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DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Intentionality of Language and Thought

GEETA RAMANA
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To the early philosophers the world of thought and experience was a sure gateway to the building of epistemological and metaphysical empires. Today, an inquiry concerning human understanding turns to language and thought, instead of ideas and impressions, for some illumination regarding the nature of mental phenomena and consequently their relation to the world of objects and events.

It has been argued that, since language expresses ones thought, the analysis of the one must correspond to that of the other. Wittgenstein proceeded at first precisely on these lines, where the task of the *Tractatus* was to investigate the nature and limits of language and thereby the limits of thought. Since 'things are in order as they are', the logic of language can be revealed by presenting clearly what can be said. Everything that can be thought of can also be given linguistic expression. The condition of our sense consists in setting the limit to what can be thought or said. In order to think and talk about the world there must be something in common between language and the world. It was believed that since logic reveals the structure of language, it must also reveal the structure of the world. It is in language then, that the limit must be set. Since the essential function of language is to depict or describe the world, the form of a thought mirrors the form of what it depicts, as much as propositions do. Propositions then must have the same logical form as that of facts.

Underlying the *Tractatus* was the fundamental point that thought and proposition are both internally related to the state-of-affairs that make them true. This condition of sense or the logical form can only be shown, as that which is common to language and the world cannot itself be represented. For a proposition to have sense in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is for it to picture a possible state-of-affairs. The logic of our language tells us that all that can be said is ***how*** reality is. Nothing can be significantly said about ***what*** reality

is.[1] We see that there is a search for order, structure and conditions of sense in attempts to relate language and the world.

More attention was paid to the language through which one understood concepts. Language was able to represent an almost mirror-like picture of the world and its objects. On this model speech is conceived as 'the indirect communication of thoughts in default of a direct means of grasping the thought in question'.[2] With Frege, Russell, Popper, Wittgenstein and others from the post-Cartesian world one tried to move away from psychologism to more concrete forms of thought as seen in say judgements and propositions. It was hoped that the 'linguistic turn' would be able to reveal the nature of the world and the relation between the physical and the mental phenomena clearly.

Wittgenstein very soon gave up the search for order in his 'Philosophical Investigations' because he now believed nothing lies hidden, 'everything lies open to view'.[3] If there is any structure to be unearthed, it is at the level of 'describing the grammar of language'. The conditions of sense are revealed when language is examined in its use. For instance, we think of thoughts as products of our thinking and imagine them to be stored somewhere in the head. But, what goes on inside our brains is no more inside than outside. The turn to analysis of concepts as understood in ordinary non-philosophical contexts, does not report thoughts, memories, fears, desires and expectations but reveals a wide range of contexts governed by differing rules and conventions. The criterion of having an experience is to look for its expression that makes it 'appropriate' and 'relevant' in the concerned language-game of say, describing an object or speculating, reading or telling a story, making a joke, praying or solving a problem. Language is now seen, not as a representation of possible states-of-affairs but as a language-game that is heterogeneous in nature. What is meant is, that it is within the system of language, which is connected to grammar and social conventions that one criticizes, argues, explains and justifies phenomena. It is depth-grammar that enables one to see the complex variety in which different concepts, mental and physical are used. The grammar of 'thinking' for instance reveals a variety of forms like reflecting, wondering, assuming, and believing, each capable of expression in a variety of ways. The structure of thought is neither hidden nor mysterious. The study of thought processes and their relevant and appropriate expression is one and the same enterprise. Meaning is thus contextual and tied to the particular language-game in question. Various language-games are thus described, compared and contrasted to dissolve the apparent philosophical dilemmas. One has to now only 'battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence, by means of language' [4]

We see that post-Cartesian analysis shied from taking the Subject as primary in order to avoid the private realm of meaning and interpretation and consequent relapse into Solipsism. Later-Wittgenstein too wondered what could count as language if it was merely an expression of pre-linguistic thought. In a sense, when we learn to speak we also learn to think. It is in fact language that provides us with a way to account for the meaning of words and concepts used 'inter-subjectively and intro-subjectively'.[5] (Therefore the question, can one think without a language or without any capacity for linguistic expression, becomes important in order to realize the constraints of language and thereby of thought.)

An attempt to introduce the Subject in the analysis of language can be seen in the notion of language seen not as an instrument or vehicle of thought processes or as a system of communication governed by rules and conventions, but as itself a part of human activity. Like Later-Wittgenstein, Austin observed that a variety of acts could be performed with language. Not all sentences describe phenomena. Interrogatives, imperatives and requests, for example are performatory in nature and not characterized as being either true or false but appropriate, good, sincere or odd. The basic unit of language therefore is an act that is performed with the aid of words and sentences.

What is the function of the analysis of language apart from communicating the variety of uses it can ordinarily have. Can it solve traditional philosophical problems of the mind, of reality, of truth, and truth-conditions. On an Austinian-Wittgensteinian analysis 'I know' is no longer construed as depicting a state of mind. It has a special performative function. It is used to back a statement or induce reliability towards ones words. The phrase 'I know' has a definite role to play given the particular context. To say for example, 'She knows but she may be wrong' is highly infelicitous. Rules and Conventions in language must form a necessary part of all kinds of language-games if communication is to remain the essential function of language.

Language used as a system of representation and communication must include some theory of Semantics if it is to be understood also as an act. As Grice pointed out, for a person to communicate, it is typically required that—one, he or she at least intends to produce a certain effect in the hearer and two, intends that the hearer recognize this intention.[6] For this it is important that the speaker use meaningful expressions. It is ordinarily believed that the

conscious intelligent Subject plays a significant role in bestowing meaning and sense on the phenomenal world.

Mental phenomena have a unique relation to their objects, namely intentionality, which do not allow its expression in sentences to follow the rules of extensional, truth-functional logic and are thereby termed as intensional ('intentional-with-an-s'). The statement, 'A believes she saw the morning star' does not give us the same truth-value when 'the morning star' is substituted by 'the evening star'. That is, substitution fails to preserve extension or truth-value. One may believe in the one without believing in the other. Similarly all propositional attitude reports like desires and beliefs, hopes and fears, would exhibit an intensional (intensional-with-an-s) feature. Whenever we perceive anything or think about anything, we always do so under some aspects and not others. This is known as the ***aspectual*** shape of intentionality, which in turn requires consciousness. In the case of conscious perceptions for instance, one may see a rope ***as*** a snake or want to drink water without wanting to drink H_2O.[7] This one aspect of mental phenomena led even Russell to accept 'mental facts' as a legitimate ontological category. Their resistance to extensional, truth-functional schema makes it difficult to indicate their truth-conditions. Similarly a large number of evaluative concepts like 'good' and 'right' as Hare too has pointed out in his 'Language of Morals', do not bear truth-functional analysis.

However, not all mental states exhibit intentionality. Moods and some forms of anxiety may not have any definite object. It is possible to represent some definite object of desire or belief but 'nervousness' and certain 'anxious moments' for instance, need not be about anything in particular, which could be identified.[8] Many conscious states do not seem therefore to be intentional. Also, as seen in the propositional attitudes of some hopes and fears, one can be in the said intentional state without the object or state-of-affairs actually existing. I can hope it is raining when it is not and believe in fairies that do not exist. Some intentional states may be consciously held and some may not be so held. (Intentionality and consciousness are not therefore co-extensive.) Someone sleeping for instance may hold a number of beliefs. Many intentional states (in the sense of being characterized by *directedness* or *aboutness*) are therefore, not consciously held. On the other hand, emotions like elation or sadness may not always exhibit intentionality, but are always conscious experiences. Belief, desire, fear, hope, hostility, affection, puzzlement, imagination, disgust, aspiration, disappointment, amusement can all be seen as examples of intentional states which can nevertheless be distinguished *from non-intentional ones*.[9] One could for example treat water flowing downhill ***as if*** it had intentionality. However, 'only intrinsic intentionality is genuinely mental phenomena'.[10]

With respect to Beliefs (whether used dispositionally or occurentially), they are directed upon some state of affairs (and are therefore also termed as intentional) of which we may or may not be conscious*. Even a current belief may lie implicit in the background of many other beliefs as seen in a simple action of say opening a door. Most often we open doors quite unconscious of explicit belief-propositions like 'There is a door' and 'I am going to open it'. So, not all intentional phenomena are conscious, although they may play a very large role in the causal chain of perceptions and actions. But of course, there remains an important category of mental phenomena that require necessarily, intentionality and consciousness. *Intentional states* like intending, desiring, deciding or choosing imply that we are also aware of our intentions, desires and choices (*barring Freudian slips*!).

Although mental phenomena resist truth-functional interpretation, all intentional states *can* determine their conditions of satisfaction, as seen in say, truth-conditions with respect to beliefs, or fulfilment in the case of desires, intentions and promises, against a 'background' of capacities, abilities, tendencies, dispositions and other causal structures that are not and could not themselves be analyzed in terms of other intentional states.[11] The Semantics that is required is analyzed through certain 'conditions of satisfaction' that could thus include truth-functional analysis among others. For example Searle treats intentionality in terms of representation that can help outline the complex network of relations between various speech-acts and their 'conditions of satisfaction'. Syntax and Semantics are both sought to be accommodated in Searle's theory of Speech-acts. There is an assumption that the direction that intentionality takes, can be determined. For an utterance to be meaningful in a specific sense is for it to represent a state of affairs. This takes shape through the intentional content, direction of fit and conditions of satisfaction.[12] However the 'network' of intentional states are not themselves 'self-interpreting' or 'self-applying'.[13] 'As a precondition of Intentionality, the background is as invisible to Intentionality as the eye which sees is invisible to itself'.[14]

Certain parallels in language understood as a 'speech-act' and the Intentional states are shown which throws significant light on the relation between the philosophy of mind and that of human action. ***Intentional states represent objects and states-of-affairs in the same sense of representation that***

speech-acts represent objects and states-of-affairs.[15] Our utterances, at least on most occasions, have determinate meanings with determinate aspectual shapes, just as our intentional states often have determinate intentional contents with determinate aspectual shapes.[16]

The theory of 'Speech-Acts' as originally put forward by Austin, was intended to remedy the descriptive fallacy made in treating all statements as recording information or describing facts which are true or false. 'I promise to lend you my book' is, as we have seen earlier, a performatory statement which is characterized as being fulfilled or not honoured, rather than as being true or false. More instances of this kind can be seen in statements like, 'I declare the innings closed' or 'I bet you a 100 that the rains will stop by the end of this week' where, declaring and betting are performances. Utterances which are sayings and utterances which are doings or performatory in nature are to be distinguished. Since the person uttering the statement does something, speech is understood as a speech-act. Eventually one will see that making a statement is just as much a performing as making a promise or declaring an innings. The basic unit of linguistic communication is therefore taken to be a speech-act.[17]

Searle improves on Austin's distinction between the locutionary and the illocutionary acts within the theory of speech-acts. The locutionary act, according to Austin is characterized by it having a sense and reference that can be abstractly separated from the illocutionary force with which the locution is uttered. 'I am going to do it' for example, could be a locution with different illocutionary forces of say threat, promise or warning. Searle obliterates this distinction and characterizes all locutionary acts as 'members of the class of illocutionary acts'.[18] For instance, in 'I hereby promise that I am going to do it', the illocutionary force is part of the meaning of the locutionary act and cannot be separated. Therefore, there is only one act, namely the illocutionary act. Eventually, giving descriptions too is a performance and therefore a speech-act. Searle however does feel the need to distinguish the illocutionary act from the propositional act.

This distinction is important as it avoids construing the act of stating itself as true or false. That which is stated, the proposition, or what Searle calls the statement-object can be true or false. For example, in 'I promise to call you tomorrow', calling you up tomorrow, is something which can be described in terms of a true or false statement (I called/didn't call you up). My act of stating or the speech-act is not something that is either true or false. Only propositions it is said are characterized as being true or false.

Again, an assertion is an illocutionary act where the act of expressing a proposition is a part of the performing illocutionary act. One can order, predict, assert, suggest that X leave the room, where the clause 'that X leave the room' is termed as the propositional content (p) with the different possible illocutionary force (F)-F(p). Not all illocutionary acts however may have propositional contents as in the case of 'Hurrah' or 'Ouch'. We see that Searle rightly realizes that performatives do not bear truth-value.

We now turn to the parallel between Intentional states and Speech-acts which Searle makes in order to explain how *language as understood through the notion of Speech-acts is in fact derived from the notion of Intentionality.*[19] There are four points of similarity. One, just as in Speech-acts one can distinguish between the propositional object and the act of stating or the propositional content and the illocutionary force, so can one distinguish the representative content (r), and the psychological mode (S)-S(r) with which the content is represented. I can believe or hope or fear that you will leave the room. Note the Intentional state has a representative content which is not to be treated as an 'object' or an aboutness with respect to a state-of-affairs.

Secondly, Speech-acts of the assertive class have what is called a **word-to-world** fit. All descriptions are required to match an independent state-of-affairs in order to be an accurate description. However, the directive class of Speech-acts as seen in orders, requests and commands, as well as the commissive class of Speech-acts as seen in promises, vows and pledges, are not supposed to match an existing state-of-affairs but bring about changes in the world so that the state-of-affairs as it were matches the Speech-act. Orders have to be carried out and promises kept, thereby bringing about a **world-to-word fit**. Intentional states like beliefs too depend on an independently existing state-of-affairs which requires me to change my belief if it does not match with any particular state-of-affairs. If it was once believed the earth was a flat surface and not any more, it is because the belief has been forced to keep up with the existing state-of-affairs and is accordingly characterized as true or false. There is what is known as the **mind-to-world** fit comparable to the **word-to-world** fit in Speech-acts. Again, desires and intentions are classes that are not true or false but like the logic of the directive and commissive class of Speech-acts are to be fulfilled or complied with. There is a similar **world-to-mind** fit in that desires and intentions have to be carried out in order to satisfy the conditions of that particular mental state. There are null cases in both categories of Speech-acts and Intentional states, where no direction of fit is to be achieved, as the particular state-of-

affairs is already supposed. In apologizing or congratulating someone, the point is to express sorrow or pleasure about a situation that is taken for granted as having occurred. Similarly, in the Intentional state of feeling sorry or glad no particular direction of fit is to be reached.

Thirdly, there is an internal relation between the performance of an illocutionary act and the corresponding internal state, which is the sincerity condition of that particular Speech-act. If I promise to post the letter then I also intend to post the letter. It is paradoxical and logically odd to say, 'It is raining but I do not believe it' or that 'I order you to stop sulking and do not want you to stop sulking'. (Searle, here showing the logical relation between intentional states and their content.)

Fourthly, 'conditions of satisfaction' are required in both Speech-acts and Intentional states. Assertions must be able to also indicate truth-value, orders are meant to be obeyed, and promises need to be kept. Similarly, the logic of beliefs require that things be as they are believed to be, of desires, that they be satisfied and of intentions that they are carried out. The 'conditions of satisfaction' of the Speech-act and that of the (expressed) Intentional state are identical.[20] (*In fact the expressed intentional state is a speech-act.*) Exceptions are when a thing ordered is complied with, not because of the order but because of some other independent reason. In general, however, an illocutionary act is satisfied if and only if the expressed intentional state is satisfied.

A premise underlying all the above points of similarity is the 'Principle of Expressibility'. That is, 'Whatever can be meant can be said'. The illocutionary force with which the speaker intends can in principle always be given an exact expression in a sentence with a particular meaning.[21] Thus the meaning of every sentence contains some 'determiners of illocutionary force',[22] that can be determined, once all the meaningful components are identified. This would include not only 'surface word-order', but also intonations, gestures and underlying semantics which would determine the meaning of the illocutionary act. 'What to do includes how to understand, interpret and apply intentional states'.[23] Wittgenstein's notion of meaning, may similarly be identified by a variety of indefinite possible descriptions in a certain context. And though Searle does seem to identify with Wittgenstein's point of 'the understanding being fixed by an ungrounded way of acting,[24] it is yet not saying the same thing. Where Searle's conditions of satisfaction require internal representations, Wittgenstein's analysis of inner processes stand in need of 'outer criteria'.[25] The ungroundedness really springs from the variety of ways

in which concepts can have meaning. Searle's attempt is to rather delineate the complex background of Intentionality, which enables one to cope meaningfully with ones environment. The latter position could include the former but the converse might not be true. Although the structure of thought is the structure of the expression of the argument which is thought through, one must not, says Wittgenstein, conflate the logical stages of an argument with a psychological process or activity.

The notion of representation used by Searle is such as to include content and mode of presentation. That is, it covers not only 'reference but also predication and other truth-conditions or conditions of satisfaction'.[26] It is representation that characterizes the logical feature of Intentional states and linguistic Speech-acts. It is important to construe an Intentional state by virtue of its logical properties. To Searle, ontological problems about the nature of mental states are irrelevant to its intentional features. If one compares the linguistic counterpart of Speech-acts, the question how or in what manner is a certain linguistic act realized, can be answered by giving various descriptions. For instance, by speaking or writing in English or French or into a tape-recorder or a typewriter or a computer. These forms of realization of a linguistic act do not affect analysis of their logical properties. In both, Speech-acts and Intentional states their form of realization is irrelevant to their logical properties, namely that of representation. To Wittgenstein the manner in which intentional states are realized is varied and it is precisely because of this that they cannot have a fixed representational structure. Consequently, the context could also determine the manner of expression that would affect the meaning of a particular mental state because meaning is taken to include contextuality. To Searle, contextuality can also be represented but not by knowing the material or psychological properties of its realization, but rather its conditions of satisfaction **and** the psychological mode of the intentional state in question. Another example of the relation between language and intentionality could be understood in the following way. 'A Language could not contain the notion of "kindness" unless it contained an expression having the function of "is kind", but it could contain "is kind" without "kindness".'[27]

The point of the above analysis of Speech-acts and Intentional states is also to show how representation in terms of Intentionality is applicable to both categories. It is with the help of this concept that language as seen through the notion of Speech-acts derives its notion of Intentionality. The intentions with which acts are performed in a particular context bestow

meaning on Speech-acts. To Wittgenstein the conditions of satisfactions are purely conventional and therefore the logical criteria are according to rules governing the use of words in a particular language. 'It is in language that an expectation and its fulfilment make contact'.[28] There is no matching of either the **world to word** or **world to mind** that takes place. Searle on the other hand represents the Speech-act to logically relate to the corresponding inner state. Although the distinction between mental states as mental states and Speech-acts as intentional performances remain, there is a 'double level intentionality' in Speech-acts. Along with the expressed intentional state, the illocutionary force with which the utterance is made bestows intentionality on the utterance thus transferring the conditions of satisfaction of the expressed psychological state to the external physical circumstance. To perform illocutionary acts is to engage in a rule-governed form of behaviour in which meaning is bestowed not only by intentions but also by conventions. Illocutionary acts are acts performed in accordance with certain constitutive rules as seen in the notion of a 'promise' that is governed by the notion of an 'obligation'. As opposed to regulative rules which regulate 'a pre-existing activity', 'constitutive rules constitute (and regulate) an activity, the existence of which is logically dependent on the rules'.[29] As seen in 'I promise I will return', the conditions of satisfaction for the Speech-act require one to hold the corresponding intention or obligation to return, which conventionally binds one to fulfil the intended promise. It is similar to rules in a game of Chess, where a 'check-mate' is made only if the King is attacked in such a way that no move will leave it unattacked'.[30] Thus Language provides for a system of representation within which one is able to have intentional states.

Searle carries forward the distinction between the force and content of Speech-acts to also explain intentional behaviour. It is this distinction that also relates mental states to the world. Content, conditions of satisfaction and what is paradoxically termed as 'intentional causation' are all important to explain human behaviour in which the mental component is the intention. Intention as part of its condition of satisfaction must not only represent but also cause subsequent behaviour. The conditions of satisfaction of the intention must be achieved as a result of the intention and the action it causes and not in any other way. This is known as the causal self-referential aspect of intention.[31] The cause both represents and brings out the effect. A desire to perform an action for example is also a representation of the action to be performed. There is an internal, logical relation in the sense that the desire could not have that representation if it did not represent that particular action.

It is only ***because*** things are so represented that they can also cause that particular action. Searle gives an analogy with blueprints of a house, which represent the house and also causally relate 'by way of figuring in its construction Causality only requires that the cause and effect be separate phenomena and 'not that one should not be a representation of the other'.[32] The answer to Wittgenstein's question, 'What is left if you minus my arm raised from "I raised my arm"?' is to Searle, precisely what Wittgenstein did not want to as a residue namely intention. In fact Wittgenstein s question is analogous to the question, 'If I see the table, what is left over if I subtract the table?' In each case the answer is presentational Intentionality, that is, experience of acting and visual experience respectively that has an intentional content and termed a representation. It is because of the possibility of intentional causation that mental contents affect the world. But one can experience the arm going up even if someone else pulls it up. This is explained by saying that it just went up for some other reason, the condition of intentional action not being satisfied. Searle makes the distinction between prior-intention, which includes the plans formed prior to an action and the intention-in-action. The former accounts for cases where one may form an intention and not act on that intention. This could represent some of our well-intended but unfulfilled plans. The latter can account for seemingly non-deliberate actions like walking or spontaneous behaviour of any sort where one acts intentionally without any prior-intention. The 'intention' in the intention-in-action is the actual mental component and part of the action which causes the bodily movement and which comprises the rest of the action. So, all intentional actions contain an intention-in-action that represents the intentional content. Searle identifies the intentional content with the experience of acting.[33] Here Searle does not make any distinction between experience as in 'being aware and conscious of me raising the hand and the active first person subjective process which represents the intentional criteria, along with the third person neurobiological phenomena and consequent physical behaviour. Searle's only reply is that Intentional behaviour exhibits a 'flow'.[34] As one walks, talks, gives a lecture there is a continuous flow of intentional behaviour governed by the experience of acting.

However, Wittgenstein s observation that the intentional content of a state is not an experience is worth consideration. As he says, 'When I raise my arm I do not ***try*** to raise it [35] Understanding, meaning, intending, thinking, remembering lack the kind of duration characteristic of experience. They are not mental processes at all. Searle, I think shares with Wittgenstein the

'Principle of Expression'—Whatever can be meant can also be said. The sincere expression of an individual's state is the criteria of being in that state. 'The mental state does not have a nature that is logically independent of how it would be expressed'.[36] Searle ***improves*** on this position by relating the intentional states to behaviour in terms of a more direct intervention. Thought and proposition are internally related, as Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* had surmised, but not by logical form. They are related by the intentional content and the conditions to be satisfied empirically.

Some of the conditions for a sincere promise for example would include, that the speaker and hearer both know how to speak the language, are conscious, not under threat, not play-acting, not obvious that the promise will be carried out in the normal course of events, sincerity of the promise maker and placing of oneself under obligation to carry out the said or intended promise.[37] 'Greetings' do not have any propositional content and no sincerity condition. 'The preparatory condition is that the Speaker must have just encountered the hearer (conventional requirement fulfilled) and the utterance indicates courteous recognition of the hearer.[38] However, expressions like Hurrah! Ouch! Hi! may exhibit equally the sense and force of the Speech-act. Simple Speech-acts like Groans and Greetings must also be accounted for but not on the grounds of lack of sincerity condition and propositional content. Particularly if, what can be meant can be said in however brief a manner.

According to Searle the conditions of satisfaction for speech-acts and Intentional states are the same. And yet the exact meeting ground of intentional representations and conventional requirements is not very clear. Granting the role of intentions and conventions as equal and necessary in the theory of Speech-acts, not all Speech-acts however may follow a set convention. An order for example may be carried out but responded to in different ways, when issued by a Judge to the court, an Umpire to the players or a Boss to her secretary. The internal representation that characterizes intentional behaviour might be said to be satisfied by the fulfilment of the concerned intentional state in different ways.

To Searle an important condition of satisfaction for any intentional action ought to be that one performs the action out of a choice which must relate causally to the performance of the action and also represent logically the related desire. Some of the background states are logically necessary. For instance, if one intends to go to the bookstore, it is assumed one wants to buy a book and believes it will be available in that store. The intention formed coordinates all other relevant factors and creates an ability to settle

in advance among several options that might be available. The background network of other intentional states could help form the required intention and resolve any state of indecision, if any. Sometimes the decisions to be taken that arise from conflicting interests may result in akratic actions. 'I ought to do y (confess) because it will save a life; I ought not to, because it will be a lie.' In spite of judging y to be the course of action to be performed under the given circumstances (say, if one values saving a life over telling the truth), and thereby intending to perform y, I perform x. An agent intends to do y (chooses and decides to do y), which is held to be the best course of action among alternatives, and nevertheless does x.[39] Such actions are termed as incontinent or akratic. On Searle's account such an action would represent an intentional action. But what is the intention that must get represented (y or x) to cause the resultant behaviour. In any conflict with respect to taking a decision, intention must reflect a clear choice in order to represent the conditions of satisfaction that would be required for that particular action. In incontinent behaviour, no structure of rational thought is detectable. As Davidson puts it, '... The actor cannot understand himself. He recognizes, in his own intentional behaviour something essentially absurd'.[40]

On Searle's analysis, whatever the practical reasoning involved, the intention must reflect a choice and only then can the conditions of satisfaction be represented causally and logically. The mind-to-world fit depends on being able to identify the intentional state and its conditions of satisfaction. In the direction of the mind-to-world fit, one expects agent A to do y, but post-facto analysis shows that the intentional action of the akrate can only have the causal intention to do x, which A did not have. This paradox is the most difficult to account for in Searle's account of biological naturalism. It is an act which cannot logically have a condition of satisfaction. One wants to do x which cannot be done. This internal representation cannot have its condition of satisfaction. But this inability is not the only reason for the problem. It is because, to Searle, Speech-acts derive their meaning and conditions of sense, of satisfaction, from the notion of intentionality, that the akrate is exposed to having an illogical and impossible mode of behaviour; and yet, its non-fulfilment is not to be explained on grounds of non-representation, for it is a genuine action. The akrate does not *seem* to have any determinate representation of action. The discrepancy between thought and action, intention and its expression, content and its representation, is also not always explained by pretence or lying. Akratic behaviour is *not* to be therefore treated as an *exception*, as, there is no pretence or a lie and yet the speech-

act is difficult to represent. In fact, the illocutionary force of an expressed statement like, 'Alright, take the purse (to a thief)', is not really insincere when directed to the thief.

Maybe, actions performed contrary-to-intentions as it were, could be redeemed as genuine intentional actions by acknowledging that there are *degrees* of voluntary and involuntary actions as in Aristotle's philosophical analysis of human actions. The akratic behaviour is an action, insofar as there is some (practical) reasoning that satisfies ones curiosity about the 'why' of an action. What made A do x instead of y? This analysis could now be fitted back to Searle's causal self-referential aspect of intention, which accounts for the action only in terms of what it represents. But again, how does one represent the degree to which an action is intentional. What are the conditions of satisfaction that would reveal this. These are important questions for the representation of an adequate theory of human action. The 'asymmetry'[41] in the course of action by an akratic choice requires a theory of Intentions more than what Searle provides.

Another question that is often asked is whether intentional phenomena can be reduced to attitudes like beliefs and desires which in turn could be understood in terms of certain neurobiological brain-states. Functionalists and Behaviourists do advocate such eliminative accounts of intentionality. Other action-theorists following Wittgenstein and von Wright speak of the unique and irreducible nature of intentional phenomena on grounds of the language-game wherein mental phenomena are logically, not causally connected with their objects.

To Searle all mental phenomena are biological in nature and yet there is a level of intentionality that cannot be substituted by any other kind of explanation. Mental phenomena should be treated as caused and realized in biological systems. Consciousness, Intentionality, Subjectivity and mental causation are all accommodated in a world-view where mental phenomena are just higher level features of the brain caused by the behaviour of lower level elements like synapses and neurons.[42] This position of Searle, known as Biological naturalism says that 'Brains cause minds' and that 'minds are higher level features of the brain'. On this basis the enterprise of cognitive Science rests on a mistake. 'Programs are formal (syntactical)', 'Minds have contents (semantics)' and 'Syntax is not sufficient for Semantics'.[43] Searle is probably right in identifying the most important features of the human mind namely Intentionality, Consciousness, Subjectivity and granting even mental causation. Are all these features necessarily related to one another for a

human Subject such that this is what distinguishes a human from a non-human?

The Chinese-room argument is a case which according to Searle, refutes Strong AI thesis as, ***no understanding*** has taken place. 'No digital computer has anything I do not have'.[44] Should the question have rather been, 'What is it that I have that the digital computer, or any other less complicated object like a stone perhaps, does not?' Wittgenstein had pointed out that it is logically absurd to even imagine what it is like for stones or any other system to have consciousness.[45] It would be senseless to ask what is it to have or not have consciousness just as it would be impossible to imagine in what manner trees and stones can be conscious (PI-418). Both Searle and Wittgenstein emphatically believe that there is no real 'mystery' of being conscious. To Wittgenstein that human beings and higher animals have consciousness is not an empirical truth but a grammatical one. We attribute Consciousness to a creature on the grounds of its behaviour in the circumstances of its life, not on the grounds of its neural organization and complexity.[46]

By keeping close contact with language and its use one does realize important features of a concept. Take 'Consciousness' for example; it is neither an object of experience, nor can one point towards it nor identify it with behaviour or with experience. In fact as is agreed that to have an experience is to be conscious; on can enjoy, as it were, various states of consciousness. In another place Wittgenstein points out that '... the "world of consciousness" does not belong uniquely to me since it "belongs" to no one. I can as little own it as I can walk about it or look at it or point to it.' This point goes against the 'ordinary supposition' that being conscious is a subjective experience.

On the other hand, to Searle Consciousness is as much an empirical fact of life as say the existence and characteristics of other creatures on this planet. Searle is right when he says that some connection must exist between the mind and the brain otherwise as he puts it 'we are left with a situation where the mind does not matter'.[47] The mind does matter. Pain and other mental phenomena are features of the brain and are to be accounted for on biological grounds. Subjectivity is as much an objective fact of biology. It is a consequence of the way human beings are defined that 'its conscious aspects are accessible to me in a way not accessible to anyone else'.[48] Privacy is a defining characteristic of conscious experiences that need not however remain private. All that can be experienced can also be possibly expressed. *(On the lines of the Principle of Expression earlier stated by Searle.)*

When heat was discovered to be nothing but mean kinetic energy or that colour was nothing but a particular frequency of light waves, the subjective experience of heat or colour do not thereby disappear or get reduced. Similarly one may redefine 'pain' in terms of 'patterns of neuronal activity' as well as experience pain as a higher level feature of the activities of the brain. Searle admits that the same analysis will not hold for Consciousness. It is therefore 'irreducible' and this is only 'a trivial consequence of our definitional practices'.[49] Unlike solidity or liquidity one cannot redefine Consciousness in terms of an underlying micro-structure and treat surface features as effects of real Consciousness. Is this fact of 'irreducibility' of such trivial consequence?

To Searle '... sameness of neurophysiology guarantees sameness of mentality but sameness of mentality does not guarantee sameness of physiology.[50] If one takes the brain-in-vat example, the two brains that were identical to the last molecule, the causal basis would guarantee the same mental phenomena. It is logically possible that Consciousness and Intentionality be caused in some other sorts of artificial or natural system.[51] Whether systems can causally produce Consciousness is an empirical issue. If so, why should Searle reject the enterprise of cognitive science when irreducibility of Consciousness is claimed on empirical grounds. We can literally make hearts that tick and eyes that see. Human consciousness at least is caused by and realized in the biological system made up of neurons. Searle seems to treat consciousness, at times as an 'irreducible' and unique feature of intentional states and at times like any other 'mental' product. If we stretch the question why do molecules arrange themselves the way they do, it may be possible to re-define matter in terms of intentionality. The rudiments of this enterprise can be seen in the development of bio-chips or organic-chips.

We have seen that the semantics involved in speech-acts arise mainly from the interrelation between intentionality and consciousness. Searle had said that it is in fact Intentionality that explains language and its use such that there is an internal, logical connection seen through the conditions of satisfaction that both share. Searle's position of biological naturalism however, complicates the problem of intentionality by necessitating an explanation of human behaviour in terms of 'intentional causation', where the nature of representation demands more definitive contents if the internal, logical relation between thought and language be maintained through adequate conditions of satisfaction. Searle admits that 'Representation' is an unfortunate term as it is only a device used to indicate and coordinate notions like 'propositional content', 'direction of fit', 'causal self-referentiality', Network, etc.[52] Yet the

sense and reference of mental content escapes at times the net of representation.

To Searle, logical analysis of the meaning of terms does also reveal the semantics necessary, which would also throw light on what it is to be in a particular mental state. Therefore, there ***is*** an attempt to combine the logical and the empirical question;* the conditions of satisfaction and the (consequent) psycho-semantics requirement. It is true that representation and content and the world-to-word fit and vice versa, are all imagery to enable us to link language with reality; but they are imagery purported to *explain* the relation between language, mind and the world. To that extent we cannot treat them only as metaphors.*

Language as a speech-act however does throw a different light in the way we may understand the world of objects, events and intentional states. But the combination of syntax and semantics by the human language user cannot be attributed only to the biological or special condition that we happen to be equipped with. Unlike Searle or Wittgenstein there are some philosophical problems that cannot be empirically solved or logically dissolved so easily, and the mind-body and thought-language relation are two of them.

NOTES

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3. Wittgenstein, 1953, *Philosophical Investigations* 126.
4. Ibid., P.I. 109.
5. Guttenplan, 1994, *Companion*, Malcolm Budd on Wittgenstein, p. 620.
6. Grice, 1969, *Philosophical Review*, 'Utterers Meaning and Intention', pp. 147–77.
7. Searle, 1992, *Rediscovery*, p. 157.
8. Searle, 1983, *Intentionality*, p. 1.
9. Ibid., p. 4.
10. Searle, 1992, *Rediscovery*, p. 156.
11. Guttenplan, 1994, *Companion,* Searle, p. 548.
12. Lepore and Gulick, 1991, *Searle's Response*, p. 83.
13. Ibid., p. 291.
14. Searle, 1983, *Intentionality*, p. 157.
15. Ibid., p. 4.
16. Searle, 1992, *Rediscovery*, p. 164.
17. Austin, 1975, *How to do things with words*, p. 52.
18. Berlin et al., 1973, *Essays on J.L. Austin*, Searle on 'Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts', p. 149.

19. Searle, 1979, *Mind*, 'What is an Intentional State p. 75.
20. Ibid., p. 79.
21. Berlin et al., 1973, *Essays*, Searle on 'Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts', p. 150.
22. Ibid.
23. Guttenplan, 1994. *Companion* Searle, p. 549
24. Ibid.
25. Anscombe and Rhees (Tr.), 1953, *Philosophical Investigations* 580.
26. Searle, 1979 *Mind*, 'What is an Intentional State p. 80.
27. Searle, 1969, *Speech Acts*, p. 119.
28. Anscombe and Rhees (Tr.), 1953, *Philosophical Investigations* 445.
29. Searle (ed.), *Philosophy of Language* 'What is a Speech-act', p. 41
30. Ibid.
31. Searle, 1983, *Intentionality*, p. 93.
32. Searle, 1979, *Mind*, 'What is an Intentional State', pp. 86–7
33. Searle, 1983, *Intentionality*, p. 91.
34. Lepore and Gulick, 1991, *Searle's Response*, p. 293.
35. Anscombe and Rhees (Tr.), 1953, P.I. 622.
36. Guttenplan, 1994, *Companion*, Malcolm Budd on Wittgenstein, p. 620.
37. Searle (ed.), 1971, *Philosophy of Language*, 'What is a Speech-act', pp. 48–53.
38. Ibid.
39. Davidson, 1980, *Essays on Actions and Events*, p. 25.
40. Ibid.
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42. Guttenplan, 1994, *Companion*, Searle, p. 545.
43. Ibid.
44. Searle, 1997 *The Mystery of Consciousness*, p. 11.
45. Anscombe and Rhees (Tr.), 1953, P.I. 418.
46. Hacker, 1992, *Meaning and Mind*, p. 238.
47. Searle, 1984 *Minds, Brains and Science*, p. 17.
48. Ibid p. 25
49. Block et al (ed.), 1995, Searle on '*Reductionism and the Irreducibility of Consciousness*', p. 457.
50. Ibid.
51. Guttenplan, 1994, *Companion*, Searle, p. 547.
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De Re Thoughts: Issues in the Relation Between Thought and Reality

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Bertrand Russell starts his essay 'On propositions: what they are and how they mean' by saying '*A proposition may be defined as: What we believe when we believe truly or falsely.*' Among the many uses that the notion of proposition is traditionally taken to have, Russell's definition brings out one of its most important. After defining the notion of proposition in this way, Russell goes on to say 'In order to arrive, from the definition at an account of what proposition is, we must decide what belief is ....' That is exactly what we want to do in this paper. Our discussion will follow two distinct stages. In the first stage, to decide on what belief as a paradigmatic case of propositional attitude is,[1] we will try to understand its nature by motivating the distinction between two kinds of belief—the *de re* and the *de dicto* belief. It should be noted that interest in the *de re/de dicto* distinction is not something new. The distinction was first applied to modal contexts, and then extended generally to attitude (and more specifically to epistemic) contexts. The intuitive idea behind the distinction was that besides the class of *de dicto* beliefs, which are individuated by their content and mode, there is a class of beliefs which are essentially about objects.

In spite of its widespread use, important questions have been raised concerning the very distinction itself—particularly concerning the existence of *de re* beliefs. Opposition to the distinction has taken various forms. Some philosophers have claimed that there may be a distinction to be drawn at the level of belief-reports, but this distinction does not correspond to any distinction at the level of beliefs themselves. Another line of attack consists in reducing *de re* beliefs to *de dicto* beliefs, and claiming that *de re* beliefs are really a species of *de dicto* beliefs. Simply saying that *de re* beliefs are a special case of *de dicto* beliefs because the former can be reduced to the latter, however, does not necessarily imply that they are the same. In the second stage, we

will try to show that there is a genuine distinction at the level of the beliefs themselves. The reason for admitting *de re* beliefs is based on the very nature of our thoughts about the world.

1. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN *DE RE* AND *DE DICTO* BELIEFS

1.1. Preliminary Remarks

The orthodox distinction may be set up in a very simple way: belief *de dicto* is a belief that a certain dictum (or a proposition) is true, whereas belief *de re* is about a particular *res* (or an individual) that has a certain property. In this sense, we can say, following Woodfield[2], that a *de re* belief can initially be taken to have two features:

(i) It is about an object.
(ii) It is tied to objects constitutively.

The second feature really suggests that the thought could not exist without the object existing, because, to individuate the thought, it seems essential to individuate an object. It should be noted that there is a difference between the orthodox way and our way of understanding the *de re/de dicto* distinction. According to the standard way of explaining the distinction we allude to here, in a *de dicto* belief the thinker has a belief in a proposition, but does not in the case of a *de re* belief. What we are trying to defend here, however, is that even in a *de re* belief context the belief is in a proposition—a singular proposition, which has as its essential constituent an object and a property. So even if the discussion may sometimes suggest that *de re* beliefs have non-propositional content, it really means that they do not have as their contents propositions in the Fregean sense. This terminological point is brought out by McDowell [1984]. According to him, in the case of a *de re* attribution one should recognize a 'Russellian proposition'. As he says, 'It would be a merely terminological question whether one should say that there are no propositions but "complete" ones, so that *de re* attributions involve no propositions; or whether in connection with *de re* attributions one should recognize propositions of a different kind: "Russellian propositions" ... .'[3]

A widely held view among philosophers[4] is that all beliefs are *de dicto*. The support comes from Frege's arguments for admitting a thought or a sense of a sentence to be the content of a propositional attitude—like belief. Philosophers who adhere to this view think that if the thought or the sense of a sentence is the content of belief, any correct ascription of belief would involve a complete specification of the thought, that is, specification of the

sense without any specification of the reference of the constituent expressions, and so the belief has to be a *de dicto* belief. In the case of a singular belief, like 'Tom believes that Cicero is a Roman orator', the Fregean view, in one of its interpretations, has to be supported by the idea that knowledge of a particular object is essentially indirect, because even the so-called referring expressions require the mediation of sense to determine the reference. The relation between thought and object is also indirect. In dealing with names which do not have any reference, a Fregean would say

> ... the sense of a name, if expressible otherwise than by the name itself is expressible by a definite description. Definite descriptions are also taken to have whatever sense they have independently of whether or not objects answer to them. Thus a name without a bearer could, in Frege s view have a sense in exactly the same way as the name with a bearer.[5]

If this is the case, then whether the object exists or not would be merely incidental to the availability of the thought. One who is against *de re* propositional attitudes is committed to this view, and thus would claim that there is no need to specify beliefs in terms of objects, in fact, a correct specification of a belief should be made in terms of the specification of the complete thought.

A non-Fregean may, at this point, argue that whether a name has a bearer or not does make a difference as to the ascription of belief containing that name. So McDowell says

> A sincere assertive utterance of a sentence containing a name with a bearer can be understood as expressing a belief correctly describable as a belief, concerning the bearer, that it satisfies some specified condition. If the name has no bearer (in the interpreter's view), he cannot describe any suitably related belief in that transparent style. He can indeed gather from the utterance, that the subject believes himself to be expressing such a belief by his words. That might make the subject's behaviour, in speaking as he does, perfectly intelligible; but in a way quite different from the way in which, in the first kind of case, the belief expressed makes the behaviour intelligible.[6]

So, in cases where the name occurring within a belief context has a reference, it seems essential to specify the belief in terms of the object in question. When someone sincerely and assertively utters a sentence containing a proper name, one does not mean to be expressing a belief whose availability to be expressed is indifferent to the existence, or otherwise, of the bearer of that name.

Here, one may take up the first line of attack mentioned at the very beginning and argue that the *de re/de dicto* distinction is a genuine one at the level of belief ascription but not at the level of belief itself. When we give a *de re* report of a belief, that is, just specifying the object about which the reported thinker has her belief, we are doing so because we do not want to commit ourselves to a claim about the way in which the reported thinker thinks of the object of her belief. The general distinction is a distinction between a belief report where the modes of presentation associated with expressions used in the report are intended to match the modes of presentation the believer uses in having that particular belief (this being the case of a *de dicto* belief report), and, on the other hand, a belief report where the intention is merely that the reference is preserved (this being the case of a *de re* belief report). But this distinction within belief reports cannot be extended to belief itself. To counter this argument we need to show that there are some genuine *de re* beliefs. The discussion which follows will try to do this. By taking clues from Gareth Evans's arguments for singular/Russellian thoughts, we will try to establish that some beliefs themselves are to be characterized as *de re*.

These are all preliminary remarks. But one thing that they seem to suggest is that the *de re/de dicto* distinction is not as unproblematic as it appears. Most philosophers are doubtful about the *de re* side of the distinction. So it seems essential to see why, if at all, this distinction is needed, what is the motivation for admitting a class of beliefs which are *de re* over and above the *de dicto* beliefs.

1.2. Quine and De Re *Beliefs*

One motivation for distinguishing between *de re* and *de dicto* beliefs comes from considerations of Quine's distinction between notional and relational senses of belief, or, as has been indicated in the Introduction, his distinction between transparent and opaque contexts and the problem of substitution in these contexts.[7] We have already mentioned, sentences reporting beliefs and other propositional attitudes, according to Quine, are ambiguous. They may have either a transparent reading or an opaque reading. The two sentences 'There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy' and 'Ralph believes there are spies' may both be ambiguously expressed by the sentence, 'Ralph believes that someone is a spy'. But the distinction between the two sentences is vast. In one case there is a particular man whom Ralph has in mind, and believes of him that he is a spy. In the other case Ralph is just like one of

us who believes that there are spies without having the belief about any particular individual. Let us take another example. Suppose that there is a particular spy Holmes suspects of being a murderer, while Watson suspects only that there is a spy who is a murderer. Quine thinks that there is an essential difference between Holmes's belief and Watson's belief. Watson is inclined to believe the proposition that at least one spy is a murderer. But Holmes does more: he suspects about a particular spy that he is a murderer. So Holmes's belief, being about a particular individual, is *de re* and may be reported as 'Of A, who is a spy, Holmes believes that A is a murderer', while Watson's belief is *de dicto*, and his belief may be reported as 'Watson believes that a spy is a murderer'. This seems to suggest that a subject does sometimes have a belief which is essentially about an object and thus, is *de re*.

As it has already been hinted at the Introduction, according to Quine the test which really helps us in identifying a belief to be of a particular kind is the test of substitutivity of co-referential singular terms. For example, suppose Ralph believes *de re* that Ortcutt is a spy. Then we can characterize Ralph's attitude by substituting any correct description of Ortcutt, like 'the man in the brown coat', regardless of whether Ralph could or would describe Ortcutt in that way. The intuition seems to be that our ascription relates Ralph to the individual in such a way that the particular description or conception that Ralph would use to represent Ortcutt plays no role in this sort of ascription. A belief-ascription is *de dicto*, if at every place in the content clause, substitution of co-referring expressions fails.

Burge [1977] has tried to show that the Quinean criterion of substitutivity does not adequately draw the *de re/de dicto* distinction. In some cases (when, say, Tom is acquainted with the man in direct perception) we may attribute to Tom a belief like, 'Tom believes that the man in the brown coat is a spy', and may refuse unlimited substitution of terms denoting the man on the ground that Tom's belief involves thinking of the person as the man in the brown coat, and not, say, as the man who killed Smith. We may attempt to answer Burge here in the following way. The criterion of substitutivity, as used by Quine, is a criterion for distinguishing between *de re* and *de dicto* belief-reports. *De re* belief-reports, which presumably satisfy the criterion of substitutivity, are not complete. They are not complete in the sense that the report leaves one in the dark as to how the reported believer thinks of the object of his belief. But that does not mean that in a particular context they are not correct. Incompleteness of a belief-report should not be confused with

the report's being non-truth-preserving—and this is the confusion that Burge seems to be making here.

Let us try to explain this a bit more with the help of an example. Suppose Tom wants to tell me how his friend Ralph got into an argument with my sister at a party, and says

Ralph thinks that your sister is rude.

However, it happens that Ralph himself does not know that the person with whom he got into this argument is my sister (he knows my sister by descriptions which he gathered by social interaction with her at the party) The report is not a complete guide to Ralph's thought, but it is, nonetheless, correct. Tom could have used any other familiar description of my sister, and the report would have been correct. Contrary to what Burge says, co-referential expressions may be substituted in a correct *de re* belief report *salva veritate* and Burge confuses the fact that such substitutions may result in belief-reports which leave out information about how the believer being reported thinks of the object with the report's being non-truth preserving. So it seems that a Quinean substitutivity criterion can be applied to bring out a significant distinction between *de re* and *de dicto* belief-reports, where the former is correct, and the latter is complete. *De re* belief-reports are correct in the sense that in a report of this kind substitution of co-referential names do not fail to preserve truth. But in case of a *de dicto* report, we aim at completeness that is, we want to report how the believer thinks of the object. When a report aims at being a complete guide to the believer s thought substitution of co-referential names results in false reports. Therefore, there does seem to be a way of using the Quinean criterion of substitutivity to bring out a distinction between *de re* and *de dicto* ascriptions of beliefs.

1.3 Burge and De Re *Belief*

Apart from Quine s logical basis for distinguishing between *de re* and *de dicto* beliefs, Burge [1977] brings out an epistemic basis for distinguishing between these two kinds of beliefs. From an epistemic point of view a *de dicto* belief is

> a belief that is fully conceptualized. That is, a correct ascription of the *de dicto* belief identifies it purely by reference to a 'content all of whose semantically relevant components characterize elements in the believer's conceptual repertoire.[8]

For example, suppose Alfred believes that the most powerful man on earth in 1995 is a crook, without knowing who this particular man is. As Alfred's epistemic state depends completely on concepts in his repertoire, and not on his relation to a particular individual, his belief is *de dicto*.

In characterizing *de re* beliefs as opposed to *de dicto* ones, Burge writes,

> A *de re* belief is a belief whose correct ascription places the believer in an appropriate non-conceptual, contextual relation to objects the belief is about. The term non-conceptual does not imply that no concepts or other mental notions enter into a full statement of the relation. Indeed, the relation may well hold between the object and concepts, or their acquisition or use. The crucial point is that the relation not be merely that of the concepts' being concepts *of* the object—concepts that denote or apply to it.[9]

What Burge seems to be saying here is that in a *de re* belief the subject is related to the object in a non-conceptual way. This does not mean that the subject's way of individuating an object is purely non-conceptual. Most of the time, perhaps always, the subject's thought about an object does involve some concept of the object. The point is that the object of a belief of this sort is not determined by the concepts which apply to it, but by some contextual relations between the subject and the object—the believer's relation to the relevant object of belief is not merely that he conceives of it or otherwise represents it. This is often the case where the subject perceives the object. We can explain this point with the help of Burge's example. Suppose we see a man coming from a distance in the fog. We may believe about him that he is wearing a red cap. But it might very well be the case that we do not see the man well enough to describe him in such a way that we are able to individuate him fully. There is no purely conceptual means for individuating the object of our thought. According to Burge these are cases where the requirement of denotation in addition to the causal or contextual connection with the object of thought remains unfulfilled. The requirement of denotation is the requirement that the subject has some purely conceptual, non-contextual means of individuating the object of his or her thought. This requirement can be further explained by showing that it is a stricter requirement than is needed to understand cases of the above kind. Philosophers, for example Kaplan, who take *de re* belief to be a species of *de dicto* belief, contend that a singular term within a belief report can be said to represent an object if that name denotes the object. But for the name to denote in this way, that is, in a way which would help in showing that *de re* belief is only a species of *de dicto*

belief, the name must pick out or individuate the object in a context-independent way. However, in our perception of a man coming from a distance in the fog and in having subsequent thought about him, we do not seem to have a purely conceptual means of individuating the object (or the individual) that the thought is a thought of. We may be able to pick out the man ostensively with the help of a description that is available in this context (like, 'the man out there'). But there seems to be no reason to hold that we can always conceptualize the entities we rely on in our demonstration. Therefore,

> These considerations indicate that there will often be no term or individual concept in the believer's set of beliefs about the relevant object which *denotes* the object. This is not to deny that the believer always has some mental or semantical instrument for picking out the object—a set of concepts, a perceptual image, a demonstrative. But whatever means the individual has depends for its success partly but irreducibly on factors unique to the context of the encounter with the object, and not part of the mental or linguistic repertoire of the believer.[10]

So Burge's claim is that sometimes one's way of thinking about the object depends ultimately on one or other demonstrative or contextual factors. That is why we can have *de re* thought about the man seen in the fog, and believe of him that he is wearing a red cap. Therefore *de re* thoughts are thoughts in which the relationship between the subject and the object is not just the application of concepts; the relationship between them is determined by the causal and contextual factors which connect them. If the relationship between the thinker and the object of thought is determined by a direct contextual relation of the above kind, then it seems to follow that the thinker's *de re* thoughts of this kind are essentially directed towards the object.

Burge takes a further step and argues that a *de re* belief is in some important ways more fundamental than a *de dicto* belief. He tries to argue for this in two ways. First, he tries to show that if an entity lacks *de re* propositional attitudes we cannot attribute to it the use or understanding of language. As Burge rightly points out, the first sentences that children actually use or understand are invariably related to their immediate and perceptually accessible environment. And so the attitudes accompanying such assertions are *de re*. An obvious objection to this view may be that, from the fact that our understanding of language necessarily involves indexical elements, it does not follow that understanding of language in general is of this kind. We can think of some other organisms or robots which are programmed in such

a way that they are able to understand indexical-free languages. This objection, according to Burge, is misguided. Machines that are programmed to use indexical-free languages cannot be said to understand or use languages autonomously. For them manipulations of symbols are nothing more than mechanical or purely syntactic activities. To indicate the fact that symbols have some semantical or extra-linguistic significance they must be able, at least sometimes, to correlate symbols with which they symbolize—correlate either through some nonlinguistic or through some linguistic activities, or by a combination of both of them. When someone says that she wants a piece of cake, you might go and get it from the fridge, or tell her 'there's a piece of cake in the fridge', or do both—that is utter those words and at the same time get the cake from the fridge. The case with subjects who are said to have propositional attitudes is similar. In having a propositional attitude, the subject must ultimately indicate some ability to correlate his thoughts with objects that those thoughts are thoughts of. Failure to do so would indicate that there is no adequate ground for attributing an understanding of language. And any propositional attitude accompanying such understanding of language must necessarily involve *de re* attitudes.

Apart from this argument from the understanding of languages, Burge tries to show that evidence or justification for purely *de dicto* empirical beliefs depend on support from some *de re* belief or other. He[11] says,

> Consider our purely *de dicto* empirical beliefs, where all such beliefs in singular form are nonindexical and where the definite descriptions can be used attributively, ... Taken by themselves, these beliefs are clearly lacking in evidential support. The attributively intended singular beliefs have the force of 'the F, whatever object that is, is G'. Justification for the belief that there is an F or that it is G requires some more specific identification. ... Many of our *de dicto* beliefs are justified because they are based on authoritative hearsay from others. But then, at a minimum, the 'others' must have some *de re* belief in order to ground their authority on the subject.

So even a purely *de dicto* empirical belief is based on some *de re* beliefs, and in this sense *de re* beliefs have a primacy over *de dicto* beliefs.

De re beliefs then are beliefs which are essentially object-directed. What the subject is thinking about is determined by immediate contextual connection and the subject's relation to the object is not just the application of concepts.

2. THE MOTIVATION FOR ADMITTING IRREDUCIBLY *DE RE* BELIEFS

What motivates philosophers to admit a class of beliefs which are irreducibly *de re*? We can begin by considering Quine once again. There are two insights involved in Quine's notional and relational senses of belief which are important and should be highlighted at this point. Firstly, there really seems to be a class of beliefs irreducibly *about* objects. That means that there are beliefs which relate the believer to an object, so when we say 'Tom believes that Cicero is a Roman', it is not only a fact about Tom; under the circumstances it is a fact about Cicero as well—it is a fact about Cicero that Tom believes him to be a Roman. Hence, the belief state intrinsically is a state concerning Cicero. Secondly, there is clearly a distinction between propositional attitudes which are directed at particular objects and those which are not. Quine's example[12] would bring out this point. Suppose someone says, 'I want a sloop'; now in a case like this we need to make a distinction between the desire that the man might have for a sloop, where any sloop would do (as Quine says, what he seeks 'is a mere relief from slooplessness') and the desire that a man might have which is directed at a particular sloop. The two desires are definitely not of the same nature.

One important point seems to be emerging from all these discussions: the ultimate motivation for admitting a class of beliefs which are *de re* or are about particular objects comes from our nature of thought and the relation that obtains between our thoughts and the world. Suppose we cannot have any *de re* thoughts. That would mean that all our thoughts about the world would be descriptive, that is, we could think of objects only by description, each merely as something belonging to a certain sort.[13] Now, if all our thoughts about things could only be descriptive, our total conception of the world would be merely qualitative. But our perceptual beliefs provide us with a class of beliefs where the thought involved is not just descriptive. To quote Kent Bach[14] here,

> When we perceive something, we can think about it in a fundamentally different way than if we thought of it merely by description. To think of something by description is just to think of whatever happens to have the properties expressed by the description. But to perceive something is to be in a real relation to it, to be in a position to think that object in particular, no matter what its properties. ... Our thoughts about it are not DESCRIPTIVE but DE RE.[15]

Our perceptual beliefs do not always have associated with them some descriptions which individuate the individual completely. Burge's example of seeing a man coming from the distance in the fog and forming the belief about him that he is wearing a red cap clearly brings out the *de re* nature of perceptual cases.

3. EVANS AND *DE RE* THOUGHTS

3.1. Preliminary Remarks

The view that to think of an object or make a judgement about it one must be in an intimate relation to the object has been argued for by Evans [1982]. In arguing for the Russellian status of what he calls information-invoking singular terms, Evans considers the nature of thoughts, in particular the nature of thoughts needed in order to understand sentences containing those terms. These are information-based thoughts, and are thoughts about objects in which they are grounded. In this sense information-based thoughts seem to correspond to the notion of *de re* thoughts that we tried to explain in the previous section. So, the main task of the rest of the chapter will be firstly to explain the nature of information-based thoughts and information-invoking singular terms, then to bring out the principles on which they are based, and finally to show in what way Evans's notion differs from ours. As R.M. Sainsbury in his Critical Notice to *The Varieties of Reference* points out, the intended upshot of Evans's argument is 'that for a wide range of singular terms the kinds of thoughts we must have to understand sentences containing them are thoughts that would be simply unavailable in the absence of a referent of the term.'[16] Therefore, thoughts expressed by utterances involving singular terms of this kind, thoughts which are called 'information-based thoughts' and which are grounded in information derived from objects referred to by Russellian singular terms, seem to provide us with a definite class of *de re* thoughts.

There are a wide variety of ideas that are being referred to in the previous paragraph which need unpacking. The questions that we need to answer to understand Evans's position concerning *de re* thoughts are: 1. What are information-based thoughts? 2. What are information-invoking singular terms? 3. When do we say that an information-invoking singular term is Russellian? These are all complicated questions involving a wide range of issues that Evans [1985] deals with. Most of them will remain undiscussed in this chapter. For our purpose of understanding the nature of *de re* thoughts, we

will concentrate on his arguments for the Russellian status of information-invoking singular terms and the nature of information-based thoughts.

3.2. Evans on Frege and Russell

What does Evans mean when he says that singular terms are Russellian? A singular term is Russellian in the case where the significance of the singular term depends upon its having a reference. Therefore, if a sentence containing a proper name of this kind is significant, that is, expresses something true or false, then the proper name in that context must stand for something. Evans, however, in an important way, distances himself from Russell's notion of logically proper names—which, according to Russell, are the only kind of expressions that fulfil the requirement laid down. The two most important differences are the following: 1. According to Russell, the connection between a logically proper name and its bearer is direct, that is, the connection is not mediated by the sense of the name. A Russellian singular term in Evans's sense has associated with it some way of thinking of the reference, and thus has a sense. 2. Russell further wanted a logically proper name to have a guaranteed reference, the question of failure of reference does not arise in the case of a logically proper name. In contrast, in Evans's framework we can attempt to use an expression as a Russellian singular term but fail to have a reference due to the unavailability of a suitable object.

An important point should be noted here. Though Evans thinks that a Russellian singular term is like any other term that has sense as well as reference, for him the reference of such an expression has a primacy over its sense. In the case of a Russellian singular term its possession of sense depends upon its having a reference. This is a point where Evans departs from Frege as he is usually understood. That is why to understand what Evans means by the 'Russellian' nature of a singular term, it might be helpful to state, very briefly, Evans's understanding of the Fregean theory of sense.

As has already been mentioned, according to one familiar way of understanding the Fregean theory of sense, it is usually held that the understanding of an expression does not, in any way, presuppose the knowledge of the referent of the expression. The knowledge of a particular object is essentially indirect, because even so-called referring expressions require the mediation of sense to determine the reference. The relation between a thought and an object is also indirect. If this is the case then whether or not an object exists is irrelevant in determining the sense. Evans does not accept this interpretation of the Fregean notion of sense. He, following Russell, and opposing Frege,

holds that it is impossible to understand a sentence containing a proper name, that is, to grasp the proposition it expresses, without knowing which object it stands for. According to Evans, Frege's theory of Bedeutung, or what he translates as meaning or semantic value, starts with the idea that the significance of a sentence consists in its being either true or false. Given this starting point, it seems natural for Frege to proceed by saying that the semantic value of a substantival expression consists in its power to affect the truth-value of the sentence in which it occurs. It is natural to think further that this power is determined by the expression's association with an extra-linguistic entity—which may be called the referent of the expression in question. But Frege also claimed that a full account of the significance of an expression cannot be given solely in terms of the semantic value of an expression, it has to be given in terms of some further property, which he called 'sense'. Sense explains the difference in cognitive value of two sentences having the same semantic value, like, 'Hesperus is Hesperus' and 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'.

For Evans, the essence of the Fregean notion of sense consists in the way in which the semantic value is presented. The consequence of this way of understanding Fregean sense is that it seems that there can be no sense without reference. But in that case, this view conflicts with the usual Fregean view that an expression, like an empty singular term, can have sense while lacking reference. According to Evans, Frege's ascription of sense to empty singular terms should not be taken seriously. Though it seems that Frege ascribes sense to empty singular terms, this is, for Evans, 'equivocal, hedged around with qualification, and dubiously consistent with the fundamentals of his philosophy of language.'[17] Evans 'rejects Russell's obliteration of the distinction between sense and reference, yet he does not go to the other extreme of allowing sense without reference.'[18] So his strategy is to show that grasp of sense essentially requires identifying knowledge of the referent.

This way of interpreting the Fregean notion of sense leads Evans's Frege to be close to Russell. Evans quotes[19] Russell's criterion for testing terms which are classified as referring expressions,

> Whenever the grammatical subject of a proposition can be supposed not to exist without rendering the proposition meaningless, it is plain that the grammatical subject is not a proper name, i.e., not a name directly representing some object.

Evans takes a singular term which passes this test to be Russellian. And the main task of the book is to establish the Russellian status of a large group

of singular terms. It should be noted that Evans is not trying to show that all kinds of singular terms are Russellian. Names which are introduced by explicit stipulation (like his example of the name 'Julius'[20]) are referring expressions but non-Russellian referring expressions. What he wants to argue is that for a wide range of singular terms, the kinds of thoughts we must have to understand sentences containing them are thoughts which cannot be had if the singular term failed to have a reference.

As Sainsbury remarks,

> his [that is, Evans's] view lies between two extremes, ... At one extreme is Russell's view, on which the existence of Russellian thoughts is, of course, granted, but it is denied that there can be *two* such thoughts predicating the same property of the same object. At the other extreme is the view which some, though not Evans, attribute to Frege, on which there is no problem about allowing thoughts to be distinct, even though they predicate the same property of the same object, but it is denied that thoughts are Russellian. Let us call these, respectively, the Russellian and the Fregean poles. Evans, of course, has a view combining elements from each pole: Russellian status together with allowing the Fregean distinction.[21]

Frege held the view that for communication to be successful, the thought that the speaker and the hearer associates with the utterance must be the same. Evans thinks that this is too strong a claim to make. Though it is true that communication depends upon a certain overlap between the information possessed by the speaker and the information possessed by the hearer, a considerable difference may exist between their information, and so it is sufficient for communication that the speaker and the hearer think of the right object. It is not, in addition, required that they think of it in the same way. Therefore the Fregean condition of communicatively successful use of singular terms should be replaced by the requirement that for the hearer to understand the speaker, both must think of its referent. If there were no such object the utterance would not be understood, and nothing would have been said. So the nature of successful communication itself suggests that the terms be Russellian.

This is no doubt an important argument, but Evans uses it as a supplementary argument to establish the Russellian status of singular term. The main reason is that the same conclusion can be reached by considering the nature of the thought in which such singular terms occur. If we can, following Evans, show that thoughts of this kind are Russellian, then that would provide us with good grounds for admitting a definite and irreducible class of *de re* thoughts.

3.3. Russell's Principle and Information-Based Thoughts

According to Evans, our thoughts about particular objects must satisfy what he calls 'Russell's Principle'.[22] This Principle states

> A subject cannot make a judgement about something unless he knows which object his judgement is about.

The Principle suggests that, in order to be thinking about an individual/object or making a judgement about him/it, one must oneself know which individual/object he or she is thinking about. What is it to have such knowledge? The knowledge which is required in this connection is, according to Evans, 'discriminating knowledge'. So, a subject cannot be said to make a judgement about something unless he has discriminating knowledge about the object of his judgement. Knowledge of this kind would enable the subject to distinguish the object of his judgement from all other things.[23] There are three ways in which a subject can come to know which object his judgement is about. They are descriptive, demonstrative and recognition-based, and they help us in the determination of the identity of the thought. Thus a sentence of the form 'that G is F' may express a thought involving a descriptive kind of mode of identification if the identification exploits the fact that the object is uniquely G. An utterance of the same sentence, in a different context, may also express a thought in which recognition-based identification is involved, that is, if we recognize that the currently perceived G is someone we have previously encountered. And an utterance of the same sentence may express a thought involving a demonstrative identification if the relevant G is currently perceived by us. When an object is identified in any one of these kinds of modes of identification, it can be called the thought's object. So, according to Evans, thoughts about particular objects are governed by Russell's Principle, and therefore, a defence of this Principle is necessary. A defence of Russell's Principle would be helpful in two ways. In the first place, it would provide us with an account of what common thing a subject is able to do in the case of descriptive, demonstrative and recognition-based identification by showing us why it is that thought about a particular individual requires the subject to be able to do it. In the second place, it would help us in answering questions about the boundaries of demonstrative identification. Questions like, 'Does perception of an object always provide us with discriminating

knowledge of it?' or 'Can we demonstratively identify an object seen in a photograph or heard on the radio, or must we rather think of them descriptively?' can be answered properly only when Russell's Principle is defended as an acceptable principle governing our thoughts about particular objects.

Evans initially defends Russell's Principle with the help of the example of two indistinguishable steel balls. The example goes like this,[24]

> Suppose, ..., that on a certain day in the past, a subject briefly observed two indistinguishable steel balls suspended from the same point and rotating about it. He now believes nothing about one ball which he does not believe about the other. This is certainly a situation in which the subject cannot discriminate one of the balls from all other things, since he cannot discriminate it from its fellow. And a principle which precludes the ascription to the subject of a thought about one of the balls surely has a considerable intuitive appeal.

In this kind of case, if we try to think of just one of the two balls, we will try to do that by focusing on something which will help us in distinguishing it from the other ball. Now, if there is no distinguishing mark which allows us to do so, we shall have to admit that we are incapable of thoughts about one of them, as distinct from the other, because, if the subject has no way of distinguishing between the two balls, his effort to think about one of the balls is bound to fail. We will come to a fuller discussion of Russell's Principle later on.

Thoughts that are about particular objects and are governed by Russell's Principle are called 'information-based thoughts' by Evans. Very often a thinker can entertain thoughts about an object because they are based on the information they have about the world, information which flows from the object itself. Perception, memory and testimony may all three provide this information link. To quote Evans,[25]

> Our particular thoughts are very often based upon information which we have about the world. We take ourselves to be informed, in whatever way, of the existence of such-and-such an object, and we think or speculate about it. A thought of the kind with which I am concerned is governed by a conception of its object which is the result neither of fancy ... nor of linguistic stipulation ..., but rather is the result of a belief about how the world is which the subject has because he has received information (or misinformation) from the object.

Evans explains this point with the help of an example. Suppose A and B went for a hunting trip and came across a beautiful bird. Years later A might want to talk about that bird with B by using expressions which would invoke information in B's mind. A might say 'Do you remember the bird we saw on the hunting trip we went on?' and fail to make B remember the bird he was talking about. He might elaborate the description in different ways (like, mentioning the date, the place etc. of their trip, or show a picture of a bird similar to the one he was talking about). B, taking A to be trustworthy, may believe all that A is saying, but as Evans points out, 'I do not think that he can be said to have understood the remark, as it was intended to be understood, until he *remembers* the bird—until the *right* information is retrieved.'[26] And once the hearer is able to identify the bird the speaker was talking about, he will be in a different information state than the one he was in.

The above example shows only one of the three ways in which the subject may provide an information-link. Information of the object would control the thought about the particular object if and only if the subject, due to his acquiring and retaining information, is disposed to evaluate and appreciate[27] thoughts about the object that it is so-and-so. For example, suppose a subject is looking at a black and white cat which he has never seen or heard about before. He may entertain different thoughts about that cat, but it is the content of his perception and no other information which controls his thought.

So there is a duality of factors involved in the notion of an information-based thought. On the one hand, the subject possesses information which he derives from the object and he regards this information to be germane to the evaluation and appreciation of the thought. On the other hand, the subject fulfils the requirement imposed by Russell's principle, that is, he identifies (that is, has discriminating knowledge of) the object that his thought concerns. Therefore, in all cases, the overriding purpose of the subject's thinking consists in thinking about the object from which the information is derived. He aims at this object, which Evans calls a 'target',[28] but like all other aiming he may miss it. Now a necessary condition for the existence of an information-based thought about the particular object is the following:

> It is only when the procedure which determines the object and the procedure which determines the target locate the same object can the subject be credited with an information-based particular thought about that object.[29]

No such procedure governs the having of purely descriptive thought, for the notion of target plays no role in stating the conditions for having such a thought.

If this be the necessary condition for having an information-based thought, then if a mode of identification in fact fails to identify anything, it cannot figure in an information-based thought about an object. So, for an information-based thought to be about an object, had not the object existed, that thought could not have existed either. In this sense, information-based thoughts are Russellian. Evans insists that 'It is no part of this proposal that his mind is wholly vacant, images and words may clearly pass through it, and various ancillary thoughts may even occur to him.'[30] He may have general thoughts, but, as Sainsbury points out, this view of thought is perfectly consistent with the following view of thought-expression: where an attempt to express a Russellian thought fails because there is no appropriate object.

3.4. The Main Argument for the Russellian Status of Singular Terms

Having characterized the nature of information-invoking particular thoughts in this way, Evans tries to show that the role it plays in the main argument is the following: for many singular terms one must think an information-based thought in order to understand utterances containing them. Information-based thoughts are Russellian, that is, provided that if the particular object (the thought is said to be a thought about) did not exist then the thought itself could not have existed. Hence singular terms occurring in utterances whose understanding requires information-based thoughts are Russellian—if they did not refer, there could be no thought sufficient for understanding utterances containing them. An information-invoking singular term is one which is typically intended, as used in an utterance, to make the hearer bring to bear, in understanding the utterance, information antecedently in his possession.

One may here wonder why understanding of an utterance involving information-invoking singular terms requires that the singular term refer? We can, at this point, state the argument very briefly. Having done that, we can discuss how Evans argues for each step in the argument. The argument proceeds in the following way:

In order to understand an utterance involving information-invoking singular terms, an utterance of the form 'A(t)', one must oneself believe that there is something to which the term 't' refers. Understanding any utterance is knowing a truth, that is, knowing what has been said. But understanding, being a species of knowledge, cannot be based on a false belief—that is, the belief that 't' refers cannot be false. Therefore, 't', that is the information-invoking singular term, must have a reference.

Evans justifies the claim that to understand an information-invoking singular term, one must oneself believe that there is something to which the term refers, by first showing that for the hearer to understand an information-invoking singular term, some information already in his possession must be invoked. And the information that the hearer invokes and the speaker has are derived from the same object. Here we may refer back to the example of talking about a bird which two persons saw on a hunting trip. As has already been pointed out, the hearer cannot be said to understand the speaker unless he connects the speaker's use of the phrase 'that bird' with the information he himself has about the bird. Evans makes this point clear with another example.[31] Suppose a speaker makes a demonstrative reference to a man in an environment he shares with the hearer and says 'this man is F'—now the hearer can be said to understand the remark only if he perceives the particular man and brings his perceptual information to bear upon his interpretation of the remark. Examples of this kind, therefore, show that there are many cases where understanding an expression requires activating antecedently possessed information. One may, however, wonder whether understanding of this kind (1) has to involve some belief, and (2) has to involve only belief which is true. In the following paragraphs we will see how Evans tries to show that the notion of understanding of an expression in the relevant sense not only involves belief, but involves a true belief.

According to Evans, invoking information in this connection really means that the hearer must evaluate (that is, arrive at a provisional assessment of its truth and falsity) and appreciate (that is, think out what the consequences of the remark would be if it were true) the remark in accordance with the content of the relevant information. Invoking information, according to Evans is not merely a matter of calling the information to mind, it should be brought to bear upon the interpretation of the remark.[32] Evans here concentrates on the process of appreciation of the remark in the use of information.

Some might argue that although bringing information to bear in appreciation of an utterance involves the fact that one must oneself believe that there is something to which the term refers, it does not follow that the term really has a reference. Suppose someone says 't is F' where t invokes information which may be represented as 'Φ_1, ... Φ_n'. Then understanding an utterance of this kind consists in nothing but realizing that what the speaker said is true, if and only if, something is both Φ_1, ... Φ_n and F. This example is

analogous to the example of a descriptive name like, 'Julius'. Someone who understands the utterance involving a stipulative name like 'Julius', an utterance saying 'Julius is a genius', will come to believe that if what the speaker said was true then there is someone who invented the zip and who was a genius. But, none of these beliefs commit the hearer to the existence of something which is $\Phi_1 \ldots \Phi_n$ nor to the existence of someone who invented the zip. In answer to this objection, Evans tries to show that understanding is a species of knowledge. Then, with the help of this notion of understanding and the seamlessness principle (the principle that asserts 'there can be no truth which it requires acceptance of a falsehood to appreciate'[33]), he shows that knowledge cannot be based on false belief and this, in turn, shows that the information-invoking singular term refers.

Evans thinks that the picture is not as simple as the opponents take it to be. In appreciation of a remark we must try to find out a justification for the hearer's arriving at such a belief. Let us first take the example of a remark involving the name Julius. In cases like this, understanding such a remark on the part of the hearer requires being faithful to the speaker's intention, and the speaker's overriding intention is to convey his conception, which can be conveyed even in a case where there is no object. As Evans says,

> ..., the hearer's belief results from an attempt to be faithful to the speaker's conception of the object, if any, to which he is referring. Such a conception may be conveyed, and such a belief arrived at in the absence of any object it concerns.[34]

The belief arrived at by the hearer in understanding of utterances like 't is F' (where the hearer draws upon the properties of being $\Phi_1 \ldots \Phi_n$) cannot be given a similar kind of justification as the Julius case. In cases like this, although the speaker intends his hearer to bring information to bear, the information that the hearer brings to bear, honouring the speaker's intentions, may not figure in the content of the belief of the speaker about reference. So in bringing information to bear the hearer must draw upon his own resources in order to select appropriate information.

> The only possible justification of the belief that, if what the speaker said is true, there is something which is $\Phi_1, \ldots \Phi_n$ and F is that it follows from some belief of the form 'The speaker is referring to *a*', together with a view as to how things stand with *a*. So, unlike the belief that one might form on hearing an utterance of 'Julius is F', the appreciation-constituting belief in the case of an information-invoking remark is of the hearer's belief about the world—about how things stand with one particular object in it.[35]

This therefore shows that even though it is possible to possess information in the absence of belief on the part of the hearer, concerning the existence of the relevant object to which the speaker is referring, it is not possible to bring this information to bear coherently upon the interpretation of the referential remark.

But it is not enough that the hearer believes that the speaker is referring to something. He can bring his information to bear on the basis of this belief, even if the belief is not true, so that there is nothing to which the singular term refers. The argument so far 'shows only that a certain belief is required on the part of those who understand the remark, not that the belief must be true.'[36] Here Evans provides the final argument. He says that understanding an expression amounts to the knowledge of what is said. That means, to understand an utterance u of a speaker S is to know what the speaker says by uttering u. Understanding is a kind of success—it is knowing which thought was expressed. However understanding or knowledge of truth cannot be based on a falsehood. This is known as the seamlessness principle, which is expressed by Evans thus,

> Truth is seamless; there can be no truth which it requires acceptance of a falsehood to appreciate.[37]

Therefore, understanding an utterance containing information-invoking singular term implies that a belief, on the part of the hearer, to the effect that the speaker is referring to an object by the use of the singular term, has to be true. And for this belief to be true, the singular term must refer—that is, it must be Russellian. As Evans concludes the discussion,

> ... thinking about the world, even if it consists in entertaining thoughts rather than judging them to be true, requires us to make intelligent use of the information that we possess. What we must realize is that using information in this way is not a neutral activity. One can intelligibly use information in this way only if one takes it to be veridical; ... .[38]

This, then, is Evans's argument for the Russellian status of some singular terms—singular terms that are information-invoking. But by exploiting the special characteristic of understanding utterances involving information-invoking singular terms and by appealing to the seamlessness principle, he arrives at this conclusion. To understand utterances containing information-

invoking singular terms one must think an information-based thought, which itself is regarded as having a Russellian status, and the argument also appeals to this property of information-based thought.

I do not want to question this main argument of Evans regarding the Russellian status of a wide variety of singular terms. What I want to look into, in more detail, is the nature of information-based thought—thoughts which are required in order to understand utterances containing those singular terms—and try to compare it with our notion of *de re* thought. Information-based thoughts are governed by Russell's Principle, and it is particularly this principle which I want to question.

4. RUSSELL'S PRINCIPLE EVALUATED

It is essential, at this point, to try and see whether the analogy we drew between *de re* thoughts as we characterized it in section 3.1 and Evans's notion of information-based singular thoughts works. We need to see whether *de re* thought as we understood it is exactly the same as the notion of information-based particular thought. If they are not, we need to show where exactly they differ. Our aim in this section is to show how Evans's notion of information-based thoughts, though similar to our notion of *de re* thoughts, differs from the latter in an important respect and is a much stronger notion than ours. It will become clear that we do not need that stronger notion, as it does face some difficulties.[39]

Information-based thoughts are *de re* thoughts in the sense that they are *of* the objects from which information is derived, and in which they are grounded. As Evans remarks, '... according to my explanation of the notion of information-based thoughts, such thoughts commit the subject to the existence of something as their object.'[40] But, according to Evans, it is not enough that a thought of this kind is grounded in an object. Over and above this the subject must satisfy Russell's Principle (the Principle that says, to repeat, that in order to have a thought about a particular object the subject must know about which object he is thinking) which would enable him to have discriminating knowledge about the object of his judgement, knowledge that will help the subject to distinguish the object of his judgement from all other things. One might object, at this point, that Russell's Principle seems to be too strong. One can think of something without being able to identify it by the process of discriminating it from all other objects, that is without knowing which object it is, at least, not in any useful sense of 'knowing which'. The distinction which may be drawn here is a distinction between identifying an object and merely thinking of one.

It should be noted that Evans defends Russell's Principle by arguing against counter-examples to it. Evans thinks that there are intuitions both in favour and against this principle, and therefore, whether or not we are to accept it depends on theoretical arguments. He develops these arguments, and then uses them to deal with apparent counter-examples. Two main strategies can be distinguished in this connection. The first one depends on the application of his 'Generality Constraint' to the example of a child who, according to Evans's opponent, can think of an individual without having discriminating knowledge. The second strategy is to claim that in order to be able to think that p one must know what it is for p to be true and then apply it to the counter-example involving steel balls.

There are two examples which will be discussed here—examples which, Evans claims, violates Russell's Principle and therefore prevent the subject to have thoughts about the particular object in question.

The first example concerns a child's thinking about Socrates by hearing merely that Socrates was a Greek philosopher.[41] In a case like this the child would violate Russell's Principle because she will not have discriminating knowledge.

Application of Russell's Principle in a case like this depends on the application of the Generality Constraint—a 'fundamental constraint that must be observed in all our reflections'.[42] According to this principle,

> if a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every property of being G of which he has a conception.[43]

According to Evans, a singular thought, that is, a thought which can be interpreted as having the content *that a is F*, involves the exercise of two separate capacities—one being the capacity to think of *a* and the other being the capacity to think of *F*. Once a subject is credited with the exercising of these conceptual abilities, there is no conceptual barrier to his being able to entertain the thought that *a is G* or the thought that *b is F*. For example, someone who is able to think that John is happy, has the ability to think that John is sad or that Harry is happy. As Evans points out 'in order to overthrow Russell's Principle, one would have to show that this general capacity to think of an object, and grasp indefinitely many hypotheses about it, can be possessed entirely in the absence of any discriminating conception of the

object.'[44] What Evans tries to show is that counter-examples to Russell's Principle involve examples of subjects having thoughts that violate the Generality Constraint, and thus these subjects cannot be credited with a singular thought.

According to Evans, a counter-example to Russell's Principle would be the example of a child who comes to know of Socrates by hearing simply that Socrates was a Greek philosopher. In a case like this the child has no discriminating knowledge, no capacity to distinguish the object of her judgement (that is, Socrates) from all other objects. Evans thinks that the child in this case is violating the Generality Constraint, and he argues for this claim by considering an expansion of the above example. To quote him,

> If the ignorant child has got hold of the widely disseminated piece of information (or misinformation) 'Socrates was snub-nosed', we might well be inclined to say that the child has a true or false belief about Socrates, or at least acquired information (or misinformation) about him. But the inclination to say that the child has, and is expressing, a belief about Socrates is far less strong when we envisage the child not merely repeating a widely disseminated piece of information, but uttering the words 'Socrates was fat' (say), perhaps as the result of some confusion.[45]

What Evans tries to do with the help of this example is to show that the child does not have the ability to think that Socrates is fat. In order to defend Russell's Principle against this counter-example Evans has to argue further that we will have to give up the view that the child has the ability to think that Socrates is snub-nosed. Suppose we agree that the child cannot have the thought that Socrates is fat. Now, *if* she could have the thought that Socrates is snub-nosed, she should be able to have the thought that he is fat. So we can say that she cannot have the thought that Socrates is snub-nosed. Let us therefore consider whether the child is indeed unable to think that Socrates is fat.

It is a hypothesis of the example that the child did say, in so many words, 'Socrates is fat'. So, we need to explain in the first place, how the child came to say 'Socrates is fat'. There may be two ways in which she did:[46] (i) she might have confused Socrates with someone else, or (ii) she does not confuse Socrates with anybody else, but comes to utter the sentence 'Socrates is fat' due to some other reason. In case of the second alternative, the child might have come to utter the words 'Socrates is fat' as a result of an inference. Maybe she thinks that all philosophers are fat, and came to know from her older sister that Socrates is a philosopher, and thus came to hold that Socrates is fat. In this case the child comes to think of Socrates as being snub-nosed, as well as being fat, and therefore seems to fulfil the Generality Constraint. Some might say here that this just postpones the question raised at the beginning. They may ask how does the child get to have the thought that Socrates was a philosopher as opposed to the merely general thought that there was once a philosopher called 'Socrates'? Therefore, this answer to Evans's objection may not work.

The other case is the one where the child confuses the philosopher Socrates with somebody else. We have to see whether she violates Generality Constraint and thereby cannot be credited with any thought concerning Socrates. It might very well appear that if the child is in a confused state as this we are disinclined to say that she is thinking of Socrates. In cases where we think that the child may be confusing Socrates with somebody else, we will say loosely 'she can't be thinking of Socrates'. What this remark amounts to is expressing our view that it is *unlikely* that she is thinking about Socrates. But this does not mean that she *cannot* think of Socrates. Let us further elaborate the example of this child to make this point clear. Suppose the child was told by her older sister that Socrates is a Greek philosopher and is snub-nosed; suppose, on another occasion the older sister wanted to tease her and, pointing to a guest in a party said that he was Socrates. This guest was fat. The child might later on say to her sister 'Socrates is fat'. Now her sister will of course realize that the child was talking about the guest at the party. It is also natural to say that she is thinking about the guest and not about Socrates, but we cannot say that the child can never think that Socrates is fat. If the child confuses Socrates with someone else then we may have to say that at one point she *does* think about Socrates and that at another she *does not*. But this is as close as we can get to a violation of the Generality Constraint. We can never judge that she can think that Socrates was snub-nosed, but cannot think that he was fat.

A second important point should be noted here. In order to explain our hesitation to ascribe to the child a thought about Socrates, we do not need to appeal to Russell's Principle. The hesitation can be explained by pointing out that there has been a confusion in the information chain—the thought that Socrates is fat and the utterance 'Socrates is fat' was grounded in someone other than Socrates. So any problem in applying the Generality Constraint in examples of this kind does not immediately imply that we need Russell's Principle to explain it.

Finally we might grant that in one version of this example, the child is too confused to have thoughts about Socrates, but this concession is compatible with the fact that there are other possible cases that do pose problems with Russell's Principle. For example, imagine a situation where the child is not confused about Socrates, but that the knowledge she has is not discriminating knowledge. I guess here, Evans would say that the child lacks information-based thoughts. However, one can say that the child can have thoughts about Socrates by virtue of some causal link going back to the philosopher.

The best example in support of Russell's Principle comes from the steel ball cases. There are two cases that Evans considers. We will discuss them separately. In the first example, already mentioned, a subject sees two indistinguishable steel balls hanging from the same point. The subject has access to no facts which will help him in discriminating the two balls. Therefore, Evans concludes that due to the unavailability of discriminating knowledge, he can think of neither of the two balls, and, so the example provides a strong case for Russell's Principle.

Now, the observation that we cannot have any discriminating capacity in a case of this kind is quite correct. It seems to be quite correct to say that if we try to think of just one ball where we are aware of two, we will focus on one of them by virtue of something which will distinguish it from the other ball. If we are unable to recall anything that would help us in distinguishing one ball from the other, we will have to give up trying to do so and not seem to have any thought about one of the balls. However, the reason for this failure may not be due to the fact that the subject is not able to distinguish the object from all other objects, as Russell's Principle requires. The reason might be due to the unfulfilment of a more modest requirement—the requirement is, that in order to focus on an object when attempting to think about it, a subject must find a way of distinguishing the object from the other objects he or she is aware of at that time. And the reason why he or she cannot distinguish one ball from the other is due to the fact that 'there has been a merging of causal lines (whereas what is required, it may be said, for a thought-episode to concern an object, X, is that there be a single causal line running from X to the episode).'[47] It is not due to his or her lack of discriminating knowledge of the very exacting kind that Russell's Principle requires. This can be compared with the second point raised regarding the previous example of the confused child. Our hesitation to say that the child is thinking about Socrates is due to something being wrong in the causal line, similar to what is happening in this case.

Evans now considers another example where the subject does not have a problem in distinguishing one steel ball from another. The story goes in this way.[48] Suppose a subject saw two distinct steel balls on two consecutive days, but due to some localized amnesia, forgets completely about the first episode. Now, suppose many years later she thinks about 'that shiny ball', now Evans's point is this,

> If asked which ball he is thinking about, our subject cannot produce any facts which would discriminate between the two.[49]

Therefore,

> There is no question of his recognizing the ball; there is nothing else he can do which will show that his thought is really about one of the two balls (about *that* ball), rather than about the other. The supposed thought—the supposed surplus over the *ex hypothesis* non-individuating descriptive thought—is apparently not connected to anything.[50]

The difference between this example and the previous one is that the subject has no problem of distinguishing one ball from the other because he has memory of just one ball. The origin of the current thought is the ball which the subject remembers. He has no trouble focusing on the ball he remembers because he is aware of seeing only one ball, but, according to Evans, although the subject behaves as if he is subscribing to Russell's Principle, he cannot have thoughts about one of the balls. The point of formulating the steel ball example in the second way is two-fold. In the first place, in this case it seems that the subject satisfies the requirement laid down by Russell's Principle. In the second place, there seems to be no hesitation to say that the subject is thinking of the second ball. These are, no doubt, due to the fact that the subject has a loss of memory about one of the balls. But, as Evans argues, 'if asked which ball he is thinking about, our subject cannot produce any facts which would discriminate between the two.'[51] And, thus, the subject cannot be credited with thoughts about the second ball.

But someone might argue against Evans in the following way. It is an indubitable fact that in a case where a subject has encountered just one ball (without there being any further relevant circumstances), he can have subsequent thoughts about it. It is also without doubt that if a subject actually saw one ball and very nearly saw another (maybe he would have seen the other one unless it was removed from his sight just as he entered the room, he might even have been told that an exactly similar ball was removed from the

room just a minute ago), he must be able to think about the particular ball he saw. The mere possibility of seeing a ball cannot in any way affect thought about the ball actually perceived. These are uncontroversial claims that Evans would have to accept, but if he accepts that we can have thoughts about the ball in the second case, then, 'how does this differ from the case under discussion, in which though two balls are seen, the memory of one incident is obliterated? Since the second ball now impinges in no way upon your consciousness, its nullified impact can make no difference to whether or not you can think of the first one.'[52] It should be noted that there is no qualitative difference in recognitional capacities between the case where only one ball is seen and the case where two balls are seen but the memory of one experience is obliterated. In both the cases the subject has low-grade recognitional capacities. Now, if the recognitional capacities are the same in both the cases, and if Evans accepts the uncontroversial claim that the subject can think of the ball in the first case, then why can we not say that the subject can think of the ball in the second case (that is, the case where he remembers perceiving just one ball) as well?

As Sainsbury remarks, 'the essence of the position he (Evans) has to defend, ..., is that having a particular-thought is knowledge-involving: you must know which object our thought concerns. ... Evans must therefore hold that a situation which would prevent any knowledge of an object would prevent any thought of that object.'[53] Knowledge in this case has to be discriminating knowledge. But it seems that the steel ball case (in either of its formulations) can be interpreted in a way which would support the claim that we can think of an object without having discriminating knowledge of it.

What we have tried to show by discussing these examples is that Russell's Principle is too restrictive a requirement for having *de re* thoughts. We agree with Evans in maintaining that to refer to an object, we must be able to think of that object. Information-invoking singular terms seem to have reference in this sense and information-based thoughts seem to be about objects in the above sense. But Evans's point is that information-based thoughts must further satisfy Russell's Principle. And it is here that they differ from *de re* thoughts.

One can think of something without being able to identify it, that is without knowing which object it is, at least, not in any useful sense of knowing which. The distinction which may be drawn here is a distinction between identifying an object and merely thinking of one. Some examples

may be given to make the point clear. We can think of perceptual objects by merely attending to them. It might happen that if you look away and then turn back, you need not be able to perceptually pick this object out of a crowd. Similarly you can think of an object which you have perceived previously merely by remembering it. That you remember something, and therefore, have the ability to think of it, does not require that how you remember it distinguishes it from others. And if someone refers you to something by name, you can think of it simply by the name. In all three cases the possibility remains that you can think of an individual without knowing which particular one it is. For our purpose of providing a viable explanation of *de re* thoughts, this weaker thesis, that is, thinking about an object or making a judgement about it without having discriminating knowledge about it, seems to be adequate. For, if some thoughts are of this nature, then they will be essentially about an individual, and hence be *de re*.

In conclusion, we can say that Evans's information-based thoughts initially seem to bear an affinity to *de re* thoughts as characterized at the beginning of the chapter. They are similar in the sense that both of them are thoughts grounded in objects from which information are derived. Information-based thoughts are dissimilar to *de re* thoughts insofar as they are supposed to fulfil the additional requirement of satisfying Russell's Principle. If we said that *de re* thoughts are exactly the same as Evans's information-based thoughts then we would have had to say that knowledge of objects of *de re* thoughts would have to be discriminating knowledge. But we do not think that knowledge of objects of *de re* thoughts has to be discriminating knowledge in Evans's sense.[54]

NOTES

1. Note that the discussion which is to follow will concentrate mainly on examples of belief-ascribing sentences. In the philosophical literature on propositional attitudes, philosophers very often concentrate on discussing belief and belief-reports. The reason may be that many (of course not all) other propositional attitudes can be said to involve belief in some way (e.g. my intention to have an ice-cream involves my belief that I can have an ice-cream) and the 'that'-clause in all the other cases can be given a reading uniform to the one in the case of belief-ascription. Therefore, what is true of belief could be regarded as true of other propositional attitudes as well. We are not committing ourselves to this position, but as it is true that belief is the paradigm of propositional attitudes, and as there seems to be no reason why it should not be taken to be a typical example of a propositional attitude, it is convenient to concentrate

our discussion on belief-ascribing sentences to bring out the general features of sentences which ascribe propositional attitudes.

2. Woodfield [1982], p. 1.
3. See McDowell [1984], p. 99.
4. See, for example, J.R. Searle's *Intentionality*, E. Sosa's paper 'Belief *De Re* and *De Dicto*. Crimmins [1992] expresses his reservations against *de re* beliefs.
5. McDowell [1977], p. 172.
6. Ibid., pp. 172–3.
7. See Quine [1960], pp. 138–56, 166–70, 206–16 and [1966], pp. 185–96.
8. Burge [1977], pp. 345–6.
9. Ibid., p. 346.
10. Burge [1977], p. 352.
11. Ibid., p. 349.
12. Quine [1956]; reprinted in Linsky, [1971], pp. 185–7.
13. Without going into a detailed and intricate discussion surrounding the relation involved between the subject and the object of a *de re* thought, we can, following Bach [1987], point out one thing. According to Bach the object of a descriptive or *de dicto* thought is determined satisfactionally, that is, the fact that the thought is about that object does not require any connection between the thought and the object, and therefore the connection is not, what Bach would call 'a real or a natural' relation. Whereas, in the case of a *de re* thought there is an intimate contextual causal relation between the thinker and the object the thought is about.
14. Bach [1987], p. 12.
15. Note that although the objects of perception make up the basic kind of *de re* thoughts, they are not the only kind. We may also have *de re* thoughts about things which we have perceived before and now come to remember, and even about things others have perceived and informed us of. This will become clear in the course of the discussion. It is, however, correct to say that objects of our *de re* thoughts are essentially objects of perception, objects which we perceive now or have perceived previously or objects which have been perceived by someone else. This view, that is, a view where perceptual or demonstrative factors are essential in having belief about a particular object, despite applying to *de re* thoughts about concrete individuals other than oneself, does not apply to *de re* thoughts about abstract objects and about oneself. Whether it is at all possible to have *de re* thoughts about abstract objects is itself debatable—it may be argued that our thoughts about particular abstract objects do not involve any causal or contextual relation, individuation of abstract objects being purely conceptual. This is a complicated issue which won't be addressed here.
16. Sainsbury [1985], p. 123.
17. Evans [1982], p. 38.
18. Sainsbury [1985], p. 122.
19. Evans [1982], p. 43.

20. See Evans [1982], p. 31. We might introduce a name into our language by some kind of reference-fixing stipulation such as, 'let us call whoever invented the zip "Julius" '. They are descriptive names and understanding a name of this kind does not require possession of information flowing from the object which is being referred to by the name. We will have occasion to come back to this example again.
21. Sainsbury [1985], p. 130.
22. Evans [1982], p. 89.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 90.
25. Ibid., p. 121.
26. Ibid., p. 308.
27. We will be discussing more on evaluation and appreciation of a remark in the next section.
28. Ibid., p. 138.
29. See Evans [1982], p. 139.
30. Evans [1982], pp. 45–6.
31. Ibid., p. 305.
32. Ibid., p. 327.
33. Ibid., p. 331.
34. Ibid., p. 329.
35. Ibid., p. 329.
36. Ibid., p. 330.
37. Ibid., p. 331.
38. Ibid., pp. 331–2.
39. There is a detailed discussion of where Evans may have gone wrong at this point in Rozemond [1993] and in Sainsbury [1985], section *11.3*.
40. Evans [1982], pp. 326–7.
41. Ibid., pp. 73–4.
42. Ibid., p. 100.
43. Ibid., p. 104.
44. Ibid., p. 75.
45. Ibid., p. 75.
46. For a detailed discussion see Rozemond [1993].
47. Sainsbury [1985], p. 133.
48. See Evans (1982), p. 90.
49. Ibid., p. 90.
50. Ibid., p. 115.
51. Ibid., p. 90.
52. Sainsbury [1985], p. 133.
53. Ibid., p. 134.
54. In writing this I have greatly benefitted from my discussions with Crispin Wright and Bob Hale.

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A Middle Ground Epistemological Position: Economics as a Classical Practical Science

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This paper attempts to show that the Aristotelian epistemological paradigm of practical science adequately fits in with economics. This proposal arises as an answer to the question about how should economics deal with free choice while retaining rationality, and as an alternative to other paradigms which fail a satisfactory solution to this subject.

Freedom is an essential feature of human action. Economic action is a free action and thus, economics should allow for an underlying conception of humans as free acting beings.[1] However, the concept of inner freedom is not at the surface of economics. Freedom is a philosophical assumption which reflects in the epistemological and methodological frames of economics and in their concepts of rationality. Economic rationality has traditionally been considered a mean-ends rationality, according to which human freedom is left outside of science. As it will be shown, this is true in the neoclassical theory, and also of the Austrian school notwithstanding the fact that the representatives of the latter claim to have rescued freedom. Hence, in this paper I shall firstly look for the underlying concepts of freedom and rationality in both theories—neoclassical and Austrian. I shall further expand on Mises's ideas on these topics, because of his relevance in the Austrian school, and because he claimed and is often supposed to have overcome the 'mechanical' neoclassical position. Although both theories are epistemologically and methodologically different, they share a similar concept of rationality—which influences in the notion of freedom—and their methods include induction and/or deduction as the only methodological devices. Naturally, this first section of the paper will be leading with assumptions of the meta-levels of those theories.

Next, I shall point out some difficulties concerning the concept of freedom according to the hermeneutical and rhetorical positions. For this purpose, I decided to briefly analyze D. McCloskey's view, for she is representative of

the spirit of these positions and is well known. Rhetoric and hermeneutic devices and views are conceived as alternatives to traditional rationality. However, the conclusion will be that their concept of freedom neither shows to be adequate. In this section I shall be working at the meta-level and its assumptions.

Then, I shall introduce practical science and its characteristics. I suggest that practical rationality is the proper way to leave room for inner freedom in economics. I shall continue by reviewing some criticism which unconsciously argues for the adoption of the practical science paradigm. Finally, I shall draw some conclusions.

THE FAILURES OF THE RATIONALIST POSITION[2]

It would be repetitive and uninteresting to explain what everybody says about the limitations of the neoclassical model. Countless authors have pointed out and expanded on its narrowness. The main failures underlined and developed by them are: its limited concept of rationality (the Weberian *Zweckrationalität*), its Newtonian spatialized concept of time,[3] the limitations of its competitive market structure, and its central concern with equilibrium. These problems stem from its epistemological framework imported from natural sciences, and subsequently, from its anthropological conception. These underlying suppositions lead to a typical neoclassical mentality which, in the end, is misleading. Examples are useful and will help to understand this mentality. Thus, I shall offer two examples narrated by an old and a young economist, respectively. The first is provided by Maynard Keynes, who had a deep grasp of this issue. When ending his famous critical review on a book by Jan Tinbergen, he ironically said: 'I have a feeling that Professor Tinbergen may agree with much of my comment, but that his reaction will be to engage another ten computors and drown his sorrows in arithmetic.'[4] This is the usual way in which neoclassicals face flaws: they try to reduce them to manageable variables. The second example comes from a paper by Karl Mittermaier suggestively entitled 'Mechanomorfism'. He comments on the misunderstanding of Ludwig Lachmann's emphasis on the importance of expectations in economics. Mittermaier recognizes that Lachmann's argument has been taken up by other economists, but in a different spirit, he points out. Indeed, they realize that the omission of expectations is a defect, but they seek to solve it by attempting to introduce expectations into the models.[5]

Lachmann is claiming that to a great extent expectations are unmanageable. The neoclassical spirit tries to manage what cannot be managed.

This neoclassical mentality entails an unconscious, weak concept of human freedom. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen has provided us with insights of merit about some roots of this neoclassical thought. Georgescu-Roegen, perhaps more than any other scholar, has examined the bridges between economics and natural sciences from many angles and with depth. This examination has led him to study the deterministic metaphysical systems founded upon the principle of least action supported by Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Nicolas de Malebranche, and Baron Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz.[6] An essential feature which their systems transfer to neoclassical economics is the absence of human inner freedom. According to Malebranche freedom does not have an actual efficacy. In fact, for Malebranche freedom means not being restrained, a typical liberal notion, whereas Leibniz's theory of pre-established harmony seriously compromises freedom.[7] From these rationalistic thinkers to neoclassical economists a path can be traced which Georgescu-Roegen thoroughly follows. In addition, we do not require a sound philosophical knowledge to realize that there is no choice in utility maximization, since utility—the end of the action—is always predetermined and left out of economic science. As Peter Koslowski appraises, the mechanical ontology of Neoclassical theory, together with its naturalistic understanding of the economic principle and its physicalist interpretation of human action, is an inadequate framework for a theory of human action, which is at the centre of economics.[8]

Meanwhile, more subtlety would be required to identify the rationalism and consequent erroneous view of freedom in the Austrian school in general and Mises in particular, for he sustains a teleological view of human action, which could leave room for freedom. Therefore, I will largely focus on Mises as an example of what could also be proved of Menger, Hayek or Kirzner.[9]

The main target of Mises's critics is his apriorist system. According to Don Lavoie, the deductions from the set of self-evident axioms which constitutes his praxeology are completely mechanic.[10] Mises makes a considerable effort to distinguish natural sciences from the sciences of human action, and praxeology from history in the realm of the former. Mises's critics stress the formal and ahistorical character of his perspective. He needed to provide an apodictic character to his theory, and he did it by keeping a high degree of formalism.

For many authors like Lachmann—and even Hayek—Mises was a rationalist.[11] To be a supporter of rationality is not in itself a problem. The real problem is to have a narrow scope of the notion of reason. According to Lachmann's interpretation, Mises's apodictic theory stems from Menger's exact orientation; expectations are left out in both cases for they are closely related to time, and time challenges the 'omnipotence of reason' (Shackle). Thus, time's denial is perfectly understandable in a stout rationalist such as Mises.[12] Accordingly, Mises lays out a construct such as the generally criticized[13] 'evenly rotating economy', which offers what he was looking for, i.e., security, but, in this way, his theory loses its principal worth, namely a sound insight into human action, which finally becomes denaturalized. In fact, praxeological laws do not leave room for freedom. David Gordon categorically asserts that Mises was a determinist,[14] whereas Mark Addleson affirms that he was a conductist.[15] Actually, Mises afirms: 'The sciences of human action by no means reject determinism.'[16] Addleson thinks that the reason why Mises views the market process in deterministic terms derives from his particular notion of human action which does not consider its origin, and from his lack of concern with ends.[17] Plenty of reasons could be argued for such a position. Nevertheless, the main one is that his determinism is closely related to the value-free scientific requirement and, even more directly, to his denial of intrinsic human freedom. In economics, ends as given, are required in order to support the value-neutrality condition. Obviously, this is not only an epistemological question, but an implicitly anthropological one, closely tied to Mises's conception of freedom. Hence, let us analyze some of Mises's texts on freedom.

First of all, for Mises 'Primitive man was certainly not born free.' Thus, what is freedom according to Mises? 'A man is free, he says, in so far as he is *permitted* to choose ends and the means *to be used* for the attainment of those ends.'[18] Then, he says, 'there is no kind of freedom and liberty other than the market economy brings about.'[19] The individual 'is free in the sense that the laws and the government do not force him to resign his autonomy and self-determination to a greater extent than the *inevitable* praxeological law does.'[20] The reason is that 'a man's freedom is most rigidly restricted by the laws of nature as well as by the laws of praxeology,'[21] to such an extent that 'we may or may not believe that the natural sciences will succeed one day in explaining the production of definite ideas, judgements of value, and actions in the same way in which they explain the production of a chemical compound as the necessary and unavoidable outcome of a certain combination

of elements.'[22] Mises's very definition of action states that 'Action is (...) the ego's meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its environment, is a person's conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life.'[23] Hereof we may conclude that Mises manages a univocal concept of external freedom as absence of coercion. Since all personal action is rational, there is no room for irrationality, except for interfering with others' actions, which are themselves praxeologically determined. In sum, according to Mises, freedom consists in avoiding obstructions to acting deterministically. Such a concept proves to be a rather weak vision of what freedom really is. Mises's notions of freedom and rationality are related back and forward. In his *Epistemological Problems of Economics* he reduces Max Weber's four types of rationality to the first, which is instrumental rationality, which derives of leaving freedom outside.[24]

In the other way, Mises's rationalism is directly tied with his notion of freedom. In *Theory and History* he says that 'Choosing means is a matter of reason, choosing ultimate ends a matter of the soul and the will;'[25] and 'Action'—he asserts in *Human Action*—'means the employment of means for the attainment of ends.'[26] Therefore, 'Action and reason are congeneric and homogeneous.'[27] The only thing we should do concerning action is 'to behave according to the decision made'.[28] This is what Mises calls 'activistic determinism': 'If you want to attain a definite end, you must resort to the appropriate means; there is no other way to success.'[29] Either there is no room for freedom 'during' action, or for a dynamic consideration of human action. According to classical anthropology, rational will and freedom give origin to and inform all the human action from beginning to end.[30] Meanwhile, for Mises, 'the incentive that impels a man to act is always some uneasiness,'[31] a rather sensitive feeling, not a positive will of an end. Neither is freedom present for Mises 'before' action. Values and ultimate ends are not freely chosen. 'All his [Man's] actions are the inevitable results of his individuality as shaped by all that preceded. An omniscient being may have correctly anticipated each of his choices (...) Actions are directed by ideas, and ideas are products of the human mind, which is definitely a part of the universe and of which the power is strictly determined by the whole structure of the universe.'[32] All freedom is just appearance stemming from the ignorance proper of individuality.[33] In sum, 'The offshoots of human mental efforts, the ideas and the judgements of value that directs the individuals' actions, cannot be traced back to their causes, and are in this sense ultimate data. [The lack of such knowledge generates the epistemological differences

between natural and human action's sciences.[34]] In dealing with them we refer to the concept of individuality. But in resorting to this notion we by no means imply that ideas and judgements of value spring out of nothing by a sort of spontaneous generation and are in no way connected and related to what was already in the universe before their appearance. We merely establish the fact that we do not know anything about the mental process which produces within a human being the thoughts that correspond to the state of his physical and ideological environment.'[35]

For many people, as we pointed out above, Austrian economics is a valid alternative. However as already shown, a solution to the co-ordination between rationality and human inner freedom is not found in Austrian orthodox positions, as Mises's. This is not the right place to prove that neither do some New Institutionalist, Post-Keynesian and Radical developments solve the problem, because they also fall into the neoclassical mentality. Let us now analyze the other extreme of the pendulum.

IRRATIONALIST POSTMODERNIST EXAGGERATIONS

Laments against rationalistic economics arise at different places. However, when the time comes to propose positive alternatives, these are not completely satisfying. The key to arriving at the desirable position is an adequate notion of freedom. A balanced notion of radical freedom supposes a balanced notion of rationality. Freedom needs a rational pattern to confront it with. A narrow concept of rationality, such as the neoclassical and the orthodox Austrian ones, avoids freedom by restraining it. But an extremely broad concept of rationality, which is rather irrationality, evaporates freedom by taking away contrast. White and grey requires black; without black they can not exist. We must not fall in the irrationalist extreme; in spite of the inadequacy of rationalistic rationality, some kind of rationality is required.

An example of this extreme position is D. McCloskey. Although McCloskey argues for a wider rationalism, she is a Rortian neo-pragmatist which means an irrationalist. McCloskey would quickly retort that this charge comes from an authoritarian.[36] The problem with McCloskey—and with much of the postmodernist thought—is inconmensurability.[37] We could spend all day criticizing and replying without arriving at any conclusion. While McCloskey speaks English, I speak Spanish; I do not know a word of English and McCloskey does not know a word of Spanish.[38] Thus, dialogue is not possible. It is a waste of time. The only solution would be that either one of us

dies or that one of us 'converts' to the other side. One can be with McCloskey or against her: you must choose. Arguments are not useful: it is a matter of 'moral' stance. You must read McCloskey and make the election, and then your whole self will be committed to this election. If you choose McCloskey, stop reading: it will be useless. Although I argue—like McCloskey—for a broader rationality, I choose against McCloskey, because I consider that she goes beyond common sense. Several quotations could be cited showing McCloskey's exaggerations: economists only use metaphors and tell stories, and economics is a kind of writing, a story, and so on.[39] Instead, I prefer to point out the deep root of the difference. McCloskey, as my compatriot Jorge Luis Borges, whom she quotes, sustains that nothing from reality is knowable.[40] As an economist and philosopher, I am a realist. She is not. We must be realists: reality is evident. We need to be realistic; otherwise, why are we scientists? If we are not realists, science and all knowledge—also economics—make no sense. Thus, if you are not a realist, shut this Journal. From an irrationalist point of view, not only freedom but also all economic theory vanishes. With positions like McCloskey's one can not discuss details. The argument must be carried to the end, and one must decide then. But if you want to continue coherently being an economist, you must reject McCloskey's temptation.

The former could also apply to Donald Lavoie, and specially to Arjo Klamer, among other postmodernist economists.[41] Nevertheless, these proposals have two beneficial effects. First, they introduce the hermeneutical view and rhetorical aspects which may be relevant in economics. One might leave room for these former considerations for they could complete the knowledge of the richness of reality. However, authors inspired in postmodernism think that reality is no more than rhetoric. According to them, competitive narrations are equally valid if they are internally coherent and accepted by their respective audiences. The second positive effect of these positions is that they powerfully shake economics from its dogmatic and rationalist dream. But once awake, what should we do? Neither McCloskey, nor Klamer, nor Lavoie tells us something useful besides postmodern rhetoric, which can add nothing new due to its break with reality. In brief, they positively push for a change of mentality, but then they end up sterilizing this contribution and freedom impoverishes for it becomes pure indetermination. In the next section I shall introduce an epistemological framework of economics which considers a middle ground notion of rationality: neither rationalist rationality nor irrationality, but practical rationality.

WHAT IS PRACTICAL SCIENCE?

Practical rationality is reason applied to *prâxis*. *Prâxis* is human action. Hence, practical reason is the capacity to guide action to be adequate, while practical rationality means the way to adequate action. Adequacy asks for an end and a path in order to achieve it. Thus, practical rationality begins motivated by ends, follows by the correspondent means, and finalizes achieving the former ends. Therefore, it needs an inquiry on ends, which in the human realm includes moral values. For such a conception, human action is intentional, i.e., teleological, and the human being is free.

Practical science aims at stating correct utterances on human rational action. It is a prudential science which tries to answer the questions: What should we do? What should we choose? and, How should we achieve it? Thus, practical science supporters sustain that a rational research on values not only is possible but necessary. They conceive of these questions and research as a reaction against the Enlightenment *ethos* requirement of value-neutrality in the realm of the social sciences, and rescue Aristotle's thought in order to confront it versus this former epistemological trait.

Let us review some facts. For the Enlightened position, scientific reason was only applicable to means. The ends were a matter of private decision which surpassed the limits of science. However, since human action is essentially free and, therefore, essentially moral, sciences whose subject is an aspect or sector of human action have to include ethical considerations as well. Some years ago, before theory-ladenness was largely accepted, Leo Strauss stated that it is impossible to study social phenomena without making value judgements, and that if they are forbidden to enter through the front door of political science, sociology or economics, they will enter through the back door.[42] If these values, which inevitably embed all social thinking, are not rationally found and established, they are ideological. Members of the Frankfurt School such as Jürgen Habermas accused Weberian *Wertfreiheit* as an ideological capitalistic mask, but they did not offer a satisfactory alternative. Likewise, the movement of rehabilitation of practical science arose, which proposed to apply the Aristotelian paradigm to the social sciences. At the same time, the answer to this challenge in our area should be an evaluative economics outlined following the path opened by the Aristotelian approach. This is a task which still ought to be done. In order to shed some light on this project, I will briefly review some traits of practical sciences.[43]

First, I want to state that the Aristotelian model is less demanding than the rationalist one. Therefore, it better withstands criticism. Aristotelian

practical science acknowledges the inexact character of its conclusions, due to the contingency of human action deriving from its freedom and singularity. Aristotle asserts in his *Nicomachean Ethics:* 'Now our treatment of this science will be adequate, if it achieves that amount of precision which belongs to its subject matter. The same exactness must not be expected in all departments of philosophy alike, any more than in all the products of arts and crafts (...) We must therefore be content if, in dealing with subjects and starting from premises thus uncertain, we succeed in presenting a broad outline of the truth: when our subjects and our premises are merely generalities, it is enough if we arrive at generally valid conclusions.'[44] Science should not be demanded more than it can say in relation with the nature of its subject. This limitation is not shameful, since it does not originate from a weakness of science but, as Aristotle also says, from 'the nature of the case: the material of conduct is essentially irregular.'[45] A certain erroneous 'inferiority complex' leads neoclassical mentality to search for security by using tools belonging to the natural sciences.[46] Nothing is more evident from economics than the inexactness of its conclusions and predictions.

If we are speaking about inexactness we can not avoid a reference to Daniel Hausman's *The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics* (*ISSE*) in order to situate this trait in contemporary methodological thinking. However, Hausman's inexactness has a difference origin from Aristotle's. While according to Aristotle this source—the condition of practical matters—ultimately remits to human freedom, according to Hausman it derives from complexity of economic causes and ultimately from ignorance.

Hausman adopts Mill's interpretation of inexactness with 'slight' differences:[47] for we can not know the whole set of causes and conditions of economic facts, economists insert vague *ceteris paribus* clauses and, thus economics becomes inexact. A science of tendencies. I am specially interested in pointing out that Mill develops this epistemological trait of 'the science of human nature' after having stated his thought on freedom (*A System of Logic*, 6.3 and 6.2, respectively). The analogies posed by Mill—Tidology, Metereology and Astronomy (6.3)—coherently correspond to his idea of human action as completely determined and supposedly predictable as physics phenomena, and to his concept of freedom as a feeling due to a lack of knowledge of all the factors which influence on the acting person (6.2).

Being freedom one of the sources of inexactness, the Aristotelian practical science includes more methodological devices than Millian inexact science does. Hausman realizes the mechanical aspect of Mill's view and he also

underlines that economists do not strictly practice this method. But he does not clear up his position in regard to human freedom. He seems to consider only a difference of *gradation* in inexactness between, e.g., physics and economics. Instead, I would 'aristotelically' speak of two ontologically different *kinds* of inexactness: stemming from incompleteness and freedom respectively. Accordingly, Mill's method is hypothetical-deductive, while Aristotle includes other devices, as will be shown below. In sum, even though they both speak about inexactness, they do it from different epistemological positions. Hausman clearly asserts that the fact that economics is a social science is crucial to its methodological problems.[48] But for Hausman a social science is not a 'full', a 100% science. For Hausman, inexactness means imperfection; it is, although justified, a failure, a necessary relaxation of a strict science: the cost of actually tidying causal complexity to rationality. He is still thinking from and within the traditional concept of rationality.

Besides, his position has some other problems. His definition of economics as neoclassical microeconomics is extremely narrow, as was rightly pointed out by Roger Backhouse.[49] Thus, whether he accepts this definition of economics and consequently inexactness, he can not—as he does—blame economists for sustaining a separate science. In fact, Uskali Mäki has recently argued and Hausman recognized, that his differential treatment of inexactness and separateness is ill founded.[50]

In his *ISSE*, Hausman had rejected separateness timidly, as he felt guilty of moving away from rationality by his suggestion: there he asserts that defense of separateness stems from the link with a theory of rationality, but he simultaneously affirms that concerns about rationality are unavoidable.[51] I newly suggest that he is speaking from a narrowly defined concept of rationality. Instead, if he had adopted practical rationality as economic rationality and practical science as its epistemological status, he would have avoided this incoherent situation. Even though practical science is inexact and needs assistance from (not fusion with) other social sciences, it is a 100% science, for its completeness is judged from practical rationality, not from formal rationality.

Once finished this digression and inexactness established, a second feature of practical science directly follows it. Practical sciences must be closely connected with the concrete case. 'Now no doubt,' Aristotle says, 'it is proper to start from the known. But "the known" has two meanings—"what is known to us," which is one thing, and "what is knowable in itself," which is another. Perhaps then for us at all events it is proper to start from what is known to us.'[52] An adaptation to the particular case, considering its cultural

and historical environment is necessary. This way of knowing leaves room for inductive as well as rhetoric and hermeneutical procedures in economics. In fact, Aristotle was a precursor of the inductive, rhetorical, and hermeneutical methods. For Aristotle, induction does not mean scepticism about knowledge of the real essences and causes, resigning to establishing mere observable regularities, or just making reliable predictions—as in Friedman's instrumentalist view. Nor does the link of practical science with hermeneutics make reality become only discourse. As in Neville Keynes's Political economy, economics as practical science discovers laws of causal connection and investigates the *verae causae*.[53] A wise blending of adequately chosen theories and historical, cultural and empirical elements is the clue to a correct interpretation of economic human action.

Third, while inexactness and closeness to reality are features which stem from the freedom and singularity of human action, the ethical engagement of practical science arises as a consequence of its other side, namely, morality. However, let us bear in mind that economics is not Ethics. Economics is a moral science as far as it is a practical science. While Ethics studies the ethical problem in itself, economics studies the economic problem—as Politics and Law do with their corresponding subjects—but these problems can not be isolated from their ethical aspects. Aristotle has wisely distinguished between Ethics—which is a science—and practical sciences, which are ethical in so far as they consider ethical aspects of the analyzed subject. Value-neutrality is an Enlightenment concept which originates in gnosiological and metaphysical agnosticism. One of its first supporters was David Hume with his contended separation of Is- and Ought- Propositions.

Rationality is an analogical term. In transitive human actions a triple rationality may be distinguished, i.e., practical or moral, technical, and logical. Transitive actions are those which surpass the person who performs them, like producing a good. Immanent actions are those not quitting the subject, as thinking, loving or, more simply, living. Transitive human actions have both, a transitive result and an immanent character: While we produce, we think, love or live. Practical *immanens* rationality embed the whole action to the extent that the existence of a purely technical *transiens* action can not be sustained. Whatever the action, it is always essentially ethical. Since human action is ethical, and since economic action is human action, economics has an inner ethical commitment. Economic rationality is a technical rationality immersed in a practical rationality. Gilles-Gaston Granger affirms that within the economic area an intertwining between the different perspec-

tives of rationality has to take place in order to arrive at a correct knowledge.[54] Practical science assumes this task.

This might be the right place to insert a short exposition of Aristotle's theory of economics. Firstly, Aristotle's *oikonomiké* is more than household management, as many economic historians believe.[55] Aristotle pointed out that *oikonomiké* deals with the house and also with the *polis*.[56] Secondly, Aristotle considers *oikonomiké* as the use of what is necessary for Good life, i.e., the moral life. *Oikonomiké* can only be aimed at the good; it is essentially moral; first, because it is a human act—*enérgeia*—belonging to the *prâxis*, i.e., practical category; second, because this act is aimed at Good life; and third, because the person must technically and morally esteem the necessary. On the contrary, for Aristotle, chrematistics is a technique subordinate to economics, and it deals with the acquisition of what is used by *oikonomiké* (production, finance and commerce). Chrematistics is not essentially oriented toward the good. Therefore, while according to Aristotle, a harmful *oikonomiké* is unthinkable, two kinds of chrematistics can be considered: a subordinate, limited and natural one, and a wicked, unnatural, unlimited one. Thus *oikonomiké* is an act, the right act of using things in order to achieve the good, i.e., virtuous life. Therefore, virtue is needed as a habit which facilitates the performance of the former act. In addition, his *oikonomiké* is embedded in its Political environment.[57] Aristotle poses an example of practical analysis of an economic issue by his market analysis in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book V, Chapter 5). Hereby, he concludes that the principle which rules demand, and therefore prices and wages, is *chreia*, which means economic necessity. *Chreia* is relative and subjective, but intrinsically moral. It should not be forgotten that this Chapter on economic exchange belongs to his Treatise on Justice and that Justice, for Aristotle, is the main social virtue. Summing up, Aristotle's *oikonomiké* is an ethical act with an inner relation with the historical, cultural, social, and political factors which surround it.[58]

Concerning the ethical engagement of science, it will be enlightening to shortly refer to Hans Albert's proposal of norms rational discussing in a scientific context. Albert rejects both logical positivism for its resignation about issues of moral philosophy, and hermeneutic and existentialist positions for their irrationality. Instead, he proposes critical rationalism as providing a set of critical principles which bridges the gap between being and ought to be, between science and ethics.[59] In fact, for many authors as Enrico Berti, Albert could be listed among practical rationality supporters.[60]

A fourth trait of practical science is its pragmatic aim. An abusive theoretical intentionality has invaded the realm of the social sciences, and this process has led economics to a certain sterility which is evident in the mainstream economic Journals. A social science may have a theoretical aim, but it is always virtually oriented at action, for the essentially practical character of its subject defines its epistemological status. Normativeness and prescriptiveness are the reverse sides of the coin of description and explanation. In this way, the framework of practical science successfully resolves the dichotomy between positive and normative science, simultaneously leaving room for a certain legitimate autonomy of both.

Finally, concerning the methodical devices proper to practical sciences, the bibliography on this topic is abundant and could be summarized in an interesting proposal of methodological plurality. In his *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle admirably combines axiomatic deduction, inductive inference, dialectic arguments, rhetorical suggestions, imagination, examples, and topics. In a prudential science of this kind, all these instruments add up. These are the adequate devices to deal with free human action. Methodical strategies which have been separately developed in different economic currents are amalgamated in this approach, which takes away from the social and economic sciences any dogmatic methodological reductionism. Actually, this is the case of the real practicing economics.

UNCONSCIOUSLY CLAIMING FOR PRACTICAL SCIENCE

Somebody could rightly claim that the previous discussion resembles an extremely general declaration of principles. The short length of this paper could be a valid excuse, as well as the fact that this old paradigm, when applied to economics, actually constitutes a new research program. Notwithstanding, a powerful argument can be made in favour of practical science: its fitness to solve the problems pointed out by the most relevant criticism of the mainstream of economics. In fact, the critics are unconsciously claiming for practical science. Unconsciously, for they work at the level of theories, not at a meta-level. Unfortunately, they also have problems. Let us review some examples.

The Austrian school focuses on human action and argues for features such as abandoning mechanic analogies, adopting an appropriate epistemology and considering institutions and time. All this constitutes an approach to the practical view. However, Menger's unintentionally originated social struc-

tures, Mises's infallible laws of praxeology, and Hayek's spontaneous order entail a rationalistic mentality. Radical subjectivists remark that this tendency toward equilibrium is not necessary. Lachmann, who is strongly influenced by Max Weber's wise insights, even defends human inner freedom. In such a way, this position takes another step toward practical science. However, Lachmann continues defending the value-free requirement. It is worth pointing out that radical subjectivists join efforts in these topics with their traditional adversary Maynard Keynes's essential message, as interpreted by George Shackle and Paul Davidson:[61] there is a kind of uncertainty inherent to human nature which avoids any possible calculus.[62] Then, following the Austrian path, Lavoie renounces value-neutrality and proposes an interesting hermeneutical approach, but he goes beyond practical science when sharing a postmodernist view of reality. Concerning the rhetorical position, practical science should be the broad rationality which McCloskey argues for. However, as already mentioned, she actually turns rationality into irrationality.

New forms of Institutionalism include items like transactional costs, property rights, law, and constitutional aspects, but mainly within a neoclassical mentality.[63] Radical political economists also extend the boundaries of economics. They see economics as a part of the social sciences. Nevertheless, they often fall back on an ideological perspective.[64] Besides, some institutionalists, radicals and post-Keynesians adopt biological analogies, which are more sophisticated than mechanical ones.[65] Only little is gained, however, by changing from a physical model to an organic one. The nature of the human being, though it shares physical and animal aspects, surpasses both. Therefore, biological analogies are as misleading as mechanical ones.[66]

Even in neoclassical authors, we can find a rebuttal of the value-neutrality criterion. It is the case of Kenneth Boulding in his article 'Economics as a Moral Science.'[67] Sir John Hicks warns us about the danger of a sort of Maquiavelism in economics when treating social problems as technical matters, not as facets of the general search for the Good life.[68] In a similar spirit, Albert Hirschman, proposes to develop economics as a moral-social science in which moral arguments should be systematically blended with analytic reasoning.[69] Even a positivist as Terence Hutchison argues, quoting Aristotle, that clearness and conclusions depend on what the concrete scientific subject allows, thus acknowledging a typical feature of practical science.[70]

Inner freedom is clearly present in some authors like Lachmann. This is also the deep thought of Harvey Leibenstein when he criticizes the tautological character of the maximization postulate.[71] Yet, another defender of free-

dom is Alec MacFie. He replaces the behaviourist psychology underlying mainstream economics by other theories which make room for liberty. The result is a consistent criticism of neoclassical devices and a proposal to relate economics with Ethics and Social Anthropology.[72] Following a similar path, Mark Lutz and Kenneth Lux introduce Humanistic psychology in a new proposal of Humanistic economics. They attack the neoclassical narrow view of the human being and defend his freedom with insight. For them, all approaches to an economic question must consider the ultimate ends of human life. In a more generous definition of economics, values are essential features.[73] However, their closeness to the Kantian conception of Ethics leads them to an unnecessary break between a supposedly pure and unmotivated ethical action and the natural teleology of all human action, including economic action.[74] Shackle thinks that uncertainty derives from the fact that both means and ends involved in the decision are filtered by interpretation. The chooser is free to originate the choosable entities. He speaks of 'the freedom of unknowledge', and argues that decision as 'creation' avoids determinacy.[75] It is the free Will which commands the whole dynamic action. Hence, Shackle affirms that decision is an act not only of deliberative thought but also of moral commitment.[76]

Summing up, many economists nowadays criticize neoclassical theory for its deterministic view of human conduct. They support the inexactness of economic conclusions and predictions, they stress the necessity to adapt economics to its subject, and they propose to consider within economics formerly exogenous factors like institutions, time, historical and cultural elements, and even for some authors, values. If we look for an epistemology which satisfies these complaints and which takes care of these proposals, and if we compare it with the Aristotelian practical science paradigm, we arrive at the conclusion that the latter constitute a useful framework to resolve these basic problems.

CONCLUSIONS

If all this is so evident, why has nobody said it before? For people who have been trained both in philosophy and economics the reason is clear: both disciplines are necessary, and they need to be adequately combined in order to formulate theories which generally embody an underlying philosophy of economics.[77] For a philosopher educated in the classical tradition, it is evident that all human sciences are practical sciences. However, he often does not

know much about economics or its problems. Likewise, the average economist has never heard a word about practical science. Indeed, it is difficult to bring together economics and philosophy adequately. This lack of understanding derives from the dissolution of the unity of human sciences proper of the Enlightenment. This dissolution impedes the rise of open-minded human scientists who could provide comprehensive proposals. In fact, some of the thinkers who approach practical science are more than economists, such as Weber, Keynes, Shackle, Lachmann and Hirschman.

The position I am actually arguing for is the tradition of political economy. Political economy used to be a branch of philosophy of praxis.[78] We saw this in Aristotle, and twenty centuries later Adam Smith said that it was 'a branch of the science of the statesman or legislator.'[79] Political economy died with neoclassical economy. Nowadays, however, the term 'political economy' has revived, but with a different meaning.[80] Hence, it could be misleading to adopt it again, as even Lionel Robbins has suggested.[81] Nor is 'practical economics' an adequate term for the proposal on this paper, for it sounds as 'applied economics'. Hence, we must cautiously choose a label in order to avoid confusions and to establish the main lines of the present proposal, a renaissance of the old epistemological status of economics: the practical one in the classical Aristotelian sense. This proposal for a renewed classical economics is supported by the inadequacy of both the rationalistic and postmodernist projects, in order to adequately combine with a deep concept of human freedom and by the fitness of the Aristotelian theory to overcome their problem—as denounced by the economists—providing an appropriate epistemological frame.

A last word. Nobody has written an Essay on Principles of Economics nor have different economic branches been developed in this fashion. On the other hand, economics has greatly evolved since Aristotle. Therefore, a great deal is to be done if we want to update this program. But a great deal has already been done, because as Aristotle also affirms, 'if you wish to solve a problem it is useful to examine it in detail; for a clear understanding of any subject depends on correctly posing its difficulties.'[82] This is what I have attempted to do in this paper.

NOTES

1. I shall refer in this paper to human 'inner' or 'radical' freedom as an intrinsic capacity or openness of human being that is the source of free choice.

2. I define here rationalism as the position that reduces rationality to instrumental and formal rationality.
3. Cf. G.P. O'Driscoll, M.J. Rizzo (1996): 53 ff.
4. J.M. Keynes (1939): 568.
5. Cf. K. Mittermaier (1986): 242.
6. Cf. N. Georgescu-Roegen (1990): 23 ff.
7. On Malebranche and Leibniz systems, cf. e.g. M. Fazio, D. Gamarra (1994): 81–92 and 108–26.
8. Cf. P. Koslowski (1990): 20.
9. I developed this issue at length in my book, 1997c. Parts of this argument appear in my article, 1997a. Cf. also my 1997d.
10. Cf. D. Lavoie (1986): 195–6.
11. Cf. L. Lachmann (1982): 31 and 37.
12. Cf. Ibid.
13. For example, by S.C. Littlechild (1982): 91, 93 and 97. Littlechild thinks that—Hahn whose neoclassical version of the general equilibrium model he studies—and Mises share a similar view of general equilibrium (cf. p. 91). Cf. also J. High (1986): 112, T. Cowen, R. Fink (1985), Lachmann (1976): 60–1, G.P. O'Driscoll, M.J. Rizzo (1996): 82.
14. Cf. D. Gordon (1993): 53. See also his argument in 1994—with which I completely agree, specially pp. 98–9 and 103–4.
15. Cf. M. Addleson (1986) and (1992): 227.
16. Mises ([1957] 1985): 93.
17. Cf. M. Addleson (1986): 11.
18. Mises ([1949] 1966): 279. Cursives are mine.
19. Ibid., 283
20. Ibid., 281.
21. Ibid., 279. Cf. also 885.
22. Ibid., 18.
23. Ibid., 11.
24. Mises (1960): 82.
25. Mises ([1957] 1985): 15.
26. Mises ([1949] 1966): 13.
27. Ibid., 39.
28. Ibid., 13.
29. Mises ([1957] 1985): 177–8.
30. Cf. my paper 1996b.
31. Mises ([1949] 1966): 13.
32. Mises ([1962] 1978): 57.
33. Cf., e.g. (Mises [1957] 1985): 78, 90, 93, 183; (Mises [1962] 1978): 58. As for Mill.
34. Cf. (Mises [1962] 1978): 58.
35. Mises ([1957] 1985): 78.

36. Cf. McCloskey (1983): 509.
37. Cf. R. Rorty 1997: 65–7.
38. Example inspired in McCloskey (1987): 127.
39. Cf. e.g., McCloskey (1990).
40. Cf. McCloskey (1989): 5.
41. I expanded on Lavoie's position in 1997a.
42. Cf. L. Strauss (1959): 21.
43. For more details, cf. my article 1997b.
44. *NE*, I, 3, 1094b 11–27.
45. *NE*, V, 10, 1137b 17–9.
46. I take the idea of an inferiority complex from F. Machlup (1956).
47. Hausman (1992): 128.
48. Hausman, Id.: 270.
49. Cf. Backhouse (1997).
50. Cf. Mäki (1998) and Hausman (1998).
51. Cf., e.g., Hausman (1992): 277–80.
52. *NE*, I, 4, 1095b 2–4.
53. Cf. J.N. Keynes ([1917] 1963): 176 and 224.
54. Cf. G.-G. Granger (1992): p. 80.
55. I prefer to use the term *oikonomiké* due to the relevant differences between this Aristotelian concept and modern economics.
56. Cf. *Politics*, I, 8, 1256b 12–4; I, 10, 1258a 19–21; I, 11, 1259a 33–6.
57. Cf. K. Polanyi (1968).
58. I analyze the Aristotelian concept of economy and economics at length in some works: 1993–4 and 1996a, and 1997c, Chapters IV and V. The expert on Aristotle, W.L. Newman (1950): I, 138, thinks that Political economy almost originated with him.
59. Cf. Albert (1968 [1973]) chapter 3, specially paragraph 12.
60. Cf. Berti (1987): 57 ff.
61. Cf. Shackle, e.g., (1961), and Davidson (1981) and (1993). On the links between Davidson and Austrian economics, cf. O'Driscoll, Rizzo (1996): 9 and *Critical Review,* 1993, 7/2–3. For a similar view of Keynes's thought, cf. V. Vasquez Presedo (1995).
62. Cf., e.g., *General Theory,* Chapter 12, VII.
63. Cf. E. Furubotn (1997).
64. Cf. M. Sawyer (1989): Chapter 1.
65. Which is traditional for Institutionalism, and can be found in the radical S. Bowles and H. Gintis (1993): 97 and 100, and in the Post-Keynesian A. Eichner (1983): 12 and 229.
66. I develop this issue in my paper (1999).
67. Cf. K. Boulding (1969): 1–4.
68. Cf. J.R. Hicks (1941): 6 (quoted by S. Zamagni, (1996): 2). Cf. also Hicks (1976).
69. Cf. A.O. Hirschman (1984): 109–10.
70. Cf. T.W. Hutchison (1976): 184.

71. Cf. e.g., H. Leibenstein (1983): 146 and M. Perlman (1992): 191.
72. Cf. A. McFie (1953).
73. Cf. M. Lutz and K. Lux (1988): 96, 146–8, 221, 315–8.
74. Cf. Ibid.: 105–8 and 148–9.
75. Cf. Shackle (1979): Chapters 13 and 14.
76. Cf. Shackle (1986): 285.
77. Cf. U. Mäki (1996): 34.
78. Cf. S. Zamagni (1996): 6.
79. Cf. A. Smith, *Wealth of Nations,* Book IV, Introduction.
80. For a review, cf. R.D. Collison Black (1983). The term is used by Neo-Marxists, Radicals, Institutionalists, Post-Keynesians and Public Choice economists.
81. On this issue, cf. my paper 1998.
82. *Metaphysics,* III, 1, 995a 27–9.

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What Exactly is Wrong with 'What is Wrong with Post-Modernism?'[1]

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Christopher Norris is an author of more than ten books.[2] Barring a few, which deal with political themes, the others wear a multifaceted outlook. The most dominant theme of his outlook is the *entente cordiale* between these three major thrusts of the century, such as deconstruction, hermeneutics and post-modernism. He writes on these exotic matters with a great deal of conviction and wants to vindicate a view according to which there is an 'analytical divide' between deconstruction on the one hand and hermeneutics and post-modernism on the other. In one of the strongest critiques of post-modernism calling it as a new idol of the cave, he draws out a plethora of political implications for refuting this new brand of ultra-scepticism. That is to say that such an analytic divide suggests a constrast which carries far-reaching implications for the interface between philosophy and literature. One chief implication is that while deconstruction can very well sustain such an interface, post-modernism undermines it both within philosophy, by attacking it as a universal theory of reason as well as within literature, by attacking the theory of literary criticism. Hermeneutics counters deconstructionist levelling of the genre distinction by offering transcendental hopes of a metanarrative.[3] Both of the above views are questionably wrong according to his view, for they cannot facilitate the above interface. Now, the analytical divide is that while deconstruction has the conceptual resources of analytical motif, post-modernism lacks them. This is very much due to another divide that exists between theory and practice which post-modernists advocate, and consequently, set their heart on political practice to the exclusion of theory, while deconstruction, at least in a depoliticized version, has an escape route from political practice. In a sense, deconstruction has distanced from a generalized post-modernist in its attitude towards theory.[4] This might lend credence to the idea that deconstruction also belongs to the same range of discourse which

Habermas terms as the philosophical discourse of modernity,[5] but it strains one's credulity to think so. On Norris's reading, unless the 'philosophical' in the above discourse is sensitized towards the pre-revisionary reading of the Kantian ideal of *sensus communis*, and is to be used as a tool for a kindred cosmopolitical outlook, which he recommends, post-modernism is sure to end up as a fascist idea. Norris uses this as an exact tool to stake a claim for reading the full ethico-political implications of deconstruction.[6]

Lately, Norris moves towards a strong assertion of a pair of lemmas. The first lemma states that an ethics of reading will entail an ethics of criticism.[7] The second lemma builds up this into one that states that there is an *episteme* of criticism—that is, there are truth claims in literary criticism[8]—in the above sense in which it has a *modus vivendi* with the ethics of *sensus communis*. Norris is ready to defend the above under any threat. With this above strategy, Norris tries to counterpose the postmodernist 'contest of faculties' with the epistemological and ethical concerns of deconstruction, by holding that there is a passage from the phrase-regime of cognitive truth to the phrase-regime of ethics and practical justice. Whereas post-modernist scepticism entails an ultra-relativist position, in which Kant gets completely disfigured, Norris's will resurrect this with a better Kantian transcendental argument.[9] Norris prefers to characterize such an argument as an argument in the empirical mode: the external world itself is the condition of possibility of our conceptual scheme; fine-tuned to the alternative systems of descriptions, it holds that our conceptual knowledge is poised to speak about the independent existing reality. There is *a priori* possibility of comparing or translating between different conceptual schemes. This is the ultimate form of the transcendental argument at least in the version given by Davidson: ontological relativity must presuppose the very idea of conceptual scheme, *contra* Quine. The defect of this 'weak' version is that it assumes truth as primitive. It was also led to the dictum that there is no such thing as a language. A more cogent form is Derrida's which reads: there is *a priori* condition of impossibility for the above: there is language and there is truth for there is a world.[10] The idea that props up the above is that there is an intra-theoretic mode of revisibility.[11] Couched in the analytical idiom, it comes to that natural kind terms (e.g. lemon) bear revision in possible worlds of ramifications. The crucial question Norris faces here is whether this can be given a Kantian explanatory content.[12] Following the latest philosophy of physics, there is *a priori* reasoning in science as exemplified by thought-experiments. I think Norris's thesis is tendentious and its veracity can never be immediately known. Accordingly, what his diagnosis of the post-modernist ethos tells us is that the moment others are thought of as a radically altered or deviant sub-group, then the 'contest' enters and the moment they are treated as our equal partners in the socio-political milieu, then *sensus communis* results.

A discourse on modernity, on Habermas's view, becomes philosophical the moment when it recovers communicative reason (philosophy is the custodian of reason) in the incomplete project of modernity that is, in post-modernity.[13] In my opinion, a paradigm such as this has the prospect of reaching a convergence between the postanalytical, post-modern and post-functional at least in the senses of these words that are currently operating in the literature on 'resistance', as it is applicable respectively to the three domains of linguistic reference, naturalistic theory, and mind[14] and will not therefore strike down the alleged analytical divide. In sharp contrast, a discourse on modernity becomes philosophical, on Norris's view, if it can be sufficient to restore the place of logical argumentation to literary criticism by allowing it to mimic philosophy of language. Deconstruction is, therefore, not a bad or naive philosophy, as alleged by many critics, but a species of analytical contestation of texts of philosophers (e.g. Husserl) with a modicum of analytical rigour, and so, it has no reason to keep a distance from the major Anglo-American analytical traditions.[15] So any view that does not allow this to happen must be countered with gusto.

Richard Rorty is one who resists this, since for him, language cannot become yet another transcendental paradigm, and his enterprise turned out to be merely counter analytical and narrativist in its tenor; (witness a recent critic: 'from the claim that there is no distinctly analytic criticism, I do not draw the seemingly Rortyan conclusion that there is no analytic philosophy'; we have only to counterpose this so as to get: there is analytic philosophy and *a fortiori*, there must be analytic literary criticism).[16] Nevertheless, Norris has a different choice: one can agree that any vulgarization of deconstructive logic as found among literary writers (New Critics) or philosophers (New Historicists who later get their ransom by becoming Kantians) must be confronted with a sense of urgency.[17] Witness J. Kriesteva (on cultural otherness) or Edward Said (on Gulf War), for example, who look upon the enlightenment ideals seriously in their attack against the existing disparity in the socio-political milieu and complete the modernist ideals in their own way. Norris little realizes that Chomsky is a good counterexample here. His credentials also fall within post-modernism in my sense, however much he might disclaim.[18] Hence, the neo-pragmatist's dictum which holds that phi-

losophy is a species of literary activity must also be confronted by saying that literary activity is nothing but a species of philosophizing in the analytical mode. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether sophistication in the realm of deconstruction can analytically complete the project of erstwhile philosophies of language, in exactly the way as he claims to be. Maybe, the *differend* between Habermas and Norris consists in the former's alleged adhesion to a metanarrative, and the latter's acceptance of the linkage between aesthetic theory and critical practice. But Norris should demonstrate that the project of deconstruction gets analytically completed, if he wants to carry conviction among analytical philosophers. Likewise, Norris[19] is at present not satisfied with Karl-Otto Apel, who may be understood to demonstrate that there is an analytic completion for hermeneutics, post-modernism and deconstruction, and he is nowhere near to this and he can hope so, if only he has completed the post-modern project at least in the way Habermas does,[20] for his obvious concern is with deconstructionist completion of the modernist project in the above Kantian way. This does not mean in the least that Norris's writings fail to tread upon territories which are practically inaccessible even to thinkers who have a knack for philosophy-literature interface. In his attack on post-modern scepticism or ultra-nominalism, or ultra-relativism in recent philosophy of science, Norris makes a vigorous attempt to establish the credentials of realistic epistemology of criticism.[21] My first difficulties are therefore with the analytic divide and the second is with his acceptance of the metanarrative of realism. Norris prefers to speak of critical realism or causal realism, but at times varying his postures.

One of the guiding premises of his thinking is that deconstruction, especially the French variety, inaugurated by Jacques Derrida, has its own unique logic and hence it is defensible while post-modernism as practised by Lyotard as well as the philosophical discourse on modernity in which Habermas proposes to complete modernity in post-modernity are not, for there is something basically wrong with both in their respective adherence to counter theory in any or all forms and the acceptance of theory in the universalist form.[22] What gives us the initial shock is the question as to how these two incompatible motifs become the simultaneous targets of Norris's critique. To begin with, deconstruction is poised to contest or deconstruct the Kantian presumption of autonomy of faculties of pure reason, as reflected in the tripartite distinction between the cognitive, ethical, and the aesthetic on the one hand, and again it targets the valorising of the one as a model over the others, especially the aesthetics over the others. On the other hand, it also

finds their commensurability in the way it makes aesthetics as playing a mediating role in the way Kant has done in his *Conflict of Faculties*,[23] which remains just an extension of the first or second *Critique*. Thus the alleged *modus vivendi* is more a movement from the first to the second *Critique* and more natural at that, even while granting that the first is a sort of mirror image of the third, rather than the less natural movement from the third to the second, with all the fractal imago, and this is what that is posed to celebrate the above interface with that alleged idea of *sensus communis*.[24] That is, no doubt, post-modernism also wants to differ from it by privileging the aesthetical, but at the same time, it ends up with creating a rift between different phrase regimes. As Norris tells us, there are two sides to the post-modernist stance against metanarratives.[25] On the one side, they set their hearts against any conflation between them, by proscribing any extrapolation between one regime (the cognitive) to the other (the aesthetic), and running the risk of ultra-nominalism, and secondly, they are also equally against accepting a revisionist reading of this as privileging aesthetics, which is supposed to provide a model for political practice. The aesthetizing of political on the other hand, emerges as the inimitable source and model for all forms of aesthetic ideology, but it is only too weak since it ends up with the consequent potential for an 'inverted Platonism'.[26] Such an inverted Platonism inaugurates a dangerous vision of society with its anti-realism or scepticism or irrationalism and it is thought that deconstruction has the true potency for a realistic counter and it is, therefore, the best candidate for sponsoring an *ideologiekritik*. Calling the above as yet another transcendental illusion, Norris suggests that the most appropriate tool in this context is provided by deconstruction: we must deconstruct the aesthetic ideology, as it was demonstrated in the theorization and practice by Paul de Man within the precincts of literary criticism.[27] This tantamounts to showing that the functions of literary criticism still depends on textual close-reading. In brief, whereas deconstruction mediates theory and practice, post-modernism divides their unity. One can safely attribute the analytical motif to the former, but not to the latter. That is, deconstruction extends the Kantian theme of the condition of possibility of each of the above three faculties in the direction of marking out the conditions of impossibility as the further, much less understood, limits of the Kantianized critique, here being the critique of literal or aesthetic discourse, and thus, it is well motivated to follow a close Kantian reading of Kant. So, there is a specific need to push the argument in one direction. The Kantian beginnings of deconstruction are amply attested to by holding

that deconstruction starts off where Kant leaves off.[28] This bespeaks of a contrast to his later thesis which characteristically abandons it in favour of a quasi-differentiation between ethics and aesthetics where his motto seems to be: ethicize aesthetics before aestheticizing politics. It seems to be clear that by virtue of the acceptance of the above analytical divide, Norris cannot relish the thesis, which shows that the stuff that makes deconstruction as well as post-modernism are both offshoots of the analytical traditions in philosophy. Norris has no patience for any such argumentation that could possibly show that they are rooted in analytic traditions. If so, he can hardly convince any analytic philosopher about the soundness of his enterprise by simply showing that deconstruction is tolerably arguable and hence it can fall within the analytical mode of discourse while post-modernism falls without. Conversely, the above interface can be sustained to stay, Norris thinks, only when it becomes fine-grained enough to withstand the onslaughts both from post-modernists as well as from contra-post-modernists (hermeneuticists) like Habermas. The deconstructive contesting can, therefore, be defended for its analytical rigour against the attacks levelled against both by post-modernists and hermeneuticists alike. Norris's analogy between epistemic and evaluative concerns (a similar analogy is warranted in the context of Foucault's pre-revisionary reading of Kantian individualist ethic, where Norris's difficulties about ascetic-aesthete interface become much more apparent) *in lieu of* the contest, may not work after all by simply granting the analogy between taste for the beautiful and the desire for justice.[29] In what follows, I shall directly defend Lyotard's version of the aesthetic-aesthete interface for providing a far more superior analytical paradigm, depending on materials which Norris hardly utilizes for arriving at the so-called truth about post-modernism, and thereby indirectly defend the Habermasian completion of the project as providing a more coherent convergence between analytical and post-modernist ethos.

First, I propose to examine some of his major stances and show that there is something basically wrong since it hardly allows analytic philosophers to accept any thesis about the interface with any comprehension, and consequently, the thesis about the contest of faculties goes wrong at least on one major count namely that it sorely ignores the real or *de facto* contestability about the contest of faculties that have been mapped and portrayed both by hermeneuticists as well as post-modernists.[30] Norris is open to the charge that he employs a subterfuge to identify the *a priori* condition of possibility with an *a priori* condition of impossibility *a la* Gasche. *Contra* Norris, I shall use

the very same context to contextualize *sensus communis* (thus inverting Norris). If they are shown to execute this without depending on deconstructing the text, then so much the worse for the contradistinction Norris posits at the beginning. On the other hand, if it is shown that their analytical credentials are no less important, then also so much the worse for the so-called analytical divide. On both grounds, Norris's thesis can hardly take off the ground. Further, granting that the Kantian arguments for deconstructions are shown to be flawed, one must still post the analytical rigour as important. The best way to understand Habermas's ideal of communicative reason is that it is poised to dedifferentiate the three value spheres within the parameters of his philosophical discourse of modernity within the analytical mode of consensus (dissensus) theory of truth, while Lyotard obtains a unity of philosophy by a close reading of the analytic of the sublime *via* the analytic of indeterminancy,[31] that directly stand in support of the aescetic-aesthete interface.[32]

The thesis about dedifferentiation, according to my understanding provides the key for grounding the conflict on language, where the three phrase-regimes intermesh (Habermas's term for dedifferentiation), whereas the thesis about *modus vivendi* stops short at finding an ethics epistemology interface with an added ascetic imperative (individualist *rapport-a-soi*) with ones own self and others.[33] On the other hand, Lyotard's attitude to dedifferentiation is not complete without understanding his near-total exploration into the two aspects of reflection in the Kantian notion of subjectivity.[34] This is the direction he takes in his latest reflections on the analytic and dialectic of the sublime and taste. We can safely assume that for both of these endeavours, analytic philosophy of language is to serve as a metanarrative. Hence, it is more appropriate to think of them as offshoots of philosophy of language. Norris's understanding goes by default since he has no intention to couch post-modernism in the analytical idiom, whereas the analytical idiom in which deconstruction is couched is not sufficient to warrant acceptance. The point I am driving home here is that while deconstruction stops at contesting, a term that is ambiguously thrown into the context, postmodernists and hermeneuticists can be understood to go further in proposing an analytical solution. And hence, they cannot be characterized as counter-theoretical because they are counteranalytical which in no way sacrifices the analytical mode. A very similar point can also be made about Rorty, and if so, this can be used to question the way Norris aligns Fish with Rorty, whereas both use different modes of argumentation, though they are directed to the same neo-pragmatic end.[35] What I am saying in the above upshot is that no amount of

Derridean credentials would go to prove anti-thetical to the above varieties of extreme theorizations (one accepting metanarratives and the other rejecting it), for the very reason that their genealogical roots remain the same. The genealogy lies in the analytical mode of language that each one pursues to its advantage. The failure to perceive this leads Norris to face the following dilemma: on the one hand, Norris cannot show that they are to be genealogically differentiated; on the other hand, he cannot show that they are analytically cohesive. In my opinion, as against Norris, Habermas achieves this without falling into any *aufgehobonist* (sublimating) trap, thus avoiding Gasche's fallacy, which Norris certainly commits, or so it seems.[36] *Pace* Norris, this lends credence to the very idea of deconstruction.

Fundamentally, Norris has no obvious answer to the query made by analytical philosophers: how shall we take the apparent lead of illogicality of these two strains unless it is shown that there is a specific lineage between the analytical mode and the analytical offshoots. This is what he cannot show because his endeavours stop short at the claim that there is a certain logic informed by the current analysis, which the deconstructivists' reading of text and the analytical traditions share: that is, both point to the failure of the referential theories of meaning.[37] True, such a failure of nerve is termed as post-analytical and *a fortiori*, there is a close connection between post-analytical mode and the deconstructivists denial of the referential mode, no less sanctified by the denial of the distinction between normal and deviant cases of utterances.[38] If anything it is the latter that provides a plank for deconstructing the texts of the speech act philosophy of language *a la* Searle.[39] What this eventually shows is that the analytic concerns of Derrida have the unique potential to critique current philosophies of language and jump into the other major mainstream varieties. For Norris, Habermas's theory of ideal speech situation has ancestry in Searle's speech act philosophy of language, wherein he has a recourse to a distinction between normal (serious) and deviant (non-serious) and hence, he too is likely to succumb to the denial of interface between philosophy and literature. If so, he too deserves the same treatment like the one he meted out to Habermas. Norris uses this as one of the major bones of contention, and the same is made explicit by saying that one cannot make any rough-and-ready distinction between them. Indeed, this provides a nucleus for the entire argumentation, which is aimed to show that there is something wrong with post-modernism.

Searle goes wrong, on Norris's view, for the simple reason that he cannot better Austin's earlier account of speech acts that does not seriously believe

in dividing it into typecast categories. Again, so long as they were rejected in favour of a different classification of speech acts into locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary speech acts, Searle has no use for it. So, for Austin, it is presumed that there is a two term relation of ordinary language to the linguistic activity of (serious) speech acts and the (non-serious) literary activity of criticism and just as there is, for Derrida, a two flow relation between language and literary criticism. Apart from Derrida's ironic close reading of Searle, this goes against Habermas who cannot recognize such a two-term relation; nor could he give allowance to stylistic differences of ordinary language.[40] Nevertheless, what Norris misses here is that the continuity lies in certain specific concerns of language, and this is what gets exemplified in the above dichotomy or the refusal to adopt this dichotomy. No doubt, Norris demonstrates with aplomb that analytical philosophers too are hallowed in their lack of semantic credibility as much as their deconstructive counterparts, and *a fortiori* both of them are to be located in the same boat. This is nothing but a transcendental *tu quoque* with which he himself castigates Habermas.[41] Much of this has found expression in the critique of Davidson's theory of truth and meaning as well as in his treatment of Empson's theory of semantic differentials.[42] More recently, Norris wants to turn this to his advantage in an effort to criticize that there is a high prospect for literary theory after Davidson. But, for Norris this route is blocked. This is due to his attitude towards analytical philosophy of language, knowledge and science, which leads only towards an ultra-relativist's view, or better put, it reads: all philosophies of language are *au fond* anti-realist.[43] Such an imago is patently absurd, he argues, since it generates fractal or catastrophic strains in rational argumentation. Norris however exempts and extends only a qualified support to the analytical paradigm advanced by Empson (especially in his *Structure of Complex Words*) which receives support from unexpected quarters (Bohr's thesis of complementarity). The support is qualified for the simple reason that its antirealistic undertones still wait be deconstructed so as to make a smooth passage to a sort of transcendental realism *a la* Bhasker which Norris fully endorses, obviously taking Bhasker as a Hegelian type of dialectician.[44] But close reading of Bhasker will reveal that he is no dialectician in the outmoded Hegelian sense, but his credentials are consistent with the dialectic of differentiation and dedifferentiation, which I advocate here. So either Norris should give up the transcendental or else he will end up with an inconsistent dialectic of the Hegelian type as mentioned already. But he proceeds to argue that even recent quantum physics is no exception, and hence

epistemological realism, as opposed to anti-realism, within quantum physics, Norris argues, needs to be fully supported. To what extent will this turn out to be plausible remains an open question, since a plethora of questions remain unanswered even today. Norris formulated his Kantian argument which goes from the premise that quantum (micro) physics is always understood to reject classical (macro) physics, towards concluding that it does not follow that Kant, whose affiliation was to Newtonian physics should also be rejected. Just as the quantum physics must be taken beyond its limits, anti-realism also must be taken beyond its limits, by accepting *a priori* reasoning in physical theory. All these are greatly confusing.

Norris earlier took the view that what undergrids Davidson's philosophy of language is an echo of Sausserian linguistics that assumes that language is an interplay of structural relationships. Undoubtedly, as he then felt, Davidson needs a Derridean counter. More recently, Norris is willing to come to terms fully with Davidson's interpretation so as to counter Quinean scepticism of translation. He has already conceded earlier that the inability to do referential semantics may bind both in an irrevocable union. Nevertheless, one must be told there is something analytical besides being logical and this he is not willing to consider. Perhaps Norris is correct to believe that Davidson cannot provide the ultimate paradigm for the ethics of criticism, thus impaling him on one-horn of the dilemma, the other horn is the revisionary reading of Kant which Norris perpetuates. Neither of which he can choose with ease. However, it would be too hazardous to think that there is something that binds them together so as to prop up the above interface without which it will not have any legitimate claim, and that must be shown rather than assumed.

The main argumentative stance that Norris uses for the defence of deconstructive analysis is that the theoretical claims of deconstruction are its claims of logical rigour. That logic behind official deconstruction as Derrida presents it can be formulated in the following seven injunctions:[45]

1. Make an appropriate choice of text (literary text is a proxy);
2. Bracket the text for a close-reading;
3. Read a sub-text in its margin;
4. Show that the margin is central to the text;
5. Therefore, margin is not to be taken as a deviant text;
6. There is a coalescence of text and the subtext almost to the point of identity.
7. Deconstruction is an activity that is based on non-identity (or identity in difference), as the classical example shows as obtaining between difference and *difference*).

There is a different conclusion to reach in the last line, which recalls the dialectic that Adorno brings to the fore without falling into a classical Hegelian sublimation.[46] There is no need to push it in one direction so as to achieve the required novel sense of deconstruction. Without realizing the full implications of the above, Norris foists a Kantian motif to the above saying that while deconstructing is detextualizing, it is textualizing in yet another sense. It is this that facilitates the drawing of the following conclusion that holds that there is nothing outside the text and the subtext. True, Norris cannot agree with this populous rendition of deconstruction. Consequently, on his reading, Derrida must be understood to explore not only the conditions of the possibility of a text but also the conditions of the impossibility of the text.[47] My impression here is that Norris equivocates both conditions, and at times takes the empirical world as a prior condition for our talk about it. Following Rudolf Gasche, he fits this into a Kantian picture of Derrida, which elevates philosophy over rhetoric as reflected in the undifferentiating character of a generalized rhetoric.[48] This is what is warranted by the above Kantian picture, which mixes the two levels namely, the possibility and impossibility into one single strain. So, Derrida's project, on Norris's understanding, has a singular merit in the way it incorporates an undifferentiated character of normal and deviant uses of language in contradistinction to Searle who valorizes truth values of utterances. Still one can believe that credentials of deconstruction are as much real as Searle's or for any one else's for that matter. Nevertheless, Norris refuses to address himself to the question as to whether this trait itself is enough to bring Derrida closer to their counterparts. Norris's hat trick here is that the condition of possibility is the condition for impossibility to be deviant or *vice versa* and so deviance is not really deviance in his sense.

If it is shown that this may be so, then Norris's failure to do justice to his deconstructionist guru becomes more than apparent. This is what seems to strike me as his double failure. If non-seriousness of speech acts is to be equivocated with literary activities, then, it can be argued, that both Habermas as well as Lyotard have devised constructs that made room for this by recognizing deviant character of speech acts in their respective theorizations.[49] In my view, this very thing is executed without even granting that deviance is deviance. To explain: deviance is not itself deviance because normativity meshes up with deviance and *vice versa*. The actual rift between this view and that of Norris is that while Norris fails to read the deeper implication of the above, both Habermas and Lyotard read the prospect of a new paradigm of a combinatorial intent. Thus, the finer point of detail is that they still

continue to be engaged in their relation without giving up philosophy of language on the one hand, and without eulogizing the rationale of literary activities. Habermas's position is brought out in his own words: though he defends the possibility of demarcating normal speech from derivative forms, he wants to take exception in saying that he has 'not shown how fictional discourse can be separated from the normal (every day) use of language'.[50] The relation lies more on a subtle level, in the exact sense that they all family-resemble to a certain extent, and beyond which they differentiate, but still they never lose sight of the relation. This is the reason why there arose many different paradigms within literary theory (e.g. reader-response theory). Similarly, Lyotard draws attention to the pagan urge to violate the rule of language and incorporates this as a component within the rule following speech acts within a grandiose scheme of what he calls the post-modern agonal character of language use.[51] Lyotard's further use of this in his 'justice by paralogy' (after Kantian paralogism) and his continuing efforts to fit this into his analytic concerns of sublime and taste embody an analytical character.[52] It is this that informs much of the analytic of the sublime with all the above positive implications that Norris has missed in his project, even while accepting a comparison with Kantian antinomies. Obviously I recommend a reading of Lyotard which no other interpreter has suggested until now. This entails the view that doing justice to parties does not necessarily mean that their inherent opposition is thrown to the winds. It is a paradigm of differentiation and dedifferentiation and to what extent this provides a unique analytical paradigm is a question that is worth probing into. My point however is that the corresponding political implications are to be distinguished as follows. While for Norris normativity's recognition of alterity goes counter to the postmodernist suppression of alterity, for Habermas as well as Lyotard, it comes with the vengeance: normativity and violation are to be treated on par with each other. None of them espouse any totalitarian motives.

If what I say in the above has any substance, then one can turn the entire discussion in a different direction. Elsewhere, I have called attention to this phenomenon of 'neither rule-following nor rule-violation' as important combinatorial paradigm within philosophy of language and aligned it to Kripke's agnostic interpretation of later Wittgenstein's account of rule-following.[53] A combinatorial paradigm such as this has not been recognized by any interpreters except Stuart Shanker in another context, namely the context of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics.[54] Shanker recognizes that the *satzsystem*-following and *satzsystem*-violation is requiring more than one

system of proof (e.g. impossibility proofs can be proved in yet another system), thus resulting in the halving of the combinatorial paradigm.[55] I have made an attempt to study the above paradigm taking the cue from Crispin Wright who uses a procedure of agnosticating the agnostic view within a novel reconstruction of Kripke's *reductio* which therefore, starts with the above agnostic position of 'neither rule-following nor rule-violation'.[56] What this brings to the fore is that both agnostication and agnosticating the agnostic are proximal to each other. My specific hunch is that the symbiosis of the above paradigm brings it much closer towards Davidson's (prior/passing theory in interpretative strategy) or Dummett's (long-term/short-term theory within a theory of understanding) can never be so easily overlooked. Davidson/Dummett's over-all theoretical set-up cannot be explicated without knowing how divergences from norms occur. On the one hand malapropism involves violation or circumvention of linguistic conventions and it also serves as a prototype of linguistic creativity. Claims such as these have come to the fore in the recent estimate of Davidson's paradigm of literary criticism. So even without assuming the symbiosis of serious-non-serious speech acts with the above combinatorial paradigm, by virtue of their binary traits, one can hazard a guess by saying that while the splitting of the combination does not augur well for a view (I shall identify this with a *die Logik* view *a la* Wittgenstein[57] which assumes that every unique symbolism has a certain metaphysical import) such as the one pursued by post-deconstructionists (e.g. Paul de Man), it cannot altogether show that a Derridean deconstruction can trespass a *difference* between writing and reading.[58] To put it simply, the above argument should be construed as saying that between the two theoretical frames of reading and writing, there is a differentiation and dedifferentiation. Both stand in a certain relation to ordinary language. Seen from this angle, the mistake in the interpretation of Derridean deconstruction is that it valorizes the theory (or reading) and recovers its impossibility in writing. If so, then its proper place is lower than that of post-deconstructionists like de Man who bends upon yet another variety of differentiation to be discussed below, whereas Habermas's is on a higher scale of gradation. I shall pursue this point below.

Surprisingly, however, Norris puts the *agon* to a different purpose in which he tries unsuccessfully to relate to aesthetic ideology.[59] *Agon*, according to this reading, signifies the rivalry between *aletheia* and *mimesis*, and in the context of ideology, it conveys the idea of a mimetic rivalry, which Heidegger sought to introduce in his vision about the ancient Greeks. It takes

a new turn in Norris's interpretation with what he calls the settlement of account to the earlier ethical commitment with Nazism. Norris wants to put deconstruction to a distinct political use in which acceptance and rejection become the flipsides of the same coin. Norris's way of demonstrating this calls for a defence of Heidegger (for the Nazi affair) and also for Paul de Man on the basis of their coming to terms with the past. No doubt this finds an easy passage towards the so-called *sensus communis*. This is exactly the sense of contesting Norris uses. In other words, Norris uses contest as a political equivalent of deconstruction. This is the reason why he terms as the escape route that deconstruction has from untoward or awkward political implications. I have a tendency to believe that the Nazi adherence and disowning has a symbiotic analogue more to the above combinatorial paradigm. Our differences lie here. That is, while Norris, in his zeal to expound a dictum, which holds that 'deconstruction is a hyperarticulated instance of ethical discourse' and *a fortiori*, there is an inevitable ethics of literary criticism, to be conceived as a non-conflating ideal. Still he misses the crucial stage of the argument by outright rejection of any recovery of postmodernist trace (Labarthe is under fire for foisting ideology on postmodernism). No doubt he speaks of commitment/settlement dialectic, but he fails to show how it is directly supported by Adorno's identity of non-identity, and no nonconflating ideal is suggested here. Similarly, he notes the dialectic of blindness and insight *a la* de Man, but fails to read its significance. Now, the onus is on Norris to demonstrate that it is appropriated within such a suitable analytic deconstructive model. I think that he cannot undertake this task. I claim to have moved in this direction. Since he does not show this, I am forced to think that his concern with deconstruction is an analytical failure. Nevertheless, Norris may defend his position by arguing that it is only for this, that he has recourse to de Man's dialectic of deconstruction. In fact he uses it as a major plank to draw out many different senses of aesthetic ideology which actually results in a tissue of confusion. I shall assess its full significance towards the end of the essay after first considering his comments on Lacou-Labarthe's postmodernist gloss on Heidegger's factual commitment[60] and metanarrativist settlement of accounts by hypostatizing national aesthetics and second, by focusing on the flaws in his interpretation of de Man's post-war writings in Belgium, in which the commitment is shown to be settled within a narrativist account of the linguistic predicament. Norris's defence of factive or realistic reading of this episode leads him into many

traps. Let me first review the argument that is supposed to be common to Fish and Rorty below.

On Norris's understanding, postmodernists like Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish are anti-theoretical in that they cannot seriously believe that theory issues in practice. There are at least three senses in which they are against theory. First, theory in the sense of a universal set of principles (metanarrative sense); secondly, theory in the sense of a scientific paradigm (Kantian sense), and thirdly, theory in the sense of a consequentialist enterprise (the transcendentalist part of theory).[61] Against Rorty, Norris argues that he cannot make philosophy as a species of writing.[62] He counters it by saying there is reasoned argument in literature especially reflected in the way literary criticism is practised currently. Rorty shares a common platform of anti-realism with Stanley Fish's equally vibrant new-pragmatist plea for practice.[63] Both deconstruct theory from this point of view. Norris examines the steps of Fish's non-consequentialist *reductio* of theory as found in the following argument: the premises of Fish's *reductio* are formulated as follows:[64]

1. We have theory and therefore it issues in practical consequences; we have no theory, and therefore, we have no consequences for practice;
2. The pragmatic clause: What difference it makes or what practice it engenders;
3. The neo-pragmatic clause: literary activity is neo-pragmatic in the exact sense that we have continuity in our beliefs;
4. The philosophic Gettiar-type of anti-epistemic clause: Our beliefs need not necessarily be related to absolute claims (Gettiar-type of counterexamples show that we have certified true belief but it is not knowledge; we have no knowledge of our knowledge);
5. Literary activity has no Cinderella status and as such both theory and non-theory have no status; they do not issue in any consequence; they are inconsequential or a better way of putting it is that they make no difference;
6. The assumption (1) is reducible to absurdity for we have belief, which does not require any theoretical backing;
7. The lack of theory is non-consequential;
8. Therefore, theory cannot give any guidance;
9. The acceptance of abyss clause: there is a cleavage between theory and practice;
10. Therefore, practice must go on, irrespective of theory or no theory.

Norris is obliged to show that his argument to prove the flaw in postmodernism can ill-afford to become consistent with the above. But given his stance for realism, this is what it becomes. For what he calls attention to in the above is that both resistance to theory and the resistance to resistance to theory are inconsequential. His argument for realism will be proved fatal once if it is shown that Norris's own resistance to resistance of theory is equally inconsequential. So, he cannot hold fast to an astute defence of realism from the point of view of scientific theory *a la* Roy Bhaskar without seriously believing that it is also inconsequential.[65] Conversely, he cannot use his realistic commitments to demonstrate that resistance to theory is inconsequential. This leaves him absolutely with no choice but to accept that both realism as well as anti-realism[66] is inconsequential. Will he be able to assert that both realism as well as anti-realism is inconsequential? He can say that anti-realism is inconsequential, but he can never assert that realism is inconsequential. Nor could he theorize saying that both are consequential. Later he however turns the thesis round to saying that anti-realism is not wrong, but it cannot transgress the limits. Transgressing in Norris's diction means deconstructing, and so, his advice is deconstruct antirealism. Like Fish, he can only ask whether it makes any difference to prove that there is a fatal flaw in postmodernism. I think his best bet is naturalism which however he chooses not to follow because it can accommodate especially the post functional variety. Knowing that it cannot, then his arguments against postmodernism cannot succeed. We can indeed hold that in neither of these three senses, one can go against theory. But it does not mean that one can privilege theory in the manner in which Habermas does in accepting ideal speech situation that can effectively counter distorted speech communication. Nor can anyone totally reject a metanarrative in the way Lyotard recommends. Norris finds a middle way and this middle way suggests that there is a linkage between theory and practice. This is what gets reflected in political theory and practice. One cannot privilege political theory of Marxism as a metanarrative without being conscious of what is happening around the world. Many Marxist intellectuals go astray by privileging aesthetics in its stead and think that the practice of aesthetics will change people's lives.[67] But this is yet another form of *idelogiekritik*, which cannot be sustained This is indeed the lesson to be drawn from Paul de Man's version of self-deconstruction, which has ample evidence to show that this is yet another form of false consciousness. Norris criticizes Baudrillard for making such a wholesale version of aesthetic ideology.[68]

On Norris's understanding, it is not that Lyotard refuses to recognize the link but he places the analytic of sublime as providing a link. The flaw about this view is that it makes the linkage as issuing in a passage to heterogeneity.[69] The passage to heterogeneity, as Lyotard understands it, is due to what he calls the aesthetic time. The notion of aesthetic time replaces the notion of subjectivity, or at least makes it paradoxical. And, because of its unconditioned character, it also causes indeterminacy. Unfortunately, Norris has no occasion to consider Lyotard's later reflections on the analytic and dialectic of the sublime.[70] What lies on the analytic side is the paradox of subjectivity which denies the possibility of an aesthetic subject with temporality and what lies on the dialectic side is the recovery of the subjectivity that is allowed by the same property. In my understanding, such a position warrants an epistemic standpoint in which the externality and the internality of the reflexive subject are seen in cohesion with one another. Put in the language of philosophy that is familiar to the Indian traditions, this means that the self is non-dual. Two consequent points are worth reflecting on. On the one hand, the analytic is divided into two of its major reflexive functions which Lyotard calls as the tautegorical (I have my mental states) and the heuristic (which seeks the methodical unification through the discovery of *a priori*) of Kant's transcendental psychology, a term Lyotard introduces to capture the identity within a multiplicity of dissimilarities.[71] That is to convey the idea that paradoxicality of the sublime is resolved in the notion of taste. The elaborate way in which it gets resolved thus requires us to read the tautegorical function as having a post-functionalistic character in which it cannot identify self as such except through external means in which the subjective (reflexive) heuristics also plays a methodical role. As Lyotard conceives it, the dialectic is a transcendental process rather than a natural one and it is this, which prevents the natural dialectic of reason from misleading us, without being able to eliminate it. Lyotard takes them to be the real principles after Kant which incite us to tear down all these boundary fences. It is this, which brings the projects pursued by Lyotard and Habermas into close proximity with one another. Actually, Norris mimics the above while trying to read Foucault in the Kantian way. Nevertheless, his argument requires the following motions:

1. 'Ought' follows from 'is';
2. 'Is' states the facts of the cases;
3. Ought also states the facts of the cases;
4. Turn 'ought' into a self-fashioning ego;
5. Take (4) as the minimal Foucaultian ethics of the specific individual;

6. The countermodernity clause: the ethical self-fashioning is an analogue to Lyotard;
7. Resolve the antinomy between (2) and (3), so as to get (1) in the Kantian mode.

Each of the above premises seems questionable from Lyotard's point of view, especially when the reading that Norris sponsors becomes suspect on the following grounds. If (4) is denied, then no Kantian resolution needs to be presupposed. *Contra* Norris, Foucault's alleged return never disposes off the earlier stances of sceptical genealogy, in the preferred characterization of Norris. So, the change that Norris notices is only superficial. Foucault cannot give up and the later Foucault is only a complex rendition of the earlier (like Lyotard's), the support Norris receives from an obscure remark from Ian Hacking notwithstanding.[72] Further, Foucault agrees that the empirical-transcendental doublet renders the self as a locus of conflict. Later, he also concedes that Foucault's relation to Kant remains ambivalent. It follows, therefore, premise (6) will forever be a stumbling block. Ultimately, Norris is forced to the following conclusion stating that he is resuscitating Kantian enlightenment ideals. Norris characterizes this as Kantian in the minimal sense, conveniently forgetting the Utopian residue he quotes from Roy Boyne at the beginning of the essay. There is indeed no argument to show that if Foucault is faithful to enlightenment ideals, he should also be faithful to Kant, especially when the Kant of enlightenment is shown to depart from his ideals. Norris seems to overcome his earlier obsession with the Kantian negative mode *a la* Gasche, but he does not want to leave the Kantian *a priori*. But both have similar flaws.

For both Habermas and Lyotard, the critique of subjectivity and the critique of philosophy feed on one another. It may be noted that Habermas also not only endorses the rejection of *principia individuationis* and proposes a consensus-dissensus model of communicative reason, which lies close to the above paradigm, but also it makes it a model for all the three intermeshing spheres.[73] The reason why I subscribe to this and lay emphasis in this context is just to bring out the post-functionalistic preoccupation of Habermas's reasoning. I am aware that this goes against most of the other functionalist readings of Habermas. Ignorance of these nuances, however difficult they may be is likely to exact a heavy price on our understanding of Lyotard's real position. This is what is seen in his stopping short to understand Lyotard's 'incredulity of metanarratives' as no more than providing a counter-theoretical leverage. It is countertheoretical because it cannot grant determinate stages of

history as pre-reflected upon by a theory. On Norris's understanding, Lyotard's efforts lie in producing a heterodox reading of Kant which enjoins not that we distinguish between triple spheres of reason, but the thin line of linkage should not pre-empt a conflation between them. No doubt Lyotard reads Kant's analytic of sublime as a supervening sensible, but we cannot bring it under an enlightened consciousness.[74] It helps us only to distinguish the sublime from beautiful, which is consensus based. Consequently, he thinks that the political reading of Kantian sublime would only drive a wedge between political theory and political practice as disparate phrase regimes, which cannot be reconciled. A more appropriate reading would suggest that the relation between the sublime and the beautiful sponsor a unity without falling into a Kantian post-modernism which forges the unity by counterbalancing the incredulity to meta narratives by accepting a small narrative, and thereby dedifferentiating their differences in the Kantian way.[75] In sharp contrast to this, taking the 'beautiful' as providing the countervailing stress to sublime, which only provides an unbridgeable gulf, Norris claims that Derrida provides a reasoned argument in his account of deconstruction and proves himself to be as not against any form of theory. The strength of the above conclusion squarely depends on the analytical credentials of Derrida's textual strategies. It is not so much that Norris intends to prove the analytical credentials of Derrida beyond doubt. Norris has weakened the above thesis so as to show that he shares certain similarities with analytical involvement with semantics in much the same way as it is understood by the post analytical philosophers of language. I think that Norris intends to attach a meaning to this particular label as revealed in his latest essay.[76] There is ample evidence to show that the analytic involvement with semantic functions of language is not as straightforward as he seems to think and hence they all lie closer to heart to the Derridean deconstruction. This is demonstrably true in the case of theorists like Donald Davidson who indulge in the realistic construals of the semantics for a natural language.[77] Davidson becomes a cynosure overnight within the precincts of literary criticism, but the question as to how literary critics are intending to use him eludes his grasp for reasons stated in the above. So there are currently two paradigms operating upon the scene: the analytical literary criticism *a la* Davidson's mode and the deconstructive literary criticism *a la* Norris's mode. If it is shown that Davidson avoids the route to relativism, which is supposed to be a 'heady and exotic doctrine', and has no truck with Kantianism, then Norris has to reconsider many of his

lemmas. Clearly, Norris weans himself away from the former paradigm, as evidenced from the lack of response from his side.

It is clear from the foregoing that Norris's word 'contest' renders it ambiguous by overlooking two of the recurrent phrases that occur in Lyotard's writings, namely the 'agnostics of language' and the 'phrases in dispute' both of which have unlimited potential for a Kantian reconstruction.[78] But Norris's use of it is a double-think. Its fundamental sense is the deconstructive contesting of the text. It is used first in the deconstructive sense in which it contests the metanarrative (universal) character of theory, whereas it has also to be understood in the positive sense in which it contests the metanarrative character of one regime over others so as to prove their credentials for a linkage. No doubt, Paul de Man provides an exemplar for Norris in this second context. Briefly Norris's use of it needs a thorough overhaul. But Norris is aporetic in the way in which he uses factive evidences for an interpretation which is least convincing and hence it mars that otherwise consistent treatment of the theme. The aforesaid linkage is one that obtains between theory and practice. As Norris thematizes, it provides a linkage between Paul de Man's involvement of Nazi military regime and the later disowning of it. This is equally true of Heidegger[79]. Paul de Man's resistance comes, so to say, not from any extraneous source, but from within and against. Thus Norris appropriates Paul de Man's dialectic of self-deconstruction, with little realizing that it conveys a different sense of deconstruction, albeit a stronger one, than the one he projects in his book-length study about him.[80]

The stronger sense is brought out by the acceptance of the universal impossibility of all theory. Since his theory, obviously a meta narrative one, and it cannot be excluded by it, is both self-referential and paradoxical. It is curiously post-deconstructional in the exact sense in which it does not admit that (when we read a text), we deconstruct a text; but it say that when the text is read, the texts deconstruct themselves; that is they resist our reading of it. It is only because of this resistance, we know how to foreground the figural into the logical. This is what leads him further on towards what he terms as an epistemology of tropes but we know them by the manner in which they resist our reading. *Contra* Derrida, reading cannot be theorized, and captured by means of a reductive programme, but reading itself is theoretical. The Derridean logic of deconstruction couched in the above in sentences (1) to (7) is not totally agreeable to post-deconstructional logic, since they all presuppose a metanarrative about reading.[81] Paul de Man is immune

to this aporetic consequence. What underlies this piece of curious logic is the following set:

1. We read the text;
2. The text resists our reading;
3. The language of the text resists our reading of it;
4. So, language should become our first *episteme*;
5. Such an *episteme* demands that we read because language resists it;
6. Both the materiality of the text and the reading resist it;
7. The materiality of reading devolves into the text;
8. The literariness of the text resists it, resists because it sponsors a dialectical (in the Kantian sense) movement;
9. Such a dialectical movement self-deconstructs the text;
10. The dialectic foregrounds the figural ruses;
11. Such a foregrounding inaugurates an epistemology of tropes.

It may be noticed that the queer turn of logic provides the linkage between the different phrase regimes much in the same way that Lyotard thinks it possible, especially in his later analysis of the analytic and dialectic of the sublime. The term 'aesthetic ideology' is loaded with a strange meaning, in the context of Norris's discussion of different strands of deconstruction. On the one hand, Norris wants it to be understood to mean the false consciousness of *aesthesis* as an *episteme*. Further, the *ideologiekritik* is supposed to unmask the ideological aberrations. It is my contention that the analogy between aesthetic ideology and political ideology may not be as straightforward as Norris seems to think, if my foregoing formulation of the argument is acceptable. Since there is no figure of unmasking here, the whole figure might be suspect. Norris stretches further pushing it first in the direction of theory considered as a meta narrative, and secondly, in the direction of language considered again as a meta narrative.

On the first view, resistance to theory must become analogous to resistance to ideology, meaning thereby resistance to the resistance of theory can possibly rescue theory to the ground level. On the second view, the resistance to ideology is actually resistance to language. Norris is clearly wrong to resuscitate his old favourite thesis here: the resistance to resistance to the linguistic predicament, which is understood to problematize the relation between grammar and rhetoric on the one hand, and constatives and performatives on the other, must restore the phenomenal character of meaning in a realistic manner. The phenomenal character of meaning, as far as his argu-

ment goes, is recovered once the underlying confusion between phenomenal cognition and meaning is shown to be the direct consequence of ideology, which conflates the Kantian spheres of *episteme* and *aesthesis*. What is termed as the confusion between the linguistic and natural reality or between the function of reference with phenomenalism needs to be unmasked. On Norris's view, language cannot become hypostatized and hence it cannot become a meta narrative. Heidegger succumbed to this ideology when he hypostatized poetic language as the national *aesthesis* of the German *Volk* and thereby became vulnerable for adopting the most extreme form of inverted Platonism.[82] In sharp contrast, de Man had an insight into the ideology and this is expressed in his opposition to Heidegger's appropriation of hermeneutics as forestructures of understanding. A renewal of reason and philosophy, on de Man's view, requires a return to philology in which resistance to language is overcome.[83] Briefly, his argument is: If only Heidegger paid some attention to philology, in the way de Man does, he would not have been misled to embrace the aesthetic ideology. So, there is a real reason why he cannot conflate different regimes. Once this a overcome, perhaps he would never have subscribed to this ideology. But Norris soft-pedals the differences between Heidegger and de Man and that is that he failed to read the resistance of language at a deeper level. Wherever he talks about the contrast, he takes de Man as aesthetizing language and thereby collapsing the genre distinction. Nevertheless, without assigning any specific role to language or discourse, and in his zeal to Kantianize the whole project, Norris decides to counterbalance the 'blindness' to ideology with an 'insight' into its moral fibres, but at the same time, what Norris failed to understand in the above is the very dialectic between these two as reflected in the dialectic between the phenomenal and the ethical. He stopped short of saying that the language of ethics is the language of resistance since it can never be modelled on the phenomenal. This much de Man also agreed but at the same time, he has gone further.

De Man has a double front against aesthesis. For de Man, *aesthesis* can be granted the prospect of becoming an *episteme*, just as *episteme* itself becomes a vortex of materiality of the phenomenal object. The analogy here is between the way materiality 'resists' phenomenality and the way *aesthesis* 'resists' our entry into the text. De Man foregoes one model namely that Kantian one and replaces it with another one, which captures the ruses of the phenomenal. It may incidentally be noted that de Man goes further than Derrida to lend credence to the phenomenal, understood in the above way. The above interpretation goes right against Norris because he wants to pursue

the phenomenal and thus overlooks the resistance. Norris, on the other hand, pursues a view, according to which the commitment and settlement of Nazi belief needs stretching of the Kantian conditions of the possibility into the conditions of the impossibility so as to fulfil the need of contesting or deconstructing the text.[84] Such a move commits to a fallacy of equivocation of Derridean and de Manian versions of deconstruction whereas they portend different stances as foreclosed in the above. Nevertheless, the model is Kantian in its core, but differs from it in foregrounding the negative aspects.

What political implications can one draw from this? While this is being so, Habermas's dedifferentiation of triple spheres or what he calls 'unmetaphorical intermeshing' may not altogether be different from de Man's in that the genre distinction between philosophy and literary criticism is denied only to the extent of recognizing their family resemblance, but when they acquire a distinct mode of argumentation, the distinction is restored. The reasoning is similar to de Man's in that still the paradigm is provided by epistemic argumentation, but this is not in *episteme* but it is in *aesthesis* and this is how they intermesh. Norris takes aesthetic ideology as a convenient peg to hang his argument on, but he lost sight of the intermeshing. Quoting the lapidary sentence from de Man, Norris argues in favour of epistemology of tropes. But arguing for epistemology of tropes does not resolve the tension any more than Lyotard. This is distorted again to the maximum so as to create the following ruse: his is only amounting to a qualified version of Kant and hence is should be dismissed.[85] Norris has justification, after all, to maintain such a position so long as Habermas does not provide any *a priori* conditions of possibility for different kinds of reasoning.

Against this qualified Kantianism, Norris attempts to provide a *de facto* Kantianism.[86] Derrida is a Kantian in the exact sense, according to this claim, that he has an extended version of transcendental argument that pushes the conditions of possibility in the directions of conditions of impossibility. I am not criticizing Norris for the wrong model he pursues throughout, but only the tendency to abuse it: his model plays up the Kantian so as to muster the required transcendental strength, as against the Hegelian speculation (sublation) which is what Gasche recommends, and which allows it to straddle both the impossibility and the necessity of systematizing thought.[87] Norris privileges the conditions of impossibility over the conditions of possibility and puts a premium on it. No wonder, his struggles to fit this picture in an effort to Kantianize Foucault are more than apparent as evidenced especially in his venture to find the 'truth' about postmodernism. What stands in support of

this is the presumption that *aesthesis* is an *episteme*, which undoubtedly valorizes textuality or strategies of textuality. An illustration of the *modus operandi* would be stated in the following set:[88]

1. Saussurean Text: Speech is the condition of possibility of writing;
2. Subtext: Speech is not the condition of possibility of writing;
3. Speech is the condition of impossibility of writing;
4. Textual Depth Reading: Writing is the condition of possibility of speech.

Similarly,

1. Husserlian text: There is a firm distinction between expressive and indicative functions of language;
2. Subtext: No such conditions of intentionality;
3. It is impossible to have such a distinction;
4. Textual Depth Reading: We must allow constatives and performatives interplay (wihtin one and the same text).

In both cases, the backdrop is provided by Sausserian linguistics, which is poised to prove the following dictum: The language, understood as an economy of difference, is really an economy of *difference*. For Norris, this is a positive conclusion to reach in Derridean logic. The bane here is that the subtext overtakes the text and this is shown to be Derridean. Impelled by the zeal to show something positive, textuality is read as textuality; *mutatis mutandis*, subtextuality is subtextuality. What it ultimately brings out in the first set is the relation between two theories, namely theories of reading and writing as applied to one and the same text. The cost is too high since this also forces us to take Kant too literally. The presumption that *aesthesis* is *episteme* is a direct outcome of this. Postdeconstructionists bettered it to the extent that they work within one and the same text (I have compared it with Wittgenstein's *die Logik*; a better formulation holds that language is a universal medium).[89] It is not strictly Kantian as the former. What it fails to show is that there is a Kantian model behind it which is what is shown both by Habermas as well as Lyotard, who agree to take ordinary language itself as the ultimate metalanguage.[90] Both can agree to a post-functionalistic stance. The solution does not therefore lie in a Kantian postmodernism or Kantian deconstructionism but really in postmodernizing or deconstructing Kant. Norris thus failed to apply his own tool to his analytic treatment of deconstruction. The prerequisite for this is that one must complete the project of analytical philosophy itself (this is what Karl-Otto Apel does in his project), a project

which eschews the ambiguity of the above combinatorial paradigm, so as to obtain a convergence between the post-analytical, post-modern, and the post-functional.[91] The reason for this is that each of these will lend more or less the same dialectical strength to its respective matrix as demonstrated in the above essay.[92]

Notes and References

1. This is the winding-up essay of Part III of my project on the *Major Analytic Traditions* titled as the 'Hermeneutic Turn' and was originally written as a review of the most recent book of Christopher Norris, which is a near-thorough exploration into the thematic relation between hermeneutics, deconstruction and post-modernism. It is titled '*What is Wrong with Post-Modernism?*' (*WWPM*, hereafter) and subtitled as 'Critical Theory and the End of Philosophy' (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990). It is purported to examine the nuances of Norris's near-coherent reconstruction to date, which includes his past reflections found in various books, in all of which the 'postmodernist pragmatist malaise' provides the *bete noire*; see f.n. 2 below. Its ancestor was read in the ICPR Seminar on 'Critical Theory, Modernism and Postmodernism' in 1997 at the Radhakrishnan Institute of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras. It is now updated in the light of many observations made by the audience. Much as I admire the critical remark made by an anonymous referee, which needs extended discussion, I could not revise the text but altered footnotes [15], [52] and [78]. My heartfelt thanks to Professor Dr Daya Krishna, the Editor, for his unfailing words of encouragement.
2. Beginning with the *Deconstructive Turn: Essays on the Rhetoric of Philosophy* (1983), Norris is continuously engaged in such themes; see especially *The Contest of Faculties: Philosophy and Theory After Deconstruction* (London: Methuen, 1985) (*COF*, hereafter) *Derrida* (Fontana, 1986) (*D*, hereafter) and *Paul de Man: Deconstruction and the Critique of Aesthetic Ideology* (London: Routledge, 1988) (*DCAI* hereafter). The more recent *The Truth About Postmodernism* (Manchester, 1994) (*TP* hereafter) and *The Truth and the Ethics of Criticism* (1994) (*TEC* hereafter) increase the prospects of an *episteme* of criticism, whereas the latest book on the *New Idols of the Cave: On the Limits of Anti-realism* (Manchester, 1997) (*NIC* hereafter) is an admirable summary of his entire outlook with distinct implications for philosophy of science. The last mentioned work renews the plea for a Kantian reading. The present survey includes much but is still wanting to do more to the distinguished philosopher whose prolific writings inspire my own thinking and still continue to be top in my agenda. Thanks to Ms Preeti Chandra, Librarian, for the continuous supply of the writings from the ICPR Library, Lucknow.

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3. R. Rorty 'colonized' philosophy by subjecting it to literature, Habermas's critique decolonizes it by 'rigidly' (66) segregating it from literature and making it autonomous. Both are vulnerable from my point of view. See Jurgen Habermas's 'Excursus: on levelling the genre distinction between philosophy and literature' in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (*PDM*, hereafter) [trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987)], pp. 185–210. There is no reason to take Habermas as Kantian, and my proposal is to read Norris's Kantian credentials.
4. Norris remarks: 'Deconstruction has distanced his own thinking from a generalised post-modernism'; *WWPM*, p. 50. Consequently, he absorbs Paul de Man's resistance also as deconstruction; see the equation on p. 192 of his *TPM*. See also Paul de Man's *Resistance to Theory* (*RT*, hereafter) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), for example shares deconstructionist as well as postmodernist motifs. Later he derives inspiration from de Man's ethics of reading. *TPM* holds it as an exemplar.
5. Norris identifies deconstruction as another philosophical discourse of modernity, but with a contrast. The contrast is while deconstruction recovers its 'analytic', hermeneutics apostrophizes a metanarrative of communicative reason and hence it has a 'blindspot', p. 52. Later Norris is wrong to think that he can reconcile this with Habermas by taking *sensus communis* as the metanarrative; if so, then much of his counter against postmodernist scepticism will defeat its purpose.
6. Norris employs the term with a certain connivance in that it is neutral to the ethics as well as the episteme of *sensus communis* which requires him to further assume a *modus vivendi* between the two senses. It appears more in his later writings in a succinct form in which it is counterposed to Norris's 'contest' a term which remains as a proxy for Kantian conflict of faculties (Critique?). However, the final pages of *IC* merely mention 'echoes of Kantian antinomies' (225).
7. This entailment occupies his *TP* as well as his *TEC* and serves as a code for realism as well as lever for curtailing the onset of anti-realism.
8. Norris sets this as an apex ideal for his entire outlook; see especially his *IC*.
9. This is the ultimate version found in *IC* which bears a contrast to his earlier form which was derived from Gasche; a third version recommends *a priori* reasoning in science.
10. Norris's *a priori* is only an assumption set. The weak and strong versions are distinguished in *IC*.
11. Norris's entire discussion takes us only to this idea, which is allowed to go all the way down in his textual exegesis; see *IC*.
12. It is simply enigmatic to know how Norris wants to give explanatory content in the Kantian sense.
13. Habermas takes modernity as an incompleted project of enlightenment. See *PDM* which bears the name of dialectic according to Albrecht Wellmer; see his 'On the Dialectics of Modernism and Postmodernism' in *Praxis International* 29 (1985), pp. 337–57.

14. Aporia of reference, theory, and mind respectively leads to the postanalytical, post-modern and the post-functional. See Derrida 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences' in *Of Grammatology*. Norris takes Derrida's critique of Foucault as providing a paradigm case; so if Derrida is a Kantian, then Foucault is as well, as evidenced in his late seminal essay on 'What is Enlightenment?' (see *TP*).
15. Norris's main thesis is to analyticize and to semanticize deconstruction and to look upon postmodernism and critical theory as its archrivals. Calling them as revisionists, Norris eulogizes Derrida for his analytical rigour. He provides a model of deconstructive literary criticism in the analytic mode. It is, therefore, necessary to know its underlying logic. Norris's fault is brought out succinctly in the following remark: '... if a particular reading of analytical philosophy gives us merely the same opening in literary theory that has already been accomplished and articulated by deconstruction, then it would be superfluous to take analytic philosophy in the same direction' (see Bill Martin's article in *Literary Theory after Davidson*). It does not rule out taking the analytical model in the direction of analytical literary criticism. I thank the anonymous referee for bringing to my notice a serious lacuna caused by my incautious remarks about a particular defence of 'agonal' philosophy of language to the point of adoration. In fact my point is not to project into a metanarrative. So to the question whether there is a lurking sense of metanarrative in Lyotard, my answer is that it may not be. However, I agree that the advice to combine the issue of narratives and phrasal regimes sounds good. If the above retreat from metanarrative is correct, then this is what is invariably in focus in my essay.
16. I have worked out this in my *R. Rorty's Counter-Analytical Narrative* (Ms.) which forms the penultimate essay in my Hermeneutic Turn. Now I wish to read Bill Martin's remarks from the recent book on *Literary Theory after Davidson* which holds that 'Rorty's own work is the best argument: even though Rorty keeps saying that analytical philosophy has come to an end, he continues to rely on analytic arguments in his work and his basic frame of reference remains the analytic tradition' (141) in a new light. The revised version shows how flawed this outlook is.
17. Norris is against the application of deconstruction to literary criticism, calling it as vulgarization. His early works thematize it very much. I am in agreement with his critique of American understanding of hermeneutics, as practised especially by American neo-criticism, but for a different reason; my essay on R. Bernstein 'The Agon and the Dialectic' (Ms.) reveals this as it is purported to criticize the alleged rapprochement of the Anglo-American and the Continental. Factually, there is a hiatus. Recently, this gets its support from Horace L. Fairlamb who in his book [*The New Constellation: The Ethico-Political*

Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1992)] notes the sea change from *Aufgebung* to 'Constellation' that echoes Adorno. *Contra* Norris, Fairlamb however prefers to argue against this taking it in the direction of post postmodernist paradigm of epistemology; see below f.n. 28 and 36 also.

18. See Robert F. Barsky's *Chomsky: A Life of Dissent* (MIT: Cambridge, 1997). Both Chomsky and Norris will have a contrary opinion on Faurisson's affair; the opposition is caused by Norris's acceptance of the factual truth of Holocaust. Chomsky's attitude to the 'rabid ideologue' is acutely paradoxical; this receives attention in my unpublished 'Noam Chomsky's Grammar of Dissent'.
19. Norris is wrong to criticize Apel for the lack of epistemology of hermeneutics which is what he pursues. I prefer to think that Apel will join the set of combinatorial paradigm theorists I speak of here. See *IC*, p. 18.
20. I prefer to call Karl-Otto Apel's completion as the second semiotic turn and agree with David Rasmussen's assessment of Apel as providing a new third generation critical theory as argued in his introduction to the *Handbook of Critical Theory* (Blackwell, 1996) and for Apel see my essay on Hans Gadamer, J. Habermas and K-O. Apel which brings out this fully along with a rapprochement of the binary trait, embodied in the combinatorial paradigm.
21. The labels, as used by Norris, are vulnerable. Realism is false, but that does not validate anti-realism.
22. Norris takes the opposition to be as one between deconstruction and hermeneutics and while the former is against a metanarrative, the latter is not. This is what I call the analytical divide; *WWPM*, p. 49ff. Taking Davidson as a model however may dilute this (*TEC*).
23. There seems to be nothing wrong in taking I. Kant's *Conflict of Faculties* which is called his nascent Fourth *Critique* which contains his later reflections on the essential forms of modalities of political judgement, especially the essays on freedom, democracy, progress, and perpetual peace, but Norris prefers to take the first critique for obtaining the aestheticized model; see the references given under Lyotard.
24. This is much more pronounced in his later works; see *IC*.
25. Norris describes the two sides in *WWPM*, p. 52.
26. Norris calls this as inverted Platonism which is described to be 'a fixed determination to conceive no ideas of what life might be like outside the cave' *WWPM*, p. 182. Later Norris takes the 'mimetic rivalry' (this is identified with one sense of agon) of the German spirit with the Greeks as an extreme form of inverted Platonism, in the grand project of aesthetizing the political (236). The inverted Platonism (Norris's later term is antirealism) is therefore to be conceived as the direct consequence of this tendency.
27. Norris interprets Paul de Man's advocacy of textual close reading as aesthetizing the political or what he calls *ideologiekritik*; his ethics of reading is deduced as a lemma.

28. Following Rudolph Gasche, *The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection* (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1986), Norris also provides a rich diet of Kantian postmodernism (the term is borrowed from David Ingram). For a recent assessment of Kantian modelling of Irene Harvey on Gasche see Horace L. Fairlamb's *Critical Conditions: Postmodernity and the Question of Foundations* (Cambridge, 1994). The Kantians tend to conflate between two senses of limit namely the conditions of possibility as well as the conditions of impossibility. Lamb resolves it by holding that deconstruction deconstructs and causing and aporia or tension between system and non-system, as reflected in Derrida's *Of Grammatology* (p. 89). This sense of self-deconstruction is to be differentiated from a more thoroughgoing variety found in Paul de Man. For Norris's preferred reading of de Man as a Kantian self-deconstructionist, see his *TPM*. Norris treats Derrida as self-contesting the three phrase-regimes, p. 38 of *WWPM*.
29. Norris's interpretation of Foucault changes guard in order to highlight this.
30. What I call de facto contestability stems from the binary or combinatorial trait that cannot be deconstructed in Norris's way as mentioned in the text.
31. Lyotard's seminal essay on the 'Reflections in Kant's Aesthetics' (*'RKA'*, hereafter) in *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 16 (2) 1993, pp. 375–411; it is not that Norris has missed this, but he indirectly comes to terms with it. I bring out the analogy between Foucault and Lyotard.
32. See esp. Norris's essay on Faucault in *IC*.
33. The original Greek version is *askesis-aisthesis* and provides the necessary impetus here. See *TP*, p. 64; it may also be noted that Habermas's word for dedifferentiation is intermeshing: he remarks that the three phrase regimes are 'unmetaphorically intermeshed'.
34. What is shown here is that Lyotard's analysis of Kantian subjectivity has an affinity more with Habermas because it strikes a congenial chord with the rejection of principle of individuality (a rejection of cartesian subjectivity, which is widely shared by many contemporary movements).
35. Stanley Fish and R. Rorty, *WWPM* (Chapter 2).
36. According to my understanding, the American views of deconstruction as well as postmodernism and hermeneutics tend to go Hegelian dividing the line between the Continental and Anglo-American approaches, with the exception of R. Bernstein who lately realized its worth. Norris is predominantly empirical, keeping up with traditions.
37. Norris brings out the coherence of the failure of the analytical theory of reference with deconstructionist reading.
38. Norris is wrong to grant deconstructionists' denial of the distinction of normal and deviant utterances.
39. The divide between Austin's theory of speech acts and that of Searle's, on Norris's view lies in the former's exclusion of deviant utterances, whereas they are parasitical on them; see p. 63 of *WWPM*.
40. On Norris's view, there are only stylistic differences between them.

41. *Tu quoque* reads: 'you too have it'.
42. See Norris's essay on Davidson in *COF*; recently literary theorists take Davidson as an exemplar in which endeavour they do not fully succeed. Norris does not openly endorse this view, but he takes seriously certain views which compare Derrida with Davidson, but prefers to go beyond; see *Literary Theory After Davidson* ed. by Reed Way Dasenbrock (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1993). It closely follows another earlier volume *Redrawing the Lines: Analytic Philosophy, Deconstruction and Literary Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). Analytic philosophy is moribund within, but it provides exemplar for literary theorists.
43. This claim is false. See p. 186 of *IC*.
44. Norris's interpretation of Bhasker as transcendental or critical realist seems to be of a dubious character.
45. I try to capture the logic behind deconstruction in this set; added to it my comments that cannot agree with Norris's idea of deconstructionist logic.
46. I fully endorse the interpretation advanced by Peter Dews. See his *Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy* (Verso, 1995).
47. The Kantian underpinnings are discussed on p. 53, and are widely pervading each of his books. Its success is highly questionable. Without Kantianism at the backdrop, Norris's grand edifice falls to pieces. Norris walks on a tightrope in attacking all Kantian interpretors which includes Hillis Miller and Onora O'Neill for their revisionism, calling them as 'detractors'; Foucault has 'disfigured' Kant according to this reading.
48. I think Norris's reading of Gasche is a *misprision*, *TOM*.
49. The 'pagan urge to violate the rule' that leads on towards the multiplicity of language games stands in evidence to Lyotardian philosophy of language and this is elaborately treated in my 'F. Lyotard's Postmodern Agonism' (Ms.).
50. This is quoted from Habermas; see his essay in *PDM*.
51. The agonal nature of language is in central focus in his *Au Juste (Just Gaming)* 1979.
52. Ibid. I want to add: The agonal nature of phrase regimes is no doubt traced to the agonal nature of language. Even if it is granted that it is by nature agonal, in my opinion, it hardly conveys anything foundational or metanarrativist and hence it is called the combinatorial with a great deal of caution.
53. Saul Kripke's *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Oxford, 1982); I owe to Crispin Wright's recent formulation.
54. Stuart Shanker's *Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics* (Croom Helm, 1987).
55. Ibid.
56. My survey on Wittgenstein, is found in 'Wittgenstein's Challenge to the Rule-as-Rails Platonism in Philosophy of Psychology' (Ms.).
57. *Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922).
58. No one can argue that reading and writing does not carry binary implications.

59. Norris has a different version of *agon*.
60. Chapter 7 on Labarthe in *WWPM*.
61. For the three senses, see *WWPM*, pp. 7–8.
62. See his Essay in *COF*.
63. Chapter 2 on Fish in *WWPM*.
64. The reductio is formulated by me; see Chapter on Fish in *WWPM*.
65. Norris criticizes Roy Bhasker; see his *Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation* (London: Verso, 1986); for a summary view see p. 6. As evident, Norris actually intends to draw out the implications of this brand of realism for literary theory.
66. I have shown that Norris has to accept both Realism and Anti-realism.
67. This is what is called the 'aesthetizing the political'; it is comparable to the eleventh thesis of Feuerbach.
68. *WWPM*, Chapter 4, p. 24.
69. Norris has perpetual quarrel with the passage to heterogeneity without realizing that there could be knowledge about heterogeneity just as there is knowledge about complementarity within quantum physics; see Fairlamb's book mentioned earlier.
70. See '*RKA*'.
71. See '*RKA*'.
72. Ian Hacking's only quoted remark reads: '... Foucault was a remarkably able Kantian'. See p. 51 of *IC*.
73. For Habermas's demolition of the principle, that has been overlooked by many interpreters, see *PDM*.
74. Lyotard's '*RKA*'.
75. For the jargon 'Kantian Postmodernism' is due to David Ingram, who reads Lyotard as a Kantian, see 'The Postmodern Kantianism of Arendt and Lyotard' in *Review of Metaphysics* 42 (1988), pp. 51–77.
76. Norris, 'Post-Analytical Philosophy: What is in a Name?' in the *Cogito* (1995) pp. 216–23.
77. See Norris's Essay in *COF*.
78. F. Lyotard, *Le Differend (Phrases in Dispute)* (trans. Georges van den Abbeele) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1988). It is here I wish to correct the impression which charges me as one who adored analytical philosophy, projecting it as a combinatorial model. I endorse the agonal variety in a milder form without succumbing to its metanarrativist character. I explain this in my revised essay on Rorty mentioned in f.n. 16 above.
79. See Chapter on Heidegger in *PDM*.
80. It is not clear how far Norris is correct in maintaining that all types of deconstruction are modelled on Paul de Man's idea of self-deconstruction. I differ from him in maintaining that this is not true. There is a difference between deconstruction per se which requires us to read the text in a particular way, and de Man's view which attributes this trait to the very text. The

difference in other words comes to the following: while sufficient allowance is made to read the text in one way or other, de Man's idea is to treat the text as causing such a close reading.

81. For the reasons mentioned in f.n. 61 above, I shall call de Man as a post-deconstructionist.
82. For inverted Platonism, see f.n. 26 above.
83. de Man's account makes use of philology.
84. See f.n. 9 above; similar motives are evident in his discussion of the limits of antirealism.
85. The lapidary sentence takes straightaway to the privileging the phenomenal.
86. pp. 57.
87. See Peter Dews pp. 119–20.
88. I shall illustrate the *de facto* contestability in the following sets.
89. The idea of language as a universal medium underlies early Wittgenstein.
90. Habermas terms this idea in this way.
91. *Contra* Norris, I endorse a theme of convergence. I think, this is a sound reason for disagreement.
92. I am indebted to the distinguished professors that include Ashok Vohra, Bokil, Indra, Rajagopal, Ananda Giri, Pannerselvam, Mathivanan, Mohammed Ali for their kind comments and encouragement at the seminar. I dedicate this modest work to the sacred memory of the distinguished philosopher and my former teacher, Dr R. Sundararajan (Chennai, Pune), who taught me a great deal.

What are the Sixteen Padārthas of Nyāya? An Attempt to Solve the Dilemma of Long Standing

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1. Sixteen fundamental principles of Nyāya (padārtha)—the means of right knowledge (pramāṇa), objects of knowledge (prameya), doubt (saṃśaya), motive (prayojana), illustrative examples (dṛṣṭānta), tenets (siddhānta), the members of a syllogism (avayava), reasoning (tarka), ascertainment of the right solution of a dilemma (nirṇaya), dispute (vāda), sophistic debate (jalpa), eristic debate (vitaṇḍā), cavils (chala), pseudoarguments (hetvābhāsa), futile rejoinders (jāti), and the causes of defeat in a debate (nigrahasthāna)—constitute the specific heritage of this classical Indian school of thought to the same extent as seven dimensions of the real (with the non-real added to them) in Vaiśeṣika, which is close to this tradition, nine parameters of individual being in Jainism, 25 cosmic principles in Sāṃkhya or 75 dharmas in classical Buddhism. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, no other system of fundamental principles of any Indian philosophical system ever caused so much essential controversy among Indologists.

The interpretation of the 16 fundamental principles of Nyāya as philosophical categories—sometimes with certain vacillations and reservations—dates back to the first European reviews dealing with Indian philosophical systems—namely, to 'Essays on the Philosophy of Hindus' (1823–24) by T. Colebrooke,[1] as well as to *Philosophy in the Progress of World History* (1834) by C. Windischmann;[2] they were presented in the same light by such authorities of Indology as P. Deussen (1908),[3] S. Vidyabhushana (1913),[4] S. Dasgupta (1922),[5] O. Strauss (1925),[6] M. Hiriyanna (1932),[7] W. Ruben (1971)[8] or C. Oberhammer (1984),[9] in several monographs on Indian categories, for example, in the fundamental work by H. Narain (1976)[10] or in the dissertation by P. Kumari (1984)[11] as well as in some philosophic lexicons.[12] However, soon enough, this interpretation encountered strong opposition.

Thus, in his well-known book *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* (1899) F. Max Mueller regards 16 fundamental principles of Nyāya only as 16 topics the list of which, in his view, is both inconsistent and redundant (since the first two principles already exhaust the whole philosophical content of this system). R. Garbe (1917) preferred to view them as mere 'logical ideas', S. Radhakrishnan (1977)—as 16 topics reflecting the stages of dialectical controversy which ultimately leads to the achievement of adequate knowledge, P. Masson-Oursel (1923)—as the 'stages of rational reasoning', S. Chatterjee and D. Datta (1939)—as merely '16 philosophical topics'. J. Filliozat (Renou & Filliozat, 1953), who directly opposed their earlier identification (dating back to Colebrooke) as categories considered them to be '16 elements of operations by intellect' and even as 'common places of dialectics' rather than as 'topics' (according to him, they were interpreted in this way as early as mid-19th century by French Indologist B. Saint Hilaire). K. Potter (1977) does not reject their definition as categories but believes that initially they were a suitable 'list of topics for a manual of debate or discussion' that subsequently 'accumulated' various kinds of subjects aimed at finding the truth through the process of discussion. D. Chattopadhyaya (1982) regards them as 'philosophic topics'.[13]

It goes without saying that the presented list of Indologists who dealt with this problem is by no means exhaustive. Anyway, the importance of Nyāya for the development of Indian philosophy fully justifies the desire to verify the interpretations of its fundamental principles—either as philosophical categories or something else. This verification is to be followed by an attempt to solve this problem from a historical point of view.

2. The compound *pada* + *artha* (Pali *pada* + *attha*) literally means 'the meaning of a word' and its interpretation was a recurrent subject of discussions in the ancient Indian linguistic tradition. Thus, Patañjali the grammarian (2nd century BC) already analyzed two extreme viewpoints which took shape as early as the epoch directly preceding the varttikas of Kātyāyana (3rd century BC). The first one was upheld by Vyāḍi, the alleged author of the grammatical treatise *Saṃgraha*, according to whom common names mean individual things (the meaning of the word 'cow' will be this or that specific cow). His opponent Vājapyāyana advocated the view that their denotation is a genus 'form' of the entire class of designated things, e.g., the meaning of a 'cow' would be the common feature of 'cowness' (Mahābhāṣya I.6.8 et al.). Kātyāyana thought that both positions, taken to the extreme, are equally

groundless, while Patañjali himself thought that the solution of the problem might be found in their combination since a word expresses both things. In a different section of his work he tried to bring together the respective positions of the opponents, maintaining that the first position actually recognizes individual referents as the main element in the meaning of a word and their genus characteristics as the secondary element, while in the second position the emphasis is placed in the opposite way (Ibid. I.246.14–18).[14]

The semantic discussions of grammarians on the subject of *pada* + *artha* (*sabda* + *artha*) are reflected in philosophic texts. The most graphic example is *Nyāya-sūtras* II.2.65–68, where after referring to the opposing views in the vein of Vyāḍi and Vājapyayāna the author of the sūtras explicitly expresses the view that *pada* + *artha* includes all three, i.e. individuals, the genus form and the genus itself altogether (II.2.68). But the author of the *Nyāya-sūtras* does not yet treat padārthas as philosophical categories (the main codification was completed probably not earlier than the 3rd–4th centuries AD).[15] We cannot find it either in the first sūtra itself, which enumerates their above-mentioned list and alleges that their distinctive cognition is followed by the supreme good (I.1.1), or in any other sūtra. But then, starting from the 5th–6th centuries AD, we already find special treatises (by the 20th century their number together with the commentaries was more than 70), where the term *padārtha* becomes the standard designation of the fundamental principles of philosophical systems.[16]

To clear up the question as to what extent the fundamental principles of Indian systems, including those enumerated in the *Nyāya-sūtras*, correspond to the meaning of 'philosophical categories' we have no other choice but to turn to contemporary philosophic writings. When examining the definitions of philosophical categories in modern philosophy encyclopedia publications (of the second half of the 20th century)—French,[17] German[18] and Anglo-American[19]—we can say that modern philosophy as a whole regards philosophical categories as the most fundamental, generally valid and 'atomic' (irreducible) notions which enable us to classify either things themselves or our ideas about them, while, being applied to philosophical disciplines (which is characteristic of German publications), it distinguishes two classes of categories—respectively, ontological and epistemological ones. We are going to use this summary definition as our criterion while assessing whether Indian padārthas might mean philosophical categories.

First of all, fully in line with the suggested definition, we start from Vaiśeṣika, the system which corresponds to all three criteria common to all

categories—fundamentality, general validity and 'atomic nature'. We mean the famous six-fold system which distinguishes substances (dravya), qualities (guṇa), actions (karma), the general (sāmānya), the particular (viśeṣa) and inherence (samavāya). Partly in line with the same Western definition was an attempt by Candramati (5th–6th centuries AD) to bring this system to a ten-fold one. It is well-known that he added to the above-mentioned scheme the causal potency (śakti), the absence of such potency (aśakti), the general-cum-particular (sāmānyaviśeṣa) and non-existence (abhāva). We emphasize that Candramati's system of categories corresponds to the above-mentioned criteria *partly* because the third addition proves to be insufficiently 'atomic' (it can be reduced to the 'general' and the 'particular' in their correlation), while the first two are insufficiently fundamental. The Vaiśeṣikas themselves were well aware of that since they admitted only the introduction of 'non-existence' that corresponds to all three system criteria. Essentially the categories of the Vaiśeṣikas are of purely ontological type—the type which in the European tradition dates back to the system of five categories in Plato's *Sophist* (254e–260a).

Quite in line with the suggested criterion of philosophical categories are also those systems of padārthas which are modifications of the set of categories advocated by the Vaiśeṣikas. Such is the system of categories of the Mīmāṃsā school of Kumārila where the first four categories of Vaiśeṣika (substance, quality, action and the general—with a distinction between more general and less general entities) are accepted fully as 'positive ones' (bhāva), as well as the last category—non-existence, which is classified as a 'negative one' (abhāva), and in which four subclasses also borrowed from the Vaiśeṣikas are distinguished symmetrically (preceding non-existence of something before its appearance, the subsequent non-existence of something after its destruction, the mutual non-existence—that of two things in relation to each other, the absolute non-existence—that of phantom objects like the horns of a hare, a heavenly flower or the son of a sterile woman). Another attempt of building a system of padārthas on the basis of Vaiśeṣika is that of the Mīmāṃsā school of Prabhākara. It also includes eight units but adds to the four initial categories of the Vaiśeṣikas four new ones: 'dependence' (paratantratā), 'potentiality' (śakti), 'similarity' (sadṛśya) and 'number' (saṃkhyā). The last category corresponds to quantity, lacking (as a separate category) in Vaiśeṣika, but recognized in classical European systems of categories beginning with that of Aristotle, the third category—to that of relation widely recognized in European philosophy—while the second one refers to the possibility of the

'maturing' of the results of actions (above all, ritual actions). The qualification of the first category appears to be less unequivocal. This categorial system evidently corresponds to three formal criteria of fundamentality, general validity and 'atomic nature' of its component parts. Finally, in the ten-fold system of the padārthas advanced by the Vedantist-Dualist Madhva (13th–14th centuries AD), six padārthas of the Vaiśeṣikas (where we do not find inherence but encounter non-existence) are supplemented with 'the qualified' (viśiṣṭa), 'the whole' (aṃśin) and with 'potency' and 'similarity' which are already known to us from the system of the principles of Prabhākara. The first of these additions is easily reduced to the 'general' and the 'particular' and, therefore, does not correspond to the criterion of an 'atomic nature', whereas the 'whole' was evidently to make up for the absence of inherence, but is in essence a pseudo-category because 'the whole' actually combines the six initial categories of the Vaiśeṣikas. Nevertheless, both two Mīmāṃsā and the above-mentioned Vedānta system of padārthas correspond as a whole to the modern criteria of categories and also belong (like the system of the Vaiśeṣikas which initiated them), to the ontological type.

There was also one more system of categories in Indian philosophy. It was reconstructed by the outstanding Russian Buddhologist Th. Stcherbatsky from Diñnāga's main work 'the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*', from the commentary by Kamalaśīla on Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* and from some other texts of Vijñānavāda, the Buddhist idealism, defined not as padārthas but as pañcavidhakalpanā—a 'five-fold structure [of reason]'. The essence of this system consisted in the fact that an object of our thought cannot be reality per se (as it was the case with the Vaiśeṣikas) since in Buddhism reality is constituted by dynamic moments of being, that is 'particular' points, instantaneous and unverbalized ones—but the projections of thought through which it constructs the world from its fundamentally nondiscursive initial material. It is a system of mere 'names' (nāma): individuals—proper names (nāmakalpanā), classes—genus names (jātikalpanā), qualities—the names of attributes (guṇakalpanā), movements—verbs (karmakalpanā), and substances—substantive projections (dravyakalpanā). But the constructive imagination of our reason is also capable of making of a synthesis of notions. Therefore, the categories of the five-fold structure of reason evolve into the table of the four possible relations of two notions, namely, in assertion (vidhi), negation (anupalabdhi), identity (tādātmya) and causality (tadutpatti). What brings the Buddhist system close to the categorial system of Aristotle, is, according to Stcherbatsky, its affinity with grammar categories, as well as with the un-

derstanding of the subject of predications as something which 'does not refer to anything else'. At the same time the consideration of categories only as the 'lenses' or reason through which it views things, or, to be more exact, its own methods of their conceptualization and brings the Buddhist system of categories still closer to that of Kant.[20] Obviously this philosophical structure corresponds to all the above-mentioned criteria of categories and refers—the only case in the history of Indian philosophy—to the categories of the epistemological type in the proper sense.

An original system was represented by the tattvas/padārthas of the Jainas generalized by Kundakunda (1st–2nd centuries AD) as three categories: substances (dravya), their attributes (guṇa) and the manifestations of the latter (paryāya). The class of substances includes two subclasses: souls and non-souls, and the second subclass includes four further components: matter, the initiation of movement, the cessation of movement and space. His proposed disciple Umāsvāti (but not the subsequent Jaina tradition as a whole) replaces the three-part categorial pattern with a set of seven categories: 'soul' (jīva), 'non-soul' (ajīva), 'inflow of karma matter' (āsrava), its 'enslavement' of the soul (bandha), 'interruption' of this flow (saṃvara), its final 'blocking' (nirjarā) and 'liberation' (mokṣa). At least by the 10th century AD another two categories, viz. 'merit' (puṇya) and 'non-merit' (pāpa), were firmly established in the categorial system of the Jainas.

We might suspect most of the Jaina padārthas of lacking sufficient fundamentality, but these doubts require, in our view, not so much a reappraisal of the Jaina system as an amplification of some dimensions of present-day categoriology—something which has both heuristic and comparativist aspects. As a matter of fact, the Western definitions of categories presuppose 'by default', and even explicitly, as in the case of German philosophic lexicons (see above), that there are only two fundamental spheres of philosophy—epistemology and ontology. Meanwhile, it is only too easily forgotten that starting from the first attempts to structure philosophical knowledge (those of Xenocrates and the Stoics, that is, dating back to the late 4th century BC), it included as its main 'fields', apart from 'logic' and 'physics', also 'ethics' which was an invariable component part in any philosophic system up to the 20th century. Seven Jaina categories out of nine refer exactly to that philosophical field which is closest of all to 'ethics', that is to soteriology. In this connection the above-mentioned set of padārthas (along with the above-mentioned ontological and epistemological ones) provokes an attempt of specifying contemporary understanding of philosophical categories.

We feel it would not be too presumptious to suggest a definition of categories as conceptual universals that establish the parameters of objective reality, the process of cognition or the fulfilment of the goals of human existence. From this standpoint, the Jaina system of categories (which suggests certain possibilities for modern categoriology) can be characterized as an ontologico-soteriological one.[21]

3. In order to determine the categorial status of the 16 fundamental principles of Nyāya we should also proceed from the unity of the formal aspect of philosophical categories (the criteria of fundamentality, general validity and 'atomic' nature) and the aspect of their contents (the criteria referring us to at least one of the three main philosophical fields—'logic', 'physics' or 'ethics').

From the standpoint of formal criteria the padārthas of the Naiyāyikas were already thoroughly examined by their Indian opponents. Thus, the Jaina Vādideva (Devasūri) in the autocommentary *Syādvādaratnākara* on his treatise *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* (the 12th century AD) found no less than seven incongruities in its categorial system. Some categories of Nyāya do not correspond, in his opinion, to the criterion of fullness: 'doubt' is for some unknown reason included in the list, while no less significant 'delusion' or 'uncertainty' are not. When including 'the members of a syllogism', it is absurd to omit inference itself or a logical conclusion because syllogism is only its outward expression (this note is based on the difference between internal inference and 'external' syllogism in the Buddhist school of Diñnāga). Furthermore, 'pseudoarguments' are singled out into a separate padārtha, while perceptual errors are, according to Devasūri, completely ignored. Other categories of the Naiyāyikas violate, in his opinion, what we called the criterion of 'atomic nature', for they might be easily included in more general categories: a 'graphic example' should not have been singled out because it makes a part of a syllogism [if it is singled out, an argument (liṅga) together with other members of a syllogism should have been singled out but this does not happen]. Finally, it is superfluous to single out 'doctrines' because they correspond to the thesis of a syllogism and, consequently, are already implied in the enumeration of 'the members of a syllogism', whlie 'ascertainment' is a result of the functioning of 'the means of knowledge' and, therefore, should be included in the latter. As for 'futile rejoinders', they do not differ in any way from 'pseudoarguments'.[22]

The Jaina criticism of the Nyāya padārthas is quite pertinent in itself, since it demonstrates the main principles of the study of categories in Indian philosophy that are compatible with the definitions of present-day philosophy and, partly, even replenish them (we mean an emphasis on the criterion of fullness). However, this criticism is not so convincing as it seemed to H. Narain who maintained that 'our finding is that fourteen categories beginning with doubt are a disorderly conglomeration of stray topics forming the subject-matter of the science of Nyāya, or rather *NS* (the Nyāyasūtras—*V.Sch.*). There is no order in which, no principles on which, they may be said to have been arranged. They cannot be regarded even sub-categories of the means of knowledge. Categories worth the name are only two in number, means of knowledge and objects of knowledge or knowables, of which, too, the former has nothing to do with the classification of reals'.[23]

Thus, contrary to the opinion of Devasūri and Narain 'futile rejoinders' and 'pseudoarguments' of the Naiyāyikas are not one and the same thing: the latter mean certain errors in the middle term, while the former mean incorrect answers based on a mere similarity or dissimilarity without the final test of the middle term.[24] 'Ascertainment' is a preference of one of the alternative points of view achieved through reflection and is not directly included to the 'means of knowledge'. If the main criterion of being one of 'the means of knowledge' is already the indirect connection with them, then Devasūri should have said that all methods and modes of reasoning ultimately belong to the sphere of the 'means of knowledge'. And the alleged fault of the Naiyaikas, according to which they single out 'the members of a syllogism' without singling out 'inference' is also hardly valid: after all, the latter is already included in the 'means of knowledge' (as the second of the four units) and, therefore, is related to a different padārtha. Moreover, it can be said that any possible criticism of the fundamental principles of Nyāya from the standpoint of an 'atomic nature' is ultimately based on insufficiently careful use of the definitions of its basic texts (for the alleged faults from the standpoint of fullness see below).

On the other hand, Devasūri missed a possibility of pinpointing a much more serious fault of the padārthas of Nyāya. From the standpoint of the principle of fundamentality verbal tricks, futile rejoinders or errors in the middle term of a syllogism cannot be as significant as 'the means of knowledge' or 'objects of knowledge'. Therefore, all mentioned units prove to be quite vulnerable in respect to their 'typological homogeneity'. As a matter of fact, the 'means of knowledge' and 'objects of knowledge' are related to the

process of cognition, 'members of a syllogism' present argumentation; 'dispute', 'sophistic debate' and 'eristic debate' provide the classification of different types of discussion; the 'causes of defeat in a debate' constitute the 'legal' aspect of polemics, which enables 'trial commission' to state that the arguments of one of the polemists are groundless, while 'pseudoarguments', 'pseudoanswers' and various verbal tricks are valid reasons for such a verdict. We do not witness a similar heterogeneity in any of the above-mentioned Indian categorial systems that correspond to the modern principles of categoriology.

So the padārthas of Nyāya do not meet the criteria of philosophical categories either from the formal point of view or from the point of view of the contents. If we approach them in a systematic way, it is easy to see that they do not belong either to the sphere of 'ethics' (despite the fact that the author of the *Nyāya-sūtras* promises the 'supreme good' as a reward for their cognition—I.1.1), or to that of 'physics' (the sphere of the 'subjects of knowledge' remains open as such), or even to that of 'logic' (though this field of philosophical discourse was very near to the aspirations of the systematizers of the Nyāya set of padārthas). They rather belong to the activity of a 'practicing philosopher', to the materials and instruments he has to master in order to participate in discussions, while making use of all available discursive and polemical means and successfully defeating opponents without giving them a chance to win a victory. Therefore, their recognition as philosophical categories would lead to such a radical expansion of the latters' contents that it would inevitably tear apart the 'categoriological fabric' of present-day philosophy.[25]

4. Without belonging to either of the three main philosophical spheres, the 16 padārthas of Nyāya represent an arsenal of the tools of any dialectician, and, as a result of the polemical character of Indian theorizing in general, they constitute the necessary weapons of a controversialist in any sphere of 'disciplined' knowledge. From this point of view they are far from being illogical or disorderly (their alleged faults pointed out by Max Mueller and Narain testify only to their complete misunderstanding from the side of these, in many respects blameless, Indologists). Actually, a student of controversy, making use of the 16 padārthas of Nyāya, had to learn, primarily, those 'means of knowledge' (No. 1) and the 'objects of knowledge' (No. 2) for without them it was impossible for a professional erudite to function. Further, he should know what problems in his field of knowledge might cause 'doubt'

(No. 3) and he should also be aware of their reasons, that is, the 'motives' of cognition (No. 4) and the causes of difference in opinions. In order to act in a competent way he should adhere to certain 'doctrines' (No. 5), that is, he should advocate his own doctrines and refute those of his opponents. Acting among erudite persons in intellectual beau monde, he should be equipped with 'illustrative examples' (No. 6) so that his argumentation would be accepted. Another condition for a successful study of any problem in a discussion was the professional mastership of the 'members of a syllogism' (No. 7), the lack of which would not allow him to be accepted seriously both by his 'judges' and his opponent. However, since not all problems can be solved by means of a simple syllogism, he should learn both 'reasoning' (No. 8) as a process of rational comparison of alternative solutions of scholarly problems, and the criteria of 'ascertainment' (No. 9) regarding one of the two ways of the solution of a problem. Indeed, he should also learn all the three types of discussions in order to choose the one where he felt the stongest and be aware of the rules of game suitable for this particular case—be it a respectable scientific 'dispute' (No. 10), 'sophistic debate' (No. 11), where some doubtful means are permitted, or an 'eristic debate' (No. 12), where the goal is achieving victory over an opponent while being completely indifferent to both one's own and another person's thesis. He should know well 'cavils' (No. 13) in order to be able to use them himself and to find them out in the argumentation of an opponent; he should also know the main 'pseudoarguments' (No. 14) which might go unnoticed by an insufficiently competent audience and which he can pinpoint in the argument of his opponent. For the same purpose he should also learn the most popular 'pseudoanswers' (No. 15). But apart from that, he should also know well in advance what turn of a discussion might prove dangerous for him—in order to avoid the 'causes of defeat in a debate' (No. 16).

The 'practical', dialectico-controvertible character of the 16 padārthas of Nyāya prevents them from being determined as merely philosophical categories; they cannot be defined either as epistemological, logical or of any other kind (and as soon as we get rid of this interpretation, all their imaginary shortcomings immediately fall away), or as 'logical ideas' (Garbe), or else as the 'stages of rational reasoning' (Masson-Oursel), or even as 'elements of the operations of intellect' (Filliozat). Much more close to the truth was their characteristic given by Potter who considered them to be initially a 'list of topics for a manual of debate or discussion'. We need only two additional clarifications: 1) this was a curriculum an Indian intellectual was supposed

to master in order to become an expert not only in the practice but also in the theory of reasoning and debate; 2) this curriculum had an obvious 'interdisciplinary' (which might have included a certain philosophical side) character. The 'interdisciplinary' character of this curriculum is demonstrated by a list of 44 topics of the eighth section of the famous medical treatise *Caraka-Saṃhitā* (the *Vimānasthāna* section 27–65) intended for a dialectician among physicians, whose 22 topics correspond to the padārthas of Nyāya, either coinciding with them directly or providing varieties.[26]

One of the genre parallels to the 16 fundamental principles of Nyāya—a system of 32 methodical metarules tantra-yukti (lit., a 'connection of threads')—has got the same 'interdisciplinary' character because it was preserved in an almost identical way both in the medical treatise *Suśruta-Saṃhitā* and in the manual on government *Arthaśāstra*, where it composes the final section.[27] These rules make it possible to correctly interpret any classes of texts important for one or another sphere of knowledge and are intended for a 'post-graduate course' training of a theoretician-exegete in the spirit of Mīmāṃsā (as a discipline of interpretation of Vedic texts rather than a philosophical system).

The last note is much more than just an ordinary analogy. It means that the ways of the evolution of the Nyāya philosophy from Nyāya as a tradition of the theory and practice of argumentation and the Mīmāṃsā philosophy from Mīmāṃsā as a tradition of the theory and practice of exegesis were quite similar. In both cases these processes were accelerated by the presence-cum-influence of two schools close enough to these two traditions—the schools that were essentially philosophical right from the start—namely, Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta. In both cases philosophical darśanas have evolved in a sense as the result of the first commentaries on the corresponding collections of sūtras.

5. We do not know exactly what interval of time separated the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* by Vātsyāyana (Pakṣilasvāmin) from the body of the *Nyāya-sūtras*.[28] If we pay attention to the final verse of his commentry, where the quasi-mythological author of the sūtras is called a 'ṛṣi' by Vātsyāyana, we have to suppose that this interval was long enough. But if we take into account that interpreters at a much later stage hesitate whether to ascribe some sūtras to a sutrakāra or to his commentator, this interval is substantially shortened. Some passages of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* do not leave any doubt that the author already had some predecessors among interpreters of the sūtras with whom he carried polemics.[29]

On the other hand, he was also a predecessor of Diñnāga (5th–6th centuries AD), the founder of the school of Buddhist logic, and, judging by his direct borrowings from the *Yoga-sūtras* and abundant polemics with the classical tenets of Sāṃkhya, he must have been a younger contemporary of Patañjali the Yogin (circa the 4th century AD) and an older contemporary of Iśvarakṛṣṇa (circa the 5th century AD). Placing him between the 4th and 5th centuries AD we come to an essentially important date—the time of the initial transformation of the grammatical term padārtha into the designation of philosophical categories, corresponding, for that matter, to all criteria of modern categoriology (see above). We shall try to support this thesis with written data.

Vātsyāyana discusses the 16 padārthas of Nyāya in a few passages of the initial lines of his commentary.

(1) While concluding his reasoning at the very end of his introduction to the commentary (where four necessary components of cognition were discussed, i.e. the subject of cognition, the object, the process of cognition and its result) and having found out that the means of the cognition of the real and non-real are one and the same, he promises that 'the existent will be described as distributed among 16 [categorical topics]' (sacca khalu ṣoḍaśadhā vyūḍhamupadekṣyate).

(2) Forestalling the introductory sūtra (I.1.1) where all 16 units are enumerated (see above), Vātsyāyana opens their list with a remark: 'The same varieties of the real ...' (Tāsāṃ khalvāsāṃ sadvidhānām ... .)

(3) After completing a syntactical analysis of this sūtra, he summarizes its contents, which consisted, as we know, in the enumeration of the 16 padārthas in the following way: 'Such is the evidently real (vidyāmānārthāḥ) whose faultless knowledge is the objective of teaching [this science of Nyāya], and the enumeration of its full subject content (tantrārtha) should be known as such'.

(4) When challenged by the imaginary opponent whose believes that all 14 padārthas, beginning with doubt, can be safely included in the two main ones—the means and objects of knowledge—and, therefore, could have been omitted, Vātsyāyana agrees with him in principle but suggests that he should think the situation over in a different way. There are four disciplines of knowledge taught in the world, one of them being philosophy (ānvīkṣikī) and all of them have their special subject matter (pṛthakprasthānāḥ).[30] In case of philosophy such a sphere is made up by 14 padārthas, beginning with 'doubt', because without their special nomination it would not differ in any way from 'the cognition of Ātman suggested in the *Upaniṣads*'.

(5) Finally, in many cases Vātsyāyana emphasizes that these 'small padārthas', which could be included in one 'big padārtha'—the objects of knowledge, are to be reasonably singled out for purely pragmatic reasons. 'Doubt' is to be singled out because it initiates any discourse necessary for any rational cognition; 'example'—because both logical inference and the evidence of authority are based on it; 'doctrines'—because it is only their difference that conditions the logical possibility of all three types of a discussion, i.e. respectable dispute, sophistry and eristics, and for the same reason also the 'members of a syllogism'. At last, extrasyllogistic 'reasoning' is to be singled out as an important 'aid' for the means of knowledge during a dispute.[31]

These laconic provisions of Vātsyāyana testify to many things. Firstly, to the fact that he realizes the criticism levelled by the imaginary opponent (this opponent might have been actually inspired by the Buddhists, cf. the attack levelled at all 16 Nyāya padārthas in the Vaidalyaprakaraṇa attributed to Nāgārjuna) in connection with the different calibre of the 16 padārthas of Nyāya. He explicitly distinguishes among them, in accordance with a typical pattern of Indian mentality, pragmatic and 'unconditioned' padārthas (so to say padārthas on the vyavahārika and pāramārthika levels of the truth), so that from the standpoint of the relative truth there are 16 of them, while from the standpoint of the absolute truth there are only two and the 14 are subordinate to the 2 in the general system of fundamental philosophical principles. Secondly, and this is of utmost importance, all padārthas of Nyāya, especially the 'small ones', constitute its distinctive attributes as the science of philosophy because they provide Nyāya, identified with philosophy as such, with its own subject matter, since otherwise it would not differ from the Gnosis of the *Upaniṣads*, that is, with essentially pre-philosophic texts. Thirdly, all the 16 padārthas are clearly interpreted ontologically: they correspond to being itself as its forms and special modes, while it is emphasized that they have 'positive' being, and in this capacity they are opposed to the entire sphere of non-being.

As a result, the Nyāya padārthas in Vātsyāyana's exposition acquire all the characteristics of philosophical categories in full accordance with present-day criteria. Apart from the formal criterion of an 'atomic nature' which is initially immanent to them already at their initial stage, i.e. their irreducibility to each other (see above), they correspond to the other two—fundamentality and general validity—due to subtle dialectics overcoming their heterogeneity and ensuring a possibility to subordinate 14 pragmatic padārthas to 2 universal

ones. However, in spite of this subordination the former ones are by no means 'absorbed' by the latter but preserve their own 'legal status'. But all the 16 correspond now to the criteria of philosophical categories also from the standpoint of their contents, because they point out the varieties of being itself and, therefore, even 'pragmatic topics' turn out to become no longer mere points of controversial dialectics to be employed in any field of knowledge, but ontological (not epistemological, as they were often understood) categories. In that case Vātsyāyana was the first thinker who managed to build Nyāya as a philosophical system, provide it with a firm theoretical foundation, reveal the specifical subject matter and, at the same time, map out the outlines of a peculiar but, undoubtedly, advanced ontology whose sphere embraces not the 'objective' being (which he left to the Vaiśeṣikas) but the 'subjective' one—the world of intellectual activity.

Chronological considerations allow us to assume that starting with Vātsyāyana the term *padārtha* has become the main instrument of categorization of philosophical categories in Indian philosophy, as well as the object of highly specialized and, apparently numerous treatises dealing with philosophical categories (see above). The fact that it was Vātsyāyana who became the initiator of the philosophical approach to this initially grammatical term fits well enough with his universally recognized close links with the tradition of the grammarians.[32] It is certainly difficult to say what prompted him when he chose this term for this purpose (we know that in the *Nyāya-sūtras* themselves the term is found in a purely linguistic context—see above). But one line of thought could be traced through the reasoning according to which philosophical categories—being ultimate conceptual universals—to some extent contain within themselves the ultimate meaning (artha) of any other notions or words (pada). If we are right in assuming that, the intuition of Vātsyāyana could be supported with the image of the six classical ontological principles of Vaiśeṣika that, at least partly, corresponded to this lofty metaphysical ideal.

Summing up the results, we can suggest a new solution of the old dilemma of Indologists—whether the 16 padārthas of Nyāya are philosophical categories or not. It differs from preceding solutions since it is not 'dogmatic' but historical. Initially these padārthas were not categories at all and represented only a curriculum of the 'interdisciplinary' discursive and polemical activity of an Indian intellectual (competing with several other curricula one of which was preserved in the *Caraka-Saṃhitā*). They became real philosophical categories only in the work of Vātsyāyana, and because of that Nyāya, which

took serious steps toward becoming a philosophical school (these efforts are already reflected in the *Nyāya-sūtras*), becomes a philosophical system based on a specific categorial foundation. At the same time, we are probably dealing with the historical paradox: a 'non-categorial' list of topics originally served as the initial material for all-Indian categoriology. But any history, including the history of philosophy, prefers experiment through paradoxes, especially when its plans are destined to be fulfilled by such outstanding minds as that of Vātsyāyana.[33]

Notes and References

1. Colebrooke, however, makes a qualitative distinction between the first two categories (the 'sources of knowledge' and 'objects of knowledge') as the main categories and the remaining 14 as additional ones and notes that it is only the 'name' that draws the categories of Nyāya as a whole close to those of Aristotle, Kant or 'Scotch philosophers'. We cite a French translation of his report: [Colebrooke, 1833, pp. 51–2].
2. See: [Windischmann, 1834, p. 1908]. Windischmann, a follower of Schelling, was the first philosopher who introduced 'on full rights' Oriental material in the general history of philosophy, not without opposition, it seems, to Hegel's Eurocentrism.
3. He hesitates, however, in his interpretation of *padārtha* in Nyāya between 'Kategorie' and 'Hauptstuck', 'Rubrik', believing that 'genuine' categories were only in Vaiśeṣika, and supposes that already for this reason Nyāya is something 'secondary' in relation to Vaiśeṣika. See: [Deussen, 1908, S. 361–2].
4. See his translation of the term *padārtha* in [*Nyāya-sūtras*, 1913, p. 1].
5. Dasgupta shows the same hesitations as those of Deussen (See Note 3), interpreting the padārthas of the Naiyāyikas as 'categories' (cf. 'logical categories') and at the same time as mere 'subjects' of their teaching [Dasgupta, 1922, pp. 294, 302].
6. Strauss emphasizes that the main 'interest' of the Naiyāyikas was dialectical and by this reason interprets their padārthas as logical and dialectical categories [Strauss, 1925, p. 144].
7. Hiriyanna, 1976, p. 245.
8. Ruben, 1971, pp. 171–2.
9. See: [Oberhammer, 1984, p. 1]. The author characterizes the 'categories of Nyāya' as mostly epistemological but also as dialectical.
10. See: [Narain, 1976, pp. 34, 43]; the fact that he severely criticizes (see below) the 'categories of Nyāya' does not prevent him from considering them a categorial system, though, from his point of view, unsuccessful.
11. The author characterizes the 16 principles of Nyāya as 'logical categories' [Kumari, 1984, p. XII].

12. For example, in the most popular German 'Dictionary of Philosophy' of H. Schmidt it is said about the 'complicated systems of categories' in Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Nyāya [Schmidt, 1955, S. 307–8].
13. See: [Max Mueller, 1973, p. 351; Garbe, 1917, p. 432; Radhakrishnan, 1977, pp. 33–4; Chatterjee, Datta, 1950, pp. 166–7; Masson-Oursel, 1923, p. 191; Renou, Filliozat, 1953, pp. 59–60; Potter, 1977, p. 43]. The position of D. Chattopadhyaya follows from his interpretation of the contents of the collection of the Nyāyasūtras [*Nyāya-sūtras, Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 1982, p. XXIV].
14. The historiography of these discussions of grammarians is given in [Cardona, 1976, p. 257]. Among special articles dealing with the difference between the semantic concepts of Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana should be singled out [Hiriyanna, 1938], among other publications [Biardeau, 1964, pp. 43–61; Ruegg, 1959, pp. 38–40]. The material related to the grammatical sources of the philosophical term *padārtha* is discussed in detail in the thesis for a doctor's degree [Lissenko, 1998, pp. 92–105].
15. This does not mean, certainly, that the initial stratum of the Nyāyasūtras' codification dates back to the same period. After convincing studies by G. Tucci (1929) and G. Oberhammer (supported by E. Steinkellner) there are hardly any grounds to doubt that the most ancient sections of the sūtras, i.e. I and V, dealing with an exposition of the 16 fundamental principles, date back to a comparatively early stage of the theory of argumentation (according to G. Oberhammer, Vāda-Traditionen), having followed, most probably, immediately the appropriate material of the *Caraka-Saṃhitā* (circa the 1st century AD), and after a special study by A. Meuthrath there are hardly any reasons to doubt that section II preceded the critique of the Nyāya epistemology in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and other works by Nāgārjuna (2nd–3rd centuries AD). See: [Tucci, 1981, pp. XXV–XXVI; Oberhammer, 1963, pp. 102–3; Meuthrath, 1996, pp. VII–VIII].
16. This statistical account follows from the data of the newest edition of K. Potter's bibliography of Indian philosophy. See: [Potter, 1995, pp. 1505–6 et al.]. The data under consideration are, of course, not exhaustive and being constantly supplemented with new information.
17. See, for example: [Cuvillier, 1956, pp. 30–1; Lalande, 1962, p. 125; Foulquie & Raymond, 1969, p. 83; Julia, 1995, p. 41].
18. See, for example: [Schmidt, 1955, S. 306–7; Neuhäusler, 1963, S. 106; Meyers Lexikon, 1987, S. 219; Brugger, 1992, S. 192].
19. See, for example: [Urmson, 1975, p. 61; Lacey, 1976, p. 25; Angeles, 1981, p. 31; Honderich, 1995, pp. 125–6].
20. Stcherbatsky, 1930, Vol. 1, pp. 252–4, 259–62.
21. The enumeration of the principles of the world in Sāṃkhya tattvas, often regarded as a set of philosophical categories, does not correspond, however, to the above-mentioned criteria. These cosmic principles—Primordial Matter (Prakṛti), Pure Consciousness (Puruṣa) and 23 modifications of the former

(intellect-buddhi; egoity-ahaṃkāra; the elevenfold capacities-indriyāṇi, including sensing, motor functioning and mind-manas; the five subtle elements-tanmātras and five gross elements-mahābhūtāni) fail to correspond not only to an 'atomic nature' (23 principles of the 'manifested' world are only manifestations of the 'Non-manifested' Primordial Materiality) but also to general validity, representing a version of archaic cosmogony of Indian esoteric Gnosis. The same is true also with some latter eclectic set of 'categories' advocated by some early medieval 'theistic Sāṃkhyas' who added to this scheme also time (kāla), as well as five breaths (prāṇas) and additional 'mentality' (citta) while having subtracted some classical units and identified Primordial Materiality with Māyā. This set of principles, testified by the early Vedāntist text *Mānasollāsa* (*Dakṣiṇāmūrtivārttika*) and described as containing 24 'categories' altogether, was enlarged, in turn, by the so-called Paurāṇikas who had brought the set up to 30 units adding to the discussed Sāṃkhya principles such Vedāntic ones as Māyā and Avidyā (Mānasollāsa II.31–42). The 'categories' of Southern Śaivites [we mean the 'Lord' (Śiva), his creative female energy (kuṇḍalinī), the power of Illusion (Māyā), 'herd', i.e. men and other living beings (paśu), 'fetters' (pāśa) and 'actions'] represented in the *Pauṣkara-āgama* do not correspond to the criterion of general validity either. Things stand no better, from the standpoint of categoriology, in respect to another classification called 'the six padarthas' in the *Matāṅgaparameśvara-tantra*, in which 'awakening' (bodhi) and 'mantra' (magic formula) are also included. According to the same author of the *Mānasollāsa*, Kashmirean Śaivites added to 30 above-mentioned 'categories' of the Paurāṇikas six further units including the 'drop' (bindu), 'sound' (nāda), 'calmed' (śanta), 'gone beyond' (atīta), together with Śiva and his 'conjugal energy' (II.43). Undoubtedly in all mentioned cases we have to do with lists of the principles of sectarian rather than general validity (not to mention that their contents, to put it mildly, are not too close to those of the philosophical fields proper).
22. The passage of Devasūri is reproduced in the monograph [Narain, 1976, p. 49].
23. Narain, 1976, pp. 51–2.
24. See *Nyāya-sūtras* I.2.4–9 and I.2.18 with explanations by Vātsyāyana.
25. It is true that the same 'fabric' in Vaiśeṣika was much more elastic, even too much elastic, because according to Praśastapāda (6th century AD), who does not differ in this matter from Candramati, the universal characteristics of the Vaiśeṣika padārthas are that they are existent, cognizable and nameable, and, according to Śivāditya (12th century AD), the padārthas have only one universal characteristic—to be objects of correct cognition [Praśastapāda, 1994, pp. 1–3; Śivāditya, 1893, pp. 9–10]. But it is evident that such characteristics hardly allow us to distinguish categories from anything else.
26. *Caraka-Saṃhitā*, 1939, pp. 285–91. A much greater number of 'dialectical topics' in the medical treatise do not allow us, however, to consider the 16 padārthas of Nyāya to be the result of a direct abridgement and revision of the

Caraka-Saṃhitā units (as is stated, for example, in [Ruben, 1971, S. 170]), for such a conclusion needs much more sustantial argumentation. We prefer to speak, in contrary, about a considerably wide spectrum of traditions that specialized in dialectical topics one of which, worked out within early Nyāya, seems to have been more elaborated than one preserved in the above-mentioned section of the medical treatise.

27. See, for example, the text of these 'meta-rules' (cf. those of Pāṇinean grammar) with explanations in such an authoritative edition of the text as [*Arthaśāstra,* 1924–25, Part III, pp. 241–7].
28. Its 'preliminary nature' in the epoch under consideration can be judged already by the fact that even in the 9th century AD Vācaspati Miśra had to compile his *Nyāyasūcinibandha*—a list of the sūtras of Nyāya which should not have been enlarged by means of further interpolations.
29. Thus, in his comment on sutra I.2.9 Vātsyāyana rejects outright the opinion of those interpreters, according to whom an argument, which upsets a temporal order (kālātīta), means a displacement of the order of the members of a syllogism. References to 'some' and 'others' can also be found in the interpretation of other sūtras.
30. This four-part classification of sciences was borrowed directly from the *Arthaśāstra* (I.2) [*Arthaśāstra*, 1924–25, Part I, pp. 16–18]. Without embarking on a long-standing discussion on the subject whether it is possible to identify ānvīkṣikī in the *Arthaśāstra* as philosophy in detail, we cannot but confess that we are inclined to answer this question in the affirmative (thus, taking the side of H. Jacobi against his numerous opponents including such a classic of Indology as P. Hacker), at least for the reason that this term generalizes in the above-mentioned passage three philosophical schools—Sāṃkhya, Yoga (possibly Vaiśeṣika is implied here) and Lokāyata.
31. We refer to the text of Vātsyāyana according to the edition of Ganganatha Jha [*Nyāya-sūtras, Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 1925, pp. 13, 14, 16–17, 19–21, 22, 27, 29, 31, 34].
32. The fact that Vātsyāyana studied Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya thoroughly is evidenced by some specific features of his grammatical method in his commentaries on the sūtras of Nyāya, beginning with the first one. See a special study [Paranjpe, 1941].
33. Among the most outstanding of Vātsyāyana's achievements we can mention, apart from those we have just indicated, the transplantation of the dialogical style of the ancient grammarians (with the participation of both a real and abstract opponent) into Indian philosophy and the formulation of the classical scholastic method of the exposition of any philosophical subject-matter through three logical procedures (an introduction to the commentary on the sūtra I.1.3)—nomination (uddeśa), definition of nominated object (lakṣaṇa) and investigation of definition (parīkṣā)—which after him have become model principles of expounding philosophical material in Indian darśanas up to the present time. Other considerable achievements of Vātsyāyana include the elaboration

of the concept of the subject of cognition (**jñātṛ**) as the agent and, at the same time, the 'substratum' of feeling, will and action, thus drawing it close to a greatest extent, as compared with the interpretation of other darśanas, to the notion of a personality (comments on III.2.34). Finally, we cannot but note the significance of his differentiation between philosophy proper and the Gnosis or cognition of Ātman according to the **Upaniṣads** (see above)—the differentiation which has been ignored very often till now by the historians of Indian philosophy who in their attempts at dividing Indian philosophy into periods mix up theoretical and pre-theoretical patterns of thought.

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Brahman-World Illusion in Advaita Vedānta: A Critique

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1. INTRODUCTION

The inquiry into the three levels of reality (*sattātraya vicāra*) is one of the methods in Advaita Vedānta to establish *nirguṇa* Brahman as one and only non-dual reality. Depending on the concept of sublation,[1] Advaitins categorize reality[2] into three levels, namely, (i) Empirical reality (*Vyāvahārika sattā*)[3], (ii) Phenomenal reality (*Prātibhāsika sattā*),[4] and (iii) Absolute reality (*Pāramārthika sattā*).[5] Advaitins also refer to another category, namely, Absolute non-existence (*tuccha*),[6] only to show that none of the three levels of reality is absolute non-existent. But *tuccha* is neither accepted as a kind of reality nor as one of the three levels of reality in Advaita Vedānta.

Advaitins describe the appearance of the empirical reality as an illusion on the absolute reality. For, the empirical reality, according to them, can be sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. Advaitins try to illustrate the same in terms of dreams and illusions. There is an incompatibility between the explanation of the illustration and that of the world illusion in Advaita Vedānta. While knowledge of the gross objects sublates the knowledge of the dream objects, the falsity of the lesser reality of the dream objects is determined in waking experience, that is, in higher reality. Also the dream objects disappear when sublation takes place.

Contrary to the dream sublation, in the case of Brahman-world illusion, the falsity of the lesser reality of the empirical world has to be determined while one is in lesser reality itself. When world gets sublated by non-dual experience, the world will not disappear and it continues to exist. That is to say that, according to Advaitins, world has to be realized as an illusion while one is in world illusion itself. How can an illusion be realized as an illusion while one is in the same illusion? It cannot be. Thus the position of Advaita on three levels of reality needs to be examined.

This paper aims at evaluating the position of the Advaita on the three levels of reality. It attempts to prove that world cannot be an illusion on non-duality and world of duality cannot be sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. In the same place, it will be shown that non-dual experience can be an illusion on duality of the world and the waking experience can sublate the non-dual experience.

The evaluation is done in the following manner. It will be shown against Advaita, that world is not an illusion on Brahman from the following arguments, namely, (i) there is no proper illustration to explain the world as an illusion, and (ii) world cannot be sublated by non-dual experience. Later, it will be argued that non-dual experience can be an illusion on dual world and the same can be sublated by the knowledge of waking experience. Further it will be shown that the cause of *duḥkha* is subject illusions. Then, it will be established that an ontological sublation of the world by non-dual experience, which implies physical disappearance of the world, is not required to attain *mokṣa*. Finally, it will be argued that none of the four varieties of experience stands for the *pāramārthika sattā* and therefore, the ultimate reality cannot be determined in Advaita Vedānta.

2. WORLD CANNOT BE AN ILLUSION ON BRAHMAN

2.1 There is No Proper Illustration to Explain World as an Illusion

Advaitins hold the view that the appearance of the world is an illusion on Brahman. They try to substantiate their view by saying that world can be sublated by the knowledge of Brahman, just like dream gets sublated by waking experience. Sublation is taken by the Advaitins as a criterion to determine the absolute reality of Brahman and the falsity of the world of duality. In order to explain the process of sublation between the world and Brahman, Advaitins take the cases of illusions and dream to apply the same to the Brahman-world illusion. Can the process of sublation in 'dream and waking' be applicable to the case of Brahman-world illusion? It necessitates one to analyze the application of sublation in different cases of illusions.

Let us explain, first, the Brahman-world illusion in order to find whether there is any similar illusion. If a similar illusion is not available then the sublation of world by *brahmajñāna* will be regarded only as faith of the Advaitins and not a reality. It will be shown in the following arguments that none of the processes of sublation, not only of dream but also of the other illusions, can be applicable to Brahman-world illusion.

2.1.1 Brahman-World Illusion Explained

Śaṅkara admits that before the realization of the identity of the individual self with Brahman, the world exists as it is.[7] So long as one does not attain *brahmajñāna*, one believes that the duality of the world is real. Thus the conviction of any person before Brahman-realization will be that 'this duality is real'. Once one gets *brahmajñāna* then the previous conviction regarding the reality of the world changes.

There is confusion in Advaita philosophy regarding the change of conviction in the realized persons. According to *Dṛṣṭi sṛṣṭi vāda*, a realized person always maintains non-dual experience,[8] lives like an insensible object,[9] and sustains oneself only on the food available by chance.[10] On the contrary, according to *Sṛṣṭi dṛṣṭi vāda*, a realized person, Śaṅkara says, necessarily undertakes the work for the welfare of the world.[11] Since this paper does not deal with the *dṛṣṭi sṛṣṭi vāda*, only the change of conviction in the realized persons from the standpoint of *Sṛṣṭi dṛṣṭi vāda* will be discussed here. Śaṅkara's statement, namely, 'a *brahmajñāni* necessarily undertakes the work for the welfare of the world,' implies that the duality physically appears to a *jīvanmukta* even after Brahman-realization. Thus according to Śaṅkara, the falsity of the world must be determined while one is in waking experience, for, it cannot be done so in *Turīya* and other states of experience. In other words, one realizes the illusoriness of the world while one is in world illusion itself.

Let us inquire whether there is any illusion in which, the falsity of illusory object is determined while one is in illusory experience itself. It necessitates one to analyze the application of sublation in different cases of illusions.

2.1.2 Classification of Illusions

Illusions can be broadly classified into two categories, namely, (I) Object Illusions, and (II) Subject Illusions. The object illusions can be divided into two, namely, (1) Private Illusions, and (2) Public Illusions. The private illusions again can be subdivided into two, namely, (i) Mind Dependent Illusions, and (ii) Mind-Sense Dependent Illusions. The mind-sense dependent illusions can be divided further into two, namely, (a) Positive Illusions, and (b) Negative Illusions. The public illusions can be divided into three, namely, (i) Object Dependent Illusions, (ii) Natural Illusions, and (iii) Artificial Illusions. The natural illusions can be subdivided into two, namely, (a) Individually Sublatable Illusions, and (b) Continuous Illusions. The subject illusions can be divided into two, namely, (1) Identity Illusions, and (2) Possession Illusions.

2.1.3 Application of Sublation in Illusions

Sublation can be of two kinds, namely, (i) ontological sublation, and (ii) practical sublation. Sublation in all object illusions corresponds only to ontological determination of falsity of a lesser real entity and the same in all subject illusions corresponds only to practical determination of falsity. The practical sublation cannot have ontological concern and the ontological sublation cannot have practical concern. The scheme of three levels of reality implies the utility of only ontological sublation by Advaitins. It is necessary now to find how the process of ontological sublation takes place in different kinds of illusions in order to determine what kind of sublation process is suitable for Brahman-world illusion. If one of these kinds of process of sublation is proved to be suitable for Brahman-world illusion then the Advaitin's definition of *vyāvahārika sattā* will be accepted. Otherwise, the world will not be accepted as empirical reality. It will be proved in the following arguments that none of the processes of sublation is compatible with Brahman-world illusion.

2.1.4 Sublation in Object Illusions and Verification with Brahman-World Illusion

(a) Private Illusions

Individuals create all private illusions for themselves. An example for mind dependent illusion is dream. In dream illusion the sublated knowledge (*bādhitajñāna*), for instance, can be that, 'I am riding a flying horse.' The sublating knowledge (*bādhakajñāna*) of the same is 'I am not riding a flying horse but I am lying on my bed.' That dream objects physically disappear by the ontological determination of their falsity. The falsity of lower reality of the disappeared dream objects is realized while one in a higher reality, that is, waking experience.

This kind of sublation between dream and waking world is not compatible with the case of Brahman-world illusion. For, in the case of Brahman-world illusion, the falsity of world cannot be determined while one is in the higher reality, that is, Brahman. Because, the instrument for determination of falsity, that is, mind, does not exist in non-dual experience. Also when the falsity of the world is realized while one is in waking experience, the world will not disappear like dream objects.

An example for positive illusions is shell–silver and the same for negative illusions is rope–snake illusion. Both belong to mind-sense dependent illusions. In both the cases the sublated knowledge (*bādhitajñāna*) is 'This is silver' and 'This is a snake' respectively. The sublating knowledge (*bādhakajñāna*) is 'This is not silver but only shell' and 'This is not a snake but only a rope' respectively. The illusory objects physically disappear with an ontological determination of their falsity. The falsity of the lower reality of the disappeared illusory objects is realized while one is in a higher reality. This kind of sublation is also not compatible with the Brahman-world illusion for the reasons given in the case of dream sublation.

(b) Public Illusions

Public illusions are experienced commonly by all. Examples for object dependent illusions are: (i) roseness of the clear crystal, and (ii) movie picture on a theatre screen. When a rose and crystal are kept close to each other then the crystal appears to be rose in colour. The roseness of the crystal is caused by the proximity of the rose and it depends on the rose itself. Similarly, a movie on the theatre screen depends on the projecting process. The *bādhitajñāna* in the first case is: 'This is a rose crystal.' The *bādhakajñāna* would be: 'This is not a rose crystal but only a clear crystal.' The roseness of the crystal exists as long as the proximity of the rose lasts. It is possible to verify and realize the real nature of the crystal by removing the rose. The movie on the theatre screen may be understood in the same manner. In the above two cases of object-dependent public illusions, the illusory objects, namely, roseness and movie on theatre screen, vanish only when the respective objects are physically removed.

This type of sublation depending on the physical removal of the object is not compatible with the case of Brahman-world illusion. Because the proximity of world to Brahman is not possible, for, Advaitins do not accept world as a second reality besides Brahman.

An example for individually sublatable natural illusions is water in a mirage. All can experience the water illusion in a mirage. But those who go in search of water in a mirage only can realize that there is no water but only sand. While such realization takes place individually the others still can see water for they have not realized that there is no water. Thus the water appears for those who have not realized and the same disappears for those who have realized the sand simultaneously. When the realized person of sand comes back physically and joins with other unrealized persons, water still appears for the realized one. Thus the illusory object disappears as long as one is in its substratum, that is, sand and appears when one physically comes out from sand experience.

This type of sublation between water and sand appears similar to the case of Brahman-world illusion. For, Advaitins believe that when one is in non-duality the duality disappears and non-dual experience disappears when one is in the experience of duality. That means while one is in *Turīya*, the duality of world disappears and when one is in waking experience the non-dual experience disappears. But still this type of sublation is not compatible with Brahman-world illusion. Because, non-dual *Turīya* disappears in the state of experience where one determines the falsity of duality. The determination of the falsity of the world cannot be done in *Turīya*, for; mind does not exist in *Turīya* to determine the falsity of the world. Whereas in the case of water–mirage, one can determine the falsity of water instantly while one realizes the sand in mirage. That means, one determines the falsity of an illusory object while one is in higher reality, namely, sand, but it is not the case with Brahman-world illusion.

An example of continuous illusions is blue sky. Unlike in the other cases of illusions, blueness of the sky will not disappear when sublation takes place, for, the ontology of blueness of the sky never changes even if one knows that the sky is not blue. This is to say that whether or not one knows the reality of sky, blue-sky continues to be seen. An example of artificial illusions is live sports on the television screen. In this case one can realize that what one is seeing is only the television screen but the knowledge of the illusory objects that one gets is real. Since the physical object under perception is only the television screen and not live sports, it is still an illusion.

The two cases, namely, (i) blue-sky, and (ii) live sports on television screen, are also not compatible with Brahman-world illusion. Because while one is in non-duality, that is, sublating reality, the duality, that is, sublated reality disappears unlike blueness of the sky. The knowledge of the world cannot be true when one is in non-duality unlike live sport on a television screen.

Thus it can be ascertained that none of the types of object illusions stand as an example for Brahman-world illusion. Therefore, it can be said that world cannot be an object illusion on Brahman. For, the other reason also, it can be said that Brahman-world illusion cannot be an object illusion, that is, an object illusion necessarily requires two independent entities but, world is not accepted as an independent entity in Advaita Vedānta.

2.2 Duality Cannot Get Sublated by Non-Dual Experience

Everyone will agree with the contention that dream objects are false because there are many convincing reasons[12] and the falsity of dream objects is realized in relation to or in comparison with gross physical objects while one is in waking experience. In other words, since, waking world has higher reality than dream world, the falsity of the latter can be determined while one is in higher reality, that is, waking experience. Contrary to the dream illusion, according to Advaitins, in the case of Brahman-world illusion, the falsity of the duality of the world has to be realized while one is in lower reality, that is, world itself. How is it possible that the determination of the falsity of the lower reality can be made while one is in lower reality itself? In other words, how can an illusion be realized as an illusion while one is in the same illusion? This position of Advaita leads one to inquire whether sublation is possible between Brahman and world. It will be shown in the following argument that non-dual experience cannot sublate the world of duality.

2.2.1 Advaita Application of the Concept of Sublation

According to Advaita, Sublation requires a minimum of two cognitions, namely, (i) sublating cognition (*bādhakajñāna*), and (ii) sublated cognition (*bādhitajñāna*). When sublation takes place between the two, the object of the latter cognition is said to be of lesser reality than that of the former. Among the three levels of reality, the cognition of the objects of *vyāvahārika sattā* in waking experience becomes *bādhakajñāna* for the cognition of the objects of *prātibhāsika sattā* in dream experience and it cannot be *vice versa*. Similarly the Consciousness, that is, the *Pāramārthika sattā* becomes *bādhakajñāna* for the cognition of the objects of *vyāvahārika sattā* in waking experience but it cannot be *vice versa*. In other words, the cognition of the objects of *prātibhāsika sattā* in dream experience becomes *bādhitajñāna* to the cognition of the objects of *vyāvahārika sattā* in waking experience and the cognition of the objects of *vyāvahārika sattā* in waking experience becomes *bādhitajñāna* to the *Pāramārthika sattā*, that is, Consciousness.

2.2.2 A Critique

Sublation can be of two kinds, namely, (i) ontological sublation, and (ii) practical sublation. The former ontologically determines the falsity of the objects whereas the latter so does practically, namely, falsity of posses-

sions and identities of the person. The first type cannot have practical concern and the second cannot have ontological concern. Advaitin's classification of three levels of reality implies the application of only ontological sublation. Now let us inquire whether world gets ontologically sublated by Brahman.

Generally the process of sublation involves in the following: (i) the cognition of the false object, (ii) the knowledge of the substratum, (iii) the sublating knowledge in the form of negation of the knowledge of the false object and substituting the same with the knowledge of the substratum, and (iv) the state of experience where the falsity is realized.

The requirements for Brahman-world sublation are as follows: (i) The knowledge of the false object is 'This world of duality is real.' (ii) The knowledge of the substratum is the *jīvabrahmaikyajñāna*,[13] in the form, that is, 'I am Brahman'. (iii) The *bādhakajñāna* is 'This duality is false but "I am Brahman".' (iv) The state of experience where the falsity of the duality is realized in waking experience. It will be argued here that the Advaitin's position is defective.

It is a fact that all the cases of determination of either falsity or reality of anything are done only in the waking state and not in any other state of experience. For instance, the falsity of the world cannot be realized in *Turīya*, for, *Turīya* is expounded as non-dual pure consciousness without any instrument, such as, the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Since, the determination of the falsity of the duality is an act of mind and mind does not exist in *Turīya*, the falsity of the world cannot be determined in *Turīya*. The falsity of the duality cannot be determined even in the *suṣupti*, for, it is not possible to determine anything in *suṣupti* because *antaḥkaraṇa* does not exist in *suṣupti*. It cannot be determined even in dream for all determinations in dream are false. Therefore, the only alternative state of experience where the falsity of the duality is realized is waking state. Thus an Advaitin should concede that the determination of the falsity of duality has to be done in waking state of duality itself.

According to the Advaitins, the sublated knowledge (*bādhitajñāna*) in the Brahman-world illusion, is 'This world of duality is real.' The knowledge of the substratum is 'I am Brahman.' Now it can be argued against an Advaitin that, how can the knowledge, that is, 'I am Brahman' be the sublating knowledge (*bādhakajñāna*) to the knowledge, that is, 'This world of duality is real?' Any isolated knowledge of the substratum cannot sublate the false knowledge. For instance, in the case of rope–snake illusion, the

simple perception of rope, that is, 'This is a rope' cannot sublate the cognition, that is, 'This is a snake.' If it can, then the cognition of any rope should sublate the false cognition of snake on any other rope. But it is not the case with the concept of sublation. The sublation requires knowledge of the particular rope on which the false snake is cognized and such knowledge of rope alone is capable of sublating the snake cognition. In other worlds, it is only when one gets the knowledge in the form, that is, 'It is not a snake but only a rope,' the false knowledge, that is, 'This is a snake' gets sublated. That means when sublation takes place the sublating cognition substitutes the sublated cognition after negating the same.

When the same principle is applied to the case of Brahman-world illusion, the knowledge of the substratum, that is, 'I am Brahman' cannot sublate the cognition, that is, 'This world of duality is real.' For, the knowledge 'I am Brahman' implies only that 'I am not this world but only Brahman.' This knowledge cannot ontologically sublate the world of duality. For, it cannot convey the sense, that is, 'I am not the world, therefore, world is false.' Also it does not convey the sense, that is, 'Whatever is different from "I" is false.' But, it only can convey the meaning, that is, 'The world is different from "I".'

An Advaitin may argue that since the *Upaniṣads* prove of Brahman as one and only non-dual reality, the knowledge of identity, namely, 'I am Brahman' may mean that, 'Whatever is different from "I" is unreal.' An Advaitin should accept two alternative positions in this situation, namely, (i) 'World is different from "I",' which approves the possibility of *vyāvahārika sattā*, and (ii) 'I' which is identical with Brahman alone exists and nothing else exists apart from Brahman. For the first position: if *bādhakajñāna* is, 'This world is false because it is different from "I" who is identical with Brahman,' then, we say that such knowledge cannot ontologically sublate the world. Rather it implies the coexistence of duality with 'I', which is non-dual Brahman. This position is not acceptable for an Advaitin, for it sounds like Kapila's dualism in Sāṁkhya philosophy. For the second position: it is contradictory to say that the instrument for such determination, that is, the *antaḥkaraṇa* does not exist. For, the determination of the falsity of the duality is made only in the waking state and it necessarily involves with the existence of mind. In other words, since such determination is done only in waking state, it cannot be said that the *antaḥkaraṇa* along with all duality does not exist in waking state. For without mind such realization is not possible. Even Śaṅkara admits the existence of the *antaḥkaraṇa* apart from the self.[14]

Thus it is proved that the *bādhakajñāna* cannot occur in the form, namely, 'This duality is false and "I am Brahman".' An Advaitin may argue that the sublating knowledge may occur in the form, that is, 'This is not duality but only non-dual Brahman.' This position leads one to inquire into the problem, namely, whether such knowledge of the so-called substratum, that is, 'I am Brahman' or 'All this is indeed Brahman' is possible. We hold the view that such knowledge is not possible.[15] Even if one wants to agree with Advaitin then, it is still contradictory to say that it is only Brahman that exists while such determination is made by mind, which is not Brahman. What remains now is that if an Advaitin wants to differentiate 'I' from the world of duality then, it means only that 'I' is different from the world of duality. Such knowledge does not confirm any ontological sublation of world by Brahman but only implies the coexistence of 'I' with the world. Thus it is proved that the duality cannot be ontologically sublated by non-dual experience.

The foregoing argument leads one to inquire into the alternative position, namely, if non-duality cannot sublate the duality then, is it possible for duality to sublate the non-duality? It will be proved in the following argument that the waking experience can sublate the non-dual experience.

3. NON-DUAL EXPERIENCE CAN BE AN ILLUSION ON DUALITY

As stated above, the requirements for the ontological sublation in the case of non-duality getting sublated by duality are as follows: (i) The *bādhitajñāna* is 'I am non-duality'. (ii) The knowledge of substratum is 'This world of duality is real.' (iii) The sublating knowledge is 'I am not non-duality but duality consisting of body-sense-mind complex.' (iv) The state of experience where the ontological falsity of non-duality is realized is waking experience.

It is a fact that any determination is possible only in waking state for the reasons mentioned above. Since the falsity of non-duality is realized in waking state based on the knowledge, that is, 'This world is real' the contents of the world can be the substratum for the knowledge of non-duality.[16] As far as the false cognition, that is, 'I am non-dual Brahman', is concerned, we have already proved that such knowledge is false and impossible.[17] The *bādhakajñāna*, namely, 'The non-duality is false but world of duality is real,' is possible in waking state. While the determination of the falsity of non-dual experience occurs in waking state, it is

not possible to have the existence of the non-dual experience. For, it is the Advaitin's own rule that where there is no duality there is non-duality and where there is duality there is no non-duality.[18] Therefore, when the determination of falsity of non-duality is made, there cannot exist non-duality even according to Advaitins.

For the other reason also, that is, this ontological sublation looks similar to that of dream, it can be ascertained that non-duality gets sublated by duality. As long as one is in dream one thinks that dream objects are real so also one thinks that non-duality is real as long as one is in *Turīya*. But when one wakes up either from dream or from *Turīya*, both dream and *Turīya* disappear and become false, for, what exists there in the waking state is only the world of duality. If an Advaitin says that *Turīya* according to the *Upaniṣads* in the substratum for the world then, we say that this conviction is only a mark of an Advaitin's faith in the *Upaniṣads* but not a reality. Thus it is proved that the knowledge of the non-duality can ontologically be sublated by the knowledge of duality in waking state.

The foregoing arguments go to prove that non-duality cannot sublate duality and duality can sublate non-duality. This implies that world cannot be an illusion on non-duality but non-duality can be regarded as an illusion on duality. It will be shown in the following argument that the subject illusions cause *duḥkha*.

4. *DUḤKHA* IS CAUSED BY SUBJECT ILLUSIONS

The basic purpose of Advaita Vedānta is to redeem one from suffering (*duḥkha*). Advaitins believe that man suffers from duality. Pain and pleasure are experienced only when one is in duality and no one experiences the same in dreamless sleep, for, there is no duality in *suṣupti*. When man comes back to waking state from deep sleep he realizes that he had peaceful and blissful sleep. It implies that the world causes suffering[19] in man. There are two ways of looking at the fact, that is, world causes suffering: (i) Since the absence of the world in deep sleep results in peaceful and blissful experience, the appearance of the world by itself causes *duḥkha*, and (ii) Since suffering man is also a part of the appearance of the world, it cannot be said that the very existence of man is the cause of his own suffering. It can be said that man experiences suffering not because of the appearance of the world, but because of his desire to possess the objects of the world. Advaitins support the first view and try to argue that non-

dual knowledge sublates the world. Contrary to the Advaita view we uphold the second view for, it is unreasonable to say that man has to get rid of his own existence along with the existence of the world in order to destroy his *duḥkha*. It sounds like saying that the best cure for the disease is to destroy the patient.

Thus one needs to understand that the very existence of the world cannot be the cause of *duḥkha*. Therefore, the Advaitin's argument, namely, the world disappears when non-dual experience ontologically sublates the world becomes unwarranted. It is a fact that world always exists without concerning the existence or non-existence of the enjoyer of the world. World exists all the time and it never intends to cause suffering in human beings, for, it cannot think like man. Rather it can be stated that all the worldly objects are there to sustain the life of all living beings. How then does man suffer from the world? It is not a fact that the existence of the world causes suffering in man by itself. But it is man who causes suffering for him by developing subject illusions on the worldly objects, such as, identities and possessions. It is by the influence of the *vāsanas* that man volunteers himself to fall into the craving for the possession of the objects. Whether man desires an object or not, the objects remain the same. When man desires he suffers and when he does not desire he does not suffer. All the desires are caused by man's false ideas, such as, possessions and identifications with the objects. The whole process of suffering happens naturally because man deliberately falls into the problem of suffering with his wrong ideas by engrossing himself in thinking to possess the objects.

It is apt now to cite an example for such an illusion where man volunteers to fall himself into the illusion and deliberately takes all illusory objects as real. Bharata in his *Nātyaśāstra* states that the dance drama is the best example for the illusion where man knowingly forgets himself by absorbing himself in the characters of the drama. We are so much engrossed with the characters that even when we wake up from dance drama illusion during the interval we wilfully go back again to it after the intermission and even when the curtain finally falls we return home discussing and remembering it for quite some time.

Similarly man always falls into the subject illusions voluntarily by the influence of his past *vāsanas*, desires, likes and dislikes. Thus one should understand that the man is naturally falling himself into the subject illusions with the influence of his own false ideas. Again when man desires

or does not desire an object, the object stands untouched by the feelings of the enjoyer and it cannot by itself cause suffering in man. Thus one needs to understand that the cause of human suffering is only one's subject illusions and not the object illusions. Therefore, one has to remove one's subject illusions in order to get liberation, rather than working on understanding the Advaitin's Brahman-world illusion.

We are going to show in the following argument that an ontological sublation of the world is not required for liberation and what is required for liberation is the practical sublation of one's subject illusions.

5. SUBLATION OF THE WORLD IS NOT REQUIRED FOR *MOKṢA*

All human beings aspire for removal of sorrow and attainment of happiness. For Advaitins *mokṣa*, which is the supreme human goal (*parama puruṣārtha*), is of the nature of cessation of suffering and attainment of bliss.[20] Advaita philosophy believes that man is having *duḥkha* and release of man from such suffering is its goal. According to Advaitins, there are only two categories, namely, (i) the seer (*Dṛk*), and (ii) the seen (*Dṛśya*). For them, the seer is Brahman, which is blissful and only existent, therefore, *Dṛk* cannot be the cause of suffering. So only *Dṛśya* must have caused suffering, for, it is the only other category. *Dṛśya* according to the Advaitins is world of duality. In order to remove suffering there are two alternative methods, namely, (i) to hold the view that world of duality does not exist at all, and (ii) world appears but it is not ultimate reality.

Surprisingly, Advaitins adopt both the views in different methods of establishing their philosophy. The first view is adopted in their *Dṛṣṭi sṛṣṭi vāda* according to which the duality, which never exists, is only imagination of the individual. Man suffers from his own imagination (*kalpana*) of duality in the place of non-duality. If one stops imagination then one will be released from suffering. Since this method of Advaita does not believe in the reality of anything other than non-duality, it does not involve the concept of sublation.

The second view is adopted in the *Sṛṣṭi dṛṣṭi vāda*. This method, unlike the other, advocates the view that *Īśvara* creates the duality. *Anādi jīva* thinks that this duality belongs to him and suffers from such ideas of possession of the worldly objects, etc. According to Advaitins one should realize that the world is an illusion on Brahman in order to attain liberation. The world illusion on Brahman will be removed only by the knowl-

edge of Brahman because Advaitins believe that Brahman is the substratum of the world. Since Brahman is non-dual in nature, the attainment of the same sublates the world illusion on it. Thus Advaitins argue that Brahman knowledge alone liberates man from world illusion.

But we hold the view that the cause of human suffering is not the appearance of the world but man's desires for the objects and therefore, there is no need for Brahman-knowledge and sublation of the world by non-dual experience in order to attain liberation. One should learn to see things as they really are, that is, things do not belong to one, in order to get release from suffering. Is it necessary to remove whole duality outright in order to get release from such suffering caused by mere wrong thinking? It seems not necessary. If one thinks properly then one does not suffer from the objects of the world. One suffers only from the identity and the idea of possessing the objects. This we call subject illusions. The subject illusions get practically sublated by the knowledge, that is, nothing is permanent and unchangeable; there is nothing that belongs to oneself; and nothing can be possessed in this world. Such knowledge sublates the idea of one's identity and possession of the world. This sublation we call practical sublation, which alone can release man from suffering.

Thus Advaitin's argument for the possibility of the ontological sublation of the world by Brahman is repudiated. In the same place a practical sublation of the delusion in the form of identity and possessions of the world, which does not involve in physical disappearance of the world is accepted. It can be stated now that, whether or not one realizes the real nature of the world, the world remains the same. That means, world continues to exist not only when man is in the state of suffering, but also, when he is liberated. The presence of the world is nothing to do with man's suffering. Man suffers only from his own cravings and from such subject illusions, as, possessions and identities. He gets liberated from such suffering only when he stops craving for the things of the world by realizing the falsity of his subject illusions.

6. *PĀRAMĀRTHIKA SATTĀ* CANNOT BE DETERMINED

The Advaitins define *Pāramārthika sattā* as that which does not get sublated in three-fold time. Let us evaluate which one among the four types of experience, namely, *Turīya*, deep sleep, dream and waking stands for the scrutiny of the criterion, that is, unsublatability in three-fold time. Dream

knowledge ontologically gets sublated in waking state in the form, that is, 'The dream is false but only the gross objects are real.' The same sublation of the gross objects is not possible in dream. Deep sleep also gets sublated in waking state, in the form, that is, 'I did not know anything in deep sleep but now I know this world is real.' Gross objects cannot get sublated in deep sleep for there is no possibility for such determination in deep sleep, that is, 'This world is not real and I know nothing in deep sleep.' Similarly, non-dual *Turīya* gets sublated in waking experience in the form, that is, 'It is not non-duality but only duality is real.' Such sublation of duality in non-duality is not possible for there cannot arise a *bādhakajñāna* in *Turīya*, that is, 'This is not duality but only non-duality,' because of the reasons mentioned above.

Now it can be said that duality never gets sublated by any other experience but waking experience sublates knowledge of the other states of experience. Thus the world of duality is proved as higher reality than the reality of the other states of experience. For the other reasons that the awareness of real time is possible only in waking experience and the existence of the objects of the same is verifiable in three-fold time, the objects of waking experience are said to be of higher reality in comparison with the reality of the other states of experience.

If an Advaitin, by leaving away unsublatability as a criterion of the ultimate reality, wants to hold the view that, that which exists continuously without any change is the highest reality then we say that none of the four varieties of experience, namely, waking, dream, deep sleep and non-dual experience stands for the *pāramārthikasattā*. For all the varieties of experience are not constant and they do not exist continuously. Instead of ascribing the highest reality to one of the levels of experience, we rather hold the view that none of the levels of experience is worth calling as the highest reality.

It is not important for a *mumukṣu* to know what is gaining the highest reality; but what is necessary for him is to discover the cause of his suffering in order to get rid of *duḥkha*. If an Advaitin says that the very existence of the world is the cause of human suffering then we say that it is unreasonable. For it is not reasonable to say that headache is caused because of the existence of the head. Thus we admit that let the world be as it is and man has to discover that the cause of suffering is his craving for the possession of worldly objects. When one successfully gets rid of one's desires, one gets liberated. What a man needs to do in the name of

attaining liberation is that he should alter his false views on the worldly objects by realizing that he cannot possess any object.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The position of Advaita, namely, the world is an illusion on Brahman is proved wrong by showing that (i) there is no proper illusion to explain the Brahman-world illusion, and (ii) world cannot get sublated by non-dual experience. It is established that the non-duality can be an illusion on duality. It is also proved that the non-dual experience gets sublated by waking experience. Then it is shown that the cause of suffering (*duḥkha*) is subject illusions. Further, it is established that the ontological sublation of the world, which implies the disappearance of the world, is not required for the attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*). Lastly, it is held that if one has to determine the *pāramārthika sattā* by applying the unsublatability as a criterion of reality then the duality must be ascribed as the higher reality, that is, *pāramārthika sattā*, in comparison with the reality of the other states of experience, else, nothing is worth calling as the highest reality.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Parasurāmapantula Lingamūrty Gurumūrty, Sītārāmānjaneyasamvādamu, pp. 260–1 *Telugu Ṭīkātātparyavivaraṇasahitamu*, Vavilla Ramaswami Satrulu and Sons, Madras, 1934.

   Sublation is known as destruction in a technical sense. Destruction is mainly of two kinds, namely, (i) *dhvamsa*, and (ii) *bādha*. *Dhvamsa* is the destruction of physical objects generally found when such methods of destruction as breaking, burning the objects, etc., are used. *Bādha* is also a kind of destruction generally applied when illusory objects are destroyed by the dawn of the right knowledge of their substratum (*adhiṣṭāna*).

   Niścaladās, *Vicārasāgaram*, p. 145, translated into Sanskrit by Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal, The Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal Library Committee, Tanjore, India, 1986. *Bādho nāma aparokṣa mithyātvaniścayaḥ*

   Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya, 3.2.4, p. 346, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998. *Vaitathyam bādhyamānatvāt*

   S.S. Suryanarayana Sastry, *Philosophies and Philosophical Works*, 'On the Nature of Sublation', pp. 191–6.

   For Suryanarayana Sastry, sublation is sublimation.

   Eliot Deutsch, *Advaita Vedānta* (*A Philosophical Reconstruction*), p. 15, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1988.

   According to Eliot Deutsch 'sublation', which he tried to reconstruct as 'subration', is the mental process whereby one disvalues some previously apprised object or content of consciousness because of its being contradicted by a new experience.
2. *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, 3.2.4, pp. 346–7, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998.

   Pāramārthikastu nāyaṁ saṁdhyāśrayaḥ sargo viyadādisargavadityetāvat pratipādhyate|Na ca viyadādisargasyāpyātyantikaṁ satyatvamasti|Prāktu brahmātmatvadarśanādviyadādi prapañco vyavasthitarūpo bhavati|Saṁdhyāśrayastu prapañcaḥ pratidinaṁ bādhyata iti.
3. Niścaladās, *Vicārasāgaram*, p. 145, translated into Sanskrit by Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal, The Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal Library Committee, Tanjore, India, 1986.

   Yasya padārthasya brahmajñānamantarā na bādhaḥ, kimtu brahmajñānenaiva bādho bhavati tasya vyāvahārikasattāvatvena vyapadeśaḥ| Brahmajñānetarābādhyatve sati brahmajñānamātra bādhyatvaṁ vyāvahārikasatvamiti yāvat| Sa ca satteśvara sṛṣṭapadārtheṣvasti| Yato dehendriyādi prapañca rūpeśvarasṛṣṭerbrahmajñānamantarā na bādho bhavati, kimtu brahmajñānenaiva bhavati| Tasmādīśvarasṛṣṭapadārtha vyāvahārikasattākā iti jñeyaṁ|
4. Ibid., p. 146.

   Brahmajñānetara bādhyatvam prātibhāsikatvaṁ| Tādṛśam satvaṁ yatrāste sa prātibhāsikapadārtha ityucyate| — Prātibhāsikaḥ = Pratītikālamātrasattākaḥ| — Pratītikālamātrabhāvinaḥ padārthasya prātibhāsika sattocyate|
5. Ibid.

   Kālatrayābādhyatavm = Pāramārthikasatvaṁ| Caitanyamekameva na kadāpi bādhyata iti pāramārthika sattā caitanyasyaiva|
6. *Tuccha* is used only to show that any content of our experience can never be absolutely non-existent and whether such content deserves some kind of reality depends upon its scrutiny by applying the concept of sublation.
7. *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, 3.2.4, p. 347, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998.

   Prāktu brahmātmatvadarśanādviyadādi prapañco vyavasthitarūpo bhavati|
8. *Māṇḍūkhyopaniṣad Gauḍapādakārikā Śāṅkarabhāṣya.*, 2.38.
9. Ibid., 2.36.
10. Ibid., 2.37.
11. *The Bhagavadgītāśāṅkarabhāṣya.*, 3.25, p. 54, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1988.

    Yadi punarahamiva tvaṁ kṛtārthabuddhirātmavidanyo va tasyāpyātmanaḥ kartavyābhave 'pi parānugraha eva kartavya ityāha.
12. *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, 3.2.1–6; also see

    Māṇḍūkhyopaniṣad Gauḍapādakārikā Śāṅkarabhāṣya., Chapter 2.
13. *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, 3.2.4, p. 347, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998.

    Prāktu brahmātmatvadarśanādviyadādi prapañco vyavasthitarūpo bhavati|

14. Ibid., 2.3.32, p. 289.
    Taccaivaṁ būtamantaḥkaraṇamavasyamastītyabhyupagantavyaṃ.
15. *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, January–April, 1997.
    'A Critique on Brahman-realisation', pp. 71–82.
    We have proved in the above article that Brahman-realization is not possible.
    Also see the same Journal, Vol. XVII, No. 2, 'A Critique on the Concept of *Jīva*', pp. 117–42.
    We have proved in the above article that '*Jīva*' which is indicated by 'I' is not Brahman. The *Brahmacaitanya* cannot be the source of the *jīvacaitanya*.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.*, 2.4.14; 4.5.15.
    Yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati
    Also see
    Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad., 4.4.19,
    Kaṭhopaniṣad., 2.4.11
    Neha nānāsti kiṁcana
19. A detailed discussion on *duḥkha* is not presented here. The relationship of the world with *duḥkha* is very briefly admitted here with all limitations such as the scope and the context of paper.
20. Dharmarāja Adhvarin, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 153, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, India, 1984.
    Ānandātmikabrahmaprāptiśca mokṣaḥ; śokanivṛttiśca: Also see
    Niścaladās, *Vicārasāgaraṁ*, p. 21, translated into Sanskrit by Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal, The Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal Library Committee, Tanjore, India, 1986.
    Sakalajanānāṁ ca duḥkhanivṛttau sukhāvāptau cedṛśicchā samjāyate. Īdṛśānarthanivṛttiḥ paramānandavāptiśca mokṣa ityucyate.

Primordial Waters: Some Remarks on Ṛgvedic Creation Hymns

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When the vast waters moved, pregnant with the universe as embryo producing Agni, thence he evolved, the sole-life principle of the gods, to what god we should worship with our oblations? (Ṛgveda, X.121.7)[1]

STATEMENT

I wish to highlight in this paper* a distinct idea found in the Ṛgveda that interpreted cosmogony in terms of a cosmic conception,[2] using womb/foetus and parturition metaphors. This is seen in those hymns that regard Waters[3] as the primordial stuff that bear and generate the first creative principle through a process of transformation and generation. However, only a small number of hymns talk of creation in terms of transformation, autonomous generation and even female agency. A process wherein an interior modification and autonomous engendering of the evolutes takes place, is what I refer to as feminine creation. The metaphor of the womb[4] is used explicitly in some contexts, while in many others, it is not so used. But, nevertheless, the process of generation described is comparable to feminine engendering.

The popular and dominant motif for cosmogony in the Ṛgveda has been the myth pertaining to god Indra and the demon Vṛtra. Indra, often invoked as the destroyer of Vṛtra (Vṛtrahan)[5] not only slays Vṛtra, but also releases the waters and the Sun. He separates the sat from the asat, spreads

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out the earth, props up the sky, and organizes and assigns duties to the gods.[6] Thus there is a notion of destruction and valour in many hymns, which seems to be a prerequisite for creation. This notion not only points to an understanding of war-like heroic valour as intrinsically creative or productive,[7] but also brings about the contrast with the cosmogony in terms of gradual generation from a given primary material such as the cosmic Waters. The emphasis of the present paper is not the performance-oriented creation myth, but the notion of creation in terms of human conception.

In the following section I explain the notion of feminine creation and also in detail the enigmatic Nāsadīyasūkta of the tenth *maṇḍala* of the Ṛgveda which could be interpreted as envisaging the model of interior transformation and generation.

SOME NOTIONS OF FEMININE CREATION

Many forms of the root *jaṅ* (*janayati, jaṅyate, jāyate, jātaḥ* etc.) which means to 'produce' can be discerned in the contexts of Ṛgvedic cosmogony. There are at least two distinct and significant applications of words that are derived from the root *jaṅ*.[8] Many scholars[9] have pointed out that some major Ṛgvedic cosmogonies consciously invoke creation as approximating (feminine) engenderment which involves inner transformation and self-manifestation, akin to parturition; while others closely resemble the 'masculine' performances operating from outside, such as impregnating, tearing or opening up, or shaping an object like a carpenter, potter, weaver, smith or even a sacrificer.[10] In the former model a distinct trend of representing the primordial Waters as the womb from which arises the first principle can be indentified. I have chosen the enigmatic Nāsadīya creation hymn (X, 129) and a couple of verses from the Hiraṇyagarbha (X, 121), both from the tenth *maṇḍala* of the Ṛgveda to demonstrate the idea of feminine creation. In the Nāsadīya hymn, one notes the self-generation of the first principle, 'That One', *Tadekaṁ* from the primordial Waters *salilaṁ*.[11] In the Hiraṇyagarbha hymn (X.121.7), the primordial 'vast Waters' *brhatīrāpaḥ* bearing the vital germ, thus explicitly invoking the metaphor of the womb and the foetus. References are made in this paper to hymns like Aditidākṣyāyanīvā (X, 72, 4) and Vāgaṁbhraṇi sūkta (X, 125), which clearly view creation in terms of feminine body metaphor and agency. In Aditidākṣyāyaṇīvā the creation of

earth is seen to proceed from the outstretched feet *uttānapad* of Aditi, akin to parturition, while in Vāgaṁbhraṇi, creation is seen in terms of an active female agency. Despite difference in their philosophical assumptions and treatment of sexuality and gender, the above texts are similar in that they view creation as taking place autonomously. The Nāsadīya and Hiraṇyagarbha hymns, however have a strong sceptical and speculative tones, even though the primordial Waters is posited as the primary substance that bears the first principle. I shall undertake a detailed study of the entire Nāsadīya hymn alluding to several Indological and philosophical works on the subject.

The following section is divided into two parts: in the first part, I discuss the importance and the opacity of the Nāsadīya text,* and in the second, the verses of the text with different interpretations of the key terms are rendered. The focus of this enterprise is to demonstrate that there is a primary material prior to all creation, the Waters or *tamas*, which holds the first principle *Tadekaṁ* within it like the womb. Through a process of *tapas* the *Tadekaṁ* evolves. There are two different views maintained by Indologists on the primordial stuff expressed by the term *apraketam salilaṁ* (X, 129, 3). According to one set of Indologists the expression means 'a surge of darkness' and to others it refers to 'the indistinguishable Waters'. With the former view, the first principle arises from the surge of darkness through *tapas*, while with the latter it evolves from the Waters through *tapas*. In the subsequent sections of this paper both the views are delineated but the latter reading of the expression *apraketaṁ salilaṁ* is taken into consideration to evoke the metaphor of womb and the embryo and also the process of autonomous generation.

SECTION 1

> 'There is beginning. There is not yet begun to be a beginning. There is not yet begun to not yet begin to be a beginning. There is something. There is nothing. There is not yet begun to be nothing. There is not yet begun to not yet begin to be nothing. Suddenly there is something and nothing. And yet I don't know what follows from there "being" nothing. Is it something or is it nothing?'
>
> The Chuang Tzu[12]

*I am indebted to Professor George Hart, University of California, Berkeley, and C.N. Subramaniam, Ekalavya Institute, Hoshangabad, India, for their substantial contribution to my understanding of this most interesting hymn.

'Who really knows? Who shall here proclaim it—from where was it born, from where this creation? The gods are on this side of the creation of this world. So then who does know from where it came to be? This creation—from where it came to be, if it was produced or if not—he who is the overseer of this (world) in the highest heaven, he surely knows. Or if he does not know ...?'

The Nāsadīyasūkta 6&7[13]

The Nāsadīya Hymn

The above Chinese quotation and the last two verses of the Nāsadīya hymn, if not identical, do have similar tones. According to Roger Ames, the early Chinese thought 'discouraged the interpretation of creativity in terms of *creatio ex nihilo* and *destructo in nihilum*' for it believed in 'identifiable rhythm, order and cadence of cycle and viewed the organismic process, fundamentally cyclical.'[14] The Nāsadīya, on the other hand, seems to question the capacity of the human intellect to probe into the problem of primordial creation. The Nāsadīya differs from the above Chinese 'interpretation of creativity'[15] in sporadically making positive suggestions about the beginning, only to dispute everything in the last two verses quoted above. However, both seem to adopt a tantalizing linguistic device to abandon and transcend all dualistic modes of understanding.

The Nāsadīya hymn[16] has seven ambiguous verses, out of which verses 1, 6 and 7 express a strong philosophical scepticism. The hymn is extremely significant for at least two or three reasons. Joel Brereton, has pointed out that the hymn does not really offer a 'detailed picture of the origin of things nor describe the nature or agent of primordial thought, because to do so would defeat its own purpose.'[17] The poem, according to him is open ended pointing 'to the process of thinking as an approximate answer to the unanswerable riddle about origin of things.' According to Jayatilleke, 'the scepticism of the Nāsadīya Sūkta is interesting not merely because it ends on a sceptical note but because it does so after taking account of almost every possibility with regard to the problem of the origin of the world.'[18] The same hymn is viewed by other scholars like H.D. Velankar, Alfred Collins and Aguilar I. Matas as suggesting a distinct and significant cosmogony.[19] The cosmogony of the Nāsadīya, 'is not dependent on a divine dragon-slayer (Indra) or propper-apart of heaven and earth (Varuṇa) to release the constriction. Creation is the autonomous self-manifestation of the primal being, at least on the objective level'.[20] The Nāsadīya hymn indeed prioritizes the notion of generation as against the other major cosmogonic account in the Ṛgveda which is premised on the notion of self-sacrifice (Puruṣasūkta X, 90).[21] Coomaraswamy, Chanana and Raja have detected the origin of the Sāṁkhya system in this hymn.[22] As Coomaraswamy and Raja point out, all the three words *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*, that crop up prolifically in the classical Sāṁkhya philosophy, occur for the first time in the Nāsadīya hymn.[23]

Even though this hymn has not been as popular as the Puruṣasūkta with the brahmin ritualists, its philosophical, social and historical implications must not be underestimated. Philosophical speculations begin in right earnest with the Nāsadīya text. The two major Brahmanical schools that have drawn their sustenance from the speculations of the text are the Sāṁkhya and the Vedānta. The speculative methodology itself is well utilized by the Buddhists, as noted by Jayatilleke.[24] The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (X.5.3.1) contains the earliest extant comment on the Nāsadīya and it clearly identifies the first principle, *Tadekaṁ*, with mind, *manas*.[25] Sāyaṇa,[26] the fourteenth century commentator, provides two readings of the text, from the Parmārthika and the Vyavahārika points of views and identifies the *Tadekaṁ* with the Vedāntin's Brahman.[27] When the emphasis is shifted from the *Tadekaṁ* to the primordial Waters, *salilaṁ* which serves as the receptacle of *Tadekaṁ*, then the progress is in the direction of the natural philosophy of the Sāṁkhya. The Nāsadīyasūkta thus has aroused and generated contentious interpretations and translations, thwarting any single or comprehensive conclusion. The very obscurity of the text allows for multiple, complex and contrary interpretations. Virtually every Indologist has attempted a translation and interpretation of this hymn. Even though Indologists have certainly distinguished this model of creation from the other ones, not much emphasis has been laid on the metaphor of the womb and auto-generation of the first principle. Therefore, an attempt is made in this paper to understand the notion of feminine creation based on the metaphor of womb. There seem to be two distinct trends in textual reading that give rise to two views on the text. In the following section the two trends and the inherent difficulty in reading the text are discussed.

The two trends in the textual reading

In view of the above discussion, one would suggest two distinct trends—a latent and a dominant—in the same text. This is not to argue that a single view must be accepted or rejected as correct or incorrect. Rather it is important to recognize the readings of the text that were accorded importance by later thinkers in developing their own philosophies. The text offers one view of creation predominantly, which is the autonomous evolution of the first principle *Tadekaṁ*. But this does not negate the subterranean view that is also present, although seldom consciously articulated. This substratum view could be seen as indicating a different and contending position of that time, which the poet is coming to terms with. In fact, one could see the tension between the dominant and the latent views as constituting the discourse of this hymn. It could thus be argued that both views are inherent in the Nāsadīyasūkta, which consequently formed the basis for future debates and conflicts. It must also be emphasized that the source of confusion is the instability of key terms like *salilaṁ*, *kāma*, *raśmi*, etc., in the hymn.

The central theme of the hymn is speculation, followed by a narration of the dual creative processes—the primary and the secondary. The primary creative potential *Tadekaṁ* is self-generated, while for the secondary creation (*visṛṣṭi*) *kāma* or desire is posited as the prime mover. This *kāma* then creates a sexually graded division that engineers the final creation. This model stands in noticeable contrast with the popular *yajña* or sacrifice model found in the other Vedic creation hymns.

The following reading of the text capitalizes on the subterranean view present in the text. Verses 1 and 3 seem to regard the primordial Waters (*ambhas* and *salilaṁ*) as the sole material present before the distinction between the dual categories of *sat* and *asat* has emerged. The first principle *Tadekaṁ* arose by its own inherent power (*svadhayā*) from the chaotic and indistinguishable Waters *ambhas/salilaṁ*. This reading covertly engages us in the metaphor of the womb, because the primordial Waters (*ambhas/salilaṁ*) are seen to exist prior to the generation of the *Tadekaṁ*. Some renderings of the text give prominence to the generation of the *Tadekaṁ* by its own power (*svadhayā*) diminishing the role of the primordial Waters, while others emphasize the role of the primordial Waters in generating the first principle. Again I would like to focus on the latter rendering of the hymn, which locates the emergence of the *Tadekaṁ* or the *ābhu* from the primordial Waters.[28] The first three verses and the first half of the fourth verse deal with primary creation, while the latter hemstitch of the fourth verse and the fifth verse deal with secondary creation. For our present purpose we deal with the first three verses in detail and merely allude to the other verses.

In the first verse, an attempt is made to grapple with the nature of the world prior to the emergence of the distinction between *sat* and *asat*. Hence, the first verse is admittedly speculative, although it is sure of a few things for which it uses affirmative language.

> Na asat āsīt nó iti sat āsīt tadānīm na asit rājah nó iti viyomā paraḥ yat, kim a avarīvariti kuha kasya śarman ambhaḥ kim āsit gahanam gabhīram.[29] (1)

There was not the non-existent nor the existent then; there was not the air nor the heaven which is beyond. What did it contain? Where? In whose protection? Was there Water, unfathomable, profound?[30]

The terms *sat* and *asat* have been variously understood. Maurer considers *sat* and *asat* as predicate adjectives to 'all this' *sarvam idam*, meaning the world, occurring in the third verse.[31] However, Collins suggests that the terms *sat* and *asat* are predicate nominatives to '*tat*' which evolves into the cosmos, mentioned in the second verse.[32]

The last line of the above verse '*ambhaḥ kiṁ āsit gahanaṁ gabhīraṁ*' is ambiguous as it has been translated in at least two different ways. Norman Brown, J. Muir, Adolf Kaegi[33] and many others attach the speculative note to the existence of the pre-cosmic Waters: that is that the verse may not intend a definite assertion about the existence of the Waters. They have viewed this as an attempt to describe a primeval state wherein the existing categories cease to function. This view denies the existence of the pre-cosmic Waters.

Following other translators like Griffith, Collins, Renou and Macdonell,[34] the last hemstitch is read as describing a condition where the pre-cosmic Waters existed in the beginning, and the speculative note[35] is attributed to the fathomless abyss of the Waters. Different implications seem to follow when the above rendering is read in conjunction with the verse 2 which alludes to the self-existent *Tadekaṁ*, and also the verse 3 that asserts the existence of the undistinguished *salilaṁ*. But the term *ambhas*[36] for waters in the first verse, as noted by Alfred Collins, is not only grammatically

neuter, but more importantly, is neuter in conception as well[37] as the Waters engender nothing at this stage.

> No mṛtyuh āsīt amṛtaṃ na tarhi na rātryāḥ ahnah āsit praketaḥ ānīt avātaṁ svadhayā tat ekaṃ tasmāt ha anyāt na paraḥ kiṁ cana asa. (2)

There was not death nor immortality then. There was not the beacon of night, nor of day. That one breathed, windless, by its own power. Other than that there was not anything beyond.

The verse 2 now points out that there was 'that one' or 'that alone' *Tadekaṁ* which existed and breathed windlessly *avātaṁ* by its own power *svadhā*. According to Coomaraswamy this statement is profound and significant as it implies all the correlative of motion without local movement.[38] Referring to self-power, or self-position,[39] the term *svadhā*, which is feminine gender,[40] occurs once more in the verse 5 to qualify the feminine seed-bearers as distinguished from the male seed-depositors.

If we concur with the second interpretation of the last hemstitch of the first verse that there were pre-cosmic Waters, then the first two verses can be reread to get a different view:

'When there was neither existent nor non-existent, there was indeterminate waters from which emerged "That one" by its own potential.'[41]

But verse 3 throws some more light on the issue of the existence of the pre-cosmic waters:

> Tamah āsīt tamasā gūḷham agre apraketaṁ salilaṁ sarvam idaṁ ah tuchena ābhu apihitaṁ yat āsīt tapasaḥ tat mahinā ajāyata ekaṁ. (3)

Darkness was in the beginning hidden by darkness; indistinguishable, this all was water. That which, coming into being, was covered with the void, that One arose through the power of heat.[42]

The third verse slides back partially, to describe again the primordial state and the generation/manifestation of 'That One', now called *abhu*. The ambiguous expression here seems to be *apraketaṁ salilaṁ* that is again rendered in at least two different senses. The emphasis of the first half of the verse is on darkness covered by darkness prior to creation. In accordance with this description, *apraketaṁ salilaṁ* is taken to mean a flow or surge of darkness.[43] According to Maurer and Raja, *apraketaṁ salilaṁ* need not be taken literally to mean 'undistinguished sea' but a state of 'indeterminateness.'[44] Griffith too translates the expression as 'indiscriminated chaos'.[45] In contrast, Macdonell, Kaegi, Zaehner and

Collins render *apraketaṁ salilaṁ* as unillumined/indistinguishable Waters.[46] Collins in fact suggests that the 'self-swelling' *salilaṁ* in this verse, 'although grammatically neuter', represents a more feminine, fructifying stage than the *ambhas* of stanza 1'.[47]

If we accept Collins's conception of *salilaṁ*[48] as representing feminine and fructifying Waters, then there seems to be some connection, though unclear, between the primordial Waters and the *ābhu*. In this sense the force (*ābhu*) (with the power of evolution) which was enclosed in emptiness (of the unillumined Waters) was born through the power of its own (creative, incubating) heat.

Derived from the root *bhū*, the term *ābhu* means; to be present; to exist; to originate; to begin to exist. The *ābhu* is translated as the 'force' with the power of evolution,[49] or 'germ' of all things[50] and it was enveloped in *tuccha* or the void of the *salilaṁ*.[51] It is interesting that the Nāsadīya hymn does not use the feminine gender *ap*, instead it uses the neuter nouns *ambhas* and *salilaṁ*.[52] But as pointed out by Collins, *salilaṁ* in this verse represents a more feminine, fructifying stage than *ambhas* of the earlier verse because of its engendering ability.[53] If this interpretation is accepted as plausible then there arises the conception of the 'germ' being enveloped by the darkness *tamas* of the Waters *salilaṁ*, which is undoubtedly evocative of the amniotic fluid surrounding the foetus in the human womb.[54] Although the hymn does not use the metaphor of the womb, it can be read as suggesting it. Furthermore, the self-swelling creative Waters *salilaṁ*, giving birth to the 'germ' through *tapas*, could again be read as implying the gestation period and giving birth, as in biological reproduction.[55]

> Kāmah tat agre samavartata adhi manasaḥ retaḥ prathamaṁ yat āsīt sataḥ baṁdhuṁ asati nir avindan hṛdi pratūṣya kavayaḥ manīṣā. (4)

Desire in the beginning came upon that, (desire) that was the first seed of mind. Sages seeking in their hearts with the wisdom found out the bond of the existent in the non-existent.

Compounding the verses three and four, it could be inferred that from the primordial Waters arises the one principle through *tapas* or the power of heat. Desire, being the first seed of mind, evolved from it. *Retas* or the male creative semen manifested itself from the combination of *kāma* and *manas*. The order of creation is as follows:

From the Waters through the power of tapas, the Tadekaṁ or that One came into being. Then arose desire or kāma. The sūkta concretizes desire

as semen, thereby implying that desire is the origin of all living beings and, by extension, of the world in general.[56]

The *Retas*, the creative potency or semen,[57] evolves from *manas* that has evolved from the desire *kāma* of the *Tadekaṁ*. The *Tadekaṁ*, in turn is generated from *tapas* that arises from the Waters. Creation is autochthonous involving no second entity until this point. What seems noteworthy here is the autonomous self-generation until the semen, *retas*, which is required for the second order creation. Following Sāyaṇa, some have interpreted the word *kāma* not as a sexual urge to procreate but as the desire to create the world (*sisrkṣā*).[58] Although the emphasis of the text is on the autonomous evolution of the *Tadekaṁ* from the primordial Waters it may not perhaps be really incongruous to posit the Waters as the primary source. As Macdonell[59] points out, this is the start of the natural philosophy which developed into the Sāṁkhya system.[60] The next verse describes the horizontal sexual division between the impregnators and the receivers of the seed.

> Tiraścīnaḥ vitataḥ raśmiḥ eṣām adhaḥ svit āsīt upari svit āsīt retodhaḥ āsan mahimānaḥ āsan svadhā avastāt prayatiḥ parastāt. (5)

Their cord was extended across: was there below or was there above? There were impregnators, there were powers; there was energy below, there was impulse above.

The shift from autonomous generation to bi-sexual creation is obvious in this verse. This verse could be read as assuming that creation is a sexual process, in which an ordering of the sexes is essential. The verse alludes to the 'seed depositors' *retodha, prayati* above and energies called *svadhā* and *mahimāna* below. With the creation of the male semen, *retas*, the physical division is horizontal in that the male impregnators are placed above while the feminine receivers in the form of power and energy are below which represent some ordering. In verses 2 & 3, the terms *svadhā* and *mahimāna*, are used to qualify the *Tadekaṁ* in its pre-sexual, self generative stage. The same terms are used again in verse 5, for the energies that are placed below the seed depositors.

The last two verses of the hymn end with a note of scepticism thus:

> 'ko' addhā veda ka iha pra vocat kuta ajātā kuta iyaṁ visṛṣṭiḥ arvāg devā asya visarjanena athā ko veda yata ābabhūva. (6)

Who after all knows? Who here will declare whence it arose, whence this world? Subsequent are the gods to the creation of this (world). Who, then, knows whence it came into being?

> Iyam visṛṣṭir yata ābabhūva yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na. (7a) Yó asyādhyakṣaḥ parame vioman só aṅga veda yadi vā na veda. (7b)

'Who is there who knows whence was the origin, and whence this creation. He who is the highest overseer in heaven, he surely knows, or perhaps he knows not.'

Brereton draws our attention to the formal features of the last verse, which underscores the hymn's lack of resolution. According to him in the line 7b two syllables are missing from the eleven-syllable line and this rhythmic incompleteness is 'verbal image of the unresolved cosmogony.'[61] The aim of the poet could have been to emphasize the methodology of thought process rather than arrival at some concrete answer.

There seems to be a deliberate ambiguity in the use of grammatical gender in the text. The key terms *ambaḥ* (always neuter), *salilaṁ* (used in neuter), *Tadekaṁ* (*ekaṁ* in neuter gender)[62] are in neuter gender. The hymn explains the process by which duality and hierarchy emerge from a neuter unity, and how this unity itself evolves from the primordial indistinguishable Waters, again neuter gender. The Waters contain the neuter principle, like a womb an embryo. What seems remarkable in this hymn is the process of gradual transformation through *tapas*, and an autonomous generation of the first principle. Creation is not an outcome of creator's agency (unlike the performances of Indra or Prajāpati in other hymns), but is a slow emanation from a primary material stuff. Furthermore, in the process of creation, there are two major transitions noticeable, the first affected by *tapas* while the second by *kāma* or sexual desire. The final creation is set in motion by the dual seed-placers and receivers.

In the following sections I shall be considering the relevant verses briefly to show the explicit parallels between the Waters and the womb in the Hiranyagarbha hymn.

The Hiraṇyagarbha Hymn

The Hiraṇyagarbha (X, 121) is a *brahmodya* or a hymn in a riddle form to the god *ka* (who?), from the refrain, 'to which god shall we offer our oblations?' (*kasmai devāya haviṣa vidhema*?).[63] The answer to the riddle is contained in the last verse. However, Prajāpati who answers the riddle

by becoming responsible for creation, is seen by Indologists as a later interpolation into the hymn.[64] It may be remarked here that the Hiraṇyagarbha and the Aditidākṣyāyanīvā hymns explain the origin and ascendancy of two important gods of the brahmins, namely Prajāpati and Brahmaṇaspati. These two may not have been popular gods at the time of composition of the earlier verses. The two gods were perhaps propped up by the brahmins as their titular deities to sanctify and legitimize their own position. Unlike the Nāsadīya, the Hiraṇyagarbha, overtly traces the origin of the universe in a womb. It must be mentioned here that the terms *garbha* and *yoni* [65] are used almost habitually in the Ṛgveda and in the Upanisadic texts,[66] in the context of creation or for indicating the source or origin of anything. The word *garbha* from the root *graḥ* 'to conceive' refers to the womb and also to the inside, middle, interior of anything.[67] Hiraṇyagarbha, is 'a truly pregnant term' as Wendy Doniger observes.[68] Scholars have associated the term 'Hiraṇyagarbha' variedly with golden egg, golden embryo, golden sun, golden child and golden germ. Following Sāyana, the commentator on the Vedas, Wendy Doniger suggests the meaning; 'he in whose belly the golden seed or egg exists like an embryo'.[69] According to her, 'the egg is both a female image (that which is fertilized by seed and which contains the embryo that is like the yolk) and a male image (the testicles containing seed). Thus the range of meanings may be seen as a continuum of androgynous birth images: seed (male egg), womb (female egg), embryo, child.'[70] It may be noted that the physical function of the womb holding an embryo,[71] is situated in the belly of the male creator. A major replacement of the feminine creative potency by an egg[72] (*aṇḍam*) occurs in the creation myth of the Mahabharata. There is no use of the Ṛgvedic terms 'garbha', 'ap' or 'asat', instead it postulates a mighty egg[73] from which all the male divinities like Brahma, Manu, Dakṣa and thirty three thousand, three hundred and thirty three gods emerge.[74]

Indologists also use it in a secondary sense, to mean an embryo or that which is contained inside a womb. The primeval substance, often regarded as the 'Waters', is identified with the *yoni* or *garbha*.[75] For instance in the self-eulogy[76] of the Vāgāmbhraṇi or Vācsūkta, (X, 125, 7) the goddess declares rather enigmatically that her womb (*yoni*) is the Waters of the ocean.

Ahaṁ suve pitaramasya mūrdhaṁmama yonirapsvaṅtaḥ samudre
Tato vitiṣṭe bhuvanānu visvotāmuṁ dhyāṁ varṣmaṇopasprśāmi.

I give birth to the father on the head of this world.[77] My womb is in the Waters, within the ocean. From there I spread out over all creatures and touch the very sky with the crown of my head.[78]

An identification of Waters with *garbha* is again discerned in the Hiranyagarbha Hymn X.121.7:[79] According to this hymn, the Waters, *Ap*, with mighty motion generate fire, *agni*, the first evolute and for this reason *Agni* is called the son of the Waters, *Apāṁ napāt*.[80]

The Hiraṇyagarbha hymn describes the god who creates the cosmos and then asks the identity of that deity by the refrain:
Kasmai devāya haviṣa vidhema, To which god should we offer our oblations? There seems to be an element of scepticism which is closed in the last stanza by identifying the god as Prajāpati. Scholars have interpreted the emergence of Prajāpati as auguring disbelief in Indra as creator and sole God.[81] Despite its initial scepticism, the Hiraṇyagarbha hymn thus dramatically differs from the Nāsadīya hymn which is clearly open ended. The first verse of Hiraṇyagarbha hymn (X, 121, 1) is as follows:

Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgre bhūtasya jātaḥ patireka āsīt.
So dadhāra pṛtivīm dyāmutemāṁ kasmai devāya haviṣa vidhema?

'In the beginning rose Hiraṇyagarbha, born only Lord of all created beings. He fixed and holdeth up this earth and heaven. What god shall we adore with our oblation?'[82]

Verses 1–6 talk about the power and the prowess of the unidentifiable god. How did the Hiraṇyagarbha originate? The answer is found in verse 7, which is of considerable importance to us for our present discussion.

Āpoha yadbṛhatīrviśvamāyangarbhaṁ dadhāna janayatīragniṁ.
Tato devānāṁ samavartatāsurekaḥ kasmai devāya haviṣa vidhema?

When the vast Waters (*āpo yaḥ brhatīh*, the term *brhati*, translates as bulky, firm, solid, compact, massy, strong, great, immense), moved, pregnant with the universe (everything *visvam*) as embryo (*garbhaṁ*) producing Agni, thence (from the waters) he evolved, the sole-life (principle) (*āsu* of the gods; to what god shall we offer worship with oblation?[83] There are few qualifications attributed to the primordial Waters in this hymn that are worthy of consideration. The word *ap* in feminine gender is used and is characterized as *brhatīh* which means vast and bulky. It has movement and moves holding the universe (*viśvaṁ*) like a womb that holds an embryo. It generates Agni, the life principle. The feminine waters are used in the

above two verses as the matrix of creation that possesses a biological function of generating the male creator god. The moving feminine waters act as a container, a womb that autochtonously, engenders the supreme god. Interestingly and typically, in the Hiraṇyagarbha hymn, the strength and the supremacy of the male creator god is eulogized and not the creative potency of the dynamic waters. The creative Waters continue to represent chaos and undistinguishability despite their ability to generate the key principle of order and distinguishability. Similar tendency can be observed in the context of the classical Sāṁkhya wherein the *avivekī* (non-distinguishable) Prakṛti or the materiality with feminine gender, evolves and generates an ordered universe. Hence the usage of the term *prasavadharmī* is probably seen as a typical human woman's function.

Unlike the Nāsadīya hymn, the grammatical gender of the Waters *ap* in the Hiraṇyagarbha is clearly feminine.[84] The Waters like womb carry Agni, the principle of life. However, the Nāsadīya and the Hiraṇyagarbhā posit Waters as the primordial substance that bears and generates the first creative principle, the *Tadekaṁ* or the Agni. The significance of this cosmogonic account is two-fold. In the first place, there is a postulation of a material and not any spiritual principle as the primordial base. This gives rise to a naturalistic account of creation and is markedly different from the other kinds of theories offered to explain the primary creation. Even if *tamas*, normally rendered as darkness, is the source of creation, the focus on materiality does not change much. Whether darkness or the Waters, the first principle is contained in it. The process of creation is evolutionary. It is qualified by a dual process of modification within the primordial stuff that contains the germ, and an autonomous emergence requiring no second principle. This is definitely different from the accomplishment-oriented creation. This then is the second notable feature of this model of cosmogony.

I now examine the concept of Aditi and some of its application in Vedic contexts.

Uttānapad of Aditidākṣyāyanī vā

The self-manifestation involved in the generative process is also seen akin to a human woman giving birth to a child. The use of the metaphor of the 'outstretched feet'[85] (*uttānapad*) of Aditi in the creation hymn of 'all gods' (*sarve devāḥ*) is quite effective in conceptualizing creation through the metaphor of parturition.

In a Ṛgveda hymn, 1.89.10,[86] Aditi is portrayed as an immanent feminine goddess and is eulogized thus:

> Aditir dyaur, aditir antarikṣaṁ,
> aditir mātā sā pitā sā putrāḥ
> viśve deva aditihpañca janā,
> aditir jātaṁ aditir janitaṁ

Heaven is Aditi, the mid-space is Aditi, mother, father and son is Aditi. Aditi is all the gods and the five peoples, what is born is Aditi and what is yet to be born. This verse perhaps echoes the other speculative hymn called *sarva devāḥ* or Aditirvadākṣyāyaṇi va (10.72) which suggests that all the gods and the world emerge from a feminine creative principle whose act of creation is indeed like a physical woman giving birth to her infant. Interestingly, in the verses 1 and 2 of the Atharvaveda hymn (XI.1), a woman who wishes to give birth to a male offspring is called Aditi.[87] The verse declares, 'this Aditi here who is in distress having a desire for sons cooks rice for the brahmins'.[88] The Ṛgvedic gods, Mitra, Varuṇa and Aryamān are regarded as *aditeh putrah*. Her maternal and nurturing functions are clear in the Vedic texts. In the Atharvaveda XII.1.61, Aditi is compared to a nurturing cow and is referred to as the *Kamadugdhā* one 'who yields wishes as her milk'.[89] The Ṛgveda VIII.101.15, identifies the cow with Aditi, the great goddess, who is the mother of the Rudras, daughters of the Vasus, sister of the Adityas and origin of immortality, and supplicates the people not to slay cows.[90] Aditi is also identified with the earth, the foundation of all, in the later Brāhmaṇas like Śatapatha, (SB. I.1.4.5 etc.). Aditi is likewise seen as the feminine viraj in SB. VII.5.2.19 and in the Atharvaveda VIII.10.1 it is said that '*virād va idaṁ*'.[91]

The hymn 10, 72, has again disparate verses that allows several interpretations. Like the Nāsadīya hymn, the hymn 10, 72, postulates the generation of sat or god, from the first principle, which is asat. In the beginning (*purve yuge*) from the asat arose the god, the sat, who represents the order of the universe. Brahmaṇaspati, the creator like a smith fanned up all this, referring to the creation. Also earth, atmosphere, and sky were generated. Interestingly the process of generation is described in the third, fourth and the fifth verses as follows:

Devānāṁ yuge prathame asataḥ sadjāyataḥ
Tadāśā anvajāyanta taduttānapadaspari

In the first age of the gods, existence was born from non-existence. After this the quarters of the sky were born from her who crouched with the legs spread.[92]

Bhūrjajña uttānapado bhuva āśā ajāyanta
Aditerdakṣ'o ajāyata dakṣād aditiḥ pari

The earth was born from her who crouched with the legs spread, from the earth the quarters of the sky were born. From Aditi, Dakṣa was born and from Dakṣa, Aditi was born.

Aditirhyajaniṣṭa dakṣa yā duhitā tava
Tāṁ devā anvajāyanta bhadrā amrtabandhavaḥ

For Aditi was born as your daughter, O Dakṣa, and after her/from her, were born the blessed gods, the kinsmen of immortality.

Aditi identified with asat the primal being is the autochotonic power that generates the creator and the earth. The earth is seen as a feminine principle and here we locate Aditi the feminine principle emanating earth. This is one rare and a significant hymn in which clearly the creation manifests from the allegory of the *uttānapad* or creation through parturition metaphor. The term *garbha* is substituted for the *uttānapad* which is a symbolic representation of a physical woman giving birth to an offspring. Aditi, is a creative power, that engenders the god and the interdependent Dakṣa-Aditi pair (the male potentiality and the female creative power). Aditi is also the creative material for earth, sky and the directions.

The female physiology and reproductive functions are thus used explicitly in the Ṛgvedic cosmogony. The focus of this paper has been the few hymns that account for cosmogony by implicitly and explicitly using female physiology. The cosmogonic accounts of the primordial Waters as that which holds and generates the first principle *Tadekaṁ* or *Hiraṇyagarbha* deploy an imagery borrowed from the observation of a physical woman's womb that holds the foetus (garbha) and then through a process expels it. The few hymns that narrate cosmogony through the feminine model clearly seem to edge out the performance-oriented male myths. Based on an elementary biological experience of reproduction, these cosmogonic accounts push the feminine from the margin to the centre and are therefore valuable.

Notes and References

1. Translated by J. Gonda, *The Function and Significance of Gold in the Veda*, E.J. Brill, Leiden (1991), p. 216.
2. F.B.J. Kuiper, *Ancient Indian Cosmogony,* Vikas Publishing House, Delhi (1983), p. 109. The interpretation of creation in terms of human conception is advocated by Kuiper but rejeted by Walter O. Kaebler on the grounds that Kuiper takes a modern notion of conception and assumes it to have existed in the Vedic mind. According to Kaebler no fertilization of an egg or ovum in the modern sense takes place according to the Vedic texts. He points out that the texts speak of the transference of an already existing embryo into the female, or the transference of the seed into the female; in either case the embryo or the seed is already the self to be born. Walter O. Kaebler, 'Tapas, Birth, and Spiritual Rebirth in the Veda', in *History of Religions,* 15 (1975), p. 351.
3. The Sanskrit word *Ap* means water and is used in feminine gender. *Ap* is 'declined in Classical language only in plural, but in singular and plural in Veda', Vaman Shastri Apte, *The Student's Sanskrit–English Dictionary*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi (1965), p. 30.
4. *'Garbha'* is the Sanskrit word used for 'womb'. *Garbha* refers to the 'interior of anything' with a specific reference to womb. However, it also refers to a foetus or an embryo. Ibid., p. 183.
5. Kumkum Roy, 'Vedic Cosmogonies: Conceiving/Controlling Creation', in *Tradition, Dissent and Ideology: Essays in Honor of Romila Thapar,* Ed. by Champakalakshmi and S. Gopal, Oxford University Press, Delhi (1996), 9–19, p. 12.
6. Norman W. Brown, 'Theories of Creation in the Rig Veda', in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 85 (1965), 23–4, p. 24.
7. Kumkum Roy, 'Vedic Cosmogonies...', p. 12.
8. Alfred Collins, 'Reflections on Ṛg-Veda X. 129, Stimulated by Walter Maurer's Paper', in *The Journal of Indo-European Studies,* Fall (1975), Vol. 3, No. 3, 271–81, p. 278.
9. M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, George Allen and Unwin, London (1973), p. 43, H.D. Velankar, *Ṛksūktāni*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay (1972), p. 300, Alfred Collins, 'Reflections on Ṛg-Veda...', p. 278.
10. By no means do I suggest that all theories of creation can be reduced to the above two kinds.
11. According Kupier, 'from a very instructive material collected by A.J. Wensinck from the literature of the Western Semites one meets with such passages as the following (from an Arabic source): "Forty years before Allah created the heavens and the earth the Ka'ba was a dry spot floating on the water and from it the world has been spread out." ' *Ancient Indian Cosmogony*, p. 109. An-

other strikingly similar description of darkness and water prior to creation is from the Io (Maori) cosmogony which is as follows:
Io dwelt within breathing space of immensity,
The Universe was in darkness, with water everywhere.
There was no glimmer of dawn, no clearness, no light.
Jonathan Z. Smith, *Imagining Religions from Babylon to Jonestown*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1982), p. 121.

12. Roger T. Ames, 'The Meaning of Body in Classical Chinese Philosophy', in *Self as Body in Asian Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas P. Kasulis with Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake, State University of New York Press (1993), 157–77, p. 160.
13. Translation from Joel P. Brereton, 'Edifying Puzzlement: Ṛgveda 10.129 and the Uses of Enigma', *Journal of American Oriental Society*, 119 (1999), pp. 248–60.
14. Roger T. Ames, 'The Meaning of Body in Classical Chinese Philosophy', pp. 160–61.
15. Ibid.
16. While taking into consideration almost all the English translations available on the Nasadiya Sukta, I have used the following translations extensively: Ralph T.H. Griffith, *The Hymns of the Ṛgveda*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi (New edition, 1993), John Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, Vol. 5, (5 vols., London, 1872; Amsterdam, 1976), Norman Brown, 'Theories of Creation in the Rig Veda', in *Journal of American Oriental Society*, Vol. 85 (1965), and Walter H. Maurer, *Pinnacles of India's Past, Selection from the Ṛgveda*, John Benjamin's Publishing Company (1986). The explanations of Alfred Collins, 'Reflections on Ṛg-Veda X, 129, stimulated by Walter Maurer's Paper', and H.D. Velankar, *Ṛksūktāni* (1972) have been used and occasionally the insights from Ananda Coomaraswamy, *A New Approach to the Vedas*, Luzac and Co, London (1933) and Dev Raj Chanana (edited) *Ṛg-Bhāṣya-Saṅgraha*, Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi (1961) and K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, reprint (1980) have been utilized.
17. Joel Brereton, 'Edifying Puzzlement: Ṛgveda 10.129 and the uses of Enigma', in *Journal of American Oriental Society*, p. 248.
18. K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 27.
19. Velankar (1972), p. 300, Alfred Collins (1975), p. 273, Aguilar I. Matas, *Ṛgvedic Society*, E.J. Brill, Leiden, (1991) p. 83.
20. Alfred Collins, 'Reflections on Ṛg-Veda...', p. 273.
21. 'From having no proper cosmogonic account, India, would have gained not one but two, the first in connection with the notion of self-sacrifice, the second in connection with the notion of generation, which, inspite of its interest and depth, was not however, the one to get the upper hand, for as Madeleine Biardeau points out in her book on the sacrifice, the Purusa-sūkta is not only that which constitutes in all probability the oldest Indian cosmogony, but also the core around which the Brahmanico-Hindu religious universe was little by little to get elaborated'. Aguilar I. Matas, *Ṛgvedic Society*, E.J. Brill, 1991, p. 83.

22. Ananda Coomaraswamy, *A New Approach to the Vedas*, p. 56, Dev Raj Chanana. *Ṛg-Bhāṣya-Sāngraha*, p. 358, C. Kunhan Raja, *Poet-Philosophers of the Ṛgveda*, Ganesh and Co., Chennai, (1963), p. 227, Gerald James Larson too traces Samkhya philosophy from the Nāsadīya Sūkta, *Classical Sāṁkhya, An Interpretation of its History and Meaning*, Motilal Banarsidass, 1969, p. 83. Walter Maurer points out in the context of the Nāsadīya Sūkta that 'the vagueness and condensation of its phraseology are such that it can be regarded as providing the basis of both Sāṁkhya and Vedānta systems'. 'A Re-Examination of the Ṛgveda X, 129', in *The Journal of Indo-European Studies* (1975), Vol. 3, p. 220.
23. Ananda Coomaraswamy, ibid., Kunhan Raja, ibid., p. 226.
24. K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 28.
25. Walter Maurer, 'A Re-Examination of Rgveda X. 129', fn 21, p. 227.
26. *Ṛg-Bhāṣya-Saṇgraha*, ed. Dev Raj Chanana, pp. 273–82.
27. '*Tat sakala vedāntaprasiddhaṁ brahmatattvaṁ ānīt prānivat*', ibid., p. 275.
28. According to A.A. Macdonell '... the origin of the world is explained as the evolution of the existent from the non-existent. Water thus came into being first; and from it was evolved intelligence by heat.' *A Vedic Reader for Students*, Oxford University Press (1960), p. 207.
29. The Nasadiya text is taken from Dev Raj Chanana's *Ṛg-Bhāṣya-Saṅgraha*, p. 273.
30. All translations of the Nāsadīya hymn in the above section are from A.A. Macdonell, *A Vedic Reader for Students*, pp. 207–11.
31. Walter Maurer, 'A Re-Examination of Ṛgveda X. 129', p. 221.
32. Alfred Collins, 'Reflections on Ṛg-Veda X.129...', p. 271.
33. W. Norman Brown, 'Theories of Creation in the Rig Veda', p. 33. J. Muir, Original Sanskrit Texts, Vol. V, p. 356, Adolf Kaegi, *The Rigveda: The Oldest Literature of the Indians*, authorized translation with additions to the notes by R. Arrowsmith, Amarko Book Agency, New Delhi, (second edition 1975), p. 90.
34. Collins, 'Reflections on Ṛg-Veda X. 129...' p. 273, L. Renou, *Hymnes Speculatifs du Veda*, Gallimard (Paris), (1956), p. 254, A.A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, Motilal Banarsidass, (reprint, 1981), p. 13.
35. Walter Maurer contends that this verse has two answers to the query 'what existed prior to creation?' Water existed or a wide chasm existed prior to creation. 'A Re-Examination of Ṛgveda X. 129', p. 222.
36. The grammatical gender of the term *ambhas* is neuter, Sir Monier Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi (reprint 1999), p. 84.
37. Alfred Collins, 'Reflections on the Ṛg-Veda...', p. 273.

38. Ananda Coomaraswamy, *A New Approach to the Vedas*, p. 57.
39. Ananda Coomaraswamy identifies the term *svadhayā* with *śakti*, *māyā* and *ātma māyayā* of the Bhagavat Gita, ibid., p. 57.
40. Monier M. Williams, *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary* (reprint 1999), p. 1278.
41. According to Alfred Collins 'the pre-cosmic waters may be imagined to swell outward like a self-inflated balloon, thus opening an atmospheric space in their minds, which will later make possible the heaven/earth (male/female) opposition'. 'Reflections on the Rg-Veda...', p. 273.
42. 'Darkness there was at first concealed in darkness, this All was indiscriminate chaos. All that existed then was void and formless; by the great power of Warmth was born that Unit.' Griffith, *Hymns from the Ṛgveda*, p. 368. Note the different rendering of the term *apraketam salilam*.
43. Sayana too uses the term *apraketam ṣalilam* to mean 'indistinguishable darkness', Dev Raj Chanana, ed., Ṛg-Bhāṣya-Saṅgraha, p. 277.
44. Walter Maurer, 'A Re-Examination of Ṛgveda...', p. 225, Kunhan Raja, *Poet Philosophers of the Rgveda*, p. 225.
45. See above Footnote no. 42.
46. A.A. Macdonell, *A Vedic Reader for Students*, p. 207, Adolf Kaegi, *The Rigveda: The Oldest Literature of the Indians*, p. 90, R.C. Zaehner, *Hindu Scriptures*, Everyman's Library (reprint 1992), pp. 12–13, Alfred Collins, 'Reflections on Ṛg-Veda...', p. 273.
47. Alfred Collins, 'Reflections on Ṛg-Veda X. 129...', p. 273.
48. The Sanskrit term *salilaṁ* can assume masculine, feminine and also neuter genders. Thus it is more gendered than the term *ambhas* which is neuter at all times. Monier M. Williams, *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary*, p. 1189.
49. W. Norman Brown, 'Theories of Creation in the Rig Veda', p. 34.
50. Walter Maurer, 'A Re-Examination of Ṛgveda X. 129', p. 225.
51. P.L. Bhargava following Sayana translates *ābhu* as 'all pervading' and ajāyata as 'manifested' and 'revealed'. Bhargava translates the verse 3 as follows: 'Darkness was in the beginning hidden by darkness. All this was an indistinct fluid. The all pervading one, who was surrounded by the void, manifested himself through the power of (his own) fervor.' 'Some Problematic Words and Phrases in the Hymn of Creation', in *Indologica Taurinesia*, Vol. XXI–XXII, 1995–96, pp. 19–20.
52. Incidentally, verse 16 of *Sāṁkhyakārikā* uses the term *salilavat* to characterize the ability of Prakṛti to undergo modifications. *Iśvarakṛṣṇaviracita Sāṁkhyakārikā*, ed. Dr Baijnath Pandeya, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan (1998), Delhi, p. 36.
53. Alfred Collins, 'Reflections on Ṛg-Veda X. 129...', p. 274.
54. H.D. Velankar, *Ṛk Sūktāni*, p. 300.
55. Alfred Collins, 'Reflections on Ṛg-Veda X. 129...', p. 274.
56. Joel Brereton, 'Edifying Puzzlement ...' p. 13.
57. Alfred Collins, ibid.

58. Walter Maurer and P.L. Bhargava hold the view that *kāma* refers to the creation of the objects of the world and not procreation. Walter Maurer, 'A Re-Examination of Ṛgveda X. 129', p. 226, P.L. Bhargava, 'Some Problematic Words and Phrases in the Hymn of Creation', p. 20.
59. A.A. Macdonell, *A Vedic Reader for Students*, p. 207.
60. Kunhan Raja traces Sāṁkhya Philosophy to the Nāsadīya Sūkta even without rendering *apraketam salilam* as primordial waters. *Poet-Philosophers of the Rgveda,* p. 226–30.
61. Joel Brereton, 'Edifying Puzzlement...' p. 4–5.
62. Monier M. Williams, *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary*, p. 227.
63. Norman Brown, 'Theories of Creation in the Rig Veda', p. 25.
64. Ibid.
65. The terms often used in the Upanisads are *samudra yoni*, *brahma yoni*, *śāstra yoni*, etc. Ananda Coomaraswamy, *A New Approach to the Vedas*, p. 31.
66. In the Hiranyagarbha hymn, Rg Veda X 121–7, *āpaḥ* or waters is in feminine gender. From the Waters regarded as garbha or the womb emerges the male god Agni.
67. Monier M. Williams, *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary*, p. 349.
68. *The Rig Veda,* translated and annotated, Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, Penguin Books, India, 1994, p. 26.
69. Ibid., p. 27.
70. Ibid., p. 27.
71. Walter O. Kaelber, 'Tapas, Birth, and Spiritual Rebirth in the Veda', p. 351–2.
72. Anda or andam assumes neuter or masculine gender. Monier M. Williams, *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary*, p. 11.
73. In this world that was destitute of brightness and light and enveloped all around in total darkness, there came into being, as primal cause of creation, a mighty egg, the one inexhaustible seed of all created beings. *The Mahābhārata*, Vol. 1, tr. Pratap Chandra Roy, Datta & Bose Co., Calcutta, p. 2.
74. *The Mahābhārata*, 1.1.27, ed. Vishnu S. Sukthankar, Vol. 1, *The Adiparvan,* Poona Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, 1933, p. 8.
75. Rg Veda, X. 121.7.
76. For an excellent understanding of Self-eulogy or Ātmastuti, see George Thompson, 'Ahamkāra and Ātmastuti: Self Assertion and Impersonation in the Ṛgveda' in *History of Religions*, November 1997, No. 2, pp. 141–71.
77. *The Rig Veda,* translated and annotated, Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, p. 63.
78. Walter Maurer and Sally Sutherland also translate *mama yonirapsvam antaḥ samudre* as 'my birth is within Waters, in the ocean'. According to this translation the goddess Vac originates from the primeval Waters. If this translation is appropriate then we have an instance of waters generating a female principle. Walter Maurer, *Pinnacles of India's Past, Selection from the Rgveda*,

p. 281, Sally J. Sutherland Goldman, 'Speaking Gender; Vac and the Vedic Construction of the Feminine' in *Invented Identities: The Interplay of Gender, Religion and Politics in India*, ed. by Julia Leslie and Mary McGee, Oxford University Press, 2000, 57–83, p. 66.

79. In the Śaunakiya recension of the Atharva Veda Saṁhitā, IV. 2, 7. The Above Ṛg Vedic mantra occurs and is translated by Jan Gonda as follows: Verily when the mighty (fundamental, brhatih) waters moved, bearing (pregnant with) the universe (everything, visvam) as embryo (garbham) producing Agni, Thence he was evolved, the sole-life (principle) (asu) of the gods; to what god shall we offer worship with oblations? Jan Gonda, *The Function and Significance of Gold in the Vedas*, p. 222.
80. Rg Veda II.35, A.A. Macdonell, A Vedic Reader for the Students, p. 67–78.
81. Norman Brown, Theories of Creation in the *Ṛgveda*, p. 32.
82. Ralph T.H. Griffith, *The Hymns of the Ṛgveda*, p. 628.
83. Translated by J. Gonda, *The Function and Significance of Gold in the Veda*, E.J. Brill, Leiden (1991), p. 216.
84. Monier M. Williams, *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary*, p. 47.
85. Rg Veda X 72.4 and V 61.3 refer to *Uttānapad* or the outstretched feet.
86. Joel Peter Brereton, *The Rigvedic Ādityas*, American Oriental Society, 1981, p. 192–7.
87. Ibid., p. 242.
88. Joel P. Brereton, *The Rigvedic Ādityas*, p. 242.
89. Ibid., p. 246.
90. Ibid., p. 246.
91. Ananda Coomaraswamy, A New Approach to the Vedas, p. 31.
92. All English translations of Aditi Sūkta are from Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, *The Rig Veda*, pp. 38–9.

The Anumāna Reconsidered

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When a modern scholar writes on the Nyāya, or any other Indian system of thought, his primary aim is to explain the concepts to Western scholars. Therefore, he invariably compares the Indian concepts with the concepts current in the corresponding field in the Western tradition.[1] Thus, Matilal, in a more general context, observes,[2] 'Anybody who wants to explain ... an Indian philosophical text ... cannot but compare and contrast the Indian philosophical concepts with those of the Western philosophy'. Such a comparison can be more rewarding than mere clarification of concepts. Stcherbatsky, for example, observes[3] that such a comparison makes us perceive 'that there are such problems which the human mind naturally encounters on his (sic) way as soon as he begins to deal with truth and error'.

However, mere explanation of a concept in the Nyāya with the help of concepts in the Western logic, classical or formal, can at best be a very elementary objective of a scholar who is familiar with both, the Nyāya and the Western logic. A far more rewarding but complicated exercise will be to appraise and, if possible to appropriate, the concepts in the Nyāya in terms the formal logic.

Such an exercise will be highly speculative. The Nyāya belonged to a civilization which is now totally lost. It has no links even with the present Indian civilization. Thus, interpreting, for example, the anumāna in terms of the formal logic means resurrecting a lost framework of thought. But such an endeavour, if successful, is likely to be rewarding in three directions. Firstly, it will clarify some of the puzzles connected with the anumāna. For example, in the anumāna it is difficult to understand the function of the udāharaṇa and the upanaya. These two steps appear to be superfluous once the general rule, the vyāpti, is explicitly stated. Secondly, such an appraisal of the anumāna will help us to evaluate the status

of anumāna relative to formal inference. Thirdly, after this exercise, the anumāna may turn out to be a special kind of inference which is useful in certain situations.

FORMAL LOGIC

The formal logic that we need for the present purpose is the first order logic comprising propositional calculus and quantification over individuals coming from a given universal set.[4] The following brief summary covers the items in the formal logic that we need in the sequel.

(a) The basic unit in the formal logic is an atomic/simple statement. It has the form 'a is p' or 'a has P', which means that the object has the property/attribute P. A simple statement has exactly one of the two truth values 'true' and 'false'. How a truth value is assigned to a simple statement is a problem which lies beyond the scope of the formal logic.

Combining simple statements by means of logical connectives like 'not', 'and', 'or', 'implies' etc., compound statements are formed. Rules are framed to decide the truth values of compound statements when the truth values of simple statements are given. This part of formal logic is called the calculus of statements.

(b) An atomic statement 'a has P' may be denoted as Pa. Statements Pa, Pb etc. may be looked upon as instances of propositional function Px. It is an expression with one individual variable x. It becomes a proposition when an individual constant, say a, is substituted for x. Thus, Px is a propositional function and Pa is its instantiation. Pa has a truth value, but Px is not a statement.

From the propositional function Px, we get its 'negative' –Px, whenever Pa is true –Pa is false and when Pa is false –Pa is true.

Given a propositional function Px the following possibilities arise:

(i) There is an individual $a \in U$ such that Pa is true. The fact that Px gives at least one true instance is stated as $(\exists x)$ Px. This is a proposition. Similarly $(\exists x)$ –Px means there is at least one false instance of Px. Note that the statements $(\exists x)$ Px and $(\exists x)$ –Px can both be true but both cannot be false. They are called the subcontraries of each other.

(ii) If a propositional function Px is such that all instances of it, corresponding to different elements in U, are true we denote this fact as (x) Px. Similarly we get the statement (x) –(Px). The two statements (x)Px and (x) –Px can both be false, but both cannot be true. They are called the contraries of each other.

(b) Finally, we briefly say something about arguments.

An argument is a finite sequence of statements which are supplied to support the contention that the last statement in the sequence (the conclusion) may inferred from certain initial statements (the premises). The formal logic provides a criterion for deciding when the concluding statement of an argument is to be assigned the value 'true' if each premise of the argument is assigned the truth value 'true'. The criterion is the following:

The statement q is a consequence of statements P1, P2, ..., Pn is symbolized as $\underline{P1, P2 \ldots Pn \vdash q}_{I}$ is true if and only if, for every truth value assignment to each of the atomic statements $\underline{U1, U2 \ldots Uk}_{II}$ occurring in statements I, q has truth value 'true' when each of P1, P2, ..., Pn, has truth value 'true'.

For example, the argument of the form, $p, p \supset q \vdash q$ is valid, that is, q is 'true' whenever $p, p \supset q$ are true. This is called the rule of detachment or modus ponens.

Also, true argument of the form $(x)\ Px \vdash Pa$ is valid, i.e. Pa is true whenever (x) Px is true. This is called Universal Instantiation or UI.

SETS

(a) Given a propositional function Px, we can distinguish those objects in U which make Px true. Their collection is called a set. Let a set A be such that $a \in A$ if Pa is true. This fact is formulated in the principle of abstraction which says that the propositional function determines the set A if the members of A are exactly those objects from U for which Px is true. This connection between A and Px is denoted by setting $A = \{x|\ Px\}$.

Then we adopt the principle of extension which says that two sets A and B are identical if they have the same elements.

(b) If we take the propositional function Px to be $x \neq x$, the corresponding set $A = \{x|x \neq x\}$ will have no elements. The set A is then an empty set. By the principle of extension all empty sets are identical. Hence, there is just one empty set which we denote by $\varnothing$.

(c) Let U be the universe and X be a given set. The elements of U which are not in X form a set which we denote by –X. It is called the complement of X. The sets X and –X, together, exhaust U. When $X = \{x|Px\}$, $-X = \{x|-Px\}$.

The propositions $(\exists x)Px$ and $(\exists x)\ -Px$ are equivalent to set inequalities $X \neq \Phi, -X \neq \Phi$. Clearly these inequalities can both be simultaneously true but not simultaneously false. Similarly, the propositions (x) Px and (x) –Px are equivalent to X = U and –X = U respectively. These set equalities can both be false but not simultaneously true.

(d) The formal logic and the corresponding set theory are based on certain presuppositions. The assumption that every atomic statement has to be true or false legislates on the nature of the individuals and the predicates. The assumption is that given an object a and a predicate P we can unambiguously state if P is an attribute of a or not.

This assumption has an implication for the set theory also. It is that given a set X and an object a we can unambiguously state if $a \in X$ or not. Following Berneys we may call it a platonic assumption.[5]

The relationship between the truth values of a statement p and its negation –p is that when p is true, –p is false and when p is false, –p is true. Therefore, to show that p is true, it is sufficient to show that –p is false, and to show that p is false, it is sufficient to show that –p is true. This is called the law of the excluded middle.

GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE NYĀYA

(a) The Nyāya is a realist school in the sense that it assumes that there is a reality which is independent of our knowledge of it and that we gain knowledge of this reality through our experience of it. It is this postulate which sets the Nyāya logic apart from the formal logic. In the Nyāya logic every statement is, in principle, verifiable in the reality.

Though the Nyāya admits the possibility of unmediated experience (nirvikalpa jñana), its accent is on experience expressed in language. The Nyāya assumes that every term used in expressing an experience has a counterpart in reality. That is why, all objects in the reality are called padārthas, that is, meanings of terms. The padārthas are divided into seven categories.

(b) The basic unit in a Nyāyic argument is a cognition.[6] A cognition is itself an object in the reality and can be captured by another cognition. It belongs to the category of quality (guṇa). Since, according to the Nyāya a quality resides in a substance, a cognition must be located in some substance. This substance is the self (ātman) of the knower. A cognition, though it is a quality of the self of the knower, does not remain private

to the knower. It is accessible to others because it is expressed in language and because it refers to an object external to itself.

How a truth value is assigned to an atomic statement is a problem outside the scope of the formal logic. Given the truth values of the atomic statements it lays down the rules regarding assigning truth values to compound statements and an argument. But, for the Nyāya, there is a reality where the statements are verified. A cognition, like an atomic statement has the form 'a has P'. But here neither the predicate P nor the object a are definite. Therefore attribution of P to a raises several problems. For example, if a is an apple and P stands for red it may not be objectively possible to decide if the apple is red or not. Some portion of its surface may be red, some portion green and the rest of it may be pink. Also one has to consider the possibility of the whole of the apple becoming red in a day or two. Thus, the Nyāya is faced with objects and properties that are indefinite, inexact and not clearly distinguishable.

THE SĀMĀNYA

(a) For the Nyāya the problem of forming sets begins with the problem of constructing the individuals and predicates. What we call 'objects' are, according to the Nyāya, effect substances. They are essentially different from their properties, parts and causes. When we say that an apple was green yesterday and will become red tomorrow, the apple, as a substance, is taken to be different from its properties of greenness and redness. The latter are called the dharmas which are located in the dharmis, that is, the apple, in this case. A table comprises legs and top, but it is different from them. Legs and top are the parts (avayavas) of the table which is the whole (avayavin). The whole exists independently of the parts and inheres in them.[7]

It will thus be seen that though the Nyāya is a realist and an empiricist school its conception of the individual is, in significant respects, different from the conception of some of the empiricists in the West. The radical empiricists look upon an individual as a package of properties and parts. Moreover, passage of time is a factor which is ignored in conceiving the individual and its properties, at least in the context of logic, in the West. An apple will be regarded as red if it is red at the present moment.

(b) When we look at reality we seldom find the presence of a uniform property in a body. If we take the property redness, we find a number of

shades of red present in different individuals. How do we then identify redness pure and absolute? Further, the presence of redness in a body may or may not be permanent. Will we regard a body as red if it possesses redness for some moment? Also, will we regard a body as red if only a part of it is red? A variety of complications presents itself when we attribute a property to an individual.

Before considering how a property is attributed to an individual, it will be instructive to discuss how a property is scooped up from experience. A property is abstracted from individuals by introducing a two place predicate 'similarity'.[8] If two things are similar they have some sense quality in common. A property is then defined as a set of things that resemble each other.[9] However, this definition suffers from the following lacuna. Suppose a and b share the quality q_1, b and c share the quality q_2 and c and a have the quality q_3 in common. Then the set {a, b, c} is a resemblance set but it will not define quality.

Perhaps to overcome such a difficulty Körner defined a resemblance set in terms of one or more standard members and standard non-members.[10] In a somewhat circular fashion we may explain the notion as follows.

Suppose we want to define whiteness. We then pick up an exemplar of whiteness, say, a swan and collect the objects that resemble a swan. Here it is understood that the whiteness of the swan is so predominant that for resemblance that quality is used as the main criterion. Given an exemplar of whiteness one may think of an exemplar of the absence of whiteness. A crow may be chosen as such an exemplar. If we denote the resemblance set based on the swan as A^+ the set based on the crow may be denoted as A^-.

The resemblance sets thus appear in pairs, A^+ and A^-. But A^+ and A^- do not exhaust the universe. There may remain some bodies which are neutral to both the opposite properties and will not be either in A^+ or A^-. That is why the resemblance sets are inexact. There may be some bodies which are initially neutral but which aspire to be included in one of the A^+ and A^-. In their case a decision will not necessarily be on objective grounds. It depends on the free choice of the author of the resemblance sets.[11]

(c) Our thesis is that the Nyāya constructed its predicates on the basis of similarity or resemblance and that the sets which the Nyāya implicitly adopted were the resemblance sets. We justify the thesis on the following grounds.

The Nyāya does not explicitly speak of sets. It talks in terms of a shared property or the sāmānya. But the word sāmānya was originally a synonym for sādharmya[12] which means similarity. Jaimini uses the word sāmānya to mean similarity or similar thing.[13] Kumārīla defines the sāmānya as something that gives the cognition that these bodies are together.[14] Thus it seems that, at least in early stages of the evolution of the Nyāya epistemology, the word sāmānya was used to indicate similarity which, a little later, came to signify a common property.

Next we come to the notion of 'negation' in the Nyāya. It is, in many respects different from that in the formal logic. Let $p \equiv$ 'a has P'. Its formal logical negation, denoted by –p, is $-p \equiv$ 'a does not have P'. The negation is the sense of Nyāya will be $p^- \equiv$ 'P is absent in a'. Now suppose that the property P is redness. 'A parrot is not red' is a true statement but 'Redness is absent in a parrot' is a false statement. Thus, the statement $p \equiv$ 'A parrot is red' is false; the statement $-p \equiv$ 'A parrot is not red' is true and the statement $p^- \equiv$ 'Redness is absent in a parrot' is also false. Thus p and p^- can both be false.

The Nyāya conception of negation is the 'atyantābhāva'. It means 'the absolute absence' of a property. The stock example of the absolute absence is the absence of colour in the air.[15] The Nyāyakośa explains the term atyantābhāva as the absolute and all time absence of some thing or some property.[16] If we interpret the negation of p as the atyantābhāva, that is, p^- as above, it is clear that p and p^- can both be false; but both cannot be true.

(c) That this interpretation of p and p^- is correct is supported by several other sources also. There is a particular variety of debate, called 'Vitandā', where the debator after refuting p proceeds to refute the 'negation of p' also.[17] This is clearly possible only if the 'negation of p' is interpreted as p^- and not as –p. Further, in the case of 'Saṃśaya', when we have two alternatives regarding an element x, say, if something standing before me is a man or a pillar, the two alternatives are not regarded as negations, in the sense of p and –p, of each other. That is why the refutation of p does not validate the alternative.[18] After refuting p the debator has to deploy the means of cognition (pramāṇas) again to validate the alternative.[19]

Given a property P we first get hold of an examplar of P, say e^+. For example, the kitchen is mentioned as the exemplar of the presence of fire. There is also the exemplar of the absolute absence P. For example, the lake is the exemplar of absolute absence of fire. Between these two ex-

tremes are arranged several locations where P is present with varying intensity. We then allot them to classes A^+ and A^- centred respectively on e^+ and e^-, on various, often subjective, grounds. Some locations may remain neutral for good. For example, in the case of whiteness and its opposite blackness centred on the swan and the crow, a parrot may remain neutral.

What we have established is that the conception of negation in the Nyāya is different from that in the formal logic; that the sets contemplated in the Nyāya are inexact; that they are conceived as resemblance sets which occur in pairs; that the sets in each pair are not the complements of each other but that they may be regarded as 'opposites' of each other; and that each resemblance set has an exemplar.

THE ANUMĀNA

(a) The anumāna is a two stage process. From the given premises a logician draws a conclusion for himself and then convinces his interlocutor of its validity. The first part is called the swārthānumāna and the second is called the parāthānumāna. Here we are concerned with the latter and call it the anumāna, for convenience.

The process of the anumāna comprises five steps and it is illustrated as follows:

Pratijñā: The mountain has fire.

Hetu: For there is smoke.

Udāharaṇa: Where there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen.

Upanaya: This (smoke on the mountain) is like that (smoke in the kitchen).

Niṣkarṣa: Therefore (this mountain) is of that sort (i.e. a location with fire).[20]

Athalye converts it into the syllogism 'Barbara' as follows:[21]

A) Whatever smokes is fiery.

B) This mountain is a thing that smokes.

C) Therefore, this mountain is fiery.

This syllogism is expressed as an argument as follows:

Let $Sx \equiv$ 'x is smoky' and $Fx \equiv$ 'x is fiery'. Then

(i) $(x)\ \{Sx \supset Fx\}$	
(ii) $Sm \supset Fm$	$m \equiv$ mountain.
(iii) $Sm \supset Fm\ \&\ Sm$	UI.
(iv) Fm	from (iii), (ii) Modus Ponens.

This, prima facie, looks like a neat appropriation of the anumāna to the formal logic. But it distorts the anumāna in crucial respects and ignores the actual thought process lying under the anumāna, as it was, presumably, originally conceived.

(b) In converting the anumāna into the syllogism two steps in the anumāna, namely, the udāharaṇa and the upanaya are deleted. However, it is these two steps that hold the clue to the process of thought in the anumāna.

Udāharaṇa means illustration. The step with this title should, therefore, include the mention of kitchen only and not the general rule.[22] Matilal says that the anumāna was initially an unsophisticated process of inference based on analogy and previous experience.[23] If this is so, one may suggest that originally this step contained only the illustration and not the rule. The Upanaya then compares the mountain with the kitchen in the respect of smoke. The conclusion that the smoke on the mountain must be accompanied by fire since the smoke in the kitchen carries fire with it, follows. It is cryptically stated as 'the mountain is also with fire'.

Matilal gives, in two places, his explanation of citing the udāharaṇa after stating the general rule. Firstly,[24] he says that the Nyāya did not contemplate an implication with the empty subject class. Secondly,[25] he apprehends that the assertion that 'every smoke individual has a fire individual with it' may invite the rejoinder that 'a smoke individual is accompanied neither by fire nor by absence of it'. Citation of an example where a smoke individual is definitely accompanied by fire pre-empts this objection.

However, these explanations fail to justify the upanaya where the smoke on the mountain is compared with the one in the kitchen. If the general rule is true, one can directly infer the presence of fire on the mountain without comparing the two smoke individuals.

(c) Our thesis is that all the steps in the anumāna are neatly explained on the basis of the resemblance sets.

What is our objective? The presence of fire on the mountain. With respect to the presence of fire the locations in the universe are divided into two opposite sets: the set where fire is definitely present and the set where fire is definitely absent. The exemplar of the first class is the kitchen and that of the second class is the lake. The mountain is a neutral element.

Now we have to make a decision on the mountain: Is there fire on it or not? We find that smoke in the kitchen is accompanied by fire. The

crucial step involves the decision that the smoke on the mountain is also accompanied by fire. In fact, Uddyotakara explicitly states that what we infer is that this body of smoke (on the mountain) possesses fire.[26]

The rule 'where there is smoke, there is fire' is conceived as a resemblance set consisting of those smoke individuals which are accompanied by the fire individuals. The exemplar for this set, say A, is the smoke individual located in the kitchen. Now, if a candidate, say, the smoke individual perceived on the mountain, aspires to membership of A, our decision about it is based on the comparison of it with the exemplar. Note that this comparison is partly subjective in that we do not perceive fire which is expected to accompany the smoke on the mountain; and the presence of fire is a criterion of comparison. This subjective comparison is made in the upanaya and the decision is made that the smoke on the mountain is like that in the kitchen.

Thus, the smoke individual on the mountain qualifies to be a member of the set A. Hence it carries fire as its qualifying adjunct. This accompanying fire is located in the mountain where the smoke individual in question, is also located.

CONCLUSION

We began with the intention of appraising the anumāna by the standard of the formal logic and, if possible, to appropriate it to the formal logic. Our examination of the Nyāya, in general, and of the anumāna, in particular, establishes the following theses:

(a) The formal logic is based on exact sets and definite individuals. In terms of predicates, given an individual a and a predicate P, either 'a has P' or 'a does not have P'. This law of excluded middle is the anchor of the formal logic.

(b) In the Nyāya the predicates/properties are conceived in terms of resemblances and exemplars. Therefore, given a predicate P the universe is divided into three parts A^+, A^- and the neutral elements. The decision on inclusion of a neutral element either in A^+ or A^- depends on comparison of the candidate with the corresponding exemplar.

(c) The anumāna, therefore, cannot be squeezed into a straightforward inference in the formal logic. The anumāna is a special kind of inference which may prove useful when we are dealing with situations where the predicates and individuals are not exact.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Thus, for example, Athalye [1] p. 235 compares it with the syllogism 'Barbara'. Stcherbatsky [13] p. 315 also makes the same comparison. Scholars who were familiar with the formal logic, for example, Ingalls [7] p. 78 compare it with inference.
2. Matilal [10] p. 78.
3. Stcherbatsky [13] p. XII.
4. Apart from properties there are relations also. But we do not consider them here.
5. See Berneys [4] p. 274.
6. We use the term 'cognition' for the Sanskrit term jñāna.
7. Shastry [11] p. 134.
8. Goodman [5] p. 106.
9. Op. cit., p. 107.
10. Körner [9] p. 20.
11. Op. cit., p. 26.
12. Harsh Narayan [6] p. 179.
13. Op. cit., p. 196.
14. Op. cit., p. 197.
15. Ingalls [7] p. 55 and Shastry [11] pp. 402–3.
16. Zalakikar [16] p. 9.
17. Matilal [10] p. 17 and pp. 26–7.
18. Bagchi [2] pp. 73–4.
19. Jayanta [8] Vol. I, p. 584.
20. Athalye [1] p. 38. Translated by the present author from the original Sanskrit. The words in brackets are not original.
21. Op. cit., p. 270.
22. This general rule is called the vyāpti. Its introduction into Nyāya will require a separate discussion.
23. Matilal [10] p. 40.
24. Op. cit., p. 55.
25. Op. cit., p. 75.
26. Quoted by Matilal [10] p. 62.

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Possible Worlds

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A world, as Leibnitz pointed out long ago, involves the notion of 'compossibility' or, in other words, the possibility of different possibilities being 'possible' together. The idea, though long accepted, is not clear as it implies that things or events or facts which are each separately possible, may be impossible together. A conjunction of 'possibles', it is argued, may be impossible. But this can only be possible if it implies contradiction which is usually a conjunctive assertion of two propositions having opposed truth-values in a two-valued logic. This, however, would imply that every well-formed sentence is possible or asserts a possibility by virtue of the very fact that it is well formed or syntactically correct in that language.

The semantic notion of possibility refers to a 'world' where being 'well-formed' alone is not sufficient to ensure the 'truth' of a sentence. But if one accepts the idea of a 'world' where many different possibilities can be 'possible', then they can not be incompatible with each other. The difference has to be minimally spatio-temporal in nature and, if so, the law of contradiction as formally formulated cannot be applied, in principle. As for the entities that are non-spatio-temporal in nature, they are defined by their properties and hence the question of incompatibility does not arise in their case. There is, of course, always the problem of contradiction or contrariety or incompatibility or incoherence in the statements that we make or the theories or the hypotheses we build about them. But, then, that is a problem about our 'knowledge' of the possible worlds and not about the possible worlds themselves. In this perspective, however, the distinction between the possible and the actual disappears, a point that has been tangentially made by some philosophers in the Arabic tradition, in their penetrating discussion of the subject. The distinction, it has not been seen, depends on believing that there is only one spatio-temporal framework

in the universe and that there is only one form of matter that we find in the world we live in.

Each possible world then will have to be deemed an 'actual' world. But, then, how shall one conceive of the relation between them and 'the world of all possible worlds'. The idea of the completed totality of 'all' possible worlds may itself create a problem as it can make no sense unless some possibilities in certain possible worlds are excluded as they are 'impossible' in principle because of their very nature. But how can this be possible in face of our contention that nothing can be impossible because of the way we have conceived of 'possibility'.

The contention, however, is made only in the context of each possible world and not of what may be called 'the world of all possible worlds' which, of course, will require a restriction if they are to form a totality that itself is finite or at least determinable in principle. This restriction was called by Whitehead God who defined it as the first restriction on the world of possibility. Perhaps, the ontological proof for the reality of God means just this. If anything is to be, God must be, and as 'something' is, God must be. The necessity for the postulation, however, has shifted to another level, as the possible worlds themselves have to be 'compossible' if they are to form one emcompassing world in some sense of 'encompassing' which perhaps is minimally provided by the 'possibility' of some communication between them. The 'possible worlds', in other words, cannot be monadic or windowless in the Leibnitzian sense and it is 'God' who is supposed to provide the precondition of this possibility, though in a sense different from that of Leibnitz. In a sense each possible 'world', if it is to be a 'world', must have compossible possibilities within it. But the compossibility between all possible worlds, or 'lokas' as they are called in the Indian tradition, has to be of an order higher than the one which has to be postulated for each possible world.

It will be tempting to call the latter 'gods' in contrast to 'God' which is the term we used for the former. But if we give in to the temptation we will have to face the problem of the relationship between 'God' and the 'gods' with all the intellectual and moral problems arising from such a situation. A restriction on the number of 'godheads' may perhaps be as necessary as the one on the 'lokas' that was required for rendering the idea of the world of all possible worlds feasible.

God, or the principle of the transcendent unity of all possible worlds, to use a Kantian phrase, would have to be not only the ontological guarantee

for what we may call the cosmic system, but also the foundation for ensuring and safeguarding the primacy of the positively valuational, if being with consciousness at the human level is to be counted therein. To postulate man is to postulate God, as the former is impossible without the latter for the simple reason that it alone can provide a guarantee for the human seeking if it is conceived of in valuational terms.

The God thus has to be *Śiva* or that which ensures the ultimate survival of all that is good in the cosmos by virtue of the simple fact that it itself is good.

The *śivatva* or the 'goodness' in the Godhead, or rather the guarantee for the 'good' in the universe, however, assumes that at least some of the possible worlds are inhabited by beings who are self-conscious, as without self-consciousness one cannot conceive of the distinction between 'good' and 'bad', or between 'good' and 'evil', arising in the universe. And, in case there are more than one such 'lokas' or 'worlds' the problem of the compossibility between 'goodnesses', is bound to arise and the only solution for it lies in the postulate of 'God' who, by definition, is existentially supposed to solve it.

But if *śivatva* arises only in the context of self-conscious beings, then what is the characteristic or quality that intrinsically belongs to the nature of consciousness itself? Perhaps, two characteristics may be said *prima facie* to belong to it. The first is the feeling of 'existential reality', which it asserts indubitably of itself and proclaims aloud to everything else. This is what is meant by the term *svaprakāśatva* in the Indian philosophical tradition. Besides this self-certifying character of consciousness which is captured by the Sanskrit term, it has others which are equally intrinsic, though not as foundational as this. These relate to its relation to the 'objects' of which it is conscious and arise in relation to them. They may be characterized or indicated by the term 'beautiful' on the one hand and the term 'pleasant' on the other. There are so many shades and varieties of these that it is difficult to capture them all in any one language, or even by all the languages together. Still it would be rewarding to find the shades and varieties that are captured by each of them and the way they have been embodied in the artistic cultures to which those languages belong. But though both these characteristics arise in relation to 'objects', there seems a radical difference between them as the quality of 'being pleasant' appears to belong to consciousness, while that of 'being beautiful' belongs to the 'object'. The apprehension of the 'beautiful' however,

creates a quality in the consciousness which can be characterized only in its terms as it is so bound up with it that it can not be separated from it and expressed independently of it.

But, though beauty is felt to belong to the object, it arouses a response in the consciousness that feels it and this feeling is qualitatively different from what we have called 'pleasantness' or 'unpleasantness' which characterizes consciousness itself. This feeling has been called *rasa* in the Indian tradition and 'aesthetic emotion' in the west, though the latter is substantively different from the former. The difference in the two emanates from the difference in the analysis of that from which, and in respect of which, the feeling or the emotion arises. Beauty is a supervening quality, or a quality which arises from all the other qualities fused together and forming a whole that not only transcends the qualities in their totality, but also 'says' something which is different from the meaning which the object with its qualities is supposed to be as the referent of the 'sense' which refers to it. *Rasa* may be said to be the 'subjective' counterpart in the consciousness that apprehends it. 'Aesthetic emotion', on the other hand, arises not so much from the apprehension of the beautiful as from certain properties which are primarily formal and organizational in nature. These are not only formal in such a way as to be in the centre of attention but also so that all the other aspects may recede in the background and hence are neglected altogether or function only as supplementing or complementing the effect produced by that which is in the focus of attention. The history of western art in recent times may be seen as a search for the achievement of the perfect purity of this emotion and then a rejection of it because of the alienation involved in it resulting in an evaporation of almost all emotion from it. The latest phase of this history is a rejection of even this rejection resulting not in a restatement of the former but an absolute negation like that of the Advaitins, of the 'reality' of that from which the whole enterprise had started.

The feeling that beauty arouses, though pleasant, is of a radically different kind from the pleasant feelings aroused by all sensuously apprehended objects in a sensuous subject. It is also different from the feeling aroused by the feeling in another 'living' being which itself is different depending upon the fact whether the other is self-conscious or not. In case the 'other' is also apprehended as beautiful, the feeling in respect of this feeling is again different because of the complexity involved in the situation that is radically different from feelings that arise inevitably in a

conscious being when it apprehends any object. This is concerned with *śivatva* or the feeling that something is good or bad, 'right or wrong'; in short, the moral dimension which affects the life of feeling in such a way that it loses its innocence and can never be again what it was in the Garden of Eden, if we accept the Biblical account of it. It was not the Tree of Knowledge, but the tree of morality that destroyed the realm where only consciousness created the world and there was as yet no self-consciousness to doubt or question the 'rightness' of that which was felt by it.

Self-questioning of consciousness along with that of all that appears as 'object' to it introduces an ambiguity and 'suspicion' at the heart of all possible worlds as the awareness of what we should not be, demands a rectification on the part of the consciousness that apprehends it as such. The transition from 'should' to 'ought' introduces an element of 'obligatoriness' in the situation which results in a feeling of 'guilt' if one does not do what is required to rectify the situation. But as the attempt to realize that which 'ought-to-be' not only does not always succeed but also results in consequences that are not valuationally acceptable to the apprehending consciousness, a feeling of despair, despondency and utter futility results which may only be got over by an act of faith which believes that there is something in the universe or the totality of all 'possible worlds', which not only ensures communication between them but also guarantees that the effort at rectification shall not be completely wasted.

The 'existence' of 'something' in the space-time-matter that we know and the 'existence' of consciousness and self-consciousness in it as experienced therein ensures that there is some 'X' which makes the compossibility of everything at the levels of what has usually been called 'Truth', 'Beauty' and 'Goodness' possible and actual at the same time. Outside the realms where consciousness is not present such a 'postulation' raises no problems at all. Who worries about the innumerable 'worlds' which are talked about in the astronomical literature of today and the 'spaces' and 'times' they involve? And, even when 'consciousness' appears as in the innumerable species of plants and animals that have flourished in geological time on earth, there is only wonder at the inexhaustible variety that swarms all around, but there are no real questions except those that arise in the context of any 'existent' whatsoever. But the moment self-consciousness appears as in man, the very notions of truth, beauty, and goodness undergo a radical transformation and find a question mark raised against them which applies in a paradoxical way to that

'X' also which is supposed to be their foundation and source in both the 'existent' and the 'existential' senses of the term.

The diremption in the heart of 'reality' that self-consciousness introduces can hardly be healed as it affects all values including those of 'truth' and 'goodness' which, in a sense, question the self-certifying 'certitude' of consciousness and infect it with a 'doubt' that reverberates through the whole realm of being, thus making it aware of that which is its opposite, that is, that which cannot be and yet is or, in other words, 'non-being' which self-consciousness brings into being and which it can not get rid of even if it so wishes. The insane dialectic which this brings into being results in the introduction of a new and different form of time-consciousness than the one which was present at the level of consciousness. Time is not now a form of inner sensibility as Kant said, but a form of human action where the 'future' forms an immanent ingredient of the 'present' shaping it in the direction of that which is 'desired' and hence is regarded as 'desirable'. The fallacy involved is necessary, as without this illusion action at the human level just can not be. Transformation of both the forms of sensibility and the categories of understanding at the level of self-consciousness has not been seen by Kant just as Hegel did not grasp the transformation in the nature of the dialectic between being and non-being at the self-conscious level. Space is no more the place where things are, but that in which motion or activity can take place. Similarly, Time is now that in which purposes can be realized and 'freedom' shows its power to bend causality to achieve its ends which would have been dismissed as unreal by a consciousness that was confined to the immediacy of the present, and to that only.

Categories themselves undergo a radical transformation as now they appear in a judgemental form which is necessarily constituted in terms of them. At the conscious level, the categories are only implicitly involved and that too only individually. It is, of course, difficult to say with any certainty whether all the categories may be said to be even implicitly present at the conscious level. The category corresponding to what is called 'necessity' can scarcely be considered even as being implicit at the level where there is no self-consciousness, as it involves the notion of 'contingency' which involves a 'questioning' that is not possible without it. The same is perhaps true of the category of 'limitation' which Kant includes under 'Quality'.

Self-consciousness, however is necessarily judgemental at the ordinary human level and in a judgement the categories are not only related to one another and brought into a 'unity', but there is also an element of 'assertion' which accompanies the act of judging and which Kant indicated by the phrase 'I think' or 'I judge' (Ich denke). This 'act' of 'assertion' is a psychic act involving the 'owning' of 'responsibility' which implies that one is prepared to give grounds for one's judgement and justify it on those grounds. To question the grounds is to question the judgement and it is this aspect of judgemental cognition which gives rise to man's enterprise of rationality which consists in providing 'reasons' for what one says. But the 'reasons' can always be found to be inadequate or shown to be inconsistent with what one holds on other grounds. There is, thus, an inherent 'dubitability' in the enterprise of rationality which 'self-consciousness' has inevitably to engage in just because it is self-consciousness.

This element of 'questionability' which belongs to self-consciousness-qua-self-consciousness has been understood in many ways in the philosophical traditions of the world. But it has seldom been seen that the elements of 'reflexivity' and 'negativity' arise in a pre-reflective consciousness that is neither reflexive nor negative in the sense in which 'self-consciousness' appears in man. The 'negativity' is surrounded by a vast certitude which belongs to consciousness itself. And, reflexivity at this level is the self-certitude of consciousness as reflected in the indubitable self-certainty of the 'I' at the level of self-consciousness.

The indubitability of 'I' and the dubitability of everything else thus provides the matrix of the drama of self-consciousness which man essentially is. The dubitability arises from the intrinsic 'questionability' of everything that 'appears' to self-consciousness, while the indubitability arises from the famous Cartesian observation that 'doubting' cannot be doubted, as the doubting of a doubt will reinstate the doubt once again. The recourse to 'levels of doubting', as Sibajiban Bhattacharya has done, will not help as the issue is not epistemological but ontological in nature. The self-certitude of the 'I' involved in 'doubting' is 'existential', even though the nature of the 'I' that is involved may not be clear. The ontological argument in Descartes thus may be seen as applying to the 'self' and not 'God', even though Descartes himself thought otherwise. Similarly, the dualism in him is not that of body and mind, as is generally accepted, but that of the 'dubitable' and the 'in-dubitable' or the world and the 'I', or all that is 'object' and that to which it is an 'object'.

Consciousness, thus, is indubitable, even though at the level of self-consciousness it becomes dubitable as it too becomes an 'object' to itself, like all other objects. It is this 'dubitability' however which gives rise to that eternal seeking in respect of both the self and the world which finds them not as they could be and hence tries to make them 'better'. The unending dynamism that this engenders defines the human situation. But it also gives it that tragic dimension which haunts it perennially as nothing satisfies it ever and all achievement seems ultimately futile and meaningless. The two, though seemingly opposed to each other, are really complementary or two sides of the same phenomenon as they not only depend on each other, but are also rooted in the phenomenon of self-consciousness, which gives rise to them, Self-consciousness, however, is itself grounded in consciousness which, as pointed out earlier, provides another dimension to it which is essentially tangential in character.

Consciousness, however, is not so simple or transparent as has generally been supposed to be. It not only varies continuously in clarity, intensity and quality as is revealed in the phenomena known as 'dreams' and 'sleep' but also is unable to ensure the truth or veridicality of what it reveals. Yet, this is what it always claims, a claim whose 'falsity' is revealed in the phenomenon known as 'illusion' which claims as much veridicality as anything else.

The spuriousness of this claim is fully revealed, however, only in self-consciousness which refuses to take the 'claim' as self-evident and demands that it be established and re-established in each case anew including that of itself. Still, as consciousness is 'mirrored' in self-consciousness, the 'claim' is always present and gives rise to that strange dialectic between 'certitude' and 'incertitude' which defines the human situation in its unique indescribable way as it is founded in a self-contradiction which is unresolvable in principle.

The relation between self-consciousness and consciousness and of consciousness to its object is so diverse, varied and multiple in character that it is impossible to be articulated or understood by anyone in any meaningful way. The diversity amongst objects is itself incomprehensible to any finite understanding and the relationships that they have to consciousness and the ways in which they are reflected in self-consciousness passeth all understanding.

But these *are* the possible 'worlds' in which all 'living' beings live and each of them lives in a 'world' of its own, not only because of the distinctive

nature of its history and the memories it has, but also because of the way it recreates and organizes this material from its own point of view. The centre of 'creative receptivity' that all consciousness is inevitably results in these innumerable 'private worlds' which yet share a common point of reference which makes them members of what, for them, is their 'public world'.

The 'public worlds' however are also as diverse and different as the 'private worlds', a problem which self-consciousness faces when it thinks about the idea of 'possible worlds'. Strangely, most of the possible worlds are actual in the sense that some living being or other 'lives' them in and through the consciousness or self-consciousness which it has. The 'return' from the 'private' to the 'public world' or the communication about the former through the medium of the latter ensures a sense of 'shared' reality in which one's being is grounded along with those of others. At the human level, this is ensured by the linguistic and symbolic creations which those living in a cultural or civilizational area share. But behind and beyond these lies the world of nature to which the 'body' belongs and which is 'known' primarily through it and, in a sense, even constituted by it. This provides also the common reference point on the basis of which the diverse 'public worlds' can and do communicate between themselves, thus engendering the belief that all can share the common world in which everyone lives.

The 'Common World', however, is not only 'relative' to each individual who inhabits it, but also to the 'world' which residually remains after all the so-called 'constructed' or 'created' worlds in it are discounted or not taken into account. This, at the human level, is seen in terms of the body and, as we said at the beginning, is constituted by the space, time and matter perceived and felt in the context of knowledge and action at the routine day-to-day level. There are other levels, both of knowledge and action, felt by everyone but they are treated as ultimately secondary because of the foundational fact that the 'body' dies and that with its death, everything else is supposed to die also. One may think of 'something' surviving the death of this body, but, one just can't make sense of what this 'survival' could mean as the very notion of something 'making sense' is determined by the experience undergone by a being who possesses the type of body we all possess.

The idea that there may be bodies different from those of ours, constituted by forms of matter which is radically different from the one we

ordinarily know of, living in 'spaces' and 'time' different from ours is found in the mythical and mystical texts in most religions and there always has been some relatively well-authenticated evidence of it at all times, but there has always been the problem as to how to build a coherent picture of it, if it all were to be accepted as 'true'.

Factual knowledge itself, however, now seeks to open the idea of possible worlds for serious consideration in the new ideas of matter, space, time and causality that it proposes without taking into account the consequences that they entail. Recent studies on consciousness are only a hesitant and faltering step in this direction. The crucial question is that of 'death' and whether anything can be said to survive it and, if so, in which possible manner. The facts of 'death' and 'life' are so closely linked together that one cannot understand the one without understanding the other. And, what seems even stranger is the fact that the idea of death seems to assume that something 'living' ceases to be alive. But something that is living cannot be 'understood' as ceasing to be so and if anything is supposed to survive after 'death' then death can not be considered to be 'death' either.

The simple point is that either we assume and accept that there is a final and irretrievable cessation of life or that death is an illusion which, though seemingly a 'fact', is not really so. The situation is further complicated by the fact that 'life' does not seem to be uniformly so at all its levels and that there is the appearance of both consciousness and self-consciousness within it which display an unbelievable creativity which is impossible to believe, even though it is attested by so many creations of man encircling him all around. What is the relation between the type of consciousness and self-consciousness that men possess and the life that he also 'lives', like all other 'living beings', is the unanswerable question which has to be entertained if the question of death is even 'meaningfully' to be posed. 'Death', may be the cessation of life, but is it the cessation of consciousness or self-consciousness as it is possessed by man? In other words, is 'I-consciousness' or self-consciousness as found in man independent of the biological life that he 'lives with' and 'lives-in' also? In a certain sense this is so self-evident that one is surprised why it has not been noticed or emphasized up till now. There is little relationship between the biological living and the creativity of man. But, creativity requires some material to be shaped or transformed where the 'materiality' is both denied and transcended in some form or other. Can consciousness, then, be creative without some external 'matter' which it tries to transcreate in the light of some 'imaginary' or ideal perfection which it vaguely apprehends? And, what about the 'living body', which is necessary for this transformational activity to take place? Can consciousness create without the help of the body on the one hand and the resistant yet 'cooperative' matter on the other? Literary creations have the strangest material as one can hardly think of language as 'matter' in the strict sense of the term. Not only this, a literary creation is a creation out of 'meanings' without which language can not be regarded as language at all. The same thing is true of philosophy where creativity obtains at the level of thought and where the matter or the medium is what can only be described as 'thought' itself. In both of these, the use of the body is minimal, almost non-existent. Contrast this with dance where the body itself becomes the medium of creativity. In fact, not only the whole body but each of the senses informing it has its own centre of creativity and creates a world around it which is as 'objective' and 'real' as anything else.

But, can consciousness exercise this function of 'creativity' on itself? The consciousness that is actually 'enjoyed' or 'lived-in' seems to be of very poor quality, even amongst those who evince great creativity in their 'products'. A great writer or a great philosopher, not to talk of musicians, painters, dancers and singers, may be, and generally is a poor specimen of humanity. The saints are supposed to be the 'masters' who have tried to exercise their creativity on consciousness itself, and those who have achieved it have visibly exercised influence over millennia. Yet, they too seem to have been 'specialists', even though they have seemed to have transcended the ordinary human condition in a way that was transparent to many who encountered them in life, a fact which comes through almost alive to those who hear or read about them.

The relation of matter to life and of life to mind and of mind to reason and imagination is difficult to understand. Still more difficult is it to understand the relation of all of these to consciousness and of the latter to self-consciousness. The relation of creativity to each and all of these is perhaps the central mystery which pervades the universe, and the key to the understanding of the idea of 'possible worlds' lies in imagining the myriad relationships between these and the innumerable forms that they can take. The 'world' we live in is itself full of millions of possible worlds as can easily be found if one looks around oneself or reads the morning newspaper. That there can be still other possible worlds, is vouchsafed by

the new emerging technologies and forms of matter that surround us today and which are symbolized by the internet about which one hears all the time.

The body seems to be the stumbling-block and the ultimate limitation on the possibility of 'possible worlds'. Shall this ever remain a limit which can not be transcended or overcome, is the crucial question which faces mankind today. The other question which has always faced mankind is whether the death of this body is really the 'death' of everything. These have invariably been perennial questions but the recent turn in the researches on matter, space, time and consciousness suggest that death can not be regarded as the end of everything as most religions have said up till now. But if one, even provisionally, accepts this as a hypothesis then even more difficult questions arise which should, at least theoretically, be formulated and discussed. The relation between 'possible worlds' and different types of 'being' and the corresponding notions of individuality, identity and continuity, along with the crucial epistemological and metaphysical issues need to be imagined and thought of as all of these, up till now, have been framed on the assumption that this *is* the only possible world that '*can*' be. And strangely, even in respect of this world the formulation of these problems has almost consistently ignored the actuality of 'possible worlds' that lie all around us. This has been so because the paradigmatic example of the 'really real' has always been taken by the layman and the philosopher alike to be a solid, hard, impenetrable, inert, dead stone and not the heart that beats within or the mind that dreams or the thought that thinks or the 'x' that is conscious and creates the world around us.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Notes on Discussion

I

A discussion group is not only an intellectual but also a moral group.

Intellectually, in a discussion group, people aim at getting at the truth of something through an interchange of ideas. Thus, for example, they wish to find out: what is the nature of criterion, how is criterion distinguished from definition and test, what are the different kinds of things which qualify to be used as criterion? What are the conditions under which a 'statement' would be said to be meaningless? Is the employment of the notion of truth as correspondence of a judgement with facts about which this judgement claims to be inextricably involved in infinite regress? Can the authorities which have falsely charged one of their employees with misappropriation of funds be pressurized to retract their step? Is it sometimes the case that our differences of opinion look much more serious than they actually are, because we work ourselves up to them? Is it possible to construct a social organization, be it, for example, an educational institution or even a state, in which no person or body of persons has to be assigned authority over others, in order to do away with the fairly general and not seldom rather disturbing misuse of this authority? and so on.

One may go on to say that, in a discussion group, in order to get at the truth of something, people would have to have varied other intellectual equipment, like clarity and exactness of understanding of a problem, capacity to follow an argument and counter-argument, discriminating what is irrelevant, consistency in thought, readiness to give up false positions and receptivity to new ideas.

Morally, in a discussion group: people have to have regard for others, insofar as they have to believe that they may have something worthwhile to say; they have to try to understand (sometimes even try very hard to understand) what others may be saying, and in order to do that, they have to have patience, perseverance and on various occasions sympathy; they have to have tolerance, even show some extra consideration, towards others when they may be saying something different; they have to have

enough of self-control or self-discipline so as not to permit any extraneous considerations, like personal likes and dislikes or differences in approach, to intervene in evaluating the merit of what others may be saying; they have to have the courage and impartiality to accept whatever conclusion it is to which their most carefully worked out argument leads, and also the courage and impartiality to reopen the issue, whether wholly or partially, as soon as some flaw in the argument is discovered or something else is discovered which has a bearing on the argument; and there may indeed be some other moral qualities, some other moral equipment, which a discussion group would have to have.

Imagine a society in which, in the face of differences of opinion, people bring into display not just the intellectual but also the moral paraphernalia which I have mentioned above. That would, needless to say, be as non-violent a way as possible of dealing with these differences of opinion. I am tempted to say here that a discussion group in which there obtains not just the intellectual but also the moral paraphernalia which I have mentioned as belonging to it, looks like being on the way to becoming a society in which people are more or less fond of one another (looks like being on the way to becoming a kingdom of love, to express the same thought somewhat exaggeratedly).

II

How exactly or more or less exactly does a discussion group function?

Let us suppose that some people decide to come together to discuss things. Further, suppose that they take up the following problem for discussion: given a morally good end, would one be morally justified in adopting any means which are productive of that end or only those means which, besides being productive of that end, are also themselves morally good or are at least not morally bad? Given, for example, the protection of innocent people from what are called anti-social elements as a morally good end, would one be morally justified even in incapacitating these elements in case that helped, or only in adopting some such method as talking to these elements about becoming parts of society like other people, again assuming that that method would help? It is possible that this formulation of the problem is itself arrived at after a certain amount of discussion; it is not there to begin with; what is there to begin with is some general thing like 'Ends and Means'.

In the course of discussion about the above-mentioned problem, sooner or later, the following positions or standpoints may emerge: (1) *any* means, so long as they are productive of the given morally good end, are morally justified; as a matter of fact, the morality of means is entirely dependent upon the morality of end. (2) Just as there are ends which are themselves morally good or morally bad or morally indifferent, there are also means which are themselves morally good or morally bad or morally indifferent. One would be morally, and not merely morally, justified in adopting only those means for the production of a morally good end which are themselves morally good or at least not morally bad, on the assumption, of course, that these means are productive of that end. As a matter of fact, if the means adopted happen to be morally bad, they will never be productive of a morally good end. (3) There is as much reason to believe that there are means which are themselves morally good or morally bad or morally indifferent as to believe that there are ends which are themselves morally good or morally bad or morally indifferent. Further, both kinds of means, namely those which are themselves morally good or at least not themselves morally bad and those which are themselves morally bad, would often appear to be able to produce morally good ends, and it is also found that the results which the former kind of means produce need not be any more lasting than the results which the latter kind of means produce. Finally, given that the former kind of means produce morally good ends in equal measure and within the same period of time or even within a longer period of time but without any adverse or any significantly adverse consequences, then they are to be morally preferred to the latter kind of means.

Now, as the next step, in examining these three positions, the discussion group may take the following questions for consideration: (a) is it the case that there is as much reason to believe that there are means which are themselves morally good or morally bad or morally indifferent as to believe that there are ends which are themselves morally good or morally bad or morally indifferent? (b) Is it the case that both kinds of means which I have mentioned under the third position in the preceding paragraph would often appear to be able to produce morally good ends, and also this that the results which the former of them produce need not be any more lasting than the results which the latter of them produce? (c) Is it the case that if the former kind of means produce morally good ends in equal measure and within the same period of time but without any adverse

or any significantly adverse consequences, then they are to be morally preferred to the latter kind of means? Among these three questions, it should not be difficult to see that the third one is rather easy to answer.

In the preceding I have no more than outlined the kind of direction in which our discussion group, more or less ideally speaking, would function. As the discussion proceeds, in all likelihood, there would be further clarifications, contentions and questions, there would be arguments, objections to these arguments and rejoinders to these objections or there would be arguments and after some pondering over agreement with these arguments, there would be presentation of evidence in favour of what one is maintaining and consideration of this evidence, there would be suggestions towards making new moves and explorations of these suggestions and so on. And at the end of it all there could be a conclusion reached.

III

How exactly or more or less exactly, let me ask here, does an act or operation of reflecting on one's own function? Let us suppose once more that one is reflecting on one's own about the same problem which one was discussing in the preceding section, namely the problem: given a morally good end, would one be morally justified in adopting *any* means which are productive of that end or only those means which, besides being productive of that end, are also themselves morally good or are at least not morally bad?

It is possible in the present case also just an in the previous case that this formulation of the problem is itself arrived at after a certain amount of reflection; it is not there to begin with; what is there to begin with is some general thing like 'Ends and Means'.

Now, given this problem for reflection, one possibility is that one collects various views which people may have about it. One may do so by talking to them, by being present on occasions when this problem is being dealt with or discussed, by reading literature on the subject and so on. And after one has done so, one subjects these various views to examination. Let us suppose that the various views which one is able to collect from people are the same three views which emerge in the course of discussion and which I have mentioned in the preceding section. Let us also suppose that, as the first step in one's examination of these views, one raises the same three questions which the discussion group itself took

for consideration and which again I have mentioned in the preceding section.

We, further, find that, once again more or less ideally speaking, one's reflection about the given problem proceeds basically in the same kind of way as one's discussion of it with other people. Here also, just as, in all likelihood, there are further clarifications, contentions, questions, arguments, objects of these arguments, rejoinders to these objections, agreements with arguments, evidence for or against something, evaluation of this evidence, new suggestions, exploration of these suggestions and so on. The difference, needless to say, is that, in the case of one's reflection about the problem, unlike in the case of one's discussion of it with other people, one, entirely by oneself, imagines various interlocutors, probably some having their likeness in reality but some not, and speaks on behalf of all of them and not merely on one's own.

Normally speaking, one would be inclined to believe that in one's reflection about the given problem, when one, entirely on one's own, imagines various interlocutors and speaks on behalf of all of them, there are likely to be at least limitations in range; this is in contrast to one's discussion of the problem with other people. Normally speaking, one would also be inclined to believe that, in one's reflection about the given problem, when one, entirely on one's own, imagines various interlocutors and speaks on behalf of all of them, there are likely to be chances of one's adhering to some thesis or theses without ever feeling the need to challenge them; this is once more in contrast to one's discussion of this problem with other people.

In this section so far I have mentioned one of the ways in which one may reflect upon the given problem. I have said, in effect, that, in reflecting upon the given problem in this particular way, one (1) takes up this problem, (2) collects various views which people may hold about it, (3) poses certain leading questions in respect of these views, and then (4) goes on to discuss these questions. Now, yet another, somewhat different, way in which one may reflect upon that problem is as follows: (i) one takes up that problem; (ii) one finds out on one's own that in that problem one is called upon to decide between the thesis '*Any* means, which are productive of a morally good end, are morally justified (where it can be taken as assumed that the means are themselves neither morally good nor morally bad) and the thesis 'Those means alone, which are themselves morally good or at least not morally bad, are morally justified'; (iii) one

poses some leading question or questions in respect of these theses, like 'Are there some means which are themselves morally good or morally bad?'; and then (iv) one goes on to discuss the leading question or questions posed under this third head.

IV

Imagine the following and by no means an unusual kind of situation.

There is a group of people before whom the person A offers to initiate a discussion on the topic of 'Ends and Means'. He begins by saying that it is a difficult topic and there has been a lot of controversy about it. The person B, who is a member of the group, is already impatient with what A is saying. He would like him to specify what particular problem (or problems) it is under the general topic of 'Ends and Means' which he finds difficult and about which, as he says, there has been a lot of controversy; there is nothing yet about the general topic of 'Ends and Means' itself, after the terms involved in it are clear, which is difficult or otherwise and about which there is any controversy. Let us suppose that after some discussion in which not merely A and B but the other members of the group also participate and in the course of which A is not always entirely happy, it is agreed that at least one of the problems under the general topic of 'Ends and Means' which is found difficult and about which there has also been a lot of controversy is the one which I have already mentioned and which is as follows: given a morally good end, would one be morally justified in adopting *any* means which are productive of that end or only those means which, besides being productive of that end, are also themselves morally good or at least not morally bad?

Now, concerning this particular question, as the discussion proceeds, A takes the stand that *any* means, which are productive of a morally good end, are morally justified; and there are no means which are themselves morally good or morally bad. Again somehow it turns out to be B who enquires of A why it is that while he does not hesitate to concede that whereas there may be ends which are (themselves) morally good or morally bad, he asserts that there are no means which are themselves morally good or morally bad. Could not there be objects which are means to the attainment of a morally good or morally bad end and which are also at the same time themselves morally good or morally bad, just as one does not hesitate to concede that there are ends which are (themselves) morally good

or morally bad? At this point A, who has already been found to be unhappy, can no longer restrain himself from giving expression to his feelings. He accuses B especially by saying that B must always oppose what A is saying, however true that may happen to be, just because A is saying it.

This case brings to light a type of irrelevant consideration which may be introduced in the course of discussion and which may well endanger it. This consideration consists in somebody confusing the question of the truth of what somebody else may be saying with the question of some or the other real or supposed attitude of that somebody else towards something or someone. There are other types of irrelevant considerations also which may be introduced in the course of discussion and which may endanger it. Thus, to mention here just one more of these, A may completely ignore the question of the truth of what B is saying in objection to his own theses and may simply go on to back up these theses through the invocation of some authority, in whom he may not only have faith but about whom he may also feel greatly emotional. Generally speaking, this other type of irrelevant consideration consists in somebody confusing the question of the truth of what is being said with the question of what someone who is or is taken as an authority in the matter thinks about it.

V

It is a remarkable gift of nature to man that he works for the attainment of truth. It seems to me to be no less a remarkable gift of nature to man that he works for the attainment of truth in collaboration with other people as well. Discussion, which I have understood as an interchange of ideas directed towards the attainment of truth, is a form of this collaboration.

We seem hardly ever to come together for discussion in order to supplement each other's limitations, in the way in which a shoe-maker and a builder may come together in order to make their respective contributions towards their common living, or people belonging to different disciplines may come together in order to make their respective contributions towards a common theme. It seems hardly ever as if the person A has in his possession, say, a certain idea which the person B does not have and *vice versa*, and, in a discussion, they come together in order to pool their respective ideas towards getting a more complete picture of things. When the people come together for discussion, they may only succeed in liqui-

dating whatever ideas they may happen to present on the occasion. Or they may be led to modify them more or less. Or they may find occurring to them an idea which had never occurred to them before. Or they may find emerging into some kind of light an idea which had so far been lying in their consciousness in a dormant form or in a vague kind of way. Or they may find that they have presented on the occasion an idea about which some further thinking needs to be done before one knows whether that idea is to be accepted or rejected. Or they may present on the occasion an idea about the truth of which they are themselves fully convinced, but they do not find themselves in a position to convince others. One may say that when the people come together for discussion, they do indeed do so in order to supplement each other's limitations, but according to all appearances, not in that arithmetical kind of way which I have mentioned above, but in a critical or suggestive or provocative or encouraging kind of way or in the way of resistance and so on.

I have maintained that, in a discussion, we are primarily concerned with the attainment of truth, with getting at the facts of the case. We can express this fact differently by saying that, in a discussion, we move essentially within the realm of objectivity, where the term objectivity is used in its sense of having to do with the facts of the case. Thus, for example, in a discussion, we wish to find out whether it is the case that the people who have vested interests in anything would not permit, without the use of some kind of violence, a change which is likely to affect these interests in an adverse manner; whether it is the case that not seldom the people who come to occupy positions of authority begin to take that fact itself as the justification for their doing and saying all sorts of things; whether it is the case that if the statement p logically implies the statement q and *vice versa*, then the statements p and q are identical with one another; whether it is the case that the definition as *per genus et differerntiam* is only an empirical statement mentioning those characteristics of a naturally existing class of objects which are both common and peculiar to the members of that class and so on.

It is also a strange endowment which nature has made to man that man not only works for the attainment of truth, he finds himself deviating from it as well. These deviations may even be more or less deliberate, and not merely undeliberate. They are more or less deliberate as when, for instance, somebody may somehow become attached to some theses and then may try to convince himself as well as others of its truth through refusing to consider some facts relevant to that truth. They are undeliberate as when, for instance, somebody may accept a thesis as true as a result of a long habit of oversight of the facts relevant to that thesis being true or as a result of not being adequately equipped to take those facts into consideration.

VI

There may be a discussion group in which all the participants are more or less equally well equipped, i.e. equipped intellectually, to discuss whatever they may be discussing. There may indeed be someone amongst them who attracts greater attention by some special gift which he may have, like his clear, precise and elegant expression. But that fact need not stand in the way of other people making their own competent contribution.

Then, there may be a discussion group in which all the participants are not more or less equally well equipped to discuss whatever they may be discussing. Some of them may be deficient in the information which they need in order to discuss whatever the discussion group may be discussing, or they may still be unfamiliar with the idiom in which the discussion is taking place, or they may not yet have acquired the capacity to think in that kind of way. As a result, while the people who are not so well equipped to participate in the discussion would expectedly be doing their best to equip themselves adequately, the discussion group itself could play an important preparatory role in the matter, for example, through proper guidance and even some instruction.

Just as there may be degenerate forms of other kinds of society, like a state, there may be degenerate forms of a discussion group as well. An occasional visitor when the discussion group is engaged in some discussion need not be a bad thing; he may come, stay for a while, simply listen silently or make his contribution and then go away. Things like wit and humour, again, are as much a spice of discussion as of life in general; if nothing else, they provide a relief from the strain of a serious discussion. Likewise, the participants in a discussion can learn to put up with some deviation without any substantial loss to the discussion, even granting that what is considered as a deviation is really a deviation. Another fact which need not worry one about the fate of a discussion group is that there may

be occasions when the participants in a discussion in which the discussion group may be engaged are just not feeling as their usual selves and consequently are not able to make any inroads whatsoever into the area of their discussion. To mention just one causal factor for the time being, degeneration in a discussion group, just as in any other spiritual body, sets in when it begins to acquire a purely ceremonial character, people attend discussions and even ask questions and make comments solely because it is expected of them to do so for the sake of the outward form.

VII

The acquisition of moral qualities which are needed in a discussion is not a simple matter. Thus, even in a discussion group in which the participants are more or less equally well equipped intellectually to discuss whatever they may be discussing, there may be a good deal of intolerance. One of the ways in which this intolerance may manifest itself is the following: when one finds that some other person differs from one's own well-thought-out point of view, one may think that this is because this other person has not given sufficient thought to the matter, or his attitude is being governed by some personal consideration, or there is something else of that sort. In the same way, as an instance, in a discussion group in which all the participants are not more or less equally well equipped intellectually to discuss whatever they may be discussing, the ones who are better equipped may consider those who are not so well equipped not worthy of much regard. Let me spend some time here over one particular intellectual-cum-moral quality which is needed for a discussion and which it is so very difficult to acquire. This quality consists in being able to be impersonal in connection with the thesis which one may be examining.

There are various reasons for somebody being personal in connection with the thesis which he may be examining; all these are reasons as far as one can see, none too easy to avoid. These reasons include, presumably amongst several others: (1) a person all but taking a thesis as true which proceeds from somebody whom he takes as an authority in the matter and his all but rejecting a thesis as false or as not being worthy of any serious consideration which proceeds from somebody whom he does not take as an authority in the matter; (2) a person being well-inclined to accept a thesis as true which proceeds from somebody whom he is fond of, and his being well-inclined to reject a thesis as false which proceeds from somebody whom he is hostile to; and (3) a person not being prepared to examine a thesis or going along with a thesis or mumbling away about a thesis which proceeds from somebody whom he is afraid of or from whom he has something to gain for himself or who is in authority.

The personal element may make its appearance in connection with the thesis which one may be examining. That is, it may intrude into one's examination of a thesis. When that happens, then one has done one's own very best to prevent one from being objective in one particular sense of that term. However, it is interesting to note that the personal element may also make its appearance not in, but after, one's examination of a thesis. Even after one has discussed a thesis with somebody else, both the parties being apparently well-equipped in every way for this discussion, one may find that there is still a difference of opinion between them. And this fact may, although it need not, bring into existence a personal factor in their relationship which could be as much as a shadow or as little as a joke, but both equally undefined. Let it be noted here that this personal factor which has now emerged, whatever other difference it may make to the world, need not on the whole have any influence upon any further discussion which the parties concerned may have.

VIII

Take the following cases:

(1) There is a group of people who are involved in a controversey over something with the authorities with or under whom they work. The authorities are of the view that this controversy can only be resolved in manner m. The group of people concerned are of the view that this controversy can only be resolved in manner n. Now, as the deliberations proceed, the person A, who is one of the group of people, finds himself in a position to suggest that this controversy could perhaps also be resolved in manner o, o being some kind of a compromise position between m and n. While the authorities, after some hesitation, accept this new way of resolving the controversy, the other members of the group feel let down by A for not having stuck to n in their joint opposition to the authorities. A may want to argue with the other members of the group about o, but the sense of hurt of these people prevents them from reciprocating A's desire. Every move which A may make in the direction of discussion may indeed be met with a look of cold contempt by these people.

(2) It is possible that, in the example which I have mentioned above, all the members of the group are of the view that the controversy between them and the authorities can be resolved, if not in manner n, then in manner o, but the authorities themselves stick to their original position m as the only manner of resolving the controversy. The authorities, explicitly or implicitly but not surprisingly, in the last analysis take the very fact of their being the authorities as the basis of their being in the right, and as a result what they have to say as not subject to any further discussion. And once these shutters have been pulled down, the other people, normally speaking, would just be wasting their time in trying to raise them.

There is another possibility. The authorities do their best to avoid any further discussion, through disallowing it or postponing it indefinitely or in some other manner, not because they think that they must be right, but because they are uncertain about the correctness of their position and, for whatever reason, it does not occur to them to give up their position even if it is found to be wrong. What the authorities do, the other people may do just as well in their own way.

(3) In an institution of higher learning there is found to be a certain sexual harassment of a rather perverse nature. While the authorities concerned are still waking up to doing something in the matter, some people belonging to the institution who feel apparently strongly about the goings on soon seek to make of it a public issue. Their contention is that whereas there might be some matters which should be dealt with or resolved within the bounds of the institution itself, there are indeed some others, like the present one, in which the people at large have stake. There is, however, another lobby inside the institution which is firmly of the view that various matters pertaining to the institution, including the present one, are a concern of the institution alone, and consequently any member of the institution who seeks to make of them a public issue is simply being disloyal to the institution. And, say, this lobby will hear nothing more in this connection.

(4) In the preceding example, when the authorities are found to be rather slow to act, some people who feel apparently strongly about the goings on overreact in rushing to make of it a public issue. The lobby which is of the view that the matter is entirely a concern of the institution itself overreacts by being aggressive towards those who have tried to make of it a public issue and by accusing them of bringing their own institution into disrepute. The public, which could hardly find anything

better to tickle its interest in the world, overreacts by blowing the thing out of all proportion and subjecting the institution to a good deal of harassment. The authorities, which had so far been slow to act, now overreact by treating practically all and sundry as if they constituted hostile forces against whom the institution had to be protected with as much might as possible. We find that this chain of overreactions produces an atmosphere which is highly confused and agitated and is also full of distrust and, consequently, one is hard put to finding out how a discussion is to take place under these conditions.

(5) There is a crowd of people bent upon mischief-making for whatever reason and carrying with them various instruments for doing harm. They invade a place, damage property and more than harass people, and as they go on and on with their destructive work, they become more and more excited and out of themselves. Now, in the face of this assault, does anyone really think that one could go up to these people and engage them in discussion about what they were doing? Would one rather not be immediately inclined to look for some other method of handling the situation, like confronting those people with a greater force or diverting their attention to something else or speaking a word or making a gesture which would function something like a bolt to them? It seems to me that by and large the answer to the first of these questions would be in the negative and to the second in the affirmative.

(6) The employees of an establishment go on strike against what they consider to be an act of injustice done to one of them by the authorities. The authorities all the time try to give the impression of being prepared to sit with the employees and discuss with them to find out whether or not an act of injustice has really been done. However, it is found in the course of time that the authorities are determined not to budge from their accusation, whatever the strength of the argument against them, and, although they talk of sitting together and discussing, they have already made up their mind to do whatever they may be wanting to do with the employee concerned and have suitably organized things for that purpose. As a matter of fact, their offering to sit together and discuss things with the employees may itself be the result, not merely of their wanting to present the appearance of being fair, but also of their wanting to gain more time for bending things their own way. What the authorities have been doing, the employees may do just as well. They may also all the time try to give the impression of being prepared to sit with the authorities and discuss with

them to find out whether or not an act of injustice has really been done, but they may likewise in fact all along be upto something else. It is quite obvious that, in the face of this attitude on the part of the authorities and/or the employees, any discussion is hardly possible.

In the preceding I have mentioned just some of the examples of cases in which discussion does not seem to be possible, given the things as they are. Somebody feels frightfully let down and then he is no longer prepared to discuss. Somebody is absolutely sure of his position for whatever reason and then he considers it unnecessary to discuss. Somebody is uncertain about the correctness of his position, but as he is somehow unwilling to give it up, he does his best to avoid discussion. Somebody is dogmatic about his position and as a result he takes it as no longer open to any kind of discussion. There is an atmosphere heavily charged with emotion and distrust and consequently one is at a loss to find out how things can be sorted out through some kind of discussion. There is a crowd of people simply bent upon mischief-making and then by and large we would not think of appealing to those people to discuss what they are doing. There are people who all the time pretend to discuss but without actually discussing and then one feels quite helpless and frustrated about making them discuss.

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Kumarila Against Relativism

In this note I briefly examine Kumarila Bhatta's arguments against relativism in the context of validity of local custom. Custom as tradition per se was of course recognized by most schools of thought as a valid source of dharmic action. Its place in relation to *śruti* and *smṛti* remained a matter of debate. For Purva Mimamsa, custom (which Ganga Nath Jha translates as 'usage') comes below *śruti* and *smṛti* in the hierarchy of authoritative sources of *dharma*. Kumarila goes further to examine the status of local customs. Paradoxical as this may appear, Kumarila argues that well entrenched local customs have universal, i.e. global valdity.

Now though mores rather than morals are the subject under scrutiny, it is important to remind ourselves that modern day distinctions did not hold for the ancients; lines were drawn, but not precisely along the same divide. For a Brāhmin to wear two locks of hair rather than three is as much a matter of *dharma* as not committing adultery with the guru's wife!

It is well known that for the Mimamsakas the Vedas occupy the supreme position in all matters related to *dharma*. They are the ultimate source and also the final court of appeal for matters pertaining to right human action. It would appear that for such a school of thought an outright universalism transcending all limitations of time, place and person, even absolutism, would be the order of the day. Surely there is no scope here for debate or even dialogue for that matter.

But this is not the case. In the *Tantrvartika* Kumarila Bhatta adduces several sorts of reasons to show why each local custom carries with it in principle at least universal validity assuming that it does not expressly flout the norms laid down in the extant Vedas. This rider is uncompromisingly adhered to, though even at this point Kumarila allows for the possibility of the reinterpretation, of *śruti* texts.

Between the advent of the Vedic period and the time that Kumarila and Prabhakara wrote (around the 7th–8th century AD) *Āryavarta* had experienced major upheavals, diversifying from the primitive nomadic and pastoral existence of the early Aryans to numerous complex and well articulated urban communities, kingdoms and religious sects. Buddhism had already successfully challenged the Brahminical order and there were known lands and people beyond the pale of Vedic civilization. The ground realities then that faced the disciplines of the already ancient Vedic texts (whose very language was becoming difficult to decipher) posed a formidable challenge to the latter's authority, Kumarila met this challenge head on, as had Śabara before him, by interpreting and expanding on Jaimini's Sūtras on the subject.

As he said,

'There are certain customs that are followed by the Eastern people, though avoided by the exceptionally good amongst them, and we proceed to consider whether these customs have been laid down for these people alone, or for all men. In the same manner, there are certain customs that are peculiar to the Southerners, some to the Westerners and others to the Northerners; and we have to take into consideration each of these' [*Tantravartika* (henceforward TV) p. 244].

In this reply Kumarila points out that causes cannot be dissimilar to their effects. The Dharmasūtras (the effects) themselves contain injunctions that are universal in character. They do not in other words describe themselves as being applicable only in the East or in the West. How then can we infer or posit śruti texts that would delimit the application of their injunctions whether enjoining or prohibiting actions? Further, Kumarila argues, the very nature of the imperative and of the optative verbal root is such that 'in both cases the injunctions or the prohibitions distinctly refer to all persons that have the capability of doing the acts enjoined or prohibited'. Thus 'none of these usages or *Smṛtis* can ever be taken as having a limited applications, as referring to any particular place, time or person' (TV p. 247). Capability, non-prohibition and in certain cases unique prescription—as in the case of the rājasūya Sacrifice—are the only criteria for the performance of actions. This would exclude only the blind, the deaf, the mad and the dumb but no one else (irrespective of caste and condition *paristhiti*) who inhabits Aryavarta.

To limit the Vedic authority for a custom in geographical terms leads to further problems. The point is nicely illustrated with reference to persons known as Mathur. This name could denote a person hailing from Mathura but now residing elsewhere, or to someone who lives in Mathura or even one intending to take up residence there. How could a universal maxim take these complexities into account? Moreover, as matter of empirical fact it is seen that there is no strict correspondence between customs and location. The fact that some practices are prevalent in a certain part of the country does not preclude their being adopted by another part. All in all no injunction indicating the oughtness of an action can sustain so many qualifications. From all this Kumarila concludes that any localized custom that has withstood the test of time must have originated in a universally acceptable injunction.

It is clear that Kumarila's argument rests heavily on the nature of verbal injunctions, as statable propositions, i.e. as linguistic entities. The Vedas whether written or orally transmitted are nothing if not the words that constitute them arranged in grammatically significant ways. In his approach to the problem and indeed to many problems Kumarila anticipates by over a millennium developments in modern philosophy. Here we refer specifically to Wittgenstein's observations in the Investigations when he says: 'Essence is expressed by grammar' and 'Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is (theology as grammar)' (*Philosophical Investigations* 116 e 371 and 373).

The parallel becomes even more remarkable when Kumarila goes on to argue that all words in an injunction denote either a class or an individual, i.e. they are either purely general in their connotation or singular. There is no class of Easterners or Westerners—is there a lesson to be learnt by us here? True classes such as those of 'man', 'brahmans' etc. cut across all geographical and historical boundaries. Thus no true moral law could ever refer to groups, communities and religious sects. In Kumarila's own words, he has 'rejected the possibility of such qualifying words on the ground that any indication (by such words) of either a class or an individual in accordance with particular customs, is absolutely impossible; and as such the injunction (assumed) cannot but be taken as referring to *all* men as a class which is implied by the force of an injunction' (TV p. 251).

But suppose there are customs of which one can find no written support not even by way of *Smṛti*. What then? The Mimamsakas as other school men fall back on the opinions and practices of the wise—the *śiṣtas*. They possess knowledge that has been handed down for generations—indeed from time immemorial. Such knowledge could only have emanated from a smrti or directly from *śruti*. How does one recognize the *śiṣta*? As the ones that follow the Vedas in other matters. Now the circularity of this definition is not lost on the Purvapaksha that accuses the Mimamsaka of thinking 'those people as good whose conduct is good, and hold(ing) that conduct to be good which consists of the acts of these people'. (TV p. 183).

In response to this telling criticism Kumarila enunciates an important principle in the matter of determining *dharmic* practices. He says that if no perceptible motive of greed, self interest or of other worldly gain is discernible in the practice, then one can safely assume that they are dharmic for they could then only be motivated by the imperceptible gain of Heaven (which is not to condemn a large number of morally neutral practices that clearly are carried out for gain: commerce, agriculture etc.). The practice of intrafamilial marriage is condemned not arbitrarily but precisely because such alliances are made only with a view to keeping inheritance intact and so on. So tests exist which customs must successfully face. But barring the ones that fail, one can confidently assert 'all local customs as well as the *Gṛhyasūtras* that are prevalent only among certain sects to have a universal authority' (TV pp. 251–2).

Halbfass is just one amongst many who claim that 'in the Purva Mimamsa "orthodox" Hinduism found its most uncompromising expression' (*India and Europe* p. 325). Without appearing to hold a brief for the mīmāṃsaka, I feel we must still draw attention to texts such as the *Tantravartika* that demonstrate how grossly misunderstood the school is. That however not being the central aim of the present discussion, we go on to quote Halbfass again where he notes that 'The conviction that what is "in itself correct" can be inferred from certain forms of society and rules of behaviour that are de facto given, empirically determinable and sanctioned by tradition is indeed crucial to the Hindu understanding of dharma' (*India and Europe* p. 324). Of whom could this be more truly said than of Kumarila Bhatta? Though the axiomatic acceptance of the *apauruṣeya* Vedas is never surrendered, the social reality, in fact realities, are never dropped from sight. The actual practices that are entrenched in communities are approached with the greatest respect. The transcendental must be immanent in the empirical which has survived centuries of weathering. The result is a unique position recognizing on the one hand the universal which brooks no exception but with great finesse arguing that the plurality that confronts us—in a large number of cases—flows from that one valid originary source.

It is of course possible to argue that the orthodox were left with little option but to accept that which they could not change. I think it is also legitimate to conclude that much of the hypocrisy that we find among the 'worthy citizens' of today can be traced to the definition of the śiṣta as ones that perform the rituals laid down for them. All this is of no mean interest but cannot be pursued here.

For the present purposes what requires focussing on is one man's effort to refute relativism as a potential source of moral and social anarchy and his bid to keep secure the cohesiveness of society—indeed of the world as it was known to him.

The modern world lacks a Veda, an overarching principle in light of which people are required to live and let live, to allow pluralities to thrive not because 'its alright for *them*' but because they are recognized as truly legitimate ways of life. Could the preservation—if not of human life *per se*—but of human and indeed all life's dignity—become today's Veda?

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A Rejoinder to Professor R.C. Pradhan's 'In Defence of the Metaphysical Absoluteness of Persons'

Professor R.C. Pradhan has given a reply to my comments on his thesis of metaphysical absoluteness of persons through his article: 'In Defence of the Metaphysical Absoluteness of Persons' published in the *JICPR* Vol. XVII No. 1. I intend to examine his reply in the sequel.

There are four key-concepts in his thesis. They are: (1) self, (2) person, (3) minded being, and (4) metaphysical absoluteness. I shall try to analyze all these concepts in the light of what Professor Pradhan himself says about them.

(1) Self

'The self is not in time and space like the body' (p. 180). 'Had the self been a bodiless ego, it would be difficult to prevent it from lapsing into an abstract metaphysical existence' (p. 180). 'This does not of course entail that the self has no connection with the body or that it is a bodiless phantom' (p. 177).

(2) Person

'My concept of a person does not demand the disembodied existence of the self' (p. 180). 'I admit that the person or self as an embodied being shares the temporality of the body in the sense that it is a continuant being in space and time' (p. 180). 'That a person as a substance is in space and time has to be admitted because otherwise there is the fear of its being reduced to a bodiless spirit' (p. 180). 'Whereas we burn or bury the dead body, we revere the person who is no more. This is all to remind us of the fact that person and body are not the same and that the person lives longer than the body' (p. 177).

On the basis of the above statements it can very well be said that self and person are the same. But on their basis what cannot definitely be said is whether a self or a person is bodily or bodiless. And this uncertainty about a self and a person makes any determination of their metaphysical character extremely difficult.

(3) Minded Being

A minded being is one who possesses the capacity of transcending in very many different ways; for example, a minded being can transcend its body through thinking. It can transcend or rise from a first-order desire to a second-order desire, as when a thief when converted can rise from his desire of stealing others' property to his desire of honouring it as such. Also, when a person becomes self-conscious he transcends from a lower level of consciousness to a higher level of the same. 'To be self-conscious is to be conscious of the fact that we are not our bodies and that we are not the same as our physical appearances' (p. 179). When this capacity of transcending is actualized under suitable conditions, some kind of conscious thinking does occur. Hence all these actualizations are mental activities. And because all these activities are the doings of a self or a person, selves and persons are minded beings.

(4) Metaphysical Absoluteness

This concept has two aspects—one of absoluteness and the other of metaphysicality. Let us take absoluteness first. Professor Pradhan says, 'The absoluteness of a person lies in his or her remaining the same substance across the time, and this is represented by the fact that the person-substances are continuant beings' (p. 181). Thus a person is absolute for the reason of its being permanent in time.

Now, the question arises: why should such a time-continuant be regarded as absolute metaphysically? Perhaps we can find a reply to this question in Professor Pradhan's statement: 'That persons have a metaphysical nature of their own is beyond doubt for the reason that the very notion of a person is metaphysically grounded in the idea of an absolutely indissoluble self that knows no extinction as long as one is self-conscious of being a minded being' (p. 181). I think the implication of this not very easy statement is that a being capable of being self-conscious is indissoluble or irreducible and therefore it is basic and thus metaphysical. In other words, to be minded is to have a basic character and therefore it is metaphysically ultimate.

Now, in order to make this ultimate type of being absolute, one has merely to make it a time-continuant. But can this be done? If a self is

bodily, it is clearly perishable. And if it is bodiless, it could be permanent only by being an eternal soul. But the Professor would not be a Cartesian at all. Furthermore, he would not I think be willing to grant to a self or a person the grandiose status of being the all-inclusive total reality. According to him a self or a person must have to be a relative being though of a basic type because of its being minded. And surely such a being cannot be regarded as absolute because it has to be related not only to other such beings, but also to a vast external environment.

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Comment on R.K. Kaul's Article 'Does Grammar Have Any Relation with Theology? published in *JICPR,* Vol. XVII, No. 2

R.K. Kaul the author of the article 'Anglo-Saxon View of Future and Fate: An Essay in Grammar and Theology' in *JICPR,* Vol. XVII, No. 2, Jan.–April 2000 seems to suggest that absence of Article as a 'word class' in Hindi and other Indian languages reflects the disregard for individuality and 'stress on universality'. Though the author does not say so, yet the inference is obvious.

The author points out the deficiency of Hindi language in having no separate words for 'yesterday' and 'tomorrow', and absence of future tense in English language and its implication for the concept of Fate.

The author has mixed up many things. Let us take the world view of language. There are thousands of languages if not millions both written and spoken on this planet. Linguists have classified languages of the world into 14 major language families. English and Hindi belong to one family known as Indo-European. Article as a 'word class' does exist in some languages viz. Greek, Germanic and Romance languages (of Latin origin) but it is conspicuously absent in Russian and languages of Slavic origin. It is also missing in Hindi and other Indo-Aryan languages besides Indo-Iranian. So practically the majority of Indo-European languages have no class of Article. But this does not mean that the function performed by the Article in Greek, Germanic and Romance languages is not performed in Non-Article languages of the Indo-European family.

What is the function of Article and how the class developed is a separate topic. It will suffice to point out that grammatical phenomena may be absent in one language overtly but it does not mean that the function it performs in one language is not performed in the other language for the lack of a formal class. A different device performs in fact the same function. Here is an example of Hindi, a Non-Article language in which 'generality' and 'specificity' are expressed by the use of a special verb which is a unique feature of Hindi verbs and difficult to handle by foreign language learners.

1. *aasmaan niilaa hai* (the) sky is blue. Specificity.
2. *aasmaan niilaa hotaa hai* Sky is blue. Generality.

In modern Hindi '*honaa*' as a main verb and '*honaa*' as an auxiliary or incomplete verb have become homophonous though one comes from Sanskrit root '*bhuu*' and the other from '*as*'. The contrast of specificity and generality is expressed by the use of case markers also.

Languages are culture specific. There may be some similarities between languages because of common ancestry but often they develop independently like any living organism and they have their own mechanism. I am reminded of an example given by famous Hebrew philosopher Martin Bubber in his thesis 'I And Thou'. He mentions the absence of the concept of 'far' in Zulu which is substituted by an expression which if translated into English would be 'a place where one calls mother! I am lost'. The concept of 'far' is related to human relationship which Bubber considers far more superior than the so-called 'analytical wisdom' of the western world. The problem with the author (Kaul) is that he does not make difference between logical concept of Time and grammatical concept of Tense. Time is a universal concept whereas Tense is language specific. There are languages in the world which do not have grammatical categories of verb like Tense, Mood, Aspect and Voice but this does not mean that they do not classify Time. There are other ways of dissecting Time. We have concept of time expressed through lexical as well as grammatical means. Time is a logical concept but Tense is Grammatical. Tense is language specific. Every language develops its grammatical system independently. Languages have 'redundancy' in their systems so we have concept of Time expressed through Lexical means as well through Grammatical (category of Tense) to get meaning across. '*kal*' yesterday as opposed to tomorrow does not confuse us because its individual lexical

meaning is supplemented by the grammatical category aspect (perfect vs. future marker) e.g. *aayaa: aayegaa* (*came: will come*). Each language has its peculiarities and idiosyncrasies. The English verb 'put' remains unchanged in all Aspects; still we get the meaning across. The crux of the matter is that the forms in languages are limited but functions are unlimited so one form performs more than one function. This can be attested by going through the lexicon of any living natural language.

Future is not considered the category of Tense by many Linguists for the simple reason that nothing can be said of an event, process, state and activity that has not taken place. It is equated with Subjunctive mood and in many languages the verbal inflections of subjunctive mood are identical with that of Future. Hindi has a special Future marker as well as Subjunctive marker appended with the verb root which grants Future status of Tense and places it with subjunctive mood that expresses doubt, apprehension, wish, probability and desire. In old Indo-European languages (Greek, Latin, Sanskrit and Avesta) Future is an acknowledged category of Tense system.

The author advances a thesis that 'The Anglo-Saxon concept of future is partly related to the word "wyrd" usually translated as "fate"' and that 'fate' is 'a misleading concept'. There are many weaknesses of this thesis. For a layman who is neither a linguist nor a philosopher future is an unseen time which is yet to come and which generates hope, resolution, desire, doubt, uncertainty, apprehension and so on according to one's circumstances and station in life. Its fears and uncertainties are the chief source of deep religious feelings, a psychic protection, 'an infantile yearning for a father figure', a protector. Future as a term can be described as an invisible point in the linear scale of time which exists formally in some languages as a grammatical category of verb and is absent in others. So far as the correctness and equivalence of translation of word 'wyrd' into 'fate' is concerned, it can safely be said that total translation equivalence between words of two languages is impossible unless the words denote universal physical phenomena like 'fire' or 'water' or are artificially coined terms of science and technology. Equivalence between even the so-called synonyms is a myth. Synonyms share some semantic features as do words 'wyrd' and 'fate'. Fate is derived from Latin word 'fatum'. It is the past participle of verb 'faris', to speak. So fate literally means 'what has been spoken'. This meaning of fate presupposes an authority, a superior power which has the power to chalk out a person's course of life, a belief which

people of different faiths have in one way or the other. Taken literally wyrd (as per author) 'what has become' does not seem too removed from the concept of fate. 'What has been spoken' presupposes an explicit 'oracular' event and a supernatural authority. Wyrd also presupposes an implicit authority or agency governing the life of a person, the difference between the two is of 'active' and 'passive' supposition of the authority or higher agency. So in spite of the change of faith the concept is the same.

Transfer of religious concepts on account of change of faith is an interesting area of study. My observation is that majority of people who change their faith actually transfer their icons to the newly acquired symbols. So when Greeks accepted Christianity their goddess Athena was replaced by Maria only in name. Old religion is not wiped out from the minds of the masses; its outer contours are changed but it lives in the 'collective psyche' of the race. Similarly a majority of tribals who accepted Christianity as their faith in the hope of better future (and I do not blame them) took Christ as an alternative of Ram or Krishna in India. For these simple-minded people the concept of a monotheistic God is simply not palpable. I have personally witnessed this phenomena. I had a chance to stay in a catholic convent in a place near Hazaribagh (Bihar) for 5 weeks during the summer of 1975. There were 15 foreign nationals and about 30 Indians, all ecclesiastics. One evening while returning from a long walk and talk with an American priest which we both enjoyed very much we heard the tune of the popular hymn 'Om jay jagdish hare' a known Hindu prayer followed by a vigorous jingle of *majiras* and *khartal*. I could not believe my ears. How come these novitiates were singing a Hindu prayer in a convent (although the wordings are secular)? When we reached near the convent then we could find the difference. They had replaced the word '*Jagdish*' with '*Khrist*' (Christ) and the rest of the prayer was intact. I said to Father Grib, 'Father, you have not changed these fellows to Christianity, rather your Christ has become a Hindu god.' Father Grib had no answer.

In my view it is a mistaken belief that grammatical phenomena or a lexical item has a bearing on theological view of a speech community. In Garhwali dialect the word for head is '*barmand(a)*' which is the corruption of Sanskrit word '*brahmand(a)*' the universe. But it will be naive to think that Garhwali folk take the micro-cosmic view of the word. An ordinary speaker of the dialect would hardly be aware of the etymology of the word unless the person is a linguist or a Sanskrit scholar. Here is another example from the same dialect. There is the word '*tark(a)*' which means 'argument' in Sanskrit but in Garhwali it denotes 'lines made by a watery substance from the back of the palm to the elbow' (a reference to eating some soup like thing without a spoon). Admittedly these two words must have been used metaphorically by a writer or speaker with a philosophical bent of mind but in Garhwali these words are used not as metaphors but as literal denotative words and they do in no way suggest theological or philosophical mode of thinking of the speech community. In my assessment there is hardly any relationship between Grammar and Theology.

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A Rejoinder on the Above

Out of the four pages of Bahuguna's article the first one-and-a-half are devoted to demonstrating that the absence of the definite article in the Indian languages does not signify the absence of a sense of individuality in their culture. In fact if he had read my article carefully he would have found that that was exactly what I said in my refutation of Dorothy Figuera's contention. Perhaps the joint family, the caste system and other such bonds are responsible for undermining one's individuality in our society.

The point that I made, however, has been ignored. I stated that both the parent languages of Hindi and Urdu namely, Sanskrit and Persian, did have different words for yesterday and tomorrow. Why then was this distinction lost by Hindi and Urdu? Again it is possible to argue that the context helps the reader and the listener to determine whether the writer or the speaker means yesterday or tomorrow. But the historical fact remains unaccounted for.

Bahuguna says that the concepts of time and tense should not be mixed up. Once again I have to remind him about what I actually wrote. I stated that the sense of future is conveyed in English through other means. I quoted Frank Palmer's observation that 'There are other ways of referring to future time e.g. the progressive (going to) and the simple present (about to).' The sense of future then is conveyed in spite of the absence of the future tense. Still the fact cannot be ignored: when the other languages of

the Indo-German family do have a distinct future tense why doesn't English have it?

So far as 'wyrd' and 'fate' are concerned, that part of my article was purely speculative. Bahuguna has every right to disagree with me. After all where would philosophy be if there were no spirit of contradiction? In the same spirit I might add that the etymology of 'fate' (from the Latin 'fari', to speak) does not throw any light on the sense in which it is used. The commonly understood meaning is illustrated memorably by Fitzgerald's version of Omar Khayyam:

The moving finger writes and having writ,
Moves on ...

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Can the 'Game' of Wittgenstein Entertain the 'Essence' of Daya Krishna?

1. There is no 'essence' of any concept that can fill the blank '—' in 'philosophy of —'.
2. Denial of the 'essence' of a concept entails that there is no boundary of its applications.
3. Therefore,
   (a) The philosophy of — has no boundary (no matter what you put in the blank).
   (b) Philosophy has no boundary.
   (c) Distinctions suggested by putting distinct words in the blank of 'philosophy of —' 'would only be archaeological remnants of older, out-moded, confused ways of thinking'.[1]

The question involved in Professor Daya Krishna's query[2] is basically this: Can we deny (3), if we accept (1) and (2)? The query has a significant implication. That is, if nothing is wrong in the above argument, our philosophical investigations are sheer paper works without any conviction. If our philosophical enquiry convinces us of the absence of 'essence', our use of any concept should not presume an essence. Consequently,

none of our conceptual study should be confined to any particular concept, even, our conceptual study need not be just conceptual because, not only that every ordinary concept is bereft of an essence, the concept of concept may have the same fate, hence, be without a boundary or definition.

One may try to refute (3) on the ground that (3b) does not follow from (3a). That is, even if philosophy consists of its different branches which have no demarcated boundaries, it does not imply that philosophy has no demarcated boundary. An area of investigation may have a boundary even if its sub-areas do not. Secondly, one may consider (3c) as harmless as the truth that all human beings are mortal. That is, no investigation is endless, the growth of every kind of investigation has a culmination point that gives way to a new kind of investigation, hence, the truth of (3c) is acceptable without any problem. These two moves are superficial. Because, like the truth of (3a), the truth of (3b) follows from the denial of 'essence' and (3b) is not dependent on (3a). The reason for which a sub-area has no demarcated boundary, for the same reason, the main area may not have. In other words, if, for example, philosophy of science has no boundary because there is no essence of science, philosophy has no boundary because philosophy has no essence. Secondly, unlike the truth that all human beings are mortal, the truth of (3c) is not natural. Death is natural, so also life, and each of us has a natural impulse to live. But, is there anything natural that forces one to do his/her conceptual study on a well defined area of investigation? No. The only impulse one may think of is social, if not logical. The logical impulse is to have a purpose prior to an investigation but the purpose is socially determined. Were the human society be empty of scientific investigations, none would have thought of a philosophy of science.[3]

To find a fault in the above argument, we may go for the 'game' of Wittgenstein, an important concept of an important anti-essentialist.[4] The point of Wittgenstein's 'game' is to argue against the idea that every concept has an essence that we refer to in expressing the concept through language.[5] For Wittgenstein, no such essence is available and, since expression of any concept through language becomes meaningful owing to its 'use', neither such an essence nor a definition corresponding to the concept is required for an explanation of meaning. Instead of essence, what we actually observe are the overlapping and criss-crossing similarities among the members that come under the concept.

'Family resemblance'[6] characterizes the kind of similarities that different applications of any particular concept actually have. Of course, one may argue, all the members of a family have one traceable common origin after which the family has been named. But Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance' accounts only for the visibles like 'build, feature, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc.'[7] To avoid the problem that whether we really have one traceable common origin of a family or not, we can concentrate on 'game', considering 'game' the paradigm family resemblance concept that attempts to explain (i) that there is nothing common to all the members, and (ii) that the overlapping and criss-crossing similarities is the basis on what the concept is applicable to different members.[8]

One may try to locate the essence of 'game' in the similarities or points of resemblance: every game must have at least one point of resemblance. For example, if F1, F2, F3, ... , Fn are the different points on which at least one or other game resembles with at least one other game, then, every game has F1vF2vF3v ... vFn. In short, one may try to define 'game' by disjoining the similarities. But Wittgenstein considers it 'playing with words'.[9] Because, (i) it does not specify any particular feature but expresses something vague, namely, F1vF2vF3v ... vFn, and (ii) these features of similarities need not be limited, hence, the compound of disjuncts may not be limited.[10] But if the ground of the rejection of F1vF2vF3v ... vFn is its 'vagueness' and its 'limitedness', then no definition by means of the actual applications of a concept can be acceptable. For, whether the definition is vague or not, it cannot account for the infinite possibilities.[11] Accordingly, we cannot define philosophy as an investigation having at least one feature with which at least one among the philosophy of science, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of history, the philosophy of culture and so on resembles with at least one other. If we follow Wittgenstein, we cannot define philosophy by means of whatever actual divisions of philosophy we have. Because, it would fail to account for the infinite possible divisions.

Even if the number of groups is limited, if there is no essence, none can identify a new group of games when no present game has any of those features that the new one has and the only way a game can be identified is in observing some similarities/resemblances with the present games. For it is possible to have a new group of games having completely new features of which none appears in any of the present games.[12] Without an essence, in the process of transformation, the overlapping and criss-crossing

similarities may include anything under this sky. In this process, it is quite possible to have a group of games in which no feature of any actual game exists. Perhaps, to resist such uncontrolled transformations we are tempted to adhere to an essence.

Accordingly, an unidentifiable branch of philosophy is possible, if there is no essence of philosophy and the only means of identification is the finding of some similarities/resemblances with the ongoing philosophical activities of one kind or other. But, should we call an unidentifiable branch of philosophy a branch of philosophy; an unidentifiable group of games a group of games? No. Then, either we must accept 'essence' or we must employ some means other than the finding of similarities/resemblances to identify. The first alternative is unacceptable in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. The second alternative is acceptable and it clarifies one more point on Wittgenstein's 'game'. That is, Wittgenstein's 'game' as a paradigm family resemblance concept does not account for all the possible games but the actual games. Family resemblance does not characterize the similarities/resemblances among the future members of a family; likeness between unobserved non-existents and the existents is not at all a point in 'family resemblance'.[13]

Wittgenstein's game does not claim that, in place of essence, the similarities/resemblances among the individual instances can enable one to foresee all the possible individuals. Precisely because whatever enables so would be the other name of 'essence'. Wittgenstein's anti-essentialism claims that nothing really exists in the possible instances of a concept and, hence, nothing can exist as a common to both—the actual instances and the yet to come possible instances. Thus nothing can be common to all the actual and possible instances of a concept. 'It is one of the most deep-rooted mistakes in philosophy to see possibility as a shadow of reality.'[14] Such a mistake tempts one to find something common between the actual individuals and the possibilities and, then, name that alleged common something the 'essence' of a concept.[15]

No doubt, 'Bring me a flower' means 'Bring me a, b, c *or some other flower*' rather than 'Bring me a, b, c';[16] the meaning of 'He is playing a game' is different from 'He is playing hockey', 'He does philosophy of science' is different from 'He does philosophy'. But, at the same time, getting a flower follows from getting a rose, playing hockey implies playing a game, doing philosophy of science implies doing philosophy. That is, even if a general concept and its instances are so different from each

other that one does not touch the other,[17] their expressions have a close relationship. The relation may be described as a grammatical relation. The signs expressing the concepts and the signs expressing the instances are used with certain rules. Those rules ensure that the above relation between the two types of expressions holds good. Nothing else determines that relation, hence, no common thing or essence is needed to explain that relation.

'He is playing a game' and 'He is playing hockey' are empirical propositions. But 'He is playing a game follows from he is playing hockey' is not an empirical proposition, it is a grammatical proposition. For, unlike the two empirical propositions, it is a proposition about the two propositions; a description of language rather than reality. The rules involved in the use of propositions describing reality are expressed through the grammatical propositions. In Wittgenstein's words, '"$(\exists x).fx$ follows from fa" is not a proposition (empirical proposition) of the language to which "$(\exists x).fx$" and "fa" belong; it is a rule laid down in their grammar.'[18] Even if the so called essence is taken for granted, it cannot go against the inference—'$(\exists x).fx$ follows from fa'—expressed through the grammatical proposition. On the other hand, one of the main reasons for which 'essence' is upheld, though mistakenly, is to explain that inference. The explanation misleads because it presupposes a mistaken idea, namely, the idea of considering the possibilities real. Subscribing to this mistaken idea, one fails to distinguish the propositions about empirical propositions from the empirical propositions. Therefore, if we are so much acquainted with the word 'essence' that we do not like to miss it in philosophy, then, the essence that does not mislead us and helps us in understanding the relationship between a concept and its instances may be attributed to Grammar. For, '*Essence* is expressed by grammar.'[19] However, in this sense, essence cannot be a thing, concrete or abstract, to be identified or posited in the concepts or in their instances. Because, grammar is not a thing, thought it 'tells what kind of object any thing is.'[20]

The argument that represents Professor Daya Krishna's query concerns us only if (a) we are anti-essentialists, and (b) we do not consider the conclusion (3c) trivial. This discussion assumes both (a) and (b). The non-triviality of (3c) demands an answer to the question: How do we actually use a concept without demarcating its boundary?[21] I think, Wittgenstein's 'game' as a paradigm family resemblance concept answers it correctly,

and Professor Daya Krishna's query assumes the 'essence' that Wittgenstein's 'game' forbids.

Notes and References

1. Daya Krishna (1999), *JICPR*, Vol. XVI, No. 3, p. 157.
2. Daya Krishna (1999), *JICPR*, Vol. XVI, No. 3, pp. 156–7.
3. The fields of interest in different departments of philosophy in India give a corroborating picture of this. Looking into the social environment in which the leading figures of a department are trained in the field they have specialized, one can realize what has actually gone deep into the department's present state of affairs—internationalism, nationalism, regionalism or colonialism proportionate to its hold in the minds of the leading figures.
4. Wittgenstein's idea of 'game' is well received, but not left unchallenged. Rowe, M.W. (1992) 'The Definition of "Game"', *Philosophy*, 67, pp. 467–79, offers a definition of 'game'. Of course Rowe's definition does not convincingly counter Wittgenstein's argument against essentialism.
5. Of course, Wittgenstein's concept of 'game' also attempts to explain the constitutive character of the rules followed in language. But, the introduction of 'game' is basically an attempt to explain the absence of essence or common feature of the instances of a general concept.
6. To characterize the similarities among games, Wittgenstein would not think of any better expression than 'family resemblance' See PI:67. [Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Investigations*, (trans.) Anscombe, G.E.M., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 2nd edn., 1958, is abbreviated as PI.
7. PI:67.
8. In fact, the common origin is not the real point to be pondered over because it is almost impossible to find out the origin of most of the general concepts.
9. PI:67.
10. PI:68.
11. As Dr. Chinmoy Goswami suggests (in correspondence), perhaps quantification plays a crucial role in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. The length of the compound F1vF2vF3v ... vFn is too wide to clearly represent one common factor and, hence, becomes vague; it is too narrow to represent the infinite possibilities, hence, becomes very limited.
12. Let A, B, C be three mutually exclusive sets of features and G a group of games such that, given any x,

    x belongs to A if and only if x belongs to every member of G,
    if x belongs to B then x belongs to at least two members of G.
    x belongs to C if and only if x belongs to at most one member of G.

    If one divides all the actual games available to us into an n number of groups, G1, G2, G3, ... , Gn having the mutually exclusive common features, A1, A2, A3, ... , An, the mutually exclusive resembling features, B1, B2, B3,

... , Bn, the mutually exclusive dissimilar features, C1, C2, C3,..., Cn, respectively, such that

(i) $(A1 \cup A2 \cup A3 \cup ... \cup An) \cap (B1 \cup B2 \cup B3 \cup ... \cup Bn) = \varnothing$

(ii) $(C1 \cup C2 \cup C3 \cup ... \cup Cn) \cap (A1 \cup A2 \cup A3 \cup ... \cup An) = \varnothing$

(iii) $(B1 \cup B2 \cup B3 \cup ... \cup Bn) \cap (C1 \cup C2 \cup C3 \cup ... \cup Cn) \neq \varnothing$

(iv) $(B1 \cup B2 \cup B3 \cup ... \cup Bn) \cap (C1 \cup C2 \cup C3 \cup ... \cup Cn) \neq \varnothing$ only because of $C1 \cap B2 \neq \varnothing$, $C2 \cap B3 \neq \varnothing$, ... ,$Cn\text{-}1 \cap Bn \neq \varnothing$,

then, no feature of the group Gn+k exists with any actual game available to us, when $k \geq 2$.

13. However, this point may be related to 'rule-following' and, hence, to 'game' when 'game' is used to explain the constitutive rules of language.
14. PG, p. 283. [Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Grammar*, (Ed.) Rhees, R. (Trans.) Kenny, A., Blackwell Publishers, 1974, is abbreviated as PG.]
15. For Wittgenstein, not only that there is nothing common but also that there is nothing in between. He says, 'There is no third thing between the particular enumeration and the general sign' (PG, p. 281).
16. This example is from PG, p. 276.
17. In PG, p. 276, Wittgenstein says, 'enumeration does not touch the concepts "plant" and "egg" at all.'
18. PG, p. 279.
19. PI: 371.
20. PI: 373.
21. As (3c) is not an isolated assertion but inferred from (1), (2), (3a) and (3b), if the asked question has no answer then (3c) can mislead us to accept 'essence' by *reductio ad absurdum*.

NEHU, Shillong 22 LAXMINARAYAN LENKA

On Kroḍapatra

I have gone through the article of Professor Prahlādāchār on kroḍapatra (kp) published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, which gives a sketch of a most difficult form of work in Navya Nyāya in black and white. In my opinion kp is a form of work that discusses a vast subject in minimum words. There is a metaphor in Sanskrit 'kroḍi kṛtya vadati',—says in toto. Any one perusing the work of Bachchā Jhā, particularly the Gūḍahartha Tattvaloka (GT) on Sāmānya nirukti or Vyutpattivāda, would find this definition of kp quite convincing. The author of kp raises numerous questions and presents solutions in a few sentences. Bachchā Jhā, in my

opinion, was the last authentic writer of kp and as far as I know, he was the only eminent Kp-writer of Mithila schools. He wrote his kp on some of Hetvābhāsa texts of Gadādhara and Vyāpti texts of Jagadeesha. The reason behind it is that there is a tradition in South India, except in Andhra Pradesh, to study Gādādharī right from the beginning. In the rest of India they usually study Vyāptivāda of Jagadeesha and Uttar-vāda (Avayava-Bādha) of Gadādhara, Vyāptipañcaka Rahasya of Mathurānātha is also studied but this is an exceptional case. Bachchā Jhā wrote kp not only on Nyāya themes but also on Vedānta problems. His GT on Madhusūdanī of Geeta is very famous. In that text he has refuted the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of paramāṇu in a very scholarly way. Unfortunately some of his kps are still unpublished and are in the possession of Shri Rateesh Jha, a relative of Bachchā Jhā, perhaps his grandson.

Besides, the Bengal School has also given several kps. Professor Prahlādāchār has himself mentioned two writers—Kalishankar and Chandra Nārāyana. Here I would like to add two more names—1. Goloknātha who wrote Golokī or Vivechanī on Sāmānaya nirukti Gādādharī, and 2. Baladeva Bhattāchārya who wrote Baladevī on the same text. As I understand it, Baldevī is an elaborated form of Golokī, which is still studied in South India. The contribution of South Indian scholars to kps is also remarkable, though they are not as well known as the scholars belonging to the Bengal School and their work is also not widely studied. A debate between Vaiṣnavite scholars and Smārta scholars on Śatakoti of Kuṇigal Rām Śāstri is quite interesting. Lastly, Professor Prahlādāchār has shown how Naiyayikas do Anugam. In this way his paper fulfils its aim.

While talking about Kālīshankar and Chandra Nārāyaṇa, Professor Prahlādāchār mentions their kps on Sāmānaya Nirukti Gādādharī. Some more kps written by these authors are also available. Kālīshankar covers Anumāna-khaṇḍa of Gadādhara as well as that of Jagdeesha, whereas Savyabhicāra and Satpratipakṣa of Chandra Nārāyana may also be mentioned.

While discussing 'yadroop,' Professor Prahlādāchār could have also referred to what other authors of kps have concluded about it. In this context I would like to quote from three kps, without any analysis—Baldevi, GT, and Vādārtha—an excellent kp collected by Shri Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara. They all have unanimously concluded यद्रूपावच्छिन्नत्वं as यद्रूपावच्छिनानुयोगिताकपर्याप्तिकावच्छेदकंताकत्वम्.

According to this the yadroop will be वहिन-वहिन्त्व-अभाव-अभावत्व-हृदत्वगत समुदायत्वम् ।

Vādārtha has discussions on these two views. They are also discussed both by Kālīshankara and Chandra Nārāyana. On the other hand Bachchā Jhā starts his analysis of 'yadroop' with the above statement and has discussed the issue quite well. I do not want to discuss all these in detail.

One more very interesting thing appeared in a later kp—'Ankur'. When the author of a kp fails to solve any particular problem he imagines a unique case to save the thesis of 'Moolkara'. Such a case is called *Ankur*. Normally the authors of kps do not take resort to such a device, for they take it to be the last option. However, there is a restriction on the use of Ankur and that is, only a *Siddhanti* can use it.

Professor Prahlādāchār writes replying to Professor Daya Krishna's comment on his article that his aim was to write that article just in order to present a picture of kps and to highlight their contribution to the Navya Nyāya tradition. I think that his effort was the first attempt of its kind and is quite appreciable. Professor Prahlādāchār, as I know him, is one of the few Naiyāyikas of today who have studied kps and who still teach them. May we expect some more contribution of this kind from him?

Professor Daya Krishna reflecting on the above article, has raised some interesting issues. Referring to the Vaḍavānal and dry lake, he raises the question against the validity of the cognition—'the lake is not fiery'. But as far as I know, things like Vaḍavānal or dry lake do not occur in any of the four Śāstras—Nyāya, Vedānta, Vyākaraṇa and Mimāṁsā. The reason behind it is that the Vaḍavānal has no causal relation with the smoke. When a person infers fire on a mountain he refers to a particular fire which is the cause of that smoke, because only that can be inferred on the basis of smoke. Since Hetvābhāsa is presented just to prevent the wrong inferential knowledge it should be concerned with the same fire which has occurred in the inferential knowledge. If the cognition—'the lake is fiery' is not valid then it must be expected that the fire occurring in cognition as mentioned above is not there in the lake. Thus to maintain its invalidity it should be expected that the fire which is the cause of the smoke is the 'Sādhya' in the above Anumiti and that fire is not there in the lake. Because of the same reason the dry lake can not be the 'pakṣa'. If the invalidity of the cognition—'the lake is fiery'—is not maintained then the concept of hetvābhāsa will make no sense at all.

One more thing can be pointed out here. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system the third substance तेज is divided into four—भौम (earthly), दिव्य (heavenly), औदर्य (gastric), and आकरज (mineral). The first one, i.e. भौम, is defined as भौमं वह्न्यादिकम्. According to this the vadavānal can not be called वाहिन, although the words वहिन and अनल have the same connotation.

Some more issues relating to the fundamentals of Nyāya as raised by Dr. Daya Krishna will definitely lead to a new approach and reflection in the understanding of Navya Nyāya. Since these issues are not directly connected with the paper of Professor Prahlādāchāra, discussion on them can be held separately.

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A Logical Illumination of Tādātmya Relation in Navya Nyāya

I

A query has been made in the *JICPR* (Vol. XV, No. 2, p. 169) whether identical statements like *ghaṭaḥ ghaṭaḥ* etc. give rise to any meaning or not. In response to this query our senior friend Professor V.N. Jha has put forth the key-point in justifying such statement. In this paper I would like to represent some more supplementary arguments in favour of accepting *tādātmya* relation in Navya Nyāya along with highlighting the key-point mentioned by Professor Jha.

II

Though the term *Tādātmya* is used in Buddhism and Navya Nyāya, both the systems have taken this relation in a completely different sense which needs to be focussed here for the proper understanding the concept. Other various philosophical complications may stand on the understanding of this relation, if this part is not discussed properly.

III

The Buddhists admit that identity (*tādātmya*) is a relation. From this it will lead to another assertion that there are relata, because relation only remains in two objects as far as the Buddhist view is concerned. The

Buddhists have used the term *tādātmya* (identity) in a very specific sense, i.e. in the sense of *similarity*, but not in the sense of absolute sameness as understood by Navya Naiyāyikas. According to them, *tādātmya* or identity is the similarity in the sense that one relatum would be less extensive than the other. The Buddhists accept identity between *śiṁśapātva* (i.e. property existing in *śiṁśapā*, a kind of tree) and *vṛkṣatva* (treeness). It can safely be said that wherever there is *śiṁśapātva*, there is *vṛkṣatva* or treeness, but not the otherwise. As the property *vṛkṣatva* (treeness) has more extensive pervasion than *śiṁśapātva*, from the *śiṁśapātva* one can easily infer *vṛkṣatva* (treeness) due to having the relation in the sense of similarity (*tādātmya*) there. But, on the other hand, from the property of a tree (treeness), one cannot infer *śiṁśapātva* because treeness has got more extensive pervasion in the sense that we cannot say 'wherever there is *vṛkṣatva* (treeness), there is *śiṁśapātva*' because 'treeness' covers all the trees in this world, not to speak of *śiṁśapātva*. That is why, the Buddhist concept of *tādātmya* is taken neither as completely identical nor completely non-identical, but in the sense of similarity. An object covering narrower place remains in another object existing in wider places as shown above.[1]

Dharmakīrti has explained the above-mentioned identity as 'a reason for deducing a predicate when the subject alone is by itself sufficient for that deduction, i.e. when the predicate is a part of the subject. It is, therefore, not absolute identity but it is a partial identity.'[2] If there is a class and a sub-class relation, it is called 'identity' in the above-mentioned sense of the term. The relation between flower and stone, for example, is absolutely different (*atyantabheda*) and hence the identity relation cannot be accepted. If, on the other hand, it is accepted '*ghaṭa* is a *kalaśa* (i.e., a jar is a jar), there such relation cannot be accepted due to their absolute identity (*atyantābheda*). Such type of identity is not accepted in the Navya Nyāya. Even to the Buddhists this relation is an unreal one as it comes under *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Like *Tadutpatti* this notion of *Tātātmya* (identity) is taken by the Buddhists as a means of ascertaining *Vyāpti*. Such a form of inference is not accepted by the Naiyāyikas. For, they would at most describe the properties like treeness (*vṛkṣatva*) as a form of universal called *parasāmānya*, i.e. a universal covering more places than the other property like *śiṁśapātva* which is called *aparasāmānya* due to its existing in comparatively less places. If the former is a set, the latter would be taken as a subset. There is no question of Inference according to Nyāya.

It may be taken as a perceptual cognition. On the other hand, the Buddhists cannot say that this is a case of perceptual knowledge, because to them unique singular (*svalakṣaṇa*) alone is real as it is momentary. Any cognition other than this (*svalakṣaṇa*) is inferential which has got unreality in the sense of phenomenal reality (*samvṛtisatyatā*).

Though identity comes under *samṛtisatyatā*, the concept may not be understood in this sense only. Some might say that it is the case of similarity, but not identity. According to the Navya Naiyāyikas, the *tādātmya* relation may be taken in the following way.

IV

The term *tādātmya* may be understood at the very beginning as the absence of *bheda* (difference) which is accepted as *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence). If the term *tādātmya* is replaced by the term '*abheda*' it would mean an absolute absence of a *bheda*, i.e. mutual absence. Why is *tādātmya* called *abheda*? For, it is nothing but an absence of *bheda* as it is said in the *Vyutpattivāda abhedastādātmyaṁ* (i.e. identity means the absence of mutual absence). Here 'absence' means 'absolute absence' (*atyantābhāva*).[3]

Identity (*tādātmya*) is possible only when difference (*bheda*) is excluded according to *Navya Nyāya*, i.e. when it is said that a jar is not a cloth (*ghaṭo na paṭaḥ*). A jar is understood as different from a cloth. The Naiyāyikas will say that in a jar there is the mutual absence of a cloth. That is, the Navya Naiyāyikas can distinguish these two objects as having mutual absence of a cloth in a jar. Though this distinction is known perceptually, it can also be inferred if someone has strong desire to do it (*siṣādhayiṣā*). In this case the syllogistic argument in the form—'A cloth is possessing mutual absence from a jar, as it possesses clothness in it' (*ghaṭānyonyābhāvavān paṭatvāt*). However, the distinction between two objects is a subject of perception or Inference. If it is possible, why is some sort of relation between two objects having no distinction (*abheda*) not accepted? If *bheda* is admitted as a content of cognition, why not the case of *abheda*? The term '*abheda*' would mean the constant absence (*atyantābhāva*) of *bheda* (mutual absence or *anyonyābhāva*). This absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*) of *bheda* (mutual absence or *anyonyābhāva*) may be interpreted as the absolute absence, the absentee of which is limited by mutual absenceness (*bhedatvāvacchinnābhāva*). It may be interpreted in another way. It is an absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) whose

absentee is a *bheda*, i.e. mutual absence (*bhedapratiyogikābhāva*). Both the interpretations are not tenable because if they are accepted, they lead us to the land of absurdity. If the former interpretation (*abhedoyadi bhedatvāvacchinnābhāva*) is taken into account, the absolute negation would not be available anywhere. Because the mutual negation (*bheda*) of any object can be found everywhere, and hence the absolute negation of the *bheda* (mutual absence), the absenteeness of which is limited by *bhedatva*, i.e. distinctness is not possible. For, the absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) is contradictory to its absentee—the absenteeness of which is limited by *bhedatva* (i.e. mutual absenceness). As an object having *anyonyābhāva* or *bheda* is not available anywhere, the absolute negation of it limited by *bhedatva* is contradictory by virtue of the fact that *bheda* which is taken to be absentee limited by the property *bhedatva* is not at all possible. If it is said that there is the absolute negation of *bheda* limited by *bhedatva* is contradictory, because the *bheda* limited by the limitor of *bheda* (*bhedatva*) is always available and hence to search for its absolute negation leads to absurdity (*abhedo yadi bhedatvāvacchinnābhāvastadāprasiddhiḥ*).[4] This thesis would be nullified if a single case (*vyakti*) of a constant absence exists in a particular case. That is, the absolute negation would not be found in such cases. It has been said here that *bheda* limited by the property of being *bheda* (*bhedatva*), i.e. *bhedatvāvacchinnabheda* is general. Hence an individual manifestation of *bheda* limited by *bhedatva* would never be available, because everywhere there is a *bheda*. Even if it is accepted that an individual manifestation of *bheda* is there but not in general (*bhedatvāvacchinna*); then in this case also there is a contradiction to the absolute negation of the mutual absence or *bheda*. Because, we do not find a place in this world where there is no individual manifestation of *bheda*.[5] So the absolute negation of the mutual absence is not possible.

In order to avoid these difficulties another proposal may be suggested. In such a case the mutual absence, the absenteeness of which is limited by being property of *bheda* (*bhedatvāvacchinnābhāva*), which cannot be accepted, but the mutual absence (*bheda*), the absenteeness of which is another *bheda* (*bhedapratiyogitākābhāva*) can easily be accepted in order to remove the earlier difficulties. If in a particular locus there is the mutual absence of a particular object, there may be *bheda* (mutual absence) of another object. As for example, if there is the mutual absence of a jar (*ghaṭabheda*), then there may be another *bheda* or mutual absence of a cloth (*paṭabheda*) because a particular manifestation (*vyakti*) of *bheda* may remain in another locus where there is another *bheda* as it is an absence, the absentee of which is *bheda* (*bhedapratiyogitābhāva*). Let us suppose in a particular place there is a *bheda* (mutual absence) of p; it can easily be said that there is the mutual absence of q as it is not taken as a *bheda* which is limited by *bhedatva*.

If the second interpretation (*bhedapratiyogitākābhāva*) is taken as the meaning of the term *abheda* (identity), it would give rise to some erroneous cognition, viz. 'The water is blue' (*yadi ca bhedapratiyogiko'bhāvastadā nīlaṁ jalamityādivākyasyāpi prāmāṇyāpattiḥ. Jale dvitvādinā nīlabhedādyabhāvasyāpi sattvāt*).[6] In this context the absolute negation of *bheda* of *Nīla* (*nīlabhedābhāva*) can be found in water, because here *nīlabheda*, i.e. the absence of the *nīlabheda,* is having the property of the conjoint two objects, i.e. water and *nīlabheda* (*vyāsajyavṛttidharma*) as the limitor of the absenteeness. Water is not blue in the actual world and hence water can always be expressed as having no colour, i.e. blue. This sentence would mean that there is a *bheda* or *anyonyābhāva* of blue (*nīlona*) in water. Though the *anyonyābhāva* or *bheda* of blue (*nīlabheda*) is not found in water normally, yet it can be said to exist in water if the absolute absence of the mutual absence (*bhedābhāva*) is taken as *bhedapratiyogikābhāva*, i.e. an absence, the absentee of which is *bheda* or mutual absence. If we take another object (jar) with the mutual absence of blue (*jale nīlabhedaghaṭobhayaṁ nāsti*), the absolute absence has got two absentees—the mutual absence of blue (*nīlabheda*) and a jar (*ghaṭa*). In this case it can be said that the absolute negation has got 'mutual absence of blue' (*nīlabheda*) as an absentee. Here we find another absentee, i.e. jar. From this it can be said that the absolute absence of both the mutual absence of blue (*nīlabheda*) and the jar may be designated as having the mutual absence of blue (*nīlabheda*) as its absentee. Hence, the absolute absence of the mutual absence of blue (*nīlabhedābhāva*) can be said to exist in water and for this reason the previously mentioned sentence—'water is blue' refers to erroneous content and hence one could claim its validity. Because, that which possesses the absolute negation of the mutual absence of blue in it is identical with blue. Hence the object can surely be called blue, which is actually not found in the phenomenal world. For this *asiddhi* (i.e. substantiation of something which is absurd) would surely follow.[7]

From the foregoing discussion it can be said that identity (*tādātmya*) is nothing but non-distinction (*abheda*) which implies an uncommon property (*asādhāraṇo dharma*) existing in the self (i.e. *Sva*) i.e. a particular object. This uncommon property exists in one and only one object (*Abhedastādātmyaṁ. Tacca svavṛttyasādhāraṇo dharmaḥ Asādhāraṇyañca ekamātravṛttitvaṁ*).[8]

If the distinction of some object (*bheda*) is admitted from another one, it will logically follow that there might be some cases where there is *abhedatva* or identity or *bhedābhāvatva* (absence of mutual absenceness). In fact, the Buddhists have accepted the method of *apoha* (negative reasoning) depending on this phenomenon of distinction (*bheda*) of a particular from other. As for example, a cow can be known as it possesses distinction from 'non-cow'. In the same way, they recognize a jar as such by virtue of its distinction from 'non-jar'.

If distinction (*bheda*) of a particular object from others is admitted by the Buddhist, why would it not be admitted *abhedatva* (identity) in the sense which the Navya Naiyayikas have admitted. It has already been discussed that the Buddhists have accepted the term '*tādātmya*' (identity) *not* in the sense of absolute sameness. However, there is no point in rejecting *abheda* or *tādātmya* in the sense of absolute sameness.

If it is said—'Devadatta is Devadatta' or 'a jar is a jar', they convey the sense of absolute sameness (*bhedābhāva*) between two objects. It has been accepted that a jar exists in itself through the relation of identity (*Tādātmyasambandhena ghaṭaḥ svasmin eva vartate*). The importance of *tādātmya* as relation may easily be understood if the definition of *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence) is carefully noticed. We generally explain *anyonyābhāva* (*bheda*) with the example—'A jar is not a cloth' (*ghaṭo na paṭaḥ*) where the absentee (*pratiyogī*) is a cloth (*paṭa*). How do we know this? In reply to this question, the relation of identity for knowing an object as non-different from other is to be admitted. If it is asked why a jar is different from a cloth, because the absentee or *pratiyogī* which is a cloth (*paṭa*) does not exist in itself (*paṭa*) through the relation of *tādātmya* (*Tādātmyasambandhāvacchinnapatiyogitākābhāvaḥ*). That is, that something is different from something is known by the absence of *tādātmya* between them.

There is another significance of accepting *tādātmya* as a relation. When it is said by one—'Calcutta is Calcutta', 'Rabindranath is Rabindranath', it cannot be ignored as having no meaning. If these sentences are uttered, these convey some meaning to the hearer. Generally, when we want to express some incomparability of some city or person, we express it with these types of identical statement. The city Calcutta has got certain characteristics of its own which cannot be compared with other cities, but with itself. The same is the meaning of the second sentence—Rabindranath is Rabindranath.

Such identical statements carry some weight in the case of metaphor in the sense of *Rūpaka*. When a face is identified with the moon (*mukhacandra*), the *upameya* (object which is compared) is 'face' which is identical with the 'moon', the *upamāna* (an object with which something is compared). The ascription of identification between two objects inspite of not concealing their difference (*atisāmyāt apahnutabhedayoḥ upamānopameyayoḥ abhedāropaḥ*)[9] is called *Rūpaka*. Sometimes the *Upameya* is used as *upamāna* in order to express the incomparability of the object as pointed out by Bhatṛhari. In these cases due to having a strong desire (*vivakṣā*) of the speaker *Upamāna* may be assumed as non-different from *Upameya* though in the real world it is not true. The identification between them is shown which is a kind of artificial intellectual exercise with a view to showing the incomparability of the object. Though there is the imposition of identity (*abhedāropah*), the two objects (*upamāna* and *upameya*) are not bearing contradicting properties (*parasparaviruddhavattvena upasthāpita*).

Some Indian thinkers are interested to make an artificial difference between two identical objects after using the term '*iva*'. Bhatṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* said that two objects, though identical, are demonstrated in such a way that one will think of their difference. But this difference is artificial in order to show the absolute sameness of the object. In the sentence—'*Indra iva dasyuhā bhava*' (like Indra become the dasyu-killer) *which is addressed to Indra*, the term '*iva*' shows the relation of standard and the object of comparison on the basis of an artificial difference. It reminds me of a romantic line said to a lover by his lady love: '*Tomar tulanā tumi ogo*' (i.e. you are comparable to 'you' alone) or '*Tumi ye 'tumi' ogo*' (you are really 'you'). Where a really different object is not available as standard of comparison, it itself is used as the standard in order to bring out its incomparability. As for example the statement: '*Rāmarāvaṇayoryuddhaṁ rāmarāvaṇayoriva*' (i.e. Rama-Ravana fight is like Rama-Ravana-fight) is also a case of identity statement.[10]

Viśvanatha, the author of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, has accepted the meaningfulness of such identity-expression as he has accepted such statements as a form of rhetoric (*alaṁkāra*) called *ananvaya*. When an object is imagined as having both the property of *upamāna* (*upamānatva*) i.e. the object with which something is compared and the property of *upameya* (*upamānatva*) i.e. the object compared simultaneously is called *ananvaya* (*upamānopameyatvamekasyaivatvananvayaḥ*).[11] In short, if an object is taken as both *upameya* and *upamāna* simultaneously, it is called *ananvaya*.[12] As for example *Viśvanātha* has given the following example: '*Rājīvamiva rājīvaṁ jalaṁ jalamivājani candraścandra ivātandraḥ saratsamudayodyame.*' That is, when autumn comes in full swing, the lotus becomes like a lotus (*rājīvam rājīvamiva*) untouched by mud of the rainy season, water becomes like water (*jalaṁ jalamiva*) untouched by mud, the moon becomes like the moon (*candraścandra iva*) uncovered by thick cloud.[13]

The Navya Naiyayikas also have used the term 'identity' (*tādātmya*) in such cases, but not always. They have also admitted the identity between a jar (*ghaṭa*) and 'a blue jar' (*nīlaghaṭa*).

If the Buddhist asked Navya Naiyāyikas the reasons of accepting such a sense of identity, they might say that there is identity between 'a jar and a blue jar' from the general standpoint, but not specific (*sāmānyena abhedaḥ na tu viśeṣataḥ*).

The Navya Naiyāyikas may in other ways justify the above-mentioned identity according to the general accepted principle—'A qualified entity is not different from a pure one' (*viśiṣṭaṁ śuddhānnātiricyate*). From this it is, however, proved that the *tādātmya* in the sense as taken by the Buddhists is not at all capable of being rejected. It is also established that the statements like '*ghaṭo ghataḥ*' bear some logical basis.

Notes and References

1. Sāyanamādhava: *Sarvadarśanasaṁgrahah (Bauddhadarśana).*
2. Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 251, Dover Publication, New York, 1962.
3. *Vyutpattivāda*, p. 63, Chowkhamba Edition.
4. Ibid., p. 49.
5. '*Yasya kasyacidbhedasya sarvatraiva sattvāt abhāvasya pratiyogitāvacchedakatvāvacchinnena saha virodhāt bhedatvāvacchinna-pratiyogitākābhāvāprasiddhirityarthah.*
   Commentary on *Vyutpattivāda* by Jayadeva Misra (Chowkhamba), p. 49.
6. *Vyutpattivāda*, p. 49 (same editor).
7. Dr. D.C. Guha: *The Navya Nyaya System of Logic*, Old Edition, pp. 74–8, 1968.
8. *Vyutpattivāda*, p. 63.
9. *Kusumapratimā* on *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Ch. X.
10. *Bhaṭṛhari: Vākyapadīya*, III/14/253–254 and III/14/563–566. My paper: 'Jñāpya-jñāpaka-bhāva Relation' in V.N. Jha (Ed.): *Relations in Indian Philosophy*, Satguru Publications, Delhi, pp. 79–87, 1992.
11. Viśvanātha: *Sāhityadarpaṇaḥ*, Ch. X/37.
12. '*Ekasyaiva tu padārthasya upamānopameyatvam yugapadeva upamānatvamupameyatvañca kalpitaścet tadā ananvayo nāmālaṁkāraḥ syāt.*' *Kusumapratimā* on *Sāhityadarpaṇaḥ* on X/37.
13. '*Śaradaḥ kālasya samudayena sampūrṇabhāvena udyame pravṛttau āvirbhāve sati, rājīvaṁ rājīvamiva padmaṁ padmamiva atandraṁ varṣāpaṅkādikṛtamālinyahīnaṁ ajani, jalaṁ jalamiva atandraṁ kardamādimalahīnamajani, tathā candraścandra iva atandro ghanāvaraṇarūpamalaśūnyaḥ ajani jātah.*'
    Ibid.

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Agenda for Research

The concept of 'being' is perhaps one of the most fundamental concepts which has engaged the attention of philosophers since the very beginning of philosophy and deserves serious in-depth exploration right from the Greeks onwards. Aristotle's distinction between Being-qua-Being and Being-as-Substance and Being-as-Quality deserves notice in this connection. So does the idea of the 'being' of a 'process' or 'activity' or 'motion' which necessarily involve 'time' and 'change' in them. Besides these, 'being' of 'thought', of 'imagination', of 'memory' and of the processes underlying them, that is, 'thinking', 'imagining', 'remembering' needs to be explored, linked and compared with those that obtain in what is usually called the external world.

And, at another level, what one would like to understand is the 'being' of theoretical entities postulated for understanding 'reality', 'entities' that are proliferating continuously in all realms of science these days.

DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

1. Richard Sorabji's Gifford lectures entitled '*Emotions and Peace of Mind*' Pub: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, deals with a subject which has been generally neglected by philosophers who concentrate mostly on issues relating to knowledge, reality and values in their writings. Emotions have been relegated to the realm of the 'irrational' and hence considered unworthy of attention by thinkers who pride themselves on their being 'rational' beings *par excellence*. Sorabji brings to our attention the element of rationality involved in emotions as evidenced in the Stoic discussion of the subject and raises the important issue whether art/or thought can be said to engender emotions in the literal sense of the term.

Strangely, the creative role of emotions seems to have been absent from the western discussion of the subject, an aspect that was explicitly explored in the Bhakti tradition of India and which has recently been brought to attention in the Volume entitled *Philosophical Dimensions of the Bhakti Tradition in India* published by the ICPR, 1999.

2. Research in Indian philosophy is seriously hampered by lack of information about the bibliographical sources available regarding it. The following are the standard sources in the area which provide comprehensive information regarding the works published uptil now:

1. *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies (Bibliography)*, Vol. 1, by Karl. H. Potter.

   It contains information about all the basic texts published uptil now and the papers published thereon in different languages of the world. The IIIrd edition of the bibliography was published some time ago and a detailed review article on it was published in the *JICPR,* Vol. XIII, No. 3. Potter's comments on it along with a reply to it were published in the *JICPR,* Vol. XV, No. 1.
2. The Bibliographical reference work published by Professor Thangaswami Sharma, who passed away recently, is not so well known to scholars of Indian philosophy as it is written in Sanskrit only. However, in some ways, it is more comprehensive than Potter's bibliography although it does not contain articles published on various schools and texts in Indian philosophy. Instead, it gives

detailed information regarding the author of the text, his teachers and the place to which he belonged. It also provides information about the development of school and sub-schools in different schools of Indian philosophy. The following major bibliographies in Sanskrit were published during his lifetime:

(a) *Advaita Vedānta*. Pub: University of Madras, 1980, Rs. 32.
(b) *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika*. Pub: University of Madras, 1985, Rs. 20.
(c) *Mīmāṁsā Manjarī*. Pub: ICPR, 1996, Rs. 375.

The above three volumes are collectively entitled *Darshan Manjarī*.

Notes and Queries

A. REPLIES TO QUERIES

(a) 'Philosophy of Science'. Reply to query published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XVI, No. 3

The denial of 'essence' entails the impossibility of demarcation ... and if taken seriously could result in blurring all sharp distinctions.

The above argument which has been used here to deny the possibility of Philosophy of Science, Law or something else can be refuted by indicating the fact that each sphere of knowledge has certain basic principles or say presuppositions which may be called its privilege points. Such points are only believed and not questioned within that sphere. But it does not mean that those presuppositions cannot be questioned at all. It is the function of philosophy to question those presuppositions; hence we can meaningfully use the phrases as 'Philosophy of ... .'

In case demarcation between science and non-science is not acceptable leading to blurring of all sharp distinctions, can we say that religion and natural sciences, e.g. physics, chemistry etc., belong to the same area or level? The progress in any area, as regards its study, is possible only if demarcations are accepted and there is a systematic approach, otherwise there will be chaos in the realm of knowledge. After all, we have to distinguish pure imagination from sensory perception and categorize them accordingly.

The stand taken in the given view will be dogmatic as it does not allow freedom to question the fundamental assumptions of any area.

Denying the essences entails denial to all abstractions, even in mathematics and physics, because there too the formulae are based on the belief that all the similar cases will be the possible applicable cases for a formula.

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(b) '*Dhvani* and *Vyanjanā* '. Reply to query published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XVII, No. 1

Dhvani and *Vyanjanā* are not the same. The difference between the two can be explained by invoking the idea of 'sphota' or the meaning of a word in

the mind of the listener. The listener apprehends the *Dhvani* uttered by the speaker in the form of a word and understands its meaning (direct or implied) through 'sphota' of the same.

Vyanjana is a style of expression of ideas through implication. Ānandāvardhana was the first to introduce the notion of *Vyanjanā*.

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(c) 'Brahman according to Samkara'. Reply to query published in the *JICPR,* Vol. XVII, No. 3

The principle of Brahman in Advaita Vedānta is the inner consciousness of everyone and the universe itself. It is devoid of deterioration as well as sorrows and pluralities which are mere superimpositions. Everything in the world is existence factor in all things including our body and is termed Brahman. The principle Brahman can be realized through its derivative meaning too. Sankara points out that the root बृह् (Brh) denotes the omnipresent nature along with the eternal, pure, conscious and liberated nature. Brahman in Advaita should not be realized in its positive sense as set forth by Upanisadic sentences like 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' and 'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' for such a knowledge will lead the knower to know Brahman with worldly attributes. That is to say, when Brahman is described 'eternal' it is to be realized as something different from non-eternal, otherwise eternality will be the attribute of Brahman. In the same way 'conscious' means that which is different from inert objects, 'pure' means that which is different from impure objects that are ignorance-ridden, 'liberated' means that which is free from all kinds of bondages. This negative type of understanding avoids all attributes from Brahman and helps one to imagine Brahman as devoid of qualities that are commonly attributed to it. It is said:

'यदा पञ्चैव लीयन्ते ज्ञानानि मनसा सह।
बुद्धिश्च नेङ्गते तत्र परमात्मानमइनुते।।'

(One can attain the बृह्मभाव when one's five sense-organs, mind and intellect become stable.)

However, Advaita is a state of mind that is to be acquired through one's own genuine interest and effort. The preceptors of the Upanisadic period

selected students by severe tests. Naciketas and the six friends of Prasnopanisad are some of the students subjected to severe experiments. This fact proves the status of Advaita Vedanta as higher to mere intellectual exercise. It is the supreme goal and shelter of everyone, "सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म विज्ञानमानन्दं बृहम्'—scriptures like these help to arrive at a clue regarding Brahman which is nothing other than our own self, as pointed out by Sankara. He stresses this point in his sutrabhasya that if there was not self in people, no one can ever be aware of 'I' consciousness. Sankara clarifies that the scriptures like 'आत्मावाऽरे दृष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' serve as advice to help people withdraw from their ordinary routine of actions.

Brahman cannot be universal or an individual. These terms signify the objects of the world as perceived in Nyaya Philosophy. The definition given for 'universal' in Nyaya is totally different from the Advaitic standpoint of the universe. That is to say, 'universal' is defined in Nyaya as 'eternal (नित्यं) 'singular' (एक) and inherent in many (अनेकानुगतं). There are a lot of universals like घतत्वं, गोत्वं, अश्वत्वं etc. which is the common attribute in all those individuals. But contrary to such a view, Advaita recognizes no eternal and non-dual principle apart from Brahman. Moreover, अनेकानुगतत्व or अनेकसमवेतत्व cannot be conceived by Advaita, for समवाय or inherence is totally rejected in this system. Advaita cannot stand for a permanent relation (inherence) because relation always denotes the significance of more than one object and it will be quite irrelevant in the view of Advaita.

Brahman cannot be mere generic form, a generic characteristic or generic idea, for, these words fail to describe it. The greatest universal advocated by Nyaya—सत्ता—Existence (सत्तासामान्यं परसामान्यम्-कारिकावली) can be described with such terms. Brahman is the inner essence of everyone, beyond all categories of universe. With regard to logic, as Professor Daya Krishna wrote in an essay in a book *Contemporary Indian Philosophy—II series*, Edited by Mrs. Margaret Chatterjee, the distinction between pure and applied logic is remarked in the case of mathematics by Einstein—'To the extent it can be applied, it is not exact and to the extent it is exact, it cannot be applied'. Here the application (with the help of language, calculation or experimentation) is revealed as not designating the exactness of anything, and at the same time, the exactness cannot be revealed through any kind of application. This view is equally agreeable in Advaita Vedanta which strives to describe Brahman which is the essence and 'Being' in everyone. Scriptures like नेति, नेति (not this, not this), अशब्द मस्पर्श मरूपव्ययम् (devoid of sound, touch, form and mortality), यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह (from where the words with the mind

withdraw themselves) also put forth this view. Advaitic Brahman is to be experienced as oneself. Being different from all 'isms' or technical 'schools of philosophy' Advaita inspires man to explore his inner essence and attain the supreme bliss which is the goal of everyone in his life.

It is not illegitimate to ask the meaning of the word 'Brahman' even if it is beyond all linguistic categories. But this reveals the unpreparedness to go deep into Indian philosophical (advaitic) vision. In the empirical life also, common man sometimes meets with experiences beyond description with the help of language. It may be joy, fear, sorrow or such feelings. Though language cannot express them fully, the experience gives a full picture of it. Similarly, Brahman beyond barriers of language also can be understood through experience of it as one's own self. This needs great concentration of mind in the concepts of Advaita and preparedness to keep it aloof from all worldly bondages and objects which, no doubt, disturb the restraint of the mind.

Sankara does not consider any word universal: He considers words as applicable to empirical life itself. 'नानुध्यायाब्दहन् निवर्तन्ते, 'यद्वाचानभ्युदितम् 'शब्दान्वाचो विग्लापनं हि तत्,' such scriptures were familiar to Sankara. He was aware of the incapability of words to signify the ultimate Reality. The divisions of anything as universal or individual is relevant in the empirical realm itself. Being devoid of descriptive content, Brahman is to be identified as one's own self through experience itself. If Brahman is devoid of descriptive content, there may arise the doubt of the relevance of various upanisads which contain numerous sentences. Sankara clarifies that upanisads are not proposed to define Brahman, on the other hand, they help to ward off all false notions inside themselves created by ignorance. The scriptures like 'तस्मै मृदितकषाय तमसः पारं दर्शयति भगवान् सनत्कुमारः' reveal this fact.

B. If the question is put forth against Advaita, there can be these solutions. We cannot refer to things that are not there or that are 'not felt' there. Otherwise we have to refer to the absence of those things with the valid knowledge—अनुपलब्धि or non-apprehension. But Advaita does not deny the empirical existence of this universe and the objects in it.

The act of signifying will occur only when a performer is aware of what it signifies. There exists the subject–object relation (कर्तृकर्मभाव). It cannot be and need not be denied of descriptive content even if it signifies a universal or an individual. It will be of descriptive content when comparatively lower

degree of knowledge (अपरा विद्या) exists in man. But it can be referred to as nothing (mere appearance), that is to say, there will never be subject–object relation and it will be devoid of descriptive content when the supreme Reality is experienced. This is the advaitic concept.

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(d) 'If there were no snakes at all ...'. Reply to query published in the *JICPR,* Vol. XVII, No. 3.

First of all, let me say that such a question will be relevant if the question was re-written into this form—'If there were no snake at all *in this universe*...'

This question aims at the theory of मिथ्यात्व posited by Advaitins. The word मिथ्या is pathetically mistaken by almost all the opponents of Advaita. It is generally mistaken into the meaning of अत्यन्तासत्—non-existent. This fact is clearly explained in the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusudana-Saraswati. A thing can be मिथ्या or false when it is wrongly felt in another substratum. Advaita vedanta cannot be synonymous with shunyavada (in its literal sense) or Atyanthasattva vada, which alone can consider the universe around them as non-existent. That thing can be असत् which cannot be felt in any substratum. Snake is not such a non-existent thing according to Advaita. The whole world is considered as existent in the substratum known as Brahman. When this substratus is identified as one's own essence, one can negate all worldly objects as false and can experience the unlimited bliss in oneself.

Philosophical thoughts and theories are to be formed by living in this world itself. But Advaita teaches that this world cannot be the last resort of men due to its impermanent nature. No one in this world can be regarded as a born Advaitin. By restricting the actions of mind, body and senses one can reach the eternal nature of one's own. It is in fact a state to be identified as one's own self when the ignorance in one's mind disappears.

However this identified knowledge of all-pervaded consciousness and 'I' is not attained, there remains the knowledge of this world and worldly things as more significant. The Advaita philosopher can merely explain the things

as false but he cannot experience their falsity. For, such an experience needs genuine interest and renunciation from the world.

It was never possible to mistake a rope for a snake, if the snake was either unknown to him or non-existent. Foreseeing the possibility of the occurrence of such mistaken knowledge in common man, Advaita put forth such empirical examples to reveal the status of world and Brahman. In the course of empirical livelihood, people have to consider worldly affairs around them as true. Vedanta Paribhasa makes this view clear:

'देहात्म प्रत्ययो यद्वत् प्रमाणत्वेन निश्चितः
लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणन्त्वाऽऽत्म निश्चयात्।'

(The common man does not differentiate body from Atman. Likewise, till the origin of the doubtless knowledge of Brahman, the worldly affairs are to be considered as true.)

The 'I' concept and the concept of indefinable consciousness, bliss and nature of knowledge are the experience of every man beyond contradictions. 'Who am I?' is a question very difficult to answer. Advaita goes into the depth of this question. Though it can be philosophized in this way, the real Advaitin has to keep aloof from snakes and ropes and nacre and silver and has to strive for the attainment of the self-effulgent nature of Brahman, as his own nature.

For the sake of clearing the doubts of opponents and to make the philosophical standpoints more clear, Advaita does not consider it a crime to recognize the empirical existence of the world with its objects. Moreover, misunderstanding in vivid forms is common in the world around us. Every man, including the opponent of Advaita, cannot escape from being subject to any kind of misunderstanding in his life. Hence these kinds of common experiences are put forth as examples.

The above-said facts reveal the relative existence of the world and various experiences in it. Therefore the absence of snake in rope in three tenses does not mean the absence of it being felt in the rope.

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(e) 'Suppose Mr. X realizes the Advaitic Brahman, will he be able to make that claim (not just speak, etc.) by making the statement "*Ahambrahmāsmi*"? Will he be able to tell Mr. Y "*tattvamasi* " and "*sarvam khalvidambrahma*"?'. Reply to the queries of U.A. Vinay Kumar published in the *JICPR,* Vol. XVII, No. 3

The query is concerned with identification and the identifying claim of a realizer of *Brahman* in *Advaita Vedānta*. We know that the case of identification is applicable to the field of individuals and universals that are the objects of knowledge and is significant only for the individuals who know a thing through the knowing process. *Advaitic Brahman* is not an object of knowledge, rather it, for them, is the knowledge itself, which is transcended witness of all the knowledge of the objects. The question of making a claim of '*Aham Brahmāsmi*' and providing justification in the favour of such a claim are significantly possible on the plane of reason and the realizer of *Brahman* transcends that plane. Any such claim and justification are neither logically possible nor required at the level of the realizer. There is no such purpose, for him, to be fulfiled by such claims as his state is *Āptakāma, paramaniṣkāma*. His state is beyond all the linguistic categories. Realization means realization of wholeness. Discriminations and distinctions from others, individuals and universals, do not arise at that plane. The moment we accept that realization is not a state of knowledge, discriminative and distinctive in nature, we will be in a position to know that questions regarding claim of identification of '*Ahambrahmāsmi*' and justification in its favour do not properly arise at the level of the realizer as his is a state beyond the epistemological and linguistic categories.

However, there is no logical need for such an identification of a realizer. This does not mean that the state of the realizer is a state of any kind of disability in any way. It is a state of perfection. It is not denied, in *Vedānta*, that a realizer by proxy can preach '*Tattvamasi*' and '*Sarvam khalvidam Brahman*' for the welfare of the human communities. He can express his realization of '*Ahmbrahmāsmi*' also, not as a part of his egoity but as a simple expression of the state.

Nonetheless, one, by observing his activities based on the sense of non-duality and perfection or by imagination based on text regarding that state, can very well claim the truth of those statements and can furnish justifications and evidences in their favour.

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(f) Observations on the statement of Russell published under the section 'Focus' in *JICPR,* Vol. XVII, No. 3 by (i) N. Mishra, (ii) R.K. Gupta, and (iii) Dani Raveh

(i) A Reply to Professor Daya Krishna's Query Regarding Russell's Moral Defect

In *JICPR* (Vol. XVII, No. 3, p. 179) Professor Daya Krishna draws the attention of the readers towards a statement of Russell which according to the Professor seems strange 'especially as it suggests that the "moral" quality of one's consciousness may affect one's intellectual work'. The Professor perhaps thinks that a person's moral goodness or moral badness has nothing to do with his performing an intellectual job. Surely enough, not only a saint but also a sinner can be a great mathematician.

However, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Indian Edition, Scientific Book Agency, Calcutta, 1985) gives as one of the meanings of the word 'moral' as "of, relating to, or acting on the mind, character, or will". Now, if we take the word 'moral' used in Russell's statement as meaning what Webster has given in his Dictionary, then perhaps there is no strangeness in Russell's statement, not even *prima facie* strangeness.

But there is a difficulty here. Russell himself has used in his statement the word 'even' before his phrase 'my mathematical work'. The implication of the use of the word 'even' should, I think, be that a mathematical work is not affected by any moral quality either good or bad. Even then he says that this mathematical work was affected by a moral defect.

But then one may argue here that there are certain qualities of mind which are very necessary for doing any type of systematic and purposeful work. They are, to name a few, being realistic (not fanciful), being sincere (not undevoted to the task), and being calculative or ratiocinative (not sentimental or not liable to be swayed away by emotions). And because these qualities can be cultivated by a person wilfully, they can quite well be regarded as moral qualities. And lack of such qualities can very well be regarded as a moral lack or a moral defect. Morality, as we know, is related to freedom of will, responsibility, sense of guilt, praise and blame, reward and punishment, etc. Russell has pointed out in his statement that the defect of his mind that affected his mathematical work was his own creation ('allowed myself to fall'), and I think his statement is suggestive of his readiness to own the responsibility and even his willingness to be condemned for it. Perhaps the building up of a frame of mind necessary for doing an intellectual work is

an indispensable and unavoidable duty of the person who wants to undertake such a work. Accordingly, such a building-up becomes his bounden moral duty. And if he fails to carry out this duty, he acquires a moral defect.

But then it may be pointed out here that what has been regarded above as a moral necessity is perhaps just a methodological requirement. Without the qualities of the mind that have been enumerated above, no difficult goal of any sort can be achieved. But only when the goal is a moral goal, the method used for its realization is a moral method; and any defect in respect of such a method will be regarded as a moral defect. Mathematical excellence cannot be a moral goal, because it is not concerned with social behaviour, nor is it concerned with social harmony or social development. Ignorance of mathematical knowledge can permit excuses, but not doing of moral action cannot. No person can be condemned for not writing a *Principia Mathematica*.

So, it is not just *prima facie* but really very strange that Russell has regarded his unrealistic, insincere and sentimental frame of mind to be morally defective in the context of doing his mathematical work. Now, we have two options before us. If we go by Webster's Dictionary, we can reject even the alleged *prima facie* strangeness in Russell's statement. But if we take morality not in its lean psychological sense as taken by Webster, but in its full-blown social sense in which it is usually taken then we shall have to admit that there is in Russell's statement not just *prima facie* strangeness, but real strangeness.

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(ii) Knowledge and Morality: A Short Note

Under Focus I (*JICPR*, Vol. XVII, No. 3, p. 179), Daya Krishna quotes the following statement from Russell: 'By this time I had secured Whitehead's cooperation in this task, but the unreal, insincere and sentimental frame of mind into which I had allowed myself to fall affected even my mathematical work ... . This defect in my work was due to a moral defect in my state of mind' (*The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1967, p. 151). He finds it *prima facie* strange that the moral quality of one's consciousness should affect one's intellectual work. The question which I would like to ask here is this: what exactly is the relation which Russell may have in mind in this place between a person's state of mind

which he may consider morally unsatisfactory and the quality of his intellectual work? A possible answer to this question is that the person's said state of mind produces disquiet in him, and this disturbs his concentration, and this affects the quality of his intellectual work. However, this answer will not do. For it will only show there to be a relation between his lack of concentration, which is an intellectual matter and may be caused by moral disquiet as also in a variety of other non-moral ways, like the loss of a dear one and the quality of his intellectual work, and not between something of a moral kind and something of an intellectual kind. But, then, what other relation may Russell have in mind?

One can talk of different kinds of relations between knowledge and morality. The well-known relations are: knowledge and its use for immoral ends and the use of immoral means for the acquisition of knowledge. I do not wish to go into these at the moment. But there is a kind of relation upon which I would like to spend a little time here. In my paper, 'Knowledge and Morality' (*Gandhi Marg*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 57–67), I have mentioned several intellectual and moral qualities which are presupposed in our pursuit of knowledge; and I have dwelt upon the latter at some length. The intellectual qualities include the following: (i) a person who pursues knowledge should clarify his problem to himself and formulate it as exactly as possible; (ii) he should be as clear, precise, simple and straight as possible in his expression and use no jargon; (iii) be should find out, through his own reflection or discussion or in any other way, the various objections which may be raised against his position and give them due consideration; and (iv) he should accept his thesis, even after he has done his best to confirm it, only tentatively. The moral qualities include: (1) a person who pursues knowledge should make sure that he is interested in the problem which he wants or undertakes to explore; (2) he should be determined to persevere in his work in face of things which threaten to bring it to a premature end; (3) he should allow his work to take its own course and time; (4) he should do his best to understand a point of view which is different and opposite, and even to sympathize with it; that is to say, he should do his best to be tolerant towards such a point of view; (5) he should be ruthless, that is, totally unbiased, in his examination of people's positions, including his own; (6) he should have the awareness that he may have made some or the other mistake in the course of his work, that it is possible that his work is not worth much and that it is not worth much on the whole any way; that is to say, he should be humble about his work; (7) he should be prepared to suffer privations; and (8) he

should allow his work alone, and never considerations of any personal gain, to dictate to him the results of that work; that is to say, he should be entirely objective and unselfish in determining the results of his work.

What Russell may have in mind may bring to light yet another moral quality presupposed in our pursuit of knowledge, or yet another kind of realtion between knowledge and morality.

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(iii) A Short Note in Response to Daya Krishna's Query Regarding Russell's Statement

Under Focus I, Daya Krishna draws the readers' attention to what he calls a 'prima facie strange' statement by Russell in his autobiography, which implies that one's morality affects his intellectual work. I would like to suggest that this alleged anecdote from Russell supports the following contention: Knowledge is derived from and determined by one's 'way of life'. Meaning that since knowledge is a way-of-relating or an act of defining-a-status (as in Śaṅkara's 'This is not a snake, but a rope'), this very way of relating cannot be divorced from the knower. In other words, a person gains a certain kind of knowledge when he becomes a certain being. This might be obvious when dealing with 'spiritual knowledge': in order to know Brahman, one has to become Brahman ('becoming' which is phrased in the first-person mahāvākya 'Aham Brahmāsmi'). This might be 'logical' when speaking of 'anthropological knowledge': to know a foreign culture, one has 'to get into it', to live and experience it, to become (as much as possible) a part of it. But I would like to further claim that the notion of knowledge-as-way-of-life is in fact applicable to each and every kind of knowledge, even mathematical, as shown by Russell. The 'way of life' in our anecdote is what he calls 'state of mind'. What Russell actually says is that a state of mind which he characterizes as 'unreal, insincere and sentimental' and as 'morally defective', had an influence over a certain kind of knowledge, i.e. 'mathematical-knowledge'. His statement implies that in order to gain (or in his case to regain) such knowledge, one has to become real, sincere and non-sentimental. But it can also imply that our state of mind (any state of mind) affects (positively or negatively) the type of knowledge accessible to us. 'Knowledge as way of life' not referring then to an outer lifestyle, but rather to an inner-attitude.

And if the contention sketched here briefly is accepted, then what seemed *prima facie* strange becomes more understandable.

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(g) '*Sabdi Bhavana* and *Arthi Bhavana*'. Reply to query published in *JICPR,* Vol. XVII, No. 3

Professor Daya Krishna asks the following two questions:

(1) What exactly is the difference between *Sabdi Bhavana* and *Arthi Bhavana*?

(2) What is the significance of this difference in the relation between language and action?

In reply to his questions I would like to say the following:

Sabdi Bhavana is consciousness of a word or linguistic phrase used as an imperative. *Arthi Bhavana* is consciousness of the objective to be realized by acting in accordance with the imperative. Thus, the former *bhavana* is concerned with the understanding of language and the latter one with doing an action.

Now, either the two *bhavanas* are distinct from each other, the former coming first and the latter next, or they form one psychosis in which they do not occur separately, even though they can be distinguished from each other conceptually. If we accept the first alternative, we have to answer the question: How does language lead to action? If the second, then we need to answer the question: Can language and action form one psychical whole?

In answer to the first question just raised we may say that when an imperative is heard or received by a person who is already disposed to act very faithfully in accordance with the imperatives of the received type, his mind is automatically activated to form a will to act in accordance with the received imperative. In such a person there is a transition from one state of mind to another.

But in answer to the next question we have to say that the imperative received does not start any thinking process, but straightaway 'triggers' the action. I am reminded here of Stevenson's theory of persuasive function and Austin's theory of performative function of language, and also of what is called the *niyoga*-function of the *Vaidic Vidhi*. What needs to be specially

noted here is that language can through some of its uses influence a person straightaway to act in some specific manner. In such actings there are not two *bhavanas* or consciousnesses occurring successively in the mind of the actor. So, there cannot be in such actings any relation between the imperative language received and the recipient's intention to act. In such actings there is just one consciousness in which what happens is that the language acts. If this phenomenon of language acting appears to be too unrealistic, we can very well say that in such a unitary consciousness the imperative language makes its addressee keenly intent to act in accordance with itself. So, in such consciousness there can hardly exist any relation between language and action. Perhaps any search here about a relation between language and action is a wild-goose chase.

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B. QUERY

The Bhagvadgita on the Problem of Evil

Chapters IX and X of the *Bhagvadgita* are devoted to the enumeration of the Lord's *vibhutis*, which word may be translated as 'manifestation' of divine glories, 'attributes', 'essence', 'perfection', 'type', 'pattern', ideal' of all things herebelow. Chapter IX is entitled by Dr. Radhakrishnan as 'The Lord is more than his creation' and Chapter X as 'God is the source of All; to know Him is to know all'. The Lord is the 'seed and perfection of all that is.' This description recalls to the mind Plato's Theory of Ideas.

The Lord signifies it as his 'sovereign mystery'. Several examples are given which symbolize His divine glory more or less in an imperfect way. While He goes on recounting the manifestations of His divine glories, in verse 36 of Chapter X he makes the sovereign mystery more mystifying. Says He: 'Of the deceitful I am the gambling' (dyutam chalayatamasmi) followed by 'Of the splendid I am the splendour' etc. etc.

The drift of both these chapters is that 'The cosmic process is not a complete manifestation of the Absolute' (Radhakrishnan). Though gambling was a royal pastime, it is mentioned here as the supreme form of 'deceitful-

ness'. This characterization by the Blessed Lord of gambling as the greatest deceitfulness makes this statement fade into and overlap the ultimate question of the origin and status of Evil.

The point defying a resolution is: Since Evil is the Lord's *vibhuti*, it is co-eternal and equipollent with Good and His other *vibhutis*. It is the type and perfection abiding in the Absolute of mundane evil. In that case, can Evil, manifestation of which *vibhuti* is His nature (according to *Gaudpada*), be ever entirely got rid of? Is the human condition, as the Calvinists and Jansenists believe, irredeemable?

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Book Reviews

RAIMON PANIKKAR: *The Cosmotheandric Experience*, Motilal Banarsidass, 1998, pp. xv + 160.

The central theme of the book under review is 'a unified vision of reality', a vision—called *cosmotheandric intuition*—in which the World, God and Man are seen as the three irreducible dimensions of reality. In this connection Raimon Panikkar quotes a text from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad which says that He revealed himself threefold, *sa tredhā ātmānaṁ vyakuruta* (1–2–3) (p. 55). He has coined the expression *cosmotheandric* with the help of three words *cosmos*, *theos* and *anthropos*. He has developed the theme of the book through a study of Man in prehistorical, historical and transhistorical contexts. To him history is to be understood not with reference to any particular culture or age. It is an attempt to look at the present predicament of Man without limiting the attempt to any perspective, ancient or modern, Greek or Brahmanic, Christian or Buddhist. Rightly speaking, the cosmotheandric perspective may be considered as representing an intercultural and interreligious study. It is therefore hailed by Scott Eastham as an 'interdisciplinary study with a firm foundation' (p. viii).

According to Panikkar, the cosmotheandric vision is 'the original and primordial form of consciousness' (p. 55) of which Man was in possession. With regional discoveries, physical and metaphysical, he relinquished this consciousness. He divides the indivisible and rejects from his consciousness all that seems to be incongruous or disagree with the new discoveries. As a result, God is 'deprived of a body, and later of matter altogether' so that he becomes 'spirit only' (p. 57). There is this exclusion in his case also. To give an example from the recent past, man 'first stripped himself of his animality, then his body and senses, and soon enough he put aside his feelings until he became a "thinking rod", a *res cogitans*, and a speaking machine' (p. 58). These are evidently cases of reductionism, one spiritual and another anthropological. The urge to seek the original unity, though clouded by the reductionist tendencies, asserts itself now and then. So 'Man is not satisfied to attain the peaks if from there he cannot at least see the valleys as well.' The entire reality is to be embraced, 'matter as much as spirit, goodness as much as evil, science as much as mysticism, the soul as much as the body'

(p. 57). Thus the cosmotheandric view consists in overcoming all forms of 'overbearing reductionisms'. And this is possible, says the author, only when 'we pierce through our own anthropocentric perspective in the ongoing conquest of the new innocence' (p. 58).

The book falls into two major parts with an introduction and an epilogue, part one and part two having the titles *Colligite Fragmenta* and *The End of History* respectively.

The *Introduction* by Scott Eastham says of Raimon Panikkar that he illustrates the genuine multicultural, multireligious experience. It points out that his vision overcomes 'the lopsidedness of monism or dualism' (p. vii).

The first part introduces the theme of the book by saying that its task is to offer an *open horizon* which is meant to preserve the validity of the present trend 'toward unity and universality, but without closing it up in any single perspective, vision or system' (p. 13). Then it deals with the three major forms of consciousness—primordial, humanistic and ecological, and cosmotheandric. Having thus prepared the ground, the author describes the nature of the cosmotheandric intuition. This contains his essential contribution to the study of Man. Two things are worthy of attention. First, the cosmotheandric vision is described in terms of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* (pp. 61–4). Secondly, the trinitarian relation upon which the vision emphasizes is said to be 'non-dualistic' in nature (p. 74). This is how Panikkar defines the relation: 'God is not only the God of Man, but also the God of the World. A God with no cosmological and therefore no cosmogonic functions would not be God at all, but a mere phantom' (Ibid.).

The second part of the book returns to a deeper analysis of the trinitarian consciousness already dealt with very briefly. The analysis is done under three captions—nonhistorical consciousness, historical consciousness and transhistorical consciousness.

The *Epilogue* closes with an outline of 'cosmotheandric spirituality' which consists, among other things, in the formula—'Service to the Earth is divine service, just as the love of God is human love' (p. 152).

An impartial critic will certainly agree with the standpoint of Panikkar—that Man progresses from a primordial to a new and catholic synthesis. It is a reaffirmation of the conclusion of many contemporary thinkers of the world. In India, as early as the beginning of the last century, Sri Aurobindo (1872–1950) had written extensively on the subject. Particularly his book *The Human Cycle* gives a profound and systematic account thereof. The value of Panikkar's book lies in the fact that it speaks to the western audience in the idiom intelligible to the members.

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N. JAYASHANMUGAM

ANANTA GIRI: *Global Transformations: Post Modernity and Beyond*, Rawat Publications, Jaipur, 1998, Rs 675

The unprecedented scientific and technological innovations in the last decade of the 20th century and its concomitant impact on socio-cultural and individual life, turned topsy-turvy the claims of Enlightenment Reason to liberate humanity from incrustations of obscurantism and place the individual at the pedestal of dignity. As has been the tradition of the Homo Sapiens, new thoughts in variegated forms and at multiple levels have been developed to counter the claims arrogated to itself by previous human mind and so it happened after Renaissance in the West. A plethora of theories centred around civilization and cultures, individual and society, economy and market, local and global and modernity and post-modernity have positioned themselves against the phenomena which has produced and propagated the epistemology and axiology of pure immediacy in which man is cut from both memory and history and has become a victim of the commodification of the self. Ananta Giri's book *Global Transformations: Post-modernity and Beyond* is an attempt to encapsulate various streams of thought in the contemporary era at a single place, evaluate their contribution and attempt to synthesize the developing philosophies with the wisdom that India has in philosophers like Aurobindo and, of course, in its tradition.

Dr Giri, in this book attempts to capture a number of themes ranging from modernity, post-modernity and globalization to tradition, culture and the self; transformations which the world is witnessing at a much faster rate; social movements, which have become significant mediums of social solidarity and human redemption and neo-religious resurrections added to which is the discussion on the redundancy of earlier methods in descriptive sociology and the logic to develop new insights to understand the overarching but traumatic changes which almost every society is experiencing.

Under the canopy of modernity, tradition, culture and self, the author finds obsolete the theory of possessive self as discussed by Macpherson two decades ago and also the theory of the self-aggrandizing individual described by

Anthony Giddens. The category of the self is an ontological category as argued by the author and it is reflective, and has a transcendental identity which inheres the urge for evolution from lower to higher. Self, being both transcendent and immanent is not satisfied with passive recipience of informations designed by other; rather it craves to see the other in itself. Modernity had buried this self into the graveyard of the period considered to be outside the ambit of history. Post-modernism is an attempt to reincarnate that self and, therefore, today's democratic societies need to be conceptually redefined and so the notions of ethics, morality, justice, citizenship and apathy. In this context the author finds the concepts of Discourse Ethics, Communicative Action and Cognitive Distantiation as developed by Habermas as remarkably useful. Equally useful to him is the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo who favoured a spiritual society. It is through the spirituality of Aurobindo that Habermas's humanized society can be established. Thus, he makes humanism emanational from spiritualism.

The theoretical underpinning of the philosophy of post-modernity has been undertaken by the author in Chapter 6 of the book entitled *The Condition of Post-modernity and the Discourse of the Body*. The Cartesian dualism between mind and body paved the way for the sovereignty of reason and the subsequent ascendance of mind over body but its limitations were exposed by philosophers like Wittgenstein, Morly Ponty and Gilbert Ryle. The limits of reason were further discussed in the anthropology of Pierre Bourdieu, and Emily Martin, and the sociology of Anthony Giddens and Bryan Turner. Body, to post-modernists, is not something on which the script of culture and society is written but a constitutive and transformative agency of culture, which is well-articulated in Derrida's concept of 'difference'. It is the body, which differentiates one from the other and retains his/her individuality. Post-modernity aims at formation of a culture of immanence, which embodies human inspiration and wherein the resources of body and memory are in continuous transformation. Every culture has its own language. The linguistic world is full of metaphors. Post-modernism favours the language of metaphors, which show the corporeal and sensible way of recording what the word means. The first language of life is bodily. Metaphors not only show the unity of mind and body but are also closest to the description of reality. Reason, as a uniform category is the source of totalitarianism. With the philosophy of post-modernity, the process of deconstruction of the state and civil society has ushered in the transformation of the political process into participatory democracies. This is visible in social movements and activism, which are dealt with in chapters 1 and 2 of the book.

Social movements are the signals of the decline of faith in the sovereignty of reason. Since the 1960s, the American society has witnessed the emergence of mystical, Christian fundamentalist and evangelical left movements. Challenging the boundaries between religion and science, and state and society, these movements are response to the crises generated by post-industrial transformations in the American society. Religious fundamentalism in the USA seeks to establish early Christianity, which lays emphasis on 'Love', a theme which forms one of the quintessential components of the Christian-ethics and metaphysics. Secularism, Marxism and process of desacralization stand eclipsed today and, religion stands rationalized, making use of advanced tools and technologies to present itself in the public. Spiritual movements are now treated as creative movements.

Social activism in India is explained in terms of popularization of science within a reflective framework. The British uniperialism was a curse in terms of advancement of indigenous science and technology in India. Therefore, science, tailored to the needs of the Indian people is being popularized by Patriotic and People Oriented Science and Technology (PPST), with its headquarters in Chennai. Other organizations engaged in such activity are Muruguppa Chettiar Research Centre (MCRC), which is also located in Chennai, and Bangalore-based Application of Science and Technology for Rural Areas (ASTRA), which is devoted to find innovative low-cost housing technology and new grammars of architecture in the areas of energy, building, agroprocessing and transformation. People's Science Movement (PSM), using traditional languages and mediums for imparting scientific knowledge, is active in identified areas of Madhya Pradesh and appears to be a modern form of 'Bhakti Movement'.

What the author intends to convey is that in India also, which previously derived its ideological pabulum from Marxism, has now discovered alternative platforms for its identity formation and resources mobilization for others instead of going for underpinning of class antagonism and annihilation of enemies of the working class and peasantry. This reveals the failure of Marxist Reason in India.

The scenario of post-industrial transformations or in literary parlance 'the third awakening' is discussed in chapters 3 and 4 of the book. In this phase, the governments are continuing to be market friendly but markets refuse to become people friendly; consequently the democratic system of governance needs to be reviewed. It is a false assumption that representative governments are representative democracies. In fact, they are the communities that are

really democratic as is found in certain Latin American countries where the community encourages creative conflicts and where every individual has the opportunity to participate in the process of conflict resolution, thus providing enabling and conducive conditions for self-assertion and identity formation. The existing gap between nation state and global democracy has lead to terrorism because the individual finds himself lost. To properly locate the individual in the transnational democracy, it has become imperative to re-define citizenship. Citizenship should be representative of the other than the self, a philosophy systematically articulated by Aurobindo in India. The agenda of democracy should be the transformation of self.

Chapters 5, 6 and 10 of the book are concerned with the theoretical issues concerning post-modernity and globalization and its impact on the marginalized groups in society especially women. Essentially these chapters are a critique of the contemporary culture which is the product of contemporary economic structure. The enormities of technological changes, encouraging flexible specialization in economic production and distribution, have made economy and society synonymous. De-industrialization has given birth to new conservatism, adversely affecting the lives of women workers in non-expert sectors. The desire to revolt but their existential inability to do so that has made them victims of psychological disorders. Their comfort, it any, lies in toilets, locker rooms and prayer rooms at the workplace. Its solution lies in discovering a new meaning in nature. Nature as 'prakriti' is activity and diversity. As an expression of 'shakti', nature is the feminine and creative principle of cosmos. In conjunction with the masculine principle (Purusha), it creates the world. The recovery of the feminine principle of 'Shakti' is needed to reintegrate the division caused by contemporary science and technology.

The relevance of the use of methods in the study of today's societies and social processes has been discussed in chapters 7, 8 and 12 of the book wherein the limits of the comparative method are shown through the example of the debate between Louis Dumont and Andre Beteille on the nature of Indian society, studied by the former in his book *Homo Hierarchius*. Dumont found the existence of various hierarchies in Indian society in contrast to equality in western societies. To Beteille, Dumont has given priority to contrast over comparison, to difference over similarity and to discontinuity over continuity. When feudalism had its ascendance in Europe, similar hierarchy persisted because hierarchy is more a theological notion than sociological. Later on Dumont introduced the concept of acculturation in his study on German society which means co-existence of non-modern elements with

modern ones or non-modern cultures with modern civilizations. But Andre Beteille, without appreciating this shift in emphasis, continued the debate on methods oblivious to the fact that this method has lost its significance on account of development of transnationalism as a theme which can be studied not only in the ethnography of the present but also in the archaeology of the past. Theories of nationalism and socialism having collapsed and science of abstraction having been relegated to the background, social science needs to be imaginative and hermeneutical, capable to unfold the sensibilities of others like literature, with self at the centre of its discourse.

The book by the author covering a vast range of subjects fails to discuss even briefly the aetiology of the revolt against the Enlightenment Reason which started with Rousseau and continued upto existentialist philosophers and Albert Camus. In fact post-modernism as a critique of modernity was a much later development. Dostoyevsky in his *Notes From the Underground* had much earlier anticipated the aquiline glance of modernity which would capitalize on the miseries of others. Secondly, the author appears to be zealously optimistic about post-modernity, forgetting that reason is being put into another garb or veil. Hence, its perils cannot be totally overlooked. A similar situation was visible in the '70s when post-behaviouralism was introduced to meet the criticisms levelled against behaviouralism; but it turned out to be a mere will-o'-the wisp. Similarly, it is going to be a long wait to evaluate whether post-modernism is a substitute of modernism or posthumous modernity or a tool to advance the teleology of modernity in the changed cultural milieu. It is possible that an author who attempts to encompass most of the themes of the contemporary world will at some place feel exhausted of theoretical analysis and discuss them elaborately at some other place. One who goes through the book will appreciate it but expect more details and discussions on such sensitive issues as self, culture, tradition and making of social science as sensitive as literature to the question of the self. Further, the reader will also like to know more on how the author is satisfied with combining Habermas with Aurobindo, as the two are like parallel lines; the genesis of the former lying in metaphysics and marching towards unicity with the Ultimate through askesis and the latter's roots lying in the Reason of Modernity targeted to fulfil its unfinished project.

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MUHAMMAD ABDUL SALAM KHAN: *Ibn 'Arabi ka najarya wahdat-i wujud*, pp. 3–56.

The task of systematizing the metaphysical thinking of Ibn 'Arabi and its coherent presentation is difficult if not impossible. This is because Ibn 'Arabi does not present his ideas systematically. His key ideas are found scattered throughout his numerous writings [Osman Yahya's list contains over 800 works]. Few have attempted to systematize his ideas. 'Abd al-Karim al-Jili was one of those closer to the time of Ibn 'Arabi who attempted to systematize his thinking on the notion of the Perfect Man (*al-insan al-kamil*). In more recent times, it was Affifi who tried to give a systematized account of Ibn 'Arabi's Mystical Philosophy, with an attempt to interpret Ibn 'Arabi around the notion of the 'unity of being' (*wahdat al-wujud*). Nothing could be more damaging and reductionistic than this idea taken out of the context of the complex world of thoughts of Ibn 'Arabi and then used as the single hermeneutical tool. All through the works of Ibn 'Arabi, his attempt is to avoid extremes in theology, philosophy and jurisprudence. His genius was in using the extremes as the necessary components of the whole or the entire affair. Ibn 'Arabi was a genius in reconciling contradictory ideas. In such a scheme of things the idea of the unity of being was merely notional. The normative reality of the whole affair was polar containing innumerable sub and sub-sub polarities. Thus, the affirmation of *ahdiya* or *wahdiya* or *wahdaniya* was notional. The realms of the worlds and the Divine Unity were assumed to be normative and eternal.

The author of the work under review states at the outset that he plans to concentrate on a more modest goal of outlining the basic principles of Ibn 'Arabi's thoughts. But what he is attempting to do in the work is to present in a systematic manner Ibn 'Arabi's key thoughts. For this reason, the work has become extremely dense and consequently out of the reach of the common readers interested in theoretical Sufism. It appears to me from my reading of the greatest master that all his life he struggled against the elitism of the philosophers, jurists and theologians. While it is possible to accuse Ibn 'Arabi also of having been elitist, there is evidence that he was concerned about ensuring that his works were widely read. For instance, he presented his complex thought using the existing styles of writing purportedly to ensure that the common masses would understand the message. There is also evidence that his works were circulated widely during his own lifetime just like the thought of the *ikhwān alsafa* (Brothers of Purity). I feel therefore, that

it would have been better for the author, given the modest size of his work, to have concentrated on just one of the aspects of Ibn 'Arabi's works.

Having made these remarks, we may return to the work under review. The author begins with two polar premises of philosophical enquiry in an attempt to locate Ibn 'Arabi in the larger context of philosophy:

1. The realities and their essences exist independent of our perception/awareness of them. The author does not state this but clearly the realities are understood here in the Platonic sense of ideas. The assumption being that human awareness of the realities is subordinate to the realities.
2. The realities do not exist beyond the limits of human awareness. Again one may add that the realities here are understood in the Aristotelian sense. The assumption being that human awareness is what constructs the realities.

The author first attempts to show how the One Reality is related to the universe of multiplicity. The author suggests that the primary supposition of Ibn 'Arabi concerned the absolute and unknowable God-in-himself. It is impossible to even say that it exists or contains potential realities, attributes etc. But since the universe presents itself as a locus of multiplicity and it has been supposed that multiplicity derives from unity, the One Real Essence can be said to contain all the cosmic and human realms' diversities in a potential and haphazard state. It seeks objectification resulting in the manifested realities. Thus there is a connection between the essence and the manifestation. It is this Essential Reality that can be said to pervade all the other realities belonging to the cosmic or human realm. The entities belonging to these two realms are at best the 'examples of the realities' containing the essences and pointing to them.

The author further makes a note of an important dilemma: Humanity is capable of epistemically exhausting the 'examples of the reality', but the essence of the realities and the Reality itself remain remote to human senses and awareness.

The author proceeds to explain how multiplicity issues from absolute unity without affecting its pure Essence. He notes that Ibn 'Arabi posited several possible ways of looking at the Absolute Essence in relation to multiplicity.

i. First in the hierarchy is what may only be described as absolute absence or the absence of the absence. This is the state of pure

essence. It cannot even be called being. Thus no qualities, no diversity—potential or otherwise—could be attributed to it.

ii. Second is the state, which may be called Being or Reality because it is supposed to contain the diversity of realities in their potential state. The Absolute Essence in this scheme can be called the Reality of realities.

iii. Third is the state of the names and attributes existing in the totality. The totality of all the names is designated as the name Allah, which is the name of the names corresponding to the reality of realities.

The realities, names and attributes that exist as potentialities in the Real or Allah are also called 'immutable entities' (*'ayn thabita*) because without them one cannot suppose the engendering of the universe and the notion of the command '*kun*' would not be possible without supposing the diversity of possible realities.

The author also makes a note of the term 'substance' (*jawhar*) [see for details pp. 35–7] in relation to the term immutable entities [p. 26]. The exact nature of the connection becomes clear when it is said that the attributes and thus by implication the immutable entities or the names are the grades of Substance. In this sense Substance is comparable to Allah or Reality. The author repeats the conclusion already stated in the first few pages that the objectification of the absolute essence pictured as the Names or Attributes of the immutable entities is what constitutes the world [p. 31].

The author also makes a note of some central metaphors explaining the process of 'creation'. A brief explanation is in place here for those new to these ideas. A reference to the command '*kun*' was made above. The word '*kun*' is a metaphor that indicates the process of the objectification of multiplicity stated in the traditional language of the creator causing the creation out of nothing. Similarly, there are other categories that explain the process of the 'creation' of the universe. The idea is that of the Reality or Allah experiencing an inner turmoil on account of the non-knowledge of itself. Knowledge presupposes duality, thus an impulse to know oneself necessitates objectification. This process of objectification is pictured as breath blowing out of the Real and collecting opposite the Real in a 'cloud of moisture'. The cloud refers to the stage of the externalization of the hidden or immutable essences where all the multiplicity now lies exposed, and yet together. Since from the point of view of the cloud this externalization now makes it possible for it to know itself and its cause/creator, the Real is called the Merciful and the 'breath' externalizing the immutable essence is called the 'breath of the merciful'.

The author also attempts to show the notion of 'the cloud' is related to some of the other ideas such as 'a containers containing the temporal entities' or 'imagination containing the possible entities' or 'the locus of the manifestation of the cosmic realities' and so on [pp. 32–3]. The cloud is further presented as a reality conceived as going through a series of compound manifestations [p. 34].

In addition to the subject covered above the author deals with the other topics such as the intermediate world, the hereafter, time and eternity and so on. But in all this his fundamental motive appears to be to show how the entire affair is to be conceived normatively as divided into two primary halves in the entire affair containing various sub-levels—the world of singularity and the other the world of plurality. The latter's existence is dependent on the former, for it denotes the interiority of Unity.

Related to the simplified scheme of the entire affair above is the idea of the perfection of the world of plurality. The idea is rooted in al-Ghazzali and is found in Ibn 'Arabi's works like the *insha' al-dawā'ir* [ed. H.S. Nyberg, *Klienere Schriften des Ibn 'Arabi*, (Leiden: 1919)]. This notion has also been commented upon by M. Takeshita in 'An Analysis of Ibn 'Arabi's *insha' al-dawā'ir* with Particular Reference to the Doctrine of the "third entity"', in the *Journal of the Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 243 ff. The author has indicated the idea of the perfection of the world. But the idea has not been developed despite its importance in Ibn 'Arabi's system of thought not least because it shows how the knowledge of the actualized essences or the names denoting the diversity of the worlds leads to the knowledge of the Real. The idea has been variously called as 'the theory of the best possible worlds' or 'the principle of plentitude'. Put simply it means that the objectified universe represents the full and complete realization of immutable entities. This idea also supports the traditional notion of Allah being generous and merciful. If Allah withheld the best from being manifested, He would not be Merciful. This argument is repeated three times in the treatise referred to above. The importance of the theory of the best possible world is, however, in the fact that it is attached to the notion of human knowledge of the Real/Merciful Allah. Since the worlds as they exist are fully realized and the best that was possible, they are the perfect images of the Real. Thus, human knowledge of the entities of the worlds will eventually lead to the Real.

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GOUTAM BISWAS: *Art as Dialogue: Essays in Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*, Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi and D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd., New Delhi, 1995, pp. xiv + 155, Rs 200.

The book under review is an absorbing and stimulating exercise in introducing a novel dimension in our understanding of the nature of aesthetic experience. Phenomenology as a methodological framework was seen as a refreshing alternative to deal with problems in epistemology and social science. It was soon realized that another suitable field for its application was aesthetics. Aesthetic experience, when studied and analyzed in terms of various experiential elements involved, renders itself unhesitatingly to phenomenological approach which claims to understand a thing in its entirety through intuitive method. But the present volume reveals yet another approach whereby phenomenological understanding of aesthetic experience can be further illuminated by placing it within Buberian mould. Professor Biswas, a Buber scholar, has meticulously employed the Dialogical method to explain the nature of art experience and art appreciation. The I–Thou paradigm provides an ideal approach to comprehend art experience at various levels of communication and interpretive and intuitive understanding. The main thrust of the present work lies in explaining the intimate relation between man's consciousness and the art object. The application of the dialogical framework seeks to explain aesthetic experience as a bipolar cognition where consciousness and art object are inseparably united. The reciprocity inherent in such a concept of art experience is comparable to Polanyi's analysis of personal knowledge.

In his attempt to locate the dialogical mode of cognition and interpretation of the art object, Professor Biswas seeks to enter into the world of existentialism, phenomenology and Buberian ideas on the one hand and the thought systems of Indian thinkers like Tagore and Radhakrishnan on the other. The book comprises six chapters: Introduction, The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, Buber's Concept of Art as Dialogue, Michael Polanyi's Aesthetics, Tagore's Philosophy of Art and Radhakrishnan's Phenomenology of the Art. The odyssey into the diverse worlds of thought is envisioned by the persistent theme of a pervasive dialogical interpretation of aesthetic experience. Biswas convincingly argues that thinkers with different philosophical leanings affirm that the transcendental quality of art experience can be best brought out by applying the I–Thou like paradigm instead of explaining it in purely subjective or objective terms. Biswas makes it amply clear that the

notion of dialogue he adumberates and applies to various views and approaches encompasses pre-linguistic, linguistic and translinguistic framework of the relation between man and art (p. 5). Hence, for him 'art experience is dialogue in all its pre-linguistic, linguistic and translinguistic aspects' (p. 6). The second chapter unfolds the logical/conceptual space in which the dynamic interplay of the subject and the work of art can be located. The chapter encapsulates the development of aesthetic theory from the Greek and medieval periods to the modern and contemporary developments in order to bring out the thematic thrust of the work under review. The appropriateness and the effectiveness of the dialogical approach in explicating the nature of art appreciation has been argued with the help of what men like Kant, Sartre, Heidegger, Mikel Dufranne or Roman Ingarden have said.

Subsequent chapters are devoted to analytical exposition of the theories of art of Martin Buber, Michael Polanyi, Tagore and Radhakrishnan with a view to defend the thesis developed by Biswas in the present work.

In his discussion of Martin Buber's concept of art as dialogue, Biswas explains the dialogical mode of intentionality and the I–Thou mode of reciprocity in understanding the work of art which has a reality character. The unique nature of art object is revealed to us as a being in the sense of existential and phenomenological ontology. It is the ontology of human experience which assigns meaning to the ontology of the work of art. Biswas tries to show that art experience is a personal encounter involving existential elements in human experience. It transforms the beholder or listener at every stage of such experiences. The essence of such an experience is the realization of oneness with the object of experience. This brings about a fusion of subject and object. It reminds us of Gabriel Marcel's theory of participation. Biswas' exposition of Buber's position brings it closer to the existentialists and Gadamar. The art object is 'present' to man's consciousness and at the same time man is 'present' to the object and it is this co-presence which gives rise to aesthetic experience. In case of an inanimate object man is capable of turning it into a 'Thou' without man himself becoming a 'Thou' for it. But the aesthetic object is a 'Thou' for man and at the same time man himself becomes a 'Thou' for the former. While experiencing aesthetically the object of art, man 'lives' it and gets transformed by the meaning-content as well as the feeling-content of the experience. It is the result of interactive participation in the being of the other.

Similarly, for Polanyi aesthetic experience presupposes integration with the object of art. The artist and even the beholder through participation

discovers the world or the object he portrays or enjoys and in this process discovers himself as well. Man loses himself in the aesthetic experience only to regain himself with new dimensions added to his being. It is for Polanyi a mysterious or mystical sort of 'meeting' the object in which the two come together in a Buberian dialogical relation.

In his chapter entitled 'Personal Man and Aesthetic Truth', Biswas constructs Tagore's views on aesthetics in a manner which brings it closer to Buberian approach. He also shows with clarity and care how Tagore's position reflects some streaks of existentialist thought. Biswas' admirable attempt to interpret Tagore's philosophy of art in relation to philosophical anthropology adds a hitherto unexplored dimension to Tagore's philosophy. He shows that for Tagore the aesthetic object appears to the artist or the beholder as a wholeness constructed by the co-presence of truth, beauty and harmony. 'This wholeness is a phenomenological construction within a sphere of dialogue between the personal man and the world' (p. 111). Tagore's integral and relational view regarding aesthetic experiences is in consonance with the approaches of Gadamar, Buber and Polanyi.

In the final chapter on Radhakrishnan's concept of artistic knowledge, Biswas interprets his theory of aesthetic experience as non-intellectual based on personal relation with the art object. The integration between knowing and being is the ground on which the intuitive cognition flourishes. Intuition, for Radhakrishnan, is a knowledge of being which transcends the subject-object paradigm of epistemology. Aesthetic experience marks individual man's striving to rise above his insulated existence. Thus man over-reaches his individuality to become universal spirit. Like Tagore's concept of 'surplus' in man, Radhakrishnan's universal spirit establishes a direct communion with the aesthetic reality, transcending the commonsense world or suspending it analogously to Husserl's phenomenological reduction.

The book is indeed a valuable contribution to the philosophy of art. It brings together at symbiotic level various contemporary western and Indian theories and offers a unique approach to the interpretation of aesthetic experience. Moderately priced, it must find a place in the personal collection of every student of philosophy besides of course adorning the shelves of all institutional libraries.

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Shirley Jethmalani: *The Nietzschean Vision of Man*, Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, 1993, pp. 165.

This book by Shirley Jethmalani is the first publication in the University of Rajasthan Philosophy Series and has been published by the Department of Philosophy. It deals with various issues discussed by Nietzsche in his writings, which have a bearing on his conception of man. The author takes into account most of the important philosophical writings of Nietzsche to support her conclusions.

The author thinks that there is an underlying unity in Nietzsche's different philosophical works which is provided by his rejection of life-negating worldviews and an attempt to put forward a life-affirming worldview. Jethmalani thus regards the distinction between life-affirmation and life-negation as central to Nietzsche's thought. Any worldview that defines man's role as obeying an already accepted set of 'objective' or 'eternally given' values and denies him the freedom to create values, is life-negating for Nietzsche. Opposed to this is the attitude of total acceptance and love of life, a 'celebration of life as inherently joyful and powerful' which Nietzsche wishes to support. Neither life's transience, nor its uncertainties, nor the sufferings it causes to man are viewed by Nietzsche as a flaw and for him love of life implies that man should be able to accept them as part of life and instead of complaining about them should try to overcome them.

The book's central concern is to outline Nietzsche's vision of man. This comes out primarily through his distinction between life-negating and life-affirming perspectives, his discussion of the will to power and his ideal of overman or superman. The author divides her discussion in eight chapters. The first chapter discusses Nietzsche's conception of the nature of philosophical enterprise. It concludes that this enterprise for Nietzsche consists in creation of new life-affirming values and is a manifestation of the philosopher's will to power. The second chapter is devoted to Nietzsche's appraisal of the Greek tradition, which brings out his critique of the classical Greek tradition and his endorsement of the Dionysian vision of total acceptance and love of life. Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality and his assessment of the European philosophical tradition are discussed at some length in the third and fourth chapters. Nietzsche looks at Jesus as a rebel and a value creator who challenged the pretensions of the Jewish Church. But he is highly critical of the Christian Church and Christian values of love, compassion, charity and emphasis on a life devoted to obeying divine commands. These

values for him are life-negating and represent a slave-morality. Christianity, according to Nietzsche, is aimed at preserving the life of the weak, the suffering and the defeated. It, like Buddhism, is fit only for the mediocre men. Nietzsche's basic objection against Kant is that he is trying to justify Christian morality. Moreover Kant, in his opinion, has not grasped the true meaning of freedom which consists in the ability to create a new order. Nietzsche rejects Schopenhauer's vision of man also. He feels that it embodies a life-denying attitude because of its emphasis on asceticism.

The author takes up the issue of nihilism in the fifth chapter. We find that the term 'nihilism' admits of different senses. A philosophical perspective that challenges the dominant value system of its time can be regarded as nihilistic. Nietzsche, however, would not disapprove of it. He does reject a life-negating perspective, i.e., one which is nihilistic since it deprives man of the strength and the will to live. A philosophical system that treats this world as unreal and some other world of being as true, or is grounded in the will's self-negation, is also nihilistic for Nietzsche and unacceptable. There is a sense of 'nihilism', however, which Nietzsche finds desirable and in this sense his own philosophy is nihilistic. In this sense it implies the thesis that structure, meaning and values are not intrinsic to the world but impositions by the human will. Nihilism in this sense seems to have a close relation to his conception of man as a creator of values. The next two chapters are devoted to discussion of Nietzsche's conceptions of the will to power and of overman. The importance of the principle of the will to power in Nietzsche's philosophy can not be overstated. Freedom in its true sense is the will to power. It embodies the thesis that a free man is a sovereign. The capacity to overpower resistance, the ability to provide direction to oneself and the power to create new values are manifestations of this will to power. The author by and large moves along the generally accepted interpretation of the idea of the will to power. She does not discuss other different interpretations of this idea here, which regard the will to power not as the urge to dominate others but, for example, as the drive to overcome dualism and alienation or as the urge for power over oneself. Jethmalani does refer to Kaufmann's interpretation in terms of the urge for self-control and self-perfection in chapter eight. She however does not find this interpretation acceptable. The last chapter is devoted to the author's assessment of Nietzsche as the philosopher of the Dionysian vision. She feels that Nietzsche's charge that western philosophy's claim to objectivity is more a myth than a fact has much substance. She agrees with Nietzsche that western philosophers were basically trying to

provide rationalization for the dominant worldview of European civilization. In her assessment, Nietzsche has made a very significant contribution to philosophy by giving a deeper meaning to the idea of freedom and endorsing the Dionysian perspective of love of live.

Nietzsche's conception of what a man should be, that emerges from the discussion of various issues, is of an agent who is free, who loves life with all its vagaries and who has the strength to defy the existing system of values and the capacity to create a new one. Such a man is not a follower but a leader. It is because of this respect for that strength to defy the existing tradition and for human creativity that Nietzsche admires Jesus as a creator of values, though he criticizes Christianity. His conception of the overman brings out this emphasis clearly. Such a man is a manifestation of the will to power through his strength, determination and creativity. He exemplifies freedom in its true sense, which consists not merely in exercise of an option to obey or defy a command, but in creation of values. Such a man has the strength and the determination to annihilate the existing system/systems of values. But even his ruthlessness and destructive urge are desirable because they are a prerequisite of the ability to create new values. This vision of man, it seems, is fully endorsed by the author along with its controversial and non-egalitarian dimensions.

The overman is an ideal but it is clear that most of the real human persons are nowhere near this ideal. Nietzsche is fully aware of this and admits that most human beings exemplify the herd mentality rather than the strength of a creator of values. Nietzsche has only contempt for these. He rejects the principle of equality of men and endorses rank and order. For him men are ranked and unequal and should be treated as such. The domination of lower men by the more powerful and higher men is perfectly legitimate and desirable. A social system that allows this paves the way for emergence of excellence and overman. A society based on the principle of equality and democracy, on the other hand, results in 'dwarfing and degeneracy' of man and turns them into pygmies with equal rights and claims. It is surprising that even such highly controversial ideas and observations are allowed to remain unchallenged by the author.

A reluctance to subject Nietzsche's views to rigorous critical evaluation can be seen throughout the book. One gets a feeling that the author's presentation of Nietzsche is overly sympathetic. Even if the author wishes to endorse Nietzsche's ideas, a discussion of various criticisms levelled against him and their rebuttal would have been desirable and useful. A lot has been

written on Nietzsche, ranging from enthusiastic support to severe criticism of his ideas. A book of Nietsche cannot afford to ignore these. Similarly it would have greatly enhanced the value of the book if while discussing Nietzsche's assessment or critique of other philosophers, the author had also discussed how far Nietzsche's understanding of these is correct and how valid are his objections against them.

Let us consider the features that Nietzsche demands of a life-affirming perspective. It must not devalue this world and human life in comparison to a higher reality. It must not deny man the freedom to create values and it must exemplify a total acceptance and love of life as it is. The conception of man that Nietzsche derives from such a perspective is of a strong, powerful, joyful man having the courage to overcome suffering and a creator of values. It is of a man who pursues the path he himself has chosen with ruthless determination and does not bother if in so doing he has to hurt or subjugate others. The implications of life-affirmation for morality are that any moral system which demands that man should obey an already given set of moral principles is life-negating hence undesirable. The ascetic ideal of withdrawal from life and freedom from desire is also life-negating and unacceptable. Nietzsche's severe critique of Christian morality is based on his assessment that it is life-negating. Its concern for the poor and the meek makes it unsuitable for powerful and higher men. Noble morality equates good with the powerful and the happy, not with the meek and the suffering. The consequences of a life-affirming attitude for social and political system in Nietzsche's opinion are that these should facilitate emergence and growth of truly noble, original and creative spirits, i.e. geniuses. But this demands that majority of ordinary people should work as means for the ends of a select few. Nietzsche takes it for granted that men are ranked and for him any attempt to treat them as equal is life-negating. The higher types or the strong and the powerful have every right to dominate over others and demand subjugation of the weak and the ordinary. Since the will to power is a central principle in his philosophy, Nietzsche conceives of human relations in terms of confrontation and an urge to dominate the other. Emotions like sympathy, love, affection, concern for others etc. have no place in Nietzsche's vision of man as a celebration of human strength, freedom and creativity, even though these may be instantiated in only a select few. It has been sometimes suggested that the drive to overpower the other is not really an expression of strength but of fear. A man not afraid or suspicious of others would not be obsessed with this urge. And fear is something that has no place in Nietzsche's

vision of man. Suppose we accept Nietzsche's contention that this drive is a manifestation of the will to power, it still needs to be shown that power and strength are more valuable than other human and more humane qualities. Another question that deserves consideration in this context is whether a wholehearted celebration of man as a creator of values can at the same time lay down parameters for desirable and undesirable creations say in the realm of moral values. Why must it be deemed necessary that every newly created moral or value system be life-affirming also in Nietzsche's sense? And if such a system is not so, should creativity be given more importance or the principle of life-affirmation? Jesus, Buddha, Gandhi and several others can be seen as rebels. On the one hand, the life of such a person is to be seen as an example, and yet what he accepts may be totally unacceptable on Nietzsche's principles. I feel that there is a certain tension between Nietzsche's emphasis on man as a creator of values on the one hand and his insistence that every value system must be life-affirming.

Jethmalani has totally ignored Nietzsche's views about women. It is important to examine the question whether Nietzsche's vision of man, specially his conception of the overman, has any possibilities for women. Nietzsche makes several derogatory remarks about women in his writings. His remarks in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* are specially relevant because he regards it as one of his best and most profound works and because Zarathustra can be viewed as an overman. Woman there is referred to as 'the most dangerous plaything', as meant only for 'recreation of the warrior'. Her nature is said to be shallow and changeable and she is unable to comprehend the depth and power of man. Her happiness consists in what a man wills, while a man's happiness consists in what he himself wills. Similar remarks can be found in other works of Nietzsche. He thinks of woman as a being who is to be dominated and controlled by men. Her existence is for man's happiness and recreation. She has to be subservient to man so that he may move towards higher things. She is reduced to becoming a man's property with no rights of her own. Her happiness lies in being possessed by man. Nietzsche conceives of man-woman relationship in terms of confrontation and leaves no scope for love and friendship. He not only devalues women but also all those qualities that are supposed to be associated with feminine nature. It is a common practice not to mention a philosopher's views about women while discussing his philosophy. However since Jethmalani's central concern is Nietzsche's vision of man, his views about women are definitely relevant. It seems that Nietzsche does not allow the possibility that a woman may qualify to be an overman.

Nietzsche has been severely criticized for his misogyny, though at the same time some feminists find his ideas of the will to power and transvaluation of values promising from the point of view of feminism.

Jethmalani's exposition of Nietzsche's thought is detailed and takes into account most of his important works. Herein lies the strength of the book. The language is simple and clear and has an easy flow. The style is lucid. Jethmalani succeeds in giving a clear account of a difficult thinker. The book's get up is good. Those who want an introduction to Nietzsche's philosophy would find the book particularly useful.

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RAM SHANKAR MISRA: *The Integral Advaitism of Sri Aurobindo*, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, Delhi, First Edition 1998, pp. 437, Rs 495.

The book, as the author says, was published 'long back in 1957' by Banaras Hindu University and is 'now being republished', in which the author has simply 'modified and developed' the chapter on 'the Logic of the Infinite' and has 'added a few pages' to the chapter entitled 'The Absolute as Existence'.

The author calls the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo as the 'The Integral Advaitism'. For Sri Aurobindo 'does not deny the reality of any of the aspects of Existence. ... It is not based on the denial of the reality of the world and the individual.' And, the reason for it is that the 'contradictions that seem to exist between Brahman and the world seem to be irreconcilable only to the finite or abstract reason' and not to the 'higher reason', which Sri Aurobindo calls the 'Logic of the Infinite'. Therefore, the author says that a 'most notable and fundamental contribution of Sri Aurobindo to Metaphysics and, specially, to Vedānta', is his 'conception of the Logic of the Infinite.' Since the integral knowledge of the Absolute constitutes 'The Logic of the Infinite', the 'concept of Integral Knowledge', says the author, 'provides a solid epistemological foundation to the Integral Advaitism.' Thus, Sri Aurobindo's philosophy is 'the philosophy of Upaniṣads in a new light and in all its integrality and depth.' Besides, Sri Aurobindo's 'theory of individual and cosmic evolution and the conception of destiny of man' constitute 'novel and notable features of his philosophy.'

The author's presentation of the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo in 11 chapters with five parts is very elaborate, systematic, critical and comparative. Almost in all the chapters, there are critical comparisons between the views of Sri Aurobindo and the views of other philosophers, Indian as well as Western. Especially in the last chapter entitled 'A Critical Estimate of Sri Aurobindo's Integral Advaitism', the author's critical comparisons between the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo on the one hand and the philosophies of Rāmānuja and Śaṁkara on the other are very illuminating and thought-provoking.

The book is, thus, a scholarly work on the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo. As also, it is a very thought-provoking work in the field of Advaitism. For, in the light of Sri Aurobindo's detailed criticisms of the philosophy of Śaṁkara, a fresh attempt is needed to understand the views of Śaṁkara about the nature of the Brahman, the world and the Jīva from the original writings of Śaṁkara and to see whether there is really an essential difference between the views of Śaṁkara and Sri Aurobindo and whether Sri Aurobindo's criticisms of the philosophy of Śaṁkara really hold water. It becomes all the more necessary since Sri Aurobindo himself says, in one of his letters, that he did not go through the original works of Śaṁkara and had accepted the conventional interpretation of the philosophy of Śaṁkara.

The Index to the book is a detailed one. And, the printing of the book is excellent.

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BISWAMBHAR PAHI: *Studies in Formal Logic*, University of Rajasthan Foundational Studies: 1, Jaipur.

This book is the inaugural volume in the *University of Rajasthan Foundational Studies* series. It is a collection of papers, all except two of which deal with issues in the metatheory of prepositional logics. Of the remaining two papers, one is about syllogistic logic, the other, written by G.H. Von Wright, presents an overview of its author's career in logic. With the exception of the paper by Von Wright, all of the papers are written by Biswambhar, though he has collaborators on three of them. It is worth noting that Biswambhar is the series editor as well as the author of this first volume. All of the papers in

this volume have been previously presented at conferences, though none of them has appeared earlier in print.

The paper of most general interest is 'A Logician's Itinerary' by Von Wright. This chapter is the written version of the opening address of the Seminar on the Foundations of Classical Indian Sciences of January 1986. The paper presents a sort of roadmap of Von Wright's studies in logic. While there are no new results presented in the paper, it does a very nice job of putting Von Wright's work into a broader context and drawing connections between various stages of Von Wright's career. Von Wright is unarguably one of the most important logicians of the 20th century. His paper is well worth reading by anyone interested in the development of modern formal logic generally or Von Wright's contributions to it specifically.

The second paper was written in collaboration with N.N. Vyas and is on the general topic of syllogistic inference. In it the authors argue against Bochenski that Aristotle appeals to general semantic principles in order to show that certain syllogistic moods are invalid.

The third paper provides an explanation and comparison of the differences between Gödel's and McKinsey's proofs that intuitionistic propositional logics cannot be characterized by matrices involving only a finite number of truth values.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth papers all present constructions of propositional calculi without the finite model property. A propositional calculus has the finite model property if every non-theorem of the calculus is invalid in some finite model. There is thus a close connection between the results of the third paper and the papers of this group. Indeed, the connection is close enough that at the end of the third paper the author is moved to remark that 'philosophically interesting [propositional calculi] invariably possess the [finite model property].' Of course, given this remark we are left wondering why the author devotes the next three papers to constructing propositional calculi which are, by his own admission, not philosophically interesting.

The seventh and eighth papers present bridging results for various modal propositional calculi. Given two modal calculi, a bridging result determines a class of well formed formulae which when added to the axiom base of one modal calculus yields the other. Paper seven deals with bridging systems **K** and **D**. Paper eight, written in collaboration with Lopamudra Choudhury, bridges systems **D** and **T**.

The ninth paper deals with extensions of relevant implicational calculi. Here there are two results. The first result establishes the independence of

the first and second relevant properties. The second result is that a certain method of restricted extension (previously defined by the author) preserves both relevant properties. But here again the author undercuts his own results by noting that 'all the interesting normal [implicational calculi] known to the present writer from the literature either have both the relevance properties or neither of them'. His independence results proceed by 'constructing artificial examples'. With regard to the second result, he notes that it has no non-trivial positive applications at present, and that thus the only non-trivial applications are negative.

The final paper extends Smullyan's analytic tableau method to modal calculi and presents consistency and completeness results for several modal systems using the extended tableau method. This paper is a collaborative effort with R.C. Das.

As the above synopses suggest, the papers in this volume represent neither a broad overview of logic, as the volume's title might suggest, nor a group of findings focused on a single topic. The papers present minor results on a variety of topics, with little or no unifying theme. In fact the only unifying theme to the book is that, with the exception of the paper by Von Wright, it is a collection of conference papers presented by the author.

Still, the book does contain some important insights and many logicians will find something in the book of interest to them. Von Wright's 'A Logician's Itinerary' presents an important overview of his work. The paper extending Smullyan's tableau technique may be of interest to those engaged in teaching modal logic. The paper comparing techniques for demonstrating the non-characterizability of intuitionistic propositional calculi by finite matrices may provide fruitful ground for those wishing to extend these techniques to other areas. Those interested in syllogistic inference, particularly Aristotle's presentation of it, may see the second paper as a useful starting point for study. The remaining papers are less interesting, as the author's own admissions suggest. Nonetheless, logicians studying in the specific topic areas of the papers may find something useful in them, and the author's own deprecatory comments may be somewhat overstated.

Overall, this is a book to be read by those interested in Von Wright's career, and by logicians working in the specialized areas treated by Pahi's papers.

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Reply to Shekhawat's Comments on the Review of his book *On Rational Historiography: An Attempt at Logical Construction of a Historiography of Sciences in India*, published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XVII, No. 2.

A book is something which many-a-times is written with great effort, so it is understandable that an author might feel hurt by a critical reception of it. Therefore, the author's response to a book review is not something that normally deserves a reply. However, in responding to my review[1] of his book[2] Shekhawat[3] has brought in some peculiar points that necessitate a reply.

First, I must reject as improper Shekhawat's suggestion that the book review should have been revised before publication. As a matter of editorial policy, it would obviously be unethical to have book reviews written in consultation with the author, or to ensure that the reviews somehow satisfy the author. Of course, Shekhawat clarifies that he is putting forward this suggestion not out of self-interest, but out of concern for *JICPR*, and refers to 'obvious inconsistencies' in the review (without, however, providing any valid example). However, it is a sad practical fact that institutions are fragile, and numerous institutions in India have been destroyed because of the widespread practice of putting self-interest above institutional interest. Naturally enough, in this process, self-interest was rarely explicitly acknowledged, and various other reasons were usually advanced, though self-interest was very clearly operative in the background. Therefore, without at all meaning to pass a judgement on the motives in this particular instance, and treating these motives as completely irrelevant to the suggestion, I entirely reject the suggestion to revise book reviews as procedurally improper, and bad for *JICPR*.

Secondly, Shekhawat should have responded to the actual criticism stated in the review. Instead, in his response, he casually manufactures a series of opinions for me, without any basis, and follows through with quixotic attacks on these manufactured opinions. It is necessary to correct this. For example, Shekhawat states 'there can be no reason why Raju should accept "social sciences" as "science" and reject the received sciences as "traditional systems of knowledge"'. Where and when have I 'accepted "social sciences" as science'? Since I have not even used the term 'social science' in the review, there cannot even be any possibility of any misunderstanding. In fact, I was, until now, unaware that I had even reached a definite opinion on this question! In any case, I would hesitate to apply sharp demarcations to that large amorphous category of subjects which goes under the proper name 'social science'.

In short, there is not the slightest basis for Shekhawat's statements about my opinions. I do not understand why then he should attribute such opinions to me. Perhaps he has started from the wrong end, with certain stock arguments, and has then proceeded to confound my opinions with the simplistic positions that these stock arguments refute! In any case, attributing opinions to others without caring to find out their actual opinions is not the most ethical way to write a rejoinder. I feel such sophistry is best left to legal wrangles, which concern narrow self-interest, and should be avoided in philosophical discussions which concern, or ought to concern, much larger issues.

My exact position on what constitutes an acceptable scientific/physical theory is not terribly relevant to the review, where I have used the terms 'science' and 'tradition' only as they are commonly used. However, my position is stated separately for the record. At any rate, I certainly do not advocate the simplistic dichotomy between science and tradition that Shekhawat incorrectly imputes to me, and then goes on to attack. Quite to the contrary, in reference 7, I laid out the criteria for a scientific theory precisely to argue that certain key aspects of Indian tradition, such as the notion of *ātman*, are physical, though the counterparts in Western tradition—such as the notion of the soul—may be metaphysical. On the other hand, I think some theories of 'contemporary science', such as quantum gravity, are not scientific theories by the above criteria.

Contrary to the view that Shekhawat attributes to me, my actual views are clearly reflected in my review of Shekhawat's book: my point was that the arguments that Shekhawat advances in support of his proposition are weak and merely hurt the proposition they seek to defend. As an illustrative example, in the review itself I had pointed out that Shekhawat, despite his explicit protestations to the contrary, implicitly accepts a permanent and necessary barrier between science and Indian tradition by uncritically accepting the racist thesis of a Greek origin of all science.

Further, in the review I had even given instances of much stronger arguments that could have been given.

1. There are significant continuities between tradition and science, as e.g. between the *Yuktibhāsā* and the 'Newtonian revolution'.
2. There are parallels between tradition and science, as e.g. between action by contact in the *Nyāyā Sūtra* and the debate over action by contact in quantum mechanics.

The point was that, such specific continuities and parallels would better illuminate the relation between tradition and contemporary science, which it is Shekhawat's stated aim to connect. However, Shekhawat avoids all such particulars, presumably because he has never engaged extensively enough with 'contemporary science'.

Thus, my criticism of Shekhawat's book concerned not so much the thesis that he is ultimately defending, but the *way* in which he defends the thesis. Therefore, also, inventing positions for me, and attacking these positions is hardly the relevant way to respond to the criticism of his book stated in my review.

In fact, my other criticism of Shekhawat's book was that instead of entering into any such specific and substantive issues, Shekhawat's entire strategy is limited to quibbling about the meaning that ought to be assigned to words, and he proceeds by adjusting and redefining a variety of terms, 'science', 'paradigm', 'axiomatic method', 'theorem', 'fact' etc., in ways that suit him, though the redefinitions naturally tend to become diffuse, ambiguous, and idiosyncratic in view of the conclusions that the redefinitions must ultimately support!

There are obvious problems with Shekhawat's strategy of focussing on quibbles and avoiding substance.

First, a continuity between two things cannot be established merely by changing or attempting to change the usage of some words. Second, even where a substantive continuity does exist, e.g. between a horse and a mule, one is unlikely to be able to sell a mule, except to a gullible customer, simply by insisting that it ought to be called a horse. On the other hand, calling a mule a horse tends to conceal germane differences between them. Thus, I believe key differences do exist between the philosophy of mathematics in Indian tradition, and in the current philosophy of formalistic mathematics deriving from the European tradition of rational theology, I believe these differences are of current importance, and, in my review, I mentioned these differences in passing by referring to the 'epistemological discontinuities' in the calculus in Europe.

To be quite explicit, my reference[4] was to Newton's *ritualistic* use of the axiomatic method to assimilate an imported mathematics with a different epistemological idiom. Therefore, it is rather amusing that Shekhawat responds to my criticism by citing Newton's use of formalism as authoritative! It is, in fact, quite like citing Newton's authority to permit an author to review his own book! (As president of the Royal Society, Newton chaired

the committee which enquired into Leibniz's allegations of plagiarism against Newton, he wrote the 'impartial' report exonerating himself, got it published, and himself reviewed it anonymously, afterwards writing in his diary that what he did quite broke Leibniz's heart.)

I should add, however, that one can nevertheless distinguish between degrees of ritualistic usage: despite Newton's failed attempt to axiomatize the calculus, the calculus could eventually be successfully axiomatized 200 years later. A school student of science performing practicals ritualistically and mimetically is another case in the point: the practicals could, in principle, be performed differently. However, Shekhawat has reduced the axiomatic method to the ritual of merely uttering (or writing) the words 'theorem' 'proof' etc., and he justifies attaching these labels to his opinions by quibbling that history is not mathematics, so that these terms must have a different meaning in history. This labelling strategy hardly merits a discussion: what Shekhawat calls a 'theorem'—that 'Arabic-Persian-Turkish culture ... was not cognitively competent'—is something that I would call a raw prejudice. To avoid further quibbles, let me state quite explicitly that he is, of course, free to apply any labels he wants, just as much as others are free to take his labels non-seriously and to consider them unworthy of discussion. That history is not mathematics ought to be a ground to avoid formalization of history, and not an excuse for the lack of rigour in an attempt to capture the labels and authority of formalization.

Incidentally, I also do NOT hold the opinion which Shekhawat attributes to me, that axiomatization should be reserved for 'Euclidean' geometry. Shekhawat 'redefines' my opinions as arbitrarily as he attaches the label 'Theorem' to his own prejudices, but I have earlier expressed the opinion that Hilbert's attempt to axiomatize 'Euclidean' geometry has been unsuccessful![5] In fact, at the recent East-West conference in Hawai'i, I expressed the opinion that mathematics itself should not be axiomatized, that it should be de-formalized, and de-platonized, and that the empirical should be introduced into it.[6] I am currently working on this, and I plan to give a summary of this argument in the *JICPR*, at a later date.

A final point on the matter of quibbles. A word, such as 'science' refers to something in common discourse, in a context. While I accept redefinitions as permissible (so long as these redefinitions pertain to words and do not extend to my opinions!) a redefinition of the term not quite informed by its common usage in the philosophy of science can easily become a misrepresentation. It is one thing to insist that a mule should be called a horse, it is

altogether another to do so because one is unaware of the way in which people commonly distinguish between the two!

Thus, as I pointed out, on Shekhawat's definition of 'science', '... there is no longer any *essential* difference, such as falsifiability, between science and traditional metaphysics ...'. Apart from his general views on the place of tradition in the history of science, Shekhawat does not inform us why he holds the opinion that there ought not to be any difference between physics and metaphysics. Nor does he inform us about the reasons for the failure to observe the usual distinction between a formal theory which is metaphysical and a scientific theory, which is physical. For, even in his response, Shekhawat states that 'if we gloss through some works on the history of Greek science, for example, it will be found that they considered Ethics, Politics, and Economics also as science (episteme) and moreover they thought that these could be axiomatized on Euclidean geometrical model.' This remark, on the face of it, confounds a formal theory with a scientific theory. Shekhawat seems unaware that a theory which can be axiomatized, like 'Euclidean' geometry, is a formal theory, and *hence* NOT a scientific theory.

A formal theory deals solely with tautologies, and the criterion of (logical) falsifiability is precisely that a scientific theory is one which is prepared to deal with non-tautologies, which is prepared to stick its neck out, and which is prepared to be proved to be false by empirical circumstances. Hence, also it is expected that those who claim that some or all aspects of tradition are scientific, are required to indicate the conceivable circumstances under which they would accept the tradition as FALSE. They are required to put the tradition to empirical test. This is a central expectation that cannot be easily bypassed; the aim of Popper's criterion is precisely to block the quibbles and silences with which people hang on to a variety of beliefs. One might have reservations about Popper's criterion (I do), but that does not detract from the central point that one empirical test is worth a thousand quibbles.

Moreover, the point of Popper's criterion is that a statement such as 'All swans are white' may *seem* to have something to do with the empirical, though it actually does not when it is combined with quibbles about whiteness being the essential nature of swans. Unfortunately, there is not even a single case in which Shekhawat cares to depart from the safe ground of authorities and quibbles, to the risky ground of empirical tests. Is this why Popper does not appear in the book's index? This avoidance of the empirical incidentally ignores also the method of validation in Indian tradition where *pratyaksa* is

the one *pramāna* accepted by all schools of thought. Naturally enough, Shekhawat also sidelines those Indian traditions which have dismissed the authority of the Veda etc. as unreliable, and proposed a reliance solely on *pratyaksa* or on *pratyaksa* and *anumāna*.

Incidentally, to my knowledge, the first and last mention of 'Euclid' the geometer, in early Greek sources, is confined to a stray remark by Proclus in the 5th century CE. Therefore, could it be that the relevant 'some works' on the history of Greek sciences that Shekhawat has 'glossed through' really rely upon the 14th and 15th c. CE Byzantine Greek sources which translated from the Arabic originals into Greek, like Ibn as-Shatir's text on heliocentric planetary orbits that Copernicus translated from Greek to Latin?

APPENDIX: CRITERIA FOR A SCIENTIFIC THEORY

For the record, my position[7] is that a tentatively acceptable scientific theory should satisfy the following criteria: (i) internal consistency, (ii) brevity, (iii) (logical) refutability, and (iv) external consistency, in the sense of (v) maximum likelihood. As explicitly specified in reference 7, there are a number of caveats, so that my usage of these terms differs somewhat from the common usage. Thus, for example, internal consistency still means that not every statement should be both true and false, but I do not assume, a 2-valued logic by default, so that inconsistency is NOT equivalent to A ^ ~ A: Schrodinger's cat CAN be simultaneously both alive and dead, as in quasi-truth functional logic which I have suggested as the basis of quantum mechanics.[8] Inconsistency for me simply means triviality, or a theory in which every statement is both valid and invalid.

Again, I disagree with Popper's attempted resolution of the problem of induction. Popper is quite right that probabilities (in Kolmogoroff's framework) are not ampliative. However, in practice, one never knows probabilities, since one only has estimates of probabilities, and estimates of probabilities may be ampliative. The principle of maximum likelihood is simply a commonsense rule to reach practical decisions in an inductive situation. Obviously, 2 experiments against, and 12 experiments for violation of Bell's inequalities provide better ground to believe in the violation of Bell's inequalities than do 2 experiments for, and 2 experiments against.

By these criteria, many current theories, such as quantum gravity, do not qualify as scientific theories. Also, neither Newton's laws of motion nor

Newton's law of gravitation, by themselves, constitute a scientific theory in the above sense, though the two put together do.[9]

Finally, there is a key caveat about the criterion of falsifiability: it is my stated position that all the above criteria (logic, refutability ...) for a scientific theory depend upon the nature of time, and that the assumed nature of time in the physical theory should be consistent with the nature of time assumed to decide whether the theory is physical. Thus, one may need to modify either the criteria or the picture of time.

To take a concrete example, the Buddhist position which accepts *pratyaksa* and *anumāna* as the only *pramāṅa*-s while formulating a new picture of time in the theory of *paticca samuppāda*, provides a picture which I regard as being overall consistent. To take another concrete example, with the above criteria for a scientific theory, overall consistency requires a change in the picture of time, or a modification of the present-day understanding of physics, for example along the lines that I have suggested of using mixed-type functional differential equations of motion. This latter proposal is still in the process of being empirically tested.

Though I have used the term 'scientific theory' in the above paragraphs, I would prefer to substitute it with the term 'physical theory'. Also, despite the above definition, I would continue to use the word 'science' the way it is used in common parlance, the particular sense in which the term is used being clear from the context.[10]

The classification of theories as physical or metaphysical is NOT primarily a methodological classification, and one could arrive at the primary hypotheses of the theory by any method—by dreaming or by referring to some scriptures or by observing natural phenomena.

Notes and References

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4. Aryabhata group (C.K. Raju & Dennis Almeida), 'Transmission of the Calculus from India to Europe. Part I: Motivation and Opportunity', and 'Part II: Documentary and Circumstantial Evidence'. Papers presented at the Aryabhata Conference, Trivandrum, January 2000.
5. C.K. Raju, 'How Should "Euclidean" Geometry be Taught?' Paper presented at the International Seminar on History of Science: Implications for Science Education, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, February 1999. Also, C.K. Raju, 'Interactions between India, China, and Central Asia in Mathematics and Astronomy'. in: A. Rahman (ed.) *Interactions between India, China and Central Asia*, PHISPC, New Delhi, forthcoming.
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7. C.K. Raju, 'Time in Indian Traditions and Time in Physics', in: *Mathematics, Astronomy, and Biology in Indian Tradition*, (Eds) D.P. Chattopadhyaya and Ravinder Kumar, PHISPC, New Delhi, 1995.
8. C.K. Raju, *Time: Towards a Consistent Theory*, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 1994. (Fundamental Theories in Physics, Vol. 65).
9. C.K. Raju, 'Newton's Time', *Physics Education*, **8**, 15–25 (1991).
10. Discussion and writing would become extremely awkward, if one had to specify each time the precise thing one is referring to. Though there are obviously many Newtons in the world, the Newton referred to is clear from the context. Therefore, in natural language, one normally assumes that the reader is informed enough to sort out whether 'science' means 'the term science in common usage', 'scientific theories according to Popper's criterion of falsifiability' or 'science according to Shekhawat's redefinition'. This practice extends also to formal languages: e.g., the statement 2 + 2 = 4, does not explicitly specify whether 2, +, and = refer to natural numbers, or integers, or rationals, or reals. Even in formal languages, used in current-day computers, like C++ and Java, where there are substantive and non-trivial differences in the way these categories of numbers are treated, this practice is permitted to enable clearer programming, and is called 'overloading': it is extensively used, for example, in the code for the common Windows operating system.

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The Indian Philosophical Congress

On behalf of the Indian Philosophical Congress, we extend to you the cordial invitation to attend the 76th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress which will be held at Gurukula Kangri Vishwavidyalaya, Haridwar from 29 October to 1 November 2001, under the presidentship of Professor S.B.P. Sinha, retired Professor and Head, Department of Philosophy, B.R.A. Bihar University, Muzaffarpur.

The Vice-Chancellors are requested to send delegates from their universities to this Session.

For accommodation and other matters relating to their stay and detailed programme of this Session the desirous persons are requested to contact the Local Secretary, Professor Jaidev Vedalankar, Head of the Department of Philosophy, Gurukula Kangri Vishwavidyalaya, Haridwar, by September 30, 2001.

Various categories of Membership fee of the Indian Philosophical Congress are as follows:

Life Membership	Rs. 800
Annual Membership	Rs. 100
Student Membership	Rs. 50

The Membership fee has to be sent through a/c payee Bank draft drawn in favour of 'The Indian Philosophical Congress' payable at New Delhi, to the Treasurer, Dr U.S. Bist, Department of Philosophy, Gurukula Kangri Vishwavidyalaya, Haridwar 249404. All delegates and the accompanying persons will be required to pay membership of the Congress, if they are not life members. The Treasurer will issue membership receipts and Railway Concession Forms on demand. Outstation members attending the Congress can avail of the Railway Concession to the extent of 25 per cent in the 2nd class/sleeper class provided their total emoluments/earnings do not exceed Rs. 5,000 p.m. and the distance to be travelled exceeds 400 km each way. This concession is not available for travel by air-conditioned/ first class. Members fulfilling these requirements and wishing to avail of rail concession should write to the Treasurer along with a certificate to this effect from head of the institution where the person is working.

Neatly typed full length papers to be presented should be sent to the Joint Secretary, Dr R.S. Vyas, Head of the Department of Philosophy, M.L.S. University, Udaipur 313001 (Rajasthan) along with the summaries latest by 31 August 2001. The length of articles should not be more than eight pages and that of the summaries half a page. The papers transgressing this limit will not be published. Full length articles and abstracts should be sent in duplicate along with proof of membership of IPC. This is a prerequisite for acceptance of the papers.

The essays for B.N. Seal Memorial, S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri and Bhavananda Datta Memorial Essay Competitions on the topics suggested below should reach the Joint Secretary, Professor Manjulika Ghosh, Professor of Philosophy, North Bengal University, Darjeeling 734430 (West Bengal):

B.N. Seal Memorial Essay Competition:
Message of Lord Mahavira

S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri Essay Competition:
Women's Empowerment

Bhavananda Datta Memorial Essay Competition:
Role of Youth in Curbing Corruptions in Society

The students willing to participate in the essay competitions are required to send their essays in duplicate along with the proof of membership of the Congress.

Teachers and students of Philosophy and all interested scholars are welcome to get themselves duly registered for participation in the Congress. They are requested to pay a sum of Rs. 700 as registration fee to the Local Secretary. A Research Scholar or a student will pay only Rs. 375 as registration fee on the production of a certificate of proof of his/her studentship from the head of the institution.

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Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

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Forthcoming

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ	ā
ई	ī
ऊ	ū
ए,ऐ	ē } (long)
ओ	ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ	ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as r̄)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ्	ṅ
ञ्	ñ
ण्	ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च	ca and not cha
छ	cha and not chha

Linguals

ट	ṭa
ठ	ṭha
ड	ḍa
ढ	ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श	śa
ष	ṣa
स	sa

Unclassified

ळ	ḷa
क्ष	kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ	jña and not djña
ऌ	ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā*, *jñāna* and not *djñāna*, *Kṛṣṇa* and not *Krishṇa*, *sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ன	ṉ
ழ	ḻ
ண	ṉ
ற	ṟ

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa),

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:

e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai

Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:

e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence

coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:

e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*

veve or *véve* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.

(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for

laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:

Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:

Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it): next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.