar from tribal warfare erupting in the vacuum created by the collapse of the state, genocide in Rwanda resulted from the machinations of state actors seeking to extend and consolidate their power', p. 16.

3. Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men* : Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, Harper Perennial, New York, 1993, p. 189.

4. Simone Weil, *Waiting for God*, trans. Emma Craufurd, Harper & Row, New York, 1973, p. 98.

5. Gilbert Ryle, 'On Forgetting the Difference between Right and Wrong', in *Essays in Moral Philosophy*, A.I. Melden (ed.), University of Washington, Seattle, 1958, p. 156.

6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, tr. Peter Winch, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984, p. 49.

7. Conversion may be broken down into various elements and there is some discussion about what these elements might be. See Donald L. Gelpi, S.J., 'Creating the Human: Theological Foundations for a Christian Humanistic Education,' *Horizons* 24, 1997, 50-72. For my purposes, no matter how this discussion turns out, the result of conversion must be that one's life has changed.

8. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, 2nd edn, Macmillan, New York, 1958, esp. para. 19, 23, 241 and p. 226. 'Form of Life' is a very broad notion in Wittgenstein, much broader than 'language-game', for instance. If genocidal thinking is as deep as I fear it is, then I think the conversion in question would qualify as a change in our

form of life. For the influence of Wittgenstein of Goethe's practice of 'morphology', see Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*, Free Press, New York, 1990, pp. 303-4 and 509.

9. Ibid., para. 225.

10. Ibid., para. 133.

11. Ibid., para. 115.

12. Bernard J.F. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, Longmans, Green and Co., London, p. 191.

13. Matthew 6:23. Revised Standard version.

14. Slavenka Krakulic, 'Woman Hide Behind a Wall of Silence', in *The Nation*, 1 March 1993, p. 270.

15. *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath*, Human Rights Watch, London, 1996, p. 43.

16. *The New York Times*, 13 June 1997, p. A3.

17. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kamf*, Reynal and Hitchcock, New York, 1939, p. 416.

18. *Slaughter Among Neighbours: The Political Origins of Communal Violence*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995, p. 14.

19. This is substantially Michael Ignatieff's 'civic nationalism' (versus 'ethnic nationalism') in *Blood and Belonging*, p. 6. Ignatieff emphasizes equality instead of liberty. I think that choosing liberty as the key idea draws a clearer contrast with tyranny in its many forms. In genocide a kind of equality is recognized ('you are all impure') but it is liberty that is entirely eliminated.

20. Michael Ignatieff, 'Nationalism and Narcissism of Minor Differences', *Lecture at the Open University*, October 1994, p. 9. See also his *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*, Noonday, New York, 1993. Bernard Lonergan, 'Practical intelligence necessitates classes and states, and no dialectic can promise their permanent disappearance', *Insight*, p. 238.

21. Ignatieff, 'Nationalism' and *Blood and Belonging*, pp. 21-8.

22. Vamik Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies*, Jason Aronson, Northvale, NJ, 1994. See also Vamik Volkan and Max Harris, 'The Psychodynamics of Ethnic Terrorism', *International Journal on Group Rights* 3, 1995, 145-59.

23. Ignatieff, 'Nationalism', p. 9.

24. Ibid., p. 5.

25. Ibid., p. 1. The word used was stronger than 'rubbish'.

26. Bette Denich, 'Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide', *American Ethnologist*, 21, 1994, 371.

27. For an interesting discussion of modern science as metonomy and William Blake's opposition to this development, see Stuart Peterfreund, 'Blake and the Ideology of the Natural, '*Eighteenth-Century Life* 18, February 1994, 92-110, and his 'Power Tropes', *New Orleans Review* 18, 1991, 27-35.

28. Hitler, *Mien Kampf*, p. 675.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., pp. 706 and 710-11. Hitler had a keen sense of responding to a crowd (see pp. 705-6), but this is not dialogue in the sense of a discussion which is devoted to the mutual seeking of the truth.

31. See Wittgenstein on reading a face (*Philosophical Investigations*, para. 537) and noticing aspects and 'seeing as' (pp. 193-214). See also Mary Warnock, *Imagination*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1976; and John Hick, *Problems of Religious Pluralism*, St. Martins, New York, 1985, ch. 2.

32. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, tr. Denis Paul, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, para. 140-4 and 94.

33. Of Course, many thousands of years ago children may have had different developmental histories ('Garden of Eden'), and thousands of years in the future things may be different once again. These 'forms of life' would be very different from ours.

34. Igantieff, p. 8. He takes the word from Hans Magnus Enzenberger. John Hick says that salvation should be thought of as a 'transition from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness'. *Religious Pluralism*, p. 86.

35. Ignatieff, p. 5.

36. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, para. 95.

37. *Shattered Lives*, pp. 74-5.

38. Deitrich Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, Eberhard Bethge (ed.), Collier, New York, 1972, p. 369.

39. Weil, *Waiting for God*, p. 99.

40. Ibid., p. 281. There is a kind of freedom from traditions here, which I take, by the way, to be characteristic of Buddha, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad. John Hick has recently supported a criteria for judging religions by appealing to 'basic moral consensus for all the great world faiths'. 'The Possibility of Religious Pluralism', *Rel. Stud.* 33, 1997, 164. In my opinion, some of the 'great world faiths'—if not all—have a consensus that genocide is permissible and even sometimes required. My moral appeal is not to historical data but to our own moral sense. I am saying that things must change—whether or not this perception is in accord with any religious tradition at all.

41. Ibid., p. 361; also, 'worldly' interpretation, p. 286.

42. Ibid., p. 381.

43. The sufferings of the Jewish victims is a Jewish problem, the actions of the killers is a Christian problem, according to Elie Wiesel in an interview with Ronald Eyre in 'Judaism: the Chosen People', *The Long Search*, Episode 7, Videocassette, Ambrose Video, 1977.

44. In the ideal sense, a state devoted in principle to individual liberty shares in *some* of the attributes of 'cosmopolis' as described by Lonergan in *Insight* when he says that it 'is neither class nor state' (p. 238), for a citizen's devotion to liberty is not simply equivalent to loyalty to any particular government of that state, and any such government has no legitimate purpose outside of liberty.

45. Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, p. 370.

46. Ibid., p. 300.

47. Ibid., p. 362. Cp. '[t]hat, I think, is faith; that is *metanoia*', p. 370.

48. Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 2nd edn. Herder and Herder, New York, 1973, p. 240.

49. Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, p. 382.

50. Ibid., pp. 376 and 381.

51. Ibid., p. 282.

52. Geffrey B. Kelly, *Liberating Faith: Bonhoeffer's Massage for Today*, Augsburg, Minneapolis, 1984, p. 158. See also Ruth Zerner's, 'The Legacy of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Hans von Dohnanyi', *International Bonhoeffer Society Newsletter* 63, February 1997, 8-11.

53. Ibid., p. 382.

54. The principle architect of this document, John Courtney Murray—himself having been previously silenced for his views on religious liberty and disinvited from attending the first session for Vatican II—says, understandably in the light of our present discussion, this was 'the most controversial document of the whole Council'. *The Documents of Vatican*, II, Walter M. Abbott (ed.), Guild Press, 1996, p. 673.

55. See Virgil P. Elizondo, *La Morenita: Evangelizer for the Americas*, TX : Mexican American Cultural Centre, San Antonio, 1980, chap. 3.

56. Virgil Elizondo, *The Future is Meztizo*, Crossroad, New York, 1992, p. 65.

57. Marcus Borg, *Jesus: A New Vision*, Harper Collins, San Francisco, 1991, p. 132. There are other parallels with the Jesus story, too. According to John Dominic Crossan, 'Easter Sunday lasted quite a few years'. *Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography*, Harper Collins, San Francisco, 1995, p. 190. The cult of Guadalupe, like the cult of the risen lord, did not form overnight. In both cases there was at first opposition and then a growing popular following, during which time the story (or stories) underwent considerable development. On the opposition to Guadalupe and neglect of Juan Diego, note Stafford Poole's comment: 'Why was there no move to canonize him? Obviously, because he was an Indian'. *Our Lady of Guadalupe*, University of Arizon Press, Tucson, 1995, p. 225.

58. Elizondo, *The Future is Meztizo*, p. 64.

59. Naturally, the Mexican nationalistic elements of Guadalupe are not particularly useful for a universal spirituality.

60. See Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, 2nd American edn.; Wilmot, WI: Lotus Light, 1990, ch. XX. Aurobindo insisted on the reality of the individual in an evolving cosmos and that 'rebirth of some kind' follows from this (p.756). Now Christianity does have 'rebirth of some kind' in the traditional ideas of earthy life, purgatory, and heaven. The difference has to do with repeated earth lives. If the future of humanity may be conceived of as a communion that is no longer based on physical existence—though perhaps 'bodily'—then it is not clear that rebirth must be in every case tied to physical existence, although it is through this physical condition that evolution proceeds at least during one period of cosmic history.

61. There is no suggestion here that *Christians* by and large actually understood this. It is possible, for instance, that the meaning of the incarnation was for the most part hidden to the great historical churches and that its post-genocidal understanding in the west awaited discovery by inspired non-conformist teachers such as George Fox and John Woolman. Should this be so, then John Hick's looking for 'historical information' for the uniqueness of Jesus and deciding that 'we lack the kind of evidence, touching every moment and aspect of Jesus' inner and outer life' as a solution to this *spiritual* issue about the uniqueness of Christ would be a 'category mistake'. That is, information might abound—indeed it did for many who personally knew Jesus)—and still the information might not be understood on account of a blindness on the part of the interpreters (as the author of the Fourth Gospel thought, for instance). See John Hick, 'The Non-Absoluteness of Christianity', in *The Myth of Christian Uniqueness*, John Hick and Paul F. Knitter (eds.), Orbis Books, Maryknoll, NY, 1987, p. 32.

62. Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, p. 1035.

63. Rudolf Steiner, *The Philosophy of Freedom: A Philosophy of Spiritual Activity*, tr. Rita Stebbing, Rudolf Steiner, London, 1988, p. 22.

64. By 'thought-being' I do not mean to exclude the elements of feeling and will: our thoughts have emotional values, our feelings have a conceptual component, and impulses to action are associated with both; and so genocidal actions are not far behind genocidal thoughts and feelings.

65. Sri Aurobindo, *The Divine Life*, p. 757. By 'involution' he means descent. On original sin, cp. D. M. Baillie: When persons put themselves in the center of the universe, 'it separates them both from God and from each other. . . . That is original sin'. *God Was in Christ*, Scribner's, New York, 1948, p. 204.

66. Steiner speaks of thinking's 'warm, luminous reality, which drives down into the world phenomena. This dividing down is done by a power that follows through the thinking activity itself—the power of spiritual love'. *The Philosophy of Freedom*, pp. 95-6. For a discussion of thinking in Steiner, see Georg Kuehlewind, *Stages of Consciousness*, trans. Maria St. Goar, Lindisfarne, Great Barrington, MA, 1984, and my 'Living Thinking', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* XI, 1994, 1-23.

67. It is true that 'struggling to overcome' is a problematic description since *fighting* egocenteredness is itself an egocentric attitude and is thus self-defeating. In spiritual practice under consideration here; 'attending to' in some form is what goes on. Nevertheless, for most for us on the lower rungs of the spiritual ladder, there is a definite struggle as awareness fades and normal consciousness reasserts itself and feels defeat.

68. Etty Hillesum, *An Interrupted Life: The Diaries of Etty Hillesum*, Washington Square, New York, 1984, p. 2.

69. Ibid., pp. 150, 28, 16 and 73-4.

70. Ibid., p. 27.

71. Ibid., p. 179. Thoreau was capable for prodigious meditative attending and he shares with Etty the metaphor for growth. Speaking of his contemplative first summer at Walden Pond, Thoreau said: 'I did not read books that first summer; I hoed beans. . . . Sometimes I sat in my sunny doorway from morning till noon . . . in undisturbed solitude and stillness. . . , until by the sin falling in by my best window, I was reminded for the lapse of time. . . . I grew in those seasons like corn in the night.' Henry David Thoreau, *Walden and Other Writings*, Bantam, New York, 1962, p. 188.

72. Ibid., p. 170.

73. In the east, as the old Zen story has it, when Master Ikkyu was asked to list the 'maxims of highest wisdom', he wrote one word: attention. Phillip Kapleau, *The Three Pillars of Zen*, Beacon, Boston, 1967, p. 10. According to William James *voluntary* attention is 'the very root of judgment, character, and will'. This is not an intellectual quality he warns. '[G]enius tends actually to prevent a man from acquiring habits of voluntary attention'. *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. I, Dover, New York, 1950, p. 424. Simone Weil says that 'prayer consists of attention' and that 'the development of the faculty of attention is the real object and almost the sole interest of studies'. *Waiting for God*, p. 105.

74. Bodhidharma, 'Treatise on No-Mind', trans. Urs App, *Eastern Buddhist*,

XXVIII (Spring 1995), p. 99. 'Just' and 'totally' are, of course, key words here. For beginners, the practice is simple but difficult; for the enlightened awareness happens of itself. As to meditative *attitude*, attention can be either inclusive or exclusive, and as to *content* that meditations may be either open or thematic (where a certain theme is selected). Exclusive concentration is more commonly advocated—in mantras, prayers, etc.—but in fact one can, e.g., inclusively attend to some themes, such as the breath. If the attention is inclusive and the content is open, then one has Krishnamurti's 'choiceless awareness'. If this awareness is carried over into daily life, then one has Bodhidharma's total awareness in all affairs—obviously a rare occurrence. Of Krishnamurti's many references to choiceless awareness, see his *Krishnamurti's Notebook*, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1976, p. 64: 'Meditation is this attention in which there is an awareness, without choice, of the movement for all things, the cawing of the crows . . ., a boy calling . . ., the feelings, the motives, the thoughts chasing each other and going deeper, the awareness of total consciousness. And in this attention, time . . . has become quiet and still. In this stillness there is an immeasurable, not comparable movement; a movement that has no being, that's the essence of bliss and death and life.'

75. Ibid., p. 101.

76. As David Bohm has noted, we not only live in habitual thoughts, but these thoughts form a controlling 'system' while *denying* their control of our lives: 'Thought runs you. Thought, however, gives the false information that you are running it.' *Thought as a System*, David Bohm Seminars, Ojai, CA, 1992, p. 5.

77. Hillesum, *Interrupted Life*, p. 136.

78. Ibid., p. 178.

79. Ibid., p. 135.

80. Ibid., p. 47. This 'passive' attitude is, of course, a *voluntary* attending and is therefore quite active.

81. Ibid., p. 198.

82. Ibid., pp. 101-2.

83. Ibid., p. 222.

84. Ibid., p. 223.

85. Ibid., p. 218.

86. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, tr. Constance Garnett, Barnes and Noble, New York, 1995, p. 296.

87. Hillesum, *Interrupted Life*, p. 234.

88. Ibid., p. 242.

89. Ibid., p. 209.

90. Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, tr. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Bereton, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1997, p. 235.

Samvād Niyama or Rules of Discourse

V. SHEKHAWAT

Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

Just as *vyākṛta vāgbhāṣā*[1] is governed by rules of linguistic usage, *vyākṛta*[2] *samvāda* is governed by rules of rational discourse upon systematic analysis of *prākṛta samvāda* and identification of fallacies (*samvāda doṣa*) so that any occurrence of fallacies in discourse may be avoided. Such discovery of rules[3] is absolutely indispensable for ensuring that *sthāpanā* is free from fallacies and *pratisthāpanā* or *pratiṣedha* as well as refutation of *pratisthāpanā* (*vipratiṣṣedha*) is just. A rule of discourse is essentially a rule for, firstly, guaranteeing the discourse and, secondly, to ensure that the discourse remains rational and free from fallacies. If these two criteria are not adequately met, the discourse would generally land into paradoxes and dilemmas. Thus, it is absolutely indispensable to have foreknowledge of likely fallacies and rules for avoiding them while constructing *rational* knowledge systems lest the systems land sooner or later into paradoxes. In this regard, indigeneous logic has considered many *types* of fallacies[4]—the ones of primary interest here are fallacies of reasoning (*yukti/vāda doṣa*) and fallacies of consistency of rational systems (*saṅgattā doṣa*). However, some fallacies of both types may be such that these are *unavoidable* in systematization of knowledge so that rules not for avoiding such fallacies but for not criticizing on grounds of such fallacies are required to be formulated. There are thus two kinds of rules: rules for avoiding the fallacies and admitting the criticism to be just in case these fallacies occur, and rules for barring the criticism on grounds of some fallacies that are unavoidable in discourse or in construction of knowledge systems as strings of *siddhāntas*. Further, some rules have been presented purely intuitively here while others have been rationally defended.

Now, since logic seeks only the conditions of *validity* of argument-units or proofs; or, of *consistency* of knowledge systems, we shall confine ourselves here only to rules that ensure these conditions. [As indicated, classical *Samvāda Śāstra* sought both the conditions of truth of propositions as well as conditions of validity of argument-units and

proofs (as also conditions of consistency of rational systems of knowledge)]. Since two kinds of conditions are quite mixed up in *Saṁvāda Śāstra* because, particularly, *anumāna* serves as a *model* for argument-units or proof, we shall have to separate these carefully while investigating the fallacies or paradoxes and the rules of discourse discovered in their light. In fact, we can classify these rules into three categories: *basic rules, rules of reasoning,* and *consistency rules.* Amongst these, some rules have to be accepted as common-sensical or on purely intuitive grounds, while others can be defended rationally. Further some rules have to be considered largely as fallacies which should never occur in reasoning or in knowledge systems, while some are to be understood as fallacies that must be guarded against by both the propounder and the critic; or, still others may be seen as unjust criticisms of the critic, since some fallacies are unavoidable in any knowledge system whatsoever, and therefore critic's knowledge system is also bound to suffer from these. Criticism on their basis, too, is unjust.

1. BASIC RULES OF DISCOURSE

These rules lay down fundamental conceptions of logical system, logical-All, truth, validity, proof/propounding and counter-proof/refutation. It is well known that *Sāṁkhya Siddhānta* first made a distinction between real (*sat*) and its complementary (*viparyay*) nonreal (*asat*) and held intuitively that *sat* remains *sat* and *asat* remains *asat* or *sat* can never *become asat* and *asat* can never produce (*utpāda*) *sat.* Any position contrary to this, shall be called by us fallacy Fb_1. Thus:

Rule One: *Sat* remains *sat* and *asat* remains *asat* and neither can *sat* become *asat* nor can *asat* produce *sat.*

The same *siddhānta* also held that there can be no entity which is at-once *sat* as well as *asat.* Any position contrary to this may be called fallacy Fb_2. Thus,

Rule Two: There can be no entity which is at once *sat* and *asat.*

The same system further held intuitively that either some entity can be said to be *sat* or it can be said to be *asat.* A position contrary to this may be called the fallacy Fb_3. Thus,

Rule Three: Either any entity can be *sat* or it can be *asat.*

Since a proposition either expresses *sat* as *sat* and *asat* as *asat* or it expresses *sat* as *asat* and *asat* as *sat,* this implies a distinction between propositions that can be either true or false. These rules therefore lay down a conception of two-valued logical system purely intuitively. Since *asat* is nothing or nonexistence like a horn of man (*nṛsṛṅga*), the question now is: how to clearly *demarcate all* that which is *sat?* This problem can be solved by defining a logical-All (*sarva*) in terms of the famous 'set of twenty-five' (*pañcaviśa gaṇa*) and admitting that although there is something in excess (*ādhikya*) of these but cannot be known/established logically. Vaiśeṣika Siddhānta subsequently demarcated this logical-All as the famous 'six reals' (*ṣaḍa padārtha*). (The terms *sat, vastu* and *padārtha* are treated as synonyms). Thus,

Rule Four: The 'set of twenty-five' or 'six reals' constitute *sat* and All (*sarva*).

[This limits the discourse only to All excluding anything whatsoever in excess of it]. Further it identifies the All with *sat,* for nothing can be said about *ādhikya* whether it is *sat* or *asat.* The problem that is to be settled now is: How can the All be known? This can be solved by appeal to most ordinary or commonsense experience (*loka/sahaj*). *Sāṁkhya Siddhānta* held that three and only three *pramāṇas,* which are *sahaj siddha* or *lokataḥ siddha,* would suffice for knowing All. However, this view was modified by logicians later including resemblance (*sādraśya/upamāna*) also as *pramāṇa* which was also accepted by Sāṁkhya theorizers as only a variety of *anumāna.* Thus,

Rule Five: Whatever evidential propositions (*hetu*) are required for *complete* knowledge of All can be generated by four and only four *pramāṇas.*

[Any position contrary to this will be called a fallacy, Fb_4.]

Rule Six: The excess or *ādhikya* can never be known by means of *pramāṇas.*

[The reason for this rule is that although *pramāṇa* is *lokatah siddha,* *ādhikya* is not *laukik,* therefore, *ādhikya* can never be established by *pramāṇas*]. In order to generate/establish new propositions from the ones obtained by means of *pramāṇas, siddha vākya*[5] or *siddha vākyarūpa* was conceived. It was argued that since *siddha vākyarūpa* generates understanding (*bobdhṛtva*) and situation of acceptance (*svikārya saṁsthiti*), one can validly establish new propositions by it. Any position contrary

to this may be said to lead to *yuktidoṣa*. Thus,

Rule Seven: Propositions can be discovered and/or established by *hetuvākya, dṛṣṭānta/udāharaṇa-vākya* and *upanayavākya* as premisses which thus suffice.

This general rule of discourse in fact involves several specific fallacies which need be avoided for ensuring valid *siddhavākyarūpa.* Thus, in a valid *siddhavākyarūpa,* similarity is established on ground of *sādharmya* and dissimilarity is established whenever *viparyay dharma* is possible. In all such cases 'There is *gotva,* therefore there is *go*' is the standard and its violation leads to fallacy.

Rule 7.1:   In establishing a conclusion on grounds of *sādharmya,* violation of the standard form is not allowed.

When one establishes dissimilarity on grounds of *vaidharmya* and counter-establishes similarity wherever *viparyay* of *vaidharmya* is possible, 'There is *gotva,* therefore there is *go*' is the standard and its violation leads to fallacy. Thus,

Rule 7.2:   In establishing a conclusion on grounds of *vaidharmya,* violation of the standard form is not allowed.

In a *siddharūpa,* diverse alternative *dṛṣṭāntas* are possible in establishing a conclusion because alternative similarities (*dharma vikalpa*) between *nigamana vākya* and *dṛṣṭāntas/udāharaṇa vākya*) are possible. This possibility must be ensured by a rule. Thus,

Rule 7.3:   When similarity is expressed in *upanayavākya* on grounds of even slight *sādharmya* and conclusion is derived, criticism on grounds of *vaidharmya* is unjust.

Rule 7.4:   *Dṛṣṭānta/udāharaṇa vākya* is justified on grounds of its ability to guarantee transitivity towards the conclusion and its criticism on grounds of some *vaidharmya* is unjust.

When for the predicate of *nigamanavākya* of a *siddharūpa,* the perceptual evidence is non-specific or the predicate of the conclusion can never be observationally established, there might arise fallacies in it which need be corrected instead of giving up the idea of *siddharūpa* itself as inadequate. This, then requires a rule:

Rule 7.5:   When fallacies in the *siddharūpa* arise due to non-specificity of perceptual evidence or non-observability

of predicate, their criticism is valid and need be corrected.

Rule 7.6:   Rejection of the idea of *siddharūpa* on grounds of fallacies arising due to non-specificity of perceptual evidence or non-observability of predicate in the conclusion, is unjust.

When we support a *hetuvākya* by a *dṛṣṭānta vākya* whether for proving a conclusion or for counter-proving it, the role of the latter may appear ambiguous. Thus, if the *hetuvākya* is clearly established by perception, there is hardly any need of a supporting *dṛṣṭāntavākya.* Moreover, in refutation, a counter-*dṛṣṭānta* plays the same role in establishing the counter-conclusion as a *dṛṣṭānta* does in establishing the original conclusion so that the idea of supporting *dṛṣṭānta* may be hardly said to be fruitful. But such suspicions about the logical role of *dṛṣṭānta/udāharaṇa* are unjustified for in situation of establishing a conclusion, it further illuminates the mind like seeking a less luminuous lamp with the help of more luminuous one and in situations of refutation also it plays a samilar role. Thus,

Rule 7.7:   Criticism of indispensability of *dṛṣṭāntavākya* in a *siddharūpa* on grounds of its ambiguous role is unjust.

In *Sāṁkhya Siddhānta,* it was held that if any position, whether intuitive or established in any alternative system of logic having alternative demarcation of All, implied a fallacy in violation of above rules or any other rule of discourse, then this situation would itself give rise to fallacy called *aniṣṭa prasaṅga* so that such a position cannot be acceptable. This requires a rule so that,

Rule Eight: Any position or counter-position implying a violation of rules of discourse cannot be acceptable in the system.

Nyāya Sūtra extended this idea further and added a further rule:

Rule Nine: Any position or counter-position that gives rise to a proper dilemma (*dvividhā*) cannot be acceptable in the system.

2. Rules of Reasoning

These rules are essentially the rules for propounding, criticism and defence of propositions so that these may be said to ensure the *validity* of reasoning given the concept of a *siddhavākyarūpa.* Thus, in these

rules, the structure of a *siddhavākyarūpa* or proof has been taken for granted. For example, one may though accept the above structure of proof and present a *hetuvākya* which apparently seems correct and true but is actually misleading. Similarly, one may present a *dṛṣṭānta* which seems apparently relevant but is actually misleading. These rules also assume a two-valued logic so that a proposition is either true or false, and it cannot be both true and false at the same time, otherwise it leads to fallacies. Moreover, only true *hetuvākya* is allowed so that when the premisses and the conclusion are claimed to be true, the *siddharūpa* is valid (*apadeśa*).

Now, what is proposed to be proved must be clearly stated with clear explication of meanings of its terms and relation obtaining between them for a subtle shift in the meanings or relation may change the meaning entirely leading to a fallacy called Fr_1. Thus,

Rule Ten: What is proposed to be proved must be categorically stated with clear meanings of terms of their relation.

One states the *hetuvākya* after stating the *pratijñā* and if the latter is opposed to or contradicts (*virodha*) the former than the fallacy, Fr_2 of *pratijñā virodha* arises. Thus, in order to avoid such fallacy,

Rule Eleven: Hetuvākya must be categorically stated and it must not contradict *pratijñā vākya*. After the *hetuvākya* is stated, one states the *dṛṣṭānta/udāharaṇavākya* which must be pertinent to the *hetuvākya* and must not have significant similarity with any possible counter-*dṛṣṭānta/udāharaṇa vākya*; such similarity (*pratidṛṣṭānta dharma*) leading to the fallacy, Fr_3. Thus, in order to avoid such fallacy.

Rule Twelve: Dṛṣṭānta/udāharaṇa vākya must be pertinent to *hetuvākya* as well as categorically different from any possible counter-*dṛṣṭānta/udāharaṇa*.

One may appear to state the *hetuvākya* categorically and yet it may be misleading. Such fallacy, called *hetvābhāsa*, is not easily detectable and *Nyāya Sūtra* has recorded five kinds of *hetvābhāsas*, namely *savyabhicāra, viruddha, prakaraṇasama, sādhyasama* (which was also called *siddha sādhana doṣa* in *Sāṁkhya Siddhānta*) and *kālātīta*. Thus, in order to avoid these fallacies,

Rule Thirteen: Hetuvākya must be entirely free from five kinds of *hetvābhāsas.*

The *hetuvākya* may have a very general and ambiguous meaning leading to a fallacy called Fr_4. Thus, to avboid such a fallacy.

Rule Fourteen: The *hetuvākya* must have clear and specified *uddeśya* term.

Sāṁkhya Siddhānta was very much committed to empirico-practical self-evidentness of *dṛṣṭānta* and refused to entertain any position which made this self-evidentness suspect, such as the Bauddha position of universal transience. After the analysis by Vaiśeṣika Siddhānta, however, this commitment to *lokavāda* or commonsense was abandoned and *udāharaṇa* instead of *dṛṣṭānta* was required only to be clearly demonstrable practically. Thus, the fallacy called *dṛṣṭānta asiddhi* by *Sāṁkhya Siddhānta* was not considered justly a fallacy.[6] However, the fallacy of *dṛṣṭānta ābhāsa* or *udāharaṇa ābhāsa* was considered legitimate in which the *dṛṣṭānta/udāharaṇa* appeared to be pertinent to *hetuvākya* and yet was not so. Thus, to avoid such fallacy,

Rule Fifteen: In *dṛṣṭānta/udāharaṇa vākya* the terms must have the same relation as the terms of *hetuvākya* have and it must lead to required equivalence or *sādharmya* in the *upanaya vākya.*

Sāṁkhya Siddhānta had also pointed out some very important fallacies of reasoning many of which concern specifically its knowledge system alone. However, some fallacies are quite general, such as *anyonyāśrayatva doṣa* which is the fallacy of vicious circle whereupon one seeks to prove 'q' by 'p', and 'p' by 'q'. Thus, in order to avoid this fallacy.

Rule Sixteen: When the *hetuvākya* of a *siddharūpa* itself calls for a proof, the conclusion must never occur as a premiss in such proof.

The fallacy of contradicting oneself is well known and was called by *Sāṁkhya Siddhānta, swavacovyāghāt doṣa*, that is, to hold that a certain proposition is true and subsequently, admitting some other proposition as true, to say that the former is false. Thus, to avoid such a fallacy,

Rule Seventeen: Svavacovyāghāt must never occur in one's reasoning.

The fallacy of infinite regress is known as *anavasthā doṣa* (Sāṁkhya) or *uttarottar prasaṅga* (Nyāya). Thus, if some position involves such

fallacy, it must never be embraced (except in situation of legitimate *saṁśaya*).

Rule Eighteen: A position or counter-position involving *uttarottara prasaṅga* must never be embraced, except in situations of scepsis proper.

3. CONSISTENCY RULES

Following the transition from Vedānta to Siddhānta inquiry, not only was the art of reasoning perfected but also the art of construction of rational systems of knowledge was perfected. This required not only clear formulation of basic rules of logical discourse but also criteria of truth, validity and consistency. With regards to the criteria of consistency of knowledge systems or *siddhānta tantras*, the systematizers seem to have followed the general rule that any proposition that is inconsistent with any definition (*lakṣaṇa*) or *siddhānta* or rules of discourse of the system cannot find *entry* in the knowledge-system. This, they seemed to ensure by the methods of *aniṣṭa prasaṅga* and *dvividhā*. These methods seemed to ensure that knowledge systems were consistent and free from paradoxes. However, it seems to have been well recognized in these systems that certain paradoxes/fallacies are unavoidable in knowledge systems and *none* can be free from these. If this is the situation, then to criticize a knowledge system on grounds of some fallacy with which one's own system suffers is itself unjust and therefore fallacious—a fallacy known a *matānujñā*. Similarly, if all knowledge-systems accept some cosmically universal principles such as *kāraṇatā, dharma, prayojana* etc., then such principles must not be contradicted as a rule in the process of systematization. *Sāṁkhya Siddhānta* even seemed to insist that commonsense or *sahaj* experiences of the *loka* themselves must be saved in theorization. However, this demand upon theoretical systems seemed rather unjust, particularly for Bauddhas. Consistency of knowledge systems was thus conceived purely in logical terms as, for example, by ensuring that a well proved proposition can attain the status of *siddhānta only* after undergoing criticism and response, or, for that matter, by ensuring that no proposition implying a fallacy can enter the knowledge-system. These methods of ensuring consistency therefore centered on the notion of fallacy and it was a matter of great significance for knowledge-systems to decide what exactly is a fallacy and what is not. Since the game of criticism and defence was pursued as a sport in

India of those days,[7] victory or defeat also depended on awareness of these fallacies so as to avoid these in one's own formualtions and to point these out in adversary's formulations. The sport in turn helped in mastering the art of theorization so that knowledge systems were perfected more and more leading to expulsion of fallacies/defects and attaining of greater consistency. It is in such a climate that alternative demarcations of logical-All and alternative conceptions of multivalued logics emerged particularly in Bauddha and Jaina trends. [It seems the parent, Ārṣa, trend gradually found it more and more difficult to cope up with this tide of innovations and thus turned more and more defensive!]

Now, *Nyāya Sūtra* presents a system of two-valued logic accepting both Sāṁkhya Siddhānta and Vaiśeṣika Siddhānta as fields of discourse. Sāṁkhya cosmology holds *prkrti* as *upādāna kāraṇa* of cosmos and *prkrti-puruṣa-saṁyoga* as *nimitta kāraṇa* of cosmos. Similarly, Vaiśeṣika cosmology holds *drvyas* as *samavāyi kāraṇa* of cosmos and *drvya saṁyoga* as *asamavāyi kāraṇa* of cosmos. Since both cosmologies admit the principle of *kāraṇatā*, one may ask: What is the cause of *prkrti* or of *drvyas*? Or, one may ask: What is the cause of *puruṣa-prkrti-saṁyoga* itself and *drvya-saṁyoga* itself? To answer the latter question, both the theories follow their own strategy: the former takes the cause to be what is called '*mahat uparāga*' and the latter puts the cause in 'cut-off realm' holding the cause to be *adrṣṭa kārita*. In answer to the former question, *Sāṁkhya* holds *prkrti* to be eternal and *akārya* yet being identifiable and characterizable therefore determinate. Vaiśeṣika holds *drvyas* to be eternal and *akārya*, therefore *pūrvotpanna*. But since *kārṇopapatti is* only for *utpanna* and not for *prāgutpanna*, or *pūrvotpanna* the principle of cause cannot be refuted and if such refutation is attempted, it is to be considered a fallacy, say Fc_1. Thus, we have a conditional rule,

Rule Nineteen: If kāraṇa is held to be *prāgutpanna*, then *kāraṇa pratiṣedha* is unjust.

Sāmānya is held to be real and permanent (*nitya*) or temporary (*anitya*) depending upon whether the similars have a permanent *sādharmya* or temporary *sādharmya*. Similarly, *drṣṭānta* is held to be empirico-practically self-evident. In the *siddharūpa*, we show *sādharmya* or *vaidharmya* of *hetu* and *drṣṭānta* in the *upanaya vākya* on grounds of *sāmānya*. If, then, any scepsis (*saṁśaya*) arises about *sādharmya*, it is illegitimate. If it arises about *vaidharmya* or both *sādharmya* as well as *vaidharmya*, it would imply a fallacy of extreme scepsis. Thus, in all

cases, scepsis is illegitimate and gives rise to fallacious criticism Fc_2. We thus have the rule,

Rule Twenty: Extreme skeptical criticism of *sāmānya* is unjust criticism.

In the process of criticism and defense, there obtains some common ground (*ubhaysādharmya*) between the two views without which there can be no dialogue. In knowledge-systematization, we assume an adversary and criticize our own position that we seek to establish which involves a fallacy of refuting one's own position. Yet since the view is actually criticized sooner or later, it is legitimate to criticize one's own position and yet establish it. Thus, the criticism on grounds of Fc_3 is illegitimate.

Rule Twenty-one: Criticism on grounds of Fc_3 is unjust criticism.

Sākṣātavādins or Vedāntavādins criticized *pramāṇa* on grounds of its nonprovability in present, past and future (*trikālasiddhi*). Since, however, if *pramāṇa* is *trikālasiddha* and since *hetu* is generated from *pramāṇa, hetu* too is *trikālasiddha.* But this involves the critic in self-contradiction since he is himself establishing his position on groungs of a *hetu,* and such fallacious criticism may be said to constitute Fc_4. Thus, we have the rule,

Rule Twenty-two: Criticism on grounds of Fc_4 is unjust criticism.

While establishing a knowledge-system, we consider only the *possible* criticisms of the critic which he may never make and think up some other criticisms. Moreover, as we consider the possible criticisms, we, for the time being, seem to abandon our own position involving ourselves in a fallacy of abandoning our own position. Since, however, the critic has not said anything (*anuktatva*), he could come up with any other possible criticism (*anaikāntikatva*). Because of this *anaikāntikatva* and abandoning of our own position we are unavoidably involved in a fallacy, say Fc_5, during knowledge-systematization. Since, however, this is unavoidable for all knowledge-systems without exception, criticism on its grounds will be unjust. Thus,

Rule Twenty-three: Criticism on grounds of Fc_5 is unjust criticism.

If we are all investigating the same one and universal (*aviśeṣa*) *dharma,* then not only ought there be something common between our views (*sadbhāvopapatti*) but also there ought not to be any difference in our view. This, however, leads to a fallacy of everything

being nonspecific or general which implies absence of any particulars at all. Since, however, in actual point of fact, we sometimes reach exactly the same conclusions as others do, sometimes this does not happen. Therefore criticism on grounds of above fallacy, Fc_6, is unjust and we have the rule,

Rule Twenty-four: Criticism on grounds of Fc_6 is non-criticism.

In the sister cosmologies such as Sāṁkhya Siddhānta and Vaiśeṣika Siddhānta, two different kinds of causes are propounded (*ubhay kāraṇopapatti*) such as *prkṛti* and *drvya,* the former being one and the latter ninefold. This sort of situation is apparently fallacious. Since, however, the cause of such propounding (*upapatti kāraṇa*) is itself well understood (*abhi-anujñāna*) by each within the knowledge system as a whole, criticism on grounds of such fallacy, say Fc_7, is non-criticism. Thus,

Rule Twenty-five: Criticism on grounds of Fc_7 is non-criticism.

When some cause is propounded, the critic argues for its absence (*abhāva*) and yet takes it to exist (*upalambha*) at least for purpose of criticism, giving rise to a fallacious situation. However, though different causes (*kāraṇāntar*) are propounded by systems, each does so for establishing *dharma* (*dharmopapatti*) so that criticism on grounds of above fallacy, Fc_8, is non-criticism. Thus,

Rule Twenty-six: Criticism on grounds of Fc_8 is non-criticism.

If, however, it is held that although the cause is there, it cannot be known/perceived (*anuplabdhi*), then it cannot be taken to exist and therefore proves its absence (*abhāvasiddhau*) leading again to a fallacious situation. The actual situation, however, is that since it is not taken to exist therefore it is not inferred (*anupalabdhi*). Thus, the above *hetu* is a non-*hetu* and there exists no fallacious situation, Fc_9.

Rule Twenty-seven: Criticism on grounds of Fc_9 is groundless criticism.

If we admit of *sādharmya* between different knowledge systems, this would imply *tulya dharmopapatti* which would in turn imply a fallacy of everything being transient. This sort of reasoning, however, itself involves a fallacy, say Fc_{10}, since by disproving knowledge systems on grounds of *sādharmya,* one disproves the criticism itself as transient, what is being disproved itself having *sādharmya.* Thus,

Rule Twenty-eight: Criticism on grounds of Fc_{10} is self-defeating.

Whatever is eternal (*nitya*) has *nityatva-upapatti* but since *anityabhāva* is itself *nitya,* this gives rise to a fallacy, Fc_{11}. However, if *anityabhāva* is *nitya* and gives rise to *nityatva upapatti,* then since what is to be disproved is *nitya,* the criticism becomes noncriticism. Thus,

Rule Twenty-nine: Criticism on grounds of Fc_{11} is non-criticism.

Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika cosmology present not only a theory of cosmos but also propound a *method* of knowing the cosmos and establishing the theory. The logical method is only one aspect of the method, the other being the methodology of *samādhi.* However, since there *can* be no one system of logic nor one methodology of *samādhi,* this gives rise to the problem of which method is truly adequate. However, when the method is propounded, only that method is defended; this, then, gives rise to a fallacious situation, Fc_{12}. But since different methods ensure the knowledge of only those causes which they uphold, deployment of a different method may not ensure the knowledge of a cause upheld in different theory. Thus a different method is a non-*hetu* if on its grounds a different cause is claimed to be known. Thus, all methods suffer from the same defect insofar as variant causes cannot be known by these and the criticism of any one method would be unjust. Thus,

Rule Thirty: Criticism on grounds of Fc_{12} is unjust criticism.

Sāṁkhya Siddhānta discovered many fallacies which would be implied by certain propositions if these are admitted as true. Most of these fallacies are relevant only to this specific knowledge-system but some are quite general so that if any proposition implied any of these fallacies, it would be inadmissible. We can, therefore, formulate rules vis-à-vis such fallacies in order to ensure consistency of knowledge-systems in general.

If a *siddhānta* has been established in the system, then no proposition that damages it can be admissible in the system and it is said to imply a fallacy called *siddhāntahāni.* Thus,

Rule Thirty-one: Any proposition implying *siddhāntahāni* is inadmissible in the system.

Any *siddhānta* established in any alternative or counter-system, cannot be admissible if it damages or is contrary to any *siddhānta* in the system. Thus,

Rule Thirty-two: Any *siddhānta* implying *apasiddhānta doṣa* is inadmissible in the system.

If any proposition contradicts any empirico-practically self-evident fact, then it is inadmissible. However, we can modify this condition as: if any proposition contradicts any practically demonstrated fact or *udāharaṇa,* then it gives rise to the fallacy called *dṛṣṭabādha prasakti* and is therefore inadmissible. Thus,

Rule Thirty-three: Any proposition leading to *dṛṣṭabādha prasakti* is inadmissible in the system.

If a system of knowledge explains satisfactorily the world of experience and remains well-grounded and well-established without hypothesizing any extra entities, then such entities must not be postulated and if done so give rise to a fallacy called *vastu kalpanā prasakti.* Thus,

Rule Thirty-four: Any proposition involving *vastu kalpanā prasakti* is inadmissible in the system.

The principle that there is some ultimate cause of the cosmos is called *ādhyakāraṇatā* and is admissible by all Indian cosmologies save one. If any proposition damages this principle, then it implies a fallacy called *ādhyakāraṇatāhāni,* and cannot be admissible. Thus,

Rule Thirty-five: Any proposition implying *ādhyakāraṇatāhāni* is inadmissible in the system.

If any proposition contradicts that which has been established by means of the accepted *pramāṇas,* then it implies a fallacy called *pramāṇavirodha prasaṅga* and is inadmissible. (If both the propositions are grounded in the same *pramāṇa* system, then *uttarottara prasaṅga* with be inevitable in discourse).

Rule Thirty-six: Any proposition implying *pramāṇavirodha prasaṅga* is inadmissible in the system.

If some illogical idea is accepted or postulated and then several propositions are deduced from it and these further established as *siddhāntas,* then this gives rise to a situation called *ayauktika saṁgrah* and the said idea or proposition is said to imply such fallacy. Thus,

Rule Thirty-seven: Any proposition implying *ayauktika saṁgrah doṣa* is inadmissible in the system.

Some propositions involve double fallacies so that if one tries to overcome one fallacy during defense, it gives rise to another, and if one tries to overcome the latter, then the former crops up. This is called *doṣadvaya prasakti*. Such propositions are inadmissible. Thus,

Rule Thirty-eight: Any proposition implying *doṣadvayaprasakti* is inadmissible in the system.

No two objects can exist in the same space at the same time and if any proposition implies such a situation, then it is said to imply a fallacy called *avyavasthā doṣa*. Thus,

Rule Thirty-nine: Any proposition implying *avyavasthādoṣa* is inadmissible in the system.

When we admit the principle of cause and effect, we admit that the cause transforms/disappears when it has given rise to the effect so that when the cause is perceived, the effect is not perceived and when the effect is perceived, the cause is no longer perceived. If, however, one upholds the absence (*abhāva*) of cause as well as effect, then one will affect double violation of the above implications and is said to imply *ubhaya vyabhicāra doṣa*. Thus,

Rule Forty: Any proposition implying *ubhaya vyabhicāradoṣa* is inadmissible in the system.

4. Now *prākṛta saṁvāda* occurs naturally without any explicit awareness of fallacies or inconsistencies or rules of discourse—just as *prākṛta bhāṣā* occurs naturally without any awareness of rules of grammar. However, as the idea of a rational discourse arises, we gradually become aware of fallacies and inconsistencies and thus seek to frame rules for a system of logic, for criteria of validity of reasoning, for criteria of truth of propositions, etc. The above rules have thus not been 'promulgated' arbitrarily but have been *discovered* by us by historical study of long process of *saṁvāda* and of systematization of knowledge. Adhering to such rules thus ensures the *saṁvāda* to be *vyākṛat* and our systems of knowledge to be rational and consistent. These then provide us a *grammar* of rational discourse.

It may be noticed here that Indian systematizers employed the method of *aniṣṭa prasaṅga* only for barring the entry of propositions in the system not for allowing such entry. Thus if an affirmative proposition implies a fallacy, it cannot enter the system. This they did because they had a system of *pramāṇas* for ensuring the entry of true and only true propositions in the system, as also they had a

method of *sthāpanā-pratisthāpanā* for generating new true and only true propositions from the ones obtained by *pramāṇas*. Greek geometrician Euclid, however, employed the method of *aniṣṭa prasaṅga* for *admitting* true propositions in the system. Thus, if any counter-affirmative proposition implies a fallacy, its counter-counter-affirmative, that is affirmative must be true and is admissible in the system. This is generally known as the 'method of indirect proof'. Euclid resorted to this method because he neither had any system of *pramāṇas* for generating true propositions nor any method of *sthāpanā-pratisthāpanā* for generating more new propositions from the given ones. The important question however is: Are we justified in employing *aniṣṭa prasaṅga* for *admitting* true propositions in the system? It seems we are not justified in doing this for in this method if an affirmative proposition does not imply a contradiction, it does not follow that its counter-affirmative is in fact true and therefore does imply any contradiction. Reasoning the other way, it follows that if a counter-affirmative does imply a contradiction, it does not follow that its affirmative does not imply any contradiction. Moreover, Indian theorizers employ only affirmative propositions as *pratijñās* so that all *siddhāntas* were by and large affirmative propositions, the counter-affirmative *pratijñā* was supposed to be employed by the critic. But Euclid did just the contrary; he began with a counter-affirmative *pratijñā*, refuted it himself and reached an affirmative conclusion, something that Indian theorizers would find difficult to comprehend!

The well-known 'paradoxes of Zeno' seemed to imnply that empirico-practically self-evident *dṛṣṭānta* is paradoxical at the root since what, for example, is always known to move empirically, is found upon logical analysis to be static at every instant of time. This even has implications for *pratyakṣa* as a *pramāṇa*. However, if we examine Zeno's paradoxes of motion, then the two well known ones seem to say this: (*i*) the proposition 'Arrow is moving' implies *sarvasthairya prasaṅga*, therefore the arrow cannot be moving; (*ii*) the proposition 'Arrow is hitting the target' implies *sarva ananta prasaṅga*, therefore the arrow cannot be hitting the target. Both the criticisms are self-defeating for if everything is static then Zeno's argument is also static and is therefore a non-argument, and if everything takes infinite time to reach a destination, then his argument would also take an infinite time to reach a conclusion and is therefore not *yet* an argument! This analysis of Zeno's paradoxes provides us a general method of resolving paradoxes: These arise when some proposition implies a fallacy and are resolved when the whole argument itself is shown to involve some fallacy.

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The above examples make it amply clear how important it is to have clear rules of discourse and above all to stick to these so as to avoid pitfalls and traps of discourse as also to make our knowledge-systems consistent and fallacy-free as far as human reason permits whether in the fold of a two-valued logic or of non-two-valued logics.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The term *vāgbhāṣā* is employed for distinguishing spoken language from symbolic language.
2. The term means discovering rules *underlying* natural rational discourse.
3. Although we have gained insights regarding most of these rules from *Sāṁkhya Sūtra* of Kapila, *Nyāya Sūtra* of Akśapāda and *Ānvīkśiki* of Gautam (as presented in Vimāna Sthāna of *Caraka Saṁhitā*), we for the moment, refrain from any reference to these texts. This strategy is being adopted for the simple reason that we, for the moment, want to avoid any controversy regarding textual interpretation and would take up the task of translating these texts (with focus on their logical worth) in near future with necessary technical assistance. In marked contrast with the approach of Greco-European scholars, who generally welcome and appreciate new/novel interpretations and understanding of, say, Zeno or Euclid or Aristotle, Indian experts on our *sūtras* generally show negative approach to such innovations and rush for the cover of *bhāṣyas* or dig trenches in the relatively safe field of technicalities of Saṁskṛt language. The *bhāṣyas* are, however, utterly unreliable, if not corrupt, as has been repeatedly shown by eminent scholars (e.g. the works of Brahmadutta Jijñāsu, Yudhiṣthir Mimānsaka, or even of Swāmi Dayānanda). We thus own these rules of discourse as *our* discovery and would defend these on their own grounds if and when some inspired critics undertake to refute these.
4. These can be classified as *lakṣaṇa doṣa, pramāṇa doṣa, yukti doṣa* and *saṅgattā doṣa.*
5. The structure of *siddha vākya* is of great significance for proper understanding of indigenous logic and thus a key to uncovering the structure of *sūtras* in knowledge-systems themselves. V. Shekhawat, *JICPR,* 13(2), 1996.
6. V. Shekhawat, *JICPR,* 13(2), 1996.
7. The rules of reasoning as presented in *Nyāya Sūtra* may be understood in the light of this fact, since some of these rules appear too strict to us today. See Nigrahasthāna Prakaraṇa of *Nyāya Sūtra.* [This gives rise to a general problem: if philosophy is a sport what are its rules?]

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Imaging Time in Music
Langer's View and Hindustani Rhythm

S.K. SAXENA
2/81, Roop Nagar, Delhi-110007

Of the many features that distinguish Hindustani (or North Indian) music, two may be said to be pre-eminent: *ālāpa* of the *dhruvapada*-singer and a very complex system of cyclic rhythm. *Ālāpa* is a kind of *singing.* But it is not accompanied by drumming. Nor does it avail of language. So it is a clear challenge to those who believe that only instrumental music can be pure in the sense of being quite non-representational. But our rhythm too is distinctive. Its material is not beats alone, but *bol-s* or mnemonic syllables which are not (meaningful) words, but mere letters or their collocations. *Ālāpa* can evoke very deep, even elevating effects. Rhythm, on the other hand, is important not only because it serves as 'accompaniment' to the bulk of our music and dance, but because it is a vital means of composition in these arts.

'Composition' may here be taken in two senses: the act of creating *or* of disposing material artistically. If not quite sharply, the two senses can be distinguished with ease, because whereas 'to create' is commonly taken to mean the process of bringing something *new* into being, disposition of details in the way of art signifies, in the main, some *winsome* arrangement which can be quite various. Such arrangement, which may tickle our senses and feeling for design or at least give an edge to percipience, is a norm for the *khayāl*-singer's *taans* (or beaded patterns) as well; and so it would be wrong to think that *sthāyi* (or the first line of the song) is the only instance of composition in Hindustani music.

Yet, we may note, if *composition* is taken in the sense of 'setting in order' or 'disposing artistically'—and if the disposition in question is interpreted as integration of *all* the basic constituents of a work of art—a *sthāyi* must be regarded as a composition in a richer sense than a mere *taan.* It is true that a *taan* is not expected to stray from the *rāga* (or melody-type) being presented; and that it is also required, though it may not always be able, to observe a more or less dominant

relation to the basic rhythm as marked by the drummer. Yet it cannot be said to concretize or explicate the *rāga* and the *tāla* (rhythm-cycle) as identifiably as a good *sthāyi* normally does. The reason is that , quite unlike many *taans,* a *sthāyi* (as a rule) appears to be framed, quite visibly, as a self-completing passage and *as enclosed in a single round of the rhythm-cycle,* in addition to being quite in accord with the set form of the chosen *rāga.* Rhythm is indeed a vital source of the overall charm of Indian music. On the other hand, Langer has written on rhythm pretty thoughtfully and at fair length. So it should be interesting to see how her view compares with the practice of rhythm in Hindustani music.

Langer believes that, like every other art, rhythm too is *a symbolic projection of life as felt.* But this looks odd to us. In our country solo expositions of rhythm by seasoned drummers are still welcome to trained audiences, and this is so because, by and large, rhythm is taken to be appealing in itself, and not by virtue for any relatedness to objects or happenings in the everyday world or to contents of inner, personal life. Yet, because she nowhere speaks of rhythm as an *imitation* of some detail of life, and distinguishes *symbolic projection,* her own preferred concept for relating art to feeling, pretty sharply from direct representation, Langer's entire thinking on the subject calls for a careful study before any judgement is passed on its net value. One may even say that her view of rhythm is distinctive not only because of its positive emphases, but also by the virtue of the way she opposes the commonly accepted notions of this art. However, the angle from which I propose to consider her account cannot be very wide; it has to be very specific, or that of *Hindustani* (or North Indian) rhythm; for only with this genre of rhythm can I claim to be truly familiar and still actively concerned.[1] This is going to be a clear limitation of this essay; but it is luckily set off, if in part, by the fact that quite a few concepts and general features for Hindustani rhythm are also to be found in the way the art is understood and practised in south India.

I also feel encouraged by the fact that—though, of course, in its own way—Hindustani rhythm utilizes almost all the individual appearances of rhythm in the various arts; and that it is easy to illustrate the point. In music, in its basic form of *lāya* or aesthetic pace, rhythm appears as regulation of abidance at the chosen notes, as also by way of a quick or leisurely passage across different *swaras;* and in poetry, as arrangement of words into more or less regular sequence of stressed/unstressed or long and short syllables. The arts of painting, sculpture and architecture utilize rhythm in the following different

ways: harmonious or balanced employment of lines, colours, figures, and volumes; interactive sequence of masses and voids; and adroit alternation of light with shade. Now, temporal analogues of these devices are all clearly seen in our art of rhythm. Variations of pace and accent; alternation of brief and crisp segments of syllables with ones that seem to elongate themselves majestically; and a deft punctuation of collocated *bols* with pauses that do not appear to divide the pattern, but only idealize its unity by prompting the *rasika* (and the drummer himself) to visualize where exactly the (sounding) playing is to resume,—these are all common features of our experience of listening to a recital of rhythm. But the *overriding* features that determine our rhythm as norms are not the ones that Langer emphasizes, namely, 'mutual conditioning' and the build-up and release of tension. I would rather pick articulate form, *regulated pace,* and accentuation as the main determinants of creative work in our rhythm. By 'articulate', I mean 'relatedness of syllables which yet retain a measure of self-existence'; and by 'regulated', not all along 'changeless' but only 'actively controlled with an eye to aptness and lucidity of both form and flow'.

However, before I turn to bring out the differences that separate Langer's view of rhythm from the way this art is practised in the field of Hindustani music, it would obviously help if the essentials of Hindustani rhythm are outlined quite simply. Incidentally, if it be taken to mean a measured and organized number of *mātrās* (or beats)—that is, as a *tāla—rhythm* is not really the fundamental temporal concept of Indian music; that place can only be given to *laya. Laya* is aesthetic pace or duration which may either be regulated and measured/identified with the help of beats including some accented ones; or, as in the case of the *ālāpa* by a *dhruvapda-*singer, only by his individual aesthetic sense, and with an eye to some specific effect or proper unfoldment of the *rāga* chosen for treatment. So to speak of *laya* is, however, a bit too succinct; and I think it needful to clarify what I have just said.

First, *laya* signifies not only the pace at which the musician moves from one note or rhythmic syllable (or segment) to another, but the length of time (or duration) he invests in singing a *swara* or melodic phrase, or in playing a bunch of *bols* (or syllables) of rhythm. As sheer pace, *laya* has to keep itself steadfast, unwavering; that is, unless the drummer himself intends to quicken or decelerate it, the present tempo should not undergo any change. But, on purpose, it can surely be made to move leisurely (*vilambit* or adagio), nimbly (*drut* or

allegro), or very fast (that is, *atidrut*). Yet, once any one of these paces has been taken, it has to be kept as such, quite without wavering for some time, that is, until a further change is wilfully desired. So, to borrow a concept from Langer's writing on rhythm, *vilambit, drut,* and *atidrut* (slow, quick, and very quick) are distinct *phases* in the flow of the *laya*. They are no mere marks in a monotonous stretch, but accents that determine the look of music variously. Even a minimal rise in its *laya* can make a composition appear to bloom. As regulated duration, *laya* indeed contributes to the quality of music in quite a few striking ways. If the singer just marks the *taar shadj* (upper tonic) gently and tunefully, but *for a mere moment,* the note may appear to twinkle starrily. And if he lets his voice tarry at the note in question as a thin, but sweet and steadfast utterance, it may feel like a breath of bliss. Further, how long the singer dwells at a particular note is, in general, also a vital determinant of the grammatical rightness of the *rāga* being sung. A leisurely projection of the note *re* in *rāga pūriyā* would be a clear deviation from the *rāga's* requisite form.

If it be contended, here, that whatever I have just said about *laya* does not relate to *rhythm* as such, and so is irrelevant to the subject of this essay, my answer would be threefold. First, even if it is taken in the familiar sense of (regular) recurrence of beats, rhythm would not be itself if the beats it comprises do not follow one another at *even* pace. In other words, *laya* is the requisite underrunning evenness of rhythm; and, therefore, to talk of *laya* is no way to abjure, but only to refer to the very essence of rhythm. Second, in *dhruvapada*-singing, which is a venerable, if not very popular form of classical Hindustani music today, the traditionally accepted forms of rhythmic variations, such as *ārh, kuvārh* which do not (in principle) cause any violence to the verbal meaning of the composition, are called types of *laya*, not of *tāla* or rhythm. Thirdly, *laya* not only signifies something which is the very essence of rhythm (that is, evenness of pace) but relates to a very distinct and important temporal idiom to which the word rhythm or *tāla* is generally not applied. My reference here, is to *jāti*. We commonly speak of *jātis* of *laya*, not of *jātis* of rhythm or *tāla*.

A *jāti* is simply a distinct kind of *flow*, distinguished by the number of beats it comprises and the location of its emphases. *Tāla* or rhythm, on the other hand, is (in Hindustani music) necessarily a *cycle* with a focal beat, called the *sama*. It sets out from and lapses back to the first beat, making this beat appear central and itself as completing a round. No such focus or cyclic quality is to be seen in a *jāti*.

But there is one other distinguishing feature of *laya* and *tāla* (or

rhythm) as against *laya*. The beats of a rhythm-cycle, and the strokes that make the regular patterns played across and within the cycle, are all roughly similar in sound to the *bols*—or utterable syllables, may be a single letter or a bunch of letters, but all alike meaningless—that may be said to name the elements of drumming. This is why whatever is played at the drums, be it a cycle or a rhythmic pattern, is foreknown to the drummer and can be recited by him. The only exception to this parity of playing and openness to recitation is provided by those improvised flourishes with which a seasoned drummer may choose to relieve his set playing. However, the point to be noted here is that Hindustani rhythm as actually played (as a solo recital) is subject to a double orientation. It has to arrive at the *sama* recurringly, and with split-second accuracy; *and* it has to conform to the design and details of the pattern (or the cycle) as remembered and recitable. In other words, it is all along an intentional blend of overt act and parallel ideation.

To conclude, the place of rhythm in Hindustani music is multirole. It makes for determinateness of the pace of singing or playing, and for variety in the look of notes or phrases as they appear to contemplation; helps in accuracy of *rāga*-rendering; makes the basic composition appear self-complet*ing*; and serves (in its cyclic form) as the ground of numberless collocations of *swara* and changes of pace, thereby making them appear orderly or patterns, and not mere variations. Rhythm in Indian music is surely not a mere paving of the way for what is to come.

II. THE AUTONOMY OF (HINDUSTANI) RHYTHM

But, one may ask, is it proper to focus on rhythm *as such* in the face of contemporary practice, in western aesthetics, of looking on it as but an element of music? Can rhythm fairly claim to be an independent art? My answer is, yes; but I know many a *rasika* would hesitate to agree with me. For, even in India today, rhythm is presented and admired mostly as 'accompaniment'; and a lay listener would perhaps question the view that rhythm is autonomous. But, I may point out, it is also a fact that in our main music conferences even today a *solo* rhythmic recital may well be the main draw of an entire session of music.[1a] In fact, in India it has ever been so. Sculpture, in the West, had to shake off subservience to architecture. Painting too had to win its freedom from representation. In the case of our rhythm, on the other hand, it is the heightened emphasis on *accompaniment* that

may be said to be a recent development. The primal test for the skill of the drummer for us has ever been his capacity for *solo* playing.

The musicologist may protest by pointing to our well-known integrative word: *sangeet.* It certainly covers both music (vocal, instrumental) and dance, *and does not omit rhythm.* How then is rhythm independent? My reply here is that if the same word is used for many things, they are not thereby prevented from functioning severally. To illustrate, though they all come under *sangeet,* there is, in fact, no dancing or drumming with *ālāpa* of the *dhruvapada*-singer, nor any singing with the *tatkār*[2] of a Kathak dancer; and so far as rhythm is concerned, it is not only true to *say* that it can be independent, but quite easy to *explain* this possibility.

The cyclic quality of our basic rhythm (or the *thekā*)[3] at once favours the suggestion of wholeness. If the unique manner of the cycle has been properly 'established';[4] if, what is more, the accents neither seem to tug the flow nor appear blurred in its running unity; and if the playing is also possessed of a measure of euphonic charm,— say, by virtue of proper tuning of the right drum, and also because of the 'blended' use of the two drums that the *tablā* comprises[5]—the rhythm as heard can not only appear to run because of its own *inner impetus,* but hold attention, happily, in utter abstraction from everyday concerns. It is indeed quite easy for a duly played cycle to wear the look of what Dewey calls '*an* experience', that is, *an* experience which appears to stand out as a distinct wholeness.[6]

But the independence of rhythm as an art can be argued also by appealing to aesthetic theory. Langer proposes that an art may be taken to be autonomous if it is seen to have its own materials, its 'peculiar primary creation', and its own creative principles.[7] Our rhythm, I believe, meets all these requirements adequately; but the point obviously calls for some explanation in detail.

A. Consider, to begin with, *the material of rhythm.* It is doubtless distinctive; what it comprises is mere letters or meaningless bunches of letters, like *tā, dhā, tin, dhin* (ता, धा, तिन, धिन); and the drummer's task is to produce their rough parallels on the drums. As thus replicated, they do not appear unmusical to the ear, but they mark only one or two notes of the scale. Their function is to make us identify the actual sounds produced, and their beauty arises as much from the design of their collocation as from their clear execution.

Now it is possible to hold that because of this uniqueness of its material, rhythm is not only distinctive but *important* among the arts.

One may here build upon Herbert Read's way of arguing for the pre-eminence of *music:*

> . . . almost in music alone, it is possible for the artist to appeal to his audience directly, without the intervention of a medium of communication in common use for other purposes. The architect must express himself in buildings which have utilitarian purpose. The poet must use words which are bandied about in the daily give-and-take of conversation.[8]

But if, as argued in the above extract, the rank of an art is to be judged by considering if its medium is *not at all* used for 'other (non-aesthetic) purposes', rhythm, I believe, should be given a place higher than music; for, whereas musical notes are in fact sweetly employed, say, by some hawkers in their typical cries, or by some bells to chime the hour pleasantly—purposes which are both clearly utilitarian—the mnemonic syllables (or *bols*) of rhythm are never employed for any non-aesthetic purpose.

Nor do they refer to anything external. A good rhythmic recital is quite non-representational. Yet because of the excellence of its own inner organization and articulateness, it can be so absorbing that it may induce in knowledgeable listeners a state of self-forgetfulness and attune them in *tādātmya*[9] with the variform, winged beauty of rhythm. Of course, if he is so decides, the drummer *can* produce syllables that *resemble* everyday sounds and familiar happenings, such as the movement and the noise of a train as it steams out and gathers speed; but whenever this is attempted, those who know the *art* of rhythm only feel amused. Our rhythm is indeed very true to the ideal of 'pure' art.

Here, I may add, it would be wrong to contend that rhythm *as played* represents or 'imitates' syllables (*bols*) *as recited* or contemplated; and that rhythm is, therefore, not free from subservience to the external. For, merely as it occurs in speech, writing or thought, a *bol* is nothing self-complete. It is meant to be played, and it receives the supplement it intrinsically needs when it is reproduced on the drums. Therefore when they are played, the *bols* may not be said to be imitated by, but only incorporated in rhythm, like words in poetry.

B. Nor can rhythm be said to lack a 'primary creation' of its own. Such 'creation', here, is *an automotive and articulate symmetry of pure pace.* It is *primary* because, as Langer would like us to say, it is always created in an exposition of rhythm.[10] The other key words in my

formulation of rhythm's primary creation may be explained as follows:

By 'symmetry' I mean beauty of form. Everything in the region of rhythm is indeed required to seem well-organized and shapely. This is true for both the basic rhythmic-cycle and the patterns that are woven across and (ultimately) within it. As for the epithet *articulate*, I think it is truer of our rhythm than of any other art. Langer emphasizes it in the context of music. I recall that 'a composition', according to her, 'is not merely produced by mixture like a new colour made by mixing paints but is articulated, i.e., its internal structure is given in our perception'. Here, the parts, she adds, 'maintain some degree of separate existence'.[11] But this is not categorically true of form as it obtains in Hindustani music, where it is often *meends* or glides that serve to bring out the organic form of the *rāga* and the composition chosen. The notes which a *meend* comprises are just not seen to have a measure of *separate* existence, though they sure remain *distinguishable* to the discriminating ear. Further, in *ālāpa* on the *veenā* an important aesthetic excellence is often a winsome stilling of individual notes into, rather than an affirmation of their separateness from, their immediate neighbours in the *rāga* or tonal scheme.[12]

In the region of rhythm, on the other hand, articulation is always the key requirement. Here, even in the case of such patterns as a *relā* or a *rau*, which are all meant to be presented at a quick pace, we insist on the clarity of syllables,—consistently, of course, with the requisite measure of fluency. The ideal indeed is to see that the *bols* are 'cut out' so as to keep off fuzziness. This detail of manner is called *bol kātnā* and playing which quite meets the requirement is called *khushkhat* (खुशखत). The syllable 'dir, dir', as played at a fast pace, may seem to be an exception to this general rule; but it is not really so; for, the effect aimed at is one of *tremulous* fluency, *and the palpitation is not to be allowed to get quite eclipsed in the flow.* This, indeed, is why the old masters would be averse, as a rule, to playing at hectic speed[13] where the syllables are bedimmed and come to appear as a mere flowing lump.

Its *automotive* character is another important feature of our rhythm. What I mean by this emphasis is not merely that rhythm *somehow* appears to be self-propelling, but that the length or brevity of the very first syllable or beat as played or recited[14]—or its own temporal extent—directly determines whether the entire subsequent playing is to be leisurely or brisk. In *parhant* (or recitation of *bols*) it is in fact quite easy to see the point that if one utters the first beat slowly—in the manner of a drawl—the entire subsequent counting has to be

just as leisurely; and that if the same beat is then spoken sharply and briefly, the following beats too have to be quickened correspondingly. I wonder if we can anywhere find a more obvious instance of determination of the whole-form by the character of a part. And this is, I may add, a *clearer* indication of the 'autonomous form' of rhythm than Langer's following remark on some records of African music in which the constructive power of the drum is paramount: '... Anyone familiar with many works of that sort would probably feel their structure and mood almost from the opening beat.'[15]

C. The automotive symmetry of pure pace is, however, not the only 'illusion' that distinguishes rhythm. It evokes some 'secondary illusions' too, as all 'advanced artistic creations' do, according to Langer.[16] But before an attempt is made to trace such illusions in the play of rhythm, it seems necessary to bring out how exactly she distinguishes between primary and secondary illusions.

A primary illusion, she says, is not that which the artist makes *before* everything else—for (say, in painting) 'it comes *with* the lines and colours, [and] not before them'—but that which is '*always* created', like virtual space in painting.[17] Further, this basic illusion 'remains steady', complete and all but imperceptible because of its ubiquity'.[18] Now, all that is clearly true of what I have spoken of as the primary illusion of rhythm. As already explained, the automotive symmetry of pace is the evenness or constancy of tempo as determined by the length or brevity of the very first rhythmic syllable as played or recited; and this evenness, I may add, gains an added look of symmetry by virtue of its being framed as a cycle—in the form of a *thekā*. Further, the symmetry or temporal evenness in question arises *along with*, and surely not *before*, the playing of the first syllable. What is more, in so far as this evenness of *laya*, as kept and projected by the *thekā*, persists as a largely visualized background throughout the recital —that is, even during the playing of patterns which may dominate attention because of their variform and striking design—it is only occasionally that the equable pace of the *thekā* is *expressly* noticed, though the *rasika* surely remembers it all along, if subduedly. Secondary illusions, on the other hand, 'arise and dissolve again'.[19] Two clear instances of such illusions are 'the sudden impression of colour in music, or of eloquence in the lines of a statue ... [both making for] a sublimation of the expressive form'.[20]

In the practice of rhythm too such illusions—or semblances which are quite unlike the look of a merely steady pace—freely arise. There

are patterns that seem to make for, and flower at the *sama*, and also such as appear to deviate designedly from the focal beat, without really losing sight of it.

These two 'illusions' may be called, respectively, the rhythm of orientation and the rhythm of intentional abandon or willed waywardness. They are 'illusions' in the sense that they only appear to be, but are surely not actual cases of goal-directed endeavour or wilful waywardness that impart a little zest or relaxation to daily living. Yet both are real features of our aesthetic experience of rhythm. For this reason, and also because they have been generally ignored by writers on rhythm,[21] not excepting Langer who too speaks *only* of the setting up and release of tension—and of continuity and repetition—where she discusses rhythm.[22] I think it necessary to comment on them at length.

The rhythm of orientation

When a drummer plays a well-designed pattern of *bols* it often happens that, from a particular point in its flowing yet articulate form, it appears to rouse and gather itself by way of reaching the *sama*, and finally climaxes at the focal beat in due of fulfilment, so to say, of its own inner impulse. The *sama* here appears as the destiny of a clearly oriented rhythmic flow. I wonder if any other art can provide clear*er* instances of the linkage of a structural focus with its immediately preceding oriented context.

Here it would be relevant to point out that, as is (according to Langer) requisite for any art that claims to be independent, rhythm too can be credited with some criteria that relate to it uniquely. One of these is the drummer's capacity for a 'blended' employment of the two drums. The reference here is obviously to *tablā* which comprises two drums; but it needs some explanation. The point is that each drum has its own share to contribute to the total playing. The 'left' drum is meant to work up effects of a certain breathing continuity (called *sāns*), and of depth and inwardness; and the 'right' one contributes crispness, discreteness or clarity, a measure of tonal sweetness, and fluency. The requirement is that (at least) in the actual projection of the rhythm-cycle the use of the two drums be duly coordinated, so that the total playing may neither appear to be a mere succession of disconnected sounds, due to undue dominance of 'the right one', nor a mere booming loudness because of overmuch use of the left, but (positively) a mellow, flowing round wherein the

details occur gently, without being blurred in resonances of 'the left'. Another requirement which relates to rhythm alone is the drummer's ability to come back to the *sama* with split second accuracy.[22]

This (second) criterion, I believe, is more clearly usable than standards that relate to evaluation in the field of other arts. Two critics, equally competent and watchful, may find it difficult to decide whether a piece of music is properly structured or expressive. But two listeners, who have but a fair knowledge of rhythm, are almost bound to agree as to whether or not the drummer has reached the first beat accurately. For them it is as easy a matter as it is for us to mark that a person has arrived on the dot.

The rhythm of abandon

Some patterns are so knit and played that they end a little after or before the *sama*. The deviation is here willed; and is demanded by a little economy or ebullience of structure itself. Here, the *sama* is slightly overstepped or just not attained; but it is heightened in idea by the very design of refusing to end the playing exactly *at* the beat. A *part*[23] of this artifice may not seem new to those who are familiar, say, with the art of poetry. It is indeed common knowledge that inspired artistic content may, so to say, spill over the bounds of prefixed extent, and thereby vivify 'form' as internal structure by its very incompliance. See, for instance, the following from an eminent writer on poetry:

> Form does not lie simply in the correct observance of rules. It lies in the struggle of certain living material to achieve itself within a pattern. The very refusal of a poet to sacrifice what he means to a perfectly correct rhyme, for example, can more powerfully suggest the rhyme than correctness itself would.[24]

But, I believe, it is not *so* easy to realize the other half of the matter,—that is, the truth that our awareness of 'form' may be heightened even by the act of falling a little daintily *short* of the normal stretch, in intentional response to the structural demand of a specially designed pattern. Yet this is exactly what is done by our patterns that are made to end a little before the *sama*.[25] As a rough parallel, one may perhaps here refer to a detail of Rodin's artistic practice. It is said that once he had succeeded in finding the precise kinetic touch in a figure or in a bust, he would often stop and leave, say, the hands or feet literally unfinished; and yet without any harm to the seeming self-completeness of the work as contemplated, may be because of the operation of the Gestalt law of coercive design.

The rhythm of simultaneity

But the better known rhythm—and surely easier to follow—is that of
simultaneity. I have here in mind the kind of rhythm that *distinguishes*
the drummer's art of providing 'accompaniment' to the main
performer, say, a *sitār* player. This is the rhythm of similarity, or parallel
flow, and of coextension and unitive advent. The reference is to a
very skilful kind of *sangat*[26] (or accompaniment). Where the music
seeks to dally with rhythm, the drummer may seize forthwith the
manner (*andāz*) of the *sitārist*; and, without ever slackening his hold
over the cycle, may so adapt his own playing to that of the main
performer that the two flowing forms may seem to be a quite free
confluence, and finish at the *sama* with well-nigh perfect simultaneity.
Here, *what* syllables the drummer plays is not the basic thing; and
what counts, I repeat, is only his unerring grasp and replication of
the *manner* of the music. The instant of jointly reaching the *sama*
satisfies not in detachedness, but largely because it consummates a
flowing *design*; and the net effect, because of confluent form and
rhythmic turns, is one of intertwining.[27]

This rhythm too, I may add, is nameable as a 'secondary illusion',
—an 'illusion' because the drumming in such cases is not *strictly*
simultaneous with the playing of the main performer. The drummer
often lags a little, but the lag, where it occurs, is so slight that it hardly
strikes us, and the semblance of a conjoint run is not at all ruffled.
And, of course, as is all along implicit in Langer's talk about the virtual
in art, the semblance of simultaneity is here created artistically; and
its perception is at once some notice of design or manner. In everyday
cases, on the other hand, simultaneity is rarely brought about
intentionally. It just happens, as when two runners breast the tape at
exactly the same moment. What is more, in such cases we are struck
essentially by the moment of simultaneous occurrence, not by the
approach that leads upto it.

Creative devices

Rhythm may also be said to have its own '*principles of constructing* its
final creations';[28] and, in the context of Hindustani rhythm, these
'creations' may be taken to mean not merely the basic structure of a
pattern, but the variations it permits. The point may be illustrated by
considering the case of what is called *quāyedā* by our *tablā*-players.

A *quāyedā* truly is what it means as a word—a very methodical

composition in respect of both conception and practice. First, it is
named after the main *bol* (or syllable) which occurs freely and
prominently in its individual structure. Second, though every *quāyedā*
admits of a fair number of variations—which is why the legendary
Ustad Natthu Khan of Delhi could develop a single such pattern into
an hour-long recital—such freedom is by no means absolute. No *paltā*
(or variation) can include a syllable (a *bol*) which does not figure in
the basic composition. Thirdly, the variations must follow a particular
sequence. The first variant has to build upon the opening *bol* of the
composition; the next one, upon the second *bol*; and so on. What is
more, the terminal syllable of the two segments (of the basic
composition) have to rhyme, without being identical. Thus, if the
last *bol* of the first segment is *tinākinā*, the *bol* which closes the second
segment has to be *dhināginā*.

This technical device is called *quāfiā radeef*, and is roughly
comparable to end-rhymes in poetry.[28a] If it be objected, here, that if
everything is so prefixed in the playing of *quāyedā*, it cannot really
provide for creativity, the answer would be, first, that though every
variation has to open with a specific *bol*, what exactly the alteration is
going to be in respect of pace and order of syllables, without
incorporating any such *bol* as is alien to the basic structure of the
quāyedā, surely calls for some independent, if disciplined thinking
on the drummer's part; and, second, that in the art of drumming,
improvization cannot be rated higher than design and clarity in the
actual playing of syllables.

I may add that in the making of rhythm one also finds a free use
of the Gestalt laws of perception, such as those of figure and ground
and common destiny. But what I wish to focus on, in this context, is
another constructional device which is at once basic to, and perhaps
distinctive of the Indian art of rhythm. This is the act of so filling a
stretch of some beats, or the duration *between* two separate beats, with
orderly bunches of *bols* that the playing gets invested with the *spatial
suggestions of teeming, or appearing crowded or even overflowing* with them.
A syllable so inserted may even come to look as a wedge holding the
neighbouring ones apart. On the whole, the richer and the more
orderly the placement of *bols* within a narrow interval of time, the
greater is the title of the drummer to acclaim, provided, of course,
the *bols* are also neatly and truly played. From the viewpoint of this
particular feature of the drummer's craft, our rhythm may well be
regarded as an aesthetic demonstration of the divisibility of time.

III. LANGER ON RHYTHM

Now that enough has been said by way of arguing that, even from the viewpoint of Langer's conception of what makes an art autonomous, Hindustani rhythm may be regarded as an independent art too, and that it is therefore proper to consider our rhythm in relation to Langer's aesthetics, I may proceed straight to consider what exactly *she* has to say on the subject.

A. *Negative emphases*

To begin with Langer's negative emphases in respect of rhythm, they may be briefly put as follows, along with some argument from my side:

It is commonly believed in scientific thinking that the essential character of rhythm is the repetition of any distinct, recognizable event at equal intervals of time, i.e., that is, rhythm is periodic repetition. But, in fact, not all rhythmic repetitions are strictly periodic. There may even be rhythmic sequences of events which are not really repetitive; for instance, a performer of 'modern dance' rarely repeats a movement, yet every least motion of the dance has to be rhythmic[29]

in the sense, *we* may add, that in the economy of the whole number every step or bestirring of the limbs leads to, or makes for the one that follows.

Recurrence of identical units at equal intervals is, of course, what we commonly understand by rhythm—at least in the case of drumming which builds upon beats or *mātrās*. But such periodic repetition cannot be taken as the *essence* of rhythmicity taken generally, though it may well be regarded as a key structural principle of music. Consider, for instance, the ticking of a clock. It is repetitious and regular; and the ticks are mostly identical. But it cannot be regarded as rhythmic in itself. Why *I* say so (supporting Langer) can be brought out with the help of two simple examples. If fifty stone slabs, all similar in shape and size, are put on the roadside at equal distance from one another, we may well be struck by the appearance of order and similarity, but nobody will call the entire arrangement rhythmic. Even regularity of succession *in time* may not be said to be the essence of rhythm. Day and night follow each other with unfailing regularity, but nobody takes this alternation as a case of rhythm. The point really is that in cases of mere regularity of succession—that is, where there

is no dynamic *interplay* of elements or processes—the mind must enter into, and do some active ordering in respect of *what is presented to it* before the presentation can come to appear and be regarded as rhythmic. Thus, if in the process of counting, one chooses to group every four adjacent numbers ideally as one, and to utter the opening number of every segment a little emphatically, the process will at once come to wear the look of rhythm. So there *is* truth in Langer's remark that the ticks of a clock come to appear rhythmic only when 'the human mind organizes them into a temporal form'.[30] By themselves, indeed, features like similarity and repetition are not enough to produce the appearance of rhythmicity.

Nor are these features *always* there in what seems to be rhythmic. Consider, for example, the case of a talk that impresses the listeners with its rhythmic quality. Obviously, it cannot be a succession of segments of equal extent, all comprising words of similar sounds. In such cases, the pace is indeed not even all along. Nor are the sound, extent, and meaning of words used similar. The truth here rather is that phrases, emphases, and even single pauses are all so organized that the present utterance (or pause) makes us *look forward to what is to come next*; and that the complex of succeeding words satisfies the expectation. Similarly, what is invariably present in every rhythmic pattern is that, by virtue of its own pace, the very opening syllable generates in our minds the expectation that, by and large, a definite tempo will be kept; and that occasional increase or deceleration of pace will be duly redeemed, so as to save it from appearing as a positive infringement of the basic, overall requirement, namely, *laya* or evenness of pace. Where the reparation is not duly done, rhythm disappears forthwith.

B. *Langer's positive views*

The way is now paved to consider Langer's positive account of rhythm. Here, perhaps the most striking detail is her thesis that rhythm is 'related to *function* rather than to time'.[31] Function, as we know, is a (potential) activity appropriate to a person or thing. An activity is a happening or an event. As a process in time, it has a beginning and an end; and a 'rhythmic pattern arises whenever the completion of one distinct event appears as the beginning of another'.[32] Langer is indeed emphatic on this point. In *Feeling and Form* she openly declares that the *essence* of rhythm is the preparation of a new event by the ending of a previous one;[33] and in support of this view, she cites quite

a few illustrations:

> The classic example is the swinging of a pendulum. The momentum of its drop drives the weight upward in the opposite direction, and builds up the potential energy that will bring it down again; and so the first swing prepares the second swing; the second swing was actually begun in the first one; and similarly, after that, each swing is prepared by the one before. The result is a rhythmic series.

> Or, consider the breaking of waves in a steady surf on a beach; the momentum of the water drives it up the beach, until that momentum is spent, and the slant of the shore causes the water to run seaward again; but the piling of the second, incoming wave is also sucking back the spent water, and making its return a downward rush, that stops the bottom part of the new wave and causes it to break over itself. Here, again, is a rhythmic pattern. The completion of each breaker's history is already the beginning of the next one's.

> In a living organism . . . the most obvious rhythmic processes are, of course, heartbeat and breath. In the heart, every systole starts a diastole, and vice versa. . . . In breathing, . . . as the oxygen of a breath is used up, it builds up the imperative need of oxygen that is really the beginning of the new breath. This sort of mutual conditioning is the law of organic function. . . . In every cell, the very process of its oxidation—its burning away, breaking down— is the condition that has already started the chemical change which builds up its characteristic substance again . . . [Rhythm is really] a functional involvement of successive events . . . [and] periodic rhythms [are only] a special sort (of rhythm).[34]

Now, I have nothing to say about the first two examples. But, in the third extract, Langer's account of instances from *organic* life appears to contain some clear errors. Where she characterizes the swinging of the pendulum and of 'the breaking of the waves in a steady surf on the beach' as rhythmic, her meaning professedly is that each movement is not only prepared by the one before, but makes for the one that follows. This is also why, in her view, heartbeat is a rhythmic process; 'every systole starts a diastole, and *vice versa*'. But, we may note, though the two physiological events are definitely cyclic in recurrence, so that one necessarily starts after (or before) the other, neither can be said to give rise to the other *straightaway*. Systole and

diastole are quite disparate haemodynamic events; the former is a positive action brought about by the pacemaker and the latter is a rather passive, relaxed state of the heart. Each one of them *ends* before the other one begins; so neither can be said to directly start the other. What is more, according to clinical pathology of the heart, there may even be a very brief interval between systole and diastole, a kind of refractory period during which the heart remains quite still. This stillness can even be felt as a sinking sensation of the heart when the refractory period becomes a little longer (than it usually is) because of extra systoles.

Again, it is *not* the consumption (or being 'used up') of the oxygen *of a breath* that 'builds up the imperative need of oxygen that is really the beginning of a new breath'. The need in question relates rather to the metabolic requirements of the body cells and tissues; and though it is undeniably imperative, the need varies from time to time. Langer's explanation of the way two breaths are related is further invalidated by a simple, verifiable fact. As in a heart attack or cerebral stroke, a dying tissue may simply perish *after consuming* the last available amount of oxygen *without* creating any need for a fresh supply of oxygen.

It is also wrong to speak of the oxidation or 'burning away, breaking down' *of cells*. Only the nutrients in a cell—such as carbo-hydrates, fats, and proteins—are burnt out, the first two completely, and the third one partly, to yield energy for cellular activity. Cells and their structural contents (organelles) certainly age and eventually die, but they are never oxidized or burnt away in the sense of getting metabolized. Incidentally, the term *oxidation* is used only for chemicals (and biochemicals) some of which are also to be found in cells. Finally, it is too sweeping to speak of '*mutual* conditioning [as] *the law* of organic function'. A major process like secretion of enzymes (and hormones) operates only as a *one-sided response*, so to say, to a need. Unlike the heart beat, it does not work ceaselessly. The sight or smell of food may well bring about a secretion of saliva containing an enzyme, but the secretion in question does not obviously bring about the presence of food. Again, there is nothing rhythmic—in the sense of 'mutual conditioning'—about the working of the brain and organs of sense-perception. When a person wishes to raise his hand, a motor impulse from the brain/spinal cord may readily bring about the desired movement; but all this is occasional, not periodic in a regular way. And, to be sure, the raised hand may not directly cause any further motor impulse. Barring, of course, the heart, most of the bodily

organs—like the liver, stomach, and kidney—work by way of uni-directional response to some need or stimulus, and not as a mutual conditioning of stimulus and response.

However, inaccuracies such as these[35] need not disturb us; for what Langer here wishes to emphasize—namely, the point that rhythm is importantly, (if not exclusively) 'a functional involvement of successive events'[35]—is surely relevant to a considerable amount of art; and so we cannot ignore it. Even in drumming, practised in India (I repeat) also as an independent art, the completion of one rhythmic phrase is freely seen to make for what follows, quite directly. Langer's overall writing on rhythm, however, makes some other points as well; and to make our study of the matter adequate to her total view, we may discuss them all individually, along with some recall, where necessary, of what we have already noted.

a. Rhythm is essentially a matter of function, not of time. In organic life, as also in nature, rhythm is to be found as the 'mutual condi-tioning'[36] of processes, movements, or events; or as 'the preparation of a new event by the ending of a previous one'.[37] The mind too, 'even in its highest operations . . . follows the organic rhythm which is the source of vital unity: the building up of a new dynamic *Gestalt* in the very process of a former one's passing away'.[38]

Now, the reason why rhythm cannot be regarded as, in essence, a matter of periodic succession has already been discussed earlier. But a little clarification is surely demanded by some other points in (a part of) Langer's view just stated. Is (a) the *mutual* conditioning of processes exactly the same thing as (b) 'the preparation of a new event by the ending of a previous one'? We can hardly say, yes. For, where as (a) may well be regarded as signifying a kind of cyclic rhythm—a clear instance, here, being the twosome of the inhalation and exhalation which determine *each other*—(b) can be merely serial and ever onward, that is, quite without a determination of the antecedent by the successor. Which of the two may be said to be Langer's overtopping emphasis? I cannot say, *mutual* conditioning, specially if we look at the matter from the viewpoint of rhythm as it appears *in the arts*. Langer, I believe, opts for the 'serial' view where she says that everything that *prepares a future* creates a rhythm';[39] that the rhythm of destiny is the feeling or appearance that the future is already an entity 'embryonic in the present'[40]—which is obviously quite different from the thought that the future too determines the present; and that the tragic rhythm is '*the deathward advance of* . . . [our] individual lives . . . which has a series of stations that are *not repeated*: growth,

maturity, decline'. Tragedy, she adds, 'is a cadential [not cyclic] form. Its crisis is always the turn towards an absolute close'.[41] In all such cases the rhythm involved is clearly not cyclic. The difference is heightened by what Langer has to say on rhythm as dialectic. Where, as in the case of repetitive playing of a rhythm-cycle, the successor is 'a replica of the predecessor', which is 'often' [but not necessarily] the case;[42] and where '*each* element in spending itself prepares and initiates its own converse', such as a rise making for a fall, or suction pressing for expulsion—rhythm may be said to be dialectic.[43] This means that, according to Langer, cyclic or dialectic rhythm represents only a form of rhythm, and not its very essence.

But, to turn anew to the opening formulation (in *a*) of the points being discussed, how can the higher workings of mind be said to bear out Langer's basic thesis in respect of rhythm? I may answer thus, largely following Langer's own line of thinking.

Suppose, after a look at the works of art which are commonly admired because they seem to move us readily—to tears or laughter, or to open acclamation—we arrive at the unifying view that art is the powerful expression or transmission *and evocation* of *emotions*. Suppose, further, that thereafter our attention is invited to acknowledged works of art which are *non*-representational in character and which, like the whole of our classical instrumental music, charm us essentially by virtue of their formal organization or some other striking quality—such as sparkling fluency, clarity of utterance or steadfastness in *vilambit* playing or observance of *laya* (or even pace) generally. Attention to such cases may well impel us to reject our first general-ization about art. But in the very dissolution of this *gestalt* (or whole-view) we may be moving towards an alternative view, say, the view that art is 'expressive' in the sense of giving utterance not only to the commonly recognized emotions of joy and sorrow, fear and jealousy, but even to such details of felt life as excitement, vitality, langour, and repose; or to a third simpler view that, quite without any essential relatedness to human emotions, art is just the creative aesthetic embodiment of some meaning that emerges only when the work is completed.

It must, however, be added that transition to 'alternative views' will actually take place not automatically, but only if we try to remove, by means of more careful thinking, our dissatisfaction with the first view. The 'highest symbolic operations' of which Langer speaks in this context have all to be kept up *by us*; but, of course, because of its very felt quality, the (unsatisfactory) *gestalt* of the first view

may also be said to press for its own transcendence by a more adequate view, and so to generate a kind of tension, as Langer would like to say.

b. Rhythms, like the one of self-correcting, evermore embracive thinking that we just visualized are, however, not the 'fundamental' ones. The latter, according to Langer, are those processes of mutual conditioning that regulate the organic function; they may be called 'fundamental' or 'major' because if they are 'greatly disturbed, or suspended for more than a few seconds, the organism collapses, life stops'.[44] It is because of the ceaseless operation of these basic rhythms that life, as a process of remaining active and suffering diverse experiences, feels one and undivided.[45] This unity does not stand in need of any proof; for it is felt, and feeling—as direct, irresistible experience—is 'the intaglio image of reality'.[46] But in the higher organisms, 'secondary rhythms (also) develop, [these are] specialized responses to the surrounding world, tensions and their resolutions within the system; emotions, desires, attentive perception, and action'.[47] In organic life at lower level, three of the many *subsidiary* rhythms that Langer takes pains to distinguish are those of successive individuations,[48] contraction and expansion[49] and induction and inhibition.[50] She points to these three kinds of rhythm where she speaks of some cases of colonies of coelenterates, mutilated organisms and organs of cell types. But in so far as her ultimate aim in citing such instances is to show that it is the symbolic projection of these very rhythms of life that makes *art* significant, it would be quite proper if, instead of dwelling upon the details of the cases referred to, we straightaway turned to see if the three rhythms we just have spoken of are to be found in the region of art as well.

Now, I see it clearly that they all operate in rhythm considered as a distinct art in itself. But the rhythm of successive individuations—which in the case of some coelenterates, is *necessary to preserve life of the stock*[51] is important quite *differently in the art of drumming*; here it often brings out the room that the ambit of a single rhythm-cycle offers for endless creative work, so impressively indeed in the case of a top class drummer that he is himself awestruck, at times, by the illimitableness in question; and therefore generally prefers to focus, in his solo playing, essentially on *one tāla* throughout his career. The patterns woven across the rhythm-cycle—and also, in a way, *within* it, for they have (as a rule) to end at *its* focal beat—are all 'individual' in the sense that they appear to be *self-complete, and are no more fragments*; and in case the form of the cycle has been properly established at the very

outset, they strike us as its own individuations, and not as merely imposed on it, because they all appear to the *rasikas* as welling up from within its intrinsic, determinate pace and compass. Here, however, I may also refer to a detail of Hindustani rhythm which may seem to—but does not really—counteract what I have just said about the individuality or wholeness of patterns. What is called a *tukhrā* in the region of *tablā*-playing is admittedly an extraction from some elaborate collocation of *pakhāwaj*[51a] *bols*; but it is yet saved from appearing fragmentary by adding to it, as a suffix, a *tiyā* or threefold rhythmic phrase which generally suggests completion.[51b]

The rhythm of contraction and expansion too is to be freely seen in the practice of Hindustani rhythm. Consider, for instance, the following piece from an *anāgat* pattern which begins from the off-beat (in *tritāla*):

धिननन नागेतिट कड़्धेत धातिट घेघेतिट घेघेनातिट
9 13 1

गद्दी धिड़ान नागेतिट किड़ान
5 9

Here the bols कड़्धेत धातिट show a little contraction; for, धातिट comes after कड़्धेत very quickly, almost impatiently. On the other hand, the relatively sedate नातिट, धिड़ान and किड़ान look like a little loosening or expansion of syllabic filling.

To turn, in the end, to the rhythm of induction and inhibition, it may be said to operate in the rhythm-cycle itself. But let me explain. The *thekā* (or the cycle as played) induces the grounding of the basic pace by virtue of the temporal character of its very first beat. But, at the same time, it may also be said to inhibit, first, its own run by coming back to that beat, the *sama*; and secondly, the course of the patterns too, because they are (as a rule) required to end (ultimately) at *its* focal beat, failing which they fall into immediate error.

c. Such rhythms are quite various, and are often the explicit objects of attention as we contemplate art. But, according to Langer, reflection on art itself requires us to pay due heed to the rhythms in *life* as well; for it is, she believes, only by projecting these rhythms that art acquires its distinctive significance. Now, 'life' may be taken in two basic senses: first as 'the characteristic functioning of organisms', or as what is 'opposed to death'; and, second, as what happens, or as 'what the organism encounters and has to contend with'.[52] In both these senses life may be said to be characterized by rhythm. Indeed, besides the fundamental rhythms of organic function that we have already spoken of, the rhythm that may be regarded as basic to man's *existence* as an animal is

the strain of maintaining a vital balance amid the alien and impartial chances of the world, complicated and heightened by passionate desires. The pure sense of life springs from that basic rhythm, and varies from the composed well-being of sleep to intensity of spasm, rage, or ecstasy[53] . . . As comedy presents the vital rhythm of self-consummation . . . [The tragic rhythm is] the deathward advance of . . . [our] individual lives . . .[a passage] towards an absolute close. This form reflects the basic structure of personal life, and therewith of feeling when life is viewed as a whole.[54]

d. Now, what really concerns us here, in respect of Langer's views given above, is not the validity of the way she relates tragedy and comedy to human life, but how exactly the diverse instances she cites of organic function and man's existence, and the literary genres of tragedy and comedy can all be said to be cases of rhythm. This, in turn, demands that we focus anew on the basic question of this essay. What exactly is rhythm, in life and in art? Here, two of Langer's unambiguous answers that we have already touched are as follows:

a. The essence of rhythm is the preparation of a new event by the ending of the pervious one.[55]

b. The essence of rhythm is the alternation of tensions building upto a new crisis, and the ebbing away in a graduated course of relaxation whereby a new build-up of tension is prepared and driven to the next crisis, which necessitates the next cadence.[56]

Now, either definition assumes that rhythm is matter of function (see: 'building up', 'preparation of', in the two definitions just cited). This is, in fact, a view which Langer reiterates in her works. But if the emphasis is admitted, how can one speak of the literally moveless rhythm of colours in a painting? This, however, is not the only point that I wish to press against the definitions. My protest is fuller, and I may put it thus:

The first definition, claiming (like the second) to seize the essence of rhythm, does not use the word *tension* at all. Therefore, it may be said to be quite relevant to the cases of rhythm as mutual conditioning said to be quite relevant to the cases of rhythm as mutual conditioning which Langer cites in *Problems of Art*—say, 'the swinging of a pendulum' and 'the breaking of waves in a steady surf on a beach'—in respect of which she herself uses the word *momentum*, not *tension*. And the preference is warranted; for, *none* of the acknowledged meanings of *tension*, namely, the following

stretching, a pulling strain, stretched and strained state, strain generally (or, formerly, pressure in gases or vapour), electro-motive force; a state of barely suppressed emotion, as excitement, suspense, anxiety or hostility,

is really applicable to the cases of mutual conditioning just listed. But, if it is so, if no tension may be said to be there in instances of rhythm which Langer here cites, how can *b*. which defines rhythm in terms of *tension* be said to hold?

Further, if (as *b'*. requires us to do) rhythm be defined as a *cycle* (see: 'alternation') of 'tension-crisis-ebbing away (or cadence)-another tension-crisis-cadence', and so on, how can the deathward (or towards a *final* or 'absolute close')[57] advance of individual lives be regarded as making for tragic *rhythm*. The second definition (*b'*.) is indeed not true to the practice of Hindustani rhythm. Here, as far as the *thekā* is concerned, there is (ordinarily) no building up of a tension, nor any 'ebbing away in a graduated course of relaxation. . . .' Artistic form is here secured only by an evenness of pace and clear and 'blended' execution of the constituent syllables of the *thekā* besides, of course, a consistently accurate marking of the *sama*. The language in which a well played *thekā* is commonly acclaimed is roughly as follows:

वाह! क्या ठेका क़ायम किया है! दायें-बायें का वज़न भी बराबर है

In the first segment of such applause, the reference is to evenness of pace; and in the second, to a skilfully balanced employment of the two drums. And, to turn to the various *patterns* in which a solo exposition of rhythm abounds, though some kind of tension may well seem to be built up, at times, in the manner of their gaining access to the *sama*, what follows the attainment of *sama* or the completion of the pattern—is surely no 'ebbing away in a *graduated* course of relaxation', but a prompt return to the *thekā* as it was before the pattern began.

A few other details are suspect in Langer's view of the rhythm, if we look at it all from the viewpoint of Hindustani rhythm. Traces of tension, I admit, are surely to be found at places in our rhythm as practised and as contemplated. In fact, one important feature of our rhythmic system is that (as pointed out earlier) if we are used to contemplating rhythm as art, the pace at which the very first *bol* is played or uttered, makes us *expect* —may be, a little *tensely*—that the subsequent pace too will be sharp or leisurely according to how the first *bol* has been projected. Further, though the evenness of pace (or *laya*) is admittedly a basic requirement, what is admired as a mark of

special technical excellence is not this steadiness in itself, but the ability to keep it even when the sitar or *sarod* player executes patterns of 'wanton heed and giddy cunning', or when the drummer himself plays a pattern which does not go haywire in *laya* in spite of the incorporation of a phrase or syllable that deviates purposely from the basic *laya*. In either case, we may note, a kind of gentle *pull* is created, and even felt, between the normal tempo and the moments of wilful deviation. Yet it seems to me that the emphasis which Langer puts on the build-up and release of *tension* is a little overdone. When a *thekā*, which is the ground of our rhythm, has been properly established as a measured extent of even and articulate pace, it seems to move on effortlessly—of its own impulse, so to say. Nor does the *rasika* here see any tension. Rather, as an easy exercise of imaginative concurrence, he just feels swayed and lulled into sweet acquiescence by the self-completing rhythmic flow. Our experience here is one of effortless following, not of any strain or pressure at all.

Consider, next, a detail of Langer's protest against the commonly held view that rhythm is a matter of periodic succession. As a rebuttal of this view, she points to a matter of fact. A tennis player's motions may well 'impress one as rhythmic—[even though] he does not repeat a single action'; and, what is more, he may well be less metrical in his step than 'a drunkard man walking'.[58] Langer would like us to believe that in such cases we may see rhythm only because every movement of the player at once paves the way to the next. But I do not think that her reasoning here is supported by the evidence of fact. The most easily identified locus of rhythm in tennis is a long rally comprising (seemingly) effortless and flowing strokes unruffled by jerky movements. If a movement prepares the way to the next, *but with sudden and manifest effort*—say, by way of a leap to counter a lob, or as a dive for scooping a drop shot—the playing is likely to seem acrobatic rather than rhythmic; and if some may yet prefer to call it *rhythmic* it will only be because the return turns out to be a winner, in which case the appellation will relate to the adequacy of effort *as a whole* to the attainment and not really to the conduciveness of just *one step* to another.

And in the context of architecture and painting, the inaptness of Langer's view is perhaps even *more manifest*. No one can deny the presence of rhythm in every art. As Otto Baensch points out,

> rhythm not only dominates music and poetry, but also, in a wider sense, architecture, sculpture, and painting: the bigger part of a space is heavier than the smaller, one spatial form, whether linear

> or plane, weightier, more striking, or stronger in character than another; colours, also, are distinguished from various points of view for greatly varied impressiveness. . . . If, therefore, we want to define rhythm in general, we have to say: rhythm is the alteration between heavy (stressed) and light (unstressed or less stressed) parts, in so far as it follows certain rules.[59]

Now there is no doubt that we freely speak of the rhythm *of colours*. But our meaning, here, simply is that they seem to go well together; and it would be very odd if, using Langer's language, some one chose to say that in the case in question every colour (as perceived) *is an event that paves the way to the next.*

I hasten to add, however, that the generalization on rhythm by Otto Baensch which I have just cited itself seems questionable. It cannot be said to cover *every* instance of rhythm. But let me explain:

The basis of north Indian rhythm, we have seen, is *thekā* or the rhythm-cycle. The structure of this cycle is admittedly a blend of *khāli* and *bhari*, or the unstressed and the stressed beats, the *sama* always being the focal point of emphasis. But though this structure is, of course, the foundation on which the entire edifice of our rhythm stands, it is not aesthetically the most satisfying feature of the practice of this art. Much more admirable is the infinite variety of patterned ways in which a good drummer can gain access to the *sama*. Such access surely heightens the look of the *sama*-beat too, partly because it is reached with split second accuracy; but our delight here, we may note, relates to the whole manner of gaining access to the *sama*, instead of being confined to this beat as played; and the distribution of delight over that complete segment of the pattern where it appears to take a look at, and to move towards the *sama* noticeably, is precisely what *is not* covered by the conception of rhythm as a mere balancing of stressed and unstressed beats. The same may be said of those brief passages where the pattern is made to *deviate* purposely, though for a very brief while, from the basic pace of the *thekā*—only to repair to that pace unfalteringly.

IV. WHAT IS RHYTHM: A PROPOSAL

To cover *every* instance of what strikes us as rhythmic in the creation and contemplation of art, *and* in everyday life, I think *we* could perhaps put forth the following definition of rhythm:

> Rhythm is such an order*ed* (or order*ly*) disposition of elements, acts, processes, events, or stages that, because of some specific

factors, the mind feels (on the whole) happy—or in some way enlightened—in traversing it as an object of contemplation. The factors in question are mainly the following: regular recurrence, contrast and balance, mutual complementariness, directed attainment of an end, or the mind's own expectations generated by habituation, past training, or present interest.

We may now see if this definition covers our experience of rhythm and rhythmic quality in diverse areas of life and activity.

To begin with, notice may be taken of a possible distinction between the order*ed* and the order*ly* or between that which has been put in order *by* some human effort—as in the creation of a work of art—and that which *is originally given to us in an order*, like the sequence of seasons or the alternation of the systole and diastole. The word *disposition*, as meaning arrangement, may be taken to signify not only sequence and juxtaposition but interplay; and so to cover not only the occurrent arts of music and dance, but literature, sculpture, painting and architecture. As for contemplation, it obviously stands for both *looking at* and *considering* attentively. 'Enlightenment', again is to be taken in its usual senses of 'imparting knowledge and information to' and 'elevating by knowledge'. Discriminating awareness of the regular and repeated sequence of the various stages of human life not only informs us, but elevates us into a philosophical acceptance, of the inevitability of decay and death. These stages may be said to provide a kind of rhythm not only because of the constancy of the order in which they occur, but because, as Langer would say, the very tapering of one stage is at once a making for the emergence of the next.

How our definition appears to cover every feature of our practice *of rhythm as a distinct art* may be brought out next—at some length, say, as follows:

The shapely passage of a pattern towards the *sama* of the *thekā* is covered by 'directed attainment of an end'; and the momentary passage of wilful staying from—and prompt reparatory return to —the basic pace, by the following words in our definition: *mutual complementariness*. And, of course, we feel gratified in either case, as we follow the turns and passages of rhythm.

The *felt agreeableness* as the mind traverses details of the object contemplated is, indeed, the essence of the matter here; otherwise they are not likely to appear as a making a *rhythmic* whole or sequence. Where we speak of the rhythm of events, actual or as projected in a

novel or film, our reference is to such likeable chains of events as are, on the whole, satisfying and/or in some way enlightening. A good instance of such a chain *in actual life* is provided by the following: the long incarceration of Nelson Mandela as a champion of South Africa's struggle for freedom from *apartheid*; his eventual release; repeated meetings with the country's President F. W. de Klerk; the holding of non-discriminatory, democratic elections; the President's magnanimous admission of defeat; the election of Mandela as the country's first black President; therefore the establishment of black majority rule through negotiation; and graceful acceptance of the right of the majority Black by the minority White.

Where the chain comprises events that are merely virtual, as is said to be found in the unfoldment of plot in a novel or a play, it may put an edge on our awareness of a good deal of what we encounter in real life, but do not contemplate enough: say, the diversity of human nature, the interplay of situation and character, the havoc that may be created by petty human foibles, and the (possible) ominousness of a present situation. The chain of *actual* events we have referred to (in the preceding para) is, of course, good warrant for Langer's view too; but just as clearly, it does not elude the grasp of the definition *we* have put forth. It is, in fact, duly covered by the following words in our definition: '*directed attainment* of an end'.

As for the 'several factors' that lend a little charm to the mind's passage across concatenated details or elements, and make it seem rhythmic, they are all at least as clearly at work in the practice of our rhythm as in the region of any other art. Thus, regular recurrence is visibly there in the beats at equal intervals; and in being actually played on the drum (that is, as *bharī*) or as quietly affirmed in the mind (*khālī*), they not only provide a kind of balance by opposing each other, and so prevent an overplay of sound or silence, but necessitate attention to both overt playing and ideal attunement, again by virtue of their very opposition. It is also a noteworthy feature of the practice of Hindustani rhythm that whole bunches of mnemonic syllables (*bols*) often seem to be mutual complements in the sense that, besides being similar by virtue of covering an equal number of beats, the later bunch provides what the earlier one *lacks*, say, syllables having a subdued sound. Thus, in the following sequence: तकिटतका तिटकतागदि गिन whereas the first phrase has only one *bol* of closed sound (किट), the second has as many as three: तिट गदि गिन

The *effective* working of all these factors, however, depends on the past training, habits of attention, and present interest of the contemp-

lator. No detail of the practice of rhythm as a *flowing*, yet articulate form can be rightly perceived unless one is able to hold on to the basic pace of the *thekā*; and this ability is not an instant acquisition, but the product of long training or habituation. It works necessarily, if subduedly, where what is contemplated is not merely the *thekā* as such, but a full pattern that runs across and, on the whole, within the ambit of the *thekā*. And where the pattern in question is exceptionally intricate—may be because of some moments of intentional deviation from the basic pace—intenseness of present attention is an indispensable requirement.

Notes and References

1. I say so because only on November 26 and 27, 1996, I recorded a fairly analytical discussion on, and exposition of the art of *tablā*-rhythm for our national archives, and on behalf of Sangeet Natak Akademi, New Delhi. The *tablā* maestro who played and was 'interviewed' on this occasion was Sudhir Kumar Saxena, a retired Professor of *tablā* from the College of Performing Arts, Baroda University. He was ably assisted by his leading pupil, Madhukar N. Gurav who provided longer pieces of illustrative playing.

1a. Thus, in accordance with the convention that the most eminent artist is to perform last of all in a session of music, Ustad Zakir Hussain's *tablā* recital was the concluding item of the Shriram Shankarlal Music Festival, April 13-16, 1996.

2. *Tatkār* is a display of pure footwork in Kathak dance. It is generally presented as the closing number of a full recital.

3. *Thekā* is the rhythm-cycle as drummed.

4. This is the English word for what we mean by कायम करना.

5. *Tablā* is the more popular drum in the region of North Indian or Hindustani music. It comprises two pieces, literally called according to the way they are put in relation to the drummer's own position,—the 'left' and the 'right' ones बांयां – दांयां

6. A much better illustration of the point in question would, however, be *quāyedā*; for this pattern has a far richer structure than a mere cycle.

7. S. K. Langer, *Problems of Art* (hereafter, referred to as PA), Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957, pp.78-9.

8. Herbert Read's essay, 'A Definition of Art', in *Aesthetics and the Arts*, edited by L.A. Jacobus, McGraw Hill Book Co., 1968, p. 4.

9. *Tādātmya* is imaginative self-identification with the essence of the other.

10. PA, p. 35.

11. S. K. Langer, *Feeling and Form* (referred to, from now on, as FF), Routledge and Kegan Paul, 3rd Impression, 1963, p. 31.

12. The reference, here, is to my remarks on *ālāpa* in *rāga eman kalyān* by the *veeṇā* maestro, Pandit Gopal Krishna, in my write-up, 'Ustads pay brilliant homage to Dagars', on the 11th Dhrupad Samāroh (Kamani Auditorium,

New Delhi, March 18-20, 1995), published in *The Asian Age*, New Delhi, of March 24, 1995.

13. An oft quoted example of such masters is the late Ustad Natthu Khan of Delhi.

14. In the case of Indian rhythm, we may note, most of the sounds that the drummer produces while playing, can be recited by him, as syllables or *bols*, the playing and the speaking being related by similarity of mere manner. Recitation of rhythmic syllables is, for us, an important part of the drummer's art.

15. FF, pp. 125.

16. S. K. Langer, *Mind—An Essay on Human Feeling*, Abridged edition by Van Den Heuvel (AB. ed., from now on), The John Hopkins University Press, 1988, p. 94.

17. PA, p. 35

18. AB. ed., p. 82.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 94.

21. As by Frye, where he speaks of the various kinds of rhythm. See his *Anatomy of Criticism*, Princeton University Press, 1957, PB., pp. 251-81.

22. FF, pp. 125-32.

23. Why I here speak of only 'a *part* of this artifice' will be brought out in the para that follows the extract to be cited presently.

24. Stephen Spender, *World within World*, Hamilton, London, pp. 313-14.

25. Such rhythmic patterns are called *anāgat.*

26. The other kind, which is easier and more current today, is quite different. Here the drummer reproduces the rhythmic parallel a little *after* the *sitārist* has finished the pattern and has begun playing the basic *gat* (composition) again. But this, I protest, is closer to solo playing than to *sangat* which literally means 'accompaniment', and not mere following and reproduction.

27. The Hindustani word here is लिपटना.

28. PA, p. 79.

28a. Whatever I have said about *quāyedā* in this para has been taken from my 'recorded' discussion with Prof. Sudhir Kumar Saxena referred to in n.1.

29. S. K. Langer, *Mind—An Essay on Human Feeling* (MHF. from now on), The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1967, Vol. I, p. 232.

30. FF, p. 126.

31. PA, p. 50.

32. Ibid., p. 51.

33. FF, p.126.

34. PA, pp. 51-2.

35. In pointing out all these inaccuracies in Langer's view, I have been helped by my son, Dr. P. Kumar, a Reader in the Department of Zoology, Hans Raj College, University of Delhi.

36. PA, p. 52.

37. FF, p. 126.

38. Ibid., pp. 126-28.

39. Ibid., p. 129.

40. Ibid., p. 311.

41. Ibid., p. 351.
42. MHF. I, p. 204.
43. Ibid., p. 324.
44. PA, pp, 52-3.
45. FF, p. 126.
46. Ibid., p. 349.
47. Ibid., pp. 52-3.
48. MHF. I, p. 341.
49. MHF. II, The John Hopkins University Press, PB. 2nd printing 1978, p. 10.
50. AB. ed., p. 125.
51. MHF. I, p. 341.
52. FF, p. 214.
53. Ibid., p. 330.
54. Ibid., p. 351.
55. Ibid., p. 126.
56. MHF. I, p. 324.
57. FF, p. 351.
58. PA, p. 50.
59. S.K. Langer (ed.), *Reflections on Art*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2nd printing, 1960, p. 26.

Text as a Process

PRIYADARSHI PATNAIK
Department of Humanistic and Social Studies, I.I.T., Kharagpur

Just so O king, is the continuity for a person or a thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were simultaneous.

The Questions of King Milinda, II.2.i.

We shall never know for the good reason that writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin. Writing is that neutral composite, oblique space where objects slip away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the identity of the body writing . . . the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the author.

ROLAND BARTHES, 'Death of the Author'.

Identity is an act of freezing. It is, for that split moment, taking up the position of oblivion to the fact that everything is transitory, a process, and not a product; it is an act of stilling yourself into a moment in order to conceptualize and grasp in another process shapes or qualities that are assumed to persist. That is the way we live our life.

Let us take an illustration—the yellow chair in my house. Whenever anyone sees it, on a hot afternoon in the garden, under the florescent light in the drawing room or in the darkness of the verandah at night, one recognises it and refers to it as the 'yellow chair'. The chair's identity is assumed irrespective of the fact that in the sunlight it looks bright chrome -yellow, under the florescent lamp a pale yellow and in the dark verandah indistinguishable. Similarly, over a number of years, even when the yellow colour fades and a part of the left leg rots away, it is called 'the *same* yellow chair, now *old*'. The difference in appearance, the wearing away, are qualified by the expression 'old' in order to maintain the 'sameness' of the chair. In this way, what is knowingly or unknowingly disregarded and not acknowledged is a perpetual *change*—a change which is indistinguishable from the processness, the flow of what we call 'things'.[1] What I am trying to point out is the fact that *temporality* is in this way suspended. In conceptualizing a thing and giving it identity, for that moment, we

do not consider the fact that the perception comes to us through time—the interaction of our senses with a 'thing' is possible only in a temporal sequence.

This is the way we use language. This is also the way we relate to what is known as a text, an author or a reader within the framework of language.

We have, here, introduced words like 'text', 'author' and 'reader'. In the present context each of them is a fairly problematic word. We shall take each of them one after the other and try to find what they usually mean and what they can mean when seen from a different perspective.

The question, what is a text, is not permissible here. Such a question presupposes that there can only be *one* answer. This is not tenable. Six blind men touched an elephant and described it differently as a rope, a wall, a snake, a pillar and so on, depending on what each touched. This is a very old illustration in the Indian tradition. When individual subjectivity and subjective colouration of words is taken into account (where, unwittingly, the processes and contexts that make the meaning of the word at that moment are felt) no single position can emerge. Rather, we will try to say what *we* mean by a text. By text we mean a chain of interlinked words, sentences, paragraphs, chapters or larger units. It can be on a computer, on a recorder, on paper or in one's memory where it is isolated from the various other words and sounds that float around. As a book, as a physical entity, it consists of a number of pages and even volumes. Its uniqueness is that it is referred to as a unit, a unity. When articulated in language, like a man or a thing, the text is also considered as a *singularity* (a text or the text) and thus acquires an *identity.*

Earlier, I said that this identity is an act of freezing, of conceptualization, of attempting to grab a temporal process as a *chunk.* This can be best understood by a comparison to music. A 'piece' of music is very similar to a text in that both unravel themselves in a temporal sequence. Musical notes are also arranged like words and sentences and recognizable clusters can be repeated again and again like frequently used words. But the sequentiality and processness of music is more accurately felt. We generally fail to grasp a musical composition as a whole in a single moment in our mind. We do not usually point to a cassette and say, that is the music. This, perhaps, happens for many reasons. Unlike words musical note-clusters do not have concepts attached to them. In listening to them we do not associate them conclusively to certain concepts and possibilities. They come and fade and are felt for themselves, for their grain. In that

they are emotive, but their referentiality is a matter of no conclusive cultural code. They operate at the level of suggestion and, that too, very vaguely. The other significant reason why this happens might be because music is its *very own texture.* In whichever way it is codified, the only way of experiencing it is by hearing it. A text can come to us by means of a voice, by visible signs on a paper, as touch in Braille. Unlike music, a text transcends its own physicality.

Coming back to the issue of identity, this act of acquiring an identity for the text is also the act of isolating it from living; the way we isolate a man from his living in identifying him. What this means is that in each case of identification, for that moment, we suspend all the processes in which he is involved. To go a step further, we can say that it is the moment we stop seeing him as a process, a continuity, a temporality. We try not to remember that as we are identifying him the cells in the skin are changing, his body odour is spreading, his voice is fading in the air. In fact we do become aware of the body as a process once it is dead and the metabolic changes are more perceptible. It usually escapes our notice that both the text and the man are actually perceived *in* and *as* processes and not identities. That (identity) is not the result of our immediate perception but our conceptualization, our immediate perception also being a process. True, pure perception can either come as total confusion or as sublimation. In it, through it, nothing can be articulated, the very nature of language being such that it can only pick chunks and call them units. So, it is perhaps time that we start seeing a text not as we have conceptualized it, but as it comes to us—in a *sequence* of perception. Thus, like Buddhist monk Nāgasena, in language, the best we can say about a man, a thing or a text is that 'it is neither the same nor different'.[2]

In assuming a text as we have been doing all these time, we actually assume a *product.* All our lives we use words but do not call them texts. They come and go as sounds and swirl about in memory. But we do not bunch them together as a temporal sequence and keep them ready as a package. The moment we do so, we have a text. But perhaps I must, first, make clear what I mean by process and by product.

Process is a continuity, a stretching that can only be seen as that and as nothing else.[3] The best analogy is that of the sea and of the waves. A swell and a crest—we call it a wave. But what separates a wave from the other? There is no absolute criterion. The difference that exists is a difference where the differentiating condition is blurred. This condition exists in the twilight zone of dawn or dusk.

Nothing certain can be said, nothing can be individualized or picked or separated either physically, perceptually or conceptually.

On the other hand, as the process involves change, no identity can ever be grasped simultaneously with an involvement in its process quality or *processness*. The moment I point and say 'this is a process', its *processness* has been disregarded, and I have conceptually, hypothetically, grasped it (however unstable) as a totality and thus reduced it into a *product*, i.e., something has to be conceptually grasped as a totality at one instant and not as a temporal unfolding.[4]

Since experiencing and conceptualizing are different things and the concept (or thing) as a stable entity does not exist in the natural time in which we exist, a framework is assumed where time does not affect *it*. Let us take an illustration. If I look at my mother's face, what I actually see are various faces from various angles, at various stages of composition or weathering all through my life. If I try to point and say it is *the* face, I cannot do so *simultaneously* while I take into account the fact that every moment I see different contours, different features in different ways and different lights. Thus, I have to build up a conceptual framework where these changes or this *processness* is not taken into account.

This conversion is almost natural, and is due to the nature of conscious perception and our language, both of which operate in units and breaks. In acknowledging a product we acknowledge its freezing. But just at the corner *processness* sits in our awareness, for what we call things are in space and time; and in space and time everything is a process. The moment I say 'that thing is old' I acknowledge its *processness*. But this saying that it is 'old' is freezing it as product again, while at the same time doing away with its *processness* by conceptualizing time-change in terms of past-old. Here, even the *processness* is reduced into a concept. The most frequent way to do this is by saying, things have *changed*. And this is necessary in order to be able to grasp in our language.

Coming back to the text, I have said earlier that by conceptualizing a text we freeze it. This freezing is an act of transcending real time and space into hypothetical time and space. In this, time's *timeness* is lost while space becomes conceptual and two dimensional. This is so because touching a thing or experiencing sensations presuppose a location in three-dimensional space. *Locating* involves movement and hence the necessity of time where it can take place. In fact, according to some Physicists, location can only take place in four-dimensional space-time continuum where time is considered the fourth coordinate required to locate an object—in the sequence of process. It is essen-

tially this time that is no longer available. Hence I say that we have a certain kind of two-dimensional conceptual space only.[5]

This perception, I believe, is very significant in the modern critical context. Modern critics and philosophers seem obsessed with the problem of *presence*. They take up the concept of *absolute* presence and show that it is not possible to have absolute presence. An instance is Zeno's paradox of movement. Take the flight of an arrow. If reality is what is present at any given instant, then the arrow is always at a particular spot at a given instant. But if we wish to insist that it is in motion at any given instant, we have to accept that every instant of presence is marked by traces of past and future. If motion is to be present, it is to be marked by difference and defferal.[6] A moment always holds its *traces* of past and its future. It cannot be *pure* presence. This problem, I believe, emerges out of the act of disregarding the *processness* of language and the reality we try to grasp or create through language. It is a problem that relates to the notion of *freezing*. Whether it is the traditional notion of *presence* or the modern notion of *difference*, language is not taken as a process. Once we are free from these notions, this problem no longer troubles us. In regarding life and text as continuum concepts of past, present and future become fluid and merge into one another.

Let us now try to understand text as a process. But we must do so in a language that itself operates in units and in terms of an understanding that must grasp and be grasped in chunks in order to be able to understand though understanding itself is a sequence without break. When king Milinda asked Nagasena, 'what is man', Nagasena said that man is only a continuity, like a flame, held together by a thread of memory. In that he is neither the same nor another through every moment he is reborn.[7] Thus with a text.

And so, if we try to see a text in terms of our language and conception, each moment it dies and is born again. And so also the author. He is not one, but a sequence and hence a text is actually an act of *collaboration*. Each word is a product of its own moment and the artist who created it is dead along with it. Out of the memory of each word and its artist (they cannot be separated here) flow the next word and the next. In that the text has neither a beginning nor an end. It simply flows from not-words into words into not-words . . . .

The above passage calls for certain clarifications. The passage strongly indicates the possibilities or the imposibilities of beginning and end. Even without going into cosmology or Buddhism what is obvious is that the point to which a word can be physically traced back is only to the point when it is uttered or written by the author. It

is also so with the entire sequence of traces that we call a text. Each link in the chain can only be traced back to the point of its transformation into an articulation or writing. Beyond it the *author* is no *originator* since the word exists in his mind and has been transmitted through generations. From the point of view of process, thus, there is only the possibility of locating an *emergence* and not a beginning. Thus, the author, living and continuing, *authorizes* the text after its emergence.

The other thing that need explaining is *not-words*. What are implied by *not-words* are all the other things that relate to a particular word to make it meaningful. A word in isolation is nothing. It is its relation to the other words with which it combines that makes it meaningful. This is expressed well by the word *ākāṅkshyā* in Sanskrit which means the 'expectancy' that the word generates for other words to make an unit of sense. But not-word is not just this. It is also the context, the consciousness, the process, all of which go into making a particular sense at a given time. Thus, there is a collaboration always going on among the various components, acknowledged and unacknowledged, that make up a man's world; the text is not a moment or a composite of moments but a flow.[8] This possibility is explored by Roland Barth's 'The Death of the Author'. But there he only goes as far as to say that traditionally the 'author . . . is always conceived of as a past of his own book . . . (while) the modern scriptor is born simultaneously with the text. . . . '[9] In that he neither takes the process of writer and his words together, nor acknowledge the processness of a text that can only emerge from not-words to words.

Reading is thus also a collaboration. And this is a little difficult to grasp for in re-reading a text you are neither reading the same text nor another. In reading, one becomes aware of the text only on reflection. One draws back from the *texture* and with the help of the memory and conceptualization looks back. It is only then that the text emerges. Rather, the text gains its composite identity only then when the reader is self-conscious about reading and forces an unity upon it.

What the reader is holding is a book, a text. Then he goes into a process and becomes a process. When he looks up again from his reading, he sees the book in his hand, looks back and the text *re-emerges*. Between readings, when the reader is aware of the book in his hand, he is no longer in the process of living, reading. He is isolated from his reading and living, his *processness*, and the text *re-forms* in his mind. This is not all. The reader has infinite more possibilities. To begin with, the 'author' can become a reader when he reads his 'text'.

And each reader can read a 'text' an infinite number of times, each reading being different from the other. Barth says 'writing ceaselessly posits meaning ceaseless to evaporate it'.[10] This statement in fact applies more poignantly to reading. Reading ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it. In saying about the reader, 'he is simply that *someone* who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is constituted',[11] Barthes at the same time shows an awareness of the reader's processness while still striving to give him an identity, although as a mere 'someone'. The step which follows inevitably is one where the reader also co-emerges 'simultaneously' with his reading, not just once, but again and again, like waves in a sea.

Now, coming to the process of reading itself, each word, though received in isolation, generates a *growth* of associations, like fungus. Memories of things, memories of words, memories of shapes, colours, voices, smells come in. In this, the word itself *melts* into a process. In reading, words come alive, lose their contours, the text comes alive and becomes a co-process.

We could stop here. Be in doing so we shall be neglecting individual readings. In taking them, two different points of view emerge. The first is of the person who reads, who refers to himself as 'I'. In this case whatever my senses touch become extensions of myself. In this way I am fluid. But even so I cannot assume to know what is going on inside your head and hence cannot assume to dissolve into you a co-process. A small example may suffice.

Three men were walking around a road. An owl hooted. The first started and said, 'evil omen.' The second sniggered and said, 'rubbish'. The third man did not even hear.

This is in a way a text about a text. The third man hardly even read the hoot of the owl. Thus the text does not even exist for him.

The example isolates man from man, reading from reading. On the other hand we can take a point of view which assumes to transcend individuality. Seen thus, the various co-processes of reading, voices, associations, dissolve into one another.

Even so, the paradox still persists. In taking any point of view, we conceptualize, freeze things. But that is the language in which we must operate, reflect, freeze and isolate things. For understanding might be a flood or *sphota* in the sense of blossoming or explosion, but before that we must use words and concepts.

The text as a process, thus, enters the readers in their processes of reading like a current entering the strands of sea. Here all processes

merge. Languaging leads to silence. There is no beginning, no end.
Only memory and sequence.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. By the expression change, one both conceptualizes and articulates processness. In other words, by using 'change' process is pinned down and loses its momentariness and flow.
2. *The Questions of King Milinda,* The Sacred Books of the East Series, Ed. Max Muller, Motilal Banarasidas, New Delhi. This is a *Hinayāna* Buddhism text where Nāgasena, the Buddhist monk, answers the questions of the king about the nature of things.
3. Here, by talking about the process I have frozen it, but this is basically a limit of our language itself.
4. A product is assumed. Conscious perception involves inference by the process of identity and difference. The concept of anything assumes a timelessness, though it is affectetd by physical time—our concept of things do change, ever so slightly, in the process of living. At a conceptual level, time, though operating sequentially, gives us access to go back to things, which physical time does not.
5. In closing our eyes and visualizing space we use a method that stimulates three-dimensional space. Even so, locating a thing on the other side of the imagined space requires a change in perceptive and movement and hence time, thus resulting in an imagined space-time continuum. This is not what I am referring to here.
6. See discussion of Jacquis Derrida in Jonathan Culler's *On Destruction,* Cornell University Press, New York, 1982.
7. *The Questions of King Milinda.* Here man is compared to a flame whose identity is in its continuity; where man, in time, is considered neither the same nor another.
8. For a similar concept in the context of the reader's understanding of a text see Wolfgang Iser's 'The Process of Reading: A Phenomenological Approach', *Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader,* Ed. David Lodge, Longman: London, 1988.
9. 'The Death of the Author', *Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader,* Ed. David Lodge (ed.), Longman, London, 1988.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.

My position is an extreme one. In the very act of talking about *text* I am creating a world that operates on the basis of identity and difference. But without them I cannot survive. Nor can I talk. By taking this position I hope that I have been able to point to certain possibilities that perhaps exist at the border of language. The other reason I take up this position is because it points directly to the post-Modern transitoriness of life. What Buddhism suggested we experience, *momentariness,* is today a felt experience where everything, including relations, keep changing. Today we do not have to unlearn concepts to enter processness; processness sucks us in.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

A Rejoinder to Dr. S. K. Ookerjee's Comments on Dr. Rajendra Prasad's 'Applying Ethics'

In *JICPR,* Vol. XV, No. 2, 1998 Dr. Ookerjee has made certain comments on the second section: 'Applicability of an ethical theory' of Dr. Prasad's article 'Applying Ethics' which was published in *JICPR,* Vol. XIV, No. 2, 1997. Dr. Prasad has expressed the view that ethical behaviour involves application of ethical principles; whereas Dr. Ookerjee holds that in normal cases of ethical behaviour there is hardly any involvement of this kind. He says that 'this entire idea of applying moral knowledge or moral principles is misconceived' (pp. 125-7). He goes on to say further, 'In normal cases people do, of course, act morally, but they do not do so by applying available ethical knowledge. They act naturally and spontaneously' (pp. 126-7).

However, he accepts that an agent's ethical action is an expression of his 'mature, cultivated moral sense' which is 'partly inherited from one's cultural heritage and partly through one's own reflection on certain situations' (p. 127). Now if an exercise of morality is not an articulate application of ethical knowledge, it must certainly be a spontaneous expression of a moral disposition acquired by the moral agent in the past. But then the question is: Can a moral disposition or for that matter a moral character be acquired without a moral principle playing a distinctive role in such acquisition? Can any telling of the truth spontaneously be regarded as a moral action, if the teller of the truth has never in his life acknowledged the high moral value of telling the truth, and has not developed in himself a pro-attitude towards such telling? And if the moral agent's telling the truth is not at par with a parrot's 'telling the truth', the very great importance of the role played by the moral principle of telling the truth in acquiring the moral trait and also the psychological readiness for such telling at appropriate times must have to be acknowledged. It is true that at times the moral agent may not be conscious of acting in accordance with the moral principle and he may just be reacting to the confronting situation as though on the spur of the moment. But then his reaction must have to be loaded with his entire relevant past and that past must include the role played by the relevant moral principles on

various occasions.

Dr. Ookerjee appears to be endorsing the same view when he tries to justify the moral propriety of the reacting agent's act. He says, 'A man tells the truth because there is no reason to tell a lie; one returns a borrowed article because one just does not think of appropriating it' (p. 127). Thus telling the truth is obviously an activity involving the opposite principle of telling a lie, i.e., the principle of telling the truth; and likewise returning a borrowed article is an activity involving the opposite of the principle of appropriating a borrowed article, i.e., the principle of returning a borrowed article.

We may also note that even in an automatic truth-telling or normal returning of a borrowed article human beings *act* and are not just *made to perform* an activity. In such acts agents do whatever they do out of their own accord and that is the reason why they are praised and applauded for their acts. And because these acts are responsible acts and not mere movements, they must involve application of moral principles in some manner. When the ethical principles are applied in observance, the resulting actions are moral; and when in breach, the actions are immoral. Furthermore, an application of an ethical principle may either be conscious or unconscious. In unusual case it is clearly conscious, but in usual ones it is most often unconscious. But even in the usual cases of the unconscious variety which far outnumber all other cases, the ethical principles do play their part by virtue of being the very *raison d'être*, as it were, for the agent's acquired ethical dispositions which make the occurrence of these cases possible. Dr. Prasad is indeed correct when he observes in his article (pp. 5-6), 'More often than not the application takes place in a smooth, effortless, manner. Sometimes it is so smooth that we feel no pressure at all on our moral nerves'. Perhaps the idea of applying moral principle in moral behaviour is not misconceived after all.

Retired Professor of Philosophy   Nityanand Mishra
Dahua House, Tilakamanjhi
Bhagalpur-812001

Taxonomy of Civilizational Historiography and Objectivity of History and *Itihāsa*: Response to Professor S. Paneerselvam

I must say that I liked Dr. S. Paneerselvam's elucidatory and critical commments on my paper, '*Itihāsa*, History and Historiography of Civilization' [*JICPR*, June, 1996]. In his contribution the writer has raised various points, though briefly. From among those points I propose to comment on (*i*) what may be called the limits of my historiographical taxonomy, (*ii*) difference between history, on the one hand, and *itihāsa* or *purāṇa*, on the other, and (*iii*) historical objectivity.

I

My aim in the said paper was indeed very modest. Historiographies of different countries for obvious cultural diversity cannot be identical yet one can hardly miss comparable patterns in them. Human creativity does not negate the stability of human nature and what flows out of it.

I did not try to present, in the limited scope of the paper, a comprehensive account of all *types* of historiography. That is neither possible nor illuminating. My reference to different forms of historiography, Vedic, Buddhist, Islamic and European, are basically illustrative, not substantive.

Historiography, unlike zoology and botany, for example, is not a taxonomic discipline. It is essentially narrative. But if one tries to write history or physics or mathematics, one is obviously expected to introduce some non-narrative, rather formal, elements in it. The critic's point that my 'classification (of Historiography) is incomplete' is admittedly correct. Narrative historiography, even if it is typological, is bound to be so. Every narration has to tolerate some gaps or incompleteness in between the sets of narrative statements. Where Paneerselvam has definitely a point against me is the absence of any reference to Dravidian historiography in my paper. This is more due

to my ignorance than anything else. I wish I could know little more about this important area of India's cultural heritage. Besides, I submit, the careful reader might have noticed that my treatment of the subject is typologically diachronic, has taken note only of a few *periods* and does not claim to be comprehensive.

A related point which deserves attention here is this: different branches of learning do not come into existence all at once. For example, economics and sociology, as we understand them today, were not there before the eighteenth century. This is not to suggest that the subjects falling under them were totally unknown to earlier scholars who had written on social sciences. Name of a discipline depends much on how its elements are formulated and related. Economics and *Arthuśāstra* are not synonymous. Nor is the scope of Political Science identical with that of *Daṇḍa-nīti*. Economic views had been in circulation long before Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nation* (1776) was published and the same thing may be said of the elements of 'Sociology' before this new name of the discipline was coined by Comte (1838). I mention these things only to remind ourselves that *history* in the received sense and *itihāsa* in the classical sense took their recognizable character around a particular period of time and as located in an identifiable culture. History or *itihāsa* is not an ontological concept like time. While the latter is primarily physical, the former is basically cultural. However, their relation is not to be denied. Total denial of the relevance of *time* to *culture* and history leads to a sort of post-modernist dispersal of those basic principles and institutions which hold us together and lend a direction to the change which *we* bring out—critically and creatively.

Like most of us I am aware of the intimate relations between archeology and history. But to achieve *regressive* synthesis of archeological materials on the basis of historical 'facts' is not always an advisable enterprise; nor is it ordinarily practised. It is the other way round. Archeological findings provide us cues for *progressive* synthesis of historical materials. This discipline-related asymmetry is a fallout of the correctly understood relation between time and culture.

A similar point may be made out with reference to the linguistic subsoil or underpinnings of culture. Remarkable linguistic affinity between the Indo-European cultures strongly suggests that this group of peoples have been interacting through migration and immigration, leading and borrowing and interaction over the millennia, yet in order to have a clear picture about them we are obliged to draw a line of

distinction between, for example, archeology and history, history and pre-history. The researchers on comparative philology and cultural anthropology are well aware of the connections, visible and tenuous, between the said branches of knowledge.

I entirely agree with Paneerselvam that there are no special reasons to trace the origin 'of *itihāsa* to the Vedic period'. In fact to speak of culture or history in terms of their so-called origins is misleading unless it is adequately clarified and qualified. Strictly speaking, there is no compulsive reason to trace our cultural lineage only to the *Vedic* period. With reference to our *siddhāntas* it is generally agreed upon that these are intermixed and cannot be said to be purely *āgamic* or purely *nigamic*. During the long process of acculturation in South Asia these two types of *siddhāntas* have been creatively and critically interactive and interpenetrative. Before the Aryans with their changing language started settling down in India, at least two other peoples, the Austric and the Dravidian, with their languages had already arrived in India and been interacting with the indigenous Negritos. It is unrewarding to try to trace the roots of the Negroid people and their tongue. For we must recognize that every 'beginning' has its beginning and that we have to stop somewhere our temporal regressive inquiry. 'Pure race', 'pure culture' and 'pure language', like the zero-coordinate of geometry, are ideal typical, i.e. heuristic in character and not descriptive in content. Every point of departure has its own *temporal past* or backdrop. Even then for expository or elucidatory purpose we take a particular point as cut-off point and for the purpose, on demand, we remain prepared to spell out our assumed criteria or presuppositions.

Archeologists persuasively affirm that in North and North-West India, particularly in the Indus Valley, flourished a civilization, marked by different (at least six) layers, well before the arrival of Aryans in the area. Of the oldest cultures referred to by the comparative linguists, archeologists and anthropologists, viz. Mehrgarh [Baluchistan (*c.* 8000-2500 BC)], Catel Huyuk [Central Anatolia (*c.* 7200-6100 BC], Dnieper-Donets [Black Sea Region (*c.* 5000-3400 BC)] and Pit-Comb Ware [Baltic to Ukraine (*c.* 5000-3000 BC)], India is credited to have the first and long-lasting settlement in Baluchistan.[1] It appears that this civilizational settlement was related to BMAC (Bactrian-Margiana Archaeological Complex) and Harappan Culture of the Indus Valley Civilization. It is interesting to recall that even before the excavations of Mohenjo-daro and Harappa (1922-23), some historians of science like P.C. Roy in his *History of Hindu Chemistry*

(1901-08) boldly conjectured the existence of a developed bronze-age civilization in Baluchistan on the basis of surface archeology and metallurgical remains. Pending the decipherment of the Indus Valley script, it is not easy to identify the exact ethnic affiliation and language of the builders of the Indus Valley Civilization. But it is generally agreed upon that they had been Dravidian-speaking rather than Aryan-speaking. There is a strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that the Aryan-speakers superimposed themselves on the Dravidians, who gradually withdrew to the southern and central eastern parts of the continent.

One of the Dravidian languages, *Brahui,* is still available in the north west of Indus. Reference to this ethnic stock may be found in the latter Vedas. For example, in the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* (3.2.1.23-24) we come across the word *Mleccha* denoting non-Vedic-speaking strangers. The comparative philology tells us that its meaning is like the Akkadian word *Meluhha.* Apparently, Dravidian-speaking people of the Indus Valley Civilization, of which it seems Mehrgarh was a part, have distinct stories of their own to tell us. I am alluding to their story before their southern and eastern migration. But given the present state of scholarship, to reconstruct this story to our satisfaction would be extremely difficult. All these I, as a philosopher, submit only to emphasize the point that the prospect of 'Dravidian historiography' was never under doubt. Certainly not to me. In fact I am aware that some scholars have been studying this relatively less known branch of learning for quite some time. I must confess my professional inability to contribute to this highly interesting area. Scholars like Jean Przyluski have tried to show how the Sumerian speech of Chaldea, itself allied to primitive Austric, through the Persian-Avestan language influenced the language of the pre-Vedic and the Vedic languages of India.[2] The cultural traces of the Austric-speaking Proto-Austroloids are found among the present-day Kol or Munda people of eastern India. The Aryan-speakers, who came to India presumably through Iran, borrowed many Austric words pertaining to the flora and fauna of India. 'Barley', *yava* in Sanskrit, is *zea* in Greek, *bere* in old English, and *barizeins* in Goth. The word for wheat (Sanskrit *godhuma,* literally [white] earthsmoke, Iranian *ganduma*) is traceable to *bveiti* (old Nordic), *hwaete* (old English) and *weizzi* (old High German) and all these Indo-Euporean (IE) words are akin to 'white' in their meanings. The oldest Indo-Aryan word for 'rice' seems to be *vrihi* and its affine IE words are *birinj* (Persian) and *briza* (Greek) and is conjectured to be related to *arichi, arki, argi* (Dravidian).

Some of the basic elements of Indian civilization—material, ideological and ritual—are due to the Austric-speaking Proto-Australoids who arrived in South Asia with two recognizably affine tongues, *Austronesians* (comprising Indonesians, Melanesians, Micronesians and Polynesians) and *Austro-Asiatics* (comprising Kol, Munda, and non-Khmer languages of Assam and beyond, Burma and Indo-China). Evidently India had immigrants from all directions and they intermixed here without being obliged to give up totally their ethnological identity. The cultivation of rice, manufacture of sugar from the cane, weaving of cotton cloth and the domestication of elephant are believed to be among the material gifts of the Proto-Austroloids to Indian civilization.

It is difficult to assert with definiteness that the speech of the builders of Mohenjo-däro, Harappa, Lothal and Kalibangan was Dravidian. But the scholars who favour this hypothesis have their own grounds. Sound philological basis is there to assume that the word *Tamil* or *Dravida* is of the Eastern Mediterranean origin. The oldest form of the word, suggests Suniti Kumar Chatterjee, was *Dramila* or *Dramiza.* The Lycians of the Asia Minor called themselves *Trimmili.* In the fourth century BC, the Greeks in India identified a group called *Arabitai* in South Sind. Chatterjee's hypothesis is that the concerned people were Dravidian-speaking. To the Telegus the Tamilians are *Aravalu* (from *a-rava,* i.e., voicelessness or speechlessness, suggesting unintelligibility). From the works of scholars like Bishop Caldwell,[3] P.T. Srinivas Iyengar,[4] Krishnaswami Iyenger, Mark Collins, V.R.R. Dikshitar,[5] Viyapuri Pillai,[6] N. Subrahmanian,[7] K.A. Nilakanta Sastri[8] and others[9] of the modern times one can have a fairly good idea how deeply the Dravidian culture and language have influenced and been influenced by the Aryan culture and language.

II

When the Aryans started arriving in India they found mainly two groups here, which they named *Dāsas-Dasyus* and *Niṣādas.* The Iranians used to pronounce *Dāsa* as *Dāha* and *Dasyu* as *Dahyu. Dahyu* meant country to the Iranians and not 'robber' or enemy offering resistance to the advancing tribes. It is also to be remembered here that when the Vedic people started entering into India they did not have the feeling of entering into a new country. This confirms the view that territorial boundaries (in the modern sense) were not there at that time. The main difference was between the *settled* peoples and the

nomadic or *semi-nomadic* tribes. The peoples, presumably the Harappans or Dravidians, who were being referred to as *Dāsas-Dasyus* in fact had already established a flourishing civilization, both materially and institutionally, in the Indus valley. Later on, it seems, when the Aryans started pouring into North West India in waves, destroying the towns of the settled peoples, the latter offered resistance. It is not without point that Indra (literally, 'subduer') is referred to as Purandara ('destroyer of Pura'), Śiva as Puradvis and Puramathitr ('enemy or destroyer of Pura') and Viṣṇu as Purari ('enemy of Pura'). Gods were deified as warring tribal chieftains.

But, it must be admitted, that does not satisfactorily settle the long-debated question about the true relation between language and race. In some cases it is found that many races belong to the same language family. Also it is found that one and the same race speaks different languages. Nilakanta Sastri, among others, has persuasively pointed out the untenability of drawing a sharp line of racial or civilizational demarcation between the 'Aryan' and 'Dravidian'. Max Müller argued long back that an Aryan race, like a brachycephalic language, is a theoretical construct, not inspectable reality. What it suggests is: genetic and cultural factors should not be conflated. The physical features of the Brahuis in Baluchistan are quite different from those of the Dravidians but they speak a Dravidian dialect. That shows, argues Nilakanta Sastri, 'community of language does not show community of blood'. Besides, one must remember that what is called Dravidian language is in fact a family of languages comprising not only Tamil, Malayalam, Kannada and Telugu (literary languages) but also Tuda, Kota, Gond and Ku (non-literary languages) and its presence is all-Indian. The intermixture of the Aryan culture with the Dravidian culture has been so extensive and intensive that it is impossible to understand and evaluate them in isolation. R.C. Majumdar rightly points out 'that the Aryan religion, thoughts and beliefs have been profoundly modified by those of the Proto-Austroloids and Dravidians . . . in material civilization the Dravidian speaking peoples perhaps excelled the Aryans, and . . . they must be regarded as partners of the Aryans in building up the great structures' of Indian civilization.[10]

Civilizational partners are not necessarily hegemonic in their intention. Often after having a living space for themselves in the land of adaption the newcomers develop in their own self-interest an attitude of 'live and let live'. For example, the Aryans adapted many pre-Aryan and non-Aryan gods and added to their pantheon. Kannan,

the Tamil pastoral god, though analogous to Kṛṣṇa in conception has his distinctness. Similarly, Indiran, the Tamil god of agricultural region, though resembles the Aryan god Indra in some respects, has his different attributes. For the purpose of gradual cultural acceptance when the Aryans started recognizing the local or regional gods as their own, naturally the concerned people felt pleased and favourably disposed to the new comers, their social views and religious values. Nilakanta Sastri writes, 'when the Aryan rishis moulded the Vedic cult, they utilized the pre-existing gods and adapted them to their philosophical concepts [and it] accord(s) well with the theory that Harappan gods were absorbed into the Indo-Aryan pantheon'[11]. A comparable argument from the Marxist standpoint is offered also by D.D. Kosambi.[12]

III

Several questions have been raised by Paneerselvam and I am afraid it well be difficult for me to react to each one of them. For example, he is not favourably inclined to take the epics and *purāṇas* as elements of history. Personally speaking I, like D.R. Bhandarkar, Pargiter, Barnett, Sri Aurobindo, and many others, think that the *purāṇas*, in their *traditional* sense, are important source of genuine historical reconstruction. Before this point is explicated one must bear in mind that whenever we use such terms as *itihāsa* and *history* belonging to different languages we must be careful and remember that their inter-linguistic translation is visited by an element of ineliminable *indeterminacy*. Those who think in English and use it as their paradigm, the first preferred language, are likely to be disturbed by the use of the word *itihāsa* in its *traditional* sense. An element of cultural relativism silently creeps into the mind of the English-speaking and English-thinking people. While they say *itihāsa*, they mean history. Many of us including myself are subject to this infirmity of thought, unless, of course, we remain critically conscious of our undisclosed presupposi-tions. The presuppositions, in brief, are that whatever is historical must be spatially locatable, calendrically or temporally datable, and causally explainable. Scrutiny reveals that in writing history if these requirements are insisted upon, history is then cast in the mould of natural science. There is nothing intrinsically objectionable in trying to write scientific history. In fact in certain areas of knowledge this is even welcome. But it would be uncritical to suggest that *itihāsa* (*iti-ha-āsa*), what indeed happened, always lends itself to scientific

reconstruction, satisfying the triple requirements as enumerated above, viz., locatability, datability and causality.

In this connection, the first point we should remind ourselves, is that history is not a *totality* but only a *modality*, a mode of experience. Attempts to *reduce* the historical mode of experience to the scientific one are bound to prove unsuccessful. Even to *assimilate* the former under the latter is likely to prove unrewarding. History seems to be an autonomous mode of experience in which we are basically interested in understanding the *past*, the past *human* affairs, from a given, which may be the *present* point of view. If we accept the premise that human consciousness is intrinsically intentional, objectward or *ākāṅkṣādharmī*, history is bound to be *futural* in an important sense.

There are many views or definitions of *itihāsa*. Perhaps we may have an advisable point of departure if we recall Kauṭilya's own notion of *itihāsa* as found in *Arthaśāstra*. He tells us *itihāsa* draws upon the *purāṇas, itivṛtta, ākhyāyikā, udāharaṇa, dharmaśāstra* and *arthaśāstra*. It is a comprehensive notion and purported to be practically applicable. The requirement of applicability presupposes that in its very structure *itihāsa* must have some *particular* cues for application. In other words, *itihāsa* must have some *particular* cues for application. In other words, strictly speaking, it cannot, therefore, satisfy the conditon of scientific *generality*. Physical locatability, datability, generality and similar notions are alien to the nature of *itihāsa*. In recent times this point has been highlighted by such writers on history as Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin.

To understand the past human affairs as really past, what did really happen, we have to take note of the views, values and institutions of the past, however outlandish they might appear from our present point of view. The mental excursion into the past is not an easy exercise. It demands of us imagination and genuine sympathy for what the past historical agents thought and did. In a way we are epistemologically obliged to 'internalize' their web of beliefs. It is futile to expect science and scientists to provide us some general rules of capturing the past. The past events and ideas are not like fixed books in a distant shelf. They are not matter of external inspection or observation. They are matter of construction or, to be more accurate, *re*construction of others' thought and action.

In *itihāsa* we find a blend of realism and constructionism. In a sense the past is indeed independent of us. After all we, the people of the present, are not the authors of our ancestors' thought and action. 'Contemporaneity of history', the well known Croce-Collingwood thesis, is only an instructive, metaphor. Yet in an important sense the independent past lends itself to reconstruction by us, the historians,

who are living now. As materials of history, even the discarded views, discontinued practices and vanished institutions have to be taken into account by us. On the proclaimed grounds of modernity and scientificity we as historian cannot refuse to recognize the reality of what is past, however bizarre they might appear to us today. The past materials of historical thinking have some general features in them which enable the historian to reconstruct or rethink the same in the present. However, this does not imply either the literal access of the historian to the past (historical agents, their thought and action) or the unreality of time.

That the *purāṇas* would appear irrational or even absurd to 'the modern mind' is hardly surprising. These are said to be compiled tales or anecdotes, songs and lores which have survived through the ages. Before composing the Mahabharata, tradition tells us, Vyāsa compiled the material of original *purāṇa* and noted the same down to one of his disciples and also taught him what is *itihāsa*. The *purāṇa* is referred to under *Atharva Veda, Śatapatha* and *Gopath Brāhmaṇas, Taittirīya Araṇyaka, Chhāndogya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads*. It is mentioned also in *Aśvalāyana, Gṛhyasūtra, Dharmasūtra* of Āpastamba and Goutama, *Mahābhārata* and *Manusaṁhitā*. In the Vedic literature, *itihāsa* and *purāṇa* are often used as synonymous. In brief, *purāṇa* denotes history, traditional anecdotes and religious treatises. *Purāṇa* has been referred to in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* as the fifth Veda. But its authority is not comparable to that of the original Vedas. However, Śaṁkara in his *Bhāṣya* recognizes it as a secondary (*gauṇa*) authority.

Many *purāṇas* are extremely rich in their historical and geographical reference. For example, the *Agnipurāṇa* is encyclopedic in its scope and character. Construction of temple, the ways of making the images of different deities, the disciplines of medicines, architecture and animal husbandry, gemology, rhetoric (*alaṅkāra*), drama (*nātya*), and grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) are among the subjects discussed in this book. Many of the *purāṇas* have in them a distinct regional character. For example, in parts of Bengal and Assam, *Kālikāpurāṇa* occupies an important place in the public mind. The same may be said of *Nīlamatapurāṇa*, in Kashmir, *Svayambhūpurāṇa*, in Nepal and *Ekamrapurāṇa* in Utkala areas. It is clear that the *Purāṇas* provide a wide range of humanistic research base for reconstruction of what is now called history. The Buddhists and the Jainas also have their *purāṇas*.

IV

It is true that on the question of historical importance of the *purāṇas* experts are not unanimous. While A.B. Keith is sceptical about their historical significance, Sri Aurobindo and D.R. Bhandarkar think history of the ancient India may be reliably reconstructed from the *purāṇas* through their perceptive interpretation. There is no reason to believe that interpretation necessarily involves distortion and destruction of objectivity. This point has been argued at length and very forcefully, among others, by Gadamar in his *Truth and Method.* Vincent Smith observes that 'modern European writers have been inclined to disparage unduly the authority of the *purāṇic* [geneologies], but closer study finds in them much genuine and valuable historical tradition'. For example, he shows that the geneologies of kings of Andhra mentioned in the *Matsyapurāṇa* are pretty reliable.

Not only Keith but also Indian historians like Majumdar and Kosambi are sceptical about the historical importance of the *purāṇas*. Majumdar thinks that 'the Indians displayed a strange indifference towards properly recording the public events of their country'. Kosambi speaks of 'the deplorable Brahmin habit of putting in an ordered sequence traditions that belong to different groups'. At the same time the latter praises 'most informative' character of the *Jātakas* and also speaks of 'the influence of *Sātavāhana* trade upon the brahmin *purāṇas* [which show] their extraordinary geographical knowledge buried under descriptions by gods and goddesses of supposedly imaginary regions'.

Given the rational or scientific cast of the modern mind, it is not difficult to understand these critical views about the traditional Indian ways of writing about the human past. Once we recall, as I said before, that peoples belonging to different cultures and sub-cultures have different ways of remembering and writing about their past. The *purāṇas* are different from the *Jātakas*. History is different from *itihāsa.* But at the same time, we all are aware that we cannot run away, individually speaking, from our biographical past or, collectively speaking, from our racial memory. There is no unique way of writing about the past. Paneerselvam has expressed his dissatisfaction over my failure to provide 'a particular method' to tackle the problems of writing about the past. Frankly speaking, to the best of my understanding, there is no unique method of writing history or *itihāsa* or *purāṇas.* It partly depends upon the subject matter, partly upon the time when it is being written, partly upon the cultural milieu as a

member of which it is being written and various other related factors. Besides, the demand for methodological uniqueness in history is intellectually misplaced. Certainly the method of writing art history or that of religious history, for example, would be different from the method of writing mythological history. In some cases method may be narrativistic. In some other cases it may be hypothetico-deductive, to use a scientific methodological term. There are various other methods, dialectical (marked by the rhythm of totalization→detotalization→retotalization), structural (anthropological-cum-historical), and deconstructionist. Personally speaking, I am not inclined to be committed to any *unique* historiographical method. In the name of scientific history I think we should not be scientistic in our approach. On the subject I have expressed my views elsewhere.[13]

There are some writers on history like Ernst Cassirer[14] who are professionally familiar with both scientific and humanistic disciplines. He has persuasively argued to show that the mythical, the metaphysical and the scientific domains of knowledge form a sort of continuum, both conceptually and historically. The theoretical structure of our world-view is stated to be resting on the distinction between 'what is' and 'what seems to be' between the sensory-somatic and the cognitive-objective. But when humans are in their mythical or *purāṇic* mode of consciousness, these distinction, differentiation and stratification are found to be blurred or altogether non-existent. Enclosed in the immediacy of 'intuitive-imaginative'(Kantian), 'dream-heavy' (Spenglerian), and 'symbolic' (Aurobindian) consciousness, the mythic/*purāṇic* mind does not try to locate the 'object' of its consciousness in the 'alien' framework of space, time and number or quantity. But the scientific mind, haunted by its methodologically sceptic or searching motivation, remains always keen to situate the content of its cognitive consciousness in an objective, spatio-temporal and causal-quantitative framework.

V

How to achieve objectivity in history? How historical *judgments*, in the strict sense, are possible? Is it judgability or is it intelligibility which is the prime concern of the historian? These questions make little or no sense unless it is assumed that objectivity, judgability, intelligibility and cognate ideals are realizable.

It is not easy to define objectivity in the context of history. In scientific discourse this concept is defined in terms of laws, testability,

i.e. repeatability under controlled conditions, quantifiability or measurability. At times even the weaker criteria like confirmability, precisifiability and predictability within a given margin of error are commended in the areas of 'soft' sciences. But the main problem is that history is not regarded as science at all, at least not among the English-speaking people. Though in German *Geschichte* (or *Historie*) is often regarded as *Wissenschaft* (science), but the sense of the latter in German is different from that of 'history' in English, *Wissenschaft* is not necessarily *Naturwissenschaft* (natural science).

Earlier it has been suggested that neither historical reality nor the subject matter of *itihāsa* or *purāṇa* is *independent* of the historian's mind and contemporary readers of the works on history. Because history, which is written or re-written now, that is, at present, must be influenced by the historian's mind, his value judgment, prejudices and biases. The ideal of total elimination of the subjective factors from the historian's mind or for that reason any human mind is unachievable. An element of fallibility is built into the very finite mind of all humans, all writers of history, *itihāsa, purāṇa* and even auto-biography. We often fail to recollect our own past. Certainly one cannot remember one's own past life in its totality. It is only in the infinite mind of God, it is said, as it has been said by Ranke, that every segment of time—past, present and future—and whatever happens therein are *immediate*. By implication what is conceded is: whatever is thought of or reconstructed as event or fact by the *human* mind is mediate, mediated by some sort of interpretation, imagination etc. An element of 'fabrication' seems to be there in every humanly available 'fact'. The point has been forcefully argued by philosophers like Nelson Goodman.[15] 'One and the same' world, the real and objective world, has been and is being made and remade, interpreted and reinterpreted in different ways. This can be illustrated not only by referring to the cosmogonies and cosmologies found by anthropologists in different cultures but also from the history of philosophical and scientific cosmologies. We all know that 'one and the same' universe has been differently theorized by scientists or natural philosophers like Ptolemy, Copernicus and Newton. Even today the scientists are not unanimous about the nature of the relation between *quanta* and *field*. The popular belief that the scientific theories, unlike historical judgments, command universal acceptance is seriously mistaken.

In spite of the attending difficulties of notion of objectivity, I believe in the possibility of attaining some sort of objectivity in history.

Objectivity is to be understood as intersubjectivity, common sharability of views and values of *other* persons at *other* times and belonging to *different* cultures. This concept of objectivity is not due either to Ranke or his student Burckhardt. Ranke's God's eye-view of history, based on critically sorted and sifted evidence or source materials, seems to me only ideal typical. Enormity and complexity of evidence recognized by Ranke in his historiography do not make historical judgments more definitive than cultural judgments highly recommended by Burckhardt.

Historical objectivity may be likened to juristic objectivity. The judge in the court of law tries to be objective in his judgment (*i*) by rising above his personal or subjective inclinations, (*ii*) by relying on direct and circumstantial evidence, and (*iii*) by following the laws of the land, including those of evidence. But, on scrutiny, it becomes clear that each one of these factors is variable or inconstant. For example, there is a limit beyond which one cannot be impersonal. Obviously one cannot jump out of one's own skin or scheme of thought. God's-eye-view of any case is not available to any human judge. Secondly, every evidence, direct or indirect, perceptual or inferential, is subject to error. Thirdly and finally, laws are amended and revised from time to time. All these considerations strongly suggest that the juristic notion of objectivity is not above question and correction. And that explains why judgments of a lower court can on appeal be taken up by higher courts for stay, revision or rejection. Over the years even the same court changes its position.

Even after admitting all these limitations, we do recognize the possibility of objective judgment and have respect for court's verdict. Neither the judge nor the historian should be expected to deliver a judgment which is unconditionally and permanently valid.

In our anxiety to be objective, objective in terms of evidence, we should not forget that evidence itself is the result of an act of judgment. The value of every evidence or set of evidences, confirmatory or infirmatory, establishing or disestablishing, is limited and never conclusive.

Historical objectivity is primarily an epistemological, not ontological, notion. I say 'primarily' because in history I am realist of a sort. I do not believe, perhaps no historian does believe, that the event which he claims to have established is his own construct. Historical events are partly due to the historian's judgment and partly to the source materials which, at least to cetain extent, are independent of him and his judgment.

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Centre for Studies in Civilizations   D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA
Delhi and Calcutta

Towards a Mutuality of Explorations and the Limits of Assertions:
A Dialogue on Self, Society and the Other

Ontology as a state of affairs can afford sleep. But love cannot sleep . . . Love is the incessant watching over of the other . . .

EMMANUAL LEVINAS (1995)
Ethics of the Infinite, p. 195

Once the participants in dialogue have let go of clinging to their own points of view, the second stage begins—the resynthesis. People discover they can listen to each other in a new way, that there is some common ground to be discovered . . .

DONAH ZOHAR & IAN MARSHALL (1994),
Quantum Society: Mind, Physics and the New Social Vision, p. 237

Review of any work is a work of dialogue. This dialogue begins with a description of the *weltanschauung* and the arguments of the author but in the process seeks to widen the universe of discourse. The act of criticism here has no axe to grind but seeks to explore the truths about the human condition in a spirit of mutuality where both the critic and the author are co-travellers. If the critic were to totally subscribe to the foundational assumptions of the author then can an act of criticism lead to a widening of the universe of discourse and enable us to raise new questions and understand the multi-dimensional constitution of the object of discourse and the subject of meditation? At the same time, if in the name of critical encounter a critic superimposes his own beliefs on the text and the author then is an understanding possible in the first place? I believe that the task of criticism is to overcome the temptations of both and to pursue one's journey in a spirit of what Jurgen Habermas (1996) calls 'cooperative search for truth' in which both the critic and the author are fellow travellers. I have followed such an approach to criticism in my dialogue with Professor Govind Chandra Pande in his book, *Bharatiya Samaj: Eitihashik Aur Tattwik Vivechan.* Therefore, I am at pains to read Dr. Badri Narayan Tewari's allegation about the massacre of meaning of the text that supposedly takes place in my review. It is certainly true that a text has multiple meanings and a reviewer focusses on some (because this is what is humanly possible) but that does not

mean that this leads to a hierarchy of meanings nor their massacre. To begin one's response with such charges unfortunately does not help in the further continuance of a dialogue. I am grateful to Tewari for writing a rejoinder to my essay, but it would have been helpful if he had spent a little time in exploring the 'remaining and untouched aspects of the book' that he refers to and I have supposedly left out.

It would also have been helpful if Tewari had tried to make a dialogue with my whole argument rather than the ones with which he disagrees. For example, Tewari differs with me on the issue of self-knowledge. I raise the question of self-delusion towards the end of a long paragraph in which I seek to understand a number of issues for making self-knowledge the foundation of sociological knowledge, as Professor Pande envisions. For facilitating the present conversation, I repeat these concerns:

> Pande's arguments to make self-knowledge the foundation of sociological knowledge is exciting but raises a number of questions. How self-knowledge is going to be the foundation of sociological knowledge? Pande suggests that this should be in both a constitutive and an objective sense. In a constitutive sense, it means that the self-knowledge of the subject of inquiry is an important factor in the study of society. But what are the processes by which self-knowledge of the student of society becomes sociological? Through a deeper knowledge of one's self—its transcendental dimension as well as interactive dimension—one can have illuminative knowledge about society. But knowledge of the transcendental universalism of self is not the same as that of its interactive universalism. Fields of social scientific inquiry such as anthropology and psychology have all along emphasized the significance of self-knowledge of the students of society and culture but have always invited us to understand the complexity of the problem and process of movement from one level to the other. Moreover, even in their critique of positivism, they have pointed to us the significance of evidence. True in sociology, validity can not be scientific and has to be interpretative but how do we establish the interpretative validity of our self-knowledge? How do we distinguish between self-knowledge and self-delusion? (Giri 1997: 174-5).

It would have been helpful if Tewari had thought through all these issues. At the same time, his admittance that 'if self-knowledge is inconstant or fails to deliver one from suffering, it is reasonably

suspect' can enable us to see beneath all the claims of self-knowledge.

But when we come to the next two paragraphs we are in the company of a lot of puzzles and unfortunately of assertions, too. Consider here the following lines of Tiwari: 'It must, however, be remembered that self-knowledge in its transcendental aspect differs from empirical and logical constructs.' This itself suggests that the transcendental aspect of self-knowledge is only one aspect of it. What are its other aspects? It has been my argument that self has both a transcendental dimension as well as an interactive dimension. But how does the transcendental knowledge of the self relate to its interactive universe? This question remains unanswered and the following line again makes assertions but does not help us come to terms with this central question: 'In so far as self-knowledge is transcendental, it is self-authenticating.' This again makes clear that all self-knowledge is not transcendental. By Tewari's arguments, self-knowledge becomes self-authenticating when it is transcendental. But what happens to the problem of authenticity when self-knowledge is not transcendental? But even when transcendental, and granted that this self-knowledge is self-authenticating, how is this shared with others and perceived by others? One may consider one's knowledge self-authenticating but others may not consider it so. In such a situation, how do we go beyond the binding of ontology and meet the world on its own terms? The challenge of communication, sharing and mutual validation is integral to any knowledge and that is why I believe that an agenda of self-knowledge cannot be non-chalant about the question of validity. Of course, this validity, as I have argued in my essay, is not merely scientific but interpretative where the self and the other arrive at points of mutual validation through dialogue and deliberations.

Immediately after this line about 'self-authenticating knowledge', Tewari writes: 'The interactive knowledge of self and other or knowledge of persons as social objects is different from the transcendental knowledge ultimately presupposed in societal knowledge which directly is based on empirical self-consciousness.' This sentence is based on a lot of unsubstantiated presuppositions and makes assertions which ought to be argued out and looked into closely. This suggests that the empirical knowledge of self and the other is different from the transcendental knowledge. It may be so but that does not free itself from the responsibility of relationship, i.e. the relationship between transcendental knowledge and empirical knowledge. Moreover, even for Tewari, 'empirical self-consciousness' is not

insignificant since by his own admission societal knowledge is directly based on it. Moreover, the above line of Tewari suggests that in societal knowledge, transcendental knowledge and empirical self-consciousness meet. But how do they meet? In what way they talk to each other and mutually transform? I was eagerly looking for help in coming to terms with this challenge while going through Professor Pande's book. Instead of thinking through some of these issues which confront a reader, Tewari defends the positions with which he feels at home and further asserts that transcendental knowledge is presupposed in societal knowledge? How?

Frankly speaking, I am unable to understand what Tewari means by the 'magic circle of transcendental illusion'. Tewari writes with enviable certainty that 'sociology as an empirical discipline cannot escape the magic circle of transcendental illusion' which should make any of us applaud him in these days of deconstruction. He looks at sociology in a formulated eye. Sociology and its kin anthropology are empirical disciplines and modern thought has to be grateful to these fields of inquiry for urging us to realize the significance of paying attention to the facts, empirical details and the configuration of human relationships as they exist and unfold in this world. Speculative philosophy certainly has its use but it is always enriching if it is combined with a dialogue with people's experience. Certainly the knowledge that is produced from such a dialogue with people and the facts of their living is not absolute and may not have the status of what Tewari calls but rarely defines 'transcendental knowledge' but for that matter such a knowledge does not become an illusion. Moreover, while sociology and anthropology are empirical pursuits they are not bereft of post-empirical philosophical and theoretical reflections. Both sociology and anthropology today consider it their vocation to be attentive to both facts and interpretations. In this context, what noted theoretical anthropologist Tim Ingold writes helps us to clarify the vocation of sociology and philosophy:

> If we study ourselves it is because we (men and women, adults and children) are all fellow travellers on this earth, and because we care about where we have come from and where we are going. In fieldwork we go to study with, or under, other people who become our guides and tutors. And we do so because the knowledge that these people can impart to us, sharpened as it is by their practical experience of everyday involvement in the world, can help us to reach a deeper and richer understanding of the human predicament. Philosophers, of course, have speculated

on this predicament for centuries, and might even claim such activity as their special preserve. Rarely if ever, however, do they enlist the help of ordinary people in their enterprise, or test their insights against the wisdom of common sense. Anthropology is a kind of philosophy too, but it is not so exclusive. . . . *Anthropology is a philosophy with the people in.*

And it is needless here to add that sociology is also philosophy with people in.

But for Tewari, it seems, 'the knowledge of the people is a matter of common sense and one does not need sociology in order to have the knowledge of "oneself" in relation to another on dynamic interaction'. But is the knowledge of the continued relationship between the self and the other that self-evident? Moreover, the relationship between the self and the other does not include the face-to-face interactions but many webs of relationships which bind one even with the farthest on the globe and cosmos. Is all this knowledge self-evident? Even in the face-to-face interactions among people psychoanalysts tell us how enriched our relationship can be if we relate to each other with a measure of therapeutic touch and subtlety. This, of course, does not mean that we deride our common sense and make it subservient to the claimed professional expertise of sociology or psychology. What is certainly true is that at present the relationship between self and the other is full of much antagonism and hostility at all levels—from the personal to the impersonal to the transpersonal. Students of sociology and anthropology believe that both the pursuits of knowledge through their description of the dynamics of human relationships at work at different levels can enable participants to transcend their egos and see the world through a third eye, through the eye of the mid-point of relationships. It is to be noted that such a belief in the work of description to engender a critical reflective consciousness in us is emphatically stressed in our recent times by none other than a philosopher. Richard Rorty tells us in the very beginning of his *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity:* 'Human solidarity is to be achieved not by enquiry but by imagination, the imaginative ability to describe our strangers, those who are different from ourselves and to redescribe ourselves. This is task not for theory but for genres such as ethnography' (Rorty 1989: xvi).

Thus sociology is an invitation to understand the dynamics of life as it unfolds in the field of self, culture and society. It is not primarily concerned with prediction and we should only remember Max Weber

who nearly a century ago had taught us that the primary vocation of sociology is understanding. The significance of sociological understanding lies in the fact that our everyday life may be full of conventions and may be islands of what Jurgen Habermas (1990) calls 'problematic justice'. Tewari believes that the knowledge of the self and the other is 'given to everyman in his moral consciousness'. Such a view takes for granted that the everyday consciousness of humans is also a moral consciousness. But the everyday consciousness a person can be immoral as well. When Guru Dronācārya sent the seeking Eklavya back to the jungle refusing him to teach, he might be operating within the realm of existing conventions but was his consciousness moral? It is a deeper reflection on what we take for granted as facts of everyday life that enables us to make a distinction between the conventional morality of a Dronācārya which masks injustice and unpardonable annihilation of human dignity and the calling of post-conventional moral developments (Giri 1998a; 1998b). The significance of sociological seeking to understand life lies in its humble aspiration to contribute to the cultivation and growth of a post-conventional moral development in society where society is not sufficiently aware of and wakeful towards its divine potentiality and possibilities. Such a sociological seeking contributes to an enriched self-understanding as well. As Anthony Giddens, the doyen of the sociologists of our times, tells us:

'As individuals, all of us know a great deal about ourselves and about societies in which we live, yet there are definite boundaries to such self-knowledge . . . people make many common sense judgements about themselves and others which turn out to be wrong, partial or ill-informed. Sociological research both helps us to identify the limitations of our social judgements and at the same time 'feeds back' into our knowledge of ourselves and the social environment. . . . [In this context] Sociology can provide self-enlightenment, increased self-understanding' (Giddens 1993: 17-18, 23). And closer to home, as Professor Andre Beteille, who has devoted a life-long career to the task of sociological understanding, tells us: 'We must surely deplore the mystification of the simple through the display of technical virtuosity; but we must also recognize that common sense is not always successful, by its own unaided effort, in making complex things simple' (Beteille 1996: 2361).

It should be clear to the readers by now how unfortunate it is that Tewari should look at sociology as a child of imperialism. Apart from its lack of veracity at the contemporary juncture such an indictment

raises wider questions about the way we carry our cross-disciplinary conversations. If two disciplines start throwing stones at each other from their own walls of home-grown truths, then what is the possibility for creating a mid-point where both can stand and continue to learn from each other? In India, cross-disciplinary conversation is a new field of inquiry and as we are engaged in this, it requires humility from all of us concerned (Giri 1998d). In this context what Herbert Simon has written can help us to go beyond the disciplinary chauvinism of both sociology and philosophy: 'When in economics, there is no substitute for talking the language of marginal analysis and regression analysis—even (or especially) when your purpose is to demonstrate their limitations. . . . Immediately upon landing on alien shores, you must begin to acquire the local culture, not with the aim of denying your origins, but so that you can gain the full respect of the natives' (Simon 1992: 269).

From these wider issues of cross-disciplinary conversations, now let us come to Tewari's points about the self and the other. For Tewari, self-knowledge is not individual's knowledge of oneself. Then, what it is? I agree with Tewari that 'the whole quest of self-knowledge is to move beyond the separateness of selves'. But this quest does not make it redundant and irrelevant the continued fact of separation of selves at a given point of time. Tewari is certainly right that I begin with a plurality of selves but these selves, I also believe, are not egotistic monads (cf. Harvey 1996) but share a dimension of universality in the constitution of both, particularity and plurality. In fact, this constitutive universality—as an ideal, value and a fact of life—connects particularly with plurality making habitation of selves in a shared space possible. But I do not therefore subscribe to the 'ultimacy of their empirical particularity'. What I am interested to explore is the shared space that this plurality of selves inhabits and seeks to create. For me the empirical self is not ultimate, what is my ultimate concern is the ethics and aesthetics of relationships—relationships which touch both the ground of immanence and the sky of transcendence.

I also believe that by privileging either the self or the other we cannot adequately prepare ourselves for the calling of the ethics and aesthetics of relationships. In a recent essay 'The Calling of an Ethics of Servanthood', I have discussed the problems that afflict us when we privilege the self as the Vedāntins do and the other as the contemporary deconstructionists such as Jacques Derrida (see Giri 1998c). What I argue is that relationship requires dialogue between the self and the other and this I do not, because, as Tewari alludes,

'the goal of overcoming the distinction of self and other may not be actually realizable'. I turn to the other because in the name of over-coming the distinction between the self and the other, the self has sought to swallow the other. As I have argued in my review essay on Professor Pande, I find it problematic that 'the only way to know the other is through self-knowledge and empathy', as Tewari argues. In order to know the other one has to come out of oneself and touch the face of the other on her own terms. This, of course, does not mean absolutizing or reifying the other but to bend one's knee before the face of the other and to share her pain and be responsible for her growth (cf. Levinas 1995). This is crucial to a friendship and love between the self and the other and in leading an ethical life of what Emmanuel Levinas (1995: 195) calls 'permanent wakefulness'. I also turn to the other because the other does not vanish just because the Vedāntins assume, believe and assert that the self is universal and all-pervasive. It is true that the Vedāntins speak of 'unitive self-conscious-ness' (cf. Chakraborty 1995), but this self-consciousness now has to probe the nature of this unity in the light of the movement of differen-tiation and the celebration of difference that has taken place in the course of evolution and history. The contemporary discursive move-ment of deconstruction as well as the socio-political movement of ongoing democratization have reiterated the significance of difference and now the Vedāntic self has to come to terms with it instead of asserting its universality and transcendental knowledge. If the self is universal, then let its universality be demonstrated and embodied in webs of care and love rather than asserted!

The concluding comments of Tewari relate to my argument about Advaita Vedānta and Quantum Physics. He is right that I do not explore the pathways between Sāṃkhya and Quantum Physics and this is an important criticism. Regarding *my* point about the equivalence about the distinction between *Brāhmaṇa* and *Śūdra* and *Puruṣa* and *Prākṛti*, I had made a metaphorical point but this is a metaphor which is so close to experience despite the recent movement of emancipation of the depressed castes. In my review essay I did not argue that Professor Pande defends current caste system. Nobody can defend it really! But the very fact that Śūdras were debarred from reading the Vedas in the vedic time is written by Professor Pande himself in the book under discussion. Professor Pande (p. 70) writes: '*Adhyana nishedhvi śudras ke liye sirf Veda adhyan kā thā, nā ki adhyana matraki* [Insofar as exclusion from reading was concerned, the Śūdras were only debarred from reading the Vedas, not from other kinds of

reading]'. As I have already argued in my review essay, Professor Pande does not find it problematic that the Śūdras were debarred from reading the Vedas even though they supposedly did not have any such restriction in reading other materials.[1]

Finally, about the demand of my description! As readers and participants of a conversation, all of us have so much to learn from an engaging master interlocutor of our times such as Professor Pande. I do not have the audacity to take Professor Pande to task for his silence on the demolition of the Babri Masjid. But when the past[2] and the present so viciously flow into each other as it happens in contemporary India, Tewari's defensive reactions to my eagerness to learn about Professor Pande's public stance on this issue smacks of evasion of responsibility. When the fundamentalists are using the same language of *Sanātana Dharma* to kill human beings, destroy our places of worship and grab power for the sake of ego-aggrandizement then we can certainly expect our historians and philosophers to help us meet with these forces of destruction with the resources of a caring and responsible spirituality—a spirituality that is prepared to die for the sake of Truth and for the celebration of Life.

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1. In this context, what Amartya Sen (1997: 33) writes deserves our careful attention: 'When in the 11th century, the Arab-Iranian mathematician Alberuni came to India, and studied extensively Indian mathematics, astronomy, general sciences, linguistics and history, he already spoke of the real deprivation of "those castes who are not allowed to occupy themselves with science". That substantive deprivation remains largely untouched even today (after nearly a millenium), with half of the adult population of India (and nearly two-thirds of the adult women) still illiterate, and there is very little evidence except in some specific regions, of a serious effort to bring education and science to the large mass of the citizens of India.'

2. Here again, Amartya Sen's arguments are helpful: 'The interpretation of India's past cannot but be sensitive to the concerns of today. Our identities cannot be defined independently of our traditions and past, but this does not indicate a linear sequence whereby we interpret our past first, and then arrive at our identity, equipped to face contemporary issues. On the contrary, our reading of the past and understanding of the present are inter-dependent . . . .' (Sen 1997: 35).

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Madras Institute of Development Studies,   ANANTA KUMAR GIRI
Chennai

A Comment on Dr. R.C. Pradhan's Article 'Persons as Minded Beings: Towards a Metaphysics of Persons'

Dr. R.C. Pradhan in his thought-provoking article 'Persons as minded beings: towards a metaphysics of persons', published in *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 3, 1998, has tried to establish that human beings are persons or selves who transcend and also survive their bodies and thus have what he calls 'metaphysical absoluteness'. Well, in a sense persons do, in fact, transcend and survive their bodies. I am at the moment here in India, but I can in intellect be roaming at this very moment

in front of St. Peter's College, Oxford. So, in a sense I can transcend my body. Gandhi no longer exists, but he still lives in the memory of millions and billions of people. In this sense Gandhi does, indeed, survive his body. And in this sense even the physical objects can survive their physical extinction. The ancient Indian river Saraswati does not exist now, but it has been immortalized, as it were, not only in the minds of the historians and geographers who have studied ancient India but also in those of a vast multitude of educated people.

But, perhaps, Dr. Pradhan in his article does not seem to accept the above senses of 'transcendence' and 'survival'. Nor does he want to accept a person's or self's ability to transcend and capacity to survive his body on the ground of a person or self being a soul-substance. He says, '. . . in order to be a self, it need not be a soul-substance; all that is needed is the person's capacity to distance himself or herself from the body. The person as a self is a transcendent being in this limited sense' (p. 22).

In the above quotation the phrase 'capacity to distance' is, indeed, crucial, because the thought it symbolizes is the sole basis of Dr. Pradhan's argument in support of the metaphysical absoluteness of persons. Is the verb 'distance' used here in the literal sense of physical distancing? Does a person possess in himself or herself a capacity to transfer or posit his or her self at some physical distance from his or her body? Or, is this capacity to distance just a capacity to think in *intellectu* that the self is not just the body but something other than it or something more besides? If it is just the latter, obviously distancing cannot have any ontological implication. Furthermore, what is this capacity to distance or trancsend? Undoubtedly it is just a disposition of the person concerned, which actualizes itself under suitable conditions. And when the person possessing this *capacity* dies, this capacity too, along with all his other capacities, ceases to exist. Now, if the distancing of the self from the body is not literal but just metaphorical and if capacities do not have any ontological permanence, how can persons be regarded as having any metaphysical character on the ground of their having merely a capacity to distance? But Dr. Pradhan is very emphatic about persons 'having some sort of metaphysical permanence'. He says: 'The persons are metaphysical beings who . . . must claim an ontological reality. . . . Two features of the persons must be noted here: one is their metaphysical essence that lies in their being minded beings, that is, in their being conscious; and the other is their unity or solidity which lies in their being not open to dissolution or dissipation in the non-physical sense' (p. 22).

The first feature of persons' being minded or being conscious is quite understandable; but how is the second feature of persons' being not open to dissolution or their metaphysical absoluteness or, perhaps more candidly, their eternality arrived at by Dr. Pradhan? To argue on the paltry basis of a person's capacity to distance himself or herself not *in re* but in *intellectu* that he or she is eternal or metaphysically absolute is, to say the least, a queer feat of logical ingenuity.

P.G. Deptt. of Philosophy, Dahua House   N. Mishra
Tilkhmanjhi, Bhagalpur 812001

"Have the Neo-Naiyāyikas been leading us up the Garden Path"

Prof. Prahladachar has, in his essay entitled 'On the Krodapatras', brought to the notice of modern logicians an unique type polemical literature in Indian logic in which certain logical and other concepts discussed in Nyāya texts and commentaries are analytically elaborated with utmost precision so that they can be treated as foolproof. In Neo-Indian logic Kāliśankar, Candranārāyaṇa, Neelkaṇtha, Ramśastry, etc. are quite well known as authors of Krodapatras (the etymological meaning of the word is 'marginal notes' and these do not deal with *sentences as Daya Krishna writes*). Prahladachar has instanced a few concepts (logical and epistemic) or properties which these authors have ingeniously elaborated so as to make them invulnerable to any logical drawback. Since Prahladachar's explanation of the logical elaborations (called *anugamas*; the etymological meaning of the word being 'generalized logical formulations') is somewhat technical. We are giving below a simple elucidation of a few of these elaborations. It is not possible to deal with all the different elaborations here; the main purpose of the elucidations being to highlight the extraordinary logical acumen of the great Nyāya scholars. After the elucidations we give extracts from Daya Krishna's comments on the elaborations to show how wide off the mark, distorting (of the nature of the elaborations) and even erroneous these comments are. Since the comments are very lengthy and uniformly of the same character from beginning to end, only the first few pages of them are critically considered here. Students of Nyāya are sure to be dumbfounded to read these comments.

Prahladachar starts with Gaṅgeśa's definition of the fallacies of reason in his account. As per this definition a fallacy of reason is one whose cognition is preventive of the inferential cognition in which the reason plays the part of the middle term. For example the false inference, 'The lake is afire because there arises smoke from it' is opposed by the true cognition, 'the lake is devoid of fire'. In this definition the term 'whose cognition' calls for precisification because, the lake and the lake devoid of fire being identical even the cognition of the *mere lake* can be treated as the cognition of the *lake as devoid of fire*. But the cognition of the mere lake is not preventive of the said inference. Raghunātha Śiromaṇī, the great commentator of *Tattvacintāmaṇī*, anticipates this objection and tries to meet it by elaborating the term 'whose cognition' as 'the cognition of a qualificand as determined by its qualifier'. The cognition of the 'mere lake' is not such and so it is excluded from the purview of the definition of fallacy. Gadādhara, the eminent sub-commentator of Raghunāth's commentary has sought a further elaboration in the meaning of the term 'whose cognition' on the above ground itself. The mere lake is the same as the lake as qualified by the absence of fire. So the cognition of the mere lake may also be regarded as the cognition of the qualified lake. To exclude this cognition the meaning of the above term has to be modified to read as 'the cognition whose preventive nature is determined (*avaccheda*) by the cognitive relation having the specific property of the determinate cognition as its limitor (*avacchīdaka*). The preventive nature of the cognition of the lake as devoid of fire is delimited by the property '*Lakeness* qualified by the absence of fire'. Here the qualificatory relation between lakeness and the absence of fire is coexistence as the lake is the locus of both lakeness and the absence. The relation is not '*swarūpa*' as Daya Krishna suggests because the absence is always present in lakeness by this relation. So there would be no point in mentioning the qualification of lakeness by the absence by the *swarūpa* relation. Kālīśankar, the famous author of a Krodapatra has raised an important question here. He asks, 'What exactly is the property that is supposed to delimit the preventive nature of the fallacy-cognition'? Evidently the property as suggested above would be the property lakeness as coexistent with the absence of fire. Now taking objection to the foregoing elaboration, Kālīśankar says that even a cognition like 'Something is endowed with lakeness as coexistent with the absence of fire' is tailormade to the above description of the preventive cognition. But it does not prevent the inference of the form 'the lake is on fire' because 'the lake as lake' is not the

qualificandum in the cognition. Here one may enter a caveat against the further elaboration of the foregoing term that Kālīśankar suggests. Kālīśankar's relevant Krodapatra is not before the present writer. So he has to depend upon what Prahladachar has given as Kālīśankar's answer to the above objection. The caveat is to the effect that the modification in the composition of the *qualifier* cannot meet the objection. It is the nature of the qualificandum that needs to be precisely specified to ward off the objection. In the above example, the qualificandum remains undelimited by any property which renders the said cognition ineffective as preventer.

From all this explanation it will be clear that all these eminent logicians are concerned with precisifying the exact logical structure of the determinate cognition that can prevent another determinate cognition. Prahladachar has referred to and explained some other concepts also which are elaborated by Kālīśankar and Candranārāyaṇa. But this much elucidation coupled with an account of what Daya Krishna says regarding it in his comments will suffice to show how irrelevant, distorting and even erroneous the statements in *Daya Krishna's comments are.*

1. Daya Krishna's first objection is that Gāngeśa's definition does not take into account the distinction between the one who gives the arguments (the word is used for inference) and the one who only receives it. Gāngeśa's definition is inadequate as he does not take into account the distinction between *svārthānumāna* and *parārthanumāna.* One is stunned to read this. Does the cognition 'the lake is devoid of fire' cease to contradict the inferential cognition 'the lake is afire' if the inference is for oneself or for others? The psychological processes involved in the two kinds of inferences may be different from each other but they do not affect the contradictory natures of the two cognitions.

2. Daya Krishna's second objection goes like this: 'the term *dhumāt* in the stock example only means that the ground of this inference is the perception of smoke *but not directly the perception of fire itself. The hidden ground of this inference is the adage* 'where there is smoke there is fire' but even this ground of the formulation is faulty, for the terms 'where' and 'there' are ambiguous (italics mine). From this excerpt from the comments it is obvious that according to Daya Krishna it is *the direct perception of fire* that is the ground of *the inference of fire.* What is one to say of such a perverse statement? Further, how can the concomitance of smoke and fire be regarded as the *hidden ground* of the inference of fire and in what sense can the statement of the

concomitance be called *an adage?* Moreover the meanings of the adverbs 'where' and 'there' are quite obvious even to school-going children. If a logical formulation of the meaning is needed it is given by Nyāya in terms of what is called *vyāpya-vyāpakabhāva* even in elementary texts of Nyāya.

3. The third objection trotted out by Daya Krishna is, in his own words this: 'the second definition of fallacy given by Gāngeśa would not be able to distinguish between the statements' 'the mountain is fiery because there is smoke' and the statement 'the lake is fiery because there is smoke in it'. Even though the latter is obviously fallacious while the former is not. The reason why the second statement is supposed to be fallacious is that 'there seems to be *a priori knowledge* that water, by its very nature cannot have the characteristic of having fire in it. But it is never discussed in the tradition how one obtains this knowledge about it.'

A grosser misinterpretation of the criticized passage printed on page 101 (of the said elaboration) can rarely be imagined यद्विषयकत्वेन. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi suggests a slight modification by replacing यद्विषयकत्वेन by यद्वपावाच्छिन्न विषयकत्वेन. Suppose this modification is not made, then the definition would not be applicable to any fallacy for, since mere '*hrada*' is identical with '*hrada* qualified by *vahnyabhāva*' but the cognition of mere '*hrada*' does not prevent the inferential cognition '*hrado vahniman*'.

Evidently the absurd statements of Daya Krishna are the result of a gross misunderstanding of the simple fact stated here that the qualified lake and the mere lake being identical, the cognition of the mere lake is not preventive of inference and thus the definition cannot apply to the fallacy of the *bādha,* which the cognition of the lake devoid of fire represents. In view of this simple fact the aforementioned remarks that there seems to be *a priori knowledge* that water cannot have fire in it, that it is never discussed in the tradition how one obtains this knowledge, that even a mountain can never have fire unless there is a forest cover on it, that water cannot only get very hot but also boil and burn, that Rama is supposed to have burnt the ocean or threatened to burn it and so on and on, which follow the foregoing remark leave the reader simply *aghast.* Does all this aberration have any place in any strictly logical discussion of the nature of the fallacies of reason?

4. The above fantastic objections are sought to be justified by Daya Krishna on the ground that 'the traditional Nyāya logician seems

never to have carefully distinguished between the logical and the empirical . . . and (so) he is continuously faced with problems arising from the absence of such a distinction'. This means that those who accept this distinction do not have to worry 'whether mountains have fire or not or whether some lakes will always be devoid of water or not!' One wonders what the said distinction has to do with the definition of fallacy.

5. Regarding the modifications introduced into the definition of fallacy referred to earlier, Daya Krishna says nonchallantly that 'these definitions have to do with the absence of *the vyāpti relation* of the *hetu* and *sādhya*'. On the basis of this utterly erroneous suggestion Daya Krishna goes on to reprimand the authors of the Krodapatras 'for confining their discussion to the specific example of the fallacious inference that the lake is on fire because there is smoke in it.' How appropriate is this admonition that the discussion of the fallacy should deal with the *vyāpti* of *hetu* and the *sādhya* instead of the fallacious inference prevented by the fallacy of cognition!!

6. A more perverse misrepresentation faces the reader just two sentences ahead of this where it is said that 'to put the same thing in Nyāya terminology . . . it is the absence of the *fireness in waterness which obstructs the process of inference*'. What has this absence to do with the inference that 'there is fire in lake?' First, it is absence-cognition not absence which obstructs the said inference. Secondly the preventer absence-cognition concerns the absence of *fire in water, not of fireness in waterness*.

7. Daya Krishna attributes to Kālīsankar forgetfulness concerning the fact 'that there can be such a thing as a dry lake and such a lake where there is no water is not a contradiction in terms'. One becomes tongue-tied in face of such shocking remarks.

8. The relation of *sāmanādhikaraṇya* or coexistence connecting the absence of fire with lakeness referred to at the beginning invites similarly ridiculous objections in the comment. There the fantastic remark is made (p. 125) that 'this is no solution at all as the basic question is whether the absence of fire is accidental or necessary'. There is absolutely no occasion here to discuss this. The issue being discussed by Kālīsankar is that *vahnyabhāvavalrhrdatva* being the property limiting the preventive nature of the cognition of the form *vahnyabhāvavan hṛdatva* what relation connects *vahnyabhāva* and *hṛdatva*. As this cannot but be coexistence as the lake is the colocus of fire-absence and lakeness. *Swarūpa*, of course, is the connecting relation between fire-absence and the lake.

One may thus go on and on pointing out all kinds of solecisms in the comments without coming across a single point that is either relevant to the discussion in the Krodapatra or is in itself logically sustainable either from the Western or the Indian viewpoint. This is why Prahladachar reacting to the comments says with tongue in the cheek that the 'observations made (by Daya Krishna) miss to recognise the philosophical points that emerge from the discussions and to evaluate them'. V.N. Jha, to whom the comments were referred, is more explicit when he says that 'it appears that nobody has made the fundamentals of *navyanyāya* clear to you (Daya Krishna)'.

If the present writer were to voice his honest reaction to the comments he would be forced to say that the whole thing is a tremendous joke which has unwittingly perhaps botched the penetrating logical insights (of geniuses like Kālīsankar, Candranārāyaṇa, etc.) which would have done honour even to the greatest contemporary logicians of the West.

474-A, Professors' Colony,   N.S. DRAVID
Hanuman Nagar, Nagpur-440009

Comments on Daya Krishna's Article: 'The Myth of the *Prasthāna Trayī*'

Coming to your article on *Prasthāna Trayī*, I am told that the followers of Yamunācārya depended on the *Harivaṃsaṃ* and not *Srimad-bhāgavata*. Being a Vaiṣṇavite who has been studying the traditional works, especially Svāmi Nārāyaṇa as the one who added the *Viṣṇusahasranāma* to the list of 'authoritative texts', Parasara Bhattar's commentary on the *Sri Viṣṇusahasranāma*, titled *Sri Bhāgavad Guṇa Darpaṇa* is used by the Sri Vaiṣṇavite widely in their discourses and hence the *Sahasranāma* must have gained scriptural importance by the time of Rāmānuja. The Maṇipravala commentatorial tradition has gained much from this emphasis on the various 'names' of the Lord.

91, South Chitral Street   PREMA NANDA KUMAR
Sri Rangam, Trichirapalli-620006

An apology and an explanation

The readers of the *JICPR*, or at least some of them, might have been surprised to find that in the article entitled 'The Myth of the *Prasthāna Trayī* (published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XVI, No. 1), I had not referred to or discussed the points raised by Prof. R. Balasubramanian in his rejoinder to my article entitled 'Vedānta in the First Millenium AD: A Retrospective Illusion imposed by the Historiography of Indian Philosophy' published in the *JICPR* Special Issue entitled 'Historiography of Civilizations', June, 1996. The Rejoinder of Prof. R. Balasubramanian was published in the *JICPR*, Volume XIV, No. 1, and entitled 'Dayakrishna's Retrospective Delusion'.

It is a 'moral' lapse in the academic context and is unpardonable, especially as both the article and the rejoinder were published in the same Journal. In fact, Prof. Balasubramanian must have been surprised to find no mention of his extended critique on the very same issue

which I was discussing in my paper and which was published later. I owe an apology both to him and the readers for this grave omission.

The simple explanation for this is that I had postponed reading Prof. Balasubramanian's rejoinder as I thought I would take it into consideration along with the comments of the others on my article and try to reply to them later. Also, as the issue of the '*Prasthāna Trayī*' was not the main subject of discussion in my paper on 'Vedānta in the First Millenium AD', I had no reason to suspect that Prof. Balasubramanian had dealt with it also in his Rejoinder.

As now that all the comments on my paper 'Vedānta in the First Millenium AD' have been received and published in the *JICPR*, I propose to discuss the relevant points raised by them including the one relating to the '*Prasthāna Trayī*' and what will be said there about it may be taken as a supplement to the article on the '*Prasthāna Trayī*' published in the *JICPR*, VOL. XVI, No. 1.

My apologies once again to the readers of the *JICPR* and to Prof. R. Balasubramanian, for this involuntary 'lapse' on my part.

DAYA KRISHNA

Historiography: a Tantalizing Situation

I feel very much delighted to have received the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* to which great luminaries of historiography have contributed thought provoking articles, illuminating various aspects of historiography.

D.P. Chattopadhyaya, in his introductory address has provided a perspective to comprehend and contemplate the Indian socio-cultural pluriformity, forgetting that geo-historical fact, based on religio-cultural oriented hypothetical assumption, has bifurcated and distributed the whole world into two hemispheres, namely (*a*) religious hemisphere, and (*b*) materialistic hemisphere.

The religious hemisphere, no doubt, has tremendous feedback in terms of religio-cultural literature that has framed the intellectual mode of mind and consciousness to conceive and structuralize the material world in the framework of abstractions, metaphors, similies, allegories, signs, myths and archetypes, ascribed to intellectual romanticism, from which all religious ideologies might have emanated, confronting other embedded opposite currents, intending to religate the materialistic position of the world to the extent to entrap and entangle the human mind in the self-consciousness and self-realization, constructing the spiritual blocks in the formation of mind.

The materialistic position holders tried their best to emancipate the human mind from mystico-religious and arche-typal bondage. The idealists conceived and thought the physical world in terms of ideas, monads and the spiritual structures, working behind the physico-chemical genesis of the world to impart energy and force to their transformation and translations of the matter for further evolution which is yet to be evolved, comprehended and contemplated.

The biblical narratives regarding the genesis of the world provide the apostolic, socio-cultural history for the formation of our 'genetic' awareness to conceive the world as our opostles have conceived and presented it. Consequently, we perceive the world and the events taking place, through our 'genetic' consciousness, oriented by the knowledge; fed to us to construct and structuralize outwardly, as it is in our ideas, thought formations and thought translations.

Consequently, historiography becomes hypothetically the presuppositions of a single interpretation oriented re-enforcement, subservient to the ideology given and floated to see the things as conceived and formulated ideologically. In the spiritual scheme of things, mind

feels and observes nothing, but its creative reflections appertaining to the moved physico-chemical behaviour. Mind is not a 'tablerasa' as termed by Locke. The receptivity of impressions gained, empirically are reflected upon by the mind is nothing but the recaptulation of the reflections sparked through the mental activities corresponding to the physical experiences.

The materialistic school of thought discovered, inferring that just groping in the religious romanticism in terms of pure abstractions cannot get anywhere except, banging one's head against the exploration of the unknown. This school of thought conceives the world as a 'fact' to be dealt with rationally, structurally and blockwise; based upon politico-economic power. They dismissed the philosophy with regard to the genesis of the world, perceiving matter as a reality evolving through the Hegalian concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, culminating in the absolute idea through its reversals, identical with God. Karl Marx sensed, in the religio-cultural analysis, the element of exploitation and the dehumanization of poor landless labourers. Marx was convinced that religion has allowed the stratification of society to subjugate the poor and the weak; to serve the ends of the feudalists. In this religio-cultural hierarchy, the feudal lord takes the position of the good identical with God in the ideal and spiritual system of things. So, he tried for the redemption of human mind from the cocoon of religious romanticism to grow creatively and independently. He made Darwin the basis for his materialistic theory advocating the economic power responsible for the classification and sub-classification of the society, ignoring that in the spirit of Darwin's theory of 'survival of the fittest', the force of religious romanticism works to designate human potential as a given potentiality imparted by God himself. Evolution, in the light of survival of the fittest, is romantically, the workability of the divine mind, converting human kingdom into the weak and the strong; to be perceived through casual theory to avoid communism and to rule and administer the world, allowing worldly weal and woe.

These are the two ideologies that have dominated the world equally creating two blocks of history revolving around them. The displacement of centrality of a religion is not possible, because, all the metaphors, similies, symbols, allegories, corresponding to various cultures depending upon socio-political and socio-economic power, are abstracted from the religious arche-typal romanticism in terms of global brotherhood-oriented spirituality, catholicism, resulted in emergency of various movements and modes in philosophy, recorded

and recapitulated in the history of the world.

The comparative study and comprehensions of the world religions lead us to believe that every movement in the history was hypothetically an offshoot of the placement of different politico-economic blocks established by the advocates of industerio-technocratism; resulted in tantalization to formulate and promote various perceptions with regard to existential predicament. The material point of view, basically, is subservient to the religious current embedded and flows throughout the system, shaped and structuralized by the arche-typal historicity experienced and afforded by the human knowledge predetermined, realized through empirical fashion.

I beg to defer Dayakrishna, a brilliant philosopher and analyst, who is of the opinion that 'developments in historiography have been closely associated not only with amassing of evidence from all fields, including archeological excavations, but also the development of modalities for critical evaluation of processes and principles involved in the interpretation of evidence. The religious dimensions recede further and further away from actual history writing and began other influenced by what may be called different ideologies in the interpretation of the evidence concerned'. Analytically speaking, that ideology is nothing but a mental framework, oriented and fedback ideology is nothing but a mental framework, oriented and fedback through, since the time of conception. Mind gets feedback and is fed with the unknown knowledge to be realized through his life. History is the collection and recapitulation of facts taken place somewhere in the past, bereft of life and functionality. The interpretation and evaluation of a historical fact is subject to the interpretation and evaluation of a wise person who had never been witnessed to the happenings and the occurrences. He evaluates the facts in absentia of the living observers. Consequently, history does not have any wisdom, inherited direction towards the future to be realized and captured by the posterity. History is a classical thing, not leading anybody to the redemption of existential vacuum and nothingness. Because the situations are either political, social or demand afresh perceptual tactics to further the progress.

From idealism down to existentialism and post-structuralism, forms of consciousness have been explored for the establishment of the socio-economic value system found in the mind set; to be realized and experienced through lifelong struggle, endeavours and enterprises. The value system inherited actually takes formation and translations in terms of 'isms' for the regularizations of psycho-physical behaviour, escaping civilizational madness to dump the empirical

truths. History cannot manage and afford ethico-cultural system for the orientation of the perceptions related to the world of contingents to constitute modalities for the thought processes to live a life 'thrown into the world' as Heidegger intellectually intuited; but records and registers the systems. History starts from the middle, narrating the events, facts created by a historical figure, without conceiving and envisaging the beginning and the end. Consequently, historical directions are nothing, but the reconversions and reconcentrations on the starting point consolidating vacuums and hollowness existing between the absentia of beginning and the end, subjected to the inherited epistemological spiritual phenomena. Knowledge pertaining to the world of particulars is the realization through the spiritual mind in terms of linguistic structures, articulations and communications established with the physical activities. The articulations of the experiences is a form of the form perceived intuitionally and communicated through abstractions comprising metaphors, similies, allegories, signs and myths. Historiography throughout endeavoured to construct and construe the decodificational results and destructuralizations of the symbols, metaphors, myths, allegories and abstractions used in the religious literature constituting and forming the mode of mind, offering opportunities to the strong to rule the world and commiserate the poor to tolerate everything as coming from the heaven. In the history of philosophy the idealists provided ethical support to the dictators of the world to grab the economic and political power to subjugate the poor and the weak. Aristotelian theory of causation is an open support; holding that 'ruler and to be ruled are identical' was endorsed by Hegelian idea of the absolute.

Fundamentally, there is only one principle based on religion, governs the whole affair of the world and materialistic ideology is a corresponding source to establish the theory of ideas dominating the world equally and history revolves around it. There are two big spiritualisms: (*a*) Christianity and (*b*) Hinduism. Both are emancipating religions, advocating global brotherhood and unity of body and mind. The Bible teaches the world 'love' and Hinduism teaches 'love' and ethics eminating from '*sūtras*', 'Vedas', and 'Upniṣads'. The political and socio-economical principles governing the Hindu society are the outcome of the spiritual system embodied and enshrined in 'sūtras', 'Vedas', and 'Upniṣads'.

To confuse this spiritual dictums, conspiracies, cultural aggressions and attacks were hatched to destroy the hegemony, of both the

religious cultures of the rest of the world and they did not accept any external influences providing a great deal of psychological space for creativity and for the cultivation of intellectualism. Both have the potential to influence the other cultures by introduction, shall not be a finality, but a rediscovery of forms of consciousness, programmed and oriented 'genetically'. History either discovers the spiritual point of view, or explores the materialistic position of the history creators. It has nothing of its own to offer; except the reinforcement of facts and events presented by the historians' ideology related to the working ideology of the system which they live and construe and protect. However, this special issue of the historiography of civilizations comprising eleven articles is a contribution to the exploration of the argument to establish the feasibility of history in human development. Historiography should not be a simple narration but a wisdom, illuminating the power seekers to rule and govern the concepts related to the world of particulars in a global direction. If history can do this and keep the rulers away from the imposition of their will on the weak and the strong, really, it would be a subject to be taught in the departments of life.

Research Officer Languages   IQBAL FAHIM
State Institute of Education, Srinagar-190001

Focus

Louis Dumont's *Homo Hierarchicus* is a work well known among sociologists in India, but it is not so equally well known amongst philosophers in this country. His other works are hardly known to scholars and thinkers in general who are concerned with the understanding of Indian civilization. The 'structuralist' approach to the understanding of civilizations is virtually unknown in this country. We are, therefore, happy to publish the following brief note on the work of Dumont by Professor T.N. Madan who has been a close student of his work and, in fact, edited a volume of essays in his honour entitled *Way of Life: King, Householder, Renouncer: Essays in Honour of Louis Dumont* (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1982).

Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications (1970) by Louis Dumont is by now well established as a modern classic. Originally written in French, it has been translated into a number of European languages, but is not as yet available in any Indian language. It is widely known not only among sociologists and social anthropologists but also among social scientists and humanists as well. Its location within the French intellectual tradition of rationalism (Descartes) and its French structuralist methodology (Lévi-Strauss) have perhaps stood in the way of its easy accessibility in India, particularly among readers brought up on a mixture of Anglo-American empiricism and functionalism.

Homo Hierarchicus is an explicitly and uncompromisingly comparative work. The holistic (the parts of a complex institution have meaning only in relation to the whole) and hierarchical (a relationship of superior and inferior elements characterized by the latter being encompassed by the former even though opposed to it, e.g. *dharma* in relation to *artha* and *kāma*) ideology of the caste is adequately understood only when seen in contrast to the individualistic and egalitarian ideology of the modern West. The caste ideology is considered representative of traditionalism and not idiosyncratic.

Since the publication of *Homo Hierarchicus* Dumont has authored three major works exploring and outlining the profile of Homo Aequalis. The first of these books is *From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis*

and Triumph of Economic Ideology (1977). Here he argues that, speaking the language of relations (which as a structuralist he must), the transition from tradition to modernity occurred in Europe when, among other things, the primacy of the relationship of persons to one another was displaced by that of persons to things. This development freed the economic category from both morality (Mandeville, Adam Smith) and politics (Locke, Marx). Economic ideology thus emerged as, first and foremost, the ideology of modernity. Dumont called this development 'the modern revolution in values' and maintained that it was 'the central problem in the comparison of societies' (p. 9).

Dumont devoted the second book to the exploration of, as its title announced, the ideology of individualism: *Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective* (1986). The focus here was on, not the individual as an empirically given sense datum for such individuals are present in all societies, but on the elevation of the individual to the status of a value and on individualism as the global ideology of modern society. The Brahmanical ideology of renunciation also valorizes the individual, but the renouncer is located by choice outside the world of caste and family ties, although not wholly detached from it. The modern ideology by contrast affirms the secular world and promotes praxis in relation to and within it (not from outside). The primacy of the economic category and the ideology of individualism entail each other.

As in the first book the focus was on ideas and values, not as fixed substances or entities, but as configurations of relations. Thus, Dumont asks: 'how can we build a bridge between our modern ideology that separates values and "facts" and other ideologies that embed values in their world view? Lest our quest should appear futile, let us not forget that the problem is in a way present in the world as it is. Cultures are in fact interacting, thus communicating in a mediocre manner. . . . We are committed to reducing the distance between our two cases, to reintegrating the modern within the general one' (p. 247). Needless to add, the task is intellectual, philosophical.

While tracing the history of individualism in Europe from its Christian beginnings (individual outside the world to individual in the world), Dumont introduced a further refinement, namely the presence of national variants (of modern ideology). The third and the most recent book in the series, *German Ideology: From France to Germany and Back* (1995), develops this theme. The focus is on the German variant. He explains that the beginnings of the divergence

are traceable to the distinctiveness of the German version of the Enlightenment compared to the Western (French), for it was religious. The 'estrangement' was expressed through 'an extraordinary intellectual and artistic blossoming' between 1770 and 1830 and marked by the growth of community consciousness defined culturally.

An essential but apparently contradictory accompaniment of these developments was the ideal of 'self-cultivation' (*Bildung*). Thus, 'community holism + self-cultivating individualism' was the 'idiosyncratic formula of German ideology' (p. 20). One 'is a man through his being a German' (p. 19), but the Frenchman thinks of himself as 'a man by nature and a Frenchman by accident' (p. 3). The Enlightenment in its secular expression and the Revolution are the formative forces in France; Lutheran Pietism and the Reformation, in Germany. In its German version, individualism emerges as a cultural category *par excellence*, distanced from the socio-political domain which is crucial in France. But the political category is not wholly absent: 'the belief that the German state had a vocation to dominate the world' (p. 21) takes care of that.

The situation is complex, and the German-French contrast has ontological and epistemological significances; indeed, its ethical dimension may not be denied. Underlying it is a question of immense philosophical import. This is how Dumont puts it: 'How, without contradiction, can we acknowledge the diversity of cultures and at the same time maintain the universal idea of truth-value? I think it can be done by resorting to a . . . complex model . . . where truth-value would figure as a "regulative idea", in the Kantian sense' (p. 34). Such an exercise is not, however, taken up in the book.

T.N. MADAN

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II. Attention is drawn to a monograph on Advaita Vedānta entitled *Advaita: A Critical Investigation*, by Prof. Srinivasa Rao, published by Indian Philosophy Foundation, Jñāna Bharati, Bangalore, 1985, p. 95.

The Advaitins have always treated the rope-snake illusion as the paradigmatic example of the way the Brahman is related to the world that we experience, the former being analogous to the rope and the latter to the snake in the example. Yet, most of the Advaitins also subscribe to the notion of Brahman-realization by many persons who continue to live in this world even after they have achieved such a

realization. But, 'life in the world' cannot be lived with awareness of 'difference' and multiplicity, which are the hall-mark of the world. The Brahama-realization, thus, could not have resulted in the 'disappearance' of the world in the same way as the snake is supposed to disappear after one has realized that what one was seeing as 'snake' was really a 'rope'.

The basic contradiction does not seem to have been squarely faced by the Advaitins, even though most of them hold all these positions together. Prof. Srinivasa Rao has focussed his discussion on this basic issue and suggested possible modifications in the way one might 'save' the truth of Advaita in the face of such a situation. The discussion on what he has said would thus be helpful in clearing up one of the central issues which all Advaitins must face.

The fundamental dilemma posed by Prof. Srinivasa Rao may thus be formulated in the following ways:

1. Either one must give up the rope-snake illusion as illustrating the relation between the Brahman and the world, or

2. One must give up the idea that one may continue to live in the world even after one has 'realized' the Brahman.

It is for the Advaitins to choose, but whatever the choice, it will involve radical changes in the advaita position as it has been understood until now.

DAYA KRISHNA

* * *

The world of Arabic philosophy is generally a closed world to the philosophical community in India. And this has been so inspite of the long presence of Islam in this country. This is in sharp contrast to the acquaintance with Western thought, inspite of the fact that the British presence in India lasted for a much shorter period. As a first step in lessening this ignorance we would like to draw attention to a remarkable work by Ibn Rushd (Averroes) entitled *Tahafut al Tahafut*.[1] This is a point-by-point response to Al Ghazali's attack on philosophers in his work entitled *Tahafut al Philsafa*. The work reminds us of the great controversy between Vyāsatīrtha II and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in the tradition. The work has been translated into English by Simon Van der Bergh and published quite sometime ago by the trustees of

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[1] *Tahafut al Tahafut* (Incoherence of the Incoherence) by Averroes translated from Arabic with Introduction and Notes by Simon Van den Bergh published by the Trustees of E.J.W, Gibb Memorial. Reprinted 1978 & 1987.

E.J.W. Gibb Memorial. The work contains a detailed discussion of the notions of possibility, actuality and necessity and should be of interest to all those who are interested in the current discussion on these topics. Some of the issues discussed in the various chapters of the book are given below:

1. Eternity of the world.

2. Incorruptibility of the world and of Time and Motion.

3. God as the agent and the maker of the world.

4. Inability to prove the existence of a creator of the world.

5. Denial of attributes.

6. Is God ignorant of the individual things which are divided in time into present, past and future.

7. Is there any logical necessity between cause and effect?

8. Can there be demonstrative proof that the soul is a spiritual substance?

DAYA KRISHNA

Agenda for Research

The debate between *abhivaithhyavāda* and *anvitabhidhānavāda* is generally supposed to start with Kumārila and Prabhākara. Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapādiya* had already distinguished between *padāvadins* and his *akhaṇḍapakṣavādin* theory.

It needs to be investigated whether there is an earlier discussion on the subject and how is Bhartṛhari's discussion related to it. Similarly, it needs to be explored as to what is the relation between Bhartṛhari's discussion on the subject and the subsequent discussion on it in the various philosophical schools of India. For example, Bhartṛhari's notion of *akhaṇḍavākya* is the same as notion of *ekavākyatā* which is used by many thinkers in the tradition.

Similarly, one needs to explore as to how this discussion is related to the discussion between *saṁsargatāvāda* and *prakārtavāda* in the Nyāya tradition and what is the philosophical significance of these discussions.

DAYA KRISHNA

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Lifeworld and *system* as conceived by Jürgen Habermas in his theory of communicative action deserve to be investigated as possibly crucial categories in a philosophy of education. As a social function, education requires not only shared meanings drawn from custom and cultural tradition to construct identities and create social solidarity (*lifeworld*), but also strategies for coordinating resources and controlling social forces (*system*). Education contributes to social evolution in a two-sided rationalization process of the *lifeworld* and the the social *system* enhancing in the former reflexivity, the universalization of beliefs and the differentiation of knowledge spheres, and in the latter institutional mastery and higher levels of autonomy. Communicative educational processes which preserve the identity of both the individual and the collective forms simultaneously should be examined as a major constituent of a philosophy of education.

Chintalayam, Keezhikunnu
Kottayam-686002 (Kerala)

DR. BERND PFLUG

Notes and Queries

A Reply to Ashok Vohra's Query:
Mahājana: What does it mean?

Ashok Vohra in his query entitled 'Mahājana: What does it mean?' published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 3, seems to be worried over the meaning of the term '*mahājana*' which was used by Yudhiṣṭhira in his reply to Yakṣa's inquiry regarding the nature of the path to be adopted by people. The reply, as is well known, was '*mahājano yena gataḥ sa panthāḥ*'.

Vohra points out that Arvind Sharma in his book *Hinduism for Our Times* (OUP, 1996) has mentioned two meanings of '*mahājana*': (*i*) a great person, and (*ii*) a great number of persons. But none of these two meanings is acceptable to Vohra in the present context. For, he says, 'if it means "great man" then the path is one which is shown by the great man or may be class of great men. And the question . . . boils down to who is a great man? . . . *ṛṣis* cannot be regarded as great men . . . because they differ among themselves and there is no consensus among them regarding the nature of the path' (p. 151). So, whom to follow? The second meaning also is not acceptable to him. To quote his own words, 'If a greater number of persons, at a given time and in a given state are corrupt then corruption shall be the norm, the *dharma*. But *dharma* cannot be so shifty' (p.151).

Thus Vohra is under a dilemma and he finds it difficult to resolve. At the end of his query he almost despairingly asks, 'How is this dilemma about the meaning of the term *mahājana* to be resolved?' (p. 152). But then, why does Vohra think that he is under such a dilemma which does not allow any escape from it? He himself, in his query, notes that according to *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* what are ultimately relevant are not the individual persons, but high ideals, sense of duty, equanimity, good will, virtue, etc. And he has also talked in his query about Mill's 'competent judges' who obviously cannot be competent by being mere persons, nor even by being a multitude of persons, but by possessing the ability to discriminate between the desirable and the undesirable in human actions. Such judges, in adjudicating matters, certainly use principles which are high or *mahā*, because it is only these which people *ought* to act on. And whoever acts on such

moral principles is surely a *mahājana.* This particular use of the epithet *mahā,* which is not a 'numerical' use but a 'moral' one, is neither eccentric nor unusual. Nor is it linguistically or grammatically unidiomatic. As Vohra himself points out, one of the meanings of '*mahājana*' given in V.S. Apte's *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary* is 'a great man, a distinguished or eminent man'. And in Monier William's *Dictionary from Sanskrit to English* also one of the meanings is 'a great or eminent man, great person'. Now, if *mahājana* is an *eminent* or *distinguished* person, and if his eminence or distinction is not related to caste or trade (each having been mentioned *separately* in both the above Dictionaries), but to the treading of the path of *dharma* (as is indicated by the context of Yudhṣthira's reply), '*mahājana*' must mean 'a person who acts in accordance with *dharma* or moral duty'. Gandhi was called '*mahātma*', not because he was Karam Chand Gandhi, but because he practised the high moral norms of *satya* and *ahimsā.* If, thus, '*mahātma*' can have a moral significance, why can't '*mahājana*' have the *same?*

And it is worth noting here that moral norms or principles are not the fiats of any individual or any group of individuals, nor even of any scripture; these norms or principles have·their own sanctity. They truly lie hidden deep down in the cave (*guhāyām*), and they need to be dug out. How they are dug out, or, if we drop the metaphor, how they are thought out and known is not the question at issue here. Here the question simply is: What does '*mahājana*' mean? And in the light of what we have said earlier, it can quite safely be said that '*mahājana*' means 'a great person who acts in accordance with high moral principles and is worthy of emulation'. And so the path that he treads is the path which can very well be an exemplar.

Retired Professor of Philosophy   NITYANAND MISHRA
Dahua House, Tilkamanjhi, Bhagalpur-812001

II

How can there be such a discipline as Philosophy of Science when attempts at demarcation between science and non-science have failed in spite of the herculean efforts of Popper. In fact, the same fate seems to have befallen the attempt to demarcate between cognitive and non-cognitive enterprises of man.

Moreover, if there are no 'essences', as is now commonly believed, how can there be philosophy of anything, or even such a thing as

'philosophy' itself. The denial of 'essence' entails the impossibility of demarcating or drawing of boundaries and, if taken seriously, would result in blurring all sharp distinctions. And, in case this is correct, distinctions indicated by such old-fashioned phrases as 'philosophy of . . .' would only be archaeological remnants of older, out-moded, confused ways of thinking.

DAYA KRISHNA

Book Reviews

His Holiness Tenzin Gyatso, The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, *Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, tr. and ed. by Jeffrey Hopkins, co-ed . by Elizabeth Napper, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1997.

The Aim of Buddhism: Questions for His Holiness

This is an excellent book for the uninitiated, the practitioner, as well as the Buddhist scholar. It is a collection of talks by His Holiness the Dalai Lama at numerous gatherings. The selections reflect the background of the audiences. Sometimes they are general and inspirational, sometimes technical and subtle. Throughout, His Holiness presses the theme of universality and the need to understand the nature of human suffering. In various ways, he outlines how Buddhist insights and practices can maximize happiness and alleviate suffering. Key topics include Compassion, Altruism, Motivation, Karma, Four Noble Truths, Emptiness, Self and Selflessness, Meditation, and others. The short chapter on Meditation is especially useful. Everywhere His Holiness is careful to delineate his understanding of these things from schools other than the consequentialist middle way of Tibetan Buddhism.

I shall focus on His Holiness's remarks that address the question 'What is the aim of Buddhism?' On the face of it, this looks like a simple question. But it is not. I cull his remarks from several passages (page references in parentheses) that bear on this question. In very general terms, the overriding aim of Buddhism is dual: (a) *the achievement of happiness*, and (b) *the avoidance of suffering*, including the suffering of birth, death, sickness and old age (100, 123). This dual aim is variously formulated. He discusses (a) happiness in the contexts of the following: Enlightenment (30, 118, 155), Liberation (38, 48, 128, 130, 137), Salvation (48), Selflessness (40), Peace (32, 88, 139, 160), Happiness (32, 37, 54, 120), Bliss (139), Buddhahood (38, 117), Omniscience (38), Purification (30), Meaning in Life (84), Inner Development (29), Altruism (38, 44, 46, 47, 48, 54). And he discusses (b) the avoidance of suffering in the contexts of the following: Avoidance of affliction (31), Elimination of Ignorance (130), Minimizing Hatred (35), Freedom from Suffering (37, 136), Liberation from Cyclical Existence (131, 155), Liberation from Misery (132), and Removal of Defilements (192).

I offer three clusters of questions which I leave unanswered in

this brief review. The first is whether the dual aims, (a) and (b), are conceptually distinct, and if so what is the relation between them? Are they mutually dependent? Or is one accorded greater weight than the other? If they are not conceptually distinct, should they be made so? Is it not the case that in some important instances minimizing suffering does not entail happiness? Indeed, are there not certain forms of suffering which are necessary for happiness? If so, what would those forms of suffering be, and how would they be distinguished from the ego-attachment forms of suffering that Buddhist practices seek to deconstruct?

The second cluster of questions concerns whether one can adopt the aim of (b) the elimination of suffering without thereby adopting the aim of (a) the achievement of happiness. For example, upon the realization of emptiness, is it (a) the achievement of happiness that is approximated, or (b) the minimizing of suffering that is? Put otherwise, while the elimination of suffering may generally be understood to be a necessary condition of happiness, is the elimination of suffering also to be taken as sufficient for the attainment of happiness?

The third cluster of questions concerns the relation between one's soteriological place and the very formulability of the aims themselves. That is, while in a moment of analytic reflection one might *speak* of these things in the way His Holiness does, in the state of equipoise where one 'overcomes' any experienced subject-object duality, it seems that the question of the very nature of the aim(s) could not arise. That is, it seems that one's soteriological place enters into the conditions under which analysis can operate. While one cannot speak of the unspeakable when one is in the state of equipose, perhaps in retrospect one might be able to do so after such a state. But then the adequacy of the retrospective account of the equipose must remain indeterminate. What would his Holiness say about such indeterminacy? Once equipose is achieved, one should share with one's community the possibility of (a) maximizing happiness or (b) alleviating suffering. This is the task of one who has attained Buddhahood. Again, does this communitarian task amount to more than the alleviating of suffering?

Were I present at one of His Holiness's talks that were collected in this volume, I would like to have raised some of these questions. No doubt he would have answered with 'kindness, clarity, and insight'.

Department of Philosophy, Bryn Mawr College   MICHAEL KRAUSZ
Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania 19010, USA
email: mkrausz@brynmawr.edu

A.K. SARAN, *Traditional Thought: Toward an Axiomatic Approach,* Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, Varanasi, 1996, Rs.175.

This is an unusual kind of book to come by. Rather than set about explicating and commenting on traditional thought and wisdom in the usual exegetical manner, the author employs the axiomatic mode of the original itself for its exposition. The whole book seems designed to serve as a role model of the axiomatic approach which is part of the theme, presenting, in effect, a monumental exemplification of it. What it discards is the explanatory, discursive, and the 'critique' elements that go with the customary conceptualized discourse of academic scholarship. The purpose is to retrieve the essence of traditional thought from the academicizing of philosophic concepts. Putting away all such wordy baggage the author resorts to directness of expression, brevity of line, and simplicity of common, though compact phrasing, making it all the more forceful and startling, so that the writing acquires something of the original scriptural moulding and authority as though it were a sort of *Qu'ran* of traditional thought, and of Indian traditional thought in particular.

The sizable Prefatory material—a good third of the book—helps us adjust our sights for a meaningful approach to the main thrust of the work. In his Publisher's Note Prof. Rinpoche refers to the author's status as being one of the 'extremely rare intellectuals of our age' following the footsteps of the great *savant* Anand Coomaraswamy in upholding universal and timeless philosophical principles. He points out that as a critic of modernity and scientific mode of thinking, Prof. Saran, a Professor of Sociology, in this his *Summa Sociologica,* derives principles of human ordering from tradition and establishes that cosmology and ontology have to serve as the bases of sociology. Similarly, His Holiness the Dalai Lama in his Foreword adverts to a certain significant aspect of the author's life, pointing out that 'living a life of austere simplicity Prof. Saran is a subtle, profound and dedicated seeker of truth. Those who know him readily testify that to communicate with him is to undergo a memorable experience.' This at once brings to mind a basic feature of our metaphysical tradition: A vision of truth necessarily implies a corresponding state of the mind and soul in the perceiver. The knower of reality is the *self-realized* one; and the alteration that is wrought in him is a total transformation of life. That's what finally makes this a work of art in which the voice of the spirit is unmistakably heard.

The Preface itself initiates the axiomatic mode of expression. While in a somewhat rambling fashion the author acknowledges his

debt of gratitude handsomely to a number of intimate friends, elders, patrons, administrators, and so on, who had been directly or indirectly of help. At the same time, it also initiates the nature of the substance or message and the way it is to be put across: 'True:/expressions/ rupture/the rapture/of/the inexpressible. True:/speech/breaks/ the/Resonance/of/Primordial/Silence. True:/the spoken word/ is/discontinuous/with/the unspoken. True:/the unthought/the unuttered/is/discontinuous/with/the world. . . . The world/is a symbol/of/transcendent/Reality/Measured out/from/the Immeasurable. . . .'

Likewise, a short prose piece clarifies for us the nuances that the theme of tradition implies: 'Tradition being formless and/supra-personal in essence escapes definition in terms of human speech and thought'. Wherever a complete tradition exists it will entail the presence of four things: (1) a source of inspiration (of revelation), (2) a current of influence or grace issuing from that source and transmitted variously, (3) a way of verification which, when faithfully followed, will lead the human subject to 'actualize' the truths that the revelation communicates, and finally, (4) a formal embodiment of tradition in the doctrines, arts, sciences, and other elements that go to determine a civilization. Thus 'the voice of tradition is an invitation to that freedom whispered in the ear of existential bondage; whatever echoes that message . . . may be properly called traditional. Anything that fails to do so is untraditional and humanistic.'

All this, however, is incidental to the dynamic central impulse behind the whole enterprise. What motivates the author above all is his total alienation from modernity, modernization and the so-called 'progress', and his irresistible longing to wean away present-day humanity from it, to get man re-discover the universal traditional wisdom, realize its importance and essentiality so as to adopt its ways and make it prevail. He braces himself to that Herculean task and reverts to that prime intention time and again. As the Preface has it: 'Modern knowledge/is a knowingness/safely, complacently/ forget-fully/distanced/from/the radical wonder/of/the Absolute/of/the Void. What he hopes for is to kindle among kidred minds the misery of modernity and the truth and grandeur of tradition today, always. Whole sections are devoted to it: 'Modernity/announces itself/and/ proclaims/its task:/to destroy Tradition/and/to usurp/its/"time" and space. Preaching/pan-relativism/Modernity/Modernization/claim/ transhistorical/authority/worldwide/expansion. . . . Modernity sustains itself/on the obsolescence/built into it. Rejecting/all inheritance/Modernity/grounds itself/on/Novelty. Self-grounding,

Novelty, Violence/Modernity/(are) synonyms.'

The spirit in which this book is written, the author makes it clear, is wholly opposed to the spirit of the main current of European and American civilization. And he deplores the disappearance of culture in our time of 'the unimpressive spectacle of a crowd whose best members work for purely private ends'. This note of disillusionment and despair reaches a climax in the Epilogue: 'The world is about to end . . . . We shall perish by that which we have believed to be our means of existence. So far will machinery have Americanized us, so far will "Progress" have atrophied in us all that is spiritual, that no dream of the Utopians, however bloody, sacriligious, or unnatural will be comparable to the result. I appeal to every thinking man to show me what remains of life. . . . The universal ruin . . . will appear in the degradation of the human heart. . . . Lost in this vile world, elbowed by the crowd, I am like a worn-out man whose eyes see, in the depths of the years behind him only disillusionment and bitterness, ahead only a tumult.'

The bitterness of these pages is apt to strike one as strangely incongruous and discordant with the rest of the book. It was a passing fit of depression and anger, but he decides: 'I will let these pages stand since I wish to record my days of anger.' Nonetheless however, the main composition is far from being vitiated by any such distractions. The author assays his task with an unclouded mind and in the spirit of those lines of his Prologue: 'To know/is to remember/ the unknowable. To feel/is to live/by intuitions of revelation. . . .To act/is/to imitate the inherited/archetypes . . . . Conscience mediates/ the Above/and/the Herebelow . . .'

The main text comprises two parts—the first explores general aspects of the reality of man's condition, his consciousness, his aware-ness of his transcendent purpose, his *telos*, and has to do, so to say, with *natura naturans*. The second part continues those ideas as they relate to the manifested world, namely, *natura naturata.* The composi-tion starts with the assertion that an axiom is a proposition or idea that carries in itself an internal tautological necessity which derives from the Primordial identity of Being (*sat*), Knowing (*cit*), and Bliss (*ānanda*). Accordingly, this internal necessity coincides with our self-consciousness and with an innate intimation of our transcendent *telos*. Then follows a collection or a series of axiomatic expressions—what may perhaps be properly called a concatenation, since the ideas have an inner connectedness and the axioms grow out of one another, free of confusion. The axiomatic discourse adopted for both the parts by no means makes it easy to describe the substance of what is being

conveyed. However, Prof. Saran's statements early on contain the key to that problem: 'Axioms are grounded ultimately on revealed wisdom. To believe in and to be loyal to axioms is to be aware of the truth of our being and to be loyal to the wholeness of our being.' That is to say, one can grasp the text only with our minds focussed and attuned to the immeasurable wholeness of our being and its source. Everything then falls into place.

Within that frame of reference, to take a sampling from the wide range of topics of the first part: 'The bond between human thinking and human language (the four *vāṇis*) is indescribable; Language is creative, holy and the mother of reality. It is fossil poetry: To think of the origins is to think originally, metaphysically: Understanding 'totality' can only come from Above (Revelation): Contingency is the fundamental condition of man; it is an expression of Time theory as both *chronos* and *kairos*: Analogic relations are hieretic; they lead back to the source, the Absolute: The inexplicable ever remains; we shall never be able to create a bird: Eternity and momentaneity are one. Thinking is a mode of participation in the Absolute: A yearning for wholeness (holiness) beyond time and space is built into all human experience: Finitude and infinitude converge in one as sight and vision, as experience and imagination: The 'I' *qua* 'I' is wholly, purely, transcendentally, a non-object; 'Me' is the inescapably alienated form of 'I': Human askesis is founded upon man's awareness of his finitude simultaneously with his longing for the infinite: An exclusively phenomenological approach to reality is opaque and inadequate: Myth is a symbolic narrative, verbal iconography; Human life and the universe have a mythical reality and meaning; Myth is archetypal, essentially timeless; It is the source and origin of human and cosmic history. . . .'

Incidentally, a caustic reference to Sociology, Prof. Saran's professional interest, surfaces: 'The orderliness of order, the ruliness of a rule comes from their participation in the cosmic hierophany. It is this truth that is vulgarized, prophaned and mocked at in the Durkheimian theory of society and the social order.' So also an important aspect of his intellectual integrity comes into view—his fairness to every religious faith, showing a mind wholly free from parochialism. His inclusive approach identifies a meaningful common ground of tradition in each. He had already laid a stress on this unity of tradition in his Preface: 'Tradition/comes to us/from time/ immemorial; it is given/from/Above/to/all/peoples/in/all lands; all creatures live and sustain themselves/by/the Tradition they receive.'

Toward the close of Part I he turns to the specifics of Christianity and Islam as being as much integral to a universal tradition as Hinduism and Buddhism which are treated as analogical. Traditional wisdom accommodates all religion as such. The Prophetic modalities of the self-disclosure of the Divine absolute, he says, are these five: (1) the Vedic (symbolic), (2) the post-Vedic (*avatāric*), (3) the Buddhic (iconic-symbolic), (4) the Christian (iconic-symbolic), and (5) the Islamic (prophetic). Of special interest may be the way he explains the position of Islam, in his scheme, based on the ideas of the absolute oneness and sovereignty of God and the uniqueness of Muhammad as the one and only messenger of God. The Word of God descends upon Muhammad in a kind of ecstatic yet fully conscious and mindful state. 'These are transmitted by the Prophet; then collected to form the *Qu'ran*. The *Qu'ran* is God's speech. Muhammad is not an *avatār* (Divine Descent). He is the locus of God's Word and the Messenger-Medium of the Word of God. Islamic Prophethood iconically symbolizes a mystical isoteric trinity of the Messenger, the Message and the Medium (and mode) of the Divinely descended Message.'

Since Part II shifts focus to the manifest world—the *natura naturata*—it has a similar concatenation of axiomatic expressions on topics that tend towards action in the world and social implications. There are topics like the three *guṇas* (*sattva, rajas, and tamas*), the five *kośas* (Annamaya, Pranamaya, Manomaya, Vijñānamaya, Anandamaya); the concept of debt; the Geneological Principle; the affirmation that not self-assertion but atoneness with the source is the *telos* of the human will; the nature of justice, power, authority, *Regnum*—the temporal power and custodian of Justice—as being sub-ordinate to the *Sacerdotium*; the theory of punishment as a just occasion for repentence; Dharma as the king of kings; a just social order founded on conformity to reality alone is what can provide freedom for man to pusue his *telos*, and so on. . . . Sometimes such deep sociological probings seem strangely out of tune to-day when Regnum, the temporal power, is replaced by the politician who derives his power and sanction from the demos. Similarly, when it is said that 'the aristocrat is the bearer of the consciousness of the whole and a servant of the *Hieros*, one wonders where Prof. Saran would like us to locate such an aristocracy to-day. To be fair to him, however, it is true, he himself raises the question: 'Could anyone ever don this heavenly mantle?' conceding that such a risk 'the priests and artists of the world have to bear.'

But a doubt might assail us: Could we possibly be wronging this

book's uniqueness in so treating it as though it were the usual kind of discource engaged in conceptual explications and discriminations, coming to conclusions about the validity of certain propositions or theses? This is the kind of book one turns to again and again—to ponder, the sort of text that doesn't yield its wealth of meaning unless frequently dipped into and even meditated upon. You go to it not so much for conviction regarding a particular truth or belief. What is involved is not that type of intellectual satisfaction but rather a wholesome alteration of one's inner life—a re-adjustment of one's priorities and polarities. The singular stylistic feature too reinforces that aspect. Faced with a string of axiomatic propositions it is natural to ask how are the linkages brought about? One looks for a structural frame or principle that holds things together. In a broad sense there is such a principle. As indicated often in the text itself if everything is viewed in the light of, and in relation to, the whole, the Prime Source, the Absolute, the particular statement puts on meaningfulness. Such evocation of the Source is in fact the main aim and purpose of the enterprise.

Again the axiomatic statements are so juxtaposed—without the usual linkages—that what appears like a fault actually turns out to be the book's strong point. As the reader's mind is wrenched away from its habitual grooves, it is required to ponder what is said all the more deeply, with an in-depth participation in order to go ahead. So that though the linkages may look non-dialectical, there is no denying they are experiential. The force of an axiomatic expression derives not so much from conceptual exactness and clarity as from its being a spur to experience. Though it may look bare-boned, skeletal, the simple ordinary words in it gain a new power through a subtle blending of poetic effect in them. As an exquisite example from that prologue has it:

'Tradition/the freshness/the authority/of the/morning'. The sense if complete. Deviation from the normal syntactic structure such as the omission of the verb only adds a punch to the utterance. The metaphor, the oxymoronic force of pairing tradition with morning, and the *aura* of suggestiveness round the image of the morning—all this spells the Primordial force lending ever-freshness as well as authority to Tradition. The book's composition variously engages the reader's attention, the artistic use of language being often truly amazing. To pick an example or two:

'The Will has a double kinship; with Intellect as father and guardian; with desire as mother who like a Siren lures us to forbidden lands.... Two things irreducible to any rationalism Truth and Beauty.

... Art is not imitation; it is unveiling. ... Proofs weary the truth.... To formalize is to finitize.... A room is the bother of leaving it!'. ... and so on and on.

A word as to the significance of this work for modern-day India may be in order. Prof. Saran informs us of his being invited in 1991 to give a course of lectures on Coomaraswamy's *Hinduism and Buddhism* at the International Christian University, Tokyo. He says, 'I prepared a set of propositions to be studied by the students for approaching the Coomaraswamy marvel', and that the present work derives from that lecturing exercise. In an important sense, he continues so ably and effectively the Coomaraswamy tradition. 'Why is it necessary?' The question hardly needs to be asked. Nor is it necessary to recount the decadence that had debased Indian culture with deadly formalizations of ritual and institutional life, totally isolated from the original purpose, and the consequent impact of the "modern" cultural mode taking its toll, making inroads beyond its legitimate limits. The question rather is how, in what form, could those cultural foundations and traditional wisdom be resuscitated, allowing for the great alteration that has taken place in contemporary man's mental climate, texture of life and environment. What could re-invigorate the imaginations of the intelligentsia and the new generations?

Would a work like this of Prof. Saran (or may be, some might like to add, a Prof. Som Raj Gupta's projected volumes *of The Word Speaks to the Faustian Man*) meet the need adequately? Or is there some other approach still to be experimentally attempted? The road is surely long. Meanwhile, there can be little doubt *Traditional Thought—An Axiomatic Approach* is a major achievement, the clearing of a crucial milestone on that journey. Finally, then, what a reader looks for is a response to the query: How is one to pursue one's *telos* living in the present-day democratic and a very heavily science-oriented *milieu?* Though that query is not directly addressed, this is the kind of book that may prepare the mind, point to the way, and supply the fillip. There will be some who will say, 'Though your goal be something timeless you have to march to the music of the time'. That might seem a sensible thing to do. But actually what we need is to listen to some other music altogether. Though ostensibly attuned to the world here and now, we have to keep our ears trained to catch echoes of that 'silence that measures the trace of what is in itself immeasurable'.

50, Yoginagar Society   V.Y. Kantak
Fatehganj, Baroda

V. Shekhawat, *On Rational Historiography: An Attempt at Logical Construction of a Historiography of Sciences in India*, Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy, and Culture. (Distributed by Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, Price: Rs. 290.)

How should the history of sciences in India be written? The historiographic controversies raging in India have not paid much attention to the particular case of the sciences. One difficulty is that so many historians, ranging from imperial to post-modern, have tended to see science as something almost uniquely Western in origin. A way out is to accept this perception, explicitly or implicitly, and to focus exclusively on the last 150 years or so. Some younger historians of science in India have favoured just this pragmatic approach, which is undoubtedly profitable! Many Indians, however, tend to feel uneasy with such pragmatism: for a nation which allegedly has no sense of history, Indians today, especially the elite, are remarkably obsessed with the past.

A second way out of the difficulty is to trace the quiet colonial appropriation of the indigenous knowledge bases, as e.g. Irfan Habib (the senior) has attempted for the case of technology. Though hundreds of thousands of manuscripts were taken away, these have not been acknowledged as the source of even a single scientific or technological development during the European renaissance. The calculus, for example, was the key to the Newtonian revolution; a central result of the calculus is an infinite series expansion that was quite unambiguously explained in one such manuscript, the 1530 Yuktibhāṣā MSS in Malayalam with its roots going back to Aryabhata. Howsoever the MSS might initially have travelled to Europe, it was first brought publicly to the attention of the English-speaking world in an article published in 1835, so studiously ignored by the leading colonial historians that it is still not common knowledge.

Shekhawat, however, seems to accept as valid the view that the genesis of modern science owes little to anyone except the ancient Greeks—there is no reference here to Martin Bernal's painstaking documentation of how imperial historians fabricated ancient Greece. Shekhawat also grants that the last 150 years are important, for the history of science in India, but he would like to see this as a phase ('modern science') embedded in a wider historical movement stretching back to ancient times. Even if modern science is a transplant, a graft, he would like it to be assimilated in a compatible tree of Indian culture, to prevent the roots of this tree from becoming

irrelevant. His objective (p.108) is self-consciously to construct an intellectual history 'in which the native history of indigenous sciences is saved from becoming irrelevant and obscure . . . in which a natural transition is made from indigenous cognitive history to the new heterogeneous cognitive history boosted by *vijñāna*'.

Shekhawat has a multi-pronged strategy to synthesize this 'natural transition'. In the first move, Shekhawat generalizes the term 'science' to mean '*vidyā*'. Shekhawat is concerned with the particular case of Indian tradition, but if this is accepted, one seems compelled to accept the term 'science' to denote also any traditional form of knowledge in any culture, so that the division between science and tradition is rendered inessential at one stroke. Thus, in this phraseology, one may properly speak of the 'science of voodoo'. This is quite in keeping with the post-modernist position that science is just another belief system, like any tradition.

Though, on this view, there is no longer any *essential* difference, such as falsifiability, between science and traditional metaphysics, Shekhawat nevertheless accepts changes of paradigm. Popper's 'metaphysical research programme' connoted a bunch of (related) potentially scientific theories, each of which was potentially falsifiable; for Shekhawat the term 'paradigm' seems to mean a socially dominant trend, a generalized 'research programme' of the community as a whole, in which there may be progressive additions to whatever the dominant elements in the community regard as knowledge. Shekhawat contends that a 'pursuit can be claimed to be . . . cognitive, if and only if' [*sic*] it has a paradigm. And here the paradigm must chalk out what is cognitive. . . '. Shekhawat's paradigms have identifiable time-horizons: the modern *vijñāna* phase was preceded by the Tantra phase, which was preceded by the Śāstra phase, and the Saṁhitā phase. The equivalence of phases and paradigms is broken only by the assertion that the Tantra phase did not have an associated paradigm.

With such a generalized view of scientific knowledge, can one hope to discriminate between 'right' history and 'wrong' history? Can history go beyond narrative? Is Shekhawat's view of the history of science in India anything more than a highly personalized account? Is it anything more than a tale the way he would like it to be told? This question, and the answer to it, is implicit in the title of the book. Shekhawat's answer lies in appealing to the *authority* of reason and formalism. Shekhawat's views on general cognitive history are stated using a schema of axioms, definitions, and theorems. Naturally

enough, the structure is only superficially formal; the theorems are not actually proved; they are only 'substantiated'. In Shekhawat's terminology, he uses *puṣti* rather than *siddhi*. There seems little point in calling them 'theorems' unless it is to claim that his view of history ought to be treated as if it had that flavour of certainty that belongs to mathematics but not to fiction.

Shekhawat does not hesitate to extend the principle of causality (already suspect in physics) to the domain of ideas. The causes of each paradigm are located by Shekhawat in the inadequacies of the preceding paradigm. Though Shekhawat does not dwell on these inadequacies, he does emphasize a consequence: Indian cognitive history is seen as entirely an internal development unaffected by all externalities, except for the last *Vijñāna* phase from around 1850.

The commendable aspect of the book is the very attempt to construct an alternative historiography of sciences, better suited to embrace traditional knowledge. The book will hopefully start off a debate on this question, or at least provoke others to put forward their own views. In fact, one sees the beginning of this process already in the foreword to the book, written by D.P. Chattopadhyaya, who raises a number of questions. Can historical perspective alone define a paradigm? Is it not a little strained to try to capture neatly the heterogeneous cognitive enterprises of a given time within a single paradigm? Contrary to Shekhawat's liberal use of an already overloaded term like paradigm, would it not be more meaningful to define paradigm with reference to an affinity between ideas, rather than chronological juxtapositioning? For example, would it not be better to say that action by contact in the *Nyāya Sūtra* and the rejection of action at a distance in the interpretation of quantum mechanics both represent the same paradigm? Would this not make it easier to see the continuity of science and tradition?

There are numerous other questions that are bound to arise. It is hard to believe that nothing 'external', not even the material circumstances, had any impact whatever on the development of ideas in India, until the arrival of the Europeans. To say the least, this gives a rather larger-than-life role to the British! It is difficult to take seriously Shekhawat's proposition that Muslims provided absolutely no inputs, particularly after he has generalized the term science to mean *vidyā*. Does *vidyā*, by definition, exclude anything Islamic?

In an age where few professional historians claim 'objectivity' for their viewpoint, stating such raw prejudices as 'Theorems' about 'competent cultures' is not likely to enhance their credibility. Even

Spengler, who gave currency to the term 'culture' in historiographic discourse, had emphasized that analogy, rather than mathematics, better suited the study of history.

Indeed, there are many deeper ironies in this appeal to the authority of reason and formalism. For example, the infinitesimals of the calculus were a source of perplexity for centuries, just because the underlying epistemology of numerical approximation was so hard to assimilate within the epistemology of rational theology, as evident from the epistemological cleavage in Newton's *Principia*. So, the proof of the continuity that Shekhawat seeks may lie exactly in the epistemological cleavage that he rejects!

NISTADS, New Delhi

C.K. RAJU

Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein, translated into Hindi by Ashok Vohra, ICPR, New Delhi, 1996, xvi+287.

The necessity of rendering seminal texts of widely discussed authors whose thoughts have made a deep impact on later thinking and trends of thinking, in Hindi cannot be over-emphasized. Unfortunately many of such texts (think of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Hegel and a number of recent thinkers Russell onwards; I am not oblivious of the fact that a few dialogues of Plato and Kant's Critique are available in Hindi, but by and large many other texts are still beyond the reach of Hindi reader) are still awaiting the love and labour of some expert at home in the concerned two/three languages. In these days when the awareness of interculturality is gradually increasing, the significance of translations of important texts belonging to one culture into the language of another culture has gained immense dimension.

In this situation, Prof. Ashok Vohra's translation *of Philosophical Investigations* of Ludwig Joseph Johann Wittgenstein is highly welcome. It hardly needs to be stated that Wittgenstein has been one of the most influential thinkers of this century. He occupies almost the same place in recent times as did Plato or Aristotle (the two divide the entire intellectual world amongst themselves if one takes Coleridge serioulsy) in ancient times, nay even in contemporary times. *Philosophical Investigations* is a text which like a dialogue of Plato is an invitation to the reader to accompany the author into a most fascinating journey into the intricate, labyrinthine by-ways, sometime touching the highway, and then again leading into the zig-zag lanes of some important

philosophical problems. As one moves through this text one's consciousness is heightened and the landscape of these problems—relating to language, names, rules, universals, description, thought, feeling, other mind, learning, philosophy and so on—gets more and more illumined. The obvious becomes less obvious and less obvious becomes more obvious.

Unless one has read the German or English version of *Philosophical Investigations* one is likely to feel that one is going through a text done originally in Hindi. Vohra's language is facile and unobstrusive. With some exceptions, one does not notice any strangeness or oddity in the text. The Hindi syntax has been allowed autonomy and has been carefully kept free from the peculiarities of German or English syntax. This is normally a difficult thing to attain. But Vohra has amply succeeded in this.

He seems to have followed largely the English version. This version is available in the bilingual edition of *Philosophical Investigations*. But this has led to some infelicities. The German *Erscheinung* has generally been rendered in English as *phenomenon*. Now the English *phenomenon* creates problems for the Hindi translator. In its English usage the word is elastic in the sense that it points to some special kind of event or happening and also to any event. It is also used for things or events as appearances or objects to a consciousness. Somehow this elasticity of the English usage does not attract the attention of the translator and he starts hunting for some special kind of equivalent in Hindi for the English word. The results are not always happy. In the present case too, the word chosen for phenomenon is संवृति which has its own technical connotation in Indian thought and sits ill in the general flow of language. Personally I would prefer no equivalent and appropriate the term in Hindi as it is, if it were to be used in contrast to *noumenon* as in Kantian context. (I refer to this context for a specific reason. In that context too, the generally used term is *Erscheinung* and not phenomenon—except where it is contrasted with *noumenon*.) In the present case घटना for any event, विलक्षण घटना for some special event प्रतीति for an object or event as being an object or appearance to consciousness, would have been more appropriate.

Wittgenstein generally uses the second person intimate form, i.e., *du*. Corresponding English *you* is used in both ways—in an intimate address, as well as in a polite and formal address. In Hindi we have the facility as in German (*du, sie*), to distinguish between the two usages as तुम and आप. I wonder why Vohra preferred आप to तुम for *du*. The use of the term आप in the entire text takes away the intimate

relationship Wittgenstein may have intended to have with his reader by using the intimate and familiar address *du*.

Similarly or rather closely is the case in respect of *der Vorstellung*. In English it is rendered as *image* (ss. 386) and in Hindi it is translated as कल्पना. Now generally *der Vorstellung* is used in the sense of something being there as an object to consciousness or something being presented. As such English *idea* is very close to it. *Image* is also one of the usages. However, in the present context 'idea' seems to have been a better candidate and so in Hindi विचार would have been more appropriate.

यथार्थ and अयथार्थ for exact and inexact (ss. 70, 88) do not appear to be consonant. ठीक ठीक or सटीक for exact अनुपयुक्त for inexact, would have been more fitting. Similarly, स्ववाचक in place of निजवाचक (ss. 16), विभिन्न रूपों में in place of विभिन्न प्रकारों से (ss. 38) जिन्हें चिन्हित in place of जिनका द्योतन (ss. 55), समान in place of साझा (ss. 65), परिवेष in place of वातावरण (ss.117), निषेध in place of अस्वीकार (ss. 306), ग्राह्य in place of अग्राह्य (ss. 421), and अन्तर्पेक्षण in place of आत्मालोचन (ss. 587) के जैसे देखना in place of के समान देखना (p.197, II, xi, also p. 202), सादृश्य in place of समानता (p. 210, II, xi), स्वरनली in place of स्वर-यंत्र (p. 274), एक खेल है in place of एक खेल का नाम (p. 277), seem to me to have been better candidates for the originals.

Some sentences or part of sentences could have been rendered differently in order to be closer to the meaning of the text. Some examples are given below:

1. Wir werden sagen können (§17)
    It will be possible to say:
    यह कहना संभव होगा –Tr.
    हम कह सकेंगे ।   – Suggested.

2. wo das Zeichen auf dem Gegenstand steht, den es beseichnet, (§ 15)
    When the object signified is marked with the sign:

''द्योतक है'' शब्द का सब से सीधा प्रयोग संभवत: तभी होता है जब द्योतित वस्तु पर वह प्रतीक अंकित कर दिया जाए जिसका वह द्योतन करता है ।   –Tr

''चिन्हित है'' शब्द का सबसे सीधा प्रयोग संभवत: वहीं होता है, जहां चिन्ह उस वस्तु के लिए होता है, जिसे वह चिन्हित करता है ।   –Suggested

3. "Name" nennen wir *sehr verschiedenes*; (§ 38)
    we call very different things names:

हम विभिन्न विषयों को नाम कहते हैं :   –Tr

''नाम'' का प्रयोग हम बहुत भिन्न चीज़ों के लिए करते हैं ।

           – Suggested

4. Denn die Philosophischen Probleme entstehen, wenn *die Sprache feiert.* (§ 38)

   The Philosophical problems arise when language *goes on holiday.*

   क्योंकि जब <u>भाषा विरत हो जाती है</u> तब दार्शनिक समस्याएं उत्पन्न हो जाती हैं

              –Tr

   दार्शनिक समस्याएं उत्पन्न हो जाती हैं, जब <u>भाषा छुट्टी मनाती</u> है ।

              – Suggested

5. Wollte man Thesen in der Philosophie aufstellen . . .(§ 128)
   If one tried to advance theses in philosophy . . .

   यदि कोई दर्शन में स्थापना प्रस्तुत करे   – Tr
   यदि कोई दर्शन में स्थापनाएं प्रस्तुत करना चाहे   – Suggested

6. von den wesentlichen Bezügen der Äusserung, um sie von andern Besonderheiten unseres Ausdrücks absulösen . . .
   . . . essential references of the utterance in order to distinguish them from other peculiarities of the expression we use.

   मैं उच्चारणों के अपीरहार्य सन्दर्भों का उल्लेख इसलिए कर रहा हूँ ताकि उनका हमारे द्वारा प्रयोग की जाने वाली अभिव्यक्तियों की विशिष्टताओं से किया जा सके ।

              – Tr

   मैं कथन के आवश्यक सन्दर्भों की बात इसलिये कर रहा हूं कि उनसे उन अभिव्यक्तियों की दूसरी विशिष्टताओं को अलग किया जा सके जिनका हम प्रयोग करते हैं ।   – Suggested

7. (जब कोई गतिविधि इतनी वेदनापूर्ण होती है कि उसी स्थान पर होने वाली संवेदना बिला जाती है, तो क्या इससे वह अनिश्चित हो जाता है कि आपने यह गतिविधि की भी थी या नहीं? क्या इससे आप कुछ खोजने को प्रेरित होते हैं? (p. 230)   –Tr

   (जब {शरीर की} कोई गति इतनी अधिक पीड़ा दायक हो कि उसी स्थान में कोई हल्की सी संवेदना भी उस पीड़ा में समा जाए तब क्या यह बात अनिश्चित हो जाती है कि तुमने वैसी गति कि भी थी? क्या यह {स्थिति} तुम्हें इस दिशा में ले जा सकती है कि तुम स्वयं अपनी आंखों से उसका पता करो?)   –Suggested

Some renderings seem to me to be wrong, e.g., गहन for 'sublime', instead of उदात्त (ss.89), अपूर्ण for 'unsatisfied' instead of असन्तुष्ट (ss. 438, 9) पदलोची for 'elliptical' instead of लघुरूप.

There are some misprints : बियावान for बियाबान (ss.79), बारी में for बारे में (ss.108), की व्यारख्या for उसकी व्यारख्या (ss. 71), इसे अटपटे for इस अटपटे (p. 205), वर्तित रूप for परिवर्तित रूप (p. 277).

At one place I notice some indecision about the matras e.g. 'छुपा', ' छिपी' (p. 278).

Wittgenstein in Devanagri script should be written as विट्गेन्श्टाइन and not as विट्गेन्स्टाइन. I do not know why some writers including Vohra prefer the later form.

Although a translator is not called upon to provide summary introduction, headings to various sections or clusters of sections, and a detailed index, they would have surely added to the value of the translation, for the book would have for its readership students and researchers in majority.

One comment in the translator's 'निवेदन' has intrigued me. He points out that it is because of the individual's self-concern that Wittgenstein has begun his text by a quote from Augustine's *Confession.* He later on points out that a confession is the best way to get rid of the ahṁkāra. Fine. However, to me the quotation has hardly anything to do with confession or egoity. Wittgenstein himself explains that the quote has something to do with the language of mankind— a *particular* view of that language.

In any case, you have an excellent translation in spite of the few points raised above. A translation always has a possibility of revision or re-doing. That does not take away its intrinsic worth. For the Hindi reader it opens a new window, which may permit him to have a way of doing philosophy in a fascinating way. Prof. Vohra deserves our heartiest congratulations for making such an important text accessible to the Hindi reader.

10/558, Kaveri Path, Mansarovar,   R.S. BHATNAGAR
Jaipur-302020

YASHDEV SHALYA AND MS. BHAGAWATI, *Pramukha Bhārātīya Aur Pāścātya Darśana-Dhārāein*, Jaipur, Darshan Pratishthan, 1997, 147 pp., Rs. 250.00.

The book under review is a welcome addition to our philosophical literature in Hindi. It is a collection of ten articles mostly written and published during the years 1970 to 1975, titled here as 'Major Indian and Western Philosophical Currents'. The chapters of the book are: (1) *Aitareya Upaniṣad*—The Philosophical Purport of The Metaphor, (2) The Metaphysical Insight of *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, (3) *Sāṅkhya*, (4) *Śaṅkara's Advaitavāda*, (5) The *Vijñānavāda* of Vasubandhu, (6) Apohavāda, (7) Jaina Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda, (8) Descartes, (9) Immanuel Kant, and (10) Contemporary Western Empiricist Philosophy—A Survey.

The author of Chapters 7 and 10 is Yashdev Shalya and remaining chapters are taken from the research work of Dr. Bhagawati. All the chapters are implicitly or explicitly both critical and constructive. The book may be viewed as a representative work in Shalyan way of philosophizing.

Yashdev Shalya is a well-known philosopher and his contribution to philosophy and philosophical movement in our country is manifold. For him, Metaphysics is at the centre of philosophy and key issue is to explain the relationship between self and not-self. The association of the two is the given empirical reality, and the dissociation of each other and the return of the self to its original nature is the ideal and the highest value. This basic and intuitive idea is pursued and interpreted within different systems of thought selected here while simultaneously reconstructing them in a novel manner.

The first two chapters deal with the philosophy of Upaniṣads while focusing upon the *Aitareya* and the *Taittirīya Upaniṣads*. It is maintained that all the major Upaniṣads enunciate the same idea that the world is a manifestation of the One reality—pure consciousness. To view it otherwise is ignorance and to view this way is the *vidyā* or knowledge (p. 4). It is contended that the world is not conceived here as ignorance or illusion, or even as suffering (ibid.). Brahman or self is at once transcendent from and immanent into the world. The objective of the Upaniṣads, according to the author, is to explain both the Object-oriented and the Self-oriented expressions or movements of human consciousness (p. 2), and thereby, point at the emptiness of the former and the valueness of the latter movement.

In Chapter 3 *Sāṅkhya* is remarkably reconstructed and contrasted,

on the one hand, from Descartes' dualism and, on the other hand, from Śaṅkara's non-dualism. Cartesian dualism is reduced to the realm of *prakṛti*, alone which manifests itself both as subject and object, as interior (*pratyak*) and exterior (*parāk*), due to the non-discrimination of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* (see pp. 11-12).

The essential difference between Sāṅkhya and Śaṅkara on the problem of self and not-self is well articulated by Bhagawati. She says:

> Generally for all Indian Philosophies it is inconceivable that self or consciousness is a progressive reality. Self being by nature a perfect reality, the existence and the ground of not-self is a great problem for them. Holding it unreal Vedanta maintains its ground in consciousness and taking it real *Saṅkhya* maintains its ground independent [in the *prakṛti*]. But, on being not considering the ground of not-self, which is a defect, independent it would have to be viewed as a defect in self and thus self would have to be considered as investigating of its own nature and historical [reality], which is unacceptable to Vedānta. Therefore, the existence of not-self is a problem to Vedānta, which is not to Sāṅkhya in that way (p.16).

In the fourth chapter Bhagawati has successfully and unambiguously drawn the framework of Śaṅkara's philosophy of the Brahman as the non-dual reality of the world (*Brahma advaitavāda*), keeping aside the temptation to indulge into the subtle and intricate dialectics of the Advaitins and confining herself mainly to Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*. Then, she sought to resolve the intriguing problem of self and not-self: that from the point of view of Śaṅkara the problem is due to a category mistake which arise when the argument of empirical level is raised at the transcendental level (see p. 40). The purport of Śaṅkara's philosophy is put forth thus: 'Only the self is real and that alone is to be known' (p. 42).

In the fifth chapter Vasubandhu's *Vijñānavāda* (Absolute Idealism) is dealt with which begins from epistemology and culminates at metaphysics (p. 47). The thesis is that consciousness alone is real; for the objects of knowledge are not independent and external realities. Vasubandhu's affinity to Śaṅkara and distinction from Berkeley and Kant are pointed out in the course of discussion of *Vijñānavāda* which can be summarized as: the subject as well as the object are only modification of the *Ālaya Vijñāna* which itself is only a modification of Pure Consciousness. Hence, Pure Consciousness is the only Reality.

In the next chapter *Sautrāntika* Buddhists' differential theory of language and reality (the *Apohavāda*) is dealt with which played a great role in the medieval period of Indian philosophy. This doctrine is a logical consequence of Diṅnāga's framework which is guarded by two things: (1) the radical distinction of the spheres of perception and thought and language being included in thought, and (2) the momentariness of reality (see. pp. 58-61). This framework may be controverted; still some of the implications of the *Apohavāda* are unavoidable and acceptable to many Idealists, such as, language does not represent the reality and is concerned only with our thought-construction. So, the author may be justified in saying that 'though this theory does not do full justice to the nature of meaning (*bhāṣārtha*), nevertheless it has a fundamental insight which reveals the significant aspect of the nature of meaning' (p. 57).

In the seventh chapter Yashdev Shalya has examined and rejected Jaina *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādvāda* as logically unsound and philosophically unsatisfying (p. 84). The reason of this judgment is based on his disclosure of various issues and inconsistencies regarding the concepts of soul, *saptabhaṅgī*, etc. which in his view are not answered or answerable by the Jainas. He, also, maintains that the scope of *Anekāntavāda* is quite limited and it cannot be applied to many philosophically important propositions and issues as *syāt asti* and *syāt nāsti*. His examples are 'Everything is suffering', 'The root of world is ignorance', 'The essence of the perceptual world of things is only the consciousness', and 'what is merit and demerit' (ibid.). Here is a fresh debate opened up by Yashdev Shalya which may be joined by anyone having philosophical outlook combining realism and spiritualism.

The next two chapters are devoted to Descartes and Kant whose theories of knowledge and reality have been frequently mentioned and utilized in the preceding chapters in order to interpret and differentiate the conceptual schemes of *Sāṅkhya*, Śaṅkara, and Vasubandhu.

Descartes' philosophy of self, God, and world moves around his famous Cogito principle, which is exhibited by Bhagawati as amenable to various interpretations (pp.101-2). Descartes is a Realist as he maintains that the truth of ideas depends upon their correspondence to objects. He is an Idealist for he maintains that (1) the apprehension of self is concurrent to the apprehension of ideas, e.g. 'I know that 2+2= 4', and (2) that which is not clearly and distinctly conceived cannot exist. (Thus Cartesian self is endowed with not-self) Or else, he may be a mystic for he can be interpreted as holding the view that

the apprehension of self is possible only after the elimination of all the ideas, contents, i.e. not-self from the self (ibid).

The chapter on Kant begins with Kant's own idea to correlate his three critiques of human experience, which respectively deals with the sharply differentiated field of knowledge, action, and imagination. Knowledge and imagination both are concerned with sensation but in different ways, and action with its condition, the thing-in-itself. Next, the author goes on to summarize Kant's theories of knowledge and action, and then picking up different threads of his theories, she tries to accomplish a synthesis while at the same time reminding her reader that Kant's 'aim was quite limited to explain scientific knowledge and moral action, which he considered self evident truths and he had no interest or idea to find out a common source or ground to these truths' (p. 118). But, if the threads were to be synthesized the Kantian philosophy would be that '. . . self is not intelligence (luminous) by nature, but is active by nature. Consequently, it cannot be self-conscious, and even the imputation of moral law cannot provide knowerness (*pratyaktā*) to it. For its execution it takes recourse to sensation where it lost itself' (p.120).

In the last chapter Shalya presents a critical survey of Contemporary Western Empiricism, and brings out assumptions and implications of (1) Moore and Russell, (2) Early Wittgenstein and Logical Positivism, and (3) Later Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language Analysis. The aim and methods of the philosophers belonging to this movement were quite different, but they all were against metaphysics (see p.147). Shalya has argued that this anti-metaphysics attitude is a cultural prejudice rather than based on sound argument (see p. 136).

Neither the book is a restatement of known things nor an end of the matter. The book makes an enjoyable reading and enriches our understanding of Indian and Western philosophy. It will certainly promote critical and creative thinking. I recommend the work for all interested students and teachers of philosophy whose medium happen to be Hindi.

Department of Philosophy,   DR. RAJKUMAR CHHABRA
J.N.V. University, Jodhpur

Special Report

The Third International Dharmakīrti Conference held at Hiroshima University (Japan): A Report

The Third International Dharmakīrti Conference was held at Hiroshima University (Japan) from 4 to 6 November 1997. The Conference was attended by almost one hundred scholars coming from all over the world. Thirty-five papers concentrating on different aspects of Dharmakīrti's Logic were presented and discussed in the Conference which was arranged in the International Conference Hall situated in the Peace Memorial Park, the apicentre of the atom bomb dropped by the U.S.A. in 1945.

Like other conferences there were some traditional inaugural functions which were followed by first academic session in which first paper was presented by Johannas Bronkhorst of Switzerland on 'Nāgārjuna and *apoha*'. The scholar had suggested that the theory of *apoha* had solved a problem that something non-existing could not come into being. Because the cause of something non-existent is ineffective. The cause of something that exists has no function as it is already there. The words of a statement correspond one to one to the things. As the theory of *apoha* does away with the notion of one to one correspondence between words and things, it undermines the correspondence principle and thereby it solves a great philosophical problem.

Piotr Balcerowiez of Poland had given an account of taxonomic approach to *dṛṣṭāntabhāṣa* in *Nyāyabindu* and in Siddharṣigaṇi's *Nyāyāvatāravivṛti*. Dharmakīrti's typology and the Jaina criticism thereof. Siddharṣigaṇi, a Jaina logician, had accepted various fallacies accepted by Dharmakīrti, but he dismisses some sub-varieties of the fallacies listed by Dharmakīrti as either irrelevant or wrongly classified.

Roland M. Davidson of USA in his paper 'Masquerading as *Pramāṇa*' had tried to examine the impact that these systems had on the Indian Buddhist meditative systems.

Georges Dreyfus of USA in his paper 'Getting Oriented in the Tibetan Tradition: A contribution' offers a contribution to the ongoing project by examining some of the conflicting views within the Tibetan tradition concerning perception. As for example, the views

of *Cha-ba* who argued for a more cognitively active view of perception, were contrasted with the views of Sa-pan who held for the more traditional view of perception as a passive reception of external impressions.

Vincent Eltshinger of Switzerland gave an analytic description of the content of Subhagupta's almost unexplored Tibetan text— *Śrutiparīkṣākārikā* which discloses in Dharmakīrtian background. This paper was also a critical edition of *Śrutiparīkṣākārikā* based on four editions of Tibetan *Tripiṭaka*.

Eli Frenco of Germany had considered the problem of circularity as found in the Dharmakīrtian arguments in connection with the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of *Pramāṇavārtika*. This had been pointed out by the scholars like T.E. Vetter, M. Nagatomi, etc. The scholar had asserted with arguments that the statement of Dharmakīrti did not involve circularity.

Toru Funayama of Japan had dealt with the Kamalaśila's interpretation of the term *abhrānta* as found in the definition of perception given by Dharmakīrti. The scholar had appreciated the view of Kamalaśila that illusion is of two types: arising from mind (*mānasibhrānti*) and arising from sense-organ (*indriyajābhrānti*). The latter being *Kalpanā* is excluded by the term *Kalpanāpoḍha*. He had substantiated this view and rejected those of others.

Jonardan Ganeri of U.K. had addressed himself with the question whether Dharmakīrti's theory of *Vyavaccheda* is consistent with the use of *eva* in the *Nyāyabindu* statement of the *Tairūpya*.

Myself had presented a paper entitled 'Is Relation really unreal? A critique of Dharmakīrti' which was based on Dharmakīrti's *Sambandhaparīkṣā* and *Nyāyabindu*. An effort had been made to show the path of Dharmakīrti that relation is unreal. This standpoint is not free from paradoxes. First, Dharmakīrti had already accepted two-fold *pramāṇas*: Perception and Inference but they argued that the later is unreal. Secondly, *svalakṣaṇa* is momentary and perceptual but *prāmāṇya* of it can be known extrisically (*parataḥ*). Thirdly, an object existing for a moment is *arthakriyākārī*. How can the causal efficacy be determined within a moment? I had suggested a re-interpretation of what Dharmakīrti had said. Some *yogic* power has to be accepted to avoid the earlier paradoxes.

Breden Gillon of Canada had drawn our attention to the formal and material dimension of the Indian syllogism following Dharmakīrti.

Masahiro Inami of Japan emphasized on the determination of the *Kāryakāraṇabhāva* theory in Dharmakīrti's logic. On the one hand,

Dharmakīrti had given emphasis on the determination of causality of one observation but on the other hand he had relied on the careful observation to exclude mere coincident. The author, after reviewing the views of the post-Dharmakīrti Buddhists, had defended Dharmakīrti.

Takashi Iwata of Japan had raised some interesting points on the interpretation of the Subject (*dharmin*) of an inference. Nāgārjuna had explained that each and every object is devoid of intrinsic nature. From this two objections can be raised. First, if the subject of inference (*pakṣa*) becomes essenceless or negative, the thesis which is established would be annulled. Secondly, if the subject is taken as non-existent, the proposal for adducing some reason regarding the subject which is unreal is in vain leading to the defects of *āśrayāsiddhi* etc. Dharmakīrti and his followers suggested solutions of these problems. The first objection could be removed from the position of *prasaṅga* and the second one could examine validity of such inference from the perspective of autonomous inferences.

Birjit Kellner (Japan) had thrown some light on the levels of perceptuality and the expression *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta* and its significance for the Buddhist *anupalabdhi* theory.

Hideyo Ogawa (Japan) had shown some similarities between *vatṛhari* and Buddhist epistemologists regarding the meaning of a word (*śabdārtha*).

Ole Holton Pind of Denmark had highlighted Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga's *apoha* theory. Ernst Prets of Austria had argued on Dharmakīrti's refutation of *Kevalānvayin* and *Kevalavyatirekin* reasons in the light of Naiyāyikas view. This paper was an attempt to examine the counter arguments of the Naiyāyikas against the arguments of the Buddhists.

Mark Siderits of USA had elucidated the theory of *apoha*, nominalism and resemblance theories. He also had brought out the centrality of the Buddhist doctrine of two levels truths for our understanding of *apoha* semantics.

Tom H.F. Tillemans of Switzerland had raised the question— how much of a proof is scripturally based inference (*āgamāśritā-numāna*)? He had referred to the views of those who had accepted it and also who had not as an inference. Those who are against this view are of the opinion that the scriptural inference is not an inference due to lack of certainty and that such inference turns on a justification theory which is not objective (*vastubalapravṛtta*). Finally, the author suggests that attributing of such inference to Dharmakīrti is extremely

conservative and dogmatic so far as the interpretation of the Buddhist scriptures are concerned. However, he had mentioned another Dharmakīrtian position which might be taken as a critique of dogmatic about scriptures.

Noboru Ueda (Japan) criticized the second condition of *hetu* from which *vyāpti* is deduced according to Dignāga. The author argued the modification of the article of J.F. Staal who among the three conditions—(viz. *pakṣa, sapakṣa* and *asapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*) admitted that the second condition, i.e. *sapakṣa* is the main condition of deducing *vyāpti*. If there is no *vipakṣa* of a *hetu*, the third condition is automatically satisfied. To Dignāga if there is no *vipakṣa*, an inference is possible through any *hetu* satisfying the second condition. But the author had found an exception in the case of *Kevalānvayī anumāna*. As *hetu* is everywhere, there is no *vipakṣa*. Hence it provides a logical ground of accepting *vyāpti* without the help of third condition of *hetu*.

Alex Wayman of USA raised a question whether the theory of momentariness precludes anything permanent or not. He has put forward more critical points regarding the definition of *pratyakṣa* and its classification, also regarding the terms *kṣaṇika, arthakriyā* and *paramārthasat* that are related to *pratyakṣa* or not which has only a *svalakṣaṇa* object. From this it appears that *pratyakṣa* itself is *not* called momentary. Hence the four kinds of perception having nonmomentary nature are to be deemed as perception.

Hideomi Yaito of Japan had dealt at length on the theory of perception according to Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti enumerates certain kind of *yogins* perception as one of the four kinds of perception. The scholar here claims that Dharmakīrti regards *kṛtsnāyatana* meditation by the yogins free from conception (*kalpanāpoḍha*) and non-erroneous (*abhrānta*), which is still unexplored.

Shodovamakami of Japan had made a comparative study on the theory of perception between Dharmakīrti and Bhāsarvajña. In his study the author had shown various inconsistencies in the Buddhist view from the standpoint of Bhāsarvajña. First, the concept of *avisaṃvāditva* (knowledge corresponding to reality) is contradictory to *kṣaṇikavāda* as it cannot be judged within a moment etc.

Apart from these there were many reputed scholars who had presented their scholarly thought-provoking papers, viz. Kyo Kano of Japan 'On *anyathānupapatti* and *avīta*', Ryusei Keira of Japan on 'Kamalaśīla's interpretation of *anupalabdhi* in the *Madhyamakāloka*, Toshihiko Kimura (Japan) on 'New Chronology of Dharmakīrti'; Helmut Krasser (Austria) on 'Dharmakīrti and Kumarila on the

refutation of the existence of God', Taiken Kyumo (Austria) on '*Bheda* and *Virodha*', Horst Lasic (Austria) on 'Dharmakīrti and His Successors on the Causality', Moriyama Seitesu (Japan) on 'Kamalaśīla's proof of Non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāva*) and the reversed formula from the *Prasaṅga (Prasaṅgaviparyaya)*' Chisho Mamoru Namai (Japan) on 'Śrīdhara's criticism on the Buddhist *cittasantāna* theory', Claus Oetke (Sweden) on 'On the Disjunction in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*', Kazafumi Oki (Japan) on 'On *Pravṛtti*', Futoshi Omac (Japan) on 'Dharmakīrti as a *Varṇavādin*', Motoi Ono (Austria) on 'Dharmakīrti on *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*, Peter A. Schwabland (USA) on 'The function of affirming and negating cognitions in early Tibetan Exegeses regarding the definition of Valid Cognition', Tadashi Tani (Japan) on 'Re-instatement of Extrinsic Determination on Logical Necessity (*bahirvyāpti*): Jñānaśrīmitra's Proof of Momentary Existence', Helmut Transcher (Austria) on 'Phya pa chus kyi seng ge's opinion on *Prasaṅga* in His dBu ma'i shar gsum gyi stong thun, Tomoyuki Uno (Japan) on 'Ontological affinity between the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsakas viewed by Buddhist Logician', Leonard W.J. Van der Kulip (USA) on 'Some remarks on mtshan nyid by Mtshur ston Gzhon nu sengge', and Chizuko Yoshimizu (Japan) on '*Dṛṣya* and *vikalpya* or snag ba and btags pa associated in a conceptual Cognition'.

The participants and the paper-readers had a joint meeting after 9 P.M. (i.e. after seminar was over) regarding the present state of research and studies in Indian Philosophy in general and Buddhism in particular in different countries and different concrete suggestions had come from the participants on how to develop the teaching and research in Indian Philosophy.

Department of Philosophy   RAGHUNATH GHOSH
University of North Bengal
Dist. Darjeeling-734430, West Bengal

Surama (Mitra) Dasgupta
1907-1998

A resident in Bethune Hostel (1921-1928), Surama completed her schooling in 1924 with basic training in mathematics and Sanskrit at the Bethune School, Calcutta. She achieved distinction in Logic and Sanskrit as a student of Intermediate (Arts) at the Bethune College, Calcutta and received her undergraduate degree from Calcutta University in 1928 with first class Honours in Sanskrit. In the year 1930, she earned her M.A. degree in Sanskrit from Calcutta University with distinction and with specialization in Vedanta. Her distinguished record at school, college and university, soon won her recognition. Calcutta University awarded her a research scholarship for doing research in Indian Philosophy from a study of original Sanskrit and Pali texts. Surama got herself enrolled in the Govt. Sanskrit College, Calcutta. In recognition of her work on law of *karma* and the theory of *rebirth*, the college conferred on her the 'Śāstri' title in the year 1939. In the year 1941, Surama Dasgupta became the first woman recipient of the Ph.D. degree of the University of Calcutta for her research work on the subject of 'Good, Evil and Beyond'. A textual study in the Vedas, Upaniṣads, Smṛti, Purāṇas and the classical Indian philosophical systems, in her Ph.D. thesis Surama Dasgupta grappled with Indian ethical theories, focusing on the *self, karma, rebirth,* and the highest spiritual and ethical values. In the year 1945, Calcutta University awarded her a Fellowship to support her research project in the field of literary aesthetics with reference to original Sanskrit texts (3rd century B.C. to 1700 A.D.) at Newnham College, University of Cambridge, England——a work for which she was awarded a Ph.D. by that university.

Many of us—her former students in India and abroad—were taught Indian philosophy, particularly ethics and schools of Indian idealism, by Surama Dasgupta, which she continued to do until her retirement from Lucknow University in early 1970s. If there was anything which could intervene and keep her away from her class, she once told her students at Lucknow University, it was death, a sudden death. This single remark speaks volumes for her great personal and professional qualities which did not diminish even with her old age or illness. Surama Dasgupta was a contemporary of Kalidas Bhattacharya. As colleagues they even corresponded with each other on academic matters of common interest or regarding their students.

Both were equally great as teachers of philosophy, with at least one great quality in common. If they had found that one of their own students had discovered his/her way to philosophy, encouragement and blessings from both these great teachers poured out for that student naturally and spontaneously.

Surama Dasgupta's professional activities were many and wide-ranging. In the year 1963, she visited various universities and cultural centres in Bonn, Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt and Heidelberg at the invitation of the Govt. of the then Federal Republic of West Germany. In the year 1971, she visited Switzerland to deliver lectures at the Zuerich Jung Institut. She was a Visiting Professor at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque (1957); the University of Nebraska, Lincolin (1958); Wellrsley College, Wellesley, Mass. (1961-62); Troy State University, Albama (1967); Kansas State University, Manhattan (1968); San Jose State College, California (1968-1969); Temple University, Philadelphia (1969-1970). Surama Dasgupta was a member of the American Philosophical Association. She attended its Conferences held in 1957 at Aspen, Colorado and in 1969 in New York. She represented her country at the International East-West Philosophy Conference in 1964 in Hawaii, where she presented her paper in ethics entitled 'The Individual and the World', which appeared in the Conference Proceedings.

Surendranath Dasgupta's *Indian Idealism* was published by Cambridge University Press in 1937. As soon as it went out of print, Surama Dasgupta wrote a Foreword to the paper back edition of the book in 1962, making it available to readers throughout the world. Her published work—her principal publications—includes her two books: (1) *Development of Moral Philosophy in India,* Orient Longman 1960 and Unqer Publication, New York 1965; and (2) *An Ever Expanding Quest of Life and Knowledge,* Orient Longman, 1971. She edited and published the following volumes written by her husband Surendranath Dasgupta: *History of Indian Philosophy,* Vol. V. Cambridge University Press, 1955; *Religion and National Outlook,* Allahabad Law Journal Press 1954/Motilal Banarasidas 1974; *Fundamentals of Indian Art,* Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan 1953 (and subsequent reprints). Besides, she revised the following publications of the Kapil Math, Madhupur, Bihar: *The Yoga Philosophy of Pātañjali by Swami H. Aranya* (English Translation), the 2nd edn. published by the Calcutta University 1977; *The Sāṅkhyasūtras of Pañcaśikha of Swami H. Aranya,* Motilal Banarasidas 1977; *A Study of Yoga of Jajneśwar Ghose,* Motilal Banarasidas 1977.

The last time I heard from Surama Dasgupta, after a gap of about

25 years, was shortly before August 1992 when she had fell down in her living room and become permanently bedridden at late Guru Swami Dharmamegh Aranya's Monastry, Madhupur, Bihar, while my colleague Deepti Dutta from Miranda House and myself were thinking of inviting her for a stay in Delhi. Surama Dasgupta passed away on 12 June 1998 at the age of 91 years. In the death of Surama Dasgupta, there passed from the scene an eminent scholar of ethics and aesthetics, and a great teacher of Indian philosophy. As one of her former students, I speak for all who knew her when I say Surama Dasgupta will be fondly remembered for all that which they received from her as their teacher, guide and friend.

Department of Philosophy,   G.L. PANDIT
University of Delhi, Delhi-110007

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ	ā
ई	ī
ऊ	ū
एअे	ē } (long)
ओ	ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ	ṛ and not ṛi; (long ऋ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals
Anusvāra

(˙) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ्	ṅ
ञ्	ñ
ण्	ṇ (or ṅa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate
Visarga

(:) ḥ

Consonants
Palatals

च	ca and not cha
छ	cha and not chha

Linguals

ट	ṭa
ठ	ṭha
ड	ḍa
ढ	ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श	śa
ष	ṣa
स	sa

Unclassified

ळ	ḷa
क्ष	kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ	jña and not djña
ऌ	lr and not lri

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Krishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha or garha,* (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and specific) characters

ன	ṉ
ழ	ḻ
ற	ṟ
ங	ṉ̄

Examples

Ilaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḻa (and not Chola), Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṉ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jānaï* and not jānai
Seuṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Ṣanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *véve* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script. (The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for *laghu-guru* of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.