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Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XVII-3 VOL. XVII No. 3 May - Aug. 2000

ISSN 0970–7794

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

JICPR

Editor DAYA KRISHNA

Volume XVII Number 3
May - August
2000

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For the papers written in English, words from Sanskrit, Ardhamāgadhī and other Prākrits including the Apabhraṁśa etc., will be diacriticised if rendered in Roman script. (Quotations can also be in Nāgarī script.) (Here we suggest those for the Sanskrit (classical), the Prakrit, the Apabhraṁśa, and the Dravidic languages. For other languages, namely Arabic, Persian and the modern European languages, the current international conventions for transliteration for their rendering may be followed.)

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JOURNAL OF INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH

Volume XVII
Number 3
May–August
2000

Editor: Daya Krishna

Indian Council of Philosophical Research

36, Tughlakabad Institutional Area, Mehrauli-Badarpur Road,
New Delhi 110 062, India

Articles published in this jounral are indexed in the *Philosophers' Index*, USA.

Typeset by S.J.I. Services, New Delhi 110024
Printed in India
at Saurabh Print-O-Pack, Noida 201301
and published by Member-Secretary
for Indian Council of Philosophical Research
36, Tughlakabad Institutional Area
Mehrauli-Badarpur Road, New Delhi-110062

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From the Editor's Desk

A PLEA FOR A NEW HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN INDIA

Few will dispute the fact that most of the existing books on Indian philosophy are outmoded. Yet, these are the books that have always been used all the world over to teach what Indian philosophy is, and have been so used through the ages. A lot of important information and new material has accumulated which needs to be assimilated and organized afresh in an interrelated manner around philosophical issues dealt with by a succession of thinkers over at least three millennia of recorded history. Each of these thinkers has an originality of his own and makes some new contribution, even though he may have written only a *bhāṣya*, a *vārtika*, a *vṛtti*, a *tika* or a *pariśuddhi* on an earlier work. There have also been new departures and radical breaks, many a time self-consciously, as when Udayana calls himself an *ādhunika* or a school calls itself *navyanyāya*.

The philosophical insight which is found in such abundance in the earliest texts needs not only to be highlighted but also linked with the later developments which assume a more differentiated and systematized 'form' from the *Sūtra* period onwards. The differentiation, however, is not a loss of active interrelationship, though it is usually presented as such. Even the earliest texts, such as those of Yāska, present views ascribed to previous thinkers and the *Nyaya-Sūtras* explicitly refute the mimāṁsā views of the *nityatva* and *apauruṣeyatva* of *śabda*, the *aikatva vāda* of the Upanisads and the *sarva pramana khandana* of the Madhyamic Buddhists, besides many others.

It is not only the interactional dialectic that is missing from the usual presentations, but also its historical development over a period of time. D.N. Shashtri's pioneering work in this regard in his *Critique of Indian Realism* has found hardly any followers, or been pursued further.

The shifting focus and emphasis in the discussion of issues has hardly been noticed, nor the reasons for them explored. The long absence of certain schools of thought from the centre of philosophical debate and their sudden reappearance into prominence has totally escaped the attention of historians, as has been the background of socio-political events surrounding philosophical activity in the country. The sudden disappearance of Buddhism on the philosophical scene from AD 1200 onwards has hardly been noticed; nor has the dramatic rise in the number of Jain

thinkers from, say, AD 1000 onwards. The rise and fall in the fortunes of schools seems to have totally escaped the attention of scholars, as have the radical shifts and developments within the schools themselves. Never has history been so absent from the writing of the history of any subject as has been the case of the philosophy of India. How unbelievable it seems that hardly any attempt has been made to discern its inner connections with developments in thought in other civilizations, or even with those that occurred within its own civilizational space in the field of art, or the sciences, or the theoretic reflection that occurred on them. The realm of social, political and legal thought seems to have been segregated, as if it had no relation to philosophical thought in the country. The same has been the case with thought about the arts; even though poetics is known to have had a long history of distinguished thinkers in the tradition; and the actual achievement in the field of sculpture and architecture is of such an outstanding quality as to arouse the wonder of the world. Theoretical reflection astronomy, mathematics and medicine has met the same fate, implying that knowledge enterprises in these domains had no relevance to philosophical thought in this country.

Both the timeless and insulated perspective in which Indian philosophy is seen has been aggravated by the almost total absence of any awareness of the way it has been influenced by thought currents in sister civilizations, or the way it might have influenced them. The Persian, the Greek, the Central Asian and the Chinese civilizations were in active interaction for long periods of time with the Indian civilization and it is extremely unlikely that they were not influenced by one another. In fact, it might be intellectually more rewarding to see this as one whole civilizational area with diverse, relatively autonomous centres in it. The parochial egocentricism of the currently 'national' and 'civilizational' identification is reflected in the way one looks at the past, and forgets that at that time no such identifications existed and that people did not need passports and visas to cross boundaries.

The manner in which history has been 'created' during the past few centuries itself is, however, the root cause of such a distorted way of looking at the past. History writing has been a child of the exploitation and domination of the world by a few West European powers during the last four centuries who have systematically produced a history in their own way, to suit their own interests. This is *not* history as 'others' see it and, even at its best, it can be regarded *only* as history from the viewpoint

of modern West European man who did not exist at the time when ancient Greece and Rome flourished.

The total appropriation of the Greek heritage by the West would have remained a strange curiosity in the intellectual history of mankind were it not for the fact that it has not only been accepted by most scholars the world over but also given rise to a persistent denial of any influence on Greek thought and culture by the other civilizations which flourished in those times. The close similarity of Greek thought, particularly in Plato and Parmenides, to certain schools of Indian philosophy has always been a 'problem' to Western scholars, as if the admission of any influence would contaminate the purity which they had achieved, solely on their own. The thought from Plato to Plotinus has such an Indian echo that only a 'purist' about civilizations would ever feel like decrying it.

If the western historian of thought is allergic to admitting even the possibility of any influence on Greek thought from any 'outside' source, his Indian counterpart is not even aware of the problem and takes it almost as axiomatically true that the Indian civilization has grown in complete isolation from the Vedic or the Harappan times onward. The 'monadic self-sufficiency' of Indian thought and culture is taken for granted in spite of the fact that in the field of mathematics, explicit mention of borrowing from the Greeks has been made in the Indian tradition and the development of what is known as 'Gandhara Art' unambiguously confirms this. It is extremely unlikely that the Greek influences were confined *only* to these two fields. The Indo-Greek kingdoms in north-west India in the post-Alexander period must have fostered interaction in all fields. Later, during the Śaka and Kuṣāṇa periods [1st–3rd century AD), large parts of North India were integrated intimately with Central and West Asia and it is highly improbable that only administrative and commercial interaction occurred between the different units of the region. We have also evidence of active trade links with the Roman Empire on the south-western coast of the Indian peninsula and, better still, of a long intellectual interchange with China, revolving around the Buddhist university at Nalanda. The latter seems to have been connected both by land and sea routes to China and there is evidence that a strong intermediary intellectual centre emerged at Palembang in what is now known as Indonesia.

The Buddhist connection with Sri Lanka and Tibet is well known, but little is known of the counter-influence from these countries except in the field of Tantra from the latter. The story of non-Buddhist, primarily Hindu, influences in South and South-east Asia is usually vaguely known, but the

awareness of its intellectual side seems totally absent. Similar is the case with the changes and modifications that they underwent there. Hardly anyone knows, for example, that a work from Thailand entitled *The Three Worlds of King Ruan* (Ed. B.L. Smith, Pennsylvania: Anima Books, 1978, pp. 194–203) shows a distinct influence of Indian thinking in the intellectual domain but presents noticeable differences with it as well.

The pre-Islamic encounters and interactions are however, at least dimly present on the margins of the intellectual consciousness about the past of this country. But even this is absent in respect to the intellectual interaction with the world of Arabic learning, its science and philosophy. From at least AD 1200 onwards, Islam may be said to have a definitive presence in North India. Yet, the histories of thought in the second millennium AD in this country show hardly any awareness of its presence, or of the possible influence that it might have had on the varied fields of intellectual life in this country. Usually, it is taken for granted that, except for the arts and religion, there was nothing substantive in this regard. Yet, Professor A. Rehman's pioneering work on this subject has shown that from the 8th century AD there is evidence of active interchange between Arabian, Persian and Sanskrit learning in the different fields of specific knowledge, particularly medicine, mathematics and astronomy. More than seven thousand works are listed in his *Bibliography* and they include translations of texts from the two different traditions in their respective languages.

These figures need an upward revision in the light of recent work, but this does not make any difference in respect to the problem that we are trying to point out in connection with the writing of the history of philosophy in India. There is, as far as we know, no mention of any interaction or influence between the Arabic and Indian philosophical traditions, even though there was an ample opportunity for such interaction to occur in this country. How could the rich traditions of Arabic philosophy remain unknown in India in spite of this long presence of West Asian learning? It is extremely unlikely that this was the case, particularly when there is substantive evidence of an opposite situation in so many other fields of knowledge. And, in case it was really so, it requires exploration and explanation.

The absence of any discussion regarding this issue in the histories of Indian philosophy is an anomaly that can hardly be understood in any way. So also, perhaps, is the total neglect of the presence of Christian theological thought in this country, or its influence on Indian philosophy.

Christianity is supposed to have come very early in India, and yet, as far as I know, its influence has hardly been a subject of any investigation.

The need for a new history of philosophy in India, thus, can hardly be denied. But even if the plea is accepted, how shall one go about implementing it? The usual method is for some institution to approach an outstanding scholar to undertake the work who, in turn, would ask other scholars to write for the volume. But as they are generally well-known specialists in the field, when they are invited to write on the subject, they only summarize, repeating what they have already said on the subject. Few scholars are prepared to do any new research to write for a volume edited by someone else and hardly anyone can adopt the viewpoint or perspective of someone else to do the task he/she is asked to do. Thus, at the end, what one usually gets is a volume of uneven quality, repeating the old things with the addition of some new information which has appeared since the earlier volumes on the subject were published.

What, then, is to be done to avoid such a situation? Perhaps, only a long-term plan consisting of diverse strategies at various levels would yield the desired result. One could start with a stocktaking of what has been done, spell out what needs to be done and then locate persons at various levels who could be involved in the thinking and execution of the project. A detailed spelling-out of interrelated research could be given to see that research work is done in those domains. Similarly, successive seminars could be planned in such a way as to explore questions that need an answer or problems that need to be resolved.

The ideal of a long-term collaborative, cumulative research has not happened in the Humanities though it is now commonplace in the natural sciences and even though it is true that disciplines in the Humanities need this, particularly in the context of projects such as this. What one needs is imagination, will and commitment to undertake these enterprises. Potter's *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies,* Thangaswami Sharma's *Darsanamanjari* and some of the forthcoming volumes in the 'Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture' have already done some fieldwork in this connection. The challenge is to carry the work further, and let us hope the challenge will be met. But, first, there has to be an awareness of the need for such a work. The rest will follow, at least, let us hope so.

Jaipur DAYA KRISHNA

Formal Logic and the Autonomy of Ethics

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More than once in the long history of philosophy, moral judgements have been held by some philosophers to have a logical status much inferior to that of factual judgements. But a number of highly sophisticated and influential studies, conducted in the last five decades of this century, in several areas, such as deontic logic, metaethics, and philosophy of language, have successfully contested this view. They have shown, in an extremely convincing and effective manner, that it is based on grievously misunderstanding either the nature of moral language, or of logic, and, in some unfortunate cases, of both. These studies have shown that all, or almost all, of important (formal) logical operations, which can be performed on, or with, factual judgements, can be performed on, or with, moral judgements as well. If we come across a case in which a moral judgement seems to resist a particular logical operation, we must not, they counsel us, rule out *ab initio* the possibility of making the latter, with some ingenuity or augmentation, applicable to it. There is a clear-cut, sound, Philosophical Policy behind the suggestion that one should move very cautiously in forming any judgement about the logical capabilities of moral language, i.e. about its amenability to logical operations, or to the application of logical rules. This policy can roughly be stated as follows:

If a certain class of moral (or even non-moral) concepts or judgements appears to be recalcitrant to some logical operation, when it is not intuitively obvious that it would be improper to treat the former as an appropriate object on which the latter can be used, we should first examine the nature and scope of the logical operation itself with an open mind. We should try to find out if we can modify or supplement it, in case it is necessary, in such a manner that it becomes applicable to the concepts or judgements concerned, of course, without distorting its own, or the latter's, basic character. That is, if the occasion demands that the benefit of

the doubt be given to either one of the two parties, it should be given to moral language, and not to logic. It should be given to logic only after becoming convinced that the former does not deserve it. We must not jettison, in order to lighten the load on logic, any part of our stock of (moral) concepts, or judgements, by hurriedly concluding that it has no, or has a very poor, capability of being logically manipulated. This is so because moral language is a segment of ordinary speech which has built into it a set of rules governing or guiding the various things it does, or we do with it. It is these rules which are the ultimate grounds of what we call logical rules, and not vice versa.

To accord to moral judgements logical respectability comparable to that of factual judgements does not commit one to deny all differences between the two classes of judgements. In fact, a large number of philosophers do both: they consider moral judgements amenable to logical operations as well as functionally different from factual judgements. This is done even by those who hold what is called the autonomy of ethics.

The philosophical theory of the autonomy of ethics can be stated as a semantic, as well as a logical, theory. It does not matter which way we start because the two are very intimately, or rather conceptually, related with each other. One would be holding the semantic autonomy of ethics if he maintains that every moral judgement performs a set of functions logically or categorially different from the set of functions a non-moral judgement performs, and therefore no moral judgement can be completely, or exhaustibly, translated, or analysed, in terms of a set of non-moral judgements. He would be holding the logical autonomy of ethics if he maintains that no moral judgement can be deduced from a set consisting only of non-moral judgements.

It may be said, and perhaps truly, that the above way of stating autonomism, semantic as well as logical, does not say anything about the status of a moral judgement. A moral judgement is, tautologically, not a non-moral judgement, and therefore, tautologically, the set of functions performed by it would be different from the set of functions performed by a non-moral judgement. For the same reason it would also be tautological to say that it cannot be deduced from a set of non-moral judgements. It is a tautology to say that the moral cannot be reduced to, or entailed by, the non-moral.

The fact of the matter is that, in recent discussions, in the context of the autonomy of ethics, 'non-moral' is generally taken to mean factual.

Autonomism, therefore, in both of its forms, should be understood as upholding the autonomy of moral language in relation to factual language, the semantic one maintaining that the jobs the former does are different from those which the latter does, and the logical one maintaining that no moral conclusion can be logically drawn from a set of premises each one of which is a factual judgement. Neither of the two positions is tautologically true. Rather, each one of them has proved to be highly contentious.

There is another point which has to be kept in mind in the discussion of both forms of autonomism. It is moral language in its substantive, normal, or standard, use which is said to be autonomous, semantically or logically. A substantive moral judgement is one which is capable of guiding or determining what is to be done, for instance 'I ought to X', or is an expression of reflection on the morality of what has been done, for instance, 'I ought not to have Y-ed but X-ed'. A non-substantive moral judgement, therefore, would be one which, for some reason or other, has become deprived of its action-guiding, or action-assessing, role but retains, of course, superficially, the form of a (substantive) moral judgement. It contains a moral phrase which in it is inoperative or normatively idle. A semantic autonomist need not deny the analyzability of a non-substantive moral judgement in terms of a set of (non-moral or) factual judgements, and a logical autonomist the deducibility of the former from the latter. This is so because a non-substantive moral judgement does not function as, or lead the life of, a normal moral judgement. It is called a moral judgement only in a grammatical sense, or as matter of courtesy. Therefore, it does not matter if an autonomist of either sort does not care to prove, or fails to prove, that non-substantive moral judgements are autonomous. If he proves that they also are autonomous he does something over and above his obligation as an autonomist. Similarly, if a critic of autonomism proves of a certain non-substantive moral judgement that it is not autonomous, in the semantic, or logical, sense, he would not thereby be disproving autonomism, semantic, or logical. All this, as well as the notion of a non-substantive moral judgement, will become clearer when I shall examine certain attempts to refute logical autonomism on some formal logical grounds.

The relation between the two types of autonomism is very close. A semantic autonomism entails logical autonomism. If a moral judgement performs functions logically different from those which a factual judgement performs, i.e. if it is a logically different type of judgement from

what the latter is, then certainly it cannot be validly deduced from any set of factual judgements. Many philosophers have taken this route to logical autonomism. They first characterize what seem to them the important logical differences between a moral and a factual judgement, and then argue, on the basis of their characterization, that no reasoning, in which a moral conclusion is drawn from a set of premises all of which are factual judgements, can be valid. This seems to be the basic point of Hume in the famous passage from the *Treatesi*[1] so often quoted in discussions of autonomism, or of moral reasoning. He seems to be making what he considers to be a very significant point about the logic of 'Is' and 'Ought': Since an 'Ought'-sentence expresses a new kind of relationship not expressed by any 'Is'-sentence, no 'Ought'-sentence (i.e. a moral judgement) can be validly inferred from an 'Is'-sentence (i.e. a factual judgement).

I am not very sure whether logical autonomism entails semantic autonomism. Perhaps it does not. But it definitely makes a proponent of it tilt towards the latter. Showing that no moral judgement can be validly inferred from a set of a factual judgements would give a great fillip to thinking that this may be so because of there being some semantic disparity between the two sorts of judgements. One may thus get encouraged or motivated to discover the logical differences between them, of course, if there be any. In actual philosophical practice, the two sorts of exercises generally creep into each other, and more often than not they differ only procedurally. Even in this essay, which will be devoted primarily to discussing logical autonomism, some shadow of semantic autonomism may occasionally be visible.[2]

The autonomist thesis, with which I shall particularly be dealing here, is thus the claim that no substantive moral judgement, i.e. one with the capability of guiding content, can be validly inferred from a set consisting of only factual or non-moral premises. An alternative way to express it would be to say that no set of factual judgements can entail a moral judgement. Autonomism can therefore be refuted by giving a counter-example of either sort; that is, an example of a valid argument whose conclusion is a moral judgement and all of the premises are factual, or that of a set of factual judgements entailing or implying a moral judgement. Autonomists' claim is that neither sort of example is possible, but the heteronomists', i.e. their critics', claim is that both sort of examples are easily available. I shall examine separately the two sorts of cases

presented by heteronomists and show that none of their examples is a genuine counter-example. I shall take up the second type of case first.

Some critics of autonomism have tried to bring out a counter-example out of contraposing the Kantian dictum '"Ought" implies "Can"'. 'A ought to X' implies 'A can X', and therefore by contraposing it we can say that 'A cannot X' implies 'It is not that A ought to X'. 'A cannot X' is a factual judgement, a judgement about what A cannot do, and 'It is not that A ought to X', the claim goes, a moral judgement. Therefore it may be said that

(A) A cannot X ⊃ It is not that A ought to X

is a counter-example to, or an argument against, autonomism, because in it a factual judgement is implying a moral judgement. This sort of argument has been used by David Rynin (1957)[3] and very recently by Collingridge (1977)[4]. But it does not really disprove autonomism. To show that it does not, I shall discuss in some detail the relation of implication which is said to exist between 'ought' and 'can'.[5]

That 'ought' implies 'can', if not in all, at least in some, cases is one of the few things about which there is a general agreement among philosophers. It also has the prestige of being one of the things which commonsense considers to be an important truth. To make my analysis a little tidier and briefer, I shall symbolize an 'ought'-judgement of any form ('I ought to X', 'You ought to X', 'One ought to X', 'X-ing ought to be done' or 'X is obligatory', etc.) as

OX.

'OX' is normatively denied by

O ~ X

because 'O ~ X' also is a full-fledged normative judgement. It says that not-X-ing is obligatory, or one ought not to X. We do this, for example when we counter 'X-ing ought to be done' by saying 'X-ing ought not to be done'. Since both are equally normative, 'OX', as well as 'O ~ X', implies 'X-ing can be done'. I shall symbolize a 'can'-judgement of any form ('I can X', 'You can X', 'One can X'. 'X-ing can be done' [is possible), etc.] as

CX.

'CX' is a factual, non-normative judgement and so is its denial '~CX'. Since one can or cannot X, only one mode of denial is available in the case of a 'Can'-judgement.

To say that not-X-ing is obligatory is to say that X-ing is forbidden. But X-ing does not have to be either obligatory or forbidden. It could as well be only recommendable, or permissible. To say that X-ing is not obligatory is different from saying that non-X-ing is obligatory. I shall symbolize any judgement denying obligatoriness to X-ing, for example 'It is not obligatory to X', 'It is not that one ought to X', etc. as

$$\sim OX.$$

Since in saying that X-ing is not obligatory, obligatoriness itself is denied of X-ing, I call '~OX' the logical denial of 'OX'. When we deny X-ing's obligatoriness, we leave open the possibility of its being only recommendable, or permissible. It is only recommendable if not doing it brings no discredit to the agent, but doing it brings to him some credit. It is only permissible if neither doing it, nor not doing it, is creditable, or discreditable. It is morally indifferent in the sense that one may, or may not, do it as he chooses.[6]

In ordinary English when we deny 'A is obligated to X' by 'A is obligated not to X, or to not-X', or by 'A is not obligated to X', both the denials, in spite of their logical differences, look natural. In case of the 'ought'-form of an obligative judgement, 'A ought to X', its normative denial 'A ought not to X' too looks natural, but its logical denial 'It is not that, or it is not the case, that, 'A ought to X' does not seem to be as natural a form as the latter. Moreover, it has to be in some such form because then its logical difference from 'A ought not to X' becomes clearly visible and also because usage does not permit 'A not-ought to X'. But if the latter does not look terribly abhorring to one's eyes, it can be used as the logical denial of 'A ought not to X'. The symbolic form '~OX' exactly does what the latter does by applying the tilde directly to O, i.e. to 'ought' or 'obligated'.

The commonly accepted view, among classical as well as contemporary moral philosophers is that since 'OX ⊃ CX', by transposing it we can get '~ CX ⊃ ~ OX'. '~ CX' is, they say and truly, a factual, non-moral, judgement being the denial of the factual judgement 'CX'. On the same logic, some of them say, '~ OX' should also be called a moral judgement because it is the denial of the moral judgement 'OX'. If this is so, '~CX ⊃ ~ OX' is, they say, a clear counter-example of autonomism because in it the factual judgement '~ CX' implies the moral judgement '~ OX'.

I shall show a little later that it is not correct to say that ~ CX ⊃ ~ OX, and therefore it cannot be offered as the transpositive of 'OX ⊃ CX' and consequently cannot be a counter-instance of autonomism. But I shall first show that even if it is, for the sake of argument, accepted as the transpositive, it cannot be used as a counter-instance of autonomism because of the peculiar nature of '~ OX'. Therefore, before replying to critics of autonomism who use the above argument, I shall first analyze the role of '~ OX'.

Since 'X-ing is not obligatory' is the denial of the moral judgement 'X-ing is obligatory', one may feel naturally tempted to call it a moral judgement. But only to say to anyone that it is not obligatory for him to X is to offer him no effective guidance with regard to what he should, or should not, do. It has, therefore, (almost) no practical relevance, no action-guiding role. If he is bothered about whether he should, or should not, X to tell him that he is not obligated to X is telling him that he need not. From 'It is not obligatory for you to X' it does not follow that he should not X because X-ing may be, as already said, permissible, or even worth doing, though not obligatory. Therefore, a judgement of the form 'It is not obligatory to X' is not like a standard obligative, or moral, judgement because it does not have the action-guiding role which the latter has.

That there are situations in which '~ OX' does not function as a moral judgement cannot be absolutely denied. But in some situations it may have some normative role, though, as will be shown in what follows, of an extremely weak or diluted kind.

Suppose one thinks he ought to X but finds it extremely difficult, or inconvenient, to X, and therefore is morally worried. Then, telling him that it is not obligatory for him to X, would, or may, relieve him of the worry. Secondly, if he has not X-ed, and therefore feels morally guilty, telling him that X-ing was not obligatory for him, may help him to get rid of the feeling of moral guilt. All this shows that it can sometimes have some moral relevance. But it is also clear that even in such cases its obligative content is very thin. It does not function the way a full-fledged, standard, substantive, judgement of moral obligation does. That is why at the most it can be called a degenerate, watered-down, or sub-standard, moral judgement. If one hesitates to call it non-moral, he would only because it contains 'obligatory', which in some special context, entitles it

to have some moral relevance. When the autonomist says that a factual judgement cannot imply a moral judgement by the latter he means a substantive, full-fledged, one, and not a degenerate one like '~OX'. Therefore, it would be wide of the mark to claim a refutation of autonomism by showing that ~ CX ⊃ ~ OX is obtainable from 'OX ⊃ CX' by transposition. The autonomist may accept the transposition. But that would not logically force him to give up his autonomism, or make him self-inconsistent, because what he denies is the deducibility of a full-fledgedly action-guiding moral judgement, and not that of one, like '~OX', which at the most can have only a faint trace of normativity.

Rynin (1957) seems to suggest that ~CX ⊃ ~ OX, since OX ⊃ CX, and therefore goes against autonomism. But he does not expand this argument, nor offers it so straightforwardly as I have put it here. But Collingridge (1977) has made an elaborate use of this argument. Therefore, I will discuss his view in some detail, and try to show that he has failed to thereby refute autonomism because he has failed to show that ~OX is a full-fledged normative judgement. Since his argument seems to counter mine, I quote him below at some length:

> It might be objected here that the sentence 'It is not the case that X ought to do Y', being only the negation of an evaluative sentence, is not itself evaluative.
>
> There seems little to recommended this, however, for to say that it is not the case that X ought to do something is to place restrictions on what it might be that X ought to do, and this is an evaluative question. Thus surely I am giving evaluative advice to a troubled friend if I tell him that he is not under an obligation to repay some particular debt, or that it is not the case that he ought to keep his marriage vows. If he thinks that he ought to keep such vows and I think that it is not the case that he ought to keep them, then we are in dispute, and in dispute over the evaluation of marriage vows. It should also be noted that if 'It is not the case that X ought to do Y' is non-evaluative, then so presumably is 'It is not the case that X ought not to do Y', and yet these two together entail 'X may or may not do Y (as he pleases)' which is undoubtedly evaluative. If we want to avoid deriving an evaluative sentence from non-evaluative ones we should, therefore regard both these negative ought-sentences as evaluative.

Collingridge has given here two arguments, not completely independent of each other. His first argument is that

C(I): 'It is not the case that he ought to keep his vows' is evaluative because it puts restrictions on what he ought to do.

The sentence within single quotes, which is the same as '~OX', puts restrictions in the sense that it restricts the zone of his obligations in such a manner that keeping his marriage vows falls outside its boundaries. This is only to say that keeping his marriage vows is not obligatory. It restrains him from *calling* keeping his marriage vows obligatory, or 'oughty', but not *from* keeping his marriage vows. That is done by the judgement 'He ought not to keep his marriage vows' which it definitely is not. It does not tell him what he should or should not do, but only that he is not required to keep his marriage vows. It gives him no help or guidance in deciding what to do or not to do. Therefore, its evaluative content, would be very thin, or watery, if it has any. To say it is only to say that he would not be doing anything wrong if he does not keep them. But this is to say nothing about what exactly he should do to his marriage vows. It is not even to say that he ought not to keep them. Its action-guiding role would thus be zero, or almost zero, for a person who faces the real problem of deciding what to do to his marriage vows. It neither tells him that he should, nor that he should not, keep them. His moral worry about what exactly he should do, therefore, remains undiminished. Being told that not keeping them is not wrong does not help him because then keeping them may be morally neutral, or may even be good (though not obligatory) in the sense of being recommendable, or, commendable, in a supererogatory sense.

It can be admitted, however, that when two persons disagree about whether or not it is obligatory for one to keep his marriage vows, their disagreement would be about an evaluative matter. It would be for the obvious reason that the issue of dispute between them is the obligatoriness of keeping marriage vows. But when they decide that it is not, his perplexity may not end because his marriage vows may be still worth keeping, on some non-obligational grounds, say, on the ground that by not keeping them he would loose his social respectability, or loose the money he is presently receiving from his wife's assets bequeathed to her by her parents. After being convinced that keeping them is not obligatory he may even feel *more* worried than when he was not, because now he would think that even when it is not that he ought to keep them, it is not that he

can break them with complete impunity. All this is likely to happen because the judgement 'It is not that he (or you) ought to keep his (or your) marriage vows' offers him (or you) no decisive guidance and it does not because it is empty, or almost empty, of evaluative content.

Collingridge's second argument is that

C(II): If 'It is not the case that X ought to do Y' is non-evaluative, then 'It is not the case that X ought not to do Y' is also non-evaluative. But these two, when taken together, entail 'X may or may not do Y (as he pleases)'. But the latter is undoubtedly evaluative. Therefore, since two non-evaluative sentences entail an evaluative one, autonomism gets refuted.

This argument seems to suffer from more than one defect. Firstly, 'X may or may not do Y (as he pleases)' is not undoubtedly evaluative. In answer to X's question 'Ought I to do Y', to say 'You may or may not do Y (as you please)' is not to adequately answer his question; it is not to offer him an operative or effective evaluative, or, 'ought', answer. If it is evaluative, it is only marginally so, as it only tells him that you would not be doing anything wrong by not doing, or doing, Y. It gives him no hint as to what would be right for him to do. It is important to note here that 'You may or may not do Y' is not even a disjunctive evaluative judgement like 'You ought to keep your marriage vows or legally divorce you wife (to make her free to remarry).' The latter is fully normative. It only offers him two courses of action, at least one of which he ought to adopt, and takes away his freedom to do as he pleases which 'You may or may not do Y (as you please)' gives to him. A 'may or may not do Y'- type judgement does not bind him at all; it does not bind him to do, or even to abstain from doing, Y.

On the other hand, a disjunctive evaluative judgement of the above sort binds him to adopt *at least one* of the two courses of action and this it does because it is not possible to adopt both of them. We can have a disjunctive evaluative judgement of the sort which says that one ought to X or to Y when he can do both, because if he can fulfil his obligation by X-ing alone, or by Y-ing alone, then if he can both X and Y, his doing that would be doing more than what he ought to and therefore doing something commendable. This is the case when one does something supererogatory. For example, when we tell someone that he ought to arrange for his son a private tutor or ought to teach him himself, we tell him that he would be fulfilling his obligation if he does at least one of the

two things. But if he does both, since it is possible to do both, of them, for example, he arranges for a private tutor in the mornings and himself looks after his studies in the evenings, he would definitely be doing something commendable. But we cannot have a 'may-or-may-not-do Y' type 'ought'-judgement. To tell someone 'You ought either to keep, or not to keep, your marriage vows' is not to tell him to do anything; it is to prescribe nothing. It is in the very logic of a prescription that it can be obeyed or disobeyed; that which cannot be disobeyed, as is the case with the latter, cannot be called a prescription.

Even if we accept that (a) 'It is not the case that X ought to do Y' is evaluative, or that (b) 'X may or may not do Y (as he pleases)' is evaluative and follows from the former conjoined with (c) 'It is not the case that X ought not to do Y', it is clear, as I have shown earlier, that the element of evaluativeness, or normativity, present neither in (a), nor in (b), nor in (c), matches that of a standard, normal, evaluative judgement. Therefore, to repeat, one cannot refute autonomism by showing that (a) is evaluative, or that (a) and (b) entail (c).

I agree with Collingridge that in whichever way we interpret the relation of implication between 'Ought' and 'Can', transposition would work on it and therefore from 'X cannot do Y' we can infer 'It is not that X ought to do Y'. But, as I have shown, the latter does not function as a full-fledged, operative, evaluative, sentence. Therefore its inferability from the former would not disprove autonomism since what it denies is the inferability of a full-fledged, operative, i.e. action-guiding, evaluative sentence from a purely descriptive one.

Collingridge's suggestion that autonomism can be saved if ' "Ought" implies "Can" ' itself is taken to be an evaluative sentence. He thinks that 'It is never the case that a man ought to do what he cannot do' is a substantival moral principle like 'It is always the case that a man ought to do what he has promised to do', and has been misrepresented as a logical one ascertainable only by analysing the meaning of 'ought'. Then, since we can deduce 'It is not the case that X ought to do Y' not from 'X cannot do Y' alone, but only when we conjoin it with the moral principle 'It is never the case that a man ought to do what he cannot do', we shall not be offering a counter-example to autonomism, or breaking what he calls Hume's Rule. But, if my interpretation of 'It is not the case that X ought to do Y' and of the autonomism thesis is accepted, we can protect autonomism or Hume's Rule from being dishonoured without rejecting

the status of ' "Ought" implies "Can" ' as a logical principle and interpreting it as a moral or evaluative principle. In this way we can avoid being forced to swim against the main current of past and present ethical or metaethical philosophizing. It is not always unwise to swim against the main current, and sometimes it may not only exhibit the swimmer's bravado, but may also be justified or warranted. In the present case it is not warranted because Hume's Rule can be left uninfringed even while maintaining the status quo about ' "Ought" implies "Can" ' as a logical or denotic principle.

It does not seem to be very wise also because it is not at all obvious that 'It is never the case that a man ought to do what he cannot do' is a moral principle. What kind of reasoning can one offer to support it except appealing to what we normally or ordinarily mean by saying that one ought to do something? Rather, it seems quite obvious that in a large number of cases, if not in all, we can say it meaningfully only if we know, believe, or at least assume, that he can do it. And, if there really exist some cases in which we can do that without the only-if clause, it is highly probable that 'ought' functions in those cases in a more or less deviant manner.

The principle 'It is always the case that one ought to do what he has promised to do', which Collingridge offers as an obvious example of a moral principle, does not seem to fare better. To promise to do something is to commit, to morally bind, or obligate, oneself to do it. After securing your admission that you promised to X, I need to do nothing else to convince you that you ought to; rather, I do not have to convince you that you ought to. Nor can you then ask for a reason why you ought to. Of course, all this presupposes that you and I are rational persons. But it also shows that there is something in the very meaning of promising which makes us say that one ought to do what he has promised to. It is the element of meaning, or logic, which imparts a ring of obviousness, or truisticness, to the principle 'Promises ought to be kept'. One may question his obligation to do what he has promised when something has happened which has made the promise void, or taken away some, or a large, part of the obligative force which the original act of promising naturally had. In such a case the alleged act of promising has ceased to be a full-fledged one and therefore its not being oughty does not show that there is no logical link between promising to do something and being obligated

to do it. Such a situation can arise with respect to the logical link between any two concepts.

I have said earlier that though I accept that (OX v O ~ X) ⊃ CX, I find it difficult to accept unqualifiedly '~ CX ⊃ ~ OX' as the transpositive of 'OX ⊃ CX'. The reason for this is that I also find '~ OX' implying 'CX' which nobody, to the best of my knowledge, seems to have noticed. Rather many seem to hold that ~OX and ~ CX can go together. If '~CX ⊃ ~ OX' is true, being the transpositive of 'OX ⊃ CX', then certainly they can go together. But when '~OX' also implies 'CX', as I hold, they cannot.

To say that ~OX, i.e. it is not obligatory for one to X, is to admit the possibility of X-ing being, for him, only permissible or morally indifferent, or being only recommendable. To think of it as merely permissible is, as has been said, to admit that it does not morally matter whether or not he does it. He may, or may not, X, as he pleases. This means that he must be, or at least assumed to be, able to X, otherwise there would be no point in telling him that he may, or may not, X. To call X-ing a recommendable action is to tell him that he may not X without any moral loss, but if he X-es, he would be doing something worthwhile. This also can be done only if he is, or is assumed to be, able to X. Therefore, I say that like 'OX' and 'O ~ X', even '~ OX' implies 'CX'.

Since 'CX' is implied by 'OX' as well as by both the sorts of its denial, it may be said, *à la* Strawson, that 'OX' presupposes 'CX'. This means that the transpositive of 'OX ⊃ CX' cannot be '~CX ⊃ ~ OX' if '~OX' is taken to mean that X-ing is not obligatory, but could be permissible, or recommendable. This is so because, in this sense of '~OX', '~OX' implies 'CX'. It is this very sense of '~OX' which gives to it, in some contexts, some moral relevance, or evaluative content, albeit, of an extremely diluted kind. Therefore, on the alleged ground that '~CX ⊃ ~ OX' is the contrapositive of OX ⊃ CX', '~ CX ⊃ ~ OX' cannot be offered as a counter-example of autonomism, even if '~ OX' is said to be an evaluative judgement, as Collingridge does, or Rynin seems to do. This is so because '~ OX', in that use of it in which it is evaluative, though minimally, implies 'CX'. Therefore, it cannot be contraposed as '~ CX ⊃ ~ OX'. This is nothing very startling, or bizarre. This is only to say that a judgement of obligation, whether it is a fully functional one like 'It is obligatory to X', or 'It is obligatory not to X' (i.e. 'It is forbidden to X'), or even one of an extremely diluted obligative, or conative, content, like

'It is not obligatory (though it may be only permissible, or recommendable) to X' presupposes, or implies, that the agent concerned can X.

It X-ing is not possible, i.e. if the agent cannot X, then it can neither be called, for him, obligatory, nor recommendable, nor even permissible. Even calling an action permissible, or morally indifferent, may mean that we attach some value to it in the minimal sense that neither doing, nor not doing, it is wrong. If '~ OX' is taken to mean that X-ing is neither obligatory, nor recommendable, nor permissible, then certainly it can be implied by '~ CX'. If one cannot X, he cannot be said to be obligated to, or obligated not to, X. Nor can we recommend to him to X, or even to leave it to him to X, or not to X, as he chooses. But we must also realize that if we declare X-ing to be neither obligatory, nor recommendable, nor permissible, it would mean that it has no practical, and therefore no evaluative, or moral, relevance.

'~OX' would then fall outside the zone of the praxis of all those who cannot X, and outside that of human praxis itself if nobody can X. Normally, when we say of an action that it is not obligatory, we only deny to it obligatoriness, and leave open the possibility of its being recommendable, or permissible. In this sense it may be said to have some evaluative role, but it cannot then be, as has been argued here, the implicate of '~CX', and therefore we could not have '~CX ⊃ ~ OX' as the transpositive of 'OX ⊃ CX', which a critic of autonomism may use as a counter-example of autonomism. In the other, special, sense in which we exclude the possibility of the non-obligatory X-ing's being recommendable, or permissible, as well, we can have '~CX ⊃ ~ OX'. But in its occurrence in this sentence '~ OX' would have no practical and therefore no evaluative role, or significance, at all. Therefore, we may take '~CX ⊃ ~ OX' as the transpositive of 'OX ⊃ CX', but the former would not be a counter-instance of autonomism. It would not be the case of a non-moral, or factual, judgement '~CX' implying a moral or evaluative judgement '~OX', because as has been shown above, in this occurrence of it '~OX' has become bereft of all practical or evaluative content and therefore is not a moral or evaluative judgement. '~CX ⊃ ~ OX' here means the plain truth that what cannot be done can have no practical relevance. But this point needs some elaboration as well as modification.

Moral life is concerned with the moral improvement of the human situation. That is why we are, in our moral dealings, concerned with what we can do. To be morally concerned with an action is to take an attitude

towards it. This attitude could be one of considering it obligatory, or a duty; or, one of approval, i.e. approving doing it without considering it a duty; or, one of moral neutrality, i.e. of considering doing, or not doing, it of no moral significances, which amounts to feeling free about it. Any of these attitudes can be adopted only about what can be done. But it is also true that there are several things we cannot at the moment do, but consider them worth doing. An Indian, for example, may feel that he cannot eliminate, nor can he form a group which can eliminate, or even significantly reduce, the prevailing corruption in political practice. But he does feel that something should be done to eliminate, or reduce, it. What happens in such cases is that one entertains the picture, or idea, or a value, or goal, which he considers worth realizing or achieving. But he does not find anybody capable of doing that. Therefore, he cannot assign it to anybody as his duty or obligation. But he can say that somebody should. For example, we do consider cancer an evil and consider its cure a great-good, though we also believe that nobody can at the moment cure it. We do not assign to a medical expert the duty or obligation to cure it, nor do we blame him if he fails to cure a patient suffering from it. But, since we believe that it is possible to acquire the ability or expertize to cure it, we say that he ought to try to acquire it. We say he ought to try because he can try. Therefore, here too we find that we adopt the moral attitude of considering it his duty to try acquiring the expertize because we assume that he can try. What can be done, or at least believed or assumed to be doable, can alone be the object of a moral attitude, just as what can be said, or at least assumed to be sayable, can alone be the object of an epistemic attitude, i.e. the attitude of considering it true or false, certain or uncertain, etc.

After this short discussion about what cannot be done, which may be taken as a brief aside, let us examine some other cases, allegedly derived from perfectly impeccable use of some rules of logic and claimed to be counter-examples of autonomism, just as the rule ' "Ought" ⊃ "Can" ' has been claimed to yield one. I have shown in the preceding few pages that the latter does not really yield a viable counter-example, and hope to show, in what follows, that even the other attempts do not fare better.

David Rynin in the work already referred to and Arthur Prior in his of (1960)[7] have made *apparently* quite ingenious uses of formal logic to give examples in which moral judgements are deduced from non-moral premises and thereby they claim to refute autonomism. Prior's refutation is more

comprehensive and includes a large part of the ground covered by Rynin's. Therefore, I shall examine Prior's refutation in some detail, and Rynin's only casually in course of doing the latter. Prior holds that in the standard, ordinary, sense of deduce, ethical conclusions can be validly deduced from a set of completely non-ethical premises. He gives some examples of such inferences which do appear to be impeccable because they use some well-known rules of formal logic. If anyone doubts the ethical character of the conclusion of an argument of this type, he draws the same conclusion from a set of premises which contains at least one moral judgement. His assumption is that the conclusion of this mixed set would be accepted to be a moral judgement by the autonomist. Since it is identical with the conclusion which has been drawn from a set consisting of only non-moral, or factual, judgements, the autonomist, he thinks, has no right to refuse to call the latter conclusion a moral judgement.

It seems to me that it is redundant for Prior to take this step. If a moral judgement is shown to have been deduced from a set of non-moral premises, there is no reason to refuse calling it a moral judgement on the ground that its set of premises contain no moral judgement. No autonomist would do that. I do not think any autonomist holds the view that a judgement is a moral judgement *only because*, or because, it follows from a mixed set of premises at least one of which is a moral judgement. A judgement is a moral one, he would say, because of what it does, because of the function, or functions, it performs in human life. It can be inferred or deduced only from a mixed set of premises because of its being what it is, i.e. a moral judgement; it is not that it is a moral judgement because it is deducible only from a mixed set.

Prior does not say what he himself thinks a moral judgement does, nor does he discuss what any autonomist claims it to do. This seems to me the main reason for his finding it so easy to give what he considers to be unquestionable counter-examples of autonomism and also for his counter-examples not really disproving autonomism. Therefore, I shall examine only those examples of Prior in which he claims to deduce moral conclusions from neat, unmixed, sets of premises, and ignore their mixed counterparts or equivalents in which at least one premise is a moral judgement.

Premises in a moral argument matter the same way they matter in a non-moral argument. By a moral argument I mean one in which the conclusion is a moral judgement, and by a non-moral argument, one the conclusion of which is not a moral judgement. Premises matter in both of

them in the sense that one cannot use indiscriminately any set of premises to draw any sort of conclusion. Prior seems to hold that they matter in a different way to moral conclusions because if among the premises there is at least one moral judgement, the conclusion cannot be refused to be called a moral judgement. This seems to be untenable. Take the following example:

(B) 1. All truth-telling people are benevolent.
2. All benevolent people abstain from telling any lie.
3. Therefore, all truth-telling people abstain from telling any lie.

Both the premises are moral judgements and have different contents. (2) does not say what a universal converse of (1) would have said because being a truth-teller and an abstainer from telling any lie do not mean the same thing. One may abstain from telling a lie, but may not tell the truth, though he knows it and the situation he is in requires that it be told: He may remain silent. (3), the conclusion, is not a moral judgement, though it appears to be. It is not because it is analytic or tautologous. To tell a truth one must abstain from telling any lie. Therefore, (3) does not give any moral information, and cannot function as a viable moral judgement.

Prior's first example, or counter-example of autonomism is built upon a use of the rule of disjunction: P, therefore P v Q

P (I) (1) 'Tea-drinking is common in England.
(2) Therefore, either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot' (p. 90)

The premise is a factual judgement and the argument is valid. Let us accept the conclusion to be a moral judgement. Now, since it is a moral judgement, it must help one, who needs its help, in deciding what to do. Suppose this argument is given to a police officer entrusted with the task of shooting all those who ought to be shot and has to decide whether or not New Zealanders are to be shot. Can this argument, or its conclusion, help him in deciding what to do with New Zealanders? In place of helping it may befuddle him. The disjunctive conclusion would not tell him what to do. He can get any help only if he is somehow able to disjoin the second disjunct from the first. If the disjunctive conclusion is to be taken as a moral judgement, it can be so taken only because of this disjunct. This disjunct can help anyone in decision-making only when it is separated from the first, i.e. when it is given the status of an independent

judgement. But it can be separated from the first, i.e. inferred from the disjunctive conclusion, only when a denial of the first disjunct is made available. But the first disjunct is also the premise, and therefore to add its denial as another premise is to introduce self-contradiction in the reasoning because then it would have two premises, one contradicting the other. The reasoning would then assume this form:

(1) P
(2) ∴ P v Q
(3) ~ P
(4) ∴ Q.

This example of Prior, thus, only shows that a moral judgement can be deduced from a self-contradiction, which he does not want to say (p. 90). He would thus have to face a dilemma here: Either the disjunctive conclusion is to be called a moral judgement only by courtesy because it is incapacitated, on account of its structure, to function as a moral judgement, or to take out from it a moral judgement, there has to be a self-contradiction in the reasoning. Accepting neither of the two horns of the dilemma would disprove autonomism.

In Prior's example 'Tea-drinking is common in England' is not ethical. By itself it cannot make a judgement, in which it occurs as a part, ethical. Suppose the ethical judgement 'All New Zealanders ought to be shot' is in dispute between A and B. If we abbreviate 'Tea-drinking is common in England' as P and 'All New Zealanders ought to be shot' as Q, then obviously P is irrelevant to proving Q. But A, who offers P as a premise, may say 'P, therefore, P or Q'. Can he always say it?, or would B always allow him to say it? Speaking from the point of view of formal logic, A can and B should. But if it is a real context in which B is disputing the tenability of Q, and A is trying to prove it, B may not allow him on the grounds (a) that P is irrelevant to proving Q and (b) that when Q itself is in dispute, it should not be put as the disjunct of P. Since P has been accepted as true, having been used as an independent premise, to say 'P, therefore P or Q', is formally innocent. But B may say that it may dupe a person, not knowing the logic of disjunction, into believing that Q is true when he is told that since P is true, P v Q has also to be accepted as true, even if Q is false. Even A should not proceed to deriving 'P v Q' from 'P' because he would know that he cannot get 'Q' from 'P v Q' without having 'not-P', which he cannot have. He cannot assume both 'P' and 'not-P', and he cannot get 'not-P' from 'P or Q' by any logical manoeuvre. It is clear from this discussion that the argument-form 'P, therefore, P or Q', when 'P' stands for a factual or non-moral judgement, has no role in proving that a moral judgement can be derived from a set of non-moral premises.

An argument-form which can be used to demonstrate that a moral conclusion can follow from a set consisting of only non-moral premises, must be usable to deduce, if the need be, a moral conclusion in dispute, or its denial, which also would be a moral judgement. It cannot have only the limited role of providing a counter-example of autonomism; if it is so handicapped, it would not have the right to be called an argument-form. Put on this test, Prior's form 'P, therefore P v Q' fails. Suppose A is pleading for rejecting the moral judgement Q and B for accepting it. Suppose further that both of them agree that P is a factual judgement. Now using the rule of addition, B offers to A the argument 'P, therefore P v Q'. A can then very well say that this argument is valid but completely irrelevant to their dispute. And, so it really is. They have to prove or disprove Q, but what has been proved is 'P v Q', which is not equivalent to Q. And, we have seen the difficulties in getting separated Q from P v Q. This argument-form thus cannot be used to prove or disprove a moral judgement which is in dispute, or needs to be proved or disproved. It can be used to prove an entirely different one, a disjunction whose one disjunct would be the disputed judgement. This means that the mode of deducing a moral judgement involved in it is of no use in explaining or illustrating the nature of moral reasoning which we actually use in solving our moral disputes, or substantiating our moral views.

A word about a moral judgement's being implied by a self-contradictory sentence. To accept that a moral judgement can be implied by a self-contradictory premise is not to accept that a moral judgement can be implied by a non-moral premise. Self-contradictory and tautologous sentences are neither moral, nor non-moral or factual, sentences. Anything follows from a self-contradictory sentence. If one man deduces Q from the premise 'P and not-P', his opponent can, with equal ease, deduce not-Q from the same premise. Similarly, to deduce a tautology from a moral judgement would not be relevant to proving that a moral judgement entails a non-moral judgement. Any tautology can be deduced from any judgement, or more accurately, from a null set of premises. Therefore, it does not mean much to deduce it from a moral judgement. No autonomist

means to deny all this of elementary logic when he denies the deducibility of a moral from a non-moral judgement.

It is true that a false judgement implies any judgement, and therefore it would also imply a moral judgement. One way to rule out this possibility would be to declare that a moral judgement is incapable of being true or false. Then it would neither imply, nor be implied by, any other judgement because the implication-relation, which is relevant here, is generally defined in terms of the truth-values of its relata. But that would make it also incapable of figuring in an argument either as a premise, or as a conclusion, which it very well does. Therefore, taking this step would be unfair to its logic. Moreover, since I hold, though would not explain here, that a moral judgement has truth-values, I would not adopt this method for protecting the autonomy of ethics. It is also not necessary because the logical truth that a false proposition implies any proposition offers no real threat to autonomism. If '2 + 2 = 5' implies that A is guilty of homicide, the implication only means that if a person accepts the untruth '2 + 2 = 5', then he cannot deny that A is guilty of homicide, or, for that matter, anything else, howsoever untrue or absurd that may be. It does not mean that one should accept '2 + 2 = 5' or 'A is guilty of homicide'. The rule of implication does not give anybody the licence to use a false proposition as a premise in an argument, or as a reason to prove something. If L offers it to M as a premise to prove that A is guilty of homicide, M may not let it stay as a premise on the ground that it is false. If L claims it to be true, M may easily prove it to be false, and if he does not, he may easily prove that it has no relevance to proving, or implying, that A is guilty, etc. At this point L cannot say that it is false and therefore implies the latter because he has already claimed it to be true. Besides, he has used it as a premise, and to use anything as a premise is to assume it to be true at least in the ensuing argument's universe of discourse.

To use a false P as a premise, while admitting that it is false is self-inconsistent because to use it as a premise is to assume it to be true. To use it without admitting it to be false while knowing that it is false is to cheat. That one ought not to cheat is not a logical but a moral rule and can safely be assumed by logic, as it is by all other types of human enterprises, intellectual as well as non-intellectual. Man's logical activities are, like his other voluntary activities, not outside the zone of ethics. By saying that a false proposition implies any proposition, the logician is only saying one of the several things which his definition of implication means

or signifies. He is not saying, or implying, thereby that logic issues a general permit to everyone to use a false proposition to prove whatever he wants to prove.

I do not think any heteronomist has used the false-proposition-implying-any-proposition paradox of implication, as it is generally called, to disprove autonomism. I have discussed it above only to obviate whatever little apprehension one may have on this account. It is also not to be forgotten, though it may appear to be a trivial truth, that when the autonomist says that a set of factual premises cannot yield a moral conclusion, he means by the former a normal set, i.e. a set which does not contain self-contradictory premises, or a deceptively introduced false premise.

Moral activities take place in a social setting. That is why moral living can be called an aspect, a feature or constituent, of social living. I would not call it a necessary constituent of the latter because immorality and sociality can also be sometimes combined together. But, since moral action, in that sense of the term in which it is opposed to immoral action and not to non-moral action, is done only in a social set-up, there is bound to be an active interplay between moral and non-moral (i.e. social or societal, and others which are related to them) concepts. Therefore, moral judgements, though not entailed by social or societal ones, are quite intimately related to the latter. Some moral predicates, for example, share some of the logical features of some non-moral ones and because of this commonality, both of them have some similar presuppositions. For example, the moral predicate 'cheating' is, like the non-moral 'marrying' dyadic, and therefore both are governed by the logic of dyadic predicates. 'A has cheated his wife's sister', as well as 'A has not cheated his wife's sister', implies that A's wife has a sister. Since both the affirmative and the negative forms imply it, we can say that 'A has cheated ...' presupposes 'A's wife has a sister'. Similarly, we can say that 'A has married his wife's sister' also presupposes that his wife has a sister because not only it, but also its denial 'A has not married his wife's sister' can be asserted only if A's wife has a sister. What is to be noted here is that the moral judgement 'A has cheated his wife's sister' implies the factual 'A's wife has a sister' not because 'cheating' is a moral predicate, but because it is a dyadic predicate. The similar implication holds between 'A has married his wife's sister' and 'A's wife has a sister' because 'marrying' too, though non-moral, is a dyadic predicate. Therefore, if a moral judgement implies a factual one, only after a thorough analysis it can be said to be a case of

the moral implying the factual and, transpositively, that of the denial of the factual implying the denial of the moral. Thorough analysis is necessary because the moral might have implied the factual not because of the evaluative character of the moral concept occurring in it but because of some non-evaluative, logical, property of the latter.

I have said that the disjunctive conclusion of P(I) can be called a moral judgement only by courtesy, and thereby questioned its claim to be a counter-example of autonomism. It may be said that Prior anticipates this objection and refutes it when he assumes a disjunctive judgement to be non-moral, and using it as a (non-moral) premise in an argument, containing no moral premise, deduces a moral conclusion. Prior does seem to do that. He gives the following example (p. 91) which is his second counter-example:

P(II) (1) Either grass is blue or smoking is wrong.
(2) Grass is not blue.
(3) Therefore, smoking is wrong.

Here both the premises are non-moral, and the conclusion is moral. Therefore, Prior would say, the autonomist cannot refuse to accept it as a counter-example of autonomism.

This argument is an instance of the valid argument from 'P v Q, ~ P, therefore Q', and therefore valid. But would it convince anybody, who wanted to know whether or not smoking is wrong, that smoking is wrong? Would it give him a reason for giving up smoking, or considering it wrong even if he finds it psychologically difficult to give up smoking? The reply would obviously be a 'No'. This is so because though the argument is formally valid, it is irrelevant to justifying the wrongness of smoking, i.e. to showing that smoking is wrong. To find out why the argument does not justify its conclusion we need to look into the point or purpose of giving a moral argument, the role, or roles, a moral argument has to fulfil in the moral language-game.

When the autonomist says that an argument cannot yield a moral judgement as its conclusion, unless the set of its premises contains a moral judgement, he is not simply reiterating the Aristotelian logical theory that nothing can occur in the conclusion of a syllogism if it does not already occur in its premises. The autonomist's thesis about moral reasoning is a summary statement of his analysis of what a moral argument does, or can be expected to do, in human transactions, and his analysis of it is based

on his analysis, characterization, or understanding, of the job, or jobs, a moral judgement does in the form of life which the moral language-game partly, or largely, constitutes. The moral language-game is played in a community which we may call the moral community, the community the members of which broadly share a set of moral beliefs, ideas, ideals, goals, values, institutions, rules and regulations, etc., i.e. have a more or less common moral outlook, or world-view. To accept a moral judgement sincerely is to have at least an attitude of preparedness to use it as a guide to action. The moral judgement one accepts tells him which way to go. Therefore, when he is in doubt about the veracity, soundness, or credibility, of a moral judgement in a certain situation to which it is relevant, he does not see which way should he go. It is at this point that he needs an argument to determine the tenability or untenability of the judgement concerned in a rational, cogent, manner.

To have a problem about the tenability, or untenability, of a moral judgement is to have a moral problem, a problem of moral decision. In fact, as a ground reality, we first face the problem 'Is smoking wrong?' 'Should I, or should I not, stop it?' And, then we raise the question about the status of the moral judgement 'Smoking is wrong'. We need to nourish our answer with reasons which we do by means of an argument, or arguments, for and against smoking. An argument must provide relevant reasons in favour of its conclusion, and only relevant reasons can nourish the conclusion. For example, saying that smoking is injurious to health does rationally support saying that smoking is wrong. But this it can do only if it is accompanied with the other reason or premise that whatever is injurious to health is wrong, i.e. with the conviction that good health is a moral value. The reasons for a moral judgement support it in an internalist, and not externalist, manner. They enter into its being; that is why I say that they nourish it. This is the reason that they enable it to guide the choice, or action-plan, of the person who sincerely consents to it, or accepts it. One who honours good health as a moral value and admits smoking to be injurious to health, cannot refuse to call smoking wrong. He can do that only if he is irrational, or, you can say this also that, if he does, he would be irrational. It does not mean that if he agrees to consider smoking wrong he would surely stop it; he may not for some other reasons, or causes. But this is not the place to discuss what the latter could be, or how can a rational person, after accepting it wrong, may still continue smoking.[5]

The autonomist's point, therefore, is that if one wants his moral argument to achieve what is natural for it to achieve, i.e. to rationally nourish his conclusion, he must include in his premises a relevant moral judgement or principle. For 'Adultery is an evil' is a moral judgement but irrelevant to proving or disproving that smoking is wrong. When we look at Prior's counter-examples I and II, it is clear that none of them can do what a moral argument is expected to do. This in fact is the case with all of his examples against the autonomist's thesis. Since I have said a lot about P(I) let me make a few observations about P(II).

From the very form of the argument of which it is an instance, it is clear that the first disjunct of premise 1, 'Grass is blue', must be false. It has to be false because only then it can be truthfully denied in premise 2, 'Grass is not blue'. And, its denial in premise 2 is necessary because only then we can draw the conclusion 'Smoking is wrong'. But if the first disjunct of premise 1 has to be false, its second disjunct has to be true, otherwise the entire disjunctive premise would be false. And, the premise has to be true because to use knowingly a false premise is unfair to the practice of good argumentation. But, then, the second disjunct is the conclusion itself, and therefore to assume it to be true in the premise is to bring into the argument a clear petitio.

A conscientious arguer, therefore, is not likely to use an argument of this type. Moreover, his disputant, if he is serious about and respectful to the practice of argumentation, who is really interested in knowing whether or not smoking is wrong, or in deciding whether to continue or give it up, would not let him use premise 1. He would object to it on both the grounds; that is, on the ground that its first disjunct is palpably false and also on the other ground that, therefore, its second disjunct, which is the conclusion of the argument and in dispute, has to be assumed to be true.

It is formally permissible to use any sort of disjunction and the logician can always determine its truth-vales in terms of those of its disjuncts, no matter what they are. But nobody is likely to use an argument of type P(II), unless he is a logician as keen as Prior to contrive, in a fair, or unfair, manner a counter-example of autonomism. Its pointlessness is obvious from the fact that its form can be used to formally prove anything without convincing its recipient of the tenability of its conclusion. For example, one can argue the following way as well:

P(II)a (1a) Either grass is blue or adultery is a virtue.
(2a) Grass is not blue.
(3a) Therefore, adultery is a virtue.

It can be used even to prove 'Prior's refutation of autonomism is a humbug' by putting it as the second disjunct of 1a of P(II)a [or of 1 of P(II)]. Such things are bound to happen when moral reasoning, or argumentation, is taken in isolation from the moral language-game in which, those who play the game, actually use it. What has been said here of arguments P(II) or P(II)a can also be said of I. Prior infers 'Either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot' from 'Tea-drinking is common in England'. But from the latter we can also infer 'Either tea-drinking is common in England or no New Zealander should be shot, whatever he does'. If Prior's examples are considered to be in agreement with the normal practice of using moral arguments, it would mean that the practice has got built into it some sort of an incurable perversity. But the latter cannot be the case; the normal cannot be perverted. As Wittgenstein would have said, it is not a mere accident that both 'normal' and 'normative' derive from the same word 'norm'.

Prior's third counter-example (p. 91) is as follows:

P(III) (1) There is no man over 20 feet high.
(2) Therefore, there is no man over 20 feet high who is allowed to sit in an ordinary chair.

(2), the conclusion of the argument, is a moral, or normative judgement, and (1), the premise, a non-moral, a purely factual, statement. The inference is an instance of the valid argument-form:

$$\sim (\exists X)AX$$

$$\text{Therefore } \sim (\exists X)(AX \cdot BX).$$

We can say: There is no golden mountain: therefore there is no golden mountain which is climbable.

P(III) shares the defects of both C(I) and P(I). Firstly, it would remain valid even if we replace that part of the conclusion which has been added to the premise by something else of a similar grammatical structure. We can, for example, infer from 1, 'Therefore there is no man over 20 feet high who (is allowed or) has the authority to chair any session of the Indian parliament'. Secondly, this mode of argumentation is irrelevant to solving a moral problem, resolving a moral dispute, or enabling one to

make up his mind, etc., which a moral argument is expected to do. Its conclusion is not meant for guiding anybody's choice, or decision-making. Rather, when there is no man over 20 feet high, the question of affirming, or denying, of it any moral predicate, or any predicate as a matter of that, does not arise. The non-existent man over 20 ft high can neither be meaningfully allowed, nor disallowed, to sit in an ordinary chair, because nothing can be said of, or done to, him. Moral arguments have their point when they arise in a context in which someone is in doubt about the morality of something, or when someone is so convinced of the morality of something that he wants to morally convert someone else to his view. Non-existent things or situations cannot be the subject-matter of such an argumentation. It is true that we argue about the possible moral merits or demerits of a policy, projection, or plan of action, and implement one which we rank as the best of the alternative proposals. But this is different from ascribing a moral quality or deficiency to a non-existent being. The moral evaluation of a proposal, or plan of action, is quite often the utilitarian assessment of the likely consequences of its implementation, or an examination of its coherence or non-coherence with the accepted ethos of the society to which belong the implementers, or the people for whose benefit it is going to be implemented.

Prior's conclusion 'There is no man over 20 feet high who is allowed to sit in an ordinary chair', is odd because, I have said, when there is no man over 20 feet high it is pointless to say, or deduce from it, that there is no man over 20 feet high who is allowed to sit in an ordinary chair. After admitting that there is no such man, and for Prior it is to admit this since he has it as a premise that there is no man over 20 feet high, he debars himself from saying or concluding that no such man is allowed to sit in an ordinary chair, or rather from saying anything of the non-existent man. After admitting that there is no golden mountain we loose our logical right to say that it is not climbable. To say that formally it is all right to deduce from 'There is no man over 20 feet high 'There is no man over 20 feet who is allowed to sit in an ordinary chair', is only to say that the former implies the latter. But it remains odd nevertheless, just as ' "2 + 2 = 5" implies "Today is Monday"' remains odd even if the implication is true. It is odd because although '2 + 2 = 5' implies 'Today is Monday', nobody has the right to use '2 + 2 = 5' to prove to someone, who wants to know what day today is, that it is Monday today. Nor would any sensible man wait to see how does he proceed to find out what day today

is when he starts with '2 + 2 = 5' as his premise. Similarly, Prior's example P(III) is a good one to illustrate the argument-form '~ A, therefore, r ~ (A and B)' which, again, is a variant of the rule of disjunction. Since '~ (A and B)' is equivalent to '~A or ~B', this argument-form is the same as '~A, therefore, ~A or r ~ B'. But this does not mean that Prior can use, or his listener would allow him to use, a negative existential proposition as a premise in a moral argument, even one denying a moral attribute or permission to a non-existent being.

Prior's conclusion is uncalled-for when we remember his premise because when there is no man over 20 feet high, it is uncalled-for to say that such a man is not allowed to sit in an ordinary chair. But when it is looked at independently, as a sentence in its own right, it does not look so odd, and that may motivate someone not to resent it. This is likely because sometimes we put in this form a sentence which is semantically very different from it. For example, we may say 'There is no member of the Indian Parliament who can preside over any meeting of the Nepalese Cabinet' meaning thereby that there are members of the Indian Parliament but none of them can preside over any meeting of the Nepalese Cabinet. This we can say because we have not deduced it from 'There is no member of the Indian Parliament'. It cannot be and is not a deduction from the latter. It is therefore that we can say it pointfully, and even truly. But Prior cannot assert his conclusion simply because it is a conclusion, or deduction, from his premise, even though it is true.

Prior's fourth example runs as follows:

P(IV) (1) Undertakers are Church officers.
(2) Therefore, undertakers ought to do-whatever-all-Church-officers-ought-to-do.

Like his other examples P(IV) also has an innocent look. But there is a very obvious assumption here and that assumption is ethical. The assumption is that Church officers ought to do certain things. If it is not there, then we cannot say that undertakers ought to do-whatever-all-Church-officers-ought-do-do. Therefore, when this assumption is made explicit the above argument assumes this form:

(1) Undertakers are Church officers.
(2) All Church officers ought to do xyz.
(3) Therefore, Undertakers ought to do xyz.

In this form the argument contains an ethical premise, and therefore it does not go against the autonomist thesis.

Something like P(IV) is given to Arjuna by Kṛiṣṇa when he tells him that, since he is a Kṣatriya, he ought to do what all Kṣatriyas ought to do. But he soon adds his ethical premise 'All Kṣatriyas ought to fight a righteous war' which expresses one of the main principles of the then prevalent caste ethics (Varṇadharma). Being a Kṣatriya is to have a position in the then Hindu society and to that position is attached a set of duties, 'oughts' and 'ought-not's'. Prior's argument is of this very type, but he does not state the ethical assumption. To be an undertaker, as well as to be a Church officer, is to hold a position, an office, and certain duties go with each of the two positions. If the positions of the two are the same and so are the duties, the undertakers ought to do what Church officers ought to. But the former ought to do what the latter ought to only if there are things which the latter ought to.

If an office carries no duties, then we cannot say of one who holds it that he ought to do what a holder of that office ought to. Take this example: Some Indian journals have a list of advisory editors without formulating any policy to the effect that an advisory editor ought to do such and such things. The inside truth is that the journals' managers associate some well-known names with the journals only to gain some prestige in the profession. The people whose names are included in the list also feel honoured on that account, and do not feel in any way burdened because no duties accrue to them because of their having the position of advisory editors. In this situation we cannot have an argument like P(IV):

P(IV)a (1) A is an advisory editor of IQP.
(2) Therefore, A ought to do what an advisory editor of IQP ought to do.

We cannot have P(IV)a because no premise of the type 'An advisory editor of IQP ought to do XYZ' is available. And if one insists that we can still have an argument of this type, it would really mean:

(1) A is an advisory editor of IQP.
(2) Therefore, A ought to do what an advisory editor of IQP ought to, if there is something which the latter ought to.

(2) is a trivial tautology. It simply means that A, who is an advisory editor of IQP, ought to what an advisory editor of IQP ought to, if there

is something the latter ought to. One thing is clear here. To every person we can say that he ought to do what a man of his status ought to do if a man of that status ought to do anything. This too is a tautology. To protect it from being a tautology we must drop the if-clause and have in its place an independent evaluative judgement about what a man of his status ought to do, i.e. an evaluative premise in our reasoning from what he in fact is to what he ought to do in virtue of his being what he is. This kind of argumentation is possible only in a society in which there are well-defined social strata or positions and each stratum or position has been assigned a set of duties or obligations. This was the case in classical Indian society. That is why in classical Indian literature we quite often come across such arguments as 'You, he, or I, being a Brahmin, a Kṣatriya, a teacher, etc. ought, or ought not, to do such and such things'. But these are not examples of inferring moral judgements from factual premises alone.

Autonomists have been maintaining that to deduce a moral judgement from a set of premises we must have in the set at least one moral judgement. Both Rynin and Prior claim that such an argument, using the principle of exportation, can be converted into a conditional argument in which from a factual, or non-ethical, premise a conditional ethical conclusion can be deduced. This would mean, they say, that an ethical conclusion can be deduced from a non-ethical premise, and this specific type of argument cannot be rejected by an autonomist because it is equivalent to one with a mixed set of premises and an ethical conclusion which the autonomist considers to be faultless.

I would give below an example from Rynin's (1957) in a slightly simplified form:

R(I) (1) All promises ought to be kept.
(2) I have given my promise.
(3) Therefore, I ought to keep my promise.

This argument is in keeping with the autonomist's thesis. Premise (1) is a moral judgement, (2) a factual one, and (3), the conclusion, a moral judgement. By using the principle of exportation on it we get the following argument which is its equivalent, or another variant:

R(I)a (1a) I have given my promise.
(2a) Therefore, if all promises ought to be kept, I ought to keep my promise.

In R(I)a the conclusion follows only from 1a which is a factual proposition. The conclusion is definitely not a non-moral judgement since both, its antecedent and consequent, are moral judgements. Therefore, it has to be taken, Rynin says, as a moral judgement because he does not think a judgement could be neither moral nor non-moral. If we accept this reading of R(I)a, then we have in it a clear refutation of autonomism, as Rynin and Prior both claim of such arguments.

Nobody would question the validity of R(I)a. But the moral or evaluative character of its conclusion is definitely questionable, or rather its non-moral, or non-evaluative, character may be said to be obvious because it is a tautology. Nobody can question its tenability because it follows from the meaning of the quantifier 'all'. It can be put even in a purely formal way: 'If all X's ought to be Y-ed, this X ought to be Y-ed', or even as 'If all X's *are* Y-ed, this X is Y-ed'. This means it is neither about promises, nor about obligations, or oughting. Its tautological character is also obvious from the fact that it is not a judgement which can be had only by using exportation on an argument like R(I). It can be had even from the factual proposition 'I have given my promise', or from no premise at all. It does not require any premise. One who knows the meaning of 'all' can, without using any premise, say such things as 'If all promises ought to be kept, I ought to keep this one of mine', 'If all ripe mangoes are sweet, this ripe mango is sweet', etc. A tautology is neither moral, nor non-moral, and therefore not a moral judgement. Therefore, by deducing 2a from 1a in argument R(I)a, or in anyone of this type, no philosopher, including Rynin and Prior, can claim to have disproved autonomism.

The trivial logical truth that from any particular factual proposition we can (seemingly) deduce a hypothetical moral judgement, whose antecedent is a universal moral, and consequent a particular moral judgement, may give the impression that we can really draw a moral judgement from a factual one. I have shown that the hypothetical moral judgement so drawn is not a moral but a tautologous judgement. But even if it is taken to be a moral judgement, its inference would not disprove autonomism. Suppose from the factual judgement 'A is a professor' we draw 'If all professors are noble-minded, A is noble-minded'. This would really mean that *assuming* that all professors are noble-minded, A is noble-minded; it would not amount to deducing either 'All professors are noble-minded', or 'A is noble-minded'. Rather, it amounts to conceding that only by assuming, i.e. having as another premise, the moral judgement 'All professors

are noble-minded', in addition to the factual premise 'A is a professor', and not from the latter alone, we can deduce the moral judgement 'A is noble-minded'. This is what the autonomist insists on.

The other point, which I have made so many times, is that a judgement like the conclusion of R(I)a, 'If all promises are to be kept, I ought to keep my promise', cannot be a guide to action, or express a decision. But the conclusion of RI, (E) 'I ought to keep my promise', would be. This judgement cannot be derived from (U) 'All promises ought to be kept'. (U) is a universal moral judgement and (E) a particular, or existential one (rephrasable as 'This promise which I have made ought to be kept'). Therefore (U) alone cannot yield (E). It would need the assistance of an existential factual judgement like Rynin's 'I have given my promise (or 'There is this promise which I have given'). This would mean that a universal moral judgement, not by itself but only with the assistance of a particular (i.e. existential) factual judgement, can yield a particular moral judgement. But then the resulting argument would be the same as R(I), the one which the autonomist says a moral argument is very often like. There is nothing surprising here. R(I)a is a conditional argument:

(1a) I have given my promise.
(2a) Therefore, if all promises ought to be kept, I ought to keep my promise.

One way to prove it is to assume the antecedent of the conclusion as a premise and then to deduce only its consequent:

(1) I have given my promise.
(2) All promises ought to be kept.
(3) Therefore, I ought to keep my promise.

The above is the original example R(I). Since (1) the factual premise cannot alone yield (3) the moral conclusion, we have added to it (2), a universal moral judgement. We have got now an argument containing a moral judgement and a factual one in the set of its premises, validly yielding a moral conclusion, and instantiating an argument-form which the autonomist says has the form of a moral argument. Thus we are back to autonomism. But it is also clear from this discussion that the autonomist does not ignore or undervalue the role of factual judgements in moral reasoning. As has been shown above, he admits that not only a factual judgement cannot yield a moral judgement, a universal moral judgement

also cannot alone yield a particular moral judgement. The particular factual needs the assistance of a universal moral, and the latter needs that of the former, to yield a particular moral judgement which is what ordinarily guides our action, or helps us in arriving at a decision.

If propositions of deontic logic are considered to be non-ethical, then, Prior says, we can definitely have faultless arguments in which ethical conclusions follow from sets of premises containing no ethical premise. He gives the following which is his last example:

P(V) (1) No one ought to do what is invariably accompanied by the doing of something wrong.
(2) X.Y invariably acts as he says he will act.
(3) Therefore, X.Y ought never to say that he will do something that he ought not to do.

Of this argument the first premise, he says, is a proposition of deontic logic. The second is obviously factual, and the conclusion ethical. The argument is definitely valid. If the argument is what Prior takes it to be, then it does go against autonomism. But to me it does not seem to do that because the first premise is an ethical principle, and a questionable one, and not a proposition of deontic logic which Prior claims it to be. I shall show this just now.

To make its structure clear, the first premise can be expanded as follows:

(1a) No one ought to do A which is invariably accompanied by doing B and doing B is wrong.

It would have been a purely deontic proposition if it meant (1b): 'No one ought to do what is wrong' or 'No one ought to do B when doing B is wrong.' If doing B is wrong, not doing B is obligatory, and vice versa. But it cannot mean (1b) because of the phrase 'is accompanied by'. An action can be said to be accompanied only by another action, and not by itself. Therefore, what no one ought to do must be an action, say A, invariably accompanied by another action B which is wrong. Reference to two different actions is, thus, surely involved in (1) which has been made explicit in (1a). The relation between the two actions, namely, the relation of B's invariably accompanying A, is empirical, not logical or conceptual. A proposition which says that no one ought to do an action because between it and another action, which is wrong, there exists the empirical relation of invariable accompaniment, cannot be one of deontic logic. A

deontic proposition must be purely conceptual, i.e. true solely on account of some logical, not empirical, relation, holding between some deontic, or evaluative, concepts. In effect, what (1), or (1a), really says is that no one ought to do A, whatever doing A may be, if doing it is invariably accompanied by doing B which is wrong. That is, even if A has a great value, or is worth doing on, say, utilitarian considerations, one ought not to do it because it is invariably accompanied by doing the wrong B. It is therefore an ethical principle giving preference, or high priority, to the deontological notion of wrongness over any other evaluative notion. Such a preferential principle of action cannot be a proposition of deontic logic, or of any logic. It is not at all difficult to formulate a concrete example of it. We can say: No one ought to give alms to a beggar which is invariably accompanied by doing the wrong thing of weakening his power to earn anything by hard labour. Therefore, my conclusion is that this argument which, according to Prior, has the greatest fire power against autonomism, does not fire at all; or, if it fires, it fires on heteronomism and not on autonomism.

Some critics of autonomism hold that means-end, instrumental, moral judgements are derivable from factual judgements. Therefore, their derivation from factual ones provides examples contrary to autonomism. One way to rebut this move would be to hold that they really are not *moral* judgements, and all moral judgements are categorical, or unconditional. But it would be difficult to maintain this view. Moreover, even if one succeeds in maintaining it, he would find it extremely hard to prove that they are not even normative. And, if they are normative, though not moral, and derivable from factual judgements, autonomism would still be refuted, or at least have a set-back, because it, in principle, maintains that no normative judgement can be derived from a set of non-normative, say, factual, judgements. Therefore, assuming that they may be normative, or may even be called moral, judgements, I shall try to show that, when they function as normative, or moral, judgements, they too cannot be derived from a set consisting of only factual premises. And, whenever they seem to be so derivable, when the reasoning involved is made fully explicit, it is found to contain some normative, or, moral, premise, or premises.

It is true, as the saying goes, that he who wills the end, must also will the means. If following the rules of one's language is the best means for conveying well his ideas to his audience, then, if he wants to convey his ideas well to his audience, he ought to follow the rules of his language in

talking about them. Generalizing it, one may, therefore, say that we can deduce 'If A wants to have Y, then he ought to X' from the factual sentence 'X-ing is the best means for having Y'. Suppose A wants to have Y but does not want to X while admitting that X-ing is the best means to having Y. One obvious, or natural, response to him would be to call him irrational. The reason is that the means–end normative reasoning, of which the above is an example, when expanded in its full-blown form, is something like this:

(C) (1) X-ing is the best means to having Y.
(2) Anyone who wants to have Y ought to X, otherwise he would be irrational (Postulate).
(3) A wants to have Y.
(4) A is a rational person (assumption).
(5) Therefore, A ought to X.

In using means–end reasoning we have the rationality postulate as well as the rationality assumption. Neither the postulate nor the assumption is in any way something very strange or unusual. The postulate is only the statement of one of the various commonsense norms, namely, the norm of being rational (or irrational), and the assumption one of the concerned person's satisfying the norm of rationality. We make use of premises like 2 and 4 whenever we enter into any sort of argumentation with anybody. If A denies 4, i.e. declares himself to be irrational, we cannot argue with him. If he denies 2, then again we cannot argue with him unless we arrive at a commonly agreed standard of rationality relevant to means–end reasoning. The point is that some standard or norm of rationality and some assumption of the agent being rational have to be there in every means–end reasoning, and it is they which bring in normative elements in the reasoning, and make it normative, and prevent its becoming just factual, reasoning. Therefore, the autonomist can say that here too the normative conclusion does not follow only from factual premises like 'X-ing is the best means for having Y' and 'A wants to have Y'. Rather it follows from them when they are supported or strengthened by the postulate of the standard of rationality and the assumption of the agent's rationality, both of which involve normative, or normativized, notions.

Some of the alleged counter-examples of autonomism which have been examined in this essay and shown to be unsuccessful in disproving autonomism have been discussed by some other philosophers. But the

points which I have made have not been made by any one of them. The earlier critics, almost all of them, have criticized them on purely formalistic logical lines. Even I have done that to some extent because, in logically evaluating an argument, formal logic has to be used. But my primary objective has been to comment on the alleged counter-examples, keeping in my focal vision the point or purpose of arguing for, or against, a moral judgement in a real, life-like, situation. To do this it has become necessary to have always in mind the jobs to do which, or the purposes to fulfil which, moral language is ordinarily and primarily used. This is so because moral argumentation derives its point from the way or ways moral language is used. It is what it is, or functions the way it does, because moral language is what it is, or functions the way it does. The critics of autonomism, as well as their critics, do not seem to have paid adequate attention to these things.

Similarly, a rule of formal logic, when used in a formal system, to speak a little metaphorically, functions insensitively. That is why to infer 'P v Q' from 'P' would be perfectly right, when both 'P' and 'Q' are well-formed formulae of the formal system in which the inference is drawn and the rule of disjunction a primary, or a derived, rule of inference in it. But in an actual, social, context, its use may not be pointful if it is so insensitively used. Suppose A is questioning and B is asserting that C has committed adultery, when both know that the drawing room in which they are arguing belongs to B. If B tells A that since, this is his (B's) drawing room, therefore either this is his drawing room, or C has committed adultery, B would certainly be using correctly the rule of disjunction. But it would be pointless and would show B's logical insensitivity. Rather, one may even say that he lacks logical commonsense. What I want to emphasize is that the use of logic too, when made in concrete situations, of which moral controversies provide very good examples, would be meaningful or pointful only if it is made with sensitivity to, and understanding of, the nature of the controversy concerned, its purpose and context. One of the counts on which I have found the critics of autonomism, as shown in my rebuttal of their counter-examples, wanting is that not only have they been insensitive to the nature of actual moral controversies or arguments, but have also insensitively used logical rules in their counter-examples, as if they were illustrating their use in a formal system.

Some philosophers think that, without resorting to the use of formal logic, by a direct appeal to what we sometimes do in our social

intercourse, we can locate paradigmatic, or uncontroversial, examples of an item of purely factual, or descriptive, information, yielding, in an impeceable manner, a moral or normative conclusion. If there are such examples, they would be counter-examples of autonomism. I shall present this point of view in my own way, of course, without doing any injustice to it, and then comment on it.

Imagine the following conversation between A and B about C:

A: C has put his old father in an old men's hostel run by a Jaina charitable trust.
B: But why? Does not A have enough of space in his house, or is his father too irritable or incohesive a person?
A: Nothing of the sort. C has a large house, and the old man is as normal a person as an old man could be. And, you know, financially C is very sound.
B: Then, I fail to understand why he has done that.
A: The reason is very simple: C does not want to keep his father with himself or his family.
B: That is too bad. C ought not to have done that.

'C has put his old father in an old men's hostel', as well as 'C does not want to keep his old father with himself' is, *on the face of it,* a factual, descriptive, or reportive, sentence. In the Indian society any B would, on the basis of either one, justifiably say of any C that what he has done is morally wrong, or that his attitude towards his father is, morally speaking, a dispicable one. It may seem that here we have a counter-example of autonomism, which is natural or commonsensical and therefore more respectable than any manufactured by an ingenious logician.

But when we go a little deeper into the logic of an example like the one given above, we would notice that the so-called purely factual or descriptive sentence is not that pure, neat, or unadulterated; that is, slightly adapting Austin, it is not the sentence 'that wears the trousers'. Rather, we would find that it contains a good amount of normativity or evaluativeness, and that it derives or obtains the latter from the social institution its factual content is a part of, or grounded in. In the Indian society the institution of parenthood is so constituted that it makes it morally bad, wrong, or derogatory, for a son to keep his old father in an old men's hostel, or not to want his old father to live with him. Our overall moral assessment of C's personality is bound to be adversely affected after knowing that he has

kept his father in an old men's hostel, etc. It is the derogatory evaluative element built into the sentence 'C has kept ...', which authorises B to pass, in a natural way, the moral judgement 'C ought not to have done that'. He does it in a natural way because the derogatory evaluative element has also flowed, in a natural way, into the descriptive content of the sentence. That is why it is not that pure a descriptive sentence as the heteronomist may think it to be. There are several social institutions which make certain descriptive-looking sentences, or references, concerning them, evaluatively, or normatively loaded, for example those of marriage, family, neighbourhood, citizenship, friendship, etc.

What I have been maintaining here does not imply that the same sentence can in one society yield, and in another it cannot yield, a normative conclusion. Somebody may say that in a Western society the sentence 'C has kept his old father in an old men's hostel' would not authorize a member of that society to call what C has done morally wrong. I am not sure it would not, but even if it would not, that would not go against the position I am maintaining. If the Western institution of parenthood has not passed any element of derogatory normativity into the sentence 'C has kept ...', then the latter would be purely descriptive and would not yield any moral or normative judgement. If it yields the latter in an Indian social context, it does because the Indian institution of parenthood has not let it remain purely descriptive. Rather, it has so functioned that some element of evaluativeness has accrued to the sentence. Then, though the sentence uttered in an Indian context would be grammatically similar to its occurrence in a Western context, in its two occurrences it would be functioning in two different ways. Therefore, we may even say that in its two occurrences it is not (functionally) the same sentence. But how we describe it is not an important issue here. My main purpose of discussing its use in a moral reasoning is to show that such innocent-looking examples of purely descriptive sentences yielding evaluative conclusions are not really innocent. Perhaps this is always the case.

Notes and References

1. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Vol. II (Everyman's Library), pp. 177–8.
2. For my version of semantic autonomism, see chapters 3 to 6 of my *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality* (ICPR, New Delhi).

3. David Rynin, 'The Autonomy of Ethics', *Mind* 66, 1957, pp. 308–17.
4. D.G. Collingridge, 'Ought-Implies-Can and Hume's Rule', *Philosophy* 52, 1977, pp. 348–57.
5. For my earlier views on this topic, different from the one presented here, see my 'Ability, Obligation, and Option' in Crighton Peden and Yeager Hudson (ed.) *Freedom, Dharma and Rights*, (The Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), pp. 55–77, and 'The Paradox of Obligation', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, XI, 1994, pp. 1–27.
6. For a detailed discussion of the issues involved here see my 'The Paradox of Obligation', pp. 1–7.
7. Arthur Prior, 'The Autonomy of Ethics', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 38, 1960, reprinted in his *Papers in Logic and Ethics* (Duckworth, 1976), pp. 88–96. All references to this work. In an earlier work, *Logic and the Basis of Ethics* (Oxford, 1949), Prior had defended the autonomist thesis.

Facts and Obligations

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That there is a logical distinction between statements of fact and value, so that from a statement that something is the case no conclusion can be drawn about what ought to be done, has become axiomatic in a good deal of recent writing about ethics. R.M. Hare has formulated the principle as 'No imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premises which does not contain at least one imperative.'[1] In order not to beg the disputed question of whether an 'ought' proposition as best interpreted as an imperative, I prefer to put it more generally and to say that no conclusion as to what ought or ought not to be done can be validly inferred from a set of premises which does not at least contain one term which states, indicates or implies that actions of a certain kind ought or ought not be done. Nevertheless others have pointed out that statements of fact are often adduced as reasons from which duties can be inferred.[2] My purpose in this paper will be to examine some kinds of instance in which it appears that an obligation is being deduced from statements of fact, to try to see whether the factual premises are indeed purely factual, and determine the force of the 'ought' in the conclusion.

As a formal point, it seems unquestionable that no conclusion containing an 'ought' can be strictly deduced from premises which state only facts. This must surely be so, since deductive logic is concerned with getting pints out of pint pots, and nothing more can appear in the conclusion than can be extracted from the premises taken together. Yet in much moral argument or persuasion, this principle does not seem to be held. Hume, indeed, in a well-known passage, often taken as the locus classicus in these discussions, says that such a principle if recognized would 'subvert all the vulgar systems of morality.' 'In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes

the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am suprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is* and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought* or *ought not.* This change is imperceptible, but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this *ought,* or *ought not*, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.'[3]

Hume is surely right in saying that there is a logical jump here. But is he right in saying that the change from propositions not connected with an 'ought' to one so connected is 'imperceptible'? No doubt in popular moral argument and preaching it often goes unperceived, but it may be possible to see how the transition is made. For in actual moral discussion, these transitions are continually being made; as indeed they are in Hume's own discussion of how morality works in social practice, where he shows ideas of obligation being extracted from factual premises, through inducing people to see how they can take an interest in what is to the general interest.[4]

I shall now consider some of the ways in which a statement of obligation is connected with statements of fact, in order to see both what its force is, and what is the nature of the transition.

'The state of the roads being what it is, if you want to catch the 10.30 p.m. train you ought to leave now.'

This is a hypothetical imperative; the apodosis states what, according to reasonable expectations, is likely to be a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for fulfilling a desire indicated by the protasis. Can the statement be rephrased so as to cut out 'ought'? If it were rephrased as, 'If you do not leave now, you will not catch the train', it would become a simple prediction, and it might be falsified if the train were late. The force of the 'ought' is to say, amongst other things, that one should not bank on trains being late. If you are to be able to do what you want to do, knowing the facts about the roads and according to all reasonable expectations of when the train is likely to arrive, you ought to leave now. The 'ought' here has the force of warning you that you would be flying in the face of reasonable expectations of success if you did not do this. The recommendation is only made on the assumption that you have in fact got a certain desire or purpose. It points out that if you are wanting to achieve your purpose, and if you are prepared to behave reasonably, you are committed to taking certain steps. As Kant put it in writing about hypothetical imperatives, 'Who wills the end, wills also (so far as reason decides his conduct) the means in his power which are indispensably necessary thereto.'[5] The operative words here are 'so far as reason decides his conduct.' Hence the 'ought'. Even in a hypothetical imperative one cannot say that it follows simply from statements of fact. It might appear so; as when I say, 'I want to catch the 10.30 train; it is close on 10 o'clock and will take me half an hour to get to the station, so I ought to leave now,' gives information about means to my end ('my leaving now will give me time to catch the train'). It is implied by the indicative premises. The 'ought' adds the force of a recommendation I am making to myself as to what I had better do, on the assumption that I am adopting a prudential attitude. If I am not adopting such an attitude, I might say, 'But all the same I am going to stay another five minutes.' So even the prudential 'ought' in a hypothetical imperative is not, I think, entailed by indicative premises; it can be overridden by a moral 'ought', as when, for instance, in spite of the fact that I want to catch the train I decide I ought to wait because I have promised to meet someone.

In a categorical imperative, as Kant also pointed out, the 'ought' does not state that a certain means-end commitment is reasonable within a presumed purpose. Kant said it enunciated a universal law, we may prefer to say a 'principle', in order to avoid the implications of command suggested by the word 'law', as by the word 'imperative'. But whether we call it law, principle, recommendation or prescription, a statement such as 'All men ought to tell the truth' is not a dubious general statement of fact, such as 'everyone tells the truth', or 'All men are liars,' and those who break it do not invalidate the general principle (if it is valid). Since categorical imperatives (if there be such) are never held to be derived from factual premises, they raise no problems relevant to this discussion (though, of course, they raise plenty of others).

One reaction to the sharp distinction between statements of facts and moral expressions has been to deny that the latter are assertions at all, and to interpret them as expressions of attitude, joined with an injunction (conveyed by the word 'ought') used to get others to share our attitude. So 'You ought to tell the truth' becomes 'I approve of telling the truth: do so, too'.[6] But this way of putting it has come in for a good deal of criticism on the score that it reduces the function of ethical language either to the

propagandist one of trying to influence people's attitudes and/or to the dictatorial one of commanding them to agree with us; and neither of these does justice to the possibility of moral *argument* or rational persuasion.[7] And in moral arguments, people put forward facts as considerations which may cause their opponents to change their views; as also in making one's own decisions, one may be influenced by having a fact formerly unnoticed brought to one's attention. Does this go to show that there is, as Hume remarked, a transition from facts to 'ought', as Hume showed in his practice of actual moral argument? Is there a kind of inference which is not strict deduction, but which allows for this transition?

Stuart Hampshire[8] holds that it is wrong to draw 'the inference from the fact that moral or practical judgements cannot be logically derived from statements of fact, that they cannot be based on or established exclusively by reference to beliefs about matters of fact.' Hence, he says, moral judgements are discussable; the only kind of rational discourse is not strict deduction, but there may be another 'loose kind of inference' by which we pass to moral decisions. There may, indeed; but I am not happy about saying that these judgements can be 'established exclusively' by reference to beliefs about matters of fact, unless we are seeing facts not just as what is the case, but in the light of some guiding attitude of fairness or sympathy. Otherwise, why should a consideration such as 'You ought not to hit him because he is smaller than you' carry any appeal?

Toulmin in *The Place of Reason in Ethics* also says that factual statements may be 'good reasons' for moral judgements, and calls the process by which we pass from facts to values 'evaluative inference'. The transition is made by invoking a formulation of what he says is 'the function of ethics', a general principle such as those elsewhere called 'rules of inference'.[9] That is to say, the inference can be drawn because, whether explicitly or not, this principle is being used; it states that the function of ethics is 'to correlate our feelings and behaviour in such a way as far as possible compatible'. So a moral judgement could be derived from factual statements if it could be said that 'this action would be likely to promote the maximum harmony of interests.' This is reminiscent of Benthamite utilitarianism, and raises the same difficulty: how do I pass from saying this action would promote the maximum harmony of interests to saying I ought to do the action, unless I make some judgement (like the major premises of the practical syllogism) to the effect that to promote a harmony of interests is good ('good' here meaning 'desirable' or 'a worthy

aim'—is provided for by introducing his view of 'the function of ethics' as a rule of inference. But this view of the function of ethics is not uncontroversial; it might be possible to argue that some interests should be eliminated rather than promoted or harmonized, and that ethics are in fact sometimes used to do just this. To call this view a 'rule of inference' suggests it is less controversial that it is.

Hare in review of Toulmin's book[10] (in *Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. I, No. 4, 1951, pp. 372–5) says that Toulmin's 'evaluative inference' from fact to value is in effect the old Aristotelian practical syllogism in disguise. In the practical syllogism, the major premises is a general rule to the effect that such and such actions or objects are good, or desirable, or should be chosen, while the minor premises states the fact that X is an action or object of this kind, from which follows the conclusion that it ought to be done or chosen. In Toulmin's scheme, the major premises is replaced by a general rule of inference which says we are entitled to pass from the one factual premises to the conclusion—the rule in this case being that the function of ethical judgements is to harmonize desires. But this introduces a value judgement; it could be put as a major premises stating a general principle, e.g. 'we ought to act in the kind of way which will serve to harmonize desires,' or even 'to find ways of harmonizing desires is what we should use ethics for' (if we are wanting to stick close to the notion of 'function', and noting that in fact ethics is not always used in this way). Whether we prefer to call this a major premises, or a rule of inference or (as Toulmin is now inclined to do[11]) a 'warrant', does not alter the fact that a sentence introducing judgement about values, and not only about facts, has been introduced. By 'value judgement' I understand broadly some expression indicating approval or disapproval, or being used to command or condemn. Following on this, if action is called for (there may be purely contemplative kinds of valuation where it is not), we can conclude that certain kinds of action would be more appropriate than others and in some cases where action is not optional, this may be of a kind to which we are committed if we make the value judgement at all. Hence, the 'ought'. I look on road accidents as bad things, and therefore I ought to do what I can to avoid them. It would be logical to say 'but all the same I do nothing to avoid them,' 'admitting that this is reprehensible on my part since I own road accidents are bad. It would not be logical to say 'but all the same I *ought not* to try to avoid them.'

I conclude that formally speaking the logical point must stand, that value judgements or statements about what ought to be done cannot be deduced from purely factual statements. But there is the question of whether in practice it is always possible to make a sharp distinction between bare factual statements and statements which are valuationally loaded, so that they at least indicate, if not imply, recommendations about what ought or ought not to be done. The notion of 'fact' itself is, of course, far from simple. Ideally, it means something which actually is or was the case; in practice we have to make do with statements of fact, which are propositions giving interpretations of what is or was the case. So in practice we have more than bare description. We have interpretation which selects, emphasizes, relates. If this is so to some extent even in describing the facts in a physical situation, it is still more so in describing the facts of social situations, which are the kinds of facts usually adduced as reasons supporting moral judgements or decisions. For facts about social situations, or 'social facts' as they are sometimes less accurately called, are not just statements about individuals with certain physical and biological properties. They are statements about people occupying various roles *vis-a-vis* one another. And a role is a relationship of a recognized kind within a given society, with some notion of the kind of conduct appropriate to it built into its description. The difference can be seen by considering a well-known passage in Hume,[12] which ignores this notion of social relationship. 'Let us choose any inanimate object, such as an oak or elm; and let us suppose that, by the dropping of its seed, it produces a sapling below it, which springing up by degrees, at last overtops and destroys the parent tree: I ask, if in this instance there be wanting any relation, which is discoverable in patricide or ingratitude? Is not the one tree cause of the other's existence; and the latter the cause of the destruction of the former, in the same manner as when a child murders his parent. 'Tis not sufficient to reply, that a choice or will is wanting. For in the case of patricide a will does not give rise to any different relations, but is only the cause from which the action is derived; and consequently produces the same relations, that in the oak or elm arise from some other principles.'

Hume says that what is lacking in the one case and found in the other is a *sentiment,* and the sentiment is an emotion of approval or disapproval within the breast of the observer. But if the relation of a child to parent is considered as social, and not merely as physical, it becomes a role relation constituted by certain notions of appropriate conduct which are

built into its description. These may, of course, vary in different societies, but there will always be some such notion, so that it is possible to speak of 'filial' and 'unfilial' conduct to designate ways of behaving which are appropriate or inappropriate in the role. Indeed, the history of the terms 'natural' and 'unnatural' shows how deep-seated is the belief that certain kinds of conduct are part of the normal description of a social relation. The ambiguities in 'natural' and 'unnatural' may suggest these terms are better avoided in these discussions (I shall return to this in a later context). Social behaviour is always artificial, in the sense that it is not just instinctive or impulsive. It is informed by expectations about what it is appropriate to do in certain types of situation, and this only seems 'natural' where the expectations are so strongly grounded in custom and so widely accepted that they come to seem self-evident.[13] So David Ross and Prichard used to tell us that it was intuitively self-evident that if X had borrowed money from Y, he had an obligation to repay it, or that if A was the father of B, B had a duty to help A in his old age. But these are role relations where the beliefs about appropriate conduct are so firmly established that what it is right to do gets seen not as a decision, but as part of the facts of the situation. If I suggest that this 'self-evidence' is partly the result of established custom, this does not mean that such judgements are merely 'socially-conditioned' and so may be arbitrary. They may also be the result of the sense of fairness, sympathy and something like Toulmin's principle of the need to make for harmony of interests, working on custom so as to reinforce or amend it. And these, I suggest, are among our means of criticism and rationality in moral judgements. For fairness and sympathy are attitudes which help us to put ourselves imaginatively into the role of the other people in the situation, and so help us to be more objective about our own role in relation to them. And this is surely one way of trying to be rational. Making fairness, sympathy and a will to harmony our guides, the facts of the situations in which we have to act can then be seen as constituting good reasons for decisions; but they are not good reasons on their own account, and apart from these guides. Seen under the guides of aggressiveness and selfishness, the facts might provide good reasons for different courses of action. So we should still say that it is only possible to pass from description of fact to moral judgements by the help of some guiding evaluation. This may not be explicitly enunciated as a principle; in the case of the morality of role behaviour it may have become

part of the accepted notion of what is implied in occupying the role of e.g. a debtor or a parent.

The notion of *role*, therefore, I suggest provides a link between the factual descriptions of social situations, and moral decisions about what ought to be done in them. It has, so to speak, a foot in both camps. Where roles have become recurrent and generally recognized forms of relationship within a social way of life, certain norms of behaviour become, as I have suggested, built into their description. So individuals acting in such roles are not all the time thrown back on their own first-hand judgements as to what they ought to do. And however much we may pride ourselves on the individual, personal character of our own moral decisions, or pour scorn on established codes if we like to think of ourselves as 'Outsiders', we all in fact depend on what can be taken for granted in role morality to a far greater extent than we always realize. But that this implies acceptance or rejection of norms, and not bare reading of facts, is shown on the occasions where role morality is challenged (for instance the Victorian notions of what constituted 'filial behaviour', especially on the part of daughters), or where there are conflicts of role, and difficult decisions have to be made about priorities. It then becomes evident that role morality, however, strongly established, does not just exist as a natural fact outside the minds of individuals, exercising causal pressure of established tradition, existing in the minds of individuals through their social education, and continually being strengthened or weakened by their sometimes more and sometimes less responsible acceptance or rejection. So when the 'facts of the situation' seem to point inescapably to certain obligations, this may be because they are the facts of a social situation, seen as already charged with the norms of roles as established within a social tradition. And these must either be accepted or rejected. When the acceptance is tacit or taken for granted, the norms are likely to be seen simply as part of the facts of the situation.[14] Where they are not taken for granted, a personal decision has to be made to accept or reject them.

When therefore an 'ought' follows from statements concerning roles ('X is your son, therefore you ought not to treat him like that': 'Since you are a doctor, you ought to respect the confidences of your patients'), what is happening is that a person is being referred to value-acceptances which he can be presumed to hold. The force of the 'ought' is not merely to make a recommendation (which sounds too tentative), still less to issue a command (which sounds too dictatorial), but to recall a commitment to act in

accordance with these value acceptances. This, I think, holds both for the third person, 'you ought', and for the first person 'I ought'. The former 'ought' is more likely to invoke as the reasons for a decision about accepted norms of role morality, put as facts of a social situation. The latter is more likely to register a decision in which adherence to these is reasserted, or is questioned on account of adherence to some other commitment. In neither case is the 'ought' deduced from valuationally neutral statements of fact.

Another range of instances where 'ought' statements appear to follow from statements of fact occurs in talking of purposive activities or of things made for a purpose. 'If that is a knife you ought to be able to cut with it' differs from 'If that creature is a whale, it ought to be a mammal', in that in the latter case the 'ought' can be displaced by the purely factual (and timeless) 'will be'. If the creature proves not to be a mammal, it is no whale, and that is that. But if we cannot cut with this tool, then is it no knife? Perhaps, or perhaps not. It might be an exceedingly blunt knife. Efficiency to fulfil the purpose for which a thing has been made is a matter of degree, and not an all-or-none affair as when something is or is not a mammal.

When words are defined teleologically, i.e. with reference to the purpose of the thing defined, we do not recognize instances of them by being shown them ostensively, as we might of e.g. red things. We have to be told what they are *for*.[15] A knife is a single-bladed tool to cut with. If you were given some blunt instrument that could never conceivably have cut even butter, you would not want to say it was a bad knife; you would not call it a knife at all. So if one says 'That is a knife, so you ought to be able to cut with it', the 'ought' conclusion follows from what looks like a factual premises only because the meaning of 'knife' is something with which it ought to be possible to cut (so the conclusion is really analytic). An object like a knife has a *functional definition* with reference to its purpose, and we may ask how sub-standard in efficiency such an object may be before we begin refusing to accord it the class name. Sometimes reference to a standard is presupposed, and then terms have not only functional but also evaluative meaning. I do not think there is a hard and fast line between the two; in as those used in a pejorative or commendatory sense, like 'murderer', 'late', 'statesman', 'saint'. (Here an 'ought' can follow, as in 'He arrived late for the lecture, so ought to have got up earlier', since 'late' means 'after he ought to have done'.) I suggest that

evaluative meaning, though not necessarily an evaluative definition, is normally attached to purposive activities and the practitioners of these activities. To be an instance of one of these, one must achieve a certain modicum of effectiveness in carrying out the activity. Otherwise one is not even a bad instance, but a 'bogus' instance, or not an instance at all. Take politics as such an activity, accepting for the sake of argument Oakeshott's definition:[16] 'the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a set of people whom chance or choice has brought together'. If common actions directed to general arrangements produced merely a free-for-all shambles, we should not, I think, consider that they counted as politics. There is an element of 'stipulation' here: different people may draw the line in different ways; we need not say there is an 'essential nature of politics'. But there is a measure of effectiveness in being able to get people to work together, even if only in order to frustrate other people, which a person's activities will have to show if we are to call them 'political'. If someone is quite incapable of doing this, we should not be prepared to call him a politician, not even a bad politician, but perhaps only a 'would-be' politician. Moreover, in considering purposive activities, it is surely reasonable to discuss them not only in terms of what it is to do them, but what it is to do them well, which is why political science, from Aristotle on, is likely to include recommendations as well as descriptions, and why the recommendations as to what ought to be done appear to be following from the descriptions.

The loaded meaning becomes an evaluative definition in the case of commendatory or honorific terms like 'statesman'. A statesman is someone who carries out political activity on a fairly high level if he is to earn the name. We have noted class membership in the case of terms where evaluative meaning is not assigned in an all-or-none way, but as a matter of degree. So it may be said not only that A is a *better* statesman than B, but that he is *more* of a statesman than B (or 'more of a politician', or 'more of a philosopher'). In some cases when it looks as if an 'ought' conclusion follows from factual premises, this will be because one of the terms in the premises has an evaluative definition, 'Since A is a statesman, the measures he put forward ought not to be ill-conceived.' Note that it would also be possible to say that since the measures put forward were ill-conceived, A was no statesman. This becomes analytic. But it is not pointless, if we are considering whether to apply the term 'statesman' with

its evaluative definition to A or not. And if it is applied, the implication is that a certain standard of wise conduct can be taken for granted.

Role activities purposively undertaken are likely to have evaluative meaning not only in that some modicum of efficiency in the role is presupposed when according the name, but also in that, as we have already seen, the name may be withheld if certain generally acknowledged obligations of the role are not observed. The role of doctor is a clear instance. If a person fails to behave in accordance with the norms of the role beyond a point, people may say that 'He is no doctor.' It might be said that the operational definition of this point is given by a person being struck off the Medical Register. But this apart, I think it is fair to say that the social fact of the doctor-patient relationship includes certain obligations in its description, and if these are grossly disregarded on either side the name of the role will be considered inappropriate and withheld.

Thus purposively assumed roles may be said to have evaluative meaning. What about ascribed roles, based for instance, on natural kinship relations, such as X's role in being the son of Y? It might be said that since such roles are not voluntarily assumed, they cannot be forfeited through inefficiency or misconduct. And indeed Y may say of X, 'However he has behaved, he is still my son'. But it may be possible nevertheless to distinguish the social from the natural relationship. Y is saying that he still recognizes the obligations of being X's father; it might have been open to him to sever the social, as distinct from the natural relationship, by disinheriting X and considering himself no longer bound by the obligations of the role of X's father. Hence the social relationship can have an evaluative meaning and the name be withheld in some cases where the natural relationship still holds. And contrariwise, a stranger by blood may be adopted or initiated into the social role of a kinship relationship. So it can be said that the role as a social and not merely a natural relationship has an evaluative aspect, and is only held to obtain where certain standards of expected conduct are at least to some extent observed. This can hold even of persons occupying roles of rivals or enemies *vis-a-vis* one another. ('How can I go on calling you my enemy when you are deliberately giving me chances to escape?') The test is a standard of socially expected conduct, not necessarily of mutually benevolent conduct.[17] Thus, in cases where descriptions of facts are descriptive of social situations in which the relations are role relations, a rigid distinction between descriptive and prescriptive language cannot be maintained. When reasons for

moral decisions are given by citing the facts of a situation, the situation may already be seen in terms of certain expectations as to appropriate conduct in it, if the situation consists of people in certain roles *vis-a-vis* each other, such as father and child, or debtor and creditor. So an agent in deciding what he ought to do, when he considers the facts, must associate or dissociate himself from these general expectations as to appropriate behaviour. And when some one else, as *spectator,* tries to describe these role expectations as held by other people, it will be well for him to remember that his own terminology for describing social roles contains terms some of which have evaluative meanings, and also terms like normal', 'harmonious', 'integrative', 'disintegrative', which carry their own sorts of evaluative estimate with them.[18] This need not mean that studies of this kind are not 'scientific' and biased by personal preferences. It means that we need to recognize that the subject matter can, it seems, only be described through terms which are to some extent evaluative.

Lastly, I come to an important group of instances in which injunctions about what ought to be done seem to be being derived from what appear as statements of fact, namely many of the injunctions of religious morality. Moore, Popper and others have insisted that even if the facts adduced as reasons are facts of a spiritual or meta-physical kind, they cannot lead to a statement of obligation without the introduction of a premises containing a distinctively moral judgement. Thus if, as Kant says, religious morality consists in seeing our duties as divine commands, the obligation to obey follows not from the fact that God commands, but only if this is conjoined with the belief that what God commands is right. In many people's minds this is analytically implied, since the idea of God is evaluatively charged with the idea of goodness.

Sometimes a religious injunction containing an 'ought' is related to statements of fact as the conditions on which certain aspirations can be fulfilled. Here the logic is that of the means–end 'ought' in hypothetical imperatives. If one is committed to a certain purpose, certain necessary means ought to be taken. Sometimes, however, the fact cited as a reason for an 'ought' looks like neither a fact of command, nor a condition within the context of an end to be achieved. The facts are adduced as direct reasons for obligations to certain ways of behaving. In general, I think that this is because the facts are looked on not as valuationally neutral, but either as evoking gratitude or as somehow *exemplary.* 'Because Christ so loved us, we ought also to love one another'—the obligation is not only

an obligation to gratitude, but the facts are held out as exemplary of a way of life which, if accepted, brings commitment to certain ways of behaviour.[19] A moral judgement is implied in accepting the facts as exemplary, and therefore a moral conclusion can be drawn about the kind of behaviour which follows accordingly. But the moral judgement which accepts the facts as exemplars need not depend on comparing them with an already accepted moral ideal which they can be taken to illustrate (as Kant held, when he said that the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognize Him as such).[20] Insofar as religious morality can give new moral vision, it may be by producing exemplars for ways of behaving which, while appealing to existing moral judgements, can yet also show a better kind of morality. (This is the *a fortiori* technique of the Gospel parables.)

So in some of the cases in religious morality where facts are held to entail obligations, this happens because the facts are seen as exemplars within a way of life to which the person is committed. There are, however, also forms of religious morality where the kinds of facts adduced as reasons for behaviour are not exemplary but are said to be facts about the nature of the world, and it is said that anyone leading a moral life should conform to these. This holds of the long tradition which presents morality as in some way 'living according to nature', where the notion of 'natural law', is used in a moral as well as a physical sense, setting out the most general principles according to which human beings should behave if they are to fulfil their 'nature' as human beings. Here we find a combination of the descriptive and prescriptive notions of law, and the notion of 'nature' as standing not only for the totality of things that exist in *rerum natura,* but also carrying evaluative meaning according to which the 'nature' of a thing is to be a good instance of its type. And so too, with the notion of 'human'. From one point of view we might say that all the ways in which people can live and behave can be called 'human' in a perfectly proper sense, and we can count nothing human as alien to us. But from another point of view, the notion of 'human', as that of 'natural', may be used with evaluative meaning. This way of speaking may, however, bring out something important for morality. It may be a way of saying that morality does not only depend on personal decisions as to how one ought to live, but can also be a matter of the *discovery* of principles according to which it is possible for people to live together in ways which lead to an increasing capacity for moral growth and development, and that this

capacity is weakened in ways of living which disregard these principles. In the European tradition of natural law, one such principle has been some form of belief in the unity of humanity, according to which obligations are recognized to any human beings as such and not only to members of special groups; and another has been the principle of *pacta sunt servanda,* making for the possibility of mutual trust. When such ways of behaving are described as more 'natural' or more 'human' than others, I think what is happening is that human beings are being looked on not just as members of the biological species *homo sapiens,* but as having a *social role* in the universe. So 'natural' and 'human' now become role concepts, and as such have a normative element built into them. Thus, the 'dignity of the human being' may be invoked, calling attention to a man's obligation to live according to the norms of this social role, and to the obligation on others to respect his right to do so. And it may be when they fail to do so that the evaluative meanings of the terms 'human' and 'natural' get invoked.

We have obviously travelled a long way here from mere statements of fact. The facts of nature or of the order of the universe with which it is said that the moral life should conform, are either principles of moral development or valuationally-charged descriptions of what is thought of as the human role. We cannot, therefore, read our duties off the facts, for a moral decision depends on willingness to take the responsibility of accepting or rejecting certain values. We must accept the logical rule that no obligation is deducible from mere matters of fact. But facts are seldom 'mere' when they are facts of social situations. They become facts of social situations because they are seen within the context of ways in which people live together, and the common values these involve. And anyone who responsibly accepts such a way of living accepts its commitments.

Notes and References

1. For different ways in which moralists such as Hume, Kant, Moore, and Prichard have subscribed to this, see R.M. Hare, *The Language of Morals,* pp. 29–31. Popper, in the *Open Society and its Enemies,* Vol. I, pp. 52 ff. and p. 204, note 5, has a vigorous statement of the distinction. See also his paper in the symposium, 'What Can Logic Contribute to Philosophy?', *Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Moral Discourse.*

2. Cf. e.g. S.E. Toulmin, *The Place of Reason in Ethics,* Stuart Hampshire, 'Fallacies of Moral Philosophy', *Mind,* 1949, P. Edwards: *The Logic of Moral Discourse.*
3. *Treatise on Human Nature,* Book III, I, § 1.
4. The contrast between this often quoted passage in Human and his actual practice in ethical argument has been brought out in detail by A. MacIntyre in an unpublished paper, and was pointed out by Stuart Hampshire in *Mind,* Vol. LVIII, p. 466 (note), 'Fallacies in Moral Philosophy'. They both think that Hume was concerned to bring out that moral arguments are not logically conclusive deductive arguments.
5. *Metaphysic of Morals,* p. 42.
6. Cf. C.L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (Yale, 1944), pp. 26 ff.
7. Cf. for instance W.D. Falk, 'Goading and Guiding', *Mind,* 1953; Paul Edwards, *The Logic of Moral Discourse.*
8. 'Fallacies of Moral Philosophy', *Mind,* October, 1949.
9. Cf. his The Philosophy of Science, pp. 97 ff. Also G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind,* pp. 121 ff. on 'inference tickets' or 'warrants'.
10. In his book, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge, 1958), Toulmin prefers to speak of rules of inference or 'warrants' rather than premises because he sees, no doubt rightly, that such arguments are seldom set out in the pattern of formal syllogistic deductions. My own preference would be to reserve the notion of 'rules of inference' for a few very general formal principles, such as the *dictum de omni et nullo,* according to which types of inference are drawn. To make every general statement about a law of nature or the function of something into a rule of inference leaves us with a large number of *ad hoc* material principles, and it is hard to see the advantage of this over the older notion of implicit major premises. Be this as it may, the relevant point for our present discussion is that the apparent transition from fact to value is only possible because a value-loaded principle has been introduced somewhere.
11. *Treatise,* III, I, § 1.
12. Or they may be the standards looked on as obvious in the circles in which the speaker moves. A weekly journal recently quoted an incident in a cafe. The waitresses were tittering at an odd figure. 'It were a grey woollen cap and some kind of jerkin; the legs were bare below the knee and the feet were shod in a pair of plimsoles. The area from the waist to the knees was very decently covered in a pair of dark navy bloomers.' The waitress remarked to the writer, 'It's not natural, is it?' His eye noted the waitress's own permed hair and neat uniform with the starched white collar. 'Oh, no,' he said. 'Oh, no, it's not natural.'
13. R.M. Hare, *The Language of Morals,* p. 147, remarks how evaluative meaning may be overlooked where standards are stable.
14. Cf. R.M. Hare, *The Language of Morals,* pp. 100 ff, on 'functional words.'

15. In his inaugural lecture, *Political Education,* reprinted in *Philosophy, Politics and Society* (ed. Laslett), p. 2.
16. There is an example in William Faulkner's novel, *Intruder in the Dust,* where expected role conduct is the reverse of benevolent, but where it is suggested ironically that if only people act in character, we can all feel at home. The speaker is representing the views of a storekeeper in a small country town in Mississippi, where a Negro accused of murder is in jail and is may be going to be lynched. 'He has nothing against what he calls niggers. If you ask him, he will probably tell you he likes them even better than some white folks he knows and he will believe it. They are probably constantly beating him out of a few cents here and there in his store and probably even picking up things—packages of chewing gum or bluing or a banana or a can of sardines or a pair of shoelaces or a bottle of hair-straightence—under their coats and aprons and he knows it; he probably even gives them things free of charge—the bones and spoiled meat out of his butcher's ice-box and spoiled candy and land. All he requires is that they act like niggers. Which is exactly what Lucas is doing; blew his top and murdered a white man—which Mr. Lilley is probably convinced all Negroes want to do and now the white people will take him out and burn him, all regular and in order and themselves acting exactly as he is convinced Lucas would wish them to act like white folks; both of them observing implicitly the rules; the nigger acting like a nigger and the white folks acting like white folks and no real hard feelings on either side (since Mr. Lilley is not a Gowrie) once the fury is over; in fact, Mr. Lilley would probably be one of the first to contribute cash money towards Lucas's funeral and the support of his widow and children if he had them. Which proves again how no man can cause more grief than one clinging blindly to the vices of his ancestors.'
17. I propose to discuss in another paper respects in which concepts like these are evaluative.
18. R.B. Braithwaite, in his Eddington Lecture, 'An Empiricist looks at Religious Belief', finds the exemplary use of stories to be one of the main characteristics of religious morality.
19. *Metaphysic of Morals*, § 32.

The Ethics of India Going Nuclear

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ABSTRACT

Is it right for India to go nuclear? Not only does this paper, which adopts a broadly utilitarian approach, answer this question in the negative, but it argues that there is no real scope for ethical controversy in the matter. The actual use of nuclear weapons would mean an unimaginable catastrophe, the extent of the catastrophe depending on the scale of use. It follows that nuclear weapons cannot be acquired for such reasons as Great Power status and strengthening one's diplomacy. However, the acquisition of nuclear weapons to deter a nuclear attack is clearly justifiable. During the cold war, western ethical philosophers defended nuclear weapons for other reasons as well. They argued that even if a nuclear conflagration was the worst possible outcome, the chances of a nuclear war happening under current conditions was negligible, while western nuclear weapons averted huge non-nuclear evils such as Soviet world domination or a Soviet conquest of Western Europe with conventional forces. But in the South Asian case, one cannot point convincingly to some huge evil, nuclear or non-nuclear, that is being averted by India's nuclear weapons, while the probability of a South Asian nuclear holocaust is rather high. The huge evil is being created, not averted.

This paper will try and bring out the ethical issues surrounding the Indian decision to go nuclear, a hitherto neglected area of philosophical inquiry in this country. It will follow a broadly utilitarian approach—that policy is the best which is the most conducive to human welfare. Since the paper employs a utilitarian approach, the decision will inevitably involve a consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of India going nuclear, in particular of the risks involved in India's nuclear policy. It is again an

exercise in applied ethics, and such an exercise will require an accurate factual basis for the ethical conclusions.

The utilitarian approach will separate the approach of this paper from one based on God's commandments as revealed in some sacred book, a principle which has been much used in nuclear ethics. It is true that the utilitarian principle often fails to give practical guidance. Even if we agree that the best policy is the one which is the most conducive to human welfare, 'most' and 'welfare' are likely to be defined differently by different people. However, it is the present writer's contention that this problem will not be felt when discussing the ethics of India going nuclear. We shall try and identify ethical positions and it is true that an ethical position acquires that status because we are considering the facts in the light of some ethical assumption or value and (often in nuclear ethics) some calculation of the probabilities of outcomes. We may agree in principle that others may arrive at different ethical positions if they bring in competing utilitarian or other values and different probability calculations. But the present writer feels that this cannot be done plausibly when discussing the ethics of India going nuclear (or, for that matter, of the present-day west retaining nuclear weapons).

This paper is not written from a nationalist standpoint. Nationalism is not an ethical position at all. Of course, some forms of nationalist behaviour can be defended ethically (e.g. the Indian nationalist struggle against the British) but only by using utilitarian or other ethical principles. It might be objected that ethical principles cannot be appropriately applied to governments because of their character as trustees for the welfare of their citizens but even if one accepts this concept (the present writer does not) it cannot be used in this case to reach conclusions different from those arrived at here. Another point which should be made is that the west has lived with nuclear weapons for a long time and a sophisticated literature on nuclear ethics emerged there during the cold war. The present paper will apply ideas contained in that literature to the case of India.

When we consider the question of when India went nuclear, it becomes clear that we are dealing with a long-drawn-out and ongoing process. Pokharan II was certainly not the beginning of the process. The BJP government inherited the wherewithal for the tests from others. Nor was Pokharan I the beginning—the wherewithal for Pokharan I existed because of policies instituted long before that event. A decision was then taken to explode an atomic device and this happened in 1974 (Pokharan

I). After that, Pakistan developed its own nuclear weapon technology and both India and Pakistan stockpiled nuclear devices and acquired delivery systems. Then Pokharan II happened. The Indian government claimed, and we shall accept the claim in this paper, that one of the devices tested was a hydrogen device, and such a device must surely have been developed (along with other devices and delivery systems) under previous governments, since the BJP government had been in power for only a few weeks before the tests were carried out. Pakistan subsequently tested nuclear devices. The Indian Defence Minister announced that India would deploy its nuclear weapons[1] and Pakistan presumably will do the same, although it has proposed to India that both sides agree not to deploy weapons and both countries appear to be under pressure from the United States at the time of writing (December 1998) not to deploy nuclear weapons. There can however be no doubt that Pokharan II was a major escalatory act (even if it was only one event on a continuum) and some of the argumentation of this paper will relate specifically to Pokharan II.

Nuclear weapons are morally objectionable because they carry with them the possibility of a nuclear disaster. But we must recognize that the expression 'nuclear disaster' accommodates many possibilities. An atomic bomb, like the ones dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, could kill one lakh people and injure a similar number, most of whom would either die or require medical attention all their lives. A thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb would cause a much greater disaster but the extent of the disaster will depend upon the yield of the weapon, whether it is exploded in the air or on the ground or under it, and other factors. It is possible to devise a hydrogen bomb, or several hydrogen bombs mounted on one missile, which could kill a million people and injure a similar number, most of whom would either die or require medical attention all their lives. A temperature of a million degrees Centigrade, equal to that on the sun, would be created. Most of the casualties will be due not to heat or blast, but to radioactive dust, which will be carried by the wind to other places.

The extent of a nuclear disaster will depend upon the scale on which nuclear weapons are used, but it cannot be calculated exactly. A full-scale nuclear exchange between the United States and the former Soviet Union, involving the use of thousands of hydrogen bombs, could have resulted in hundreds of millions dead, perhaps the end of all life in the northern hemisphere, or even the end of all life on earth, owing to the depletion of the ozone layer, a nuclear winter caused by the blotting out of sunlight by

dust-clouds and other factors. And ours may be the only inhabited planet in the universe!

A thermonuclear war between India and Pakistan, involving dozens of hydrogen bombs on each side, could result in hundreds of millions dead, perhaps the end of all life in the sub-continent. Even an atomic exchange involving a few dozen atomic bombs on each side could result in millions dead on both sides, a disaster from which it would take a century to recover. It appears to be the case, at the time of writing, that India has both atomic and hydrogen bombs while Pakistan has only atomic bombs but Pakistan can still impose huge losses on India. Moreover, since fallout in a thermonuclear attack will kill more people than heat or blast, and fallout is carried by the wind, a large proportion of the casualties in an Indian hydrogen bomb attack on Pakistan might be sustained in north-western India.

We might infer from all this that no one with any humanity in him would tolerate for one moment the idea of nuclear weapons. Yet, nuclear ethics was much discussed in the west during the cold war and western ethical philosophers did not by any means unanimously reject them. It must be remembered that the philosophers had to deal with many possible nuclear outcomes, as also many possible non-nuclear alternative outcomes (i.e. outcomes resulting from giving up or not using nuclear weapons). Assessments of the magnitude of harm and benefit involved in these outcomes and alternative outcomes, and the rightness and wrongness of the means of bringing these outcomes about, could vary, as also assessments of the probabilities of these outcomes and alternative outcomes. Even if assessments were the same, the ethical prescriptions based on these assessments could differ. Discussion in the west usually took the form of a weighing of alternatives, of weighing the consequences of retaining or even using nuclear weapons, against the consequences of giving them up or refraining from using them. Once the lesser of two evils was identified, choosing it could be (although it did not have to be) regarded as a moral duty.

The first use of nuclear weapons might seem to be unacceptably evil, but the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with several hundred thousand fatalities, has been defended on the ground that since it avoided the loss of a million allied lives which an invasion of Japan would have caused, it was a lesser evil. But those who emphasized the status of those affected—Japanese civilians as opposed to Allied soldiers—did not

accept this argument.[2] (There is also a view, which the present writer shares, that Japan was about to surrender anyway; this shows how important it is in applied ethics to have an accurate knowledge of the facts). The British philosopher and humanist, Bertrand Russell, favoured an atomic attack on the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, to prevent the spread of the Stalinist system to Western Europe and the loss of the core values of the west. This seemed to him to be the probable outcome of refraining from an atomic attack on the Soviet Union, and a greater evil than the attack.

It was the use of the atomic bomb that was in question in these cases. The advent of the hydrogen bomb made the first use of nuclear weapons much more difficult to justify. Even so, some defended the limited first use of the hydrogen bomb in certain contexts, e.g. in case the Soviet Union launched an invasion of Western Europe with conventional forces. After all, nations have sometimes shown a readiness to inflict and to sustain millions of casualties in conventional warfare to protect their core values like independence. A few million casualties resulting from a limited nuclear war seemed to some to be a lesser evil than the Soviet conquest of Western Europe. But others thought that such use was ethically indefensible. Yet others thought it would be wrong but for a different reason: the danger that it would escalate into a full-scale nuclear war; they did not object to the limited first use of the hydrogen bomb in principle. The acquisition and retention of nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet nuclear attack upon the west, which was officially stated to be the main purpose of the western deterrent, seemed to many philosophers to be ethically justifiable. After all, a government has a duty to protect its citizens, to prevent what is infinitely horrible happening to them. But it was also possible to argue, and some did argue, that it was unethical to intend to kill millions of innocent people, even for the purpose of preventing the killing of millions of equally innocent people in the west. (The principle behind deterrence was that the Soviet Union would not launch a nuclear attack upon the west if it knew that its own destruction was assured, that the west would respond with an equally devastating attack upon the Soviet Union.) Therefore, deterrence was morally wrong unless it was purely a bluff, which was not really a workable policy. Deterrence did give rise to a more specific moral problem. What if it failed, and the other side launched a nuclear attack which completely devastated one's own country except for one's nuclear weapons, enough of which survive for an equally devastating counterblow? There would no longer be any benefit to one's

own side in doing this; the only purpose would be to punish the aggressor.[3] A majority of western writers felt (and the present writer agrees with them) that it would be wrong to take millions of innocent lives purely for the sake of punishment.

To some, nuclear weapons seemed to be justified because they believed the west might otherwise have to surrender to each and every demand made by a nuclear-armed Soviet Union, or a Soviet Union which also gave up nuclear weapons but which acquired a crushing political and military ascendancy in the Eurasian continent. But others thought that such considerations could not justify the retention of weapons of mass destruction.

Discussion of the magnitude of harm and benefit of various outcomes and of the probability of outcomes, saw the expression of many different viewpoints. All agreed, of course, that an apocalyptic nuclear war would be a horrible catastrophe. But Finnis, Boyle Jr, and Grisez, authors of an important book on nuclear ethics in the 1980s, thought that Soviet world domination, which in their view was the likely outcome of the west giving up nuclear weapons, would be every bit as horrible an outcome. Nevertheless their ethical prescription, based on the Christian principle that one cannot knowingly intend to kill huge numbers of innocent non-combatants (they were by no means absolute pacifists) was that the west should unilaterally renounce nuclear weapons.[4]

Their view that Soviet world domination would be as bad an outcome as an apocalyptic nuclear war was a minority viewpoint. Western writers generally agreed that an apocalyptic nuclear war would indeed be the worst possible outcome, but some brought in probabilistic considerations which they used to justify nuclear weapons conditionally, as a lesser evil compared to the consequences of renouncing them. A leading theme was that of retaining nuclear weapons to protect the core values of the west. Even if a philosopher thought that a nuclear holocaust was the worst possible outcome, his assigning a very low degree of probability to it would make it possible for him to justify the nuclear deterrent in terms of the need to protect the core values of the west (by preventing Soviet world domination, ensuring the freedom and political survival of western communities, deterring a Soviet invasion of Western Europe with conventional forces, preventing the neutralization of Western Europe and so on) if he thought that the likelihood of the loss of core values if the deterrent was given up was much greater than that of a nuclear holocaust if the

deterrent was retained. For example, Gregory Kavka argued that while a nuclear holocaust was indeed the worst possible outcome, the probability of a nuclear war happening under current conditions was much less than that of unilateral western disarmament leading to Soviet world domination, which was also a very bad outcome, and therefore that deterrence was morally superior to unilateral disarmament, although mutual disarmament was better than either. Kavka therefore favoured a policy of decreasing the probability of a less bad but more likely outcome instead of one of decreasing the probability of a worse but less likely outcome. He emphasized disaster probability rather than disaster size.[5]

On the other hand, Jefferson McMahan thought unilateral disarmament morally superior to the deterrent because it would decrease the probability of the very bad outcome of nuclear war, while the increase in the probability of the significantly less bad outcome of Soviet world domination would not be significantly greater than the decrease in the former, and the adoption of the policy would not have other undesirable consequences which, together with the increase in the probability of the less bad outcome, would outweigh the advantage of reducing the probability of the worse outcome.[6]

It is obvious that such probability calculations were likely to be highly controversial and that the writer's values were likely to influence them. Another viewpoint was that of Robert Goodin, who thought that if there was a risk of something infinitely awful happening, probabilistic considerations were out of place, and everything must be done to avoid that evil.[7] It is not totally senseless, however, to argue that a nuclear holocaust might in some contexts be more likely under unilateral disarmament than under deterrence. Both Stalin's Russia and Mao's China may have had more nuclear security with nuclear weapons than without them.

Turning now to the case of India, we shall find that not only is it possible to identify ethical positions but also that there is no scope for ethical controversy like that in the west during the cold war (the present-day west is a different matter) and that it is not possible to treat the possession of nuclear weapons convincingly as a necessary or lesser evil, to successfully bring in competing values which would make possessing them arguably a moral obligation upon us. Nuclear weapons are capable of causing immense suffering. We can conclude from this that certain kinds of reasons for acquiring them are wrong. One must be able to argue that some huge evil is being deterred or some great good is being made

available; reasons which do not lend themselves to such use do not justify the acquisition or retention of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons should not therefore be acquired for Great Power status, for a place at the international top table. Nuclear weapons should not be acquired for internal political advantage. Nuclear weapons should not be acquired to strengthen one's hand in diplomatic and trade negotiations, for general national advantage (we reserve questions of supreme national importance, involving core values, for later examination). They should not be acquired to make a conventional war in South Asia less likely; the Indo-Pakistan wars of the past have not been particularly bloody and in a conventional war (but this is not an ethical argument) India would have the advantage. More than one of these considerations probably entered into the decision to stage Pokharan II, but they do not justify Pokharan II, although they may help to account for it; in fact, they do not appear to be ethical considerations at all.

Many people would probably reject this ethical position. They certainly would not say that Great Power status, for example, or general diplomatic advantage, would be worth a nuclear war. But they would invoke probability. They would say that such things are still worth having and that the probability of a sub-continental nuclear war is so infinitesimally small that the risk of it should be accepted. There would be a difference in moral assumptions between the present writer and such advocates of nuclear weapons. In this writer's view, nuclear weapons are abominable things whose acquisition can be argued for only if one can plausibly point to some immense evil to be deterred or some immense good to be protected or obtained, which one cannot do in this case. But the present writer's probability calculations are also different. In his view, which will be defended later, the risk of a South Asian nuclear war is uncomfortably high.

If there is a possibility that another country may attack us with nuclear weapons, we can agree (although absolute pacifists and some others would dispute it) that the Indian government has a right, indeed a duty, to protect its citizens from a nuclear holocaust and if the acquisition of nuclear weapons is the most efficacious way of doing this, the Indian government has a right and a duty to acquire these weapons. Here, the outcome that is sought to be prevented is not a non-nuclear event whose probability is greater than that of a nuclear holocaust under deterrence, even if its magnitude of evil is less but a nuclear holocaust itself. Even someone who thinks that a nuclear holocaust is the worst possible outcome and all our

efforts should be directed to avoiding it, can accept this argument, if he is convinced that there really is a nuclear threat, although he is very likely to insist that disarmament efforts should also be vigorously pursued. (There does seem to be an inescapable intellectual tension between maintaining that there is a nuclear threat and implicitly assuming that the adversary in question will allow us to acquire the means of counteracting it without delivering the attack, but we shall overlook this difficulty.)

But is there really a nuclear threat to India which justified Pokharan I and Pokharan II? Most observers agree that Pakistan's nuclear policy is reactive to India's. It might be argued that China attacked us in 1962 and is still illegally occupying Indian territory. Therefore, it may attack us again, perhaps with nuclear weapons this time. An accurate knowledge of the facts is essential in applied ethics and the ethics of India going nuclear cannot be determined without an accurate knowledge of what really happened in 1962. Outside India, there is a scholarly consensus that China did not attack India in 1962 and is not illegally occupying Indian territory now. Our thinking on this subject is going in a cocoon; or is it only our talk that is going on in a cocoon and not our thinking?

Some other considerations should be kept in mind. China faced a threat of nuclear attack from the United States and the Soviet Union which justified her decision to go nuclear. China has never threatened other countries with nuclear weapons. It has promised no first-use of nuclear weapons, and has agreed to give up nuclear weapons if other countries do so, which the United States and Britain are unwilling to do. China's nuclear record is the cleanest among the nuclear weapon states. The likely adverse effects of nuclear adventurism towards India on China's known priorities, which are economic, should be kept in mind. There are no political or ideological rivalries between China and India which might encourage Chinese nuclear blackmail aimed at forcing concession after concession from India; there are political and ideological differences but no rivalries (the relationship between the west and the former Soviet Union was quite different). The last consideration also rules out the possibility of a Chinese conventional invasion of India.

Another consideration, which is quite decisive in this context of trying to prevent a nuclear holocaust, is this: the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India to deter a nuclear attack creates a much greater risk of a nuclear holocaust than self-limitation in this regard. This is because it greatly increases the risk of an India-Pakistani nuclear conflagration and to a

much lesser extent, of a Sino-Indian nuclear conflagration. Other countries are provoked, and not deterred by our nuclear weapons. A decision to go nuclear means an arms race in South Asia (involving nuclear bombs and warheads and delivery systems as well as conventional weapons), intensifying mutual suspicion and fear against the background of the continuing crisis in Kashmir, in short, an atmosphere in which the risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan becomes too high for comfort. The danger of nuclear war by accident would become a very grave one. Neither India nor Pakistan can afford the electronic systems used by the superpowers during the cold war to lessen the danger of a nuclear war happening by accident. A pattern on a radar screen may be wrongly taken by one country for a missile attack. This may lead it to launch its own nuclear weapons, for fear of losing them to an enemy strike, or for fear that the enemy strike may incapacitate its own command structure, making it impossible to deliver a retaliatory blow. An Israeli strike against Pakistani nuclear facilities (there was once an Israeli strike against Iraqi facilities) might be mistaken by Pakistan for an Indian strike. When President Clinton launched cruise missile attacks on targets in Afghanistan, an American general was sent to Pakistan to inform the government that the missiles that would be passing over their territory were American, not Indian.[8] (This precaution was very necessary and one can only hope that it will be repeated in future.) It may become necessary, to be sure of being able to deliver a retaliatory attack, to delegate the power to field commanders, thus increasing the risk of nuclear war happening without a decision by the government. Even more serious, probably, is the risk of nuclear war by deliberate decision but in an atmosphere of crisis, when decision-makers are likely to act out of psychological compulsions instead of rational calculation. The plain truth is that tested Pakistani nuclear weapons are now ready for deployment on aircraft and missiles or perhaps have already been deployed on then. Few would deny that this is the outcome of Pokharan I and Pokharan II and of India's space programme.

The likelihood of a Sino-Indian nuclear war is much smaller than that of an Indo-Pakistan one, if only because the Sino-Indian border problem is not a live wound like Kashmir. However, the chances are that there were no Chinese nuclear weapons targeted on India before Pokharan II and India's subsequent announcement that it intended to deploy its nuclear weapons on delivery systems and that there are now. (Before Pokharan II, there was no need for them to target Indian cities, because India could not

have converted its nuclear devices into missile warheads without the additional tests that were carried out during Pokharan II.) Moreover, it was reported after Pokharan II that China was developing a short-range missile that would be deployed in Tibet to target Indian cities. It is easy for China to target North Indian cities from Tibet, but economically prohibitive for India to target major Chinese population centres.

That nuclear weapons can be acquired for deterring nuclear attack is a moral rule that would be acceptable to most. But one must always ask in such cases if deterrence is actually happening. Far from deterring a nuclear threat from China and Pakistan, Pokharan II has created a Chinese nuclear threat where none existed before and greatly aggravated the already existing threat from Pakistan, itself the product of Pokharan I. China and Pakistan have been provoked, not deterred.

Someone might accept that China has never been a nuclear or any other kind of threat to India, but might still argue that past experience is not an infallible guide, that China might become a nuclear threat in the future, and India should therefore acquire nuclear weapons now, so as to be ready for such an eventuality. When the magnitude of a disaster is unimaginably great, why should even an infinitesimally small risk of it be accepted? But the infinitely small risk of the unimaginably great disaster happening must be weighed against the much greater risk of the disaster happening now that India has gone nuclear. Moreover, a moral rule must surely be capable of being adopted universally. This argument would justify every nation in the world going nuclear, including all our South Asian neighbours. A variant of this phoney argument is being used by the NATO countries, who claim a right to retain nuclear weapons in order to ward off alleged nuclear threats, lying in the future, from so-called 'rogue states' and individual terrorists.

Deterrence as a justification for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot apply uniquely to any one country. The Indo-Pakistan relationship has special features (historical circumstances, the festering wound of Kashmir and other factors) which make it very much more reasonable for India to fear a nuclear threat from Pakistan if Pakistan goes nuclear, and for Pakistan to fear a nuclear threat from India if India goes nuclear, than for India to fear a nuclear threat from China. Had Pokharan I and Pokharan II been staged by Pakistan, the Indian government would have been justified in adopting the measures actually adopted by Pakistan. In other words,

Pakistan's nuclear policy can be defended ethically. This is not because of their superior virtue, but the force of circumstances.

While most people would agree that a country has a right to acquire nuclear weapons to deter a nuclear attack, this right does not exist in a vacuum. A policy of deterrence must be accompanied by sincere efforts for mutual disarmament. Since Pokharan I, Pakistan has made numerous proposals which seem exactly calculated to lessen or to eliminate totally the nuclear threat from India to it, and from it to India—adherence by both countries to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities, adherence by both countries to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and so on. This is consistent with our moral rule, and shows the Indian threat is a reality to Pakistani planners, that their nuclear policy is truly a response to our own. On the other hand, India offers to give up its nuclear option if the Big Five do so, not if China does so. Does this not suggest that the Chinese threat is not a reality to Indian planners and what is at stake is Great Power status? Of course, the retention of nuclear weapons by the Big Five is a great evil, but our present focus is on deterrence and Indian nuclear weapons are not meant for deterrence against those countries, not even, it appears, against China.

A thermonuclear retaliatory strike by India against Pakistan would cause a huge number of Indian casualties from fall-out and a thermonuclear retaliatory strike by Pakistani in northwestern India would cause a huge number of Pakistani casualties. Even a purely nationalistic approach would have to take account of this factor when evaluating the nuclear policies of India and Pakistan. The moral difficulty involved in deterrence—intending to take millions of innocent lives, even if only to protect millions of one's own citizens—and the dilemma that would arise if deterrence failed, and one would be taking millions of lives purely for the sake of retaliation, arise in the South Asian context as well.

Far from deterring an unimaginably evil outcome, which can be a justification for acquiring nuclear weapons, India's nuclear policy has created the possibility of such an outcome, in the form of a South Asian nuclear holocaust. Renouncing nuclear weapons would remove the threat from China, while Pakistan's position all along has been that it would give up nuclear weapons if India did so. The possibility of Pakistan, influenced by distrust of India, cheating in a disarmament arrangement should not be treated lightly but it is the product of Pokharan I and II and the risk must be weighed against that of continuing with present policies. The solution would appear to lie in the strictest possible mutual or third-party inspection.

If there is a threat to our core values, it comes not from China and Pakistan but from the developed world in the form of so-called globalization. But how can nuclear weapons help us here?

The Indian contention that the perpetuation of the present nuclear club is unjustifiable is morally sound. The present members of the nuclear club, except China, have all violated one or more of the ethical positions identified here and others as well. The cold war is over, but Britain and France are retaining nuclear weapons to preserve Great Power status. Americans have said that although the cold war is over, the US should retain nuclear weapons for the sake of general political and economic advantage. It is unpardonable in nearly all circumstances to use nuclear weapons first, but the US and Britain have refused to give a no-first-use pledge, probably in order to be sure of prevailing in situations like those created by the Gulf War. The US, Britain and France are perfecting their hydrogen bomb technology by trying to replace fission triggers with laser triggers. There is no move to prohibit such practices while there is a move to curb fissile material production. The three western nuclear powers are acquiring overwhelming nuclear superiority, which could be used to retailor the world according to their specifications, a very different matter from protecting supreme national interests. What would happen if the far-right movements in some Western European countries come to power aided (as before the Second World War) by the world depression which seems to be in the offing? What would be the consequences for non-white nations, particularly those situated close to Western Europe? The west justifies its retention of nuclear weapons in terms of the need for defence against 'rogue states' and individual terrorists who may acquire then, but a law-abiding nation can become a rogue state, given the appropriate circumstances. If the rogue state-terrorist argument is valid for the western countries, it is valid for all countries. What such dangers imply is that there should be a universal ban on nuclear weapons, not that a priviledged few should retain them.

The retention and continuous improvement of nuclear weapons by the west is a very great evil, but how are we to tackle it? It has been suggested that Pokharan II was meant to contribute to efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons globally, that it would act at a catalyst in international efforts in this regard. While the magnitude of good involved in such an outcome is

very great, it is not clear exactly how Pokharan II will mediate that outcome. There is also the question of the probability of, and the magnitude of harm involved in, a nuclear conflagration in South Asia considered as an outcome of Pokharan II. We have seen that the probability of it is high; it is certainly a much more likely outcome of Pokharan II than global nuclear disarmament. Moreover, it is not at all certain that the magnitude of harm which might result if the west retained nuclear weapons (nuclear blackmail, or the use of nuclear weapons, are possible outcomes) would be greater than that resulting from a South Asian nuclear conflagration. Therefore, the western hegemony must be fought in other ways, such as refusing to sign, or repudiating, western-engineered arms control agreements.

To conclude: there appears no scope for genuine ethical controversy over India going nuclear. It is ethically wrong for India to go nuclear and also for the present-day west to retain, and to refine its nuclear weapons. There seems to be no room here for ethical controversy, for weighing alternatives and making comparative judgements.

Notes and References

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Understanding Intentionality and Intentional Actions

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The terms 'intentionality' and 'intentional actions' are distinct, yet closely related to one another. Generally, intentionality is seen as a phenomenological concept, and intentional action as praxiological. Here, I would propose to initiate a discussion on their relationship, the former being seen as the ontological ground for the possible functioning of the latter. At the end, I would also attempt to highlight one of the possible implications of intentional actions on legal philosophy.

The phenomenological conception of intentionality looks out for consciousness as 'consciousness of something', i.e., consciousness is posited towards something other than itself. 'Other than itself' should not lead one to think that there is an ontological self of the consciousness. Consciousness, in fact, does not have a substantival self. It is merely an operational notion; an act directed towards something external. Arthur Danto's contention that to be conscious is to be aware in a transitive way of something external to consciousness demands further exposition. Consciousness is always to have some content, however dimly and confusedly presented. Further Danto writes:

> It makes no sense, for example, to speak of merely believing: one must believe something or other to be the case ... intentionality, to introduce the technical term, is what makes the basic difference between conscious beings and mere things....[1]

The positing character of consciousness as understood in phenomenology cannot, however, explain the Indian notion of *chit. Chit* or consciousness, as the Indians believe, contrary to ..... perceives, is contrary to what Danto perceives, is a pure state of awareness where the presence of an external object, even in the presentational state, is not required. My concern here is to explore the general characteristics of intentional action involving an awareness of the goals or the ends that one desires.

Intentionality as a phenomenological concept is the dividing criterion between conscious and non-conscious beings. Conscious being, here, is meant

to imply human beings. One may raise questions as to where we should put the 'lesser conscious' animal kingdom. Animals are neither fully conscious like human beings, nor are they devoid of consciousness like plants and inert (physical) objects. The other issue is that within human beings, in their different stages of growth, the level of apprehension of ideas and development of consciousness is not the same. My answer to these queries will be that we ought not confuse the psychological notion of consciousness with its phenomenological and praxiological notions. Understanding of 'consciousness' should not be identified with particular instances of how animals or children, for example, behave or respond in a particular manner to certain stimuli or external forces. When I talk of man being conscious, I am referring to a free, rational and responsible human being rather than a conditioned, partially developed, causal respondent. Even if the view that animals are capable of responding to certain stimuli as well as anticipating certain lower forms of acts or events is accepted, they are not able to reformulate a rule. An animal may be conscious of an object or aware of an event, but it is not conscious of the very fact that it is performing a conscious act. The second order act of consciousness, perhaps, is the prerequisite condition for the reformulation of a rule. In the words of Wittgenstein, a dog is aware that his master will come, but cannot envisage whether his master will come tomorrow or the day after. Considering these facts, Danto's distinction of 'conscious beings' and 'mere things' requires modification.[2] Intentionality, in fact, differentiates between human and non-human worlds, and not between conscious beings and mere things as Danto perceives.

Intentionality is not merely a differentiating criterion but is also an act of positing towards an external object. The act of positing implies two possibilities; one, an awareness of the object of knowledge, and two, an act of meaning giving. It is through the 'act of positing' of the consciousness that we start having the knowledge of the world. 'Knowledge of the world' should not mean only the knowledge of the external world we perceive. Even mathematical knowledge will be called a knowledge of the world. The object of knowledge may range from abstract concepts of 'identity', 'coherence', 'zero', etc. to perceivable objects like wood, papers or animals. All are included under our concept of 'object of knowledge'. The act of positing, thus, is an object-directed activity. In addition to this, it also posits meanings to the objects of knowledge, for instance, value judgement.

Two lines of argument can be noticed here. First, the act of consciousness is initially an act of awareness. It may later lead to understanding. Second,

the object of consciousness upon which the act of consciousness is directed, is not a homogeneous object. Since consciousness is an act of awareness, it is often confused with the subject or the performer of the act. Consciousness and the act of consciousness are one and the same thing. There is no such thing as consciousness, quite different from the act. Consciousness is not the agent, but human mind is. The role of the agent, however, is immaterial to the discussion, for agents are merely variables. What is important in the discussion is the act of intentionality, the playfulness of the consciousness.

The object of knowledge is the object upon which consciousness posits. The nature of positing depends upon the nature of the object. The object of knowledge does not have a homogeneous character. Its nature may range from being an abstract concept to a concrete demonstrable object. As mentioned above, there are abstract concepts, such as immortality, beauty, perfection, etc. We often talk of such concepts as the object of our discourse. But they do not have a concrete corresponding object as the reference of that concept. These concepts as objects of knowledge have to be conceptually explained and understood. On the other hand, there are objects of knowledge such as concrete demonstrable objects which can be directly perceived with our sense organs and be demonstrated directly as well. When I say 'This is a table' or 'The colour of the shirt is red', I can point my finger directly to the object of my discourse, say in this case, the table and the colour 'red'. There are also objects which are partially abstract in character and partially demonstrable as shown in the earlier case; for instance, concepts like marriage, divorce, society, etc. Such concepts are collectively formulated to fulfil certain goals or projects. These are social facts and human constructs. They can be demonstrated through explanation, if not on the same plane as objects like table, pen or chair, which are directly demonstrable as 'this' or 'that'. As mentioned above, I can point my finger to a pen and say 'This is my pen', whereas, if I say 'Indian society is culturally rich', I would not be able to point my finger in the similar manner as I did before and say that 'This is the Indian society'. I do not mean that it cannot be demonstratively explained at all. In addition to demonstration, one requires conceptual explanation as to what is meant by 'Indian society'; the collective ideals, myth, ways of life of the people of India, etc. Therefore, objects of consciousness are not homogeneous. They may vary depending upon the context and situation, and of course, the goals and projects upon which the act of consciousness is directed.

Considering the two formulations; one, that consciousness has no substantival self, it being an operational notion, and consideration of the subject (performer) as immaterial, and two, that object of knowledge is heterogeneous in nature; we may assert that the nature of positing, as the consciousness functions, depends upon the kind of object of knowledge indicated in the discourse.

Intentionality and intentions are co-related concepts. While intentionality is associated with the act of understanding and knowledge, intention is a praxiological notion. It is understood in terms of intentional action. As Carlos J. Moya writes:

> ... we have found several elements present in several intentional actions. Here is a brief list: aims, beliefs, plans, rules, future intentions, immediate intentions.[3]

> ... a particular activity or piece of behaviour of A is an intentional action (under the description D), if and only if, in performing that activity or behaviour, under that description, A follows correctly a rational intention of his or hers .... In our definition, 'intention' should be understood in the sense of *future and generic intention*, that is, in the sense in which one has now an intention to do something later and the content of that intention includes generic concepts.[4] (The italics are mine.)

The two extracts presented above, though attempting to define intentional action, seem to conflict with one another, if not contradict. The first extract takes into account, in addition to aims and projects, both future directed intentions and immediate intentions. Future directed intention is identified with those acts whose goals are to be achieved over a longer period of time or whose goals will generate an intense impact on other future actions. Immediate intentions, on the other hand, implies those acts whose goals are immediately desired and do not have serious future orientations. In the second extract, the term 'intention' is supposed to be understood only in terms of future goal orientation and a generic conception realized through rational decision. Apart from the conflicting views, one proposition that can be undoubtedly accepted is that intentional action involves the act of intending prior to performing an action. A minimum goal is visualized or intended. The action is, thus, performed in order to achieve what is intended. All such actions are goal-oriented.

The distinguishing feature between the intentional action and the act of intentionality is that while the former is goal-directed, the latter is object-

directed. 'Object' as mentioned here should be understood in terms of the object of knowledge as discussed above. Consciousness as an intentional act[5] is an awareness towards something outside; directed towards an object of knowledge. Therefore, an act of consciousness as an act of understanding is object-directed. On the other hand, intentional action visualizes a project or a goal to be realized. The projection of a goal necessarily presupposes an awareness of the goal so desired. Therefore, it is goal-directed. The projection of a goal and peforming in accordance with it is a complex goal-directed activity involving an object-directed act. When one visualizes certain goals to achieve, one is not only looking out to achieving the goal, but is also aware of the nature of the object so desired. A goal-directed activity also involves an awareness of the object, i.e., an object-directed act. Thus, intentional actions fulfil the phenomenological act of intentionality, as the phenomenological act of intentionality is the perennial foundation for any intention or projection of goals.

It may also be seen that the relationship between the act of intentionality and intentional action is that of the relationship between knowledge and action. To be conscious of an object means to be aware or have the knowledge of the object posited by the consciousness. Similarly, to be able to act necessarily presupposes knowledge of the action one has decided to perform. For instance, I go to a park instead of going to the market. I am aware of both the possibilities, either to go to a park or to the market. But I choose to go to the park to breathe some fresh air. My going to the park is not an abrupt or a conditioned action. It is guided by good reasons, of course, involving my desire to go there instead of going to a crowded place like the market. While I go to the park, I am aware not only of my action of going to the park, but also the good reasons for intending so. Knowing something and visualising something (preferably goals) have certain commonalities, as in both the cases, consciousness plays a crucial role. In order to visualize some goals or ideals, one is required to be conscious of or have the knowledge of the goals that are being visualized. So, knowing something and visualizing something, both having involved the act of knowing, are to be seen as compatible with one another. It may also be noted that visualizing some goals also means intending to achieve those goals. Visualizing and yet not intending to achieve is simply impossible to think of, insofar as visualization is a goal-directed activity. We may argue that the concept 'visualization' logically involves projection of goals which are realizable. So, the involvement of intentions and actions is inherently present in the very idea

of visualization. We now arrive at the following propositions as a result of the discussion undertaken so far.

(i) The intentional act of consciousness, as positing towards an object, is an act of knowing.
(ii) The phenomenological formulation of intentionality (intentional act of consciousness) builds an *a priori* foundation for the exercise of intentional actions.
(iii) Intentional actions presuppose goals and projects.
(iv) Actions are performed in order to achieve those goals or projects.
(v) To visualize a goal/project includes an awareness or knowledge of the goals/projects.
(vi) Intentional act of consciousness is an object-directed activity whereas, intentional action (praxis) is goal-directed activity.

Thus intentional act of consciousness and intentional actions are not exclusive activities. They are parts of one and the same indivisible process. The former should be seen as the ontological act of intentionality and the latter as the praxiological mode of the intentions. The *ontological* act of intentionality can be seen as the *ground* for the praxiological mode of intentions. In order to visualize a goal and act accordingly, one ought to be aware of the goals or projects one so visualizes. So, the praxiological mode of intentions involve an *a priori* act of intentionality.

Exploring the nature of intentional action, a question may be raised—What is so important about human action and its intentionality that it has been a subject of discussion in the philosophical discourse? Let me present one of the answers as that it is the differentiating criterion for conceptually distinguishing human beings from animals. That is to say, intentionality and intentional actions pertain solely to human beings. This argument also logically suggests that animals are both/either incapable of performing intentional actions and/or they cannot/do not perform the act of consciousness.[6] Let me take the argument in a slightly different direction, towards the distinction between 'consciousness of something' and 'self awareness'. This distinction, however, is that of the already known first and second order act of consciousness. The first act of consciousness, i.e., 'consciousness of something' is also possessed by the animals. It is the second order act of consciousness, i.e., 'being conscious of the act of consciousness' (self reflection/self awareness), which is lacking in animals. As Mary Warnock writes:

> Consciousness is, by definition, directed onto an object: but its most important feature is that it is directed at one and the same time upon two objects, itself and something else.... This feature of consciousness carries with it the consequence that at any moment of perception in the world, the perceiving subject is aware that he is different from what he is perceiving ....[7]

This capacity of self-reflection as the second order act of consciousness is the source of human creativity, criticism and disciplining which distinguishes it from the animal world.

The two acts, however, are neither isolated nor separated, but exclusive of one another. Of course, one can be distinguished from the other.[8] Both may take place simultaneously or one may follow the other. A may perceive an object, say 'O', but A may not consciously ponder over the very fact that A is perceiving 'O'. A may do so whenever he does/feels like doing so. Another possible case is that A may perceive 'O' and at the same time know that he is perceiving 'O'. That is, the 'act of positing' may take place simultaneously with the act of self-reflection.

Coming back to the nature of intentional actions, they are not of a homogeneous kind. There are various kinds of actions depending upon the nature of intentions and the goals so projected. For instance, intending to get married and intending to have a glass of water are two entirely different intentions involving two different forms of actions. Not only the nature of actions, but also the nature of goals and intentions, and their relationships are different. It is on the basis of their different relationships that one action may vary from another. Take an example; I may feel thirsty and look out for water. I pick up a glass of water and drink the same. Another case may be that I need children to look after me when I grow old. So, I decide to get married and do the same. Quenching the thirst by having a glass of water and getting married to have children to look after me in my old age are two different actions. They are not only two different actions, but are also two characteristically different actions involving two different intentions and goals. Quenching the thirst is a goal which is immediately desired, whereas having a child is desired over a period of time and is supposed to bear fruit at a later stage. The difference between the two actions, as we have seen here, is on the basis of the duration of time to achieve the goal so desired. The difference can also be made on the basis of intensity or seriousness of the 'intentions' and 'actions' as well. Having a glass of water is not a serious act as compared to getting married. Marriage as a social institution, in general, requires a

person to go through the contract/ceremony once in many years, desirably only once in a life time.[9] Further, it demands certain forms of obligation towards the society in general and the spouse in particular. The intensity found in the actions involving marriage is certainly higher than that of having a glass of water. There are other possibilities as well. Apparently similar looking actions and goals may vary in the intensity of the performer's intentions. A and B may both be working hard to pass an examination. For A, passing the examination may be a goal complete-in-itself. For B too, passing the examination is a desirable goal. But unlike A, B may want to pass the examination with distinction so that she can pursue further studies. Passing the examination and working for it are the goals and actions visualized and preferred by both A and B, yet the intensity of their actions and intentions is different; B's intentional action being more serious than that of A. Sometimes, similar actions may carry different or conflicting intentions. I may help a friend just because he happens to be a good friend, and I find it morally obligatory on my part to extend my service to him. I could also help him with the hope that he would help me in future when I face similar situations. In both the cases, my actions are the same, that of helping a friend. But the intentions with which the actions are performed are not the same. In case of the former, it is a morally obligatory action, whereas in the latter, it is a pragmatic action with expectation of return in future.

Though the nature and degrees of intensity of the actions and intentions discussed above may vary, yet the involvement of intentions prior to the performance of an action is invariably ascertained. As Ted Honderich writes:

> What typically precedes what we call an action is an intention that comes well before it in time ....[10]

Honderich has a stricter view of intention. He further writes:

> If I have an intention, and what happens the next moment bears no resemblance to it, is not represented by it at all, it seems that I did not act. One thing that will help to persuade us of this is that actions are things for which people are held responsible.[11]

> If I have a full-blooded intention, however else it is connected to the movement that follows, I am surely not responsible for the movement if it was in no way what I had in mind .... There are borderline cases of course. What are we to say of the man who fully and really intended to kiss his bride at the altar, and shakes hands instead?[12]

The concept 'intention', as explained in the quotation 10, suggests that it is not merely *a priori* awareness of what one is going to perform or one is going to do, but also being aware and ready to accept the consequences of the actions one has so performed or is going to perform. This makes an action responsible and committed. If we go along this line of argument, the case of drinking a glass of water perhaps has to be bracketed from our discussion. Or the bridegroom intending to kiss the bride, but shaking hands with her, was not perhaps intended.

On the other hand, Anthony Kenny writes:

> Direct intention is primarily a volitional state: it concerns what a man wants, either for its own sake or as a means to something else. Of course, as mentioned earlier, if an action is to be voluntary at all then it must be an action which was done because the agent in some sense wanted to do it. But it may be voluntary without being (directly) intentional if it is neither wanted for its own sake nor as a means to any further end. The sense of 'want' in all voluntary actions is the minimal one elucidated earlier; to say that an agent wants to do X, in this minimal sense, is merely to say that he does X consciously while knowing that it is in his power to refrain from doing X if only he will give up one of his purposes or chosen means.[13]

Intending to drink a glass of water, if seen in the light of 'want' of water, is merely a willingness to drink rather than not drink or to drink rather than eat. It is not an intention. Anthony Kenny seems to be making a distinction between intention and want. But it seems that the distinction does not explain the problem, rather it complicates. Is not wanting a form of intending? The argument gives room for non-intended voluntary actions. This to my mind is not done. What about the simplest of actions such as raising an arm? For Anthony Kenny, such actions cannot be said to be intentional, since they are neither performed nor desired to be performed for their own sake, nor are they means to any further (superior) goals/ends. But there are instances when voluntary actions may not directly involve intentions and yet are intentional. As Searle writes:

> ... many of the actions one performs, one performs quite spontaneously, without forming consciously or unconsciously, any prior intention to do those things. For example, suppose I am sitting in a chair reflecting on a philosophical problem, and I suddenly get up and start pacing about the room. It is an intentional action, but I need not intend first.[14]

One may not necessarily have a systematically given set of intentions prior to performing an action. One may not be quite self-conscious of the action, say getting up and starting to pace around the room, as given in the example quoted. But when asked about his behaviour, Prof. Searle would be able to give a reply that he was pacing about the room without any specified or well-directed aim or objective. But the action cannot be said to be non-intentional either. Searle sees it, at its minimal sense, as an *a priori* involvement of intention in actions which are performed without any desire for achieving some goals. He writes:

> The intentional content of my intention must be at least (that I perform the action of raising my arm by way of carrying out this intention).[15]

According to Searle, the intention involved in raising of the arm is 'the desire to raise the arm' and nothing else. It need not have a successive goal as aim. We may say that it is for the 'heck' of raising the arm. There is some form of intentional content prior to raising the arm which may not be very detailed or clearly visible. The prior intention thus makes reference to the whole action as unit, not just the movement, and it is causally self-referential.[16] What is suggested by the discussion is that any voluntary action should have an *a priori* intention of a minimal order. Searle further writes:

> I am not claiming that there is a characteristic experience common to every intentional action, but rather that for every conscious intentional action there is the experience of performing that action, and that experience has an intentional content.[17]

If this is so, raising the arm as well as having a glass of water can be termed intentional actions. In both the cases, the agents are accountable for their actions, which amounts to saying that they have acted knowing well what they were doing. Going by that argument, all forms of voluntary action ought to be considered intentional action. There cannot be, as it seems, any exceptions to this phenomenon. Even Sartre's claim that the act of the careless smoker who caused the powder magazine to explode, is not to be considered an intentional action,[18] can be seriously contested. An action said to be performed intentionally out of negligence, cannot be considered non-responsible. Rather, it is a case of irresponsibility.

This way of looking at intentional action will, to my mind, throw some light on legal philosophy, where 'responsible intentional actions' and 'non-responsible intentional actions' have serious impact on the judgement on an

action. The case of the careless smoker is that of irresponsibility and thus, he can be prosecuted for acting irresponsibly. He could have acted responsibly. But there are cases where actions apparently look value neutral and thus free from any unhappy or unwanted results. But in the long run, the consequences of these actions may turn out to be harmful. The cutting down of the forest by tribals is one such case. This case is different from that of the careless smoker.

Negligence and ignorance are two different things. Tribals who are ignorant of the impact of cutting down forests cannot be said to be responsible for bringing disaster to the environment. Cutting down of the forest in this case is an intended action, yet a non-responsible act for these people are unaware of the consequences their actions will lead to—global warming and climatic imbalances, for instance. Negligence, on the other hand is not non-awareness, but being careless to be responsible. One is aware that smoking near a powder magazine is not safe, yet one smokes not caring about the possible disastrous consequences. Such action is accountable, for it is performed by a responsible person with certain amount of knowledge about the possible consequences of one's actions. Barring such cases as ignorance, all voluntary actions are, in general, responsible actions in character.

To conclude, intentionality or act of consciousness should be seen as the precondition or ground for intentional actions, that intentional actions are performed only through the act of consciousness. It has also been argued that every intentional action must possess at least a certain form of intentionality, even in the minimal order. However, when it comes to actions which have deeper social significance or implications, degree of intentionality comes to the fore. The case of ignorance and negligence, for instance, is one such case where the nature of intentionality will determine the nature of an action. The nature of intentionality involved in the actions of the tribals are different from that of the unmindful smoker. So, the place and importance of responsibility will be guided by the nature of intentionality involved in the knowledge of an action.

Notes and References

1. Arthur C. Danto (1975), *Sartre*, Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, p. 51.
2. Danto's distinction of being under 'conscious being' and 'mere things' suggests putting human beings and animals under one category. If by 'conscious being', he meant only the human beings; the animals are left out, for they cannot be put under 'mere things'. This creates unnecessary complications. So I have preferred to retain Sartre's own distinction of Being as *pour soi* and *en soi*.

3. Carlos J. Moya (1990), *The Philosophy of Action*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 58.
4. Ibid., pp. 129–30.
5. 'Intentional act' and 'intentional action' should not be confused as one concept. The former implies the act of consciousness, the awareness or positing towards an object of knowledge. It is an act of intentionality. The latter refers to concrete action. It is also praxiological in character involving intentions and goal-directed activity.
6. Reference may be made to the debate between Daya Krishna and Ashok Vohra on the status of animals being stripped of consciousness. Daya Krishna's contention that 'the so-called feeling of freedom which the higher animals may be supposed to experience when they are able to pursue unhampered and with success the goal they are pursuing, is illusory because all their activities are instinctive leads them to their biologically predetermined ends', has been strongly challenged by Vohra. Ref. Daya Krishna, 'An Attempted Analysis of the Concept of Freedom', in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, USA, June 1952, p. 550. Also ref. Ashok Vohra, 'The Concept of Freedom', in *The Philosophy of Daya Krishna*, Bhuvan Chandel and K.L. Sharma (eds.) (1996), New Delhi: ICPR, p. 140.
7. Mary Warnock, 'Freedom in the early philosophy of J.P. Sartre', in *Essays on Freedom of Action,* Ted Honderich (ed.) (1973), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 4.
8. S.S. Barlingay, *Belief, Reasons & Reflection.* Pune: IPQ Publications, p. 47.
9. There are exceptions to the practice of marriage as shown in the chapter. There are cases of polygamy found in many places of the world. But considering the general practice, it has been anthropologically found that one-to-one spouse partnership is the most common form of marriage. The involvement of religiosity is not our concern here. We are only interested in the seriousness of such a contract in any society. It is on the basis of the institution of marriage that we differentiate and distinguish pre-marital, extra-marital, live-in relationships, etc.
10. Ted Honderich (1993), *How Free Are You?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 47.
11. Ibid., p. 51.
12. Ibid., p. 51.
13. Anthony Kenny (1978), *Freewill and Responsibility*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 51.
14. John R. Searle (1983), *Intentionality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 84.
15. Ibid., p. 85.
16. Ibid., p. 93.
17. Ibid., p. 90
18. J.P. Sartre (1956, 1966), *Being and Nothingness*, tr. H.E. Barnes, New York: Washington Square Press, p. 559.

The Cartesian Privacy and Antara Bhāsā

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> If someone were to explain correctly what are the simple ideas in human imagination out of which all human thoughts are compounded, and if his explanation were generally received, I would dare to hope for a universal language very easy to learn, to speak, and to write ... it would make peasants better judges of truth about the world than philosophers now. But do not hope ever to see such a language in use.
>
> Descartes[1]

1. INTRODUCTION

I underline 'use', the last word in the above quote. Of course, Descartes does not consider language philosophically significant and has not analysed language to solve philosophical problems. But, like Wittgenstein, he is against any wild imagination of making language possible without its use. Philosophers who customarily consider Wittgenstein the 'mighty anti-Cartesian', or the 'final dragon-slayer', may discard this idea. I do not argue in defense of but presuppose this idea.[2]

In this paper, my main objective is to find a sense of privacy and its corresponding language in accordance with Descartes' Mind-Body dualism. The privacy's name is Cartesian Privacy and the language's name is *Antara Bhāsā* (internal language/soul's language/language from the heart).[3]

Antara Bhāsā represents an interpretation of Wittgenstein's conception of private language. Considering the number of interpretations and private language argument's importance in Wittgenstein's philosophy, it is not ridiculous to coin a different name (i.e. *Antara Bhāsā*) for a different understanding of Wittgenstein's conception of private language. As the understanding owes to Cartesian dualism, acceptance of *Antara Bhāsā*,

therefore, is a denial of Kripke's attribution of Humean scepticism to Wittgenstein. The two—Cartesian scepticism and Humean scepticism—do not go together. Moreover, insofar as Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of a private language, the strength of *Antara Bhāsā*'s establishment proves, in equal proportion, the weakness of Wittgenstein's private language argument, and vice versa.

Considered its sphere of application, *Antara Bhāsā* vindicates the use of linguistic units corresponding to (the concept of) private language beyond philosophical discussions, particularly, beyond the western world. In everyday life, *Antara Bhāsā* bears a significant meaning. We use certain expressions like 'Only God knows the language of heart (soul)', God is *antaryāmi* (Knower of the heart or soul), 'None can know what his heart says', 'Oh God, can't you know the pain of my heart?', 'I love you from my heart', etc., that express a sense of privacy. Thus, if we go by the maxim 'Meaning is in use' ('the meaning of a word is its use in the language.' PI: 43),[4] 'private language' or '*Antara Bhāsā*' is not at all nonsense. It is meaningful even if there is no private language of *Antara Bhāsā* (cf. '... and the sign "N" to have meaning even when its bearer ceases to exist' PI: 41). So one should be very clear from the beginning that Wittgenstein, when he argues that private language makes no sense, definitely attributes nonsense to the claim that private language exists, and not to the sense of a concept of private language. Accordingly, his characterization is against a metaphysical claim, not an epistemological or linguistic, and suggests a worth mentioning point against Kripke. For what Kripke considers the point of Wittgenstein's argument is more of epistemological than metaphysical.

I admit, Wittgenstein might have privately cultivated a different sense of private language that no one else could manage to make out and, accordingly, this paper too fails to capture that sense. Really, it surprises. A man argued so much against the possibility of private language but retained no less of the argument in private such that, even the philosophical public have already spent more than five decades to understand what exactly he claims. My claim in the following two points may sound a bit stronger than it has been successfully argued. Nevertheless, to make my stand clear, I put forth. One, *Antara Bhāsā* is a private language that resists Wittgenstein's private language argument. Two, Wittgenstein's private language argument is very trivial if it does not aim at refuting a language of *Antara Bhāsā* kind.

In the next section, I distinguish Cartesian scepticism from Humean scepticism in a framework of dualism. In section 3, corresponding to Cartesian scepticism and Humean scepticism, meaning scepticism is understood in two different ways, and Cartesian privacy is explained in the light of Cartesian meaning scepticism. Section 4 contains an outline of Wittgenstein's private language argument. Section 5 is devoted to a counter argument against the private language argument. This counter argument indirectly justifies the possibility of *Antara Bhāsā*. No separate discussion is made on *Antara Bhāsā*. For, not only as a private language it cannot be made public and, at best, be proved to exist, but also that the whole paper is in a sense meant for the establishment of *Antara Bhāsā*. In section 6, I conclude that our attitude towards life determines the kind of language (private or public) we are interested in.

2. DUALISM, CARTESIAN SCEPTICISM AND HUMEAN SCEPTICISM

Dualism basically claims an ontological separation between two fundamental entities, namely, Mind and Body. However, it is not bound to accept a purely non-physical mental subject. The mental subject is the possessor of mental states or the executor of mental activities. If the mental states and activities are not the ingredients of mind, then, if only mind and its ingredients are non-physical, the mental subject is not purely non-physical. Secondly, even if those are the ingredients of mind, if mind is not purely non-physical, the mental subject is not purely non-physical. In other words, it is possible to hold in a dualistic framework that mind is not purely non-physical and the mental states or activities are its ingredients. And, also, that mind is purely non-physical and the mental subject is distinguished from mind.

Notwithstanding the basic claim that there is an ontological separation between Mind and Body, there may be two understandings of dualism. In one, mind is the name of a realm comprising self-contained and autonomous mental states or activities. In the other, mind itself contains and executes every mental state or activity. The former understanding does not allow a mental subject to be purely non-physical. The latter claims the purely non-physical character of the mental subject. We may say, following Foster, one accepts just the mental subject and the other accepts a *basic mental subject*. According to the latter claim, 'we must represent each item of mentality in the biography of a mental subject' by accepting

'an ontology of basic mental subjects'.[5] The former rejects this ontology altogether, considers mentality 'fundamentally subjectless'.

The above two claims are clearly the conclusions of two different scepticisms—the Cartesian and the Humean. The Humean scepticism is fundamentally epistemic and the Cartesian is metaphysical. In addition, it may be noted, the answer of the fundamental epistemic doubt is the basis of an answer to the metaphysical in Humean scepticism and, contrary to this, the metaphysical is the basis of the epistemic in Cartesian scepticism.

In Cartesian scepticism, the metaphysical doubt vanishes with the establishment of the indubitable truth *I am* or *I exist*. This indubitable truth in turn enables one to identify 'clear and distinct perception' as the touchstone of true knowledge and, thereby, the epistemic doubt is defeated. In *Principles of Philosophy*, part I, Descartes' answer to an epistemic doubt is the Principle xliii: *That we cannot err if we give our assent only to things that we know clearly and distinctly.*[6] Prior to this, the importance of the metaphysical doubt appears in Principle i: *That in order to examine into the truth, it is necessary once in our life to doubt of all things, so far as this is possible.*[7] In between appears the answer to this metaphysical doubt, in Principle vii: *that we cannot doubt our existence without existing while we doubt.*[8] Moreover, for Descartes, this answer is the first philosophical answer as well as the first knowledge. That is, to continue Principle vii, *this is the first knowledge that we obtain when we philosophize in an orderly way*. Descartes does not keep 'What is existence?' or 'What is knowledge?' to be answered first. Because, for him, it is *existence* that matters the most.[9]

Contrary to Descartes, Hume's move is from epistemic to metaphysics; from 'perception' to 'existence'. Never being able to catch himself at any time without a perception,[10] he rejects the ontology of self. For him, mental states and activities are subjectless because the alleged subject is beyond the scope perception. He says,

> when my perceptions are removed for any time, ... truly be said not to exist. ... If anyone upon serious and unprejudiced reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him .... Setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement.[11]

3. MEANING SCEPTICISM AND THE CARTESIAN PRIVACY

Meaning scepticism may be metaphysical or epistemic. One may extend Cartesian scepticism from objects to meaning and find metaphysical meaning scepticism. So also, one may find epistemic meaning scepticism through Humean scepticism. Epistemic meaning scepticism, that is, Humean scepticism extended from the world of objects to meaning, can be more or less represented through Kripke's understanding of Wittgenstein's sceptical paradox in PI: 201,

> no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made to accord with the rule.

That is, for example,[12] if someone answers 12 to 7 + 5 = ?, it is not necessary that in answering 12 he has followed the rule of + and not the rule of +*, where +* has been defined as

$x +^* y = x + y$ (when x and y are less than or equivalent to 50)

$x +^* y = 10$ (when x and y are greater than 50).

That certain rules are followed in using + does not justify the meaning of +. Because, no fact guarantees whether the rule of + or the rule of +* is followed in using +. So also, the meaning of any linguistic unit (word, expression, sentence or non-verbal sign) cannot be factually justified. No fact guarantees the exact rules followed in a particular use of a particular linguistic unit. If there is no guarantee, factual or non-factual, that one has followed the rules of +, not of +*, there is no point in claiming that he means +, not +*, when he says 5 + 7 = 12. And, if there is a guarantee but non-factual, then the meaning of + is determined non-factually.

The emphasis on perception leads us to hold that the mental states and activities are subjectless. There is no mind or basic mental subject which is purely non-physical. Parallel to this, the emphasis on fact leads to hold no inner self for meaning determination. No such entity beyond the factual realm ever can be proved to be existing. Meaning is not an act of mind or basic mental subject. In other words, rejection of private language is based on the rejection of private facts. Language represents reality and there is no reality that private language represents. Secondly, since no fact ever can determine meaning, even if there is a private fact, it does not determine meaning. Meaning determination is not factual, private or public. It is a collection of agreements among the members of a community

made in such an inconceivable gradual way that particular public practices turn into a rule of general public practice. This answer is analogous to the sceptical solution: Mental state or activity is not perceived, hence, it is not a thing of any kind, physical or purely non-physical, but a collection of properties so rapidly moves in succession that it is inconceivable.

To include meaning scepticism in Descartes' philosophy is definitely risky, if not inappropriate. First, it seems we go beyond his field of investigations. We revive the baroque understanding of language, that is, language is primarily a representational medium and, then, ask how meaning determination is possible in the face of various conflicting interpretations available for one text. The representational character of language has been the main concern of Descartes' contemporaries,[13] though representation has perplexed them the most. Descartes has made a shift, from representation to certitude. By making this shift, 'by not problematizing the relation of man to representation, he left out that which is defining essence of man—language.'[14] Instead of investigating language which in turn leads to the investigation of representation, Descartes investigated the world and, thereby, the certitude which is the ideal of language. Second, relying on the precept 'clear and distinctness', existence of language may be straight-forwardly asserted and, hence, of meaning. There would be no point in giving importance to meaning scepticism. Thus, either we wilfully disregard the historical background and dislocate Descartes' philosophy or we find meaning scepticism uninteresting in the parameter of Cartesian investigation. Consequently, a genuine pursuit of metaphysical (Cartesian kind) meaning scepticism would be at best a case of adopting Descartes' method as a means.

Analogous to doubt on the objects of this world due to the deceptive character of our sense perceptions, one may doubt on meaning due to the deceptions involved in linguistic communications, and ask a question like 'Is there a thing called meaning?' This doubt is defeated when meaning is categorically asserted. Analogous to *I exist*, one may say *I mean* when one wants to defeat the meaning sceptic. This answer would presuppose the existence of a private language as much as *I exist* presupposes the consciousness of a basic mental subject. This kind of language may be equated with *Antara Bhāsā*. This is the language of the soul. It is free from the deceptive nature of human beings. If I mean something in a deceptive way, no doubt, that is I who mean. As a thinking subject cannot doubt that he is a thinking subject, so also, a subject who means cannot

mean to himself that he does not mean anything. This is perhaps the fundamental reason for which we do successfully communicate even though in many instances we are deceptive, unsuccessful or incomplete besides emotional, illogical, unsociable or even absurd.

I mean is undoubtedly a non-deceptive meaning for anyone who means something as an utterer or audience. Even in a dream, I mean when I mean to say something to somebody. But, where does this I exist? Can there be a semantic I *vis-à-vis* an epistemic I? Is there an entity purely non-physical but of pure socialness, to distinguish from consciousness? An independent ontology of semantic I stands against the Cartesian dualism. For, thereby, a third fundamental entity would be introduced to the Mind–Body dualism. On the other hand, if the semantic I does not exist as a fundamental entity, the very rudimentary element of meaning lacks its ontological basis. What strikes to be the solution is the inseparability between language and thought. That is, the semantic I and the epistemic I are the same I insofar as the ontology of I is concerned. In other words, consciousness and socialness are the two sides of the same coin.

However, though the above understanding does not go against dualism as such, it conflicts with Descartes' idea of the purely non-physical mind attributed only with consciousness. To be more faithful to Descartes, we may rather say that the semantic I is an action of the soul. According to Descartes, thoughts are of two types—actions of the soul and passions of the soul. The former proceed directly from the soul and depend on it alone. These are our desires. Desires are again of two types: desires terminating in the soul and desires terminating in the body. In his words,

> one consists of the actions of the soul which terminate in the soul itself, as when we desire to love God, or generally speaking, apply our thoughts to some object which is not material; and the other of the actions which terminate in our body, as when from the simple fact that we have the desire to take a walk, it follows that our legs move and that we walk.[15]

The semantic I can be said to be the former sort of desire, namely, that 'consists of the actions of the soul and which terminates in the soul itself.' In other words, it consists of the *I mean* caused by and terminated in the soul. This is the language of the soul, the *Antara Bhāsā*, that does not go to the public since its termination takes place in the soul itself.

4. THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language may be formulated as follows.[16]

(i) If there is a private language, it must be used in private. Because, it does not worth language if it is not in use, and it is not private if used in public.

(ii) If there is a private use, there must be a private rule-following. Because, no language can be used without its rules being followed and, on the other hand, public rule-following implies public use.

(iii) If there is a private rule-following, there must be a private criterion to check the correctness of rule-following. Because, rule-following makes no sense without being susceptible to a test of its correctness. A public criterion implies a public point of reference or public ground which, in turn, implies a public language.

(iv) A private criterion is impossible. Hence, a private rule-following makes no sense. Since a private rule-following is nonsense, a private use of language is meaningless. Hence, either such a language does not exist or, if insisted to exist, it does not worth language at all.

Why cannot there be a private criterion? Is it because a private criterion ultimately leads to an inarticulate sound, since any articulation, presumably, belongs to public language? Or, is it because a private criterion cannot justify the connection between a sign and what the sign means? Consider Wittgenstein's example of the Private Diary User (PI: 258). Wittgenstein argues against any success of the diary user in keeping a record of his private sensation, S. In the light of the above two questions, we can have two different understandings of what Wittgenstein argues. One, the diary user's inability owes to the fact that he cannot formulate the definition of S. Two, his inability owes to his failure in justifying that the sign 'S' stands for the sensation S.

The diary user cannot formulate a definition of S because he has no language at his hand to formulate a definition. He is yet to establish a language, the private language. Of course he may try his hand at an ostensive definition. But, not by a way in which one says 'This is red' and points to a red object. For that would be public and he allegedly has a private sensation. He may concentrate his attention on S while speaking

or writing 'S'. He could inwardly establish the connection between 'S' and S, had he got a justification for the following. That he concentrated on S and wrote down 'S' when and only when it was S he experienced. In other words, the connection between 'S' and S is established if the diary user justifies that the connection he makes between 'S' and S is right. It is possible that he makes a wrong connection, and uses 'S' for two different peculiar sensations. Otherwise, 'whatever is going to seem right to me is right' (PI: 258).

If the diary user attempts to impress S on himself to rightly remember 'S' for S in future, then, again, he must justify that he rightly remembers the connection between S and 'S'. To justify this, he cannot take recourse to the recollection of something in his mind that helps him to check the correctness of the connection he remembered. For, that would be a case of justifying memory on the basis of memory (cf. 'I don't know if I have remembered the time of departure of a train right and to check it I call to mind how a page of the timetable looked' (PI: 265). In other words, scepticism about memory cannot be avoided as much as scepticism about the concentration (of the same kind of sensation S). Thus the diary user cannot legitimately define S even if he attempts to make an ostensive definition. To put the result in brief, S cannot be defined because, insofar as the connection between 'S' and S is not justified, there is no justification that anything defines S. That is, no definition for something yet to be expressed in language makes any sense.

5. A COUNTER-ARGUMENT

The problem of private language is not at least a problem of finding something indescribable. If everything is describable, nothing escapes the mould of descriptive statements; every language-game could have been reduced to the language-game of describing, stating or reporting. But later Wittgenstein's enterprise strongly recommends in favour of multiple language-games. He argues how a large number of communications we make through language are not in the mould of descriptions. There are indescribables at least in the sense that they do not and cannot (after reduction) fit into the form of descriptive statements. No instance of naming, for example, is a description (though 'a preparation for description' like 'putting a piece in its place on the board' (PI: 49)). The problem of private language, therefore, is something other than the problem of finding

indescribables. In other words, the private language argument does not address to the existence or non-existence of private sensations as such. Hence, it is not a challenge against the possibility of private sensations.[17] Consequently, since it is not again against the meaning of the expression 'private language', it is natural to have a problem of relating 'private language' with private sensation if the former somehow stands for the latter, very much like the problem of making a relation between the public language and the publicly observable objects of the world.

Now, granted that there is a private sensation S, should we accept that there is no justification for the connection between 'S' and S? The real crux of private language argument is to convince us in favour of a negative answer. Because, insofar as the existence of S itself is not under question and, in fact, considered irrelevant, the meaning of the sign 'S' has to be challenged in order to show that, even if there exists a private world, a language representing such a world does not make any sense. Accordingly, the first step of the representation, that is, the connection between a private name and a private object, the connection between 'S' and S, has to be challenged.

Is the connection between 'S' and S is not justified because, if a sign 'S' stands for nothing defined but for any arbitrary thing, then, in its true sense of standing for something, 'S' stands for nothing? No. That would make the private language argument circular: no definition because there is no justification for the connection and, on the other hand, no justification for the connection because there is no definition. We are supposed to accept:

(i) If the connection between 'S' and S cannot be made out, then, even if S is defined, there is no justification that 'S' is marked when and only when S is experienced. That is, one cannot justify that he identifies the same connection if he is not justified in making out the connection itself.

Or, (ii) Even if a connection between 'S' and S is somehow made out, that won't guarantee an identification of S unless S has been defined. For, the identification of an undefined S may be an identification of anything other than S, and S is undefined.

Is it correct that the understanding of the connection depends on the definition, or that the definition depends on the understanding of the connection? If the former—that the understanding of the connection between 'S' and S depends on the definition of S and, by itself without the definition, it does not fit into an adequate argument against the diary

user's success—is correct, then, in the same light, the connection between 'cat' and cat, for example, depends on the definition of cat and by itself (the connection) without definition does not make a good argument for the establishment of public language. But, public language is well established. It needs no good argument for its establishment. Consequently, if the connection between 'cat' and cat need not depend on the definition of cat, then, for an establishment of private language, or for the success of the diary user, the connection between 'S' and S need not depend on the definition of S. The connection is not so dependent in case of cat and, hence, not in case of S. In other words, the well-established public language suggests that the definition of S, demanded for the establishment of private language, is not a primary requirement in language establishment. How can a cat be ever defined before it is represented through a language? If it is defined so, an obvious oddity crops up. Namely, definition is made without language.

Well, for the sake of argument, take ostensive definitions for a definition without language. But, in that case, ostensive definitions are meaningless. No meaning could be made possible without language. In other words, to put the argument in the reverse way, meaning is impossible without language and, hence, any definition without language is meaningless. Thus a cat, for example, cannot be meaningfully defined without language. As it is absurd to ask for such a definition, so also, it is absurd to demand the definition of S. If the second alternative—that the definition depends on the understanding of the connection—is correct, then, most of the theoretical definitions, insofar as those deal with abstract objects, are implausible. The connection between the object and the linguistic units representing that object is to be made out prior to the definition. But, as a matter of fact, an abstract object makes little sense without its definition. Thus, if a definition is made only after the understanding of the connection between the sign and its object, definitions for abstract concepts become implausible. On the same ground, if S is an abstract object, there is no wonder in the implausibility of the definition of S, insofar as the point of making out a connection between S and 'S' is insisted upon.

The point of making out a connection between S and 'S' is to establish a criterion for the correctness of the connection, prior to any definition of S. The criterion is not available, if no connection can be made out. And, the argument is, any connection between S and 'S' is not at all justified

because there is no criterion by which one can check the correctness of the connection. But, the argument is based on a mistaken premise. Namely, everything is concrete or, at least, understandable in terms of concrete objects in this world. This mistaken idea is in the root but so hidden in the argument that we skip it involuntarily. If this premise is not taken for granted, the demand for a checkable connection between S and 'S' is not at all justified. Is there a connection between a geometrical point and '.' that one can justifiably make out without the definition of the geometrical point? As there is no publicly observable connection between the point and '.' and yet we use '.' to represent the point, so also, 'S' may be used to represent S even if the diary user fails to make a publicly observable connection between S and 'S'. Of course, one may question the usefulness of 'S' *vis-à-vis* the usefulness of '.'. But that is a different question altogether. Wittgenstein recognizes that question (in PI: 258) and asks 'what is this ceremony for?' in connection to an attempt for making an inward definition of S. But he does that to shift from the problem of definition to the problem of making out the connection and, then, to the problem of memory scepticism.

No initiative is taken to find out the usefulness of an inward definition or, for that matter, of any definition other than the publicly checkable ostensive definitions. Because, although it is rightly presupposed that definitions are meant for the better establishment of meaning ('a definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign', PI: 258), it is unjustifiedly presupposed that no meaning is established by an inward definition of S, but someone's thinking that 'S' has the meaning S. If no meaning is established through an inward definition, the attempt for inward definition of S definitely becomes a futile exercise. But, ex hypothesi, 'S' belongs to a private language. Only a private meaning is associated with 'S', namely, S. Hence, not that no meaning is established, a public meaning is not established. If we conclude that no meaning is established from the fact that no public meaning is established, then, we presuppose the very conclusion of the private language argument, namely, there is no private meaning. Thus the argument commits the fallacy of *petitio principi*.

How does the inward definition fail to establish the meaning? Here, again, Wittgenstein's answer in PI: 258 can be understood in two ways. One, there is no justification for the connection between S and 'S', therefore, no meaning can be ascribed to 'S', and, since no meaning can be ascribed to 'S', no definition of S can establish the meaning of 'S'. Thus

an inward definition of S fails to establish the meaning of 'S'. Two, the inward definition is at best one's impression on oneself, has no objective footing, therefore, it cannot be justifiedly called a sound definition (cf. 'whatever is going to seem right to me is right' (PI: 258)).

It is true that meaningless signs are not defined. Also, that a sign absolutely disconnected from the world is meaningless. But, to justifiedly claim that a sign is so disconnected, the demonstration of a failure in justifying some connection is not sufficient. One may not justify the connection and yet have the connection between S and 'S'. Wittgenstein does not prove that 'S' is completely disconnected from S as much as the diary user does not prove that 'S' is connected with S. But the diary user may have the ability to connect 'S' with S even if he cannot justify the connection. One may cry even if there is no justification for the crying. One can connect one's crying and why he cries even if no justification exists for that connection. As a matter of fact, this problem of connection is a problem of representation, an age-old problem in philosophy. As Goswami puts this problem in figurative, 'Here is a free port for the export import of many crucial philosophical problems as to how an abstraction gets tied to something concrete, how language is hooked to reality!'[18] The problem is not peculiar to private language, to the connection between 'S' and S.

If you wish to cite Wittgenstein's beetle-box example (PI: 293) to explain how 'S' is absolutely disconnected, it won't be helpful. For the morale of this example is, 'if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of "object and designation" the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant' (PI: 293). It is not the meaninglessness of the sign but the object's existence is challenged here and dismissed as irrelevant, not even as nonexistent. If the meaning is dismissed when the object is irrelevant, or even non-existent, then, certainly, meaning is no more determined by use. This could be a suicidal move for Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's argument in PI: 293 makes the move in a reverse way. That is, meaning is determined by use and, if a sign makes no sense in use, it makes no sense that the sign represents such and such object. The object becomes irrelevant.

If the second understanding—inward definition as one's impression on onself—is correct, then, outward definition is no less one's impression on oneself. The difference between the two is just in the object in question. If a publicly verifiable object O is in question instead of the private S, then, the diary user himself alone cannot justify that he rightly connects

the sign 'O' to represent the object O, as much as he fails in doing that between 'S' and S. The difference between inward definition and outward definition can have significance only when the latter is necessarily a practice that involves more than one person. Otherwise, since no objective justification is available in either case, one's definition to oneself on O is as much implausible as that on S.

If objective justifications were there for one's act of connecting + with his following the rule of addition, then, following the rule of addition could be self-justified. The paradox of PI: 201 could be solved straightforwardly. But, according to Wittgenstein, that is not possible. Precisely, because, that would be a case of private rule-following and private rule-following is impossible (cf. it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it. PI: 202). In other words, private (or inward) rule-following is as much meaningless as inward (or private) definition. But, which one's meaninglessness does make the other meaningless? In accordance to the above understanding, private rule-following's meaninglessness makes inward definition meaningless. On the contrary, in accordance to the private language argument cited above in section 4, the meaninglessness of inward definition makes private rule-following meaningless. Thus the above understanding does not explain but begs the question.

Now we may say that there is no conclusive proof for the impossibility of a private criterion, and argue against the Private Language Argument as follows.

(i) There is no conclusive proof for the impossibility of a private criterion.
(ii) Therefore, since a private rule-following is nonsense only when there is no private criterion, private rule-following is possible.
(iii) Private use is possible. Because, a private use is impossible only when private rule-following is impossible, and it is concluded in (ii) that private rule-following is possible.
(iv) Therefore, if private language is impossible only when its private use is impossible, private language is possible.

The need of a criterion makes sense only when rule-following is checkable. If there is no condition of checkability, criterion means nothing. For, the criterion is the criterion to check the correctness of rule-following, and rule-following need not be susceptible to checkability. The condition of

checkability presupposes that every rule can be disobeyed. But there may be rules which cannot be disobeyed at all and, thereby, by the intrinsic property of those always-followed correctly rules, one cannot make out a situation when such a rule is disobeyed. On the other hand, if we accept that every rule is susceptible to the mistakes of its followers, we presuppose that language is public and, thereby, beg the question (that there is no private language). If I disobey the law of identity just by making a statement like 'A is not A', then, there is no law of identity but its demonstrations through different public languages. If the law of identity is something other than the scripts and utterances, it need not be public as much as it need not be private. We cannot prove either of the two. If pointing to a sensation is not an act of the soul because, as Wittgenstein says, when one points to something, 'the pointing is not a hocus-pocus which can be performed only by the soul' (PI: 454), then, the user of a private language may very well retaliate, and say that the pointing is not one of the crystal clear scripts, utterances or physical behaviours that only a human body by itself or utilizing some empirical resources can manage to manufacture. The inward pointing of a sensation cannot be an act of the body to another body, if not an act of the soul to itself.

6. CONCLUSION

If there is only one kind of language, namely, public language, then, neither the Cartesian privacy is expressed through language nor does an expression through *Antara Bhāsā* or private language make any sense. But this is not a proof for the conclusion that there is no Cartesian Privacy, no *Antara Bhāsā*. This presupposition of one and only one kind of language, in favour of public language, would be a case of begging the question. On the other hand, as we have discussed above, it is not at all conclusively proved that there is no possibility of private language.

It is a matter of attitude adopted in our way of life that largely ensures the type of language we are interested in. However, if we are solely interested in public language, then, as Wittgenstein rightly points out, it is a matter of confirmation to our form of life that ensures the meaningfulness of the expressions we use. 'If a lion could talk we could not understand him' (PI, p. 223). Because, the lion does not confirm to our form of life. But, with an attitude of a child, we can understand. Otherwise, if meaning is in use, fairy tales are nothing but meaningless noises.

Our form of life is not a fixed whole of practices we adhere to but a changing whole of outlook we cultivate. A child's form of life changes as he grows up and broadens his outlook. There is no static human form of life as much as there is no static human culture as such. Don't we have a human form of life if, in the consideration of a future generation, we are no better than what now we consider monkeys?[19]

The unfair strategy made in the private language argument is this: Do not deny the existence of soul but, since its connection with its actions cannot be objectively justified, deny its actions to be the actions of the soul such that the soul becomes inactive. Will you dismiss your *Vivek* (conscience) as irrelevant if it cannot be observed by the public but exercised by your soul? If no *Vivek, bhābanā*, attitude or intention is relevant for you, then, what is that you really try to disclose in public by doing something, by reading or writing pages after pages?[20]

NOTES

1. Descartes writes this in a letter to Mersenne on the 20th of November 1629. See Kenny, A. (1970), p. 6.
2. This paper does not make a comparative study between Cartesian Semantics and Wittgensteinian Semantics. Neither Wittgenstein nor Descartes has any philosophical interest in semantics *qua* theory of meaning. Of course, establishment of foundations, principles and theories is of primary importance to Descartes, and exploration into meaning is vital for Wittgenstein. But the former keeps meaning irrelevant to philosophical discussions, the latter eschews theory-building. Thus for one, theory is important, not the theory of meaning; and, for another, meaning is important but not its theory. However, to get a rough idea on how this paper presupposes a similarity between Descartes and Wittgenstein (insofar as *use* is concerned) and yet advocates for Cartesian privacy and *Antara Bhāsā*, the following may be noted.

   Descartes stresses on the use of a theory or language and, for him, a theory of language is hopeless if it cannot be in use. Wittgenstein stresses on the use of individual units of a language and, for him, meaning of a linguistic unit is determined by its use. This difference may suggest the following. If each one of us uses a language of his own and none has an access to that of the other, then, even if we happen to have just one language that turns out to be private, since it is in use, it won't be discarded by Descartes. On the other hand, even if the language is in use, the use of its linguistic units is not subject to public scrutiny. Therefore, the meaning of its linguistic units cannot be determined. Such a language is refuted by Wittgenstein. Figuratively speaking, even though souls are private they are not hopeless because they exist in each of us. On the other hand, the expressions of our souls to ourselves cannot be determined because such expressions are not at all public and, obviously, a private determination has no sense in public terms.

   However, Descartes' denial of making language universal as well as public should be underlined to match his conception of language with that of Wittgenstein's denial of making it private as well as public, notwithstanding their philosophical differences.
3. These are the approximate translations from Sanskrit to English.
4. *Philosophical Investigations* has been abbreviated to PI.
5. Foster, J. (1991), p. 206.
6. HR, vol. I, p. 236. (HR is the abbreviation for Haldane, S. Elizabeth & Ross, G.R. (1911) *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*).
7. HR, vol. I, p. 219.
8. HR, vol. I, p. 221.
9. He says, 'when I stated that this proposition *I think, therefore I am* is the first and most certain ... I did not for all that deny that we must first of all know *What is knowledge, What is existence*, and *What is certainty*, ... but because these are notions of the simplest kind, which of themselves give us no knowledge of anything that exists, I did not think them worthy of being put on record.' (*Principle x*, of Part I, HR, vol. I, p. 222.)
10. Hume says, 'For my part, when I enter intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.' (Hume, D. (1978), p. 252)
11. Hume, D. (1978), p. 252.
12. Following the 'plus' and 'quus' example of Kripke, S. (1982), p. 9.
13. Like Charles Sorel and Montaigue who are famous for *Le Berger Extravagant* and *Essays* respectively. Judovitz, D. (1988) discusses the literary historical background of Descartes' philosophy.
14. Judovitz, D. (1988), p. 25.
15. HR, p. 340.
16. I make the argument short-cut, without much discussion. My discussion on the premises (more or less similar to the premises given here) of the argument is in Lenka (1991), and on what makes the argument interesting is in Lenka (1995).
17. As Hunter, J.F.M. (1994) argues, PI: 314, 316 and 327 clearly suggest that Wittgenstein believes 'that one cannot find out what something is ... by examining instances of it.' Not only that private sensations are not scrutinizable, as by their very nature they are private and immune to public scrutiny, but also that we cannot know what private sensations are from the instances of what private sensations manifest publicly.
18. Goswami, C. (1997), p. 43.

19. Cf. *Zettle*: 43, 108.
20. This work is partially supported by the Department of Science and Technology, Government of India. I am thankful to Dr. Chinmoy Goswami, Dr. Arindama Singh, A.K. Moharana and an anonymous referee of this journal for their comments/encouragement/suggestions.

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Gadamer and the Paradigm of Hermeneutic Circle

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I

Heidegger has defined hermeneutic circle as a circle beyond metaphysics insofar as epistemology is equated, with the metaphysics of beings regarded as objects presented to subjects.[1] Heidegger makes an effort to demonstrate that the hermeneutic circle takes us beyond traditional ontology. The hermeneutic circle is a circle beyond traditional ontology which is equated, with metaphysics, regarded as the theory of the beingness (*Seienheit*) of beings in distinction from fundamental ontology which asks after the meaning of being (*Sein*). Bleicher defines hermeneutic circle as the ontological condition of understanding which proceeds from a communality that binds us to a tradition in general and that of our object of interpretation in particular and which provides the link between finality and universality, and between theory and praxis. He further states that hermeneutic circle is a methodological device in interpretation which considers a whole in relation to its parts and vice versa.[2] While explaining the hermeneutic circle as movement back and forth, between part and whole, Gadamer holds the view that the criterion of correct understanding is the harmony of all the details with the whole.[3] It is because understanding must always anticipate the completeness of the text, which is possible by both the whole and the parts. This is important because we can understand the parts of the text only if we understand the whole and similarly the understanding of the whole becomes complete only by understanding the individual parts. The hermeneutic circle becomes complete on the basis of (1) tradition, and (2) interpretation and understanding. Since this is possible only through the medium of language, in hermeneutic circle, language also plays an important role. In this paper, I shall attempt a critical study of Gadamer taking into consideration how tradition, interpretation and language play a role in his hermeneutic understanding,

keeping thinkers like Heidegger, Habermas and Caputo in the background. Also I have tried to show how Gadamer is successful in responding to the above critics.

II. GADAMER AND HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE

Hermeneutics has been used in the eighteenth century to refer to the interpretation of texts. Though initially it was used in religious writings, later it was extended to linguistic understanding. For example, it was Schleiermacher who used hermeneutical method in theology and defined it as the art of avoiding misunderstanding. Savigny, Boeckh, Steinthal and Dilthey developed the method of Schleiermacher. Dilthey, who was the historian and the biographer of Schleiermacher, stressed that there is no presuppositionless understanding. Understanding was the foundation of human science, according to him. Later Heidegger explained the need for all interpretation to rise from a previous understanding. He openly refuted the idea that understanding can be presuppositionless. 'All interpretation is grounded in a fore-sight, and a fore-conception,'[4] says Heidegger. His work *Being and Time* gives a broader approach to the hermeneutical movement. But it was Gadamer who has made the movement more popular by the publication of the book *Truth and Method.* Hermeneutical method is universal, because understanding is the fundamental way in which human beings participate in the world. Gadamer has been very much inspired by Heidegger on a number of points. His views on language, all understanding comes into its own in interpretation, and interpretation is based on fore-having or pre-possession, fore-sighted preconception—all these are derived doctrines of Gadamer from Heidegger. Gadamer ties all human experience of meaning to language. He states that it is in language that we articulate the experience of the world insofar as this experience is common. Hermeneutics is concerned with the mediation to man of the eternal foundations of all meaning and values. Man must know the eternal values and the meaning of life. Often he forgets the purpose and meaning of his life, because he plunges deep into the temporal aspects of things and believes what is unreal as real. Gadamer states that each person ought to seek to realize the values and goals, for its harmony of measure and its fullness would point the way to mature and perfect human formation.[5] 'Hermeneutic experience is the corrective by means of which thinking reason escapes the prison of language and it is itself constituted

linguistically,'[6] says Gadamer. He supports the view that the process of interpretation is a circular one, involving the movement from the part to whole and whole to the parts. This means that in order to understand the meaning of a sentence, the parts, namely, the meaning of individual words is to be understood. Similarly, in order to understand the meaning of a paragraph, we need the understanding of individual sentences, and in order to understand the sentences, we require an understanding of the language. Thus Gadamer stresses that language is interwoven with sentences and words, and understanding is possible only through the implicit relation between the whole and parts.

Tradition and Heritage

Gadamer in *Truth and Method* attempts to refound the notions of tradition and heritage, to discover its real nature and foundation. For Gadamer, hermeneutics is centered on a theory of interpretation, of the transmission of the stored up riches of the tradition, of the dynamics of that transmission. Tradition is the finite unfolding of an infinite content, a history of finite actualization of an essentially inexhaustible, or infinite, truth. Gadamer does not see the tradition as a given and an 'inescapable facticity'. He puts the history of philosophy by means of 'tradition' back on a more modest, human limit, built up out of meetings between the text and the reader. The idea of the tradition can no more be found in Gadamer than can the idea of conversation. For him a word exists only in a conversation, similarly the tradition stands only in the telling of it. Every re-telling of it is a renewal of the tradition. By emphasizing our belongingness to tradition as our primordial ontological condition, he distances himself from the position of Habermas who emphasizes our ability to break free from the belongingness of tradition through critical reason. Caputo in his book, *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project* remarks that Gadamer's thinking is 'historical but not epochal'. He attacks Gadamer for breaking away from Heidegger's hermeneutics. But it must be kept in mind that in some respects Gadamer goes beyond Heidegger. Our participation in the tradition is not eminently epochal, as it is for Heidegger. We participate in the tradition which carries the values when we read particular texts. Thus it is not epochal, but historical according to Gadamer. Tradition is built out of meetings between the reader and the texts. There is also another place where Gadamer goes beyond Heidegger. Tradition, for Heidegger is a fixed cannon of names or a

stabilized cast of characters. But for Gadamer, tradition is the play of conversation with others. This generates meanings and it is how tradition becomes an ongoing process. By virtue of the openness and inclusion of conversation, all those who appreciate it retain tradition. The famous Habermas-Gadamer debate also explains the position of Gadamer in a more clear way. Though Habermas criticizes Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, he has drawn his theory of communication from hermeneutics of Gadamer. Habermas in the theory of communication maintains that the primary aim of knowledge is to reach understanding, which is intersubjective. 'Reacting understanding is the inherent telos of human speech,' says Habermas. Gadamer's notion of understanding and agreement has helped Habermas to draw his theory of communication. Through critical reason, Habermas emphasizes the need to break from the belongingness of tradition, but for Gadamer our belongingness of tradition is our primordial ontological condition. I shall return to this point later.

One of the important aspects that Gadamer emphasizes is the revival of tradition. For him, one can understand the value and importance of tradition and heritage by living with other persons. Life develops with others in culture, time, and place. Man's life, knowledge and understanding are connected with the tradition and heritage. Knowledge and experience of one tradition is carried over to the other by history. The historian is concerned with the whole of historical tradition, which he has to combine with his own present existence, if he wants to understand it and which in this way, he keeps open for the future.[7] The cumulative result of the extended process of learning and testing constitutes tradition[8]. Tradition is the locus of understanding. It helps us to correct the mistakes of the present. We are shaped by our past in various ways and this has a tremendous influence on our understanding. The past and the present are related and become a continuous process through the tradition. For Habermas, tradition is right only if it can be judged reflectively to be right. But for Gadamer, tradition is always right, because it is traditional. In *Truth and Method,* he is concerned with the fundamental condition involved in understanding. He explains how in three spheres of art, history and language, it operates. In art, the subject seizes us, captures our interest even long before we pass a critical judgement on it. Similarly, in history, we are already in tradition even before we are conscious of it. History does not belong to man, but man belongs to history. Thus history is effective or operative history, according to Gadamer.

Gadamer differentiates himself from his predecessors like Schleiermacher, Dilthey and others by emerging as a critique of the tradition practiced earlier and its methodological conception of understanding. For Gadamer, the cultural tradition is important because it is the locus of understanding. Habermas charges Gadamer for this and argues that communicative action plays a significant role in understanding. The three cognitive interests, namely, the control, communicative action and emancipation are important for Habermas. This is replaced by tradition in Gadamer, for he believes that it is tradition, which plays a role in understanding. Gadamer understands hermeneutics as the manifestation and restoration of a meaning addressed to the reader in the manner of a message.

Understanding and Interpretation

For Gadamer two questions are of primary importance: (1) what is the structure of understanding, and (2) how to reach it? The hermeneutical process explains what happens in understanding. Scholars like David E. Linge argue that Gadamer's hermeneutics does not offer a new canon of interpretation, but seeks to describe what actually takes place in every event of understanding.[9] To get an overall view of Gadamer's notion of understanding, one may look at Dilthey. He says that understanding is essentially a self-transposition or imaginative projection whereby the knower negates the temporal distance that separates him from his object and becomes contemporaneous with it.[10] Thus for Dilthey, the present situation, becomes a negative value to the knower. The interpreter has to transcend all these. Historical understanding, according to the above view of Dilthey, is the action of subjectivity purged of all prejudices, and it is achieved in direct proportion to the knower's ability to set aside his own horizons by means of an effective historical method. The interpreter negates his own present as a vital extension of the past.[11] Gadamer objects to this. It is because in the above contention of Dilthey, the knower is separated from his own historicity. It is not a mere accidental or subjective condition, but an ontological one. In other words, our prejudices do not cut us off from the past, but initially open it up to us. For Gadamer, prejudice does not mean the narrow-mindedness of bias but the fundamental and orienting pre-understanding that the understanding brings to bear whenever there is anything to be understood. There is never a point when we are totally free from this productive prejudice, but that is

precisely what pushes the tradition forward in an ongoing process productive of novelty and innovation.

This led him to say that all understanding is interpretation. Understanding includes always an element of application. Understanding, interpretation and application is a triunity, and hence is inseparable, says Gadamer. Ultimately, understanding and interpretation are the same. He holds:

> Since the romantic period we can longer hold the view that, should there be no direct understanding, interpretative ideas are drawn on, as needed, out of a linguistic storeroom in which they are lying ready. Rather, language is the universal medium in which understanding itself is realized. The mode of realization of understanding is interpretation.... All understanding is interpretation, and all interpretation takes place in the medium of language which would allow the object to come into words and yet is at the same time the interpreter's own language.[12]

For Gadamer, interpretation is always open-ended which means no interpretation is ever final, thus allowing always-new interpretation. This means understanding is always application. Here, one must be a little careful in understanding the term, 'application', because for Gadamer, the term does not mean applying something to something. By application, he means that we see a text or a situation as already significant. Our understanding grows out of a particular context and when the context changes, the need for re-interpretation arises. But Gadamer claims that re-interpretation may lead to changes in our situation, but we cannot free ourselves completely from our given tradition and situation. Here the role of the interpreter is important. Schleiermacher believed that an interpreter could identify himself with the author. The interpreter must place himself on the same level as that of the reader, by deepening his knowledge, of the language and the customs of the reader's time. Identification with the reader, for Schleiermacher means identification with the author. Thus the interpreter can reach an understanding with that of the author through the reader. But Gadamer has a difficulty in accepting the Schleiermacherean point. For Schleiermacher, interpretation is guided by understanding, whereas for Gadamer, understanding is guided by *Wirkungsgeschichte Bewusstsein,* hermeneutic consciousness. But for both, understanding is interpretation. Gadamer is against the idea that to understand a work is to understand what the author has intended. The intention of the author, holds Gadamer, is an inadequate standard of interpretation because it is non-dialectical. He

considers understanding as essentially dialectical. This means that new meaning is born in the interplay that takes place continuously between the past and the present. In every interpretation, the text gives new meaning. In *Truth and Method,* he says:

> The meaning of the text surpasses its author not occasionally but always. Thus understanding is not a reproductive procedure, but rather always also a productive one ... It suffices to say that one understands differently when one understands at all.[13]

It is not necessary, says Gadamer, to discover the intention of the author. This is because most of the time, the author does not understand what he is doing. Gadamer is of the view that the author is in a weaker position than others are. The interpreter has greater authority than the author does. The author has no privilege as an interpreter of his work. In interpretation of the text, no doubt, the intention of the author plays an important role. This definitely has some advantages; for example, the meaning will remain the same at all times. But the main difficulty in such a position is that it will lead to stagnation in meaning. Tradition always takes the meaning beyond the intention of the author and the intention of the author is not a necessary condition for understanding.

Understanding and interpretation are indivisible. 'Understanding and interpretation are indissolubly bound up with each other',[14] says Gadamer. Understanding is not outside tradition, and it always belongs to tradition because it involves self-application. All understanding of tradition is self-application. Understanding makes the tradition, of which it is made. It is understanding that makes history, according to Gadamer. Thus he reverts to the position of Hegel, according to which history belongs to understanding. Gadamer has taken this position because understanding contributes to and belongs to the ongoing course of history. Also Gadamer rejects the Hegelian projection of a universal history and supports the fragmentary character of history. In his reply to the critics he writes:

> The experience of history is not the experience of meaning, plan and reason, and the claim to grasp reason in history could be raised only under the externalizing view of the philosopher of absolute knowledge. In truth, the experiences of history return the hermeneutic task to its own place. It always has to decipher the meaning of fragments of history anew, fragments that are limited by, and shipwreck on, the dark

> contingency of the factual and, above all, on the twilight into which for each present consciousness the future disappears.[15]

Every event that happens is affected by history, thus has a pre-history, and affects history and will have a post-history. Thus to know the history of an event means that one must know the pre-history and post-history. 'Understanding is the interplay between the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding text is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the common bond that links us to the tradition. But this common bond is constantly being developed in our relationship to tradition,'[16] says Gadamer. While explaining the role of understanding, Gadamer uses the analogy of conversation and play. Understanding, he holds, is like a game with back and forth movements of questions and answers with no definite ending. We do not know where the game will lead to and what is the end process. It does not allow us to know in advance. The game can only be interpreted and resumed after. It cannot end. Understanding is similar to that of a game. Understanding is always on the way to truth. In a game, the player does not stand outside the game. Instead, he involves himself in the game. The real subject of playing is not the player, or in being played, but instead it is the game itself. What is important in the game is the back and forth movement involved by the player. The game exists in a particular place and time and its movements are in no way directly involved in the world outside it.

Language

For Gadamer, the notion of hermeneutics can be better understood in terms of the relationship between language and interpretation. Habermas correctly says that with Gadamer, language acquires a third dimension.[17] The unity of language, which disappeared in the pluralism of language-games, is dialectically restored in the context of tradition.[18] Language exists only as something traditional, for tradition mirrors language. Language is said to be the medium of hermeneutical experience. Hermeneutical problems are not ones of the correct mastery of language but the proper understanding of that which takes place through the medium of language.[19] Language is the middle ground in which understanding and agreement concerning the object takes place between two people.[20] All knowledge of ourselves as well as of the world comes to us through language. For

Gadamer, language is not a mere tool we use, but something which precedes us and whose play we submit to. We can only think in language, and just this residing of our thinking in a language is the profound enigma that language presents to thought.[21] Language grows with thought, or rather thought grows with it. In the ultimate analysis, they may be identical. Hermeneutical method is intimately related with language. Habermas says that what distinguishes hermeneutic circle from being a vicious one is the connectedness of language and the practical social context of life.[22] Language is compared to that of play or a game. In a game, Gadamer says that the players are more played on than playing. Similarly, language speaks us, rather than we speak it. In language, we are always already in language, even before we could analyse or speak about things. Heidegger's statement that language is the house of being is echoed in Gadamer's statement, 'Being that can be understood is language.'[23] His following statements are interesting.

> Understanding ... shows the universality of human linguisticality as a limitless medium that carries everything, not only the culture that has been handed down through language, but absolutely everything, because everything is incorporated into the realm of understandability in which we interact.[24]

Habermas analyses how Gadamer uses the image of the horizon to capture the fundamental hermeneutic character of every concrete language. He says: 'Each of the partners between whom communication must be established, however, lives within a horizon.'[25] This point of Habermas is very significant and it explains how Gadamer represents the hermeneutic process of coming to an understanding with the image of a fusion of horizons. But Gadamer is careful in saying that the past and the present are separate horizons that are not closed off from each other. He emphasizes that when we understand the past, we are expanding our horizon, and not stepping out of our horizon into the other horizon. The following remarks of Gadamer prove this:

> Understanding a tradition ... undoubtedly requires an historical horizon. ... the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. There is no more an isolated horizon of the present than there are historical horizons. Understanding, rather, is always the fusion of horizons we imagine to exist by themselves.[26]

The object of interpretation is tradition, especially written language. It is the written words in the text, which bear the tradition. Understanding is ultimately related to language. Schleiermacher must be very correct in saying that everything that is presupposed by hermeneutics is only language. Gadamer, like Schleiermacher and Heidegger, explains the importance of language as follows:

> ... if we start from the linguistic nature of understanding, we are emphasizing, on the contrary, the finiteness of the linguistic event, in which understanding is constantly concretised. The language that things have—of whatever kind of things may be—is not the *logos ousias,* and it does not attain its perfect form in the self-contemplation of an infinite intellect, but it is the language that our finite, historical nature apprehends. This is true of the language of the texts that are handed down to us in tradition, and that is why it was necessary to have a truly historical hermeneutics. It is as true of the experience of art as of the experience of history.[27]

III

Now let us see how the hermeneutical understanding of Gadamer has been reviewed by some of his critics. A distinction between general and special hermeneutics is made in the hermeneutical study. Gadamer who represents the general hermeneutics argues that the starting points of hermeneutics proceeds and undertakes any scientific inquiry, but his primary interest is to know the understandability thesis. Commenting on this in one of his famous essays, 'The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem' he says:

> ... the central question of the modern age is ... how our natural view of the world—the experience of the world that we have as we simply live out our lives—is related to the unassailable and anonymous authority that confronts us in the pronouncements of science.[28]

Gadamer was mainly concerned with understanding which works in our encounter with and participation in a cultural tradition—something which is prior to any systematic hermeneutic investigation. This method of understanding is not a matter of unprejudiced appropriation of a text, but a fusion of one's own horizon of meanings and expectations with that of the text. Thus it is clear that the aim of hermeneutics, according to Gadamer,

is not to offer a different methodology of understanding. He is concerned with the processes, which precede and underlie interpretative methods. He says:

> The hermeneutics developed here is not a methodology of the human science, but an attempt to understand what the human sciences truly are, beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them with the totality of our experience of the world.[29]

One common objection to the Gadamerian notion of the recognition of authority in tradition is that it undermines both our freedom and creativity. But this objection is not a valid one because Gadamer's intention is not merely to emphasize the authority of tradition but to explain how it shapes our thinking in the process of understanding. Tradition is what is transmitted and handed down from the past and remains as a possible source of truth. Tradition does not tie us down. It is something we carry forward in a modified form. Also it must be kept in mind that he was not against questioning the tradition. In fact, he saw this questioning to be a matter of mind or of understanding. Another objection which is related to this point also comes from Habermas. The term 'prejudice' is used by Gadamer in a purely non-pejorative sense. 'What is necessary is a fundamental rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and a recognition of the fact that there are legitimate prejudices, if we want to do justice to man's finite, historical mode of being',[30] says Gadamer. The word 'prejudice' simply means a necessary condition for understanding as such. 'Prejudice' in the sense of pre-understanding, gives rise to our expectations and makes understanding possible. But for Habermas interests are more important than prejudices. For him, it is interests that shape our life. His belief is that a dialogue and communication can remove misunderstanding. In other words, the critique is more important than the tradition. No doubt, the attempt made by Habermas in understanding is very important. In fact for both, understanding is more important and both are against dogmatic acceptance of the text. But both Gadamer and Habermas reach understanding, through tradition and critique respectively. Gadamer, who allows a critique of tradition, is always in favour of renewal and reinterpretation of tradition and thus tradition becomes a truly living vision. There is no intrinsic opposition between reason and tradition. Gadamer says:

> Genuine authority rests on recognition and hence an act or reason itself which, aware of its own limitations, accepts that others have better

> understanding. Authority in this sense, properly understood, has nothing to do with blind obedience ... but rather with knowledge.[31]

Gadamer is against the Habermasian position where tradition is replaced by emancipation. His following views are noteworthy:

> The unavoidable consequence to which all these observations lead is that the basically emancipatory consciousness must have in mind the dissolution of all authority, all obedience. This means that unconsciously the ultimate guiding image of emancipatory reflection in the social science must be an anarchistic utopia such an image, however, seems to me to reflect a hermeneutically false consciousness.[32]

In Gadamer's hermeneutical understanding, there is triunity of understanding, interpretation and application. This is something unique because, it was maintained in the exegetical hermeneutics, that these are separated. Two of his critics, Betti and Hirsch charge him for this tri-unity. But Gadamer explains how the inter-relation exists among them. He says that all understanding is interpretation and all understanding includes an element of application. 'All reading involves application, so that a person reading a text is himself part of the meaning he apprehends. He belongs to the text that he is reading,' says Gadamer. Ultimately, all understanding is self-understanding. He explains the need for the tri-unity as follows:

> ... what is truly common to all forms of hermeneutics is the fact that the sense to be understood finds its concrete and perfect form only in interpretation, but that this interpretative work is wholly committed to the meaning of the text. Neither jurist nor theologian regards the work of application as making free with the text.[33]

Gadamer's significant contribution to philosophical hermeneutics lies in the hermeneutic circle, which calls for a movement from part to whole and back to the part. In other words, for understanding of a sentence, one must understand the individual words which requires an understanding of the sentences which requires an understanding of the paragraph which requires an understanding of individual sentence which requires an understanding of the language. Thus the relation between the whole and the part is an inevitable aspect in any understanding. Another significant contribution of Gadamer is that he stresses that the interpreter has more advantages than the author does. It is because the meaning of the text goes beyond its author. Understanding thus is always productive and not merely

reproductive. This means that we understand *differently* if we understand at all. This led him to reject the notion that meaning is something fixed by the author; it is not something imposed by the author. Since every person's horizon of prejudices differs from that of the past, new meanings occur accordingly. As there is no one fixed meaning that is tied to the text by the author, the interpreter always gains new meaning. Thus the notion of understanding and interpretation acquires a fresh and new look in the hands of Gadamer.

Thinkers like Habermas have also criticized Gadamer's notion that all interpretation is linguistic. Gadamer argues that interpretation as well as understanding is reached through language. It is true that Habermas appreciates Gadamer by saying that with Gadamer, language reaches a new dimension. He says that the unity of language, which disappeared in the pluralism of language of Wittgenstein, is dialectically restored in the context of tradition. Language exists only as something traditional, for tradition mirrors on a large scale the life-long socialization of individuals in their language. According to Habermas, Gadamer transcends the monadic isolation of language game and brings to consciousness the inherent reflectivity of ordinary language. The writings of Gadamer disclose a dimension of language neglected by Wittgenstein, says Habermas. Language *is* only as handed down. But, at the same time Habermas attacks Gadamer for converting this historical insight into an absolutization of cultural tradition. Gadamer overlooks the fact that language itself is dependent upon social processes, which are not wholly linguistic in nature. Habermas says:

> Language is *also* a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimate relations of organized power. Insofar as the legitimations of power relation, whose institutionalization they make possible, are not articulated insofar as these only express themselves in the legitimations, language is *also* ideological.[34]

The role of language and the way tradition is tied to it by Gadamer disturbed Habermas very much. He writes as follows:

> It makes good sense to construe language as a kind of meta-institution on which all social institutions depend, since social action is constituted only in communication in ordinary language. But this meta-institution of language as tradition is clearly itself dependent on social processes,

which are not just normative relations. Language is *also* a medium of domination and social power.[35]

The above view of Habermas that language is a medium of domination and social power, which serves to legitimate relationships of organized force, has been challenged by Gadamer. He says that the mirror of language reflects everything. Language includes everything. Language has different aspects and Gadamer already includes social power and domination in language.

Another critic, Caputo says that Gadamer betrayed the 'hermeneutics of facticity' of Heidegger. He further says that Gadamer's thinking is historical but not epochal. But Caputo fails to note that by being historical rather than epochal, Gadamer's approach acts as a check on Heidegger's narrative of the relation between philosophy and the destiny of the west. Caputo also claims that in the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer, radical elements are absent. By radical what he means is not to lay any philosophical problems to rest.[36] 'If there is anything that we learn in radical hermeneutics, it is that we never get the better of the flux,'[37] says Caputo. But Gadamer is more radical than other hermeneuticians are. For example, his explication of the historicality of human understanding and his effort to show the historical conditions under which the understanding operates, reflect that Gadamer is more radical than others are. Similarly, Caputo argues that in the Gadamerian analytic of finitude, there is a shift from Heidegger to Hegel and a radical Heideggerian facticity has been subverted from within by a creeping Hegelianism. In other words, the contention here is that Gadamer reinterprets hermeneutics in a more Hegelian way that undermined the radicality of facticity of Heidegger. But this criticism of Caputo once again has no sufficient ground because a close study of Heidegger would reveal that the later Heidegger himself, who replaces it with Being, betrayed the hermeneutics of facticity.

Thus it is clear that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is free from the criticisms made by the other hermeneutic thinkers. His contribution to this field is noteworthy. Though the earlier thinkers have influenced him, he has developed his own hermeneutics by showing the importance of tradition in understanding and interpretation. He could see understanding and interpretation in a new light without neglecting the importance of language in hermeneutic understanding.

Notes and References

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2. Joseph Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, p. 267.
3. Hans-George Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* Garrett Barden and John Cumming, (Tr.), London: Sheed and Ward, 1975, p. 291. (Quoted henceforth: *TM*). The 'whole' according to Gadamer does not mean everything but only the whole of a given context. But Derrida and Roland Barthes argue that even the belief that a work is a whole and has unity, which is otherwise known as 'total holism', may be problematic.

   Two different methods of hermeneutics are suggested: (1) hermeneutics as knowing, and (2) hermeneutics as being. The second, otherwise known as the ontological hermeneutics, has been followed by Heidegger and Gadamer, whereas the first one known as epistemological dimension, was supported by Ricoeur. This paper mainly concentrates on hermeneutics as a mode of being.
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26. *TM,* pp. 271–3.
27. *Ibid.,* p. 433.
28. *Philosophical Hermeneutics, op. cit.,* p. 3.
29. *TM,* p. xiii.
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Psychotherapy: An Applied Philosophy

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There has been an increasing tendency to think of Psychotherapy as an exclusive realm of Psychologists. But, I would like to point out in this paper that Psychotherapy is rather an integrated part of Philosophy of Mind and that much discussion on the subject-matter needs to be carried out in Philosophy departments, because:

1. Psychotherapy is an applied philosophy, because it adopts deductive and inductive procedures in understanding a person; in order to bring about a reorientation of the perspective.
2. Psychotherapy is concerned with conceptual problems of life, as philosophy is concerned with conceptual problems of thought. So, both are, in some way, hermeneutics of perspective because both philosophical problems and problems of Psychotherapy are problems of semeiology.
3. Any Scientific Paradigm is insufficient to explain interapsychic processes. One must rather adopt a Holistic Paradigm in understanding man and the intricate Psychological States.

Science, it is said, is knowledge par excellence. Science not only tries to study phenomena critically, but also tries to establish generalized principles that can be universally applied to a similar set of events or phenomena. An endeavour towards this is not just a mere speculative game, but a process intuitively moved towards an objectively verifiable conclusion with the help of observation and experimentation. Hence, observability, objective verifiability and falsifiability are the trademark of any scientific enterprise. This undercurrent, then, is the meta-rule in an empirical game. This is a meta-rule because, this rule is not only applicable to the scientific game in natural sciences, but a rule that is often emulated and appropriated by any enterprise worth the name of scientific enquiry. So is the

case of Psychology, let alone social sciences. Psychology has empirically developed since Wilhelm Wundt and, may be, Sigmund Freud, to such an extent that one might equivocally call it an empirical science! Different schools of psychology have been evolving during the past few decades—especially in the line of experimental psychology where man is ascribed the see of a mysteriously operating mechanism. Nonetheless, the question that still remains is, despite the accumulation of empirical data from the sophisticated studies on the mysteries of human nature, can any *absolutely* certain and (may it be empirically or rationally) generalized principles be derived from the studies of particular cases? There are various sets of theories regarding the nature of man and nature and function of human psyche—like that of the Christian's, the Marxist's, Sartreian's, Skinnerian's, Lozenz's etc. However, most of these theories belong more to the realm of empirico-analytical studies of human beings than to those of purely empirical pursuits. We may call their theories empirical as far as they are systematic enquiries into the nature of human beings. But, we cannot consider them to be factual enquiry of physics' sort, for they lack objective verifiability and hence falsifiability! One can falsify a theory only when counter-factual evidences are brought against it. As far as human beings are concerned all that one observes is the case and so will be the case with the second, third and fourth person to infinitum. This shows the uniqueness (the individuality) of human being(s) and the subjective nature of one's experiences. As Somerset Maugham puts it:

> When I look over the various parts of my character with perplexity, I recognize that I am made up of several persons and that the person that at the moment has the upper hand will inevitably give place to another. But which is the real one? All of them or none?[1]

This points out that any theory regarding the nature of human being is just, may be, one dominant aspect of the being, which the theoretician views from his own perspective. The reason behind the depicted diversity and yet obscurity of human nature is that man, essentially, is a psychosomatic being in space and time. One is not only limited by one's genetic and constitutional factors, but also environmental and situational factors. The impact of these factors on one is vivid in the diversities in character and personality (perspective) found in two different persons from two societies, guided by different social values and institutional rules. My endeavour in this work is to point out how human nature, and specially

the mental set up, is formulated due to the interaction between these two forces, viz. Exo-psychic forces and Endo-psychic forces. However, the conspicuous fact is that what is commonly called as human nature is actually a complex of so many aspects that are so incoherent, that any attempt to construct an analytical definition which would take into account all its aspects will lead to failure. If we wish to comprise in the concept of human nature all the semantic institutions attached to it, then we get an incoherent whole. This is so because the development of each system depends on the *perspective* and set orientation towards the goal of the researcher. However, we can delineate from that complex whole several coherent parts.[2] Hence on the foundation of that, thinkers construct several concepts of human nature. Thus, such basic concepts that thinkers like Freud, Sartre, Hobbes, Lozenz etc. systematically isolated to construct their definitions are instincts, energies etc. Whereas behaviourists and neurologists go with the concept of neurological alterations that can be produced due to environmental interactions; hence a specific behaviour: overt behaviours.

Nevertheless, these studies, may they be empirical or empirico-analytical, implicitly or explicitly indicate much determinism by considering man just as an adaptive-operative mechanism. But, I like to point out that man is not just a mechanical being but a conscious-adaptive-operative mechanism. In other words, man, though a conscious being, is a mechanism that operates—psychologically—in a deterministic manner due to certain sort of motivational dispositions of the unconscious cognitive perspective which constantly tries to operate in the world in an adaptive manner. We call a body alive which shows activity, organization and a more or less stable form which remains the same inspite of continuous renewal of matter. In an analogous manner we can call a thought alive (that I call the cognitive perspective) which is able to produce activity and certain form of behaviours, i.e. to move people either to feel or think or act in a specific manner[3]. In other words, this works as a persona-(lity), whereby one may control, suppress and disguise one's true self, i.e. what one really wants is to be a *hero* and tries to operate adaptively. But at times s/he fails; when the self can no longer retain its self-deceptive position and this we call abnormal caprices such as dread, anxiety, urge to die etc. Hence, in all of one's behaviours what one tries to implicitly project out, and yet apparently keep disguised in order to be acceptable and adaptive to the system, is the *will to power*, an egoistic narcissism, a

will to be a hero as Adler or even Neitzsche might say. However when this inner desire appears threatened, one would feel put down and become agitated; so then the ultimate aim would be fight or flight-suicide. But all these depend, again, on one's perspective orientation towards one's own life and that of others as well. This statement might sound deterministic, for one being deterministically disposed towards, as it were, the decrees of perspective.

However, determinism in the case of human beings is incomplete and relative. This is so, for man is being in time with different experiences. If one is to understand persons, one is compelled to try in understanding their interpersonal relationships as social beings. What we call person is defined in terms of comparison with, and one's interaction with, other people. This is what John Macmurry meant when he said: 'Persons ... are constituted by their mutual relation to one another. "I" exists only as one element in the complex "you and I"'.[4]

This is what I've been emphasizing while underlining the impact of these interactions in one's life, throughout the developmental phase, which creates a cognitive pattern and perspective. In other words, the cognitive residues of different experiences (interpersonal relations) determine the dispositional output. But these cognitive residues vary from person to person, so also the dispositional output, although different persons happen to experience the same set of stimuli for the same consecutive period. This shows not only the uniqueness of man but also the relevance of relative determinism. In other words, the output (behaviour) is relative to the cognitive content of the unconscious (roughly the amalgam psychic state). A perspective is an idea, may it be malism or whatever. This perspective is cognitively assessed and filtered essence, or rather the effervescence out, of several instantaneous experiences. Hence, any alteration in the cognitively conditioned content of the person would alter the disposition. Thus an alteration in the behavioural output. This is the viewpoint of psychoanalysts in general and Freud in particular. Nevertheless, I go a step further to state that no mental mechanism is operative without its semeiology. Cognitive conditioning is impossible without an appropriate thought pertaining to it. But, no thought is possible unless there are words and no words are available unless there are concepts. So, words are nothing but symbolic surrogates of concepts. But the semantics of mind might not be similar to that of ordinary language. It has symbolic approximations to the experiences which to a large extent depend on socio-

culturally determined moorings. Man is not just the activities of electrochemical substances; or else there would have been no difference between man and Robot. Man is a conscious-adaptive-operative mechanism[5] which can be reconditioned by making necessary alterations in the semeiology of the unconscious; without necessarily inflicting a modification on the individual parts alone, like that of an allopathic physician—but an adequate change in the whole (perspective). Thus a systematic therapy is the hermeneutics of the perspective. Hence, therapeutic systems like psychoanalysis, neurolinguistic programming, transactional analysis etc. endeavour at a cathartic process through the alteration of semantics of the unconscious to the alteration of a cognitive-perspective, towards oneself as well as the outer.

It is, then, evident that an adequate psychotherapy and even any systematic enquiry into the nature of functioning of the human psyche should be a consistent philosophical system. The reason behind it being that the psychotherapeutic endeavours are not concerned with the cure of a symptom or two alone, but a cure of the *whole*. Its task is reorientation and integration of the tormented self with re-invigorating spirit and an aspiration to live. This is somewhat similar to that of the philosophical endeavour. Philosophy tries to understand parts in terms of the whole. Philosophy tries to give an all encompassing knowledge. At this task philosophers are constantly enhanced by their intuitions. This is true of psychotherapy also, because objective understanding of a person, like the behaviourists hold, will not help the therapist at the gnosis of the *quid* of other's feelings and emotions at a given situation in question and apply them to the present situation of the client intuitively and empathetically. If the therapist treats the patient the way in which a scientist treats a chemical solution, he cuts himself off from the sources of information that we habitually use in understanding each other. This is what Isaiah Berlin made clear in his *Vico and Herder:*

> Understanding other men's motives or acts, however imperfect or corrigible, is a state of mind or activity in principle different from learning about, or knowledge of, external world ... . Just as we can say with assurance that we ourselves are not only bodies in space, acted upon by measurable natural forces, but that we think, choose, follow rules, make decisions, in other words possess an inner life of which we are aware and which we can describe, so we take it for granted—and, if

questioned say that we are certain—that others possess a similar inner life, without which the notion of communication, or language, or of human society, as opposed to an aggregate of human bodies, becomes unintelligible.[6]

Psychotherapists are, therefore, not merely concerned with making what is unconscious conscious, but with the total understanding of the person. If one is to understand a person, one must assume an inner life which is revealed only through an introspective analysis; a life with unconscious intentions, will, motives, beliefs and values. It is precisely this point that Skinner and his followers tried to rule out, taking science as the paradigm. But psychic experiences are deeply embedded in the subject and require our understanding them, not mere duplication as in the case of experiments in chemistry or physics. Hence, the task of psychotherapy would be to seize upon the inner psychic process, which is projected on the outside world, through definite patterns of behaviours. So, in the process of an attempt to eliminate the peculiar symptoms of the subject, a therapist brings about renormalization and integration of the (whole) self, on the understanding of the whole. This is so, because behaviours are always someone's (inner) choice between alternatives, and are due to one's experiential self-assertions that cannot be commonly predicted nor explicated in ordinary language. But what one can on the other hand say in this field is only what can be logically said, and the only statements that reach this degree of logical impeccability are the statements pertaining to facts that make little claim on objective verifiable experiences. So is the case of a philosopher; a philosopher is one who speaks or writes, abstractly or conceptually—enquires, relates, generalizes—on everything that appears to be given; often in more detail about some particular things. A philosopher who has something to say must have lived his problems, if they are existential, and he must have firsthand and inner knowledge of them like that of a therapist. Hence, any adequate system of psychotherapy must be a consistent system of philosophy. Any act of Psychotherapeutic procedure is an art of philosophical deduction, based on reflective-inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning is based on material and formal truth, and so the therapist engaged in reflective-inductive procedures is engaged in applied aspects of conceptually capturable problems of life and its situational issues. A Psychotherapist, in the course of analysing the belief system and reorganizing the client, constantly engages in the art of

rational-emotive deductions pertaining to the causal factors that lurk behind the symptoms. These internal deductive procedures on the one hand enhance one in understanding the client as a whole and on the other hand in rationally drawing up a conceptual possibility regarding the modes of alleviating the Psychosomatic symptoms. Thus, every therapeutic advance that a therapist makes must be systematically organized and must be congruent with the total therapeutic framework; incongruity and contradiction at any step of therapeutic procedures are antidote to psychotherapy. Nonetheless, in these painstaking processes the therapist still stands uncontaminated by the situations that he encounters to sort out in the life of the client; although a kind of subjective involvement cannot be ruled out. This is akin to philosophical enquiries.

Philosophical enquiries, though, may be concerned with practical problems, are essentially conceptual. Philosophical problems are conceptual problems of language and perspective, and solutions are arrived at by reflective-deductive thinking. These conceptual philosophical problems could be pertaining to anything—be it religious, existential, ethical, metaphysical, sociological, or anything as such conceivable. A philosopher, grappling with conceptual problems, engages himself, consciously or unconsciously, in the art of analysing the issue at hand from a specific perspective—positivistic, existentialistic, rationalistic, pragmatic, etc., etc.—in order to arrive at a conceptual solution to the problem that s/he investigates. One may adopt any of these perspectives, even without being aware of the fact that there are such and such 'isms', with such and such perspective, prevalent. It may be important to mention here that, in this pursuit s/he is certainly, in no way inflicted by the ideas; though may be at times intoxicated by the act of philosophization itself. Every bit of philosophical analysis is not only an art hermeneutics of the conceptual problems at hand, but also simultaneously aimed at deducing a systematic and rational solution. Hence, every philosophical claim is a statement that effervesces from the subjective realm of the thinker. However, philosophical assertions worth the name, concerning a subject-matter of enquiry, must be conceptually coherent—inconsistency and contradiction are antidote to philosophical discourse. In other words, philosophical problems originate at the subjective realm, due to some specific perspective of someone, and culminate themselves at the objective realm due to different perspectives of different thinkers. These variations in the perspective bring forth different contentions on the same subject matter of discourse. This

vividly indicates that there are individual semeiological set-ups in different thinkers, based on each one's perspective. Diverse the set-up, diverse the perspective; diverse the perspective, innumerable the viewpoints on the same subject of discourse. This is so, because every perspective has a specifically oriented semeiology, in order to explain the topic of discourse from that perspective. Thus, one cannot understand the thought (the topic of discourse), unless one understands the perspective—and to understand the perspective is to understand the semantics of it. That is to say, the structure of thought contains the essential ingredients—semantics and syntax. Hence, philosophical discourse becomes a sort of hermeneutics of thought-perspective. It is precisely this point that vindicates the claim that Psychotherapy is akin to Philosophy, because both deal with conceptual problems complicated by internal perspective—semeiological set-up. I say this because, Psychopathology being the issue of Psychotherapy, its approach towards the malady is basically conceptual and based on both deductive and inductive reasoning. Psychotherapeutic procedures are essentially philosophical, insofar as their *modus operandi* is concerned, although their problems are concerning the *modus vivendi*. I think that against this backdrop it is genuine to hold the viewpoint that Psychotherapy is an applied philosophy. And, perhaps, this is a new mode of discourse to be carried out in philosophy departments, in order to give a new mode of philosophical expression to the present condition of man—both the ill and the jobless philosophy graduates.

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The Two Types of Devotees in the Gita

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1. TWO TYPES OF WORSHIP

The Gita is basically a treatise on the philosophy and practice of a yoga which divinizes the human soul, *yogam aiśvaram.* Most of its important ideas appear in the second six chapters—chapters 7 to 12. In the twelfth the idea of Bhakti, alluded to from the very beginning, is fully developed into a firm foundation for the rest of the chapters—chapters 13 to 18. Here its unique merit in the yoga of the Gita is enunciated in terms at once concise and conclusive. Of the twenty verses of this chapter, we are mainly concerned with the first five where Kṛṣṇa gives his views on the relative merits of the two forms of worship known to the Vedantins—(i) worship of the unmanifest Imperishable, *avyaktam akṣaram,* and (ii) worship of the supreme Lord of the world, *lokamaheśvaram.*

2. TEXT AND TRANSLATION

TEXT

अर्जुन उवाच

एवं सततयुक्ता ये भक्तास्त्वां पर्युपासते।
ये चाप्यक्षरमव्यक्तं तेषां के योगवित्तमाः।। (१२ । १)

श्रीभगवानुवाच

मय्यावेश्य मनो ये मां नित्ययुक्ता उपासते।
श्रद्धया परयोपेतास्ते मे युक्ततमा मताः।। (१२ । २)
ये त्वक्षरमनिर्देश्यमव्यक्तं पर्युपासते।
सर्वत्रगमचिन्त्यं च कूटस्थमचलं ध्रुवम्।। (१२ । ३)

संनियम्येन्द्रियग्रामं सर्वत्र समबुद्धयः।
ते प्राप्नुवन्ति मामेव सर्वभूतहिते रताः।। (१२ । ४)
क्लेशोऽधिकतरस्तेषामव्यक्तासक्तचेतसाम्।
अव्यक्ता हि गतिर्दुःखं देहवद्भिरवाप्यते।। (१२ । ५)

Translation

Arjuna Said: Those devotees who thus by a constant union seek after Thee, and those who seek after the unmanifest Imperishable,—which of these are the accomplished knowers of Yoga? (12–1)

Shrī Bhagavān Said: Those who found their mind in Me, ever-united and endowed with a supreme faith, and seek after Me—these I hold to be perfectly united. (12–2).

But those who seek after the Unmanifest as the indefinable, the imperishable, the all-prevading, the unthinkable, the high-seated, the immobile, the eternal, they by restraining all their senses, by making their understanding equal and by engaging themselves in doing good to all beings, arrive to Me only. (12–3, 4)

With difficulty is reached the goal of the Unmanifest by embodied souls; greater is the difficulty of those who are attached to their exclusive realization of the Unmanifest*. (12–5).

3. TEXTUAL PROBLEMS

Before we proceed to expound the teachings of the Gita in these five verses we shall have to set the direction very clearly and show why this interpretation has become necessary.

Generally, Vedantic interpretation is a difficult venture. One of the reasons why it is so is that it has to deal with problems arising from the style of textual compositions. And the interpretation of the Gita is no exception to this rule. There are two textual problems in the above five verses which stand in the way of a proper comprehension of the Gita's

* I have split the compound *avyaktāsaktacetāmsi* into *avyakta* + *āsaktacetāmsi* and rendered the second word as 'those who are attached to their exclusive realization', because all attachment without exception implies exclusiveness.

teachings. The first one concerns the word *yuktatamāḥ* in the second verse and the next one concerns the whole of the fifth verse.

(i) In 12–2 the word *yuktatamāḥ* is correlated with the seekers of the Īśvara. It implies that the seekers of the Avyakta cannot be correlated with the word. But in 12–4 this implication is not upheld; at the same time they are not openly correlated with the word as in 12–2. This makes the Gita's teaching uncertain. (ii) The same uncertainty prevails in 12–5 also, but in a different form. One line says that the goal of the Avyakta is difficult; in another line the same goal is said to be very difficult. Does this imply that the Gita is not in favour of the seekers of the Avyakta? If so, it is not clear why it should try to abandon in 12–4 the distinction made between the two groups of seekers in 12–2, as if it favours both of them.

As these problems arise out of the style of composition and not out of the obscurity in the ideas of the teacher of the Gita, we are sure of solving them successfully. But the way to solve them is to read the original texts again and again till we find the solution. At the same time we must not forget the fact that repeated readings pay only when we are already in possession of the master-idea of the main text.

4. EXPOSITION

Having had the vision of the Īśvara and having realized that Kṛṣṇa is verily the great Lord of the world, *lokamaheśvaram*, answering to all descriptions of the Lord given previously by Kṛṣṇa himself, Arjuna sees two possibilities of worship. First, worship of the Īśvara with his three dominant characteristics—(i) the Imperishable (*tvam akṣaraṁ*) (11–37); (ii) the original Doer or the original Nature which does works (*tvam ādikartre*) (11–37); and (iii) the supreme Imperishable (*tvam akṣaraṁ paramaṁ*) (11–18). Secondly, worship of the limited form of the Imperishable exclusive of the other characteristics. They correspond to the two types of seekers with which Arjuna is familiar—those who worship the Īśvara and those who worship the unmanifest Akṣara. Now he asks Kṛṣṇa: Which of them are the accomplished knowers of Yoga, *yogavittamāḥ*?

Kṛṣṇa's answer to this question is direct and decisive. He uses the word 'Me' to refer to the Īśvara-form as distinguished from the other form of the unmanifest Imperishable. He says, 'Those who found their mind in Me, ever-united and endowed with a supreme faith, and seek after Me are perfectly united.'

A *yukta* is one who is united; so a *yuktatama* is one who is perfectly united. According to Kṛṣṇa, the seekers of the Īśvara excel in union, whereas the seekers of the Avyakta do not. Though excellence in union differentiates the two types of seekers, we do not know how the excellence is measured by Kṛṣṇa.

The words Īśvara and Avyakta are used in two distinct senses: While the first stands for Brahman in its integrality—the supreme Imperishable with the unmanifest Imperishable and Nature as its two inseparable aspects, the second refers to the same Brahman exclusively identified with the aspect of the unmanifest Imperishable. To be united with the exclusive Brahman or the Avyakta is to be a *yukta;* to be united with the integral Brahman or the Īśvara is to be a *yuktatama.* To put the distinction differently, a *yukta* is one who is united with the Avyakta and whose union is exclusive or imperfect; a *yuktatama* is one who is united with the Īśvara and whose union is integral or perfect. The Gita always insists on knowing the integral Brahman and attaining perfect union—*brahma tadviduḥ kṛtsnam* (7–29), *mām vetti tattvataḥ* (7–3). Hence its emphasis on *yuktatama.*

Now we understand why the seekers of the Īśvara excel the seekers of the Avyakta. The former excel, because they are united with the integral Brahman; the latter do not, because they are not united with this Brahman but with the exclusive Brahman.

Owing to their exclusiveness the seekers of the Avyakta are generally insistent and do not go beyond what they have attained. Therefore they see the unmanifest Brahman purely in its own terms—as the indefinable, the imperishable, the all-pervading, the unthinkable, the high-seated, the immobile, the eternal and so on. But if they give up their exclusiveness, they also can become perfectly united, *yuktatmas.* This is the significance of the two indeclinables used in the third and fourth verses—*tu* and *eva.*

If they drop their insistent attitude and admit that the unmanifest Imperishable does not exclude but is the very source and foundation of Nature, then they see that Nature manifests all beings here, *sarvāṇi bhūtāni,* and works out in them the Will of the supreme Imperishable or the Īśvara. Hence, instead of resorting to mortification of their personal nature, they restrain their senses, *saṁniyamya indiriyagrāmaṁ,* develop their understanding into a faculty which perceives everywhere the same impersonal Will being worked out by Nature, *samabuddhayaḥ,* and, with the instruments thus upgraded, engage themselves in doing good to all creatures,

sarvabhūtahite ratāḥ, that is, in fulfilling that Will in all. By doing so they too become the seekers of the Īśvara and attain perfect union, *te prāpnuvanti māmeva.* There is therefore only one way for the seekers of the Avyakta to overcome their limitation and become *yuktatamas* and this is by becoming the seekers of the Īśvara, *madbhaktaḥ* (12–14). Other than this, there is no way.

The way of the Avyakta is hard and painful, *avyaktā hi gatirduḥkham,* unlike the other way which is very easy, *susukham* (9–2). For in this way the seeker faces many difficulties, difficulties in realizing the Unmanifest and greater difficulties in overcoming the limitation in the realization. In the first he must pass from the manifest to its opposite side where abides the Unmanifest; in the second he must release himself from the limitation of exclusive realization of the Unmanifest. In the other way these difficulties do not exist. For the seeker does not have to pass out of the manifest order; nor is his realization of the Unmanifest exclusive. By passing beyond the three Gunas, *gunān etān atītya trīn* (14–20) and yet remaining within the order of becoming of Nature, he realizes the Unmanifest without exclusiveness. This means that his realization takes place in the very conditions of the manifest, *ihaiva* (even here) (5–19), which makes the goal of the Īśvara easily attainable.

In the ultimate analysis the difficulties in the way of the Unmanifest result from the fact that the faith of the seeker is in his personal effort and personal strength and achievement. But in the other way the seeker puts his whole faith in the impersonal Nature, *daivīmprakṛtiṁ* (9–13), which takes him easily to the supreme Imperishable. This is its greatest merit and this is why the Gita speaks of the seekers of the Īśvara as being endowed with a supreme faith, *śraddhayā parayopetāḥ.* Here the seeker progresses only by the strength of the impersonal Nature of the Īśvara. Therefore he faces no difficulties, as in the way of the Unmanifest.

Embodied souls are souls manifest in Nature, *dehavatbhiḥ.* In them Nature is at work, fulfilling the Will of the Īśvara through personal nature. Since the manifest is considered to be the opposite of the Unmanifest, no embodied soul, without ceasing to accept the conditions of embodied life, can reach the opposite side, for to be embodied is to accept and remain committed to the manifest—personal nature and the works of Nature. Therefore an embodied soul can pass out of the manifest only by mortification of its personal nature and eventually by resisting and setting aside the mighty Will of the impersonal Nature. This is really an uphill task

very difficult to accomplish, *duḥkham dehavatbhiravāpyate.* However, success in this way is surely possible, but it is gained by breaking all the powerful laws of development by which Nature does works in the embodied souls.

There are three distinct stages in the way of the Unmanifest: first of all, the seekers discriminate between the manifest and the Unmanifest, the manifest in which they grow by the inexorable laws of Nature and the Unmanifest which they have to conquer by leaving aside the manifest; second, they escape into the Unmanifest by systematically severing all connections with the manifest; third, having thus entered, they keep their whole consciousness fixed upon the Unmanifest, *avyakta-āsakta-cetāmsi.* But this is an exclusive realization, because they have realized Brahman to be exclusively the Unmanifest. Given the exclusiveness, they become attached to their realization, *avyakta-āsakta-cetāmsi,* because they cannot come out of their realization and see that Brahman is the supreme Imperishable, the Īśvara who exceeds the unmanifest Imperishable and manifests all by his original Nature. As long as they are attached to their exclusive realization, they are *yuktas* and not *yuktatamas.*

From the point of view of the integral Brahman, there is really no opposition between the Īśvara and the Avyakta. Therefore, is it not possible for the *yuktas* to develop into the *yuktatamas,* the united to become the perfectly united? It is certainly possible, but they must be prepared to face hurdles much more difficult to overcome than those they faced while entering the unmanifest Imperishable, *kleśo 'dhikataraḥ teṣām.*

The first and foremost step in this direction is to understand that perfect union with Brahman is not possible unless they are willing to abandon their attachment for the exclusive realization of the Unmanifest. This takes them to the next step where they become totally unattached to this exclusive realization, *avyakta-āsakta-cetāmsi.* In the third and final step they abandon their exclusive realization by accepting all that they originally abandoned for the sake of winning the Unmanifest. They now admit that the unmanifest Imperishable is the eternal foundation upon which Nature works out the Will of the supreme Imperishable in all beings, *sarveṣu bhūteṣu.* They also admit that their main occupation is to do good to all creatures and take delight in promoting the upward movement of Nature in them. These are immense difficulties, unlike those confronted while conquering the Unmanifest, because at every step the *yuktas* have

to reverse their original position and abandon all that they considered to be advantageous and good in reaching this position.

On passing through these difficulties the *yuktas* become the *yuktatamas* and arrive at the grand realization of the integral Brahman, the Īśvara, *te prāpnuvanti māmeva.* However, they are not declared to be *yuktatamas* in the words of the Gita. We must understand why they are not so declared by the Gita.

The reason why the title of *yuktamāḥ* is withheld from the seekers of the Avyakta is that they do not fulfil the requirements demanded of a *yuktatama.* In the Gita's view a *yuktatma* excels in union as well as in the means of union. The seeker of the Īśvara is declared to be a *yuktatama* because he excels in both. But the seeker of the Avyakta in verse 12–4 excels only in union and not in the means of union. Unlike the direct and easy means of the seeker of the Īśvara, the means adopted by him are tortuous and very difficult (12–5). Hence the Gita does not confer the title on him.

5. CONCLUSION

Now we have two categories of the seekers of the Avyakta, *yuktas* and *yuktatamas.* As *yuktas,* they seek the unmanifest Brahman purely in terms proper to its position—as *akṣaram, anirdeśyam, sarvatragam, acintyaṁ, kūtaṡtham, acalaṁ, dhruvam,* etc. When the seeking develops fully, they are united with the Unmanifest and get attached to its exclusive realization. And the path leading to their realization is hard and painful, *duḥkham.* As *yuktatamas,* they get rid of attachment for the exclusive realisation of the unmanifest Brahman and resolve to seek the integral Brahman, the Īśvara. In the end they are united with the Īśvara. But on account of the great difficulty, *kleśo 'dhikataraḥ,* associated with their means the Gita withholds from them the title of *yuktatamāḥ* (12–4).

In contrast to the two categories of the seekers of the Avyakta, the seekers of the Īśvara are unique. For they alone win the title of *yuktatamāḥ.* The seekers of the Avyakta come closer to them by uniting themselves with the Īśvara, but miss the title by using a means of union which is very difficult and tortuous. But when they unite themselves with the unmanifest Brahman through a similar means but less arduous, they become attached to its exclusive realization. As a result, they move farther away from the seekers of the Īśvara and miss not only the title but the very realization

of the Īśvara. Among the three categories of seekers, the second one is very rare and exceptional. So we may leave it aside and consider as if the first and the last alone exist. If we try to grade them according to merit, we find the seekers of the Avyakta occupy a position much lower than that of the seekers of the Īśvara (12–2). The Gita's choice, therefore, falls naturally on the latter. It speaks approvingly of *mayyāvesitacetāmsi* (those who have lodged their whole consciousness in the Īśvara) (12–7), as opposed to *avyaka-āsakta cetāmsi* (those who are attached to their exclusive realization of the Avyakta) (12–5), and declares that in the case of the former the Īśvara himself becomes the liberator of the souls, *teṣāmaham samuddhartā mṛtyusamsārasāgarāt bhavāmi* (12–7).

We know that ascetics seek the unmanifest Imperishable. They look upon that as the highest desirable object besides which nothing exists. As embodied souls are on the side of the manifest, *vyakta,* they hold that the goal of the Unmanifest must be reached by renunciation of all to be found on this side, *sannyāsa.* By bringing out the inferior position the seekers of the Avyakta occupy in comparison with the seekers of the Īśvara, the teacher of the Gita plainly tells us that the support he offers to the ascetics and their view of renunciation is not unqualified. Arjuna's question about the relative merits of the two forms of worship implies that he is under the influence of the current view that asceticism is the ultimate teaching of the Vedanta. Kṛṣṇa's decisive answer clinches the issue by assigning an inferior position to the ascetics. Therefore asceticism cannot be the dominant view of the Vedanta or of the Gita for that matter. The stern opposition from the ascetic tradition to this conclusion pales into insignificance before the authority and assertion of no less a person than Kṛṣṇa. This perhaps is the true message of the opening verses of the twelfth chapter.

There is a good deal of metaphysics in the Gita, yet it is not a metaphysical pronouncement made in logically perfect and flawless terms. Because it is pre-eminently a metaphysical poetry. If the sense of its terms is uncertain in some places, it is not a fault that has crept into its texture inadvertently, but a merit that makes metaphysical poetry possible. Deliberate uncertainty in expression is used as a device to break the rigidity of words and create out of them a highly suggestive and rich poetry. In this the Gita is without a match among the works of its kind. In the opening verses of its twelfth chapter we see a little bit of this poetry emerging out of words into which a doubtful sense is put by the text.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

(a) The two Sramana Traditions: Similarities and Differences. Some Reflections.

The very starting points of the two are different. Buddha began with the problem of 'Sorrow' (not on the personal but on the cosmic scale) and its extinction; whereas the Jain tradition begins with the problem of 'impurity' and attainment of a 'Pure' State, *Kaivalya.* The problem of Sorrow, it seems to me, must spring from the deepest sources of compassion. Without compassion it is not even possible to face the problem of sorrow (at least the sorrow of others).

The attainment of a state of 'purity' need not have at its base compassion at all. Even *Ahinsa* seems to have different significance in the two traditions. In the Jain tradition *Hinsa* is forbidden because it soils the primordial 'Purity', while in the Buddhist tradition it is forbidden because it causes suffering.

These are two different visions or points of view. However, it should be remembered that both of them are movements in (or of) psyche, rather than results of conceptual thinking. Psyche is much more than conceptual thought or mind, it is even more than consciousness (at least as we ordinarily experience it). Its knowledge starts from nothing mental but from experience. It proceeds to 'see' rather than 'think' the pattern of the whole as it is reflected in the parts.

Compassion is not merely a virtue in Buddhism. It is the Law. Both Hinayana and Mahayana are dominated by the All Compassionate personality of the Sakyamuni. So is the Buddhist Art. The two factors that open the way for Mahayana, I think, are compassion on the one hand and the Buddha's stress on the Middle Path on the other. Where Compassion is the Law there acceptance must be total. Rejecting of anything or anyone is simultaneously rejecting compassion. It embraces all living Creatures. Perhaps it was due to this that Nagarjun equated *Samsara* and the *Nirvana.* There is no difference, not the slighest shade of difference between the *Samsara* and the *Nirvana.* The limit of the one is the limit of the other.

As to the Middle Path; because it excludes the extremes, it can be found anywhere and in any situation, sharp though it may be as a razor's edge. The Gita called it *Samatvam* (balance) and the Greeks Temperance; Sharpness of its edge depends upon, perhaps, on the level at which it is practiced. The higher one goes, the sharper it becomes. How is one to practice treading the Middle path; the answer to this is simply by treading it. Anyway; this stress upon the Middle Path, I think, opened the way to Mahayana.

A word about Tṛishṇa. Perhaps it is the same which Vedic seers called 'Desire' (*Kama*) and Heracleitus 'Ever living Fire', which is the same thing as Becoming. Perhaps when 'Becoming' turns upon itself and enters its own essence, there is found Peace that, in the words of Christ, 'Passeth all understanding.' It does not depend upon understanding, in fact understanding depends upon it.

(b) The Mahavira and the Buddha: Similarities and Differences. Some Reflections.

Although both Jainism and Buddhism belong to the tradition of renunciation, it seems to me there is an unbridgable gulf between the two. Renunciation arising out of recoil or fear is not the same as renunciation springing from love. A Tirthankar's Kaivalya is totally indifferent towards helping anyone; it is least concerned with it. While the Buddha (at least in Mahayan and that is the flowering of Buddhism) still standing on the threshold of Nirvan, each morning scans the entire world with his Divine Eyes to see if anyone has lit his lamp, and to help him.

In Art we can notice this difference clearly. Throughout Jain art nowhere is a Tirthankar shown with *Abhaya Mudra* (the mudra of protection), whereas the depiction of the Buddha abounds with it. A Tirthankar's flight is 'the flight of the alone to the Alone'. Buddha's flight, it seems, is the flight of the free for the Free. And, what could be more free than Love.

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The Other Side of Paradigms! Comments on the query regarding 'Philosophy of Science' published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XVI, No. 3

It has been, of late, noticed that there have been a lot of questions concerning the essence of science and philosophy. In this paper I have attempted to figure out the essence of theoretical pursuits in general and scientific enquiries in particular, by delving into the potential source of scientific paradigms, from an existential point of view. This paper, in some way, highlights the point that subjectivity cannot be outrightly ruled out from the scientific arena, and that the *subjective-configuration* of the data is the essence of science and other theoretical enterprises like philosophy.

The general trend of the time is that our enquiries, to be deemed worthwhile, must be scientific. Any unscientific discourse is classified as mere opinion founded on baseless speculations and belief. To be scientific, in any discourse, is to meticulously follow the pertinent set of scientific principles and adhere to its methodology. The foundation of scientism lies in its methodology. Scientific methodology inculcates a certain set of parameters—such as observation, hypothesis formation, experimentation and putation, comparison of the results with the facts and evaluation of it, classification and generalization etc. All these steps are worked out with much logical precision, so that the investigators would emulate and embrace what is known as the scientific methodology; if at all it endeavours in bringing about results that are scientifically meaningful and convincing. However, scientific investigations are usually based on a certain set of already established scientific theories. It is these theories that pronounce scientific verdict upon a phenomenon under investigation. Hence these theories are the foundation principles that Kuhn in his work *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* calls *Paradigms*. Paradigms are the set of theoretical framework, within which scientific investigations progress. It is a characteristic set of scientific techniques with the help of which one not only observes the given data but also gives an explanation of the given phenomenon. Thus, paradigms are the basic set of principles which determine the course of one's approach to the given phenomenon and the functional principles which justify one's knowledge of the given phenomenon. This is so, because by making our observations selective, paradigms distinguish between what one should observe and what should be neglected

in a given phenomenon. Hence, paradigms are the theoretical framework against which scientific investigations and theories are adjusted. If an investigation brings forth successful results, within the parameters of the paradigm, then it is well vindicated. But if it falls short, it is either negligible or yet to be adjudged with the future tests, with more evidence. This is much evident in Kuhn's writings, as he puts it in *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (1962, p. 81):

> No one seriously questioned Newtonian theory because of the long-recognised discrepancies between predictions from that theory and both the speed of sound and motion of mercury. The first discrepancy was ultimately and quite unexpectedly solved by experiments on heat undertaken for a very different purpose; the second vanished with the general theory of relativity after a crisis it had had no role in creating.[1]

The foregoing claim is an indication that, usually, paradigms are unquestioned. They are like the standard foot-scale. In Kuhn's account there is no harm in hanging on to a theory, even if at the moment it cannot produce sufficient explanation for the shortcoming of its predictions. Kuhn makes it clear in his work that scientific activity is essentially a puzzle-solving activity. In this process anomalies of theories are put forth as problems to be solved. But the task of resolving these anomalies are carried out without any presumption that failure to solve them will lead to the rejection of the theory in question. Kuhn here points out the example of Vulcan which was posited basing on the success of Newtonian physics in the discovery of Neptune—to be the inter-Mercurial planet that is responsible for the deviation of Mercury from its path. But, unfortunately Vulcan could not be discovered. Despite this, Newtonian physics continued to be successful in many other fields. Hence, it would have been irrational on the part of scientists to give up a knowledge-increasing model of reality like Newtonian physics. Nonetheless, my contention is that all theories are probablistic and render only partial and probablistic viewpoints. This is so, because the theories are to a large extent determined by the subjective conditions that impinge upon the processes of their discovery. And, if we strictly base our investigations on a particular paradigm (like Newtonian physics[2]), our discoveries will be one-sided and what is beyond the reach of this particular paradigm will never be discovered nor be understood. Hence, we need innumerable, well-tested, paradigms to investigate upon and discover the diverse modalities of reality. In Kuhn's account a paradigm is a frame of reference into which

things must fall in proper order. If so, Marxism and psychoanalysis too are some sort of paradigms as theoreticians base their assumptions on them. Thus, the function of a paradigm is to direct our cognition and make them selective. Paradigms determine the standard of a theory and the predictive characteristic of a theory. But, how does one determine the accuracy of a paradigm itself? Is there any authentic set of rules which can justify the feasibility and credibility of a given paradigm?

It is at this juncture that one may need to call on Popperian *Falsification* theory, in order to justify the Kuhnian paradigms. Popper holds that if a theory (that stands as the paradigm) yields to Falsification criterion, then one must discard it and work out a new theory that would stay as a paradigm until it is further discarded by the criteria of conjectures and refutation. So in Popperian account, search for refutation, by counter evidence, is the trademark of scientism. Popper being an anti-inductionist, holds that the reason behind this is that one can never conclusively prove a theory, but can only disprove it. This is so, because a generalization based on induction by simple enumeration is refutable by just a counter evidence. And proving a theory amounts to the accumulation of experiences of its previous workability and the subsequent inductive generalization. This implies that only objective theories are vulnerable to falsification criterion and be scientific. But, subjective theories, like psychoanalysis and Marxian economics are not vulnerable to falsification, as the theoreticians try to defend the shortcoming(s) of their theories. However, falsification criterion is used in evaluating theories. So, falsification is, as it were, the paradigm that stands as an aid in rating the liability of theories; while these theories (like Newtonian physics) themselves stand as paradigms that enhance further investigation. Popperian philosophy of science, while leaving an open platform for scientists, also, as it were, propagates innumerable Kuhnian paradigms, and falsification theory is a major way of judging those paradigms. This not only renders falsification theory a boost as the paradigm of paradigms (a Meta-Paradigm), but also puts it into devastating danger of vindicating its own scientific spirit by its own laws. That is, if falsification theory is to be scientific, it should undergo and stand the test of falsification. The law of contradiction states that a thing (theory) cannot be both itself and not itself at one and the same time. So in our endeavours to falsify the theory of falsification, if we could somehow succeed, then falsification theory, itself being false, cannot any longer stay as a paradigm in justifying the scientific status of other theories. Thus:

1. The credibility of a scientific investigation is determined by its relationship with a paradigm—if it is within the framework of the paradigm then it is scientific and if not, it is either unscientific or one must wait for further evidences.
2. Scientific calculations and predictions must be within the parameters of the set paradigm.
3. Scientific theories (which themselves are paradigms) stand in-relation to some other paradigms; one paradigm would need another paradigm to justify itself: and one of the ways to justify itself would be to subject itself to the principle of falsification.
4. Thus, even the theory of falsification itself has to stand before the falsification-paradigm, in order to establish its scientific tenability. Is it not a vicious circle?

To go a step further, in Popperian line, to test a theory one needs to construct sub-theories (or what he calls Conjectures), which would make bold and unexpected predictions, and if they are (at least one of them is) false then it would be sufficient to reject the theory and declare it unscientific. According to Popper, a theory is well corroborated, if it is highly testable and yet survives severe testing. In other words, for a theory to be scientific it must be potentially falsifiable. As he writes, 'statements or systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientific, must be capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable observations.'[3] The testability of a theory is related to its capacity to yield testable predictions with empirical content. Popper's example to this point is the bold and highly improbable predictions, that Einstein made by his theory of gravitation, about the deviation in the path of light which was thought to be caused by the presence of a heavy body. This prediction was not tested until the year 1919, when a total eclipse of the sun made the testing possible. But, should this test have run against Einstein's prediction, then he would have renounced his theory; because counter-evidences stand against it. However, in this way, in my opinion, even a hypothesis, which is otherwise unproved can be justified to be a scientific-paradigm—provided that all the bold and unexpected pedictions that are based on the hypothesis in question are proved true. An elegant example to this point is the Avogadro Number. The Avogadro Number (6.4×10^{-23}) is in itself a hypothesis, but very much used in molar chemistry. This is so, because the predictions based on it are proved to be workably true. Still more, certain factual statements like 'virus exists', 'there are cells in the human body' etc. are

empirically true, though they do not have potential falsifiers. Does it mean that they are unscientific? Here, one needs to keep in mind that certain things are justified by some sort of relationship that it holds with certain known things, and that they may also possess some kind of, justifiable, relationship with some unknown things. Sometimes these unknown relations may be more valuable in establishing its worth. Perhaps, the same sub-theories that the Avogadro hypothesis claims to justify could be justified by some other, may be, yet undiscovered theories. In other words, the same fact can be proved and justified in innumerable ways by an infinite number of potential theories. Our ignorance of such theories could be due to technological limitations or intellectual limitations, or both; along with the divergent orientations of our psychological apparatus. It is worth mentioning here that the psychological set-up of a person, to a great extent, determines the scientific aspirations of that person.

Given the above points, what I would like to state is that, what holds true in any scientific investigation is a complex relationship, in some way, between the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge. It is not merely a perceptual relationship, rather a deep-rooted psychological relationship between the knower—coloured by the perspective that s/he holds about life, self and the universe—and the knowee (object of knowledge). Every paradigm is not only relative to the psychological perspective that one cherishes, but also that the creation and selection of any theory as a paradigm for any investigation is the by-product of one's psychological set-up. Our psychological apparatus is imbued with certain form of moral, religious, cultural, socio-economic and political compulsions and concerns. These compulsions and concerns can be held responsible for colouring our precepts and strategies. Thus, our thought processes are determined not only by our somatic constitution, but also by the impact of socio-cultural moorings. At this point I would like to state that a successful paradigm is the by-product of some (positive) sort of personal-situational factors; and that the grooming of a paradigm is not an accidental act, but an act spontaneously and deliberately precipitated by some preponderant psychological impetus. This is not only obvious in Einstein's discovery of relativity theory (compelled by his obsessive desire to move the clock as fast as possible), but also well evident in Newton's discovery of planetary motion. Newtonian theory of planetary motion—though based on the general gravitational law—is an off-shoot of his faith in some Supreme Being. That is to say, it might have been inspired by his theological considerations in understanding and uniting phenomena and noumena with

mathematical accuracy. Here, one may reckon the age-old aphorism *man is the measurer of all* and juxtapose it with Berkelian subjective-idealism that *perceiver constitutes the world*. The point that, no matter how objective one tends to be, one's psychological whims and aspirations determine the strategic progress of scientific investigation and discoveries is buttressed conceretly by various evidences provided by modern science and technology. Man's desire to fly and establish dominance over other planets determines the discovery of scientific theories (in aero-physics) that would work as a paradigm in constructing space-ships and the development of space technology. More so, in information technology; let alone the advancements in medical science and missile technology—which are the consequences of man's desire to perpetuate his mundane existence by subjugating his enemies, both at microcosm and macrocosm. Man's desire to communicate with people afar determines the discovery of theories (in energy physics) that would work as a paradigm in the invention of sophisticated information technology. Yet, notwithstanding the initial discoveries, every day more sophisticated and improvised versions of a technology emerge: Now, what is the principle behind all this sophistication? Well, it is none other than (empirical and logical) configuration possibility. A system, be it abstract or concrete, can be configurated in an infinite number of ways. And the discovery of every potential theory is the resultant of configuration of the data in a particular way or other, depending upon the psychological orientation and aspiration of the person at work. An example of this point is that both Newton and Leibniz, being influenced by their own existential concerns and subjective state, could independently develop Calculus.[4] Hence, the foundation of scientism is built upon the rock of configurational possibility of the data, which is determined by the existential and subjective state of the investigator. This not only harkens us to the jigsaw of psychological relativism operating in scientific investigation, but also warns us of the threat of a stringent psychological determinism that it would accentuate. In other words, at the deeper strata, a theory (or what we call paradigm) is, implicitly, the outcome of a certain form of configurational activity that, somehow, operates within the psyche of the investigator. Anything that is constituted, abstract or concrete, has a configurative structure. It is this configurative structure that makes something what it constitutionally is and installs on it a convincible meaning. This was readily understood by Leibniz, as he wrote to Bartholomew de Bosses, about infinitesimals: 'Infinitesimals are Psychological fictions, though they have their place in calculations, like the imaginary roots in

algebra'.[5] So also is the case with both philosophy and science. Philosophers and scientists, being concerned with unfolding the manifold dimensions of reality, are constantly engaged in the activity of logical configuration of ideas; while the genesis of these ideas might have been triggered by some subjective concerns. And what is logical is also subjective, because logical processes are in-here and not out-there, hence the essence both science and philosophy is *subjective-configuration*. Is it not what Jainism teaches in śyādvada?

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महावाक्यम्: Comments on the Notes & Query entitled 'What shall be the Navya Nyāya analysis of the sentence' published in *JICPR*, vol. XV, No. 1.

Introduction

[1]तदेवेदं भासमानं रक्तपुष्पं वर्तते, [2]यस्य सूक्ष्ममधुरसुगन्धः तां सुन्दरीं राजपुत्रीं तथा गभीरतया प्रभावितवान्, [3]यथा सा रचकीयराजोद्याने प्रारब्धनित्यभ्रमणा अद्यापि तद्विषये स्वसरवीभिः सह अभिभाषते वदति च 'सुगन्धममुम् आजीवनं स्मरिष्यामि' इति। अत्र त्रीणि वाक्यानि सन्ति। यत्तच्छब्दयोगात् त्रीण्यपि मिलित्वा एकं महावाक्यमिति स्वीक्रियते। तत्र यथा सा इत्यादितृतीयवाक्ये तद्विषये इत्यत्र तच्छब्देन द्वितीयवाक्यस्य सुगन्धस्य

परामर्शोऽस्ति। द्वितीयवाक्ये यस्येति निर्दिष्टस्य प्रथमवाक्ये तच्छब्देन परामर्शोऽस्ति। अतः द्वितीयं तृतीयेन संगमय्य ततः तृतीयं प्रथमेन संगमय्य महावाक्यार्थो वर्णितः।

अथवा तृतीयवाक्यस्थयथाशब्दार्थस्य द्वितीयवाक्ये तथाशब्देन परामर्शात् तृतीयं द्वितीयेन संगमय्य द्वितीयं प्रथमेन संगमय्यापि महावाक्यार्थो वर्णनीयः। पूर्वोत्तरभावमात्रे विशेषः। अन्यत् सर्वं समानम्। 'सुगन्धममुं स्मरिढयामि' इति तु वाक्यपरम्, न तु वाक्यार्थपरम्।

[1]'यस्य सूक्ष्ममधुरसुगन्धः तां सुन्दरीं राजपुत्रीं तथा गभीरतया प्रभावितवान्'

यस्येत्यत्र षष्ठयाः संबन्धोऽर्थः। तस्य सुगन्धेऽन्वयः। सुगन्धशब्दस्य सुरभिगन्धोऽर्थः। तत्र सूक्ष्ममधुरपदार्थयोरभेदसंबन्धेनान्वयः। तच्छब्दार्थस्य सुन्दरीशब्दार्थस्य चाभेदेन राजपुत्र्यामन्वयः। तथा इत्यत्र याल्प्रत्ययस्य प्रकारोऽर्थः। तच्छब्दः यथेत्यत्र यच्दब्दनिर्दिष्टमर्थः परामृशति। राजपुत्रीशब्दस्य राजसंबन्धिपुत्रीत्यर्थः। पुत्रीमिति द्वितीयामाः समवेतत्वम् (समवायसंन्धावच्छिन्नमाधेयत्वमर्थः) तत्र निरूपितत्वेन राजपुत्र्याः अन्वयः। समवेतत्वेस्याश्रयतया प्रपूर्वकभाधात्वर्थेऽन्वयः। गभीरतया इतीत्यंभूतलक्षणे तृतीया। तस्याः विशिष्टत्वमर्थः। तस्य भाधात्वर्थेऽन्वयः प्रपूर्वकभाधातोः प्रकृष्टज्ञानमर्थः [आसक्तिजनकज्ञानमर्थः]। तदुत्तरणिचः अनुकूल्व्यापारोऽर्थः। झवतुप्रत्ययस्य आश्रयोऽर्थः। तस्याभेदसंबन्धेन सुगन्धेऽन्वयः। याल्प्रत्ययार्थप्रकारस्य णिजर्थे व्यापारेऽन्वयः तथा च 'यस्य सूक्ष्म ... इत्यादि ... प्रभावितवान्' इत्यन्तवाक्यान्।

यत्संबन्धी सूक्ष्माभिन्नमधुराभिन्नसुरभिगन्धः तदभिन्नसुन्दर्यभिन्नराजसंबनिपुत्रीसमवेततत्प्रकारविशिष्टगभीरत्वविशिष्टप्रकृष्टज्ञानानुकूलव्यापारवदभिन्नः-

इति शाब्दबोधो भवति।

[2]'यथा सा स्वकीयराजोद्याने प्रारब्धनित्यभ्रमणा अद्यापि तद्विषये स्वसरवीभिः सह अभि भाषते, वदति च सुगन्धममुं आजीवनं स्मरिष्यामीति।'

यथा इत्यत्र यछब्दोत्तरयाल्प्रत्ययस्य प्रकारोऽर्थः। तस्य आश्रयतासंबन्धेन अभिपूर्वकभाषधात्वर्थे अभिभाषणे वदधात्वर्थे कथने यान्वयः। स्वकीयशब्दार्थस्य स्वसंबन्धिनः राजोद्यानशब्दार्थे राजसंबन्ध्युद्याने अभेदसंबन्धेनान्वयः। सप्तम्याः अधिकरणत्वमर्थः। तत्र आधेयतासंबन्धेन राजसंबन्ध्युद्यानस्यान्वयः। अधिकरणत्वस्य निरूपकतासंबन्धेन भ्रमणेऽन्वयः। प्रारब्धशब्दस्य प्रारम्भकर्मेत्यर्थः। तस्याभेदसंबन्धेन नित्यभ्रमणशब्दार्थैकदेशे भ्रमणेऽन्वयः। नित्यभ्रमणशब्दस्य सार्वकालिकभ्रमणवती अथवा प्रतिदिनभ्रमणवती इत्मर्थः तस्या अभेदसंबन्धेन तच्दब्दार्थ राजपुत्रयामन्वयः। अद्यशब्दस्य इतछिनमर्थः। अपिशब्दस्य पूर्वदिनसमुच्चयोऽर्थः। तस्य आश्रयतासंबन्धेन इतछिने न्वयः। इतछिनस्य कालिकसंबन्धेन अर्भिभाषर्णेन्वयः। स चासौ विषयश्च तद्विषयः। तदभिन्नविषय इत्यर्थः। [तछब्दः सुगन्धपरामर्शकः] सप्तम्याः विषयत्वमर्थः। तत्र आधेयतासंबन्धेन तद्विषयस्याऽन्वयः।

विषयत्वस्य निरूपकतासंबन्धेन अभिभाषणेऽन्वयः। स्वसरवीशब्दस्य स्वसंबन्धिसखी इत्यर्थः। तृतीयायाः कर्तृत्वमर्थः। तत्र आधेयतासंबन्धेन स्वसखीशब्दार्थस्यान्वयः। तृतीयार्थकर्तृत्वस्य निरूपकतासंबन्धेन सहशब्दार्थैकदेशे अभिभाषणक्रियायामन्वयः। सहशब्दस्य साहित्यमर्थः। तच्च प्रकृते अभिभाषणसमानकालीनाभिभाषणरूपम्। अभिभाषणं नाम ज्ञानजनकशब्दप्रयोगः। सहशब्दार्थान्तर्गतप्रथमाभिभाषणेन्तीयार्थकर्तृत्वस्यान्वयः। द्वितीयाभिभाषणस्य कर्तृतत्वसंबन्धेन तच्छब्दार्थराजपुत्रयामन्वयः। अभिभाषते इत्यत्र आख्यातस्य कृतिरर्थः। तत्र घात्वर्थस्यानुकूलतासंबन्धेनान्वयः। कृतेः आश्रयतासंबन्धेन तच्छब्दार्थराजपुत्रयामन्वयः। इतिशब्दस्य 'सुगन्धममुमाजीवनं स्मरिण्यामि' वाक्यगतानुपूर्वीरूपप्रकारोऽर्थः। तस्य आश्रयतासंबन्धेन वदधात्वर्थे ज्ञानजनकशब्देऽन्वयः। वदतीत्यत्र आख्यातस्य कृतिः अर्थः। तत्र घात्वर्थस्यानुकूलतासंबन्धेनान्वयः। कृतेः आश्रयतासंबन्धेन तच्छब्दार्थ राजपुत्रयामन्वयः। चशब्दस्य अभिभाषणसमुच्चयोऽर्थः। तस्याश्रयतासंबन्धेन वदनेऽन्वयः। तथा च 'यथा सा ... इत्यादि ... स्मरिष्यामीति' इत्यन्तवाक्यात् 'स्वसंबन्ध्यभिन्न राजसंबन्ध्यभिन्नोद्यानिष्ठाधिकरणतानिरूपक-प्रारम्भकर्माभिन्न-सार्वकालिकभ्रमण-वदभिन्न-राजपुत्री स्वसम्बन्धिसरवीनिष्ठकर्तृता-निरूपकाभिभाषणसमान-कालिका भियाषणकर्त्री पूर्वदिनसमुच्चयाश्रयएतद्दिनकालिकतदभिन्नविषयविषयक यत्प्रकारक अभिभाषणानुकूलकृत्याश्रयः 'सुगन्धममुमाजीवनं स्मरिण्यामि' वाक्यनिष्ठानुपूर्वीविशिष्ट 'अभिभाषणसमुभ्रयाश्रयज्ञानजनकशब्दानुकूलकृत्याश्रयः (राजपुत्री) इति शब्दबोधः।

[3]'तदेवेदं भासमानं रक्तपुण्यं वर्तते'

तच्छब्दः यस्येत्यत्र यच्छब्देन निर्दिष्टमर्थं परामृशति। एवकारस्य अन्यभिन्नमित्यर्थः। तच्छदार्थस्य एव-शब्दार्थस्य च रक्तपुष्पेऽन्वयः। इदंशब्दस्य पुरोवर्तीत्यर्थः तस्याभेदेन रक्तपुष्पेऽन्वयः। भासमानमित्यस्य प्रतीयमानमित्यर्थः [वर्तमानकालिकप्रतीतिविषयः]। तस्याभेदेन रक्तपुष्पेऽन्वयः। रक्तपुष्पं रक्ताभिन्नं पुष्पम्। वृतधातोः सत्ता अर्थः। तेप्रत्ययस्य आश्रयत्वं वर्तमानकालिकत्वं चार्यः। वर्तमानकालिकत्वस्य सत्तायाम्, आश्रयत्वस्य रक्तपुष्पेऽन्वयः। तथा च-उक्तवाक्यात् 'तदभिन्नतदन्यभिन्न पुरोवर्त्यभिन्न वर्तमान कालिकप्रतीतिविषयाभिन्नरक्ताभिन्नपुष्पं वर्तमानकालिक सत्ताश्रयः इति बोधः।

महावाक्यार्थबोधः

तथा च वाक्यत्रयघटितात् महावाक्यात्

यत्संबन्धी सूक्ष्माभिन्नमधुराभिन्नसुरभिगन्धः तदभिन्नसुन्दर्यभिन्नराजसंबन्धिपुत्रीसमवेततत्प्रकारविशिष्ट गमीरत्वविशिष्टप्रकृष्टज्ञानानुकूलव्यापारवदभिन्नः,

स्वसंबन्ध्यभिन्नराजसंबन्ध्याभिन्नोद्यानिष्ठाधिकरणतानिरूपक-प्रारम्भकर्माभिन्न सार्वकालिकभ्रमणवदभिन्ना स्वसंबन्धिसखीनिष्ठकर्तृतानिरूपकाभिभाषणसमानकालिका-

भिभाषणकर्त्री तादृशसुगन्धरूपविषयविषयक-पूर्वदिनसमुच्चयाश्रयएतद्दिनकालिक त्वप्रकारकाभिभाषणानुकूलकृत्याश्रय: 'सुगन्धममुमाजीवनं स्मरिष्यामि' वाक्यनिष्ठानुपूर्वी विशिष्टाभिभाषणसमुच्चयाश्रयज्ञानजनकशब्दानुकूलकृत्याश्रय: राजपुत्री, तदभिन्न-तदन्यभिन्नपुरोवर्त्यभिन्नवर्तमानकालिक प्रतीतिविषयाभिन्नरक्ताभिन्नपुष्पं वर्तमानकालिक-सत्त्राश्रय इति शब्दबोधो भवति।

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Exercise on the *'Mahāvākya'* for *Śābdabodha* Response to the comments on the *Mahāvākya* received from N.S.R. Tatacharya

The following is my comment on the *Navya Nyāya* Analysis of the complex sentence (*mahāvākya*) which is published in the *JICPR,* Vol. XV, No. 1. It may be pointed out that my comment consists of four parts and they are about:

I: The sentence,
II: The translation (in Sanskrit),
III: The *śābdabodha* (as has been presented by Professor N.S.R. Tatacharya), and
IV: The whole exercise.

I. THE SENTENCE

This is the same bright, red rose whose sweet and subtle fragrance so deeply affected the beautiful princess, when she came for an early morning stroll in the private royal garden a few days back that she still talks about it to her friends and says that she would remember the fragrance all her life.

Before I say anything, I think it is worth recording an interesting comment on the structure and syntax of this sentence by my computer[1]:

Your sentences may be too long to be effective and may be hard to follow. For clarity and conciseness, consider rewording your sentence or splitting it into two sentences.

This, I think, is a very precise and accurate comment on this sentence. It is clear that this is not a sentence from any classical/Standard English literature but 'deliberately constructed' to test the *Navya Nyāya* analysis of long and complex sentence structure. The 'deliberateness' as has been suggested by the complier directed towards analysing the phrases like '*bright, red rose*' or '*sweet and subtle fragrance*' without questioning the conventions of *Navya Nyāya* analysis. It refers to the analysis of the adjectival clauses, when there are two adjectives to one and the same noun. I do not think it is a big problem to handle for the *naiyāyika*s. Then the question is why should one deliberately construct a sentence like this, whose grammaticality is doubtful. Anyway this presents an interesting exercise for *śābdabodha*.

If the meaning aspect of the sentence is taken into account, it can be doubtlessly said that the sentence is ambiguous. I think the ambiguity arises out of the clause '*that she still talks about it*'. The question is 'about what'? Is it about: 'The bright red rose'? 'The sweet and subtle fragrance'? or 'How deeply it *affected* the beautiful princess'? In other words, does it refer to the grammatical subject, or the grammatical object or the grammatical event? In fact, there are two grammatical subjects in the given complex sentence: (i) the rose, and (ii) the fragrance. There are also two grammatical objects. They are: (i) the princess and (ii) her friends. There are several events; at least four may be considered for the sentential analysis point of view. And they are: (i) *deeply affecting* the princess, (ii) her *coming* for an early morning stroll to the private royal garden, (iii) her *talking* about it to her friends, and (iv) *remembering* the fragrance all her life. Taking all these factors into account, the question certainly arises whether such complex construction in English itself is grammatically viable/desirable.[2] The syntax in English is the most difficult area of study and the *meaning analysis* of the complex sentential construction fully depends upon the structure of the sentence. Needless to say that unless we understand the sentence and its grammatical structure in its *source* language, it would certainly be difficult in translating it to the *target* language and analyze it in a different framework accordingly in the target language.

II. THE TRANSLATION (IN SANSKRIT)

The sentence in question is translated into Sanskrit as follow (I present it in Roman diacritic for writing conveniently with the help of my computer):

tad evedaṃ bhāsamānam rakta-puṣpaṃ varttate yasya sūkṣma-madhūra-sugandhaḥ tāṃ sundarīm rājaputrīṃ tathā gabhīratayā prabhāvitavān yathā sā svakīyarājodyāne prārabdha-nitya-bhramaṇā adyāpi tad-viṣaye sva-sakhibhiḥ saha abhibhāṣate vadati ca sugandham amum ājīvanaṃ smariṣyāmīti /

This is not a very good translation in Sanskrit. There are several English words/phrases not properly translated into Sanskrit that can bear the near-most meaning to express the idea in its original construction. For instance:

(1) The word '*bright*' is translated into Sanskrit '*bhāsamānaṃ*'. Though the verbal base (*dhātu*) *bhās*—means 'to sign', 'to bright', 'to appear', 'occur to the mind' etc., still, the word '*bhāsamāna*' is mostly used in *śāstric* works to mean '*pratīyamānam = varttamāna-kālika-pratīti-viṣayaḥ*' (complete understanding or clear apprehension), as has been explained by Professor N.S.R. Tatacharya in his *Navya Nyāya* analysis. This explanation is not congruous with this construction. It is obviously wrong due to the inappropriate translation of the word '*bright*' that leads to an inappropriate explanation in terms of *Navya Nyāya* analysis. Therefore, I think '*bhāsamāna*' is not a good Sanskrit rendering of the English word '*bright*'. It could have been translated as '*ruciram*' or '*bhāsuram*' which could have been compatible with the sentential meaning analysis.

(2) The word 'red rose' is translated as '*rakta-puspam*' (red flower). Perhaps, we do not have a word in Sanskrit for 'rose'. V.S. Apte's Dictionary is helpful to some extent when it defines '*japā/javā puṣpam*' as synonym to 'rose'. I think there is no harm in accepting this name for 'rose'. How long we will be bereft of the *name* of a flower that is so dear to all of us these days!

(3) The English word '*subtle*' is translated into Sanskrit as '*sūkṣma*'. However, this translation does not describe the subtle charm of the sentence. Thus I think it could have been rendered as '*anirvacanīyam*' (or *anyādṛśam/asādhāraṇam*) because the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) defines the word '*subtle*' as: 'difficult to perceive or describe because fine and delicate'.

(4) The word '*deeply*' is an adverb in English but its translation in Sanskrit as '*gabhīratayā*' is a noun (in instrumental singular ending), which has created problem in the sentential analysis in the *Navya Nyāya* framework. (We shall discuss this later on.) It could have been translated only as '*gabhīram*' in an adverbial form.

(5) The word '*affected*' is translated as '*prabhāvitavān*', which is derived from the verbal base *bhā-* with the pre-verb *pra-*[3], that means 'begin to become light, shine, gleam, to appear, seem, to look like, to illuminate, enlighten' etc. These meanings do not come closer to the meaning of '*affect*': 'have an influence or impression on, act on' (OED). It is because of this inappropriate translation, Professor Tatacharya goes on explaining it as '*pra-pūrvaka-bhā-dhātoḥ prakṛṣṭa-jñānam arthaḥ* [*āsakti-janaka-jñānam arthaḥ*]', which neither suits the context nor the sentential analysis. This term could have been translated with the verbal base *abhi-bhū-* (*abhibhūtavān*) which would have given a meaning that is closer to the meaning of the original construction.

(6) The phrase '*prārabdha-nitya-bhramaṇā*' which, anybody will agree, certainly is not the translation of the English clause '*when she came for an early morning stroll*'. It is because of this wrong translation, the whole episode in the semantic exposition in the *Navya Nyāya* analysis is misleading. Moreover, the word '*stroll*' is translated '*bhramaṇa*' which is not a very good rendering in Sanskrit. The Sanskrit word '*vihāraḥ*' would have been a better term in this context.

(7) The phrase '*a few days back*' in the original sentence has not been translated into Sanskrit.

(8) The clause '*she ... says that she would remember the fragrance all her life*' is an indirect statement, whereas '*vadati ca sugandham amum ājīvanaṃ smariṣyāmīti*' is a direct statement. Though it is desirable to translate an indirect statement into direct statement sometime, it is not desirable here, because it effects the semantic analysis. Therefore, Professor Tatacharya opines that '*sugandham amum smariṣyāmi*' refers to the phrase itself but not to the meaning of the phrase. Thus he does not explain the phrase (*atas tasya pṛthag vākyārtho na varṇitaḥ*). The question arises that is it desirable to leave the meaning analysis of an indirect statement in the *Navya Nyāya* framework or not. I, however, do agree with Professor Tatacharya that the direct statement need not be explained and he is perfectly right in this case. It is not the translation that makes a difference.

III. THE *ŚĀBDABODHA*
(as has been presented by Professor N.S.R. Tatacharya)

The *śābdabodha*, as has been presented by Professor N.S.R. Tatacharya, certainly proves the living tradition of the *Navya Nyāya* analysis with its astounding glory. This is not a simple task but this exercise has made it clear that present-day's scholarship is in no way diminished from that of the works of the great Gaṅgeśa to Raghunātha, from Tattvacintāmaṇi to Didhiti. Of course, it is true that there are very few outstanding scholars like Professor Tatacharya these days who have command over the *Navya Nyāya* exposition in sentential analysis. I am however not very happy with the sentential analysis or the representation of *śābdabodha* as has been given here. It is solely because of the inappropriate translation of the English sentence. Professor Tatacharya however has done a commendable job.

The sentence in question has a complex structure. Its semantic representation is expected to be obviously more complex than the sentence structure. Professor Tatacharya has analyzed the given translation of the original English sentence with a great acumen of the *Navya Nyāya* conceptual framework of the *śābdabodha. Śābdabodha* usually considers representing the cognitive structure of the *expression* as has been received by the listener. It of course takes the cognitive mechanism into account and then relates the micro-sentential representations to construe the macro-sentential representation (*mahāvākyārtha*). Before proceeding to represent the *śābdabodha* of a complex sentential structure like this one has to identify the embedded clauses of the main structure.

Professor Tatacharya identifies three such embedded clauses of the sentence in question in the following manner and says due to use of '*yat*' and '*tat*' they all form a '*mahāvākya*' (a complex/long sentence).

[1] *tad evedaṃ bhāsamānam rakta-puṣpaṃ varttate,*
[2] *yasya sūkṣma-madhūra-sugandhaḥ tāṃ sundarīm rājaputrīṃ tathā gabhīratayā prabhāvitavān,*
[3] *yathā sā svakīya-rājodyāne prārabdha-nitya-bhramaṇā adyāpi tad-viṣaye sva-sakhibhiḥ saha abhibhāṣate vadati ca sugandham amum ājīvanaṃ smariṣyāmīti.*

According to Professor Tatacharya, the clause [1] is the main clause of this sentence and therefore the so called '*rakta-puṣpam*' is the chief qualificand (*mukhya-viśeṣya*) in the cognitive representation of the

sentence being the subject. The clause [2] is about the 'fragrance' (*sugandhaḥ*) which again is the subject in the second clause. The clause [3] is about the 'princess' (*rāja-putrī*). It may be pointed out here that the subjects in all these three clauses are in nominative singular endings (*prathamānta*) and all of them are suited to the conventional theory of the chief qualificand (*mukhya-viśeṣya*) in the cognitive representation in the system of *Navya Nyāya* analysis. Therefore, Professor Tatacharya has very accurately analysed the clause [2] first and then the clause [3] and thereafter he related the whole cognitive representation to the cognitive representation of the clause [1] upholding 'the rose' as the chief qualificand of the *mahāvākyārtha*. Professor Tatacharya of course has proposed a second way out of the cognitive representation, of the *mahāvākya*. According to his second alternative, the clause [3] may be taken first for the sentential analysis and then the clause [2] and thereafter the whole sum of these two clauses may be added to the cognitive representation of [1] for giving the final shape to the cognitive representation of the *mahāvākya*. He however, takes the first option and goes on to explain the *śābdabodha* of the sentence.

The *śābdabodha* consists of the *padārthas* (the word meanings) and their mutual 'relations' (*saṃsargas*) represented through the conventional process technically called '*saṃsarga-maryādā*'. Literally it may be translated as 'the boundary or limit of relation'.[4] However, this literal translation seems to be incongruous with the conceptual framework of *śābdabodha*. According to the commentators, the term *saṃsargamaryādā* is *rūḍha* ('has a conventional meaning' as opposed to 'etymological meaning') in the sense '*ākāṅkṣā*' (syntactico-semantic expectancy).[5] Therefore, we may translate the term *saṃsargamaryādā* as 'the governing principle of syntactico-semantic expectancy'. While representing the *śābdabodha* of a sentence like this, one has to pay special attention to the meaning of the case ending or the affixes/suffixes (*vibhakti/pratyaya*) first, and thereafter to the nouns or verbs. Because the meanings of the nouns and the verbs are almost fixed in the lexicons (i.e., *koṣa/dhātupāṭha*), whereas that is not the case with the case endings. Therefore it is a common phenomena seen in almost all *śābdabodha* works that the *śāstra-kāras* always try to define (or redefine) the meanings of the case endings first and then try to relate it with the meaning of the substantives or the verbal bases as the case may be. The next crucial thing about the *śābdabodha* is to identify the 'relation' *(saṃsarga)*, between two so-called *padārthas* (word meanings

strictly represented by *vṛtti*), which functions as connective of the word meanings. Though the 'relation' is to be identified strictly according to the principle of '*saṃsarga-maryādā*' (the boundary or limit of relation) still, I am always confronted with the question: does this so-called relational limitation limitless? Is it flexible enough to give scope to imagine any relation that appears to be appropriate/suitable to the cognitive engineer? In other words, is it to some extent subjective? There is indeed an aspect of thinking on relations to be due to *ātma-niṣṭha-pratyāsatti* (the relation based on self-contact) in contrast to that of *viṣayaniṣṭha-pratyāsatti* (the relation based on object-contact). In other words if the relation is subjective then how scientifc is the cognitive structure and the cognitive event? If it is objective what is the role of *saṃsargamaryādā* which is often interpreted as '*ākāṅkṣā*' (desire), a quality of the self? These aspects are yet to be seriously investigated upon. I am interested in raising this question in this connection because this is a plain case of *doing* a serious exercise on *Navya Nyāya*. Though I have no serious objections to *what* and *how* Professor Tatacharya has explained the *śābdabodha* here, still there are places where doubt regarding the relations may be raised as to 'why this relation, why not that'. For instance, let us take the *śābdabodha* into consideration of the clause [1] of the sentence, namely '*tad evedam bhāsamānam rakta-puṣpam varttate*' as has been presented by Professor Tatacharya.

The *śābdabodha* is given as: '*tad-abhinna-tad-anya-bhinna-purovartty-abhinna-varttamānakālika-pratītiviṣayābhinna-raktābhinna-puṣpam varttamāna-kālika-sattāśrayaḥ*'.

Let us relate the sentence/clause [1] to the *śābdabodha*. For that we have to check the words and their respective meanings first and then the relations between the word meanings subsequently. For the sake of clarity, let us do it like this:

(a) *tad* = this is a relative pronoun and refers to the same meaning which is referred to by the counter relative pronoun *yat* (in the clause [2]).

(b) *eva* = this is an indeclinable (*avyaya*) and means (in this context) 'other than something, different from itself' (*anya-bhinnam ity arthaḥ*). This is how Professor Tatacharya has explained in the most simple manner possible. A traditional scholar would have explained the same in a more sophisticated manner as '*eva-kārasya itaravyavacchedo' rthaḥ*', which almost means the same as above.

(c) *idam* = 'this'. This refers to 'the thing which is present before someone (that he can indicate pointing out to it by his finger/indicator)'. It is explained in Sanskrit as '*purovartti ity arthaḥ*'.

(d) *bhāsamānam* = *vartamāna-kālika-pratīti-viṣaya* (see Section I no. 1).

(e) *raktapuṣpam* = [(e_1) *rakta* + (e_2) *puṣpa*] *raktābhinnam puṣpam* (see Section I no. 2).

(f) *vartate* = [(f_1) *vṛt-* + (f_2) *-te*] = *vṛt-* means '*sattā*' (existence) and *- te* means '*āśrayatvam*' and '*vartamānakālikatvam*' ('substratum' and 'belonging to present time').

The relations between the meanings of the words have been presented by Professor Tatacharya in the following manner:

(i) The relation between the meanings of (a) and (b) is *abheda* (identity);
(ii) The relation between the meanings (c) and (e) is also *abheda*;
(iii) The same between the meanings of (d) and (e) is also *abheda*;
(iv) The relation between the meanings of (e_1) and (e_2) is also *abheda*;
(v) The relation between the meanings of (f_1) and (f_2) is *janakatā* represented by the primary suffix *ka*.

The relation between the meanings of (d) (*viz. vartamāna-kālika-pratīti-viṣaya*) and (e) (*viz. raktābhinnam puṣpam*) has been given *abheda* (see iii). This is of course true. But I think there is possibility of contemplating different relations in the following manner if we consider the *śābdabodha* of this sub-clause as:

(a) '*vartamāna-kālika-pratīti-viṣyatā-nirūpaka-raktābhinnam puṣpam*' or
(b) '*vartamāna-kalika-pratīti-viṣaya-niṣṭha-viṣyatā-nirūpaka-raktābhinnam puṣpam*' or simply
(c) '*vartamāna-kālika-pratīti-viṣyaka-raktābhinnam puṣpam*'.

Well, what I am doing is trying to expand the simple cognitive structure into more complex cognitive structure. This further can be expanded and this is called *pariṣkāra-prakriyā*. The purpose behind this is to make the cognitive event more explicit, clearer, and more unambiguous. However in essence they do not differ from one another. But the point to be noted is that this expansion is technically possible due to the concept of '*saṃsargamaryādā*' which seems to be flexible in nature, of course within the limit of its conceptual framework. The question, as has already been pointed out, is 'how flexible is it'? To what extent does *saṃsargamaryādā* limit/restrict the application of a relation? For instance, we can say '*pratīti-*

viṣayābhinna-raktapuṣpam' represents the same cognitive structure as that of the '*pratīti-viṣayatā-nirūpaka-raktapuṣpam*'. However, can we say '*abheda*' is the same relation which is represented by the primary suffix *ka* to the substantive '*viṣaya*'? The reply will certainly be in the negative. Because, the suffix *ka* (*nirūpaka*) is a *bheda* relation whereas the other is an *abheda* relation and in that case can it be said that the *abheda* relation is convertible with a *bheda* relation? It is of course evident in the *śāstric* works that they are inter-convertibles, since the term *abheda* is explained as: (a) *bhedatvāvacchinnābhāvaḥ*, (b) *bhedapratiyogikābhāvaḥ*, (c) *bheda* and *abhāva* (being related appropriately). The inter-convertibility of *bheda* and *abheda* leads to the question of their ontological reality and logical compatibility. There are a lot of issues that can be raised in this connection and that invite serious attention.

IV. THE WHOLE EXERCISE

Now may we think on the merit and demerit of the whole exercise? To my mind even though this is a very interesting exercise, still how useful is it if we just do *Navya Nyāya* without thinking about the questions and issues as has been pointed out above. Moreover, I do not think it is necessary to 'deliberately construct' a complex sentence in English and then try to translate the same into Sanskrit (which often looses its original flavour) and then try to exercise its *śābdabodha*. If this is the aim, then why go for a roundabout way of thinking/constructing a sentence in English and then translating it into Sanskrit and then exercising to give the cognitive structure of the same in *Navya Nyāya* framework? We can do the same picking up any *śloka/vākya* from the vast and marvellous literature in Sanskrit. We should think ourselves fortunate to have a very rich literature both in prose and poetry in Sanskrit. For the sake of *śābdabodha*, can't we find an appropriate (and if required, complex) sentence from it? Have we forgotten the great Mahākāvyas like Kādambarī or Daśakumāracaritam? Well, if we would like to concentrate only on a sentence where a *prathamānta* (nominative singular) is present as the chief qualificand then we have an innumerable number of sentences in our literature. Therefore, I do not think this type of exercise shows a very healthy intellectual trend. We should instead seriously concentrate upon deliberating on different issues and concepts and their applicability to the modern linguistic and logical concepts. We should also try to reinvestigate

the historical development of the conceptual framework for emphasizing the rich tradition of *Navya Nyāya* and we should go for constructing a comparative logic and epistemology.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. I am using *Microsoft Word* for word processing job.
2. A colleague of mine who is a professor in English says that the sentence in question is certainly grammatically wrong.
3. *prabhāvitavān* is also derived from the verbal base (*dhātu*) *pra-bhū* (where the *dhātū* is *bhū* with the pre-verb *pra*, which means 'to come forth, spring up, arise or originate from, appear, become visible, happen, occur, etc. However, Prof. Tatacharya has taken it to be derived from *pra-bhā* while explaining the sentential analysis.
4. *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies—The Philosophy of Grammarians* (1990) translates *samsarga-maryādā* as 'association of word meanings' (p. 10, 98) or 'the power of association' (p. 96). Matilal, B.K. (1968, p. 152) translates it as 'relational seam'.
5. '*saṃsarga-maryādā-śabda ākāṅkṣāyām rūḍhaḥ*'. See *Tippaṇī* on VV-S, p. 10.

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ACHYUTANANDA DASH

The *Navya Nyāya* Analysis of the *Mahāvākya*: Some Comments. Response to the comments on the *Mahāvākya* received from N.S.R. Tatacharya

I

The intention of this paper is give some comments on the *Navya Nyāya* analysis of *Mahāvākya* (the sentence and its Sanskrit translation appeared in *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 1) given by Professor N.S.R. Tatacharya.

II

In connection with determining the meaning of the large sentence (*Mahāvākyārtha*) Professor Tatacharya has divided the sentence into three parts, viz., (a) This is the same bright red rose (b) whose sweet and subtle fragrance deeply affected the beautiful princess (c) At the time of her

early morning stroll in the private royal garden a few days back, she still talks about it to her friends and says that she would remember the fragrance all her life.

Professor Tatacharya has first explained the second part of the sentence—'*Yasya sūkṣmamadhurasugandhaḥ tāṁ sundarīṁ rajaputrīṁ tathā gabhīratayā prabhāvitavān.*' The meaning of the genitive case in *yasya* is the relation which is connected with fragrance. In this context the identical relation prevails in two objects—subtle and sweet. The meaning of the term '*tat*' found in '*tāṁ*' is connected with the princess who is identical with the meaning of the term 'beautiful'. The suffix '*thāl*' in the term '*tathā*' gives rise to principal adjective (*prakāra*). The term '*tat*' (in *tāṁ*) refers to the meanings expressed through the term '*yat*' found in '*yathā*'. The meaning of the term '*rājaputrī*' (princess) is 'the daughter of the king' (*rājasambandhī*). The second case-ending attached to *putrīṁ* refers to the superstratumness (*ādheyatvaṁ*) limited by the relation of inherence (*samavāyasambandhāvacchinna*), which is again related to *rājaputrī* through the relation of being determined (*nirūpitatva*). The term '*prabhāvitavān*' is derived from root *bhā* preceeded by the prefix *pra*, which means best cognition (*prakṛṣṭajñānaṁ*) or cognition generating desire (*āsaktijanaka-jñānamarthaḥ*). The suffix *ṇij* attached to this means favourable action (*anukūlavyāpāraḥ*). The suffix *ktavatu* gives rise to the meaning—the substratum (*āśraya*). It is connected with sweet fragrance through the relation of identity.

If all the terms are combined, it will have the following comprehensive meaning:

The fragrance which is identical with sweetness and subtleness is related to that which is endowed with action favourable to best cognition qualified with depth which is again qualified by the chief qualifier of that inhered in the daughter related to royal race and endowed with full beauty. (*'yat sambandhī sūkṣmābhinnamadhurābhinnasurabhigandhaḥ tadabhinnasundaryabhinna-rājasambandhiputrīsemaveta-tatprakāravisiṣṭa-gabhīratva-viśiṣṭa-prakṛṣṭa-jñānānūkūla-vyāpāravadabhinnaḥ'*)

III

The third part of the sentence runs as follows: '*yathā sā svakīyarājodyāne prārabdhanitya-bhramaṇā adyāpi tadviṣaye svasakhībhiḥ saha abhibhāṣate, vadati ca sugandhamamuṁ ājīvanaṁ smariṣyāmīti*'.

In this part of the sentence the term *yathā* means chief-qualifier (*prakāra*) signified by the suffix '*thāl*' adduced to the term *yat*. It is construed with the phenomenon of saying and addressing (*abhibhāṣaṇa*) coming from the meaning of the roots—*vada* and *bhāṣa* prefixed by *abhi* through the relation of substratumness (*āśrayatāsambandha*). The meaning of the term *svakīya* is the royal garden in relation to self (own) and which is *identical with* garden in relation to king (*rājasambandhyudyāna*). The meaning of the locative case-ending is the substratumness (*adhikaraṇatva*). In this context the royal garden is related to the locative case through the relation of superstratumness (*ādheyatāsambandha*) and the substratumness (*adhikaraṇatva*) is related to strolling (*bhramaṇa*) through the relation of determinatorness (*nirūpakatāsambandha*). The term '*prārabdha*' means *prārabdhakarma* (action) which is connected with 'a part of regular strolling' (*nityabhramaṇaikadeśa*) through the relation of identity. The term '*nityabhramaṇa*'—is either 'woman strolling at all times' (*sārvakālikabhramaṇavatī*) or woman strolling everyday (*pratidinabhramaṇavatī*). This adjective is construed with the princess, the meaning of the term '*tat*', through relation of identity. The term '*adya*' (today) means 'this particular day' (*etaddinaṁ*). The term '*api*' has got a different import which is 'the assemblage of earlier days, (*pūrvadinasamuccayaḥ*), which is connected with 'this day' through the relation of substratumness (*āśrayatāsambandhena*). The relation between 'this day' and 'addressing' is through the temporal relation (*kālikasaṁbandha*). The term '*tadviṣayaḥ*' means the identity between *'thāl' in tat* and object (*viṣaya*). In this context the term '*tat*' is used as a pointer to 'the cognition of sweet smell' (*sugandhaparāmarśaka*). The locative case-ending refers to the 'contentness which is connected with that object' (*tadviṣaya*) through the relation of superstratumness (*ādheyatāsambandha*). The contentness is connected with the phenomenon of addressing (*abhibhāṣana*) through the relation of determinatorness (*nirūpakatā*). The term '*svasakhī*' means 'friends in relation to her own' (*svasambandhisakhī*). The 'third-case-ending' has got the meaning of agentness (*kartṛtva*) which is connected with 'own friend' (*svasakhī*) through the relation of superstratumness (*ādheyatāsambandha*). The 'agentness' (referred to by third case-ending) is construed with the activity of addressing, a portion of the meaning of the term '*saha*' i.e., 'togetherness' (*sāhityaṁ*). The definition of addressing (*abhibhāṣaṇa*) is 'the usage of words for generating cognition' (*jñānajanakaśabdaprayogaḥ*). The first

addressing or saying which is included under the meaning of the term '*saha*' is connected with the 'agentness', the meaning of the third case-ending. The second addressing or saying is construed with the princess, the meaning of the term '*tat*' through the relation of agentness. The verbal suffix in *abhibhāṣate* means 'effort' (*kṛti*). Here the meaning of the verb is connected with this (*kṛti*) through the relation of favourability (*anukūlatāsambandha*). The 'effort' is connected with 'the princess' through the relation of substratumness. The term '*iti*' refers to the meaning of the a sub-section of the section—'I shall remember this fragrance during the whole life' (*sugandhamamumājīvanaṁ smariṣyāmi*'). This is again connected with 'the usage of the words generating congnition', the meaning of the root '*vada*' through the relation of substratumness. The meaning of the verb—'*vadati*' is volition (*kṛti*) which is connected with the meaning of the root through the relation of favourability (*anukūlatāsambandha*). The 'volition' (*kṛti*) is related to princess through the relation of substratumness. The term '*ca*' (and) means 'collection of *abhībhāṣana*' (*abhibhāṣaṇasamuccayaḥ*), which is connected with the phenomenon of saying (*kathana*) through relation of substratumness.

This is the analysis of the second part of the *Mahāvākyam*.

IV

The analysis of the first part—'*tadevaṁ bhāsamānaṁ raktapuṣpaṁ vartate*' is as follows. The term '*tat*' here refers to the particular meaning expressed by the term '*yat*' existing in '*yasya*'. The term *eva* is used to give an emphasis on this particular meaning different from other (*anyabhinna*). The meaning of the term '*tat*' and '*eva*' have got connection with red flower (*raktapuṣpa*). The term *idaṁ* is used to refer to an object existing in front, (*purovartī*) which is identical with red-flower. The word '*bhāsamāna*' means appearance (*pratīyamāna*) of something known in the present tense, which is identical with red-flower. The 'red-flower', a flower identical with this property—'*red*' (*raktābhinna*). The root '*vṛt*' means 'to exist' (*sattā*). The suffix 'te' (in *vartate*) indicates substratumness (*āśrayatva*) and 'being in present tense' (*vartamānakālikatva*). The former is construed with the red-flower while the latter with the state of being (*sattā*).

The whole meaning of this part is ascertained as follows. The knowledge of the substratum of being in the present tense of the flower identical with redness which is identical with the object known in the present tense and identical with an object existing in front, which is again identical with

that which is referred earlier (*Tadabhinna-tadanyabhinna-purovartyabhinna-vartamāna-kālika-pratīti-viṣayābhinna-raktābhinnapuṣpaṁ vartatamānakālika-sattāśrayaḥ iti bodhaḥ*).

V. COMMENTS

Following the *Navya Nyāya* analysis of the different parts of the *Mahāvākya* we have an idea about the justification of each and every term, each and every grammatical formation of the terms, each and every prefix and suffix and some *avyayas* used in the sentence. The English rendering of the meaning is given for the better understanding of the non-Sanskritists. I personally agree with the analysis of Professor Tatacharya to some extent. Though it seems to be clumsy to go through the different parts of the sentence, it is necessary for the sake of accurate and precise expression following the *Navya Nyāya* terminology. As for example, the meaning of *rājaputrī* is *rājasambandhiputri* the second case-ending in *putriṁ* gives rise to the meaning of the superstratumness limited by relation of inherence (*samavāyasambandhāvacchinnamādheyatvaṁ*), *raktapuṣpaṁ* means a flower identical with the property '*red*' (*raktabhinnaṁ puṣpaṁ*), the *avyayas* like '*eva*' '*api*' (in *adyāpi*) etc. meaning '*anyabhinna*' (different from other), '*pūrvadina-samuccaya*' (assemblage of the previous day) etc. These specific meanings can be pointed out if many peculiar relations and technical terms are used.

It is said in connection with the second part of the sentence that 'nityabhramana-śabdasya sārvakālikabhramaṇavatī athavā pratidin-abhramaṇavatī'. In this connection I would like to mention that the original term should be '*nityabhramaṇā*' (with feminine suffix *ṭāp*) but not *nityabhramaṇa* as mentioned by Professor Tatacharya. Moreover, the meaning of the term *nitya* as *sārvakālika* or *pratidina* may be *questioned*. Is it really the intention of the speaker that the beautiful princess comes for a stroll 'everyday' (*pratidinaṁ*) or 'always' (*sārvakālika*)? *I do not think so*. Because from the English sentence it is known that 'the beautiful princess came for an early morning stroll'. Here the term '*nitya*' is redundant, as there is no mention of everyday stroll or stroll covering all times (*sārvakālika*). If at all the term *nitya* is kept intact, the meaning of it as *sārvakālika* should seek a justification which is lacking in the present analysis. Moreover, the Sanskrit translation of the term—'an early morning' is not done in the given translation. The term '*nitya*' should have been

replaced by the word—'*prātaḥ*', to keep the sanctity of the original English sentence, which is unfortunately not done.

In context of the explanation of the second part of the sentence, Professor Tatacharya has given the different meaning of the actions—*abhibhāṣaṇa* and *kathana*. To him the meaning of the root *bhāṣa* prefixed by *abhi* is *abhibhāṣaṇa* (addressing)—*abhipūrvakabhāṣa-dhātvartha abhibhāṣaṇa* and the meaning of the verb *vada* is 'saying'—*vada-dhatvārthe kathane*. Though the difference is shown in the first part, these are not maintained afterwards, but used in the same sense in the second part of his elucidation. The definition of *abhibhāṣa* is given as '*jñānajanakaśabdaprayogaḥ*' (i.e. the application of words giving rise to cognition). Afterwards Professor Tatacharya has taken the meaning of *abhibhāṣaṇa* and '*kathana*' in the same sense, because the former is referred to as *prathamābhibhāṣaṇa* while the latter as *dvitīyābhibhāṣaṇa*. In fact, there are two verbs—*abhibhāṣaṇa* and *kathana* in two different contexts and hence these two cannot be used in the same sense. The first one is used in the context of general experience and the second one is in the context of specific sentence in the form—'I will remember this sweet fragrance all my life'. These specific meanings are hinted at with the usage of the two verbs, which should have a separate mention in the analysis. However, the given analysis may be taken for granted if the meaning of the term *abhibhāṣaṇa* is taken in a general sense '*jñānajanaka-śabdaprayogaḥ*' i.e., the usage of a term for generating some cognition, then both the verbs can be taken in the same sense, which perhaps Professor Tatacharya wants to mean.

Lastly, one may raise a question whether 'sweet fragrance' can really be translated as '*madhuraḥ sugandhaḥ*'. The term '*sugandha*' means '*surabhigandha*' i.e., sweet smell, in one word, fragrance. If it is so, why is the adjunct '*madhuraḥ*' inserted to *sugandha*? Is it not tautologous? I do not know if there is any justification of such usage. Professor Tatacharya also did not highlight this issue, which was essential in the *Navya Nyāya* pattern of analysis accepted to be most precise and accurate in logical thinking. If it is said '*amadhuraḥ sugandhaḥ*', it is contradictory in terms. If something is *amadhuraḥ,* non-sweet or bitter, it is no more *sugandha* or fragrance. Again, the explanation of the concept of subtlety (*sukṣmatva*) is not given by Professor Tatacharya. One can similarly raise a question—Is there any *sugandha* in this world which is of *shūla* (as opposed to *sūkṣma*) type? These probable questions are not replied to in the given *bhāṣya* of the Mahāvākya.

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Comments on Daya Krishna's Paper 'How *Anekāntika* is *Anekānta*? Some Reflections on Jain Thoery of *Anekāntavāda*. Published in *JICPR*, Vol. XVI, No. 2

1. pg. 1t — You have correlated *anekantāvāda, syādvāda* and *nayavāda* with ontology (metaphysics), epistemology and logic respectively. I think, *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* represent Jaina epistemology and logic respectively. Reasons for this have been given in my paper (1992) on Jaina *Anekantāvadā* and *Syādvāda*.
2. pg. 1m. — Your view that Jaina ontology of *anekānta* does not logically entail *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* as unique corollaries is correct, but unfair because it is true of any other system of ontology. No ontology can uniquely specify epistemology or logic. That's why Bradley based his 'metaphysics' (Appearance and Reality) on his 'logic' (Principles of Logic). It was not for nothing.
3. pg. 2t — I agree that neither 'indefinite' nor 'infinite' is a proper translation of *'aneka'* in *anekāntavāda*. How about 'inexhaustibly characterizable'? It is just a suggestion.
4. pg. 2b — Your view that what *anekāntavāda* asserts is vacuous/non-significant because it is a case of 'predication without exclusion'. It seems unfair to me. Certainly they wouldn't say that 'a barren woman's son both exists and does not exist', as *you* have pointed out on pg. 13t. Granted this, it becomes incumbent on us to work out the formal structure of the Jaina notion of 'inconsistency' or 'non-contradiction'. I have done some work along this line in my 'Logics

Beyond Consistency' (1996) and in*S.R. Saha (ed.) Essay in Indian Philosophy (1997).

5. pg. 3b As regards your question whether reality is *anekāntic* for a *sarvajñā* (Kevali)—the answer may be 'Yes', in the sense in which sunlight is polychromatic for a physicist though colourless at the same time in a perfectly intelligible sense. A 3-D hologram would be another relevant analogy.

6. pg. 4t Attaching the particle 'syāt' is *not* pointless as you suggest. It emphasizes the need of contextualism and tolerance of opponents' views (which was almost an obsession for the Jainas to regard as a virtue).

7. pg. 5–10 I *agree* with you on the following points:

(p. 5t) (a) Trying to make sense of '*anekānta*' along the Buddhist way is *not* O.K.

(b) Types of meaningful denial should be clearly delineated (pg. 6 m).

(c) Unactualized possibility approach raises more problems than it can solve (pg. 8–10).

8. pg. 8t Regarding the logic of unactualized possibility—N. Rescher in his 'Theory of Possibility' tried to tackle some of the problems raised by you, but not with particular success. See my, 'Maladies of Quantified Modal Logic' (1980) for my assessment.

9. pg. 8b The notion of 'self-contradictory' is NOT always clear even in a purely formal system for reasons worked out in my 'Logic Beyond Consistency' (1996).

10. pg. 11m Regarding properties of mathematical objects (numbers)—your own predilection is 'Platonic'—Jainas and *naiyayikas* have *different* views about the ontological status of numbers (too complex to go into here).

11. pg. 11–13 About (a) Jaina view of relational properties and existence and nonexistence, and (b) a new interpretation of *'avaktavyam'*, please see my 'Some Reflections on *Anekāntavāda*' etc. in *Jadavpur Journal of Philosophy*. 1992. If my interpretation, as given there, is tenable, your objections lose force (see your paper). Regarding relationality of all properties later Jainas followed the

nayanyāya notion of *'anyavyavartakatva'* (e.g. in Pramanamimamsa). Details in my paper (1992).

12. pg. 13 m Your claim that '*anekānta*' be delinked from *syādvāda* and *nayavāda* does not seem convincing to me. The three cannot be delinked without making each of them philosophically 'anaemic'.

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How Does a Sarvajña (the Omniscient, the Savant) See Reality?* Comments on the article 'How *Anekāntikā* is Anekānta? Some Reflections on Jain Theory of Anekāntavāda. Published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XVI, No. 2

Let me say, first of all, that the doctrine of *anekāntavāda* (reality is multiple) is inseparable from the doctrines of *syādvāda* (relativism of judgements) and *nayavāda* (perspectivism). For Jainas the theory of the multiplicity of the Real arises from the fact that no single description of the Real can alone be true. Jainas were convinced that since different people perceive Reality in different ways we have to say that Reality is amenable to a plurality of cognitions, descriptions and interpretations. To anybody's critical reflection, Jainas thought, it would be evident that statements made by different persons with regard to a thing, or statements made by the same person with regard to the same thing at different times, would reflect different aspects of that thing. The aspect of a thing, or of the world for that matter, was called by Jainas *naya*. *Naya* is something that an individual consciousness obtains from its encounter with the given. A *naya* or an aspect could be equivalent to what writers in 'Consciousness Studies' today call 'qualia'. An aspect is what a perceiver, a sentient, an experiencer, a thinker, grasps or can grasp of a thing, from the spatiotemporal position, from the cultural 'sediments', from the neurophysiological constitution he or she is endowed with. It would follow from this that statements made

*This paper is a reaction to Professor Daya Krishna's thought-provoking paper 'How *Anekāntika* is *Anekānta*?' (*JICPR*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, pp. 121–8). Some of the ideas incorporated in my reaction have already appeared in my 'A Pragmatist Critique of Jaina Relativism' (*Philosophy East & West*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 59–64).

by different observers of the world, or made by the same observer of the world in different situations, are *syād* (relatively true and relatively false, or may-be-true and may-be-false) statements, since each of them represents a partial comprehension, a partial knowledge, a point of view, of the Real. For instance, a statement S_1, containing a *naya* N_1 grasped at time T_1, would be, according to *syādvāda*, a 'may-be-true' and 'may-be-false' statement in relation to other statements, say S_2, S_3, S_4 containing *nayas* N_2, N_3, N_4 obtained at time T_2, T_3, T_4 respectively. A *naya* is, psychologically and espistemically, that facet of the given which offers itself to the grasp of a perceiver or thinker, and descends into his or her statement, making the statement a *syad* (relatively true) statement.

Jainas thought of *syādvāda* as a corollary arising from their *nayavāda*. It is obvious that if all that an individual can have an access to in his perception or thought is an aspect (*naya*, viewpoint) of the given, it would be erroneous on his part to hold that the aspect he has an access to is the only possible aspect of the given. *Syadvāda* or the doctrine of the relativism of judgements implies that every single statement about a thing or a situation, or about the world itself, must be looked upon as a relatively true and relatively false statement. That is to say every particular statement embodies a particular aspect and is true *vis-à-vis* that aspect. However, considering that numerous statements embodying numerous aspects of a thing or of a situation are possible, depending on the variety of individual viewers and their singular positions, no single statement would be free from the status of its being a relatively true, a may-be-true, statement. *Anekāntavāda*, *nayavāda* (or *saptabhanginaya*) and *syādvāda* are so ingeniously interwoven in Jainism that all the three theories form a firm base for liberalism, the ethics of toleration, for the culture of open-mindedness in socio-political affairs, and indeed for existentialism. The anchorage of what can be called the point of view of an individual toward whatever is offered to him or her and toward his or her very being, is his or her subjectivity, which is a collocation of his or her needs, interests, attitude, beliefs, purpose, preferences and, in the language of modern physicalists, the neuronal firings in his or her brain. While writing on the relevance of one's viewpoint to all these within one's subjectivity, F.C.S. Schiller, the famous pragmatist, has the following to say:

> To say that relevance means subjectivity means that it is conceived not as a quality residing in the thing thought of *per se* but only in its relation to us; it lies in its value for us and in our attitude towards it. It implies a relation to a human purpose by its very etymology.[1]

Like Jainas, Schiller argues that what is selected in perception or reflection is plainly a part, an extract, and not the whole, because of peculiar 'act of will,' a special 'logic of values' inherent in the unique mode of a subjective consciousness.[2]

Indeed there is a certain mental level at which Jainas reflected to produce *anekāntavāda, syādvāda* and *nayavāda*. This level is not our everyday, commonsense level of consciousness. It should be called the phenomenological level in the sense that Jainas wanted to seek answers to the questions, such as 'How much can one claim to comprehend of anything?' 'Could one's claim be such that it could repudiate other persons' claims to knowledge of the world?' 'What do we do with descriptions of different viewers, not in agreement as regards their form and content, directed to the same things?' The philosophical acumen of the Jainas is fully visible when we notice that they did not remain contented with their day-to-day realistic attitude toward the world but felt that no complete portrayal of anything is possible for a single individual observer or thinker. *Anekāntavāda*, *syādvāda* and *nayavāda* do not emerge from a layman's practical life in the world. The layman's life in the world is dictated by his natural attitude. Jainas' epistemological and logical search developed from their reflective thinking, their explorative attitude toward the entire gamut of knowledge—its stages, viz., empirical, phenomenological and transcendental, its objective and subjective parameters, and its relative and absolute status. Jainas wanted to assert that there are as many *nayas* of the Real as there are viewers and that no *naya* (or no statement expressing it) of a single individual can be total, absolute, and completely capturing the whole nature of the Real. It is possible, as historians of Indian philosophies have often pointed out, that Jainas' phenomenological outlook with the blending of epistemological pluralism, perspectivism and relativism in it must have been triggered off by the then prevalent and forceful absolutism of the Brāhmins. Jainas must have realized that their epistemological and logical assumptions were an effective rhetorical tool to fight the arrogance of the absolutist Brāhmins. Jainas were too frank in saying that when a person (a bigot, for instance), without acknowledging the inherently restricted nature of his perspective, equates what is really a fragment of the Real accessible to him with the whole of the Real he commits the fallacy of *nayabhāsa* (or particular *naya* or aspect of the given in experience taken as its absolute knowledge). For Jainas, to adopt an *aikāntic* (unitary, monistic, integralist) view toward the world either at the commonsense level or the critical and reflective level

is impossible. While at the commonsense level the universe is seen as objectively *there* or real, and as consisting of diverse objects, at the critical and reflective level it sheds its uncompromisingly real status and hangs on every perceiver's first-person or subjective point of view. For the appropriation of the *aikāntic* view of existence, where the subject–object relation is zeroed, one has to reach the stage of *sarvajna*, i.e., one has to attain what Jainas have called *kevala-jnāna* (peak knowledge).

All this that I have said is for supplementing Professor Daya Krishna's observation in the following key paragraph of his paper. Professor Daya Krishna writes:[3]

> The Jaina position may be regarded as novel in the sense that what has usually been said regarding ultimate reality is supposed by them to characterize objects of ordinary apprehension as well .... But as the Jainas also postulate the 'reality' of an omniscient human being, that is, Mahavira, and admit the possibility of such beings in their system, the first question that is to be clarified is whether the reality is *anekantic* for a *sarvajna* or not. For if it be held that it is not so for a *sarvajna*, or being who is omniscient, then the doctrine cannot be regarded as ontological in character. On the other hand, if the *sarvajna* also sees the reality as *anekantic* in character, then at least the doctrines of *syādvāda* and *saptabhanginaya* will not apply in his case. In fact, they will be seen to result from the ignorance of a finite and imperfect being who does not know that he is such and hence mistakenly thinks that what he alone knows is true, that is, is *aikantic* in character.

Three questions must be asked at this stage to appreciate Jainas' position regarding *anekāntavāda*, *syādvāda* and *nayavāda* and their validity: (1) to which tier of one's consciousness is reality, according to Jainas, *anekāntic*? (2) what is the *aikāntic* view of reality like? (3) how does a *sarvajna* perceive reality?

The doctrine of *anekāntavāda* (epistemological pluralism, perspectivism, the thesis that reality is multi-faceted) must be taken as maintaining that nothing about a thing could be affirmed absolutely, that all affirmations about a thing are true under certain conditions. Contrary to what Professor Daya Krishna holds, the commonsense perception of things is neither *anekāntic* nor *aikantic*. To a commonsense person, the phenomenal world is simply there as an empirical reality. For instance, in our everyday life we attribute qualities to objects as we observe them and we do not doubt their objective existence and their being not-otherwise. Our ordinary

perception is not of a *nayavādin* and *syadvādin*, and thus not of a pluralist in the philosophical sense. When I perceive a tomato as red, taste sugar as sweet, and hear the growl of a dog, the redness of the tomato, the sweetness of sugar and the growl of the dog are objectively given to me. While I perceive these qualities I carry no doubt that they must be there for all percipients. The statements I make to describe the world in my everyday life are unqualified affirmations and do not contain any element of uncertainty. It is only when I reflect phenomenologically and speculate about the others' perceptions of these qualities, or my own perceptions of them at different times, that I become convinced of *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*. Thus *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* and, emerging from them, *anekāntavāda* result from speculation, a critical reflection on whether an individual's perception of a thing, or of the world, at any given time is tantamount to the apodictic knowledge of it. The discovery that any single perspective of the world must not be mistaken for the knowledge of the whole picture of the world and that the statement or judgement I make about the world's constitution does not close the possibility of others' judgements about the world being equally tangible, would dawn on me according to Jainism from a critical examination of the knowledge I am capable of having of the world. The consciousness which does this critical examination transcends, as Kant and Husserl had suggested, the consciousness that adheres to naive realism. Because of the deep penetration into the essence of the consciousness-world relation and because of the constant stepping-back from the natural, ordinary attitude it would have toward the world, the Jaina epistemology is a kind of phenomenology. Jainas saw that every individual, being what he is as positioned in a particular spatio-temporal matrix and as harnessed to the law of *karma*, is capable of comprehending only a *naya* of whatever he bumps into. There is a distinctly epistemological understanding of the idea of *naya* in Jainism when the Jainas speak of the synthesis between *samgraha-naya* and *vyāvahāra-naya*. The analysis of these *nayas* is far removed from the commonsense level. *Samgraha-naya*, for jainas, is the universal characteristic and *vyāvahāra-naya* is the specific characteristic—a combination of the two *nayas* being evident in the aspect that is perceived by an individual in a given situation. When one perceives a patch of red colour, for example, the *samgrah-anaya* of what one sees as coloured is in the background while the *vyāvahāra-naya* of 'this is red' stands as overt and is related to one's intuition of the particular shade of 'red'. The shade of red, that is, the *vyāvahāra-naya* would vary from individual to individual. It would vary, even in the case

of the same individual observer from moment to moment, notwithstanding the fact that the *samgraha-naya* (the universal 'colouredness') would remain unaltered in the background.

The statement an individual makes about his encounter with whatever is given in his experience, Jainas emphasized, has to be a *syād*, or a relatively true, statement, since whatever there is arouses, as it were, different views in different people to be expressed in their own individual linguistic styles. *Nayavāda* and *syādvāda* are thus epistemological and logical theories respectively, not to be regarded as arising from the unreflected-on life one leads in the world, this life being governed by the belief that whatever one perceives and says about a thing is the whole truth about that thing. We know pretty well that, as laymen, all of us are naïve realists, and *nayavāda* (perspectivism) and *syadvāda* (what one can state about a thing is only relatively true) do not enter our lay consciousness. In the same way, our commonsense perception of the world cannot be called *aikāntic* because at that level there is no integrated, harmonized vision of the whole of existence. In our commonsense experience, things fall apart. There are around us and also inside us discrete events, objects, phenomena, which we are not able to tie together or harmonize with one another.

The *anekāntavāda-syādvāda-nayavāda* syndrome speaks of the subjectivist trait in Jaina philosophy. Jaina philosophy assumed that naïve realism governs man's day-to-day approach to the world, but the moment man transcends this approach he has to take note of the fact that different percipients accede to different facets of the universe and that therefore no single facet would contain the entire nature of the universe. Actually the Jaina concept of *naya* and, grafted on it, the concept of *syād*, are comparable to the concept of noesis in phenomenology and, as it was passingly mentioned above, to the concept of qualia in 'Consciousness Studies'. Noesis, like *naya*, is that aspect of a real, empirically given thing that one's sensation or perception or thought grasps. Thus the same real or empirically given thing would emit, so to say, different noeses to different sensing, perceiving or thinking individuals. For instance, the redness of the tomato perceived by one individual is not the same as that perceived by another individual. Surely this plurality of noeses is captured by different individuals, or captured by the same individual at different moments, when the same thing or quality is offered to their sensation, perception or thought. We do not know exactly how a *naya* originates, just as Husserl could not define the exact epistemological nature of the noesis.

Husserl, like Jainas, did suggest that in every knowledge situation the noesis is that sense or meaning which the perceiver or knower intuits out of the given empirical situation. The statement made by an individual expressing the noesis grasped by him would have something unique about it. Statements made by different persons and tied up to their noeses are therefore diverse descriptions of the noema, that is, of that which is *outside* and not necessarily related to or corresponds with the noetic realm. According to Husserl, the noetic is what the consciousness's intentionality is directed toward. From the natural, commonsense point of view, the intentionality of consciousness grasps the noetic as a meaningful 'something', but this something may not necessarily have a noema in actuality. The noesis may be a self-created entity. We do not know in what form it is there, or how it happens to engage the perceiver's consciousness. Our intentionality just *sees* its being there.

There is something akin to *naya* in the modern concept of qualia. Qualia are experiential properties of sensations, perceptions, feelings, and even of thoughts and desires. Qualia are intentional properties of whatever is given to consciousness, that is, they are the ways one perceives the given, one intuits whatever one runs into, one 'sees' one's own thought, one's own feeling, one's own perception in a unique, induplicable manner. Physicalist and behaviourist writers on the mind–body problem (one of the most influential of them today being Daniel Dennett) deny that there are qualia.[4] Yet the fact is that there is in the sentient, conscious individual always a feeling that the redness of the tomato he sees or the pain in the tooth he experiences are exclusively *his* feelings. Writers supporting the theory of qualia maintain that 'redness seen' and the 'pain felt' are basically first-person occurrences, subjective experiences, self-bound. When the Jainas' term '*naya*' is analysed from a psychological-epistemological-logical point of view we would discover that it, like the notions of noesis and qualia, would necessarily point to the complexity of the entire knowledge mechanism, its mystique so to say.

Professor Daya Krishna correctly points out:

> The contention that reality is *anekāntic* in character may ... be taken to mean that an object has an indefinite number of unactualized probabilities along with those that are actually known to us. In other words the actual manifested properties of an object do not exhaust its reality and hence it is an illusion to think that it has only those finite sets of properties which it manifests to us.[5]

Professor Daya Krishna's remark is actually attributable both to the noetic in the perceiver's or thinker's intentionality as well as to the qualia captured by a subject *vis-à-vis* whatever appears as a representation of the empirically given in his consciousness. However, what is to be remembered is that the *anekāntic* perspective characterizes the clearly subjectivist theories of *naya*, noeses and qualia, and results from a skeptical and critical attitude the mind would adopt regarding the man–world encounter, and not from the commonsense or natural outlook we have about the world's being there outside us. At the same time the *anekāntic* consciousness is not ontological since it would not be in a position to inter-relate the diversity of impressions it would contain.

Now to turn to the question how the *sarvajna* consciousness would look at reality. Needless to say, the *sarvajna* consciousness of reality would be *aikāntic*, because *sarvajnatā* takes place at a tier of consciousness that transcends both the natural, commonsense level and the logical and epistemological level. That is to say, the plurality of *nayas* and the *syād* uncertainty must not haunt one if one lives as a *kevalajnāni* (omniscient). One of the main suggestions in atheistic existentialism is that when the noetic-noematic realm is bracketed and consciousness is directed toward its own roots so the say, consciousness would attain the status of Being (or Nothing). Here the distinctiveness of the individual *nayas* or points of view and the relativity among *syād* propositions regarding reality collapse into one, homogeneous awareness of pure feeling of peace (Buddhists insightfully described it as *tathatā* or suchness). For Jainas, this pure feeling is *moksa* (release) from the *anekāntic* consciousness—it is the state transcendental to the ordinary and also to the logico-epistemological stages of living. Jainas underline the fact that omniscience (*sarvajnatā, kevala-jnāna*) is not coloured by reflectivity, and therefore not by *naya., syād-* and *anekāntic* perception—omniscience signifies infinite perception of all things as well as an infinite knowledge of all things in all their details juxtaposed. It is only when by some internal discipline one is overtaken by a mind-lifting or mind-deepening experience that one realizes that the *anekāntic* picture of reality is not ontologically true. For Jainas, the *kevala-jnāni*'s knowledge is by the highest possible intuition and it is absolute. Being limitless, this knowledge integrates all the facets of experience prevalent at the lower levels. The restrictions placed on knowledge at the commonsense tier and at the epistemic tier at which one cannot free oneself from fallibility are totally absent in the *kevalajnāni*'s self. The *kevala-jnāni* is thus necessarily *aikāntic*.

The main problem which the propounders of *sarvajnatā* or *kevala-jnāna* (omniscience) or, for that matter, of the absolutism of knowledge of the transcendentalist have to face is how the naïve realists' world-experience or the critical philosopher's multi-faceted world, giving rise to the *nayavāda-syadvāda-anekantavāda* syndrome and the reality of other minds, can be accounted for from the status of the *sarvajna* or the transcendental seer. Unless a *sarvajna* is able to meet this problem, and integrate the realist's reality and the transcendentalist's reality, *sarvajnatā* will remain the privilege of a few and isolate these few from the day-to-day and commonsense experience not only we but also they as 'flung-into-the-world' beings are condemned to. This is a problem which Jainas must have been aware of (although we have no reliable evidence of this) but were not able to solve.

References

1. Schiller, F.C.S., *Logic for Use: An Introduction to the Voluntarist Theory of Knowledge,* London, 1929, p. 77.
2. *Ibid*., pp. 77–8.
3. Daya Krisna, 'How Anekāntika is Anekānta? Some Reflections on the Jain Theory of *Anekāntavāda*,' *JICPR*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, p. 122.
4. Dennett, Daniel C., 'Quining Qualia' in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (Eds.), *Consciousness in Contemporary Science*, Oxford, 1988.
5. Daya Krishna, 'How Anekāntika is Anekānta? Some Reflections on Jain Theory of *Anekāntavāda*', p. 125.

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Response to Dr Mukund Lath's comment on 'Imaging Time in Music: Langer's View and Hindustani Rhythm'. Published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XVII, No. 1

Dr. Lath's critical reaction to my essay is a bit too bold. The two terms of the relation I have discussed are Hindustani rhythm and an aspect of Langer's aesthetics. Dr. Lath, it appears, is a stranger to both. He speaks of rhythm, more than once, as an art which is based on *alapa*. This is not only ambiguous but incorrect, as I hope to show a little later. And as for

his familiarity with Langer's aesthetics, its slightness is borne out by his own following words:

'I do not remember Langer's views, and I had read her book *only cursorily* and quite long back.' (Italics added)

Now, I do not mind Dr. Lath's forgetting what he read *quite long back*; such dimming is natural, with the passage of years. But I sure feel pained at the way (he says) he read Langer's book. Essays in philosophical aesthetics are not to be read 'only cursorily'. Such reading is no aid to intelligence; and if it becomes a habit, it can even lead to imprecision in writing.

But, of course, it is not enough to generalize. I should proceed piecemeal; and, to be fair to Dr. Lath, strictly in the light of the words that he himself uses. So I now set out to put, one by one, the various points that he makes; and my response, immediately after each point, so as to make for easy comprehension:

(a) 'Making Langer a *purvapaksa* does not seem a happy idea. Langer does not belong to a sophisticated tradition of rhythm *making* where *alapa* is central to the process.' (second italics added)

A part of what this extract contends may be put thus. I should not have focused on Langer's view because she is not a *maker* of rhythm. Now, I admit, I have no evidence to show that Langer ever *made* any rhythm. But, as a philosopher of art, she has surely made a serious attempt to *understand* what rhythm is. Does Dr. Lath wish to suggest that, to turn to our music, one should try to understand the views only of those Ustads or Pandits who create rhythmic cycles or patterns, and not of those aestheticians who seek to understand what our rhythm is, may be on the basis of their own long experience of listening to recitals of rhythm discriminatingly?

(b) After attending to the word, *making*, in the extract I have cited, let me now consider its closing words: 'a sophisticated tradition of rhythm making where *alapa* is central to the process'. Later, in his comments, Dr. Lath also attributes to me the view that '*tala* as parallel to the *raga*, [is] an independent form built up through a similar process of *alapa*'; and adds that I have argued that *tala* like *raga* is an independent *alapa*-based non-representational art'. Here, I rejoin thus:

Our own tradition of rhythm, as both practised and comprehended, is highly sophisticated; but it surely does *not* centre on *alapa*. A little attention to the words which Dr. Lath actually uses is enough to show where

and why he goes astray. *The process* he speaks of can only mean the act of rhythm-making. The paradigm of *alapa*, on the other hand, is provided by the non-verbal music (also *sans tala*) that precedes the singing of a *dhruvapad* composition which is duly set not only in a *raga* but in a specific *tala*. The making of rhythm, whether in the form of playing the basic cycle or in that of weaving rhythmic patterns, proceeds all along on the basis of, if not in direct correspondence with, beats (or *matras*) which follow each other at a carefully guarded even pace. Further, unfaltering and recurring—and, at times, also adroitly designed—return to the focal beat (or *sama*) is also an essential feature of rhythm-making in the field of Hindustani music to which alone my essay relates. The making of *alapa*, on the other hand, is surely not marked by any such feature, though in the case of some *dhruvapad*-singers of today a very slight and passing suggestion of evenly placed vocal emphases does seem to occur when the pace of *alapa* is intentionally quickened, after the initial reposeful stages. But the suggestion, I repeat, is quite subsidiary. And as for the semblance of a cyclic return to the focal beat, it is just not there in the *alapa* I speak of so. As an actual form of music that is available to us today, *alapa* can in no way be said to be central to the process of rhythm-making. Dr. Lath seems to be utterly unaware of the details I have distinguished. This is why he commits the mistake of suggesting that *alapa* is central to the process of sophisticated rhythm-making. The error is blatant, and is not at all covered up by his patriotic appeals to the Indian tradition and scholarly references to famous names and key concepts relating to our traditional thinking on the arts. And if he thinks, as he evidently does, that I hold and have even *argued for* the view 'that *tala* like *raga* is an independent *alapa*-based non-representational art', it is perhaps because he has read my essay quite as cursorily as the book of Langer he refers to (I do not name the book because he too does not!). I have nowhere likened *tala* (as rhythm-making) to *alapa* (-singing). If I have argued for the autonomy of rhythm as a distinct art, as I surely have, it is on the basis of some quite different features, such as the uniqueness of the material of rhythm—which comprises not only beats, but *bol*-s—and of its criteria of evaluation.

Incidentally, may I here draw readers' attention to the way Dr. Lath has phrased his remark I just cited: '*tala* like *raga* is an ... art'. So to speak is ambiguous, if not positively erroneous. It is common and proper to take art as a kind of mak*ing*; and rhythm, as mark*ing* time or as keep*ing laya* even. Thus, as activities, both are similar to each other. *Raga*, on the other

hand, has no such direct affinity with activity. It is simply the concept of a melodic matrix having an integrated and a specific perceptual character, though the proper *singing* of a *raga* may well be said to be an art. I find it difficult to blend such casualness in the use of words with genuine regard for our traditional scholars who often looked on verbal propriety as almost a sacred requirement; and the aplomb which yet shows up in Dr. Lath's comments on my essay therefore amuses me.

(c) The close of his criticism is a virtual reprimand. It accuses me of (almost) committing the 'theoretical sin' of ignoring traditional Indian thought on the subject, '[the] more so because I am an Indian and 'am thinking about an Indian art'. What can I say to this except that I wish Dr. Lath had also shown the way to my possible redemption by pointing out at least one clear error or deficiency in my theoretical concern with the art of rhythm (as it obtains today) *from the viewpoint of traditional art theory* which he is probably conversant with? The mere suggestion that 'thinking in the Indian conceptual context will ... prove richer and more stimulating' is hardly of any help to me. It is simply a general off-handed remark made condescendingly.

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Swaraj in Cultural Perspective

Swaraj is a compound of two words SWA and RAJ. While Raj means the same as 'control' or 'rule' and although Swa means 'one's own' (i.e. the self) but in political sense it refers to the nation. Nation is a group of human beings differentiated from other social units by its geographical boundaries, cultural and historical aspects, as well as its political and constitutional history. Thus the Swa of one nation is determined by its geographical boundaries, state of authority and by those numerous other things which constitute its nationality. Since all these factors take different shapes in different parts of world, the Raj takes particular form and colour depending upon the individuality of the participating persons. In the light of the form and expression of the Swa of a nation we shall try to find out the essential factors of Swaraj in cultural perspective. In this context it is proper to make it clear that our discussion shall be based entirely in the Indian context.

The above discussion, implies that Swaraj means 'own-government' or 'self-rule'. However, Swaraj can be viewed in two ways: Negative and Positive.

In its negative aspect Swaraj means freedom from the rule or control of other nations. Here Swaraj is a political concept. Political Swaraj can be achieved merely by overcoming conflicts among rival groups and nations. As long as a nation has enemies in any form its citizens cannot be absolutely free to regulate their lives and activities according to their will. For them, self-determination is a meaningless term as the people of a nation stand in perpetual fear of exploitation and subjugation by other nations. From this point-of-view no nation on the globe is in absolute terms free. Bipin Chandra Pal, a noted freedom fighter, rightly observed in his book *Swaraj*:

> They cannot act according to their own desires or work for their own good freely, that is, without regard to what their rivals and possible enemies are doing or may do at any time in the immediate future. Before the last war the British Budget had to be shaped not exclusively by the requirements of the British people, but by what Germany was doing, and the British Government had to starve its own subjects and deny them help which they so badly required ... . And just a glance at these obvious facts will prove how false indeed is the conceit of freedom and self-determination of even the most powerful nations...[1]

Therefore, Swaraj is not simply freeing a country from foreign rule or self-government. Freedom indicates the cutting of all outside political shakles so that a nation may shape and determine its own culture. It is a struggle for social regeneration. A true 'self-government' is not just the capture of political power but a means of self-realization by the people as a whole; a realization based on their self-regard and self-consciousness. Gandhiji has said, 'The Swaraj of my dream recognizes no race or religious distinction ... Swaraj is to be above all.'[2]

Mere political freedom becomes absolutely meaningless. It attains meaning in the context of the culture of a nation. The word 'culture' has been derived from Latin 'cola' meaning 'to cultivate'. Sir Edward Taylor defines 'culture' as 'that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.'[3]

Generally the term 'culture' is used in two senses. Narrowly, 'culture' is used for refinement of mind or maturity of mental outlook. It means

something cultivated or ripened, and it is opposed to raw and crude. Broadly, culture covers all aspects of life, knowledge, belief, art, morality, law, custom, and habit. It includes our way of thinking and acting. In this sense it has two aspects, material and intellectual. Man acts to satisfy his material needs. Albeit, material needs are necessary and important for him. But, no less important are the ways through which he procures or produces them. The objects and the procedure by which they are produced are man's material culture. But man has intellectual needs also. He pines for peace, and is interested in art, music, reading and religious discourses. All these come under man's mental or 'intellectual' culture. Both the cultures come under the general term 'culture'. So the culture of a society is the way of life, material and mental, which are transmitted from generation to generation. But at the root of every culture lies the belief in certain values. In other words, man in his cultural quests shows his deep concern for what is valuable. He is not only a creator but also a reckoner of values. He acts according to certain values which he cultivates and obtains from different sources. To quote Professor Ashok Kumar Verma, 'Values are not only our perspectives but our beliefs, not only our ideas but our faith. Values of life determine the nature of a society.'[4]

INNER CONTRADICTION IN INDIAN CULTURE

The ancient Indian society and culture was influenced by the Upanishadic vision which offered a world view wherein every existent animate or inanimate was seen as the expression of the Divine. Cosmic brotherhood and the principles of live and let live has been the primitive motto of Indian society. But, unfortunately, right from the Vedic period a dichotomy between theory and practice has been noticed. Inner contradiction is evidenced in Manu's classification of caste system. Intellectuals got the highest place in society. But can an intellect grow without the help of the other counterparts? Manual work is no less important. Both are interdependent. Due to wrong emphasis on established values of life (*Artha, Kama, Dharma* and *Moksha*), there appeared a dichotomy in the society. Whereas, on the one hand the members worshipped Gods in the temples, they indulged in corruption outside. Spiritually we may be believers in *Advaita* (oneness), but we divide the society on the basis of caste and religion. In other words, a dual personality develops. Outside influence also has been responsible to a great extent for the acceleration of the problem. Habits at two different places differ due to their differing climate, conditions, progress in science, morality and philosophy.

PRIMACY OF CULTURAL SWARAJ

The cultural bond of the Indian nation has been much stronger than the political. The Swaraj which India enjoyed was primarily cultural. Westerners attach inordinate importance to politics and consider 'political swaraj' to be the primary one. However, 'cultural swaraj' emphasized upon spiritual and intellectual advancement. Enormous respect for such abiding values made India prosper, at least, on the level of the intellect despite enormous political upheavals. The primary object of higher education in India has been ethical and spiritual.

Despite hundreds of years of political slavery India maintained her 'Cultural Swaraj' even during the British rule. The following sentences of Sir Thomas Munro testify the idea:

> If a good system of agricultural, unrivalled manufacturing skill, a capacity to produce whatever can contribute to either convenience or luxury, schools established in every village for teaching, reading, writing and arithmetic, the general practice of hospitality and charity, amongst such each other and above all a treatment of the female sex full of confidence, respect and delicacy are among the signs which denote civilized people—then the Hindus are not inferior to the nations of Europe, and if civilization is to become an article of trade between England and India, I am convinced that England will gain by import cargo.[5]

FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR DECAY IN CULTURAL SWARAJ

However, the rapid spread of English education affected the Indian culture tremendously. It produced Indians in blood and colour, but English in taste, opinions, morals and intellect too. No doubt social evils, such as sati and polygamy, to a great extent, have been cast aside under the influence of English education and culture. But the tremendous disadvantage brought by English education was so great that the good things were all weighed down. Education must be an assimilation of life building, man making and character making ideas. Devoid of it, mere informatory knowledge is worthless. It is culture that provides prestige and resistance against odds. Knowledge without culture produces only savagery. To quote Swami Vivekanand, 'Knowledge is only skin deep, as civilization is, and a little scratch brings out the old savage . . . . They will get information, but something more is necessary; give them culture. Until you give them that, there can be no permanence in the raised condition of the massess.'[6]

Hence, we find that culture is closely correlated to knowledge of which education is a means.

Education is a means to an end. That end is, of course, knowledge. But all knowledge is not desirable, e.g. the kind of knowledge which enables one to practice unfair means more efficiently and more scientifically is condemnable. From this point of view, the spread of knowledge of destructive devices (like guns and poisonous gases) is deplorable. Such knowledge has affected the culture of the whole world disastrously. It is the result of a delusion that the practical applications of physical science to the art of war would make wars less frequent and less destructive. The wars of the present century have frustrated this expectation.

It means that the end of education is right knowledge. But what is right knowledge? For ancient scholars, Eastern as well as Western, the goal of knowledge was ethical and spiritual advancement. They strove to keep the struggle for animal existence to the lowest point of animal necessity in order that one might be free from moral corruption, and, thereby, devote more time and energy to the higher and more arduous struggle for spiritual development than he would otherwise be able to do.

NEED OF CULTURAL SWARAJ

Modern culture is based on the principle of the satisfaction of the sensual desires of man. Education has been commercialized. It has effaced, to a large extent, the old line of demarcation between education for culture and education for livelihood. The domain of knowledge has undoubtedly been expanding widely and rapidly, but the domain of wisdom has equally been contracting. The Western Litterateurs have, no doubt, widened the spectrum of knowledge to a great extent and, thereupon, have made people at large perplexed and bewildered. But, sadly speaking, they have failed to point out a rational goal of one's life. The inventive miracles of the West, however, have enabled it to build up its colossal fabric of industrial civilization and to exploit the weaker people of the globe. From the purely material standpoint, therefore, it has gained at least temporarily. Though India has also gained from Western civilization, but the losses due to it, completely overshadow the gains. Its spread has led to physical and moral degradation. Moreover, it has contributed to the destruction of genuine village self-government, decay of indigenous industry and of communal concord. Striving for mere political Swaraj on the Western model, even if desirable, is totally futile. The salvation of India depends upon the revival of her cultural Swaraj.

CONCLUSION: THE ATTAINMENT OF CULTURAL SWARAJ

For the promotion of cultural Swaraj numerous educational organizations and institutions have been established in the past fifty years. The sole purposes of such organizations have been the propagation of ancient Indian culture, art and medicine. Emphasis is being laid on 'Brahmacharya'. Discipline of simple living and selflessness can rescue humanity from the morass of militarism, malevolence, greed, selfishness, destitution etc. Without simple life and self-abnegation, genuine altruism is not possible. The ideal of education has been to produce a whole man, physically, intellectually and morally. Religion, morality, education and conduct are interblended ideals. These ideals benefit humanity on the whole, as the social system based on these ideals is very stable as well as happy. Swaraj is a means for the attainment of these ideals and ultimately the basis for cultural excellence.

India garnered Political Swaraj fifty years ago, but its cultural Swaraj has been outweighed resulting in social crisis at various levels. Invertebracy has been increasing among the average Indians. Matters relating to sanitation, education, industry and even social reforms, which could have been managed at the community level, are left to rely totally on the help and initiative on the part of the government. Now-a-days, Indians, bitterly complain about the inactivity on the part of the leaders but are oblivious of the elementary principles of progress. A feeling of helplessness and dependence has overwhelmed our people. It has left them sullen and resentful of those who hold the reins of patronage. Arun Shourie has rightly said in his article 'Reflection':

> A political system can thrive only if ordinary people have the opportunity as well as the self-confidence to bring their governors to account. Mahatma Gandhi often emphasized that Swaraj would not come when a few acquired authority from the British but when all acquired the capacity to resist authority when it was abused; that independence would be real only if it meant independence of people and not just of their rulers.[7]

'Swaraj' would come only when the average person become conscious of the fact that he is the maker of his destiny and when he begins to act as such. The objective of 'Swaraj' is the establishment of a non-exploitative and egalitarian society. The institutional arrangements and patterns of relationship there, are arranged in such a manner that the economy, polity

and society cannot be exploited. Moreover, the weakest can share in the process of decision-making and realize their fullest potential through the merit of self-actualization. All these are possible only if the cultural aspect (discussed above) of the society is emphasized. This type of society is attainable through the ladder of 'Cultural Swaraj'.

Cultural independence is a must but the actual reality of the world today is that the spatial and temporal factors between two countries are shrinking gradually. One culture is bound to affect another one, and one will overtake the other if it has the quality of survival. In this way it appears to me that in spite of cultural independence, which is possible only if there is political independence, every country is inching towards a composite culture which we may call a world culture. Such a culture will not subjugate the culture of other countries but assimilate itself into it. It would neither be the Western culture, nor the Indian culture, not even the Asian culture or American culture, and there would be no divide between the Eastern and Western culture.

In a nutshell, the way out for the achievement of Cultural Swaraj is to cultivate those new values which are beneficial to the society and ultimately to mankind, and to discard those old ones which have turned useless in changed circumstances. In this way there would be an amalgam of the old and new. Let society accept this change. It would create a new unified personality. The duality would be over, and a new modern society would emerge. And it will be for the first time in the history of the world that for the attainment of Swaraj (self-rule), the basis will be culture.

References

1. Bipin Chandra Pal, *Swaraj*, National Printers and Publishers, Bombay, 1922, p. 2.
2. M.K. Gandhi, *Young India*, 3. 1. 1925.
3. Edward Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, London, 1891.
4. Professor Ashok Kumar Verma, 'Cultural Crisis in Indian Society', *Patali Chakra*, Patna, March 2, 1996, No. xxvi, p. 3.
5. Sir Thomas Munro, quoted in P.N. Bose, *Swaraj—Cultural and Political*, Usha Publications, New Delhi, 1986, p. 40.
6. *Selections from the Complete Works of Swami Vivekanand*, Advaita Ashrama, Publication Department, Calcutta, p. 282.
7. Arun Shourie, 'Reflection', *Seminar*, October 1975, p. 31.

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Agenda for Research

1. PRAVṚTTI, KARMA AND DOṢA

The Indian philosophical thinking has centered around the notions of *Pravṛtti*, *Karma* and *Doṣa*. Each of these needs a close analysis and the interrelationship between them mapped in detail so that a clearer picture may emerge of the way different philosophical traditions dealt with them. The notion of Karma, for example, differs widely in the Mīmāṁsā, Vaiśeśika and the Jain traditions. So also is the case with Advaita Vedānta where even *Upāsanā* is treated as a Karma. On the other hand, the notion of Karma in the Bhagwad Gita is treated primarily as concerned with the socio-political realm. Sāṁkhya seem to treat both *Pravṛtti* and *Karma* as essentially divided into the *Sāttvika*, *Rājasika* and *Tāmasika*.

The different concepts and insights developed in this context have to be articulated and developed independently of the context in which they arose and their relation to consciousness and language explored in such a way as to bring out the presuppositions involved in them.

Indian thinkers who have developed the theory of knowledge, action and feeling (primarily in the context of Alaṁkāra Śāstra), have to be brought together into one focus so that a unified theory of consciousness may be developed and made available to the contemporary thought in this regard.

2. BENARAS EXPERIMENT

Attention is drawn to a unique experiment that was done at Benaras during the second half of the nineteenth century. After the establishment of Sanskrit College there it was felt that one of the best ways of making the classical Indian tradition of philosophy 'alive' once more would be to have a continuous 'living' interaction between Western and Indian philosophical traditions through the translation of the classical texts of each into the languages of the other. Thus, a massive enterprise of the translation of various philosophical texts into English and of some of the major works of the British Empiricists into Sanskrit was undertaken. A journal entitled *PANDIT* was launched in whose pages such translations were to be published regularly. In the course of this enterprise the following portions of works from Locke and Berkeley were translated into Sanskrit and published in the Journal.

LOCKE:
Volume X
(a) Pp. 54–59 June, 1877 (b) Pp. 103–109 July, 1877
(c) Pp. 167–176 August, 1877

Volume XI
(a) Pp. 231–257 September, 1877 (b) Pp. 359–363 November, 1877

BERKELEY
Volume VII
(a) Pp. 22–23 June, 1875 (b) Pp. 67–69 August, 1875
(c) Pp. 135–137 November, 1875 (d) Pp. 163-165 April, 1876

For some reason the translation of these works stopped, as no other portions from these works are found in the pages of the Journal. It will be interesting to see the response of modern Sanskrit scholars in the field of Indian Philosophy, who do not know the English language to these translated portions of the well-known works of Locke and Berkeley.

In addition to this the journal contains other interesting articles. The whole set is a rich mine for investigating the intellectual climate of those times and may prove immensly rewarding to anyone who undertakes its study seriously.

3. *ŚABDA PRAMĀṆA* AS *ĀPTOPADEŚAḤ ŚABDAḤ.* IN GAUTAM'S *NYĀYA SŪTRA*

Gautama in his *Nyāya Sutra* defines *Śabda Pramāṇa* as *Āptopadeśaḥ Śabdaḥ*. The definition questions the Apauraeṣeyatva of the Veda and suggests that only the *Upadeśa* of *Āpta Puruṣa* can be regarded as authentic. But, then, the question arises as to who is an *Āpta Puruṣa*. He cannot be equated with Īśwara as there will be little point in calling him 'Āpta'.

The issue is taken up for discussion in Samanta Bhadra's *Āpta Mīmāṁsā*, a Jain work, where it is subjected to a detailed analysis which has not been paid sufficient attention up till now.

The issue regarding the definition of *Āpta* in the Nyāya tradition thus needs to be explored in detail and the reply that was given to Samant Bhadra's observations by subsequent Nyāya thinkers needs to be pursued further by those who are interested in this aspect of the Nyāya Philosophy. Also, it needs to be found, as to when the doctrine of the God's authorship of the Vedas was formulated in Nyāya and how this was made to accord with the definition of the Śabda Pramāṇa as given in the Nyāya Sūtras.

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JICPR. XVII-3

Focus

I

Attention is drawn to the following statement of Russell which prima facie, seems strange, specially as it suggests that the 'moral' quality of one's consciousness may affect one's intellectual work:

> By this time I had secured Whitehead's cooperation in this task, but the unreal, insincere and sentimental frame of mind into which I had allowed myself to fall affected even my mathematical work. ... This defect in my work was due to a moral defect in my state of mind.
>
> [The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1967, p. 151] .

II

Most religions believe in some sort of life after death, and religions which have originated in India believe in rebirth also. Yet, the evidence regarding these is difficult to find and even more difficult to believe. In the case of India most philosophical schools believe both in the theory of karma and the theory of rebirth which are integrally related to each other. The hypothesis is difficult to sustain in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Yet the well-authenticated counter-cases are to be collected and critically evaluated in as 'objective' a manner as possible. We give below details of the following two books in this connection:

1. *Twenty Cases: Suggestive of Reincarnation,* by Ian Stevenson, M.D., University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA, 1974.
2. *Ravindranath Ki Parlok Charcha,* published originally in Bengali by Amitabh Choudhury and translated into Hindi by Bharati Bhakt, published by Rajkamal Prakashan, New Delhi, 1998.

DAYA KRISHNA

Notes and Queries

REPLY TO QUERIES

1. Dhvani and Vyanjanā published in the JICPR, *Vol. XVII, No.1.*

a) Anandavardhana does not claim that he is disucssing the theory of Dhvani for the first time, and he talks of this theory as a well-known principle. In fact in the very first Kārika of his Dhvanyāloka he explicitly says that the principle of Dhvani is already a well-known theory in scholarly circles.

In sahityasastra the word Dhvani is used in different contexts to denote five meanings which are (i) the suggestive word, (ii) the suggestive meaning, (iii) the meaning suggested, (iv) the process of poetic suggestion, and (v) the poem where this process materialises. Dhvani therefore has a wider connotion in the field of Kāvya.

The credit for establishing Dhvani theory could be given to Anandavardhana owing to the fact that no other earlier work is available on Dhvani-theory in Kāvya and also owing to the fact that he was the first Acharya to have discussed the implications of Vyanjanā in Kāvya at such an extensive level.

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b) There are similar terms like Dhavanana, Dyotana, Vyanjanā, Pratyayana, Āvāgamana and Prakaśanā to express the fourth power function (distinct from the three—abhidha, tātparya and lakṣanā), *Vyanjanā Vyāpara.* However, a mere presence of *Vyangyasamsparaśa* (suggestion) does not constitute *Dhvani.* What constitutes *dhvani* is that *Vyangya* which is also exclusively important in relation to other elements of beauty in the poem and ideal poetry itself can be none other than *Dhvani.* In fact *Dhvani* is the name of the whole poetic process. It is the basic principle of poetic creation.

It is Anandavardhana's contention that only the *dhvani* theory can adequately explain all the facts of the poetic process to the satisfaction of the creative poet on the one hand and the appreciative critic on the other. He succeeded not only in laying his finger on *rasa* as the soul of Poetry but

also in offering an explanation of it in terms of *dhvani*. Although *Dhvani* is the quintesssence of poetry, and *rasa* is the quintessence of *dhvani*. Dhvani is an exclusively poetic feature concerned with exploiting the beauty of every element in the medium of language like *alaṁkāra, guṇa* and *rīti* to serve the ultimate artistic end of *rasa*.

In verse 13 of uddyota 1, Anandavardhana defines *dhvani* that the suggested sense must be dominant over the expressed sense (*vachyartha*) in order that the piece of composition be the proper locus of *dhvani*. The term dhvani, therefore, is applicable not only to vyangyārtha or the deliberate use of *vyanjanā vyāpāra,* but also to all the constituent factors of suggestion of poetry. He further says that not only suggestive meanings and suggestive expressions can serve the purpose of *Kāvyātman* but the art of arrangement, the effective employment of them flashes suddenly across the truth-perceiving mind of perceptive critics.

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2. Vedas and Upaniṣada as part of Śruti, published in the JICPR, *Vol. XVII, No. 1.*

We can make an effective attempt to appreciate the *'Śruti'* in the light of following fundamental facts based on texts:

The Upaniṣada are not metaphysical speculations but precious manuals of *Sādhanā* of the ancient *ṚṢIS*. We hear of many *Vidyās* in them and of the spiritual disciplines or *Sādhanās* by which one sets out to realize and live the truth envisaged and taught to him by the seer, his teacher, the Acharya. Thus these are not only books of knowledge, but also of Upāsanā or the way by which one may attain and realize what is theoretically known in one's own being and consciousness.

It was Jaimini who propounded the theory that though Mantra and Brāhmaṇa together form the *Veda*, the former has value in so far as it subserves the purpose of the ritual for which the Brāhmaṇa are the sole supreme eternal authority. Thus the Upaniṣads which form part of the Brāhmaṇas, are treated by the Mīmāṁsā-school only as a supplement or subsidiary to the Brāhmaṇas. The Mīmāmsakas therefore use the word *stuti* only to mean the Brāhmaṇas, while to the later teachers of the Vedanta, the term means the Upaniṣads. This is the position that has been in vogue for many centuries now.

Although *Śruti* and *Smṛti* are related Vedic terms, the former denotes the inspirational, spiritual audience, the latter intuitive discovery on what has been heard by the mystical subtle hearing. That is why *Smṛti* or Dharmaśāstra is supposed to be a discovery of the sense of the *'Śruti'* which was lost to the direct hearing.

In fact the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣada are the record of a powerful revival which took the sacred texts and ritual as a starting point for the new statement of spiritual thought and expression. If the Brahmaṇas represent the conservation of forms, the Upaniṣads represent the revelation of the Soul of the Veda.

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3. Reply to Query raised by Dr. Mukund Lath on the statement on Atreya Brāhmaṇa published in the JICPR, *Vol. XVII, No. 1.*

Re: Flexibility/Freedom in Performance of Rituals

The Mīmāmsā school accepts the whole of the Vedas as valid with certain riders. They have divided the vedic sentences into four categories, viz. Vidhi, Arthavāda, Mantra and Nāmadheya. The validity of these four categories is to be ascertained depending upon their ability in teaching a Vidhi (an act to be performed) or a pratisheda (an act to be desisted from). This amounts to saying that only those sentences which propound a vidhi or a pratisheda are valid and all the other sentences, viz. Arthavāda, Mantra and Nāmadheya etc., though a part of Veda and though they convey some meaning by themselves, are not valid in so far as they do not teach us that an act is productive of Dharma or Adharma. The validity of vedic sentences depends on their import of conveying an unknown thing, i.e. not known through other means of knowledge. Vedas will become redundant if they are meant to teach us those things which are known or can be known through other means of knowledge. Therefore, those sentences which directly prescribe a Vidhi or a pratisheda and those other sentences which convey the other details like what are (the results) to be achieved, which are the means for achieving them and in what manner they are to be achieved are valid only when they are taken together with the vidhi-vākya or pratisheda-vākya and not independently.

The very definition of Dharma in Mīmāṁsā is that it is a means which is not known by temporal knowledge as a means to attain a result called Śreyas. That an act is a means to attain Dharma is not known by sense perception, inference etc. It is known only through the vedic sentences and hence the vedas are a separate source of valid knowledge; not otherwise. At the same time, those sentences which do not convey a vidhi or a pratisheda cannot be dismissed as useless; in that case they become invalid and such a situation is not desirable. Hence they are classified as auxiliary sentences to the vidhi and pratisheda sentences; in that case, they become valid in combination with those sentences conveying a vidhi or pratisheda. Vedic sentences other than vidhi-vākyas, i.e. Arthavāda, Mantra and Nāmadheya do not convey a vidhi or pratisheda and they are not meant for conveying a means for attaining a śreyas, i.e. Dharma. All the words and sentences do convey some meaning and when they are analysed to decide their purport it is to be concluded that a particular sentence is in praise of an act or derides an act. Thus stuti or a nindā encourages or discourages a person to undertake an act of ritual and hence the sentence, forming a mahāvākya alongwith vidhi-vākya, becomes valid. Now, the present sentence quoted by Dr. Mukund Lath from Atreya Brāhmana says that the Āhuti to Agni is a heavenly offering, i.e. heaven-producing offering. Therefore, whether it is ordered by a Brāhmaṇa or not (generally vidhi-vākyas are from Brāhmaṇa portions of the vedas); or, whether it is uttered by a non-brahmin (only brahmins are eligible to act as ritviks); or even if it is uttered by a ritvik improperly, it reaches the particular god to whom it was intended and there is no sin incurred due to a lacuna. This is clearly a praising of the ritual, inducing the doer to perform it.

In the second sūtra of second pāda of first adhyāya of Mīmāmsā Sūtra (1–2–2)=Shāstradṛshṭa Virodhācca, Jaimini has raised this question, i.e. there is shāstra virodha in certain sentences; and there is pratyaksha virodha in some other sentences. Then, how can these sentences be accepted as valid? This is called Arthavāda Adhikaraṇa where there are six sūtras in pūrvapaksha and the siddhānta from seventh sūtra—where it is said that praising words help the performer by inducing him in the performance of the ritual. Where there appears a contradiction in Shāstraic sentences, there the conveyed meanings of the words are not intended but only praise of the ritual and therefore, there is no contradiction. However, in these instances, the denoted meanings of the words are not taken as telling

something but simply meaning praise. This kind of overlooking the conveyed meanings is not a defect as long as the vidhi in the Mahāvākya, i.e. group of sentences conveying one meaning is maintained. The whole of the pāda two of first Adhyāya in Mīmāmsā Shāstra deals with this subject from different angles and concludes that one vidhi is to be accepted as main and all the other sentences in that prakaraṇa are to be treated as supporting that vidhi in various ways so that no sentence is invalid or redundant. If this position is not accepted then there arise numerous objections and the premiss that the entire veda is valid will fall apart as a house of cards.

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4. What was the Mīmāṁsaka's reply to Śamkara's contention in his commentary on the Īsopaniṣad?

It is true that mīmāṁsaka's dear contention is that the whole Veda is meant for including a human being into some action or the other. But it is just a partial view of the truth.

Two points may be taken into consideration:

(i) When we use the convenient short form, namely, '*mīmāṁsā*' what we are significantly missing is the adjective namely, *purva* which is very important.

Pūrvamīmāṁsā, while interpreting the Veda, primarily concerns itself with the *pūrva* or prior part of the Veda, i.e. mainly upto the *Āraṇyakas* excluding the *Upaniṣada*. It is true that some *upaniṣada* form an integral part of the *Saṁhitās*, some that of the *Brāhmaṇas* and others some of *Āraṇyakas*. But it is also equally important to remember that, here, perhaps, the term '*upaniṣad*' is applicable to those portions of the Veda which do not as it were, prescribe any ritual of yāga but rather discuss matters like the nature of soul, salvation and how to realize it and so on and so forth. And hence, it is indirectly accepted that the consideration of the interpretation of the *upaniṣada* is the area of *uttara-mīmāṁsā* and not that of the *pūrvamīmāṁsā*. In other words, the Veda is divided into two sections: *Karma*-section and *Jñana*-section. *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* deals with *Karma*-section and *Uttara-mīmāṁsā* with the *Jñana* section. Hence, mīmāṁsakas are not at all disturbed with the interpretations put forth by *Uttara-mīmāṁsā*.

Sánkara, being one of the great pioneers of the *Uttara-mīmāṁsā,* is no exception to this.

(ii) If one seeks an answer to the above query from the system itself then: The system has divided the whole Veda into five different types of sentences. It is well accepted in the system that though the entire Veda aims at some activity or the other, it is not the case that each and every sentence of the Veda is prescriptive. There are some descriptive sentences also in the Veda, nevertheless, they do have some connection with some action or the other. Thus, the significance and validity of *arthavādas* or narrative sentences and also of the *mantras* or incantations to be recited in the rituals are established. Thus, upaniṣadic sentences which are not prescriptive may fall under the category of either of the two mentioned above namely, *mantra* or *arthavād.* Nevertheless, there are sentences like *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ Śrotavyo mantavyaḥ* ... (Brhadā-*raṇyaka upaniṣad*) which prescribe the act of knowing the self. Some mīmāṁsakas add the point here that whatever is performed with full knowledge is more effective. Thus, if one performs a ritual after having 'knowledge' of the self as prescribed by the *upaniṣada* he will be a greater gainer. One can also have a prescription (of course, an inferred one) from the upaniṣadic passages where no explicit ritual is seen.

To conclude, one may also remember that the line, 'a person should desire to live 100 years on this earth by performing various activities'
कुर्वन्ने वेह कर्माणि जिजी बिषेत् शतं समा:
is very much from the same *Īṣā-vasyopaniṣad* while commenting on which Śankara has had, as it were, a difficult time and explains it as follows: 'this passage is meant for a person who is incapable of *ātmajñāna*'.

In fact this is the contention of Śankara regarding all rituals and sacrifices that all these activities are meant for those who are just beginners on the path of the ultimate goal. These activities help these people purify their minds which is a necessary requisite on the path of knowledge.

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5. Reply to the Query on 'Ghaṭo Ghaṭaḥ' published in the JICPR, *Vol. XV, No. 2.*

"घटो घट:" इति वाक्यं न प्रमाणम्"

अभेदान्नयबोधश्च विरूपोपस्थितयोरेवेति व्युत्पत्ति:। विरुद्ध-धर्माभ्यामुपस्थितयोरेव अभेदान्वयबोधो भवतीत्यर्थ:। यया "नीलो घट:" इत्यत्र नीलत्वघटत्वाभ्यां विरुद्ध-धर्माभ्यामुपस्थितयो: नीलघटयो: अभेदान्वयबोधो भवति। घटत्वघटले न विरुद्धधर्मौ। अत: "घटो घट" इत्यत्र घटत्वावच्छिन्ने घटत्वावच्छिन्नस्य अभेदसम्बन्धेन शब्दबोधो न भवति। विधेयांशेऽधिकावगाहि-शब्दबोधस्वीकारात् "घटो नीलघट:" इत्यत्र अभेदान्वयबो-धो भवति। तत्र विधेयां शो नीलस्याधिकस्य-प्रवेशात्। "घटो घट:" इत्यत्र च उद्देश्यकोटौ विधेयकोटौ च केवलघटस्यैव प्रवेशात् विधेयकोटौ अधिकावगाहित्वाभावेन अभेदान्वयबोधो न जायते।

तद्धर्मावछिन्नाभेदसंसर्गावच्छिन्न प्रकारतानिरूपित विशेष्यतावच्छेदकतासम्बन्धेन शब्दबुद्धित्वावछिन्नं प्रति तद्धर्मभेद: कारणम्। "द्रव्यं घट:" इत्यत्र घटत्वावछिन्नाभेद सम्बन्धावच्छिन्न प्रकारतानिरूपित विशेष्यतावच्छेदकता सम्बन्धेन द्रव्यत्वे जायमान शब्द बुद्धित्वावाछिन्नं प्रति द्रव्यत्वे घटत्वभेद: कारणम्। घटाभिन्नं द्रव्यमिति शब्दबोधो जायते। यत्र विशेष्यतावछेदक प्रकारतावछेदकयो: भेदो वर्तते, तत्रैवाभेदान्वयबोधो भवतीति सिद्धम्। "द्रव्यं घट" इत्यत्र द्रव्यत्वं विशेष्यतावछेदकं, घटत्वं प्रकारतावछेदकम्। "घटो घट" इत्यत्र तु घटत्वमेव विशेष्यतावछेदकं प्रकारतावच्छेदकयेति विशेष्यतावछेदक प्रकारतावच्छेदकयो: भेदाभावात् अभेदान्वयबोधो न भवति। अयत्र कार्यकारणभाव: शब्दबुद्धि प्रति पृथगुक्त:।

ज्ञानसामान्ये सर्वानुगत: कार्यकारणभाव: तद्धर्मान्यवृत्ति विषयतासम्बन्धेन ज्ञानं प्रति तद्धर्मभेद: कारणम्। ज्ञानत्वं व्यापकधर्म:। शब्दबोधत्वं व्याप्यधर्म:। व्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्ने कार्ये जननीये व्यापकधर्मावछिन्नकार्यस्य सामग्री अपेक्षिति। ज्ञानमात्रं घटत्वान्यवृत्ति विषयतासम्बन्धेन घटत्वभिन्ने एव वर्तते। एवस्य व्यापकीभूत ज्ञानत्वावछिन्नोत्पादक सामग्री घटत्वभेदघटितेति "घटो घट" घटत्वभेदविरहान्न घटत्वे उक्तज्ञानापत्ति:। अत: शब्दबोधाजनकं "घटो घट" इति वाक्यं न प्रमाणम्।

संशयनिवर्तकं यत् तदेव प्रमाणं भवितुमर्हति। "घटो घट" इति वाक्यस्य न कस्यापि संशयस्य निवर्तकम्। द्रव्ये घटत्व घटत्वाभावोभयावगाहि "द्रव्यं घटो न वा" इत्याकारक-संशयनिवर्तकत्वेन "द्रव्यं घट" इति वाक्यं प्रमाणम्। प्रकृते "घटो घटो न वा" इति संशयो नास्ति। तस्य घटे घटत्व-घटत्वाभावोभयावगाहित्वेन आहार्यत्वं वर्तते। बाधकालीछवाजन्यं ज्ञानं आहार्यम्। तच्च न कस्यापि प्रतिबध्यं, प्रतिबन्धकस्य भवति। अतो "घटो घट" इति वाक्यं प्रमाणं भवितुं नार्हति।

तादात्म्यसम्बन्धावछिन्न प्रतियोगिताकत्वमन्योन्याभावस्य लक्षणम्। घटतादात्म्यस्य घटे वर्तताम्। परन्तु "तादात्म्यसम्बन्धेन घटो घटेऽस्ति" इति प्रतीतिरापादयितुं न शक्ये। तादात्म्यसम्बन्धस्य वृत्त्यनियामकत्वात्। "घटतादात्म्यवान् घट" इत्यपि प्रतीतिरापादयितुं न शक्यते। विधेयस्य घटतादात्म्यस्य उद्देश्यतावछेदकरूपत्वाङीकारे घटतादात्म्यं घटत्वस्वरूपमेव। तदानीमुद्देश्यतावछेदक विधेययो: ऐक्यात् भेदाभावात् तदाक्यं अप्रमाणमेव भवति।

अपि च शाब्दबोधे आकांक्षापि कारणम्। प्रकृते घटत्ववदुद्देश्यक घटत्वविधेयक शब्दबोधजनने आकांक्षा नास्ति। आकांक्षाभ्रमात् जायमान: शब्दबोध: प्रकृते भ्रमात्मक:। अत: तज्जनकं "घटो घट" इति वाक्यं सर्वधाप्रमाणमेव भवति।

एवस्य "घटो घट" इति वाक्यं नैयायिकैरवश्यं प्रमाणत्वेन अङीकर्तव्यमिति नास्ति नियम:, नास्ति सिद्धान्तस्य।

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C. QUERY

1. What exactly is the difference between Śābdi Bhāvanā and Ārthī Bhāvanā?

   What is the significance of this difference in the understanding of the relation between language and action?

DAYA KRISHNA

2. If there were no snake at all, would it still be possible to mistake a rope for a snake?

Goralkot, Binsar, P.O. Ayarpani VIVEK DATTA
Almora U.P.

3. (a) What exactly does the word 'Brahman' signify according to Śaṁkara? Does it signify an individual or a universal or both? If it signifies an individual, is it devoid of descriptive content? If it signifies a universal, what is it? Is it a mere generic form, a generic characteristic or a generic idea? What is its logical status?

Is it illegitimate to ask, what exactly does the word 'Brahan' mean when it is beyond all the linguistic categories?

Does every word form Śaṁkara mean a 'Universal'? If Brahman is devoid of descriptive contents, how it is to be identified?

(b) Can we significantly refer to things that are not there? Does the act of signifying put its 'performer', that is, one who utters the performation in touch with what it signifies? How it can be denied of descriptive content if it signifies universal?

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4. Suppose Mr. X realizes the Advaitic Brahman, will he be able to make that claim (not just speak etc.) by making the statement *aham brahmāsmi*? Will he be able to tell Mr. Y *'tat tvam asi'* and *'sarvam khalvidam brahma'?*

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Book Reviews

ANIL GUPTA and NUEL BELNAP: *The Revision Theory of Truth*. The M.I.T. Press, Massachusetts, Institute of Technology, 1993, pp. 299.

The book is organized as follows:

Chapter 1 offers an exhaustive and critical presentation of the existing theories of truth. It is meticulously argued that 'these methods ... do not preserve all the features of our ordinary notion of truth and of our ordinary language' (p. 10). The thesis put forward seems to lay its foundation on the crucial assumptions viz., 'truth is a circular concept' and 'there is nothing wrong with circular definitions'.

The problem to be solved is formulated as follows:

'Given a first-order language L with a distinguished predicate T that means "true-in-L", and given a classical model M of the T-free fragment of L, construct a systematic account of the signification of T that yields a classification of the sentences of L into true/false/paradoxical/etc. a classification that conforms to our ordinary intuitions and uses of "true".

and

yields an interpretation of T-biconditionals that is in accord with the Signification Thesis' (p. 32).

Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to describe and critique the well-known 'fixed-point' theory of truth. It is argued that 'fixed-points yield languages that contain their own truth predicates' and 'fixed points are correct interpretations of truth not in general but only ... if there is not vicious reference in the language' (p. 85).

Chapter 4 presents an informal formulation of the revision theory of definitions (formally developed in Chapter 5) which turns out to be strikingly useful in making this work accessible to a wider audience. It is argued that 'every kind of pathological behaviour that the concept of truth exhibits can be mirrored in concepts with circular definitions' and also that 'a more general logic of definitions is possible that will show us how to make sense of and work with circular definitions' (p.117). In order to achieve this goal, the authors have exploited the notion of 'extension of predicate under various hypotheses' and 'if under all possible hypotheses...' to attain 'categoricalness'.

In Chapter 5, a general theory of definitions is developed and it is shown to adequately accommodate circular and mutually independent concepts. The modules exploited, name a few, are the following: 'truth depends on meaning and facts' (p. 21), 'The weak notion of truth carries more information ... work if the language is rich in logical resources' (p. 22) etc. Despite the involvement of some sophisticated mathematical concepts, such as ordinals, cofinality, stability, etc., every detail is lucidly worked out to arrive at a sufficiently rich construction to meet the demands of 'content' and 'conservativeness' simultaneously. The resulting ideas are applied to the concepts of truth, categoricalness, and necessity in Chapter 6. Chapters 5 and 6 together provide all technical details for a variety of constructions that help conducting the 'transition from the merely hypothetical to the categorical'. The notion of the rule of revision is exploited. For example (p. 121), let G be a circular concept, D the domain of discourse, M the set of relevant facts, and $\delta_{D, M}$ a function that takes as input a hypothetical extension for G and yields as output $\delta_{D, M}(X)$ the set the definition declares as the resulting extension of G. This function $\delta_{D, M}(X)$ is exploited as a rule of revision, which when applied to a hypothetical extension X results in a set $\delta_{D, M}(X)$ that is a better candidate for the extension of G, according to the function, than X. Repeated applications of $\delta_{D M}$, result in a sequence (called, the revision sequence) of better and better candidates for the extension of G. Finally, a whole lot of standard semantic concepts, such as true, false, valid, categorical, stable, etc. are systematically introduced. The authors, by considering transfinite applications of the revision rule, have provided (sections 5A–5D) a fully satisfactory account of circular definitions.

Chapter 7 provides a philosophical account of what this book is all about. In addition, both methodological and substantive objections that might be brought against the philosophical analysis conducted for identifying the main problems concerning the notion of truth and approvals to solve them are convincingly vindicated. It also discusses three other circular concepts viz., semantic concepts (reference, satisfaction, etc.), set-theoretic and property-theoretic concepts (membership and exemplification), and modal and doxastic concepts (necessity, belief, and knowledge) that could be adequately described within the framework of the revision theory.

In the reviewer's opinion the main contribution of this highly significant work seems to centre around indicating Tarski's T convention and, by implication, T-biconditionals. Every plausible effort has been made to substantiate the thesis that for a correct definition of truth it would be necessary to treat truth as a relation between sentences and various features of context. Although this idea has numerous antecedents (for example, any reasonable theory dealing with intensionality), the novelty lies in developing a new approach viz.; the revision theory of definition to expound it. Excepting the technical formulation of the revision theory which turns out to be fairly complex, and perhaps keeping that in mind the authors have already advanced an informal exposition, the overall presentation is lucid, crisp, coherent and stimulating. On the point of complexity arising in the formulation of the revision theory, the authors elaborate (p. 260): 'This complexity is due to the fact that the theory considers arbitrary situations, including those that contain infinite cross-reference ... . Because it is meant to be applicable in all sorts of complex, infinatory situations.'

Finally, a couple of comments:

(a) The claims that 'it aims at capturing the ordinary and unproblematic features of truth' on the one hand and 'we shall be concerned with only formalized languages (classical first-order quantificational languages, a very limited fragment of natural languages)' on the other do not seem to conform outright. The authors, however, have indicated (p. 277) that the former needs to be given primacy.

(b) 'There is nothing wrong with circular definitions' is quite a question-begging proposition and needs to be understood in a proper perspective.

The authors themselves have admitted (pp. 117–18):
'It is not our aim, however, to argue that all strictures against circular definitions must be relaxed. In certain contexts it may well be advisable to avoid circular definitions...'

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Arindama Singh and Chinmoy Goswami: *Fundamentals of Logic.* ICPR, New Delhi: 1998, pp. 312, Rs. 450, ISBN: 81-85636-34-6.

The study of logic as a formal discipline in academic institutions has a long-standing tradition in India as well as in the West. Although the

subject has undergone many changes especially in the recent decades, the tradition nonetheless has been continued as is evinced in the existing curricula of colleges, institutes, universities, etc. Although cynics may observe that in these days thinking clearly and being rational may be detrimental to one's mental and physical well-being, the common aim of the academic organizations, I presume, is to thus instill the basic principles of clear and systematic way of thinking while teaching some effective methods for processing, analyzing and evaluating information. Higher education is meant to enrich the intellectual prowess of the learners and to promote a respect for reason. Study of logic is an effective tool for achieving these goals.

The book under review is primarily intended to be an advanced level textbook in logic. However, co-authored by a mathematician and a philosopher, it is not targeted exclusively to any one particular discipline. It is supposed to be the material either for the Masters level, or for the Ph.D. level in disciplines such as Mathematics, Philosophy, Computer Science, etc. The entire book is recommended as the study material for a one year course. If used for a semester-long course, certain chapters are supposed to be used selectively. To assist the instructor in selection, the authors have suggested various possible tracks with the links shows with a figure at the very beginning of the book. While the operational time, level and disciplines may vary for an instructor, the chapters on *set theory, syntax* and *semantics of sentential logic* and *predicate logic* respectively, and on *metalogic* are prescribed as compulsory reading. In addition, the suggested optional tracks appear to be as follows:

- Either, a study of the syntactical aspect of logic for which the book has to offer chapters and sections on the *axiomatic theory,* the syntax and axiomatization of predicate logic, and separately of predicate logic with equality.
- Or, a semantics-oriented study in *natural deduction* etc.
- Or, a guided study on proof procedures especially suitable for machines, such as *theorem resolution refutation* and related matters.

Thus, there are more than one sequence of chapters in this book which would form syllabi for a course in logic. Regardless of which sequence is chosen, if an instructor has one semester, as per the plan of the authors he will have about six chapters from the book to cover. For a one-year course, it should be possible to work through the entire book which consists

of all total eight chapters and an appendix. Either way, the work-plan seems feasible.

A textbook in logic has many challenges to face. Among them, one of the prime tasks is how to strike a balance between the breadth and the depth of the subject. Also, the presentation style needs to be both pedagogically attractive and formally rigorous. It is desirable that the text should be easy-flowing even when the material by nature is unavoidably dense. Moreover, the links among the chapters should be justifiable ones so that the entire material appears to the students as a well-structured, cohesive whole. It is a pleasure to note that while maintaining a consistent standard the book under review has satisfied each of these requirements. This is particularly praiseworthy, since this book has a self-imposed added burden of catering to the needs of advanced students from several disciplines. Easy readability of the material has been paired nicely with the rich content, which embraces some of the relatively recent developments in formal logic. The formal material presented in the book is usually accompanied by informal explanations. Throughout the book, important concepts and key terms in each chapter have been highlighted with boldface characters to enhance comprehension. In addition to a general index given at the end of the book, both the students as well as the casual reader of this book can benefit from two specially prepared indices on eminent names and important theorems cited in the work. The figures and the tables used in the book have further enhanced the quality of the explanations provided.

The book begins with introductory discussions on staples such as set theory, number system, cardinality, formal languages. It then proceeds to develop the bivalent system of logic by acquainting the reader first with its elements. A system of five basic truth-functional connectives has been chosen for the discussion on sentential logic. A discussion on the limitations of sentential logic has been used as the platform for introducing predicate logic and its comparative advantages. The notions of *proof* and *effectiveness* constitute the central themes in the chapter on Axiomatics. The discussion has been enriched by the inclusion of the Gentzen systems and their relative merits. Various proof strategies, such as natural deduction, *reductio,* semantic trees or analytic tableaux, resolution refutation etc. have been gradually introduced with helpful comments on the special utility of each of them. Predicate logic with equality operator (PLE) has been discussed separately as further extension of predicate logic. In addition,

various proof procedures have been instantiated once more especially for PLE. The book ends with a chapter on metalogic which in one stroke ranges over a wide variety of items such as consistency, negation-completeness, Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, Church's thesis, Church's theorem, Turing machines and effective procedures, Uncomputability, Undecidability, Gödel's incompleteness theorems, etc. The appendix contains a reiteration of the discussion of the bivalent system placed in the context of translation between ordinary (English, to be precise) and a chosen symbolic language of logic. At the very end, there is a section on applications of logic which touches upon relatively new developments such as automated theorem proving and logic programming. The material is well organized and is enough to run a decent advanced-level course in logic.

Overall, it is a commendable effort on the part of the authors and the publishing concern. One can imagine the amount of time, effort and energy the project must have demanded. The layout and the jacket design deserve notice, and the paper and the print quality are delight for the eyes. However, here are few suggestions from the present reviewer to further add value to this already valuable work.

First, it is expected that a textbook in logic should contain a broad and copious selection of exercises. In the case of an advanced level textbook, I suppose, it is desirable that the selection should be marked by its provoking quality rather than by its ampleness. The book under review does contain a list of problems at the end of each section in each chapter. Although they are not too many in number, the problems are challenging enough to urge the learner to apply what has been learnt. Also, where possible, the authors have made an effort to add an Indian flavor to the examples (see for instance, p. 66, and p. 69). However, the point of having the set of problems in the textbook is to allow the student an opportunity to measure his/her competence in the subject. To serve this broader objective better, perhaps it is a good idea in the textbook to provide along with the problems some, if not all, of the solutions as well (see for instance, Geoffrey Hunter's classic work *Metalogic: An Introduction to the Metatheory of Standard First Order Logic,* University of California Press, California, USA, 1971). This will not only help the students but also may provide pointers to the instructors about what would qualify as a model answer for a given problem. Or, the authors may consider adding a separate manual which will contain solutions to some

selected exercises given in the textbook. This can be made available to the learner along with the textbook, so that the advanced level student can use it for a self-paced learning of the material. Additionally, a manual can be made available to the instructor alone which may contain not only the full answer set but also some sample problem sets on each chapter which if necessary can be used as a model for assignment sets. (For a successful implementation of the plan mentioned, see for instance *The Logic Book*, Merrie Bergmann, James Moor & Jack Nelson, Random House, New York, 1980.)

Second, the title *Fundamentals of Logic* seems to assume and suggest to the reader that there is only one kind of logic, when perhaps the authors intend the book to be on what is generally known now as 'standard logic'. Although in the preface the authors have remarked that the subject 'logic' has growing in '... leaps and bounds in the last hundred years' (p. vi), perhaps due to the constraint of space and the fear of losing the focus required for a textbook, there is no discussion, not even in the appendix, about the other kind of growth the subject has undergone in terms of variety. An advanced-level training in logic in these days cannot afford to choose to remain ignorant about the heterogeneity of logical systems. It would have been a value-addition to the book to have a section on non-standard logics, such as, many-valued logic, fuzzy logic, intuitionistic logic, non-monotonic logic, etc., which have sprouted in the recent decades and have carved their niche in the history of logic. It would be enlightening to the student if the section also contains pointers as to how and where exactly the systems differ from what is known as the 'standard logic'.

Third, any logic text written in English in the nineties should give some account of why it deserves to be added to the already available material. In the preface, the authors claimed to have identified a lacuna,

> One of the most fundamental difficulties that both of us faced is the nonavailability of a proper textbook which can be recommended to the learners without reservation. Surprisingly, there is none by any Indian author(s). (p.vi)

To have a worth-recommending book on western logic penned exclusively by Indian authors for the Indian readers/students is certainly no meant feat. A good textbook in any subject is often a rare commodity. Good textbooks on any discipline by Indian authors are arguably an even

rarer commodity. However, the advantage of this production probably can be greatly enhanced both in the Indian market as well as in the international field if interesting comparative notes and observations on Indian logic are also included in this Indian textbook. Indian Navya Nyaya system and its theory of *avacchedaka,* for instance, are worth exploring for gaining a new perspective on, say, the traditional way of doing standard predicate logic (some initial work along this line has already been accomplished by the *Akshar Bharti* group, Center for Applied Linguistics and Translation Studies, University of Hyderabad).

Fourth, in the book the authors have repeatedly asserted that the logical principles are the *universal* principles or uniform patterns underlying human thinking; in other words, the laws of logic are supposedly the *laws of thought* (see for instance, p.v, p. vii). This view of logic, which was first proposed by psychologist Jean Piaget in the '50s, is still supported by a group of cognitive scientists. However, the fact remains that the supporting evidence for this view is no longer held as incontrovertible. Moreover, lately research in cognitive psychology seems to contest the Piaget-hypothesis and hints at other possible views about logic and logical principles (see for instance, *Deduction,* P.N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M.J. Byrne, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, USA, 1991, *Human Reasoning: The Psychology of Deduction,* Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, Stephen E. Newstead, Ruth M.J. Byrne, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, USA, 1993).

Finally, a minor point. The authors claim that the only presupposition made on their part about the audience is that the audience should understand the English language used. Strictly speaking, the veracity of this claim is perhaps arguable, as the text clearly requires a minimum training in reading English texts interspersed with mathematical and logical symbols.

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N.N. VOHRA and J.N. DIXIT, eds. *Religion, Politics and Society in South and Southeast Asia.* New Delhi: Konark & India International Centre, 1998, pp. xvi + 281, Rs. 350.

The volume under review comprises about twenty papers read at a seminar held at the India International Centre in 1997 as part of its Asia

Project. The theme of the seminar, we are informed, was suggested by Dr. Karan Singh, whose keen interest in the place of religion in society is well known. Appropriately, he has contributed an introduction, but this is much too brief, and says little beyond castigating the 'fashionable' tendency to 'shy away from talking about religion', and reiterating the resilience of religion in the face of the historic processes of secularization. The contributors come from a dozen countries and deal with a number of issues, but not all of them focus on religion; in fact some of them are more concerned with politics and economics. There is much useful information here about the country scenarios, and many useful insights, but there are also some old ideas (e.g. the desirability of convergence between eastern religions and western thought), bold declarations (e.g. Hinduism as 'Sanatana Dharma ... faces chaos without crisis', p. 257), and simplifications (e.g., 'To reduce the tension between different economic and interest groups what is needed most is increasing an effective *dialogue',* p. 13).

The first paper by a Chinese scholar (Huang Xinchuan) is an interesting exercise to make sense of the South Asian scene, which is seen marked by the 'rejuvenation of traditional religions'. The author calls for the bringing in of 'religious cultures into play in international relations' and also considers 'secularization of religions ... a necessity'. Obviously, a conference paper does not allow one to elaborate one's ideas and reconcile them.

The paper that perhaps may be of most interest to the readers of *JICPR* is the Sri Lankan scholar Ponna Wignaraja's discussion of 'Critical elements in the knowledge system for a culturally relevant paradigm of South Asian Development' (pp. 215–41). Wignaraja is an advocate of 'another development pathway' and expectedly calls for 'a paradigm shift': both phrases are by now like old war horses in development debates and seem rather worn out. Other related and equally sensible ideas are 'sustainable development' and 'participatory democracy'.

The question that demands an answer is why, despite more than a quarter century of strong advocacy, these foregoing ideas have not yet fructified. What are the obstacles and why are they so strong? Wignaraja's analysis includes some large answers. For example: 'The crisis of the modern knowledge system confirms the need for devising new methods of scientific inquiry' (p. 221). One would agree, but the suggested remedy pushes the horizons of effective social intervention beyond the foreseeable future. We are assured that 'People in South Asia have a great deal of scientific knowledge which can be applied to their daily lives and

problems'. Further: 'Revival of this traditional knowledge can only be undertaken through a participatory process within the culture' (p. 229). And so on. All this makes good sense, I am sure, but it also makes a better future for the common person seem quite distant. Wignaraja is an activist but, obviously, he also believes that before the world of human relations (power relations) may be changed, the nature of our knowledge of the world must be deconstructed and new epistemologies constructed. Human societies may want to be but cannot be in a hurry. Whatever happened to revolutions, one wonders as the twentieth century draws to its close? Were they all lies?

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K.J.S. CHATRATH (Ed.) *Education for Human Rights and Democracy.* Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1998, pp. 177, Rs. 240 (Cloth).

The notion of human rights is one of the great gifts of classical and contemporary human thought to civilization. With the end of cold war and increasing disrepute of Communist ideology, it is developing into a new ideology to guide and judge the development of human society; to preserve, protect and promote basic human rights has become the chief purpose of our societal endeavours. The sphere of human rights thought and action has widened to new arenas. A very rich debate on this issue between Marxists and Liberals has taken place which is of much relevance to the experience of the impoverished masses of the Third World countries like India. Yet, not much has been achieved in practice. After reviewing the progress made in the field of human rights, the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, June 1993) asked UNESCO to prepare a Programme of Action. Central to this Plan of Action is the assessment of needs and formulation of effective strategies for the furtherance of human rights education through formal as well as informal educational systems. As a follow-up measure, UNESCO in collaboration with the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, organized a Workshop on 'Education for Human Rights and Democracy' from 29 September to 1 October 1995. The present volume contains the papers presented in the Workshop, the unique feature of which was that not only academics and journalists but others who deal with human rights everyday: lawyers, law

enforcement officers, human rights activists and armymen actively participated in it. This makes the volume extremely relevant as it provides a survey of the Indian national experience in the field of education for human rights and democracy, examines the status of this focused education in primary, secondary and higher education institutions and analyses present policies, strategies and programmes.

In his welcome address, Professor Mrinal Miri raises many conceptual points as he looks upon education for human rights as part of the larger human project of moral education. As such, it is crucial to grasp the difference both in its objectives and pedagogy from both liberal and professional/technical education and to confront the modern dilemma of morality as irrelevant to the worldly success of man in terms of power, wealth and happiness. He further points out some of the major difficulties faced when the universality of the concept of human rights is kept in mind: different moral systems may be mutually incommensurate with one another; the obligation of security is internal to the concept of a nation; and certain religious obligations may be incompatible with a common sympathy for mankind. His comments would have been more perceptive had he also touched upon the controversy concerning basic human needs and basic human rights. This entire problematic has been ignored by the classical and contemporary western liberal thinkers, though it is obvious that without basic needs being fulfilled, freedom of speech, of assembly, of association, of conscience, of religion, of political participation through adult suffrage, may be existentially meaningless for its 'victims'. The expression human rights presupposes a level at which biological entities are bestowed with the dignity of being called human. Thus, in a situation of mass poverty, the problem of human rights is a problem of development and accountability, a process of planned social change through continuing exercise of public power. Seen in this perspective, much discussion on juristic conception of human rights may be considered as shallow and even hollow. The battle for human rights will not be won by further refinement of its juristic formulation but only by shifting our focus to the social developmental context in which these formulations are to be operated. Education for human rights and democracy needs to be geared accordingly.

Justice Ranganath Misra, in his inaugural address, mentions that our Constitution embodies all the major principles outlined in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). But it is difficult to accept his

contention that human rights had an Indian origin conceptually. Leaving aside its origin and history in the west, one may easily point out that the caste-based social system never allowed equal dignity to *dalits* and women throughout Indian history. Similarly, our five decade long experience as a functioning multi-party democracy does not add to our confidence to say that we have developed a firm base to deepen and further build a durable regime of human rights and democracy. One finds it difficult to agree with Janusz Symonides too when he feels, in his Keynote Address, that the Indian model of education might be a model for other countries. However, his call to build a culture for human rights and democracy by creating a comprehensive system of education, formal or non-formal, can be considered a step in the right direction, especially his stress on education of two types of professional groups. One group consists of teachers and journalists whom he terms as 'multipliers' and another group of professionals who deal with human rights every day: law enforcement officers, armies, police etc.

In his broad overview paper, 'Legal Policies and Frameworks for Human Rights Education in India', Priyadarshi Thakur scans the historical development of the concept of human rights and links it with the recent efforts of the National Council for Educational Research and Training and the National Human Rights Commission in revising the school textbooks as well as preparing appropriate teacher training modules. He correctly points out that while all societies have some elements of human rights interwoven in their governing philosophies, they are also marked by man-made distinctions of race, colour, creed gender etc. that mar basic rights of human existence. It is only after the horrors of World War II that the international community came together under the aegis of the United Nations to formulate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Hence the need for international cooperation to ensure implementation, promotion and protection of Human Rights cannot be undermined. Yet, as Thakur rightly points out, the actual operational aspects of human rights implementation depends largely on a country's voluntary commitment to respect and enforce human rights as well as its economic, educational and cultural preparedness to lend substance to the form of human rights. But, today we seem to face the rather paradoxical position of law versus order since human rights violations are increasingly done by State machinery which displays little respect for the rule of law. This raises issues related to the values of the power elites in the society. Given increasing

dehumanization of the middle classes, to design educational exercise so that it imparts the value and spirit of struggle is a challenging task. But unless the balance of power is not tilted in favour of the vulnerable sections by transforming the structure of dominance, mere educational exercise will be inadequate in improving the situation. However, the role of education in altering our structure of attention cannot be denied. Struggle can only follow such awareness.

The next paper, 'Media and Education in Human Rights: Problems and Opportunities', by Ajit Bhattacharya, highlights the need for appropriate coverage of human rights issues by mass media—both modern such as radio, T.V. and the Press and traditional like folk, theatre and music, especially in a country like India where the goal of universal primary education is yet to be realized. Yet he is well aware of the limitations—both commercial and intrinsic—of the media. Human rights news has to compete for attention with the more catchy, entertainment related items. Given the levels of professionalism in different newspapers, as well as ownership patterns and commercial pressures, he is somewhat skeptical of the awareness creating potential of the press and argues that greater potential exists in radio and T.V. because they do not demand literacy, and because their reach is wider. But official control and rank commercialism do not allow T.V. in India to realize its potential for the purpose. A broad ideology of 'national interest' leading to self-censorship comes into play when issues of governmental violations and national security are concerned. Mainstream media also tends to support the structures and values of status quo rather than highlight the issues of struggle and resistance—particularly on issues relating to women, minorities and indigenous people. Hence the need to educate media persons can not be minimized.

In the third paper Arjun Deo and A.K. Sharma deal with Human Rights Education at the primary and secondary levels of school education. It is explained that pedagogically the approach in India has been one of integrating various aspects and dimensions of human rights and democracy into existing courses of studies and not as a separate area of study. Though the framework is comprehensive, the authors are aware that it does suffer from serious limitations such as regressive content in many places, heavy load on children, poor facilities, low teacher-student ratio etc. One may add to this a high drop-out rate and relative absence of any strategy for out of school children. It can also be pointed out that mainstream school education is too examination oriented and what is taught remains at the

level of words only. Even if we are able to apply possible correctives to the dismal situation, there seems no solution to the paradox of moral education: what is preached in schools, students observe as not succeeding in real everyday life.

Javeed Alam in his paper 'Community Based Threats to Individual Rights' deals with the issue of minorities and the human rights education in India. Distinguishing between pre-modern and self-created communities, Alam takes to task former ascriptive groupings unwilling to grant autonomy to its members while claiming the same for itself. They pose a threat to human rights of the individuals who want to opt out, as well as of the members of other communities. Deeply imbued with liberal assumptions, Alam's claim fails to answer the sharp escalation in communal consciousness in recent years and non-dissolution of such communities even after so much of modernization. He does not give adequate credence to the psychological craving for identity as well as for community that group membership provides. How the human rights educational process can be effective in dealing with such a real life conflict situation remains unanswered.

Col. S.K. Sharma's paper 'Human Rights Education in the Army' presents the dilemmas faced by the army when brought in to deal with insurgency. Though steps have been taken to build awareness of human rights in the army's educational programme at all levels, one would have to acknowledge the difficult situation the army faces, in which it is difficult to distinguish between ordinary civilians and militants/terrorists. Too many unwarranted allegations of human rights violations tends to demoralize them. One needs to be very careful and judicious in making a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence in matters of national security. But it is easier said than done.

In his paper, 'Education for Democracy in India', Sundara Rajan argues for the need to distinguish between primordial natural order *Communitas* based on homogeneity of birth, race and common history and *Civitas,* the cultural order. While the stranger is considered as a threat by the *Communitas,* the *Civitas* stresses obligations to the stranger—hospitality, politeness and safe conduct. Professor Rajan explains that education is the medium in which *Communitas* can be transformed into *Civitas.* This is also the basic project of human rights. However, Rajan's contention is open to similar criticism as that against Javeed Alam's paper. Too much preoccupation with the contemporary problem of communalism in the

form of assertion of community identities, perhaps, makes him skeptical of the possibility of constructing a ground of basic human rights within community formations. But the assumptions of liberal political theory are inadequate to live as a free, democratic citizen, for without postulating a notion of limits, absent in individualism, there is no basis for politeness/compassion. Also, postulating *Communitas* and *Civitas* as a pair of binary oppositions is unsustainable because all group identities are constructed by excluding the other. We live in a world, not of abstract universalism but one which is characterized by multiple and conflicting moral orders. In such a situation, the task of an educational programme for human rights and democracy is to generate tentativeness, if we conceive the basic project of human rights to provide a legitimate space for the stranger.

In the last paper on 'Human Rights Education for Rule of Law and Democracy', Vijai S.T. Shankerdass advocates the necessity to go beyond the idea that law ought to be the same for everyone. Thus the problem of human rights goes beyond the concept of liberal state and the created legal subject. To educate people about these rights, one needs to locate the discussion in the struggles of everyday life which will help specify the values and relationship within which people define what is just and right. Appealing to abstract law will not be effective. Though Shankerdass, a lawyer, makes an effort to go beyond a purely legalistic perspective, which is laudable, yet in the absence of a common system of values to provide a framework to negotiate conflicts, the value of legal and the constitutional framework cannot be undermined. To sustain it, the State must be seen to be fair, just and accountable. Therefore, an educational programme to sensitize individuals about human rights must focus on evolution of our laws and constitutional provisions, stress the mutuality of rights and responsibilities, and thus empower the people to demand accountability of state structures in the interests of justice and fairness. But given the widespread resistance to human rights in the educational bureaucracy itself, the problem is to educate the educators first.

The papers presented in the book deal with the issue of human rights on three distinct but interrelated planes. The first relates to a philosophical understanding of human rights. The second one revolves around the specific empirical situation in India—the Constitution, laws, institutions and processes that define the context within which one can assess the state of human rights and democracy. The third one focusses on the concrete programme for education—both formal and informal systems. What came

out successfully was that the gap between promise and the actual status of the human rights in the country is due not only to a non-implementation by the State of the various laws and constitutional provisions, but equally because of the violations occurring in the arena of family, kinship groups and communities, having less than adequate concern for individuals. Thus, it is necessary to go beyond developing structures and instrumentalities of accountability *vis-à-vis* the State and look at modes of democratizing civil society. In this context, to design educational strategies to promote awareness of human rights norms and values is an essential part of developing a democratic culture. But even an elaborate framework of formal education has its limitations in this regard; we should not expect too much from it. Since the values of human rights get internalized through a long and arduous process of continuous struggle, we should try, in addition to efforts within the formal system of education, to work out norms of living that would satisfy both our moral universe as also the international consensus on what constitutes civilized behaviour. The book ends on a note of cautious optimism—contributing hopefully to the evolution of new and creative programmes, thus making it a necessary reading for all those interested in promoting human rights education. Its value would have been even greater, had it contained few more papers by human rights activists working in the areas such as women, family, children, Dalits, tribals and other vulnerable sections of society. Yet it is a welcome contribution to the literature on human rights education.

A good feature of the book is that it contains, as extensive appendices in the end, the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and added to this a comparison of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with those of the Constitution of India and excerpts from the National Policy on Education (India) 1986 with modifications made in 1992. All this material makes this slim volume a valuable reference book. Edited with care and understanding, it also contains a brilliant 'Report on the Workshop' by Harsh Sethi which makes the task of reviewing the book rather easy. They have succeeded, one can say, in bringing out a commendable volume out of the material presented in the Workshop, considering the inherent limits of such an exercise.

53, Ashraf Tola, Hardoi (U.P.) ALOK TANDON

S.M.S. CHARI, *Philosophy and Theistic Mysticism of the Alvars*. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1997, pp. 263, Rs. 300.

Āḻvārs are the celebrated saints of South India. They are devotees of god Viṣṇu. The lived between the 5th and 8th centuries AD. Temples dedicated to Viṣṇu were places they frequently visited. During their visits they composed devotional hymns in praise of Viṣṇu. The hymns propagate devotion and surrender by glorifying the greatness of Viṣṇu. Since Tamil is their mother tongue, the hymns they have composed are in simple spoken Tamil which even laymen can understand. They are not only devotees who surrendered themselves to God, but profound mystics whose identification with God was so complete that there was hardly anything in their being not pervaded by His luminous substance. Though their hymns are replete with the ideas of the Vedas, their uniqueness lies in the great emphasis laid on devotion and surrender which are rarely found in the Vedic Mantras or in the highly metaphysical pronouncements of the Upaniṣads.

The principal Āḻvārs are ten in number, beginning with Poygai Āḻvār and ending with Tirumaṅgai Āḻvār. According to another enumeration two more Āḻvār are added to the original list and they are Āṇḍāḷ and Madhurakavi. Among the twelve, Āṇḍāḷ is the only woman saint. Her *Tiruppāvai* is held in high esteem by the Śrīvaiṣṇavas and referred to by them as the song of songs. The hymns of the twelve Āḻvārs make a total of 4000 and are collectively called *Nālāyira Divyaprabandham.* According to the tradition, the Āḻvārs are regarded as divine incarnations, incarnations of divine instruments and divine beings. For example, Āṇḍāḷ is considered to be a manifestation of Bhū-Devi, one of the consorts of Viṣṇu. The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* predicts the advent of the Āḻvārs in South India (11-5-38 to 40). And Vedānta Deśika has accepted the authority of the *Purāṇa* and approvingly quotes the relevant text in his work dealing with the Āḻvārs.

According to S.M.S. Chari, a comprehensive account of the philosophy and mysticism is a desideratum and his present work on the Āḻvārs is 'intended to meet this requirement' Therefore the book under review falls into two broad divisions, one dealing with the philosophy and another with the mysticism of the Āḻvārs. On the philosophical side, the teachings of the Āḻvārs are remarkably identical with those of the Upaniṣads; on the side of mysticism, the Āḻvārs have succinctly brought out the full

significance of the mystic union between the human soul and the Lord of the world and, through this, given a practical extension to the teachings of the Upaniṣads.

Chari discusses the philosophical aspects of the Āḻvārs under five heads: (i) the doctrine of Ultimate Reality; (ii) the doctrine of God; (iii) the doctrine of individual Self; (iv) the doctrine of Sādhana; and (v) the doctrine of supreme Goal.

(i) There is no doubt that the Āḻvārs were well-acquainted with the sacred texts of Veda and Vedānta. For example, Nammāḻvār's reference to the sacred texts in his hymn (1-3-7) bears testimony to the fact. In the hymns the philosophical teachings are either corroborated or elucidated by the words of the Āḻvārs.

Chari draws our attention to several teachings of Veda and Vedānta and aptly explains how they are reflected in the hymns of the Āḻvārs. For example, we shall take the concept of body-soul relation (*śarīrātma-bhāva*) mentioned in the *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.* Chari takes the concept to be referring to the equation of the supreme Being with the universe and shows how the concept is understood by Nammāḻvār, with the help of several passages culled from his hymns. He concludes his study thus: 'Among Vaiṣṇava saints, Nammāḻvār has the credit of presenting this philosophical theory more explicitly than others to explain the equation of the supreme Being with the universe' (p. 45).

(ii) Chari writes that Godhead as a supreme Person has several aspects: (i) God's essential nature (*svarūpa*); (ii) God's attributes (*guṇa*); (iii) God's personality (*vigraha*); (iv) God's incarnations (*avatāra*); and (v) God's activities (*līlā*). Of these five, God's essential nature is given greater importance in the Upaniṣads. And the rest are elaborated in the Āgamas, Itihāsas, Purāṇas and other religious texts. The merit of the hymns of the Āḻvārs lies in the fact that they take into account all the five aspects of God and describe them in great detail. However, we must note that among God's activities creation, protection and dissolution of the world are repeatedly mentioned in the hymns of the Āḻvārs. Chari points out how the Vedāntic account of the cosmic functions of God, as mentioned particularly in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* can be discerned in the metaphorical descriptions of the Āḻvārs. The expressions *uṇḍu* (eating) and *umiḻndu* (spitting) are used as metaphors for the dissolution and creation of the world. The reason why these activities of God are mentioned very frequently by the Āḻvārs is that they are considered to be an act of compassion

on the part of God. For they give an opportunity to the living beings whose aim is to overcome the beginningless bondage and attain freedom. Both dissolution and creation are helpful to them; in the former they cease from their endless efforts to escape bondage and get necessary strength to work again for their liberation, and in the latter they are given a fresh opportunity to realize their aim. Apart from these, God's activities include those that are performed for the protection of celestial deities and for punishing the evil-doers and saving the pious individuals. These relate to the legends as narrated in the Epics and Puranas. The hymns speak about them because their aim is to promote devotion for Viṣṇu, the supreme God. Chari writes: 'They (the Āḻvārs) have included these episodes in their devotional songs for the purpose of promoting *bhakti* among the common folk and induce them to turn towards God and refrain from the indulgence in the sensual pleasures" (p. 107).

(iii) As Chari rightly observes, the hymns do not give us a detailed account of the doctrine of the individual soul, *jīva.* But there are 'references to *jīva* in different contexts from which we can gather the views of the Āḻvārs' (p. 109).

Nammāḻvār refers to *jīva* as the luminous entity in the body (1-1-10). The very word *jīva* is used in one of his hymns (7-8-5). The *jīvas* are considered to be eternal, *maṇṇuyir* (1-2-2). Chari quotes a passage where Nammāḻvār speaks to the effect that a bound soul has three characteristics: (1) it does not perform good deeds; (2) it does not abstain from doing evil deeds; and (3) it indulges in the enjoyment of sensual pleasures (3-2-6). Who is the cause of bondage? *Jīva* or *Īśvara*? In so far as *Īśvara* resides in the *jīva* and controls all its movements, He is responsible for its bondage. Similarly, who is the cause of freedom? Chari says that the 'general tenor of the hymns relating to this subject is that God who is the primary cause of the bondage should also remove it. Nammāḻvār in all his prayers pleads before God to remove his *vinai* or *karma.* He even goes to the extent of stating that 'no one else other than compassionate Almighty can cause its destruction' (pp. 114–15). This does not mean that there is no place for human endeavour. The individual is always free to choose any kind of deed, good or bad. Once the choice is made God as the *antarātmā* controls all his activities and brings about the appropriate result.

In the Vedānta *jīva* is regarded as an integral part of Brahman, *aṁśa*— (*Brahma Sūtra*, 2-3-42). In the hymns of the Āḻvārs the idea of *aṁśa* is rendered as the property of the Lord (Nammāḻvār, 2-7). Therefore the *jīva*

is referred to as *dāsa-bhūta.* Nammāḻvār prays that he should be accepted by the Lord 'for the exclusive purpose of offering divine service at all times' (p. 117). The relation between God and the *jīva* is not one-sided; on the contrary, they are united by a mutual bond of love and affection. As a result, the relation between one *jīva* and another acquires a special significance. In Vaiṣṇava tradition the *jīva* is not only subordinate to God but to God's devotees as well. This is referred to as *bhāgavata-śeṣatva.* The greatness of subordinating oneself to God's devotees is extolled in two of the hymns of Nammāḻvār (3-7 and 8-10). Speaking about this concept, Chari writes: 'Though this concept can be traced to a few statements in the Itihāsas and Vaiṣṇava Purāṇas, the credit of developing it into a doctrine goes to the Āḻvārs' (p. 119).

(iv) The word *sādhana* stands for the means by which a seeker of *mokṣa* realizes Brahman. According to Rāmānuja, knowledge of Brahman 'culminating in the unceasing loving meditation on Brahman' is the *sādhana.* This is *bhakti-yoga.* Another means is *prapatti* or complete surrender of one's self to God as the sole refuge. In the Upaniṣads and the *Gītā* both *bhakti-yoga* and *prapatti* are mentioned as the two means of realizing God.

If we analyse the hymns of the Āḻvārs and try to find direct evidence in support of *bhakti-yoga* or *prapatti* in their words, we have no such evidence. However, there are certain words which when rightly interpreted, can be taken to refer to one of the means or both of them. For instance, Nammāḻvār uses the word *tavaneri* (10-4-1) as the means for *mokṣa.* It is interpreted to mean both *bhakti-yoga* and *prapatti.* In some places the evidence is unmistakable. In 9-10-5 Nammāḻvār says that God is the sole protector for all who seek His feet as the sole refuge. Here *prapatti* is indicated as the means of *mokṣa.* It is significant to note that tradition regards him as the foremost among those who are surrendered to God, *prapannajana-kūtastha.* In 3-2-8 Nammāḻvār regrets that he has not performed unceasing meditation on God's feet, *vaṇaṅ-girrilen.* Here he clearly refers to *bhakti-yoga.* Though *bhakti-yoga* and *prapatti* are the means of *mokṣa,* God's grace (*arul*) is indispensable. Hence the Āḻvārs invoke the grace of God in overcoming their bondage.

(v) According to the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, mokṣa* consists in attaining supreme equality with God (3-1-3). *Mokṣa* is not merely a negative state of freedom from bondage but a positive state of existence in Brahmaloka.

Chari observes that the teachings of the Āḻvārs on *mokṣa* 'conform fully to the Upaniṣadic theory'.

In 3-3-7 Nammāḻvār describes *mokṣa* as *samankol vīḍu.* It looks as if he has put the idea of the *Muṇḍaka* in an idiom suitable to Tamil. But he gives greater importance to eternal divine service, *bhagavat-kaiṅkarya.* Since *mokṣa* is necessary for doing eternal service to God, it is sought only for the sake of the latter. In other words, *nitya-kaiṅgarya* is regarded as the highest goal of human life. *Mokṣa* is mentioned in an extended sense also where freedom from bondage culminates in God-realization and eternal service to God. Nammāḻvār is opposed to taking *mokṣa* in the limited sense of freedom from bondage, *kaivalya* (1-7-1). In the Upaniṣads the idea of divine service is not mentioned, though the idea of service to God in the world is found in the second mantra of the *Īśa Upaniṣad.*

Chapter 7 is on the mysticism of the Āḻvārs. It is the longest chapter in the book. Chari defines the mysticism 'as the spiritual quest of an individual for a direct and comprehensive vision of God culminating in an eternal, uninterrupted divine service' (p. 152). Central to the mysticism of the Āḻvārs is the concept of love, *kāma.* It is not the ordinary desire for the things of the world, but the intense desire for God. In the Rig Veda there are passages where the love for God is mentioned (1-62-11, 9-32-5). Nammāḻvār and Tirumaṅgai Āḻvār express their mysticism through relations proper to a *nāyaki* who is in deep love with God, the *nāyaka.* The mystic songs of Āṇḍāḷ show that she considers hereself as a bride wedded to the Lord. Chari concentrates on the hymns of the five Āḻvārs—Nammāḻvār, Tirumaṅgai Āḻvār, Āṇḍāḷ, Periyāḻvār and Kulaśekarāḻvar—and brings out very vividly the nature and significance of their mysticisms. In the course of his exposition he invites our attention to numerous passages culled from their hymns. His renderings are accurate and do not, at the same time, annul the beauty and majesty of the originals.

The last and eighth chapter of the book 'General Evaluation and Conclusion' brings Chari's study of the Āḻvārs to a fitting close. Here his concern is to 'evaluate the contribution of the Āḻvārs to the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta' (p. 221). (i) The Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas accord the status of Veda to the humns of the Āḻvārs. Chari thinks that they can be considered as Veda, because they not only reveal the knowledge of God (*vedayati iti vedaḥ*) but also contain the essential teachings of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads (p. 223). (ii) It is generally held that the hymns of Nammāḻvār rise to the position of Tamil Vedānta. Chari writes that *Tiruvāymoḻi* 'can

be accepted as a Vedānta work in the sense that it is a composition containing Upaniṣadic teachings' (p. 227). (iii) The Śrīvaiṣṇavism of South India is known by the title of *Ubhaya-vedānta* because it is based on two sources, the Tamil Vedānta of *Divyaprabandham* and the Sānskṛit Vedānta of the Upaniṣads. Chari points out that since the philosophical and religious works, whose aim is to develop Śrīvaiṣṇavism as a system, are based upon the two Vedāntas, the title is perfectly applicable to the system (p. 223). (iv) Since Rāmānuja does not make any reference to the Āḻvārs or their hymns in any of his works, a doubt arises whether he was influenced by them. Having raised the question, Chari finds it very difficult to give a direct answer. So he concludes with an assertion: 'Whether or not Rāmānuja referred to the Āḻvārs ... the fact remains that he has been influenced in several ways by the hymns of the Āḻvārs' (p. 237). He is at pains to establish his view. (v) In the post-Rāmānuja period we witness the rise of two sects, *Tenkalai* and *Vaḍakalai.* Concerning them there is a question: to what extent do the two sects owe their origin to the teachings of the Āḻvārs? Chari, after a brief analysis of the facts, comes to the conclusion that the rise of the sects is certainly due to factors not related to the teachings of the Āḻvārs because the teachings do not provide any basis for their appearance (p. 244).

Chari's book is undoubtedly an authentic and, at the same time, an accurate and systematic presentation of a very difficult subject—philosophy and mysticism of the Āḻvārs. There is not a single page where we are not impressed by the scholar in him; for his statements and conclusions are invariably supported by the words of the original text. Therefore I happily commend it to all who are interested in the study of Vaiṣṇavism in general and of the Āḻvārs in particular.

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Kishore Nath Jha: *Nyāyaśāstrānuśīlanam*, Akademi Press, Allahabad, 1998, pp. viii + 133, Rs. 100.

I am not sure if the present period could be called the period of *renaissance* in the study of *Navya Nyāya* but if anybody shares this view I am with him. Studies on *Navya Nyāya* continued without a gap till this date

and it is evident from the historical data presented by Professor K.N. Jha in this work under review. However, it should not create any confusion in the minds of the readers that this is a work of great historical significance. This book consists of 15 independent articles on different issues, some of which were published elsewhere from time to time and it is an appreciable endeavour of the author to present them in a single volume to readers of this prestigious tradition. It is not an easy task for a reviewer to judge the merit (or demerit) of such work, not because it presents diverse areas of studies but due to lack of considerable in-depth expertise in all those fields where angels fear to tread.

This work as has been mentioned above presents 15 articles[1] in total. These can be classified into two groups: (i) 'Articles of historical significance', and (ii) 'Articles of analytical significance', though the author does not arrange them in that fashion. There is only one article (1) that deals with the historical issue belonging to the ancient period whereas there are three articles (13–15) that deal with the modern period. The rest of the articles bear analytical significance and they mainly deal with the issues belonging to *Navya-Nyāya, Bauddha Nyāya* and *Mīmāṃsā*. There is only one article (11) which deals with the *Mīmāṃsā* and there are an equal number of articles, namely 5 each, in *Navya-Nyāya* (2–5, 12) and *Bauddha Nyāya* (6–10). The articles of analytical significance deal with (a) Textual analysis, (b) Issue based analysis, and (c) Comparative analysis: Here for the sake of critical appreciation of these areas of study we shall look into them from historical and analytical points of views.

ARTICLES OF HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE

It is unfortunate that we do not know the history of any branch of Indian scientific developments very accurately. The significance of the history of *Nyāya* therefore need not be looked at from a temporal point of view, it is rather from the development of cognitive enterprise in Indian logic. The article (1) on *Nyāya-darśane Vyākhyā-paramparā* discusses the growth of *Nyāya* tradition through the ages starting from *prācīna-nyāya* (Old school of *Nyāya*). Commentaries (*vyākhyā*) in the śāstric tradition do not just mean to 'explain' the original text to their readers/listeners, but to critically examine the views. Many a time the initial 'propositions' in the text are thoroughly revised and many new dimensions are added to it leading to rigourous debate. Professor Jha tries to bring out the difference of

opinions of the *Bhāṣya, Vārttika* and *Tātparya-ṭīkā* on the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gotama (popularly known as *caturgranthikā*—quadrangle of basic *Nyāya*—books) with a few examples (there remain many more to substantiate his point). It further elaborates the original views of the sub-schools (*ekadeśins*) like Bhāsarvajña etc. According to Professor Jha, the commentators have a fourfold responsibility; namely (i) explication and elaboration of the issues for their proper understanding, (ii) defining the methodological exposition, (iii) collaborating the related views/thesis of the contemporary scholars, and (iv) removal of the opposite views/arguments for strengthening the orthodox doctrines (p. 4). These responsibilities have been carried out well by the authors in the *Nyāya* system of Indian philosophy. According to Professor K.N. Jha, each and every author in the tradition of *Nyāya*, whether he is a commentator or an author of independent work (*prakaraṇa grantha*), always keeps his track with his predecessor while maintaining his own individuality by contributing substantially for further growth of the theoretical framework. The main concern of the *naiyāyikas* was to establish their thesis at the face of the strong opposition from the Buddhist logicians[2] in the era of *prācīna-nyāya*. It may be noted here that the Buddhists were the first opponents to the *naiyāyikas* in the first millennium of the Christian era. But by the beginning of the second millennium the Buddhist logicians were out of the scene and there comes a turning point in the study of Indian logic. The *naiyāyikas* search for their partners for their intellectual activity to go on amongst the orthodox thinkers and they were happy with the *mīmāṃsakas,* who had posed a great challenge in turn to occupy the place of *pradhāna-mallas.* It is evident from the magnum opus work of Gaṅgeśa's Tattvaciñtāmaṇi that he had to work hard on the views of Prābhākaras (*jñātvā gurūṇām matam*) before working out on his thesis. Thus it is clear that by the time of Gaṅgeśa, the focus for the *naiyāyikas* was on the *mīmāṃsaka's* view rather than the views of the Buddhist logicians. Interestingly however, by the second half of the second millennium when the *Navadvīpa*-school of *Navya-Nyāya* was developed, the *mīmāṃsakas* were also out of the scene and the *naiyāyikas* fought each other on different minute points of debate. This is the time when the *Kroḍapatras*[3] were composed and there were many sub-schools developed in the broad spectrum of the *Navya Nyāya* thinking. Professor Jha presents an interesting episode of *prakāratāvāda* vs *saṃsargatāvāda* in the *śābadabodha* of *Navya Nyāya* while dealing with the glorious personality and scholarship of Pt. Dharmadatta [Baccā] Jhā in

the article (14) *'Śāstramūrttiḥ Dharmadatta-[Baccā]-Jhā—Vyaktitvam Vaiduṣyaṃ ca'*. He is conspicuously silent on this important development of the school of *Navya-Nyāya* in this work. This issue namely *prakāratāvāda* vs *saṃsargatāvāda* is very interesting and possibly the very foundation of the discussions on *śābdabodha* in Gadāhara's Vyutpattivāda, on which Baccā Jhā wrote a commentary called 'Gūḍhārthatattvāloka'. This article (14), is I think, the most valuable article in this whole work. It brings out the outstanding scholarship of a *Naiyāyika* who belonged to this century and who is in every sense as great as Gaṅgeśa and Raghunātha. This is the answer to them who hold the view that 'there is no significant contribution to the study of *Navya Nyāya* after 18th century'. Baccā Jhā's Gūḍhārthatattvāloka, the commentary on Vyutpattivāda is traditionally treated as a *Kroḍapatra,* where in-depth study (*talasparśi-vicāra*) on different particular issues is dealt with minutely and extensively. In this article (14) Professor Jha argues in support of the views of Baccā Jha, who is a *saṃsargatāvādin* as against Raghunātha and Gadāhara, who are traditionally considered to be the *prakāratāvādins*. I reserve my comments here on the controversies of the views of these two sub-schools in *Navya-Nyāya* because I have dealt with it in detail elsewhere.[4] But I feel this certainly is an interesting area of research in the development of the study of *Navya Nyāya.*

The other historical articles are (13) *'Navyanyāyasyodbhavao vikāśaś ca'* (The origin and growth of *Navya Nyāya*), and (15) *'Viṃśatitamyāṃ Śatadbdyāṃ Nyāyaśāstre Mithilāyā avadānam'* (The Contribution of Mithila to the *Nyāyaśāstra* in Twentieth Century). These articles to my mind are a very useful contribution for the study of *Navya Nyāya* and they present the picture of academic activities along with the historical background in a nutshell. The last article (15) needs special mention where the author draws our attention to many outstanding scholars who are our contemporaries and who still hold the flag flying high. Pt. MM. Jayadeva Miśra, the author of Jayā (Comm. on Vyutpattivāda), Pt. MM. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, Pt. Khuddi Jhā, Pt. MM. Bālakṛṣṇa Miśra, Pt. Yadunātha Miśra, Pt. Lakṣmīnātha Jhā, Pt. Śaśinātha Jhā, Pt. Kṛṣṇamādhava Jhā, Pt. Maheśa Jhā, Pt. Rūpanātha Jhā, Pt. Ugrānanda Jhā, Pt. Anantalal Thākur, Pt. Khaḍganātha Miśra etc. do deserve special mention. While giving a brief account of these scholars the author presents a critical appreciation of their works and contributions to the field. For instance, Pt. Khaḍganātha Miśra, a living scholar (retired principal of Mahārājā Saṃkṛta

Mahāvidyālaya, Jaipur) has written a highly scholarly work viz., Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Tattvāloka Prakāśa (a commentary on Tattvāloka by Baccā Jha, published by the Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur (1996) in two volumes) which is an excellent contribution to the field in the last decade of the 20th century. Professor Jha thinks that this work was composed by Pt. Khaḍganatha Miśra with an intention to refute the views of Kṛṣṇamādhava Jhā, author of the commentary *Subodhinī* on Gūḍhārthatattvāloka of Baccā Jhā. Professor Jha opines that this type of competitive attitude in *Navya Nyāya* does not lead to any disgusting situation, rather it creates a relishing atmosphere for the intellectuals by giving occasion for rethinking over the issues (*avadheayam idam yan navya-nyāye pratispardhā na janayati vairasyam api tu cintanāvasarapradānenāmodam* p. 126). This certainly gives a bird's-eye view of the *Navya Nyāya* activities in this century and emphasizes that the tradition is a living tradition.

ARTICLE OF ANALYTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

Articles of analytical significance are mainly dealing with the Buddhist Philosophy and Nyāya philosophy. There are some articles based on textual analysis and some on different issues. For instance article No. 2, presents the nature of 'perception' in the school of Nyāya. Here the author gives a logical classification of 'perception'. First of all perception is classified into two as: (i) *laukika-pratyakṣa,* and (ii) *alaukika-pratyakṣa,* and then the *laukika-pratyakṣa* is classified into two as *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka. Savikalpaka* is further classified into two as *bāhya* and *ābhyantara* and *bāhya* is classified into five categories depending upon five sense organs and *ābhyantara* is called *mānasa* which is only one type. The *alaukika* is of three types namely: (i) *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa,* (ii) *jñānalakṣaṇa,* and (iii) *yogaja* depending upon their different modes of presentation (*sannikarṣa*), their cause (*karaṇa*) and the result (perceptual cognition = *pratyakṣa jñāna*). This classification, I believe, will certainly help any student of Nyāya to understand the basic conceptual framework of the perception clearly.

The next article (No. 3) deals with the influence of the old authors on Nyāya Kusumāñjali by Uadayanācārya and article (No. 4) presents the differences between the Vārttika (by Udyotakara) and Tātparyaṭīkā (by Vācaspati Miśra). These two articles are helpful for understanding and

appreciating these works. These articles were worth forming part of the preface had the learned author edited these works for the benefit of the readers, which otherwise hardly carries any usefulness when published as an independent article. The next article is on *adṛṣṭa* (unseen [merits and demerits]) and *apūrva* (not-caused-before, a consequence not immediately preceded by its cause). These concepts are fundamentally brought about in the *Mīmāṃsā darśana* and discussed in almost all other orthodox schools of Indian philosophy. Here the author discusses these issues as has been presented in Nyāya school of thought. This article presents a logical explanation of these concepts, which traditionally are discussed with reference to sacrifice and heaven. Here the author brings these concepts to interpret mundane reality and their applicability to day-to-day life while trying to remove the misconception about the mutual inclusiveness of these concepts.

There are five articles on Buddhist logic (6–10). The articles (No. 6 and 7) give a brief picture of the similarity of the conceptual framework of Nyāya and Buddhist thinking (*Bauddha-naiyāyikayoś cintana-sāmyam* and *Bauddha-Nyāya-darśanayoḥ bandha-mokṣayoḥ svarūpam upāyaś ca*). As has been pointed out that the Buddhists were the main opponents of the *naiyāyikas* and the latter always aim at refuting the former to establish the orthodox doctrines. However here the author argues in favour of emphasizing the theory that the foundation of the conceptual framework of the *naiyāyikas* and Buddhists is very much similar. The fundamental theories on metaphysics like bondage (*bandha*), salvation (*mokṣa*), the cycle of birth (*bhava-cakra*) etc. in both these schools have close affinity. Gotama in his Nyāya-Sūtra (NS. 1.1.2) says that out of the cycle of *duḥkh-janma-pravṛtti-doṣa-mithyā-jñāna*, whenever the destruction of the latter is seen, the former is destroyed and finally by the destruction of *duḥkha* one can achieve *apavarga* (salvation). The Buddhists also adopt a similar line of metaphysical thinking while they accept *avidyā* or *tṛṣṇā,* which is the seed of all the *duḥkhas.* The destruction of *avidyā* leads to *nirvāṇa.* Buddhists do not accept *ātman* (soul), however, they accept *pañcaskandha* which takes care of all that is accomplished by the acceptance of *ātman* in the orthodox schools. The cycle of the micro-cosmos is due to *pratītyasamutpāda* consisting of twelve interwined aspects of human life (technically called *bhhava-cakra*) is recognized, which is the essence of *śūnyavāda* according to Nāgārjuna. *Nirvāṇa* is defined in terms of getting rid of this *bhava-cakra* for which the eight-fold path of *āryas* (*ariya-*

aṭṭhaṅgika-magga) is advised by Lord Buddha. In this aspect only do the Buddhists differ from the Naiyāyikas, who on the contrary advise adopting the path of *tattva-jñāna* that alone is capable of destroying miseries (*duḥkha*). Metaphysically this is the main reason for a tough tussle between the Buddhists and orthodox logicians, opines, Professor K.N. Jha (p. 50).

The article (8) *Śubhaguptācāryakṛteśvarabhaṅgakārikāvimarśa*—a work on the denial of the existence of God (the creator) by Śubhaguptācārya, a Buddhist logician who is also author of Sarvajñasiddhi, Bāhyārtha-siddhi, Śruti-parīkṣā, Anyāpoha-vicāra and Īśvarabhaṅga-kārikā etc. Professor Jha thinks that MM. Satishchandra Vidyabhusan's mention of Kalyāṇarakṣita (a Buddhist scholar) as the author of these works is based on misconception. These works were not available in Sanskrit. MM. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya (the teacher of Professor K.N. Jha) found them in Tibetan language and translated them into Sanskrit, which was published by Professor Jha in the journal of the Mithila Sanskrit Research Institute. The next article (9) *Ātma-nirāse Dharmakīrtti-yukti* also deals with a similar topic, where the author brings out an extensive debate on refutation of the existence of *ātman* (Self) by Dharmakīrtti, a celebrated author in Buddhist logic. The next article (10) *Virodhy-apratītau virodhāpratītiḥ* deals with the intricacies of the *kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda* of the *naiyāyikas* vs the *kṣaṇikavāda* of the Buddhists. Each and every article is very interesting and enlightening on various core issues in the conceptual framework of orthodox logic as well as Buddhist logic.

Last but not the least, I must confess that I have never seen any work till date on the complicated issues as has been mentioned above written in such a lucid Sanskrit that anybody, even a beginner of Sanskrit language especially in the field of Indian philosophy, can grasp well. I wish the author would help the younger generation by bringing out many more such works, which would add a new dimension to the *śāstric* studies.

Notes and References

1. It may be noted here that the articles are not numbered 1 to 15 in that order as we refer to them here. For the sake of convenience we give hypothetical numbers in the order as they are arranged in the book.
2. Professor Jha cites a good number of instances of the Buddhist logicians like Dharmakīrtti, Diṅnāga, Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrtti, Kamalaśīla etc., who were strong opponents of the *naiyāyikas*.

3. See a paper on *Kroḍapatra* by Professor Prahlada Char in *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 3 and Discussion on the same by Daya Krishna and Comments by Prahlada Char in *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 3.
4. See my paper on '*Śābdabodha*, Cognitive Priority and the Odd Stories on *Prakāratāvāda* and *Saṃsargatāvada*', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 27, No. 4, August 1999, pp. 325–76.

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Kamla Jain: *Aprigraha—The Humane Solution*, Parsvanatha Vidyapitha, Varanasi, 1998, pp. 102, Rs. 120.

Ideologically, consumeristic attitude is supposed to be rooted in the western way of civilization but it has taken the shape of a lifestyle in the era of post industrialization. Nowadays, the worldwide and multidimensional expansion of consumerism has become a directive principle for the so called growth of global civilization. That it is enormously and anormatively supported by science and technology together with capitalism is really a matter of great concern. This inspired the author of the book under review to pen down her thoughts and reflections on related issues as an effective criticism of consumerism. The whole effort of this book is intended to provide a sustainable solution to consumerism in the Indian value system.

The first chapter of this book, 'Consumerism: The Anti Human Goal' deals with the historical prespectives regarding the development of consumeristic ideology during the period of the last two hundred and fifty years. It was due to the Adam Smithian and Keynesian views on economic development that western society took a marked stride towards consumerism, as if this was the ultimate goal of life. The author has criticized consumerism, labelling this as an anti human goal by illustrating its negative aspects alongwith its dangerous consequences. Citing the views of eminent economists like J.K. Galbraith and E.J. Mishan etc., the author has analysed the myths and dogmas of the modern economic system in a convincing manner. The author has also elucidated different ways of controlling consumerism by accepting a solution in value education, voluntary simplicity and in limiting one's desires (*Icchā parimāṇa*).

The second chapter of this book, 'Environmental Degradation: A Risk to Human Survival' is confined to the analysis of different aspects of

consumeristic exploitation of nature. Environmental degradation caused by consumeristic exploitation of natural resources is of such an alarming consequence to human survival that its remedy demands paradigm shift of man's attitude towards nature. In the present context, the situation has become very critical because consumerism, exploitation of nature and the modern idea of development have become intertwined. Thus, to talk about environmental protection is often blamed as something against development. It seems that consumerism would not let it go beyond this point since the edifice of economics and the grandeur of science and technology would not then survive. The author has pertinently criticized the modern concept of material development which leads to a risk to human survival at the cost of affluence. Instead of this 'growthomania', an idea of sustainable development has been emphasized which means a development that requires to meet our needs and not our greed. It is our greed or imposed needs that motivates us to exploit more and more natural resources while the actual need-oriented view of development ethically confines man to a proper utilization of the natural gifts. The author has supported her views by presenting a good amount of discussion regarding the relationship between man and nature from different religio-philosophical points of view. Accordingly it seems to be very helpful to develop a sense of divinity towards nature.

The last chapter of this book '*Aparigraha:* The Humane Solution' has been devoted to provide a permanent solution of the problem of consumerism and environmental degradation. In fact, serious attention to the problem indicates a bleak future for mankind in the context of what is euphemistically called material advancement. The solutions which are usually suggested to the problems of consumerism seem to be lacking causal concern of the problem. It must be treated with an attitude of mind at the causal level. Therefore, voluntary control over desires and possessions can be considered as a humane solution for all consumeristic problems. It is in this context that the author has discussed various aspects of *Aparigraha* according to the philosophical thoughts of Hindu, Bauddha and Jain traditions. *Aparigraha* is essentially a part of spiritual discipline but the author has given more emphasis only upon its practical and social aspects. What is most commendable is that the author has identified similar ideas of *Aparigraha* in Christianity and Islam as well as in socialism and communism. In this way the idea of *Aparigraha* has been accredited as one of the principles of universal ethics.

Thus, one can say that this book is a critique of consumerism and an appraisal of *Aparigraha* as an antidote to consumerism. Though the ideas and issues discussed here are of great contemporary relevance, their treatment appears to be perfunctory. The author has considered consumerism as an anti-human goal, while the very idea of human goal has totally been left in darkness. It is to be pointed out that the idea of human goal can be conceptualized here in terms of human existence or survival and more profoundly in terms of human essence. So far as the human survival is concerned, consumerism can be said to be an anti-human goal because of its alarming consequences like pollution and chronic diseases etc. But it is definitely insufficient to recognize consumerism as an anti-human goal with regard to human essence. If the author's idea of anti-human goal is based only on the worst conditions of human survival generated by consumerism then today's anti-human goal would be the pro-human goal tomorrow if science and technology provide a better solution to the negative effects of consumerism, which does not seem impossible. Therefore, the author's views of consumerism as an anti-human goal require deeper analysis of the problem in terms of human essence. It can be said from the human essence point of view that man becomes finally the product of his own products (*bhogā na bhuktā vayameva bhuktā*) in a consumeristic way of life, which is virtually harmful for creativity, freedom and value pursuing essence of human being. In fact, sclerosis of objectivity which is essentially implied in the consumeristic attitude is totally against the human subjectivity i.e. essence. I think that the above line of interpretation should be added to the empirical analysis of consumerism, if at all it is necessary to label consumerism as an anti-human goal in the proper sense of the term.

However, if consumerism is accepted as an anti-human goal then the solution offered by the author is insufficient to eliminate consumerism. It should not be forgotten that consumerism is very much rooted in a particular world outlook in which the world is considered as a 'free lunch' for mankind. Thus, we will have to change the frame of consciousness, constituted by this world view, to find a proper solution to consumerism. *Aparigraha* as a method of voluntary control over desires and possessions can only check consumeristic drive to some extent by limiting our consumptions. It cannot change the mode of consumption, which is very much required if we are to be rescued from consumerism. Even to check consumerism, *Aparigraha* cannot be called a very effective solution

because consumerism, at its advanced stage, does not leave us capable for self control over desires and possessions. It fabricates our frame of consciousness in accordance with the given or produced surrounding situations where we really lack our freedom of choice.

Thus, *Aparigraha* really makes consumerism 'sustainable' by limiting our consumptions instead of providing a humane solution to uproot consumerism. The complete solution to the problem of consumerism requires something more than *Aparigraha* i.e. *Tena Tyaktena Bhuñjīthā*, an Upaniṣadic vision.

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V. KRISHNAMURTHY: *The Clock of the Night Sky*, UBS Publishers Distributors (K.K. Birla Academy Publications, No. 2), pp. 107.

The term *jyotisa*, as in the Vedânga-Jyotiṣa, concerned the measurement of time, a problem relating to astronomy. *Jyotisa* was regarded as standing at the head of all the sciences, like the combs of peacocks and the crest jewels of serpents. Since time measurement was needed to fix, among other things, the time of rituals, *jyotiṣa* came to refer to the art of fixing an auspicious or lucky moment to commence an activity. This book concerns *jyotiṣa* in the former sense—it concerns traditional astronomy rather than astrology.

Most of us can, at least to a crude approximation, judge the time of the day from the elevation of the sun. To tell the time of the night from star positions is much harder, since few non-specialists learn how to do this. Sadly, it is probably impossible for children brought up in an urban environment who rarely even see the stars since they are obscured by the sky-glow due to artificial lighting. Living in a rural area, as a child, the author of this book learnt the art of telling the time from the night sky, in the traditional way from his father. This book gives an interesting account of these traditional verses in Sanskrit and relates them to basic positional astronomy. The Sanskrit formulae are also compared with some Tamil formulae and formulae from an 18th century Tanjore manuscript that the author later found.

The book does an excellent job of explaining the tradition and relating it to modern positional astronomy. While the author does attempt a critical analysis of the tradition, the analysis itself leaves out a couple of desirable things. As the author himself observes, the use of the tradition to tell the time may lead to errors that are sometimes as large as 1 hour and 42 minutes. Nevertheless, he has not followed any statistical methodology in computing an 'average' error of 25 minutes. Under the circumstances, it is not clear what this 'average' means, and how reliable the method actually is.

Secondly, the author does not feel the need to provide any basis for his assertions about the date of the tradition ('as early as the start of human civilization'). Thus, it is not clear how old the method actually is. Clearly, human civilization and astronomy ante-date the Vedic period. Clearly, also, this particular method at least post-dates the Katapayâdi system of numeration, which it uses, and is probably much younger. This neglect of chronology, though ironic, is probably not terribly important for the purposes of the present book. But this loses valuable information, in general, since horology relates also to stellar navigation, an area where technique was presumably valued above tradition, though the tradition itself began very long ago. Thus, this reviewer knows of at least one recent case where a translated manuscript on 'traditional navigation' techniques brought out by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, at great expense, contained tables from a British sailing manual of 1860!

Overall, this is a useful book for those interested in an introduction to traditional astronomy and timekeeping, though the author's assertions about the antiquity of the tradition should be taken *cum grano salis*.

Centre for Studies in Civilizations C.K. RAJU
New Delhi

Part I: ARINDAM CHAKRABARTI on Nyāyāmṛta:
The Elixir of Logic: Dualist Dialectic in Defence of a Real World of Difference: A Critical Notice of Vyāsatīrtha's Nyāyāmṛta, with 3 Māddva Commentaries and Advaita Siddhi, by K.T. Pandurangi.

How does the protagonist of a Secondless One Reality debate with a second person? How can one claim to have or impart philosophical knowledge of a pure consciousness which is the object of no knowledge? What

is the idealist-nondualist's account of intentionality? It is an irony arising from the dialectical nature of philosophical activity that an otherwise invincible non-dualist philosopher has to embarrass himself by entering into a logical argument with *another* philosopher of a different persuasion. The pragmatic self-refutation lurking behind a denyer of all difference having to deal with a real difference of opinion has often been compared with the solipsist's predicament concerning an opponent or, for that matter, a supporter. The Classical Indian Advaitic-Monists, however, were a hard-headed lot. While their hermeneutics, mysticism and logic led them to distil out the message of non-duality from the irreplaceable authorless authority of the Veda, their doctrine of 'levels of reality' allowed them to live in a highly stratified society endorsing, by and large, the birth-based distinctions of caste as well as made it possible for them to argue with their dualist and pluralist opponents with unparalleled logical ferocity. Of course, since nothing but pure impersonal objectless formless consciousness—Atman/Brahman—was regarded as 'truth', the falsity of the world of difference—including the differences of opinion—was itself assessed as false. But it would be too rash to apply double negation here. The world of distinctions along with our philosophical recognition of its falsehood is false no doubt, but this falsity of falsity does not take us back to the *truth* or reality of the world. To draw a parallel from Nyaya logic (which is far from nondualistic in its metaphysical underpinnings) the absence of a turtle's hair is as unreal as the fictional turtle's hair. In the actual world there is, in a manner of speaking, absence of turtle's hair. But that does not mean that we could find turtle's hair in the world. Perhaps this parallel is problematic because unreality is not a kind of absence, except in Maddhva logic. But more about this falsity of falsity later.

Inspite of committing the objective physical world to unintelligible falsity and thus departing radically from realistic commonsense, Advaita Vedanta enjoyed supreme respectability among the Vedic schools of Indian thought since the time of Samkara. Ramanuja rebutted Samkara's theory of ignorance and strict identity between God and soul, but even he claimed to be a non-dualist of a sort. There was not more than one independent substantial real, the world and us being adjectival to God! Even after five hundred years, between Sriharsa—the arch-refuter of all realist categories in the mid-twelfth century, and Citsukha—the astute clarifier of the concept of immediate self-manifesting subjectivity in the late

thirteenth century, the fate of Realist-Dualist Vedanta was more or less sealed in the philosophical scene of medieval India. Yet it was in the middle of this hostile anti-dualistic milieu that Maddva alias Anandatirtha (alias Purnaprajna) composed his dualistic commentary on the Brahmasutras and wrote many volumes to establish the full ultimate reality of the five distinctions, between God and the individual, between God and the world, between one individual and another, between an individual and the material world, and between one material object and another. 'Just as God is real, equally real is the world' was his slogan. After this, the fourteenth century was to be marked as the dawn of the New (epistemic) Logic, thanks to the great Gangesa whose 'Philosopher's Stone of Truth' (*Tattvacintamani*) became the irreplaceable *organon* of Logic, Theory of Knowledge and Semantics for the next four centuries all over India. Gangesa was not primarily interested in Metaphysics and never engaged directly with the dualism-nondualism debate. But he provided a sophisticated logical grid for all systematic philosophical discussions and set new standards of rigour. So in the late fifteenth century we have Vyasatirtha who uses his complete command over Navya Nyāyā analytical tools (though he also undertook the first systematic demolition of Gangesa's analysis of the Ways of Knowing) to write 'The Elixir of Logic' (*nyayamrta*) which revives and fortifies Maddva Dualism and Realism about the external world of difference and materiality.

Vyasatirtha's attack of Advaita in *The Elixir* falls into four parts of which a very sketchy table of contents could be given as follows:

Chapter One discusses roughly sixty topics from which a few are mentioned below:

1. Is the dispute-describing disjunctive sentence an essential part of a philosophical debate?
2. What is the limitor of subjecthood in the inference of the falsity of the world?
3. The first definition of falsity refuted.
4. The second definition of falsity refuted.
5. The third definition of falsity refuted.
6. The fourth definition of falsity refuted.
7. The fifth definition of falsity refuted.
8. The destructive dilemma concerning whether falsity of the world is a truth or a falsehood.

9. What is objecthood (= perceivability) the first alleged ground of the world's falsity?
10. What is inertness (= otherness from consciousness) which is the second ground?
11. What is limitedness which is the third ground?
12. Falsity as grounded on divisibility according to Citsukha.
13. How all the above grounds are nonconclusive because of a not always present extra adjunct.
14. Parity of the Advaitic reasoning with faulty arguments.
15. What is reality?
16. Primacy of perception.
17. The perceived reality of the world cannot be impugned by any inference.
18. No scriptural testimony can override the clear claim of perception.
19. How inferring falsity of the world is like inferring coldness of fire.
20. Does the vulnerability of perception to a possible future defeater make perception unreliable in general?
21. How perception grasps ultimate reality.
22. The alleged falsity of the world is contradicted by inference.
23. The alleged falsity of the world is contradicted by Scripture.
24. Can unreal/untrue provers (e.g. the image on the mirror) establish a real/true probandum (e.g. the face)?
25. What is the relation between seeing (awareness) and the seen (object)?
26. How we can decide *which* object is intended by *which piece of awareness* (प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था) under the nondualist picture of pure consciousness?
27. Interpretation of the numerous *sruti* passages which contradict non-dualism.

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ARINDAM CHAKRABARTI

Book Received

1. न्याय शास्त्रानुशीलनम
   Kishor Nath Jha
2. '*Culture and Value* by Ludwig Wittgenstein'
   Tr. Ashok Vohra.
3. '*T.V. Kapali Sastri*' Prema Nanda Kumar
   Gen. Ed. R. Balasubramanian.
4. '*Sri Aurobindo*' M.P. Pandit.
   Gen. Ed. R. Balasubramanian.
5. '*T.M.P. Mahadevan*'
   R. Balasubramanian.
6. '*The Philosophy of the Vedantasutra*'
   S.M. Srinivasa.
7. '*Sunyata: The Essence of Mahayana Spirtuality*'
   Motilal Pandit.
8. '*Studies in Formal Logic*'
   Biswambhar Pahi.
9. '*East and West in Aesthetics*'
   Ed. Grazia Marchiano.
10. '*Freedom*'
    Ed. Santi Nath Chattopadhyay.
11. '*Social Justice: Philosophical Perspectives*'
    Gen. Ed. P.K. Mohapatra.
12. '*Dhvani: Nature and Culture of Sound*'
    Ed. S.C. Malik.
13. '*The Intergral Advaitism of Sri Aurobindo*'
    Ram Shankar Misra.
14. '*Aparigraha: The Humane Solution*'
    Kamla Jain.
15. '*Facets of Humanism*'
    Gen. Ed. P.K. Mohapatra.
16. '*Religion Politics and Society in South and South East Asia.*
    Ed. N.N. Vohra and J.N. Dixit

ANNOUNCEMENT

The *JICPR* proposes to bring out an Issue devoted to the following subject:

Life-Worlds: Private and Public—
Love and Friendship-Power and Welfare.

Articles may be sent to the *JICPR*, B/189-A, University Marg, Bapunagar, Jaipur 300015. The last date for the receipt of the articles is 30th September, 2000.

ANNOUNCEMENT

The Indian Council of Philosophical Research nominates one Senior scholar every year to visit Paris under the Indo-French Cultural Exchange Programme. Interested scholars may send their Curriculum Vitae to the Council's address.

ANNOUNCEMENT

The special issue of the *JICPR* devoted to Development in Philosophical Logic will now be published in a book-form entitled *Circularity, Definition and Truth*. This has become necessary as the articles received for it amounted to more than 360 pages and hence cannot be accommodated in a single issue of the *Journal*.

In view of this, a decision has been taken that the subscribers of the *JICPR* may acquire the book at a discount of 33% of the price of the book when published.

Editor

Special Issue on Chronology and Indian Philosophy
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

Editors: G.C. Pande and Daya Krishna

Subhash Kak: *On the Chronological Framework for Indian Culture*

U. Kalpagam: *Chronology and the Notion of Progress*

Arvind Sharma: *Towards a New Chronology of Ancient India: Reflections on the Role of Astronomical Evidence*

Klaus K. Klostermaier: *Questioning the Aryan Invasion Theory and Revising Ancient Indian History*

N.D. Kazanas: *A New Date for the Ṛgveda*

K.M. Srivastava: *The Date of Buddha*

Prakash Sinha: *Buddhist Chronology Revisited*

R.N. Misra: *A Note on the* Vastusutropaniṣad, *A text on Vastu-Śilpa*

V. Shekhawat: *Emergence of the Idea of Darśana Śāstra*

Malati J. Shendge: *At the Beginning of Philosophy In India: The Philosophy of the Ṛgveda*

Forthcoming

ANNOUNCEMENT

Indian Philosophical Congress Platinum Jubilee Session will be held in Delhi from December 28, 2000 to January 1, 2001.

The general theme of the Conference is Spirituality, Science and Technology. Some of the sub-themes are as under.

(i) Recovering and Interpreting Indian Spiritual Heritage
(ii) Consciousness: Estrangement and Enlargement
(iii) Yoga and Spiritual Praxis
(iv) Value-oriented Science and Eco-friendly Technology
(v) Spirituality, Science and Technology for World Peace and Prosperity
(vi) United Human Family
(vii) Civilizational Crisis and Beyond
(viii) Education as Learning and Cultivation of Values
(ix) Rethinking Foundations of Science
(x) Roots and Horizons of Science
(xi) Orientation and Limits of Technology

Scholars from all over the world are cordially invited to participate in the Platinum Jubilee Session and present papers.

For details contact

Coordinator and Organizing Secretary
Professor S.R. Bhatt
M/P 23, Maurya Enclave
Pitampura, Delhi-110034
INDIA
Telephone: 91-11-7242093, 7416473.

ANNOUNCEMENT

The *JICPR* is seriously thinking of forming a Network Group consisting of those of its readers who would like to receive the contents of its special features such as 'Focus', 'Agenda for Research' and 'Notes and Queries' before their publication so that they may become aware of them as soon as they are received and may respond to them in case they would like to do so.

The *JICPR* is at present published three times a year and thus it takes a long time for items under these sections to be published and brought to the attention of our readers. In order to avoid the delay, it is proposed that those who would like to be actively involved in the on-going discussions may write to us expressing their desire to become members of the *JICPR* Network Group so that they may be sent the material immediately as soon as it is received by us. Those interested may kindly write to the Editor.

EDITOR

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ANNOUNCEMENT

We have the pleasure to inform you that the *JICPR* will be published quarterly from Vol. No. XVIII, No. 1 as under:

January – March
April – June
July – September
October – December

In view of the quality and quantity of the articles we have been receiving, the need was felt to make the journal from Triannual to Quarterly. Readers are requested to note the revised rates of the journal from *JICPR* Volume XVIII, No. 1 onwards.

Institutional	Rs. 450.00	$40
Individual	Rs. 200.00	$30
Students/Retired Teachers	Rs. 100.00	$15
Single Issue	Rs. 100.00	
Individual	Rs. 500.00 (for 3 years)	
Life membership	Rs. 1500.00	$200

Editor

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ	ā
ई	ī
ऊ	ū
ए,ऐ	ē } (long)
ओ	ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ	ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं)	ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ्	ṅ
ञ्	ñ
ण्	ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः)	ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च	ca and not cha
छ	cha and not chha

Linguals

ट	ṭa
ठ	ṭha
ड	ḍa
ढ	ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श	śa
ष	ṣa
स	sa

Unclassified

ळ	ḷa
क्ष	kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ	jña and not djña
ऌ	ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā*, *jñāna* and not *djñāna*, *Kṛṣṇa* and not *Krishṇa*, *sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and specific) characters

ൽ	ḷ
ൾ	ḷ.
ൺ	ṇ
ൻ	ṉ.

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa),

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:

e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai

Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:

e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence

coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:

e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*

veve or *vévе* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script. (The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for *laghu-guru* of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:

Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:

Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.