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From the Editor's Desk

A PLEA FOR A NEW HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN INDIA

Few will dispute the fact that most of the existing books on Indian philosophy are outmoded. Yet, these are the books that have always been used all the world over to teach what Indian philosophy is, and have been so used through the ages. A lot of important information and new material has accumulated which needs to be assimilated and organized afresh in an interrelated manner around philosophical issues dealt with by a succession of thinkers over at least three millennia of recorded history. Each of these thinkers has an originality of his own and makes some new contribution, even though he may have written only a *bhāṣya,* a *vārtika*, a *vṛtti*, a *tika* or a *pariśuddhi* on an earlier work. There have also been new departures and radical breaks, many a time self-consciously, as when Udayana calls himself an *ādhunika* or a school calls itself *navyanyāya*.

The philosophical insight which is found in such abundance in the earliest texts needs not only to be highlighted but also linked with the later developments which assume a more differentiated and systematized 'form' from the *Sūtra* period onwards. The differentiation, however, is not a loss of active interrelationship, though it is usually presented as such. Even the earliest texts, such as those of Yāska, present views ascribed to previous thinkers and the *Nyaya-Sūtras* explicitly refute the mimāṁsā views of the *nityatva* and *apauruṣeyatva* of *śabda*, the *aikatva vāda* of the Upanisads and the *sarva pramana khandana* of the Madhyamic Buddhists, besides many others.

It is not only the interactional dialectic that is missing from the usual presentations, but also its historical development over a period of time. D.N. Shashtri's pioneering work in this regard in his *Critique of Indian Realism* has found hardly any followers, or been pursued further.

The shifting focus and emphasis in the discussion of issues has hardly been noticed, nor the reasons for them explored. The long absence of certain schools of thought from the centre of philosophical debate and their sudden reappearance into prominence has totally escaped the attention of historians, as has been the background of socio-political events surrounding philosophical activity in the country. The sudden disappearance of Buddhism on the philosophical scene from AD 1200 onwards has hardly been noticed; nor has the dramatic rise in the number of Jain

thinkers from, say, AD 1000 onwards. The rise and fall in the fortunes of schools seems to have totally escaped the attention of scholars, as have the radical shifts and developments within the schools themselves. Never has history been so absent from the writing of the history of any subject as has been the case of the philosophy of India. How unbelievable it seems that hardly any attempt has been made to discern its inner connections with developments in thought in other civilizations, or even with those that occurred within its own civilizational space in the field of art, or the sciences, or the theoretic reflection that occurred on them. The realm of social, political and legal thought seems to have been segregated, as if it had no relation to philosophical thought in the country. The same has been the case with thought about the arts; even though poetics is known to have had a long history of distinguished thinkers in the tradition; and the actual achievement in the field of sculpture and architecture is of such an outstanding quality as to arouse the wonder of the world. Theoretical reflection astronomy, mathematics and medicine has met the same fate, implying that knowledge enterprises in these domains had no relevance to philosophical thought in this country.

Both the timeless and insulated perspective in which Indian philosophy is seen has been aggravated by the almost total absence of any awareness of the way it has been influenced by thought currents in sister civilizations, or the way it might have influenced them. The Persian, the Greek, the Central Asian and the Chinese civilizations were in active interaction for long periods of time with the Indian civilization and it is extremely unlikely that they were not influenced by one another. In fact, it might be intellectually more rewarding to see this as one whole civilizational area with diverse, relatively autonomous centres in it. The parochial egocentricism of the currently 'national' and 'civilizational' identification is reflected in the way one looks at the past, and forgets that at that time no such identifications existed and that people did not need passports and visas to cross boundaries.

The manner in which history has been 'created' during the past few centuries itself is, however, the root cause of such a distorted way of looking at the past. History writing has been a child of the exploitation and domination of the world by a few West European powers during the last four centuries who have systematically produced a history in their own way, to suit their own interests. This is *not* history as 'others' see it and, even at its best, it can be regarded *only* as history from the viewpoint

of modern West European man who did not exist at the time when ancient Greece and Rome flourished.

The total appropriation of the Greek heritage by the West would have remained a strange curiosity in the intellectual history of mankind were it not for the fact that it has not only been accepted by most scholars the world over but also given rise to a persistent denial of any influence on Greek thought and culture by the other civilizations which flourished in those times. The close similarity of Greek thought, particularly in Plato and Parmenides, to certain schools of Indian philosophy has always been a 'problem' to Western scholars, as if the admission of any influence would contaminate the purity which they had achieved, solely on their own. The thought from Plato to Plotinus has such an Indian echo that only a 'purist' about civilizations would ever feel like decrying it.

If the western historian of thought is allergic to admitting even the possibility of any influence on Greek thought from any 'outside' source, his Indian counterpart is not even aware of the problem and takes it almost as axiomatically true that the Indian civilization has grown in complete isolation from the Vedic or the Harappan times onward. The 'monadic self-sufficiency' of Indian thought and culture is taken for granted in spite of the fact that in the field of mathematics, explicit mention of borrowing from the Greeks has been made in the Indian tradition and the development of what is known as 'Gandhara Art' unambiguously confirms this. It is extremely unlikely that the Greek influences were confined *only* to these two fields. The Indo-Greek kingdoms in north-west India in the post-Alexander period must have fostered interaction in all fields. Later, during the Śaka and Kuṣāṇa periods [1st–3rd century AD), large parts of North India were integrated intimately with Central and West Asia and it is highly improbable that only administrative and commercial interaction occurred between the different units of the region. We have also evidence of active trade links with the Roman Empire on the south-western coast of the Indian peninsula and, better still, of a long intellectual interchange with China, revolving around the Buddhist university at Nalanda. The latter seems to have been connected both by land and sea routes to China and there is evidence that a strong intermediary intellectual centre emerged at Palembang in what is now known as Indonesia.

The Buddhist connection with Sri Lanka and Tibet is well known, but little is known of the counter-influence from these countries except in the field of Tantra from the latter. The story of non-Buddhist, primarily Hindu, influences in South and South-east Asia is usually vaguely known, but the

awareness of its intellectual side seems totally absent. Similar is the case with the changes and modifications that they underwent there. Hardly anyone knows, for example, that a work from Thailand entitled *The Three Worlds of King Ruan* (Ed. B.L. Smith, Pennsylvania: Anima Books, 1978, pp. 194–203) shows a distinct influence of Indian thinking in the intellectual domain but presents noticeable differences with it as well.

The pre-Islamic encounters and interactions are however, at least dimly present on the margins of the intellectual consciousness about the past of this country. But even this is absent in respect to the intellectual interaction with the world of Arabic learning, its science and philosophy. From at least AD 1200 onwards, Islam may be said to have a definitive presence in North India. Yet, the histories of thought in the second millennium AD in this country show hardly any awareness of its presence, or of the possible influence that it might have had on the varied fields of intellectual life in this country. Usually, it is taken for granted that, except for the arts and religion, there was nothing substantive in this regard. Yet, Professor A. Rehman's pioneering work on this subject has shown that from the 8th century AD there is evidence of active interchange between Arabian, Persian and Sanskrit learning in the different fields of specific knowledge, particularly medicine, mathematics and astronomy. More than seven thousand works are listed in his *Bibliography* and they include translations of texts from the two different traditions in their respective languages.

These figures need an upward revision in the light of recent work, but this does not make any difference in respect to the problem that we are trying to point out in connection with the writing of the history of philosophy in India. There is, as far as we know, no mention of any interaction or influence between the Arabic and Indian philosophical traditions, even though there was an ample opportunity for such interaction to occur in this country. How could the rich traditions of Arabic philosophy remain unknown in India in spite of this long presence of West Asian learning? It is extremely unlikely that this was the case, particularly when there is substantive evidence of an opposite situation in so many other fields of knowledge. And, in case it was really so, it requires exploration and explanation.

The absence of any discussion regarding this issue in the histories of Indian philosophy is an anomaly that can hardly be understood in any way. So also, perhaps, is the total neglect of the presence of Christian theological thought in this country, or its influence on Indian philosophy.

Christianity is supposed to have come very early in India, and yet, as far as I know, its influence has hardly been a subject of any investigation.

The need for a new history of philosophy in India, thus, can hardly be denied. But even if the plea is accepted, how shall one go about implementing it? The usual method is for some institution to approach an outstanding scholar to undertake the work who, in turn, would ask other scholars to write for the volume. But as they are generally well-known specialists in the field, when they are invited to write on the subject, they only summarize, repeating what they have already said on the subject. Few scholars are prepared to do any new research to write for a volume edited by someone else and hardly anyone can adopt the viewpoint or perspective of someone else to do the task he/she is asked to do. Thus, at the end, what one usually gets is a volume of uneven quality, repeating the old things with the addition of some new information which has appeared since the earlier volumes on the subject were published.

What, then, is to be done to avoid such a situation? Perhaps, only a long-term plan consisting of diverse strategies at various levels would yield the desired result. One could start with a stocktaking of what has been done, spell out what needs to be done and then locate persons at various levels who could be involved in the thinking and execution of the project. A detailed spelling-out of interrelated research could be given to see that research work is done in those domains. Similarly, successive seminars could be planned in such a way as to explore questions that need an answer or problems that need to be resolved.

The ideal of a long-term collaborative, cumulative research has not happened in the Humanities though it is now commonplace in the natural sciences and even though it is true that disciplines in the Humanities need this, particularly in the context of projects such as this. What one needs is imagination, will and commitment to undertake these enterprises. Potter's *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies,* Thangaswami Sharma's *Darsanamanjari* and some of the forthcoming volumes in the 'Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture' have already done some fieldwork in this connection. The challenge is to carry the work further, and let us hope the challenge will be met. But, first, there has to be an awareness of the need for such a work. The rest will follow, at least, let us hope so.

Jaipur DAYA KRISHNA

Language Origins, Archaeology and Animal and Human Consciousness

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Language is an arena in which philosophers have fought fierce battles. Mostly they have been about the nature of language, about the signifier and signified and their interrelationship. Here we need not go into the interesting controversies between Saussure (1974) and Derrida (1976). In the postmodernist context they have acquired a new meaning (Cilliers 1998). Nor are we going into the problems of artificial intelligence (AI) so famously discussed by Searl (1984, 1994) in his numerous writings. They have assumed wider horizons with physicists like Penrose (1989, 1994) joining the fray with his quantum gravity explanations. But our discussion cannot avoid the problem of consciousness—both animal and human.

As I am neither a philosopher nor a linguist, but an archaeologist, I will have to look at these controversies in an evolutionary perspective. Whether animals had the language skills, or can acquire some, becomes relevant in understanding the origins of tool technology only with the advent of *Homo habilis*.

In this essay I deal with some of the old problems and some new about the difference between humans and animals, as also the relationship between tool (tool in this essay has been generally used for Stone Age artefacts) technology and human evolution and language origins. The field is replete with controversies. These problems, intricate as they are, have some broader philosophical implications too.

There are the old anecdotal stories of wolf children when they came back to human parents, they could learn human language. But animals brought up and trained by humans could never do it. Today, the controversy has become a bit acute between the trainers of chimps who claim that the chimps can and do learn sign languages and those who think it is all nonsense and that the language instinct is unique and natural to humans only.

This takes us to the old 'continuity and discontinuity' (whether animals have consciousness) theories, though in the mid-century there was a dominance of discontinuity theories (cf. Gibson 1993). Does the advent of humans designate a break (discontinuity) from the animals? Are humans a breed apart? Is there something special about humans? Are there any behavioural discontinuities to separate apes from humans (Diamond 1992; Gibson and Ingold 1993)?

Let me clarify that I am not so much interested in the human uniqueness as such, but in the possible role the development of technology could have played in the origins and development of language. Since the role of technology in human evolution cannot be discussed by skirting these controversies, I will have to give a broad review of the present state of art in the field, as a preamble to my arguments about the origins of language.

THE BACKGROUND

Goodall and her students have claimed that chimps were not only toolmakers but like humans indulged in 'lethal inter-group conflicts and long term behavioural bonds among genetic relatives'. In fact, McGrew (1993: 314–33) gives 20 propositions for the intelligent use of tools by chimps. He even thinks that a large number of the so called early hominid tools may belong to chimps, and not to hominids (McGrew 1992). Chimps have also been reportedly taught the American Sign Language. They have found that many of the apes had symbolic capacities. Bright says, 'Man is clearly not alone in being able to use symbols to represent objects and events, but is there a need for an animal to go further? ... When man had swung down from trees to live in an open Savannah environment, group living provided an insurance against predators ... the ability to use a vocal signal to manipulate others is going to have a strong premium placed on it; an ideal situation in which a sophisticated language could have evolved' (Bright 1984: 234).

The discontinuity theory got a jolt when it was claimed that animals can use syntax, emit sounds of environmental reference, recognize themselves in mirrors, and use a tool to make a tool (Gibson 1993: 3–19). But then this still leaves the problem open: if apes possess all behaviours that humans can think of defining, then what if anything evolved?

To contradict simplistic 'continuity' theories, McGrew (1992, 1993) clarifies that chimps do not have human culture, material or otherwise. Similarly, even the simplest aspects of human culture are not those of apes, or other primates, mammals or vertebrates. Yet much of what chimps

do is so close to humans that the two are indistinguishable. It is the best available source of knowledge about our behavioural evolution. Concluding his book, McGrew makes a very poignant remark, 'If we wish to reconstruct the prehistoric origins of human technology, then we need to use the available acts of the creatures with whom we last shared a common ancestor. Our hominid predecessors are irretrievably gone, but our hominoid cousins survive. What a pity it would be to extinguish them before they could tell us all that they know' (McGrew 1992).

It has also been claimed that parrots not only can 'speak' human languages but can also select objects and express feelings. Dolphins have been reported to understand words and word order, the main feature of human language. The Georgia State University Language Centre has shown that the pygmy chimp (named Kanzi) could express his desires, feelings and understand human language. He even showed his capability to understand grammatical word order. A favourite treat of Kanzi was locked in a box and the key was placed inside another box tied with a cord (Kanzi had earlier learnt how to use knife and key). By striking flints on the hard concrete floor, he produced knife like chips and used them to cut the cord to get at the key and used the key to open the box to grab the treat. Chimps are known to regularly use stones to break open nuts and also train the young ones in this art! 'Chimps trained to use lexigrams suggest that they can form abstract representations of the relations between objects ... apes have the capacity to make inferences, to innovate, to attribute relations between objects and to form mental representations all of which are aspects of intelligence' (Lee 1992: 111).

Another large brained marvel is the whale. The whales exhibit a highly complex song system. They may be indulging in intellectual pursuit and communicating in complex languages and, who knows, may even be wiser than humans. 'True, whales have large brains, in fact the largest brains of any animals that have ever lived. It is tempting to suggest that whales reason about the world as man does, but they are constrained by the environment they live in. Whales lack hands and therefore brain power cannot be channelled into the creation and use of tools' (Bright 1984: 27).

Before we discuss Hun's philosophical views on such experiments, let us summarize what Pinker has to say about them in his famous book, *The Language Instinct* (1994).

Pinker in fact ridicules such claims. He complains, 'Most of the trainers have refused all requests to share their raw data, and Washoe's trainers, Beatrice and Alan Gardner, threatened to sue another researcher because he used frames of one of their films' (Pinker 1994: 337). Pinker is cat-

egorical, 'the apes did not learn American Sign Language (ASL). This preposterous claim is based on the myth that ASL is a crude system of pantomimes and gestures rather than a full language with complex phonology, morphology and syntax. In fact, the apes have not learnt any true ASL signs' (p. 337). He further says that with more standard criteria the chimps' true vocabulary count would be closer to 25 than 125. 'True, some of the chimps can carry out these commands more reliably than a 2 year old child but this says more about temperament than about grammar: the chimps are highly trained animal acts and a 2 year old is a 2 year old' (p. 339).

The zoologist E.O. Wilson, summing up his survey of animal communication remarked on its most striking property, 'animals', he said, 'are repetitious to the point of inanity'. 'The chimps seldom sign spontaneously; they have to be moulded, drilled, and coerced .... Also, the chimps rarely make statements that comment on interesting objects or actions; virtually all their signs are demands for something they want, usually food or tickle.' He contrasts it with the example of his 2 year old niece, who comments on the colour of the horizon, just for the sake of commenting on its colour (Wilson quoted by Pinker 1994: 338).

'Within the field of psychology, most of the ambitious claims about chimpanzee language are a thing of the past. Nim's trainer H. Terrace, turned from an enthusiast to a whistler ... Sarah's trainer does not claim that what she acquired is comparable to human language. The Gardners and Paterson have distanced themselves from the community of scientific discourse for over a decade. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and D. Rumbaugh concede that the chimps they train at the computer console did not learn much but they are now claiming that a different variety of chimpanzee does much better' (p. 341). On the claims about Kanzi, he says, 'The so called sentences are all chains like the symbol for chase followed by the symbol for hide, followed by a point to the person Kanzi wants to do the chasing and hiding ... Kanzi's language abilities, if one is being charitable, are above those of his common cousins by a just noticeable difference but no more' (p. 341).

Pinker clarifies, 'The chimpanzees' resistance is no shame on them; a human would surely do no better if trained to hoot and shriek like a chimp ...' In fact, the idea that some species need our intervention before its members can display a useful skill, like some bird that could not fly until given a human education is far from humble' (p. 342). Though Pinker is very harsh on the so-called 'animal trainers', others take such studies more seriously. For example, Hunt (1995: 106–12) in his book *On The Nature of Consciousness*, refers to such experiments in the context of animal consciousness. He says, 'At the other end of an evolutionary continuum of awareness we can locate the first clear signs of a self-referential consciousness, at least within our own direct evolutionary line, in the multiple capacities emerging in the higher apes (chimpanzees, orang-utans, and gorillas).'

Hunt refers to the review by Gordon Gallup (1977), in which the latter describes the 'fascination with mirrors in the higher apes, which is widely taken as indicating a capacity for self-recognition that seems to be absent in baboons and monkeys. An especially striking demonstration of this nascent sense of self-awareness is found in the ability of the gorilla to recognize as its own a red dot painted on its forehead when first seen in the mirror, as indicated by immediate exploratory touches to the head ...

Further indication that the recognition of self requires some sort of internalization of social relationship comes from the persistence shown by home-reared chimpanzees, not having been exposed to other chimpanzees, in grouping photographs of themselves with human photographs rather than with those of other chimpanzees.'

Hunt further quotes the most famous example by Wolfgang Kohler's (1926) early demonstration of the spontaneous ability of his captive chimpanzees to stack crates one on top of the other in order to reach food placed beyond normal access. 'There are also Jane Goodall's (1971) fascinating observations of this same recombinatory capacity applied to social situations in the wild .... There is also indication in Goodall's observations of a kind of aesthetic resonance to natural phenomena, as in the rain dance 'that chimpanzees in the wild do at the first seasonal torrential downpour—tearing off branches and waving them in the air while rushing and jumping about.' Taken together, the co-emergence of these multiple indicators of self-referential symbolic cognition all seem to rest on or imply an underlying capacity for cross-modal translation. This seems most obvious with signing, where the proto-languages taught can be either visual or haptic. It also seems clear with spontaneous mirror behaviours and the 'kinesthetic dance' to sudden rain. (Hunt 1995: 106–12).

Hunt reviews the controversies further, 'It is the research on signing behaviours in higher apes—especially chimpanzees—that has caused the greatest controversy within contemporary psychology and philosophy. On the one hand, a rationalist tradition has always argued that language is unique to *Homo sapiens*, and that all other symbolic forms and self-awareness itself depend upon it. From this perspective, there has been immense scepticism over the existence of a genuine proto-linguistic abil-

ity in higher primates and much puzzlement over its lack of natural expression in the wild. However, from an evolutionary perspective, as we have seen, we should be puzzled at a defining feature of our own mentality being totally absent in our nearest evolutionary cousins, the chimpanzees, with whom we share approximately 98 per cent of our morphological DNA' (Gould, 1977) (Hunt 1995: 107). Hunt does not like the condemnation of such research as 'pseudo-science' in 'some intellectual circles'.

Referring to the recent research of Susan Savage-Rumbaugh and colleagues (1983, 1986, 1988) and David Premack (1978, 1983) who developed a paradigm in which a chimpanzee in one room was required to provide the tool, based on signing, that would allow a chimpanzee in another room to retrieve and then share secreted food, Hunt thinks that such work is quite credible ... 'Savage Rumbaugh's (1986, 1988) findings with pygmy chimpanzees (*Pan troglodytes* being the species used in most signing research) are the most startling and thorough in refuting critiques of the earlier signing research. Several pygmy chimps showed spontaneous pointing and gestural communication (twisting movements for opening a bottle) from an early age; and the chimp prodigy Kanzi acquired signing behaviour entirely on the basis of his observations of his mother's laboratory sessions ... . Finally, in what seems to be the first stage of a capacity for internalized "inner speech" (Vygotsky, 1962), Kanzi goes off by himself with his portable signing board and spontaneously signs various unsuggested activities—such as "piling pebbles" or "hiding"—and then on his own initiative performs them. We find in the higher primates—with dolphins and perhaps parrots—the seeds of self-awareness, empathy and deception, recombinatory problem solving in physical and social situations, proto-sign language (at the least), and aesthetics' (Hunt 1995).

On the other hand, Hunt (1995) does find significant differences between animals and humans. 'There is no sign whatsoever of individual apes spontaneously entering tonically—immobile trances, after which they are especially nurturant or affiliative toward other apes, who would then respond with a temporary "state-specific" subordination or themselves become "absorbed" in turn. There might seem no reason in principle why this could not happen, especially given "regression" models of transformations of consciousness, but it does not. Higher primates sign, show self-awareness, recombine, and manifest the beginnings of an aesthetic sensitivity, but they do not go into spontaneous, non-defensive "trance".'

So after all there may be some substance in the claims of the 'animal trainers'!

EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND TOOL TECHNOLOGY

Before we discuss the cognitive processes involved in stone tool making, it may be useful to differentiate between language and communication. Bronowski does not believe that all language is communication and gives four desiderata to distinguish human behaviour from that of animals: 1. In man, there is a delay between stimulus and speech, because the input is referred to several centres in the human brain. 2. There is a separation affect of emotional charge from the content. 3. There is dramatic prolongation of reference. Human speech is constantly used to refer backward and forward in time. 4. Internalization of language is perhaps a new use as it also becomes an instrument of reflection and exploration (Bronowski 1977: 104–31). 'The effect of these differences ... is to distance ... the human speaker from the immediate context that occasioned his utterance ... The most telling behavioural component in human language is disengagement ... No other animal even approaches it' (Bronowski 1977: 145).

Though it is not universally accepted that stone tools reflect linguistic or cognitive processes (Lock 1993: 279–99; Langer 1993: 300–313; Parker and Milbrath 1993: 314–34), most of the scholars agree that object manipulation, symbolism and language are strongly interwoven and interdependent in the development of the human child. The advanced motor and cognitive controls required for tool use and tool making might automatically provide increased gestural capacity as both tool use and gesture reflect neurological control of the arm and hand. Linguistically oriented scholars, on the other hand, have suggested the presence of a grammar of tool making analogous to language syntax (Falk 1993: 216–29). Toth & Schick (1993: 346–62), Davidson & Noble (1993: 363–88), Wynn (1993: 389–406), and Reynolds (1993: 407–28) all agree that modern technological achievements require strong interactions between social and technological domains of activity. All these scholars argue that Upper Palaeolithic people possessed modern linguistic and cognitive capacities.

It may be useful to clarify some basic issues regarding the difference between tool technology, techniques, replication of tools, and their simple use. Elsewhere, I have emphasized that the innovation of new tool technology required original thinking to empirically understand the behaviour of impact energy through the stone medium (Agrawal 1979: 1–15, 1992: 101–10, 1993: 35–42; Agrawal and Kusumgar 1997: 49–64). The master

craftsman who invented a new technology thought about these processes and learned by experience and observation that the angle of the ridge and the striking platform, the surface of the core, the type of percussion used, the type of stone used, all had critical roles to play. Once he had perfected an efficient tool type, it could be replicated by demonstration. The stimulus for thinking and understanding comes not from replicating tools but from innovating new types.

This is the crux of our argument, which relates the development of language and tool technology right from the early hominids. On one hand, the empirical understanding of the behaviour of impact energy through stone, and preparation of the core surface required thinking and understanding, which Bronowsky called 'internalization of language'; on the other, tool replication on a scale required by a close-knit community involved instruction, demonstration and social co-operation. These two aspects, innovation and replication, need to be understood independently. To give an example, only a gifted scientist could design a computer. Once the design is established, an average technician can assemble it, or in the context of prehistory, an ordinary community member, gifted with some manual dexterity, could replicate the tool type. As the computer can be used by practically everybody, so also any member of the community could have used the stone tool. In the early hominid context, what would help develop the early language faculties would be the need to innovate, the efforts to understand the empirical behaviour of impact energy through different types of stone media. Replication of the established tool types would require more of social manipulation and their large-scale use would require division of labour between the two sexes and the other members of the community. We have argued in this essay that though language confers many other advantages in human evolution, its main association has been with the development and innovation of tool techniques. It is also supported by the fact that both handedness and speech centres are located in the left hemisphere of the brain.

Now that I have explained my thinking on these issues, let us review the recent research in these areas.

RECENT RESEARCH

Pinker (1994: 332) described the versatility of the elephant's trunk as to how it can perform both very heavy-duty as well as delicate tasks like making figures with a pencil on a small paper. They also use the trunks for communication as also to perceive smells miles away. Elephants are

the only living animals that possess this extraordinary organ. Such a unique organ could initiate a debate amongst biologists, as it has about the unique language instinct. But nobody seems to make much fuss about the elephant's trunk.

Pinker (1994: 333) says, 'Chomsky and some of his fiercest opponents agree on one thing: that uniquely human language instinct seems to be incompatible with modern Darwinian theory of evolution, in which complex biological systems arise by the gradual accumulation over generations of random genetic mutations that enhance reproductive success ... Though we know few details about how the language instinct evolved, there is no reason to doubt that the principal explanation is the same as for any other complex instinct or organ in Darwin's theory of natural selection.'

'Language is obviously as different from other animal communication systems as the elephant's trunk is different from other animal nostrils. Non-human communication systems are based on one of the three designs: a finite repertory of calls (one for warning of predators, one for claims to territory and so on), a continuous analogue signal that registers the magnitude of some state (the livelier the dance of the bee, the richer the food source that it is telling its hive mates about), or a series of random variations on a theme (a birdsong repeated with a new twist each time). As we have seen, human language has a very different design. The discrete combinatorial system called 'grammar' makes human language infinite (there is no limit to the number of complete words or sentences in language), digital and compositional' (Pinker 1994: 334).

He argues, 'Even the seat of human language in the brain is special. The vocal calls of primates are controlled not by their cerebral cortex but by phylogenetically older neural structures that are heavily involved in emotion. Human vocalizations other than language, like sobbing, laughing, moaning, and shouting in pain, are also controlled sub-cortically. Sub-cortical structures even control the swearing that follows the arrival of hammer on a thumb and that can survive as Broca's aphasics' only speech. Genuine language ... is seated in the cerebral cortex, primarily the left perisylvian region' (Pinker 1994: 307).

Criticizing Sagan and Druyan (1992), Pinker (1994: 336) asks, 'Is it really humility for us to save species from extinction because we think they are like us. What about all the creepy, nasty, selfish animals who do not remind us of ourselves, ... can we go ahead and wipe them out ... . Like many other writers, Sagan and Druyan are far too credulous about the claims of the chimpanzee trainers.'

'But, in fact, if human language is unique in the modern animal kingdom as it appears to be, the implications for a Darwinian account of its evolution would be as follows: none. A language instinct unique to modern humans poses no more of a paradox than a trunk unique to modern elephants. No contradiction, no Creator, no big bang' (p. 342) ... . 'But evolution did not make a ladder; it made a bush. We did not evolve from chimps. We and chimps evolved from a common ancestor now extinct.' Pinker says, 'So if the first trace of proto-language ability appeared in the ancestor at the arrow (referring to his figure-DPA) there could have been on the order of 350,000 generations between them and now for the ability to have been elaborated and fine tuned to the Universal Grammar we see today' (p. 345).

The interesting question is whether human language is homologous to anything in the modern animal kingdom ... here primates are relevant, but, Pinker laments, the ape trainers and their fans are playing by the wrong rules. An example of a module growing out of bits that were not originally a module is the elephant's trunk. It is a brand new organ but homologies suggest that it evolved from a fusion of the nostrils and some of the upper lip muscles of the extinct elephant hyrax common ancestor, followed by radical refinements.

Conceding that Chomsky may be wrong too, Pinker denies that he is a crypto-creationist. He compares Chomsky with Gould and Lowentin whose essays have been influential in the cognitive sciences, and Chomsky's scepticism that natural selection can explain human language is in the spirit of their critique. Natural selection is not just a scientifically respectable alternative to divine creation. It is the only alternative that can explain the evolution of a complex organ like the eye ... . 'The ability of many ancestors to see a bit better in the past causes a single organism to see extremely well now.'

All the evidence suggests that it is the precise wiring of the brain's microcircuitry that makes language happen, not gross size, shape or neuron packing.

Summarising his views, Pinker says, 'I suspect that evolving humans lived in a world in which language was woven into the intrigues of politics, economics, technology, family, sex, and friendship that played key roles in individual reproductive success' (p. 361).

Ingold (1993: 429–49) does make an emphatic distinction between technology and technique. He takes technique to refer to skills, regarded as the embodied capabilities of particular human subjects, and technology to mean a corpus of generalized objective knowledge, so far as it is capable

of practical application. He defines techniques as the area of overlap between tools and artefacts. Not all tools are artefacts, and not all artefacts are tools. The stone pebble used as paperweight is a tool but not an artefact; a cake is an artefact but not a tool ... . Technique appears to be 'given' in the operational principles of the tools themselves, quite independently of the experience of the users. If all technical activity is tool-using activity, it is because the technique is seen to reside outside the user in the tool.

According to Ingold, technique places the subject at the centre of activity whereas technology affirms the independence of production from human subjectivity. Mitcham notes that 'tools or hand instruments tend to engender techniques, machines technology ... . Technique is more involved with the training of the human body and mind whereas technology is concerned with exterior things and their rational manipulation. ... At the core of technology there seems to be a desire to transform the heuristics of techniques into algorithm of practice' (Mitcham 1978: 252).

Ingold further argues that in most practical contexts tool using entails touch and vision just as speech entails hearing. Thus both speaking and tool using, as forms of skilled activity, are ways of perceiving as well as of shaping the environment. The emergence of tool use and speech is a chapter not in the evolution of some specific mental capacity going by the name of intelligence but in the evolution of human being as animals endowed with specific capabilities of action.

Ingold proposes a radically alternative claim: namely, that there is no such thing as technology nor language, at least in the non-western societies. He argues, 'I incorporate the diverse objects in the current of my activity without attending to them as such: I concentrate on my writing, not the pen; I see the time, not my watch. Indeed it could be said that these and other instruments become truly available to me, as things I can use without interruption, at the point at which they effectively vanish as objects of my attention. Only the work links them together. The same thing happens when a speaker is telling us about some situation which is embedded within a total pattern of verbal and non-verbal activity, a form of life' (Ingold 1993: 451).

We argue below that he is patently wrong in these assumptions.

Calvin (1993: 230–50) suggests a unitary hypothesis for the origin of language, tool making, intelligence and planning. He explores the possibility of co-evolving talk, technique and thought. According to Calvin, in general the brain is better at new uses for old things than any other part of the body. Left brain is good at stringing things together. It is not

necessary to have all these functions overlapping in the brain. Some neural machinery could be used interchangeably for one, than the other. It looks as if a broad smear of wiring could cause simultaneous activation of rather different muscle groups. The tendency of right handed gestures to accompany left-brain-generated speech is the most commonly noticed manifestation of this higher order control of sequence. An overlap between language disorders and sequential hand movements has been demonstrated. It would thus appear that the brain has some regions which are particularly specialized for generating and analysing sequences and that they may be associated with language capability.

No early hominid is likely to have reached modern size of the human brain, but large brain size is no indication of human uniqueness. It has been shown that brain size is proportional to body size raised to a power that depends on the taxonomic group of mammals under consideration. For primates this value ranges from 0.66 to 0.80 (Deacon 1992: 110). The encephalization quotients perhaps give a better idea of brain and language evolution. 'Mammals are more encephalized than lizards and fish, primates and dolphins are most encephalized of all'. 'Encephalization probably first exceeded the ape range at least 2 million years ago with the appearance of ... *Homo habilis*. ... But by 1.5 million years ago, the *Homo erectus* brain weighed almost 1000 gms' (Deacon 1992: 116). The brains of the australopithecine hominids fall within the range of modern great apes. Anatomically, as well as from the level of language and brain capability, the earliest australopithecine hominids could not have been far different from chimps, which after all, bifurcated from the hominid tree less than 5 million years ago, as indicated by the molecular clock (Gribbin 1993).

Broca's and Wernicke's are the main areas associated with language and speech evolution, though other brain areas are also involved in the language/speech circuitry. These areas seem to appear even in pongid brains, though less developed. The development of sulci in the Broca's language area has been noticed in both *Homo habilis* and *Homo erectus*. These folds however do not appear on endocasts of Australopithecus brains (Deacon 1992: 116–17). As distinctive tool making is mainly associated with *Homo habilis*, Broca's area may probably be involved also with flaking skills and understanding of flaking mechanics. A correlation between the development of Broca's language areas and the innovation faculty of early hominids for new tool types is clearly indicated. Besides, 'the tendency for the dominant hand to accompany the representation of language in the left hemisphere suggests that the handedness and language

ability are linked. The evolution of the stone tool manufacture, handedness and laterisation of language are probably interdependent' (Deacon 1992: 121).

Perhaps the advantages conferred by language were more in the realm of mind. The artefacts he fabricated to implement his strategies and plans are a part of his material world. The earliest tools made by Australopithecus could have been the result of an immediate stimulus for a visible future—not much different than a chimpanzee's efforts at tool making to reach a banana or to meet his multiple requirements. Conceptually, an Oldovan chopper produced by hitting a rock against another was no different than the flint chips made by Kanzi, the chimp.

However, for making more sophisticated Acheulian axes, or later, by using the Levallois techniques, both for multiple uses of tools as also perhaps for aesthetic considerations to make elegant and symmetrical tools, early humans had to empirically learn the behaviour of impact energy through stone medium. During our experiments on flaking mechanics we found that the angle of the ridge, the surface of the core, the type of the hammer used and so forth mattered critically in shaping the flake. Only language could make such thinking and understanding of flaking mechanics possible. For example, the centripetal flaking in the Levallois technique ensures an even spread of impact energy over the core surface to produce an ovalish thin flake. The required strokes were perfected in the mind and executed through manual dexterity, which transformed stone into elegant and efficient tools. There may have been external pressures too. For example, to match the speed of a running deer was not humanly possible, but a spear could overtake and kill the game. It required nice, thin ovalish flakes as tips for the spearhead and, later, for the arrowheads—the first missiles invented by humans.

Later on, in the crested guided ridge technique, the Upper Palaeolithic man, did just the opposite: he piled mass over a narrow front so that the impact energy did not surface out till the end of the ridge was reached, and the outcome was a long blade (Agrawal 1979: 1–15). What we are emphasizing is that the empirical understanding of the behaviour of the impact energy through the stone medium was an essential part of the innovation of these techniques and provided a stimulus for early human neuro-biological evolution. As explained earlier, the innovation of technique, the replication of standardized tool types, and use of new tool types requires three different levels of mental capability. Only the first provided an evolutionary stimulus for language capabilities to develop; the other two mostly require only social co-operation and manual dexterity.

Chimps seem to have made some tools but never reached the heights of human accomplishment. Though Australopithecus seems to have chimp like capability it could not go further. Only the *Homo* lineage seems to have innovated new tool techniques and reached the zenith of language accomplishment. In both these processes, the human language instinct perhaps helped. Perhaps the language instinct appears in the *Homo* genus for the first time and may explain the limitations of both the apes and Australopithecus. The need of innovation helped in thinking and understanding of flaking mechanics as well as development of language and reflection. Thus Pinker's theories tend to explain our viewpoint better. Otherwise, it would remain a paradox as to why chimps, despite their human-like capabilities, did not evolve further either in tool making or complex language. It also explains why when the other ingredients of language development—social relationships, individual leadership, male and female relationship etc.—are all common to both apes and humans, only the latter evolved in these directions. Evolution and innovation of tool techniques and language and thinking could reach such heights in humans alone because of the language instinct.

More than any other animals, the language conferred a unique advantage on humans—the capability to manipulate time.

MANIPULATION OF TIME

It is surely self evident that a behavioural cultural invention of the order of a primitive language would allow any species with this capacity to outpace other hominids very rapidly. Language could help manipulation of other members of the group for both maintaining one's leadership as also to plan strategies for defence against predators. Also in maintaining a proper social relationship in the group which has very complex hierarchies.

Leakey (1993: Chapt. 14) says that with the faculty of reflective thought, language, humans created a world, which is unique and is capable of coping with complex practical and social challenges. Its primary product was human culture, a mix of things material and mythological; things practical and spiritual; a unique human mental model of the world woven on the loom of language.

Apes show a remarkable ability to manipulate the present to obtain a future goal. A chimp can stack several boxes one above the other to reach a hanging banana. Kanzi (the chimp) used its fabricated flint chips to cut the cord of the box, using them as a knife. A chimp can strip a branch of a tree to shape a probe to extract termites from the anthill. All these, however, are responses to deal with the future, which is immediate and visible, not far away into the invisible future. Australopithecus too made chopper like stone tools but perhaps to meet an immediate need, a visible future. At what stage did hominids start planning for the future: to make tools for a distant future need? Such an effort would require thinking, planning, and language. A more distinct power that language imparts is the ability to manipulate time.

The Chinese *Homo erectus* invented fire about 400,000 years ago. These humans were 'provident enough to keep supplies of fuel on hand and skilful enough to keep the fire going'. Eventually, humans could use words, not only for communication, but also for 'moving things in time'. With language capability, he could now leisurely instruct his juniors, in the security of his own cave, how to tackle a charging bull or a mammoth without having to wait for an actual charge! Therefore, the human need to tackle time is concomitant with the evolution of his mental faculties: memory, intelligence, and language. To sum, language conferred on early hominids multiple advantages to manipulate the group members for personal leadership as also to plan strategies to defend against predators in an open Savannah country; to develop proper relationships in the milieu of complex social hierarchies and to plan and provide for the future.

CONCLUSIONS

I have argued that humans do not differ qualitatively from our nearest relatives: chimps and gorillas. Chimps also seem to have some capabilities of language, thinking, and intelligence, of manipulation of time. Consciousness is a more elusive thing to talk about but apes do seem to recognize their image in the mirror, and appear aware of themselves as has been argued by Sagan & Druyan (1992) and Gibson (1993: 3–19). The apes could not have been very different from our australopithecine ancestors in anatomy and language skills. Only with the *Homo habilis* do we find unambiguous tools as also sulci in the speech areas of the hominid brain.

I am not qualified to pass a judgement on the controversy between Pinker (1994) and other primate ethologists, especially who train chimps in language skills [though some philosophers like Hunt (1995) seem to take such animal experiments seriously]. Pinker not only does not believe the experiments in training ape's language capability but ridicules such an approach. He strongly argues for a language instinct in humans. This does

seem to explain why human children can so effortlessly learn several languages whereas the apes seem to do so poorly. As explained above, this explains better my hypothesis that tool technique, innovation and language development go hand in hand and complement each other's evolution better.

I must however make it clear that I don't believe in the anthropocentric views of human uniqueness or greatness. The language instinct makes humans unique in the same sense as an elephant's trunk makes it unique. Who knows, the whales with their largest brains and complicated song systems may be capable of conducting philosophical discussions! May be one day we will like to explore what they are talking about. Humans are unique in the sense of not only being gifted with the unique language instinct but perhaps also with some capability for innovating techniques which again may not be unrelated with the language instinct.

Language and speech capability did confer many evolutionary advantages on the hominids, including planning, reflection, and manipulation of time. Language is also crucial for proper social interaction and to manipulate other group members. Humans stand apart from other animals by virtue of the complex material world that they have created. So the material world, tools and other artefacts that they have created were a powerful stimulus, also a feed-back, to the evolution of human brain, mainly to its language and co-ordination areas.

Roger Penrose (1994) believes that artificial intelligence and computers can never replace the human brain or even equal it. He says, ' ... Whatever brain activity is responsible for consciousness it must depend upon a physics that lies beyond computational simulation' (Penrose 1989: 411). I think computers provide humans another strong language skill to manipulate and understand the world better. I won't be surprised if this high-tech information revolution creates a powerful feedback loop to push evolution further to generate a new human species!

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The Anglo-Saxon View of Future and Fate: An Essay in Grammar and Theology

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This paper is on the borderline between language and what is popularly known as philosophy. Two specific features of Anglo-Saxon have been taken up for examination, one grammatical and the other philological. It is hoped that the conclusion might interest some philosophers of language. Perhaps it should be stated that there is no attempt to investigate the areas touched upon by Strawson in essays like 'Grammar and Philosophy'[1] or Chomsky whose ideas occasioned Strawson's essay.

The present writer is fully aware of the danger of drawing hasty conclusions from the peculiarities of any grammatical system. For example Dorothy Figuera in *Translating the Orient: The Reception of 'Sakuntala' in Nineteenth Century Europe* offers the following formulation:

> The stress on the universal and consequent disregard for the particular is manifest in the general absence of definite and indefinite articles in Sanskrit.[2]

The absence of the definite article is also a feature of Hindi, Urdu and numerous Indian languages. But two of the languages on which western civilization is based, namely Hebrew and Latin are deficient in this feature.

It is true that the third source of western civilization, namely Greek, has 24 forms of the definite article but Greek had relatively little influence on the grammar or syntax of the European languages. The original texts of Greek were discovered only after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. The Romance languages are derived directly from Latin, the north Europeans like the Mediterranean people felt the influence of both the Roman Empire and the Roman Catholic church which converted them to Christianity. It might be added that the legal codes of the European nations were compiled under the Latin influence.

In view of the evidence adduced above it is difficult to establish any connection between the definite article and the rise of individualism. Although causal connections cannot be based on such flimsy evidence, careful and well-considered conclusions bordering on the philosophical can be drawn. The Danish grammarian Otto Jespersen's book *The Philosophy of Grammar*[3] is an outstanding example.

Consider for example a singular deficiency of Hindi/Urdu: the same word is used for 'yesterday' and 'tomorrow'. Both Sanskrit and Persian have two distinct words for them. Why then did this distinction disappear in the modern Indian languages? It appears that the other languages currently spoken in India are also deficient is this respect. Historians of the Indian languages would perhaps know when this distinction disappeared. It must reflect some vagueness in the attitude to time, common to the speakers and writers of modern (and medieval?) Indian languages.

One of the features of the Anglo-Saxon language that I wish to examine is the absence of the future tense. It is not being suggested that the absence of the future tense necessarily indicates the absence of a sense of future and what it signifies.

One cannot help observing that while many of the languages of the Indo-Germanic family have a distinct form for the future, English does not. Latin, for example, has three distinct forms 'cantat' (he sings), 'cantavit' (he sang), and 'cantabit' (he will sing). French again has a real future tense 'donnorai' (he will give). About the English language, this deficiency has been noted by numerous grammarians. Jespersen states:

> It would be wrong to include a separate future in the tense system of the English langauge. Futurity is often not expressed at all in the verb (I start tomorrow at six); or it is expressed by means of phrases which do not signify mere futurity, but something else besides; in *will* there is an element of volition, in *am to* an element of destiny, in *may* (he may come yet) an element of uncertainty, and in *shall* an element of obligation.[4]

The following is a summary of Frank Palmer's concluding remarks:

> There is, then, a real sense in which English has no future tense. ... *Shall* and *will* are modal auxiliaries functioning exactly as *can* and *may*. ... *Will* is used for functions other than future time reference. ... Similarly *shall* is used for threat or promise. ...
>
> There are other ways of referring to future time ... e.g. the progressive (*going to*) and the simple present (*about to*).[5]

Proceeding from these factual observations if we move on to the philosophical basis of the future tense, it need hardly be argued that strictly speaking no statement about the future can be made in the indicative mood. Thus there is a radical difference between 'I went to Delhi last month' and 'I will go to Delhi next month' because 'we can assert nothing with regard to a future time but mere suppositions and surmises.'[6]

The philosopher Wittgenstein agrees with this view. Thus in the *Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus* he states:

> It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest eventuality will in fact be realized.

He even asserts:

> It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will rise.

The philosopher holds that since 'We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present', 'Belief in the causal nexus is superstition'. On the same ground he rejects the procedure of induction.[7]

The present writer as an amateur in these matters would like to suggest that the future tense has several philosophical implications which most laymen are not aware of. The absence of the future tense in Anglo-Saxon perhaps reflects a realistic recognition of experience. They resorted to the use of the subjunctive mood instead which expresses uncertainty, hesitation and diffidence instead of certainty.[8]

The next point I wish to make also relates to the Anglo-Saxon view of the future but its scope is theological, not grammatical. In the nature of things a theological matter is bound to be speculative; it cannot be based on hard facts. The Anglo-Saxon concept of the future is partly related to the word 'wyrd', usually translated as 'fate'. In this paper it is proposed that 'fate' is a misleading translation.

Before proceeding any further it is only fair that the evidence in favour of this mistaken view should be considered. No less an authority than King Alfred (849–99) in his version of Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* translates the Latin word 'Parcae' as 'wyrd'.[9] Needless to add that the *Oxford English Dictionary* follows King Alfred's example. Nor can they be blamed because there is no exact equivalent in modern English of the Anglo-Saxon term. They naturally sought help from words like 'fate' derived from Latin. It should be borne in mind that the encounter between a backward people like the Anglo-Saxons and the Romans was not a meeting between equals. While Latin culture overwhelmed English

culture, there was no reciprocal influence of the English on the Latin speaking people.

The *Parcae* (like the Greek *Moirai*) were originally birth spirits, i.e. 'Alloters' of a new born child's portion. The original meaning of the word *fatum* was probably the spoken word of the prophet announcing destiny, the ordained future.[10]

In my view neither 'fate' nor 'destiny' renders the implications of the Anglo-Saxon 'wyrd'. Etymologically 'wyrd' is derived from 'weorthan' (to become). 'Wyrd' is that which 'has become', that which has 'happened'. In other words it has no reference to the future. The notion of pre-destination cannot be derived from it. Hence 'destiny' is a misleading translation of it.

But under Latin influence the word fell into disuse and was replaced by 'fate' and similar words with different implications. It may be remarked incidentally that its successor 'weird' survives as an adjective with a debased meaning 'peculiar' or 'eccentric'.

A piece of evidence which may be adduced against the above thesis is the almost exact equivalent of the Fates in Norse mythology called Norns, the three maidens who weave man's destiny. It could be argued that the closest kinship of Anglo-Saxon literature as of language is with Norse and the Germanic languages and culture. After all the Norns appear in Richard Wagner's opera *The Niblung's Ring* (1876).

But neither in Anglo-Saxon poetry nor in Wagner's opera is the future accurately prophesied as in Greek mythology. The contrast may be illustrated. Even before Oedipus and Achilles are born the Oracle prophesies how and when they will die. In *Beowulf* and Anglo-Saxon poetry, as in Wagner, the only thing known for certain is the ultimate defeat of the heroes and the gods. A sense of all-pervading doom is cast over the poems. Perhaps we could stretch the word 'wyrd' to include the sense of doom.

The fundamental difference between Greek and Norse mythologies is that Wotan, unlike Zeus (or Jove or Jupiter)

> ... is not omnipotent. His will prevails only up to a point beyond which he is helpless. First his wife Fricka and then his own creations Brunnhilde and Siegfried defy him. Finally the abode of the gods i.e. Walhall is burnt and all gods perish with it.

Against this background it was inconceivable that there should be anything like fate which is often equated with the will of Zeus. Nobody

in Greek or Roman mythology can overrule his will. Hence fate has a distinctly different connotation.

The final section of this paper illustrates this thesis with examples from Anglo-Saxon poetry. A word of caution first. The pagan poetry of the Anglo-Saxons was transmitted orally long before it was actually written down. The complication arises from the fact that the scribes (like King Alfred the translator) were Christians and super-imposed Christian concepts on the pagan poems. According to one critic David Wright, the poet of *Beowulf* was himself a Christian speaking to a Christian audience. Nevertheless the material is pagan and 'the background of pagan philosophy breaks through the newer ethos'[11]. The poet could neither alter the blood feud nor the elaborate ceremony of the hero's cremation. He did not transform it into a Christian burial.

Fr. Klaeber in his authoritative edition of *Beowulf* states:

> The transformation of old heathen elements in accordance with Christian thought may be readily observed ... . The curse placed on the fateful treasure is clothed in a Christian formula and is declared to be void before the higher will of God.[12]

What Klaeber does not note is that the heathen belief in fate he finds in *Beowulf* is itself an imposition of Graeco-Roman mythology on it. The motif of curse on whoever possesses the gold hoard, common to both the *Niblung's Ring* and *Beowulf* could be interpreted allegorically as a curse on mindless greed, condemned to brood over the treasure rather than enjoy it. But that is scarcely a moral exclusive to Christianity. There is a story in the *Jatakas* in which three robbers, in their attempt to avoid sharing the heap of gold, end up by killing one another. This is the ultimate source of Chaucer's *Pardoner's Tale*.

After Klaeber's caveat it is proposed to furnish examples from some Anglo-Saxon poems:

(i) from *The Wanderer*, copied about AD 975. Its date of composition is uncertain. It is the elegy of an exile who is compelled to wander because he has lost the protection of his liege-lord (presumably dead):
(The exile) must traverse tracts of sea, sick at heart, trouble with oars ice cold waters ... *wyrd* is inexorable.[13]

(ii) from *Beowulf*. Composed in the early 8th century AD. The manuscript was made about the year 1000:

that was no longer his (i.e. Grendel's) *wyrd*, that he should devour more of human kind after that night. (L. 734)

(iii) from *Beowulf*:
if death seizes me (Beowulf) ... no further will you need to care about the disposal of my corpse ... *wyrd* goes as it must. (L. 455)

(iv) *Beowulf:*
Wyrd has swept off all my kinsfolk, undaunted nobles, to their doom. (L. 2814)[14]

From the above examples it appears that *wyrd* does not refer to the future. There is no assumption of foreknowledge on the part of anybody. Needless to say there is no omniscient supernatural power who could have shaped the destiny of Beowulf or his adversaries, viz. Grendel and his mother. In other instances *wyrd* has been translated as doom which hangs over man's lot (through 'lot' itself implies predestination or fate). Some translators use words like 'fortune' or 'luck' instead of 'fate' but they are equally inexact.

The use of *wyrd* then confirms a conclusion drawn from the grammatical lacuna in Anglo-Saxon, viz. the absence of a future tense. The Anglo-Saxons regarded the future as uncertain, fraught with danger and above all unpredictable.

NOTES

1. P.F. Strawson, *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, (London: Methuen & Co., 1971), pp. 130–48.
2. (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), p. 177. Quoted in R.K. Kaul, *Studies in William Jones*, (Shimla 1995).
3. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1924).
4. *The Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 50.
5. *Grammar*, (Penguin, 1971), pp. 193–4.
6. *The Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 265.
7. Quoted in George Pitcher, *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, (New Delhi: Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 73.
8. Otto Jespersen, *Essentials of English Grammar* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1933), p. 294.
9. *Sweet's Anglo-Saxon Reader*, ed. C.T. Onions, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), p. 12.
10. Paul Harvey, *The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature*, (Oxford, 1986).
11. *Beowulf*, ed. David Wright, (Penguin, 1965), p. 17.
12. *Beowulf*, ed. Fr. Klaeber, (New York: D.C. Heath & Co., 1941) p. xlix.
13. *The Earliest English Poems*, trans. Michael Alexander, (Penguin, 1966).
14. *Beowulf*, trans. J.R. Clark Hall (Allen and Unwin, 1950).

Religious Language as Analogical: A Study in Aquinas*

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Any discussion of a philosophy of religious language in Aquinas is seemingly a futile exercise. This, for two reasons: Firstly, the problem of religious language is of recent origin in the history of Philosophy. It has emerged as a specific problem within the contemporary philosophy of language, under the impact of significant developments in semantics, syntactics, semiotics, the attack on metaphysics by the logical positivists and, above all, the theories of meaning—conceivably none of which was a significant problem for the thirteenth century Europe, where Aquinas is philosophically located. Secondly, there may be some, especially in the Anglo-American philosophy, who would hesitate to consider Aquinas a philosopher at all. And this, not merely because his *magnum opus*[1] is primarily a theological treatise, but because of his own testimony to the effect that he is not a 'philosopher'. The legacy then of either a philosophy or a philosophy of religious language is supposedly not medieval.

Yet, the problem of religious language is eminently relevant to the thought of Aquinas that abounds in insightful reflections on the incarnation of the divine Word in Christ,[2] the relation between reason and revelation[3] and the scriptural hermeneutics. The concern of the contemporary philosophers on the nature and function of language was not foreign to medieval philosophers. More than one philosopher addressed themselves to the problem of our use of descriptive terms, taken from our day-to-day language, to speak of God. The manner however of their answers may be different from that of the analytical philosophers. Even so, the intellectual climate of the medieval times was different, but not less rigorous. Moreover, the theologians in medieval times understood by 'philosophy' the Grecko-Roman 'pagan' philosophy. Terms like 'Christian' and 'philosophy' seemingly could not be put together. But it goes entirely to the credit of Aquinas to have given a Christian philosophy to the west. He justifies the legitimacy of the employment of reason in theology, assigning the rightful place for a natural theology.[4] The metaphor of philosophy being

a 'handmaid to theology', it may be noted, is not of Aquinas. The relation between philosophy and theology, for Aquinas, is rather like the one between water and wine[5] while water gives consistency to wine, wine itself transforms water. Aquinas clearly aims at an integration of philosophy and theology.

A. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Aquinas is aware of the problems of religious language. The meanings of everyday words (e.g. 'good', 'loving', 'kind', 'forgiving', 'commands', 'speaks', 'hears', 'wills', 'purposes' etc.) are not problematic, as they are determined in the 'secular' context. But, when employed in religion, they do become suddenly problematic. Thus 'love', in our ordinary usage, may range in its meaning from love-making to forms of practical and sacrificial caring. The meanings in all of them refer to our physical behaviour. But how can it be applied to God, said to be incorporeal? How can God express love? Can there be disembodied love? Such problems are also met with in all other terms purported to refer to divine attributes. How does religious language function?

Classical rationalists, like Aristotle, may be said to have a logico-epistemological orientation to all problems of language and meaning. Since language embodies a system of signs, that supposedly represent the realities, adequately captured by metaphysical categories, the problem of meaning is one of *defining* our terms. The word, 'chair', is defined as 'a piece of furniture for sitting on either to relax or study', as the case may be. Likewise our words, 'God', 'soul' and 'immortality', need to be precisely defined to convey their meaning. Like all linguistic expressions, religious expressions are also cognitive. There is a single logic for all language, religious or non-religious. Much before the logical positivists in our times were to protest against all forms of cognitive theories in religion, ethics and aesthetics, Aquinas was fully alive to their infelicities. Our contemporary non-cognitivists, be they symbolists, emotivists, conativists, 'incarnationists' or 'game' theorists, in respect of religion, may be said to be foreshadowed by the analogists, chief among whom is Aquinas: our day-to-day terms are not used descriptively in religion. Without abandoning metaphysics, Aquinas advocated an analogical theory for overcoming the infelicities of the cognitive theories.[6] Analogical theory may be said to be a bridge between the cognitivists and the non-cognitivists. It was further elaborated by Cajetan. I shall however base this study on the two works of Aquinas, the *Summa Theologie* and *Summa Contra Gentiles*. The power of the analogical theory in our days is amply evidenced from the fact that it is not less subscribed to than criticized by the philosophers in the history of western philosophy. It is as arresting, if not more, as his arguments for the existence of God.

B. ANALOGY OF BEING

If we are to understand the fuller significance of analogical theory of religious language in all its intricacies, we must first study its metaphysical foundation. The foundation is the doctrine of the analogy of Being, full of technicalities, often couched in the archaic metaphysical jargons. We ought to be acquainted with it, however abstruse, at least in its bare outlines, for a proper understanding of Aquinas' religious language.

Thomistic philosophy is indebted to Aristotelian metaphysics, in particular, to the latter's metaphysical and epistemological realism, in more ways than one: Aristotle's formal logic, division of scientific thought into the theoretical, practical and productive disciplines, reasoning in terms of actuality and potentiality, causation, intellectual contemplation as the goal of human life, free choice as the origin of moral action, distinction between the material and the immaterial, the temporal and the eternal, the body and the soul, and the empirical grounding of human knowledge—are all an Aristotelian legacy, which Aquinas is indebted to. The free borrowing however is put to creative use by Aquinas in the service of Christian philosophy and theology. The Aristotelian philosophy, under his influence, was to constitute soon a substantial part of the intellectual heritage of the entire western culture. Truly, Aristotle may be said to have been 'baptized' by Aquinas. The contribution is largely forgotten, today, because of the pejorative appellation of 'the dark ages' to the medieval times, which, as a matter of fact, was an age of quiet, nonetheless, creative syncretism. From this legacy, let us pick up the most fundamental concept, *being*, the starting point for metaphysics.

1. Being, the Starting Point

Both for Aristotle and Aquinas *being* is the most primitive notion. It is naturally known by the human intellect. Naturally known, because it is abstracted from the sensible things. But, what is being? All that we encounter in our 'perception', in the widest sense, is *being*: *Substance* (e.g. metal, plant, animal, man); *accidents* (e.g. quality like colour, quantity like size) that inhere in the substance; *actuality* and *potentiality* (the one refers to what is present, the other to what is yet to come through the

operation of an efficient causality); the *temporal* and the *non-temporal* (the one refers to the material, subject to change, the other to what is without a potentiality to change). All these are beings. Basically they are all types of *essences*. Such essences may exist either in reality or merely in thought. It is important for us to note that they are all beings with a focal reference to *substance*, to the extent that it is the substance that has accidents, actualities and potentialities; that changes or retains its essential identity etc. Substance is being, in the primary sense, but all the rest are beings, only insofar as they are related to the independent substances. Within this Aristotelian theoretical framework Aquinas does his philosophy;[7] and quite creatively, too, in as much as the Greek ontology is radically changed for a Christian metaphysics of creation.[8]

Aquinas realized that the Aristotelian metaphysics did not show much concern for *existence*.[9] Aristotle viewed 'thing' (*res*) and 'being' (*ens*) as one and the same, because they coincide with 'what something is'; the 'what' of a thing or being is its essence, or quiddity, or nature. Moreover, if Aristotle admitted an efficient cause, it was merely to initiate 'motion', or change, in the substance, rather than for imparting any existence to it. Thus Aristotle treated being as identical with essence. Aquinas, however, inspite of the structural resemblances with Aristotelian metaphysics, was to effect far reaching changes in it by introducing existence.[10] This has been virtually unnoticed by many western philosophers. The changes, presumably, have been partly occasioned by the historical conditioning of the thirteenth century Christian culture, which was radically different from that of Greece in the fourth century BC.[11] In Aquinas, the doctrine of being now acquires a new dimension and, with it, a new significance: The Aristotelian finite substance, which is primarily being, without being rejected at the empirical level, gets transformed, at the transcendental level, by Aquinas into God, the focal Being, which communicates 'be-ing' to all created beings by way of his creative efficient causality.[12] For Aristotle, the focal point of reference to all being is the finite substance, whereas, to Aquinas, it is God's Being, the fullness of being. What has happened here?

2. Essence versus Existence

Being, for Aquinas, is now no more a mere quidditative essence, or a nature. It is rather the 'act of be-ing'. It is plainly *existence*. If being is understood as 'what is', the 'what' represents an essence, whereas, if understood as 'is', it represents existence. God's efficient causality is not

merely for initiating the motion, but to establish the finite natures into the actuality of existence. Only God is the primary instance of Being. If his nature is spoken of, it is such that it is completely identical with his existence; his essence and existence are identical. The identity concerned is the manner of God's being, the primary analogate. All his creatures however are related to him as the secondary analogates, after the manner of effects. They are analogated with their efficient cause as their focal point of reference. Hence, in the created order, every finite being is composed of a nature, or an essence and an existence. Far from being identical, its existence is proportionate to its essence. The communicated existence, or be-ing, is limited by the potentiality of the receiving nature. *Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur* is a fundamental principle of Thomistic philosophy. The essence and existence of the composite being, then, are related as potency and act, the latter delimited by the former.

What has necessitated this development in the Aristotelian thought? Aquinas, as can be expected, is rooted in the Biblical perception of God as the Be-ing: God is 'I am who Am' (*Ego sum qui sum*).[13] The 'Am' is the first person singular of the verb, 'to be' (*sum* derived from *esse*).[14] Aquinas seizes upon the Biblical insight that the proper name and nature of God is Being. Coupled with it is yet another scriptural perception that before creation there was nothing, or non-being, for creation is out of nothing (*ex nihilo*).[15] God is the primary instance of Being; all others, in virtue of their being created, are only established in be-ing, with the focal reference to the primary Being. Within this basic metaphysical truth Aquinas situates other religio-moral attributes, viz. 'loving', 'kind', 'holy', 'just', 'provident', 'saving' etc., on account of the Christian personalistic theism. However, all the religio-moral attributes of God too are to be understood analogically, that is with reference to their primary analogate, namely, God who *is* love, kindness, holiness, justice, providence, salvation etc. Thus the Aristotelian notions are seen by Aquinas flexible enough to be translated and transcreated into the content of revelation. Aristotle would treat the finite substances as the efficient causes, but Aquinas made out of God the infinite substance (*pleroma*), that, in virtue of its being the prime-mover, communicates be-ing to finite natures. The remote, detached prime-mover of the Greek philosopher has put on the robe of the Judeo-Christian creator God, whose name and nature is Being. Unicity of the subsistent existence belongs only to God, while all else has participatory act of be-ing from the former.

3. Divine Transcendence and Immanence

The doctrine of the analogy of being comes handy to Aquinas to safeguard the divine transcendence and immanence, and thereby the incarnational nature of the Word and all language. God is transcendentally removed from everything created, since he is Being as no other beings are. This suggests that no creature can have be-ing as its nature, but only as conditioned by its nature; its be-ing is other than its nature. Yet, God is immanently close to everything created, because the be-ing of the finite thing is bestowed by the Being as such through his creative causality. Creation is God's free act as the efficient cause, or the prime-mover, that not merely initiates a motion in a finite nature, but establishes it in the act of be-ing. Hence, while Being as such is necessary, all beings are thrust in the act of be-ing, therefore contingent. If created being is said to be being, it is because every effect partakes in a limited manner of the causal being of God.[16]

4. Unity and Multiplicity of Being

If being is the most primitive notion under which all beings can be subsumed in such a way that they are partly similar and partly dissimilar, what kind of unity can we trace in being? Conversely, what kind of multiplicity can we trace in the beings? The unity should be such that it should be applicable to all beings, without losing its unicity. Likewise multiplicity of beings should be such that their diversity can be traced to the unity of being, without losing their multiplicity. If we are to appreciate the genius of Aquinas, we better counterpose his views here with those of other Greek metaphysicians on the unity and multiplicity of being. Parmenides applied the notion of being univocally as 'that which is', and thereby destroyed all differences among beings. The first casualty of his philosophy of being, or permanence, was the notion of becoming, or change. Change became ephemeral. Heraclitus, on the other hand, applied the notion of being equivocally as 'that which becomes', and thereby destroyed the subsistent substances. The casualty here is the self-identity of substance for the protection of difference. Thus Heraclitus destroyed the one, and Parmenides the many.[17] But Aquinas safeguarded both: the unity of being, thereby the creator-God; and the multiplicity of beings, thereby the created world, the multiverse. Hence, he applied the notion of being analogically, thus safeguarding at once the unity and multiplicity, permanence and change, eternality and temporality—in short, the creator and his creature.

The problem of the analogy of being can be studied at two levels, the horizontal and the vertical. At the horizontal level, Aristotle applied the notion of being to substance and all other categories, that inhere in the substance. Such categories are, as we all know, quantity, quality, relation, 'habitus', time, place, position, action and passion. They are beings with a focal reference to substance. The horizontal application of being safeguards primarily the difference among beings. At the vertical level, however, Aquinas may be said to have applied the notion of being to different kinds of substances, material and immaterial. Here, even God, the Being as such, is included. All substances are beings with a focal reference to the divine self-subsistent Being. The vertical application safeguards the identity of the being.

The importance of the analogical predication of being, that safeguards both unity and difference, becomes evident, when we analyze the nature of predication. Predication is a judgement, in which we say something of a subject. In the univocal predication of a term, both the name and its intelligible content are the same. The term, 'animal', can be predicated of 'man' and 'donkey' with the same intelligible content. But in the equivocal predication, the name may be the same, but the intelligible content is different: Thus, '*canis*' can be predicated of a 'barking animal' and a 'celestial body', but with different intelligible contents. But, in the analogical predication, a term is applied to different things, differing in their intelligible content, but they are *relevantly related to one and the same thing.*[18] For example, 'health' primarily is the wholesome state of an organism, but it can also be applied to something else, a different intelligible content, in the sense of 'a sign of health' (e.g. healthy urine) or 'a cause of health' (e.g. a healthy tonic). Here the 'sign' and the 'cause' are relevantly related to the wholesome state of the organism, that we call 'health'. Obviously, the wholesome state of organism is the primary analogate, whereas the 'sign' and 'cause' are the secondary analogates. The analogical predication of 'health' safeguards its sameness and difference, even as the analogical predication of being safeguards unity and multiplicity of being.

Aquinas however asks us not to think of being, in vertical predication, as the genus, of which substance and accidents are the species. This is because nothing can be added to being from outside.[19] A *differentia* may be added to a genus, or an accident to a subject, to obtain a species or an individual, as the case may be, but not so in respect of being. Rather, being is intrinsically present in substances and accidents alike, yet, in

different ways. In the horizontal predication, substance, which is primarily being, is the highest being. Quality, quantity, generation and corruption, that give rise to new substances, are being at the intermediary ranges. Finally, negation and privation, which exist only in thought, are being at the lowest level. Likewise, in the vertical predication, God is the Being as such, and all the rest are beings, to the extent they participate in the act of be-ing of the Being.

5. Participation in Being

For Aquinas the doctrine of the analogy of being is inextricably related to the doctrine of participation.[20] This is so for two reasons. Firstly, God is the primary Being to which all other beings are analogated. Secondly, God's causality is not merely for initiating a motion for further change, but, more importantly, for establishing the finite nature in the act of being. The doctrine of participation is therefore a logical corollary to that of the analogy of being, which, in turn, is a corollary of the great chain of Being: 'beings participate in the Being.' The statement, purporting to be a basic Thomistic thesis, obviously needs some clarification.

Negatively, participation is not an identification. When A receives a universal quality, B, that belongs to C, then A may be said to participate in the B. A and B cannot therefore be identical. In the order of reality, when beings participate in the act of be-ing, which properly belongs to Being as such, we are confronted with the metaphysical problem of participation. Participation may be of three kinds: Firstly, in a *logical* participation, a less extended intelligible content participates in a more extended content. Such a participation is realized, when a species participates in the genus (e.g. Man is an animal), or an individual in the species (e.g. Socrates is man). Secondly, in an *ontological* participation, a subject may be said to participate in an accident, or matter in a form. It is also called a *real* participation, because a real composition results from such a participation (e.g. the potentiality of the wood participates in the form of the table). Real participation, to say the least, is an 'essential' participation, in as much as it is a participation in an essence, or nature. Finally, in the *causal* participation, an effect may be said to participate in the cause, especially when the effect is unequal in power to its cause. The participation of a nature in existence, or be-ing, falls under this category. Causal participation is more than an 'essential' participation; it is an 'existential' participation. This is of special significance to me in the present context.

Existence (*Esse*), according to Aquinas, is not, strictly speaking, concretely, but absolutely, signified. By implication, it suggests, first of all, that existence cannot logically participate in anything else. Rather existence itself is what is participated in by everything else. For, for existence to participate in anything else logically, there should be something more extensive than existence but, as a matter of fact, existence is the most extensive; nothing else is more extensive than existence. Secondly, existence also does not participate ontologically, because we would then be constrained to make a distinction within existence itself between a subject that participates and the accident in which existence participates. But existence is absolute; being simple, it does not admit an internal differentiation. While in relative and composite things a distinction between a nature and existence can be made, in the absolute and simple existence, we cannot make any such real distinction. Since existence (*Esse*) is the proper name and nature of God, God is the absolute subsistent existence, that cannot be ontologically pluralized, as a common essence can be. Aquinas is keen on rejecting the ontological participation of existence that God is, lest it should surreptitiously make room for pantheism, thanks to his familiarity with the thoughts of the Jewish and Islamic philosophy.[21] Otherwise the created world would have to be treated as a part of God.

But he does admit the causal participation in existence. However, it is participation by the finite nature, not so much in the subsisting existence as in the act of be-ing. In the causal participation, *Esse* is realized intrinsically in the existing creature/nature. It is neither a participation in existence in general (*esse commune*) nor a participation in the subsisting *Esse* that is God. Rather, in God's creative act, a creature's finite nature is actualized in the act of be-ing. It may be noted that there is a two-fold actualization for all composite entities:[22] Firstly, from the potentiality of matter to the actuality of form. This was highlighted by Aristotle's hylemorphism. This is accepted by Aquinas, too. Secondly, from the potentiality of the composite essence to the actuality of existence. This was missed by Aristotle, but could not be ignored at any cost by Aquinas, because of his acceptance of the Biblical doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*.[23] We are now in a position to study his religious language.

C. ANALOGY AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

For Aquinas, the doctrine of the analogy of being, along with its corollary of the doctrine of participation, is the basis for our knowledge of God and the expression thereof, therefore, of religious language. This makes for a

conviction that, despite a radical diversity of nature between the creator and the creature, there is *somehow* a likeness between them, after the manner of a likeness between the cause and effect. This likeness is the ontological justification for analogical predication of religious language. Since we do not know what God's nature is, it must forever retain its mystery to us. Yet, an analogical knowledge of God, however dim, is possible for man, even speaking philosophically. The movement here is from the created order to the creator, revealing at once the Thomistic preference for a realistic epistemology. Since the being of the sensible world is after all derived from its cause, the self-subsistent Being, all our knowledge of God is based on our experience of the world. The method of this knowledge however is analogical, and this makes for a theory of religious language as analogical.

Man is a language-using animal. By language we mean a system of articulate sounds, if spoken, and symbols, if written, constituting a network of meanings. It is rooted in our culture, in the sense that we are born, brought up and live in a linguistic community. When we use a word, say, 'good', its meaning is obviously given to us in the context of our day-to-day living. Thus, in the assertion, 'This is a good chair', the term, 'good', may mean 'conducive to work, or sit and relax', as the case may be. But what about its meaning, if applied to God, as in the assertion, 'God is good'? Surely, there seems to be a shift in the meaning from its original application. It is not used in the univocal sense, that is, in exactly the same sense. God is not good in the way that a chair is said to be good. If the sense is not univocal, is it then equivocal? This too is ruled out, because the use is not totally different either, as is the case with the term, 'bat', in assertions, 'Bat is a flying mammal' and 'Bradman has a straight bat'. Yet, the use of the term, 'good', if applied to God and chair, while being neither univocal nor equivocal, has a definite relation. Analogical usage embodies the relation concerned.

To Aquinas, the relation in point may be said to reflect a metaphysical commitment to a religious belief, not without a philosophical justification, however, that God is the creator of everything existent. There exists a relation of cause and effect between God and his creation. The effect shares *in some measure* in the reality and character of its cause.[24] The being of the effect is somehow dependent on the Being of the cause. Analogical usage of words then is obviously rooted in the analogy of beings to Being as such. Analogy implies a certain likeness, or similarity, of the creature to the creator, and therefore, rules out the former's total

difference from the creator. Even so, it implies a certain unlikeness, or dissimilarity, between the two, which, again, rules out a total identity between the two.

1. Types of Analogical Predication

Analogy can be of many types. I shall restrict myself to two types: 'analogy downward' and 'analogy upward'. Let us consider the example of the likeness of human life to a lower form of life to explicate the analogy downward. Consider the two statements, 'The dog is faithful' and 'The man is faithful'. The term, 'faithful', is predicated of the subjects, 'dog' and 'man', because of certain similarity in the quality exhibited in the behaviour of dog and man. The quality concerned is 'the steadfast adherence to a person' that we call fidelity. Because of the similarity in quality, fidelity is predicated of the two subjects, hence an equivocal sense of fidelity is ruled out. This however does not mean that there is a total identity of the quality concerned in the two subjects. Hence a univocal sense of the usage, too, is ruled out. There is a certain difference in the quality concerned, in fact, the difference is enormous. Faithfulness of the dog is conditioned by the habituated responses, and rooted in the instincts. On the contrary, faithfulness of man is freely chosen, humanly imagined and rationally strengthened. If a man does not want to direct this quality towards another human person any longer, for whatever reason he may deem it fit, he can say 'quits' to it. Fidelity to one's master, spouse, party and even a cause, may be at a later stage as freely withdrawn as committed in the first instance. Both in the commitment and the withdrawal thereof man is equally responsible to the consequences that are likely to follow from his action. All this only goes to suggest that there is an immense difference between the quality of faithfulness exhibited by a brute animal and a human person. The quality of human fidelity is immensely superior: it is freely given, responsibly borne and self-consciously deliberated; it may therefore be inextricably linked with moral goals. The quality of the canine fidelity, on the other hand, is considerably inferior, in that it is largely ensured by conditioned reflexes, and strengthened by a sense-bound consciousness. In virtue of this difference, the term, 'faithful', is not univocally predicated of man and dog.

The concept of analogy, then, implies a part similarity (so, equivocality is rejected) and a part dissimilarity (so, univocality is rejected). We say, the term, 'faithful', is analogically predicated of man and dog. It suggests that there is in dog a quality of steadfast adherence to a person, and that

it is similar to the one in man, too, although it operates at the lower level of the brute consciousness. As distinct from the quality operating at this lower level of consciousness, there is a similar quality in man, a devotion to a person or cause, and it operates at the higher level of human rational consciousness. There is a certain correspondence between the qualities exhibited in the canine and human behaviour. In the structure of the behavioral attitude, there is a recognizable likeness. Because of this likeness, we speak of dog as faithful. But the human faithfulness differs from the canine faithfulness to the wide extent that the human person differs from the dog. Similarity within difference and difference within similarity are woven warp and woof in the notion of analogy. If the dog is said to be faithful, the higher human quality is applied downward to it analogically. This is analogy downward. In the exemplification of the analogy downward, the focal point of reference is human fidelity. Human fidelity is normative, because it is directly known to us, insofar as it is what is realized within ourselves. The canine fidelity, however, operating at the lower level of brute consciousness is known by us only dimly and imperfectly; briefly, it is known merely analogically.

Let us now clarify the analogy upward. This is of special significance to us in the present context. We may know a quality directly within us, yet, as a poor shadow of the quality, that should however be expected to exist in all its perfection in a form of consciousness infinitely superior to our own. Let us consider the two assertions, 'The boy loves the girl' and 'God loves man'. The quality of 'love', (so are terms like 'faithful', 'good', 'wise', 'forgiving', 'saving', 'compassionate' etc.), predicated of 'boy' and 'God', is directly known to us and within us, because we first encounter it at the level of our own consciousness. But, though directly known to us, it is known in us only dimly and imperfectly, because it is in us neither in all its purity nor in its full measure; more often than not it is found to be wanting in some measure or other. Operating at the level of human consciousness, it may often by fused with its opposite quality (e.g. self-giving vs self-seeking). Yet, the more or less of the quality of love logically implies the most love somewhere. This most love is captured by the man of religion in his belief that God *is* love. God is not said to have, but be, love. Thus all the qualities, predicated of man and God, in us are known, as though they are only shadows, a mere re-presentations of the perfect qualities in godhead. In God, in virtue of his being the self-subsistent Being, all perfections should be in their absolute purity and fullness. In us, however, in virtue of our derived being, they are in a measure,

more or less, although they are known to us directly. The focal point of reference for the human 'love', 'goodness', 'fidelity' is God's own love, goodness and fidelity. If they are known in us directly, but dimly, they are also said to be known indirectly and merely analogically in God. This is analogy upward, admitted by Aquinas, in the context of religious language. It represents a movement of knowledge upward from the created being, say, man to God, from creature to the creator. For Aquinas, all the human knowledge of God is analogical, by way of analogy upward. We move in knowledge upward to God from the sensible world, in virtue of the link between God and the world, related as the efficient cause and the effect. Analogy upward is the reverse movement, if we are to compare it with the analogy downward. The possibility itself is rooted in the analogy of Being and the participation therein.

Thus, in the statements, 'God is good' and 'Man is good', we mean to suggest that there is perfect quality of goodness in the infinitely perfect Being. And that it also corresponds in some measure to what we know of it in man, at our own human level, however imperfect that goodness in him be. In this type of analogy, the 'divine goodness' is the focal point; it is the true goodness, the normative goodness, the unbroken goodness. On the contrary, 'the human goodness' is a mere shadow, a faint, fragmentary and distorted reflection of the perfect quality of goodness in God. Only in God, Aquinas reminds us, can the perfections of all qualities, more importantly, of being, be in their true, perfect and unfractured nature. Similarly the terms like 'knows', 'loves', 'righteous', 'compassionate', 'just', 'merciful' and so on can be applied in the fullest measure and proper sense only to God. But, our knowledge of them in God is analogical. To man, on the contrary, they can be applied only in a measure, more or less, and imperfectly. But our knowledge of them in us is direct. Therefore, all religious language is analogical, insofar as it purports to give us the knowledge by way of analogy upward.

2. Analogy and Rational Psychology

If all religious language is analogical, because it purports to give us only analogical knowledge of God, it has something to do with the natural endowment of our mind to knowledge and its expression.[25] To Aquinas, the endowment, however, operates within a realistic psychology.

In a judgement in the form, 'The table is round', the concepts of 'table' and 'round' are formed through a 'simple abstraction' of their finite natures. But what about the knowledge of the copula, 'is'? It escapes the

characterization of either finite or infinite. In itself, it could be either: Finite, when received into a limiting subject but, infinite, when treated as subsisting existence. What is represented by 'is' and the various forms of the verb 'to be', for that matter, is existence, which can be known only by the 'non-precisive abstraction'. This is no abstraction at all, it is rather a 'separating' activity of the mind, which is called, more precisely, 'judgement'. Aquinas holds that existence is an actuality, indeed, the actuality of all actualities, perfection of all perfections. Whereas Aristotle confined actuality to that of the finite forms, that actualized the potentialities, Aquinas extended it to existence. If he further identified it with the existence, that is the self-subsistent Being of God, it was partly due to his religious belief that Being is the proper name and nature of God. In virtue of causal participation, being may be received as the act of be-ing in finite natures. This participation is effected by way of God's creative causality. Thus Aquinas was able to arrive at a pure actuality without any potentiality, separated from the actuality of finite forms, advocated by Aristotle. Such pure actuality is the infinite existence that cannot be numerically multiplicated. Self-subsistent existence is not like the common universal that gets pluralized in the individuals.

For Aquinas, these conclusions, though reinforced from the scriptures, can be arrived at by the unaided philosophical reason. The scriptural vision however may be brought to bear upon them, when the self-subsistent existence is further said to be all-knowing, provident and loving, unlike the Aristotelian impersonal and otiose actuality. This explains why the Aristotelian pure actuality could be only the final cause, the Being of the contemplation for intellect,[26] but not the efficient cause communicating its act of be-ing to the finite natures. Thus the presuppositions of his rational psychology permit only an analogical knowledge of God, although the starting point of all our knowledge is grounded in a sensible world. The analogy upward is a movement of knowledge from the finite to the infinite, from the beings to the Being.

3. A Methodological Tool

Neither the metaphysical subtlety nor the psychological sight nor the scriptural insight into the nature of religious language as analogical should make us impervious to the latter's value as a methodological tool.

The Semitic sense of the transcendence is deeply inbuilt into Aquinas' philosophy: God is a mystery hidden from us. We can know directly neither the divine nature nor its perfect attributes in themselves. However,

the doctrine of the analogy of being provides us with a platform for an analogical knowledge of God. This alone justifies our analogical use of language in religion. But analogy is only indicative of a relation between the partly similar and partly dissimilar meanings of a term, when used of God and man. It neither explores intensively nor maps out extensively the infinite nature of God. It is a mere linguistic and methodological tool to appraise us of the way we use our terms. Having presupposed God's existence (though this can be rationally demonstrated), and a dim knowledge of its nature, the methodological device is meant to be a broad framework for making certain limited statements about God. This procedure, Aquinas believes, is a safeguard against both agnosticism and a scientific reductionism of religious mystery. The mystery of God is never totally comprehended, but merely and peripherally apprehended,[27] for a God that is thoroughly comprehended is no God at all.

The methodological tool is further supplemented by Aquinas with the methods of 'negation' and 'culmination'. Whatever knowledge we have of God proceeds from our created order. Since every perfection in the created order is fused with imperfections, the way of negation is meant precisely for purifying the perfections of the created order of their negativities and privations.[28] Love is a perfection in the created order, but we all are sadly aware how imperfect it is in any of its forms. Its imperfections are first of all to be negated radically, before the term, 'love', can be meaningfully applied to God. This procedure is the *via negativa*. Likewise the perfection, that is realized in creation, admits of degrees. Since God is the most being, therefore, the most in every perfection, too, created perfections, before they can be applied to God, will have to be culminated, or maximized, to their fullest measure. This procedure is *via eminentia*. Thus the statement, 'God is love', suggests that 'love' is predicated of God, not only in all its purity but also in all its intensity.

By way of concluding, we may briefly consider how, in the light of Aquinas' reflections on religious language, philosophy itself should be thought of. I shall restrict myself to two observations.

Firstly, one may be tempted to suggest that, since Aquinas brings in his religious perspectives to bear upon his philosophical investigations, as he has done in respect of religious language, what he gives us is less than philosophy. This however does not seem to be the case. Contemporary hermeneuticians remind us that every philosopher learns through language. This means that we all think according to the specific traditions we find ourselves in. Aquinas too is no exception to this post-Modernistic insight

about language and tradition. But there is a crucial difference. Aquinas does not ground his philosophy on language and tradition, as the post-Modernists do. Rather his final court of appeal is the external world of sensible things. He is too much of an Aristotelian to pattern his philosophy on language. Aquinas perhaps would find the post-Modernist approach bound by its own historical antecedents; further, such a dependence may also logically land us into an infinite regress. Aquinas, on the contrary, may be said to give us a sound principle: Language is checked by thought, and thought by reality. To him, committed as he is to Aristotelian realism, things themselves are indisputably prior to both thought and language.

Secondly, to Aquinas, metaphysics is the core of philosophy, 'the first philosophy',[29] to use his own expression. It is the philosophical science of being as being (*ens commune*). It is clearly distinct from Natural Philosophy, the study of being as subjected to change. Again, from Mathematics, the study of being as quantified, because the concept of number is rooted in quantity. Being the philosophical science of being as such, metaphysics need not be treated as the study of God. However, having begun the study of being as being, it may further study the Being as the cause, or the principle, under which all beings fall. It is only to this extent that it may be treated as the philosophy of God, indirectly, however. Therefore Aquinas does not see any conflict between faith and reason, religion and philosophy, revealed theology and natural theology, in short, metaphysics as the science of the divine and metaphysics as the science of being as Being. This justifies the employment of philosophical reasoning for demonstrating the 'preambles of faith' (e.g. the existence of God), supplying analogies for illustrating the mysteries of faith and, sometimes, even for explicating certain types of attacks on religion as philosophically non-sustainable. Being as Being can be philosophically discovered: In the philosophical order, we begin with the sensible world and, through reason, ascend to God as its creative principle, whereas in the theological order, we begin with God as the revealed Being and, through faith, descend to the sensible world as the effect that has received that act of be-ing from its cause. Therefore, if there should be a philosophy of religious language, to Aquinas, it can be legitimate only to the extent that such a language is purely analogical.

Notes and References

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11. Joseph Owens, in op.cit., pp. 42ff.
12. *Summa*, Ia.45.5.
13. *Exodus*, 3:14; *Gentiles*, I.22.
14. The third person singular of the Sanskrit *san* becomes in the Upaniṣads *Sat*, occasioning a similar scriptural insight. Upaniṣadic phrases like *ekam sat,*

brahma satyam, despite the impersonalistic absolutism, express similar insight.

15. *Genesis*, 1 : 1.
16. The similarity between God and his creatures is sought to be further elaborated in the later Scholastic philosophy in terms of either an *imago*, reflected in the intellection and volition of a spiritual supposit, i.e. man, or a *vestigium*, reflected in a purely material supposit like a star.
17. Indian metaphysics has its counterpart in the controversy between Vedānta and Buddhism.
18. John F. Wippel, 'Metaphysics', in Kretzmann and Stump, op.cit., pp. 90ff.
19. Ibid., p. 92.
20. *Summa*, Ia.44.1. See also Clark W.N., (1952), 'The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas Aquinas', in the *Proceedings of the American Catholic Association*, 26; J.F. Wippel, (1987), 'Thomas Aquinas and Participation', in the edited work, *Studies in Medieval Philosophy*, Washington: Catholic University of America Press, pp. 117–58.
21. David B. Burrell, C.S.E., 'Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers', in Kretzmann and Stump, op.cit., pp. 60–84. His indebtedness to Maimonides, Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) is specially acknowledged. See also Aquinas' *Expositio Super Dionysium De Divinis Nominibus*, 2.3.158.
22. David B. Burrell, op.cit., p. 63.
23. Aquinas fully utilizes the insight from the causal participation in his 'Fourth Way' for the existence of God, based on the degrees of perfection. The notion of degrees of perfection into more or less suggests the most in the perfection concerned. Thus we can speak of the truest, the best and the noblest etc. In the same way, the notion of the more or less of being suggests the most Being, or the *pleroma*. When Aquinas further states that the fullness of Being is the truest, he thinks of the ontological truth rather than the truth of the proposition. The maximum is the cause of everything that participates more or less in it. This way, God, the fullest Being, is thought of as the first cause of beings. I do grant, the argument may have a Platonic ring, but, I believe, neither Aquinas nor his mentor Aristotle is free from the Platonic influence.
24. *Summa*, Ia.13.5; *Gentiles*, 1.29; 1.34.
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On the Very Idea of Relative Truth

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This paper intends to examine the notion of relative truth in contemporary Western philosophy in view of the fact that the classical notion of absolute truth has been increasingly challenged by the relativists and the critics of the absolutist metaphysics of truth and reason. The relativists seek to reject the view that truth is absolute and eternal and that history and culture make no difference to it. They in their zeal to debunk the absolutist metaphysics of truth and reality espouse the contestable thesis that truth, like any other concept, must be relativized to our history and culture.[1]

In this paper I will argue that relativism is not free from difficulties in view of the fact that the very concept of relative truth is contestable. In sections 1 and 2, I will bring out the dogmas of relativism and expose the limitations of relativization of our concepts. In section 3, I will show how the ethnocentric framework of Rorty is inadequate to explain the concept of truth. In section 4, I will show, following Putnam, that truth has to be placed in the normative discourse as it stands for the ideal limit of our cognitive inquiry. In sections 5 and 6, I will defend a rationalist view of truth according to which truth belongs to the common core of the conceptual scheme shared by mankind. Thus I would defend a sort of moderate absolutism about truth in the well established rationalist tradition of the West.

1. RELATIVISM AND THE IDEA OF TRUTH

The way relativism is characterized[2] has much to do with how we define some of our concepts like truth and reality in terms of some prior notions like language, culture and history. Relativism takes various forms[3] such as ontological, epistemological, linguistic and moral depending on which concepts it treats according to its main thrust of relativizing the concepts to culture, community and conceptual frameworks. Relativism thus introduces into philosophical analysis the method of relativization of concepts

to the historical and cultural settings in which they have their origin. Therefore, the relativist thinkers have always made their inquiry overtly empiricist, historicist and anti-metaphysical.[4]

The concept of truth has been one of the key concepts which, the relativists think, has resisted a historicist and anti-metaphysical analysis. They have therefore taken the concepts of truth and reality as the main focus of their anti-absolutist and anti-metaphysical arguments.[5] The notion of conceptual scheme has come handy to the relativists in their effort to show that what we hold as true and real is nothing but what we project in our conceptual scheme to be so. And since there are multiple conceptual schemes possible, it is argued, there is no unique concept of truth available in all possible conceptual schemes. The distinction between scheme and content,[6] i.e., between our conceptual system and experience is thus underlying the relativist argument that truth is a matter of our conceptual construction. Therefore, it is argued, truth has nothing to do with the absolutist notion of correspondence with reality.

The relativist argues that not only the concept of truth but also the concept of the world must shed its absolutistic aura in the sense that there is no unique meaning which can be assigned to these concepts. The concept of the world must undergo revision in view of the fact that we cannot take for granted that there is an absolutely existent world independently of our conceptual schemes.

The idea of a conceptual scheme, as Davidson[7] has pointed out, gives rise to the relativist idea that there are alternative conceptual schemes all vying with one another to capture reality in their conceptual networks. That is, it gives legitimacy to the idea that the multiple conceptual schemes are the alternative arrangements of concepts to organize experience. This in a sense leads to the Goodmanian concept of alternative versions of the world or the ways of worldmaking.[8] The ideas of alternative vocabularies of Rorty[9] and the alternative conceptual paradigms of Kuhn[10] are but the different articulations of the same idea of alternative conceptual schemes.

Relativism is thus the result of the effort to make the conceptual paradigms or the schemes the key to our understanding of the world. The effort is to make our world amenable to as many world-pictures as possible and thus to show that there is no unique notion of truth as an absolute relation between thought and language on the one hand and the world on the other. Since alternative world-descriptions are possible, it cannot be ruled out that there are alternative ideas of truth. Gellner puts the relativist position as follows:

> The problem of relativism is whether there is one and one only world, in the end; whether all the divergent visions of reality can in the end be shown ... to be diverse aspects of one and the same objective world, whose diversity can itself be explained in terms of the properties or laws of that world.[11]

The relativist thus raises the important question: Is there a unique world underlying all possible world-descriptions? Obviously the answer which the relativist provides is that there is no such unique 'the world' which is the common subject-matter of all world-descriptions. Each world-description or conceptual scheme projects its own world. Therefore, the relativist says, there are as many worlds as there are world-descriptions or ways of worldmaking. From this it follows that the realist notion of the world is a misnomer and that we must countenance not only a plurality of world-views but also a plurality of worlds. The strongest form of relativism is thus committed to the thesis that since there are alternative conceptual schemes which are incommensurable, there must be alternative worlds which have nothing in common with one another.

The idea of incommensurability of the conceptual schemes and the world-descriptions is the mainstay of strong relativism. Kuhn has provided a standard definition of incommensurability[12] according to which two conceptual schemes are incommensurable when they cannot be translated into each other, that is, when they have nothing in common, not even the meaning of the terms. Accordingly two conceptual schemes, say CS1 and CS2, are so structured that we cannot compare one with the other: the expressions in both differ not only in truth but also in meaning. Both have two different languages which cannot but have two different schemes for describing the world. The result is that there is no one world existing for both; there are two different worlds altogether, say W1 and W2 corresponding to CS1 and CS2 respectively.

The relativism resulting from the Incommensurability Thesis claims that not only the scientific paradigms in Kuhn's sense differ from one another but also even our commonsensical views of the world differ from age to age, from culture to culture. There is therefore rampant relativism not only in matters related to science but also common sense. Not only the world-views differ but also no one world-view can be understood in terms of another. Each conceptual scheme is independent of the other.

So far as truth is concerned, as already noted, there is no universal truth available for all conceptual schemes. The standard of truth accepted in CS1 is different from the standard of truth accepted in CS2. Therefore

what is true in CS1 may be false in CS2. The relativist thus feels encouraged to say that there is no concept of truth which can apply to all conceptual schemes. As Newton-Smith puts it,

> The central relativist idea is that what is true for one tribe, social group or age might not be true for another tribe, social group or age.[13]

Thus truth ceases to be ahistorical and transcendent. It is as much bound to conceptual schemes as to the languages in which it is embedded.

Relativism has taken an ethnocentric turn[14] in Rorty who argues that only in the context of a community can truth and reality be properly understood. According to him, what is accepted as true and real is a matter which can be investigated only in the context of what people in a community believe and accept. The community puts the stamp of approval on the beliefs and attitudes of the people in it which is thus crystallized into the solidarity[15] of the community. It is solidarity that vouchsafes for the truths accepted by the community. Why a belief or opinion is true, according to Rorty, is that it is agreed to be true by the community and so the solidarity backing it accounts for its acceptability. Solidarity replaces objectivity in this ethnocentric scheme of things.

This form of relativism asserts that truth is not a culture-transcendent phenomenon and that it is bound up with the interests and the social practices of the community concerned. In that sense, the truth of the beliefs is a matter of how they are socially conditioned and thus justified in the larger interests of the community. As Rorty points out, the true beliefs are so called for their pragmatic utility as well as the solidarity underlying them such that truth is a compliment[16] to the beliefs held in the community.

Relativism thus brings in an element of cultural or ethnic contextuality into the whole picture of relativizing truth to the conceptual scheme. The problem of truth and reality is sought to be solved or circumvented by the idea that there is no truth in the realist sense and that there is no conception of an ahistorical truth that has nothing to do with the human interests and the ethnic beliefs.

Thus there are basically two dogmas of relativism: one is that truth is relative to a conceptual scheme and the other is that truth is a product of the human interests. The former can be called the dogma of conceptual relativization and the latter the dogma of ethnocentrism.

2. SELF-INCONSISTENCY AND THE LIMITS OF RELATIVIZATION

Relativism, as delineated above, does not succeed in many of its arguments because either they are self-refuting or they are weak. The relativist dogmas have a touch of irony about them as they fly in the face of common sense and reason. The first sign of the collapse of relativism is evident in the fact that it cannot without self-inconsistency establish that it itself is valid. According to relativism, any conceptual scheme is as valid or good as any other and therefore there is nothing to choose between the different world-views. Thus relativism as a world-view is as good as absolutism as there is no reason why relativism can alone be valid. Relativism has no greater claim to truth than absolutism, since if relativism can claim absolute truth, it will lead to self-inconsistency.

The relativists argue that there is no absolute standard of truth so that at no point of time could there be one and only one conceptual scheme which is true. This further leads to the conclusion that if there are competing conceptual schemes, all of them could claim to be true at the same time. This is what relativism allows for so far as the alternative conceptual schemes are concerned. But this goes against the very truth-claim of relativism. If all truth-claims lack ultimate and absolute sanction in reason, then so does the truth-claim of relativism. It cannot be the case that only the relativist world-view is correct over all others, since it will bring in absolutism through the backdoor. It is self-contradictory to suppose that relativism is the absolutely correct point of view. If that is so, then it follows that relativism itself cannot vouchsafe for its truth and so keeps open the possibility that it itself is false. Putnam puts the point in the following passage:

> That (total) relativism is inconsistent is a truism among philosophers. After all, is it not obviously contradictory to hold a point of view while at the same time holding that no point of view is more justified or right than any other? ... If any point of view is as good as any other, then why isn't the point of view that relativism is false as good as any other.[17]

What Putnam intends to say is that relativism has no rational ground to justify its radical claims about truth. Its own point of view lacks rational justification insofar as its validity is open to question. Thus if relativism is by remote chance true, it opens the possibility that there is no rational ground for that and under similar circumstances it might have been false as well. For the relativists, truth ceases to have universal significance as

it is utterly confined to the language in which it occurs. It is the product of a conceptual scheme and so lacks any sense beyond it. For example, CS1 has truth1 which varies from the truth in CS2: that is truth1 and truth2 differ so radically that there is nothing in common between the two. In that sense both CS1 and CS2 can simultaneously be true or simultaneously false. Thus there is no one sense in which they are true or false; they have different logics altogether.

Now the question is, how can a conceptual scheme be true when it itself has only relative truth? Relative truth is such that it happens to be truth only within the conceptual scheme concerned. In that sense the notion of truth loses significance as what is true might have been false under the same circumstances. Besides, what is that point of view from which it is true except its own? Since its own point of view could not be relativized to another, there is absoluteness about its own point of view and so its truth must be absolute and not relative to any other point of view. Every conceptual scheme, if it has the concept of truth at all, must have a single standard of truth and that must work absolutely since that is what truth signifies. Truth works either absolutely or does not work at all.

The idea of multiplicity of conceptual schemes does not stand in the way of absolute truth when properly understood. The many conceptual schemes could adopt a single standard of truth such that they could be evaluated fairly and equally by the same standard of truth. This becomes necessary because of the fact that when we have a series of conceptual schemes such as CS1, CS2 ... CS*n* we have the responsibility of ordering them logically in terms of their cognitive strength. There truth-content is the deciding factor in this ordering. But we cannot judge their truth-content unless we have the concept of truth that goes beyond the relative truth of the conceptual schemes. The critical assessment of the relative truth-content of the conceptual schemes demands that there be a concept of truth from a logical point of view. The logical point of view is the one we adopt as the critical inquirers. It is inevitable that we occupy such a standpoint for the possibility of critical judgement. That such a standpoint is available for critical assessment of conceptual schemes is evident in the idea that we can ascend to truth progressively. However, it cannot be the case that this standpoint is a God's point of view as we cannot transcend the limits of our thought and language.

The critical or logical point of view demands an absolute concept of truth in the sense that there is no other point of view from which it could

be viewed. Hence relativization is not any more possible. We have in a sense reached the limit of all relativization. Putnam has brought out the concept of limit of all cognitive valuations in this context while defending a non-relativist notion of truth. For him, truth signifies the limit[18] of all cognitive justifications. That is, truth marks the limit of all justification of our cognitive claims. It is the ideal limit rather than a conditional one as it cannot further be overruled by another limit. The ideal limit is rationally and necessarily fixed by an a priori logical method because there is the possibility that truth slips back into the conditional process of justifying our cognitive claims. Putnam says:

> Truth cannot simply be rational acceptability for one fundamental reason; truth is supposed to be a property of statement that cannot be lost, whereas justification can be lost.[19]

Further, he says:

> We speak as if there were such things as epistemically ideal conditions and we call a statement 'true' if it would be justified under such conditions.[20]

Thus the notion of an ideal limit is necessitated by the fact that we can have an ideal observer's point of view which itself is human rather than God's point of view.

What we are arguing here is that relativization has a limit and that limit is signalled by truth which has an absolute core about itself. This is further reinforced by the fact that truth cannot be relativized to a theory or language beyond a certain limit. It is no doubt true that every theory in Quine's[21] sense has a truth-claim based on its conceptual resources; that is, every theory is likely to make its truth-claim subservient to its overall goals. This makes truth immanent to the conceptual scheme and to a large extent pragmatically situated in the theory itself. But a little reflection can show that our theory-choice itself needs criteria which themselves are rooted in the absolutistic concept of truth. Truth and the criteria of consistency, coherence and simplicity are all necessary for a rational assessment of the theory or theories concerned.

The point of the argument is that truth as the ideal limit of all critical inquiry demands that it be placed within our language and conceptual scheme without being relativized to any local language and theory. Truth thus must belong to the overall conceptual scheme or the way of thinking of mankind rather than to that of any ethnic group or community. This

may seem to be incorporating an element of transcendent truth into the picture which is resisted by the relativists. As we shall subsequently see, the inevitability of a transcendent truth is evident if we have to see that there is a limit to historicism and contingency emphasized by the relativistic and the ethnocentric point of view.

3. SOLIDARITY, CONTINGENCY AND REASON

Ethnocentrism as advocated by Rorty is a form of relativism which provides a theory of truth and reality from within an anthropocentric and communal point of view. Ethnocentrism advocates that the concepts like truth and reality have a cultural origin in the communal life of the people and therefore there is a historical process in which they evolve. Rorty argues that because of the historical origin the concepts evolved in our language are contingent and so might not have been there at all. Especially the concept of truth does not carry any transcendental connotation as it is the product of a historical process. Truth, like any other concept, originates in time and history and has to be located in the life of the people. Rorty's idea of solidarity[22] as the only basis of our concept of truth suggests that we have the agreement of the community in holding certain beliefs to be true. The agreement is the only ground on which the entire edifice of our language and communication stands. This is, however, no reason to believe that solidarity itself is a non-contingent notion, according to Rorty.

Contingency[23] is the constant theme of Rorty's analysis of the concept of truth and language. According to this analysis, our language and the conceptual scheme embedded in it are products of our culture and the collective beliefs. Truth has thus no trans-cultural location. It is the one that has evolved accidentally rather than necessarily in the historical process. Our language, like our world-picture, is contingent in the sense that there is no logical reason why this and this alone is true and not another. Rejecting the idea that there is an objective ground for our conceptual scheme, Rorty argues that we should search for collective agreement or solidarity rather than transcendent objectivity. He says:

> The question whether truth and rationality has an intrinsic nature, whether we ought to have a positive theory about either topic, is just the question of whether our self-description ought to be constructed around a relation to human nature or around a relation to a particular collection of human beings, whether we should desire objectivity or solidarity.[24]

Rorty's preference for solidarity and contingency follows from his commitment to the idea that it is the human collectivity that provides ground for the acceptability of a belief or theory. Truth therefore cannot go beyond the collective acceptance of a belief.

Rorty's argument for the ethnocentric view of truth follows from his pragmatist commitment that it is the communal interests that ultimately prevail. It is the latter that determine how the notion of truth functions in systematizing our beliefs. Our beliefs are true only when they are found useful and acceptable to the community in which we live. Rorty says:

> For the pragmatist ... 'knowledge' is, like 'truth', simply a compliment paid to the beliefs which we think so well justified that, for the moment, further justification is not needed. An inquiry into the nature of knowledge can, on this view, only be a socio-historical account of how various people have tried to reach agreement on what to believe.[25]

Thus, for Rorty, beliefs have validation only in the collective agreement of the community. This results in grounding truth of the beliefs in the ethnocentric solidarity. This entails relativism in the sense that beliefs have their truth only within the community which entertains them.

Rorty's theory of contingency, however, suffers from difficulties which follow from the tendency to globalize contingency across all our conceptual schemes. So far as our local conceptual schemes are concerned, it is obviously the case that they are the products of cultural epochs and so are bound to be contingent. But can the conceptual scheme which all human beings more or less share be also contingent? It is not that human beings across the globe do not share anything. If that were so, then communication among different communities would not have been possible at all. Now, if everything pertaining to this global conceptual scheme were contingent, then what is that in contrast to which the concepts are contingent? There must be therefore something in our conceptual scheme which is non-contingent and non-relative[26] because of which something else is contingent and relative.

Rorty's argument for the wholesale contingency of our conceptual scheme does not work because it does not provide any standard of necessary truth. Ethnocentrism fails to account for how and why we agree on certain beliefs rather than on others and how we come to provide acceptable justifications for what we believe. Our beliefs, even if communal in origin, have to be certified by certain rational procedures. That is, we have to subject our beliefs to certain standards or norms, or else any belief will

be as good as any other. In that case there will be nothing to distinguish one set of beliefs from another.

Reason is the hallmark of human beings, who use language and express beliefs in communication. Human beings are socially and culturally trained to seek justification for their beliefs. This will not be possible if they do not presuppose rational norms in debate and discussion. Rorty misses this vital point when he dismisses Putnam's plea for norms in our cognitive inquiry. Rorty says:

> On this holistic account of cultural norms, however, we do not need the notion of a universal transcultural rationality which Putnam invokes against those whom he calls 'relativists'.[27]

That is to say, any appeal to trans-cultural rationality is an anathema to Rorty's theory of ethnocentric norms. But how can the so-called cultural norms operate if there are no norms which are non-ethnocentric?

We must admit that all norms cannot be ethnocentric and that at least some must be transcultural and a priori. This also explains why reason cannot itself be the product of history and so must transcend it. If it were a product of history, then we cannot begin to make any sense of history itself. Rorty's claim is that truth never goes beyond the pragmatic and communal acceptance. But this overlooks the fact that even pragmatic choices have to be according to certain criteria. The latter are part of the process of reasoning which is *a priori* given to man.

Rorty's anti-transcendental standpoint thus fails to be convincing because it misses the point that rationality is also a part of human nature and that what he calls solidarity is itself a product of our rational nature. Solidarity is the rational man's response to the contingency which faces him in his communal existence. There is every effort made by man to rise above contingency by institutionalizing the cultural norms and thus stabilizing the concept of truth. Man thus cannot give up the concept of truth itself because that will signal a collapse of the rational system of beliefs and hence of all cognitive inquiry. It is therefore not enough to say that there is cognition but no effort to reach truth in cognition or that 'there is only the dialogue'[28], but no reason as to why the dialogue should be continued.

4. TRUTH, IDEALITY AND THE NORMATIVE DISCOURSE

The concept of truth is not basically an ethnocentric notion, nor does it fall strictly within a historicist framework. It is a category within the logico-semantic discourse. Only when we transcend the historicist and ethnocentric discourse do we encounter the discourse of truth. The latter is bound to be logocentric in that the notion of truth arises only at a logical level (called the metalanguage by Tarski[29]). The difficulty with Rorty's ethnocentrism is that it abolishes the metalanguage or the metanarrative altogether thus falling into the trap of unmitigated contingency. The logical discourse, however, does not share the contingency of the ethnocentric discourse.

The logical discourse has the characteristic structure of rules of reasoning and thus has the function of evaluating the propositions of the non-logical discourse. These evaluative activities are performed with the help of the standard of truth proposed in the logical discourse. Rightness and wrongness, correctness and incorrectness all belong to the evaluating function of the normative discourse. The notion of truth is built into the evaluative procedures of the normative discourse.[30]

It is in a sense right to say that the realist notion of correspondence does not capture the intuitive essence of truth as the correspondence between language and reality is disclosed by truth rather than constituted by it. The correspondence theorists make the mistake of identifying truth with correspondence which obviously is defeated by the fact that truth is presupposed by correspondence. Truth stands out clearly in its own right as the basic category[31] in our logical discourse. It needs no other logical prop to function as the standard of semantic valuation.

Truth is the ideal limit of our conceptual scheme in the sense that it not only spells out what constitutes the norm or standard of rational thinking but also it shows how far our critical thinking can reach in judging the merits of our cognitive claims. As we have already shown, Putnam's limit theory of truth hints at this aspect of our critical appraisal of our cognitive claims. However, it is not a vacuous limit in the sense that it is only an ideal having no reality in the ongoing discourse of mankind.

The discourse of truth stands for idealization no doubt, but it does not mean that the ideal has no root in the real, nor is it true that the real is devoid of ideality. This dialectical relationship between the real and the ideal shows that the truth as the ideal cannot be divorced from the actual processes of language-use. Truth logically messes up with language-use

and the associated social practices. Thus it arises in the linguistic practices,[32] and yet it transcends those practices because it is the norm of those practices themselves.

Rorty's identification of truth with the social and linguistic practices is stoutly refuted by Putnam because Putnam finds the attempt to reduce truth to the justification of the cognitive beliefs self-refuting since every time we evaluate a belief we have to presuppose the rules of truth. The rules of truth themselves are *a priori* and logical. Putnam aptly remarks:

> ... the two key ideas of the idealization theory of truth are (1) that truth is independent of justification here and now, but not independent of all justification. To claim a statement is true is to claim it could be justified. (2) truth is expected to be stable or 'convergent'; if both a statement and its negation could be justified, even if conditions were as ideal as one could hope for to make them, there is no sense in thinking of the statement as having a truth-value.[33]

Thus truth ceases to be a matter of justification *per se*, but of ideal and convergent justification which presupposes the notion of truth itself. Truth cannot be reduced to justification since justification can be defeated,[34] but truth remains stable and intact.

It is now evident that the Rortyan argument that truth has no transcendental grounding and that there is no metaphysical dimension to truth is rather weak, since it could be seen that truth has the inherent tendency to go beyond the natural process of the formation of our beliefs. Truth is transcendent for the reason that, like any other concept in our logical discourse like reason, rationality, rightness, etc., it has both an immanent as well as a transcendent dimension. Putnam has put this point in the following way:

> If reason is both transcendent and immanent, then philosophy, as culture-bound reflection, and argument about eternal questions, is both in time and eternity. We don't have an Archimedean point; we always speak the language of time and space; but the rightness and wrongness of what we say is not just for a time and a place.[35]

That is, truth like reason goes beyond space and time while all the while being involved in time and history. In that sense truth is transcendent as well as immanent in that it is not a product of a temporal process though it applies to the temporal history of judgement-formation.

5. THE AVAILABILITY OF A UNIVERSAL CONCEPTUAL SCHEME

Now the question is: Is there a universal conceptual scheme from within which all other particular conceptual schemes could be judged? That is, is there a logical and transcendental point of view which can preserve our evaluative standards? The concept of truth is part of our rational logical discourse which represents our normative standards. The relativists are happy to reduce truth to justifiability, warranted assertability and so on with the purpose of deflating it and making it disappear from the logical discourse. The relativists thus make a short account of the discourse of truth itself. Therefore they take truth as a truncated notion or make it almost non-different from the human interests and practices. Thus relativism challenges the very idea of truth itself.

In order to retrieve truth from the relativist deconstruction, what we need is a full-scale attempt to install it at the centre of our rational discourse. This requires us to take two important steps, viz.: (a) to recognize that truth is a substantial notion in our conceptual scheme and language; and (b) to make room for a universal conceptual scheme which is shared by all mankind. The first step involves a rejection of relativism as a viable theory of truth. The second provides rationale for the universality and rationality of our conceptual scheme which can vouchsafe for our normative standards.

The first could be taken first. Truth is not culture-bound in a significant sense. It is that which all cultures presuppose as the primitive substantial category[36] in the sense that cultures may change and disappear but the concept of truth remains as of transcultural significance. In terms of scientific paradigms, it is the case that truth does not belong to a paradigm, but is the standard of evaluating the paradigms, judging them and making them intelligible at all. Thus the paradigm-shifts do not entail shifts in the conception of truth itself. There is a normative core of truth that saves it from slipping into the relativists' trivialization.

Truth cannot itself be naturalized as it demands a space in the non-natural realm of norms, standards and criteria. Truth thus has a transcendental character in the sense that it belongs to the *a priori* order of concepts. The demand that truth be available to the cognitive discourse[37] and our linguistic practices does not rule out the possibility that truth remains an *a priori* notion embedded in our conceptual scheme. Truth in this sense is both transcendent and immanent in character.

The second step mentioned above is taken when we reintroduce the idea of conceptual scheme despite Davidson's objections[38] against this

very concept. The idea of conceptual scheme itself is innocent though the scheme-content distinction along with the idea of alternative conceptual schemes is dispensable. Alternative conceptual schemes do not add to our understanding of the world as they make it absolutely unintelligible as to how we can retain a rationally acceptable notion of truth. Truth cannot healthily be interpreted if there are competing conceptual schemes. Davidson says:

> For we have no intelligible basis on which it can be said that schemes are different. It would be equally wrong to announce the glorious news that all mankind—all speakers of language, at least—share a common scheme and ontology. For if we cannot intelligibly say that schemes are different, neither can we intelligibly say that they are one.[39]

That is, since we cannot have alternative conceptual schemes, we cannot talk meaningfully of the one conceptual scheme we have. But it is not that we do not have any conceptual scheme at all. The conceptual scheme which embeds truth and rationality is ours. But this is not a 'glorious news' because it is so fundamental and constitutive of us.

Truth constitutes the *a priori* condition of rationality of the conceptual scheme we have. It makes our conceptual scheme intelligible, coherent and translatable. The local conceptual schemes that do arise presuppose our background conceptual scheme which is the foundation of our discourse of truth. The local conceptual schemes are made intelligible by the background conceptual scheme. Therefore relativism which pins its hope on the availability of local schemes has to be defeated by the discourse of truth that belongs to the background conceptual scheme. The background conceptual scheme is the universal conceptual scheme shared by all mankind.

The scheme-content distinction arises at the level of the local conceptual schemes which raise the bogey of the uninterpreted 'given' as distinguished from the scheme of concepts. The given is variously interpreted and so is ultimately lost[40] in the sense that the given is ultimately untraceable in the chaos of multiple interpretations. Thus there is no hope of regaining the world if variable interpretations are available. But at the level of the background universal conceptual scheme, the distinction between scheme and content does not arise. There is no scope for interpreting the world as language is directly in link with reality. Davidson puts this point as follows:

> In giving up the dependence on the concept of an uninterpreted reality, something outside all schemes and sciences, we do not relinquish the notion of objective truth—quite the contrary … . Of course truth of sentences remains relative to language, but that is as objective as can be. In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false.[41]

That is to say that truth remains firmly in the saddle in our conceptual scheme even if the scheme-content distinction goes overboard along with the local conceptual schemes.

The idea of relative truth arises when we confuse the universal conceptual scheme of ours with the local schemes of varying sorts. The latter are the relativist's myths created for blocking our understanding of language and thought. Relativism becomes weak once we realize that a global conceptual scheme is deeply embedded in our language. It is this universal conceptual scheme that absolutism in its moderate and acceptable form demands for the sake of preserving our cognitive norms against the relativists who refuse to accept non-relative rational norms. The non-relativists are satisfied with the availability of a logical standpoint that preserves truth and other evaluative norms.

6. FROM NON-LOCALISM TO NON-RELATIVISM

The argument against relativism does presuppose that there is a core of human thinking that cannot be relativized to our language and culture. This has been the standard criticism against relativism that it has denied the very possibility of a common core to all human thinking. This common core is called 'the bridgehead' by Martin Hollis[42] and Steven Lukes[43] meaning thereby that there are truths which all human beings can accept as rational and which provide for the foundations of whatever else they accept. Hollis writes:

> All interpretation thus rests on rationality assumptions which must succeed at the bridgehead and which can be modified at later stages only by interpretations which do not sabotage the bridgehead.[44]

Thus it is admitted that the bridgehead counts as the foundation of all our rational discourse. The concept of truth belongs to this core and thus we can admit with Strawson that there is 'a massive central core of human thinking which has no history'.[45]

With the admission of a central core in human thinking, it has become easy to argue that truth cannot be subject to a relativist construal because that itself will entail the denial of the rational foundation of our thought. Relativists, however, do not easily concede this rationality assumption because they think that this leads us to a blind alley. Barnes and Bloor, for instance, argue that

> ... the rational bridgehead, the alleged common core of belief shared by all cultures, turn out to be a purely imaginary construct with no empirical basis at all.[46]

Thus the relativists' denial of reason as the core of human thinking follows from the fact that they admit no role for the standards of truth and rightness in the absolutist sense. The absolutist notion of truth seems too ahistorical and acontextual to the relativists.[47]

However, it must be admitted that the relativists have never accepted irrationalism and anarchy[48] in their bargain against the absolutists. All that they have asked for is a moderate form of relativization of our concepts and principles to the human discourse. Therefore they are right in denying that there is a God's Eye view of the world which ensures an ahistorical and acontextual point of view. Krausz put this as follows:

> Relativism amounts to a denial of a God's Eye view of the universe, or a denial that anyone will ever have that view. It amounts to a denial of a view from nowhere. The insistence that knowledge should be absolute is to set standard for knowledge unattainably high.[49]

Thus the argument against the so-called God's Eye view of the universe has been part of the contemporary anti-absolutist and anti-Platonist debate.[50] This is precisely because we have in general lost faith in the absolute and the transcendent truths espoused by Plato.

However, it is not to be dismissed as mere dogmatism that there is a common conceptual framework in which all rational human beings participate, and that they share a large number of concepts and principles including the principles of logic and mathematics. This itself disproves that localism prevails in our thinking. Localism yields to universalism for the sake of its own intelligibility because in the absence of universal logical standards we are unable to understand our own Protagorean frameworks. It is here that we must rise above our Protagorean provincialism and look for a Platonic anchor[51] for our thoughts in a universal conceptual scheme.

The argument so far has shown that relativism in its extreme form is as unacceptable as the extreme form of absolutism. In their extreme forms relativism and absolutism look absurd because while one denies the very idea of truth and rationality the other makes them unattainable. While extreme form of relativism ends in scepticism, the extreme form of absolutism ends in dogmatism. Both become enemies of rational debate and discussion. It is therefore logical that we argue for a moderate form of either relativism or of absolutism.

We have been arguing that the very notion of relative truth is contestable not because it is no concept of truth at all but because we require a stronger notion of truth that can, without becoming ahistorical, play a normative role in our language and thought. Truth as a part of our universal conceptual scheme plays the role of an evaluative standard for making the multiple conceptual schemes intelligible. Such a standard is within the reach of every rational thinker and therefore it is very much in use[52] in our critical thinking. Our critical and logical thinking makes available a non-relative notion of truth.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Non-relativism rather than radical absolutism is the rational demand for steering clear of the Scylla of scepticism and the Charybdis of dogmatism. It is the demand that truth be preserved as a stable and strong concept in our logical thinking and that there be scope for criteria for evaluating the conflicting conceptual paradigms in all fields of our conceptual activity. Cultures are as much in need of rational assessments as the scientific and the moral paradigms. We, the rational thinkers, must steer clear of both extreme localism and extreme absolutism for the sake of making truth available in our rational debate.[53]

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50. See Putnam, *Realism With a Human Face*, op. cit. and also his *Reason, Truth and History*, op. cit. for the rejection of metaphysical realism and the idea that there is no God's Eye view of the world.

51. See Campbell, *Truth and Historicity*, Chapter 4 for a discussion on Plato's rejection of Protagora's relativism.
52. This idea is raised by the unknown referee of this paper.
53. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a National Seminar on 'Relativism' organised by the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Calcutta in 1997. I am thankful to all those who commented on the paper. I am also thankful to the referee for the insightful and helpful comments.

Russell's Argument Against Fregean Sense

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I

During the period before the first world war and upto Philosophy of Logical Atomism (PLA)[1] Russell had to come to terms with Frege's account of semantics, and in particular the latter's distinction between 'sense' (Sinn) and 'reference' (Bedeutung).[2] His 1905 paper 'On Denoting' (OD)[3] contains, among other things, a strong criticism of Frege's notion of Sinn and a famous analysis of definite descriptions. It contains also criticism of Meinong's distinction between 'existence' (Sein) and 'subsistence' (Subsistenz), but in this paper my aim is to consider only the former. The criticism of Frege's theory is important because in rejecting the notion of Sinn, Russell committed himself to an account of semantics which placed all the emphasis on the idea of a naming or referring relation between linguistic expressions and items in the world. That account might be correct, or well grounded, even if Russell's criticism of Fregean Sinn were unfounded. However, since Russell represented that rejection as a part of the route to his own theory, I think it important to consider the success of the argument against Frege. That view can be reinforced by considering that Russell's argument has sometimes been thought to be mistaken. Hence I shall note that some recent writers have taken opposed views about the success of Russell's critique of Frege. Searle[4] strongly defends Frege against Russell, but Blackburn and Code[5] believe that Russell has a substantial point to make. Finally I shall consider a difficulty in comparing Frege with Russell, namely that Frege's own semantic theory is open to divergent interpretations.

II

In OD Russell criticized Fregean sense which, he thought, involves an 'inextricable tangle'. He translated Frege's 'Sinn' and 'Bedeutung' as 'mean-

ing' and 'denotation' respectively, and claims that such a distinction is untenable.

Indeed the notion of sense according to Russell is vulnerable to a problem about identifying, or referring to, the sense of some expression. Russell outlined that problem in relation to a specific expression, namely 'The first line of Gray's Elegy', and he suggested two possible ways of trying to identify, or refer to, its sense. The two ways are:

(a) The sense of the first line of Gray's Elegy.
(b) The sense of 'The first line of Gray's Elegy'.

The fundamental problem that Russell claimed to find here is that whichever choice we make is going to fail. He thought that neither of these ways can succeed in making an adequate reference to the required sense.

Russell considered first option (a) in that if we try to refer to the required sense by using the same expression without quotation marks, that would refer to the *sense* of the first line of Gray's Elegy which, of course, is: 'The curfew tolls the knell of the parting day'. So what we actually get is the sense of the expression 'The curfew tolls the knell of the parting day' and *not* the sense of the expression 'The first line of Gray's Elegy'. The expression 'The curfew tolls the knell of the parting day' is, however, the referent of the expression 'The first line of Gray's Elegy', and it is for this reason that option (a) identifies the sense of that referent. If, therefore, we choose the option (a), it fails to identify the sense of the given expression, but succeeds only in identifying the sense of the referent of the original expression. This result is achieved in this special case, just because the referent of 'The first line ...' is itself a sentence and so can have both a sense and a reference assigned to it, at least in principle. If the referent were *not* a linguistic expression, then it might be simply nonsensical to speak of its sense at all. The failure in this case might be explained in terms of the distinction between the 'use' and 'mention' of linguistic expressions. In (a) the expression 'The first line of Gray's Elegy' is *used* to refer to that line, while in (b) the expression is put in quotation marks and so *mentioned* rather than used.

If we choose option (b) and put the expression in quotes as in 'The first line of Gray's Elegy', then we *mention* that expression rather than use it. In this way we avoid the difficulty found in the first case. According to Russell, however, we do not succeed either, because (b) provides us with a sense which is 'merely linguistic through the phrase', as Russell said,

and so does not show any 'logical' relation between the reference and the required sense. Russell argued,

> ... the difficulty which confronts us is that we cannot succeed in *both* preserving the connexion of meaning [Fregean Sinn] and denotation [Fregean Bedeutung] *and* preventing them from being one and the same; ... .[6]

Russell is quite right to treat the *identification* of meaning (sense) and denotation (reference) as a decisive objection to Frege's view. The question is, though: What kind of relation between sense and reference does Russell require? There seem to be two points here: One is that Russell believed, wrongly, that Frege wished to claim that sense *itself* has reference, and this point will be noted later (see Pt. III). The other is that to identify a sense seems to require us to identify a verbal expression in quotation marks which, according to Russell, is not itself a sense but only something that *refers* to a sense. Thus when we mention the expression within quotation marks and want to talk about sense,

> ... it must be not the meaning, but something which denotes the meaning.[7]

The option (b), therefore, does not work either, since

> ... there is no backward road from denotations to meanings, because every object can be denoted by an infinite number of different denoting phrases.[8]

For Russell, the occurrence of the expression in (a) gives us the *reference*, not the sense; and in (b) it gives us only an expression *which refers to a sense* and so not the sense itself. These concessions, Russell held, cannot be accepted because then the relation of sense to reference is totally mysterious. He thus rejected the Fregean notion of Sinn and effectively returned to the earlier theory of Frege in which the notion of Sinn plays no part.

Even with this amount of clarification Russell's position remains unclear, and three potential queries arise:

(1) We would need to be satisfied that the argument was quite general, and did not, for example, arise simply from Russell's choice of a special case (e.g. one in which the expression in question refers to another expression which *could* itself have a sense and a reference).

(2) We would need to be satisfied that Russell has given a fair account of Frege's distinction, and there are already preliminary indications that he has not done this which we shall also see in Searle's account.

(3) We would need to be satisfied that the crucial objection, which claims that there is 'no logical connection between sense and reference', is clear. So far it seems quite obscure and dubious. However, all these points come up in the discussions of the issue raised by Searle, and Blackburn and Code (ref. Sec. I), so it is to their accounts that we must turn.

III

It was suggested earlier that Russell's argument might hinge on special features of his own example, and some of Searle's criticisms address this point. One criticism concerns Russell's use of quotation marks. Searle's view is that that use violates the distinction between use and mention.

Searle thinks that Russell's use of quotation marks is unfair to Frege. Russell assumed that when we enclose an expression in quotation marks then we should, according to Frege, immediately identify the sense of that expression. But, as Searle says,

> ... there is [not] any context at all in ordinary speech where enclosing an expression in inverted commas is by itself sufficient to indicate that the resultant expression is being used to refer to its customary sense.[9]

The suggestion is that Frege could not have supposed that the use of quotation marks was sufficient by itself to identify the sense of an expression.

Searle also claims that Russell gave an inaccurate account of Frege's distinction. According to him, Russell attributed the view to Frege that it is the *sense* of some expression that refers to the reference of the object (see Sec. II). But Frege's view is formulated in a different way. For him

> A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) *expresses* its sense, *means* or *designates* its meaning [Bedeutung]. By employing a sign we express its sense and designate its meaning.[10]

Thus Frege in his later paper, when he had introduced explicitly the notion of Sinn, insisted that every significant expression of langauge (proper name etc.) has both a sense and a reference; and that the sense as well as reference of complex expressions is a function respectively of the senses

and the references of their constituents. Hence there is no suggestion in Frege's view, contrary to Russell's claim, that the sense itself refers to the reference.

According to Russell, when a reference is made to some object in a proposition, what is being referred to *occurs as a part of a proposition*. For example, in the proposition 'The teacher of Alexander is a great philosopher', the man referred to as 'The teacher of Alexander' will be a constituent of the proposition. But, although this account of Russell's can be defended, nevertheless ostensibly it violates an intuitive category restriction.[11] We would not normally say that actual objects are constituents of propositions, even where those objects are referred to by the relevant expressions. We would normally speak of the constituents of a proposition as concepts, or as the meanings of certain expressions, just as we would naturally speak of the expressions themselves as constituents of the relevant sentences. It is true that this way of speaking raises a question about the nature of propositions as opposed to sentences, and Russell had some difficulties over such a question.[12] Russell's own formulation, however, clearly needs some further explanation, and Searle is surely correct to point out this underlying problem.

Because Searle finds Russell's notion of what 'occurs in a proposition' unacceptable he proposes an alternative account of this notion. He says that 'occurring in a proposition' is

> ... equivalent to Frege's notion of what is expressed in a proposition. To say that a sense occurs in a proposition is to say that the sense is expressed in the proposition.[13]

This proposal, however, should be queried. For Searle's suggestion, although it fits Russell's terminology into a Fregean framework, nevertheless is quite at odds with the view that Russell actually held. Searle regards the constituents occurring in a proposition as Fregean senses, so that it is the sense of 'The teacher of Alexander' that occurs in the proposition 'The teacher of Alexander is a great philsopher'. As we have seen, such legislation answers in one way to our natural intuitions about propositions and their constituents, but it is clear that Russell could not have accepted such a view, since he did not wish to employ the idea of a Fregean sense at all. Searle's proposal might consequently be regarded as begging the question against Russell, since it tacitly licences the introduction of Fregean senses when this is precisely what Russell wished to avoid. It could be said, on the other hand, that Russell's own preferred terminology is not

only at odds with those noted intuitions, but also begs the question against Frege by refusing to allow any concessions to Fregean sense from the start. For the present it is enough merely to note these dangers. Whether they affect the outcome of the argument will be considered later.

A further preliminary point arises also from another suggestion of Searle's. He wants again to clear up Russell's terminology by holding that:

> ... the sense of an expression *occurs* in (to use Russell's expression) a proposition, and in virtue of that sense the proposition refers to the referent. The referent *does not occur* in the proposition.[14]

This proposal is itself misleading with respect to Frege's own ideas. Searle seems to suggest that when a singular term is used in a proposition, that proposition then refers to the object corresponding to the singular term. But this is not Frege's view at all. His (Frege's) view is that the reference (or referent) of a proposition is a truth value, the true or the false, and not any specific object which is the referent of a constituent expression in the proposition.

Searle argues that once the appropriate amendments have been made to Russell's account, then his argument fails to justify the rejection of Frege's terminology of 'sense'. We might ask whether these mistakes in Russell's account of Frege are sufficient to reject Russell's criticisms. If, for Frege, an expression has both a sense and a reference, then sense presumably is in some way related to that reference in some form or other. Even though Searle is sometimes quite correct in rejecting Russell's terminology, an issue of substance may still remain. For in whatever terms Russell expressed his point, it is clear that he thought Frege's account of the relationship between sense and reference is grossly unclear. There are two issues here. The crucial issue is whether Russell's *argument* demonstrates that unclarity. As we shall see, there might be grounds for complaining of some unclarity in Frege's theory independently of Russell's specific argument.

Basically, there are two ways that Russell seems to argue. One is that Frege's theory is incomplete because it shows the relationship between sense and reference as arbitrary. The other is that when we look at the way in which Frege talked about the relationship, it involves a regress. Thus it is not only arbitrary, it is also incoherent. There are two possible lines of argument although Russell was considering primarily the former. Russell, however, was wrong to think that Frege expressed no relationship between sense and reference. For Frege, they are related by the relationship

of 'mode of presentation'.[15] But the question is: Is that sufficient to answer Russell's problem?

Russell's position has been strongly defended by Blackburn and Code.[16] According to them,

> ... Russell has discovered a dilemma of sorts.[17]

They thus indicate that such objections as Searle's have missed the point, and that Russell had a more substantial objection to make. In attempting to explain that further point of Russell's they reconsider the problem of identifying Fregean senses of expressions. They hold that Russell is right to say that there are basically two such ways: Either sense is simply identified with reference which is incompatible with Frege's distinction, or these two are distinguished in some quite arbitrary way, so that there is no 'logical' connection between sense and reference.[18] Russell believed that the absence of any 'logical' connection between these two yields an account of sense which is utterly arbitrary and quite unmotivated.

Since the identification of sense with reference would destroy Frege's theory, the argument really turns on Russell's notion of 'linguistic through the phrase', and on the consequent charge of arbitrariness. Blackburn's suggestion is that if sense is specified simply by mentioning an expression for example in 'The sense of "Aristotle" ', then the relation *is* merely 'linguistic through the phrase' and so arbitrary. The point he illustrates by considering a pair of propositions, for example,

(1) Aristotle, the magnate, married Mrs. Kennedy.
(2) Aristotle, the philosopher, wrote books.

where the relation between sense and reference of the name in the two sentences is quite arbitrary.

The case is different when the same name 'Aristotle' is examined in another pair of propositions, for example,

(3) Aristotle taught philosophy.
(4) Jones believes that Aristotle taught philosophy.

where, Blackburn believes, the reference of 'Aristotle' in both cases is the same. He argues that there must be a logical connection involved between the reference of 'Aristotle', in (3) and (4) which will then enable the subject Jones to believe what is being said about the reference. Hence there must be a logical link between sense and reference and therefore, sense cannot be defined merely linguistically. This is similar to Russell's

claim that the 'the meaning denotes the denotation' (p. 49, OD). So according to Blackburn,

> ... what we need is a definition of either 'the sense of "Aristotle"' or some other phrase which we may suppose to refer to the sense of 'Aristotle'.[19]

However none of these alternatives, according to him, do work.

According to Blackburn, the first pair of propositions (1) and (2) are not co-referential in that they have two transparent references and have referred to two different people. In the other pair of occurrences, the issue is complicated by the fact that the name 'Aristotle' in (3) and (4) is not necessarily co-referential and *can* refer to different people. He thinks that (3) and (4) should yield a valid inference to the conclusion 'Jones believes something true'. Since (4) contains an opaque reference, this inference cannot be validated because Frege's theory is that in belief propositions the term 'Aristotle' does not have its customary reference, it has an 'indirect reference', namely to the sense of 'Aristotle'. So the expression 'Aristotle' has two different references in (3) and (4): one to the man, and the other to the sense of the expression 'Aristotle'. Blackburn thinks that Frege's way of dealing with opaque contexts makes it impossible to give an account of the validity of the relevant inference.

Blackburn's view suggests that a necessary condition for the validity of the required inference is that the expression 'Aristotle' should refer to the same object in both cases. The crucial argument that Blackburn raises is that the inference rests on two different uses of names, one of which is transparent and the other is opaque. And he assumes that Frege's treatment of names in opaque contexts excludes the possibility of making the same reference as the reference in transparent context which implies that they *cannot* refer to the same object.

Blackburn thinks it crucial that the notion of reference and the notion of sameness of sense have to be built-in in order to safeguard the inference. This reinforces Russell's claim that either the link between sense and reference is arbitrary, or the two items become identical. He is effectively asking that Frege should license the inference precisely by spelling out in some non-arbitrary way the required link between sense and reference which will guarantee the inference, and also avoid the identity of sense and reference.

Blackburn, however, is disinclined just to accept Russell's criticism that the relation of sense to reference is 'linguistic through the phrase', and

attempts to interpret this is his own way. His view is that Russell's second option (b) does succeed both in identifying, and referring to sense, but this is then achieved in an arbitrary and unsatisfactory way. He therefore constructs an argument to make some independent contribution to the further regress objection he raises. He considers the following three expressions:

(E_1) 'The first line of Gray's Elegy'
(E_2) 'The sense of "The first line of Gray's Elegy"'
(E_3) 'The sense of "E_2"'.

According to Blackburn (and perhaps to Russell) the introduction of sense needs *some* denoting phrase, such as E_2, which we understand and can grasp. It might be thought that the sense thus introduced becomes identical with a reference, because the reference of E_2 *is* the sense of the expression 'The first line of Gray's Elegy'. This is not an objection, however, since according to Frege, that expression, i.e. E_2 itself has both a sense and a reference. Now since we know what the *reference* of E_2 is, namely the sense of the expression 'The first line of Gray's Elegy', then the question arises: what will be the *sense* of the whole expression (E_2)? Here Blackburn considers two responses: Either we don't offer any further means of identifying the sense, and just accept it; or we introduce some other denoting phrase like E_3, which refers to E_2 and which we grasp in turn. So what we get at the end is the interpretation of a further sense for the whole expression, and an infinite regress is generated. Therefore, the required Fregean sense is simply not available in a satisfactory way. According to him,

> The regress can be stopped, but only if we pay the cost of saying that there is some level at which we do not need an understood description or a definition, but we can rest content with an outright recognition of sense.[20]

Blackburn's argument shows that he wants to *specify* the sense by writing some expression like E_2, but where on specifying the sense of E_2, he then constructs another nominal expression E_3 which will require a further such construction and so on indefinitely. The question now is: Does Blackburn succeed in making clear what Russell meant by his expression 'linguistic through the phrase' or by his demand for a 'logical connection' between sense and reference, and once he makes it clear, does his argument stand? In the next section his argument will be examined more closely.

IV

Russell's own text, and Blackburn's version of the argument, turn on a question about identifying, or referring to, the sense of some expression. Some of these difficulties clearly depend upon a consistent and satisfactory use of quotation marks with which to identify expressions. For example, if no discrimination between mention and use is made, then option (a) might be open for Frege and yet leads to quite the wrong result for him. It seems, however, in that case that only a natural use of quotation marks is needed to avoid the problem. Beyond that, as Searle, surely rightly indicates, Russell's own use of quotation marks is highly questionable, and cannot be used without further elucidation to criticise Frege.

However, neither Russell's central point criticising option (b) nor Blackburn's version of the argument turns on quotation, but involves an alleged difficulty in identifying or referring to a sense even when the use of quotation marks has been agreed. In this case however, something further needs to be said about the requirements for identification, or reference, in the case of sense. One point that needs to be made initially is simply that Frege himself offered guidance in identifying senses. We need to ask why that guidance is inadequate. Frege's strategy is primarily to distinguish sense, as the mode of presentation of a referent, from reference itself; and he did this in general by demonstrating cases where, with respect to some given expressions, the referent may be the same, though the sense differs. If such a demonstration is accepted, then it *shows* that sense and reference can be distinguished, even though it remains open exactly how we further explain the intimate relationship between them. For one thing it would be impossible to have expressions with the same sense but a different referent if the very notion of a sense is defined in terms of the mode of presentation of a *specific* referent. According to such a view, sameness of referent is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for sameness of sense. Later we shall link this with Evan's interpretation of Frege.

In that way Frege had provided an adequate ground for identifying sense and distinguishing it from reference, at least if the basic cases are accepted at all. However it might still be said that this falls short of what Russell and Blackburn require. Even if Frege succeeded in differentiating sense from reference in this way, questions may still be raised about the nature and identification of sense itself. The initial cases might be queried, not perhaps on the ground that they have no intuitive plausibility for that would be hard to sustain, but on the ground that we do not yet know *enough* about sense to be able clearly to discriminate one sense from another, or clearly to give a full account of any specific sense.

Criticisms along these lines have been levelled at Frege often enough. As is well known, Frege attached to his conception of sense an 'ontological' commitment in which senses, along with numbers and other abstract items, had real existence in a 'third realm' different from the realms of the physical and the mental. Frege's so-called Platonism attaches a strong metaphysical doctrine to his semantic theory, and can be questioned, doubted, and even rejected. Russell's criticism is quite different from this. He, on the contrary, insisted that if we try to identify sense with the complement of 'the sense of', still that is not adequate enough for an identification of sense. It gives only a nominal identification of sense for Russell, but for him this is not enough and he made a further demand for a right account of the senses of expressions. This is to query the semantic theory and not its supposed ontological commitments.

The situation remains complex and obscure, however, for several reasons. For one thing, when Russell talked about identifying the sense of some expression, he seems sometimes to want to identify some object which *is* that sense. He seems, that is, to treat the sense of expressions as though it was just like another reference, and so to 'reify' Frege's notion. To take such a view would be not only objectionable but also in serious danger of begging the question against Frege. For it might be simply to assume that Russell's account of denoting or naming was the only legitimate semantic apparatus, and to require that Frege's notion of sense be fitted into that framework.

Even if that problem is evaded, Russell's central argument has some ambiguity in its account of the requirements for identification, or specification, or explanation of sense. It is clear that Russell canvassed a problem about the identification of sense, and, as has been suggested, this may be in danger of begging the question. But Russell's principal argument is one about the nominal specification of sense, that is, one in which when we refer to 'the sense of "the first line of Gray's Elegy"' we offer a specification of that sense which is 'arbitrary' and 'only linguistic through the phrase'. One way of interpreting this point would be to say that Russell believed the notion of sense to require further explanation, or elucidation, which Frege did not provide, but this is far too charitable to Russell. For there can scarcely be any doubt that Frege left room for further explanation of his concept, and this could not constitute a decisive ground for

rejecting that concept. Russell's intention, and his argument, are certainly designed to make a more specific and decisive criticism of sense and its relation to reference. It is that more specific argument which Blackburn attempts to provide in the interpretation of Russell.

That there is a need for further explanation of 'sense', however, is clearly shown in the criterion that Evans uses as a means of specifying sense.[21] Evans wants to consider expressions as having different senses if, for example, it would be possible for one and the same person to have a belief towards a certain object/person expressed in one way, and at the same time not to have that belief towards the same object/person when expressed in another way. For example, John believes that the queen is sixty years old, and in English the expression 'queen' carries the same sense as the expression 'female monarch'. According to Evans, it is impossible for John to believe that the queen is sixty years old, and at the same time not to believe that the female monarch is sixty years old.

Evans wants to use this test to determine that the two expressions 'queen' and 'female monarch' actually have the same sense. On the other hand, if the queen is the colonel of the highland regiment, and the expressions 'queen' and 'the colonel of the highland regiment' refer to the same person, it would be perfectly reasonable and not inconsistent, Evans thinks, for Jones to believe that the queen is sixty years old and not to believe that the colonel of the highland regiment is sixty years old, simply because in that case Jones might not know that the two expressions refer to the same person. Evans here is using what he calls the 'Intuitive Criterion of Difference' in order to discriminate what counts as the same sense or as a different sense.

Frege did not give us any good criterion for identifying the specific sense of particular expressions. He of course used several examples, but he did not mention any clear-cut, straightforward criterion. Evans attempts to supplement Frege's account by using this Intuitive Criterion as a way of discriminating between same senses and different senses.[22] Important though that point also clearly is on the semantic level, it is by no means obvious that this is the problem which Russell and Blackburn claim to see in Frege's account. Their problem has to do with a certain 'arbitrainess'—'purely linguistic through the phrase'—which is supposed to afflict the identification of, or reference to, sense. We therefore have to consider other ways of understanding their difficulty.

One difficulty that Blackburn raises is the lack of co-reference with the same sense in opaque context. Clearly there are ways of defending Frege

depending on how we actually interpret Frege's own account of sense and reference. Under Evans's interpretation, the sense is the 'mode of presentation of a referent' which means that we cannot have same sense without same referent. This suggests that sameness of referent is a necessary condition for sameness of sense. If this view of Evans's is accepted, then the two expressions 'Aristotle' in (3) and (4) can be shown to refer to the same object having the same sense. In the transparent context 'Aristotle' has its direct sense, and *that sense* is the mode of presentation of the object. In the opaque context the sense comes in as 'indirect reference', that is, indicated indirectly but still the two occurrences have the *same* reference. If this interpretation is correct, then, on this account, the two expressions must also have the same reference, directly or indirectly, obliquely or non-obliquely. So on this account Frege can be strongly defended to validate the inference on the assumption of sameness of sense which then also preserves the assumption of co-reference.

However if we do not accept Evans's interpretation, we can provide an alternative interpretation. We can show that it is possible that we have two expressions with the same sense, but with different reference. For example, the expression 'The King of France' has the same sense when it refers to Louis XIV or to Louis XVI. It is true then sameness of sense of the expression 'Aristotle' in (3) and (4) does not guarantee co-reference. The crucial question is: Does it *exclude* it? We know that the expression in an opaque context has an indirect reference to the sense of the expression, while in a transparent context the expression has a direct sense and also refers directly to 'Aristotle'. Nothing in the definition of sense guarantees that the expressions might have also the same reference, but it leaves the possibility open to preserve the validity of inference, that we associate the same reference to the expression in two cases. That is, we say, in the opaque case the expression refers, indirectly, to its customary sense, and through that sense to a specific referent, namely Aristotle, and that this is the same referent as that involved in the non-opaque occurrence. In fact, all we need to do here is to make a further assumption that the two expressions with an identical sense can also have the same reference.

Blackburn might not accept this argument on the ground of arbitrariness. But we have seen that there is bound to be some arbitrariness in the preservation of the inference. Blackburn himself says that the use of the same name does not guarantee co-reference, so if the inference is to be licenced at all, it must be on the further assumption that the two occurrences of 'Aristotle' are co-referential. Even on a Russellian theory that

further assumption is, in a way, itself arbitrary, for to preserve the validity of the inference we still have to suppose that the two occurrences are co-referential. So Frege's 'arbitrariness' is in no worse a position than Russell or Blackburn in their attempt to validate the inference.

In these arguments Frege is represented as claiming that in the opaque occurrence the expression 'Aristotle' has both a reference to a sense, and a reference to the man. It may be thought that this does not match what Frege actually said, for he may be thought to be saying that in the opaque occurrence there is just one reference, namely to the sense of 'Aristotle', and *not* to the man. This is probably how Blackburn comes to think of the indirect reference as excluding any other reference; that is, how the indirect reference to sense *excludes* any reference to the man. In the first interpretation we saw that this conflicts with the requirement that sameness of sense entails sameness of referent. This undoubtedly shows that Frege has some further explaining to do, but it also shows how he could escape the criticism. The same problem will afflict the second interpretation, too, though the conflict will be less strict, since Frege is not then building sameness of reference into his conception of 'same sense'. Therefore if we allow the possibility of a further premiss of co-reference to validate the inference, then the premiss will not involve any comparable difficulty. Such inferences and the additional premisses needed to validate them might still be thought to deserve more investigation. If these lines of argument against Blackburn are correct, then his view cannot be said to make any independent contribution to the argument about an infinite regress. We, therefore, move on to examine his other argument about an infinite regress.

The argument about an infinite regress is given in the above examples (E_1)–(E_3), so let us consider them. (E_1) *mentions* an expression which, if used, would refer to the line 'The curfew tolls the knell of the parting day'. (E_2) takes that quoted, mentioned, expression (E_1), and nominally identifies its sense (by prefixing it with 'the sense of'), and then mentions that whole nominal identification by putting the expression in quotation marks. Again, if we were *using* (E_2), and not mentioning it, we would refer to the sense of (E_1). Blackburn supposes that an infinite regress can now be generated, because if we wish to raise a question about, or further specify, (E_2), then we are forced to construct a further expression, (E_3), which if used, would refer to the sense of (E_2). Therefore, now the suggestion seems to be, (E_3) has exactly the same form as (E_2), and if we wish to raise a question about, or further specify, (E_3), then we will be similarly forced to construct a further expression (E_4) and so on.

It is not at all clear, however, that this is a strict infinite regress, or if it is, that it is also any obstacle to Frege's theory. Suppose, for example, that we identify some man, say Russell, and then raise a question about his immediate ancestry. We may then form the expression 'The parents of Russell'. If we now wish further to raise the same question about the new items referred to we can go on to form the further expression 'The parents of the parents of Russell' and perhaps can continue indefinitely. Such a possibility does not cast any serious doubt on the very first step in the process where we speak of an enquiry into Russell's parents, or on our ability to identify Russell's parents.

The situation is not much changed if we speak of linguistic objects. Suppose we use the phrase 'The translation of …' to indicate a translation into a specific language. If we now start with a phrase like (1) 'The first line of Gray's Elegy' we can ask for (2) 'The translation of "(1)"' and, if we wish, ask further for (3) 'The translation of "(2)"'. In a similar way if we wish to raise such further questions there need be no end to such a series, but this would not cast serious doubt on the initial notion of a translation for (1), or for any other expression. It is true here that in most languages there will soon be a formula for specifying further translations. In most languages the iterated occurrences of 'The translation of …' will be the same whatever the complement may be. However, a language might follow a different rule and have different expressions for 'The translation of …' when it occurs as the second, third, or fourth iteration.

If these cases were exact parallels of Blackburn's examples, then it is hard to see what his objection to Frege could be. Of course, it remains true, as Blackburn says, that to continue the iteration will not throw any more light on the phrase 'The sense of …' than was already present in the first use at (E_2). All that this shows is that to follow such an iteration is patently not the right way to offer any further elucidation of that Fregean phrase. This reinforces the point made earlier in distinguishing a *specification* of sense from an *explanation* of it. To continue an objection to Frege it would have to be shown that to follow such a path is either forced, or else is required in order to offer that further explanation of sense. We saw earlier that alternative accounts can be followed, and have been canvassed. We might, as Frege did, specify more precisely the conditions under which we have sameness or difference of sense along with sameness and difference of reference. We might, as Evans suggested,

offer a test like his Intuitive Criterion, in order to separate Fregean sense and reference. Nothing in Blackburn's, or on that interpretation of Russell's, regress argument constitutes an obstacle to these strategies.

It still remains true that Frege's notion of sense needs more elucidation than Frege himself offered, but that was not in any case the substance of Blackburn's or Russell's criticism in terms of the regress argument. We know that Blackburn has talked about the straightforward recognition of sense to stop the regress. Therefore the question is: If we can provide an adequate account of sense by relating sameness (difference) of sense to sameness (difference) of reference why should anything else be required? This issue is also related to Dummett's discussion where he is actually concerned to interpret Fregean sense. He agrees that there is an alleged difficulty in giving an arbitrary recognition of sense, but he believes that:

> The notion of sense is ... not a mere theoretical tool to be used in giving an account of a language; it is one which, in an inchoate fashion, we constantly appeal to or make use in our actual practice (as, for instance, when we challenge someone to make precise the sense in which he is using some expression).[23]

What Dummett wants to say is that Frege's notion of sense is not just a fancy theoretical apparatus with no obvious connection with our linguistic practice. He thinks that sense has to have a very clear anchorage in our ordinary linguistic practices. This point of Dummett can be tied in very clearly to the issue that Blackburn raises where in discussing the regress, he (Blackburn) says that the only way to get out of the regress is to stop it arbitrarily at some point and then just to accept sense. According to Dummett there is not any reason why that should be arbitrary because the notion of sense is not an arbitrary theoretical apparatus, but can be understood perfectly well through ordinary linguistic practice.

Here Dummett is liable to a danger of begging the question, for he seems to imply that in order to get a clear picture of Fregean sense, we just need to appeal to our competence as native English speakers. This suggests that for Dummett to grasp the sense of some expression is no more than just understanding it, but this view of Dummett is overstated. The fact that ordinary people can somehow respond to Frege's notion of sense does not explain what sense *is*, because Frege defined sense in a rather technical way. Evans, (see ref. in footnote 22) for example, does not accept Dummett's view about sense, so there is even disagreement about that technical account.

There *is* an intuitive plausibility about Frege's examples and the way he introduced the notion of sense in terms of those examples by means of difference of sense and sameness of reference. These are the basic data in which any ordinary speakers can gain access to Fregean sense, and Dummett is right to that extent. However if this is not enough, then we have already moved from any kind of intuitive practical understanding of the examples to the question of semantic theory, and that theoretical issue cannot be resolved just by an appeal to our ordinary linguistic intuitions.

The question now arises, if it is not just an intuitive feature of those examples of language, then what is its theoretical importance? One answer is that Frege's notion of sense needs to apply to every significant linguistic unit. In his examples of names and descriptions, the intuition seems to be very clear. When it moves away from names to predicates or from the whole sentence to other kinds of linguistic expressions like adverbs or prepositions, then the question of identifying difference (sameness) of sense and sameness (difference) of reference is more difficult. Indeed, what we need is simply some more elucidation of the way in which Fregean sense fits into an overall semantic theory, and that can no longer be dealt with simply by examples. Dummett's appeal to intuition, therefore, seems not to fit Fregean sense into an overall semantic theory. At this point his appeal needs instead a clear theoretical framework.

Dummett is using an ordinary, colloquial, understanding in order to reinforce his point that Frege's notion of sense is not just a piece of arbitrary theoretical apparatus that cannot be used in our everyday life. It may be that the ordinary use of 'sense' doesn't match a strict theoretical use, but that doesn't mean that it is totally divorced from our ordinary linguistic practice. It can be anchored to our standard linguistic practices and undoubtedly can be anchored to some of the colloquial ways in which we talk about the sense of this or that expression, even though these colloquial ways are not sufficiently characterized in the theory. Now if Dummett's point is said to be overstated then it seems to favour Blackburn's case, but if we accept a compromise position between Dummett's colloquial uses of sense and Frege's technical idea of sense, then Dummett does seem to have a point. For what the compromise conclusion shows is that if the technical notion of sense can be anchored in our ordinary linguistic practice, then there is nothing very wrong with our 'just accepting' the examples given of sameness (difference) of sense. In that case, however, one part of Blackburn's objection will be inadequate. For the point shows that there is nothing objectionable about our resting the elu-

cidation of sense ultimately on some quite ordinary grasp of linguistic expressions. It may be that this is in any case inevitable.

What follows from the whole discussion is that Russell and also Blackburn keep returning to the quite general, and fair, point that Frege's sense does need more exposure and more explanation. However, in the light of the discussion, neither Russell's nor Blackburn's argument *add* anything decisive to reinforce that general complaint. On the contrary, the point they raise about identifying sense as a specific object is in danger of 'reifying' sense which is objectionable. Russell's argument shows that the connection between sense and reference is certainly very obscure, but Blackburn's interpretation of Russell seems not to resolve that obscurity or to add a decisive objection to Frege's apparatus. If that is so, then we have to conclude that Russell was not justified in rejecting Frege's notion of sense. The most that he achieved is to point to the need for more clarification of that notion.

Notes and References

1. Russell, B. 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' (1918) in Marsh, R.C. (ed.) *Logic and Knowledge* (Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1956, paperback 1988).
2. There are some difficulties in translating the term 'Bedeutung' into English, but I shall use the term 'reference' for this purpose. When Frege's writings were initially translated into English by Geach and Black (ed.) *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, First published 1952, 3rd edition 1980, Reprinted 1985, 1988) that was the preferred translation. But more recently 'Bedeutung' has been translated rather than as 'meaning' in order to bring out some of the distinctive aspects of this notion (see different interpretations of Frege's Bedeutung offered by Dummett, D. in *Frege: Philosophy of Language* (Duckworth, London, 1973), and Evans, G. in *The Varieties of Reference* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982).
3. Russell, 'On Denoting' in op. cit. *Logic and Knowledge.*
4. Searle, J., 'Russell's Objection to Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference', *Analysis* (Vol. 18, 1957–58), pp. 137–43.
5. Blackburn, S. and Code, A., 'The Power of Russell's Criticism of Frege: "On Denoting" pp. 48–50', *Analysis* (Vol. 38, 1978), pp. 65–77.
6. Op. cit. Russell, 'On Denoting', p. 49.
7. Ibid., p. 50.
8. Ibid.
9. Op. cit. Searle, 'Russell's Objection to Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference', p. 138.
10. Frege, G., 'On sense and meaning' in op. cit. Geach and Black (ed.) *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, p. 61.

11. Russell's unclarity over the naming or meaning of proposition creates a difficulty about how he understood or explained his conception of the constituents of propositions. The problem is: Are the constituents of propositions, actual entities (objects) or are they symbols? If we examine carefully Russell's account in PLA, the answer is unclear. We shall consider some specific quotations from Russell in OD (1905) and PLA (1919) which reflect this unclear position very obviously.

    (1) You must observe that the name does not occur in that which you assert when you use the name. The name is merely that which is a means of expressing what it is you are trying to assert, and when I say 'Scott wrote *Waverly*', the name does not occur in the thing I am asserting. The thing I am asserting is about the person, not about the name. So if I say 'Scott is Sir Walter', using these two names *as* names, neither 'Scott' nor 'Sir Walter' occurs in what I am asserting, but only the person who has these names, and thus what I am asserting is a pure tautology (PLA, p. 246).

    (2) When I say 'the author of *Waverly* exists', I mean that there is an entity c such that 'x wrote *Waverly*' is true when x is c, and is false when x is not c. 'The author of *Waverly*' as a constitutent has quite disappeared there,

    ... You have instead this elaborate to-do with propositional functions, ... It would not be possible if 'the author of *Waverly*' were a constituent of propositions in whose verbal expressions this descriptive phrase occurs (PLA, p. 250).

    In (2) Russell seems clearly to assume that it is *expressions* which are constituents of propositions. The only proviso that might be made is that in the final sentence the quotation marks around 'the author of *Waverly*' might be deleted, so that Russell is claiming that that person is not a constituent. However, in (1) the opposite view seems equally strong. For this final sentence implies that what occurs in the proposition, that is, in what is asserted, is the person and not just the expressions referring to that person. Both quotations might, however, be construed in other ways.

    But Russell's view shows some inconsistency when he said,

    (3) (a) That the components of a proposition are the symbols we must understand in order to understand the proposition;

    (b) That the components of the fact which makes a proposition true or false, as the case may be, are the *meanings* of the symbols which we must understand in order to understand the proposition (PLA, p. 196).

    Russell here in (a) and (b) made a distinction between the understanding of the components (constituents) of a proposition and the components of the fact which is expressed in the proposition. In (a) he clearly suggested that the constituents of a proposition are 'expressions' or 'symbols' which is similar to what he meant in (2). But when Russell in (b) defined *objects* (components of the fact) as the *meanings* of those symbols expressed in a proposition then his view is no longer clear. For if *objects* are defined as the *meanings* of expressions or symbols then those *objects* can be regarded as 'occurring in'

a proposition. Here a distinction can be drawn between propositions and sentences in that expressions (symbols) really *are* constituents of *sentences*, but propositions are thought to be different from sentences precisely because propositions are regarded as the *meanings* of sentences.

However, Russell's tendency to talk about constituents of propositions as real entities can also be seen in his earlier account when he drew the conclusion in OD by saying,

(4) One interesting result of the above theory of denoting is this: when there is anything with which we do not have immediate acquaintance, but only definition by denoting phrases, then the propositions in which this thing is introduced by means of a denoting phrase do not really contain this thing as a constituent, but contain instead the constituents expressed by the several words of the denoting phrase. Thus in every proposition we can apprehend ..., all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance. Now such things as matter ... and the minds of other people are known to us only by denoting phrases, i.e. we are not *acquainted* with them, but we know them as what has such and such properties. In such a case, we know the properties of a thing without having acquaintance with the thing itself, and without, consequently, knowing any single proposition of which the thing itself is a constituent (OD, pp. 55–6).

Here it is *quite* clear that Russell meant 'constituent of proposition' to signify actual entities which might be denoted by expressions (symbols) occurring in the corresponding *sentence*. A similar view is also expressed by him in the following passages:

(5) If you take such a proposition as 'Romulus existed', probably most of us think that Romulus did not exist. ... If Romulus himself entered into our statement, it would be plain that the statement that he did not exist would be nonsense, because you cannot have a constituent of a proposition which is nothing at all. Every constituent has got to be there as one of the things in the world, and therefore if Romulus himself entered into the propositions that he existed or that he did not exist, both these propositions could not only not be true, but could not be even significant, unless he existed. That is obviously not the case, and the first conclusion one draws is that, although it *looks* as if Romulus were a constituent of that proposition, that is really a mistake. Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' (PLA, p. 242).

(6) Now the next point that I want to make clear is that when a description ... occurs in a proposition, there is no constituent of the proposition corresponding to that description as a whole. In the true analysis of the proposition, the description is broken up and disappears. That is to say, when I say 'Scott is the author of *Waverly*' it is a wrong analysis of that to suppose that you have there three constituents, 'Scott', 'is', and 'the author of *Waverly*'. ... 'The author of *Waverly*' is not a constituent of the proposition at all. ... you can have significant propositions denying the existence of 'the so-and-so'. 'The unicorn does not exist'. ... Propositions of that sort are perfectly significant, ... true, decent propositions, and that could not possibly be the case if the unicorn were a constituent of the proposition, because plainly it could not be a constituent as long as there were not any unicorns. Because the constituents of propositions, of course, are the same as the constituents of the corresponding facts, and since it is a fact that the unicorn does not exist, it is perfectly clear that the unicorn is not a constituent of that fact, because if there were any fact of which the unicorn was a constituent, there would be a unicorn, and it would not be true, that it did not exist. That applies in this case of descriptions particularly (PLA, pp. 247–48).

In both of these extended quotations Russell's view amounts to the suggestion that both ordinary proper (OP) names and descriptive phrases, after being properly analysed, do not designate any constituent of the proposition. This is clear in (5) which captures two essential features of Russell's account: (i) OP names are not logically proper (LP) names; (ii) where an expression can be analysed away, as in OP names, then that expression does not signify any 'constituent of the proposition' or does not 'enter into' the proposition.

The same idea is presented when Russell said in one place.

(7) But 'the author of *Waverly*' is not a name, and does not all by itself mean anything at all, because when it is rightly used in propositions, those propositions do not contain any constituent corresponding to it (PLA, p. 253).

Here again, Russell implies that expressions are constituents of *sentences* while the objects denoted are, or may be, constituents of the *proposition*. Russell's view, however, seems confusing when he wrote,

(8) I cannot emphasize sufficiently how important this point is, and how much error you get into metaphysics if you do not realize that when I say 'The author of *Waverly* is human' that is not a proposition of the same form as 'Scott is human'. It does not contain a constituent 'the author of *Waverly*' (PLA, p. 252).

This terminology of Russell is different from the ones expressed in (5), (6) and (7). Here his view seems to be ambiguous because it suggests two distinct ideas. If we take seriously the quotation marks around the descriptive phrase 'the author of *Waverly*' in (8) then it matches the account expressed in (2) which is that constituents of propositions are *expressions* or *symbols*. But if the quotation marks in (8) are not taken seriously then it seems to be in line with the views suggested in (5), (6), (7) and (4) which is that constituents of propositions are actual entities. Here it is worth noting that Russell's terminology slips from one usage to the other which suggests that either he (or his terminology) is confused or not consistent.

Russell's text shows clearly that he used *both* terminologies. One view suggests that constituents of propositions are symbols and that names or expressions should definitely be distinguished from the objects they stand for. But his other idea that constituents of propositions are actual entities (objects) is also clearly present in the text and indeed is expressed more often than the other. This latter view therefore cannot be ignored or disregarded, because his account of LP names is linked very directly with his belief that in their cases

relevant propositions really do contain the corresponding objects. Such a view is explicit in (4) and (5) above, and implicit in such a claim as:

(9) An atomic proposition is one which does mention actual particulars, not merely describe them but actually name them, and you can only name them by means of names (PLA, p. 200).

This view of Russell is of considerable importance in the account of later philosophers like Evans (op. cit), *The Varieties of Reference*, Peacocke 'Proper names, reference and rigid designation' in Blackburn, S. (ed.) *Meaning, Reference and Necessity* (Cambridge Univesity Press, 1975) and Sainsbury, *Russell* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979) when they talk about 'object-involving' or 'entity-invoking' expressions. Although they criticize Russell's account of actual objects occurring in the proposition, nevertheless they take up his account in a somewhat different way. It could be said that they believe that Russell's terminology, although open to objection, nevertheless points to an important insight about names. Their efforts are then directed towards the attempt to clarify what that Russellian terminology properly means. According to them some definite object is required to give meaning to certain expressions, i.e. names occurring in a sentence, and then the corresponding object can be regarded in some sense as a 'constituent of the proposition'. This theory of the later philosophers, therefore, suggests that Russell's account of actual objects occurring in the proposition is not a loose way of expressing his view but rather bears a considerable significance in the theory of names. (There are many other passages in PLA where we equally get an ambiguous picture of what Russell actually meant by 'constituents of propositions'. Such passages can be found, for example, in pp. 197–8, 223, 231, 239, 269–70.)

12. Russell's view in PLA brings difficulties in accounting for two of the central semantic units in language. Any semantic theory which places all the weight on naming will be expected to provide an adequate account of linguistic expressions which are themselves names. For this reason any such theory will expect to have difficulties in accounting for those expressions which we do not ordinarily think of names at all. In Russell's case this difficulty emerges clearly in his attempt to discriminate between names and *predicates*, and also in his attempt to account for the meaning and nature of whole *propositions*.
13. Op. cit. Searle, 'Russell's objection to Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference', p. 142.
14. Ibid.
15. Frege in his classic paper 'Uber sinn and Bedeutung' invoked the notion of sense motivated by the idea of the informative claim involved in the notion of identity sentences like a = b. On one side, it expresses a relation; and yet if a claim of identity is true, the relation holds for just one object. After some discussion, he concluded that the identity claim asserts an identity of reference, but presents the object referred to in different modes. The suggestion is that informative identity statements rely on a difference in the mode of presentation, and that new information can be obtained even if the two names 'a' and 'b' stand for one and the same object. The mode of presentation of any

such object was then identified by Frege as the Sinn of the relevant expression. He gave as an illustration that the planet 'Venus' can be referred to by two different names, viz. 'the morning star', and 'the evening star'.

16. I shall refer only to Blackburn as the author.
17. Op. cit. Blackburn and Code, 'The Power of Russell's Criticism of Frege: "On Denoting", pp. 48–50', p. 72.
18. See Russell's view in my discussion in Sec. II.
19. Op. cit. Blackburn and Code, 'The Power of Russell's Criticism of Frege', p. 73.
20. Ibid., p. 74.
21. Op. cit. Evans, G., *The Varieties of Reference.*
22. Ibid., pp. 18–22.
23. Op. cit. Dummett, D. *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, p. 107.

Jameson and Historicism

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In the introduction to his book *Postmodernism or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* Fredric Jameson explains his 'rhetorical strategy' with regard to postmodernism 'as an attempt to think the present historically in an age that has forgotten how to think historically in the first place.'[1] In Jameson's analysis this 'crisis in historicity' is distinctive of the postmodern situation. Jameson makes use of the Lacanian conception of 'Schizophrenia as a breakdown in the signifying chain' to describe the 'breakdown of temporality' which, according to Jameson, characterizes the postmodern condition.[2]

Jameson's work represents, for many, an extraordinarily ambitious attempt to open up the horizon of history and to move out of the cul-de-sac of contemporary criticism. Indeed, Jameson's work represents an ambitious attempt to put forward a Marxist *Aufhebung* of 'Postmodernism'.

In the first part of this essay I shall discuss the major theoretical motifs and arguments that characterize the Jamesonian Marxism. I shall particularly focus on his innovative rethinking of history and narrative. The discussion will be followed by a more critical inquiry into some of the problematic assumptions of his interpretive practice. I shall appeal to Jacques Derrida's philosophical rethinking of historicity in order to clarify my 'position' with respect to historicism. A very brief discussion of some of the radical aspects of the postcolonial criticism will perhaps show some limit points of the historicizing project.

Jameson's uses of the term *history* are diverse and multilayered, sometimes puzzling even for a most attentive reader. The difficulty is not unjustified, however. In traditional historical thinking there is no unambiguous answer to the question 'What is history?' To oversimplify, at least two different but related meanings are ascribed to the term history: it is on the one hand the totality of events, the *resgestae,* comprising the tem-

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poral process of the past, the present and the future and on the other the account or record of events, the *historia rerum gestarum.* The relation between the two is marked with ambiguity. Does history have an objective referent or is it only a story through which the events become history? Or does history's referent only have a linguistic existence, as a term in a discourse? Much of structuralist thinking, more or less, affirms the latter view. Thus Roland Barthes, for example, writes in his influential essay 'The Discourse of History' that, 'in "objective" history, the "real" is never more than an unformulated signified, sheltering behind the apparently all powerful referent. This situation characterises what might be called the *realistic effect (effet du réel).*'[3]

But Jameson thinks otherwise. For Jameson, history (as an account of past events) has a real referent. But then, Jameson distances himself from any naive realism which presupposes 'an epistemology for which knowledge is in one way or another an identity with the thing.'[4] He rather takes recourse to a certain 'transcendental' realism. He links his conception of history to Lacan's notion of the Real as that hard kernel which 'resists symbolization absolutely' and to the Althusserian-Spinozist idea of the 'absent cause' which is present only in a series of effects that we confront as 'Necessity'.[5] This Real (history) as absent cause, argues Jameson, 'can be understood as a term limit, as that which can be both indistinguishable from the symbolic (or the Imaginary) and also independent of it.'[6]

In a dialectical way Jameson joins this idea of history as Real absent cause to the Lukàcsian and Adornean conception of totality which, as Jameson cautiously reminds us, is not available for representation but is conceived as a critical heuristic standard (PU, 54–55)[7]. The discomforting paradox of the Lacanian Real or of the Lukàcsian–Jamesonian totality and history is that although it does not exist (in the sense of 'really existing') it exercises a certain structural causality. Its absent present must always be presupposed. The Lacanian *le sujet suppose Savoir* (The subject supposed to know) is such real.

Jameson's notion of historicism—which he calls 'Absolute historicism' in order to distinguish it from any teleology and to open up the objective historical ground of the 'Sequence of modes of production'—poses a challenge to all forms of subjectivist 'Presentism'. The past should not be seen as some dead, inert object which the present can make use of according to its 'political' needs. Rather, the living reality of the past and the future modes of production 'come(s) before us as a radically different life from which rises up to call our own form of life into question'.[8] The

radical otherness of the past and the future threatens and unsettles our illusion of an absolute present. History, as Jameson insists in a quasi-sartrean manner, is an other experience of Necessity which 'sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis'.

Jameson lays bare his presupposition quite unequivocally:

> History as ground and untranscendable horizon needs no particular theoretical justification: We may be sure that its alienating necessities will not forget us, however much we might prefer to ignore them (PU, 102).

Conceived in this sense, history, as Jameson insists, 'is *not* a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise'. But then, Jameson complicates his argument further when he suggests that this history is 'inaccessible to us except in textual form and our approach to it and to the Real itself necessarily passes through its prior textualisation, its narrativisation in the political unconscious' (PU, 35).

Jameson thus draws an ontological distinction between narrativistic historicization which is always already textualized and the 'diachronic evolution of History itself, the realm of time and death'.

Jameson seeks to preserve many of the insights of structuralism and post-structuralism with regard to the textual dimension of history, while at the same time cancels what he considers 'the fashionable conclusion that because history is a text, the "referent" does not exist'.

Jameson as a dialectical hermeneutic thinker retains the notion that history is meaningful. Meaning of history, however, is related to the larger problem of representation of history which, for Jameson, is 'essentially a narrative problem, a question of the adequacy of any storytelling framework in which History might be represented' (PU, 49).

'To Althusser's list of three kinds of causality operative in history', as Hayden White appropriately remarks, 'Jameson adds a fourth which might be called narratological causality … . The seizure by consciousness of a past in such a way as to make of the present a fulfilment rather than as an effect is precisely what is represented in a narrativization of a sequence of historical events … .'[9]

In an important essay on historical narrative White himself puts in question the ultra-scientific prejudices of certain historiography (the *Annalistes*, for example) that denies to narrative history truth value and validity. They often mistake a 'meaning' for 'reality'. There is a temporal gap between the real events and their narrative representation. Narrative

transfigures the events which is its referent 'into intimations of patterns of meaning that any literal representation of them as facts could never produce'.[10] In that sense, narrativization of history should be regarded as allegorical, that is, as saying one thing and meaning another.

Inseparable from Jameson's conception of narrative is his politicized notion of desire. Historical narratives, according to the Jamesonian theorizing, embody our desire to transcend the seemingly blind laws' historical process. Powerful attraction of narrative lies in its capacity to sublimate necessity into a symbol of freedom.

Indeed, the notion of desire and freedom serves as an interpretive pivot in Jameson's political hermeneutics.[11] Desire for freedom as a permanent negational act, as Jameson affirms, keeps alive the promise of 'reconciliation' and the utopian vision of liberation of desire and of libidinal transfiguration.

In his thinking of narrative as 'socially symbolic act' and of the political unconscious, Jameson is extraordinarily indebted to Northrop Frye's great interpretive work. Through an innovative reading of Frye, Jameson brilliantly rewrites the four-fold system of medieval Biblical interpretation, that is, the literary, allegorical, moral and analogical. Jameson's political unconscious is equivalent of this ultimate analogical moment of Biblical interpretation. It is Frye who, more than anyone else, has shown 'willingness to raise the issue of community and to draw basic, essentially social consequences from the nature of religion as collective representation' (PU, 69). However, in contrast to Frye's individualistic and ethical rewriting of the analogical moment of the system of four levels, a Marxist Social hermeneutic 'must necessarily restore a perspective in which the imagery of libidinal revolution and bodily transfiguration once again becomes a figure for the perfected community' (PU, 74).

This prompts Jameson to lay wager on an absolute semantic priority of Marxist political interpretation, which involves two-fold task of unmasking the figural truth of every reified ideology and ethics and of projecting a utopian vision of liberated community. Jameson's contention is that only Marxism can offer a genuinely historical and hermeneutic understanding of this essential link between desire, utopia and narrative. Thus in a central passage in '*The Political Unconscious*' Jameson writes:

> Only Marxism can give us an adequate account of the essential *mystery* of the cultural past ... . This mystery can be reenacted only if the human adventure is one; ... . These matters can recover their original urgency for us only if they are retold within the unity of a single great collective story; only if, in however disguised and symbolic a form, they are seen as sharing a single fundamental theme—for Marxism, the collective struggle to wrest a realm of Freedom from a realm of Necessity, ... It is in detecting the traces of that uninterrupted narrative, in restoring to the surface of the text the repressed and buried reality of this fundamental history, that the doctrine of a political unconscious finds its function and its necessity. (PU, 19–20).

Jameson's essential thesis is that Marxist historicism subsumes or dialectically sublates other interpretive systems and methods. It is the Marxist master narrative that provides the framework in which the fundamental *plot* of the narrative of historical process can be adequately represented.

Let me reiterate. Jameson argues for a 'genuine' philosophy of history which can respect the radical otherness of the past, 'while disclosing the solidarity of its polemics and passions, its forms, structures, experiences and struggles, with those of the present day', and which is also the 'anticipatory expression of a future society'.

Whence follows the need to imagine 'a whole new logic of collective dynamics, with categories that escape the taint of some mere application of terms drawn from individual experience (in that sense, even the concept of praxis remains a suspect one)' (PU, 294). Jameson envisions an eschatological third term of non-centred collective subject 'beyond either the "autonomous individualism" of the bourgeoisie in its heyday or the schizoid part-objects in which the fetishization of the subject under late capitalism has left its trace.'[12]

Jameson thus seeks to maintain a critical distance from the subject-centredness of the Lukácsian-Marxian tradition. Yet inspite of this salutary caution Jameson reveals his Lukácsian stigmata when in his interpretive practice he still attaches a well-nigh ontological priority to class categories.

It should by now be clear from the foregoing discussion that narrative as symbolic act has to be regarded as what Jameson calls ideological strategies of containment. As a symbolic act a text makes a 'projective' resolution of social and political contradictions in which it is situated and thus 'represses' its own origin in historical necessity. In this sense, narrative asideology is, as Jameson argues following Althusser's great dictum, 'the representation of the subject's *Imaginary* relationship to his or her *Real* conditions of existence.'[13] The ultimate aim of a Marxist criticism then is to open up the horizon of social classes and of history in its vastest sense of the sequence of modes of production.[14]

Now, any practice of historical reconstruction or totalization presupposes a certain conception of social causality and mediation. Jameson largely endorses the Althusserian critique of mechanical and expressive causality and subscribes to what Althusser terms structural causality. Unlike mechanical or transitive causality, structural causality does not reduce the whole to its parts, nor does it essentialize the whole, unlike expressive causality. What Althusser calls structural totality, in contrast to Hegelian totality, expresses no essence or centre. It is a 'structure of structures' comprising a 'plurality of instances' or levels (with their distinct practices) which are relatively autonomous of one another. Each level possesses 'a *peculiar time*, relatively autonomous and hence relatively independent even in its dependence of the 'times' of the other levels.'[15]

Are we then cut loose into pluralistic chaos and confusion? Jameson really takes pains to ward off the heterological potentialities inherent within the Althusserian notions of overdetermination and structural causality. Thus in contrast to post-Althusserian 'pluralism' Jameson asserts that for Althusserian 'structuralism' 'only *one* structure exists: namely the modes of production itself, or the synchronic system of social relations as a whole' (PU, 36). But then he adds the stipulation that the synchronicity of modes of production is only an abstract concept which can be historicized. Jameson accepts Nicos Poulantzas' suggestion that 'every social formation or historically existing society has in fact consisted in the overlay and structural coexistence of *several* modes of production all at once ... (T)he moment of historical coexistence of several modes of production is not synchronic in this sense but open to history in a dialectical way' (PU, 95). This is perforce to have crucial implications for Marxist criticism. This notion of the overlapping of modes of production precludes the attempt to classify texts according to the appropriate mode of production, 'since the texts emerge in a space in which we may expect them to be crisscrossed and intersected by a variety of impulses from contradictory modes of cultural production all at once' (PU, 95). This complicates the concept of periodization. What Jameson calls *cultural revolution* brings to surface the antagonistic and dynamic coexistence of various synchronic systems or modes of production. This notion of cultural revolution, as Jameson argues, goes beyond the opposition between synchrony and diachrony. This dynamics opens up, as we have already seen, the third horizon of interpretation where the text and its ideologemes is read in terms of '*the ideology of form*, that is the determinate contradiction of the specific

messages emitted by the varied sign systems which coexist in a given artistic process as well as in its general social formation' (PU, 99).

As we have noted, Jameson seeks to ward off two constantly seductive traps: reductionism and autonomous disciplinary compartmentalization. Towards this aim, Jameson, with remarkable ingeniousness, retrieves the Hegelian category of mediation. He defines mediation as a process of transcoding: as the strategic use of a particular code to analyze two distinct types of texts or two distinct structural levels of reality. For Jameson, the Althusserian notion of structure, far from being a critique of mediation, serves as an interesting example of the concept. According to Jameson, the Althusserian critique of expressive causality chimes well with the Hegelian critique of premature mediation. The structural causality can only mean a more complex, mediated and differential unity of the various levels. (T)he very force of this mediation presupposes your sense of the relative autonomy of each of the sector or regions in question' (PU, 43). Nonetheless, the assumption of 'some ultimate underlying unity of the various "levels"' provides the philosophical rationale for a concrete practice of mediation (PU, 40).

In his analysis of both modernism and postmodernism Jameson employs the concept of reification as a mediation, as an identificatory transcoding. He uses the category of reification to characterize both the social relations in Late Capitalism (standardization, rationalization of contemporary 'Life world') and contemporary 'structure of feeling' (fragmentation of temporal sequence, loss of critical distance). The former is the 'Subtext' to which the latter comes as a 'Symbolic resolution'.

A brief discussion of Jameson's periodization of postmodernism may be in order here.

Jameson proposes interpreting postmodernism as a historical phenomenon and not as one cultural style or movement. Jameson seeks to identify in a radically non-moral way some 'moment of truth' (that is, figural truth) 'within the more evident "moment of falsehood"' of postmodernism. Jameson presents, in keeping with the Lukácsian equation of art and age, postmodernism as 'the Cultural logic of Late Capitalism'.

Drawing on Ernest Mandel's formulation of the three stages of capitalism Jameson attempts to establish an analogical correspondence between the three stages of Capital (that is, market capitalism, monoply capitalism and multinational or consumer capitalism) and the three stages of art (that is, realism, modernism and postmodernism). Contemporary capitalism is a purer, more realized and thus more reified form of capitalism than the

earlier stages. According to this formulation, contemporary capitalism has colonized ever more domains of life, Jameson writes:

> One is tempted to speak in this connection of a new and historically original penetration and colonization of Nature and the Unconscious: that is, the destruction of precapitalist third world agriculture by Green Revolution and the rise of the media and the advertising industry.[16]

Jameson introduces two principal features of postmodernism. They are (a) schizophrenia by which he means fragmentation of a sense of temporal and historical continuity, and (b) pastiche, which is parody bereft of critical potentiality and distance.

Jameson's thesis is that these are symptoms and expression of the enormous transnationalization of 'local' space. This results in 'our insertion as individual subjects into a multidimensional set of radically discontinuous realities, whose frames range from the still surviving spaces of bourgeois private life all the way to the unimaginable decentering of global capital itself.'[17] This whole process, in the absence of any adequate representation, 'in lived experience makes itself felt by the so-called death of the subject, or, more exactly, the fragmented and schizophrenic decentering and dispersion of this last'.[18]

This decentering process of globalization makes the task of establishing ideological coordination between local political actions and international ones enormously difficult.

Jameson attempts to overcome this impasse by means of what he calls 'aesthetics of cognitive mapping'. He draws on Kevin Lynch's discovery of how people make imaginary mapping of a city space. This is a spatial analogue of the Althusserian notion of ideology. Cognitive mapping thus involves the ideological task of discovering the subject's imaginary location in an otherwise unrepresentable reality. Jameson argues that this mapping is of crucial importance for socialist internationalist politics. '(T)he incapacity to map spatially is as crippling to political experience as the analogous incapacity to map spatially is for urban experience.'[19]

In Jameson, however, the question of mapping does not remain an open question. An exemplary historicist, Jameson teleologically fastens his aesthetics of cognitive mapping to the predictable reemergence of a global proletariat ('taking forms we cannot yet imagine') from this 'convulsive upheaval'. 'Cognitive mapping was in reality nothing but a code word for class consciousness.'[20]

Thus far I have attempted to present descriptively major theoretical motifs and assumptions that characterize the Jamesonian Marxism. In what follows I wish to make a more critical revaluation of some of the key assumptions of his overall interpretive practice. My purpose here is not at all to put forth any alternative scheme, but rather to show what I consider some limit points of his historicist interpretation.

It is not very difficult to see Jameson's historicist hermeneutics as a powerful and unreserved affirmation of the Hegelian tradition of Western Marxism, albeit supplemented by Althusser and Lacan. Jameson's contention is that the Hegelian dialectic represents a true break with 'identity theory'. '(O)nly the dialectic provides a way for "decentering" the subject concretely, and for transcending the "ethical" in the direction of the political and the collective' (PU, 60). The whole of Jameson's argument rests on this assumption. But I do not think that the contention is really tenable. True, what Hegel calls totality does not imply, unlike Schelling's originary synthetic unity (immediate intellectual intuition), a complete annulment of all oppositions. Instead, for Hegel, absolute totality *contains* the moment of alterity and non-identity presupposed by identity. Totality is the line of continuity that encompasses both identity and non-identity. As Hegel famously puts it: 'The Absolute itself in the identity of identity and non-identity; being opposed and being one are both together in it.'[21] But then the identity of the self-same is never put in radical question. The non-identity remains within the binary opposition to identity. One can legitimately argue that Hegel leads us to a higher level of identity—that is, more complex, more concrete and more secure self-identity—through a mediation of other-relations. One can also argue, following Jacques Derrida, that the Hegelian *Aufhebung* rests on the understanding of difference as contradiction 'only in order to resolve it, to interiorize it, to lift it up ... into the self-presence of an onto-theological or onto-teleological synthesis.'[22]

Jameson offers, in the manner of his more celebrated progenitor Sartre, a certain finitized project of *Aufhebung*. For Jameson, as for Sartre, totalization is an ongoing process and does not reach an absolute end. 'Totalising is ... that process whereby, actively impelled by the project, an agent negates the specific object or items and reincorporates it into the larger project-in-course.'[23] In this larger project of totalizing praxis decentering comes only as an initial moment. Thus, Jameson admirably inaugurates the radical decentering of the individual and the ethical and again sublates it into a secure self-presence of the 'Collective'.

Jameson recognizes the finitude of the historicizing project. But what remains excessive with respect to any historicizing or totalizing project is again subsumed under what he calls 'absolute historicism'. This notion of absolute historicism really smacks of a conception of homogeneous continuity of time which, as Althusser has adequately shown, is the mark of Hegelian historicism.

Dominick LaCapra has rightly pointed out that Jameson's concrete interpretive practice—for example, his discussion of *genre* criticism—often suggests a supplemented dialectics that resembles what LaCapra terms repetition with variation.[24]

Indeed, in Jameson's interpretive practice there remains a discomforting time-lag, an ambivalent to and fro between decentering and totalizing, between text and context. But on a theoretical plane, Jameson never really reflects on the *difference* between these two motifs. Instead, Jameson's historicist mission consists in establishing *identity* and hermeneutic harmony between decentering and totalizing. A well-nigh metaphysical assumption of the fundamental oneness of social life enables Jameson to sublate the radical contingencies that characterize the symbolic domain of social relations.

Another important point I wish to make is that although Jameson seeks to transcend the logic of binary oppositions, and even appreciated Derrida's deconstructive critique of binary logic, he himself anchors his hermeneutics in certain unreflected binary opposition: individual and collective, ethical and political, Necessity and Freedom and so forth. The major trouble with Jameson's theorization of binary logic in terms of the ethics of good and evil (à la Nietzsche) is that this argument downplays the ambivalences and the contingencies that inform the generation of binary oppositions. Ultimately, a certain transcendental notion of History offers Jameson the exit out of the impasse of binary oppositions.

Now, this leads us to perhaps the most problematic point in Jameson's theoretical argument, that is, this notion of History as Real absent cause. The notion of absent cause serves as a mysterious rendezvous point where different concept metaphors converge: Real, totality, History and so on. Here one can legitimately draw parallels between Jameson's History as absent cause and the hidden Good of negative theology. Negative theology, I like to stress, is always concerned with disengaging a hyper essentiality beyond the finite categories of essence and existence. Jameson's notion of absent cause can be seen as a secular variation on this metaphysics of negative theology. In effect, History here turns out to be a master

code which judges and limits other codes. This means that such a notion of history, to use Derrida's expression, 'locks up, neutralizes and finally cancels historicity' itself.

A brief discussion of Derrida's rethinking on the question of historicity may be in order here. I hope that would enable us to think about the conditions and the limits of the possibility of history without falling into the frame of any 'new' historicism (or anti-historicism) or any new Philosophy of history.

From the outset Derrida's deconstructive procedure consists in calling into question the distinction between structure and genesis, history and ahistory. Rodolphe Gasche puts the argument succinctly:

> The seemingly ahistorical doctrine of structuralism is, indeed, tributary to the notion of end-time-oriented history, that is, to history as such, since mere chronological series of facts are not history at all. The structure by which they become conceptualised and in which the essential relations are laid out, represents the final outcome, the fulfilled telos of history.[25]

The argument is that both the concepts of structure and history are organized by a certain closure of an original opening.

From the outset, Derrida has sought to reveal the original unity of both structure and genesis, that is, the structural phenomenological *a priori* of historicity itself. Derrida has attempted to retrieve the radical potentialities, the promise, of the structuralist enterprise. By radically bracketing the spatial metaphoricity of the concept of structure Derrida has sought to arrive at what he calls the 'Structurality of structure' which is not different from the 'historicity of history'. The genitive 'of' does not designate the essence of presence, rather it marks the 'site' (or non-site) of difference/differance between them. This conception of non-spatial structure means a 'transcendental' opening that makes possible (and impossible), founds (and unfounds) the structure in the narrow sense. It is this structural opening, the radical systematic *play* of differences which, says Derrida, 'liberates time and genesis (even coincides with them), but it is also that which risks enclosing progression towards the future-becoming-by giving it form.'[26]

The famous Derridean terms for this structural opening are differance, trace, espacement etc. These terms designated a certain structural delaying. The spelling (or misspelling) of differance with an 'a' means a combination of two verbs—to differ (spatial difference) and to defer (temporal

delay). This delaying is not preceded by the originary and indivisible unity of present possibility. The acknowledgement of differance as the origin of both identity and difference should not mean that differance remains before them in a simple and unmodified present. 'Differance is the non-full, non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences.'[27] Thus the name 'Origin' is Catachrestic. Differences are thus radically historical. As Derrida explains:

> If the word 'history' did not in and of itself convey the motif of a final repression of difference, one could say that only differences can be historical from the outset and in each of their aspects.[28]

The 'concept' of original deferment is what Derrida calls temporization. Temporization is temporalizaton and spacing, the becoming-time of space and the becoming-space of time. Differance as temporalizing opens up time and history. But then, 'difference is no more static than it is genetic, no more structural than historical.'[29]

Derrida is attempting to think the present by way of the trace of past and future:

> It is because of differance that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-called 'present' element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element ... and constituting what is called the present by means of this very relation to what it is not: what it absolutely is not, not even a past or a future as a modified present.[30]

Historicity itself is made possible by what Derrida calls originary repetitive structure of writing. This means that the past reference is always already textualized, always already written.

Derrida never denies history's trajectory. But this trajectory is always an indeterminate criss-cross of protentions and retentions, an interminable *fort da.* Historicisms arrest the opening of this 'ecstatic temporality'.

Derrida does not oppose historicism with an 'anhistoricity' He rather attempts to think another historicity, 'another opening of event-ness as historicity'.[31]

Differance also radically unhinges totality and totalization. Derrida distinguishes his critique of totalization from any facile celebration of fragments:

> If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field—that is, language and a finite language—excludes totalization. This field is in effect that of *play,* that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite ... instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a centre which arrests and grounds the play of substitution.[32]

Deconstructive criticism does not 'wage war on totality' and history. Rather, as Gasche suggests, it mimics totality in *its* totality, while simultaneously 'making it insecure in its most assured evidences'.[33]

Before concluding it would be worthwhile to consider, once again, Jameson's totalizing account of the postmodern from the perspective of the post colonial. This brief discussion will indicate, by implications, certain limit points of Jameson's overall historicizing project. It is quite evident that the post colonial theoretical discourses make use of and rewrite, at the same time, the dominant 'post modernist' concept metaphors. But it resituates them within a different 'Social temporality' of what Homi Bhabha calls 'post colonial contra-modernity'.[34]

Post colonial criticism bears witness to what Jameson calls the 'unrepresentable' process of transnationalization which opens up contingent and ambivalent spaces of cultural differences that resist totalization. These hybrid locations of differences, to use Bhabha's influential expression, unsettles the political strategies based on foundationist and originary subjectivities and opens up the spaces of agonal subject-positions.

To claim, as Jameson does, that these are the negative symptoms of 'the transitional nature of the new global economy (that) has not allowed its classes to form in any stable way, let alone to acquire genuine class-consciousness';[35] means to disavow the performative identities of the minority groups for whom differences and contingencies is not something to sublate but a resource for resistance. Such claims also disavow the very 'historicity' of the moments of the colonial and the post colonial.

Post colonial discourses cannot affirm the narrative of the transition to postmodernity in that it bears witness to the ambivalent, interruptive and hybrid moments—time-lag as Bhabha terms it—that emerge in the colonial and post colonial 'translation' of the modernity itself.

In contrast to the narrativistic forms of social interpretations Bhabha asserts that 'the encounters and negotiations of differential meanings and values within 'colonial' textuality, its governmental discourses and cultural

practices, have anticipated, *avent la lettre,* many of the problematics of signification and judgement that have become current in contemporary theory—aporia, ambivalence, indeterminacy, the question of discursive closure, the threat to agency, the status of intentionality, the challenge to "totalizing" concepts, to name but a few'. The acknowledgement of the 'colonial contra-modernity' 'would question the historicism that analogically links, in a linear narrative, late capitalism and the fragmentary simulacral, pastiche symptoms of postmodernity.'[36]

Indeed, the colonial and post colonial moment can be seen as the 'limit-text', to use Roland Barthes' expression, of any historicizing and totalizing project.

Post colonial criticism cannot affirm (pace Jameson) the notion of 'the unity of a single great collective story' of history. Its task is rather to isolate and repeat radically the discontinuous interruptive and 'monadic' moments that remains excessive to 'a single fundamental theme' of history.

But then, as Hayden White too points out, Jameson's argument for the priority of the Marxist master narrative rests on the assumption about which he himself is somewhat ambivalent: 'Only *if* the human adventure is one ...' (PU, 19).

Notes and References

1. Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), p. ix.
2. Ibid., pp. 27–28.
3. Roland Barthes, 'The Discourse of History', trans. Stephen Bann, in *Comparative Criticism: A Yearbook,* Vol. 3, ed. E.S. Schaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 17.
4. F. Jameson, 'Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan', in *Literature and Psychoanalysis,* ed. Shoshana Felman (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 387.
5. F. Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (London: Methuen, 1981), p. 35. Hereafter cited parenthetically in the essay: as PU.
6. Jameson, *Imaginary and Symbolic*, pp. 387–88.
7. For Jameson's comments on Adorno and totality, see his *Late Marxism: Adorno or the Persistence of the Dialectic* (London: Verso, 1990).
8. F. Jameson, 'Marxism and Historicism' in *The Ideologies of Theory,* Vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 175.

9. Hayden White, 'Getting out of History: Jameson's Redemption of Narrative' in *The Content of Form* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p, 149.
10. H. White, 'The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory' in *The Content of Form.*
11. See F. Jameson, *Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 84, pp. 113–114 and also, PU, p. 67.
12. F. Jameson, 'Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan'.
13. L. Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in *Lenin and Philosophy* (London: New Left Books, 1971).
14. In *'The Political Unconscious'* Jameson offers a brilliant Marxist rewriting of the Christian hermeneutic notion of stages in interpretation in terms of the three progressively widening semantic horizons. They are, (1) Political level in which the text or the individual work is grasped essentially as a symbolic act, (2) the social level in which the object of study is the *ideologeme* of the social order, that is, 'the smallest intelligible unit of the essentially antagonistic collective discourses of social classes, and (3) the ultimate horizon of history—here the text and its ideologemes are grasped in terms of the '*ideology of form*, that is the symbolic messages transmitted to us by the coexistence of various sign systems which are themselves traces or anticipations of modes of production' (PU, 75–6).
15. L. Althusser, 'The Object of Capital' in L. Althusser and E. Balibar, *Reading Capital*, (London: New Left Books, 1970), p. 99.
16. Jameson, *Postmodernism,* p. 36.
17. Ibid., p. 413.
18. Ibid., p. 413.
    Jameson, however, attempts to distance himself from any 'expressive causality'. The new cultural forms are not just an epiphenomenal expression of the 'infrastructural' development. Thus, according to Jameson, while the economic preparation of postmodern began in the 1950s, culturally, the preconditions can be found in the social and cultural changes in the 1960s. Cultural preconditions, Jameson opines, preexist their moment of 'crystallization into a relatively hegemonic style'. Jameson argues, in keeping with the Althusserian notion of 'structure in dominance' that the various levels retain their relative autonomy and still 'conspire to produce a totality' (ibid., pp. XIX–XX).
19. Ibid., p. 416.
20. Ibid., p. 418.
21. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy,* trans. W. Cerf and H.S. Harris, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), p. 156.
22. J. Derrida, *Positions,* trans. A. Bass, (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), p. 44.
23. Jameson, *Postmodernism,* p. 333.

24. Dominick LaCapra, 'Marxism in the Textual Maelstrom: Fredric Jameson's *The Political Unconscious*' in *Rethinking Intellectual History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
25. Rodolophe Gasche, 'Of aesthetic and historical determination' in *Post-structuralism and the Question of History*, ed. Derek Attridge et al., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 140.
26. J. Derrida, *Writing and Difference,* trans. A. Bass., (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 26.
27. J. Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy,* trans. A. Bass., (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982)., p. 11.
28. Ibid., p. 11.
29. Ibid., p. 12.
30. Ibid., p. 13.
31. J. Derrida, *Specters of Marx,* trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 75.
    In his essay 'My chances/Mes chances' in *Taking Chances: Derrida, Psychoanalysis, Literature,* ed. J.H. Smith and W. Kerrigan. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). Derrida explains that unexpectability conditions the very structure of an event.
32. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, p. 289.
33. Rodolphe Gasche, *The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida, and the Philosophy of Reflection* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 180.
34. In what follows I am depending on Bhabha's rethinking of the Post colonial and the postmodern.
    See Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994).
35. Jameson, *Post-modernism,* p. 348.
36. H. Bhabha, 'The post colonial and the post-modern: The question of agency' in *The Location of Culture,* p. 133.

Iqbal and Sartre on Human Freedom and Creativity

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I. INTRODUCTION

Muḥammad Iqbāl (1877–1938) a renowned poet-philosopher of the East and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) a famous existentialist thinker and litterateur of the West are the two influential thinkers who placed human freedom and creativity at the heart of their value system and dealt with the problem from an existentialist perspective on human life.

Both Jean-Paul Sartre and Muḥammad Iqbāl occupy a unique place in their respective areas of influence in the modern Western and Eastern philosophical worlds. Sartre is a prominent champion of existential philosophy, while Iqbāl's greatness lies in reviving and reconstructing Islamic thought. It would be an interesting study to compare and contrast their positions regarding freedom, an issue that has acquired new dimensions in the context of the present historic situation in which an individual's identity and freedom have been threatened by bureaucracy, technology and an all-embracing collectivism. This study becomes all the more interesting in view of their contrasting beliefs—Sartre is declared atheist, and Iqbāl is firmly committed to the Islamic faith—as one of them rejects God in order to safeguard human freedom, while the other reaffirms his faith in God so that man can exercise his freedom fully. Yet both of them are the champions of human freedom. Furthermore, both of them are creative writers of the highest calibre. Sartre is a great fiction writer of our age and Iqbāl is universally acclaimed as one of the greatest poets of Indo-Persian tradition in the 20th century.

The similarities and dissimilarities in their philosophical outlooks are equally glaring. There are some areas in which both are in agreement and some in which they disagree. Their difference seems prominent due to Sartre's tackling of the metaphysical notions on an atheistic basis; conversely Iqbāl's system of thought is rooted in the intensive faith in God,

and his approach is a theistic one. The main question is how far does belief or unbelief in God make a difference in relation to a philosopher's views on freedom. Does it make a fundamental difference or give rise to only secondary and minor differences? Here in the following pages we shall discuss these questions.

Existentialism is a point of departure, insofar as it provides an alternative approach to the understanding and living of life and consequently changes one's entire outlook by creating new attitudes, values and ideals. The central contention of existential philosophy—in the words of Sartre—'existence precedes essence'[1] is a revolutionary one and shakes the hitherto dominant essentialist philosophy to its foundations. It provides a new conception of man, and a new outlook by making '*human existence*' the real frame of reference. For Sartre human reality or human subjectivity is the foundation of all thought and action. He says that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world and consequently defines himself afterwords.[2]

Iqbāl, whose thought is a synthesis of Eastern religious insight into reality and Western intellectualism, has crucial existential insights to offer. He dwells upon certain important existentialist themes without calling himself an existentialist. However, he is not in full agreement with the exponents of the slogan—Sartre's dictum—'existence precedes essence' and its implications. Nevertheless, he emphasises the main themes current in contemporary existentialist philosophy such as:

(a) Man's existence and his personal involvement;
(b) Anti-intellectualism and anti-personal functionalization;
(c) Alienation and authentic existence; and prominent among all;
(d) Freedom and creativity.

These concepts he certainly shares with the continental existentialist thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Marcel, Heidegger and more prominently with Sartre. At present, we shall take up the issue of 'freedom and creativity' and expound briefly some common views put forward by the existential exponent Sartre and the Muslim philosopher Iqbāl. We shall also compare and contrast Sartre's and Iqbāl's approaches to such conceptions as well.

II. THE CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM AND CREATIVITY

The conception of freedom in the philosophy of Iqbāl and Sartre is interesting from various angles. The *weltanschauung* of the two is apparently

radically opposed; that is, one is a theist while the other is an atheist. Moreover, Sartre's philosophy is the culmination of the anti-intellectualistic tradition of the Western philosophy, particularly representing a revolt against the Platonic-Christian world-outlook, while Iqbal's philosophy is a radical point of departure within the framework of the Eastern thought, particularly the Islamic tradition of philosophy. Despite their different historico-religious backgrounds, there are many common elements in their thought systems on various issues such as man's existence, freedom and creativity, alienation, authenticity, materialism and its various forms etc.

As indicated earlier, existentialism being a philosophy of 'freedom' and 'creativity' is anti-deterministic. The emphasis of the existentialists on personal existence and subjectivity has led to new stress on man's freedom and responsibility. According to the existentialist thinkers determinism, whether genetic, social or environmental, does not offer adequate explanation of man's inner potentialities and capabilities. The existentialists say that man brings out his unique inner potentialities and creative skill only because of his freedom. Their view-point insists that first of all, man exists in the world and with his utmost freedom creates himself through each of his actions. He is the maker of himself and 'by virtue of this freedom, originally creates himself'.[3] Man is the project which possesses subjective life. Apart from this projection of self, nothing exists. The existentialists hold that man fulfills his project only due to his freedom. He is responsible for whatever he does and, in this way, the whole responsibility of his action falls on his own shoulders. Man has considerable freedom within his own being in case he wills to express it. According to Karl Jaspers, the dignity of man is in his freedom:

> To see the essence of man in his freedom, however, is to see him in his dignity. All individuals, myself included, are irreplaceable under the same high obligations.[4]

Freedom is a unique quest which lies in working out the demands of one's inner nature and expressing one's genuine or authentic self. Freedom means facing conflicting choices, making decisions and accepting them.

Jean-Paul Sartre alone among all the existentialist thinkers elaborated a systematic and detailed theory of freedom. He approaches the problem from the atheistic viewpoint totally denying the existence of God. Man is completely free to do whatever he likes. To him in case there is no God and hence 'everything is permitted'.[5] Sartre says:

> Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself. He discovers, forthwith, that he is without excuse.[6]

In case God does not exist, Sartre points out, there is only one being whose existence comes before its essence and that being is 'man'. Man is indefinable, because to begin with he is nothing:

> Freedom is precisely nothingness which *is made-to-be* at the heart of man and which forces human reality to *make itself* instead of *to be* ... for human reality, to be is the choose *oneself*; nothing comes to it either from outside or from within which it can receive or accept .... Thus, freedom is not *a being*; it is *the being* of man—i.e. his nothingness of being.[7]

The human individual will not be anything unless and until he will be what he makes of himself. Hence, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have an idea of it:

> For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism—man is free, man *is* freedom.[8]

It is an important point to note that Sartre's atheism is somewhat different from that of the followers of a certain type of secular moralism and French radicalism. His disbelief in the existence of God is actuated by specific reasons. Accordingly, Sartre points out that the existentialism is nothing else but an attempt to draw the full conclusions from a consistently atheistic position. He thinks that the '*anguish*' or '*despair*' does not occur due to one's attitude of unbelief as the Christians think, but in reality, the despair of the existentialists is something different and has its own reasons. They hold that neither belief nor unbelief would solve man's problem because he finds himself again and again surrounded in new situations. Man is left alone without excuse. He is condemned to be free:

> Existentialism is not atheist in the sense that it would exhaust itself in demonstrations of the non-existence of God. It declares, rather, that even if God existed that would make no difference from its point of view. Not that we believe God does exist, but we think that the real problem is not that of His existence; what man needs is to find himself again and to understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence of God.[9]

Sartre does not include religious elements in his existentialism because he argues that there are different existing delineations of specific aspects of human nature (whether religious or secular) and all are based exclusively upon theological concepts. One of them, for example, is the belief that 'God had created man in His own image'. Such theological concepts are not tenable according to Sartre, as George F. Kneller rightly remarks:

> There is no God for Satre; more precisely, Sartre hypothesizes no God; for him, god is not necessary. One cannot argue morals if presuppositions are in essence theological. The basis of any argument must lie in understanding man's inherent freedom; for man is not simply born free; he is 'condemned to be free'.[10]

In his existential philosophy Sartre has used various terms (like authenticity, dread, anguish, abandonment, facticity, responsibility etc.) to explain his conception of freedom. At present we shall discuss only two out of these namely '*anguish*' and '*facticity*'. Of all the existentialists Sartre has most stressed the anguish of freedom. According to him 'when a man commits himself to anything, fully realizing that he is not only choosing what he will be but is thereby at the same time a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind',[11] and, in such a moment that man cannot escape from the sense of this complete and profound responsibility. If he shows no such anxiety over it, he is certainly trying to disguise his anguish. The anguish of freedom is really anguish over the fact that one *must* choose:

> The anguish of freedom arises only with the realization that one must always decide for oneself and that efforts to shift the burden of responsibility upon others are necessarily self-defeating. Not to choose is also to choose, for even if we deliver our power of decision to others, we are still responsible for having done so. It is always the individual who decides that others will choose for him. At times he may dull the awareness of his original and inalienable responsibility, but he can never wholly suppress that awareness.[12]

By the sense of '*facticity*' Sartre means the For-itself's necessary connection with the In-itself (i.e. with the world and its own past). In simple words it is what allows us to say that the For-itself *is* or *exists*. In this way the '*facticity*' of freedom is the fact that *freedom is not able not to be free*. We cannot change our past history for it is what *it is*. It constitutes a part of what Sartre calls our 'facticity'. Thus, our past is a part of our facticity which is, in other words, our being as an itself. Our future, on the other

hand, is absolutely open, completely undetermined either by our past self or by the external world. From this Sartre comes to this conclusion that it is only through the For-itself or consciousness that the future comes into being.

Sartre discusses freedom and facticity with reference to their 'situational setting'. A human being is always surrounded in a '*situation*'. Man's place, his past, his environment, his fellow man and his death—all have been discussed by Sartre in order to make us understand this '*being-in-situation*' which characterizes the *For-itself* in so far as it is responsible for its manner of being without being the foundation of its being.[13] In the following words of his *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre, referring to Heidegger, describes what is, in reality, the facticity of freedom:

> In fact we are a freedom which chooses, but we do not choose to be free. We are condemned to freedom, ... thrown into freedom or as Heidegger says, 'abandoned'. And we can see this abandonment has no other origin than the very existence of freedom. If, therefore, freedom is defined as the escape from the given, from fact, then there is a *fact* of escape from fact. This is the facticity of freedom.[14]

Man is not what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, what he chooses and 'what he makes of himself'[15] through freedom, and 'that is the first principle of existentialism'.[16] Moreover, freedom, according to Sartre, is the only ground of all values.

On the contrary, regarding freedom and creativity, Iqbāl has referred to various Qur'anic verses in his Urdu and Persian poetry and particularly in his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* affirming his faith in *Allah* (God). In the fourth lecture in *Reconstruction*, he presents *three* significant themes from the Qur'ān reaffirming the Islamic view of man's being a Vicegerent (*Khalīfah*) of *Allah*, a chosen entity and a trustee of a free personality which he accepted at *his peril*.[17] 'The perfect Muslim is, for Iqbāl, nothing but the realization of the Qur'anic sentence according to which Adam was ordered to be the *Khalīfa*, the Vicegerent of God on earth.'[18]

Iqbāl argues that man's freedom and creativity, in the sphere of ethics, must be under the direction of the Highest Good and Absolute Freedom, i.e. God. The greatest of all obstacles, says Iqbāl, in the upward life of the ego, is Matter or Nature, yet it is not evil, since it enables the latent powers of life to unfold themselves. According to Iqbāl, the Ego attains freedom by the removal of all the obstructions in its way. 'It is partly free and partly determined; and reaches fuller freedom by approaching the individual who is most free, termed "God"'.[19]

Iqbāl points out that it is man's firm faith in *Tawḥīd* (Unity of God) which makes him to believe that this principle is the foundation of every aspect of human life. He says in his *Rumūz-i Bēkhūdī:*

> What is it that infuses one breath in a hundred hearts?
> It is one of the secrets of faith in *Tawḥīd*!
> Be United and thus make *Tawḥīd* visible;
> Realize its latent meaning in *action*!
> Faith and wisdom and law all spring from it,
> It is the source of strength and power and stability!
> Its power exalts the nature of man
> And makes him an entirely new being!
> Fear and doubt die out; *action* becomes alive!
> The eye can look into the heart of the Universe!
> 'There is no god but God' is the capital of our life!
> Its bond weaves our scattered thoughts together.[20]

Conversely, Sartre holds that there is no God and man is condemned to freedom:

> Everything is permitted (because of the fact that) God does not exist ... . One will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words there is no determinism—man is free, man is freedom.[21]

His position is not like that of Iqbāl who maintains that man in some spheres of activity is free, and in some other spheres has to follow the Divine Commands. Sartre emphatically asserts in *Being and Nothingness:*

> Freedom is not a being; it is *the being* of man—i.e., his nothingness of being. If we start by conceiving of man as plenum, it is absurd to try to find in him afterwards moments or psychic regions in which he would be free .... Man cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all.[22]

This is, in fact, the major difference between the approaches of the two thinkers. Sartre's existentialistic outlook is labelled as humanistic because he saves man's freedom at the cost of God. Iqbāl's existentialism—if the term may be applied to his approach—is also humanistic despite his firm faith in God, because God in his philosophical *Weltanschauung* does not deprive man of his freedom but rather guarantees it.

However, in spite of some differences, what both the systems have in common is the doctrine of freedom through which human existence can translate its authenticity into actions. For Iqbāl, as for Sartre, man is a self-contained centre of activity, self-conscious, creative and self-evolving being. Human self is free in the sense that it is not determined by anything outside it.[23] Freedom is its own architect and the very laws governing its mode of operation in the world are of its own making. Above all, according to Iqbāl, man is the architect of his own life and is the sole sovereign in the scheme of creation and the undisputed master of his destiny. In this connection Iqbāl says in his *Jāvīd Nāmah:*

O lover of Truth! Be conclusively final like a glittering sword,
Be thy self the destiny of thine own world.[24]

According to Sartre freedom reveals itself in dread that compels man to seek refuge in the inauthenticity of existence. To him overcoming dread leads to authentic existence and that is moral, and flight from it is inauthentic and immoral. In Iqbāl's philosophy, when one realizes what is freedom, it seems to be the source of all values. According to him life of the ego is possible in freedom only:

Life is reduced to a dried rivulet when it is imprisoned within confines;
In freedom, life embraces boundlessness like an ocean.[25]

Iqbāl maintains that there are only ego-sustaining and ego-dissolving acts.[26] Freedom sustains the ego, while slavery dissolves it into nothingness. Man's first act of disobedience to God, which caused his expulsion from heaven, was an act of freedom meant to sustain the ego. Escape from freedom, according to Iqbāl, is an ego-dissolving act that negates all future for human existence. He asserts that when a person gives up his freedom, he falls down from the high pedestal of human existence, into the state of inauthenticity. Iqbāl, in his poems, calls all the acts of the slave devoid of morality; according to him even his prayer is not authentic, because it negates the freedom of ego, it is not a bold 'yearning for a response in the awful silence of the universe'.[27] A slave's prayers deepen and thicken this silence. To accept slavery and to remain contented with this state is the death of ego. Real man can only be brought up in the spirit of freedom, while slavery distorts characters, degrades human nature and finally lowers man to the level of beasts.[28] On the one hand, God refuses to respond to the prostrations of the slaves, and, on the other, the earth refuses to accept the dead body of a slave:

O the heartless being! Thou hast been a slave in the world;
Because of thy surrender to slavery my heart is burning like hell-fire.
Thy corpse has made my darkness even darker;
Thy corpse has torn into shreds my veil of modesty.
Beware of the corpse of a slave, Beware a hundred times!
O *Isrāfīl*, O the Creator of the Universe! pure soul, Beware![29]

For Iqbāl, freedom is the highest religious, social, moral and political value. He gave a philosophical orientation to his attempt to reconstruct the religious ideas according to the historic necessity of his times. Like Sartre, Iqbāl accorded the highest position to freedom in the hierarchy of values. No doubt, freedom occupies a similar position in the existentialist philosophy in general, but Iqbāl's concept of freedom seems far more comprehensive than that of all the existentialist thinkers including even Sartre. Sartre's views are in conflict with those of Iqbāl when he (Sartre) proclaims that there is *no God* and 'we are left without excuse'[30] and that 'man is condemned to be free.'[31] Iqbāl says that there *is God*—Who is the Most Free and is the Creator of the heavens and the earth. The human ego attains highest freedom by removing all the material obstacles in its way, though matter is not a bondage, it rather paves the way for attaining freedom. And attaining supreme freedom does not mean that human self or Ego has to annihilate itself for the sake of being absorbed in God. Man remains man and does not lose his *Khūdī* or egohood. The Prophet of Islam, the ideal and the most perfect of all the prophets has to ask his followers to proclaim:

We bear witness that Muḥammad(S) is the slave and the messenger of *Allah*.

It reiterates that man is first of all 'a man' howsoever high a position he may attain. The obedience to *Allah* ensures the life of human ego and strengthens his *Khūdī*, which is life of freedom. For Iqbal freedom is not a value or mode of human existence. It is the very life of *Khūdī* (egohood).

Iqbāl points out that the purpose of Prophet Muḥammad's mission was to infuse freedom, equality and brotherhood among all mankind. He says in his *Rumūz-i Bēkhūdī (The Mysteries of Selflessness):*

Believers all are brothers in his heart,
Freedom the sum and substance of his Flesh.
Impatient with discriminations all.
His soul was pregnant with Equality.

Therefore his sons stand up erect and free
As the tall cypresses, the ancient pledge
In him renewing, '*Yea, Thou art our Lord*'.[32]

Iqbāl seems to be in agreement with Heidegger and Sartre who hold that it is the fact of 'consciousness' which radically distinguishes man from other beings and all other creatures. The issue assumes central importance in the thought system of Iqbal. For Iqbāl the realization of freedom is the core of human consciousness. According to him it is not something static, rigid, given and complete, but it is a dynamic process, and because of freedom it is a self-creative process based on an act of improvization and rejection of what has been (its bondage). Like Iqbāl, both theistic and atheistic versions of the existentialistic philosophy maintain that man is incomplete, indefinable and unpredictable. As Karl Jaspers says:

> Nobody can conceive all human potentialities. Man is always capable of doing more and other things than anyone expected. He is incomplete, he cannot be completed, and his future is never sealed. There is no total man, and there never will be one.[33]

Similarly, atheist Sartre asserts that:

> [man] is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself.[34]

For Iqbāl, human consciousness is the basic and central subject of discussion. According to him, it is only this unique faculty of consciousness which makes man radically distinct from other worldly objects, so that he can participate in the creative act of God. Here Iqbāl differs from Sartre, according to whom there is no other creator but only human individual. He says that God is the Supreme Creator (*Khālīq*) of everything and man with his consciousness and other capabilities participates in the creative act of *Allah*. Iqbal says:

> Man, therefore, in whom egohood has reached its relative perfection, occupies a genuine place in heart of the Divine creative energy and thus possesses a much higher degree of reality than things around him. Of all the creations of God, he alone is capable of 'consciously participating' in the creative life of the Maker.[35]

According to Iqbāl, this universe is a Divine creation but it is not a complete act of creation. In the light of the Qur'ān this universe is liable to develop further:

> The process of creation is still going on, and man too takes his share in it, in as much as he helps to bring order into at least a portion of the chaos. The Qur'ān indicates the possibility of other Creators than God.[36]

He, again, puts it more unambiguously in the following verses:

The universe is still incomplete perhaps.
For one may respond to an ever-recurring command of
'Be! and it became.'[37]

There are other worlds unseen And the essence of existence is not yet void![38]

It is man, in the view of Iqbāl, who is destined to complete the process of creation. In a long poem *Sāqī Nāmah*, he writes:

Every one of them waiting for thy conquest,
For the unbridled play of thy thought and action
The object of the passage of time is but one;
To *reveal* to thee the possibilities of *thy ego*![39]

According to Iqbāl, man creates his own world and ideals as he likes. If the present or given world does not provide any meaning and importance to human existence, it should be destroyed and reshaped according to the human needs and aspirations. In the poem *Zindgī (Life)* he says:

Burn up this borrowed earth and sky,
And raise a world of your owns from the ashes.[40]

Again, in this connection, he emphatically asserts in his *Zerb-i Kalīm*:

Only he overcomes the revolution of Time,
Who creates an eternal life with every breath.

Iqbāl lays great stress on man's creative activity and refers to the Qur'ān, which expressly mentions creators besides *Allah*. For instance, one of the following verses of the Holy Book (Qur'ān) indicates:

Blessed is God, the best of *those* who create.[41]

Such a reference to the Qur'ān indicates how Iqbāl conceives the act of human 'creativity'. One will not find in Sartre or other atheistic existentialists this view of human creativity. And it is in this unique interpretation

of human freedom and creativity that Iqbāl goes beyond existentialist philosophy and surpasses its conception of freedom.

This comparative study undertaken by us needs further elaboration by comparing and constrasting various philosophers having divergent ontological, political, ethical, social and psychological world-outlooks; and views regarding the nature of human being and his capacity for *freedom* and *creativity*. We feel that such a study is indispensable in the contemporary situation, which threatens to deprive the human individual of his *freedom* and endeavours to submerge all differences within an all-embracing physicalism and technocracy, wrongly called pan-humanism, a modern atheistic version of pantheism. Iqbāl revolted against the Sufis' pantheism just as Kierkegaard developed a powerful critique of conventional Christianity; while Sartre's revolt has been against the modern panphysicalism. Both revolted with a view to affirm and assert the right of individual beings to freedom, for without freedom human existence becomes absurd and meaningless.

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A Critique on the Concept of *Jīva*

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1. INTRODUCTION

Based on their conceptions of *jīva* (individual self),[1] the Indian philosophical systems can be categorized[2] as follows:

(i) The systems which believe in the existence of the individual self distinct from the body.
(ii) The system which believes that there is no individual self distinct from the body.
(iii) The system that believes in the non-existence of a permanent and unchanging individual self.

Almost all orthodox Indian philosophical systems share the view of the first category. However, each system disagrees with the other in defining the individual self. The systems of the first category can be classified into two:

(a) The system that believes in the identity of the individual self with the Supreme Self.
(b) The systems which believe that the individual self is not identical with the Supreme Self or God.[3]

Advaita Vedānta holds the first of the above views and the rest of the orthodox systems share the view of the second category with some differences among themselves. The present paper confines itself to a criticism of the *Advaita Vedānta* view of the individual self. My criticism ultimately aims to establish the thesis that neither *Brhamacaitanya* nor *Īśvaracaitanya* can be the source of *Jīvacaitanya* and that the *antaḥkaraṇa* is itself sufficient to explain the conscious nature of the living being.

1.1. Importance of the Concept of Jīva *in* Advaita Vedānta

The concept of *Jīva* is one of the most important concepts in *Advaita Vedānta*, because, it is the foundation for the other Vedic concepts such as *karma,* rebirth, *mokṣa*, etc. Without *Jīva* the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions become useless.[4] In other words, if the concept of *Jīva* as conceived by the advaitins is proved wrong, then the other Vedic concepts mentioned above, at least in their advaitic interpretation, will have to be dismissed.

2. ŚAṄKARA ON BRAHMAN AND *JĪVA*

According to Śaṅkara, the essential nature of Brahman is Consciousness having potentiality to wish (*kāma*),[5] to will (*ekṣata*),[6] and to think (*īkṣata*).[7] Before the first creation there was Brahman alone and the above texts under reference state that Brahman wished to become many and created the multitude. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* states: There was Existence alone before creation. It willed to become many and created all the elements.[8] Here the word '*willed*' implied that such thinking was not there earlier in the Existence. According to Śaṅkara, Brahman while becoming many has not transformed entirely. For, he says: 'The *Upaniṣads* prove both the facts for Brahman—the non-transformation of Brahman as a whole and partlessenss.'[9] The *Upaniṣad* states that after transforming into the bodies, He entered into the living beings as the *jīva.*[10] It is to be noted that the upaniṣadic verses do not explicitly mention whether Brahman transformed Itself into the bodies partly or wholly. But Brahman's entering into the living beings would not have been possible if It had transformed Itself entirely into the bodies. Hence we have to conclude that a part of Brahman transformed Itself into the bodies and it was only the remaining untransformed part of Brahman which entered into the hearts[11] of the living beings.

Śaṅkara is of the conviction that the individual self is in its essence Brahman Itself. Brahman, says Śaṅkara, somehow gets Itself entangled with the adjuncts such as intellect etc., and as a consequence falsely assumes individuality. According to Śaṅkara, '... the Supreme Brahman Itself, which while remaining immutable, appears to exist as an individual soul owing to association with limiting adjuncts.'[12] This view is supported by the text, 'The Self is indeed Brahman, as well as identified with the intellect, the *manas* (mind), and the vital force, with the eyes and ears.'[13] For Śaṅkara the text 'Assuming the likeness (of the intellect), it moves

between the two worlds (this and the next),' shows that even while going to another world, there is no dissociation for the Self from the intellect.[14] According to him, the soul assumes the likeness of the intellect itself, for only that is near at hand.[15] The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* states: 'Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, want of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence and fear all these are but the mind.'[16] Bādarāyaṇa also says, 'But the soul comes to have such appellations because of the dominance of the modes of that intellect.'[17] For Śaṅkara also, desire, dislike, happiness, sorrow, etc., are the modes of intellect. These modes constitute the essence or chief factors in the attainment of the state of transmigratoriness by the soul.[18]

Explaining further the relationship between the *antaḥkaraṇa* and Brahman which results in the assumption of individuality by Brahman, Śaṅkara says: 'This internal organ, constituting a conditioning factor for the Self is variously spoken of in different places as the *manas*[19] (faculty of thinking), *buddhi*[20] (faculty of knowing), *vijñāna*[21] (cognition or egoism), *citta*[22] (feeling or memory).'[23] In spite of being a non-dualist, Śaṅkara paradoxically admits of the existence of a second entity, namely, the *antaḥkaraṇa* in addition to Brahman. He says: '... it must of necessity be admitted, that an internal organ of this kind *does exist*, for unless that organ is admitted, there will be the contingency of either constant perception or non-perception.'[24] The text, 'It thinks as it were, and shakes as it were'[25] implies according to Śaṅkara that the consciousness does not think by itself, nor does it move; but when the intellect thinks it seems to think, and when the intellect moves, it seems to move.[26] Śaṅkara is of the view that the connection of the soul with the intellect has but false ignorance at its root.[27] He says: 'This connection with such limiting adjuncts as the intellect does not cease so long as the identity of the Self with Brahman is not realized.'[28] Later in this paper, I will be exposing the inherent contradictions in such views of Śaṅkara regarding Brahman's assumption of individuality.

3. THE RATIONALE BEHIND ŚAṄKARA'S CONCEPT OF *JĪVA*

According to Śaṅkara, the absolute Reality, namely, Brahman, is one without a second.[29] Brahman is non-dual, attributeless, unfragmented, homogeneous and unconditioned Reality. Śaṅkara felt that the existence of Brahman can be established by the actual realization of It by man.[30] Śaṅkara could not find any method or reason for the direct revelation of Brahman to Itself. Therefore, he brought out the concept of *jīva*, which

according to him, is Brahman conditioned by adjuncts such as intellect.[31] He tried to establish the identity between Brahman and *jīva* by using the formulae such as 'I am Brahman', 'That thou art' and 'This *ātman* is Brahman'.

Śaṅkara identifies Consciousness in the living body with Brahman.[32] Brahman-consciousness when individuated becomes *jīva* and is distinct from the body.[33] This position led Śaṅkara to establish the finiteness of the infinite, conditioning of the unconditioned, parts of the partless and individuation of the universal Brahman.[34] Advaitins put forward theories[35] such as (i) *Kalpana vāda,* (ii) *Ābhāsa vāda*, (iii) *Pratibimba vāda,* and (iv) *Avaccheda vāda* as valid explanations to justify the identity of the individual consciousness with Brahman. In spite of their rigorous rational arguments, the Advaitins could not establish these theories without seeking the role of faith. Śaṅkara suggests one to have faith in the beginninglessness of the 'individuality of Consciousness' and 'creation of the universe'.[36] The proof of the existence of Brahman being only 'realization of Brahman', Śaṅkara recognized the need for faculties of realization like intellect, physical body, etc., without which Brahman-realization is impossible.[37] According to him, it is not possible for Brahman to have all these faculties by Itself. Therefore, there is a need to conceive of Brahman which is unconditioned to be conditioned as the individual self possessed of the faculties of realization so that it can realise itself as identical with Brahman.

The advaitins must necessarily maintain that Brahman individuates itself into the *jīvas. Advaita Vedānta* requires this in order to establish the existence of Brahman. For, Brahman cannot reveal Itself to Itself and as a matter of fact, it may not be necessary for Brahman to reveal Itself to Itself. Without the individual self, the idea of the existence of Brahman becomes only a matter of faith which can never be known by man by any means such as realization, save through the *Upaniṣads*.

Now, in the light of the foregoing, it is necessary for one to examine whether the advaitic concept of individual self could stand the test of both reason and experience. Especially so, due to the vulnerability of the concept of the beginninglessness of the contact between Consciousness and intellect which is based on mere faith. That the concept of *jīva* in *Advaita Vedānta* is riddled with contradictions can be shown in the following arguments.

4. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CONCEPT OF *JĪVA* IN *ADVAITA VEDĀNTA*

4.1. Sarvajñatva of Īśvara vis a vis Avivekatva

According to Śaṅkara, *jīva* is a complex of both the Identifier and the Identified. The Identifier is *Īśvaracaitanya*[38] and the Identified is the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa).* Śaṅkara neither calls *Īśvaracaitanya per se* as *jīva* nor the *antaḥkaraṇa* by itself as *jīva. Jīva* comes into existence only when *Īśvaracaitanya* identifies itself with the *antaḥkaraṇa.* This identity is caused by ignorance (*avidyā*).[39] *Avidyā* is in the form of non-discrimination (*aviveka*) between the real nature of the Identifier and that of the Identified. Śaṅkara is of the view that *jīva* gets liberated from such ignorance only when it realizes its original nature as identical with that of Brahman.

It is stated that *avivekatva* is the cause of *jīvatva.*[40] If this be so, whose *aviveka* is this?[41] Does it belong to *Īśvaracaitanya* or the *antaḥkaraṇa*? It cannot belong to the *antaḥkaraṇa*[42] because the *antaḥkaraṇa* is the Identified. It is itself a product of *avidyā.* It is material by its very nature and therefore, not capable of possessing *aviveka.* Alternatively, one should accept that *aviveka* belongs to the Identifier, that is, *Īśvaracaitanya.* One may now ask the question, 'Is it possible for *Īśvara*, who is omniscient (*sarvajña*) and self luminous (*svayamprakāśa),* to possess such *avidyā* which is in the form of *aviveka*?' It appears that it is not possible.[43] For, even though the *Upaniṣads* state that after creating the bodies and the *antaḥkaraṇas, Īśvaracaitanya* enters into the cavities of the hearts of living beings,[44] we could still ask, 'When did *Īśvaracaitanya* get entangled with *avidyā*?' Did *Īśvaracaitanya* possess *avidyā* before entering the cavities of the hearts of living beings? It cannot be so. For, if non-discrimination existed in *Īśvaracaitanya* before It entered into the hearts of living beings then *Īśvara* cannot be called omniscient (*sarvajña*) and ever-liberated (*nityamukta*) since He would not have been able to discriminate Himself from His own creation. It would not have been possible for Him to enter deliberately and specifically into the cavities of the hearts of living beings. Further, *Īśvara* should have identified Himself with His creation indiscriminately and become attached to the created universe. Thus, *Īśvara* would become a *baddha*, that is, a limited agent and as a consequence, would have lost His *nityamuktatva.* Furthermore, if *Īśvara* had *aviveka* before entering into the living beings, then He cannot be all knowing (*sarvajña*). For, *aviveka* refers to lack of discriminatory knowl-

edge, and it would be contradictory to say that *sarvajña Īśvara* does not have 'knowledge' of discrimination.

Due to the above mentioned reasons, the advaitin will have to take recourse to the alternative view, namely, that *Īśvaracaitanya* could possess *avidyā* only after entering into living beings. This view too is beset with problems. For, one may ask: 'How will *sarvajña Īśvaracaitanya* suddenly get possessed of *avidyā* on entering into living beings?' *Upaniṣads* speak of the association of the intellect and *Īśvaracaitanya* even while *jīva* goes to the other world.[45] They do not expressly mention that *Īśvaracaitanya* gets entangled with *avidyā* only after entering into the bodies. It implies that such association of *avidyā* with Consciousness existed even before *Īśvaracaitanya* entered into the bodies of the living beings. However, I have already proved above that it is impossible for *Īśvaracaitanya* to possess *avidyā* before entering into the bodies of the living beings. If *avidyā* cannot exist either in the *Īśvaracaitanya* or *antaḥkaraṇa,* then, where does this *aviveka* come from? According to Śaṅkara, *avidyā* cannot also exist on its own. Therefore, the very existence of *avidyā* is impossible. Further, without *aviveka* it is not possible for *Īśvaracaitanya* to identify itself with the *antaḥkaraṇa* and without such identity, *jīvatva* of *Īśvaracaitanya* is impossible. Alternatively, setting aside the concept of *aviveka*, if one wants to believe in the *Advaita* view that *jīvacaitanya* is identical with *Īśvaracaitanya* and is distinct from the body, then one has to accept that *Īśvaracaitanya* deliberately identifies Itself with the *antaḥkaraṇa* and becomes *jīva*. If *jīvatva* is due to *Īśvara*'s deliberate assumption then liberation (*mokṣa*) for *jīva* cannot be left to its own choice and efforts. It will have to depend on *Īśvara.* Such a position will not be acceptable to Śaṅkara. All these arguments go to prove that the advaitin's concepts of *jīva* and *avidyā* are unsustainable.

4.2. Anāditva *of* Sṛṣṭi *and* Jīvatva

According to Śaṅkara, *Īśvara* makes use of the merit and demerit of *jīvas* in order to achieve variety in creation.[46] But, it is only after the first creation, depending on the diversification into bodies, etc., that merit and demerit arising out of work (*karmaphala*) could be possible. For, one can perform *karma* only in this world and it is possible only after the first diversified creation. However. Śaṅkara takes *karmaphala* as the cause of the diversified creation. This position leads to the fallacy of mutual dependence, namely, it is only after creation that results of work, depending on the diversification into bodies, etc., could be possible, and the diversification into bodies could be possible only due, to the results of work. Śaṅkara tries to resolve this problem by saying that, the defect, namely, the fallacy of mutual dependence, arises only if transmigration has a beginning. He explains that the transmigratory state has no beginning and therefore, there is nothing contradictory for the fruits of work and the variety in creation to act as cause and effect to each other on the analogy of the seed and the sprout.[47]

Śaṅkara gives the reasons for the beginninglessness of the transmigratory existence. One such reason is, had it emerged capriciously all of a sudden, then there would have been the predicament of freed souls also being reborn here, and also the contingency of results accruing from non-existing causes, for the differences in happiness and misery would have no logical explanation.[48] Śaṅkara argues that if creation is conceived as beginningless, then, the fallacy of mutual dependence does not arise even as in the case of the seed and the sprout, and hence there will be no defect.[49] In other words, Śaṅkara cannot offer a logical explanation for causality between *karma* and *sṛṣṭi* without seeking recourse to faith in the beginninglessness of *jīva* and *sṛṣṭi.* Faith, because Śaṅkara cannot rationally prove the *anāditva* of *jīva* and *sṛṣṭi.* That the state of transmigration has no beginning is only an assumption made by Śaṅkara. Perhaps Śaṅkara was forced into the assumption of the *anāditva* of transmigratory existence for filling up a gap in his arguments. Unless the concept of *anāditva* could be rationally proved, other concepts in *Advaita Vedānta* cannot be explained.

Now one may raise the question as to what Śaṅkara means by saying that the transmigratory existence is *anādi*? Does he mean that *jīva* and *sṛṣṭi* do not have a beginning at all? Or does he mean that the beginning of the first creation is not known because of innumerable past cycles of creation?

Śaṅkara appears to believe that *jīva* and *sṛṣṭi* do not have a beginning at all.[50] But, it is contradictory to say that *jīva* and *sṛṣṭi* do not have a beginning. For, according to Śaṅkara, everything other than *jīva* has origination.[51] But the whole of creation, namely, *sṛṣṭi*, originated from Brahman. Logically speaking, whatever is created should have a beginning. Therefore, *sṛṣṭi* also must have had a beginning. As for the *jīva,* Śaṅkara holds the view that it has not been created. For, he thinks that *jīva* is nothing other than Brahman. For Śaṅkara, *jīva*'s non-creation must also imply its beginninglessness. Even if one were to accept this view of Śaṅkara

on *jīva's anāditva*, one cannot, yet, accept his view on *sṛṣṭi*. For creation necessarily implies a beginning.

If *anāditva* can be denied of *sṛṣṭi*, then one is also compelled to re-examine its tenability in respect of *jīva*. According to Śaṅkara, *jīva* is a complex of the unoriginated Brahman and the originated[52] adjunct, that is, intellect. *Jīva*, while in transmigratory existence cannot be identical with Brahman. If *jīva* is identical with Brahman always in all levels of existence, only then *jīva* can be accepted as beginningless. But once this view is accepted, then one cannot differentiate *jīva* from Brahman. There will then be *jīvatva* for Brahman which, according to the advaitins cannot be. Therefore, the advaitin needs to separate *jīva* from Brahman. Beginningless Brahman cannot become *jīva* unless there is an adjunct and any adjunct must have a beginning. Since, an originated adjunct is involved in *jīva*, and un-originated Brahman cannot become Himself a *jīva* without adjunct, *jīva* must have a beginning.

If Śaṅkara still argues that *jīva* has no beginning because texts speak of its eternality,[53] then he has to accept that Brahman has been eternally in the form of *jīvas*. It implies that it is only the universe which undergoes the process of creation, sustenance and destruction. This position appears similar to the *Sāṁkhya* philosophy and, therefore, it cannot be acceptable for Advaitins. Also, it is illogical to say that there exists an un-originated soul which has as its ingredient an originated adjunct, namely, intellect. Thus, one must accept that *jīva* must have a beginning.

The other view, namely, that *jīva* and *sṛṣṭi* are *anādi* because the beginning of the first creation is not known due to innumerable past cycles of creation, is also not convincing. For, the *Upaniṣads* clearly describe the details of the first creation. It is stated in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* that in the beginning, before creation, there was only Existence, one without a second.[54] This statement implies that there was at least one instant, namely, before creation, when Brahman existed as It was without any qualities such as the merit and demerit of the *jīvas*. Another statement, namely, 'It thought why can't I be many and created—,'[55] shows that there was a state of Brahman without creation and then creation began with *ākāśa*, etc. Thus, even according to the *Upaniṣads*, creation must have had a beginning. It follows from this that *jīva*, whose coming into existence depends on the created *antaḥkaraṇa*, must also have a beginning. The advaitin's argument for *anāditva* of creation and *jīva* is thus proved to stand on flimsy grounds.

4.3. Partless Non-dual Brahman and Partial Creation

According to Śaṅkara, at the time of first creation Brahman had transformed partly into the universe.[56] For he says, 'The *Upaniṣads* prove both the facts for Brahman—the non-transformation of Brahman as a whole and partlessness.'[57] But, this position of Śaṅkara is fallible. For, if Brahman is *one, non-dual* and *partless* and It wished to *become* many, then It must have transformed Itself completely into this universe.

Against the arguments for a total transformation of Brahman in creation, Śaṅkara contends: 'Do not bring those things within the range of argumentation which are beyond thought. The nature of a thing beyond thought consists in its being other than the thing within Nature.'[58] But while Śaṅkara thus criticizes the other philosophical systems for rationalizing the existence of metaphysical entities, he conveniently ignores his own prohibitive injunction and brings all metaphysical concepts into the fold of reasoning. If any philosophical stand is irrational then one should reject the same. Śaṅkara claims that all the other systems maintain irrational philosophical positions, and so, he rejects them all. Similarly Śaṅkara's own philosophical position, namely, 'partless Brahman gets partly transformed into universe' is also irrational and therefore, should be rejected outright.

Just because Śaṅkara states that it is possible for Brahman to have partial transformation while being partless, one need not accept it. Because it is an open contradiction. If an advaitin insists on the power of Brahman to have partial transformation, then, he should accept the fact that Brahman is not partless. To say both that Brahman has partial transformation and is also partless is, again, a blatant contradiction.

4.3.1. Entry of Untransformed Brahman into the Bodies

If an advaitin says that Brahman had completely transformed Itself into the world, then nothing would remain of It and hence Its entering into the cavities of the hearts of living beings as *jīva* would be rendered impossible. With this, all the identity formulae such as, 'I am Brahman' would also become absurd.

Alternatively, if it is contended by the advaitin that only one part of Brahman got transformed into the world and that the remaining part, in its entirety, became the *jīvas*,[59] he can yet be questioned. For, this position as such implies that the whole creation stands divided into two basic categories, namely, (i) World; and (ii) Consciousness in the body (*jīva*). This categorization appears similar to the well-known dualism of Kapila in his

Sāṁkhyasūtra. However, to be in the same group with Kapila must be anathema to the advaitin. For, a major portion of *Vedāntasūtra* devotes itself to refuting *Sāṁkhya* view by making *Sāṁkhya* philosophy as the prime wrestler (*pradhāna malla*).

The above arguments have proved that Śaṅkara's faith in the partial transformation of partless Brahman is unreasonable and, therefore, to be rejected. There will not arise any question regarding the untransformed Brahman after creation, because, such a view is nonsensical and impossible. Further, since the concept of *jīva* in *Advaita Vedānta* is based on such an impossible untransformed Brahman, one can reject the same.

4.4. Brahmacaitanya *is Not the Source of* Jīvacaitanya

In *Advaita Vedānta, jīva*, could be understood in two ways: (i) Non-functional; and (ii) Functional. As non-functional, *jīva* is defined as Consciousness conditioned by *avidyā* (*Avidyā avacchinnacaitanyam jīvaḥ*). As the functional, *jīva* is defined as Consciousness conditioned by the *antaḥkaraṇa* (*Antaḥkaraṇa avacchinnacaitanyam jīvaḥ*). One can understand from the advaitin's definitions of *jīva* as non-functional and functional that there are three principles in it: (i) *Caitanya*, (ii) *Avidyā* and (iii) *Antaḥkaraṇa.*[60]

Advaitins believe that *Jīvacaitanya* is identical with *Brahmacaitanya*. For, in the process of creation *Brahmacaitanya* directly enters into the bodies as *Jīvacaitanya.*[61] The advaitin's view that *Brahmacaitanya* is the source of *Jīvacaitanya* can be criticized as follows.

4.4.1. Thinking Capability and Caitanya: *An Argument*

Consciousness (*caitanya*) in *Advaita Vedānta* needs to be understood from two perspectives: (i) *Jīvacaitanya;* and (ii) *Brahmacaitanya.* Competency for thinking is very essential for Consciousness in *Advaita Vedānta.* For, as the pure Brahman, Consciousness cannot create the universe and become many without thinking. As *jīva*, Consciousness cannot enjoy *jīvatva* without thinking. The argument here is: Since, according to Śaṅkara, *Jīvacaitanya* and *Brahmacaitanya* are identical, their thinking modalities should also be the same. If there is any difference between the thinking capabilities of *Jīvacaitanya* and *Brahmacaitanya*, then *jīva* and Brahman cannot be identical. Further, if the difference in the thinking capabilities of *jīva* and Brahman can be established, then it will strengthen my later argument (referred to in the section: Is the Direct Presence of Brahman Necessary to Make a Human-body Conscious?) that the conscious

antaḥkaraṇa obviates the necessity of Brahman's entering into the bodies to make them conscious. Let us now examine whether the thinking capabilities of *jīva* and Brahman are the same.

The thinking potentiality of *jīva*, is proved by the fact that it is revealed in one's personal experience. The *Upaniṣads* also speak about it.[62] The non-functional *Jīvacaitanya* (*Prājña*) can be identified with the state of deep sleep (*suṣupti*), whereas the functional state of the same is identified with the states of waking (*jāgrat*) and dream (*svapna*). It is said in *Advaita Vedānta* that *suṣupti* is the cause and the functional states are the effects.[63]

As pure *Jīvacaitanya, jīva* cannot think or act in his non-functional state (*suṣupti*). This state is defined as Consciousness conditioned by *avidyā.* When *avidyā* gives rise to its effect, that is, the *antaḥkaraṇa, jīva* starts thinking and acting. This shows that *jīva* in its pure state, being devoid of the *antaḥkaraṇa* cannot think or act. *Avidyā* in *suṣupti* is said to conceal the real nature of *Jīvacaitanya* and in the functional state, it not only conceals the real nature of *Jīvacaitanya* but also projects the false multitude to the *jīva.*

Now, let us examine the thinking potentiality of *Brahmacaitanya* in order to see whether it is identical with that of *Jīvacaitanya.* As in the case of *jīva*, there are two states of *Brahmacaitanya*: (i) *Brahmacaitanya* after *pralaya* or before creation; and (ii) *Brahmacaitanya* at the time of creation. The first state is a state of non-function and the second a state of function. In other words, the first one is a state of non-thinking and the second, a state of thinking.

The advaitins say that even as *Jīvacaitanya* has *avidyā*, *Brahmacaitanya* too has its inherent power called *māyā.* According to the advaitins, *māyā* cannot conceal from *Īśvara* His true nature as *Brahmacaitanya.*[64] It is accepted by the advaitins that *māyā* is a common factor to both *Brahmacaitanya* and *Īśvaracaitanya*. But, unlike in the case of the *Jīvacaitanya,* a material product like *antaḥkaraṇa* is not spoken of in the case of *Īśvara* to explain His thought to create. We can now raise the question: What is it that makes *Īśvaracaitanya* to think and create? The answer cannot be that it is *māyā*. For, *māyā* was associated with the pure Brahman, even before creation.

One should observe that in the case of *Jīvacaitanya, avidyā* is the cause and *antaḥkaraṇa*, the effect of *avidyā* is instrumental for thinking. There is difference in form between *avidyā* and *antaḥkaraṇa*, for, *avidyā* is the inherent power of *Caitanya* and *antaḥkaraṇa* is the product of subtle elements.[65] In the case of *Brahmacaitanya,* for It to become many, think-

ing is a *sine qua non.* But in spite of *māyā* being accepted as Its inherent power the production of an instrument to think like the *antaḥkaraṇa* in the case of *jīva,* is not mentioned in the Upaniṣadic texts. Brahman should, therefore, remain the same in both the thinking and non-thinking states. That is *Brahmacaitanya* in Its non-functional state had unchanging Consciousness with unchanging *māyā* and in Its functional state also had the same unchanging Consciousness with unchanging *māyā.* In other words, both the states of *Brahmacaitanya* are not different from each other.

It follows that, in *Advaita Vedānta,* one can only maintain: Either *Brahmacaitanya* is in constant non-function which leads to the impossibility of creation (*sṛṣṭi*) or *Brahmacaitanya* is in constant function which leads to the impossibility of dissolution (*pralaya*). In the case of the *jīva, avidyā* gives rise to *antaḥkaraṇa,* resulting in thinking. But in the case of Brahman, *māyā* does not give rise to any such instrument. Yet Brahman (as *Īśvara*) thinks and creates. This proves the fact that *Brahmacaitanya* is different from *Jīvacaitanya.* Such a position may also lead to a further conclusion, unpalatable though it may be to the advaitins, that *Brahmacaitanya* is not the source of *Jīvacaitanya.*

4.4.2. Argument from the Inherent Power of Caitanya

The advaitins argue that *Brahmacaitanya* is identical with *Jīvacaitanya.* But, whereas *māyā,* the power of Brahman only projects the universe in the case of Brahman, with *jīva,* the corresponding power of *avidyā,* both conceals the reality as well as projects the apparent world. If Brahman and *jīva* are identical this should not be so. The question to be answered now is why does the concealing power of *māyā* not operate in the case of Brahman?

If advaitins accept the influence of the concealing power of *māyā* on Brahman, then Brahman becomes ignorant like *jīva* and loses His omniscient power. If they say that the concealing power of *māyā* does not exist at all, then *jīva* must always be considered to be on par with Brahman and to possess omniscient power. *Jīva* loses his *alpajñatva* and becomes ever liberated. If they say that the concealing power of *māyā* emerges due to the *Brahmacaitanya*'s wish to enter into the cavities of the hearts of living beings, then it becomes a deliberate move to become *jīvā* and therefore, there will not be any need for liberation. The position, namely, emergence of the *āvaraṇaśakti* of *māyā* only in *jīva* is untenable because an advaitin should explain the reason for its suppression in the case of *Īśvara.* Such reasons are not found in *Advaita Vedānta.* Therefore, *māyā* and *avidyā,*

the inherent powers of *Brahmacaitanya* and *Jīvacaitanya* respectively, must be construed to be different.

If an advaitin claims that *māyā* and *avidyā* are different from each other, then *Brahmacaitanya* and *jīvacaitanya* become different and therefore, cannot be identical. For, *Caitanya* is non-dual, and *māyā* as its inherent power can also be only non-dual. Hence it cannot be accepted that It acquires a different inherent power all of a sudden. If *avidyā,* which cannot have existence apart from *Jīvacaitanya,* is different from *māyā,* which cannot have existence apart from *Brahmacaitanya,* then *Jīvacaitanya* must be different from *Brahmacaitanya.* Therefore, it has to be accepted that *Brahmacaitanya* cannot be the source of *Jīvacaitanya.*

4.4.3. Īśvaracaitanya *is Not the Source of* Jīvacaitanya

Brahman is defined[66] as Consciousness (*Dṛk*) associated with *māyā.* Similarly, *Īśvara* is defined[67] in *Advaita Vedānta* as Consciousness (*Dṛk*) conditioned by *māyā.* These definitions imply that the difference between the two lies only in the conditioning by *māyā.* Before entering into the main question of whether *Īśvaracaitanya* is the source of *Jīvacaitanya,* it is necessary for us to get a proper perspective of the nature of *māyā* and how it conditions *Brahmacaitanya.*

Is *māyā* a separate entity? According to the advaitins *māyā* is not an independent and separate entity. *Māyā* is said to be the inherent power of *Caitanya.* It is said by the advaitins that *māyā* is indefinable either as *sat* or as *asat.* Since *māyā* is perceived in the form of the universe, it cannot be *asat* and since it is sublated by the knowledge of Reality, it cannot be *sat.* Therefore, *māyā* is said to be *sadasadanirvacanīya.*

Now, if we can establish that the role of *māyā* when it is with *Īśvara* is different from its role in the case of the *jīva,* then the fundamental difference between *Īśvara* and *Jīva* would stand proved. We can, then extend the argument to prove that *Īśvaracaitanya* is not the source of *Jīvacaitanya.*

What was the ontological status of *māyā* when Brahman got transformed into *Īśvara*? Was *māyā asat, sat* or *sadasadanirvacanīya*? Since there was nothing apart from *Brahmacaitanya* before the advent of *Īśvara* or before the creation of the universe, *māyā* could not have been there. This position may lead one to infer the non-existence of *māyā* because of the non-appearance of the multitude. But one has to infer the existence of *māyā* from the above position, for the reasons such as: (i) Brahman becoming *Īśvara* implies the existence of *māyā* in Brahman; and (ii) Creation of the universe from *Īśvara* also implies the existence of *māyā*

in *Īśvara*. Even when *Brahmacaitanya* exists in the form of *Īśvaracaitanya, māyā* continues to exist, even though *Īśvara*, as *sarvajñātman,* is not affected by it. Thus *māyā* cannot be *asat*, but can only be *sat.* If it is *sat,* then it cannot be *sadasadanirvacanīya*.

When *māyā* is accepted as *sat*, then a problem arises. If *māyā* is accepted as a separate *sat* apart from *Brahmacaitanya*, then the non-duality of Brahman suffers. Hence, *māyā* cannot be accepted as a separate entity by the advaitins. Then, what is the ontological status of *māyā* when Brahman got transformed into *Īśvara*? At the best one can say that *māyā* is the power of *Caitanya.* Thus, when this power of *Caitanya* is in a static condition then *Caitanya* is called Brahman and when it is dynamic, then *Caitanya* is called *Īśvara.*

In the light of the foregoing discussion about Brahman's transformation into *Īśvara* through the conditioning by *māyā*, let us now enquire into the advaitin's version of the process of creation, namely, the coming into being of the world and *jīvas*. I shall be showing that the advaitin's account is riddled with contradictions.

According to the advaitins, *Īśvaracaitanya* first got transformed into the universe and later entered into the living beings as *jīvas.* This implies that a '*part*' of *Īśvaracaitanya* became the world when another '*part*' remained untransformed and that this untransformed '*part*' later became the *jīvas*. But to talk of *Īśvara* in terms of parts, should, in the first place, be blasphemous to the basic advaitic tenet of a partless *Īśvara.*

The advaitin, in order to avoid the above difficulty, must accept that there was simultaneous creation of universe and *jīvas*. This position goes against the upaniṣadic statement, according to which *Īśvara* entered into the bodies '*after*' creating them. The advaitic interpretation of the *Upaniṣads* implies that the untransformed *Īśvaracaitanya* would remain static for some time, because, until there was creation of bodies, the question of *Īśvaracaitanya*'s gaining entry into the bodies would not arise. Such untransformed *Īśvaracaitanya* must be viewed as Brahman with static *māyā*. This position leads to the conclusion that Brahman is not non-dual. Further, since Brahman with static *māyā* could be associated only with the state prior to creation, the advaitins view leads to the absurd and contradicting position of accepting creation and non-creation at the same time in one and the same Reality. A total transformation of *Īśvaracaitanya* is also not possible. For that would leave the world and the *jīvas* without an *Īśvara.* The above arguments, by disproving the advaitin's version of creation, have, in effect, also established the fallacious nature of their theory that *Īśvaracaitanya* is the source of *Jīvacaitanya.*

4.5. Is the Direct Presence of Brahman Necessary to Make a Human-body Conscious?

The advaitic view regarding the presence of Brahman in a living being, could be proved erroneous through a more radical argument. We shall now argue that for explaining the consciousness in a living being, the positing of the direct presence of Brahman in it, is redundant.

The advaitin supposes that, that which is created is insentient and is not conscious.[68] But in the case of a living being, inspite of its being constituted by a body, which is insentient, we find that it has awareness. This strange combination of sentience and insentience in one being is rather puzzling. Yet, to explain this by the direct presence of Brahman in the living being, as the advaitin does, is not acceptable. An examination of the process of creation would reveal to us why this is so.

According to Śaṅkara, Brahman, in the beginning created ether (*ākāśa*) from out of Itself. Brahman, as consciousness, having the potentiality to wish, had '*wished*' to create ether in the beginning. For Śaṅkara, Brahman had not completely transformed into ether. There remained a portion of Brahman untransformed. This makes ether as not all-pervasive.[69] Then, the subsequent process of creation, namely, creation of air, etc., could not have been out of the untransformed portion of Brahman after creation of ether, because, as per Śaṅkara's view, that portion of *Brahmacaitanya* was required to make *jīva* after creation. And there was no other portion of Brahman left behind to create air, etc. Hence, the further process of creation could not have been effected by Brahman. The *Upaniṣad*[70] too states that the further process of creation occurs from ether itself. In the *Chāndogyopaniṣad,* it is stated that fire '*willed.*' Similarly in the *Taittirīopaniṣad* it is mentioned that from ether, air is produced. Such upaniṣadic statements reveal that the subtle elements such as ether or fire had capacity to '*wish*' and '*create.*' If sentience is attributed to Brahman only because of Its having the potentiality to '*wish*' and '*create*'[71] then, for the same reason, such sentience should be attributed to the elements such as ether, etc., also.

An advaitin may object to the above and say that the words, namely, ether, etc., do not denote the elements but refer only to the deities. But we can still ask him to explain whether these deities are '*created*' or not. Even if they are deities, the above argument for the conscious nature of the products of Brahman holds good because, these so called deities are also '*created*' from Brahman and have competence for '*willing*' and '*creating*'.[72] The advaitin must, therefore, concede that the role of Brahman in

creation begins and ends with the creation of ether. Further, in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* and *Chāndogyopaniṣad* it is mentioned that ether created air, air created fire,[73] fire wished to create water, water wished to create earth.[74] These verses clearly show that all the subtle elements were conscious because they had potentiality to '*wish*' and '*create*.'

Śaṅkara opines that the senses and mind are created by the elements.[75] Since the internal organ is created by the conscious elements (food)[76] it must also be of the nature of consciousness having the potentiality to '*wish*' and '*create*'. In other words, any product in the process of creation, at least at its subtle level, should be conscious in nature. This, in its turn leads to the necessity of accepting the following:

(i) Some kind of conscious materialism; and
(ii) The conscious internal organ itself is sufficient to make a living body conscious and conduct all activities.

Let us now examine the first of the above positions. As we have seen already, in the process of creation all subtle elements ought to be conscious. The Advaitin's account of further creation after the creation of five elements is not much different from that of the *Cārvāka* system. Because, advaitins believe in the theory of *pancīkaraṇa* which advocates the combination of the five elements. *Cārvākas* also believe in the idea of combination of elements in the process of creation. But, the more important point is that the advaitin who always swear by the *Śruti*, must, as already shown above, accept that there is no need of Brahman in the process of creation after the coming into being of ether. But, by such an acceptance, the advaitins almost fall in line with the *Cārvākas* who do not have any place for Brahman at any stage in creation.

Conscious nature of elements necessitates the acceptance of the view that the conscious internal organ itself is sufficient to make a living body conscious and conduct all activities. Since the internal organ is the product of conscious elements, it also has to be conscious with the potentiality to create and wish, it itself is sufficient to make a living body conscious. If this position is accepted, then, the advaitin's notion of the direct presence of Brahman in the living body can be discarded.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The arguments in the foregoing section have established the following conclusions which go to prove that Śaṅkara's concept of *jīva* is untenable:

Aviveka as the cause of the coming into being of the *jīva* has no locus. It cannot exist either in *Īśvaracaitanya* or in the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Nor can it exist on its own. It cannot also be accepted that *Īśvaracaitanya* deliberately identifies itself with the *antaḥkaraṇa* and becomes *jīva*. For, this makes the concept of *mokṣa* in *Advaita Vedānta* absurd.

The *anāditva* of *jīva* and *sṛṣṭi* advocated by Śaṅkara is also not acceptable.

Śaṅkara's account of *sṛṣṭi* speaks of Brahman's transforming Itself partially into the world and also entering into the hearts of living beings. This view has been refuted on the grounds of impossibility of partial transformation of Brahman.

Neither *Brahmacaitanya* nor *Īśvaracaitanya* can be the source of *jīvacaitanya*. This is due to an essential difference in the nature of *jīva* and *Īśvara*.

There is no need to assume the presence of *Brahmacaitanya* in the *jīva* to account for the latter's conscious nature. The *antaḥkaraṇa* itself could be the ground for consciousness in *jīva*. For, the *antaḥkaraṇa* is not insentient as held by Śaṅkara. Rather it is conscious by itself.

ABBREVIATIONS

Text	*Abbreviation*
(1) ***Śrī Śaṅkaragranthāvaḷiḥ, Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*** Samata Books, Madras, 1983.	*SSBB*
(2) ***Śrī Śaṅkaragranthāvaḷiḥ, Bhagavadgītā Bhāṣya*** Samata Books, Madras, 1983.	*BGSB*
(3) ***Īśādidaśopaniṣadaḥ,*** ***(Ten principal Upaniṣads with Śaṅkarabhāṣya)*** *Śrī Śaṅkarācāryagranthāvaliḥ, Prathamo Bhāgaḥ* Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, Reprinted, 1992	
Chāndogyopaniṣad	*CUP*
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad	*BUP*
Kaṭhopaniṣad	*KUP*
Taittirīyopaniṣad	*TUP*
Muṇḍakopaniṣad	*MUP*
Praśnopaniṣad	*PUP*
Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad Gauḍapādakārikā	*MGK*
Aitareyopaniṣad	*AUP*
(4) Bellaṁkoṇḍa Rāmarāya kavi, ***Śrī Śaṅkarāśaṅkarabhāṣyavimarśaḥ,*** Published by Kavita Venkatasubrahmanyasastri, Śrī Rāmakavitāgranthamālāsampādakaḥ,	*BV*

Text	*Abbreviation*
Narasaraopet, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh, India, 1953	
(5) Bellaṁkoṇḍa Rāmarāya kavi, ***Vedāntasaṅgrahaḥ*** Published by Kavita Venkatasubrahmanyasastri, Śrī Rāmakavitāgranthamālāsampādakaḥ, Narasaraopet, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh, India, (Sādhāraṇanāma samvatsaram).	*VS*

Notes and References

1. Henceforth I will be using the term '*jīva*' interchangeably with 'individual self'.
2. *Iha dehavyatiriktasya ātmanaḥ sadbhāvaḥ samarthyate, bandhamokṣādhikārasiddhaye;* (*SSBB*, 3.3.53, p.698)
   — dehavyatiriktasya ātmano astitvamucyate—(*SSBB*, 3.3.53, p.699)
   Dehamātraṁ Caitanyaviśiṣṭamātmeti prākṛtā janā laukāyatikāśca pratipannāḥ| Indriyaṇyeva cetanānyātmetyapare| Mana ityante| Vijñānamātraṁ kṣaṇikamityeke| Śūnyamityapare| Asti dehādivyatiriktaḥ saṁsārī kartā bhoktetyapare| Bhoktaiva kevalam na kartetyeke| Asti tadvyatirikta Īśvaraḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvaśaktiriti kecit| Ātmā sa bhokturityapare| Evam bahavo vipratipannā yuktivākyatadābhāsa samāśrayāḥ santaḥ| (*SSBB*, 1.1.1, p.9)
3. Even among these systems, while theistic schools like *Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita,* etc., make the *jīva* dependent on God, other systems like the *Sāṁkhya* consider the individual self to be independent. For, the *Sāṁkhya* system, at least as it existed before Īśvarakṛṣṇa, did not recognize God.
4. *Śāstraphalasaṁbandhopapatteḥ| Śarīrānuvināśini hi jīvo śarīrāntaragateṣṭāniṣṭaprāpti parihārārthau vidhipratiṣedhāvanarthakau syātām|* (*SSBB*, 2.3.16, p.445)
   Iha dehavyatiriktasya ātmanaḥ sadbhāvaḥ samarthyate, bandhamokṣādhikārasiddhaye; na hi asati dehavyatirikta ātmani paralokaphalāścodanā upapadyeran; kasya vā brahmātmatvamupadiśyeta| (*SSBB*, 3.3.53, p.698)
5. *So akāmayata* (*TUP*, 2.6, p.296)
   (*Bhāṣya*): *Kāmayitṛtvāt| Na hi Kāmayitracetanamasti loke| Sarvajñe hi brahmetyavocāma| Ataḥ kāmayitṛtvopapattiḥ|* (p.298)
6. *Tadaikṣata* (CUP, 6.2.3, p.509)
   (*Bhāṣya*): *Tatsadaikṣatekṣāṁ darśanaṁ kṛtavat| Ataśca na pradhānaṁ Sāṁkhyaparikalpitaṁ jagatkāraṇam| Pradhānasya acetanatvābhyupagamāt| Idaṁ tu saccetanamīkṣitṛtvāt| (Ibid.)*
7. *Sa īkṣata* (*AUP*, 1.1.1, p.329)
   (Bhāṣya): Sa sarvajñasvābhāvyāt ātmā ekaḥ eva sannīkṣata lokānnusṛjā iti| (*Ibid.*, p.330)

8. *Sattveva somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam* (*CUP*, 6.2.2, p.508)
   Tadaikṣata bahu syāṁ prajāyeyeti tattejo asṛjata tatteja ekṣata bahu syāṁ prajāyeyeti tadapo asṛjata| Tasmādyatra kvaca śocati svedate vā puruṣastejasa eva tadadhyāpo jāyante| (*CUP*, 6.2.3, p.509)
   Tā āpa ekṣanta bahvyaḥ syāma prajāyemahīti tā annamasṛjanta tasmādhyatra kva ca varṣati tadeva bhūyiṣṭamannaṁ bhavatyadbhya eva tadadhyannādyaṁ jāyate|
   (*CUP*, 6.2.4, p.510)
9. *Śabdaścobhayamapi brahmaṇaḥ pratipādayati—akṛtsnaprasaktiṁ niravayavatvaṁ ca* (*SSBB*, 2.1.27, p.335)
10. *Seyaṁ devataikṣata hantāhamimāstistro devatā anena jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇīti|* (*CUP*, 6.3.2, p.512)
11. *Kaṭhavallīṣveva paṭhyate—'Ṛtam pibantau sukṛtasya loke guhāṁ praviṣṭau parame parārdhe| Chāyātapau brahmavido vadanti pañcāgnayo ye ca triṇāciketāḥ' iti| Tatra saṁśayaḥ—kimiha buddhijīvau nirdiṣṭau, uta jīva paramātmānāviti|* (*SSBB*, 1.2.11, p.106)
    —Brūmaḥ—Vijñānātmaparamātmānāvihocyeyātāṁ| Kasmāt? Ātmānau hi tāvubhāvapi cetanau samānasvabhāvau| (*Ibid.*, p.108)
    Aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣo antarātmā sadā janānāṁ hṛdaye sanniviṣṭaḥ| (*KUP*, 2.3.17, p.104)
    (Bhāṣya): Idānīṁ sarvavallyarthopasaṁhārāthamāha—aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣo antarātmā sadā janānāṁ sambandhini hṛdaye sanniviṣṭo yathā vyākhyātaḥ| (Ibid.)
12. *—parameva brahma avikṛtamupādhisaṁparkājjīvabhāvenāvatiṣṭhate;* (*SSBB*, 2.3.18, p.451)
13. *Sa vā ayamātmā brahma vijñānamayo manomayaḥ prāṇamayaścakṣurmayaḥ śrotramayaḥ—*(*BUP*, 4.4.5, p.913)
    —Brahmaṇa evāvikṛtasya sato asyaikasya anekabuddhyādimayatvam darśayati—(*SSBB*, 2.3.17, p.449)
14. *—'sa samānaḥ sannubhau lokāvanusaṁcarati'—iti ca lokāntaragamane apyaviyogaṁ buddhyā darśayati|* (*SSBB*, 2.3.30, p.463)
15. *Kena samānaḥ Tadaiva buddhayeti gamyate, saṁnidhānāt;* (*SSBB*, 2.3.30, p.463)
16. *—kāmaḥ saṅkalpo vicikitsā śraddhā aśraddhā dhṛtiradhṛtirhrīrdhīrbhīrityetatsarvaṁ mana eva—*(*BUP*, 1.5.3, p.697)
17. *Tadguṇasāratvāttu tadvyapadeśaḥ prājñavat|* (*SSBB*, 2.3.29, p.459)
18. *Tasyā buddheḥ guṇāstadguṇāḥ—Icchā dveṣaḥ sukhaṁ duḥkhamityevamādayaḥ—Tadguṇāḥ sāraḥ pradhānaṁ yasyātmanaḥ saṁsāritve saṁbhavati, sa tadguṇasāraḥ,—*(*SSBB*, 2.3.29, p.460)
19. *Trīṇyātmane akuruteti mano vācaṁ prāṇaṁ tānyātmane akurutānyatramanā abhūvaṁ nādarśamanyatra manā abhūvaṁ nāśrauṣamiti manasā hyeva paśyati manasā śṛṇoti|* (*BUP*, 1.5.3, p.697)
20. *—avatiṣṭhante saha manasā yadanugatāni, tena saṅkalpādivyāvṛttenāntaḥkaraṇena| Buddhiścādhyavasāyalakṣaṇā na viceṣṭati svavyāpāreṣu na viceṣṭate na vyāpriyate—*(*KUP*, 2.3.10, p.101)

21. *Yasmādvijñānakartṛkaṁ sarvaṁ tasmādyuktaṁ vijñānamaya ātmā brahmeti|—tasminvijñānamaye brahmaṇyabhimānaṁ kṛtvopāsata ityarthaḥ|* (*TUP*, 2.5, pp. 293–4)
22. *—prāṇaiḥ sahendriyaiścittam sarvamantaḥkaraṇaṁ prajānāmotaṁ vyāptaṁ yena kṣīramiva snehena, kāṣṭhamivāgninā|* (*MUP*, 3.1.9, p.170)
Citta ca cetanāvadantaḥkaraṇam| Cetayitavyaṁ ca tadviṣayaḥ| (PUP, 4.8, p.127)
23. *Antaḥkaraṇaṁ mano buddhirvijñānam cittamiti ca anekadhā tatra tatrābhilapyate; Kvacicca vṛttivibhāgena—saṁśayādivṛttikaṁ mana ityucyate, niścayādivṛttikaṁ buddhiriti;—*(*SSBB*, 2.3.32, p.465)
24. *Taccaivaṁ bhūtamantaḥkaraṇamavaśyamastītyabhyupagantavyam, anyathā hyanabhyupagamyamāne tasminnityopalabdhyanupalabdhi prasaṅgaḥ syāt|* (*SSBB*, 2.3.32, pp.465)
25. *—dhyāyatīva lelāyatīva sa hi—*(*BUP*, 4.3.7, p.867)
(Bhāṣya):—yato dhyāyatīva dhyānavyāpāraṁ karotīva, cintayatīva, dhyānavyāpāravatīṁ buddhiṁ sa tatsthena citsvabhāvajyotīrūpeṇāvabhāsayan tatsadṛśastatsamānaḥ sandhyāyatīva, ālokavadeva| Ato bhavati cintayatīti bhrāntirlokasya| Na tu paramārthato dhyāyati| Tathā lelāyatīva atyarthaṁ calatīva| Teṣveva karaṇeṣu buddhyādiṣu vāyuṣu ca calatsu tadavabhāsakatvāt tatsadṛśaṁ taditi lelāyatīva| Na tu paramārthataścalanadharmakaṁ tadātmajyotiḥ| (*Ibid.*, p.870)
26. *—Etaduktaṁ bhavati—nāyaṁ svato dhyāyati, nāpi calati, dhyāyantyāṁ buddhau dhyāyatīva, calantyāṁ buddhau calatīveti|* (*SSBB*, 2.3.30, p.463)
27. *Api ca mithyājñānapuraḥ saro ayamātmano buddhyupādhisaṁbandhaḥ|* (*SSBB*, 2.3.30, p.463)
28. *Na ca midhyājñānasya samyagjñānādanyatra nivṛttirastītyato yāvad brahmātmatānavabodhaḥ, tāvadayaṁ buddhyupādhisaṁbandho na śāmyati;—* (*SSBB*, 2.3.30, pp.463–4)
29. *Sattveva somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam* (*CUP*, 6.2.2, p.508)
30. *—avagatiparyantaṁ jñānam—jñānena hi pramāṇenāvagantumiṣṭaṁ Brahma|* (*SSBB*, 1.1.1, p.8)
—śrutyādayo anubhavādayaśca yathāsaṁbhavamiha pramāṇam, anubhavāvasānatvādbhūta vastuviṣayatvācca brahmajñānasya| (*SSBB*, 1.1.2, p.11)
31. *—parameva brahma avikṛtamupādhisaṁparkājjīvabhāvenāvatiṣṭhate—*(*SSBB*, 2.3.18, p.451)
32. *—tadeva cetparaṁ brahma jīvaḥ, tasmājjīvasyāpi nityacaitanyasvarūpatvamagnyauṣṇya prakāśavaditi gamyate|* (*SSBB*, 2.3.18, p.451)
33. *—dehavyatiriktasya ātmano astitvamucyate—*(*SSBB*, 3.3.53, p.699)
34. *—yathāgnivisphuliṅgayorauṣṇyam| Ato bhedābhedāvagamābhyām aṁśatvāvagamaḥ|* (*SSBB*, 2.3.43, p.479)
35. Mainly there are four theories of *jīva*, namely, (i) *Kalpanavāda* of Gauḍapāda, (ii) *Ābhāsavāda* of Sūreśvara, (iii) *Pratibimbavāda* of Sarvajñātman and Padmapāda (*Vivaraṇakāra*), and (iv) *Avacchedavāda* of Vācaspati.

(i) Gauḍapāda establishes his *Kalpanavāda* in his *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad Kārikā*, 2.16. *Jīvaṁ kalpayate pūrvaṁ tato bhāvān pṛthagvidhān| Bhāhyānādhyātmikāṁścaiva yathāvidhyastathāsmṛtiḥ|*
(ii) Sūreśvara in his *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārthika* presents *Ābhāsavāda* through the example of *Vyādharājaputra*. This theory is also supported by *Nṛsimha Uttaratāpinī Upaniṣad. Jīveśāvabhāsena karoti māyācāvihyāca svayameva bhavati.*
The *Brahmasūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.3.50, *Ābhāsa eva ca*, also represents this theory.
(iii) *Pratibimbavāda* can be found in *Brahmasūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, 3.2.18, *Ata eva copamā sūryakādivat*, and in 2.3.46, *Prakāśādivannaivaṁ paraḥ|*
(iv) *Avacchedavāda* can be traced from the *Śruti* text:
—yathā sudīptātpāvakādvispuliṅgāḥ—(*Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 2.1.1), *Smṛti* text, *Mamaivāṁśojīvaloko jīvabhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ (Bhagavadgītā*, 15.7), and *Brahmasūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.3.43, *Aṁso nānāvyapadeśāt—*
This theory can also be found in the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra* from the examples such as, *ghaṭākāśa*, etc. **Note:** Criticism of these theories is not dealt in this paper.
36. *—anāditvātsaṁsārasya—* (*SSBB*, 2.1.35, p.343)
37. *Manasaivānudraṣṭavyaṁ* (*BUP*, 4.4.19, p.927)
Dṛśyate tvagryayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā sūkṣmadarśibhiḥ (*KUP*, 1.3.12, p.82)
38. Here the terms *'Īśvaracaitanya'* and *'Īśvara'* are used interchangeably.
39. *Api ca mithyājñānapuraḥ saro ayamātmano buddhyupādhisaṁbandhaḥ|* (SSBB, 2.3.30, p.463)
40. *Idaṁ hi kartṛtvaṁ bhoktṛtvaṁ ca sattvakṣetrajñayoritaretarasvabhāvāvivekakṛtaṁkalpyate|* (*SSBB*, 1.2.12, p.111)
41. Śaṅkara in his *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 13.2, holds the view that *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*. In the same place, he raises the opponent's question, that is, whose is this *avidyā*? (*Sā avidyā kasya iti*). By way of answering this question he says that 'by whomsoever it is seen, and eventually confirms that *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā* (*Jānāsi tarhi avidyām tadvantam ca ātmānam*). All the arguments of Śaṅkara, in the above text, for the locus of *avidyā* completely depend on his assumption that there is *jīva* which is *anādi*. Śaṅkara never argues for the locus of *avidyā* independently without relying on the above presupposition. But what I am attempting here in this paper is to reject Śaṅkara's presupposition itself, namely, that there is *jīva* which is *anādi*, rather than refuting his arguments, based on his own assumption in the existence of *jīva*, for the locus of *avidyā*. I am going to repudiate the advaitic concepts, such as, *avidyā, anāditva* of *jīva* and creation, etc., in the following Sections in order to prove that there cannot exist a *jīva* as explained by Śaṅkara.
42. *Paramārthatastu nānyatarasyāpi saṁbhavati, acetanatvātsattvasya, avikriyatvācca kṣetrajñasya| Avidyāpratyupasthāpitasvabhāvatvācca sattvasya sutarāṁ na saṁbhavati|* (*SSBB*, 1.2.12, p.111)
43. *Ibid.*

44. *Kaṭhavallīṣveva paṭhyate—'Ṛtaṁ pibantau sukṛtasya loke guhāṁ praviṣṭau parame parārdhe| Chāyātapau brahmavido vadanti pañcāgnayo ye ca triṇāciketāḥ' iti| Tatra saṁśayaḥ—kimiha buddhijīvau nirdiṣṭau, uta jīva paramātmānāviti| (SSBB,* 1.2.11, p.106) *— Brūmaḥ—Vijñānātmaparamātmānāvihocyeyātām| Kasmāt? Ātmānau hi tāvubhāvapi cetanau samānasvabhāvau| (SSBB,* 1.2.11, p.108)
Aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣo antarātmā sadā janānāṁ hṛdaye sanniviṣṭaḥ| (Bhāṣya): Idānīṁ sarvavallyarthopasaṁhārārthamāha—aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣo antarātmā sadā janānāṁ sambandhini hṛdaye sanniviṣṭo yathā vyākhyātaḥ| (KUP, 2.3.17, p.104)
45. *—'sa samānaḥ sannubhau lokāvanusaṁcarati'—iti ca lokāntaragamane apyaviyogaṁ buddhyā darśayati| (SSBB,* 2.3.30, p.463).
46. *'Sadeva somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam' iti prāksṛṣṭeravibhāgāvadhāraṇānnāsti karma, yadapekṣya viṣamā sṛṣṭiḥ syāt; sṛṣṭyuttarakālaṁ hi śarīrādivibhāgāpekṣaṁ karma, karmāpekṣaśca śarīrādivibhāgaḥ—itītaretarāśrayatvaṁ prasajyeta; ato*
vibhāgādūrdhvaṁ karmāpekṣa Īśvaraḥ pravartatāṁ nāma;
prāgvibhāgādvaicitryanimittasya karmaṇo abhāvāttulyaivādyā sṛṣṭiḥ prāpnotīti cet, naiṣa doṣaḥ; anāditvātsaṁsārasya; bhavedeṣa doṣaḥ, yadyādimānayaṁ saṁsāraḥ syāt; anādau tu saṁsāre bījāṅkuravaddhetuhetumadbhāvena karmaṇaḥ sargavaiṣamyasya ca pravṛttirna virudhyate| (SSBB, 2.1.35, p. 343)
47. *anādau tu saṁsāre bījāṅkuravaddhetuhetumadbhāvena karmaṇaḥ sargavaiṣamyasya ca pravṛttirna virudhyate|*
(SSBB, 2.1.35, p.343)
48. *Upapadyate ca saṁsārasyānāditvam—ādimattve hi saṁsārasyākasmādudbhūtermuktānāmapi punaḥ saṁsārodbhūtiprasaṅgaḥ, akṛtābhyāgamakṛtavipraṇāśaprasaṅgaśca, sukhaduḥkhādivaiṣamyasya nirnimittatvāt; (SSBB,* 2.1.36, p.344)
49. *—na ca karma antareṇa śarīraṁ saṁbhavati, na ca śarīramantareṇa karma saṁbhavati—itītaretarāśrayatvaprasaṅgaḥ; anāditve tu bījāṅkuranyāyenopapatterna kaściddoṣo bhavati| (SSBB,* 2.1.36, p. 344)
50. *[Jīvaḥ]:*
Tasmādutpadyate jīva iti|| evaṁ prāpte, brūmaḥ—nātmā jīva utpadyata iti; kasmāt? aśuteḥ; na hyasyotpattiprakaraṇe śravaṇamasti bhūyaḥsu pradeśeṣu| (SSBB, 2.3.17, p.448).
—ityevamādyā nityatvavādinyaḥ satyaḥ jīvasyotpattiṁ pratibaghnanti| (Ibid., p.449) *[Sṛṣṭiḥ]:*
Upalabhyate ca saṁsārasyānāditvaṁ śrutismṛtyoḥ| śrutau tāvat—'anena jīvenātmanā' iti sargapramukhe śarīramātmānaṁ jīvaśabdena prāṇadhāraṇanimittenābhilapannanādiḥ saṁsāra iti darśayati; (SSBB, 2.1.36, p.344).
51. Here the word 'origination' is used interchangeably with 'creation'.
52. *Tadāhi śāstraṁ darśayati—'yoayaṁ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hṛdyantarjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ sa samānaḥ sannubhau lokāvanusaṁcarati dhyāyatīva lelāyatīva'*

ityādi; tatra vijñānamaya iti buddhimaya ityetaduktaṁ bhavati,—(SSBB, 2.3.30, p.463)
Idaṁ hi kartṛtvaṁ bhoktṛtvaṁ ca sattvakṣetrajñayoritaretarasvabhāvāvivekakṛtaṁ kalpyate| (SSBB, 1.2.12, p.111)
Bhavati ca bhautikatve liṅgaṁ karaṇānām—'annamayaṁ hi somya manaḥ āpomayaḥ prāṇastejomayī vāk' ityevaṁjātīyakam; (SSBB, 2.3.15, p.444)
53. *Tāḥ kāḥ śrutayaḥ?—ityevamādyā nityatvavādinyaḥ satyaḥ jīvasyotpattiṁ pratibaghnanti| (SSBB,* 2.3.17, pp.448–9)
anāditvātsaṁsārasya (SSBB, 2.1.35, p.343)
54. *Sattveva somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam (CUP,* 6.2.2, p.508)
55. *Tadaikṣata bahu syāṁ prajāyeyeti tattejo asṛjata tatteja ekṣata bahu syāṁ prajāyeyeti tadapo asṛjata| Tasmādyatra kvaca śocati svedate vā puruṣastejasa eva tadadhyāpo jāyante| (CUP,* 6.2.3, p.509).
Tā āpa ekṣanta bhahvyaḥ syāma prajāyemahīti tā annamsṛjanta tasmādhyatra kva ca varṣati tadeva bhūyiṣṭamannaṁ bhavatyadbhya eva tadadhyannādyaṁ jāyante| (CUP, 6.2.4, p.510)
56. Contrary to this view, Śaṅkara advocates beginninglessness of creation:
Upapadyatecasaṁsārasyānāditvam—ādimatve hi saṁsārasya akasmādudbhūtermuktānāmapi punaḥ saṁsārodbhūtiprasaṅgaḥ, akṛtābhyāgamakṛtavipraṇāśaprasaṅgaśca, sukhaduḥkhādivaiṣamyasya nirnimittatvāt; (SSBB, 2.1.36, p.344)
anāditvātaṁsārasya (SSBB, 2.1.35, p.343)
57. *Śabdaścobhayamapi brahmaṇaḥ pratipādayati—akṛtsnaprasaktiṁ niravayavatvaṁ ca (SSBB,* 2.1.27, p.335).
Against his own view, Śaṅkara says:—*te sarve brahmaiva—iti hīnajantūdāharaṇena sarveṣāmeva nāmarūpakṛtakāryakaraṇasaṁghātapraviṣṭānāṁ jīvānāṁ brahmatvamāha; (SSBB,* 2.3.43, p. 479)
Ato bhedābhedāvagamābhyāmaṁśatvāvagamaḥ| (Ibid.)
58. *Tathā cāhuḥ paurāṇikāḥ—'acintyāḥ khalu ye bhāvā na tāṁstarkeṇa yojayet| prakṛtibhyaḥ paraṁ yacca tadacintyasya lakṣaṇam' iti| (SSBB,* 2.1.27, p.335)
59. *Īśvaragītāsvapi ca Īśvarāṁśatvaṁ jīvasya smaryate—'mamaivāṁśo jīvaloke jīvabhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ' iti; tasmādapyaṁśatvāgamaḥ (SSBB,* 2.3.45, p.480)
60. Any theory of *jīva* in *Advaita Vedānta* requires these three principles. This paper examines only *jīvacaitanya* among these three concepts, because individual Consciousness is the key factor to decide the validity or invalidity of the concept of *jīva* in *Advaita Vedānta.* It does not deal with the criticism of different theories of *jīva* upheld by advaitins.
61. Śaṅkara in his *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya* holds the view that Brahman after creating the world entered Itself directly into the living bodies as *jīva.*
Tasmādvā etasmādātmana iti brahmanyevātmaśabdaprayogādveditṛātmaiva brahma| etamānandamayamātmānamupasaṅkrāmatīti ca ātmatāṁ darśayanti| tatprveśācca, tatsṛṣṭvā tadevānuprāviśaditi ca tasyaiva jīvarūpeṇa śarīrapraveśaṁ darśayati| ato vedituḥ svarūpaṁ brahma| (TUP, 2.1, p.284).
In the same place Śaṅkara speaks against the reflection theory. He presents possible meanings of the textual statement, that is, *tatsṛṣṭvā tadevānuprāviśat,*

and rejects them. One of the meanings that he rejected is that Brahman enters into the living bodies as a reflection.

—jalasūryakādipratibimbavatpraveśaḥ syāditi cenna| aparicchinnatvādanūrtatvācca| paricchinnasya mūrtasyānyasyānyatra prasādasvabhāvake jalādau sūryakādipratibimbodayaḥ syāt| na tvātmanaḥ, amūrtatvāt ākāśādikāraṇasyātmanaḥ vyāpakatvāt| tadviprakṛṣṭadeśapratibimbādhāravastvantarābhāvācca pratibimbavatpraveśo na yuktaḥ| (*Ibid.*, p.300)

Śaṅkara after rejecting the reflection theory says that there is a different meaning for the abovesaid statement.

Anyārthatvāt| kimarthamastāne carcā? prakṛto hyanyo vivakṣito asya vākyasārtho asti, sa smartavyaḥ,—Taddhṛttisthānīye tviha punastatsṛṣṭvā tadevānuprāviśadityucyate| (*Ibid.*, 2.6, pp. 300–301)

It is important to note that Śaṅkara contradicts his own theory presented in the *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya.* This contradiction is evident when Śaṅkara approves the reflection theory in his *Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣa.* See

—Anena jīvenātmanānupraviśyeti vacanāt| Jīvo hi nāma devatāyā ābhāsamātram| buddhyādibhūtamātrāsaṁsargajanitaḥ, ādarśe iva praviṣṭaḥ puruṣapratibimbo jalādiṣviva ca sūryādīnām| acintyānantaśaktimatyā devatāyā buddhyādisambandhaścaitanyābhāso devatāsvarūpavivekāgrahaṇanimittaḥ sukhī duḥkhī mūḍha ityādyanekavikalpapratyayahetuḥ| (*CUP*, 2.3.2, p.513).

Such contradictions are possible in Śaṅkara's theory of *jīva* because he tries to maintain the essential identity between the individual self and Brahman. One has to resort to such contradictions only in order to sustain the identity formulae, such as, 'I am Brahman.'

62. *—kāmaḥ saṅkalpo vicikitsā śraddhā aśraddhā dhṛtiradhṛtirhrīrdhīrbhirityetatsarvaṁ mana eva—*(*BUP*, 1.5.3, p.697)
63. *(Bhāṣya* on sixth mantra*): Ata eva yathoktaṁ sabhedaṁ jagat prasūyata ityeṣa yoniḥ sarvasya yata evaṁ, prabhavaścāpyayaśca prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānāmeṣa eva* (*MGK, Āgamaprakaraṇam,* Sixth mantra, p.181)
(Bhāṣya on eleventh *kārikā): kāryaṁ kriyata iti phalabhāvaḥ| kāraṇaṁ karotīti bījabhāvaḥ| tattvāgrahaṇānyathāgrahaṇābhyāṁ bījaphalabhāvābhyāṁ tau yathoktau viśvataijasau baddhau saṅgṛhītāviṣyete| prājñastu bījabhāvenaiva baddhaḥ| tattvāpratibhodhamātrameva hi bījaṁ prājñatve nimittam|* (*MGK, Āgamaprakaraṇam,* Eleventh *kārikā,* p.188)
64. *Tasmānnityajīvanmuktasya Īśvarasya ajñānāvaraṇābhāvepi ajñānavikṣepa sattvādajñānādipratibhāsostyeva—yathā jīvanmuktasya jīvasya| —Īśvarasya hi nājñānāvaraṇaṁ, kiṁtu tatkṛtavikṣepadarśanameva| Ataeveśvarasyājñānasākṣitvamuktam|* (*BV*, p.302)
65. *Bhavati ca bhautikatve liṅgaṁ karaṇānām—'annamayaṁ hi somya mana āpomayaḥ prāṇastejomayī vāk' ityevaṁjātīyakam;* (*SSBB*, 2.3.15, p.444)
—annamayaṁ hi somya mana—(*CUP*, 6.5.4, p.518)
66. *Svaprakāśatve sati svetarasarvāvabhāsakatvaṁ dṛśo lakṣaṇam|—Māyopahitā dṛk Brahma|* (*VS*, p.1)
67. *—Māyāvacchinnā tvīśvaraḥ—*(*Ibid.*)

68. —acetanatvātsattvasya—(*SSBB*, 1.2.12, p.111)
69. *Utpattyanumānasya ca darśitattvāt; anityamākāśam, anityaguṇāśrayatvāt, ghaṭādivadādityādiprayogasaṁbhavācca; ātmanyanaikāntikamiti cet, na; tasyaupaniṣadaṁ pratyanityaguṇāśrayatvāsiddheḥ; vibhutvādīnāṁ ca ākāśasyotpattivādinaṁ pratyasiddhatvāt|* (*SSBB*, 2.3.7, p.434)
70. *—tasmādvā etasmādātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ| ākāśādvāyuḥ| vāyoragniḥ| agnerāpaḥ| adbhyaḥ pṛthivī|* — (*TUP*, 2.1, pp.280–1).
(Bhāṣya):—tasmādetasmādbrahmaṇa ātmasvarūpādākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ samutpannaḥ| ākāśo nāma śabdaguṇo avakāśakaro mūrtadravyāṇām| tasmādākāśātsvena sparśaguṇena pūrveṇa ca ākāśaguṇena śabdena dviguṇo vāyuḥ| sambhūta ityanuvartate| vāyośca svena rūpaguṇena pūrvābhyāṁ ca triguṇo agniḥ sambhūtaḥ| agneśca svena rasaguṇena pūrvaiśca tribhiścaturguṇā āpaḥ sambhūtāḥ| adbyaḥ svena gandhaguṇena pūrvaiścaturbhiḥ pañcaguṇā pṛthivī sambhūtā (p.287).
71. *So akāmayata* (*TUP*, 2.6, p.296)
Na hi Kāmayitracetanamasti loke| Sarvajñe hi brahmetyavocāma| Ataḥ kāmayitṛtvopapattiḥ| (*Ibid.*, p.298)
Tadaikṣata (*CUP*, 6.2.3, p.509)
(Bhāṣya): Tatsadaikṣatekṣāṁ darśanaṁ kṛtavat| Ataśca na pradhānaṁ Sāṁkhyaparikalpitaṁ jagatkāraṇaṁ| Pradhānasya acetanatvābhyupagamāt| Idaṁ tu saccetanamīkṣitṛtvāt| (*Ibid.*)
72. *Tadaikṣata bahu syāṁ prajāyeyeti tattejo asṛjata tatteja ekṣata bahu syāṁ prajāyeyeti tadapo asṛjata| Tasmādyatra kvaca śocati svedate vā puruṣastejasa eva tadadhyāpo jāyante|* (*CUP*, 6.2.3, p.509)
Tā āpa ekṣanta bhahvyaḥ syāma prajāyemahīti tā annamasṛjanta tasmādyatra kva ca varṣati tadeva bhūyiṣṭamannaṁ bhavatyadbhya eva tadadhyannādyaṁ jāyante| (*CUP*, 6.2.4, p.510)
73. *—tasmādvā etasmādātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ| ākāśādvāyuḥ| vāyoragniḥ| agnerāpaḥ| adbhyaḥ pṛthivī|* —(*TUP*, 2.1, pp.280–1)
(Bhāṣya):—tasmādetasmādbrahmaṇa ātmasvarūpādākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ samutpannaḥ| ākāśo nāma śabdaguṇo avakāśakaro mūrtadravyāṇām| tasmādākāśātsvena sparśaguṇena pūrveṇa ca ākāśaguṇena śabdena dviguṇo vāyuḥ| sambhūta ityanuvartate| vāyośca svena rūpaguṇena pūrvābhyāṁ ca triguṇo agniḥ sambhūtaḥ| agneśca svena rasaguṇena pūrvaiśca tribhiścaturguṇā āpaḥ sambhūtāḥ| adbyaḥ svena gandhaguṇena pūrvaiścaturbhiḥ pañcaguṇā pṛthivī sambhūtā| (p.287)
74. *Tadaikṣata bahu syāṁ prajāyeyeti tattejo asṛjata tatteja ekṣata bahu syāṁ prajāyeyeti tadapo asṛjata| Tasmādyatra kvaca śocati svedate vā puruṣastejasa eva tadadhyāpo jāyante|* (*CUP*, 6.2.3, p.509)
Tā āpa ekṣanta bhahvyaḥ syāma prajāyemahīti tā annamasṛjanta tasmādyatra kva ca varṣati tadeva bhūyiṣṭamannaṁ bhavatyadbhya eva tadadhyannādyaṁ jāyante| (*CUP*, 6.2.4, p.510)
75. *Bhavati ca bhautikatve liṅgaṁ karaṇānām—'annamayaṁ hi somya mana āpomayaḥ prāṇastejomayī vāk' ityevaṁjātīyakam;* (*SSBB*, 2.3.15, p.444)
76. *—annamayaṁ hi somya mana—*(*CUP*, 6.5.4, p.518)

'Shock-proof', 'Evidence-proof', 'Argument-proof' World of Sāmpradāyika Scholarship of Indian Philosophy

(Some reflections on the comments and responses to the article entitled 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD: The Case Study of a Retrospective Illusion Imposed' published in *JICPR*, Special Volume)

It is both 'gratifying' and 'shocking' to read the responses and comments of well known scholars to the article that I wrote some time ago. 'Gratifying' because such outstanding scholars of Advaita Vedānta as Prof. Balasubramaniam, Prof. K. Saccidananda Murty and Prof. G.N. Mishra not only read the article but chose to respond to it. 'Shocking' as I thought I was merely recording 'facts' which could hardly be objected to by anybody as they were from sources which are accepted to be authoritative by the scholarly world in the field of Indian philosophy all over the world. Potter and Nakamura are highly respected for their objectivity, impartiality and comprehensive scholarship in respect of the things they have written about. Potter's is the most comprehensive bibliography of Indian philosophy that exists in the English language. There is no other source of information available at present except that of Thangaswami Sarma's which have been written in Sanskrit and covers only Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Advaita Vedānta and Mīmāṁsā up till now. As for Nakamura, who would dare dispute his commitment to the cause of Indian philosophy spread over his whole life time resulting in monumental works of scholarship and insight such as was evident long ago in the one entitled *Ways of Thinking of Eastern People.* Both of them, of course, may be wrong here and there, for they are human beings like all of us. But before one disputes them, one should take special care and show why they are mistaken or wrong.

The main contention of the paper was that, on all available evidence, the presence of *Vedānta* in the first millennium AD is far *less* than that of other schools in Indian philosophy during that period and that it does not enjoy the *same* supremacy as it did in the second millennium AD particularly after AD 1200. This, obviously, is a comparative, quantitative statement

and hence, has to be contested on that ground *alone,* all other considerations are irrelevant as far as the contention of the paper is concerned.

The simplest way of refuting the contention would have been to show that it is incorrect. Comparatively speaking, the quantitative works which may be considered to be Vedāntic in nature were actually far greater than the other schools of Indian philosophy taken singly, or even collectively. *This has not been done.* The only exception is G. Mishra who has quoted a statement from *Śrībhāṣyaprakāśikā* of Śrīniwāsācārya which states that 'There existed ninety-six bhāṣyas on the Brahmasūtras before Rāmānuja who refuted all those views in his Śrībhāṣya.'

If the statement of the author of Śrībhāṣya-prakāsika is correct, then obviously my main contention stands refuted. But there remain many questions still to be answered both by Prof. G. Mishra and others who accept the truth of this statement. First, the statement is not of Rāmānuja himself but of a commentator on Rāmānuja's work who is supposed to belong to the 18th or 19th century. (Introduction, *Śrībhāṣya Prakāsika*, Ed. by T. Chandrasekharan, Madras Govt. Oriental manuscript series-48). Secondly, as Sriniwasacarya has stated that 'Rāmānuja refuted all these views in composing his Śrībhāṣya', it is incumbent on Prof. Mishra to find out where exactly these refutations occur and on what grounds they are to be referred to *separate* earlier bhasyas on the Brahma Sūtra. This is important as mere refutation of a position does not entail that the view so refuted belongs to a separate independent text, unless the name of the author is specifically mentioned by the person who is refuting the views. Many a time, as Prof. Mishra knows very well, the views which are being refuted are imagined as *Pūrva Pakṣas* by the author himself. Not only this, the same text may contain many *pūrva pakṣas* which are to be refuted by the opponent and hence no one–one co-relation can be established between the *pūrva-pakṣas* and the text in which they are supposed to have been propounded. It will be interesting to find what exactly were the views which Rāmānuja was refuting and what are the grounds for the conjecture that Śrīniwasacarya has made in making such a statement in his work.

Besides these, it may be assumed that if Rāmānuja was refuting these views they must be non-viśiṣṭadvaitic in character and as we know that no other non-viśiṣṭadvaitic schools of vedānt existed before Rāmānuja except that of Śaṁkara, they may be presumed to be advaitic in character. This will mean that all these 96 Bhāṣyas were advaitic in nature and must have been written between Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja, if Śaṁkara's writings do not show any awareness of them. But if they 'really' existed during this

period then there must be some evidence of them in the writings of both the advaitins and the other schools of Indian philosophies which flourished during this period. It is unbelievable that Rāmānuja was aware of *all* of them, but none of his predecessors knew about them. And what about the successors? Does Madhva or Vallabha or anyone else show any awareness of them and try to refute them in their writings from the viewpoint of the position held by their own *Sampradāyas*? Surely, Vyāstīrtha II, the author of Nyāyāmṛta, may be expected to know about at least some of them and refute the advaitic arguments in his well-known work on the subject. The same should be true of Vedanta Desika (AD 1330) who belong to the *viśiṣṭadvaita* school itself. His famous work is entitled '*Satdusani*' which is a trenchant critique of the advaitic position and has been recently replied to by Pandit Anant Krishan Sastri in his '*Satbhusani*'. To say, or suggest as Prof. G. Mishra seems to do that *all* of them were 'lost' is to ask for an 'act of faith' which sounds so improbable that no one can be expected to take it seriously.

The only other text that Prof. Mishra refers to is *Śrīvidyārṇava* of *Vīdyaraṇya* which says that 'There were five famous Ācāryas between Gauḍapāda and Śaṁkara.' The statement of Vidyāraṇya [once again, Prof. Mishra does not give the date of Vidyāraṇya who seems to be a different person from the well-known author of *Anubhūtiprakāśikā* (AD 1350) or information about the publication of the work he refers to] does not exactly entail the conclusion which Prof. Mishra wants to draw from it for, obviously, the period from Badarāyaṇa to Śaṁkara includes the period from Gauḍapāda to Śaṁkara in it. Hence, it is not as if the five *ācāryas* who are supposed to have occurred between Gauḍapāda and Śaṁkara are in addition to the other five that Potter is supposed to have mentioned between Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṁkara in his bibliography. Prof. Mishra could have easily found the number of persons mentioned by Potter between Bādarāyaṇa and Gauḍapāda and seen how far the total exceeds the number mentioned by us on the basis of Potter's reference.

The only person about whom there can be no dispute that he occurred between Bādarāyaṇa and Gauḍapāda (AD 525) is Bodhāyana (AD 350). All others, in case we accept the current chronology, occur either after Gauḍapāda or may be regarded as his contemporary. The four advaitins whose dates are also given by us occur in the period between Gauḍapāda and Śaṁkara, thus, leaving only one extra advaitin not mentioned by us during the period from Bādarāyaṇa to Śaṁkara so if we accept Vidyāraṇya's statement then the total number of advaitins comes to 6 and not 5 as we

had mentioned in our article. The correction is gladly accepted but does it affect the comparative picture we have drawn in any way what-so-ever?

Prof. Mishra tries to suggest that one may 'legitimately' explain the non-availability of bhāṣyas on the Braham Sūtra before Śaṁkara by postulating the hypothesis that *all* of them were *'lost'* due to various reasons. He writes for example that 'Those commentaries might have been lost due to the ravages of time and numerous other factors such as constant quarrels among the scholars nourished by their patrons, kings, which went to the extent of destroying the existing literature of opposing schools' (page 140). This perhaps, is also meant to apply to all those 96 bhāṣyas which, according to Prof. Mishra, must have existed because they have been referred to in Śrībhāṣyapradīpikā of Śrīniwāsācārya. Such a staggering loss of material which was known to Rāmānuja needs to be explained on more substantial grounds than saying that all of them must have been lost due to the attitude of the patron kings which 'went to the extent of *destroying* (emphasis mine) the existing literature of opposing schools.' The destruction of these 96 advaitic bhāṣyas could only have been done by the non-advaitic vedāntins, who at that time, most probably would have been viśiṣṭādvatins as the other non-advaitic schools of vedānta had not appeared on the scene. I wonder if the followers of Rāmānuja would like the charge made against them by Prof. Mishra which is transparently implicit in what he had said on the subject.

The hypothesis of 'loss' to account for the absence of the advaitic texts before and after Śaṁkara have been resorted to by other persons also who have responded to my article on the subject, but all of them, including Prof. Mishra, forget that the hypothesis can equally be applied to the texts of other schools also. After all, the so-called 'ravages of time' do not distinguish between the advaitic and the non-advaitic texts and, as for the patrons, they belong to all schools of Indian philosophy and there is written evidence to show that most of them were hostile to advaita and advaita only. In fact, the charge of deliberate destruction of the texts of other Sampradāyas is a slur on the Indian system of patronage which generally supported the scholars of all persuasions and there is little evidence of any large-scale mass destruction of books in this country.

The quantitative counter-evidence given by Prof. Mishra, thus, does not seem to support what he is trying to establish. There is, however, another objection which questions the very legitimacy of the quantitative approach that I have adopted in the article concerned. The urge is that it is 'quality' and not 'quantity' that matters in all fields, including that of philosophy.

I would readily accept this, as I do not believe that quantity *alone* connotes something important except in a marginal manner. Quantitative indices are important in certain contexts and they cannot be ignored. It may remembered that the comparative context in which the article was written has an essential quantitative aspect and to deny its relevance in that context is, to my mind, utterly meaningless.

But even if we bring in considerations of quality, how shall one ever be able to determine the quality of works that are just not there. And, secondly, who dares to deny the quality of thinkers like Vasubandhu, Dignāga or Dhramakīrti or Udyotkara or Akalaṅka, to name but a few. The advaitic insight may be qualitatively of the highest order but philosophically it has to be exhibited in concrete works which are to be found in works before Śaṁkara that can reasonably be considered Vedāntic in character. The appeal to the 'quality' of works that are supposed to be lost, is an appeal which no one can take seriously in a cognitive context as literally 'nothing' can be said about it.

A more fundamental objection has been raised by Prof. Balasubramanian to my contention that 'The presence of Vedānta in the first millennium AD thus can only be understood in terms of what happens to the *Brahmasūtras,* and the attention they aroused in the philosophical world of India after they were composed' (page 202). According to him, 'The relation between the Upaniṣads and Brahmasūtras is such that it is neither possible nor desirable to separate them' (page 141). The same is said, in a sense, by Prof. K. Satchidananda Murthy when he concedes that *if* vedānta is considered to be that doctrine alone which is propounded in the Brahmasūtra then it will be certainly correct to say that it is not very conspicuously present in the first millennium AD. The obvious implication of Prof. Murthy's statement is that the situation will drastically change if the Upaniṣads were also to be taken as the legitimate source of what is known by the name of *'Vedānta'* in the philosophical tradition.

Prof. Balasubramanian's objections to my separation of the Brahmasūtra from the Upaniṣads for the treatment of Vedānta as a *'philosophical'* school appear to be the following. According to him, the Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtra are related in such a way that two cannot be separated in any meaningful way and that the attempt to do so is 'the fallacy of separating the inseparables.' He has given the examples of gold and bangle, clay and pot and, at a more abstract level, matter and form to explain his contention. The argument reminds one of the well-known contention of the advaitins where the 'reality', that is, Brahma which itself has no

form, *appears* to have form because of the *upādhis* which ultimately hide its reality instead of revealing it. This analogy will be totally unacceptable to any advaitin as he would not like to relegate the Brahmasutra to the 'illusory' status which the 'world' is given because of the *upādhis* in the advaitic system.

On the other hand, the relation between matter and form to which Prof. Balasubramanian takes recourses will not be helpful either. This is so for the simple reason that the same matter can take different forms and that the same form can be exhibited in different materials. This is involved in the very notion of form as it is an abstraction which can be exhibited or exemplified in different materials. As for 'matter' it is ultimately a residual category, something absolutely formless, a pure potentiality—a point that Aristotle emphasized long ago. The mother in the story, which Prof. Balasubramanian told to exemplify his view, could easily have satisfied the child by giving her a glass bangle instead of a gold one.

It is bound to be objected that we are taking literally the example given by Prof. Balasubramanian and not seeing the essential point which he is making. After all his main contention is that the Upaniṣads and the *Brahmasūtra* are so integrally and intimately related to each other that the one can neither be separated nor understood without the other. The contention, if taken in its 'strong' sense, could imply not only that the *Brahmasūtra* can not be understood without the *Upaniṣads* but also that the *Upaniṣads* can not be understood without the *Brahmasūtra.* Prof. Balasubramaniam may find this very satisfactory, but it will entail the conclusion that nobody could understand the *Upaniṣads* before the *Brahmasūtra* was composed. This is important as no one will deny that the Brahmasūtras were composed after the *Upaniṣads* and are a human creation. Thus, there is a radical difference between the *Upaniṣads* and *Brahmasūtra* especially for those who consider the former as Śruti, as the latter can never achieve that status being the work of a person called Bādarāyaṇa who tried to understand them according to his own insights. But if this is accepted then the *Brahmasūtra,* being the work of a human authority, can neither exhaust nor completely unfold the meaning of the Upaniṣads. In fact, alternative 'human' understandings of the Upaniṣads are implicit in the situation and even the earlier analogy of matter and forms demands it as there is no reason why one particular form *alone* should exhibit or embody all the possibilities inherent in the substance to which it is trying to give a form. As a matter of fact, the work itself refers to earlier attempts of understanding the Upaniṣads and gives reasons for disputing their understanding. But

if Bādarāyaṇa can do it, so can others and there is no reason why the authority of Bādarāyaṇa should be invoked to preclude this possibility in principle. The idea of there being other Brahmasūtras than the one ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa is not as preposterous as it may appear to be at first sight. The Gītā itself refers to the *Brahmasūtra* in 13.4, a fact mentioned by Prof. G. Mishra in his comment on my paper. This according to Prof. Mishra may point to the '... availability of some other Brahmasūtras which were known to the author of the Bhagvadgītā' (page 139). Śaṁkara, according to him thinks otherwise and believes that the reference in the Gītā is not to the text known as *Brahmasūtra* but to *Brahman.* This, of course, seems improbable as such an interpretation of the *śloka* does not make any sense, particularly if the phrase 'हेतुमद्भिः' is taken seriously.

Perhaps, the simple way out of the difficulty would be to assume that the author of the *Gītā* has inadvertently referred to the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa and thereby revealed both the human authorship of the work and the relative date when it was composed which, on such an interpretation, will have to be assigned to a time which is later than that of the *Brahmasūtra*. This, of course, would be anathema to all those who treat the Gītā as the word of the Lord himself and assign it to some time at the end of the *Dwāpara* age when the *Mahābhārata* war was supposed to have been fought. These people, then, would have either to assign the *Brahmasūtra* to an even earlier date than that of the *Mahābhārata* war or treat the Upaniṣads, where *alone* we find a distinctive reference to *Brahman,* as being earlier to the war described in the famous epic.

The problem has a simple solution, but nobody would like to 'accept' it because it will make the *Gītā* a 'human document' written after the composition of the *Brahmasūtra,* and not the word of the Lord himself who delivered it at the beginning of the battle of the *Mahābhārata.* The *Gītā* also has many *ślokas* which are a verbatim repetition of those given in the *Upaniṣads* and one has the problem of either treating the Upaniṣads as having being composed later than the *Gīta* or vice-versa. But, whatever the alternative one chooses, it creates insuperable problems for those who want to treat the *Gītā* as the message of the Lord delivered to Arjun at the battle-field of the Kurukṣetra.

There is another problem in the *Gītā* which has generally not been faced. On the one hand, it claims for itself, or others have tried to claim for it, the status of an *Upaniṣads* which deals with *Brahmavidyā.* A claim which is *not* recognized by anyone in the Indian tradition as it has always, being recognized as a *smṛti* and not as a *śruti* in it. The other well-known

statement that 'The *Gītā* gives the essence of all the *Upaniṣads'* makes it rival of the *Brahmasūtra* which attempts to do the same thing and, thus, suggests that the author of the *Gītā* was not satisfied with what the *Brahmasūtra* had done or conversely the author of the *Brahmasūtra* was not satisfied with what the author of the *Gītā* had done.

The relations between the *Upaniṣads,* the *Brahmasūtra* and the *Gītā* are, thus, very complex and can not be treated in the simplistic way as has been done by Prof. R. Balasubramanian and Prof. G. Mishra. There are other problems which have not been seen by them or anybody else. If the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahmasūtra* are 'inseparable' as Prof. Balasubramanian has asserted, then the simple question as to which of the *Upaniṣads* are related in this 'inseparable' way to the *Brahmasūtra,* will have to be faced by him and all those who accept what he had said in this connection. There would have been no problem if there was only one *Upaniṣad* or only a limited number of the Upaniṣads written before the *Brahmasūtra,* the essence of all of which was given in the *Brahmasūtra.* But as this does not happen to be the case, as the texts known as the Upaniṣads continued to be written long after the *Brahmasūtra* and even after Śaṁkara, the problem is almost insoluble in nature. The Brahmasūtras, according to analysis of Nakamura, refer only to the following Upaniṣads—Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chhāndogya, Aitareya, Kauṣitakī, Taittirīya, Īśa, Kaṭhaka, Muṇḍaka, Praśna, Śvetāśvatara and Mahānārāyaṇa.[1]

As will be evident from this, the *Brahmasūtra* does not refer to two important upniṣads, the *Māṇḍukya* and the *Maitrāyaṇi,* thus creating the problem that its author perhaps did not consider them to be of sufficient importance to be referred to in his work. On the other hand, Śaṁkara is supposed to have written independent commentaries on a number of upniṣads and also written a *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra* in which he has referred to the various *Upaniṣads* which he must have considered authoritative. However, recently, doubts have been raised regarding the authenticity of ascription of some of these works to Śaṁkara, mainly because of the critical textual works on these by Paul Hacker and Mayeda. Prof. Potter has summarized the position in his discussion on the subject in his volume entitled 'Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṁkara and his pupils' in the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* edited by him (Motilal Banarsidas, 1981). He writes, 'The upshot of the most careful scholarship to date of the works of Śaṁkara, therefore, is that the following may without question be accepted as the work of the author of the Brahmasūtra bhāṣya. The Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad bhāṣya the Taittiriyopaniṣadbhāṣya, and the Updeśasāhasrī. There seems no real reason to question the inclusion of the Aitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya, the Chhāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya, the Mundakopaniṣadbhāṣya and the Praśnopaniṣadbhāṣya in this list. Beyond this point, however, is only speculation.' Thus, it seems that both the author of the Brahmasūtra and Śaṁkara accept only the authority of certain Upaniṣads and not of others even if they existed *before* the Brahmasūtra was composed. There seems, thus, to have been a *'selective attitude'* adopted by both in respect of the Upaniṣads that they chose to regard as *Śruti* for their purposes. This raises some fundamental questions regarding the so-called 'integral' and indisoluble relationship between the Upaniṣads and the *Brahmasūtra* for which Prof. Balasubramanian has contended. The 'relation' has already been separated at least in relation to certain Upaniṣads by the author of the Brahmasūtra itself. In case we accept that those Upaniṣads existed *prior* to the times when the Brahmasūtra was composed. The selection, in fact, exists even in respect of the *Upaniṣads* which are referred to in the Brahmasūtra as some are openly being treated as major sources for what is being said and others treated only as minor (see Nakamura, pp. 466–7).

1. See page 466–7, *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy.*

This, of course, would not have mattered if the *Upaniṣads* were not being treated as *Śruti,* because if some text or texts are considered in that way, all of its or their parts will have to be treated as having *equal* importance. If something is a *Śruti,* then one can not regard some parts of it as having greater authority than others.

The relation of the Brahmasūtra to the Upaniṣads that existed before it, is thus not only selective but also 'imposes' on them a structure which they themselves did not have. This structural organizsation consisting of *adhyāya, pāda* and adhikaraṇa undoubtedly 'manifest', as Prof. Balasubramanian has pointed out, what was implicit in the Upaniṣads. However, it does not and can not entail the conclusion that this is the *only* structure that is there, or that no alternative structural organization is implicit in the text or texts concerned. The structural organization of the Brahmasūtra not only constrains us to see the Upaniṣads in a certain way but also creates the illusory impression that there is, and can be, no other way or ways of seeing the text/texts.

There is a close parallel between what the Brahmasūtra has done in the context of the Upaniṣads and what the other sūtra-texts have done in the case not only of other schools of Indian philosophy but also of all the

other cognitive disciplines in the Indian tradition. After all, everyone admits that there was a lot of discussion regarding the problems which the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra or the Nyāya Sūtra or the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra or the Yoga Sūtra deal with before they gave a systematic organization and presentation to what had gone before in their works. But once they were written, a *Śāstric* form was given to the disorganized, scattered heterogeneous thinking regarding them which had occurred earlier. And, this was the reason why they became the points of departure for all subsequent thinking on the tradition by replacing completely whatever was written earlier on the subject. A *Śāstra* gives a systematic structural organization to what had been thought earlier and, in that process, selects and highlights only those issues which it considers important, rejecting the others or neglecting them all together. The clearest example of such a phenomena occurs in *Paṇīnī's Aṣṭādhyāyī* in the Indian tradition. Everyone knows that after *Paṇīnī* there was introduced a radical distinction among the ways Sanskrit was spoken or written, a distinction which can be seen even today amongst the traditional scholars of the language when they point out to each other that such a *prayoga* is *apāṇinīya* or *non-pāṇinīya.*

The same thing happens after the composition of the various *Śāstric* texts in different fields of knowledge, as they not only superseded the earlier scattered pieces of knowledge relating to the subject, but also provided a model for what was to be regarded as 'Knowledge', in the strict sense of the term, in that domain. The same may be presumed to have occurred in the case of the *Dharmasūtra* as they, after the composition, became the standard 'reference point' for what was to be regarded, as the *Śāstric* form of knowledge. The Upaniṣads, of course, continued to have an independent existence and be a source of inspiration for all those who were interested in what was contained in them. But this was not 'knowledge' in the *Śāstric* form, a point which is ignored by those who argue, like Prof. Balasubramanian for their co-ordinate authority with the Brahmasūtras. This 'independence' of the Upaniṣads from the Brahmasūtras can easily be recognized by the fact that many people read the Upaniṣads without recourse to the *Brahmasūtras* and that the latter are *only* important for those who care for the *Śāstric* form of knowledge of what has come to be called *Vedānta* in the Indian philosophical tradition.

The same, in fact, is the case with the *Gītā* which, though included in the so-called *Prasthāna trayī* by many of the vedāntins, has an independent status of its own and does not even have a 'Śāstric' form of organization of the material. The simple point is that the Brahma Sūtras, because of the *Śāstric* form of their structural organisation, can not be treated on par with either the Upaniṣads or the Gītā which have a totally different form from that of the Brahmasūtras.

There is, thus, a strict sense of the term philosophy which, if taken seriously, would include only the text known as Brahmasūtras under it. In a loose sense, however, the term may be applied to the Upaniṣads as they also treat many of the subjects which are treated in the Brahmasūtra. But, as pointed out earlier, there is the insoluble problem of what Upaniṣads to include and what to exclude. Śaṁkara, for example, is supposed to have referred to Paingī and Jabāla (page 46, Nakamura) Upaniṣads which find no place in the Brahmasūtras. Not only this, he writes an independent Bhāṣya on Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣads, which has not been referred to in the Brahmasūtras, according to Nakamura. As for Rāmānuja, he is said to have quoted 'Garbha Cūlikā, Mahā and Subāla Philosophy'[1] which finds no place either in Śaṁkara or in Brahmasūtra.

This, obviously, creates another difficulty for the thesis that the Brahmasūtra are so inseparably related with the Upaniṣads that they can not be considered independently of each other. There is, however, another fact to which little attention has been paid by all those who argued for the 'inseparable' relation between the Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtra. This concerns the status of the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* in the Advaita tradition. Normally it is supposed to be almost of equal importance to the Brahmasūtra, particularly in view of the fact that Śaṁkara himself is said to have been influenced by it in the interpretation of the Brahmasūtra because his own teacher Govinda Bhagvatpāda belongs to the tradition deriving from that work. But the Māṇḍūkya Kārikā is, *prima facie*, a work on Māṇḍūkyopniṣada which finds no place in the Brahmasūtra itself. Thus, the tradition of Advaita may be said to derive from two sources; the one from the Brahmasūtra and the other from Māṇḍākyakārikā. The situation becomes a little clearer if we remember that Śaṁkara himself wrote an independent Bhāṣya on the Māṇḍūkyopniṣada even though, if Nakamura's analysis is to be believed, he does not refer to it in the Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra. In any case, as there are so many Upaniṣads and most of the thinkers adopt a selective function in respect of them, nothing definitive can be said regarding all of them in their totality or of their relation to the Brahmasūtra or what has come to be called 'Vedānta' in the Indian philosophical tradition. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the texts known as Upaniṣads continued to be written not only long after the

1. Page 47, *A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy,* Nakamura.

Brahmasūtra was composed but even after Śaṁkara had written his Bhāṣyas on some of the most important in them. There is another aspect relating to this whole issue which has not been paid attention to even though I had brought it to the notice of the scholarly world in my article entitled 'The upniṣads—what are they?' Many of the important Upniṣads are a '*selection*' from earlier texts and the selection, as pointed out in my article, is arbitrary as it does not sometimes include those portions in the original which explicitly proclaim themselves to be Upaniṣads. As for the term 'vedānta', there are so many problems in respect of it as pointed out in an even earlier article of mine entitled 'Vedānta—Does it really mean anything at all?' which as far as I know, have not been squarely faced by scholars who concern themselves with such issues.

But, whatever may be the problem or problems concerning the relation of the Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtras, little difference is likely to be made even if we accept what Prof. Balasubramaniam has said on the subject. For a moment let us ignore all the objections raised above and accept his contention that the upniṣads and Brahmasūtra are so integrally related to each other that any attempt to separate them will be 'to separate the inseparables'. This would only amount to accepting the Upaniṣads as an integral part of the Vedāntic tradition along with the Brahmasūtras. But does this 'acceptance' change in any way the situation prevailing in the first millennium AD in respect of what has come to be called the Vedānta in Indian tradition? There are, as far as we know, no independent Bhāṣyas on the Upaniṣads during this period. There is, of coursé, an isolated reference to a work of Tanka (AD 500) on Chhāndogya upniṣada in the *New catalogues catagorum* as mentioned in Potter's Bibliography. There might be a few others, but would their inclusion change the '*comparative*' picture of the presence of the Vedānta in the first millennium AD in any way whatsoever? The 'inclusion' will certainly highlight the presence of the awareness of the Upaniṣadic stream in Indian philosophy during the millennium but it will not establish its dominant status there in any way, particularly, if it is compared with those of other schools of Indian philosophy. The term '*aupniṣdic*' certainly occurs and as pointed out by Nakamura, it refers to a school of thinking which is associated with the idea that the reality is one and hence non-dual in character (Nakamura, page 252). This certainly is close to the advaitic position but the 'school', though known, hardly exercised any influence on dominant philosophical trends in the millennium before Śaṁkara appeared on the scene. In fact there are no independent works on either the Upaniṣads or the Brahmasūtra during this pre-Śaṁkara period and though one may postulate innumerable 'lost' bhāṣyas, Vārtikas, tīkās etc. on them, this can change the situation only for those who want to believe in something which is against all evidence and arguments in this context.

The situation certainly changes after Śaṁkara, but as we pointed out in our article, it does not affect in any substantive way the 'comparative' strength of the so-called Vedānta *vis-à-vis* other philosophical schools which flourished during that period. It is true that there is a substantial change in the awareness of Vedānta and the concern with it after Śaṁkara, but this in no way affects the truth of the contention that we had made in our article regarding the comparative status of Vedānta in the first millennium AD.

Prof. Balasubramanian had objected to my use of the word *adhyāsa* as according to him '*Adhyāsa* is *perceptual* error, which is different from errors in reasoning as well as errors in interpretation' (page 137). Prof. Balasubramaniam is an eminent authority on the subject but I would like to suggest that even if he is correct, there can be 'extended' use of the term, especially if the 'extension' preserves the essential character of that in the context of which the original usages were adopted. Ultimately *adhyāsa* is a term for erroneous cognition and there is no reason to confine it to the relam of perception alone.

However, there is a problem in the traditional usage of the term in Advaita Vedānta itself to which I would like to draw his attention as well as of the other specialists in Advaita vedānta who share his views regarding this issue. Śaṁkara himself raises the question at the very beginning of his bhāṣya and had given the reply to the objection that how could there be *adhyāsa* between the *atman* and the object when the *ātman* is not an object of perception. The reply is at two levels. The first is to show that *atman* is an object of perception because it is an object of the 'Asmadpratyaya'. Now this implies that '*Pratyakṣa*' can *only* be that which is a *viṣaya* of some *pratyaya* or other. But the moment such a definition of perception is accepted there can be no realm in principle which can be excluded from being an object of perception except the *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* which by definition is supposed to be the content of no concept what-so-ever.

However, it is his reply at the second level which interests us more in the context of our discussion and it leads in a direction which may shake the very formulation of advaitic thought as it has been developed up till now. Śaṁkara observes that there is no such rule that the *adhyāsa* shall occur only in relation to an object which is present before our consciousness. It is not easy to give the exact translation of what is meant by the

original text in this connection which reads as follows: 'न चायमस्ति नियमः पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरमध्यसिततव्ययमिति।' He does not just say this but gives a concrete example to illustrate his point. The example chosen is that of 'Ākāśa' which, according to him appears to be *'malīna'* and also have a *'tala'* in it, even though it is not an object of perception. The exact wordings are as follows—'अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्याकाशे बालास्तलमलिनताद्यध्यस्यन्ति।' The statement obviously suggests that it is only the 'ignorant' who 'erroneously ascribe' (अध्यस्यन्ति) *'Tala'* or *'malintā'* to *ākāśa* which can not, in principle, posses this property as it is not an object of perception. The statement raises enormous problems, but we are not interested here in pursuing them. The point we want to emphasize is that, according to Śaṁkara, *adhyāsa* can occur even in respect of an object that is not an object of perception and that, hence, the objection that both the objects have necessarily to be perceptual in nature for *adhyāsa* to occur is untenable. In the example that he gives, only one of the objects is non-perceptual in character, while the quality that is ascribed to it happens to be perceptual in character. But the restriction is not necessary, even if Śaṁkara's example may be said to imply it. A non-perceptual object may also have non-perceptual qualities ascribed to it which, on reflection, are discovered to have been erroneously attributed to it. Śaṁkara does not seem to have considered the problem of *adhyāsa* in the context of properties that are essentially relational in character, the relation being different from *'Samvāya'* that is said to be obtained between properties and objects in the Nyāya tradition. But whatever may be the complexities produced by the introduction of these issues, there can be little doubt that Śaṁkara does not seem to subscribe to the position of Prof. Balasubramanian in this connection. Śaṁkara may have changed his position later, or the advaitins may have adopted a non-Śaṁkarite position on this subject later but, as far as these statements are concerned, they do not seem to support Prof. Balasubramanian's contention. Ultimately, the problem relates to erroneous cognition in general and not to that which occurs in the context of perception alone. If the term *adhyāsa* is to be restricted to the perceptual field alone then we'll have to coin another term for erroneous cognition that occurs in other fields. But what would be given by it, only Prof. Balasubramaniam can tell.

Prof. Suresh Chandra has disputed the claim that the so-called Digvijay of Śaṁkara during his own times and even later is hardly attested to by the facts as they are known today. He asks, 'Was there any other scholar of Śaṁkara's time whose work excelled that of Śaṁkara both in quality

and quantity? Was there ... vedānta philosophy?' (page 127) Surely, Prof. Chandra could have found the facts for himself had he taken the trouble to do so? The dates and period of Śaṁkara's time are not so well established as he seems to assume, but most scholars who have written on the subject agreed that there were outstanding contemporaries, both senior and junior, who are said to have belonged to the same time as Śaṁkara and who were outstanding philosophers by any standards. Kumārila is a well-known example, and so are many others. In fact, he has not even taken the trouble to find that the so-called account of Śaṁkara's Digvijaya is based on a work that was written much later than Śaṁkara's time. Prof. G.C. Pande in his recent work on Śaṁkarācārya has examined in detail the whole question and concluded that 'It (Śaṁkara Digvijaya) could belong to a fairly extensive time bracket, viz. from the 14th to the 17th centuries' (G.C. Pande, page 12)[1] But even if we accept the earliest date, it would still have been written at least six hundred years after Śaṁkara. It can, thus, hardly be cited as a reliable evidence as a contemporary observer of the scene. As for the so-called 'failure' of the 'academic empire' of Śaṁkara, Prof. Suresh Chandra does not seem to know the stature of a Padmapāda or a Sureśwara in the tradition of Advaita Vedānta, not to talk of Maṇḍana Miśra, in case he is supposed to be different from Sureśwara. The tradition of Advaita after Śaṁkara and his immediate disciples is fairly strong, as we find at least three persons before Vācaspati Miśra I, who is supposed to have lived around AD 960 and wrote his famous commentary on the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya of Śaṁkara. As the date of Sureśhwara is given as AD 740, this will mean a time-lag of about 200 years during which, if Potter's bibliographical information is accepted, we have three persons known as 'advaitins' who have written on the subject. One of them, that is, Gyānottam, is said to have written on the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya, while the other two, that is, Gyānaghana (AD 900) and Vimuktātman (AD 950) are said to have written 'Tattva (pari) Śuddhi', and 'Iṣṭsiddhi' respectively. Of these three, the work of Gyānottma, that is Vidyāśrī, has not been published, even though it is supposed to be a work on the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya of Śaṁkara and might provide are interesting link between the works of Padmapāda, Sureśwar, and Maṇḍana Miśra on one hand and Vācaspati Miśra I on the other. The real impact, however, appears in the works of non-advaitic, and even anti-advaitic, thinkers such as Jayanta and Udayana, a fact already mentioned in our article. Yet, all these are significant pointers to the spreading influence of Śaṁkara. They,

1. Page 12, *Life and Thought of Samkaracarya* by G.C. Pande.

in no way, mitigate the fact that all these thinkers taken together do not stand anywhere near the quantity and quality of work produced by others. The most surprising fact in this connection is that even Vācaspati Miśra I, whose outstanding stature amongst the post-Sureśwara advaitins is acknowledged by everyone, also wrote on both Nyāya and Sāṁkhya with '*equal*' authority.

Prof. Suresh Chandra, thus, does not seem to have made the slightest effort to find out the facts by himself, which he could have easily done if he seriously wanted to know what he was writing about. The 'free-association', the 'free-wheeling' method adopted by him, can hardly help matters. What, for example, can one say about the way he has dismissed the evidence of Haribhadra Sūri in this regard, who occurred just after Śaṁkara and must have been a contemporary of both Padamapāda and Sureśwara if the chronological dates of Potter are accepted. He writes in this connection that, 'Haribhadra's work can not be considered as the "general survey" of the schools of philosophy existing at his time. It was simply a survey of the philosophical system of his choice' (page 129). Suresh Chandra should have known that a 'survey' is generally made by a person as objectively as possible and not determined by any subjective, personal whim on one's part. After all why should one write a survey? And Haribhadra Suri was not an ordinary name in Jain tradition. What is even more surprising is to find Suresh Chandra writing, 'The best way to reject a philosopher is to ignore him. *But motives should not be imputed*' (page 129). He conveniently has forgotten that Haribhadra Suri was not writing about individual philosophers but generally accepted schools of Indian philosophy in his times. And, who is imputing motives, if not Suresh Chandra himself as he just writes after this that the survey he had written was not objective but only a result of his 'choice'. If this is not imputing motives then what is it?

Prof. Suresh Chandra has made another distinction which he thinks is of crucial importance in the context of the article I had written. This is the distinction between the 'common-practitioner' and one "who knows Vedānta by philosophical arguments concerning the identity of 'I' with 'Brahman'," or, in other words, the distinction between the 'lay-man' and the 'professional philosopher' who specializes in Vedānta as a school of philosophy with ratiocinative, argumentative expository sense of the term. He draws this distinction in the very beginning of his article, but forgets that it is totally irrelevant in the context of the contention that I had made in my article on the subject. After all, I was concerned only with the latter and not the former and, in fact, it could not have been otherwise as the

question of the comparative presence of Vedānta in the first millennium AD can not be decided by any appeal to empirical facts concerning the 'common-practitioners' about whom Prof. Chandra is talking and whose beliefs he is worried about. He has not asked himself even the simple question as to how such an empirical investigation can ever be carried out in respect of persons who are dead and gone and about whose beliefs no record had been left, as far as I know. Perhaps Suresh Chandra knows about these records and, if so, he will enlighten us by his empirical investigation on the subject soon. But I hope that even he will accept the distinction which is obtained at all levels and in all fields between what may be called, to use an Indian term, the '*Śāstric*' tradition of knowledge and the common beliefs of the people who generally do not entertain one set of beliefs only, but have an amalgam of them, little caring for the consistencies in them. The question, then, was how to find the presence of 'Sāstric' tradition of Vedānta in the first millennium AD and I will suggest that not only Suresh Chandra, but also all the others who have commented on my paper undertake this work and come to a conclusion on their own on the basis of evidence that is available to them. I look forward to their investigations and conclusions and I will be happy to revise my own judgement in the light of the conclusions they reach. I may make it clear that I am neither a 'Vedāntin' not 'anti-Vedāntin' and that I myself had shared the view prevalent in this regard as I had read the same books which my colleagues had read. They can not imagine the surprise and the shock received when I accidently stumbled on the evidence which, at least to my mind, lead to a different conclusion and 'demanded' to be brought to the attention of the scholarly world so that they may deal with it as honestly as possible. I would like to add that in all intellectual matters one has to have what I have called 'Niḥsaṅga buddhi' which is analogous to what the Lord had called 'Niṣkāma Karma' in the Gītā. And, I may add one thing more, that for a 'real' advaitin, it should not be difficult, for his consciousness ultimately is not 'attached' to any specific *nāma, rūpa* or doctrine what-so-ever.

Jaipur

DAYA KRISHNA

A Note on the Idea of Human Rights

In this brief note I would like to raise just one issue which seems to me to be among the basic issues connected with an adequate formulation of

a human rights perspective. There are different possible starting points for this. I shall take the following: one claim which has been resolutely made on behalf of human rights is that such rights are unique and universal—unique and universal at least to the extent that the idea of a human being is unique and universal. The uniqueness and universality of the idea of a human being is part of the official ideology of modern liberalism. Perhaps the best way of showing this is to point out its easy derivation from modern epistemology. My knowledge of the world, according to this latter, depends crucially on my capacity to take a totally disengaged view of it—disengaged, that is, from any particular circumstance in which I happen to be situated. The philosopher Nagel has very picturesquely characterized this as the 'view from nowhere'. What enables me to achieve this is my reason or rationality understood in the sense of my capacity to carry out procedures in my thought or mind which have strict pre-given criteria of correctness, clarity and distinctness. The modern idea of freedom is an adjunct of this concept of rationality. My freedom consists in my rational ordering of my desires so that they can be maximally satisfied. Human dignity consists in upholding this freedom. Every human being is potentially rational, and, therefore, the potential locus of freedom and dignity. Human rights are rights, which belong to human beings, *qua* human beings, as beings who can exercise freedom through reason. Such rights, therefore, are unique to human beings and apply universally to all human beings.

Suppose we accept: (1) the modern concept of knowledge; (2) the idea of freedom associated with it; and (3) the idea of human dignity as premised on this freedom. Then the argument for human rights can be constructed with a great degree of convincingness. But as the critique of modernity—in its different, and sometimes incompatible, forms (e.g. Gandhi and Foucault) has shown all these are highly contentious issues. It is not necessary, however, to enter into the critique of modernity at all to appreciate the difficulty of articulating a detailed human rights perspective. Problems arise the moment we descend from the level of abstraction at which it is possible to construct a neat enough argument, to the level of particulars and specific forms of human life. Even to ask the question, 'given that there are human rights in the sense we have just described, what *exactly* are these rights?' is to plunge into an arena of claims and counter-claims—an arena where our thinking and our practice, or our being-in-the-world are so closely interwoven that disengaged reason can only be a helpless spectator, or at best a hollow dictator. This can be

shown in detail, but I desist from doing so primarily because if I do not do it well enough, I shall be in danger of mistakenly suggesting that for me there is little use for the idea of human rights. Instead I shall merely state just the beginning of a possible argument for showing that—the human rights discourse can become practically relevant for us—that is, can enter into the density of our everyday practical concerns only by shedding its pristine universality and uniqueness—at least to a large extent. The basic premise of this argument is that the notion of a human right is primarily a moral notion. I do not think there will be many quarrels about this. But once this is accepted, we shall have to ask questions such as: 'how does it enter into our idea of the good life?', 'what is its place in the hierachy of goods that we envisage in a morally fulfilling life?'; 'how does it help in reaching clarity about morally perplexing situations?' It is my contention—a contention which is by no means uncontroversial—that the 'view from nowhere', 'universal'—and I shall add another adjective 'procedural'—rationality is not much help in dealing with questions of this kind. Their natural habitat is an arena of the engagement of human intelligence which has been pushed into obscurity—or at least into the background—by the stridency of the liberal-humanist-universalist ideology of modernity. This is the arena where what Aristotle called 'phronesis', or Gandhi, in our times called *satyagraha*, must be allowed unqualified precedence. One way of understanding the idea of phronesis is to think of it as implying that clarity about goodness or about the good life can be achieved only in and through one's active intelligent engagement in a moral practice. Any particular moral practice embodies ways of discriminating between the good and the bad, between the right pursuit and the wrong, between what will constitute true fulfilment and what will not. It is in the active contemplation and insightful use of these ways of discrimination that the moral practice itself acquires openness and possibility of change and transformation; this, in its turn, leads to ever finer articulation of the ways of discerning the good, in complex, frequently unpredictable human situations. The good is not something, which is open to an uncluttered, disengaged, rational view. It opens itself to one never wholly, but in increasingly greater depth maybe, in one's thoughtful active engagement in more or less dense, more or less complex moral situations. In the Gandhian notion of *satyagraha* similarly, knowledge and practice are inalienably interwoven. Knowledge and articulacy about *satya*, which, for Gandhi, is the same as the good, is to be achieved only through active and contemplative moral engagement in actual human situations.

Acara and *vicara*—to use words I learned from the late Professor K.J. Shah—must always inform and enrich each other. *Satyagraha* is the only authentic method of engaging seriously in situations which hold out the possibility of making moral mistakes. While *satyagraha* is necessarily practical moral engagement, it also, in and through this engagement, leads to finer moral insights.

If it is agreed, therefore, that the idea of human rights is a moral idea, then the human rights discourse must be rescued from its abstract, disengaged universality and placed firmly in the context of localized moral discourses and the practices from which these discourses derive their sustenance.

Another—much more brutal, but perhaps for that very reason, more effective—way of putting the entire matter may be as follows: A serious and mature human rights advocate must already know—and act in ways which shows that he or she knows—what it is like to be, for instance, a good father or a good mother, a good friend, a good husband or a good wife, a good member of a community, a good citizen, and, if she is in academics, a good researcher. Otherwise, human-rights talk is likely to be not much more than hollow rhetoric and worse—talk inspired by ulterior motives.

If what I have said is right, then it has very important consequences. One of these is that human rights cannot be just a matter of following rules—of doing the 'right' thing. This is because morality or being moral is not just a matter of rights and duties—it involves active engagement in phronesis or *satyagraha*. Another, related, consequence is that the primary human rights discourse cannot be a discourse of legality or law. The law book is the quintessential book of rules. While rules may be useful, the reduction of human rights issues to issues of legality, is likely to displace them from the centrality that they ought to have in our moral life. Yet another consequence is that solemn universal declarations of our commitment to human rights must be taken—to put it very mildly—with a pinch of salt. This is not, of course, an expression of cynicism, it is rather a reminder that morality is a much more serious business than making declarations, in spite of the undoubted importance of declarations particularly in public spheres.

There has been a growing demand for the inclusion of human rights as part of the regular curriculum of college and university education. I wish to end this note with a word about the implication of what I have said so far for the 'teaching' of human rights. Teaching of human rights must be as subtle as teaching of morality itself. A curriculum for such education in our formal educational institutions must begin with the enormous assumption that the proper place for such education is not perhaps the classroom itself, but practices where human beings enter into relationships which require the judicious exercise of virtues such as kindness, generosity, courage and even justice not in the legalistic sense but in the everyday sense in which it involves the adequate appreciation of the other's point of view. One great instrument of moral education is the stories we are told and listen to again and again with undiminished attention in our childhood. The political correctness of such stories may be questioned from time to time—but this is also an acknowledgement of their effectiveness. What we need perhaps are new stories about terrorism, fundamentalism, wars, about human diversity, about children and women—stories which are told with the powerful naturalness of the folk-story and heard with loving attention.

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MRINAL MIRI

Comments on the Note entitled 'The Idea of Human Rights' by Mrinal Miri

Professor Miri argues, in 'A Note on the Idea of Human Rights' (This Journal, p. 159), for rescuing the human rights discourse from the modern western anchorage in what he calls 'disengaged universality' of *reason*, i.e. in the notion of unencumbered Cartesian rationality of clarity and distinctness presumed to be potentially common to all human beings. This rationality, with its pristine universality and uniqueness, is held to be the source of human *freedom*, and human *dignity* is said to consist in upholding this freedom. Since every human individual is potentially rational in the aforesaid sense, every individual is therefore the potential locus of freedom and dignity. And since every individual can—or has the potentiality to—exercise freedom through reason, the individual has therefore the *right* to a kind of life-space within which she or he can live with freedom and dignity.

It is this 'liberal-humanist-universalist' ideology underpinning the human rights discourse that Professor Miri is most critical of. The disengaged reason of modern epistemology, the abstract 'view from nowhere' conception of rationality, 'can only be a helpless spectator, or at best a hollow dictator' when it comes to bringing to light what *exactly* are the

universal and unique human rights of practical relevance. For, as he contends, such rights can be discerned only from within the dense and complex practices of actual life—i.e. in our 'active intelligent engagement' in moral practices. It is not in abstract, disengaged rationality, but in concrete, engaged reason, that we can find the real sources of human rights.

The fulcrum of Professor Miri's counter-argument is the idea that the notion of a human right is primarily a *moral* notion. Once the indisputable morality of human rights is acknowledged, the inevitable intimacy of the link between human rights and the *good life* becomes immediately apparent. But, then, questions about how the notion of a human right enters into the idea of the good life, what place it has in the hierarchy of goods, and how it plays a clarifying role in situations of moral perplexity, are such that abstract, universal, procedural rationality cannot, according to Professor Miri, effectively deal with them. These questions, which are questions of the practical relevance of the human rights, can be dealt with by reason in its engaged role in localised moral practices. Professor Miri cites Aristotle's **phronesis** and Gandhi's **satyagraha** as paradigm examples embodying the notion engaged reason effective in the judicious discrimination of right conduct and attitudes from wrong ones in particular moral situations.

What seems to me central to Professor Miri's critique of the liberal-humanist-universalist theory of human rights is his reiteration of the *primacy* of the good over the right. The morality of a human right consists in its ultimate grounding in the good life. But the good is not something which is 'open to an uncluttered, disengaged rational view'. Rather, it comes to light gradually, painstakingly, 'in one's thoughtful active engagement in more or less dense, more or less complex situations'. If this is Professor Miri's view, then it in fact assigns to human rights a *secondary* status relative to the primary, and foundational, status of human goods. A theory of human rights would then be wholly derivative from a theory of human goods, or the good life.

Professor Miri's account may thus be characterized as a *virtue-theoretic* account. Towards the end of the Note, while discussing the issue of the education of human rights, he suggests that the right place for such an education is not so much the formal classroom as the practical situations of relation which require 'the judicious exercise of virtues such as kindness, generosity, courage and even justice ... in the sense in which it involves the adequate appreciation of the other's point of view'. This is perspicuously a virtue-theoretic thrust given to the idea of human rights.

This thrust is crystallized in Professor Miri's edifying recommendation that human rights education, which is essentially moral education, be imparted through *stories*—'new stories about terrorism, fundamentalism, war, about human diversity' and so on. These stories, gripping as they are to infantile minds, are illustrations of reason's active engagement in realizing the virtues of the good life. Through these 'virtuous' stories one learns what it really means for something to be a human right, and thereby comes to know how the important human rights determine the shape of a good life.

I think that the virtue-theoretic account of human rights, based on the primacy of the good over the right, is quite tenable, and it is also an appropriate antidote to the liberal-humanist-universalist theory of human rights. But it also bespeaks of the ultimate *reducibility* of rights to goods. This consequence seems inevitable from the way Professor Miri develops his position, even though he fears that a non-detailed working out of his critique of the liberal-humanist-universalist position might yield the impression that 'for me there is little use for the idea of human rights'. The virtue-theoretic view as developed in this Note seems to amount to saying: where there is no question of goods, there is no question of rights. Rights are there only to the extent goods are there to set the direction of a worthy life.

If Professor Miri's line of thinking is pushed to its logical limits, the emerging view would, I think, be tantamount to something that he is rather hesitant to subscribe to—namely that there really is not much use for the idea of human rights. For whatever is involved in the idea of a human right is already incorporated in the content of the good life. The education of human rights would therefore not be anything additional to the education of the virtues constitutive of a worthy life. And the clamour of so-called 'solemn universal declarations of our commitment to human rights' carries no extra moral imperative than the utmost urge to remain committed to the cultivation of virtues which would ensure a good society—a society free from the atrocities of war, terrorism, fundamentalism, gender and racial discrimination, economic deprivation, corruption and other evils.

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Comments on Dr. Mukand Lath's Comments on the Article Entitled 'Imaging Time in Music: Langer's View and Hindustani Rhythm' by S.K. Saxena published in the *JICPR* Vol. XVII No. 1

Dr. Lath's critical reaction to my essay is a bit too bold. The two terms of the relation I have discussed are Hindustani rhythm and an aspect of Langer's aesthetics. Dr. Lath, it appears, is a stranger to both. He speaks of rhythm, more than once, as an art which is based on *ālāpa*. This is not only ambiguous but incorrect, as I hope to show a little later. And as for his familiarity with Langer's aesthetics, its slightness is borne out by his own words:

> 'I do not remember Langer's views, and I had read her book *only cursorily* and quite long back" (italics added).

Now, I do not mind Dr. Lath's forgetting what he read *quite long back;* such dimming is natural, with the passage of years. But I certainly feel pained at the way (he says) he read Langer's book. Essays in philosophical aesthetics are not to be read 'only cursorily'. Such reading is no aid to intelligence; and if it becomes a habit, it can even lead to imprecision in writing.

But, of course, it is not enough to generalize. I should proceed piecemeal; and, to be fair to Dr. Lath, strictly in the light of the words that he himself uses. So I now set out to put, one by one, the various points that he makes; and my response immediately after each point, so as to make for easy comprehension:

> (a) "Making Langer a *purvapakṣa* does not seem a happy idea. Langer does not belong to a sophisticated tradition of rhythm *making* where *alapa* is central to the process" (second italics added).

A part of what this extract contends may be put thus. I should not have focused on Langer's view because she is not a *maker* of rhythm. Now, I admit that I have no evidence to show that Langer ever *made* any rhythm. But, as a *philosopher* of art, she has surely made a serious attempt to *understand* what rhythm is. Does Dr. Lath wish to suggest that, to turn to *our* music, one should try to understand the views only of those Ustads or Pandits who create rhythmic cycles or patterns, and not of those aestheticians who seek to understand what our rhythm is, may be on the basis of their own long experience of listening to recitals of rhythm, discriminatingly?

> (b) After attending to the word, *making,* in the extract I have cited, let me now consider its closing words: 'a sophisticated tradition of rhythm making where *ālāpa* is central to the process'. Later, in his comments, Dr. Lath also attributes to me the view that *'tāla* as parallel to the *rāga,* [is], an independent *ālāpa* based non-representational art.' Here, I rejoin thus:

Our own tradition of rhythm, as both practised and comprehended, is of course highly sophisticated; but it surely does *not* centre on *ālāpa*. A little attention to the words which Dr. Lath actually uses is enough to show where and why he goes astray. The *process* he speaks of can only mean the act of rhythm-making. The paradigm of *ālāpa*, on the other hand, is provided by the non-verbal music (also *sans tāla*) that precedes the singing of a *dhruvapada* composition which is duly set not only in a *rāga*, but in a *tāla*. The making of rhythm, whether in the form of playing the basic cycle or in that of weaving rythmic patterns, proceeds all along on the basis of, if not in direct correspondence with beats (or *mātrās*) that follow each other at a carefully guarded even pace. Further, unfaltering and recurring—and, at times, also adroitly designed—return to the focal beat (or *sama*) is also an essential feature of rhythm-making in the field of *Hindustani* music to which alone my essay relates. The making of *ālāpa*, on the other hand, is surely not marked by any such feature, though in the case of some *dhruvapada*-singers of today *a very slight and passing suggestion* of evenly placed vocal emphases does seem to occur when the pace of *ālāpa* is intentionally quickened, after the initial reposeful stages. But the suggestion, I repeat, is quite subsidiary. And as for the semblance of a cyclic return to the focal beat, it is just not there in the *ālāpa* I speak of. So, as an actual form of music that is available to us today, *ālāpa* can in no way be said to be central to the process of rhythm-making. Dr. Lath seems to be utterly unaware of the details I have distinguished. This is why he commits the mistake of suggesting that *ālāpa* is central to the process of sophisticated rhythm-making. The error is blatant, and is not at all covered up by his partriotic appeal to the Indian tradition and scholarly references to famous names and key concepts relating to our traditional thinking on the arts. And if he thinks, as he evidently does, that I hold and have even *argued for* the view 'that *tāla* like *rāga* is an independent *ālāpa* based non-representational art', it is perhaps because he has read my essay quite as cursorily as the book of Langer he refers to. (I do not name the book because he too does not!). If I have argued for the autonomy of rhythm as a distinct art, as I surely have, it is on the basis of some quite

different features, such as the uniqueness of its material—which comprises not only beats, but *bols*—and of its criteria of evaluation.

Incidentally, may I here draw readers' attention to the way Dr. Lath has phrased his remark I just cited: '*tala* like *raga* is an ... art.' So to speak is ambiguous, if not downright erroneous. It is common and proper to take art as a kind of mak*ing*; and *rhythm* as mark*ing* time or as keep*ing laya* even. Thus, as activities, both are similar to each other. *Raga*, on the other hand, has no such direct affinity with activity. It is simply the concept of a melodic whole or matrix having an integrated and specific perceptual character, though of course the proper *singing* of a *rāga* may well be said to be an art. I find it difficult to blend such casualness in the use of words with genuine regard for our traditional scholars who often looked on verbal propriety as almost a sacred requirement; and the aplomb which yet shows up in Dr. Lath's comment on my essay therefore amuses me.

(c) The close of his criticism is a virtual reprimand. It accuses me of (almost) committing the theoretical sin of ignoring traditional Indian thought on the subject, '(the) more so because I am an Indian and am thinking about an Indian art'. What can I say to this except that I wish Dr. Lath had also shown the way to my possible redemption by pointing out at least one clear error or deficiency in my theoretical concern with the art of rhythm (as it obtains today) from the viewpoint of traditional art theory which he is probably conversant with? The mere suggestion that 'thinking in the Indian conceptual context will ... prove richer and more stimulating' is hardly of any help to me. It is simply a general, offhanded remark made condescendingly.

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Reaction on the Expression Ghato-Ghatah by V.N. Jha published in the *JICPR,* Vol. XV, No. 2

Dr. V.N. Jha's argument is not clear. By drawing our attention to the definition of अन्योन्याभाव, provided by the Naiyayikas, he seems to argue that since पट etc. objects have the difference of घट, घट has to be admitted as having घटतादात्म्य and hence the expression 'घटो घटः' conveying the same, is quite acceptable. But, what I fail to understand, is as to why Dr.

Jha takes the trouble to prove the identity of jar in the jar. घटतादात्म्य in घट, is a universally admitted fact and there is no necessity to prove it by referring to the definition of अन्योन्याभाव. Anyway, Gadadhara's discussion in व्युत्पत्तिवाद, aims at finding out the reasons for the absence of the expression—'घटो घटः'. This implies that none has ever doubted the absence of such expressions. But, Dr. Jha seems to hold that since घट has घटतादात्म्य, there must also be an expression conveying the same and 'घटो घटः' could be such an expression. If this is his view, I think it is not justifiable. For, let alone in Sanskrit, in no other language, are such expressions found. For instance, in English, we come across the expressions such as 'a blue jar', 'a red jar' etc. But we never find the expressions like 'a jar jar'. This shows that whenever two words in the same case affix, which generally denote the objects that stand in the relation of identity, are used then they are such that they denote different properties. The expression 'घटो नीलः' is an example. The two words that are here, denote the objects that are related by the relation of identity and the properties they denote viz. घटत्व and नीलत्व are different from each other. But, in the case of the alleged expression 'घटो घटः' it is not so. For, the two terms denote the same property namely—घटत्व. In short, an expression like 'घटो घटः' can not convey the identity of jar in the jar, for the properties denoted by the two terms are not different.

Then the question may arise as to how the identity of a jar in the same can be conveyed. The answer is simple. It can be conveyed by the sentences such as 'घटो घटाभिन्नः' or 'घटः घटतादात्म्यवान्' etc. The difference between the alleged expression 'घटो घटः' and the above sentences, is too obvious and needs no explanation.

The Naiyayikas hold this view, mainly with regard to verbal cognitions and a non-verbal cognition wherein both qualifier and qualificand are presented through one and the same property, can occur. Nothing can prevent us to infer 'घटः तादात्म्येन घटवान् घटत्वात्'. The inferential cognition produced by it, would have घट as both qualifier and qualificand, and तादात्म्य as the relation.

Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati D. Prahalada Char

A Note on Identity Relation

Professor N.S. Dravid, following the line of Gadādhara, has tried to highlight the meaninglessness of the tautology as found in the case of identical statement. So far as my understanding goes, the defect of tautology as found in the West is not accepted in Indian Logic. To him nothing can be supposed to be located in itself by the identity-relation although everything is self-identical. To this point I beg to differ, because each and every object becomes *abheda* with itself. The *abheda* means 'the absence of mutual absence' (*bhedābhāva*). If it is possible logically to say that something is different (*bheda*) from something, it is quite natural or there is also a logical possibility of saying that something is *not different* from something. If *bheda* becomes an object of description, why not *abheda*? That an object is non-different from itself is an *'information'* in the true sense of the term, because in terms of 'non-difference' an object is known as different from another. In the Nyāya-framework the absence called *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence) would become 'inconceivable' or 'meaningless' if there were no idea of '*abheda*' i.e. the absence of mutual absence. Any idea of *bheda* presupposes the idea of *abheda*. For this reason *bheda* (*anyonyābhāva*) is defined in terms of *tādādmyasambandhāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāva* (i.e. an absence, the absenteeness of which is limited by the relation of identity). Without the acceptance of identity the *anyonyābhāva* (*bheda*) cannot be admitted as a form of *abhāva*. I do not know in such cases how the position of Gadādhara can be defended.

Professor Dravid argues that if the epistemic qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the epistemic qualificand (*viśeṣya*) are not different from each other, the cognition cannot be determinate at all. If in this context determinate cognition is taken as a *savikalpaka* knowledge then the definition of it may be considered carefully. It runs as follows: '*Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-samsargāvagāhi jñānaṁ*' (i.e. a cognition in which qualifier, qualificand and their relation are revealed). In the present case of 'A jar is a jar', the first ('a jar') is to be taken as a jar existing in proximity to our eyes and the second one ('a jar') is taken as a jar seen earlier and in between these two there is a relation (*saṁsarga*) called *tādātmya*. Though the same word (a jar) is used at both the places, the first one may be taken as a qualificand and the second one is a qualifier and *tādātmya* (identity) is the relation. Hence it is a case of determinate cognition. In our daily life we generally make such identity-statements in the above-mentioned sense and there is a successful communication with others. Once a friend of mine came to my house on the occasion of *Sarasvatī pūjā* in my childhood. Customarily if some guest comes during this occasion, he is given some *prasāda* (some eatables sacrificed in the name of the goddess). When my friend was given a plate full of *prasāda*, he took a small portion of it. When he was asked the reason for not taking the rest, he answered boldly, '*Prasāda is Prasāda*'. I didn't have any difficulty to understand the import of the sentence though I didn't read philosophy at that time. He wanted to mean that *Prasāda* does not lose its sanctity and purity if taken in a small portion, because it is virtually a *prasāda* which cannot be compared with other objects. As it is *prasāda,* the quantity of it is irrelevant. Hence, these statements cannot be totally ignored as meaningless.

Lastly, I would like to know from the scholars whether there is any Sanskrit term for expressing '*tautology*'. If it is translated as '*punarukti*', then what may be the differentiating factors between *punarukti* and *tādātmya* (identity). It seems to me Professor Dravid did not make a distinction between these two, but in the West there is a distinction between them. However, even if the sentences like '*ghaṭo ghaṭaḥ*' are taken as tautology, they may be taken as virtuous ones, but not vicious. Whatever is stated in the form of a sentence in the Indian Logic is material, but *not* merely a formal one. Hence there is hardly any sentence which is meaningless in the context of Navya Nyāya if it possesses conditions like *ākāṅkṣā* etc. Any sentence which is determinate must be 'relational', which entails some meaning. The terms like hare's horn (*śaśaśṛnga*) etc. do not convey any meaning as they are absurd entities (*alīka*) which do not come under any category (*padārtha*) accepted by them.

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Comments on the Note of Prof. Rudolf Brandner's Published in the *JICPR Vol. XVI No. 2*

Professor Rudolf Brandner in his letter to you (published in *JICPR*, Vol. XVI, No. 2) tries to show that your approach to understand Indian Philosophy is fundamentally defective. In his letter he not only explains your defect, but also tries to delineate the correct approach towards understand-

ing Indian Philosophy, or for that matter any other Philosophy. According to him every culture or cultural tradition has its characteristic feature which is peculiarly its own. And he seems to think that this peculiarity or speciality of a culture cannot be understood by any method other than the one which is in 'empathy', as it were, with it. As, according to him, you have tried to understand the special feature of Indian Philosophy with the help of what he calls the method of scientific-technological rationality, your approach in his opinion has been defective.

But I do not feel very happy about what Professor Brandner thinks about your approach towards understanding Indian Philosophy. Let us first try to understand what the Professor takes this method of scientific-technological rationality to be. According to him this method originated in the West; so it can very well be called a method of the Western model. And even though this model according to him is not in perfect harmony with the Western tradition, it is surely a 'reconstruction of the fundamental principles of occidental philosophy and its religious traditions' (p. 143). (I fail to understand how this method is a reconstruction of the occidental religious traditions.) He also acknowledges that this method 'is unifying the entire humanity into one and only one *valid* (my italics) way of relating to things' (p. 142). But, despite this, he does not find it suitable for doing philosophy. And he feels certain that even you 'must not have felt too comfortable writing the sentence: "Surely, the term *ānvīkṣikī* comes as close to it (= the word philosophy) as one may want it to be" ' (p. 144). For him philosophy cannot be *ānvīkṣikī* at all (p. 144).

Now, the question is: If Philosophy is not *ānvīkṣikī* or any kind of critical analysis, what is it after all? It appears to me that, according to the Professor, Philosophy is just an enterprise for understanding the basic spirit or genius of a cultural tradition in its pristine form and glory. He says, 'We need a very high level of competence for any attempt to conceptualize the different thinking traditions; and central methodological problem for me remains the phenomenological reconstruction of the basic concepts of each of these traditions. Put into strong terms I think that every application of a concept originated within the realms of one tradition onto the other is methodologically faulty and theoretically unacceptable' (pp. 144–5).

Thus, according to the Professor, the task before philosophy is to understand the essential conceptual structures of the different cultural traditions. And there must not be any attempt to change those structures, nor to impose them on to any other cultural tradition. But then the question

arises: Can this sort of approach be regarded as genuinely philosophical? It cannot be gainsaid that the conceptual structure of any *thinking* (my italics) tradition must contain some theoretical or cognitive belief or beliefs. And because no such belief can be subjected to any scientifico-rational examination as stipulated by the Professor, it can very well be any bizarre thing whatsoever. *Mokṣa* (taken literally and not metaphorically), Virgin Motherhood, Sonhood of God, Creation of the world by a Divine Decree, Noughting to Nothingness, etc., are some examples of such bizarre things. And the Professor agreeing fully with the above approach has no hesitation in dubbing your attempt to show Indian Philosophy as being not *mokṣa*-centred to be quite funny.

But then it is surely very lamentable that philosophy should be deprived of both its universal scope and its critical function. Human beings are after all rational beings and because of their rationality they can very well understand, communicate with and criticize one another. Your understanding the Professor's letter and his understanding and criticizing your book could not have been possible if there would have been no rationality in both you and him. It should also be noted that your understandings of each other have been possible despite your belonging to two different cultures—yourself to the Eastern and the Professor to the Western.

It will not be beside the point to mention here that whenever any question regarding the factual truth of any cognitive belief of any culture will arise, it is not a 'phenomenological reconstruction' that can clinch the issue. In all such matters it is only the science-based rational enquiry that can play the decisive role. How else can *mokṣa* (taken literally and not metaphorically) be authenticated or rejected, if not by a science-based rational enquiry? Cultures indeed have boundaries, but truth can hardly have any. A culture can very well give a style of life, but it cannot justify that style by itself. In such matters it is only the critical reason or *ānvīkṣikī* that can foot the bill. Has not Professor Brandner himself taken help of critical reason in regarding your approach as defective? And was he not philosophizing when he was taking such help? I am afraid nobody can avoid rational enquiry or *ānvīkṣikī* if he really wants to do philosophy.

But then, it is quite possible that I have not been able to understand the Professor at all. In that case I sincerely beg to be excused.

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NITYANAND MISHRA

Agenda for Research

(1) How is Vātsyāyana's discussion in the Upodghāta to his Bhaṣya of the Nyāya Sūtra carried on by Udyotkara, Jayanta Bhaṭṭ, Vācaspati Misra I, and Udayana. Vatsyāyana starts his Bhāṣya on the Nyāya Sūtras with an Introductory Note entitled Upodghāta wherein he extends the notion of Pramāṇa Vyāpāra to apply to all living beings, as they all seek pleasure and avoid pain. This is the exact meaning of *Artha* according to him and Karma in the sense of Prvṛtti-Sāmarthya which is supposed to attain them. The original reads as follows:

[वा पृः १; टी पृः १; प पृः १]

प्रमाणतोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तौ प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यादर्थवत् प्रमाणम्। प्रमाणमन्तेरण नार्थप्रतिपत्तिः। नार्थप्रतिपत्तिमन्तरेण प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यम्। प्रमाणेन खल्वयं ज्ञाताऽर्थमुपलभ्य[१] तमीप्सति वा जिहासति वा। तस्येप्साजिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य समीहा प्रवृत्तिरित्युच्यते। सामर्थ्यं पुनरस्याः फलेनाभिसम्बन्धः। समीहमानस्तमर्थमभीप्सन् जिहासन् वा[२] तमर्थमाप्नोति जहाति वा। अर्थस्तु सुखं सुखहेतुश्च, दुःखं दुःखहेतुश्च[३]। सोऽयं प्रमाणार्थोऽपरिसंख्येयः प्राणभृद्भेदेस्यापरिसंख्येयत्वात्।

अर्थवति च प्रमाणे प्रमाता प्रमेयं प्रमितिरित्यर्थवन्ति भवन्ति। कस्मात्? अन्यतमापायेऽर्थस्यानुपपत्तेः। तत्र यस्येप्साजिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य प्रवृत्तिः, स प्रमाता। स येनार्थं प्रमिणोति विजानाति[४] तत्प्रमाणम्। योऽर्थः प्रमीयते ज्ञायते तत्प्रमेयम्। यत्तदर्थविज्ञानं सा प्रमितिरिति। चतसृषु चैवंविधासु तत्त्वं[५] परिसमाप्यते।

किं पुनस्तत्त्वम्? सतश्च सद्भावोऽसतश्चासद्भाव इति। सत् सदिति गृह्यमाणं यथाभूतमविपरीतं तत्त्वं भवति। असच्चासदिति गृह्यमाणं यथाभूतमविपरीतं तत्त्वं भवति। कथं पुनरुत्तरस्य प्रमाणेनोपलब्धिरिति? सत्युपलभ्यमाने तद्वदनुपलब्धेः प्रदीपवत्। यथा दर्शकेन प्रदीपेन दृश्ये गृह्यमाणे तदिव यन्न गृह्यते तन्नास्ति। यद्यभविष्यदिदमिव व्यज्ञास्यत, विज्ञानाभावान्नासतीति। एवं प्रमाणेन सति गृह्यमाणे तदिव यन्न गृह्यते तन्नास्ति। यद्यभविष्यदिदमिव

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१. तमर्थमभीप्स० TC २. ०मभीप्सन् जिहासन् वा Om J ३. सोऽयं प्राणभृन्मात्रस्य व्यवहारः, प्रमाणेनार्थमुपलभमानस्तमर्थमभीप्सन् वा जिहासन् वा समीहमानस्तमर्थमाप्नोति वा जहाति वा added J ४. विजानाति J ५. अर्थतत्त्वमिति बहुत्र; तत्त्वं प्रमाणवार्त्तिकभाष्ये पृः ४०१।

व्यज्ञास्यत। विज्ञानाभावान्नास्तीति। तदेवं सतः प्रकाशकं प्रमाणमसदपि प्रकाशयतीति। सच्च खलु षोडशधा व्यूढमुपदेक्ष्यते।

How does this affect our understanding of the Prāmāṇa Vyāpāra in the context of Nyāya? In this connection it will be interesting to find whether Udyotkara, Jayanta Bhaṭṭ, Vācaspati Miśra I and Udayana show any awareness of this contention in Vatsyāyana's work and, in case they do so, how do they deal with it.

(2) Śaṁkara in his discussion on Adhyāsa in the Bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtras clearly states that there is no such rule which says that Adhyāsa can *only* occur between one perceptual object and another. The original reads as follows:

न चायमस्ति नियमः पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरमध्यसि तव्यमिति, अप्रतत्य षोडपिह्याकाशे बालास्तल मतिनताद्यदय स्यन्ति।

It will be interesting to know if this observation of Śaṁkara has been accepted in the Advaitic tradition, starting form Vācaspati Miśra I's commentary on the Bhāṣya of Śaṁkara. Also, in case Śaṁkara's statement is taken seriously, what effect will it have on the ontological status of the world?

Focus

(1) Attention is drawn to the material available on tapes prepared by eminent specialists on various philosophical issues and available from the Teaching Company, 7405, Alban Station Court, A-106, Springfield, VA 22150-2318, USA.

Presently, the following material is available:

1. Philosophy of Mind (12 Lectures) by Prof. John R. Searle, University of California.
2. Philosophy and Religion in the East (32 Lectures) by Prof. Phillip Cary, Eastern College.
3. Philosophy and Intellectual History Part-I (12 Lectures), Part-II (10 Lectures), Part-III (10 Lectures) by Prof. Phillip Cary, Eastern College.
4. The Great Ideas of Philosophy (50 Lectures) by Prof. Daniel N. Robinson,* Georgetown University.
5. The Great Minds of the Western Intellectual Tradition (70 Lectures) by Prof. Darren Staloff, City College of New York, and Prof. Michael Sugrue, Princeton University.
6. The Birth of the Modern Mind: An Intellectual History of the 17th & 18th Centuries (24 Lectures) by Prof. Alan Kors, Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania.
7. Plato, Socrates and the Dialogues (16 Lectures) by Prof. Michael Sugrue,* Princeton University.
8. Greek Legacy: Classical Origins of the Modern World (12 Lectures) by Prof. Daniel Robinson, Georgetown University.
9. No Excuses: Existentialism and the Meaning of Life (16 Lectures) by Prof. Robert Solomon, University of Texas.
10. The Search for a Meaningful Past: Philosophies, Theories and Interpretations of Human History (16 Lectures) by Prof. Darren Staloff, The City College of New York.

Intending scholars may write directly to The Teaching Company, 7405, Alban Station Court, Suite A-107, Springfield VA-22150-2318, USA.

(2) Jewish and Arabic philosophy are little known in this country. And, though there are books dealing with them, there has been little attempt at seeing them in the background of a comparative

perspective provided by outstanding philosophical thinkers in the Western tradition. A recent book entitled *Jewish and Islamic Philosophy: Crosspollinations in the Classic Age* by Lenn E. Goodman, Professor of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee attempts to do just this and brings to our attention the names of philosophers like Muhammad Ibn Zakarya al-Razi, Saadiah Gaon, Bahya Ibn Paquda, Avicenna, Maimonides, Ibn Khaldun, and Baruch Spinoza, unknown to us.

The contents of the book are as follows:

1. Crosspollinations
   1. Hearing God's voice in words
   2. He who knows himself knows his 'Lord'
   3. God's act in history
2. Razi and Epicurus
   1. Perception and sensation
   2. Pleasure and pain
   3. Desire, motivation, and free will
   4. Razi's ethics and the ethical transparency of hedonism
3. Bahya and Kant
   1. The antionomy
   2. Bahya's response
   3. The philosophical impact of Bahya's approach
4. Maimonides and the Philosophers of Islam
   1. Creation
   2. Theophany
5. Friendship
   1. Friendship as reciprocated virtue
   2. Biblical, Rabbinic, Maimonidean and Qur'anic fellowship
   3. Miskawayh on friendship
   4. Friendship in al-Ghazali
6. Determinism and freedom in Spinoza, Maimonides and Aristotle
   1. Aristotle's determinism
   2. Maimonides' determinism
   3. Spinoza's determinism
   4. Spinoza's defence of human freedom
   5. Maimonides on character and freedom
   6. Freedom and *akrasia*
   7. Conclusion
7. Ibn Khaldun and Thucydides
   1. A science of history and civilization
   2. Governance in history

(3) Attention is drawn to a philosophically important distinction between Abādhita Jñāna and Bādha-Yogya-Vyatirikta Jñāna in the work of Sri Purshottama Pitambara entitled *Prasthāna Ratnākara*. The author belongs to the Vallabha Sampradāya and is said to have lived in the seventeenth century. The distinction is philosophically important as it raises the question whether the knowledge that has not been refuted or disproved is of such a nature that it can not be disproved or refuted, in principle, ever.

The exact text reads as follows:

तत्र प्रमाणशब्दो भावष्युत्पन्नोऽबाधितज्ञाने वर्तते बाध्ययोग्य व्यतिरिक्ते च करण व्युत्पन्नस्तु।

DAYA KRISHNA

Notes and Queries

(1) How are the Nyāya Sūtras 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 related to each other. The Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.1. enumerates the 16 padarthas and relates them to the achievement of Nishreyas, while the Sutra 1.1.2 mentions Duhkka Janma, Pravṛtti, Doṣa etc., and hence ends in apavarga which is supposed to be achieved through a removal of Mithya Jñāna regarding them. There seems to be, therefore, two unrelated, independent, themes in the Nyāya Sūtras which, *prima-facie*, do not seem to have any relation to each other. The Nyāya scholars may enlighten us on the issue as to how the two things have been integrated in the Nyāya tradition from the Sūtras onwards.

(2) How is the view of Abhinava Gupta embodied in Kashmir Shaivism different from the one that is embedded in Advaita Vedānta, Samkhya, Vigyanvada Buddhism.

(3) Do the Advaitins regard the Upaniṣads as *Apauruṣeya* or the word of God? It cannot be the latter as the Advaitins do not accept Iswara and regard it as a part of Māyā. In case it is the former, how can it be accounted for as the Upaniṣads are not only plural in number, but many of them are selections from the Samhitas, the Brahmanas and the Aranyakas, and the selections must have been made by some persons.

DAYA KRISHNA

Book Reviews

FRED DALLMAYR AND G.N. DEVY, eds. *Between Tradition and Modernity: India's Search for Modernity. A Twentieth Century Anthology.* New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1998. pp. 376. Rs. 395 (cloth), Rs. 225 (paper).

The theme of the relationship (or situation) of tradition and modernity with reference to India has been written about by many scholars, Indian and non-Indian, over the last many decades. The earlier bipolar model (tradition *versus* modernity) was abandoned in the 1960s when we read about 'the modernity of tradition' or 'the modernization of tradition'. It is now generally agreed that in an over-all societal and cultural framework elements from both tradition and modernity (of what has been received from the past and what has been newly created) coexist, sometimes in easy juxtaposition, sometimes in a creative dialectical relationship, and at other times in conflict resulting in displacement of what is already present or rejection of what is new.

The book under review illustrates the complexity of the tradition–modernity interface in India in the twentieth century. Being an anthology, the argument proceeds piecemeal and not always in smooth progression. Its interest lies not so much in the argument, but in the variety of ways and with the varying emphases with which it is put forward.

Part One, entitled 'Colonialism and the struggle for national independence', comprising readings by twelve authors, covers familiar ground. All the major authors one would expect to have been included here, from Vivekananda to Jawaharlal Nehru, are present. The only surprise perhaps is Jiddu Krishnamurti with extracts from discourses on 'Freedom' and 'Nationalism'. Needless to emphasize, that his conception of these ideas is different from the more commonly held positions. Thus, we have his compelling definition of freedom of 'action outwardly' as being entirely dependent upon 'a mind that is free from inward authority', that decides spontaneously or 'choicelessly'. Otherwise one is a 'follower' and, therefore, 'a second-hand human being'. Rejecting all authority (of *shruti, smriti* and *sadachar*), Krishnamurti seems to embrace the fourth pillar of *dharma,* namely *atmatushti*. He himself does not invoke this four-fold classification, but that is what the argument seems to me to be all about. Similarly, while many would say with Krishnamurti that nationalism carries with it

'poison, misery, and world strife', how many would maintain that nationalism can 'disappear only when there is intelligence'?

Part Two, 'Modernization and its Discontents', comprises readings by another set of twelve authors, all published after the end of colonial rule. The emphasis on the discontents rather than the benefits of modernization as the focus reveals the editors' preference and determines their choice of authors. Gandhi's thought, represented in Part One by excerpts from *Hind Swaraj* and two other readings, is a backdrop for Part Two. His critique of industrial civilization is invoked in several contributions, including the first, which is a seminal piece by A.K. Saran on 'Gandhi's theory of society and our times'. Saran maintains that, contrary to what the modernists believe, Gandhi did not want 'to put the hands of the clock back', but rather 'to set them to another noonday' (p. 215). This is thoughtfully said. Under the garb of the familiar, the traditional and the religious, Gandhi's endeavour was uniquely and wholly original, not so much in its elements as in its holistic approach. And yet, as Saran notes, it was not fruitful, perhaps because it asked for more than people were willing to offer.

Saran's essay sets the tone for this part of the book. Other contributors include Rajni Kothari, Ashis Nandy, Thomas Panthem, Ranajit Guha, Romila Thapar, Ramchandra Gandhi, U.R. Anantha Murthy and Wahiduddin Khan. Kothari goes well beyond the conventional framework that looks upon 'development' as the way out of the stranglehold of the past of which socio-economic inequalities and poverty are seen as inalienable aspects. He looks beyond the public and private sectors to the people's own good sense and initiatives. His emphasis on the humane and the ethical is noteworthy, but one wonders whether he underestimates the importance of leadership.

Romila Thapar looks critically at the conception of tradition, emphasizing, first, its constructed (or imagined) character and, then, the uncritical postulation of an ancient, homogeneous and tolerant Hindu tradition. Her views are of considerable significance in these days of Hindutva advocacy. The birth of Hindutva becomes intelligible in the context of colonialism which gave birth to a nationalist upsurge. Ranajit Guha's piece illumines some aspects of the historiography of colonial India, emphasizing the need for going beyond the elite or 'top down' view of events and giving voice to the 'subalterns', the people at the bottom. Ramachandra Gandhi and Sudhir Chandra recall K.C. Bhattacharya's call given in the late 1920s for 'swaraj' in ideas.

It is perhaps the novelists U.R. Anantha Murthy and Nirmal Verma who sum up best the dialectic of tradition and modernity—of the view from inside and the view from outside. Murthy writes: 'I would not have been a fiction writer if it were not for the impact of the scepticism of the modern civilization on me. And also, I must add, the kind of fiction writer I am is due to my quarrel with modern civilization' (p. 325). And Verma echoes this insightful observation: 'Two traditions, Indian and European, are seeking a sort of completion in one another, not through a philosophical discourse or mutual cross questioning, but by creating a "common space" within which the voice of the one evokes a responsive echo in the other, feeling the deprivations of one's own through the longings of the other' (p. 352).

In short, the book comprises a selection of 34 readings, of which the first 21 are familiar (with a couple of exceptions), and the latter 13, representing contemporary thinking, innovative and (I think) more interesting. The editors provide a useful introductory essay and notes on authors.

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PREMA NANDAKUMAR: *T.V. Kapali Sastri,* Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1998, pp. xii + 126, Rs. 225.

Many contemporary Indian scholars, academic as well as non-academic, have enriched the philosophical tradition in several ways. Like the classical commentators, they are 'builders' of Indian philosophy in the twin areas of pure and applied philosophy. The present monograph is the one in many others like B.G. Tilak, J. Krisnamurti, Kalidas Bhattacharya, K.C. Bhattacharya, M. Hiriyanna, P.N. Srinivasachari, P.T. Raju, Rabindranath Tagore, R.D. Ranade, Sri Aurobindo, T.M.P. Mahadevan and Tilak, published in the series called 'Builders of Indian Philosophy'. It is the first full-length study of Kapali Sastri, intended to be an introduction to his multifaceted writings.

Apart from a brief introduction pertaining to the series in which the book is published, and the author's Preface, the book consists of ten chapters, entitled: (1) Life at the feet of the masters; (2) The philosophical background; (3) Vedic pathways; (4) Upaniṣadic sādhanā; (5) Tantra

sādhanā; (6) Homage to men of God; (7) Upāsanā; (8) Commentator of contemporary scriptures; (9) Translator; and (10) The philosophical poet. It is followed by a bibliography listing books authored by Kapali Sastri and those referred to by the author of this book, as also an index listing authors and Sanskrit works and words.

Not much information is given about herself by the author, nor by the publisher, except that she is a daughter of Professor K.R. Srinivasa Iyenger whom she had watched speak and write about Kapali Sastri during the latter's centenary celebrations, that she drew closer to the great scholar-devotee and began to understand his great achievements in different fields and his love and regard for Vāsiṣṭha Gaṇapati Muni, Ramaṇa Maharshi, Sri Aurobindo and the Mother, that she was aware of her own shortcomings, and yet she felt the love of the divine Mother for her weakest child when she was blessed with the privilege of giving the Commemoration Address on 'Mysticism: Mystic Poetry', that she began an adventure of studying Sastri with increased fervour when Professor R. Balasubramanian asked her to prepare a monograph on the savant, that her husband's name is M.S. Nandakumar, and that she is a close student of classical and modern Tamil literature, and that her publications include *A Study of Savitri, Dante and Sri Aurobindo.*

The first chapter gives an outline of the life of Kapali Sastri and his nurture at the feet of the three great masters mentioned above. Thus, we are informed that Kapali was born on 3 September 1986 in Mylapore, Madras, that his father, Visweswara Sastri, was a Sanskrit scholar attached to the Connemara Oriental Library, that the family belonged to the Sāmavedic branch of the Bharadvāja *gotra* and was known for its Sanskrit scholarship and expertise in traditional ritualism as well as *Śrī-vidyā upāsanā,* that the son was named Kapali after Śrī Kapālīśvara, the presiding deity of the Mylapore temple, and that his father initiated the son into Śrī-vidyā and study of the *Sāmaveda* quite early. By the time Kapali was twelve years old, he had read the *Rāmāyaṇa* twelve times over. The young Kapali made it daily to the shrine of Śrī Lalitā Tripurasundarī at Tiruvottiyur where he would repeat the *Srī-vidyā mantra* 1008 times.

But, being no blind, ignorant adherent of the Vedic system, he watched keenly as he grew older the preeminent sway the Vedic hymns held over each and every aspect of the Hindu's religious, spiritual and secular lives. After studying Sāyaṇa's *bhāṣya* on the Veda, his intuition indicated that there were other worlds within the hymns for man to capture and open new pathways to knowledge and growth. He had already been made aware

of Madhvācārya's intuitive interpretation of select Sūktas from the Ṛgveda, of the Indian renaissance that had brought about the reflowering of Vedic studies, of questioning the interpretation of the Vedas offered by Western writers, of Swami Dayanand Sarasvati, who considered the Vedas as directive scriptures for man's moral and spiritual perfection. These were but distant pointers, since Kapali wanted to know more about the Vedas that would help him take up a systematic study of the scriptures.

His aspirations were answered when he met the renowned scholar Vāsiṣṭa Gaṇapati Muni at the Tripurasundarī temple. For another quarter century Kapali was to be in close contact with this great teacher and imbibe the experiential knowledge of Tantra-sāstra and the inlaid significances of the Vedas, as also get inspiration to take up the writing of poetry, translations and commentaries of significant works on spiritual matters.

And, it was Gaṇpati Muni himself who took Kapali to Sri Ramaṇa Maharshi at Tiruvannamalai, and the Maharshi granted even on his first *darśana* the rare gesture of *hasta-dīkṣā* which helped the young man make an incredibly swift progress in his spiritual studies. Meanwhile, Kapali became a Sanskrit teacher at Muthiyalpet High School, Madras, where in 1914 he came upon the first issue of *Ārya* edited by Sri Aurobindo in whom he found God, since at the very first meeting with Sri Aurobindo it was indeed a supernal experience for Sastri to come face to face with this spiritual Agni.

In 1927 he married happily to Parvati Ammal, and teaching school children was a welcome vocation, since now he had also all the leisure he desired for his scholarly studies, the worship of Śrī Lalitā Tripurasundarī and meditation. Two years later, when he was forty-two, he resigned his job in the Muthialpet School on 21 May 1929, and joined the Ashram at Pondicherry as a disciple of Sri Aurobindo, and an unswerving devotee of the Mother, after Sri Aurobindo announced that She would be in direct charge of the spiritual life of the *sādhakas.* Sastri's wife was a true *sahadharmacāriṇī* and was accepted by the Mother, who gave her the assurance, 'I am with you.'

On 17 June of that year Sastri's mother passed away, and the same year he suffered another grievous loss in the sudden passing away of Gaṇapati Muni; but his faith being translucent, Sastri went on with his *jñānayajña;* and these Ashram years of him were full of unceasing literary work. But, probably the greatest crisis in his life occurred on the day when Sri Aurobindo entered Mahāsamādhi on 5 December 1950. Yet Sastri bore the thunderbolt with the characteristic calm of a Vedic sage. And, even as

he continued to be an ideal and beloved disciple of the Mother during his lifetime, Sastri was also a compassionate *guru* for those who came to him for spiritual guidance. Kapali Sastri passed away on 15 August 1953.

In Chapter Two, the author has tried to provide the philosophical background to highlight the scholarly personality of Sastri, particularly since it could not have been all that easy to have accepted Gaṇapati Muni, Ramaṇa Maharshi and Sri Aurobindo as Masters at the same time, for the three were widely apart in their philosophical outlook and methodology of *sādhanā*, and Sastri may have passed through the dark nights of the soul, about which he has left some stray records, but has left much unsaid as well. Having come under the cover of each of them, Sastri followed their particular pathway and achieved certain insights by synthesizing his experiences and emerged as a mature *jñānin,* a pure *bhakta* and a perfectionist in works as we know him. Sastri's first encounter with Gaṇapati Muni gave him an assurance about the correctness of the age-old practices in Indian tradition. Sastri had been taught the efficacy of *mantra-sādhanā*. He had received the training in Vedic recitation (*veda-adhyayana*) and was longing to understand the power behind the Vedic hymns, and Gaṇapati Muni could explain them each with ease, thanks to the clarity of perception acquired through penance (*tapasyā*). For one who was launching on the pathways of the spirit, Gaṇapati Muni was the right introduction.

When Gaṇapati Muni took Kapali to Ramaṇa Maharshi, a new path opened before the young man, who had learned from the former the possibility of a psychological interpretation of the Vedic hymns. For him the presence of the Maharshi was an entirely different sort of experience. Whereas it was an onrush of poetry, scholarly discourse, ritual worship and ready wit and humour in the presence of Gaṇapati Muni, a massive silence greeted Sastri in the person of the Maharshi, who was an effulgence of knowledge. The *Ramaṇadarśana* revolves around the pronouncement: 'Ask yourself, Who am I?' It rises from what the Maharshi experienced, and his writings, consisting of several verse clusters centered on the Arunachal experience written in Sanskrit. Sastri has written a commentary on it titled *Śri Aruṇācala-pañcaratna-darpaṇam.* Quite obviously Sastri was drawn to the philosophy of the Maharshi because of the simplicity and certainty embedded in it; was a perfect blueprint for individual realization. And, Sastri never lost contact with the Maharshi's philosophical writings which enriched the timbre of his own writings on philosophy and yoga. The student of the Vedas, penance and the Vedantin moulded and blossomed so far under two great masters and at last found his final

port of call in Sri Aurobindo who, however, did not negate the earlier ones.

In the third chapter the author outlines the Vedic pathways treated by Sastri. The mass of writings Sastri has left behind illumine some of the difficult aspects of our glorious heritage. At the apex of his works are his English writings on the Vedas, his Tamil translation of the Agni-sūktas and the Sanskrit commentary, called Siddhāñjana, on the first Aṣṭaka of the Ṛgveda. Although his discipleship under Gaṇapati Muni was of immense use at the start of his Vedic studies, it was his contact with Sri Aurobindo's writings and the Aurobindonian yoga that turned out to be a blaze to reveal the significances of the Vedas to him. He noted the twofold language of the Vedic hymns, one, the exterior image (a Vedic deity or an action) and two, the esoteric significance; while the former helped in the conduct of a society's rituals, the latter could be understood only through personal perseverence like meditation and yoga. It was obvious that the Vedic sages had given prime importance to intuition and experimental verification. He further noticed that in the middle ages, intuition was sidelined while intellectual philosophizing on the one hand and ritualism on the other took the stage.

Kapali Sastri firmly belonged to the school of intuitive interpretation. He felt that European scholarship, in spite of its sincerity and analytical intelligence, had done a disservice to Vedic studies, and more than the Europeans, it was the modern Indian mind which tended to accept uncritically the European views that has done the real damage. A study of the Vedic hymns shows that their Ṛṣis among the Vedic populace were spiritually sensitive and capable of intense contemplation leading to an intuitive recognition of the planes beyond the visual one, rather than being prehistoric cavemen. They were the few gifted representatives and turned out to be tremendous barrier-breakers and flaming pioneers. Sastri realized that it would be a folly to hold on to the traditionalist interpretation of the Vedas by Sāyaṇa, of the 13th century, as the whole truth, since it came more than a thousand years after the Vedic seers and their first available commentator Yāska who refers to other interpretations of the Vedas from the viewpoint of spiritual knowledge. Sastri skillfully dissects the position of the Mīmāṃsakas who hold that Vedic dharma consists in simply performing their Vedic sacrifices in the traditional manner. He accepts their immense capacity in explaining texts, but according to him, this leads us but to a dead end, since such traditional interpretations cannot get at the inner import of the Vedas. The seers have 'seen' and

'heard' them, not merely imagined them. Sastri quotes Yāska as saying that only those who do *tapasyā* can understand the meaning of the mantra. However, this aspect of the Vedas was lost for centuries. Fortunately, seven centuries ago Madhvācārya and his follower Rāghavendra went back to the spiritual interpretation and said that the deities act as special instruments of Lord Viṣṇu, and the same prayer acts as a direct approach to the supreme Lord if seen through their etymological *(yaugika)* background. Sastri notes that Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Paramasiva Iyer have tried an exploration of the *Ṛks* by departing from the traditional ritualistic interpretation. However, Sastri feels that Sri Aurobindo's *Hymns to the Mystic Fire* acts as an ignition key for understanding the entire spiritual mass, since it is based on his yogic vision. Fortunately for Sastri, Sri Aurobindo went through his commentary, Siddhañjana, which is thus an important Sanskrit document for the Aurobindonian *paramparā* of Vedic studies; and brilliant as it is, it has a sun-clear introductory background statement (*rg-bhāṣya-bhūmikā*), in which Sastri makes it clear at the very outset that he explores the Veda 'for understanding of the esoteric sense, in accordance with the Light (of Wisdom that is Sri Aurobindo) unaffected by the bonds of ritual without understanding.' His commentary which deals with the First Aṣṭaka of the Ṛgveda was taken up when he was sixty; he came to this obviously ordained job almost by accident, when some friends familiar with his in-depth scholarship requested him to give a word-for-word meaning of the hymns in Sanskrit so that they could translate it into Hindi. Thus, one hundred and twenty-one hymns are studied in depth in his commentary. This commentary shows how the scholar has had to wrestle with each word. Sastri's mastery of the existing commentaries and other works in Sanskrit is breathtaking; we find herein a worthy disciple of Sri Aurobindo.

The fourth chapter serves to present Sastri's Upaniṣadic sādhanā. The Upaniṣads have a vital place in the Vedic tradition as they are bridges of understanding which connect the esoteric symbolism of the Vedic hymns and the Itihāsa-purāṇic efflorescence of later days. Sastri's studies in the Upaniṣads are also an isthmus for they connect his Vedic exegesis and Tāntric formulations; they are a purposive extension of the Aurobindonian territory. Sri Aurobindo has translated the *Īṣa* and the *Kena* Upaniṣads with commentary considering the Upaniṣads as extension of the Vedic parameters, rather than a revolutionary turning away from the so-called Vedic ritualism as has been held by European scholars. This launched Sastri on an intense reading of the Upaniṣads, which he found mapping

the pathways for man to exceed himself, so as to enable each aspirant to choose the one most helpful for his attainments. Each of these pathways projects one or more programmes of *sādhanā*, generally known as *vidyā*. Scholars have enumerated as many as thirty-seven *vidyās*, as taught in the Upaniṣads. Sastri has chosen to write in detail about six of them in his classic, *Lights on the Upaniṣads,* viz., *Bhūmā-vidyā, Praṇa-vidyā, Śāṇḍilya-vidyā* and *Vaiśānara-vidyā* from the *Chāndogya, Naciketa-vidyā* from the *Kaṭha,* and *Madhu-vidyā* from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka.* Kapali Sastri himself has given no reason for his choice of the *vidyās* except that he sought to work on the Upaniṣads not dealt with in detail by Sri Aurobindo. The closing movement of Sastri's book brilliantly ties up the various *vidyās* as a shining necklace. He had chosen the *Chāndogya* as the main plank for the volume because many of the *vidyās* enumerated in this Upaniṣad are discussed in the *Brahma-sūtras,* which in their turn happened to become the major base for the testing of different systems of philosophy like Advaita, Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita. Sastri draws our attention to Sri Aurobindo 'who finds that each of the realizations is true and the truth of and one need not and does not nullify the truth of any other.'

In Chapter Five, Tantra Sādhanā, the author endeavours to describe the Tāntric aspect of Kapali's life. While the Vedas provided him with the base of mysticism, and the Upaniṣads gave pointers for the possibilities of mystic disciplines, the Tantras gave him the actual mystic experiences that lead to realization. Being initiated into the Tāntric worship of Tripurasundarī at an early age, his taking up the Aurobindonian *yoga-sādhanā* was but an extension of his early Tāntric predilections, as Sri Aurobindo's yoga has elements of Tantra as well. Sastri's biography of Gaṇapati Muni, *Vāsiṣṭha Vaibhavam* refers to his many-sided genius which achieved the heights, be it in the Vedic studies, Śāstric knowledge, *tapasyā, japa,* or poetry. Sastri's *Mahāmanustava* carries the quintessence of his experiences in meditating upon the supreme Mother as Śrī Lalitā Tripurasundarī, who, as Sastri says, guarded him from failures and led him to the Goal. It was her grace that enabled him to see her in the stone sculpture, bound him to sincerity and destroyed his ignorance. His approach to the Tantras was not mere academic interest. But he had a deep historical sense and hence the *Sidelights on the Tantra* gives us a complete view of the development of this spiritual discipline; but he confines himself to one segment: the worship of the supreme Mother, and as elsewhere, his guide for this study is also Sri Aurobindo. He agrees with the view that the Tantras conserved and explained Vedic truths, although they

obviously differed from the Vedic discipline in a significant manner. Setting aside the Buddhist and Jaina Tantras, as they turned away from the Vedic authority, Sastri takes up the last out of the Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva and Śākta Āgamas, for study and practice, because Tantras on Śakti have a special position also due to their totally liberal outlook. In this connection the author has elaborately explained this outlook in the remaining part of this chapter. With regard to the *anāhata-nāda* and *bīja-akṣaras,* Sastri rightly says that the psycho-physical power attributed to the seed-sound theory has been complemented by the findings of modern science, that the vibration of sound can be creative and destructive of forms. And, the power of the seed-sound opens up particular states of consciousness in the aspirant.

The rest of the chapters, six to ten, give the details of the concerned aspects of Sastri's life, as one who paid homage to Men of God, as an *upāsaka*, as a commentator of contemporary scriptures, and as a philosophical poet.

At the end of the book, the author has given a Bibliography of the books written by Kapali Sastri, and about twenty-four works referred to by her.

The author has done an excellent job, since it very lucidly and elaborately provides the highlights of the contribution of a highly valuable, memorable, spiritual, and scholarly personality, Kapali Sastri, who was a veritable legend in the Aurobindo Ashram for more than two decades.

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Jñānagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter from the Samdhinirmocana-sūtra: Study, Translation and Tibetan Text. John Powers. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. 1998. pp xii + 156, including index.

John Powers has established himself as one of the foremost Western scholars of Yogācāra thought. His fine translation of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* (1995) as well as his erudite discussion of the hermeneutic tradition regarding that text (1993) establish him as the foremost of contemporary scholars discussing the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* and its associated literature in any Western language. This small volume, which will be of

interest almost exclusively to those specifically interested in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* itself or Yogācāra thought more generally, confirms his scholarly stature in this field. The scholarship is meticulous; the introduction informative and judicious; the editorial work on the Tibetan text helpful and thorough, and the translation highly reliable.

The text presented in this volume is a brief commentary by the 8th Century (approx.) Indian Buddhist philosopher and commentator Jñanagarbha. The commentary follows and explains the 'Questions of Maitreya' chapter of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra.* This chapter is primarily concerned with the nature of *samatha* and *vipasana*, but also contains some brief, but important remarks on the proper understanding of the idealism defended in this sūtra and in related Yogācāra texts. The commentary follows the text closely, and contains a good deal of very useful clarificatory information, documenting the fact that the sūtra was understood at this time as firmly idealist. The commentary is hence a useful text for those who would study this sūtra, which itself is so important to the foundations of Yogācāra. It might (along with Sthiramati's important commentaries to other early Yogācāra texts such as *Trimsikākārikā* and *Mahāyānasutrālamkara* and *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāsya*) be cited to refute those Western scholars who recently and inexplicably assert that Yogācāra is not idealist (see Garfield 1997, 1998).

Powers notes in his introduction and reaffirms throughout the notes to the introduction and translation his debt to Professor Geshe Yeshes Thabkhas for oral commentary on Jñanagarbha's commentary and on the root text. This is indeed one of the great strengths of this book, and one that sets Powers' work apart from that of many others who work on Mahāyāna philosophy in the West. The Tibetan oral tradition represents the most continuous and important source of interpretative insight into this literature. Professor Yeshes Thab-khas is one of the greatest contemporary Tibetan scholars of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra and holds important oral transmission lineages. Powers' reliance on oral instruction from and discussion with such a scholar adds both depth and interpretative legitimation to his account. I emphasize this fact because many scholars either fail to draw on the riches of the Tibetan oral tradition, or—for fear either of minimising the importance of their own scholarship or of the stigma of 'going native'—hide that fact. Powers is to be commended for his forthright acknowledgement of his reliance on this oral tradition and for demonstrating its scholarly value.

The introductory essay is brief but informative. He brings together the scant evidence that we have regarding Jñanagarbha's life and offers a

carefully reasoned defence of the probity of attributing this text to Jñanagarbha, who is also credited with an important Svātantrika-Madhyamaka text—*Differentiation of the Two Truths* (Eckel 1987). Powers argues convincingly on doxographic grounds that it would make perfect sense for Jñānagarbha to comment on the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* from a Yogācāra point of view while writing the *Differentiation* from a Svātantrika-Madhyamaka point of view. This is plausible not only because of Jñānagarbha's stated view that both sets of teachings are authentic Buddhist doctrines aimed at distinct audiences but also because of the doxography defended in the dGe lugs tradition according to which the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* is relied upon by Svātantrikas as well as by Yogācārins. Powers also properly emphasizes the importance of the explicit idealism Jñānagarbha finds in the text. The introduction is also very explicit about the methodology utilised throughout, enabling the reader to approach the text critically.

A great virtue of this volume for the scholar of this literature is that it includes the complete Tibetan text. Powers relies primarily on the Peking edition, but has compared it carefully with the bDe ge and the Stog Palace editions, indicating all disparities clearly in the text, and indicating pagination in all editions. Those who read Tibetan will be grateful for such meticulous textual scholarship.

The translation is aimed clearly at Buddhologists and not at lay readers. Unlike Powers' very literary and fluid translation of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* (1995) itself, this work is lexically oriented, with great effort made to present insofar as English can do so, the structure of the Tibetan source text. At times I would argue that Powers goes overboard in this respect, producing very difficult-to-parse English renditions of rather clear Tibetan prose. But instances of this sort are rare, and in general the translation is readable and clear, if awkward English. For the most part the translation is precise and hard to fault. Of course any two translators will approach a text like this somewhat differently and I might make different choices in some places than Powers. But there is almost no place where I could seriously find fault with the choices he has made.

There is one exception to this generalization, however, and given its importance, and the attention Powers has given to these issues, it is a surprising lapse: On p. 42 Powers translates the discussion of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra's* presentation of the relationship between the three natures and the three naturelessnesses. In the crucial passage, the Tibetan phrase 'ngo bo nyid' occurs twice in each of a series of important verses—

once in a positive construction, and once in the negative 'ngo bo nyid med pa nyid.' It is clear that the sūtra is emphasizing the relation between each nature and its corresponding naturelessness here, and that the use of the same lexical item is crucial in the exposition. But inexplicably Powers—who is generally if anything overcautious in his attention to lexical details—translates this phrase in two different ways in *each* of these pairs of occurrences, thus both misleading the unwary reader and losing the sense of the original Tibetan both of the sūtra and of the commentary. In each case he translates its first occurrence properly as 'nature' and its second as 'entityness' (actually, inasmuch as the second occurrence is in the negative construction 'ngo bo nyid med pa nyid' as 'non-entityness.')

Now, leaving aside the ugly English neologism for perfectly good philosophical Tibetan, it is clear that the phrase is meant to have exactly the same sense in both of its occurrences in each of these verses and this is the only way the relevant text can make any sense. While the phrase is ambiguous, and can mean *entitihood* as well as *nature,* it is also absolutely clear that in this context it means *nature,* and that what is being explained is the relation between the three natures and the three naturelessnesses, a central topic for Yogācāra idealism, and a topic for which this passage is an essential source (Garfield 1997). Given the two semantically unrelated renderings of the same term, one of which is clearly misplaced—an error repeated throughout the entire discussion—the sense of this central and in fact rather clear text disappears completely in the English. This lapse is hence both important and unfortunate. It is also uncharacteristic.

Two other small errors should be noted. On p. 26 (English) Powers renders 'Zhib' (p. 96 Tibetan) as 'fourth', instead of 'subtle', reading 'bzhi pa' for 'zhib'. In the context of a discussion of the distinction between conceptual and analytical samādhis, where the sūtra is indicating that only the most *subtle* (not the fourth) samādhis are analytical, this misses the sense. On p. 29 (English) Powers renders 'za ba po' as 'the profound', instead of as 'the agent' reading 'zab pa' for 'za ba po'. This renders a distinction between the inner and the outer domains rather incomprehensible. Both of these, of course, are small errors of reading, but each significantly distorts the relevant section. Such errors, however, are rare in this text.

Otherwise, this is a very fine volume. It will not be to use of general readers, or to those with only passing interest in Yogācāra. But for those

for whom this literature and philosophical tradition is of focal concern, this is essential reading.[1]

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A Review of *The Doctrine of Karma*, Yuvraj Krishan, Motilal Banarsidas Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1997, pp. 650, Rs. 595.

Indian culture is so wide and varied, subtle and complex that even though its diverse theories and practices are most intimately experienced in their concreteness, yet they defy theorizations and conceptual formulations. In view of the spatio-temporal vastness, it has not been easy to fathom the depth and intricacies of the variegated Indian culture. Nevertheless, specialized study of any one of a few aspects of Indian thought, beliefs and practices, if pursued seriously, judiciously and insightfully, does help in their proper understanding and appreciation.

The book under review aims at the study of one such pivotal and differential theory which may enable us to understand the Indian psyche. The theory of Karma has, for centuries, exercised a pervasive and unmitigated influence on the Indian mind. It has deeply affected the Indian modes of thinking and ways of living of all people in all walks of life, age, denomination, etc.

[1]Thanks to Ven Soman Thackchöe for assistance.

The theory of Karma purports to explain the inequalities and travesties of human life and it is an undeniable fact that it has been resorted to by the laity and intellectuals alike; particularly in situations of trials and tribulations much succour and solace is claimed to have been derived from it. However, like many other theories of Indian thought, this has also been much misunderstood and maligned both within and outside the Indian tradition. The present work is not an exception to this.

There are different facets and diverse formulations of this theory and therefore it is very difficult to point out as to which one is the classical formulation. Every school and system of thought has put forth its own formulation suiting its own requirements and therefore it could be acceptable within that particular framework only. Any attempt to transport one formulation to an alien thought system would be like attempting to fix a square peg into a round hole.

By way of clarification it may be pointed out that the terms: law, theory and doctrine should not be used interchangeably which has been done many-a-times by the author of this book. The theory of Karma may be called law-like, but it is not law proper. Basically, it is a theory, a metaphysical theory and not an empirical one; hence it is not proper to demand or search for its empirical verification. Empirical data may substantiate a metaphysical theory but its justification need not be in empirical terms only. It could be that for a metaphysical theory adequate empirical or logical justification might not be available at a particular point of time and it may fall into cognitive disonance, but this does not amount to its falsification. Thus the working tenability of this theory can be maintained on the basis of its psychological utility.

It may be worthwhile here to discuss the underlying presuppositions of this theory and the author has also done so (p. 3 and pp. 195–200), as this would enable us to understand it in its proper perspective and its acceptance or rejection would, to a great extent, depend upon acceptance or rejection of those presuppositions. In a way, there can't be a satisfactory formulation or complete enumeration of the prerequisites of this theory. Nevertheless, broadly speaking there can be the following three main presuppositions:

(a) This theory assumes a Tacit belief in an order, particularly moral order, in the universe on causal pattern. Every event in the universe depends upon some necessary and inevitable causal conditions and

in case of the activities of a moral agent these conditions also constitute the causal collocation.

(b) It implies the nature of human being as a ratiocinative, free and responsible agent to whom attribution of agency and responsibility for the consequences could be apportioned.

(c) The doctrine of rebirth may be regarded as another presupposition of this theory, although some scholars may take it as its necessary corollary.

The volume comprises forty-seven articles on different aspects of the theory of Karma, divided into fifteen sections according to various related themes. It is a well-documented work containing a mine of information about several facets of the Karma theory. It covers a vast canvas and has a comprehensive sweep. There is a good collection of data with copious quotations and references. This reflects the hard and painstaking research undertaken by the author. In a voluminous work of 650 pages, he attempts to present an exposition of this theory in almost all the schools of Indian philosophical thought and many of the important texts. This apart, he also discusses some crucial issues related to or issuing from this theory. This makes the work all the more interesting and informative.

The book is in many respects, a good spade-work for further research in this field, but it may not be so beneficial for the general reader who might get confused due to variety in presentation. It must be stated that inspite of extensive research, there does not seem to be any system in the presentation of subject-matter resulting in repetitions (p. 3 and p. 26) contradictions (p. 9) and hasty generalizations (p. 20). For example, the author discusses ethical concepts in Vedic Saṁhitās and at the same time denies it (p. 9). It may be understood when one looks at the references quoted therein, since he is basically relying on the secondary sources and not on the original Vedas (pp. 14–16). There is a separate chapter on the Upaniṣads and yet the author discusses Upaniṣads while referring to the Saṁhitās (p. 6). Similarly while discussing Hīnāyāna and Mahāyāna, there is a mix-up of both the texts and the ideas.

It may be said without hesitation that proper arrangement of the subject-matter could have improved the quality and shortened the length of the book. Since it is a collection of different papers written and published by the author from time to time in various journals and magazines, he should have taken more care to make it a co-ordinated presentation. The author has discussed different issues pertaining to theory of Karma, both schoolwise and topicwise, but quite often his presentation has been hodge-

podge and there is neither logical order nor consistency of thought and he jumps from one idea to another or from one text to another (pp. 6–7).

In other words, this work does not evince philosophical acumen and one is at a loss to find analysis of contents. For example, it would have been better if the author could have pointed out distinctive contribution of different schools and thinkers and analysed the cognate concepts like *kāla, svabhāva, niyati, vidhi, bhāgya, puruṣakāra* etc. (p. 254 onwards) which could be either substitutive of or supplementary to the Karma theory. In doing so, the question of their specific meaning should not have been mixed up with their relative importance as causal factors in determining an individual's life and conduct. Particularly, there is a need to clarify the difference between: (a) past *karmas* and *daiva*; (b) *karmavipāka* and *niyati*. These terms should have been clearly analysed and co-related. Similarly the apparent synonyms like *daiva, diṣṭa, vipāka* and *niyati* etc. have been used in the context of exposition of Karma theory, but the subtle distinction in their connotation needs to be drawn out by referring to their individual differential features.

No doubt the author has marshalled exhaustive references at the end of each chapter, and the reader would naturally expect him to come up with constructing a positive theory but would be disappointed to find none. Uneven treatment of different schools and inclusion of some irrelevant chapters (32 and 46) also mars the quality of the work.

As regards the chapterwise contents of the book, it may be said about the Chapter I that the author has not been able to properly understand and appreciate the theory and practice of *Yajñakarma*. It is not to be understood in a ritualistic sense only, it has to be interpreted in the light of teachings of the Upaniṣads and the Gitā. It is only when *Yajña* is understood in a purely ritualistic sense that one finds it to be shorn of moral context. In fact the author himself refers to several ethical concepts and terms pertaining to pre-Upaniṣadic Vedic literature (p. 9 onwards). Therefore it is inconsistent on his part to deny presence of moral ideas in the Vedic thought. In fact the concepts like *svadhā, iṣṭāpūrta, pāpa, puṇya* etc. are full of moral overtones and it is not correct to exclude them from moral sphere.

Coming to the Upaniṣadic thought, the author talks of 'ambivalence' (p. 17) but he does not spell out or substantiate as to where he could discern such infirmity. Nor could he establish satisfactorily the 'contradictory trend of Upaniṣads' (p. 26). In fact, such sweeping remarks betray his lack of understanding of subtle and sophisticated Upaniṣadic thought. Besides

this, the concept of *svarāt, kāmācāra* etc. should not be understood as capricious, arbitrary agency as the author has mistakenly done. In fact, to use Kant's terminology, *kāmācāra* is comparable to the actions ensuing from 'Holy Will', a will that always wills good and never evil.

A question has very often been raised by the critics in respect of the compatibility of divine grace with the spirit of Karma theory. But divine grace and redemption are never unmerited. The Vedic and Upaniṣadic thought is very explicit on this point, it is a case of justice seasoned with mercy. In fact, devotion to God and God's grace do not abrogate the theory of Karma as is wrongly stated by the author (p. 115).

In Indian philosophical speculations, there are many conceptions of God. So, the concept of God should not be understood singularly, any consideration of the co-relation between God and application of Karma theory has to be undertaken within the conceptual framework of a particular school or system and any cross-reference may not be helpful in proper understanding of the same.

According to the author of the present book, the treatment of Karma theory in Mahābhārata presents its classical formulation. But he has not put forth the ground for this contention in the chapter concerned. While discussing Karma and the caste system (p. 101, 117, 455) the author should have drawn a distinction between birth in a particular caste based on previous Karma and the present Karma for being or not being in the fold of a particular caste. As per classical Indian social thought, there can be an upward or downward mobility in belonging to a particular caste and there was no rigidity in the caste system, particularly at the time of Mahābhārata. Very often the scholars working on caste-system or on the theory of Karma have tended to overlook this important point. Caste distinction is based on previous Karma, but it can be obliterated on the basis of present Karma.

Similarly, while discussing *dharma*, *adharma* (p. 108) in the context of the Karma theory of Mahābhārata, it should not have been forgotten that according to Mahābhārata, *dharma* and *adharma* are also related to *deśa*, *kāla* and *paristhiti* and there is also something called *āpaddharma* which provides a ground for situational morality as distinct from absolute morality.

As far as the chapter on Gītā (p. 121) is concerned, the author could have done well to distinguish *anāsakta* Karma from *niṣkāma* Karma. The Gītā advocates the former and therefore it does not exclude the role of *kāma* from the framework of *karmayoga.* Desire to act or desire to act for

is not incompatible with *anāsakta* Karma; it only rules out attachment to the consequences of Karma. In other words, in the framework of *karmayoga, jñāna, icchā* and *kriyā* all the three have a distinct role to play. When the Gītā talks of non-attachment to the consequences, it only means that the consequences are to be surrendered to the totality. In this way it is not merely non-attachment, it is to act for the sake of totality and in so doing there is no deprivation for the individual, because individual is a part and parcel of the totality; in the well-being of the totality, the well-being of the individual is also ensured. The author finds a paradox in the Gītā between *svadharma* and *niyatakarma* (pp. 115–16) but the paradox can be resolved if one undertakes a holistic approach.

The treatment of Karma in the chapter on *sāṁkhya-yoga* (pp. 141–8) is quite sketchy. There the concept of *lingaśarīra* should have been discussed as it is a distinct contribution of the *sāṁkhya* system. The author, however, uses the term *adṛṣṭa* and *apūrva* in the context of *sāṁkhya* system, apparently as synonyms (p. 146) which they are not. On the other hand, *apūrva* is the most important contribution of *mīmāṁsā* in respect of Karma theory and so the detailed implications of this important concept should have been worked out in a more elaborate manner.

No doubt, Buddhism highlights the fact that moral action is essentially mental, but this is not the original contribution of Buddhism, as the author has remarked (p. 162). This idea was already present in the Vedas. Further, annulment of the fruits of Karma through grace etc. was not a modification introduced by Buddhism, it was also inherent in the Upaniṣads. In the same way, the author writes (p. 72) that religious beliefs regarding Karma-*vipāka* are supported by religious justification but has not substantiated the point.

Although the author has remarked that the Jaina theory of karma is unique in its genesis (p. 39), yet he has not spelt out its uniqueness while discussing it. He says that Karma is essentially material according to Jainism (p. 32) but it is not clear from his presentation as to whether it could not be non-material also, particularly in the context of *bhāvāsrava* as distinct from *dravyāsrava*. Moreover, his statement that the material character of Jaina doctrine of Karma is traceable to Vedic *iṣṭāpūrta* (p. 33) is also not convincing; it is a far-fetched co-relation.

There are some basic infirmities in the book which evince either ignorance or carelessness of the author with original tradition of Indian texts. For example:

(i) he quotes Udayana as the writer of Nyāyavārtika (p. 203).

(ii) One comes across some confusing statements where his loose thinking (p. 264) and lack of maturity of thought is very clear (p. 203).

(iii) At many places, the author seems to be too influenced and misled by Western judgements, e.g. in the chapter on Sanskrit drama he does not even mention the name of the Sanskrit play (pp. 385–90), he is merely relying on Keith's view.

(iv) There seems to be an initial derailment in his understanding of Karma theory, otherwise it should not have been understood as a theory of retribution, but as a theory of attribution. In fact the greatest damage has been done to this theory by taking it or mistaking it as a theory of retribution. The operation of Karma theory could be explained as a retributive theory only if it is accepted as a mechanical process (p. 195). But since it is not incompatible with the grace of God or transference of merit, sharing and distribution of consequences is very much possible, hence the theory of Karma is a teleological process.

On the whole it may be said that although the present work is a naive and simplistic understanding based on immature thinking and secondary sources, yet the author has sufficient material at hand which has been skilfully utilized. It is a good collection of data but there is no analysis of contents or any logical development of the theory. The author may do well to bring out a revised edition which is more concise and concerted, systematic and analytical like that of *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*, so ably edited by Wendy O'Fleharty. But this is not in any way to undermine the unstinting labour put in by the author. Even in its present form, the book may be recommended for the different types of readership. The printing is pleasant and the three appendices alongwith a detailed bibliography and the indices will be undoubtedly useful for further researches in the field.

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Comments on Reviews

Comments on V. Shekhawat's Monograph on Rational Historiography by C.K. Raju

RESPONSE

In fact C.K. Raju should have been asked to revise his review of my Rational Historiography since there are obvious inconsistencies in his pronouncements, yet, since it has been passed on to me for response, I have to say that the two major points that he makes are that I have not made a proper distinction between 'science' and 'non-science/psuedo-science' and therefore my history-of-science is actually a history-of-something-else-than-science. Secondly, that although I claim the historiographical method developed here to be rational, it is so only at a surface level and thus not strictly so.

C.K. Raju prefers the term 'traditional systems of knowledge' for Vidyā-Śāstra-Tantra body of knowledge and wants to reserve the term *science* for contemporary science only. But we may ask: is the concept of science methodologically quite well marked in contemporary times? Ought we to understand science strictly in the sense of natural science or ought we to include in it social sciences also? Are Anthropology and Psychology sciences? If we delimit the concept of science only to natural science, this would give rise to a radical problem: Are human sciences possible at all? On the other hand, there has been growing discontent/concern amongst contemporary scholars/scientists that the 'model' of natural science is not adequate for human sciences and a search for *alternative* models of science has been going on for quite some time in human sciences/psychology. Aware of these problems while writing the history, I have accepted only that body of knowledge of ancient/classical India as science in which there is some criterion of *rationality* and some respect for *empirical facts*, for we cannot expect the methods of ancient sciences to be exactly like those of modern natural sciences. These criteria are fully well satisfied at least in all the Śāstras that have been counted. Further, if we gloss through some works on history of Greek science, for example, it will be found that they considered Ethics, Politics and Rhetorics also as sciences (*episteme*) and moreover they thought that these could be axiomatized on Euclidean geometrical model. Similar will be the case in the history of Chinese

sciences. Therefore, since no well-demarcated concept of 'science' is available, there can be no reason why Raju should accept 'social sciences' as 'science' and reject the received sciences as 'traditional systems of knowledge'.

A characteristic feature of indigenous sciences that one can notice was the element of 'ritual' present in these. Thus, for example, in Vāstu Śāstra, raising of an *iṅdra dhvaja* is part of *vidhāna*. Or, for that matter, in Ārogyā Śāstra, various herbs and metals were properly 'worshipped' before these were prepared as medicines. But even on this count we cannot argue that the seekers of these sciences were not strictly scientists, for we cannot expect the scientists of those days to be so secular in outlook as to separate the ritual from the theory. We may say that *science* itself has *evolved* over millennia and modern science actually stands on the shoulders of ancient Indian, Greek as well as Chinese sciences. The debt of modern science to Greek science has generally been recognized by Western historians and it is up to the Indian historians to show how indigenous sciences have influenced Greek sciences themselves—as well as post-1600 CE modern science.

Not that modern science has evolved to a point of saturation. Recent explosion of research in psychophysiology in the study of altered states of consciousness has brought into focus indigenous Samādhi Śāstra—a science which Raju will perhaps be most unwilling to accept as science—and has the potential of giving rise to the possibility of permanently altering human consciousness under controlled conditions. This, in turn, can radically alter the methodology of modern science itself by increased focus on the observer rather than on the observed.

In order to avoid the dangers of uninformed criticism and for a thorough appreciation of indigenous sciences and the conceptions of rationality adopted by these, my forthcoming volumes on Theories and Methods may be read.

This leads us to Raju's second scepsis regarding the rationality of my historiographical methodology itself. The reason why Raju is enabled to raise this point is that he has not been more cautious in thoroughly appreciating the notion of *siddhi* in indigenous logic. The conclusion is derived or deduced in indigenous logic from two premises, namely a *hetuvākya* which is perceptually true and a *dṛṣṭānta vākya* which is true by virtue of being empirico-practically self-evident. Thus, the truth conditions of premises ensure the truth of the conclusion and the possibility of false premises leading to false conclusion is not entertained at all. Now, it is

important to note that this notion of *siddhi* does not admit of any distinction between formal and empirical, rather the two are integrated at the very root in the conception of the *yukti*. This gives us an insight into the indigenous conception of rationality itself. The beauty of this way of conceiving the *yukti* is that it admits of a notion of *puṣṭi* merely by replacing of the *dṛṣṭānta vākya* by a *vṛttānta vākya* without altering the logical structure of the *yukti* as such. And this *puṣṭi*, though not as rigorously deductive as in case of *siddhi*, is suited most for construction of history. Now, here again, Raju thinks that only such propositions can be claimed to be theorems as are established strictly in the manner of Euclidian geometry. But history is not mathematics, neither is mechanics mathematics; (Newton's theorems in his *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*[1]); nor is ethics mathematics (Spinoza's theorems in his *Ethics*).

Here again, it may be remembered that 'rationality' of Euclid's geometry was challenged long back by Labachevsky and new developments in multiple logics over the past few decades have compelled rethinking on rationality in general and on the notions of deduction and proof in particular.

But a more compelling reason for why I became interested in developing rationalist historiography has been that history—at least in India—has tended to remain the handmaiden of politics. Very few Indian historians have shown respect for facts—some suppress while others cook the facts. History, however, is not a platform for perpetrating lies nor is it propaganda. If, thus, history has to be a science, it must account for *all* the available facts and causally explain the process of event unfolding. I have steadfastly stuck to these criteria in the present construction—it is these criteria which compel the interpretation of Vāma Tantra as a rebellious counter-trend and *vijñāna* as due to intervention of external history. Thus, my project aims at exactly the opposite of what Raju alleges—to discourage personalized narratives.

* * *

The issues that Professor Chattopadhyaya has raised in his Foreword and which Raju reiterates are quite significant. Thus, for example, it is difficult

1. Although Galileo had earlier employed the term science for his mechanics—Two New Sciences—Newton still preferred the term *natural philosophy*.

to swallow that persistent interventions of Turks, Afghans and Moghuls (1200–1700 CE) had no influence whatsoever on indigenous culture. It may, however, be noticed that at the very outset, I make a distinction between *cultural form* and *cultural materials/civilization.* The two jointly form a culture-civilization-complex of which the core is cultural form as the work of reason largely. When external history intervenes on any culture-civilization-complex, the changes in civilizational structures are quick to accrue for there seems no principle of selectivity operative here but cultural form only *selectively* receives those ideas and conceptions which harmonize with it. Thus, I do not deny that civilizational structures underwent change due to the aforesaid intervention—in fact a heterogenous Indo-Moghul civilization came into existence during 1550–1700 CE in which new symbols in architecture, painting, music, poetry, foods, dresses etc. appeared. But historical evidences only indicate that the cultural form remained uninformed of the presence of Turk-Afghan-Moghul intervention. The reasons for this, as already pointed out, could be that the intervening forces themselves were not interested in any serious investigation of *vidyā-śāstra-tantra* body of knowledge; and that the vibrant *śāstra* phase had already declined and reached its finale so that hardly any minds were available to investigate whatever 'knowledge'/sciences the forces of external history brought with them. The analysis of this earlier intervention becomes easier if we contrast it with the succeeding Greco-European intervention (1700–1947 CE): they not only made serious investigations in the history of Indian culture-civilization-complex in general and *vidyā-śāstra-tantra* body of knowledge in particular, but also created a middle class or intelligentsia for administrative-bureaucratic purposes which then pursued modern science. The reason why I have not taken up the consideration of these interventions of external history in the present work is that my chief objective here has been to work out a *history of cultural form* and not of cultural materials/civilizational structures, or, for that matter, of the entire culture-civilization-complex.

My interpretation of Tantra phase as a paradigmless phase of seeking, raises many fundamental issues about the concepts of paradigm as well as of science. On the one hand, Tantra seeking cannot be said to be *strictly cognitive* if it was paradigmless and for that very reason it cannot be claimed to be science proper for science is pursued under paradigms. Now, the minimum requirements for a paradigm to come into existence in cognitive seeking are, firstly, that there must be a paradigmatic system of knowledge providing a fairly broad world-view to serve as a beacon for

widespread and prolonged pursuit; secondly, that there must be a well knit community committed to this world-view; and, thirdly, that the community must exchange ideas and debate the issues, and modify and improve upon the given within certain norms so that knowledge may *grow.* These criteria, at least, do not bring in any element of history so that the concept of paradigm is most suited to historical construction. Now, Tantra trend satisfies only the second criterion amongst the above as there was neither any paradigmatic system of knowledge serving as a beacon for they never classified disciplines and nor did they exchange any ideas and debated the issues whether with adversaries or amongst themselves. At least I have so far not come across any written record of any debate having taken place between *tantra*-seekers and *ācāryas/śāstris* of *śāstra* fold. Thus, in Tantra works, we find only certain recurring *themes* and freely undertaken *inquiries.* Moreover, Tantra pursuit was not merely cognitive either, as it stressed not merely the 'realization of truth' but *anubhūti* or actualization of truth as well as beauty as well as goodness simultaneously. One may here object that it is no business of science to actualize beauty and/or goodness and thus *tantra*-seeking must never be claimed to be an activity of science. But, we may ask, why science ought not be so conceived that actualization of beauty and goodness be also accommodated in it—that is, if not accepted on par with the actualization of truth? The complexity of Tantra seeking and the style and manner of its inquiries indeed compel us to rethink about the received and currently accepted notions of science!

Now, it would be a radical misconstrual of my approach if 'phase' and 'paradigm' are taken to be coextensive. 'Phase' is a concept of history—it ensures temporal division in time-span, like a wave succeeding another. Not so with 'paradigm' which, along with the concept of 'model', permits rational historical construction. A major problem faced by the investigators of history of indigenous sciences was that of situating in time various materials of the past. The problem was aggravated by the confusion created by British historians. Temporal division in phases coupled with the notions of paradigm and model as also repeated classifications of the body of knowledge facilitate proper situating of materials in our construction which, then, is its great advantage. Moreover, the DSSS-paradigm helps us exclude such claimants to science as, for example, *yajña vidyā* and *srāddha vidyā*—carry-overs from Kalpa Vedānga. This point, incidentally, refutes Raju's allegation that my conception of science is influenced by, or, even, sympathetic to the so-called post-modernist conceptions.

Science, howsoever conceived indigenously by a culture-civilization-complex, cannot be a mere system of beliefs and practices.

Thus, although it is difficult to find many takers of indigenous sciences in the English speaking elite of today's India, when the theories and methods worked out in these sciences are explored further, these can suggest not only alternative models of scientific method and rationality but can also help the formulation of a more comprehensive and mature conception of science in general. And why only the conception of science, the more fundamental conceptions of man, society, state and culture-civilization-complex, which the elite has acquired by virtue of a heavy dose of Greco-European conceptions and formulations, may be found to require re-examination. That, however, is not possible unless the elite acquaints itself with these sciences. It is, therefore, not surprising that Raju has nothing whatsoever to say in the entire review regarding the sciences themselves. Though Raju, thus, objects to granting a 'larger-than-life role to the British' in introduction of modern science in India, he, in effect, pleads for a unique place of modern sciences in history by denying indigenous sciences as science implying thereby that the history of Indian cultural form prior to the arrival of modern science is a history of obscurantistic jargon! As if the Greco-European British had undertaken the project of 'civilizing' India in order to be enabled to see this day only!! If these symptoms are indicative of anything, then it may be safely predicted that Indian culture-civilization-complex is never likely to reach the post-modern state in the manner of Greco-European culture-civilization-complex for it seems to be threatened apparently by a kind of delirium-due-to-overdose in the present state of rejuvenation and modernization itself.

Now, it has been suggested that there is an 'epistemological cleavage' between 'traditional systems of knowledge' and modern science. But what precisely is this epistemological cleavage? Has modern science discovered some unique means of knowledge in its methodology not accessible to earlier seekers of knowledge? Are we here not facing the same kind of situation as faced by the skeptics of the Transition Period when the Saṁhitā-phase-seers claimed access to special *sākśāt*? Unless the nature of this (fictitious) cleavage is spelt out and analysed, the eulogizing of modern science is destined to remain suspect.

Lastly, to mention but two ambivalences only in C.K. Raju's pronouncements: On the one hand he says that my historical account is 'highly personalized' while subsequently, as if to correct himself, commends my historiographic method. Again, while he insists on a distinction between

the tradition and the science, he also asserts that rejection of action at a distance in QM and Nyaya belong to the same pardigm(?). His review is more of a ruckus!

Dept. of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur-302004 VIRENDRA SHEKHAWAT

Comments on Review of the book entitled *Bhartiya Samaj* by G.C. Pande by Ananta Kumar Giri, published in *JICPR*, Vol. XIII, No. 3.

DESCRIPTION AND DEMAND
(Understanding the Social Thought of the Indian Tradition)

A text contains multiple meanings. When any interpreter explains it, he sticks to one of them and establishes it hierarchically above to the other meanings. Many of these 'other meanings' are not considered in a justified manner and many meanings get demolished and massacred even. Because of this, even after reading the review of the book *Bhartiya Samaj* (Govind Chandra Pande) reviewed by Ananta Kumar Giri (Understanding the 'Social' Through the Indian Tradition: The Ideal and the Real, *JICPR*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, p. 151) 'much more' about it remains to be mentioned. Here I am not going to explore the remaining and untouched aspects of the book: but just to point out the confusing constitution of certain demands made by the reviewer through his descriptions.

While discussing Pande's argument to make self-knowledge the foundation of sociological knowledge, Giri raises the question of the distinction between self-knowledge and self-delusion. He overlooks the fact that the question of distinguishing self-knowledge and self-delusion is part of a larger question, how do we distinguish knowledge from delusion. In fact, if something cannot be doubted and denied, it will not be knowledge, it will only be tautology. It follows that self-knowledge, like every other knowledge, must permit of self-delusion also. The criteria of distinguishing knowledge from delusion have been diversely formulated by philosophers without any finality. For all practical purposes, however, a pragmatic criterion is almost universally accepted. If some knowledge is found to be falsified in practice, then it must have been an illusion. This is true of self-knowledge also. If self-knowledge is inconstant or fails to deliver one from suffering, it is reasonably suspect.

It must, however, be remembered that self-knowledge in its transcendental aspect differs from empirical and logical constructs. All constructs have only limited truth, and yield knowledge subject to the possibility of error. Transcendental knowledge, on the other hand, is a kin to the 'higher immediacy' of Bradley. In so far as self-knowledge is transcendental, it is self-authenticating.

The interactive knowledge of self and other or the knowledge of persons as social objects is different from the transcendental knowledge ultimately presupposed in societal knowledge which directly is based on empirical self-consciousness. As Sankara says, empirical self-knowledge is compounded of truth and error, of the knowledge of the self and of the other.

Sociology as an empirical discipline cannot escape the magic circle of transcendental illusion. In fact, for a man to know himself in relation to another in dynamic interaction, he does not need to turn to sociology at all. Such knowledge is given to every man in his moral consciousness. It is only those who set aside moral consciousness, whether statesmen, generals or pirates who for predatory purposes need a set of scientific rules with which one could predict other peoples' behaviour so that they may be controlled in one's own interest. It is not without reason that sociology belongs to the age of imperialism.

Giri observes that Pande's work on religion, spirituality, culture and society privileges 'self' rather than 'other' (p. 175). But this observation places self and other in the same category and can only be described as a 'category mistake', to use the well known phrase of Professor Ryle. The only way to know the other is through self-knowledge and empathy. To confuse self-knowledge with an individual's knowledge of his particular self vitiates the very notion of self-knowledge. The whole quest for self-knowledge is to move beyond the separateness of selves. Dr. Giri starts by assuming the validity of a plurality of selves and thus of the ultimacy of their empirical particularity. Professor Pande's point of view, on the other hand, is that of Advait which is reflected in Vivekanand's quotation quoted in this very review 'As Swami Vivekanand tell us so forcefully: The Watch Word of all well being, of all moral good is not "I" but "thou". Who cares whether there is a heaven or hell, who cares if there is an unchangeable or not. Here is the world and it is full of mystery' (p. 175).

It is a strange argument that asserts that since the distinction of self and other may not be actually realizable, we should turn from the self to the other. No higher ideal is ever perfectly realizable. We do not thereby give up the quest. If we can not treat the self and other alike, shall we adopt the standards in injustice?

The reviewer puts another demand as follows:

> Pande argues that soul is neither objective nor subjective but does not describe its nature in this space of mediation. Nor does he discuss the sociological implication of such a perspective on soul (p. 176).

In fact the distinction of subject and object belongs to empirical knowledge. The nature of the self transcends the distinction. There is no question of the space of mediation. The reviewer seems to think that Atmvidya is valued as an 'ancillary' to sociology. He forgets the science of self is the ultimate science. Sociology is another name for 'vyawahar vidya' or 'niti'. Its usefulness lies in providing space for moral conduct or Dharma, which is turn prepares men for self-realization.

The reviewer perceives Pande's distinction of Purusa and 'prakriti' in Indian tradition as an 'outmoded' view of reality. He takes help of the symbolic power of quantum physics knowledge in the support of his perception, but he does not take the trouble of making Sankhya and quantum physics commensurable.

If the reviewer was aware of classical Advaitic argument, he would not confuse 'purus' and 'prakriti' with the distinction within the realm of physical science, nor is quantum physics any authority for misleading and arbitrary philosophical pronouncements. He attributes to Indian tradition the view that Brahmans are all 'purusa' and shudra's are all 'prakriti'. Such a strange opinion could not have been gained from any original authority. As I understand, Pande's book never affirms any such things. Nor does Advait vedānta distinguish between man and nature. For Advait vedānta all reality is spiritual.

The reviewer is not very clear about Pande's conception of caste system as reflected in the original texts (p. 176). In fact Pande does not at all defend the current caste system. He points out that the vedic system was different. The reviewer says that in the vedic time sudras were debarred from the reading of the vedas. This is a one-sided view, not a fact.

About the reviewer's observation about Pande's silence on the demolition of Babri Masjid, one would submit that the theme of the book is the long sweep of Indian History, not contemporary incidents, especially those which happened after the book was completed.

G.B. Pant Social Science Institute, Allahabad Badri Narayan Tiwari

Obituary

On the day of his retirement from the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University in May 1996 when the present author together with two former students of Pranab Kumar Sen presented him with a bouquet of red roses pinning up a card to it in which was written 'To Sir, With Love', she never knew that she would have to write this article in the near future. Philosopher-friends of mine might say that this only shows that in empirical contingent matters, at least, knowledge about the future is not possible. How, then, I wonder, could the attending doctors tell his family members on morning of June 22 that they would have to bid farewell to our immortal Sen that very day? The doctors were sincerely apologetic. But is knowledge expressed apologetically any inferior to knowledge expressed audaciously? No answer to this question, in fact, no rambling in epistemology is of any use here. The simple indubitable truth is that Pranab Kumar Sen, Professor Emeritus of Jadavpur University breathed his last in a Calcutta Nursing Home on June 22, 1999, after a brief illness.

Born on 20 May, 1931 in Calcutta, Pranab Kumar Sen was the second son of Shri Birendra Kumar Sen and Shrimati Kamalini Sen originally of Village Teota, Dhaka (now in Bangladesh) of undivided Bengal. Shri Birendra Kumar Sen, an M.A. in English and History, and a Jyotiṣvidyāvinode was the Headmaster of Ishwar Pathsala, Comilla (now in Bangladesh) for quite some time. Kabi Kaji Nazrul Islam, the revolutionary poet and freedom fighter, used to stay with the Sen family during his visits to Comilla. Later on he married B.K. Sen's cousin sister and became Pranab Kumar Sen's uncle. During the family's stay in Calcutta in the early and mid '30s B.K. Sen became the Inspector of schools, and what is most noteworthy is that he published the well-known Bengali journal *Nabarun* (meaning The New Sun) which was edited for some time in 1934–35 by Shri Manik Bandyopadhyay, the great Bengali literateur. For a certain period again the family had been to Rajshahi (now in Bangladesh) and there an intimate friendship grew between B.K. Sen and Late Gopinath Bhattacharya (one of the two famous philosopher-sons of K.C. Bhattacharya) who was then transferred to Rajshahi Government College and occupied a part of B.K. Sen's in-law's house as a tenant. As early as that, Pranab Kumar Sen came in close contact with Bhattacharya whom he began to address as 'Mama' (Maternal Uncle).

When the Sen family finally moved to Calcutta in 1943 Pranab Babu was admitted to Town School.

During his school and college days Sen used to learn English and Sanskrit grammar from his father every morning. In Calcutta Sen passed Ādya, Madhya and Antya examinations with brilliant results. After successfully passing Matriculation and Intermediate Arts examinations in 1946 and 1948 respectively he took admission in Presidency College, Calcutta in B.A. Class with honours in Economics. Gopinath Bhattacharya was then teaching here and as per his advice Sen attended some Philosophy Honours classes. It was Bhattacharya's class on Plato's *Republic* (most probably) that decided Sen's academic life and career. He switched over to Philosophy honours. So he got his B.A. degree with honours in philosophy in 1950, and Master's degree in Philosophy in 1952, both from the University of Calcutta. From the same University he obtained his Ph.D. degree in Philosophy in 1959 for his thesis on 'Kant's Notion of Self', and the prestigious Premchand Roychand Scholarship in Humanities for his dissertation on 'Some Problems Concerning Deductive Inference *and* Induction and Confirmation' in 1962. The history of his Ph.D. thesis is unique in character. Accompanied by Dr. Kalipada Baksi, one of his best philosopher friends, Sen occasionally used to go to his supervisor Professor Gopinath Bhattacharya for discussing philosophical problems. Bhattacharya never saw or read what Sen was writing—the former's precise argument was that since he would be one of the examiners of the thesis he must not read it before it was officially sent to him. As the last date of submission was knocking at the door, Sen hurriedly wrote within about two months his brilliant thesis in wood pencil with Baksi sitting beside him most of the time to correct any mistakes. It was typed by a professional typist and submitted to the university after binding. The manuscript has been carefully preserved by Sen's wife, Rama Sen.

It is not at all surprising that when Late Professor Bhattacharya was appointed Professor of Philosophy at Jadavpur University, in 1956, he immediately brought in Sen (of whom he was extremely proud), then a lecturer at Bangabasi College. By his stimulating teaching, meticulous scholarship and numerous publications of high quality Sen has imparted a character to the contemporary trend of philosophy in this part of the world. He received many academic distinctions and honours in his lifetime. He was Visiting Professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, USA, 1977–78, University of Poona, 1990, and Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1995. He was Visiting Fellow at Visva-Bharati,

Santiniketan, 1968, All Souls College, Oxford, 1983–84, Magdalen College, Oxford, 1988, a Commonwealth Academic Staff Fellow, Oxford University, 1972–73, a Specialist Fellowship Grantee, Helsinki University, Finland, 1973, a Senior Fulbright Research Fellow at the Universities of Chicago, California at Los Angeles, California at Berkeley, Harvard, Princeton and Pittsburgh, USA, 1977–78; a National Lecturer of the University Grants Commission, 1981 and a Senior Fellow, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi and Lucknow. He was a member of the UGC from July 1991 to June 1995. As an invited panelist he attended the Twentieth World Congress in Philosophy held in Boston, USA, 1998.

Late Professor Sen is the author of two invaluable books dealing with contemporary problems in Philosophy—*Logic, Induction and Ontology* (Macmillan, 1980) and *Reference and Truth* (Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi in association with Allied Publishers Limited, 1991). He has edited five volumes of Philosophical essays including *The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson* (jointly with Roop Rekha Verma), and published a large number of seminal articles in national and international journals and anthologies. Eleven scholars have received Ph.D. degrees under his supervision, one more has submitted the thesis and waiting for the viva voce examination, two more working with him could not submit their theses because of Sen's sudden illness. Till the last moment of his life he was associated with a number of research projects of the UGC Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy at Jadavpur University, Calcutta. As the Editorial Fellow of the Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture (PHISPC) he was editing two volumes on 'Philosophical Concepts Relevant for Science'.

Sen had been largely instrumental in nurturing and developing philosophical talents of two generations of Indian students. A devoted teacher to the core, making ideal teachers was a passion with him. Each and every lecture delivered by him, scheduled in the department timetable, or small seminars, or large conferences, or refresher courses arranged for young teachers, or somewhat popular lectures presented before educated laymen had been a paradigm of what teaching should be. One of the present author's colleagues often says, 'Can you find a person who knows English and has common sense but does not understand what Sen says or writes?' The day Professor Arindam Chakrabarti, now teaching at the University of Hawai, heard Sen's talk at Presidency College, Calcutta, in the early '70s he nicknamed him 'G.E. Moore of Calcutta'. 'Though his published

works are all absolutely first-rate contributions to philosophy, his influence on Indian philosophic thought was out of all proportion to his comparatively small literary output. It was by his lectures, his discussion-classes, his constant and illuminating contributions to discussion at the Research Groups of Jadavpur University Philosophy Department, Friday Group of Calcutta Philosophers, and his private conversations with his colleagues and pupils that he mainly produced his effects on the thought of his time.'

I have been tempted to quote the above with little changes, where necessary, from C.D. Broad's notice entitled 'G.E. Moore' (reprinted in Moore's *Philosophical Papers*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959), for, in my opinion, the above is absolutely true about 'G.E. Moore of Calcutta'. Our 'Sir' sincerely believed, it seems, in W.K. Clifford's idea that one's beliefs are not one's private possession which concerns himself alone. Sen always wanted to transmit his knowledge and beliefs to his students. Gifted with an excellent brain and acquiring vast scholarship he had generously donated throughout his life his hard-earned wealth. Formation of a better world of philosophy in which posterity would live was one of his dreams and a self-imposed duty.

Though Sen's main area of specialization was Euro-American philosophy, it is well known to his intimate colleagues and students that his familiarity with Indian thought was deep. In philosophical discussions Sen never lost his temper over wrong or irrelevant arguments. But he abhorred intellectual dishonesty. One of his sweet gestures, while trying to correct or improve upon the argument offered by any one of his friends in the weekly sessions of the Friday Group (of which he was a Founder-member) was to tightly hold one hand of the friend and request him with a smile on his face, 'My dear Brother! Please don't get excited. I may be wrong. But please give me a patient hearing for a few minutes. Then I promise to sit tight-lipped for this evening.' In a personal letter to the bereaved family, Professor John Watkins of London School of Economics who suddenly passed away (this shocking news has just been received) described Late Sen as the 'sweetest man in the world'.

Sen's entire lifestyle was modelled on the ideals of a sense of proportion and propriety. One would never see the professor hurried or hassled. This perfectly combined with his sense of split-second accuracy—he was never late for his classes or in attending any formal or informal occasion. The rough and tumble of life never affected him. A man of short stature and low voice, the height he reached in his community is simply amazing. Sen's large family consisted of his wife, two loving daughters and his

students. Like the other three members, the student-members did not have to subscribe anything for life-membership of the family. On the contrary, the head of the family was used to giving donations in kind—the kind was no other than philosophical knowledge. Teaching was a kind of worship to him, though he did not hold any particular religious beliefs. In his uninterrupted life-long worship, Sen was helped by an equally dedicated, wonderful, highly intelligent secretary who has been his wife since 1963. Research students meeting Sen at his campus residence were always treated with simple but unique philosophical arguments, and delicious home-made dishes, by Sen and his wife respectively. In fact, almost every day the family had more guests at home than the professor's meagre income could warrant.

Late Sen was a dutiful and obedient son, a caring and considerate husband, a loving and responsible father, an affectionate and demanding teacher, and a conscientious and uncompromising citizen of his motherland. On receiving the news of Sen's death, in a personal letter to Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya, George Henrik von Wright has written on 10 July, 1999, 'I much appreciated Pranab as Philosopher, but also, and not least, as a human being. He was a singularly nice man.' Philosophy was the professor's first love, but his was a multifarious personality. In financial matters his incompetence was complete. But in every other matter of daily life his concern and interest were unparalleled. In his early youth accompanied by his friend Dr. Baksi and occasionally by one or two more friends, he used to see all the best English and Hindi movies of the '50s and early '60s. Those were the days of free unmarried life. Sports of different kinds immensely attracted him. Football and cricket matches between top-ranking teams are going on in the city and Sen (with Baksi) is not seated in the galleries—this was something unusual. On one such occasion he had Russell's book *Leibniz* in hand so as not to waste time in the queue for getting a ticket for the match of the day. On their way back home after the match was over, he just could not say anything about what happened to the book.

He was no ordinary spectator—he knew all the details of football, cricket, table tennis, lawn tennis, and chess.

In his married life accompanied by his wife and daughters, he enjoyed, at times, select English, Bengali and Hindi movies directed by his favourite directors.

Perhaps his intense intellectual exercise found some relaxation in Hindi movies full of action which he watched occasionally in later days on the television. And nobody or no philosophy could dissuade him if some high

quality football, cricket or tennis match was on the TV screen. On the last but one evening that he spent in his dear mortal abode he was engrossed in discussing the results of the World Cup Final with one of his colleagues and one of his former Ph.D. students. In one word, Sen fully enjoyed his life of sixty-eight years. Most probably, the art of enjoying every moment of daily existence was an inborn, untrained dexterity with him.

Sen was known in the community for his sense of humour and ready wit. Even his terminal illness could not mar his jovial disposition and thirst for knowledge. A few hours before passing away, he asked for his medicines in the right order, wanted to know the minutest detail about his disease and treatment. He fought many battles in his life, but never without rhyme or reason. And defeat was not his lot. Together with his family members he fought an exemplary, heroic battle for the last time, from March to June 1999, again reasonably and rhymedly, but he accepted defeat in his characteristic smart style. People who have had the privilege of coming in intellectual and personal contact with him consider it to be their greatest fortune. In his sudden demise, a golden age of philosophical teaching has come to an end; academia has lost a great thinker of our time.

I apologize to my readers for my impudent attempt at translating below the last two stanzas of Rabindranath Thakur's poem 'Biday' from *Kshanika*:

Amidst light and shade, delight and suffering
My day is over, not too badly.

With no one and for no thing
Do I have a quarrel really.

On occasions I thought
This and that, a little bit.

Changes, were they brought
Might also disturb thought.

This self of mine today
I would look for again, say!

So, it seems, my day
Hasn't been bad, little to desire.

Just a little weary today
Let me retire, let me retire.

As reported by the family, our 'Sir' peacefully retired, may be, while mentally uttering the above-mentioned stanzas of the original poem which are quoted below:

Āndhār-āloy sādāy-kāloy
Dinṭa bhaloi gechhe kāṭi,
Tāhār janye kar-o sañge
Nāiko kono jhagrājhāṇṭi.

Mājhe mājhe bhebechhilum
ekṭu-ādhṭu eṭā-oṭā
Badal jadi pārta hate
Thākto nāko kono khonṭa.

Badal hale kakhan manṭā
Hoye paḍta Vyatibyasta
Ekhan jeman āchhe āmār
Seiṭe ābār cheye basta.

Tāi bhebechhi dinṭa āmār
Bhāloi gechhe, kichhu nā chāi-
Ājke śudhu śrānta āchhi,
Ghumote jai, ghumote jai.

* * *

I am indebted to my respected teacher Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya, and to Professor Daya Krishna, Editor, *JICPR*, for asking me to write this article. My sincere thanks are due to my ever-helpful friend Dr. Amita Chatterjee of Jadavpur University who gave me a detailed C.V. of Late Sen prepared by her as soon as I requested her. I am grateful to my Kalipadada (Dr. Kalipada Baksi), Late Sen's wife and daughters who have helped me by providing an account of my mentor's early life when I was not acquainted with him. My most affectionate colleague Shri Somnath Chakrabarti knows better than me how grateful I am to him.

Department of Philosophy,
Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta

SANDHYA BASU

Book Received

1. *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya: Chapter from the Samdhinir Mocana Sūtra (Study, Translation and Tibetan Text),* John Powers.
2. *Jaina Philosophy and Religion,* Tr. Nagin J. Shah.
3. *The Supreme Wisdom of the Upaniṣada—An Introduction,* Klaus G. Witz.
4. *Between Tradition and Modernity. India's Search for Identity,* Ed. Fred Dallmayuyr and G.N. Devy.
5. *Transformation as Creation,* Mukund Lath.
6. *Problems of Indian Philosophy,* Ed. S.P. Dube.
7. *On Certainty,* Tr. Ashok Vohra, Ed. G.E.N. Auscombe and G.H. Von Wright.
8. *Karma, Freedom and Responsibility,* Aparna Chakraborty.
9. *Illuminations—A Proposal,* A.K. Saran.
10. *On the Intellectual Vacation,* A.K. Saran.
11. *A Glossary of Technical Terms in the Commentaries of Sankara Ramanya and Madhia on the Brahma Sūtras,* K. Jayammal.
12. *The Philosophy of Life,* S.P. Dubey.
13. *Renaissance Humanism Studies in Philosophyes and Poetics,* Ernesto Grassi.
14. *Heidegger and the Question of Renaissance Humanism,* Ernesto Grassi.
15. साक्ङोतिंक तर्क शारध्म्, Dharmanand Sharma.
16. *Tat Tvam Asi Vol. I,* Pathikonda Viswambara Nath.
17. *Tat Tvam Asi Vol. II,* Pathikonda Viswambara Nath.
18. *Living in God,* Roy Engene Davis.
19. *Ayurveda: The Gentle Health System,* Hans H. Rhyner.
20. *The Nietzschean Vision of Mau,* Shirley Jethmalani.
21. *The Burden of Poetic Consciousness,* Ed. Shirley Jethmalani and Prafulla C. Kar.

ANNOUNCEMENT

The *JICPR* proposes to bring out an Issue devoted to the following subject:

Life-Worlds: Private and Public—
Love and Friendship-Power and Welfare.

Articles may be sent to the *JICPR*, B/189-A, University Marg, Bapunagar, Jaipur 300015. The last date for the receipt of the articles is 30th September, 2000.

ANNOUNCEMENT

The Indian Council of Philosophical Research nominates one Senior scholar every year to visit Paris under the Indo-French Cultural Exchange Programme. Interested scholars may send their Curriculum Vitae to the Council's address.

ANNOUNCEMENT

The special issue of the *JICPR* devoted to Development in Philosophical Logic will now be published in a book-form entitled *Circularity, Definition and Truth*. This has become necessary as the articles received for it amounted to more than 360 pages and hence cannot be accommodated in a single issue of the *Journal*.

In view of this, a decision has been taken that the subscribers of the *JICPR* may acquire the book at a discount of 33% of the price of the book when published.

Editor

Journal of Indian Council of
Philosophical Research

Editor: DAYA KRISHNA

Volume XVII Number 3 May–August 2000

Call For Papers

3rd Bimal Matilal Memorial Conference on Indian Philosophy

Date: 27th January 2001
Place: King's College London, UK

Papers are invited in all areas of Indian analytical philosophy.

Papers presented should take 30 minutes to present and will be followed by a 15 minute discussion period. Submissions will be acknowledged as received. Manuscripts should be prepared for anonymous refereeing, typed, double spaced and will not be returned (emailed submissions will not be considered). The author's name should appear on a detachable cover sheet.

DEADLINE: 30 JULY 2000
Results to be conveyed no later than 15 October 2000

There will be two sessions with invited speakers (Prof. J. N. Mohanty, Temple University and Dr. J. L. Shaw, Victoria University, Wellington) and four sessions (two concurrent) for the submitted papers.

For more information please contact:

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ANNOUNCEMENT

JICPR Research Advisory Service: the *JICPR* announces the provision of a Research Advisory Service for its readers so that any one, at any level, may approach it for help, guidance and advice regarding any problem or difficulty that he/she may be encountering in his/her research work. This includes even such things as the selection of a promising topic for research, bibliographical guidance and help in getting photocopies of material required for research in case it can be located. The help and counsel of experts in all fields of philosophy, both in India and abroad, who have been associated with the *JICPR* in various ways will be available to our readers in this task. Persons seeking advice in this regard may write directly to the Editor, *JICPR*, B-189-B, University Marg, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur, making specific mention of the *JICPR* Research Advisory Service announced in this *Journal*.

EDITOR

ANNOUNCEMENT

The *JICPR* is seriously thinking of forming a Network Group consisting of those of its readers who would like to receive the contents of its special features such as 'Focus', 'Agenda for Research' and 'Notes and Queries' before their publication so that they may become aware of them as soon as they are received and may respond to them in case they would like to do so.

The *JICPR* is at present published three times a year and thus it takes a long time for items under these sections to be published and brought to the attention of our readers. In order to avoid the delay, it is proposed that those who would like to be actively involved in the on-going discussions may write to us expressing their desire to become members of the *JICPR* Network Group so that they may be sent the material immediately as soon as it is received by us. Those interested may kindly write to the Editor.

EDITOR

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Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए(े) ē } (long)
ओ ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ r and not ṛ. (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as r̄)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not m

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṉa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not lha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ lṛ and not lri

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā*, *jñāna* and not *djñāna*, *Kṛṣṇa* and not *Krishna*, *sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc.

etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ൽ ḷ
ഴ ḷ.
ൺ ṇ
ർ ṛ.

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa),

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:

e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai

Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:

e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence

coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:

e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*

veve or *vēve* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.

(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for

laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:

Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:

Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it): next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between: finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.